DIALOGUE BETWIXT Two Friends, VALENTIUS of FRIELAND AND earnest FRIEDMAN, Being met together in HOLLAND, Concerning these Present Conjunctures.  
Printed Anno Domini 1675.   

A Dialogue betwixt Two Friends, Valentius of Frieland, and earnest Friedman, &c.  Van Frieland. 
MY Old Friend, who would have thought to have found thee in these Parts? I am the gladdest man in the world to see thee.  Friedman. 
Not gladder then myself sure, to find my dear Friend here, and in health, upon the first moment of my arrival in the Hague.  Frieland. 
Well: But how hast thou done this many a day? What strange alterations have there been in Christendom, since you and I saw one another last? No talk but of War, and Military Actions.  Friedman. 
Since you and I partend, I have spent most of my time in Swedeland, and I do now design through France for Italy, till the troubles in Germany be over, which I hope will not be long first; for they say, that this State has been hard put to it, and may have a Peace now for itself, if it will, which in consequence will conduce likewise to the quiet of the Empire.  Frieland. 
The truth of it is, God hath miraculously preserved us; and there is nothing, that we so much long for, as a general Peace: But such is our misfortune, that we are no sooner out of one danger, but we are falling into another; insomuch that those we took for our Friends, prove our Enemies, and threaten acts of Hostility against us.  Friedman. 
I pray explain yourself in this, for I do not well understand it.  Frieland. 
Know then, that our Intelligence from Sweden tells us, as if that Crown likewise intended to come and Attack us, which puts us to much trouble and expense; for in case of the worst, we must provide to defend ourselves.  Friedman. 
Now I took Swedeland to be so far from this, that I ever found them exceedingly well affencted toward Holland; and methinks it is an unreasonable thing, to imagine otherwise, considering the care and trouble the Crown of Sweden has for a long time taken, and the charge it has been at, for the procurement of an happy Peace to this State: appearing for Holland with so much zeal by its ambassadors, that the other Parties concerned have not stuck to impute a Partiality to the Swedish Mediation: Notwithstanding the wrongs and damages which the Swedish Commerce and Navigation did all the while sustain, by having their Ships brought up against right and reason, and confiscated, with their Lading; all which hath been done to my certain knowledge. Neither can I conceive it possible, for the Crown of Sweden in this juncture, to design any ill to this State, which could with so much ease have contributed to its overthrow, when it was in a weaker condition, and yet never acted any thing against it, although under some degree of provocation by several inconveniences it hath suffered from it. So that upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground for this apprehension.  Frieland. 
Doth not the Crown of Sweden invade the Country of the Duke of brandenburg? and if the Elector be attacked as a Friend and Ally to this State, and for assisting Holland against the power of France, and helping to redress those wrongs, which France hath done to the Roman Empire, contrary to the Westphalian Treaty, or the Instrument of Peace: Is not this as much as to take up arms against this State? especially since it gives France time to recover breath, and attack us and our Allies with a greater Force.  Friedman. 
'Tis true, that I have observed Swedeland to be much unsatisfied about the proceedings of the Elector of brandenburg, and I have heard many complaints, as if he comported himself in such a manner, as that thereupon a rapture betwixt the Crown of Sweden and that Elector was likely to ensue. I have also heard, that the High Constable of Sweden Count Wrangle was marched into the Territories of brandenburg, but I could never learn other, then that the said Elector had even forced the Crown of Sweden to this resolution: And it seems to me that this controversy betwixt Sweden and brandenburg, is wholly foreign as to the point in question, concerning this State. The Allies of this State are so many, that they make up at present the greatest part of Europe; now put the case, that these several Allies having divers Interests, should break one with another; this State, by your way of reasoning, must concern itself in all their Quarrels: a thing not only difficult to conceive, but also impracticable. The only way to compose these mischiefs, and to prevent other, for the time to come, must be a General Peace.  Frieland. 
You say well; But how to gain that Peace, is the question: for this way of proceeding tends rather to multiply disputes, then reconcile them.  Friedman. 
This might be justly said, if the Crown of Sweden by the resolution taken against brandenburg, should any way endeavour to hinder this State, from making of a Peace; or improve this War to an advantage, of making any Conquest in Brandenburgh's Country, or in the Roman Empire. But seeing that the Crown of Sweden takes up arms singly and wholly to support and maintain the Westphalian Peace, and to frustrate those Counsels and Designs, which would at length inevitably overthrow the same; labouring also in the mean time to procure a Peace to the United Provinces, it cannot be charged upon the Crown of Sweden, either to act, or to design any thing to the disquiet or prejudice of this State.  Frieland. 
The preservation of the Westphalian Peace is as much our care, and business, as theirs, as appears by the provisions we have made for it in all our Alliances.  Friedman. 
If it be so, then are this State and Sweden agreed upon that point; and there is no cause of complaint, if the Crown of Sweden, having tried in vain to preserve the Treaty by fair means, find it necessary to endeavour it by force, as the only way to attain the end desired: And it were to be wished, that all the outward pretenders to the maintenance of the said Treaty, were in their hearts as well inclined thereunto; which may be much doubted, considering those rigours, and severities, which have been exercised upon the poor Protestants in Silesia, and in the Imperial Hereditary Countries, contrary to the Conditions therein agreed upon. But in regard that the two Crowns of Sweden and France, stand engaged by virtue of the said Treaty, for the maintenance of the Right and the Freedom of the States in the Empire, it cannot be expected, that all the Parties concerned should take any great pleasure in that prospect; as hath been found by the experience of several Protestant Princes and Members of the Empire, who have been often deprived of those common benefits, which Law and Justice allows to every man.  
And he that rightly considers, how several States of the Empire, and chiefly the Protestants, have been dealt with, during this present War in Germany, will find reason to suspect, that it was purposely intended to ruin them, to the end that that power might at last over weigh, which was formerly balanced by the Westphalian Treaty: Now on the other side, it will appear very clearly to all the World, and to all reasonable men, that Swedeland's real intention is to preserve the Westphalian Treaty in its full force; That is it which Sweden hath fought for above twenty years; and many thousand Swedes lye on that score butted in Germany, where the Great Gustavus Adolphus did also sacrifice his life for the same. Neither did the Crown of Sweden ever intend any other thing, then to recover to the States of the Empire their ancient Liberty, Right, and Security, which for that time lay groaning under intolerable Tyranny; and hath also stroven to restore them to a peaceable condition again. And to this effect did Sweden deliver up many Strong Holds and Advantages, which it had possessed itself of in Germany, resting contented with very small and reasonable terms, merely to have thereby an easy correspondence with the Empire, chiefly for the security of the Interest of the Protestant Princes: So that none of the said Protestants, nor any Member of the Empire in general, but must aclowledge, to owe unto the Crown of Sweden in that affair a great obligation. Yea Sweden itself, which in regard of Pomerania and Bremen is become a State or Member of the Empire, and cannot be maintained therein, but by the Westphalian Treaty, must be supposed so wise, as not to act any thing against its own Interest. And therefore in reason the Westphalian Treaty ought to be as dear to the King of Sweden, as the Union of the Seven Provinces is to the States General: and his Majesty cannot at all be blamed for being very careful of the conservation of the same; nor can such his inclination be condemned here in Holland, since the States General receive also thereby a great benefit, and a joint protection. So that considering the premises, I cannot find what reasonable ground Holland can have to go counter to Sweden, as you were pleased just now to say they were resolved to do; principally since I am assured, that nothing will be more acceptable to the Crown of Sweden, then to continue in a good understanding with this State, and to have just cause to bear a real and amicable affection towards the same; which is made evident enough to the World, by the King of Sweden's constant care and tenderness for the welfare of the United Provinces, making no difficulty to continue it, and the negotiation of the Treaty, in favour of the Interest of this State, notwithstanding the Assembly of Cologne was interrupted, and Sweden in reason might have been weary of its Mediation; which yet hath sent ambassadors both by Sea and Land to several Courts of Europe, to dispose them unto a Peace: whereby the Crown of Sweden may with good reason pretend to have merited particularly from this State. And besides, whereas these two States, Sweden and the United Provinces, may produce many great advantages and profits, both to their mutual conservation, and the increase of Commerce and Trade, so the King of Sweden hath purposely endeavoured to enter into the same confidence with this State, as it hath been used between them in former times, renewing for that end, by his ambassadors that were here, the ancient Alliances, and adjusting all those matters which might have given any the least occasion of difference. And further, to strengthen the said mutual Bond and Alliance, his said Majesty hath as well before, in case any such thing should have been propounded by this State, lodged such requisite Orders with his said ambassadors, as now sent to his ambassador, that is for the present here, full power thereunto, as I am credibly informed, and is probably not unknown unto yourself. Now for the States General, to pay their acknowledgements with any contrary design, and in an hostile manner, chiefly in a business, wherein they are nothing at all concerned, and wherein the Crown of Sweden is obliged to act for the defence of its own Interest, I leave it to your own consideration, and to judge if in Justice it can be maintained.  Frieland. 
