THE ORIGINAL CAUSE OF Temporal Evils.  
The opinions of the most Ancient Heathens concerning it, examined by the sacred Scriptures, and referred unto them, as to the Source and Fountain from whence they sprang.  
By MERIC CASAUBON D.D.  Orig. contra Cells. lib. IU. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. If any Argument, fit for humane disquisition, be of difficult investigation to humane industry, among such may this which is concerning the Original of Evils, well be reckoned. 
LONDON, Printed by M. F. and are to be sold by Richard Minne, at the sign of S. Paul in Little Britain. 1645.   

The Preface.  
ARistotle in his Rhetorics where he treats of the properties of men according to their several either ages, or conditions of life, hath a notable observation concerning those he properly calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or fortunate men; That among a greater number of bad qualities, they have one that is commendable and makes some amends; which is, that they are commonly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lovers of God; or, piously affected towards God. It may well seem strange, if not altogether false, it being more generally received, and apparently more probable, that (Bonae mentis soror paupertas) Virtue and Poverty (poverty & piety, the virtue of virtues, especially) are of a kind. It were no hard thing with such distinctions and limitations of circumstances, as in cases of this nature must always be presupposed, to reconcile these two. Neither indeed doth Aristotle simply say, that they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, religious, in point of life, which may prove quite another thing; but this only, that such are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that is, that They love God, (whether really, or in their opinion only, is the question: See S. John Chap. XIV. ver. 15.21, 23, 24. and the same S. John I. Epist. Chap. V ver. 1, 2, 3.) and have a kind of confidence in him, (or, trust in him after a sort) because of those goods Fortune hath cast upon them.  
And this is further confirmed by S. Basil also (for herein the common saying, that Contrariorum eadem est ratio, will hold well:) where he discourseth of the original of Atheism: When men, saith he, at first are crossed in their worldly affairs, then begin they, for want of patience, to doubt in themselves, whether God in very deed regardeth the things of this world; whether he take care of particular men; and whether he reward every man according to his deeds. But afterwards when they see no end of their troubles and miseries, but one evil continually attended with another evil, they settle in themselves that wicked opinion, and absolutely resolve in their hearts, that there is no God. So Basile in his Homily, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: That God is not the cause of evils. The words therefore of the Psalmist are very emphatical, 
Psal. 44. ver. 9, 10, etc.  Thou hast cast off and put us to shame, etc. All this is come upon us, yet have we not forgotten thee, neither have we dealt falsely in thy covenant. Our heart is not turned back, neither have our steps declined from thy ways.  
At such times then especially, hath that question been most rife, (and pertinent indeed) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Whence are evils, and what brought them forth into the world: of which so much hath been written by ancient Philosophers. The Scriptures indeed, not in positive assertions only, which in divers places are to be found; but even by the whole stream and series of Ecclesiastical stories and events of all kinds, afford so bright and resplendent a light in this point, that he sees not the Sun in the firmament at noon day, who makes not this conclusion from them, That as all evil of sin is from man, by the instigation of the Devil; so all evil of punishment is from God, for the amendment of sinners. These two, malum culpae, and malum poenae, (as they are commonly discerned,) the evil of sin, and the evil of punishment, (though this latter be not evil absolutely, but rather good, in regard of the end and consequents of it, as heathens themselves have well acknowledged:) being the two springs, from whence not Illae, as it is in the Comic, but omnes lachrymae; whatsoever Adam's wretched posterity groaneth under, and through which the very frame of this lower and sublunary world laboureth, doth flow. So that were all that profess Christianity, and consequently, to embrace the Scriptures as divine Oracles, truly and really what they profess; as the resolution of this point would be easy and obvious, so the arguing of it, among Christians, needless. But by books that of late have been written as well by Protestants as by Papists, it may easily appear that many among Christians are to be found, who in their inward are nothing less than what outwardly they profess themselves; yea, and not a few, it should seem, that dare freely enough profess what they believe. Libertins', as I take it, is their name in some countries. And besides this, it may further appear by holy David, (or whoever was the composer of the 73. Psal.) that in time of either public extraordinary confusion, or private distress and extremity, it may be the case of a man, religious otherwise and godly, to be at a stand for a while, and to entertain some doubts.  
Of all opinions in this kind, contrary to the truth, and destuctive of all godliness, I find two chiefly to have prevailed in the world. That of Epicurus (so I call it, because from him chiefly propagated to afterages; though long, in part at least, in the world, before him:) as more known, I shall first name; which was, (as he openly professed it: for some ancients make him to have been an arrant atheist:) That there is a God, an excellent Nature, whose happiness and perfection is to enjoy himself free from all troubles and cares, not regarding or heeding any thing at all but himself: That it is a folly to believe that God had created the World, as either Sun or Moon, or any other part of this Universe: and not folly alone, but impiety to believe that God either regarded what is done by men, or was the cause of any whether good or evil that happeneth unto them.  
This opinion, though it might and did in the later ages of the world, when God ceased by strange apparitions, and otherwise, so familiarly to reveal himself unto men, as before; yet in the first ages of it, (impious enough otherwise) when the memory of the Creation, & other great and miraculous works of God, was so fresh, and his presence (by Angels and the like) so frequent among men; it could not possibly take place. The Devil then in those days, when God did so manifestly interest himself in the affairs of men, because the time for Epicurism was not yet come, in stead of it, he poisoned men with an opinion, That God was of an envious nature: which was (as is showed in the ensuing Treatise) the very argument he used to our first father and mother, Adam and Eve, to make them transgress, and so to forfeit their first happiness. And when some men by the very light of natural humane reason that remained in them, began to discern the impiety and absurdity of this opinion, they fell into another, not altogether so impious, but more absurd, that God is not omnipotent, and wanted not will, but power to amend what they conceived to be amiss in the world: or, that there were two Authors and Creators of all things, the one good, and the other evil.  
These were the first errors and extravagancies of men against the true doctrine of God's Providence, and administration of the world, as it is taught by the holy Scriptures. Most men that have written of and for Providence, fall upon Epicurus and his opinions copiously enough; as indeed it is a large and copious argument, especially since that by so many it hath been beaten and trodden. But I know not of any that hath examined and refuted that more ancient error, or scarce taken notice of it: which nevertheless is not less, yea, in some respect I may say, more considerable. For as it is more ancient, so it may more clearly be derived from its first spring, mistaken Scripture: which affords us a good argument for the antiquity and authenticknes of the Scriptures themselves, against atheists and infidels; as good, almost, as any can be. This is it therefore, that in this ensuing Treatise I have proposed to myself, and endeavoured. I intent it (I confess,) but as a part of a greater work, concerning Divine Providence, in general, which long ago I have had in my thoughts. But whatever becomes of the rest, this either as a part (if it shall please God to spare me life, and other opportunities shall serve) may begin; or if otherwise, stand by itself as a supplement to what hath already been written by others of that argument; and either way, give some satisfaction, I hope, in this main point, to His glory, to whom whatsoever is not referred, I never thought much considerable.   

Errata.  
Pag. 14. Lin. 33. Soon after. p 16. l. 26. he did so. p. 20. l. 25. in his XV. Iliad. p. 22. l 6. heterogeneous. p. 50. l. 2. Thou shalt know. p. 61. l. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

THE ORIGINAL CAUSE OF TEMPORAL EVILS.  
THat the life of man in this world is full of troubles & miseries, is so common a complaint in the mouths of all men, of what rank and quality soever they be; and so obvious a subject in Writers of all Ages, Nations and Professions, as that it may well be reckoned among those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or known Principles, which common sense teacheth, and Artists ground upon as indisputable truths. Yet he that will see this common and beaten subject, most tightly even in the judgement of humane reason, setting aside the credit and authority of divine inspiration, handled, needeth but go to Ecclesiastes; the excellency of which discourse he shall best understand, who judiciously compares it with the choicest, and most approved pieces, either old, or late, concerning that argument. The truth is, there hath been little said by others upon that Theme, either for wit or wisdom much considerable, which may not both be found here, and probably be supposed originally to have proceeded hence. I will give one instance. What among the Ancients, upon this subject of man's misery, more famous, than that old saying, whereof they made one of their Sileni, (a degree above Philosophers, among ancient Heathens) to be the author, That it was the chiefest happiness, not to be born; next to that, quickly to die? Divers expressions of this saying by several Greek Poets (if any shall desire to see them together, & compare them) have been collected by Erasmus. The matter is by Tully in his Tuscul, briefly thus recorded: Fertur de Sileno fabella quaedam, etc. There goes an old tale (or, story: for so the word fabula sometimes is taken) of a Silenus, who being taken by Midas the King, is said to have given him a ransom (or, reward) for his dismission: which was, that he taught him, how that it was a most happy thing not to be born; but in the next place, to die very soon. And this long before any memory of any either Midas or Silenus, 
Eccles. 4. ver. 1, 2, 3.  was thus delivered by wise Solomon: So I returned and considered all the oppressions, that are done under the Sun, and behold, etc. Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead, more than the living which are yet alive. Yea, better is he then both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil work that is done under the Sun. These words, Better is he then both they, etc. misunderstood, might probably occasion that opinion of the ancientest Philosophers, (of which we shall have occasion for to say more afterwards) that the souls of men had a subsistence long before their incorporation, and were thus driven into this lower world, and confined into bodies, as Cages or Prisons, for some miscarriages in their former and better condition. Pliny the eldest, who had studied the world as much as any man, and hath written of the world, (his Natural History I mean) more than any; who for his parts of nature, (wit, and curiosity) and other great advantages of fortune might be supposed to know as much as any other man; his observation is, that nullum frequentius votum, no wish more frequent among men, than the wish of death; and thereupon his conclusion is, that Natura nihil brevitate vitae praestitit melius: and elsewhere he calls death, pracipuum naturae bonum, the greatest benefit of nature, or the greatest blessing that heavens have vouchsafed unto mankind. Yet all this notwithstanding, if any judging of this life by what hath hitherto happened unto themselves, and not much sensible of what they have known to happen unto others, be of another mind, and think better of the world then so; I might tell them of Croesus, and others, who once thought themselves the happiest of men, and afterwards became notorious examples of man's misery; I might also tell them, that among the miseries of this life, those that are public, and extend unto many, (such as are the miseries of wars, slaughters, slaveries, plagues, famines, and the like; of which that of the Poet, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
That both Sea and Land are full of miseries,  hath generally been true, and visible at all times) are the chiefest, and those which most affect a man, that is a man indeed; that is, truly sociable, and communicable, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Greek Philosophers express it: this I say, and much more to this purpose I might tell them; but that, not the consideration of our miseries be they more or less, or what opinion men have of them, is the subject by me here undertaken; but the original cause of our miseries, & what was the opinion of ancientest Heathens about it; and how consonant and agreeable it is with the truth of the holy Scriptures: such consonancy either of humane reason, (in times of Paganism) or ancient traditions with the Scriptures, having been accounted by ancient learned Christians no small evidence of the truth of the Scriptures themselves, and by them therefore upon all occasions with all possible care, and curiosity, sifted, and inquired into. But before I come to what I have more directly proposed to myself, I must be way of introduction take notice of some other opinions of theirs, that have much affinity with the former subject; and what relation they have to my main scope, will appear in the progress and conclusion of our discourse.  
It is a common observation among the Ancients that there is no worldly good, which is not either tempered with some present evil; or at least, hath the seeds in itself of some evil consequence, and future inconvenience: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: or as some others, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that no worldly good, or pleasure, is pure, and sincere; unmixed, and untainted of the contrary. I know not any other subject that ancient both Historians and Philosophers (Greeks especially) more frequently insist upon, if it come in their way; or more willingly digress into. Theophrastus' in that excellent fragment of his Metaphysics, handles it with admirable wit, and profundity; showing, that such is the nature of this sublunary world, as to consist of contraries; and how one contrary doth beget another: a curious speculation; curiously handled and speculated no● by Theophrastus' only, but by the author of that polite Treatise De mundo, (too polite I doubt for Aristotle's stile, though ascribed unto him by divers ancients, besides Apuleius, as Justin Martyr, and Philoponus) the which Apuleius of old, and Budaeus of late have turned into Latin. One of the first, if not the very first now extant, in whom this observation of the mixture of sweet and sour in worldly things, is to be found, is old Plato, who recordeth how his Master Socrates, that very day that he drank his last and fatal cup, which made him immortal to all ensuing generations, having casually rubbed his thigh or knee to allay the itch, which the fetters had occasioned; and perceiving a kind of pleasure to ensue upon it; took that occasion to instruct his friends and auditors then present, concerning the nature of all worldly delights and pleasures in these words: How incongruous in my judgement, O friends, is that thing, which men usually term sweet? how marvellously (or, naturally) inclinanable it is to that, which because they cannot be together at one time, seemeth contrary, pain? Yet nevertheless, such is their nature, that if a man pursue after the one and obtain it, it shall go very hard but he shall be constrained, as if both hanged by one string, to have part in the other also. And certainly had Aesop thought of it, he would have made a Fable of it, how that God purposing to reconcile these two, sweet and sour, together, and not being able; he did chain them together by the head (alterum ex altero verticibus inter se contrariis deligavit, as Aulus Gellius expresseth it;) so that whosoever is partaker of the one, cannot be long without the other also; as now it hath happened unto me, the same fetter having caused first pain, and now pleasure unto my thigh. So Socrates in Plato. What Aesop did not, learned and ingenious Camerarius hath since done; he hath contrived it into two fables, the one of them with the text of Plato, the Reader shall find, if he please at the end of this Treatise. This was the practice of the Ancients, (I note it by the way, because we have many examples of it in the holy Scriptures) by fables and parables, to work upon men: and they found it a most powerful and effectual way; whereof Plutarch in his Consolation to Apollonius, hath a notable instance; & it is in an argument of much affinity to this. But to return, it would be long even to name those several ancient Authors, who have descanted upon it, and applied it to several occasions. Pliny the latter among the Latins, in his incomparable Panegyric, in few words, but as elegant and pithy, as they are short, thus: Habet has vices conditio mortalium, ut adversa ex secundis, ex adversis secunda nascantur, (nascuntur, not noscantur; as it is in some editions:) Occultas utrorumque semina Deus, & plerunque bonorum malorúmque causae sub diversâ speci● latent.  
But that which concerns us to take more especial notice of, is an other observation of the same Ancients, concerning all extraordinary worldly successes, and more than usual prosperity in any kind, which they held generally to be very ominous, yea very unlucky; in so much as they were accounted wise and prudent, who could, if not altogether prevent, (which is not in the power of man) yet by certain art and cunning, temper and allay such excesses of fortune. Whether this was intended by Menander, or no, (that famous Comic) I know not; for he might have another aim: but his words are pertinent: 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Of all unhappiness among men, the chief cause is, Much (or, too much) happiness.   
