THE REFUTER REFUTED.  
OR Doctor HAMMOND'S 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 DEFENDED, Against the impertinent Cavils of Mr. HENRY JEANES, Minister of God's Word at Chedzoy in .  
BY WILLIAM CREED B. D. and Rector of East-Codford in Wiltshire.  
LONDON, Printed for R. Royston, and are to be sold at the Angel in Ivy-lane. 1660.   

Mr ROYSTON,  
I Have received four of the Refuter Refuted, which I have spent some time in; and by all that I have read, find it excellently well done; and doubt not but it will find Readers of all into whose hands you can put it. I wish the success of this may encourage him to make himself known on other occasions and subjects, for surely he is a man of excellent learning and parts. I judge much better of it now then I did by the little I read at your house. I am  
Your true friend, H. H. Westwood, Novemb. 29. 1659.   

To the Learned Doctor H. HAMMOND, Health.  
SIR, whosoever I am, is not much material to know. I humbly beg your Pardon for intermeddling with your Quarrel, without your Privity and Knowledge, which you, of all men, are best able to maintain without Abettors or Assistants. And I hope you will look upon it only as an Error of Love, that I should presume to answer that Pamphlet, which yourself had so severely condemned to Neglect, and resolved to confute only by your learned Silence. For all the world knows how speedily you could, if you pleased in so just a Cause as this, have set forth a rejoinder, because you have already so soon answered far abler Adversaries than this Refuter, whatsoever Opinion himself and his Friends have of his Scholastical Abilities.  
Indeed it was my desire, and in my own Judgement it would have been more for my interest and quiet, if I had been silent, or at most served only as an under-workman to have fitted and prepared Materials for an abler Artist to have raised a more lasting Monument and Obelisck to your Name and Memory. And so conscious I am to mine own Weakness and inabilities to endure the Wind and Sun, and so little thoughts I had, when I first set upon this Business, of doing any thing for the Public, that now all is finished and exposed to the world, I cannot but wonder that it could be drawn from my Retirement, to run so hazardous a Course. And howsoever I may be concealed, yet I cannot but frequently blush at the many Censures that will pass upon the Unknown Author, though no man speaks, or thinks of me.  
But now such as it is, I humbly throw it at your feet, not for approbation and applause, but for pardon and patronage. It has nothing to commend it but the cheerfulness of the Oblation. It is no ambitious nor covetous Exhalation, but a perfect Nidabah and Free will offering of Love. And such I doubt not will be acceptable. It was this alone that made the poor Widows two mites a richer present to the Corban then the Gold and Silver talents of the more wealthy but less willing Votaries: and the very Heathens could smell, that one grain of this Incense made a sweeter Perfume in the nostrils of their gods, than the greatest clouds of smoke that arose from other Hecatombs.  
But you well may wonder how a Defence of two sheets should swell into such a Volume, and what strange overruling Influence should raise a Cloud of a hand-breadth to fill and overspread the whole face of Heaven.  
And the very truth is, Sir, I myself am much astonished at the Bulk, now all is finished. But I shall give you my Reasons, that made the work to enlarge thus insensibly under my hands.  
Sir, you have an Adversary more Confident than strong; one that (as I could tell you from credible information) does not only Publicly brag that he has made you a Dunce, but in every Sermon almost of note that he makes has one Use of Confutation against the learned D. Hammond: Nay that his ordinary Country Lectures, and Homilies to the People are full of such Ovations, and not the meanest Pulpit round about him, but has been turned into a Divinity Chair, where Professor-like, he has disciplined, and arraigned, and condemned you in a Scholastical way.  
But I insist not on Report, it is his Pamphlet I fix on. That you, and the world may see, I do not wrong him (especially because he 
† It is my desire and purpose, to have fair wars with you, and my Pen shall not drop a disrespective syllable of you. pag. 17. I hope it may contend with your reply for Civility and fairness in carriage of the Controversy between us, pag. 39  professes Respect) I shall here, with your Patience, give you in a short List of his Fair and Civil usage.  
First then, in a sarcastical Irony and Jeer, he calls you great Critic, that is in plain Terms, an empty whiffling Grammarian, and says, he is 
a Pag. 10.  loath to enter into a Contest with so great a Critic, as yourself, touching the meaning of a word. And what is it? The poor English Monosyllable, Mince.  
Then in the very same Section he ranks you among the number of those 
b Pag. 10.  erroneous Persons (no less than Heretics without doubt) that in the first broaching of their Errors Mince the matter and speak more Cautelously, then afterwards, when they are fleshed, and encouraged with success.  
Next he tells you (and in the very same breath where he professes Respect) that he is 
c pag. 17.  resolved to swallow none of your Proofless dictates; and that 
d pag. 15.  you must pardon him if he entertain not your vehement Asseverations, as solid Arguments, as if they were Propositiones per se notae.  
But he has hitherto used you kindly. For in another place in plain terms he challenges you 
e pag. 19  to show any thing for the justification of your Tenent from any Schoolman to be had in Pauls-Churchyard, or at least in the Library at Oxford, the great Bodleys' Library.  
And as if this had been too little, again he tells the world, that he is 
f pag 37.  confident that no learned man, either Protestant, or Papist did ever ascribe such growth to the Ardency of Christ as (you) this Replyer does.  
Then almost in every Section he slyly questions 
* Pag. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 34, 37, 38,  your Philosophy, and Logic, and skill in the Art of Reasoning, and Syllogism, or says 
† Pag. 6, 9, 11, 12, 16, 18, 21.  you are impertinent, and speak little sense or 
* Pag. 3, 13, 14, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 35, 38, 39  scornfully puts you to learn, what you are yet ignorant of, from such a place in Scheibler, and Suarez, in Thomas, or Scotus, in Petrus Hurtado de Mendoza, Capreolus, Albertinus, Raunandus, and Collegium Complutense, (hard names, and that make a deep and reverend sound in our English ears, not acquainted with such charms,) and this with such slighting behaviour, as if you were some Novice or Freshman in the Schools, and knew not how to speak, but in a Critical way.  
But, what is worst of all, he craftily accuses you as a Factor for Popery and broaching such doctrines, that 
●a. ●9, 30, 31.  the Protestants generally oppose in Bellarmine and his Complices.  
Nay he is not ashamed to charge your Doctrine, as if it were little less than 
* Pag. 27.  Heretical, and speaks in plain terms that your Assertion is 
* Nay not only Aquinas, but generally all the Schoolmen and Civilians too, are so precise in this Particular, as that among the Degrees of Damnable Propositions are ranked by them, not only Propositions downrightly Heretical, but also, Propositio sapiens Haeresin, Propositio male sonans, every Proposition that doth but smell, that hath but a smack of Heresy, that sounds but ill and suspiciously &c. Mr. H. Jeanes of Abstinence from all Appearance of Evil. 8o. Oxon. 1640. p. 34, 35. and for this he quotes Albertinus, and Alphonsus à Castro. vid. loc.  Propositio male sonans, harshly sounding in the ears of Christians, that are jealous of their Master's honour, and that now (since his Resutation is published) he hopes it will be ingeniously confessed by yourself upon a review of it.  
And then (for a close) he declares in his very Title Page that he has proved it to be utterly irreconcilable with the 1. Fullness of Christ's Habitual Grace. 2. The Perpetual Happiness, and 3. the Impeccability of his Soul.  
I confess at first reading I was troubled at this usage: but since I see it is the Mode of confuting D. Hammond. And therefore finding the Adversary Confident and Scornful but withal very weak, I resolved to display both his Ignorance and Folly to the view of all, even the meanest spectators. Nor could I in Justice do less to one, that had so unworthily handled you, without any Provocation.  
Indeed what course was else to be taken to answer such severe, but uningenuous Criminations? Should I only have tamely replied, that I had well weighed your Reasons and considered his Replies, and carefully consulted the Authors he refers to, and had found he was mistaken, and so left him to a further Proof and Confirmation of his Objections? I confess that this had been a very short way, and satisfactory enough. For by the Laws and Rules of Disputation, nothing more is required of the Respondent but to deny, or distinguish, where he sees cause, or else plainly to grant the Argument: and the Opponent (whose place your Refuter evidently sustains) is bound to prosecute his Objection, till he make the Defendant to yield to the force of his Reason, or by Distinction to show that it concerns not the Question. But then withal I considered, that if I should have taken this course, I should have said little, to the greatest part of Readers in your Apology and Defence.  
For first, I saw that his Reply was Printed (I suppose with Licence and Approbation of the present University) at Oxford. And then secondly, I understood that he had many Admirers, especially among Country Divines, and young Students, for his skill in School-learning now a stranger among us. And thirdly I considered, that he being a writer of tall Name, and strong repute among many, I should have gained nothing but contempt among them, for such Answers; and that the Denial of a Nameless Author, without Credit, and without Fame, would not at all have Balanced against the weight of so valued a Schoolman. But lastly, which most moved me, I was not ignorant, that as the Books he refers to, were very rarely to be had, especially in Private Studies, so even those, that had them, would rather have believed his suggestions, against mine, then put themselves to the Trouble and Expense of consulting and perusal of Authors, to umpire the difference. And therefore I judged it necessary for the Readers satisfaction, and the full defence of that Truth you maintain, to lay down the Author's words at large, and clearly thence prove either his prevaricating or mistakes.  
And this is one main Reason of the increase of the Bulk.  
A second Motive that drew me to this length, was my unwillingness altogether to spend time in the unprofitable discoveries of an other man's errors, but I rather desired to be didactical and instructive. And therefore where I saw reason, and the argument was profitable and material, I let my pen run beyond the ordinary limits of an elenchticall discourse. And because I saw little or nothing as yet said on either side, to explain the nature of that ardency and love, which was the subject matter of the Dispute, I resolved, as occasion offered, to state it as clearly, as I could, and to my poor abilities open the true nature of it, that so the Reader might be satisfied in the business of the Controversy, and not altogether lose his prospect after the substance, amidst the clouds and smoke of contention, but aswell discover the full lineaments and pourtraicture of that truth, you maintain, as the mistakes of your adversary, and his false shapes and phantasms of it.  
A third Reason was because I found your Refuter, having upon the matter done with your 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, fall to oppose your Doctrine in gross, by Arguments drawn from the fullness and perfection of Christ's habitual grace, his perpetual uninterrupted happiness and impeccability, and from thence had largely digressed to censure a passage in your Treatise of Will-worship, about the sense of the first and great Commandment of Love, and this I must confess made me willing to amplify and digress, as well as he. Nor have I only contented myself to answer his Arguments, and acquit and vindicate your Doctrine from the corpse aspersions thrown upon it of Popishly affected, but in a Scholastical way have treated of the Themes themselves, as well as discovered the gross ignorance of your Adversary. And because his discourse lead me to consider those high and noble Themes of the Love of God, and perfection both Legal and Evangelicall, as also Christ's two fold state of Comprehensor and Viator, I was willing to treat of them with that Industry and care, as so weighty Arguments deserved, and have as well Didactically as Eristically considered them. And withal upon occasion where M. Jeanes and M. Cawdrey did agree upon the same common principles of opposition to you, I have (though contrary to my first design and aim) fallen upon a vindication of some passages in your Tract of Will-worship, which M. Cawdrey and he had censured, and upon that occasion also I have cleared and confirmed divers passages in your Account to the Triplex Diatribe.  
And then, which is the last great Reason of the bulk of this Discourse, I have taken occasion to prove the Invariability, of God's love, and to demonstrate that it is no changeable transcendent quality, but one immutable and substantial act against Crellius and the Socinians, and yet withal declare how God notwithstanding this, is, and may be said to love some more, and some less. I have spoken also of the nature of Acts and Habits, in order to that habitual and actual love of Christ the main business of the Controversy; I have proved and confirmed the fullness of Christ's habitual grace; I have treated of his merits, and the nature of his sufferings, and the greatness of them in his bloody agony; of his twofold will; and how as God-man he was in capacity to pray; of his ardency in prayer, and how he might earnestly desire a removal of that cup, which yet he came to drink off. I have treated also of the several kinds of love agreeing to him, as viator and comprehensor; of his zeal and hope, and trust in God, and shown what love of concupiscence and complacency in him was capable of increase, and how all these are different from ardency in Prayer. I have also taken occasion in order to M. Cawdrey but with some reflections on M. Jeanes to treat of counsels Evangelicall, and Gospel-freewill-offerings, of perfection of life and perfection of state, of works of supererogation, to speak of original sin, and the opinion of S. Austin in it; of Man's threefold state; of growth in grace; of different degrees in glory; of the inequality of the Saints and Angels love of God in heaven; and of Adam's possibility of proficiency in grace in the state of Innocence; of lukewarmness and sincerity; of justification, and of the difference of the two Covenants, and Man's several obligation under them, with other points of this nature, together with some Metaphysical and Philosophical notions interspersed. All which as they are themes of high nature, and would not admit of a running discourse, so they are not altogether digressions from the main Argument, especially in order to the Refuters manner of reasoning, that in many parts required it. And becausethe Reader will not ordinarily meet with such arguments treated on in our language, especially in a Scholastical way, I was willing to gratify him in them, to the utmost of my power. And if he be offended with this my labour of love, and too officious desire to please him, I here promise before you, that if he pardon me this once, he shall not have occasion to blame me for a second-such-offence.  
And now having given you the true Reasons of the length of this Discourse, it will be fit I also make you some account of my stile, and my manner of handling it.  
As than your Refuter every where pretends to Philosophy and the Schools, so fit it was I should treat him in a Scholastical way and in writings of this kind: The best ornament arises from the strength and reason of the discourse, and he is most eloquent, that can express his matter clearest, and make such knotty stuff plain. I have seen the statue of a Roman Gladiator portrayed naked, and as combating his enemy in the midst of the Amphitheatre. And it was a piece of high worth, and curious art, and more rich in the lively representation of the wrathfulness of the look, the stretched and well set muscles, the strong and brawny parts, and the vigour and agility of the limbs, then if he had been carved in the robes of a Senator.  
And therefore since my work was for argument and defence, I chose to build my Fabric not curious, but strong, and because much of my materials were of marble, I laboured only to polish, not to paint it. And this is the genuine true beauty, that springs from the natural compactedness, and solidity of the stone; and he that strives to trim it with painting, though of gold and vermilion, doth but hid, not adorn it. Such embellishments are only fit for less solid materials. And therefore, Sir, as I cannot tempt my Reader, or beguile his patience to the end of the discourse, with artificial expressions, and curious conceits, and lively flashes of wit: so I must tell him that if he look for colours, and varnish and eloquence, he must not seek after Architects and Schoolmen, but Limners and Romances. For though Embroideries and lace, rich jewels, and curled tresses, are the usual ornaments of brides, yet they are as unhandsome, and commonly suspected as meretricious in matrons.  
I care not then for neatness, if you, that are best able, judge me solid and strong. And I doubt not but the knowing Reader will be better contented with the plain demonstration and proof of a conclusion, then if I had written in a strain of the declamations of Quintilian and Seneca's controversies.  
But yet Sir, because the age is more for fancy then reason, and better pleased with fine and airy discourses, then with solid and plain, and because I have known some exquisite Architects that have been curious Painters too, I was willing, where the matter would bear, and needed rather illustration than proof, to let my fancy take wing, and to range and sore about like a haggard Hawk, that in a Sunshine day more minds her weathering then her prey. And willing I was, though in the midst of the Schools not to be always severe, but amidst business and reason to yield a little to the garb and mode of the age, and to gratify the Printer so far, as to let the world see, that where my expressions are plain, and after the manner of the Schools, it arose not altogether from barrenness of wit, and a lowness of expression, but election and choice.  
And for this as I have the authority of a great Master of wit and method at Rome: so I have seen in noble buildings, where the foundation has been of rough and solid stone, and the pillars of marble, and the walls of plain Ashler, yet the Pilasters and Capitals, and the Architraves and Freezes, that bear no stress in the building, have been artificially carved.  
And now having said this, Sir, I have but only told you my design and platform, I speak not of my performance. That were a piece of vanity unpardonable. This was only in Idea, in my prospect and aim, and what I desired to accomplish and perfect, when I undertook your defence. For I thought you deserved the best Apology could be writ, which (pardon me your modesty, if I say) none can make but Doctor Hammond.  
If I have done any thing in order to the vindication of the truth and you, I have then my ambition, and all the reward that I desire is, that you will not inquire after me, nor ask after my name. But if you and the Reader shall find nothing in me to content you, then inflict upon me the worst censure, that can befall a bad Author, and inquire not at all after me, but let me be forgotten, and thought unworthy of a name. Whether then you approve or condemn, I have my sole aim, if I continue unknown.   

THE ADVERTISEMENT to the READER.  
Courteous Reader,  
THou art to be advertised of three things. The first is, that though the Author be assured, that things once well done, are always done soon, and that the Hemerocallis though a very fair flower, is as born, so also dead and faded the same day, and therefore cannot presume to any applause or commendations for the quickness of his dispatch, yet lest M. Jeanes or his admirers should think his reply to Doctor Hammond a strong and stiff work that requires so large and studied an answer, and such delay in the publication, I am to acquaint thee, that this work was begun, except the first essay, about Whitsuntide 1657, and finished as it is (some few quotations and small alterations and additions excepted) and brought up to the Printer that Michaelmas term following, and that it had been committed to the Press very shortly after, but that the first and only draught was through the haste of the Author, and the badness of his quick and running hand in many places so obscure, and illegible, that it was justly conceived the Compositor would be very much mistaken in the setting, which faults by the Ordinary Overseer of the Press could not easily and to the sense of the Author be amended. And therefore by reason of the Author's great distance from London and the difficulty of returns upon the consulting doubts and amendments, it was desired that the copy might be fair written before it was attempted. This so reasonable a request, could not but be very easily assented to, and though it was speedily intended, yet a fit Amanuensis, of whose fidelity the Author could be confident, was not presently thought on. And when that was done, by reason of the Author's distance from him, and his many necessary employments, the transcription went on so slowly, that a great deal more time was spent in the new writing, than was in the first draught. So that in the mean while, the Stationer being engaged in other businesses, not very suddenly to be dispatched, this was forced to stay its turn. For it is with Writers for the Press, as with Watermens at the Thames, both must stay till their course, unless the Author be well known, and the world has experience of his worth to encourage the Marchand-Libraires to an extraordinary undertaking, which could not here be expected, where the Author for reasons best known to himself, was so resolved on his concealment, that neither the Doctor nor the Printer himself should easily come to know him. And this is the true cause that it comes out so late, and when the Controversy is almost forgotten, although it was done so soon, and in so seasonable a time.  
The second concerns not the Learned, but the common English Reader. And that is to let him know, that he need not much be troubled at the long quotations in Latin not rendered into English. For such a work was conceived altogether needless for him, because as they are produced only in order to M. Jeanes, and the Readers, that could easily understand them, so the full sense and meaning of them was every where given in short. And therefore the translation of them would very needlessly have swelled the work to a greater Bulk, that was too unwieldy already.  
The third concerns M. Cawdrey. And for this know you must, that the Author, when he first undertook Master Jeanes had no design or thoughts at all of him. But in the process of the work being forced to have frequent recourse to the Doctors Account he could not in justice but compare M. Cawdreys' work with it. Hereupon finding a great agreement between them, especially in the latter and most plausible part of M. Jeanes his rejoinder, he found it necessary for the Doctor's fuller defence, as they say, to white and plaster two walls with the same mortar and brush. And he was the more easily induced to this course for several Reasons. First because M. Jeanes his use of confutation, and this reply were but Apologies of M. Cawdrey and designed for his defence in that part, on which the cause seemed most to lie. Secondly, because at that time there was a confident report that M. Cawdrey was dead, which was the rather believed, because he had so long been silent without any reply to the Doctor. And therefore M. Jeanes being thus by a kind of jus leviratus next of kin to the dead, was now bound to marry the cause and raise up seed to his brother. And then thirdly, as many passages, for this end, were enlarged against M. Cawdrey, to give M. Jeanes occasion to undertake the cause in gross, so the Author conceived it very necessary for the Doctor's vindication, which in some places in the Account seemed (to him at least) to need further proof or explication.  
But how reasonable soever this course did then seem to the Author, yet now he sees it is likely to create him more trouble, then at first he expected. For he finds the report false, and that M. Cawdrey yet lives (and may he long live till he find either reason to recant, and own the Doctrines, he formerly subscribed to, but now decryes in D. Hammond, or else by better reasons then yet he has urged, make the Author his Proselyte) and that he has lately published an Answer shall I call it, or rather sharp Invective? to the Doctor's Account. A piece I may justly say as defective of true reason and argument as it is stuffed with calumny and reproach. And strange it is that M. Cawdrey, who in his Triplex Diatribe was formerly so respectful, should now to the great disparagement of his cause be as infamously virulent in opposing D. Hammonds Defence of the Rites and Ceremonies established among us, which himself had subscribed to, as S. W. or William Sergeant an eminent Proselyte of Rome and a great Factor for that persuasion in his several Treatises of Schism against the Doctor's vindication of the substance itself, and very being of the Church of England. But I have read of the Snake in the Fable, that when sound in the Wood amidst winter frosts and snow, was a very innocent thing, and might be handled without danger, was no sooner warm in the Chimney corner, and refreshed, and thawed by the fire, but it presently began to hiss, and show that it had a sting both in the head and the tail, and boldly and menacingly to stare in the face of its Patron. And I hope I may without offence make this impartial observation from the story of the Times; that it was just as low with Presbytery as now, when the Triplex Diatribe was writ, and we were then under the same Masters, as we are again at this day (— sic me servavit Apollo) but it was afterwards taken under the wings of a P. and it was no sooner warm but it bristled, and began to appear in its formidable likeness and durst to look upon its master. But — Cynthius aurem vellit— I shall only tell M. Cawdrey that though he style his last work The Account Audited and Discounted, yet the way that he there takes, is a very strange kind of Reckoning and Auditing of Accounts. And mind him I must that it is the usual custom of bad debtors, and stewards, where they cannot satisfy their Creditors, to rail at their demands, and when their purses and bills are short, to make payment and discount in bad language, that so at least they may shame, where they find they cannot satisfy, and tyre and weary where they cannot pay. Indeed for an Adversary politicly to rail where he cannot conquer, and confidently to undervalue the force of that reason which he is unable to resist or answer, is a very easy way of consutation I confess, but it is by libel, not by book. And such pitiful advocates, that can only calumniate and scold in behalf of a client without any solid plea, make a bad cause far worse by such manner of defence.  
Now as the Author does not envy this happiness of M. Cawdrey in his auditing of accounts, so he is persuaded that if this reply to M. Jeanes could have been published as soon as it was designed for the Press, he himself might also have received such an answer as the Doctor has done, and been paid in the same coin, and so at least had had a more special call, than now he has, to take notice of M. Cawdreys' new manner of reckoning, and stating of accounts. But being not at all concerned in that Treatise, he was very willing, as yet, not to take any notice of it. And it was for these Reasons.  
First because he saw, that what he had already written against M. Cawd. needed not any further confirmation, there being nothing at all said in this new rejoinder to impair any thing here delivered. Secondly, because if he should have said any thing more to this Reply of M. Cawdrey, the work already grown too unwieldy, would have swelled to too large a bulk. And thirdly, because it could not well be done without making too large digressions from M. Jeanes to follow a new adversary, which would have made the discourse too obscure and intricate by such unnecessary diversions. And fourthly, because the Author was willing to try, how the Doctor, and the world would like his present undertake, before he further intermeddled with the Doctor's business, who as he is most immediately concerned, so of all men he is fittest to undertake, and best able to perform it.  
Howsoever that our Author might not be wanting to the cause, he had thus already undertaken (though contrary to his first intention) during the time that this was under the Press, he cast an eye upon M. Cawdreys' Audit, and by way of Essay, to satisfy the Reader of the strength of that discourse, drew up an answer to one chapter that he conceived of most strength in the whole book, and which had a great influence on all the rest. But seeing that this work was big enough already, and could not with convenience admit of this Appendix, he thought fit to suppress it, rather than at first be too troublesome to the Reader, especially because he doubts not, but that the Doctor himself, if there shall be found cause, will not be wanting to gratify the Reader far better, than himself could with this, which he had already provided.  
Howsoever if the Doctor shall think fit to decline this task, and the world shall judge M. Cawdreys' Audit to deserve a review, this, which he intended to have added here by way of appendix, may in due time see light, with some additions and strictures on the rest, and M. Cawdrey may find a Person, far inferior to the Doctor, that may call him to a new reckoning, before he receives his quietus est or Acquittance.   

The CONTENTS.  

SECTION I.  
THe Refuters ominous changing the Doctor's Title Page, and the state of the Question. His advantage by it over four sorts of Readers. How easily the Doctor concluded against by it. Love of God, what it commonly signifies to English ears. How difficult to defend the Doctor in that sense. Not so in the Doctor's wary state. The Refuters Reply foreseen: Answered. The phrase, The love of God variously taken in Scripture. How understood by the Doctor. In what sense Prayer an Act of holy Charity. Page 1.   

SECT. II.  
Doctor Hammonds renouncing the Error charged upon him. His civil address unjustly taxed by the Refuter. The Defenders Resolution hereupon. His reason for it. Scurrility not maintained. Seasonable Reproof lawful. The Defenders no regret to the Refuters person and Performances. His undertake against the Refuter. This Course unpleasing to him. But necessary. The Doctor not guilty of high Compliments and scoffs. The Refuters Friends the only Authors of them. The Defenders hopes. The Refuters promise. The Defenders Engagement. p. 7   

SECT. III.  
The Refuter acknowledges the Doctor to assert the fullness of Christ's Habitual Grace. His Use of Confutation and after undertake groundless hereupon. The terms of the Question much altered by the Refuter in his rejoinder. p. 15   

SECT. iv  
The Refuters Argument no ground of the Use of Confutation, unless he writes by inspiration. He confounds the Immanent Acts of Love with the Action of Loving. His Argument concerns not the Doctor's Assertion. The Acts of Divine Charity in Christ may gradually differ, where the Habit is the same. His frequent begging the Question and impertinence. Scheibler vainly quoted. What in that Author seemingly favourable to the Refuters pretences, censured. Immanent Acts truly Qualities. Proved. Not to be excluded out of the number of Entities. Belong to the first species of Quality; why. Dispositions when imperfect things. The Acts of divine Love in Christ supernatural. Not ordained to further Habits-Grace the sole effect of God. Why these Acts called Dispositions. The Doctor a Metaphysician. The Refuters 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. His irrefragable Argument broken. More ridiculous for the Refuters Confidence. p. 19   

SECT. V  
The Doctor innocent of the former Crimination. The Refuters new Endictment proved vain by a clear instance. His Argument a Parologism of four terms. The Doctor affirms the direct contrary to the Refuters Charge. Humane lapses; doubtful speeches. Three rules of the Civil Law to interpret them. All writings subject to obscurity. How the Doctor to be understood in the passage arraigned. He demonstrates by it the fullness of Christ's Grace à posteriori. The only rational way of proving it. Christ's Love more intense in his agony then in his suffering hunger. Asserted by S. Paul. Christ's habitual grace always perfect. Always. Christ against the Sociniant. Christ's habitual grace not to be augmented: Whence. The Refuters boldness. His adding the word before to the Doctor's discourse, and second misadventure in this kind. His proof foreseen; answered. Difference in the actings of voluntary and natural agents. Acts of love in Christ, howsoever heightened, can never intent the habit. Proved. The Refuters major opposite to Scripture as well as the Doctor. The habit of grace in Christ not determined to one uniform manner of acting. Saints and Angels love God necessarily and freely. So Christ as Comprehensor. This not to the purpose. The Refuters charitable additions. The acts of holy charity of two sorts: of which the Doctor to be understood. The Doctor's censure of the Refuters additions just. 42   

SECT. VI  
The Refuter acknowledges his own ignorance of a generally received opinion. Love a genus to the habit and the act. Proved for the Refuters instruction. His charging▪ his ignorance on Aristotle. Aristotle his Master, why? vainly quoted. He speaks not to the present controversy. The assumption only denied. 72   

SECT. VII.  
The Refuters reply impertinent. The Doctor's distinction of love into the habit and the act found in the tract of Will-worship, and the answer to M. Cawdrey. Outward sensible expressions refer first and immediately to the inward acts of love. The Refuters digression to a matter never doubted. The Doctor never asserts that love was univocally predicated of the habit and outward sensible expressions. The Refuters four reasons against no body. His unhappiness in proving a clear truth. His third most false. In univocal productions the cause and effect still comprehended under the same genus, sometimes also in equivocal. His assumption of his first reason infirm. His second and fourth reasons coincident. Raynaudus seasonable assistance. The Refuter misunderstands him. Love not univocally predicated of the habit and outward sensible expressions, proved: not concerns the Doctor. 78   

SECT. VIII.  
The Refuters tongue-combat. He a man of business. The pertinency of the Doctors first papers to explain the meaning of the latter. Unjustly censured for speaking cautelously. The Refuters understanding the Doctor for a critic, and a dunce. Erasmus' sat the same with the Doctors. Critic, an honourable title. The best Scholars critics, and who. The true critic an universal Scholar. Sextus Empericus and Crates character of a critic. Quintilianus character of the true Grammarian. Aristotle the first author of criticism and grammar. Necessary to complete the Divine. The best way to advance learning, to unite criticism and school-learning. Pity the Refuter had not been a critic. His mistake of the word Salvo; what it signifies. The method of the Schools in polemical discourses observed by the Doctor. The Refuter saying and unsaying. 91   

SECT. IX.  
The Refuters impertinent referring to former performances. His vain pretences of proof. The Refuters reasonings with himself inconsequent: proved. The intention of the act proportioned to the intention of the habit, so as not to exceed it, unless by accident; but not always to equal it. Proved by instance of the Lutenist, and Painter, and Preacher. Habits not necessary, but voluntary causes, unless ab extrinseco determined. 104   

SECT. X.  
The Refuters saying is the only proof that actual love is in the predicament of action. The contrary proved by Suarez, Smiglecius, Scheibler. In actual love the action and the terminus of it considerable. The Refuters remarks in Scheibler impertinent His oracles nothing to the purpose. The propositions to be proved Immanent acts in what sense qualities. Scheibler not slighted. Aristotle his character of Eudoxus agreeable to the Refuter. His words not home to the Refuters purpose, proved from reason and Suarez. Habitual and actual love both qualities and species of the same genus: proved from sundry places in Suarez. The Refuters further impertinencies. Immanent acts of love in what sense dispositions, in what not, from Smiglecius, Aquinas. Acts of two sorts. 112   

SECT. XI.  
The Doctor's explication from the Refuters concessions. The Refuters reply and valiant resolution. His first charge answered. His second charge answered in three distinct propositions 1. Expressions gradually different may, and in Christ always did, flow from a love equally intense in the habit. This not the question. 2. Nothing naturally hinders but that expressions gradually different may flow from acts of love gradually the same. Proved. God's outward favours and expressions different. The inward act of his love still one and invariable. Proved against the Socinian. God's love▪ one infinite and substantial act, against Crellius. In what sense God in Scripture said to love some more, some less. The doctrine of the Schools safer than that of the Socinian. God by one immutable act dispenses all the variety of his favours. Illustrated. The variety in Gods outward favours: whence it arises. Confirmed from Lombard, Aquinas, Scotus. Applied to the Refuter. 3. In men the outward expressions ordinarily vary according to the gradual difference in the inward acts of love. Proved by reason, and the authority of Gregory, Durand, Aquinas, Estius. The Doctor's assertion hence proved as fully as the thing requires. The Doctor not engaged to prove, that expressions gradually different could not proceed from a love equally intense. The third charge answered. No mystery in the word proportionably The correspondence between the inward acts of love and the outward expressions to be understood, not according to Arithmetical, but Geometrical, proportion. 131   

SECT. XII.  
The Doctor's proof of the vanity of the Refuters use of confutation: made good from the Refuters mixture. The Refuters reply and endeavour to make good his charge by consequences,; impertinent. The Refuters momentous objection strikes as well against himself and other his friends, as the Doctor. The weakness of it. The intention of Christ's actual grace so proportioned to that of his habitual grace, as not to exceed it; but not so, still as to equal it. Illustrated by a clear instance. The Schoolmen no no where say, that the Intention of Christ's actual grace is exactly equal to that of his habitual. Aquinas of the Refuters, not the Doctor's ciration, He speaks fully to the Doctor's purpose. What meant by works and the effects of wisdom and grace in Aquinas. An intensive growth in the inward acts of wisdom and grace argues not an intensive increase in the habits. Asserted also by the Refuter. Cleared by a distinction. The Chedzoy challenge. The vanity of it. Christ did gradually increase in the acts of wisdom and grace as he did in stature, Proved from the Refuters mixture: from Ames, Vorstius, Grotius, Hooker, Field, Suarez, Estius, others, both Fathers and Schoolmen, and reformed Divines. The Defenders advice to the Refuter to be more wary in his challenges 171   

SECT. XIII.  
The Refuters melancholy fancy: his acknowledging the Doctor's innocence. The Doctor constantly speaks of the gradual difference in some acts of charity, never of the habit. The Refuters consequence hereupon. His monstrous Syllogism examined. The acts of Christ's love were primariò & pierce, and not only secundariò and per accidens, capable of degrees: demonstrated. Actions and passions intended and remitted only in regard of their terms. The habits and acts of charity in Christ gradually only, and not specifically different from those in all other men. God in his extraordinary power may create something greater and better than the habitual grace of Christ. Asserted by Aquinas, Suarez, and many other Schoolmen, and the Refuter himself. The acts of the habit of grace in Christ de facto gradually diflerent in themselves, and from the habit. The phrase, The love of God, variously taken in Scripture: proved. In what sense the Doctor constantly takes it. Demonstrated. The greater good to be more intensely beloved. There is an order in the acts and degrees of love. Asserted by the Schools. Of the order in the love of Christ. The habit of love to God and our neighbours one and the same quality: proved. God and our neighbours not to be loved with the same equality and degree of affection. Actus efficaces & inefficaces what they are. That they were in Christ. Of the gradual difference between them. Hence demonstratively proved, that the first great law of charity, Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart, etc. does not always oblige us pro hic & nunc to the highest degree and noblest act of Divine love. Of the gradual difference between the free and necessary acts of Christ's love. Phrase actual love distinguished. The acts and operations of grace in Christ were neither intensively nor extensively still commensurate with the habit. Proved. In what sense Aquinas' rule urged by the Refuter holds. 205   

SECT. XIV.  
The Doctor's discourse here only ad hominem. The Refuters reply grants all that the Doctor's argument aims at. Where the degrees of any Quality particularly the love of Christ, are for number multiplied in the same subject, there the quality, particularly the love, is more intense. Proved. This infers not Intention to be a mere coacervation of homogeneous degrees. The Refuter reaches not the Doctor's meaning. The Doctor argues from the effect to the cause. The reasonableness of the proof. The only way to conclude the fervour of the inward devotion by the outward performance. Length and continuance in prayer an argument of high zeal. Suarez and Hurtado's discourse concerns not the Doctor. The Refuters ignorance notwithstanding his confidence. Quantitas virtutis, molis. No absurdity in the Doctor's discourse, if (as the Refuter falsely charges him) he had concluded a greater ardency in Christ's devotion, from the multiplying of the several acts of prayer. Continuance in prayer a demonstration of fervour. Frequent repetitions of the same words in prayer an argument of an heightened fervour of Spirit. 251   

SECT. XV.  
The pertinency of the Doctor's Argument, and impertinence of the Refuters charge. The Doctor's argument à posteriori from the necessary relation between the work and the reward. Not understood by the Refuter. The outward work more valuable in God's sight, for the inward fervour and devotion. The Refuters petitio principii. Works in a Physical sense what, and what in a Moral. The Refuters discourse of the infinite value of Christ's merit arising from the dignity of his person. Nothing to the purpose. The dignity of a moral action, according to the physical entity of the act, or according to the dignity of the person performing it. The actions of Christ in regard of his person infinite in value. Not so in regard of their substantial moral goodness. Proved: and acknowledged by our Refuters own Suarez. Consequently in this regard they might exceed one another in moral perfection. The Doctor's argument that it was so in Christ. The appositeness of the proof. The Scriptures say the same. 265   

SECT. XVI.  
The second part of the Refuters second answer. The distinct confession of all the Doctor pretends to. The English translation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (more earnestly) justified. The Refuter's nonsense. What ardency in Christ it was that was heightened Luk 22. 43. Comprehensor, Viator what. In what state, whether of Comprehensor or Viator, Christ was in a capacity to pray, as that signifies either petition, deprecation or thanksgiving: and this whether only for others, or also for himself. Of prayer, and the several kinds. Whether though Christ were in a capacity thus to pray, yet being God, that was able of himself to accomplish whatsoever he might desire as man, it was expedient for him to do so: and whether God had so determined. What things Christ might and did pray for, both for himself and others. M. Hooker commended. Whether Christ did in truth and reality, or only in show, pray for a removal of that cup which he came on purpose to drink. Whether these prayers and desires were not repugnant to God's decree, and the end of his coming into the world, and his own peremptory resolution to drink it. How those desires for a removal of this Cup might be advanced, notwithstanding his readiness and resolution to drink it. How Christ's ardency in prayer for a removal of this cup might be increased above what it either was, or there was occasion for, at other times. Of the greatness of his agony and bloody sweat. How his zeal in prayer at this time might be advanced, without derogation from the fullness of his habitual grace, the impeccability of his soul, and the uninterrupted happiness of it, and perfect love as he was Comprehensor. Strictures on the former part of the Refuters second answer. 276   

SECT. XVII.  
The Refuters three arguments to prove the act of Christ's love always equally intense, impertinent to the present question. His confident proposal of them to be examined as rigidly as the Doctor pleases, and his vain ostentation in placing them in his Title-page censured. The ambiguity of the phrase, Christ's love of God, distinguished from Crellius, Estius, Aquinas, and others. In what sense still used by the Doctor. 333   

SECT. XVIII.  
The Refuters first argument contradicts his second, and proves not his conclusion. Reduced to form. The Sequel denied. The reason. His authorities concern not the question. His citing Aquinas from Capreolus censured. The conclusion to be proved. Hurtadoes, and Aquinas first saying from Capreolus true, with the reason of it from Suarez; but not pertinent. A view of the place in Aquinas. He speaks of the habit, etc. not the act. The different workings of necessary and voluntary causes. The Refuters argument guilty of a double fallacy. His next place of Aquinas from Capreolus impertinent. His gross ignorance, or prevaricating in his third place of Aquinas. Scotus testimony impertinent. Aquinas and Scotus maintain that proposition which he would confute in the Doctor by their testimonies. 337   

SECT. XIX.  
The Refuters second argument, Christ on earth Comprehensor, true: but Viator also. Proved from Scripture, Aquinas, Scotus, in the places referred to by the Refuter. From Suarez also. None but the Socinians deny Christ to be thus Comprehensor. His beatific love as Comprehensor an uniform, because necessary, act. Fruitless here to inquire wherein the essence of happiness consists according to the Thomists or Scotists. It follows not, because Christ's love as Viator was more intense at one time in some acts, then at another in other acts, that therefore his happiness as Comprehensor was at that time diminished. Proved, The Doctor never denies the fullness of Christ's happiness as Comprehensor. The Refuters grave propositio malè sonans. His argument a fallacy à dicto secundum quid. Christ's twofold state. Though the infused habit of grace in him always full, yet not so the acts. The reason. M. Jeanes and others guilty of this propositio malè sonans as well as the Doctor. The piously credible proposition of the Schoolmen, as the Refuter calls it, much prejudices an assertion of his own in his mixture, but no whit the Doctor. 345   

SECT. XX.  
The Refuters third argument reduced to form. The major denied. His sophistical homonymy discovered. His confounding the different acts of Christ's love as Viator, and Comprehensor. The true assertions in his discourse severed from the false inferences. Christ impeccable. Thence i● follows not, that the acts of his love are all equal, but the contrary. The great commandment of love enjoins the most ardent love that we are able to reach to, Thence it follows not, that the acts of this love ought always to be equal. Christ as Comprehensor had on earth greater abilities to love God then Adam in paradise or the Saints and Angels in heaven. Thence it follows not that the acts of his love as Viator were to be equal, or if they increased successively that he sinned. This discourse cleared and confirmed from Suarez. The several acts of charity by which Christ merited. Hence the inequality of intention in these acts demonstrated. Further proved from the Refuters mixture. The Viator differs in abilities from the Comprehensor. Proved from Scripture and reason, Cajetan Scotus. The Refuters following digression impertinent; his design in it to amuse the Reader, and to bring the Doctor into an unjust suspicion. 365   

SECT. XXI.  
As the Doctor needs not, so is it not his custom to make use of former expositions. This practice in the Refuter censured. This digression not an answer to the Ectenesteron, but a fling at the treatise of Will-worship. His brief transcribing the Doctor's exposition, and large examining of it censured. M. Cawdrey grants all in controversy between the Doctor and Refuter, but contradicts himself. The Refuters prevaricating and false suggestions to his Reader- His first reason for this suggestion reduced to form. Destructive to all religion. Biddle, Hobbes Leviathan. Whatsoever answer he shall make for himself against a Socinian, Anabaptist, Quaker, etc. will secure the Doctor. His five very false and proofless criminatious in his next reason mustered up. His hasty oversight in citing Chamier. 374   

SECT. XXII.  
The occasion of the Doctor's exposition of the first great commandment of love. The reasons of his fundamental position in short. If any one of them demonstrative, as M. Cawdrey grants one is, than all not bound to it, to every act acceptable to God, nor to perform it to a degree, even then when they are obliged ad speciem. This the utmost the Doctor undertook either against M. Cawdrey or the Refuter Reasonable the Refuter should answer these, before he suggested to the Reader a need of further proof. 383   

SECT. XXIII.  
The Refuters two first charges, Bellarmine's explication at large. The Doctors. The defenders challenge hereupon. The difference between Bellarmine and the Doctor examined. What good in Bellarmine approved by the Doctor. What erroneous, not found in the Doctor, or else declared against. Bellarmine and the Doctor, speak not of the same thing, Chamier assents to the Doctor's position. The sixth Corollary of Bellarmine, if found in the Doctor, yet otherwise understood: not censured by Chamier, Ames, Vorstius. Two men may love God with all their hearts, and yet one love him more than the other. The Doctor's exposition not borrowed from Bellarmine, nor yet popishly affected, 386   

SECT. XXIV.  
The Refuters third and fourth charges. The Doctor's exposition parallel to that of Bishop Andrewss, Davenant, Downham, White▪ Hocker, Field, Grotius, Ainsworth praised. Assembly Annotations, Vrsin, Calvin, Victor Antiochenus. Imperfect work on Matthew, Theophylact, Theodoret, Zacharias, Austin, Chamier. The objections from Calvin, Vrsin, answered. Chamiers conclusion against Bellarmine examined; concerns not the Doctor; advantages not the Refuter. State of innocency a state of proficiency. Proved from M. Cawdrey. Saints and Angels love not God all to the same indivisible height. Saints differ in glory. The Doctor of the first and second covenant. Perfection Legal, Evangelicall. Learned Protestants agree with him against Chamier. The falsehood of Chamier's inference as understood by the Refuter and M. Cawdrey demonstrated. How to be understood. Heresy of the Perfectists, How not favoured by Chamier. Thus more agreeable to himself. Recapitulated in five positions. Chamier and the Doctor agreed. The Doctor justified from M. Cawdrey's concessions. M. Cawdrey's contradictions in the point of perfection In what sense free will-offerings and uncommanded degrees and acts of piety and charity. The question stated. Davenant, Montague, White, Hooker, and generally the Fathers and divers Protestants agreeing with the Doctor in this point of perfection and counsel, and doing more than is commanded. This proves not the Popish doctrine of Supererogation. 440   

SECT. XXV.  
Heads of the reasons for the Doctor's exposition and assertion of degrees in love and freewill offerings. Refuters' fifth charge examined. Falsehood of it. Challenged to make reparations. Calumny of Popishly affected, how easily and unhappily retorted 433   

SECT. XXVI.  
Artifice in refuting the Doctor in Ames words; answering by halves. Doctor asserts not lukewarmness. How differs from sincerity. What. Christianity a state of proficiency. Growing grace true▪ acceptable. How differs from lukewarmness. Bellarmine and Ames dispute concerns not the Doctor. Artifice in citing Bishop White. Doctor asserts sincerity as opposed to partial, divided love. What. Bishop Whites words not to the purpose. Love of God above all things objective, appretiative, intensive, what. Doctor maintains all. Most intense love required, yet not so much as is possible to the humane nature. Perfection of charity: how required of Christians, how not. 438   

SECT. XXVII.  
His first reason proves not. Intention and degrees of what love fall not under the commandment. Modus of a virtuous act how under precept. Aquinas how to be understood, Opposes not the Doctor. No one precise degree of love commanded. First inference denied. Lukewarmness and first degree of love differ. Second and third inferences denied. Vanity of his argument demonstrated. Natural, spiritual qualities how differ. His conclusion granted. Love the highest, 1, in respect of the thing beloved. 2, The person loving (according to man's threefold state. In innocence obliged to sinless perfection, Condition of the first covenant. How urged by Protestants, and S. Paul. Condition of the second covenant. How the Doctor denies legal perfection obligatory to Christians. How bound to love God now. Their love still growing. Acknowledged by M. Cawdrey. Opposed to lukewarmness. Our loves future, how the highest, how not. Degrees of this love proportioned to degrees of glory. This the Saints crown not race.) 3, Love the highest in regard of the form. No one precise degree highest in love, as in natural qualities. May be increased in infinitum. How a set number of degrees in love. His argument retorted. Doctor's assertion proved by it. God's righteousness infinite, immutable. Inchoate sanctification a fruit of the Spirit. Whole recapitulated. No prejudice to the Doctor if all granted. 450   

SECT. XXVIII.  
His second reason proves not, yet granted. God by more obligations, than he expresses, to be loved. Acknowledged by the Doctor. This love infinite. Not positively & Categorematicè, but negatively and Syncategorematicè, acknowledged by Bellarmine and others. Hinders not freewill-offerings of love. These asserted by Bishop White. Doctor not confuted, though Bellarmine may. Bellarmine and Ames at no great odds here. Concerns not the Doctor. Refuters' artifice censured. Doctor's comfort and precedent in this persecution of the tongue. 473   

SECT. XXIX.  
His authorities oppose not the Doctor, why urged by Protestants. Bellarmine acknowledges the places and inference. But such love simply impossible even in Paradise. How Austin, Bernard hold it obligatory, how not; Bellarmine the Refuters' adversary, His authorities from Aquinas, Scotus, his charity to his Reader. First, from Aquinas, answered. His meaning. Bellarmine and he agreed. Doctor and all Protestants will subscribe to this of Aquinas. His second from Aquinas, answered. Perfection of life, state, according to Aquinas, not pertinent. Aquinas opinion summed up. Scotus, his manner of writing. How God may be loved above all things according to Scotus. Henriquez opposed by him. Love melting, strong. This genuine, that a passion sensitive. Scotus, love of God above all things intensiuè, extensiuè agreeable to Chamier. He rejects the reason grounded on Austin, Bernard. His authority pruned. At large. Contrary to the Refuters inference from him. His sense cleared from D' Ordellis, Cavellus. The sense of the old Schoolmen from Durand, Austin, and Bernard's opinion, the same with Durands and the Doctors, proved. How urged by Chamier. These Father's opinion summed up. What perfection required of Christians according to them. What proposed, Refuters discourse impertinent. Distinction, Quatenus indicat finem, non quatenus praecipit medium not invented by Bellarmine. Taken from Aquinas. By whom used to expound S. Austin. Agreeable to Austin, Cajetan, for freewill offerings. 480   

SECT. XXX.  
The Refuters return. His proof impertinent; weakens a known truth. Christ's agony a fit season for heightening ardency in prayer. As Comprehensor he enjoyed an intuitive knowledge of the Divine Essence. Hence a love necessary. Love as Viator. Beatific love hindered not the free exercise of this love, and graces: nor his happiness his grief in the sensitive appetite. Suarez. Hence a gradual difference in the acts of love as Viator. Particularly in prayer. Fallacy à dicto secundum quid. His confounding of terms. Grounds, Motives, Occasion. What. Christ as Comprehensor still had cause to love God, but no grounds, motives, nor occasions. As Viator he had. Refuters' contradictions. Tautologies. Love of desire complacency, distinguished, not divided. One oft gins the other. Bishop Andrews. Natural love of desire in Christ. What hope in Christ. Love of concupiscence, though first in men, yet otherwise in Christ. Threefold love of complacency in Christ. Experimental love of desire and complacence in him capable of increase. Both heightened at his passion. Ardency of these and of prayer different. Of which the Doctor. Vanity of the Refuters Title-page. 520   

SECT. XXXI.  
Poor Refutor. Doctor digresses not. Affliction a fit season to heighten devotion. Christ's ardency our instruction. The Doctor heightening Christ's actual love derogates not from his habitualfulness. Charitas quamdiu augeri potest, etc. variously cited. The Doctor's mistake. The words not Jeromes, but Augustine's. This lapse how possible. Venial. Occasion of Augustine's writing to Jerome. His several proposals of solving the doubt. His own upon the distinction of righteousness Legal, Evangelical. Place in Austin at large. How applied against Papists. How not. M. Baxter's censure of our differences in point of justification. Place impertinent to the Refuters conclusion. Ex vitio est how here understood against M. Cawdrey, and the Refuter and the Doctor. Denotes original corruption. This how called by Austin. Signally vitium in opposition to a saying of Pelagius. Parallel places for this meaning. Pelagius objection: Answered. Austin and the Doctor accord, but not the Refuter. Doctor's exposition of Austin. Corrected. Dilemmas. Confidence springs from ignorance. Chedzoy-confidence. Learned Protestants and Papists, and himself assert, what he says, all else deny, but the Doctor. A new Jury of them against him for the Doctor, Erasinus, Cajetan, Tolet. (Outward works of wisdom and grace in Tolet what) Estius Jansenius, L. Brugensis, Beza, Piscator, Deodate, Assembly notes, Cameron, Raynolds. How Christ grew in actual grace, the habitual still invariable. Illustrated by two instances. Erasmus and Doctor Eckhard assert Christ's growth in habitual perfection. This charged on Luther, Calvin, etc. by Bellarmine with probability on Calvin. How they acquitted. Refuters' conclusion complyes with the sourest of Jesuits. Maldonates' censure of the Lutherans and Calvinists. Answered. Stapletons' like censure. Answered. They and Bellarmine, if they speak consequently, must mean the same with us. Whole recapitulated. Refuters' unhappiness. Doctor's safety. 540   

SECT. XXXII.  
Zeal and loud noise different. M. Cawdrey grants all in controversy. Heightening outward expressions à posteriori conclude the increase of the inward acts. Outward and inward acts, both complete the moral action. How proportioned. Difference of Christ's obligation to purity and ours. All born in sin. First covenant how in force, how not. Cannot oblige to sinless Perfection. Man reprieved from the final execution of its curse by Christ. Objections. Answered. New covenant how aggravates damnation. What required by it. La holy. How a rule. The subject matter as well of the second as the first covenant. Difference of obligation to its purity under the first and second covenant. La abrogated not as a rule, but as a covenant. Second covenant allows growth toward perfection, which the first did not. What the Doctor speaks of. Refuters' first reason. Terms of the first part of his assumption distinguished. Applied. Second part of his assumption. Answered. Aquinas serves not the Refuters interest. Exterior acts of charity here signify not outward sensible expressions, but moral duties. Proved from Aquinas, Cajetan, Suarez. His second reason. His ignorance and confusion in it. Necessity, Liberty of three kinds. What. He denies Christ to be the meritorious cause of our salvation. He confounds Christ's natural liberty of will with the moral liberty of the action. Contradicts Scripture. Christ how no more free to the outward expression, than the inward act. How indifferent actions determined. Christ how free to the use of outward expressions, how not. Proof from Suarez examined. Grossly understood. What Suarez intends. Defenders advise to the Refuter. 595   

SECT. the Last.  
The close. Refuters deliberate answer abortive. His civility. His appeal to the Readers judgement. His styling himself the Doctors Refuter. His challenge of the Doctor to a rejoinder. Clearness in dispute approved by the Defender. Why the Refuter plainly dealt with. The Libeler his own executioner. Defenders proposal and promise. The Refuter may take his leave for the present, and if he please rest for ever. Refuters strange compliment at parting. Why the Defender, as the Refuter, subscribes not his name, but keeps unknown, 638    

Names of AUTHORS Cited, Examined and Illustrated in this TREATISE.  

A  
Aelianus.  
Aelius Lampridius.  
Ainsworth.  
Alphonsus à Castro.  
Ambrose.  
Amesius.  
Andrews B.  
Aquinas.  
Argentinus.  
Aristoteles.  
Assembly-notes.  
Athanasius.  
Augustinus.  
Author imperf. Op.   

B  
Bartolus.  
Basilius M.  
Baxter.  
Beda.  
Bellarminus.  
Bernardus.  
Beza.  
Biddle.  
Biel.  
Bonaventura.  
Boys El.  
Brugensis Luc.  
Burgersdicius.  
Buxtorfius.   

C  
Cajetanus.  
Calvinus.  
Cameron.  
Capreolus.  
Catechismus Racoviens.  
Cavellus.  
Chamier.  
Chrysostomus.  
Collegium Complutense.  
Crellius.  
Cyprianus.  
Cyrillus Alex.   

D  
Dailler.  
Damascenus.  
Danaeus.  
Davenant B.  
Deodate.  
Digest.  
Diodorus Siculus.  
Dion.  
Dionysius.  
Downham B.  
Drusius.  
Durandus.   

E  
Eckhardus.  
Epiphanius.  
Erasmus.  
Estius.  
Eusebius.  
Euthymius.   

F  
Fagius Paulus.  
Field.  
Forbesius.  
Fulgentius,   

G  
Gregorius M.  
Gregorius Naz.  
Grotius.   

H  
Halensis.  
Heinsius.  
Henriquez.  
Hieronymus.  
Hilarius.  
Hobbs.  
Hooker.  
Horatius.  
Hùgo de S. Victore.  
Hurtado de Mendoza.  
Hyperius.   

I  
Jansenius.  
Javellus.  
Juvenalis.   

K  
Keckermannus.   

L  
Lanfrancus.  
Leo M.  
Liturgia Grae.  
Lombardus.  
Lucianus.  
Lutherus.   

M  
Maldonatus.  
Maresius.  
Martialis.  
Martyr P.  
Medina.  
Morton B.  
Montague B.  
Musculus W.   

N  
Navarrus Pet.  
Neopolitanus.  
Nierembergius.   

O  
Occam.  
Optatus.  
Orbellis D.  
Origenes.  
Ovid.   

P  
Paulinus.  
Paulus Jur.  
Piscator.  
Plato.  
Platus.  
Plinius Sen.   

Q  
Quintilianus.   

R  
Robuffus.  
Reynolds Ed.  
Richardus Armachanus.  
Riverius.  
Ruerius.  
Ruvio.   

S  
Sales Fr.  
Salmasius.  
Scaliger Ju.  
Scaliger Jos.  
Scheiblerus.  
Schenchius.  
Scnedewinus.  
Scotus.  
Scultetus.  
Selneccerus.  
Sennertus.  
Sextus Empiricus.  
S. Joseph.  
Smiglecius.  
Soto.  
Stupleton.  
Strabo.  
Strada.   

T  
Tertullianus.  
Theodoretus.  
Theophylactus.  
Toletus.  
Tridentinum Conc.   

V  
D. Valentia Greg.  
Valerius Max.  
Victor Antioch.  
Vincentius Lir.  
Virgilius.  
Volkelius.  
Vorstius.  
Vossius J. G●r.  
Vrsinus.   

W  
White B.  
Windelinus.  
Wingate.  
Wotton.    

Doctor HAMMONDS 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Defended, etc.  

SECT. 1.  
The Refuters ominous changing the Doctor's Title Page, and the state of the Question. His advantage by it over four sorts of Readers. How easily the Doctor concluded against by it. Love of God, what it commonly signifies to English Ears. How difficult to defend the Doctor in that sense. Not so in the Doctor's wary state. The Refuters Reply foreseen: Answered. The phrase The love of God variously taken in Scripture. How understood by the Doctor. In what sense Prayer an Act of holy Charity.  
§. 1. MAlum omen in limine! The Romans counted it Ominous, if they stumbled at the threshold, when they first set forth on any business. Though I am far from approving any such ridiculous superstitions, and fond idle conceits, yet I cannot behold it as any prosperous Symptom of this Refuter's fair carriage in the Managing this controversy, that he should thus palpably prevaricate in the very Frontispiece of his Pamphlet.  
§. 2. For whereas Doctor Hammond had thus styled his Reply (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Or, The degrees of Ardency in Christ's Prayer Reconciled with his fullness of habitual Grace,) This Refuter has thus advantageously changed it, (Doctor Hammond his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Or, A greater Ardency in Christ's love of God at one time than another, proved to be utterly irreconcilable, 1. With his fullness of habitual Grace, 2. The perpetual happiness, and 3. The impeccability of his Soul.) It is true indeed, this alteration serves little to the real confutation of his Adversary, yet in the issue and recess it will be very prejudicial to Doctor Hammond, and the truth maintained by him.  
§. 3. For how many be there in the world, whose business will not suffer them, or whose curiosity will not carry them on, to read further than the very Titles of Books? And yet these from this Lantschap-Discovery can talk as confidently, and censure as severely, as if they had throughly read and weighed every line and Period in the whole Discourse. How many are there that read Books out of Interest and faction, that are passionately desirous that every one should be in the wrong, & confuted, that is not of their party? These weigh not reasons but names, and put not judgement into the balance, but prejudice and advantage. They had rather truth should suffer, than the cause they are engaged in, and are abundantly satisfied to see an Adversary answered, whatsoever Arts or Means are made use of to blow up a Refutation. How many also are there in the world, that are not able to distinguish truth from Pretences, and shapes and Pictures from solid bodies? that think all is right that is vehemently pretended, and every Apparition real, that presents itself to their deluded sense and Imagination? Nay how few are there even of those who have the skill and abilities to judge, that either have the patience, or the leisure, in controversies of this nature, to compare Author with Author, and Reply and rejoinder together?  
§. 4. And yet who seethe not, but every one of those (which together make up the only considerable number of Readers) are likely to be imposed on by this Change, and Doctor Hammond be concluded guilty in their Judgements of a gross and palpable mistake?  
§. 5. For who is there almost so green a Catechumen and Neophyte in the Christian faith, that knows God to be the only good, and the last end of Man, but will be ready to reply against the Doctor, that we cannot love God sufficiently, and that we must therefore love him to the utmost height we can; that he who loves not God with all his heart, with all his soul, and with all his might, doth not love him as much as God deserves, or as much as man ought; and therefore to maintain a greater Ardency in Christ's love of God at one time than another, must be a dangerous Error, & bordering on that Heresy that denies the Godhead of our Saviour; an Error that pulls the Crown of innocence and happiness and perfection from his head? Doctor Hammond, right or wrong, is now abundantly confuted in the Judgement of the Many, and it will be almost an impossible Task, and an unpardonable crime to undertake his defence. So great a School-man as Mr. Henry Jeanes of Chedzey has lost his labour in this rejoinder, and has been only too courteous in honouring Doctor Hammonds gross Error, with a Scholastical Refutation. His Arguments and Pains might have been spared in opposing that so palpable mistake, which at first-sight discovers itself in the naked proposal of it.  
§. 6. Indeed this Phrase, The love of God, to English ears carries with it nothing less than that high and transcendent Act of the Soul, that immediately fixes on God as it's proper Object. And therefore if the Doctor had undertaken to maintain, that this Act of Divine Love had not always been at the full height in Christ, who by virtue of the Hypostatical Union so clearly always knew God, and so perfectly enjoyed him, his learning and parts would in the Judgement of most, have only served him to parget o'er an Error, too gross and palpable to be defended by any man that owns and glories in the name of a Christian, and a Preacher of the Gospel, and his work would be justly accounted fit to be joined to the monstrous Paradoxes of the age; and the Panegyrics of Nero and the Altar of Busiris would have been reputed as true, though to carry infinite less danger in them, than this Assertion. So successful has this alteration been to our Refuters' Advantage!  
§. 7. But then if the Doctor's Position had been faithfully represented, and the Question laid down in these precise Terms, wherein he had so warily stated it, not one of a thousand Readers could have found any fault with it. And if so great a School-man as Mr. Henry Jeanes of Chedzey pretends himself to be, could, with all his skill and advantage in that curious and subtle learning, have discovered in it a mistake, the Error would in the Judgement of the most have been accounted venial, and such, which the most profound and knowing might be subject to. For even Saint 
* Luke 22. 44.  Luke himself does positively declare, that our Saviour being in an Agony, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, prayed more earnestly; which is the very thing that the Doctor asserts in his Title Page: and all the business of his reply is to prove, how this plain Assertion of the Evangelist may be reconciled with his fullness of habitual grace. And therefore when our great Schoolman had done the utmost here he could, the sum total of his performance would, in most men's opinion, have been only this, That he had showed a better way of reconciling this Text of Saint Luke with the fullness of Habitual Grace in Christ, than Doctor Hammond had yet met with.  
§. 8. If now our Refuter shall here return, that he undertook not to oppose Doctor Hammonds Title, but his Book, and that in divers places of his Reply he positively maintains, that the Acts of Christ's love of God were capable of degrees, more Ardent at some time than others, which was the dangerous Error he was willing to Reprieve and secure the Reader from, and therefore he hath done the Doctor no wrong, if in those terms he proposed to Refute it in the Frontispiece of his rejoinder, which being his own Child, he might name as he pleased, without any man's just offence;  
§. 9 To this I Answer.  
That true it is that this Phrase, The Love of God, is variously taken in Scripture, as shall in due place be largely demonstrated.  
First generally for the habit, or any Act or Acts of holy Charity, as it contains the whole duty of man towards God and our Neighbours.  
Secondly, in a more restrained sense, for the Habit, or any Acts of Piety, or Holiness, or devotion towards God.  
Thirdly, most strictly and properly, for that high and transcendent Act of divine love, whereby the soul is immediately fixed and knit to God as the only Good.  
In the two first acceptations the Denomination is only Figurative and Causal, because the Acts, so called, are the Effects and issues of the love of God. In the third and last, the Denomination is Formal and Proper, and signifies nothing else but that Love from whence those other Acts do flow.  
§. 10. If therefore Doctor Hammond, speaking of the degrees of Ardency in Christ's Prayer, and the gradual heightening of other Acts of like nature in him, according to the variety of times and occasions, does sometimes by a Metonymy of the effect, or Synecdoche generis, say, that these Acts of Christ's love of God, or holy Charity, are capable of degrees, and sometimes more heightened, more ardent and intense than at other times, or in other Acts, this will therefore be no excuse to our Refuter for charging Doctor Hammond in his Frontispiece, for asserting a greater Ardency in Christ's Love of God (properly and formally taken) at one time than another, and notwithstanding any such plea or defence he must, 
* 
Vid. Digest. l. 48. tit. 10. De lege Cornel. de falsis, & de Senatus-consulto Liboniano. Tria in Falso jura requirunt, primo dolum. l. 1. in princ. ff. ad legem Corncl. de Fal. §: Item lex Cornel. inst. de publi. judic. gl. in c. ad falsariorum. de cri. fall. c. homines, & seq. 22. q. 2. Secundò mutationem veritatis. text. in auth. de instr. cautela & fide in prin. & l. quid si falsum ff. de fall.— Tertiò requirunt, ut falsum alteri noceat. gl. sing. in l. damus, & ibi addidi C. de le. Cornel. de fall. decis. Neopolit. q. ult. Lanfranc. in rep. c. quoniam. in verb. testium depositiones. Col. 6. in magno vol. de prob. & sic patet quid sit falsum, nam est immutatio veritatis dolo facta, etc. Rebuff. prax. beneficiorum. in Bull. Coenae Dom: art. 4. (mihi) p. 311:  
Falsum est quod animo corrumpendae. veritatis in alterius fraudem dolo malo fit. l. nec exemplum▪ 20. C. eod. l. quid sit falsum▪ 23. ubi Bartol. ff. eod— materia sunt falsa testamenta. l. 1. 6. l. divus 15. l. uxori. 18. ff. eod. l. Paulus 221. ff. de Verborum significat. Instrumenta. l. instrumentorum 16. ff. eod. Scripturae publicae d. l. 16. l. siquis instrumentorum. 21. verb. publicis. C. eod. etc. Denique quaevis res in qua veritas depravari, falsum insinuari cum alterius injuria potest. d, l. 1. joh. Schneidewin. Commentar. in lib. institut. lib. 4 to tit. 18. §. Item lex Cornelia, de falsis §. 2. & 6. etc. p. 2141, 2142, etc.   Lege falsarii, be condemned.  
§. 11. The truth is, 
(a) Oratio est actus inferioris deprecantis superiorem ut se adjuvet, unde est actus indigentis ope alterius cui cultum & reverentiam exhibet, & ideo ad religionem pertinet, Suarez, in tert. part. Thom. q. 21. art. 1. in Commentar: tom. 1. p. 588. Dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est, q. 81. art. 2. & 4. ad religionem proprie pertinet reverentiam & honorem Deo exhibere. & ideo omnia illa per quae Deo reverentia exhibetur, pertinent ad Religionem. Per Orationem autem homo Deo reverentiam exhibet, in quantum sc. ei subjicit & profitetur orando se eo indigere, sicut authore suorum bonorum: unde manifestum est, quod oratio est propriè Religionis actus. Aquin. 2. 2. q. 83. art. 3. in corp. Vide Cajetan: alios in loc. Vide infra de hoc latius suo loco.  Prayer is properly an Act of Religion, and devotion towards God, and improperly and figuratively only an Act of holy Charity, or divine love. And therefore, though our blessed Saviour's love of God properly and formally taken, be supposed to be always uniform, always the same, still advanced to the utmost height of Ardency and fervour, that the humane nature in the days of his flesh was possibly capable of; yet this nothing hinders, but his devotion in some Acts of Prayer at some times might be more advanced, his zeal here might be more fervent and intense than at other times, according to the variety of occasions, and the difference of the blessing or favour prayed for, or evil and danger deprecated.  
§. 12. And as this was all that Doctor Hammond undertook to maintain in his Reply; (as appears from his very Title Page) so it is so highly rational in itself, that I wonder what Temptation could fall upon our Refuter, that calls himself a Schoolman, a Divine, and a Minister of God's word, that he should undertake, in any shape or dress whatsoever, to oppose it.  
§. 13. I shall not labour to infuse Jealousies and umbrages into the Reader against this Refuters' discourse, but shall leave his Judgement free and entire to the Merit of the Cause depending between us. I shall only assure him, that I conceived it necessary to premise this that hath been spoken, to dispossess him of that prejudice, which this Refuters changing of the terms of the Question might unobservedly have impressed upon him. And so I pass to the business of the Discourse.   

SECT. 2:  
Doctor Hammonds renouncing the Error charged upon him. His civil address unjustly taxed by the Refuter. The Defenders Resolution hereupon. His reason for it. Scurrility not maintained. Seasonable Reproof lawful. The Defenders no regret to the Refuters person and Performances. His undertake against the Refuter. This Course unpleasing to him. But necessary. The Doctor not guilty of high Compliments and scoffs. The Refuters Friends the only Authors of them. The Defenders hopes. The Refuters promise. The Defenders Engagement.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
§. 1. I Was very willing to hearken to the seasonable advice of many, and wholly to withdraw myself à foro contentioso, to some more pleasing and profitable employment, but discerning it to be the desire of the Author of the Book entitled, A Mixture of Scholastical & Practical Divinity, that I should reply to his examination of one passage of mine against Mr. Cawdrey, I shall make no scruple immediately to obey him, not only because it may be done in very few words, but especially because the Doctrine which he affixeth to me, seems (and not without some reason) to be contrary to the truth of Scripture, which I am to look on with all reverend submission, and acquiesce in with captivation of understanding, and so not assert any thing from mine own conceptions, which is but seemingly contrary to it.  
§. 2. The Proposition which he affixes to me is this, That Christ's Love of God was capable of further degrees: and that he refutes as a thing contrary to that point (a truth of Scripture) which he had in hand, viz. The dwelling of all fullness of habitual Grace in Christ.  
3. By this I suppose I may conclude his meaning to be, that I have affirmed Christ's Love of God (meaning thereby the habitual Grace of divine Charity) to have been capable of further degrees, so as that Capacity of further degrees is the denial of all fullness of that habitual Grace already in him.  
4. And truly had I thus expressed myself, or let fall any words which might have been thus interpreted, I acknowledge I had been very injurious, not only to the verity of God, but also to mine own conceptions, and even to the cause which I had in hand, which had not been supported, but betrayed, by any such apprehensions of the imperfection of Christ's habitual Grace.  
5. This I could easily show, and withal how cautiously and expressly it was forestalled by me. But to the matter in hand, it is sufficient that I profess I never thought it, but deemed it a contrariety to express words of Scripture in any man who shall think it, and in short, that I never gave occasion to any man to believe it my opinion, having never said it in those words which he sets up to refute in me, never in any other that may be reasonably interpretable to this sense.   
Thus the Doctor.  
§. 1. TO this so ingenuous and civil address, and clear acknowledgement of the danger of that Error which the Author of the Mixture undertook to refute, though causelessly, in Doctor Hammond, this Refuter in very much anger replies, and with pride and scorn sufficient to oppose a thousand Heretics. And though this renouncing and detestation of the Error, undeservedly, and through an overhasty mistake, and too prejudicated a zeal, laid to the Doctor's charge, had been sufficient to any Son of Peace, on whom the Spirit of Peace did truly rest, to have made an end of this unnecessary contention between the Professors of the same Faith; yet this Mr. Henry Jeanes of Chedzoy will not rest contented with it. Because he hath once unhappily accused the Doctor of an Error which he is no way guilty of, which he never gave occasion to any man to believe his opinion, having never said it in those words which he sets up to refute in him, and never in any other that may reasonably be interpreted to that dangerous sense, he will still perversely continue to affix it on him.  
§. 2. And this is all the thanks that the Doctor hath gained by this his fair condescension, and labouring to undeceive this mistaken Author, and those that possibly might be deceived by him. His recompense is only the disturbing of his peace, the blasting of his name, and a provocation to a very impertinent and unnecessary debate in any times, but now highly dishonourable to the Glory of God, and the Protestant Religion, which is so every where assaulted, both by enemies from without, and unruly Professors and Pretenders to it within.  
§. 3. And though as the case now stands with our sad and very much afflicted Mother the Church, this contention might have been pardonable, if it had been carried with that innocence and candour as becomes Professors of Gospel-truths', though differing in Judgement in some petite and inconsiderable debates; yet to the great contentment of the Jesuit abroad, and the Quaker and Anabaptist at home, it is managed with such vehemence, and scorn, and Passion, as if the whole Honour and safety of Christian Religion did depend upon it.  
§ 4. And now, though his Opinion and Judgement is Orthodox, and altogether the same with that which the Author of the Mixture of Scholastical Divinity with practical undertook to maintain; yet his innocent language shall be arraigned of Ironies and scorn, and hypocritical high compliments, and his Tongue and Pen shall be concluded guilty, where his Heart and Tenants cannot. For thus he bespeaks the Doctor;  

JEANES.  
Whereas you term your Compliance with my desires, that you should Reply unto me, Obedience, I look upon it as a very high Compliment (for what am I that my desires should have with you the Authority of a Command?) and shall not be so uncharitable as to think it a Scoff, though some of my friends have represented it to me under that notion. But suppose it were meant in way of derision: yet this shall abate nothing of my gratitude for your Reply, which is a favour and honour of which I willingly confess myself to be unworthy.   
§. 5. In good time, Sr. And therefore since you are a Person of so tender sense and apprehension, that even Balsams and Perfumes offend you, I am now resolved to change the Method, and take another course in this rejoinder than the Doctor hath done. Nor shall I be troubled, if either yourself or nicer Friends shall account me sharp and Sarcastical, or tending to that which you interpret as scoff and derision.  
§. 6. If a Ruffling Gallant on the highways shall assault me or my friend, to take away our Purse, I shall not fear his accusations or threats of an Action of Defamation, if in an Hue and Cry, or Endictment, I call him Thief in the face of the Country.  
§. 7. I am not altogether unacquainted with the writings and practice of Physicians and Surgeons, and know by experience that Centaury and Wormwood, and Medicines of Rhubarb, are more pleasing and profitable to some Choleric distempers, than the choicest Confections Art can make of Honey and Sugar. I have seen Aegyptiacum and Cauteries have mundified putrid Ulcers, and cured that proud and spongy flesh that Oils and Lenitives had raised. And therefore I shall not compliment you into the suspicion of an Irony; and when I find you grossly ignorant, I shall in plain English tell you so; nor shall I be afraid to call you Sophister, where you endeavour to abuse your Reader by a prevaricating Elench.  
§. 8. I see you arrogate to yourself the glorious Attribute of a School-man, and every where pride yourself in your Scholastical discourse. The Logician still disputes or fights (as they speak) pugno contracto. His fist is always clutched, to show the power and the strength of his discourse. And therefore I care not, if you are offended that I do not struck you on the cheek with the soft extended palm of a charming Rhetorician. I shall use the plain and rough Language of the Schools, with which you would be thought to be very well acquainted.  
§. 9 In Sparta, Story tells us, that plain, but warlike Nation, were wont to call Ligonem, Ligonem, or as we say in our Language, a Spade, a Spade. And therefore in a contest with a Lacedaemonian, I shall not fear the imputation of rude and unmannerly, if, even the Areopagites being Judges, I should not court him with the smoothness and soft expressions of Athens.  
§. 10. I speak not this to justify Scurrility, or maintain reproachful Language. I know that 
(a) Judas v. 9  Michael disputing even with the Devil himself about the body of Moses, durst not bring against him any railing accusation. I acknowledge it to be most Christian advice of the Apostle, and worthy all acceptation, when he says, 
(b) Gal. 6. 1.  Brethren, if a man be overtaken in a fault, ye which are spiritual, restore such a man in the spirit of Meekness, considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted.  
§. 11. Yet when I find such gentle courses serve only to inflame an Adversary with pride and disdain, I must remember his counsel to Timothy, and Reprove such an one openly, that others 
1 Tim. 5. 20.  also may fear.  
§. 12. I confess, I have no regret at all to your Person, nor do I envy you the Acquests you have gotten in School-Learning, too much a stranger nowadays. No such unchristian Temptation has drawn me from my obscure private shade into the Sunshine. It is only love of truth, and the vindicating a Learned Man's name, who was resolved to confute you by his neglect, and pursue nobler thoughts than such poor and trivial controversies, has brought me into the Theatre.  
§. 13. And now, if I prove you not extremely ignorant of the first Principles, and very Elements of Logic and Philosophy; if I do not demonstrate that you quote School-Authors at random, which you never read; if I make it not evident, that you have either ignorantly, or, which is worse, most wilfully mistake the Doctor's meaning, and imposed an Assertion on him which he never meant, and will as readily dis-own as you yourself (which yet, for all that, you have not where confuted, at least to any purpose;) if I make it not clear as the Sun at Noon, that you have not urged one Author to purpose; nay, that all the Authors almost you have cited, do directly make against you; let me then be decried for the most monstrous Railer and Sycophant, or any worse thing, that Christianity abominates.  
14. This course I confess is no ways pleasing to me, and I had rather use (as he counselled) soft words and hard Arguments, because I find by experience that Truth is never at a greater loss, than in a Personal Dispute, and the discovery of the Error and mistakes of an Adversary that are nothing to the Cause.  
§. 15. But let the world be Judge, what other course should be taken with such a touchy Opposite, that is offended with the Doctor for saying, He should make no scruple to obey his desires, and has vouchsafed him that Reply, which he confesses he is unworthy of. I have found by experience, that if you softly handle the Nettle, it will sting you for your Courtesy: but if you roughly crush it, you shall find it a very innocent Plant, and not able to offend you. Since therefore I perceive this Refuter has somewhat of this angry Herb in him, it will be necessary for my own defence that I handle him accordingly.  
§. 16. But let me tell you, Sir, the Doctor is too much a Christian to be guilty of high Compliments in Theological discourses; and he is too Charitable and humble to scoff and deride an Adversary, though never so weak and unworthy. All the world sees, that though his Ink be black and lasting, yet he has no Copperas and Gall in it; nor could the intemperate Language of any Scurrilous Opposite yet tempt him to forgo his settled Meekness and Patience. Your Friends then that represented to you that fair and civil expression of the Doctors under the notion of a Scoff, were the only Authors of it, and you must accuse them of the Derision that feigned it, where it was not at all intended.  
§. 17. And now if what you add in this Paragraph, has in sincerity fallen from your Pen; and if also, though it had been intended by the Doctor not only as an high compliment, but a scoff (as you and your Friends do vainly fancy) yet it shall abate nothing of your gratitude to him for his Reply (which is a favour and honour you justly confess yourself unworthy of, unless you had made better use of it;) I shall not despair, but that my plain and downright managing this Controversy against you may be acceptable, and that you will yet thank me for my severest reproofs, which, if I be not very much mistaken, will show you more ignorant than either yourself or Admirers imagine. And I have good hopes yet, that you may prove Senex bonae indolis, and acknowledge your mistakes in a public Recantation: which will be as great an Honour to yourself, as a Repairing the Doctor's Credit, which you have to the great disservice of the Church so unworthily blasted, whose Labours in God's Vineyard are made by it unfruitful to many that might otherwise have profited by them. For you immediately add;  

JEANES.  
The best testimony I can give you of my thankfulness is, to assure you, that if in the Exceptions which you shall condescend to return to this Paper, you can prove that I have done you any Injury, you shall find me very ready to make you satisfaction. But if, on the contrary, you shall fail in such proof, I hope you will be so much a friend to the Truth, as to retract your mistake.   
§. 18. Say and hold, Sir, in the first, and then never doubt the latter. Remember the wholesome advice of Saint James, 
* Jam. 5. 12.  And let your yea, be yea. 
(a) Quod verbo promittitis id facto implete, sive id in agendo, sive in non agendo consistat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & promissum significat, & promissi implementum, ut videre est 2 Cor. 1. 18, 19, 21. Est igitur hic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut insimili dicto Judaeorum. Justi. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & Non est Non. Illud 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est promittentis, ut 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Graecis. H. Grot. in Loc.  Be not only a Minister of God's word, but a Christian, and make good your promise. And if I do not demonstrate, that you have every where done very much wrong to the Truth, and great Injury to the Doctor, its defender, I myself shall more readily make you satisfaction than you can desire it, and shall publicly retract whatsoever is here written. And the Doctor, I doubt not, will be more a friend to the Truth than his own reputation. And as I believe he is a great admirer of the Wit, and Parts, and Learning, and Piety of S. Austin; so I question not but he will be ready to show, that he no no where more applauds him, and thinks him fit to be followed, than in his Retractations.  
And now we are fallen upon the Business and matter of the Controversy.   

SECT. 3.  
The Refuter acknowledges the Doctor to assert the fullness of Christ's Habitual Grace. His Use of Confutation and after undertake groundless hereupon. The terms of the Question much altered by the Refuter in his rejoinder.  
This Refuter goes on and says,  

JEANES.  
You acknowledge that to affirm that Christ's Habitual Love of God was capable of further degrees, is a Contrariety to express words of Scripture. Now the Proposition which you thus disclaim, is the natural and unavoidable sequel of that you in this your Reply, §. 21. confess to be your Opinion; to wit, That the inward acts of Christ's Love were more intense at one time than another: and this I will make good by an Argument which I shall submit unto your severest examination.   
§. 1. BUt Sir, by the favour of this your irrefragable Argument, which you think will endure the Hammer and the Touch, the Fire and the Water of Separation, It is confessed then on all hands, and so by you acknowledged, that the Doctor plainly asserts, That to affirm That Christ's Habitual Love of God was capable of further Degrees, is a contrariety to express words of Scripture. What then, I pray Sir, is become of your Use of Confutation in your Mixture of Scholastical and Practical Divinity? Why then as conquered Ensigns must Doctor Hammond's innocent name serve to adorn the Index and several Pages of your Book? Will you by Hallifax-Law first execute, and then proceed to Judgement and enquiry? To what purpose else do you labour to conclude him guilty of that Error, which here he publicly disclaims, and proves could not possibly be his Opinion in that place you laboured in your Use of Confutation to oppose, by a Passage drawn from his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, §. 21. that was written long time after that your Use of Confutation was Penned and Published to the world?  
§. 2. When at 
* Secondly, this Point (of the dwelling of all fullness of Habitual Grace in Christ) may serve for confutation of a Passage in the Learned Doctor Hammond against Mr. Cawdrey, to wit, that Christ's Love of God was capable of further degrees. That I do not fasten this Tenet wrongfully upon him, will appear unto any rational man by his own words, which I will therefore transcribe. Doctor Hammond, p. 222. In the next place, etc. Jeanes Mixture of Scholastical Divinity with Pract. p. 258.  first in your Mixture of Scholastical Divinity with Practical, you publicly did attack the Doctor, you did confidently ground your Charge upon a Passage taken from his Account of Mr. Cawdreys' Triplex Diatribe. There you undertook to make it appear to any rational man, from his own words taken from that Treatise, that you did not fasten this Tenet of the denial of all fullness of Habitual Grace in Christ wrongfully upon him. There, there you expressly say, you will therefore transcribe his words, from that very Treatise. And have you not quoted the very Page, and taken the Passage thence at large, against which your Use of Confutation purposely was addressed, and all to show the Doctor's guilt, and your own fair innocence?  
§. 3. And is now that Task declined, since the Doctor's Public Vindication of his injured Fame? Is now that Passage, upon which your Use of Confutation was so expressly grounded, proved to be so clearly innocent, and so palpably misunderstood, that now of necessity you must have recourse to his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that was signally addressed against your Use of Confutation, to prove the Justice of it, and that ex consequenti only, by consequence, and not directly?  
§. 4. I appeal, Sir, to yourself, whether this be not an Injury to the Doctor's innocent Name and writings, to charge them with dangerous Errors, which you cannot prove, and which you do acknowledge that the Doctor does as publicly renounce as you yourself. If the Passage upon which at first you built your charge be guilty, to what purpose is this Tergiversation? why do you not prosecute, and make it good? why must his one and twentieth Paragraph in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be now arraigned, to prove him by deductions and by sequels guilty? If the Passage quoted by you from the Account be innocent, I hope you cannot so soon forget your promise, and we shall find you ready, Sir, to make the Doctor satisfaction, and let those words at least, you have so solemnly accused, be acquitted by you.  
§. 5. Howsoever, Sir, if you should not be so honest as to make good your public Promise, so ingenuous as to retract a causeless injury, done to an innocent, learned, highly-deserving Person (as indeed I look for little from you) yet I must desire the Reader to take notice that the Terms of the Question are much altered now, in this rejoinder, from what they were at first. At first this Refuter charged the Doctor with a direct and flat denial of the All-fulness of Habitual Grace in Christ, and for proof of this his Accusation, he quoted a Passage taken from the two hundredth twenty second Page of his Account of Mr. Cawdrey's triplex Diatribe, where, in the fourth and fifth Paragraphs of that Page, the words are truly found.  
§. 6. But since the Doctor in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 has so fully cleared himself from that Crimination, since there he has so publicly declared his Opinion of the All-fulness of Habitual Grace in Christ, and there professed (who best of all men knew his own opinions) that he never did think otherwise, but deemed it a contrariety to express words of Scripture in any man who should be of that Judgement, and, in short, having declared that he never gave occasion to any man to believe it his opinion, having never said it in those words which this Author sets up to refute in him, nor ever in any other that may be reasonably interpretable to that sense; Now this Refuter, in his rejoinder to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in pursuance, at least in Countenance, of his Use of Confutation, puts the Question thus;  
Whether this Assertion of the Doctors (in this his Reply or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 §. 21.) That the inward acts of Christ's Love were more intense at one time than another, does by natural and unavoidable sequel infer the intensive growth of Christ's habitual Love, which is always acknowledged all-full, and incapable of increase? But, as he said,  Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo? 
And yet I despair not, that though he never so often shift and change his shape, I shall halter him fast enough, and in a Line of his own twisting.  
The Question then being, not (as at the first) whether Doctor Hammond be guilty of a direct denial of the All-fulness of habitual Grace in Christ; (an Error pretended to be broached in his Account of Mr. Cawdrey's triplex Diatribe) but whether he may be proved to be thus guilty by consequence, drawn from a Passage §. 21. of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; the Replyer affirms it, and thinks he proves it by this Argument.  
And fit it is that we hasten to the consideration of it: for he faith, he shall submit it to the Doctor's severest examination. And now can the world judge, that it should be less evident than a Mathematical Demonstration, of which so acute and profound a School-man is so confident? Thus than it follows.   

SECT. 4.  
The Refuters Argument no ground of the Use of Confutation, unless he writes by inspiration. He confounds the Immanent Acts of Love with the Action of Loving. His Argument concerns not the Doctor's Assertion. The Acts of Divine Charity in Christ may gradually differ, where the Habit is the same. His frequent begging the Question and impertinence. Scheibler vainly quoted. What in that Author seemingly favourable to the Refuters pretences, censured. Immanent Acts truly Qualities. Proved. Not to be excluded out of the number of Entityes. Belong to the first species of Quality; why. Dispositions when imperfect things. The Acts of divine Love in Christ supernatural. Not ordained to further Habits. Grace the sole effect of God. Why these Acts called Dispositions. The Doctor a Metaphysician. The Refuters 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. His irrefragable Argument broken. More ridiculous for the Refuters Confidence.  

JEANES.  
Intention and Remission are primarily & per se only of Qualities: so that an Action is not capable of Degrees of Intention and Remission, but secondarily and mediante Qualitate, which it produceth, or from which it proceedeth 
(a) Collegium Complutens. de generatione & corrupt. dist. 4. q. 5. §. 11. 47. n: Scheibl. Metaph. l. 2. c. 12. num. 35, 36.  ratione termini or ratione principii. The Intention and Remission of Actions therefore must be proportioned unto that of the qualities which they regard, either as their terms or principles. Now you acknowledge in terminis, that the inward Acts of Christ's Love were more intense at one time than at another: and hereupon it undeniably and unavoidably followeth, that either the Terminus, some Quality that was the product of these inward Acts of Love, or else the Principium, some Quality that was the Principle of them, was more intense at one time than at another.  
If you say that the Terminus, some Quality that was the Product of these inward Acts, was more intense at one time than another: why then, first you must tell us what this Quality is, and in what Species of quality it is placed. It cannot with any colour of probability be ranked under any other of the four Species of quality than the first; and if it be put there, it must be either dispositio or habitus. Now dispositio is such an imperfect inchoate thing, as that I am very loath to think so dishonourably of my Saviour, as to ascribe it to him. If you make it an Habit, than you will run upon the Opinion which you disown, for it can be no other than a Moral Habit, and therefore in Christ it must be a virtuous and gracious Habit. To affirm therefore that this quality was more intense at one time than at another, will be by just consequence to affirm that a gracious habit in Christ was more intense at one time than another. 2. Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate, and therefore I shall reject this Quality è Numero Entium; unless you can by convincing Arguments prove a necessity of asserting of it. I am not ignorant that it is a common opinion that Omnis Actio habet terminum. But how it fails in Immanent actions, you may see (if you will vouchsafe to stoop so low) in Scheiblers Metaphysics §. 2. c. 10. t. 3. ar. 3. punct. 1.  
If you take the other way, & say that the Principle, Quality producing these inward Acts of Christ's Love of God, was more intense at one time than at another; why then you grant that which you seem to deny. For the Principle of them is nothing else but the habitual Grace of Divine Love, and therefore you aver that the habitual Grace of Christ was capable of farther intention. And thus you see what the reason was that induced me to charge you with this Opinion.   
§. 1. ANd are you sure, Sir, that thus we see what the reason was that induced you to charge the Doctor with this Opinion? Will you then be thought not only a School-man, but a Prophet too? Is your Study at Chedzoy like the * Sibylls 
Virg. Aeneid. lib. 6. circa init.  Cave, where you are no sooner entered, but you are possessed with a Spirit of Divination, and write by Rapture and Enthusiasms? How else could a Passage drawn from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, written and published half a year after that your Use of Confutation had been printed, be a ground and reason to persuade you to affix that Error on him in your Mixture? Unless you had the Spirit of Prophecy, when you penned that use, and foresaw the Passage that the Doctor afterwards would publish, this could not be the Motive that induced you thus to charge him.  
§. 2. But this is one of the smallest misadventures our Refuter will appear guilty of: and therefore I shall not fix upon it, especially since it matters not much, if the Doctor be proved obnoxious to the Error charged upon him, what the Reason was that first did move him to confute it.  
§. 3. Yet for his comfort I must tell him, that as his first undertaking was altogether groundless, so this whole Process is ridiculous, and only a great heap of Errors and mistakes.  
§. 4. For first, he very ignorantly or wilfully confounds the Immanent Acts of Love with the Action of Loving, things that are toto genere different. For this is a Praedicamental Action, and the other are Qualities specifically distinct from the habit of Love, as shall in due place be demonstrated. And he could not but know that the Doctor positively does maintain it in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and therefore must not by the Rules of Art be supposed to be otherwise, without a Pitiful begging of the Question, till the contrary has been proved against him. This Argument then of which he is so confident, that he shall submit it to the Doctors most severe examination, at the very first glance appears an empty Paralogism, that cannot conclude any thing against the Doctor. For the Syllogism, let it be put into whatsoever form this Refuter can devise, will consist of four terms (the Doctor by the Acts of Love, in the Conclusion, to be brought against him, meaning the Quality of Actual Love, and the Refuter in one of the Premises by the Acts of Love understanding the Predicamental Action of Loving) and consequently there can be no opposition, because it cannot be ad idem.  
§. 5. But than secondly, suppose we his Discourse were artificial, yet it will not at all concern the Assertion of the Doctor. For Intention and Remission is properly a gradual heightening or abatement of the same Numerical Form, as we shall hereafter prove. But the Doctor never affirms, as I can find, that the selfsame Numerical Act of Holy Love in Christ was more intense at one time than at another, which this Argument supposes. He only affirms that Christ in one Act of Divine Love, or holy Charity, (for this alone the Doctor means, as shall in due place be evidenced, though this Refuter either ignorantly or wilfully mistakes it, for that high and most transcendent Act of Love that was immediately fixed on God as its proper Object) was more ardent than in another, as, in his dying for us, than in his suffering Hunger, Poverty, Nakedness for our sakes: or that this inward Act of divine Charity in Christ was more ardent and intense than those other were.  
Now this Assertion, as it is a Truth clearly demonstrable (and shall in due place be made good) so it is not any ways concerned in this Argument of the Refuter.  
§. 6. For though true it is, that Actions are not intended, but by reason of Qualities; yet this nothing hinders, but that one individual Action may Comparatively and Respectively be more intense than another, even where the gradual height of both is supposed to be still Simply and Absolutely invariable, still the same. For instance; Illumination is a proper Praedicamental Action; and yet Sense and experience tells us, that the illumination of the Sun, and the illumination of any one of the fixed Stars, are gradually different, and yet the illumination of both is still the same in itself, and never varies, but by accident, in respect of the variety of the Medium, or distance: because the Original light of the Sun and Stars is still invariable. 
* Aristot. li. 2. the Generate. & corrupt. c. 10. text. 56.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, says the great Philosopher, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
(a) Causa necessaria ad aliquod agendum determinata est, agitque quando & quantum potest. Burgersdic. Log. li. 1. c: 17. theor. 13. Vid. commentar. Agentia pure naturalia recte se habentia, ad unum natura sunt determinata, ut sublatis impedimentis externis, non possunt non id producere; ut patet exemplo corporum coelestium, etc. Wendelin. Contemp. Physic. Sect. 1. Part. 1. c. 4. p. ●00. So also Scheibler. Metaphys. l. 1. c. 22. tit. 8. art. 2. n. 96.  For all natural Causes continuing still the same, do always work alike, because they work by a necessity of nature, and to the utmost of their strength and might.  
§. 7. And therefore notwithstanding this Refuters' Argument, I see no reason why also it may not be so in respect of the several individual Acts of Christ's Love, and that, though they in themselves be supposed to continue still invariable, of one equal intention in themselves, they may not yet, in comparison and respect of one another, be said to be more or less ardent and intense.  
§. 8. For thirdly (to show this Refuters Discourse yet more impertinent) though most certain it is (as the Doctor clearly grants and maintains) that the Habit of Divine Charity in Christ was the facto always at the height, and in its utmost fullness that a finite Nature was capable of; yet it is not therefore necessary that every Act of holy Charity should be always in its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and full height: nor will it thence follow, that every Act of this Habit should be equally intense with the Cause from whence it flows; but may differ in degrees not only from the Habit, but also from all other Acts springing from it; unless this Refuter can by other Arguments than this prove a necessity of the gradual determination and equality of intenseness of the several Acts with the Habit.  
§. 9 Now all things that are any ways determined, must of necessity be determined either ab intrinseco, or ab extrinseco; from some internal cause, and necessity of nature, or from some outward bounds and limitations.  
§. 10. Ab intra there can be imagined no determination possible, as his Master Scheibler may teach him. For the Habit or Principle of these Immanent Acts is not necessary and determined in its Operations, but an absolute 
* Of the difference between Natural & Voluntary Agents, Vid. Scheibler. Metaphys. li. 1. c. 22. tit. 8. art. 2. n. 96. De actibus liberis censeo etiam certum, nec de potentia absoluta posse liberos esse, nisi effectiuè fiant à potentia libera cujus sunt Actiones, ut in superioribus tactum est. Suarez. Metaphys. disp. 47. Sect. 2. §. 9 p. 557.  free Cause, as the Will itself is, wherein it is subjected, with which it coeffectively still concurres to the Production of the Acts, because (as it is confessed by this Refuter in this very Argument) it is a Moral Habit, that is only seated in the Will.  
§. 11. Ab extra the Habit cannot be supposed to be determined in its Operations to one absolute height and degree of intenseness, without a manifest Petitio Principii, till it be proved against the Doctor. For the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Quaesitum between the Doctor and Refuter (occasioned by a Passage in Mr. Cawdrey against the Treatise of Will-worship) is, Whether the actual Grace of Divine Love or holy Charity, commanded by God, does consist in a latitude, and that, though the sincerity of that Grace be always necessary, by reason of God's command, yet the full height and perfection in the utmost degree of intention possible, in every Act is not; so that though the more intense be the more perfect, and, Morally in itself and by itself considered, more valuable, yet the less intense is not sinful, and therefore may upon occasion be lawfully and commendably made use of, and chosen.  
§. 12. This the Refuter knows that the Doctor affirms, and undertakes to mantain as well against himself as Mr. Cawdrey. And therefore to suppose the contrary without proof, and to argue against his Adversary upon such a supposition, what is it but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to beg the Question in the very entry of the Discourse? A Quality very commendable in a writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity.  
§. 13. But I shall wave all these misadventures also. And now having in general shown the weakness and impertinence of his Discourse, I shall gratify him so far, as to consider punctually that part wherein the only seeming strength lies.  
§. 14. It is this. If these Acts are Qualities ranked under the first Species, they must be either Dispositions or Habits: but you cannot say they are Dispositions: and therefore you must affirm them to be Habits, which is to assert by consequence that which you just now denied. He proves the Assumption by three Reasons. First, because Disposition is such an imperfect and inchoate thing, that he is loath to think so dishonourably of our Saviour as to ascribe it to him. Secondly, because Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate: and therefore he shall reject this Quality è numero Entium, unless the Doctor can by convincing Arguments prove a necessity of asserting it. And thirdly, because he is not ignorant that it is a common Opinion, that Omnis Actio habet terminum; but how it fails in immanent Actions, the Doctor may see (if he will vouchsafe to stoop so low) in Scheiblers Metaphysics.  
§. 15. And these are the three proofs upon which the whole strength of his Argument, and his Book too, does depend. But this threefold Cord is very easily broken. And for our more orderly proceeding, I shall answer it ordine Retrogrado, beginning with the last first.  
§. 16. To that then I answer, That,  
Though I conceive it too low for the Doctor to consult such vulgar Authors, in a question of this importance, yet I will see whether I can learn it from him. For I am sure 
* Tertia sententia est, De ratione Actionis, ut sic, esse, quod habeat Terminum quem intrinsecè respiciat, idque proîndè commune esse omni Actioni quae à verâ causâ efficiente proficiseatur. Haec communior Sententia Theologorum in 1. dist. 27. praesertim Durandi & Gabriel. 9 q. 2. sumiturque ex Scoto, q. 3. & quodlib. 8. & ex Bonaventurâ in 1. dist. 3. art. 1. q. 1. & ult. & ex Antonio Andred 9 Metaphys. q. 4. & aliis circa citatum textum Aristotelis. Et hanc Sententiam existimo omnino veram. Ex quoniam, ut dixi, de Actione transeunte nulla est controversia, declaranda prius est veritas hujus sententiae in Actione immanente, & deinde confirmabitur absolutè de Actione ut sic. Suarez. Metaphys. didst 48. sect. 2. n. 7. pag. 556.  I have been taught the contrary by very able Philosophers, and to me they seem to have great reason on their sides.  
What then says Scheibler to this purpose in the place quoted by our Refuter? and let us duly consider it.  
The question indeed is, An omnis Actio habeat Terminum? Concerning which he reckons up first three Opinions, and then he adds his own, Ego quod mihi videatur hâc in re per distinct as propositiones propono.  
Now the first is, 1. Dico, Actiones immanentes revera sum Actiones.  
Be it granted; for I know no able Philosopher, especially of late, that denies it, and the contrary Arguments have sufficiently been answered by Suarez and others.  
The second is, 2. Dico, Actiones immanentes aliquae non habent terminum, aliquae eosdem habent.  
The third, which follows by way of Corollary from the former, 3. Dico, Actio ut sic non dicit respectum ad terminum.  
And this is all that Scheibler undertakes to maintain in the place quoted by the Refuter. Vide Scheib. Metaphys. l. 2. c. 10. tit. 3. art. 3. punct. 1. n. 26. ad 36.  
§. 17. But now how these Assertions, if all were granted, can any ways advantage the Refuters present Argument, I leave any man to judge. For Scheibler expressly asserts, That as some immanent Actions have no Terms, so others of them have; and he proves it by an Instance borrowed from Julius Scaliger against Cardan, Exercit. 307. Sect. 28. & Exercit. 1. Sect. 3.  
§. 18. Now to prove that nulla Actio immanens habet terminum (which must be the Refuters Proposition, if he speak any thing to the purpose; for how else will he prove that the immanent Acts of Love have no Terms by this Medium?) by this assertion of Scheibler, that speaks only of some such, and proves the contrary of others, will be impossible, till he can show us a new Mood and Figure to prove an Universal by a Particular.  
§. 19 Indeed it might have been somewhat to the purpose, if that Author had undertaken to prove that either the Operations of Infused Habits, or particularly the Operations of the Divine Habit of Charity, had no Terminus. But this as it is most false in itself (as shall in due place be evinced) so that Author undertakes not to maintain.  
§. 20. All that seems to look that way is this, §. 29, 30. in the proof of the second Proposition. Patet autem utrumque. Nam inprimis datur aliquis Actus immanens 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sive effectivus, quo agens aliquid facit in seipso, veluti est operatio quâ facimus Syllogismum in ment, etc.— Secundo, quod non omnes Actus immanentes habeant Terminos, patet, quia secus omnes Actus immanentes essent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sive effectivi. Per terminum enim nunc ille intelligitur qui per Actionem producitur. At Actio post quam aliud relinquitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est, sive effectrix. Absurdum autem est omnes Actiones esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut saltem patet ex discrimine Artis & Prudentiae apud Aristot. l. 6. Eth. quae per Agere & Facere distinguuntur: et confirmatur, quod null us possit dari terminus qui producatur per actiones aliquas immanentes. Quid enim producit v●g intellectio vel visio? Nihil hic dici specio sius potest, quam quod per istos actus producatur Notitia habitualis. Sed haec inprimis per acoidens est ad actus illos, ut hic etiam fatetur Suarez. d. l. aliique. But now how far short this is of Proof, will appear to any man that considers either the nature of the things themselves, or what Suarez has delivered in this Argument in the place quoted by this Author.  
§. 21. The whole strength of the Argument is built upon the force of this Consequence, Si omnes Actus immanentes habeant terminum, Ergo omnes actus immanentes sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sive effectivi. Now this Sequel is very infirm, nor has he brought any thing material to countenance it. 
(a) 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Arist. l. 6. Eth. c. 4. §. 2.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. ib. §. 1.   For if he take the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sive effectivi properly, as Effection is distinguished from Action, as he seems to do by his quotation from Aristotle, as also by his 
(b) Ad primum respondeo, omnem actionem esse causalitatem; sed non omnis causalitas est per modum productionis propriè & rigoresè, pet quam sc. producatur aliquid post actionem remanens, etc. Scheibler. ibid. §. 82.  answer to the first reason of Suarez, it is most evidently false.  
§. 22. For first, it is not true of all transient Actions, that are acknowledged to be terminated in Qualities, ut res producatur permanens transacto actu, which is proper to Manual effections, and the like Artificial Productions. For Illumination is properly a Praedicamental transient Action 
c Suarez. Metaphys. disp. 48. sect. 2. §. 17. p. 558.  productiva proprii termini, scil. Luminis, quod tamen ita ab illuminatione dependet, ut illuminatione cessante seu transactâ non manet, an Action this that so depends upon the constant influx of the Sun, that it no sooner sets or is eclipsed, but it instantly vanishes: unless (which yet is nothing to the present Argument) we may give credit to what Galileus doth somewhere relate, That there are a sort of stones found in Italy (as I take it) that are of a spongy & pumiceous substance, that will imbibe and fix the Rays of the Sun, and retain the Light in them for four or five days together. And therefore it follows not, that if Actions immanent be Praedicamental Actions, and have their Terminos, that therefore their terms must remain, as in Artificial productions and operations most commonly they do. For though it be affirmed to be essential to every Praedicamental Action to have its term, yet it is accidental to a Praedicamental Action, ut sic, to have its term, produced by that Action, permanent and lasting after the Action is ended. For even that Author in this very discourse 
* Scheibler. Metaphys. l. 2. c. 10. tit. 3. art. 3. punct. 1. n. 36.  acknowledgeth that Quod convenit alicui quatenus ipsum, convenit omni sub illo comprehenso.  
§. 23. Nor, secondly, is it true of all Actions that are Artificial, and, according to Aristotle's 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. Eth. l. 6. c. 4. §. 1.  determination in the place quoted by that Author, confessedly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that their terms and work does remain after the Action is past: as appears in the Artificial actions of singing, and playing on the Lute and other Musical Instruments. And this is sufficient to prove the inconsequence of his Argument, and the weakness of whatsoever Proof the Refuter shall draw from it.  
§. 24. But than it was a plain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in that Author, to prove that some immanent Actions have no terms, because nothing produced by them remains. For one thing it is for an Action to be productive of a Quality, another thing to produce a Quality that is permanent after the Action is finished. And even 
(b) Dico de intrinseca ratione Actionis ut sic, et omnis Actionis esse, ut habeat terminum ad quem tendit ut producendum per ipsam, & consequenter in essentiali & completo conceptu Actionis includi transcendentalem respectum ad hujusmodi terminum. Prior pars probatur etc. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 48. text. 2. §. 16. pag. 558.  Suarez, (as good a Metaphysician sure as Scheibler) that undertakes to demonstrate (and in my Judgement has done it) that it is essential to every Action, ut sic, to have its term, does make this to be a difference between Immanent and Transient Actions, that in these the terms are still permanent, unless by accident, in the other they are not, but are still dependent upon the Actions by which they are produced. His words are these:  
Differentia ergo consistit in hoc, quod Actio Immanens non habet unquam terminum permanentem post ipsam: Actio verò Transeuns regulariter illam habet, quanquam interdum ac rarò aliter evenit. In quo etiam est differentia, nam quando id quod fit per actionem transcuntem non permanet, solum est ob imperfectionem, vel imperfectam participationem, ratione cujus non potest permanere, nisi actu conservetur: sic Sonus, qui est terminus factus per actionem cytharizandi aut cantandi, non permanet ob imperfectionem suam, & Lumen, & similia. At vero in Actionibus immanentibus & vitalibus id provenit ex peculiari quadam naturâ pertinente ad Perfectionem, sunt enim ultimi actus vitae, & ideo permanere non possunt sine actuali influxu Principii vitalis. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 48. sect. 2. §. 21. pa. 559.  
§. 25. And now if our Refuter shall think fit to lodge any strength upon Scheiblers Confirmation, I shall refer him for an answer to Scotus, l. 1. Sentent. d. 3. q. 6. where he shall find this largely discussed, that though Habitual knowledge be not the intrinsic term of these Operations, sed quasi consequens & extrinsecus, and that Operationes hujusmodi possunt intelligi & esse sine habitu, ut patet in habentibus habitum intentissimum, ut in Beatis, and in Christ in respect of habitual Grace, which was always in him in its utmost height possible; yet they cannot possibly be or conceived to be without Actual knowledge, the Quality that terminates them. To this purpose also may the same Scotus be seen, l. 1. Sent. d. 3. q. ult. s. 130. et 1. Sent. d. 27. q. 3. p. 347. ad 3. ex edit. Cavelli.  
§. 26. But this is plainly a Metaphysical Parergon, and no way subservient to the design of the Refuter. And therefore to return;  
§. 27. Though it were granted to his great Master Scheibler, that some immanent Actions have no Terms (which yet at first sight seems very absurd;) yet plain it is that the Acts of this divine habitual Grace of holy Charity are terminated in the Quality of actual holy Love. And for his learning in this point (of which he professes himself so totally ignorant) I should think fit to refer him to Ruvio's Logica Mexicana, as grave an Author as his Scheibler, or the Author of the Collegium Complutense.  
§. 28. His words most pertinent to this purpose are these; — Cum omnis motus vel actio sit via in terminum per ipsum productum, quaelibet harum actionum (sc. appetitus sensitivi) proprium habet terminum, & quidem terminus transmutationis corporalis sensu percipitur— Terminus vero actionis appetitus non percipitur sensu, quemadmodum neque actio ipsa: Iram enim, nisi aliqua alteratione Corporis ostendatur, vel certe verbis aut signis, non agnoscimus; sed cum sit Actio corporea, absque dubio habet proprium terminum, nomine ejusdem actionis significatum, ut ostendunt Operationes Voluntatis & similes. Dum enim Voluntas rem aliquam Amore prosequitur, Actio ipsa Amandi suum habet terminum in eadem voluntate productum, nempe Amorem actualem, quemadmodum actio Intellectus verbum mentale; sed eodem nomine significamus Actionem & Terminum, nempe Amoris Actualis. Ita ergo de Actibus appetitus intelligendum est, Amorem sensitivum, Irae & Gaudii motus, suos habere Terminos inneminatos, quos iisdem nominibus ac actus ipsos nominamus, nempe actualem Amorem, actualem Iram & Gaudium. Et rursus, quemadmodum Amor actualis per Actum Voluntatis productus, & Verbum mentale per Actum Intellectus, sunt Qualitates, cum tamen Dilectio & Intellectio sunt Actiones; pari ratione de Actibus Appetitus sentiendum est, etc. Ruu. Log. Mexicana, lib. Praedicam. c. 8. q. 4. in solut. dubii 2. p. 1184, 1185.  
§. 29. But yet if this Author should seem too obscure and mean for a writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinities perusal, I shall refer him to that very Suarez, whom he himself recommends to the Doctor's inspection, and yet not so much to his Authority as his Reason; though yet oportet discentes credere, among whom in this point he confesses himself to be. His words are these, 
* Vide Suarez. Metaph. disp. 48. sect. 2.  Prima erat instantia de Actibus immanentibus, quam multi expediunt negantes illas esse Qualitates, sed Actiones tantum, quae inter Thomistas videtur esse valde recepta opinio, ut infra videbimus tractando de Praedicamentis Actionis, ut ibi ostendemus; tamen negari non potest, quin illa actio aliquem habeat terminum intrinsecum qui per eam fiat, ut ibidem ostendemus: ille autem terminus non potest esse nisi Qualitas, ut facile patebit discurrendo per caetera Praedicamenta. Item secundum hos Actus verè dicimur Quales, nempe boni aut mali, scientes, Amantes, irati, etc. Item high actus sunt formae ultimo actuantes ac perficientes ipsas substantias quibus insunt; ergo convenit illis communis ratio Qualitatis supra assignata. Atque haec sententia est communis inter authores: cam tenet D. Thomas opusc. 48. & Soncinas 5. Metaphys. q. 36. & Latius l. 9 q. 21. Ferrariensis 2. contra Gentes, c. 82. & 2. de Anima, q. 12. Hervaeus quodlib. 9 q. 8. Aegid. tract. de Mensur. Angel. q. 10. Et in eadem sententia est Scotus, 1 Sent. d. 3. q. 6. §. Hic sunt, & Quodlib. 12. §. Ad tertium Principale: quem sequuntur Scotistae, praesertim Antonius Andreas 9 Metaphys. q. 4. & idem sentiunt Durand. Gabriel. 1 Sent. d. 27. q. 2. Thus Suarez. Metaphys. disp. 42. sect. 5. §. 13.  
§. 30. Howsoever, though he thinks fit to refer the Doctor, because he is a Critic, to learn some Metaphysics from Scheibler; yet I will be so civil to him, because he is a Schoolman, to refer him for his learning in this point to one of the subtlest of those Doctors. And let Scotus be the man: it is l. 1. Sent. d. 27. q. 3. §. 19 ad tertium. The place is short, but full, and not taken notice of by Suarez. And the words are these: Ad Tertium, concedo quod Notitia est proles & verè genita, sed productio illa non est actualis intellectio, quia, ut dictum est supra, actualis intellectio non est Actio de genere Actionis, sed est Qualitas nata terminare talem actionem, quae significatur per hoc quod est dicere, vel in communi per hoc quod est elicere; non igitur Verbum est aliquid productum actione, quae est intellectio, quia ipsa intellectio non est productiva alicujus, sed ipsa est producta actione quae est de genere actionis, sicut dictum est supra. He here refers to the place quoted by Suarez, 1. Sent. d. 3. q. 6. p. 110. col. 2. n. 31. & ib. q. ult. p. 130. ex edit. cavel. where he has very solidly proved it.  
§. 31. And thus we have Reason and Authority sufficient to clear this point, That Actual Love is a Quality flowing from the Habit of Divine Love, that terminates the immanent Action of Loving, which, for want of sufficient words, are both comprehended under the same common name of the Immanent Acts of Charity or Divine Love. And therefore to come to his second Argument.  
§. 32. Though, as he truly says, Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate; yet these Qualities that terminate immanent Acts, and are produced by them, particularly the Quality of Actual Love, that proceeds from the energetical operation and working of the divine Grace of holy Charity (of which the Scriptures and Fathers and all Divines are so full) must not be excluded out of the number of Entities for this Refuters Grave saying, till he can more solidly prove that all immanent Acts, and particularly this of Divine Love, are purely Actions not terminated in Qualities of the same name with the immanent Acts or Actions themselves. And so I come to his first Argument, the Forlorn hope of the Cause.  
§. 33. If they be Qualities, they must most probably be ranked under the first of the four Species, etc.  
§. 34. To this let the same Suarez, to make it more authentic, give answer. Metaph. tom. 2. dist. 42. sect. 5. §. 15. Supposito ergo, says he, quoth high Actus sint Qualitates, videri potest alicui esse collocandas in tertiâ specie, tum quia sunt termini suarum Actionum, tum etiam quia Aristoteles Passiones Animae in illâ specie collocat, ut Iram, Gaudium, etc. quae tamen Actus immanentes sunt: sed hae rationes non urgent, jam enim diximus, esse terminum Actionis, non esse adaequatam vel essentialem rationem illius tertiae speciei. Passiones autem animae per se ipsae ut sunt actus immanentes, non pertinent ad tertiam speciem, sed secundum id à quo accipiunt nomen Passionis, nimirum ex alteratione quam in corpore efficiunt, & ex termino ejus. Dicendum ergoest hos Actus aut Qualitates primae speciei & propriissimè sub nomine & ratione Dispositionis comprehendi. Ita sentiunt frequentius Authores citati, qui hos Actus Qualitates esse docent, & juxta omnes rationes sufficientiae supra adduct as id ostendi potest. Name high Actus secundum se internae Qualitates sunt, atque adventitiae, non enim suntinnatae: ergo juxta sententiam Simplicii in prima specie collocandi sunt. Rursus, hae Qualitates sunt maximè convenientes vel disconvenientes secundum naturam, & per eam efficimur boni vel mali: ergo pertinent ad primam speciem, juxta secundam illam sententiam, ut notavit Fonseca lib. 5. c. 14. q. 1. sect. 3. quia neque sunt objecta sensuum, nec termini motus seu Passionis propriè sumptae. Juxta ultimam vero rationem sufficientiae à nobis datam, res est manifesta; quia hi Actus sunt Perfectiones ultimae Potentiarum: sed in prima specie collocantur omnes Qualitates quae ad actuandas & determinandas Potentias institutae sunt: ergo ad illam pertinent hujusmodi Actus.  
Thus Suarez.  
§. 35. But let the bold Jesuit think what he please, yet our modest, humble Refuter dares not think so dishonourably of our Blessed Saviour, as to attribute such imperfect inchoate things as Dispositions unto him: and the Doctor cannot say they are Habits, without contradicting himself, and embracing the Error he would seem to renounce.  
§. 36. But here our Refuter, though he pretend to be a Schoolman, betrays his gross Ignorance, and is abundantly mistaken. For though Dispositions, which are in order to Acquisite Habits, are inchoate and imperfect things, and to attribute such to our Blessed Saviour might be justly deemed to derogate from the fullness of his supernaturally infused habit of Divine Grace; yet the Qualities that terminate Immanent Acts issuing from that Divine Habit, are not in themselves inchoate and imperfect, and ordained to further Habits, but are all perfect in their kinds, or may be even as intensively perfect as the Habit from whence they proceed. Such were those Acts of divine Love in our Blessed Saviour, that had God himself for their immediate Object.  
§. 37. Now this distinction of Acts in order to Habits he might have been pleased to have learned from his own Master Scheibler, that learned it from Scaliger: Actiones sunt duplices in respectu ad Habitum. Aliae sunt antecedentes eum, aliae consequentes: istae igitur sunt causae habituum, hae vero sunt effecta. Vtrumque eleganter expressit Scaliger Exer. 307. sect. 4. p. 
* Mihi p. 884.  925. Affectus, inquit, est motus animi nondum exiens in actum, veluti misericordia, aut ira. Ex his educitur Actio vel ad sublevandum inopem, vel ad opprimendum authorem offensionis, ita sane, si prius appetivero sublevationem aut oppressionem. Is igitur est ordo; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, affectus, misericordia; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, appetitus, cui non est hic nomen positum; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, incitatio motus illius interni ad actionem; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, actio, quae est sublevatio. Cujus multiplici repetitione quasi fabricatur habitus qui ejusdem nominis cum affectu est, quo ritè dicor et ero misericors. Actiones igitur quae hactenus fuerunt sunt antecedentes, quae per modum causae comparantur ad habitus. jam vero subjicit Scaliger, A quo deinde habitu certae & imprepeditae fluunt actiones, non autem incertae, quales ante ipsum fiebant, bonae quidem, sed non bene. Atque hae actiones sunt consequentes, & sic effecta habituum. Scheibler. l. 2. Metaph. c. 8. n. 104.  
§. 38. Now plain it is that all 
(a) Est enim Habitus Acquisitus, qui per proprios actus hominis operantis efficitur— Infusus autem habitus, qui per influxum solius Dei obtinetur— Addendum est, duobus modis posse habitum infundi à Deo: uno modo, quia ex naturâ suâ non est aliter producibilis, nec per actus, nec per aliam causam creatam; alio modo, ex sola voluntate & Potentiâ Dei Ita distinguunt Theologi duplicem habitum infusum. Priorem vocant infusum per se, & natura sua postulat ita, & non aliter, fieri: Posteriorem vocant infusum per accidens; non quia, quando infunditur à Deo, non per se ac propriè fiat per infusionem tanquam per actionem per se terminatam ad illum; sed quia talis habitus per se non postulat illum modum productionis, acciditque illi ex voluntate & potentiâ extrinsecae causae ut ita fiat. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 13. n. 5, 6. pa. 461.  infused Habits, that are peculiarly such, (of which kind are the three Theological Graces, and in particular the All-full, All-perfect habit of Divine Grace in Christ) as they are in themselves things purely supernatural, the sole effects of God's Goodness, and Mercy, and Power, so, because they are such, they are not 
(b) 
Habitus Acquisiti causantur ex actibus nostris; Infusi autem non, sed tantum à Deo: propter quod actus nostri se habent ad habitus acquisitos aliqualiter effectiuè; ad Charitatem autem & ad habitus infusos non, sed tantum dispositiuè, & per modum meriti. Et hoc tam respectu infusionis, quant respectu augmenti: quia ex eisdem fit acquisitio & ejus augmentum. Durand. l. 1. Sent. d. 17. q. 8. §. quantum ad primum L. p. 46. col. 1. vide Suarez. Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 11. §. 43. — Ab eodem generatur habitus & augmentatur, ex 2. Ethic. generatur autem habitus hujus charitatis à Deo, igitur & augmentatur ab ipso: hoc autem— quia Deus augendo addit aliam realitatem praecedenti— Dico ergo— quod est ibi nova realitas addit● praeexistenti, sicut partes vel gradus, non quidditativi, sed individuales & existentiae. Scotus l. 1. Sent. d. 17. q. 6. n. 3, 4.  
Duplici ratione aliqui habitus homini à Deo infunduntur. Prima ratio est, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae natura, quae est ultima & perfecta hominis Beatitudo, ut supra dictum est. Et quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad hujusmodi finem disponentes excedant facultatem humanae naturae: unde tales habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divinâ. Alia ratio est, quia Deus potest producere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis causis secundis, etc. Aquin. 1. 2. q. 51. art. 4. in corp.  
Dicendum quod virtus illorum Principiorum naturaliter inditorum non se extendit ultra proportionem naturae: & ideo in ordine ad finem supernaturalem indiget homo perfici per alia Principia superaddita. Aquin. 1. 2. q. 63. art. 3. ad 3. Vide etiam Aquin. 1. 2. q. 51. art. 4. ad 3m. infra citat. & confer Pet. S. Joseph. Ide. Theol. moral. l. 3. c. 3. Resol. 5. pag. 252, 253.   Physically and effectively Perfectible by any acts or humane endeavours, but only in some (as in the Saints in via) they may dispositively be augmented by them, as the Schools determine. For as Water naturally ascends not higher than the springhead from whence it flows, because it being now come to a Level, the parts and weight are equally poised, and therefore new force must be added ab extrinseco to make it mount higher: so the Principles of Reason and Morality, naturally implanted in us, may mount and rise to a strange height, yet they can never exceed the proportion of Nature. 
* Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, & cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom i● no variableness neither shadow of change: of his own will begat he us with the word of truth, etc. James. 1. 17:  Grace is a gift that purely descends from the Father of lights. And as the light of the Sun proceeds only from the Sun, and all that Art can do here, is to contract it into a fire by a Burning-glass, or multiply it, by reflection of itself upon itself; it cannot possibly make the least Ray, or increase the meanest Sunbeam by the addition of any thing but itself: So the Habit of Grace and holy Charity, as it comes down from Heaven, so is it not by any humane endeavours or Acts possibly to be augmented. God only, that is the first Author, must be the sole finisher of it: and all that we can do here is, not to shut it out, or cloud it, but to suffer it to shine upon us, and dispose it to an increase, by reflection of itself upon itself, or uniting the Rays and fervour of it, in a due use and exercise.  
§. 39 And consequently the Qualities that terminate the Acts or Actions proceeding from these infused Habits, cannot possibly be accounted Habits or Dispositions, as that signifies an inchoate and imperfect Quality produced by Acts in order to an Acquisite Habit. And therefore when it had been objected, 
(a) Aquin. 1. 2. q. 51. art. 1. in 3. & respons. ad 3m.  Si quis habitus à Deo infunditur, per illum habitum homo potest multos Actus producere: sed ex illis Actibus causatur similis habitus, ut in 2. Eth. c. 1. & 2. dicitur. Sequitur ergo duos habitus ejusdem speciei esse in eodem, unum acquisitum, alterum infusum, etc. To this Aquinas makes answer in the place already quoted. Ad Tertium dicendum, quod Actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso non causant aliquem habitum, sed confirmant praeexistentem; sicut medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant aliquam Sanitatem, sed Sanitatem prius habitam corroborant. 
(b) Cajetan. in locum.  Et in promptu causa est, says Cajetan in his Commentary on the same place, de per se infusis quidem, quia improducibiles sunt nisi per infusionem, ac per hoc ex Actibus nostris.  
§. 40. But then, because they are Qualities, and in the first Species ranked, as we have proved, for other reasons they may and are also called Dispositions.  
§. 41. And let Suarez tell you what they are. 
(c) Suarez. Metaph. disp. 42. sect. 6. n. 15. pag. 402.  Suppono ex dictis, says he, in hac specie habitus & dispositionis solum comprehendi Qualitates perficientes Potentias animae, etc. Rursus in Potentiis animae distinguere possumus actus ultimos seu secundos à primis, qui sunt Principia secundorum cum ipsis Potentiis. Ex quibus Actus secundi vocari possunt Dispositiones, primi verò propriâ & peculiari ratione vocantur Habitus.— Et utrumque constat ex communi modo loquendi omnium. Et ratio est— quia Actus secundus ex suo genere, quia pendet ex actuali influxu & attentione potentiae vitalis, non habet esse omnino fixum & permanens, sed facile transmutatur; at vero Actus primus de se & natura sua habet esse permanens: nam etiamsi Potentia cesset ab operando, potest in ea conservari, nisi aliunde pendeat ab extrinseco agente, etc. So Suarez.  
§. 42. Hence plain it is, why these Acts of Divine Love, even in our Blessed Saviour, are called Dispositions: not because they were inchoate and imperfect things, at least in their kind, and so ordained to further Acquisite Habits; but because, by reason of their dependence on the Actual influx of the vital Power of his Will, perfected by the Habit, they had not an absolute fixed permanency, as the Divine Habit of Charity in him had, but were movable from him, at least when * he slept. Now facile & difficile mobile are the two differences 
Mat. 8. 24. ●ark 4. 38. Luke 8. 23.  of Habits and Dispositions, 
(a) Suarez. ibid. n. 13. p. 402.  quae, as the same Suarez, non significant diversos status ejusdem rei secundum esse perfectum & imperfectum, sed indicant differentias essentiales per ordinem ad diversas causas quas diversae qualitates postulant.  
§. 43. And then, for the Refuters further learning, he after adds, 
(b) Ibid. n. 16. p. 403.  In hoc ergo sensu utendo illis vocibus, verissimum est, Habitum & Dispositionem specie ac essentialiter differre. Nam Habitus & Actus communi consensu omnium, (Let our Refuter mark the words,) differunt specie, ut patet ex modo attingendi objectum. Actus enim per se & immediatè illud attingit, & est quasi formalis & proxima unio ad objectum: Habitus verò solum attingit mediante Actu; & ideo dicitur esse propter Actum, & est tantum radicalis unio ad objectum post ipsam Potentiam tanquam principium Actûs. Potest etiam haec essentialis diversitas declarari per illas differentias: Facile & difficile mobile ex naturâ suâ, & ex propriis causis. Nam Qualitas quae naturâ suâ pendet ex actuali influxu Potentiae, & inde habet quod sit facile transmutabilis, essentialiter differt à Qualitate quae à naturâ suâ non habet talem dependentiam, & ideo quantum est ex se habet esse permanens & durabile. Sed hoc modo differunt Habitus & Dispositio juxta praedictam interpretationem. Ergo. Minor constat ex dictis; & Major est per se nota, quia uniuscujusque rei natura non potest meliùs dijudicari quam ex habitudine ad suas causas. Et juxta hanc etiam interpretationem verissimè dicitur nomen seu conceptum Dispositionis genericè & specificè sumi posse. Nam priori modo idem est quod Actus perficiens & actuans potentiam operativam, ut abstrahit ab actu primo & secundo, & sic constituit hanc primam speciem Qualitatis, quatenus est simplex quaedam species subalterna, quae ulterius dividitur in actum primum & secundum, tanquam in Habitum, & Dispositionem strictè & specificè sumptam.  
§. 44. And therefore — Ringantur ut ilia Codro— I must tell our Refuter, that though he count the Doctor but a Critic, yet he has showed himself a true Philosopher, and an acute Metaphysician, and a solid Divine, when he asserted that Love was truly a Quality of the first Species, which as a Genus proximum was predicated of Habitual and Actual Love; and therefore more truly deserves the Title of a School-man than our writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity, that confesses himself to be ignorant of such vulgar common Truths, which it is impossible a true Schoolman and Philosopher should not perfectly know.  
§. 45. And now for a close, I shall add that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first ground of this Refuters mistake all along in this Discourse, arises from his misunderstanding of the nature of Immanent Acts, which by a mistake, and too hasty running over a Passage in Scheibler formerly quoted, he makes to be simply Praedicamental Actions, toto genere different from Habits, and not at all Qualities; either not distinguishing, or not apprehending how in Immanent Acts, the formal operation (which is acknowledged to be a Praedicamental Action) could be distinguished from the Quality that terminates, and is still produced by that Action (which as it is the first causa procreans, so it is the constant causa conservans of it too. For it is with these Qualities as it is with Light; the Quality of actual Love, that terminates the Action of Loving, does still constantly depend on that Action in its being and preservation, as Light does on Illumination.) The vanity and falsehood of which Assertion of this Refuter as it hath already appeared, so he will instantly give us further occasion to demonstrate.  
§. 46. And now for a breathing bait, I shall be bold to ask our Refuter, what he thinks of this his irrefragable Demonstration, which at the beginning he so confidently submits to the Doctor's severest examination. Let him tell me, whether it appear not to himself now as ridiculous as 
* 1 Kings 12. 11, 25.  Zedekiahs' iron Horns, when he fled at the news of the King of Israel's rout and destruction. Let him tell me, whether his boasting and confidence of Success before an Enemy appeared, make not his flight and overthrow more worthy to be scorned & laughed at then otherwise it would have been. Let him tell me, how it is possible the first horn of his Dilemma or Captious Argument (wherein all the strength and terror lay) being broken and destroyed, that the Doctor should be in any the least danger of the other. What necessity now is there, and let our Refuter himself judge, that the Doctor must be forced to say that this Quality is a Habit? and consequently what will become of his Inference, That the Doctor must by consequence affirm what he seems to deny? Indeed if the Doctor had asserted that the Habit, the Principle of these Acts, had been intended, he had formally contradicted himself; or if he had said that some Habit, the terminus of those Acts, and produced and acquired by them, had been intended, he had spoken and affirmed a kind of contradiction in adjecto: for than he had affirmed that a pure supernatural Grace, that solely depends upon the gift and infusion of God, had been acquired by humane Acts and endeavours. But then if he had so said, this had not been to have contradicted himself. He had spoken nonsense indeed, but not a Contradiction to himself, because he had not said that the all-full supernatural infused Habit had been increased, but either a new Habit acquired, or augmented by those Acts. And therefore our Refuter was as much mistaken in this attempt as in any of the rest.  
§. 47. But let me tell him, that as the Doctor had no necessity to lay down such an Assertion, so he was too sound and solid a Philosopher and Divine to do it; though yet this Refuter does every where decry him for a Dunce, and brag he has so made him. And therefore I shall only say, that since the Doctor had so often and so early, and withal so clearly, disclaimed this Opinion, in regard of the intensive growth of our Blessed Saviour's Habitual Grace of Divine Love, the Refuter in my Judgement could have no other aim in the re-doubling this charge in the close of his Argument, but only to fill up his Paper; and swell it into a volume. He was, sure, at his— 
* Martial.  aliter non fit, Avite, Liber; or else he was willing to amuse the eyes of weak Readers, and fill their heads with vain jealousies.  
§. 48. And thus we see  

* Horat.  Suis & ipsa Roma viribus ruit.  
Though the Romans counted their City immortal, and dedicated to it Temples and Altars with this Inscription, Vrbi Aeternae; yet Time and Roma Sotterranea has showed, that their Poet was the better Prophet. And though our Refuter were so confident of this Argument, that he proudly submits it to the Doctor's severest examination; yet, as overladen with its own greatness, it sinks into an empty and very impertinent Sophism. If he had not put so much trust in it, and swollen it with heterogeneous matter to this Bulk, the Fall had not been so great. But now, as he said of Pompey's overthrow,— 
* Martial.  jacere  
Vno non poterat tanta ruina loco;  
so, as if it were not sufficient to have showed the vanity of it once, we shall be forced to hear of it again in very many places of his Pamphlet: for there is scarce a Section to be met with, where he grounds not his Reply upon this his first great, but very unfortunate, performance. And therefore his Foundation being thus destroyed, and not one stone left unremoved, I shall with the greater security proceed to the examination of the rest. They say of Mahomet's Tomb (though the more sober reports of later Travellers contradict it) that, being an Iron Chest, it hangs in the Air in the Temple at Mecha, drawn up & suspended by the Magnetical force of a Loadstone roof that does cover it. And such methinks is this following Discourse of our Refuter, an empty Castle in the Air, that has nothing to support it but the Magnetical chains of his own deluded Imagination. And so we are come to a more solid building of the Doctor's erection. For thus he goes on;   

SECT. 5.  
The Doctor innocent of the former Crimination. The Refuters new Endictment proved vain by a clear instance. His Argument a Paralogism of four terms. The Doct. affirms the direct contrary to the Refuters Charge. Humane lapses; doubtful speeches. Three rules of the Civil Law to interpret them. All writings subject to obscurity. How the Doctor to be understood in the passage arraigned. He demonstrates by it the fullness of Christ's habitual Grace à Posteriori. The only rational way of proving it. Christ's Love more intense in his Agony than in his suffering Hunger. Asserted by S. Paul. Christ's habitual Grace always perfect. Always. Christ against the Socinians. Christ's habitual Grace not to be augmented: whence. The Refuters boldness. His adding the word Before to the Doctor's Discourse, and second misadventure in this kind. His proof foreseen; answered. Difference in the actings of Voluntary and Natural Agents. Acts of Love in Christ, howsoever heightened, can never intent the Habit. Proved. The Refuters Major opposite to Scripture as well as the Doctor. The habit of Grace in Christ not determined to one uniform manner of Acting. Saints and Angels love God necessarily and freely. So Christ as Comprehensor. This not to the purpose. The Refuters charitable Additions. The Acts of holy Charity of two sorts: Of which the Doctor to be understood. The Doctor's censure of the Refuters Additions just.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
§. 6. FIrst, I said it not in these words which he undertakes to refute: These are pag. 258. of his Book thus set down by him;  
This point may serve for confutation of a passage in Doctor H. against Mr. C. to wit, That Christ's love of God was capable of further Degrees.  
7. These words I never said, nor indeed are they to be found in the Passage which he sets down from me, and whereon he grounds them, which he says is this,  
D. H. p. 222.  
In the next place he passeth to the enforcement of my Argument from what we read concerning Christ himself, that he was more intense in Prayer at one time than at another, when yet the lower degree was sure no sin, and prepares to answer it, viz. That Christ was above the Law, and did more than the Law required, but men fall short by many degrees of what is required. But sure this answer is nothing to the matter in hand, for the evidencing of which that example was brought by me, viz. That sincere Love is capable of Degrees. This was first showed in several men, and in the same man at several times, in the several ranks of Angels, and at last in Christ himself, more ardent in one act of Prayer than in another.  
8. Here the Reader finds not the words (Christ's Love of God is capable of further Degrees,) and when by deduction he endeavours to conclude them from these words, his conclusion falls short in one word, viz. (further) and 'tis but this,  
That the example of Christ will never prove Doctor Hammond his Conclusion, unless it infer that Christ's Love of God was capable of Degrees.  
9 This is but a slight charge indeed, yet may be worthy to be taken notice of in the entrance (though the principal weight of my Answer be not laid on it) and suggest this seasonable advertisement, that he which undertakes to refute any saying of another, must oblige himself to an exact recital of it to a word and syllable, otherwise he may himself become the only Author of the Proposition which he refutes.  
10. The difference i● no more than by the addition of the word (further.) But that addition may possibly beget in the Readers understanding a very considerable difference.  
11. For this Proposition (Christ's Love of God was capable of further Degrees) is readily interpretable to this dangerous sense, that Christ's Love of God was not full, but so far imperfect, as to be capable of some further Degrees than yet it had. And thus sure the Author I have now before me acknowledges to have understood the words, and accordingly professeth to refute them from the consideration of the All-fulness of habitual Grace in Christ, which he could not do, unless he deemed them a prejudice to it.  
12. But these other words, which though he finds not in my Papers, he yet not illogically infers from them (that Christ's Love of God was capable of Degrees, more intense at one time than at another) are not so liable to be thus interpreted, but only import, that Christ's Love of God had in its latitude or amplitude several Degrees, one differing from another secundum magis & minus, all of them comprehended in that All-full perfect Love of God, which was always in Christ so full and so perfect, as not to want, and so not to be capable of further Degrees.  
13. The matter is clear: The Degrees of which Christ's Love of God is capable, are by me thus expressed, that his Love was more intense at one time than at another; but still the higher of those Degrees of intenseness was as truly acknowledged to be in Christ's Love at some time, viz. in his Agony, as the lower was at another, and so all the Degrees which are supposed to be mentioned of his Love, are also supposed, and expressly affirmed to have been in him at some time or other; whereas a supposed Capacity of further Degrees seems at least (and so is resolved by that Author) to infer, that these Degrees were not in Christ (the direct contradictory to the former Proposition) & so that they were wanting in him, and the but seeming asserting of that want is justly censured as prejudicial to Christ's fullness. Here then was one misadventure in his Proceeding.   
§. 1. TO this so clear vindication, wherein the Doctor very evidently declares, 1. That neither the Words this Author undertakes to refute are to be found in his Book, nor the Sense he draws from them, 2. His acknowledgement of the dangerous sense that Proposition, which he causelessly charges on the Doctor, is readily interpretable to, and that he (who best knew his own opinions of any man in the world) was so far from any such meaning, that he expressly declares, that the but seeming asserting of that want in Christ's habitual Grace is justly censured as prejudicial to his fullness, our Refuter returns a very proud answer, and nothing to the purpose, thus;  

JEANES.  
1. He that saith that Christ's Love of God was more intense in his Agony than before, affirmeth that his Love of God before his Agony was capable of further Degrees than yet he had: But you affirm the former; and therefore I do you no wrong to impute the latter unto you. The Premises virtually contain the Conclusion; and therefore he that holds the Premises maintaineth the Conclusion. I shall readily hearken to your seasonable advertisement, that he that undertakes to refute any saying of another, must oblige himself to an exact recital of it to a word and syllable; but notwithstanding it, I shall assume the liberty to charge you with the consequencies of your words, and if I cannot make good my charge, the shame will light on me.  
2. If there were any mistake in supplying the word (further,) it was a Mistake of Charity, for I was so charitable, as to think that you spoke pertinently to the matter you had in hand. I conceived that your scope in your Treatise of Will-worship was, to prove that there be uncommanded Degrees of the Love of God; that those large inclusive words, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, withal thy soul, etc. do not command the highest and most intense degree of the Love of God, so that a man may fulfil this command, and yet there may be room or place for further and higher Degrees of the Love of God. Now this Proposition, Christ's Love of God was capable of Degrees, which you confess to be not illogically inferred from your Papers, will never reach this point, unless you understand the word (further;) and therefore your censure of my supplying the word (further) as a misadventure in my proceed, is groundless.   
§. 2. You have said, Sir. And now to which of the former Paragraphs is this answer addressed? Have you any where shown the falsehood or weakness of the Doctor's vindication of that Passage in his Account, from the charge laid in against it in your Use of Confutation? Has he not here clearly demonstrated his Innocence, and that neither the Words nor the Sense imposed upon him are his? Has he not manifested, beyond exception, that by your own addition of the word (further) not to be found in that Passage, you have charged him with an Error that he is no ways guilty of, and as hearty abominates as you or any man can? Review the Passage you taxed in your Use of Confutation, and compare it with the present Defence; and if you can yet find it faulty, let us know your reasons in short. Do not set a new house on fire, that you may run away in the Smoke: for that will but aggravate your guilt. Remember, Sir, your Promise, and retract what is amiss. Do not seek for new Calumnies, till the former be made good. Howsoever the world must needs see by this your 
(a) Qui non facit quod facere debet, videtur facere adversus ea, quia non facit: Et qui facit quod facere non debet, non videtur facere quod jussus est. Digest. de Reg. Jur. l. 50. tit. 17. leg. 121:  Tergiversation, and hunting after new Cavils to countenance old Aspersions, that the Doctor is innocent, and that a verse in Machiavels Proverbs, which he borrowed from Tacitus, Calumniare fortiter, & aliquid adhaerebit, was your Text, from whence you deduced your second Use of Confutation.  
§. 3. The former Passage then being supposed innocent by our Refuters 
(b) Qui tacet, non utique fatetur, sed tamen verum est eum non negare. Digest. de reg. Jur. leg. 142. ibid.  no reply to the Doctor's vindication, (for all Courts of Judicature in the world absolve the person arraigned, when the Accuser either cannot or will not make good his Crimination,) I shall now proceed to consider, whether the Doctor ex post facto may be concluded guilty of the Use of Confutation, by this that our Refuter has anew brought in against him.  
§. 4. The Indictment now is, The Doctor guilty, not directly, as before, but only by consequence. And thus the Accuser endeavours to make good his Charge:  
§. 5. He that saith, that Christ's Love of God was more intense in his Agony than before, affirmeth (by consequence, you mean, Sir,) that his Love of God before his Agony was capable of further degrees than yet it had: But you affirm the former; and therefore I do you no wrong to impute the latter unto you. The Premises virtually contain the Conclusion; and therefore he that holds the Premises maintaineth the Conclusion.  
§. 6. In good time, Sir. But than it must be where the Syllogism is 
(a) Leges communes sunt septem: Prima, In Syllogismo non debent esse plures termini nec pauciores tribus. Haec lex praecipitur l. 1. prior. c. 25.  just and right, and the 
(b) Secunda lex, Non debet esse plus aut minus in Conclusione quam fuit in Praemissis.  Conclusion logically and artificially inferred from 
(c) Septima, Conclusio sequitur partem debiliorem: quare cum propositio negans deterior sit affirmante, & particularis universali, si altera Praemissarum negans aut particularis sit, Conclusio quoque debet esse negans aut particularis.  true and unquestionable principles: 
(d) Haec regula se extendit etiam ad conditiones materiae, ita ut si altera Praemissarum sit necessaria, altera contingens, Conclusio debet esse contingens, ut docetur l. 1. Prior. c. 24. Burghers. dic. Log. l. 2. c. 8.  otherwise though the Premises virtually contain the Conclusion, yet the inference will be false. Unless the matter as well as the form of the Syllogism be true, the Conclusion, though rightly inferred, for all that will be an untruth. 
(e) Cum Conclusio dicitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 necessario sequi ex praemissis, non intelligitur necessitas ipsius conclusionis quae sequitur, quae necessitas consequentis appellatur; sed necessitas sequelae sive consequentiae. Necessitas enim conclusionis consequentis in solâ demonstratione locum habet, Necessitas consequentiae in omni Syllogismo bene formato: haec enim necessitas est anima Syllogismi; eâ enim sublatâ, Syllogismus non erit Syllogismus, sed Paralogismus. Burgersdic. Log. l. 2. c. 6. in Comment. §. 3.  Fellow it may by a necessity of consequence, but there will be no necessity in the consequent, and the inference will be naught. Though you are a writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity, yet I see I must be forced to read a Logic Lecture to you. And therefore to make this evident by an undeniable instance, and not to asperse, but only to give our Refuter a Use of Instruction. He that saith that the Pope is the supreme Head of the Church, affirmeth by consequence that he has also power over every particular Congregation. But you, Mr. Refuter, affirm the former; and therefore I do you no wrong to impute the latter to you. The Premises virtually contain the Conclusion; and therefore he that holds the Premises maintaineth the Conclusion. I know, Sir, notwithstanding this Argument, you will bid defiance to the Pope, and every the least rag of Antichrist, and you will deny that you are any ways concerned in the Conclusion, because the Assumption is false. I believe it, Sir, and accept of your answer, and therefore acquit you from the danger of the Inference.  
§. 7. But then withal I must ask you, in the Doctor's behalf, And what if there be no less than four terms in your Syllogism? and there be more in the Conclusion than the Premises naturally infer? and that the Assumption also is directly false? If these be all true, as I shall not fail to demonstrate, must the Doctor lay his hand on his mouth, and say you do him no wrong, because you now assume the liberty to charge him with consequencies he professedly disclaims, and deduce them from words he never said in the sense you impose upon him? It was wittily said by the Poet,  
Quem recitas, meus est, o Fidentine, libellus: 
Martial.   
Sed malè dum recitas, incipit esse tuus.  
You may do well to take notice of it, and adjoin it to the Doctor's seasonable Advertisement. For he which undertakes to refute any saying of another's, must oblige himself not only, as the Doctor says, to an equal recital of it, to a word and syllable, but also, let me add, to the true and clear meaning of those words and syllables recited.  
§. 8. And now, though this in the general be sufficient, yet I shall return a more particular answer to this irrefragable Demonstration. For so, sure, the Refuter accounts it, or else he would never have professed in the Close, that if he could not make good his Charge, the shame should light upon him.  
§. 9 First then, I say that whatsoever opinion this Refuter has of the force and strength of it, yet it is no other than an empty Paralogism, the Picture and Shadow of an Argument, like the Colours in the Rainbow, that are not what they appear; and though the Inference is very gravely brought in with an Ergo to usher it, yet it is in no mode and figure, and concludes nothing against the Doctor, because it consists of four terms. 
* Saepe contingit ut in Syllogismo quatuor termini sint, cum tres tantum esse videantur, idque fit tribus potissimum de causis: primo, quia vox aliqua aut oratio in Syllogismo ambigua est, ut in hoc Syllogismo, Quod caret principio & fine aeternum est: Mundus caret principio & fine: Ergo Mundus est aeternus. Hic sunt quatuor termini, quia principium & finis in Majore de duratione intelliguntur, in Minore de magnitudine, etc. Burgersdic. Institut. l. 2. c. 8. Theor. 7. §. 2.  For though it seem to consist only of three, and the Subject of the Major is word for word the Predicate of the Minor; yet for all that, by reason of the ambiguity of the Term the Love of God, there are truly four, though three only in show. For by the Term Christ's Love of God, etc. in the Proposition, the Refuter must mean the habitual Love of God, otherwise the whole Proposition will be false, and therefore so (as the Doctor observes) he declares himself to mean in his Use of Confutation: but then by the same Term Christ's Love of God, etc. in the Assumption, the Doctor means only Christ's actual Love of God, and so he every where declares himself. If now our Refuter, to shift his neck from this yoke, shall reply, that he also means the same in the Major as the Doctor does in the Minor, I shall then allow his Syllogism indeed, but then I must tell him, that both the Major and Minor are most notoriously false.  
§. 10. To begin with the Assumption, where the strength of the Inference seems most to be lodged. I deny it, Sir, I deny it. For where I pray does the Doctor affirm this? Is it in these words §. 11. where he says expressly, That this proposition, Christ's Love of God was capable of further Degrees, is readily interpretable to this dangerous sense, (I pray mark it) that Christ's Love of God was not full, but so far imperfect, as to be capable of some further Degrees than yet it had? Or is it in those other §. 12. That Christ's Love of God was capable of Degrees, more intense at one time then at another, that is, Christ's Love of God had in its latitude or amplitude several Degrees, one differing from another secundum magis & minus, all of them comprehended in that all-full perfect Love of God (I pray mark it) which was always in Christ so full and so perfect (good Sir, I pray mark,) as not to want, so not to be capable of further Degrees? If in these two Assertions the direct contrary to what you conclude from the Doctor's words be laid down, as his proper meaning, what a strange unhappy man is this Doctor in his expression, (that yet was once thought so eminent for his Language and Rhetoric, as to be chosen in public Convocation for the University Orator) to deliver his meaning in such words that speak contrary to his thoughts? Well; I shall never hope that Words can clearly express the Notions of the Mind, when I see such Inferences drawn from them that directly cross the Thoughts they were designed to represent.  
§. 11. But perhaps he will collect it from the following words in the next Paragraph, §. 13. The Degrees of which Christ's Love of God is capable are by me thus expressed: That his Love was more intense at one time then at another, but still the higher of these Degrees of intenseness was as truly acknowledged to be in Christ's Love at some time, viz. in his Agony, as the lower was at another; and so all the Degrees which are supposed to be mentioned of his Love, are also supposed and expressly affirmed to have been in him at some time or other: whereas a supposed capacity of farther Degrees seems at least (& is so resolved by that Author) to infer that these Degrees were not in Christ (the direct contradictory to the former Proposition,) and so that they were wanting in him; and the but-seeming asserting of that want is justly censured as prejudicial to that fullness.  
§. 12. What say you, Sir? Are these the words from whence you collect your Inference? But — ne saevi, magne Sacerdos: 
Vi●g●●.  Good Sir have Patience. For suppose the worst, suppose that the Doctor had hastily let fall from his pen some obscure expression, that might be racked and tormented by some Tyrant Adversary to make it speak otherwise then he meant; all the Triumph and Acquest would be only this, That the Doctor was somewhat unhappy in an expression, and spoke otherwise then he did intent. 
* Errare possum, haereticus esse nolo. August.  A Lapse this that may speak him Man, and frail, but not haeretical and dangerous. A Lapse that the best and wisest men are subject to. A Lapse to be pitied and excused, but not upbraided. For, Sir, I pray deal faithfully. Would you be contented to be handled thus yourself? And are all your own expressions so clear and happy, that they cannot be warped to another sense than you intended? If so, then remember that very wholesome good advice, and 
(a) Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, even so do ye to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets. Matt. 7. 12.  quod tibi fieri non vis alteri ne feceris. The 
(b) Ael. Lamprid.  Emperor Alex. Severus, no good friend to Christians, so much admired the Equity and Justice of that saying of our Blessed Saviour, that he commanded it to be frequently inscribed and set upon his Palace walls. If the Doctor had immediately before so fully and so clearly expressed himself in this particular, that it is impossible it should be more evident, why then did you not rather judge his meaning by the Plain, then, like another Delius Natator, Dive for that in the Obscure, which God knows he never meant?  
§. 13. There are three very excellent Rules in the Civil Law, which I shall recommend to our Refuter, for a Use of Instruction, to guide and direct him better to manage his Uses of Confutation. The first is, Semper in dubiis benigniora praeferenda sunt, 
1. Digest. de Regul. Juris, l. 50. tit. 17. leg. 56. 2. Ibid. leg. 96.  In all doubtful cases the fairest gloss and construction is to be preferred as the best. The second is, In ambiguis orationibus, maxim sententia spectanda est ejus qui eas protulisset, That in all ambiguous doubtful speeches, we must especially regard the meaning and sense of him that delivered them. The 
3. Ibid. leg. 114.  third is, In obscuris inspici solet quod verisimilius est, aut quod plerumque fieri solet, That in things that are dark and obscure, we must use to regard that which is the most probable and likely to be true, or that which most commonly is wont to be done. The reason and equity of them is so great, that they are universally approved of. For what writing or speech is there in the world, wherein the obscure and doubtful expressions are not, and in Justice ought not to be, expounded by the plain? Is not this the course in all Courts of Judicature in the world? Is it not usual in all Contracts, and familiar in all Discourses and Disputes? And is it not a ruled case, both in the Pulpit and the Schools, to unriddle the dark and doubtful intricate places of Scripture by the more clear and manifest? How else, Sir, would you be able to Answer a Julian, or a Porphyry? or make return to a Socinian?  
§. 14. And shall not the Doctor have so much favour allowed him as to obtain common Justice? Or shall that be a fault in him which is not so in all other Writers? It is not only the Fate of Riddles and Oracles to be obscure. 
* 2 Pet. 3. 16.  Saint Paul in his Epistles has many things hard to be understood, as well as Ezechiel and the Revelation. Words and Language, Sir, are too narrow to express the notions of the Mind; nor are they always faithful interpreters to others of those Thoughts they were designed to represent.  
§. 15. And therefore, Sir, I beseech you to allow this Plea at least for the Doctor, and if there be in this Paragraph any seeming contradiction to his own true and proper meaning, and former plain expressions, let the one reconcile the other; and though you and the Doctor differ in judgement, yet be not so uncharitable as to make him at variance with himself.  
§. 16. But this only upon supposal that you have not misquoted the Doctor, and that he had truly contradicted himself.  
§. 17. But the truth is, the Doctor needs no such defence. The matter is clear to any man that will not wilfully mistake. And thus the Case stands. The Doctor in the former Paragraph had declared his Opinion of Christ's all-full perfect habit of Divine Love, which he acknowledges was always in him, so full and so perfect, as not to want, and so not to be capable of further Degrees. And this he is not only willing to assert, but also to demonstrate. And an Argument he borrows from that very Sentence that the Refuter first cavilled at; and it proceeds à Posteriori, from the Effect to the Cause, thus: If Christ's Love of God (in the Act and exercise) was capable of Degrees, more intense at one time then another, and had in its latitude or amplitude several Degrees, one different from another secundum magis & minus, all of them comprehended in (because issuing from) the Habit of Divine Love, than this habitual Love of God must be acknowledged all-full and perfect, always in him so full and so perfect as not to want, and so not to be capable of further Degrees. But the Antecedent is true, and therefore also the Consequent. The evidence of the Sequel is supposed & grounded upon two very known Maxims; Nihil est in Effectu quod non prius erat in Causa, and, Nihil dat quod non habet. And therefore if the Acts be the Effect, and the Habit the Cause (
* De Habitibus infusis longe diversa▪ ratio est; nam sine illis non habet potentia ullum principium intrinsecum, proportionatum propriis actibus talium habituum Suarez. Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 6. §. 14.  especially in all supernatural productions, where the Will can do nothing of itself, but by the assistance of the supernatural concurrence of the Habit) whatsoever perfection is to be found in the Acts must also be acknowledged to have been in the Habit from whence the Act springs. The Assumption he proveth in the 13 th'. Paragraph, thus: The Degrees of which Christ's Love of God is capable, are by me thus expressed, That his Love was more intense at one time (that is in one Act) then at another (in another Act;) but still the higher of those Degrees of Intenseness was as truly acknowledged to be in Christ's Love at some time, viz. in his Agony, as the lower was at another, and so all the Degrees which are supposed to be mentioned of his Love are also supposed, and expressly affirmed, to have been in him at some time or other. To make this Discourse more clear and evident, I shall put it into form, and thus prove the former Assumption. If the higher of these Degrees of Intenseness of which Christ's Love of God is capable, was (and must be) as truly acknowledged to be in Christ's Love at some time, viz. in his Agony, as the lower was at another, than all the Degrees which are to be supposed to be mentioned of his Love are also supposed, and expressly affirmed, to have been in him at some time or other, and then by consequence it will follow, as in the former Assumption. But the Antecedent is true; and therefore also the Consequent. I confess the Doctor's Discourse and manner of arguing is here cryptical and 
*— Brevis esse laboro, Obscurus fio. Horat.  obscure, and his labouring to be brief has made him leave out some words, which has brought a cloud o'er his Discourse. But he supposed he writ to a Schoolman, to whom dark phrases are no strangers. Howsoever I shall endeavour to clear all by a familiar instance. Suppose I should commend Titius or Sempronius for a most exquisite Musician, that had the Habit of his Art in its utmost perfection, and for proof of it should say, he could play at first sight the hardest Lesson could be set as well as the easiest, and that at such a time he had actually done the one as well as the other; would not this be an evident Demonstration of the perfection of this man's skill and Habit? I suppose that it would; nor can our Refuter doubt of it, if he understand his own Maxim quoted from 
* Petr. Hurtad. de Mendo. de Anim. disp. 16. sect. 8. p. 672.  Hurtado, and it be true, as he says, that Intensio Actus secundi supponit aequalem intensionem in Actu primo, cum Actus secundus supponit primum. The reason is plain, because 
(a) Vide Suarez. Metaph. tom. 2. disp. 44. sect. 5. §. 6. Quomodo si ab Actionibus fit Habitus, ab ipso Habitu fiunt Actiones? Circularis enim esset demonstratio in eodem genere causae; quod cum per se fieri nequit in natura, tum prohibetur ejusdem praeceptionibus. Verum haud ita est; ex Actionum crebritate, &c Jul. Scaliger ad Cardan. de subtle. exercit. 307. sect. 4. p. mihi 884. Vide eund. supra ibid. Vide Suarez, Metaph. tom. 2. disp. 44. sect. 6, 7. per tot. & sect. 10. praesertim §. 17. & Scheibler. Met. lib. 2. c. 8. tit. 4: art. 6. punct. 1, 2, 3.  the Habit together with the Will is the principle from whence these Acts flow. And though there may be some doubt of this Maxim of Hurtado in respect of Acquired Habits, because these are the effects of Acts, and attained by them; yet of these Habits that are merely supernatural, and are alone bestowed by Infusion from God, there can be none, quia illi habitus sunt per se necessarii ad substantiam actus, & quia ob hanc rationem actus non possunt effective producere aut intendere illos habitus, as Suarez very acutely.  
§. 20. Since than that these Acts are the effects of the Habit, and the Habit as the Principle is only in ordine ad Actus, acquired and infused only in order to this end, it is generally resolved that as Actus specificantur ab Objectis, so Habitus specificantur ex habitudine ad Actus; and consequently the best way to know the nature and perfection of the Habit will be by considering the perfection of the Act. Nay indeed it is impossible either in regard of the essence, or gradual intensive or extensive perfection of the Habit, to know it any other way then by the Acts, except by Revelation. For 
(b) Tertio loco, potest ex dictis facile definiri in quo subjecto sunt hujusmodi Habitus. Dicendum est enim solum esse in viventibus intellectualibus, & proximè tantum esse in potentiis elicitivis actuum immanentium, & quae rationales sunt, vel aliquo modo rationem participant, etc. Vid. Suarez. tom 1. Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 1, 2, 3, 4. & Scheibler. Metaph. l. 2. c. 8. tit. 4. art. 3.  Habits being only seated in the Rational Faculties, or those that are some way partakers of Reason, are not discernible to Sense; and their Acts being all of them immanent and elicit Acts, must only appear by some outward transient Acts, and sensible expressions, that have necessary dependence on and connexion with the immanent and elicit Acts of the Rational Powers. And therefore the resolution of Suarez 
(c) Suarez. Metaph. tom. 2. disp. 43. sect 1. §. 4.  even in this sense is most true: Quod ergo hujusmodi Habitus sint, à nobis solum cognosci potest ex Actibus, quatenus aliquam facilitatem & consequenter novam aliquam facultatem in operando relinquunt. And if this be true of all acquisite Habits, it must be much more true of those that are per se infusi. Because these, quatenus per se supponuntur ad actus ut connaturali modo fiant, magis censentur habere rationem potentiarum quàm habituum, as the same Suarez does in that place very rationally determine.  
§. 21. He than that will assert a Perfection and all-full height of any Habit, especially in those that are infused, to be in any Subject, he cannot possibly prove his assertion (unless by Revelation, and  Arguments drawn from Authority, firm indeed, but inevident) except by instancing in the several Acts that must demonstrate the in-being, and Capacity, and Perfection of the Habit. He must suppose that if the Habit be in that Subject in all Perfection, that it is a Quality whole essence consists in a latitude, and consequently has in its latitude or amplitude (as the Doctor very Metaphysically) several Degrees, one differing from another secundum magis & minus, all of them comprehended in the Habit supposed to be all-perfect. For if it were a form absolutely indivisible, it could not possibly be capable of gradual perfection. And now when the Latitude of the form is supposed, he cannot prove that this form is inexistent in its utmost Latitude, but by instancing in the several Acts gradually differing in Perfection one from another that flow from this Habit, as the Doctor has done. And therefore says Saint James 
(a) James 2. 18.  upon this very Principle of Reason, Yea, a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works. In vain it is for a man to pretend to have the Habit of Faith or any other Grace, unless he can demonstrate it to them by the Acts, and works, and fruits, and Effects of it. For as the same Saint James, 
(b) James 2. 14.  What does it profit, my brethren, (does it any ways advantage him? is he either the better man in himself, or the opinion of others?) though a man say he have faith, and have not works?  
§. 22. Though then a supposed capacity of further Degrees seems at least (and is so resolved by this Refuter) to infer that these Degrees were not in Christ; yet the Proposition which the Doctor confesses is not illogically inferred from his words (viz. That Christ's Love of God was capable of Degrees, more intense at one time then at another) is a Proposition necessary to be supposed by any man that by true and natural Medium's would prove the full Perfection of Christ's habitual Grace, viz. by the fruits and effects and Acts of it, which is the only rational way of proof. And therefore the Doctor in this Discourse is so far from any direct or consequential denial of the Fullness of habitual Grace in Christ, that he has taken the best way to demonstrate it. And strange it is that our Refuter should be such an unhappy Disputant, as to draw from the Doctor's Principles the direct contrary Proposition to that which the Doctor inferred from them, and labours to prove by them.  
§. 23. And therefore, good Sir, I beseech you tell us where the Doctor has let fall the Assumption wherewith you charge him. In what place has he said that Christ's Love of God was more intense in his Agony then before? Let us have you prove the Crimination, otherwise I assure you the Boldness will be unpardonable, although (as you somewhat insolently say) you shall assume the liberty to fix it on him, and the shame must light on you, since you cannot make good your Charge.  
§. 24. It is true indeed, the Doctor says that Christ's Love was more intense at one time then at another, viz. in his Agony and dying for us more intense then in his suffering Nakedness and Hunger for us.  
§. 25. And does not the Apostle tell us the same, when he says, 
(a) Phil. 2. 6, 7, 8, 9  That he being in the form of God, though he thought it no robbery to be equal with God, yet made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of man, and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross; wherefore God also hath highly exalted him? His birth his life, his death, were all Acts you see of Divine Love or holy Charity: but the greater, the lower still the Humiliation; the more intense, the more high, the more noble Act of Divine Charity, both in respect of God and us. And therefore God also has proportioned his exaltation in the humane Nature to his a basement and sufferings, & given him the 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Cor. 6. 20. 1 Pet. 1. 18, 19  People he had so dearly purchased, and advanced his Name to that height, that it should transcend every name besides, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father.  
§. 26. But then the Habit of Divine Love or holy Charity in Christ, as of all other graces else, was always 
(b) There is no doubt but the Deity of Christ hath enabled the nature which it took of man to do more than man in this world hath power to comprehend, forasmuch as (the bare essential Properties excepted) he hath imparted to it all things: he hath replenished it with all such Perfections as the same is any ways apt to receive, at least according to the exigence of that oeconomy or service for which it pleased him in love to be made Man (Luk. 2. 47.) For as the parts, degrees and Offices of that mysterial administration did require which he voluntarily undertook, the Beams of Deity did in operatione always accordingly either restrain or enlarge themselves (vid. Theodoret. & Iren. l. 3. advers. haeres.) From whence we may somewhat conjecture, how the Powers of the Soul are illuminated, which being so inward unto God, cannot choose but be privy unto all things which God worketh, and must therefore of necessity be endued with knowledge so far forth universal (vid. Col. 2. 3.) though not with infinite knowledge peculiar to Deity itself. The Soul of Christ, that saw in this life the face of God, was here through so visible presence of Deity filled with all manner of Graces and Virtues in that immatchable perfection, for which of him we read it written, that God with the oil of gladness anointed him above his fellows. Vid. Esai. 1. 2. Luc. 4. 18. Act. 4. 27. Heb. 1. 9 2 Cor. 1. 21. joh. 2. 20, 27. hooker's Eccles. Policy, lib. 5. §. 54. p. 298. Vid. Field of the Church, l. 5. cap. 15. who from the Schoolmen has most judiciously and profoundly stated this question of the fullness of all Habitual Grace in Christ.  full and perfect, so full and so perfect, that it was not in him capable of any further addition, without any possibility of want or increase. And so it must be acknowledged by all Christians, when the Apostle tells us Coloss. 2. 9 that in him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. For it pleased the Father that in him should all fullness dwell, Col. 1. 19 So acknowledged it must be by all Christians, when the Evangelist. Jo. 1. 14. expressly asserts that the Word was made flesh and dwelled among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth; and that of his fullness we have all received, and that Grace for Grace, Vers. 16. Habitually so full he was, that as the same Saint John assures us, c. 3. 34. God giveth not the Spirit by measure to him.  
§. 27. Most certain it is (say the 
(a) Quod qudem elogium ipse Christus ante suum in Coelos ascensu● sibi tribuit, nor quod rem encomio isto notatam tunc reverâ possidebat, cum nondum in Regni sui gloriam ingressus esset, sed quia certò, idque mox, futurum erat, ut in Imperii istius possessionem constitue retur, etc. Volkel. de vera Relig. l. 3. c. 21. ubi late illud prosequitur. Quemadmodum ad ipsius Regnum viam quandam ei (mors ejus) aperiebat, ideoque nondum plane regnare tunc, cum mortem pateretur, dici potuit: ita cum illius Sacerdotium idem fere reipsa sit quod ejusdem Regnum, eandem mortem principium seu praeparationem quandam istius Sacerdotii in coelo demum administrandi extitisse, etc. Vid. Volkel. de vera Relig. li. 3. c. 37. pag. 145. ubi late illud prosequitur.  Socinian what he will to the contrary, and it might be very largely demonstrated, were it not eccentrical to the present Dispute) that Christ was always Christ, as well so in the womb, as at the right hand of God. For otherwise Elizabeth had never called Mary the 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Luc. 1. 43.  Mother of her Lord, before he was yet born. Nor had the Angels said unto the Shepherds at his birth, Behold I bring you tidings of great joy which shall be to all people: for unto you is born this day in the City of David a Saviour, which is (not, as the 
(c) 
Quae verò ipsius Regni ratio est? Ea, quòd Deus eum suscitatum à mortuis & in coelos assumptum à dextris suis collocavit, ei potestate in coelis & in terrâ omni datâ, & omnibus ipsius pedibus, se excepto, subjectis, ut fideles suos gubernare, tueri, & aeternùm servare posset. Catechis. Racoviens. de offic. Christ. Reg. pag. 275.  
Quid? an non erat sacerdos antequam in coelos ascenderet, & praesertim crucifixus penderet? Non erat, etc. Ibid. de offic. Christ. Sacerdot. pag. 291.   Socinian perversely, which shall be after his ascension, and session at the right hand of God; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is) Christ the Lord. Impossible it is he should be otherwise, since he was God as well as Man from the first moment of Conception. And therefore it was resolved justly against the Heretic Nestorius, that his Blessed Virgin-Mother was truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mother of God.  
§. 28. Whosoever then he be that against Arrius, Photinus, and Socinus, acknowledges the Divinity of our Saviour (and he is no true Christian that does not) must also ex consequenti acknowledge that the Manhood of our Saviour now anointed all over with the Godhead, was by virtue of the Hypostatical Union full of grace and truth, not as a Vessel, but the Ocean, and the fountain of living waters. For as God gave not the Spirit by measure to him, so when the Word was made flesh, so full he was, that, as the Evangelist expressly, of his fullness we have all received, and that Grace for Grace. All the Graces that we have, either for kind or degrees, do all flow from his Fullness, as all Springs and Rivers take their beginnings from the Ocean. And a perfection this is that 
(a) Vid. Aquin. 3. part. q. 7. art. 12, 13. Suarez. tom. 1. in 3 am. part. Thom. disp. 22. sect. 1, & 2. per tot.  de congruo flows from the Personal Union and assuming of the Manhood into God. It was not fit that he, who was all infinitely Perfect as God, should have any thing of Perfection wanting in him as Man, so far forth as a finite Nature was capable, and the present state and condition of that Office he had undertaken to perform and execute in the days of his Flesh did admit.  
§. 29. But then let me add, for the further clearing of this debate, that  
§. 30. Though the Habit of Divine Charity in Christ, concretively considered, and as supernaturally subjected in the Will of that man who was truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, was by reason of the Hypostatical Union, though not infinite, yet incapable of addition; though from the first moment of Conception it was in him in all fullness, so as to be incapable of increase; yet precisely and abstractly considered, this, as all other Habits, was capable of Intention and Remission: as de facto we find it true in the same (
(b) 
Dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, (art. 3. hujus) quando imperfectio alicujus rei non est de ratione speciei ipsius, nihil prohibet idem Numero, quod prius fuit imperfectum, postea perfectum esse, sicut homo per augmentum perficitur, & albedo per intensionem. Charitas autem est amor de cujus ratione non est aliqua imperfectio: potest enim esse & habiti & non habiti, & visi & non visi. Vnde Charitas non evacuatur per gloriae perfectionem, sed Eadem numero manet. Aquin. 1. 2. q. 67. art. 6. in corp.  
Charitas quidem ex parte est, ut saepe Sancti docent, quia ex parte diligimus nunc: & ideo ipsa evacuabitur in quantum ex parte est, quia tolletur imperfectio, & addetur perfectio; remanebitque ipsa aucta, & actus ejus & modus diligendi. P. Lombard. 3. Sent. d. 31. lit. C. Vid. Scot ibid. q. 1. n. 7, 8. Durand. ibid. q. 60. in corp. Aquin. alios ibid.  ) numerical Habit of divine Charity in respect of the same Saint in patriâ, (
(c) Deus quanto perfectius cognoscitur, tanto perfectius amatur. Aquin. 1. 2. q. 67. art. 6. ad. 3 am.— Ignotinulla cupido. ) more intense then formerly in viâ, where we can love but in part, because we know but in part, and our Love of necessity must bear proportion to our Knowledge. And therefore it was wholly accidental to the Habit of Divine Grace in Christ, that it should be thus in that superlative height conferred upon the Manhood of Christ in the first moment of Conception, so that in that nature it was now incapable of increase, even according to the ordinary power of God himself. (
(a) Ad Secundum dicendum, quod virtus Divina, licet possit facere aliquid majus & melius quam sit habitualis Gratia Christi, non tamen posset facere quod ordinaretur ad aliquid majus quam sit Personalis Vnio ad Filium unigenitum; cum Vnioni sufficienter correspondet talis mensura Gratiae secundum definitionem Divinae sapientiae. Aquin. q. 7. art. 12. ad 2 am. Potuisset quidem D. Thomas clarius dicere, argumentum concludere posse, illi Gratiae fieri additionem in gradibus intensionis de potentiâ absolutâ, non tamen de ordinariâ: hoc tamen significavit illis verbis, ut utriusque partis rationem attingeret. Ideo enim de potentiâ absolutâ posset augeri seu intendi, quia nullam involvit repugnantiam aut contradictionem, magis quàm quod finita quantitas secundum se & Mathematicè considerata augeatur: tamen, quia ex ordinatione Divina Gratia illa quasi coaptata est gratiae Vnionis, & non potest ad altiorem ordinari, ad illum vero sufficit quantitas gratiae quae ex dispositione Divinae Sapientiae Christo data est, ut in solutione ad secundum aperte dicit D. Thomas, ideo sub hac consideratione haec Gratia habet rationem connaturalis formae, & ideo augeri non potest secundum potentiam ordinariam, ut dictum est. Suarez. tom. 1. in 3m. partem Thomae, q. 7. art. 3. in Commentar. ad loc. supracitat. p. 315. B. C. ) This height and perfection sprang not at all from the nature of the Habit, but only from Gods will, and the congruity between the Person and that fullness of Grace on which it was bestowed. God that has thus heaped it in all fullness on the Manhood of our Saviour, might (
(b) Vid. Suarez. in 3. part. Thom. tom. 1 disp. 18: sect. 4. p. 292. col. 2. & 293. col. 1. Vid. ibid. in commentar. ad q. 7. art. 1. p. 284. col. 2. b. & ibid. sect. 1. p. 287. col. 1, 2. Amesii Bellarm. Enervat. l. 2. c. 1. thes. 1. §. 6. & Suarez. in 3. part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 38. sect. 4. p. 528. col. 2. E. ) at least the potentiâ absolutâ by degrees have conferred it on the Manhood, notwithstanding the Personal Union: and the Godhead in the Person of Christ might gradually have communicated the sight and comfortable influence of the Divine Nature to the superior faculties of the Soul (wherein, as shall be showed in due place, he was always Comprehensor) as it did de facto communicate it to the inferior faculties (in which regard in the days of his flesh he was viator.) Now Suarez himself resolves that, quanquam Christi Gratia fuerit tam intensa, ut juxta ordinem Divinae Potentiae nulla intensior esse potuerit, de Potentia tamen Dei absoluta potuisse fieri intensiorem, tam in ipsâ animâ Christi, quàm in Angelo, vel in aliâ animâ. And he has great Reason and Authority on his side. Vid. Suarez. in tert. part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 22. sect. 2. p. 322. col. 1. F, etc.  
§. 31. And this Habitual Gràce of Divine Love is so often acknowledged by the Doctor to be all-full and perfect in Christ, nay to be always in Christ so full and so perfect as not to want, and so not to be capable of further Degrees, nay so clearly acknowledged it is by the Doctor in this very Paragraph, from whence the Refuter draws his Charge, that he acknowledges the but seeming asserting of that want is justly censured as prejudicial to Christ's fullness, that I cannot but wonder at the strange boldness of the man, that though he says he would assume that liberty, yet for all that he durst lay that to the Doctor's charge which he had so clearly, so expressly, so frequently disclaimed. But my wonder must cease, when I consider that from a Country-Lecturer he is arrived to be a writer of Scholastical and practical Divinity: since he has attained to the Philosopher's stone in Theology, and (as himself in effect tells us in this Pamphlet) he has all the Schoolmen at his finger's end, nay just as many, no more nor no less, then are in Paul's Churchyard & the Library at Oxford, he may now conclude quidlibet ex quolibet, and by his Almighty tincture make an Ingot of a Brass Andiron.  
§. 32. And therefore, Sir, I must again renew my request, and desire you in good earnest to tell us where the Doctor does say, that Christ's Love of God was more intense in his Agony then before. I would you had as carefully observed, as you profess you shall readily hearken to, the Doctor's seasonable Advertisement, that he which undertakes to refute any saying of another's, must oblige himself to an exact recital of it to a word and syllable. I have carefully read over the whole Section, and do not find the very word (before) in it: And yet let me tell you, Sir, that this word (before) is the only serviceable word, that in probability might seem to infer that Conclusion which you lay to the Doctor's charge. For he that says that Christ's Love was more intense in his Agony then before, does seem to imply that his Love did receive addition and growth in his Agony. But this the Doctor says not, nay he frequently and clearly even in this Section disclaims it. This is only your addition, and a second misadventure in your proceed. You had formerly added the word (further) to the Doctor's expression, and now you will again assume the liberty to add another word (before) to it, that must conclude the Doctor to mean and speak what he never thought or intended. Sir, you are a bold man indeed. But this is only to cudgel a Jack-of-Lent of your own making. And if you make a quarrel, and destroy the shadow of the Lion which yourself have cast, how can you choose, Sir, but deserve the Laurel, and be cried up for a Conqueror?  
§. 33. But perhaps (now he is called upon for it so earnestly) he will prove his Assumption also by Consequence (for he is an excellent Sequele-man) thus; Whosoever asserts that Christ's Love of God was more intense at one time then another, viz. in his Agony more intense then in his suffering hunger for us, does by consequence assert that Christ's Love of God was more intense in his Agony than it was before: But the Doctor asserts the Antecedent: Ergo.  
§. 34. Hold you there, Sir; your Major I deny, and there is no connexion and consequence at all in it. For though he that says, Christ's Love was more intense in his Agony than it was at another time in another Act, suppose of suffering hunger for us, acknowledges a gradual difference in respect of the intention of these two several Acts; yet he does not acknowledge a gradual heightening or increase of any one of them. For it is not with the intention of these Acts and Qualities that are the issues of the Will, as it is with those that are the fruits and effects of Natural Agents. The Will here being a free and voluntary Agent, may and does 
(a) Voluntas nostra subitò prorumpere potest in ferventem & intensum actum amoris, etc. Suarez. tom. 2 Metaph. disp. 46. sect. 3. §. 15. Si agens sit liberum, potest pro sua libertate applicare vim suam ad magis vel minus agendum. Suarez. ibid. sect. 4. §. 14.  act how and when it pleases. It may instantly produce the most fervent, as well as it does a less intense Act; or it may heighten the gradual Perfection of the Act by degrees and successively. But then 
(b) Vid. Suarez. Metaph. tom. 1. disp. 46. sect. 3.  Natural Agents, by reason of the distance of the Agent from the Passum, or the resistance of some contrary Quality to be expelled, or the weakness of their own virtue, must of necessity intent the Quality successively, and the higher degree cannot be produced before the lower have been first attained. And therefore though one of these Acts in comparison of another is more intense, yet neither of them is therefore said to be formally heightened and intended, because being the free issues of the Will, they might be produced severally in the same indivisible degree of height wherein they after continued; and consequently here is no asserting that Christ's Love in his Agony was more intended (as that signifies a gradual heightening of the same numerical form or Quality) than it was before. Add to this, that he who says that Christ's Love was more intense in his Agony then in his suffering hunger for us, does not by Consequence assert that his Love was now more intense than it was before, but only compare two Acts together; and notwithstanding this comparison, he may yet further assert, that Christ's Love of God was more intense before his Agony then in it, though in his Agony it was more intense then in his suffering hunger for us, to wit, in that Act of his Love which was immediately terminated in God himself, and in which Act of Divine Love all the rest were radicated and planted. And indeed of necessity it must be so supposed. For though he loved us men, and for our Salvation came down from Heaven, and was incarnate and made Man, and lived and died for us; yet every step and degree of this Love, every one single Act, wholly issued from this high transcendent Act of Divine Love the most superlative of all, and still he loved us for God's sake. 
(a) Heb 10. 5, 6, 7, 12.  Wherefore when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me. In burnt-offerings and sacrifices for sin thou hadst no pleasure. Then said I, Lo, I come (in the volume of the Book it is written of me) to do thy will, O God,— By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus once for all. And therefore he says to his Disciples that were troubled when he foretold of his death (Joh. 14. 31.) But that the world may know that I love the Father, & as the Father gave me commandment, even so I do. Though then his Love of God in his Agony and Death was the highest Act of Charity to us men; yet this, as all the rest, was rooted in that higher Act of Love to his Father, because they all issued from it, and in every Act though he loved us, yet it was only for God's sake.  
§. 35. But yet (to make our Refuter's Discourse as strong as he can desire) I shall for the present suppose that the Doct. had positively and in terms terminant affirmed, that Christ's Love of God was more intense in his Agony then before; what then will be the issue? will it then appear that he does the Doctor no wrong? and that he is able to infer his Conclusion against him? Certainly not. For now the Major will be proved altogether as inconsequent as the Assumption has already been evidenced to be false. It is this, He that saith that Christ's Love of God was more intense in his Agony then before, affirmeth that his Love of God before his Agony was capable of further Degrees than yet it had. But, etc. Ergo, etc. The whole strength and force of it does depend and rest upon this only Supposition, That any gradual heightening in the Acts of Christ's Love must of necessity infer a gradual heightening in the Habit. But this is most notoriously false. For the Acts of Love in Christ, howsoever heightened and advanced, can never possibly increase the Habit.  
§. 36. For first, 
(a) 
Habitus infusi non producuntur, neque augentur, effective per proprios Actus, etiam in proprio Subjecto. Suarez. in 3. part. Thom. tom. 1. q. 13. disp. 31. pag. 416. col. 2. 4.  
Neque Habitus operativi— ut charitas & aliae virtutes infusae, possunt per se producere sibi similes. Et ratio reddi potest, quia haec est communis ratio Habitùs operativi, ut scil. non est productivus alterius Habitus, sed solum actuum. Vel certe dici potest, Gratiam esse eminentem quandam participationem Divinae naturae, quae propterea postulat ut solum per influxum Divinitatis naturâ suâ participari possit, & ideo non est qualitas activa sui similis, sed à solo Deo, ut à principali causa, producibilis. Suarez. ibid. col. 1. D, E.   Infused Habits (such as this) as they cannot be produced, so neither can they physically and effectively be augmented, by any Acts, or humane endeavours, as already it has been proved.  

