AN ORATION OF AGRIPPA TO Octavius Caesar Augustus, AGAINST MONARCHY.  
Taken out of the LII. Book of Dion the Philosopher, Caelius, S. C. being the Interpreter. Printed at Basil after the End of Nichol. Machiavels Prince, Anno M. D.XXC.  
And now put into English by A. R.  Habb. 2.9. Woe to him that coveteth an evil covetousness to his house, that he may set his nest on high, that he may be delivered from the power of evil. Vers. 12. woe to him that buildeth a Town with blood, and establish a City by Iniquity. Vers. 8. The Remnant of the People shall spoil thee, because of men's blood, and for the violence of the land of the City, and of all that dwell therein. 
LONDON, Printed for Livewell Chapman at the Crown in Popes-head-Ally. 1658.   

To the Reader.  
THis Discourse coming by an unexpected providence into my hands; after perusal, I had many impulses within me to make it speak in the English Dialect: At last, I obeyed and intent it for the good of this Commonwealth, as the Author did for his. He was an intimate friend to Octavius Augustus, with whom he communicated in all his counsels; and this Octavius was the Adopted Son and Heir of Julius Caesar, the great and Victorious General of the Romans, who (after his many Conquests) affecting the Government, and to be a King, was miserably stubed to death, with twenty three wounds by the Senators, as the Reward of his Usurpation. I am pained to the very heart, to think how the plain heartedness, fidelity and honesty of this Roman Heathen (who scorned for his own private lucre, to betray the cause of his Country & the truth) shall one day rise up in judgement against the Treachery, Perjury and Corruption of high professing Christians in this Generation, and condemn them.  
I have dealt faithfully in the Translation, not varying from the honest Author's sense at all, if at any time from his words: If it may be of any service to my Country, I shall rejoice therein; That being the great desire of him, who is devoted thereunto,  
A. R.   

The Discourse of Agrippa to Augustus Caesar against MONARCHY.  
Do not wonder Caesar, that I who may have so many benefits heaped upon me by thy Kingship, should dissuade thee from it; who (if it were likely to become profitable to thee) should rather persuade thee to it: But sigh there is no similitude betwixt the condition of Princes and their friends, because the blessings they receive by them are taken without envy or danger, when all the hatred and loss redounds upon the Prince himself: I have thought it my duty, as in other things, so also in this, not to have respect to my own profit and gain, but to thine and the common good of all: Let us therefore with an unprejuced mind consider of all things, which are contained in this Kingship.  
And first of all, let us turn our eyes upon that, to which reason itself doth lead us; for no man will say, 
Sect. 1.  that this Dominion is to be desired, unless it may become profitable; otherwise, we shall seem either lifted up with prosperity, or blown up with our victories, to have affected the kingdom long before: or that the Senate and the People of Rome had propounded to us, not that we should deliver them from their Enemies, but that we should bring them into bondage; both which are to be discommended: For who finding one thing to be professed in words, and another thing intended by us, can forbear to be in indignation against us? Who would not now prosecute us with greater hatred, than if we had manifested our desire from the first, and had openly aspired to the Throne? For it is believed, agreeable to the nature of man, to dare to attempt such a thing by force, although it seem unjust; for whoever studies to excel or go before another in any thing, he desires also to obtain better things than he whom he desires to excel: which if it succeed prosperously is attributed to the power of Fortune, and the contrary to its inconstancy: But now whoever Imagines by deceit and fraud to compass such a thing, he is first of all accounted a deceitful, inconstant, and wicked man, with which vices I persuade myself thou wouldst not willing be taxed, though thou mightest gain the Empire of the whole world; and than if the thing succeed, he seems to have gotten but an unjust gain; but if otherwise, all mortal men will think, that all evils are deservedly fallen upon thee: which although they should not happen, yet this must be needs imputed as a Crime, that whilst at first we had thought nothing of a Throne, yet now at last we should desire it; for he is much more worthy to be reproved, who is overcome by his present Fortune, not being able to contain himself and moderately use his prosperity, than he that in adversity is injurious to others. For some men are very often thrust upon sin, and the prosecution of their own advantages, by their miseries and not by their own will, but these on purpose and design are contriving against common good: And who can think that such can govern well, or be constant in adversity, who are neither endued with any simplicity of heart, nor can rightly use the gifts that have been bestowed upon them.  