I must confess, that we have great reason to give the Crown of Sweden thanks for all the favour, kindness and care which the King hath shewed towards this State, and I do very well see, that both these States may produce great advantages, to their respective Interest and concerns. But I cannot also forbear to tell you, that they cannot find here, upon what ground the differences between Sweden and brandenburg must be grounded, just at a time, when nothing is so highly desired and wished by us, as a good and happy Peace, and when we flattered ourselves, with some appearance of it. Therefore I entreat you, as coming now out of Sweden, and where doubtless you have endeavoured to get a particular and true information of those affairs, to let me know, what may be the Elector's faults, that he should be thus attacked. And although there should be some difference between them, why have they not endeavoured to use rather at first some friendly ways, for a composure,( and wherein this State should certainly have employed all its endeavours) then to suffer it to come to the extremities of a War?  Friedman. 
I am ready to give you all satisfaction, as far as I am informed thereof. But to attain to the true ground of the same, it will be necessary for you to know, how far the whole Empire stands engaged, by virtue of the Westphalian Treaty, and the Instrument of Peace, relating as well expressly to France, as also to Sweden, in regard of the Common Interest which both these Crowns have in the said Treaty, and in the mutual advantages, which were then granted unto them; viz. That none of the States of the Empire shall or may give any Succour or Assistance to any Enemies of either of the Crowns, living out of the Empire. This so dear bought Security for Sweden and France, hath the King of Sweden with great earnestness always endeavoured to maintain in its full force; As to his cost he did in the late Polonian and Danish War, where some setting wholly aside the Obligation of the Instrument of Peace of Westphalia, proceeded with such hostility against Sweden, as if Sweden could not have pretended to any Interest in the said Treaty; for so did the Emperour, and the present Elector of brandenburg, at that time demean themselves toward the late King Charles Gustaff of blessed memory: a story so fresh, that it needs not to be repeated. And this is the true reason, why his Majesty of Sweden, seeing a War to threaten the neighbourhood of the Empire, and in probability to go further, as it since hath done, did prudentially enter into a new Alliance with France, for the maintaining of the abovesaid Security, which was given to both the Crowns by the said Instrument of Peace, and which formerly had been violated against Sweden, when the differences which were at that time between Sweden and Poland, and afterwards with Denmark, did no more concern the Empire, then this present Quarrel between France and Holland seems to concern the same. And this is the Alliance which the Crown of Sweden did conclude with France, in the year 1672. last past, grounded upon that foundation, which was laid by the Westphalian Treaty, and which the States General can no more now interpret to have been designed to their prejudice, then they heretofore could interpret the King of France's proceedings( in the late Polish and Danish Wars, upon the same ground declared) a breaking with the Emperour, in case he did not lay down his arms, which the Emperour then used against Sweden; So that whatsoever is agreed on between the Crowns of Sweden and of France, doth only concern the real observance and maintenance of that Security, which was granted to them both by the said Westphalian Treaty, and therefore it cannot be said, that any thing hath been concluded to the prejudice of the States General, which hath been agreed upon between the Kings of Sweden and of France, only to provide, that the present War which Holland stands involved in, might not endanger their own Security: Chiefly the King of Sweden having shewed himself very backward, to enter into any Alliance or Association with England and France, when he was by them informed of their design, to go jointly against Holland, although he could not but see great advantages lie before him, and Holland by its own Conduct, might very well have deserved it from Sweden, by their strange comportment in several occasions; wherein the States General did show themselves very little concerned for Swedeland's Interest, and continued yet in the same unkindness at the time of sending their ambassadors to Sweden, when this present War between Holland and France, was already coming on; for in lieu of bringing any Orders with him for adjusting and composing of several differences, that remained between Sweden and Holland, the said ambassador declared, that he had no Orders in that business; which makes it evident to all the world, that Sweden could not draw any other consequence or conclusion from such a procedure, then that the States General continued in the same neglect of their Interest with Sweden, and that the same must rather have increased then diminished with them, since the present conjuncture of the affairs in Europe seemed to invite them to another method of proceedings.  Frieland. 
Sir, give me leave to interrupt you a little, before you proceed any further. I confess that I have heard people speak very often of this Alliance between Sweden and France, and that very differently; nor can I find that interpretation, which both Sweden and France do make of the Westphalian Treaty, to be so well grounded as is pretended: It being manifest, that both the Crowns seem disposed to deprive the States of the Empire of the freedom to enter into any foreign Alliance, which is a particular Right, belonging even to any Free-State whatsoever. And moreover would I fain know the reason, why the Crown of Sweden so earnestly embraces the Alliance with France, and yet refuses that with Holland, though offered with great advantages?  Friedman. 
Far be it, that the Crowns of Sweden and France should intend to deprive the States of the Empire of the freedom of making Alliances: for it were a thing quiter contrary to that care which both Crowns have had for the preservation of their privileges in the Westphalian Treaty. The Crown of Sweden itself hath made several Alliances with brandenburg, and other Princes of the Empire, for their mutual defence, and maintenance of the Westphalian Treaty; whereby it is evident, that the States may also treat with others, and others with them: but that the States of the Empire shall have the freedom to conclude any offensive Alliances with the Enemies of both the Crowns of Sweden and France, and contrary to that Security, which the Westphalian Treaty allows unto both the Crowns, cannot more be approved of, then all other things that are directly against the Westphalian Treaty. And indeed Sweden ought at least to expect that return of gratitude, from the States of the Empire, considering the effusion of so much Swedish blood, to redress and maintain these privileges( as it appears by the eighth Article of the Instrument of Peace) which were trodden under foot; and also in regard of that tie and obligation, which the Crown of Sweden had taken upon itself, to become Guarranty for what was obtained for the freedom and advantage of the States of the Empire, by the Westphalian Treaty, that the States themselves should disapprove of all that, which any ways might expose or endanger the Interest and Security of Sweden. And to pass by many other reasons, which do clearly evidence, that the interpretations of the Westphalian Treaty( whereupon as a solid ground and foundation both the Crowns have made the Alliance aforesaid between themselves) are right and just, this only thing will suffice, most clearly to convince the world of the truth thereof, that the Emperour himself hath acknowledged as much in the Alliance which he did conclude with France, at the same time when this War began, and near the very days when Sweden concluded its Treaty with France in the year 1672.  