The opinion may seem strange, but the practice of many of them, upon it, much more; and the grounds both of the one and of the other, when well weighed and considered, most of all. Herodotus shall be the first from whom we will take our information about it, as being the first of ancient Historians, now extant; and in that respect, for his antiquity, to us most considerable. He toucheth upon it often, upon divers occasions; but most fully and positively (though not as from himself there, but in the person of Amasis, King of Egypt, a Prince of great renown, among the Ancients) in his third book, and fortieth chapter, as it is usually divided. Polycrates, King, or rather Tyrant of Samos; (an Island of the Egean sea, bordering upon Asia, once so flourishing, that even the hens of it were proverbially said to be milked; but now in a manner altogether forsaken of inhabitants) having had for a long time more than ordinary success in all his enterprises, his felicity all that while not crossed in any other kind either at home or abroad; Amasis' King of Egypt, his great friend and confederate, is reported to have written a Letter to him about it; the copy whereof according to Herodotus was this:  
Amasis to Polycrates, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, haec mandat. as Camerarius renders it) saith thus: That thou dost well and prosper, is no small joy unto me, as thy friend and confederate; but I must tell thee plainly, that these great and overflowing successes do not please me, who know full well, the nature of the Deity, how envious it is. It is my wish concerning my own self, and the same I wish to all that are dear unto me, sometimes to prosper, and sometimes to miscarry; and in this vicissitude of fortunes to pass my life; rather then without any alteration to prosper. For I never yet could hear of any, who having thus prospered long, did not, at the last, end in an universal destruction. Be thou therefore persuaded by me, and take this course with thy prosperity: Consider seriously with thyself what thing thou hast thou most esteemest, and for the loss of which then wouldst be most grieved: this, whatever it be, cast away, that it may never be seen again: And for the time to come likewise, if thy successes shall not interchangeably be varied, help thyself in the same manner that I have now shown thee.  
So Amasis to his friend Polycrates: And Polycrates being before, as is probable, possessed with the same principles of the nature of the Deity, as Amasis was, was easily persuaded. He threw a ring, which of all his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or precious jewels, he most valued, into the Sea, never likely, as a man would have thought, to see it more; but his good luck, or ill luck rather, as they apprehended it, was such, that he could not find occasion of grief, though he sought it; not when he sought it, at least. For his ring was soon after brought to him again. How this happened, and other particulars of the story, but especially the lamentable Catastrophe of his life, according to his friend Amasis his predication, may be read in Her●dotus at large: and more briefly in others, (as Strabo for one by name) that had it from him. This narration to some that know nothing but their own times may seem ridiculous. I cannot peremptorily undertake for the truth of it: but for the probability, (that one particular of the miraculous return of his ring excepted) I can easily, both from the opinion and practice of divers others in afterages. Some writ of Epaminondas, a famous Theban; some of Philippus, King of Macedon; that after high and unexpected victories, they became (in their outward carriage and deportment, at least) very sorrowful, more like mourners, than triumphers, for no other reason, then through fear of some great eminent disaster, which they by this provident sensibleness, and voluntary humiliation hoped they should prevent: Of this latter, Niceph. Gregoras; of the former, Isid. Pelusiota, (not to mention others) bear record, and commend them for it: Christians both, the one an Historian of later Greece; the other (Isidorus) an ancient Father, one of S. Chrysostom's Disciples. Augustus, that great Monarch, (in whose days the Saviour of the world was born, and took upon him the form of a servant) stipem quotannis, die certe, emendicabat à populo, (saith Suetonius of him) cavam manum asses porrigentibus prabens: that is, in plain English, that once in the year he was wont to turn beggar, and (cauâ manu, that is, in the most ignominious way of taking) received alms of such of the common people, as would give him. Suetonius saith no more of it then so, neither in those days needed he, to be understood; but learned men, and well versed in antiquity, that have written upon him, show the reason. He mistrusted his own long continued felicity, (though varied by many cross chances and accidents, whereof Pliny the elder hath made a whole Chapter in his History of the world) and dreaded (upon the same supposition as Amasis in Herodotus) that so dreadful, in those days, invidiam Numinis. So Camillus a Roman Captain, having with marvellous success delivered his Country from miserable thraldom, he made it, say ancient Historians, his request unto God, that if such hap and success was too great to escape the strokes of Heaven's envy, himself, and not the Public might be the object of those strokes: which they say befell to him according to his desire; first, a sudden light fall; and afterwards, persecution from those whom he had delivered.  
To these I shall add but one passage of Plutarch, in his Paulus Aemilius, that it may be compared with Herodotus, because the one will not a little give both light and credit unto the other. Herodotus, according to the supputation of most accurate Chronologers and Historians, publicly (as the manner was in those days) recited his Histories about the year since the Creation, 3504. Plutarch, all know, lived under Trajan; so that the distance of time between Herodotus, and Plutarch, is of about 600. years. Plutarch then having related the particulars of this Paul. Aemil. his triumph, (according to the Roman fashion) for his wonderful success against Perseus, a Potent King, (the last of Macedonia, and the last of Alexander the great his successors,) having in a very little time got both King and Kingdom into his own hands; and now passing to the narration of those sad accidents, that befell him about the same time; to wit, the sudden death of two of his children which he kept at home, as dearest unto him, the one whereof died five days before; and the other four days after this public triumphing:  
In all this, Aemilius (saith he) was admired by all men, envied by none that were good and virtuous: but that there is a certain Deity, whose proper task it is to bring down lower (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it were by pumping) all great and overswelling prosperities, and so to mix and temper every man's life, that no man may be happy in this world, without a rub, or a stain: So that according to Homer, those are to be accounted most happy indeed, & to far best, whose fortunes are varied with a vicissitude of events in both kinds.  
The place of Homer to which he refers, are those noted verses in the last of his Iliads, (elsewhere cited by Plutarch at large) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. where the Poet feigns Jupiter to have two barrels or vessels by him, the one of good, the other of evil luck; out of which he distributes unto every man his several fortune. Those men, saith he, to whom Jupiter deals out of both vessels, they are happy: but those unto whom he deals out of one only, they are most unfortunate. It is not so expressly said by Homer, that they are unhappy unto whom Jupiter deals out of either vessel without mixture; but he is so interpreted by Plato, (whose words are not so clearly rendered by the Latin Interpreters, as they might have been) in his Books, De Republica, the 11. Book: which exposition is here followed by Plutarch.  
These few examples may serve to show both their practice and their opinion, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that such is the nature of the Deity (of some Deity at least) to envy men. It was a thing so frequent in their mouths upon all occasions, that hardly shall you read any ancient Author, either Greek or Latin, where you find it not, or some traces of it. We shall meet with divers passages as we go on, which I forbear here, to avoid repetition. There be some ancient Authors who seem to derive it from Herodotus, as the first of that opinion; others, from Simonides, a Poet of very great antiquity: we shall produce their words, and show the contrary, before we have done. A strange thing it is to observe how apprehensive some were (none of the meanest neither, but men learned, and reputed wise and sober, in common estimation of men) in this kind: so apprehensive, that they durst not acknowledge their own, though but ordinary welfare, without an excuse, left they might seem to boast, 
●lin. Epist. lib. v. Ep. 6.  and so provoke envy. We may observe it in Pliny, the latter, plainly: In a place, commending the wholesome situation of one of his Country houses, Mei quoque (saith he) nusquam salubriùs degunt, usque adhuc certè neminem ex its quos eduxeram mecum, venia sit dicto, ibi amisi. So in the VIII. Book, and the eleventh Epistle, having spoken of his wives miscarrying of a child, and her great danger upon it, Fuit alioquin, (saith he) in summo discrimine; impunè dixisse liceat, fuit. He durst not acknowledge her to be past danger (to which purpose the word fuit, is very emphatical) without some such qualification, to deprecate envy, impunè dixisse liceat; as before, venia sit dicto: being both to one effect. Many such passages occur in ancient Authors, where Interpreters and Commentators not ware of this so generally received opinion, are much put to it; as it seems Dio Cassius was, though within less than two ages after, about that fact of Augustus his yearly begging, which out of Suetonius we have spoken of. But besides this, that which sometimes breeds no small obscurity, is the variety of terms used by Authors in this argument: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the like: we shall say somewhat of the chiefest of them at the end of this Treatise; that we be not too long upon words, before we come to the matter itself.  
Now when they thus complained of the envy, or malignity of superior powers, that some of them understood such powers, as they worshipped for gods, is not to be doubted, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (which is all one) that is, God, or, the Deity, being the word often used in this argument; not by Herodotus only, but divers other Greek Authors; as Deus is, by Latin Authors, not a few. But because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, daemon, or, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the more usual word upon this occasion; whether God, or the Devil, or somewhat equivalent to what we call the Devil, was by them that used the word intended, is a question not very easy to be resolved, if well sifted, and throughly canvassed. Ancient Grammarians and some others observe of it, that by Homer and other Ancients it is promiscuously used for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, God: which I think no man will make a question of, that hath ever but looked into any of them. The same Grammarians, or some of them, do also observe, that the word is otherwise used by Hesiod, for an inferior kind, once men, and afterwards immortalised, and deified to a certain degree of Deity, different from the first kind; which will not concern us: but, whether of old, originally; or, if not originally, when then the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 began to be used in that worst sense we now spoke of, either by some, sometimes; or commonly and generally by most; is a question both among ancient and later Writers; and it will concern us much to know the truth of it; if by any means it can be known. I shall therefore endeavour to say what may be said of it upon good and satisfactory grounds.  
First, than it must be granted that soon after Christ the word daemon in question, began generally, not among Christians only, but even Heathens, in common use to be taken in the worst sense. This we learn from Tertullian, whose words in his Apologetic, are: 
Tertul. Apologet. ca 22.  Sciunt daemonas Philosophi, etc. Etiam vulgus indoctum in usum maledicti frequentat. Name & Satanam principem hujus mali generis proinde de propriâ conscientiâ anima eadem ex sacramenti voce pronuntiat. So I find the words set forth in the last Paris edition of the year 1635. which pretendeth to follow Rigaltius his Text, per omnia, but doth not here, I am sure. The common exposition of the words, grounded upon that false reading, is much contrary to Tertullian his aim and intention; which was to tell us, not what Christians thought, or were taught in their Sacraments concerning daemons: but what even Heathens themselves that worshipped them did in their ordinary language, unwittingly and against their wills, as it were, acknowledge of them: as is more fully declared by S. Augustine, long after Tertullian; whose words will give much light to those of Tertullias. S. Augustine then in his De Civit. 
August. in De Civi●. Det l. IX ca 19  Dei, having first spoken of the acception, or use of the word in holy Scriptures, and among Christians, goes on in these words: Et hanc loquendi consuetudinem in tantum populi usquequaque secuti sunt, ut eorum etiam qui Pagani appellantur, & Deos multos ac daemones colendos esse contendunt, nullus ferè sit tam literatus & d●ctus, (Tertullian goes no further than vulgus indoctum: but now as Christianisme prevailed, the word grew more infamous every day) qui audeat in laude vel servo suo dicere, Daemonium habes: sed quilibet hoc dicere voluerit, non se aliter accipi quam maledicere voluisse non dubitare non possit. So elsewhere, why Apuleius did entitle his book De Deo Socratis, and not De Daemonio rather, whereas in that very book he disputes at large, and maintains it to have been a Daemon, (not a Devil, but one of those subordinate powers to the Deity, in Hesiod's acception) and not a God; the same Augustine gives this reason, Ita enim per sanam doctrinam etc. because through the Gospel of Christ the word daemon was become so generally odious, and abominable, that whoever had read the title, De daemone Socratis, before he had read the book itself, wherein the daemon is commended as one of the better kind, would have thought Socrates by that title, to have been possessed and out of his wits. Hierocles also, a Heathen Philosopher upon Pythagoras (so commonly called) his Golden verses, acknowledges almost as much, in effect: but so obscurely, that without S. Augustine's help I should hardly have understood him. This Hierocles when he lived, I know not certainly; this we are sure enough of, that he lived since Christ a good while, and before S. Augustine. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in those verses, which in former times would have passed currant enough for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (often occurring in ancient Inscriptions, in Latin Dii Stygii called) he expounds of men eminent in knowledge and virtue, taking 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, contrary to the common use of that word. For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of itself sounding then but ill in the ears of most men; he knew well enough if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in its ordinary acception, (for subterraneos, or infernales) were put to it, it would be a hard thing to persuade men to take it in the better sense, for any other then mere Devils, Therefore not content with this bare interpretation, he adds withal for further prevention, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. For God forbidden, that is, any should conceive that the author of these verses would bid us worship any evil kind, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he means, or, evil spirits) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, as some perchance might surmise according to the more vulgar use of that word. Had learned Salmasius thought well of this, and better considered of the text of Hierocles, he would have been, I believe, of another opinion concerning the right meaning of these words, then that he is of in his Preface to the Arabic Translation of Cebes his Table.  
Now to return to Tertullia's words, (which I must desire the Reader once more to look upon) it hath been observed by some, that exsecramenti, in one word, and not exsacramenti, is the reading of some ancient Manuscripts; and exsecramentum, or rather, execramentum, in Tertullian his African Latin, for execratio, or maledictio, is by some others well expounded also; who, so far, saw the right meaning of the words, but did not, or could not sufficiently prove it; which now I think no man will make any question of. But whereas Tertullian both here and elsewhere, in his book De Testimonio Animae, doth seem to affirm (which hath most troubled Expositors, and made them to understand him of Christians) that not only the word Daemon but that of Satan also, was even by Heathens frequently used in detestation, or by way of cursing; whereof I know no vestigium in any other Author extant, but much against it extant in divers; I therefore conceive that the word pronuntiant (which is the word in both places) must be understood, not of words expressed or uttered; but of a sense, or rather sentence (and so the word pronuntio, is very proper) that may be inferred, as implicitly contained in the common use of that other word daemon, which was spoken of: as if he said, That whilst they commonly used the word daemon in detestation, to express their averseness from a thing; they did at the same time implicitly subscribe to the truth of the Scriptures, which set out unto us Satan, the Prince of daemons, as the author of all evil. The very word proinde in the Text of Tertullian (by which his denique in that other passage must be expounded) doth imply some such thing, that it is but by way of collection or inference that Satan is thus pronounced against. Name & Satanam principem hujus mali generis proinde de propria conscientia anima, eâdem exsecramenti voce pronuntiat; as it was well before in some former editions. And Rigaltius his edition varies but very little from this. In stead of anima, it hath animae, which comes all to one: but that he that reads Tertullian in De Testimon. Animae, cap. 2. will, as I conceive, judge that the righter. But now for the sense of the words, he that shall read that learned man his Observations upon this and that other passage of Tertul. De Testimon. Animae. (cap. 3.) will I hope (if he mark well Tertul. his words) think the better of what hath here been said of them.  
