A DISCOURSE Concerning the East-India Trade.  
Wherein is showed by Arguments taken from a Treatise written by Sir Josiah Child, Reprinted this present Year 1693, that the said Trade may be carried on by a Regulated Company, to much greater Advantage of the Public, than by a Company with a Joint-Stock.  
THE many and great Advantages which all Kingdoms and Countries receive by Trade, are so obvious, That its what no Man denies; and there needs no Arguments to prove a thing so generally admitted, and therefore it is, that the Wisest and Justest Governments have made it one of their chiefest cares, to Discover and Establish those ways and methods, that do best ●●serve and improve it: And this being the measure observed for Trade in general, it's so likewise in particular Trades, especially such as bear a great proportion in the value and influence of the Trade of any Nation or Country, and ●●cti by an ill foundation and a worse management, are like to be lost, if not to ●●hole, yet to the greater part of the Subjects of that Country.  
Among other Trades that to the East-Indies is become one of the greatest that ●n England, and therefore well befitting the care of our Representatives in Par●● to decalre and establish the Right thereunto its management; this being likewise one of the greatest and most beneficial Trade of all the Trade; of Holland, as that Author observes in page 144. of his Ingenious Treatise. The Dutch, says he, with good reason esteem the Trade of the East-Indies more profitable to them than are the Mines of Gold and Silver in America to the King of Spain. Therefore, as of all others, it's that wherein the Dutch are mo●● emulous of any Competitors, so we are under the more absolute necessity to have a share in it, and are the more concerned to secure and increase it: One of the chief designs of Sir Josiah Child in that Treatise, seems to be, the showing the Ne● cessity and Advantage of increasing the Trade of this Kingdom, so as to enable 〈◊〉 to Cope therein, with our Neighbours in general, and particularly with the Dutch which is a Subject of very great importance; and well worthy so great a Pe●● And the Nation is much indebted to him for those many Ingenious Maxims and Observations he has made Public, which were never more necessary to be considered than at present.  
There are many of his Propositions, which may be made extremely useful and advantageous to the Trade of this Kingdom in general, and particlarly in the settlement of the East-India Trade, by an easy Admission into it, under the Government of a Regulated Company of Merchants; which is the Method the Author propo●● as most beneficial to the Kingdom for all other Trades which are managed by Companies; and the East-India Trade being that, wherein of all others, he has had greater Share of Interest and Experience, it might reasonably have been expect●● he should have laid down such Rules and Methods for the future conduct and improvement of it, as might effectually have answered the aforesaid end of ●● Treatise.  
But as the greatest Men are subject to Humane Frailties, so herein that Gentlem●● has given an Instance of it, for he has been most silent as to the methods of t●● Government of that Trade, and though it be of so great importance as well this Kingdom as the Dutch; he has treated of it in the slightest manner of m●● others, and given neither Rules nor Reasons worth mentioning either for the present or future management of it; But yet in that little which he has observed concerning it, his private Interest has led him to contradict himself and his o●● Propositions, by which he has given a very great blemish to that noble Undertaking, and shown the World how difficult a thing it is for some Men to be I●● partial, where Private Interest comes to stand in competition with the Public.  
I shall in order to the Treating this matter, consider these Four things:  

I. The Propositions laid down by the Author, as his Opinion concern●● Trade in General.  
II. The Reasons which he has offered for the management of the East-India Trade in the present method.  
III. Show how inconsistent the present constitution of the East-India Company, is with the Author's Propositions and Opinion, laid down as Trade in General.  
iv I shall Answer some of the most Popular Objections which are made against the determination of this Company, and the management of that Trade, in any other manner than by a Joint Stock.   
I might add likewise a Fifth, to show how contradictory the present constitution of the East-India Trade, is to the Law of Nature, and the Liberty of a Free Born People, and to the Common and Statute Laws of the Land. But of this I shall say nothing, it is a Subject which would deserve a particular consideration; If the Learned Arguments which have been made upon the occasion of its contest, together with the Opinions of most of the Judges which have been given upon this matter, had not sufficiently proved it.  