Concerning your second objection, it is to be observed, that the nature of the Alliance between Sweden and France is such, that it was not in the King of Sweden's power, upon the King of France's request, to refuse it: Neither could Sweden more refuse the Guarranty of the Westphalian Treaty unto France, then France to Sweden, without breaking the obligation which France lies under for the support and maintenance thereof. Moreover, the chief point which this Treaty with France aims at, is to preserve the Westphalian Treaty entire from any alteration, and to wrong no body thereby; but the Treaty which the States General did propound to Sweden, about the beginning of this War, was of a quiter different nature: For first, the project was new, drawing its beginning from the then rising Conjuncture of Affairs; when his Majesty of Sweden had his hands free to do, or refuse, according as the matter might succeed, or fall out, to the one or the other of his three Friends advantage or disadvantage. Secondly, The said Alliance which the Dutch projected, did strike directly at two of the Crown of Sweden's best and old Friends and Allies, and with whom the said Crown had not the least occasion of difference: And the King of Sweden could not but see, that it would be too hazardous, that he by pleasing one of his Allies, should fall out with two of his most ancient Friends and best Allies, chiefly there being no antecedent provocation to such a proceeding.  
But to go on where I left, concerning the Elector of brandenburg; his Majesty of Sweden did also communicate unto the said Elector, as well as other Princes of the Empire his Allies, the said Treaty with France, as soon as it was concluded, and met with no contradiction from the said Elector, but rather an acknowledgement that the same was grounded upon a very beneficial design, for the Empire: So that the King of Sweden having so well provided for a general satisfaction, and for his own security in the Empire, was in hope that he might then undertake the Mediation, which was conferred upon him by the consent of all the Parties concerned in the War, and by his Interest to procure a Cessation of arms, and expect a fair issue of the War in which the States General were engaged; But while the King of Sweden was employing all his industry and care upon the Negotiation of Peace, the Elector of brandenburg breaks out into a War with France, but with so ill success, that he finds himself forced by the Army of Mons. de Turenne, to try to save himself by an Accommodation with France; The King of Sweden seconds his intention, not so as to do this State any prejudice thereby, on whose behalf he had so far engaged himself, for the procurement of a happy Peace, but to deliver a principal Member of the Empire, his Ally, from utter ruin. The said Elector comes at last to a conclusion with France, yet not without the condition, that the Kings of Sweden and England should be the Guarrants for performance of the Conditions then agreed upon; From which time the said Elector seemed very ready to Act communicatis Consiliis with Sweden, for the security of the Empire, and for the advancement of a happy Peace in the Neighbourhood. And whereas there was then in being a former Treaty of Alliance, concluded for nine or ten years between Sweden and brandenburg, which about the same time was almost expired; as soon as the said Elector had concluded this advantageous Treaty with France, he desired the said Treaty with Sweden might also be renewed. The King of Sweden was thereby induced, to dispatch General Mardefield and colonel Wangelin, to that end, to the said Elector, and among other things, to accommodate some new matters to the present juncture of Affairs: And then the said Elector promised, to live in the mean while in Neutrality; that to that purpose he would endeavour by his good offices at all Courts, to advance the Negotiation of Peace already in hand, and to maintain quiet and tranquillity in the Empire, whilst the King of Sweden should on his side continue his Mediation: But if time should give an occasion to either party, to take other measures, then it should be done with a mutual notification, consideration and resolution on both sides, expressly stipulating, that it should not be lawful for either of the parties, to enter into a new Alliance, without the others knowledge. This agreement about the forementioned Neutrality, which the King of Sweden and the said Elector found very beneficial, together with their unanimous correspondency, both in Counsels and Actions, did not aim, as I acquainted you before, at any other end, then the quietness of Germany, and its preservation, and the conclusion of a Peace between this State and its Enemies. And it was performed accordingly, as well during the Negotiation of the said Treaty, as since the conclusion thereof, by the said Elector, to the great advantage of the Empire; who sent his Envoy the Baron Marenholz from Ratisbone to the Emperour's Court, with an intention to dissuade the Emperour from the march of those Troops, which he intended to sand into the Empire, showing him an easier way to obtain satisfaction, and avoid the danger, which otherwise might arise from such a violent proceeding. And moreover, when the French Minister Mons. Verjus, endeavoured to draw the said Elector into the French party; his Electoral Highness answered and declared, that he would not take further notice of any party, but remain unalterable with that Neutrality in which he stood engaged, and promote the Peace, reiterating several times since the said resolution to the King of Sweden's Minister, residing at his Court. The King of Sweden hath likewise on his side not been wanting, to show his readiness to live according to the tenor of the Treaty, informing the Elector of all things and passages, as they fell out, and communicating unto him the several projects of Treaties, which were in hand with several Princes and States; as also those projects which were on foot in Cologne, between his Majesties Ministers, and several Princes in Germany, about the promoting of a Peace, and a mutual Safety; deferring also all things to the Counsel and Advice of the said Elector: who likewise did very often on his side show a great jealousy over some increasing power, whereby the Interest of the Protestant Religion might fall into any danger. But at the very time when the King of Sweden relied upon the Treaty, and his unfeigned Conduct and Carriage towards the Elector; as also upon the many assurances, which from time to time he received from himself; then did his Majesty not without a great surprise hear, that the said Elector had changed on a sudden, concealing from him all his actions, and pretending ignorance of any Treaty that should be on foot between him and the States General, when in truth it was so, and afterwards finished without the least information or participation given of what had past. The King of Sweden's Minister at Berlin, colonel Wangelin, having an hint of it, desired with all decent remonstrance, that the Elector would not recede from that, which had been concluded and agreed on, between the King his Master and the said Elector. But he was entertained only with fair words and promises, that the Elector would firmly adhere to his Neutrality, and to his agreement between the King of Sweden and himself; yet in the mean while kept the whole Negotiation so secret, that no certainty could be had of it, before it was advised from Holland, and other places, both to the King of Sweden, and his Minister at Berlin; who immediately thereupon addressed himself to the Elector, humbly beseeching him to make a serious reflection, upon this his Carriage towards the King of Sweden; and rather to stand to those Treaties, which were so newly concluded with Sweden. The Elector then at last declared, that he was resolved to begin his March for the defence of the Empire; as being obliged by the mutual agreement, which was between all the Electors of the Empire, to espouse the Interest of the Electors of Trier and Palatine against France. And though the Swedish Minister applied all his best endeavours, to persuade the Elector to stand steadfast to his Alliance, and the many Protestations given to Sweden, which might yet prevent great inconveniences to ensue, and to desist at least from this his purpose, till he might give the King of Sweden information thereof, by an Express, and receive his Majesties answer; yet could he not obtain any of his so just desires, but only was amused with many fair words, without any stop put to so dangerous a resolution. And that which the more aggravates the Elector's proceeding is, that the said Elector not only concluded an Alliance with Holland, but also with Spain, at the same time, and that upon very extraordinary conditions: Amongst others, that he the said Elector receiving Supplies as well from Spain as Holland, and the quality of General upon him, engages himself, to attend and follow the order of the Emperour, Spain, and the States General, and to act immediately upon the place, and in such manner as they shall direct: And moreover, that all his Generals, himself not excepted, to whom the Elector in case of any sudden Sickness, should give the Command of all his Troops in his place, should jointly with the whole Army take an Oath of Fidelity to the Confederates; a thing not to be expected from a Confederate Army, or from any associated arms, but is an entire, separate, new engagement and obligation. And to give you a more ample information of the Elector's variable Comportment and Conduct, I cannot forbear to make you acquainted with a very remarkable passage, whereby the Elector framed a project of getting Subsidies of France, per indirectum, and by the Crown of Sweden, under a pretention, thereby to maintain his Army as a Neuter, for the common and public good; For the performance of which, the King of Sweden sends such power and orders to his Minister Monsieur Wangelin, as was desired by the Elector. But this was no sooner set on foot, but the Elector changes again, and engages himself in the abovesaid Alliance. Now Sir do you judge, if these proceedings be not very surprising, and if the Crown of Sweden hath not great reason, to be very much dissatisfied with the Elector, who almost at the same moment, when he concludes with Sweden, and promises a Neutrality,( at least a Communication of Counsels, if he should be obliged to take any to the contrary) enters into another Alliance with the States General, quiter contrary to the former; and if these actions of the Elector can be otherwise understood by the King of Sweden, then as a mere contrivance, to lull Sweden asleep, till he might put that in execution, which he knew Sweden could neither with prudence or safety yield unto. You know very well, how a private man is looked upon, when being once engaged in society with others, he goes off from his words and engagements. And to what purpose should the Elector hid from Sweden the conclusion of this Alliance with the States General, were it not that he had fully been convinced, that the engagements which he had