We take it then for granted, that the word daemon, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, soon after Christ, began to be taken in the worst sense; of the time before is all the question, not yet resolved. There be, who because the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is taken sometimes in the worst, and sometimes in the better sense; for a happy, sometimes; and sometimes for a wretched unfortunate man; infer upon it that therefore the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 likewise was originally vox media, as they call them, as properly signifying an evil, as a good spirit. But why not rather 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so taken and used on both sides, upon a supposition, that all man's happiness, or unhappiness, (as by divers Heathens is maintained) is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, (according to some) from God immediately; according to others, (taking the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for fortune; as frequently) from fortune; and that the endeavours of men in that kind can but little, or nothing. Whence Eustathius upon a place of Homer, The words, saith he, may also be understood of Jupiter, who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So Orpheus, (though not that ancient Orpheus, often mentioned by Plato, and by ancient Fathers; yet an ancient Poet, yea perantiquus, as some very learned and judicious speak of him) in his hymn or prayer entitled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he makes the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the author, as of happiness, to some; so of misery, to others. There is as much ambiguity in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which by Christians is usually taken in the worst sense for daemone corript, vel agitari, to be possessed: but by heathen Authors for the most part, in the better sense, for numine afflari, to be inspired: and so it should be translated indeed, in divers places, whe●e Christian Interpreters impose, unwittingly I believe, their own sense upon heathen Authors, wrongfully. Again, whereas ancient Heathens, Historians and others speak often of hurts, and mischiefs done or occasioned by daemons, it is no good argument to infer thereupon that therefore the word daemon of itself, is sometimes taken in the worst sense, it being as ordinary with them to ascribe such things to their best gods, as is at large proved by Clemens Alexandrinus and some others; and that in those very places sometimes, where they tell us of either their evil daemons, or evils done by their daemons, they forbear not the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but use it promiscuously, calling the same sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as I could show by divers instances: so that we can infer no more, upon this, of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, then may be inferred of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 also. The word Angel, is a good word of it sel●e, always taken in the better sense when absolutely used; yet Psalm 78. ver. 49. we are told of evil angels. He cast upon them the fierceness of his anger, wrath, & indignation and trouble, by sending evil angels among them. Some Expositors by these evil angels understand devils, or evil spirits: but others with no less probability, good angels. Good angels may be the instruments and ministers of temporal evil, and in that respect called evil Angels. But as for this place, I for my part rather incline to them, Rabbins and others, who by evil angels understand the evils, or plagues themselves, which were sent upon Egypt; and this the rather, because I find that kind of expression to have been familiar to the Hebrews of old. So for example, where Psalm 89.49. according to the Hebrew it is, What man is he that liveth, and shall not see death; the Chaldee Paraphrase renders it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. What man is he that liveth, and shall not see the angel of death? And Hab. III. v. 5. according to the Hebrew: Before him went the Pestilence: the Chaldee, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from before him was sent the angel of death; and so elsewhere. These kind of expressions, whether used the better to teach us, that all things life, death; good, evil, that happen to men in this world, are from God originally, whose ministers these Angels (called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spirits, in the New Test.) are; or by a kind of figure, called by the Grecians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whereby things insensible, incorporeal, are made to live; virtues and vices (which some Stoics really believed) represented as animals, and the like; I shall not here inquire further. But it seasonably puts me in mind of an interpretation of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 much to this purpose, which I remember to have read in Dio Chrysostomus, in a long Oration of Diogenes the Cynic, to Alexander the Great. It is a very considerable interpretation, but not to our purpose here: and therefore it shall serve to have mentioned it.  
Hitherto we have found nothing, that could induce us to believe that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was of old (as is affirmed by some) and before Christ vox media, & taken sometimes even by Heathens in the worst sense: much less, that it originally signified a Devil, or an evil spirit, as is by others affirmed. If Plutarch help us not, I doubt no man will: out of whom I find two passages quoted to this purpose. The first is, out of his De I side & O siride, (to which they might have added another passage of the same author in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, where he hath the same words again) where speaking of the opinion of many, (which it seems was Plutarch's opinion too, as appears, not by this only, but by other Treatises and paslages of his) concerning two contrary principia, or creators; the one good, and the other evil: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ (saith he) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. etc. that is, Of these two, the better they call, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, god: the other, they call, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, daemon: as Zoroaster the Magus, etc. Here first it must be observed, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are Plutarch's own words, or interpretation: for the words used by them he speaks of, Zoroaster and others, were, (as himself soon often tells us) Oromazis, (Oromaides rather, as it is in that other passage we told you but now of) and Arimanius. Secondly, that Aristotle long before Plutarch writing of the same thing, expresseth it otherwise, and it is not unlikely that Plutarch, though he kept not precisely to his Author's words, might take it, if not out of Aristotle, yet of some other (for divers are named by Dio. Laertius that write the same) that related it as Aristotle doth. Now, Aristotle in his first De Philosophiâ (they are Diog. L●ertius his words in his Proem to the Philosopher's lives) writeth that the Magis were ancienter than the Egyptians; and that according to them, there be two principles, (or authors) the one a good, and the other an evil daemon; (or, God) and that the first, is called 〈◊〉 (or, Jupiter) and Oromasdes; and the second, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (or, Hell) and Arimanius: which Hermippus, Eudoxus, and Theopompus, etc. From which words, it is evident, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Aristotle's language is all one: and that all we can inserre from Plutarch's words, is but this, (which is no more in effect then hath already been granted and proved) that in his days, who was some 100 years after Christ, and some 40. or 50. before Tertullian, the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 began in ordinary language to be taken in the worst part, & sometimes in the writings of learned men also.  
The second passage out of Plutarch, is out of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or, Table-talk of the seven wise men at a solemn Feast, where to a question proposed by Amasis' King of Egypt, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; What is most profitable, or beneficial? answer is made, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God: again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; What most pernicious in the world? it is answered, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: a daemon, or the daemon. But what is the censure even there upon this answer? that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is a bold, insolent, unheard of answer and distinction; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; as the word is used oftentimes upon such occasions: or if you take the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as ordinarily; that it is a bold Answer, & of dangerous consequence: of dangerous consequence indeed, as making Devils of those whom they believed, & worshipped as Gods: an answer then, not grounded upon any publicly known and approved difference, or different sense of the words, but upon the conceit of one single man. That this is the sense of the words may further appear by another passage of the same Plutarch, in his tractat De defectu Oracul, where at the mention of evil daemons, one of the interlocutors is much scandalized, as at a thing unknown, and absurd. And yet the question there was not whether 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of itself, or absolutely, was ever taken in the worst sense, (which is our question here) and must needs have offended much more; but whether there were any such indeed as evil spirits, or daemons. Besides what may be suspected not without some ground, that here also Plutarch might alter, not of purpose, but heedlessly, the ancient words, and fit them to the dialect of his times. And this I must also answer if another place of the same Plutarch should be objected, where speaking of Pythagoras his opinion concerning the first principles of all things, he writeth that he the said Pythagoras called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is, the unity, God; and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (duty) daemon. And indeed it is observable, that speaking of the same thing in divers other places, I do not find that any where else, but in this, he tells us of this difference; no not in his Treatise De Iside & Osir. where nevertheless we find divers other names and appellations collected, whereby the Pythagoreans extolled their said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and as much vilified and reviled the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Having therefore taken some pains to satisfy myself, as not willing to pass by so notable an advantage to my cause, if I might have sound grounds to convince me; I must now desire to be excused, and that I may not be thought to prevaricate, if I dare not ground either upon S. Augustine his bare assertion, who somewhere doth peremptorily determine that daemon was at the first taken in the worst sense for a Devil: or, evil spirit; and doth acutely divise the reason both of the different, with some; and promiscuous use of the word, with others: not upon him I say; nor upon Clemens Alexandrinus in his Admon. ad G. (not to name others) his observation, who because Homer calls some of their chiefest Deities (among Heathens) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (even among the Heathens of his time) were taken ordinarily for evil spirits, conversing about Tombs and Sepulchers, etc. therefore he conceits that of purpose he did did so call them (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to dishonour and vilify them. In the Edition of Clemens it is printed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and translated, (than which nothing could be more contrary to his meaning) qui illos improbè honoravit: whereas it must of necessity be read, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being here for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that is, of purpose, and not casually, or unwittingly) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Though the very context well weighed, and other considerations will enforce this correction; yet to prevent all cavil and opposition, I shall make Clemens to be his own Expositor, whose words in this very book, some 8. or 9 pages after are these: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that is, And not Menander only, but Homer also and Euripides, and divers other Poets freely reprove your Gods, and make no scruple at all as freely to revile them. Other such conceits of Homer, and Plato's obliqne reproofs of the superstition of their times, other Fathers, besides Clemens, have, which compared with this might add further light unto it, if it needed it; which it doth not. To return therefore to our word, and to conclude somewhat; Upon all that hath been said hitherto about it, I conceive that from books now extant and remaining, (Clemens and S. Augustine perchance might see many in their days that are not now to be seen) it cannot peremptorily be affirmed, or made good, that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or daemon used by the Latins, before Christ and Christianity, was taken in the worst sense, being put absolutely and simply, as Crammarians speak; that is, without any addition, or limitation; but either indifferently taken for the very same as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (which is the more ordinary use:) or if for an inferior and subordinate kind, even then, for good, and not evil spirits. Which use of the word after Christ also remained among the learned Heathens, as may appear by their writings, very common, even then, though not altogether so common as before; but among the vulgar, it soon began to alter, and in time, quite lost its first use. However, nothing that hath hitherto been said doth hinder, but that the word many years, yea, and ages perchance before Homer might be taken otherwise then in his time and afterwards, and originally signify a devil, or evil spirit, there being in all languages examples of divers words, which in process of time have lost their primitive use and signification, and usurped another, fare different, yea sometimes contrary. This may be supposed, but supposed only. And here the etymology of the word, if certainly known and agreed upon, might happily stand us in some stead: but neither are ancient Greek Grammarians and others that speak of it, altogether of one opinion about it; and among the learned of these later times, since the knowledge of tongues hath flourished more than ever, it is not agreed whether it be originally a Greek word or no, some fetching it from the Hebrew, and some from the Arabic; so that in such variety of opinions, and dissonancy of judgements I shall not take upon me peremptorily to determine, so as to build upon it: Nevertheless what I think of the right Etymology of the word, and upon what grounds, (which will require more words than I can think seasonable in this place) shall have a place by itself at the end of this Treatise.  
In the mean time, what need we so much to stand upon words, if the thing itself can be proved? to wit, that there was an old tradition among ancient Heathens of certain (however called) evil spirits, who envied mankind, and out of mere envy and malignity did what they could to mischief and annoy them. Somewhat to this purpose we shall have occasion to say when we shall treat of the Etymology of the word, what opinion the Ancients had concerning those they called heroes. But without it or any thing else, one single, but very pregnant and pertinent testimony of Plutarch may serve to do the deed. I shall therefore first set down his words, for their sakes that are not so well versed in the Greek tongue, in English; and then in Greek: rather here, then at the end of this Treatise, with some others, because they are words of so much consequence to us: and not only set them down in Greek, but also with some Notes and illustrations make them plainer, and clearer, and more unquestionable, then otherwise they would be to every Reader. Plutarch then in the beginning of his Dio, having spoken of some apparitions of spirits, & taken notice of some men's opinion, that deny all such apparitions to be really what they are pretended, but merely to proceed from conceit and fancy, incidental to children, and women, and such only who through sickness, or any other distemper of the body, are not well in their wits; But on the other side, saith he, if such as Brutus and Dio, grave men and learned in Philosophy, not apt easily to be be moved, or to be wrought upon by any passions, were nevertheless so affected with these apparitions, that they did acknowledge it unto others; we shall, I doubt, be enforced to allow of that very ancient opinion (though it may seem to some no less ridiculous than it is ancient) that there are certain wicked and envious daemons, (or, spirits), who envy good men, and oppose their actions, by sudden fears and troublesome fancies, endeavouring to supplant them in their virtuous courses: and this of purpose, lest if they should continue unshaken and untainted unto the end in the pursuit of that which is right and just, they should after their lives attain to more happiness than themselves have obtained.  