(b) Dicunt aliqui, Christum Dominum per Actus virtutum quos exercebat acquisivisse augmentum harum virtutum: sed hoc nec verè nec satis consideratè dictum est, nam rationes quae probant habuisse Christum hos Habitus à principio, probant similiter habuisse illos in gradu Heroico, ut hîc dixit D. Thomas; vel, ut clarius dicamus, habuisse in sua summa perfectione, quam habere possunt vel secundum legem Dei ordinariam, vel secundum naturalem capacitatem & facultatem hominis, cui high Habitus & eorum actus accommodantur; vel denique in summa perfectione quam in ipso Christo unquam habituri erant.  Secondly, When any Habit already is in the utmost height that the Subject is capable of, no Acts, howsoever gradually intense, can possibly increase it. Now it is supposed on both hands that the Habit of Grace & holy Charity in Christ was already in him in all fullness in gradu heroico, as Aquinas calls it.  

(*) 
Concedo ergo per hos Actus, neque Habitus neque augmentum eorundem Christum acquisivisse, quia Actus non intendit Habitum, nisi sit intensior illo: Christus autem à Principio habuit Habitus vel magis vel aequè intensos quàm futuri essent Actus. Suarez. in 3. part. Thom. tom 1. q. 7. art. 3. disp. 19 sect. 2. p. 300. col. 1. C, D, E, F. Aquin. 3. part. q. 7. art. 2. & Suarez. commentar in loc.  
Actus nullo modo augent Habitum jam sibi aequalem. Vid. Suarez. Metaph. tom. 2. disp. 44. sect. 10. §. 14, 15, 16, 17.  
Habitus sicut generatur per Actus, ita etiam intenditur: non intenditur autem nisi per Actus intensiores, ut infra dicemus. Suarez. ibid. sect. 6. §. 2. pag. 431. col. 1. Vide etiam ibid. §. 5.   Thirdly, No Acts can possibly intent even an Acquisite Habit, unless they be more gradually perfect then the habit supposed to be intended by it. But in this present case, the Habit is not acquired, but infused, and all the Acts, howsoever heightened or intended, must also be acknowledged to issue and flow from it. And consequently since the Effect cannot be more noble than the Cause, they can never advance the Habit, or make it gradually more intense then formerly it was. But of this again in due place.  
§. 37. But then fourthly, If there were any truth, any Consequence in this Major, it will directly strike against the Scriptures, as well as Doctor Hammond. For do not they every where magnify this last Act of Christ's Love manifested in his dying for us, as the most transcendent and superlative, and which is not to be parallelled amongst all his other acts of Love towards us? 
(a) Joh. 15. 13. Vide Maldonat. Jansen. & alios in loc.  Greater Love, says our Saviour, has no man then this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. And the Apostle, in Saint 
(b) Tu majorem habuisti, Domine, ponens eam etiam pro inimicis. Bernard. serm. Fer. 4tâ hebdom. sanctae. Rom. 5. 10.  Bernard's opinion, seems to go higher: for when we were enemies we were reconciled unto God by the death of his Son. And again, 
(c) Rom. 5. v. 6, 7, 8.  For when we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die. But God (and Christ, let me add, for 
(d) Esay 53. 7.  oblatus est quia ipse voluit) commendeth his Love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Well then might Saint John cry out in Contemplation of this Love, Ecce quanta Charitas! 
(e) 1 Joh. 3. 1.  Behold what manner of Love the Father hath bestowed upon us! And again, 
(f) Jo. 3. 16.  Sic dilexit, So God loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son. And again, 
(a) 1 Jo. 4. 9, 10.  In this was manifested the Love of God towards us, because that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is Love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins. This, this was Love; the height and commendation, and full manifesting of it. His Birth, his Life, his Doctrine and Miracles, his suffering Hunger and Nakedness and Poverty for our sakes, were all high Acts of Love. But hereby, as Saint john speaks, 
(b) 1 Joh. 3. 16.  perceive we the Love of God, because he laid down his life for us. And therefore the Apostle, in the place formerly insisted on, to express the Super-excellency of this Act above the rest, tells us, 
(c) Phil. 2. 8.  That he humbled himself to death, even the death of the Cross.  
§. 38. And now I shall desire our Refuter to sit down, and sadly consider what will become of his Consequence: If neither the Proposition nor Assumption can be true, how then will he be able to infer his Conclusion against the Doctor?  
§. 39 Indeed he had said somewhat to the purpose, if this Habit of holy Love in our Saviour had been determined in its Operations to one equal uniform degree and height, as natural forms are. 
(d) Vid. Burgersdic. Log. l. 1. ca 17. theor. 10, 11, 12, 13.  For these working by a necessity of nature to the utmost of their strength, therefore always work the same, unless they be by some Accident hindered. And consequently any variation in the Effect must argue a proportionable increase or abatement of the natural virtue and efficacy of the Form, that is the Agent. But here the case is far otherwise: For this Grace of holy Charity in Christ being a Moral Habit, as our Refuter does and must acknowledge, and so supernaturally seated in the humane Will of our Saviour, must of necessity partake of the nature of the Will, wherein it is subjected, and still 
(e) Vid. Suarez. Metaph. tom. 1. disp. 44. sect. 6. §. 6, 7, etc.  concurring effectively with the Will to the production of the Act, it must continue still free, as the Will itself is, which it qualifies and modificates. 
(a) 
Relinquitur ergo, non posse Habitum juvare aut facilitare potentiam ad Actum, nisi augendo virtutem per se effectivam talis actus, etc. Suarez. Metaph. ibid. §. 10.  
Actiones quae parto jam fiunt Habita, non ab ipso Habitu, tanquam ab efficient, oriuntur, sed ab eâdem voluntate. Habitus autem ille quasi forma quaedam est illarum Actionum, etc. Jul. Sca. lig. de Subtle. exercit. 307. §. 4. pag. 884.  
Potentia & Habitus conveniunt ad effective causandum Actum, sicut unum perfectum principium, ita quod ambosimul non differunt ab uno, sicut imperfectum differt à seipso perfecto. Cajetan. in 1. 2. q. 49. art. 3.   Advance and heighten indeed it does the power and efficacy of the Will to the performance of those Acts which of itself it is unable to perform: but then the Will thus assisted by the Habit, continues still a free Agent, not destroyed in its nature and working, but perfected.  
§. 40. If it shall be here replied, that the Saints and Angels in heaven love God freely, and yet love him necessarily too, and quoad ultimum virium;  
§. 41. I readily grant it in the sense that 
(b) 
Causa libera est quae consultò causat; necessaria, quae non consultò, sed necessitate naturae causat— Cum voluntas libera dicitur, cumque causa libera causae necessariae opponitur, Libertatis nomine nihil aliud intelligitur quam immunitas à coactione, & à necessitate ac determinatione naturali. Burgersdic. Log. l. 1. c. 17. Theor. 10, 11.  
Dico secundò, hanc libertatem voluntatis humanae Christi non solum intelligendam esse oppositam coactioni, sed etiam necessitati, atque adeo includere indifferentiam aliquam, seu potestatem operandi & non operandi. Non est sensus, Christum in omnibus actibus suae voluntaris habuisse hanc indifferentiam, non enim est hoc necessarium; nam Deum clarè visum necessariò amabat & necessariò illo fruebatur, sicut alii Beati: sed sensus est, habuisse Christum libertatem in aliquibus actibus, etc. Suarez in 3. part. Thom. q. 18. art. 4. disp. 37. sect. 1. pag. 512. Vid. eund. ibid. disp. 39 sect. 2. per tot.   Freedom is improperly taken for a liberty from Coaction. And withal I acknowledge it most true of the prime Act of Divine Love in Christ immediately terminated on God, clearly seen and enjoyed, as Comprehensor in the superior faculties of his Soul, he always loved God freely, and yet necessarily; and because he could not choose but love God the greatest good, whom always he most perfectly knew, he could not choose but love him in the height, and utmost Perfection. But then withal I must add, that this is nothing to the purpose. For it was an 
(c) Heb. 10. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 Esay 53. 10.  Act of pure Love and Choice in Christ to be born and die for us. And therefore he loved us not of necessity, but freely, and he loved us as he himself best thought fit. And therefore every Act of 
Joh. 10. 18. Non necessitate sed voluntate crucem subiit. Hieron. in Isai. 53. Omni necessitate calcatâ, cum voluit mortem sponte suscepit. Gregor. lib. 24. Moral. c. 2. Vid. Suarez. tom. 1. in 3. part. Thom. disput. 37. sect. 2. pag. 511, 512.  this Love respecting us must be commensurate to his own good will and pleasure. And being alwise, as well as all-good, he loved us in every several Act proportionably to that which his own Wisdom thought fit. Every Act of this Love being purely voluntary, though it was not equally intense, yet so high and fervent it was, that it was not any way disproportioned to the present end and occasion.  
§. 42. By this it evidently appears (that I may make some reflections on the second Paragraph) how much of Charity there was in our Refuters adding, not supplying, the word (farther) to the Doctor's Discourse. If these be his mistakes of Charity, to pervert an Adversaries saying to a contrary sense, and that very erroneous, I wonder what is his Malice. The addition indeed might be very pertinent to the matter that himself had then in hand, which was to calumniate the Doctor, but it concerned not at all the business and scope of the Treatise of Will-worship. For what though the Doctor in that Treatise had undertaken to prove that those large inclusive words, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy Soul, etc. do not always pro hîc & nunc, (as they speak) oblige us in every single Act of Divine Charity to the most intense and high degree, but only to that sincerity and fervour as the present occasion does require? will you thence conclude it to be the Doctor's meaning, that a man may fulfil that command, though he loves not God with all his heart? If you do, Sir, you are very uncharitable and irrational, as might easily be demonstrated. But I am loath to run into an unnecessary Digression, and therefore I shall reserve the full clearing of the sense of this Commandment to its proper place. For this Refuter will anon give occasion to prosecute it at large, according to those true and solid grounds that the Doctor has already laid.  
§. 43. I shall only add, to preclude all subterfuges and captious advantages that may arise from general and undistinguished and ambiguous terms, that the Acts of holy Charity or the Love of God are of two sorts. 1. Those that are immediately terminated on God the only good; 2. those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake, in whose Love, as the Prime Act, they are all radicated and founded. The one the Schools call Charitas ut finis, the other they call Charitas propter finem.  
§. 44. Now though there be a gradual difference in the tendency of these Acts to the Object of Love; yet, because the divine goodness, though unequally communicated, is one and the same, and the formal Object of both, 
(a) 
Licet charitas sit una virtus, habet tamen duos Actus, quorum unus ordinatur ad alium sicut ad finem. Aquin: 2. 2. q. 44. ad 1.  
In Dilectione proximi includitur Dilectio Dei, sicut finis in eo quod est ad finem, & è converso. ibid. ad 4m.  
Cum Habitus dicitur specificari per Actus, id intelligendum est cum proportione. Triplex enim modus Habitûs ex dictis colligi potest, etc. — Alius est qui in esse est etiam simplex qualitas, virtualiter autem seu in agendo est multiplex; quia est potens ad plures Actus ita inter se connexos, ut in ordine ad idem ac indivisibile objectum formale necessariam connexionem inter se habeant, & in aliquo primario Actu quodammodo radicantur: & ideo talis Habitus dici potest specificari ab illo primario actu in quo alii radicantur, ut habitus, verbi gratia, Charitatis & Amoris Dei. Suarez. Met. tom. 2. disp. 44. sect. 11. §. 70.  
Habitus Voluntatis tendunt ad prosequendum aliquod bonum: omnis autem prosecutio boni est ex aliquo motivo, seu ex aliqua ratione bonitatis, quae Voluntatem attrahit. Hoc ergo motivum, seu ratio tendendi, est, absque dubio, quae dat Actui specificationem— quia semper id quod est formale, est quod dat speciem— Contingit unam & eandem rationem tendendi non aequè applicari diversis materiis, & ideo non eodem modo attingi per Actus; ut est, v. g. Bonitas Divina, quatenus est in Deo, & reddit illum amabilem, & quatenus per quendam respectum applicatur proximo, ut illum etiam amabilem reddat. Nam licet illa Bonitas in se una sit, non tamen illis rebus aequè convenit, & ideo modus tendendi in illam non est idem.— Tunc vero licet inter eos actus sit aliqua diversitas, est tamen quaedam necessaria connexio. Quia Actus qui versantur circa Objectum intrinsecè & per se habens rationem illam, est radix aliorum, & virtute continens illos, ut Amor Dei amorem Proximi, etc. Suarez. ibid. §. 30, 31.   it is generally resolved, that the Habit whence they issue is but one simple Quality; and the Acts that flow from it are called by the same name, the Love of God, or holy Charity.  
§. 45. Though then the Acts of Christ's Love, as immediately terminated on God, were always at the height and one equal perfection (as was never yet questioned or denied by the Doctor;) yet this nothing hinders but that the other Acts of this Love (of which alone the Doctor speaks) regarding us for God's sake, might consist in a latitude, and gradually differ from one another, and fall short of the fervour of those Acts that immediately respected God, as has already in some part appeared, and shall further in due place be evidenced.  
§. 46. And therefore this Proposition, Christ's Love of God was capable of Degrees, which the Doctor (in the sense already given of the phrase, the Love of God) confesses to be not illogically inferred from his Paper, will sufficiently reach the point he had in hand, without your understanding the word farther. For though one Act of Divine Love may in comparison of another be more intense; yet nothing hinders but both may equally flow (I say aequè, though not aequaliter) from one and the same all-full habit of Charity, that is free as the Will is, and indetermined in its Acts and Operations.  
§. 47. And therefore all the world will acknowledge, Sir, the Doctor's censure of your adding, not supplying, the word (farther,) as a misadventure in your proceeding, to be just, and not groundless.  
§. 48. And now, Sir, because I find you a man of such unprosperous undertake, let me advise you for the future, that if you shall assume the liberty to charge the Doctor with Consequences, as you boldly profess you shall, that you do it purely from his own words, without any additions or alterations of your own framing. For otherwise you yourself, as the Doctor tells you, will be the only author of the Proposition you undertake to refute. And since by such unhappy Arts you will never be able to make good your Charge, the shame will not only light, as you acknowledge, but also fix and dwell upon you; where I leave it for the present, and hasten to the next Section.   

SECTION. 6.  
The Refuter acknowledges his own ignorance of a generally received Opinion. Love a Genus to the Habit and the Act. Proved for the Refuters instruction. His charging his Ignorance on Aristotle. Aristotle his Master, why? vainly quoted. He speaks not to the present Controversy. The Assumption only denied.  
§. 1. THough we have already shaken the very foundations of our Refuters Discourse, yet the Doctor tells us,  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
14. BUt this is but the Proemial part of my Reply; there is a more Material part of it still behind, which may yet seem necessary to be added, viz. to mind him of (what he well knows) the distinction between Habits and Acts of Virtues or Graces; and that Love as the Genus doth equally comprehend both these Species; and that his Discourse of All-fulness belonging to the Habitual Grace of Christ, I speak distinctly of another matter, viz. of the Degrees of that Grace discernible in the several Acts of it.   
§. 2. To this our Refuter replies, with a very unfavoury and immodest acknowledgement of his own Ignorance, which he charges upon Aristotle, as if he had been the sole Author of it.  

JEANES.  
THe distinction between the Habits and Acts of Virtues or Graces I very well know; but that Love as a Genus doth equally comprehend the Habit and Act of Love, is a thing which I confess that I am yet to learn, and if it be a matter of Ignorance in me, you must blame my Master Aristotle, for he hath misguided me herein. He tells me, lib. 1. top. c. 15. n. 11. that if a word be praedicate of things put in several predicaments, that then it is homonymous in regard of them. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now the Habit of Love is in the Predicament of Quality, the Act of Love in the Predicament of Action: and hereupon I cannot but conclude that the Praedication of Love concerning the Habit and the Act is only aequivocal, and consequently Love no Genus to them. No Genus can equally comprehend those things which do differ to to genere, and are therefore termed primo diversa rather then differentia: but now such are the Habits and the Acts of the Love of God; and therefore Love as a Genus doth not equally comprehend them as its Species.   
§. 3. But how is this, Sir? Are you a professed writer of Scholastical Divinity, and yet to learn this vulgar Truth, that every Puisney in Metaphysics and Logic is acquainted with? Howsoever, if you be not too old to learn, and your more profound thoughts be not so drowned in the Schoolmen, that you can recover a little breath, and gain leisure to look back on those Authors you have either not throughly read, or well weighed and considered, or at least utterly forgotten, I undertake you may be taught it. Nor shall I put you to much trouble, but shall only refer you to that Suarez whom you yourself have so seriously recommended to our Critick-Doctors consideration.  
§. 4. If you will be pleased to turn to him, you may in very many places find that Habitus & Actus specie distinguuntur, and that it is a 
(a) Habitus & Actus communi omnium consensu specie differunt, etc. Suarez. Metaph tom. 2. disp. 42. sect. 6. n. 16.  generally received Truth, whereof no man of sense doubts. And he has demonstratively proved it in the place formerly quoted.  
And now, that you may be sure to be taught it against another time, I shall add another place from the same Author, and I shall give it at large. His words are these, Superest ut responde amus ad difficultatem in principio positam, de mutuâ efficientiâ inter Habitum & Actum. In quâ suppono Habitum & Actum esse Qualitates specie distinctas (you see he supposes it as an undoubted Truth, that they are both Qualities, and specifically distinct) name si essent ejusdem speciei, facilis esset solutio illius difficultatis, nam inter res ejusdem speciei nullum esset incommodum, ut una res efficiat aliam similem illià quâ facta est, quia inter illas est emanatio aequivoca (I read it univoca.) Non possut autem Habitus & Actus censeri ejusdem speciei, quia Actus est Qualitas (I pray mark it, Sir,) naturâ suâ pendens in fieri & conservari ab actuali influxu potentiae vitalis; Habitus vero est Qualitas permanens sine tali dependentia. Vnde etiam habent hae Qualitates formales effectus specie diversos, etc. Suarez. Metaph. to. 2. disp. 44. sect. 9 §. 14.  
Once more (that you may be sure to understand it) thus the same Author in the very next Paragraph, §. 15. Licet Objectum in se sit idem, modi autem tendendi in illud sunt in Actu & Habitu ita diversi, ut inde etiam satis colligitur specifica diversitas. Nam Actus attingit immediate Objectum, illudque unit actualiter potentiae, vel praesentative, trahendo Objectum ad Potentiam, vel impulsive seu effective, trahendo Potentiam ad Objectum: Habitus vero attingit Objectum mediante actu, propter quod dioi solet Habitus specificari per Actus, & Actus per Objecta. Differunt ergo simpliciter in specie Habitus & Actus, unde non habent inter se convenientiam essentialem in aliquâ differentiâ ultimâ, ratione cujus dicantur esse ejusdem ultimae Speciei aut simpliciter aut secundum quid. Posset tamen concipi inter eos aliqua peculiaris conveniontia in ordine ad idem Objectum, ratione cujus dicantur ejusdem generis proximi, vel speciei subalternae — id tamen ad praesentem difficultatem non refert; satis est enim, quod inter Habitum & Actum sit simpliciter differentia essentialis. Ex quo principio (Mark that, Sir,) sequitur, juxta communem doctrinam, alteram ex his Qualita ibus esse perfectiorem essentialiter, quia non dantur duae species rerum aequè perfectae, ut circa lib. 8. Metaph. c. 3. tactum est.  
§. 5. And so much be spoken for the Instruction of our writer of Scholastical Divinity in a Metaphysical Speculation, wherein, to the great prejudice of his Theological Reserches, he professes he is yet to seek. But I wonder he should not have taken notice of this Doctrine in his perusal of the Schoolmen, since it is to be found in 
(a) Aquin. opus. 48. Scot 1. Sent. d. 3. q. 6. §. Hîc sunt. Durand. Gabriel 1. Sent. d. 27. q. 2.  Thomas, in Scotus, in Durand, Gabriel Biel, and others: and Cajetan is to far from making the Act and the Habit to be primo diversa, that he makes both the Power and the Habit and the Act to be all of the same species. Potentia & habitus, says he, licet absolute distinguantur specie, ut tamen sint principia talis Actus non differunt, nisi secundum magis & minus perfectum in eadem specie, quia sunt ejusdem speciei cum Actu, & consequenter interse. Cajetan. in 1. 2. q. 49. art. 3. p. 98. col. 3. D. But Bernardus non vidit omnia; even our writer of Scholastical Divinity himself sees not all things in the Schoolmen.  
§. 6. But what talk we of Suarez and Cajetan, and the rest of the Schoolmen, in this Case? Let them say what they will. If this be matter of Ignorance in our Refuter, we must not blame him, he says (by all means take heed of that) but his great Master Aristotle, for he hath misguided him herein.  
§. 7. But bless me from wonder and astonishment! What read I? My Master Aristotle? It is certainly so. But, good Sir, I beseech you tell us, how long has Aristotle been your Master? It is well, I see, you conceive that he speaks for your advantage. If the Doctor, in a Controversy that concerned your own Copyhold, had made use of such a Plea, we should instantly have heard, 
(b) Mat. 23. 9  That we must call no man Master upon Earth, and that 
(c) Rom. 14. 23.  whatsoever is not of Faith is sin. But if Aristotle seems to speak for the Advantage of your Cause, he shall instantly be your Master: Nay, if any of the Father's drop a word in favour of the present design, than not only Austin and Jerome, but even Tertullian also shall be a Saint. But if they speak any thing in opposition to what yourself call the Truth, we shall instantly hear of the Montanism of Tertullian, the Choler of S. Jerome, and the Retractations of S. Austin. And why all this? but only to prove, that because they were men (though Fathers in the Church) and have had their Lapses and Errors, as all other men have had, that therefore they must not be trusted or believed in any thing they say, if it chance to make against us.  
§. 8. But this, Sir, notwithstanding, I shall no ways envy you the honour of so great a Master. Go on and prosper in your study of him so long till you rightly understand him, and know how better to apply his Maxims to your advantage, than you have done in the present Controversy.  
§. 9 For what, I pray Sir, says Aristotle to misguide you in the case? Is this it you mean, in the place quoted from his Topics, 1. Top. c. 15. n. 11? Is it this, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Alas, alas, Sir, why should you conjure up Aristotle's Ghost to speak an Oracle and Truth that never was yet questioned? You might have saved the Printer the labour of troubling his Greek Characters. Smith's Elements of Logic had been sufficient to prove that, which every Freshman in Logic knows to be an undoubted Axiom. But you were willing to let us know you had Aristotle's Organon in your study, and that you could quote him in Greek.  
§. 10. But, good Sir, I pray tell me, how could your great Master Aristotle misguide you in the point depending betwixt you and the Doctor? Was it ever denied by your Adversary that Entia primo diversa cannot be put in the same Predicament? or has he any where asserted, that a word is not ambiguous that is attributed to things that are put in divers Predicaments? To this only speaks Aristotle. But by the way give me leave to tell you, that either the Printer or your Amanuensis were mistaken in this Quotation. For it is not to be found in the 15th. but in the 13th. Chapter, at least in my Edition, wherein there are but fourteen Chapters in that Book. Howsoever, the words I acknowledge, and pass by the Lapse as venial: and if you can now prove, that Love, which the Doctor makes the Genus of the Habit & the Act, is a transcendental thing, and found in several Predicaments, like the Philosophers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which he in that place instances in, I shall then acknowledge the force of this Quotation from Aristotle; but till you can make this appear, and make good your Assumption, I cannot take it for an Oracle, that the Habit and the Act of Love are Entia primo diversa, things put in several Predicaments, because that you have asserted it. You may spare your pains, Sir, in proving Axioms, and your Major should have been granted you for ask, without Aristotle's authority. Till the Minor, which is only the matter in debate betwixt you and the Doctor, be made good, and you can prove that Actual Love is not a Quality, but a simple Praedicamental Action, I must say, that since Conclusio sequitur partem debiliorem, you have concluded nothing against the Doctor. And so I take my leave of this Section with a Nego Minorem.   

SECT. 7.  
The Refuters Reply impertinent. The Doctor's distinction of Love into the Habit and the Act found in the Tract of Will-worship, and the Answer to Mr. Cawdrey. Outward sensible expressions refer first and immediately to the inward Acts of Love. The Refuters' digression to a matter never doubted. The Doct. never asserts that Love was univocally praedicate of the Habit and outward sensible expressions. The Refuters four Reasons against no body. His unhappiness in proving a Clear Truth. His third most false. In univocal productions the Cause and Effect still comprehended under the same Genus, sometimes also in aequivocal. His Assumption of his First Reason infirm. His second and fourth Reasons coincident. Raynaudus seasonable assistance. The Refuter misunderstands him. Love not univocally praedicate of the Habit and outward sensible expressions, proved: not concerns the Doctor.  
§. 1. THe Doctor now having cleared the Ambiguity of the Phrase that gave the Captious advantage to the Use of Confutation, and shown that he spoke of another matter then the Author of the Mixture did, comes now to show that this was no new-coined distinction, on purpose invented to decline the force of that Use.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
15. THis Distinction I thought legible enough before, both in the Tract of Will-worship, and in the Answer to Mr. Cawdrey.  
16. In the former the Refuter confesseth to find it, reciting these words of mine, It is possible for the same person constantly to love God above all, and yet to have higher expressions of that Love at one time then at another. Where the expressions, at one time, and at another, must needs refer to the several Acts of the same all-full habitual Love.   
§. 2. To this our Refuter makes a very large reply, but nothing to the purpose, thus;  

JEANES.  
THe distinction which you thought legible enough before in your Tract of Will-worship, in which you say that I confess to find it, is such a distinction between the Habits and Acts of Love, as that Love equally comprehends them both as Species. Now I utterly deny that there is any such distinction in those words of yours which I recite, It is possible for the same person constantly to love God above all, and yet to have higher expressions of that Love at one time then another. And the reason of this my denial is, because love as a Genus doth not comprehend the expressions of Love equally with the Habit. 1. Nothing can as a Genus be equally praedicate of things put in several Predicaments: but the Habit of Love and expressions of Love are put in several Predicaments: therefore Love as a Genus doth not equally comprehend them both. 2. The Habit of Love is formally and intrinsically Love; the expressions of Love (that is, as you expound yourself. §. 21. the outward expressions of the inward Acts of Love) are termed Love only by  denomination from the inward acts of Love: and therefore Love doth not as a Genus equally comprehend the Habit and expressions of Love. Raynaudus in Mo●. discip. dist. 3. n. 144. makes mention out of Gabriel Biel of a distinction of Love into affective and effective: and what is this effective Love, but the effects and expressions of Love? But now that he doth not take this to be a proper distribution of a Genus into its Species, appeareth by what he saith out of the same Author concerning the division. Effectivum dicit ipsum illius Amoris eliciti effectum. Translato quippe causae nomine ad effectum, is dicitur amare effectiuè, qui non ostentat infertilem ac sterilem amorem, sed cum se dat occasio, erumpit in fructus dignes amoris. Quam esse admodum impropriam amoris divisionem fatetur Gabriel, quia amare propriè est in sola voluntate tanquam in subjecto; ea autem productio effectuum amoris in aliis facultatibus cernitur, estque actus transiens non immanens voluntatis. 3. No one word can as a Genus equally comprehend the Efficient and the Effect: The Habit of Love is the Efficient cause, and the sincere and cordial expressions of Love are the Effect: therefore Love is not predicated of them equally as a Genus. 4. That which is predicated properly of one thing, and tropically of another, cannot equally comprehend them both as a Genus: But Love is predicated properly of the habit of Love, tropically (viz. Metonymically) of the expressions of Love, by a Metonymy of the efficient for the effect: therefore love as a Genus cannot equally comprehend them both.   
§. 3. Put the case, Sir. And what will you thence conclude against the Doctor? Will this ever make him guilty of denying the Habitual Fullness of Christ's Grace? or prove that he never aimed at the distinction of Love into the Habit and the Act in either of these Discourses? Suppose you had not found this distinction so clearly laid down in the Tract of Will-worship; me thinks, unless you had resolved to be captious, it might have sufficed you to have seen it in the Answer to Mr. Cawdrey, which was the Treatise you quarrelled at. For does not the Doctor tell you plainly, that he thought it legible enough in both? Is there no such distinction in either Tract to be met with either in terminis or by just consequence? Let us know your positive answer, and run not out into new Controversies. Howsoever, though the whole that is here replied be a most perfect digression to a matter clearly impertinent, not any ways hinted or occasioned by the Doctor, yet I am resolved to follow you through all this winding Labyrinth.  
§. 4. Thus than you return, The distinction which you thought legible enough before in your Tract of Will-worship, in which you say that I confess to find it, is such a distinction between the Habits and Acts of Love, as that Love equally comprehends them both as Species. Now I utterly deny that there is any such distinction in those words of yours which I recite, It is possible for the same person to love God above all, and yet to have higher expressions of that Love at one time then at another. And the reason of this my denial is, because Love as a Genus doth not comprehend the expressions of Love equally with the Habit.  
§. 5. Well, Sir, if this be all you aim at, your reasons might have been spared: It is granted as to the recital, and express mention of that distinction in the words by you recited. But yet I beseech you deal plainly, is it not clearly there intimated? For what speak the Antecedents and Consequents? Read you not in the two very next preceding lines this distinction very plainly employed? Are not these the Doctor's words 
(a) Treatise of Will-worship, Sect. 49. p. 101. edit. London. ? which (loving God in a more intense degree) may be observed amongst the Angels themselves, the Soraphin being so called because they are more ardent in zeal then other Angels. Nay for the same person constantly to love God above all, and yet etc. Is it not clearly here evident the Doctor means the height and fervour of the Seraphins actual Love? Can their greater ardency in zeal refer to any thing else then that Love which is modificated by it? But yet if this be not plain enough, what think you of the words immediately following the passage by you recited, and which the Doctor added on purpose to prove and explain it? Consider what he says, Sir. 
(a) Treatise of Will-worship, ibid.  Thus we read of Christ himself, Luc. 22. 44. (who, we know, did never fail in performing what was man's duty in Prayer, or any thing else, yet) that he at that time prayed more earnestly; which is a demonstrative evidence that the lower Degree is not sinful, when the higher is acceptable to God. What say you now? Does not this evidently refer to the height and fervour of the inward Act of Prayer? And does not the Doctor expressly and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 say so in the Recapitulation of this whole passage in the 
(b) Account of Mr. Cawd. trip. Diat. c. 6. sect. 5. §. 5. p. 222.  Account to Mr. Cawdrey's triplex Diatribe, and in the very words by you cited in your Use of Confutation? This (that sincere Love was capable of Degrees) was first showed in several men, and in the same man at several times, in the several ranks of Angels, and at last in Christ himself, more ardent in one Act of Prayer then in another. Is not this now plain enough, and by you acknowledged also in your Mixture 
(c) Jeanes Mixt. of Scholast. Divin. with Pract. treat. 2. p. 258. , where you have in perpetuam rei memoriam yourself recorded it? And therefore said not the Doctor truly, that he thought this distinction legible enough before, both in the Tract of Will-worship, and in the answer to Mr. Cawdrey? For I hope you will not say, that the Doctor in the last passage, on which your Use of Confutation is grounded, does refer to the outward sensible expressions, and that by Christ's greater ardenoy in this Act of Prayer in his bloody Agony, he only means a more earnest cry, and louder noise, and deeper groan.  
§. 6. But suppose we that no more had been expressed concerning this distinction then what is intimated in these words rehearsed, and by you acknowledged to be recited in your 
(d) Jeanes Mixture, ibid. p. 259.  Mixture. Yet, Sir, deal plainly with the world; can you think the Doctor a man of so crude, raw Judgement, as to take the outward sensible expressions for the inward Acts of Love? Or can you believe him so weak, as not to understand his own meaning? or to have lost so much of Christianity with his Ecclesiastical preferments, as that he is not fit to be believed and trusted when he professes to declare what was his own meaning? One of these you must needs say, or this whole Reply is nothing to the purpose.  
§. 7. For though it were granted (as the contrary has been showed) that the Doctor in that Passage does only mention the Habit of Love, and the outward expressions; yet plain it is, that the outward sensible expressions can refer to nothing but the inward Acts of Love, which (according to the Doctrine of the best Metaphysicians and Schoolmen, as has been declared) the Doctor makes specifically distinct from the Habit. For the expressions of Love must first and immediately refer to the Acts, and by them to the Habit; otherwise your great Master 
* Aristoteles eum qui tantum habet Habitum comparat dormienti, eum verò qui Actum exercet, vigilanti. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 9: §. 14.  Aristotle had vainly compared the Habit to a man asleep, and the Act to one waking. The outward expressions in the subordinate inferior Faculties must first denote the promptness and facility in the Act, and then this ready nimbleness in the Act must declare the perfection of the Habit. If therefore expressions be expressions indeed, and there be a necessary relation between the sign and the thing signified, than the expressions of Love, the outward sensible expressions, must of necessity respect the inward Acts of Love, of which alone they are properly and immediately expressions. And therefore we may well take the Doctor's word, when he says, though (in the words acknowledged and cavilled at by this Refuter) he only mentioned the outward sensible expressions, yet there the expressions, at one time and at another, must needs refer to the several Acts of the same all-full habitual Love. Which inward Acts, alone, and nothing else, he makes to be specifically distinct from the Habit of Love.  
§. 8. But in a Parenthesis to his second Argument he tells us, that by the expressions of Love the Doctor expounds himself to mean, §. 21. the outward expressions of the inward Acts of Love, which are termed Love only by  denomination.  
§. 9 True, Sir. But is it with exclusion of the inward Acts? How then are they expressions of them? But let us view the Doctors own words in the 21. §. that our Refuters fair dealing may notoriously appear. I must only say (says the Doctor there) that is a misapprehension: for that by loving with all the heart, in the first place, I certainly meant the sincere habit of Love, by love in the latter place, the inward Acts of Love, and by the expressions of Love, the outward expressions of those inward Acts; and of these Acts only I speak, and of these expressions, when I say they are more intense at one time then another.  
§. 10. But now, though it be so clearly evident, that in the places already quoted the Doctor by the expressions of Love still refers to the inward Acts, which only he makes specifically distinct from the Habit, yet this was hint enough to give our Refuter advantage to make a noise and a Book. He has now found new matter of Dispute, and with might and main he labours to prove that which no man ever doubted, and the Doctor never thought of. We shall now have Reasons and Authority, no less than a whole Page-full, in this puisny Pamphlet, to prove that which might have been granted for ask. And, O what pity it is that our School-man should not have Truth more often on his side, because he makes so much of it when he chanceth to meet it, though it be out of his road▪  
§. 11. But in good sadness, Sir, why no less than four Reasons to prove that which was never denied you? Has Doctor Hammond asserted any thing to the contrary? Did he ever affirm, that Love was univocally predicated of the Habit and the outward sensible expressions as its Species? If he has, pray quote us the place, that we may also confess and acknowledge his mistake. If he has not, (as without doubt he not where has) than you only fight with a shadow of your own casting, and much good do you with the Conquest. If you set up a Shroveing-Cock from your own Dunghill, I shall not any ways forbidden you to throw as many Cudgels at him as you please.  
§. 12. But yet, Sir, I cannot choose but take notice of your Craft: you have cunningly raised a Cloud of Dust, to amuse your unwary Readers, who will think that all this while you fight with the Doctor, because they see you so zealous in your Mood and Figure, and have urged no less than four Reasons, backed and confirmed with two venerable Authorities, most demurely against No body.  
§. 13. And now I assure you, Sir, it is well that your Conclusion is a Truth sufficiently evident of itself. For otherwise (so profound a Disputant you are) your Reasons would very, very hardly enforce it.  
§. 14. Your Third (to begin with that, for I shall not tie myself to your Method) is most ridiculously false. You say (not to trouble ourselves about the Mood and Figure) (3) No one word can as a Genus equally comprehend the Efficient and the Effect: the Habit of Love is the Efficient cause, and the sincere and cordial expressions of Love are the Effect: therefore Love is not praedicate of them equally as a Genus.  
§. 15. Your Major, Sir, your Major; by all means have a care of your Major. For what think you, Sir, of all 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. l. 2. Gener. Animal. c. 4. in fine.  univocal productions? When Fire produces Fire, and Corn brings forth Corn, when a Man begets a Man, and one Heat makes another, does not one and the same word as a Genus comprehend the Efficient and the Effect? And is it not in these a certain Maxim that Qualis est causa, talis est effectus, such as the Cause is in nature, such also is the Effect? And I hope you will think it lawful for things of the same nature to be comprehended under the same Genus. Nay, are not these distinguished from 
(a) Quaedam est quae effici● Effectum ejusdem rationis; & haec dicitur Vnivoca, ut Ignis quum generat Ignem: & universaliter Causa, quae operando per virtutem suae formae similem reddit Effectum, est Causa univoca, & in suo ordine Principalis, ut recte notat D. Thomas 3. p. q. 62. art. 1. Alia vero est Causa producens Effectum alterius rationis, quam oportet esse nobiliorem Effectu; et haec appellatur Causa Aequivoca; quia non convenit formaliter cum Effectu in eâdem formâ, sed eminenter illam continet. Suarez. Metaph. tom. 1. disp. 17. sect. 2. §. 21. Vid. cund. disp. 26. sect. 1. §. 6. & sect. 5. §. 13, 14, 15, 16, etc.  Aequivocal productions, because in these Effectum est ejusdem rationis cum efficient, but in the other Efficiens non convenit cum effectu in eâdem formâ, sed eminenter illam continet? Nay, does not your own 
(b) Scheibler. Metaph. l. 1. c. 22. tit. 9 n. 116, 117, etc.  Scheibler as well as Suarez (both whom you so seriously commend to the Doctor's perusal) tell you that Causa univoca est quae producit effectum similem in specie? But me thinks, Sir, if (since your more noble, more serious employments in the study and writing of Scholastical and Practical Divinity) you had thought fit to neglect such vulgar Authors, and to forget the common Notions and Maxims delivered by them, yet you should at least have observed this in your Reading of Aquinas, that in his Sums 
(a) Vid. Aquin. Sum. p. 1. q. 4. art. 2. in corp. & Cajetan. Javel. alios, in loc. & 3. part. q. 62. art. 1. in corp. & alibi saepissime.  does frequently deliver this Doctrine, and makes very good use of it. And now, Sir, I hope you will think it lawful for things of the same nature to be comprehended under the same Genus. For where, I pray, will you rank the several Individuals of the selfsame Species (for such are all univocal Causes and Effects, as is plain from sense and experience) if not under the same Genus?  
§ 16. I might prove the gross and palpable falsehood of your Major, Sir, by divers instances drawn from Aequivocal Productions, where the cause and effect must be placed in the same Predicament, and consequently under the same remote Genus at least, which is sufficient to destroy your Major. When the Sun and Stars produce Gold and Silver and Brass, and other Minerals, when they produce Stones of all sorts and kinds in the bowels of the earth, are not the cause and effect, at least as Species subalternae, placed under the same Genus of Substantia corporea? When an Ass begets a Mule, or a Man produces Worms and Vermin in his head and entrails, and when a woman brings forth monstrous births in stead of legitimate issues, as Serpents, Moles and Frogs, and other such like (of which among 
(b) Ita nonnullas mulieres Serpents, Talpas, Ranas, Mutes, Aves, aliaque animalia enixas fuisse inter historias relatum est. Imo verò in Apuliâ & Lombardiâ frequentem esse talium animalium generationem multi Authores referunt, idque Genus animalium ideo vocari Fratrem Lombardorum, à Gordonio, Tornamirâ, aliisque Barbaris Medicis Arpa, seu Arpia, nominatur, quod hujusmodi monstrum multos plerumque habeat pedes, quos etiam sermone illo barbarico Arpas nominant. Lazar. River. Observe. med. Cent. 2. observ. 100 p. 201. Vid. Schenckium & Lycosthenem de Prodigiis.  Physicians there are many true stories) I pray, Sir, must not the cause and effect be both ranged under the same immediate Genus proximum, which is Animal? So when light produces heat, are not the cause and the effect both put in the same Predicament, under the same Genus of Patible Qualities? To keep closer to the business more immediately in controversy. The habit of Love 
(c) Dicendum est habitum simul cum potentia efficere actum, & hunc esse proprium finem ejus. Vid. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 5. n. 6. & sect. 6. n. 12. Scheibler. Metaph. l. 2. c. 8. tit. 4. art. 2. n. 59 & art. 4. punct. 2. n. 104. Vid. etiam Aquin. 1. 2. q. 49. art. 3. in corp. Et Cajetan. in loc. latè, Scot l. 1. Sent. didst 17. q. 2, 3. & 4. Sent. didst 49. q. 1.  effectively concurs with the Will to the production of the inward Acts of Love, and yet I say that Love as a Genus is equally praedicate of the Habit and the inward Acts of Love, as has already been demonstrated, and may in due time be further proved, notwithstanding any thing you have or can say to the contrary. And this is abundantly more than sufficient to show the falsehood of your Major, when you say that no one word can as a Genus (whether proximum or remotum, summum or subalternum (for you absolutely deliver it) equally comprehend the Efficient and the Effect.  
§. 17. But perhaps you had read somewhat like it, concerning the First most universal Cause, God, and his effects; or perhaps you had heard the like concerning the Cause and the Effect in Actu Signato, and therefore you would apply it to all Causes and Effects in Actu also Exercito. And so much be spoken to your third Argument.  
§. 18. I come now to your First. And this though it be not altogether so absurd, yet is false enough in conscience. For whereas you say, that nothing can as a Genus be equally predicated of things put in several Predicaments; but the Habit of Love and Expressions of Love are put in several Predicaments; therefore Love as a Genus doth not equally comprehend them both: Here, Sir, your Assumption is too infirm. For let me ask you, Quanta est Minor? Is it not universal? And if it be not, your Syllogism will be false, and you will conclude an Universal, contrary to all Rules of Art and Reason, from a Praemisse particular. If it be universal, as the Mood and Figure and Conclusion requires, (for rightly framed it is in Celarent, thus, Whatsoever things are put in several Predicaments cannot have the same Genus: But the Habit of Love and the Expressions of Love (in general) are put in several Predicaments: Ergo, the Habit of Love and Expressions of Love (in general) cannot have the same Genus) I say it is false, and you will never be able to prove and make it good, if any one instance can be produced to the contrary. What say you now? Are not Joy and Grief and the other Passions of the mind frequent expressions of Love? 
* Joh. 11. 35, 36.  when Jesus, seeing Mary and the women weeping for Lazarus, groaned in the Spirit, and was troubled, and also wept, said not the Jews truly, Behold how he loved him? But now I hope you will not say, that these Passions of the mind are any thing else then Patible Qualities, and ranked in the third Species, as Habits are in the first. And consequently true it is, that all the Expressions of Love are not (though true it is, I grant, of many or most of them that they are) put in several Predicaments. And if so, your Conclusion, though most true in itself, does not follow by virtue of these Praemisses, because your Assumption is false. And so much for your First.  
§. 18. Your Second and Fourth have somewhat in them, I confess, of the Face of an Argument. An argument, I say; For though you have slit it into two, and divided it from itself by another what-you-call-it between, yet it differs no more than Socrates in one suit does differ from himself in another. The matter is the very same, though the words be different, and both the Minors depend upon one and the same Medium.  
§. 19 But, good Sir, let me advise you, that though now you have the good luck to light upon a right proof of your Conclusion, yet do not for the future obtrude your Arguments upon the world without any more confirmation than your bare Ipse dixit. For I assure you, Sir, you have all-along in this Discourse showed yourself so unhappy a Disputant, that even now when you have clear and evident truth in your Conclusion, men would not believe that it followed from your Praemisses, if Raynaudus had not been brought in to your assistance, who has said more to the purpose in that small passage you have quoted from him, than you have done in the whole page besides.  
§. 20. And yet I must be bold to tell you, that though Raynaudus be your Friend, you do not throughly understand him, and that Author in the place quoted means more than you seem to apprehend. Your words are these, Raynaudus makes mention out of Gab. Biel of a distinction of Love into Affective & Effective; and what is this Effective Love but the Effects and Expressions of Love? Thus you. Now the subject matter of your present discourse leads me necessarily to understand your interrogation of the outward sensible effects and expressions of Love. And if this be your meaning, I must tell you that Raynaudus is not so to be understood; and plain it is from that Author, that Love effective is not only the outward sensible effects and expressions, but also something else. For though it be true, that all the outward sensible effects and expressions of Love be Love effective, or in plain English the issues and effects of Love; yet the terms are not reciprocal and convertible. For there are many effects of Love that are not sensible and thus external. For instance, good Wishes, good Prayers, are the effects of true Love, so also are Joy at the welfare of the beloved Persons well doing, and Sorrow and Grief at his miscarriage; and yet they are not always expressed, nor does any prudent man always show his Joy or Grief, or express his good wishes, thoughts and desires to him he most tenderly affects. The truth is, Raynaudus speaks clear and plain to any man of understanding, and with him Love effective is nothing else but the effect of the Affection of Love. This an Imperate Act, which is the Effect; the other an Elicit Act, the Cause. This performed by any of the other Faculties, and is purely a transient Act; that an immanent Act of the Will, wherein this Love affective is subjected. His words as you cite them (for I have not the Author by me) are these, Effectivum dicit ipsum illius amoris eliciti effectum; translato quippe causae nomine ad effectum, is dicitur amare effective qui non ostentat infertilem & sterilem amorem, sed cum se dat occasio erumpit in fructus dignos amoris. Quam esse admodum impropriam amoris divisionem fatetur Gabriel, quia amare propriè est in sola voluntate tanquam in subjecto; ea autem productio effectuum amoris in aliis facultatibus cernitur, estque Actus transiens, uno immanens, Voluntatis.  
§. 21. And the truth of it is, Love cannot as a Genus comprehend nor be equally praedicate of the Habit and the outward expressions of Love. 1. Because this Love, the Genus of the Habit, is seated in the Will, and not in any other Faculty wherein the outward expressions are subjected. Now since 
(a) Vid. Keck. Log. l. 1. c. 3. can. 2 a. Generis perfecti, p. 55. Ar. 4. Top. c. 1.  tota natura generis continetur in qualibet specie, 
(b) Vid. Burgersdic. Log. Institut. l. 1. c. 11. §. 15.  if the Genus and Species be Accidents, they must have both the same Subject. Hence it is that Science is not, cannot be the Genus of Moral Virtue, quia Scientia est in intellectu, & Virtus in appetitu. And therefore 
(c) Aristot. l. 4. Top▪ c. 3. mihi pag. 314. A.  Aristotle tells us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. 2. I might add, (if it were needful in a case so clear) that the outward expressions of Love are either Actions, or Passions, or Patible Qualities, but never any thing belonging to the first Species of Quality, wherein the Love we now speak of is always placed. 3. That Love is an Elicit Act of the Will, but the expressions of Love are always Acts imperate. 4. That Love is an immanent Act of the Will, but the expressions of it are transient, and performed by the other Faculties, in obedience to the Dictates and Commands of the Will, as Raynaudus has well observed.  
§. 22. — Sed jam dic, Posthume, de tribus Capellis. 
Martial.  What is all this Pro or Con to Doctor Hammond, who never said any thing to give just occasion to this Digression of our Refuter? Go we on then to the next.   

SECT. 8.  
The Refuters Tongue-combat. He a man of Business. The Pertinency of the Doctors first papers to explain the meaning of the latter. Unjustly censured for speaking cautelously. The Refuters understanding the Doctor for a Critic, and a Dunce. Erasmus' fate the same with the Doctors. Critic, an honourable title. The best Scholars Critics, and who. The true Critic an universal Scholar. Sextus Empiricus and Crates character of a Critic. Quintilianus character of the true Grammarian. Aristotle the first Author of Criticism and Grammar. Necessary to complete the Divine. The best way to advance Learning, to unite Criticism and School-learning. Pity the Refuter had not been a Critic. His mistake of the word Salvo; what it signifies. The method of the Schools in Polemical discourses observed by the Doctor. The Refuter saying and unsaying.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
§. 1. ONly I guess not what Temptation he had to choose that expression which he there makes use of, viz. [That there Doctor Hammond minceth the matter, and speaketh more cautelously,] adding [that what he there says is nothing to the matter now in hand.] Whereas, 1. those of Will-worship, being the First Papers written on that Subject, are sure very pertinent to ascertain him of the meaning of the latter, written in defence of them.   

JEANES.  
THat your first Papers written on this Subject are very impertinent to ascertain me of the meaning of your latter is easily discernible unto any man that will compare both together; however I shall offer to your consideration two reasons to prove the impertinency of them for that purpose. 1. In your first papers you speak only of the Expressions of Love, i. e. (as you interpret yourself) the outward expressions of the inward Acts of Love: in your latter Papers you speak of Love itself. Now the outward expressions of love are termed love only extrinsecè, denominatiuè, & participatiuè from the inward act of Love; as some say the imperate acts of the Will are said to be in this sense only free or voluntary. 2ly. That your first Papers are very short in explaining the meaning of your latter, is apparent by this your Reply, wherein you extend the Love of God, which you affirm to be capable of Degrees, beyond the outward expressions, unto the very inward acts of Love.   

Doctor HAMMOND.  
ANd 2ly, the early cautelous speaking there, might have made further latter caution unnecessary.   

JEANES.  
I Had thought that in Polemical writings, it had still been needful for a man to continue on his caution, for otherwise he may expose himself unto blows and knocks which he never dreamt of. Early cautelous speaking is no Salvo unto after-unwariness.   

Doctor HAMMOND.  
ANd 3ly, I could not be said to mince (which to vulgar ears signifies to retract in some degrees what I had said before) and again, speak more cautelously, when that was the first time of my speaking of it.   

JEANES.  
I Am very loath to enter into a contest with so great a Critic touching the meaning of a word; however I shall adventure to say thus much, That a man may be said to mince a matter, and speak more cautelously at the first time of speaking of it, than afterwards at a second time of speaking of it. Neither shall I be beaten from this mine assertion, by your bare and naked affirmation, that to mince to vulgar ears signifieth to retract in some degrees what hath been said before: for I appeal to both vulgar and learned ears, whether or no we may not say truly of divers erroneous persons, that in the first broaching their Errors they mince the matter, and speak more cautelously than afterwards, when they are fleshed and encouraged with success.   

Doctor HAMMOND.  
17. Meanwhile it is manifest, and his own confession, that there these were my words, and those so Cautious, that this sense of the words which he undertakes to refute could not be affixed on them. And this I should have thought sufficient to have preserved my Innocence, and forestalled his Use of Confutation.   

JEANES.  
SVppose that in your tract of Will-worship those were your words, and withal that they were so Cautious that this sense of the words which I undertake to refute could not be affixed on them; yet this is nothing at all unto the purpose, and contributes nothing to the clearing of your Innocence, and forestall my Use of Confutation: and the reason hereof is very evident, Because that which I undertook to refute was affixed by me, not on these your so Cautelous words in your tract of Will-worship, but on a passage in your Answer to Mr. Cawdrey. Indeed I censured those your words in themselves impertinent unto your matter in hand, and withal proved them to be so. But if you had gone no further than these words, you should not have heard from me touching this subject; for time is more precious with me, then to waste it in meddling merely with the impertinencies of any man's discourse.   
§. 2. And here in all this we find very little to the purpose, but an empty Contest about words and phrases, which he carps at in the Doctor, who is a little too old to be taught the meaning of his Mother-tongue, and the usual import of it. Only I observe, that though he profess in the Close of this Tongue-combat, That time is more precious with him, then to waste it in meddling merely with the impertinencies of any man's discourse, yet he is so much at leisure for all that as to spend the compass of two pages at least in his puisny Pamphlet, upon some words and phrases of the Doctors. He is a man of business indeed.  
§. 3. But I cry him mercy. Did I say it was only a controversy about words this? I am afraid I was mistaken. For he will offer to consideration no less than two reasons to prove the impertinency of the Doctors first Papers to ascertain him of the meaning of the latter. The first is, because the Doctor there mentions only the Habit, and the expressions of Love, which are called Love only by  denomination, but here he mentions the inward Acts themselves. The second is, because the Doctor now extends the Love of God, which he affirms to be capable of Degrees, beyond the outward expressions, unto the very inward Acts.  
§. 4. And with your Patience, good Sir, ought he not so to extend it? why else did you so lately blame him for not doing so? But what then, Sir? what then? Conclude, man, with your Ergo Potlid. What's all this to the purpose? Suppose the Doctor there speaks only of the outward expressions of Love (and yet we have clearly evidenced that he speaks also of the inward Acts,) yet must not these of necessity imply and relate to the inward Acts of Love whereof they are Expressions? Why then could you not guests at his meaning in this passage? Can you be so uncharitable, as to think the Doctor was a man of so slender shallow parts, as to take the outward Expressions of Love for Love itself, and a coordinate Species of the same Genus? If not, without doubt the Doct. must of necessity mean nothing else than what he professes, that best knew his own meaning of any man in the world.  
§. 5. The truth is, the Doctor then thought he writ to men ingenuous and candid, that would not look for knots in Bulrushes. But after finding by sad experience, that he was to deal with some that endeavour to move every stone, to throw at those that are not in every thing of their Judgement, though never so ridiculous and false, though never so disadvantageous to the peace and welfare of the Church; he was forced clearly to express that which before he had sufficiently employed.  
§. 6. And yet now he must be told, that at first he did mince the matter, and speak more cautelously than afterwards, as Heretics indeed are wont. Before he was condemned for speaking too little, and now he is upbraided for speaking too much. Nay our Refuter can do no less then to appeal to both vulgar and learned ears, whether or no we may not say truly of divers erroneous persons (such as without doubt the Doctor is) that in the first broaching of their Errors they mince the matter, and speak more cautelously than afterwards, when they are fleshed and encouraged with success.  
§. 7. It is readily granted, Sir, and for your further confirmation, I refer you to Lysimachus Nicanor, and to Sleidan's History of the Anabaptists in Germany, and other true stories, and Pasquil's, and practices of later times.  
§. 8. And now, though it be high time to leave this Tongue-Combat, yet I cannot part with this Section, without expressing my just indignation at this Refuters so contemptuous undervaluing the Doctor's excellent Learning. I am very loath (says he) to enter into a contest with so great a Critic touching the meaning of a word. The Doctor, in our Schoolmans' opinion, is some petty Grammaticaster, that knows the meaning of Musa, and can tell how to decline Lapis, some great Critic forsooth, one fit to teach Schoolboys perhaps the meaning of a Greek or Latin Author: but for any skill in the Arts, and Reserches of Philosophy, he is a very Dunce, and not at all seen in the curious Speculations and Subtleties of School-learning.  
§. 9 And now I see this under his hand in print, my wonder must cease, that he even among his Apron-men of Bridgewater so fastidiously decries the Doctor for a Dunce. For it has been assured me, from very credible witnesses, that he every where brags, he has made this Doctor a very Dunce.  
§. 10. This minds me of the Fate of the great Erasmus, that Phosphorus to all curious learning which so brightly shines in the Christian world; whose wit, and Judgement, and industry, and skill, all Scholars admire, and very few equal, and scarce any exceed: whose Countrymen thought themselves so highly honoured in his Birth (as once the Grecians did in that of their Homer) that at the public charge they erected a Brazen Statue for him, as well to their own honour as his memory. And yet this Erasmus, whose Writings shall outlast ten such Brazen Statues, was so highly undervalved by our Countryman Lee and the Paris Divines, and some such Pretenders to School learning as our Refuter is, as to be counted no Scholar, no Divine, but a Critic and a whiffling Grammarian. His Apologies for himself in this kind are swelled into a Volume: and in this Work he has showed as much Judgement and Learning as in any that he ever wrote; and has clearly demonstrated the advantage of the Critic above the Pretender to the Sums and the Sentences, and that more goes to the making a true and genuine Scholar then to rally up a Distinction, and to quote Aquinas and Scotus; men indeed of admirable parts, and high sublime Judgements, and curious subtle inventions, and which wanted nothing but the Critic to make them more perfectly deserve the titles of Doctor Subtilis and Doctor Angelicus.  
§. 11. And therefore this Refuter has been so far from blasting the Doctor's reputation, that he has written a libel to his Honour, and has defamed him to his Credit.  
§. 12. A great Critic! Sir, it is the only style that befits a Prince among Scholars: And all the knowing men that ever were have gloried in the Title. Let me tell you, Sir, that even 
* Vid. Dan. Heinsii Prolegom. ad Aristarch. Sac. seu Nonnum, pag. 18, 20, etc.  Esdras himself, and the * Masorites, and R. Moses Ben Maimon (of 
(a) Tritum est inter Judaeos & passim notum, quod Hebraei de eo dicunt, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, h. e. A Mose (Prophetâ scil.) ad Mosen (istum Aegyptium) non surrexit sicut Moses (iste qui doctrinâ & erudition Mosi Legislatori aequiparandus esset.) Addu●itur ab Elia Levita in praefatione prosâ Libri Thisbi. Buxtorf. in Praefat. ad More Nevochim. Vid. amp.  whom they say, à Mose ad Mosen non erat talis Moses) were all Critics among the Jews. Let me tell you, Sir, S. Paul himself (praefiscinè dixerim) was not only an Apostle, but also a Critic: one bred up indeed at the feet of Gamaliel, but withal so tightly skilled in all exotic learning, so admirable a Rhetorician, and so powerful in Argument, that the blasphemous Porphyry was wont to say, that it was pity so gallant a man should be bestowed upon so mean a Religion. Nay I must tell you, Sir, that the great Aristarchus, and Varro, nay Cicero, and your great Mr. Aristotle, were Critics. If you will not take my word, let the most excellent 
(a) Vid. D. Heins. Prolegom. in Non. p. 3, 14, 19 & passim pertotam Dissertationem. Critices & omnis sapientiae Monarcha Aristoteles, etc. Heins. ib. p. 34.  Heinsius assure and prove it to you beyond exception. Further yet, Sir, (as the same judicious Heinsius) our Origen, and Hierome, Clemens Alexandrinus, Eusebius, and Tertullian, and Basil, and Isidore, and Photius, and the most learned of all the Christian Fathers, were Critics. To come down to our own times. What think you of Erasmus (magnus ille literarum restitutor, as 
(b) Heins. ibid. p. 24.  Heinsius worthily calls him?) What think you of the two Portents of Learning, the Father and the Son, Scaligers? What think you of Cardinal Cajetan and Tolet? I hope you will value them at least for their School-learning, and yet these were high Critics. Nay Serrarius, and Possevine, and Maldonate, and Bellarmine, let me add, and Suarez, and Sirmond, and Petavius, and whosoever of that Society has the name of a Scholar, will be proved to be thought a Critic. I cannot choose but expatiate. The Leiden Triumvirate of all good letters, the incomparable Grotius and Vossius and Heinsius, all were Critics. Nor must Salmasius be forgotten. Our Andrew's, our Usher, our Montacute, our Davenant, our Savill, our Cambden, our Boys, our Fuller, our Selden, the great glories of our Nation, were all Critics. To go further, Paraeus, and Beza, and Cameron, and Casaubon, and Fagius, and Rivet, and Drusius, and Gerard, and Chemnitius, nay even Calvin and Luther, the glorious lights of the Reformation, were all Critics. And to make short, let this Refuter tell me of any Scholar in the world that ever gained a solid name, that was not a Critic?  
§. 13. If this in our Refuters ear savour too much of Declamation, let me refer him to learn from the exquisite Heinsius 
* Vid. D. Heinsii Prolegom. in Nonnum, which that Author calls Ad Aristarchum, sive, De verae Criticae apud veteres ortu, progressu, usuque in caeteris disciplinis, tum in Theologiâ praesertim, Dissertatio.  the true worth and abilities of a Critic. He will there find, to his wonder and amazement, that the great Crates was wont to say, as Sextus Empiricus has observed, omnem eruditionem ac scientiam in Critico requiri, That the Critic must be a universal Scholar, and that Language and Grammar make up the very lest part of him. Though he speak as many tongues as Mithridates of Pontus, or the Apostles did at the day of Pentecost; yet if he be not skilled in all the liberal Arts and Sciences, if he knows not the History of times, and the rites and customs of Nations, and be not acquainted with their Laws, if he has not searched into the secrets and mysteries of Nature, and with Solomon can read a lecture from the Cedar to the Hyssop on the wall, and if he crown not all the rest with a profound skill in the depths of Theologi, he will many times be to seek, and not able to give a right Judgement and solution to doubts that may arise. So much therefore as he is defective in any kind of solid learning, so much is the Scholar wanting of the Perfection of the true Critic.  
§. 14. Though then our great School-man count a Critic but a Grammarian, and a Grammarian but an empty Pedagogue, yet let Sextus Empiricus, a Philosopher of some note (and so perhaps the more venerable with our Scholastical Pretender) tell him the difference between the Grammarian or Pedagogue, and the Critic. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. That is, the saying of Crates may seem to be of some weight and moment, who said that this was the difference between a Grammarian and a Critic; the Critic indeed must be skilled in all the liberal Arts and Sciences, when the Grammarian is only an interpreter of language, and a teacher of Accents, and knows only such trifles: So that the Critic is like, and may be compared to the Architect, and the Grammarian to his Labourer or Hods-man.  
§. 15. And now if our Refuter should retract the word Critic, which at first he understood not, and call the Doctor a Grammarian; yet let Quintilian tell our Refuter what the true Grammarian is, that so at last he may leave the Doctor no other but his ordinary household language, that he so frequently bestows upon him, in plain English, A Dunce. But what says Quintilian 
(a) Fab. Quint. l. 1. c. 4. De vero Grammatico, p. 19, 20. Vid. amplius.  for our Schoolmans instruction in the nature of the true Grammarian? Nec Poetas legisse satis est; excutiendum omne Scriptorum genus, non propter historias modo, sed verba, quae frequenter jus ab Authoribus sumunt. Tum nec citra Musicen Grammatice potest esse perfecta, cum ei de metris rhythmisque dicendum sit. Nec si rationem Syderum ignoret, Poetas intelligat, qui (ut alia mittam) toties ortu occasúque signorum in declarandis Authoribus utuntur. Nec ignara Philosophiae, cùm propter plurimos in omnibus ferè carminibus locos ex intima quaestionum naturalium subtilitate repetitos, tum vel propter Empedoclem in Graecis, Varronem & Lucretium in Latinis, qui pracepta sapientiae versibus tradiderunt. Eloquentiâ quoque non modicâ est opus, ut de unaquaque earum quas demonstravimus rerum dicat propriè & copiosé. Quo minùs sunt ferendi qui hanc artem ut tenuem & jejunam cavillantur, quae nisi Oratori futuro fundamenta fideliter jecerit, quicquid superstruxeris corruet: necessaria pueris, jucunda senibús, dulcis secretorum comes, & quae sola omni studiorum genere plus habet operis quam Ostentationis. Thus Quintilian, who of any was best able to judge of the Parts and due abilities of a Grammarian indeed.  
§. 16. And therefore it is the less to be wondered that 
(b) Dion. dissert. 53. de Homero.  Dion tells us of Aristotle, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that from this Prodigy of knowledge, in whom God has showed how far humane Reason is able to pierce into the secrets of Nature, both Criticism and Grammar first took their beginning.  
§. 17. I might now show how useful, how necessary the Critic and Grammarian is to complete the Divine: But the most Excellent Heinsius has saved me that labour in the Dissertation already quoted. I shall only appeal to all knowing and judicious Divines, whether the best Expositors of Scripture are not also the best Critics, and whether since that kind of Learning has been in fashion in the world, we have not known more of the obscure, doubtful and knotty places of Scripture in this last Age, than the Christian world was able to discover in five hundred years before, and in the very height of School-learning.  
§. 18. But yet I would not be thought to undervalue this Learning also. I know the great use and Advantage of a judicious skill in it. I admire at the strange heights and curious subtleties and profound reasonings of those Doctors; and I know nothing wanting to make them the most admirable of men, but the true Critic and Grammarian. And he that would advance Learning to the height, must fix the airy speculations, that now begin to float too much in some Critics heads, with the solid Reason of the Schools. And he, at least in my Judgement, will prove the only Scholar, that judiciously studies both.  
§. 19 And therefore though our School-man so much undervalue this learning, (wherein the Doctor has demonstrated his excellence to the world in his very many writings, particularly in his exquisite Comment on all the Books of the New Testament, and that other upon the Psalms,) yet what pity is it that such a profound Doctor and so eminent a School-man as he is, had not also been a Critic, that so he might have truly understood the import of words and phrases that are used in his own mother-language?  
§. 20. For very ignorantly he tells the Doctor, though he speak it as sententiously as if Seneca's Ghost had inspired him, that Early cautelous speaking is no Salvo unto after-unwariness. For though the word Salve in English signify a Medicine, yet this hybridous word Salvo most certainly does not. Borrowed it is from the use and practise and customs of the Law, which are wont to express clauses of Reservation and Exception with a Salvo jure meo and the like, from which and the like forms it is translated into our Language to signify a Reservation and Exception. And this is all our Don Henrico has gained by speaking English in a Spanish Dialect, to talk exquisite Nonsense, and make his language ridiculous.  
§. 21. But why, I pray Sir, is Early Cautelous speaking no Salvo, no excuse you mean, for after-unwariness? I had thought that in Polemical writings and Scholastical Disputes it had been the method of the Schools, first to set down the state of the Question, and then to guide and steer the whole body of their Discourse by that Chart and Compass. Though the Dispute does multiply into never so much length, it is not the custom of those Authors to make a new state, or repeat the old at every turn, because they count that done sufficiently in the beginning of the Discourse. And therefore, Sir, you betray yourself to be no great Master of Method in such Eristical Discourses, for blaming the Doctor for his Early cautelous speaking, which in the Judgement of all the world, that know the manner of such Controversies, might justly make latter caution unnecessary; since all that follows in the continuation of such Disputes, by the practice of all writers, is only to be understood according to the first state and setting the bounds of the Question. The Doctor indeed had not the spirit of Divination, nor could he foresee what a subtle Disputant he should cope with: otherwise without doubt he would have dreamt at least of the Blows and Knocks he is now exposed to, and would as carefully have warded them.  
§. 22. But if his words in the Treatise of Will-worship were so cautious, that this sense of the words you undertake to refute could not, by your own confession, be affixed on them, why then is this no clearing of his Innocence? Is it not usual all the world over, for men to expound latter doubtful speeches by the former? especially when so cautious a Repetition of a man's meaning, at every turn, would be so ridiculously nauseous? Good Sir, give me a Reason why the Tract of Will-worship, wherein the state of the Question was first very punctually set down, should not serve to explain the meaning of the Account to Mr. Cawdrey, since this last was written in defence of the former, and is nothing else but a Continuation of the former Dipute? If you cannot, (as I know you cannot) then let his early cautious speaking there be a sufficient clearing of his Innocence here, and an absolute forestall of your Use of Confutation.  
§. 23. But how is this, Sir? what? your Use of Confutation grounded on a Passage in the Doctors Answer to Mr. Cawdrey? I had thought, Sir, you had told us it was grounded on the 21th. §. of the Doctors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. I am sure, when the Doctor had professed his own innocence in that passage by you quoted, and proved it, and publicly renounced the Error which you then laid to his charge, you then told us, that you would charge him by Consequence, and in the Close of your first Argument (which makes the greatest part of this your Reply) grounded on the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 you tell us, Thus you see what the Reason was that induced me to charge you with this Opinion.  
§. 24. But this saying and unsaying is now no news to me: since I am gotten so far in the Examination of this Empty Pamphlet, I am fully confirmed that you are nothing but Words and Noise; and you can with great Confidence say any thing against a great Critic. And so I come to the next Section.   

SECT. 9  
The Refuters impertinent referring to former performances. His vain pretences of proof. The Refuters reasonings with himself inconsequent: proved. The intention of the Act proportioned to the intention of the Habit, so as not to exceed it, unless by Accident; but not always to equal it. Proved by instance of the Lutenist, and Painter, and Preacher. Habits not necessary, but voluntary causes, unless ab extrinseco determined.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
18. BUt the Answer to Mr. Cawdrey, which occasioned it, was, I think, as cautious also, 1. in the words recited by the Refuter, viz. that Christ himself was more ardent in one Act of Prayer then in another; 2. in the words following in that Answer, but not recited by him, viz. that the sincerity of this or that Virtue expressed in this or that performance, is it we speak of, when we say it consists in a latitude and hath Degrees: where the (this or that performance) are certainly Acts of the Virtue, consisting in a latitude; and having Degrees (viz. in that latitude) no way implies him that hath Virtue in that latitude (viz. Christ) to want at present, and in that sense to be capable of further Degrees.  
19 I am willing to look as jealously as I can on any passage of my own, which falls under any man's Censure; and therefore finding nothing in the words (set down by him as the ground of the Refutation) which is any way capable of it, I have reviewed the whole Section, and weighed every period as sufficiently as I could, to observe whether I could draw or wrest that Consequence from any other passage not recited by him.  
20. And I find none in any degree liable, except it should be this in the beginning of the Section, where setting down the Argument as it lay in the Tract of Will worship, I say, 'tis possible for the same person which so loves God (i. e. with all the heart) to love him, and express that Love more intensely at one time then another, as appeared by the example of Christ.  
21. And if this be thought capable of misapprehension, by reason of the (and), disjoining Love from the expressions of it, and so the expressions belonging to the Acts, the Love be deemed to denote the habitual Love, I must only say, that is a misapprehension, for that by loving with all the heart in the first place, I certainly meant the sincere habit of Love, by Love in the latter place, the inward acts of Love, and by the outward expressions of Love, the outward expressions of those inward Acts: and of those Acts only I speak and of those expressions, when I say they are more intense at one time then another.   

JEANES.  
I shall here briefly represent unto you that which made me think you guilty of detracting from the All-fulness of Christ's habitual Grace, and refer you for confirmation hereof unto what I have said in the beginning of this my Discourse. The undeniable consequence of what you say in answer to Mr. Cawdrey is, as I have proved, that Christ's Love of God was capable of further Degrees. Now hereupon I thus reasoned in my mind: You were to be understood either of the Habit, or of the inward Act of Love; for as for the outward Expressions of Love, it is without dispute that they cannot be said to be Love properly, but only by a Trope. If you should have said that you spoke of the Habit of Love, than you would have expressly impugned the All-fullness of Christ's habitual Grace; and if you should say, as now you do, that you meant the inward Acts of Love, why then you would even hereby impliedly, & by consequence, have opposed the perfection of Christ's habitual Grace, because the intention of the inward acts of Love proceedeth from the intention of the habit of Love, and is therefore proportioned unto it. But of this more fully in the place above mentioned. Thus having shown you what invited me to my Use of Confutation, I shall pass over the three other Sections, which you yourself I presume would have spared, if you had been privy unto that which I now acquaint you with.   
§. 1. The Doctor in the four former Paragraphs had truly stated the Question in Debate, and clearly set down his own meaning, and after the most impartial survey of every suspicious period in the quoted Section, had found nothing that with any ingenuity could be forced to speak contrary to his present judgement here expressed. And now our Refuter, in stead of convincing the Doctor, and disproving any thing here said, steps in, and tells us that he shall briefly represent to the Doctor that which made him think him guilty of detracting from the All-fullness of Christ's habitual grace, and refer him for confirmation hereof unto what he has said in the beginning of his Discourse.  
§. 2. Say you so, Sir? I see then your skill in Music is but little, because you are always harping upon one string. But, good Sir, forbear, in charity forbear: for know you not that  
Occidit miseros Crambe repetita Magistros? 
Juvenal.   
Howsoever, if you can allow us no new Arguments, it is not fit, nor can you in justice expect to receive any but old Answers. And therefore have the Patience to look back, and you shall find this your invincible Demonstration proved no better than a ridiculous Sophism and a Farrago of Mistakes.  
§. 3. But he goes on with Triumph, and the Galliardise of a Conqueror, and says, The undeniable consequence of what the Doctor says in answer to Mr. Cawdrey is, as he has proved, that Christ's Love of God (his habitual Love he must mean, if he speak any thing to the purpose; for the Doctor positively maintains a gradual difference in the Acts of Christ's Love) was capable of further Degrees.  
§. 4. But, good Sir, I beseech you do not talk too much of Proof. Where, where have you performed this so wonderful Achievement? In good earnest tell us, that we may erect for you no less than Bacchus' monuments and Hercules Pillars, with a Ne plus ultra inscribed for a Motto, and a Trophy of your great Acquests. For my own part, I cannot yet tell where to find it, but all along I see that your Proofs and your Conclusions are at far greater distance than yourself and Doctor Hammond. For little hope there is they should ever be reconciled, though in good time you and the Doctor may. You seem indeed (to speak to you in your own Rhetorical expressions, which I hope 
Jeanes Answer to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pag. 15.  will therefore please you) most vehemently to assert your Conclusion, and to affirm that you have proved it. But you must pardon me if I entertain not your vehement Asseverations for solid Arguments, as if they were Propositiones per se notae. Pray, Sir, review your Proofs again, and put more strength into your Arguments. If you can make good that they contain any disproof of what the Doctor has said, unless begging of the Question, and your own 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be argumentative, you shall have my hearty leave to triumph o'er the Doctor as you please. And now I give you thanks for this answer, with which your own papers have supplied me.  
§. 5. But now we have need of an O yes. For he will condescend to discover to the world his own secret thoughts, that surpass those Contemplations of Columbus, that first drew him on to the search of a New world. Say on, Sir, and we shall give you as venerable Attention as the votaries of Apollo Pythius did to the Oracle when it spoke.  
§. 6. Now hereupon, says our Refuter, I thus reasoned in my mind: You, Mr. Doctor, were to be understood either of the Habit, or the inward Act of Love; for as for the outward Expressions of Love, it is without dispute that they cannot be said to be Love properly, but only by a Trope. If you should have said (which he never did, but always declared the contrary) that you spoke of the Habit of Love, than you would have expressly impugned the All-fulness of Christ's habitual grace (which yet the Doctor does always profess to acknowledge;) and if you should say, as now you do, that you meant the inward Acts of Love (as he always did) why then I concluded, that you would even hereby impliedly, and by consequence, have opposed the Perfection of Christ's habitual grace, because the intention of the inward Acts of Love proceedeth from the intention of the Habit of Love, and is therefore proportioned unto it. But of this more fully in the place above mentioned.  
And thus, he says, he has showed us what invited him to his Use of Confutation.  
§. 7. Well, we see what roused the good man. But yet I cannot choose but suspect the whole for a plain sophistical Elench, since all that follows the Because, upon which alone as the Basis the whole Argumentation is founded, is a very gross mistake. But they say the Ephesian Temple, one of the Wonders of the world, was built upon a Quagmire.  
§. 8. And therefore, good Sir, notwithstanding your (because,) I must needs deny your sequel; and because I deal fairly with you, I shall give you my Reasons for it.  
§. 9 It is true, the intention of the inward Acts of Love must proceed from the intention of the Habit, so as it is 
(a) Potentia ex vi Habitûs non potest efficere Actum intensiorem quam sit ipse Habitus: quia nulla forma remissa potest per se conferre ad effectum intensiorem, ut supra disp. 18. fusiùs tractatum est. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 6. n. 3.  impossible that the Act should per se be more intense and perfect then the Habit. Because the Act is the Effect, and the Habit is Cause of the Act; now no Effect can be more noble than its Cause, because Nihil dat quod non habet, aut eminenter, ut in causis Aequivocis, aut formaliter, ut in Vnivocis. For I speak not now of Causes per Accidens, because they have no place here.  
§. 10. But then, though the Act, which is the Effect, cannot be more high and intense then the Habit from whence it effectively flows, and so the intention of the Act must proceed from the intention of the Habit, and is therefore in this sense 
(b) 
Propter necessariam proportionem inter Habitum & Actum, non potest Habitus remissus per se efficere intensiorem Actum se, quia Habitus non inclinat nisi ad Actus similes illis à quibus fuit genitus, teste Aristotele, 2. Eth. c. 1. & teste etiam experientiâ, etc. Suarez. ib. n. 4.  
Denique, etiam in Habitibus infusis, docent communiter Theologi ex vi illorum non posse Potentiam efficere Actus intensiores ipsis Habitibus; quamquam in eyes posset esse major ratio dubitandi, vel quia tales Habitus sunt perfectiores suis Actibus, vel quia non solum dant facilitatem sed etiam potestatem: nihilominus, quia revera sunt Habitus, & dantur cum debita proportione ad Actus, ut ex vi illorum fiant Actus connaturali modo, ideo quantum est ex intrinseca virtute talium Habituum, non valet Potentia efficere intensiores Actus ipsis Habitibus, sed si eos interdum elicit, est ratione alterius auxilii Divini. Suarez. ibid. n. 5. Vid. ibid. ampl. n. 6, 7.   proportioned unto it: yet let me ask you, Sir, is it necessary, vice versâ, that the Act should be always as high and perfect and intense as the Habit? I trow not, Sir. And if it appear so in the issue, as without doubt it will, than you have put a Fallacy upon yourself, and by a downright mistake fallen upon your Use of Confutation.  
§. 11. For instance. I hope you will not say that any Lutenist can ever play better than his Art can guide him, or that his playing shall regularly and per se exceed his skill, or that the Painter's fingers should outdo his Art; unless the 
† This story is at large in Strabo Geograph. l. 6. p. 180. edit Basil. which Erasmus in his Adages, Tit. Taciturnitas laudata, Adag Acanthia Cicada seu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, has thus elegantly rendered; Strabo Timaeum citat authorem, quendam in Pythiorum certamine Eunomum Locrensem, & Rheginensem Aristonem in canendi certamen venisse: Aristonem Apollinem invocasse Delphicum, ut sibi canenti fieret auxilio, quod à Delphis Rheginenses olim essent profecti. Eunomus respondit, Rheginensibus nè certandum quidem omnino de Musica, apud quos Cicada, vocalissimum animal, voce careret. Vtrisque ce●ta●tibus, cum in Eunomi Cithura una inter canendum chorda frangeretur, Cicada supervolans astitit, ac vocem alioqui defuturam suo cantu supplevit: atque ita victor declaratus statuam Cithara di posuit cum cicada citharae infidente. Vide etiam Erasmum, Tit. Auxilium, Ada●. Chordae vice.  Grass-hopper, as I remember to have read, that once in the Pythian Games he did come in to mend the Music which the Artist failed in; or the 
* 
Est in ea Canis mirè factus, ut quem pariter casus & ars pinxerit. Non judicabat se exprimere in eo spumam anhelantis posse, cum in reliqua omni parte (quod difficillimum erat) sibi ipsi satisfecisset. Displicebat autem ars ipsa, nec minui poterat, & videbatur nimia, ac longiùs à veritate discedere, spumaque illa pingi non ex ore nasci, anxio animi cruciatu, cum in Pictura verum esse, non verisimile vellet; absterserat saepius mutaveratque penicillum, nullo modo sibi approbans. Postremò, iratus arti, quòd intelligeretur, spongiam eam impegit inviso loco tabulae, & illa reposuit ablatos colores, qualiter cura optabat; fecitque in Pictura Fortuna Naturam. Hoc exemplo similis & Neaclem successus in spuma equi similiter spongiâ impactâ secutus dicitur, eum pingeret poppyzonta retinentem equum. Canem ita Protogenes monstravit & Fortuna. Plin. Natur. hist. lib. 35. ca 10. mihi pag. 346. tom. 3.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. lib. 6. Eth. ca 4. §. 3.   Painter's rage casually directs his Pencil to draw the Dogs and Horses foam, which all his skill and frequent attempts could not reach to. The Perfection of the Act still argues the Perfection of the Habit, and the intention here must be derived from the former. But then, though the Painter cannot limne beyond his skill, nor the Lutenist play unless by chance; yet I hope the Lutenist and Painter is not morally or naturally bound and necessitated always to play and limne as well as they can.  
§. 12. To come closer; I suppose Mr. Jeanes to be a good Preacher (for I have seen a good Sermon of his in print concerning Abstinence from all appearance of evil, and he would do well to think of his own Doctrine;) but yet I cannot think him bound either by God's law or man's to preach always as well as he can: Nor do I believe he makes his Sermons with the same care and pains, and sets them off with the same Learning and Rhetoric when he preaches weekly to his Parish at Chedzoy, as when he preaches before the Judges in the face of the Country. And yet still the intention of the Act must proceed from the intention of the Habit. A man of lower parts, and less learning and Judgement and Rhetoric than himself, cannot speak or write so well as he himself can: And yet he himself is not always bound to exceed a meaner Scholars performances, and many times Prudence & Discretion will invite him to stoop and condescend to the weakness and Capacity of his Auditors.  
§. 13. For the 
* 
Dicendum est ergo, quòd Habitus determinat Potentiam ad hoc, ut ipsa Habitu perfecta sit proprium principium perfecti operis, in quo sua consummatur perfectio. Et quoniam Habitus est quo quis operatur cum vult, & non cum habet, & propterea est quo quis operatur infra ejus Potestatem, quantum vult, non quantum potest, ut patet in Artificibus; ideo non mireris si Actus Potentiae habituatae non sunt semper perfectiores Actibus Potentiae non habituatae. Cajetan. in 1. 2. q. 49. art. 3. pag. 98. col. 4. K.  
Habitus in tantum potest esse Principium Actus Liberi, in quantum possumus eo uti cum volumus: non ergo dat ipse Habitus libertatem, sed potius (ut ita dicam) illam accipit à Potentia in qua residet quatenus Potentia est, quae Habitu utitur, ut in ejus facultate positum est illo uti vel non uti, etc. Vid. amp. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 19 sect. 5. n. 8.  
Dicimus Qualitatem ex se habere talem naturam (intensibilem) & non ratione alterius, quamvis quoad existentiam redigatur in actum magis vel minus perfectum ab agente inaequali, vel in virtute vel in approximatione, vel in voluntate si sit liberum. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 46. sect. ●. n. 3. vid. ibid. sect. 3. n. 9 & n. 15, 16. & sect. 4. n. 14. p. 497. col. 1. & Suarez. disp. 19 sect. 2. & sect. 4. n. 8. etc.—  
Voluntas ab objecto proposito non semper determinatur ad unum; certa est & recepta ab omnibus, eàmque ex professo probat D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 10. art. 2. Name perinde est dicere Voluntatem non necessitari ab alio, quod non determinari ad unum ab illo— Sed est certum non necessitari ab omnibus objectis, ergo nec determinari ad unum. Igitur quoad Exercitium solum in Patria ab infinita bonitate Dei clarè visi determinatur ad unum, juxta receptam doctrinam; quoad Specificationem verò à Bono in communi, aut aliis similibus objectis, etc. Suarez. Metap. disp. 19 sect. 6. n. 9 Vid. ibid. sect. 5. n 7.   Habits whereof we speak, being seated in the Will, do ordinarily partake of the nature of the Will wherein they are subjected, and concurring still effectively with the Will to the production of the Act, must still be free and voluntary causes to act, not necessarily & ad ultimum virium, but how and when and in what manner and measure he that has the Habit shall think fit, unless the Will be otherwise limited and determined. For instance, The blessed Saints and Angels in Patria love God ad ultimum virium necessarily, and yet freely (as freedom is improperly taken) because such is the excellency of the Object, God, which now they know face to face (being Comprehensores and in Patria, as they speak in the Schools) that he cannot choose but most necessarily and most ardently be loved. But then this determination is wholly  to a Habit ut sic, and praecisely considered, and only by accident in respect of the Knowledge and Perfection of the Object, which cannot choose but be always most perfectly loved where it is so perfectly known.  
§. 14. And Thus (to speak in your own Compliment, which you vouchsafe in the Close of this Section to spend upon the Doctor) having showed you the ground of your mistake that invited you unto your Use of Confutation, I might pass over not only the three other Sections, but the rest of your whole Book, which you yourself I presume would have spared, if you had been privy to that which I now acquaint you with.  
But we must attend you in your motion.   

SECT. 10.  
The Refuters Saying is the only proof that Actual Love is in the Predicament of Action. The contrary proved by Suarez, Smiglecius, Scheibler. In Actual love the Action and the Terminus of it considerable. The Refuters remarks in Scheibler impertinent. His Oracles nothing to the purpose. The Propositions to be proved. Immanent Acts in what sense Qualities. Scheibler not slighted. Aristotle his Character of Eudoxus agreeable to the Refuter. His words not home to the Refuters purpose, proved from Reason and Suarez. Habitual and Actual Love both Qualities and Species of the same Genus: proved from sundry places in Suarez. The Refuters further Impertinencies. Immanent Acts of Love in what sense Dispositions, in what not, from Smiglecius, Aquinas. Acts of two sorts.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
22. THe word Love, as I said, is a Genus equally comprehending the two Species, habitual and actual Love, and equally applicable to either of the Species, to the Acts as well as the Habit of Love. And so when I say, Love is capable of Degrees, the meaning is clear, The Generical word Love restrained to the latter Species, i. e. considered in respect of the Acts of Love gradually differenced one from the other, is in that respect capable of Degrees both inwardly and in outward expressions: that Act of Love that poured out and expressed itself in the more Ardent prayer, was a more intense Act of Love then another Act of the same habitual Love which did not so ardently express itself.   

JEANES.  
THat Love is not a Genus equally comprehending habitual and actual Love, as it's two Species, I have already proved by this Argument, Because they are in several Predicaments, Habitual Love in the Predicament of Quality, and Actual in the Predicament of Action. There are, I know, divers great Philosophers and Schoolmen that make all immanent Acts, and consequently all inward Acts of Love to be Qualities; they are, say they, only Grammatical Actions, not Metaphysical Actions in the Predicament of Action. But this opinion is untrue in itself, and no ways advantageous unto your cause in hand.  
1. It is untrue in itself; and to confirm this, I shall offer to your consideration two arguments out of Scheibler, which clearly prove immanent acts to be true, proper, and predicamental actions in the Predicament of Action. In universum id sine incommodo potest dici Actio, quod sufficit ad constituendam causalitatem Efficientis: Atqui dantur causae efficientes, quibus non convenit alia causalitas quàm quae sit actio immanens: Ergo actio immanens vere est actio. Propositio patet, Quia praedicamentum Actionis ponitur ad locandam causalitatem efficientis causae in genere entium, ut supra disputatum, explicando divisionem praedicamentorum. Et confirmatur, Quod actio sit adaequata causalitas efficientis, ut supra visum est, lib. 1. c. 12. Assumptio patet. Nam Homo absolutè est causa efficiens in quantum denominatur videre aut intelligere: et tamen isti sunt actus immanentes. That which is the causality of an efficient Cause is a true and predicamental Action in the predicament of Action: But immanent Acts are the causalities of efficient causes; and therefore proper and predicamental Actions. Deinde ad actus immanentes sunt potentiae activae: Sed potentiae activae sunt per ordinem ad veras actiones: Ergo actus immanentes sunt verae actiones. Et si high solum titulo tenus sunt actiones, Ergo etiam potentiae illae activae titulotenus sunt potentiae activae. That which terminates and actuates an active power is a proper and predicamental action: But every immanent act terminates and actuates an active power: and therefore every immanent act is a proper and predicamental action. Met. lib. 2. cap. 10. n. 27. You may perhaps slight Scheibler, as a trivial author; but I urge his reasons, not his Authority: and if you can answer his reasons, you may speak your pleasure of him, and of me for alleging of him. But I can press you with an Author far greater than Scheibler, our great Master Aristotle, of whom you make somewhere in your writings honourable mention. He, lib. 10. Ethic. c. 3. tells us roundly, that the operations of virtues, and even happiness itself, are not qualities, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but these are immanent Acts, and therefore in his opinion immanent acts are not qualities. But secondly, suppose this opinion were true in itself, yet will it no ways advantage your cause; for the patrons of it range immanent acts under the first Species of quality, and then are they either Dispositions or Habits. If you say they are dispositions, as most of the  schoolmen hold them to be, against this I object, That however they may be so in other men, yet they cannot be so in Christ: for a Disposition carrieth in its notion inchoation and imperfection, and therefore to attribute it unto Christ is to throw an apparent dishonour upon him. If you say they are habits, why then, you cannot deny them to be gracious habits, and so you will fall upon that opinion of which in this reply you so studiously endeavour to acquit yourself, viz. that the same habits of Grace in Christ may be more intense at one time then another, and consequently that his habitual Grace was not always full and perfect.   
§. 1. Whereas the Doctor had been forced again to mind our Refuter of the useful distinction of Love into its Species, Habitual and Actual, he tells us again, that Love is not a Genus equally comprehending them as it's two Species, as he has proved by this argument, because they are in several Predicaments, habitual Love in the Predicament of Quality, and actual Love in the Predicament of Action.  
§. 2. It is true indeed that you have told us seven or eight times already that this you have proved. And what pity is it, that since you are a man of such Gravity and parts, that we should not take your word for it? But my good Pythagoras, since we are out of our five years' Probation, give us more than your bare word for the proof of this part of your Assumption, that actual Love is in the Predicament of Action, and not of Quality. Review your former Pages (that I may retort your own language) and tell us whether you have attempted any thing to this purpose. Do not then beg the Question, like a Puisny Sophister, but prove it like a Schoolman. Shall I again bestrew your way with your own Rhetorical flowers? 
* Jeanes Answer to the Eclenest. pag. 15, 17.  I am resolved as well as you to swallow none of your proofless Dictates: seeing I have entered the Lists with you, you must not think me irreverent and saucy, if (as the Soldiers speak) I dispute every inch of ground with you, and be so bold as to call upon you for the Proof of whatsoever you assert touching that which is in controversy between us. Said indeed you have often that actual. Love is a Predicamental Action, and not a Quality, but you have not where proved it.  
§. 3. And give me leave to tell you, that it will be impossible to make it good, till first you shall demonstrate against Suarez, and the best Metaphysicians and Philosophers, that Actio, ut sic, non dicit essentialem respectum ad terminum, and that there can be any Motion, whether instantaneous or successive, and not from a Terminus à Quo to a Terminus ad Quem, and give us a solid answer to their Arguments.  
§. 4. And now that you may see that Suarez is not singular in this Doctrine, besides the Authors I have already quoted to this purpose (for I am willing to move your Palate with a fresh Dish) I shall now refer you to Smiglecius Logic, a book of solidity and clearness in matters of this nature. He tells us, Non solum sunt in corpore passibiles Qualitates, sed etiam in anima. Nam etiam in anima oriuntur affectus ex passione & alteration corporeâ, ut ira, gaudium, timor, tristitia, Amor, etc.  
Quod si objicies affectus istos esse Actiones mentis, & in Praedicamento Actionis reponendos (how say you Mr. Refuter?) Respondeo, in Actione duo considerari; primò, Actionem, secundò, Terminum, qui est effectus Actionis. Ratione primi, affectus spectant ad Praedicamentum Actionis; ratione secundi, spectant ad Praedicamentum Qualitatis. Smiglec. Log. disp. 11. q. 3. p. 417. edit. Oxon.  
§. 5. Nor must you be ready to take advantage, and say, that though actual Love be not a predicamental Action, yet Smiglecius you see makes it a Patible Quality, and so Love as a Genus cannot comprehend the Habit in the first Species of Quality and the Act in the third, and therefore hence at least it will appear that the Doctor is mistaken.  
§. 6. For the same Smiglecius has sufficiently prevented this Objection, when in the beginning of his disputation 
(a) Smiglec. Log. disp. 11. q. 1 p. 412. Vid. etiam Suarez. Metaph. disp. 42. sect. 5. n. 15.  he lays it down for a ground, that eadem Specie qualit as potest induere omnes illas rationes, & esse simul & Habitus, & naturalis Potentia, & Passibilis Qualitas. And therefore actual Love, though as considered with respect to the alteration arising by it, it be ranked among Passable Qualities, yet as it is Qualitas bene vel malè afficiens subjectum, abstrahendo ab hoc, quod sit facilè vel difficilè mobilis, it belongs to the first Species.  
§. 7. Nay, which perhaps will raise a wonder in our Refuter, I do not think but this Doctrine will also be found in his own Master Scheibler. 
(b) Scheibler. Metaph. lib. 2. c. 8. n. 105. p. 918.  For whereas it had been objected, that Actionis non datur Actio, his answer is — Respondeo, Actus immanentes per quos fiunt habitus posse bifariam aestimari, nempe simpliciter in ratione Actionis, vel quantum ad intrinsecum terminum suum qualitativum. Actio igitur convenit hoc solum posteriori respectu, ut Suarez. determinat disp. 18. Metaph. sect. 4. & disp. 44. sect. 8 n. 23. Actionis autem non est actio immediatè & ex vi suâ, seu in quantum talis est, & dimisso respectu ad qualitativum terminum. Vid. supra c. 6. tit. 4. art. 3. punct. 1. num. 37.  
§. 8. Well then, in Actual Love two things may be considered, the very Action of loving, or the Quality of Love produced by that Action, which is its terminus and product. Now these two, by reason of the narrowness of language, are comprehended under the same common name as other immanent Acts are: but yet though the name and expression be the same, the nature of the things are so different, that they are put in several predicaments; the immanent act of love considered as in fluxu is in the Predicament of Action, but considered as in termino continually depending on the action of Love (as light does upon illumination) that produces it, it is a Quality, and in the first Species ranked and placed. I have already cleared this Doctrine in the answer to our Refuters irrefragable demonstration.  
§. 9 But now we shall hear news indeed, and he will let us know his own remarks in Scheibler, & he tells it us as gravely as the Roman Priests were wont to relate the Fate of the Empire from the books of the Sibylls, which themselves could only read. Never any man without doubt made the like observations.  
§. 10. There are, I know, says he, divers great Philosophers and Schoolmen that make all immanent Acts, and consequently all inward acts of Love, to be Qualities; they are, say they, only Grammatical actions, not Metaphysical actions in the predicament of Action. But 1. this opinion is untrue in itself; and 2ly no way advantageous to the Doctor's cause in hand.  
§. 11. For once, Sir, be it granted. And what do you thence conclude against Doctor Hammond? I see you are a cunning Angler, that having fished long and catched nothing, now fall to troubling the stream. But, En Rhodus, en Saltus. The Doctor made use of a distinction of Love into the Habit and the Act, which all the world, for aught I could ever find to the contrary approve of; and our Refuter to oppose it tells us, that some Schoolmen and Philosophers make all immanent Acts Qualities, etc.  
§. 12. And is not now Doctor Hammond confuted? Sing, sing your Io Paean; while we look out some Diogenes with his Candle and Lantern, to find out in what corner our baffled Doctor hides his head. Well, Sir, I see you are so excellent a Schoolman, that I must give you my Vote to answer Bellarmine. There is nothing can withstand your  Confutation.  
§. 13. But, good Sir, I beseech you tell us, what's all this to the Doctor or the present dispute? Did he ever take part with those Philosophers and Schoolmen? I pray what temptation had you then to run into this Digression? Truly none, but that a book was to be made, and Doctor Hammond to be confuted, whether he spoke right or wrong, or say any thing or nothing. By this I see, Sir, you can answer Quodlibets, and Ergo you are a writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity.  
§. 14. But if we will but stay and have patience till the Sun is up, this Memnon's head will vent an Oracle.  
First then he says, This Opinion is untrue in itself; and to confirm this he shall offer to the Doctor's consideration two arguments out of Scheibler, which clearly prove immanent Acts to be true, proper and predicamental Actions in the Predicament of Action.  
§. 15. And have you not told us news indeed? you should have brought us word that the Sun shines at Rhodes, or when it is in its Zenith. There is nothing more generally received in the Schools then that is. And I dare say, scarce any Philosopher or Schoolman of any note has for these hundred years almost delivered any thing to the contrary. Why then urge you Scheibler and his reasons, as if he, being a late writer, had discovered a Truth which former Authors were mistaken in? If in the next edition of your book, or rejoinder to Doct. Hammond, it may any way gratify you, I shall refer you to Authors of a greater Bulk and larger name than Scheibler for the proof of this point. I shall refer you to Smiglecius, to Ruvio, to Suarez, and all the Authors they have quoted: but especially I shall refer you to Suarez his most excellent reasons which he has urged in the Demonstration of it. And give me leave to tell you, that your Master Scheibler first lighted his Candle at his Taper.  
§. 16. That you may see we will not always be at difference, and that it is not love of contention and victory, but Truth only that I strive for, it is granted to you, and your Master Scheibler, that Actio immanens verè est actio. But then withal let me add, that this is not the question between you and the Doctor. The Proposition you must prove is only this, that Actus immanentes sunt tantum Actiones, & nullo respectu Qualitates, that immanent Acts are only Actions, and in no respect Qualities. Soncinas, it is true, said that Actus immanentes sunt tantum qualitates; and Suarez, and your Scheibler, and others have demonstrated the falsehood of that assertion. But then this said not the Doctor, and so falls not under the lash of this Use of Confutation.  
§. 17. He said indeed that Actual Love was a Quality specifically distinct from Love that is the Habit. But he never denied that the Action of loving (comprehended under the same common name with actual Love) was a predicamental Action.  
§. 18. Prove then, good Sir, if you will acquit yourself like a Schooleman, either 1. that the immanent act of Love in no respect or consideration is or can be a quality, or 2ly that all immanent acts in general, or 3ly that this immanent act of Love in particular, has no terminus or Quality produced by it which is called by the same name. When you shall have done this, I shall not then blame you for starting a new Question.  
§. 19 If you will be pleased to consult, you may find that the same Suarez 
* Suarez. Metaph. disp. 48. sect. 2. n. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18. , who proves that all immanent acts are not simply Qualities, but in some respect also true predicamental actions, does also demonstrate 
† Suarez. Met. disp. 42. sect. 5. n. 13, 14, 15,  that immanent acts are not only actions, but also qualities, called by the same name with the Actions themselves, and that it is de intrinseca ratione Actionis ut sic, ut habeat intrinsecum terminum ad quem tendat ut producendum per ipsam: and consequently that the immanent Act of Love, as well as all other immanent Acts, is not only a predicamental action, but includes in its essence a transcendental respect to the quality of actual Love that is its Terminus, and which is that very Quality which the Doctor truly makes the opposite species to habitual Love, and equally comprehended under one and the same immediate Genus.  
§. 20. Though then true it is, that all immanent Acts that are causalities of efficient causes are consequently predicamental Actions, which is all Scheibler says in his first argument; yet as true it is, as Suarez and others say, that all predicamental Actions, and consequently all immanent Acts, that are truly such, must of necessity relate to some term by them produced, which in the present case is a Quality called by the same name as the Action is. And therefore Doctor Hammond must be concluded to be in the right, till you shall answer Suarez his arguments, and prove his Doctrine to be in the wrong.  
§. 21. Though secondly it be granted to your Master Scheibler, that immanent Acts, because they terminate active powers, must be concluded to be predicamental actions; yet it cannot be denied to Suarez and others, that immanent Acts, because they are predicamental Actions, must have some Quality to terminate them. As there cannot be an efficient Cause without its Causality: 
* Suppono quod impossibile est esse motum vel mutationem realem sine termino real. Ex hoc arguo sic, etc. H. cavel. in Addit. ad Scotum l. 1. Senten. d. 17. q. 5. n. 3.  so impossible it is there should be any Causality, where nothing is produced and caused by that Causality. As it is impossible there should be an Active power without respect to the Act that terminates the Power: * so impossible it is there should be any Action without some product to terminate the Action.  
§. 22. And thus I have neither slighted Scheibler nor his reasons, but acknowledged that truth which that Author labours to prove by them.  
§. 23. But he says he can yet press us with an Author far greater than Scheibler, our great Master Aristotle, of whom the Doctor makes somewhere in his writings honourable mention.  
§. 24. And do you think, Sir, the Doctor will cease to give him that venerable respect, because you now seem to have borrowed from his writings an argument against him? I dare assure you the Doctor is still the same civil man, and being himself a Person of great learning and Parts, he knows how to give that respect such a gallant man deserves. And if you can make good that Aristotle speaks on your side against the Doctor, I dare pass my word to bring you his public Recantation.  
§. 25. But what says our great Master? 
* Arist. lib. 10. Eth. cap. 3.  He tells us roundly, says our Refuter, that the operations of Virtues, and even happiness itself, are not Qualities: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
§. 26. The words indeed I acknowledge, but I cannot understand them with our Refuters' Comment.  
§. 27. The truth is, one 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. l. 10. Eth. c. 2. §. 1.  Eudoxus, as we find in the beginning of the second Chapter of that Book, did maintain that Pleasure was the Last End, and greatest Good.  
And by the way give me leave to mind our Refuter of his great Master Aristotle's 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. ibm. §. eod.  observation concerning this Eudoxus. He tells us, that though the man's reasons were weak, and no ways able to support his Opinion; yet because he was looked on as a sober temperate man, he gained credit and belief with many. For so good and virtuous a man as he, could not be deemed by them thus to teach for love of Pleasure, but only because it was indeed the very truth. And is not this the present Fortune of our Refuter? does he not gain many Proselytes and Votaries to the Errors he has vented in this Treatise, because he is looked on by some young men not only as a man of parts and great Judgement, but also as a leader and Captain in School-learning. But Eudoxus, though otherwise never so good, was much mistaken in this Point, and so is our Refuter, though otherwise never so venerable and learned. I doubt not but that already this has sufficiently appeared, and I shall in the Process also further demonstrate it.  
§. 28. For (to return to the text in Aristotle) whereas Plato had undertaken to refute the opinion of Eudoxus, his great Scholar, though he agreed with him in the Conclusion, yet he could not approve of his Master's reasons as sufficient. And the first of them gave occasion to this Text that our Refuter has urged. It was this, as I find it reduced to form by Aquinas, 
(a) Tho. Aquim. Comment. in loc..  in his Commentary on the place; Bonum videtur ad genus Qualitatis pertinere; quaerenti enim quale est hoc, respondemus quoniam bonum: Delectatio autem non est qualitas: Ergo non est bonum. To show the weakness of this Reason the Philosopher replies, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. It follows not, as Plato thought, though Pleasure be not ranked among the number of Qualities, that therefore it is not good: for even the Operations and Acts of Virtues and Felicity itself are not Qualities, which no man yet can deny to be good.  
§. 29. And now to show how little this makes to our Refuters' advantage, the Philosopher in this reply (as appears from the sixth 
(b) Vid. Arist. l. 10. Eth. c. 6. §. 1, 2, 3.  Chapter of this Book) refers to what he had more largely delivered to this purpose in the very entrance of this Treatise. He had there proved by induction, that Love was a Transcendent thing, and placed in all 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Arist. 1. Eth. c. 6. § 2, 3.  Predicaments. He had also proved that Felicity, as it was the greatest good, so it consisted not in a dull and lazy quality; that it was no 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. l. 10. Eth. c. 6. §. 2. Vid. eund. l. 1. Eth. c. 5. §. 3. etc. 7. § 3, 4, 5. & ibid. c. 8. §. 7. where this is at large prosecuted.  habitual goodness, but a quick and active thing, whose excellence and perfection did consist in Act and Operation, in use and exercise, not in Possession; and that virtue too, though it were in its own nature a habit, yet it did perform nothing good, but only in the use and operation. And both these he proves by this excellent reason, because a man may be habitually virtuous and happy whilst he sleeps, or does any thing or nothing, even in the midst of sufferings and miseries and greatest misfortunes. But they cannot possibly be so in regard of the Acts and exercise of virtues. And therefore he concludes, that as in the Olympic Games, not the most beautiful and strong, but those that run and strive, because only such do conquer, are crowned; so amongst those that are good and honest in the course of humane life, those only that do well do win the Prize and Laurel.  
§. 30. And now, Sir, what's all this to your present purpose? Because Aristotle disputing against Plato, asserts, as he had before proved, that the Operations of virtues are not habitual qualities, but Actions placed in another Predicament, that Felicity consisted not in the habitual possession of Virtue, but in the Act and exercise of it, and that both these were good, though not qualities; will you therefore conclude from this place that they are Actions not terminated in qualities, or that there can be any such thing, without a transcendental respect to that which terminates the Action, and is produced by it? Says the Philosopher any thing Pro or Con, as they speak, to this purpose? And yet the only matter in debate between you and the Doctor is, whether immanent Acts, such as that of actual Love is, be purely predicamental Actions, and nothing else, not terminated in qualities that are called by the same names with the predicamental actions by which they are produced?  
§. 31. Indeed if our moral Philosopher had here said any thing to this purpose, he had digressed from his Theme into a Metaphysical Reserche and speculation; he had been guilty of that which they call Transitio à Genere ad Genus, a fault which the great and best Master of Method had declared to be unpardonable.  
§. 32. In short then, Virtue and Felicity consist not in the Habit, but in the Act and exercise; and being thus properly considered, and in fluxu & operatione, they are Actions and not Qualities; and because though thus considered they are Actions, and not Qualities, yet the one being the greatest good, and the other also good because virtuous, they must be acknowledged to be good, though not Qualities. And this as it was sufficient against Plato, so it was all that the Philosopher there intended.  
§. 33. But than secondly, because these acts of Virtue and Felicity, as all other immanent Acts, are something more than bare Actions, and carry with them a transcendental respect to the Qualities that terminate them, hence it is that these Acts are in this respect called Qualities, and those Qualities are placed in the same Predicament with the Habits whereof they are the Effects and Acts.  
§. 34. And now, Sir, that you may see I do not speak altogether without Book, you shall find the very same answer in Suarez; 
* Suarez. Metaph. disp. 42. sect. 5. §. 14.  Solum potest obijci difficilis locus Aristotelis l. 10. Eth. c. 3. ubi sic ait, Atqui neque si voluptas non est qualitas, propter hoc bonum non est, neque Operationes virtutis sunt qualitates, neque felicitas ipsa. Constat autem voluptatem, felicitatem, & operationes virtutis esse actus immanentes, & ita etiam absolutè docent D. Thomas & alii non aliter interpretando verba Aristotelis. Existimo tamen aliquo indigere moderamine, nimirum Voluptatem aut Felicitatem non esse puram qualitatem, quae non necessariò consistit in actuali operatione ejus qui voluptate vel felicitate afficitur, quia nemo potest aut voluptate affici vel fieri felix, nisi actualiter aliquid efficiendo, non tamen potest negari quin illud quod facit Qualitas sit. To this, for the greater confirmation, I shall subjoin another passage in the same Author. 
† Suarez. Metaph. disp. 48. sect. 2. num. 25.  Rursus cum dicitur Beatitudo consistere in actione immanente, si propriè loquamur, intelligendum est consistere in ipso actu immanente, ut est Qualitas informans ac ultimo perficiens ipsum operans; nam in actione ut actio est non consistit nisi praesuppositiuè & in via ad talem perfectionem.  
§. 35. Indeed I wonder that you should see the Objection in that Author, and not refute or take the least notice of this Answer. But perhaps you thought that so great a Critic as the Doctor would not dip in Suarez Metaphysics, because there was nothing in it for a Critics observation. And therefore you might easily suspect that your objections thence taken would not be answered by him: yet you did forget your art, when you pointed the Doctor to Suarez for satisfaction in this kind. Without doubt the Doctor, though a Critic, has shown himself better read in Metaphysics then yourself, though a writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity.  
§. 36. And that I may make it good, and also instruct you in that wherein you profess yourself yet to seek, viz. that habitual and actual Love are both, as the Doctor says, Qualities in the same Predicament, and coordinate Species of the same next and most immediate Genus of Love, nay that it is the generally-received opinion amongst Metaphysicians, I shall now acquaint you with some of my observations to this purpose in that very Suarez, whom for instruction in this point you recommend to the Doctor's perusal. First then, in his Disp. 14. sect. 3. tom. 1.  
§. 14. I find that Habitus & actus earum (potentiarum) in eodem genere in rigore collocantur. Licèt enim Actio ut Actio (I pray mark it, Sir,) pertineat ad praedicamentum Actionis; tamen ut Actus vitalis habens esse consummatum in suo genere, collocatur in praedicamento Qualitatis. You may see it proved in that place, if yet you doubt it, ibid. §. 14, 15, 16. To the same purpose look the same Suarez disp. 44. sect. 8. §. 14, 15. & disp. 42. sect. 5. §. 13, 14, 15. & disp. 48. sect. 3, 4. per tot. And thus I hope I am out of your debt for your observations from Scheibler.  
§. 37. And now our Refuter having spent no less than one whole Page to no purpose, to charge Doctor Hammond with an untruth he never thought of, nor had any Temptation in the Controversy to let fall from his pen, he is now at leisure to tell the world, that suppose this Opinion were true in itself, yet it will no ways advantage the Doctor's cause in hand.  
§. 38. Well, grant, Sir, that this opinion of those divers great Philosophers and Schoolmen; against whom you dispute, is not only untrue, but also nothing to Doctor Hammond's purpose, yet what is all this to the Confutation of your Adversary? Did he ever say, that immanent Acts in general, or that Love in particular, were, as some say in Suarez, 
* Suarez Metaph. disp. 48. sect. 2. §. 10.  purae qualitates, & non actiones nisi aequivocae; vel, ut alii loquuntur, Grammaticales, quia significantur per modum actionis tendentis ad objectum ut in terminum, cùm tamen in illud nihil producant? If even the same Suarez himself, who confutes this opinion (which you deliver in his very phrases and language translated) do yet also maintain that the Habit and the Act are both Qualities specifically distinct, how then could this reach the Confutation of Doctor Hammond, that only says that Love was divided into the Habit and Act as a Genus into its Species? Or would you be so uncharitable as to proclaim him to the world a man of so shallow Judgement, as not only to speak gross untruths, but that which also is most impertinent? Well, Mr. writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity, far more able adversaries than yourself have felt the force of his Judicious pen, and found that it is not his custom in any kind (though you count him no Schoolman, no Philosopher, but a Critic, forsooth, a great Critic, nay a very Dunce) to make use of other men's errors to gain Credit to his own, but to speak true and to the purpose.  
§. 39 But, good Sir, let us see how well you prove this Opinion is to no purpose, that your admirers may behold what a Schoolman and a Philosopher you are.  
§. 40. You say 2ly, Suppose this Opinion were true in itself, yet it will no ways advantage the Doctor's cause, for the Patrons of it range immanent. Acts under the first species of Quality (they do indeed, and for this you may see Suarez, Smiglecius, Ruvio and others;) and then they are either Dispositions or Habits. If you say they are Dispositions, as most of the  Schoolmen hold them to be, against this I object, that however they may be in other men, yet they cannot be so in Christ: for a Disposition carrieth in its Notion inchoation and imperfection; and therefore to attribute it unto Christ is to throw an apparent dishonour upon him.  
§. 41. Would not a man wonder you should dispute so gravely, and with so much confidence, and yet so ridiculously? that you should so often give us the same impertinent stuff under your hand, and in Print?  
§. 42. Though then Dispositions that are in order to Acquisite Habits, and the Acts that produce, and consequently precede them, carry in their Notion inchoation and imperfection in respect of the Habit; yet in Infused Habits (of which alone you and the Doctor speak) as also in the Acts that flow from Acquisite Habits now complete and full, the case is far otherwise.  
§. 43. For Infused Habits, especially this of divine Charity in Christ, are immediately, supernaturally, and instantaneously produced by God, without any the least concurrence of humane endeavour. They are all full and perfect in an instant. For nescit tarda molimina Spiritus Sanctus; God and his holy Spirit, 
Ambrose.  being infinite in Power, do all things like themselves. They but speak the word, and it is done; they but say, Let the Habit be infused, and instantly it is created. No Acts then can precede them to produce an imperfect quality in the soul, to be advanced by after - Acts unto habitual perfection. And therefore the Acts that flow from them cannot, are not by any called Dispositions, as that is properly taken for an imperfect inchoate thing in order to an Acquisite Habit; but for other reasons already mentioned.  
§. 44. And then, as for the Acts that are the Consequents and Effects even of Acquisite Habits now complete, they neither can be nor are by any counted as Dispositions properly taken, but for other Reasons. And let Suarez and Smiglecius tell you them.  
§. 45. It would be too tedious a task for me to transcribe whole Disputations: Take the sum of it in short from Smiglecius. 
* Smiglec. Log. disp. 11. q. 2. p. 413. Vid. Sua. rez. Metaph. disp. 42. sect. 6. §. 16.  Sciendum igitur est Dispositionem dupliciter accipi: Primò in Communi, pro Qualitate bene vel male afficiente Subjectum, abstrahendo ab hoc quod sit facile vel difficile mobilis, & sic est veluti Genus ad Habitum & Dispositionem: secundò, pro Qualitate bene vel male afficiente Subjectum, & leviter inhaerente Subjecto, ità ut facile sit mobilis à subjecto; & sic distinguitur ab Habitu intra latitudinem speciei, sed accidentaliter tantùm. When therefore the Act and the Habit are both ranged under the first Species of Quality, both the Habit as well as the Act are called by the name of Dispositions, as that is taken in the first sense, and makes the first distinct Species of the four in the Predicament of Quality.  
§. 46. The reason why the Acts that follow, and are the Effects of Habits, are ranged under this Species, may be seen in the forecited Authors, and already we have quoted some of them from Suarez.  
§. 47. But if these should not content our writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity, I shall refer him for further Instruction to Aquinas 
* Aquin. 1. 2. q. 49. art. 2. ad 3m.  his Sums.— Dispositio-dupliciter acciptur, uno modo secundum quod est genus Habitus; nam in 5. Metaphys. text. 25. tom. 3. Dispositio ponitur in definitione Habitus: alio modo secundum quod est aliquid contra Habitum divisum. Et potest intelligi Dispositio proprie dicta condividi contra Habitum dupliciter: uno modo sicut perfectum & imperfectum in eadem specie, ut scilicet Dispositio dicatur, retinens nomen common, quando imperfecte inest, ita quod de facili amittatur; Habitus autem, quando perfecte inest, ut non de facili amittatur: & sic Dispositio fit Habitus, ut Puer fit Vir. Alio modo possunt distingui sicut diversae Species unius generis subalterni, ut dicantur Dispositiones illae qualitates primae Speciei, quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem ut de facili amittantur, quia habent causas transmutabiles, ut Aegritudo & Sanitas; Habitus verò dicantur illae qualitates, quae secundum rationem habent quod de facili transmutentur, quia habent causas immobiles, sicut Scientiae & Virtutes: & secundum hoc Dispositio non fit Habitus. Et hoc videtur magis consonum intentioni Aristotelis, etc. Thus he.  
§. 48. It will not now, for a close of this Section, be amiss to tell you, the Doctor never takes Acts for Habits, but specifically distinguishes them; nor yet counts them Dispositions, as that word is properly taken, but says only at large that habitual and actual love are both Qualities, and Species of the same Genus. And now that you may have no opportunity to mistake his meaning, I must mind you of the known distinction of Acts, some whereof precede the Habit to be produced, and effectively concur to the making of it, and others follow the Habit now complete and perfect, as effects and issues of it. The first are inchoate imperfect things in order to the production of a Habit, and so are Dispositions properly so called. The other are not so, but follow as Effects from their Cause, whether the Habit be infused or acquisite; and are called Dispositions, not specially and properly, but generally and improperly taken, for reasons formerly alleged. And strange it is, you should not observe this doctrine in Suarez, in Scheibler, in Aristotle, where it is to be found, all which you yet recommend to the Doctor's inspection for satisfaction in this kind.  
§. 49. And so much at present for our Refuters long-since forgotten Metaphysics: we come now to his Familiars, his dear Acquaintance, the Schoolmen.   

SECT. 11.  
The Doctor's explication from the Refuters Concessions. The Refuters Reply and valiant resolution. His first Charge answered. His second Charge answered in three distinct Propositions. 1. Expressions gradually different may, and in Christ always did, flow from a Love equally intense in the Habit. This not the question. 2. Nothing naturally hinders but that expressions gradually different may flow from Acts of Love gradually the same. Proved. God's outward favours and expressions different. The inward Act of his Love still one and invariable. Proved against the Socinian. God's Love one infinite and substantial Act, against Crellius. In what sense God in Scripture said to love some more, some less. The doctrine of the Schools safer than that of the Socinian. God by one immutable Act dispenses all the variety of his favours. Illustrated. The variety in Gods outward favours: whence it arises. Confirmed from Lombard, Aquinas, Scotus. Applied to the Refuter. 3. In men the outward expressions ordinarily vary according to the gradual difference in the inward Acts of Love. Proved by Reason, and the authority of Gregory, Durand, Aquinas, Estius. The Doctor's assertion hence proved as fully as the thing requires. The Doctor not engaged to prove, that expressions gradually different could not proceed from a Love equally intense. The third Charge answered. No mystery in the word proportionably. The correspondence between the inward Acts of Love and the outward expressions to be understood, not according to Arithmetical, but Geometrical, Proposition.  
§. 1. THe Doctor having now truly stated the Question in Controversy between him and his Adversary, and shown that the Acts of Christ's Love (of which alone he spoke) were sometimes gradually differenced one from another, and in this respect were capable of Degrees, though his habitual grace were not; he comes now §. 23. to explain (explain he says, and not confirm or prove) this by the Refuters own Confession.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
23. I Shall explain this by the Refuters own confession. The Death of Christ, saith he, was an higher Expression of Christ's Love of ut, than his Poverty, Hunger or Thirst. To this I subjoin, that such as the Expression was, such was the Act of inward love of which that was an expression, it being certain, that each of these expressions had an Act of internal Love, of which they were so many proportionably different expressions. And from hence I suppose it unavoidably consequent, that that Act of internal Love expressed by his dying for us, was superior to those former Acts which only expressed themselves in his Poverty, and so the same Person that loved sincerely, did also love, and express that Love more intensely at one time then at another, which was the very thing I had said in another instance. But this I have added ex abundanti, more than the Refuters Discourse required of me.   
§. 2. To this our Refuter returns three things in three Sections.  

JEANES.  
IF you had repeated that which you call my confession full and entire, as it lay in my Book, the impartial and unprejudiced Reader would soon have discerned that there was in it nothing that made for your advantage. My words at large are these; There may be a gradual difference in the expressions of the same Love for Degree. Christ's Death for us was an higher expression of his love of us then his Poverty, Hunger, Thirst, etc. and yet they might proceed from a Love equally intense. Now, Sir, have you said any thing to prove that they could not proceed from a Love equally intense? You seem indeed most vehemently and affectionately to affirm that they could not, but you must pardon me if I entertain not your vehement Asseverations as solid Arguments, as if they were Propositiones per se notae. Pray, Sir, review this Section, and put your Argument into some form. If you can make good that it containeth any disproof of what I have said, unless begging the Question be argumentative, you shall have my hearty leave to triumph over me as you please: however until than I shall take your words asunder, and examine every passage in them.   

Doctor HAMMOND.  
TO this I subjoin, that such as the expression was, such was the Act of inward Love of which that was an expression; it being certain that each of these expressions had an Act of internal Love, of which they were so many proportionably different expressions.   

JEANES.  
THat each of these expressions had an act of inward Love of which they were so many different expressions, is an obvious Truth, but impertinent to the matter in hand, unless you can prove that they were of necessity equal in point of intention: and the proof of this you have not hitherto so much as attempted.   

Doctor HAMMOND.  
ANd from hence I suppose it unavoidably consequent, that that Act of internal Love expressed by his dying for us, was superior to those former Acts, which only expressed themselves in his Poverty, and so the same person that loved sincerely, did also love and express that Love more intensely at one time then at another: which was the very thing I had said in another instance. But this I have added ex abundanti more than the Refuters discourse required of me.   