I. The Propositions laid down by the Author, and his Opinion as to Trade in General.  
The great Design of the Author being to lay down Rules and Methods for the increase and Improvement of the Trade of this Kingdom in General, and for enabling us to Cope therein with our Neighbours, and especially the Dutch, he has proposed several, as necessary to the attaining that end; and Principally the Encouragement of Industry and Ingenuity, and the abatement of Interest as mainly convincing to it, the Advantages of which are largely handled, and take up a great part of that Treatise. And in Page 153. speaking of the Balance of Trade, he asks  
What is to be done in England to Improve the Trade thereof to such a Degree, as to Equalise- or Overbalance our Neighbours in our National Profit by our Foreign Trade?  
The Method I propose, says he, for the Answering this great Question, is (following my own Principle, that if Trade be great, and much English Shipping employed, it will be good for the Nation in General, whatever it may be for private Merchants.) First, to lay down some general Rules for the enlargement of Trade in England, and then some ways of reducing those general Rules into Use and Practice, The General Rules for the Enlargement of Trade are not many.  

1. Increase of Hands in Trade.  
2. Increase of Stock in Trade.  
3. Make Trade Easie and Necessary, i. e. make it our Interest to Trade.  
4. To make it the Interest of other Nations to Trade with us.   
And after in fol. 159. speaking of the 4th. General Rule to reduce it to Practice, Viz. To make it the Interest of other Nations to Trade with us. We must be sure, says he, to furnish them at as Cheap or Cheaper Rates than any other Nation can or doth; and this I affirm can never be done, without subduing Usury especially, and doing those other things beforementioned, that will conduce to the Increase of our Hands, and Stock, for our being in a Condition to Sell our Neighbours Cheaper then others, must be principally, when it is an effect of many Hands, and much Stock.  
Obj. But it may be said (says the Author) how shall we Profit by this Rule, of Selling Cheap to Foreigners, where as the contrary is said to be the Way to Riches, Viz. to Sell Dear and Buy Cheap.  
To which he Answers, That in a strict Sense it may be so, for the Private Merchants, but in this Discourse, says he, I am designing to show how our Public National Trade may be so managed, that other Nations who are in Competition for the same, may not wrest it from us, but that ours may continue and increase, to the Diminution of theirs; if there were no others to wage with us, we might as the Proverb says Make our own Markets, but as the case now stands, That all the World are striving to engross all the Trade they can, that other Proverb is very true and applicable, All Covet, All Lose.  
And to avoid Mistakes which may be made in the Consideration of these matters, the Author in his Preface to that Treatise, advises the Reader, That in all his Meditations on these Principles, he should warily distinguish between the Profit of the Merchant, and the Gain of the Kingdom, which are so far from being always Parallels, that frequently they run counter one to the other, almost all men by their Education, and business, having fixed their Eye, and Aim, wholly upon the former, do usually confound those two, in their Thoughts and Discourses of Trade.  
And speaking of Companies of Merchants, fol. 81, 82. he says,  
it hath been a Moot Case whether any incorporating of Merchants be for Public Good or Hurt; for my own part, says he, I am of Opinion.  
1. That for Countries with which His Majesty hath no Alliance, nor can have any by reason of their Distance or Barbarity, or Non-communication with the Princes of Christendom, etc. where there is a Necessity of Maintaining Forces and Forts (such as the East-India and Guinea) Companies of Merchants are absolutely necessary.  
2. It seems evident to me, that the greatest part of these two Trades, aught for Public Good to be managed by Joint-Stocks.  
3. It's questionable to me whether any other Companies of Merchants are for Public Good or Hurt.  
4. I conclude however, that all Restrictions of Trade are naught, and consequently, that no Company what soever can be for Public Good, expect it be easy for all on any of His Majesty's Subjects to be admitted, etc.  
I. Because the Dutch, who Thrive best, and have the surest Rules to Thrive by, admit not only any of their own People, but even Jews and all kind of Aliens, to be Free of any of their Societies of Merchants, or any of their Cities, or Towns Corporate.  
II. Nothing in the World can enable us to Cope with the Dutch in any Trade, but increase of Hands and Stock, which a general Admission will do, many Hands and much Stock being as necessary to the Prosperity of any Trade, as Men and Money to Warfare.  