Thus Plutarch in my English; his own words are these, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Those that have passions, (saith Aristotle somewhere in his Politics) cannot judge of the truth. where by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as here also in Plutarch, we must not only understand those stronger affections, as anger, love, hatred, joy, sorrow, and the like; but all disordinate appetites, all vicious exorbitances from right reason, as vainglory, covetousness, pride, self-conceit, and the like; all which come under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or passions, and have been noted by best writers, not Philosophers only, but Historians and others, some more violently, some more insensibly, but as dangerously, to corrupt reason, and partially to sway the judgement, even of the most rational otherwise, and quicksighted.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, may be also translated, absurd, incredible, or strange: and this may be referred partly to their opinion, who laugh (as he told us before, and whereof you may read more in Lucian's Dialogue inscribed Philopseudes, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉:) at all apparitions, as mere fables and fopperies: and partly to what here follows, of the envy, wickedness and opposition of some daemons. As for apparitions, it is a large subject, and of great consequence. I purpose to treat of it hereafter by itself, God willing, and shall endaevour to satisfy all that are not yet satisfied, as about Apparitions, so about Witches. In the mean time I shall refer them to what learned M. Vossius (my worthy friend) hath written in his elaborate Commentations De Origine Idololatriae, lib I. c. VI But it is more probable that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here must be referred to that which follows of wicked spirits, or daemons. For even since Christ, & Christianity far spread in the world, there were eminent Philosophers, that thought it much inconsistent with reason, to believe any such. Will you have some of their reasons? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. It is not easy to make these words run as smoothly in the English as they do in the Original; but the sense is this: If any believe that there are any evil daemons, (or, that the daemons are evil) I ask, if they have their power from the Gods, how then evil? If not from them, then are not the God's authors of all things. If not authors, then either because they would, but cannot; or because they can, but will not, neither of which is agreeable to the nature of God. They are the words of salustius the Philosopher in his De Diis & Mundo, the XII. Chapter. Much to this purpose are the objections of Celsus against the Serpent that beguiled our first parents. You may see, if you please, what answer is there made to him by Origen. Or, if he satisfy not, there be store of others Fathers, and Christian writers that will. Our author here (Plutarch) in his Discourse, Of the cessation of Oracles, takes it upon him to prove that it was the opinion of divers Ancients besides Empedocles, as Plato, Xenocrates, and others, that there were evil daemons. I wish he had set down their own words. I make no question of the thing, that divers ancients were of that opinion, that there were evil spirits; but what word they used, because we have found Plutarch before to relate the opinions of ancients not in their own, but his words, or words of his age rather; I would gladly have known from themselves. However even there Plutarch doth acknowledge that the opinion would seem strange to most men, and full (the very word here used) of absurdity.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] There was an ancient tradition among heathens, that certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, insolent, or rebellious Gods, or daemons; (Angels, indeed:) had been cast out of Heaven. The Original of which tradition some that understood not, grounded it upon a passage of Homer (from whom, and from Hesiod, they did ordinarily fetch all their Theology) in his XVI. Iliad, where Jupiter severely rebukes his wife Juno, and bids her remember what she had formerly suffered. Celsus in Origen, out of ancient Commentators upon Homer, as is likely, doth produce a pregnant testimony out of Pherecydes (one of the first Philosophers, of whom there is any memory extant, Pythagoras his Master) concerning these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and their punishment. And it is his conceit, (or theirs rather) that Pherccydes understood Homer as they did, and grounded his words upon him. But it is a ridiculous conceit; as their allegorical exposition of Homer's words is also, as ridiculous and impertinent, as any I have met with in that kind. Many men both later, & ancient, have been deceived (as is well observed by learned Holstenius, in his Notes upon Porphyrius) in the country of Pherecydes, making him Syrum, instead (a vast difference) of Syrium. However, Pherecydes, though not an Assyrian, yet he is one of them that are recorded by the Ancients, (Plutarch and Numenius) to have conversed with the Hebrews, and to have been instructed by them. It is very likely that Plutarch here had respect to some passages as of others, doubtless, so of this Philosopher also. But more of him, or out of him rather, upon the last words. Of Empedocles there is no question at all to be made, but that he had written of these kind of daemons, and of their fall and banishment from Heaven, very plainly and copiously, as may be collected out of divers places of Plutarch. In his Treatise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Of the inconveniencies and miseries of taking money upon use, he mentions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, certain daemons, pursued by the divine vengeance, and cast out of Heaven; described by Empedocles; part of whose verses he there produceth.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.] Plutarch certainly doth here allude to Plato's words in his V De Legibus, where Plato would have all men earnestly exhorted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. to make this their chief study, neither in time of adversity, when cross daemons arise against them, nor in prosperity, when their own good daemon (such was their opinion in those days) stands for them and prevaileth, through immoderate either joy or sorrow to misbehave themselves, but in all fortunes and conditions to carry themselves as becometh men, according to the rules of good order and decency. His words are many: but the chiefest to our purpose are these: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in Plato, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Plutarch here, opposite cross daemons; that is in Hebrew, Satan's; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Of these evil cross daemons, Porphyrius, that arch-enemy of Christianity, in his De Philosophiâ ex Oraculis, (quoted by Theodoret, Therapeut. III. where the Latin, electorum, for, ex oraculis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, must be corrected) and in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and elsewhere, hath pregnant passages: but because he lived long after Christ, when Heathens began in many things cunningly to temper their Philosophy with Christianity; I meddle not with him.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.] It is very likely that Plutarch had a respect to those words, (elsewhere by him excepted against, as we shall see afterwards) of Herodotus, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what it properly doth import here, may best be learned, as I conceive, from Plutarch in his De Poëtis legendis, where he expounds that old proverbial speech, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (that is, In the head of a Polypus, there is that which is good, and there is that which is naught) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Because, saith he, this fish Polypus is pleasant to the taste, but it disturbeth sleep with troublesome and heterogenous (or, unnatural) fancies, As also from Plautus, 
Plautus in M●●●t. & in Rud.  Miris modis Di ludos faciunt hominibus Mirisque exemplis: nam somnia in somnis danunt. Ne dormientes quidem sinunt quiescere. And elsewhere, Miris modis, etc. as before: then follows, Velut ego hac nocte hac quae praeteriit proxima, In somnis egi satis, & fui homo exercitus. It is taken otherwise, passively, by Aristotle, where he defines 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in men, to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Molestiam turbulentam: though there also it may bear an active construction. See also, if you please, Oracul. Chald. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. and there Psellus.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] Herodotus again, lib. VII. ca 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. By him, saith he, a great army may easily be overthrown by a small one, when God, envying them, shall send upon them a sudden fright or thunder, (as upon the Marcomanni in Marcus Antoninus his time; a famous story among Christian writers) through which the most worthy have unworthily been defeated.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] without falling, properly: which puts me in mind, (and I must have remembered it however) of Adam's fall. Now as we have here an ancient tradition concerning the envy and malignity of certain evil spirits to mankind; so was there among them another tradition of no less antiquity, concerning the fall of man, or men, from their primitive estate of Angelical happiness: both which traditions being put together, will make it evident, (which is a great part of our task) that the fall of Adam, as it is recorded in holy Writ, by the temptation of the Devil, was not altogether unknown unto ancient Heathens. Of this latter, (besides Plato, and all Platonics after him, who speak of it often, but more obscurely, and allegorically) Tully writes in this wise: Ex quibus humanae vitae erroribus & aerumnis fit, ut interdum veteres illi sive vates, sive in sacris initiisque tradendis divinae mentis interprete, qui nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vitâ superiore poenarum luendarum caussâ, natos esse dixerunt, aliquid vidisse videantur: verumque sit illud quoth est apud Aristot. simili nos affectos esse supplicio atque eos qui quondam, quum in praedonum Etruscorum manus incidissent, crudelitate excogitatâ necabantur; quorum corpora viva cum mortuis, adversa adversis accommodata, quà aptissimè colligabantur; eâ nostros animos cum corporibus copulatos, ut vivos cum mortuis esse conjunctos: that is,  
From these many errors (or wander) and miseries of this mortal life, I am ever and anon much inclined to believe, that those ancient, whether Prophets, or Ministers and Interpreters of the divine will, by whom sacred rites & mysteries were instituted; who taught that we were born and brought forth into this world to suffer for some crimes by us committed in our former life; did speak the truth indeed: as also for the same reason to subscribe unto that of Aristotle's as most true, who writes that our punishment is not unlike that which was used by some Etruscan robbers (elsewhere by S. Augustine called Reges Etrusci; and Thusci Tyranni: Contra Cresconium Grammat. l. 4. c. 49. & contra Parmen. l. 3. cap. ult.) who to show their cruelty towards some who were fallen into their hands, devised this kind of death; to fit their live bodies with other dead bodies, and to bind them up very artificially, the one opposite to the other, face to face, and so of other parts: that even so our souls are coupled and joined with our bodies, as those live bodies were joined with the dead. We own this excellent passage of Tully unto S. August. by whom, out of his Hortensius, in his iv book against Julianus the Pelagian, it is cited, and so preserved; the whole book from which it was taken, some few fragments excepted, being since perished. Orpheus is the man intended by Tully, who was both vates, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 too, a great contriver of sacred mysteries, who first, as we are told by Plato in his Cratylus, called the body, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quasi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a tomb, or sepulchre. This Orpheus is very ancient: according to Eusebius his computation, he lived about twelve hundred years before Christ was born; long before Homer. There is very little of his (some few verses, collected from several Authors) now extant, that is truly his: but of old, even in Plato's time, as himself witnesseth, there were divers counterfeit books that went under his name. Di●g. Laertius thinks him not worthy the name of a Philosopher. Neither do I, if he did write indeed such things, as he layeth to his charge. Now whereas those ancients (Orpheus, and since him, Plato and others) who speak of man's happiness before this life, seem to make man in that state of happiness, merely spiritual; a pure soul, I mean: this will easily be reconciled with the truth, if it be considered that the same Ancients, (Plato I am sure) did attribute unto man, (that is, unto the soul of man) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; an immortal, bright, resplendent, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: a material mortal body: of which t●ey th●● desire to know more, may read Synesius in his De Inso●●●●●, and the Greek Scholiast there: as also Hierocles, upon Pythageras' his ve●ses; who treat of it at large. So that according to them, the soul even before it was joined unto this body, was not without a body, but so different in qualities from this, that it seems it was mistaken for another quite different, as well in substance, as qualities. And as for the place where this former life was, not mentioned here by Tully, but expressed by Plato and others, to have been Heaven; we know that Paradise, the place of our first Parents abode during their innocency, is even in the Scriptures taken for Heaven, sometimes; or at least, for a place of bliss, different from the earth: and even S. chrysostom, who sharply censureth those that turned the situation of Paradise, as it is described in the Scripture into allegories, yet himself spareth not to say, that our first Parents in Paradise, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, inhabited the earth, as a kind of Heaven; styling man in the same place, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Terrestrial Angel. S. Basil is yet more free in his expressions; and so are other Ancients, whom I shall not need to name.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.] Pherecydes his words in Origen against Celsus are these; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that is, Of that portion is the Tartarean portion, (or company) kept by the daughters of Boreas, Harpies, and Thuella, (or, Tempest) and thither doth Jupiter cast whoever of the Gods (or Angels; which word of Angels, was not unknown to ancient Heathens, as Pythagoras, and others: and Angels in the Scripture also, we know, are sometimes called Gods:) doth grow insolent; or, rebellious.  
And so I have done with this place of Plutarch; which together with that of Tully, being unquestionable, deserve to be much made of by them who had rather a little genuine truth, though they labour for it, than plenty of specious impostures. The Sibyls, and Mercurius Trismegistus, we purposely decline to meddle with in this case; yea, and the Oracula Chaldaica too: which though I do not altogether reject, yet I am very suspicious that there is in them more of Porphyrius, than his bare (as himself pretends) collection.  
All this that hath been said well pondered, S. Augustine's assertion, that we spoke of before, (with little variation) that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, at the very first, (long before Homer) was taken in the worst sense, for an evil spirit; and afterwards, when evil spirits began to be worshipped, (which how it happened, Justin Martyr, and others that have written against the Gentiles, do show) for a good spirit; goodness and bountifulness (as Tully well argues against Epicurus) being if not the only, yet the chiefest object of divine worship; this assertion, I say, so qualified, though we cannot for want of proofs, and evidences of those times, affirm it certainly true, yet certainly it may be supposed and granted not improbable. But however, take the word in either sense, for a God, or for a Devil, the opinion we have spoken of, of the envy and malignity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, will equally, but in different respects appear to have proceeded originally from the Scriptures. And besides this, that the very word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God, by Greek writers, as the Latin Deus, by the Latins, is often used upon this occasion, hath been observed before, and must here be remembered. The Text of the Scriptures that we must ground upon, is that unhappy conference between our first mother, Eve, and the subtle Serpent, which we therefore think fit to set down here at large, as we find it recorded in the third Chapter of Genesis, and the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. verses of the Chapter. The words according to our last English Translation are these:  
Ver. 1. Now the Serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field, 
Gen. III.  which the Lord God had made: and he said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the Garden?  
2. And the woman said unto the Serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden:  
3. But of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not cat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.  
4. And the Serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die.  
5. For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, than your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil.  
Let the words, first in themselves; and then compared with the event, and other circumstances, be well considered, and these two inferences will of themselves, as I conceive, without the help of a comment, offer themselves to any ordinary judgement. First, that the Devil doth object unto God, their Maker, envy and malignity towards men. Secondly, that it was mere envy and malignity towards mankind, that moved the Devil, thus to set upon the woman, and to counsel her as he did. As I will not therefore altogether decline them, so neither will I trouble myself and my Reader with multiplicity of Commentators upon the place. I think it will not need; and I must confess, I have not, at this time, many by me to look upon. We shall treat of those two inferences in the order they were but now set down.  
Of all Ancients that have written upon Genesis, I shall ever give the preeminence unto S. chrysostom, for the most literal and genuine Expositor. Upon the 4. verse, And the Serpent said, etc. he hath these words, (upon the fourth verse, as I said; but his words concern the fifth rather) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that is, Afterwards not content to have contradicted the words of God, that he might the better make way for his imposture, and by foiling the woman, fulfil his own designs, he doth traduce their maker as envious.  
Of later Commentators, Junius, (as most generally received among Protestants) and learned Diodatus, (lately set out in English: I wish more care had been taken both in the version and printing) will suffice. Junius upon the place, Videtur enim ex multis rationibus, etc. Among other arguments, which he (the Devil) used to persuade them, that men were not so loved of God, as they thought, but hated rather, and that happiness was envied unto them, he brings this as the chiefest, because they were forbidden to eat of that fruit, from which depended man's chiefest happiness, the knowledge of good & evil.  
Diodatus, upon the fifth verse, God doth know, etc. He doth wrest (I make use of the translation set out) into a wrong sense the name of that tree, as if it had power to confer divine knowledge, and the understanding of every thing: accusing God of envy, and provoking the woman to pride and curiosity.  
Before I proceed, I will by the way impart unto my Reader a certain passage of Aristotle, which I have often admired, and do still, as often as I think of it. The opinion being currant in his days, that God was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or, envious; which by the vulgar, who have little sense of any other happiness, but such as is to be found in the fruition of worldly goods, was applied accordingly; Aristotle in his Metaphysics takes notice of both; both of the opinion, and how applied: and as for the opinion, he doth protest against it; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it is not possible it should be so: but secondly, were it so indeed, that such is the nature of God, as to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, then in all probability (saith he) his envy doth especially consist in this, that he doth not afford unto men the happiness of perfect knowledge, and contemplation, He speaketh it of the Metaphysics particularly, as absolutely being the noblest of all sciences; by himself therefore, and by others often called, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Divinity. His words are not many, (as his manner is to be short) but contain fully the substance of all I have said; we shall have them afterwards upon another occasion. I think no man hath ever laboured to any purpose in the search of any truth, either divine, moral, or natural; or ever observed with himself how prone men are generally, and always have been upon all occasions both of themselves to mistake, and to be misled by others; who will not acknowledge Aristotle, (though hardly censured by divers) as well deserving that glorious title of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (divine) as his so much admired master by ancient, both Christians and Heathens, ever did, for so many lines. Especially if to this be added his complaint in another place, that men knew so little of those things that belonged unto God; 
De part. animal. l. 1. c. 5.  professing withal his readiness to prefer a little true Divinity, well grounded, before all humane knowledge and philosophy.  
But now to return to the words of the Devil, as they are recorded in the Scripture: though there recorded to his shame, and for our instruction; yet the Heathens that had but parcels of it, and those too by tradition (whereof there be many examples in the ancient Fathers) much adulterated; no wonder if they made a contrary use of it, and by sad experience finding the effects of Adam's fall, and God's curse; and not well informed of all particulars: the Devil also being as busy with them, upon all occasions, as he had been with our mother Eve, to promote error and impiety: no wonder I say, if they made a contrary use of what is written and recorded, and believed of God, many of them, as our first Parents (upon the Devil's persuasion) believed. Even since Christ and Christianity, some Heathens, no vulgar men, that had read the Scripture very diligently, from these very particulars of Adam's fall, as they are there recorded, framed matter of blasphemy; and from Moses his words objected envy and malignity unto that God, whose goodness and glory Moses intended to set out. So Porphyrius, a Philosopher, among Heathens, of prime note; by Christians justly surnamed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the impious; speaking of the forbidden tree, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that is. Questionless out of mere envy that tree was forbidden them, God envying men knowledge, and purposing that they should continue fools, (or, idiots). He is answered by Greg. Naz. in his 38. Orat.  