Let me deal freely with thee, nor can I indeed speak any otherwise, 
Sect. 2.  for I know thee to be a person who art not taken with lies or flattery. Equality and Right, are things of greatest reverence; and is it not just and right that they who are of the same nature and Nation, educated under the same laws and customs, and have contributed by the same use of Heads and Hands, for the good of their Country, should have other things in common likewise? Neither is it fit that one be preferred above another, unless it be, because he excels in virtue; for the like condition requires a like distribution, which if men obtain, they are pleased, if not disgusted: And since mankind hath drawn his original from above, and must again return thither, he looketh upward, and w●ll not always be subject to one man below, nor can endure that whilst he is a partner in the Travels, Dangers and Expenses of his country, he should be excluded from the profit thereof: And although he may be compelled to suffer such things, he always hates him who is the Author of that force, and is ready to take vengeance on him upon all occasions: For all men are desirous of Rule or Government, and upon that account are willing to endure it, yet will not suffer themselves to be oppressed, but rejoice in such Honours as are given them by their equals, and likewise commend those punishments which are inflicted according to the Laws. Therefore in this state of things, knowing both good and evil to be common, they desire the hurt of none, but wish well to every one. And if any be endued with any singular virtue, he both willingly doth manifest, and and cheerfully doth exercise the same; and if he perceive the same to appear in any other, he undauntedly doth encourage it, studies to increase it, and speaks honourably thereof: But if any be wicked and dishonest, he is hated by all good men, but he that is afflicted by sufferings, all men do pity, and the injury and reproach which is suffered, is held to be in common: This is the nature of a Popular State.  
But now in Tyranny all things are found contrary: 
Sect. 3.  but what need we speak more, in a word, there is none that is willing to have any excellent thing appear in him, because all the great ones are his enemies upon that account: All men do make the Prince's manners the rule of their own life, and what they think they can effect without danger, that they labour in, whereby almost all do study nothing but their own particular advantages. All other men they hate, reckoning the happiness of such to be their misery, and the calamity of such to be their gain: And sigh things are so, why thou shouldst be moved to desire the Throne, I know not; for beside that, that its trouble some to the People, it is like to prove much more troublesome to thyself: Dost thou not see the nation and the affairs thereof yet troubled and unquiet? and how difficult it will be to reduce our people who have so long tasted liberty, and no less difficult to bring into bondage our fellows and companions, of which, some use their own laws, and others have been made free by us, especially sigh we have so many enemies round about us?  
And that I may begin with that which is to be accounted the first and chiefest; 
Sect. 4.  much money is upon every occasion to be found out by thee, for which thy present estate (as well for other things, but especially to maintain the Armies) is never able to suffice: which difficulty, although it arise in a popular State also because no commonwealth can be without expense; yet in that State most men do willing contribute much, because they do it aiming to arise at greater honours, and do receive from thence worthy rewards; And if by Pole, necessary Tributes be required, they do it not unwillingly, satisfying themselves herein, that they do it for their own benefit and advantage: But in Monarchy, all hold it equal, that the Prince abounding in wealth should undergo the charge, enquiring diligently into his Incomes, but not so readily into the occasions of his expenses: And therefore particular persons do by private ways contribute against their wills, and do not readily assent unto the common Taxes; for the first no man would do, lest he should betray himself to be rich; nor would it be profitable to the Prince if he should, because by this means he might get a popular opinion, and being so heightened, might attempt some new commotions. And for the second (to wit) to pay a common Tax, is very grievous and burdensome unto many; especially since they receive the detriment and others the profit thereof; For in a popular State, they which pay the Tax, for the most part have to do with the Camp, by which their money some way or other returns back again into their hands; But in the Government of One, there are one sort of persons which Till the Land, Trade and play the Merchants, from whom the greatest part of the money is extorted; and another sort, who follow the Wars, and do receive Salaries: And this is one of those things which is like to breed thee trouble.  
There is a second thing which I shall open: 
Sect. 5.  who ever commits any wickedness, it behoveth that he be punished; now a great part of men can neither be chastised by chide, nor examples, but are altogether to be punished by disgrace, banishment, or death; which thing, in so great an Empire, and so great a multitude of men, and especial in the change of a Commonwealth, are wont to happen: Now these guilty ones, if thou commit their judgement unto others shallbe absolved, if they be such as are reputed to be thy enemies, for then the Judges think themselves mighty, when they give judgement against the opinion of the Prince: And if at any time they be condemned, they will seem to bear their punishment at thy instigation. But if thyself be Judge, thou must needs punish many that are thy equals, which thing will make thy life unhappy, and thou wilt seem altogether to inflict thy punishments in wrath, rather than in equity: For such in whose power it is to offer violence, are thought by no man to decree righteous judgement: For all men think them only to hold forth the colour and shadow of a Commonwealth, and by the pretence of legal judgements to satisfy their unlawful lusts: Those things fall out in the Dominion of a single-Person, but in a Popular administration, if any do transgress, Judges are proposed of persons like unto himself, by which it comes to pass, that what ever happens, it is more easily born, because men think themselves not forced to suffer any thing from the Judge, either by power or favour.  