JEANES.  
FRom hence: whence, I pray? If from the words immediately foregoing, than your Argument stands thus, Every of these expressions had an Act of internal Love, of which they were so many proportionably different expressions: therefore that Act of internal Love expressed by his dying for us, was superior to those former Acts which only expressed themselves in his Poverty. And here I must profess that the reason of your Consequence is to me invisible, and I shall never acknowledge your Inference legitimate, until you drive me hereunto, by reducing your Enthymeme unto a Syllogism. But perhaps there may be some Mystery in the word proportionably, and your meaning may be, that these different expressions in regard of intention must be proportioned exactly unto their inward respective Acts of Love equal or parallel unto them. And if this be your meaning, than your Argument is guilty of that Fallacy which is called Petitio principii. It is my desire and purpose to have fair wars with you, and my pen shall not drop a disrespective syllable of you; but yet I am resolved to swallow none of your proofless dictates.  you have entered the Lists with me, you must not think me irreverent and sancy if (as the Soldiers speak) I dispute every inch of ground with you, and be so bold as to call upon you for the proof of whatsoever you assert touching that which is in controversy betwixt us.   
§. 3. And thus our valiant Hector is resolved to stand his Ground, and not yield an Inch to this Achilles, till he be forced and dragged by the heels about the walls of his falling Troy.  
§. 4. But I find him yielding already. For he grants to the Doctor that it is an obvious Truth, that each of these expressions had an Act of inward Love, of which they were so many different expressions. I shall desire him to remember it. For I doubt not but from this poor Concession to prove the pertinency of the Doctor's Discourse, and also to demonstrate before we part, that he can have nothing justly to reply against it.  
§. 5. In the mean while I come to give an answer to his three Charges he has laid in against the Doctor, in these three several Sections.  
§. 6. The first Charge is, That if the Doctor had repeated his Confession full and entire, as it lay in his Book, the impartial and unprejudiced Reader would soon have discerned that there was in it nothing that made for his advantage, etc. Because he added these words, which the Doctor has omitted, and yet they (expressions gradually different) might proceed from a Love equally intense.  
§. 7. How pertinent this reply is, the Reader, if he will but peruse your words at large, as they lie in your 
*— But of this we may say as he doth of Mr. Cawdrey's answer, it is nothing to the matter now in hand. Because there may be a gradual difference in the expressions of the same Love for Degrees. Christ's death for us was an higher expression of his Love of us then his Poverty, Hunger, Thirst, etc. and yet they might proceed from a Love equally intense. His argument then (you see) from Christ's example will not serve the turn, unless it conclude a greater intention in his Love of God at one time then at another. And the falsehood of such an assertion is evident from the point here handled and confirmed, the absolute fullness of Christ's grace; which by the general consent of the Fathers and Schoolmen was such, as that it excluded all intensive growth. It was a Sequel of the Personal union, and therefore it was from the very first moment of conception. The Word was no sooner made Flesh, but it was forthwith full of grace and truth. His Love of God was uncapable of further Degrees, unto whom God gave not the Spirit, that is, the Gifts and Graces of the Spirit, by measure, &c: Jeanes Mixture of Scholast. etc. Tract. 2. p. 259, etc.  Use of Confutation, will instantly discern, and that you are a most exquisite Architect for a Monument of Confusion, that thus pull down with one hand what you build with the other. For how I pray, Sir, understand you the word (Love) in the Clause you pretend that the Doctor has so much to your prejudice omitted? of the Habit, or the Act? if you say, of the Act of Love, than you make the whole passage in your Use of Confutation to be nothing to the matter there in hand, that only concerns the fullness of Christ's habitual grace. If you say it was meant of the Habit (as the Antecedents, and Consequents, and Proofs from Scripture, and the authority of the Fathers and Schoolmen, and your Subject and Title-Page confirm) then this Reply is nothing to the present Purpose, and you contradict not the Doctor, who speaks only of a gradual difference in the Acts of Christ's Love and the several expressions of them. Which way soever you shall take, you cannot avoid either the Quicksand or the Rock.  
§. 8. The truth is, the Doctor finding this Clause in that part of your Treatise, which was designed to prove the allfulness of habitual grace in Christ, he would not be so uningenuous as not to understand this general expression, but with Relation to the subject matter of your discourse. Your Title had proclaimed you a Writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity; and the Doctor well knew that it was not the Custom of such Authors to speak loosely and at random. Though in Poets and Orators, whose aim is rather to delight and persuade then convince, it may be pardonable to leap from one thing to another; and Digressions sometimes may be looked on not as Blemishes, but Ornaments: yet those Military men (among whom you desire to be numbered) that by the power and force of Reason endeavour to conquer the Judgement, and subdue it to assent, must still carefully traverse their Canon to the Point, otherwise they will prove as contemptible as the Gunner that has neither Powder nor Bullet, and like the Engineer in Kett's camp that discharged his Artillery over the heads of his enemies: they may fall by the Sword of that Conqueror whom they would be thought to have spared. I doubt not but if the Doctor had made use of those words, and imposed the sense on them to your disadvantage, which yourself do now give, he should have been impleaded for injustice, and you would have managed your cause by clear Arguments drawn from the Antecedents and Consequents in the Use of Confutation. But since you have showed yourself so ill a Master of Defence, as by warding one blow upon the Shin to expose your whole Body to the stroke; and since, to acquit yourself from the Doctor's Argument à Concessis, you are content to proclaim yourself no Master of Method in a Professed Scholastical discourse, and are willing, when your Argument is the Habitual grace of Christ, to restrain your general expressions to the Actual, of which you there spoke not; I am content for the present so to understand you. Nor shall I labour by Consequences to rack your words, to make them speak and confess that which you would not be thought to mean, though this has been your own frequent Practice all along against the Doctor.  
§. 9 But then I must add that Doctor Hammond, who understood you in this Passage according to the Current of your Discourse, did you therefore no wrong in omitting those words, which (in the sense he justly conceived he was bound to understand you) did no more concern the present Debate, than any part of your whole Book. For it was a received and acknowledged truth on both sides, that the Habit of Divine Grace was always perfect, and at the utmost height possible in Christ; and therefore though the outward expressions were gradually different in themselves, it must also mutually be granted, that they must flow from a Love still equally intense in the Habit. But then this being nothing to the present controversy, which only concerns the gradual difference of the Acts of Christ's Love, it was no whit material whether he took it in or left it out, and he might justly use his freedom without any man's offence. But be your meaning what you please, I shall easily grant you the liberty, my good Sphinx Philosophicus, to expound your own Oracles and Riddles. And what then will be the issue?  
§. 10. Why then, says our Refuter, (and it is his second Charge) The Doctor has said nothing to prove that these several expressions could not proceed from a Love equally intense; Nay (as he adds in the following Section) he has not hitherto so much as attempted it, unless vehement Asseverations be solid Arguments, etc.  
§. 11. That I may give a clear account to this Charge, and bring the present debate to some issue, it will be necessary to distinguish. And couch the Answer I shall in these several Propositions.  
§. 12. First then, I say, That Expressions gradually different may flow, and in Christ always did, from a Love equally intense as respecting the Habit.  
§ 13. But then this is not the Question, and makes nothing to the purpose, unless our Refuter can prove That all the Acts of Christ's Love represented by those expressions were equally intense and full, as the Habit from whence they proceeded. It is true, in this Reply he does vehemently and affectionately affirm it, (that I may retort his own language) but pardon me he must, if I entertain not his vehement Asseverations as solid Arguments, as if they were Propositiones per se notae. And as he has no where in all this Pamphlet attempted the Proof of it, unless begging the Question be argumentative; so I know it is impossible for him to make it good, and I have in due place demonstrated the contrary. And therefore  
§. 14. Secondly, I say, That nothing Naturally and ab intrinseco hinders, but that several outward expressions of Love in themselves gradually different, may sometimes flow from several Acts of inward Love that are gradually the same.  
§. 15. For the outward expressions of Love being Imperate Acts of the Will, and under its command, the Will is naturally free, and still at Liberty, unless it be by some superior cause ab intrinseco determined to one uniform expression, to represent its own internal and Elicite Acts how and in what manner it pleaseth.  
§. 16. And now because this may be of some importance in this Controversy, I shall (to gratify our Refuter) endeavour to clear it by some apposite instances.  
§. 17. Suppose we then a Father with the same height of Actual love to affect his only Son, for some space of time at least. Suppose we the same Husbands or Friends to do the like, in respect of the Wives of their bosoms, and the inmates of 
Vid. Platonem in Convivio & in Phaedro.  their Breasts. We need not run to Plato's School for Examples; the world does daily afford us such lovers as well as his Socrates. And yet no man will say, that these are always bound, or do or can express the same equal love after one and the same sort, and with the same height and fullness. For sometimes they have not the opportunity to do it, and sometimes Prudence enjoines them to conceal it, and sometimes there may be a necessity to express it beyond what they have, or indeed can do at another time.  
§. 18. Further yet (that I may clear it beyond exception) we know that God loves his Chosen, his Predestinate in Christ, with the same equal Love, not only because he loves them as in and for Christ's sake, but also because this inward Act of his Love is no other but himself. And yet God's outward Love and favour does not always shine on them in its Noon and Zenith; sometimes it looks higher, sometimes lower: and though it knows no night, no going down, though the native light be still the same, yet sometimes, by the interposition of a dark opacous body, the light (as that of the Sun) lies hidden from our sight in a sad Eclipse. Sometimes the 
(a) Cant. 3. 1, 2.  Spouse in the Canticles was put to seek him whom her soul loved, and though she sought him, yet she found him not. And therefore the Lord her Redeemer says to her in 
(b) Esai. 54. 8.  Esay, In little wrath I hide my face from thee for a moment, but with everlasting kindness will I have mercy on thee. Nay it is also true of Christ 
(c) Matt. 3. 17.  the Beloved in whom alone he was well pleased, That though he were always Christ, always God-man, yet the 
* Leo it is that first said it (and all Antiquity allow of it) Non solvit unionem, sed subtraxit visionem. The union was not dissolved; true; but the Beams, the Influence was restrained: and for any comfort from thence, his Soul was even as a scorched heath-ground, without so much as any drop of dew of Divine comfort, etc. Bp. Andrews Serm. 2. Passion, p. 356. Confer Leonem Serm. 16, & 17. the Passione Domini, p. 53, 54.  humane Nature did not always enjoy the comfortable influence of the Godhead. And therefore we find him crying out upon the Cross, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?  
§. 19 And as in respect of the same Person, the light of God's Countenance is not always lift up to the same Degree of Altitude; so it shines not equally on several Objects. There are as well the sands, and stones and deserts of Arabia, as the Spices: and though the whole Country enjoy the same common name and Climate, yet all is not Felix, but some part is Petraea, and another Deserta. Though those that live under the Aequator enjoy a constancy of Sunshine and equality of Day; yet those of Lapland & Finland have little else but night and Frost for almost half the year together. The case is very plain. I believe no man will say that those outward Acts of God's Love that appear in his common Providence, and whereby he maketh 
Mat. 5. 45.  his Sun to shine, and his Rain to fall as well upon the unjust as the just, are to be equalled and paralleled with those more peculiar Acts of his Love whereby he regards his Saints and Chosen. For the Apostle hath told us, that though God be a Saviour of all 
1 Tim. 4. 10.  men, yet it is with an especially of them that believe. His eye and his ear are always open to the Righteous; they are not so unto 
Psal. 34. 15, 16.  the wicked. He loves indeed all the Creatures he has made, and therefore constantly preserves them. But Man he loves more than the rest of the Creatures, which he made for Man's use. But then his 
* Deut. 10. 15.  Delight is in the Saints, & those that fear his name. For their sakes his Son died and risen again; for their sakes he made Heaven, and there has laid up for them a never-fading Crown of Glory. But his Son he loves more than all Saints and all Angels. This, this is his beloved Son in whom alone he is well pleased.  
§. 20. But then, though these outward Acts of his favour be thus gradually different, yet by reason of the infinite Perfection of his Essence, the inward Act of his Love must be still one and the same, because it can be no other but himself, one and the same Act always infinitely loving, and one and the same Object always infinitely amiable and beloved. And therefore the Scriptures are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be understood, and in a way that best suits with the Majesty and Excellence of God, when speaking 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, after the manner of men, they represent to us this one most simple infinite Act of his Love, as if it were many, and those in themselves also gradually distinct; because among men the inward Acts of Love do usually vary according to the gradual difference of Goodness in the several Objects beloved, which the greater it is truly or falsely apprehended to be, the more it still allures and draws the affections and inclinations of the Will.  
§. 21. And now because the Socinian denies it, and it is of great importance in the Christian Faith, I shall upon this occasion endeavour to make it good. And I hope that our Refuter himself will pardon this Digression, that speaks so much for his advantage.  
§. 22. Say then Vorstius and Crellius what they will to the contrary, those places of Scripture that speak of the different 
Ea verò (attributa) sunt Voluntatis Divinae Actus in ipso residentes, seu Actiones voluntatis immanentes, ut vocant— Actus vero illi— sunt duplicis generis. Alii enim affectuum similitudinem inprimis referunt, eorumque nominibus in sacris literis praecipuè designantur: alii Decreta sunt. Illi sunt Voluntatis Divinae, ut ita dicam, commotiones, praesertim vehementiores, seu actus ejusmodi quibus Voluntas vehementius vel in objectum suum fertur, vel ab eo refugit atque abhorret.  ut forte res ad quam affectus incitat, non sit firmiter conclusa, etc. Crellius de Deo & attributis apud Volkel. lib. 1. de vera Religione, cap. 29. p. 295. Vide eund. ibid. per tot. & cap. 30, 31. per tot. Vorst. de Deo. Biddle's Catechis. c. 4.  Degrees of God's Love cannot properly be understood, and as if in God the inward Acts of his Will were gradually different, as in men commonly they are. For being the First Cause of all things, he has no superior to limit him, nor will he limit himself, because this were to lessen his own perfection; neither could he indeed bound and determine his own Being and Excellence, if he could possibly will or attempt it, because he is the one and alone necessary Being, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who is 
| Exod. 3. 14. & 6. 3.  I am that I am. Nor can any Second inferior Cause do it, be it of what kind soever; because they being the free issues of his Power, who 
* Ephes. 1. 11. Vid. Esay 14. 24. & 40. 13. Rom. 11. 33, 34, 35. Ephes. 3. 20. Psal. 115. 3.  worketh all things according to the Counsel of his own Will, they must of necessity be supposed to flow from him, when now he has his Essence already undetermined. And therefore he being the First Cause of all things, and consequently infinite in his Essence as well as his Power and Perfection, which only flows from the Infinitude of his Essence, he must be absolutely simple in this his Essence, and most perfectly One, as much without all shadow of Parts or Accidents, as he is of Change or Alteration. For if he were made up of Parts, he could not be the First Cause of all things; because the Parts are first in Nature at least before the Whole compounded of them. And if there were in him any Accidents, he could not be the 
† Malach. 3. 6.  Lord that changes not, no more infinite in Perfection, (which the 
* 
Accedit quod perfectissimum unicum tantum est.— Quis vero dubitat supremum Numen, primum Naturae Principium, esse Perfectissimum? quis id aliquo defectu laborare dicat? Crell. apud Volkel. l. 1. ca 17. p. 113.  
Haec Dei immensitas atque Omnipraesentia (Potentiae, Sapientiae, Potestatis, Perfectionis) ut omnium confessione certissima, & sacris literis testatissima, ita nobis creditu utilissima, etc.— Ejus autem Essentiam in quovis pulvisculo— latere nondum ex sacris literis discere potuimus— viri quidam doctissimi— ex Christianorum scriptis ea collegerunt dicta, quae vulgarem sententiam de diffusione Essentiae Divinae per res universas vel penitus refellunt, vel non ●arùm labefactant, etc. Crell. ibid. cap. 27. p. 277, 278. vide ibid. per tot.   Socinian dares not deny against so many clear express Scriptures) than they say he is in his Essence; because he stands in need of those Accidents and changeable alterations that must complete his Perfection. Nor could he indeed be that One all-perfect Being from whom all things else flow, if he were not absolutely as well without Accidents as Parts; because by the Addition of any thing (whatsoever it be) of necessity he becomes finite, and simpliciter & per se imperfect, because capable of this Addition. And therefore it is most rationally determined by the Schoolmen (though the Socinian will not grant it) that In Deo neque est aliud, neque Accidens; and Quicquid est in Deo, Deus est. That God is nothing else but one entire, and simple, infinite and eternal Act; and that nothing can possibly be found, or at least imagined, in him which is not himself.  
§. 23. Hence it necessarily follows, that when God in Scripture is said to love, he must not be understood properly to love as man does, by the help of 
(a) Cum autem Actiones etiam Divinae duplicis sunt generis, a●iae— immanentes— aliae transeuntes: etiam facultates quae earum sunt principia duplicis sunt generis. Aliae enim immanentium propria sunt principia, aliae transeuntium. Facultates quae per se immanentium, consequenter & transeuntium actionum sunt Principia, duae in Deo sunt, Intellectus & Voluntas, quae vitam ejus veluti determinant, ac differentiarum instar ad eam restringunt Speciem quae est perfectissima. Facultates similiter quae actionum transeuntium sunt principia duae sunt, Potentiae, quae in efficacia consistit ac viribus, & Potestas, quae in Jure, etc. Crellius apud Volkel. ibid. li. 1. ca 19 pag. 131.  Natural Faculties and Habits; but his love is only one and the same infinite and substantial Act, which is nothing but Himself. And this is it that S. John means, when he tells us, 1 Joh. 4. 8. That God is Love, infinite and essential Love. For, think 
(b) De hoc amore loquitur Johannes, cum ait Deum Charitatem esse, 1 Joh. 4. 8. quod quidem nihil aliud est quam Deum Charitate, ut ita dicam, plenissimum esse, hunc in illo affectum veluti dominari, & luculentissimis ab eo effectis ac documentis demonstrari. Metonymia enim est, in qua attributum abstractum, ut in Scholis vocant, de suo subjecto emphaticè enunciatur, vel, quod eodem recidit, abstractum— Charitas pro Charitate plenus ponitur. Crell. ibid. c. 30. p. 301.  Crellius what he will, this is no Metonymical Praedication, and he is not properly full of Love, but Love itself: such additional perfections as these are belong to finite Creatures only, not to God; to whom we can assign no Attribute that is not properly and infinitely himself. Nor do I like 
(c) Hunc in illo affectum] Dicitur Deus esse Charitas, sive, ut Crellius interpretatur, plenus Charitatis, non per modum affectus, sed per modum virtutis & perfectionis moralis; ad quam & nos pro modulo nostro tam saepe invitamur. Maresii Hydra Socinianism. expugnat.  Maresius' Animadversion on this place of Crellius much better, unless it be very warily understood. For as God cannot be said to be Love per modum affectus, so neither can he properly be said to be Love, or full of 
(d) Tertio, intelligi potest ex dictis, eas virtutes quae sunt in Deo propriè non esse cogitandas per modum habitus, sicut in nobis, sed solum per modum Actus ultimi: nam Habitus est quid medium inter Potentiam & Actum: ubi ergo non est Potentia, sed purus Actus, non debet, nec potest verè concipi virtus per modum Habitus, sed tantum per modum puri Actus. Loquor autem ex parte rei conceptae, nam ex parte concipientis fieri potest ut hae virtutes concipiantur in Deo secundum aliquam rationem Actus primi, ac si essent Habitus, ad modum supra explicatum in scientia, est enim eadem ratio, etc. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 30. sect. 16. §. 68 Vid. amplius §. 69, 70. & confer cum §. 59, 60. ib.  Love, (
* Dan. Heinsius, Aristarch. Sac. in Prolegom. pa. 49. 8vo. ) per modum virtutis, & perfectionis Moralis. God is as well free from all Habits & such Moral Perfections, or any thing like them, as from Passions: and if we at any time conceive such things in God, this arises only from the weakness of our apprehensions and Intellects, there is no such thing in God; and when these and the like are attributed to him, the Praedication is not Formal, but Identical, and the Distinction between the Subject and Attribute is only Rational, not Real. And therefore I rather approve of that in * Heinsius' his Prolegomena upon Nonnus, Virtutem constat esse Habitum, quem in Deo locum non habere inter Scholasticorum Scita est: quemadmodum virtutes singulas quae ei tribuuntur eminenter esse in eo, ut loquuntur ipsi. Sed & Ethicorum Primo, negat magnus Doctor Deum proprie laudari posse. Laudem enim proprie virtutis esse, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, inquit; quia, ut recte ibi interprete, idonei ab ea ad praeclaras actiones fiunt homines, quod in Deo locum non habet. Et in Magnis Moralibus ab eodem dicitur, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Deo non convenire virtutem, quia melior virtute est Deus, neque ex virtute dici potest bonus. Quare in Deo locum haec non habent. Thus he.  
§. 24. I confess this is very hard, if not impossible, to be understood by us, whose understandings are finite as well as our Natures. And therefore the 
(a) Lombard. l. 3. Sent. didst. 32. B. infra citand.  Mr of the Sentences said well in this case, that God's Love, as well as his Peace, surpasseth all understanding, because it is infinite, as himself is. And the Holy Ghost in Scripture does in these and the like expressions condescend to our weakness, and in forms of speech borrowed from ourselves, does rather represent to us some external effects of God than any thing in him; who, because he is infinite, can be only known and comprehended by himself, 
(*) 1 Tim. 6. 16.  who only, as the Apostle speaks, hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto, whom no man hath seen nor can see; to whom be Honour and Power everlasting. Amen. And for his eternal Honour it is, that he can be seen or known by nothing but himself.  
§. 25. Now as God's Love is still one and the same substantial 
Vide Suarez. Metaph. disp. 30. sect. 16. §. 59  Act, always equal and uniform (as I may so say) in itself, because always infinite and commensurate with himself; so this Love can have no other Object then what is proportionable to itself. And therefore the Act being itself infinite, the Object of this Act cannot possibly be less. For between things Finite and Infinite there can be no proportion, because the difference will always be infinite between them. When therefore God loves, he can properly be said to love only himself. The 
(a) Psal. 16. 2.  goodness of all the Creatures in the world, no more than David's, extendeth to him. For 
(b) Job 22. 2, 3. Confer c. 35. 7. & Psal. 50. 9, etc.  Can a man be profitable to God, as he that is wise may be profitable to himself? Is it any pleasure to the Almighty that thou art righteous? or is it gain to him that thou makest thy ways perfect? That goodness alone which is the greatest, and no less than infinite, which can be nothing else but God, can possibly content or satisfy his Love. For if God could properly be said to love any thing but himself, he could not be infinitely Perfect in himself, as most necessarily he is. For Goodness being the one Proper Object of Love, if any good, which is not God, could be the Proper Object of his Love, that Goodness must be wanting in God, because loved and desired by him. No Love then of Desire or Complacence, as they call it, is here to be found, in a Proper acceptation. 
(c) Wisd. 11. 21, 22, 23.  He sees nothing  or lovely in them, but the free communications of his own grace and favour. By his own good will and pleasure and Power they were all created; and when he had now made them all what now they are, than he 
(d) Gen. 1. 31: Eccl 39 16. Vid. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 30. sect. 16. §. 60.  saw all things that he had made, and lo they were very good. And therefore in this sense he may be said indeed to love them, because by his favour they are what they are, nor can they arrive to any higher advancement but only by his bounty. Nothing therefore of Excellence and Perfection can he possibly find in them, but what issues from himself by a voluntary Communication, and was infinitely in himself from all Eternity before, and thus only fitted for his Love. And this is it which the most 
* Scot in 3. Sent. didst 32. q. 1. §. 5, 6. infra citand.  Subtle Doctor means, when he tells us that the Act whereby God loves all things is still equal, always one and the same; Quia una est Potentia, unum Objectum primum, & habet unum Actum infinitum adaequatum sibi, Because the Power and Object and Act is always one and the same, and nothing else but God, who as he is the last and only Good, so is he One simple infinite, and Eternal Act, nothing but God.  
§. 26. When therefore God is said in Scripture to love any thing without himself, the expression is not proper, but only Metonymical, in regard of those effects of his grace and goodness bestowed upon them: and when also he is said to love some more, some less, the like Figure is also to be understood. And because men do ordinarily affect less or more, where they bestow the less or greater favours and pledges of their Love, therefore by an Anthropopathy God, though his Love be still the same, yet is said in Scripture to love more where he bestows the greater blessings, and marks and tokens of his Goodness.  
§. 27. But then let me add, since 
(a)— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Arist. l. 1. Eth. c. 1. §. 1. Vid. eund. ibid. c. 7. Et lib. 8. Eth. c. 5. §. 7. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 23. sect. 5.  Bonum est quod omnia appetunt, and Goodness, wheresoever it is found, cannot choose but be affected, and the greater still it is, the more amiable it appears, and is the more eagerly beloved; God, loving only himself, and his own infinite Perfection, may yet be said virtually, though not Formally, even in regard of this inward Act, to love those things more that partake most of his Goodness, and carry the greatest likeness and resemblance with his own all-infinite Perfection, which to him is alone amiable and lovely, 
(b) Maresii Hydra Socinianism. l. 1. c. 30. p. 549. §. In eoque libertas divina.]  Cum (as Maresius in his Animadversions on Crellius says well) non tam res ipsas amat, quam seipsum in illis, & bonitatis aliquos radios quos in illas effundere, prout omne Bonum est sui communicativum, dignatus est.  
§. 28. And therefore in this sense I can safely allow this in Crellius to be true, 
(a) Crellius apud Volkel. l. 1. c. 30. p. 301.  Omne bonum cognitum per se amatur, & quanto melius esse cernitur, tanto magis. Quod ergo Deus valde bonum esse vidit videtque, quomodo etiam non amaret? Similiter autem dubitare nemo potest, qui vel Sacras Literas vel ipsam Rationem consulit. Deum pietatem hominum factaque suae voluntati consentanea amare, etc. So again, 
(b) Ibid. p. 302.  Vnde etiam Sacrae Literae de piis nominatim, atque adeo peculiari ratione, affirmant, eos à Deo diligi, quasi caeteri ab eo non diligantur, etc.— Vid. Psal. 146. 9 Joh. 14. 21, & 23. etc. 16. 27. Jud. Ep. vers. 21. And again, 
(c) Ibid. p. 302, 303.  Jam quod ad homines etiam pios attinet, non dubium est alium alio magis à Deo amari, prout vel ipse magis Deum amet, vel Deo in ipsum placeat esse benigniori. Nil dicimus nunc de discrimine amoris Dei in Homines & Angelos, in quo quidem ex parte Angeli nos antecellunt, sed ex parte vicissim à nobis superantur, etc.— Quis vero dubitare potest supra omnes & Angelos & Homines pios diligi à Deo Christum, quem ipsemet Filium suum dilectum, in quo bene ipsi complaceat, seu quo insigniter delectetur, voce de coelo bis repetitâ pronunciavit? Matt. 3. 17. & 17. 5. Vid. Coloss. 1. 13. Ephes. 1. 6. Esai. 42. 1. Mat. 12. 18. Joh. 3. 35. & 5. 20. But then when he adds, 
(d) Ibid. p. 303.  Diversitas autem haec Amoris Divini partim ex ipso Deo, liberrimaque ipsius voluntate ac decreto proficiscitur, partim ex ratione Objecti in quod Amor ille fertur, etc.— I can by no means approve it in the sense he puts upon it; as if there were a true and real difference in the inward Acts of God's Will, proportionably divers in themselves according to the various goodness of the Object, or the will and pleasure of him from whom they flow. For though it be thus with men, yet it is far otherwise with God. Because they being Creatures finite, and more or less compounded in their Natures, it can be no derogation from their perfection, if they have different Powers and Habits and Acts superadded to their Essence, since naturally they are Creatures perfectible by means of such additions: But God being most simple, because infinite in his Being, to attribute any such Acts to him that are distinguished in themselves, and different from his Being, must needs highly derogate from this his Essence, and all infinite Simplicity and Perfection, and therefore cannot properly be ascribed unto him without implying a Contradiction.  
§. 29. The Doctrine therefore of the Schools is far safer, that tells us that the inaequality of God's Love, of which the Scriptures make frequent mention, is not to be considered in regard of the Act of God loving, which because it is but one simple, infinite, and immutable Act, is not capable of Intention and Remission; but only in regard of the things beloved, and the things bestowed upon them, which make them thus beloved. 
(*) Scot l. 3. Sent. dist. 32. q. in fine, 217.  Scotus calls the one Actus operantis, and the other Actus transiens super Objecta. The one is nothing else but God's Essence and Being; but the other are outward Effects and Communications of his Love and Goodness to the Creature. Si vero, as 
(a) Durand. l. 3. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. art. 3. 1.  Durand, inaequalitas & gradus attendatur ex parte boni voliti, sic Deus non aequaliter diligit se & omnes Creaturas, sed plus se quam Creaturas, nec omnes Creaturas aequaliter, etc. Though then it be most certainly true, to make use of the same 
(b) Durand. ibid. in fine.  Durand, quod magis bonum est magis diligendum intensiuè à voluntate, quae movetur ab objecto; yet Voluntas Divina, quae ab Objecto non movetur, sed bonitatem rerum causat, hanc impressionem non recipit ab Objectis, sed actu invariabili vult uni bonum quod alteri non vult, & quibus vult bona, sive aequalia, sive inaequalia, vult aequali voluntate, The will of God, that is not moved by any outward Object, is not subject to these changes and alterations, but by one immutable Act does dispense all the several varieties of his outward Love and Favours. As the Sun, according to the opinion of Copernicus, though it continue still fixed in one  centre of the world, always equally projecting its Light in an uniform Ray, yet by reason of the various posture of the Sphere, arising from the triple motion of the Earth, it makes Perigaees and Apogaees, and at one and the same moment distributes Summer, and Winter, and Autumn, and Spring, and Morn, Noon and Night to the several parts and Climates of the habitable world: So this various participation of God's outward Love and Favour arises not from any difference and variation in the inward Act of God's Love, but only from the several approximations of the Creature to God in its Essence or additional perfections, or as it is fitted and qualified to receive and admit a greater portion of it. And therefore most certain it is, that when any such change is wrought, the Creature varies, and not God, whose inward Love is eternally one, the same infinite and immutable Act, that has no other Object but itself, always loving and beloved. To make this yet more clear, I shall prosecute the former illustration. We know the Sun, according to whatsoever Astronomical Hypothesis, continues still invariable in its Light, and Heat, and Influence: and yet the effects of these three are not uniform and equal, but vary in regard of the Bodies they work on. The Stars borrow their light from this fountain; but then because they are celestial Bodies, and, as Aristotle determines, of a nature Quintessential, they are not capable of Heat, and such elementary qualities, and alterations arising from them. The Air, because perspicuous, transmits' its Light and Heat and Influence. The Earth, because opacous, withstands the Light, but imbibes its Heat and Influence; and Stones and Minerals in the bowels of it are multiplied in their kinds by them. Plants vegetate and flourish by them; and Animals not only increase and grow, but also move, and feel, and perceive them. But Man, the Microcosm, being himself a little World, enjoys within himself all varieties of effects to be found in any of the Creatures springing from them. And yet notwithstanding there be so great a difference and multiplicity of effects, this arises not at all from the Sun, whose Light, Heat and Influence is always the same, but only from the several dispositions and tempers and Perfections of the Creature, whereby they are qualified and fitted for these Effects and Alterations. And now because — sic parvis componere magna solemus, we may say the like of God. The inward Act of his Love, as well as his Essence, is always one and the same, and all the difference in the outward effects of it arises from the various disposition and capacity and approximation of the Creature to him in his Being and Perfection. If natural and irrational Creatures partake only of the fruits of his common Sustentation and Providence, their natures are not capable of higher advancements. If the Carnal man perceives not spiritual Objects, it is because he wants a Principle to receive them; or he wilfully shuts his eyes, and withdraws himself from the Sunshine. If the Angels and Spirits of just men made perfect now share not in those various dispensations and assistances of Grace that the Church militant is partaker of, it is because they are above it, and are free from all humane Changes and Alterations. If the wicked and reprobate arrive not to heaven, it is because it was prepared for the Saints, and those only that fear God's name, that carefully seek after it.  
§. 30. It is true indeed, that this variety in the several participation of God's Love and Favour, which is found in the Creature, springs originally from the will and pleasure of God, which alone gives them Being in that variety and difference, that qualifies them for this several reception, and approach to him, or distance from him. But yet his Love is still the same, though the Gifts and Graces and Favours be thus different; as the Light of the Sun is still the same, though the Slime be only warmed, and the Plant be. quickened from its seed, and the several Births and aequivocal productions of Frogs and Infects and the like brought forth by it, are capable of and enjoy higher perfections and advancements from it.  
§. 31. And now, because we have had occasion often in this Discourse to refer to the Doctrine of the Schoolmen, I shall, with the Readers Patience, endeavour further to clear and confirm this by some passages taken from them. And I shall begin with the 
(a) P. Lombard. l. 3. Sent. didst. 32. A. B. C.  Master of the Sentences. Dilectio Dei divina 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est: eademque dilectione Pater & Filius & Spiritus Sanctus se diligunt & nos, ut supra disseruimus. Cumque ejus dilectio sit immutabilis & aeterna, alium tamen magis, alium minus diligit. Vnde Augustinus, Incomprehensibilis est dilectio Dei atque immutabilis, quâ Deus in unoquoque nostrûm amat quod fecit, sicut odit quod fecimus. Miro ergo & divino modo, etiam quando odit, diligit nos. Et hoc quidem in omnibus intelligi potest. Quis ergo digne potest eloqui quantum diligit membra Vnigeniti sui, & quanto amplius Vnigenitum ipsum? De ipso etiam dictum est, Nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. Ex his percipitur, quod Deus omnes Creaturas suas diligit, quia scriptum est, Nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. Et item, Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, & erant valde bona. Si omnia quae fecit bona sunt, & omne bonum diligit, omnia ergo diligit quae fecit, & inter ea magis diligit rationales creaturas, & de illis amplius quae sunt membra Vnigeniti sui, & multo magis ipsum Vnigenitum. Cum autem Dilectio Dei immutabilis sit, & ideo non intenditur vel remittitur, quaeritur, quae sit ratio dicti, cum dicitur magis vel minus diligere hoc quàm aliud, & cum dicitur Deus omnia diligere. Dicimus dilectionem Dei, sicut 
(*) Phil. 4. 7.  Pacem, exuperare omnem sensum humanum, ut ad tantae altitudinis intelligentiam vix aliquatenus aspiret humanus sensus. Potest autem intelligi eâ ratione dici omnia diligi à Deo quae fecit, quia omnia placent ei, & omnia approbat in quantum opera ejus sunt, nec tunc amplius placuerunt ei cum facta sunt, quàm prius antequam sierent: imo ab aeterno omnia placuerunt ei, non minus quam postquam esse coeperunt. Quod vero rationales creaturas, id est homines vel Angelos, alios magis, alios minus diligere dicitur, non mutabilitatem charitatis ejus significat; sed quod alios ad majora bona, alios ad minora dilexit, alios ad meliores usus, alios ad minus bonos. Omnia enim bona nostra ex ejus dilectione nobis proveniunt. Electorum ergo alios magis, alios minus dilexit ab aeterno, & diligit etiam nunc: quia aliis majora, aliis minora ex dilectione sua praeparavit bona, aliisque majora, & aliis minora bona confert in tempore. Vnde magis vel minus dicitur hos vel illos diligere.  
Consideratur enim duobus modis Dilectio Dei, secundum Essentiam, & secundum Efficientiam. Non recipit magis vel minus secundum Essentiam, sed tantum secundum Efficientiam: ut magis dilecti dicantur, quibus ex dilectione ab aeterno majus bonum praeparavit, & in tempore tribuit, & minus dilecti, quibus non tantum. Ind etiam est quod aliqui, quando convertuntur & justificantur, dicuntur tunc incipere diligi à Deo: non quod Deus nouâ dilectione quemquam possit diligere, imo sempiternâ dilectione dilexit ante mundi constitutionem quoscumque diligit; sed tunc dicuntur incipere diligi ab eo, cum aeternae dilectionis sortiuntur effectum, scil. gratiam vel gloriam. Vnde Augustinus, Absit ut Deus temporaliter aliquem diligat quasi nouâ dilectione, quae in ipso ante non erat, apud quem nec praeterita transierunt, & futura jam facta sunt. Itaque omnes sanctos suos ante mundi constitutionem dilexit, sicut praedestinavit; sed cum convertuntur & inveniunt illum, tunc incipere ab eo diligi dicuntur, ut co modo dicatur, quo potest humano affectu capi, quod dicitur; sic etiam cum iratus malis dicitur, & placidus bonis, illi mutantur, & non ipse: ut lux infirmis oculis aspera, firmis lenis est, ipsorum scil. mutatione, non suâ. Ita cum aliquis per Justificationem incipit esse amicus Dei, ipse mutatur, non Deus, etc. Thus Lombard.  
§. 32. I shall annex the Determinations of his two great Scholars, Aquinas and Scotus, who divided the whole School between them.  
§. 33. Dicendum, says Aquinas, quod Amor dupliciter mensuratur. 
Aquin. in 3. sent. didst 32. q. 1. art, 4.  Vno modo ex suo Principio, & sic dicitur magis amari illud, ad quod amandum efficacius Voluntas inclinatur; & sic Deus aequaliter omnia diligit, quia in dilectione sua respectis cujuslibet rei, habet infinitam efficaciam in diligendo. Alto modo ex parte Objecti, secundum quod dicitur aliquis magis diligere illud cui vult majus bonum; & sic Deus dicitur magis diligere unum quam aliud, in quantum vult majus bonum: & ex hoc etiam habet majorem effectum in illo, quia Voluntas ejus est causa rerum. Thus he in Corpore. And then in his Answer to the second Objection he says, Dicendum quod Dilectio non tantum importat id quod est ex parte Dei, sed etiam id quod est ex parte Creaturae; cujusmodi bonum, prout est à Deo volitum, in dilectione Dei includitur. Et ideo, quia creaturae non se habent aequaliter ad Deum, nec possunt aequaliter bonitatem ejus participare, ideo non aequaliter omnia diligit. And then in his Answer ad quartum, Dicendum quod non dicitur magis diligere quia intensius diligit, sed quia majus bonum vult. And then he adds ad quintum, Dicendum quod quantum ad effectum dilectionis semper eundem aequaliter diligit, quia semper vult ei idem bonum finaliter, quamvis non velit quod semper habeat aequale bonum vel idem, & ideo secundum effectum non est aequalis. So again in his Sums, Dicendum 
Aquin. Sum. part: 1. q. 20. art. 3. in corp.  quod cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest aliquis magis vel minus amari: uno modo ex parte ipsius actus Veluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus; et sic Deus non magis quaedam aliis amat, quia omnia amat uno & simplici actu Voluntatis, & semper eodem modo se habente: alio modo ex parte ipsius Boni quod aliquis vult amato; et sic dicimur aliquem magis alio amare cui volumus majus bonum, quamvis non magis intensâ voluntate. Et hoc modo necesse est dicere quod Deus quaedam aliis magis amat. Cum enim amor Dei sit causa Bonitatis rerum, ut dictum est, non esset aliquid alio melius, si Deus non vellet uni majus bonum quam alteri. Thus Aquinas.  
§. 34. To the same purpose Scotus; Tertium patet, (sc. 
Scotus 3. sent. didst 32. q. 1. §. 5, 6. p. 216, 217.  Actum diligendi omnia in Deo esse unum) quia una est Potentia, unum Objectum, & habet unum Actum infinitum adaequatum sibi: nec oportet illum unum esse omnium, quasi omnia requirantur ad perfectionem hujus Actus; sed solum ex perfectione hujus Actus sequitur, quia perfecte tendit ad primum terminum, quod etiam, perfect tendit in omnia circa quae primus terminus est totalis ratio agendi tam Intellectui Divino quam Voluntati; quia si aliquid aliud posset esse prima ratio agendi, vilesceret illa Potentia.  
Ex hoc patet quomodo est aequalitas in Deo in diligendo omnia, comparando Actum ad Agens: sed comparando ad Connotata, sive ad ea super quae transit, est inaequalitas, non tantum quia illa volita sunt inaequalia, vel inaequalia bona sunt eis volita; sed etiam quia secundum quendam ordinem transit super illa: nam omnis rationabiliter volens vult primo Finem, & secundò illud quod immediatè attingit Finem, & tertiò illa quae remotiùs sunt ordinata ad attingendum Finem. Cum igitur Deus rationabilissimè velit, licet non diversis actibus, sed tantum uno, in quantum illo diversimodè tendit super Objecta ordinate, primò vult finem, & in hoc est Actus suus perfectus, & Voluntas ejus beata; secundò vult illa quae immediate ordinantur in ipsum praedestinando, sc. Electos— tertiò vult illa quae sunt necessaria ad attingendum hunc sinem, sc. bona gratiae; quartò vult propter illos alia quae sunt remotiora, puta hunc mundum sensibilem, ut serviat illis, etc.—  
Patet igitur inaequalitas volibilium, quantum ad ipsa volita, non ut volitio est ipsius Voluntatis, sed ut transit super Objecta modo praedicto. Nec tamen illa inaequalitas est propter bonitatem praesuppositam in Objectis quibuscunque aliis à se, quae sit quasi ratio sic vel sic volendi; sed ratio est in ipsa Voluntate Divina: quia sicut ipsa acceptat alia in gradu, ita sunt bona in talia gradu, & non è converso. Vel si'detur quod in eyes, ut ostensa sunt ab Intellectu, ostenditur aliquis gradus bonitatis essentialis, secundum quam debent complacere voluntati, hoc saltem est certum, quod complacentia eorum, quantum ad actualem existentiam, est merè ex Voluntate Divina, absque alia ratione determinante ex parte eorum. And then he adds in his Answer to the third Objection, Et ista inaequalitas Dilectionis, hoc est effectus Dilectionis, concedenda est, non solum quantum ad gradus specificos, sed etiam in individuis ejusdem speciei; nec ratio est in isto & in illo, sed sola Voluntas Divina, etc. Thus Scotus.  
§. 35. I might add more from Durand. l. 3. Scent d. 32. q. 1. art. 3. Nichol. de Orbellis l. 3. Sent. d. 32. Dub. 1. Estius l. 3. Sent. d. 32. §. 1. pa. 110. E. F. & 111. A. B. Hales and Bonaventure, Argentinus, Gabriel Biel and others are quoted by H. Cavellus to this purpose, in his Scholia on this place of Scotus. But it were vain to fill paper with more quotations, since in citing these I have pointed out all the rest. And I believe there is not a writer on this distinction in the Sentences, or on that question in the Sums, but has expressly delivered himself to this purpose, as the Master and these his Scholars had done before them.  
§. 36. And therefore I cannot choose but wonder that our Refuter should take no notice of these or the like passages, which to ordinary eyes would have showed more to his advantage then all that he has quoted in his Pamphlet from the Schoolmen, and Suarez and Scheibler to boot. But this and some other Passages in his Book, which offered themselves at first sight, make me not value his School-learning at the same rate and price he has put upon it in the Title-Page of his Mixture. But old Homer was blind, though he were the prince of Poets; and our writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity sees not all things in those Doctors that may most serve for his advantage.  
§ 37. Howsoever the Proverb is on his side, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Euripid.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, his second thoughts may be wiser. Now I have helped him to a Festcue, and pointed him to the places, we may in his next rejoinder meet with these and more the like observations. For methinks I already hear him at his Dicite Io Paean, & Io bis dicite Paean, and that as cheerfully he sings it as the great Archim●des did his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, when he had found out the Demonstration of that Problem which a long time in vain he had attempted. Here at least it is acknowledged that he has all the Schoolmen on his side: and therefore did not he rationally challenge the Doctor in any of those Writers to be had in Pauls-Church-yard or the Library at Oxford?  
§. 38. But, good Sir, soft and fair. For I doubt not but I shall yet be able to pull off the Wheels from your Triumphal Chariot, though you were now entering the very gates of the Capitol, to sacrifice to your Goddess Victory.  
§. 39 For in the third place, I must tell you, that though nothing naturally hinders but that the inward Acts of Love in Men may be gradually the same where the outward Expressions, are gradually different; yet ordinarily they are not, but the inward affection commonly varies according to the intention and remission of the outward Expressions and Effects.  
§. 40. And hence it is, that God Almighty is very frequently in Scripture (that speaks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and after the manner of men) said to love some more than others, and the same person more or less at one time than he does at another, though his Love in the inward Act must of necessity be still the same, because it is most usual with men (from whose custom this is borrowed, and applied to God) that the outward Expressions do carry a proportionable correspondence to the inward Affections, and as the one gradually varies, so most commonly do the other. Nor would the Scriptures by an Anthropopathy have applied this to God, unless it had been most usual and ordinary with men.  
§. 41. Indeed this is in itself so familiar and obvious a Truth, (so commonly also received among the Schoolmen,) that I am even ashamed at our Refuters either Ignorance or Folly, that he should put the Doctor, because he is a Critic, to prove that which every day's experience does manifest to all sorts of people. For else how can we be able to distinguish true Love from that which is hypocritical and counterfeit, but only upon the supposal of this Maxim, That in the ordinary course of affairs among men, there is and must be a Correspondence between the inward Acts of Love and the outward Expressions. Upon what score but this did our Saviour reprove Judas, for betraying the Son of Man with a kiss? 
Luke 22. 47. Judges 4. 18. & 5. 25, 26.  When Jael courted Sisera with fair language and proffers of security and protection, at the time she had resolved his destruction in her heart, when in one hand she brought milk and butter in a Lordly Dish, and the nail and hammer in the other; when Joab struck Amasa under the fifth rib and killed him, and at 
2 Sam. 20. 9, 10.  the same time cried Hail, Brother, and took him about the neck and kissed him, where else lay the cruel hypocrisy but only in this, that the outward Expressions spoke abundance of Love, when there was war and bloodshed in the Heart?  
§. 42. And indeed were not this a generally-received Truth amongst men, that such as are the outward Expressions such also ought the inward Acts to be, and that as the one does grow or decrease, so ordinarily do the other, there could be no security of any man's Love or Friendship in the world, but all things must fall into Jealousy and Confusion. For the inward Acts of Love being immanent Acts of the Will, it is impossible that they should appear and be discovered to others but only by the outward signs and Expressions. And as it is impossible that the inward and elicit Acts of the mind should be discerned and known to others but only by the outward transient Acts: so also it is generally received from Saint Austin, that mentiri est contra mentem ire, and men in Sincerity are bound as well candidly to express, as to speak truth to their neighbours; else there will be as much a Lie in the Action as is in the Tongue.  
§. 43. If our Refuter shall here reply from the 38th. Page, that though it be a piece of high dissembling for a man to make great pretences and shows of Affection, when there is little or none in the Heart, yet there is no such matter where either it is not expressed to the height, or else totally concealed;  
§. 44. To this I answer, That as there is no General Rule without exceptions, so it has already been granted, that it may be lawful sometimes to conceal our Love, or not express it to the height, and Prudence also dictates that in some cases it is both commendable and necessary to assume and put on even a 
* Illud hic generatim dici potest; Vbicumque Simulatio aut dissimulatio per se nihil habet quod Dei gloriam laedat, aut in alterum sit injurium, aut nostrae laudi vel commodo nimium aurigetur, eam ad breve tempus, cum res ita fert, adhiberi posse; saepe enim ad gubernationem rerum, & ad consilia perficienda, opus est quaedam dissimulare; nonnunquam etiam severitas quaedam simulari potest in liberos, aut alios qui nobis subsunt, ad eos imperio continendos: quod tantum abest ut reprehensionem mereatur, ut potius laude sit dignum, tanquam ad disciplinam servandam vehementer utile. Joh. Crellii Ethic. Christian. l. 4. c. 27. pa. 517.  contrary Passion of Anger and Severity toward those we most tenderly affect, and consequently that he is no Hypocrite that in these cases hides his Love, or does not fully express it. But then these being but extraordinary cases and exceptions from general Rules, can no whit prejudice the usual contrary Practice and Obligation. And hence it is that I said (which this Objection no way strikes at) that ordinarily the outward Expressions must, and commonly do, carry a correspondence and proportionable agreement with the inward Acts of that Love which they are designed to represent.  
§. 45. And now for this in the next place I appeal to the Common Notions and general apprehensions of Mankind. For all men naturally are persuaded, that where they conceive the Passion is not counterfeit, there, such as are the outward Expressions, such also is the inward Love; and as the one falls or rises, so also does the other. I pray, Sir, do not you yourself guess at your welcome by the freedom and nobleness and height of your entertainment? Though the Table be loaded with plenty, yet if a — Super omnia vultus Accesscre boni— if locks 
Ovid. Metam.  come not in to grace the entertainment, or if others be more friendly accosted then yourself, you will soon enough descry that you are none of the Guests for whom the Feast was provided, and that your room would be better accepted then your company. When the Jews saw our Saviour weeping for dead Lazarus, 
Joh. 11. 35, 36.  did they not make a just construction of this Action, and say truly, Behold how he loved him? When Mary Magdalene washed 
Luke 7. 38, etc.  our Saviour's feet with her tears, and wiped them with her hair, and kissed them, and anointed them with precious ointment, did not our Saviour from thence truly argue the greatness of her Love, and prove that it was (though she were a sinner) far more than that of Simon his entertainer, because he neither (as the Custom was) had offered him a kiss, or oil for his head, or else water for his feet? And therefore the Schools do generally conclude from Saint Gregory, that Probatio dilectionis 
Gregor Magn. Homil. in Evangel mihi pa. 321. E.  exhibitio est operis, (It is in his 30th. Homily upon the Gospels) Such as is the Expression, such is also the Love; and the one is the Index and Touchstone to manifest the other.  
§. 46. Indeed true Love is a very fruitful and operative thing, and it cannot choose but be communicative. Like Mines of Gold and Silver in the Bowels of the Earth, it manifests the rich treasure by certain Signs and Indications. And though we would ourselves, yet it cannot, will not lie hid. Every Concealment lays Shackles and Bonds upon it, and shuts up that in a most tedious imprisonment which was born to be free, and cannot long live restrained. Like the natural heat in the Body, it must have its vent; and therefore if the Pores be shut up, it puts all in a Flame, till the Passages be opened. Every Tree, says 
Luke 6. 44, 45.  our Saviour, is known by its fruit; and out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. And again, If ye love me, keep my 
Joh. 15. 21.  commandments. He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me: and he that loveth me, shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and manifest myself to him. Indeed true Love does as naturally manifest itself by the outward Expressions, as Springs of water discover themselves by the verdure of the grass they run under. It's excellence consists in doing good, and being communicative; and, like Light, it was as well made to show itself as comfort others; and it has this Property also of Light, that the greater or less it is still in the Fountain, the stronger or weaker it always is in the Ray. Nay it is altogether useless, unless it be working, and manifesting itself: and a Love concealed is altogether as if it were not. What Saint James says of Faith, may be as well said of this, As 
Jam. 2. 26.  the body without the Spirit is dead, so Love without works is dead also.  
§. 47. This then being the nature of true Charity, the Christian grace of sincerity requires that our Love be not only such as it seems, but that it appear in the effects to be such as it truly is. And therefore says S. John, My little Children, let 
1 John 3. 18.  us not love in word, neither in tongue, but in deed and in truth. From which place Tolet, in his Commentary on Rom. 12. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 let Love be without dissimulation, observes that 
Tolet. Commentar in Epist. ad Rom. c. 12. p. 527, 528.  there are two sorts of hypocritical and counterfeit Love. Nota, says he, duas dilectiones fictas & simulatas. Una est quae fit verbo, quando aliquis amat quidem, sed amor ejus non se extendit ad opera, sed ad sola verba bona erga eum aut de eo quem amat. Huic opponitur dilectio seu amor conjunctus operi, quando qui amat & verbo & opere amorem internum ostendit erga amatum. Joh. 14. 21. Qui habet mandata mea, & servat ea, ille est qui me diligit: et Jacob. 2. 15, 16. Si frater aut soror nudi sint, & indigeant victu quotidiano, dicat autem aliquis, Ite in pace, calefacimini, & saturamini, non dederit autem ea quae necessaria sunt corpori, quid proderit? Haec igitur est dilectio ficta: quamvis enim qui sic se habet interius, aliquo modo amet, tamen ad verba sola progreditur. Altera est quae fit solâ linguâ: quando homo non amat interius, tamen exterius amare se dicit, iste amat linguâ; cui opponitur amor & dilectio in veritate. De illa dicitur Matt. 15. 8. Populus hic labiis me honorat, cor autem longè est à me. Joannes ergo verbo Opus linguae veritatem opponit; quia ficta dilectio est quae sit verbo sine opere, aut linguâ solâ. Illa verò est perfecta & sine simulatione quae fit opere & veritate, tam erga Deum quam erga proximum; ad quam nunc Paulus exhortatur.  
§. 48. The Love then that is true and sincere, and such as ought to be found among Christians, is neither barren nor counterfeit, hypocritical nor lame, and is always perfect as well in deed as in truth, except where Christian Prudence does dictate a temporary concealment in some very few cases. And therefore though he that pretends love where it is not is in that regard only an Hypocrite; yet he also that pro tempore conceals it either in whole or in part, puts on another shape, and appears to be what he is not, and in that sense does dissemble. And if all men should do that, which is lawful only for some time, and in some cases, and for good ends, there could be no certainty and assurance of any man's Love or Friendship; and the concealment of our Love generally would prove as dangerous as the personating of it.  
§. 49. Since then that Love and Charity, where it is true and perfect, cannot choose but be operative, and Sincerity requires that it appear no other than it is, except only in some cases; since also men apprehend, where they conceive there is no deceit, that such as are the outward expressions, such is also the inward Love; and since there is no other way to distinguish the Hypocrite and pretender from the true Lover; it necessarily follows, that there is, and ordinarily must be, a Proportion and Correspondence in respect of Intention & Remission between the inward Acts of Love and the outward Expressions, and as the one falls or rises, so commonly do the other, and the Love else would prove imperfect and fruitless, or counterfeit and hypocritical: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
§. 50. And now though this be sufficient to demonstrate the truth of the Assertion, and to give a full and satisfactory Answer to the utmost pretences of the Objection; yet because I conceive that this is all that with any colour of Reason can be said against it, and we are now to deal with a Schoolman and a soldier, that is resolved to dispute every inch of ground with us, I shall, to give him a total Rout, call in the Auxiliary forces of the School. And indeed it will be necessary, at least for the Doctor's Vindication. For whereas he had most truly asserted, that such as the Expression was, such was the Act of inward Love of which that was an Expression; it being certain that each of these Expressions had an Act of inward Love, of which they were so many proportionably different expressions; this our Refuter calls a proofeless Dictate, a plain begging of the Question, and a Fallacy, and expressly says, that the Doctor must pardon him, if he entertain not his vehement Asseverations as solid Proofs, as if they were Propositiones per se notae. And who that reads this, and a great deal more such vaunting stuff, would not verily think that the Doctor was most grossly mistaken, and had asserted that for a Truth which could not possibly be made good by any shadow of Reason, or Countenance from Authority? But this is not the first time that our great Writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity has betrayed his Ignorance in the Schoolmen. And that I may make this appear as evident as the Doctor's Assertion, which he so highly decries, I shall now come to them.  
§. 51. To begin then with Durand. Quantum ad secundum (sc. An ordo iste (Charitatis) attendatur secundum solum 
Durand. l. 3. Sent. didst 29. art. 3. E.  affectum, an secundum effectum?) Dicendum est quod secundum utrumque. Cujus ratio est, Quia quando duo Actus sic se habent, quod unus dependet ab alio praecise, & sicut posterius à priore, secundum ordinem qui est in primo oportet ponere ordinem in secundo: Sed affectus interior & effectus exterior se habent sicuti prius & posterius; quia effectus est posterior affectu & ab ipso dependet praecise, quia ad completum affectum seu ad completum velle sequitur effectus seu operari respectu eorum quae sunt nobis possibilia: Ergo secundum ordinem qui est in affectu est ordo in effectu. Unde Gregor. in Homil. Probatio dilectionis exhibitio est operis. Unde ei quem plus teneor diligere in affectu, teneor ex debito charitatis plus impendere in effectu, si aequaliter indiget; ita quod si oportet alterum career, eligendum esse illum carere qui minus ex charitate diligendus est— Est etiam advertendum, quod cum dicitur quod effectus correspondet affectui, intelligendum est de effectu qui non est ex alia causa debitus, etc. Thus Durand.  
§. 52. To the same purpose Aquinas upon the same Question, Utrum ordo charitatis sit attendendus secundum affectum vel secundum effectum. His words are, Sed contra Gregor. dicit, quod Probatio dilectionis est exhibitio operis: si ergo secundum effectum est ordo, oportet quod etiam sit secundum affectum. 2. Praeterea, Bonum est Objectum Charitatis quantum ad affectum: sed ordo Charitatis, ut dictum est, attenditur secundum diversitatem bonorum: ergo Charitas habet ordinem non solum secundum effectum, sed etiam secundum affectum. 3. Praeterea, sicut Charitas principaliter affectum, ita Beneficentia respicit effectum: si ergo ordo esset solum secundum effectum, non esset haec ordinatio Charitatis, sed solum Beneficentiae, quod est contra authoritatem Canticorum in litera inductam.  
Respond. Dicendum quod effectus exterior non pertinet ad Charitatem, nisi in quantum ex affectu procedit in quo primo est Charitatis actus. Unde si esset ordo in effectu tantum attendendus, ordo ille nullo modo ad Charitatem pertineret, sed ad alias virtutes magis, sicut ad Liberalitatem vel Misericordiam. Unde cum Charitas ordinata perhibeatur, oportet quod ordo in affectu observetur, & ex affectu in effectum procedat; non hoc modo, quod ei qui plus ex affectu diligitur magis in effectu impendatur, sed quod homo sit paratus magis impendere si necesse foret, quia quandoque qui diliguntur nostris auxiliis non indigent. Et hoc etiam patet per simile in Natura, quia unicuique rei naturali tantum inductum est à Causatore de amore naturalierga aliquid, quantum necessarium est ut effectum circa id exhibeat. Et similiter secundum gradum, qui necesse est ut observetur in effectu, ordo affectus lege Divinâ imperatur. Aquin. l. 3. Sent. distin. 29. q. 1. art. 2. in corpore.  
§. 53. To the same purpose Estius. Alia Scriptura est Gal. 6. Operemur bonum ad omnes, maximè autem ad domesticos fidei. Cum igitur probatio dilectionis exhibitio sit operis, teste Gregorio homil. 30. in Evangelia, consequens erit eos maxime diligendos, qui fide & charitate sunt nobis conjunctiores. I confess the whole is brought in by him as an Objection, but I urge it only for the Antecedents sake, upon which the Consequence is built. And that this is acknowledged by him for an undoubted Truth, that Probatio dilectionis exhibitio sit operis, appears from what follows, in his Resolution of the Question, ibid. p. 102. col. 2. C. D.  ad haec objecta breviter respondeamus, sciendum circa id quod primo loco objiciebatur, quorumdam fuisse opinionem, quam in textu Magister recitat, omnes proximos pari charitatis affectu diligendos esse, etsi non pari charitatis effectu, i. e. operum exhibitione prosequendos (And what say you now, Mr. Refuter? are not you one of this number, at least by just and lawful consequence?) Quam sententiam merito Magister rejicit, (pray mark it, Sir, against another time) & S. Thomas refutat, 2. 2. q. 26. art. 6. quia sicut in naturalibus, ita & in spiritualibus oportet Inclinationem rei proportionatam esse actui ejus convenienti. Quare sicut Terra majorem habet gravitatem quam Aqua, eo quod naturâ petat locum inseriorem; ita major debet esse affectus Charitatis erga eos quibus debemus externa beneficentiae opera. Estius l. 3. Sent. d. 39 §. 5. p. 102. col. 1. C. & col. 2. C. D.  
§. 54. Aquinas in his Sums delivers the same Doctrine. Respondeo, Dicendum quod 2ª Opinio circa hoc fuit. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod omnes proximi sunt aequaliter ex charitate diligendi quantum ad affectum, sed non quantum ad exteriorem effectum, ponentes ordinem dilectionis esse intelligendum secundum exteriora beneficia, quae magis debemus impendere proximis quam alienis; non autem secundum interiorem affectum, quem aequaliter debemus impendere omnibus, etiam inimicis. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Non enim minus ordinatus est affectus Charitatis, qui est inclinatio Gratiae, quam Appetitus naturalis, qui est inclinatio Naturae. Utraque enim inclinatio ex Divina sapientia procedit. Videmus enim in naturalibus, quod inclinatio naturalis proportionatur actui vel motui qui convenit Naturae uniuscujusque; sicut Terra majorem habet inclinationem gravitatis quam Aqua, quia competit ei esse sub Aqua. Oportet ergo quod etiam inclinatio Gratiae, quae est affectus Charitatis, proportionetur his quae sunt exterius agenda (How say you, Sir? what think you now of your Doctor Critic? had he not the Schoolmen before his eyes, when he delivered his Proposition in the very English reddition of Aquinas words? And is it not certain, as he said, that each of these Expressions had an Act of internal Love, of which they were so many proportionably different Expressions?) ita scil. ut ad eos intensiorem Charitatis affectum habeamus quibus convenit nos magis beneficos esse, etc.— Aquin. 2. 2. q. 26. art. 6. in Corpore.  
§. 55. Upon which place Cajetan thus, Secundò, repugnat corpori praesentis articuli. Nam contra primam opinionem conclusum est, quod proportionalis est interior dilectionis affectus exteriori Beneficentiae. Si enim Benevolentia & Beneficentia proportionatae sunt, non erit Benevolentia ad omnes, & Beneficentia ad quosdam. Et si una est ad quosdam, & altera ad omnes, sequitur quod non respondeant sibi invicem proportionaliter— Admetus (quod) dubium dicitur, quod procedit ex malo intellectu Literae. Non enim in Litera docemur proportionalitatem simpliciter & absolutè inter diligere & benefacere, quia potius (ut modo expositum est) falsa invenitur ista proportionalitas; sed traditur in Litera proportio inter Beneficentiam & Benevolentiam, ita quod major Beneficentia (I pray mark it, Sir,) praesupponit majorem Benevolentiam ut causam. Et hoc contra opinionem dicentem, quod erat major Beneficentia absque majori Benevolentia (how say you now, Mr. Refuter?) Ex hac enim proportione, sc. quod major Benevolentia & major Beneficentia mutuò se inferunt, non sequitur quod, si Benevolentia est ad omnes, Beneficentia sit ad omnes, (hoc enim est extra rationem majoris & minoris intensiuè, de quibus est sermo;) (I pray again mark it) sed bene sequitur, quod major est Benevolentia ad illos ad quos est major Beneficentia. Cajetan. in loc.  
§. 56. It were vain to trouble the Reader and myself with more quotations to this purpose. I dare say, not any Author on the Sums or the Sentences, that have written on these questions, but have declared their minds concerning that Proportion that is and aught to be between the inward Acts of Love and the outward Expressions, as the Doctor here has done.  
§. 57 That I may not fill paper with Translations, the sum and substance of the former Doctrine in short is this; That there is and aught to be a proportionable correspondence betwixt the outward Expressions and the inward Acts of Love, and that the one does manifest the other, according to that of S. Gregory, Probatio dilectionis est exhibitio operis. For the 
Cum ergo causa per Accidens non sit proportionata ad Effectum, sed solum Causa per se, etc. Aquin 2. Sent. d. 21. q 1. art. 3. in Corp.  outward Expressions depending precisely upon the inward Acts, as the Effect upon their Cause, it necessarily follows, that the more I love, the greater Expressions of this Love I am bound to exhibit, and to whom I am bound to show the greater tokens of Love, him I ought to love more in proportion to the Expressions, otherwise let me add, the Love will be lame and imperfect, or else hypocritical and counterfeit. Not that every man is bound at all times to express his Love according to the height and intention of the inward Act, but that he is obliged to do it when a just Occasion offers, and a Necessity requires it. For sometimes they whom we love do not either stand in need at all of our outward signs and expressions, or perhaps do less want them than others less beloved; or else there may not be a fit Opportunity to express our Love unto the height, when they want or we desire; or perhaps it may be more advantage for those we love, to have the height and Ardour of this Love for the present concealed, as we also have already intimated. But then, though sometimes it be convenient not to express our Love unto the height, yet ordinarily it is required that there be a proportion and agreement, in respect of Intention and Remission, between the outward Expressions and the inward Acts of Love. For the affection of Charity, which is an inclination of Grace, is not less ordinate than the Appetite and Inclination of Nature, because both flow from the same divine Wisdom. But we see in Nature, that the inward Appetite is proportioned to that outward Act and Motion which is proper to every thing. For the Earth has a greater inclination to gravity then Water, which naturally is seated above it. And therefore since, as the good Father said, Amor meus pondus meum, since Love is as it 
Augustin.  were the weights and plummets of the Soul, the more the Soul loves in the inward Act, the more it carries the Soul to higher and nobler Expressions; and a proportionable agreement and correspondence there will and must be between the inward Affection and the outward Effects; and as the Bounty increases and is more intense, so in proportion does the Love: which is the very same that the Doctor had asserted.  
§. 58. And this was abundantly sufficient to the Doctor's purpose, though he never had attempted to prove, that Expressions gradually different in themselves could not flow from several Acts of Love that were gradually the same, or that the outward Expressions and the inward Acts of Love were of necessity equal in point of Intention. For since you grant to the Doctor that it is an obvious Truth, That each of these Expressions had an Act of inward Love in Christ, of which they were so many different Expressions; then, if (to use Cajetan's word) major Benevolentia & major Beneficentia mutuò se inferunt, and, unless there be a proportion between the outward and the inward Acts of Love, the Inclinations of Grace, as Aquinas proves, would be less orderly than those of Nature, the Doctor might very well conclude, that where the outward Expressions were gradually different, there the inward Acts, from whence the Expressions issue, were gradually different also. If it be ordinarily so with all others, that the greater Expressions argue the greater Love, what should hinder but that the Doctor might conclude it was so in Christ?  
§. 59 It will not be enough to Reply in this case (and yet this is all you have to say) that the Doctor has said nothing to prove that these Expressions, which are acknowledged to be gradually different in themselves, might not, could not proceed from a Love equally intense.  
§. 60. For though nothing naturally and ab intrinseco hinders, but that different Expressions (because they are imperate Acts of the Will, and subject to its Command) may flow from Acts of Love still the same for Degrees; yet ordinarily they do not. And therefore unless you can show that the case is different in Christ from all other men, and that every Act of his Love, that flowed from the same all-full all-perfect Habit of Divine Charity, was of the same height and intenseness, and equal to the Habit, it cannot be denied but that the Doctor's Conclusion is most rational and just.  
§. 61. For Morality admits not of Mathematical Demonstration; but, as the 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Arist. l. 1. Eth. c. 3. §. 1.  great Master of Method tells us, sufficient it is if here the Conclusion be inferred from Praemisses and Medium's that are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and most commonly so. And therefore, Sir, if the gradual intention and remission in the inward Expressions do most commonly argue and infer a proportionable increase and decrease in the inward Acts of Love, you must needs be unjust for charging the Doctor, for not saying any thing to prove that these different Expressions could not proceed from a Love equally intense, and for speaking impertinently to the matter in hand, unless he can prove that they were of necessity equal in point of Intention. For why should you require the Proof of that which the nature of things will not admit of? The Doctor now was not engaged in the Demonstration of a Mathematical, but an Ethical Problem (for the Schoolmen will tell you of Theologia Moralis;) and he that proves that such a Proposition is most commonly so, has as demonstratively concluded as that Science does re-require.  
§. 62. But why cannot the Doctor's Conclusion evidently follow, unless he can first prove that they ought of necessity to be equal in point of Intention? For will you therefore conclude, because Expressions gradually different may flow (since there is no necessary reason to the contrary) from Acts of Love gradually the same, that therefore they do so, or necessarily must? If you should, (as you intimate by this your redoubling your charge against the Doctor) I must tell you that you are guilty of arguing A potentia ad Actum affirmatiuè, which is the most simple and palpable Sophism of all: just as if I should argue, Because nothing naturally and of necessity hinders but that Mr. Jeanes may be a Jesuit in a Minister's cloak, therefore without doubt he is so.  
§. 63. Whereas you then put the Question to the Doctor, and thus ask him, Now, Sir, have you said any thing to prove that they (Expressions of Love gradually different) could not proceed from a Love equally intense? and then add in the following Section, That though it be an obvious Truth, that each of these Expressions had an Act of inward Love of which they were so many different Expressions, yet it is impertinent unto the matter in hand, unless he can prove that they were of absolute necessity equal in point of Intention, the proof whereof he has not hitherto so much as attempted; It is evident you are mistaken, and the Doctor's Conclusion will rationally and clearly follow, though he never attempts to prove that which you so eagerly require, and though indeed it is impossible for him to perform it in respect of every Act. And so much for your second Charge.  
§. 64. And now because you profess (and it is your third Charge) that the reason of the Doctor's Consequence is to you invisible, and that you shall never acknowledge his Inference legitimate, until you be driven thereunto by reducing his Enthymeme unto a Syllogism; I shall once, for your better satisfaction, perform it. Thus then; If ordinarily there is and must be a proportionable agreement in respect of Intention and Remission betwixt the inward Acts of Love and the outward Expressions, than that Act of internal Love expressed by Christ's Dying for us was superior to those former Acts which only expressed themselves in his Poverty, etc. But the Antecedent is true, as we have showed from Reason and Experience, and the Authority of Gregory and the Schoolmen. Therefore also is the Consequent.  
§. 65. And thus you see, Sir, that there was no Mystery, but a plain and obvious Truth in the word proportionably. Not as if the Doctor thereby had meant, as you descant, that these different expressions in regard of their Intention must be proportioned exactly unto their inward respective Acts of Love equal or parallel unto them; but only thus, That the greater or the less the outward Expressions are, the greater or the less commonly are the inward Acts of Love. For here I must mind you of a known Distinction, There is an Equality of Proportion, and an Equality of Quantity; and it is made use of by Estius to 
Estius 3. Sent. d. 29. §. 5. p. 104. col. 2. E  this very purpose. For whereas among other Passages this also had been urged out of Austin for an Equality of Love, where the Expressions were different, Quis est, inquit, qui non judicat personaliter? qui diligit aequaliter. Dilectio aequalis facit non acceptari personas. Nam cum homines diverso modo pro suis gradibus honoramus, tunc timendum est nè personas accipiamus. Augustin. tract. 30. in Joan. To this Estius there answers, Non aliam hîc requirit aequalitatem, quam quae personarum acceptionem excludit. Itaque aequalitatem intelligit Proportionis, non Quantitatis. So, say I, is the Doctor to be understood, as speaking of an Equality of Proportion betwixt the outward Expression and the inward Act, and not, as you would have him to mean, an Equality of Quantity. Sufficient it is if, as the inward Acts of Love increase or diminish, the outward Expressions do so too, though the increase and decrease in both be not parallel and exactly equal.  
§. 66. But in case that Distinction should be quarrelled at, yet I hope this of your great Master Aristotle shall be allowed. He tells us in his Ethics of a twofold Proportion, and it is approved of as most undoubted by all Mathematicians in the world, for aught I ever could find to the contrary. The one 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. li. 5. Ethic. ca 3. §. 8. Vid. l. 5. Eth. c. 4. §. 1, 2. Et l 2. c. 6. §. 2. Quod proportionem Arithmeticam observat, eodem modo semper se habet, & ubique atque omnibus unum idemque est: quod proportionem observat Geometricam, hoc non ubique, aut omnibus, aut semper est idem, sed pro rerum diversitate varium. l. Crellii Eth. Aristotel. par. 2. c. 5. p. 42. Arithmetical Proportion is when divers numbers differ according to equal reason, that is, have equal differences: Geometrical Proportion is when divers numbers differ according to like reason, etc. Wingate's Arithmetic Natural, lib. 1. c. 9 §. 4. & 17.  he calls from them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. In the first, the Proportion Arithmetical, the increases are always equal, as in 2. 4. 6. 8. 10. 12. in the other, the Geometrical, they are like, as 2. 4. 8. 16. 32. When therefore the Doctor says, that there is a proportionable difference between the outward Expressions and the inward Acts of Love, and that as the one increases and decreases in respect of Intention and Remission, so also do the other, he is to be understood, that the increase or decrease between them is not according to Arithmetical Proportion, so as the Intention in the outward Act is still equal to the Intention of the inward; but only according to Geometrical Proportion, and that as the inward Act increases, so in like manner also does the outward, though the Intention be not equal and parallel in both.  
§. 67. And thus you see, Sir, (though the Doctor added it ex abundanti, more than your discourse required of him) that even from hence (from hence, I say,) he did justly suppose it unavoidably consequent, that that Act of internal Love expressed by Christ's Dying for us was superior to those former Acts expressed in his Poverty, etc. And so the same Person that loved sincerely, did also love and express that Love more intensely at one time then at another: quod erat demonstrandum, and was the very thing he had said in another Instance. And so I proceed to the next Section.   

SECTION 12.  
The Doctor's proof of the vanity of the Refuters Use of Confutation: made good from the Refuters Mixture. The Refuters Reply & endeavour to make good his Charge by Consequences, impertinent. The Refuters momentous Objection strikes as well against himself and other his friends, as the Doctor. The weakness of it. The intention of Christ's actual Grace so proportioned to that of his habitual Grace, as not to exceed it; but not so, still as to equal it. Illustrated by a clear instance. The Schoolmen no no where say, that the Intention of Christ's actual Grace is exactly equal to that of his habitual. Aquinas of the Refuters, not the Doctor's citation. He speaks fully to the Doctor's purpose. What meant by works & the effects of wisdom and Grace in Aquinas. An intensive growth in the inward Acts of wisdom & Grace argues not an intensive increase in the Habits. Asserted also by the Refuter. Cleared by a Distinction. The Chedzoy Challenge. The vanity of it. Christ did gradually increase in the Acts of wisdom and Grace as he did in stature. Proved from the Refuters Mixture: from Ames, Vorstius, Grotius, Hooker, Field, Suarez, Estius, Others, both Fathers and Schoolmen, and Reformed Divines. The Defenders advise to the Refuter to be more wary in his challenges.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
24. IT now only remains that I consider whether this Refuter have in the process of his Discourse added any thing wherein I may be any whit concerned.  
25. And 1. saith he, the falsehood of such an Assertion is evident from the point there handled and confirmed, the absolute fullness of Christ's Grace, which by the general consent of the Fathers and Schoolmen was such, as that it excluded all intensive growth.  
26. But to this the Reply will be easily foreseen from the Premises, that as the point by him handled and confirmed was distinctly the all-fulness of habitual grace in Christ, so his proof of it by the consent of Fathers and Schoolmen belongs still to that fullness of habitual Grace.  
27. Witness one for all, Aquinas Par. 3. qu. 7. art. 12. ad secundum; Licet virtus Divina possit facere aliquid majus & melius quam sit habitualis Gratia Christi, non tamen— though the Divine power may make somewhat greater and better than is the habitual Grace of Christ, yet— So 'tis plain he speaks of the fullness of the habitual Grace. And ad tertium; In Sapientia & Gratia aliquis proficere potest dupliciter: uno modo secundum ip. sos Habitus sapientiae & Gratiae augmentatoes; & sic Christus in eyes non proficiebat: alio modo secundum effectus, in quantum aliquis sapientiora & virtuosiora opera facit; & sic Christus proficiebat sapientiâ & Gratiâ, sicut & aetate, quia secundum processum aetatis perfectiora opera faciebat— & in his quae sunt ad Deum, & in his quae sunt ad homines. One may increase in wisdom and Grace two ways: One way according to the habits of them increased; and so Christ increased not: another way, according to the effects, when any doth more wise and virtuous works; and so Christ increased in wisdom and Grace, as he did in Age, because according to the process of his Age he did more perfect works, and that both in things belonging to God and men also.  
28. And thus are the Schoolmen understood by the Refuter himself, in his producing their Testimonies, as appears by the express words (habitual Grace, pag. 260. lin. penult. and holiness, and the Image of God in him, pag. 261. lin. 13.) And so 'tis most clear, their Consent belongs not, even in his own opinion, to the matter I had and have in hand, no way denying, but asserting a Capacity of Degrees among the Acts of Christ's Love of God, and the Expressions of it.   
§. 1. And now, my good Refuter, I pray deal ingenuously, and speak plainly without any subterfuges and ambages. Can any thing be said more fully for the proving the vanity of your Use of Confutation? For was not your Theme the All-fulness of habitual grace in Christ's Manhood? Does not the Title of every Page from p. 229. to p. 297. speak as much? Does not the whole carriage and Proof of your Doctrinal part evidence it? Do you treat of any thing but that? Nay do you not usher in your first Use of Information from your former Doctrine thus; From the dwelling of all-fulness of habitual Grace in Christ we may infer this Qualification and fitness for all his Offices, & c? And then does it not follow in order after this Use, p. 258. thus, Secondly, this Point may serve for Confutation of a Passage in the learned Doctor Hammond against Mr. Cawdrey, to wit, that Christ's Love of God was capable of further Degrees? I pray, Sir, what does this Ordinal (Secondly) mean? Has it not relation to that which went before? Or what is the Antecedent to this Relative (This?) Is it not the Point of the All-fulness of habitual Grace in Christ? Is it not from hence that you conclude Doctor Hammond guilty? Did you from pag. 237. to pag. 258. (where gins your Use of Confutation) speak of any thing else? Nay do you not continue on this Argument to pag. 297? Nay do your Authorities from Aquinas, 3. part. q. 7. art. 12. & in 3. Sent. dist. 13. say any thing else? Nay do not your Thomists and Scotists that, you say, are unanimous in asserting that the grace of Christ's Humanity was in regard of 
† Vide Davenant. in Coloss. c. 1. v 19 p. 99, 100 Suarez tom. 1. in 3. Part. Thom. disp. 22. sect. 2. p. 322. et disp. 26. p. 306. col. 1 C. ibid. sect 2 p. 367. col. 2. A. B.  God's Power ever (which yet would be considered of, were this a place fit for it) Summa, both positive and negative, speak the same? Are not your two reasons which you fetched from Aquinas, which, you say, are dilated on by his Commentators, brought in only to this purpose? Do you not say expressly in your first Reason, 1. Ex parte Formae ipsius Gratiae, The habitual Grace of Christ was referred unto the grace of Union, as a consequent Ornament of it, and therefore in all congruence it was to be suited and proportioned to it? Is not your second Reason taken ex parte Subjecti to this purpose also? Say you not, that Christ was not pure Viator, but in his soul he was also Comprehensor, and that from the first instant of his incarnation? He always therefore in his soul enjoyed heaven, happiness, the beatifical vision; and therefore all his Graces, and consequently his Love of God, were in termino, and therefore could not admit any further degrees? And do you not therefore add, to show you speak only of habitual Grace, that it is not to be denied, but that by special dispensation there was some restraint of the influence of happiness or beatifical vision in the whole course of his Humiliation, and particularly in the time of his doleful Passion? But surely it seems very improbable, and no ways sortable unto the state of Christ's blessedness, for his Grace and Holiness, the Image of God in him, his Love of God, etc. to be liable unto perpetual motion and augmentation. Sir, If these be your 
Vide Jeanes Mixture of Scholast. and Pract. Divinity, p. 260, 261.  words even in the midst of your Use of Confutation, as you know they are, what could be said more to the purpose to acquit the Doctor from the dint and force of it, than he has done? Your Subject is as clear as the Sun, the fullness of Christ's habitual Grace, and nothing else; and from this Doctrine you infer your second Use, a Use of Confutation of Doctor Hammond, who never any where denied this fullness of habitual Grace, and in the Passage you undertake to refute, spoke only of a gradual difference in respect of some Acts and some Expressions of Christ's Love. If this be not clearly to acquit himself, I know not what is. And I shall sooner expect that Calvin and Luther shall receive absolution in the Conclave at Rome, than the Doctor in the Judgement of our Refuter. But if this plea be not admitted, I shall never believe that any thing can be proved, and shall instantly turn Sceptic, and think that all the world will be Pyrrhonists as well as myself. I remember that somewhere it is reported of Diogenes, that when a bold simple animal would against all sense and reason undertake to maintain there was no Motion, he did instantly refute him with a blow on the Pate. Yet I would not be mistaken. All I urge this story for, is to show that Diogenes with his Cudgel did not more clearly refute him that maintained there was no Motion, than the Doctor by this Answer has overthrown your Use of Confutation.  
§. 2. But the Doctor must comfort himself, and patiently take up his Cross. I see it is a part of his portion to be loaded with Uses of Confutation. For when our Refuter cannot now deny the Doctor's plea to be just, and when he had cleared his Innocence from that charge and Crimination, as if every line were a Sunbeam, he now adventures by Engines and Consequences to torment and rack the Doctor's words to acknowledge this guilt of the denial of the fullness of Christ's habitual Grace. For thus he says in answer to the Doctor's plea, and it is divided into three Paragraphs: for - numero Deus impare gaudet.  

JEANES.  
1. THey that can so easily foresee this your Reply, may with as little difficulty foreknow the Objection against it, to wit, that the Intention of Christ's actual Grace is exactly proportioned unto that of his habitual Grace; and therefore your denial of the perpetual all-fulness of Christ's actual Grace, is a virtual and implied denial of the all-fulness of Christ's habitual Grace: and how you are provided of an Answer hereunto the event will show. It is not then so clear as you pretend, That the testimony of the Schoolmen belongs not, even in mine own opinion, to the matter you had and have in hand.  
2. As for that place you quote out of Aquinas, it is plain that therein, by the effects of wisdom and Grace, are meant such as are outward, for these are most properly termed works. And besides, an intensive increase in the inward Acts of wisdom and Grace would argue and presuppose an intensive increase in the very Habits themselves.  
3. Whereas you say in the close of Section the 28. that the consent of the Schoolmen is no ways denying, but asserting a capacity of Degrees among the Acts of Christ's Love of God, i. e. of the inward acts thereof; There will be little sense in your words in themselves, and less pertinency unto the matter in hand, unless your meaning be, as you elsewhere express yourself, that the inward Acts of Christ's Love of God were more intense at one time then at another: and if this be your meaning, I must needs assume the boldness to tell you, that no such matter is visible unto me in any of the Schoolmen. But perhaps, you may mean such Schoolmen as such a Puny as I never saw or heard of: however you cannot expect belief until you produce their testimonies. And I shall entreat you to allege such as may be had in Paul's Churchyard, or at least in the Library at Oxford.   
§. 2. Most gallantly spoken! and with scorn and Confidence enough, yet with far greater ignorance, as shall instantly be proved!  
§. 3. But, good Sir, were all granted, yet how serves this to prove Doctor Hammond guilty of denying the habitual fullness of grace in Christ, the thing you undertook to make good in your Use of Confutation, inferred from the former Doctrine? Have you said any thing of Deductions and Consequencies all along in that Discourse? Nay do you not every where charge it upon him as his downright opinion? and do you not confront this Proposition, That sincere Love is capable of Degrees, with Proofs and Confirmations of the absolute fullness of Christ's habitual Grace? How you are provided of an Answer and defence of this so uncharitable Crimination the event has declared; and though you are not so ingenuous as to acknowledge your Offence, yet you dare not deny your Gild, and therefore you craftily raise a mist and a cloud that you may run away undiscovered. But, my good Achelous, you shall not escape me so. For I am resolved to hunt you, Sir, through all your shapes.  
— Etenim tibi saepe novandi  
Corporis, o Juvenis, numero finita potestas. 
Ovid. Metamor. lib. 8. in fine.   
§. 4. Whereas then you say, that the event will show how the Doctor is provided of an Answer to your Objection against his Reply; let me tell you, that when the Event has declared how well you are provided to make good your Objection, the Doctor will instantly be provided of an Answer.  
§. 5. But, good Sir, I had thought you had all this while been making good the Charge you laid in against him in your Use of Confutation. And is it now come only to an Objection against his Reply? But for once I shall let it pass, and take it for granted, that the Doctor is innocent from the former Charge, against which the Use of Confutation was addressed, and see whether de novo he can by Consequence be concluded guilty.  
§. 6. But what is this momentous Objection, that is with as little difficulty foreknown as the Doctor's Reply was easily foreseen? Why, in plain English this, no less nor no more, That the Intention of Christ's actual Grace is exactly proportioned unto that of his habitual Grace, and therefore your denial of the perpetual all-fulness of Christ's actual Grace, is a virtual and implied denial of the all-fulness of Christ's habitual Grace; and then this will be enough, at least by a Jus postliminio nati (for it is built on a passage taken from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that was Printed half a year after that the Charge against the Doctor was published) to conclude the Doctor guilty of the Use of Confutation.  
§. 7. A most weighty Objection indeed this, and well worthy the second thoughts of a writer of Scholastical and Practical Divinity! But I pray, Sir, how do you prove that the Intention of Christ's actual Grace is exactly proportioned unto that of his habitual Grace? Prove me that, Sir, and I shall acknowledge Doctor Hammond confuted indeed. But then withal I must add, that if this can be made good, I shall anon also clearly prove that Mr. Jeanes and his friend Doctor Ames, and Aquinas, and divers others to boot, are all, as well as Doctor Hammond, within the compass of the Lash of this Use of Confutation. I deny then your Antecedent, and withal for your Comfort I tell you, that it is impossible for you to prove it. And if this be not proved (since it is impossible from false Premises 
Vide Arist. 2. prior. Analyt. c. 2.  that a Truth should per see and virtute praemiss arum be inferred) I pray then, Sir, what will become of your Conclusion? Must Doctor Hammond for all that be concluded guilty? Or is the world bound to believe your Conclusion, because it is inferred against the Doctor? Well; the world is grown to a fine pass, and any thing shall be cried up for an Objection, if it be thrown at Doctor Hammond, as any thing was an Apple in Rome that was thrown at Vatinius.  
§. 8. But, Sir, to keep you close to the subject matter, I shall here distinguish your Antecedent, thus; The Intention of Christ's actual Grace is exactly proportioned unto that of his habitual Grace, so as it cannot exceed it. For then the Act, which is the Effect, should be more noble than the Habit, which is the Cause, and there should be something in the Effect that was not in the Cause, contrary to that received Maxim, Nihil dat quod non habet, aut eminenter aut formaliter. And you know, I have already told you, that I speak only of Habits infused, (though the reason be the same of Habits acquired, that are now complete and full) and of the Acts that flow from them. And if this be your meaning, you are a most egregious Sophister, and speak nothing to the purpose; and then I deny the sequel of your Enthymeme. And let me tell you withal, that from the Antecedent in this sense, it will be impossible to infer your Conclusion against the Doctor. And therefore secondly I say, that the Intention of Christ's actual Grace is not exactly proportioned to that of his habitual Grace, so as the actual Grace does always equal the fullness and height and Intention of his habitual Grace. And as this is the Proposition to be proved against Doctor Hammond, so when you shall make it good — Eris mihi magnus Apollo, et - Phyllida solus habeto; I shall 
Virgil. Ecl. 3.  acknowledge you for a Schoolman, and a Confuter of Doctor Hammond.  
§. 9 But to clear this by a known and received Instance. It is an undoubted Truth in Natural Philosophy, that 
(a) Sennert. Epit. nat. scient. l. 1. c. 5. p. 47. Edit. Oxon.  in qualibet viventium specie dantur intrinseci magnitudinis & parvitatis termini, extra quos Natura viventia nec producere nec conservare potest. And this according to the frequent Determination of the 
(b) Aristot. 1. Phys. c. 4. §. 36. & 2. de Anima, c. 4. §. 41. et 4. de gen. Animal. c. 4. & polit. 7. c. 4. Aquinas part. 3. q. 7. art. 12. ad primum. Suarez. in 3. part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 18. in expos. q. 7. art. 12. ad primum, p. 315.  great Philosopher. Suppose we then the greatest height of man in nature to be 4 Cubits, and the least to be 1, it will be impossible to find any man above 4 cubits high or under 1, but all will be either 4, or 3, or 2, or 1, or of some other intermediate Stature between one and four. So again suppose we any one degree of I●●●●sion for the height of the Habit, be it 8, or 7, or 5 degree of Intention: the intention of the Act that flows from the Habit, as the Effect from the Cause, will never exceed the degree of intention in the Habit; & so in this sense it will be exactly proportioned to the intention of the Habit. But what? will you thence conclude that because it cannot exceed, that therefore always the Act equals the intention of the Habit? Then, Sir, you may as well prove that all men are of an equal stature, because none is taller than four Cubits or shorter than one, the two extremes of Nature's Boundary.  
§. 10. And now, Sir, though it be a very sufficient answer to your Objection, to deny your Antecedent, yet, before I part with you, I promise you to prove, that the Acts of Christ's Grace are not, nay cannot always be exactly proportioned unto that of his habitual Grace, so as still to equal it in Intention.  
§ 11. And now, whereas in the close of this Paragraph you infer from the former Objection, and say, that it is not then so clear as the Doctor pretends, that the Testimony of the Schoolmen belongs not, even in mine own opinion, to the matter you had and have in hand; I must say, that I see not from whence this Inference is deduced.  
§. 12. For do the Schoolmen any where say that the Intention of Christ's actual Grace is exactly proportioned unto that of his habitual Grace? Nay do they any where say that Christ's actual Grace is not capable of Intention and Remission, as they do of his habitual? If Aquinas, in the places quoted by the Doctor, which is of your own Citation, denies only an increase of Christ's habitual Grace, and nothing else, as is plain to any that shall read the places you have cited (and do not you yourself quote them only for that very purpose, as has already been demonstrated from your own Papers?) is it not then as clear as the Sun at noon, that the Testimony of the Schoolmen by you cited belongs not even in your own opinion (as you have all along in those Papers expressed it; for of that the Doctor only spoke, and not of that which you should af●●● declare) to the matter the Doctor had and has in hand, which is ●●e gradual difference in the Acts of Grace in Christ, and not the gradual difference in the Habit, which he always did believe to be full and complete, still one and entirely the same, without possibility of addition or decrease?  
§. 13. And therefore this being so evident, in the second §. you are put to a new Shift. For thus you say, As for that place you quote out of Aquinas, it is plain that therein by the Effects of Wisdom and Grace are meant such as are outward, for those are most properly termed Works.  
§. 14. Now, Sir, I thought it had been you that had first quoted this place of Aquinas. And all that the Doctor had to do, was to show that even that Schoolman, whom you had cited to countenance your Use of Confutation, spoke nothing against him; for all that he said, or that you quoted him for, was only for asserting, that Christ could not possibly increase according to the Habit of Wisdom and Grace, which could not possibly concern him that spoke only of the gradual difference in respect of some Acts of Grace and holy Charity. And now, Sir, I pray tell me, does not Aquinas speak fully to this, and nothing else? And did not you therefore quote him in your Use of Confutation? And if this be so, then did not Doctor Hammond rightly infer that this Aquinas in this Testimony spoke nothing against him? To what purpose then do you divert the Reader to another thing, that was never in controversy between you and the Doctor? Whether the Effects of Wisdom in this place of Aquinas be either inward or outward, it is no whit material to the present debate. For Doctor Hammond sought no advantage by it. All that he had to prove was only this, That when Aquinas and the other Schoolmen, in the places by you quoted, denied all intensive growth of Grace and holy Charity in Christ, they were only to be understood of the Habit, as they had in express terms declared in the very places by you cited. As for the Acts that flow from those Habits, and their intensive perfection, whether they were all equal in themselves or gradually different, as it concerned them not in point of Argument there to determine, so they had said nothing at all concerning them; which was all the Doctor aimed at to demonstrate, and was sufficient to secure him from your Use of Confutation, that spoke clearly of another thing than he meant.  
§. 15. But for the present be it granted that the Doctor meant to make advantage by this latter Passage of Aquinas, and thence had concluded, that as Aquinas denied all increase in the habitual Grace of Christ, so he no ways denied, but asserted, a Capacity of Degrees among the Acts of Christ's Love of God, and the Expressions of it, as appears from this place of Aquinas by him cited in his answer ad 3 m. For does not Aquinas say there expressly, that as Christ increased in Age, so he did in Wisdom and Grace, because according to the process of his Age, he did more perfect, more wise and virtuous works, and that both in things belonging to God and Men also? And have we not already cleared it from Aquinas, that such as the outward Expressions of Grace are, such are also the inward Acts from whence they flow? and that the Schoolmen, in particular Aquinas, do generally maintain from Saint Gregory, that Probatio dilectionis is Exhibitio operis? If this be clear, as indeed it is, why then might not the Doctor say truly, that the Consent of the Schoolmen was no way denying (as most plain it is to any man that will read the places by you cited, because they speak not a word expressly of the inward Acts) but (rather) asserting (for the Doctor, though he positively there speaks, must be comparatively understood) a Capacity of Degrees among the Acts of Christ's Love of God and the Expressions? For that Aquinas speaks plainly of a gradual difference in the Expressions of Christ's Love, yourself do maintain; and that this by consequence implies a gradual difference in the inward Acts themselves whereof they were Expressions, we have also declared to be the opinion of Aquinas and other of the Schoolmen.  
§. 16. But how plain is it, I pray Sir, that in that place of Aquinas, by the Effects of Wisdom & Grace are meant such as are only outward? Is it because these are most properly termed works?  
§. 17. But now suppose, Sir, this reason be invalid. For what, I pray Sir, do you think of a Mathematical Demonstration? 
Arist l. 2. Eth. c. 6. §. 3. Our Refuters' Master Scheibler also calls a mental Syllogism 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a work. Vid. Scheibler. Metaph. l. 2. c. 10. n. 29. p. 703. already quoted.  Is it not truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, opus, a work? why else does Aristotle say, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; And yet I hope you will not say that it is external as it is an intellectual work, and purely form in the brain, and there subjected. For no necessity lies upon the Mathematician to express by words or writing the Demonstration he has framed. But perhaps you heard of the difference of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and that in artificial productions, such as properly are Poietical, the works as they are permanent and lasting, so they are commonly external. But does not Aquinas expressly say, that alio modo proficere quis potest secundum effectus, in quantum sc. aliquis sapientiora & virtuosiora opera facit, et sic Christus proficiebat sapientiâ & gratiâ sicut & aetate? And are not the inward Acts of Wisdom and Grace as truly, nay more properly, the Effects of the infused Habit of Wisdom and Grace then any outward Expressions of them? For the inward Acts that flow from this Habit, as the Effect from the Cause, are the proper natural elicit Acts of the Will, but the other are imperate, transient Acts. Besides I would desire our Refuter to tell me, how it is possible for any man to do sapientiora & virtuosiora opera, or perfectiora opera sapientiae & virtutis, where the inward Acts of Wisdom and Grace are supposed to be the same. For I must here remember him of his own distinction, and tell him, that the 
* Suppono ex prima 2 da q. 20, & 21. proprium & formale meritum esse in actu elicito Voluntatis; actus vero externos per se non addere me ritum actui Voluntatis, neque esse formaliter & intrinsece meritorios, sed solum per extrinsecam denominationem ab actu meritorio voluntatis, à quo imperantur, & extrinsece seu moraliter informantur, sicut etiam ab illo denominantur liberi & study. si. Suarez tom. 1. in 3. p. Thom. disp. 39 sect. 1. p. 540. col. 1. C. D. Vide Aquin. 1. 2. q. 20. art. 1. in corp. Cajetan. alios in loc.  outward works are not properly called works of Wisdom and Grace, but only by a Metonymy of the Effect, and by  denomination: it is the very same with the outward Expressions of Wisdom and Grace, as he says of the outward Expressions of Love, that are Love only by  Denomination and the Metonymy of the Effect. And therefore 
† Suarez in tert. part. Thom. q. 7. p. 315. col. 2. E. F. in Comment. ad loc. infra citat.  Suarez (who without doubt as well understood Aquinas as our Refuter or any man else) expounds him, in his Commentary on this very place, of an intensive growth of the inward Acts themselves of Wisdom and Grace, as shall in this Section be manifested in due place.  
§. 18. The truth is, Aquinas is no otherwise to be understood; and though the word (Opus a work) sometimes signifies that which is external, yet it is generally received in the Schools, that a Moral work or Action (such as these without doubt are of which Aquinas speaks in this place) consists both of the inward Act of the Will and the outward Performance, as the two essential Parts that concur to the being and constitution of a Moral Action. For this let Suarez speak; 
* Suarez tom. 1. in 1. part. Thom. disp. 38. sect. 4. p. 519. col. 2. A B.  Illud praeceptum, says he, directè cadit in ipsum Actum exteriorem, qui est objectum interioris Actus Voluntatis, qui etiam consequenter praecipitur, quatenus cum exteriori componit unum Actum moralem & liberum. But to make it more authentic, let us hear Aquinas himself. 
† Aquinas 1. 2. q. 20. art. 3. in corp. & respons. ad 1m. Vide Cajetan. in loc..  Dicendum, says he, quod, sicut supra dictum est, Actus interior Voluntatis & Actus exterior, prout considerantur in genere moris, sunt unus Actus. In Corp. And then in his Answer ad primum, Dicendum, says he, quod ratio illa probat, quod Actus interior & exterior sunt aiversi secundum genus naturae: sed tamen ex sic diversis constituitur unum in genere moris, ut supra dictum est. The place he refers to is in the 17th. Question art 4. in corp. Thus, Sicut autem in genere rerum naturalium, aliquod totum componitur ex materia & forma, ut homo ex anima & corpore, qui est unum Ens naturale, licet habeat multitudinem partium; ita etiam in actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter se habet ad actum superioris, in quantum inferior potentia agit in virtute superioris moventis ipsum, sic enim & actus moventis primi formaliter se habet ad actum instrumenti: unde patet, quod imperium & actus imperatus sunt unus actus humanus, sicut quoddam totum est unum, sed est secundum partes multa. To the same purpose also he speaks ibid. q. 18. art. 6. in Corp. To the same purpose Durand: 
* Durand. 2. Sent. didst 42. q. 1. B. C. p. 153. col. 1.  Actus interior & exterior sunt boni vel mali moraliter eâdem bonitate vel malitiâ secundum numerum, quae est in actu interiori subjectiuè, in exteriori autem objectiuè solum & extrinsecé. Quod patet dupliciter: primò, quia nulli actui convenit bonitas vel malitia moralis nisi voluntatio ut voluntarius est, dicente Augustino, quod peccatum adeo est voluntarium, quod si non fuerit voluntarium, non erit peccatum. Sed actui interiori competit esse voluntarium subjectiuè vel intrinsecè, velle enim in voluntate est: actui autem exteriori non competit esse voluntarium nisi objectiuè, actus enim exterior est objectum actus interioris voluntatis, & in hoc solum est voluntarius. Ergo, etc. Though much more might be added to this purpose from other Schoolmen, yet this is abundantly sufficient to clear the meaning of Aquinas; and Suarez. was not mistaken, when he understood him of a real increase in the inward Acts of Wisdom and Grace, which are the formal parts of a moral Work or Action, the exterior or outward Work being only the material part of it, according to Aquinas his own Doctrine.  
§. 19 But he has another Reason behind, that will strike it to a hair: for he adds, And besides, an intensive increase in the inward Acts of Wisdom and Grace would argue and presuppose an intensive increase in the very Habits themselves.  
§. 20. But are you indeed sure of this, good Mr. Refuter? How then shall the Author of the Mixture of Scholastical and Practical Divinity (I hope you know the man, Sir,) escape the lash of this Use of Confutation? For though Doctor Hammond never said that there was an intensive growth in any one Act of divine Grace in Christ, yet Mr. Jeanes himself has said it of many. All that the Doctor ever said was only this, that one Act of Divine Grace or holy Love and Charity in Christ, compared with another Act, was more high and intense; as the light of the Sun is more intense (though still equal in itself) than the light of a Candle, or a Star of the least magnitude, when both are compared together. He says that Christ's ardency in one Act of Prayer, to wit, in the Garden, was more intense then at another time in another Act, when there was not that occasion for the heightening this Ardency. He says that Christ's Love of us men was more high, more intense in that Act of his Dying for us, then in those other of his suffering Hunger, Poverty, Nakedness and the like. He never says that any one numerical Act was ever gradually intended.  
§. 21. But before I come to make this good from our Refuters own words, let me be so bold to ask him how he proves, that an intensive increase in the inward Acts of Wisdom and Grace would argue and presuppose an intensive increase in the very Habits themselves. I deny it, Sir, I deny it; and I beseech you let us have no more of your ipse dixit's for a proof. For I assure you, Sir, you have all along shown yourself a most bold obtruder of the crudest notions on the world, that I ever yet saw vented and published in print.  
§. 22. For are not, Sir, the inward Acts of the Habit of Grace elicit Acts of the Will? and are they not absolutely free, as the Will is, from whence they flow? Though it be not possible for any inward Act of the Will to be gradually more intense then the Habit is from whence it coeffectually with the Will flows; yet is not the Will free (ab intrinseco, I mean) and still naturally at Liberty, unless otherwise determined ab extrinseco by some superior command, to act how and in what manner it pleases? I have already demonstrated it, and therefore shall not trouble the Reader with nauseous repetitions, but shall recommend that piece of Art to our Refuter.  
§. 23. In short then, though in acquisite Habits, not yet perfect and complete, but only in fieri, an intensive increase in the praecedaneous Acts, that concur to the Efficiency and Perfection of the Habit, may argue and conclude an intensive increase in the very Habits themselves, and 
* Vide Arist. Eth. l. 2. c 2, & 3.  Aristotle hath proved it; yet in infused Habits, and Habits now perfectly acquired, and complete and full, the Intention and Remission of the Acts that are subsequent, and now flow from the Habit, as the Effect from the Cause, does not argue a proportionable increase or decrease in the Habit, but only an innocent exercise of the Liberty of the Will, if that be not by some superior Cause or Command limited to a constant equality of acting: which yet our Refuter has not undertaken to make good, in respect of all the internal Acts that flowed from that all-full and perfect Habit of Grace in our Blessed Lord.  
§. 24. But now here enters a Conqueror indeed. Nothing now but Ovations and Triumphs can serve the turn. And that it may be done to purpose, behold he sings his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 himself, in a loftier strain than Nero did when he returned from his Conquest of the Grecian Musicians. For in the 3d. §. he cries, Whereas you say in the close of Section the 28, that the consent of the Schoolmen is no ways denying, but asserting a Capacity of Degrees amongst the Acts of Christ's Love of God, i. e. of the inward Acts thereof, there will be little sense in your words in themselves, and less pertinency unto the matter in hand, unless your meaning be, as you elsewhere express yourself, that the inward Acts of Christ's Love of God were more intense at one time then at another. Well, Sir, it shall be granted you for ask, that it was the Doctor's meaning, that some inward Acts of Divine Charity in Christ were more high, more intense, at one time than others were at another. But what then? why, And if this be your meaning (says our Refuter) I must needs assume the boldness to tell you, that no such matter is visible unto me in any of the Schoolmen. But perhaps you may mean such Schoolmen, as such a Puisny as I never saw or heard of. However you cannot expect belief until you produce their Testimonies. And I shall entreat you to allege such as may be had in Paul's Churchyard; or at least in the Library at Oxford.  
§. 25. Lo there now. Is not this a bold challenge? and was ever the like heard of? What, in all the Schoolmen to be had in Paul's Churchyard, or in the great Bodly's Library? Not any old Motheaten and obscure Manuscript excepted? Was ever the like Schoolman heard of? Alas, Suarez, that man of so prodigious Judgement and Memory, though (as Strada testifies of him) he were able to quote any passage in Saint Austin, or his 
Vide Strad. Prolusiones, li. 1. prolus. 1. orator. p. 7.  own voluminous writings, both to page and column, and antecedents and subsequents, was but a shallow-brained man to our profound Undertaker. Methinks, Sir, you should have excepted those at least of the last Mart, whose names are scarce yet come to your study at Chedzoy. Sir, you are a man of a high Spirit, and Alexander the great, when with his handful of Macedons he undertook the conquest of the vast Persian Empire, was but a Fencer in comparison. What now can the world imagine after this notorious flourish, but that the Doctor is overcome? What not be able to allege any thing for his Cause out of any one Schoolman, to be had either in Paul's Churchyard or the Library at Oxford? Well, good Mr. Refuter, the world will say, you are a bold adventurous man, though you chance to be mistaken, and that you have Magnis tamen excidit ausis for your comfort; and a Gogmagog Leap and a Chedzoy challenge shall be both equally famous. Howsoever I thank you, Sir, you have afforded me field-room; I have liberty to range for the proof of the present Point in any of the Schoolmen either in Paul's Churchyard or the Library in Oxford. But, Sir, not to trouble you with hard names, or to be so uncharitable as to put you to the trouble and expense of going to Oxford or London to peruse Quotations, I shall search for this point, in debate betwixt you and the Doctor, only in such of the Schoolmen as my own and some friends private Studies have afforded me; and the Authors shall be such as you make the world believe that you have read, by the Quotations in your Margin.  
§. 26. The Point then to be proved is this, That the Schoolmen no ways deny, but assert a Capacity of Degrees amongst the inward Acts of the all-full, all-perfect Habit of Divine Grace in Christ. And then in doing this I shall in effect make good my promise, and prove to you, without any need of a new undertaking, (and yet in due place I shall further make good that engagement by rational Arguments) that the inward Acts of Christ's Grace are neither equal in themselves, nor can always be exactly proportioned unto that of his habitual Grace, so as still to equal it in intention.  
§. 27. And then withal I shall prove that Mr. Jeanes himself has asserted this very Doctrine, though Doctor Hammond has not. And therefore if it be true (as old Cato, or whosoever 
Vide Marci Zuerii Boxhornii Quaest. Roman. q. 14. p. 73, etc.  was the Author of those Distiches) and Turpe est doctori cum culpa redarguit ipsum, Mr. Jeanes himself will deserve this Use of Confutation. I shall begin with the last first.  
§. 28. And now because our Refuter has left me the liberty to allege any Schoolman to be had in Paul's Churchyard, or in the Library at Oxford, I shall begin with an Author without doubt to be had on every stall in Paul's Churchyard. It is no other than the Author of a Mixture of Scholastical Divinity with Practical, Mr. H. Jeanes of Chedzoy, an Author of our Refuters near Acquaintance: his words are these, pag. 249.  
2. As for his state of humiliation, the fullness of his knowledge in that was consistent 1. with the nescience of divers things. He knew not as man the day of Judgement, Mar. 13. 32, the barrenness of the figtree, Mar. 11. 13. 2. with increase in his knowledge; for in Luke 2. 52. he is said to increase in Wisdom in the same sense wherein he is said to increase in Stature, for they are both coupled together by Luke. But he increased in Stature really, indeed and in Truth, and not only in the opinion of men, and therefore also there was a Reality in the growth of his wisdom. For this also our Divines usually allege Luke 2. 40. And the Child grew and waxed strong in Spirit, filled with Wisdom, and the Grace of God was upon him. The word translated filled denoteth three things.  
1. The fullness that was in the Wisdom of Christ: He was full of wisdom.  
2. The dependency of it upon its Efficient. Christ as man was filled with Wisdom, to wit by God. The Humanity did not, could not fill itself, but was replenished by the Deity.  
3. We have here implied the Antecedent or Terminus à Quo of this his fullness, to wit, a denial of the antecession thereof, The Child grew, etc. and was filled with wisdom. He was filled then and not before. The manhood was always even from the very first moment of its conception full of Wisdom, according to the first Act (that is, in plain English, according to the Habit, which 
* Anima Christi neque in actu primo, seu Habitu, videt, etc. Suarez 3. p. Thom. tom. 1. q. 10. disp. 26. tect. 2. p. 336. col. 1. F.  Metaphysicians and Schoolmen call the first Act, in opposition to the Acts that issue from the Habit, which they call Actus secundi; for he cannot mean the Natural faculty of the Understanding by the first Act) and yet we see here, there is a fullness of Wisdom de novo accrued unto him, to wit of actual apprehension.  
And then Bellarmine is alleged, and confuted for speaking contrary to this Doctrine, tom. 1. de Christ. l. 4. c. 2.  
§. 29. And is this good Doctrine, Mr. Refuter? and does Bellarmine deserve to be opposed for speaking against it? How then comes Doctor Hammond under the lash of your Use of Confutation, that said not half so much as yourself do here? nay not the very shadow of that you after urge against Bellarmine out of Ames? For do not you expressly say he was ignorant or nescient of many things? particularly of the day of Judgement? Nay do you not say that he really, and not in the opinion of men only, did increase, and that there was a Reality in the growth of his Wisdom and Grace, as well as his Stature? Do you not say, in effect, that it is the usual doctrine of our Divines of the Reformation? Do you not add that there was implied a Terminus à quo of this his fullness, a denial of the antecession of it? He was filled then and not before. And do you not add, to clear your meaning, that though the Manhood was always according to the first Act or Habit filled with Wisdom, yet a fullness of Wisdom de novo (actual Wisdom you mean) accrued unto him, to wit in regard of actual apprehension?  
§. 30. And now, Sir, I pray tell me, has the Doctor said half so much of the intensive growth of the Acts of Divine Love in Christ, as you have done of the Acts of Wisdom, both which flow from the same One all-full, all-perfect Habit of Divine Grace, from whence, as their first spring and Ocean, flow as well the Acts of his Wisdom as his holy Love? For under this term of Habitual Grace the Schoolmen comprehend all Divine infused Perfections. Is it a Crime in Doctor Hammond, which is none in yourself? And shall Bellarmine be confuted for speaking contrary to this Doctrine, which you decry as erroneous in Doctor Hammond? Certainly either Doctor Hammond is innocent, or Bellarmine is unjustly confuted. What now, Sir, is become of your Reply in your second Paragraph? Is it so plain in the place quoted from Aquinas, as you say it is §. 2. that by the Effects of Wisdom and Grace are meant, not the inward, but the outward Acts; for these are most properly termed works? And besides, is it so plain, as we must take it upon your bare word, that an intensive increase in the inward Acts of Wisdom and Grace argue and presuppose an intensive increase in the very Habits themselves? What, is this good Doctrine because it is addressed against Doctor Hammond, the contrary to which was true reformed Doctrine in your former Writings, when addressed against Bellarmine? I see, Sir, you are as valiant as Samson, and you will pull the pillars of the house you lean on down about your ears, that so you may destroy your Adversary; and you will strike your sword through your own Bowels, that the point may reach the Doctor, as Ajax killed himself to strike the shadow of his enemy.  
§. 31. I know you will be apt to reply, that you speak not here of an infused, but acquisite Habit of knowledge; and that to this purpose you had before said, p. 248. §. 5. There was in him (Christ) an acquisite or experimental Knowledge, gotten and gained by experience, and for this they quote Heb. 5. 8. That 2. there was in his Knowledge a fullness of Degrees, and therefore his increase in Wisdom spoken of Luke 2. 52. is extensive only, and not intensive. That 3. there was in his Knowledge a fullness of Objects, etc.  
§. 32. But how you will reconcile this with that follows, I leave any man to judge. For you add, Some Schoolmen have affirmed that Christ as Man even in this life knew all creatures possible. Most of them affirm that he knew all things past, present, and to come. Becanus limits the extent of Christ's infused Knowledge only unto all things concerning Men, Angels, and himself. But we for our parts shall presume only to say, that he always knew all things in every Article of time, that then was necessary for our salvation and the execution of his office. Distinguish we must betwixt his state of Humiliation and Exaltation— etc.  
As for his state of Humiliation, the fullness of his knowledge in that was consistent 1. with the Nescience of divers things etc.— 2. with increase in his knowledge etc.— and that real not imaginary etc. as we have already quoted.  
§. 33. Secondly, how you will reconcile this distinction with that you have quoted out of Aims against Bellarmine, the Reader must judge. I shall quote as much of that Passage in Latin as is necessary, because you have already translated it into English. Concedimus (says Ames, as you have quoted it right) 
Amesii Bellar. enervat. l. 2. c. 1. Thes. 1. §. 3. p. 83.  Christum fuisse unctum Spiritu sapientiae ab ipsa conceptione, (frustra enim sophisticè occupatur hujus temporis negatio à Bellarmino, quasi esset nostra defensio:) sed sicut divina natura in ipso comprimebat aliquo modo, & occultavit suam majestatem in humiliatione Christi, ne exereret illam dignitatem, quae postea apparuit in Exaltatione; sic etiam cohibebatur Spiritus ille Sapientiae, ne statim in perfectione, sed paulatim proratione statûs Christi exereretur. 2. Spiritus sapientiae est ubi faculcas adest omnia percipiendi, quae sunt necessaria scitu prout occasio fert, quamvis omnia singularia actu non sciantur. 3. Sapientia illa quae intensiuè & Actu primo est perfecta potest actu secundo augeri per extensionem ad Objecta nova. And then in the 4th §. p. 84. he adds, illi ipsi qui aliquam sapientiam ab initio plenam & perfectam Christo tribuunt, fatentur tamen de scientia acquisita, quod Christus in illa non tantum profecit secundum effectum, nec tantum secundum experientiam, sed etiam Essentiam vel habitum ipsius Scientiae. Thom. in sum. part. 3. q. 12. a. 2. ubi ad Ob. 2. respondet etiam Scientiam Christi fuisse perfectam secundum tempus (hoc est pro ratione aetatis,) sed non simpliciter, & secundum naturam. Then in the 6th §. which you have taken notice of he adds, Ista dona de quibus agitur, non naturaliter & necessario sequebantur ex union, sed ex libera communicatione. Credibile est igitur potuisse certo consilio paulatim communicari. 2. Aequè credibile est, quaedam dona vel donorum gradus non fuisse in ipsa incarnatione effusos in animam Christi, ac in corpus non fuisse statim effusam gloriam illam quam in resurrectione accepit. And when §. 7. Bellarmine had urged, Sapientia & gratia Christo homini fuit naturalis; he answers, naturalia dona non solent hominibus Simul & Semel in summo gradu adesse. In the 12. §. when Bellarmine had said of this place Luk. 2. 40. & 52. sensus est, organa corporea magis repleta fuisse indies sapientiâ, & aptata ad opera excellentiora; he returns, hoc aliquid est, sed non totum. Evangelista enim affirmat eum corroboratum fuisse spiritu, non corpore solo, quatenus implebatur sapientiâ, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And when Bellarmine had again said, Replebatur sapientiâ acquisitâ per experimentum proprium Practicè earum rerum quas non ignorabat Theoricè; he replies, Neque in Scriptures, neque usquam alias reperitur haec phrasis, tali sensu, ut quis dicatur sapientiâ impleri, eo quod experitur illa quae antea perfecte sciebat. 2. Hac ratione crescebat in sapientia etiam post Resurrectionem, non minus quam in pueritia. Tunc enim expertus est, quid sit in coelum ascendere, sedere ad dextram Patris. And when Bellarmine had added, Proficiebat Christus sapientiâ & gratiâ opinione hominum, quibus indies magis aperiebat sapientiam suam; he replies, Verum hoc est de persona Christi, sed humana natura etiam humano more proficiebat. 2. Eodem sensu dicitur profecisse in Sapientia, quo proficiebat in Statura, conjunguntur enim à Luca: sed reverâ crescebat staturâ, non opinione solum. 3. Thomas ipse in Sum. p. 3. q. 12. a. 2. affirmat & probat ex hoc loco ipsum habitum sapientiae acquisitae suscepisse incrementa una cum Corporis aetate ac staturâ, cui etiam assentiuntur multi veterum, ut Medina in illum ostendit.  
§. 34. To Ames I shall adjoin Vorstius in his Antibellarminus, in this work not suspected; Christum juxta animam 
Conrade. Vorstii Antibellarm. contract. tom. 1. p. 36, 37.  suam seu naturam humanam, mox ab initio suae conceptionis, nondum vere & plene omniscium fuisse; sed quaedam vere & proprie in statu humilitatis ignorâsse, & multa progressu temporis, tum ex divina patefactione tum propriis experimentis, vere didicisse seu plenius cognovisse, adeoque sapientiâ & aliis id genus Spiritus S. donis verè profecisse, his fere argumentis probare solemus. Luc. 1. 52. At qui vere proficit gratiâ & sapientiâ, is majorem sapientiam & gratiam acquirit. Ergo, etc. Exceptio— de Christi profectu non vero— sed apparente Textui— contraria est, etc. 2 Joh. 8. sicut me docuit pater ita loquor. At qui docetur is revera discit, quia relata simul sunt naturâ. Sic Heb. 5. Neque hic de apparent, sed de vera docendi & discendi ratione agitur. And after he had quoted divers Texts for Christ's ignorance of the day of Judgement, Barren figtree etc. he concludes, Itaque non modo non absurdum, sed & probabile & rationi congruum est, Christum aliquando nonnulla vere ignorasse quae tamen omnia nunc exactè noverit, postquam sc. ad dextram Dei exaltatus est, & Judex omnium factus sit, etc. In the next Section he tells us, Rursus eundem Christum juxta animam humanam in statu humiliationis, nondum perfectè beatum, seu prorsus felicem & 
Vorst. Antibel. tom. 1. p. 36.  gloriosum, etc. his argumentis evidenter ostendimus, etc. And in his Answer to Bellarmine's arguments he tells us— Unctio 
Ibid. p. 39  Christi licet aliquatenus ab initio coeperit, non tamen uno Momento statim absoluta; sed suis quibusdam gradibus paulatim perfecta fuit, etc. And then he concludes, Denique distinguendum 
Ibid. p. 40.  est hoc loco prudenter inter Divinam sive increatam Christi scientiam, quam semper eandem habuit sine ulla mutatione, & humanam sive creatam, eamque duplicem, tum Infusam, tum Acquisitam sive experimentalem, h. e. proprio study & experimentis comparatam; secundum quam utram que anima Christi paulatim profecit, h. e. multa progressu temporis didicit ac plenius cognovit quae antea verè ignorabat, ut supra vidimus.  
§. 35. To these I shall add H. Grotius, a man whose excellent writings, especially in his book de Jure Belli & Pacis, show him as well skilled in the Schoolmen as in the Civil law, unless he deserves to be Outlawed for this kind of learning, because 
H. Grotius annotat. in nov. Testam. p. 637.  he is a Critic, as Doctor Hammond is. In his Annotations on Luk? 2. 40. he tells us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] Et hoc Actum, insolitum quidem, sed tamen Successivum, ut loquuntur, significat. Tale est & infra, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And upon Mark 13. 32. 
Idem ibid. p. 581.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] Videtur mihi, ni meliora docear, hic locus non impiè posse exponi hunc in modum, ut dicamus divinam Sapientiam menti humanae Christi Effectus suos impressisse pro temporum ratione. Nam quid aliud est, si verba non torquemus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Luc. 11. 52? Sicut igitur post resurrectionem accepit omnem potestatem, ita & omnem Scientiam. Ac nequis hanc sententiam ab antiquitate damnatam putet, satis admonere hos potest illud Ambrosii, Secundum carnem utique Sapientiâ Dei implebatur & Gratid. Pro tempore enim 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suae Jesu opus non erat scire diem universalis Judicii, quem Deus Pater latere voluit. Nec aliter sensisse Christianorum vetustissimos indicio est Irenaeus, qui lib. 2. cap. 48. & 49. Scientiam, inquit, dici illius Filius non erubuit referre ad Patrem, & dixit quod verum est. Item: & secundum agnitionem itaque praepositus esse Pater annunciatus est à Domino. Leontius de sectis: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So Grotius.  
§. 36. To these I shall adjoin, of our own, that most incomparable pair, the Judicious Hooker, and the profound Doctor Field, men as well skilled in School-learning as any whatsoever.  
§. 37. The first, in his Ecclesiastical Policy, treating of the fullness of habitual Grace in Christ, tells us, that though the Deity did replenish the humane nature of Christ with all perfection of Grace according to the Habit, yet it was with a gradual difference in respect of the Acts and Operations. We have already quoted the whole passage at large; but the words that 
Hooker Eccles. pol. l. 5. §. 54. p. 298.  concern the present purpose in short are these — The Deity of Christ— hath replenished (the humane nature) with all such Perfections as the same is any way apt to receive, at least according to the exigence of that oeconomy or service for which it pleased him in love to be made Man. For as the parts, degrees and offices of that mystical administration did require, which he voluntarily undertook, the Beams of Deity did in Operation always accordingly either restrain or enlarge themselves. Thus Hooker.  
§. 38. The second, Doctor Field, having declared the all-fulness of habitual Grace in Christ, quoad Essentiam & virtutem, intensiuè & extensiuè, he proceeds to unfold the present Difficulty.  
§. 39 The passage is too long to be here transcribed; and therefore I shall take only what is sufficient to the present purpose, and refer the Reader to the whole Discourse well worthy his perusal. Thus than He: How is it then, will some man say, that the Scripture pronounceth that he (Christ) increased in the Perfections of the mind, to wit, both in Grace and Wisdom, 
Luk. 2. 52.  as he grew in Stature of body? And here that question is usually proposed and handled, Whether Christ did truly and indeed profit and grow in Knowledge, as not knowing all things at the first, as he grew in Stature of body from weak beginnings, or only in the further manifestation of that Knowledge he had in like degree of Perfection from the beginning? For the clearing whereof we must note, That there were in Christ two kinds of Knowledge, the one Divine and Increate, the other Humane and Created, etc.— which the Schoolmen divide into two kinds; the one in verbo, the other in genere proprio; that is, the one in the eternal Word, wherein he seethe all things, the other, that whereby he seethe things in themselves, etc.— Concerning his Divine Knowledge, the Perfection of it was such and so infinite from all eternity, that it is impious once to think that he grew and increased in the same.  
Touching the Humane Knowledge he had of things in the eternal 
Vide apud Scotum §. 3. d. 14. q. 2. opinionem Henrici, quodlib. 5. q. 14. etc.  Word, and in the clear glass of the Divine Essence, it is most probably thought by some of excellent Learning, that though the soul of Christ had at the first, and brought with it into the world, a potential hability and aptness to see all things in God, so soon as it should convert itself to a distinct view of them; yet it did not Actually see all things in the divine Essence of God at once from the beginning, but afterwards in process of time: and for the other 
* Ibid. quaest. 4.  kind of Knowledge and apprehension of things which he had as beholding them in themselves, they think it was perfect in Habit from the first moment of his Incarnation, but not in actual apprehension, wherein he did truly increase and grow, as also in experimental Knowledge. For the humane Knowledge that was in Christ, was by conversion to those phantasmata and sensible representations of things, that from without are by the senses presented unto the soul, and was discursive; though not proceeding from things known to find out things altogether unknown, yet from things actually known to such as he knew but habitually only, and not actually, before. That the humane Knowledge of Christ had of things in themselves was discursive, and by conversion to the sensible representations of them from without, it is evident, in that all Perfections are received according to the condition and capacity of the receiver. Now the condition of the soul of Man in the state o● this life is, to know nothing but by conversion to the sensible appearances of the same, and that not only in respect of things Natural, but Mystical also, and Supernatural. Quia impossibile 
Dionys. citat. ab eod. Durand. ib. q. 3.  est (saith Dionysius Areopagita) nobis aliter superlucere radium divinum, nisi sacrorum velaminum varietate circumvelatum, Because it is impossible the beam of divine light should shine on us, unless it be veiled on every side with the variety of sacred veils.  
Thus than we see how it may be truly said that Christ grew in Wisdom and Knowledge as he did in Stature of body, non quoad habitus Essentiam & Extensionem, sed quoad actualem cognitionem & experimentum: that is, not in respect of the Essence or extension of the Habit, but of actual Knowledge and Experience. That which Thomas and others have, that Christ knew all things at first by an Insused Knowledge, and afterwards attained another kind of Knowledge which they named Acquisite, is not so fit (I pray mark it, good Mr. Refuter:) for two Forms or Qualities of one kind cannot be in the same Subject. Now as the sight which is in men naturally, and which once lost is restored again by miracle, is of the same nature and condition: so is that Knowledge of things that is by infusion, and that which is acquisite, howsoever these men seem to make of them two kinds. Wherefore passing by this conceit as not probable to conclude this point. 
* Alexand. de Hales part. 2. q. 89. mem. 2. With Doctor Field Scotus lib. 3. sent. d. 14. q. 3. agrees, and argues excellently against this opinion of Aquinas; quem vide: So also Durand. l. 3. Sent. d. 14. q. 4. Nay Suarez himself in this forsakes his great Master.  Even as touching the condition of Children, etc.— so likewise some think that the Babe Jesus, even in his humane Soul, had the Actual Knowledge of all things from the beginning, and that he grew only in experimental Knowledge: but there are other of as good judgement, and as great Learning, who think that, howsoever he had the habit of all Knowledge from the beginning, and brought it with him out of the womb; yet not the Act and Use of it: & this is all that either Luther or Calvin say, & yet we know how clamorously some inveigh against them, as if they had broached some damnable Heresy (And therefore, good Doctor, possess your soul in Patience; you see you have good Company to bear a share in this Calumny, and no worse men than Luther and Calvin have been traduced as broachers of some damnable Heresy, and denying the habitual fullness of Christ's Grace, as you have been in direct terms and by Consequence concluded, because they maintained a gradual difference in the Acts of divine Grace, and that successively and by degrees he received increase, though not in the Habit, yet in the Act and Use, and internal operation.) But some will say, If we grant that Christ in his humane Soul knew not all things from the beginning, but in process of time learned that which he actually knew not, we fasten on him the disgraceful note of Ignorance, and consequently b●ing him within the confines and compass of sin. Hereupon 
* Hug. de S. Victore de Sac. fide, l. 1. part 6. ca 26.  Hugo de S. Victore (let me add, and 
† Quamvis demus ex rebus quae in sola divina potentia continentur, & ab ea fieri possunt, aliquas non cognovisse, de quo infra dicetur; tamen illa carentia seu negatio scientiae non potest dici vera ignorantia, quia ignorantia non significat quamcunque negationem cognitionis, sed privationem illius scientiae quae inesse deberet juxta conditionem vel statum propriae naturae; ut non dicitur homo ignorans, eo quod careat scientiâ Angelicâ: cognoscere autem omnia possibilia fortasse. non pertinet ad statum vel conditionem intellectûs creati; & ita Christus nihil eorum nescivit seu ignoravit quae oportuit scire, consideratis dignitate personae, conditione naturae, & ratione statû● seu officii; & ita, simpliciter loquendo, ignorantiam non habuit, sed plenitudinem scientiae Suarez. 3. in par. Thom. disp. 24. sect. 3. p. 343. col 1. A B.  Suarez too) answereth, and showeth the folly of this silly Objection, peremptorily resolving, that Non omnis qui aliquid nescit, aut minus perfectè scit, statim ignorantiam habere seu in ignorantia esse dicendus est; quia ignorantia non dicitur, nisi tunc solum cum id quod ignorari non debuisset nescitur: that is, We must not say that every one that knoweth not a thing, or doth less perfectly know it, (I beseech you mark that, Sir, for the avoiding of after-cavils; for I know you will be apt to talk of an extensive augmentation to more Objects, and not an intensive growth) is ignorant or in ignorance, because ignorance is the not knowing of such things as should have been known. Neither is there any distinction more trivial— then that of Nescience and Ignorance: and therefore though some in the heat of their distempered passions (such as that of our Refuters was) lay a heavy imputation of horrible impiety upon Luther and Calvin, and others, (as our Refuter has done upon Doctor Hammond) for that they say there were some things which Christ in his humane soul did not actually know from the beginning; yet Maldonate (for their acquittance in this kind) confesseth— that many of the Ancient Fathers — denied not, but that there were some things which Christ in his humane nature did not actually always know— yea upon the 24. of Matthew he testifieth, 
Maldonat: in 2. Luc. 40.  that many of them said plainly that Christ as man knew not the day of Judgement. And though he labour to construe some 
Maldonat. in Matt. 24. 36.  of their words to another sense, yet Doctor Field shows that Origen saith, That Christ knew not the time of the day of Judgement 
Origen. tract. 3. in Matt.  when he said, Of that Day and hour knoweth no man, no not the Son; but that afterwards he knew it, when he was risen, and appointed of his Father King and Judge. He proves the same also of cyril, and this is confessed of both these by Jansenius; 
Cyrill. l. 9 Thesaur. c. 4. citat. à Jansenio Comment. ●n Evangel. concord. p: 123.  and that this is not the Heresy of the Agnöetae, as some ignorantly affirm. Field of the Church lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 435, 436, 437. edit. ult. Oxon.  
§. 40. And thus we have Protestants and Papists, Schoolmen and Fathers, men of all Ages and Interests and Judgements, Calvin and Luther, Ames and Grotius, Vorstius and Field, Henricus and Scotus, Durand and H. de S. Victore, Origen and Cyrill; I might add Ambrose and others, nay Maldonate, and Jansenius, and Hooker, and our very Refuter himself, acknowledging a gradual increase, though not in respect of the Habit, yet of the Acts of Christ's Knowledge and Wisdom and Grace, as well as Doctor Hammond.  
§. 41. But the spite of it is, that these are none of the Schoolmen as may be had either in Paul's Churchyard or the Library at Oxford. These are such Schoolmen as such a Puisny as our Refuter is perhaps never saw; and therefore he tells the Doctor, that he cannot expect belief, until he produce the Testimonies of those Schoolmen he is acquainted with, such as he has seen and heard of; and for this end he entreats him to allege such as may be had in Paul's Churchyard, or at least in the Library at Oxford.  
§. 42. Well, Sir, if there be no remedy, I shall now allege such as you have heard of and seen, unless your Margin and Text be stuffed with other men's Collections and Observations, such as without doubt are to be had in Paul's Churchyard and the Library at Oxford, and (unless you have very much deceived the world) even at Chedzoy too.  
§. 43. I shall begin then with the very acute Suarez (as you justly style him) in tertiam partem Thomae tom.. 1. one very frequent in your books. And it is in his Commentary on the 7 th'. Question, Art. 12. in his explication of Aquinas, Answer ad 3m m, the place now in Controversy. For whereas some doubt might be made whether Aquinas understood that place of Saint Luke, Puer autem crescebat sapientiâ, aetate & gratiâ, non de augmento ipsius Gratiae in se, sed in ostensione & manifestatione sua, not of an increase of Grace in itself, but only in the further manifestation of it to men, in respect of some outward work and more noble expressions, as Mr. Jeanes does here expound it; He says thus, Sed de priori dubitari potest, quia ita dicitur de Christo, crevisse in gratia sicut in aetate: sed in aetate non solum ostendit augmentum, sed verè comparavit illud (and does not Mr. Jeanes say the very same in his Treatise of Christ's habitual Grace, and conclude also with an) Ergo & in gratia; unde & itidem dicitur crevisse coram Deo & hominibus: Respondetur, Ideo D. Thomas hic non solum dixit crevisse ostendendo gratiam suam, (I pray mark it, good M. Refuter,) sed crevisse in effectibus (the inward Acts without doubt he means, as appears not only by the adversative particle said, but by what follows) faciendo excellentiora opera ipsius gratiae. Et hoc modo revera crescebat, quia re ipsa efficiebat opera Gratiae excellentiora, per quae licet ipse non fieret sanctior (in respect of the Habit he means) aut justior, (I pray mark it, Sir, and that he speaks not only of the Acts of Wisdom, but of Justice and Piety and holy Charity also) nec plus aliquid mereretur propter infinitam dignitatem personae suae, & quia à principio habuit gratiam consummatam (in regard of the Habit;) nihilo minus illa opera de se (I pray mark it against another time, when we shall have use of it) erant sufficientia ad augendam gratiam, quatenus novum meritum continebant. Suarez in 3. p. Thom. tom. 1. q. 7. art. 12. in Commentar. p. 315. col. 2. D. E. F.  
§. 44. But if this be not full enough to the present purpose, and for the clearing as well of Doctor Hammond as Aquinas; let us hear the same Suarez in the same book, q. 9 art. 1. disp. 24. sect. 2. p. 339. col. 2. F. & p. 340. col. 1. Dico secundò, in intellectu Christi fuit actus creatus intelligendi. Hanc etiam Conclusionem existimo de fide certam & definitam in 6. Synodo & aliis conciliis (how say you, Mr. Refuter?) quae definiunt, in Christo esse duas Operationes, Divinam & humanam: est enim universalis definitio, quae non minus locum habet in actu Intellectus quam Voluntatis (I pray, good Sir, mark it.) Item ex supra citatis generalibus locutionibus, quibus affirmant Concilia fuisse in Christo utramque naturam perfectam cum omnibus proprietatibus. Probatur autem breviter ex Scriptura ipsa. Isa. 11. 2. Requiescet super eum Spiritus Domini, Spiritus Sapientiae & Intellectus, Scientiae & Consilii; quod esse intelligendum de donis creatis, supra ostendimus ex Sanctis, qui magis de Actibus quam de Habitibus loquuntur. Item Lucas 2. 52. Proficiebat, inquit, sapientiâ & aetate & gratiâ apud Deum & homines. Nam licet hic locus à multis Sanctis exponatur de demonstratione & ostensione Sapientiae, sicut supra diximus agentes de gratia (he means the place now quoted) tamen, sicut etiam diximus hanc ostensionem non esse sine aliquo augmento in ipsis Actibus Gratiae (what can be more plainly said? and can an augmentation or increase in the Acts of Grace signify any thing else then an intensive growth and gradual increase in respect of their Perfection?) ita non suit sine Actibus Scientiae, praesertim quia insra, q. 12. referemus multos Patres qui locum hunc intelligunt de vero augmento Scientiae creatae (this is far higher you see, a gradual increase of the very Habit itself) per proprios Actus ejus. Ac denique ex contextu constat, sicut est sermo de aetate & gratia hominis, ita & de Scientia hominis, ut expresse docuit Ambrose lib. the Incarnate. Dom. Sacram c. 7. ultimò, ratio sumpta ex proprietate & perfectione humanae naturae (which is the Reason our Field grounds on) quae est in Christo hoc confirmat. Once more in the same book, q. 12. art. 4. disp. 30. sect. 2. p. 402. col. 2. F. Ad tertiam confirmationem respondetur, primum, illud Testimonium Lucae 2. à multis Patribus exponi eodem modo de Scientia sicut de Gratia, scil. de augmento quoad ostensionem & operationem, quos ante citavimus, q. 7. circa art. 12. And thus in one Suarez we have Fathers, and Councils, and Scripture, and Reason, let me add and Schoolmen too, to acquit Doctor Hammond, all attesting a Real increase and growth and gradual intention in the inward Acts as well as the outward Expressions of the Grace as well as the Knowledge of Christ.  
§. 46. But, say Suarez what he will for the explication of Aquinas, he has reason on his side, though but little Authority. For he adds as a most irrefragable demonstration; Besides, an intensive increase in the inward Acts of Wisdom and Grace would argue and presuppose an intensive increase in the very Habits themselves. His proof is, ipse dixit, we assert it; and that is sufficient against twenty Critics, were Grotius and Heinsius, nay Scaliger and Vossius, and Salmasius also, of the number.  
§. 47. But let his own acute Suarez supply him with a Use of Instruction. It is to be found in the selfsame book also, which shows the man had very ill luck in his reading, that he could observe nothing in that Author that any way made to the purpose. For when it had been objected, Christum Dominum per Actus harum virtutum quos exercebat, acquisivisse augmentum harum Virtutum; after he had first proved the falsehood of this Assertion, because Christus habuit hos Habitus à principio in gradu heroico, ut hic Aquinas, vel, ut clarius dicamus, in summa perfectione quam habere possunt, vel secundum legem Dei ordinariam, vel secundum naturalem capacitatem & facultatem hominis cui hi habitus & eorum actus accommodantur, vel denique in summa perfectione quam in ipso Christo unquam habituri sunt, quia hoc totum debitum erat unioni; and secondly had confirmed it, 1. quia modo in beatitudine non augentur high Habitus in Christo per Actus, sed à principio conceptionis fuit perfectè beatus, etc. sicut nunc est, 2. quia Christus non reddebatur promptior vel facilior ad operandum studiose per exercitium Actuum, ut eleganter dixerunt Basilius & Dionysius praecedent. disp. cit. sect. 3. quia omnis haec perfectio est naturalis Christo; He now in the third place makes answer to the Objection thus, Concedo ergo per hos actus, neque habitus neque augmentum eorundem Christum acquisivisse: quia Actus non intendit Habitum, nisi sit intensior illo; Christus antem à principio habuit Habitus vel magis vel aequè intensos quam futuri essent Actus. Suarez. in 3. p. Thom. q. 7. art. 4. disp. 19 sect. 2. pag. 300. col. 1. D. E. F.  
§. 48. Well then, in the Judgement of Suarez, and it is (as has been showed) demonstrable by Reason and Experience, where the Act gradually intends the Habit, there the Habit itself must be capable of increase, and the Act or Acts also that augment it must be more intense then the Habit they increase. But where the Habit is now in its utmost Perfection possible, and more, at least equally intense as any Act can be, there a gradual increase of the Act or Acts can never argue, much less presuppose, an intensive increase in the very Habits themselves. And this is the present case of the habitual perfection of Grace in Christ, which is at the utmost bounds in him both quoad Essentiam & virtutem, intensiuè & extensiuè, so that no Act how far soever intended can exceed it in height and gradual perfection, and very few equal it.  
§. 49. I shall cite but one Schoolman more, and it is only because he is an Author to be had in very many private Studies. For he that is acquainted with this kind of learning may by knowing one Schoolman, easily find out all the rest, because they go upon a Road in the Sums and the Sentences. And no meaner Author than Estius is the man. He in Sent. lib. 3. dist. 13. (where the Master treats of this Question) §. 3. p. 39 col. 2. thus says, Nonnullam quaestionem habet quomodo superiori doctrinae (de plenitudine habitualis Gratiae Christi) non sit contrarium quod ait Lucas c. 2. Jesum profecisse Sapientiâ & Aetate & Gratiâ apud Deum & apud homines, etc.— Ad hoc respondet Magister, Christum non in se, sed in aliis, Gratiâ & Sapientiâ profecisse: dum videlicet hominibus munera Gratiae & Sapientiae suae secundum processum aetatis magis magisque ostendebat, etc. Verum huic expositioni obstare videtur primum, quod Lucas in eodem ordine Gratiam & Sapientiam ponit cum aetate, in quibus Christum profecisse dicit; unde sicut revera atque in seipso profecit aetate, ita profecisse videtur & Gratiâ & Sapientiâ. Deinde quod non tantum apud homines, sed & apud Deum profecisse dicitur; quod certè non ita accipi potest, ut non in seipso, sed in oculis Dei intelligatur profecisse; cum idem sit coram Deo & in veritate quippiam fieri: unde omnino significatus videtur verus aliquis Christi in semetipso profectus.  
Quocirca planior est aliorum responsio, qui dicunt Christum revera quidem in Gratia & Sapientia profecisse, non tamen secundum Habitum, sed secundum Actum; quia licet Habitus Gratiae & Sapientiae ab initio conceptionis animae ejus infusus nullum acceperit incrementum, ab eo tamen Habitu per accessum aetatis majora subinde opera gratiae & sapientiae procedebant (they are the very words of Aquinas almost to which he refers in the margin §. 1.) Majora, inquam, (let our Refuter mark it well) secundum rei veritatem, ideoque non tantum coram hominibus, sed & apud Deum. Per hoc etiam fiebat ut & iste Habitus Gratiae & Sapientiae ejus, qui revera non crescebat, hominum tamen opinione cresceret. Atque hoc sensu non incommode accipi possunt verba Bedae à Magistro citata, quem sensum indicat etiam Damascenus, l. 3. c. 22, etc.— sunt autem qui memoratum Evangelii locum malunt intelligere de Sapientia acquisita, quam etiam secundum Habitum putant aetatis successu auctam in Christo. Sed obstat huic intellectui quod adjungitur de Gratia. Non enim credibile est Christum secundum aliquem Habitum acquisitum in Gratia profecisse, qua Deo & hominibus paulatim gratior evaderet. Et sane rectius Scientiae, quae rerum est humanarum, quam Sapientiae, quâ res divinae cognoscuntur, Habitus aliquis acquisitus videretur in Christo agnoscendus: quare retinenda est superior explicatio. Thus far Estius.  
To these I might add Scotus l. 3. Sent. dist. 14. q. 3. and all the rest of the Schoolmen that H. Cavellus has there quoted, Durand. lib. 3. Sent. d. 14. q. 3. ad 3. & q. 4. ad 1. Aquinas 3. par. q. 7. art. 12. ad 3m. & q. 12. art. 2. in corp. Cajetan and others in loc.. For the best Commentators in these places understand him as speaking of a real increase in the inward Acts of Wisdom and Grace. Aims in the place forequoted citys Bartholomeus Medina in tertiam partem Thom. q. 7. a. 12. & q. 10. a. 2. to this purpose. But  
O me probe lassum juvate! Posteri. It is time to cry out, Claudite jam rivos, pueri, sat prata biberunt. 
Virgil.  If this be not enough to edify our writer of Scholastical & Practical Divinity, it is not a Demonstration but a Miracle must do it.  
But before I part with this Section, I must advise him for the future to be more wary in his Challenges, and to let the Schoolmen in Paul's Church yard and the Library at Oxford alone, and rather to entreat the Doctor to allege the Testimonies only of such as are in the King of Spain's Library of Saint Laurence, or the Vatican at Rome, where the Inquisition will be sure to keep the Doctor or his Hyperaspist from discovering his ignorance or folly. And so farewell my bold Challenger, till we meet in the next Section. Only let me add for a close, that since I have showed that you have few or none of the Schoolmen on your side, which in your ecstatical passion and Galliardise you called all your own, that now I expect with the Grecian Madman (that in his pleasant dream called all the Ships in the haven his) you will cry out as he did (after his friends had cured him of his Frenzy) and declaim against my cruel Courtesy with a — pol me occidistis, amici, 
Horace.   
Non s●rvastis,— And so we go on to the next Section.   

SECTION 13.  
The Refuters Melancholy Fancy: his acknowledging the Doctor's Innocence. The Doctor constantly speaks of the gradual difference in some Acts of Charity, never of the Habit. The Refuters' Consequence hereupon. His Monstrous Syllogism examined. The Acts of Christ's Love were primariò & per se, and not only secundariò and per accidens, capable of Degrees: Demonstrated. Actions and Passions intended and remitted only in regard of their Terms. The Habits and Acts of Charity in Christ gradually only, and not specifically different from those in all other men. God by his extraordinary Power may create something greater and better than the habitual Grace of Christ. Asserted by Aquinas, Suarez, and many other Schoolmen, and the Refuter himself. The Acts of the Habit of Grace in Christ de facto gradually different in themselves, and from the Habit. The phrase, The love of God, variously taken in Scripture: Proved. In what sense the Doctor constantly takes it. Demonstrated. The greater good to be more intensely beloved. There is an Order in the Acts and Degrees of Love. Asserted by the Schools. Of the Order in the Love of Christ. The Habit of Love to God and our Neighbours one and the same Quality: Proved. God and our Neighbours not to be loved with the same equality and degree of Affection. Actus efficaces & inefficaces what they are. That they were in Christ. Of the gradual difference between them. Hence demonstratively proved, that the first great Law of Charity, Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart, etc. does not always oblige us pro hic & nunc to the highest degree and noblest Act of Divine Love. Of the gradual difference between the free and necessary Acts of Christ's Love. Phrase Actual Love distinguished. The Acts and operations of Grace in Christ were neither intensively nor extensively still commensurate with the Habit. Proved. In what sense Aquinas 's Rule urged by the Refuter holds.  
§. 1. THe Refuter in a Melancholy Contemplation (and Melancholy men are full of Fancy, they can create Armies and Castles in the Clouds, and Lions and Dragons in the Sielings of their Chambers; and the very Curtains of their Beds) was pleased to imagine that the Doctor was his Enemy, and to raise Objections against his Doctrine, a full year shall I say? or rather twelve at lest? before his Mixture had been published to the world. For the Passage in the Account; against which his Use of Confutation is addressed, is but a recapitulation of what had been more largely delivered to that purpose in the Treatise of Will-worship. And therefore the Doctor is willing to undeceive him in this misapprehension also. Thus than he.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
29. SEcondly, he will hear the Doctor's Objection, and consider of what weight it is.  
Objection? against what? against the fullness of habitual Grace in Christ? Sure never any was by me urged against it. And he cannot now think there was. The degrees of intenseness observable in the several Acts of Christ's Love, his praying more ardently at one time then another, was all that I concluded from that Text Luc. 22. 24. and that is nothing to his habitual Love.   
§. 2. Indeed the Case is so plain in itself, and the Doctor in this and the former Sections has so fully cleared his own Innocence, that now even our Refuter himself professes his readiness to believe it, though his Lucid intervals are very short. For thus he bespeaks the Doctor in the very entrance of his Reply.  

JEANES.  
THat this Objection was not intended by you against the fullness of Christ's habitual Grace, upon your Protestation I readily believe, but, that by consequence it reacheth it, I thus make good, etc.   
§. 3. But why upon your Protestation? why not rather upon your Proof and Reason? For has not the Doctor all along demonstrated that his words could be meant of nothing else but the degrees of actual Love? Nay is not this expressly and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 declared even in that very Passage you quarrel at? Are not these the very words, as you yourself have cited them even in your Use of Confutation, That sincere Love was capable of Degrees, was first showed in several men, at several times, in the several ranks of Angels, and at last in Christ himself, more ardent in one Act of Prayer then in another? But if the words of themselves were not so clear and plain, yet the whole subject matter of the Treatise of Will-worship, and the Account to Mr. Cawdrey, would abundantly declare it. For is not the whole business and design of those Discourses to show, that there be some Acts and Degrees of Piety and Devotion, that are not commanded by any particular Law, which yet are acceptable to God when performed? and that Love which is sincere in the Habit is capable of Degrees in the several Acts and exercise? And is it not for this, among other Instances, that this example of Christ's ardency in Prayer is produced by him? How then was it possible that you should be so strangely mistaken? And what Temptation could you have, to charge the Doctor with the denial of the habitual fullness of Christ's Grace, from a Passage that speaks expressly of the Act, a thing specifically distinct from it? However you are a courteous man to take the Doctor's word at last for his own meaning, that best knew it of any man in the world. But proceed in your new-begun ingenuity, and take your pen and write a Deleatur also to your Use of Confutation. For to what purpose serves that against Doctor Hammond, that never denied, or so much as questioned, your Doctrine of the Fullness of habitual Grace? If you believe as you profess, the world will count you unjust, unless you writ an Index expurgatorius unto your former Treatise. For the Schoolmen will tell you, non tollitur peccatum nisi restituatur ablatum; and you cannot otherwise restore the Doctor his good Name, of which you have, by your confession, so unjustly, so unworthily rob him.  
§. 4. But hold; we are too quick and nimble. For says he not, he will make the Charge good by Consequence, although the Doctor never meant it?  
Sure the man was born under a Mood-and-Figure-Planet; and Ferio was the Lord of his Ascendent: he is altogether for Consequences. But what's the Consequence? It is this to a word and syllable.  

JEANES.  
THat Objection which is urged against the perpetual all-fulness and perfection of Christ's actual Love, the inward Acts of his Love of God, strikes against the perpetual all-fulness and perfection of his habitual Love: because the degrees of the inward Acts of his Love of God are commensurate unto the degrees of his habitual Love. For they have no degrees at all, but secundariò, in regard of the Habit of his Love: but now this Objection is urged by you against the perpetual all-fulness and perfection of his actual Love, the inward Acts of his Love; for it is brought to prove, that the inward Acts of Christ's Love were more intense at one time then another, and a greater intention presupposeth a remission and imperfection, for intensio est eductio rei intensae de imperfecto ad perfectum, as Aquinas very often. Therefore this Objection strikes against the perpetual fullness and perfection of Christ's actual Love of God, and so consequently against the perpetual fullness and perfection of his habitual Love.   
§. 5. What a monstrous Syllogism is here? Like the Trojan horse, it has Troops of Arguments and Proofs in the bowels of it: and the Major, Minor and Conclusion are not bare Propositions, but Syllogisms themselves. It is not a single Man of war, but a Spanish halfmoon, an invincible Armado linked and coupled together.  
O patria! O Diuûm domus Ilium! & inclyta bello  
Moenia Dardanidûm!—  
Now or never Troy is 
Virgil.  taken, and Doctor Hammond confuted.  
§. 6. But, Sir, there is nothing proved all this while, but only by your own venerable authority. For what if the whole be no other than a Sophism 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the Doctor's Assertion will by no means infer your Conclusion? For proof of it, I first deny your Major; there is no consequence at all in it: for we have already demonstrated, that Acts which issue from Habits that are seated in the Will are free, and not necessary effects of the Will from whence they flow, and therefore may be gradually different in themselves, where the Habit continues gradually one and the same. We have showed you also from Reason and Scripture, and Authority of Protestants and Papists, as learned as any, from Schoolmen and Fathers also, that there was a gradual difference in some Acts of Christ's Wisdom and Grace, and that they did successively increase in Perfection, as he himself did in Stature, though the Infused Habit of Wisdom and Grace were in him always at the utmost height, both intensively and extensively.  
§. 7. But what are all the Fathers and Schoolmen that are to be had in Paul's Churchyard or in the Library at Oxford to the purpose, if he can prove his Major? which thus he does. If the degrees of the inward Acts of Christ's Love are commensurate unto the degrees of his habitual Love, than whosoever says the Acts are not always intensively perfect, says also by consequence that the. Habit is not always intensively perfect. But the degrees, etc. Ergo.  
§. 8. Here, Sir, you are in danger of a double Sophism. For first, you prove Ignotum per ignotius, aut aliquid saltem aeque ignotum, because it is as doubtful (in the sense you should mean, if you speak to the present purpose) whether the degrees of the inward Acts of Christ's Love are so commensurate unto the degrees of his habitual Love, as still to equal them in intensive perfection; and to assert it without Proof is Sophisma 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Secondly, if you conclude that the Acts and Habits are commensurate in every thing, because they are commensurate in this, that the Act can never exceed in Perfection the Habit from whence it effectively flows, (as you do all along in this Discourse, but more particularly in your first Argument, p. 25, 26.) you most sophistically argue à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. For though the Acts of Christ's Love may be full and perfect in suo genere, yet they may not be all equal in themselves, and with the Habit: and though they may and must be commensurate with the Habit, as not to exceed it in perfection, because they are the effects of the Habit; yet they may not, for all that, still equal the gradual perfection of the Habit, because the Habit is not a necessary, but a voluntary cause, and the Acts that flow from it are all Acts of the Will. And consequently this way of proof will be no other than a plain Sophism 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thus, Because the Act 
Arist. l. 1. Soph Elen. h. c. 4.  is in some respect commensurate with the Habit, Ergo, it must alsolutely and in every respect be commensurate with it: just as if I should argue, Mr. Jeanes has read some Passages in Suarez and Durand, therefore he is skilled sufficiently to challenge Doctor Hammond in all the Schoolmen in Paul's Churchyard, or the Library in Oxford.  
§. 9 But leave Sophisms and Elenches to Ignatius his Conclave and the Aequivocating Jesuits; he has proved this assertion also.  
§. 10. But, Sir, what is that which you have proved? Is it this, That all the inward Acts of Christ's Love are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, simpliciter, absolutely and in every respect commensurate with the Perfection of the Habit? Show me this, Sir, and I have done. For if you make not this good, but speak only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, secundum quid, of a commensuration of the Habit and the Acts in some kind and sort, all is nothing to the purpose. But how and where is this proof? Why, all lies dormant in the Bowels of this monstrous Major.— illos patefactus ad aur as  
Reddit equus, laetique cavo se robore promunt  
Tisandrus Sthenelusque deuces, & dirus Ulysses.  
And 
Virg. Aeneid. 2.  this last is a subtle one indeed, it can be no other than Ulysses himself for cunning. Thus it is. If the inward Acts of Christ's Love have no Degrees at all, but secundariò in regard of the Habit of Love, than the inward Acts of his Love of God are commensurate unto the degrees of his habitual Love. But they have no Degrees at all, etc. Ergo. Lo now; here is a For, able to prove any Because whatsoever. It is able to make good contradictions, and make the two extremes of the North and Southern Poles to meet. They are commensurate in gradual perfection with the Habit, which is as high and intensely perfect as can possibly be imagined, beyond all the perfections of all men and Angels, though united and joined together; and consequently they are ab intrinseco all full and intensively perfect. And yet in the Antecedent that is brought for a proof of it it is said, that they have no Degrees at all in themselves, but secundariò in regard of the Habit, which is only ab extrinseco. Sir, you have an admirable faculty in discourse. For what with your ipse dixit's, and your proving of one Contradictory by another, you are able to demonstrate any thing, and confute not only Doctor Hammond, but the whole world of Critics. For if the Acts have no Degrees at all, but only secundariò in regard of the Habit, how then are they commensurate to the Habit in Degrees, that is gradually perfect in itself? And thus you see your Sequel wants another For to make it good; and so it will be, Sir, in such sequels, though you go on in infinitum. Where one unknown is proved by another, there the proofs must still be endless.  
§. 11. And therefore, to proceed on to examine your For, upon which the whole strength of your Proof depends, How know you that the Acts of Christ's Love have no Degrees, but secundariò in regard of the Habit of his Love? 1. Is it because being commensurate with the Habit, they are always in one height and indivisible perfection? But then this, as it is no other than Petitio principii, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so if it were granted, it must prove that they have all gradual perfection in them, as the Habit has. 2. Or is it, that they have no Degrees at all, but secundariò in regard of the Habit of love, because the Acts effectively flow from the Habit? But will you therefore conclude that a hot Iron has no Degrees of Heat in it, but only secundariò in regard of the Fire, because it's Heat proceeds not from itself, but only from the Fire? Has it not Heat in itself, because not from itself? Sir, you had been an excellent man to have preached in old time before a Trial by fire Ordeal. But then let me tell you, Sir, that as your Minor in this sense is false, so the whole is a Sophism à non causa pro causa. For as the Iron is formally and so gradually hot in itself, though effectively it be not the cause of its own Heat; so the Acts of Christ's Love are formally Love, and have a gradual perfection in them, though the Acts all proceed from the Habit of Divine Love. 3. Or is it, that they have no Degrees at all but only secundariò, because Actions (among which you range the immanent Acts of Love) are only thus intended? If this be your meaning, I must tell you that you are guilty of a double Mistake. For first, we have showed that the immanent Acts of Love are not only Actions, but Qualities, that are called by the same common name, of which alone the Doctor speaks. And secondly, I must tell you that Actions (supposing the immanent Acts of Love were purely of that number) are not said to be thus intended in regard of the Efficient, but only in regard of their Terms or Qualities; as shall instantly be showed both from Suarez and Scheibler. For here we take not Intention effectiuè, but formaliter; which distinction you may also learn from Scheibler. l. 2. Metaphys. c. 8. §. 191.  
§. 12. And therefore now to let the world see your profound skill in Metaphysics, I shall demonstrate that the Acts of Christ's Love were primariò & per se, and not only secundariò and per accidens, capable of Degrees. And thus I perform it. All Qualities whose Essence consists not in an indivisible point, but in a Latitude, are primariò, per se & essentialiter capable of Degrees: But all Habits and Acts that effectively flow from them are Qualities whose Essence consists not in an indivisible point, but in a Latitude: Ergo. The Major is evident in itself; for Intensio propriè sumitur pro Latitudine, seu modo Entitatis formae intensibilis & remissibilis, ratione cujus est capax illius intensionis & remissionis. So Suarez Metaph. tom. 2. disp. 46. p. 380. col. 1. A. So again, Dicendum est, 1ᵒ. Qualitatem intensibilem non esse in Entitate sua indivisibilem, sed habere aliquam Latitudinem partium ratione cujus potest interdum secundum se totam esse in Subjecto, interdum secundum partem majorem vel minorem: Et quia talis Qualitas naturaliter non est in rerum natura, nisi etiam insit, ideo talis est etiam illa Entitas ut aliquando possit tota esse in rerum natura, aliquando verò secundum partem; & inde provenit ut possit esse intensior & remissior, & ut possit magis & minus afficere Subjectum. It is his first Conclusion in his resolution of the Question, and there by him demonstrated. Ibid. sect. 1. §. 24. p. 486. Let the same Suarez also demonstrate the truth of the Minor, thus. Quod verò (haec proprietas seu latitudo intensiva) sit in prima & tertia specie, (Qualitatis,) satis constat inductione in Habitibus & Actibus animae, & in primis Qualitatibus Elementorum, ut in Coloribus & aliis hujusmodi. Ratio verò reddi potest, quia in his Qualitatibus inveniuntur omnia quae ad hanc Latitudinem intensivam sufficerè possunt. Nam omnes illae fiunt per proprias actiones absque diminutione naturali; vel si aliquae earum manent naturaliter ab aliquibus formis, ut calor à forma ignis, frigus à forma aquae, habent tamen contrarium, à quo impediri possunt & minui, & per se etiam seu per propriam actionem fieri possunt. Rursus hae qualitates ex vi suarum rationum essentialium includunt indivisibilitatem repugnantem huic Latitudini intensivae, & alioqui habent proprias Entitates accidentales, in quibus possunt esse capaces hujus Latitudinis: Qui discursus probat optimè, si in aliquo genere dantur qualitates intensibiles, ut revera dantur, in his maximè dari. Suarez. ibid. sect. 2. §. 13. p. 490. But more particularly to the present purpose, thus; Et in qualitatibus, & subjectis spiritualibus, in quibus non est extensio partium, est id evidentius, quia etiam in illis qualitas recipit hoc augmentum (intensivum,) ut amor vel voluptas circa idem Objectum: unde etiam ex Principiis fidei certa redditur haec veritas, nam Gratia, Charitas & Fides augeri & perfici possunt in eodem subjecto indivisibili, etiam absque aliqua extensione ex parte objecti: illud ergo augmentum non potest esse nisi intensivum. Suarez. ibid. sect. 1. §. 1. pa. 380. With Suarez agrees your own Scheibler. l. 2. Metap. c. 8. art. 2. punct. 1, 2, 3, 4. Vid. §. 208.  
§. 13. 1. If you say (as formerly) that these immanent Acts are not Qualities, but Actions; to this I must reply, That as I have formerly demonstrated the falsehood of this your 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so were it granted unto you, it would not profit in the present case. For suscipere magis & minus non convenit actioni & passioni nisi ratione suitermini, quatenus in illo est latitudo intensionis. So Suarez, ibid. sect. 2. §. 2. and your own Scheibler says that in Relatione, Actione & Passione datur intensio & remissio secundariò, & mediante qualitate, ut docet Arist. l. Categ. c. 9 And that there might be no doubt what Quality 
Vid. Burgersdic. Log. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 36. Theor. 23. §. 1.  he means, he adds, Idem est in actionibus & passionibus: Ita frigefactio & calefactio dicuntur intensiores vel remissiores ratione Terminorum quos producunt, Caloris sc. vel Frigoris; & sic in aliis. Scheibler, ibid. c. 8. art. 2. punct. 4. §. 209. Since therefore Actions and Passions are intended only by reason of their Terms, suppose the Acts of Christ's Love were Actions, not Qualities, they must be intended secundariò only ratione Terminorum, and not in regard of the Habit of Love from whence they flow, as the Effect from the Cause and Principle.  
§. 14. 2. If you say that though the Acts of Grace in all other men are per se capable of intention and remission, but it is otherwise in Christ, in whom by virtue of the hypostatical union, and the good pleasure of God, both the Habits and all the Acts of Grace were in summo, in that absolute and indivisible height, that they could be neither increased nor diminished; I answer that although this were all granted, yet it does no whit help you here. For the Habits and Acts of Divine Charity in Christ were not specifically different in him from those in all other men, but gradually only. And therefore since magis and minus non variant speciem, & quod convenit speciei convenit omni individuo sub specie contento, it necessarily follows, that as the Habits and Acts of Divine Charity in all other men are essentially & per se capable of Intention and Remission, it must be so also in Christ, since in him they are not specifically, but only gradually different from the rest, and that it is by accident only (I speak in respect of the infused Graces and Acts themselves) that they be not capable of being gradually more or less perfect. And then further let me tell you, that though the Schoolmen do all generally hold that the habitual Grace of Christ, (in particular the infused Habit of Charity) though it were as high as possibly it could be, even in the person of Christ, quoad potentiam ordinariam; yet being but a created, because an infused, Grace, and consequently in its own nature sinite, therefore virtus divina potest facere (per potentiam scil. extraordinari●m) aliquid 
Aquin p. 3. q. q. n. 12. ad 2.  majus & melius quam sit habitualis Gratia Christi. You know it is Aquinas, & in this he is generally approved and followed by the Schoolmen. Dicendum est igitur, says Suarez (as 
Quanta sit haec perfectio in Anima Christi eodem modo judicandum est sicut supra in simili dubio de perfectione. Gratiae respondimus: est enim summa, quae de potentia ordinaria esse potest, quamvis de potentia absoluta possit esse major; ut hîc etiam circa articulum quartum cum D. Thoma notatum est, & magis ex sequenti disputatione patebit. Suarez. tom. 1. in 3. part. Thom. disp. 26. p. 360. col. 3. C. Vide ibid. sect. 2. p. 367. col. 2. A. B.  we have formerly noted) quanquam Christi gratia fuerit tam intensa, ut juxta ordinem divinae sapientiae nulla intensior esse potuerit, de potentia tamen Dei absoluta potuisse fi●ri intensior●m, tam in ipsa anima Christi, quam in Angelo, vel in alia anima. And for this he there citys Aquinas, Lombard, Gabriel Biel, Capreolus, Aureolus, Gregor. Ariminens. and Ocham. Suarez in 3. part. Thom. q. 7. art. 13. disp. 22. sect. 2 p. 322. col. 1. C. & 2. A. B. C. where he does not barely dictate, but prove it. Nay our Refuter himself acknowledges that there is more moderation in this opinion then in that of their Adversaries. Mixture of Scholast. and Pract. Divinity, pag. 231, 232.  
§. 15. 3. But then as for the Acts of this Divine Grace, it is so far that they all should be in the same perfect height as the Habit was, that we have seen it proved from the Schoolmen and others, that Christ did gradually increase in the perfection of the Acts of Wisdom and Grace, as he did in Stature, and our Refuter is of the number.  
§. 16. But because he is still harping upon Consequences, and that I may not only free the Doctor from guilt but from all suspicion of it, I shall now undertake to demonstrate, That the Acts of the All-perfect Habit of Divine Grace in Christ, or holy Charity, were not only de facto gradually different in themselves, and so not at all commensurate with the height and intensive perfection of the Habit, but also that they must of necessity be gradually different from one another.  
§. 17. And now, because our Refuter seeks for Refuge under 
Vide Crellii Ethic. Christian. infra citat.  the Ambiguity of this phrase, the Love of God, and to bring the debate between the Doctor and him to a final issue, it will be necessary in the first place to distinguish that Term, that so every thing may be clear before us in the present Debate, and the Truth and the Doctor's Innocence may be evidenced to the world, and the Sophisms and mistakes of this Refuter be discovered.  
§. 18. First then, this phrase, the Love of God, (which the Refuter always construes in a different sense from the Doctor, and only for his advantage) may be, and is commonly taken in a threefold sense. First more generally, as it signifies the Divine Grace of holy Charity, as the Schools call it from Saint Paul 1 Cor. 13, the greatest of the three Theological Graces, and that alone which never faileth, that Grace which the Apostle there most excellently describes, and the Schoolmen treat of l. 3. Sent. d. 27. & 2. 2. q. 23, 24, 25, 26, etc. the Grace that in its latitude or amplitude contains the whole duty of man towards God and our Neighbours, whatsoever is good and excellent in him. And therefore the Master of the Sentences defines 
P. Lombard. 3. Sent. didst. 25. B. Vid. Aquin 2. 2 q. 25 art. 1.  it thus, Charitas est dilectio quâ diligitur Deus propter se, & proximus propter Deum, vel in Deo; and it is approved by all his Scholars, for aught that I can find to the contrary.  
§. 19 Secondly, more specially for Piety and Holiness and Devotion towards God, and the Duties of the first Table.  
§. 20. Thirdly, most strictly for that most sublime and perfect Love, immediately terminated and concentred in God the only Good, in which alone all the Acts of Piety and Charity are founded, and from whence alone they stream and flow. This is that which Aquinas frequently calls Charitas ut finis, the other 
Vid. Aquin. 2. 2 q. 44. art. 3. in Corp. Aquin. 2. 2. q. 44. art. 1. in corp. Aquin. ibid. art. 3. ad 2.  he calls Charitas propter finem. Finis, says he, spiritualis vitae est ut homo uniatur Deo, quod fit per Charitatem, & ad hoc ordinantur, sicut ad Finem, omnia quae pertinent ad spiritualem vitam: unde Apostolus dicit, 1 Tim. 1. Finis praecepti Charitas est de cord puro, & conscientia bona, & fide non ficta, etc. And now because, as the same Aquinas, that alii actus Charitatis consequuntur ex actu dilectionis, sicut effectus ex causa, hence is it that by a Synecdoche generis, or a Metonymy of the Efficient, (Tropes familiar in all Writers) all the Acts of Piety and Mercy and Charity and Virtue are called the Love of God, because they flow from it.  
§. 21. And now that this is no new-coined distinction, invented on purpose to salve the present sore, will appear from the Scriptures themselves, where we have it in express terms.  
§. 22. For though to English ears this phrase, The Love of God, seems especially to import the prime and more principal Love, that has God for its immediate Object; yet in Scripture-phrase 
Tertull. count. Martion. l. 4. c: 27. p. 548. A. B. ex edit. Rigalt. Vide Bezae major. Annot. in loc. Luc. Brugens. tom. 2. in Evangel. p 802. Piscator. Maldonat. Theophylact. alios in loc.  it frequently does not. And therefore says our Saviour, as we find it S. Luke 11. 42. Woe unto you Pharisees, for ye tithe Mint and Rue, and all manner of herbs, and pass over Judgement, and the Love of God; these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone. It is in the Original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Judicium & charitatem Dei. So Beza, and the Vulgar Latin. But in the vulgata vetus, in use in Tertullia's days, it is vocationem & dilectionem Dei, and accordingly we translate it the Love of God. The true meaning of the place Tolet, methinks, has fully reached— Majora mandata praeteritis, nempe Judicium & Charitatem: Judicium quidem, nocendo aliis, & rapiendo aliena, contra leges Justitiae; Charitatem verò, non miserendo proximi, nec eleemosynam pauperi conferendo. Non solum ergo rapinas & injustitias non recompensatis eleemosynis, sed & illas perpetratis contra judicium, & eleemosynas non facitis contra charitatem, quae sunt majoris momenti quam decimas dare tales. Addit (Dei) quia charitate Deus diligendus est, & proximus. Pharisaei autem nec Deum nec proximum diligebant: qui enim non diligit proximum, non diligit Deum, 1 Jo. 3. Qui viderit fratrem suum necessitatem habere, & clauserit viscera sua ab eo, quomodo Charitas Dei manet in illo? 1 Jo. 4. Qui non diligit fratrem quem videt, quomodo Deum quem non videt diligere potest? Tolet. in Luc. 11. 42. p. 690. in Commentar. I know the place is otherwise expounded by 
* Vide Erasm. in loc.. H. Grot. in Annot. ad Matth. 23 23.  divers, and we have no need of doubtful places. S. John, the beloved Disciple, whose argument is Charity and the Love of God, whose Text and Sermons were, as Ecclesiastical Story testifies, nothing else but this, does in one short Epistle afford us instances sufficient beyond all exception. 1. Ep. John 2. 5. But whoso keepeth his word, in him verily is the Love of God (Charity, as Saint Paul, or Love, as the same Apostle and Saint John himself often indefinitely and generally style it) perfected. Hereby 
1 Cor. 13. Rom. 13 10. Gal. 5. 14. 1 Tim. 1. 5, 14.  know we that we are in him. It is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So again 1 Joh. 3. 17. But whoso hath this world's good, and seethe his Brother hath need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; how dwelleth the Love of God in him? So again 1 Joh. 4 20. If a man say, I love God, and hateth his Brother, he is a liar: for he that loveth not his Brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen? And therefore in the close of his Epistle, 1. 5. vers. 3▪ thus he describes the Love of God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For this is the Love of God, that we keep his Commandments, and his Commandments are not grievous. Plain then it is, that in Scripture-language the Love of God is put for the Grace of divine Charity in general, extending itself to that Love that is immediately centred on God himself, and on our neighbours for God's sake. This is that Love which the Apostle tells us is the fulfilling of the Law, 
Rom. 13. 10. 1 Tim. 1. 5.  and the end of the Commandment.  
§. 23. And therefore sure it can be no tergiversation, if we say that Doctor Hammond does take this phrase, the Love of God, or sincere Love, wheresoever he uses it, as Saint John does, in the general notion for the Grace of Divine Charity and holy Love; which to distinguish from all other Loves, he calls the Love of God: 1. because he is the giver and the alone infuser of it, by his holy spirit; and 2ly, because he also is the prime and principal Object of it, and for whose sake alone we love our Neighbours; and 3ly, because this alone is the root on which all the other parts and branches of holy Charity are grounded, and from whence they all spring, and without which they are nothing worth.  
§. 24. And that I shall prove by such clear Arguments as the Doctor's writings afford.  
If then, as the great Philosopher tells us, that Words are but the images and expressions of the Thoughts of the mind, and 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. l. 1. de interpretatione, c. 1. §. 1.  Writings are the pictures and indications of Words, then, if the meaning of any word be questioned as doubtful, the best way to unfold it is, by considering the subject matter of the Discourse, and the scope and purpose of it.  
§. 25. And now I doubt not but it will appear obvious to the most ordinary capacity, that the subject matter of the Doctor's discourse could not possibly tempt him to make use of this phrase, the Love of God, in any other sense then what we have given of it; and that the cause he undertook to defend had utterly been betrayed and lost, not supported, by the meaning that the Refuter puts upon it. For the main business and scope of the Treatise of Will-worship, and the defence of it against Mr. Cawdrey, is only to show, that there be certain Degrees and Acts of Piety and Charity and Virtue, that no particular law enjoines, which yet God accepts of as freewill Offerings from the Christian when performed. For this we shall not need further proof than what one short Passage affords, wherein the Doctor has briefly summed up his Opinion in both Treatises so largely insisted on. It is in his Preface to the Reader prefixed to the Account, §. 5. And besides these there is somewhat of more sublime consideration (on occasion of that of Will-worship) the freewill Offerings, which will very well become a Christian to bring to Christ, rewardable in a high degree, though they are not under any express precept; such are all the Charities and Devotions, and Heroical Christian Practices, which shall all not only be degraded but defamed, if every thing be concluded criminous which is not necessary, if all uncommanded Practice be unlawful.  
§. 26. And now, though this in the general might suffice to clear the Doctor's meaning from any possible mistake unless to the wilfully perverse, yet because the remainder of the Refuters Reply is wholly built upon this abused Notion of the Phrase, and what he calls his threefold Demonstration (so industriously placed in the Frontispiece of his Pamphlet, to amuse vulgar Readers, and those that look not beyond Titles) has no other Basis and Foundation, I shall, with the Readers patience, descend to a more particular confirmation of it.  
§. 27. The task, I confess, would be endlessly tedious to search for Proofs, as they lie severally dispersed in those Treatises. And therefore for brevity sake I shall confine myself to that very Section in the Account that first occasioned the Use of Confutation.  
§. 28. In the very first §. of that Section the Doctor tells us, 
Doctor Hammond's Account to Mr. Cawdrey's Triplex Diatribe, cap. 6. sect. 9 p. 221.  that those large inclusive words, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, etc. denoted only two things: 1. the sincerity of this Love of God, as opposed to partial divided Love (to which I now add, for further explication, that what we do according to the precepts of God's Law, we do out of Love towards God, not hypocritically, or as by constraint;) and 2ly, not admitting any thing else into competition with him, this sincere Love of God mean while being capable of Degrees: so that it is very possible for two men to love God with all the heart, and yet one to love him more intensely than another, (as was exemplifyed among the very Angels;) nay for the same person which so loves him, to love him, and express that Love, more intensely at one time then another; as appeared by the example of Christ, Luc. 22. 44. To this I shall subjoin the very words upon which the Refuter grounds his Charge in the Use of Confutation, §. 5. of that Section. But sure this answer is nothing to the matter now in hand, for the evidencing of which that example of Christ was brought by me, viz. That sincere Love is capable of Degrees. This was first showed in several men, and in the same man at several times, in the several ranks of Angels, and at last in Christ himself, more ardent in one act of Prayer then in another, wherein what is affirmed of Christ is common to Angels and Men, etc. And now I appeal to our Refuter himself, and desire him to tell me, whether the Doctor can possibly mean any thing else by this Phrase, the Love of God, and sincere Love, in these places, than the grace of holy Charity, that in its general comprehensive notion contains in it whatsoever is holy, good, or virtuous for kind or degree, that the Christian out of a sincere Love to God either freely or by way of Duty performs? Can he possibly here mean by Christ's Love of God in these places, that Beatific Love of God which was always in termino, and was proper to him as Comprehensor? Does he not expressly add, in the Close of those words, that what herein is affirmed of Christ, is common to Angels and Men? And do not his several instances speak as much? Let our Refuter himself judge, what other Love can the Doctor mean, that is common to Christ, to Angels and Men, except that Love and Charity which the Doctor constantly makes a Genus to habitual and actual Love?  
§. 29. That this, and no other, was the Doctor's meaning, will 2ly appear from Mr. Cawdrey's Reply, and the Doctors answer to it, §. 2. For whereas the Doctor had affirmed that this Grace of holy Love (or Divine Charity) consisted in a sincere endeavour after perfection; Mr. Cawdrey now returns that it consisted in an absolute sinless Perfection, such as was that of Adam in innocence, and therefore perfect Love, such as did cast out fear, 1 Jo. 4. 18. Now to this the Doctor returns, 1. that that perfect Love of Adam in innocence consisted not in an indivisible point in the several Acts; 2ly, that S. John 's Love was not that of Adam in innocence, which is confessed not to be attainable, but that other which is in every Confessor and Martyr, which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Love of Christ in sincerity, Eph. 6. 24.  
§. 30. Thirdly, this appears from the several Acts the Doctor instances in that consisted in a Latitude; the Love of Adam in innocence; the Zeal of the Martyrs and Confessors for Christ in their patience and sufferings; the ardency of Christ in several acts of Prayer; the different ardency of Prayer in other men, which he acquits from sin by the example of Christ; and lastly by several acts of Mercy and Liberality to the poor. All which as it is plain they are Acts of the infused Grace of holy Charity, all rooted in that high sublime Love immediately centred in God himself, so clear it is that they are not that Love as thus specially and properly taken, but rather fruits and expressions of it.  
§. 31. Lastly, this will appear from express words in the Doctor, §. 5. of that Section, thus; Still it must be remembered, says he, that it is not the sinless Perfection we speakof, when we say it consists in a Latitude, and hath Degrees, but Sincerity of this or that virtue, (I pray mark it, good Sir,) expressed in this or that performance: and as this, though it excludes not all mixture of sin in the Suppositum (the man in whom it is) yet may by the grace of God in Christ exclude it in this or that Act (for it is certain, that I may in an act of Mercy (mark it again) give as much as any law obligeth me to give, and so not sin in giving too little;) so to this his answer belongs not at all, nor shows any difference or reason, why such Sincerity may not in any pious Christian be capable of Degrees as well as in Christ himself, (I pray, good Sir, mark it) and the lower of them be sinless, and all the superior voluntary oblations more than the strict Law required of us.  
§. 32. And thus also was the Doctor understood by Mr. Cawdrey in his instance in Christ himself. For whereas the Doctor had urged, he was more intense in Prayer at one time then another, when yet the lower degree was no sin; to this Mr. Cawdrey answers, That Christ was above the Law, and did more than the Law of God required, but men fall short many degrees of what is required.  
§. 33. Nay the Doctor was understood in this sense by the Author of the Mixture of Scholastical and Practical Divinity himself. For whereas his Theme had been the All-fulness of habitual Grace in Christ, from pag. 230. to 256. he there gins to draw out four Uses from that Doctrine so largely before handled. The second whereof is a Use of Confutation of Doctor Hammond, thus, pag. 258. Secondly, this point (of the fullness of habitual Grace in Christ) may serve for Confutation of a passage in the learned Doctor Hammond against Mr. Cawdrey, to wit, That Christ's Love of God, or habitual Grace, (for it were nothing to the purpose, as the Doctor in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and we also have already showed, to understand it of any thing else) was capable of further Degrees. And for proof of his Charge he quotes this very Section, §. 4, 5. p. 222. And in this sense he did oppose the Doctor all along in his Use of Confutation; witness this short passage for all the rest, pag. 259. And the falsehood of such an assertion (to wit that Christ's Love of God wa● capable of Degrees) is evident from the point here handled and confirmed, the absolute fullness of Christ's Grace, which by the general consent of the Fathers and Schoolmen was such as that it excluded all intensive growth. It was a sequel of the personal union, and therefore it was from the very first moment of his Conception. The Word was no sooner made Flesh, but it was forthwith full of Grace and Truth. His Love of God was uncapable of further Degrees, unto whom God gave not the Spirit, that is the Gifts and Graces of the Spirit, by measure.  
§. 34. Indeed, as it had been nothing to that Author's purpose; and his Use of Confutation had appeared absolutely groundless, to have understood the Doctor in any other sense, so had it been nothing to the Doctor's Argument also, if by the Love of God all along in those Discourses he had understood any thing else, than the several Acts of that divine Grace of holy Charity, which he said consisted in a Latitude. For the question in the Treatise of Will-worship was, whether that first great Law, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, etc. did oblige every man by way of Duty to the utmost height of perfection possible in every Act of Grace and goodness, or to such a Sincerity in the several Acts of this or that Virtue or Grace, that consists in a Latitude and hath Degrees? The Doctor asserted the latter, and Mr. Cawdrey undertook to make good the legal obligation to the former. And therefore as it had been a vain and fruitless attempt for the Doctor to have laboured to make good his Conclusion by instancing in that Act of Christ's Love, which every Smatterer in Theology and the Schoolmen knows to be necessary, because it is actus Comprehensoris: so it had been nothing to the Doctor's purpose, because this Act being necessary and flowing per modum emanationis, as they speak, it could not come possibly under the power of a Command, or the notion of a Duty. Because the Saints in Patria, that are Comprehensores, that see God face to face, love him always to one height and fullness; because they always know and enjoy him at that height they love, and therefore love him perfectly, because they are now perfectly united to him; it can be no argument or pattern for us men, that are now in via, to love God to that height, because we can love God but to the height of our Knowledge of him. And as they love God necessarily and naturally (as I may so speak) since their glorification, because therein consists the height of Heaven's happiness; so we love God freely, and by way of Duty, in order to that happiness: which Duty consists not in one indivisible point and height in every act of habitual Grace, but in sincerity, that admits of a Latitude of performance in the several Acts of Grace, as our Knowledge is enlarged, and Occasion does require.  
§. 35. No other sense than can rationally be affixed to this phrase, the Love of God, either in the Treatise of Will-worship, or the Vindication of it against Mr. Cawdrey. Nor can any other sense be affixed on it in the Ectenesteron also. For, if I have not miscounted, it is but 13. times to be met with in that Treatise, and in most of them they are the words of Mr. Jeanes in his Use of Confutation, and are taken up by the Doctor for a necessity of argument rather than choice.  
§. 36. Besides, it being a vindication of himself from a false imputation in that Use of Confutation, for a denial of the fullness of habitual Grace in Christ, he knew it was not necessary so precisely to distinguish that phrase, the Love of God, which the whole subject matter of that argument must needs clear to be understood, as parallel and aequipollent to habitual Grace and the Acts of it.  
§. 37. Besides, the Doctor in the very entrance of that Treatise, §. 2, 3. had so fully cleared his own and the Refuters meaning (saying expressly that the Refuters meaning was this, that he had affirmed Christ's Love of God, meaning thereby the habitual Grace of divine Charity, to have been capable of further Degrees, so as that capacity of further Degrees is the denial of all fullness of that habitual Grace already in him, and accordingly in that Treatise he makes answer to that Charge) that no other sense could by any ingenuous man be affixed unto that Phrase.  
§. 38. Add to this, that the Doctor expressly denies that he ever said these words, That Christ's Love of God was capable of further Degrees. And now I shall desire our Refuter to show me so much as the very subject of it, Christ's Love of God, in terminis, either in the Treatise of Will-worship, or the Defence of it against Mr. Cawdrey. The truth is, the Proposition is none of the Doctors, and all that the Refuter pretends to is, that he rightly inferred it from these words in the Account, That Sincere 
Account to Mr. Cawdrey's Triplex Diat: c. 6. sect. 9 §. 5.  Love is capable of Degrees, as appears (among other instances) from the Example of Christ, more ardent in one Act of Prayer then in another: and therefore in all equity must have no other meaning and signification, than what the place from whence it is pretended to be deduced does admit of, which can be no other than what we have given of it. And though the Doctor here acknowledge that those other words not found in his Papers are yet not illogically inferred from them, (viz. That Christ's Love of God was capable of further Degrees, more intense at one time then at another;) yet he that best knew his own meaning there expressly declares, that they only import, that Christ's Love of God (or holy Charity in the general Notion, as he distinctly expresses 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. § 12.  it, §. 14.) had in its Latitude or Amplitude several Degrees, one differing from another secundum magis & minus, all of them comprehended in that full all-perfect Love of God, which was always in Christ so full and so perfect, as not to want, and so not to be capable of further Degrees. Besides, that this and no other could be his meaning, is evident from his instancing in that Place (whence the Proposition is pretended to be inferred) in the different Ardency of Christ in several Acts of Prayer, which is rather an Act of Religion than Charity; And though it be founded in Charity and flows from it, yet Prayer, that is Deprecation or Petition (such as that of Christ's then was) is rather an effect of that Love of God which the Schools call Amor Concupiscentiae, a love of God for our own sakes, then that which they call Amor Amicitiae, a love of God purely for himself 
Vid. Durand. l. 3. Sent. d. 28 q. 1. art. 1. B.  and nothing else. Beseech God indeed we do to help us, because we believe he is the fountain of all goodness, which makes the Act formally an Act of Religion, and rather to be radicated in Charity, then formally and immediately an Act of Love; the Effect and issue of Charity, rather than it.  
§. 39 Add to this, that the Doctor expressly says, that the 
Vide 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 § 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22.  word Love in that Passage was to be taken by a Synecdoche generis, for the Acts of holy Charity, and not for habitual Love.  
§. 40. And then he explains his meaning by an instance taken from the Refuters own Confession, thus, The Death of Christ, 
§. 22.  saith he, was an higher expression of Christ's Love of us (of us, but for God's sake) than his Hunger, etc. To this I sub join, That such as the expression was, such was the Act of inward Love, etc. And so the same person that loved sincerely, did also love and express that Love more intensely then at other times. Love? but what? God, as the immediate Object? no; that was neither the meaning of the Refuter nor the Doctor. But us he loved, and expressed that Love to us, more in his Death then any other Act of holy Charity and Love to us. An Act of Charity & Love of God this was without doubt which he bestowed on us; but us in these Acts he loved immediately for God's sake.  
§. 41. This will further appear by the several other Phrases he uses as aequipollent to this of the Love of God: For sometimes, nay most commonly, he rather uses the word Love absolutely, than the Love of God; sometimes he expresses it by Graces; sometimes by Acts of virtue; sometimes in the Concrete, thus, a sincerely-pious man, a true lover of God, etc.  
§. 42. I confess I have been over tediously curious in this part of the Reply. But I conceive it necessary to show how beyond all possibility of defence this Refuter is unjust, in affixing that other sense to the Doctor's words which he never meant, nor could possibly serve his turn. But so it was, that the Doctor had so fully acquitted himself from the Use of Confutation, that nothing now but Consequences and new-devised meanings of words and phrases would help him; and he was forced of necessity to prevaricate, otherwise it had not been possible to have found out a Medium to have confuted Doctor Hammond a second time. And as the Reader will see a necessity of this Travel before the Discourse is ended, so I doubt not but the ingenuous will therefore pardon it.  
§. 43. Well then, it being plain that this phrase, the Love of God, may be taken generally & in confuso, as they speak in the Schools, and as it prescinds or abstracts from this or that particular Act, or else specially, as it relates in particular to the prime and most noble Act of Divine Charity, that is immediately terminated in God; and it being as plain, that Doctor Hammond takes it in the first sense, when he says that The Love of God, or the Acts of that Love, do consist in a latitude, and, if we compare them one with another, are more intense at one time then another; it now remains that I make good the Assertion, for the full and absolute acquitting of the Doctor. Which I do by these Arguments.  
§. 44. Where there is, and of necessity must be, a gradual rinse, and more in respect of the goodness of the Objects of the Habit of Charity or the Love of God, there is, and of necessity there must be, also a gradual difference in respect of the several Acts of this Habit of Charity or the Love of God. But there is and must be a gradual difference, and more, in respect of the goodness of the Objects of the Habit of Charity or the Love of God in Christ. Therefore, there is and must be a gradual difference in respect of the several Acts of this Habit of Charity or the Love of God in Christ.  
§. 45. The Major and the Minor are both Propositions that are pierce notae, and carry their letters of Credence in their forehead. But because we have met with such an exquisite Schoolman, that, Soldierlike, he is resolved to dispute every inch of 
jean's pag. 17.  ground with us, I shall now, with the Readers patience, for the Refuters satisfaction, prove them.  
§. 46. The Major than I thus Demonstrate. If Goodness be 
Vid. Suarez in 3. part. Thom. tom. 2. disp. 38. sect. 1. p. 524. B. C.  the sole proper Object of the Will and the Affections of it, and Love be nothing else but a Tendency to a union of the Will with the Object beloved, then of necessity it follows, that where the greater Goodness is, either truly or apparently, to be found in the Object beloved, there it is the more amiable and lovely, and the Will is carried with a stronger inclination, a greater Ardency of affection, and a proportionably gradual intention to the Goodness of the Object, either real or apprehended. But so it is, that Goodness is the sole and proper Object of the Will and the affections of it. Ergo. And hence it is that the great Philosopher tells us in his Ethics, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Arist. l. 8. Eth. cap. 2. §. 3, 4.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And again more clearly in the same Treatise, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Arist. l. 1. Eth. c. 7. §. 1.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And again, 
Ibid. § 2.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. The sum and substance is this, That as whatsoever is good, is good either absolutely in itself, or in order to something else; good either as an End, or else as a Means in order to that end, whether it be absolutely such, as the last great End of all, or in suo genere in this or that kind, in this or that Art or Science or Faculty: so every man loves and pursues that which is either thus good as an End, or a Means, in truth and reality, or else only in show and appearance. And that as the good is either in itself or appearance greater, so it is more eligible, more desirable in itself, and pursued by the Will with the greater inclination, and stronger ardency of affection: and that Happiness, because it is the last End of man, is therefore by all most desirable, and most earnestly pursued, though they that follow after it do not run all in the same, but most in several Paths.  
§. 47. And indeed if this were not so, it would evidently follow that God, who is the great and only Good, were not to be beloved with an higher ardency of affection, with a more intense Act of Love, than any other created, inferior, finite good. And what then would become of that first and great Commandment, and the second like unto it, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, etc. and thy neighbour as thyself? God, who is the first, the greatest Good, must still be loved with the most high, most noble and most ardent Act of Love; and then ourselves, and then our neighbours as ourselves.  
§. 48. And therefore the Schools do all, after the Mr. of the Sentences, resolve, that Datur ordo in Charitate, and that this Ordo Charitatis cadit sub praecepto. That there is not only a gradual difference in respect of Intention in the several Acts of Divine Love, but that God himself has so commanded, and it would be unreasonable and brutish in us not to observe it. And now, Sir, though I have not read, scarce dipped into a quarter of them; yet having read Lombard, and Thomas, and Scotus, and Ocham, and Durand, D'Orbellis, and Cajetan, and Suarez, and Estius, and Bonaventure upon the point, and the matter being so clear and evident in itself, and none found in these several Authors quoted as Opponents in this controversy, I dare challenge you, in all your great reading in the Schoolmen in Paul's Churchyard or the Library at Oxford, to show me but one instance to the contrary. To give the Reader a Taste; and yet I am ashamed to be forced to prove things as plain and bright as the Sun at noon. Si attendatur gradus in Charitate secundum intensionem & remissionem Actus volendi, Sic dicendum est, quod talis ordo est in Charitate, quia intensiùs tenemur diligere Deum quam nos ipsos; et majus bonum debemus nobis magis velle vel proximo, quam minus bonum; sic aequale bonum magisnobis quam proximo, caeteris paribus. Et de Deo quidem, quod sit magis diligendus quam nos ipsi, patebit in sequente quaestione. De aliis autem duobus probatur hoc ex dictis Arist. 8. Eth. ubi dicit sic, Bonum simpliciter & amabile simpliciter; unicuique autem bonum proprium. Ex hoc potest dupliciter argui. Primo sic; Sicut simpliciter ad simpliciter, sic magis ad magis. Ergo magis bonum est magis amabile, & maximè bonum est maximè amabile. Nunc est ita quod inter bona quae nobis vel amicis optamus, est dare minus bonum, & magis bonum, & maxim bonum; Ergo unum est magis alio amandum & magis optandum. Secundo, potest argui ex altera clausula dicti Arist. Unicuique est amabile bonum proprium. Sed quod est bonum mihi est magis proprium quam illud quod est proximi: quia licet proximus sit alter ipse, non tamen est Ego ipse, sed alter. Ergo aequale bonum debeo mihi magis diligere & optare quam proximo; & ita, quod si ambo non possemus habere, plus debeo eum velle carere quam me: quod est intelligendum semper caeteris omnibus existentibus paribus. Et sic patet primum principale. So Durand, lib. 3 Sentent. d. 29. q. 2. art. 1. C. D. Onoc more. Ratio diligendi alia ex charitate est bonitas Divina: primò quidem ut in se existens, ac deinde ut ab aliis participata. Et quia in hoc est multiplex gradus; ideo & in Actu dilectionis charitatiuè est dare multos gradus Durand. ibid. art. 1. ad primum. So again, Ad Tertium dicendum, quod ordo Charitatis attenditur secundum Actum, prout tendit in objecta, inquibus invenitur differentia bonitatis, & per consequens in ipso Actu gradus intensionis & remissionis: nihilominus Charitas ipsa ante Actum dicitur ordinata, in quantum per eam voluntas sic disponitur, ut cum opus fuerit exeat in Actum secundum ordinem supra dictum. Durand. ibid. art. 2. ad 3m. It were vain to add more to this purpose, seeing that all, for aught I find, who writ on the Sentences follow the Master, l. 3. Sentent. d. 29. and assert after him A. B. that, 1. Datur ordo in charitate; and that 2. Ordine dilectionis Deum omnibus aliis praeferendum esse, quem tenemur diligere plus quam nos ipsos; 3. quod quisque se magis quam proximum diligere debeat; 4. quod propinqui prae aliis sint diligendi, & illi magis inter proximos qui secundum carnis originem sunt nobis propinquiores; 5. quod iste ordo Charitatis, seu differentia gradualis ex parte Actuum Charitatis, cadat sub praecepto. For this see Lombard. l. 3. Sent. dist. 29. per tot. Aquinas 3. Sent. dist. 29. a. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7. Scotus l. 3. d. 29. q unical Alexander Halensis, Bonaventure, Richardus, Valentia, Soto, Petrus Navarrus, Capreolus are also quoted by H. Cavellus, as agreeing with his Master Scotus. See also Durand. l. 3. d. 29. q. 1, 2, 4. Estius l. 3. Sent. d. 29. §. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Aquin. 2. 2. q. 26. art. 1. ad 3m. & q. 44. art. 8. Cajetan, and the rest of the Commentators on the place.  
§. 49. And thus having cleared the Major, I come to the proof of the Minor.  
§. 50. And now if the infused Habit of Grace and holy Love in Christ were specifically the same with that of Angels and men, of necessity also it must have the same Object; and consequently also, if there be a gradual difference in respect of the goodness of the Object there, it must of necessity also be so in respect of the Objects of Christ's Love. And for this the Scriptures are very evident. For as they testify that our Blessed Saviour loved, Jo. 14. 31. and honoured, Jo. 8. 49. and did the will of his Father; so they as expressly declare, that for us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven, and that he so loved ●s, that he gave himself for us. And though he took not on him the Nature of Angels, but the seed of Abraham; yet he so loved those blessed Spirits, as to become the head of all Principality and Power; and to reconcile all things unto God, whether they 
Ephes. 1. 10, 20. Colos. 1. 20. Suarez. in 3. p. Thom. q. 19 art. 2. dist. 42. sect. 1. p. 570. col. 1. E. & p. 572. col. 1. F. & sect. 2. p. 574. col. 1. F.  be things in earth or things in Heaven. And therefore the Schools determine, 1. Christum Dominum meruisse Angelis gratiam & gloriam, quae illis data fuerit propter merita Christi; 2. Christum Dominum meruisse Sanctis Angelis omnia dona gratiae, quae nobis meruerit proportione servatâ; exceptis iis quae ad remedium peccati pertinent, electionem scil. praedestinationem, vocationem, auxilia omnia excitantia, adjuvantia, sufficientia & efficacia, ac denique omne meritum & augmentum gratiae & gloriae. And consequently he may be styled the Sanctifier, the Justifier and Glorifier of Angels, though not properly their Redeemer. And therefore it unavoidably follows, that there must be a gradual difference in respect of the Acts of Christ's Love respecting God, the holy Angels and Men, according to the gradual goodness to be found in the several Objects, and according to that measure and standard that God's Law required. Quod erat demonstrandum.  
§. 51. It is true indeed, the Schools do rationally resolve, that there was not the same order in the Acts of Christ's Charity or holy Love, as there is in other men, who rightly love according to the state and condition of this life. Nam Christus secundum animam fuit ab initio perfectus comprehensor, ideoque ille dilectionis ordo qui Beatis, non qui Viatoribus competit, ei tribuendus 
Estius l. 3. Sent. d. 32. §. 5. Confer Aquin. 2. 2. q. 26. art. 13. in corp.  est. Atqui in Beatis totus ordo dilectionis accipitur ex sola conjunctione ad Deum. Quare talem distinctionis ordinem in Christo ab initio fuisse fatendum, quo unumquemque hominem & Angelum eo magis minúsve diligeret, quo magis minúsve per justitiam Deo esset conjunctus.  
§. 52. There can be but two things possible (as fare as I can foresee; and if our Refuter can look further, I hope he will let us know it) returned in answer to this Discourse.  
§. 53. First, that it is not one and the same Habit of Charity whereby we love God and our neighbours as ourselves; and therefore as the precepts are several, so the Objects are divers, and the affections of the Soul, that carry it on to the love of God and our neighbour, are as different as the Objects themselves are. And therefore though it be granted, that the several Acts that flow from these severally distinct Habits do gradually differ in themselves in respect of intenseness, according to the gradual distance of goodness in the Object; yet it follows not, that therefore the Acts of one and altogether the same Habit of Charity and holy Love do gradually differ also; which was the thing to be proved.  
§. 54. Secondly, though it were granted that the Habit of Charity and holy Love to God and our neighbours be one and the same Habit, yet a gradual difference in the goodness of the Objects of this Love will not argue a gradual difference of intenseness in the inward Acts of this Love, but only in the outward Acts and Expressions.  
§. 55. If our Refuter shall make use of the first Answer, I must say to him, that he has all the Schoolmen (at least all those that I have seen) for his enemies. For they all unanimously resolve with the Master of the Sentences, who herein follows Saint Austin, that the Habit of 