However, the opinion was not among Heathens so generally received, but that there were ever found some that opposed it. What Aristotle said of it, we heard but now; and before him, Plato in his Timaeus very peremptorily concludes it that God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, good, (〈◊〉, good in the highest degree, is his word a little before) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. he is not at all capable, or ever was of any kind of envy. And in the II. of his De Repub. he is very copious, and as earnest, as copious, upon that subject, that God is not the cause of any evil: which (with him) comes all to one as to say that he cannot envy. But then among them that were agreed concerning the goodness of God, there was no small controversy concerning his power. For, said they, were God as omnipotent, as he is good, why hath he not made all things as goodness would have prompted, for the best? Why not the world, (those that did not believe it so, as the Stoics) eternal: men, immortal: good and virtuous, all, naturally? Hereupon the most (even of their wisest) tell into this gross conceit, that God was not altogether omnipotent: that he had done what he could, and wanted power, not will, to do all things as their own bold fancies and imaginations suggested unto them they should have been done: They did put all the fault of all that was done a●isse in the world upon the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or, materiam, that God was to work upon, and was not able (so they) to rectify. Se●●●a Ep●st. ●8. Mittamus animum ad ea quae aeterna su●t, miremur, etc. D●u●●que inter illa versantem & providentem, qu●madmodum qua immortalia facere non potuit, quia materia prohibebat, etc. And in his Cur bonis mala, etc. cap. V Quare tamen Deus tam iniquus in distributione fati fuit, ut bo●is viris paupertatem, vulnera, & acerba funera adscriberet? Non potest artifex mut●re materiam. Haec passa est. Quaedam etc. And again in the next Chapter; At multa incidunt tristia, horrenda, dura toleratu. quia non poteram vos istis subducere, animos vestros, etc. So elsewhere, more than once. And so indeed most of them, Philosophers, Historians, and others: even Epictetus himself (who comes nearest to us in most points) in Arrianus, he sticks not to say very peremptorily, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he could not certainly. I cannot excuse Plato, though some have taken great pains to do it; how ridiculous soever the opinion may seem, his words are plain, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or, materiaprima, as eternal as God himself, did concur with him, to the making of all things: and that God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (so he speaks; and Alcinous out of him, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) that is, Did his best, that all things might be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for the best. Sometimes he speaks very doubtfully. I confess, and cannot be excused from contradicting himself (as by Plutarch is well observed in divers places) in words, at least, whatever he intended: which also made the Ancients not to agree among themselves about his opinion. Dio. Laertius acknowledges but two principia, according to Plato; Plutarch, Apuleius, Alcinou●, and others, reckon three. And of them that reckon three, some give them fare different appellations from those that others do: So that in very deed, let a man be never so well versed in Plato, he shall find it a matter of great obscurity & difficulty absolutely to determine what was his opinion. However, what we have now cited out of him, he hath in divers places.  
Others again there were, who took upon them to maintain, as the goodness, so the omnipotency of God, as Simplicius, (one of the later, but not inferior unto many Philosophers) in his Commentaries upon Aristotle De Coelo, where he hath a long contestation with Alexander Aphrodisiensis about it. Whether all his reasons and solutions (in point of humane reason, I mean, by which only he goes) be satisfactory or no; especially, where he handleth the point of moral evil, why permitted by God; because it is not my purpose here to engage myself, (elsewhere I may perchance) in that obscure and intricate Argument, I must leave to the learned and judicious Reader, who will not repent him his labour if he read him attentively. All I shall say of it is this, that what he answereth concerning moral evil, is the very same that is answered by divers ancient Fathers upon this occasion: but extremely disliked, slighted, and scoffed at by Plutarch in his Treatise, Of common notions against the Stoics. Indeed as Plutarch relates that matter from Chrysippus, it cannot but seem very absurd and ridiculous: But he that shall read Simplicius not upon Aristotle only, but upon Epictetus his Enchiridion also, where he handles it (in two or three places) very largely, may perchance be of another opinion, and think that Plutarch might have spared some of his jests, and rather have taken more pains to understand the state of the question better than it seems he did.  
Of Chrysippus his opinion Aulus Gell. also hath a Chapter in his Noctes Atticae, which in the latter Editions of Aulus Gell. is set out as imperfect, or defective in the beginning: it was not so in the old Editions; and why it should be so in the new I know no reason, but that, as I conceive, those that first so set him out did not understand him, and chose rather (as many in that ease to the great prejudice of good Authors) to place the defect upon the Copies, then to acknowledge it in themselves. I shall be very willing to bestow some pains to do that good Author some right, who hath taken so many pains to benefit posterity; and we shall find it to our purpose too. Nevertheless, because all men are not for that kind of learning, it shall make no further interruption here, but shall be added at the end. The place of Gellius that we mean, is lib. VI cap. 1. Homines fecisse dicitur, etc.  
Lastly, besides these we have spoken of, there were yet others, who upon grounds of natural reason stood for the goodness both and omnipotency of God as peremptorily as any; yet durst not upon the same grounds of natural reason take upon themselves to answer all objections against their opinion, which (their natural reason) they modestly acknowledged weak and desective, and incapable of such high mysteries and speculations. Plotinus the Philosopher, as I remember, (I might say Aristotle too, but that what he saith of the defect of humane reason, which he compares to the eyes of Bats, is upon another occasion) hath an excellent passage or two to that purpose. Antoninus (a great and glorious Monarch in his days; by many, as deservedly as ever Heathen was, both for his learning and goodness, surnamed▪ The Philosopher) hath I am sure, which may be read in his Meditations concerning himself, lib. II. n. 8. but especially, lib. XII. n. 4. How so many came to pitch upon this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or materiam, and partly to join, partly to oppose it unto God in the creation, might easily be conceived if we compare what divers of them write of it with the words of Moses, Gen. 1. v. 2. of the Chaos, which very Chaos some of them called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Necessity. Though they say not altogether what Moses saith, and added to it much; yet a man may in Moses' words see some ground for their errors. In so obscure a subject (darkness is in the Text, and caligo is the word used by some of them also for the Chaos) they might easily mistake him; they especially that had him but by tradition. But I will say no more of it here, because it is but upon the by.  
And so much concerning the original of the opinion, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Daemon, or, The Daemon (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that is, God, and the Deity, in the language and more clear expression of divers others, as by divers examples hath appeared) is of an envious nature.  
There be other places of Scripture, I know, (besides that of Genesis) which upon this occasion, and not impertinently perchance, might have been considered of. As for example, those Ironical words (though possibly not Ironically taken by all that might light upon them) of Almighty God, Gen. III. 22, 23. And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good or evil. And now lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever. Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden, etc. And again, those, Gen. XI. 6. And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language, and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them which they have imagined to do, etc. But especially, that ambiguous signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which as it signifies to be jealous (Exod. XX. 5. XXXIV. 14. and elsewhere frequently:) so Genesis XXXI. 1. and elsewhere, to envy. But since we have, as I conceive, sufficiently discovered and laid open the main spring of the error, I shall be less solicitous about the Riverets and smaller streams.  
We will now suppose that Daemon was originally taken for a Devil or Evill-Spirit. This supposition is not without some probability, as hath been said. But if that will not be granted, we are sure however that since Christ it was so taken by many Heathens; and that even before, long before Christ, there was an opinion among Heathens of certain envious Spirits or Devils that did set themselves against men, to do them what mischief they could. Now how consonant it is to the Scriptures to ascribe all temporal evils to the malice and envy of the Devil, as the first and original cause, is so apparently obvious, as little shall need to be said about it.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Through envy of the devil came death into the world, saith the author of the book of Wisdom, (Chap. 11. ver. ult.) attributed unto Solomon; In which words by death must be understood not bare death only, but all the consequences of it: all the changes & chances to which this our mortality is liable; which make our very life, (as divers ancient heathens have taught) rather a daily death, than life, properly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith S. chrysostom, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. that is, Behold the envy, and manifold, (or deep) subtlety of the wicked daemon. For when he saw man created to highest honour, and little inferior to Angels, etc. The word he useth here, and some lines after, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; but afterwards both here, and upon the seventh verse, it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. S. Basil in his Homily, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That God is not the cause of evils, hath both the words together. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Being (the Devil) the receptacle of all wickedness, he laboured of envy also. Our honour became an eyesore unto him. So Basil there: but in his XXI. Homily, Upon divers (so inscribed) places of Scripture, having occasion to speak of envy in general, he falls upon this particular of the devil's envy, and man's ruin through it, and handles it very rhetorically, So Gregor, Nyssen, as pathetically, though not so largely, in his, De vita Mosis. Divers more might be added. Hardly shall we find any Ancients that either speak of Adam's fall, or his posterities miseries in this life, but have a touch of the Devils envy. As for modern authors, in so obvious, and so unquestionable a subject among all Christians, I shall for bear their testimonies, and proceed to other matter.  
We have presumed that time out of mind such an opinion was among the heathens concerning this invidia daemonis, the subject of our Discourse. We think we have said enough to make it probable. We will now see what can be said against it: to wit, whether his Name can be produced that first either said it, or was observed to say it among heathens: which though it might, yet it doth not follow but that originally it might be from the Scriptures, since that it may as probably be supposed, whoever that first was, by so many ages either nearer, or farther from the spring, that he had it from the Scriptures, which all antiquity believed that Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Plato, and divers others in their times by travelling into Egypt, and other fare countries, and there conversing with some of the jewish nation, had some knowledge of. Nevertheless, to give the reader all satisfaction I can in this point, I will (as we promised before) see what can be said about it. There be two, (more, it may be; but two that I remember) who seem to make Herodotus the first: Plutarch, sufficiently known unto all men, and Eustathius, who hath commented, or rather abbreviated and contracted the ancient innumerous Commentators upon Homer. Plutarch, among other many tractats, in that part of his works, which is called, his Morals, hath one entitled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Concerning the malignity of Herodotus; and in that tractat, among other things, as well became him, he takes notice of his malignity towards the Gods: His words are, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. In the person of Solon he reproacheth the Gods in these words: Dost thou, o Croesus, consult me about humane affairs, who know full well that all Deity is of an envious and unpeaceable (Gr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that takes pleasure to disturb, & to create troubles: we have spoken of the word before) disposition.] For what himself conceited of the Gods, in fathering it upon Solon, he adds malignity to blasphemy. This is all he saith of it; and it is very observable he saith no more. First, that whereas Herodotus four several times at least, upon several occasions doth so blaspheme, he should take notice but of one. And secondly, that he should say nothing (copious enough, if not exuberant upon most other particulars) against the opinion itself by way of confutation, and in vindication of his gods; knowing well, that if Herodotus were the first, he was not the only that had said it. The truth is, it is not likely that Plutarch did believe Herodotus to have been the first; neither indeed doth he directly say it, though his words might seem to import as much. But besides this, Plutarch was conscious unto himself, that himself had said as much, or little less. There be divers places to be found in him, that might be pressed to this purpose: I shall instance in one. In his Consolation to Apollonius, Philip King of Macedon, (saith he: we had somewhat of this Philip before) upon the hearing of three several happy tidings, all in one day, lifting up his hands unto heaven, he said, O daemon, unto these my good haps, oppose I pray thee, some tolerable misfortune: Knowing that such is the nature of fortune, to envy great successes. So Plutarch, who doth not indeed use the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Herodotus doth; but how common and ordinary it is to all sorts of writers, (professed Epicureans and Atheists excepted) to use the word fortune in stead of God, is not unknown, and hath been, even by heathens, observed. We shall, not long after, quote a passage of Diod. Siculus, where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fortune; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Gods, are apparently in one and the same sentence, put for the same. Perhaps the generality of the assertion, that all Deity, etc. was it that Plutarch excepted against in Herodotus: & so he might be the only perchance that so generally, and peremptorily (take them both together) doth affirm it. Certainly, whosoever was the first that durst publicly so blaspheme; so easily to entertain, and so often to inculcate the blasphemy as Herodotus doth, even this was enough to evince his impiety; and it was not, I believe, without some providence, that his malignity, in general, should be so sifted, and as it were, publicly in the eyes of all men, and that by the heathens themselves cited, arraigned, and condemned; (as it is there in that accurate Invective, or Indictment rather:) who had showed so little ingenuity in the cause of God.  
As Plutarch, so Eustathius, he also seemeth to make Herodotus the first author of this blasphemy; but seemeth only. His words upon the last of the Iliads, are these: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. The Poet making, or setting out, or bringing in the gods, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, generally, as often hath been observed, adscribes unto them such affections, as men in such cases would probably be affected with. Among which this is one, that those who in other things are far eminent, would not have those of a lower condition to be equal unto them in point of happiness: whether, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) because they spite them; or, as Herodotus would say, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) because they envy; or for some other cause. I translate the words as they must be read, & not as they are printed (in the Basil. edition, at ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: of which no sense can be made▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, imply but one thing, and it is likely some either Poet, or prose author upon this very subject, had the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. However, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being the word (and the only, as I take it) often used by Herodotus upon this occasion it can be no wonder if Eustath, (or whoever; some ancienter Commentator in him perchance) having now occasion to use it himself, name him: thereby rather alluding to his word, as I conceive, then to his opinion, as either proper to him, or derived from him.  
But may not Eustathius be thought to derive it here rather from Homer himself? I think, not: for all that can be made of his words is not that Homer doth directly say so; but this, that the Poet doth ascribe such affections unto the Gods, as may be thought to proceed from such a cause. Homer's own words in that place are these; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉—  That is, How have the Gods appointed unto miserable men, to live in grief?  
Which is no more than the Scripture saith in divers places, not of gods, but of God: and yet the cause, nevertheless, according to the Scriptures, not envy, but justice, and just judgement, yea, and mercy, in some respect; as heathens themselves, upon this very subject, acknowledge. Besides, it is well known, that Homer elsewhere, (we shall have occasion to produce his words upon the passage of Aul. Gell.) brings in Jupiter complaining of the iniquity of men, who lay the cause of their miseries upon the Gods.  
But were it so that Plutarch and Eustathius should directly say it either of Herodotus, or Homer; yet there would be other Ancients found of no less authority than they, to contradict them. Simonides, an ancient Greek Poet, was since Homer indeed, but before Herodotus, one full century of years, at least. Now Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, speaking obiter of this matter, and in the very terms as Herodotus doth, he quotes this Simonides, and might be thought to make him the first author. But he doth not▪ he takes notice of the saying from Simonides the Poet, indeed, and because from none but him, disapproving the saying, he is content to say, that Poets will lie. That no body said it before him he doth not write, neither will it follow. Lastly, how easily either Aristotle, or any other, in case they had spoken more peremptorily, might be mistaken in this point, since neither all books were extant in any age, that have formerly been written, be it the happiest age that ever was; nor all that are extant, likely to come to any one man's knowledge, be he never so careful and curious, I leave it further to be considered. Aristotle's words in English (those memorable words we mentioned before) are these: Therefore it may well be thought that the possession (or purchase) of this ingenuous noble science (the Metaphysics) doth not belong unto men: For the nature of man, in many respects, is slavish: so that according to Simonides this blessedness doth peculiarly belong unto God; neither is it fit for man to seek that science which is above him [or which is not granted unto him. Gr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that is, as I conceive, such trajections being very usual, to Aristotle especially; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.] And if that of the Poet be true, that God can envy, I think it appliable to this especially: [Gr. It is probable that it so falls out in this especially:] whence it will follow, that all men are unfortunate [Gr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: he alludes to those verses of Euripides, as I take it, cited by him in his Ethics, lib. VI c. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: which is divinely confuted by him in the said Ethics, the 7. & 8. Chapters of the X. Book] who aspire to such excellency. But neither is it a thing possible that God should envy, but according to the Proverb, Poets will feign many things (or often lie:) neither aught we (though but men, and not so capable of it as of other things, that is,) to make more reckoning of any other science then of this.  
These words of Aristotle may give light to an obscure passage of Clemens Alexandrinus, who in his fifth Stromat. having discoursed at large, and to that end, brought proofs out of the Scripture also, That God had not revealed the truth unto men, but in mysteries and allegories, in dreams, and symbols: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. that is, not out of envy, since that to fancy God subject to passions, (so the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must here be rendered, not as it is translated, patibilis: in which sense it is taken, Acts XXVI. v. 23.) is impious, but, etc.  