Again, beside, such who offer injury to others, very many being heightened either by blood or riches, 
Sect. 6.  or some other way, who although they live inoffensive towards others, yet are they against the power of a single Person, who if he suffers such to thrive, cannot live safe, and if he would suppress them, he cannot justly do it: Now which way wilt thou handle these men, how wilt thou behave thyself towards them? For if thou wilt cut off their stock, if thou wilt diminish their riches, or depress their growth, thou wilt get no reputation amongst thy People: For how canst thou be beloved, when it is not lawful for any man to be nobly descended, or to get riches, to become valiant, magnanimous, or wise? And if thou suffer such to increase, thou must not easily afterward put them upon service. Now if thou couldst Govern the Commonwealth, and do all that pertains unto the Wars alone, and hadst no need of any Colleague or helper in any thing, the matter would be otherwise: But since thou hast altogether need of many Associates in Administration of thy affairs, especially in such a portion of the World; and it is altogether reason that they should be wise and valiant: Therefore if thou shalt put the Government and Army into such hands, dost thou not cast thyself and People into extreme hazard? for it cannot be, that any man should be excellent and great, but that he also should be bold; nor can any man of a base and low condition scarce become magnanimous; and if at any time such a one become bold, by and by springs up in him, a true love to liberty and an hatred of Kingship: But if now thou shalt have no confidence in such as these, but wilt rather make use of common men, thou presently incurrest the hatred of those gallant men because thou seemest no way to repose thy confidence in them: Beside, in doing this, thou errest in thy greatest affairs of State, for what can an unexperienced person, and a man of an abject fortune do? What enemy is there, that will not despise such a person? Which of his companions will obey him? What true Soldier, but will with indignation scorn to be under his command? But there is no need for me to enumerate all these evils, which thou thyself knowest rightwell; this only I must say, that if such persons manage not thy affairs well, they being more detriment to thee than to the enemy; and if they do, by reason of their ignorance, they are blown up with pride, which may afterwards prove terror to thee.  
But in a Commonwealth none of these things do happen; 
Sect. 7.  but the richer and more valiant men are, the more are they desirous of honour, and therefore by all good ways labour for the prosperity of the State, and so, profit with joy and cheerfulness comes in both upon themselves and upon the whole: Unless any one amongst them make a step toward Tyranny, and then they severely mark his paths and punish him accordingly. That these things are so in truth, and that the Government of a Commonwealth is to be preferred far before that of a single Person, is most demonstrable from the examples of Greece: For whilst all things were Governed by the will of One, they never did any great matter; but after that they fell into the form of a Commonwealth, they became most famous. The same thing is also manifest from the examples of other places, of which some living under Tyrants, are always slaves, and so always treacherous to their Lords: Others having often change of their chief Magistrates, using their own laws, continue in their Liberties But why do I seek examples from abroad, when we abound with enough at home? For we Romans ourselves, after we had been broken to pieces, and suffered very hard things by our Monarchical Lords, a desire of liberty sprang up in us, which when we had attained, relying only upon the good ways of a Commonwealth, we are arrived at the greatness which you see. For the Senate (or grand Council) first of all proposeth, after that the people decreeth and commands, then is the Army ready to obey, and their Commanders desirous of Honour in the execution, of which there hath not been found the like in the Domination of a single person: And for these causes our Ancestors so exceedingly hated that kind of Government, that they established it execrable by a law, and for ever to be detested.  
But to pass by these things, 
Sect. 8.  and speak of what concerns thy own person, how canst thou endure the management of these affairs day and night; especially if thou enjoyest not thy perfect health? And if thou be'st deprived thereof, what content canst thou receive? And wherewithal canst thou be delighted? And when art thou like to be without the greatest trouble? For it is impossible, but he that hath so large an Empire, must have both the care and fear of many things, but the sense of very few which do delight, and always and in every place must both hear and see, do and suffer things that are most grievous: For which cause I suppose, certain both of the Greeks and Barbarians have refused such principalities when they were offered to them: These things being foreseen, consider well before thou do attempt, for being once entered thou canst not easily go back; beware lest the greatness of the Power, the largeness of thy possessions, the multitude of thy guards, and the throng of thy servants do deceive thee, for they which can do much, have also much business to do; and they which possess much, have also many expenses: The troops of guards were invented by reason of the many treacheries Princes are subject too; yet these flatterers are oft the causers of their destruction, more than of their safety. And for these reasons no man that is truly wise, can desire to be made a King: But if any think it is to be desired, because he finds riches there, and that he hath power to preserve some, and that he may do many good things (and some evil too) if it seem good unto him; this man doubtless doth mistake the truth; for to be wicked, and to hurt other persons, how hateful is it both to God and men, and how dangerous it is I need not speak, because thou art not such a one, neither to effect such things wouldst thou desire to be a Prince.  