with Sweden, could in no way be compatible with those designs which were intended by the Alliance with Holland? And it is usually observed, that seldom any thing is concealed from an Ally and Friend, wherein he is concerned, unless there be a design to surprise him. And though I find, that the Ministers of the said Elector, and he himself also, do pretend, that all this transaction was communicated unto the said colonel Wangelin, his Majesties Minister; yet am I fully informed to the contrary, and do assure you, that it is to be proved by very satisfactory Arguments, that the Elector hath excused himself, that he was obliged to forbear the giving of any information, of what was concluded between him and this State, to colonel Wangelin, because he feared, that the Swedish Minister might impart it to the French Minister, who was about the same time at the Elector's Court at Berlin. Pray tell me, hath the King of France deserved this kind of confidence and comportment from the Elector, by his admitting not only an accommodation between them, when he was in a condition entirely to ruin him, but also by restoring unto the said Elector, those places which he had taken from the Dutch, and which the Elector should have left to France for its security? And it cannot but be admired, that the Ministers of the said Elector should pretend the reason of their restitution to be, because the King of France could not keep them any longer; which I leave to others to judge: yet let the Elector turn the matter which way he pleases, there can be no other conclusion drawn from it, then that such proceedings can no ways be excused, except engagements and obligations be no longer binding, then till we have a power to break them; and that former benefits must no longer be remembered, then till we may safely forget them. Nor hath the King of Sweden's so sincere and upright dealing, by concluding of this Alliance with brandenburg, by communicating to the Elector his thoughts of the Peace, and its restoration, and accepting of his fair words for a concurrence in it, deserved such a requital, that it should be thought sufficient, to amuse the Crown of Sweden with a Treaty on Paper only, till occasion and time were given, to put in execution what was intended privately; although the said Treaty, and the States of the Empire, should fall thereby into the greatest inconveniency and confusion: it being evident, that the said Elector hath not by this his precipitated resolution, put the Affairs of the Empire in a better posture, but brought them from a bad, into a worse condition. And the Crown of Sweden hath a great deal of reason to look to itself, and to keep a watchful eye over the Actions of the said Elector, when it calls to mind, how the said Elector treated the late King of Sweden Charles Gustaff, notwithstanding all the benefits and advantages he had from his said Majesty, by the sovereignty over Prussia,( which his said Majesty first promoted, and laid the first ground ston) turned his arms against the said King, and joined them to those of the Emperour, and of divers other his Majesty of Sweden's declared Enemies, entred those Provinces in the Empire which belonged to Sweden, and are comprehended under the Guarranty of the Empire, not acting as his Majesties Armies have done in his Territories, but with the greatest rigour and hostility which can be imagined: And not content with that, he agreed with the Emperour, that whatever he by his arms should take and occupy in Voor Pomeren, he should keep and enjoy as his own: In the mean while did he at the same time publish through the World, that he took not up arms for any other reason, but for the defence of the Treaty of Westphalia, as if it therein had been agreed and covenanted, that he might freely attack Voor Pomeren, and make there what Conquest he pleased. And as it is a notorious mistake, that the said Elector did inform colonel Wangelin of the Alliance, when it was in hand with the Dutch, so it is of the same nature, what I hear the Ministers of the said Elector do publish, viz. That the said Elector was forced to take this resolution, not knowing how to maintain his Army otherwise. For what I formerly said, that there were already some projects made between the King of Sweden, and the said Elector, for the maintenance of his Army in such a posture and condition, that the same might advance the Negotiation of a General Peace, upon which the said Alliance between the King of Sweden and brandenburg was grounded, is very true, and you may rely upon, as a thing which is to be verified by many authentic Arguments.  Frieland. 
How can you or any other keep the Elector from assisting the Emperour, and defending the Empire? The Laws and Constitutions of the Empire given him that liberty; and how can you disapprove of his actions, in taking up arms, when they are conformable to the public agreement of all the Electors?  Friedman. 
This were something, if the King of France had declared War against the Emperour: But I find the matter of another nature, and that there was a War between the King of France, and the States General, before the Emperour did meddle therein; and that the Emperour entred into it afterwards, contrary to the Alliance which he made, as I  told you, a little before with the King of France. And the difference which was between France and Holland, not concerning the Emperour, there cannot be found so great and urgent necessity, which should oblige the Emperour to enter into a War, and likewise induce the Elector to second him therein, if there be any reality in what the Emperour pretends, that he intended nothing by his Warlike actions, but the preservation of the Westphalian Treaty; since the same is to be had by other and better means: And the King of France likewise declares, that he neither intends any other thing, then the preservation of the said Treaty of Westphalia, and to that effect hath promised, to withdraw all his Troops out of the Empire, as soon as the Emperour will declare, that he will do the same; By which means the Emperour will not stand in need of any assistance from the Elector. But if the Emperour had had any just grounds to call for assistance, then should he have accepted of the aforesaid offer of France, and if it had refused to stand to the same, then had the Emperour eminently justified himself: ileave you also to judge, how far the Empire can be involved in this Quarrel, and how there can be made such a matter thereof, as that it should concern the whole Empire, since for that, other things are required, then such Votes and Voices, which partly by force, partly by other artifices, have been extorted and drawn from the States of the Empire, which hath been the occasion, that many of them perceiving their precipitation, have repented and highly complained of it. It is also to be considered, that though many of the States of the Empire have yielded to it, yet not all the States unanimously have been consenting and agreeing thereunto,( which yet is very requisite in those matters, that are to pass for a general concern of the whole Empire) and some fearing what a face such proceedings may at last put on,( the ancient Liberty of the Empire being much entrenched, and the Emperour's Authority too highly advanced) begin to form other Counsels, such as may open the eyes of many other Princes, and secure the Empire against the great danger wherewith it is threaned, and about which this present War, and the States General's assistance, and Charges are employed. And indeed it is very much to be doubted, if the resolutions and actions of the Elector of brandenburg be to be praised, as tending to the defence of the Empire: at least the landgrave of Hessen Darmstad( a Protestant Prince) cannot rejoice too much in them, he and his Country being quiter undone by the Brandenburgh's Forces. Nor can many other States of the Empire owe him great thanks for their defence, his Troops having by their continual Marches, Contributions and Exactions, totally exhausted them; to say nothing of the havoc they made in Alsatia, to the utter ruin of many thousands of people. The Constitutions of the Empire which are so frequently insisted on, being so obligatory, do show a quiter other method to act by, and other ways to follow, then those which the Elector takes. But it appears, the pretence of the Constitutions of the Empire, and of the preservation of the Westphalian Treaty, is to be the cloak wherewith is to be covered, what otherwise cannot be attained. The aforementioned Union of all the Electors of the Empire, is supposed to have been very well known to the Elector, before the conclusion of the Treaty and Alliance with Sweden, and doubtless he might have had the same tenderness for it then, as now he seems to have: whereby it is to be presumed, that the Elector not forgetting the said Union at the making of his Alliance with Sweden, found this latter a safer way then any other, and so entred into a Treaty with Sweden; from which he cannot recede, under pretence of the said Union, without charging himself either with the blame of having forgotten the said Union, which is not to be supposed in a Prince, who in all other occasions is reputed very watchful over his Interest, or to have made this Alliance with Sweden merely to amuse his Majesty, reserving always to himself a way open to disengage himself, under pretence of the said Union. And it cannot be, but such pretences of the Electors, to be in an Alliance with the States General, to assist the Empire, and to second Treves and the Palatine by virtue of the Union, must give warning to the King of Sweden, and oblige him to stand upon his guard, and timely to look to his own Interest and Safety; chiefly when it is known, that the said Elector, not like the other Members of the Empire, with a competent number, as is prescribed by the Matricule of the Empire, joins his Forces to the other Forces of the States, but as General of Spain and Holland, stands by Oath engaged both tot he Emperour, Spain, and Holland,( according to the abovementioned Treaty) marching to and fro through Germany, to no little charge of all the States of the Empire, and chiefly of them that show some inclination to Peace or Neutrality. Besides, he goes about to attack those Places and Strong-holds, which by virtue of the Westphalian Treaty belong to France, as it appears by the design he had upon Philipsbourgh, and by the real Engagement before Brisack, though hitherto with little or no success. Sweden yet retains in fresh memory, the appetite which the Elector shew'd to Pomerania, during the late War of Poland, and therefore hath reason to fear, that if it should so happen, that the Elector with his Confederates should quiter enervate the strength of France,( which is a joint Guarrant with Sweden for the German Peace) the Elector then with the Emperour's and Spanish Forces might easily get some advantage over Sweden, grasp into his hands that part of Pomerania so long thirsted for, and at last overthrow the whole Treaty of Westphalia; which I believe would not prove to the advantage of the States General.  Frieland. 