I have done with my main subject, the original of that opinion of ancient Heathens, De invidia Daemonis. I must now remember an observation of the same Ancients, spoken of at the beginning, concerning unusual, overswelling prosperity; for which there being sufficient ground (in ordinary construction) upon daily experience, the opinion de invidia Daemonis (especially by them of remoter times from the beginning, who were less acquainted with ancient traditions) may be thought as well to be grounded upon the same experience. This tradition, de invidia Daemonis, being once up, and generally received among men, though originally grounded, as we have said, and derived from the particulars of Adam's fall: yet afterwards, when the revolution of many Ages had partly adulterated, and partly altogether obliterated the truth of things, it was applied by men diversely, according to the several opinions men had of the Deity, and as they stood differently affected (some placing happiness in knowledge, some in greatness, in pleasure some, and some in some other thing) to the things of this world. But the most general application of it being, as we have said, and partly showed, to all eminent worldly prosperity; it will be requisite therefore, and consequent to our first intention to show, what further probable grounds (besides experience) either from certain words of Scripture, seemingly importing some such thing; or from relations of Scripture Histories (from which, as ancient Fathers prove, most of their fables were derived) ancient Heathens might have for this observation. Passages of Scripture which by them might easily be drawn to that sense, are many: the effect of all which is by Christ comprised in these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Whosoever shall exalt himself, shall be abased: and he that shall humble himself, shall be exalted, Matth. XXIII. v. 12. There was a saying among ancient Grecians, attributed by them unto Aesop, as Author of it: but certainly, whether by Aesop first, or any other, taken out of the Scriptures originally, that it was the proper work of God, and his chiefest occupation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: To abase the things that are high, and to exalt those that are low. It is thus expressed by Euripides: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that is, 
Euripid. in Troad.  I see the Gods, (or the ways of the Gods) those things which are low, they exalt aloft, (Gr. they make to tower on high) and those that are eminent (or highly prised) they cast down. See if you please job V. 11. and XL. 10, 11, 12. Psal. CXIII. v. 6, 7. I Sam. II. 3, 4, 5. etc. all pregnant places to this purpose as I take it, and many more may be found: but of all, I conceive that of Esay concerning Tyre, to be most emphatical; Tyre, that once renowned City, whose Colonies, pene toto orbe diffusae, had spread themselves throughout the whole World almost, as ancient Historians testify: Carthage, the once Imperial City of Africa, (that so long contested with Rome about the Monarchy of the World) and divers other great Towns owing their original unto it. Of this Tire the Prophet Esay, 
Isay XXIII. 8, 9  among many others, hath these words, (I must crave leave that I may set them down in their original language, because of the elegancy,) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 8, Who hath taken this counsel against Tyre, the crowning [City] whose Merchants are Princes, whose traffiquers are the honourable of the earth.  
9 The Lord of Hosts hath purposed it, to stain the pride of all glory, and to bring into contempt all the honourable of the earth.  
Though Tyre were the occasion and principal object (and well it might then be for the pride and stateliness of it) of the words, yet the sentence I take to be general, extending to all, as times, so places equally.  
I have no thought that ever Lucretius, a notorious Epicurean, had any knowledge of the holy Scriptures; and his thoughts I dare say were fare enough from what the Prophet, or the Holy Ghost by him, aimed at in these words: yet it cannot be denied that he is an excellent Poet, and that his words come very near to the literal sense of those of the Prophet, where he saith, 
Vsque adeò res humanas vis abdita quaedum 
Lucret. I ib. v.   
Obterit, & pulchros fasceis saevasque secures,  
Proculcare, & ludibrio sibi habere videtur.   
Of Scripture Histories, that of holy jobs more than ordinary prosperity, as it is recorded in the first Chapter; and the sudden alteration, which upon Satan (there said to have appeared among the sons of God) his wicked and malicious suggestion and crimination ensued; so ancient and so remarkable, as it cannot be conceived that it should altogether be unknown unto them, so what they might ignorantly infer upon it, they that are versed in their mythologies may easily guess. Through the instigation of the same Satan (as is expressed I Chron. XXI. v. 1.) David King of Israel, would needs have the people numbered: whereupon God's wrath and a great plague upon the people of God ensued. Of this there is no question, the Text is plain, that God was angry, and the people plagued; but what was David's crime, doth not so clearly appear by the Text; neither are Expositors of one mind about it. Josephus of old, and some Rabbins since him, make this to have been David's trespass, because he did not impose the redemption money (half a sickle) commanded by God, Exod. XXX. v. 12, 13. upon such occasions. Learned Diodatus his opinion (slipped over in the late English Edition of his Notes) upon TWO Sam. c. 24. is, that David (besides some other concurring provocations) offended in that he did not observe the law concerning the right age, to wit, 20 years, from which and upwards, the people was to be numbered, Exo, XXX. 14. Num. I. 2.  
So they: but the current opinion of Interpreters, saith P. Martyr, upon the place, is, that elatio animi and superbia, was his fault. God, saith he, had given him peace. He had got a Catalogue of his valiant men, and now he sets his mind upon it, to know the number of his thousands of Subjects. So Rev. Dr. Rivet also, Quando tuleris summam filio●um Isr. etc. When thou takest the sum of the children of Israel: that is, When thou shalt number them, either by me commanded, or of thyself when thou shalt think it expedient for the public good. For the numbering of the people upon such occasions was not displeasing unto God, which nevertheless in David for other causes was reprehended. Not certainly, as some Hebrews are of opinion, because he took no care for the tribute money, which was to be paid unto God: this could not be the reason why Joab dissuaded him from it: but because he saw that it was not done out of a good mind, but rather out of vanity and pride, as may appear from the whole context, TWO Sam. XXIV. So he. And this indeed, all circumstances, as he saith, of the story well weighed, will appear the most probable conjecture: multitude of subjects, (according to that of Solomon, In the multitude of people is the King's honour, but in the want of people is the destruction of the Prince, Prov. XIV. 28.) being a very likely object of a Prince's pride and carnal confidence. Now if pride was the cause both of this anger and plague, and the matter so publicly noised and construed; it is very likely that the fame of so memorable a judgement (the sudden operation and cessation of it, if not the plague itself, being apparently miraculous) spread itself to many parts of the world, then inhabited by Heathens. Of Ambassadors sent by the Princes of Babylon to inquire of the wonder in the land vouchsafed unto King Hezekiah, in confirmation of his recovery and prolongation of days by the immediate hand of God, we are told expressly TWO Chr. XXXII. v. 31.  
And since I have mentioned this of Hezekiah, I cannot pass by, being so pertinent to our purpose, Isidore Pelusiota, 
Isid. Pelus. Epist. l. 11. Ep. 74.  that elegant and witty Writer, his observation concerning him, as it followeth: [In the reign of King Hezekiah, the King of Persia came with all his power against jerusalem, and was overthrown by a divine miracle, one of the greatest that ever was. Whereupon Hezekiah being puffed up, and now through immoderate joy entertaining thoughts of himself above a man, God with a sickness, as with a bridle kerbed him, to compose his swelling mind, and to make him sensible of his natural frailty, and to cure him of that disease which his soul had contracted through excess of joy.] So Isidore: and it is in that Epistle that he writes of Epaminondas, the Theban Commander, of whom we had somewhat in the beginning. What ground this Isidore might have either from the Scriptures themselves (by way of inference:) or from tradition for this observation, I know not: But in my judgement, Hezekiah's miraculous (in some circumstances of it) recovery of that sickness he speaks of, and upon it, his vain ostentation of all his treasures and precious things in all his Kingdom before those Ambassadors whom foreign Princes had sent to congratulate him, so particularly noted in the Scripture, TWO Kings XX. 12, 13, etc. and upon this ostentation that dreadful denunciation of future heavy judgements upon his posterity, do sufficiently evince, that Hezekiah in his prosperity (after his recovery at least) did forget himself; and that God in mercy to him did use means to recall him, before he should be too far gone. These words (besides the story) seem to me to import as much: 
TWO Chr. XXXII. 25, 26.  But Hezekiah rendered not again according to the benefit done unto him: for his heart was lifted up, therefore there was wrath upon him, and upon Judah and Jerusalem. Notwithstanding, Hezekiah humbled himself for the pride of his heart (both he and the inhabitants of Jerusalem) so that the wrath of the Lord came not upon them in the days of Hezekiah.  
These, and the like passages of Scripture might, and did as I conceive, at the first (in part) occasion that observation of the Heathens, of the danger of more than ordinary worldly prosperity. But their ignorance of the Scriptures, or want rather of perfect knowledge of them, made them upon this observation to infer (in the manner I have said before) this wicked and impious conclusion, that God was of a malign and envious disposition. I see here a large field open, but I will not enter into it, as not being within the compass either of my undertaking (which was only to show the original of the opinion:) or my leisure and opportunity at this time. I shall only take notice of two reasons which are touched upon by ancient Heathens, not Philosophers I do not mean, who have written of purpose, and more generally concerning Providence: but Historians, upon the by, and in this very subject of either great prosperity suddenly blasted, or sorrows intermingled with joys; their reasons, as I conceive, being very agreeable to the doctrine of the sacred Scriptures.  
Herodotus, in one of those places where he chargeth God with envy, among other expressions to that purpose, hath these words: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that is, That God will not end●re that any other should think well of himself, but himself. Indeed it cannot be denied that the holy Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament do set out God unto us, as very jealous of his honour in that particular, in whose eyes nothing is more odious and abominable, then high looks, and high thoughts; who opposeth himself against all pride and self-conceit (in point of wisdom especially) as direct invasion, or usurpation upon his sovereignty. I do not remember that God is said in the Scripture 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to resist any other sinners but the proud. He disappointeth the devises of the crafty, saith holy Job; so that their hands cannot perform their enterprise. He taketh the wise in their own craftiness, 
Job V. 12.13.  and the coursell of the froward is carried headlong. This, I think, no man should wonder at; but rather wonder that any mortal men should so much forget themselves, their beginning, their end; their frailty, mental and corporal, whilst they live; as to grudge God, their maker (who of mere dust and clay hath made them what they are:) this prerogative of being The only wise: either impeaching his goodness, because men are but men, and not Gods; or contesting with his wisdom, as very Gods themselves, and not men. Such men (prodigies of ingratitude) have been, and are yet in the world. Est aliquid quo sapiens antecedat Deum. 
Sen. Ep. 53.  Ille naturae beneficio, non suo sapiens est. Ecce res magna, habere imbecillitatem hominis, securitatem Dei. And again, Jupiter, 
Id. Ep. 73.  quò antecedit virum bonum? diutius bonus est. Sapiens nihilo se minoris aestimat, quod virtutes ejus spatio breviore clauduntur. And few lines after, Deus non vincit sapientem foelicitate, etiamsi vincat aetate: Non est virtus major, quae largior. Such was the language, not of Seneca only, but of those wise men (not of all, some were ashamed of it, but of most) that were known from other Philosophers, by the name of Stoics. I could instance in some of our days also, who though professing Christianity, come not short of these (if they have not exceeded them) in their way of boasting: but I will leave them to the censure of posterity. Now if men, notwithstanding so many threats, and so many judgements against the proud and haughty, be nevertheless so apt to take upon themselves: What then (it is S. Chrysostom's observation somewhere,) would they do, if God did use no such means, no such examples to refrain them? So that upon due consideration, what in the judgement of blind and corrupt nature seemed envy and malignity, will appear mercy: being used by God as a profitable medicine or antidote against the greatest and most dangerous infection of the soul: and to teach men (wherein, even in the judgement of divers Heathens, consists their chiefest as wisdom, so happiness) wholly to depend of God, and in all things to acknowledge him all in all.  
Jobs words that we but now mentioned (or others to the same purpose) are in Esay also, Esay XLIV. 25. and XXIX. 14. Out of one of them Homer it may be (or some other before Homer, of whom he might borrow them) had his: for they contain the very sense, the words are these (it is a woman, Penelope, that speaks.)  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  

Homer Od. Ψ  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
So much of the first reason. It is Herodotus his reason, that God of purpose doth often confound the (carnal) wisdom and glory of men lest they should think too well of themselves. So far Herodotus is in the right, and agrees well with the Scriptures themselves: But his inference upon it (even in the judgement of more sober humane reason) most wicked and absurd, That therefore God doth envy to men their happiness and prosperity.  
Another reason is given by Diodorus Siculus in his III. Biblioth. Hist. where having discoursed at large of the manifold blessedness of Arabia Foelix; and particularly of the excellent odours and perfumes that Woods and other parts of the Country do yield, he adds, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that is, Nevertheless God (so I translate here the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) hath not afforded unto men any entire happiness, without some blemish (or envy, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉:) but to these his blessings he hath annexed somewhat that is hurtful, which might serve to admonish them, who through continuance of worldly blessings are wont to grow into a contempt of the Gods. Here first I shall observe, that whereas this seemeth to contradict what by some others is affirmed, that men are worse in times of extremity; it is easy to reconcile them by distinguishing, as of degrees of temporal crosses, so of differences of tempers and dispositions, some naturally being better able with patience to bear, though much more adversity; then they can prosperity, with moderation and sobriety: and some on the contrary, but this by the way only. That plenty and long prosperity would be apt to beget pride, and impiety, or neglect of religion, the Israelites, and in them, all men generally were forewarned by God himself, Deut. VIII. from the tenth verse, to the end of that Chapter. Clem. Alexand. in the V of his Stromata, not fare from the beginning, hath collected out of ancient authors some passages, which say almost the same. But let me give this caution to those that shall have recourse unto him about this matter first to read the passage of Thucydides in Thucydides (lib. III. in Cleo's speech) himself: which in Clemens is printed very imperfect. And so may Philistus, who doth so imitate Thucydides, as that he doth almost transcribe him verbatim, be understood, his words, for want either of this caution, or of diligence, are much mistaken by the Latin Interpreter. But to proceed, That troubles and afflictions on the other side, are apt (of themselves, for divers circumstances may alter the case) to stir up zeal and devotion, and to bring a man to himself, is not only observed by sacred writers, and by Philosophers, but even by them acknowledged that professed Atheism, or (which comes all to one, as Tully of old hath proved) Epicurism: as by Lucretius, in these words, 
— Multoque in rebus acerbis  
Acriùs advertunt animos ad relligionem.  
Quò magis in dub●is hominem spectare periclis  
Convenit, adversisque in rebus noscere qui sit.  
Nam verae voces tum demùm pectore ab imo  
Eijciuntur, & eripitur persona, manet res.   