1. August. lib. 8. de Trin. c. 8. ● Petro Lombard. citat.  
2. Augustin. lib. 1. de doctrina Christiana ca 22. ibid. citat. Pet. Lombard. lib. 3. Sentent: didst. 27. C.   divine Charity, whereby we love God, and our Neighbours for God's sake, is one and the same Habit. Ex una eademque charitate Deum proximumque diligimus, sed Deum propter Deum, nos verò & proximum propter Deum. una est Charitas & duo praecepta, unus Spiritus & duo mandata; quia alia Charitas non diligit proximum nisi illa quae diligit Deum. Quâ ergo charitate proximum diligimus, says Lombard, eâdem Deum diligimus. Sed quia aliud est Deus, aliud proximus, etsi unâ charitate diliguntur, ideo forte duo praecepta dicuntur, & alterum majus, alterum minus, vel propter duos motus qui in ment geruntur dùm Deus diligitur & proximus. Movetur enim mens ad diligendum Deum, movetur & ad diligendum proximum; & multo magis erga Deum, quam proximum. For since the 
* Vide Estium l. 3. Sentent. didst. 27. §. 5. p: 92. col. 1. D. E. F.  unity and distinction of Habits arises from the Formal unity and distinction in the Objects, it necessarily follows, that where two things materially different, such as God and our Neighbours, are beloved for one and the same formal reason and respect to be found in them, that the Habit of Divine Love towards them must be one and the same. But now that infinite goodness, which is alone found in God, is the first and most proper and immediate Object of Divine Love, and this Habit of holy Charity carries the Soul on to love other things but secondarily only, and in regard of the participation of that goodness which infinitely shines in God. As for God's sake we only love them, because they share and partake of his goodness; so it is in order only to God, and his goodness and glory, that this our Love aims. And therefore since we love our Neighbours only for God's sake, and his goodness shining in them is the sole Object of our Love, it evidently follows, that though the material Objects are different, yet the Habit of Divino Charity and holy Love is altogether one and the same. And therefore saith Aquinas, Dicendum est quod charitas, sicut dictumest, est quaedam amicitia hominis ad Deum: Diversae autem amioitiarum species accipiuntur quidem, uno modo secundum diversitatem finis— alio modo secundum diversitatem communicationum, in quibus amicitiae fundantur. Neutro autem istorum madorum charitas potest dividi in plura; nam charitatis finis est unus soil. divina bonitas. Est etiam & una communicatio beatitudinis aetennae, super quam haec amicitia fundatur. Vnde relinquitur quod charitas est simpliciter una virtus, non distincta in plures species. Aquin. 2. 2. q. 23. art. 5. in Corp. So again, Dicendum, quod virtus specificatur ex objecto suo, secundumillam rationem quâ-principaliter in ipsam tendit: unde cum Charitas diligat Deum principaliter, & omnia alia non diligit, nisi in quant●m sunt Dei, constat quod ex Vnitate divinae bonitatis, quam charitas primo respicit, unitatem respicit, & est una virtus. Aquinas, l. 3. Sent. d: 27. q. 2. art. 4. in corp. primae quaestionis. To this purpose may be seen Scotus, l. 3. d. 28. q. unica, and those that H. Cavellus there quotes, Estius l. 3. Sent. d. 27. § 5. and the rest of the Commentators on the Sentences and the Sums.  
§. 56. Since then the Habit of Divine Love or holy Charity i● one and the same, both in respect of God and our Neighbours, it must of necessity follow, 
* Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself] As truly as thyself; sincerely, though not without some inequality of degrees: as John 17. 21. Acts 3. 22. Assembly Notes, Annot. in Matt. 22. 39  that the several Acts of this Love, respecting God & our neighbours for God's sake, must differ in regard of height and intention, according to the variety of Goodness to be found in the several Objects beloved. And therefore your own 
† Suarez in 3: part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 40. sect. 2. p. 549. col. 2. D.  Suarez will tell you, Verissimum est, Christum Dominum magis amare & velle gloriam suam quam nostram, quia juxta Charitatis ordinem ita amare debet, quia illud bonum & in se excellentius est, & magis conjunctum Deo & Christo. And it is agreeable to the determination of Saint Austin, who in his book of Christian Doctrine, expressly discoursing on this very Theme, tells us, 
* August. de doctrina Christiana, c. 27.  Ille justè & sanctè vivit, qui rerum integer aestimator est: ipse est autem qui ordinatam dilectionem habet, ne aut diligat quod non est diligendum, aut non diligat quod est diligendum, aut amplius diligat quod minus est diligendum, aut minus vel amplius quod aequè diligendum est.  
§. 57 And so notwithstanding this Answer, our former Argument holds good, and stand unshaken.  
§. 58. If our Refuter shall make use of the second, as sometimes in this, Reply he refers to it (as when he says that nothing hinders, but that expressions gradually different may flow from Acts of Love gradually the same;)  
§. 59 To this I return, that though some in Peter Lombard's time did seem to maintain, quod pari affectu omnes diligendi sunt, sed in effectu, id est, in exhibitione obsequii, distinctio observanda sit, and did ground this their assertion on some mistaken passages of Saint Austin; yet he and generally the Schoolmen after him have resolved the contrary: and they have great reason and authority on their side, as we have already demonstrated; and it were vain to trouble the Reader with the repetition of what we have already delivered so largely to this purpose.  
§. 60. But than secondly, suppose it were granted, as is pretended, that all men are to be loved with the same equal affection, though our expressions and outward observances may be different; yet this will not conclude, that therefore God and our bours are so to be loved with the same equality of affection as all other men are: and even these very men that referred this order of Charity to the different outward respects to be showed to Parents and Children, and Kindred and Strangers, did also maintain that God was to be loved with an inward affection, answerable to his own goodness, and not only in hand and tongue, but also in the heart. Deum verò (say they, as I find it in the Master of the Sentences) tam affectu quam obsequii exhibitione ante omnia diligendum.  
§. 61. And so I proceed to a second Argument. It cannot be denied, but that there were in Christ, during the state of his Humiliation, those Acts of the Will that the Schools call efficaces and inefficaces; such Acts of holy Love that were complete and perfect in themselves, and in the issue and accomplishment, and such other Acts of holy Love that were imperfect in themselves, and also ineffectual in the event. The first are sometimes called Absolute acts of the Will; the second are called conditionate. Quia Actus efficax (says 
† Suarez. in 3. p. Tho. tom. 1. disp. 38. sect. 1. p. 524. col. 1. E. F.  Suarez) absolutus est in ordine ad executionem: est enim talis Actus principium operandi, & solet explicari hâc voce Volo. Actus verò inefficax est complacentia quaedam seu displicentia, ut bene explicuit Scotus in 2. dist. 6. q. 1. Et dicitur Actus conditionatus, non quia ut est in voluntate conditionem includat; id enim intelligi non potest, cum sit simplex quaedam affectio, re ipsâ adhaerens voluntati simpliciter & absolute: sed quia ex parte objecti conditionem quandam includit, vel implicitè, quatenus fertur in objectum sub una praecisa ratione consideratum, ac si esset separata ab aliis conditionibus quae illius executionem impediunt; vel etiam interdum explicitè per intellectum consideratâ, & appositâ conditione ipsi Objecto, ut in 1. 2. latius explicatur. Of these two Acts of Christ's Will and Affection the Scripture affords us many clear and apposite instances.  
§. 62. Of the efficacious Acts of Christ's Will and holy Love we may find a clear proof Heb. 10. 5, 6, 7, 10. Wherefore when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and burnt-offering thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me. In burnt-offerings and sacrifices for sin thou hadst no pleasure. Then said I, Lo, I come, (in the volume of the book it is written of me) to do thy will, o God— By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all. And this freewill offering of Christ for our Redemption had been foretold by Esay, c. 58. 7. Oblatus est quia ipse voluit, as the Vulgar reads it; or as our Translation, He was oppressed and he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth: he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before his shearers is dumb, so opened he not his mouth.  
§. 63. For the inefficacious Acts of Christ's Will and Affection we have also clear proofs, Matth. 23. 37. Luke 13. 34. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the Prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy Children together as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? As out of his abundant Love he came unto his own, though his own received him not: so to testify his Affection, he now weeps, that after all his care and pains, his preaching and miracles, their sins and obstinate impenitency should render this his Love ineffectual. Another instance we have of these ineffications Acts of his Will, Mark 7. 24. And he entered into an house, and would have no man know it: but he could not be hid. Our Saviour's prayer in the Garden, during his bloody Agony, gives us clear instances of both. Mark 14. 35, 36. And he went forward a little, and fell on the ground, and prayed that if it were possible the cup might pass from him. And he said, Abba Father, all things are possible unto thee; take away this cup from me: nevertheless not what I will, but what thou wilt. And again and again he prayed, O my father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt, Matt. 26. 39 From these and other like passages, the Fathers in the sixth general Council concluded against the heresy of the Monothelites, and established the true doctrine of a twofold Will in Christ, not contrary to themselves, but still subordinate the one unto the other, at least in the final issue.  
§. 64. I shall not now inquire whether these Acts of Christ's Will and holy Love did issue and proceed from him per modum naturae, or per modum rationis, as they speak in the Schools, or both; that is, whether they were only the natural weights and inclinations, and desires of the Will and 

Propriè non dicitur operari Voluntas ut Ratio, nisi quando ex efficaci intentione finis de mediis deliberate: & quando hoc modo non operatur, semper Actus procedit ex naturali pondere vel ipsius voluntatis, vel alicujus virtutis in ea existentis, ut Charitatis, vel alterius similis; & ad hunc modum operatur semper illos actus imperfectos. Suarez. in 3. p. Thom. disp. 38. sect. 2. p. 525. col. 2. F. Dicit Thomas rationem fuisse in oratione Christi sensualitatis advocatam. Aquin. 3. p. q. 21. art. 2.  
jidem actus qui sunt à voluntate ut naturâ, quatenus aliquo modo liberi sunt, possunt dici esse à voluntate ut ratione. Deinde interdum potuit habere Christus hos actus circa objecta quae non pertinebant ad proprium commodum, sed vel ad amorem amicitiae, vel ad alias superiores & honestas rationes: sic enim potuit desiderare omnium salutem ex charitate, quamvis sciret non omnes esse salvandos— Similiter etiam Hilarius & Hieronymus exponunt appetivisse Christum fugam mortis non solum ex inclinatione naturae, sed etiam propter vitandam ruinam Judaeorum; quae etiam fuit expositio Originis l. 1. contra Celsum: quae si non excludat affectum naturalem supra explicatum, sed praeter hunc illum alium adjungit, neque impossibilis est, neque ullum habet inconveniens. Ratio verò est, quia hi actus sunt honesti, & non repugnant perfectioni Christo Domino debitae. Suarez. ibid. D. E.  
Similiter tristitiam habuit Christus de perditione Judae & ruina Judaeorum, adeo ut Hieronymus & Hilarius dixerint, magis doluisse Christum de morte sua propter ruinam Judaeorum, quam propter suum incommodum: sed hoc etiam pertinet ad portionem superiorem; erat enim opus insignis charitatis. Et ex his exemplis facile constat ratio hujus conclusionis, quia hic etiam affectus est optimus & honestissimus, & valde consentaneus statui Christi in carne passibili, & ad satisfaciendum pro hominibus valde accommodatus. Suarez ibid. sect. 3. p. 526. col. 2. B. C.   Habit of Charity, to his own self-preservation, without any deliberation, such as is to be found in children before the use of Reason; or whether they proceeded from him out of a deliberate consideration and pondering, not so much of the now-impending evils, and the fury of his Father's wrath, as the love he bore to his own people the Jews, whose destruction and casting off he foresaw would be the consequents of his death: though Suarez seems to me to have proved the latter as well as the former. Sufficient it is to the present argument, that since Christ was himself holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, that all his actions, thoughts, desires and inclinations were holy, just and good, and issuing from that all-full and all-perfect Habit of Divine Love and Charity in him.  
§. 65. From hence I thus argue:  
Those Acts of holy Charity that were most perfect in themselves, were gradually distinguished, and secundum magis & minus different from those that were imperfect in the same kind.  
But the efficacious Acts of Christ's Love and holy Charity were most perfect, the inefficacious Acts of the same holy Love were imperfect. Ergo  
These Acts of holy Love and Charity in Christ were gradually distinguished, and secundum magis & minus different one from another. And consequently all the Acts of his Love were not equally intense in themselves, and with the Habit from whence they proceeded.  
§. 67. There can be no doubt made of the Proposition by any man that understands the nature of Intention and Remission. Nor is the Minor less evident to any that considers the nature of these efficacious and inefficacious Acts of Christ's Will & holy Love. De actibus efficacibus voluntatis Christi, (says Suarez,) 
Suarez in 1. p. Thom. disp. 38. sect. 2. p. 524. c. 2. A. B.  quoth in illo fuerint perfectissimi, nulla est difficultas, aut dubitandi ratio: constat enim per hos actus operatum esse omnia virtutis opera, & divinae voluntati ac jussioni obsecutum esse, ac denique mortem ipsam suscepisse. So again for those Acts which they call inefficaces, Scio nonnullos authores non admittere hos actus imperfectos nisi in voluntate ut naturâ est, etc. Suarez. ibid. p. 525. col. 1. F.  
Voluntas seu desiderium inefficax Christi non semper habuit effectum, seu impletum fuit— Et ratio ex ipsis terminis constat, quia si actus est inefficax, non est cur semper habeat effectum; imo tunc tantum per hujusmodi actum Christus aliquid volebat, quando simpliciter nolebat illud fieri, sed potius contrarium. Suarez ibid. sect. 4. pag. 530. col. 1. D.  
§. 68 Secondly I thus argue:  
That Act of Christ's Will whereby he laid down his life for his sheep, was more high and gradually intense than those other Acts of his Will when he prayed for a removal of the bitter cup of death, if it had been possible, or then the other Acts of his will and endeavour of the Jews conversion by his three years preaching and miracles among them.  
But these were Acts issuing from the Habit of Divine Charity and holy Love in Christ. Therefore  
Some Acts that issue from the Habit of divine Charity were more high and gradually intense than other Acts of the same Habit.  
§. 69. From whence further it seems (to me at least) most unavoidably to follow, that though by that prime fundamental law of Divine Charity we are bound to love God with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our mind; yet this only obliges us to love him so, as to prefer nothing before or above him, so as in every Act we desire nothing but what is holy, just and honest, and quoad specificationem, as they speak, conformable to his holy Will, as himself has revealed in his holy laws and precepts, and what also tends to his honour and glory; and not in every Act pro hîc & nunc & quoad exercitium, as they speak, to the most high, most noble and intense degree of holy Charity. For otherwise I see not how these inefficacious conditionate desires of our Blessed Saviour can be excused from the breach of this Law, because they had neither the most noble immediate material Objects, nor were so gradually intense as other Acts of holy Charity were. And yet most assured we are, that all his desires and inclinations, as well as his actions, were holy, just and good, and conformable to God's Will, and were the true and genuine fruits of the Habit of Divine Grace. But now most certain it is, that though he came into the world for none other end then to reconcile the world unto his Father by his Death, though he had received an express command from him, and also voluntarily contracted and covenanted with him, to perform it, and though it was in itself the most high and transcendent Act of holy Charity to his neighbour imaginable; yet for all that he truly and really, and not in show and compliment only, declined the bitter cup, though still with submission to Gods will. For first, he prayed not only prolixius, but intensius also, as shall in due place be proved; he prayed thrice, and he prayed also more Ardently then at other times, for the removal of this bitter Cup: the apprehension of the approaching torment and the horror of his Father's wrath made his soul sorrowful even to Death, and it cast him into such an Agony, that he sweat great drops of blood through his  down to the ground: so sad and so grieved he was, that an Angel was sent to comfort and support him against the present conflict and approaching torments; which he did by proposing the joys set before 
Proprius & (ut ego existimo) magis ad rem exponitur, Angelum confortâsse Christum proponendo rationes quae possent ejus tristitiam lenire, & inferiorem partem confortare, unde non fit Angelum docuisse Christum: non enim propterea ad illum eum sermonem habuit, quia Christus eas rationes ignoraret, vel illas per se considerare non posset; sed quia ita per rationem superiorem illas considerabat, ut nullum inde solatium communicari permitteret inferiori parti, ut & magis constaret veritas Passionis ejus, voluit Angelico ministerio rationes illas proponi, & quasi in memoriam revocari. Et hoc modo dicitur Angelus quantum in se erat confortâsse Christum, quanquam ipse neque illud consolationis genus acceptare visus sit, statim enim factus in Agonia prolixius orabat. Et hanc expositionem magis indicat D. Thomas hic, quam ex Beda refert, Luc. 22. sed & etiam Hieronymi Dialogo 2do. contra Pelagianos, Hilarii lib. 10. de Trinitate, Cyrilli Alexandrini Epist. 9 Damasceni l. 3 de Fide, c. 20. Bernardi sermone 1. de Sancto Andrea, Suarez. in 1. par. Thom. q. 12. art. 4. in Commentar. p. 398. col. 2. B. C. Vide Jansen. Concord. in loc.. H. Grot. in Annot▪ in loc..  him, the short and fading sharpness of those bitter torments, God's glory, and the enlargement of his own Dominion over men and Angels, and the freeing and the reconciling of a world of sinners unto God his Father. Not that he himself was ignorant of them, or did want a monitor now to mind him, and bring them to his present consideration; but only that his superior intellectual part did so wholly now affix and dwell upon them, that he would not suffer any comfort to be thence administered to the inferior faculty, that now did naturally & therefore innocently abhor these cruel sufferings. And hence it was, that so the truth of his humane nature and sufferings might appear, that he made use of an Angel's ministry and support to strengthen him. As therefore the inferior sensual part in him did truly, because naturally, abhor and dread the approaching torments as destructive to it's Being; so our Blessed Saviour did innocently, because naturally, in compliance with these apprehensions, desire and pray for a removal of them, though still with a submission in the superior part of these desires to his Fathers will. Nor was there here (as shall in due place more fully be declared) any repugnance or contradiction of the inferior faculties to the superior, or of his sensual will to God his Fathers. 
* Vide Suarez in 3 p. Thom. infra citat.  For 1. though the apprehension of the approaching torments was never so great, yet he did but only desire the removal of them, not absolutely, but conditionally, and with submission to his Fathers will. And 2ly, the inferior faculties were no whit repugnant to the superior, but yielded patiently to its dictates. And therefore 3ly, he absolutely submitted himself to God his Father's will and pleasure. And then 4ly, God himself was pleased, thereby to testify the truth of his humane nature, that these desires should naturally and innocently express themselves in them, for our instruction and guidance in such cases. All which in every part shall be fully demonstrated in due place.  
§. 70. From all which thus considered I thus argue:  
That if our Saviour did truly and innocently, because naturally, desire the removal of that bitter Cup, though with submission to his Father's will, even when so high an Act of divine Charity as the reconciling of the world to God by his death lay before his eyes, and his Father had given him a command to perform it, and he himself came for no other end into the world then to make it good; then he might as innocently have endeavoured by all lawful means his self-preservation, upon supposal that no such Covenant had been made, nor particular command given, and God had left it freely in his power either to reconcile the world to him by his death, or to endeavour by just and innocent ways to save himself. For plain it is from Scripture, that before his hour was come which the Father had appointed for this work, when the Jews took up stones to stone him, he withdrew himself, to leave us an example what we might lawfully do in such cases. And hence it is, from the Authority of this great example, that though Martyrdom be the highest and most sublime Act of Christian Charity, yet all men that profess the name of Christ are not by virtue of that first great fundamental law of divine Charity, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and all thy mind, obliged in a time of Persecution to offer themselves to fire and faggot, but lawfully may embrace a lesser good, and follow a less noble Act of Charity, consisting in a lawful endeavour of their own preservation, even when an occasion offers of glorifying God by their suffering death or persecution for his name's sake. Otherwise Saint Paul had sinned, when he was let down from the wall in a Basket. otherwise the Martyriani, that so eagerly coveted Martyrdom for God's honour, had been the best of Christians, and are unjustly branded with the name of Heretics; and Tertullia's Book against flight in time of Persecution had not deserved the mark of Montanism; and Cyprian and great Athanasius had not received the name of Saints, but had been enroled amongst Apostates.  
§. 71. From all which it seems to me clearly to follow, that (as the Doctor asserts) sincere Love in the Habit is capable of Degrees in the several Acts, either in one man at several times, or in two men at the same time, and so both may obey that first great Precept of Loving God with all the heart, in respect of some several Acts that are gradually different. For though that Act that is less intense is comparatively less perfect, yet is it not therefore so fare faulty or in vitio: because God commands sincerity of our Love, which is capable of Degrees in the several Acts, as occasion offers, and not always pro hic & nunc the highest and most noble Act of holy Charity, as appears by these so great examples.  
§. 72. If it here be said, that our Saviour prayed for a removal of this bitter Cup with submission to his Father's will, which altars much the Case:  
§. 73. I grant he did so; but then I further argue, that if it had not otherwise been lawful (praescinding still from God's decree in the present case) but the great fundamental law of Charity (without any other express and positive command of Gods, for the laying down his life) had obliged him to it, he could not have been excused, though he did desire the removal of it with 
Vide Hooker. Ecclesiast. Pol. l. 5. §. 48. p. 280.  submission to his Fathers will. For what I may not lawfully perform and do as in itself considered, that I cannot lawfully desire and pray for, though with submission to Gods will. For shall I pray to God to bless me in an unlawful Act, suppose of Murder or Adultery, because I desire it only with submission to Gods will? They must be only innocent, holy things we must ask and pray for from the most holy God; and still we must ask them too with a submission to his holy will and pleasure.  
§. 74. And as this was all the Doctor aimed to prove by that instance of our Saviour's greater Ardency in this Act of prayer then in another; so we shall have anon occasion to clear and further vindicate that instance.  
§. 75. I might in the third place demonstrate this Truth from the consideration of the gradual difference, in respect of intention, between the necessary Acts of holy Charity in Christ, and those Acts to which his Will had a most absolute freedom. For most certain it is, that in the prime and most noble Act of Divine Charity, that was immediately terminated in God the only good, he did love necessarily, and to the utmost height of intention imaginable, and he did always so love him; nor could he possibly do otherwise, because being always Comprehensor, as they speak, he perfectly knew him, and his Love must of necessity be exactly commensurate to his Knowledge. For even the great Philosopher by the light of Reason could discover, that Summum bonum and finis ultimus necessariò amatur. And then as certain it is, that in other Acts of holy Charity he did not love necessarily, but freely, and his Will had an absolute freedom in them, and by reason of this freedom and liberty in the performance of the Acts, he was capable of meriting by them. And for this our Refuter himself says, that if you please, you may see further in Suarez in tertiam partem Thomae, dist. 39 
Jeanes Reply to the Ectenesteron, p. 39  sect. 4. where the question is debated, Quomodo voluntas Christi ex necessitate diligens Deum, in reliquis actibus potuerit esse libera. But because our Refuter has mistaken that Author, and he will give us a fit opportunity of handling this Argument, I shall defer the further prosecution of it till that Section.  
§. 76. And so I come at last to the examination of the Assumption of your monstrous Syllogism. It is this.  
But now this Objection is urged by you against the perpetual All-fulness and perfection of his actual Love, the inward Acts of his Love. For it is brought to prove that the inward Acts of Christ's Love were more intense at one time then at another; and a greater intention presupposeth remission and imperfection; for intensio est eductio rei intensae de imperfecto ad perfectum, as Aquinas very often. Ergo.  
§. 77. Before I come to consider the strength of this Assumption, it will not be amiss to mind the Reader of a known distinction, to avoid all Cavils for the future, by reason of a Term therein that may be ambiguously construed, and it is the Term Actual Love.  
For sometimes it is taken for that which is opposed to Habitual Love; and than it denotes the Operation and the Acts of Love, and is no other than that which they call Actus secundus in the Schools, or that Love which is in Actu secundo.  
And then secondly, it is sometimes taken for that which is opposed to potential Love, to that which is yet incausis and in fieri, as they speak, and not in esse; and than it denotes only the existence of Love, and it is the same with the Habit of Love, and that which they call Actus primus.  
§. 78. If now the term Actual Love be taken for that Love which is only in Actu primo, and has a being in the Soul, it is granted that such an all absolute fullness of Love was actually still in the Soul of Christ, because this is no other than the actual abode of the habitual fullness of holy Charity and Grace in Christ. But then this is nothing to the purpose, it having never been brought into Controversy by the Doctor, but always granted and allowed.  
§. 79. But if it be taken in the first sense, as our Refuters words import, as it denotes the inward Acts of Christ's Love, most certain it is that there was not in him a perpetual All-fulness and perfection of his actual Love, so as the Acts and Operations of Grace were either intensively or extensively still commensurate to his habitual Love.  
§. 80. This is it which our Refuter asserts in opposition to Doctor Hammond. And now that he is most grossly mistaken in it will appear, First, if we shall consider the Subjectum quod, as they call it, of this Habit and the Operations of holy Charity, the Subject wherein they are seated, Christ. For though the Habit of holy Charity was always in him in its height and perfection from the first moment of Conception, as congruous to the hypostatical union, and flowing from it; yet there must be an intermission and cessation in the Subject, at least of some Operations and Acts of this Grace. For we read that Jesus slept, and his humane nature did require it as a necessary support of 
Matth. 8. 24.  it. And therefore since some Acts of Virtues and Graces can be only performed by us when awake, there must be an intermission and a cessation of them at least when he slept, which cannot possibly be said of the Habit of holy Charity, which was in him in full perfectness, whether sleeping or waking.  
§. 81. Secondly, if we shall consider the Object of divine Charity, there was always an habitual application or inclination in Christ our Blessed Saviour to all the Objects of divine Charity, and that according to that order and degree of goodness to be found in them: but there could not be an actual application of the Will always to all the several Objects of divine Charity, because being finite in his humane nature, by that finite humane Will, howsoever perfected and advanced by the infused perfection of habitual grace, he could not possibly apply himself to an actual embrace of so many and different Objects, at one and the same moment and instant of time.  
§. 82. Thirdly, if we shall consider the several Acts themselves, they were so many and infinite for number, so different for variety, we shall find it impossible that they should be all performed at once, though there was always and in every instant of time an habitual disposition and aptitude to the performance of any or of all of them successively, as himself should best think fit.  
§. 83. If it be here replied, that though the actual Love of Christ could not be in him in its utmost extent and latitude, though he could not perform all the Acts of divine Charity at one and the same moment, to which he had always an habitual inclination; yet this nothing hinders but that whensoever he did perform any Act of holy Charity, that Act of holy Charity must be as intensively perfect as the Habit from whence it issues, and this was all that you intended in this Objection.  
§. 84. To this I answer, That as we have already demonstrated the falsehood of this Assertion, so were it now granted, yet this would not serve the turn at present. For since by this answer it is granted that all the Acts of this Habit in their utmost latitude and extent cannot be performed at once, it necessarily follows, that those Acts that may pro tempore be suspended, and not have a being, without a derogation from the all-fulness of his habitual Love, may also have a being less intensively perfect then the Habit or then other Acts of the same Love, without any derogation from the perpetual fullness of this habitual Grace. For plain it is that these Acts and Operations of divine Grace and holy Charity are not all in individuo the necessary issues of the Habit, as those Properties and Accidents are that flow from their Causes by way of emanation, and necessity of nature, as the light from the Sun; but are the free effects of the Will and Habit of Grace from whence they flow, and therefore are  and contingent to the nature and being and gradual Perfection of the Habit. For since, as Porphyry tells us, Accidens commune est, quod potest adesse & abesse sine subjecti interitu, if any one Act may be totally and in respect of all Degrees absent, and not have a being, without derogation from the Perfection of the Habit, the same may in 2, or 3, or 5 Degrees of Perfection be also absent; since if the whole be accidental to the Habit, much more must every part and degree be accidental to it also.  
§. 85. And therefore I see not what disadvantage can accrue to the Doctor, if this your Assertion be granted as you have laid it down in Terminis. For we have already demonstrated, that some Acts of Christ's Love were not so gradually intense as others were: we have also seen it proved by Scripture, and Reason, and the Authority of Fathers and Schoolmen, and Mr. Jeanes and his own Aims among the rest, that Christ did truly and really increase, and not only in the opinion of men, as well in actual Knowledge and Grace as he did in Stature, though the Habit was always at the height and perfection. Indeed I see not how a true and real increase in the gradual Perfection of the Acts and inward Operations of Wisdom and Grace can any more derogate from the all-ful perfection of the Habit of Grace, than a true and real increase and growth in his Stature could any ways derogate from the truth and full perfection of his humane nature or Manhood. For though a greater intention presupposeth remission and imperfection, and though intensio est eductio rei intensae de imperfecto ad perfectum, as Aquinas often; yet if the Habit be full and perfect, and incapable of any diminution or increase, the gradual increase and perfection in the Acts will no more conclude the real growth and increase of the Habit, than our Saviour's growth in his Stature did conclude a growth in the perfection of his Manhood. As his humane nature was complete and perfect in his Infancy, though his Stature were now in growth; so the Habits of Wisdom and Grace were then also perfect, though his actual Wisdom and Grace were now capable of addition and growth, as his Stature was.  
§. 86. And therefore for a period of this Section, and the full acquitting the Doctor from the least suspicion of this Charge, I must again mind our Refuter of that known distinction in Scheibler which he borrowed from Scaliger. And it is this; That as Habits are either infused or acquisite, so the Acts and Operations belonging to them are either praecedaneous to the Habit, and effectually concur to the production and accomplishment of it, or else they are such as are subsequent, and flow from it now complete and perfect, as Effects from their Cause. Though then an intensive perfection and growth in those Acts and Operations that precede, and effectively concur to the production of the Habit, argue also an intensive growth in the perfection of the Habit to be acquired, and Aquinas his Rule does hold true in them: yet the Habit of holy Charity in Christ being not an acquired but an infused Habit, and always from the first moment perfect in its utmost intention, the Rule holds not, but an intensive growth and gradual difference in the Acts here argues only an innocent liberty of the Will, whose free effects they are, and no intensive growth in the Habit at all. For that being already full and perfect, and seated in the Will, and effectively concurring with it to the production of these Acts & Operations, it may, if it be not otherwise ab extrinseco determined, either instantaneously produce the Acts in this or that degree perfect, or else may successively augment them in gradual perfection. I shall give you a reason in part borrowed from Aquinas. For the gradual Perfection of these subsequent Acts depends not so much upon the Perfection of the Object, as the liberty of the Will, and the gradual difference in the virtue and efficacy and Conatus of the Agent, praecipuè (as he says 
* 
Aquin. l. 3. Sent. d. 29. q. 1. art. 2. ad 3 m:  
Dicendum quod omnis actus oportet quod proportionetur & objecto & agenti: sed ex objecto habet speciem, ex virtute autem àgentis habet motum suae intensionis. Sicut motus habet speciem ex termino ad quem est, sed intensionem velocitatis habet ex dispositione mobilis, & virtute moventis; sic ergo dilectio speciem habet ex Objecto, sed intensionem habet ex parte ipsius diligentis: Objectum autem charitativae dilectionis Deus est, homo autem diligens est. Diversitas ergo dilectionis quae est secundum charitatem, quantum ad speciem, est attendenda in proximis diligendis secundum comparationem ad Deum, ut scil. ei qui est Deo propinquior majus bonum ex charitate velimus, etc.— sed intensio dilectionis est attendenda per comparationem ad ipsum hominem qui diligit, etc. Aquin. 2. 2 ae, q. 26. art. 7. in Corp.  ) in actibus animae, quae non necessariò secundum totum suum posse agit. Sicut naturalia non mensurantur ad Quantitatem objecti tantum, sed ad efficaciam agentis & conatum in agendo. Vnde non melius videt qui majorem rem intuetur, sed qui clarius videt. I have already made this plain by familiar instances in the Lutenist, and Painter, and Preacher, who do not always operate to the perfection of the Habit, but according to the liberty of their own good will and pleasure, and as occasion requires. And therefore this Maxim of Aquinas is misapplyed by our Refuter. For it is only true and to be understood of those Qualities that are intended by successive and Physical alteration, but in others it holds not: 
* Suarez. Metaph. disp. 46▪ sect. 3. § 15.  Nam Lumen subito fit secundum aliquos gradus intensionis, says Suarez, & voluntas nostra subito prorumpere potest in ferventem & intensum actum amoris. For (not to speak of Agentia naturalia instantanea) 
† Ibid. §. 16.  Agentia libera, quatenus talia sunt, non agunt quantum possunt, (says the same Suarez) sed quantum volunt. Where then Intensio est eductio rei intensae de imperfecto ad perfectum, according to Aquinas, there the Succession in this gradual increase and growing on to Perfection arises either 1. from the distance which is between the Agent and Patient; or 2ly, from the resistance of the Subject by reason of some contrary Quality or other disposition withstanding the introduction of the present from; or else 3ly, by reason of the limitation and imperfection of the virtue and force of the Agent, as 
* Suarez. Metaph. disp. 46. sect. 3. §. 16, 17, 18. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 46. sect. 4. §. 14.  Suarez has at large proved. And this is only to be found in natural and Physical alterations that are successive. At verò si Agens sit liberum, potest pro sua libertate applicare vim suam ad magis vel minus agendum; and consequently may either successively increase this gradual perfection in the Acts, or instantaneously produce them either more or less perfect, according to his own will and pleasure, and the perfection of the Habit.  
§. 87. And thus the Proposition and Assumption being both manifestly proved to be so monstrously false or impertinent in the whole, and all the several parts, the Conclusion cannot possibly concern the Doctor: and therefore I shall leave it to our Refuter to make the best of it. And so I proceed to the next Section.   

SECTION 14.  
The Doctor's discourse here only ad hominem. The Refuters Reply grants all that the Doctor's Argument aims at. Where the degrees of any Quality, particularly the Love of Christ, are for number multiplied in the same Subject, there the Quality, particularly the Love, is more intense. Proved. This infers not Intention to be a mere Coacervation of homogeneous degrees. The Refuter reaches not the Doctor's meaning. The Doctor argues from the Effect to the Cause. The reasonableness of the proof. The only way to conclude the fervour of the inward devotion by the outward performance. Length and continuance in Prayer an argument of high Zeal. Suarez and Hurtado 's discourse concerns not the Doctor. The Refuters ignorance notwithstanding his confidence. Quantitas virtutis, molis. No absurdity in the Doctor's Discourse, if (as the Refuter falsely charges him) he had concluded a greater Ardency in Christ's Devotion, from the multiplying of the several acts of Prayer. Continuance in Prayer a demonstration of fervour. Frequent repetitions of the same words in Prayer an argument of an heightened fervour of Spirit.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
§. 30. BUt now to this he is pleased to frame answers, (though I hope his Doctrine of the fullness of habitual Grace be no way concerned in it) and to these I shall briefly attend him as my last stage.  
§. 31. And first, saith he, the Vulgar Translation renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prolixius; and if this version be good, then there is no place for the Doctor's Objection.  
But though I seek no advantage by that vulgar reading; yet thinking it a duty of reverence to that Version to take leave civilly of it whensoever I depart from it (wherein I have the suffrage of Protestants as learned in both the Languages, 
* Paulus Fagius praefat. in vers. Chal. paraph. in Pent.  Hebrew and 
* Joh. Boys Eliens. vet. Interpt. cum Beza collat.  Greek, as any) and that I may to the utmost observe the Refuters steps, I shall not utterly reject it.  
§. 32. 'Tis certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth primarily signify extension, and that properly belongs to length, and so the Comparative 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to a greater degree of that length. And if it be granted that it so signifies here, there will yet be place equally for my Conclusion.  
§. 33. For in every Act of Prayer, be it but the shortest ejaculation sent out by Christ, I suppose (and my Refuter must not doubt of it) that there was some degree of Ardency or intention. And then sure, according to the multiplying of those Acts lengthening that Prayer, there must still in Christ (I say not in every one of us) be a proportionable multiplication of those Degrees, and so parallel to a greater length, a greater Intention.   
Thus far the Doctor.  
§. 1. But before I come to the Refuters answer, I must here admonish the Reader, that this Discourse is only ad hominem, and proceeds à datis, sed non concessis. And so if the Doctor should have been mistaken in this Personal address, yet it makes nothing at all to the present Controversy. For we shall demonstratively prove anon, that our Saviour did not only in this his Agony pray prolixius, as the Vulgar, but also intensiùs more earnestly, as our Translation renders it.  
§. 2. This being premised, I come now to consider Mr. Jeanes his reply. Thus than he;  

JEANES.  
THe answer here is very easy and obvious: the intention of the Degrees of the inward Acts of Christ's Love of God may be said to be greater, either in regard of the number, or in respect of the intensive Perfection and excellency of those Degrees: according to the lengthening of Christ's Prayer there is a multiplying of inward Acts of his Love, and proportionably a multiplication of the Degrees of his Love, and consequently a greater intention of those Degrees in regard of their number, but not in respect of their intensive Perfection or excellency.   
§. 3. To this I answer, that either our Refuter speaks arrant 
Consonat autem sensui & rationi, ut forma quae intenditur & remittitur gradualem perfectionis latitudinem habeat, ita quod & Calor & esse Caloris & esse ejusdem latitudinem hujusmodi habeat: & cum de minus calido, puta ut duo, fit magis calidum, puta ut quatuor, non corrumpitur praecedens Calor, sed abjicitur solum actualis Terminatio Caloris ad gradum ut duo, & pervenitur ad actualem terminationem Caloris ad gradum ut quatuor, sic enim salvatur motus de affirmato in affirmatum absque form corruption; sicut in vero motu augmenti, cum Socrates de tripedali fit quadrupedalis, non abjicitur praecedens quantitas, sed solum actualis terminatio quantitatis ad tripedalem mensuram, & pervenitur ad actualem terminationem quadrupedalis mensurae ejusdem quantitatis; & propterea non remanet tripedalis in actu sed potentia. Et similiter non remanent praecedentes gradus Caloris in actu sed in potentia, etc.— nec refert utrum hoc fiat per motum, ut cum aliquid magis calefit, vel per mutationem, ut cum aliquid magis illuminatur; utrobique enim est eadem ratio in intrinsecis, etc. Charitas quoque eodem modo intenditur, à Deo tamen effectiuè; ita quod non corrumpitur praecedens charitas, nec nova adven●●, sed quae erat terminata ad tertium, terminatur ad quartum vel sextum gradum actualiter. Cajetan. in. 2. 2. q. 24. art. 4.  nonsense, or else he grants all that the Doctor's Argument drives at. For if the intention of the Degrees of the inward Acts of Christ's love of God may be said to be greater in regard of the Number, they must of necessity be greater in respect of the intensive Perfection and excellency of those Degrees; and if (as he grants) according to the lengthening of Christ's Prayer there is a multiplying of inward Acts of his Love, and proportionably a multiplication of the Degrees of his Love, and consequently a greater intention of those Degrees in regard of the Number, then of necessity there must be an augmentation in respect of their intensive Perfection or excellency. For though one Degree, precisely and abstractly considered, is not more intensively perfect then another; yet where two Degrees are multiplied in the same Subject, they are greater and more intense in concreto then one is; and three Degrees of the same Quality in the same Subject are more than two, and so till men come to the highest that the Subject is capable of. As for instance, suppose we Water actually cold applied to the Fire. There is at first, suppose, one Degree of Heat introduced into the Water, and successively another, and so another; every addition of a new degree of heat makes the water more intensely hot, and yet for all that, no one of those Degrees precisely and abstractly considered is more intensively perfect then the other. But this will be more evident by a familiar instance of the intention of Light. Suppose we then for the present a Room enlightened by one Candle; if another of the same equal brightness, and so another, and another, to seven or eight, be successively brought into the same Room, by the multiplication of these lights the light of the Room is successively intended, as is evident to the sight: And yet one Candle upon the present supposition is of the same equal brightness with another. And though the lights do all severally flow, and continue distinct, as will appear by the several shadows that every one of these casts; yet the whole light of the Room is more gradually perfect and intense. And therefore it clearly follows, that where the Degrees of any Quality are for number multiplied in the same Subject, there the Quality is more intense, and a Quality of three or four degrees is more gradually perfect then a Quality of one or two only; and yet one Degree precisely and abstractly considered is not of more intensive perfection than another, as the light of the several candles, when compared one with another, are equal in perfection, because they are supposed to be all of an equal brightness.  
§. 4. Nor will this infer (as he afterwards charges upon the Doctor) Intention to be a mere Coacervation of many homogeneous Degrees of the same likeness (an absurdity justly refuted by Suarez and others) but only a praecisive, mental designation of the 
Suarez Metaph. disp. 5. sect. 8. § 21, 22, 23. & disp. 46. sect. 1, 3.  several degrees that of themselves compound and integrate the same numerical Form. So the Astronomer thus divides his Circles into Degrees and Seconds, etc. and the Land measurer designs so many Acres, or Perch, or Yards, or Feet, where yet there is no real separation of parts thus designed, but all are still continued and united in the whole. And the truth of this Doctrine may be seen in the same Suarez, and in the very place 
Suarez. Metaph. disp. 46. sect 1: §. 38. Vide eundem ibid. per. tot. & sect. 3. ibid. §. 12, 13.  quoted by the Refuter. Secundo, dicendum (says he) latitudinem entitativam qualitatis intensibilis non esse meram Coarcervationem plurium graduum ejusdem qualitatis omnino similium, sed esse quandam Compositionem per se talium partium seu graduum, quorum unus naturâ suâ supponit alium, ratione cujus subordinationis unus dicitur primus, & alius secundus, tertius, etc. ita ut primus & secundus non solum distinguantur, sicut duo primi gradus existentes in diversis partibus subjecti, sed quia etiam sunt naturâ suâ primus & secundus, & sic de caeteris.  
§. 5. But he goes on to give us a Reason of his Assertion.  

JEANES.  
FOr in Christ let them be never so much multiplied, they may be and still are of an equal intensive perfection and excellency, one is not more intense then another: and so if this reading be retained, there will be no place for your Conclusion, That the inward Acts of Christ's Love are more intense at one time then at another, unless you will make Intention to be a mere Coarcervation of homogeneous degrees, (i. e.) degrees altogether like: the absurdity of which you may see in Suarez Metaph. disp. 46. & Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza de Gener. & Corrupt. disp. 5. §. 6.   
§. 6. For answer, I desire to know what is the Antecedent to these Relatives (them) and (they.) If you mean the Acts of Christ's Love, and say, Let the Acts of his Love be never so much multiplied, these Acts may be and still are of an equal intensive perfection; I reply and say, If the Degrees of his Love are in number multiplied as the Acts are, there must be a growth in their intensive perfection, and the last Act, which has the greater number of degrees in it, will be gradually more perfect than the former.  
§. 7. But perhaps he considers those several Acts, and the several degrees of them, to be so many discrete Quantities, and though they are still multiplied and increased in number, yet they be several distinct Acts of the same gradual height; as twenty shillings successively added one to the other, though they make a greater sum of money, yet they grow not into one piece by this multiplication, but are all still distinct shillings, of an equal value, stamp, and bigness, and weight. But then how this fails in the multiplication of the degrees of Quality in the same Subject, may appear not only from Suarez in the very place by him cited, but also from the former instance, 
* Vide Suarez. Metaph. disp. 5. sect. 8. §. 11.  where the whose light of the room is gradually intended by the addition of a new Candle, though the light of every Candle continues distinct, as appears by the several shadows that every one casts. And then I must also tell him, that by this Position he must unavoidably fall either upon the same Absurdity which he charges upon the Doctor, in making Intention to be a mere coacervation and heaping up in the same Subject of many Degrees altogether alike; or upon another as gross, in placing many Accidents of the same kind, and only numerically distinct, in one and the same Subject, at one and the same time. The falsehood of which assertion, together with the former, as the same Suarez has showed in one and the same Section; so Reason itself, at the very 
Suarez. ibid. §. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.  first proposal, is able to discover, that it is equally impossible for many Acts of the same kind and degree of Ardency to be in the same Subject at one and the same time, without any formal union in themselves, but continuing still distinct, as for many other individual qualities of the same kind and degrees, suppose of heat or cold, or whiteness, and the like, to be in the same Subject, without compounding and making up a more intense and perfect Quality of the same kind, wherein the several degrees shall be united.  
§. 8. But be this how it will; plain it is, by what follows in the Refuter, that he does not reach the Doctor's meaning, and the force of his Argument. For the Doctor concludes and argues from the Effect to the Cause, thus; Where the zeal is true and real, and not personate and counterfeit, (as in Christ without doubt it was most true) there a multiplication of the outward Acts of Prayer, and a longer continuance in them, argues a greater Ardency of inward affection and true zeal: and for the truth of this Assertion I appeal to the practice of the whole world. 
* Sed respondet Aquinas, 2. 2. q. 134. art. 4. Secundum ea quae exterius aguntur, accipi debere spiritualem statum in homine per comparationem ad Ecclesiam: quia nos non scrutamur corda, sed videmus ea quae patent.  concedam, oportere nos de statu interno judicare per ea quae extrinsecus aguntur; respondebo, me igitur secundum judicium Charitatis aestimare illum esse in statu spiritualis profectionis, quemcunque videro proferentem fructus justitiae & Sanctitatis, etc. Davenant. de Justit. Actual. c. 41. p 472. Vide hooker's Ecclesiast. Pol. l. ● §. 32.  For since the Devotion and Religion of the heart is an immanent Act of the Will and Understanding, it is impossible to discover it but by the outward performance. And no argument more common to guests at the inward Devotion among men, then by this continuance in Prayer, and multiplication of outward Acts. For let me appeal to our Refuter himself; does he not commonly guests at the greatness and Ardency of the Preachers zeal and Devotion by the length of the Prayer? and is not he commonly accounted most devout that prays longest? Is it not the custom of Hypocrites to continue long at their Devotions, to gain the Reputation of the most ardently zealous? Otherwise the 
† Mark 12. 40.  Pharisees had in vain for a pretence made long prayers. But the people, that could not discern the heart, guessed at the height of the inward Devotion by the outward lip-service and the continuance in that. This Pharisaical practice of Hypocrites shows us what are the best ways to guests at the Ardency of their Devotion who are sincerely Religious. For the Hypocrite counterfeits and personates that which he is not, and desires to appear religious in show, and the outward performance of those that are truly devout; when he is only a vizor, a shadow, a Picture, and not the thing he seems to be. And now from the multiplication of these Acts of Prayer, from the continuance in his outward performances, the Doctor argues and concludes the heightening of his inward Ardency and Zeal, since no better argument we can have of the inward Ardency of any man's Devotion, then by his outward prolixity and continuance in Prayer.  
§. 9 And so, if this reading be retained, whatsoever our Refuter says to the contrary, there must of necessity be a place for the Doctor's Conclusion, That the inward Acts of Christ's Love are more intense at one time then at another, though he make not intention a mere coacervation of homogeneous degrees, (i. e) degrees altogether like. And though Suarez Metaph. disp. 46. & Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza de Generate. & Corrupt. dist. 5 §. 6. (too very acute Authors, I grant) have showed the absurdity of this Position; yet this can in no respect reach the Doctor For 
Vide Suarez. Mot. disp. 5. sect. 8. § 21, 22. & disp. 46. sect. 3. §. 15, 16, etc.  they both speak of intention and remission of Qualities produced by successive and physical alteration; not of those that are produced by instaentaneous motion, as Light, nor of those that are produced by the free and voluntary operation of the Will, where the Acts are more or less gradually perfect at once, or successively, according to the good pleasure of the Will, as that is 
Vide ibid. §. 20, 21, 22.  pleased more or less vigorously to act, as we have in the last Section demonstrated. But you have given us frequent indications, that if you quote any thing out of a Metaphysician or a Schoolman, be it never so wide from the purpose, it is a good argument against Doctor Hammond, because he is a Critic. But, Sir, to show you further that Suarez and Hurtaedo's discourse does not any way concern Dr. Hammond. For does he not say expressly, that according to the multiplying of those Acts lengthening that Prayer, there must be still in Christ (I say not in every one of us, who, God knows, do often play the hypocrites) a proportionable multiplication of those Degrees, and so parallel to a greater length a greater intention? What could possibly have been said in a few words more or clearer to the purpose? And therefore our Refuter was either grossly ignorant, or wilfully perverse, to mistake his meaning, as if the Doctor had only talked of a multiplication of the inward Acts in number, according to the outward Prayers, as the superstitious and ignorant do count their Devotions on their Beads; and so from a greater number of Prayers, and outward and inward Acts of Devotion, numerically distinguished, and multiplied, he had concluded a multiplication in the Degrees of his Ardency, and an intention in his Zeal by a Coacervation of homogeneous degrees, no more united in the same Subject then discrete Quantities continuing still discrete are united in themselves. For now having cited Suarez and Hurtado against this absurdity, he goes on most triumphantly.  

JEANES.  
SIr, here I am very confident that you presumed very much on my ignorance, otherwise you would never have gone about to have imposed upon me so poor and sorry a sophism as is in the equivocation of the word Greater, which is easily discovered by a Freshman. For that you yourself should be ignorant of such an ordinary Homonymy, I am loath to harbour such dishonourable thoughts of your abilities in Philosophy as to imagine.   
§. 10. Well, Sir, notwithstanding your Confidence, I doubt not but I have evidenced that you are ignorant enough. And you are still so unhappy, as to discover your weakness most, when you cry up your own skill and parts and knowledge highest. For where, where is the Sophism and Equivocation of the word Greater? Does not every Freshman know that there is Quantitas virtutis, as well as Quantitas molis? And do we not say of a Man ordinarily, that he is a man of Great Virtues, or Knowledge, or Vices, as well as of great Bulk and Stature? The Doctor thought, Sir, he had writ to a Scholar, one that could have understood sense and reason, when it was urged. And without Sophisms and Equivocations he most solidly and rationally concluded (as all men in the world do) a greater measure of intention, a higher ardency in the inward Devotion of our Saviour from the length and continuance in the outward Devotion. He dreamt not that any man should be so ignorant as to understand him otherwise, and to think he spoke of a greatness of number and Quantity only, when he meant it of a greatness of Quality, and a gradual increase in intensive Perfection. But by this it appears what honourable thoughts you harbour, not only of the Doctor's abilities in Philosophy, but of his Ingenuity and Sincerity, and Integrity also in Morality.  
§. 11. But, Sir, since I find you to be a man of so great parts, I am content to sport an Argument with you. Suppose we then that the Doctor concludes a greater Ardency in Christ's Zeal and Devotion from the multiplying of the several Acts of Prayer, what absurdity will then follow? For does not the Scripture expressly say that he prayed the same words thrice? and in order to this (as Jansenius has rightly ordered it in his Catena, or Concordance) does not S. Luke add, that being in an Agony he prayed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more ardently? Is not this greater Ardency 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. Duest plicatio, iteratio vocis statim subiens priorem, familiaris Tragicis In magnis affectibus eâ utimur; significat enim perpetuitatem repraesentationis. O Misis, Misis! Ah Corydon, Corydon! hoc ex natura tra●tum est: etenim animalibus d●tus est motus ad fugiendum & a● consequendum. Igitur quae unico motu, puta saltu, appetitum locum nequeunt adipisci, cursu, qui est motus frequens, supplent. Jul. Scaliger Poet. l. 4. c. 29. Vide Quintilian. Institut. l. 9 c. 3. p. 425. l. Gerard. Vossi. Institut. Orator. part. 2. l. 5. c. 3. et ejusd. Part. Orat. lib 4. c. 13.  rightly inferred from his repetition and multiplication of the same words and Prayer thrice? For have you not heard of those Rhetorical Schemes, where the same word or words are repeated? And are not these repetitions by the Masters in that Art accounted as arguments of the vehemency or aggrandation of the inward affections? When the 
* 1 Kings▪ 18. 26.  Priests of Baal cried out from morning to noon, O Baal hear us, did they not express their inward false zeal to their Idol, by repeating still the same prayer? When the 
† Matth. 6. 7.  Gentiles used Repetitions in their prayers, our Saviour did not condemn those repetitions, as if they could not be arguments and testimonies of their inward zeal and Devotion, but because they expected to be heard for their very much babbling. Continuance then in prayer, and repetitions of the same words, may be arguments 
Nec prohibet longas Christus orationes, qui alibi perpetuas imperavit, sicut & D. Paulus; neque loqui cum oramus, neque repetitionibus uti, cum & ipse orando locutus sit, & ter eundem sermonem repetiverit infra: sed prohibet eo animo multum loqui, ut hominibus bene orare videamur (de hoc enim agebat) & existimantes facilius Deum multa quam pauca auditurum verba, ut statim exponit, Putant enim quod in multiloquio suo exaudiantur. Maldonat. in loc. Vid. H. Grotium, alios in locum, praecipue Luc Brugens. & Jansenium. Vid. Augustin. epist. 121. ad Probam viduam de orando Deo, cap. 8, 9, 10.  of a great Ardency in those that are truly zealous and religious, as appears by the example of our Saviour and S. Paul, and the whole world of Christians.  
§. 12. For first, as to continuance in prayer; did not our Blessed 
Vid hooker's Eccles. Pol. l. 5: §. 32.  Lord evidently demonstrate the vehemence of his intention and ardour of his soul, when he continued 
* Luke 6. 12:  whole nights together in prayer? When 
(a) Nehemiah 8. 3.  Ezra continued reading the Law from morning till noon, and the people patiently continued in their Attention, was it not an evident argument of a high and advanced Zeal and Devotion in both? When 
(b) Act. 20. 7.  S. Paul prayed and preached to the Disciples, and continued his speech till midnight, he gave as evident a demonstration of a strong desire of their instruction, as Eutychus, by his sleeping at the Apostles Sermon, did argue the dulness of his zeal, and the want of attention. You know the 
(c) Luke 18. 1, 2.  Parables of the importunate Widow, and the 
(d) Luke 11. 5, etc.  Friend that would not be satisfied with denials. They were spoken to this end, to teach us that men ought always to pray, and not to faint. But then 
* Effectus exterior non pertinet ad charitatem, nisi in quantum ex affectu procedit in quo primo est charitatisactus. Aquin. l. 3. Sent. d. 29. q. 1. art. 2. in Respons. in corp. Totum opus externum nullius momenti est apud Deum, nisi quatenus fluit & pendet ab interno actu debito & imperato, uti docet Apostolus 1 Cor. 13. 3. Davenant. de Just. Act. c. 42. p. 481.  Perseverance in prayer, and a multiplying those Acts, are therefore only acceptable to God, because they are the fruits and indications for 
(e) Matth. 12. 33.  a good tree is known by its fruit, says our Saviour) of true fervour of Spirit, and sincerity of the heart. The more we can patiently continue in this exercise, the greater is the fire of holy Love; as the Iron the more it has of fire in it, the longer it continues hot. Though the Apostle bids us to 
(f) 1 Thess. 5. 17.  pray without ceasing, and our Saviour says to us, 
(g) Luke 11. 9 Matt. 7. 7.  Ask and it shall be given, seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall be opened unto you: yet it is not the copiousness of our tongues in prayer, nor our continuance in our Prostrations, till we have made our knees hard as a Camels are, as it is reported of the Sister of Greg. Nazianzen, as I take it, or till we have worn our own shapes and effigies in the Pavement, as they say S. Jerome did, but only the 
† 
Suppono ex 1. 2. q. 20. & 21, proprium & formale meritum esse in actu elicito à voluntate: actus vero externos per se non addere meritum actui voluntatis, neque esse formaliter & intrinsecè meritorios, sed solum per extrinsecam denominationem ab actu meritorio voluntatis, à quo imperantur, & extrinsecè seu moraliter informantur, sicut etiam ab illo denominantur liberi & studiofis. Suarez. tom 1. in 3. p. Thom. disp. 39 sect. 2. p. 540. c. 8.  
Vid. Luc. Brugens. in Matt. 6 8.   truth of our Affection, the sprightliness of our zeal, and the piety of our minds, that God doth accept of. One single sigh and ejaculation, one, 
(a) 
Luc. 18. 13.  
Nihil interest ad perfectionem & meritum, quam multa aut quam magna opera externa fancies, sed quantâ fide & charitate internâ feceris. Verbi causâ, non est in perfectiori statu aut magis meritorio qui sapius jejunaverit, qui plures & longiores orationes Deo obtulerit, qui pauperibus plura largitus fuerit, quique in caeteris operibus externis excelluerit; nam in hisce omnibus Pharisaei vicorunt discipulos Christi: sed is in perfectiori statu reputatur, qui praecellit internâ fide, charitate, pietate, atque externa opera exercet prout charitatis ac prudentiae lex dictaverit. Name (ut loquitur Schola) quorumcunque actus interiores sunt ejusdem rationis & intentionis, eorum merita sunt aequalia. Davenant. de Justit. Actuali, c. 41. p. 476, 477.   Lord have mercy on me, from the mouth of an humble Publican, is more pleasing to his ears then a prayer of eight and forty hours long (and such a one we read of in Ecclesiastical story) that proceeds from Superstition and a vanity of mind. And yet God accepts of the Fruits for the goodness sake of the Tree from whence they spring. And even the multiplied Acts of Prayer are more valuable in his sight, when they come from true zeal and integrity of Spirit, and not from hypocritical pretences and customary Profession. As our overquick dispatch in so important a duty would give the world occasion to suspect we did but little value that service, wherein so little time is bestowed: so continuance in prayer, and the multiplying the Acts of it to a greater degree of length (as also standing, kneeling, and prostration on the face) have been all the world over approved of as marks of Devotion; and they are not only justified by our Saviour's practice, but God Almighty has declared his acceptance of them, for the devotions sake from whence they spring, and where they are not hypocritical and counterfeit. And hence it was that the Primitive Christians called their 
* Vide Tertul. l. de Orat. c. 14. p. 155. A ex edit Rigalt. Confer l de Jejuniis, c. 1 pag 701. C &c 2. p. 702. A. etc. 10. p. 708. A. D. etc. 13. p. 7 11.  Wednesdays and Fridays Fasts and Humiliations, Dies stationarii, and their Devotions stationes, because not only they continued in them till * three in the afternoon, but performed them constantly also 
† 
Vide H Grotium in Annotat. ad Matth. 6. 5. verbo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 140▪ Confer quae vir doctissimus annotavit ad cap. 18. Luca, vers 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut & quae habet ad cap. 3. Act. Apost. vers. 1.  
And therefore the Judicious Hooker renders the place in Tertullia's second book ad uxorem, c. 4. p. 189. C. Si statio facienda est, Maritus de die condicat ad Balneas, thus, If her presence be required at the time of Station, or standing Prayer, he chargeth her at no time but that to be present with him in his Baths. Hooker Ecclesias. Pol. l. 5. §. 41. p. 264.   standing. Their giving no ease to the body in their public prayers, and their perseverance and continuing in it, were fruits and effects and arguments of the Primitive Devotion. And is it not usual with us upon public days of Humiliation to have 3 or 4 Preachers, and as many to pray, for the service? And are not we willing by these multiplied Acts of Devotion, and our whole day's continuance in them, to testify the deep sense of our humiliation, and the sincerity of our Repentance, and the utmost height of our Devotion? We truly guess at the strength and quickness of the Bow, and the vigour of the Arm that draws it, by the further flight of the Arrow.  
§. 13. But then, as in those who are truly pious, the multiplying of the Acts of Prayer, and a longer continuance in the performing that duty, does argue a greater Ardency of Devotion; so 2ly, the frequent repetition of the same words does much more express the inward fervour of the Spirit. As the multiplying of Circles in a Pond or River, or the continued revolutions in a Wheel or Top, do argue the more violent descent of the Stone into the water, and the strenger violence and force impressed into the Wheel or Top. And therefore we read that our Saviour in his bloody Agony did not only pray thrice, and so prolixius, but also the same words, and therefore in respect of them both intensius also. When Beggars would express their utmost earnestness, and the violence of their desires of a relief of their wants, they redouble their Petitions in the same language; and it had not been taken up for a Custom among the men of that trade, if there had not been an argument and evidence of truth it it all the world over. When blind Bartimaeus and his fellow-begger understood that Jesus passed by, they lift up their voices and cried, still 
Mark 10. 46. Luc. 18. 35. Matth: 20. 30. Quo magis turba obstrepebat, tanto vehementius caecus clamabat, eadem iterans sanctâ improbitate, declarans hac ratione ardens desiderium, & invictum fidei robur, etc. Jansen. Concord. Evangel. cap. 105. p. 741. col. 2. C. D. Vide Luc. Brugens. in Matt. c. 20. ver. 1. 2. & H. Grot. ibid.  redoubling the same words, Jesus, thou son of David, have mercy on us. And when the Company reproved this practice of the Beggar in them, the Text says, they cried the more earnestly, saying the same words. And our Saviour, that as well knew the fervour of the heart as the noise and language of the tongue, did rightly measure the inward Devotion of the Spirit by their out-cries and redoubling of their Prayers. Even he himself, to express his inward grief, and earnest long after the comfortable influence of the Godhead now restrained, cries out upon the Cross, My God, my 
Matt. 27. 46.  God, why hast thou forsaken me?  
§. 14. As then the Doctor did truly and most demonstratively conclude and argue an increase of the inward fervour and ardency of our Saviour's Devotion, from the multiplying of the exterior Acts of Prayer, and so from a greater length in them did infer, by way of Proportion, a greater intention in the inward Acts of his Love and Zeal and Devotion: So shall I also as firmly and as evidently conclude this aggrandation, and more than ordinary intenseness, in the inward Acts of his Devotion, by his more than ordinary use and repetition and redoubling of the same Prayer.  
§. 15. Our Refuter then did either ignorantly or wilfully mistake the Doctor's meaning. For he never took a number for a single Quality, nor argued the gradual increase of Christ's ardency from the multiplying of so many several Acts of Prayer of the same gradual perfection, all numerically distinct. For though Children and Fools mistake a Posy for a single flower, yet Wise men know it is a bundle. And so I proceed to the next Section, wherein the Doctor further evidences his Assertion, upon that supposal that the vulgar reading of place were to be approved, as our Refuter would have it.   

SECTION 15.  
The pertinency of the Doctor's Argument, and impertinence of the Refuters Charge. The Doctor's Argument à Posteriori from the necessary relation between the work and the reward. Not understood by the Refuter. The outward work more valuable in God's sight, for the inward Fervour and Devotion. The Refuters Petitio principii. Works in a Physical sense what, and what in a Moral. The Refuters discourse of the infinite value of Christ's merit arising from the dignity of his person. Nothing to the purpose. The dignity of a moral Action, according to the Physical Entity of the Act, or according to the dignity of the Person performing it. The Actions of Christ in regard of his Person infinite in value. Not so in regard of their substantial Moral goodness. Proved: and acknowledged by our Refuter's own Suarez. Consequently in this regard they might exceed one another in Moral Perfection. The Doctor's Argument that it was so in Christ. The appositeness of the Proof. The Scriptures say the same.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
§. 34. THis is clear, and I need not add what else I might, the very multiplication of more Acts of any Virtue supposing it equally sincere in the Habit (and such is the length of Prayer when it is in Christ) is more valuable in the sight of God, & that argues it more excellent than the smaller number of those Acts would be, and proportionably more abundantly rewarded by him who rewardeth every man, not only according to the sincerity of his heart, but also secundum opera, according to the multiplied Acts or works, the more abundant labour proceeding from this sincerity. And so that will suffice for his first answer.   
§. 1. To this our Refuter returns;  

JEANES.  
FIrst, this is an utter Impertinency unto that which is in debate between us, etc.   
§. 2. Grande crimen, Caie Caesar, si probetur! But what if it appear in the issue most evidently to prove the Doctor's Position? will not then our Refuter betray as great Ignorance as Impertinence in this rejoinder? And now to show the Appositeness of the Proof, I must tell him what either he knows not, or will not observe, That the Doctor again argues à posteriori, from the Effect to the Cause, and the necessary relation between the work and the reward. His argument is founded upon a maxim of distributive Justice, not expressed, but supposed and intimated, 
Vide Suarez. 3. p. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 39 sect. 1. p. 537. col. 1.  and it is this; Where the reward does proceed of debt, as in Christ certainly it did, and is properly wages, there must be a proportionable increase of the reward and the work. And therefore 
* 1 Tim. 5. 18.  since the labourer is worthy of his hire, and 
† Gen. 18. 25.  God the Judge of all the world must needs do right; we may most evidently and demonstratively prove the gradual increase in the perfection of any Act of virtue, from a proportionable increase in the reward that he gives; because, as the Scripture testifies, he rewards every man not only according to the sincerity of his 
Matth. 16. 27. 2 Cor. 5 10.  heart, but also secundum opera, according to the multiplied Acts or works, the more abundant labour, as the Doctor says truly, proceeding from this sincerity. For it is this inward heart-devotion that God alone regards; this, this is the thing that gives life and vigour to the outward work, and makes it acceptable in God's sight: and if this go not always with the outward Act or work, God looks upon it as the sacrificing and cutting off the neck of a dog, and pouring the blood of a man upon his Altar. But then because the outward works are the fruits and effects of the inward Devotion, and ordinarily as these are more noble, so also is the Love and sincerity more strongly increased, God, for the inward Fervours sake, does reward men secundum opera, according to the multiplied Acts or outward works.  
§. 3. Well then, if the very multiplication of more outward Acts and works (for such only the Doctor means) of any virtue be more valuable in the sight of God (as without doubt they are) who rewards every man according to his works, and this because the more abundant labour in the outward Act proceeds from the greater fervour and intenseness of the inward Act, which alone gives life to it, it will evidently follow, that the length of Prayer (the outward Oraizon he means) in Christ is more valuable in the sight of God (as the work is in itself considered, and without relation to the Person that does it; for of the work in its own nature considered the Doctor speaks, as appears by the whole current of his discourse) and that must needs argue it more excellent (in regard of the intensive Perfection of the inward Act, which is that alone which God values) than the smaller number of those Acts would be. And this as it clearly proves the Doctor's Assertion, so it was the whole he aimed at in this argument.  
§. 4. But our Refuter will give us his reason why he does charge it with impertinency.  

JEANES.  
FOr suppose that the very multiplication of more inward Acts of any virtue in Christ is more valuable in the sight of God, and so more excellent than the smaller number of those Acts would be; yet this supposition will never bring you to this conclusion, That one inward Act of Christ's love of God may be more intense then another: and my reason is, because in all these inward Acts of Christ's love of God (and we may say the same of the inward Acts of other virtues and graces) there may be no gradual dissimilitude.   
§. 5. But why, I pray Sir, may or must there be no gradual difference of the inward Acts of Christ's love of God, or holy Charity, and other inward Acts of other virtues and graces? Good Sir, give us a proof of this. Is it therefore an irrefragable demonstration, because you usher it in so gravely with a Because, and this is my reason? But, good Sir, know you not that this is still Petitio principii, and the Controversy between you and the Doctor? And do you not prove still idem per idem, thus, The inward Acts of Christ's Love are not gradually different, or, which is all one, they are gradually the same; my reason is, because in them there may be no gradual dissimilitude? If this be not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I know not what your great Master Aristotle means.  
§. 6. How the Doctor's supposition has inferred his Conclusion has already appeared, and the folly also of what you have urged against it. But it is no wonder that you argue so absurdly, when you understand not the Discourse you undertake to refute. For, Sir, the Doctor does not argue from the multiplication of the inward Acts, as you suppose him, but from the multiplication of the outward Acts or works, and from the greater reward that attends them, he concludes the more noble and intensive Perfection of the inward Act from whence they flow; as the more abundance of fruit argues the rich vigorousness and plenty of the vital sap of the Tree, and the less argues either the unseasonableness of the year, or the decay of the Stock. For you yourself have told us that works signify those that are outward; how properly, has already been showed in the sense you spoke of it. The truth is, that works in a Physical consideration never signify the Elicite Acts of the Will, but the issues and Effects of them, whether inward or outward; whether immanent, as in a Syllogism purely mental, or trunsient, as in the imperate Acts of the Will: though certain it is, as we have showed, that the inward and outward Act both concur to the essence and constitution of a Moral work or Action.  
§. 7. But he goes on as gravely as if his words were all Oracles.  

JEANES.  
A Great part of the Schoolmen will tell you, that the moral virtue of one single Act of any virtue in Christ was infinite, and in the multiplication of more Acts there is but an infinite value: now one infinite cannot be greater than another infinite in the same kind wherein it is infinite; and hereupon they conclude that the multiplication of Acts makes nothing in Christ unto an intensive addition of value. The value of one Act is intensively as great as that of more Acts. The first Act of Christ (says Albertinus) habet totam latitudinem intensivam valoris moralis, etsi non adaequet totam latitudinem extensivam, Corol. tom. 1. 150. n. 61. And of this you have a reason p. 145. this Act is à persona divina, tanquam à forma intrinseca; quae in trinsecè denominatur operans ab ipsa operatione quae est in humana natura, & ut sic est illimitabilis à conditionibus Actus. Unto Albertinus I shall subjoin Suarez, who speaks to the same purpose in 3am part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 4. sect. 4. pag. 94. Plura opera Christi sunt quidem extensiuè pluramerita; intensiuè tamen non est plus valoris in multis quam in uno: ut, si essent plures Calores infinitè intensi, essent quidem plures, non tamen efficerent unum intensiorem. Et pari ratione, si in uno opere Christi, quod successiuè per partes fiebat, parts cum toto comparemus, intensiuè tantus valor erat in qualibet parte sicut in toto opere, & in uno momento sicut in longo tempore, quia forma, à qua erat valour, tota erat in toto, & tota in singulis partibus.   
§. 8. But what if all this Discourse do now prove to be nothing at all to the purpose, and that Suarez and Albertinus are brought in to tell the Doctor that which he knew better than our Refuter? For if he had so pleased he might have found this Doctrine, of the infinite value of Christ's Merits, because they were the merits of an infinite person, even in the Practical 
Doctor Hammonds Pract. Catechism, l. 1. sect. 1. p. 5. sect. 2. p. 11. 12. & 19 20, 24, 25, l. 5. sect. 2. p. 281.  Catechism. For how else should the Doctor ground that Doctrine, of Christ's tasting death for every man, which is charged upon him as Arminianism, when yet it is the very words of the 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Heb. 2. 9  Scripture, and the Church's Catechism, that was published before Arminius was born? His death and sufferings being but finite, must receive a proportionable value to a world of sinners only from the dignity of his Person, as the Doctor in his Writings has declared, before you ever put him to School to Albertinus and Suarez.  
§. 9 And therefore that I may show that this whole Discourse of the Refuter is besides the purpose, it will be necessary to consider, that the Dignity of a Moral Action may either be considered according to the substance of the Act, and the gradual perfection of it, according to the Physical Entity and real goodness in it, or according to the moral value that accrues unto it from the dignity and worth of the person that performs it. The same Action may in the same height, and degree, and perfection of Real goodness be performed by a private Subject which is performed by a Prince in State, or a Judge upon the Bench; and yet it has nothing of that legal and civil value as the other has, because it is the Action of a Subject.  
§. 10. If therefore the Acts of Christ be considered according to the moral value that arises from the Person that performs them, the merit of them is infinite, because they are the Acts of a Divine Person. Actiones enim (says Suarez excellently) per se sunt suppositorum: & ideo substantial is dignit as & 
Suarez. in 3. p. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 4. sect. 4. p. 43. col. 1. A. B. D.  perfectio ipsius Personae semper per se confert ad valorem & dignitatem ipsius operis, quia in suo genere semper influit in illud. And therefore the Action performed by such a Person is called Theandrica, the Action of God-man. And hence is it, that one Action of Christ in this respect cannot be of greater value than another, but all of necessity must be equal, because the value of every one of them is infinite; and therefore the multiplying of their number may make them extensively more, yet intensively there can be no more of value and merit in many then in one, because that which is infinite in value can in that respect be but one, and no more, and of the same equal perfection still, because it can be but infinite.  
§. 11. But then, if we shall consider these Acts of Christ that flowed from the Habit of Divine Grace in him according to the proper and intrinsic goodness that really is in them, they may be different in themselves, and one may be more perfect in respect of gradual intention than another. And therefore 
Suarez. in 3. p. Thom. disp. 4. sect. 4. p 45. col. 1. E. F. tom. 1.  Suarez acknowledges even in that very Section you quote, valorem hunc qu●m habet actus in ordine ad meritum esse quid distinctum à reali bonitate quae est differentia ipsius actus prout constituitur in esse virtutis, vel illi aliquo modo intrinsecè inhaeret— hic ergo valor non dicit physicam entitatem inhaerentem actui, sed supponit illam, & aliquas etiam denominationes extrinsec as, ut libertatem, & habitudinem ad talem personam, & consistit in morali quadam ratione & aestimatione ipsius actus: hac igitur ratione quamvis omnes Actus Christi in se fuerint finiti in entitate, atque adeo in bonitate morali intrinsecè inhaerente, nihilominus potuerunt esse infiniti valoris moralis ex personae dignitate provenientis. He had before determined, Ad hunc moralem effectum 
Suarez in 3. p. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 4. sect. 4. p. 44. D. E. F.  non oportere fingere proprium influxum physicum ipsius Personae per se ipsam in actiones humanitatis distinctum ab illo quem habet per ipsam humanitatem, ita ut ipsa divina personalitas sit aliquo modo principium aut ratio operandi tales actiones. Hoc enim nec Philosophicum est; quia licet actiones sunt suppositorum, tamen personalit as neque est ratio agendi, neque formale principium actionum: neque Theologicum; quia personalit as divina, ut sic, non est operativa, seu ratio operandi ipsi Personae, sed haec est Divinitas per intellectum vel voluntatem; tum etiam quia illa personalitas supplet in humanitate Christi munus personalitatis propriae, & ideo physicè non aliter ad actus concurrit quam concurreret propria. Concurrit ergo terminando & sustentando ipsam naturam, & ex hoc fit ut non natura, sed ipsa persona ineffabiliter composita, sit quae principaliter operatur: Et hoc satis est ut per seipsam sanctificet tam ipsam naturam quam actus, & conferat illis valorem & dignitatem. Hinc— dicitur non esse parem rationem de limitatione actus in esse entis, & in valour morali: quia actus habet proxime totam entitatem suam physicam à principio agendi, & in principio agendi, si immanens sit; valour autem moralis immediatè sumitur ab ipsa persona operante, quatenus moraliter informat ipsos actus, & denominat illos divinos.  
§. 12. And therefore the actions of the humane Nature, though performed by a Divine person, being in their own Physical entity finite, and consequently so also in respect of that moral goodness that is intrinsically inhaerent in them, nothing hinders but that one in this respect may be better and more intensely perfect then another, as well as one grief and torment which he suffered was greater than another. And therefore the same Suarez, even in that very Page and Column, and in the §. immediately preceding that passage that our Refuter has quoted, 
Suarez. in 3m m p. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 4. sect. 4. p. apud me 46. col. 1. A. B.  expressly says to this purpose: Primum omnium fatendum esse opera Christi fuisse inaequalia in propria bonitate intrinseca & essentiali, vel realiter inhaerente ipsi actui: quia, ut dictum est, tota haec bonit as erat sinita, poterat ergo esse major & minor, & aliunde unum opus Christi erat melioris Objecti quam aliud, & unum intensius alio, & sic de aliis circumstantiis, ergo erant vel poterant esse inaequalia in hac bonitate. And will not every man think that our Refuter was a man of great Judgement and Parts, and fit to quote Suarez against Doctor Hammond? But I rather think he was misguided by some Notes, and that he never consulted the Authors he quotes, but took them upon trust: otherwise methinks it is impossible he should be so strangely deceived.  
§. 13. Well then, it being so clear and evident in itself, and so acknowledged by our Refuters own Suarez, (for Albertinus I have not by me) that though every Act of Christ in respect of the Person that performed it was of infinite, and so of an equal intensive value, yet in respect of the real entity and substance of the Act and the Moral goodness inhering in it it was sinite, as the Humane nature itself wherein it was performed, nothing hinders but they, being finite, might exceed one another in gradual perfection and intenseness, & in that moral goodness that was intrinsically inherent in them.  
§. 14. Seeing then that nothing ab intrinseco hinders but that this might be so, the Doctor now, like a rational man and a Scholar, here brings his Medium to prove that de facto it was so.  
§. 15. And as the subject matter of the present discourse was only the moral goodness and different gradual perfection in the Acts of this habitual Grace, so he makes use of such Medium's that properly concern that Subject. The Moral value arising from the Dignity of the Person that performed it, would make nothing to the purpose. And therefore, though he knew it as well as our Refuter, yet being loath, contrary to the laws of Art and Method, transire à Genere ad Genus, he would take no notice of it, but keep close to the present argument.  
§. 16. And proved his assertion he has by a very clear and apposite medium, his Argument rightly proceeding from the Reward to the Work.  
For though all the Actions of Christ, as weighed in the scale of Merit, at the great Tribunal were valued (actually valued I say) according to the dignity of the Person, and not the finite goodness really inherent in the Acts; yet nothing hinders but even the gradual perfection in the Acts themselves, & their multiplied numbers and works, as they may and were by God considered in themselves, so, a● thus in and by themselves considered, they may be more or less valuable, & so might be capable of a greater reward, though de facto they were not so valued, but according to the dignity of the Person. And therefore nothing hinders but from this different valuableness of the goodness of the outward Acts, the sincerity and intenseness of the inward Acts might be collected. For most plain it is, that the Scriptures tell us that God rewards every man according to his work. And therefore if God de facto thus proceed in the rewarding of the Acts of all other men, the Acts & operations of the virtues of Christ, as considered according to their own real and intrinsic goodness, might be valuable also in his sight. For why that Moral goodness intrinsically inherent in the Act, and à qua, as Suarez tells us, Actus dicitur bonus moraliter & actus virtutis, should not in the Actions of Christ be valuable in God's sight, I see no reason, since it is so in respect of all other men besides. And this was that which the Doctor alone aimed at. For this is all that he says, The very multiplication of more Acts of any virtue, supposing it equally sincere in the Habit (and such is the length of Prayer when it is in Christ) is more valuable in the sight of God, & that argues it more excellent than the smaller number of those Acts would be.  
§. 17. And if I be not very much deceived, the Scripture speaks very agreeably to this purpose. For it tells us expressly that, 
| Rom. 5. 8.  God commendeth his love toward us, in that whilst we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. And is it not the commendation of Christ's Love, that he 
* Gal. 2. 20.  loved us, and gave himself for us? And if, as our Saviour himself testifies, 
† Joh. 15. 13. Vide Bernard. in Serm. Feriae 4. hebdomadae ● tae. Joh. 10. 15. 17. Addo quarto, si considerentur opera Christi ut erant sub divina ordinatione, & sub relatione illius operantis, plus meruisse vel satisfecisse toto vitae suae tempore quam singulis operibus, & aliquid effecisse seu obtinuisse uno tempore & non alio, etc.— Ex hoc enim intelligitur quinto, quamobrem redemptio nostra passioni & morti Christi specialiter tribuatur, cum non per solam illam, sed per omnia opera quae in vita mortali Christus operatus est, nobis meruerit, & pro nobis satisfecerit. Ratio est, etc. Vide ampl. Suarez. in tert. part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 1. sect. 4. p. 50. col. 1. F. & col .... A. B. C. and immediately after it follow the words cited by the Refuter against the Doctor.  that greater love has no man then to lay down his life for his friend, than it must be the most transcendent Act of love in Christ to die for his enemies. And that so it was valuable and accounted in God's sight, seems evident to me from that saying of our Saviour, who tells us that therefore does his Father love him, because he laid down his life for the sheep.  
§. 18. But the Doctor seems not much to insist upon this argument (for in the Introduction to it he says, I need not add what else I might) and therefore I shall forbear the further prosecution of it, and go on to the next Section.   

SECT. 16.  
The second part of the Refuters second answer. The distinct Confession of all the Doctor pretends to. The English translation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (more earnestly) justified. The Refuter's Nonsense. What Ardency in Christ it was that was heightened Luk. 22. 43. Comprehensor, Viator what. In what state, whether of Comprehensor or Viator, Christ was in a Capacity to pray, as that signifies either Petition, Deprecation, or Thanksgiving: and this whether only for others, or also for himself. Of Prayer, and the several kinds. Whether though Christ were in a capacity thus to pray, yet being God, that was able of himself to accomplish whatsoever he might desire as Man, it was expedient for him to do so: and whether God had so determined. What things Christ might and did pray for, both for himself and others. Mr. Hooker commended. Whether Christ did in truth and reality, or only in show, pray for a removal of that Cup which he came on purpose to drink. Whether these Prayers and Desires were not repugnant to God's Decree, and the end of his coming into the world, and his own peremptory resolution to drink it. How those desires for a removal of this Cup might be advanced, notwithstanding his readiness and resolution to drink it. How Christ's Ardency in Prayer for a removal of this Cup might be increased above what it either was, or there was occasion for, at other times. Of the greatness of his Agony and bloody sweat. How his Zeal in Prayer at this time might be advanced, without derogation from the fullness of his habitual Grace, the impeccability of his Soul, and the uninterrupted happiness of it, and perfect Love as he was Comprehensor. Strictures on the former part of the Refuters second Answer.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
§. 35. But, then, 2ly, says he, suppose we stick unto our own translation; yet the place may fairly be so interpreted, as that it may no ways advantage the purpose of the Doctor: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more earnestly, may be considered in reference either to the Object unto whom he prayed, God, or the matter against which he prayed, the evils with which he conflicted in his agony.  
First then, he did not in his Agony pray more earnestly then at other times, if we consider his Prayer in reference unto the Object unto whom it was, God. The religion and inward worship of his Prayer was for Degrees always alike equal. His trust and dependence upon God, love of zeal and devotion towards God, from which all his Prayers flowed, were not at one time more intense then at another.  
But now 2ly, he prayed more earnestly in his Agony then at other times, in regard of the matter against which he prayed, the evils which he encountered with, which if they were not greater than those that he deprecated in the former prayer, v. 42. yet at least they made a greater impression upon his humane nature, for they put him into a bloody sweat. Being in an Agony he prayed more earnestly, and his sweat was as it were drops of blood falling down to the ground.  
§. 36. These are the words of his second answer, and they are in the second part, the very distinct confession of all that I pretend in this matter (and therefore I need not make reflections on the first part of them:) for whatsoever or how great soever the occasion of the increase of his intention was (which I am willing to believe proportionable to the degree of the intention, a very weighty occasion that thus inflamed his Ardency) yet still 'tis confessed; that on this occasion he now prayed more earnestly then at other times, that which now approached made a greater impression on his humane nature; which what is it but a proof of the point by me asserted, that Christ himself was more ardent in one Act of prayer (this in his Agony) then in another?  
§. 37. As for the greatness of the occasion, so profestly great as to cast him into that prodigious sweat, falling 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it were drops of blood, that may testify, but it cannot prejudge the ardency which was occasioned thereby.  
§. 38. 'Twas not in Christ (he will easily suppose with me) as it is oft discernible in many of us, that those which really have no sincerity of love or zeal to God, can yet, like the Mariners in the Tempest, by some pressing fear or danger be awaked to, but formal and, be they never so loud, hypocritically zealous prayers.  
§. 39 The Ardency in Christ was sincere ardency, accompanied with acts of love & trust of the same temper, and the heightening it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, was an addition of Degrees to that Act of Ardency, and so of prayer, and proportionably of love and trust in God, above either what there was, or what there was occasion for at other times.   
§. 1. To this our Refuter does reply very much, & yet not a word to the purpose: which that I may clearly demonstrate, I shall follow him step by step.  

JEANES.  
1. FIrst, you pretend in Sect. 21. of this your Reply, that the inward acts of Christ's love of God were more intense at one time then another. Now this is not contained expressly, nor can it by any Logic be inferred from the words of the second part of my second answer, that he prayed more earnestly in his Agony then at other times, in regard of the matter against which he prayed, etc. and therefore this second part of my second answer is not the very distinct confession of all that you pretend in this matter; and therefore notwithstanding them, you must make reflections on the first part of my answer, or else you will never reply thereunto.   
§. 2. To this I answer, that what our Refuter says the Doctor pretends in his 21th. Section is an undeniable Truth, and not only the Doctor, but I also after him have most clearly demonstrated, that the Inward Acts of Christ's Love of God, or the all-full and perfect Habit of Divine Charity, were more intense at one time then at another; and then further I have proved, that of necessity they must be so; and this I have further confirmed by evident clear testimonies from some of the prime Schoolmen, ancient and modern. And if the Doctor never pretended to no more than this in any part of his writings, than I must tell you, Sir, that if this Proposition also may be Logically inferred from these words of your second Answer, although it be not there expressed, than the Doctor most rationally asserted that this second part of your second answer was the very distinct confession of all that he pretended in that matter, and therefore he neither than had, nor shall hereafter need to make any reflections on the first part of your answer, because his reply is very solid and sufficient without it. And yet, Sir, by the way, give me leave to tell you, that I may, to gratify you, make some reflections on it before you and I part.  
§. 3. And now that I may clearly prove that this assertion of the Doctors is most rationally & logically collected from the words of the second part of your second answer, it will be necessary that I first prove and justify the truth of our Translation, from whence the Doctor first collected that truth which has since been questioned by you. The words are Luke 22. 43. And being in an Agony 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he prayed more earnestly. So our Translators.  
§. 4. It is true (and the Doctor has granted it) that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does primarily signify extension and length, and therefore the Vulgar and Erasmus do here, according to the original signification, render it prolixius orabat. But than it is as true, that by a Trope 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does also signify ardency and fervour: and in this sense it is twice used in Saint Peter; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Pet. 4. 8. And above all things have servant Charity among yourselves; so again 1 Pet. 1. 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, see that ye love one another with a pure heart servently, and accordingly the Vulgar also reads it there, ex corde invicem diligite attentius. And Beza in both places intensam and intensé. The word then being in Scripture indifferently used to signify fervour and intenseness, as well as length and extension, and so equally serving both Translations, we must by other arguments then what the Grammatical notion of the word affords, inquire the meaning of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in this place.  
§. 5. The Evangelist was now describing the greatness of our Saviour's present Agony, and he does it, as 
* Quarto, amplificatur anxietas illa ex effectis ●●tbus, Corroboratione per Angelum, v. 43 Precationis intensione, v. 44 & Sudore sanguineo.  Piscator well observes, by three most remarkable instances. So great it was that, first, an Angel was sent to comfort him; and secondly, so great it was, that he prayed more earnestly then formerly; and 3ly, it cast him into that strange and prodigious sweat, falling as it were drops of blood through all his clothes to the very ground. He but a little before had made use of a far longer prayer 
Joh. 17.  for his Disciples and the Church then now he did, and he had also continued far longer at his Devotions then now: for the same Saint Luke before 
Luke 6. 12.  tells us, that he spent whole nights in Prayer. But as he never had the like horror and anxiety and dread, so he never prayed so earnestly. The greatness of the occasion did now heighten and advance his ardency and vehemence of Spirit. And therefore the Apostle Heb. 5. 7. takes notice of this more than ordinary fervour, who in the days of his flesh (says he, when the greatness of his Agony, and sufferings, and terrors, did as well testify the frailty as the truth of his humane nature) when he had offered up prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, unto him that was able to save him from death, and was heard in that he feared, or for his Piety, the greatness and the Ardour of it, as some; or delivered from that he so greatly feared, as others. Howsoever it be understood in this part, yet certain it is, this strong crying and tears can refer to no other than this that he made in the garden, when he cried out, Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me. For we read but of 2. prayers or 3. at most that he made upon the Cross: the first was for his Enemies, Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do; and 2ly when he was now upon giving up the Ghost, Father, into thy hands I commend my Spirit; which though he poured crying with a loud voice, yet the scene of his bloody bitter torments and sufferings being now ended, and the Consummatum est already pronounced, it was an argument of his voluntary yielding up the Ghost, not at all of his fear and dread. And then thirdly, as for his 
* Deus meus, ut quid dereliquisti me? vox est nec ignorantiae, nec diffidentiae, nec querelae, sed admirationis tantum, quae aliis investigandae causae ardorem & diligentiam acuit. Hug. the Sacrament. l. 2. part. 1. c. 10. as I find it cited by Hooker.  crying out, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? it was rather an expostulation, and a prayer to be delivered and supported and comforted in the midst of his afflictions, then to be freed and delivered from them; if it were not also, as some learned men think, a Memento to the Jews, to take notice that he was that Messiah, that Person whom David had foretold of in that Psalm, the beginning whereof he now repeated, if he said it not throughout, as some very learned men conjecture. If they would but call to mind that Psalm of David that began with, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? and well consider it, they might now see the Prophecy so exactly fulfilled in every minute circumstance, as if the Penman had rather been an Historian than a Prophet, and rather related what he now had seen done, then foretold it as future. Add to this, that Saint Matthew and Saint Mark have both left upon record the very Prayer verbatim that our Saviour used. And that is so short, that it makes but one verse; and this Prayer he used twice, if not thrice; for again he went away, says Saint Mark, and prayed and spoke the same words. And therefore Jansenius, to preserve the Reputation 

Mark 14. 39 Lucas trinam Christi orationem, quasi vunam, eo quod idem semper petebatur, complexus est; unde dicit eum factum in Agonia prolixius orâsse. Prolixius enim orâsse dicens, tres illas orandi vices, quae sigillatim alii duo Evangelistae prosecuti sunt, complexus est, etc. quod ergo Lucas dicit Dominum factum in agonia prolixius orasse; Mattheus & Marcus suâ narratione expressius extulerunt, prolixius enim orâsse docent, quia ter eum orâsse testantur. Jansen. Concord. c. 137. p. 990. col. 1. 2.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] Solennis numerus itaerandarum precum quoties quid majus acciderat; unde Paulus, 2 Cor. 12. 8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. H. Grot. Annot. in Matth. 26. v. 44. p. 482.   of the Vulgar Translation, when he found it on record that our Saviour's prayer was so short, refers this prolixius of the Vulgar to his thrice saying the same Prayer; as if he had prayed longer than ordinary, because now he prayed oftener. But then the lengthening of his prayer, in this sense, is so far from prejudging, that it rather argues and concludes the greater vehemency and fervency in his Prayer; since continuance in Prayer, and repetition of the same words, is an evident fruit and certain Argument of the greater ardour and vehemence of affection, as has already been declared. Add to this (what the most excellent Grotius has observed upon the place) that 
† Augescente dolore intendebat vim precationis, gestu quoque id ipsum exprimens; nam ante genua flexerat, nunc toto corpore in terram procumbit, ut ex Matthaeo & Marco diximus: eo autem situ corporis orare viri sancti solebant in extrema necessitate. Quare errant qui hic confundunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, aut 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hoc enim est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. H. Grot. in loc.  the very posture he now made use of does argue a more than ordinary vehemence and zeal and intenseness. For before he prayed kneeling, but now he falls prostrate and flat upon his face; which as it is an argument of the most deep and profound humiliation, so it is an effect and symptom of the most vehement Ardour and fervency in Prayer. And therefore says Grotius on the place, Augescente dolore intendebat vim precationis, gestu quoque id ipsum exprimens. And the accurate 
* Beza in loc..  Beza, though the Vulgar and Erasmus read prolixius, says, by way of correction of this reading, Ego verò malo ad ipsam orationis qualitatem referre tum hoc loco, tum alibi: and consequently in his Version he renders it intensius orabat. With him agrees Piscator, and he gives his reason, as we have seen; and accordingly the French, the Dutch, the Spanish, the Italian do all render it as they do. And thus we have both Reason, and the consent of the most eminent modern Translations, and three of the best literal Expositors, all concurring with our Translation to the justifying of Doctor Hammond. And therefore if it be true, as without doubt it is, that our Saviour was now more ardent in Prayer then formerly, I doubt not but with as great evidence and clearness to infer from it the Doctor's assertion of a greater intenseness in this Act of Charity then at other times. For if Ardency in Prayer be an high Act of Piety and Devotion (as without doubt it is, since the Apostle charges us to be fervent in 
Jam. 5. 16. Ephes. 6. 18. Colos. 4. 2. 1 Pet. 4. 7.  prayer,) and that be an Act of Divine Charity and holy Love; than it will evidently follow (and our Refuter must not deny it) that if this Ardency of our Saviour was, in this his Agony, so heightened and inflamed, that now he prayed more earnestly (then formerly without doubt, for the Comparative imports more degrees than the Positive with which it is compared) then this inward Act of Christ's Love and holy Charity at least was more intense at one time, than another: and consequently, if our Refuter grant the one (as plainly he does in the words of his second Part of his second answer,) he must of necessity grant the other, as the Doctor had inferred; quod erat demonstrandum.  
§. 6. But he thinks he has sufficiently prevented this sequel by that which he has added in this Reply, as also he had done in the words of the second part of his second answer. For he says  

JEANES.  
2. THat the Ardency of Christ was a sincere ardency is not doubted of: all the question is, what ardency it was in Christ that was heightened.   
§. 7. Sir, you whose reserches are so curious, that you can find knots in Bul-rushes, and write nothing but Quodlibets, may question any thing: you may doubt whether it be day when the Sun is in its Zenith; you may make the world believe Doctor Hammond understands not the import of his own mother-tongue. But they who will not be wilfully blind, and complain for want of light in the midst of the Sunshine, may with half an eye see what Ardency it was in Christ that was heightened. For, says not the Evangelist expressly, that being in an Agony 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he prayed the more earnestly? If in Grammatical construction the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can agree to nothing but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and being an Adverb of comparison denoting more Degrees of intenseness, and agreeing with a verb Active of Prayer, of necessity it must denote that the Ardency which was now in this Agony heightened, was an Ardency in the Act of Prayer, and being resolved into a Logical Proposition, it is only this, That 
Vide hooker's Eccles. Pol. l. 5. §. 48. p. 279 towards the end.  the Ardency of the inward Act of Christ's Prayer and Devotion was now more gradually intense then before.  
§. 8. But now since he is so Eagle-eyed, that without the help of Scheiner's Tubus Opticus he can discover spots in the Sun, no wonder it is that he goes on thus profoundly.  

JEANES.  
— There was, as I plainly intimated in my Answer, a two fold Ardency in Christ's prayer, one regarding God, unto whom he prayed, and this was seated in the Acts of Love and trust, tanquam modus in re modificata; another respected the matter against which he prayed, and the res modificata of this ardency was the acts of fear of and grief for those evils with which he encountered.   
§. 10. You have said, Sir, and you might have replied with as much p●mp and astonishment to your vulgar reader, that this Ardency might have been taken either Archipodialiter or Reflexiuè, and as much to the purpose you had spoken, and as well it would have been understood.  
§. 11. For to dispel the Clouds that hang about your discourse, and to draw the Curtain from before your mysterious Ompha, that makes your ignorant Votaries to admire it with such Religion and reverence; in plain English it is only this. There was a twofold Ardency or intention in the inward Acts of Christ's Prayer: the one was an intention or gradual heightening of the inward Acts of Christ's Love and Trust in God, to whom he prayed; the other was an intention or gradual advancement of the inward Acts of Fear and Grief, for the Evils with which he encountered. And now that I may not seem to wrong you, I shall demonstrate that this was your meaning, and no other, if you yourself did understand what you meant when you set pen to paper.  
§. 12. To what can you understand by the Ardency of Christ regarding God, unto whom he prayed, 
Est aliquid in rebus quod neque res ipsa est, neque alia res, neque prorsus nihil; sed medium quid inter rem & nihil. Atque illud solet appellari modus rei. Ex. gr. gradus qualitatis non est qualitas, neque etiam omnino nihil est; sed est modus qualitatis. Itaque cum qualitas intenditur aut remittitur, non fit alia qualitas, sed fit qualitas aliûs modi. Et cum qualitas aut alia aliqua res istâ ratione mutatur, dicitur modaliter distingui à seipsa: sic calor in primo gradu distinguitur à seipso in secundo aut tertio gradu, & manus explicata à seipsa contracta. Burgersdic. Log. l. 1. c. 21. theor. 5. § 1. p. 96. Vide Suarez. Metaph. disp. 46 sect. 1. §. 35.  which was seated in the Acts of Love and trust, tanquam modus in re modificata, but only the heightening & gradual advancement of the Acts of love & trust in God? For is not ardency or intention the modus of Love & Trust, that are the things modificated by this intention or ardency? Can modus in re modificata signify any thing here but the gradual heightening and intenseness of his Love and Trust? And what else can you mean by that other Ardency, which respected the matter against which he prayed, but a gradual heightening of his Fear and his Grief, which gradual heightening was the modus of the res modificata, the Acts of Fear and of Grief for those evils with which he encountered? For gradual intention, without doubt, is nothing else but the modus of the same numerical Quality that is intended; because intensio (as your own Master 
* Scheibler. Metaph. l. 2. c. 8. §. 204.  Scheibler will truly tell you) formaliter consistit in co, quod est ejusdem formae eductio ulterior è potentia subjecti; & consequenter est per majorem radicationem ejusdem formae in codem subjecto, quae major radicatio fit per unionem plurium graduum ejusdem formae in subjecto. Nor will the word Ardency help you any whit. For Ardency, precisely and in abstracto considered, is nothing else but the vehemence and gradual heightening of any thing whatsoever that is capable of gradual intention, and is the very same with Zeal; and as that comes from the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so the other comes from the Latin word Ardeo, both which signify to burn, and be inflamed▪ Zeal then and Ardency being properly nothing else but the heightening and gradual intention of any thing (and therefore we read of a zeal for God and a zeal for Satan, a zeal for good and a zeal for mischief: and hence it is that the Apostle tells us, 
Gal. 4. 17, 18.  That it is good to be zealous in a good thing; intention and Zeal and Ardency being either good, or bad, or indifferent, as the Qualities are that are modificated and intended by them) consequently they must be, when in abstracto expressed, understood always according to the subject matter that is treated of, and with respect to the thing that is intended and heightened by them, which here can be nothing else but the Acts of Love and the Acts of Trust, the Acts of Fear and the Acts of Grief. And is not this arrant nonsense now even to the most ordinary understanding? For first are the inward Acts of Love and trust both one and the same? Is not Trust in God an Act of Confidence and well-grounded Hope? and is not that as well a distinct Theological grace from Love and holy 
How and in what sense Hope and Trust in God might be in Christ, Vide Aquin. 3. p. q. 7. art. 4. Suarez in Commentar. ad loc. tom. 1. p. 296, 297. and the other Commentators on the question in Thomas, Estius lib. 3. Sent. d. 26 §. 8. p. 88 col. 1. C. D. E. F. Pet. Lombard. l. 3. Sent. d. 26. C. Durand. ibid. q 3. art. 2.  Charity, by infusion seated in the Will, as Love and Hope are two distinct passions, naturally seated in the inferior Faculties? Nay are not Fear of Evils impending, and Grief for Evils now suffered, two distinct Passions, both naturally seated in the inferior sensual Part, and as truly distinct in themselves as the Passions of Grief and Fear? Why then did you not rather say there was a  Ardency in Christ's Prayer, an Ardency of Love, and an Ardency of Trust in God, an Ardency of Fear of the Evils now impending, and an Ardency of Grief for the Evils he now laboured under? Nay might you not, with as equal reason, have said, there was a manifold Ardency in Christ's Prayer, an Ardency of the inward Acts of Obedience, of Religion and Piety, of Patience and Fortitude, and love to God and our Neighbours, of Justice and Mercy, and all other Christian Graces? For all these were as truly in Christ at the time of his bloody Agony and conflict, as an Ardency of Love and Trust, and an Ardency of Fear and Grief, and were all as much the Ardency of his Prayer as these that you have named. For fervency in Prayer (the inward Acts I mean) is an Act of Religion; and though it be rooted and founded in Charity, yet it is not formally but effectively only an Act of Love, and shall, with Faith and Hope, and all other Christian Graces, cease, when Charity shall last unto eternity. The Saints in heaven do now no more pray for themselves then they can suffer or want. And then for the heightening of his Fears and Griefs, these were the natural issues of the inferior sensual Part of his Soul, and the Passions there implanted, whose natural motions he would not now hinder, to testify as well the infirmities, as the truth of his Manhood. And though the heightening of this Fear and Grief in the inferior Part of Christ's soul were the Causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inward moving Cause, as the present and approaching growing Miseries & Afflictions were the Causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the outward moving cause of the Ardency of the inward Acts of his Piety, Devotion and Prayer; yet the Cause and Effect being really distinguished, impossible it is that the Ardency of Christ's Fear and Griefs should be the Ardency of his Prayer. It is true indeed that there was a most heightened Ardency of the Acts of Piety and Patience, Magnanimity and Fortitude, and all other Christian Graces, as well as an ardency of Love, and a heightening of Fears and Grief in Christ, when in his bloody Agony he prayed: but these were not the ardency of his Prayer. The ardency of all these several Acts were all now in the same subject Christ: but than though one Accident in concreto may be predicated of another disparate Accident, as when we say of milk, this white is sweet; yet in abstracto they cannot, for this whiteness is not sweetness.  
§. 13. And therefore when in the application of what you call your second answer, you say,  

JEANES.  
I Readily grant the heightening of this latter ardency, so that there was in his Agony an addition of degrees unto his fear of and grief for those evils against▪ which he prayed, above either what there was, or what there was occasion for at other times: but as for the former ardency regarding God, and placed in the inward Acts of his love of God, etc. that was uncapable of further heightening; for his actual love of God was in termino, as they say, was always at the highest, and most intense:   
§. 14. You herein speak nothing to the purpose. For Christ's Fear and Grief were natural Passions, and the heightening them in his Agony was but the heightening of the Acts of those Passions: but the Ardency in Christ's Prayer was the heightening of an inward Act or Acts of Piety and Devotion, which were not Acts of Nature, but of Grace, and the Habit from whence they issued was one of those 
† Vide Suarez. in 3. p. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 20. sect. 1. p. 303.  septem dona Spiritus Sancti, as the Schools call them, that the 
* Esa. 11. 2, 3.  Prophet had foretold should be infused into his Soul by God. And then though his Actual Love (that most high and transcendent Act of Love, you mean, that was immediately terminated on God as its next Object) were always in termino (as Christ was by virtue of the hypostatical union Comprehensor, as they call him in the Schools;) yet this nothing hinders, but that the fervour and ardency in the inward Acts of Prayer and Devotion might now be heightened. For the Schools when they determine that question, utrum conveniens fuerit Christum orare, do always consider him at his prayers in the state of a Viator, in which state he might truly 
* Vide Estium l 3. Sent. d. 26. §. 1. p. 88 C. D. E. F. Suaresium, alios supra citat.  pray, as well as he might be miserable, or want the exaltation of his Humane nature, which he attained not till after his Ascension. For being considered as Comprehensor, as it was impossible for him to want any thing, so he was not in a state and condition to receive any thing by way of advance from the good hand of God, no more than the Saints and Angels now in heaven, or he himself can since his Session at the right hand of God. (We shall instantly clear this for the Readers understanding.)  
§. 15. And therefore what's your grant of the heightening the ardency of Christ's Fears and Griefs in his Agony, and the denial of the heightening of that high & most transcendent Act of his Love of God, which is Actus comprehensoris, and not a free, but a necessary Act, and therefore always in Summo? Is this denial or that concession any thing material to the Ardency of Christ's Prayer, which the Evangelist tells us was now heightened? Grief and fear may be Causes and advancers of Piety; but then they are not it. Nay differ as much they do, as Grace and Nature, as Habits and Passions: and therefore the heightening 
Vide Suarez. Metap. tom. 2. disp. 46. sect. 3. §▪ 4. Vide Aquin. 1. 2. q. 52. art. 1.  of the Acts of the one cannot possibly be the formal heightening of the Acts of the other; since Intensio est eductio unius & ejusdem formae secundum diversos gradus seu partes ejus, ex quibus forma per se una componitur, & quo magis integra ●fficitur, eo magis radicari in subjecto dicitur, as Suarez, who as well as any man knew what belonged to such speculations. Where the Evangelist says, that Christ being in Agony did pray more earnestly, you say to this, that indeed he grieved and feared more greatly than before, but his love of God as he was Comprehensor was always in termino, and at the utmost height. If this be not to answer à baculo ad angulum, than I know not the meaning of the Proverb.  
§. 16. But, Sir, speak roundly and to the purpose. Was the Ardency of Christ's Prayer now more intended in his Agony? or was it not? If it were not, then tell us plainly what the Evangelist means by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. If you cannot render it better than our Translators, and Beza, and Grotius, and Piscator, and the French, Dutch, Italian and Spanish Translations have done, and it signify here, that he prayed the more earnestly; then deal ingenuously, and acknowledge your mistake. Confess, what you cannot possibly deny, that Christ was now more intense in this Act of Prayer then before in other Acts. And then ask the Doctor forgiveness for the abuse of his good name, and make the world amends by a public recantation. Do not eat your own words, but stand to what you have granted. Acknowledge, what you must, that Christ prayed more earnestly in his Agony then at other times, in regard of the matter against which he prayed. The greatness of his present and approaching sufferings was such, that it proportionably heightened his prayer for the removal of them, if it had been possible. One deep, I must tell you, did here call upon another; and a time of great Affliction is a season for more than ordinary Devotion. The Fathers and Schoolmen will tell you, that in this heightened Devotion at 
Vide Hookers Ecclesiast. Policy, l 5. §. 48. per tot.  this time our Saviour did read us his Disciples a lecture, and teach us our Duty in such cases by his own great example. As there may be a more weighty occasion for the heightening of our Devotion, so it is our duty then to heighten it. And as this was all that Doctor Hammond pretended to, so the whole world of Readers will judge that the words of your second part of your second answer do acknowledge it.  
§. 17. For that that Act of Christ's Love regarding God, which was always in termino, was not, could not be that Act of Prayer and Devotion that the Evangelist and the Doctor spoke of, will be evident even from your own proof and Argument. For you say it was Actus Comprehensoris, and in termino, as they say, and because it was a necessary Act, it was always at the height. Now the Act of Prayer and Piety and Devotion in Christ was Actus viatoris, and meritorious in itself, 
Suarez tom. 1. in 3. p. Thom. disp. 40. sect. 3. p: 542. col. 1. A:  and consequently free. For ut Actus sit meritorius, says Suarez, requiritur ut sit bonus, liber, & in persona grata in Via existente. And therefore nothing hinders but that it might be heightened in him, according to the greatness of the occasion, if God's law did so allow, which was the ground of the Controversy, and must by other Medium's be disproved then this of our Refuter, unless he is resolved to beg the Question. Nay the same Suarez will tell us not only that our Saviour did merit by this Act of Devotion, but that it is distinct from the Acts of Charity in its true and proper notion. Dico tertio, meruisse Christum per Actus omnes virtutum infusarum, quos liberè exercuit, est certissima; sic enim meruit per Actum Obedientiae, ut testatur Paulus, & per Actum Religionis, ut Orationis, etc. & ad eundem modum meruit per Passionem suam, quatenus illa erat Actus Charitatis Dei & proximi, & Religionis (erat enim Sacrificium quoddam) & misericordiae, justitiae, & obedientiae, ac ferè virtutum omnium. Et ad eundem modum philosophandum est de omnibus Actibus Christi. So Suarez.  
§. 18. And now, though this be sufficient to satisfy the utmost pretences of the Refuters Discourse; yet because I am unwilling altogether to spend time in the unprofitable discoveries of another man's mistakes, whilst the Reader, through a Cloud of dust and smoke that Contention has raised, remains unsatisfied in the m● in business and ground of the Controversy; I shall now digress from the Refuter, to explain the nature of that Ardency in our Saviour's Prayer which the Evangelist testifies was now in his Agony heightened. And as those that have a great leap to take do proportionably go back, that they may return with the stronger violence and force, to carry themselves over; so shall I. For in demonstrative discourses, not only the great Philosopher, but Experience also teaches, that the most instructive way, though perhaps the more tedious, is to proceed from Principles more remote and plain to Deductions more obscure, as Euclid has done in his Elements of Geometry. The steps than that I shall go by are these. 1. I shall inquire in what state, whether of Comprehensor or Viator, Christ was in a capacity to pray, as that signifies either Petition or Deprecation or Thanksgiving; and this whether only for others, or also for himself: 2ly, Whether though he were in a capacity thus to pray, yet being God, that was able of himself to accomplish whatsoever he might desire as Man, it was expedient for him to do so, and whether God had so determined: 3ly, What things he might and did pray for, both for himself and others: 4ly, Whether he did in truth and reality, or only in show, pray for a Removal of that Cup which he came on purpose to drink: 5ly, Whether these desires were not repugnant to God's decree, and the end of his coming into the world, and his own peremptory resolution to drink it: 6ly, How these desires for a removal of this Cup might be advanced, notwithstanding his resolution and readiness to drink it. From these Premises rightly stated, I conceive it will not be difficult to show, how our Saviour's Ardency in this Prayer might be advanced above what it either was, or indeed there was occasion for at other times; and this without any derogation either from 1. the Fullness of his habitual Grace, ●. the Impeccability of his Soul, or 3. his perpetual and uninterrupted happiness of it, or the height of that Actual Love of God which, as he was Comprehensor, was always in termino and most intense.  
§. 19 To begin then with the first. And for this it will be necessary to consider, that the Schools determine, That Christ, during the state of his Humiliation, was both 
Dicendum quod aliquis dicitur Viator, ex eo quod tendit in beatitudinem; Comprehensor autem dicitur ex hoc, quod jam beatudinem obtinet, secundum illud 1 Cor. 9 Sic currite ut comprehendatis, & Phil. 3. Sequor autem ut quo modo comprehendam. Hominis autē beatitudo perfecta consistit in anima & in corpore. In Anima quidem quantum ad id quod est ei proprium, secundum quod mens videt & fruitur Deo. In Corpore verò, secundum quod Corpus resurget spirituale, & in virtute & gloria & incorruptione, dicitur 1 Co. 15. Christus autē ante passionem secundum mentem plenè videbat Deum; & sic habebat beatitudinem quantum ad id quod est proprium Animae: sed quantum ad alia, decrat ei beatitudo; quia & anima ejus erat passibilis, & corpus passibile & mortale. Et ideo simul erat Comprehensor, in quantum habebat beatitudinem propriam Animae; & simul Viator, in quantum tendebat in beatitudinem secundum id quod ei de beatitudine deerat. Aquin. 3 part. q. 15. art. 10. in Corp. Vide eund. ibid. q. 11. art. 2. in Corp. Estium l. 3. Sentent. didst. 16. §. 2. Suaresium, Cajetanum, & caeteros Commentatores in Thom. loco suprae citato.  Comprehensor and Viator. Now a Comprehensor is he that enjoys the fullness of Happiness, which state the Apostle points at 1 Cor. 9 24. when he says, Sic currite ut comprehendatis, So run that ye may obtain; and a Viator is he that is yet in the way that leads and tends to happiness, which state the Apostle points at Phil. 3. 12, 13. Sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam, But I so follow, if by any means I may obtain. The one is in possession, the other in the way to happiness. Now as Man consists of a Body and a Soul, so the perfection of his Happiness is lodged in both these. The Soul is perfectly happy, inasmuch as in the supreme and noblest part, the Mind and Understanding, it sees and enjoys God. The Body is then perfectly happy, when it shall be raised a spiritual body, and advanced to a state of Power and Glory and Incorruption, and Mortality shall be wholly swallowed u● of Life. Now Christ, by virtue of the hypostatical union, had a full sight and all-absolutely perfect Fruition of God, from the first moment of his Conception, in the sovereign part of his Soul, the Mind, and so was Comprehensor. But then in respect of the inferior part and Faculties of the Soul, wherein he was subject to natural infirmities and Passions as men are, and in regard of his Body, that as yet was passable and mortal, he was not yet possessed of Happiness till after his Death and Passion: But now Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no more, Death has no more dominion over him. And consequently, till his Resurrection 
Rom. 6. 9  and exaltation at the right hand of God, in respect of these he was only Viator.  
§. 20. Christ then in this state taking upon him the form of a servant, was obliged to the most high and noblest piece of Service, that consists in the religious worship and veneration of God. And therefore when the Devil tempted him to fall down and worship him, he says, Get thee behind me, Satan; for it is 
Matt. 4. 10.  written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve. There is the Duty. And to the Samaritans he 
John 4 22.  said, Ye worship what ye know not, but we worship what we know: for salvation is of the Jews. There is the Fact and accomplishment.  
§. 21. Now there are two more principal Acts of Religion, to which the rest may be reduced, Sacrifice and Prayer. Not to speak of the first, because it concerns us not at present; Prayer may be taken either more generally, as it is according to Damascene 
| Damascen. l. 3. Orthod. fidei, c. 24. in principio.  Ascensus intellectus in Deum, for any inward Act of the mind whereby the Soul is elevated and mounts up to God, by contemplation, meditation, devotion, and the like: or else more specially and properly, as it is according to 
* Aquin. 2. 2. q. 83. art. 1, 2. & 3. p q. 21. art. 1. in corp.  Aquinas Explicatio propriae voluntatis apud Deum, ut eam impleat, 
† 
Oratio non est nisi quaedam explicatio voluntatis apud Deum, ut suppl●at indigentiam, quam per nos ipsos supplere non possumus: Durand. l. 3. Sent. didst 17. q. 2. art. ●. p. 185. 4.  
Oratio est Actus inferioris deprecantis superiorem ut se adjuvet, unde est Actus indigentis ope alterius, cui cultum & reverentiam exhibet, & ideo ad religionem pertinet. Suarez. in 3. p. Tho. q. 21. art. 1. in Commentar p. 588 col 2. E.  
Est oratio quaedam hominum cum Deo communicatio, quâ Sanctuarium coeli ingressi de suis promissis illum coram appellant; ut quod verbo duntaxat annuenti crediderunt, non esse vanum, ubi necessitas ita postulat, experiantur. Calv. Institut. lib. 3. c. 20. §. 2. Quando verò hunc esse orationis scopum, ut erecti in Deum animi ferantur tum ad confessionem Laudis, tum ad opem implorandam, ex eo intelligere licet primas ejus parts in ment & animo positas esse, vel potius Orationem ipsam esse propriè interioris cordis affectum, qui apud Deum, cordium Scrutatorem, effunditur & exponitur. Calv. ibid. §. 29.   an Act of the Soul, whereby we supplicate and beseech God, whom we reverence and worship, for a supply of our wants; which we ourselves are not able to attain to, but only by his assistance and bounty, in whom is all fullness.  
§. 22. But then, though this be the proper genuine signification of Prayer, yet 
* 
Etsi autem Oratio proprie ad vota & preces restringitur, tanta est tamen inter Petitionem & Gratiarum actionem affinitas, ut commodè sub nomine uno comprehendi queant. Nam quas Paulus enumerat species, sub prius membrum hujus partitionis recidunt. Calv. ibid. §. 28.  
Vide Aquin. 2: 2. q. 83. art. 17. Suarez. in 3. p. Thom. q. 21. art. 4. distinct. 45. sect. 1.   such is the affinity between Prayer and Thanksgiving, that as they usually and most decently go together, so they are commonly comprehended under the same common name of Prayer. Of Prayer in this notion, the Apostle and the Schools from him reckon up four kinds, 1 Tim. 2. 1. 
| Haec & alia nomina quibus preces distinguantur, reperies in libro de morte Mosis. Vide H. Grot. Annot, posthum. in 1 Tim. c. 1. ver. 1.  First Supplications, which the Apostle calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the Rabbins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and are Deprecations, or prayers for the removal of Evils, whether corporal or spiritual. Secondly, Prayers, which the Apostle calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the Rabbins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and these are for the procurement of Good things for ourselves. Thirdly, Intercessions, which he there calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the Rabbins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which are either for the suspension of Judgements, or obtaining of Blessings for others. Fourthly, Giving of thanks, which the Apostle calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the Rabbins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that are in an humble acknowledgement and gratulation offered up to God for the Benefits we or others have received. Of all these the Scriptures afford us frequent Instances.  
§. 23. Now if we take Prayer in the first sense, according to Damascen, for an assent of the Soul to God by Contemplation, Meditation, Devotion, and the like, there is no doubt but thus it was most super-excellently in Christ. 
* Si hoc modo sumatur Oratio, non est quod disputetur, an in Christo fuerit, cujus anima perfectissima contemplatione in Deum ferebatur, non solum per beatam fruitionem, sed per Scientiam etiam infusam▪ & liberum charitatis actum, ut in superioribus tractatum est. Suarez in 3. p. Thom. dist. 45. sect. 1.  His Soul, winged with Contemplation, still constantly lodged itself in the bosom of God, whom he so perfectly saw, so perfectly enjoyed, and so perfectly loved. The only doubt is, that since Christ was from the first moment of his Conception perfectus Comprehensor, in full and perfect possession of heaven happiness, and the clear sight and enjoyment of God, whether he may with any congruity be said to pray, as that properly signifies an Act of the Soul either requiring aid and asstance from God, for the supply of those things we stand in need of, or returning Thanks for that supply. For Christ being truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, perfect God as well as Man, he could neither have a superior to reverence, nor have need of assistance, because he was Almighty, and the Sovereign Lord of all things. And being also in the humane Nature perfectus Comprehensor, he enjoyed the fullness of heaven happiness, which excludes all wants and all sorrows. And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away, Rev. 21. 4.  
§. 24. To this I answer, from Aquinas, that if Christ were only God, or though he had two natures, yet if he had but one Will, which was divine, as the Monothelites fancied, than it neither 
Si in Christo esset una tantum voluntas, scil. divina, nullo modo competeret sibi orare, quia voluntas divina per seipsam est effectiva eorum quae vult: secundum illud Psalmi 134. Omnia quaecunque voluit Dominus fecit. Sed quia in Christo est alia voluntas divina, & alia humana, & voluntas humana non est per seipsam efficax ad implendum quae vult, nisi per virtutem divinam; inde est quod Christo, secundum quod est homo, & humanam voluntatem habens, competit orare. Aquin. 3. part. q. 21. art. 1. in Corp. Vide Cajetan: Suaresium, commentator. in loc. & alios, & Suarez. ibid. disp. 45. sect. 1. Durand. l. 3. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. art. 1.  could be needful, nor proper and convenient for him to pray. For, as God has no superior to reverence, so has he no need of any helper or assistant. His will is absolutely , and therefore says David Psal. 134. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven, and in earth, in the sea, and all deep places.  
§. 25. But then Christ being also perfect man as well as God, and endued with a humane will and understanding essentially consequent to that Nature, which of itself is not able, without the assistance of God, to perform what it may rationally desire, and being as Man of a nature truly passable and mortal, and whose Soul also, in the inferior part, was subject to Passions and infirmities, as well as his body before his Resurrection (in which respect he was not yet possessed of heaven happiness, but a necessity there lay upon him first to suffer, and then to enter into his glory;) in this state and condition he might with convenience, and without any derogation from the Perfection of his divine nature, or the heaven happiness of his Soul (which he enjoyed as Comprehensor) not only pray to God for his assistance, but bless and magnify him for it. As Comprehensor indeed, and one already fully possessed of heaven happiness and the sight of God, there was no reason he should pray, since in this he could not want, but was already perfectly possessed of whatsoever he was capable of: But then as he was yet in some respects truly in the state of a Viator, one subject to miseries and infirmities and bodily wants, and not yet possessed of that glory and those 
* Heb. 12. 2.  joys set before him, and therefore being a frail man well as an  God, that not only might, but did truly stand in need of God's aid and protection, and having also a humane will, that naturally and innocently prompted him on to desire those things he stood in need of, and yet by that will of itself, without God's assistance, was not able to accomplish his desires, pray he might for God's assistance, as also praise him for it, as well as he might also stand in need of God's assistance.  
§. 26. But what though Christ as man were in capacity to petition at the Throne of grace for those things which as man he might need, and was not able to perform, will it therefore follow that as man, being also God, it was fit for him to pray? For all things are lawful for me, says the Apostle, yet all things are not expedient.  
§. 27. To this I answer, that whether we consider his transcendent love to God, or his particular necessities in the humane nature, or his Charity and Love to man, for whose sake he became man, there could nothing be more decent, or that could better become him. For first, if we shall consider his present state and condition, as now he was in the form of a servant, obliged he was in duty to give God that Religious homage and Reverence which the Creature could pay to his Creator, such worship and veneration that was due to the most high God that heareth prayer, unto whom all flesh shall come, Psalm. 65. 2.  
Secondly, If we consider his transcendent and superlative Love to God his Father, that would still prompt him on by this best and noblest Act of worship to magnify him; since it is impossible but we should endeavour, as much as in us lies, the advancement of their honour whom we truly love and affect.  
Thirdly, If we shall consider the natural law of Charity, that obliges us to endeavour by all lawful ways the relief of our wants, the ease of our miseries and the advancement of our happiness, that would also engage him to Prayer, that is the best means to procure them at his hands that is the Father of lights, from whom every good and perfect gift proceeds.  
Fourthly, If we shall consider the Religious Piety and transcendent goodness in the Act of Prayer itself, that gives to God the honour due unto his name, that magnifies him in his best and noblest attributes of Knowledge, and Power, and Mercy, and Goodness, and Justice, and Faithfulness, that owns him as the Author and fountain of all good, the father of Mercies and the God of all consolation; there could be no Act more becoming him that was so every way holy, and so abundant and fruitful in every good work. And therefore says God in the Prophet, Psal. 50. 15. Call upon me in the day of trouble, and I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me.  
Fifthly, If we shall consider the great end of his coming into the world, which was to work out our Salvation, we shall find it fit and expedient he should accomplish it by all ways whatsoever; not only by satisfying God's Justice, and meriting our Salvation, but also by his Prayers and Intercession, and leaving us an example in all the noblest Acts of Virtue, and instructing us in the way and means how we should behave ourselves in this part of divine worship, and also how we might procure a supply of our wants from him who alone is able to relieve and help us.  
§. 28. And therefore no wonder, since it was every way so fit and expedient for Christ to pray, that God himself did also decree and ordain that he should use it, not only for our example. and an exercise of virtue, but also as a necessary means for a procurement of those blessings which it was fit he should desire.  
§. 29. For though as God he was able to effect all things (and therefore when Martha, that esteemed him only as a man, though a holy Prophet sent of God, said unto him, Lord, if thou hadst been here my Brother had not died: But I know that even now whatsoever thou wilt ask of God, God will give it thee; He, to instruct her in the truth of his Godhead, and that he had 
Vide Chrysost. homil. 61. in Joann.  no need to pray, as Elijah and Elisha did for those they raised, but could restore him by his own power, saith unto her, Thy Brother shall rise again. And when she yet understood him not, he said unto her, I am the resurrection and the life, etc.) and though as man, being Comprehensor in the superior part of his soul, he saw all things in verbo, by virtue of the hypostatical union, that God had decreed should come to pass, at least all things whatsoever that concerned himself in the state of humiliation, and the work of our Redemption (And therefore he prays, Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me, and I knew thou hearest me 
Joh. 11. 41, 42.  always. But because of the people which stand by 

Chrysostomus homil. 63. in Joan. & Euthymius ibi, & Ambrose lib. 4. de Fide, c. 3. ita exponunt illa verba quae Christus subjunxit, [Ego autem sciebam quia semper me audis] ut illa ad divinitatem Christi referant: unde ita exponunt, Gratias tibi ago, non quia indigeam precibus coram te, scio enim unam voluntatem me tecum habere, ideoque semper velle quod ego volo; sed propter Populum qui circumstat, etc. Et Theophylactus advertit Christum antequam orasset vel aliquid petiiss●t dixisse, Gratias tibi ago quia audisti me; quia enim non opus habebat oratione, non fuit Oratio audita, sed voluntas i●pleta: & hoc fuit Christum exaudiri juxta Phrasin Scripturae, jux●ae illud, Desiderium pa●●●um exaudisti, Psal 6. et, De●●●●●ium meum audivit Omnipotent. Suarez. in 3. p. Thom. disp. 4●. 〈◊〉 1. p. ●93. col. 1, 2.  
Vi 〈…〉. 3. part. q. 21. art. 3. in Corp.   I said it, that they may believe that thou hast sent me; where, we see, as Theophylact well observes, that he gives thanks before he prays or asks any thing:) yet for all that, God in his alwise providence had decreed and ordered, that as he should want somethings, to testify the truth and frailty of his humane nature, so as man now in the state of a Viator, and Candidate of immortality, as Tertullian phrases it, he should procure a supply of them by Prayer, and not without. And this to testify in that nature his submission and obedience, and dependence upon God, his Piety and Patience and holy Love and Charity, and to leave us his own great example in these so holy Christian graces. As then there was an oportet and a necessity lay upon him, first to suffer, and then to enter into his Glory, because God and so foreordained, and manifested this his decree by the Prophets, that he should thus open the way for us, and le●●● us himself into his glory: so necessary it was, that he should pour out the desires of his Soul in Prayer, because God had ordained that his Prayers should be the means to accomplish his desires. And therefore though he foreknew they should certainly come to pass, yet notwithstanding he prayed, because he also foreknew that his Prayers were to be the necessary means to effect them. As therefore we read in the second Psalm that God says unto his Son, Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine 
Psal. 2. 8.  inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the Earth for thy possession: 
Joh. 17. 1, 2.  so we read in Saint John, that our Saviour prayeth for that which God did promise in the Psalm, Father, says he, the hour is come, glorify thy Son, that thy Son may also glorify thee. As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him. And the event has declared that God has made good his promise, and answered his Sons prayers. For we see he has his dominion from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth: And bless God we do 
Psal. 72. 8.  that we are a part of it. No defect than was there in his Person, as if he of himself were not able to supply whatsoever his humane nature should need, and therefore must procure them by 
Vide Suarez. tom. 1. in 3. p. Thom. disp. 45. sect. 1. per totum.  Prayer; but only that God for congruous reasons, respecting his own glory and our advantage, was only pleased he should so procure them, as 
† Non defuit Deo alius modus possibilis redimendi genus humanum, sed nullus fuit hoc convenientior. Vide Augustin. de Trin. l. 13. cap. 10. Davenant. Exposit. in Col. c. 1. ver. 20. p. 104.  die he did for our Redemption; not for want of other sufficient means to procure our salvation, but that God for great reasons (which the Fathers and the 
* Vide Durand. l. 3. Sent. didst 17. q. 2. p. 185. B.  Schoolmen have observed) had so decreed. Christ then, as Christ, had no need of Prayer, because by reason of the dignity of his Person, he was able to perform whatsoever he pleased without it. And even in his Humane Nature de facto he had a power of working miracles by his word and command, without any necessity of Prayer. But then though, simply and absolutely speaking, Christ had no necessity of Prayer; yet ex hypothesi and in sensu composito, as they speak, and upon supposal of God's decree, he could not do many things as Man, but by Prayer.  
§. 30. Since than God had so decreed, because Christ as man, in the state of a Viator, was not only capable, but it was well beseeming him to pray, the Scriptures give us frequent instances of his Prayer, in all the several kinds of it, both for himself and others.  
§. 31. But than it is to be understood with this difference, as 
Vide Durand. l. 3. Sent. didst 17. q. 2. art. 1. p. 185. A.  Durand has well observed. For himself, he prayed for corporal Blessings only, or the removal of corporal Evils: but when he prayed for others, he as well petitioned for spiritual as corporal Blessings, and the removal of temporal and spiritual Judgements and Afflictions. For prayer being only for the supply of some want, since he himself could not be defective in any spiritual blessing, in whom the fullness of habitual grace and the fullness of the Godhead did constantly dwell, that as Comprehensor, in the noblest part of his Soul enjoyed the fight of God, and the fullness of heaven happiness, there was no reason he should pray for what he did not, could not want. As therefore in the inferior faculties of the Soul he was subject to Passions and Infirmities, and was of a body frail and passable and mortal, so for that only he prayed. But then other men, for whom he prayed, being as well defective in spirituals as temporals, he indifferently prayed for both in their behalf.  
§. 32. To make this evident from the Scriptures. First then, give thanks he does to God his Father, for the raising dead Lazarus at his intercession and groaning in the Spirit, Joh. 11. 41. And praise God he does, that he had hid the doctrines he preached from the wise and learned, and revealed them to babes, Mat. 11. 25. Pray he does for St. Peter, that his Faith fail not, Luke 22 31, 32. And pray he does for his Apostles and the Church, that God would keep them from the evil of the world, and that his joy might be fulfilled in them, and that they might be sanctified through the truth, Joh. 17. 15, 16. Pray he does for his own most glorious exaltation and the enlargement of his kingdom, Joh. 17. 1, 2. And he looks up to heaven, and he blesses the Fishes and the loaves that he broke for a temporary repast, Mark 6 41. So also at his last supper, when he took bread he gave thanks, Luke 22. 19 On the Cross he prays for his crucifyers, Luke 23. 34. And in his bloody Agony in the garden, he prays for a removal of the bitter cup of his sufferings and death, Luke 22. 42. And of this strong crying and tears the Apostle takes notice, Heb. 5. 7.  
§. 33. And hitherto all is clear and plain. But now we are fallen upon a difficulty indeed. For it is not easily understood how Christ should so earnestly pray for a removal of that Cup which he came on purpose to drink off. For had he a promise to be heard in this particular also? If he had, since God is faithful in his promises, why was it not then performed? And if he had not, why then does he pray, where he had no assurance of the grant of his request, shall I say? or rather where he was assured it must be denied? Or shall we say that God decreed that he should pray for a removal of that cup which he had also preordained should be drank off notwithstanding?  
§. 34 This difficulty is very largely & solidly handled by the most incomparably judicious Hooker, which might justly supersede 
hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. 5. §. 48. Plin. Nat. hist. l. 35. c. 10. mihi. pag. 343.  all after endeavours even of the most accomplished pen, much more any slender performances of mine. For it is with his writings as it was with Apelles Pictures: Those that were finished by him, and received his last hand, are inimitable; and the other he left unfinished, are not possibly to be perfected, there being none equal to himself but himself.  
§. 35. Howsoever, because it is not easy to unfold the nature of that Ardency in our Saviour's Prayer, and how it might be heightened, without it, and because that learned man has there treated of this argument to a far different purpose; I shall therefore again attempt it. And in this very difficult Passage, I shall carefully steer by that Chart and Compass which that judicious hand has drawn, taking in the Observations of the Schoolmen, to supply those defects which his Argument in that place did not engage him to treat of.  
§. 36. For answer then to this Difficulty, most certain it is  
1. That Christ did pray for a removal of that Cup which he tasted notwithstanding, and consequently had not a promise that the Cup▪ should be removed, because it was not effected.  
2. Most certain it is, that notwithstanding God had decreed that he should taste of this Cup, yet he had also decreed that 
Vide Suarez. tom. 1. in 3. part. Thom. disp. 38. sect. 4. p. 528. col. 2. D. F. etc. & disp. 37. sect. 4. p. 518. col. 2.  Christ should pray against it, otherwise it had been absolutely impossible that it should have come to pass.  
3. Most certain it is, that as God had decreed he should suffer for our Redemption, and therefore gave him up for us all, so Christ also knew the Decree, and had also voluntarily contracted with God his Father for the Performance of it. And therefore when he cometh into the world for this purpose, he saith, Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me. 
Heb. 10. 5, 6, 7, 10.  In burnt-offerings and sacrifice for sin thou hadst no pleasure. Then said I, Lo, I come to do thy will, O my God.— By the which will, as the Apostle adds, we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all. And this he perfectly knew in all the minute circumstances, not only as God that had decreed them, and a Person that was a Party in the Covenant, but also as Man. For being Comprehensor in his Soul, 
* Vide Suarez. in 3. part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 26. sect. 1, 2, 3, etc.  by virtue of the hypostatical union, he saw all things clearly in verbo, and the glass of the divine nature, as they call it in the Schools; and moreover, as Viator, he had also 
† Suarez. in 3. part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 25. sect. 3. Joh. 18. 4.  an Infused Habit of knowledge, whereby he perfectly knew all things, at least that concerned himself, in the whole course of his Ministration during his abode here on earth. And therefore the Scriptures expressly tell us, that he knew all things that should come upon him: and accordingly we find that he foretold his Death, the time, the persons, the Actors, and the manner and the place, and every minute circumstance of it. Nor can it be said, that his sufferings had so clouded and darkened his understanding, that for the present he forgot it; since none of the Evangelists, in recounting his unspeakable and unknown Torments, as the Greeks call them in their Liturgy, mention any such defect; and impossible 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  it was he should forget the peremptory determination of his Father, and his own unchangeable purpose most willingly to undergo it. Besides, his pronouncing the Consummatum est upon the Cross, when the whole Scene of his sufferings, in all the parts and circumstances of it, was now finished, shows that not any thing was forgotten by him, even in the very height of his sufferings. And therefore we find in S. John, c. 12. v. 23, 24, &c him answering and saying to his Disciples in a public audience, The hour is come that the Son of man should be glorified. Verily, verily I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit. He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world, shall keep it unto life eternal. If any man serve me, let him follow me, & where I am there also shall my servant be: If any man serve me, him will my Father honour. Now is my Soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour; but for this cause came I unto this hour Father, glorify thy name. And he adds, vers. 31. Now is the Judgement of this world, now shall the Prince of this world be cast out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me. This he said (as the Apostle adds) signifying what death he should die.  
§. 38. For the resolving this doubt, and reconciling the seeming 
Vide Aquin. 3. part. q. 18. art. 1. & Suarez. in Commentar. & ibid. disp. 37. sect. 1. Estium l. 3. Sent. didst. 17. §. 1. & alios ibi.  Contradictions, know we must, as Christ was God man, so two wills he had, answerable to his two natures, though his person were but one. And both these, his divine and humane will, were as distinct as his two Natures. For the Will, whether of God or of Man, belongs to the Essence or nature of both, and consequently is not a Personal propriety, but a Natural attribute and Emanation.  
§. 39 Christ then, as God, must of necessity will the same, whatsoever his Father did, because though the Persons in the Trinity be distinct, yet the Nature is the same, and the divine will but one in all the three Persons. And then as for his humane will, all the works and operations of that were still subject to the will of God, and still most exactly conformable to his holy laws and precepts and secret decrees. And therefore he saith John 4. 34. My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work. In the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do thy will, O my God: yea thy law is within my heart, Psal. 40▪ 7, 8.  
§. 40. But now as every man else, so the Schools also observe 

Vid. Aquin. 3. part. q. 18. art. 6. & 1. part. q. 41. art. 2. & q. 79. art. 9 & 1. 2. q. 74. art. 7. Suarez in 3. part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 38. sect. 2. Estium l. 3. Sent. d. 17. §. 2. and the Schoolmen generally on this distinction, and those other places in the Sums.  
Vide etiam Aristot. l. 3. Eth. c. 2 ubi spontaneum seu voluntarium ad plura extendi docet quam Electionem; Est enim, inquit, cum pueru & animalibus caeteris nobis common.  
Adhuc tertio dicitur voluntas naturalis, ut elicit actum conformem inclinationi naturali, quae semper est ad commodum: dicitur autem libera, in quantum in potestate ejus est ita elicere actum oppositum inclinationi sicut conformem, & non elicere sicut elicere. Scotus l 3. Sent. aist. 17. q. 1. § 3. p. 127. col. 2.  
Est enim voluntas naturalis non re sed ratione diversa à voluntate rationali, quatenus videlicet non per modum naturae movetur; velut dum naturaliter refugit ea quae sunt naturae contraria, & secundum se mala, ut mortem, cruciatus, & hujusmodi. Estius l. 3. Sent. d. 17. §. 3 p. ●0 col. 1. E. Vide Durand ibid. q. 1. art. 1.   of Christ, that his Will had a twofold operation; the one natural and necessary, which moving according to the order & necessity of nature, does simply and without deliberation desire whatsoever is in itself good, and decline from and abhor whatsoever is hurtful: And therefore they call this Voluntas ut natura, and Voluntas sensualitatis, a willingness of nature, and a sensual inclination.  
§. 41. The other rational and deliberate, whereby it follows and embraces those things as good, which the superior faculty of the Soul, the Mind and Understanding, upon due pondering and consideration, prefers as good to that end which we simply and absolutely desire, though otherwise never so burdensome. This they call Voluntas ut ratio, and Appetitus Rationalis.  
§. 42 For instance, The Will desires the End absolutely, but the Means in order to that end. The Physician affects not the Scorpion and the Vi●er, but only for his antidote and medicine. Though the stomach loathes the Potion, and the flesh trembles at the Application of the Caustick; yet Reason conquers Nature, and the sick-man— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with a kind of unwilling willingness submits to the Cure, which in health he would as much abhor as now he does his Disease. Though his Judgement tells him, the Medicine is for his recovery; yet Nature cannot choose but express her reluctance, even when it is applied. And therefore the great Philosopher tells us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that they are a kind of mixed actions; and though in order to the end that now Reason prefers, they are willingly 