No fear of that, for France is yet very strong; and this State will be Guarranty against all such dangers.  Friedman. 
Yet this may very well happen, this Emperour having greater opportunity to effect it, then any of his Predecessors ever had; And the Crown of Sweden will doubtless be much beholding to this State for such a Guarranty, ( viz.) in case the Elector, with the Emperour, and Spain, should strive to turn the Swedes out of their Conquests in Germany, and thereby, as also by weakening France, annihilate the German Peace; the same Guarranty being in such a case necessary to both the States, Sweden and Holland: But there is none that can think it strange, if the Crown of Sweden doth also use for its own preservation a due foresight and circumspection. There might also happen such a Conjuncture, that such a Guarranty might not be so commodious for this State, and that this State might afterwards want power, to break so dangerous an intention.  Frieland. 
How can the King of Sweden accuse the Elector of brandenburg, for acting against the Treaty concluded betwixt them? Hath not the said Elector by a separate Article reserved to himself the freedom, to take what measures, or what party he should find the most expedient, though the King of Sweden did not take the same measures, nor the same party? And hath not the King of Sweden consented thereunto, and likewise reserved to himself the said Election? For what reason then can the King of Sweden take up arms against the Elector, whilst it is agreed, that in such a case, as is now mentioned,( viz.) if the King and the Elector should happen, to be of any other, nay contrary parties, the Amity betwixt them should nevertheless be preserved, and that no Hostility should be undertaken against either?  Friedman. 
I do grant, that there is, as you say, a separate Article concluded between the King and the Elector: And this is that, on which the Elector, as upon an essential condition, doth rely; which, as I hear, he in his Letter to the King of Great Britain, and elsewhere produceth, as a valid Argument to prove his own innocence, and the wrong done by the King of Sweden, relating to the resolution, which his Majestly hath been obliged to take against the Elector. But the matter being rightly considered and examined, it appears quiter another thing, then what is alleged and pretended by the Elector; For, whereas that Agreement made between the King of Sweden, and the Elector of brandenburg, as well in the principal Treaty itself, as also in the separate Article aforementioned, had for its foundation and scope a happy Peace, and the procuring of the same, and that for that said end, as well his Majesty, as also the Elector, were jointly to employ their good offices; both the Confederates making their reflection upon those Events which might ensue, if all their care and pains, bestowed upon the restoring of a desired Peace, should prove unsuccessful; if the parties in War should be found to reject all peaceable offers, and show themselves more willing to protract the War, then to promote a Peace: In that consideration finally reserved to themselves, by a separate Article, that they might freely and separately, every one for himself, take such measures, and espouse such parties, whereby the King, or the Elector, should think and believe their own security best provided for; Always provided, that in the first place, and before any resolution taken, he that was about to separate, and join himself to any other Counsels, or measures, should be obliged to communicate the same before and in due time, with his other Ally, that they might be enabled sufficiently, and well to confer together about it, and to unite their Counsels. And if after all, such Union could not succeed, then either of the Confederates, as well the one as the other, is left at liberty to follow that which seems good to him; And the mutual Amity amongst them was nevertheless to stand firm and unchanged. This is the true tenor of that Agreement, which now the Elector for his advantage produceth: By which you may see, that if the Elector could make the said separate Article pled for him, then must it be requisite,  
1. That according to the Agreement in the said Treaty, all good offices and endeavours to procure to a Peace should first be employed by both the Confederates; and  
2ly. The amicable ways propounded by both the Confederates, not being admitted by the Parties concerned in the War; then  
3ly. Both the Confederates, by the obstinacy of the Parties concerned, being obliged to incline to other measures and counsels, as might be most sutiable to the Interest of either of them in particular; that then  
4ly. Neither of the two Confederates should take any positive resolution, before they had communicated to each other those measures, which they intend to take; And when  
5ly. Both the Confederates should not be able, to agree amongst themselves in their opinion and resolution, concerning the taking of other measures, after all endeavours had been used, to make them conformable to their Intererst; That then  
6ly. It should be free and lawful, and not before, to both the Confederates, to take such separate measures, as they should think most convenient for themselves, without any prejudice to the tenor of the said Treaty, or to the preservation of their mutual Amity and Friendship.  
And I cannot draw any other Conclusion, but that it is not left free to either of the Confederates, to separate in taking their measures, and choosing their Parties, before all the particulars aforesaid are accomplished.  
Let us now compare the Elector's conduct with all this: Hath the Elector ever since the concluded Treaty, joined his Pacis officia with the king of Sweden, according to the Agreement, at the Court of France, or elsewhere? Hath France rejected and refused the King of Sweden's and the Elector's invitation to a Peace, that so the Elector might have had an occasion given him, to be offended thereat, and have been obliged thereby to take other Counsels? By no means. For the Elector stayed not so long, till what he had agreed and concluded with the King of Sweden in the Treaty, might be offected, and put in execution; But he concludes an Alliance quiter contrary to all this, with the States General, and their Allies, before he had so much as tried any way of pacification, with the one or the other party concerned in the War: And he declared open War against France, before he had made any overtures for Peace, and before he had tried, whether the same would succeed or not. I can say nothing else to it, but that it is too hasty a Resolution, to promote a Peace by such means; when the Elector did not stay, till he might have seen, what by amicable means might have been obtained, and if any of the Parties had quiter declined Peace, which yet in the Treaty with the King of Sweden was agreed on: And it is again too slow a Resolution, when I consider, with what profit and emolument the same course might have been taken, for the restoring of Peace, at least to the Roman Empire, if the Elector with the like zeal and promptitude had been willing to uphold, and second that Declaration, which France several times did issue out, of its readiness to withdraw its Troops out of the Empire, in case the Emperour would likewise oblige himself to do the same, and that the Elector had bent his arms against those, who were the occasion the said Declaration was not accepted of.  