Neither is it my purpose at present, 
Sect. 9  to tell how great evils he must do, who covets not most earnestly ●o reign righteously; but rather what things are to be done and suffered also, even by such who use their power best. And to that which is said, that by such power great benefits may be conferred upon poor Mortal Creatures, this I confess is most desirable: [but sigh this thing in a private person is both Honest, Commendable, Glorious and Secure, but in the Government of a single-person, that good is not comparable to the other evils that attend; and that for this good those evils must be chosen: for the fruits of this Bounty shall redound most of all to others, but the grief of all the Evil must return upon himself. Besides, it is not so easy a matter as some think, that one person should suffice to supply the necessities of so many; for, those that account themselves worthy to receive a Benefit, are (in a manner) all sorts of men, although they have deserved nothing from him; for, even every man by nature is apt to be well conceited of himself, and is willing to receive a benefit from him who is able to bestow it: But now those things that can be given (viz) Honours, Preferments and sometime Monies also, are but a very few being compared to so great a multitude, of men; which thing since it is most true, more hatred will arise from such who cannot obtain the things which they desire, than good will from those which do receive them. For these reckon themselves to have received but their due, and so believe they are not much engaged to him, that hath conferred the Benefit, having nothing given, but what they did expect: beside, they are slow in rendering thanks, lest hereby they may seem unworthy of that which is bestowed upon ●hem: but now in those who shall not obtain the things which they desired, are troubled upon two accounts; first, because they are deprived of that which is their own, for all men reckon that to be theirs, which they have deserved, and then, if they bear patiently the repulse, they seem to him to acknowledge themselves unworthy of such a benefit: Again, he who justly distributes those favours, appears to have diligently considered the merits of each person, and to have rewarded some, and disregarded others: whereupon pride springs up in the Conscience of the one, but grief and vexation in the other. And if any fearing this, would therefore distribute his favours without choice, he would not mend the matter at all; because wicked men and undeserving, being honoured, do become the worse, thinking themselves either praisworthy, because they are good, or flattered because formidable: but now the good men being no more valued than the worst, and seeing these to be made equal with them, would rather grieve for this under-valuing, than rejoice in the benefits received: whereupon they would leave off the prosecution of better things, and by degrees become as bad as they: Therefore that which is most desirable in King-ship, you see is the hardest to be put in practice.  
These things and what else I have here mentioned, consider well, 
Sect. 10.  whilst there is yet an opportunity; and being wise, Restore again to the People their Militia, their Territories, their Government, and their Monies, which if thou shalt now willingly and of thine own accord perform, thou wilt excel all mortal men in fame and honour, and wilt be in thy Person most secure; but if thou shalt Defer till some power shall compel, thou wilt doubtless with disgrace and shame sustain some evil. Thou mayest take examples from Marius and Sylla, Metellus and Pompey, who when they might, would not King it amongst the People; by which they did receive no damage: But Cinna and Strabo, the other Marius, Sertorius and Pompey himself, after they were once inflamed with a desire of Reigning, did perish basely: It will be difficult to make this people (who have so many years been free, and ruled over others) subject to the will of One: Camillus, who triumphed gloriously was banished by our Ancestors: And they spoilt Scipio, when they perceived him to grow too big: And remember thy own Father, who but for suspicion to affect the Kingdom, was miserably destroyed by them: And there were never any that were better than these men.  
Yet do I not persuade thee so speedily to lay aside the Government, that thou shouldst not provide for the blessings of the people, and after the example of Sylla, take care for what shall be convenient by good constitutions, for although many of them were afterwards abbrogated, yet a great and the better part of them remain: Neither would I have thee object and say, that new troubles and tumuls will arise; for I must answer, that the people oppressed with Tyranny, will much sooner attempt new matters; and if we will rightly consider things, the fears of discords, which we think are wont to arise from a Popular Government, rather than from the government of a single Person, are without any show of reason at all; of the greatness of which troubles, I shall not speak at all, lest I should seem to be desirous to make that appear evil, which is so evil in itself. And that this Government by One is such, this one thing is sufficient to convince, that the very nature of it, is to turn honest men into Knaves.  
FINIS.