Vide Aristot. l. 3. Eth. c. 1. §. 3. per totum. Vide H. Grot. Annot. in Matt. ca 26. ver. 39  
Voluntas autem simpliciter hominis est rationis voluntas: hoc enim absolute volumus, quod secundum deliberatam rationem volumus. Illud autem quod volumus secundum motum sensualitatis, vel etiam secundum motum voluntatis simplicis, quae consideratur ut natura, nonsimpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid, scil. si aliud non obsistat quod per deliberationem rationis invenitur. Vnde talis voluntas magis est dicenda Velleitas quam absoluta Voluntas; quia, scil. homo hoc vellet, si aliud non obsisteret. Aquin. 3. part. q 21. art. 4. in Corp. Vide Cajetan: in loc.   embraced, yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, no man would willingly choose them for their own sakes.  
§. 43. The Schools do well distinguish these several Acts of the Will, and the one they call Actus voluntatis efficaces & absolutos, 
Vide Suarez: in 3. part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 38. sect. 2.  the other inefficaces & conditionatos. We have already given the reason from Suarez. In the one Nature expresses her present sense and apprehension: in the other, her Reason and Judgement, that looks beyond the present, which Sense cannot attain to.  
§. 44. Now these two Operations of the Will being supposed to be as truly in Christ as in all other men, it will not be difficult to show how at one and the same moment, he might both tremble and stand amazed at the apprehension of his approaching Sufferings, and yet most willingly submit to them; he might both ardently, and now more intensely, pray for a removal of the bitter Cup, and yet most earnestly long to taste it; pray most sincerely to his Father against it, and yet pray that his Fathers will might be fulfilled notwithstanding his Prayer: and all this without any clashing or Opposition between his own desires among themselves, or the least Repugnance to God's Laws or Decrees, or the least derogation to his own superlative Love and Charity to Mankind, whom he came to purchase with his blood. And therefore God might most justly preordain, that all this should be done by Christ, notwithstanding any seeming contrariety to be found in it; and Christ, notwithstanding he knew his Father had decreed he should drink up the very dregs of this bitter Cup, might pray for a removal of it, if it had been possible.  
§. 45. To clear this.  
First then, as to the matter of fact, I suppose it most evident from the Scriptures, That our Saviour, at the very apprehension of his approaching Torments, was possessed with such astonishment and terror, that he not only prayed thrice, but more earnestly also, for the removal of this Cup, and in his agony he fell into a bloody sweat, so that an Angel was sent to comfort him.  
2. That he so willingly and cheerfully submitted himself to death, that for the joy set before him he endured the Cross, and despised the shame: and though he was oppressed and afflicted, yet 
Heb. 12. 2.  opened he not his mouth; but brought he was as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so opened he 
Esay 53. 7.  not his mouth.  
§. 46. As much willingness is here as can possibly be imagined, and yet as much dread and astonishment as could seize on flesh and blood. But yet here is no opposition, no tumult, and thwarting between the superior and inferior faculties and desires; but only two several and distinct inclinations, the one avoiding death as abhorrent to nature, because destructive to its present being, the other accepting it, as most rationally to be embraced for the Redemption of the world. Two disparate Acts of the will indeed they are, but not contrary, and the repugnance between them is only in show, and not in truth. For the great 
† Aristot. l. 2. the Sophist. Elench. c. 5. circa medium, apud me pag. 435. A.  Philosopher has told us that all Opposition, that is really such, must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
* 
Vide Luc.  
Brugens. in Matt. c. 26. vers. 39  
Dicendum quod contrarietas non potest esse nisi Oppositio attendatur in eodem & secundum idem: si autem secundum diversa & in diversis existat diversitas, non sufficit hoc ad rationem contrarietatis, sicut nec ad rationem contradictional; puta, quod homo sit pulcher aut sanus secundum manum & non secundam pedem. Aquin. 3. part q. 18. art. 6. in Corp.  
Between these desires and resolutions there was a diversity, but no contrariety; a subordination, but no repugnance or resistance. There was no contrariety, because they were not in respect of the same circumstances; for Death as Death is to be avoided: neither did superior Reason ever dislike the judgement of the inferior Faculties, but shown further and higher considerations, where it was to be accepted and embraced. There was no repugnance or resistance, because one yielded to the other. For as— the sick man considering the Portion— to be bitter— declineth it while he stays within— that Consideration; but when he casts his eyes further— on the happy operation,— he willingly accepts it— So Christ considering Death as in itself evil, and contrary to nature, while he stayed within the bounds and confines of that consideration, shunned and declined it; and yet as the means of man's Salvation joyfully embraced it, accepting that he refused, and refusing that he accepted. Field of the Church, l. 5. c. 18. p. 452. Edit. Oxon.  
Ad hoc ergo quod sit contrarietas voluntatum in aliquo, requiritur primo quidem quod secundum idem attendatur diversitas voluntatum. Si enim unius voluntas sit de aliquo fiendo secundum quandanrationem universalem, & alterius voluntas sit de eodem non fiendo secundum quandam rationem particularem, non est omnino contrarietas voluntatum: puta, si Rex vult suspendi Latronem propter bonum publicum, & aliquis ejus consanguineus nolit eum suspendi propter amorem privatum, non erit contrarietas voluntatis, nisi forte in tantum se extendat voluntas hominis privati, ut bonum publicum velit impedire ut conservetur bonum privatum: tunc enim circa idem attenditur repugnantia voluntatum. Secundo autem requiritur ad contrarietatem voluntatis, quod sit circa eandem voluntatem: si enim homo vult unum secundum appetitum sensitivum, non est hic aliqua contrarietas, nisi forte appetitus sensitivus in tantum praevaleat, quòd vel immutet vel retardet appetitum rationis; sic enim ad ipsam voluntatem rationis perveniret aliquid de motu contrario, etc. Aquin. 3. part. art. 6. in Corp.  
In hoc articulo explicat (Aquinas) hanc diversit atem non fuisse talem, ut veram oppositionem aut contrarietatem induceret, aut inter voluntatem divinam & humanam, aut inter voluntatem humanam & appetitum sensitivum inter se; quia illi diversi motus harum voluntatum, quamvis interdum circa eandem materiam versarentur, sub diversis tamen rationibus; & ita erant moderati & inter se compositi, ut unus alium minime impediret. Suarez. ibid. in Comment. ad loc.   If therefore it appear that any of these conditions be wanting, and the seeming repugnance be not in the same thing, and after the same manner and respect, and in the same time, there will be no real clashing or opposition between them. And confequently, if it may be demonstrated that in Christ these seeming contrary volitions, 1. did arise from different principles, the divine and humane will of Christ, and the superior rational appetite, and the inferior sensual desires and natural inclinations, and 2ly, that they were also grounded upon different respects and aims, and 3ly, that they did neither thwart and cross one another in their several proper motions and inclinations, nor in the event and issue; there will be found a most exact harmony and consent even in this apparent discord. To prove this by parts.  
§. 47. First then, I ask, Why may not Christ have contrary desires in contrary respects about one and the same thing, yet without any repugnance in the Acts themselves? For may not the Judge on the Bench (and it is storied of 
† Aelian. Var. Hist. l. 13. c. 24. Valer. Maximus l. 6. c. 5. Extern. 3.  Zaleucus) out of zeal to Justice and the Laws most innocently will the execution of his Son, a Malefactor, whose pardon or Reprieve out of a fatherly affection he may as innocently desire? What opposition yet is here? And the Judge may execute that Son, whom the Father would spare, if the laws would permit. But then indeed if one desire proceed so far, as to thwart and oppose the other, that it cannot be accomplished, as in the case of Zaleucus, where his natural affection would not suffer the sentence to be fully, according to the letter and tenor of the law, put in execution, there is truly an opposition, because it is circa idem, about one and the same thing, and the desires cannot now be reconciled and stand together.  
But than it was not so in the desires of our Blessed Saviour. Abhor death indeed and Torments he did, as terrible in themselves; but then he willingly embraced them as the means God had appointed for the salvation of the world. And we need no instructions to fear what is destructive to our welfare and being; for Nature instantly suggests it without any deliberation. But if Reason teach us against the Motions of Nature not to fear, and the Will follow the dictates of the Understanding, notwithstanding the dreadful apprehensions of sense, and so master's Nature, that it makes it willing to yield (even against her own preservation) and to suffer for a far nobler end that Reason proposes, here is no opposition. The desires indeed are divers, 
For the sense of Nature and inferior Reason presented the ignominy of the Cross unto him as they are in themselves evil, without the consideration of any good to follow, and so caused a desire to decline them, expressed in the prayer he made: but superior Reason considering them with all circumstances, and knowing God's resolution to be such that the world should thereby he saved, and by no other means, persuaded to a willing acceptance of them. Field of the Church, l. 5. c. 18. pag. 452.  and issue they do from different respects and considerations; but then they are not repugnant in the event, because the inclinations of the one hinder not the prosecution and accomplishment of the inclinations of the other. If Christ then had not been afraid of death, we might have doubted whether he had been truly flesh and blood: but when, notwithstanding the dreadful apprehensions of Nature, we see him patiently and cheerfully submitting to it, we now magnify his Love, that was stronger than death. Consider we then Death in itself, and Nature teacheth Christ to shun it. And if now it had not been Gods peremptory Decree, that he should suffer at this time for the Redemption of the world, at this time as innocently he might, according to this natural instinct, have declined it, as we read that he did before that his hour was come. But then consider we death as a means to procure the salvation of the world, and Piety and Mercy and his Transcendent Philanthropy raises in him a most earnest longing and desire to embrace it. If then 1. he had out of a natural instinct abhorred Death, and out of the same natural instinct had embraced it; or 2ly, if the desires of Nature had withstood and hindered the dictates of Reason and Grace (as oftentimes they do, even in the very best of men, by reason of our inbred corruption;) then there had been truly an opposition in his desires, the Repugnance had been in the same respect and the same thing.  
§. 48. We see here then Nature and Sense, Reason and Grace in Christ all innocently employed about one and the same Object, and in all amicably working without any opposition according to their proper Motions and Inclinations: Sense and Nature innocently express, what they might as innocently embrace, if God had been so pleased, and Grace and Reason had not proposed a far more noble end then self - preservation now simply and absolutely to be prosecuted, though with the dolorous sufferings of Sense, and the present ruin of Nature. We see also Grace and Reason induce the will of Christ freely and cheerfully to conform itself to the will of God, in making use of those means which were grievous to Sense, and destructive of Nature, for the attaining that end, which was of so high concernment as the salvation of the world, which now ex hypothesi and upon supposal of God's Decree could not otherwise be accomplished.  
§. 49. And therefore if secondly we shall compare the will of God, or the divine and humane will of Christ, we shall find no opposition in them neither. For two may have contrary desires in different respects without any repugnance or thwarting in either of their Wills, unless the desires of the one go so far as to endeavour or actually cross the accomplishment of the inclinations of the other: and then the Contrariety lies in respect of the same volition. We read that Saul, in regard of his oath, condemned 
1 Sam. 14. 44, 45.  his son Jonathan to death for tasting a little honey contrary to his command; and the People, in regard of the great deliverance God had that day wrought by Jonathan, were grieved that he should be put to death. As yet there was no repugnance. For Jonathan, notwithstanding the people's sorrow and unwillingness, might have died. But when they in prosecution of their desires go so far as to hinder the execution of Saul's purpose in the death of Jonathan, here was now an opposition and contrariety about the same volition. But now it was not so in Christ. For the will of God was, that Christ should suffer death, not as destructive and grievous to Nature, but as a means of the Redemption of the world; and the will of Christ, though death were repugnant to Nature, patiently submits to death in order to that end. Here then upon Christ's part there was no opposition to the will of God. Nor was there on the other side any repugnance in respect of the Divine will to the Humane, or of that with itself. For the will of God and the superior faculties of Christ's Soul did not at all hinder or trash the desires and motions of Nature. Highly pleased God was, since Christ was truly Man, endued with Sense as well as Reason, that both Nature, 
Vide Field Of the Church, l. 5. c. 18. p. 452. infra citat.  Sense and Reason in him should all move in their proper spheres without any interruption, according to their several propensions and inclinations. And therefore though there may appear a difference in the material Object, and one desired one thing, and another desired another, as appears by that of our Saviour's prayer, Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu, yet not as I will but as thou wilt; yet in the formal Object there was never 
Dico secundo, per Actum inefficacem interdum voluit humana Christi voluntas quod absolute & simpliciter Deus nolebat; semper tamen hujusmodi Actus erat conformis Divinae voluntati tanquam Principio & Regulae, & ideo simpliciter illae voluntates nunquam fuerunt contrariae. Tota haec conclusio est certa & communis Theologorum in 3. distinct. 17: ubi Ricardus & Bonaventura art. 1. q. 3. Alens. 3. part. q. 15. memb. 1. art. 2. & colligitur ex omnibus Conciliis & Sanctis citatis. Et prima quidem pars conclusionis de diversitate in materiali Objecto satis constat ex illis verbis saepe citatis, Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu, & ex dictis supra de his Actibus inefficacibus. Secunda vero pars de formali seu affectiva concordia facile etiam patet, quia etiam isti Actus inefficaces erant in suo genere honesti & boni: unde Divina voluntas volebat ut humana illos efficeret, & ipsa humana voluntas ex perfecta ratione & deliberatione illos in se admittebat, ut in hoc etiam Divinae voluntati obsequeretur: & ita non solum in hoc erat conformitas inter Divinam & humanam voluntatem, sed etiam inter inferiorem & superiorem partem ejusdem voluntatis. Et hinc facile etiam ostenditur ultima pars, & ex●lud●tur contrarietas inter voluntates Christi. Nam haec esse non potest, ubi ratione volendi est consensio voluntatum, neque ubi una voluntas nihil vult nisi quod alia vult ipsam velle. Ac denique, quia Contrarietas saltem requirit, ut quod alteri sub aliqua ratione placet sub eadem alteri displiceat; vel illud idem quod una voluntas efficaciter vult, altera absolutè nolit, quia nisi adsit haec repugnantia, voluntates non se impediunt, neque una alteram excludit, quod est de ratione Contrariorum: Ostensum est autem non fuisse in Christo actus hoc modo oppositos seu repugnantes. Suarez. in 3. part. Thom. disp. 38. tom. 1. sect. 4. pag. 592. col. 1. C. D. To this add what Aquinas has delivered to this purpose, in the place already cited in the close of his Answer in Corpore.  any difference, but a most exact harmony and agreement.  
For even these natural desires & inclinations of Sense were still conformable to Gods will as their Principle & Rule. And though God had simply and absolutely decreed they should not take effect, so as to hinder the motions of Grace and inclinations of Reason; yet decreed he had they should express themselves in Christ in an inefficacious wish and desire, to testify Nature's apprehensions, and the frailty of flesh and blood, even in the highest advancement of Grace that flesh and blood is possibly capable of, and to leave us an example and instruction in such cases. Though the hand shake and tremble when it takes the deadly Potion; yet sinful we are not, because we are frail. If notwithstanding the dread and horror at the apprehension of present Torments, we patiently submit to Gods will, and cheerfully drink the bitter ●otion, that will as well testify the enlarged greatness of our Faith, and Patience, and Charity, as it will do 
Vide Estium l. 3. Sent. didst. 17. §. 3. p. 50. col .. 1. A. B. C. D.  our infirmities that naturally and necessarily encompass Flesh and Blood. These inefficacious desires and wishes of Nature, so long as they continue such, are in their own kind good and honest, and the issues of Nature, which is the good work of God. And therefore God decreed that Christ should express them, though still with a submission and conformity to his own will, that had absolutely decreed against their fulfilling. And the humane will of Christ, upon just reason and deliberation, did not hinder these inclinations of Nature, but suffered them to express themselves in him in bedience to the will of God.  
§. 50. And therefore hitherto we find a most exact harmony and agreement between the will of God and the will of Christ, even there where most they seemed to clash, as also a perfect concord between the inferior Sensitive part and the superior Rational part of the same Will.  
§. 51. No contrariety then there can be in the Acts of Christ's divine and humane will, where there is a consent of them both in the ground and reason of willing, and where the one does never desire any thing but what the other does approve of, & wills that it should desire. And since the Nature of Opposition does require at least, that 1. what in one respect is grateful and pleasing to one, should in the same respect be also displeasing to the other, or 2. that what one does simply and efficaciously desire, the other should as absolutely and peremptorily oppose; most evident it is, that as the natural and rational will of Christ had no such repugnance and opposition in their several Acts among themselves, nor they with the divine will, nor the divine with them, there could be no true opposition or repugnance between them. God's will was the sovereign Rule and Law for Reason here to sail by, and that guided the inclinations of Sense and Nature still by that Chart and Compass. That ruled and guided Sense and Nature still moving quietly and regularly in their own sphere, and did so perfectly govern and direct all according to the will of God, that neither was Reason at any time disturbed or thwarted in its motion, nor did Sense and Nature move further or otherwise then as God's law, and Grace, and Reason saw fit. 
Ad dictorum intelligentiam adhiberi potest Similitudo de sphaera prima coelesti & orbibus inferioribus, qui quamvis motu suo tendant in oppositum, non tamen Primi mobilis motum impediunt seu retardant, sed potius ipsorum motus temperaniur motu primi, quia similitudine adsimile propositum utitur Philosophus, l. 3. de Anima. Estius l. 3. Sent. didst. 17. §. 3. pag. 50. col. 1. E. F.   
§. 52. We may make this plain by a familiar instance. We are taught in Astronomy, according to the Hypothesis of Aristotle and Pt●lemy, that the inferior Orbs have a twofold motion, the one Natural and Intrinsecal, arising from their Forms or Intelligences, which is from West to East, which they call Periodical, and is finished in that set period of time as Nature has appointed; the other adventitious and , arising from the Rapture of the Primum mobile, and tends to the direct contrary points, from East to West, and is called Diurnal. Now as every Sphere, according to its proper motion, tends from West to East to the finishing of its course and Period, and yet is carried about by daily constant turn of the Primum mobile from East to West; so neither does that in its periodical motion, though to opposite points, hinder or retard the daily motion of the Primum mobile, nor yet is hindered by the Primum mobiles motion in the prosecution and finishing of its own course and stage, but one constantly overrules, and the other as constantly obeys, and has its motion tempered and guided by the motion of the first. This may also be explained upon the Hypothesis of Copernicus in the triple motion of the Earth. But the most ingenious Galileus has helped us with an instance in Nature beyond all exception. And it is in the Motion of a Ship or Gallion under sail, where all the Motions of Bodies under deck are so attempered and governed by the general Motion of the Vessel, that they move as regularly either upward or downward, backward or forward, as if the Ship lay fixed in the harbour or at Anchor.  
§. 53. And this will plainly appear in Christ, if we consider the manner of his speech and prayer. In S. John thus we read, 
Joh. 12. 27.  that he says, Now is my Soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour, but for this cause came I unto this hour. So again in the very midst of his bloody Agony, O my 
Matt. 26. 39  Father, if it be possible, let this Cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt. And again, O my father, if this 
Vers. 42.  Cup may not pass away from me, except I drink it, thy will be done. Here indeed we have the inefficacious desires of Nature 
Vide Estium loc. supra citat. col. 1, 2.  petitioning for a removal of that bitter Cup, as so formidable to Flesh and Blood; and yet Reason and Grace so overruling Nature, that it is with a submission of itself and its desires to the will and pleasure of God. And then we have the rational will and inclination absolutely and effectually decreeing and resolving to submit to the will of God, whatsoever Terrors and Torments 
Vide H. Grot. in Mat. c. 26. v 39 p 459. Dices, high actus, volo & nollem, quamvis non sint simpliciter contrarii, tameu ut versantur circa idem Objectum materiale sunt aliquo modo repugnantes, Et unus potest alium saltem ex parte impedire, seu retardare, etc. Respond●tur, propriè nullam fuisse repugnantiam: hujusmodi enim actus tunc habent illum modum repugnantiae, quando alter eorum est praeter rationem & deliberati nem voluntatis; quando verò ipsemet actus inefficax est ab ipsamet voluntate p●aeordinatus & deliberatus, non potest ipsamm●t volùntatem retardare vel impedire ex cujus deliberato consensu oritur,— praesertim quia, cum omnes isti actus essent ex divina ordinatione, & omnes honestissimi, ●ulla inter eos poterat esse propria contrarietas aut repugnantia Suarez. tom. 1. tert. part. Thom disp. 38. sect 4 p. 529. col. 1. 2.  death shall carry with it. Christ then did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 simpliciter, as they speak, simply and absolutely submit to death, as he saw God had absolutely determined he should suffer it, and as Reason did propose it as the only means to procure the salvation of the world: and abhor Death he did, not as God had decreed he should suffer it for the Redemption of the world, but only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and secundum quid, as they speak, as destructive to Nature, and most grievous to flesh and blood as precisely and by its self considered, without relation to the end which God had appointed, which Sense could not judge of.  
§. 54. And now if it here be said, that these two Acts of the will, volo, & nollem, I will, and I would not, though they are not properly and simply contrary, yet as they both respect the same material Object, they are in some regard opposite, and one may in part hinder and retard the motion of the other, and therefore there may be some kind of reluctancy, some kind of unwilling willingness in Christ, and the Acts of his will:  
§. 55. To this I answer, that though it may be, and ordinarily it is to in all other men, yet it was not so in Christ. For those Acts of the Will are then only in this respect opposite and trashing one another, when one of them proceeds (as Suarez expresses it) praeter rationem & deliberationem voluntatis; ●ut when the inefficacious Act and desire of Nature is ab ipsamet voluntate praeordinatus & deliberatus, is foreseen and preordained, and still guided by the deliberation and counsel of the Rational Appetite, it cannot at all hinder or retard in the least the rational desires of the Will, because they proceed and spring up in Nature only by its good will and deliberate consent.  
§. 56 And therefore thirdly, since there is found no contrariety and opposition between the natural and sensual and rational desires of Christ's humane will, and all are conformable to his divine will, and since all were most just and honest in themselves, and the issues of Nature and Reason and Grace, which are the works of God, no wonder it is that now God should preordain that all these should work according to their proper Motions and inclinations, since hereby God is glorified, and the truth of Christ's humane Nature declared, and his Patience, and Meekness, and Courage, and Mercy, and Piety, and Love both to God and man so highly magnified.  
§. 57 And then fourthly, Christ might as innocently express these natural desires in Prayer to God, and petition for a removal of them, so far forth as they were burdensome and dreadful to Nature, with submission to Gods will, and a resolution patiently and freely to submit to what God has otherwise resolved 
Vide hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. 5. §. 48. pag. 283, 284.  and appointed. For what I may lawfully desire, that I may as lawfully pray for with submission to Gods will, so far and according to the respects as I may desire it. As then these inclinations of Sense dreading death were the issues of nature; so Reason might be the 
† Christus oravit secundum sensualitatem, in quantum sci Oratio ejus exprimebat sensualitatis affectum, tanquam sensualitatis advocata, etc. Aquin. 3. part. q. 21. art. 2 in corp. Vide Cajetan. ibid. in Comment. ad art. 3. Oratio potest esse alicujus dupliciter; uno modo sicut proponentis, alio modo sicut ejus pro quo proponitur. Primo modo Oratio non potest esse nisi rationis, & nullo modo sensualitatis: quia oratio proponitur Deo. Illius est ergo orare, ut proponentis orationem, cujus est in Deum tendere: istud autem non est sensualitatis, quae non transcendit sensibilia; sed rationis. Secundo modo potest esse oratio seusualitatis, tanquam ejus pro quo proponitur: & sic oravit Christus, quando petivit calicem passionis hujus à se transferri. Durand. l 3. Sent. d. 17. q 2. B.  Advocate of Sense, and express these desires in a Prayer for the removal of them, so long as Reason still so rules and governs Sense, that it patiently submits to God's pleasure, and desires it only with condition that God so sees fit. And this we find to have been the condition of our Saviour's Prayer. First the Condition is expressed, and then the Will is resigned to Gods ordering and pleasure, and finally resolved and shut up in that, Father, if it be possible, let this Cup pass from me: yet not my will, but thine be done.  
§. 58. The only 
* Sed hinc quaeritur, cum ratio sciret sensualitatem non exaudiendam, quomodo hanc proposuit petitionem. Nich. d' Orbellis l. 3. Sent. didst 17. q 2.  difficulty that remains is, to consider with what propriety and congruity Christ might thus pray, Father, if it be possible let this cup pass from me, when he knew it was not possible it should be removed; because God had from all eternity decreed and absolutely resolved he should drink it, when he himself had contracted and covenanted with his Father, and came into the world for no other end.  
§. 59 To this I answer, first, that since Christ de facto did thus pray, without doubt most congruous it was that he should so pray, though we knew not the reason of it. For plain it is that thus he prayed for a removal of this bitter Cup, since all the Evangelists do punctually record it, and S. Paul in his Epistle to the Hebrews does further confirm it; and as plain it is that he himself did know that it was impossible the hour should be removed from him, because he himself does so declare his knowledge, even when he prays for a removal of it. Now is my soul troubled, says he, Joh. 12. 27. and what shall I say? Father, save me from this 
* Vbi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 omnino mortis tempus denotat. Grot. Annot. in Matt. 26. vers. 39  hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour. Nor can it here be said, that any thing either now or in his bloody Agony did 
† 
Cum autem verba haec Christi & quae sequuntur uno nexu cohaereant, non est putandum quicquam illi velut impraemeditatum excidisse, & quod prius dixerat vere & proprie per id quod posterius est emendari, cum multo rectius dicatur uno codemque tempore Christum exprimere voluisse tum quid vellet tum quid velit, etc. H. Grot. Matt. 26. vers. 39  
Vide Luc. Brugens. ibid. Hooker's Eccles. Pol. l. 5. §. 48. p. 282.   fall from him without due pondering and regard, or that his present Griefs had distracted his Thoughts, and troubled his Reason, or disturbed his Memory so, that he should need to correct and amend what he before had spoken amiss. As this were unworthy the Saviour of the world, so more truly we must say, that Christ did at one and the same time express the desires of Nature and Grace, of Sense and Reason, both his absolute and effectual Will and Resolution, and his inefficacious desires, and the present necessities of Nature.  
§. 60. For Prayer, as Mr. Hooker has most excellently well 
hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. 5. §. 48. p. 284.  observed, has other lawful uses then only to serve for a chosen mean, whereby the Will resolveth to seek that which the Understanding certainly knoweth, or is persuaded it shall obtain. It serves as well for a presentation of mere desires, and an expression of our present griefs, as to procure desired effects at the hands of God. Pain then and Torments and Death being irksome to flesh and blood, Nature teaches us to pray and seek for remedy where it is to be had. And though we have no assurance of being heard in this our present request, nay though we know we shall be denied in the particular we pray for, yet hereby we testify our dependence upon God, and that we put our trust in him, even when or although he will slay us Add to this, that hereby we testify and acknowledge God's sovereignty over us, and his absolute Power to help us, even then when we are assured that for Reasons best known to his own almighty Wisdom he is resolved not to hearken to us. And as thereby we glorify him, by offering the Tribute of Praise to his name: so we express our Faith and assurance that our Prayers shall some way or other return into our own bosoms; and though he answer us not in that very kind that we pray for, yet he will not fail us in that which he shall judge more for our Advantage. For he himself has invited us to call upon him in the day of trouble, and has promised to deliver us, that so we may glorify him. The event shows that this Promise is not to be understood according to the deliverance we pray for, but only for that which his own Wisdom thinks fit. And therefore though to pray for things absolutely impossible be irrational and absurd; yet to pray for that which ex hypothesi, and upon supposition of this or that decree of Gods, is impossible, is most pious and Christian; since thereby we acknowledge that he who now, for some reasons best known to himself, will not help us, might otherwise very easily do it, and will otherwise compensate the refusal of this present request.  
§. 61. And therefore since Prayer is not only explicatio propriae voluntatis apud Deum ut eam impleat, but also, as the same Aquinas, it is an expression of the present exigencies of Nature, our Blessed Saviour, though he knew God had otherwise decreed, might pray for a removal of the bitter Cup, because 
Oratio est quasi interpres voluntatis humanae apud Deum. Durand. l. 3. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. art. 1 p. 1. 85. C.  hereby he did not express 
* Alio modo potest dici aliquis orare secundum sensualitatem, quia sc. ejus ratio orando Deo proponit quod est in appetitu sensualitatis ipsius. Et secundum hoc Christus oravit secundum sensualitatem, in quantum sc. ejus oratio exprimebat sensualitatis affectum, tanquam sensualitatis advocata: et hoc ut nos de tribus instrueret. Primo quidem, ut ostenderet se veram naturam humanam suscepisse cum omnibus ndturalibus affectibus. Secundo, ut ostenderet quod homini licet secundum naturalem affectum aliquid velle quod Deus non vult. Tertio, ut ostendat quod proprium affectum debet homo divinae voluntati subjicere. Vnde Augustinus in Enchiridio dicit, Sed Christus hominem gerens ostendit privatam quandam hominis voluntatem, cum dicit, Transeat à me calix iste; haec enim erat voluntas humana proprium aliquid & tanquam privatum volens: sed quia recto corde rectum vult esse hominem, atque ad Deum dirigi, subdit, Veruntamen nonsicut ego volo, sed sicut tu. Acsi dicat, Vide te in me: quia potes aliquid velle, etsi Deus aliud velit. Aquin. 3. p. q. 21. ari. 2. in Corp. Sic & Durand. l. 3. Sent. d. 17 q. 2. art. 23.  what he absolutely desired, but only what Nature was at present troubled and amazed at, and should otherwise effectually desire, if God had not been pleased to resolve the contrary.  
§. 62. And this he did for three reasons especially, as the 
* Quantum ad secundum etc. dicendum quod hujus ratio fuit triplex. Prima ad manifestationem humanae naturae assumptae, quia naturaliter refutabat passionem; & in hoc erudivit nostram sidem. Secunda verò ad confirmandam nestram imbecillitatem, ut non diffidamus si passionum pericula exhorremus; & in hoc erexit spem nostram. Tertia ut ostenderet voluntatem nostram divinae voluntati esse per omnia subjiciendam, quod ostendit in conditione apposita, Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu: & in hoc ordinavit in nobis Charitatem, quâ affectum nostrum divinae voluntati conferre debemus; unde magis oravit pro nobis in illa oratione quamoraret pro se. Nic. d'Orbellis l. 3 Sent. d. 17 q 2.  Schools have observed. First, to testify the truth of his humane Nature, and that he had taken flesh and blood, with all the frailties and infirmities of it. And secondly, to show that it is lawful for the Christian, according to the exigencies of Nature, to desire some things that God has otherwise resolved against. And thirdly, to instruct us, that notwithstanding any contrary inclinations and desires of flesh and blood, yet we should cheerfully submit our present desires to Gods all holy will.  
§. 63. Nor can it here be said that this Prayer of our Saviour was vain, because it was a desire of that which he knew was not possible to be effected; or Foolish, in that it was for the changing his will which is immutable. For though our Saviour knew that God had decreed against the removal of the Cup, yet he also knew that he had not decreed against the Prayer itself; and so it would not be vain, though the desire itself was not to be accomplished: he knew that though God had determined against the event, which would be hurtful, yet not against the desire itself, that was natural. And therefore as tender Mothers, though they resolve to deny the Child that which it cries for, because it would be dangerous, yet are pleased with the earnest prayers of the Child, because they are arguments of its affection: So God is well pleased with those Prayers which, for reasons best known to himself, he resolves shall be fruitless as to the thing desired, because they are testimonies of our Faith and dependence upon him, and that we look for nothing but only at his hands. Will any say that Hezeckiah did in vain open and spread Senacherib's letter before the Lord, or that he attempted 
2 Kings 19 14.  to lay open that to God which he knew not? Though Hezekiah knew God was Omniscient, yet hereby he expressed his abhorrence and the estation of Senacheribs Blasphemies in the sight of the Lord, and manifested his assurance and confidence in God's assistance. And the event declared that this action, as well as his Prayer, was acceptable in God's sight. And therefore as to this part of Christ's prayer, impious it could not be, that was itself an act of Piety and well pleasing to God; and foolish it could not be, that had other glorious ends beyond the supply of Nature's wants. Though it could not procure the effecting of the present desire of Nature; yet for all that it might obtain something else that would either countervail or transeend the blessing which at present Nature stood in want of.  
§. 64. We are therefore (as 
† Hooker's Eccles. Pol. l. 5. §. 48. p. 284.  Mr. Hooker most excellently) taught by his example, 1. That the presence of dolorous and dreadful Objects, even in minds most perfect, may as clouds overcast all sensible joy. 2. That no assurance touching future victories can make present conflicts so sweet and easy, but Nature will shun and shrink from them; Nature will desire ease and deliverance from oppressive burdens. 3. That the contrary determination of God is oftentimes against the effect of this desire. 4. Yet not against the affection itself, because it is naturally in us. 5. That in such case our prayers cannot serve us as a means to obtain the thing we desire. 6. That notwithstanding, they are unto God a most acceptable sacrifice, because they testify we desire nothing but at his hands, and our desires we submit with contentment to be overruled by his will; and in general they are not repugnant unto the natural will of God, which wishes to the works of his own hands, in that they are his own handiwork, all happiness, although perhaps for some special cause in our own particular, a contrary determination have seemed more convenient. 7. Finally, that thus to propose our desires to God, which cannot take such effect as we specify, shall notwithstanding otherwise procure us his heavenly grace, even as this very Prayer of Christ obtained Angels to be sent him as comforters in his Agony. And this is most agreeable to the Apostles determination, Heb. 5. 7. 
Luke 22. 43.   
§. 65. From these 
† This will not seem strange unto us, if we consider that in Christ every faculty, power and part was suffered, notwithstanding the perfection found in some other, to do that which properly pertained unto it: and from hence it is easy to discern how it came to pass that Christ should desire and pray for that which he knew should never be granted, as namely that the cup of death might pass from him. For the sense of Nature and inferior Reason presented death to him, etc. Field of the Church, l. 5. c. 18. p. 452.  Premises and foregoing considerations it will be no hard matter to show how the Ardency and fervour of Christ in the inward Acts of Prayer might gradually increase, and he might be more earnest in this Act of Prayer in his bloody Agony then formerly, without any derogation from the fullness of his habitual Grace, the impeccability and perpetual happiness of his soul, or the all-absolute Perfection of his Actual Love of God, as Comprehensor in the superior part of the Soul, his Mind.  
§. 66. For since Prayer, as 
* Suarez. in 3. part. Thom. tom. 1. q. 21. art 1. in Commentar.  Suarez tells us, est actus indigentis ope alterius, cui cultum & reverentiam exhibet, & ideo ad Religionem pertinet, an Act of Religious worship, whereby we express to God our present wants and necessities, in order to his help and assistance; this must only belong to Christ in the state of a Viator. And therefore the Apostle signally tells us, that in the days of his Flesh (as that frequently signifies the frailty and infirmity and passable condition of his humane Nature before his tion) he offered up prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, to him that was able to help him.  
§. 67. And now though, as 
† In quo actus orationis consistat & cujus facultatis sit non facile, ut existimo, explicari potest— Nunc, quod praesenti instituto satis est, supponamus actum mentalis orationis seu petitionis apud Deum (de hoc enim agimus) includere vel supponere aliquid ad intellectum & aliquid ad voluntatem pertinens, sc. voluntatem seu desiderium obtinendi aliquid à Deo, seu opedivina; quae voluntas supponit Deum cognosci ut authorem talis boni, à quo expectandum est & petendum. Deinde includit oratio ordinationem quandam hujusmodi voluntatis seu desiderii ad Deum, quâ homo manifestat Deo suum affectum, cupiens & sperans obtinere quod appetit. Sive igitur haec ordinatio vel explicatio desiderii apud Deum ad intellectum five ad voluntatem pertineat, constat tamen Christi animam capacem fuisse omnium istorum actuum, cum creatasit, Deoque subjecta & inferior. Suarez. ibid. p. 588, 589.  Suarez thinks, it be hard to determine how or in what the Act of Petitionary Prayer does consist, & to what Faculty of the Soul it belongs; yet this, which is sufficient to our present purpose, is acknowledged, that the Inward Act of Prayer or Petition unto God (of which alone we now speak) does include or suppose something belonging to the Understanding, and something that appertains unto the Will, to wit, an Actual volition and desire of obtaining something from God, by his aid and assistance; which will supposes God to be known and acknowledged as the author of that good, from whom we expect and crave it. And then 2ly it includes an ordination or address to God of this will and desire, whereby the Soul manifests her affections to God, desiring and hoping and trusting to obtain what it so earnestly longs for.  
§. 68 And therefore it being evident that Petitionary Prayer can belong to none but only those that are in want of that help from others, which they cannot give unto themselves, and that thereby we lay open and express our desires to God for his aid and relief, it must of necessity imply, as Mr. Hooker has well observed, these four things: 1. the want of that which we pray 
hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. 5. §. 48. p. 279.  for; 2. a sense and feeling of that want; 3. an earnest longing and willingness of mind to be eased therein; and 4. a declaration of this our desire in the sight of God, not as if he should be otherwise ignorant of our necessities, but because we this way show that we honour him as our God, and are verily persuaded that no good thing can come to pass which he by his omnipotent power effecteth not.  
§. 69. Since then that Prayer in its formal Notion is nothing else, as I may so speak, but an interpreter and expresser of the desires of the soul to God, who is able to help us, and since Reason 
Oratio est quasi interpres voluntatis humanae apud Deum. Durand. l. 3. Sent. didst 17. c. 2. pag. 185. C. Oratio est quaedam explicatio voluntatis apud Deum ut eam impleat. Aquin. 3. part. q. 21. art. 1. in Corp. Constat quod oratio non potest esse sensualitatis actus, & quod sensualitatis affectus potest esse materia quam oratio Deo offered. Cajetan. in 3. part. Thom. art. 2.  in the Soul of our Blessed Saviour was still the faithful advocate of Sense and Nature, to plead her wants and necessities at the throne of grace; it follows that as the desires were more high and ardent in him, or less inflamed, so the gradual intenseness of this inward Act of Prayer must grow or decrease, otherwise it could not be a true and faithful expresser of the present long and desires of the Soul.  
§. 70. And now plain it is, that the fervour and intenseness of these desires of the Soul did rise and fall in him according to the present exigences of Nature, or the gradual difference in the Perfection of the Object or the thing desired. For as he could not be cozened and deluded with empty shows and appearances of good; so his Judgement and Reason always regularly moving, must still incline him to affect and desire orderly, and according to the true value and esteem of the native worth and goodness of the desirable Object. As therefore the Order of Charity, and Reason, and God's law requires that we should love God above all, and next our selves, and then our neighbours as ourselves; so Christ, without derogation to the fullness of his habitual Grace, as we have showed, did, according to this Order of Charity, prefer and more earnestly desire his own glorification at the right hand of God than ours, for whose glory he died; so without doubt he prayed for it with a different fervour and ardency, as will easily appear by the very expressions in that Prayer, which S. John has recorded to these very purposes, Joh. 17. And has not God himself, as he commanded us to set a higher price and esteem on spiritual blessings then temporal, so also enjoined us to pray for them with a different ardour and fervency? Shall I pray as earnestly for the bread that perisheth, as for the Manna that comes down from heaven? for a little fading wealth or bodily refreshment, as for the riches of heaven and a never-fading happiness? The very 
† Vide Juvenal. Satyr. 10. — nos animorum Impulsu & caecâ magnâque cupidine ducti Conjugium petimus, partumque uxoris: at illis Notum qui pueri, qualisque futurasit uxor.  tamen & poscas aliquid, voveasque Sacellis Exta, & candiduli divina tomacula porci, Orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano. Fortem posce animum, etc. Juvenal. ibid. Vide H. Grot. Annotat. in 6. Mat. v. 8. p. 142.  Heathen Poet could jeer this folly in his Votaries: and our Saviour, that has given us the most perfect pattern of Prayer, has allowed but one Petition for temporal blessings, and five or six for spirituals; and he has so encompassed it with spiritual desires, as if he would not have it either to begin or end our Prayers. And therefore in that very Chapter where he has taught us to pray, he has given us rules for the heightening and growth of this ardour according to the worth and value of the things we desire. Lay not up (says he) for yourselves treasures 
Mat. 6. 19, 20, 21.  in earth, where moth and rust do corrupt, and where thiefs break through and steal. But lay up for yourselves treasures in 
Hoc vult Christus, prout de rebus judicamus, ita nos erga eas affici. Si in divitiis positam credimus felicitatem, futurum ut nihil pravertamus conquirendae pecuniae study: sin veram virtutem solidum credimus bonum, ei nos omnem daturos operam. Et sanè verum est, quod Philosophi etiam docent, ex decretis in animo conceptis sequi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Epictetus, ut solet, nervose, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Vnde etiam monent sollicitos nos esse debere ut discamus rem quamque suo pretio aestimare, etc. H. Grot. Annot. in 6. Matt. vers. 21. pag. 151, 152.  heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thiefs do not break through and steal. The Reason is excellent; For where your treasure is, there will your hearts be also. What we most value, that with the greatest longing and most earnest ardour we hunt after. The voice of Nature teaches us this Truth, and even Philosophy has advised it.  
§. 71. If then our Prayers be but expressions of our desires, and as they rise and fall, so of necessity must the ardour of our Prayers, where we pray as we ought, and if our desires are intended or remitted according to the present exigencies of Nature, and the real or apparent goodness of the desirable Object; it must evidently follow, that if now at least our Saviour's Natural and sensual desires were innocently heightened, according to the present pressures he groaned under, his Prayers and inward ardour and fervency of his desires for a removal of the burden must proportionably increase, according to the growth of its weight. And therefore if it also appear that our Saviour was never till this hour encompassed with such horrors, such anguish and astonishment, and Nature and Sense in him were never so oppressed; it will also most clearly follow, that such a tempestuous time as this, such an hour of affliction was a fit season for Christ's ardency to receive some growth, for his zeal, to use the Doctor's expression, to be emulous of those waves, and to pour out itself not only more profusely, but also more earnestly, at such then at a calmer season.  
§. 72. And now we find him in such an Agony 
(a) Lament. 1. 12.  that he might well cry out, Behold and see if there were ever sorrow like unto my sorrow! 
(b) Vide B. Andrews of the Passion, Serm. 2. Field of the Church, l. 5. c. 18. p. 451. Aquin. 3. part. q. 46. art. 6. in Corp. Suarez. 2. tom. in 3. part. Thom. q. 46. art. 6. disp. 33. sect. 2. p. 399. Durand. lib. 3. Sent. didst 15. q. 3. Ambros. commentar. in Luc. c. 22. Maldonat. in Mat. c. 26. vers. 39 Beza in Luc. 22. 44.  Here was now presented to his view in one sad and fatal night-piece, the fearful wrath, the flashes and the lightning of an angry God for sin, not yet attoned and pacified; triumphant death, with all its train of horrors, not yet mastered, but proudly trampling upon all the sons of Adam; Hell and the devil, with all his cursed Legions, threatening a final conquest of the race of men; and finally, flesh and blood left naked, like a winter's tree without any fruit or leaves, without any the least gleam of spiritual light or joys, and left alone, as in an open Theatre, naked, to fight with all these cruel beasts and dismal monsters, 
(c) Cum clarè testetur Petrus, impossible fuisse Christū retineri à doloribus mortis, sequitur non fuisse immunem ab illis & penitus liberum; & certe susceptâ nostrâ personâ nostroque reatu necesse habuit ad Dei tribunal se instar peccatoris sistere: hinc horror ille & pavor, qui ad deprecandam mortem cum coegit: non quia tam acerbum illi foret è vita migrare, sed quia ante oculos erat Dei maledictio qua peccatoribus incumbit, etc. Calvin. Comment. in Psal. ●2. vers. 2, 3. Vide Hug. de Sacrament. lib. 2. par. 1. c. 10. cited by Hooker l. 5. §. 48. pag. 283.  What should now frail flesh and blood but tremble? Can it choose but stand amazed, and cry for help? If nature ever were astonished, now it was in Christ. If flesh and blood could ever tremble, now it must. If 
† Vide calvin's Institut. lib. 2. cap. 16. § 11, 12.  ever Sense and Nature could have need of Reason's help, to call for aid to him that alone could help, this was the proper season. For what say the Evangelists of it? He began to be troubled in Soul, says Saint John, c. 12. v. 27. to be in an Agony, as Saint Luke c. 22. v. 44. to be sorrowful, as S. Mat. c. 26. v. 37. to be sore amazed and very heavy, as S Mark. c. 14. v. 33. So that he saith to his Disciples, my soul is exceeding sorrowful unto Death. Here is trouble, horror and amazement, and exceeding sorrow even unto death. So great the Agony was, so high was his astonishment, that now in a Cold night, in open air, lying flat upon the ground, he 
(a) Vide Suarez in 3. part: Thom. q. 46. art. 8. disp. 34. sect. 2. tom. 2. pag. 406.  sweat for very fear, and not an ordinary common sweat, but a sweat of blood: and this not diaphoreticus, a thin faint sweat, tainted with the thinner and more serous part of the blood, whereof Instances are given from 
(b) 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. de histor. animal. l. 3. c. 19 p. 891. B. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. lib. 3. de partibus Anim. cap. 5. p. 1156. F. Duas nimirum agnoscit causas Aristoteles, unam sanguinis tenuitatem & aquositatem, alteram verò raritatem & laxitatem cutis & pororum apertionem; quibus nonnulli tertiam addunt, nimirum facultatum nutritioni inservientium debilitatem. si scil. retentrix debiliter contineat, expultrix verò fortiter expellat. Sennert. Institut. Medic. lib. 2. part. 3. sect. 2 c. 8. de causis Sanguinei Sudoris, pag. 548.  
Cum sudor nihil aliud sit quam pars sanguinis aquosa quae in venis est, cur quemadmodum omnibus pars illa per sudorem effluit, non possit in paucissimis quibusdam, qui ra●issimo sint corpore, & subtiliorem sanguinem habeant, sanguis ipse tenuior loco sudoris effluere? & quemadmodum videmus omnes subito correptos metu sudare, ita Christum, qui delicatissimae naturae erat, non dicamus naturaliter apprehenso ignominiosissimo genere mortis sanguinem sudavisse? Audio de his qui viderunt aut cognoverunt, ante annos duos, Luteriae Parisiorum, hominem robustum & bene valentem, auditâ in se capitali sententiâ, sudore sanguineo fuisse perfusum. Maldonat. in Comment. ad Matt. 26. vers. 36. fol. 620. C. D. Curdled drops] A singular or at least very rare example in nature, being the effect of an extreme anguish. Deodat. in loc. Vide Bezam, Jansenium in loc.   Aristotle and others; but grumosus, a sweat of gross and clotted blood, great drops of blood, and those so many, that they went through all his , trickling down to the ground in great abundance. So great, so miraculously strange a sweat it was, that some 
* 
Notandum & Hilarium, l. 10. de Trinitate, & D. Hieron. l. 2. cont. Pelag. indicare in plerisque Graecorum & Latinorum Codicibus non inveniri neque de Angelo confortante, neque de Sudore sanguineo: verum haec erasa videntur à quibusdam, qui verebantur Christo tribuere tam insignia humanae infirmitatis argumenta. Jansenius in loc.. So also Beza, Maldonate on the place.  
Alii non delent verbum sed sensum extenuant, quasi non revera sanguinem Christus sudârit, sed Proverbiali formâ dictum sit, sudâsse sanguinem, i. e. vehementi timore correptum fuisse, sicut vulgo de his dicere solemus, qui valde anxii & impediti sunt, guttas eos sanguinis sudare: Ita Euthymius & Theophylactus explanant. Mald. in loc. Confer Janscn. hic cum Theophylact. & Euthymio. H. Grotius agrees in his Notes on the place, p. 816.   good Expositors are willing rather to understand it by a Trope or a Proverb, then according to truth and reality in the letter. Howsoever plain it is, that so great his grief, astonishment and agony was, that he had an Angel sent to comfort him. How could Nature, left alone and naked, but stand amazed to enter these so bloody lists? Well might he now take up David's complaint, and say, De profundis, Out of the depths have I cried unto thee, O Lord. Nothing now of comfort and protection was left; the Godhead now restrained its comfortable influence, and left the Manhood all naked to the encounter, and nothing left him for relief but his Prayers. Here, here was a time for ardency and zeal, and a most heightened devotion. One Deep did now call upon another; and for his encouragement in these his addresses to the throne of grace he had Gods own assurance, Call upon me in the day of trouble, and I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me. He had all the fears and burdens of nature, and the astonishment of sense, and the horror of frail flesh and blood alarming Reason to be their faithful advocate in Prayer. And therefore to deny a heightening of his ardour proportionable to his fears, is to make him insensible of his present burden, and to fancy Nature not to be desirous of relief. But the Evangelist has assured us, that as reason tells us this was a proper season for the growth of Christ's ardency in Prayer, so it was actually heightened, and being in an Agony he prayed more earnestly then at other times he did, when he had not such occasion. His prayers being now the interpreters of Nature's burden, they must of necessity be heightened in fervour according to the height of the present distress. And therefore the Apostle tells us that in the days of his flesh, when he was now encompassed with all the miseries and frailties of nature, he offered up Prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, unto him that was able to help him. These strong cries and tears 
(a) Coegit haec absurditas multos interpretes ad cap. tandum effugium. Itaque dixerunt Christum potius ex vulgi opinion, quam proprio sensu, ita conquestum esse: sed interea non viderunt se multum detrabere ex beneficio redemptionis, dum Christum à terroribus quos peccatoribus incutit Dei Judicium prorsus immunem fuisse fingunt. Inanis verò fuit hic metus, quod veriti sunt Christum tanto dolori subjicere, ne ejus gloriam min●erent, etc. Calvin. in Commentar. ad Psal. 22. vers. 2, 3. p 9●. Quod si primo conflictu elicitae fuerunt sanguinis guttae, ut opus fuerit Consolatore Angelo, non mirum est si in ultimo Agone confessus est tantum dolorem, etc. Calvin. ibid.  were not only for a show, and to be taken notice of by men, but they came from the heart; the heightened outcries, the streams and floods of tears and strong clamours were true and real symptoms of a more than ordinary fervour, a more intense ardency then formerly he had occasion for. And therefore we may well conclude, that as his now - approaching torments made a stronger impression on his humane Nature then at other times; so now, on this occasion, he prayed the more earnestly then at other times. As the occasion was weighty for the inflaming of his zeal, so it cannot be denied but his fervency was advanced to a proportionable degree. And so, as the Doctor says, his bloody Agony may well testify, but it cannot prejudge the ardency that by this occasion was heightened.  
§. 73. And therefore 
† Non ergo sine causa ipse quoque Dominus, quum precibus incumbere vehementius vellet, in secessum procul hominum tumultu se conferebat, etc. Calvin. Institut. lib. 3. c. 20. §. 29.  Mr. Calvin not only acknowledges that our Blessed Saviour did sometimes pray more ardently then at other times, but also demonstrates that times of trouble & distress are fit opportunities for the heightening of our fervour and ardency in Prayer, and that then 
Vide Calvin. in Matt. 26. 39 Institut. lib. 2. c. 16. §. 11, 12.  more especially God calls upon us for it. His words are these, Si quis objiciat non semper aequali necessitate urgeri nos ad precandum, fateor id quidem: atque haec distinctio nobis à Jacobo utiliter traditur. 
* Jac. 5. 13.  Tristatur quis inter vos? oret: qui laetus est, canat. Ergo dictat ipse communis sensus; quia nimium pigri sumus, prout res exigit, nos acrius à Deo pungi ad strenue orandum. 
Psal. 32. 6.  Et hoc tempus opportunum nominat David: quia (sicuti pluribus aliis locis docet) quo nos durius premunt molestiae, incommoda, timores, aliaeque species tentationum, ac si nos Deus ad se accerseret, liberior patet accessus. Calvin. Institut. l. 3. c. 20. §. 7. So again to this purpose §. 29. Sed enim istud nihil obstat quo minus unaquaeque Ecclesia, cum subinde ad frequentiorem precationum usum se extimulare, tum majore aliqua necessitate admonita acriore studio flagrare debeat.  
§. 74. And therefore since, as Mr. Calvin most truly, a time of great affliction is a fit season for the heightening our zeal and devotion, and God then more signally calls upon us for it; Our Saviour, all whose actions, especially of this nature, were for 
2 Pet. 2. 21.  our example and instruction, did now in this his Agony pray more earnestly, to teach us what we should do in such cases, and that we might learn from his practice, that a Time of affliction is a season for the growth of our inward ardency and devotion and intenseness in Prayer, as well as for the outward clamours and outcries. Quoderat demonstrandum.  
§. 75. And therefore, though it is evident that now it will be lost labour to make any reflections upon the former part of our Refuters second Answer, yet to gratify him in these his injunctions, I shall cast some light strictures on it, though the Doctor did not, because it was needless.  
§. 76. Whereas then our Refuter says in the application of the first branch of his second answer, That if we consider Christ's prayer in reference unto the Object unto whom it was made, God, the religion and inward worship of his Prayer was for degrees always alike equal. His trust and dependence upon God, love of zeal, and devotion towards God, from which all his Prayers flowed, were not at one time more intense then at another.  
§. 77. To this I answer First,  
1. That if these be considered in the Habit, without doubt they were always alike equal, they were not at one time more intense then at another; because habitually they were always in him in the full height and Perfection. But then this is not the question between him and the Doctor. 2. But than secondly, if these be considered in their several Acts, and if we shall compare them one with another, there must of necessity be a gradual difference in them according to the present exigence and occasion. The reason is one and the same in these and all other Acts of virtue, quod scilicet, as Cajetan truly, si homo exercet 
Cajetan. in 2. 2. q. 38. art. 12. in respons. ad terlium.  eos tenetur eos exercere cum debitis circumstantiis, A man is bound to perform them with all due and lawful circumstances. And therefore though the Habit of divine Charity, of Religion and Devotion, etc. be always full, yet the will of Christ did perform the several Acts of those graces according to those due measures and circumstances that God's Law required. His love to God in the Act, I mean in that high, that transcendent Act of divine Love immediately terminated on God, was at the height; his own glory and exaltation in the Humane Nature he loved in a proportionable degree next to that, and then the Church, and then his own life, which yet he laid down for the redemption of the Faithful. So also in the Acts of Prayer and Devotion, they were always performed with that fervency as the present occasion and the things that he prayed for did require. This already has abundantly been demonstrated, and therefore needs no further proof.  
§. 78. Secondly I answer, That if we shall consider Christ's actual Love as immediately terminated on God, and the Acts of his trust and dependence upon him, his Acts of Love and Zeal and Devotion towards him, that immediately flowed from his all-full and perfect knowledge of God's absolute sovereignty and goodness, which as Comprehensor, and also by the Habit of infused knowledge of God he enjoyed, those were always one and the same; he could not love him more than he did, or reverence him more than he did, or trust in him more than he did, because it was impossible he should know or enjoy him more than he did. But these being the spring and fountain from which all Christ's Prayers flowed, as our Refuter expressly acknowledges, were not the Acts of that holy Love and Zeal and Devotion that are now in controversy between himself and the Doctor; and therefore their constant fullness of intensive perfection makes nothing to this purpose.  
§. 79. But then there are other Acts of Love and Charity, of Zeal and Devotion which flow from these as the effects from their cause, and of which only the Doctor spoke, as we have abundantly demonstrated, that differed one from another in gradual Perfection. We have already proved it of our Saviour's Prayer in the Garden.  
§. 80. The Acts then of Love and Trust and dependence upon God, and of Zeal and Devotion to him, may be considered either precisely and abstractly in themselves, and by themselves, as flowing from peculiar Habits and Virtues of the same names, which are the causes and fountains from whence all our Prayers flow: (for pray we do to God, because we love, and honour, and reverence, and trust and depend on him) or else as they are the Acts issuing from Prayer, as they are the consequents and ●manations, 
Aquin. 2. 2. q. 83. art. 3. in Corp.  as I may so speak, that visibly shine in it, and per modum connotantiae result from it. For, as Aquinas truly, Ad religionem proprie pertinet reverentiam & honorem Deo exhibere: & ideo omnia illa per quae Deo reverentia exhibetur pertinent ad Religionem. Per Orationem autem homo Deo reverentiam exhibet, in quantum scil. ei subjicit & profitetur orando se Deo indigere, sicut authore suorum bonorum: unde manifestum est quod oratio est propriè religionis Actus. As out of Religion we pray to God, so in and by our Acts of Prayer we give him religious reverence and worship. And therefore, as Cajetan well observes, there 
Cajetan. in 2. 2. Thom q. 83. art. 3.  are three things considerable in Prayer; First, the thing prayed for, the object of our desires and prayers: and in this we acknowledge God's fullness and superlative Goodness, because we desire to have our wants supplied from his store, and therefore we ask it of him. Secondly, the Petition itself: and thus we honour God also, because our very Petition and Act of Prayer is an Act of subjection, and an acknowledgement of God's power to help us; for he that asks any thing of another, does eo ipso acknowledge his own wants, and by this very Act does submit himself to his will and power; he does also in this his ask profess a Power in him to whom he prays to relieve him, a goodness and mercy that will incline him to make use of this his Power to his relief, and a wisdom and gracious Providence to over rule and order all things, that they may best serve for his relief. Thirdly, the Petitioner, who by his mind and understanding does petition God, (for Prayer is an Act of the Understanding, the prime and most noble part of man:) and thus he also honours God in this, in that he subjects the noblest part of his Soul to him, makes use of that to express his desires, and acknowledgement of his Power and Goodness.  
§. 81. And now as by all these we honour God in Prayer, so our Religion and worship in the first and second respects are capable of augmentation, and God may be more or less honoured by them. Nay in the third also this is possible of increase, when the Petitioner, as we say in our Liturgy, does offer up not only his mind, but his whole soul and body, and every part and faculty of it in Prayer, the Mind to conceive, the Will to censent, the Tongue, the Hand, the Eye, the Knee, all to testify and acknowledge our homage. But in the first and second there can be no doubt. When we petition God for spiritual and heavenly blessings, we more honour him in this Act of Prayer then when we ask him only temporal, because we hereby more acknowledge his transcendent Perfection, Grace and Goodness. Honoramus 
Cajetan. in locum ut supra.  (says Cajetan) Deum petendo, & tanto magis, quanto vel ex modo petendi vel ex re petita profitemur ipsum esse supra omnia Creatorem, provisorem, etc. So also when with greater long of spirit, stronger ardencies and desires we petition him, hereby we acknowledge our greater trust and confidence in his Power to help us, which more magnifies and honours him. We should not come with so much eagerness, unless we had the greater confidence in his Wisdom, Power and Goodness.  
§. 82. And thus Prayer being an Act of Religion, as Aquinas truly, which in the Act of Prayer is capable of increase, this may and ordinarily is gradually intended, though the former were not. And yet we have already seen, that our Saviour did as well increase in the Perfection of the Acts of Wisdom and Grace, as he did in Stature, and this acknowledged by our Refuter himself.  
§. 83. In short then, the Acts of Religion, and Devotion, and Love, and Trust in Christ praying (or these Acts from whence his Prayers did all issue, as our Refuter has it) might be still gradually the same, and yet the Acts of Zeal and Devotion and religious worship of and in his Prayer might be, and often was upon occasion, augmented, particularly in his prayer in the Garden. And this was all that Doctor Hammond intended. His words are plain, The Ardency in Christ was sincere ardency accompanied with Acts of Love and Trust of the same temper, and the heightening it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, was an addition of Degrees to that Act of Ardency, and so of Prayer, and proportionably of Love and Trust in God, above either what there was, or what there was occasion for at other times.  
And so at last I have gotten liberty to follow our Refuter's Motion.   

SECT. 17.  
The Refuters three Arguments to prove the Act of Christ's Love always equally intense, impertinent to the present Question. His confident proposal of them to be examined as rigidly us the Doctors pleases, and his vain Ostentation in placing them in his Title-page censured. The Ambiguity of the Phrase, Christ's Love of God, distinguished from Crellius, Estius, Aquinas, and others. In what sense still used by the Doctor.  
§. 1. He goes on most magnificently, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with much pomp and ostentation, he threatens to beat the Doctor with the very Musterroll of his Forces.  

JEANES.  
His Actual Love of God was in termino, as they say, was always at the highest, and most intense: and this I shall not barely dictate, but prove by three arguments, which I present unto you to be examined as rigidly as you please, 

1. The all-fulness and perfection of Christ's habitual Grace.  
2. His perpetual and uninterrupted happiness.  
3. His impeceability.     
§. 2. Well, Sir, if this be all you aim at, you might have spared your pains in these three Arguments. For this was never yet questioned, as we have already demonstrated. The Doubt only is, whether those Acts of divine Charity or holy Love in Christ, which belonged to him as Viator, and by which he merited, (such as those of Prayer, Mercy, Charity and the like, to which he had an absolute freedom) were capable of intention and remission. It concerns not that high and necessary Act of Divine Love which he enjoyed as Comprehensor, and was always in Termino, by which, as being necessary, he did not, could not merit. And if you had not put these your Reasons in the frontispiece and Title-page of your book, and proposed them to be as rigidly examined as the Doctor pleases, or any for him, I should have wholly passed them by, as nothing at all to the purpose. Howsoever I am glad that you are a man of that equal temper, that your successes and great acquests against Doctor Hammond have not so puffed you up, as they did the Roman Caesar, that you should vote yourself perpetual Dictator, and that you will not always dictate, but afford us some proof at last.  
§. 3. Et jam ad Triarios ventum est, we are now come to our Refuters thundering and immortal legions, those whom Victory itself shall not be able to conquer. For these we may examine as rigidly as we please. These are the very Chariots and horsemen of Israel; they are the forces he is so confident of, that he sings his Io Paean himself, and proclaims his conquests by them before the battle is yet begun; and in the very frontispiece and Title of his book, he tells all spectators, Doctor Hammond his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or a greater Ardency in Christ's Love of God at one time then another, proved to be utterly irreconcilable 1. with his fullness of habitual grace, 2 the perpetual happiness, and 3. Impeccability of his Soul: by Henry Jeanes Minister of God's word at Chedzoy in Somersetshire.  
§. 4. But though our Refuter when he kept within his own verge, and talked of Thomas and Scotus, the Sums and the Sentences, amongst his Country neighbours, seemed a tall Schoolman; yet when he dares assault Doctor Hammond, whose Doctrine in defence of our Church being solidly founded on the Rock of Divine Truth, neither the overflows of Tiber nor the waves of the Lake Lemannus, though they beat never so violently against it, could overthrow, he is now in great danger to lose that little reputation he had already gained in the world.  
§. 5. But before I come to consider his arguments, it will be needful again to mind the Reader of the ambiguity of the Phrase, The Love of God. Charitas Dei, sive in Deum, says Crellius (in this no Socinian) quae per se tota ad Deum spectat, non uno modo in Sacris literis accipitur. Interdum enim sumitur latissimè, pro Sanctitate in universum; unde Jo. 1. ep. 5. 3. inquit, hanc esse Charitatem Dei, seu in Deum, ut mandata ipsius servemus; quod idem affirmat c. 2. 5. ubi inquit, Qui servaverit sermonem ipsius verè, in hoc charitas Dei perfecta est: nam hic quoque charitas Dei passiuè accipitur, hoc est pro charitate quâ Deum diligimus. Idem de charitate & dilectione sui affirmat Christus Joh. 14. 21. cum quo conjunge vers. 15, 23, 24. Huic Charitati in Deum salus veluti in solidum ascribitur, quod ad nos attinet, Rom. 8. 28 & 1 Cor. 2. 9 Vide etiam Exod. 20. 6. ubi eodem sensu ponitur diligere Deum & custodire praecepta ejus: & Deut. 11. 1. item 30. 16. Interdum verò strictius paulo sumitur, ita tamen laxè, ut omnia erga Deum praecepta & officia complectatur, & sic non pictatis pars sit, sed eadem cum illa. Quo pacto sumitur in iis locis in quibus Lex universa dilectione Dei & proximi contineri dicitur. Tertio strictissime ac maxime propriè sumitur pro affectu eo, quo desideramus ut ea tum à nobis tum ab aliis fiant quae Deo sunt gratissima, etc. Atque ex hac significatione reliquae sunt ortae. Quja enim dilectionis est seu charitatis in Deum, ex animo cupere ea quae Deo sunt grata, inter quae primum locum obtinent ea quae ad ipsius cultum & honorem praecipuè spectant; hinc fit ut charitatis divinae nomine comprehendantur, per quandam metonymiam synecdochicam, ea Pietatis officia quae in Deum per se vertuntur, quae secunda est nobis tradita hujus vocis significatio. Veruntamen, quia ea quoque Deo sunt grata atque accepta quae Deus hominibus servanda praescripsit, hoc est omnis generis virtutes ac recte facta, hinc fit ut illa quoque omnia dilectionis divinae nomine comprehendantur, etc. Io. Crellii Eth. Christiana lib. 3. c. 4. pag. 259, 260. To the same purpose also Estius, In Scriptura ferè ponuntur indifferenter charitas & dilectio, propterea quod in Graeco vox unica sit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quam interpres modo charitatem modo dilectionem 
Estius l. 3. Sent. didst. 27. §. 1. p. 89. col. ●. E. F.  vertit; unde Augustinus l. 14. de Civit. Dei, c. 7. disputans detribus his vocibus, Amor, Dilectio, Charitas, dicit eas cum in bono accipiuntur in sacris literis idem significare— Eodem loco unum atque idem vult Charitatem & voluntatem bonam: & similia scribit lib. de Gratia Christi, c. 21. Idem Serm. 14. Par. in festo omnium Sanctorum, c. 11. dicit quod nihil sit aliud Charitas quam Dilectio. Et scribens in Psal. 9 Amor, inquit, si pravus est, dicitur Cupiditas; si rectus, Charitas. Similis locus tract. de Substantia dilectionis, cap. 1. To the same purpose also Aquinas, (as shall after be shown) 1. 2. q. 26. art. 3. in Corp. 
* Francis de Sales of the love of God. l. 1. c. 14.  Sales, and so generally others.  
§. 6. In this general sense it is, as the Love of God signifies Holiness or Charity, Doctor Hammond takes it, as we have beyond all exception already demonstrated. And thus also our Refuter understood him, as will be evident from his first argument that follows; though still, when it may serve for his advantage, he understands it of the high & most transcendent Act of Divine Love, that agreed to Christ as Comprehensor, which was always in termino, and at the highest, and nothing concerning the present debate. Go we then to that.   

SECT. 18.  
The Refuters first Argument contradicts his second, and proves not his Conclusion. Reduced to Form. The Sequel denied. The Reason. His Authorities concern not the Question. His citing Aquinas from Capreolus censured. The Conclusion to be proved. Hurtadoes, and Aquinas first saying from Capreolus true, with the Reason of it from Suarez; but not pertinent. A view of the place in Aquinas. He speaks of the Habit etc. not the Act. The different workings of Necessary and Voluntary Causes. The Refuters Argument guilty of a double Fallacy. His next place of Aquinas from Capreolus impertinent. His gross ignorance, or prevaricating in his third place of Aquinas. Scotus Testimony impertinent. Aquinas and Scotus maintain that Proposition which he would confute in the Doctor by their Testimonies.  

JEANES.  
The first Argument, which hath been already so fully insisted on (but yet, with our Refuters leave,, never yet proved, as we have clearly demonstrated) is the all-fulness and perfection of Christ's habitual G●●●e; The habits of all Graces and virtues in Christ were always full and perfect, most intense, and not capable of further or higher degrees, and therefore so were the inward Acts of those Graces and virtues too, and particularly the inward Acts of the habitual grace of divine Charity.   
The Consequence of this, etc.  
§. 1. Well, Sir, hold you there. Are the Inward Acts of those Virtues and Graces, and particularly the Inward Acts of the habitual Grace of divine Charity, that very actual love of God that was in Termino, as they say, always at the highest? were they the Acts of Christ as he was perfectus Comprehensor, as you intimate in your second Argument? I desire your Reason for it, and do not dictate, but prove it. I had thought that these had, if not all, yet the greatest part of them agreed to Christ only as Viator, according to the frail, mortal condition of his state of humiliation. What need, I pray, had he of Trust and dependency on God for a supply of any want, that now, as Comprehensor, was fully possessed of heaven happiness? what need had he to pray or hope, the heaven happiness of whose soul did now even during the whole time of his abode here on earth far surmount that of all the Saints and Angels in heaven, as you assert in your second argument? Have the Saints and Angels in heaven any need of Patience, and Meekness, and Fortitude, and Temperance, and Obedience, and an humble submission to the Cross? does not the Apostle tell us, that high and most transcendent Act of Divine Charity shall remain where God is all in all? do not the Schoolmen that writ de merito Christi say, that Christ did not merit, but only as he was Viator? Why then do you so ignorantly or negligently confound those Acts and Graces that are incompossible, as they speak? As Comprehensor he could not merit, and as Viator he was not in possession of heaven happiness. As Comprehensor his holy Love was always in Termino, and a necessary effect of the Beatifical vision: As Viator it was not a necessary, but a free Act of his will, and the effect of the habit of divine Grace. As Comprehensor he has no need of the Habits and Acts of Virtues, but only as Viator, in which state he was only in a Capacity to exercise them. Either therefore, Sir, writ more distinctly and to the purpose, or else forbear troubling the world for the future with your Scholastical notions, which are so crude and half coddled.  
§. 2. Howsoever I observe that in your first Argument you rightly understand the Doctor's Notion of The Love of God, and take it here, as he still does, in the large sense, as it is all one with holy Charity, as containing in its general notion the Acts of all Graces and Virtues whatsoever: And therefore because now habemus confitentem r●um, I am resolved to hold you to your Concession; and so I come to examine it. In short it is this,  
§. 3. If the habitual Grace and Habits of all Graces and Virtues were in Christ always full and perfect, then so were the inward Acts of those Virtues and Graces, and particularly the inward Acts of Charity. But the Antecedent is true; Ergo, also the Consequent.  
§. 4. To this, Sir, I answer by denying the sequel of your Major. My Reason is, Because all Habits whatsoever, whether infused or acquisite, that are seated in the Will, are free, and not necessary causes of the Acts that issue from them. And therefore though all natural and necessary causes do work uniformly and equally, and produce the same effects, where the distance is the same, and the Patient equally disposed; yet in voluntary free causes it is far otherwise, as we have showed. And therefore since the inward or immanent Acts of all Habits are elicit Acts of the Will, and not necessary effects, their gradual intention and remission in this sense depends not upon the Physical efficaciousness, but the free and voluntary exercise of that intrinsic virtue, as we have already demonstrated.  
§. 5. But he goes on and tells us that.  

JEANES.  
THe consequence of this Enthymeme hath been already sufficiently proved, and therefore I shall add nothing for further confirmation of it, but the testimonies of some few Schoolmen, Aquinas, as Capreolus, etc.   
§. 6. How is this, Sir? I beseech you make good your promise. Did you not just now tell us, that you would not barely dictate, but prove what you undertook? And have you not told the world so long since in your very Title-page? And must we now be put off to look for a Proof I know not where? I think I have given the world abundant satisfaction already, that you have very little reason to refer us to your former Performances. They say of the Chickens that are hatched in the furnaces of Egypt, that they all come from the egg lame and imperfect, for want of a natural kindly warmth. And such abortive crippled lame creatures are all your proofs, for want of a truly genuine and Scholastical heat in the brain that brings them forth. Though in outward modesty, like Caesar, you seem to decline the title and office of Perpetual Dictator; yet it concerns you in point of Interest, as it did that great Conqueror, not to forego it, that you may secure your great victories over Truth and Doctor Hammond But by your so worthy performances in this Part of your argument, you give me very little hope that you have better quitted yourself by the testimonies of the School men.  
§. 7. And thus they follow.  

JEANES.  
AQuinas, as Capreolus quotes him lib. 1. dist. 17. q. 2. fol. 306. hath this Passage. Nihil, inquit, aliud est qualitatem augeri quam subjectum magis participare qualitatem. Non enim aliud est esse qualitatis, nisi quod habet in subjecto: ex hoc autem ipso quod subjectum magis participat charitatem, vehementius operatur, quia unumquodque operatur in quantum est actu. Aquinas thought (you see) that a greater vehemency in the Operations of Love, argued a greater participation in the Subject of the Habits of Love. And again, second â secundae q. 24. art. 4. ad tertium. Similiter charitas essentialiter est virtus ordinata ad actum, unde idem est ipsam augeri secundum essentiam, & ipsam habere efficaciam ad producendum ferventioris dilectionis actum. Unto this I shall add a third place out of Aquinas, quoted by Capreolus lib. 3. dis. 27. 28, 29, 30. pag. 209. Cum Actus & Habitus speciem habent ex Objecto, oportet quod ex eodem ratio perfectionis ipsius sumatur. Objectum autem Charitatis est summum bonum; igitur perfecta Charitas est quae in summum bonum fertur in tantum in quantum est diligibile. The Habit of Love is then perfect, when 'tis carried towards God as the chief, when God is loved so far forth as he may be loved, to wit, by a Creature: when God is not loved thus inintensely, the Habit of Love (as Aquinas thought) was imperfect. With Aquinas also Scotus accords l. 3. dis. 13. q. 3. Possibile est animam Christi habere summam gratiam, ergo summam fruitionem. Consequentia probatur, quia actus naturaliter elicitus ab aliqua forma, aequatur in perfectione illi formae. Unto these two great School men I shall add the testimony of a Philosopher of great subtlety and repute, Pet. Hurt. de Mendoza De anim. dis. 16. sect. 8. pag. 672. Intensio actus secundi supponit aequalem intensionem in actu primo, cum actus secundus supponat primum.   
§. 8. But what, Sir, if not one of these Testimonies any more concern the present controversy then any thing else in their whole writings? and that Thomas and Scotus directly assert what Doctor Hammond maintains, and you oppose? must you not appear to be a rare School-man, and that you quote Aquinas and Scotus to purpose? For your credit, Sir, I doubt not, but I shall demonstrate both these.  
§. 9 But First, I pray, Sir, why cite you not Aquinas from his own writings? why do you quote him twice from Capreolus? For what if Capreolus has misquoted Aquinas, or not rightly understood him? what if he only made use of those words that might best serve for his present purpose, and left out those that might clear the present difficulty? or what if he quoted Aquinas only to refute him, as usually the latter Schoolmen do the former? Now as these may be possible, so if either of them be certainly so, what then I beseech you is become of your proof from Aquinas? You should therefore, like a man that would write solidly, and as becomes a Master of Controversies, have referred us to the place itself in the Author, that so we might by the Antecedents and Consequents rightly have considered whether you have not mistaken the meaning of your Author.  
§. 10. But for the present we will suppose that these are the words of Aquinas, or that (which I rather believe, because I find some things tending to it in that Author) Capreolus has given us the full meaning of the place. And therefore I shall now consider how they serve to our Refuters' advantage.  
§. 11. The Sequel or Enthymeme to be confirmed by the Testimony of the Schoolmen is this, That seeing the Habits of all Virtues, and in particular that of divine Grace and holy Charity in Christ, were all fully and most intensively perfect in him, therefore the inward Acts of those Virtues and Graces must be all as full and equally perfect in themselves, and with the Habits. But do any of these Testimonies speak to this purpose? For shall I therefore conclude, because an Infant in swaddling  cannot naturally exceed the stature of a man, that therefore he equals it? Or because the Act cannot possibly exceed the Habit from whence it issues in gradual Perfection, that therefore of necessity it must be still as perfect as the Habit? I grant indeed, as Hurtado has it, that Intensio Actus secundi supponit aequalem intensionem in acts primo, that the second Act cannot possibly exceed the first in gradual perfection, quia Actus secundus supponit primum, because it issues from the first as the Effect from the Cause; and the 
† Sed contra est, quod effectus non excedit virtutem causae, etc. Aquin, 2. 2. q. 24. art. 6. §. Sed contra.  Effect cannot possibly be more noble than the Cause, because all its perfection flows from it. Aquinas therefore thought truly (as you tell us from Capreolus) that a greater vehemency in the operation of Love argued a greater participation in the subject of the Habits of Love. The holier Acts that any man does perform, without doubt the more holy he is. And where the Lutenist plays excellently, I may justly conclude, that he is a skilful Musician. But shall I vice versâ conclude, that therefore of necessity he must always play to the very height of his skill. This, this is to be proved, and nothing else. Tell us not therefore from Aquinas, that Charit as essentialiter est virtus ordinata ad actum, unde idem est ipsam augeri secundum essentiam, & ipsam habere efficaciam ad producendum ferventioris dilectionis actum. This without controversy is an undoubted truth. And I shall help you with a reason from Suarez; Propter necessariam proportionem inter Habitum & Actum, non potest habitus remissus per se efficere actum intensiorem se, quia habitus non inclinat nisi ad actus similes ill is à quibus fuit genitus, teste Aristot. 2. Eth. c. 1. & teste etiam experientiâ: ita enim facile operamur sicut consuevimus, tam in specie operum, quàm in modo. Et ratio est, quia Habitus non est nisi veluti impulsus quidam, seu pondus relictum in potentia ex vi praecedentium actuum, actus autem praecedentes non habent vim inclinandi potentiam ad motus perfectiores, sed ad summum ad similes: alias si iidem actus efficcrent inclinationem in potentia ad actus intensiores, pari ratione dici posset aequales actus intendere ipsum habitum, neque ulla superesset ratio ad oppositum probandum— Denique etiam in habitibus infusis docent communiter Theologi, ex vi illorum non posse potentiam efficere actus intensiores ip sis habitibus: quamquam in eyes posset esse major ratio dubitandi, vel quia tales habitus sunt PERFECTIORES SVIS ACTIBUS; (mark that, Sir,) vel quia non solum dant facilitatem, sed etiam potestatem. Nihilominus quia revera sunt habitus, & dantur cum debita proportione ad actus, & ex vi illorum fiant actus connaturali modo, ideo quantum est ex intrinseca virtute talium habituum, non valet potentia efficere intensiores actus ip sis habitibus, sed si eos interdum elicit, est ratione alterius, auxilii divini, de quo alias? Suarez Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 6. §. 4, 5.  
§. 12. But let us view the place at large as it lies in Aquinas. The question is, Vtrum Charitas augeri possit? The answer is affirmative, In corpore; Respondeo, Dicendum quod Charitas viae potest augeri, etc. And then in his answer ad tertium he says, Dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt charitatem non augeri, secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum radicationem in subjecto, vel secundum fervorem: sed hi propriam vocem ignoraverint. Cum enim accidens sit, ejus esse est inesse: unde nihil est aliud ipsam secundum essentiam augeri, quam eam magis inesse subjecto, quod est magis eam radicari in subjecto. Similiter etiam ipsa essentialiter est virtus ordinata ad actum: unde idem est ipsam augeri secundum essentiam, & ipsam habere efficaciam ad producendum ferventioris dilectionis actum. Augetur ergo essentialiter, non quidem ita, quod esse incipiat, vel esse desinat in subjecto sicut objectio illa procedit; sed ita, quod magis & magis in subjecto esse incipiat. The passage that Capreolus alludes to in Aquinas is, as I suppose, partly taken out of this answer ad tertium, and partly from the body of the answer to the following question, Art. 5. Vtrum Charitas augeatur per additionem? The words are these, Relinquitur ergo quod nullo modo charitas augeri potest per additionem Charitatis ad charitatem, sicut quidam ponunt. Sic ergo charitas augetur solum per hoc quod subjectum magis & magis participat charitatem, id est, secundum quod magis reducitur in actum illius, & magis subditur illi. Hic enim est augmenti modus proprius cujuslibet formae quae intenditur eo quod esse hujus formae totaliter consistit in eo, quod inhaeret susceptibili, etc. Aquin. 2. 2. q. 24. art. 5. in Corp.  
§. 13. And now, Sir, will any man suppose that you ever consulted the places that you quoted, since they make so little, so nothing to your purpose? For first, does not Aquinas here treat of the Habit of Charity, and not the Act? Does he not consider it in abstracto, and precisely, as they speak, according to the nature of the Form simply and in itself considered, and not as it is in Concreto, in this or that subject planted? what it is naturally apt and disposed to do, not what it actually still performs? And secondly, does he not here all along, and in the other questions also, consider Charity as it belongs to Sinners, and as it is capable of Increase, and not as it is in Christ in all fullness and perfection? How then can this any way serve your turn? You are gotten into a Quick-mire, and the more that you strive, the more deeply you will plunge yourself.  
§. 14. In short then I say, Though Necessary causes and Natural forms do always work uniformly, because by a necessity of Nature they work ad ultimum virium, to the utmost of their Power and Efficacy; yet in Voluntary Causes it is otherwise. They work not always according to their Power, but according to their Will and Pleasure; and this because they are naturally free and undetermined in their Operations. Of this kind are the Habits of Grace and Charity and all other virtues, whether in Christ or in all other men.  
§. 15. Your Argument then here is guilty of a double fallacy, For first you argue à Potentia ad Actum affirmatiuè, thus, The most perfect Charity, or that which is more gradually perfect, may or has a power and efficacy to produce the most or more noble Act, therefore of necessity it must, or always does so. Though this may be allowed in Natural and Necessary Causes, yet how it fails in Voluntary Causes and Effects, there is no man can be ignorant.  
Secondly, you argue à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, thus, Because the Act can never be more noble or intense then the Habit, therefore of necessity it always equals the Habit in gradual perfection. How these two fail I have already so often demonstrated, that I am ashamed to speak to the same purpose so often; but our Refuter will have it so, and therefore we must obey him.  
§. 16. To your next place of Aquinas quoted by Capreolus (though here also I suppose that Author has given us the Meaning, not the words) let Aquinas himself answer, and let his words themselves (to which I suppose Capreolus alludes) show how it makes nothing to your purpose. They are in the body of the answer of the 8th. Article, Vtrum Charitas in hac vita potest esse perfecta? To which he answers, Dicendum quod Perfectio charitatis potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte diligibilis, alio modo ex parte diligentis. Ex parte quidem diligibilis perfecta est charitas, ut diligatur aliquod quantum diligibile est. Deus autem in tantum diligibilis est in quantum bonus est. Bonitas autem ejus est infinita, unde infinitè diligibilis est. Nulla autem creatura potest eum diligere infinitè, cum quaelibet virtus creata sit finita. Vnde per hunc modum nullius Creaturae charitas potest esse perfecta, sed solum charitas Dei quâ seipsum diligit. Ex parte verò diligentis tunc est charitas perfecta, quando diligit tantum quantum potest. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Vno modo sic, quod totum cor hominis actualiter semper feratur in Deum. Et haec est perfectio Charitatis Patriae, quae non est possibilis in hac vita, in qua impossibile est propter humanae vitae infirmitatem semper actu cogitare de Deo, & moveri dilectione ad ipsum. Alio modo, ut homo studium suum deputet ad vacandum Deo & rebus divinis, praetermissis aliis quantum necessitas praesentis vitae requirit. Et ista est perfectio Charitatis quae est possibilis in via, non tamen est communis omnibus habentibus charitatem. Tertio modo, ita quod habitualiter aliquis totum cor suum ponat in Deo, ita scil. quod nihil cogitet vel velit quod divinae dilectioni sit contrarium. Et haec perfectio est communis omnibus charitatem habentibus. Aquin: 2. 2. q. 24. art. 8. in Corp. And hence it is that when in the same question art. 4. it had been thus objected, 2. Praeterea id quod est in termino non recipit augmentum: sed Charitas est in termino, quasi maxima virtutum existens & summus amor optimi boni: ergo Charitas augeri non potest. (An objection just to the design and drift 
Aquin. 2. 2. q. 24. art. 4. Obj. 2. & respons. ad 2.  of our Refuter.) To this according to the former doctrine he answers, Dicendum quod Charitas est in summo ex parte Objecti, in quantum scil. ejus Objectum est summum bonum, & ex hoc sequitur quod ipsa sit excellentior aliis virtutibus: non tamen est Charitas in summo quantum ad intensionem Actus.  
§. 17. How say you now, Sir.? Because Aquinas, and Capreolus from him, tell us that Charity in regard of the Object is infinite, will you therefore conclude it is infinitely perfect also in regard of the Subject and the Intention of the Act Will you argue, because God is infinitely Lovely, that therefore by us Men he is infinitely Beloved? Aquinas only speaks to the first, to the Perfection of Charity ex parte diligibilis, and so does also Capreolus. But your argument concerns the Perfection of Charity ex parte diligentis, which yet, in the places quoted, Aquinas does deny of all but only God, whose Love is only commensurate to the Object beloved.  
§. 18. But the truth of it is, since your Argument concerned the Habit and the Acts of Divine Grace in Christ, you were ill advised to look for any thing in the 
* Author intendit de augmento charitatis secundum statumviae, tantum & non de augmento charitatis absolute: & ratio est, quia de augmento charitatis absolutè loquendum erat in tractatu de gratia animae Christi, qui fuit verus Comprehensor ab initio, & non est ei data gratia ad mensuram, etc. Cajetan. in Commentar. 2. 2 q. 24. art. 7. §. Ad secundum dubium principale.  Secunda secundae of Aquinas Sums, where ex professo he disputes only of Charity as considered according to that imperfect state and condition of Travellers that are now in the Way to heaven-happiness. As for the habitual grace of Christ, which was all full and perfect, and belonged to him as Comprehensor, that he treats of only (I mean ex professo) in the third part of his Sums, and there you should have sought for proper Mediums and not elsewhere.  
§. 19 If you shall here reply, that the Charity of Christ is Charitas Patriae and Charitas Comprehensoris, and that Aquinas says of that, quod totum cor hominis actualiter semper feratur in Deum, and therefore the Acts of his love must be always uniform and at the height:  
§. 20. To this I answer, The Charity of Christ, or Love that we now speak of, is not actus Comprehensoris (as shall instantly be showed,) but belonged to him as Viator, & in its own general Notion contained in it all Virtues and Graces whatsoever. The Acts of this Love, though they were always perfect in their kinds, yet of necessity they could not be equal in themselves in gradual perfection, because of the gradual difference in the Objects of this Love, much less could they equal the all-full perfection of the Habit whence they issued.  
§. 21. And thus we have seen that our Refuters two first testimonies from Aquinas, and his last from Hurtado, make nothing to this purpose.  
§. 22. As for his third from Aquinas, I must observe, that he has either grossly prevaricated, or most ignorantly mistaken his Author. For whereas Capreolus and Aquinas, in the place cited, speak only of the perfection of Charity ex parte diligibilis, and in order to the Object beloved, he renders it to the Reader as if they had meant it of Charity ex parte diligentis, and in order to the person loving. The words in Capreolus as himself citys them are, Cum Actus & Habitus speciem habent ex Objecto, oportet quod ex eodem ratio perfection is ipsius sumatur. Objectum autem Charitatis est summum bonum: igitur perfecta Charit as est, quae in summum bonum fertur in tantum in quantum est diligibile. Which our Refuter thus renders, at least to the sense; The Habit of Love is then perfect when 'tis carried towards God as the chief, when God is loved so far forth as he may be loved, to wit, by a creature: when God is not loved thus intensely, the Habit of Love (as Aquinas thought) was imperfect.  
§. 23. In good time, Sir. But if it had been your good fortune to be a Critic as well as Dr. Hammond, and you had been so happy to know the difference between Participles ending in ens and ending in bilis, you would have otherwise understood Capreolus, and not have made use of a Testimony that is so utterly a stranger to your Argument.  
And so I am come to consider whether Scotus his Testimony be any whit more material.  
§. 24. With Aquinas, he says, Scotus accords; and therefore I conclude he speaks as little to the purpose.  
§. 2. The place in Scotus at large is this: Contra, possibile est illam animam habere summam gratiam, ergo summam fruitionem. 
Scotus l. 3. Sent. didst 13. q. 3. §. 2.  Consequentia probatur; quia Actus naturaliter elicitus ab aliqua forma aequatur in perfectione illi formae. Fruitio est Actus supernaturalis, & per consequens elicitus à causs supernaturali, quae est gratia; & patet quod naturaliter, quia Gratia non est formaliter libera. Ergo secundum quantitatem gratiae potest esse quantitas fruitionis.  
§. 24. The truth of it is, that Subtle Schoolman does there dispute four questions. Primò, utru Christo potuerit conferri summagratia, quae potuit conferri creaturae? Secundò, utrum de facto fuerit collata animae Christi summa gratia possibilis conferri creaturae? Tertiò, utrum possibile fuerit voluntatem animae Christi habere summam fruitionem possibilem naturae creatae? From whence this passage of our Refuter is taken. Quartò, utrum anima Christi potuerit summè frui Deo sine summa gratia? The resolution of the three first questions he defers to the fourth. His answer to the third, whence this testimony is taken is this: Ad tertiam Quaestionem dico, quod animam posse summè frui, potest dupliciter intelligi, vel formaliter, vel effectiuè; hoc est, vel quod summa fruitio informet istam voluntatem à quocunque causetur, vel quod ipsa voluntas efficiat summam fruitionem, & sit causa acttiva ejus. Primo modo possibile est summam fruitionem creabilem conferri animae Christ, quia ipsa est receptiva cujustibet accidentis convenientis sibi, & in summo; quia non determinat sibi certum gradum istius, sicut fuit probatum in prima quaestione de gratia: et fruitio est quoddam accidens absolutum, possibile creari à primo Causante immediate sine actione voluntatis creatae. Secundo modo videtur probabile, quod cum illa voluntas non possit tantam vim activam habere quantam voluntas creata alia potest habere, ut Angelica, non potest ita perfectè elicere fruitionem sicut alia voluntas potest. Licet enim possit summam gratiam habere, quae ut causa Partialis respectu fruitionis aequè causaret fruitionem in ipsa & Angelo, si haberet eam; tamen alia causa partialis erit inaequalis, ut voluntas: altera autem causa partialis sit aequalis; modo tamen de facto est maximè elicitiva, quia licet non sit voluntas ejus ita perfecta sicut voluntas Angeli, tamen ipsa cum summa gratia, ut aliâ causâ partiali actiuâ, potest ferri in perfectiorem fruitionem quam voluntas Angeli cum minori gratia, quia excedentia gratiae excedit in ea essicientiam voluntatis Angeli. The sum in short is this, that God de facto has bestowed on Christ a fuller enjoyment of himself, because of a larger measure of Grace, than he has upon Angels. For though the will of Angels be Naturally more perfect than the created Will of Christ, yet by Grace it is capable to receive whatsoever is fit for it, and God shall bestow upon it.  
§. 25. And is not our Refuter a very unsuccessful Man in all his Quotations? How can this in any measure concern the present debate? For does not here Scotus consider first what was possible for God to do, or Christ to receive,? Does he not also here consider him in the state of Comprehensor, and not of a Viator? Is not the question moved concerning the possibility of Glory, upon the supposal of an Habitual fullness of Grace, and not at all of the Acts of Grace? Does he not prove by the very words that our Refuter has quoted, that since it was possible for Christ to have a fullness of Grace, that therefore it was also possible for him to have a fullness of heaven-happiness? and this because Glory is the necessary effect of Grace, and Acts that necessarily flow, and by way of emanation, from their Forms and Causes, must of necessity be equal in Perfection to the Forms from whence they issue? If then our Refuter will say any thing to the purpose, he must conclude that all the Inferior Acts of Virtue and Grace in him did as Naturally flow from the Habits, as Glory does from Grace; and that Christ had no more proper Freedom to them, than he had, or has now to the Sight and enjoyment of God: which Position, as it expressly destroys the Foundation of his Merit, and the Redemption of the world by his death, so it is expressly contrary to the Scriptures, and all the Fathers and Schoolmen and Orthodox Divines in the world, for aught I could ever learn.  
§. 26. And thus having showed the absolute impertinency of his Testimonies to the matter in hand, I come to prove that both Thomas and Scotus maintain that very Proposition which he would confute in Dr. Hammond by the Testimonies of Aquinas and Scotus.  
§. 27. I shall not trouble the Reader with what I have already observed to this purpose from Aquinas. The Passage I insist on is taken from Lib. 3. Sent. d. 29. q. 1. Art. 2. The question is, Vtrum ordo Charitatis sit attendendus secundum affectum vel secundum effectum? It is affirmed against this, when it was objected thus, 2. Actus mensuratur secundum rationem Objecti: sed quamvis plura sint quae ex charitate diliguntur, tamen in omnibus est una ratio dilectionis, sc divina bonitas, quae est Objectum charitatis: Ergo, ad omnia quae ex charitate diliguntur aequalis affectio est. The Conclusion is the very same with our Refuters, who affirms that the Inward Acts of Christ's Love were all equal, though the Outward Acts were not; that his Love was the same quoad affectum, but not quoad effectum: To this the answer is, Dicendum, quod quamvis sit eadem ratio communis diligendi in omnibus, tamen illa ratio non aequaliter participatur in singulis, & ideo nec aequalis affectio eis debetur. So again Art. 3. of that question in his answer ad Quintum, he says, Quod Deus ubique aequaliter diligitur, tamen divinum bonum in isto esse non est tantum amabile sicut ipsum esse in Deo, quia non aequè perfectè in omnibus est. The sum of all those determinations in short is this, That though the Habit of Divine Charity respecting God and our Neighbours be one and the same; yet because of the different Participation of the divine goodness (the formal Object of Charity) which is infinitely perfect in God, and but unequally communicated to the creature, there must of necessity be a gradual difference in the Acts of divine Charity, because every thing must be beloved according to the order of the divine goodness shining in it.  
§. 28. The place in Scotus which for the present I insist on is taken out of the 3. book of the Sentences, dist. 14. q. 3. The question is, Vtrum anima Christi noverit omnia in genere proprio? Now whereas to this it had been objected, First, Luc. 2. Jesus proficiebat aetate & sapientia coram Deo & hominibus. Secondly, Heb. 5. Didicit ex his quae passus est obedientiam; Thirdly, Fuit Viator, igitur habuit cognitionem competentem Viatori.  
§. 29. To these he thus answers in order. Patet ad primum per hoc, quod Textus Evangelii non est exponendus, ut tantum proficiehat secundum apparentiam, quia secundum Augustinum 83. quaest. q. 9 contra Apollinaristas, Evangelistae narrant historias, & ideo verba eorum vera sunt ut exprimuntur: non sic à aliis sermonibus tropic is scripturae sacrae. Et hoc etiam declarat authoritas Ambrosii & Apostoli ad Hebraeos, quia vere in eo aliquis sensus profecit, non quod aliquorum cognitionem abstractivam habitualem acquisivit, sed intuitivam, tam actualem quam habitualem. And then to the third he answers, quod illa cognitio (quae est ex multis Actibus & experientiis) quoad cognitionem intuitivam semper est necessitatis, & quoad hoc competebat Christo, quia fuit nobiscum Viator. Scotus tom. 2. lib. 3. sent. didst 14. q. 3. §. 8. p. 102. ex edit. H. Cavelli.  
§. 30. The sum is, that S. Luke is to be understood literally, and that Christ did truly, and not in outward appearance only, grow and increase in the Perfection of Actual Knowledge and Grace, and that this must agree to him as Viator. But there is another passage in the same Author, in due time to be cited, where he proves that the Act of loving God as Viator, cannot be so perfect as it is and must be in him as Comprehensor, though the Habit of them both be one and the same. It is lib. 3. sent. didst 31. q. 1. §. 9 p. 213. And so I come to our Refuters second Argument.   

SECT. 19  
The Refuters second Argument. Christ on Earth Comprehensor, true: but Viator also. Proved from Scripture, Aquinas, Scotus, in the places referred to by the Refuter. From Suarez also. None but the Socinians deny Christ to be thus Comprehensor. His Beatisick Love as Comprehensor an uniform, because necessary, Act. Fruitless here to inquire wherein the essence of Happiness consists according to the Thomists or Scotists. It follows not, because Christ's Love as Viator was more intense at one Time in some Acts, then at another in other Acts, that therefore his Happiness as Comprehensor was at that time diminished. Proved, The Doctor never denies the Fullness of Christ's happiness as Comprehensor. The Refuter's grave Propositio malè sonans. His Argument a Fallacy à dicto secundum quid. Christ's twofold state. Though the infused Habit of Grace in him always full, yet not so the Acts. The Reason. Mr. Jeanes and others guilty of this Propositio malè sonans as well as the Doctor. The piouslycredible Proposition of the Schoolmen, as the Refuter calls it, much prejudices an assertion of his own in his Mixture, but no whit the Doctor.  

JEANES.  
A Second argument is drawn from the perpetual and uninterrupted happiness of Christ. It is resolved both by Aquinas 3. q. 34. art. 4. Scotus lib. 3. disp. 18. and their followers, that Christ in regard of his soul was even here in this life, from the first moment of his conception, all his life long unto his death, perfectus Comprehensor; and therefore he enjoyed in his Soul all that was necessary unto heaven happiness. And I find learned Protestants herein consenting with them. Now 'tis the unanimous opinion of the Schoolmen that a most intense actual Love of God, an actual Love of God for Degrees as high, as ardent, as fervent as is according to God's ordinary Power possible unto the humane nature, doth necessarily belong to the heaven-happiness of men. The Scotists' place the very formality of Happiness solely herein, and Suarez with others think it essential unto happiness, though he supposeth the essence of happiness not to consist wholly or chief in it. And for the rest of the Thomists, who hold that the essence of Happiness stands only in the Beatifical vision of God, why even they make this actual most intense Love of God a natural and necessary consequent of the Beatific vision.   
§. 1. To this I answer, That it is most true, as these Schoolmen determine, that Christ, by virtue of the hypostatical union was in the superior part of his soul, the mind, Perfectus Comprehensor from the first Moment of his Conception, and so he did love and enjoy God more perfectly than all the Saints and Angels did in heaven. This was a necessary Consequent of the hypostatical union and the fullness of divine Grace. Manifestum est, says Aquinas truly, Quod Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis accepit non solum tantam gratiam quantam 
Aquin. 3. p. q. 34. art. 4. in Corp.  Comprehensores habent, sed etiam omnibus comprehensoribus majorem. Et quia gratia illa non suit sine actu, consequens est quod actu fuerit Comprehensor, videndo Deum per essentiam clarius caeteris creaturis.  
§. 2. But than it is as true, that Christ at the same first Moment wherein he was Comprehensor in respect of his Soul, was also in respect of the inferior Faculties of that, and the frail mortal passable condition of his Flesh, a Viator too. And this the same Aquinas has as expressly determined in the same 3 part of his Sums q. 15. art. 10. And this is a most clear Scripture-truth in itself. For ought not Christ to suffer, says he 
Luke 24. 26.  himself, and then to enter into his glory? And therefore for the joy that was set before him, says the Apostle to the Hebrews, he endured the Cross, and despised the shame, and is now set down on the 
Heb. 12. 2. Philip. 2. 6, 7, 8, 9  right hand of God. For though he were in the form of God, and thought it no robbery to be equal with God: yet he made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and humbled himself to death, even the death of the cross; wherefore God also hath highly exalted him. In this state though he were a son, yet learned he obedience by the things that he suffered. In this state 
Heb. 5. 8.  he prayed for his own after-exaltation as well as ours, saying, Father, the hour is come, glorify thy Son, that thy Son may also 
John 17. 1.  glorify thee. In this state he merited (as Suarez and some other of the Schoolmen determine) his own exaltation in the flesh (how truly or in what sense I now determine not;) but most certain it is (and no man but the Socinian denies it) that he merited ours. And this is so clear a truth, that I think not any of the Schoolmen that writ upon the third of the Sentences, or the third part of the Sums, but acknowledge it. And our Refuter himself, if he had but consulted the places in Thomas and Scotus that here he refers to, might have found it. For Aquinas in the very next words, in his answer to the first objection says, Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum est, q. 19 art. 3. Christus non meruit gloriam animae, secundum quam dicitur Comprehensor, sed gloriam corporis, ad quam per suam passionem pervenit. The answer in the Body of that article tert. part. q. 19 art. 3. is long, the sum is this; Dicendum est quod Christus gloriam corporis, & ea quae pertinent ad exteriorem ejus excellentiam (sicut est Ascensio, Veneratio, & alia hujusmodi) habuit per meritum. And then immediately in his answer ad primum he says, Dicendum quod fruitio, quae est actus Charitatis, pertinet ad gloriam animae, quam Christus non meruit; & ideo si per Charitatem aliquid meruit, non sequitur quod idem sit meritum & praemium. Nec tamen per Charitatem meruit in quantum erat Charitas Comprehensoris, sed in quantum erat Viatoris. Nam ipse fuit simul & Viator & Comprehensor,- ut supra habitum est q. 15. art. 10. Et ideo quia nunc non est Viator, non est in statu merendi. And then as for Scotus, who in the 18th. distinction most admirably disputes this question, Vtrum Christus meruerit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, he found'st his whole discourse upon it.  
§. 3. This subtle School-man, having first proposed divers arguments against the possibility of Christ's Merit (which are all founded upon the fullness of Christ's happiness as Comprehensor, and to the very same purpose with this of our Refuter) in the next place he proceeds to determine the question. And having acknowledged the difficulty of it, he goes on to define what Merit is; and having 
Difficile videtur salvare quod meruerit (Christus,) cum fuit beatus & perfect conjunctus fini secundum voluntatem in primo instanti. Scotus l. 3. Sent. didst 18. q. unica. § 4. p. 131.  cleared that, he proceeds to resolve, that though the Saints and Angels in Heaven, because they are Comprehensores, were incapable of Merit, yet Christ in the days of his flesh, being not only Comprehensor but Viator too, in this respect he was capable of meriting at God's hands, by Particular Covenant and Contract; and that he did indirectly at least the facto merit his own exaltation in the flesh. I shall, for the Reader's satisfaction, transcribe one short passage, and refer him to the Author for the rest. Alii beati à Christo, quia secundum totam voluntatem conjuncti sunt ultimo fini, sc. Deo, affectione justitiae perfectissimae, etiam habent summum commodum conjunctum sibi, quod appetunt affectione commodi, scil. conjunctionem summi boni: ideo non possunt habere actum oppositum affectioni Commodi, ut liberè velint aliquid quod non sit eis commodum: nullum enim Objectum est in Patria quod possint velle, quod sit eis incommodum, quod affectione Commodi nolunt. Sed Christus secundum aliquid fuit Viator, & passibilis secundum partem sensitivam & portionem inferiorem voluntatis; ideo multa habuit objecta praesentia sensibus & portioni inferiori, circa quae potuit liberè velle contra affectionem commodi, quae semper est ad conveniens illi cujus est: ideo jejunando, vigilando, orando, & multis aliis talibus potuit mereri, vel exercendo talia exterius, vel volendo interius talia propter Deum; Tunc dico, quod licet Angeli habeant bonas operationes circa nos, vel alii beati; quia tamen illi actus sunt inclusi in beatitudine illorum, hoc est ratione beatitudinis, & ex illius beatitudine & collatione obligantur nobis à Deo, potest dici quod non merentur. Sed hujusmodi operationes Christi praedictae non includuntur in suâ beatitudine: ideo per illos actus meruit: quia quantum ad illos actus fuit Viator non Comprehensor, ita quod radicaliter in sua beatitudine, etc. There is very much more to this purpose all along that Disputation, but I shall give the sum of that which concerns the present argument from his Epitomator Nicolaus d'Orbellis. Quantum ad 
Nicol. d' Orbellis lib. 3. Sent. didst 18. q. unic. art. 1.  primum, sciendum quod meritum est aliquid acceptum in aliquo, pro quo ab acceptante est sibi aliquid retribuendun, velalteri pro quo meruit. Consistit autem radix omnis meriti maximè in affectione justitiae, puta, volendo Deum bonum, ut esse, & bene esse, scil. justum, sapientem, etc. & volendo sibi & proximo Deum secundum ordinem Justitiae, seu cum debitis circumstantiis. Item notandum, quod licet Christus non potuerit peccare ratione plenitudinis gratiae sibi in instanti creationis collatae, potuit tamen mereri, quia secundum aliquid fuit instatu Viatoris, licet anima ejus ab instanti creationis frueretur divinâ essentiâ. Vnde licet fuerit in Termino quantum ad impeccabilitatem, tamen non quantum ad impassibilitatem. Ideo potuit Deus omnem actum creatum illius Personae acceptare tanquam dignum pro se, vel pro illis pro quibus offertur Deo, etiam actum beatificum. Sicut enim meritum non tantum consistit in ipso actu elicito, sed in conditionibus per se elicitis; sic acceptatio divina non solum respicit actum, sed conditiones accidentales suppositi elicientis.  si a duobus fiat aeque gratiosè supplicatio pro aliquo reo apud Principem, poterit tamen citius dimitti offensa propter preces unius quam alterius, propter aliquam ejus conditionem accidentalem.  
§. 4. So also his other Author, Suarez to this purpose. Respondet ergo (D. Thomas) Christum fuisse Comprehensorem secundum animam: Viatorem verò in quantum deerat illi corporis beatitudo. Circa quam veritatem nihil nobis disputandum superest; quod n. Christi anima viderit Deum a principio suae creationis suprà latè ostendimus q. 10. quod. a. Christi corpus fuerit passibile, & dotibus gloriae caruerit, in q. 14. demonstratum est. Et ex his duobus constat fuisse Comprehensorem & viatorem: Infra etiam ostendemus fuisse in statu merendi sibi & aliis, quod est proprium munus viatoris. Suarez in Comment. ad q. 15. tert. part. Thom. art. 10. pag. 466. in tom. primo.  
§. 5. Plain then it is from our Refuters own Authors that Christ was not only Comprehensor but Viator also in the days of his flesh. And therefore I grant that Christ from the first Moment of his Conception was Perfectus Comprehensor in the sovereign part of his Soul, the Mind, and enjoyed the sight of God, and the fullness of heaven happiness, and that it is not only the Tenent of the Schools, and some learned Protestants, as our Refuter sets it down, but for aught I find of all others whatsoever, that are Orthodox, there being none, that I know of but the Socinians, and those of their Leaven, that deny the Divinity of Christ, or else eclipse it, that hold the contrary.  
§. 6. I grant also that Christ, perfectly seeing God, and enjoying him in his Soul, did therefore perfectly, equally, and uninteruptedly Love him: this Love of his was always in Termino, and at one utmost height, because it was a Necessary Act, and flowed per modum Emanationis from the beatifical vision; and impossible it was, that he should do otherwise, since even Philosophy and Aristotle could determine, that ultimus finis, and summum bonum, quando cognoscatur necessario amatur.  
§. 7. And therefore it will be now fruitless, and nothing pertinent to the Debate, to inquire, whether the Thomists or Scotists are in the right, and whether the Formality of happiness consists in the Love of God, or the Beatifical vision, or both, or whether (as I rather believe) in the Ravishing Contentment and Delight that results from both, since most evident it is, that Christ was not only Comprehensor but also Viator from the first moment of his Conception.  
§. 8. Come we now then to Consider, what advantage our Refuter can make of this Concession. He goes on then, and says.  

JEANES.  
BY this that hath been said it is evident, that whereas you aver that the inward Acts of Christ's Love of God were less intense at one time then an other (for so you affirm in saying they were more intense at one time then at an other) you deny Christ to be happy and blessed at those times, wherein his inward Acts of Love were thus less intense, & that this is Propositio malè sonans harshly sounding in the ears of Christians, that are jealous of their Saviour's honour, will I hope be ingeniously confessed by yourself upon a review of it.   
§. 9 You have said Sir. But could you possibly imagine Doctor Hammond should retract a known-scripture-truth, because you say it is propositio malè sonans? Or did you yourself believe what you here write, if you truly understood it? For how much more can this derogate from the fullness of his Soul-happinesse, than the truth of his Manhood, and the frailties encompassing it, did derogate from the truth of his Godhead, to which it was hypostatically united? For does not he himself say, 
Mark 14. 34.  that his Soul was exceeding sorrowful even unto death? And does not the Evangelical Prophet describe him to be a man of 
Esay 53. 3.  sorrows and acquainted with grief? And does not his bloody sweat, and bitter Agony express it? And does not the Apostle tell us, that for the joy that was set before him he endured the 
Heb. 12. 2.  Cross and despised the shame, and is now set down on the right hand of God? Does he not also say, that when Christ had by 
Heb. 1. 3, 4.  himself purged our sins, he sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high, being made so much better than the Angels, as that he hath obtained a more excellent name than they? what? are these also Propositions harshly sounding in the ears of Christians, that are jealous of their Master's honour? Review your assertion Sir, and confess and acknowledge your own thoughts? or will you write uses of Confutation against the penmen of sacred writ, as well as against Doctor Hammond? For can a state of Sorrow and Grief, and Misery and Want, consist with an absolute and complete uninterupted heaven happiness, where the Scripture testifies there shall be no more death, nor sorrow, nor crying, neither 
Revel. 21. 4.  shall there be any more pain for the former things are passed away? If in the days of his flesh he were so absolutely and completely happy, that this blessedness could in no respect be interrupted how then as the Apostle testifies, did he offer up prayers & supplications with strong crying and tears to him, that was able to help him? For how can he pray for assistance that is in an absolute incapacity of want? that is always as happy as God, and heaven-happiness can make him? If he were so absolutely and completely happy, so that in no respect it could be interrupted, why then for the joy set before him (which sure was not therefore yet 
Heb. 12. 2.  obtained) did he endure the cross and despise the shame? why prayed he so earnestly for his own after-glorification? Why 
John 17. 1. 2.  said he to his Disciples after his Resurrection, Ought not Christ 
Luke 24. 16.  to suffer these things, and to enter into his glory?  
§. 10. If here now you say that Christ in the state of his humiliation may be considered 1. Either in respect of the present state of his soul, in the sovereign part of it, his Mind and understanding, or else 2ly in respect of the present state of the Inferior sensitive part of his soul, and the frail mortal passable condition of his flesh. In the first respect he was Perfectus Comprehensor, and enjoyed the fullness of heaven-happiness, and therefore always did love God to the full height, that he enjoyed him; And of this only you now spoke. But then in the second respect he was in a state of frailty and misery and sorrow and want, and because truly a Viator, he was not yet possessed of heaven-happiness, and of this speak the Scriptures: I shall accept of your answer and acknowledge the truth of it. But withal I shall desire you to apply this distinction to your own argument, and the assertion of Dr. Hammond.  
§. 11. And now I pray deal ingeniously with the world, and tell us, whether ever Dr. Hammond did deny the fullness of Christ's happiness in the sovereign Part of his Soul? Does not he allow him to be truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God man, from the first endued with the fullness of habitual grace? And does not of congruity a fullness of happiness in Christ's soul flow from this Union, and fullness of grace? And does not an absolute uninterrupted Act of divine Love in its utmost height and intenseness, flow necessarily from this happiness? show us then, whether ever this was brought into debate betwixt you and the Doctor. Nay do not you yourself acquit him of this charge, in your first argument, when you conclude that the Inward Acts of the habits of all virtues and graces were always full in him, because the habits themselves were so? will you say that the habits of virtues and other graces were proper to him as Comprehensor, and that he could watch, pray, Taste, suffer, be meek, patiented, humble etc. as now in the state of heaven-happiness? And have we not most evidently proved that Doctor Hammond understands by The Love of God, only that Love and that Charity, which was proper to Christ as Viator, in the days of his flesh, and not that other necessary Act of Divine love, proper to him as Comprehensor?  
§. 11. And therefore I pray now, what is become of your argument and your grave Propositio malè sonans? do you not all this while build upon an empty Sophism, argue à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter? and conclude because Christ was perfectly happy in his Soul as Comprehensor, and did therefore necessarily love God at the height, therefore he must be absolutely so too, in every respect, and happy, equally happy, he must be also as Viator, and according to that respect; and so must also all his other Acts of divine Charity towards God, himself, and his Neighbours be equal, all in themselves, and with that high transcendent Act of Love, immediately seated on God? And is not this now a weighty argument, well deserving to be put in the Title page of the Book, to tell all the world, how Doctor Hammond is subdued by it? But because I see you sufficiently ignorant in this point, I shall add something for your instruction.  
§. 12. Plain it is that there was a twofold state of Christ during his abode upon earth. The one was status Comprehensoris, in respect of the sovereign Part of his Soul, the Mind. The other Status Viatoris, in respect of the Inferior Faculties of his soul, and his frail mortal passable condition in the Flesh. In this, he was in statu merendi; in the other not. And consequently the Schoolmen do distinguish, and observe a twofold Act of Divine Charity or holy Love in him. The one † Necessary, 
Vide Suarez in 3 part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 39 Sect. 2. p. 540. col. 1. & pag. 541. Col. 1.  qui non potuit esse meritorius, quia non erat liber, sed necessariò consequebatur visionem beatam. This they call Actus amoris Dei beatificus, and Actus Comprehensoris, and is the same with that of Christ, and the Saints, and Angels now in heaven; who, because they see, and enjoy God face to face, cannot choose but perfectly love him. The other * a Free Act, and though it is 
Vid: Suarez ibid.  supernatural, as flowing from the all perfect Habit of Divine Charity in Christ, yet distinguished it is from the Beatific Love, that necessarily flows from the Fullness of heaven-happiness: this was proper to him as Viator.  
§. 13. Now though the habit of this Love was always in Christ full, and without any interruption even as he was Viator: yet the Acts that flowed from this Habit were de facto, some or other still interrupted, because his present finite state, and condition, could not actually apply himself to the performance of all at once, and the acts themselves were not all compossible in the same subject in one and the same moment, and the Necessity of Nature, at least when he slept, required the intermission of some of them; and as they were of necessity to be interrupted, so of necessity also they could not be equal in themselves, but some must be more high, more intense than others, because of the unequal participation of the divine goodness, unequally shining in the several Objects of this Love, as we have already beyond exception demonstrated. This interruption, this inequality in the fervour of these several Acts of divine Charity, no more derogates from the fullness of that high Act of Divine Love, he was possessed with as Comprehensor, than the sorrows and anguish of his Soul and Spirit in the inferior Part, and the passable mortal condition of his flesh did derogate from the truth of his Godhead, and the fullness of his happiness which he enjoyed as Comprehensor. Nay so far it was from derogating from the fullness of his habitual grace, that if the Acts of this Love had been all equally intense, his Love in the Habit had not been yet perfect, because as we have shown, God's Law requires an Order in our Charity, and that we must love the Lord our God with all our heart, and with all our Soul, etc. and our neighbours as ourselves.  
§. 14. When therefore you say that it is evident, that whereas the Doctor avers that the inward Acts of divine love or holy Charity in Christ were less intense at one time then at another, (for so he affirms in saying they were more intense at one time then at another) he denies Christ to be happy and blessed at those times wherein his inward Acts of Love were thus intense, and that this is Propositio malè sonans, I must return that then also Mr. Jeanes himself is guilty of this harsh sounding proposition. Nay not only Mr. Jeanes himself, but his own Aims, and our Hooker 
Jeanes mixture, etc. p. 250.  and Field, and Vorstius, and Grotius, and Aquinas and Suarez & Estius, & many more of the Schoolmen, are all equally guilty of this ill sounding proposition, who all unanimously affirm that Christ did really grow in Actual Wisdom and Grace, as well as Stature. And so Doctor Hammond has very learned Company in this, if it be an Error, and our Refuter himself among the number.  
§. 15. Whereas then you say in the close of this Argument,  

JEANES.  
Add hereunto that the Schoolmen generally consent as unto a Proposition that is piously credible, that the happiness of Christ's soul did even during the whole time of his abode here, far surmount that of all Saints and Angels in heaven: but if the inward Acts of this Love of God were less intense at one time then at another, the bliss of his soul would have come far short of that of the Lowest Saint in Heaven; for the Actual love of the Lowest Saint was not, is not more intense at one time then at another, but always full and perfect; and therefore uncapable of further and higher degrees.   
This will no whit prejudice Doctor Hammond, who never spoke any thing of Christ's happiness and Love as Comprehensor in his Soul, but only of the Acts of divine Charity or holy Love that belonged to him as Viator, & as he was in statu merendi. But then let me add that if this assertion of the Schoolmen be so piously credible (as indeed it is in their sense) it will much prejudice an assertion of Mr. Jeanes his, in his very use of Confutation, who tells us, It is not to be denied, but that by special dispensation 
Jeanes mixture pag. 261.  there was some restraint of the Influence of his happiness or beatifical vision in the whole course of his humiliation, and Particularly in the time of his doleful Passion.  
§. 16. Nay I dare undertake in the Consideration of his following argument to demonstrate, that this one concession destroys the very foundation of his Use of Confutation, and all that he has replied against the Doctors Ectenesteron. And therefore I hasten to it.   

SECT. 20.  
The Refuters third Argument Reduced to Form. The Major denied. His Sophistical Homonymy discovered. His confounding the different Acts of Christ's Love as Viator, and Comprehensor. The true Assertions in his discourse severed from the false inferences. Christ impeceable. Thence it follows not, that the Acts of his Love are all equal, but the contrary. The great Commandment of Love enjoins the most ardent Love that we are able to reach to, Thence it follows not, that the Acts of this Love ought always to be equal. Christ as Comprehensor had on earth greater Abilities to Love God then Adam in Paradise or the Saints and Angels in Hèaven. Thence it follows not that the Acts of his Louè as Viator were to be equal, or if they increased successively that he sinned. This discourse cleared and confirmed from Suarez. The several Acts of Charity by which Christ merited. Hence the inequality of intention in these Acts demonstrated. Further proved from the Refuters Mixture. The Viator differs in Abilities from the Comprehensor. Proved from Scripture and Reason Cajetan Scotus. The Refuters following Digression impertinent; His design in it to amuse the Reader, and to bring the Doctor into an unjust suspicion.  
§. 1. And here our Refuter is gotten into a very fruitful and advantageous digression. Now with all the skill and Artifice he has, he labours to raise Umbrages and Clouds, to obscure the Doctor's Reputation, and to fill the heads of weak Readers with suspicions and Jealousies, as if his tenant did infer that our Saviour was not impeccable, because he loved not God as intensely as he might. But notwithstanding he is here so profusely copious, yet I undertake that all that is material to the present controversy in his full four leaves, may be contained in the compass of two Syllogisms, but I shall give it in his own words.  

JEANES.  
The third and last argument, is fetched from Christ's impeccability; it was impossible for Christ to sin: but if the inward acts of his Love of God had been less intense at one time then at another, he had sinned; for he had broken that first and great Commandment, thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy Soul, with all thy mind, with all thy might and strength, Deut. 6. 5. Matth. 22. 37. Mark. 12. 30. Luke 10. 27. For this Commandment enjoineth the most intense actual Love of God, that is possible, an actual love of him tanto nixu & conatu quanto fieri potest (i. e.) as much as may be; what better and more probable gloss can we put on that clause, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy strength or might, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than thou shalt love him with thy uttermost force and endeavour: suitable hereunto is that interpretation which Aquinas giveth of those words, Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart (i. e.) saith he, ex toto posse tuo, with as high a degree of actual love, as thou art able to reach unto. Deus est totaliter diligendus, potest intelligi ita quod totalitas referatur ad diligentem: & sicetiam Deus totaliter diligi debet: quia ex toto posse suo homo debet diligere Deum, & quicquid habet, ad Dei amorem ordinare; secundum illud Deuter. 6. Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, 2. 2. q. 27. art. 5. But now Christ-man had in him as great abilities for the actual Love of God as Adam in Paradise; as the Saints and Angels in heaven, for an all fullness of the grace and virtue of Love dwelled in him, and therefore if the inward acts of his Love were less intense at one time then another, than sometimes, when he actually Loved God, he did not Love him as intensely, as ardently, as fervently, as he could, he did not Love him with all his might, and strength, ex toto posse suo, and so consequently he fulfilled not all righteousness; for his obedience unto this commandment would have been by this your opinion imperfect, and sinful, which, to imagine were blasphemy. But you will be ready to tell me, etc.   
§. 2. This is your Argument and the most specious of all, but yet as little to the purpose as any of the rest. And that it may so appear, I thus reduce it into Form.  
He whose love of God in the inward Act is more intense at one time then an other, breaks that first Commandment that enjoins the most intense Love of God Possible.  
But Christ (that was impeccable) could not, did not, break that Commandment. Ergo,  
Christ's Love of God in the inward act was not more intense at one time then another.  
Or thus.  
He that had greater abilities for the Actual Love of God than Adam in Paradise, or the Saints and Angels in Heaven and yet does Love God in the inward Act more intensely at one time then an other, he does not always love God ex toto posse suo, and as much as the Law requires.  
But Christ had always greater abilities for the actual Love of God than Adam in Paradise, or the Saints and Angels in Heaven, and yet (as you say) his Love of God in the inward Act was more intense at one time then another. Ergo,  
(By consequence according to your saying) he loved not God ex toto posse suo, and as much as the Law requires, which consequence (because it makes him sinful) but to imagine were blasphemy.  
§. 3. Choose you which Form you will, the force and evidence of the Argument is the same, and one answer will fit both. And I shall give it you in brief, and it is no more than by a denial of your Proposition or Major in both.  
§. 4. The truth is, all the seeming strength of this Discourse lies in the ambiguity of the phrase The Love of God, which is differently understood by our Refuter in the premises, and Doctor Hammond, whom he opposes, in the Conclusion. And consequently the Syllogisms consist of four terms, and so are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fantastical paralogismes, like the Colours in the Rainbow, they make a fair show 
Arist: Elench: l. 1. c. 3.  indeed to the eye, but when we come to search what they are, they are nothing but show, and without any solidity.  
§. 5. They are both guilty of that Sophism, which the Philosopher calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first of the six in Voce. For whereas Doctor Hammond (as we have most demonstratively proved, and as is also acknowledged in our Refuters first argument) takes the Phrase, The Love of God, for the Acts of Divine Charity or holy Love in the General Notion, our Refuter here takes it; in a more restrained sense, for that eminent Act of holy Charity, that is immediately terminated on God, and is contradistinct from these other Acts of Charity, whereby we love ourselves, and our neighbours, as ourselves. And this will appear from the Tenor of the first Commandment, and the places that himself has quoted, Matth. 22. 37. Mark 12. 30 Thou shalt Love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy Soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great Commandment, and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt Love thy neighbour as thyself. Though then it were granted, that all the Acts of our Love, immediately fixed on God, must be equal, because always, by virtue of that Commandment, we must Love God, as highly, as intensely as we can, yet it will not follow that all the Acts of Divine Charity, or holy Love, must be therefore equally intense. Nay because it was impossible for the Saviour of the world to sin, I must conclude that the Acts of this his Love were not, could not be equally intense. For than he should have loved himself, and his Neighbour, the Finite goodness of the Creature with the same equal fervency and ardour as the infinite goodness of the Creator, contrary to the Tenor of these Commandments, and the fullness of our Saviour's wisdom and grace.  
§. 6. But then this is not all the misadventure of our Refuter. For in the latter part of his Discourse he confounds that Act of our Saviour's Love of God belonging to him as Comprehensor, with that other Act of Love, that belonged to him as Viator, and which alone is enjoined in that first, and great Commandment. Now these two, though the Objects be the same, yet differ as really, as heaven in possession, from heaven in hope and expectation. The one is a Free Act of the Will issuing from the Infused habit of Charity, the other a necessary Act of the Will, that flows per modum emanationis from the beatifical vision, as Light does from the Sun. To the one he had a proper freedom, and the Act by way of Duty fell under the authority and guidance of the first and great Commandment. To the other he had no more freedom, than now the Saints and Angels in heaven have; who because they are already possessed of heaven, and all that heaven can afford, are not under any Law, but as Naturally as Necessarily they love God, as since their being made perfect, they see him there.  
§. 7. And now though this be sufficient to demonstrate the weakness of our Refuters Discourse, yet for the full satisfaction of the English Reader, who is most likely to be deceived with these False Lights, and empty shows, I shall take his whole discourse asunder, that so I may sever Truth from Falsehood, and vain aerial shapes, and Appearances from solid Bodies.  
§. 8. First then I grant that it was impossible for Christ to sin; For such a high Priest became us, who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, and made higher than the heaven. Heb. 7. 26. When not only pilate's Wife calls him that just man, but even his very adversaries and accusers were not able to convince him, and his Judge does publicly acquit him; when Mahomet, who has commanded his followers to oppose and persecute his worshippers, has yet in his very Alcoran declared him to be a most holy man, and the next great Prophet sent from God, and therefore condemns his own followers that blaspheme him; for us Christians, that acknowledge him our Saviour, either directly or indirectly to pull the glorious Crown of Righteousness from his head, is most hideous and protentous blasphemy. And therefore I shall as readily, as cheerfully, as our Refuter, pronounce Anathema to all such Conclusions, that cast the least Umbrage and suspicion of guilt upon our ever blessed Saviour. And so I undertake shall Doctor Hammond; and I am bold to promise our Refuter his thanks, and most grateful acknowledgement if at any time he shall reclaim him from any such dangerous, though by himself undiscovered, Inferences.  
§. 9 But than secondly, I must add, that because Christ was absolutely impeccable, and could not sin, therefore of necessity the Inward Acts of his Love, and holy Charity could not be of the same equal Intenseness, but must differ in gradual Perfection, according to the Order of Charity that God's Law requires, and the different Participation of the Divine goodness in the several Objects of this Love.  
§. 10. Thirdly I grant, that the first and great Commandment enjoins us the most intense Actual Love of God, that is possible; command us it does, to love God tanto nixu & conatu, quanto fieri potest, with our utmost force and endeavour, and with as high a degree of Actual Love as is possible for us to reach unto.  
§. 11. But then fourthly, I must deny that it will follow that even the Acts of this Love, this high transcendent Love, that is immediately fixed on God, are all equally intense, though the Ardour of them must be still as intense, as we are able. For since as St. Austin and Bernard, Aquinas and Scotus say truly, that this commandment, in that sense, cannot perfectly be fulfilled in this life, but it shall be then only in Heaven, when man shall be totally united, and joined to God, by virtue of the beatifical vision, when God shall be all in all; since also it is evident that this first and great Commandment obliges us to love God only with all our strength, and not with more, than ever we had at first in Adam, before his fall; and since it is also evident, that Adam in innocency, had not the same Abilities to love God in Paradise, as the soul of the same Adam, and the Spirits of all just men now made perfect have in Heaven; and since it is also as evident (as I shall also by and by, and beyond all exception, further demonstrate) that Christ as considered in the state of a Viator, had not the same Abilities to know and love God, as he had at the same time as considered in the state of a Comprehensor, and fully possessed of heaven happiness, and the full sight and Vision, and enjoyment and fruition of God; it will undeniably follow that even in the Acts of this high transcendent Love of God, there was, and must be acknowledged a Gradual difference in respect of Ardour and intenseness, according to the difference of his Abilities as considered in the state of a Viator, and as considered in the state of a Comprehensor.  
§. 12. Fifthly I grant that Christ as Man had in his humane soul, as considered in the state of a Comprehensor, in the superior part of it, the Mind, far greater abilities for the Actual Love of God, than Adam had in Paradise; because from the first Moment of his Conception, and Birth, by virtue of the hypostatical Union, he had greater Abilities for this Love, than all the Saints and Angels in heaven. And therefore I do also grant, that the inward Acts of this his Love, as Comprehensor, were always One, without any Interruption, or Gradual Variation; these were always at the height, and the same equal intenseness; because they were always in Termino, and not free Acts of the Will, but Necessary effects of the Beatifical Vision.  
§. 13. But then sixthly I must add, what our Refuter has in his Mixture of Scholastical Divinity with Practical told us 
Jeanes mixture pag. 261.  concerning our blessed Saviour, as considered in the state of a Viator. That it is not to be denied, but that by special dispensation there was some restraint of the influence of his happiness or beatifical vision in the whole course of his humiliation, and particularly in the time of his doleful passion. But (though) truly (as he adds immediately) it seems very improbable, and no ways sortable unto the state of Christ's blessedness, for his grace and holiness, the Image of God in him, his love of God, etc. (to wit in the habit as these Phrases signify) to be liable to perpetual motion and augmentation, yet because, (let me add) his Abilities during this restraint of the Influence of his happiness, and as considered in the state of a Viator, were not the same, as now they are in the state of a Comprehensor, the intenseness and Ardour in the Acts of his Love now, must be higher than they were during that Restraint. But much more must this be allowed, that there was a Gradual difference in the Acts of his Love, if, as our Refuter in his Mixture undertakes to demonstrate, that 
Jeanes his mixture p. 250  our Saviour did as truly increase in the inward Acts of Wisdom and Grace, as he did in Stature.  
§. 14. But then seventhly let me add, that, if the Inward Acts of this Love of God were not always equal, but did Gradually differ, because they did Gradually increase, it will not therefore follow that our Saviour must be concluded guilty, (with all humble reverence be it spoken) of the breach of the first and great Commandment. For he that always loves God with all his Soul, and might and strength, that loves him to the utmost of his ability, that he has by God's gift, and not weakened by sin nor impaired by his own fault, loves him pro praesenti statu, as much as that Law does require; and if, as his Abilities do increase, his Love does constantly still increase, he still loves God according to that duty and measure, which that Law does require, though the Acts of this Love are now more intense, than they were formerly And thus it was in Christ, at least as compared in the state of a Viator with himself as considered in the state of a Comprehensor. The Acts then of this his Love were always holy, and most conformable to God's Law, and still in suo genere perfect, though they were not all equal in Gradual intenseness, and all simply and absolutely perfect, as now they are, where he sits at the Right hand of God. And therefore, even in respect of these Acts, it will not follow that, though they were not always equal in gradual perfection, his Obedience to this Commandment was therefore imperfect, because he did always love God ex toto posse suo, with all his might and strength, which strength did differ according to the variety of his several states and conditions, as Viator and Comprehensor.  
§. 15. But than lastly, let me add, to prevent all mistakes, that this is not by me applied to any but only our Saviour, that was still holy, harmless, undefiled. For God is not, cannot be unjust, if by virtue of this Law he should require us to love him according to the Abilities he gave us, and we have wilfully lost and squandered away: nor can we be said to love God with all our might and with all our strength, though in this lapsed depraved condition we love him as well as we can with this body of sin we carry about us, because it is by our own default that we can now love him no better, and we ourselves by our own sin and wilful default have disabled ourselves, that we cannot love him so well as we ought, and as God's Law requires; and which we might have kept, if Adam and we his offspring had continued in our first innocency. But then also let me add, that we and Adam in innocency should not have loved God with that height and ardour as now the Spirits of just men made perfect do love him, because Adam & they knew & should have known him only by Grace and Revelation, but now they know him face to face, and their love is enlarged by the greatness of their happiness and the fullness of their glory.  
§. 16. I shall clear all this by the Testimonies of some Schoolmen of great note and worth in themselves, and of great repute with our Refuter. I begin with Suarez.  
§. 17. He, in his first Tome on the third part of Aquinas Sums, disputing of the Merit of Christ, lays it down for a ground, that Christ in the days of his flesh and in the state of a Viator, was truly in statu merendi, and that all the conditions requisite to make an Action meritorius, and the Person that performs it to merit by it, were to be found in him. And if this be not granted, he could not be the Meritorious cause of our Justification. Ex his ergo omnibus sufficienter concluditur, omnes conditiones ad perfectum meritum requisit● in Christo Domino inventas esse, atque adeo potuisse mereri, ac denique de facto meruisse: Quae assertio de fide certa est, quam ex Scripturis melius infra demonstrabimus, etc.— Ratione etiam patet ex dictis, quia omnis Viator gratus Deo, illi obediens, & studiosè operans propter ipsum & ex gratia ejus, meretur coram ipso; & haec est una ex magnis perfectionibus viatoris, sed Christus assumpsit statum Viatoris, & erat gratissimus Deo, & optime operabatur, etc. ergo meruit coram Deo; sine causa enim assumpsisset statum Viatoris, & hâc perfectione seipsum privasset. Suarez tom. 1. in 3. part. Thom. disp. 39 sect. 1. p. 539. col. 2. C. D.  
§. 18. And now having proved that Christ as Viator was in statu merendi, he proceeds in the next section to determine by what Acts Christ merited, and this he lays down distinctly in four conclusions. I shall give them here ordine retrogrado, beginning with the last first.  
Dico quarto, meruisse Christum per omnes actus liberos suae voluntatis, etiam si illi fuerint ordinis naturalis, ut sunt amor naturalis Dei & actus aliarum virtutum mortalium acquisitarum▪ Probatur, quia omnes illi actus erant honesti, & à Christo refebantur in spiritualem finem, & quam vis non referrentur, sola dignitas suppositi deificantis illos satis esset ut haberent omnem proportionem & valorem ad meritum, etc.  
Dico tertio, meruisse Christum per actus omnes virtutum infusarum, quos liberè exercuit. Est certissima; sic enim meruit per actum obedientiae, ut testatur Paulus, & per actum religionis, ut orationis, etc. Et ad eundem modum meruit per Passionem suam, etc.  
Dico secundo, meruisse Christum per actum Charitatis proximorum. Est communis Theologorum & certa, quia in illo actu concurrunt omnia necessaria ad meritum: solum est notandum, hunc amorem proximi non solum potuisse esse meritorium ut consesequentem scientiam infusam, quod indubitatum est, sed etiam ut consequentem scientiam beatam, ut Alexander Alensis & Scotus supra docuerunt. And then for the clearing the latter part of this Conclusion he adds two things that will give light to our present Controversy. Voluntas Christi non majorem necessitatem habuit perseverandi semper in illâ actuali dilectione proximi quam habendi illam in primo instanti, quia neque ab Objecto neque a Deo ipso necessitatem patiebatur. Refer autem hanc necessitatem in solam naturam illius actus est gratis dictum, & est quaedam petitio Principii: nam cum ille actus sit quid creatum, ex hâc parte non est immutabilis, in quo differt multum ab actu increato voluntatis; & cum alias sit actus potentiae liberae, & versetur circa objectum quod non infert potentiae necessitatem, neque etiam ex sua specifica ratione immutabilis est, non est ergo naturâ suâ immutabilis. Deinde, quia si Christus in primo instanti liberè dilexerit proximos illo actu, ergo potuit non diligere: demus ergo sustinuisse pro aliquo tempore illum actum seu extensionem ejus, nun peterat postea in ip●re diligere proximos illo actu? certe non videtur id probabiliter posse negari, quia si in principio id potuit, cur non postea? cum ille actus capax sit illius augmenti, & ipsa potentia semper retineat vim & libertatem ad efficiendum illum. Quod si potuit Christus p●st aliquod tempus incipere proximos diligere per illum actum, ergo ille actus de se mutabilis est, secundum illud augmentum, ergo pari ratione mutari posset per cessationem ab actuali proximorum dilectione. Denique ille actus prout terminatur ad proximos, non pertinet ad essentialem beatitudinem, neque habet necessariam connexionem cum actuali amore Dei: potest. n. perfect amari Déus, quamvis proximus non semper actu ametur, sed interdum tantum in habitu: non est ergo inconveniens admittere hujusmodi mutationem possibilem in illo actu.  
And when it had been objected, quod iste actus non sit meritorius, quia non est actus Viatoris ut Viator est, cum fundetur in scientia beata; He answers, Dico igitur, ut actus sit meritorius satis esse ut sit bonus, liber, & in persona grata in via existente: unde supposito eandem personam simul esse Comprehensorem & Viatorem, non repugnat Merito ut aliquo modo fundetur in ipsa visione Comprehensoris, sed solum repugnat illi ut formaliter ac per se pertineat ad statum Comprehensoris ut sic. Vnde sicut scientia beata existens in Viatore potest esse ratio prophetandi: it a etiam potest esse principium vel fundamentum merendi, & dici potest ille actus Viatoris ut sic; quia ipsa visio non potest ad illum actum ut meritorius est deservire, nisi prout est in Viatore.  
Dico primo, Christum habuisse actum amoris Dei liberum supernaturalem & elicitum à charitate, & ab amore beatifico distinctum, & illo actu perfectissime meruisse. It a intelligo Sententiam D. Thomae hic solutione ad primum dicentis meruisse Christum per charitatem, non in quantum erat charitas Comprehensoris, sed in quantum erat Viatoris: ubi de charitate loquitur prout terminatur ad Deum. Et non potest exponi de uno & eodem actu charitatis Dei, ut sub una ratione sit meritorius, & non sub alia, quia non potest idem actus numero, prout tendit in idem indivisibile objectum, atque adeo secundum eandem indivisibilem entitatem, esse liber & necessarius, quia hae duae proprietates includunt contradictionem: ergo non potest idem actus indivisibilis esse meritorius ut est Viatoris, & non ut est Comprehensoris: praesertim quia ille actus licet materialiter, ut ita dicam, potuerit dici Viatoris, quia fuit in Christo etiam eo tempore quo fuit viator, formaliter autem propriè non dici potest pertinuisse ad Christum ut Viatorem. Intelli endus est ergo D. Thomas de charitate operante per diversos actus, quorum alter consequitur visionem beatam, & ut sie dicitur charitas Comprehensoris, alter vero versatur circa Deum ut cognitum per scientiam infusam, quae ut sic dicitur charitas viatoris, etc. Suarez. tom. 1. in 3. p. Thom. disp. 39 sect. 2. per totum.  
To this for the further clearing of the whole I should add another passage in the same Author, and the same Treatise, disp. 37. sect. 4. p. 518. But it is quoted after, and thither I refer the Reader.  
§. 19 To give the sum of this discourse from Suarez. First, plain it is, that Christ in the days of his Flesh was truly Viator, and in statu merendi. Secondly, It is essential to Merit, that the Meritorious Act be freely and voluntarily performed. Thirdly, Christ did truly merit, otherwise we must deny him to be the Meritorious Cause of our Salvation, and turn downright Socinians. Fourthly, He merited not only by the Inward Acts of that Love which was the consequent of his supernaturally infused knowledge of God, but also by the Inward Acts of Charity and Love to his own Glory, and his Love to us Men his Neighbours, and all Inward Acts of all Virtues and Graces, whether Infused or Acquisite, as also by those other free Acts of his Will of a more inferior Alloy, such as Suarez calls ordinis naturalis, his Natural Love of God. Since then that all these were not, could not be equal in themselves, and with that high transcendent Act of his Love that was immediately, yet freely, seated upon God, it necessarily follows, that as he merited by them all, though all were not of the same height and Gradual Perfection, so he was not, cannot be concluded guilty of the breach of the first and great Commandment, though they differed from one another in gradual perfection, because he truly did merit by every one of them. Qu●d erat demonstrandum.  
§. 20. But then though this be abundantly sufficient to acquit the Doctor's assertion from the least suspicion and umbrage of that so dangerous crimination, yet I shall further demonstrate it from our Refuters own Concessions, and that so clearly that either, Sampson-like, he must involve himself as well as his adversary in the same common ruin, or else retract his so uncharitable aspersion.  
For first, in his Mixture he expressly grants that Christ in the 
Jeanes his mixture of Scholastical, etc. p 261.  days of his Flesh was not purè Comprehensor, but also Viator; and if he should not, he must contradict the Scriptures, that in many places assert it.  
Secondly, he expressly grants that Christ in the days of his flesh did as truly grow in the Inward Acts of Wisdom and 
Jeanes Mixture of Scholast. p. 249, 250. Jeanes Mixture of Scholast. p. 261.  actuai apprehension and Grace, as he did in Stature.  
Thirdly, he says, It is not to be denied, but that by special dispensation there was some restraint of his happiness or beatifical vision in the whole course of his humiliation, and particularly in the time of his doleful passion.  
§. 21. From hence I argue that if Christ did truly and not in Appearance grow and receive Increase in the Inward Acts of Wisdom and Grace, than the utmost height and degree of Actual Grace and holy Love is not always pro hic & nunc required by that first and great Commandment; because Christ was impeccable, and it was impossible for him to sin.  
§. 22. Secondly, I argue that if Christ was truly Viator in the days of his flesh, then as Viator, and in that state and respect, he could not love God so highly, so ardently, by virtue of the infused Habit of divine Love, as he did as considered in the state of a Comprehensor, or as now he does at the right hand of God; because, as our Refuter maintains from Austin and Bernard, Aquinas and Scotus, this Precept of Loving God perfectly, cannot be fulfilled in this life, but only in Patria, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus.  
§. 23. Thirdly, I argue that if Christ as Viator had not, could not have the same Abilities to love God with the same fervour and ardency as he has as Comprehensor, therefore there must of necessity be a gradual difference in the Acts of his Love as Comprehensor and Viator, because our Refuter has told us in his first Argument from Hurtado, that Intensio actus secundi supponit aequalem intensionem in actu primo, cum actus secundus supponit primum.  
§. 24. And now that the Viator differs in Abilities from the Comprehensor, as it is clear to any that understands the very terms, so plain also it is, because the Viator knows God and his Goodness only by Infused knowledge and Revelation, and the other by Actual Apprehension; the one only tastes and sees how good he is by Grace, and the other actually enjoys him by fruition in Glory. And since our Love must still be proportionable to our Knowledge, the more we see and enjoy God, the more are we enabled, and the more perfectly we love God. For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which 
1 Cor. 13. 9, 10, 12.  is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. For now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face: now I know in part, but then shall I know even as I also am known. Nor can our Refuter deny but this must in some measure agree to Christ in the state of a Viator, though always absolutely sinless, as well as it does to us, to whom he was made like in all 
Heb. 2. 17. & 4. 15.  things, sin only excepted. And certainly it can be no part of our sin, that we see nor God face to face whilst we are in the flesh, because no man, as in the flesh, can approach unto him and live. 
Exod. 34. 20.  He dwells in inaccessible light, says the Apostle, whom no man 
1 Tim. 6. 16.  hath seen or can see, as considered in this state. And hence it is that our Saviour 
(a) John 17. 1, 5.  prays for his glorification in this state; and in this state 
(b) Heb. 12. 2.  for the joy set before him, he endured the Cross; and 
(c) Heb. 1. 3.  when he had by himself purged our sins he then sat down on the right hand of God. For 
(d) Luke 24. 26, 46.  thus it first behoved him to suffer, and then to enter into his glory. Besides, if in the state of his Humiliation there was by special dispensation, as our Refuter grants, a restraint of his happiness or beatifical vision, he could not then see God so perfectly, and so perfectly enjoy him, as after his Glorification when there was no Restraint; and consequently his Love could not be so ardent, so highly intense and perfect as afterwards, when now he sits at the right hand of God.  
§. 25. And further to demonstrate the clearness of this conclusion, I shall call in the reason and assistance of two eminent Schoolmen, Cajetan and Scotus. 
Cajetan in 2. 2. Aquin. q. 24. art. 7. p. 61. Col. 3, & 4.   
Diversarum rationum esse perfectionem Charitatis Viae & perfectionem Charitatis Patriae ex Signo & Ratione monstratur. Ex Signo quidem, quia quantum cunque crescat Charitas in Via ex parte Subjecti, nunquam pertingere potest ad perfectionem Charitatis in Patria ex parte Subjecti, quoniam nunquam potest ad hoc pervenire ut diligat actualiter Deum totaliter, hoc est ex toto cord, ex tota ment, etc.  patet ex infra dictis ab Augustino & authore in discussione hujus praecepti. Et similiter quantum cunque crescat Charitas Viae ex parte Objecti, nunquam pertingit ad perfectionem Charitatis Patriae ex parte Objecti, quoniam nunquam potest ad hoc pervenire, ut moveatur ad amandum à Deo viso, sed movetur in hac vita à Deo in speculo Creaturae. Hoc enim quod est quantitatem perfectionalem Charitatis in Via, quantum cunque crescat, non posse pertingere ad minimum quid quantitatis perfectionalis propriae Charitati Patriae, ostendit quantitates has esse diversarum rationum. Ratione vero, quia ea quae consequuntur ad actus diversarum rationum ut sic, sunt diversarum rationum, sed perfectio Charitatis in Via & perfectio Charitatis in Patria consequuntur ad actus diversarum rationum, Ergo sunt diversarum rationum. Minor patet, quia Subjectum in Via & in Patria diversarum sunt rationum, secundum actus visionis per fidem, & visionis facie ad faciem. Et similiter Objectum in Via & in Patria, in quantum est movens, est diversarum rationum, secundum actus visi in speculo, & visi in seipso, ut patet. Deus enim visus in speculo nunc movet ad amandum, tunc autem Deus visus in seipso— Notanter autem dixi Objectum, ut movens, esse alterius rationis hic & in Patria, quoniam Objectum Charitatis potest dupliciter considerari, sc. ut terminans amorem, & ut movens ad amorem. Et quamvis terminans sit unius rationis hic & in Patria, sc. Deus ipse prout in se est, & propterea Charitas nunquam excidit; ut movens tamen est diversarum rationum, quoniam movere ut visum in speculo, & movere ut visum in seipso, constat diversarumesse rationum. And then he adds a little after, Apparet tertio, quod diversarum sunt rationum, sicut via praeternaturalitatis semper habens aliquid admistum, & terminans in statis naturalissimo. Charitas enim quia est amicitia ad Deum consequens consortium divinae naturae, est amicitia habens suum naturalem statum solummodo in Patria, ubi similes Deo erimus, & videbimus ipsum sicutest: nunc autem in Via, apud Apostolum, semper aliquid praeternaturalitatis habet admistum ex vi ipsius peregrinationis, & quia quicquid imperfectionis in hoc praeternaturali statu habet deponetur, & ad naturalé & perfectionis undique statum perducta erit in Patria, ideo diversaratio perfectionis Charitatis in Via & in Patria ab Apostolo declaratur, exemplo perfectionis puerilis, & perfectionis virilis. Thus far Cajetan.  
But the place I most insist on is that of Scotus, which, according to promise, I now acquaint the Reader with. Et si aliquis haberet hic aequalem Charitatem sicut in Patria, non propter hoc esset beatus, quia non posset habere aequalem Actum, sicut tunc habebit; nec sequitur, si Habitus est aeque perfectus hic & ibi, igitur & Actus similiter: quia Actus diligendi Deum dependet sicut à causa partiali non solum à Voluntate & Charitate, sedetiam ab Objecto praesente per actualem intellectionem, sicut dictum est dist. 25. secundi, et hoc secundum determinatam perfectionem secundum quod est determinatè praesens, si magis, magis, si minus, minus. In Via de communi lege non potest esse Objectum praesens sicutin Patria etiam praesentia speciei ejusdem. Vnde ex hoc sequitur, quod Actus non possitesse ita perfectus, etsi Habitus sit aequalis: quia Habitus non erit totale principium illius Actus, sed partiale, et eo modo quo ipse Habitus est Principium, semper aequaliter se habet ad Actum. Semper enim quantum est exse dat Actui suo, quod sit quoddam amare Dei in quantum est summum bonum, nec Habitus dat sibi qued sit Dei ut praesens vel abs●ns, nec dat sibi perfectionem quam habet ex Objecto sic vel sic praesente. So Scotus l. 3. Sent. dist. 3. q. 1. §. 9 p. 213. col. 2. Vide ibid. §. 4. p. 212. col. 1.  
§. 26. And thus having fully acquitted the Doctor's assertion, and fully answered the Refuters arguments, I might now contentedly sit down, without taking notice of his very large Digression, that is purely an extravagance, and not at all concerns the present Question. For though all were granted that he labours to prove, and that Christ did love God ex toto posse suo, with as high a degree of actual love as he was able to reach to, as I most readily grant; yet for all that it will not follow that even this Act of divine Love was, or could be, equal in gradual perfection, with that other Act of his Love that he exercised as Comprehensor; much less will it follow, that all the other Acts of holy Charity and Virtue and Grace, were equal in Gradual Perfection among themselves, or with this high transcendent Act of Love, immediately fixed on God, as we have evidently demonstrated.  
§. 27. Howsoever, that he may not say that any part of his Reason and skill in School-learning is neglected, I shall gratify him so far as to consider this also. But then I cannot choose but observe, that since these three following Leaves are nothing at all to the enforcement of his Argument, but only tending to prove that which was never yet denied him, at least in this controversy, our Refuter could have no other design in this extravagance, but only to amuse the Reader, and to bring the Doctor in suspicion, as if this his Assertion, and consequently the whole Treatise of Will-worship, and the Defence of it against Mr. Cawdry, were Popishly affected, and that the main Pillar of it was borrowed from Bellarmine, whom Ames and Chamier and our White have already confuted; and that Aquinas and Scotus, St. Austin and Bernard, and Reason and Scripture were all opposite to Doctor Hammond, as well as Bellarmine in this assertion. But if the contrary be proved, I doubt not but the Reader will no sooner discover then abominate such Artifices wheresoever he finds them, though masked under never so specious and sanctified shapes of Zeal and Reformation. To go on then in this disquisition and Adventure.   

SECT. 20.  
As the Doctor needs not, so is it not his Custom to make use of former Expositions. This Practice in the Refuter censured. This Digression not an answer to the Ectenesteron, but a fling at the Treatise of Will-worship. His brief transcribing the Doctor's Exposition, and large examining it censured. Mr. Cawdry grants all in Controversy between the Doctor and Refuter, but contradicts himself. The Refuters prevaricating and false suggestions to his Reader. His first Reason for this suggestion reduced to form. Destructive to all Religion. Biddle, Hobbes Leviathan. Whatsoever Answer he shall make for himself against a Socinian, Anabaptist, Quaker, etc. will secure the Doctor. His five very false and proofless Criminations in his next reason mustered up. His hasty oversight in citing Chamier.  

JEANES.  
But you will be ready to tell me, that you have prevented this Charge by that exposition of those large inclusive words, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart with all thy soul, etc. Which you have given in your Treatise of Will-worship, which I shall transcribe, and briefly examine. Once more if it be objected, etc.   
§. 1. But how know you the Doctor's mind, Sir, that he will be ready thus to tell you? For suppose he could give you another answer to your argument, as you see I have done. What need then had the Doctor to borrow this answer from his Treatise of Will-worship? Sir, though you are so barren of Invention, that in every leaf almost of this Reply you give the Reader the same argument; yet he that shall peruse the Doctor's writings, will find that this is not his custom, and that if he be forced to speak to the same subject, he still enriches his discourse with New Observations to the profit and contentment of his Reader. But you, as if you writ only to children, feed us still with chewed meats. And yet if in a scarcity of better Provision you had, as the Cook in Livy, made us twenty several dishes out of one single Porket, you had showed yourself a Master in your Art, and the Reader might have judged what you could do if your matter had been more copious. But when, like Aesop's Master, you every day invite your guests to a new Feast, and yet every day, like Aesop his Caterer, you feed them only with Tongue, what other thanks can you expect than he met with.  
§. 2. The truth is, Sir, that as the Doctor has no need to make use of that answer here; so there he gave it to far different purposes, namely, to show that he who loves God with all his heart, may yet have room left for a Voluntary Oblation, notwithstanding that precept. And therefore I must conclude that as this is brought in by the head and shoulders, so it is not an answer to Doctor Hammond's Ectenesteron, but a fling at the Treatise of Will-worship, which yet, like Canis ad Nilum, you but touch at, and instantly you are gone for fear a Crocodile should meet you.  
§. 3. You tell the Doctor you shall transcribe his answer from the Treatise of Will-worship, and briefly examine it. But the truth is, you have briefly transcribed it, and very largely, and altogether besides the purpose examined it; like those that writ the Sermon in shorthand, and read it at length, and not in figures, making more at the Repetition then either the Preacher delivered or intended.  

JEANES.  
ONce more, if it be objected that whatever is thus performed, is commanded by those large inclusive words. (Thou shalt love thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, etc.) nothing being of such latitude as that the (with all) should not contain it; I answer, that that phrase denoteth two things only.  
1. Sincerity of this Love of God, as opposed to partial divided love or service.  
2. The loving him above all other things, and not admitting any thing into Competition with him: not loving any thing else in such a degree: Treat. Will-worship, p. 24.  
Here you barely dictate that that phrase, (Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, etc.) denoteth only those two things you mention, whereas your Reader hath just cause to expect a confirmation of what you say.   
§. 4. I thought, Sir, you had wholly engrossed this office of Dictator to yourself. And the Doctor of any man will not entrench upon it. But if you had been pleased to have dealt impartially with your Reader, and acquainted him with the grounds and occasion of the answer, and reported it full and entire, as it lay in that Treatise, he could have had no Reason to expect a further confirmation than what the Doctor there delivered.  
§. 5. So satisfactory indeed the reasons were, that Mr. Cawdry himself, in his Exercitation on that very Treatise and Paragraph, acknowledges and yields all that is now in contest betwixt the Doctor and you. For let it be supposed, says he, yea granted, that sincere Love is capable of Degrees, whether in the same man at several times, or two men at the same time, and so both obey the precept; yet these degrees and growth of Love do argue Love not to be perfect (and so not strictly answerable to the law) and is so far faulty, in vitio, as Hierome.  
§. 6. This latter clause is added only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that he might seem to say somewhat when the whole cause was yielded. And indeed it carries its own confutation in its forehead, because one part (to use the Doctors own words) is directly contrary, if not contradictory to the other. For— sure if those of 
Dr. Hammond's Account of Mr. Cawdrey's triplex Diatribe, pag. 222. §. 3.  whom the supposition is made do both obey the precept, than they do not offend against it: and if they do not offend against it, then is not this faulty or in vitio; for sure every fault or vice must be a transgression of the Law. And if, as he says, that Commandment require of all men that Perfection of Love that is absolutely sinless, then evident it is that the utmost Sincerity of Love, that as himself grants implies Degrees, and therefore necessarily supposes Imperfection and sin, cannot be the fulfilling of it: nor would Adam's sincerity, supposing his Fall, have ever been accepted, or prevented the Curse and his eternal damnation, if no new Covenant had been made. And if sincere Love that is capable of Degrees be a fulfilling of this law, and the same man, at several times, or two men at the same time, that are only thus sincere, and not perfectly in love, do both obey this precept, as he expressly supposes and grants; then manifest it is that this sinless Perfection he speaks of is not required to fulfil it. For it is impossible the same Law should at one and the same instant be both obeyed and transgressed by one and the same Person in one and the same respect. And if he speak of several respects, and according to several Obligations and Covenants, he doth but confusedly beat the Air, and deceive himself and his Reader, and what he grants with the one hand he takes away with the other.  
§. 7. And then to the example of Christ's ardency in Prayer, he says, Christ was above the Law, and did more than the Law 
Mr. Cawdrey's Diat. of Will-worship page 116. §. 47.  required, & did supererogate in many of his Actions and Passions, and so in the degree of affection in Prayer, if not in the Prayer it self, etc.— yet thus much that example holds forth, that greater pressures and necessities call for enlargement of affections, not as voluntary Oblations, but as Duties.  
§. 8. And therefore, Sir, you did very much prevaricate, and impose upon the Faith of your confident Reader, when you laboured to persuade him that he had just reason to expect a confirmation of that exposition which the Doctor had given. You should first have attempted to give a more solid answer to those reasons then Mr. Cawdrey had afforded, before you had called for more. Or else you should have been so ingenuous as he was, to have yielded to the force of that truth which you could not withstand.  
§. 9 But why has the Reader just cause to expect a confirmation of what the Doctor says.  

JEANES.  
BEcause this very answer is the shift of Papists in several controversies between them and us; Bellarm. tom. 2. De monachis, lib. 2. cap. 13. tom. 4. the amissione gratiae, & statu peccati, l. 1. cap. 12, etc. And was it not fit that you should acquaint us what those cogent reasons were, that necessitated you unto this compliance with Papists?   
§. 10. Well, Sir, I promise to acquaint you with the heads at least of those Reasons that induced the Doctor to make use of this Interpretation, though not to a compliance with Papists, if you will also acquaint your Reader what those cogent reasons were, that necessitated you to make use of that Objection, that not only opposes Doctor Hammond in this particular, but equally overthrows the whole Christian Religion; that destroys the Doctrine of the ever-blessed Trinity the Godhead and Satisfaction of our Saviour, and the Immortality of the Soul, and hell fire and eternal Torments; that blows up as well the Office as the maintenance of Ministers, and opens a broad gap for the Socinian and Anabaptist, the Ranter and Atheist to come and invade all that is sacred amongst us.  
§. 11. And now that the Reader may see that I do you no wrong, I shall for the present suppose that the Doctor had borrowed this exposition from Bellarmine, and consider the force of your argument against him upon this supposition. I reduce it thus into form, that the strength of it may appear. Whosoever makes use of any argument or Tenent or exposition of Scripture that is to be found in Bellarmine or other Popish writers, is guilty of a compliance with Papists.  
But Doctor Hammond makes use of this very exposition which is to be found in Bellarmine. Ergo,  
Doctor Hammond is guilty of compliance with Papists.  
§. 12. What say you, Sir? Is not this your present argument? can you give us any other Proposition to reduce your Socratical Enthymeme into a Syllogism? If you cannot, pray tell me then, what strength is in your Major? And what answer will you give to it, when a Socinian, an Anabaptist, a Ranter or Atheist shall press you with it? For does not Mr. Biddle in the 
Biddle's Catechism, preface to the Reader.  preface to his Catechism upon this very score and argument decry the expositions and determinations of all Counsels, and Convocations, and Assemblies of Divines, that are opposite to his Doctrine? Does he not in that very preface call those expressions of God's being infinite, incomprehensible, of his being a simple Act, of his subsisting in three Persons, of an Eternal generation of the Son, and Procession of the Holy Ghost, the Incarnation and Hypostatical Union, Original sin and Christ's taking our nature on him, of Christ's making satisfaction to God for our sins, and purchasing Heaven for us, etc. as well as Transubstantiation, a Babylonish confusion of language, and monstrous Terms? And does he not upon this very score plead for a necessity to reform Religion beyond such a stint as that of Luther, or at most that of Calvin, by cashiering those many intricate and devised Forms of speaking? And may he not, nay does he not justify this his Crimination by this very Argument? For are not all these very forms, and the Tenants couched under them to be found in Bellarmine's Controversies as well as in Calvin's Institutions? Are not all those expositions of the Scriptures that any Reformed Writer gives in these Socinian Controversies to be found in Bellarmine and other Popish Writers, that maintain the same common truth with us? What shall these also be condemned as well as Doctor Hammond for a compliance with Papists? May not the whole fifth and sixth Books of Volkelius de vera Religione, and the Racovian Catechism be defended by this very argument, and the Catholic doctrines be overthrown? And do not the Socinians frequently run to this Argument for shelter, and by it with the greater plausibility insinuate their damnable Doctrine to their Proselytes? Nay has not Mr. Hobbes of late founded his whole kingdom of darkness upon this very Argument? Does he not as well damn the Immortality 
Hobbes Leviathan, Part. 4. c. 44. p. 339, 340, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347. c. 46. p. 370 etc. 379 etc. 44. p. 335, 336, 341, 342. c. 47 p. 382, 383, etc.  of the Soul, and the eternal Torments of Hell, as the fire of Purgatory; as well Tithes and Universities, Presbytery and Discipline, as the Pope's Supremacy and Monastic Perfection, upon this very score, because maintained in the Romish Church? Nay, did not the Independent refute the Presbyterians at Oxford upon the proof of their calling, by this very Argument? And if Episcopacy has been damned by this one Objection as Antichristian, has not also Presbytery and Discipline and Tithes and Maintenance of Ministers been arraigned for Antichristian, and condemned in cartload of Pamphlets, by this single evidence? And does not the Anabaptist undermine the Independent by this one Engine, as now the Ranter and Quaker does by it also labour to undercreep the Anabaptist? And therefore since this is so evident in itself, and so clearly confirmed by a long succession of experiences, I cannot but wonder why our Refuter in his Anger should take up a Delphic sword, that will fit every scabbard as well as his own, and which will, at every blow he gives his Adversary, recoil upon his own breast. But whatsoever answer he shall make to this Objection, for the securing his own Interest and Principles, will equally serve for the defence of Doctor Hammond, and I undertake to make it good.  
§. 13. But then, though this were sufficient to demonstrate the weakness and folly of this Crimination, which could serve for nothing but only to amuse and terrify vulgar Readers, and may as well fright them from the Truth as from an Error; yet I shall not content myself with this, but shall in the next place declare that this is not Bellarmine's exposition, or that known Protestants have given it as well as he, and that Doctor Hammond himself has fully acquitted it, in that very Treatise, and the defence of it against Mr. Cawdry, from any such Popish compliance.  
§. 14. But I shall first hear your second Reason. For you say,  

JEANES.  
THose Protestants that have dealt in the controversies betwixtus and the Papists have proved this your sense to be too narrow, and withal have given another exposition 
(a) Nimirum huc tandem res redit, ut sciamus ita imperari nobis amorem Dei, ut nullus sit amoris gradus, intra summum, cui quisquam debeat acquiescere. Summum autem dico non tantum comparatè ad res alias quae sub amorem cadunt; sed etiam, & quidem praecipuè, comparatè ad nos ipsos, ut ne ultra possimus amare: Ita enim verè totum cor erit tota anima; mens tota, vires omnes, etc. Chamier. tom. 3. l. 11. cap. 16. sect. 22.  of the words which they have cofirmed and vindicated from the exceptions of Papists. Now of all this it had been equitable for you to have taken notice, and not to have troubled your Reader with that which hath been so abundantly refuted by Protestant pens.   
§. 15. And thus we see no less than four or five very severe Criminations are in this and the former Paragraph laid to the Doctors charge by our Refuter, and not one of them is proved but only by his own venerable authority. Consider, Sir, consider, do not you here barely dictate? What proof have you offered us of any one charge? Let us muster them up.  
1. You lay it to the Doctor's charge, that he borrowed this exposition from Bellarmine, and that it is to be found in the places by you quoted.  
2ly. That in this the Doctor is guilty of Compliance with Papists.  
3ly. That those Protestants that have dealt in the Controversies betwixt us and the Papists have proved this sense too narrow.  
4ly. They have given another exposition of the words, which they have confirmed and vindicated from the exceptions of the Papists.  
5ly. That Doctor Hammond has taken no notice of all this, but without all equity has troubled his Reader with that which hath been so abundantly refuted by Protestant pens.  
§. 16. Now for the proof of all these we have our Refuters own word, and two citations of Bellarmine, and one place quoted from Chamier in the Margin, which yet through his over great haste is mistaken; for it is not in the xuj chapter, but the xiv of that book, which figures our Refuters hasty eye did very easily mistake. And I am persuaded that if he had sat down and well weighed that Chapter, and the design and scope of that learned man, he would never have made use of his authority against the Doctor, that speaks every thing that he undertakes to make good against Bellarmine.  
§. 17. And now to acquit the Doctor from these Criminations, I conceive it necessary to lay down the Doctor's answer at large, and to acquaint the Reader with the ground and occasion of it, and what he has added further to it in his Reply to Mr. Cawdrey. And then I doubt not but our Refuters' ingenuity and fair carriage will appear to the most ordinary Capacity. To begin with the Occasion.   

SECT. 22.  
The Occasion of the Doctor's exposition of the first great Commandment of Love. The Reasons of his fundamental Position in short. If any one of them demonstrative, as Mr. Cawdrey grants one is, than all not bound to it, to every Act acceptable to God, nor to perform it to a degree, even when they are obliged ad speciem. This the utmost the Doctor undertook, either against Mr. Cawdrey or the Refuter. Reasonable the Refuter should answer these, before he suggested to the Reader a need of further Proof.  
§. 1. And it is this. The Doctor in in his Treatise of Will-worship having undertaken to vindicate the true Notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the ordinary misprision and contempt that was vulgarly thrown upon it, lays this down for his ground, that there were certain Acts of Religion and degrees of Piety to which no man by any particular Law was obliged, which yet when they were spontaneously and voluntarily performed were approved by God, and accepted of him as Free will-offerings over and above what the Law in Particular required. Treat. of Will-worship, sect. 9  
§. 2. And this he proves by divers Arguments.  
As first, by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or free-will-offerings under the Law. sect. 29. and before.  
Secondly from the Sect of the Hasidaei mentioned and defined to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Macc. 2. 42. Which, according to the Protestant Scaliger, were men that in their obedience performed something which the Law required not. Section 28.  
Thirdly, from David's Pious intention and magnificent design to build a Temple to the Lord, which was very acceptable to God, though not where commanded. Sect. 30. & 36.  
Fourthly, from Saint Paul's preaching the Gospel gratis to the Corinthians,, when he might by Gospel-law have exacted his wages as the other Apostles did. Sect. 30.  
Fifthly, from the same Apostles voluntary going up to Jerusalem when bonds expected him, which persecution he might as innocently have declined as in other cases he had done, and justified it by our Saviour's own example. Sect. 31.  
Sixthly, from the Liberal man's munificence and bounty to the poor above that proportion which by any particular Law he is obliged to. Sect. 32.  
Seventhly, from those prostrations and humble gestures and frequency in Prayer, beyond what any Law determined. Sect. 33, 34.  
Lastly, from the different improvements of the several talents and graces which God bostowes upon us, and the proportionable rewards according to those improvements. Sect. 39  
§. 3. And now as all these have been sufficiently there proved and clearly vindicated from the exceptions of Mr. Cawdrey in the Doctors Account of his Triplex Diatribe: so if any one of them be demonstrative (as without doubt some one of them at least is, and is so acknowledged by Mr. Cawdrey) the whole cause is gained, and it will evidently sollow, that all men are not bound to the performance of every Act of Charity or Piety that is highly acceptable to God when it is performed, nor to do it in such a degree, even when they are obliged ad speciem, or that the things be done, which was the utmost the Doctor undertook in this Controversy either against Mr. Cawdrey or the Refuter.  
§. 4. And therefore I must make bold to return him his own language and tell him, it had been highly equitable for him to have taken notice of these Reasons and those other the Doctor added ex abundanti in the Close of his answer to the Objection, which our Refuter now carps at, and first demonstrated the weakness of them, which yet Mr. Cawdrey has not, before he had insinuated to his Reader, that he had just reason to expect a Confirmation of what the Doctor there had said in his answer to the Objection.  
§. 5. And therefore being already secured of the Cause by our Refuters crafty tergiversation, I shall the more confidently attempt his several Criminations.   

