THE DIFFERENCE Between AN USURPER And a LAWFUL PRINCE, EXPLAINED In their several Characters, for the satisfaction of all men.  
Printed in the year, 1657.   

THE CHARACTER OF AN USURPER, That hath no Title at all.  
AN Usurper without any Title is one that necessitates himself to be always a Tyrant; For as a Thief after some few notorious detected Robberies, knows he must always remain an Outlaw; so he that usurps a power with a Faction or part of the people to dispose of the Lives, Liberties and Fortunes of a whole Nation at his pleasure, knows himself to be so public a Robber and exasperater of all interests, that he is necessitated to hate the Laws that would punish him, and by consequence those people most who are most zealous for their preservation; That is to say, all people that have Fortunes to be preyed upon, and all who have reputation and interest in their Country to disturb him, and all who conscientiously adhere to former rules, contracts, protestations, oaths and agreements, for liberty of their fortunes, persons, or Consciences. For self-preservation will as necessarily teach him to hate, as to fear all these, though perhaps they are too many to feel the effects of his displeasure all at once. But to oppose all these enemies he must fortify himself with people of as contrary tempers, principles and interests, (that is, with such as have no reputation, fortunes, or religious principles) that they may neither care nor fear to seize on the persons, or fortunes of any honest men; or cut their throats for their Masters, or their own advantage, who is to raise himself and them to greatness out of other men's ruins: & he must have so great an Army of such impious & desperate persons to secure his illgotten Power, that they are seldom to be found in any one Nation; but he must at last be forced after the raising of one Militia (and then finding most of them unfitting for his ends) to raise new Guards for the securing of his interest; and in conclusion by continuance of his dis-satisfaction in the people of all principles, and by consequence of the far greater part of the whole Nation, he is forced at last to rely upon foreign Guards for the securing of an interest so contrary to that of the whole Nation; and so because his Country hath not Rogues enough to surpress it, the rest of the world must be raked to find them out. And this is so consequent a calamity, that no Usurper can avoid it, though he would incline to moderation; for he that hath once acted against the affections, and interest of a Nation, must have a National power to defend him, and he must maintain this power, with a heavy burden to the Nation. And all this power is so far from securing the people where it is, that it rather entails quarrels upon them: For there is no Tyranny like the insolent government of a great Army, which will as much irritate the people against them, as the necessity of a recovering their ancient rights. And though part of the people would acquiesce under the burden of the great Taxes, that must maintain his great power; yet still there will be a contentious and necessitous party, that will be ready to give the Nation a purge and letting blood, to recover it of the languishing consumption of its oppression and slavery, rather than to expose it to those perpetual distempers, that will flow from the endeavours of the legal excluded government, which hath reason to make use of any foreign assistance for the recovery of its own and the Nations Rights, and will never desist though after many repulses, from renewing the quarrel, till the Nation grows unanimous against usurpation with the bitter fruits of distraction and oppression that so necessarily attend it. And I conceive nothing to be more evident, then that such an Usurper can never with his safety quit his Tyranny though he would; but must proceed from one injury to another, till he arrive at the highest extreme. For besides the unlimited power that he must exercise himself for the security and maintenance of his authority, with his fellow Thiefs and Murderers against his honest enemies, he must transfer the same unlimited power, in every Province, into as ill hands as his own, upon the same pretence of safrey, and they cannot choose but multiply their injuries by the same rules that he doth; for beside their charge of maintaining their particular Power, and unsatiable avarice, and their having the same quarrel that he hath to all free minded and conscientious persons, they will fall more particular heavy upon some out of malice, and others as they are more eminent and popular, and by consequence where any one family is excessively oppressed, they think they must needs be hated by all its kindred and alliance; and so e'er single injury begets a necessary offering of many more, according to their Maxims of illegally punishing all whom they shall think they have cause enough to suspect, and by consequence to hate and suppress; by which it is evident that no man can scape this manyheaded Monster with so sharp teeth, but those who will make themselves subordinate beasts of prey.   