But I will frame to myself this objection, that perhaps the Elector might have had reason, not to tarry till the good offices for a Peace might succeed, but rather to hasten to other measures: However he might then have given notice thereof to the King of Sweden, to deliberate with him about it, and to consider jointly, what might and could have been done; for so much the separate Article requires. But hath the Elector performed all this? No; But on the contrary, he hath kept all his proceedings secret and unknown to the King of Sweden, as I have  told you. Therefore in respect of all this,( viz. the separate Article having not been by the Elector in the least, according to its true intent, fulfilled and observed) he can no ways pretend or allege, that by virtue of the said Article, he had the liberty left him to take other measures, without disobliging the King of Sweden; since, when the foundation, whereupon this liberty for the taking other measures, was allowed and agreed to, doth fail, the liberty itself doth fall: Neither can the Elector of brandenburg pretend, not to have been able to prevail so far with the King of Sweden, as to join him to his Counsels, and that he therefore hath been obliged to take another way; which yet as a requisite circumstance is agreed on, in case the Elector will pretend, to take other measures and parties; For he hath not in the least communicated with the King of Sweden about it.  Frieland. 
What then do you think the King of Sweden would demand of the Elector?  Friedman. 
The Crown of Sweden, so far as I know, desires no Conquests of the Elector, whereof that King by his Letter to the States General gave full assurance; only the Crown of Sweden may justly demand, that the Elector should put the Affair into such a condition and state, as it was in, when the late Alliance was contracted betwixt brandenburg and Sweden; which I believe, this State itself will approve to be both just and reasonable.  Frieland. 
Sir, you will pardon me, if I declare, that I find myself not a little troubled and dissatisfied with that Argument: For you take us here to be so blind, as not to see what all this signifies; By these means shall the Elector be drawn off from this Party, and leave France not only to fall upon us, but also to overthrow the Westaphalian Peace, by going with an Army into the Territories of Cleves, Liege, and many German Provinces; invading of this State, and traversing the country with his Arwy, and surprising Treves, and the Palatinate. Is not this a breach of the Westphalian Peace? Pray do not excuse France in every thing, but consider also the wrong which hath been done this State, and its Allies, and which yet continues. The King of Sweden himself hath been obliged to confess, that France had used such a conduct, which hath been a great deal contrary to the Westphalian Peace; And yet hath he not taken up arms, to revenge and divert so many injuries, which France committed against the said Westphalian Peace.  Friedman. 
I entreat you, Sir, to harken to reason, and not to be lead away by passion; There is none, much less myself, who thinks this State blind, but rather very circumspectly and clearsighted; whereof divers proofs are extant: And what I have said, only tends so far, that the King of Sweden may justly insist, that the Elector should observe the Treaties betwixt them; and not under any subterfuge, and contrived pretexts, go to destroy the Westphalian Peace. I am assured, that it is not the King of Sweden design, that any prejudice should be by his Conduct done to this State, which now can have a good Peace, when it pleaseth; neither that France should recover breath, to invade this State, which the King of Sweden hath always by his endeavours upheld; nor to infest Germany, whose tranquillity is also the Crown of Sweden's tranquillity, and whose welfare is also the Crown of Sweden's welfare: But since France declares its willingness, to withdraw its Forces out of Germany, and absolutely to stand to the Instrumentum Pacis, or the Treaty of Westphalia provided the Emperour and his Allies will do the same; it is but just, that so good a Declaration of France should be admitted, and it is much less necessary, to use any violence against those places, which are belonging unto France in the Roman Empire. The King of Sweden doth not intend, to justify all the actions of France; neither will I myself do it, but leave the same to France itself. Nay the Declaration of the King of Sweden doth clearly show, that he is not satisfied with the whole Conduct; neither hath the King of Sweden neglected to remonstrate the same unto France: However France hath not been without some reasons, to justify some of its actions. France says, it hath obtained those places in Liege and Cologne only for a certain time, with the consent of their sovereigns, and its Confederates: The Towns in Cleves were taken by virtue of the Laws of Nations, since its Enemies the Dutch Garrisons lay in them: And it is doubtful, whether this State may upon a better ground pretend to keep the possession of the said places in perpetuity from a Prince of the Empire, to whom they properly do belong; or France to attack them, with promise to restore them to the true Owner, if once gotten out of the Dutch hands. And it is most certain, that the King of France did engage, not to touch any such Forts or places, if the Garrisons of the States General had not been in them, or if the King of France might have had any assurance, that he was not to fear any Acts of hostility from the same Garrisons. There hath been also intercepted some Letters, as France gives out, that same thousands of Spaniards, under the Emperour's Banner, should possess themselves of the City of Trier. The Elector Palatine, as France allegeth, hath first declared himself an Enemy, by making a Treaty with the Emperour. And, that France hath been obliged to continue its Troops in Germany, doth not argue, that France hath any hatred against the States of the Empire,( which France together with the Crown of Sweden did formerly restore to their Rights) But the King of France only desired a Declaration of the Emperour, that he would forbear to attack him, contrary to the Instrument of Peace, then would France immediately withdraw its Troops out of Germany; hoping also, to have given a sufficient proof of its earnest design, to leave the Empire in a peaceable condition, by its ready and friendly composition of the differences with brandenburg: But such a Declaration could never be had, either from the Deputies of the States of the Empire at Ratisbone, or from any other Friends: The aversion to it hath been discovered on all sides. And it hath been commended by almost all the States of the Empire, that Sweden did not immediately take up arms, when its Friends and Allies on all sides fell out unhappily amongst themselves, but rather entertained constantly thoughts and ways of Peace. But this State may less wonder at it, in regard the Treaty depending between the Crown of Sweden, and this State, gives leave first to try an amicable reconciliation: But whatever this may be, it doth not at present avail any thing, to ripp up all the old passages happened in this War, if a Peace be earnestly desired. This however pleads for France, that it shows a willingness to Peace, and hath as well heretofore very often declared the same, as also very lately in its Answer to Baron Spars the Swedish Embassadour's Memorial, to which in such a manner hath it expressed itself, that I see not what can be more desired of France; whereas it might have been expected, that by the success of its arms in Alsatia, it might perhaps have been transported to less peaceable thoughts or counsels. For, concerning the place of Treaty, what clearer mark of a true inclination, of facilitating in this point the Negotiation of Peace, can this State desire of France, then that the same, in stead of being vexed about the refusal of Breda,( which this State upon the persuasion of its Allies did make) condescended so far, as to leave to this State the absolute freedom, to choose and nominate any other place, lying under the States General's Jurisdiction, or within their Territories? And it cannot deserve a sinister construction, that France hath taken some time of deliberation, to except against the City of Hamborough; since, when the same was nominated for a place of Congress, the King of France had certain advice, that an Edict was sent from the Emperour's Court, to the Magistrates of Hamborough, enjoining them to remove from thence such Ministers, as were there employed in the King of France's service. The Envoy of Spain, who was in my time in Swedeland, hath also highly threatened the Magistracy at Hamborough, if they suffered any French Agents to stay there, as I have been informed by a Friends Letter from those parts. And the King of France found himself obliged, by such like strict Avocatory Letters, which the Emperour had sent abroad, not to condescend to any other place in the Roman Empire, thinking it inconvenient and unsafe for a Treaty. France hath also shew'd itself very ready, to remove the difficulty concerning the Passes for the Plenipotentiaries of the Duke of lorraine, to come to the Treaty, by promising to give them the said Passes. France hath likewise declared its willingness, to admit some expedient in the cause of Prince William of Furstenbergh; and to give order to its Plenipotentiaries, for the treating at the place of Treaty, about a Cessation of arms, for the next campaign, during which time, a Peace, with Gods blessing, possibly might have been concluded; provided this State would likewise on its own side, promote the work, and by its example and persuasion invite its Allies to the same. Which this State ought to do, having always declared, that it doth not desire to make any Conquest, and hath by the Almightie's help and assistance already recovered its own again. It is also to be presumed, that France, concerning lorraine, will stand to its Declaration, given to the Swedish ambassadors at Cologne, offering to march out of Germany, as I have  told you before, and to leave all things to the disposition of the Westphalian Peace. And whereas the greatest difficulty might be, about giving satisfaction to Spain, I think there may be also found out some Expedients, whereby Spain may get a secure Peace.  Frieland. 