If therefore that be the nature of adversity and prosperity, or rather, if that be man's nature, so to be wrought upon by adversity and so by prosperity; then upon their own grounds it might easily be maintained against heathens that crosses and afflictions in this world, are not effects of envy in the supreme Dispenser of all things, but arguments of his goodness and providence. For what was ever more generally received and admired among them, than this divine (so they believed) precept or admonition unto men, written upon the doors of that famous Church in Delphus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Know thyself? Of which words though many different interpretations have been devised by the ancients, (so many as would make a good large Tractat, if they were all collected into one:) yet that the main drift and purpose of the words was to persuade men to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Plato teacheth in his Charmides; that is to humility; or, ad minuendam arrogantiam, as Tully in his Epistles ad Q. Fratrem; is generally acknowledged. Humility, not towards men only, in ordinary conversation: but towards God also, as in matter of action and religious worship, so of thoughts and apprehensions concerning the Deity. Of humility towards God the Latin Lyric Poet speaketh well, Diis te minorem quod geris imperas: Hinc omne principium, huc refer exitum. and elsewhere again, Quantò quisque sibiplura negaverit, (contrary to the world's wisdom, which teacheth men to think highly of themselves, that others may so think of them, and indeed not without ground, among worldly men) A Diis plura foret. I know that of old it hath passed very current among Christians, that humility was altogether unknown unto ancient heathens either Philosophers, or others, under the notion of a vettue. And well indeed may it be termed and deemed the proper virtue of Christians, (or to speak more properly, of the Chirstian faith) if it be taken in its full latitude for religious, (or spiritual:) for intellectual and moral, (or civil) humility: and again, if it be considered as the virtue of virtues, as by Christ our Lawgiver, and his Apostles it is proposed unto ●s, and generally acknowledged by all Christians. However, it was not altogether unknown to heathens as a virtue. The words indeed, humilis, and humilitas in Latin, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in Greek, are by them most commonly used by way of reproach: but even by them as by Christians, in the better sense sometimes. Witness this admirable passage of Plato: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. that is, God, according to old tradition, having in himself the beginning and the end, and the midst of all things, in a straight and direct course, according to his nature, passes on from place to place. And after Him follows always Justice, the punisher of all that forsake the Law of God. Of which whosoever aspires unto happiness, holding fast, follows with humility and modesty. (Gr. humble and modest.) But he that is puffed up with pride, trusting either in riches or honours, or comeliness of body, through youth and foolishness also boiling in himself with arrogancy, as one that needed neither governor nor guide, but able to be a guide unto others; such an one is altogether void of God. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must here be understood spiritually, (not metaphysically;) for what we say commonly, void of God's grace. For otherwise, Aristotle (so is this very place cited by Philoponus) De mundo, teacheth well, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: there doth not, nor can any thing subsist in the world, altogether void of God. The same Author of that exquisite Treatise De mundo, who ever he be, (for Aristole's certainly for divers reasons, though otherwise not unworthy his name, it cannot be) hath the same passage of Plato that we have before, concerning humility, the first part of it at the end of his book, and concludes with it: and though he name Plato, yet he is mistaken by many, who refer Plato's name, not to these words that follow there, but to them that go before, which be not Plato's. And whereas in Plato, as we saw before, it is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. there it is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: which words I know not how to save from a direct tautology, though Budeus in his translation hath made a shift to avoid it. How the old translator of that Treatise Ap●letus found them, because of the liberty he commonly takes, is doubtful. But however his translation comes much nearer to Plato's sense, then that of Budeus, or then indeed, (that I may not be thought to lay the fault upon him) the Greek words themselves, as now printed in that Treatise, would bear. I can easily believe that the Author of it might alter somewhat in Plato's words: the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it may be did not please him: but that he should alter them into mere tautology, or indeed into nonsense, I do not believe. Bonau. Vulcanius, who hath written learned Commentaries upon this Author De Mundo, passeth this place over in silence, which made me the more willingly to take notice of it.  
But now to return to our word again; there be others besides Plato, who have used the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in a good sense. Aemilius Paulus in Plut. having had a great King, whom he had lately conqueted and taken, at his feet his humble suppliant; and observed, it seems, among some of the younger sort (brave and gallant spirits otherwise, whereof divers of his own kindred) much exultation, if not insultation; presently retired to his Tent, and having sent for them, after a long and sad silence, which was much wondered at, he began very pithily and gravely to discourse of the changes of fortune, and instability of all humane prosperity, and concluded his discourse with these words; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that is, Away therefore with your vain boasting and bragging for this victory, o young men, and rather with humility stand amazed, and fixing your thoughts altogether upon the future, consider with yourselves with what kind of unexpected accidents Fortune [Gr. Daemon] may requite every one of you hereafter for this present prosperity. Antistthenes, saith Theodoret, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, maintained, that in humility (modestia & humilitate, so the Latin there: which may also be further confirmed by what Dio. Laertius writes of him) man's chiefest happiness consisted. In Plato but a little before, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I have translated, humility. I know the word of itself admits of other divers interpretations; but there I conceived that sense most proper. And so Plutarch I am sure, speaking of the same thing that Plato (that famous Oracle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) useth the word, in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Not to be proud, but humble, is the readiest way [Gr. best provision] to Philosophy. So according to Philo (of whom a man may almost as soon learn what Plato maintained, as by Plato himself) in his De vita contemplate. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Which excellent saying is thus expressed in Latin by S. 
August. Ep. 56 ad. Diosc.  Augustine, Ad capescendam & obtinendam veritatem via, prima est humilitas, secunda humilitas, tertia humilitas. All which tends to the illustration and confirmation of this second reason, that if humility be the end of God's judgements, and in true humility be happiness, than those judgements not the effects of envy, but of mercy rather.  
There remaineth now nothing but Aulus Gellius his words of the opinion of many (opposed by Chrysippus) concerning the original of evils; and the Etymology of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as we promised) to be considered.  
We shall begin with Aulus Gellius, upon whose words if we be long, yet we shall not digress from our subject. We shall say little upon him, but we might as well without him, and still keep to our Text. His words then, wherewith be gins his sixth book, in ancient editions of Gellius, I find thus printed: Homines fecisse dicitur tantam vim esse aerumnarum & malorum. Adversus ea Chrysippus cum in libro 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quarto dissereret, etc.  
So in the Colon edition, Opera & impensà Ioannis Soteris, Anno 1526. mense Junio. I know there were many editions of Aulus Gellius before this; but this is the ancientest that I could find at this time. He that took care of it, whether Soter or any other, professeth (at the end of the two Tables, or Indices; Ad Lectorem, etc.) to have compared it with divers former impressions, as particularly that which he calls Veneta impressio; and observeth some differences of less moment; but not any here: so that we may probably suppose this to have been the reading of ancienter editions also. And this the rather because Petrus Mosellanus in his Annotations upon Aul. Gellius, added to that impression, he also is altogether silent about it. In another edition by the same joannes Soter a. d. 1533. mense Sep. and another, Coloniae Agrippinae a. d. 1563, and another, Basileae a.d. 1565. all which I have lately seen, I find no difference, but that in some of them, the dicitur is parted, or divided from the rest of the words, with two commas on each side, thus; Homines fecisse, dic●tur, tantam vim esse aerumn. etc. But now, if we come to later editions, in some we shall find it thus, Homines fecisse dicatur: tantam etc. dicatur, for dicitur, and a colon, or two points, after it. So in the Francford edition, Ex officanâ Zachario Palthenianâ, a. d. 1603. much improved by the learned lucubrations (which he calls his Noctes Parisinas') of that great improver of learning, Henricus Stephanus. In others, as particularly in that of Leyden, apud Hieronymum Vogel, a. d. 1644. it is set out as imperfect with three asterises (as they call them) at the beginning, thus, *** homines fecisse dicatur: tantam vim esse aerumnarum & malorum, adversus ea Chrysipus, etc. I hope I shall make it appear clearly enough that the words before (as in former editions I mean) were very right and full: but what might make some men to deem them imperfect, and thereupon, as is most probable, rashly to stigmatize them for such, if any desire my opinion, it is this. First I conceive that they stuck at the Latin itself, as either not congruous, or too course, to be owned by so polite a writer as Aul. Gellius is generally acknowledged. Those words of the second period or sentence, adversus ea, might also move them as importing (in their construction) much more to have gone before, than that short sentence. Besides, they might light upon a Manuscript (it is very likely they did) that wanted, if not the whole first word of the book (as I have seen some Latin Manuscripts,) yet the first letter of the first word (than which nothing is more ordinary,) & a void space before it: which was done, where the first whether word or letter was intended artificially to be set out in colours, and beautified with figures, to be an ornament unto the Book. I have seen it in some old printed books also: as for example, in a Virgil and an Horace of Aldus his Edition, printed a. d. 1501. But if either word or letter were for any such reason omitted in the sixth Book, were they not at the beginning of other Books as well, where no such imperfection is noted? They were certainly; but they that stuck at this beginning, and did not at others, might unconsiderately fancy more here, than they did elsewhere. But I will not take upon me to give a reason, such an one as may be satisfactory, for that which I conceive to have been done without reason. However, they that know what inconveniencies, yea, mischiefs sometimes both to Church and State from such mistakes have issued, will not think such observations altogether inconsiderable.  
But now to proceed; whether, as I say, it were done without reason or no; we shall first begin with the sense: as for the Latin of the words, we shall say more of it afterwards. The sense then of those words, Homines fecisse dicitur, etc. I take to be this: That men themselves were generally said, or supposed, to have been the cause that this world is so full of troubles and miseries. Many, if not most ancient Heathens that were of this opinion, did also maintain, that God did not intermeddle with humane affairs. And that which lead them into this conceit, is, because they could not conceive how so much wickedness and misery, as is apparently seen and acknowledged among men, could be the fruit of his administration, who, as he can do no evil himself, so he is of purer eyes then to behold (with patience & approbation) iniquity in others. The Stoic Philosophers (which Sect Chrysippus was a prime, if not sounder, yet propagator of) stood for providence, and a fatal necessity of all events; a fatal necessity, and yet a freewill too; none more eager and peremptory for it then they. It was indeed the main fundamental of all their philosophy. But whilst they went about to reconcile these two, how they did involve and puzzle themselves; hath sufficiently by Tully and other Ancients been observed. But to this particular of evils, that which they maintained, is, that they partly proceeded from God, and partly from men. From God, and yet he good nevertheless: because, said they, such is the nature of worldly things, that good here below cannot be without evil. How this business is stated by Plutarch, and how by Simplicius, I must refer the Reader to what hath been said of it before: which gave us occasion to mention this place of Aul. Gellius. This, and the next Chapter of this sixth Book (of the said Aul. Gellius) are about it; I mean, concerning the original of evils, both moral, and others, according to Chrysippus (anciently famous for the multiplicity of his writings) his opinion. But I will not meddle with any particulars of the Stoic philosophy, that are not to our present occasion. So much as hath been said of it was necessary for the better understanding of these words we are now upon. For therefore saith Gellius that Chrysippus in his books opposed that common opinion.  
That we have next to do, is, to show that such an opinion was, though not approved by all, yet generally known and agitated among ancient Heathens, that men themselves had been the cause of those evils they commonly complained of: And that this was the opinion of some, (though not of them only) who either brutishly denied the providence; or blasphemously, the goodness of God: which opinion, as commonly known, being here by our Author but briefly set down, and not understood by some that read him, principally, as we conceive, occasioned this imaginary at the first, but now real (as the words are printed) imperfection. Homer shall lead, not for his antiquity only, but for his credit also among ancient Heathens. In his first Odyssie he makes Jupiter himself to expostulate the matter with mortal men, in these words: 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
The sense of which words is, That men do wrongfully accuse the Gods as the authors of their evils, whereas they may thank their own 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, wretchedness, or wickedness, through which they bring griefs upon themselves, which never were destinated unto them. So the Golden verses (as they commonly call them) containing the chief doctrine and instructions of Pythagoras, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. He shall know, (he that takes a right course to knowledge and wisdom, that is:) how men by acts of their own free-wils bring mischiefs upon their own heads, etc. Crantor, an ancient Academic, Xenocrates his Scholar, in his Consolation to Hippocles (cited by Plutarch in his Consolation to Apollonius) had these words; [All these things doth that ancient philosophy well teach and admonish; all which if we shall not altogether allow of, yet this that concerns the troubles and travels of this life, is certainly true. For if it be not so by any order of nature (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are his words) yet by ourselves it is brought to this degree of wretchedness and corruption.] Now these, (and so divers others whom we may spare,) though they derive the chiefest miseries of men from men themselves, yet do acknowledge certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unavoidable chances, or casualties, which proceeded from another cause; as by Crantor his words that follow in Plutarch, and by other passages not of Homer only, but even of those Aurea carmina, though not many, may appear. The Stoiches might be thought to say the same; but do not. That concourse of freewill and fatal necessity they speak of, is quite another thing: as will appear to them that shall examine the particulars of the opinions, which we shall not now stand upon.  
But Seneca in his Natural Questions, comes off more roundly, and charges men to the purpose. Never did man, I think, (upon one single subject, as that is, the benefit of winds) with more wit or Rhetoric plead for providence, than he doth in that Chapter. His words (some of them) that chief concern us here, are these: Ingens naturae beneficium, si illud in injurtam suam non vertat hominum furor, etc. Adeò quicquid ex illis utile & necessarium est, non potest his repensari, quae in perniciem suam generis humani dementia excogitat. Sed non ideò non sunt naturâ suâ bona, si vitio malè utentium nocent. And again, Non tamen, ut paulò ante dicebam, queri possumus de auctore nostri Deo, si beneficia ejus corrumpimus, & ut essent contraria efficimus. And afterwards more generally yet; If we shall weigh (saith he) the benefits of nature by the perverseness of them that use them, we may say, we have received nothing but to our hurt. Who useth his eyes that he may be the better for them? who his tongue? to whom is not his very life a torment? There is not any thing so apparently good and profitable, which abuse (or viciousness) may not turn to a contrary use. Much more to the same purpose is there to be found.  
Later Philosophers that have written of this subject; to man's wickedness they join God's justice, punishing or preventing: which how conformable it is to the Scriptures, no Christian need to be told. So Hierocles upon the Aurea Caerminae, in few words: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Our wickedness (saith he) and Gods righteousness, these two concurring are the cause of all our calamities. It is very well said: but it is not unknown to them that are versed in these Philosophers that lived since Christianity began to spread in the world, that they borrowed, even those that were their greatest enemies, (as Porphyrius, & this very Hierocles) divers things from Christians, and so might in divers points come nearer to our doctrine then former Philosophers did. There is not any thing that I more admire in this this kind then what Virgil hath to this purpose, in his fourth Ecloge, Sicelides Musae, etc. which (consideratis considerandis, what he was, when he lived, etc.) I conceive to be a very good comment upon GOD'S words, Gen. III. v. 17, 18, 19  
But to return to Aul. Gel. or rather (for we have not digressed) what hath been said, to apply to him; as it often falls out that men may speak the same thing, but upon different grounds, and, which much altars a case, to contrary ends; so we noted before, that many who derived the evils and miseries of this life from men, did it not to maintain, but to overthrow providence so far as in them lay: which must now again be remembered; because to such, especially, these words of Gellius seem to have reference. Those many I speak of were for the most part Epicureans; professed Epicureans I mean, who positively maintained, That God had nothing at all to do with the affairs of men, no nor with the World in general, which they did not acknowledge to have been created by God: and consequently what either good or evil happened unto men in this World, they must needs fetch from some other cause. Epicurus (as Dio. Laertius witnesseth in his life) made this very thing to be the chiefest occasion of evils among men, that men adscribed the cause of their goods & of their evils unto God. So Diogenes of Epicurus; so Tully, Plutarch, & divers others. But the Latin Interpreter of Diog. Laert. as if he had studied how to make him ridiculous, and to speak contradictions, he turns it to a quite contrary sense, and makes Epicurus, of the worst of Heathens, by Heathens thence themselves for his opinions extremely abhorred, rather a Christian, than a heathen. The same Epicurus, as the same D. Laer recordeth, maintained, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. that is, That most evils men suffered (or, were subject unto in this life) proceeded from men themselves; either hatred, or envy, or comtempt being the cause. Upon which foundation, was that famous saying of his erected, that Fortuna sapienti rarò intervenit, as his words are translated by Seneca: that is, That Fortune (sudden evil chances and alterations) had little or no power upon a wise man: because he held none wise, but such as did altogether sequester themselves from all such employments, and courses of life, as were liable to either hatred or envy. What religion Pliny the elder was of, may easily be known from himself. It appears clearly by him, that his religion, in point of doctrine and opinions, was Epicurus his religion: and therefore we may probably suppose that his aim was no other than that of Epicurus, where he makes this observation, (it is in the Proem of his seventh book) that Homini plurima ex homine sunt mala.  