THE CHARACTER Of a Lawful PRINCE, Tied to Rules by the People's consent.  
A Wellregulated Prince established by the universal consent of the People of one or many ages, without any ambiguity in his Title, whether it be Successive or Elective, is a felicity best known to those who have felt the Calamity of an Usurper; for he is established in so secure and high a prosperity, that he must be guilty of as much folly as injustice, to hazard that eminent happiness for any thing which he doth not want, and that no necessity can oblige him to a constant continued course of oppression is so evident, that it is more against his interest to offer at it, than it would be of some extravagant person that had twenty thousand pounds per annum, to spend hiss whole time in robberies, with the perpetual hazard of his life and so great a fortune together with infamy. And this hath been so manifest in the worst of our weak and wicked Kings in England since the Conquest, that though they have sometimes raised forces and moneys too unjustly, yet none of them went about to establish the first for the maintenance of their latter injustice; but when they have had their present wills, they have (without any continuance of blood and oppression) fallen into their old Channels again with but few examples of their Cruelty because they had but few or no Competitors, to make them fear so much as to be cruel, unless they would make the People so, by the folly of their continued pressures, to the hazard of their own well established interests, which all of them were so counselled if not so wise to avoid. And if we consider how little charge, the avarice of profuseness of one family with half a dozen favourites, and their dependants can be to a whole Nation; we may conclude that it cannot be the interest of any lawful Prince, that makes a Nation miserable, but only the necessities of him that must always maintain thousands of as bad people as himself to seize upon the Persons and Sequester the Estates of whomsoever their interest leads them to seem to be afraid of for the disturbance of their illgotten power.  
And if we consider the education of hereditary Princes, we shall find them put into the best Masters hands that can be found, to infuse Wisdom, Learning, Piety, and an high sense of honour into them with so great a care, that they must be natural fools, or persons of extraordinary abilities. And Machiavil himself teacheth them to be no more wicked than needs must, and therefore his Rules are more appliable to an Usurper than a lawful Prince, who having a great reverence and power legally invested in him, hath more interest than any other person in the preservation of those mutual Laws between him and his people in a regulated and mixed government: and we find in our Civil Wars of England, that they flowed more from usurpation then any other cause, though those Usurpers could not be so cruel who had but one or two Competitors, as he must be who hath thousands.  
And to speak a little of the excellent constitution of our Laws, we find they did almost provide for all hazards, for though the Militia were solely in a single person, for the more ready common defence, yet the arms were in the Countrymen's hands by the name of Trained bands, who were not obliged to any duty out of their own Country; that there might be almost an impossibility of drawing a power together, to enslave the People without their consents; especially since these Trained bands were commanded neither by Courtiers, nor necessitous strangers, but Lord Lieutenants, and Deputy Lieutenants of their own Country, who were men of too great fortunes and interest in their Country to contribute to the enslaving of it, and their own posterity together.  