SECT. 23.  
The Refuters two first Charges. Bellarmine's explication at large. The Doctors. The Defenders challenge hereupon. The difference between Bellarmine and the Doctor examined. What good in Bellarmine approved by the Doctor. What erroneous, not found in the Doctor, or else declared against. Bellarmine and the Doctor, speak not of the same thing, Chamier assents to the Doctor's Position. The sixth Corollary of Bellarmine, if found in the Doctor, yet otherwise understood: not censured by Chamier, Ames, Vorstius. Two men may love God with all their hearts, and yet one love him more than the other. The Doctor's exposition not borrowed from Bellarmine, nor yet Popishly affected.  
§. 1. First then, he lays it to the Doctor's charge, that this very answer of his is the shift of Papists in several Controversies between them and us, and particularly of Bellarmine, Tom. 2. de Monachis, l. 2. cap. 13. Tom. 4. the Amissione gratiae & statu Peccati, l. 1. c. 12, etc. And therefore 2ly the Doctor is guilty of Popish compliance.  
§. 2. But with the Readers good patience let us view the places in Bellarmine, and compare them with the Doctor's exposition, that so his innocence may appear.  
§. 3. Thus then says Bellarmine.  
Dilectio Dei ex toto corde duobus modis intelligi potest. Vno modo— ut idem sit ex toto cord, quod super omnia integrè ac perfectè, ut nihil Dei amori anteponatur vel adaequetur. Altero modo, ut semper Actu Deus cogitetur & diligatur, & sic animum Dei amor occupatum teneat, ut nihil obrepere possit quod sit, non inquam contra, sed praeter Deivel proximi charitatem. Priori modo imperari nobis, ut Deum ex toto corde diligamus, sed cum hac dilectione negamus pugnare peccata venialia. Ac per hoc falsum esse contendimus repugnare observantiae Legis quamlibèt leve peccatum. Posteriore modo fatemur nullam vitiosam cogitationem obrepere posse ei, qui totus in Dei amore occupetur, sedeam dilectionem quae propria est beatorum nobis in hac vita non propriè imperari, sed tantùm indicari, asserimus, ut nimirum sciamus, qu● spem ac desideria dirigere debeamus. Haec autem ita se habere in lib. de Monach. c. 2, & 13. jam antea demonstravimus, etc. Bellar. lib. 1. de Amiss. great. & stat. Peccat. c. 12. col. 89. D. E. — Deus jubet se diligi ex toto cord, ex tota anima, & ex omnibus viribus, unde nihil superest non debitum qnod erogemus; quicquid enim agimus, Cord, animâ, ment ac viribus agimus: quare omnia nostra Deo sunt obstricta, etc.  
Respondeo, vis argumenti principalis potissimum in duobus posita est. Primo, in illa enumeratione potentiarum cordis, animae, mentis, virium omnium: 2 do, in illa particula, Ex toto; hinc enim videtur colligi debere, nihil omnino posse hominem propter Deum facere, sive cord, sive corpore, quod non teneatur facere. Ostendam igitur neutra ex parte argumentum concludere.  
Quod attinet ad illam enumerationem, quidam ex Patribus existimarunt illa omnia esse diversa, etc.  
Sed simplicior & Scripturae conformior est eorum sententia, qui docent ista omnia idem significare, & more Scripturae multa & varia nomina poni ad rem eandem explicandam, majoris expressionis gratiâ, itaque idem esse diligere cord, & diligere animâ, & diligere ment, nimirum diligere verè, sincerè, non fictè, non simulatè. Nam etc.  
Porrò illa verba, Ex omnibus viribus, non significant ex omnibus potentiis animae, sed cmni virtute, & quod vulgò dicimus, pro viribus: nam in Graecis codicibus nihil est aliud 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quodtamen interpres nunc vertit ex omni virtute, nunc ex omni fortitudine, nunc ex omnibus viribus, etc.— Sed etiam si juxta priorem expositionem enumerarentur variae potentiae animae, ac juberemur illas omnes exercere ad gloriam Dei, adhuc nihil adversarii obtinerent; quoniam enim hoc praeceptum affirmativum est, ideo dicendum esset solum praecipi ut exerceremus ejus potentias propter Deum, quando id necessitas gloriae ejus procurandae requireret, alio autem tempore si id sieret, opus esset Consilii & supererogationis.  
Jam vero quantum ad illam particulam. Ex toto, sunt etiam duae Patrum expositiones; una Sancti Augustini, Bernardi & Thomae, locis notatis, qui docent illud, Ex toto, significare, imperari nobis hoc mandato omnes gradus Charitatis quos vel in hoc mundo vel in alio habere possumus, it a ut semper Deum amemus, & non sit in nobis ullus motus cupiditatis, neque voluntarius neque involuntarius, cum Dei amore pugnans; ex quo recte deduc unt hoc mandatum in hac vita perfecte impleri non posse. Quae sententia non pugnat cum sententia nostra de consiliis Evangelicis, etc. (quia) Patres supra-citati existimant hoc praecepto simul imperari medium & indicari finem, & ideo docent, non posse impleri perfectè hoc praeceptum in hac vita, & tamen non esse praevaricatorem qui non perfectè illud implet, etc.— Quo circaremanet jam suus Consiliis locus etiam circa hoc praeceptum: nam etiam si nihil possim addere huic praecepto quatenus indicat finem, tamen possum addere quatenus indicat medium: & si non pecco ex sententiae S. Thomae, si non amem Deum nisi uno gradu amoris, certè non teneor in rigore amplius amare; implicat enim contradictionem, quod non peccem non faciendo quod facere teneor: ergo si addam alterum gradum amoris, amo plus quam teneor, atque eo modo facio actum supererogationis & consilii, etc.  
Est igitur alia Sententia, illud, ex toto Cord, non significare omnes actus Cordis, vel omnem intensionem possibilem, ità ut imperetur, ut nihil corde agamus nisi Deum diligere idque summâ vehementiâ amoris, sed solum ut amemus Deum praecipuo amore, nihilque illi in amore anteponamus vel aequemus; ac proinde solum in hoc praecepto contineatur id quod faciendum est, non etiam finis ob quem faciendum est: ex quo sequuntur sex quasi Corollaria.  
Primum est, Huic praecepto adversari omnia peccata mortalia, quia in omni peccato mortali anteponitur Creatura Creatori. Secundum, Huic praecepto non adversari amorem honestum affinium & amicorum, licet non roferatur actu in Deum, quia non tenemur Deum solum amare, sed eum praecipue. Tertium, Non adversari peccata venialia eidem praecepto, quia peccata venialia non mutant ultimum finem. Quartum, Non adversari eidem praecepto motus involuntarios concupiscentiae, etiam si rerum alioqui gravissimarum, ut infidelitatis, blasphemiae, adulterii, etc. Nam cum charitas Dei sit in voluntate non adversantur ei nisi motus voluntarii. Quintum, Hoc praeceptum perfectè in hac vita servare posse, quia non exigit nisi ut amemus Deum plus quam Creaturas. Sextum, Posse Deum ex toto corde magis & minus diligi; qui enim propter Deum abstinet se à licitis, magis diligit quam qui solum se abstinet ab illicitis, & tamen uterque diligit toto cord. Quod autem haec explicatio sit verior & Scripturae conformior quam superior, multis modis probari potest, etc.— Bellarm. de Monachis lib. 2. cap. 13. col. 343, 344, 345, 346.  
§. 4. The Doctor's answer stands thus.  
I answer that that Phrase (Thou shalt love the Lord thy 
Treat. of Will-worship, §. 49.  God with all thy heart, with all thy Soul, etc.) denoteth two things only. First, the sincerity of this love of God, as opposed to Partial divided Love or Service; Secondly, the loving him above all other things, and not admitting any thing into competition with him, not loving any thing else in such a degree: and in neither of these respects excluding all other things from a subordinate place in our Love Which being supposed, it will be easy to discern that this sincere Love of God above all is capable of degrees, and that it is possible for two men to love God with all their hearts, i. e. sincerely and above all things, and so both to obey the precept, and yet one to love him in a more intense degree than the other doth (which may be observed amongst the Angels themselves, the Seraphims being so called because they are more ardent in Zeal then other Angels;) nay, for the same Person constantly to Love God above all, and yet to have higher expressions of that Love at one time then at another. Thus we read of Christ himself Luke 22. 24. (who we know did never fail in performing what was man's duty in prayer or any thing else, yet) that he at that time prayed more earnestly; which is a demonstrative evidence that the lower degree is not necessarily sinful, when the higher is acceptable to God: which when it is granted, there is no doubt but these free-will-offerings will be reconcilable with that Command, and he that loves God with all his heart, may have some possibility of loving God better than yet he doth, and so some room left for a voluntary oblation.  
§. 5. To this, for a further clearing and unfolding his mind, the Doctor thought fit in his Reply to Mr. Cawdrey's Triplex Diatribe to add these two things.  
To the first branch of his answer, (The sincerity of this Love of God as opposed to partial divided Love) I now add, says the 
Dr. Hammonds Account of Mr. Cawdrey's Triplex Diatribe, c. 6. sect. 9 §. 1. p. 221. Ibid. §. 5. p. 222.  Doctor, for further explication, that what we do according to the precepts of God's Law, we do out of Love toward God, not hypocritically, or as by constraint.  
2ly. He says, Still it must be remembered that it is not the sinless perfection we speak of, when we say it consists in a latitude, and hath degrees, but sincerity of this or that virtue, expressed in this or that performance: and as this, though it excludes not all mixture of sin in the suppositum (the man in whom it is) yet may by the grace of God in Christ exclude it in this or that Act. For it is certain that I may in an Act of Mercy give as much as any Law obligeth me to give, and so not sin in giving too little.  
§. 6. To which let me now add what the Doctor had before delivered in his Treatise of Will-worship, Sect. 16.  
— When in the service of God a man out of a pious affection (of hope and gratitude inciting to do things acceptable to God, as well as of fear deterring him from all that is prohihited) shall, in conformity to God's general commands and the Doctrine of the Gospel, do any thing else besides what God hath commanded by any particular precept, this Action of his is to be accounted so much more commendable and acceptable to God. Piety being one of those virtues, quarum tantae sunt amplitudines, ut quanto auctiores sunt, tanto sunt laudatiores, which have such width of compass, that the larger they are, they are also so much more commendable; and withal the more voluntary and spontaneous, the more acceptable. To which that of the Son of Sirach is agreeable, Ecclus. 43. 30. When you glorify the Lord, exalt him as much as you can, for even he yet will far exceed; and when you exalt him, put forth all your strength, for you can never go far enough: i. e. how far soever you exceed the particular command, you are yet within the compass of the general, and in respect of that can never be thought to have done enough, though the particular act or degree of it be somewhat, that you are not particularly obliged to.  
§. 7. Lastly, I shall add one thing more from the Doctor's Annotations on this commandment, Matth. 22. 37. and then I doubt not but his exposition will appear so full and complete, that it will be beyond all exception. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, that is (says the Doctor,) with all thy Will and Affections and Understanding.  
§. 8. And thus having represented the Doctors answer full and entire, and given his true sense and meaning of it from other parts of his writings, I shall now be so bold as to challenge our Refuter to make good any one of those severe Criminations he has laid to the Doctor's charge. And if he cannot prove them (as without doubt he cannot) he is bound in Justice to make the Doctor reparations for the injury he has done him by a public Recantation. And as this is most equitable and Christian, so he has under his hand promised it in the very entrance 
Jeanes p. 2▪  of this Reply.  
§. 9 But now I undertake to demonstrate that you have notoriously abused the Doctor, and laid that to his charge he is no way guilty of, and therefore I expect that you make good your engagement, otherwise I must accuse you not only of unchristian dealing, but also of breach of promise.  
§. 10. You tell us, this very answer is the shift of Papists in several controversies between them and us, and for this you cite Bellarmine. But who is there that shall compare the places in Bellarmine you have quoted with the Doctor's Exposition, that will not clearly perceive the vast difference between them? It is true indeed that whatsoever is good in Bellarmine's exposition, the Doctor approves of: and for this he has the Authority and allowance of the learned Chamier, and our Aims, and the Fathers, and Reason and Scripture to justify him. But than secondly, whatsoever is justly wanting in Bellarmine's answer, and is so taxed for his defect by Chamier and Ames, is supplied in the Doctors: And thirdly, whatsoever is purely erroneous and Popish in this answer of Bellarmine's, is either not to be found in the Doctor's answer, or ex professo declared against.  
§. 11. The sum of Bellarmine's answer consists in this, That to love God from the heart is to love him truly and without dissimulation, and that the other words were added for the heightening of the expression. 2ly. that to love God with all our might and strength and heart is to love him pro virili, with might and main, so that God may have the chief place in our Love, so that nothing may either be preferred before him or equalled to him in this our affection. And this is all he allows to be required in this Commandment. And consequently from thence he infers.  
1. That none but mortal sins are inconsistent with that Love that is required in this Commandment.  
2. That venial sins, and the Involuntary motions and temptations to the grossest sinners of Infidelity, Blasphemy, Adultery, etc. are not opposite to it  
3. That it is possible to fulfil this Commandment perfectly in this life, and keep all the Commandments of God employed in it and depending on it, so that a man may in Justice not only merit from God, but also supererogate, and do more than this or any Law of God else does require, and therefore upon this score may deserve and expect a brighter aureola and Crown of glory at God's hands, then if he had done no more than the Law does require. And as this was the only venom of Popery to be found in Bellarmine's answer, so for the maintenance of these errors is Bellarmine's answer artificially framed. And as these are the shifts of Papists in the several controversies between them and us, so the Doctor is so far from any Compliance with Bellarmine or any other Papist in the world in these and the like shifts, that his answer and exposition does not only overthrow them, but he has expressly declared his opinion against them, and fully vindicated his exposition from having any thing to do with them, as is plain to be seen in the Treatise of Will worship in the Sections immediately following the Doctor's answer, and ex prosesso added to prevent this Calumny, § 50. 51, 52, 53. as also in the Doctor's vindication of it from the exceptions of Mr. Cawdrey in his Account of the Triplex Diatribe, c. 6. sect. 10. pag. 223, 224, 225, 226. And therefore it had been very equitable that our Refuter should have taken notice at least of the Doctor's praeoccupation and Apologetical defence carefully affixed to prevent this and the like Calumnies, before he had so injuriously defamed and aspersed him.  
§. 12. If our Refuter shall here reply, Does not Bellarmine say, That this Commandment enjoins us to love God sincerely, that is truly and from the heart, not seignedly and without dissimulation? Does he not also say, that we must love God with the chiefest Love, not preferring any thing above him or admitting any thing into competition with him? And does not Doctor Hammond say the same? And was it not fit that he should acquaint us with those cogent reasons that necessitated him to this compliance with Papists.  
§. 13. I answer, It is true Doctor Hammond and Bellarmine both say so; and so does Ames and Chamier, and the Fathers, and Reason, and Scripture say the same.  
§. 14. For as to the first, does not the Apostle expressly command and enjoin that Love be without dissimulation? Rom. 12. 9 does he not commend the Romans because they had obeyed from the heart the form and doctrine which was delivered unto them? Rom. 6. 17. Is not this truth and simplicity and purity and singleness of heart every where required, and counterfeit and hypocritical shows every where condemned? Eph. 6. 5, 6. Heb. 10. 22. 1 Pet. 1. 22.  
§. 15. And then as to the second, Does not our Saviour expressly say, Matth. 10. 37, 38. He that loveth Father or Mother more than me is not worthy of me? and he that taketh not his Cross and followeth after me, is not worthy of me? Does he not also say, Luke 14. 26. If any man come to me, and hate not his Father and Mother, and Wife and Children, and Brethren and Sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.  
§. 16. And therefore what says Mr. Cawdrey? Says he not 
Cawdrey Trip. Diatribe, p. 114. Ames. Bellar. enervat tom. 2. p. 154. Chamier. Panstrat. tom. 3. lib. 11. c. 14. § 6.  expressly, But we say that both these are noted, and required we grant? Does not Ames in the place quoted by our Refuter say, Hoc aliquid est sed non totum quod his verbis praecipitur? Does not the very learned Chamier say first, Imò ultro concedimus, non prohiberi alia quaedam praeter Deum amari, quia manifestum est alterum illud mandatum simile primo, & in Ecclesia nihil frequentius fraternâ dilectione. Concedimus ergo nihil amandum contra Deum, supra Deum, nihil aequè cum Deo. Omnia igitur infra Deum, & propter Deum? So again in the same Chapter, 
Ibid. §. 17.  Itaque sic concedimus significari id quod Bellarminus dicebat, diligere verè, sincerè, non fictè, non simulatè. And therefore if this be to be guilty of a compliance with Papists, the Doctor has good company, and he had been an Enemy to Truth if he had not thus complied. All then is not Popery we see, nor so censured by our Writers against Bellarmine, that is to be found in him.  
§. 17. But do not Ames and Chamier say that this is not all that is required in this precept? 
† Ex his quis non videt olim Christianis persuasissimum suisse, debere se ita Deum amare, non tantum ut ei nihil anteponatur, quod Bellarminus tanquam in Deum i●eral●ssimus concedit; sed etiam ut totus in amore Dei occupetur? Quod si est, quis non videt sequi illud etiam, ut nulla vitiosa cogitatio obrepere possit, quod Bellarminus negat, etc. Chamier. Panstrat. tom. 3. l. 6. c. 12. §. 34. Vide §. 35, etc. p. 91.  Yes, and justly they say so. And therefore though Bellarmine for the securing his cause is forced to maintain that these two only are meant and nothing else, yet Doctor Hammond adds a third, which satisfies all the defects that Chamier and Ames or any man else can justly find fault with in Bellarmine's answer. For does he not say, That Precept does also enjoin sincerity of this our Love, as opposed to partial divided Love or Service.  
§. 18. But before I come to demonstrate the fullness of this answer, I shall crave leave to demand of our Refuter wherein is this answer of the Doctor guilty of the least compliance with Papists, I mean in their Errors, which we justly condemn? For does the Doctor any any where say that lukewarmness in our Love is acceptable to God? or that he who loves God only with one degree, has so perfectly satisfied the obligation of this precept, that he may sit down contented, and if he will vouchsafe to love God more intensely, he than does a work of supererogation? And yet this is directly and in terminis to be found 
* Si non peccem quando amo Deum nisi uno gradu amoris, non teneor in rigore amplius amare: Ergo si addam alterum gradum amoris, amo Deum plusquam teneor, atque eo modo facio actum supererogationis & consilii. Bellarm. de Monach. l. 2. c. 13.  in Bellarmine, and is justly charged upon him by our Aims and 
† Vide Davenant. de Justit. habit. & act. c. 43. p. 496, 497. & ibid. c. 44. p. 503, 504.  our worthy Bishop Davenant.  
§. 19 Does the Doctor any any where say that this precept binds men no further then to an unfeigned and sincere love of God, and the observance of his Commandments without breach of friendship, and that therefore it binds us not to the shunning of venial sins? And yet this and more is to be found in Bellarmine, and it is justly charged upon him, and disproved by our learned and reverend Bishop 
* White against Fisher, pag. 525.  White, from St. Austin and Bernard, and also by Chamier and Ames, and 
† Davenant de Just. habit & act. c. 48. p. 535, 536, etc.  our most learned Bishop Davenant.  
§. 20. Does the Doctor any any where say that these words, The heart, the soul, the mind, the strength and might are here put to signify one and the same thing, and are added only for the greater expression? And yet this is charged upon Bellarmine's exposition by the learned Chamier. And yet 
Vide Davenant de Just. habit & act. cap. 42. p. 485.   
§. 21. The truth is, that learned man could not deny but there was some probability and truth in this part of Bellarmine's assertion. And therefore he says, At nè nos quidem serupulo si sumus in singulis voculis numerandis appendendisque, sed non habere maximum pondus tam sollicitam enumerationem nemo nos persuadebit— Nihil habere mysterii, quia non eisdem vocibus, non eodem ordine apud omnes legamus, nos negamus, nec ipse Bellarminus seriò dixit, qui concessit majorem expressionem, quae nobis satis est, nisi ab his enervatur. Concedimus idem— posse significari per totum cor, etiam si reliqua non exprimantur. Sed negamus propterea nihil esse mysterii— Hoc igitur nos magnum pondus esse dicimus hujus enumerationis, quae omnia complectitur quibus homo moveri potest intra se, & inde prorumpere in opus externum,— &c: Chamier. Panstrat. tom. 3. l. 11. c. 14. §. 11, 12, 13.  
§. 22. And says not also the Doctor the same in his Annotations on Matthew? Says he not expressly there, that the Law requires that we love God with all our Will and Affections and Understanding? And says not the Apostle the same, when he bids us to glorify God in our bodies and our spirits, which are Gods? 1 Cor. 6. 20. Nay, though the Chaldee Paraphrase, which renders the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Riches, does not so properly express it as the LXX. do, that translate it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yet there may be some good use made even of that interpretation also. For Solomon advises us, Prov. 3. 10. That we honour the Lord with our substance also. The truth is, that all that is within us, and all that is without us, must most readily be at God's service, and praise him we must not only with the best member we have, but with every part and faculty both of soul and body, and our lives and our liberties and wealth and honours must be all at his Devotion. But than it cannot be denied, what the learned Grotius has observed, Illorum supervacua diligentia qui 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nimium subtiliter hic distinguunt (as will be evident to any that shall consider the subtleties of the Ancients in their Commentaries on this place, as is acknowledged also by the learned Chamier) cum vocum multarum cumulatio nihil aliud quam intensius studium designet, sicut & Latini dicunt cord, animo atque viribus 
* In Graeco codice est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. sic etiam Hebraei loquuntur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Plautus Captivis, Persequarque cord & animo atque viribus; Cord 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Animo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; (nam animum pro anima posuit) atque viribus, Lucas dixit, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ex totis viribus tuis. Veritas Hebraica, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in omnibus viribus tuis. Drusii annot. in N. T. par. alter. in Matt. 22. 37. p. 48.  ut ab aliis est annotatum. Itaque eodem sensu quae hic habemus, terna modo, modo singula, modo bina reperias: Singula, ut 1 Reg. 14. 8. 1 Sam. 7. 3. 2 Reg. 10. 31. Psal. 119. 2. quibus addi potest illud in Eccl. c. 47. 10. Bina, ut Deut. 4. 29. 2. Par. 15. 12. & 2 Reg. 23. 3. Nec dissimile illud M. Antonini, l. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cujus hic est sensus, as the same Author had before observed, qui apud Thucididen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, id est, in id intentus sum. Idem autem valet sive dicas pro viribus, sive omni studio atque contentione. And as this is full and high to what Chamier aims at, so it is not at all questioned by the Doctor, but is expressly asserted by him in this very Treatise of Will-worship, sect. 16. as we have already quoted it at large.  
§. 23. But then let me ask further, does Bellarmine, or any Papist else, in these controversies assert that this Commandment obliges us to that sincerity of Love that is opposed to Partial divided Love, or Service? Indeed if he had done this, the distance between him and the Doctor had not been so great as now it is. But then he had withal clearly yielded up the whole cause to those he disputes against. And this is it that Chamier so successfully presses against Bellarmine from the ancient Fathers, as shall be made good when we come to parallel the Doctors Answer with their Exposition, and that of the most reformed Writers.  
§. 24. The truth of it is, that the Doctor is so far from any compliance with Bellarmine or any other Popish writer, or from making use in this answer of any of their shifts in the several Controversies between us and them (as the Refuter sadly lays to the Doctor's charge) that both Bellarmine and the rest of his party speak of another thing then the Doctor does. For 
* Vide Davenant de Justit. Act. & habit. ca 39 40, 41, 42, 43, 44.  they, by the love of God, understand the Habit of Charity, and the Perfection of Righteousness, whereby a man may not only fulfil the Law of God so, that he may in Justice merit at God's hands, but also he may supererogate and do more of Righteousness than any Law does require, and so merit a brighter Aureola, a larger Crown of glory by the advantage of this Perfection. But then the Doctor he speaks only of the Acts of this or that Virtue or Grace. For still it must be remembered, says he, that it is not the sinless perfection we speak of, when we say it consists in a latitude, and hath degrees, but the sincerity of this or that Virtue expressed in this or that performance, and as this, though it excludes not all mixture of s●n in the suppositum (the man in whom it is) yet may by the grace of God in Christ exclude it in this or that Act. For it is certain that I may in an Act of Mercy give as much as any Law obligoth me to give, and so not sin in giving too little.  
§. 25. And as this is very evident in itself, so it is plainly acknowledged by Chamier. For whereas 
* Bellarm. de Amiss great. & stat peccat. l. 1. cap. 12. col. 89, 90.  Bellarmine had objected that the Scriptures testify of David & Josias and others, that they loved God with all their soul, etc. and consequently, the Command enjoins only that Love, which excludes not venial sins; he grants that they did love God with all their heart at some times, though not at others. His words are these. 
* To the same purpose also Bp. Davenant de. Justit. habit & act. cap. 24. p. 328.  Vicimus ergo, nisi fortè meretur victoriam illud quiequid est de Davide & Josia, sed non potest. Illi igitur secuti sunt Deum toto corde suo, & tamen peccarunt: utrumque inquam, verum; sed distinctis temporibus. Tum enim cum peccârunt, non amârunt Deum toto cord. Itaque cum peccârunt, peccârunt mortaliter. Tum autem quis nescit Deum, cum de suis loquitur, saepe loqui tanquam de iis quibus nulla imputat peccata, ac proinde tanquem prorsus justis? Denique quid hoc ad peccata venialia? etc. Chamier tom. 3. lib. 6. cap. 12. §. 365.  
§. 26. And therefore I shall not be solicitous if our Refuter should suggest that the Doctor's answer agrees at least with the Sixth Corellary of Bellarmine: Sextum, posse Deum ex toto corde magis & minus diligi. Qui enim propter Deum abstinet se à licitis, magis diligit quam qui solum se abstinet ab illicitis; & tamen uterque diligit toto cord; since he speaks of a gradual difference in that perfection of Love that consists in the keeping of all God's Commandments, and is fitted to the Romish Doctrine of Merit, and the several states and degrees of Persection, and Evangelical counsels and works of supererogation. But the Doctor speaks of the gradual difference of perfection in regard of this or that Act of this or that Virtue or Grace. But then withal I cannot but observe unto the Reader, that I do not find that either Aims or Chamier or Vorstius, that ex professo unde take to refute the errors of Bellarmine, have directly taxed him for this Corollary, whichme thinks they should have done, if they had condemned it as faulty.  
§. 27. Indeed me thinks it cannot be denied but that two men may love God with all their hearts, and yet one may love him more than the other, as is plam from the Parable of the Talents. For if God reward every man according to his works, plain it is, that he that received the greater Reward and Crown, brought a greater improvement to his Lord, and so loved him more, and his Charity and Righteousness was greater, than he that received the less Glory, because his improvement and Righteousness was less. And yet as plain it is, that both these Servants loved their Lord with all their heart, because both were rewarded, and received that 
† James 1. 12.  Crown of life which the Lord hath promised to them that love him.  
§. 28. And this is abundantly sufficient to acquit the Doctor from the least suspicion of the two first Criminations: and plain it is, that he has not borrowed his exposition from Bellarmine, nor made use of any of their shifts, nor is in the least guilty of any Popish compliance.   

SECT. 24.  
The Refuters third and fourth Charges. The Doctor's exposition parallel to that of Bishop Andrew's, Davenant, Downham, White, Hooker, Field, Grotius, Ainsworth praised. Assembly Annotations, Ursin, Calvin, Victor Antiochenus. Imperfect work on Matthew. Theophylact, Theodoret, Zacharias, Austin, Chamier. The Objections from Calvin, Ursin, answered. Chamier's conclusion against Bellarmine examined; Concerns not the Doctor; Advantages not the Refuter. State of Innocence a state of Proficiency. Proved from Mr. Cawdrey. Saints and Angels love not God all to the same indivisible height. Saints differ in glory. The Doctor of the first and second Covenant. Perfection Legal, Evangelical. Learned Protestants agree with him against Chamier. The Falsehood of Chamiers Inference as understood by the Refuter and Mr. Cawdrey demonstrated. How to be understood. Heresy of the Perfectists. How not favoured by Chamier. Thus more agreeable to himself▪ Recapitulated in five Positions. Chamier and the Doctor agreed. The Doctor justified from Mr. Cawdrey's concessions. Mr. Cawdrey's contradictions in the Point of Perfection. In what sense Free-will-offerings and uncommanded Degrees and Acts of Piety and Charity. The Question stated. Davenant, Montague, White, Hooker, and generally the Fathers and divers Protestants agreeing with the Doctor in this Point of Perfection and Counsel, and doing more than is commanded. This proves not the Popish doctrine of Supererogation.  
§. 1. The third and fourth charges are, That these Protestants that have dealt in the Controversies betwixt us and the Papists have proved the Doctor's sense too narrow. And withal have given an other sense of the words, which they have confirmed and vindicated from the exceptions of the Papists; and for this the Authority of Chamier is avouched in the margin, though the figures of the Chapter be mistaken.  
§. 2. And now for the acquitting the Doctor from these Criminations, I suppose it necessary (and must therefore crave the Reader's patience) to compare the Doctor's exposition with that of the Prime Reformers, and those beyond suspicion of any Popish compliance, especially with that of the Greek and Latin Fathers, whose authority Chamier does so powerfully press against Bellarmine in this very Chapter. And if it appear that the Doctor speaks home to them, and is not defective in any thing that Chamier does require in that very passage our Refuter hath quoted in the Margin, I then shall hope that he himself will acquit the Doctor from this aspersion, and will be the first that shall blot it out in a public Recantation according to his promise.  
§. 3. The Doctor's answer is, That Phrase denoteth two things only. First, sincerity of this Love of God, as opposed to partial divided Love or Service. Secondly, the loving him above all other things, & not admitting any thing into competition with him, not loving any thing else in such a degree, and in neither of these respects excluding all other things from a subordinate place in our Love. To these in his Reply to Mr. Cawdry he adds for further explication, that what we do according to the precept of God's Law, we do out of Love towards God, not hypocritically, or as by constraint.  
§. 4. That all these are required by the precept there is no Question, and acknowledged it is by all Protestant Writers whatsoever, for aught I yet can understand. The Doubt is, whether only these are required. Let us therefore consider the full scope and purpose of it.  
§. 5. First then, when the Doctor adds, That we must love God not hypocritically, or as by constraint, this implles the freeness, 
Rom. 6. 17. Ephes. 6. 6. 1 John 3. 18. Rom. 12. ●. 2 Cor. 6. 6. and 8. 6.  the cheerfulness of our Love in opposition to all compulsion and constraint; Secondly, the truth and sincerity of our Love in opposition to that which is only in show and outside hypocritical appearance. This is that which the Apostle calls love and obedience in truth and from the heart.  
§. 6. Secondly, when he says we must love God above all other things, not admitting any thing into competition with him, not loving any thing else in such a degree, this denotes more than Bellarmine's amor praecipuus or chief Love, it implies the Ardency and Fervour and intensenss of our Love as that is opposite to a remissness and lukewarm affection, which yet Bellarmine approves of as a fulfilling of this Law. And therefore says the learned Chamier, Concedimus nihil amandum contra Deum, supra Deum, aeque cum Deo: omnia igitur infra Deum, & propter Deum. Sed addimus, voces eas esse in praecepto, quae non hanc tantum Dei comparationem cum reliquïs creaturis includunt, sed etiam emphasin habeant praeterea significandi amoris divini per se considerati. Chamier tom. 3. lib. 3. cap. 14. §. 6.  
§. 7. And therefore the Doctor says thirdly, That we must love God in sincerity, as that is opposed to partial divided love. And this makes up all that is or can justly be desired for the full sense and meaning of this Precept. For this sincerity which is opposed to partial divided Love implies, First, that we love God toti: for he that loves not God withal his soul, his mind and strength, that does not labour to glorify God in his body and in 
1 Cor. 6. 20:  his spirit, which are Gods, that does not all he can for the Love of God, is partial in his Love; he loves not in sincerity, as that is opposed to partial divided service, because he divides himself, and employs not all his strength and what ever belongs to him in God's service.  
Secondly, it implies that we love God totum, that we love every thing in God, and all that belongs to God, that we have a delight, as David speaks, to all God's Commandments; otherwise 
Psal. 119. 6, 10, 127, 128.  we are partial in our Love, and affect him by halves.  
Thirdly, it implies that we love God toto tempore, that we constantly and always love him; otherwise our Love is not sincere, but broken and divided. And this is that which the Apostle calls, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Love of Christ in Sincerity, Eph. 6. 24.  
§. 8. This then, Sir, being the true meaning and full purport of the Doctor's exposition, I come now to parallel it with that which the most eminent of the Reformed writers have given of it.  
§. 9 And I shall begin with the most incomparable Bishop Andrews. The second thing says he, required in every law, & so in this, 
Bishop Andrews Pattern of Catechist. Doctr. at large Introduct. 15. p. 64.  is the manner how it must be done, which by learned men is much dilated: we will reduce them all to three things. We are to do it, 1. Toti, 2. Totum, 3. Toto tempore, or semper.  
1. Toti, as Jacob said to Rachel, You know that with all my power I have served your Father, Gen. 31. 6. and no doubt but he would yield as much service to God as he did to man.  
2. Totum, with our whole souls and bodies we must endeavour to keep the whole law: not as Naaman did 2 Kings 5. 18. keep it by halves; but as Noah, who did all that the Lord commanded him about the Ark, Gen. 6. 22. & 7. 5.  
3. Toto tempore, not for a time only, but all the days of our life. Noah was toto tem-pore justus, righteous all his life, Gen. 6. 9 and Abraham was Juvenis & senex idem, the same man in his age that he was in his youth.  
So again the same Reverend Father.  
1. First it requires, that Toti we be whole observers of the Law It commands that we do it with our whole Soul and Body. For 
Bishop Andrews Pattern of Catechist. doctr. at large, Introduct. cap. 17. p. 70.  we consist but of those two parts. And the Soul hath likewise two parts, the Mind and the Heart. Now God must be perfectus mentis Scopus, the mark at which the Mind must wholly aim, the end of all our Actions, there must be plena intentio erga Deum, look wholly to God in them. And the Heart, which is the Will, must be tota inflammata wholly inflamed. As for the Body, every member of it must be used, and all the strength of it, to perform the Law, and be instruments of righteousness, toto cord, totis viribus, all our heart, and all our strength must be employed therein.  
2. For Totum all the Law. Its Gods own wish concerning the people, O that there were such a heart in them that they would 
Deut. 5. 29.  keep all my commandments always! and it were absurd to except any. For whereas God is perfectly wise, if some of his precepts were needless, then might he be taxed with folly, in not leaving out them which were superfluous. And as none of God's laws must be left unkept, so none but his, or what is grounded upon them, or not repugnant to them, and imposed by lawful authority derived from him, must be kept; for than his wisdom would be likewise impeached, if any thing be sides his Law, or without subordination to his, were to be kept, and the Law itself would be imperfect; but it is neither defective, nor hath any thing superfluous in it: and therefore God saith Deut. 12. 32. Whatsoever thing I command you, observe to do it; thou shalt not add thereto, or diminish from it. Nothing must be commanded in God's name, as immediately from him, but what he has prescribed.  
3. For the continuance, Tota in vita est observanda, It is to be kept always all the days of our life. The place before quoted showeth by the word (always) that to continue all our lives in his obedience is a part of the Law. And the same in effect he commandeth elsewhere, Deut. 11. 1. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and keep his charge, and his statutes, and his Judgements, and his commandments always. And in all places too. For though the place includeth not the time, yet the time includeth the place: and therefore the house of Rimmon, 2 Kings 5. 18. is not, nor can be excepted,  
§. 9 To this of Bishop Andrews I shall annex the explication of Reverend Bishop Davenant, that was purposely addressed against the errors of Bellarmine. 
Davenant de Justit. habit. & actual. c. 4. p. 489, 490, 491, 492.   
— Deut. 6. 5. Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto cord, etc.— Hinc nos deducimus nullum locum relinqui supererogatoriis operibus; primo, quia nemo potest implere hoc praeceptum, secundo, quia nemo potest facere opus melius aut nobilius quam illud quod hoc praecepto continetur, etc.— Bellarminus— quia videt, si omnia nostra Deo obstricta sunt virtute hujus mandati, quae toto cord, totâ animâ, totâ fortitudine efficere possumus, nihil indebitum superesse in quo supererogemus, primo— dicit, more Scripturae, multa nomina poni ad rem unam explicandam, majoris expressionis gratiâ, atque hoc unum juberi, ut Deum diligamus sincerè, non simulate. Sed reclamat contextus: non enim solum modo jubet verè & sincerè diligere Deum, sed diligere totali intentione omnium virium. Sic Aquinas opusc. 17. c. 6. & 2. 2. q. 44. art. 5. & 6. & 9 184. art 3. Gerson de Consil. Evangel. Ealsa ergo Bellarmini interpretatio, qui nihil aliud— praecipi vult quam sinceritatem dilectionis. Praecipitur enim & haec, & insuper totalitas, perfectio, sive suprema nobis possibilis intensio ejusdem dilectionis. Secundò respondet,— quia praeceptum affirmativum est, praecipit solum ut exerceamus has Potentias propter Deum, quando id necessitas gloriae ejus procurandae requirit; alio autem tempore si id fiat, opus esse Consilii & Supererogationis— Concesso— (quod) Affirmativa praecepta semper obligant, sed non ad semper, tamen— juxta verbum Dei obligamur ad glorificandum Deum nostris bonis operibus, non solummodò cum necessitas id exigit, sed cum facultas suppetit & opportunitas occurrit. Gal. 6. 10. 'tis 2. 14. etc. 3. 8. 1 Cor. 10. 31. Haec emnia ex Diametro pugnant cum maligna illa Jesuitae interpretatione, etc.— Tertiò respondet, illos— qui— docent imperari nobis supremum gradum charitatis, affirmare simul non fieri homines praevaricatores, licet hoc non perfectè impleant in hac vita. Vnde colligit non propriè imperari, sed potius indicari nobis hanc supremam Charitatis perfectionem: nam peccat quisquis non facit quod Deus illi propriè mandavit. Sed nec hoc— illi proderit. Nam verè dicere possumus Legem Dei obligare ad habendam & exercendam perfectam hanc dilectionem, & tamen fideles non esse praevaricatores, hoc est, non incurrere aliquem novum reatum, ex eo quod defectum patiantur perfectae charitatis tam in habitu quam in actu. Ratio, quia uterque defectus, quatenus involuntarius est, pertinet ad originale peccatum; ac proinde ejus reatus solvitur in Baptismo. Sicuti ergo inordinatae concupiscentiae sive actus sive habitus lege Dei prohibetur, & tamen renati non fiunt praevaricatores, i. e. reatum nullum contrabunt habendo vel sentiendo hanc concupiscentiam prohibitam, quia ejus reatus sublatus fuit in regeneratione spirituali: sic perfectae Charitatis habitus & actus lege divina imperatur, & tamen non constringuntur aliquo reatu fideles quod ab hâc perfectione deficiant, quia tales defectus non ultra imputantur regeneratis. Ad haec optimi renatorum non modo deficiunt ab hac plenaria charitate quam Lex exigit, sed etiam ab illo divinae dilectionis gradu, quem ad vitandam transgressionem Culpabilem ipsi Scholastici necessarium esse statuunt Num (authore 
* 2. 2 q. 18 41. art. 3.  Aquinate) infimus divinae dilectionis gradus est, ut nihil supra Deum; aut contra Deum, aut aequaliter cum Deo diligatur; à quo gradu perfectionis qui deficit; nullo modo implet praeceptum. At Christo uno excepto, ab hoc gradu defecerunt & deficiunt filii hominum universi. Nam peccati (à quo nemo immunis vivit) generalis causa est inordinatus amor creaturae, qui contrariatur ordinato amori Creatoris. Denique & illud addo, ipsos renatos in Deo diligendo & gloria ejus promovenda, non modo minus semper facere quam ex rigore Legis deberent, sed plerumque minus quam possent si enixè pietati operam darent. At qui minus fecit in obsequio divino quam potuit facere, is longissimè abest à supererogando ultra id quod debuit facere, Postremo argutatur,— Etiamsi nihil possimus superaddere huic praecepto— quatenus indicat— finem, tamen possumus quatenus indicat medium, atque illo modo facere opera supererogationis. Si per finem intelligat supremum illum gradum & finalem perfectionem cbaritatis, quam jubemur praestare in Deo diligendo per media, externa quaelibet opera pietatis, quibus exercemus & declaramus hanc nostram Dei dilectionem, nego illum qui deficit in fine posse supererogare in mediis. Dicet Bellarminus, Vtcunque non possum, quod attinet ad ipsam dilectionem Dei, plus facere quam illum toto cord, totâ animâ, tota fortitudine diligere, uti in ipso mandato praecipitur; tamen quod attinet ad media, per quae haec dilectio exercetur & ostenditur, possum plus facere, quam ex praecepto teneor. Nam possum ad amorem meum testificandum decies invocare Deum in dies: at nemo tenetur ex praecepto toties orare singulis diebus. Possum pauperibus dimidiam partem bonorum meorum elargiri: at nemo tenetur ex mandato tantam portionem illis decidere. Possum abstinere non modo ab illicitis, putà crapula, scortatione, & consimilibus, sed à rebus insuper licitis, putà a carnium esu, à conjugio, & id genus aliis. In hisce caeterisque quae afferri possent videor supererogare, quia plus facio quam teneor facere.  
 haec diluantur, scire oportet, externas circumstantias operum bonorum, ut pote Temporis, Loci, Quantitatis, Numeri, aliasque consimiles, propter infinitam varietatem nec potuisse nec debuisse lege aliquâ expressè definiri & limitari: Lex enim Dei, quae jubet nos invocare Deum, non jubet ut toties & ●amdiu illum singulis diebus invocemus: Lex Dei quae obligat ad diligendos proximos & pauperes sublevandos, non praecipit singulariter quibus & quam magnis beneficiis hanc dilectionem & benignitatem nostram internam testificari & exercere oporteat. Porro & illud notandum, hasce circumstantias externas, quae sub particulari praecepto non cadunt, esse tamen ex regula Charitatis & prudentiae moderandas. Hisce positis, nego in rebus aut circumstantiis illis externis, quae nulla lege particulari praecipiuntur, opera supererogationis constitui ullo modo posse. Primò, quia opus omne bonum aestimandum est tam ab interna parte quam externa. Quando igitur opus ex parte magis principali est mancum & defectuosum, non potest à parte minus principali ireputari eximiè perfectum & supererogatorium— Secundò, quia hae circumstantiae quae liberae relinquuntur, fiunt debitae interveniente dictamine Prudentiae & Charitatis Christianae— Postremò, (quod rei caput est) quicquid facio in hisce externis actibus aut circumstantiis quod non teneor ex mandato facere, est eo longè inferius & ignobilius adquod teneor ex mandato, quodque minimè ad amussim Legis adimpleo. Sicuti ergo miles non supererogat qui pugnat ignaviore animo quam oportuit, quamvis— utatur gladio longiore quam Imperator illi praescripsit: sic neque nos supererogamus apud Deum, quamvis utamur mediis sive instrumentis majoribus quam ille imperavit, dum in actibus internis diligendi Deum, diligendi proximum, mortificandi veterem Adamum, perfectionem illum quae sub mandato est non assequimur.  
§. 10. To him I shall annex the Exposition of our Reverend Downham Bishop of Derry. It is in his Treatise of the Covenant 
venant of Grace, c. 10. p. 175.  of Grace, c. 11. where describing what uprightness is, he tells us, among many other things tending to this purpose, it is expressed.— 5ly by the whole heart being not Legally but Evangelically understood, as when duties are to be performed with the whole heart and with all the soul, as Deut. 4. 29. and 26. 16. and 30. 2. 1 Sam. 12. 24. 2 Kings 23. 3. Psal. 119. 2, 10, 34, 69. Joel 2. 12. Which being legally understood, import a greater perfection than is incident to man since the Fall; but being Evangelically understood, according to the Covenant of Grace, nothing else is meant thereby but that they are to be performed with an entire and upright heart, or, as David speaketh Psal. 119. 7. with uprightness of heart, not with an heart and a heart, Jam. 1. 8. and 4. 8. Psal. 12. 2. 1 Chron. 12. 33, 38. without guile, Psal. 17. 1. and 32. 2, etc. And then in the recapitulation of his whole Doctrine, to this purpose he tells us, that to worship God 
Bishop Downeham ibid. p. 240.  in holiness before him, is to walk with God without hypocrisy, in sincerity and truth, with perfect, with pure, with our whole hearts, that is to say, with entire or upright hearts, walking in the way of Religion and godliness with a right foot, looking right before us, declining neither to the right hand nor to the left, neither treading awry by dissimulation, nor hallowing down right either as neuters in Religion betwixt Christ and Antichrist, or as worldlings between God and Mammon, nor worshipping or obeying God by halves, but approving ourselves to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, entire and sound Christians, to him that trieth and searcheth the heart and reins, setting God always before our eyes, and behaving ourselves as in his presence, doing that which is right in his sight. Once more. In this Evangelical sense the Obedience of the upright is total in three respects, totius Legis, hominis, vitae, as being the Obedience of the whole law, of the whole man, of the whole life▪ after our Justification and reconciliation with God obeying the law in respect of their desire and purpose, totam, toti, totâ vitâ, etc. This he there proves at large, which would be too tedious to transcribe. But this is sufficient to declare that learned and Judicious man's opinion. Indeed the whole Chapter is well worthy the Readers perusal, and is exactly agreeable to the Doctor's explication 
White's Reply to Jesuit Fisher's answer, Point the 8. §. 2. p. 523, 524. a. Aquin 2. 2. q. 44 art 4. ad 2. B. August. de doctrina Christ. l. 1. c. 22. Idem l. de Perfect Justit. Resp. ad Rat. 16. Bernard in Cant. Serm. 20. Gregor. super Reg. l 3 c. 1. Bernard in Cant. Serm. 50.  and opinion, as he has delivered it in his writings, especially in his Account to Mr. Cawdrey.  
§. 11. Nor does our Reverend and learned Bp. White (to whom our Refuter in this very argument thinks fit to appeal) differ any whit from them even in his answer to the Jesuit. For whereas Fisher had said that the precept, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, etc. doth not command an entire employment of all our powers on God with all our utmost forces; nor that we never love nor desire nor think of any thing besides him; nor that all our thoughts and affections be wholly, entirely, and perpetually on him, etc.  
To this he returns, We maintain not that the precept, Matth. 22. 37. Luke 10. 27. obligeth man at all times to an actual employment of all his powers, and the forces thereof on God, without conversion to other lawful Objects: But we believe with St. Austin and other of the Father's three things concerning this Precept.  
First, That it commandeth to esteem, desire, delight in, and to honour God Almighty above all things created, and to subject all our faculties, and the forces and operations of the same, to his Obedience and service.  
Secondly, That we ought not to entertain any cogitation or inordinate motion in our hearts repugnant to his Law, or commit any thing contrary to his commandment.  
Thirdly, That this Precept obligeth all People to the obedience thereof in this life, for it is the first and greatest Moral Precept, Matth. 22. 38. And Christ our Saviour came not to destroy, but to continue and ratify the Moral Law, Matth. 5. 17.  
§. 12. To the same purpose Mr. Hooker. In the powers and faculties of our souls God requireth the uttermost which our unfeigned 
Hooker Eccles. Pol l. 5. sect. 5. §. 6. p. 194.  affection toward him is able to yield: so that if we affect him not far above and before all things, our Religion hath not that inward perfection which it should have, neither do we indeed worship him as our God.  
§. 13. Of the same Judgement also is our most profound Doctor 
Field of the Church, in the Appendix to the Third Book, c. 13. p. 331.  Field. The Papists imagine certain degrees of Moral goodness: the lowest whereof who so attaineth not doth sin, as not doing that the Precept requireth; the higher, such as men are counselled unto, if they will be perfect, though not by any precept urged thereunto; they that attain to such height of virtue are said by them to do works of supererogation. But Gerson (de consiliis Evangel. & statu Perfectionis) showeth that these men err, in that they discern not between the matter of precepts and Counsels, imagining that the Precept requireth the inferior degrees of virtue, and the Counsels the more high and excellent: whereas the Precept requireth all the Actions of Virtue in the best sort they can be performed, and the Counsels are conversant in another matter, namely in showing us the means whereby most easily, if all things be answerable in the parties, men attain to the highest Virtue, etc.  
§. 14. To these of our own I shall subjoin the interpretation of the most incomparably learned and judicious H. Grotius. Media igitur & vera sententia haec est, exigi à Deo, non ne quid unquam praeter se cogitemus aut amemus, quod hujus vitae status non patitur, sed ut potissimum animi nostri studium Deo impendamus, hoc omni conatu agentes, ut non aliqua, sed omnia Dei mandata exequamur. Nam illud 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 idem est quod alibi dicitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut Paulus vertit 1 Tim. 1. 5. id est est corde integro atque sincero, sicut & Latinè dicimus, Totus in hoc sum. Posse autem homo intelligendus est, non id duntaxat quod potest viribus naturae peccandi Consuetudine prostratis, sed quod potest adjutus divino spiritu, quem Deus priscis illis temporibus paucis quibusdam selectis, non ex communi lege sed ex particulari gratia dedit, in Novo autem faed●re omnibus faederatis suis, hoc est in Filium suum cred●ntibus, liberaliter admodum pollicetur. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, inquit Paulus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Quo autem major nunc aut datur aut offertur Spiritus copia, eo Praeceptum quoque istud uberius praestandum est. H. Grot. in Annot, ad Matth. 22. Verse 37. p 375.  
§. 15. But if Grotius and the former be suspected as partial, what say you to Mr. Ainsworth, that left his own Country that he might be sure to run far enough from Rome? May we not say as David did of G●liah's sword? None like this. Thus he then. 
1 Sam. 21. 9  [Heart] Unto the Heart the Scripture attributeth Wisdom and Understanding, 1 Kings 3. 9, 11, 12. Prov. 2. 10. and b●l●●f in God, differing from Confession with the mouth, Rom. 10. 10 and it is opposed to Hypocrisy, Matth 15. 8. [●o●l] the s●at of the Will and Affections, Deut. 21. 4. & 24 15. & 1● 20, 21. [Might] in Hebrew Meod, which signifieth Might or Vehemency, all that we can. The Chaldees translateth it Riches, the Greek Power (Dunamis,) But the H. Ghost useth a more signife a● word (Is●l●us) Might or Ability, Mark 12. 32. where also another word is added for explanation (D●anoia) which is the efficacy both of the mind and will; and the Scribe useth a fifth word (Sunesis) Understanding, Mark 12. 33. By which variety of words God would teach us to love him unfeignedly with all whatsoever is in us, and is in our power; for we ought to honour him with our substance also, Prov. 3. 9 This praise is of King Josiah above all Kings, that he turned to the Lord with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his might, 2 Kings 23. 25. Moreover from this word with all thy Might, the Hebrews teach that a man is bound to bless (God) with cheerfulness of Soul for Evil (or Affliction) even as he blesseth for Good and Prosperity with gladness. Maimonid. in Beracoth cap 10 sect. 3 And hereof we have a good example in John 1. 21. Thus far Ainsworth in Annotat. on Deut. 6. 5.  
§. 16. What say you, Sir, to him? is he not a fit umpire in respect of his integrity? Nay is he not fit to decide this Controversy in respect of his Judgement and Learning? Where, where shall we find a Man that hath opened the Pentateuch in any language with more exquisite Judgement and profound learning and skill? This work of his, as it is very much for the honour of our Nation, so there be very few writers that do equal it, and scarce any that exceed it. And yet such is our Refuters ill fortune, that the Doctor's exposition and his are almost one and the same in themselves, and with that of the most excellent Grotius.  
§. 17. But yet if Ainsworth, because too much Independent in his Judgement, should be of as little value with our Refuter as the former, I shall now annex the exposition of those that without doubt are of greater authority with him.  
§. 18. And first I shall begin with the Annotations of the Assembly of Divines, Matth. 22. 37. Thou shalt love the Lord] Deut. 6. 5. Luke 10. 27. With all thy heart] with all the faculties of thy Soul. With all thy Mind] This is here added to Deut. 6. 5. and with all the strength or might] lest out here, is added Mark 12. 30. Luke 10. 27. Verse 38. The first] in order: for God must be loved before, and more than all men. So again on Mark 12. 39 Love the Lord thy God] see on Matth. 22. 37, 38. Luke 10. 27. with all thy strength] As much as possibly thou canst: the measure of love to thy Neighbour must be thyself, but the measure wherewith we must love God must be to love him without measure. So again on Luke 10. 27. Thou shalt love, etc.] See Deut. 6. 5. with all thy heart] as much as thou canst: modus diligendi Deum est sine modo diligere, Bernard. The measure of our loving God is to love him beyond measure. On Deut. 6. 4, 5. Thus— God though but one must be loved with all the heart, Soul and might of every Man, as in the next verse; and all that is too little for so great and so good a God, though it be a great deal more than we can perform. Cap. 4. 35. Zach. 14. 9 Mark 12 29. Joh. 17. 3. 1 Cor. 8. 4, 6. Ephes 4. 5. Verse 5. with all thy heart] See the precedent Annot. and the Annot. on cap. 4. 29. Gen. 31. 6.  
The Annotations they refer to for the fuller explication of their meaning are these. Deut. 4. 29. All thy heart] Not without word, or show, or Ceremony, but with a true confession of thy faults, and a sincere desire of his Favour. The other is Gen. 31. 6. with all my Power] A faithful and religious Servant will be as intentive and laborious in his Master's affairs as in his own, serving him as Jacob with all his might, and more than that he cannot do for himself; and as he could not do more, so could he not endure more for himself, then for his Master he did, see Verse 40. Which good Servants will take for a pattern of pains and patience to the bad, who are sleight and slothful in their Master's business, minding their own ease and pleasure more than their Master's profit (though bad Masters, as Laban was) it may be brought for a Rebuke.  
§. 19 To these I shall adjoin the interpretation of Vrsin, as I find it in his Catechism of Paraeus' edition and castigation, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum] Diligere Deum ex toto cord, etc. est ex agnitione infinitae bonitatis Dei reverenter de Deo sentire, & pro summo bono Deum habere, & ideo Deum sumè amare, nec non in Deo laetari & acquiescere, omniaque Dei gloriae postponere, adeo ut ne minima quidem cogitatio vel inclinatio vel appetitio ullius rei in nobis sit quae Deo displiceat, ac potius omnia etiam charissima amittere, vel durissima perpeti velimus, quam à Dei communione avelli, aut Deum ulla in re offendere; Denique omnia eo dirigere ut Deus solus celebretur.  
Ex toto Corde tuo) Cor Hebraeis significat affectus, appetitus & inclinationes. Deus ergo cor nostrum requirens, vult se solum agnosci & haberi pro summo nostro bono, se solum supra omnia amari, in se solo cor nostrum acquiescere, nec partem ejus sibi, partem alteri tribui; ita ut nihil sit quod ei aequale, nedum autem apponere vel in amoris partem admittere velimus. Hoc vocat Scriptura perfecto corde ambulare coram Deo: cujus oppositum est ambulare coram Deo non toto, non perfecto, sed diviso corde coram Deo, hoc est claudicare nec se totum Deo dedere.  
Object. Solus Deus est diligendus: Ergo non proximus, etc. Resp.— Fallacia accidentis à negatione modi ad negationem rei. Solus Deus est diligendus summè & supra omnia, hoc est sic ut nihil prorsus sit quod ei vel praeferamus vel aequemus, quodque ipsius causâ amittere non parati simus. Proximum verò & alia debemus non summè, non supra omnia, nec ita ut malimus Deum quam parentes offendere, sed infra Deum, & propter Deum, non supra Deum.  
Ex tota Anima tua] Anima significat partem volentem, & motus Voluntatis; quasi dicat, totâ voluntate & proposito diliges.  
Ex tota Cogitatione tua] Cogitatio significat mentem seu partem intelligentem, quasi dicat quantum de Deo cognoscis, tantum etiam eum diliges. Omnes vero cogitationes tuas intendere, ut Deum recte cognoscas, & sic etiam amabis: quantum enim cognoscimus tantum diligimus. Nunc imperfectè diligimus, quia ex parte tantum cognoscimus. In altera vita perfectè cognoscemus, ideo perfectè etiam diligemus, & id quod ex parte cessabit. Nunc cognoscimus in speculo, tunc videbimus eum à facie ad faciem, 1 Cor. 13. 10.  
Ex omnibus viribus tuis] Intelligit omnes actiones simul, internas & externas, ut cum Dei lege sint congruentes. Thus Vrsin Explicat. Catechis. part 1. de Miseria hominis, q. 4. Explicat. p. 23, 34.  
§. 20. And now for a close of this very tedious task, I shall appeal to those very places in Mr. Calvin that Chamier himself has quoted against Bellarmine in the present Controversy.  
Eam vim Calvinus ita expressit. Tunc ritè compositam fore vitam nostram, si Dei amor omnes nostros sensus occupet: solidè amandum esse Deum, & huc conferri debere quicquid facultatis inest hominibus. Deum legis praeceptis, non respicere quid possint homines, sed quid debeant Et in harmonia Mosis ad summam Legis, Jubemur Deum amare ex toto cord & anima totisque viribus. Quamlibet enitamur mutilum est ac debile nostrum studium, nisi omnes sensus nostros occupet amor Dei, & ad ipsum penitus ferantur vota nostra & cogitationes, ad eum quoque se applicent omnes nostri conatus. Institutionis lib. 3. cap. 19 §. 4. Legis praeceptum est ut diligamus Deum nostrum ex toto corde nostro, ex tota anima, ex totis viribus: id ut fiat anima prius omni alio sensu & cogitation est evacuanda, cor omnibus desideriis expurgandum, vires in hoc unum colligendae & contrahendae. Thus far the learned Chamier out of Calvin. Chamier Tom. 3. lib. 11. c. 14. §. 13.  
§. 21. Come we now to the exposition of the Ancients And here to ease myself of trouble, and the better to acquit the Doctor's exposition from any the least Popish Compliance, I shall appeal to those very places of the Fathers that the learned Chamier has quoted against Bellarmine.  
Victor Antiochenus in Marci 12 m Lex haec ejusdem verbis, circa eandem materiam repetitione prae caeteris abundat, Ex toto corde tuo, & ex tota anima tua, & ex tota ment tua, & ex tota virtute tua. Facit hoc autem, quò hominem tanto Dei amore flagrare debere commonstrat, ut nihil prorsus in ullam omnino animae facultatem irrepere sinat, quod suam erga Deum dilectionem excludat aut diminuat, aut aliò transferat.  
§. 22. To him Chamier has subjoined the Author of the imperfect work on St. Matthew annexed to St. Chrysostom in the Latin edition of his works. But I shall quote it more largely than Chamier has done.  
Quid est, says he, diligere Deum ex toto Cord? Id est ut cor tuum non habeas inclinatum ad ullius rei dilectionem amplius quam ad Dei: nec delecteris in aliqua specie mundi amplius quam in Deo; non in honoribus, non in auro vel argento, etc.— si enim aliquo horum amor cordis tui fuerit occupatus, jam ex toto corde non amas Deum. Pro quanta enim parte cor tuum fuerit ad aliquam rem amandam inclinatum, pro tanta parte minus est ad Deum— Omnis anima Christiana, quia sponsa Christi est, ita diligere debet Deum, ut nihil sit in mundo quod amplius amet quam Deum aut in tantum.  
Quid est in tota anima diligere Deum? Id est, certissimum animum habere in veritate, etc.— Quis autem diligit Deum? Qui●omne bonum credit apud Deum, & omne bonum credit esse Deum, & extra Deum non credit esse Deum: Qui omnem virtutem & sapientiam credit esse Deum, & extra Deum non credit esse aliquam sapientiam: Qui credit Deum omnia facere, & sine Deo nihil fieri posse, ille tota animâ diligit Deum.  
Quid est in tota ment diligere Deum? Id est, ut omnes sensus tui, qui pertinent ad te, Deo vacent. Cujus Intellectus Deo ministrat, & cujus Sapientia circa Deum est, cujus Cogitatio ea quae sunt Dei tractat, cujus Memoria quae sunt bona recordatur, totâ ment diligit Deum— Cujus autem Intellectus quae sunt Dei non intelligit, aut non secundum Deum sapit, aut Scientia illius est vana & secularis, aut Recordatio ejus non est bona, aut Cogitatio displicens Deo, ille non tota ment diligit Deum. Incert us Author apud Chrysost hom. 42. cap 22. Matth.  
§. 23. Then follows Theophylact, Theodoret, and others.  
Theophylactus Et si paulo alienius inquirat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, tamen bene, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. non debere Deum ex parte, sed nos ipsos totos ei imp●nd●re: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, oportet Deum amare ex tota anima, i. e. ex omnibus animae partibus & viribus ei attendere.  
Theodoretus question in Deutrono. 3a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hinc docemur dilectionem non dividere in Deum & aurum, in Deum & uxores, in Deum & liberos, verum universam dilectionis vim Creatori consecrare Deo: post Deum autem unicuique suum tribuere, liberis, fratribus, amicis. Aponius in Cantica libro secundo. Non vult alium quemquam socium amoris Deus in anima hominis; sed in tota virtute ejus, in toto cord & in totis visceribus ejus, solus obtinere desiderat principatum. Dicendo enim, Diliges Deum, Deum tuum in toto corde tuo, cogitationem sibi hominis velut palatium intitulavit. Dicendo & in tota anima, sermons sibi ejus singularem laudem sacravit. Dicendo verò in tota virtute, quis ignoret operam hominis nominâsse, quam pro sua voluntate sibi vult semper impendi? Zacharias Concordiae l. 3. cap. 127. In tribus rebus Dei exprimitur dilectio, ut nihil remaneat in homine quod non divinae dilectioni subdatur. Nam dum dicitur, diligi Deum extoto corde tuo, omnes cogitationes referendas in Deum praecipit. Dum vero dicitur ex tota anima, omnes affectiones animae referri ad Deum praecipit. Dum verò adjecit ex tota ment, omnem rationem indicat humanam quâ intelligimus & discernimus in rebus divinis esse occupandam. Ubi autem dicit, ex tota virtute, bonum Perseverantiae injungit. Augustinus lib. 1. de Doctr: Christiana cap. 2. Haec regula dilectionis divinitus constituta est. Diliges, inquit, proximum sicut teipsum; Deum verò ex toto cord, ex tota anima, & ex tota ment, ut omnes cogitationes tuas, & omnem vitam tuam, & omnem intellectum in illum conferas à quo habes ea ipsa quae confers. Cum autem toto cord, totâ animâ, totâ ment, nullam vitae nostrae partem reliquit, quae vacare Deo debeat, & quasi locum dare ut aliâ re velit frui, sed quicquid aliud diligendum venerit in animum, illuc rapiatur, quo totius dilectionis impetus currit. Et statim post, Sic proximum diligens tanquam seipsum, totam dilectionem sui & illius refert in illam Dilectionem Dei, quae nullum à se rivulum duci extra patitur, cujus derivatione minuatur.  
§. 23. Haec veterum fuit sententia, says the learned Chamier quam nos tenemus. Itaque sic concedimus significari id quod Bellarminus dicebat, diligere verè, sincerè, non fictè, non simulatè, ut tamen addamus has omnes animae vires quas exprimir tam sollicita, & ut ita dicam, tam curiosa enumeratio. Quod etiam postulat illud, Totis viribus; nam quod pro eo Bellarminus substituit, pro virili, potest ambiguum esse: cum soleat sonare quid accommodatum viribus praesentibus, non autem quae esse debeant; atque ita mensuraretur obedientia ex modulo obedientis, quod Hieronymus merito improbat in iis qui ex sua socordia arguebant praecepta esse impossibilia; nos verò multo magis in iis qui ex eadem Legis justitiam evirant peccantes in alterum externum. Amandum ergo dicimus Deum totis viribus naturae: non tantum totis viribus corruptionis. Et quia scimus hanc corruptionem obstare quo minus ametur totis viribus naturae; ideo negamus impleri posse legem. Denique omnes gradus comprehendimus amoris qui obtineri possunt vel in hac vita vel in altera, & si quid sit minus id peccato deputamus. Chamier. tom 3. l. 11. c. 14. §. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.  
§. 24. And thus we have brought in evidence sufficient, as well Ancient as Modern, to acquit, or condemn the Doctor's exposition. And now I desire no mercy from our Refuter: let him use the utmost severity of his Logic, and in his most Tyrannical Mood bring it to his Procrustian Bed, there let him torment and rack out or lop off whatsoever is defective or redundant in it.  
§. 25. If now it be here replied that Vrsin says, that to love God with all the heart, is Deum summè amare— omniaque Dei gloriae post ponere, adeo ut ne minima quidem cogitatio vel inclinatio vel appetitio ullius rei in nobis sit quae Deo displiceat, etc. I answer, that the Doctor says the same. He that wittingly and wilfully commits the least sin, that holds any the least confederacy and correspondence with the enemy of God, is not truly sincere, but is partial and divided in his love; he sets not the highest price upon his God, but admits something into a society and fellowship in his affection. True Love, and that which is sincere indeed, is a very solicitous and careful thing; it will harbour no thought, it will cherish no desire, it will be guilty of no Act that may any way distaste or offend the party that it loves. But then though to will be present with us, yet how to perform this we know not, and therefore the very best of us all have need to say, Dimitte nobis debita nostra. And though, as St. Paul said, we can do all things through Christ that strengthens us: yet if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and there is no truth in us. Nor does God now measure the height and Perfection of our Love by the exactness of our performance, but by the truth and sincerity of our endeavours. The Love may be still equal, though the Successes may not.  
§. 26. But does not Mr. Calvin say, Deum in Legis praeceptis non respicere quid possunt homines, sed quid debeant, etc. I grant it, and so does the Doctor. The holy God frames not his Laws according to the abilities of our corrupt debauched natures, but commands what is most agreeable to his own purity. He regards not quid possint homines in statu corrupto & viribus naturae peccandi consuetudine prostratis, sed quid debeant. But then though of ourselves, as of ourselves, we can do nothing, yet I can do all things, at least necessary to salvation, says St. Paul, through Christ that strengthens me. He that has promised a Crown of life to those that love him, has also promised to assist and enable us by his grace to perform what he requires in the Gospel for the attainment of this promise. And thus we love him says St. John, because he first loved us. 
1 John 4. 19   
§. 27. If it be further replied, that Calvin says, Quamlilibet enitamur, mutilum est ac debile nostrum studium, nisi omnes sensus nostros occupet amor Dei, etc.  
I grant it, and so does the Doctor, 
* Haec regula dilectionis divinitus constituta est, Diliges inquit, proximum sicut teipsum: Deum vero ex toto cord, & ex tota anima, & ex tota ment, ut omnes cogitationes tuas, & omnem vitam, & omnem intellectum in illum conferas, à quo habes ea ipsa quae confers. Cum autem ait, Toto cord, totâ animâ, totâ mentê, nullam vitae nostra partem reliquit quae vacare debeat, et quasi locum dare, ut aliâ re velit frui, sed quioquid aliud diligendum venerit in animum, illuc rapiatur quo totus dilectionis impetus currit.— quae nullum à se rivulum duciextra patitur, cujus derivatione minuatur: Augustin. de Doctrine. Christian. l. 1. c. 22. Vide Chamier Panstrat. tom. 3. l. 6. c. 12. §. 34. p. 191. Supra citat.  For he that employs not all the faculties both of Soul and Body, and all his thoughts, words and Actions, and all things that belong unto him in God's service, he loves not God above all things, but is partial and divided in his affection. And therefore says the Apostle, whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, let all things be done to the glory of God, 1 Cor. 10. 31. We must not suffer the least Rivulet to be driven backward like Jordan, or to empt itself, as that does, into a dead Sea, but it must constantly run, and pour all its streams into that boundless Ocean of goodness from whence it was derived.  
§. 28. But does not Mr. Calvin say, Id ut fiat, anima prius omni alio sensu & cogitation evacuanda? Yes he does so, and so does the Doctor. For he that cherishes any thought or desire that is opposite and contrary to this Love, or admits any thing into competition with God, and a Coordination in his affection, is not truly sincere, but is partial and divided in his Love. But then this is so far from excluding all other things from a subordinate place in our Love, that we cannot truly love God from the heart, if, according as he commands us, we do not love our Neighbours as ourselves. This present state and condition which we now enjoy in the body does require that other things besides God have a place in our affection. For as he is worse than 
1 Tim. 5. 8. Heb. 13. 1. 1 Joh. 4. 20.  an Infidel that provides not for his Family; so Brotherly Love must continue among us. For how can he love God whom he hath not seen, that loveth not his Brother whom he hath seen? But then God as he is the sovereign good, so he must have the supreme, the royal place in our hearts. For if any man loveth Father or Mother or any thing else more than me, says our Saviour, he is 
Matt. 10. 37.  not worthy of me.  
§ 29. If he shall yet further object that Chamier goes higher, for says he not, Amandum ergo dicimus Deum totis viribus naturae, non tantum totis viribus corruptionis. Et quia scimus hanc corruptionem obstare quo mimus ametur totis viribus naturae, ideo negamus impleri posse Legem. Denique omnes gradus comprehendimus amoris qui obtineri possunt vel in hac vita vel in altera, & si quid sit minus id peccato deputamus? Is not this the Perfection that St. Austin, and Bernard, and Aquinas, and Scotus, and other of the old Schoolmen say is required by this Law? And is not this denied by Bellarmine? and is it not therefore justly charged upon him by Protestants? And yet does not the Doctor's exposition in this comply with Bellarmine?  
§. 30.— To this I answer by degrees.  
First, that true it is that the learned Chamier does thus conclude against Bellarmine. But then plain it is, that these are none of that Veterum Sententia quam nos tenemus, but only Inferences and Deductions from it. And if our Refuter will allow me, what he cannot reasonably deny, that the Doctor's exposition is exactly conformable to this of the Ancients, which Chamier acknowledges that the Protestants maintain, I shall not envy him those advantages he can make by these Corollaries.  
§. 31. Secondly, though it were 
† Vide Davenant de Justit. habit. & actual. c. 46. p. 529, 550, in sol. ad 2.  granted that these Inferences were good and forceable against Bellarmine, that maintains a man may not only keep the Law to that height that he may merit at God's hands, but also supererogate, and be more holy and righteous than the Law does require; yet they no ways concern the Doctor, that speaks not of a sinless perfection, but of the sincerity of this or that virtue, in this or that Performance; which though it exclude not all mixture of sin in the suppositum, the man in whom it is, yet may by the grace of God in Christ exclude it in this or that Act. The truth of which assertion, as it is acknowledged by Chamier in the Case of David and Josiah; so is it so fare different from Bellarmine's assertion, against which these Corollaries of Chamier were directed, that it is even opposite and contrary to it.  
§. 32. Thirdly, I acknowledge that Bellarmine grants that Saint Austin and Bernard and Aquinas and other of the old Schoolmen do speak of such a Perfection required by this Law, that advances our Love to that height, that we must do nothing else but think of God, nothing else but love him, and this not only in the Habit, but in the Act. This Love he acknowledges does so wholly possess the soul, that no idle vicious Thought can obtrude or press in upon it, nothing either contrary or besides this holy love can have any the least admission into the heart, but that of necessity God is, and must be all in all. But then he adds that this Love is proper only to the Saints in Bliss, and that we whilst we are in the flesh, as we are not capable of it, so it is not, it cannot be enjoined us, but it is only proposed that we may know what we are to aim at, and hope for, and desire in heaven, and that this is the meaning of Saint Austin & Bernard and Aquinas and the Schoolmen, when they say this Perfection is not attainable in this life. But of this more in due place, and let Bellarmin stand and fall to his own Master.  
§. 33. But than Fourthly, be it granted that those Corollaries of Chamier are rightly inferred against Bellarmine's doctrine of the several states of Perfection, and works of supererogation, and the possibility of fulfilling the Law; yet neither of them will any whit advantage our Refuter in the present controversy depending between him and the Doctor. For though God should require of us by that Law that we love him totis viribus naturae, & non tantum totis viribus corruptionis; yet the 
† Vide Doctor Hammonds Account of Mr. Cawdrey's Triplex Diatribe, c. 6. sect. 8. §. 6, 7. p. 204.  Doctor has most irrefragably demonstrated against Mr. Cawdrey, that even the sinless Perfection of Adam in Innocence was a state of Proficiency, and that he and all his posterity had even in that first Integrity and Holiness wherein they were first created been in statu merendi till the time of their translation, and consequently had been obliged, as well as we are now, to grow at least in Actual Grace, and the knowledge and the Love of God.  
§. 34. And Mr. Cawdrey in effect grants it. For Christ, (being 
Heb 7. 26. Cawdrey's Triplex Diatrib. p. 116.  holy, harmless, undefiled, and still perfectly continuing in that first innocent estate, wherein Adam was created) he says, did more than the Law required, and did supererogate in many his Actions and Passions, and so in the degree of affection in Prayer, if not in the Prayer itself.  
§. 35. It is true that for a Salve he says, that Christ was above the Law.  
§. 36. But then this is nothing to the purpose. For though 
1 Tim. 6. 16.  as he was God, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords, he were the supreme Lawgiver, and the absolute Sovereign, and so in this 
Philip. 2 7. Gal. 4. 4.  sense was not under, but above the Law; yet as he took upon him the form of a servant, as he was made of a woman, so the Apostle expressly says he was made under the Law, and as he was born 
Gal. 3. 16. Gen. 17. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. Gal. 5. 2.  the Son and Seed of Abraham, so bound he was to be circumcised the eighth day; and being thus circumcised, the Apostle plainly testifies, that as every man that is circumcised, so he was a debtor to do the whole Law: and consequently in this sense he was not above it. And therefore nothing hinders but that Adam if he had persevered in his first Innocence, might notwithstanding the Obligation of that first great Law of Love (to which Christ also was subject as Man) supererogate also in some such like Actions and Passions, & so in the degree of Affection, suppose in Prayer, if not in the Prayer itself.  
§. 37. If here it be replied, that as Christ according to his Divine Nature was above the Law, so by virtue of the Hypostatical Union as Man he had the fullness of Grace, which Adam had not, whereby he was enabled to such supererogating Performances;  
§. 38. For answer, indeed I grant that he had the very 
† John 1. 16. etc. 3. 34. Coloss. 1. 19  Fullness of Grace. But then this solves not the Doubt. For the Question is not now concerning the Measure of Grace, but the Extents and Obligation of the Law, and whether that admits of any virtuous o● holy or pious performances, above what Man is in particular obliged to by it. And in this respect the first and second Adam are equal, because both as Men were equally made under the Law. But then Adam, though he were created in a mutable Condition, as Christ was not, though he had not a fullness of Grace, as Christ, had, yet if he had not fallen from his first innocence, he had such a Measure of Grace and Original Righteousness bestowed upon him, that would not only have preserved him in his integrity, but also enabled him to do whatsoever the Law required, and whatsoever other virtuous, holy, pious performances could by Man, a debtor to the Law, be done above it. And if any man shall assert the contrary, I desire either his Reason or Scripture to make it good.  
§. 39 And then secondly, as to the Perfection of the Love of the blessed Saints and Angels in Heaven, it is easily demonstrable (and the Doctor has in part done it in his Treatise of Will-worship) that though they all love God Naturally, and Necessarily, and ad ultimum virium, yet they do not all love God in the same indivisible degree of Perfection and Point of fervour and intenseness, which (to use the Doctor's 
Dr. Ham. Treat. of Will-worship, sect. 49. p. 101. edit. Londin. Vide Davenant de Justit. habit. & Act. cap. 45. p. 514, 527. Jeanes, p 27.  words to this purpose) may be observed among the Angels themselves, the Seraph in being so called because they are more Ardent in Zeal then other Angels. For if it be true that God rewards every man according to his works, and that there be different degrees of happiness in Heaven, proportionable to the Saints proficiency in Grace here on earth; it must necessarily follow, that if our Refuters' observation from the Schoolmen be any whit considerable, and that the Scotists do rightly place the very formality of happiness solely in the love of God, or if at least Suarez and others think truly, that it is essential to happiness, though the very Essence of happiness consists not wholly or chief in it; or if at least the rest of the Thomists (who hold that the Essence of happiness stands only in the beatifical vision yet) truly make this Actual most intense Love of God a natural and necessary consequence of the beatifical vision; it must, I say, necessarily follow, that the Love of the Saints must be proportionable to their happiness, and that they cannot love God more than they see and enjoy him.  
§. 40. But to wave these speculations of the Schoolmen; Plain it is from the Scriptures, and our Saviour tells us that in his Father's house are many Mansions. Plain it is from the 
John 14. 2. 1 Cor. 15. 41, 42.  Scriptures, and the Apostle has told us that as one star differeth from another star in glory, so also it shall be in the Resurrection of the dead. Plain it is from the Scriptures, and our Saviour has made it good from the Parable of the Talents, that the enlargement 

Matth. 25. 15, etc. Vide Tertul. Scorpiac. c. 6. p. 622. Augustin. Tract. 67. in Joan. p. 171. col. 1. D. & col. 2. A. Tract. 68 p. 172. col. 2. A. Gregor. M. Homil. 16. in Ezech. fol. 282. B. Dialog. l. 4. c. 35. fol. 238. C. F. Cyrill. in loc  
— A Resurrectione diversos fore honoris & gloriae gradus— Verissimum est, aliisque Scripturae testimoniis probatur, etc. Calvin in 1 Cor. 15. 41. p. 2●0. Nos, ut profitemur quod antea diximus, varios fore gradus gloriae. Chamier. tom. 3. Panstrat. l. 25. c. 4. §. 7. Vide cap. 3. §. 8, 9, 10. & ibid. l. 21. cap. 21. §. 58.  
Sed nec in ipsis Comprehensoribus est haec plenitudo summa omnium gratiarum quae est in Christo. Nam si stella à stella differat luce & magnitudine, tum multo magis differt à Sole. Habent omnes beati illam gratiae & gloriae mensuram quam capere potest maximam mens uniuscujusque sed non habet illam capacitatem vel gratiae vel gloriae mens cujusvis purae Creaturae, quam habet anima Christi. Davenant. Expos. in Colos. 1. 19 p. 100 n. 3. Vide Davenant. de Justit habit. & Act. cap. 44. p 516, 517. Quod autem visio Dei plena dicitur, non efficitur inde aequalem fore omnium Sactorum visionem & fruitionem. Name in domo Dei multae sunt mansiones; & uti inter Stellas alia alii praefulget, ita inter Sanctos diversa erit gloria, Dan 12. Quisque tamen quantum maxime pro doni sui capacitate. Lambert. Danaeus in c. 5. Enchirid. Augustin. as I find him cited and approved by Chamier, tom. 3. Panstrat. l. 25. c 3 §. 9, 10. Vide Sculteti Idea Contion. p. 1097. alios.   of our Crowns of glory shall bear some proportion with our improvement of those Graces that God has here bestowed upon us. And therefore it seems to me most undeniably to follow, that a gradual difference in the Participation of the Beatifical Vision must of necessity infer a gradual difference in the height and Fervour and intenseness of our Love. For though all the Saints and Angels in Heaven shall love God to the utmost of their might and ability (there being nothing there to interrupt it, nothing there to mingle with it) and this because they naturally and necessarily love him, and their happiness consists in this Love, and this sight, and this enjoyment of God; yet because all do not equally enjoy God, because their capacities are not the same, they cannot therefore all love him in the same height and degree. All the Stars of the firmament are full of the Sun's light: yet all are not of the same brightness and lustre, because they are not of the same Magnitude. We see there is one glory of the Sun, another of the Moon, and another glory of the Stars: For one Star differeth from another Star in glory. And yet the Sun, the Fountain of light, does equally shine on all. This gradual difference in their lustre and brightness arises from their different Capacities. If all were of an equal Bigness and Magnitude and Distance from the Sun, their sight would be the same. The Essence & the Form of Fire is as truly in the weak & lambent flames of spirit of Wine or Straw, as in red hot Iron, or molten Brass, or Nebuchadnezars' fiery furnace; and yet they do not heat and flame and scorch alike. This difference does arise from the variety of the Combustible matter now enkindled. For though Natural agents do always work uniformly, because they work necessarily and to the utmost of their power: yet the intenseness of their operations is always proportioned to the vigour and efficacy and virtue of the Causes from whence they do flow. Otherwise the light of a Candle would be equal to the brightness of the Sun, which yet we see is lost and swallowed up by the Sunbeams. And therefore Mr. Cawdrey, as we have already observed, without scruple grants to the Doctor that sincere Love is capable of Degrees, whether in the same man at several times, or two men at the same time, and so both may obey the precept; though yet with Chamier he maintains that the utmost height and Point of Perfection possible is required, and that whatsoever is short of that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and indivisible point of Perfection is so far faulty: How rationally and consequently we have already declared.  
§. 41. And therefore fifthly, though it be granted that Mr. Cawdrey and our Refuter and 
* Vide Bp. Andrew's Pattern of Catechist. Doctrine at large, Introduct. c. 17. p. 71. Davenant de Justit. Habit. & Actual. c. 44. p. 504. etc. 44. p. 484. Arg. 5. & p. 490. etc. 51. p. 556, 557, 558.  others do say with Chamier, first that God by this Law requires that we love him according to those abilities, that integrity and uprightness which he gave to Adam in innocence, and that 2ly all the degrees of love that are attainable either in this life or in the next, or, to speak in 
† Jeanes answer to the Ectenest. p. 31.  our Refuters words, a love of God with as high a Degree as is possible to the humane nature, is required by this Law, and whatsoever is short of this height is to be accounted sinful or faulty: yet as true it is that other Protestants, as Pious as Learned and as truly opposite to the Errors of Popery as any of the forenamed, are of another Judgement, and the Doctor is of their number And yet indeed the opposition here is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in word and show, and not in truth. For these speak in order to the Covenant of Grace, but those are to be understood as speaking of this obligation according to the strictness and Tenor of the first Covenant (in which sense they always dispute against the Popish Doctrine of Merit and Justification by works, and fulfilling the Law, and Perfection, and Counsels, and works of Supererogation, as is plain from † Bishop Davenant in that excellent 
Vide Davenant. de Justit. Actual. & habit. iis ipsis in locis proxime citat. & alibi passim.  Treatise of his de Justitia habit. & actual.) and consequently oppose not the Doctor in these Controversies depending between him and Mr. Cawdrey and our Refuter * The Doctor's Judgement in the case is very plain.  
§. 42. For whereas Mr. Cawdrey in his Triplex Diatribe had said, that every man is bound to be prudent to that degree of Prudence which Adam lost by sin; the Doctor makes answer, That if by sin he means not actual, but original sin, and so thinks that every man is bound to be prudent to that degree of Prudence that Adam l●st by his fall, this sure will be found a mistake. For this loss of Adam's was a punishment of Adam's sin, and when it is inflicted by God on his posterity, must be looked on as a punishment, and he that is punished cannot be obliged not to be punished No man is now obliged to be as prudent as Adam was in his integrity any more than to be as healthy, in effect to be immortal. Nay, supposing Adam to have sinned, and so to have transgressed the Law in that, it cannot be imagined that it is over and above that a new or further Act of sin in him to be less knowing, prudent or healthy than he was: all these without any new act of his will, nay contrary thereto, falling upon him by God's Decree or punitive Justice. And if it were not sin in Adam himself, then sure it cannot be such in his Posterity; and so a man now of his posterity cannot be bound to that degree of Prudence which Adam once had, any more than to be born in the state of Innocence and Perfection, when yet he is necessarily supposed to be born after the image of the lapsed imperfect Adam, which he 
Hamm. Account of Mr. Cawdrey's Triplex Diat. c. 6 sect 8. § 44 Vide Bishop Davenant. de Justit. habit. & actual. c. 30. p. 395, 396.  could not be if he were born in this Perfection.  
§. 43. And then secondly, whereas Mr. Cawdrey in the same place added, that every man is bound to be pious in the highest degree, because the law requires Perfection of holiness, and in another place, because the Law requires perfect Obedience of Christians, as the Rule of eternal righteousness; to this the Doctor makes answer thus: The Law indeed sometimes signifies the Covenant of exact unsinning Obedience. And of that Law, or that Covenant it is most true that it required perfect, as that signifies unsinning, Obedience. But then, first, This was the first Covenant, and is not now in force with faithful penitent Christians, who are not under this Law, but under Grace, i. e. under a 2d Covenant, which requires not Innocence but Repentance, sincere, but not perfect Obedience. And therefore 2ly, It cannot truly be said, that this Law requires this Perfect Obedience of Christians, nor consequently that it is the rule of Evangelical righteousness, i. e. of that righteousness by which believers are now said to be justified: for that (as he had more fully explained in the Practical Catechism) is 
Pract. Catechis. l. 1. sect. 1. p. 9 edit. Lond. 5.  positively the new Creature, or renewed, sincere, honest, faithful obedience to the whole Gospel, giving up the whole heart to Christ, the performing of that which God enables us to perform, and bewailing our infirmities and frailties and sins, both of the past and present life, and beseeching Gods pardon in Christ for all such, and sincerely labouring to mortify every sin, and perform uniform obedience to God, & from every fall rising again by repentance and reformation. In a word, the condition required of us is a Constellation or conjuncture of all those Gospel Graces, Faith, Hope, Charity, Self-denial, Repentance and the rest, every one of them truly and sincerely rooted in the Christian heart, though mixed with much weakness and imperfection, and perhaps with many sins, so they be not wilfully and impenitently lived and died in; for in that case nothing but perdition is to be expected.  
§. 44. And as this is the Doctor's opinion of the Condition of the second Covenant, and the Sincerity of Holiness required by it; so he maintains, and has fully made it good, that neither the Legal nor Evangelical Purity, not that Perfection of holiness which consisted in unsinning obedience, nor that which required sincere and upright conformity to God's laws, did include the highest degree of Piety which is possible, but had a latitude, and consisted of Degrees; both states being states of proficiency and growth, and containing in their compass and extent several 
* Vide Davenant de Justit. Habit. & Act. cap 39 p. 461, 462. cap. 42. p. 491, 492. Where he asserts the very same.  Acts and Degrees of uncommanded devotion: so that a man may do that voluntarily and spontaneously out of Love to God, which God requires not in any particular Command, sub periculo animae, but in them has left us to our Liberty to make use of those advantages which he in his Wisdom chose to afford us, that there might be somewhat for us freely to exercise his graces upon, and for him as freely to reward us. And now that there might be no mistake of his meaning, and no advantage given to quarrel by the Ambiguity of the word Perfection, he says that that word is capable of two Notions: for either it may signify the Perfect obedience of never sinning, or else any higher degree of exercise of any particular Virtue, Chastity, Mercy, Fortitude and the like; & to this only his affirmation belongs, that there are degrees in that Perfection, and that he that hath attained to any of those Degrees, sins not against Christ's precept of Perfection, though he has not arrived to the highest Degree. This the Doctor has at large proved and explained beyond all the exceptions of Mr. Cawdrey. The places are too many to be transcribed, and therefore I must refer the Reader for further satisfaction to that accurate Treatise of the Doctors, being a full Account of Mr. Cawdrey's Triplex Diatribe, particularly to the 6. chapter of that Treatise sect. 8. Indeed the whole Vindication of the Treatise of Will-worship, is chief spent upon this Argument. And I was the more willing upon this occasion to represent the Doctor's opinion in this point the more largely, that our Refuter might have occasion ex professo to undertake and to make his experiment, whether he can more successfully manage it against the Doctor then Mr. Cawdrey did or can.  
§. 45. And now to acquit the Doctor from Singularity and the aspersion of Popery in this Point, I shall crave leave of the Readers patience to instance in two, and but two, very learned Protestants (for I am quite tired with this dull work of quotation, though it cannot possibly be declined in this manner of dispute) that are of the same opinion with the Doctor, and differ with him from Chamier and our Refuter.  
§. 46. The first is that Reverend and learned Author of the Additions annexed▪ to the Pattern of Catechistical doctrine at large.  
But against this (that God gave us ability at the first to do what he commanded, but we having lost that ability vainly, God may lawfully exact of us, what he set us to do) some object, that seeing man lost this ability not efficienter, but meritoriè, God's penal Act depriving him of it, it can no more stand with God's Justice and Wisdom still to require the same obedience without new abilities, then for a Magistrate having cut of a man's feet for some offence, yet to require him to go to such a place, and then to punish him for not going: and therefore it may be said, that God never requires any thing of us, but he either gives or is ready to give ability to do it, if we be not wanting to ourselves. And therefore as God requires Obedience under the Gospel, so he enables us by his Grace, or is ready to enable, if we seek to him to do what he requires: as to avoid every known and wilful sin, and so perform the substance of every good duty; though we are still subject to sins of infirmity, which we must labour against, and though we come short of Perfection in some degree, yet we must aim at it, and not rest in a Perfection of parts. Thus every Christian may and aught to keep the Law of God, as it is qualified and moderated in the Gospel, so as to be free from all reigning sin, and to perform every Act commanded in sincerity: and as this is possible by the grace of the Gospel, so it is necessary to salvation in all after their Conversion and Repentance. As for that absolute Perfection or freedom from all sin, it is commanded too, but not as actually necessary to salvation, but only in our true and constant endeavour as that which we must aim at, and come as near to as we can, though we do not attain it in this life. And thus it may be truly said, that the Law, though it cannot be kept in that absolute and exact manner which is required in the Covenant of works, that is without the least omission or intermission, in which sense God does not now require it of us to salvation, yet as it is required in the second Covenant according to the equity and moderation of the Gospel, it may by the grace of Christ be kept, and must be kept by every true Christian, so far as God requires it of us now. And this is the Christian perfection which the Scripture often exhorts to, and the Catholic Church of Christ ever acknowledged. God having made a second Covenant, wherein there is a Law to be kept, as well as promises to be believed, requires Obedience now not by virtue of the first Covenant, which is void, but according to the second, which is still in force, whereby he is always ready by such means and various dispensations as are agreeable to his Wisdom and Justice to enable us to do what in this Covenant is required. Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine at large, Indroduct. c. 17. Addition 5. p. 71.  
§. 47. The second shall be the incomparably-learned & Judicious Grotius in his explication of his great Commandment of Love, Matth. 22. 37. But for the Readers ease I shall omit what we have already quoted from this Annotation, and desire him to have recourse to it. — Notandum est extare particulam hanc non in formula Sinaitici faederis, quod est in Exodo, sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quomodo Platonico more Philo eum librum vocat quem vulgo Deuteronomium appellamus. In eo autem libro plurima sunt quae ad normam faederis quod per Christum planè revelatum est populum vocant, & rudimenta quaedam continent Evangelicae pietatis. Rursum 
* Hortationes istiusmodi admonent quid fide exposcere, quo spem praemitt●ere, & in quae anteriora nos extendere debeamus. Augustin de Spirit & litter. cap. 36. tom. 3. Confer. Davenant de Justit. Habit. & Act. c. 24. p. 328, 329. Confer. Davenant de Justit. Habit. & Act. c. 47. p. 531, 532. etc. 42. p. 489, 490, 491.  Augustinus & eum secuti alii putant eam Perfectionem istis verbis significari, quam in hac vita nemo habuerit aut habere potuerit, quasi praescriberetur non tam quà currendum, quam quò currendum esset. Quae Sententia suum habere potest usum, ut homines infirmitatis suae admonitos intra humilitatis terminos contineat, & de siderium in iis excitet vitae alterius: sed propriam non esse hanc verborum interpretationem, patet collatis quae attulimus locis; nam David, Josias, atque alii id quod lex ista postulat fecisse memorantur: Nam Deum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in Hebraismo idem valere manifestum arbitror. Sic & implere post Deum quidam dicuntur, quod Chaldaeus Paraphrastes exponit perfectè Dei timorem sequi, ut videre est Num. 14. 24. & 32. 12. Deut. 1. 36. Praeterea vult lex amorem istum praestari pro viribus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. quantum homo potest. Posse autem hominem quantum potest nemo sanus negabit.— Posse autem homo intelligendus est, non id duntaxat quod potest viribus naturae peccandi consuetudiue prostratis, sed quod potest adjutus divino Spiritu.— Quo autem major nunc datur aut offertur spiritus copia, eo praeceptum quoque istud uberius praestandum est. H. Grot. in annot. ad Matth c. 22. vers. 37. p. 375.  
§. 48. 
† Daille l. 1. de Jejuniis, cap. 7. apud D. Hammond in his Account of the Triplex Diatribe p. 144 Scalig. Elench. Trehaeres. c. 22. in the treatise of Will worship sect. 28. Vide Bp. Downeham of the Covenant of Grace, c. 10. throughout.  Monsieur Daillé and Joseph Scaliger, both Protestants sufficient, and in Treatises particularly opposed against Bellarmine and Serrarius the Jesuit, have been quoted by the Doctor to this very purpose, and others might be added to the Number. But these are sufficient to acquit the Doctor from the suspicion of Popery in this his Doctrine; and let our Refuter know, that all Protestants are not even of the learned Chamier's opinion in this point. And now that the Doctor and those of his Judgement are in the right, I undertake to defend, and shall make it good in 
* Vide infra sect. 32. §. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, etc. 32. & sect. 26, 27, 29, 31.  due place.  
§. 49. Indeed the assertion of Chamier is so notoriously false, that it carries its own confutation in its forehead, even to the most ordinary observer; and I wonder by what misfortune and inadvertence it dropped from his Pen. What? Omnes gradns comprehendimus amoris qui obtineri possunt vel in hac vita vel in altera, & si quid sit minus, id peccato deputamus? Let our Refuter himself in his most Protestant Ruff construe it, and tell us how he can make it good. Can he ever be able to prove that it is my sin, that I see not God face to face while I am in the body, and walk by Faith, not by sight? If it be my sin that I be not a Comprehensor in Heaven while I am in the state of a Viator upon earth, that I be not present with the Lord while I am absent from him, that I enjoy not Heaven happiness and the sight of God whilst I am in the flesh (in which state no man can see him and live) than God (with all humble Reverence be it spoken) must be the Author of it. For God has planted us all in that Condition, where we can only see him by Faith and Revelation as through a glass darkly, and not face to face. Even Adam in innocence had only this advantage to see God by 
1 Cor. 13. 12.  Faith and clearer Revelation, but not at all by Sight. And now if our Love of necessity must bear proportion to our Knowledge, Impossible it is I should love God at that height whilst I am in the flesh, as I can do, and shall (by God's Grace I firmly hope) when I see him face to face, and shall know as I am known. Even the souls of Adam, and all just men now made perfect do far more intensely, more fervently love God whom they now see and enjoy in Heaven, than ever Adam did or could if he had continued still in Innocence. They love him now Naturally, Uninterruptedly, Constantly and Immutably; but Adam in Paradise Habitually, and not always Actually (for of necessity the Acts of his Love must be interrupted at least whilst he slept) and Freely, and therefore Mutably, as his fall does too sadly evidence. Nay the very Angels that fell not, but kept their first station, do now more fervently love God since their Confirmation in Grace, because they now Immutably love him, and have had since the fall of Lucifer an Experiment of his Favour to them, which the others had not.  
§. 50. With what colour of truth than can it be maintained that it must be deputed and reckoned my sin, if I love not God to as high a degree in this life as is possible to be attained in the next? For does not that height and perfection of Love depend purely upon the sight and enjoyment of God, and the participation of Heaven happiness? And is not this height and intenseness of Love an effect at least of the happiness of the Spirits of just men made perfect? And does not this wholly and absolutely depend upon God's bounty? For though the wages of sin be death, yet the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord. 
Rom. 6. 23.  And shall it be my sin that God's gifts are not at my Command, or within my power to purchase them? Or must we say with Bellarmine that it is our sin, and will be our punishment, if we do not even ex condigno merit Heaven? For so of necessity it must be said, before it can be maintained that it must be our sin and transgression of this first and great Commandment, if we love not God to that height and degree that the blessed Saints and Angels do love him in Heaven, with that precise utmost height which is possible to be attained not only in this life but also in the next. Add to this that the Saints and Angels now confirmed in grace do love God Naturally and Necessarily to that height that they love him, and they can as well cease to see God and know God, as not so to love him. This is not now their election and choice, but their happiness and Crown; their reward, nay their Nature, not their Labour and Endeavour. How then can the want of that Fervour be my sin, which is not within the compass of my Will and power to arrive at? 
* Vide Davenant de Justit. habit & Act. c. ●1. p. 470. arg. 1.  He should as well have said it is our fault, that now we be not immortal and glorified whilst we are in the flesh. And let me tell our Refuter that he also should have said, we are obliged to see God face to face whilst we are in this body, as well as to have told us, that the first and greatest Commandment enjoineth us a love of God with as high a degree as is possible 
Jeanes hic, p. 31.  unto the humane Nature. For I hope he will not say, but that is possible to the humane Nature which Enoch and Elias (not to speak of our Blessed Saviour at the right hand of God) and the Spirits of just men made perfect have now attained to.  
§. 51. Indeed this assertion of Chamier is so extremely crude and absurd in that sense which the words at first view do seem to import, that I had rather strain them to the meaning and purpose of Grotius and Doctor Hammond, than any such monstrous Paradox should be affixed to so Judicious and learned a man. Howsoever, if Mr. Cawdrey and our Refuter will needs otherwise understand him, as they seem in this assertion of theirs to have done, which I conceive was to them the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Stone of stumbling and Rock of offence, I shall leave them to defend and make it good. For though I very much reverence and value the Learning and Judgement of that excellent man; yet I have long since learned from a great Master of Morality, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Aristoteles l. 1. Ethic. c. 6. §. 1. edit. Ricobon.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ that Truth is more sacred and venerable than any the greatest Names, and that it is the honour and the duty of a Philosopher (much more than of a Divine) to retract or oppose an error, whether in himself or any other, for the preservation of this Jewel.  
§. 52. Thus therefore I should, with our Refuters leave, choose to understand the words, though I must confess with a little streining, because thus understood they are more agreeable to truth, and other Protestant Writers, and his own more sober expressions, and the whole scope of that Chapter; namely, That all the degrees of Love to the utmost height that are possibly attainable either in this life or the next, are in that commandment either proposed to our Endeavours, or our Hopes and our Aims, and it is purely through our own fault if we do not attain unto it. Not that any lower degree of love were a sin in us, but that it is through our fault if we do not grow in grace, and the love and knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.  
§. 53. I remember that Cajetan in his Commentary on that question in Aquinas, (utrum charitas augeatur in infinitum?) tells us of a sort of Heretics condemned in the Council of Vienna by Clement the fifth (and some such we have now among us at this day, or else the world is much mistaken in them) that maintained, That man in this present life may attain to that height and degree of Perfection, that might render him altogether impeccable, 
Vide Concilium Viennense in Clement in c. Ad nostrum de Haereticis: Vbi de nova secta dicitur, tenens & asserens doctrinâ suâ sacrilegâ & perversâ inferius designatos errores. Primo videlicet, quod homo in vita praesenti tantum & talem perfectionis gradum potest acquirere, quod reddetur penitus impeccabilis, & amplius in gratia proficere non valebit. Name, ut dicunt, si quis semper possit proficere, posset aliquis Christo perfectior inveniri Haec ibi, etc. Cajetan in 2. 2. q. 24. art. 7. p. 61. col. 2. E.  and unable to grow and increase to any higher degree of grace than he had already obtained. For they said if a man might always grow in grace, some man at least might be found more perfect than Christ himself. I shall not say that learned man did any ways countenance those errors: yet it cannot be denied but this assertion of his, as understood by our Refuter, will very easily and advantageously be managed to countenance that assertion; since it is easy to make good, that God requires nothing of us by, or under the Gospel as necessary to salvation, which he gives not Grace and strength to perform. And some not long since have undertaken to maintain Perfection as a duty, even upon this very score.  
§. 54. But then plain it is that those words, construed in the sense I have given of them, do no whit favour that opinion. Yet be this as it will, and let our Refuter make what use he can of them: Sufficient it will be to the Doctor's Vindication, if the same learned Chamier speaks to the Doctor's purpose in his Recapitulation and summary of all that he had formerly delivered. And it is that very place which our Refuter has in his Margin quoted against the Doctor. The words are these.  
— Nimirum huc tandem res redit, ut sciamus ita imperari nobis amorem Dei, ut nullus sit amoris gradus cui quisquam debeat acquiescere. Summum autem dico non tantum comparatè ad res alias quae sub, amorem cadunt, sed etiam, & quidem praecipuè, comparatè ad nos ipsos, ut ne ultra possimus amare: ita enim verè totum cor nostrum erit, tota anima, mens tota, vires omnes, nec erunt tamen, quamdiu aliquis motus concupiscentiae malae vigebit in nobis: quod & Augustinus dixit, & Bellarminus negare non potest a Patribus assertum. Chamier tom. 3. l. 11. cap. 14. §. 22. pag. 345. That is, The matter at length comes to this, or this is the short and sum of all, That we know and take notice that the Love of God is so enjoined and required of us by this Precept, that there can be no one degree of Love beneath the highest, with which any man may lawfully sit down and rest contented as a fulfilling of the Command. The highest, I say, not only in respect of all other things that fall under our Love, and within the compass of our affection, but also and more especially in regard of ourselves, so that we cannot possibly love more or go beyond it in our affection. For then and so only will truly the whole heart, the whole Soul, the whole mind and all our strength be placed upon this Love, which yet shall not fully be accomplished in this life, so long as any motion of sinful lusts and concupiscence reigns and flourishes or springs up in us. And this is that which Austin hath also said, and Bellarmine cannot deny to have been affirmed and maintained by the Fathers.  
§. 55. From whence plain it is.  
First, that Chamier in this place against Bellarmine speaks of an absolute sinless Perfection, and an exact conformity to the whole Law of God, not attainable in this life, which no whit concerns the Doctor, that speaks not at all of that, but only of the sincerity of this or that virtue or grace in respect of this or that Performance, which he says consists in a latitude, and has Degrees.  
Secondly, that though this sinless Perfection be not attainable in this life, yet labour we must after it as much as in us lies, there being no one degree of Charity or divine Love below this, wherein a man may acquiesce, so that he may cease to grow in grace and the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ; which was the Heresy of the Perfectists condemned in the Council of Vienna.  
Thirdly, that by the highest degree Chamier means, not that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 absolutely and simply such, as if there were, as 
* We say that there are degrees of, or rather to perfection here, upon condition that every degree, even the highest, is required by the Law of God, and what is short of the highest is so far culpable. Cawdrey Triplex Diatribe, p. 110.  Mr. Cawdrey would have it, one indivisible point of Love and height of Perfection to which all must arrive that obey the Precept; but only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which is respectively and in some sort the highest, not so much in comparison of other things beloved by us, as in regard of our own strength and vigour, so that we can not love beyond it.  
Fourthly, that then we shall truly love God with all the heart, when we shall do nothing else but love him, and perfectly obey his Laws; which will not, cannot be so long as any motion of evil concupiscence dwells in us, which will be so long as we are in the Flesh.  
Fifthly, that his Opinion in this Point is the same with St. Augustine's and the ancient Fathers; and this is all he undertakes to make good against Bellarmine.  
§. 56. And therefore if it appear (as I doubt not but it will anon) that St. Austin and Bernard, Aquinas and the old Schoolmen were of opinion, that this absolute, sinless perfection, and uninterrupted actual Love of God, was not attainable in this life, and therefore could not be obligatory to believers sub periculo animae to attain it, but was only so far commanded as that we should aspire to it, only so far proposed as the Object of our hopes and aims and endeavours, and that we should labour as much as in us lies to come up to the Perfection of Saints, (it being the prime Jewel, the brightest aureola and glory of their Crown of happiness) that we should earnestly long for our translation, and desire a better life wherein dwells righteousness, that upon consideration of it we should be humbled in our Pride & empty conceits of Perfection, and be admonished of our Frailty and infirmity, and that we should be instructed that by the works of the Law no flesh living can be justified, and that therefore we have all reason to rejoice that now we are not under the Law (which requires exact unsinning obedience) but Grace, and the second Covenant (which requires Faith and Repentance, and our utmost and most sincere and hearty Endeavours to serve God, in holiness and righteousness and conformity to all his Commandments all the days of our lives) it will evidently follow that Chamier also meant the same. And then there will be a perfect harmony and agreement between him and the Doctor, whatsoever becomes of Bellarmine.  
§. 57 And now let me desire our Refuter to review this Recapitulation and Summary of Chamier's opinion in this point, and let him tell me if it be not the very same with that of Grotius? Let him consider, and deal impartially, and say whether it be not all one in substance with that of the learned Author of the Additions to the Reverend Bishop Andrews his Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine. Let him tell me whether there be any thing in this Opinion of Chamier that is not to be found in the Doctor. For does he not expressly say that we must love God above all things, and as much as possibly we can? that we must not acquiesce in any one degree of holiness, but that we must grow in grace till we come to be perfect men in Christ Jesus, and still improve our Talents till we be called to our Audit? does he not say that though exact unsinning obedience, this absolute perfection, be not attainable in this life; yet renewed, sincere, honest, faithful obedience is required to the whole Gospel; that we give up the whole heart to Christ, and sincerely labour to mortify every lust, and perform uniform obedience to God, still bewailing our infirmities and sins, and from every fall rising again by Repentance and Reformation? Says he not in effect all along, that though Believers are not bound sub periculo animae to attain to exact unsinning obedience (that being the Condition only of the first Covenant, and not at all concerning us now to Justification, because we are not under the Law, but under Grace;) yet by the Tenor of the second Covenant we must aspire to it, and endeavour after it as much as we can, because the Tenor of the second Covenant requires our utmost endeavours to obey God in all his Commandments; to love him with the whole heart, and will, and affections, and understanding, to improve our Talents to the utmost advantage; and that the more God enables us by his Grace, the more we should labour to love him; and that having these promises we should cleanse ourselves from all filthiness both of flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of the Lord?  
§. 58. Nay says he not expressy and in terms terminant, as they speak in the Schools, That Piety is one of those virtues— which 
Hammond Treatise of Will-worship, §. 16.  have such width of Compass, that the larger they are, they are also so much more commendable: To which that of the Son of Sirach is agreeable, Ecclus 43. 30. When you glorify the Lord, exalt him as much as you can, for even he yet will far exceed; and when you exalt him, put forth all your strength, for you can never go far enough. i e. How far so ever you exceed the particular Command, you are yet within the compass of the general (this general command of Love, on which hang all the Law and the Prophets) and in respect of that, can never be thought to have done enough, though the particular Act or Degree of it be somewhat that you are not particularly obliged to?  
§. 59 And now if this come not home to that exposition of Chamier which our Refuter has quoted in the Margin; I shall never expect to find a Parallel, or that the Print and the Seal, the Face and the Shape and Reflection in the Glass should ever agree and be alike. And therefore if after a second review of this his Charge he shall not find any the least passage in that quotation rightly understood, that I shall not also parallel in Doctor Hammond and those of his Opinion, I shall in Justice expect that he should blot out this Calumny also, and say that he was mistaken in the Doctor's opinion, and acknowledge that it is the very same with Chamier's, and of all other Protestants that understand what they say, and are willing to say no more against Papists then they are able to maintain. For as for his friend Mr. Cawdrey's Addition to this exposition, it plainly appears by the Doctor's answer that he is not able to make it good; and I doubt not but our Refuter will be found as weak as he, in his defence of a known untruth, which admits of no rational Medium to make it good.  
§. 60. Nay I doubt not if it were worth while to the Doctor's vindication from this aspersion of compliance with Papists, to prove all that our Refuter with any colour or show quarrels at, even in Mr. Cawdrey himself, and in that very Treatise that was purposely writ against the Treatise of Will-worship.  
§. 61. For says he not expressly, The degree of Grace binds to a gradual improvement. To whom more is given, more is required? Triplex Diatribe p. 103. 104.  
Says he not again, Every man is bound to be merciful to his ability as our heavenly Father is merciful (which sure is the highest degree) though every man be not bound to the same degree of mercy with other men, because every man hath not either the same measure of abilities, or the same opportunities? Ibid. p. 104.  
Says he not again, Now to undertake the way of perfection in holiness cannot be dangerous to any, but is the duty of all, and every man may receive it that in Sincerity looks after it, at least to acceptation? Ibid. p. 108.  
Says he not again, Who knows not that if there be a willing mind, it is accepted according to what a man hath, not according to what a man hath not? And his reward (for aught we know) may be accordingly equal with those that have more abilities and opportunities of doing good or suffering ill for Christ. Any men, all men are always bound to aspire to the perfection of Holiness, not to the perfection of Martyrdom? Ibid. p. 109.  
Says he not again, But than thirdly, the Perfection we are commanded by Christ to aspire to is capable of Degrees, etc. we shall grant him this etc.— For we say there are degrees of, or rather to perfection here? Ibid. p. 110.  
Says he not again, If by Repentance, Faith, and Love, we sincerely endeavour after perfection, First our failings shall be pardoned, and our weak works accepted through Christ our Mediator? Ibid. p. 113.  
§ 62. If Mr. Cawdrey says this (as plain it is he says it) how then can our Refuter quarrel with the Doctor, but he must also by the same Argument fight against his dear friend? If the Doctor be Popishly affected in this Doctrine, how then can Mr. Cawdrey escape? If that first and great Commandment, and what else our Refuter in this Rhapsody, and heap of Digressions has heaped up, truly strikes at the Doctor, the point of the same sword must wound Mr. Cawdrey also through the Doctor's breast.  
§. 63. If now our Refuter shall say that it is true Mr. Cawdrey says all this, but then he adds all along, that the highest degree of Perfection is also commanded; that nothing of goodness nor any 
Cawdrey's Triplex Diat. p. 110.  the least degree is left to our Liberty and choice; that there is no voluntary oblation left to us under the Gospel; that every degree, even the highest, is required by the law of God, and what is short of 
Ibid. p. 50. Ibid. p. 111. & p. 113. Ibid p. 110. Ibid. p 113.  the highest, is so far culpable; that perfection admits of no degrees or growth, but rather degrees and growth in grace (which are oft commanded) argue there is no perfection in this life, but still perfection, though not acquirable here is under Evangelical precept, and that perfect holiness is required under the Gospel, and this in opposition to the Doctor:  
§. 64. To this I answer;  
That it is very true indeed that he says this and more in opposition to Truth as well as Doctor Hammond, nor could his cause have been maintained with any Colour but by such assertions. But then how truly, how rationally, how consequently he speaks this, I shall refer the Reader to take notice from the Doctors very learned Account of that Triplex Diatribe. Indeed it is no news for a man to speak contradictions, that undertakes to maintain Paradoxes, and to serve his Hypothesis with any say that may make for his present seeming advantage.  
§. 65. For is it not a Contradiction to say that Perfection is not attainable in this life, and yet every man may receive it that in sincerity looks after it? Is it not a Contradiction to say that perfect holiness is required under the Gospel, though it be not acquirable in this life, and yet every man may attain it that in sincerity looks after it, at least to acceptation? Is it not a contradiction to say that the perfection we are by Christ commanded to aspire to is capable of Degrees, and yet Perfection in the highest Degree is under Evangelical Precept? Is it not a contradiction to say that every man is bound to be merciful as our heavenly Father is merciful (which sure is the highest degree) and yet every man is not bound to the same degree of mercy with other men, because every man either hath not the same measure of abilities or the same opportunities? Is it not a Contradiction to say, Perfection is capable of Degrees, and that there are degrees of, or rather to Perfection, and yet that Perfection admits of no degrees and growth, but rather degrees and growth in Grace argue there is no Perfection in this life? Is it not a Contradiction to say that sincere Love is capable of Degrees, either in one man at several 
Triplex Diaribe p. 115.  times, or in two men at the same time, and so both obey the precept, and yet those degrees shall argue Love not to be perfect, and so far faulty, and in vitio, and consequently that the Law shall be obeyed and transgressed by the same person, at the same time in one and the same Act?  
§. 66. If our Refuter can now find a salve for these sores, I shall think him an admirable Chirurgeon; but then withal I must accuse him for his skill, and say he is Popishly affected, because he undertakes to make good contradictions, and maintain they may both be true, and yet be contradictory. So easy it is for men that are overcurious to spy faults in a Brother's eye, not to see the greatest beam in their own; and they that are most guilty of 
* This I can say, he speaks Contradictions; for Perfection admits of no degrees or growth, but rather degrees and growth in Grace (which are oft commanded) argue there is no perfection in this life. Cawdrey's Triplex Diatrib. p. 110.  Contradictions themselves, do first find fault with it in others; and men in opposition to a Person and a Cause they have once without reason or for interest disliked, may be drawn in that heat and zeal of contradiction to fight against truth itself for the Persons sake that maintains it. It were well if our Refuter at least could acquit himself of this sad, but too frequent misadventure.  
§. 67. If now our Refuter shall, Antaeus' like, recover breath and strength by this fall, and say, that if the Doctor acknowledge that we are bound to love God with all the heart, and to obey him sincerely in all commands, then consequently in this, and then there will be nothing that will be left to our freedom and choice:  
§. 58. To this I answer,  
First, that this Objection as equally concerns himself and his Friends as it does the Doctor For first, it is most true that there were certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the LXXII. renders it  offerings under the Law, that were a part of the worship and service of God when they were performed, which yet were not particularly enjoined by any particular precept or command of God's in the Law, but were left to every man's liberty to offer or not to offer them, but yet were accepted by God if they were hearty performed. And Mr. Cawdrey acknowledges that the Jew under the Mosaical dispensation had not only libertatem specificationis, a liberty to make choice of what he would offer, but also libertatem exercitii, a liberty to offer or not offer them, when it was (to use his own words) left free in some cases for a man to offer or not to offer beyond what was positively required by the Law. If thou wilt offer a freewill offering, a Nidabah, etc. And herein only or chief stands the formality of a  offering, as contradistinguished to those offerings which were commanded by the Law, etc. Triplex Diatr. p. 88, 91.  
And secondly, to David's Voluntary Resolution of building the Temple, the same Mr. Cawdrey replies, that this was in the time of the Law or before Christ, but the time of the Gospel gives no such allowance.  offerings were then allowed. And for this answer he quotes Chamier, tom. 3. l 20. c. 5. §. 25. p. 754. Chemnit. in Exod. and says moreover, that Divines resolve there be now no freewill offerings under the Gospel, though under the Law there were, because the worship than is far different from the worship now. Triplex Diatribe p. 95, 96. How truly this is asserted it concerns not me at present to inquire, and therefore I shall refer the Reader to the Doctors Account of this Triplex Diatribe, c. 6. sect. 1, 2, etc. Sufficient it is that both he and Chamier allow  offerings and uncommanded Acts of Worship under the Law. And therefore I infer, that this Law of loving God with all the heart notwithstanding, there are yet some Acts of Worship that were left to man's liberty to perform: if he offered them he did well, and it was accepted by God; and if he did not, he transgressed no particular command, nay sinned not against that first great Law of Love. For as plain it is, that this Law was in force even under the Mosaical dispensation, when yet as plain it is, that the  offerings were allowed. What is written in the Law (says our Saviour to the Lawyer?) how readest thou? And he answering said, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, etc. And he said unto him, thou hast answered right, Luke 10. 26, 27, 28. And in another place he resolves that this is the first and great Commandment in the Law, and that on this, and the second like unto it, hang all the Law and the Prophets, Matth. 22. 38, 39, 40.  
§. 69. And now whatsoever answer our Refuter shall be able to make to reconcile and solve this allowance with that Precept, will also equally serve the Doctor's interest and assertion; it being plain that when this Law was in force, there were uncommanded acts of Piety and Religion, which no man sinned by omitting, but were left free to the liberty and choice of him that should perform them.  
§. 70. Secondly, I answer from the Doctor, that these uncommanded degrees or acts of Devotion, though they are not enjoined or imposed upon any man by any particular Law and Precept sub periculo animae, and in this respect are left to our freedom to do or not to do them, yet they are within the compass of the general command of Love, and in respect of that, when a man has done all he can, he can never be thought to have done enough, though the particular Act or the degree of it be somewhat that he is not particularly obliged to. Treat. of. Will-worship, sect. 17.  
§. 71. Thirdly, I answer from the Doctor, that this is an affirmative Precept, of which according to the Observation of the Schools, the rule is true that obligant semper, sed non ad semper, they oblige us always, yet do not oblige us to be always exercising some one act of the virtues so commanded; and so though a man be always bound to love God to the utmost height he can, in regard of the habit, yet there may be a liberty and freedom in the exercise, not only to this or that particular Act, but also to this or that degree, not under any particular command, and yet the general Law may at the same instant be fully satisfied.  
§. 72. Fourthly, I answer, that this 
* Matt. 22. 38.  first and great Commandment, and the second like unto it, are 
† This is the first and great Commandment] It was none of the ten Commandments in particular, but contains all the Commandments of the first Table; and therefore is counted the greatest. Vers. 39 Is like unto it] Not equal to it, duty to God is above duty to man, but like it in greatness, because it containeth all the duties of the second table as the other did of the first, Vers. 40. And the Prophets] This is the contents and sum of them all. Assembly Notes on Matt. 22. 38, 39, 40.  General precepts on which hang all the Law and the Prophets, and the Gospel duties too. And therefore I cannot conceive that they should infer any other special obligation then what is commanded in the special laws, into which they are particularly branched and spread. Hence it is that our Saviour says to his Disciples, 
* John 14. 15.  if you love me keep my Commandments, And the Apostle in another place, Rom. 13. 8, 9, 10. He that loveth another hath fulfilled the Law. For this, Thou shalt not commit Adultery, thou shalt not Kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet, and if there be any other Commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thyself. Love worketh none ill to his Neighbour; therefore Love is the fulfilling of the Law. For all the Law, as the same Apostle Gal. 5. 14. is fulfilled in this one word, even in this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. These therefore being general Commandments, must be supposed, as all other generals are, to be fully contained in the several Particulars that are comprehended under them. And therefore if it appear that there be certain Acts or degrees of Piety that are not commanded by any particular Law suo periculo animae, but are left free to our liberty to perform or not perform them, they cannot be supposed to be commanded by the general, so that the man should sin that does not perform them. For that would infer a contradiction, that they should be left at liberty, and yet at the same time they should be commanded; that it should be lawful for me to do or not to do them, and yet at the same instant I should sin, and so endanger my own soul, if yet I did not perform them. And if any man at any time should be obliged to perform them sub periculo animae by virtue of this general Law, than all men, at the same instant must be obliged under the same danger to do it, because all men by virtue of this Law, are bound to love God alike, because with all their heart and mind and strength, and their neighbours as themselves; and then the Law, which is the rule of Righteousness, would be a rule and a cause of transgression, and I must of necessity sin, whatsoever I did. Add to this, that if any special obligation not contained in any particular law were over and above contained in these two generals, than something that is not in the Law and the Prophets and Evangelical precepts must be contained in it, and then the Generals would be larger than all the Particulars collectively taken; and then our Saviour had not given us a sufficient Account of the latitude and extent of these precepts, when he said they were the great commandments on which hang all the Law and the Prophets.  
§. 73. And therefore though it may be granted, that if there are uncommanded Acts and Degrees of devotion (as it is plain there were under the Law by the  offerings, and the Doctor has abundantly proved it that there are so also under the Gospel) they all come under the general command for allowance and approbation, as proceeding out of a pious affection of Love and gratitude to God, in which regard it is impossible to go beyond the latitude of the Command; yet I cannot see how they can so come within the compass of this general Law, that they should induce a particular obligation, and make the man guilty of transgression that does not perform what he is not in particular commanded.  
§. 74. Though then when they are done they may be acceptable to God, because when they are freely performed they are fruits and arguments of our Love, that is enjoined by that Commandment; yet for all that, the Omission of them cannot make us guilty of our breach of a precept, or neglect of a duty, since whatsoever is of this nature is contained in some particular law that particularly enjoins it. And therefore  
§. 75. Fifthly, I distinguish of the love of God; It is often taken (as we have formerly demonstrated from the Scriptures) in general, for the affection of Piety, or Charity, and often more strictly and properly, for that high, that transcendent affection that is immediately fixed on God himself. The Acts of this are elicit Acts, and properly and formally Acts of Love; the other are imperate Acts, and effectively, and demonstratively 
Vide Crellii Ethic. Christia. l. 3. c. 4. p. 259, 260.  Love, because they are the fruits and effects and signs and demonstrations of our love of God. For he that truly loves God, cannot choose but desire and endeavour to do that which is pleasing and acceptable to God, and that which he commands; such as are the Acts of Piety and Charity, which himself has prescribed and enjoined in his Law: and the more intense and ardent our love is, the more we shall labour and endeavour what we can to please him, and do that which is agreeable to his will. Now then, though in respect of the formal and elicit Acts of Love, there can be no Act nor degree that is left to our Liberty and choice, but all things are here in the utmost height commanded that we can possible perform, and this by virtue of 
Vide Augustin. Enchirid. ad Laurent. c. 21. per tot. p. 85. edit. Paris.  this first great fundamental Law, as also by the obligation of gratitude, and congruence (to use our Refuters words) he being infinitely good in himself, and we also owing to him omne quod sumus & omne quod possumus, whatsoever we are and whatsoever we can do; yet in respect of the imperate Acts of Love, that are the fruits and signs of the former, there may be uncommanded Acts and Degrees, which though they are approved when performed, because they are conformable to this first great Law, and are the issues and demonstrations of that Love there enjoined, yet are they not commanded by this or any other particular law sub periculo animae, but are left by God to our liberty and choice, for  offerings of our Love, that there might be somewhat over and above his particular commands for us freely to exercise his grace upon, and so for him as freely to reward us. But than whatsoever God enjoineth us to be done sub periculo animae, and as absolutely necessary to express and testify our Love to him, he has shut up under particular Precepts and Injunctions, and if we love him we must keep his Commandments, and there is a necessity and an obligation lies upon us, which we must not neglect or violate upon the peril of our Souls.  
§. 76. And therefore though every man be bound to love God as much as he is able, and to express his love in that obedience and manner that he has prescribed in his particular laws to that purpose; yet this nothing hinders but that he may labour to express that Love in some Acts and some Degrees that God has not particularly enjoined, so long as they be within the compass of his general approbation and promise of acceptance. And therefore though it be lawful for every man to express his love as much as he can, though it be in Acts of Piety and Charity or degrees of them not particularly commanded; yet it will not therefore follow, that because I am bound to love God as much as I can by this Law, therefore I am bound to express this my Love in this or that particular degree or Act of Piety and Charity not particularly commanded. And therefore notwithstanding this Law of loving God with all the heart, there may in regard of these expressions be room for a Nidabah, a freewill offering and Performance: and though we cannot in this life attain to a sinless perfection; yet out of a love to God we may in some Acts of Piety or Mercy, and the like imperate Acts of divine Love, perform more than any Law in particular requires of us; and consequently this sincere Love in these particular Acts may be capable of Degrees, and so either the same man may love more intensely at one time then another, or two men at the same time, and yet both obey the precept, as has already been frequently demonstrated; but more signally and ex professo Sect. 13. §. 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74.  
§ 78. For a close of this Section, and for a full acquitting of the Doctor from any the least suspicion of Popish compliance in this Doctrine, as the Refuter very intemperately lays to his charge, I shall here annex the concurrent Opinion and Judgement of our excellently-learned, and every-way-accomplished and Orthodox Bishop Davenant, as he himself has delivered it in that very Judicious work of his, that was purposely addressed against Bellarmine and the Errors of the Church of Rome in these very points.  
— Sub hisce nominibus (operum Supererogationis quae ex consiliorum observatione oriuntur) monstra alunt quamplurima, Divinae legis contemptum, Pharisaicam perfectae justitiae praesumptionem, novi Christianismi institutionem. Explodunt etiam certissima fidei nostrae fundamenta; utpote justificationem gratuitam & remissionem peccatorum in solo Sanguine Redemptoris, defectum & imbecillitatem nostrarum virium in impletione Legis, obligationem cujuscunque Christiani ad plenitudinem divinae dilectionis.  
Nisi haec & alia quamplurima inessent vitia huic doctrinae Papisticae, de solo & nudo nomino Consiliorum nunquam litem illis intenderemus: Nam concedendum est cum ad unum finem per diversa media tendere liceat, relinqui nobis sub consilio liberam electionem hujus aut illius, prout maxime videbitur conducere ad finem consequendum. Verbi causâ, tenemur ad castitatem corporis mentisque conservandam, tenemur ad Deum integro cord & purâ conscientiâ colendum. Jam vero Consilii res est utrum quis castitatem custodire velit, Deoque piè inservire, in statu caelibi aut conjugali: & quoniam in personis idoneis vita caelebs affert majores opportunitates atque minora impedimenta, à consulente Apostolo praefertur conjugali, atque eo respectu Opus Consilii appellatur. Sic etiam in operibus Charitatis, multa dicuntur esse opera Consiliorum, quatenus externus actus cum talibus circumstantiis nemini imponitur virtute praeceptorum. Exempli causâ, Praeceptum est diligere proximum sicut teipsum, atque bona nostra dispensare ad Gloriam Dei & utilitatem aliorum: sed quibus operibus, & quibus singularibus circumstantiis haec dilectio exercenda sit, sub consilio relinquitur. Si unus igitur dilectionem exerceat in extruendis Collegiis, alius in Templis aedificandis, tertius in pauperibus v●sti●ndis, quartus in Captivis redimendis, nemo horum non dicatur opus Consilii fecisse, quod attinet ad materiam singularem in qua charitatem suam exerit; quia nemo expresso mandato obligatur ad hoc vel illud opus singular. Nam sicuti singularia non cadunt sub Arte, ita neque sub Lege. Par ratio in aliis circumstantiis operum mandatorum considerari potest. Tenetur unusquisque ad dandum pauperibus: sed quoties, quâ mensurâ, quibus singularibus personis, non praecipitur. Si quis igitur apud animum suum decernat, ter singulis diebus aliquid erogare pauperibus, aut talem partem bonorum suorum illis decidere, aut denique hisce singularibus personis tantam pecuniae summam quotannis elargiri, is quoad hasce singulares & determinatas circumstantias rem Consilii facit, non Praecepti. Removeantur igitur errores Papistici, atque hoc sensu Multa Consiliorum opera agnoscamus.  
Postremo, quod attinet ad Perfectionem quam illis tribuunt, qui in certis Consiliorum operibus exercentur, Concedimus esse quaedam dona quoad gradum excellentiae altiora & perfectiora aliis, esse etiam Actiones ab eisdem manantes magis perfectas quam quae ab inferioribus donis dimanant, denique eos qui haec dona excellentiora ritè exercent, Praemiis majoribus ab ipso Deo honorandos: sic donum virginalis continentiae majus & altius est dono conjugalis castitatis, & si rectè excolatur, sanctèque adhibeatur, hoc est, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, coelibes in gradu altiori collocat, atque proemium luculentius tandem illis apportat. Sed haec omnia ita intelligenda sunt, ut interim agnoscumus, qui maximis & pulcherrimis donis ornatur in hac vita, inchoatam solummodo sanctitatem esse consecutum; qui maximas & pulcherrimas actiones facit à perfectione tamen in Lege mandata longe abesse; postremo, qui proemiis maximis honoratur, non merito suorum operum, sed miseratione & munificentiâ divinâ obtinuisse. Concludam verbo, si inter se comparentur dona divinae gratiae, & sunt alia aliis perfectiora: si status & opera hominum conserantur, in his etiam gradus conspici possunt Majoris & Minoris perfectionis: sed si ad perfectam & spiritualem illam Justitiam quam Lex Dei praecipit exigamus vel sanctitatem hominum, vel ipsos homines, vel quaelibet eorum opera, nihil horum attingit culmen Legis Divinae, aut perfectionem illam obtinet quae est sub praecepto. Davenant de Justit. Habit. & Act. c. 39 p. 461, 462.  
And now that there might be no doubt of what Perfection he speaks that is under the Precept, he immediately declares himself in the beginning of the following Chapter, thus — Papistis solenne est ita Consiliorum epera depraedicare, ut prae illis Divinae Legis opera faciunt sordescere. Hinc illos omnes qui 
Alphons. count. haeres. lib 12. in verbo Praecipitur.  praecepta Dei tantummodo implent dicere oportere dicunt, Servi inutiles sumus, quod debuimus facere fecimus: sed eos qui praestant opera consiliorum (quod Monachos facere arbitrantur) servos Domino suo utiles pronunciant, hosque solos tal●nta sibi commissa multiplicásse jactitant.  itaque huic áliisque erroribus obviam eatur, (Thesis' esto)  
Nulla sunt opera Consiliorum perfectiora aut praestantiora operibus in Lege Divina mandatis: Neque Monachi collocandi aut reputandi sunt in singulari aliquo statu perfectionis, propter observationem talium Consiliorum. Postremo, nemo mortalium, ex eo quod hisce aliisve quibus●unque Consiliorum operibus incumbit, plus facit in operibus sanctitatis quam tenetur sacere, hoc est, non supererogat, ut vulgo loqui solent, Ibid. c. 40 p. 462, 463.  
Nam hoc ipsum Vocabulum (Supererogationis) duo haec includit: unum,  qui supererogare statuatur, totum Legis penfum absolvat, ne minimo quidem apice praetermisso; alterum, ut Legem transvolet & transcendat, faciendo Actiones non solum indebitas & minime imperatas (quod quivis sacere potest) sed faciendo Actiones meliores, perfectiores, Deo gratiores, quam sunt illae quae in Lege praecipiuntur. Jam verò quod ad prius, certum est neminem mortalium posse ipsam Legem implere, etc. Ibid. c. 42. p. 480, 481.  
Dicit Bellarminus, quod Praeceptum commune sit omnium. Consilium non item. Hoc discrimen aliquatenus agnoscimus: nam Legis praecepta omnes ex aequo obligant, quae autem dicuntur Consilia non obligant omnes: sed illud etiam addimus Consilia ex dono & vocatione particulari induere posse naturam Praeceptorum, atque ita, in casu (ut loquuntur) hic & nunc, particulares personas particulari quasimandato constringere. Nam rectè Thomas, Nullus Perfectionis actus sub Consilio cadit, qui in aliquo eventu non cadat sub praecepto. Ibid. c. 44. p. 500  
Opus itaque Consilii (puta coelibatus, etc.) considerari potest dupliciter; in se, nullâ habitâ ratione qualitatis personarum, atque 
2. 2. q. 124. art. 3.  sic simpliciter subijcitur arbitrio humano: atque cum respectu ad hanc vel illam particularem personam, hisce particularibus donis a Deo ornatam, hâc particulari vocatione ad talem statum excitatam; atque sic non permittitur liberae electioni voluntatis humanae, quia male agit qui donum Dei & vocationem particularem ad hoc opus particulare negligat, 1 Cor. 7. 17. Ibid. p. 501.  
Once more. Quod affirmat Basilius, Deum noluisse virginitatem esse praeceptam, Respondeo, Loquitur de communi praecepto Legis Divinae quod omnes mortales ex aequo obliget. Agnoscimus virginitatem hoc sensu non esse sub praecepto: si enim itase res haberet, peccarent omnes qui matrimonium inirent. Ibid. c. 45. p. 521.  
If any be desirous to see more to this purpose, I shall entreat him to peruse the Treatise from Chap. 39 to the 47. wherein he shall find an exact harmony betwixt the Doctor and this Orthodox Reverend Bishop.  
§. 79. Nor is the Bishop singular in this Doctrine, but herein he has the Concurrence of the most eminent of our Church, and in the Controversies with the Papists.  
§. 80. For my part (says our excellently-learned Bishop Montague in his answer to the Gagger) I know no Doctrine of our 
Montague Answ. to the Gagger of Protestants, c. 15. p. 103, 104  English Church against Evangelical Counsels. Private resolutions this way or that way are but Opinions, and may aswell be rejected as admitted. I willingly subscribe unto antiquity for the point of Counsels Evangelical. For quod ex voluntate est, laudis est amplioris, saith Philastrius. God putteth the yoke of virginity upon no man, but leaveth it to those that can and will undergo it. Therefore Nazianzen well resolved, We have laws among us that bind of necessity, others which be left unto our Free choice to keep them or not; so as if we keep them, we shall be rewarded, if we keep them not, no fear of punishment or danger to be undergone therefore. But I deny thereupon works of Supererogation to be laid up in store for employments, etc.— For although a man may do more than is exacted, in many other things he doth much less than he should do, etc.  
§. 81. With him agrees that very Reverend Doctor White, to 
Bish. White against Fisher, Point 8. §. 3 p. 527, 528, 531.  whom our Refuter in this argument appeals. Touching the distinction of Precepts and Counsels, I answer; That if, according to the Fathers, we understand  offerings or spontaneous actions exceeding that which 
Augustin. Enchirid. c. 121. Gregor. Nazian. contra Julian. Orat. 1. Chrysost. in Matth. Hom. 2 & in Rom. hom. 14. & in 1 Cor. hom. 22.  the ordinary bond of necessary duty obligeth men unto, and which are acceptable to God in respect of their end, the Doctrine of Counsels proveth not works of Supererogation according to the Romish Tenet.  
In his answer to the second Section of the Jesuit he adds; Haimo and venerable Bede affirm that some men do that by vow or voluntary choice (to wit in some particular actions) which they are not obliged unto by strict Precept; and that at the day of Judgement they themselves (not souls in Purgatory) shall reap the benefit hereof (to wit an accessary augmentation of Bliss.) But from a Partial supererogation to a Total and General it followeth not.  
And in the following section he grants that the Fathers, Fulgentius, Paulinus, St. 
Fulgent Proleg. in lib. con. Monimum. Palm, Ep ad Severum. Augustin. lib. 2. 4 Evangel. c 30. ibid. c. 19 de Adulterin. conjug l. 1. c. 14. Optat. lib. 6. con. Parmen. Hieron. l 1 advers. Jovin c. 7. Chrysost. hom. 8 the penitent: Nazianzen. Orat 3 Cypr. the habit. virgin. prope finem. Origen. in cap 15. ad Rom. Ambrose de Viduis ultra mod.  Augustine, Optatus, St. Hierom, St. Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzen, St. Cyprian, Origen and St. Ambrose mention works of Counsel, and one of them saith, it is possible to do more than is commanded. But this Father (as he adds) speaketh not thus in respect of all the Commandments of God, for than he must free just persons from all sin; but in respect of some particular Actions: to wit, whereas the Law of Charity commandeth to distribute a Portion of goods to the Poor, a man may bestow half his goods, nevertheless he which performeth this may be deficient another way. And then presently after he adds that, First, Ambrose teacheth that there is a difference between Precepts and Counsels; Secondly, that the observing of Counsels is not required of all but of some; Thirdly, They which besides Precepts observe Counsels, are more profitable servants, and shall receive a greater reward. Thus he.  
§. 82. I shall conclude with Mr. Hooker; Finally some things, although not so required of necessity, that to leave them undone 
Hooker. Eccles. Pol lib. a. n. 8. mihi pag. 78.  excludeth from Salvation, are notwithstanding of so great dignity and acceptation with God, that most ample reward in heaven is laid up for them. Hereof we have no commandment, either in nature or Scripture, which doth exact them at our hands; yet those motives there are in both which draw most effectually our minds unto them. In this kind there is not the least action, but it doth somewhat make to the accessary augmentation of our bliss. For which cause our Saviour doth plainly witness, that there should not be as much as a cup of cold water bestowed for his sake without 
Matt. 10. 42.  reward. Hereupon dependeth whatsoever difference there is between states of Saints in Glory: hither we refer whatsoever belongeth unto th' highest perfection of man by way of service toward God: hereunto that fervour and first love of Christians did bind itself, causing them to sell their possessions, and lay down the price at the blessed Apostles feet. Hereat Saint Paul undoubtedly did aim in so far abridging his own liberty, and exceeding that which 
Act. 4. 35. 1 Thessal. 2. 7, 9  the bond of necessary and enjoined duty tied him unto. Wherefore seeing that in all these several kinds of Actions there can be nothing possibly evil which God approveth, and that he approveth much more than he doth command, etc.  
§. 83. More might be added from S. Augustin. l. de sancta virginitate c. 30. p. 344. Et de verbis Apostoli Serm. 18. p. 136. & in Enchirid. c. 121. p. 85. Eusebius lib. 1. de demonstrat. Evangel. c. 8. p. 29, 30. edit. Paris. Gregor. Magn. l. 15. Moral. c. 9 p. 82. F, G. Epiphan. haeres. 48. Athanasius lib. de incarnatione verbi, Basil. l. de virginitate, and others of the Ancients; as also from Bishop Morton's Appeal l. 5. c. 4. sect. 3. n. 11. Bishop Andrews count. Apol. Bellarm. cap. 8. p. 196. Muscul. in 1. Cor. 7. Hiperius in 1 Cor. 7. 25. Selnecer. ibid. and others of the moderns.  
§. 84. But this is abundantly sufficient, if not more then enough, to acquit the Doctor's opinion in this point as well from Novelty and Singularity, as from any Popish Compliance.  
And so much for his third and fourth Charges.   

SECT. 25.  
Heads of the Reasons for the Doctor's Exposition and Assertion of Degrees in Love and Freewill-offerings. Refuters' fifth charge examined. Falsehood of it. Challenged to make Reparations. Calumny of Popishly affected, how easily and unhappily retorted.  
§. 1. WE come now to examine his fifth charge. But before I consider that, it will be expedient to give the Reader an account of the heads of those cogent reasons, which necessitated the Doctor to make use of that interpretation, which our Refuter so quarrels at, though not to any compliance with Papists, as he falsely suggests.  
§. 2. And the First is, Because an absolute sinless perfection is the Condition of the first Covenant which is not now obligatory to Believers, as the Condition of their Salvation; because they are not under the Law, but under Grace: and consequently this Law now only requires of Believers that we love him in sincerity, and with our utmost endeavour above all things, etc.  
The Second, If Love were not capable of degrees, but consisted in one indivisible point of perfection, to which all, by this Law, must arrive sub periculo animae, then there could be no growth in grace; and whatsoever Act of Love, or Piety, or Charity came short of this degree, were a sin; which is directly contrary to so many Gospel Precepts, and the Parable of the Talents, and the manner of God's proceed at the day of Judgement, when he shall reward every man according to his works.  
The Third, Because it is contrary to the whole Gospel frame 
Ephes. 4. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. 1 Pet. 2. 2. 2 Pet. 3. 18. 2 Cor. 8. 6.  and temper, which is a state of constant proficiency and growth; and therefore Believers at their first admission and incorporation into Christ are said to be begotten to a lively Hope, to be and truth, he loathes this double mindedness; it is as offensive as lukewarm water is to the stomach, that causes loathing and vomiting; and therefore God threatens to spew such an one out of his mouth. But then the young Infant Christian, the newly 
Revel. 3. 16.  regenerate is as much owned by God for a child, as he that is grown up. There be Babes in Grace, as well as perfect men in Jesus Christ; nay and Embrio's too yet in the womb of the Church. For S. Paul says of his Galathians, that he travailed again in birth with them, till Christ were form in them. God 
Galat. 4. 19  in the meanest Infant and first newborn Christian beholds all the shape and Pourtraicture, and all the lineaments of his son. Christ is perfectly form in them; and therefore God owns them for his children, though they be not yet grown up. They have a perfection of parts, and increasing and growing on they are to a perfection of degrees; they have a perfection of shape, though yet they have not a perfection of stature; and they are now in their growth to the measure of the Stature 
Ephes. 4. 12, 13, 14, 15.  of the fullness of Christ. Even the very seeds, and first degrees of Grace and holy love are the fruits of the Spirit; and our Regeneration, and Newbirth, and inchoate Sanctification are the works and effects of that blessed Spirit, and we are not able so much as to think a good thought but by his blessed 
2 Cor. 3. 5.  assistance. And therefore the very lowest degree of Grace, the least spark of holy love cannot possibly be a sin, and therefore in this sense must be a perfect fullfilling of this Law, though it be not a fullfilling it in the utmost height and perfection of love. For though M. Cawdrey says, Perfection admits of no degrees or growth, but rather degrees and growth in grace (which are oft commanded) argue there is no perfection in this life; yet because he acknowledges that the Scriptures command degrees and growth in grace, and consequently in the highest royal sovereign grace of holy Love and Charity, a lower degree of Love then the highest, must be acknowledged to be no sin, because commanded by God. Nay even the state of sinless perfection, which was the utmost that the Law or first Covenant required, though it be not now attainable in this life, consisted not in one indivisible point, but had been a state of proficiency and growth to us, if Adam and we had persevered in that first integrity wherein he was created. For this state was a state of Merit and Probation, not of Trust and Reward. And then not only Philosophy tells us, that the middle point, wherein virtue does consist, admits of a latitude and degrees; but Grammar also teaches us to compare perfectus, perfectior, perfectissimus, because Reason itself is able to discover that there is nothing absolutely, simply perfect, but God, whose Perfection is alone incapable of growth and addition and degrees, because he is simply one and absolutely infinite.  
§. 10. To the next Inference. If you say one of the middle degrees betwixt the lowest and the highest, it concerneth you to determine and specify what degree this is, below which all degrees of Love are sinful; and beyond which all degrees are voluntary oblations, and uncommanded worship; Here again I deny the Sequel. For if the Doctor should assert, that neither the lowest degree of love were a fullfilling of the law, nor the highest degree enjoined, what necessity lies upon him therefore to fix upon a precise middle degree commanded, below which all were a sin and above which all were a freewill offering? For may he not say that any one, or two or more, or all the intermediate degrees may be allowed as a fullfilling of the Law, and yet there may be room for a Nidabah, a freewill offering for all that. It may be the sixth or the seventh, at least it may be the eighth, that may be left for a free will offering, and what then will become of your conclusion.  
§. 11. And therefore to your third Inference, And therefore if you cannot do this (as I know you cannot) I shall conclude that the highest degree is commanded in our love of God, I must tell you, that here I deny the Sequel also.  
§. 12. And now to demonstrate the vanity and weakness of this kind of Argumentation, and to show that it will conclude a falsehood, as well as a truth, I shall make it appear by one instance. It is a known truth, that though non datur Temperamentum ad pondus; yet datur ad Justitiam, and our health does consist in a just mixture of our natural heat and moisture, which as it is not simply the same in all men, so it is not still the same in the very same man at all times. Against this known truth I would thus argue and prove the contrary, as strongly as our Refuter does, Thus. Either the lowest degree of heat, or some middle degree; or the highest degree is required to this Crasis, and temperature of health. If the lowest. degree, than the Natural heat and Temperature of men must be the same with Plantanimals or vegetables, nay with stones and minerals, and the dead and the living would be of the same natural heat and temper; If you say some one of the middle degrees, betwixt the lowest and the highest, it concerneth you to determine and specify what degree this is, below which all degrees of heat bring a Gangrene, a deadness, and mortification of the Parts, and beyond which all degrees of heat are a Fever, and if you cannot do this (as I know you cannot) I shall conclude that the highest degree of heat is naturally required to a healthy constitution, and then the Madman was in the right, that in a fit of his frenzy cried out that he was perfect fire, and the burning Causus will not be our tormenting kill Disease, but our Nature, and we may not only live with the Salamander in the fire, but by this argumentation, we shall be Metamorphosed into it.  
§. 13. And therefore notwithstanding our Refuters rare Argument, there may be a gradual difference of intenseness and Perfection in the Acts of that Love, that is required by this Law, as well as in the habit, which the Schools do determine may be increased in infinitum, and has no precise term to bond it, beyond which it cannot go. It is not with Grace, as it is with Nature. Though Natural Forms, and Qualities, that are capable of gradual intention, have set terms beyond which they cannot go, and below the first degree they are nothing, and at the highest degree they are something else, as Heat in the eighth degree becomes Fire: yet God may increase his Graces in us, how, and in what manner he pleases. Though Christ the sun of righteousness still moved in his Ecliptic of Perfection, yet all the other Planets, that receive their light from him, move in a Zodiac and under a line of Righteousness, that consists of a breadth and latitude of degrees, and sometimes they in their Excentricity move without it; as David in the case of Vriah and Bathsheba, but then by the power of God's Grace they return into their Compass.  
§. 14. But then I shall make no scruple to grant our Refuters' Conclusion though his Premises infer it not, if he will admit me to distinguish and declare, in what sense I take it. For still to speak in general, ambiguous, undistinguished terms, as he does, is to confound, and not instruct; not to state controversies, but involve them; not to clear truth, but to cloud and mask it.  
§. 15. Love then whether in the Habit or the Act may be the highest, either absolutely or comparatively, or to make use of Aquinas his distinction, for the greater authority, it may be said to be the highest in a threefold consideration. 1. Either ex parte diligibilis, so that the Love shall be commensurate and equal to the Object, a love as high and perfect, as that is lovely and amiable. Now this love of God, that is as high as his own goodness, is absolutely and simply the highest, because it is infinite, as God is; a Love Proper and Peculiar unto God himself, that is infinite and essential love, one entire Act, Loving, and beloved; whose love must still be equal to himself, because it is no other, but himself. The Creature cannot possibly be obliged thus to love God, because being naturally finite in its being, and all its operations, it is absolutely impossible to be attained to; because between that which is naturally, necessarily finite, and that which is infinite, there can be no proportion, and there can be but one infinite, because but one God. And therefore here the 
Digest. de Regul. Juris leg. 185.  Rule of the Law is undoubted, and nemo tenetur ad impossibilia, and God might aswell oblige us to be omnipotent, to raise the dead, and make an other world, in short, be God, as thus to love him.  
§. 16. Secondly, Either, Ex parte diligentis, so that the Love be commensurate to the power of the Lover, and he cannot transcend it, and this is comparatively the highest. And thus I grant, that the Law obliges us to love God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with all our soul, our mind, our heart, our strength, every faculty both of soul and body must be wholly and to the utmost of our strength still employed in this love.  
And if our Refuter mean no other but this by his ex toto posse suo, he shall not find an Adversary of me or the Doctor in this.  
§. 17. But then because this is yet too general, and our Refuter, I perceive, has other thoughts, and means another thing by these terms then the Doctor does, and because latet dolus in generalibus, I shall (to come out of these mists and clouds of discourse) yet be more Particular. For the Abilities of man being divers in sundry respects, it will be necessary clearly to express of what Abilities we speak, when we say man is obliged to Love God to the utmost of his Power.  
§. 18. I say then further, That man's Abilities may be considered according to his threefold state, Past, Present and Future.  
§. 19 If we consider Man according to those Abilities, he had in his first estate in Paradise, we shall find, that as he came innocent and spotless from the hands of so pure and undefiled an Artificer, so God bestowed upon him the Habit of Original Justice and righteousness, whereby he was enabled to serve God and love him to the height of sinless perfection. But then as we have already observed, even this very state of sinless Perfection was a state of growth and Proficiency, because it was a state of Merit. And Adam was left in a capacity to improve his Talents of grace, and to grow in Love, as well, as we are now. Now the Law, and Natural gratitude obliging man to love God withal his strength, must of necessity also oblige him to a sinless perfection of love and service to God in all the Commandments. And this was the Condition of the First Covenant, Fac hoc & vives, Do this, and thou shalt live, whereby man was to have been Justified.  
§. 20. But though God made man upright, yet he found out many Inventions; he fell, and forfeited those Abilities God 
Eccses. 7. 10.  gave him, not only for himself, but for all his Posterity. The Attainder did extend to the Race for the grand Treason of the Father; and impossible it is, that by the works of the Law flesh and blood can be Justified.  
§. 21. But then this sinless perfection and height of Love, as it is impossible now to be attained, so it is not obligatory to the Justification of believers, that are not under the Law, but under Grace. The Condition of the second Covenant, whereby we must all be justified, is Faith, and Repentance, and sincere holy endeavours, which supposes the Fall, and Man's frail, sinful, weak condition.  
§. 22. Now of keeping of the Law according to exact unsinning obedience, a loving God to this perfect height, a loving him according to the Abilities God gave, and Adam forfeited, and here irrecoverably lost, it is that our Divines, Bishop White against Fisher, Ames against Bellarmine, Bishop Davenant de Justitiâ Habituali & Actuali, Bishop Morton de merito, Bishop Andrews in his Sermon of Justification, Chamier against Bellarmine, Hooker against Travers, and Generally the Protestants in their discourses of Justification by works, and Merit ex condigno, supererogation, and Fullfilling of the law and the states of Perfection speak, when they say God must be thus Loved; And the Romish doctrines in many Branches enforce it. Of this it is Saint Paul speaks in his Epistles to the Romans and Galathians, when he disputes with the Jew, that expected Justification without Faith, Justification by their own works, according to the tenor of that Part of Moses Law, that exemplified the Condition of the first Covenant, and affixed the Curse to every one that continued not in every thing that was written in the book of the law to do them. And according to this Tenor, this Condition of the law the Apostle demonstratively proves against the Jew from the law, that no flesh living can be justified, because that law expressly testifies that all men have sinned and fell short of the glory of God. According to this Condition expressed in Moses law, the Jew must acknowledge, that if he expects to be Justified, his righteousness must be so exact, that he must not transgress in any least branch of any the least commandment. If he does, as his own Conscience, and the law tells him plainly, that he does, he must of necessity acknowledge that by this law, nor he, nor any man else can be Justified, much less supererogate, and do more than that law requires. And therefore of necessity he must acknowledge himself in a damnable state, if he will stand to be Justified by that law, and his own righteousness. No hope there can be for him, unless he look for another righteousness, another Covenant; a Righteousness without him, and a Covenant of Faith. This is it that the Apostle so demonstratively proves against the Jew, and clearly evidences that as no man can be Justified by that first Covenant, so Abraham the Father of the Faithful, and all that ever were Justified, were Justified by faith in the Righteousness of the Messiah, and the second Covenant made and confirmed in his blood.  
§. 23. And this is the Righteousness we preach, the righteousness 
Rom. 10. 6, 7, 8.  of Faith in Christ's blood, the Condition of which righteousness or Justification, and acquitting us at God's bar, is Repentance from dead works, and Faith in our Saviour's blood, the Mediator of the new Covenant, and a sincere endeavour to keep all the Commandments of God, that Christ has imposed upon us. And this the Apostle also as demonstratively proves in his Epistles to the Romans, Galathians, and Hebrews to have been also contained in Moses law, the Ceremonial part whereof was but the type and shadow of Gospel-Promises, and Blessings and Purity and holiness.  
§. 24. But then not this, but the former Legal Perfection of Charity is the Love that Chamier speaks of, in his dispute with Bellarmine, when he says we must love God according to the Tenor and Prescript of this Law, totis viribus Naturae, non totis viribus corruptionis. And of such a sinless Perfection of love it is also, that Master Cawdrey speaks, and Doctor Hammond denies to be obligatory to the Christians Justification, that is not, cannot be Justified by the works of the law, but is therefore by God's Mercy and Christ's Merit and Purchase under the Covenant of Grace. And of a love according to this sinless height it is that our Refuter speaks, and would make good against the Doctor. But bate him his Argument called Petitio Principii, and he has not proved it. Nay I tell him, and shall by and by make it good, that it is impossible for him to prove it by any other demonstration, than what the Philosopher in his Elench's calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
§. 25. For it is one thing to say that the Law, or Covenant of works, that required unsinning obedience as the condition of Justification and righteousness by that Law, requires us to love God to that height, and another thing to say, that the Christian is obliged so to love God to Justification. For that infers that believers are yet under the law, when they are not, but under grace; which is contrary to the Tenor of the Gospel; and yet for all that it may be true, as the Apostle demonstrates, that the Covenant of works, the Law as he calls it, did require such obedience, and therefore no man can be Justified by that covenant or Law, but by such obedience, and such a height of Love.  
§. 26. If then secondly Man be considered in regard of those Abilities he has now in the Present state of Grace, and under the Gospel's dispensation, I say that Man, according to the Gospel's obligation of this Law, and the Tenor of the new covenant is bound to love God to the utmost of those Abilities of Grace, and the assistance of God's spirit, that God gives, and shall bestow upon him. Bound he is so to love God, that he may go on more and more to love him, so to make use of the present Talon of Grace, that God according to his promise in the Gospel, may give more Grace, and more Abilities to love him. For as the Gospel commands us to grow in grace and the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ, and 
2 Pet. 3. 18. 2 Pet. 1. 5, 6, 7.  that giving all diligence, we should add to our faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance, and to temperance patience, and to patience godliness, and to godliness brotherly kindness, and to brotherly kindness charity: for if these things be in us and abound, they make us that we shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ: So God has promised in the Gospel, Mat. 13. 11. and 25. 29: Luk. 8. 18. and 19 26. that whosoever hath (and makes use and improves it, that hath it not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in possession but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the use and exercise) to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance; And our Saviour expressly tells us, 
Joh. 10. 10.  that he came that we might have life, and have it more abundantly. And thus man by the Law as understood and expounded according to the tenor and gracious moderation of the Gospel covenant, is bound to love God with all the strength he either has, or shall have, and thus as S. Bernard excellently, modus amandi Deum, est amare sine modo. We can never love enough, because our love always must be in the increase, nor has any limits to fix and bond its growth.  
§. 27. But then this love, because it is a thriving thing; of necessity must admit of a latitude, and endless degrees, because as the Schools determine, it must be increased in infinitum. And thus the Doctor acknowledges that we must love God with all our strength, etc.  
§. 28. This is that Love in the height that Grotius and 
† Concedimus Charitatem simpliciter insinitam hoc mandato non requiri, quia Creatura sinita non est capax qualitatis infinitae: sed negamus huic mandato satisfacere ullum certum gradum charitatis, qui subsistit infra metas ultimae possibilitatis humanae. Nam mandatum totas vires nostras requirit in Actu diligendi Deum nullamque earum partem sub consilio relinquit, ut ex Augustino & ipso Aquinate rectissime statuit Gerson. Davenant. de Justitiâ habit. & Act. c. 44. p. 504.  others speak of, nay that which M. Cawdrey himself acknowledges cannot be denied, though he says, not without a Contradiction, that more than this is required, and that not only growth in grace is required, which of necessity implies a latitude, and degrees, but perfection also, which he says, has no degrees. Nay this our Refuter in a lucid interval does seem to import, though he long continues not in that sober mood. But I doubt not, but upon better consideration, he may be drawn to persevere and continue in it. Otherwise Naviget Antyciras for me. I shall sooner expect to cure his Intellect by a Potion of Hellebore, than a demonstration. This is that Love, that is opposed to Lukewarmness, that is opposed to partial and divided Love, or service; that Love that is the way to perfection in heaven there only attainable, and not Perfection itself. This is the Love the Doctor speaks of and contends to be required by this commandment, the Love that the Apostle calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and not that Love that consists in a sinless perfection, that our Refuter contends is now required of the Christian. This Love admits of a latitude and has degrees; it is like the grain of mustardseed, though as considered in semine, it is very small, yet by the endeavour of Paul the Planter, and Apollo's the waterer, and the richness of the soil, now manured and fitted by Grace, and the benefit of the Climate, the Church, where it only grows, and God's blessing, that still gives the increase, it grows up and multiplies into a tree so big, that the fowls of the Air may lodge, and the blessed Spirits and Angels may be delighted in it.  
§. 29. But than thirdly, man may be considered according to his future state, and the Abilities God shall either de facto give us to love him, at the last day (when not only the Spirits, but the bodies also of just men shall be made perfect) or 
* Vid. Davenant de Justit. habit. & Act. c. 4. 7. p. 532, 533.  may now by his absolute omnipotent Power bestow upon us (for nothing hinders, but that he might again create man in innocence, and bless him with the same Abilities of Original Justice which Adam had, or else he might translate us immediately soul and body into heaven, as he did Enoch and Elias.) This, this, as it is the height of our happiness, and holy ambition, so it is the utmost height of love that we shall de facto ever arrive at.  
§. 30. But then I must add, that this Love is but like the Physicians Temperamentum ad Justitiam, not like that which they call Temperamentum aequale ad pondus. There is no one indivisible point and measure of love, to which all arrive, but 
Vid. Aquin. 2. 2, que 28. art. 3. in corp. & respons. ad 2.  proportionable still it is to our works, and the reward, and the happiness God shall bestow. All the vessels of this new Jerusalem shall be full, as full of love, as they can possibly hold, but yet the love in all will not be equally one and the same, because the vessels are not all of one equal capacity. For as one star differs from another star in glory, so shall it be also at the Resurrection of the dead, and as there be degrees of Angels, whether Thrones, or Principalities, or Powers, Angels and archangels, Cherubins, and Seraphins, whose very name imports a higher and more ardent strain of love and zeal, so shall there be also degrees among Saints in respect of Glory, and happiness, and consequently of Love. Christ the first in Glory, as the first-fruits from the dead, and afterwards they that are Christ's. I doubt not but the blessed Virgin, and the Mother of God, as she was saluted by the Angel Gabriel; 
Luk. 1. 28.  with an Hail thou that art highly favoured, the Lord is with thee, blessed art thou among women, so she is blessed among Saints; as she bore our Saviour in her womb, so she is next to him in glory. And then as for the Apostles, our Saviour has promised, that they shall sit with him on twelve Thrones. And 
Mat. 19 28, 29. Luk. 22. 30. Judas 14.  if they and ten thousand of his Saints, with whom he shall come to Judgement, shall be admitted to be Assessors with him in his Throne of Judgement, I cannot but conclude they shall have a higher state of Glory. And if our Love of God must of necessity bear a correspondence to our knowledge and sight and enjoyment of God in heaven, and that knowledge, and that happiness must be proportioned according to our works on earth, than it will necessarily follow, that according to the difference of our Love, and grace, and improvement of our Talents and stewardship here, so shall our glory and happiness and sight, and knowledge and Love of God be in heaven. A love this, though it be not equal in every man, yet it is as high as any man shall for all eternity ever enjoy. The love shall be still one in every man, as the Crown of glory shall eternally be the same. A love at the utmost height, that the lover of God, whosoever he is, shall ever eternally obtain. A love perfect, because without sin; a love constant, because without interruption, and not in habit, but in Act; a love, where God shall be all in all.  
§. 31. This is the love we all hope for and aim at, and must endeavour after; and it will be our sin, and our misery, if we do not attain to it. But than it is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Christian, as we have already noted, the mark he must aim at, the crown and the kingdom, and not the Race itself, and the way to the kingdom. This is that height, that Perfection of Love, which S. Austin and Bernard, Peter Lombard and Aquinas, and others of the old Schoolmen speak of, when they say, it is not attainable in this life, but is the Perfection of heaven, and add that the Commandment in this sense can and shall only be fulfilled there. Commanded indeed they say it is in the Law, but only to be endeavoured after in this life, and attained to in the next. And more than this we shall prove by and by they say not, and as much as this, I, and those of the Doctor's opinion, shall most willingly acknowledge. And let our Refuter see what advantage he can make of it; and if he requires more than this, let him prove it, and take all, and make me also his Proselyte.  
§. 32. Thirdly, the love may be the highest, ex parte dilectionis seu Formae aut Actus Amoris praecisè considerati. a love in the highest degree, not as in this or that subject planted, but in the utmost degree that the form or Quality itself is naturally and essentially capable of.  
§. 33. For the better understanding of which it is to be considered; that the Philosopher, the better to explain the nature of Intention and Remission of Natural Forms and Qualities (whose essence consists in a latitude) divides this latitude of Essence into eight degrees of Intention or Remission, below which they are nothing, and beyond which they become something else, substantial forms, and not Accidents. Now though this be true of all Natural forms, because naturally they have their intrinsic bounds of being and growth (it being as true of Natural Forms, as of Natural Bodies; because Nature, or rather God works all things of this kind in number, weight and measure) yet it is not so in respect of Grace, and those infused Qualities, that are the immediate issues and fruits of the Spirit. These being purely dependent upon Gods good will and pleasure, have no determinate bounds and limits as all Natural Forms have, but may be greater or lesser, more or less perfect, gradually higher or lower as God himself thinks fit. There is no one degree of Grace can possibly be so high, that it can be no higher, or cease to be Grace: nor can we love God so fervently, but that by the assistance of the Spirit, we may be enabled to love him more fervently.  
§. 34. Though then Philosophy acknowledges but eight degrees of latitude in the gradual intention and Remission of natural forms; yet Theology allows no such precise number for spiritual Forms and Graces. They may by God's Power be intended in infinitum, and the more they are augmented, the perfecter still they are. And consequently no man can assign any one degree of Love, that he can in respect of the Form, perfectly call the highest degree of Love, no more than he can show me any one Number so great, that cannot be made greater by an Addition of numbers, or Multiplication of itself upon its self. And therefore, as we have observed, Aquinas and the Schoolmen determine, that charitas potest augeri in infinitum 2. 2. q. 24. art. 4. And yet our Refuter that calls himself a Schoolman, tells us of a first and middle degrees of Love, and an eight which he calls the highest.  
§. 35. And yet if we should allow degrees of Love (as we must) and for argumentation sake, we should pitch upon a precise number, suppose of eight (as the Doctor does in his Account to Master Cawdrey) yet then every degree must be allowed (as the Doctor excellently observes) to be like the Astronomers degrees in their Circles, for instance of Longitude and Latitude, that are divided into Seconds and Thirds and Fourths, etc. and every one of these Fractions into sixty parts and fractions more, and so on in infinitum, if their Observations and Art so require it.  
§. 36. And therefore our Refuter might as well tell the world of the Production of the Quadrature of a Circle, or a Natural Temperature ad Pondus, or the existence of a Platonical Idea, as of the highest degree of holy Love, that is precisely the eighth, no more nor no less, to which all men are obliged. But he, because he is a Schoolman, may talk or write any thing, and the world must admire him for speaking in School-terms, which because they make a strange noise and sound in English, must needs be deep stuff, though neither the Writer, nor the Reader understand them. But Oracles and Riddles are therefore Oracles and Riddles because they are dark, and obscure, and they therefore gain the more veneration and respect, the less they are understood. Now this is that height of Perfection to a degree that the Doctor denies, for the reasons formerly assigned, and our Refuter undertakes to make good by this Argument.  
§. 37. And now that the Doctor is in the right, besides the Reasons formerly alleged, I thus further make good by our Refuters own Argument.  
§. 38. Thus than I retort it. If neither the lowest degree of love, nor the highest degree of Love be required by this precept, then certainly some one, or all of the middle degrees are commanded, or else none at all, but some degrees of love at least is required, and not the lowest nor the highest, ergo. Not the lowest, for the reason assigned by our Refuter (which for Arguments sake, and only ad hominem we will admit of) nor the highest, which our Refuter contends for, because then every degree of love, which is not thus the highest, would be a sin, because a transgression of that commandment of Love, that our Refuter says requires the highest. But then this is most notoriously false, and directly contrary to many places of Scripture that command growth in grace, that tell us that every degree of Grace is the fruit and effect of his holy Spirit, which is the only fountain of holiness, and cannot therefore be Author of any thing that is not pure and holy. Regeneration, new birth, and inchoate sanctification are the works of the Spirit, as well as growth and the Perfection of Grace and Love, and every good gift and every perfect gift (as that signifies 
James 1. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.  any fruit of the Spirit, and holiness) comes down from above, from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, nor shadow of change: with whom is neither variation, declination, nor Parallax; but one infinite point, and Act of holiness, one Perfect sun of Righteousness, with healing in his wings, that like the sun itself, the fountain of natural light (according to the Hypothesis of Galileus, Copernicus, Philolaus) stands still in one  Centre of the world, and gives light and heat and Influence and motion to all things in the world. A sun of Righteousness, not like Joshuahs' sun, that stands still for a day or two. A sun of Righteousness, not like that in the dial of Ahaz that goes back; but a sun always fixed in one constant and  Zenith and height of Perfection, and always and in every respect the same, because infinite. And therefore I must unavoidably conclude, that since God's Spirit is like the wind and blows how and where 
Joh. 3. 8.  it listeth, and though we see and feel the motion of it, yet we know not whence it comes, nor whither it goes, since thus it is with every one that is born of the Spirit, since we cannot so much as think a good thought as of ourselves, but all our sufficiency 
2 Cor. 3. 5. Phil. 4. 13.  is of God, through whose assistance and strengthening we can do all things, he therefore will own every fruit and degree of Grace, that flows only from his own holy Spirit and gracious assistance, and will not break the bruised Reed, nor 
Mat. 12. 20.  quench the smoking flax, but in due time blow it up into a bright and glorious flame, and set the bones which he has broken. And consequently I must conclude that the highest degree is not commanded, and that an Inferior degree of Love, even of Actual love is no sin, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quod erat demonstrandum.  
§. 39 To recapitulate all for the Readers better satisfaction.  
1. First, the highest degree of Love absolutely such, or rather the one infinite height and simply perfect Act of Love commensurate with the Perfection and amiableness of God, no body says is required in this Love.  
2. The loving God according to sinless Perfection, and the abilities and original righteousness Adam had in innocence, the Apostle against the Jews, and the 
† Vid. White against Fisher point. 8. §. 1. 2. p. 510. D. p. 522. B. C. D. E. Mountague's answer to the Gagger, c. 15, 17, 19 Davenant. de Justit. Habit. Actual.  Protestants against the Romanists say, is required to Justification, and according to the Tenor of the first Covenant, which therefore they say is necessary; because the Papists speak of a Justification by works, a fullfilling of the Law, and merit ex condigno, Perfection, and works of Supererogation. This our Refuter undertakes to maintain to be now required of Christians to Justification, otherwise he has no opposite. But then the Doctor maintains, that this Law requires not that Love and that Charity, that consists in this sinless Perfection to the Justification of believers now, because they are not under the law, but under Grace. And if our Refuter be his Adversary in this, let him try his School-skill, and answer our arguments, in a School-way, and leave his begging of the question.  
3. The loving God according to the Abilities and advantages we shall have in heaven, when we shall see God face to face, is the Perfection of Saints, and those of the Church - Triumphant, not the duty of Christians and those of the Church Militant, more than sincerely to endeavour after it, and by comparing their weakness with the uprightness of the Law, and the Perfection of this Love, they may have wherewithal to humble them, and long for, and to fly to Ckrists' Righteousness, and Mediation, and God's Mercy. And though our Refuter bring after the Authorities of Austin, Bernard, Aquinas, and Scotus, to prove that to this we Christians are obliged by the Law, yet I shall demonstratively prove anon, that they say it not, but the contrary: and so our Refuter stands alone, and naked, like the Shrub on the point of a Rock, or the top of a Mast in open Sea in a storm, that has nothing to secure it.  
4. That there is no one degree in this Quality and Grace of holy love, so high, beyond which there can be no higher, or it cannot go, but it must cease to be love, and become somewhat else: and consequently we cannot be obliged to love God in any one degree precisely, much less in the eighth degree which is the highest, as our Refuter and Master Cawdrey maintain.  
5. That believers by this old, this new Commandment of Love (as 
* Mat. 22. 39 Joh. 13. 34.  our Saviour and S. John 
† 1 Joh. 2. 7, 8. 2 Joh. 4. 5.  calls it) are obliged to Love God to the utmost of their Power, and sincerely to endeavour to grow more in grace and the knowledge of our Lord, that so they may be enabled still to love him the more. The only measure of love here being to love him without measure, not fixing upon any bounds or limits of love. And this is that the Doctor and the most learned of Protestants maintain and let him see if he can disprove it, and make what advantage he can by it.  
§. 40. But now though all this is said and demonstratively proved, I must tell our Refuter, that all this is nothing to the present controversy depending between him and the Doctor: I must grant it indeed, to be very useful in itself, and very fit to be known, and better considered, then oftentimes it is. And in this respect I thank our Refuter for his digression, that has thus occasioned mine. And withal I must add, that though all were granted which now he contends for, it would no whit at all concern the Doctor's assertion: Because the Doctor expressly in very many places, especially in the defence of his Treatise of Will-worship, professes not to speak of sinless perfection, but of the sincerity of this or that virtue or Grace, in this or that performance, when he says, it consists in a latitude, and admits of uncommanded degrees. And so much for his first reason. I follow him to the next.   

SECT. 28.  
His Second Reason proves not, yet granted. God by more Obligations, than he expresses, to be Loved. Acknowledged by the Doctor. This Love infinite. Not Positively and Categorematicè, but Negatively and Syncategorematicè, Acknowledged by Bellarmine and others. Hinders not Freewill-offerings of Love. These asserted by Bishop White. Doctor not confuted, though Bellarmine may. Bellarmine and Ames at no great odds here. Concerns not the Doctor. Refuters' Artifice censured. Doctor's Comfort and Precedent in this Persecution of the tongue.  
1. HIs second Reason, whereby he undertakes to evince, that this Commandment enjoineth a most intense actual Love of God, a love of God with as high a degree as is possible to the humane Nature, now follows, and it is this.  

JEANES.  
A most intense Love of God, a love of him with the utmost of our forces and endeavours is due unto God, debito connaturalitatis, & debito gratitudinis. 1. Debito connaturalitatis, by an obligation of congruence, for it is fitting that we love him as much as we can, who is infinitely good in himself, and therefore the chief good and supreme end of man. The Protestants are brought in by Bellarmine de Monach. l. 2. c. 13. thus objecting against their Popish Evangelicall counsels of perfection, that he that is unwilling to love God as much as he can, doth hereby deny, to wit, virtually and interpretatively, that God is the chief good of man, and whereas he is so bold in his answer to affirm, that non requiritur ut quis summum bonum tam ardenter amet, quam forte posset; Ames hath hereunto a round and acute reply, tum non requiritur, ut in bonum omni ratione summum feramur affectu omni etiam ratione summo. 2. This most intense Love of God is due unto God by an obligation of gratitude, for hereby (as Doctor Francis White against Fisher out of Bernard) we are indebted and own to the Almighty, omne quod sumus, & omne quod possumus, whatsoever we are, and whatsoever we are able to do.   
§. 2. To this I answer, First, that this is not the Conclusion that he undertook to make good. For he promised to evince by these following Reasons, That this commandment enjoineth a love of God, with as high a degree as is possible unto the humane Nature, which this Proof no way reaches. For it is one thing to love God with our utmost forces and endeavours, and as much as we can, and another thing to love him with as high a degree as is possible to the humane nature. The former may be, and is obligatory to the Christian, though this latter is not.  
§. 3. Secondly, I therefore answer, That all is granted that this Argument contends for.  
§. 4. Obliged we are not only by an obligation of congruence, and gratitude, but also by many other obligations, not here named, to love God with a most intense love, with the utmost of our forces and endeavours. The Doctor grants and expressly proves it, by the Testimony of the son of Syrach, Ecclus. 43. 30. When you glorify God the Lord, exalt him as much as you can, and when you exalt him put forth all your strength, for you can never go far enough. i e. says the Doctor, how far soever you exceed the Particular command you are yet within the compass of the general (one of love he means) and in respect of that can never be thought to have done enough, though the Particular Act or the degree of it, be somewhat that you are not particularly obliged to. The words are full and high, and to all the Argument pretends to.  
§. 5. Because God is infinite in perfection, infinitely good, and infinitely amiable, we, that are finite in our Natures and Operations, can never love him enough, and as much as he deserves; and because all our sufficiency is from God, Natural gratitude, if there were no other Rule and Law, would oblige us to employ all that strength and sufficiency in his service, from whom alone all is derived. And because when we have done all we can, we should yet be short of loving him sufficiently, and to the height of his worth and Perfection, still labour we must, that we may yet more and more love him, and because this life is too short, endeavour we may and must to be admitted into heaven, where we may love him to the utmost height we can, or shall ever attain; and because we cannot love him infinitely, as his goodness deserves, we yet may love him eternally. Ratio diligendi Deum est Deus ipse, modus sine modo, says S. Bernard sweetly, that never speaks otherwise. The only Reason, and Motive to our Love of God, must be his own Goodness, and the only Measure of this Love, must be Love without Measure. Because God is Infinite in Perfection, our Love must also be Infinite; not absolutely, as God is, but only in a sort, that befits our finite condition. Our Love must be infinite Syncategorematicè as they speak in the Schools, though Categorematicè it cannot. That is, though the word Infinite, cannot be predicated of our Love in casu recto, yet it may in casu obliquo; though it cannot be Positively infinite, yet Negatively it may, and must; though still it will be finite, yet it must have no set, no determinate bounds and limits. Though our love cannot be infinite, yet we must infinitely love him, love him in infinitum, and never think we can love him sufficiently, and unto the utmost height, beyond which we neither can, nor need to go. Our work and labour of love, must be like to the Arithmeticians Operation in Progressive Multiplication. The further he goes on in his work, the more is the Product, and the greater still his Task. And if this will content our Refuter, he has mine and the Doctor's free grant, and I hope in this we shall be friends.  
§. 6. Nay if it were of any concernment, I undertake that 
Vid. Bellar. the aetern. Foelicit. l. 3. c 8. de Gemit. Columb. l. 2. c. 3. etc. 10. Fran. de Sales of the love of God. l. 3. c. 1. & l. 10. c. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. & alibi passim. Jo. Euseb. Nierembergius de Adorat. in Spiritu & veritate, l. 1. c. 9 l. 3. c. 6. l. 4. c. 4, 5, 9, 10, 12. & alibi passim.  Bellarmine, at least in his Meditations and Prayers will acknowledge it, whatsoever he does, or shall do in his polemics, and if I find not this, and much more than this in F. Sales of divine Love, and Nierembergius the Jesuit in his book the Adoratione in Spiritu, and all the rest I have seen, that writ Sermons, and Commentaries, I am very much mistaken, and I shall not believe, what I read with mine own eyes, and think that in a waking dream I read mine own Protestant Fancies, and not the writings of Jesuits and Papists. But because magna est veritas, & praevalebit, It is much for the honour and Justification of the Protestant Doctrine, that even its adversaries and opposers in their modest sober thoughts, in their more humble and mortified considerations do approve, and acknowledge, what we so eagerly contend for.  
§. 7. If our Refuter shall here reply, that he has gained all he desires in this one concession, and that then there can be no Nidabah, no free will offerings, no uncommanded degrees of Love;  
§. 8. I shall answer, that I am very glad I have pleased him, and hope he will think that I am no enemy to him, but only an opposer of Errors, a Lover of Truth, and a defender of its Advocates and Patrons whether Master jean's or Doctor Hammond. But then withal I must add, that there must and will be freewill offerings, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be found in the Law of Moses, which if he can reconcile with his Argument, and Principles, I doubt not, but to reconcile this very argument to the Doctor's Exposition and Concessions. And indeed we have already done it, or let our Refuter call in his School-abilities to help me. For he I am sure as a Divine, and Expositor of Scripture, is bound to reconcile the seeming contradictions of that, as well as the Doctor is bound to give an answer to all Objections, that may or can be brought against his doctrine.  
§. 9 Indeed I am half persuaded that upon a serious review, and more settled thoughts, our Refuter himself will acknowledge, that it is no very difficult Task. For though it be granted, that a most intense actual Love of God is due unto God, by an obligation of gratitude, because hereby (as Doctor Francis White against Fisher out of Bernard) we are indebted and own to the Almighty, omne quod sumus, & omne quod possumus, whatsoever we are, and whatsoever we are able to do; yet this 
* B. White, Reply to Fisher's answer, Point. 8. §. 3. pag. 533. C.  Doctor Francis White, in the very same Treatise and Paragraph, does acknowledge and grant unto the Jesuit, That a man may offer unto God a Freewill offering, and yet herein he performeth no more, than he is obliged unto by the Law of gratitude.  
§. 10. No clashing then here betwixt Doctor Hammond and Doctor White, unless our Refuter will make that learned man first to quarrel with himself, who positively grants, and acknowledges that Truth which Doctor Hammond maintains.  
§. 11. But then, though Doctor Hammond is not confuted, yet thanks to our Aims, Cardinal Bellarmine is confuted and confounded for all that.  
§. 12. And let him be so for me. I own him not so much service to come with a Candle and Lantern at Noon to find his Carcase at the foot of your divinity chair. Nor have I taken Fee from any of his Party, to be an Advocate in his cause. And I think they would but laugh at us both, If I should undertake to make it good. Let him and his Party stand and fall to their own Master. I am sure they are of Age, at least they pretend Antiquity enough, and therefore let them speak for themselves.  
§. 13. Howsoever, I shall express my present hasty thoughts of both places, as well Bellarmine's, as Ames; that to me they seem not to be so opposite as our Refuter would make his Reader believe, and that the difference between them is rather in the expression, than the thing itself. And I believe that Bellarmine will not refuse to subscribe Ames his Retort, and yet for all that Ames will not deny but that 
* Any men, all men are bound to aspire to the perfection of holiness, not the Perfection of Martyrdom. Cawdreys' triplex Diatribe. pag. 109.  Bellarmine speaks truth, when he says, all men are not bound to love God, so as to be Martyrs, or Virgins, or what other else he calls states, or Acts of Perfection. And yet this is all that Bellarmine seems (to me at least) to drive at, and if it were worth the enquiry, I should be content to be taught this so wonderful deep point, as the understanding a piece in Bellarmine. But the Reader if he please may turn to Bellarmine de Monachis l. 1. c. 13. Col. mihi 350. D. E. 351. A. Amesii Bellarmin. Enervat. tom 2. lib. 4. c. 2, §. 42. pa. 161.  
§. 14. But let Ames his Reply be as round and acute, as our Refuter thinks fit, I shall be so far from envying that commendations the Author does deserve in his pains against Bellarmine, that I love, and use to read him for it.  
§. 15. But what I pray is all this to Doctor Hammond? is Bellarmine's Ghost by any Pythagorean Metempsychosis transfused into the Doctor? or has the Doctor wedded or embraced this saying of Bellarmine that Ames confutes? How then is he concerned?  
§. 16. Without doubt, very much! For the vulgar Reader cannot choose but think the Doctor's opinion to be popishly affected, because our Refuter in his answer to the Doctor so eagerly confutes Bellarmine, and urges against him Doctor White and Doctor Ames.  
§. 17. It was an art of Cruelty practised against the Primitive Christians, to put them into the skins of Wolves and Bears, that they might be baited more fiercely in the theatres. And I remember to have read in Master Fox, of one of our Martyrs that being condemned to the stake, was forced to his execution in a coat all painted over with Devils, that so the rabble and multitude of spectators might be moved by this dress so to loathe and hate the Person, as not to take notice of his constancy and patience in his sufferings. And if our Refuter had any such design, I must look upon it, as a very ungodly practice, and a piece of Tyranny, not much inferior to that of Mezentius, to couple the living and the dead, that the ill favour of Bellarmine's name might poison the Doctors living spotless repute, and kill it in the Breasts of those that read him, but much more of those that read him not.  
§. 18. But if this was the design of our Refuter, I must tell the Doctor for his comfort, that he has not only the Martyrs for his companions in this piece of Persecution, but our Saviour also for his pattern and precedent. He was clothed in a purple Robe, and he had a Reed for a Sceptre, and a crown of thorns on his head, and they bowed the knee before him, and cried out hail King, though he always professed his kingdom was not of this world, and commanded us to Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's. But I go on, and so does our Refuter.   