III. There is no Pretence of any Good to the Nation by Companies of Merchants, but only Order and Regulation of Trade, and if that be preserved (which the Admission of all that will come in, and submit to the Regulation, will not Prejudice) all the Good to the Nation that can be hoped for my Companies, is obtained.  
And a little after, fol 83. making inferences from what he had been observing concerning Regulated Companies of Merchants, he reduces them to Four, viz.  

1. That restrained and limited Companles are not done sufficient to preserve and increase a Trade.  
2. That limited Companies, though established by Act of Parliament, may lose a Trade.  
3. That a Trade may be carried on to any part of Christendom, and increased without Companies.  
4. That we have Declined more, at least have increased less in those Trades limited to Companies, than in others, where all His Majesty's Subjects have had equal Freedom of Trade.   
These being the Propositions which are laid down by the Author for his Opinion to Trade in general, I shall consider the second thing proposed, Viz.  
II. The Reasons offered by him for the management of the East-India Trade in ●●e present Method.  
The East-India Trade under the present Constitution, standing upon such a foundation as contradicts the Author's Propositions for the Conduct of all other Trades, and which is accounted by him to be prejudicial to the Public Good, ●●d Destructive to Industry and Ingenuity; and considering what he says from ●●e Considerations he had made of Companies of Merchants in General, page 84. That all the Trade to any part of Christendom, might be carried on, and increased, without Companies. It might rationally have been expected that such Reasons ●ould have been Proposed for the management of that Trade in the present method, 〈◊〉 should not have been liable to any Objection, and that he would have showed ●herein it differs so much from all the Trades of Christendom, that it ought to and on so different a Constitution.  
But he has not attempted to Prove any such thing, nor shown a necessity of ●●ving any Company of Merchants at all for that Trade; much less one with a ●●int- Stock exclusive: For what he says in Pag. 81. That for Countries with which His Majesty hath no Alliance, nor can have any by reason of their Distance or Barbarity, or Non-communication with the Princes of Christendom, etc. where there is a Necessity of Maintaining Forces and Forts (such as the East-India and Guiney Companies of Merchants, are absolutely necessary; is a perfect Begging the Question: But it does not make appear, that Forces and Forts are necessary for the ●●rrying on of that Trade; nor if they were, that they could not be provided for ●bout a Company with a Joint-Stock: which if he had proved, it might have ●●●med as evident to others, as he says it does to him, that the East India and Guinea Trades ought to be so Managed; but as he only mentions those things as Arguments for a Company of Merchants; so, if they were necessary, they make nothing 〈◊〉 all to his purpose, as to a Company with a Joint Stock: For I will admit, ●hat a Company of Merchants is necessary for those Trades;— And yet I adoubt not, but it will appear very plain by the sequel of this Discourse, That if ●●●ces and Forts were necessary, they might be maintained by a Regulated Company 〈◊〉 Merchants, as well as by a Company with a Joint-Stock: For the Author ●●●ows, that Order and Regulation may be had in a Company of Merchants without Joint-Stock, and declares, That there is no other pretence of any Good to the ●●●tion by any Company of Merchants, than only Order and Regulation— And Page 88 he confesses, That the Turkey- Company maintain Ambassadors, Con●●●, etc. so that 'twill naturally follow, and he himself must admit it, That the East-India and Guinea Trades may be carried on by a Company of Merchants, without a Joint-Stock; and that if Forces, Forts, etc. were necessary for the Good 〈◊〉 Security of those Trades, they might be maintained by such a Regulated ●●●pany, as well as by a Joint-Stock; and of this their own permission Trade, is sufficient Demonstration; for which Licence to Trade, they have exacted from 〈◊〉 Fellow-Subjects, 30, 40, and 50 l. per Cent. a much greater Tax than what 〈◊〉 necessary to be Levied by a Regulated Company, for the support of their Charge. And it cannot be supposed, if the Author had not been fully convinced, of his being upon a wrong Foundation; but that a Person of his great Parts and Ingenuity, wou●● have given some better Reasons to the World, why those Trades Ought, as ●● says, for the Public Good, to be Managed by a Joint-Stock; than barely his ow● Asserting, That so it seems Evident to him. The Reader may well be surprise● how the Author should come to draw such a Conclusion from those Premises: A●● as it has been already Observed, he has given no Reason for this his Opinion although it be so contrary to his own Maxims. So that it's plain, nothing but ●● own Interest in the East-India Stock, could make that seem evident to him to best in this Trade; of which, the direct contrary, in his Opinion, is most for t●● Public Good in all other Trades. And as it would not have been decent in him, tell the World for a Reason, How Great his Concern was in the Joint-Stock the East-India Company; so it would not have convinced any other, who h●● not the same Reason as the Author, to have it seem evident to him; by having large, or at least some Share therein. Yet it must be allowed to be a convinci●● Argument, and of very great weight, as to the Author, but of no weight at all, to the Public: And it shows, how necessary the Author's Advice is, in the Preface of his Treatise, To distinguish between the Profit of the Merchant, and the Gain●● the Kingdom.  