Sir, you speak plausibly of that inclination which France hath to Peace: I believe, that it is likewise sufficiently known, out of those Declarations, which at the Emperour's Court have been given to the Swedish ambassador Count Oxenstierna, that all willingness is found on the Emperour's side, to facilitate the Negotiation of Peace; since the Emperour not only hath accepted of the Crown of Sweden's Mediation, but also shown himself inclined to a Cessation of arms, and is like to declare himself favourably in Prince William of Furstenbergh's affair. And I can assure you, concerning this State, that it earnestly inclines to Peace, and that the same will appear by the work itself. But it falls out unluckily, that now, when we have the greatest hope of Peace, it should be obstructed by the rapture of the Swedes with brandenburg.  Friedman. 
I hope the Emperour, with the other Confederates, will like Christian Potentates, at length lay to heart that innocent blood, which hath been so miserable spilled, and with a Christian commiseration will endeavour to stench the same, by a speedy Peace. They have also on all sides so honourably always testified a good propension to a blessed Peace; But as far as I am informed, those Declarations which the Imperial Court hath given out hitherto, seem rather plausible, then likely to gain the desired effect: For first, the Emperour doth not fully testify his consent to the Mediation of the King of Sweden; but he joins thereunto this condition, that in the interim, and as long as the War continues, the King shall oblige himself to a perpetual Neutrality; which condition cannot be but intolerable for the King of Sweden, he tying himself by it, not to stir in his own defence, but to sit still and wast time, with vain and fruitless endeavours in his Mediation, notwithstanding the Emperour and the other Confederates, should so long remain opiniastre against Peace, until they have got the French out of the Empire, and thereby gained a clear Field, and power after that, under some pretence to make a Quarrel against the Swedes, and to get them in the same manner out of their Provinces in Germany. And yet this might be dispensed with, if a Cessation of arms could have been approved and accepted of, by which a security in some measure had been provided against that danger, I just now discoursed about. But at length, they will admit a Cessation of arms, yet with such a condition, as makes the affair impracticable; For it is insisted upon, that France shall first quit the Franche Comte, and restore lorraine, with many such demands, which could in no other manner be made to France, unless it were absolutely conquered and subdued. And the Emperour can scarcely propose any other conditions, at the Treaty of Peace itself; And then is it surely better to say, he consents to the Peace itself, then to a bare Cessation upon the said conditions? And in case the Emperour reserve within himself other conditions, to be treated of at the said Treaty, he then will appear, to have no intentions at all for an equitable Peace. In Prince Furstenbergh's affair, it is promised, that the Process against him shall be stopped, which otherwise should be carried on; which is not an Expedient, that can warrant him from all danger, but he still remains in the same hazard he now is in, there is only given him some respite and reprieve for a while, to expect at last the extremity intended against him. As to all other obstacles, though the affairs betwixt the King of Sweden, and the Elector of brandenburg, are come to some broillerie, yet may they easily be composed. I can assure you, as I have  told you already, that the King of Sweden doth not desire the least part of Brandenburgh's Country: And they both are so near Friends and Neighbours, and have also so many common Interests, that it may be presumed, their controversy may quickly be terminated and decided, if only this State would not precipitate itself, but first seek in an amicable way to accommodate the matter. This proceeding hath ever been observed, and practised by Friends, and almost all the Treaties, which are made and concluded amongst Christians, aim at this.  Frieland. 
It were to be wished, that Sweden would do it; This State cannot in honour abandon brandenburg; The Treaties are clear, and we must be as good as our word.  Friedman. 
'Tis to be wondered at, that there is now such a fervency here. Before when Denmark and Muscovy fell upon Sweden without any cause, and Sweden according to Agreement demanded assistance of the States General, then were they extremely could, nay at length so disposed to the contrary, that in stead of sending Succours, they came with a Fleet against the King of Sweden; and although they pretended a Mediation on the one side, yet on the other, they fell upon Sweden in a hostile manner. Whereas the Crown of Sweden doth not yet bear any arms against this State, but as a Guarrand of the German Peace, hath been obliged to take up arms, for maintaining that Interest which Sweden hath in the preservation of the Peace of Westphalia.  
Surely this State, as well as all other well-minded people, ought not to guide their counsels by passion, but examine and consider what is just and honest; And it deserves praise and commendation, that this State is resolved, to perform its promise: But it is also hoped, that this State will be so just, as to have likewise this opinion of the King of Sweden, that his Majesty will do the like, and what Justice doth require of him. There is likewise a Treaty concluded betwixt him, and the King of France, merely grounded( as I have said before) upon the Instrument of Peace: The same is not unknown to the Elector, and I believe, that this State is of opinion, that the same Treaty ought also to be kept and observed by the King of Sweden. And if it should thus happen, that the Troops of this State should defeat the Swedes, should this State receive any great advantage thereby? I do fear, that it should not win very much by it, but rather, that both States should jointly suffer thereby. The Crown of Sweden may possibly get many Enemies, according as it is here, as I do understand, very much threatened with; yet can it hardly be believed, that the Kingdom of Sweden and its Interest should be in so small a consideration with the rest of the Christian world, that it should find no Friend, by whom it might in case of necessity be assisted. We have seen many changes in a little time; The same Play may yet be acted over again. The King of Sweden hath reason for what he hath undertaken; Justice is commonly concomitant to Necessity, and where the taking up of arms cannot be avoided, there also a blessing may be looked for: It were to be wished, that this State would not meddle with affairs, wherein it has no concern; it may perhaps without that, get work enough. But if it cannot be by any means avoided, but that the King of Sweden, who makes profession, to be so great a Friend and Ally to this State, and hath made it evidently appear by so many undoubted proofs of his affection, and whose good offices are by this time made known to all the world, must now in lieu of thanks be requited with enmity, and an hostile Invasion, then must he be obliged, to Arm himself with patience: And it is to be presumed, that whensoever it should thus fall out, the Swedes would not be found altogether asleep.  Frieland. 
What is it then that may be done in it, and by what means shall we arrive to a happy Peace?  Friedman. 