And the Civil parts of our Government appear no less excellent than the Military, for as the liberty of our Persons and Estates are provided for by frequent and Free Parliaments, who only could dispose of our purses, as appears by Magna Charta, and other excellent Laws; so lest Parliaments themselves should usurp a perpetual and unlimited power of a manyheaded and immortal Tyranny, which they are as naturally apt to grow to as Kings; as they are men a negative power was always thought necessary to remain in the worst of our Kings, when the people had them at the greatest advantages, lest a faction of subtle and ambitious ill people, should delude a Parliament with their premeditated speeches, or by the help of force procure sudden and destructive Votes to all our Laws and Liberties for the advancement of their own Authority. For our Ancestors knew they had so well provided for our lives, liberties, and properties, that it was more our own concernment to preserve our good old Laws already established, than the making of any new ones could be to us; and though Parliaments are the best Conservators of Liberty, yet all grant unlimited Counsels are subject to decline into Factions and confusion, which is he worst of Tyrannies; for we will suppose what we have formerly seen is like to be so again; and to go no farther for an example, the late long Parliament, before it had quite subdued the King was divided into a Presbyterian and Independent Faction, and had not the Army proved all Independent, we had seen those sparks of a war which were then kindled, grow to a great flame: And were there a free and absolute Independent Parliament, experience hath taught us, that we are to expect no less animosity between the Independents and Anabaptists, and other subdivisions of Sects, who would take part with the weaker Faction for the pulling down of the stronger; as all those did that sheltered themselves under the name of Independents against the Presbyterians; and as they had formerly done against the Episcopal party. And it must be always thus, for interest will make use of zeal to drive on Confederacies, and if one Faction have the major part in a Vote one day, the other will find opportunities to unvote it another day, either by a new state of the Question, or getting earlier into the House, or by corrupting of some, or watching the absence of others of their adversaries, till their animosities grow from contradictory Votes, to Declarations, Proscriptions, Seizures, and at last to blows, with the miseries that attend them. And thus we see how our Laws, Liberties and Peace itself may be voted from us in a tumultuary haste; if there be not a negative to this absolute power, which is so much the worse, the more avaricious interests it consists of, though it were only for the oppression without danger of confusion; which our Ancestors knew to be so much the worst of all evils, that they preferred the worst of hereditary Princes, before the best new elected person, or form of Government that must be maintained with an oppressing force and many successive Quarrels.  
And now I shall desire all men to consider the obligation that every honest man hath to any particular contract with his Neighbour, and how much greater that must be to all men of honour, Religion, or Moral honesty, which involves all interests as certainly that implicit reciprocal contract between a People and their lawful Governor, or Governors doth, which is or aught to be confirmed by the solemnity of mutual Oaths; since there can be no security, or protection of all interests where subjects are not obliged to an active, as well as a passive obedience of their Superiors. For the office of Governors is to protect the lives, liberties, and estates of all their subjects, against any foreign or domestic power that would usurp upon them. But if every particular person will judge when it is fit to obey or assist his Governor, according to the rule of his own interest, the whole government can be but a mockery, and men can have no more security or property than beasts where the stronger prey upon the weaker at their pleasure. And our Laws which are grounded upon Religion and reason, do give us a clear evidence of this in case of murder; where any man that hinders not a single murder is made an accessary: and how much greater must the obligation be in case of Treason; that comprehends so many murders, rapines, and miseries of all sorts, that the same Laws do ruin the posterity of Traitors for their offences; and with very great reason, for they that attempt to dissolve a legally established Government by force, though they were sure they intended a better form, are still the worst of men: For since men's reasons are weak and various, and all forms of government disputable in themselves, and that men do naturally oppose any thing they are unjustly compelled to, how reasonable soever in itself, such Usurpers can hope for nothing but to entail distractions with their many consequent calamities upon their Country for many ages, till the memory of the security and liberty they have lost be quite worn out of the Nation. And if the possession of any such illgotten power, shall be pretended to make it lawful, it is such an encouragement to the highest of all sorts of villainies, that no real Christian can have the impudence to argue a thing so destructive to the property of all good men.  
And to conclude, let every man examine how positively the word of God obligeth us to obey the higher powers; and whether Saul a wicked King, and Cyrus a heathen, were not called his anointed: Let us know that we are not to dissolve all bonds of humane safety at our pleasure, by making ourselves judges of those whom we have consented to be our Judges, when and how we ought to obey them, for our public defence, though God did never intent those texts for the protection of the immediate subverters of the lawful authority they are subject to, which all men of Conscience and honour are as much bound with their lives and fortunes to obey out of possession, as in it: since that can less alter a public right then any other claim. And since God who could have planted the Christian Religion by the Sword, declined this way, it is evident that he is called the Lord of such Hosts, as are for the defence of common right, and the protection of innocents' against their oppressors, and only such soldiers are men of an universal charity, and the true men of honour; for all the rest are monstrous Thiefs, Murderers, betrayers of their Country, and enemies of man kind; whosoever neglects a seasonable opposition of such opposers and betrayers of their countries' trust, are accessaries to all its Blood, Rapine, and Slavery.  
FINIS.