SECT. 29.  
His Authorities oppose not the Doctor, why urged by Protestants. Bellarmine acknowledges the Places and Inference. But such Love simply impossible even in Paradise. How Austin, Bernard hold it obligatory, how not; Bellarmine the Refuters' adversary. His Authorities from Aquinas, Scotus, His Charity to his Reader. First, from Aquinas answered. His meaning. Bellarmine and he agreed. Doctor and all Protestants will subscribe to this of Aquinas. His second from Aquinas, Answered. Perfection of Life, state, according to Aquinas, not Pertinent. Aquinas opinion summed up. Scotus, his manner of writing. How God may be Loved above all things according to Scotus. Henriquez opposed by him. Love melting strong. This Genuine, that a Passion sensitive. Scotus, Love of God above all things Intensiuè, Extensiuè agreeable to Chamier. He rejects the Reason grounded on Austin, Bernard. His Authority pruned. At large. Contrary to the Refuters Inference from him. His sense cleared from D'Orbellis, Cavellus. The sense of the old Schoolmen from Durand, Austin, and Bernard's opinion, the same with Durands and the Doctors, Proved. How urged by Chamier. These Father's Opinion summed up. What Perfection required of Christians according to them. What proposed. Refuters discourse impertinent. Distinction, Quatenus indicat Finem, non quatenus praecipit Medium not invented by Bellarmine. Taken from Aquinas. By whom used to expound S. Austin. Agreeable to Austin, Cajetan, for  offerings.  
§. 1. FRom Reason he comes now to Authority.  

JEANES.  
For the further confirmation of this point, Protestants allege the testimonies of divers of the Fathers, particularly Austin and Bernard, as also of the ancient Schoolmen, who say this Command cannot be fulfiled in this life, because it commands such a perfection of Love as is impossible to be attained in this life. I shall not clog the Readers Patience, etc.   
§. 2. For the Confirmation of this Point. What Point, I pray, is this, Sir? Do you not Antipheron like, of whom the Philosopher tells us, that having a fault in his brain, the Organs of his sight still carried his own Reflection and shape and effigies before him wheresoever he went? And do you not all along in this controversy, still carry your own shadow, and Phantasm, that an Error in your Intellectuals has created, before your thoughts? It is that point of your own framing, that still runs in your head, and no assertion of the Doctors. For he has so often expressly declared that he speaks not of sinless perfection, when he says it admits of uncommanded degrees, but only of the sincerity of this or that particular virtue or Grace in this or that Act or performance, that I am ashamed so often to remind you of it.  
§. 3. And yet it is for the necessity of this sinless perfection, and complete obedience to all God's commandments, this perfect habit of Divine Love and holy Charity that the Protestants in the Controversies about Justification by works and Merit ex condigno, etc. do make use of these Authorities of Austin, and Bernard, and the Schoolmen. But then this concerns not at all the Doctor, who meddles not here with these controversies. Howsoever I observe it is confutation sufficient to Doctor Hammond, and it is no less than one of Hercules' labours that the Protestants have alleged the Authority of Austin and Bernard for the confirmation of this, which only floats in our Refuters' brain, and is no where to be found in the writings of the Doctor.  
§. 4. But then as to the say pressed from Austin and Bernard, they are not denied even by Bellarmine to be found 
Vid. Bellarm. l. 2. de Monachis cap. 13. supra citat.  in those Authors, and withal, as may be seen in the former Quotation, he acknowledges that the Inference is good, and that such a Perfection is not attainable in this life.  
§. 5. But then our Refuter will never be able to prove that such a perfection of love that is not only sinless, but Perfectly all Act, one interrupted, constant, and eternal Act of divine love, and nothing else (which is the Perfection they speak of) was ever commanded to Adam in Paradise, much less to us Christians, that are not now under the Law and Covenant of works, but under Grace, and the Mercy of the Gospel. Nor will he be ever able to prove that either Austin, of Bernard did think that this was the sense of the Commandment as it is obligatory to Christians.  
§. 6. What Austin? what Bernard? and the old Schoolmen ever think, that such a Perfection of Love is commanded 
It is no part of our Creed, that God in the Evangelicall Covenant severely exacteth of man any thing as necessary to his Salvation, which is impossible for him to perform by the assistance of Grace, and yet we say again, That God by the Rule of his Law commandeth a greater perfection of righteousness than man is able to perform in this life, that all flesh may be humbled by the sight of infirmity, and consider the gracious indulgence of God in remitting sin, and his free bounty in conferring so great and so many undeserved benefits. Pet. Martyr super Rom. 8. Si quis recte intelligat nostram assertionem facile videbit nos non docere mandata Dei prorsus esse impossibilia, nisi tantum quod ad eos attinet, qui à Christo sunt alieni. August. de Pecc. merit. & remiss. l. 2. c. 16. Jabet Deus omnibus hominibus, ut non faciant ullum peccatum quamvis sit praescius neminem hoc impleturum: ut quicunque impiè & damnabiliter ejus praecepta contempserint ipse faciat in eorum damnatione quod justum est: quicunque autem in ejus praeceptis obedienter & pie proficientes, nec tamen omnia quae praecepit implentes, sicuti sibi dimitti volunt, si aliis peccata dimiserint, ipse faciat in eorum mundatione quod bonum est. White against Fisher point 8. §, 3. p. 533. D. E.  us Christians, as is impossible to be obtained in this life? Is this the easy yoke of Christ, whose burdens are not grievous? or were they so dull, and flat, to say it was impossible, absolutely impossible I mean for such is that Perfection that is not compatible with the state of a viator, whether in Paradise, or the Church (that is hortus inclusus, a fenced garden and vineyard) that is indeed the perfection and Crown and reward of the Saints triumphant in heaven, (which now alone is that Church without spot or wrinkle) and yet be commanded by God?  
§. 7. Commanded it may be, I grant in some sense, and it 
Vid. August. de spirit. & li. terâ cap. 36. per tot.  is so; not only proposed to our hopes and aims, but enjoined, as to our endeavours, and striving for; and so run we must, as we may obtain it. But it is not to be hoped for and gained, while we are here on earth, but only in heaven.  
§. 8. And therefore you need not have clogged your Readers patience with transcribing Quotations to this purpose. The case is plain enough, and no body denies it, and Bellarmine (our only adversary all along, not Doctor Hammond) expressly acknowledges it.  
§. 9 The only difference now between you and Bellarmine is, Whether this commandment in the sense of Perfection and height, that Austin and Bernard in those places, speak of, is obligatory to Christians? and that in this life they either are, or, let me add, ever were, even in Paradise obligatory to mankind? And since this is the mark let us now see the leap, since this is the true state of the Question between him and his Adversary, whosoever it is, let us now see his proof of it.  

JEANES.  
I shall not clog the Readers Patience with transcribing the several quotations, because I believe he may have them almost in every Writer of Controversies betwixt us and the Papists: only I shall trouble him with what I conceive to be most remarkable in Aquinas and Scotus concerning this matter. Aquinas secunda secundae. q. 44. art. 6. intendit Deus per hoc praeceptum Deut. 6. ut homo Deo totaliter uniatur; quod fiet in Patria, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus. 1 Cor. 15. & ideo plenè & perfect in Patria implebitur hoc praeceptum. And again, q. 184. art. 3. Non autem dilectio Dei & proximi cadit sub praecepto secundum aliquam mensuram, ita ut id quod est plus, sub consilio remaneat: ut pa et ex forma praecepti quae perfectionem demonstrat, ut cum dicitur, diliges Dominum Deum ex toto corde tuo: totum enim & perfectum idem sunt, sec. Phil. 3. Phys. & cum dicitur diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum: unus. quisque enim seipsum maximè diligit. Et hoc ideo est, quia finis praecepti charitas est, ut Apostolus. 1 Tim. 1. in fine autem non adhibetur aliqua mensura, sed solum in his quae sunt ad finem, ut Philosophus dicit 1. Polit, sicut medicus non adhibet mensuram quantum sanet, sed quantâ medicinâ vel diaetâ utatur ad sanandum. Thus also Scotus l. 3. dist. 27. dico igitur quod illud praeceptum Deut. 6. non potest impleri in viâ, quantum ad omnes conditiones, quae exponuntur per illas additiones ex toto Cord, & ex totâ animâ, etc. quia non potest esse in viâ istâ tanta recollectio virium ut amotis impedimentis possit voluntas tanto conatu ferri, quanto possit, si vices essent unitae, & non impeditae, & quod ad talem intensionem actûs expulsis impedimen. 'tis, & recollectis viribus debet intelligi dictum. Aug. & Magistri, quod praeceptum illud non impletur in viâ; nam pronitas virium inferiorum pro statu isto impedit superiores ab actibus perfectis. The first that Bellarmine hath to evade these Testimonies, etc.   
§. 10. Well Sir, because there can be no good Music in unison's, I cannot commend your skill very much; you are still striking on one string; Forsooth, the writers of Controversies betwixt us and the Papists. But though you are very uncharitable to the Doctor in thus aspersing his fame, yet you are very merciful to your Reader, in not clogging his Patience by transcribing those quotations so every where to be had. Howsoever I must tell you, that you had yet been more merciful, if you had spared those, that you have transcribed; because indeed they are so little to the purpose. And if these wherewith you say, you trouble the Reader, are the most remarkable that you conceive are to be found in Aquinas and Scotus concerning this matter, you must give me leave to tell you, that your Reading in those Authors is not very great, although you are a School man, nor your remarks and Récherches very deep, very pertinent and Judicious. I doubt not but that I, in my slender observation, and small reading in those Authors, shall observe the quite contrary to what you labour to persuade your Reader.  
§. 11. For your first quotation of Aquinas secundâ secundae. q. 44. art. 6. I must say, that if you had rendered it entire, and faithfully, as it lies in Aquinas, it would have been answered, before it had been objected. I represent it then at large. It is in Corp. thus. Dicendum quod praeceptum aliquod dupliciter potest impleri, uno modo Perfectè, alio modo imperfectè, Perfectè quidem impletur praeceptum, quando pervenitur ad finem quem intendit Praecipiens: Impletur, sed imperfectè, quando et si non pertingat ad finem Praecipientis, non tamen receditur ab ordine ad finem, sicut si dux exercitus praecipiat militibus, ut pugnent, ille perfectè implet praeceptum, qui pugnando hostem vincit, quod dux intendit. Ille autem implet, sed imperfectè cujus pugna ad victoriam non pertingit, non tamen contra disciplinam militarem agit. Intendit autem Deus per hoc praeceptum (and this, this is the Passage our Refuter insists on) ut homo sibi totaliter uniatur, quod fiet in Patrià, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus. Et ideo plenè & perfectè in Patriâ implebitur hoc praeceptum, in viâ autem impletur, sed imperfectè. Et tamen in via tanto unus alio perfectius implet, quanto magis accedit per quandam similitudinem ad Patriae perfectionem. The meaning of Aquinas is this. In every Precept or command we are to consider the end of the Legislator, and the end of the Law. This is the performance of the duty enjoined, which the Legislator commands, as a means for the attainment of that end, which he himself did intent and aim at, when he published the Law. For instance. A General intends and designs the taking this city or that Fortress, and therefore he rallies up his Forces, and commands them to storm it. They do so; and if they gain the City by assault, the Commander has his end, which he first intended, when he gave the word of command, and the soldier has done his duty, which was the end of the Precept: but if they storm it, and are repulsed, though the General has miss his Aim, yet the Soldier has not broken the Precept, and did as much as the Commandment, though not as much as the Commander intended. It is just so in the present case, according to Aquinas' doctrine. God, when he first made man, intended to make him eternally happy by a full enjoyment, and sight and perfect love of himself. But because he made him upright, and of a nature as well capable of serving, as of enjoying his maker, he prescribed him a Law, as a Means for the attainment of this happiness. The Law was, Thou shalt Love the Lord, with all thy heart, or as much as thou art able, and according to that strength, and that grace I bestow upon thee (For God dwelling in inaccessible light, cannot be known and loved by us any other way then as God enables us to know and to love him) and then he promised to admit man to a clear sight and full fruition, and perfect love of himself. This was God's end when he first made the Law; and our duty, and the end of the command itself was, that we should love him to the utmost of that power and strength which he should give us to love him. If therefore we consider the Perfection of that Love, and that happiness, which God intended, we should arrive at by the enjoyment of himself in heaven, this is man's duty to aim at, because it is his last end and the perfection God intended to bring him to at first, when he made him. But then because it is incompatible with our present state and Condition, as we are in the body, God made it not the end of the Precept, though it was that which he intended we should arrive at, though it were our last end and his design, when at first he created us. For otherwise he had prescribed us an impossible duty, that we should be happy in possession, and yet in the way to it; that we should be present with him, and see him face to face, and yet be absent from him, which implies a contradiction. And therefore he requires of us as our duty a lower kind of love, a love suitable to our present state, that we should love him as much as we can, and as much as he has enabled us to love him. This is the end of the commandment, and the other God's end, that enjoined the commandment. That is our duty, and this our crown, and reward. This God commands us to aim at, to labour for, and endeavour after, as much as we can whilst we are in this life, and the way and means to it is the Performance of this command in the loving him here according to our utmost abilities, and endeavours. And this is not an impossible duty, but an easy yoke; a yoke yet burdensome enough in regard of itself, but made facile and easy by the assistance of Grace. And he that thus loves God with all his heart; though he love him not so perfectly as the Saints do in heaven; yet in the Judgement, and according to the Resolution of Aquinas, he loves him with that height and perfection of love that the Law does require and look for, the end whereof is only that we love God as much as we are able, in order to our last end and happiness, and that we may gain that crown which God principally intended, when he first did create us, and imposed the command upon us. He than that loves God as much as he can, and according to the utmost of those abilities God gives him in this his passage to heaven, fulfils this commandment, though he loves him not so much as another does, to whom God has afforded more Grace, and more strength and more abilities to love him. And he that now loves him with all his heart to day, and so obeys the Command, may by the addition of more Grace be enabled, and so obliged to love God more to morrow, because the Commandment still in force indefinitely commands that we love God with all our strength whatsoever it is. And thus he can never know by this Law an end of his labour, and an end of his love, till he shall come to heaven, where he shall love God as Perfectly, as God at first intended, when he shall arrive at the end, that God aimed at in the enacting of the Law, and prescribing that inferior growing, still increasing Love, as a duty and means, and way for the attainment of the other.  
§. 12. And now that this was the meaning of Aquinas is very plain from this very resolution. For he expressly here declares that the Love in this height of Perfection is not compatible with our present state, but is the perfection of the Saints in Patriâ, who love not God by way of duty and choice and obedience, but by necessity of their glorified nature, and the beatifical vision.  
§. 13. This will further appear from his answers to the three Arguments, in this very Article and Question. For thus he. Ad primum ergò dicendum, quod ratio illa probat, quod aliquo modo potest impleri in hac vitâ licet non perfectè.  
Ad secundum dicendum, quod miles qui legitimè pugnat, licet non vincat, non inculpatur, nec poenam meretur, ita etiam qui in viâ hoc praeceptum non implet, nihil contra divinam dilectionem agens, non peccat mortaliter. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut dicit Augustinus, in lib. de perfectione Justitiae. Cur non praeciperetur homini ista perfectio quamvis eam in hac vitâ nemo habeat? Non enim rectè curritur, si quo currendum est nesciatur. Quomodo autem sciretur, si nullis praeceptis ostenderetur. So again in the same Question. Art. 4. in respons. ad Secundum, dicendum quod dupliciter contingit ex toto corde Deum diligere, uno modo in actu: id est, ut totum cor hominis semper actualiter in Deum feratur: & ista est Perfectio Patriae. Alio modo ut habitualiter totum cor hominis in Deum feratur, ita scil: quod nihil contra Dei dilectionem cor hominis recipiat: & haec est perfectio viae, cui non contrariatur veniale peccatum, quia non tollit habitum charitatis, cum non tendat in oppositum objectum, sed solum impedit charitatis usum. So again ibid. Ad tertium dicendum, quod Perfectio charitatis ad quam ordinantur consilia, est media inter duas Perfectiones praedictas, ut sc: homo quantum possibile est se abstrahat à rebus temporalibus etiam licitis, quae occupando animum impediunt actualem motum cordis in Deum. So again, 2. 2. q. 24. art. 8. Vtrum Charitas in hac vitâ possit esse perfecta? And he determines it in the affirmative, from the Authority of Saint Austin. The answer to it in Corpore is this. 
† To this very purpose see also 2 2. q. 184. art. 2. in Corp. & Cajetan. in loc.  Dicendum quod Perfectio charitatis potest intelligi dupliciter, uno modo ex parte diligibilis alio modo ex parte diligentis. Ex parte quidem diligibilis perfecta est charitas, ut diligatur aliquid, quantum diligibile est. Deus autem tantum diligibilis est, quantum bonus est. Bonitas autem ejus est infinita, unde per hunc modum nullius creaturae charitas potest esse perfecta, sed solum charitas Dei quâ seipsum diligit. Ex parte vero diligentis, tunc est charitas perfecta quando diligit tantum, quantum potest. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter: uno modo sic, quod totum cor hominis actualiter semper feratur in Deum, & haec est perfectio charitatis Patriae, quae non est possibilis in hac vitâ, in quâ impossibile est propter humanae vitae infirmitatem semper actu cogitare de Deo, & moveri dilectione ad ipsum. Alio modo, ut homo studium suum deputet ad vacandum Deo & rebus divinis, praetermissis aliis, nisi quantum necessitas praesentis vitae requirit. Et ista est Perfectio charitatis, quae est possibilis in viâ, non tamen est communis omnibus habentibus charitatem. Tertio modo ita quod habitualiter aliquis totum cor suum ponat in Deo, ita, scil: quod nihil cogitet vel velit, quod divinae dilectioni sit contrarium. Et haec perfectio est communis omnibus habentibus charitatem. So again in the following Article 9 Vtrum convenienter distinguantur tres gradus charitatis, Incipiens, Proficiens & Perfectà? he resolves it in the affirmative from the authority of Saint Austin. The Answer in Corp. is this. Dicendum quod spirituale augmentum charitatis considerari potest quantum ad aliquid simile corporali hominis augmento. Quod quidem quamvis in plurimas partes distingui possit, habet tamen aliquas determinatas distinctiones, secundum determinatas actiones vel studia, ad quae homo perducitur per augmentum, sicut infantilis at as dicitur antequam habeat usum rationis, postea autem distinguitur alius status hominis; quando jam incipit loqui & ratione uti, iterum tertius status ejus est pubertas, cum jam incipit posse generare, & sic deinde quousque perveniatur ad perfectum: ita etiam & diversi gradus charitatis distinguuntur secundum diversa studia, ad quae homo perducitur per charitatis augmentum. Nam primo quidem incumbit homini studium principale ad recedendum à peccato, & resistendum concupiscentiis ejus, quae in contrarium charitatis movent, Et hoc pertinet ad incipientes, in quibus charitas est nutrienda vel fovenda, ne corrumpatur. Secundum autem studium succedit, ut homo principaliter intendat ad hoc, quod in bono proficiat. Et hoc studium pertinet ad proficientes, qui ad hoc principaliter intendunt, ut in eyes charitas per augmentum roboretur. Tertium autem studium est, ut homo ad hoc principaliter intendat, ut Deo inhaereat, & eo fruatur, & hoc pertinet ad perfectos, qui cupiunt dissolvi & esse cum Christo, sicuti etiam vidimus in motu corporali, quod primum est recessus â termino, secundum autem est appropinquatio ad alium terminum, Tertium est quies in termino.  
§. 14. And now I appeal to all the world, whether Aquinas be not a fit man for our Refuter to build upon? For what one opinion of 
* Vid. Davenant de Justit. habit, & Act. c. 39 p. 458, 459. etc. 41. p. 469.  Perfection, and Merit, and Evangelicall Counsels, and supererogation is to be found in Bellarmine that is not in Aquinas? Nay what one Argument or answer is there that Chamier and Ames find fault with in Bellarmine in these very controversies, that may not be matched, and indeed were not borrowed and transcribed from Aquinas doctrine?  
§. 15. The truth is, Aquinas in these very places cited by our Refuter affirms nothing but what even Bellarmine grants, and (if that may content him) Doctor Hammond also will subscribe to even in these very places of Aquinas that our Refuter has here cited. Bellarmine was too subtle, and the Angelical Doctor (as they— call him) had too Aquiline a wit, and eagle-eyed Judgement to write palpable contradictions. Indeed this opinion of the Cardinals in this Particular is easily reconcileable with that of S. Austin; and Aquinas himself has chalked him out the way. In this Aquinas and Scotus, and the old Schoolmen and Bellarmine, let me add, and the Doctor, and all Protestants too (that writ not for Passion and Interest) agree, and all accord with S. Austin and Bernard, who say the same with the Doctor and Bellarmine, and Aquinas and the Schoolmen. And Truth is venerable and lovely from whose mouth soever it comes, and a Prophet may be fed with that meat a Raven brings to him, nor is it therefore polluted in the use, because an unclean bird hath touched, or brought it to us.  
§. 16. And therefore now being secure of the meaning of Aquinas, I shall not be very solicitous for an answer to your next Quotation from that Author. Indeed if you had rendered the whole determination entire, the place would have answered itself.  
§. 17. Thus than it lies at large, and let the Reader be judge how it advantages your assertion. The Question is, Vtrum Perfectio consistat in Praeceptis, an in Consiliis? For the determination of this question thus he answers in Corp. Dicendum quod Perfectio dicitur in aliquo consistere dupliciter: uno modo per se, & essentialiter: alio modo, Secundario & accidentaliter. Per se quidem & essentialiter, consistit Perfectio Christianae vitae in charitate, principaliter quidem secundum dilectionem Dei, Secundariò autem secundum dilectionem proximi, de quibus praecepta generalia divinae legis ut dictum est. Non autem dilectio Dei & Proximi (this is the passage quoted by our Refuter) cadit sub praecepto, secundum aliquam mensuram ita quod id quod est plus sub Consilio remaneat, ut patet ex formâ praecepti, quae perfectionem demonstrat, cum dicitur, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo (totum enim & perfectum idem sunt secundum Philosophum 3. Phys. & cum dicitur, Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum: unusquisque enim seipsum maxime diligit. Et hoc ideo est, quia finis praecepti charitas est ut Apost. dicit, 1. ad Tim. 1. In fine autem non adhibetur aliqua mensura, sed solum in his quae sunt ad sinem. ut Philos. dicit in 1. Polit. sicut Medicus non adhibet mensuram quantum sanet, sed quantâ medicinâ vel diaetâ utatur ad sanandum, & sic patet quod Perfectio essentialiter consistit in praeceptis. unde Augustinus dicit in libro de Perfectione Justitiae, Cur ergo non praeciperetur homini ista perfectio, quamvis eam in hâc vit â nemo habeat? Secundariò autem & instrumentaliter Perfectio consistit in Consiliis, quae omnia sicut & praecepta ordinantur ad charitatem, sed aliter & aliter. Nam Praecepta alia à praeceptis charitatis ordinantur, ad removendum ea quae sunt charitati contraria, cum quibus scil: charitas esse non potest: consilia autem ordinantur ad removendum impedimenta actus charitatis, quae tamen charitati non contrariantur. Sicut est matrimonium, occupatio negotiorum secularium & alia hujusmodi: unde Augustinus dicit, in Enchiridio. Quaecunque mandat Deus, ex quibus unum est, Non moechaberis, & quaecunque non jubentur, sed speciali consilio monentur, ex quibus unum est, Bonum est homini mulierem non tangere, tunc recte fiunt, cum referuntur ad diligendum Deum, & proximum propter Deum, Et ideò est quod in collationibus Patrum dicit Abbas Moses, Jejunia; vigiliae, meditatio Scripturarum, nuditas ac privatio omnium facultatum non perfectio, sed perfectionis instrumenta sunt, quia non in ipsis consistit disciplinae illius finis sed per illa pervenitur ad finem. Et supra praemisit, quod ad perfectionem charitatis istis gradibus ascendere nitimur. Thus Aquinas 2. 2. q. 184. art 3. in corp.  
§. 18. The sum is, that there is according to this Author a twofold Perfection, The one of the Christian life, and the other of the Christian state. The first consists in charity, and the loving God and our neighbours. This has no bounds or limits, and let a man do here what he can, he can never do enough, because charity is the end of the Precept, and no man deliberates how much or how little he should obtain of his end, but simply to obtain it. Now this being not acquirable in this life but only in the next, let us endeavour as much as we can to come to the height of it, yet we shall never attain it. Howsoever fit it was that it should be prescribed by the commandment, that man might know what to aim at, and that he should labour to attain his last end. But then as for that other Accidental perfection of state, which is only instrumental and subservient to the attainment of the former, that remains under counsel, and contains uncommanded Acts, and has uncommanded degrees, though the precepts of Charity towards God and our neighbours have not. In these all men are absolutely obliged, and nothing remains to counsel, and Freedom and discretion, but only in the other.  
§. 19 And what is all this to our Refuters' design? How little let the very same Aquinas tell him in his answers to the first, second, and third objections in that very article. I shall only acquaint the Reader with the Second. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. de Perfectione Justitiae. Perfectio charitatis homini in hâc vita praecipitur, quia non rectè curritur, si quo currendum est nesciatur. Quomodo autem hoc sciretur si nullis praeceptis ostenderetur? Cum autem id quod cadit sub praecepto diversimodè possit impleri, non efficitur transgressor praecepti aliquis, ex hoc quod non optimo modo implet, sed sufficit, quod quocunque modo impleat illud. Perfectio autem divinae dilectionis universaliter quidem cadit sub praecepto, ita quod etiam perfectio Patriae non excluditur ab illo praecepto, ut dicit Augustinus, sed transgressionem Praecepti evadit, qui quocunque modo perfectionem divinae dilectionis attingit. Est autem infimus divinae dilectionis gradus, ut nihil supra eum, aut contra eum, aut aequaliter ei diligatur. A quo gradu Perfectionis qui deficit, nullo modo implet praeceptum. Est autem alius gradus perfectae dilectionis qui non potest impleri in viâ, ut dictum est art. praecedenti, à quo qui deficit manifestum est, quod non est transgressor praecepti. Et similiter non est transgressor praecepti, qui non attingit ad medios Perfectionis gradus, dummodò attingat ad infimum.  
§. 20. In short, he that shall read the first, second, third and fourth Articles of this Question, shall find Aquinas opinion to be this.  
1. That the Perfection and last end of man consists in that Love that wholly unites man to God.  
2. That this Love is not attainable in this life, because the state of this life admits not possibly, that we should so love God, as the Saints in heaven do, because they are at the end, and we but in the way to it.  
3. That yet this Love though only attainable in the next life, is proposed to our desires and aims; and commanded we are to endeavour after it, as much as we can, because it is our Last end and Perfection.  
4. That the best way to attain this Perfection, is to Love God as much as possibly we can in this life, and because this Perfection of Love is man's Last end, therefore he must never deliberate, how much he must love God, since that agrees not to the end but the means, and consequently we must think, that we can never love him sufficiently, or more then enough.  
5. That therefore God commands us in this life by that great precept of Charity, that we love him withal our heart, and strength and endeavour, and that this is the duty of a Christian, required in that Commandment for the attainment of that end that consists in a perfect union with God.  
6. That because the abilities of men are divers, and the callings and conditions of men not alike, and the Gifts and dispensations of Grace variable, and men's endeavours not always the same and equal in the use and employments of those Talents, some may more perfectly fulfil the Commandment, and love God more perfectly than others.  
7. That he that attains the lowest degree of divine Charity that consists in avoiding of all mortal sin, has fulfilled this commandment.  
8. That this is the lowest degree of divine Charity and the fullfilling this commandment.  
9 That there is an accidental Perfection of state and calling that is helpful and instrumental to the attaining the highest degree of divine charity attainable in this life.  
10. That in respect of this state, there is something left to Evangelicall counsel, and freedom, and choice; and that herein may be a freewill offering of love unto God, and in this respect a man may do more for his sake, than God requires by any Particular command.  
11. That there is nothing left to Counsel and choice in the precepts that per se and essentialiter concern the love of God, and our neighbour, but all we can do in them, and our utmost endeavour to perform them is under the command.  
12. That an absolute sinless perfection, and an uninterrupted act of divine Love is the portion of the Saints, and not attainable in this life; and not the duty of the Commandment, though the last end and happiness of the Man.  
13. That the Christian perfection enjoined in this commandment, to be laboured after, and practised by us in this life may consist with those they call venial sins.  
§. 21. This and much more to this purpose may be found in that Author, and not only in this Question, but also in the 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, etc. where he handles the Questions of Charity at large; and with him agree the ancient and the modern Schoolmen, as will be evident to any man that shall consult them. And now how contrary these and the like assertions are to the design of our Refuter, I shall leave any man to judge, and how much hand over head Aquinas his authority was called in by him for his defence.  
§. 22. Nor is he more happy in his next quotation from Scotus, which place if considered according to the scope of the Author fairly answers itself.  
§. 23. That subtle Doctor there disputes, utrum sit aliqua virtus Theologica inclinans ad diligendum Deum super omnia? He affirms it, l. 3. sent. dist. 27. q. unica. In the handling this question, he delivers many profound, and acute, and subtle, and yet very useful things; but then, according to his manner of writing, he goes not on in an even course and method, but suddenly leaps from one thing to another, which is the cause of his obscurity to those that read him only en passant, with a more quick and transeent eye. For usually such sublime acute wits that move in the highest orb, and so transcendent a Sphere, like the fixed stars, they cast forth their light sparkling, and with a kind of trembling scintillation. They are wits of a lower station that cast forth their lustre in one constant, even, orderly Ray. And though these, because they are nearer to our apprehension, seem to have a more pleasant and far clearer brightness, yet the other, though (by reason of their height and distance from the eye) they seem to have a weaker and more inconstant trembling shine, and not to give so much light in themselves, are stars of a far greater magnitude and brightness, though to us they seem otherwise. But to come to the business.  
§. 24. That subtle Doctor §. 16, 17. whence this quotation is borrowed, first distinguishes, and says, God may be loved above all things. 1. Extensiuè, ita ut plus quis diligat Deum quam omnia alia, & citius vellet omnia alia non esse, quam Deum; that is, as others, God may be loved above all things Objectiuè, and Appretiatiuè. 2. Intensiuè, quando quis ex majori affectu vult Deo benè quam alicui alteri. And then he resolves that all do agree that God is extensively to be loved above all things, not any thing without God, nor all things together equally and comparable to God.  
§. 25. But then as to the second member he says. Some (meaning Henriques and others) do distinguish and say, that one love may be said to be more Intense, and exceed an other; first, because it is ferventior seu tenerior, more tender and melting and effeminately Passionate (a tumult in the affections, sometimes enlargeing the heart with joy, and then strangling it: for some lovers have died with it, as the Father at the news of his sons victories and triumph, and sometimes contracting it, or melting it into tears.) Or secondly, because it is fortior, sive firmior, of a more strong and masculine temper, and can make a man bold as a Lion, and resolve to lose life and all things, and suffer the utmost can be inflicted, for the great affection that is in it. And now when Henriques and they had resolved, quod dilectio Dei, etc. that we must love God above all things, quoad firmitatem, with a more manlike affection, so that nothing may be able to draw or remove us from the love of Christ, yet it is not necessary, that we should love God above all things with that Passionateness, and ravishing, and tenderness of affection, because many are found, thus to love the Creature, suppose their wives or their children more than God himself, and yet would rather forsake wife and children, part with all things than renounce God. And then secondly, because if thus both ways God may be loved above all things, than the commandment Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, Deut. 6. might be fulfiled in this life, contrary to what the Master and Austin and Anselme determine, qui nolunt, quod hoc praeceptum sit nec quod teneamur illud implere, sed quod implebimus.  
§. 26. Against this the subtle Doctor resolves that the masculine Love, that can make us bold as Lions, and ready to die for Christ is the only true Love, which is seated in the will, the other but a Gross material thing a Passion of the sensitive appetite. And if any man love more tenderly and passionately then others, and yet less firmly and strongly and valiantly, this proceeds not from any height and excess of the true genuine intellectual love, but from a mere effeminate and passionate delight, and melancholy temper or melting complexion and disposition; as some Votaries and Recluses find many times more ravishing joys in their contemplative course of life, than many more solid and well settled and grounded Christians, that an hundred times more readily, and cheerfully can suffer Martyrdom. A passion more frequently found in women then in men, in newly recovered Penitents and Converts then well grown Christians, nec dulcedo est actus voluntatis elicitus, sed passio quaedam actui retributa, quâ Deus allicit & nutrit parvulos, ne deficiant in viâ. The fragrancy of the Apple, and the perfumes of the flagons of wine wherewith Christ comforts his beloved when she gins to swoon, and faint; the milk for new born babes, not the strong meat for men.  
§. 27. And then secondly he resolves, God ought to be loved above all things as well intensively as extensively, not only super omnia alia extensiuè, sed etiam majori affectu quam aliquod aliud. Et dico majori simpliciter, quia scil: magis repugnat effectui opposito, quia facilius posset inclinari ad oppositum dilectionis cujuscunque alterius quam Dei, that is, if I rightly understand him, according to Chamier, non solùm comparatè adres alias, sed etiam ad nos ipsos, not only with a higher affection than that which we bestow on any thing else (for that though the highest may be but low in itself) but also with an affection as high as we can, because that is most opposite to sin, and most repugnant to those effects and Acts that trash and hinder our love; and is therefore most proper for this present state, wherein we are more easily inclined to love sensual objects then spiritual, the creature, than God; whence it follows, that we should love God, with such a height of affection, that shall enable us and incline us with more readiness and ease to oppose and withstand the love of any thing else, rather than the love of God.  
§. 28. And then he adds further, that the reason grounded on the authority of Lombard and Austin signifies nothing quia pari ratione fuisset dandum praeceptum de visione Dei, non ut impleretur, sed ut sciremus quo esset tendendum, cujus oppositum satis Patet, and they might have said as well that there should have been a Precept to command us to see God face to face, not that it should be fulfiled by us, but that we might know, whether to bend our hopes and aims.  
§. 29. And now having thus plainly laid down all things, and fully cleared his way he comes to give his resolution in the words our Refuter refers to. But then I must tell the Reader that he has pruned and pared off what makes against himself, and is necessary to understand Scotus his opinion, and he has brought him as well as he could to the size of his own Bed. Dico igitur quod illud praeceptum extensiuè & intensiuè secundum viam praedictam potest impleri in hac vitâ (which is the full resolution of the Question, according to the Doctor's exposition, and therefore these words were craftily left out by our Refuter, lest he should be discovered by his Reader) sed non quantum ad omnes conditiones, quae exponuntur per illas additiones ex toto cord, & ex totâ animâ; quia non potest esse in vitâ tanta recollectio virium ut amotis impedimentis possit voluntas tanto conatu ferri quanto posset, si vires essent unitae, & non impeditae, & quoad talem intensionem actûs expulsis impedimentis & recollectis viribus debet intelligi dictum Augustini, & Magistri, quod praeceptum illud non impletur in viâ, nam pronitas virium inferiorum pro statu isto impedit superiores ab actibus perfectis. That is, we are bound by the precept to love God above all things extensively and intensively, and secundum viam praedictam, according to the exposition that we have already given, it may be fulfiled (by Christians) in this life; although it cannot be fulfiled according to all those conditions, which some expositors give of those additions ex toto cord, the whole heart, and the whole soul, etc. because there cannot be so great a recollection of strength, that all impediments being removed, the will may so vigorously endeavour, as it might, if the forces of the soul were all united, and not hindered: and according to this intention, and fervour of the Acts of love, all impediments being removed, and the strength and forces of the Soul being recollected and joined, must the saying of Austin and Lombard be understood, That this precept is not fulfiled in this life. For the proneness of the inferior faculties does for the present state hinder the superior from acting to a perfect height. Thus Scotus.  
§. 30. And this is so far from serving our Refuters' interest, that Scotus directly resolves the contrary. For certain it is with him that nulla virtus inclinatur ad actum impossibilem habenti, as he grants in his answer to the second Argument §. 21. And therefore he proving that according to S. Augustine's exposition, it is simply, absolutely impossible to be observed in this life, he must of necessity resolve the precept never aimed at it in the obligation. And the Reader will consider that it is one thing to say, the precept cannot be observed according to those conditions some give of it, and another thing to say, that the precept obliges us to observe it, according to that, and those conditions so given. This Scotus denies, and only affirms the former.  
§. 31. And so his Scholar and acute Epitomator understood him, Nicholaus D'Orbellis I mean. For thus he in the Epitome 
Nic. D'Orbell l. 3. sent. didst 27. dub. 1. p. 24.  of the Question, where though he says it is Bonaventures answer, yet he gives his Master's meaning. Quod amor Dei possidere totum cor potest intelligi dupliciter, uno quod excludat omnem affectum contrarium: hoc est quod nihil diligatur supra Deum, vel aequaliter cum Deo, & sic potest in hac vitâ impleri per infusionem gratiae, quae est expulsiva omnis mortalis culpae, Deum propter se & super omnia diligendo. Alio modo excludendo omnem affectum extraneum, ita quod amor sic plenè dominetur cordi, quod omnes motus Cordis per amorem continuè referantur in Deum, Et sic motus ille non obligat pro nunc ad sui impletionem, secundum Augustinum, said in illo praecepto exprimitur, quo per amorem tendere debeamus, ut nemo se perfectum arbitretur, quousque illam perfectionem fuerit assecutus. exponitur autem ab Augustino ex toto cord. i e. ex toto intellectu; ex tota animâ, i. e. ex tota voluntate sine contradictione; ex totâ ment, i. e. ex tota memoriâ sine oblivione.  
§. 32. So also Scotus his Scholiast, H. Cavellus understood him. Scotus tantum ait Deum super omnia amandum esse, extensiuè & intensiuè, sicut explicantur haec ab aliis, id est tenerius & firmius, Deum plus caeteris amandum; quia intensiuè illis duobus modis pro uno & eodem reputat, sed non dicit majore Amore graduali eum esse amandum, sed solum majori affectu, ad quem sufficit majoritas appretiativa, seu affectus magis exclusivus oppositè. Praeterea 1. d. 1. q. 4. Et 3. d. 28. q. 1. in Report. ait quod eodem actu diligo Deum & proximum, ergo non est hic comparatio unius ad alium. Item hac d. in Report. loquens de dilectione intensiori Dei subjungit, non oportet hic amare Deum super omnia, sc: illo modo.  
§. 33. And now having found the full meaning of Scotus from himself and his followers, that best should know their Master's meaning, come we now to compare the Inference of this subtle Doctor and our Refuter together. Scotus he thus concludes. The Precept binds not us Christians to observe it in this life, according to the strictness and exposition of S. Austin and others, because it is impossible to be fulfilled in this life, according to those expositions. And now our Refuter would conclude the quite contrary from Scotus. Thus, The subtle Doctor says this precept cannot thus be observed in this life. And therefore according to Scotus it obliges us in this strictness though it cannot be fulfiled. And is not this Refuter a man of very rare Art, and uncontradictible discourse, that by his all-commanding Logic is able to conclude one contrary by another?  
§. 34. And now further to show how much our Refuter is mistaken in the sense of Thomas and Scotus, I might add the consent of the ancient and the modern Schoolmen, who all, at least that I have seen, in this unanimously agree with the two great Masters, that divide the School between them. But I am quite tired, and so I believe is the Reader. And yet for once I shall beg leave of his patience to add Durands' resolution, because of all the Schoolmen I have read, he does it the most fully and distinctly, and with the least exception of any.  
§. 35. First, l. 3. sent: d. 27. q. 2. he disputes utrum Amor Dei 
Bernard. l. de diligend. Deum.  habeat modum? And resolves it in the Negative, from the Authority of S. Bernard, Causa diligendi Deum est Deus ipse, modus autem, sine modo diligere. And then he answers by a distinction, that in Actu dilectionis Dei potest accipi triplex modus, sicut in Actu cujuscumque virtutis. 1. Secundum limitationem Essentiae, and thus it is determined in its Essence, and has a certain Modus, quia est in certo genere & certâ specie, because it is in a set predicament, and has a certain definition. 2. Secundum determinationem circumstantiae & sic modum habet, quia malum oritur ex defectu debitae & determinatae circumstantiae, bonum oritur ex causis integris. Determined it is in respect of circumstances, because an Action becomes evil for want of its due circumstances, and cannot therefore be good, unless it has all that are required. 3. Quoad proportionem medii ad superfluum & diminutum, & sic non habet modum: though virtues ordinarily consist in a middle point below which, and beyond which, they cease to be virtuous, yet the love of God has no such middle point or bounds  
Quos ultra citráque nequit consistere,  
But may be gradually intended and increased in infinitum. 1. Quia non potest vitiari dilectio Dei per excessum per se loquendo, aut Deus nimis amari, because it is impossible to love God too much, and offend him by excess of affection, as properly considered. 2. Quia actus charitatis sequitur actum fidei, nullus autem potest nimis credere in Deum, aut nimis inniti divinae veritati. Because our Love is proportioned to our knowledge, and Charity follows Faith, but we can never exceed in our faith and trust in God, or too much rely upon the divine verity and Truth. In the next question, q. 3. l. 3. d. 27. he inquires first, Quis sit ille modus quo jubemur diligere Deum, & qualiter est intelligendus, and he resolves, art. 1. Intelligendum quod in modo— quo jubemur diligere Deum, quatuor includuntur, secundum quod patet ex variis locis scripturae, sc: quod diligamus Deum, ex toto cord, & ex totâ animâ, & ex totâ ment, & ex totâ virtute, quae est idem cum fortitudine, unde in alio loco dicitur & ex fortitudine tuâ, & alibi ex omnibus viribus tuis, quod est idem, & haec quatuor insinuantur, Mat. 22. Luc. 10. quamvis in aliis locis scripturae aliqua horum omittuntur, hoc enim est, quia illud omissum, ex aliis intelligitur. Ratio autem horum quatuor hic accipienda est ad praesens, quia dilectio Dei de quâ agimus actus est voluntatis, quae hic significatur per cor. Nam sicut Cor, ut dicit, membrum materiale, est principium omnium corporalium motuum; ita voluntas, quantum ad intensionem finis ultimi, qui est objectum charitatis est Principium omnium actuum, quarumcunque potentiarum, quae moventur à voluntate, hae autem sunt tres: sc: intellectus, qui significatur per mentem; vis appetitiva inferior, quae significatur per animam unde secundum eam dicimur agere vitam animalem; & vis executiva exterior, quae significatur per fortitudinem seu virtutem seu vires. Praecipitur ergo nobis ut tota intentio nostra feratur in Deum, quod est ex toto corde diligere, & quod intellectus noster totaliter subdatur Deo, quod est ex totâ ment, & appetitus inferior reguletur secundum Deum, quod est ex tota anima, & quod Actus noster exterior ordinetur ad Deum, quod est ex tota fortitudine tua: i. e. virtute vel viribus Deum diligere. And this I hope will please our Refuter. In the second Article, the question is An modus iste possit in via totaliter impleri? And he resolves it by a distinction. Advertendum est, quod sicut dicitur 3. Phys. totum & perfectum idem sunt, & ideo totaliter diligere est perfectè diligere: sicut ergo duplex est Perfectio ita duplex totalitas; dicitur enim perfectum aliquid uno modo, quia nihil deest ei eorum quae natum est habere; alio modo dicitur Perfectum, cui nihil deest eorum quae debet habere secundum statum. Prima ergo Perfectio naturae humanae solum est in gloria, quando natura habebit omnem Perfectionem, quam nata est habere. Sed secunda Perfectio fuit in statu innocentiae, quando natura habuit quicquid habere debuit secundum statum illum, & forte plus, quia habuit Justitiam originalem gratuito naturae superadditam. Ab utraque autem Perfectione deficit Perfectio, quam potest secundum cursum communem habere natura humana in statu naturae corruptae, quia non potest totaliter vitare, quum incidat in aliquem defectum rationis, saltem in aliquod peccatum veniale. Secundum verò hoc in dilectione Dei potest attendi duplex perfectio & totalitas: una quando nihil deerit de his quae homo potest expendere in amorem Dei, quin totum semper & in actu in dilectione Dei ponat, & haec perfectio seu totalitas non ponitur nobis sub praecepto pro statu viae quia nobis non est possibilis, status enim viae non compatitur continuationem in actu, sed implebitur in Patriâ quando semper Beati videbunt Deum, & diligent ipsum, & omnia in ejus dilectionem referent ut in sinem. Alia est totalitas vel Perfectio secundum quam homo nihil subtrahit de his quae debet ponere in dilectione Dei, & haec perfectio seu totalitas non excludit interruptionem actus, nec amorem cujuscunque alterius à Deo, etiamsi actu non ordinetur in Deum, dum tamen non sit contrarium vel repugnans charitati, sicut est peccatum veniale, & haec totalitas praecioitur nobis, ut nunc implenda, & constat quod impleri potest, quia homo diligit Deum totaliter ex toto cord, etc. quicunque vitat omne peccatum mortale, quod solum est charitati contrarium: sed quilibet homo hoc potest pro statu viae facere: ergo, etc.  
§. 36. According to this he shapes his answers to the objections. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus potest in viâ amari totaliter nisi quod disting vendum est de totalitate dilectionis: hoc enim potest sumi vel ex parte rei dilectae, & sic totaliter diligitur res illa, cujus nihil est quod non diligatur, & sic cum nihil sit in Deo quod non possit ab homine diligi Deus potest hoc modo totaliter amari & in viâ & in Patriâ sed perfectius in Patriâ, sicut & perfectius cognoscitur: & sicut dictum est de amore, sic intelligendum est de cognition. Alio modo potest sumi hic totalitas ex parte diligentis, & sic potest Deus totaliter diligi, & diligitur ab his qui sunt in Patriâ, qui nihil de potestate suâ subtrahunt, quin totum ponunt in dilectione Dei semper & secundum actum: in viâ verò non sic potest diligi, sed solum secundum habitum modo, quo est expositum, quod solum cadit pro nunc sub praecepto. Alio modo potest sumi talis totalitas ex regulatione dilectionis ad diligibile, & sic totaliter diligitur illud cujus bonitati aequatur quantitas dilectionis: & sic Deus non potest diligi ab alio quam à seipso. And then to the second he answers. Quod illud argumentum bene probat, quod Deus non potest in viâ diligi totaliter vel perfectè prout totalit as vel perfectio excludit omnem defectum: sed illud ut dictum est non cadit sub praecepto, potest tamen totaliter diligi totalitate excludente omne repugnans & contrarium & hoc sufficit ad impletionem praecepti. His reasons of this determination are first, quia nullus potest ligari ad illud quod est sibi impossibile. 2. quia actus charitatis est magis necessarius in viâ, quam actus aliarum virtutum secundum illud, 1 Cor. 13. si charitatem non non habuero, etc. And since the Acts of all other virtues may be performed, therefore much more the Acts of the Queenvirtue and grace, without which all the rest are nothing; and since no Law obliges to that which is simply now impossible, and yet we are obliged to love God, with all the heart, while we are here in the body. It follows that we may so love God, as we are bound to love him, which can only be according to the sense and exposition above given. So Durand. §. in contrarium arguitur. G.  
§. 37. But there is one thing more which I had almost forgotten to take notice of in that Author. It is in his answer ad secundum in the former question. Dicendum quod 
●.  similem modificationem habet actus charitatis, sicut actus sidei, quia uterque habet duas primas modificationes, & neuter Tertiam, saltem respectu principalis Objecti, quod est Deus, quamvis fides respectu objectorum secundariorum possit habere superfluum & diminutum & medium, potest enim aliquis plus credere quam oportet, & minus quam oportet, & secundum quod oportet, & sic est in actu charitatis, non quidem respectu Dei, sed respectu aliorum: potest enim aliquis diligere propter Deum minus quam oportet, ut si diligat propter Deum tantum amicos, & magis quam oportet, ut si malos in malitiis suis, sic enim diligendi sunt homines, ut non diligantur eorum errores, secundum Augustinum, & quantum oportet, ut cum diligitur Deus, & omne bonum propter ipsum, ut ad Deum ordinatur. Thus far that good old Schoolman.  
§. 38. And now let our Refuter consider and compare this with Aquinas and Scotus, and then tell me whether there be not an exact harmony between them. Nay let him tell me, what there is in all this determination he can justly find fault with. I only except that passage, where he says, We are not bound by this Law to avoid venial sins, whilst we are in the way to heaven. And yet if this had been rightly expressed or understood according to the mind of the Author, perhaps our Refuter might be persuaded not to condemn it. If then our Author had said, that though by reason of our lapsed condition, it is impossible we should arrive at an absolute sinless perfection, yet bond we are by that Law to endeavour as much as in us lies to labour after this perfection, and the shunning of all sin whatsoever, whether venial or mortal, which if we sincerely labour after, and do not attain it, (as we possibly cannot now in this present state) yet according to the Grace and Mercy and Tenor of the Gospel Covenant through Faith and Repentance we shall be accepted in Christ, as if we had actually arrived to this sinless perfection, I see not how our Refuter could find fault, or else better state and determine the question then this Author has done.  
§. 39 And now if it appear, that this was the sense of S. Austin and Bernard in those very places that our Refuter himself hints at, I hope he will then the less blame D. Hammonds opinion for the future; because it so exactly comes up to the mind of those Authors he would have the Doctor's opinion to be measured by. And this is our last Task. And for this I shall only appeal to those very places that Chamier himself has thought fit to urge against Bellarmine.  
§. 40. And first we shall inquire from S. Austin, what is, and aught to be by this Law the Measure of our Love of God. And for this Chamier urges this l. 1 de Doctrinâ Christianâ, c. 22. and he calls it luculentissimam disertissimámque authoritatem. 
Chamier.  It is the very same that the Master of the Sentences has quoted to this very purpose, l. 3. Sent. d. 27. E. de modo diligendi Deum. Haec regula dilectionis divinitùs constituta est. Diliges, inquit proximum tuum sicut teipsum, Deum verò ex toto cord, & ex tota anima, & ex tota ment: ut omnes cogitationes tuas, & omnem vitam, & omnem intellectum in illum conferas, à quo habes ea ipsa quae confers: Quum autem ait toto cord, tota anima, tota ment, nullam vitae nostrae partem relinquit, quae vacare debeat, & quasi locum dare, ut alia re velit frui. Sed quicquid aliud diligendum venerit in animum illuc rapiatur, quo totius dilectionis impetus currit. Thus far S. Austin. And thus also the Doctor, as has already been demonstrated, and it shall be readily subscribed by me what Chamier adds. Ex his quis non videt olim Christianis persuasissimum fuisse debere se ita Deum amare, non tantum ut ei nihil anteponatur, quod Bellarminus tanquam in Deum liberalissimus concedit, sed etiam ut totus in amore Dei occupetur? Chamier Tom. 3. l. 6. c. 12. §. 33. 34. p. 191.  
§. 41. 
* Vid. August. Enchirid. cap. 121.  It cannot be denied, but that by this Law of holy Love we are bound to labour, as much as in us lies, to please God in all things, to mortify every even the least sin, and wicked thought and inclination, to repent, amend, and employ all that is within us and without us in God's service, so that whatsoever we do, must all be done by us to the glory of God. And as this is the most that S. Austin here in this place requires, and Chamier presses against Bellarmine, so it is acknowledged in terminis by the Doctor, as has been proved, and our Refuter may make what advantage he can by it, and he shall have my most hearty leave and concession.  
§. 42. But there be two other places quoted by the same learned Chamier tom. 3. l. 11. c. 14. §. 1. which perhaps our Refuter may think more for his advantage.  
§. 43. The first is taken from the same S. Austin l. de perfectione Justitiae responso 15. Peccatum est, cum vel non est charitas quae esse debet, vel minor est quam debet, sive hoc voluntate vitari possit, sive non possit.  
§. 44. And this shall as easily be assented to by me as the Former, For without doubt, it must needs be a sin, when any man performs not, what Gods Law requires, whether it be now by reason of Original Sin in his power to fulfil it, or whether by bad customs, and evil habits he has further rendered himself unable to perform, what the Law requires. For thus the words 
† The whole passage in S. Austin lies thus. Peccatum est autem cum vel non est charitas, quae esse debet, sive hoc voluntate vitari possit, sive non possit: quid si potest, praesens voluntas hoc facit, si autem non potest, pr● terita voluntas hoc fecit: & tamen vitari potest, non quando voluntas superba. laudatur, sed quando humilis adjuvatur. Augustin. de perfect. Justit. c. 6. respon. ad Ratiocinat.. 15.  may be (as they lie in that passage) expounded, unless our Refuter can show from some other place in that Father, that he meant more than this. But than what is the obligation of the Law, and the duty required by it, Saint Austin determines not here. And therefore we must look further.  
§. 45. For this the learned Chamier insists on a passage taken out of his 29. Epistle, and M. Cawdrey has borrowed it from him, and so does our Refuter. it is this, Charitas quamdiu augeri potest, profecto illud, quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est. Ex quo vitio non justificabitur in conspectu Dei, omnis vivens: propter quod vitium, si dixerimus quod peccatum non habemus nosmet ipsos seducimus. To this I shall say nothing at present, but only that D. Hammond in his answer to M. Cawdrey's Triplex Diatribe has abundantly answered it. And because our Refuter has made use of it in his next Section, I shall refer the Account of it unto its proper place.  
§. 46. We come now to inquire into S. Augustine's opinion concerning the obligation of this Precept, and to examine whether he thought it may be fulfiled; or whether he resolves that it does oblige believers now under the gospel-covenant, in that sense he determines it cannot be fulfilled. And this is the only business of moment to be insisted on, to satisfy to the full all the pretences of our Refuter.  
§. 47. And for this there are but two places produced by Chamier, and they are both the same which Peter Lombard makes use of in the distinction formerly quoted. F. de impletione illius mandati, &, G. Quaest. de Praecepti Ratione. The first is taken out of S. Austin de Spirit. & Literâ. c. 36. sed fortasse, quispiam putaverit nihil nobis deesse ad cognitionem Justitiae, quod Dominus verbum consummans & brevians super terram, dixit in duobus praeceptis totam Legem Prophetasque pendere, nec ea tacuit sed verbis apertissimis prompsit: Diliges inquit Dominum Deum ex toto corde tuo, & ex tota animâ tuâ, & ex totâ ment tuâ: & diliges proximum tuum tanquam teipsum. Quid verius his impletis impleri omnem justitiam? veruntamen qui hoc attendit, etiam illud attendat, quam in multis offendimus emnes, dum putamus Deo, quem diligimus, placere, vel non displicere, quod facimus: & postea per scripturam ejus sine certà & perspicuâ Ratione commoniti, cum didicerimus, quod ei non placeat, poenitendo deprecamur ut ignoscat. Plena humana vita est documentis talibus; unde autem minus novimus, quid ci placeat, nisi quia & ipse minus notus est nobis? Videmus enim nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Quis vero existimare audeat, cum eo ventum fuerit, quod ait, ut cognoscam, sicut & cognitus sum, tantam Dei dilectionem fore contemplatoribus ejus quanta sidelibus nunc est? aut illo modo hanc illi tanquam de proximo comparandam? Porro si quanto major notitia, tanto erit major dilectio: perfecto tunc quantum deest dilectioni, tantum nunc perficiendae justitiae deesse credendum est. Sciri enim aliquid vel credi, & tamen non diligi potest: diligi autem, quod neque scitur, neque creditur, non potest. At si credendo ad tantam dilectionem sancti pervenire poterunt, quâ certe majorem in hac vitâ esse non posset Dominus ipse testatus est, ut animam suam pro fide & fratribus ponerent: cum ab hac peregrinatione in quâ per fidem nunc ambulatur, perventum erit ad speciem, quam nondum vitam speramus, & per patientiam expectamus, procul dubio & ipsa dilectio, non solum supra quam hic habemus, sed longe supra quam petimus, & supra quam intelligimus, erit: nec ideo tamen esse plus poterit, quam ex toto cord, ex totâ animâ, & ex tota ment: neque enim restat in nobis aliquid, quod addi possit ad totum; quia si restabit aliquid, illud non erit totum. Proinde hoc erit primum praeceptum Justitiae quo jubemur diligere Deum ex toto cord, ex tota anima & ex totâ ment, cui est de Proximo diligendo alterum consequens, quod in illa vita complebimus, cum videbimus facie ad faciem. Sed ideo nobis hoc etiam nunc praeceptum est, ut admoneremur, quià fide exposcere, quo spem praemittere, et obliviscendo quae retro sunt, in quae anteriora nos extendere debeamus. At per hoc quantum mihi videatur in ea quae perficienda est Justitia multum in hac vita ille profecit, qui quam longe sit à Perfectione justitiae proficiendo cognovit. And a little after, Ad illam vitam jam immortalem pertinet, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto cord & ex tota anima tua & ex tota virtute: ad hanc autem, non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore ad obediendum desideriis ejus. The second place in the same Saint Austin that the learned Chamier urges §. 3. is taken from his Treatise the perfectione Justitiae ad Ratiocinationem 17. In plenitudine charitatis Praeceptum illud implebitur, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto cord, & ex tota anima tua, & ex tota ment tua. Nam cum est aliquid carnalis concupiscentiae, quod vel continendo fraenetur, non omnimodo ex tota anima diligitur Deus. Non enim caro sine anima concupiscit, quamvis Caro concupiscere dicitur, quia carnaliter anima concupiscit. Tunc erit justus sine ullo omnino peccato, quia nulla lex erit in membris ejus repugnans legi mentis ejus, sed prorsus toto cord, tota anima, tota ment diliget Deum, quod est primum summúmque praeceptum. Cur ergo non praeciperetur homini ista Perfectio, quamvis eam in hac vita nemo habeat? Non enim recte eurritur, si quo currendum est nesciatur: quomodo autem sciretur, si nullis praeceptis ostenderetur? Thus far S. Austin as he is quoted by Chamier. The Testimony of Bernard follows, in Cantic. serm. 50. si placet tibi magis de affectuali charitate datum fuisse mandatum, non inde contendo, dummodo acquiescas & tu mihi quod minimè in vita ista ab aliquo hominum possit adimpleri. Quis enim sibi arrogare id audeat, quod Paulus ipse fatetur non comprehendisse? Nec latuit praeceptorem praecepti pondus hominum excedere vires; sed indicavit utile ex hoc ipso, suae illos insufficientiae admoneri, & ut scirent sane, ad quem Justitiae finem niti pro viribus oporteret. Ergo mandando impossibilia, non praevaricatores fecit homines sed humiles, ut omne os obstruatur, & subditus fiat omnis mundus Deo: quia ex operibus Legis non justificabitur omnis caro coram illo. Accipientes quippe mandatum, & sentientes defectum, clamabimus in coelum, & miserebitur nostrî Deus: & sciemus in illâ die, quia non ex operibus Justitiae, quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit. Thus far S. Bernard as he is cited by Chamier. And as I must acknowledge the truth of those two excellent Father's doctrine all along in them, so I must acknowledge that as they are urged by us against the Popish Doctrine of Merit ex condigno, Justification by works, and supererogation, and the fulfilling of the Law according to this perfect rule of Righteousness and the Covenant of works, they are unanswerable, and I must also say with Chamier, Magnum hoc & inevitabile telum est, senserunt adversarii momentum. Itaque omnem movent lapidem ut eludant. Chamier tom. 3. l. 11. c. 14. §. 1, 2, 3, 4.  
§. 48. But then I must add, that this nothing concerns the Doctor's opinion, and as little the Schoolmen, and that there is little or no difference between theirs and Saint Augustine's and Bernard's opinions, as the Reader will soon perceive, if he be pleased to compare them.  
§. 49. All that is said in those passages, or that (as I conceive) can be rationally inferred from them, I shall briefly sum up in these Theorems.  
1. That the Law of God is the perfect Rule of Righteousness.  
2. That Perfection of Righteousness consists in an exact and sinless obedience and conformity to this Rule.  
3. That no man can be Justified by this Law according to the Covenant of works that does not thus perfectly observe it.  
4. That our Saviour has briefly summed up this Perfection of Righteousness, and the whole drift of the Law in these two precepts. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, etc. and our neighbours as ourselves.  
5. That he that perfectly keeps these has fulfilled all Righteousness.  
6. That in our lapsed condition we do not, we cannot so observe it, because experience, and Scripture teach us, that in many things we offend all.  
7. That though we do not, we cannot now observe it, yet by Faith and Repentance promised in the Gospel, according to the tenor of the second Covenant we shall find mercy and grace.  
8. That even Adam in innocence, though he had persevered in that state, could not have arrived to the utmost perfection of Love, that is contained in those precepts, because,  
9 This utmost perfection of love depends upon a clear intuitive knowledge of God.  
10. That here we walk by Faith, and hereafter only in heaven we shall walk by fight, where only we shall know as we are known.  
11. That since our Love depends upon our knowledge of God, and the more that increases, the more will our Love, than so much must be wanting to the perfection of our Love as is wanting to this knowledge.  
12. That though the utmost perfection of Love, that a Saint now in viâ and in his Pilgrimage to heaven can arrive at, consists, as our Saviour himself testifies, in laying down our lives for the faith and the Brethren, yet that perfection of love that the Saints now enjoy in heaven, and we hope and patiently look for, far exceeds this, and all else that we can pray for, or understand. And yet,  
13. This love of the Saints now made perfect in heaven is no more, than what is contained in this Precept; it is no more than a love of God with all the heart, etc. Because nothing can be added to that which is perfectly the whole, and if any thing might be added, as yet it were not the whole. And therefore  
14. This of loving God with all the heart is the first great precept of that all full all perfect righteousness, and the second it like unto it; and they shall both then be perfectly fulfiled by us when we come to heaven, where we shall see God face to face.  
15. That this perfect Rule of righteousness and love, though it cannot be fulfiled in our lapsed estate according to the perfection of innocence, much less according to the perfection of glory, yet it was imposed upon us for this end, that we might know what to aim at, and hope for, and endeavour after, as much as we can, and forgetting what is behind, we might earnestly press toward the mark set before us.  
16. That this love in this utmost height and perfection which the Saints now enjoy belongs not to sinners, but Saints, not to this frail mortal life, but that other which is immortal.  
17. That the righteousness and Perfection of Charity that belongs to believers in this life, is, that we strive against sin, and suffer not sin to reign in our mortal bodies that we should obey it in the lusts thereof. And therefore  
18. Since this sinless perfection of Charity much less that Perfection of glory is not possible to be attained by us in this our lapsed estate, God imposed this impossible command on us (who well knew our frailty, and the moment and weight of this Law) not to judge us by it as transgressors at the last day, but only to humble us, and that every mouth might be stopped, and the world be convinced, that by the works of the Law no flesh can be justified, but that reading our own weakness, and frailties, and miseries, and sins, and wants in this perfect Law, we might come to the throne of Grace, to find Grace to help in time of need, from him in that day, who then not by works of righteousness which we have wrought, but according to his mercy must, and will save us.  
19 That God saw it reasonable, even in this lapsed estate, to prescribe us this rule of Perfection, though no man can attain unto it, that we might know the end of our race, and the crown and reward of our endeavours, which awaits us at the end of the Goal, and to what perfection of righteousness and holiness we should aim at, and endeavour, and labour after, and consider not what we yet have attained, and then lazily sit down, as if we had done sufficiently, but still look forward, and consider what yet we want.  
20. That he is the greatest proficient in this School of Perfection, and has arrived highest to it, that considering the excellency of the mark set before us, does humbly acknowledge how much he is short of it, and still labours to go higher, so long as he continues in the race and way to it, so long as he is a stranger and Pilgrim on earth and a traveller toward heaven.  
§. 50. This is the utmost those two Fathers drive at, and I desire our Refuter to sit down, and consider, whether he can possibly make more of them then here I have done. And if this will content him, I shall here subscribe to the truth of every Theorem, and so will the Doctor. Indeed there is nothing here, but what is fully contained in the Doctor's writings, especially in the Practical Catechism, as the Reader will soon perceive, if he be pleased only to review the places already quoted. And if Bellarmine, or any Papist else, deny the truth of any one of these, or maintain any thing contrary to them, I shall lend our Refuter mies helping hand, if he will accept of such poor assistance, to oppose him in his errors.  
§. 51. But then for all that I must tell him, that he will never be able to prove, that S. Austin or Bernard ever imagined or determined, that this Law of Perfect righteousness and love, according to the strictness of the Covenant of works, much less according to the Perfection of Glory, is the rule whereby God will Judge or absolve believers at the latter day, because they are not under the Law but under Grace; and the Perfection of Glory was even in Paradise impossible to Adam; absolutely, simply impossible; and by God's penal decree, the sinless perfection of righteousness in Innocence, is now according to God's ordinary power and grace impossible to believers, whilst they are yet in the way.  
§. 52. Indeed plain it is, that both S. Austin and Bernard determine the contrary; they say in express terms that here in this life we are bound not to suffer sin to reign, that we be 
Vib. August. de perfect. Justitiae contra Coelestium per tot.  humble, and repent, and rely on God's mercy, and labour as much as possibly we can, to press towards the mark, to be as holy as we can; and this is all, they say, is required of us to Justification. And if they speak that more is required, it is only to let us know our last hopes, and last end, and last perfection, beyond which we cannot go, and after which we should pant, and long for, as the Hart does after the water-brooks. They tell us it is the Crown at the end of the Goal which we must run for, and not the race itself to the kingdom of heaven. For otherwise they must say that believers are now under the Law, as well as Adam was, and not under Grace, which is directly contrary to the Apostle, and those very writings from whence these passages are cited, and the whole tenor of their works. And therefore all things being so fair and clear it would be too great a torment to the Reader to trouble him with any other places from those Fathers to this purpose.  
§. 53. And now being come to the top of the Hill, let us cast our eyes back, and review our walk, and well consider how we are gone on in our way,  
First then, plain it is that both the Fathers and Schoolmen quoted by our Refuter against the Doctor, speak of an absolute sinless perfection, and more, a freedom from sin, and a Love as large as heaven itself, and the fruition of God can afford, when they say the Commandment cannot to that perfection be fulfilled in this life.  
Secondly as plain it is, that the Schoolmen in their discourses of charity, as well Aquinas and his Scholars in secunda secundae, and the Master of the Sentences in his third book, and the 27. Distinction etc. generally speak of the habit of divine Charity, whereby we are enabled to fulfil God's commandments, and little or nothing of the Acts of this love, especially, when they expound these two great commandments of Charity; and particularly they do so even in these very places from whence our Refuters quotations are taken.  
§. 54. Now I shall desire the Reader to consider how this nothing at all concerns the Doctor, and the Question in debate between him and his adversary.  
For, 1. The Question is concerning the degree and gradual intention of the Acts, not the habit of divine Charity, and now our Refuters proofs all concern the latter, and not the former, which was never in debate.  
2. The Question betwixt the Refuter and the Doctor concerns not the Acts of that high transcendent Love, which is immediately planted upon God, but only the Acts of charity as generally taken for the fruits and effects, and demonstrations of this Love immediately planted on God, such as are the Acts of mercy, and , zeal, and fervour in Prayer, and the like, and his proofs belong nothing to this at all, but the former, if they concern that.  
3. The Doctor oftentimes expressly declares in his answer to M. Cawdrey, written in defence of the Treatise of Will-worship, which our Refuter now undertakes to overthrow, that it is not that absolute sinless perfection that he means or speaks of, when he says it consists in a latitude, and has degrees, but only of the sincerity of this or that particular Act of virtue or grace, when he says it consists in a latitude and has degrees, and may be fulfiled by God's grace, though a man arrive not to an absolute sinless perfection, and exactly keep not all the Commandments of God, according to the strictness of the Law. And yet our Refuters arguments and Quotations do all belong to the former, and little or nothing concern the latter, alone in debate.  
§. 55. And therefore, if I thought I might any ways gratify our Refuter, I shall grant him all he desires, and so eagerly pleads for, and yet undertake to make good the Doctor's argument and Position.  
§. 56. And yet for all that our Refuter is confident that (as if the Doctor's Treatise of will-worship were like Archimedes his sphere though curious to the eye, and made with great and subtle Art, yet the frame was but of Glass) he has utterly dashed this excellent composure to pieces with this single blow; and that though M. Cawdrey had failed, yet now nothing was left to secure the Doctor from his all-conquering sword of discourse, but Bellarmine's shield and Buckler for his last refuge and defence. And therefore thus gravely he bespeaks the Doctor, and with the mercy of a Conqueror.  

JEANES.  
The first that Bellarmine hath to avoid these testimonies is not unknown to me, viz. that they are to be understood of the Command, quatenus indicat finem, non quatenus praecipit medium, If you think fit to adventure hereupon, I must needs entreat you to remove first out of your way the Replies of Chamier and Ames unto it.   
§. 5. 57 Well Sir, you have said; but how well advisedly I shall leave the Reader to consider. For though what is known or unknown to you, I well know not, yet this I know, that your knowledge and skill in Bellarmine and Aquinas is not very great, and that no man of Ingenuity and Judgement, that had ever read the places, either in Aquinas or Bellarmine, would have suffered such a passage to drop from his pen. For what is the Relative to this (They) in this passage? Is it not plain, that it refers to the places of Aquinas and Scotus? you name indeed Austin and Bernard, but you cite them not atall. And will not now any man that reads this passage against the Doctor, conclude, that this was a trick of Bellarmine's, on purpose invented to decline the force of these Quotations of Aquinas and Scotus brought against him by Chamier? What else can be the meaning of it? But now though it be true that this distinction is made use of by Bellarmine, to declare what he thought of the meaning of Saint Austin and Bernard in the passages already quoted by us from Chamier, yet was not this distinction invented by Bellarmine, much less coined by him to evade the testimonies of Aquinas and Scotus that are urged by our Refuter. Sir, Bellarmine found this distinction made to his hands by Aquinas himself, and applied it is by Aquinas in the very same manner as Bellarmine uses it, to declare what he thought was the meaning of Saint Austin in those places, as will be plain to any man that shall peruse the places formerly quoted from Aquinas. And if those be not clear enough, I shall desire him to consult the same Aquinas secunda secundae, q. 27. art. 6. in Corpore (a place too large to be transcribed to so little purpose) where this is ex professo handled. If then Bellarmine in answer to those two quotations of Aquinas, and Scotus, says they are to be understood of the command quatenus indicat finem, non quatenus praecipit medium, be the answer to Saint Austin, what it will, or the distinction true or false, he says true in this, that Aquinas so is to be understood (if Aquinas knew his own meaning) that says expressly that he meant so. And whether Aquinas truly said that this was the meaning of S. 
† Horum testimoniorum aliqua currentes exhortamur ut perfectè currant, aliqua ipsum finem commemorant, quo currendo pertendant. Ingredi autem sine maculâ non absurdè etiam ille dicitur, non qui jam perfectus est; sed qui ad ipsam Persectionem irreprehensibiliter currit, carens criminibus damnabilibus, atque ipsa peccata venialia non negligen● mundare eleemosynis. Ingressum quip, hoc est, iter nostrum, quo tendimus in perfectionem, munda mundat oratio. Munda est autem oratio ubi veraciter dicitur, Dimitte nobis sicut & dimittimus, ut dum non reprehenditur, quod non imputatur, sine reprehensione, hoc est, sine maculâ, noster ad persectionem cursus habeatur: in quâ perfectione, cum ad eam pervenerimus, jam non sit omnino quod ignoscendo mundetur. August. de perfect. Justit. c. 9 vid. etiam c. 10.  Austin and Bernard in those places, though it concerns not the Doctor to determine, who is not engaged in that controversy at all, yet I shall leave it to the Readers Judgement, whether Aquinas says truly, and shall rest in expectation till our Refuter shall tell us, what are the most material exceptions in Chamier, and Aims against it, that he insists on. For if this be his way of arguing, there will be no end of controversies, and when we have obeyed him in his desires, he will yet be at liberty to say, that he meant not these already considered, but some others.  
§. 58. Howsoever I shall not envy our Refuter any advantage he can make by these Replies. If he thinks fit to make use of them, I am willing to be so courteous, as not to forestall his market. And he has reason to thank me that I have afforded him some materials to furnish his next answer. Yet I cannot but observe that he is willing to teach young learners to construe Latin amiss, and he would very fain persuade the world that Bellarminus Enervatus signifies in English Doctor Hammond Confuted.  
§. 59 If our Refuter shall yet say, That if it be granted that the Law requires, that we love God with all our strength, and as much as we can, then consequently there will be no room for uncommanded degrees of love. To this I answer him, That if what we have already said concerning this objection do not satisfy, I shall desire him, because he is a Schoolman to look for an answer in Cajetan, 2. 2. q. 184. art. 3. the Article from whence his second quotation from Aquinas is taken, where in his Commentary he has both proposed, and answered this Argument.  
§. 60. And thus at last to mine, and I doubt not to the Readers great contentment, we are got out of a tedious digression that concerns not at all the Treatise of will-worship, much less the Ectenesteron.   

SECT. 30.  
The Refuters return. His Proof impertinent; weakens a known Truth. Christ's Agony a fit season for heightening Ardency in Prayer. As Comprehensor he enjoyed an Intuitive knowledge of the Divine Essence. Hence a Love necessary. Love as viator. Beatific Love hindered not the Free Exercise of this Love, and Graces: nor his Happiness his Grief in the sensitive Appetite. Suarez. Hence a gradual difference in the Acts of Love as Viator. Particularly in Prayer. Fallacy à dicto secundum quid. His Confounding of Terms. Grounds. Motives. Occasion. What. Christ as Comprehensor still had Cause to Love God, but no Grounds, Motives, nor Occasions. As viator he had. Refuters' Contradictions. Tautologies. Love of Desire Complacency, distinguished, not divided. One oft gins the other. Bishop Andrews. Natural Love of Desire in Christ. What Hope in Christ. Love of Concupiscence, though first in Men, yet otherwise in Christ. Threefold Love of Complacency in Christ. Experimental Love of Desire and Complacence in him capable of Increase. Both heightened at his Passion. Ardency of these and of Prayer different. Of which the Doctor. Vanity of the Refuters Title page.  
§. 1. ANd now, with our Refuters good leave, we are come to our first argument, The Ardency of Christ's Prayer. To this at his return he says,  

JEANES.  
Thirdly, you seem in the latter end of Section the 39 to intimate, that in the time of Christ's Agony there was more occasion for the heightening of his Love of God, then there was at other times. What you mean by these occasions of heightening Christ's Love of God that you intimate, I will not undertake to guests, but this I am sure of, that at all other times, he had sufficient causes, grounds and motives to induce him to Love God with as heightened degrees of Actual Love as the humane nature could reach unto; he enjoyed the beatifical vision, a clear, evident, and intuitive knowledge of the divine essence, that had in it all the fullness of goodness, and so was an object infinitely lovely and amiable: Now such an object thus known, thus seen, challengeth such a measure of actual Love, as that it leaveth no place for a further and higher degree. The Thomists generally maintain that this most intense Love of God is a natural and necessary sequel of the beatifical vision, necessary quoad exercitium, as well as quoad specificationem actus; now that which works naturally and necessarily, works as vehemently and forcibly as it can, omne agens de necessitate, necessario agit usque ad ultimum potentiae suae; therefore the inward Acts of Christ's Love of God were always as ardent, and fervent as he could perform them, and therefore some were not more intense then others: for if we speak of a liberty of indifferency, and indetermination, he had no more liberty towards the intention of the inward Acts of his Love, than he had towards the Acts themselves.   
§. 2. You have said, Sir, but I must tell you that though this argument is wiredrawn to the utmost length, yet there is nothing proved all this while, that is in debate betwixt you and your adversary. You need not have spent so much time in proving, that Christ as Comprehensor did love God to the utmost height possible. It should have been granted you for ask. It is a known undoubted truth in the Schools, a Perfection that de congruo follows from the Hypostatical union, and therefore questioned by none, but the Socinians, and those that deny the divinity of Christ.  
§. 3. But I see by experience, that Gold, the most solid, most ponderous of Metals, may be beaten so thin, that it may be moved with a breath, and broken with a touch. And our Refuter is so unhappy, as to weaken an undoubted truth by his overmuch proving it. For if the inward Acts of Christ's love were always at the utmost height, because this most intense love is a natural and necessary sequel of the Beatifical vision, than it necessarily follows, if his love were always thus intense, that then he always enjoined the Beatifical vision, the sole and necessary cause of such a love. For it is an undoubted Maxim, That Positis aut sublatis effectu & causâ necessariis, ponuntur & tolluntur causa & effectus. And if so, what then shall we say to the Author of a mixture of Scholastical divinity with Practical, Henry Jeanes of Chedzoy? For says he not expressly, That it is not to be denied, 
Mixture of Scholast with Pract. p. 261.  but that by special dispensation, there was some restraint of the influence of this happiness or beatifical vision, in the whole course of his humiliation, and Particularly in the time of his doleful Passien? And now if his fervour of love, were a natural issue of the beatifical vision, it will necessarily follow that as that his happiness, and clear intuitive sight of the divine Essence was restrained, so the fervour of his love was proportionably abated also.  
§. 4. But not to trouble ourselves much with any contradictions of our Refuter, I suppose he meant well; whatsoeever he says. It was truly said by Saint Leo, and all Antiquity has approved it, that at the time of our Saviour's Passion, Non dissolvit unionem, sed subtraxit visionem. And hence it comes to pass that we read of our Saviour's saying, My soul is exceeding sorrowful unto death, and his crying upon the Cross, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? And I believe our Refuter is not ignorant what M. Calvin has said of that expostulation.  
§ 5. And why then might not this be a fit season for the heightening of the Ardency of our Saviour's zeal and devotion, when he prayed for the restoring of those comforts and Joys that flowed from the Influence of the Beatifical vision, which now was restrained? The more comfort and happiness he formerly enjoyed from this clear intuitive knowledge, the more earnestly now, without doubt, he would long for it. And had not now our blessed Saviour in this extremity, and bitterness of his Passion, and sufferings, when the manhood was left naked, without any beams of comfort streaming from the Godhead, which now by special dispensation, our Refuter grants, (as indeed it is most evident from Scripture also) were restrained, had not now I say our blessed Saviour occasion enough for the heightening of his fervour in prayer, had he not now grounds and motives sufficient to induce him to advance his ardency, and zeal, when he prays for the restauration of those joys? For who so ardently longs for a Repossession of happiness, as he that has once been satisfied with the ravishing contentments of it? The loss of those comforts, which David formerly enjoyed, was it, that made him so earnestly cry out, Psal. 51. 12. Restore unto me the joy of thy Salvation, and uphold me with thy free Spirit: Make me to hear joy and gladness, that the bones which thou hast broken may rejoice. The Iron that has once been touched with the Loadstone, and enjoyed the benefit and sweetness of that magnetic Love, and Influence, does more earnestly desire and move stronger to a Reunion with that Loadstone, than it did before the touching. And this is abundantly sufficient to demonstrate the utmost of the Doctor's pretences in his Ectenesteron, who there undertakes only to show that the fervency of Christ's zeal and devotion in Prayer was in his Agony increased. But then because it is an Act of Piety and devotion, and consequently of Charity and love to God, as that is commonly taken in the Scripture (of which Love alone does the Doctor speak,) and so is not that Love, that high transcendent Love, which flowed from the Beatifical vision, which our Saviour, as Comprehensor, enjoyed (and that which our Refuter here speaks of) plain it is that by this Argument (if all were granted) he opposes not the Doctor.  
§. 6. But then this is not only sufficient to acquit the Doctor, but also to destroy all the truth in his Argument. For if now, especially in the time of our Saviour's doleful passion, the Influence of the Godhead, and beatifical vision were restrained, than it evidently follows that now at least there was more occasion then formerly even for the heightening of his love of God, as that is properly taken. For our Love of necessity must bear a proportion and correspondence to our knowledge, and therefore we shall love more, infinitely more, when we see God face to face, than now possibly we can, when we see him only in aenigmate, in speculo, by Faith as in a glass darkly. And consequently so must it be with our Saviour's love also, at least during this restraint. And therefore (to grant to our Refuter what he adds in that Treatise immediately after) though surely it seems very improbable, and no ways sortable unto the state of Christ's blessedness, for his grace and holiness, the image of God in him (his love of God in the habit) to be liable unto perpetual motion, and augmentation, yet even there he himself expressly grants, that his Actual grace and wisdom, and consequently his acts of divine love did increase, and gradually differ: and if he should here deny it, this argument we have urged from his own concessions, will necessarily enforce it.  
§. 7. The truth is he met with a common received truth, but for want of skill and a right understanding of the Schoolmen, in whose shop this divine truth was first struck out, and discovered, he has almost destroyed it, by his manner of proof and labouring to defend it.  
§. 8. First then I grant, That Christ in the days of his Flesh was not purè viator, but also Comprehensor.  
2. That, as Comprehensor, he enjoyed a clear intuitive knowledge of the Divine Essence.  
3. That from this clear intuitive knowledge issued a Love answerable to it; an Actual love, most perfect and in the utmost height, always uninterrupted, always the same, because (as Suarez truly) erat simpliciter necessarius tam respectu Dei 
Vid. Suarez tom. 1. in 3 par. Thom. disp. 37. Sect. 4.  quam respectu propriae beatitudinis, it was an Act simply necessary, flowing from the beatifical vision, which Christ in the superior faculty of his soul, the mind always enjoyed, and which the congruo flows from the hypostatical union. This 
Ibid. disp. 37. sect. 4 p. 518. Col. 1. D. E.  they call amor beatificus animae Christi, & simpliciter necessarius.  
4. It is supposed by Suarez and others, that besides this beatific Love, there was also in Christ's soul an infused habit of Love, whereby he also loved God in the days of his flesh, as well as he knew him by a twofold supernatural knowledge, the beatific and infused, as he declares and proves at large. ibid. disp. 39 Sect. 7. p. 540.  
5. Hence it is that the same Suarez says, Tertio suppono 
Ibid. disp. sect. 5. p. 518. Col. 1. E. F. Col. 2. A. B.  Christum fuisse simul Comprehensorem & viatorem, ex quâ mirabili conjunctione consequenter effectum est miraculosè, ut proprii actus beatifici ita continerentur in supremâ parte animae, ut non redundarent in inferiorem, neque perfectionem suam cum illâ communicarent. Ad hunc ergo modum intelligi potest, ita animam illam amâsse Deum necessario, ut amor ille sisteret in solâ formali conjunctione & union ad Deum, suo modo ad formalem beatitudinem pertinente, & non se extenderet, nec communicaret (ut ita dicam) aliis operibus & actibus, qui in Christum ut viatorem conveniebant. Cum enim haec extensio, vel Communicatio fit per modum cujusdam efficientiae poterat facilè impediri, sicut fruitio beata impedita est, ne omnem tristitiam expelleret, nec inferiori portioni communicaret. Hoc ergo supposito facile intelligitur illum Dei amorem, quem anima Christi habuit, veluti consequentem scientiam infusam & non beatam fuisse liberum, etc. ex quo ulterius facile intelligatur, ab illo amore libero liberè etiam processisse actus obedientiae, charitatis proximi, & aliarum virtutum, quos Christus Dominus ut viator exercuit: tum quid ille amor est sufficiens principium & causa illorum, tum etiam quia amor beatificus, ut dictum est, veluti continebatur, ne influeret in hujusmodi actus, sed relinqueret voluntatem operari modo accommodato viatori. Thus he. Add to this what the same Suarez has demonstrated, ibid. disp. 39 Sect. 2. we have already quoted the place at large, and shall therefore refer the Reader to it.  
6. I shall crave leave of the Readers patience to acquaint him what the same author has further observed to our purpose in his Commentary on the 15. Question of the third part of Aquinas, art. 6. utrum in Christo fuerit tristitia?— Quanquam ex divinâ contemplatione, quae erat in animâ Christi redundare posset haec delectatio in appetitum sensitivum, divinâ tamen virtute impedita est, ne dolorem vel tristitiam sensibilem impediret: quam doctrinam docuerat D. Thomas art. praecedenti, ad tertium solvens difficultatem, quomodo anima Christi beata fuerit capax doloris, & tristitiae. Circa quam doctrinam supererat difficultas, quia ex illà videtur sequi in voluntate Christi nullam fuisse tristitiam, quia in illâ fuit summum gaudium ex divina contemplatione, & visione manans. Sequela patet, quia si appetitus sensitivus privatus est delectatione quae in ipsum derivari posset in fruitione beata ne fieret incapax tristitiae: ergo voluntas, in qua per se primò fuit gaudium illud beatificum, per illud effecta est omnino incapax tristitiae. Respondeo, D. Thomam hoc loco, ea tantum docuisse quae ad praesentem difficultatem solvendam sufficiebant, & assignasse modum, quo evidentius constare poterat appetitum sensitivum Christi fuisse capacem tristitiae: an vero alio modo potuerit voluntas esse capax tristitiae simul cum gaudio D. Thomas hoc loco neque negavit neque asseruit, quoniam ad rem not spectabat. Add praeterea D. Thomam non tantum voluisse ostendere appetitum sensitivum Christi fuisse capacem tristitiae secundum quid, seu secundum aliquam rationem sed absolute & simpliciter ita potuisse tristitiam pati, ut omnis delectationis & voluptatis expers aliquando fuerit. Quod in voluntate locum habere non potuit, quia licet secundum aliquam rationem potuerit tristari, tamen quia secundum potiorem & superiorem rationem semper fuit beata, non potuit omni gaudio privari: appetitus autem sensitivus fuit in statu possibili, & caruit statu beatifico, & ideo fuit capax talis tristitiae, quae omnem voluptatem excluderet: Caetera quae ad hanc difficultatem pertinent tractabimus infra, q. 18. Suarez ibid. pag. 460. 461.  
§. 9 From all which well considered (if already we have not given a full and satisfactory answer to all the pretences of this discourse of our Refuter) it will evidently appear; that though Christ as Comprehensor in the superior Part of his soul, had always a clear intuitive knowledge of the divine Essence and a natural and necessary love of God, thus clearly known, (which was always at the utmost height, still one and the same uninterrupted Act, because simply necessary) yet this beatific knowledge, and Love of God was so miraculously ordered, that it hindered not, nor any ways altered the Acts and operations of the inferior faculties of his soul, nor changed the manner of working of those his infused graces, whether of knowledge or love of God, or his neighbours, or the exercise of any other virtues and graces, necessary for him in the state of a viator. To all which as in that state he had a true and proper freedom, so he did truly merit by the free ezercise of them. And as the happiness he enjoyed in this superior faculty of his soul, as Comprehensor, did not hinder, but that at the time of his Passion, his soul, in the inferior parts, was sorrowful unto death, and had no comfort from those supernatural joys in the superior, which now by special providence and dispensation were suspended: so this natural and necessary fullness of his beafitick Love nothing hindered, but that there might be a gradual difference in the Acts and exercise of his infused love of God, or at least in the Acts of love towards us his neighbours, and the Acts of other virtues and graces. All which Acts of Piety and devotion, and zeal to God, and love to his neighbours, and obedience to God's commands, in the exercise of all other virtues and graces, his will did freely perform in that way, that was proper and most agreeable to the state of a viator. And consequently since every man in the exercise of these virtues and graces is bound to exercise them quoad debitas circumstantias, and since we have clearly showed already, that the same ardour and fervency is not required in every Act, it evidently follows, that, notwithstanding this superlative height and fervour in this his Actual Love, as Comprehensor, yet in respect of the other Acts of Love and holy Charity, and Piety and Obedience, and virtue (which he exercised freely as viator) there might be a gradual difference of fervour and intenseness, according as the present exigence required. And therefore if it appear (as it has already) that Christ in his bloody Agony had now greater occasion for the heightening of his Fervour in Prayer, then formerly, it also as clearly follows, that not only de facto he did pray more earnestly, then at other times, but it was his duty to do so. And here for avoiding of Cavils, I must mind our Refuter of calvin's observation formerly noted, that a time of affliction is a season for more than ordinary fervency in Prayer, and that God then calls for it, and Christ has instructed us in this lesson by his own Practice and example.  
§. 10. And therefore be it now granted to our Refuter, that Christ, during his abode upon earth, and the days of his flesh, enjoyed the beatifical vision, and by reason of that clear intuitive knowledge loved God to the utmost height possible; yet what will he thence conclude? will it follow, does he think, that therefore in every respect, and as viator also he so loved him? Or at least that he loved us, his neighbours so too, and that as necessary he did exercise all the other Acts of virtues and Graces and Piety and Charity and Obedience? If so, I must ask him, how then could Christ ever be in statu merendi, and even whilst he was viator, be the meritorious cause and Author of salvation to all them that obey him?  
§. 11. I must therefore mind him, that this his long Argument is no other than the old fallacy and Sophism à Dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Thus, Because Christ as Comprehensor loved God always at one utmost height, therefore as viator in every Act of divine Love and Piety and zeal and devotion and love to us his neighbours, and in every Act of virtue and Grace, he did so too; which how absurd and false it is, will appear at first sight I doubt not, even to our Refuter himself. And therefore I deny the sequel of his discourse. For though the Antecedent be true, that Christ as Comprehensor so loved, yet the Consequence is false and fallacious, that therefore as viator he did so too. And therefore the Doctor's Position of the Contrary to the Consequent must needs be true, That the Acts of Christ's Love or holy Charity, exercised by him as viator, might be gradually different in fervour, notwithstanding our Refuters' Antecedent be granted, which is all the medium he here brings to confute the Doctor's assertion. And now let me ask our Refuter, suppose I should say, If the Aethiop have white teeth, therefore the Aethiop is white, would he not say it was a ridiculous Sophism, à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter? I suppose he would thus answer, and he would answer truly. And yet such is his Argumentation here against the Doctor, and therefore so must be answered.  
§. 12. But this is not all the misadventure of our Refuters discourse. In this 1. He betrays very much ignorance and want of knowledge of those Logical terms of Art which he uses; and 2. His own discourse contradicts its self; and 3. He speaks most apparent tautologies, all unpardonable faults in one that professes himself to write in a scholastical way.  
§. 13. For first, he very inartificially confounds these terms, Occasion, grounds, and Motives, and Causes. For thus he says, What you mean by these Occasions of heightening Christ's Love of God, that you intimate, I shall not undertake to guess; but this I am sure of, that at all other times he had sufficient Causes, Grounds and Motives to induce him to love God with as heightened degrees of Actual Love, as the humane nature could reach unto, he enjoyed the beatifical vision, etc.  
§. 14. For the beatifical vision was a necessary Cause of this most heightened Actual Love: and such an Object as God is, thus known, challengeth (as himself speaks) such a measure of Actual Love, as that it leaveth no place for a further degree. And he adds, The Thomists generally maintain, that this most intense love of God is a Natural and Necessary sequel of the beatifical vision, Necessary quoad exercitium, as well as quoad specificationem actus. And it seems, he is of their opinion. For from hence he argues; Now that which works Naturally and Necessarily works as vehemently and forceably as it can.  
§. 15. But than Grounds and Motives to induce one to Love are not Necessary causes of Love. They are only suasoria, moral persuasions, and rational inducements to persuade a man, that has a proper freedom and liberty of indifferency and indetermination of the will (which yet expressly in this discourse the Refuter denies of Christ, either to the Acts or degrees of divine Love, of which he speaks) either to forsake that which he already embraces, or to follow that, which now he neglects, or else to heighten and quicken him, either in his flight, or embrace of any object, he declines, or pursues.  
§. 16. And then as for the term (Occasion), that is nothing else but an Opportunity and advantage of time and place that has some kind of virtue to excite the Agent to work at this instant, when now all impediments seem to be taken off. This is no other than a kind of Causa sine quâ non, an accidental thing, that not always happens, and because it stays not (for — post est occasio calva, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.) therefore it stirs up the Agent more powerfully to work at this instant, then otherwise it would. But then this and the former are only Causae minus principales. And such a Cause 
Fr. Burgensdic Institut. Log l. 1. c. 17. Theor. 21. in Commentar. sect. 1. Ibid. Theor. 24. in Commentar. sect. 1.  as this, as a good Author will tell him, non tam efficit, quam subservit principali causae ad effectum producendum. They are both of them Causae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and inchoantes, and are thus defined by the same acute Logician, Occasio est temporis locique commoditas ad agendum quod velis, quae & ipsae vim aliquam movendi habet ad agendum, quatenus agendi impedimenta tollit. Author dicitur hoc loco, qui causam principalem propositis rationibus ad agendum hortatur, aut ab agendo dehortatur: vocatur etiam causa moralis. And consequently, according to this Author, Grounds and Motives, sunt rationes seu argumenta quibus propositis Author causam principalem ad agendum hortatur seu moraliter excitat, aut ab agendo dehortatur.  
§. 16. And therefore though Christ, as Comprehensor, had sufficient cause always to Love God at the utmost height possible to the humane nature, to wit, a clear intuitive knowledge of the divine Essence, yet he had no more Grounds and Motives to this love, than he had occasions, because he always loved naturally and necessarily to the utmost height, and it was impossible for him to do otherwise. Will any man read a Moral Lecture of Persuasion to excite a Stone to move downwards, or labour by Grounds and Motives to induce the Fire to burn? A pair of bellows are worth all the Suasories in Seneca, or the Declamations of Quintilian. The glorified Saints and Angels have Cause sufficient to love God, the beatifical vision, and therefore as they need no Grounds and Motives to induce them to love God, so they have none used to them in heaven, because there they naturally and necessarily love God, and it is a part of their happiness and a necessary fruit of their glorified natures to do so. Grounds and Motives as well as Occasions, are proper only to those that are in viâ, that are in the way to heaven, to stir up their spirits, and flagging dull Motions, and quicken them in the Race, as also to dehort them from those things, that may be an occasion either of their fall, or slow motion.  
§. 17. But then this nothing hinders, but, as considered in the state of a viator, he might have both Occasions to heighten his Love and ardency in Prayer, (as the Doctor affirms he had, and we have already demonstrated the Truth of his assertion, and shall by and by further clear it) and also Grounds and Motives to strengthen and confirm him in his love, and magnanimity and Patience in the midst of his bitter agony. For we have already observed from the Schoolmen, and best Interpreters, that the Angel that was sent to Comfort our blessed Saviour, and strengthen him in his bitter Agony, did it by Moral Arguments and Suasories, and Rational Grounds and Motives, Remonstrating him the transcendency of his Love to Mankind, and the Glory of the Acquest, his obedience to God his Father, and the Crown and Reward laid up for him; The Advancement of the honour of God's Mercy, and the magnifying his Name in the salvation of mankind, and the like.  
§. 18. But than secondly, by this Confusion he falls upon the Rock of palpable contradiction, and one part of his discourse confutes the other. For if Christ had always sufficient Causes, Grounds and Motives to induce him to love God, etc. then he did not love him naturally and necessarily; as he says he did: Or else if he always loved God to the utmost height naturally and necessarily, than he had not always sufficient Causes, Grounds and Motives to induce him to love God to the utmost height. For Causes, Grounds and Motives to love suppose an absolute freedom and liberty of indetermination and indifferency to love, which is perfectly contrary to an absolute necessity of loving, and therefore incompossible with it. Let him choose which part he will, and avoid the Rock if he can.  
§. 19 If he says that Christ as viator had sufficient causes grounds and motives to induce him to love God to the utmost height, because as Comprehensor he enjoyed the beatifical vision, and naturally loved him; I deny his sequel; because than it would also follow, that he had sufficient causes, grounds, and motives to love God in that height, which was incompossible with his state of viator, to wit, with as heightened degrees of Actual love, as the humane nature could reach to, which is the state of a Comprehensor; and consequently implies a kind of contradiction in adjecto.  
§. 20. And then thirdly he not only speaks contradictions, but palpable Tautologies. For he says Christ naturally and necessarily loved God to the utmost height of Actual Love, and then adds in the close by way of proof; For if we speak of a liberty of indifferency and indetermination, he had no more liberty towards the intention of the inward Acts of his Love, than he had towards the Acts themselves. It is just, as if I should affirm, the Aethiop's skin to be black, and then add for a further confirmation; For if we talk of any colour in his skin that was disgregative of the sight, he had none, which were a most ridiculous tautological argumentation, and proving idem per idem.  
§. 21. And therefore having now shown the weakness, and very inartificial proceeding of our Refuters discourse, I am at leisure to tell him, what were the occasions of heightening our Saviour's Love of God, at the time of his Passion, more than he had at other times, which the Doctor intimates, and our Refuter (out of his great Scholastical modesty, and profound Christian humility and tenderness to our blessed Saviour's honour, I suppose he means) will not undertake to guests at. But first I will tell him, what Love it was the Doctor means, that so all occasions of Cavil may be avoided.  
§. 22. The Schools ordinarily distinguish of a twofold Love of God; one they call Amor Concupiscentiae, or Amor desiderii. The other they call Amor Amicitiae or Amor Complacentiae. The first is a Love of God for the benefits we hope, and are to receive from him; and arises out of an apprehension and sensibleness of those wants and needs, that he alone is able to supply. The other is a Love of God, purely for his own goodness. This is the most genuine and transcendent Love; but the other more natural. For Nature itself teaches us in all our wants, to have recourse to God, or something we mistake for God. And hence it is, that the most acute Father Tertullian 
Vid. Suarez tom. 1. in tert. part. Tho disp. 39 sect. 2. p. 542. col. 1. C. Et ibid. disp. 34 sect. 3. pag. 457. col. 1. F. & 2. A.  makes use of this Argument, and in contemplation of it cries out, O Anima naturaliter Christiana! This is proper only to the viator. The other, in the most transcendent manner, agrees to the Comprehensor, and in a lower degree, also to the viator, according to the Perfection and excellency of his habitual grace. Yet these two, says the most incomparable Bishop Andrews, though they may be distinguished, yet 
Pattern of Catechist. Doctrine at large come. 1. c. 12. pag. 155..  are not always divided. For the one oftentimes is the beginning of the other, both in our loves to God and man. For those that have been beneficial to us, though we love them at first for the benefits we receive by them, yet afterwards we come to love them for themselves. The first ariseth from hope, because a man being cast down by fear conceives hope upon God's promises; then sending forth prayer, receiveth fruit, and saith, Praised be the Lord for he hath heard the voice of my humble petition. And 
Psal. 28. 7. 21.  thou hast given me my heart's desire: which fruit stirreth up the first love, and this Amor Concupiscentiae the love of concupiscence, which goes before Amorem gratuitum free Love. For as the Apostle saith, that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural or carnal, and then that which is spiritual: so free Love of God for himself is not first, but first we love him for his benefits, and then for himself, and this is true love, etc. That which is natural will be first, concupiscentia before Amicitia or benevolentia, and this is the inchoation of the other. Perfect love is not attained at first; for nemo repent fit summus: Now Saint chrysostom wondereth how men can slip themselves out of this Love, for if they will love any for his Benefits, none bids fairer for this Amor mercenarius then God, for he offereth for it the kingdom of heaven, etc. (And therefore) it is lawful to Love God for his benefits; for God uses them as motives to stir us up to love him, and the best of God's servants have so practised: Moses looked at the recompense: Heb. 11. but we must not rest there, nor love him only or chief for them, but for himself, etc.— I love the Lord, saith the Psalmist; and why? He is my defence, Psal. 18. 1. And in another place, Because he heard my voice: yet seeing David did not Love God only or chief for his benefits, his love was not properly mercenary, but true though not Perfect. Thus far this most excellent Bishop, whose words I have made use of, as Jewels and ornaments to this discourse, and because I think it impossible (to me I am sure) to express it better.  
§. 23. Now Christ being made like to us in all things, sin only excepted, he must also have in him this natural love of God for his benefits and protection, and assistance, that he had, and might have from him; and the Schools do resolve so. For it was in its self natural, and therefore not sinful; and his present slate of a viator in the days of his flesh required it. For though the Foxes have holes, and the birds of the Air have nests; yet the son of man had not where to lay his head. He was truly vir desideriorum, a man of desires, as well as a man of sorrows. This, as it was natural to the flesh, and proper to him in the state of a viator, so it agreed to him in respect of the Inferior part of the Will, and the sensitive Appetite, which desired things natural and necessary for itself, but yet only those things, that were lawful and fit. And therefore the Schools, though they resolve, that there was not that hope 
Vid. Estium l. 3. sent. d. 26. §. 8. & alibi. Aquin 3 part. q. 7. art 4. Et Cajetan. Suaresium alios in Loc.  in Christ, which is virtus Theologica Deum ipsum, ut principale Objectum, spectans, yet there was in him another lower kind of hope, bona quidem & vera, good, and lawful, and true in itself, which respected those things, he had not yet obtained in the days of his flesh, as his Resurrection, the Glorification of himself in the humane Nature at the right hand of God, and the honour of his Name, and Enlargement of his kingdom. In which respect saith the Psalmist in the Person of Christ in the Passion-Psalm 22. 10. I was cast upon thee from the womb, thou art my God from my mother's Belly. So again in the eighth and ninth verses. He trusted on the Lord that he would deliver him, let him deliver him seeing he delighted in him. But thou art he that took me out of the womb, thou didst make me hope when I was upon my Mother's breasts. there are many other places in Scripture to this purpose, but these are sufficient to our business. This hope as it was the ground of his Love of God, for the benefits he did expect, and the assistance he stood in need of in the days of his flesh, so it was the foundation of all his prayers, either in regard of his present pressures and wants and reliefs he stood in need of, or else in respect of the future blessings, he expected after his resurrection. As then (as Aquinas tells us) Christus habuit spem respectu aliquorum quae nondum erat adeptus, so he did 
Aquin. 3. part. q. 7. art. 4. in corp.  truly in this respect, divinum auxilium expectare. In the midst of his afflictions, and in the height of his Passion he trusted in God, and he was heard in that he feared, or delivered from it. And as he trusted in God, hoped in him, and expected aid and assistance from him; so he truly had a natural love of God, a love of desire, and concupiscence towards God, for the benefits and assistance, he daily received and hoped from him. And out of the abundance of this Love, he cries out upon the Cross, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?  
§. 24. But then, though this Love of concupiscence be ordinarily first in men, and then afterwards the Love of Complacency, though we love God first for his benefits, and goodness to us, and afterwards for himself, yet it was not so in Christ; For first, as Comprehensor in his mind, he loved God naturally and necessarily, with the highest degree of complacency, benevolence and friendship. And this from the first moment of the souls union with the body. And secondly, as viator, by reason of the fullness of the habit of Divine Grace, he loved him always as high with this love, as the present state was capable of. Though he loved God always for his own sake, yet this supernatural divine Love was not the fruit of his love of concupiscence, and because he was sensible of God's blessings and favours; but it was the effect of the Beatifical vision, and the fullness of divine Grace supernaturally infused from the first moment of his conception, and de congruo both flowed from the Hypostatical union.  
§. 25. But then, as the Schools distinguish of a threefold knowledge in Christ, the one which they call beata, the other infusa, and the third Experimentalis and Acquisita; so there is also observed by them, a threefold love of complacency in Christ. The first is the beatific Love, proper to him as Comprehensor, the second the Acts of the infused habit of divine Love; And the third, a Love of Complacency, flowing from the frequent experiences of God's goodness to him in the days of his flesh. For he also did taste and see how good and gracious to him the Lord was in that state, when he was truly that man of sorrows. This was Acquisite and experimental; and this we may without any dishonour to Christ, or the least disparagement to divine truth, say, was the issue of that other Love, a Love of God for his blessings, and gracious assistance. This was a ravishing contentment arising in the Inferior part of his soul; a sweet delight and complacency in God from the experience of his goodness, answering and satisfying those desires in these faculties.  
§. 26. Now these two Loves of God, proper to Christ as viator, the natural love of God for the blessings, we hope, and receive from him (this love of desire, and that experimental, acquisite love of Complacency, arising in the Inferior faculties of Christ's soul, from the experiment of God's gracious goodness) may without any derogation to the height and Perfection of his supernatural Love, be said to be capable of increase and augmentation. And of these the Doctor must be understood to speak, §. 39 when he says, that in the time of our Saviour's Agony, there was more occasion for the heightening of his Love of God and Trust, than there was at other times. He never before now had such occasion to Love God, and earnestly long for his assistance, as in his bloody Agony, when the comfortable beams and influence of the Godhead, were now miraculously, and by special providence pro tempore withheld. This made him to cry out upon the Cross with a loud voice, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? this made him to call up all the faculties of his soul, and to heighten his Ardency and zeal and fervour in Prayer, proportionable to the height of his Agony. As he never was in such a Passion till now, as he never sweat drops of blood before down to the ground; so he never had such occasion to heighten his Ardency, and that his Love of desire towards God and his goodness, in respect of his present aid and support, should be more advanced. The more we are in want and distress, the more nature instructs us to love those that help us; and the heightening this love, and our hope, and expectation of aid and assistance advances and quickens our Ardency and fervour in Prayer; and the more we want, we love, we hope, we desire, the higher will our zeal and devotion in Prayer be inflamed; and this Saint Luke meant, when he tells us, that our blessed Saviour, being in an agony, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he prayed the more earnestly. And now since in the days of his flesh he offered up Prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, etc. and was heard in 
Heb. 5. 7.  that he feared; since he had an Angel sent to comfort him; from this experience of God's goodness, the Inferior faculties are so ravished, and satisfied, that now his love becomes bold as a lion, and we hear no more now of these natural desires, prompting him to pray for a removal of that bitter cup. Now boldly as the Lion of the tribe of Judah, he says to those that came to apprehend him, I am he; and again, I have told you that I am he. If therefore ye seek me, let these go their way, Joh. 18. 5, 6, 7, 8. Now he willingly meets death, and gives those that came to apprehend him leave to take him. Now was this experimental Love of God in the Inferior faculties advanced to the utmost height. And now his Love was as strong as death itself.  
§. 27. But then though this be abundantly sufficient to satisfy all pretences in this, or any part of our Refuters discourse: yet I must remind the Reader, that there is a great deal of difference between the heightening Christ's Ardency in Prayer (of which the Doctor speaks) and that advancement of Christ's actual love as Comprehensor, immediately terminated on God himself, of which our Refuter speaks in this discourse, and never the Doctor, either in his Ectenesteron, or his Treatise of Will-worship, or the defence of it against Master Cawdrey.  
§. 28. And thus at last is demonstrated the vanity of our Refuters Title-Page, and shown it is to be like the Apothecary's glorious titles on his Empty boxes. For he has proved nothing he there pretends against the Doctor, and if he had proved all, he pretends to, he had not so much as opposed, much less refuted the Doctors Ectenesteron, which always speaks of another thing, than himself does. For all opposition must be ad idem, as this of our Refuters is not, as has all along been demonstrated. And so I come to the next Section.   

SECT. 31.  
Poor Refuter. Doctor digresses not. Affliction a fit season to heighten Devotion. Christ's Ardency our Instruction. The Doctor Heightening Christ's Actual Love derogates not from his Habitual fullness. Charitas quamdiu augeri potest, &c, variously cited. The Doctor's mistake. The words not Jeromes, but Augustine's. This lapse how possible. Venial. Occasion of Augustine's writing to Jerome. His several proposals of solving the doubt. His own upon the Distinction of Righteousness Legal, Evangelicall. Place in Austin at large. How applied against Papists. How not. M. Baxter's censure of our differences in point of Justification. Place impertinent to the Refuters Conclusion. Ex vitio est how here understood against M. Cawdrey, and the Refuter and the Doctor. Denotes Original Corruption. This how called by Austin. Signally vitium in Opposition to a saying of Pelagius. Parallel places for this meaning. Pelagius objection. Answered. Austin and the Doctor accord, but not the Refuter. Doctor's Exposition of Austin. Corrected. Dilemmas. Confidence springs from Ignorance. Chedzoy-Confidence. Learned Protestants and Papists, and Himself assert, what he says, all else deny, but the Doctor. A new Jury of them against him for the Doctor. Erasmus, Cajetan, Tolet. (Outward works of wisdom and Grace in Tolet what) Estius, Jansenius, L. Brugensis, Beza. Piscator. Deodate. Assembly notes. Cameron. Raynolds. How Christ grew in Actual Grace, the Habitual still invariable. Illustrated by two Instances. Erasmus and Doctor Eckhard assert Christ's growth in Habitual Perfection. This charged on Luther, Calvin, etc. by Bellarmine with probability on Calvin. How they acquitted. Refuters' Conclusion complyes with the sourest of Jesuits. Maldonates' censure of the Lutherans and Calvinists. Answered. Stapletons' like censure. Answered. They and Bellarmine, if they speak consequently, must mean the same with us. Whole recapitulated. Refuters' unhappiness. Doctor's safety.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
§. 40. OF this I shall hope it is possible to find some instances among men (of whose graces it can be no blasphemy to affirm that they are capable of degrees). Suppose we a sincerely pious man, a true Lover of God, and no despiser of his poor persecuted Church, and suppose we, as it is very supposable, that at some time the Seas roar, the tempest be at the height, and the waves beat violently upon this frail brittle vessel, may it not be a fit season for that pious man's Ardency to receive some growth? for his zeal to be emulous of those waves, and pour itself out more profusely at such then at a calmer season? I hope there be some at this time among us, in whom this point is really exemplified; if it be not, it is an effect of want not fullness of Love. But I need not thus to enlarge. It is not by this Refuter denied of the Person of Christ, and that is my entire 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in reference either to M. C. or to him, the utmost that I undertook to demonstrate then, or to justify now.   

JEANES.  
This Section your poor Refuter had passed over as a digression, had he not found himself named in the close of it, it is not by this Refuter denied of the Person of Christ. I suppose etc.   
§. 1. YOur Poor Refuter! In great humility no doubt! Sed male ominatis parcito verbis! you in a proud sarcastical Irony, and scornful undervaluing call yourself the Doctor's poor Refuter, and the event has declared, that you are his poor Refuter indeed.  
§. 2. But you say, you had passed this Section over as a digression, unless you had found yourself named in the close of it; It is not by this Refuter denied, etc.  
§. 3. Well Sir, I see you are proud of the name Refuter, and you account you deserve it. But some have worn the names of Caesar and Alexander the great, that have been the veriest Cowards in the world; and some Popes have assumed the Titles of Clement and Pius, that have least deserved them of the whole Pack. If Refuter be your name, I assure you, Sir, the world will now see, that you are very much miscalled. I have proved you to be of the Family of the Dixies, that were never good Schoolmen, good disputants, nor Refuters.  
§. 4. But why, I beseech you, Sir, had you passed over this Section as a digression? Has the Doctor here left the Question? If he has, you should have shown it. For we must have other Arguments to prove it a deserting of the discourse, besides your bare word, because you have all along given us cause to distrust your most confident Assertions. But consider Sir I pray, and once again read it, lest your virgula censoria strike it forth without desert. I am sure if it be not a proof, yet it is a very apposite instance to illustrate the Doctor's meaning. And if Instances and Illustrations be Digressions in discourse, then dark and intricate phrases and say are not the only Dialect and proper language of Oracles, and he keeps closest to the subject matter, not that labours to speak clearly, but that endeavours to be least understood.  
§. 5. But yet look again Sir, and you will not only find it an Illustration, but a Proof too. For if a time of affliction be a fit season for the heightening our Devotion, and more than ordinary fervour in Prayer; If God Almighty has commanded that then especially we call upon him, and if therefore he scourges us to bring us nigher to him, and nature itself teaches us in our affliction to seek him early, why then should that in your Judgement be unbeseeming the Person of Christ in the time of his Agony, that is every man's duty else? If secondly, every true lover of God, and sincerely pious man, then more especially lifts up his soul to God, when he calls upon him de profundis, if then still his zeal multiplies, as his miseries increase, and in a kind of pious emulation the fervency of his devotion strives to grow higher than the waves, that beat upon him, if now he need no Instructor, no Monitor to mind him; If all men every where, that have any sense of a Deity or Providence, then more especially lift up the voice like a Trumpet, if the secret Tutor in the bosom, Conscience, non quae Scholis formata, bibliothecis exercitata, Academiis & 
Tertul. l. de testim: Animae c. 1. p. 80. D▪  porticibus Atticis pasta, but that which is simplex & rudis, & impolita, & idiotica, illa ipsa de compito, de trivio, de textrino, if this teach all men, if this, without the assistance of Scripture, stir them up to pour out their devotions more profusely at such then at a calmer season, why then should we not believe this of Christ, who was made like to us in all things, sin only excepted, especially when the Evangelist himself, who gives us a Narrative of the fact, plainly says, that being in an Agony he prayed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more earnestly? Certainly Tertullian said truly, Haec testimonia animae, quanto vera, tanto 
Tertul. de testim: Anima c. 5. pag. 83. C. edit. Rigalt.  simplicia; quanto simplicia, tanto vulgaria; quanto vulgaria, tanto communia; quanto communia, tanto naturalia; quanto naturalia, tanto divina. And therefore as he said in the like case, so say I. Novum testimonium advoco, imo omni lituraturâ notius, omni doctrinâ agitatius, omni editione vulgatius, toto 
Ibid. c. 1. p. 80. C. D.  homine majus, id est, totum quod est hominis. If thirdly, none but those, that are Atheists in heart, those that think there is no God, do not tremble at the voice in the cloud, and the hand upon the wall; if it be a certain argument of want of true Piety and religious Devotion, now to be careless and cold in our Prayers, if it betray, that we either care not for God's assistance, or believe he cannot help us, or that this evil in the city is not of his sending, then certainly the multiplying and redoubling of our calls and cries to God, the growth of our fervour and Ardency and zeal in so proper a season, as this, is so far from prejudging the fullness and Perfection of the habit of divine grace that it most evidently demonstrates it, and I should rather conclude a defect, and want of true love of God in that soul, where I should not observe a more than ordinary heightened devotion and ardency of Spirit in such a tempestuous season.  
§. 6. Without doubt our blessed Saviour, that suffered for us, leaving us an example, that we should follow his steps, 
1 Pet. 2. 21.  did in this his Prayer and Devotion, and more than ordinary fervour and ardency in Prayer, read us a lecture, and taught us what to do in such cases. In this bloody scene, and part of his bitter Agony in the Garden there can no other end, and aim be observed, but only our instruction; all was only to prove him to be truly man, and to teach us what frail flesh and blood in the midst of such agonies and afflictions, is of itself apt to do, and what we by the assistance of Grace may, and aught to do in such cases. Pray we may, and pray earnestly for the removal of that Cup, that is so dreadful to nature; nor must we conclude, that if the hand tremble and shake; when it takes the deadly potion, that we therefore now are less Christians, because we are more Men. Nay we should show ourselves not to be men, but senseless stocks and stones if we were not apprehensive of the present pressures we labour and groan under; and we should show ourselves less than Christians, direct faithless Infidels; the disciples, not of Jesus, but of Zeno or Epicurus, if we should not now in a time of need come, not only with boldness, but more than ordinary zeal and devotion to the throne of Grace, to find help in time of need. Our Saviour in this has left us an example, and he has further given us instruction, that though nature teaches (without any other Tutor) that we now especially should multiply our Prayers and heighten our ardour and fervency, yet from his great example, and Precept, and instruction we should also learn still to close up our most ardent most heightened devotions, with a submission to Gods will, though in such an Agony as this of our blessed Saviour, we may pray the more earnestly for the removal of this bitter cup; yet still, when we cry out, Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me, we must add with him, yet not mine but thy will be done. And this is the entire 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Perfect clear demonstration of all that the Doctor undertook, in Reference either to M. C. or this Refuter. And I wonder how he should not see it; and if he did see it, why he so should cavil at it.  
§. 7. We go on then with our Refuter.  

JEANES.  
I suppose the antecedent to the relative is in these words May it not be a season for that pious man's ardency to receive some growth? for his zeal to be emulous of those waves, and pour itself out more profusely at such then at a calmer season? And then there be two things that you affirm, that I deny not of the Person of Christ.  
1. That a tempestuous time (a time of affliction) was a season for Christ's ardency to receive some growth.  
2. That 'twas a season for his zeal to pour itself out more profusely at such then at a calmer season.  
As for the first sentence, a time of affliction was a season for Christ's ardency to receive some growth, if by Ardency, you understand the ardency of his Love of God, I deny that it did receive any growth: for to ascribe growth unto it is to charge it with imperfection. Charitas quamdiu etc.   
§. 8. I wonder, Sir, that after so long a dispute with the Doctor, you should yet be to seek of his meaning. Review the whole section, and tell me, whether the Doctor has not fully cleared his intention. The Ardency he speaks of, is the Ardency and fervour of Prayer, which he says in this so proper season (as now our Saviour's bloody Agony) did receive some heightening and growth. And this he affirms from the Authority of Saint Luke. This is the utmost, he ever undertook to demonstrate, from the first to the last of this discourse, and his very title-Page will make it good. And therefore here Sir, you oppose not the Doctor's position, but another of your own framing. For though Ardency in Prayer be an act of Piety and devotion, and consequently of Charity, and the Love of God, as that is commonly taken in scripture (because by a Metonymy, it is an effect and fruit of our Love of God) yet the Love of God properly and formally taken for that transcendent Love, that is immediately fixed on God, is formally and really distinct, and clean another thing from Ardency in Prayer, as properly and formally taken. Of the last, and such like Acts of Charity, as these, the Doctor speaks of; of the former only our Refuter. And therefore though it were granted that the Acts of this Love, as properly taken, were not, could not be gradually augmented, yet this notwithstanding Christ's Ardency in Prayer might upon a just occasion be heightened. The opposition here, as it is plain, is not ad idem.  
§. 9 But then I deny, that to ascribe growth, or rather gradual heightening and increase even to the Acts of this love in respect of his state of viator will argue any imperfection in this love, as respecting this state, or derogate any thing from the Perfection of his habitual fullness of Grace, as has most evidently been already demonstrated, and I shall further instantly confirm from our Refuters own assertions.  
§. 10. But though he has very little reason on his side, yet at last he has met with great Authority, the Authority of S. Austin.  

JEANES.  
For to ascribe growth unto it (Christ Love) is to charge it with imperfection. Charitas, quamdiu augeri potest (saith Austin) profecto illud quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est.   
§. 11. The words I acknowledge to be Saint Augustine's, but I observe they be diversely quoted by learned men. Chamier 
Chamier tom. 3. lib 11. c. 14. §. 1. Davenant. de Justit. habit. & Act. c. 17. p. 286. et c. 24. p 327. Master Cawdreys triplex Diatr. p. 110.  and Bishop Davenant both cite it from the 29. Epistle of Saint Austin; and rightly, as we shall see anon. But M. Cawdrey he quotes it from the 62. Epistle of S. Jerome. But there it is not, and I believe not in any part of that volume, that contains the genuine Epistles of that Father. And therefore I conceive that he might possibly take the place upon Trust, unless he followed some more ancient edition. For I find in Marianus victor's censure of the ninth Tome among S. Jeromes works, that all those pieces there digested, which were formerly ascribed to S. Jerome, were put heretofore in the fourth volume of his works, and read in another Order, than now they are. Doctor Hammond in his Account to the triplex 
Ham. Account c. 6. Sect. 8. §. 33, 34.  Diatribe, he quotes it from the ninth Tome of S. Jerome page 159. and rightly as to the place, for in my Colen Edition of 1616. I find it in that page 159. col. 2. G.  
§. 12. But then I must withal acknowledge a mistake of the learned Doctors. For the place is not in Jeromes Epistle to S. Augustine, as he supposes, and says all along.  
§. 13. For first this appears, by the Inscription of the Epistle, 
Hieron. Tom. 9 epist. 44. p. 157. edit. Colon.  as it lies in the ninth Tome among S. Jeromes works. For it is, Augustinus Hieronymo de eo quod scriptum est, Qui totam legem observaverit. And the inscription of Augustinus Hieronymo is to be found in the top of every leaf all along that Epistle in that very edition.  
Secondly, it appears from the very beginning of that Epistle, quod ad te scripsi, honorande mihi in Christo frater Hieronyme, quaerens de Animá humanâ, etc.  
Thirdly, it is evident from the body of the Epistle. For the Author twice quotes S. Jeromes treatises against Jovinian, 
Quam eorum vanitatem in Joviniano illo qui hâc sententiâ Stoicus erat— de Scriptures sanctis dilucidissimè convicisti. ibid. 158. Col. 1. D. Nam tu quidem in eodem ipso opere splendide contra Jovinianum etiam hoc de Scripturis sanctis diligenter probasti. ibid. p. 159. Col. 1. A.  and highly commends them.  
§. 14. The truth is, the Epistle is S. Augustine's, and extant in the second Tome of his works, his Epistles, those which by Erasmus and all, are censured and acknowledged to be genuine. Aug. tom. 2. Ep. 29. p. 42. Paris. 1635. And this, and the former de Origine Animae, as they were written by him to Saint Jerome for his resolution in two such high and difficult points, so they are owned by him in his Retractations, and styled not Epistles, but books. And he gives this account of the 
Scripsi etiam duos libros ad Hieronymum Presbyterum sedentem in Bethleem, unum de Origine Animae bominis, alterum de sententiâ Jacobi Apostoli ubi ait, Quicunque totam legem servaverit offendat autem in uno, factus est omnjum reus, de utroque consulens eum: sed in illo priore quaestionem quam propofui ipse non solvi in posteriore autem quod mihi de illâ solvendâ videretur non tacui; sed utrum hoc approbaret etiam ille consului. R●scripsit autem laudans eandem consultationem, meam, sibi tamen ad rescribendum o●ium non esse respondit. Ego vero quousque esset in corpore hos libros edere nolu●, ne forte responderet aliquando, & cum ipsâ responstone ejus potius ederentur. Illo autem defuncto ●d hoc e●id●prior●m, ut qui legit admoneatur, etc.— Posteriorem vero ad hoc, ut quaestion● de quâ ibi agitur etiam quae nobis visa est solutio ipsa noscatur▪ August: Retract: l. 2. cap. 45.  writing, and publication of them. That in both he had a desire to provoke S. Jerome to declare his resolution and Judgement, and though he himself had not solved the former Question, yet he thought in his own Judgement, that he had sufficiently done the latter, and though he had proposed his own Judgement by way of doubt, and enquiry to gain Saint Jeromes opinion, and resolution, yet it was that which he conceived, was proper for the unriddleing the doubt, And therefore now since S. Jerome was dead, and had not answered it, he had published it to the world, to declare his own opinion, how that difficult place was to be solved.  
§. 15. The words than are not Saint Ieromes but S. Augustine's. But the mistake is not material, and that which any man might be guilty of. I suppose the ground and occasion of it might be this. For the Doctor minding his answer to M. Cawdrey and finding the quotation not among S. Ieromes Epistles, as M. Cawdrey had cited it, but in the ninth Tome of Ieromes works, he minded not these minute circumstances, but addressed himself to the business of the Epistle, and finding it not to satisfy the pretence of his adversary, but aiming at another thing, he took out what was fit for his turn, and writing in haste, and having much business before him, and the ninth Tome of S Ieromes works now in his eye, he might easily forget the inscription of the Epistle, and put down S. Jerome for S. Austin among whose works he now found it. Or else, which I rather believe, the Doctor having formerly read this Passage in this volume of Jerome, and considered the full purpose of it, he might extract, and put down in his Adversaria, that part in short which might serve as a Clavis to unlock the meaning of the whole, and for brevity sake (as the custom is) set down the place thus, Hieren. tom. 9 p. 159. which Passage he reviewing in his Adversaria, upon this occasion, and finding it quoted thus from S. Jerome, and M. Cawdrey agreeing also with him, without further consideration, and a new recourse to the place, he might take it for the writing of Saint Jerome.  
§. 16. But be the occasion what it will, the most that can be made of it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, either a lapse of memory, or hast and inadvertency. For plain it is from the Doctor's answer to M. Cawdrey, that he had read the Epistle, and has given the true and genuine sense of the place (except in one particular, wherein I differ from him, and shall shortly give my reasons for it) which he could not have done, unless he had read it all over, and well considered the purport of it. And therefore since the Doctor is not deceived in the meaning of the place, (except in that particular) the mistake in the Authors name is not material to the present business and argument he had in hand, and therefore the lapse is but venial, Ipsa enim re (as Marianus victorius in his censure of this Tome of S. Jerome says very well) non scriptoris nomine veritas aut probatur, aut adulteratur. And now let our Refuter himself when the names are changed of Jerome into Austin, and Austin into Jerome, sit in Judgement upon the Doctor's account of that place, and condemn it if he can.  
§. 17. But to come to the place itself, and the use our Refuter makes of it. The conclusion and inference he makes from it is this, To ascribe growth to the ardency of Christ's actual Love, or say, that one Act of his Love of God, was gradually heightened and more intense than another Act of the same Love, is to charge it with imperfection, because Saint Austin says, Charitas quamdiu augeri potest, profecto illud quod minus est quam debet, in vitio est. The words I acknowledge, but the Inference or sequel I deny; because it supposes clean an other thing than Saint Austin ever meant, which thus I prove.  
§. 18. The Father writes in that Epistle to S. Jerome, to resolve him in a difficulty of some concernment, and which it 
Jac. 2. 10. Quae res talis ac tanta est, ut quod hinc tibi jam non olim scripsi, multum me poeniteat. De agendâ namque praesenti vitâ, quomodo ad vitam perveniamus aternam, non de praeteritâ perscrutandâ— haec vertitur Quaestio. Aug. Ep. 29. p. 42. Col. 2. D. Ib. p. 44. Col. 1. C. D.  repent him, that he had not long since consulted him about. It is concerning the sense of that place in S. james c. 2. 10. Whosoever shall keep the whole Law and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all. The ground and rise of the difficulty was this, because the same S. james c. 3. 2. says, in many things we offend all; Non enim ait, offenditis, sed offendimus omnes, cum Christi loqueretur Apostolus. And S. john also, 1. Ep. 1. 8. says the same, If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. And this S. Jerome also himself had observed against jovinian, that pleaded for absolute sinless perfection. And therefore since we all sin in many things, and as S. james says, he that offends in one is guilty of all, how then can any believer of the many thousands, that truly and in simplicity of heart acknowledge their own sins, have any thing of goodness and sanctity in them? But then he subsumes, Absit ut dicamus, tot & tantos fideles & pios homines Dei non habere pietatem, quam Graeci vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vel expressius & plenius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocant, etc. And therefore how shall we unfold this difficulty?  
§. 19 For the solution of it therefore, he proposes divers things, and this only tendandi gratià, to draw S. Jerome to give him his opinion.  
§. 20. As first, whether S. james refer not to the sins mentioned in the context, vers. 2, 3. etc. ut qui dixerit diviti sede hic, & pauperi sta illic; huic non honorem, quem illi deferens, & idololatra, & blasphemus, & adulter, & homicida, & ne (quod longum est) cuncta commemorem reus omnium criminum 
Ibid. p. 43. col. 1. B. C. D.  judicandus est: offendens quippe in uno, factus est omnium reus. This he seeming to doubt of, as appears by this Parent hesis (nisi alio modo intelligendum ostendatur) he proceeds to a second, which is this.  
§. 21. Whether secondly the doubt may not be solved upon the opinion of the Peripatetics, who maintained virtutes esse inter se connexas, and consequently that he that wanted 
Ibid p. 43. col. 1. D. & col. 2. A, B, C, D. pag. 44. Col. 1. A, B.  the habit of any one virtue, suppose of justice or Temperance had only the vizor and shape of the rest, and not the substance: for no man will call Catiline virtuous (because he was a traitor to his Country, though frigus, sitim, famem ferre poterat, eratque patiens inediae, algoris, vigiliae, supra quam cuiquam credibile est, ac per hoc & sibi & suis magnâ praeditus fortitudine videbatur. This he positively resolves against. 
Ibid. p. 44. col. 1. B.  Non enim & ista divina sententia est, quâ dicitur, qui unam virtutem habuerit, omnes habet, eique nulla inest, cui una defuerit, sed hominibus hoc visum esi, multum quidem ingeniosis, studiosis, sed tamen hominibus, etc. And therefore he goes on to another, and inquires.  
§. 22. Whether, thirdly, it may not be solved upon the 
Ibid p 44. col. 2. A, B, C.  Opinion of the Stoics, that maintained all sins to be equal, because as they instanced, it was all one if a man were drowned whether he had a hundred fathom of water above his head, or only three inches, since he could be but drowned, and therefore it must be so in respect of sin, which whosoever commits does but transilire lineas, quas ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum, and he that has gone beyond the line was as much out of the right way, as he that wandered a thousand miles from it. But this also he resolves against from Scripture. Itaque & non justificabitur in conspectu Dei omnis vivens: 
Ibid. col. 2. C. Psal. 142. 2. Hab. 2. 4.  & tamen justus ex fide vivit. Et induti sunt sancti justitiâ alius magis, alius minus. Et nemo hic vivit sine peccato, & hoc alius magis, alius minus: optimus autem est, qui minimum. And now here he takes occasion to proceed to give his own Judgement, but modestly, warily and rather by way of enquiry than determination; for he well knew the temper of S. Jerome, to whom he writes, sed quid ego tanquam oblitus cui loquor, Doctori similis factus sum, cum proposuerim, quid abs te discere velim? sed quia de peccatorum parilitate, unde in id quod agebam incidit quaestio, examinandam tibi sententiam meam promere statueram, jam eam tandem aliquando concludam.  
§. 23. And now having prepared the way, and casually, as it were, and only to confront the opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics proved from the Scripture, that there was 
Ibid. p. 44. col. 1. C. D. & col. 2. A. & C. D.  a twofold Righteousness, one Legal the other Evangelicall, and that believers, though we all sin, did truly worship God, which they could not do without Charity; and that in respect of this he was most perfect, most holy, and righteous that most mortified the deeds of the flesh, and came nighest to a legal sinless perfection, he comes to give his own Judgement, but still by way of enquiry. And it is this, whether 
Ibid p. 45. col. 2. part. tot.  since the Scriptures mention a twofold righteousnese, Legal and Evangelicall, a justification by the works of the Law, and another by Faith, and the Grace and Righteousness of the Gospel, this difficulty may not be solved, and it may not be true according to the Covenant of works, that he that offends in one as S. james speaks, offends in all, and as certainly by that Covenant of works does incur the curse annexed to the least transgression, as well as if he had broken all: and yet it may be true, that the just shall live by Faith, though the same S. james says, in many things we offend all. Ac per hoc qui totam legem servaverit, si in uno offenderit, fit omnium reus, quia contra charitatem (that universal virtue of goodness, like the 
† Arist. infracitat.  Philosopher's universal justice, that consists in an absolute sinless perfection, that consists in keeping all God's commandments, briefly summed up by our Saviour in these two, Thou shalt love the Lord, etc. and thy neighbour, etc.) facit, unde tota lex pendet.  
§. 24. From hence he proceeds to show, that in respect of Evangelicall righteousness and sanctification, there might be a difference of holiness, and a difference also of sins in opposition to the Peripatetic and Stoic, according as they approached to the absolute sinless Perfection, or complete and Perfect Charity. Quae si vera sint, eo modo & illud absolvitur, quod ait homo etiam Apostolicae gratiae, in multis offendimus omnes. Omnes enim offendimus, sed unus gravius, alius 
Jac. 3. 2.  levius. Quanto quisque gravius leviusque peccaverit, tanto in peccato committendo major, quanto in diligendo Deo & proximo minor. Et rursus tanto minor in peccati perpetratione, quanto major in Dei & proximi dilectione. Tanto itaque plenior iniquitatis, quanto inanior charitatis. Et tunc perfecti sumus in charitate, quando nihil restat ex infirmitate, etc. This opinion he amplifies, and prosecutes, and labours to prove by divers passages in S. James to be the true meaning of that difficult place, and then concludes his Epistle.  
§. 25. And now from this Analysis and Scope of the Author in this Epistle it will be no hard matter to understand S. Augustine's mind in this text, so often insisted on by us in our controversies with the Papists, and to show how much besides the purpose of Saint Austin and other Protestants, both Master Cawdrey and our Refuter have urged it against the Doctor.  
§. 26. I shall with the Readers patience give the place a little larger than either our Refuter, or M. Cawdrey, or Chamier, or Doctor Hammond himself has done, for the clearer satisfying all scruples. And it shall not repent me of my pains spent in the satisfying of the ordinary Reader in a doubt, which perhaps may often trouble him.  
§. 27. The distinction then of Legal and Evangelicall holiness and purity, being the ground work of S. Augustine's opinion for the satisfying and reconcileing this difficulty in S. james, like a wise Masterbuilder, the good Father very artificially and clearly explains and confirms it, before he comes to make his application and inferences from it. And this passage so long insisted on, is a part of it. 
Ibid. pag. 44. col. 2. C, D.   
§. 28. Whereas then the Stoics had compared sin to a deluge of water, he disliking that, compares it rather to darkness, and Grace to light; and then adds, Profecto ita ut quis que illustratione piae charitatis affectus est, in alio actu magis, 
Ibid. D. & p. 45. col. 1. A. B.  in alio minus, in aliquo nihil: sic potest dici habere aliam, & aliam non habere, aliam magis, aliam minus habere virtutem. Name, & major est in isto charitas, quam in illo, recte possumus dicere, & aliqua in isto, nulla in illo, quantum pertinet ad charitatem, quae pietas est; & in ipso uno homine, quod majorem habuit pudicitiam, quam patientiam, & majorem hodiè, quam heri, si proficit: Et adhuc non habeat continentiam, & habeat non parvam misericordiam. Et ut generaliter brevitérque complectar, quam de virtute habeam notionem, quoad rectè vivendum attinet, virtus est Charitas, qua id quod diligendum est, diligitur: haec in aliis major, in aliis minor, in aliis nulla est. Plenissima vero, quae jam non possit augeri, quam diu hic homo vivit, est in nemine: quamdiu autem (this is the fragment our Refuter insists on) augeri potest, profecto illud quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est. Ex quo vitio non est justus in terrâ, qui faciat bonum, & non peccat. Ex quo vitio non justificabitur in conspectu Dei omnis vivens. Propter quod vitium, si 
3 Reg. 8. 46. Psal. 142. 1 Joh. 1. 8.  dixerimus, quod peccatum non habemus, nosmetipsos seducimus, & veritas in nobis non est. Propter quod etiam, quantumlibet profecerimus necessarium est nobis dicere, Dimitte nobis debita 
Mat. 16. 12.  nostra, cum jam omnia in baptismo dicta, facta, cogitata dimissa sunt. Quid itaque? qui rectè videt, videt unde, & quando, & ubi separanda (it should be read speranda, and so the sense requires, and so it is printed in the ninth tome of S. Jerome in the Colen edition, where this Epistle is extant) sit illa perfectio, cui non sit, quod adjici possit? si autem praecepta non essent, non utique esset, ubi se homo certius inspiceret, et videret, unde averteretur, quo conaretur, quare gratularetur, quid precaretur. Magna est ergo utilitas praeceptorum, si libero arbitrio tantum detur, ut gratia Dei amplius honoretur. Quae si ita se habent, unde fiet omnium reus si in uno offendat, qui totam legem servaverit, etc.  
§. 29. By this it plainly appears, not only what is the design of the Author, but how fitly it is urged by the Protestants against the Papists in the questions of Fullfilling of the Law, according to the strictness of the first Covenant of Justification by works, Merit ex condigno, and supererogation. For as long as this place is extant in S. Augustine's works, it will be impossible to prove any justification by works in this sense, any merit in this sense, any fullfilling of the Law in this sense, much less any works of supererogation. And if the Papists undertake to make good the contrary, so long as the Epistles to the Romans and Galathians are in the new Testament, and this Epistle of S. Austin's is extant, all the Bellarmine's and Suareze's, and jesuites and Conclaves in the world will never be able to make it good.  
§. 30. But if they mean not to be tried by the Covenant of works, but the gracious gospel-covenant, that requires faith and Repentance and growth in grace, and striving after Perfection, and endeavouring to mortify every sinful lust, and promises a reward to be given according to every man's works (as 
* Vid. Concil. Trident. Sess: 6. cap. 1, 2, 3, 7, 11, 16. & canon: 1, 10, 26. & alibi passim. Bellar. Judic: de lib: concord: Mendac: 4, 5, 6, 8, 20, 22, 27, 29, 30, 31, 49. & l. de Justif: c. 3. & 13. & l. 2. c. 2. & l. 4. c. 3, 4. & l. 5. cap. 12. the Penitent: l. 1. c. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. I do also profess upon a Survey of their (the Papists) writings, that many hot brained Incendiaries on both sides do persuade the world, that our distance is greater in the doctrine of Justification and Merit, than indeed it is: And I do believe it would be a useful work of any that writ against the Papists on these points, to gather the Nominal Controversies by themselves, and then let us see all the real doctrinal differences by themselves, when the verbal differences are laid by, that we may know how far we differ in deed in the matter, and how far in meet words. To which purpose Master Wooton de Reconciliatione, hath said somewhat, etc. Vide Baxter's Confession of his Faith, etc. c. 6. sect. 1. p. 133. Et ibid. passim per totum cap. sect. 1, 2, 3, 4. p. 143, 144, etc.  they do say, and it concerns them, I am sure, to make it good) The difference then, as M. Baxter thinks, may not be so large, as at first sight it seems, and in many things, perhaps, it may be more about a contention of words, than any real difference. And the same learned man in his Aphorisms of justification has presumed to tread out a Path, that may help to reconcile, not widen, not only these differences, but also those others of Antinomianisme and Perfection, so rise among us at this time. And it were well for the peace of God's Church, if wise men would set down, and with moderation consider the true grounds of difference, and separate them from verbal disputes, and misunderstanding, That so the Lord might be one, and his name one among us. But to return to our Refuter.  
§. 31. We have seen the place as it lies at large in S. Austin, and beheld his scope and design in that Epistle: It remains now we show, how our Refuter mistakes it.  
§. 32. The conclusion he should prove is, that to ascribe growth to the Ardency of any Act of Christ's love, is to charge it (that is, the habit of divine Grace in him) with imperfection, because Austin says, Charitas quamdiu augeri potest, profecto illud quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est.  
§. 33. And now, not to trouble the Reader with our Refuters Lurking, and hideing himself under the Covert of the Ambiguity of this Phrase, The Love of God, Plain it is that the place in Saint Austin is wholly mistaken by him, and will never serve his interest, nor prove his conclusion.  
§. 34. For first the Charity S. Austin speaks of, is a habit; now our Refuter speaks of the Acts of Charity, which differ at lest specie, but he himself (maintains though falsely) do differ toto genere, and so the attributes of the one, unless they be generical, cannot agree with the other.  
2. The Charity S. Austin speaks of, is not a single Grace, but an universal Virtue, such as the Philosophers universal 
Vid: Aristot: Eth. l. 5. c. 1. §. 9, 10.  Justice, that contains all virtues and graces in it, as appears from his own definition.  
But this of our Refuter is a single Act of divine Love, a single Act of one branch or habit of this universal Charity, or virtue. And this makes the difference greater than formerly.  
3. The Charity, which S. Austin says, cannot be increased is Perfectissima, quae quamdiu homo hic vivit est in nemine, That absolute sinless perfection of Innocence, and complete obedience to all God's Commandments. Of this the Doctor declares himself expressly not to speak, but only of the sincerity of this or that virtue or grace in this or that performance. And it is of the gradual difference of the earnestness in Christ's prayer in his Agony, beyond what it was at other times, that our Refuter here disputes against by this Authority of S. Austin. How fitly now let any man Judge.  
4. The Augmentation of that more imperfect habit of Charity of which S. Austin speaks is extensive to the acquisition of more graces, as of Piety, Patience, Chastity, and the like, as well as intensive: a growth in all Grace, as much as we can, towards a sinless perfection, and exact conformity to all God's Commandments. But then the Doctor has declared that he speaks of another thing, and only of the gradual advancement of the Acts of those Graces above the Particular Commands, which a man in some cases, and at some times may fulfil, though he have not the habit of sinless Perfection.  
§. 35. And therefore though none in this life may be absolutely free from sin, as the good Father constantly maintains against the Pelagian, and though that righteousness which is still in the growth, falls short of such Perfection, yet thence it will not follow, that a man can do no one Act in itself agreeable to God's Law, or that he may not in some particular Act do something more, in respect of gradual intention and fervour, than what any particular Law, at all times and in all Cases, and from all persons requires. And as this was all the Doctor undertook in that place to make good, so it will never be convinced by this saying of S. Augustine's. For we have already most clearly demonstrated, that God's Law requires a greater fervour and height of Ardency in some Acts, and towards some Objects, then in others; and also at some Times; (as to instance in our Acts of zeal and devotion in a time of more than ordinary trouble or Calamity. Than not only David has his Psalm de Profundis, but every Christian must else. This is a season when signally God calls for it, and we sin, if we do not now in obedience to his thundering voice, as well lift up our Hearts, as our cries and tongues to him.) And this is so far from being contradicted by S. Augustine's Charitas perfectissima, as that it supposes and requires it, as the same 
* Et haec est perfecta Justitia quâ potius potiora, & minus minora diligimus. Aug. de verâ Relig. c. 49. vide eund. lib. 1. de Christiana Doct. c. 27.  Father determines, because unless the Acts were now intended, our Charity would fall short of what Gods Law requires.  
§. 36. Fiftly, whereas M. Cawdrey understands this Passage, Profecto illud quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est, thus; That Charity, whether in the Act or Habit, that comes not up to the highest degree or point of gradual intention, is imperfect, and faulty; and so thence concludes that there be set degrees to the Perfection of the Habit and the Act, and our Refuter upon the same score, that there are eight degrees of gradual intention for the Acts, and that the Perfection and sinlessness of every single Act of divine Charity consists in this highest degree; this is most erroneous in itself (as we have already demonstrated) and clear besides the meaning of S. Austin.  
§. 37. For here the phrase ex vitio est, is not to be understood in a formal sense, as if the Father meant, that the growing Charity were itself a sin or faulty (for then it should be in vitio est,) but in a Causal sense, Thus: That most absolute righteousness and Legal sinless perfection, beyond which in that Father's sense, a man cannot go (for let him do all that is required, he can be but innocent and keep Gods Commandments) is not in any man in this life, but as long as we are growing on to it, the Cause, why by the Evangelicall dispensation of Grace we attain it not, arises only from our Original Corruption, or inbred Concupiscence and proness to evil, the Law in our Members, which though, for the Reatus, it be done away in Baptism; yet not to the Foams of it, as here immediately, and elsewhere 
† Vid. Aug. l. 1. de Peccat merit. & remiss. l. 1. c. 39 & l. 2. c. 4. 7. the nupt. & concupis. l. 1. c. 25, 31. & con: duas Epist. Pelagian. l. 1. c. 13.  he frequently determines. For it follows, Ex quo vitio non justificabitur in conspectu Dei omnis vivens. Propter quod vitium, si dixerimus, quod peccatum non habemus, nosmet ipsos seducimus, & veritas in nobis non est. Propter quod etiam, quantumlibet profecerimus, necessarium est nobis dicere, Dimitte nobis debita nostra, cum jam omnia in Baptismo dicta, facta, cogitata dimissa sunt.  
§. 38. That this and this only is his meaning of Ex vitio est, will appear from two other places even in the very same Epistle, where he Paraphrases the word Vitium, as we have done. The one precedes our Refuters' quotation, thus, Quis autem sine aliquo peccato? Quis ergo sine aliquo vitio, id est, fomite quodam, vel quasi sine radice peccati, cum clamet, qui supra Domini pectus recumbebat, si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipimus, & veritas non est in nobis? And thus also our learned and judicious 
* August. Ep. 29. Quis sine aliquo peccato? quis ergo sine aliquo vitio, id est, fomite quodam vel quasi radice peccati? Duo hic asserit Augustinus, neminem esse sine aliquo peccato, sc. actuali, & neminem esse sine vitio, nimirum insito & originali, quod vitium est radix actualium. Davenant. de Just. habit: & Act: c. 19 p. 299.  Bishop Davenant 
1 Jo. 1. 8.  understands him. The other follows it thus: In multis enim offendimus omnes— sed unus gravius alius levins, etc. Tanto itaque plenior iniquitatis, quanto inanior charitatis. Et tunc perfecti sumus in charitate quando nihil restat ex Infirmitate. The whole has already been quoted, and is but a paraphrase of the Passage insisted on by our Refuter.  
§. 39 That this and no other is the meaning of S. Austin will further appear from several other passages of his writings, where treating of the same argument, especially against the Pelagians (whom most industriously and zealously he opposes) he constantly resolves it for Catholic doctrine, that though the Law requires exact unsinning obedience, and the absolute Perfection of righteousness (which 
* Augustine. l. 2. de peccator. merit. & remiss. c. 6. & de nat. & great. c. 42. & de great. Christi. & origin. peccat. l 1. c. 29. & 48. This he asserts and defends. l. de Spirit. & litera. c. 1. 2. & 35. and for it writ that treatise. And though in his 95. Epist. ad Innocentium (mihi p. 164.) he seems to qualify and explain that Tenet, yet as it appears in his Censure of that Passage in his Retractations he never recalled it. Rescripsit mihi (Marcellinus) se fuisse permo●um, quod dixerim, fieri posse ut sit homo sine peccato, si voluntas ejus non defit,  adjuvante divinâ, quanquam nemo in hâc vitâ vel fuerit, vel sit, vel futurus sit; Quaesivit enim quomodo dixerim posse fieri, cujus rei desit exemplum. Propter hanc ejus inquisitionem scripsi librum, cui titulus est de Spiritu & literâ. Aug. Retract. l 2. c. 37.  he allows to be possible by the Omnipotent power of Grace working in man's will) yet 
† Vide Augustin. l. 2. de Peceat. merit. & remiss. c. 6, 7, 8. etc. etc. 17, 18, 19, 20. etc. De Natur. & Grat. c. 42, et 66. De Grat. Christ. & Origin. peccat. l. 1. c. 49, 50. De Perfect. Justit. c. 8. Epist. ad Innocent. 95. (mihi) pag. 164. col. 1. Retract. l. 1. c. 7. (mihi) pag. 6. col. 1. C. D.  by reason of our original corruption, which will be in us, so long as we live, no man ever did, or shall attain it here, but is therefore kept in an imperfect growing inchoate state and condition; so that the best men that ever were, or are, or shall be, have need constantly to pray for the assistance of Grace and pardon of sin, and daily to say as our Saviour has taught us, Dimitte nobis debita nostra, Forgive us our Trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us: And lead us not into Temptation, but deliver us from evil.  
§. 40. This Original Corruption sometimes he calls Originis Labes 
α L. de Spirit. & lit. c. 6. de peccat. mer. & remiss. cap. 26. de Nupt. & concupis. lib. 2. cap. 34. & con. Jullan. lib. 6. cap. 16. , and Languor, and Morbus 
β L. de Spir. & lit. c. 10. & alibi. , and Vetustas 
γ de Spirit. & lit. c. 17. & alibi. , sometimes Concupiscentia 
δ De Nupt. & concupisc. l. 1. c. 25, 35. & alibi.  Carnis and Carnalis and Caro, sometimes 
ε De Natur. & Grat. c. 55, 63.  Lex Peccati and Caro 
ζ De Peccatmer. & remiss. c. 28. de nuptiis & concupisc. l. 1. c. 12. 31.  peccati, and Peccatum in Membris, and often 
η de Natur. & Grat. c. 56. de Grat. Christi et origin. Peccat. l. 2. c. 19 de Nupt. & concupisc l. 1. c. 20, 23. cont. duas Epist. Pelag. l. 1. c. 13.  Peccatum absolutely, sometimes 
θ de perfect. Justit. c. 18.  Infirmitas, and other while Propaginis vitium, 
ι con. duas Epist. Pelagian. l. 2. c. 5.  Originis vitium, 
κ de Grat. Christ. & orig. Pec. l. 2. c. 15, & 39  and 
λ de Grat. Christ. & orig. Pec. l. 2. c. 33.  Naturae vitium, 
μ l. de Pec. mer. & remiss. c. 36.  Vitiosa Natura, 
ν de Pec. mer. & remiss. l. 3. c. 8.  Vitiosa primordia, and 
ξ de Nat. & Grat. c. 48, 49, 52. & alibi passim.  Vitiata Natura, but most commonly and signally 
ο de Spir. & lit. c. 27. the Nature. & Grat. c. 3, 19, 20, 23, 38, 39, 52, 54, 55, 57 de Grat. & origin. pec. l. 1. c. 19, 20. & l. 2. c. 12, 13, 15, 33, 35, 37, 39, 40. de Nupt. & concup. l. 1. c. 23, 32 l. 2. c. 4, 8, 9, 29, 33, 34. Cont. Julian. l. 2. c 9 Et l. 6. c. 7, 18, 19 cont. duat Epist. Pelag. l. 2. c. 4. l. 4. c. 3, 10. De perfect. Justit. c. 4. Epist. 105. p. 178. Epist. 106. pag. 184. Retract. l. 1. c. 7.  Vitium absolutely, and this in opposition to a saying of Pelagius, who asserted 
π Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur à nobis, capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, & ut fine virtute, ita & sine Vitio procreamur, Atque ante actionem propriae voluntatis id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit. Pelagius Haresiarcha. l. 1. de origin. Pec. apud August. de Grat. Christ. & original. pec. l. 2. c. 13. upon which Saint Austin. thus, Nempe cernitis in his Pelagii verbis, quod dogma contineatur amborum (Caelestii sc. & Pelagii) de parvulis fine ullius vitii ab Adam contagione nascentibus August. ibid. vide ibid. l. 2. c. 4.  sicut sine virtute, ita nos sine vitio procreari. For that this Phrase was signally in use in the Catholic Church to express the Doctrine of Original Sin before Pelagius and π S. Austin, we learn both from 
ρ Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est dicente David, Ecce in iniquitate— etc. Ambros. de Penitent. l. 1. c. 11.  S. Ambrose and 
σ And Hilary before him calls it Peccati originem, peccati legem, peccata humanae naturae, Originem carnis, and more expressly Originis vitium. vid. Hilarium edit. Basil. p. 501. 522.  Hilary, which the Arch-heretick in that saying eminently opposed; and he and his Scholar Caelestius, were the 
τ Vid. Vincent. Lyrinens. advers. Haeres. cap. 34.  first that durst do it.  
§. 41. Of the many places that might be quoted to our present purpose, even from my very small reading and acquaintance in S. Augustine's writings, I shall only cite two or three for the full acquitting of the exposition we have given. Nor should I in a case so clear have troubled the Reader with these unless I had found the Place to be commonly otherwise understood, even by very learned men, and by Doctor Hammond also, and through this misconstruction frequently urged to far different purposes from what the Father intended.  
§. 42. The first shall be taken out of his 200. Epistle to Asellicus. p. 310. Col. 1. B. C. D.  autem sit Spiritalis, qui legem impleat Spiritalem, non fit ipsâ lege sed gratiâ, hoc est, non imperio, sed beneficio, non jubente literâ, sed adjuvante Spiritu. Incipit autem homo secundum gratiam in interiore homine renovari, ut ment agate, quod amat, nec carni consentiat agenti, quod odit, id est, ut omnino non concupiscat, sed ut post concupiscentias suas non eat. Quod quidem tam magnum est ut si omnimodo sieret, & quamvis insint dum sumus in corpore mortis hujus desideria peccati, nulli eorum tamen adhiberemus assensum, non esset unde diceremus Patri nostro, qui est in Coelis, Dimitte nobis debita nostra. Nec tamen ideo tales jam essemus quales erimus, cum mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem. Tunc enim non solum nulli desiderio peccati obediemus, sed nulla erunt desideria talia, quibus non obedire jubemur. Nunc ergo ubi dicitur, Jam non ego operor illud; sed illud quod in me habitat peccatum, de concupiscentiâ carnis dicitur, quae 
Rom. 7. 18.  operatur in nobis motus suos, etiam quando eis non obedimus, dum non regnat peccatum in nostro mortali corpore ad odediendum desideriis ejus, nec exhibemus membra nostra arma iniquitatis peccato, in quâ justitiâ nondum consummat â perseveranter proficientes, ad ejus consummationem quandoque veniemus, ubi peccati concupiscentia non cohibenda, atque fraenanda sed nulla sit. Hoc enim Lex posuit dicendo, Non concupisces, non quod hic valeamus, sed ad quod prosiciendo tendamus.  
§. 43. The second shall be taken out of his book the perfectione justitiae. c. 8. p. 511. col. 1. B. C. D. In quâ oratione (Dominicâ) si contentiosi esse nolumus, satis nobis propositum speculum est, ubi inspiciatur vita justorum, qui ex fide vivunt, & perfectè currunt, quamvis sine peccato non sint, Vnde dicunt, Dimitte nobis, quia nondum quo curritur pervenerunt. Hinc dicit Apostolus, Non quia jam acceperim, aut jam perfectus 
Philip. 3.  sim: fratres, ego me non, arbitror apprehendisse, unum autem, quae retro sunt oblitus, in ea, quae ante sunt extentus, secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae vocationis Dei in Christo jesu. Quot quot ergo perfecti hoc sapiamus: id est, quotquot perfectè currimus hoc sapiamus, quod nondum perfecti sumus ut illic perficiamur, quo perfecte adhuc currimus, ut 
1 Cor. 13.  cum venerit quod perfectum est, quod ex parte est destruatur: id est; non jam ex parte sit, sed ex toto: quia fidei & spei jam res ipsa, non quae credatur, & speretur, sed quae videatur, teneaturque succedet. Charitas autem quae in his tribus major est, non auferetur, sed augebitur, & implebitur contemplata, quod credebat, & quod sperabat adepta. In quâ plenitudine charitatis praeceptum illud implebitur, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, & ex tota animâ tuâ, & ex tota ment tuâ. Nam cum est adhuc aliquid carnalis concupiscentiae, quod vel continendo fraenetur, non omnino ex totâ anima diligitur Deus. Non enim Caro sine animâ concupiscit, quamvis Caro concupiscere dicatur, quia carnaliter anima concupiscit. Tunc erit justus sine ullo omnino peccato quia nulla lex erit in membris ejus repugnans legi mentis ejus, sed prorsus toto cord, totâ animâ, tota ment diliget Deum, quod est primum summumque praeceptum.  
§. 44. The third and last, which I chief insist on, because it is so exactly parallel, and almost the same with that we are now upon, is taken out of his book de Naturâ & Gratiâ, cap. 
P. 319. col. 2. A. B. edit. Paris. 1635.  38. An fort peccata non sunt, de quibus generaliter cavendis atque cohibendis admonemur praecepto Apostolico, ubi dicit, Non regnet Peccatum in vestro mortali corpore ad obediendum desideriis 
Rom. 6. 12.  ejus? His quip ne obediamus ad ea quae non licent, vel minus decent quotidianâ & perpetuâ conflictatione certandum est. Nam utique ex hoc vitio mittitur vel dimittitur oculus quo non oportet. Quod vitium si convaluerit & praevaluerit etiam adulterium perpetratur in corpore, quod in cord tanto sit citius, quanto est cogitatio celerior, & nullum impedimentum morarum. Hoc peccatum, id est, hunc vitiosae affectionis appetitum, qui magnâ ex parte fraenarunt, ut non obedirent desideriis ejus, nec exhiberent ei membra sua arma iniquitatis etiam justi appellari meruerunt, & hoc adjutorio Dei. Verum quia saepe in levissimis & aliquando in cautis obrepit peccatum, & justi fuerunt, & sine peccato non fuerunt. Postremo si in Abel justo charitas Dei, quâ unâ vere justus est, quicunque justus est, adhuc erat quo posset & deberet augeri, quicquid minus erat, Ex vitio erat. Et cui non minus sit donec ad illam ejus fortitudinem veniatur, ubi tota hominis absorbeatur infirmitas?  
§. 45. The case I think is beyond all possibility of exception plain. The whole is an answer to an Objection of the Pelagians, that urged that the full Perfection of righteousness must be granted to be attainable in this life, that had actually been attained by holy men, particularly by Abel, for of him the Scripture testifies that he was righteous, but no where speaks of his sin, which sure it would have done, as well as that of Adam and Eve and Cain, if he had been any way guilty.  
§. 46. To this S. Austin answers first; That there were many things done that are not recorded; and so Abel might sin though the Scripture mentions it not, and therefore there is no arguing from Scripture negatively.  
§. 47. But because he foresaw this would not satisfy the Pelagian, that urged by way of reply, that though this may be possible in respect of other men, when the world was grown populous, yet it was not probable it should be so in the story of only 
Vid. de Nat. & Grat. c. 37.  four persons, especially since the Scripture takes notice of Abel's righteousness, but not of his sin; of Adam's and Eves and cain's sin, but not of their righteousness. And therefore as the holy Spirit of God bears witness expressly to Abel's righteousness, so there is no ground but empty conjecture, or more improbable and vain Traditions (if any) for his sin; which may with equal reason be denied as it is urged. Credamus igitur, as the Pelagian concludes, quod legimus, & quod non legimus, nefas credamus.  
§. 48. To this in the second place he answers, That though there is no Record extant in Scripture of Abel's actual transgression, yet many there be (particularly that of Rom. 6. 12. Let not sin reign in your mortal bodies, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof 
* Aug. de Nupt. & concupisc. l. 1. c. 23. & 26. De Nat. & Grat. c 56. De Nupt. & Concupisc. l. 1. c. 25. Rom 5. 12. , which he constantly interprets of Original corruption) that speaks of every man's Original, and consequently of Abel's also. But lest this might be too short, in the following chapter he adds, O utinam non dico aliud quam in illis literis legit, verum contra id quod legit, nihil vellet astruere, fideliter & obedienter audiret, quod scriptum est. Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, & per peccatum mors, & ita in omnes homines pertransiit in quo omnes peccaverunt: & non infirmaret tanti medici gratiam, dum fateri non vult naturam humanam esse vitiatam. O utinam sicut Christianus legeret, praeter Jesum Christum, nullum esse nomen sub coelo in quo oporteat salvos fieri nos, & non possibilitatem naturae humanae ita defenderet, ut homo per liberum arbitrium, etiam sine isto nomine salvus esse posse credatur.  
§. 49. Secondly he answers, that we read, it is the duty of every one of the household of faith (of which number the Scripture records Abel to be) to labour to grow in Grace, which growth implies want and imperfection, that springs from our Original corruption.  
§. 50. For the full acquitting of this sense, besides the whole scope and design of S. Augustine's answer, I shall desire here to add what the same Father had before replied in answer to another objection of the Pelagian. c. 30. of this book. For whereas it had been urged against Original sin, that, suum non est si necessarium est, aut si suum est voluntarium est, & si voluntarium est, vitari potest; He thus replies, Non respondemus suum est omnino, sed vitium, quo committitur, nondum omni ex parte sanatum est: quod quidem ut inolesceret, de non recte usâ sanitate descendit. Ex quo vitio jam male valens. vel infirmitate, vel caecitate plura commit it. Pro quo supplicandum est, ut sanetur, & deinceps in perpetuâ sanitate vivatur, non superbiendum, quasi homo eadem potestate sanetur, qua potestate vitiatus est. And this I suppose, will fully clear the true sense and import of the Phrase, Ex vitio est.  
To return.  
§. 51. Charitas perfectissima then in S. Austin here, and Charitas quae non potest augeri, is no other but the universal habit of all virtues whatsoever, an absolute Legal Perfection, and that all perfect Charity which falls short of that is not in S. Augustine's sense a sin (for that were the direct Opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics which had but now been refuted by him) but is kept in this imperfect, and yet growing condition by reason of our Original Corruption, our natural and sinful infirmity, the foam, the root of sin, the lust in our members, which will be in our natures, and our fleshly condition, so long as we live, and the more we sin, and suffer this corruption to reign, the more we shall fall short of this absolute Perfection.  
§. 52. And as this is the true and full meaning of S. Austin, so it very well accords with the Doctor's assertion, but no way serves to the interest of M. Cawdrey, much less to this more absurd position of our Refuter.  
§. 53. But before I quite leave this place, I must crave leave of the Readers patience to acquaint him either with the very great ignorance, or carelessness, or uningenuous dealing of our Refuter. For this very place of S. Austin had been urged by M. Cawdrey to a purpose not much unlike. And to this the Doctor in his Account gave a large and very full Answer. That our Refuter may appear what he is, as also to correct in it a lapse, or two of the learned Doctors, I shall set it down at large, though I be censured as tedious. It is this.  
§. 33. This matter he (M. Cawdrey) desires to speak his 
D. Hammonds Account of the triplex Diatribe. c. 6. Sect. 8. pag. 213, 214.  own sense in S. Jeromes words, Charitas quae non potest augeri, etc. citing Ep. 62. for it. But this Citation is sure mistaken, there is no such thing in that Epistle. The place sure is in S. Jeromes Epistle to S. Austin. (the Epistle is indeed extant in 
Hier. Ep. tom. 9 p. 159.  the ninth Tome of S. Jeromes works, Ep. 44. the very Page the Doctor has quoted in the Margin, Edit. Colon. but it is not Saint Jeromes but S. Augustine's Epistle, for that Tome contains only those pieces that are falsely ascribed to S. Jerome, and therefore read, The place sure is in S. Augustine's Epistle to S. Jerome) where he desires his sense of those words, James 2. 10. He that keepeth the whole law, and offends in one point is guilty of all. On which occasion he discourseth a great while, how one virtue may be found in them, which yet are guilty of other sins, and so from one thing to another, not by way of defining, but raising of difficulties to provoke S. Augustine's read S. Jeromes) solution of them.  
§. 34. And on these terms he proposes the Notion of virtue, that it is the loving of that which is to be loved, and is in some greater, in some less, in some none at all, and then he adds, plenissima verò, quae jam non possit augeri, quamdiu homo hic vivit, est in nemine; quamdiu autem augeri potest, profecto illud quod minus est, quam debet, ex vitio est, Ex quo vitio non est justus in terrâ, qui faciat bonum, & non peccet, etc. But the most full virtue, and such which cannot be increased is in no man, so long as he lives here; But as long as it may be increased, that which is less than it ought to be is faulty, whereby it is that the Scripture saith (Here I agree not with the learned Doctor, It should be thus translated (and I have already given my Reason for it) Certainly that which i● less than it ought to be (viz: by the rule of Perfect Righteousness and Charity, the Law) is caused or arises from our inbred Corruption, Ex vitio est, it is, By reason of which inbred corruption it is) that there is not a just man upon earth which doth good and sinneth not (Fro. which inbred corruption it is) that in thy (Gods) sight shall no man living be justified. By reason of which inbred Corruption it is, that if we say we have no sin me deceive ourselves, etc.  
§. 35. By this view of the place, it is evident that the virtue which on occasion of the Place in S. James he speaks, being an universal, impartial observation of the whole Law, and consequently every failing in that a vice (for to that all the proofs belong, that there is no man but sinneth sometimes) there is no reason to extend his speech any further than to this, and then it will be no more applicable to our business, which is only of the degrees of this or that Particular virtue, which it is certain a man may have, who yet is guilty of some other sin, in other particulars.  
§. 36. This therefore I willingly acknowledge, that he that fails of any part of his duty, is therein faulty, or this is Ex vitio in him (proceeds, I understand it, from his natural inbred Corruption) and if of that only, S. Hieromes (read S. Augustine's) words (quamdiu augeri potest) be understood (as it is most reasonable it should,) whether we judge by the occasion, or the Proofs of his speech, or by the express words, (quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est) that which is less than he is bound to do, is faulty (read, proceeds from his own corruption, ex infirmitate est, as he elsewhere in the same Epistle) then as I fully consent to the truth of them, so when that is granted, no man can hence infer, therefore every regular Act of Obedience, which comes short of the highest degree of Perfection is a sin, for besides many other inconveniences formerly noted, this fresh one will be observable from S. Hieroms (read S. Augustine's) own words, that then every Act of virtue in this life is a sin, for as for that fullest perfection, which cannot be increased, the beginning of this Testimony acknowledgeth, that it is not to be found in any man in this life.  
§. 37. In a word, the word Perfection, is capable of two Notions, either it may signify the perfect obedience of never sinning, and of this only S. Hierome (read S. Austin) speaks, both when he saith it is not attained in this life, and when he adds, that whatsoever is less than this, is sinful (read, proceeds from our Natural corruption) or else it may signify any higher degree of exercise of any Particular virtue, Chastity, Mercy, fortitude, etc. And of this only it is that I speak, and S. Hierome 
Arist. Eth: l. 5. c. 1. §. 9, 10.  (read S. Austin.) in the words cited from him appears never to have thought of it (for he indeed as we have already demonstrated speaks only of the habit of Charity, or obedience to the whole Law, like that of the Philosophers, 
* Vniversalis Justitia est obedientia erga omnes leges, & ideo dicitur universalis quia complectitur sub se omnes virtutes de quibus leges universaliter praecipiunt. Mag●r: Com. in loc.  Universal Justice, not at all of the gradual intention of any single Act of any Particular Virtue or Grace) and to this only my affirmation belongs, that there are degrees in that Perfection, and that he that hath attained to any of these degrees, sins not against Christ's precept of Perfection, though he has not arrived to the highest degree.  
Thus far the learned Doctor.  
§. 54. And now I shall make bold to desire our Refuter to answer me these Dilemmas. Either he read this Account to M. Cawdreys' Triplex Diatribe, or he read it not; If he read it not, how comes he then so confidently in the next sentence but one to this, to say (I cannot but extremely wonder, that you affirm this to be the utmost you undertook to demonstrate to M. Cawdrey, or to justify now against me? If he read it, how comes it then to pass, that he takes no notice of this answer of the Doctors to this very passage of S. Austin, but crudely thrusts it upon the world, and obtrudes it upon the Doctor, as if it were unanswerable? If he read not this whole Account in defence of the Treatise of will-worship, how then is he fit to oppose that Treatise (as he does) which the Doctor had so largely defended? And if he read it, how comes it so to pass, that he is so ignorant every where of the Doctor's meaning, and still talks of another Love, and other Acts, than those the Doctor had fully and expressly declared himself to speak? If he both read, and well weighed, and considered the Treatise and Defence, and understood the Doctor's meaning, where then was his Judgement to impose another sense upon the words, than the Doctor ever dreamt of? Why was he so discourteous to his Reader to trouble him with Arguments, that had already been answered, without affording the least Reply to demonstrate their weakness? Let him choose which part he please, and he will either betray his own weakness and Ignorance, or his Partiality and double dealing; and consequently manifest how unfit he is to manage a Controversy in Public, especially against so able, so learned, so acute, and modest an adversary as the Doctor.  
§. 55. But yet all this notwithstanding, our Refuter is now with this single sentence of S. Austin so proud and secure of his victory and Acquests against the Doctor, as ever Tamerlane was when he road in his Triumphal Chariot drawn by Bajazet and the Asian Kings. And therefore he goes on, and thus magnificently bespeaks the Doctor.  