You yourself know that better then I: But since you give me an occasion to discourse with you about it, I cannot but tell you my opinion therein, which is this, that this State will never take a more Christian-like, and more praise-worthy resolution, then that of a speedy Peace; and that the Negotiation of Peace may be the sooner and the better reassumed, and facilitated by a Cessation of arms: And that towards Sweden at least such marks of acknowledgement may be shown, for its former indefatigable pains, taken in the Negotiation of Peace, which may produce peaceable inclinations, and keep back any new broillerie between both the States of Sweden and of Holland. And whereas I am as easily persuaded, as you are, that the States General desire nothing so much as a Peace; so am I also of opinion, that the States General have not engaged themselves any farther with their Allies, then to attain the same end, viz. a good and speedy Peace. And therefore it were highly to be wished, that this State would with all diligence endeavour, to dive into the real designs and intentions of their Allies, and svit outward shows and appearances, to their inward designs: Then perhaps this State should find, that there is a secret and firm design, to make use of this opportunity, and under the colour of their assistance, to employ the States money, to advance that, which for a great while hath been a brewing, viz. to remove, what hath been hitherto like an obstacle to them, and to obtain an uncontrolled disposition over the States of the Empire, and chiefly over the Protestants. Which at last will not prove very advantageous for the States General, since it is not to be expected, that they shall have by their Treaty of Munster, deserved so much from all parts, that they shall expect at all Conjunctures, a true and everlasting care and kindness for their Interest. And pray do but observe, can there ever be a more convenient means, to maintain this present War on foot, then by the Interest, which the Confederates have gotten with the States General, to make them blindly attend and follow their direction? You cannot but clearly see, what this at last will come to, chiefly if you rightly consider, what formerly is past both in Germany, and in Poland: For in the said German War, there was five years spent in the agreeing upon the Preliminaries, and the Treaty itself was spun out for three years more, with several difficulties, only to nourish the War by the assistance and charge of others, until the Electors of Mayence and Bavaria, from whom the Emperour had his greatest strength, did see, that their Countries suffered the most, and went to ruin, and therefore declared themselves inclined to a Peace; whereupon likewise some other States of the Empire joined themselves with the said Electors, to that same purpose. In Poland was the War also by many means underhand protracted against Sweden, not so much for Poland's defence or advantage, as in hopes to prepare an easier way for the then approaching Election of a King, by the abating of the Swedish Forces, and weakening of the Polanders. Which continued till such a time, that the Polanders began to suspect, that there was no good matters on foot for their republic, and therefore privately conferred with the Swedish ambassadors at Oliva( the place of Treaty) and at last clearly gave to understand to their Confederates, that they desired Peace, since they found, that Sweden was likewise inclining thereunto. And this is not much unlike to what happened at Cologne, to break off that Negotiation, Prince William of Furstenbergh was violently seized on, and carried away, whereby not only was violated that security, which was given to the said Place, and without which the Treaty could neither begin nor continue there, but also, when it was perceived, that all the Plenipotentiaries did not as yet thereupon prepare themselves, with such an earnestness as was expected, for a return to their respective homes, but stayed yet a little at the instant request of the Swedish Plenipotentiaries, they added to the former violence another, by taking away the French money in the very same City of Cologne, to no other end, but that the King of France should be forced to call away his ambassadors: Whereby they at last got so far their ends, that that Negotiation of Peace was broken off, and till this very day never could be brought on foot again. It had been to be wished, that some resolution of the States General had followed upon the Declaration of France, that the Parties concerned might have met again; But whereas I do not pretend, narrowly to inquire into the reasons, which have moved the States General to nominate Moeurs for a new place of Treaty, so will I leave it to you, to consider and to judge, if it was not a very great misfortune, that just for that Dependencies sake, which the said Town of Moeurs hath of the Empire, and where it hath its seat and vote like a Member thereof, an Exception could be taken against the said place, as striving directly against the conditions proposed in the said Declaration of the King of France, for a place of Treaty: And although a new place, viz. Nimmegen, is nominated, yet is there little likelihood of coming there as yet together, whereby that wholesome work of Peace lies so long at stake, and time so irrepairably lost, whereof yet every moment is extremely precious, in regard of those many dangers, to which so many thousand men in the mean while must remain exposed. And I cannot forbear to tell you, that there are some, who do apprehended, that this resolution for nominating Moeurs for a place of Negotiation, must doubtless proceed from a preceding communication of the States General with their Confederates, and that there lay some reasons hide under it, for to elude and to put off the Negotiation of Peace. But it would be to the States General's eternal praise, if they amongst so many difficulties would endeavour to accelerate a Peace, which example of their would be followed by their Allies, or would at least discover to the world, what their drift and aim is. Nor could any thing redound to the greater glory of the States General, then if they striven, to meet the King of France with the same forwardness, as he hath done with his Allies, for Peace, as a thing the most becoming Christian Princes: And were there no other motive to it, yet methinks the saving of so much Christian blood in the Empire, might persuade them thereunto, since upon their account it is, that all this misery of War, and other calamities, is befallen it. Yea that thankfulness, which the States General owe to God Almighty, for being by his wonderful mercy delivered from an extreme danger, and for being brought to the condition of having a Peace in their power, obliges them, even for their Allies sakes, as well as their own, to put an end to these confusions, being engaged with themselves in one common Fate. I wish therefore most hearty, that the States General would lay more to heart, the faithful endeavours which the Crown of Sweden hath used for the Restoration of Peace, then the passionate suggestions of others, who study nothing more, then to see a breach in that real Friendship, which hath been between Sweden and the States General, thereby to attain those ends, which by a speedy Peace they cannot reach. The King of Sweden's firm and often reiterated Assurances, the project of a nearer and stricter Alliance and Union with the States Genearl, and his continual and faithful endeavours and pains in the Mediation, which in spite of all mis-interpretations, his Majesty most impartially hath continued, are evident proofs of his sincere intention. And to be the more convinced, that the King of Sweden really intends a Peace, it is to be observed, that although the Elector of brandenburg went about with a design, which could not prove but very prejudicial to his Majesty, yet could it not turn him from his real thoughts for Peace, but procures from the King of France by his Minister such a Declaration, that there was a fair hope to expect another Assembly of all Parties Plenipotentiaries, and a Negotiation for an universal Peace. And according to my opinion, and knowledge of these affairs, it seems Sweden hath always shown a real affection towards it, throughout the whole Mediation: For although the Swedish Plenipotentiaries were obliged sometimes to deliver over unto the Dutch Plenipotentiaries at Cologne, those Projects or Conditions of Peace, from the adverse Parties, which seemed to be too hard and heavy to undergo; it cannot be called a Partiality, since it was not in their power, to refuse the communication of one Party's Project to the other Party, when it was desired. For they were not Arbiters, whose charge had been, to judge of either Party's just or unjust demands, and to determine the same, with a final Decision; but only Mediators, whose office is to communicate to one Party, what the other Party demands is, and what hath been entrusted to them, to propose, and afterwards by their good offices and mediation, endeavour to moderate those matters which occasion any difference. Had it been so, that the Swedish Plenipotentiaries had concealed those Projects, which the States General's ambassadors did deliver unto them, then there might have been some ground and reason, to speak of a partiality; But this was not only never done by the Swedish ambassadors, although they clearly perceived, that the Projects of this State were such, that by both the Most Christian King, and his Majesty of Great Britain, they could not well be looked upon; but they did also carry themselves so much in favour of this State, that both the Kings began to show some dissatisfaction with them, and their instances, which they made in the behalf of this State, and its demands: Which should at least free the Swedish ambassadors from being suspected or accused, to have shew'd more inclination for England and France, then for this State. Yea it is moreover very well known, with what earnestness one of the Swedish Plenipotentiaries, Count Tot, endeavoured with the King of France in favour of the Dutch about Maestricht, insomuch that the said King thought himself at last obliged to ask him; if he had any order from the King his Master, to declare War against him. These, and the like more passages, ought at least to receive such a consideration with this State, that it should show to the Crown of Sweden some thankful acknowledgements for them: which if this State does, and continues with such counsels, whereby all differences with Sweden may be prevented; if it lays hold on peaceable means, to advance and promote a speedy Negotiation of Peace; if it cuts off all those delays and prolixities, which one or other might create, and gives ear to the propounded Cessation of arms; Then I hope, all will go well; the fierce flames of War will be quenched, all new threatening troubles of War will cease, and Christendom will then rejoice, to see a happy and a joyful Peace restored; which I wish with all my heart.  Frieland. 
And I do very hearty wish the same, giving you very hearty thanks for the honour of so profitable a Conversation, which I have now enjoyed. And whereas I dare not presume to trespass any longer upon your goodness, I beg your pardon, for having been so troublesone to you with my questions and discourses; not doubting, but that at another time, and during your abode here amongst us, I shall be still so happy, as to enjoy your good company. In the mean while I humbly take my leave of you, and am going to the Court, to hear what further News the Letters may have brought this day.  Friedman: 
I have great reason to beg your excuse, for having entertained you with these discourses: I shall not fail to wait on you at any other time, and so long as I continue in these parts, to enjoy your agreeable conversation. And I hope, if any News come to your hand, you will let me take part with you. So I take my leave.  Frieland. 
I remain your Obedient Servant. Adieu.  
FINIS.