As for the Barbarity of the Indians, the contrary thereof is so well known, t●● it will not pass for any Argument, there being no People in the World more Ci●● lized: Our late Carriage towards them, has indeed given them too much occasi●● to account us Barbarous; but they have not by their Behaviour ever given us a●● cause to esteem them so.  
Having thus Considered the Author's Reasons, which he has offered for M●● naging the East-India Trade in this Method, I shall consider the Third thing wh● I proposed; which is,  
III. To show how inconsistent the present Constitution of the East-India Co●● panies Trade is, with the Author's own Propositions.  
I think there needs no other Argument to prove this, then only what I h●● already observed, and taken from the Author's said Treatise; but because so●● thing more particular may be expected, I shall do it briefly.  
It's plain, by the Author's Opinion, Fol. 81. that all Restraints in Trade are naug●● I conclude however, says he, That all Restrictions of Trade are naught, and consequent That no Company what soever can be for the Public Good; except it be easy for all, on● of His Majesty's Subjects, to be admitted, etc. Joint-Stocks especially, Exclusive o● are Monopolies, and are effectual Restraints in Trade; so that they perfectly c●● tradict the Author's Principles, being so many Shackles to Trade, and Curbs to Indu●● and Ingenuity; which hinder the Increase of Hands and Stock in Trade, and 〈◊〉 most of the Advantage that is made thereby to Men of Great Estates; who, tho●● they are never such Idle Drones and Sluggards, lazily reap and enjoy the Be●● of the Labour and Pains of others; who having smaller Estates, are more Ac●● and Industrious; and they are inconsistent with one of the chief Rules laid down the Author, for the Enlargement of our Trade, Pag. 154. viz. To make it Interest of other Nations, to Trade with us.— They making Goods Dear, instead making them Cheap; and so force us to Trade with other Nations, to supply selves; instead of making it their Interest to Trade with us: As is visible, by Excessive Prices of all East-India Goods, above what they would have been, if 〈◊〉 Majesty's Subjects had Enjoyed an Equal Freedom in the Trade; and the Vast ●●●tities which have been of late Imported hither by stealth, from Holland.  
If all the Trade of this Kingdom were carried on by such Exclusive Joint-Stocks those of the East-India and Guinea Companies, this Nation might produce half dozen Men, of Estates equal with most Dukes; and all other Traders must remain ●●eir Slaves, their Vassals.— And therefore what the Author says of Usureres, 〈◊〉 24, 25. may with very little variation, properly be applied to those, who ●●e so earnest and solicitous for the Continuance of this Company; and oppose the ●●rrying on of this Trade in a Regulated Company.  
The Sufferers, I know, none, but idle persons, that live with little labour, not working with their Hands or Heads, to bring either Wax or Honey to the Common Hive of the Kingdom; but swelling their own Purses by the sweat of other men's brows, and contrivances of other men's brains; and how unprofitable it is for a Nation, to suffer Idleness to Suck the Breasts of Industry, needs no demonstration.  
In a Regulated Company of Merchants, there is a constant and easy admission for men; which is the Increasing of Hands and Stock in Trade, so much commended the Author; and which he declares to be as Essentially necessary to the Prosperity any Trade, as Men and Money are to Warfare.  