JEANES.  
And I am very confident, that besides this Replyer, no learned man, either Protestant or Papist, hath ascribed any such growth unto the Ardency of Christ's actual Love of God. As for the second sentence, etc.   
§. 56. Not to speak of your prevaricating again with the ambiguity of this Phrase, Christ's actual love of God, I shall for the present suppose, but not grant, that the Doctor had so said, and in the very words and sense you impose upon him and your Reader. What then will be the issue? why, very great! For swollen with success and scorn, he says, I am very confident, that besides this Replyer, no learned man, whether Protestant or Papist says so.  
§. 57 Well Sir! you may be very Confident, I confess, but never a whit the more knowing. For by experience I find in my little observation, both of myself and others, that Confidence is most commonly the Bastard of Ignorance, and very rarely, the genuine and legitimate Issue of true knowledge. Admiration and Confidence are most frequently begotten by 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Ignorance upon Folly. And the great Philosopher in his Morals, enquiring into the Nature of true Valour tells us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the Ignorant are a most Confident generation, because they are nigh of kin to 
Arist: Eth. l. 3. c. 8. §. 9  the Hopewells. And in his Rhetorics describing the different manners and behaviours of young men and old, he tells 
† Arist: Rhetor. l. 2. c. 2.  us, that the one are bold and confident, for want of Practice and Experience, but the other are 
* Ibid. l. 2. c. 13.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 very diffident and distrustful by reason of their knowledge, and much Observation. And therefore because they have lived long and have often been deceived, and have had great trials of their own and other men's mistakes, they are Cautious, and wary how they confidently affirm any thing, and think all things to be far less, or otherwise, than they ought to do, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, still speaking with a Perchance, and If it be so, being peremptory in nothing. And therefore upon this so sure Observation, I am the more easily persuaded you will be mistaken, because you are so confident.  
§. 58. For how is this Sir, what, no learned man, either Protestant or Papist ascribe any such growth unto the Ardency of Christ's Actual Love of God?  
— Nemo hercule? nemo? 
Pers.  What none of all those numerous Author's that in all parts of the world have published their Conceptions? Not any even in Japan, or the University of Mexico excepted? For the Jesuits have many Colleges in the East-Indies, and the Spaniards have also their Universities in America. Strange! wondrous strange! we formerly heard of a Chedzoy-Challenge, and now we shall hear of a Chedzoy-Confidence!  
§. 59 But not to travel far for Authors, what think you Sir, of Master Henry Jeanes Minister of God's word at Chedzoy in Somersetshire? what's he nor Protestant nor Papist? nor of the number of the learned? what thinks he of the exquisite Hugo Grotius, who though no Protestant nor Papist, but a religious Hermaphrodite, a Grotio-Cassandrian, yet he deserves a name at least among the Learned of the Age? But what thinks he of our own Judicious Hooker, our profound Doctor Feild, of his own Aims, and Vorstius, nay of Luther and Calvin? Are not these all learned and Protestant enough? What thinks he of his own accurate Suarez of the Order of Jesuits? Of Estius, Prime Professor of Divinity, and Chancellor of the University of Douai? Are not these learned Papists? And yet all these with many others Ancient and Modern, Schoolmen and Fathers, Protestants and Papists, and learned to boot, and himself among the number, have all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and in Terms terminant affirmed, what here he says, all else do deny, as we have already demonstrated. And though I might well content myself with the Authors produced, yet not to put him or the Reader to the trouble of looking back, and to give a Checkmate to his Confidence for ever, I shall now acquaint him with some fresh observations, not from Writers Scholastical but Practical, and Expositors of Scripture both Protestants and Papists, and those as learned as any.  
§. 60. To begin with the great Erasmus, whom though the Jesuits allow not to be either Protestant or Papist, and therefore picture him hanging between Heaven and Hell, not knowing where to rank him either among Heretics or Catholics, yet he cannot be denied a prime seat among the Learned.  
Et Jesus proficiebat] Non me fugit quibus rationibus explicuit 
Erasm. Annot. in Luc. c. 2. v. ult p. 143, 144. Edit. Froben. Basil: 1521.  hunc Locum interpres, Christum profecisse, non quod illi quicquam accesserit ● tempore quo conceptus est in utero matris, sed quod dotes suas quibus erat cumulatissimus magis ac magis expromeret exereretque, idque tum apud homines, quorum saluti consul●bat, tum apud Deum cujus gloriam illustrabat. Rursum sunt, qui sic expediant, ut dicant, Christo dotes easdem aliter contigisse, & quod prius afflatu tenebat, mox usustudioque humano comparasse; Quorum ego sententiam non refello, tamen illud velim expendat lector, num incolumi fidei sinceritate sentiri possit, cum extra Controversiam sit, dotes omnes quibus praeditus fuit Jesus ut homo, beneficentiae suisse divinae, Dictatemque per Gradus quosdam eas impartisse nature humanae assumptae, praesertim cum id apud Lucam eodem capite bis legamus, ait enim paulo superius, Puer aut em croscebat, & confortabatur, plenus sapientiâ. Quod enim corroboratur, auctu quodam virium fulciri videtur. Ac rursum apertius hoc loco. Et Jesus proficiebat sapientiâ & aetate & gratia apud Deum & apud homines. Cum enim tria conjungat, sapientiam, aetatem, & Gratiam, sicut verè profecit aetatis accessu, ita verè profecisse videtur dotium incrementis. Nam quod asserunt quidam Jesum ab initio Gratiâ plenum fuisse, non impedit profectum, cum idem de Joanne deque aliis dictum sit, quibus gradus & accessionem virtutum nihilo secius tribuimus. Neque vero pereinde nos moveat, si id pugnet cum aliquo placito Scholasticorum, aut alicujus hominis opinion, said an quod apertè scripsit Lucas fidei sincerae adversetur, cui semper est modis omnibus adhaerendum, etc. Thus far Erasmus.  
§. 61. Cardinal Cajetan his Contemporary, shall succeed for the learned among the Papists, Thus than he.  
Et Jesus proficiebat sapientiâ & aetate & gratiâ] Non est 
Cajetan: Comment: ad quatuor Evangel. Paris. 8 1540 ad Luc. 2. vers. ult.  immemor suorum verborum Ezangelisia: ut quem paulo superius dixerat plenum sapientia, modo oblitus dicat proficere sapientia. Plenus siquidem fuit semper habitu Sapientiae, proficiebat autem actibus sapientiae, procedendo à sapientibus actibus ad sapientiores. Et similiter intellige de profectu Gratiae. Apud Deum & apud homines] quoniam erat in veritate progressus ad ampliora merita apud Deum, & apparebant apud homines. Thus far Cajetan.  
§. 62. The learned Tolet, the first Cardinal of the Order 
Tolet. Com. in Luc. c. 2. verse. últ p. 212, 213 214, 215. edit. Colon. 1611.  of the jesuites shall follow. Thus than he.  
A duodecimo aetatis anno, usque ad trigesimum, quid Christus gesserit brevissimo compendio Evangelista percurrit triplicem progressum ejus describens. Primus est in sapientiâ proficiebat, inquit, & augebatur in dies Sapientia, non quod habitus ipse in se sapientiae augmentum reciperet, sed quod indies sapientiora verba & opera proferret: verba enim & opera sapientiam Evangelista appellat. And then in the Close of his Annotation on that place he adds. At quantum ad ostensionem (etiam Divinae Naturae dici etiam posset profecisse, quia verbi sapientia paulatim se prodebat per humanitatem illam tum etiam, quia impropria est significatio verborum, proficere, id est, videbatur proficere seu paulatim se ostendebat; ad impropriam autem significationem verborum non est revertendum, nisi impellente necessitate aut urgente ratione: cum autem possimus interpretari verba accommodatissime, servata proprietate non est cur improprietate utamur. Idcirco aliter mihi accommodatius dicendum videtur: sapientiam enim non ipsum habitum sapientiae appellat, sed opera ista, & verba quae à sapientia procedunt. In his autem verè Christus, secundum aetatis incrementum, proficiebat, quia opera sapientiora edebat, & verba sapientiora loquebatur, non enim omnia externa opera aequalem sapientiam habent, contingit sapienter, & sapientius loqui. Christus autem licet plenitudinem intus sapientiae haberet, exterius tamen verba & opera sapientiora proferebat, &c, Dicta ergo & facta sapientia procedentia nomine appellantur sapientiae, in hac Christus ratione humanae naturae progressum verè fecit. Atque haec explicatio mihi sanè accommodatior & proprior videtur, etc. Et Gratia] hic est tertius profectus, nimirum Gratia, qua Deo gratus erat, illique acceptus & sanctus, non quod sanctior aut gratior (habitu sc:) progressu temporis factus fuerit, qui ab oxordio incarnationis plenus gratia erat, sed quod per aetatis incrementa, perfectioribus gratiae & sanctitatis operibus incubuerit, quamvis enim quodvis opus & verbum Christi ratione personae operantis esset aequalis sanctitatis, non tamen ratione ipsius operis & verbi: gratius enim opus fuit ratione operis, jejunium quadraginta dierum, quam unius tantum, etc. And then in his Annotation on that Commentary he adds — licet (Catholici Doctores) qui perfectum in ostensione sapientiae explicant, idem dicunt de gratia: Nos verò Gratiam opera ipsa gratiae explicamus, etc.— In his ergo profectus fuit, non autem in gratia secundum Habitum, etc.— Apud Deum & homines] Haec verba ad praecedentia tria referuntur, nimirum (proficiebat sapientiâ, aetate & gratiâ apud Deum & homines.) apud Deum quidem, quia erat augmentum & profectus non solum in apparentia respectu hominum, sed re ipsa apud Deum; erant enim sapientiora & gratiora in se indies, sicut & aetas provectior. And then in his Annotation on that Commentary it follows, Titus Bostrensis hunc Profectum interpretatur secundum ostensionem, & demonstrationem, etc. — Nos verò, qui non solius Ostensionis, sed re ipsa profectum hunc esse diximus, scil: operibus ipsis, & verbis, quae nomine sapientiae & Gratiae appellantur explicuimus istud (Apud Deum) pro eo quod dicitur verè, saepe enim hominibus, aliud videtur, quam est, at Deo ipsi nuda veritas adstat, idcirco dicitur profecisse apud Deum, quia vera opera sapientiae & gratiae faciebat. Additum est (Apud homines) quia saepe contingit, quod verum est apud Deum, non ut tale ab hominibus recipiatur. Christus prosiciebat & apud Deum & apud homines, magnificabatur enim ab iis & à Deo. Thus Tolet.  
§. 63. The only doubt that can be raised of the sense of the Cardinal must arise from the words, Externa opera sapientiae & gratiae. The outward works of wisdom and Grace wherein he says Christ only increased.  
§. 64. But for the clearing of this, Observe we must, that here all along Tolet does carefully distinguish these three. First habitum sapientiae & gratiae, wherein he allows no increase. Secondly, opera Sapientiae & gratiae, wherein he allows a true increase, and Thirdly, ostensionem sapientiae & gratiae, the outward sensible demonstration, which he allows to be but an improper increase, and no whit agreeable to the words of the Evangelist, who speaks of a true and real increase aswell in wisdom and Grace, as in Stature, and that in respect of God aswell as Man. And consequently by the works of Wisdom and Grace he must of necessity mean, the inward and the outward Acts, both which the one, as the Form, and the other as the matter do concur (as the Moralists and Schoolmen grant and acknowledge, as we have formerly noted) to the completing of the moral Acts of wisdom and Grace as considered in genere moris. And these he calls opera externa sapientiae & gratiae in a double respect. First because the inward Acts themselves that make up the Formal part of the Action, or work in a moral sense are though immanent in respect of the will, yet Extrinsecall to the Habit from whence they flow, because the Habit is the cause, and these the effects; and secondly, because the outward Acts and sensible demonstrations, that are the Material part of the Moral work, are truly extrinsecall and exposed to the view and apprehension and cognizance of the Exterior senses. And thus also the learned and very accurate Suarez understands his master Thomas, who as Tolet here, acknowledges though Christ increased not according to the Habit of wisdom and Grace, yet secundum opera sapientiae & gratiae, according to the Moral Acts and works of wisdom and grace he did truly increase, and not only in show and outward demonstration. That the outward sensible expressions only and with exclusion to the inward Acts themselves cannot here be understood is plain from the Authors own words, and we need not further insist upon it. Go we on then.  
§. 65. To Tolet I shall add the learned Professor of Douai, 
Guil. Estii Annotat. in praecip. & difficilior: Scripturae loc. ad Luc. 2. v. 42 & 52. Duaci fol. 1629.  Estius. Puer autem crescebat & confortabatur plenus sapientiâ. Et infra v. 52. & Jesus proficiebat sapientià. Resp. Plenus sapientiâ, quia perfecte sapiens, nec quicquam sapientiae illi deerat. Proficiebat autem sapientia quatenus majora indies opera sapientiae apud homines exercebat. Proficiebat ergo▪ quoad actum non quoad habitum; actus enim erant paulatim majores habitu eodem & immutabili manente. And upon the 52. verse (to which he here refers) he adds, Et Iesus proficiebat sapientiâ & aetate & gratiâ apud Deum & apud homines. Illud (apud Deum & homines) ad solam gratiam videtur referendum. Nam dicere non solemus, quempiam proficere aetate apud Deum & homines, nec sapientiâ apud Deum sed Gratiâ apud Deum & homines, vide jansenium & nostra in 3. sent. distinct. 13. These words we have already cited at large, and they are clear and express to our present purpose.  
66. And because he refers to jansenius, that learned man 
Cornel. Jansenii Commentar. in Concord. Evangel. c. 12. p. 90. col: 1. B. et 2. A. B. p. 91. col. 1. A. B. Lugd. 1606.  shall follow. But the whole is much too long to be transcribed. I shall therefore set down what more immediately concerns the purpose. Apparet ab aliquo rejectam hoc loco dictionem (Spiritu) quod offenderetur illo quod Christus diceretur secundum Spiritum confortari, cujus Spiritus ab initio plenus fuerit omni gratiâ, verum offendi hinc non oportet, cum & postea dicatur profecisse sapientia & aetate etc.— Plenitudo enim gratiae non impedit profectum, cum ea joanni, aliisque tribuatur, quibus gradus & accessionem nihilo secius tribuimus. Itaque cum scripturis sacris & fidei sinceritate non obstare videatur si dicatur Deitas per gradus quosdam dotes suas impartisse humanae naturae assumptae, & Lucas id aperte hoc loco bis dicat eisdem verbis, nunc loquens de Christo, quibus prius de joanne, putat quidam (Erasmus he means) haec Lucae loca simpliciter accipienda ut verè Christus significetur profecisse sapientiâ sicut profecit aetate. Nam quod plerique veteres dicunt Christum ab initio fuisse plenum sapientiâ nec potuisse proficere, magis videntur respexisse ad sapientiam ejus divinam quae competit Christo quatenus Deus, ut patet in Hieronymo, etc.— Et Ambrosius hoc loco fatetur Christum secundum quod erat homo profecisse. Secundum carnem, inquit, utique sapientiâ Dei implebatur & gratiâ. Et sub nomine Theophili in catenâ aureâ sic legitur, verbum in carne passum fatemur, quamvis sola caro fuerit passa, quia caro verbi erat, quae patiebatur: ita proficere dicitur, ex eo quod humanitas proficiebat in ipso, verum haec à Scholasticis, & bene quidem intelliguntur dicta esse de sapientiâ Christi ipso usu & experientia acquisita, cum prius ab initio conceptionis fuerit infusa animae ejus omnium rerum cognitio, etc.— Porro quomodocunque intelligantur haec loca Lucae, illud certum his verbis Puer crescebat & confortabatur &c. illum voluisse ita notare veritatem assumptae ab eo naturae humanae, ut tamen etiam in eo significaret abiquid homine majus apparuisse, etc.— Esse tum in eo aliquid homine majus, satis declaratum est, quod simul cum aetate augebatur & robur spiritus, & sapientia, non enim obnoxius erat iis vitiis quibus ea aetas solet laborare, ineptiâ, lasciviâ, inconstantiâ, stultitiâ: sed robur spiritus, caelestisque sapientia indies, magisque sese exerebat vultu, incessu, sermone & factis in quibus nihil erat quod non spiraret modestiam, castitatem, suavitatem, sapientiam. And then upon the last verse thus he again, Porro quod 
Idem ibid. pag. 94. col. 1. E. et 2. A. B. E. & p. 95. col. 1. A.  dicitur profecisse sapientiâ & gratiâ ab antiquioribus interpretibus fere intelligitur, non quod illi quicquam accesserit à tempore quo in utero matris divinitas humanitati in ipsa conceptione est counita, sed quod sapientiam suam & gratiam magis ac magis declaraverit, & declarando magis ac magis habitus sit ab hominibus profecisse. Quod idem est cum eo, quod à recentioribus dicitur, profecisse Christum non secundum habitum sapientiae & gratiae, sed secundum Actus sapientiae & gratiae eo quod processerit ab actibus sapientibus ad sapientiores. Aliter tamen etiam à recentioribus de habitu sapientiae acquisitae, qui auctus sit in Christo, cum habitus sapientiae illi infusae, aut sapientiae beatae non sit augmentatus, verum cum sapientiam hanc, quae Christo tanquam homini ab initio conceptionis sit infusa, quaque omnia ab initio cognovisset, etiam ut homo, quidam putent non posse ex Scripturis probari, putant ut superius dictum est, simplicius hunc locum sic explicandum, ut dicatur Christum secundum sapientiam divinam, hoc est eam, quae ei competit tanquam Deo, non profecisse: secundum sapientiam autem humanam, hoc est, eam, quae ei ut homini competit verè profecisse, hominum quidem more sed tamen supra modum humanum. Nec metuenda hic videtur Damasceni sententia etc.— proinde locus hic & aliter ei similis apud Lucam superius explicandus est catholicè altero illorum modorum prius positorum. Porro— Dictio Gratia anceps est, potest enim accipi pro dono Dei quo illi grati efficimur, & bene vivimus, & tunc eodem modo oportet intelligi Christum profecisse gratiâ quo modo profecit sapientiâ. Aut— pro acceptabilitate & favore, ut significetur eum gratiosiorem factum tum Deo tum hominibus commendatione virtutum seize in eo proferentium. Quanquam & secundum hanc acceptionem non potest intelligi profecisse gratiâ apud Deum, quasi acceptabilior & gratior postea factus sit illi, sicut enim non crevit in eo gratia Habitualis, ita nec gratior factus est. Sed tantum quod semper magis ac magis fecerit acceptabilia, grata atque meritoria opera. Thus far Jansenius.  
§. 67. I shall conclude the Suffrages of the learned Papists with the testimony of the excellent Lucas Brugensis. Proficiebat] augebatur indies Sapientiâ] rerum divinarum humanarumque cognition. Iterum hic (ait Titus) Evangelista progressum in sapientiâ & gratiâ secundum corporis augmentum assignat, respicit enim Titus ad v. 40. superiorem. Sed quemadmodum illic Sapientiam, non interiorem habitam sapientiae, sed exteriorem demonstrationem sapientiae intellexerat, ita ut hic intelligit suffragantibus aliis enarratoribus Graecis, Origine & Theophylacto scribentibus in hunc Locum, & Gregorio Nazianzeno oratione in Basilii magni vitam, ubi ait de Domino Jesus; sapientia apud Deum & homines proficiebat, non ut augmentum aliquod acciperet, cum ab initio gratia sapientiaque absolutus esset, sed quod haec ab hominibus ignaris paulatins apparerent. Quare Theophylactus, Emicatio sapientiae ejus, profectus ipse est, inquit. Hanc interpretationem perfecit ea, quae est D. Thomae Aquinatis (p. 3. q. 7. a. 13. ad 3.) & aliorum posteriorum Doctorum profecisse scientia, non quod ad habitum sapientiae interiorem (qui ab initio conceptionis ita fuit perfectus, ut nihil amplius ei potuerit addi) sed quod ad effectus seu actus exteriores ex interiori illo habitu Elicitos, quotidiè enim sapientiora verba proferebat, & opera sapientiora edebat, ita proficiebat actibus sapientiae, progrediendo de sapientibus actibus (siuè verbis siuè factis) ad sapientiores; ut autem non tantum habitus, sed & Actus, verba inquam & opera nomine sapientiae appellentur ubique obvium est tam in vulgari sermone quam in sacris literis, etc.— Gratia] quâ gratus fuit & acceptus, non tamen interiori (quâ ab initio incarnationis fuerat plenus & perfectus) sed externis Gratiae operibus ex interioris gratiae habitibus Elicitis, non enim per incrementa aetatis evasit aut sanctior aut gratior, sed perfectioribus gratiae sanctitatisque operibus incubuit, qer quae & majora merita sibi comparavit, Quamvis enim quodvis opus & verbum Christi ratione personae operantis filii inquam Dei, esset aequalis sanctitatis ac meriti non tamen ratione ipsius operis aut verbi, gratius enim fuit opus jejunium quadraginta dierum, quam fuisset Jejunium trium dierum & passio majoris meriti fuit quam Circumcisio (almost the very words of the Doctor, that our Refuter so quarrels at) Profecit ergo exterius verbis factisque eminentioris sanctitatis & amplioris meriti. Name & Gratiae nomen in scriptures usurpari pro verbis factisque ex interiori gratiâ emanantibus manifestum est etc.— Apud Deum] Deo teste, judice & approbatore. Refertur ad omnia tria praecedentia, quod Iesus exterius profecerit, prout aetate; ita & sapientiae & gratiae actionibus perfectioribus (Let the Refuter mark it) non ficte & simulatè, sed Deo ipso judice, verè & sincere, ita ut ex praeclaris gestis cum aetate crescentibus accreverint & apud Deum ampliora merita, & consequentia praemia.  
§. 68 And thus besides the Schoolmen formerly quoted to this purpose we have brought in six of the most learned among the Papists, and most eminent Literal and Practical Expositors among them, attesting Christ's true and real increase in the Acts of wisdom and Grace.  
§. 69. Come we now to the eminently learned among the Protestants.  
§. 70. And among them let Reverend Beza lead the Van. Luc. 2. v. 40. Implebaturque 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vulg. plenus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Beza major. Annotat. in novum Testam. in Luc. 2. v. 40. 52. f●l edit. 1598.  Erasmus autem recte expressit vim Participii quo significatur; Deitatis effecta pro aetatis progressu in assumptâ verâ humanitate sese exeruisse, And then upon the 52. verse he thus adds, Sapientia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quum enim licet anima ab ipso exortu perfectissima donatus, tamen per omnia nobis, solo excepto peccato, conformis fuerit: adolescente demum ipso exeruerunt sese omnes animi tum corporis facultates. Imo & ipsa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 plenitudo sese prout & quatenus ipsi libuit humanitati assumtae insinuavit: quicquid garriant mataeologi & novi ubiquitarii Eutychiani.  
§. 71. To him I shall annex Piscator, another eminent Expositor. 
Jo. Piscat. Commentar. in n. T. in Scholiis ad cap. 2. Luc. v 40.  Puerulus autem crescebat, & corroborabatur Spiritu] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. id est, animo, vel Spiritu sancto, id est, donis spiritus sancti, Implebaturque sapientia] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Epexegesis.  
§. 72. The learned Deodate shall succeed, Luc. 2. 40. 
Deodat. in Luc.  Waxed strong] whereby is shown, the fullness of the gifts of the holy Ghost shown themselves in him, and brought forth extraordinary effects according to the progress of his age, and the increase of his bodily strength, and its organs, he having every way made himself like unto man, except sin.  
§. 73. The notes of the Assembly of Divines will be of moment 
Assembly Notes in Luc.  in this case, and therefore will deserve our next consideration. Luc. 2. 40. Filled with wisdom,] with admirable wisdom showing itself in him as he grew up: this was the effect of the Deity dwelling in him from under the veil of his assumed humanity. To the Deity nothing could be added: an infinite cannot increase: in the humanity he was as without sin, Heb. 4. 15. and so had a native ignorance of some things, from which he grew as he increased in Age. For though the Deity and Humanity were but one person, yet were not the incommucable Properties of the Deity given to the humane Nature: the Deity was infinite, omnipresent, etc. so was not the humanity etc. vers. 52. Increased in wisdom] as a child, lege humanae naturae as Euthymius saith well, but increased by little and little, for as God he was absolutely perfect: because he assumed a reasonable soul, as well as a humane body, the Deity thereto united, was so veiled, that the graces thereof showed themselves by certain degrees, according to the maturity of his humane faculties: and so he increased in wisdom though the fullness of the Godhead dwelled in him. Col. 2. 9 And stature] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. In stature of body, the Greek word also signifieth Age, so he as man increased in body and soul. Nam sicut carnis est aetate proficere, sic est animae sapientiâ & gratiâ profecisse. Fulgent. de Myster. Mediate. ad Thrasimund. l. 1. So these.  
§. 74. But to ease myself and the Reader in this flat and heavy work, I shall next in one Cameron tantamount and upon the matter quote the whole Reformed Church of France. For this Cameron, and his Doctrine, was of such high esteem among them, that they ordered by a decree of the Nationall Synod held at 
* Helvorum Castris.  Castres', that his works, as many, as could be had, should be gathered together and printed at the public charge. And the learned Triumvirate, S. Boucherell, L. Capellus, and M. Amyrald were employed by Authority of the Provincial Synod of Anjou and Tours, etc. to set them forth, which they carefully performed. Thus than he 
† Joan. Cameron 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: ●ract. de Eccles. 2. c. de Gratiâ p. 240. col. 1. 2. edit. Genev. sol. 1642.  and in a work formerly published in his life time, and here reprinted among his Remains. Sed duplex est Dei favour, alius qui misericordia est propriè dicta— qua miseros prosequitur peccatores— Alius est— quo prosequitur Creaturam, qui favor dicitur, quia Creatura, qua Creatura— subdita est Creatori suo, secundum hanc significationem etiam Christus crescebat gratiâ apud Deum & apud homines, non qua Deus est, sed qua homo est, Nam quo illustrior est imago Dei etiam in Creatura eo Deus creaturâ magis delectatur. Porro illustrior fuit imago Dei in Christo adolescente quam in puero: itaque crevisse dicitur Christus gratia, quod nihil detrahit (ut calumniantur Pontificii, and let our Refuter mark it) dignitati Christi; hoc enim, factum est per Oeconomiam in gratiam nostri, alioquin exclament indignum fuisse Christo ut puer fuerit, sed Christi indignitas nostra dignitas est, non enim exinanivit semetipsum in sui sed in n●stri gratiam, quemadmodum docet Paulus Christum non quaesivisse sua, sed aliena. Thus far the learned Cameron.  
§. 75. I shall conclude with Doctor Reynolds, a very learned man, it is in his Treatise of the life of Christ Thus.  
Lastly, our holiness must have a growth and proficiency with 
Ed. Reynolds life of Christ. p. 423. edit. 5. quarto. Luc 2. 40, 52. Heb. 5, 8.  it, Grow in Grace. Let these things be in you and abound, as it is said of Christ that he increased in wisdom and favour with God and men, and that he learned obedience by the things that he suffered. If it be here objected, that Christ was ever full, and had the spirit without measure, even from the womb; for in as much as his divine nature was in his infancy as fully united to his humane as ever after, therefore the fullness of grace which was a consequence thereupon was as much as ever after. To this I answer, that certain it is, that Christ was ever full of Grace and Spirit, but that excludes not his growth in them proportionably to the ripeness, and by consequence capacity of his humane nature. Suppose we the Sun were vegetable and a subject of augmentation, though it could be never true to say that it is fuller of light than it was, yet it would be true to say that it hath more light now then it had when it was of a lesser capacity: Even so Christ being in all things save sin, like unto us, and therefore like us in the degrees and progresses of natural maturity, though he were ever full of Grace, may yet be said to grow in it, and to learn, because as the capacity of his nature was enlarged, the spring of Grace within him did rise up and proportionably fill it. Thus far D. Reynolds.  
§. 76. But because this impossible supposition of a vegetable Sun may seem too obscure an instance, though borrowed from the fountain of light, I shall presume by that learned man's leave, otherwise to explain his meaning.  
§. 77. The soul of man we know, and it is generally believed, 
Vid. Scal exer. 307. sect. 29. mihi p. 941. Sennert Epit. Nat. Scien. l 6, c. 1. p. 410. Ruvio de Anim. l. 2. q. 4.  as it is spiritual in its nature so it is also indivisible; whence the philosopher has left it for an undoubted Maxim, that it is tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte. As then the soul of an Infant, though in itself indivisible, and Essentially perfect according to the first Act, does yet successively, though still indivisibly in itself, as I may say, coextend itself to all the really augmented dimensions of his Stature, till he comes to a full age and growth, and successively, though still indivisibly according to the first Act grow in actual perfections of Rationality: so the infused Habit of wisdom and Grace in our blessed Saviour, though it were indivisibly and in itself perfectly communicated to the humane nature according to the first Act, yet successively, though still indivisibly in itself did extend itself, and really increase and grow in respect of the second Act, or Actual wisdom and grace. Or if this be yet too short, I shall borrow another plainer, because Ocular Demonstration from the Mathematics. Suppose we then a Centre fixed upon a Plain, and from that Centre A, a circumference B drawn, and eight or nine circles successively also drawn from the same centre between A and B: Then let an hundred several Radii more or less be drawn through A. and every intermediate circle to both sides of the circumference B. plain it is that every Diameter that passes from one side of the circumference B to the other, does also pass through every intermediate lesser circle, and also through the centre A. And yet Reason and the Eye tells us, that there is a greater and more perfect distance of the Rays in B. then there is in any of the intermediate circles, and none at all in the centre A. and yet for all that there are, nor indeed can, no more Diameters pass through B. then through A. nor can any Ray pass from B, but it must also come from A: So is it in respect of the Habitual perfection of Christ's wisdom and Grace. Whilst yet the Manhood was, as I may so speak in the Embrio-centre at his first conception in the womb, he was equally full in respect of the Habit of wisdom and Grace, as he was when he first entered on his Prophetic office, or indeed after his glorious exaltation, yet as he grew in years and stature successively though still indivisibly, he may be said to grow in wisdom and Grace, according to the second Act, and to learn actually what he knew not actually before (in particular, the day of Judgement) because as the capacity of his nature was enlarged, the spring of Grace within him did rise up and proportionably fill it, as the Rays passing through and arising from the centre A, are proportionably, as I may so speak, enlarged, according to the Proportion of every circle, and do proportionably fill them. It is with the Habit of divine Grace in Christ in respect of the successively more perfect Acts of Grace performed by him in a more perfect manner, as it is with the centre A. in respect of all the Rays that pass through it, and all the intermediate circles to the Circumference B. It is potentially every Ray, and all arise from it, and as the capacity of the circles are enlarged, so does that spring within them rise up, and proportionably fill them.  
§. 78. If here our Refuter shall reply, that these Instances do confirm his assertion against D. Hammond, and that thence it evidently follows, as he maintains, that there was no real augmentation in respect of the Acts of Christ's wisdom and Grace, no more then in respect of the Habit, as there can be no more Rays in the circumference B, then what pass through A, and all the intermediate circles: and consequently it will follow that though he really increased in the perfection of his stature, yet he did not so increase in respect of the inward and elicit Acts of wisdom and Grace; no more than in the Habit, but only in regard of outward appearance to men, and in respect of the outward sensible imperate Acts of his wisdom and grace.  
§. 79. To this I answer, that thus indeed Bellarmine and Maldonate and others of that party, maintain in opposition to the Divines of the Reformation. But then this cannot possibly agree with Doctor Reynolds his words. And since that learned man is yet alive, he may please to consult him, and if he shall declare himself, as I believe he will not, to be of Bellarmine's Judgement, I shall then strike him out of my Catalogue, as having no need of his Testimony, since so many learned men, both Protestants and Papists, are so clear for Doctor Hammond, and against our confident Refuter.  
§. 80. But than secondly, I must tell him that there are few or no similitudes fourfooted; and when he shall be able to show me in that miracle of the Mathematics that the centre A, and the several intermediate circles are all of equal dimensions with the circumference B, and that the Embryo in the womb, and the Infant in swaddling  is equal as in stature, so in Rational Acts with a Man, I shall then begin to doubt mine own eyes, that really discern a difference greater in the distance of the Rays in B, then in any of the intermediate circles, which is none at all in A. and to question the constant experience of the world, that naturally finds a sensible difference in respect of the perfection of the Rational Acts of a Child and a Man.  
§. 81. And thus we have brought in a full Jury of Authors, Protestants and Papists, and all very eminent, and the great Erasmus for the Foreman. And therefore in a case so clear, it were in vain to heap up more Testimonies against our confident Refuter, though many, many might be had.  
§. 82. The truth is, though it be a problem at Rome, and variously disputed, whether Christ did really and truly increase though not in respect of the Habit, yet in respect of 
An Scientia habitualis & alia, istiusmodi dona, quibus Christi humanitas à primo statim incarnationis momento imbuta fuit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & incrementum admiserunt? Affirmatur contra Bellarminum, primo, quia Christus in omnibus naturalibus quae ad ostensionem verae humanitatis pertinent, & cum fine incarnationis non pugnant, fratribus factus est similis, at in scientiâ atque sapientiâ magis magisque proficere est naturale. Ergo socundo, quia eodem modo profecit quoad sapientiam & gratiam, quomodo quoad aetatem. At Christus non tantum secundum opinionem hominum, sed revera profecit quoad aetatem, ergo. Tertio, quia Christus qua homo in statu exinanitionis diem Judicii ignoravit, ergo tantam rerum notitiam Habitualem non habuit, quin majorem adipisci potuerit. Henric. Eckhard. Pandect. controvers. Relig. par. prim. cap. 3. q. 8. p. 191, 192, 193. 8ᵒ Lipsiae 1622.  Actual wisdom and Grace, yet it is the general Tenet of Protestants that he did so. And some, as Erasmus by name, and D. Henry Eckhard superintendent General of Aldenburge do plainly, as some of the Ancients also maintain, that according to the humane nature he did really increase, not only in Actual, but also in habitual wisdom and Grace, as he did in stature, and the words of Beza and Piscator already cited seem to import as much. And the same is charged upon Luther and Calvin and Zuinglius and Bucer and Beza, by 
Bellarm. tom. 1. Controvers. 2. de Christo lib. 4. c 1. mihi p. 422. Calvin. Insti. tut. l. 2. c. 14. §. 2: Luc. 2. 52. Marc. 13. 32.  Bellarmine, how truly I cannot yet discern for want of Books. But if the places he citys be rightly quoted, the words seem to come up to that purpose, and I shall leave our Refuter to tell me what he thinks of this passage in calvin's Institutions. Quod Primogenitum Paulus asserit universae creaturae qui ante omnia extiterit etc.— haec & similia peculiariter divinitati attribui certum est. Quod autem servus patris vocatur, quod crevisse narratur aetate & sapientia apud Deum & apud homines, quod gloriam suam non quaerere, nescire diem ultimum etc.— solius humanitatis id totum est. Siquidem quatenus Deus est, nec augeri ullâ re potest, & omnia propter se operatur, nec quicquam eum latet.  
§. 83. But howsoever these words and the rest, quoted by Bellarmine, may sound in other men's ears, yet I should rather understand them, as our profound and Judicious D. Field 
— There are other (of the Schoolmen) of as good Judgement and great learning, who think that howsoever he had the habit of all knowledge from the beginning, and brought it with him out of the womb, yet not the Act and use of it: and this is all that either Luther or Calvin say: and yet we know how clamorously some inveigh against them, as if they had broached some heresy.— And a little after— howsoever some in heat of their distempered Passions lay a heavy imputation of horrible impiety upon Luther, Calvin and others, for that they say, there were some things, which Christ in his humane soul did not actually know from the beginning, yet Maldonate, etc. D. Field of the Church l 5. p. 437. fol. Oxon. 1628. Vid. Jansen. Commentar. in harmony. Evangel. supra citat.  does, as speaking of a real augmentation and increase not of the habit of wisdom and Grace, but only of the Acts, and in respect of the use and exercise; because their words may according to the general current of our Doctrine, bear this sense, and they do not positively and expressedly maintain any habitual increase in them, at least in respect of the infused habit of wisdom and Grace. But yet if any shall otherwise understand them with Bellarmine, I must tell him that the learned Jansenius allows the exposition to be Catholic, and leaves it indifferent which of the two be followed, and the great Cardinal Tolet could not condemn it as heretical in 
Tolet Come. in Luc. 2. ver. 52 supra citat. Maldonat. Commentar. in Evangel. Luc. 2. v. 40. p. 993. c. infracitat.  Erasmus, whom he citys though he does not follow him. And then withal I must add that even Maldonate himself does expressly grant, that many of the ancient Fathers, as Athanasius, Epiphanius, Ambrose, Cyrillus, Fulgentius, Beda and Euthymius were of that opinion, which is sufficient at least to make the opinion tolerable, howsoever otherwise erroneous.  
§. 84. And here if I list to recriminate, and to bring the Jealous Reader into suspicion that our Refuters mixture were popishly affected, I could justly charge him (though he does falsely accuse the Doctor) that as the Assertion he quarrels at in Doctor Hammond is the general Tenent of Protestants, so his own he opposes to it, ta●●s high and rankly of the leaven of the sourest of Papists, and those that make it their business to carp at any thing in Luther and Calvin and the Protestants, not so much for love of Truth, as in hate and opposition to the Persons they call Heretics.  
§. 85. And now to acquit myself of calumny, I must crave the Readers pardon and patience, If I trouble him with a Passage or two out of Stapleton and Maldonate to this very purpose. And let Maldonate begin. Objiciebant Arriani Deum non esse qui Spiritu sapientiâque profecisset. Respondebant variò 
Maldonat. commentar. in Luc. 2▪ v. 40. p. 993 col. 1. C. D.  Catholici: quidam, profecisse quidem verè, sed humanâ, non divinâ sapientiâ, & profecisse ut hominem non ut Deum 
a Athan. term. quarto con. Arrian.  Athanasius, 
b In Anchorat.  Epiphanius, 
c Lib. de incarnate. Dom. Sacram▪ c 7.  Ambrose, 
d Lib. 10. The. c. 7. & lib. direct. sid. ad Reginas.  Cyrillus, 
e L. 1. ad Ther.  Fulgentius, 
f In locum.  Beda, & Euthymius, libenter hanc sententiam Lutherani & Calviniani amplexi sunt, magis ferendi, si eorum quos nominavimus, Patrum authoritate commoti fecissent; sed, ut puto, nesciebant, eam aliquorum Patrum fuisse sententiam, non secuturi fortasse, si scivissent tantum contra illos bellum susceperunt: nunc autem cum solà id impietate seducti fecerint, quae non sanctis modo, sed Christo etiam, quantum possunt, detrahunt, ferendum profecto non est. Thus Maldonate.  
§. 86. But our comfort is, that we neither stand nor fall by the harsh censures of such Masters, and it will appear, at least at the last day, who have most consulted the true honour of Christ and the Saints, they or we. In the mean while, notwithstanding his soul language, the Genuine sons of the Church of England are not ashamed of the Doctrine of the Fathers, but make it their glory, that they were born of that Mother, whose doctrine and discipline comes up so high, and so home to the platform of the first and purest Antiquity. And then as to the error by him charged upon the Lutherans and Calvinists at large, I shall presume to say this in their defence, that were it granted to be true (as it is apparently false, in respect of the greater part of them at least) yet it can be a mistake of no great danger, which, by his own confession, has so many of the Ancient Fathers to back it, and that they, of that opinion, will more easily reconcile themselves with the plain Narrations of S. Luke, than he, or Stapleton or Bellarmine shall their own, that make Christ to increase in Grace in respect of outward sensible manifestation only, and in the opinion of men; and when they have answered the reasons of Erasmus and their own Cardinal Tolet, and Jansenius against 
Hoc loco sapientiâ, gratiâ & aetate Christus dicitur profecisse, quamvis non eodem modo sapientiâ & gratiâ quo aetate profecerit, Nam aetate quidem verè, sapientiâ & gratiâ solâ hominum opinione profecit. Maldonat. Commentar. in Luc. c. 2. v. 4. p. 994. C. To the same purpose Bellarmine tom. 1 contro. 2. l. 2. de Christi anima c. 5. p. 427. C. D.  it, I shall not envy their Triumph. In the mean time I shall wish them first to agree among themselves before they quarrel with their neighbours.  
§. 87. Come we in the next place to our angry Countryman 
Tho. Stapleton. Antidote Evangel. in Luc. 2. v: 52. mihi pag. 157.  Stapleton. Quod autem Lucas de Gratia dicit, intelligendum est illam in Christo eandem & invariabilem fuisse, nec in eâ aliter profecisse, quam quod eam magis ac magis per actus excellentiores demonstraret et explicaret ut docet D. Thom. 3. p. q. 7. ar. 12. Quam etiam ob causam gratiam posuit Lucas ultimo loco & post aetatem, volens insinuare non juxta aetatem in eâ profecisse, sed in externâ tantum demonstratione apud Deum & homines, faciens viz. opera Deo & hominibus magis grata. Erasmi explicationem de augmento donorum Spiritus Sancti in Christo absurdam & temerariam sequitur Calvinus, quam refutat Medina, in 3. p. q. 12. ar. 2. Nec pudet Calvinum ignorantiam positivam ponere in Christo, quae accedente cum aetate sapientiâ informaretur, quia etiam mortem subiit peccati poenam. Atqui mors nec plenitudini gratiae, nec plentitudini scientiae, quae in Christo fuit, opponitur, sicut ignorantia. vide Medinam 3. p. q. 15. ar. 3. sed utinam sola rerum theologicarum ignorantiâ laborasset Calvinus, ac non pleraque study & cauteriatâ conscientia depravasset.  
§. 88 Though this calumny has in part been answered already, yet I have somethings to add. And first, it were Christianly to be wished that Passion and virulence did not rage's so much on both sides, that holy Truth might appear unmasked, and free from those clouds that anger and carnal zeal, and worldly Interest have thrown about it, and that himself and many of his party had not made it their business to rail at Calvin without cause, and, as I fear, oftentimes even against their own light and conscience. Secondly, notwithstanding this course language, I must say that if the opinion were Calvin's, as it is most certainly the great Erasmus', yet it deserves not the harsh censure of temerarious and absurd, that by his own brother Maldonates' confession has its Original and Authority from so many learned Fathers, and in their disputes with the Arrians. Thirdly, though Calvin makes Christ to be truly ignorant of some things, in particular of the day of Judgement, yet he has the Letter of the Scripture for it; and many of the ancient Fathers (as is acknowledged also by some of their own side) interpret that text as Calvin does. Fourthly, since it appears to all the world, that Calvin was a person so acute and Judicious, notwithstanding Stapletons' unworthy Censure, I cannot be persuaded that he should ground his Assertion or confirm it, by so weak and shallow a proof. And therefore I shall suspend my Judgement till the place in Calvin be produced, which I believe never will. Fifthly, that if Stapleton himself mean the same with Aquinas, as he says he does, we have already demonstrated, that the Schoolman means by the works of wisdom and Grace, the whole moral Act that consists of the inward elicit Acts of the will as the Form, and the outward Imperate sensible works, as the Matter of it, as is acknowledged by his brother Suarez in his Commentary on that place, and by Lucas Brugensis in his Commentary on S. Luke formerly cited. And this is more than an increase in regard of Ostension and the opinion of men, a real increase in the inward and Elicite Acts themselves, as is acknowledged expressly by many learned men of their own already quoted. And if he and Bellarmine speak sense, and Christ did grow in favour with God and man, as he expressly (and 
† 
Secundo peropera plena sapientiae & gratiae, quae edebat, vere prosiciebat sapientiâ & gratiâ apud Deum & homines, quia faciebat opera dignissima & maxim meritoria tam Judicio Dei quam hominum: Bellar. de Christ: l. 4. c. 5. p. 428. A. Vide Durand: l. 2. sent. distinct. 42. q. 2. per tot.  
Aquin. 1. 2. q. 11. art. 4. & q. 18. ar. 6. in Corp. q. 20. ar. 3, 4. Cajetan in loc. Suarez in 3. p. Thom. tom. disp. 39 sect. 2. p. 540. col. 1 C. infracitat.   Bellarmine speaks to like purpose) faciens videlicet opera Deo, & hominibus magis grata, they themselves must mean as much.  
§. 89. For it is a generally received truth amongst the Moralists and Schoolmen, that as the inward and the outward Act do both concur to make up and complete a Moral work or Act, so all the goodness and dignity and meritorious acceptableness of it arises only from the interior and Elicit Act, and not at all from the Imperate and exterior. For as in Naturals so in Morals, it is the Form that gives being and worth to the thing Form. And for this we have already quoted Aquinas and Durand and Suarez and others, and I think no rational man doubts it.  
§. 90. And therefore, if as Stapleton and Bellarmine both grant, that Christ did daily more and more gracious works in the sight and Judgement of God and man, and if it be true, (as Tolet and Lucas Brugensis positively say) that Christ's Fast of forty days was more meritorious and acceptable to God, than one of three would have been; and the blood shed at his Passion was in the real Physical value more acceptable and meritorious, then that shed at his circumcision, as the same Brugensis (which neither Bellarmine nor Stapleton I suppose will deny) and Suarez has largely demonstrated; then it evidently follows, that there was (and by themselves, if they will speak consequently, it must be granted) a true and real increase in the inward Acts themselves, and where the whole moral work is more physically valuable and meritorious and acceptable in the sight of God and Man, there the inward and elicit Act proceeding from the habit must also be more noble. And then if this be their meaning, they had little reason to quarrel with Calvin, that in the Judgement of our Field, means the same, and so in this they may be friends, at least with the greatest part of Calvin's followers, who declare this to be their meaning.  
§. 91. But if they understand no other proficiency and increase, then only in regard of Outward seeming appearance and manifestation, as yet I know of no Protestant of their Judgement, but our Refuter, and uncertain I am, whether (unless he will absolutely run from himself in his Mixture, where he quarrels at Bellarmine for this doctrine) he will long continue their Proselyte.  
§. 92. And now being come to the Foot of our Account, it is fit we cast up our sum total; that we may truly balance and state the difference between the Refuter and the Doctor.  
§. 93. First then the Refuter says, he is confident that no learned man, either Protestant or Papist, besides this Replyer, hath asserted any such growth unto the Ardency of Christ's Actual Love of God.  
And now upon the Account we have found, that this is the General Doctrine of Reformed Divines and many learned Papists, and opposed by none, but such as Bellarmine and Stapleton and Maldonate, that vent any thing in their anger against those they call heretics, and by these not indeed, but only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and in show, if they will speak consequently to themselves, and the received Maxims of their own Schools.  
Secondly, we have found that Erasmus clearly and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and D. Eckardus, and upon the matter Beza and Piscator and others do expound S. Luke of a real increase of the very habits of wisdom and Grace in the humane nature of our Saviour, and that the same Doctrine is charged by Bellarmine and Stapleton and Maldonate, upon Luther, Calvin, Zuinglius, Bucer, Beza, and generally on the the Calvinists and Lutherans, and that M. Calvin in his Institutions does seem to say as much.  
Thirdly, we have found that the learned Cardinal Tolet, though he does not approve, yet he does not condemn that exposition, and Jansenius allows it as Catholic, and leaves 
Jansen. supra citat.  it as indifferent to his Reader, whether he follow this or the other.  
Fourthly, it is acknowledged by Jansenius that Ambrose 
Maldonat. supra citat.  and Theophile; as also by Tolet, that Athanasius and Cyrillus; and by Maldonate, that besides these, Epiphanius also, and Fulgentius and Beda and Euthymius; and Tolet adds 
Tolet. in Luc. c. 2. v. ult. Annot: 86. p. 112. col. 1. 2.  S. Austin also, sometimes were of this opinion, and the same Tolet, let me add, observes that Origen goes higher in his first Homily on Jeremy, that the Word itself did increase in Wisdom and Grace, non quidem in se, sed in humanâ naturâ, inasmuch as the humane nature increasing in knowledge, the Word itself did increase in wisdom, inasmuch, as it knew things after a new manner, which by his divine wisdom he did formerly know.  
§. 94. And now let our Refuter himself and the whole world Judge, does he not appear most unfortunate in his confidence? And has not his Ambition to be read and accounted a Confuter of D. Hammond betrayed him to the ruin of his Credit? And has not his use of Confutation, and the defence of that use brought an umbrage and a Cloud on his whole Mixture, howsoever otherwise learned? and the Practical Divinity confuted the Scholastical? And therefore I must tell him, that I truly Pity his misfortune, that has as much sullied his Fame and learning, by his confidence as wavering, and that, Herostratus like, he should set fire to Doctor Hammond's glorious structure to gain himself an inglorious name.  
§. 95. But then withal I must add, that if he had not been mistaken in his Confidence, yet he had been very much mistaken in his Judgement. For the Doctor no where ascribes any such growth, as he here means, to the Ardency of Christ's Actual Love of God. And I publicly challenge him to show it, in the sense that he speaks of. And so the Doctor is secure and still safe, notwithstanding his Reason, his Authority, and Confidence. Go we on then to the next.   

SECT. 32.  
Zeal and loud noise different. M Cawdrey grants all in Controversy. Heightening outward expressions à posteriori conclude the increase of the inward Acts. Outward and Inward Acts, both complete the Moral Action. How proportioned. Difference of Christ's obligation to Purity and ours. All born in sin. First Covenant how in force, how not. Cannot oblige to sinless Perfection. Man Reprieved from the final execution of its curse by Christ. Objections. Answered. New Covenant how aggravates Damnation. What required by it. La holy. How a Rule. The subject matter as well of the second as the first Covenant. Difference of obligation to its purity under the first and second Covenant. La abrogated not as a Rule, but as a Covenant. Second Covenant allows growth toward perfection, which the first did not. What the Doctor speaks of. Refuters' first Reason. Terms of the first part of his Assumption distinguished. Applied. Second part of his Assumption. Answered. Aquinas serves not the Refuters interest. Exterior Acts of Charity here signify not outward sensible expressions, but moral duties. Proved from Aquinas. Cajetan. Suarez. His second Reason. His Ignorance and Confusion in it. Necessity, Liberty of three kinds. What. He denies Christ to be the meritorious Cause of our Salvation. He confounds Christ's natural liberty of Will with the moral liberty of the Action. Contradicts Scripture. Christ how no more free to the outward Expression, than the inward Act. How indifferent Actions determined. Christ how free to the use of outward Expressions, how not. Proof from Suarez examined. Grossly misunderstood. What Suarez intends. Defenders advise to the Refuter.  

JEANES.  
As for the second sentence, that a Tempestuous time, a time of Christ's affliction, was a season for his zeal to pour itself out more profusely then in a calmer season. This is not (I grant) denied by me, if by this more profuse pouring out of his zeal, you only understand the outward expressions of his zeal: but I cannot but extremely wonder, that you affirm this to be the utmost, that you undertook to demonstrate to M. Cawdrey, or to justify now against me. For first in your answer to M. Cawdrey etc.   
§. 1. SIr, I must here declare to all the world that I am quite tired with your Impertinencies. What? The Doctor so weak and shallow as to think zeal and the more profuse pouring it out at such a time, to be nothing else but a louder Noise, and a deeper sigh, and perhaps a Groan? Is this all the honour our Refuter will allow to this heightened Ardency of our Saviour's Devotion? Is this the increase and all the Earnestness of it? was this worth the recording by the Evangelist for our after-instruction? No Sir, the Doctor knows too too well the difference between true zeal and loud noise. He knows this is a Fruit of the Spirit, a Flame in the soul, that mounts up to the throne of Grace, a Flame that is quickened and made active, and vigorous by the Wind and Storms of Affliction that blow upon it. It is of the heightening these inward Acts of Piety, and zeal and fervency in Prayer, that the Doctor understands Saint Luke's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the gradual Intention of these and the like Inward Acts, the Doctor has not only justified against M. Cawdrey, but I also all along have demonstrated against you. And therefore your following Reasons to prove a difference between the Inward Acts, and the outward Expressions might have been spared, and you lose time to no purpose in evidencing that which was never denied, and is so plain in itself, that it needs no confirmation.  
§. 2. But let us hear Reason howsoever, for now perhaps we shall find it at parting.  

JEANES.  
For first in your answer to M. Cawdrey, you affirm by 
† If it be not a fault in the Printer, Master Jeanes is much mistaken, for it should be (by consequence) if I understand Logic.  consequent, that Christ's Love of God was capable of further and higher degrees, but Love is predicated of the outward expressions thereof only analogically, Analogiâ attributionis extrinsecae, sicut sanitas dicitur de urinâ.  
Secondly, In this your reply etc.   
§. 3. To the first I could wish Sir you had told us the Place; for as yet I know not where to find it. I remember indeed the Doctor asserts, and makes good in his Treatise of will-worship, that Christ's Ardency in Prayer was heightened in his Agony, and M. Cawdrey in his Triplex Diatribe acknowledges 
Cawdrey Triplex Diatribe p. 116.  the Proof, and says, Christ was above the Law, and did supererogate in many his Actions, and Passions, and so in the degree of affection in Prayer itself &c.— And as this is all the Ardency that the Doctor either directly or by consequence affirms of Christ, so this of M. Cawdreys is the very distinct confession of all that the Doctor in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contends for. And will you be so cruelly passionate, to wound a Friend, that you may strike him you count an Enemy, because he tells you the truth? If M. Cawdrey be Orthodox, then surely Doctor Hammond is unjustly opposed, and if the Doctor's Tenet be erroneous, then M. Cawdrey himself must fall under that use of Confutation, that was first written in his Defence. Either then Sir take in your bloody flag of defiance that you hang out with such Terror and Menace in your Title-Page, or let the world plainly understand your new and exquisite Policy to confute by an Apology, and though you name only Doctor Hammond, yet you also mean M. Cawdrey, though as the world now goes, you must seem to abet him. Compare your Title-Page, and this very passage together, and see whether it fits best, M. Cawdrey, or the Doctor. But, not to intrude upon your secret thoughts and designs, you plainly here manifest to the world, that you have read the Doctor's Account, and Answer to the Triplex Diatribe. And therefore I must proclaim you inexcusable, as well for not understanding, if not plainly perverting the Doctor's sense, so expressly there declared, as for not taking notice at all of the Answers he made to many of your Objections, before you undertook to Refute his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
§. 4. And therefore what you add. But love is predicated by the outward expressions thereof only analogically, Analogiâ attributionis extrinsecae, sicut sanitas dicitur de urinâ, is nothing at all to this purpose.  
§. 5. For the Doctor confounds not the Outward Expressions with the Inward Acts, but only à posteriori concludes the heightening of the one, by the multiplying and aggrandation and growth of the other. As then the Philosopher collects and demonstrates the Cause by the Effect, as the Mariner portends the greatness of the storm by the leaps and playing of the Porpoise, and other signs and observations, as the Mathematician from the print of Hercules foot in the sand or snow did find out the true dimensions of his Body: so S. Gregory has told us, that probatio dilectionis, exhibitio est operis, that the performance of the outward work, is the true Index and Touchstone and proof of our Love. And nature itself teaches us, without any other Tutor, to conclude the Inward Affection to be greatest, where the Outward Expressions of Love are most eminent.  
§. 6. Though then Love as you say is predicated of the Outward Expressions thereof only analogically, analogiâ attributionis extrinsecae, sicut sanitas de urina, yet since the Outward Expressions, if true and genuine, and not hypocritical and counterfeit, are the Fruits and signs of the Inward Affection, we may then, by the Gradual difference of them, conclude the Rise or Abatement of that Love, as the Physician judges of the health or sickness of his patient, by his urine and other symptoms.  
§. 7. And therefore Sir, if you will but grant me (as you do the Doctor) that a Tempestuous time, a Time of Christ's affliction, was a season for his zeal to pour itself out more profusely, even in Outward Expressions, then at a calmer season, I shall not doubt to conclude that his Inward Devotion was also then more enlarged. I never read of any but the Hypocrite and Crocodile that have Tears at command, and can assume a sad countenance, and at pleasure disfigure their faces, and counterfeit a passion. True zeal and devotion knows no other expressions, then what are Natural and Genuine. God's Spirit gives no Rules, no Examples for the heightening of our Outward Devotion only, nor to make a Trade of lifting up the eye, and smiting the breast, and making the Tears full and raising of our Cries and Noise. They were the Pharisees only that did teach and practise such Arts; and I read of miscreant Jews that were professed Praeficae, and hired mourners at funerals. We need no Tutors nor Instructors to teach us to express the true passions of the heart. They, whether we will or no, uncommanded, unthought of, rise and fall, as the soul itself is affected. Nature teaches us this lesson, and it is the first that we practise. The Child, the more it longs after the Mother or the Nurse, the more it cries and sheds tears; and the further they go from it, the louder still it calls, and the more earnest, more violent are the Shrieks and lamentations. If a man be fallen into a Pit, or have lost his way among the Woods, the deeper he finds the Pit, and the more remote from any Village, or company, that he conceives himself to be, the louder he calls, and the more multiplies his cries. It is just so with a truly sanctified soul. The more eager and violent is her Love of God, the more earnestly it longs and 
Psal. 51. 1, and 12.  yearns after him, and the comforts of his presence: and when God withdraws himself from it, the further that he seems to remove, the deeper still is the sigh, the more humble the Prostration, the more dejected the countenance, and the more earnest are the Cries, and more plentiful the Tears, and the more ardent still the Prayers. Our earnest Long and 
* Psal. 42. per tot.  pant after God and the Joy of his countenance, without any other Monitor and Instructor can advance and heighten our devotions. Indeed nothing but Love, and more than ordinary Affection can quicken and raise them, as nothing but Moses Rod could make the Waters flow, and gush forth from the Rock in the Wilderness. Love is often compared to Fire: As then the Fire must raise the Spirits in the Alembick before any water can distil, and drop; and as the more Spirits are raised by it, the more Water issues forth: so the Flames of holy Love must first raise the spirit of zeal and devotion in us, before it will dissolve into Tears, and breathe out in Sighs, and as that spirit of zeal and true devotion does increase, the deeper will be the Groan, the more vehement will be our Prayers. And therefore S. 
† Mat. 27. 46. Mar. 15. 34.  Matthew tells us, that our Saviour, when 
* Subtraxit visionem non dissolvit unionem. Leo.  now the comfortable Influence of the Deity was suspended, he cried with a loud voice, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me. And of this devotion this Ardency it is the Doctor speaks, and of this only he understands S. Luke's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he prayed the more earnestly.  
§. 8. And therefore you to no purpose add, when the case already is so plain.  

JEANES.  
Secondly, In this your reply unto me you expressly aver that the inward Acts of Christ's Love of God were more intense at one time then at another, Sect. 21. and I hope you have more Philosophy then to confound the inward Acts and the outward expressions of Love. That which herein hath occasioned your mistake, etc.   
§. 9 What the Doctor so expressly averrs in his 21. Section has already been cleared, and sufficiently demonstrated. And though you beguile yourself and others with the ambiguity of this Term, the Love of God, yet the Doctor's meaning is so plain, that it is impossible for any man to be deceived in it, that resolves not to be willingly mistaken.  
§. 10. But you are not deluded in your hopes. The Doctor has more Philosophy, then to confound the Inward and Outward Acts and Expressions of Love, though you betray so little Ethics to divide and sever them. For though the Metaphysician and Naturalist may precisely and abstractly consider them, yet the Divine and Moralist know, that as the Soul 
Vid. Durand. l. 2. sent. didst 42. q 1. A. B. C & q. 2. ib. Aquin 1. 2. q. 11: art. 4. & q. 18. art. 6. in Corp. & q. 20. art. 3. in corp. Suarez infra citat.  and Body make a man, so the Inward and the Outward Act concur to make up one complete Moral Action. Without this, the Outward Expressions are but empty Paint and Varnish, and all that they can do is but to dress and tyre an Hypocrite to make him truly more ugly, because it only makes him more handsome to the eye, and appear otherwise then he is.  
§ 11. And now our Refuter as if he were some Licentiate in Physic, having cast the Doctor's Water, and as he conceives, discovered his distemper, he proceeds to acquaint him with the Procatartick cause of his Malady.  

JEANES.  
That which hath herein occasioned your mistake, is I believe a supposal that the inward acts of love, and the outward expressions thereof, are if they be sincere, always exactly proportioned in point of degree, but this proposition hath no truth in it, as you will easily find, if you attempt the proof of it, who almost but may easily etc.   
§. 12. That the Inward Acts of Love, and the Outward expressions thereof, if they be sincere, are always exactly (that is Arithmetically) proportioned in point of degree (so as they be equal and parallel in gradual intention, 
* Jeanes Answer to the Ectenest. p. 16.  as you formerly express yourself) is an imaginary phantàsm, and Creature of your own brain, and no supposal of the Doctors. But that the Ardency of the Inward Acts does ordinarily rise and fall according to Geometrical proportion, as the Outward Expressions gradually do, though the increase and decrease is not Arithmetically parallel in both, is a most commonly received Truth in the practice and opinion of all sorts of people in the world, for aught I find to the contrary, and has been already demonstrated, and therefore needs not further Proof.  
§. 13. What follows is a very clear mistake, and belongs not to the matter you would prove by it, When therefore you ask the question and say,  

JEANES p. 38.  
Who almost but may easily conceive how 'tis very ordinary for the outward expressions of Love to be gradually beneath the inward Acts thereof? He is no hypocrite in expressing his Love, that loveth inwardly more than he expresseth outwardly: the inward Acts of Love may not only equal but also transcend the most sincere expressions of Love. It may be so in all men, and I shall allege two reasons, why in Christ etc.   
§. 14. To your first question I return, that it is readily granted. For every prudent Father does often deal so with the child, he most loves; and God himself sometimes in mercy hides his face, and withdraws the light of his countenance from his dear children and servants, when yet with an everlasting Love he affects, and with everlasting kindness will have 
Jer. 31 3. Isa. 54. 8.  mercy upon them. But will you thence conclude against the express letter of the Gospel, that Christ's earnestness in prayer was not greater in his Agony, then at other times? Sir, you must consider that you are not now to remonstrate, what may possibly come to pass, or what in other men, at other times, and in other cases happens, but what the facto then was at the time of our Saviour's bloody Agony. And who sees not, at first glance, that your Proofs fall a hundred short of your Conclusion? For we are not now upon the disquisition and enquiry of what was Physicê and naturally possible, but what was Morally such, and what the facto, according to S. Luke's plain Narration, and the ordinary course and Practise of men, did then come to pass. And therefore since the Rule of the Law is, that illud possumus quod Jure possumus, if it has already appeared, and clearly been demonstrated, that the Christian Grace of Sincerity does ordinarily and in most cases require it, and usually, where the Charity is true and perfect, and not counterfeit, or innocently concealed for the advantage of the beloved, there is, and aught to be a proportionable correspondence between the Outward and the Inward Acts of Love, and as the one falls or rises, so also in Proportion do the other, than it will not be enough to infer (which yet is all you conclude) that the degrees of the inward Acts of Love may not only equal, but also transcend the most sincere expressions, you must prove that they still must and aught to do so, which I think will be impossible. But yet let me tell you, that if you should perform this more than Herculean Task, you will still be very far short of concluding any thing against the Doctor. For again I must remember you, that we are not now speaking of the Elicite Acts of the Formal virtue of Charity, and the Love of God properly taken, but only of the Imperate Acts of that Charity the Ardency of Prayer, which is only Tropically such, and this will yet make your task more impossible.  
§. 15. And therefore whereas you add for a Confirmation that he is no hypocrite in expressing his Love, that loves Inwardly more than he expresseth Outwardly, I answer, that this is manifestly impertinent to the matter in debate, Christ's Ardency in Prayer. And though in some cases I shall make no scruple to grant it, yet mind you I must, that the Christian Grace of sincerity requires that in the Ordinary Course of humane affairs, as our Love should not be Personate, so it should be fruitful and operative, otherwise it would in this be lame and imperfect, as well as in the other it would be counterfeit. And this further manifests, that from such, not only vain and impertinent, but also false allegations, as understood according to the ordinary course of morality and practice among men, you will never be able to demonstrate, that our Saviour in his Agony did not more earnestly according to the inward Act and Fervour deprecate his last bitter cup then any other worldly cross and affliction, to which he was exposed in the days of his flesh.  
§. 16. But yet he will essay to make good his undertaking.  

JEANES.  
It may be so in all men, and I shall allege two reasons why in Christ the inward Acts of his Love were always equally intense, though the outward expressions thereof were gradually different.   
§. 17. And if you can make this good in the sense that the Doctor understands all along the Phrase, The Love of God, nay, if you can clearly prove it in your own, I am so great a friend to any Reason, you shall bring, that though you have failed in all your other undertake, yet I shall give you the whole cause for that single Reason's sake.  
§. 18. Let us weigh then your reasons to this Purpose, and try them at the touchstone.  

JEANES.  
The first reason agreeth unto Christ in common with other men. Christ as man was always obliged unto the most intense, ardent, and fervent inward acts of Love of God, But he was not &c.   
§. 19 Say you so Sir? Nay then I do not doubt, but notwithstanding my fair proffer, you yet will fall short, and so lose the golden Ball at last.  
§. 20. For Christ as Mediator, and one that had undertaken to pay our debt, was not only Privileged in the humane nature, by virtue of the hypostatical union, to be holy harmless, undefiled, but by virtue of the Covenant and contract betwixt him and the Father, as well as by that First made with all mankind in Adam, was obliged to be spotless and innocent: otherwise he could never have been that Lamb of God, that takes away the sins of the world. But then Man, though in his integrity, by virtue of the first Covenant he were bound to sinless perfection, yet now since the Fall, and the Fatal curse incurred, and in Part inflicted on him, he may as justly by that or any other New Covenant be obliged to be Immortal, as the Condition of his Salvation, as to be absolutely sinless, and pure from all even Original Pollution, since his Corruption as well as his Mortality is an equal fruit of the first Sin, and it is a part of the Curse, and Punishment of Adam even inflicted on him by God, that all his posterity should be left to be born after the similitude of his fallen nature. For by one man sin entered into the world, and death 
Rom. 5. 12.  by sin: and so death (by that one) passed upon all men to condemnation, for that all have sinned, or as S. Austin constantly reads it, in quo omnes peccaverunt, in whom all have sinned.  
§. 21. As than God may justly though not by Positive infliction, yet by spiritual desertion, and Penal decree, punish one sin with an other: so the Scripture assures us, that this original guilt and pollution, and the vicious effects of it, seize on us as a part of our punishment, and Praeludium of eternal damnation: and all the sons of Adam for their transgression in him, are by virtue of the first covenant as certainly dead in Law, and in some measure also executed, as the damned are now in Hell, though not so absolutely, so irreversibly, as they. I would not be mistaken, I say by virtue of that Covenant, so certainly dead in Law, though not so irreversibly. And if the Mediator of the new Covenant had not stepped in between God's wrath and us, no flesh living should be saved. In this sense it is the Apostle tells us, that we are by nature 
Ephess. 2. 3. Rom. 5. 12. 1. Cor. 15. 22. Jo. 3. 3. 18.  the children of wrath, and all dead in Adam, and our Saviour assures us, that except a man be born again he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God, because, he that believeth not, as he says in another place, is condemned already.  
§. 22. Though then the first Covenant continues still in force, as to the condemning power of it, to all the sons of Adam, yet it continues not in force as to Life and Justification by it. Nor was it for that end that the Law, and first Covenant was revived and given by Moses, but only to manifest 
Jos. 1. 7.  our guilt, and the purity we fell from, and our necessity of a Saviour. The Law, says the Apostle, was added 
Gal. 3. 19  because of transgression: And in another place, Moreover the 
Rom. 5. 20. Rom. 7. 13. Gal. 3. 22.  Law entered. that the offence might abound, and that sin might appear exceeding sinful. But now the Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by Faith of Jesus Christ (made to Adam and Abraham) might be given to them that believe. For if there had been a Law given which could have 
Gal. 3. 21.  given life, verily righteousness should have been by the Law, and if righteousness come (or were) by the Law, than Christ is dead in vain. And here the same Apostle assures us that no man is justified by the Law, because the Law, as he says 
Gal. 3. 11. Rom. 4. 15. Rom. 8. 2.  elsewhere, worketh wrath, and brings along with it, in the same Apostles Phrase, a law of sin and death.  
§. 23. The Law then, as taken by our Apostle, for a Covenant of works, and exact unsinning obedience, is no longer in force as to life, and Justification by it, since now (not so much that it is impossible that Righteousness should be obtained by it, but because) Mankind is already for transgression Actually under the curse of it; and he that is already damned, cannot possibly be obliged not to be damned, upon the self same Penalty and Censure of Damnation. And I see not yet, why it may not as rationally be said, that even the Reprobates in Hell are still obliged, by virtue of that Law or Covenant to sinless perfection upon pain of that Damnation, which now they groan under, and shall continue to do so, as well as the lapsed sons of Adam, that are already under the same fatal Curse, though (thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord) not under the same irreversible Punishment. The difference here between them is only this, that both are under the Curse of the Law, but both are not under the same final irreversible execution. They are actually plunged in Hell, and these yet in vià should as certainly have fallen into the same bottomless pit, if the Mediator had not stepped in, and procured a Respite of the Execution, and a possibility to these, by virtue of his Passion and Intercession, through the means of a new Covenant of Faith in his blood, to escape the final vengeance of it.  
§. 24. Since than Mankind in Adam is by the tenor of the first covenant damned already, there seems no reason it should stand in force to require of the condemned that Perfection of righteousness, it at first required of them, whilst they were in their Integrity and had Power and Grace sufficient to perform it; for can their after-multiplyed sins add any whit to the certainty of their damnation by that Law, and Covenant, or to the Aggravation of it? If it adds any thing to the certainty, where then is the force of the Curse threatened? If it adds to the aggravation, why not also to that of the damned?  
§. 25. If it here shall be replied, these are yet but in viâ, and a state of trial and Probation, but the other are now extra statum merendi, and he that is dead is freed from the 
Rom. 7. 1, 2, 3.  Law.  
§. 26. I shall answer this is true; but then I must cry out with our Apostle, Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ 
Rom. 7. 25.  our Lord. Otherwise, O wretched men that we are, who, 
Rom. 7. 24.  who, should deliver us from the body of this death! This arises not at all from the Nature, and Tenor, and Condition of the first Covenant, that allowed no more Respite to Man, than was granted to the fallen Angels: but only from the Intercession and Mediation of the Son of God, the Lamb slain 
Revel. 13. 8. 1 Pet. 1. 20.  from, nay before the foundation of the world, who took not on him the nature of Angels, but the seed of Abraham. And 
Heb. 2. 16.  therefore since this Respite of Execution arises not at all from the first Covenant, but from the Grace of the Mediator, and this further state of Trial and Probation that here belongs to the sons of Adam, of necessity supposes a new Covenant made, and promised and promulgated (as the Scripture testifies, that it was immediately after Adam's fall, and 
Gen. 3. 15.  as soon as the Curse of the first Covenant was by God the Judge pronounced, and in part executed against him) it evidently (at least to me) seems to follow, that both are equal in Respect of the Curse of the first Covenant incurred, though both are not equal in respect of the full, and final, and irreversible execution, which makes the one Capable of the blessings of a new Covenant, of which the other are not.  
§. 27. If it here shall be replied; how comes it then to pass, that since, as the sins of Infidels are multiplied, so also shall their torments, and levius Cato quam Catilina, as S. Austin?  
§. 28. To this I have nothing else at present to reply, but that since our Saviour assures me, that he that believes not, is condemned already, and therefore since all, not Infants excepted, are dead in Adam, because they sinned in him, I must conclude with S. Austin that the Infidel, by the tenor of the first Covenant, would as certainly be damned, if even in his infancy he died, out of the Pale of the Church, as in his riper years, and though his punishment should be the lighter, yet I know no reason in respect of the first Covenant, that as he lives longer, his hell shall be the hotter. Nor can I for the present apprehend how this should come to pass, but only upon the Promise and Promulgation of the second Covenant. Not that God sent his son into the world, to condemn 
Joh. 3. 17, 18, 19, 20.  the world, but that the world through him might be saved. For he that believeth on him is not condemned, but he that believeth not, is condemned already; because he hath not believed in the Name of the only begotten Son of God. And this is the condemnation (the aggravation and heightening of it) that light is come into the world, but men loved darkness more than light, because their deeds were evil. For every one that doth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds (by the light of the Gospel) should be reproved, or (as our margin has it) be discovered. For as when the Law was added because of transgressions, sin, that it might appear exceeding sinful, 
* Rom. 7. 8. 13.  took occasion by the 
† And the Serpent said unto the woman yea, hath God said, ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden. Gen. 3. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata.  Law to work in us all manner of concupiscence: So was the second Covenant of Life and Mercy no sooner promised, and promulgated, but sin, that it might become exceeding sinful, took occasion to aggravate our damnation by multiplying our guilt, in turning this grace of God into wantonness, and making that which was intended for our welfare, a Trap, and our very Reprieve, and new Capacity of Salvation, an Instrument of more sin, and consequently more death. And though this for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that it is, and in Justice ought to be so, seems to me very plain, yet for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the ground and reason of it, the contempt of gospel-light, which never shined on the people that (as God knoweth) yet sit in darkness, and the shadow of death, is not so easy to discern. And though it be a high and noble disquisition (whether Christ and the gospel-covenant in all Ages of the world have been so sufficiently published, that none can justly plead Ignorance in excuse for their Contempt) and well worthy our enquiry, yet because it requires some time to discuss, and is not necessary to our present purpose, I shall, lest we lose ourselves in a digression, for the present wave it, and return.  
§. 29. Since therefore by God's fatal, but just and penal decree, Man is now since the fall born sinful, as well as mortal, and by reason of this his Original Corruption it is now impossible, at least by the ordinary Power of Grace, for any man to arrive at Legal absolute Perfection, and since it is Christ's sole Prerogative to be holy, harmless, undesiled, separate from sinners, God now under the Gospell-dispensation, and the New Covenant made with Man in his fallen Condition, is pleased graciously to require no more to Life and Justification, than what by the assistance of Grace, which the Gospel holds forth, he is able to attain; namely true Faith and Repentance from dead works, and sincere and holy endeavours after Righteousness, as much as ordinarily he can in this his lapsed condition. And if man shall make use of that Grace, that God bestows upon him, and labour to grow in Grace, and the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ, God shall then give 
† Mat. 13. 12. & 25. 29. Luk. 8. 18. & 19 26. Revel. 21. 3, 4.  more Grace and greater assistances towards Perfection in this life, and that full and absolute Crown of Righteousness in the next, and as well wipe all stains and pollution of sin from the soul, as all tears from the eyes, and all sorrows from the heart.  
§. 30. 
* Rom. 3 31.  Do we then make void the Law through Faith? God forbidden, yea we establish it rather. For the Law as it is the 
a Psal. 19 7.  Rule of Righteousness, and the Measure and standard of all just and holy Actions, is still 
b Rom. 7. 12.  holy, just and good, and being the Transcript and Copy of God's eternal Purity and goodness, it must therefore still continue unchangeable, as God is. Since than that 
c 1 Joh. 3. 8.  Christ came for no other end but to destroy the works of the Devil, and 
d 'tis 2. 11, 12  the Grace of God that bringeth Salvation hath appeared unto all men, teaching us, that denying ungodliness, and worldly lusts, we should live godly, righteously and soberly in this present world; it must necessarily follow, that believers, though not under the Law as a Covenant of works, yet are obliged by it as a Rule of holiness and purity, and so shall continue to all eternity. The same * spiritual Law, as the Apostle in this sense calls it, is as 
Rom. 7. 14.  well the subject matter of the second Covenant as it was of the first. But then though the Obligation in this sense be equal, and our conformity to it, as a Rule, is and must be still the same, yet in respect of the Performance there is a vast distance. For the first Covenant required an absolute, perfect and exact Performance of it, as the Condition of man's salvation: In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely 
Gen. 2. 17. Levit. 18. 5. Ezech. 20. 11. Rom. 10. 5. Gal. 3. 10, 11. Deut. 27. 26. Luk. 2. 74, 75.  die. Fac hoc & vives; Do this, and thou shalt live, Cursed is every one that continues not in every thing, that is written in the book of the Law to do it. And consequently allowed of no Mercy, no Pardone, no after-amendment. But then the Gospel, though it also requires, That we being delivered out of the hands of our Enemies might serve him without fear in holiness and righteousness before him all the days of our life, yet by the tenor of it, it supposes Man's Fall, and the Merit of a Mediator, and high Priest, and Faith in his blood; and though it require the very Perfection of holiness and conformity to it, as a Rule, yet it admits of Repentance from dead works, and amendment, and growth in Grace, and pardon of sin. And therefore though the one part of the Condition of the New Covenant, be as the Apostle observes out of Jeremy, that God will put his Laws into our minds, 
Heb. 8. 11, 12. Jer. 31. 33.  and write them in our hearts, and he will be to us a God, and we shall be to him a people, for that all shall know him from the greatest to the least, yet the reason of this abundance of purity and holiness now under the Gospel's dispensation is built upon his Mercy. For (as it follows, says God) I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins, and their iniquities will I remember no more. And it is observable to this purpose that the Scripture never speaks of the Abrogation of the Law, but only with respect to the Condition and fatal Curse annexed, and as a Covenant and Testament, and not as a Rule.  
§. 31. In short, though Man by the Legal Covenant were bound to absolute sinless perfection, yet 
† Rom. 6. 34.  believers being not under the Law but under Grace, by the tenor of the gospel-covenant, they are bound not to Legal, but Evangelicall perfection, to faith and repentance, and sincere endeavours after holiness, as absolute, as their present state will admit (of which the 
* Rom. 7. 12.  law still holy, and the Commandment holy just and good, is the eternal Rule) as the full condition of their Justification here and Salvation hereafter.  
§. 32. And thus is evidently showed the great difference between the Obligation of our Saviour to holiness and purity, and that of all other Men besides.  
§. 33. Though then it is readily granted to our Refuter, that Legal sinless perfection did admit of no degrees, nor growth, nor proficiency, nothing less than what was absolutely sinless, yet, since even M. Cawdrey himself grants that 
Cawdreys' Triplex Diatribe p. 116.  our Saviour still innocent and spotless did yet supererogate in many his Actions and Passions, and do more than the law required, particularly in the degree of affection in prayer, if not in the prayer itself, it evidently follows, that such Perfection as this will not (at least according to this doctrine of M. Cawdrey) conclude, that the inward Acts of our Saviour's Charity were always equally intense, but only that they were equally innocent, which as the Doctor does in that very place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and expressly grant, so it is so far from infringing his Assertion of the greater ardency in Christ's prayer, that he lays it down as the very Basis and foundation of his Argument.  
§. 34. But since M. Cawdrey's concessions may be of little moment to our Refuter, whose Apologist yet he is, I shall only mind him that it is not legal, sinless perfection, that the Doctor any any where speaks of, when he says it consists in a latitude and has degrees, but only the sincerity of this or that particular grace in this or that particular performance (suppose of prayer or alms-deeds or the like) above what any particular Law requires of all persons at all times, and in all Cases. And therefore his following Reasons might very well have been spared, that concern so distant a purpose.  
§. 35. But, at least for our promise sake, we will hear his Reasons for all that.  

JEANES.  
The first Reason agreeth unto Christ in Common with other men. Christ as man was always obliged unto the most intense, ardent and fervent inward Acts of love of God, but he was not always obliged unto the most intense expressions of these inward Acts, the reason of the difference between his obligation unto the intention of the inward Acts of his Love, and his obligation unto the intention of the outward expressions thereof, you may fetch from what is said by Aquinas secunda secundae, q. 27. art. 6. ad tertium. Nec est simile de interiori actu Charitatis, & exterioribus actibus. Name interior actus Charitatis habet rationem finis, quia ultimum bonum hominis consistit in hoc, quod anima Deo inhaereat, secundum illud Psalmi, mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est, Exteriores autem actus sunt sicut ad finem, & ideo sunt commensurandi, & secundum charitatem, & secundum rationem.  
The second reason is peculiar unto Christ, etc.   
§. 36. The Argument stands thus; If Christ as man were obliged to the most intense Inward Acts, but not to the most intense Outward expressions, than there may be a gradual difference between the Inward Acts and the Outward expressions of Love. But Christ was obliged, etc. ergo.  
§. 37. The Assumption consists of two parts, and therefore cannot be answered at once.  
§. 38. To the first part than I say, that this Proposition, Christ as man was always obliged unto the most intense inward Acts of Love of God, is very ambiguous, and therefore must be distinguished.  
First then Christ as Man, may be considered according to his twofold state, either of Comprehensor in the superior part of his soul, or as Viator.  
Secondly this term, The love of God, may be diversely understood. For first either it may signify the Love of God properly, and as taken in a Formal sense, for that which the Schools call Dilectio Dei, and Aquinas and the Schoolmen call Charitas ut finis; or Metonymically, and in a Causal sense for the Love of our Neighbour for God's sake, or any other virtue or Grace of the first table, suppose of Religion, and the like, that springs from the Love of God, and is in order to him. And this is that which the Schools call Charitas ut medium and Charitas Praecepti.  
Thirdly, this phrase, the most intense, ardent and fervent inward Acts of love, may be variously taken. For first, either they may signify the most intense absolutely and simply, that the humane nature of Christ, either by the omnipotent power of God can, or else the facto shall ever arrive at. Or secondly, Comparatively; and that either first in respect of the Law, or secondly, in respect of the present State, or thirdly, in respect of the grace or quality precisely and abstractly considered.  
§. 39 Now unless these be distinctly considered, it is impossible to give a true and satisfactory answer. And for want of this distinct consideration it is, that our Refuter all along is so confused in his discourse, and exposed to so many errors and mistakes.  
§. 40. First then Christ as Man considered in the state of comprehensor, and enjoying the beatifical vision in his mind, was not under any Obligation to love God, because as the learned Chamier well observes, Precepts are not given to Angels, and the spirits of just men made perfect, because they 
Chamier Panstrat. tom. 3. l. 6. c. 12. §. 35. p. 191. Col. 2. D. Vid Suarez in 3. P. Them. ●o: 1. disput. 37. sect. 4. p. 516. col. 2. B.  are extra statum merendi, in a state not of Trial, but of Trust, not in the way, but at the end of their Race. And the Schools resolve that this Beatific love of God, was simpliciter necessarius, whereby our Saviour loved him to the utmost height possible for that state, as a natural and necessary consequent of the beatifical vision.  
Secondly, Christ as considered in the state of viator, was not obliged to the most intense Act simply and absolutely attainable, or as enjoyed by him as Comprehensor, for this implies a contradiction in Adjecto, that he should be Comprehensor and viator in one and the same respect.  
Thirdly, Christ as viator, was obliged to the most intense love of God formally taken, that he in that state could possibly arrive at, by the assistance of grace.  
Fourthly, Christ as viator, was obliged to the most intense Acts of Charity Metonymically taken, that the Law of God still required.  
Fifthly, The quality and grace of the love of God, properly taken, as precisely and abstractly considered, has no set limits, and periods, beyond which it cannot be increased, no such gradus ad octo, as all other Natural Qualities, capable of intention and remission, have. And consequently, nor Christ nor any Man else, is obliged to any one such highest degree.  
Sixthly, the love of God, as Metonymically taken, for the love of our Neighbours, has its set bounds and limits. For we must love them as ourselves, and some more, some less, according to their nearness of alliance and kindred, and Country, and the grace of God shining in them, and the like. And therefore it is resolved in the Schools, that datur ordo in charitate. And then for the other virtues and graces, they have all (except the three Theological Graces of Faith, Hope, and Charity, that have an infinite Object, God, and therefore can have no limits) their excesses, as well as defects, they have their set periods and bounds, they consist as Aquinas resolves in a middle point between two extremes. But then this middle point also is not like the Ecliptic, but the Zodiac, and consists in a Latitude. And therefore  
Seventhly, in these last the Law requires not at all times the most intense degree of the Act, but only such a degree as befits the Object at this time, and with relation to all other Circumstances.  
§. 41. And hence it is that the Doctor speaking only of some of these Acts in particular, affirms them to consist in a latitude, and that in respect of the particular Law obliging all men to the performance of them, there may be degrees above that particular command, that God leaves to our Liberty freely to exercise, that so we may have something to offer to him freely, out of those very graces, which himself has freely bestowed upon us. And consequently that Christ in the Acts and Exercise of these, (in particular the Ardency of Prayer) was not always obliged to one equal uniform highest degree of intenseness. And therefore the first part of his Assumption as confronted to D. Hammonds Assertion, is unsound.  
§. 42. All these in their several orders have been largely prosecuted and confirmed, and therefore nothing now remains, but that we proceed to the second part or Proposition contained in the Assumption.  
§. 43. And it is this; But Christ was not always obliged unto the most intense expressions of these inward Acts of his Love.  
§. 44. To which I answer; that if by the Expression of these inward Acts, he means the outward sensible expressions of the inward acts, it is thus far granted, that nor Christ, nor any man else is obliged to any one particular act or kind of outward expression, suppose in prayer, to use any one particular gesture, or language, or form, and the like, but by God's law is left indifferent to use any, that is quoad specificationem decent and fitting.  
§. 45. But then I must add that Aquinas his authority comes not up to this purpose, nor am I moved to this concession for any reason, that I, or any man else can gather from the passage cited to confirm it. For Aquinas here means not by the exterior acts of charity the outward sensible expressions of it, but only the performances of those duties and graces of the first and second table, quae sunt in ordine ad finem, which God requires us to perform in order to our last end, and happiness, our eternal union and sight, and love, and enjoyment of God in heaven. The exterior acts of charity, he there means, are, I say, no other, than the acts and performance of all virtues and graces whatsoever, as no man, that is any way versed in that Author, can be ignorant.  
§. 46. But because our Refuter is a Schoolman and a Soldier, and resolves to dispute every inch of ground with us, I shall for a full displaying of his Ignorance proceed to make it good.  
§. 47. Thus than I lay down the full sense of the place. By this interior actus charitatis the inward act of divine love, the Schoolman means the immanent and elicit act of that love, that is immediately fixed on God, in which love man's last happiness consists. This other where he calls finis praecepti from S. Paul in his Epistle to Timothy, the end of the commandment; because all the commandments only drive at this, and aim to bring us unto God. And in the place here urged he says, it has rationem finis, because man's last happiness consists in this love, and this union of the soul with God in heaven. By the exterior acts of charity he means not the material sensible expressions (as for instance, the more abundance of tears, deeper sighs, more pathetical phrases, and forms, and expressions, more humble gestures of the body in prayer; which is all the heightening and advancement our Refuter will allow to our Saviour's ardency in prayer in the garden) not the outward acts, but moral duties and gracious works and performances of any virtue, or grace, that the law of God prescribes.  
§. 48. The first are elicit acts of divine love, and therefore immanent and interior to it. But these latter moral duties are imperate acts of that love. And therefore though they are or may be intrinsecall to the will, wherein they are subjected; yet are they  to charity, belong not to the formal essence and nature of it, but are outward fruits, and effects and symptoms of it; because the more the man loves God, the more he will labour to keep his commandments, and the more sincere and cordial he is in the exercise of any duty or grace, the more it appears that he truly loves God, that has commanded it. But then though these be exterior (because imperate) acts of divine love, yet in their formal nature and essence, they are immanent acts of the will, because they are the elicit acts of the virtuous habits there seated; and consequently they are not, as our Refuter very ignorantly, outward corporeal sensible tokens and expressions. For the exterior Acts of Charity, he speaks of, he says are siout ad finem, such which God has commanded us to perform, as the way and means that we may be perfectly united to him, and see and enjoy his goodness in the land of the living, and love him eternally, & ideo sunt commensur andi, & secundum charitatem & secundum rationem, and therefore are to be measured and proportioned according to charity and reason; which words cannot possibly have any sense after the meaning of our Refuter.  
§. 49. Now that this and no other is the meaning of Aquinas, will appear from the very question itself, the answer in corpore, and the beginning of this answer ad tertium which our Refuter warily omitted. The question is, utrum charitas habeat modum, whether charity has any set bounds or limits, any gradus ad octo, as M. Cawdrey and our Refuter says it has? He resolves it in the Negative from the authority of S. Bernard, Causa diligendi Deum est Deus ipse, modus sine modo. His answer in corpore is this, Dicendum quod— modus importat quandam mensurae determinationem— In omnibus appetibilibus, & agilibus mensura est finis— Et ideo finis secundum seipsum habet modum, ea vero quae sunt ad finem habent modum, ex eo quod sunt fini proportionata— Finis autem omnium actionum humanarum & affectionum est dilectio Dei per quam maximè attingimus ultimum finem, ut supra q. 23. art. 6. dictum est. Et idèo in dilectione Dei, non potest accipi modus, sicut in re mensuratâ, ut sit in câ accipere plus & minus, sed sicut invenitur modus in mensura in quâ non potest esse excessus, sed quanto plus attingitur regula, tanto melius est, & ita quanto Deus plus diligitur, tanto est dilectio melior— Et sic, (as he goes on in his answer ad primum) etiam charitas quae habet modum sicut mensura, praeeminet aliis virtutibus, quae habent modum sicut mensurata. And so ad tertium, Dicendum, quod affectio illa cujus objectum subjacet judicio rationis, est ratione mensuranda, sed objectum divine dilectionis, quod est Deus, excedit judicium rationis, & ideo non mensuratur ratione, sed rationem excedit. Nec est simile de interiori actu charitatis (which is the passage our Refuter insists on) & exterioribus actibus, etc. Nor is there the same Reason for the love of God, and the acts of all other virtues and graces, which have their set bounds and limits proportionable to charity and right reason. Though a man can never love God too much in respect of the formal act, yet his neighbour he may, as has already been showed from Durand on this very Question.  
§. 50. And thus also Cajetan in his Commentary on the 
Cajetan in loc.  place understands his Master. Author, says he, comparat interiorem actum charitatis, ad actus exteriores imperatos, qui sunt ad finem.  
§. 51. But let Aquinas explain himself in the places he himself refers to, 2. 2. q. 23. art. 6. in corp. art. 7. in corp. vid. etiamque 44. art. 1. in corp. art. 2. & art. 3. in corp. where also in his answer ad secundum, he says, Alii actus charitatis consequuntur ex actu dilectionis, sicut effectus ex causâ, ut ex supra dictis patet: unde in praeceptis dilectionis virtute includuntur praecepta de aliis actibus, etc. And this will also further appear from the places already quoted from Aquinas.  
§. 52. And now that this doctrine may not only appear full and home to the meaning of Aquinas, but commonly also received among the Schoolmen, I shall for confirmation add a passage or two from the very accurate Suarez, as our Refuter himself calls him, and one as well acquainted, I suppose, with the meaning of this Author, as any Commentator, new or old. Duplices esse solent, says he, virtutum 
Suarez de Relig. tom. 1 l. 2. c. 1. §. 1.  moralium actus, interni sc: & externi. Quoniam verò hae voces varias habent significationes, ut supra attigi: in praesenti per internos actus solum intelligimus eos, qui proxime, ac per se fiunt, vel fieri possunt ab ipso, habitu, proceduntque ex immediatâ inclinatione ipsius, quando ex habitu fiunt, aut si illum praecedant, ipsum secum afferunt, vel efficiendo, ut in acquisitis, vel proxime ad illum disponendo, ut in infusis. Externos autem actus voco omnes illos, qui non fiunt ab habitu, nisi mediantibus his prioribus actibus. etc. And then in his second Chapter of that book he adds further to this purpose. Et juxta hunc loquendi modum, high exteriores actus distingui 
Suarez▪ ibid. c. 2. §. 2. utrum praeter actus internos habeat Religio actus externos & qui illi sunt?  possunt: nam quidem sunt corporales, quidam vero spirituales. Rursus spirituales distingui possunt, in actus intellectus & voluntatis, nam utrisque coli potest Deus, ut infra dicetur, & latius dixi in 1. tom. ad 3. Partem Aquin. Hic autem cultus qui per actus mentis fit, communi usu interior potius appellatur, ut distinguatur ab illo qui exhibetur per actus corporis, nos autem explicuimus proprium respectum quem tales actus habent ad ipsam virtutem. Quanquam adverti potest, aliud esse loqui de cultu sub nomine cultus, aliud verò sub nomine actus: Cultus enim solum dicitur cultus internus vel externus, quia intus in animâ vel extra per corpus fit: uterque autem cultus dici potest actus externus ipsius Religionis, quia sic denominatur per habitudinem ad virtutem tanquam ad principium suum quodam modo extrinsecum seu remotum. Actus autem ipse immediate procedens à religione, quem vocamus internum, non est propriè cultus, neque intrinsecus neque extrinsecus, sed est affectus celendi Deum, qui à cultu distinguitur, sicut actus à materiali objecto. Nihilominus saepe confundi solent hae voces ita ut omnis cultus interior dicatur etiam actus interior religionis, quomodo nos saepe cum multis loquemur, advertendo illa duo non converti, quia non omnis actus internus potest dici cultus, sed ille tantum, qui remotus & imperatus est, nam alius qui est propinquior & elicitus, non est cultus sed affectus cultus. Est enim, as he had before delivered, maxim advertendum, 
Suarez ib. l. 1. c. 7. S. 2.  quod supra indicavi, in his virtutibus moralibus eosdem actus externos (qui à virtute fiunt, & sunt effectus internorum actuum elicitorum à virtute) secundum se sumptos, & ut priores inordine intentionis (ut sic dicam) esse objectum seu materiam talium virtutum. Thus he.  
§. 53. The case is very clear: let the terms only be changed and it will aswell fit the place of Aquinas, as the subject matter he is upon. And I doubt not, but he that shall consult the same Author's Commentary on that very place of Aquinas here cited by our Refuter, shall find it thus expounded. But for want of books I must content myself with what is here produced.  
§. 54. And now let the world judge! Is not our Refuter a very profound Schoolman? And does he not read Aquinas to purpose? That after his acquaintance with that Author, and his very accurate Suarez, cannot learn to distinguish between actus dilectionis Dei extrinsecos, and actus voluntati extrinsecos? That is so easily captivated in his intellect, and confounded with the ambiguity of a word, and cannot perceive a difference between the outward sensible expressions of the acts of divine love, and the imperate acts of it, the interior and elicit acts of all virtues and graces performed at the empire and command of this love; and therefore called the exterior acts of this love, because that is the outward and remote cause and principle of them.  
§. 55. How then can I hope that his second reason should prevail, when he has betrayed so much weakness and ignorance in the first? But we will consider it howsoever.  

JEANES p. 39  
The second reason is peculiar unto Christ above all other men: whilst he lived here upon earth, he enjoyed the beatifical vision; and the natural and necessary consequent thereof is a most intense actual love of God, and therefore the inward acts of his love of God were equally intense at all times, but as for the outward expressions of his love of God etc.   
§. 56. Sir how often, and often have we heard of this to no purpose? Only let me ask, what is all this to Christ's love and holy charity as viator? you must now remember you talk of obligation and duty. But then this Beatific love of Christ, was simpliciter necessarius. And therefore this is still the old Sophism à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. But enough and enough of this. For though you are not at all troubled still to repeat the same objections, yet I am very much ashamed that I should be forced still to return the same Answers, and say I must as he in Plautus, in a very like case,  
— vi'n tibi adferri noctuam  
Quae Tou! Tou! usque dicat tibi, nam nos jam, nos defessi fumus.  

JEANES.  
But as for the outward expressions of these acts, Christ had to them a proper freedom, taking the word (freedom) for an active indifferency in sensu diviso, and therefore they might be more intense at one time then another. But of this you may, if you please, see further in Suarez in tertiam partem Thomae disp. 37. sect. 4. where the question debated is, Quomodo voluntas Christi ex necessitate diligens Deum in reliquis actibus potuerit esse libera?   
§. 57 Here is ignorance upon ignorance, and confusion upon confusion, and I am quite tired with cleansing this 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lucian Pssudomant.  Augean Stable. A 
† They say Hercules cleansed it by the turning of a River into it. Vid. Erasm: Adag: & Diodor. Sicul.  River of Ink must do it. I see the * Basket in Lucian is to very little purpose.  
§. 58. To acquit this harsh censure of calumny, and to remonstrate the charge, it will be fit I reduce his discourse into Form.  
§. 59 The whole supposes a Prosyllogisme, and this which he calls his second Argument, is a proof of the Assumption. Thus than it stands. If the inward acts of Christ's love of God were equally intense at all times, but the outward expressions of these Acts might be more intense at one time then another, than the outward expressions, and the inward Acts are not always exactly proportioned in point of degree, but may not only equal, but also transcend the most sincere expressions of Love; (and consequently S. Luke's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of a gradual heightening of the outward expressions only, not of the inward ardency in prayer.) But the inward acts of Christ's love etc. Ergo etc. The assumption consists of two parts, and is here severally proved. The first, that the inward acts of Christ's love of God were all equally intense at all times, he thus proves, because Christ whilst he lived here upon earth enjoyed the Beatisick vision, the natural and necessary consequent whereof is a most intense actual love of God. But then as for the outward expressions of these acts (which is a proof of the second part) Christ had to them a proper freedom, taking the word (freedom) for an active indifferency in sensu diviso. And of the truth of both these may be further seen in Suarez. Ergo etc.  
§. 60. And this his second reason, he says, is peculiar unto Christ above all other men.  
§. 61. Plain then it is, First that here he confounds the state of Christ as comprehensor, with his state of viator, Secondly, plain it is, that he confounds the beatific and necessary acts of Christ's love of God, agreeing to him as comprehensor, with the free and meritorious acts of his love agreeing to him as viator. And then thirdly, plain it is, that he confounds the inward acts of Christ's love of God, as properly taken with the inward acts of other virtues and graces, suppose of religion, and ardency in prayer, which because they are the effects and signs of that former love of God, are Metonymically so called. And fourthly, as plain it is, that he confounds all these three very distinct acts, and takes them one for another.  
§. 62. But then, as if this were not sufficient, he fifthly further confounds the outward sensible expressions of charity largely taken, with the acts of virtue and piety, that, as we have formerly manifested, are extrinsecall to the love of God strictly and properly taken, and makes the inward acts of religion and devotion, of chastity and temperance, of patience and brotherly kindness and the like, to be, upon the matter, all one with the outward sensible expressions of these virtues and graces. And then sixthly he confounds the natural necessity and freedom of the Agent with the moral necessity and freedom of the action.  
§. 63. For the better opening of which last (for the former need not further clearing) know we must that the Moralist and Divine distribute necessity and freedom into three kinds. The first is that they call necessitas naturae, and this arises from a natural determination of the form and faculties of the Agent to one uniform kind of working, and is intrinsecall to it. To this they oppose that freedom which they call natural, which arises from an indetermination of the rational appetite, called the will, to one uniform kind of operation, and supposes it naturally left at liberty either to act or not act, (which they call libertatem contradictionis or Exercitii) or else to do this, or that, which is contrary to it, (which they call libertatem contrarietatis, seu specificationis) and this at its own free election and choice. Thus stones and vegetables and the like are called necessary agents, but Men and Angels are called agentia libera, free agents: and this freedom is as essential and natural to these, as the other necessity is to the former. The second they call necessitas praecepti, a necessity of duty arising from the moral obligation in the action requiring it to be performed, or omitted by a free creature, that is lord of his own actions. And to this is opposed that moral liberty and freedom, and indifferency of the act, whereby it comes to pass, that it may be done, or omitted without sin, no law here interposing, to command or prohibit it. Thus whatsoever the law of God has enjoined or forbidden, is necessary, and whatsoever is not thus forbidden or commanded is of a middle nature, secundum speciem indifferent and morally free to be done, or not done. And this is a liberty extrinsecall to the Agent. The third they call necessitas coactionis, arising from outward violence and compulsion. But because the will cannot possibly be enforced, it is improperly called necessity, and though in respect of the outward danger impending the will moves against its own genuine inclination, yet in the act and exercise it voluntarily chooses that, which if the force were not impending, it would not have embraced. And therefore the great Philosopher in his Morals 
Arist. Ethic. l. 3. c. 1. S. 3.  does truly call such actions as these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because they are made up and compounded of violence, and choice. To this they oppose that kind of freedom, which they call signally spontaneity, that arises from the inward 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and impetus, and inclination of the agent, without any outward force and compulsion to rouse and quicken it, and is common, at least in some proportion, and inferior degree, to Beasts as well as Men.  
§. 64. When therefore our Refuter says that the inward acts of Christ's love of God were all equally intense, because they were the natural and necessary consequents of the beatifical vision, clear it is, that he takes the word necessary, for that which is naturally such, and so by consequence he destroys the merit of our Saviour's death and Passion, which was the first stone of offence, and rock of stumbling to that Arch-heretick Socinus. For plain it is, that the Saints in Heaven, and Comprehensores in Patriâ (among which number Christ on earth must be reckoned, in regard of the Beatifical vision) love not God by way of duty, and election and choice, but by a necessity of their glorified natures, and they cannot choose but do it, and consequently, as themselves are now extra statum merendi, so these acts of their love are no more rewardable and meritorious, than the natural motion of heavy bodies downward, or light bodies upward. For as Laws are prescribed to free agents only, and rewards and punishments are only proposed to those that are lords of their own actions, and are left at their own liberty and election and choice; so one of the conditions necessary to make an act or acts 
* Meritorium opus dicunt Scholastici quod potius dicendum remunerabile apud Deum Forbesii Iren. l. 1. c. 3. S. 2. pag. 77. Secunda conditio in opere meritorio necessaria estut sit liberum, quoniam per ea quae naturalia sunt & quorum Domini non sumus nec meremur, nec demeremur. Quam conditionem locum etiam habuisse in actibus voluntatis Christi, satis fusè in praecedenti. q. 18. (which is the very disputation our Refuter here refers to) disputatum est etc. Quinta conditio ex parte etiam personae merentis est, ut sit viator, quam necessariam esse saltem ex lege Dei ordinariâ (quicquid fit de absolutâ potentiâ) omnes Theologi docent. ut latius videbimus statim sect. 3. ubi simul oftendemus conditionem hanc etiam in Christo Domino fuisse necessariam. Suarez in 3. part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 39 sect 1. p. 536. col. 2. E. & p. 537. col. 2. F.  meritorious or remunerable, is, that it be free, and not natural and necessary, and performed by a person that is in viâ, because such persons only and such actions are remunerable by God. And consequently our Refuter that makes all the inward acts of Christ's love to be the natural and necessary consequents of the Beatifical vision destroys the merit of his whole life and death, and sufferings, and eo ipso denies him to be the meritorious cause of our justification.  
§. 65. But than secondly, whereas he says that Christ had a proper freedom (taking this word (freedom) for an active indifferency in sensu diviso) to the outward expressions of these acts, though he had not such freedom to the inward acts themselves, and therefore these might be more intense at one time then another, though the inward acts might not, Plain it is that here he confounds the natural liberty and freedom of the will of Christ, with the moral liberty and freedom of the actions themselves. For that freedom which is taken for an active indifferency in sensu diviso, and is here by our Refuter opposed to those natural and necessary acts, which were the consequents of the Beatific vision, is no other, but that natural liberty and freedom of the will essentially determined either in respect of contrariety or contradiction. And so the 
Vid. Suarez. in tertiam part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 37. sect. 2. p. 512. col. 1. E. F. sect. 3. p. 513. col. 1. C. etc. & p. 516. col. 1. B. C.  words in Suarez are to be understood, who frequently makes use of this expression, whence our Refuter borrowed it, though plain it is he mistakes it. But then the freedom that he speaks of in the conclusion, is a moral freedom and indifferency of the action. For thus his Argument must stand: Christ in respect of the intention and fervour of the outward expressions was under no obligation, nor necessity and duty, and therefore they might be more intense at one time then another.  
§. 66. But then this is not all the misadventure of his discourse; in the next place he splits himself upon the rock of downright falsehood and contradiction to Scripture.  
§. 67. For whereas he says, Christ had a proper freedom or active indifferency in sensu diviso to the outward expressions though he had none to the inward Acts of them, plain it is, that his words must be understood either of the natural liberty of the will of our blessed Saviour, the active indifferency and indetermination of that to the outward expressions, or else of their moral liberty and indifference in respect of any Law, or divine precept, determining these outward acts and expressions. If he understand his assertion in the first sense; plain it is, that Christ's will was thus equally free to all the inward acts of divine love, and piety, and religion, and other virtues and graces, as to the outward expressions of them, and no more liberty he could have to the one than he had to the other. For since 
* Suppono ex 1. 2. q 20. & 21. proprium et formale meri●um esse in actu elicito à voluntate, actus vero externos per se non addere meritum actui voluntatis, neque esse formaliter & intrinsece meritorios, sed solum per extrinsecam denominationem ab actu meritorio voluntatis. à quo imperantur & extrinsecè seu moraliter informantur, sicut etiam ab illo denominantur liberi & studiosi. Suarez in 3. Part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 39 Sect. 2. pag. 540. col. 1. C.  freedom of the will, and liberty of election and choice are essential to merit, and since all the moral goodness, and virtue, and honesty and rewardableness in the work arises only from the inward act, which is the form, and gives being to the whole, it evidently follows, that Christ's will must be as free and actively indifferent to the inward acts, nay rather more, then to the outward expressions of them, otherwise he could not be the meritorious cause of our salvation.  
§. 68 If here he shall reply; though this be true in respect of all other men, yet the case is otherwise with Christ; The reason here is peculiar unto him above all other men: whilst he lived here on earth, he enjoyed the beatifical vision, and the natural and necessary consequent thereof is a most intense actual love of God; I accept of his answer. But then withal I must desire him to tell me how he can reconcile this position with the many Scriptures, that so clearly assert the meritoriousness of our Saviour's whole life, and glorious example, as well as of his death and passion. For if Christ had only a proper freedom of will and active indifferency to the outward expressions and not to the inward acts of virtue and charity, but did perform them all ex necessitate by a necessity of his glorified state and condition, and clear intuitive sight of God, it was not possible he should merit by any of them, as has already been observed.  
§. 69. If he understand his assertion in the second Notion of liberty, for a moral indifferency of the action itself, plain it is, that Christ had no more moral freedom and indifferency to many, if not to most of the outward expressions, then to the inward Acts themselves. For where the outward act and expression does aeque cadere sub praecepto and is aswell the object and matter of duty commanded, as the inward act, there both outward and inward act are equally necessary to be bone or omitted. I desire him to tell me, what greater liberty and indifferency there was to Christ in respect of the outward acts of all the negative precepts of the moral law more than to the inward acts? what liberty and indifferency, there was in respect of the outward acts of many of the affirmative precepts more than to the inward acts? was he not aswell bound, at least in most cases, to the outward acts of adoration, of honouring God's name, of reverence to parents and the like, as he was to the inward acts? But than what thinks he of all the Mosaical rites and ceremonial observances, which clearly consisted in the exterior Act? As he was born of Abraham's seed, and under the law, so was he not bound upon pain of excision to be circumcised the eight day? And consequently being thus circumcised did he not become a debtor to the whole Mosaical law, ceremonial and judicial (that consisted chief in the outward acts) as well as to the moral, and this upon condition of the curse annexed to the very lest breach of the least tittle that was written in the book of Moses law? was he not bound to the outward sanctification of the Sabbath, the rites and ceremonies of the Passover and the like, as well as all other persons circumcised? Once more, what thinks he of our Saviour's obligation to the outward acts and exterior expressions and performances of his prophetic office? As the spirit of the Lord was upon him anointing him to preach the Gospel to the poor etc. So an 
* Joh. 12. 49, 50. & cap. 18. ver. 37. Luk. 2. 49.  obligation from God his Father lay upon him to do it. And 
Luk. 4. 18, 21.  therefore says he to his parents that found him in the Temple disputing with the Doctors and ask them questions, How is it that ye sought me? witted ye not that I must be about my Father's business? To conclude, what thinks he of the death and passion of our Saviour? was it not an high act of charity and love both to God his Father, and us Men? and yet plain it is, that an absolute necessity lay upon our Saviour for performance of the outward act and manifestation of this love. Bound he was to suffer, and to lay down his life for his sheep. For ought not Christ to suffer these things and then to enter into 
Joh. 10. 49. Luk. 24. 26, 27. Heb. 10. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.  his glory? For what says he himself, Sacrifice and burnt-offering thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me. Then said I, lo I come (in the volume of the Book it is written of me) to do thy will O God, by the which will we are sanctified, through the offering of the body of Jesus once for all. And it is observable from Suarez even in this very question, to which our Refuter here refers, that this Precept did directly and immediately first fall upon the outward act and expressions, 
Quod maxime declarari potest in praecepto illo moriendo pro hominibus— nam illud praeceptum directe cadit in actum ipsum exteriorem, qui est objectum interioris actus voluntatis, qui etiam consequenter praecipitur, quatenus cum exteriori componit unum actum moralem & liberum. Suarez: in 3 part. tom. 1. disp. 37. sect. 4. where the question is, Quomodo voluntas Christi ex necessitate diligens Deum in reliquis actibus potuerit esse libera? p. 519. col. 2. A.  and immediately and by consequence only on the interior, inasmuch as the outward is the object of the inward act of the will, and together with it, does compound and constitute one complete moral action.  
§. 70. If here he shall reply that he spoke not of the outward expressions that were matter of duty and under command, but only of those expressions of the inward acts, that were left indifferent, such as are the outward prostrations and gestures, the words and other signs of the inward ardency in prayer; (though it is evident that his words indefinitely proposed must reach to all the outward acts and expressions of the inward acts of divine love, that necessarily issued from the beatifical vision, yet) I shall for the present accept of this answer, (though nothing at all to the words and the purpose of this his second reason, which he says is peculiar to Christ above all other men). But then withal I must tell him that this grant and acceptation will do him no service.  
§. 71. For though it be true even in respect of the outward acts and expressions of the inward ardency and devotion in prayer, that no law of God has interposed to determine and necessitate the outward act of devotion either quoad speciem or quoad exercitium, either for kind or degree, as that we should use this gesture, suppose of standing, kneeling or prostration, etc. this form of words, these lifting up the eyes, or hands to heaven, and the like, but has left us at liberty to use what we shall see fit in either kind, whensoever we pray, yet since the law of God and religious prudence requires, that all things be done decently and in order in God's worship; it evidently follows, that whatsoever outward gestures, or words, or signs, or expressions he should make use of they were of necessity to be decent and fit, and proportionable to the present ardency and inward devotion and affection in prayer. And therefore in this sense he had no more liberty to the outward expressions then to the inward acts themselves. For still when he exercised them, he was bound to exercise them all quoad debitas circumstantias, which, as the Moralists determine, do specificate the action in genere moris, and make it good or bad, and this because malum oritur ex quolibet defectu, bonum autem ex causis integris, neither was he left at liberty to use any other posture in prayer, than what was decent, any deeper sighs and groans, or louder cries, or more pathetical expressions, than what was suitable to the inward ardency and the present occasion, and what the subject matter of his present petition and devotion did require.  
§. 72. I shall not here determine whether every individual voluntary act, though quoad specificationem and in respect of the kind, it be mediae naturae and indifferent, be yet quoad exercitium good or bad with Aquinas, or whether as 
Vid. Aquin. 1. 2. q. 18. art. 9 & 1. sect. didst 1. q. 3. & 2. sent: didst: 40. q. 5. ad 6. Scot 2. sent. didst. 41. Bonavent. ibid. Durand. 2. sent. didst 40. q. 2. §. 11. Forbesii Iren. l. 1. c. 13.  Scotus and Bonaventure and Durand and others maintain, there be some not only quoad speciem but also quoad exercitium and in individuo indifferent, yet certain it is that every individual act of religion and piety and charity, that is as they speak remunerabilis ad vitam, and such as God accepts of to that end, is either morally good or bad, by reason of some accidents and circumstances, which in the practice and exercise do make it good or bad, and require it to be done or omitted pro hic & nunc. And therefore though I shall make no scruple to grant, that no one gesture, or form, or sighs, or tears, and the like outward expressions be either 
Etsi autem media secundum speciem suam spectata neque bona sint, neque mala▪ quandoque tamen eorum indivi dua, non quidem ex naturâ suâ, sed per accidens ex circumstantiis in ipsâ praxi induunt rationem boni aut mali: prout sc: vel necessitas adhaerescentis boni, vel iniquitas adhaerescentis mali ea fieri vel non fieri, usurpari vel non usurpari postulat. unde evenit nonnunquam ut quod heri facere, idipsum hodie omittare expediat, quod tamen poftea, vel facere vel non facere poteris arbitratu tuo. Exemplo sit trina mer●●o vel tinctio in Baptismo. etc. Joan, Forbesii Iren. l. 1. c. 12. S. 16. p. 74.  quoad speciem or individuum determined by the law of God: yet evident it is, that by reason of some extrinsecall circumstances the action in the practice and exercise must of necessity be so determined, that it would not be religious or prudent or rational to use any other, than what at this time in regard of all circumstances are decent, and fit, and agreeable.  
§. 73. Whence it evidently follows, that Christ had not a moral liberty and indifference to use what outward expressions he pleased, but only such as were prudentially fit and proportioned to the expression of his inward ardency and devotion at this time; and upon this occasion. And therefore the Doctor might justly conclude from Saint Luke's testimony of the heightening of our Saviour's ardency in prayer, even according to the outward Act and expression, as our Refuter will have it, a greater heightening and aggrandation of the inward devotion and affection. And nothing that our Refuter has yet said or can say, for aught I find, will be able to overthrow it.  
§. 74. But the truth is, our Refuters notions, here at least, float up and down as confusedly, and with as little coherence in his brain, as Epicurus his Atoms did in vasto Jnani before they casually met together in a lump and mass. And when I consider their multiplied absurdities, and illogicall confusion, I cannot choose but wonder, that any man, who pretends to School-learning, should thus unhappily pitch upon them. Nay I am almost persuaded that the Author himself, that penned them, cannot be able to give any tolerable account of them, or make them intelligible.  
§. 75. Howsoever I have according to his advice consulted Suarez in the place he refers to, as hoping that he might afford me some light to understand our Refuters' meaning. And more than this, I have perused the whole thirty seventh disputation, as also his thirty ninth disputation in that tome, where he treats de merito Christi, and yet I am more unsatisfied then formerly. And I can think of no other probable ground of the Refuters mistakes but only his writing at random, and conjecture upon other men's short notes and suggestions. For me thinks it is impossible that he that read that Author (as clear, as he is accurate) should be so extremely deceived in Suarez's meaning, as our Refuter is.  
§. 76. To give the Reader a taste. In the first Section of that disputation he inquires utrum in Christo fuerit voluntas humana? And he resolves it first, that he had a created humane will; and then secondly, that this humane will was in him, not only according to the faculty and first act, but also according to the second Act, and exercise, and that it was prompt and expedite ad operandum, & eliciendum proprios actus secundos distinctos ab actu increato divinae voluntatis. In the second Section he inquires whether this humane will of Christ were libera ad operandum? And then having distinguished of liberty from necessity and Coaction, he resolves first that the humane will of Christ was proprie & perfectè libera in suis actibus, that is, not only free from coaction but necessity and determination also, as he infers in the second conclusion. Quia haec libertas seu indifferentia, & dominium propriarum actionum est naturalis proprietas hominis, & magnam dicit perfectionem, & ad meritum maximè necessaria est. Nam ut recte dicit D. Hieronymus l. 2. contra Jovinian: ubi necessitas ibi nec corona; ideo liberi arbitrii condidit nos Deus. From hence in the third Section he proceeds to inquire how the will of Christ being altogether impeccable by virtue of the hypostatical union could be possibly free and indetermined in its operations. And then having proposed the distinctions of liberty and indetermination and indifferency in sensu diviso and composito, and absolutè & simpliciter, and ex hypothesi, and suppositione, and found them, as explained by some, not home to the solution of the question, he proposes divers other answers, and rejects them as insufficient, and at last gives his own resolution to this effect, that though since Christ were by virtue of the hypostatical union impeccable, and therefore would infallibly perform whatsoever God had commanded him, yet this outward moral determination of the action by the precept would not at all hinder the natural liberty of the will, but remain it would free as before, supposing no such command. And when he had explained and confirmed this assertion, he at last concludes, Sic igitur expositus sensus divisus & compositus sufficienter solvit difficultatem hanc. In the fourth Section he further proceeds to inquire, Quomodo voluntas Christi ex necessitate diligens Deum in reliquis actibus potuerit esse libera? And this is the question our Refuter refers us to for our further satisfaction. And here in the first place he proposes a difficulty indeed, drawn from the beatific love of Christ's soul qui erat simpliciter necessarius tam respectu Dei, quam respectu propriae beatitudinis. To this he proposes divers answers, which he rejects, as unsatisfactory. And then in the fifth place gives his own.  
77. I shall set it down at large, that the Reader may perceive for a close, how hand over head our Refuter does refer us for instruction to the Schoolmen.  
Propter haec, says he, potest excogitari quintus respondendi 
Suarez. in 3. par. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 37 sect. 4. p. 518. col. 1. D. E. F. & 2. A. B.  modus: ad quem suppono Christum non habuisse praeceptum proprium charitatis amandi Deum (that is a precept alone peculiar to himself as comprehensor, and distinct from that obliging other men) tum quia cum voluntas ejus esset necessariò determinata ad hunc amorem, non indigebat tali praecepto: tum etiam quia hac ratione alii beati non habent hujusmodi praeceptum, quia de necessariis non dantur praecepta. Secundo suppono praeter amorem Dei beatificum esse potuisse in anima Christi alium amorem Dei: nam sicut anima Christi duplici supernaturali scientiâ cognoscebat Deum, beatâ & infusâ: ita potuit duplici actu amoris illum amare, ut infra q. 19 (disp. 39 de merito Christi) latius dicam. Tertio suppono Christum fuisse simul Comprehensorem & viatorem, ex quâ mirabili conjunctione consequenter effectum est miraculose, ut proprii actus beatifici ita continerentur in supremâ parte animae, ut non redundarent in inferiorem, neque perfectionem suam cum illâ communicarent. Ad hunc ergo modum intelligi potest, ita animam illam amasse Deum necessariò, ut amor ille sisteret in sola formali conjunctione et unione ad Deum, suo modo ad formalem beatitudinem pertinente, & non se extenderet, nec communicaret (ut ita dicam) aliis operibus & actibus, qui in Christum ut viatorem conveniebant. Cum enim haec extensio vel communicatio sit per modum cujusdam efficientiae, poterat facile impediri, sicut fruitio beata impedita est, ne omnem tristitiam expelleret, nec inferiori portioni se communicaret. Hoc ergo supposito facile intelligitur illum Dei amorem quem anima Christi habuit, veluti consequentem scientiam infusam & non beatam, fuisse liberum, quia neque ab intrinseco habuit necessitatem, cum non versaretur circa Deum clare visum, ut sic, nec ex praecepto, quia ostensum est Christum non habuisse speciale praeceptum amandi Deum. Et ulterius probari potest, quia nec tale praeceptum est, veluti connaturale & intrinsecum ipsi charitati, quia illi satis est unico actu diligere Deum, unde si habeat unum actum necessarium dilectionis Dei, ex natura sua non obligat ad alium actum: nec verò est cur fingamus datum esse Christo speciale praeceptum de hujusmodi actu, quia ad hoc asserendum nullum est fundamentum, & positiva praecepta sine fundamento multiplicanda non sunt: erat ergo ille amor liber. Ex quo ulterius facile intelligitur ab illo amore libero, liberè etiam processisse actus obedientiae, charitatis proximi & aliarum virtutum, quas Christus Dominus ut viator exercuit: tum quia ille amor est sufficiens principium & causa illorum, tum etiam quia amor beatificus, ut dictum est, veluti continebatur, ne influerit in hujusmodi actus, sed relinqueret voluntatem operari modo accommodato Viatori. Et ita videtur fieri satis omnibus difficultatibus positis. This he further confirms and explains.  
§. 78. And now I appeal to the whole world, whether any thing could be said more high and full to the Doctor's position, and what we have delivered in the clearing and confirmation of it, and more contrary and destructive to the pretences of our Refuter in his second argument, in every part and parcel of it. For first plain it is that Suarez here distinguishes Christ's state of Comprehensor, from his state of Viator. Secondly, he distinguishes the necessary acts of his Beatific love from the free acts of his love springing from the infused habit of charity. Thirdly he asserts that the Beatific necessary love had no influence upon the infused love, and consequently this might be most free and meritorious in the act and exercise, though the other were not. Fourthly that this free infused love was a sufficient cause and principle of all the inferior acts of obedience and piety and virtue, which as Christ in the state of viator did freely exercise, so they did as freely issue from that free meritorious love, properly so called, as their first spring and issue. And then lastly it appears from the words, that these elicit acts of virtue, piety, obedience, and the like, are the exterior acts of charity that Suarez here means, and not the outward sensible expressions, as our Refuter suggests.  
§. 79. And therefore since he has been so extremely unhappy in the quoting of Suarez, Aquinas and other Schoolmen, my advice for the future shall be to him, that he let the Schoolmen and Scholastic Divines alone, and content himself only with the Practical, wherein I hope he will be more happy.  
§. 80. Much more to our present purpose might be observed out of the following question Sect. 5. where he determines Quomodo Christus videns semper in verbo omnes actus suos eos liberè exercere potuerit, as also from his 39 disputation de merito Christi, where he proves that Christ did merit, though not by his Beatific and necessary love of God, yet by the elicit acts of the infused, as also by the elicit act of charity to his neighbour, and all other infused virtues and graces and the like. But because we cited part of this disputation already, and our Refuters gross mistakes need not further conviction, I refer the studious Reader to it, where he shall find some things worthy his perusal. For now  
— extremo in fine laborum  
Vela traho, & terris festino advertere proram.  
to mine and the Readers great contentment, I haste to the L'envoye and close.   

SECT. the last.  
The close. Refuters deliberate answer abortive. His civility. His appeal to the Readers judgement. His styling himself the Doctors Refuter. His challenge of the Doctor to a rejoinder. Clearness in dispute approved by the Defender. Why the Refuter plainly dealt with. The Libeler his own Executioner. Defenders proposal and promise. The Refuter may take his leave for the present, and if he please rest for ever. Refuters strange compliment at parting. Why the Defender, as the Refuter, subscribes not his name, but keeps unknown.  

Doctor HAMMOND.  
§. 41. And so I shut up this hasty paper, hoping that he which invited and promised it a welcome, in case it were given in a fair and Scholastical way, having nothing to accuse in it as to the first Epithet, will abate somewhat in reference to the second, and allow it a friendly, though but unqualified, it pretend not to a more hospitable reception.   
§. 1. TO this so civil parting, the Refuter returns a very confident appeal to the Readers judgement, and an unsavoury challenge to a second Reply.  

JEANES.  
Unto this your hasly paper (as you call it) I have given a deliberate answer, and I hope it may contend with your reply for civility and fairness in carriage of the controversy between us. As for the Scholasticalness of either paper, it were a very vain thing for me to say any thing of it, for we must be tried by the learned Readers, unto whom we both have, by thus appearing in public, appealed, and unto their judgement I shall contentedly submit myself. And thus your Refuter for the present takes his leave of you, hoping when your more pleasing and profitable employments shall permit, to hear further from you, in the mean time he shall rest;  
your most humble servant HENRY JEANES.   
§. 2. And thus 
Per varios casus per tot discrimina rerum  
Tendimus in Latium!   
But Sir, before you take your full leave of the Doctor, and lay yourself down to rest in the bed of fame, take my farewell along with you.  
§. 3. Whereas then you say, that to the Doctor's hasty paper (as he calls it) you have given a deliberate answer, I must tell you, it had been better that you had written in haste too, that so at least you might have had the common excuse of bad Writers. For this your 
† Audivi saepe hoc vulgo dictum dicier sole●e Elephantem gravidam perpetuos decem esse annot. Plaut. Stickus. act. 2. sc. 1. Decem annis gestare (Elephantem) in utero vulgus existimat. Aristoteles biennio, nec amplius quam semel gignere, Plin. nat. hist. l 8 c. 10.  Elephantine production proves Abortive, and in the language of the Latin 
* Ganis festinans caecos parit ca●ulos vid Erasm. Adag. [canes] gerunt uterum sexagenia diebus, Gignunt caecos: & quo largiori aluntur lacte eo tardiores v●sum accipiunt: Non tamen unquam ultra vicesimum primum, nec ante septimum. Quidam tradunt, si unus gignatur, nono die cernere: si gemini decimo. Idemque in singulos adjici. ●o●idemque esse tarditatis ad Lucem dies. Plin nat hist. l. 8. c. 40. Massurius Author est L. Papyrium Praetorem, secundo haerede lege agente bonorum possessionem contra eum dedisse, cum mater partum se XIII mensibus diceret tulisse etc. Plin. nat. hist, l. 7. c.— quosdam & cum dentibus nasci sicut M. Curium, qui ob id Dentatus cognominatus est. Et Cn. Papyrium Carbonem. Plin nat. hist, l. 7. c, 16. Vid Schenckium l. 4 observat. Sennert. Institut: med. l. 1. c. 10. & ejusd. Pract. medicine. l. 4. part. 2. sect. 6. c. 6. & authores ibi citatos, mihi p. 532.  Proverb is a very deliberate whelp, nor could your hasty teeming fancy have brought forth a blinder, if in a quarter of the space it had precipitately cast a whole litter of Answers.  
§. 4. But then though it be so extremely dark, that not only nine days, but nine ages are too short to make it see, yet as Schenckius and others report of some very slow and unnaturally late productions of women, it comes forth toothed and nailed and is no sooner born, but it can by't and scratch and be angry.  
§. 5. But yet he hopes it may contend with the Doctors for civility, etc. but what fast ground, I pray Sir, has this your Anchor to six on? Is it because you somewhere strike sail and call him the learned Doctor, and say, it is your desire and purpose to have fair wars with him, and that your pen shall not drop a disrespective syllable of him? But would call yourself mannerly, because you first wipe your mouth, before you spit in ones face, and after cry your humble servant? For though you rail not in down right terms, as others do, yet scarce S. W. otherwise called William Sergeant in a Controversy 
Vid. Schism disarmed.  that concerns the very copyhold of his Church does more slightingly undervalue the Doctor's judgement and learning, than yourself in every page almost, nor more frequently put him to School for the learning the most trivial notions in the world. And a short Catalogue of your respective language and carriage to the Doctor I have gathered and represented in the Dedicatory Epistle. Sir, if this be your civility, and fairness in carriage, I pray what is your Satire? And therefore if you hope to contend for this Laurel of fair carriage and civility in controversy, it must not be with Doctor Hammond, but with Bolsec and Schioppius and the blackmouthed Fevardentius in his Theomachia Calvinistica or our Countryman William Reinolds in his Calvino-Turcismus.  
§. 6. As for the Scholasticalness of your Paper, though you profess it were a very vain thing for you to say any thing of it, yet you are so vainly selfconceited to appeal to the judgement of the Reader for it, and to that judgement of his, you profess, you shall contentedly submit yourself.  
§. 7. But though I have nothing to rely on but the Readers favourable construction, yet since our Refuter has been pleased to appeal to his judgement for the Scholasticalness of his discourse, to that Judgement let him go. And if I have not made good my first undertaking, let him censure as severely as he please, and if he pardon my other weaknesses, let him not spare me for that.  
§. 8. And thus after this appeal he conceitedly tells the Doctor Your Refuter for the present takes his leave of you, hoping when your more pleasing and profitable employments shall permit, to hear further from you, in the mean time he shall rest, your humble servant, etc.  
§. 9 Your Refuter! In good time Sir! But how long I beseech you have you been called by that name? If it be a title of your own choosing, I doubt not but the world will see, you are mistaken, and that you had very little reason to take your leave of the Doctor with a challenge to a second encounter. Sir, It is honour enough to such a writer as yourself that you have fallen once under the Doctor's fatal pen. And whatsoever you jeeringly think of his 
* Vid. D. Hammonds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 §. 1.  more pleasing and profitable employments, yet well assured I am that wiser Judges than yourself are persuaded, that his time and abilities will be more usefully employed, then in drawing of a saw with such Schoolmen, as yourself; and therefore his friends did not unseasonably advise him wholly to withdraw himself â foro contensioso to some more pleasing and profitable employment.  
§. 10. And now Sir you may take your leave of the Doctor if you please, and rest as long as you think fit. I shall not be so confident as you are, to send challenges, nor rest for the present in expectation of new duels. Yet if you shall think fit to return an answer, I shall not fail by God's blessing to reply, but only so far forth as truth and justice go with me. For it is not victory I contend for, but that. And such is a worthy Christian contention indeed. For as there is nothing I love more than civility and clearness in disputes, so me thinks, there is nothing so becoming a Christian, as conviction, not calumny. Nor am I better pleased then when errors not persons are arraigned and condemned, and reason not passion steers and guides the whole controversy.  
§. 11. And if in some places I may seem not to have kept to this rule, it was because I foresaw I could not otherwise check your confidence, nor sooner make the Peacock to veil and sink his train then by bringing his eye to behold his black feet. If you had not all a long so undervalved and slighted your adversary (whose worth and great parts, the world has long since admired) I should not so much as have been angry with your errors, nor have been more displeased that you differed from me and the Doctor in judgement then in complexion and stature.  
§. 12. Perhaps you may be offended with this my plain dealing. For some persons are of such intemperate passions, that they can be angry with their glasses, and break them, because they faithfully reflect and represent their deformities. 
* Pinxi● et Antigoni Regis imaginem altero lumine orbam, primus excogi●atâ ratione visia condendi obliquam namque fecit ut quod corpori deerat picturae potius deesse videretur tantumque eam partem è facie ostendit, quam totam poterat ostendere. Plin. nat. hist. l. 35. c. 10.  I know it was looked upon as a piece of most artificial flattery in that great Master in painting who to conceal the want of Antigonus his eye, first invented the way of drawing the face by halves. And therefore because I had no Temptation to please you by concealing your defects, lest Apelles' fate should have been mine, and yourself and your friends should have been offended with me, as you were with Doctor Hammond for his civil addresses, I have not forborn in my own defence to display your ignorance at large.  
§. 13. And if now in your anger you shall instead of answering my reason fall to libel and railing and call that a Refutation, though my ink as well as yours is made of copperace and galls, and that to answer a Satire is the easiest thing in the world, yet I shall in this leave you to be your own executioner, nor envy you the honour of being your own defamer. For he that only libels another man's Fame, does but hang and draw himself in the effigies of an other, and paints his own deformities under the shape of his adversary.  
§. 14. But if as you pretend to Scholastical discourse you shall manage your Reply in such a way (and I have started many noble worthy Themes and well befitting the best Schoolmens consideration) I shall not drop a word in dishonour of your mistakes, but keep close to our Ob. and Sol. which as it will make short work, so I doubt not, if it be rational and solid, but it will be more pleasing to the Reader than the most witty Declamation or Satire can be made.  
§. 15. Or else if you have received it in 
* 1 King. 22. 31,  charge to fight neither with small nor great, but only with the King of Israel, or if as nothing but the 
† Vid: Plin: not hist: l: 8, c. 40. mihi p. 390:  Lion and Elephant could rouse the generous courage of Alexander's Albanian Mastiff, so you shall undervalue all other Adversaries, and think none worthy your confutation but only Doctor Hammond, or if you shall answer me in short, with a quis leget haec? and give out among your friends, that I have artificially spun out this rejoinder beyond the patience of a Refuter, or if for any other Reason, you think fit to take your leave of the Doctor, without hoping when his more pleasing and profitable employments shall permit to hear further from him, and be contented, not only in the mean time, but for ever to rest, I shall not triumph o'er your silence but commend your discretion. For well assured I am, that the world may be better employed, then in perusing the Disputes of such Schoolmen, as you, and I.  
§. 16. I have done Sir; but because I am no Italian, but an Englishman, I shall not imitate your courtship, nor follow you in the mode of the Hectors of the age. Though you close up your challenge to the Doctor with, your most humble servant, yet I never met with such compliments among the Schoolmen I converse with: nor can I otherwise count it then a strange piece of Rhetoric for Duellers in the field to cry your humble servant when they make thrusts at one another. Much less shall I, as you do, subscribe my name in great letters, because as I am not ambitious of fame, so I know I deserve it not. Nor could I look upon it as material to the Controversy, to know the Author of this rejoinder, but have found by experience that when reason cannot carry, then railing against the Author shall serve for an answer. And therefore not as ashamed of my name, or distrustful of the cause I undertake to defend, but as for other very good Reasons, so for this (among the rest) that you might not wave the present argument, and run into personal declamation, I have for the present concealed it, desiring to keep unknown, And so I leave you to rest from your labours in confuting Doctor Hammond.   
THE END.   

ERRATA.  
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A TABLE of the QUESTIONS here handled.  
WHether Doctor Hammond be guilty of a direct, or consequential denial of the fullness of Christ's habitual Grace? neg.  
Whether all actions, as well immanent as transient have their terms? affir. p. 26. etc.  
Whether the immanent acts of the habit of divine Grace or holy charity in Christ, are terminated in the quality of his actual holy love? affir. p. 30. etc.  
Whether immanent acts are dispofitions, and ranged under the first species of quality? off. p. 33. etc. 120. etc. 126.  
Whether grace may physically and effectively by humane endeavours be augmented, or dispositively only? p. 35. etc.  
Whether the acts of divine love in Christ are, and justly may be called dispositions? aff. 37. etc. 127. etc.  
Whether acts and habits are specifically distinct? off. p. 38. etc. 73, 74, 75. 126.  
Whether the perfection and in being of the habit, can any other way be rationally discovered then by the perfection of the Acts? neg.  
And consequently Whether the Doctor has not taken the best course to demonstrate the fullness of Christ's habitual grace? p. 53, 54, etc.  
Whether there were an all-fulness of habitual grace in Christ? off. p. 58, etc. 195, 571, etc. 586, 587, 588.  
Whether though the habit of divine grace in Christ concretively considered were always so full that it was incapable of increase, yet precisely and abstractly considered it were capable of intention, at least by the extraordinary power of God? off. p. 60, 61, 214, 215.  
Whether the love of Christ were more intense at some times in some acts viz. in his agony and death, then at other times in other acts, viz. in his suffering, hunger, etc. And whether his death be the greatest act of his love to us men? off. p. 57, 63, 66, 67.  
Whether a gradual heightening in the Acts of Christ's love could possibly intent and augment the habit of his love? neg. 65.  
And consequently,  
whether an intensive increase in the inward acts of wisdom and grace in Christ, will argue and conclude an intensive increase in his habitual grace, and whether the Doctor asserting the one, does by consequence assert the other? neg. p. 63, 65, 184, etc. 201, 202, 248, 249.  
Whether our charity to God and our neighbours be one and the same habit? off. p. 70, 233, 234.  
Whether the distinction of love into the habit and the act be not only legible in the Doctor's writings, but love is also truly a genus to the habit and the act? p. 81, etc. p. 116, etc.  
Whether love as a genus does equally comprehend the habit and the outward sensible expressions of it? neg. p. 84, etc. 89, 90.  
Whether criticism be not highly useful to complete the Divine? off. p. 97, etc.  
Whether the intention of the act be so proportioned to the intention of the habit as still to equal it in perfection? neg. p. 109, 110, 111.  
And consequently Whether the actual grace of Christ be so exactly proportioned to his habitual grace, as still to equal it in fullness, height, and intention? neg. p. 101 177, 178.  
Whether any thing naturally and ab intrinseco hinders but that several outward expressions of love in themselves gradually different, may sometimes flow from the same or several acts of inward love gradually equal? neg. p. 139.  
Whether though the outward acts of God's favour be different, yet the inward act of his love is still one and the same substantial act, no other than himself? off. against the Socinian. p. 141, etc.  
And confequently,  
Whether any thing but God himself can be the proper object of God's love? neg. p. 145, etc.  
Whether the gradual intention, and remission in the outward expressions of love in men do most commonly argue and infer a proportionable increase and decrease in the inward acts of love? off. p. 155, etc.  
And consequently,  
Whether we are obliged ordinarily to afford the greatest expressions and demonstrations of our love, where we are bound most to love? aff. 161, etc. 165.  
Whether the gradual intention and remission of the inward and the outward acts and expressions of love must be so exactly proportioned in point of degrees, as to be always equal or parallel? neg. p. 168, 169.  
And consequently Whether the Doctor did rightly conclude, that that act of internal love expressed by his dying for us was superior to those former, which only expressed themselves in his poverty? off. p. 166, 167, 168, 170.  
Whether the Schoolmen, particularly Aquinas affirm, that the intention of Christ's actual grace is exactly equal to that of his habitual? neg. p. 180, etc.  
Whether a moral work or action consists of the inward and the outward act as the two essential parts? off. p. 183, 184. 591. 601.  
Whether the Fathers and Schoolmen, Protestants and Papists, and the Refuter among the number affirm that Christ did truly and really increase in the perfection of the inward acts of wisdom and grace and holy love? off. p. 188, etc.  
Whether the acts of Christ's love were primario, and per se, and not only secundario and per accidens capable of degrees? off. p. 209, etc.  
Whether D. Hammond by the phrase the love of God, means any thing else then the grace of divine charity in its general notion and comprehension? neg. 216, etc.  
Whether the acts of the grace of divine charity in Christ were not only de facto different in gradual perfection among themselves, and from the habit, but aught also thus to differ? aff. 216, etc. 245, etc.  
And consequently,  
Whether the first great law of holy charity binds all in every act to the same equal intenseness and utmost degree of love and holy charity? neg. 240, 241, etc. 360, 361, 433, 464.  
Whether when the number of degrees of any quality is multiplied in the same subject, the quality itself also is proportionably intended? off. p. 253, 254, 255, 256.  
Whether the multiplication of the outward acts of prayer, and a longer continuance in them, and a repetition of the same words, argue a greater ardency of inward affection, and true devotion? aff. 257, etc.  
Whether though the merit of every act of Christ were infinite in regard of his person, yet it were finite in regard of the real physical value of the works themselves? And consequently,  
Whether one work of his might in this respect be more valuable and meritorious than another? off. p. 270, etc. 574, 580.  
Whether the English Translation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he prayed more earnestly, be just and best? aff. 279, etc.  
Whether the ardency of Christ's inward devotion were heightened in his agony? aff. 283, etc. 322, etc. 328, etc. 543, etc.  
Whether Christ in the state of his humiliation was both comprehensor and viator? off 292, 346, 347, etc. 525.  
Whether Christ, being always comprehensor upon earth, were in a capacity to pray? aff. 293, etc.  
Whether Christ being still God as well as man, it were convenient for him to pray? And God had so decreed? And Christ de facto did pray? And for himself as well as others? And with a difference? off. p. 296, 297, 298, 299, 300.  
Whether Christ in truth and reality and not in show did pray for a Removal of that cup of his passion which he knew his Father had determined he should drink, and when himself came into the world for that very purpose? aff. p, 301, etc.  
Whether Christ's agony and prayer for a removal of this bitter cup employed any unwillingness in him to suffer, or contrariety of desires in himself, or repugnance to the will of God? neg. p. 306, etc.  
Whether Christ (and consequently we from the authority of this great example) might lawfully and rationally pray for a removal of that cup, which God had absolutely decreed he should drink? off. p. 315, 316, 317, 318, 319.  
Whether as the greatness of our Saviour's agony in the garden exceeded all his former sufferings, so his ardency in prayer for a removal of it were proportionably intended? aff. 322, etc. 537, 538.  
Whether affliction be a fit season for the heightening our devotion, and more than ordinary fervour in prayer? And God now calls for it? And Christ by his own example has instructed us what to do in such cases? aff. 327, 328, 522, 523, 528, 542, 543, 544, 545.  
Whether the inward acts of Christ's habitual grace were always in termino, and at the highest? and belonged to him as comprehensor? neg. 3●7, 338.  
Whether Aquinas, Capreolus, Scotus assert that the inward acts of Christ's habitual grace were all equally intense in gradual perfection? neg. 334, etc.  
Whether Aquinas and Scotus assert the contrary? and that which the Doctor maintains? aff. 342, 343.  
Whether it were possible for Christ to merit, and only as viator? off 348, 349, 525, 526, 527, 626, 627, 628, And by what acts? 365, 366, 367.  
Whether he that affirms that the inward acts of Christ's love of God or holy charity were less intense at one time then another, does deny Christ to be happy in his soul at those times? neg. 351, etc.  
Whether he that affirms that the acts of Christ's love or holy charity were more intense at one time then another does by consequence make him guilty of the breach of the first great law of love? neg. 361, etc.  
Whether Christ as viator had the same abilities to love God as he had as comprehensor? and the charity of the Saints on earth can possibly equal in perfection the charity of the Saints in heaven? neg. 369, etc.  
Whether he that makes use of any Scripture exposition to be found in Bellarmine or other Popish writer is eo ipso guilty of a compliance with Papists? neg. 378, 379, 380.  
Whether D. Hammonds exposition of the first great commandment of love be the same with Bellarmine's? neg. 386.  
Whether the Doctor's exposition be agreeable to that of the Fathers and most learned of Protestants? aff. 400, 401, 402, etc. How reasonable it is, 433, 434.  
Whether the state of Adam in innocence were a state of proficiency? off. against M. Cawdrey. 421, 456, 612.  
Whether the Saints and Angels in heaven all love God to the same indivisible degree? neg. 423, 466.  
Whether the Saints and Angels in heaven differ in degrees of glory? aff. 423, 424, 425, 466, 467.  
Whether Christians are now bound sub periculo animae to that degree of innocence, and prudence, and perfection of Adam in paradise? neg. 425, 426, 429, 430, 446, 447, 605, 606, 607, 608.  
Whether Christians are now bound by the first great law of love to all the degrees of love either in this life or the next, so that whatsoever falls short of the utmost height is sinful, as Chamier asserts? neg. 431, 432, 486, 487. Or to as high a degree as is possible to the humane nature, as the Refuter? Neg. 433, 445, 446.  
Whether the first great law of love excludes all possibility of freewill-offerings? neg. 442, 443, etc.  
And consequently,  
Whether there be certain acts of religion and degrees of piety to which no man by any particular law is obliged, which yet when spontaneously and voluntarily performed are approved by God and accepted of him as freewill-offerings, over and above what any law in particular requires, as the Doctor maintains? aff. 383, 442, etc. 446, 447.  
Whether this Doctrine of Gospel-freewill-offerings infers the Romish Doctrine of supererogation? neg. 448, etc. And whether the Doctor has freed it from this charge? aff. 436, 437.  
Whether the Doctor asserts lukewarmness in love? neg. How it differs from sincerity? And whether Christianity be a state of proficiency and growth? aff. 438, etc. 455, 456.  
Whether God is to be loved above all things objective, appretiatiuè, intensiuè? And whether the Doctor approves all? aff. 442, 443, 444, 496, &c,  
Whether the Christian is bound to aspire to and endeavour after the loving of God according to the perfection of the Saints in heaven? aff. 446, 447, 448, 467, 472.  
Whether the modus of virtue and charity falls under the precept? neg. 453, 454.  
Whether charity may be increased in infinitum? off 458, 468, 469, 502.  
Whether the creature may be obliged to love God as much as he is lovely? neg. 459.  
Whether we are bound to love God as much as we can in this life? and infinitely and without measure? aff. 460, 464, 465, 474, 475, 476, 505, 619.  
Whether the quality or grace of divine charity or holy love admits of an eight or any set highest degree, to which all are bound to arrive at? neg. 467, 468, 469, 470.  
Whether Aquinas maintains that the first great commandment of love requires of Christians by way of Duty, that perfection of love that is only attainable in heaven? neg. 485, etc.  
Whether perfection of state according to Aquinas admits of uncommanded acts and counsels, but perfection life does not? aff. 491, 492, 493.  
Whether Scotus maintains that the first great law of love requires that perfection of Christians by way of duty, that is only attainable in heaven? neg. 496, etc.  
Whether Durand maintains the same? neg. 504, etc.  
Whether S. Austin and S. Bernard do assert the same? neg. 509, etc.  
Whether the distinction of Quatenus indicat finem, and quatenus praecipit medium were invented by Bellarmine to avoid the Refuters testimonies of Aquinas and Scotus? 517, etc. and whether it is agreeable to the sense of S. Austin? off 519.  
Whether the clear intuitive knowledge and happiness and necessary love of Christ as comprehensor, had any influence on, or altered the nature and freedom of the acts of his love, and virtues and graces as viator? neg. 522, &c, 529, 634, 635, 636, 637.  
Whether Christ as comprehensor, though he had always sufficient cause to love God to the utmost height, yet could have any more grounds and motives thus to love then he had occasions? neg. 530. 531.  
Whether as viator he might have occasions, grounds and motives to heighten his love and ardency in prayer? aff. 532, 533.  
Whether as viator he were capable of hope? aff. 535, 536.  
Whether the love of desire and complacency immediately fixed on God were in Christ as viator capable of increase, and de facto augmented? aff. 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538.  
Whether it may be rightly inferred from this saying of S. Austin, Charitas quam diu augeri potest, profecto illud quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est, that to ascribe growth to the ardency of Christ's actual love is to charge it with imperfection and sin? neg. 550.  
Whether the phrase ex vitio est, be to be causally understood, as denoting our original corruption? off 558, etc.  
What was S. Augustine's opinion concerning original sin? and whether all born in it? aff. 560, etc. 605, 606, etc.  
Whether the Refuter be very unjustly confident that besides this Replyer, D. Hammond, no learned man either Protestant or Papist hath ascribed any such growth to the actual love of God? And whether several eminently Learned both Protestants and Papists have asserted it? aff. 570. etc.  
How Christ might increase in actual grace, the habitual still continuing in one equal fullness? 583, 584 585.  
Whether the first Covenant since the fall of man were ever in force to justification, or obligatory by way of duty to any but Christ? neg. 605, etc.  
Whether God under the second Covenant requires sinless perfection to the justification of believers? neg. or only faith and evangelical righteousness? aff. 460, 462, 610, 611, 612.  
Whether from the more profuse pouring out of the outward expressions of devotion, at the time of our Saviour's agony may rightly be concluded the increase of his inward ardency? aff. 598, etc.  
Whether Aquinas means by the exterior acts of charity, moral duties, and not outward sensible expressions? aff. 617, etc.  
Whether the will of Christ had the same equal natural and proper freedom to the inward acts of love and the outward expressions of it? aff. 628, 629.  
Whether Christ had more moral freedom and indifferency to many or most of the outward acts and sensible expressions then to the inward acts of charity? neg. 629, 630, 631. Or might indifferently use any outward gestures, or actions or expressions in prayer, than what pro hic & nunc were prudentially decent and fit? neg. 632, etc.  
Whether every act of piety and charity that is meritorious or remunerable is quoad exercitium, and in individuo determined in respect of outward circumstances? affirm, 632.  
Whether Suarez asserts that the will of Christ had a natural and proper freedom or active indifferency in sensu diviso to the outward sensible expressions only, and not to the inward acts of the love of God, or holy charity? neg. 633, etc.   

Authors omitted in the Catalogue. Petrus S. Joseph. Suarez, F. Errata.  
Epist. ded. p. 4. l. 26. Raunandus, Raynaudus  
Treatise. p. 123. l. 21. love, good. 139, 8. intrinseco extrinseco. 167. 13. inward outward. 377. 23. perfectly, perfect. 387. 24. aliud, aliud nisi. 393. 23. the form and, that form of. 415. 32. Deum ex parte, De 'em amari ex parte. 422. 6. de quibus praecepta, de quibus dantur praecepta. 562. 11. ut omnino, non ut omnino. 581. 24. as with out, as we in all things without, 640. l. 12. would call, would you call.  
Smaller literal escapes the Reader will amend and pardon.  
THE END.   

A CATALOGUE of some Books Printed for Richard Royston at the Angel in Ivy-lane, London.  

Books written by Doctor Hammond, and Printed for Richard Royston, and Richard Davis.  
A Paraphrase and Annotations upon all the Books of the New Testament by Hen. Hammond, D. D. in fol. the second Edition enlarged.  
2. A Paraphrase & Annotations upon the books of the Psalms briefly explaining the difficulties thereof, by Hen. Hammond D. D. fol. new.  
3. The Practical Catechism, with other English Treatises, in two volumes in 4.  
4. Dissertationes quatuor quibus Episcopatus Jura ex S. Scriptures & Primaeva Antiquitate adst●uuntur, contra sententiam D. Blondelli & aliorum in 4.  
5. A Letter of Resolution of six Queries in 12.  
6. Of Schism. A defence of the Church of England against the exceptions of the Romanists, in 12.  
7. Of Fundamentals in a notion referring to practice, in 12.  
8. Paraenesis, or a seasonable exhortation to all true sons of the Church of England, in 12.  
9 A Collection of several Replies and Vindications published of late, most of them in defence of the Church of England, now put together in four volumes. Newly published, in 4.  
10. The Dispatcher Dispatched, in Answer to a Roman Catholic Book, entitled Schism Dispatched, in 4. new.  
11. A Review of the Paraphrase and Annotations on all the Books of the New Testament, with some additions & alterations, in 8.  
12. Some profitable directions both for Priest and people, in two Sermons in 8. new.   

Books and Sermons written by J. Taylor D. D.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A Course of Sermons for all the Sundays of the year; together with a discourse of the Divine Institution, Necessity, sacredness and Separation of the Office Ministerial, in fol.  
2. The History of the Life and Death of the Ever-blessed Jesus Christ, third Edition in fol.  
3. The Rule and Exercises of holy living, in 12.  
4. The Rule and Exercises of holy dying, in 12.  
5. The Golden Grove, or A Manual of daily Prayers, fitted to the days of the week, together with a short Method of Peace and Holiness, in 12.  
6. The Doctrine and Practice of Repentance rescued from popular Errors, in a large 8. newly published.  
7. A Collection of Polemical and Moral discourses, in fol. newly reprinted.  
8. A Discourse of the Nature, Offices and Measure of Friendship, in 12. new.  
9 A Collection of Offices or forms of prayer fitted to the needs of all Christians, taken out of the Scriptures and Ancient Liturgies of several Churches especially the Greek, together with the Psalter or Psalms of David after the King's Translation, in a large octavo newly published.  
10. Ductor Dubitantium, or Cases of Conscience, fol. in two vol. Now in the Press.   

Books written by Mr. Tho. Pierce Rector of Brington.  
THe Christians Rescue from the grand error of the heathen touching the fatal necessity of all events, in 5. Books in 4. new.  
The new Discoverer Discovered by way of Answer to Mr. Baxter with a rejoinder to his Key for Catholics, and Disputations about Church government. 4. new.  
The Sinner Impleaded in his own Court, whereunto is added the grand Characteristick whereby a Christian is to be known, in 12. newly printed.  
The Lifelesness of Life on the hither side of Immortality, with a timely caveat against procrastination.   

Books in Fol.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ecclesiae Anglicane Suspiria, The Tears, Sighs, Complaints and Prayers of the Church of England: setting forth her former Constitution, compared with her present condition; also, the visible Causes, and probable Cures of her Distempers, by John Gauden D. D. of Bocken in Essex. fol. new.  
The Royalists defence printed at Oxon. 4.  
The Regal apology printed at Oxon. 4.  
Sacro-sancta Regum Majestas by the Archbishop of Tuam 4. printed at Oxon  
The Image unbroken, or a vindication of his Majesty's Book entitled A Portraiture of his Sacred Majesty in his solitudes and sufferings, in 4. by B. Bramhall in a reply to Milton.  
Reliquiae Sacrae Carolinae, or the Works of that Great Monarch and Glorious Martyr King Charles the first 8. with a short view of his Life and Death.   
Place this CATALOGUE at the end of the Book.  
The End.