Now all this that hath been brought from several authors, of men being the cause of evils, well considered, let us see what there is in Aul. Gellius his words justly to be excepted against, why they should not pass for perfect, as in former editions: Homines fecisse dicitur (saith he) tantam vim esse aerumnarum & malorum. Adversus ea Chrysippus cùm in libro 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quarto dissereret, Nihil est inquit, etc. that is, It is commonly said that men themselves have been the cause that this world doth so abound with evils and miseries. Against which opinion Chrysippus in his fourth book of Providence, disputing, There is nothing, saith he, etc. That this was the opinion of many, hath sufficiently been showed, and that Chrysippus' writing of, and for Providence, had reason to take notice of the opinion, may also as clearly appear by what hath been said.  
If the Latin of the words were it that they stuck at, (a poor business to be stood upon, when the meaning is known) then this happily, fecisse tantam esse vim, for, ut tanta vis esset: which indeed is more ordinary, as facere ut numerarent, and facere ut scirent, in Cornelius Nepos, and the like: and there is an old Grammarian (whether Servius, or Priscian, I know not well) who somewhere passeth his judgement, that one Infinitive to govern another, is against the custom of the Latin tongue: but how much the good man did overshoot himself in so saying, let latter accurate Grammarians, (Alvarez, Vossius, and others:) or rather let any ancient Latin authors be looked upon, and it will easily appear. If all that is not ordinary, may be suspected, that I say not condemned, I durst undertake out of this one author to produce five hundred places, that may seem more strange than this: such as these, Ibi scriptum est, tum multa alia, etc. Faceret me, ut earum rerum essem prudentior, etc. and Omnia quae pater jusserit, parendum, and the like. Or was it, because adversus ea, they thought was improper, after a single sentence? But if so, they should have considered that antea, postea, praeterea, and the like, before that through much use they did coalescere in one word, were so taken and used divided, as now joined they are commonly: antea, after one single thing spoken of, as well as after many, and so of the rest. I say commonly: so I take it: though I find that Hadrianus the Cardinal in his learned Observations, De sermone Latino, & modis Latinè loquendi, dedicated Carolo Principi Hispaniarum, makes it a particular observation of the word praeterea: Haec quoque clausula (praeterea) observatione praecipuè digna videtur: nam certo modo loquends non post multa solum connumerata à perfectis illis autoribus ponitur, verum etiam post singularem aliquam vel personam vel rem. Cicero, etc. And so is postilla to this day, sometimes joined, and sometimes divided, to be found in Plautus. And so much to that passage of Aulus Gellius. we are beholding to him that he gave us the hint of so much pertinent matter; and we hope we have in some measure requited him.  
We are now come to the etymology of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and it is more than reason that Grecians themselves, of whom we received it, should be first heard about it. Plato in his Cratylus where he doth purposely entreat of the derivation of ancient Greek words, among others, he takes this into his consideration; and his opinion is, (which hath since been followed by most,) that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is so contracted of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is as much as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, wise or prudent, as Plato himself there expounds it: or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as Hesychius, and the Etymologist) that is, skilful, well experienced. And so indeed we find the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the contrary of it, used by Homer and others, so that of that word or what it signifieth, no question at all can be made; though Plato mention it, or at least the sense of it, as out of use, and in a manner antiquated, in his days. And this etymology of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, taking it in the worst sense for an evil spirit, would very well agree with what is written, Genesis III 1. and elsewhere, of the subtlety of the Serpent. Some question may be made whether 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (which would much confirm this derivation) were ever used for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Some passages perchance yet to be found in ancient Greek authors, might induce some to believe that it hath. As for example this distich of the Anthology, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Some, to whom the Greek tongue hath been much beholding, produce this very passage to prove that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (whereof much hath been said before) is sometimes taken for cacodaemon, that is, a devil, Whether they were led into this error by those that first wrote upon those Epigrams, or led them into it, I know not: but an error it is, as will easily appear to any that shall well examine the construction of the words, which cannot stand with that interpretation: neither is the jest or acumen of them any ways improved by it, but rather obscured and impaired. I did wonder, saith the Poet, to see a black Maure Professor of Rhetoric; such eloquence from such lips, (in another Epigram to the very same purpose called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, triple lips) to proceed, so white an attire, (such was the custom of those times) upon so black a skin. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 therefore here must of necessity be translated either peritus, or Deus: but the latter being not only more warrantable, because common and ordinary; but also, (in that sense that Tully calls Plato, Deum philosophiae) fare more emphatical here, is doubtless to be preferred: and so indeed I find the word by some others that have written upon the same Epigrams well rendered.  
And so much I had to say concerning this Etymology, which makes the word originally a Greek word. Others there be of the same kind, mentioned by Greek Grammarians, and others, but obvious enough, and in my judgement so little considerable, that I think it needless to insist upon them here. Neither indeed would I eagerly contend with any man about this matter, the original of the word in general, whether Greek or Hebrew, but that it may be lawful for any man to believe what himself shall think best about it. Nevertheless, because it is generally agreed upon by the learned that are skilful in the tongues, (whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in a Discourse that I intent shortly, God willing, to publish, concerning languages,) that most ancient Greek words, the sacred especially, came originally from the Hebrew, (the Mother of all ancient Tongues) and thence aught to be fetched; I doubt I should not give the learned Reader that satisfaction that he may perchance expect from me, should I not take notice of what hath been said by others to this purpose concerning this word; and also impart unto him what I can say myself.  
I have read somewhere (in Lilius Gyraldus, as I remember) that Steuchus Eugubinus, a man well versed in this kind of learning, did fetch this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by an Apheresis of the first syllable, from the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Devils: which must be upon a supposition that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at the first was taken in the worst sense. For otherwise if for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or God, he would rather upon the same grounds have said from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that is, God, often used in the Scriptures. There be examples I know (in all languages, some) of such apheresis, or contractions of words: and what other considerations Eugubinus might have besides to persuade him, I know not, because I have him not at this time, nor indeed know certainly in which of his Books to seek it. Hugo Grotius, that incomparable man, in his Annotations upon the New Testament is of opinion that the word is ex Arabicâ Origine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 probably, which signifies to endure and continue: a fit word to express God's eternity, than which nothing is more proper unto him, and in that respect a plausible derivation. But that any such word as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to express either God or a good Spirit (which his words seem to import) is used in that tongue, is more than I can yet learn, though I have done my best to satisfy myself. Neither in Herodotus or any other ancient Author that mentions the Deities anciently worshipped by the Arabs, do I find any thing that approacheth to it. Ludovicus Vartomannus indeed (cited by Mr. Vossius, in his first. De Origine Idolol. cap. 8.) in his Navigations relateth that the Calecutenses call the Devil Deumum, which comes somewhat near; but what affinity their tongue hath with the Arabic, or of what antiquity that appellation with them is, I know not. Petrus Texera in his Relationes, as he calls them, of the Kings of Persia, lib. l c. 5. witnesseth that the Persians, besides other names, call the Devil, Diu; which comes near (and probably came from it) to the Syriack, not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as some writ it, which signifies not Daemon, but Daemoniacus) but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: as in the Syriack Translation of the New Test, it often doth occur. Somewhat here might be said of the Latin Deus, and the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, also: but I will keep me to my task, the etymology of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; which for those reasons that have been intimated, I would rather derive from the Hebrew, than Arabic. And because I cannot pitch upon any particular with any warrantable certainty, I shall therefore propose to the Reader some variety, that he may have some choice and please himself.  
If then neither that of Eugubinus, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; nor what we have intimated of the Syriack 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be allowed, I would have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sanguis, taken into consideration, because most of the Deities worshipped by ancient Heathens, were observed, (a subject much insisted upon by ancient Fathers) or at least believed generally to delight in the blood both of Men and Beasts: or rather 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 similem esse, from whence come 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Chaldaik words, signifying, shapes, figures, images, and the like. And among these should I reckon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (sit honos auribus:) stercus, etc. the same reason might be given for it as is commonly (and is as currently received) for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Idols, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the same signification as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
I doubt my Reader by this hath enough, and perchance he thinks more then enough of this stuff. Yet I will crave leave that I may touch upon one etymon more, because it will give us occasion to impart somewhat that is not vulgarly known, nor impertinent to our main subject. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Hebrew, a very common word, ordinarily signifies, to keep silence: from whence also proceed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, taken for a Sepulchre sometimes in the Hebrew: and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (the very same word) the name of a certain Angel of death (as they call him) in the Chaldy Dialect. But 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 alone, as it signifies silere, would excellently well fit (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to Hesiod, being often taken for the same) an observation of Hesychius concerning the Heroes; which is this: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. That is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The better, (or, excelling.) So do they call the Heroes, who seem to be a mischievous kind. Whence it is that those that pass by the Heroa, (or, Temples consecrated to the Heroes; or, any Heroes) use to keep silence, lest they be hurt by them. So (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is,) are also the Gods called, as by Aeschylus in his Aetna. The same observation is in the Sholiast. upon Aristophanes his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and a pregnant passage of Menander concerning the mischievousness of these Heroes (besides Aristophanes his own words about it) is there also. In Eustathius also upon the second Iliad, but more imperfectly, it is to be found. I will make no further application myself, but having now done my part, as I conceive, concerning the etymon of this word, leave all to the Reader, as his own judgement, or fancy shall incline him.  
I remember somewhat concerning some other words (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,) was promised and referred to this place. Of the first, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, all that I intended about it, was my opinion only concerning the right etymon of it, which because I hope to have another opportunity for it elsewhere, and would not be overlong here upon that argument of Etymologies, I shall now forbear. As for the second, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I have since found so much already observed of it by others, as namely by Henry Stephen, partly in his Thesaurus, (a Book well known to all that aspire to any perfection in the Greek tongue) and partly in his learned Animadversions upon Erasmus in his Adages, that I shall but need to refer my Reader to him: this only briefly added, That whereas he quoteth some ancient Grammatians and others, concerning the etymon of it, it seemeth fare more probable to me, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (vehemens Dea, as the Poet Catullus speaketh of it: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the punisher of overswelling, unbridled, whether speeches or actions, as the Grecians) is a pure Hebrew word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; from whence comes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: the same difference of spiritus (the one aspirat, the other lenis) being in the Hebrew, as well as in the Greek words.  
The last is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: this also, (and so acknowledged by all men) a pure Hebrew word: but that is not it that I would say of it. It is sometimes taken for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the envy of the Daemon: which I think few men have observed. As for example, in Clemens Alexandrinus, upon a very observable occasion, the divisions of Christians among themselves, by both Jews and Gentiles (as Clemens there witnesseth) objected to Primitive Christians, as a main argument against their faith. Among other things that are answered by him, he hath these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: which words are rendered by the Latin Interpreter, Hujus aut●m cousa quod quicquid est pulchrum sequitur reprehensio. He had need to be very sagacious, if not a very Oedipus, that shall understand Clemens by these Latin words. His purpose was to answer them according to their own principles, who upon all occasions (as before we have showed) of any extraordinary either felicity, or excellency in any kind had this still 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the envy of the Daemon, in their mouths, and the dread of it in their hearts. And indeed the very word used by other ancient Christians, Historians, and others, upon this, or the like occasion (as the peace of the Church disturbed by persecutions) is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So Gregory Nazianzen in his 21 Oration, in the praise of Athanasius, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: This peace and prosperity of God's Church, envy (saith he) could not end●re. Where it is apparent by the words immediately following, that by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, envy, must be understood 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or (he being a Christian) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the envy of the Devil: So Eusebius, but more fully, after he had spoken of the peace and tranquillity of the Church for many years: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. These things (saith he) no envy did restrain, no evil Daemon either by fascination, or any plots and machinations of men was able to hinder, etc. In which words, what at the first is briefly contained in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, envy, is afterwards more fully declared and expressed in the words following; as will yet more clearly appear to them that shall observe many such expressions of ancient Fathers upon other subjects also, where the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, envy, will not admit of any other interpretation.  
Neither will it be wondered that Momus, in Clemens Alexandrinus, or any where else should be taken for an envious and spiteful Daemon, if it be remembered that according to ancient mythology, Momus was he that gave that pernicious counsel to Jupiter against mankind, to cast the seeds of divisions and dissensions among men, that they might destroy one another (Neque hic lupis mos, nec fuit leonibus Vnquam, nisi in dispar, feris:) by wars and mutual slaughters. It is said (so I find it in Eustathius upon the first of Homer's Iliads) that he did it to save the earth from a general deluge or conflagration, which Jupiter was about; he suggesting to him, that this would be a more plausible and methodical way, and offering himself to contrive the business for him. It is very likely that what we read in Genesis of the confusion of Languages, and scattering of men (before knitted and united in one Speech and one Language, as is expressly noted, Genesis XI. v. 1.) upon the face of the Earth, might be the first occasion of this Fable. But I have not further to do with that here. If I have done (in any reasonable proportion) what I have undertaken, I am glad, and hearty say,  
Soli Deo gloria.   

Imprimatur,  
Na. Brent.   

Some Passages of Authors before mentioned, and, here at the end, promised.  
¶ See before Page 4.  Plato in Phaed. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Joach. Camerarius, Elem. Rhetor. cap. De Fabulis, p. 36. Quo tempore exacto Saturno atque pulso coelestibus regnis, Juppiter imperium constituere ac ordinare coeperat, affuere coram illo voluptasque & dolour cum gravissimis criminibus & postulationibus, quibus se mutuo incessebant. Jupiter ratus è re maxim esse & sua & rei publ. inimicitia & odia deleri, operam dedit ut dissensionem litigantium componeret, & gratiam inter illos conciliaret. Sed frustrà expertus omnia, tandem renitentes & invitos vinculis insolubilibus astrinxit atque colligavit, ut quamvis dissiderent, unà tamen perpetuò atque simul traherentur, & essent. Itaque si tu, etc. 
¶ Page 5.  Herodotus, in Tbalia, sive lib. III. cap. 40. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
¶ Page 8.  Homerus Il. Ω vel, vit. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
1. Alii, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ita & Plut. in Consol. ad Apol.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Plato De Republ. lib. II. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  
¶ Page 27. and 35.  Aristoteles Metaphys. lib. I. cap. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
¶ Page 39  Isid. Pelus. Epist. lib. II. Ep. 74. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 
FINIS.