Yet the Author magnifies the Admission into the East-India Company, and finds ●●●lt with the narrowness of that into the other Companies of Merchants: Whereas, ●Charge thereof is generally small, and the Privilege great: for any one, who once admitted into a Regulated Company, may drive as great a Trade as he ●●ases, without Limitation: and 'tis such an Admission, which increases Hands and ●●●k in Trade; two of the General Rules, which the Author lays down in Fol. 154.— ●● the Enlarging our Trade. And though all the Restraints that are in most other ●●ades under Regulated Companies, may easily be removed; and those may properly be said to restrain themselves, who are not admitted, because they do ●t think it worth their while. Yet the Author is of Opinion, that even those ●●traints ought to be taken away, and the Freedom of Trade made more easy. ●●d in the Author's Answer made in the Companies Name, to the Regulations proposed by the Lords of the Council, he says, Trade is a free Agent, and must not limited or bounded; if it be so in any Nation, it will never prosper. And in another ●●●ce of the same Answer; Trade must be free, for the Public Good, otherwise it ●● die or fly away; yet he approves of the Restraint in the East-India Trade, as necessary for the Public Good; though that be such a Restraint as is in effect a total ●●hibition of all others but themselves: However, the Admission into the East-India Company for 5 l. is what he speaks of in Page 89, 90. as one of the main ●●●ses of all their Success.  
Undeniable Experience, says he, hath convinced all gainsayers in this Matter, that the East-India Company since its having had so large and National a Foundation, having likewise had a Succession of better Governors, Deputies, and Assistants, than ever it had upon that narrow bottom it stood formerly, when none could be admitted to the Freedom of that Company, for less than a Fine of Fifty Pounds, and the success hath been answerable. For the first Company settled upon that narrow limited Interest, although their Stock was larger than this, decayed, and finally came ●● Ruin and Destruction. Whereas on the contrary, this being settled on more ●●tional, and consequently more just as well as more profitable Principles, hath, ●●ough God's Goodness, thriven and increased to the Trebbling of their first Stock.  
But here I must beg leave to observe that the great Success of this Company Trade, so far exceeding the former, is not owing to the admission of any o● for 5 l. as the Author would insinuate, but to some such Causes, as these, Viz  
I. The great and general use and esteem of Calicoes, and East-India Commodities, of which the Consumption has been above ten times more than it w●● formerly.  
II. The War in which France and Holland were engaged for so ma●● Years, when we enjoyed Peace, which gave us an opportunity to furnish not o● lie those Countries, but all the World, with most sort of East-India Good● which, together with the low Duties formerly paid, have been the chief Reason's of this Companies great Success.  
Nor are the Advantages which the Nation Received by the East-India Trad● owing to the management of it, by a Company with a joint Stock, for the same mig●● be had under a regulated Company, and much greater. Those which the Author me●tions chief, are in 144, 145, and 146.  
I. That Trade, says he, employs 25 or 30 Sail of the most Warlike Ships 〈◊〉 England, wsth 60 to 100 Men in each Ship, and may in 2 or 3 Years mo●● employ a greater Number, etc.  
II. It supplies the Nation constantly and duly with that (in this age) necessary material of Salt-Petre.  
III. It supplies the Nation for its Consumption with Pepper, Indigo, Calicoes dnd several useful Drugs, near the value of 150000 or 180000 l. per Annum  
IU. It furnishes us with the Pepper, Cowries, Long Cloth, and other Callico● and painted Stuffs, proper for the Trade of Turkey, Italy, Spain, France, a●● Guiney, to the amount of 2 or 300000 l. per Annum.  
Now if not only the aforesaid Advantages be seriously considered, but also wh●● detriment the Nation would sustain, if we were deprived of those supplies, bo●● in point of Strength, and Warlike Provisious, in regard of Shipping and Sal● Petre, but also in respect of the Furtherance, it gives to many other Trades b●fore mentioned; it will easily appear that this Trade, though its imports exceed its exports, is the most advantageous Trade to England, and deserves all Encouragements, for were we to buy all our Pepper and calico's of the Dutch they would raise our Pepper (which now stands but about 3d. per pound in India,) to, or near the Proportion, which they have advanced on Nutmegs, Clov●● and Mace, (which cost the  not much more per Pound in India then Pe●per,) since they engrossed the Trade for those Commodities, and the use of Calicoes in England, would be supplied by Foreign Linen at greater Prices; so th●● what may be secured for this Nation's Consumption, would in all probability co●●● them at least 400000 l. per Annum, more than now it doth, and our Foreign Trades for Italy and Guiney, would in part decay for want of the afore said Supplies.  
Most of which Advantages the Nation has now lost, by having this Trade managed by a Joint-stock, and is never like to recover them again, unless b● the cheapness of East-India Goods, which may be procured by an open Trade and can scarce ever be attained by any other method. The French, by their high Duties, had perfectly prohibited all Calicoes, and other East-India Goods before the War, but what comes directly from thence, on their own Ships, the Dutch import so large quantities, that they do not only sup●●… themselves, and those other Countries which we formerly supplied; but even Consumption of this Kingdom. And, besides them, Danes, Portuguese and Ge●es, are all courting this Trade.  
This Company instead of employing 25 or 30 of the most Warlike Ships, and of porting 180000 l. per Annum in Pepper and Drugs, and exporting again 200000 300000 l. in Calicoes and other Commodities for Spain, Italy, etc. Have it had home in 3 or 4 Years time, that value in all manner of Goods, ●ough most sorts of East-India Commodities, are and have been sold for ●ble, some treble, and four times as much as formerly, and for Salt Petre, ●y have scarce had any home of late, so that for want thereof, a Bill is now ●ought into Parliament, to Licence the importing of it from Holland, that Commodity being now sold at about 8 l. per Cent. which was formerly sold for little ●ore than 40 s. per Cent. and its observable, that the want of East-India Goods not occasioned by the present War, or a want of leave to send out Ships; but ● want of Stock to lad home those Ships which they had: So that the Restraining East-India Trade to this Company, and not permitting others to Trade thither, ● hindered the Improvement of it, and in a manner wholly given it to the Dutch; ●o never had so great Cargoes from thence, as they have had now of Late.  
What remains to be considered is,  
V To answer some popular Objections which are made against the determition of this Company, and the managing the East-India Trade, in any other man● than by a Company with a Joint-Stock.  
In considering which Objections, I shall reduce them into four particulars.  
I. The Trade will be spoiled by paying dear for our Native Commodities ●e, and selling them cheap abroad, and buying Foreign Commodities dear a●ad, and selling them for less than they cost, to the ruin of those who ●ade, and Destruction of the Trade itself, as was experienced by the open ●ade formerly, when the Indians were the only Gainers; and besides, the ●●ch will run away with all the Trade.  
II. Private Merchants will only look to their private Gain, whereas Compass with joint Stocks, lay out great Sums of Money, without any present Pro● only upon the Prospect of future Improvements and Advantage.  
III. If joint Stocks exclusive are so prejudicial to the public, and such Distagements to Industry and Ingenuity, how came any joint Stocks ever to Established, and the Dutch to manage their East-India Trade in that Me  
IV. Forts and Castles are necessary, and the Trade cannot be carried on ●●hout them, and they cannot be maintained without a joint Stock, they have the Company above a Million of Money, and are their Property, and they ●ot be forced to part with them, and if they should, how could they be for them.  
These seem to be the most considerable Objections which have occurred to me to have been offered against the carrying on the East-India Trade by a regulated Company, and if upon Examination they should appear to be of no weight it will then doubtless be admitted, that, for the Public Good, the East-India Trade ought not to be carrved on by a joint Stock, (and especially an exclusive one,) but in an open Trade by a Company of Merchants, like the Turkey o● other regulated Companies.  
First Objection. The Trade will be spoiled, etc.  
The Author himself answers this Objection, in p. 84, 85. Caveat Emptor, says he Let particular Men look to themselves, and so doubtless they will, in those Trade for which there are now Companies, as well as they do in others, for which there are 〈◊〉 Companies; It's the Care of Lawmakers, first and principally to provide for th● People in Gross, not particulars; and if the Consequence of so easy an Admission should be to make our Manufactures cheap abroad, and foreign Commodities cheap here (as is alleged) our Nation in general, would have the advantage both ways.  
If in an open Trade, People will ruin themselves by trading to loss, its a● Argument the Trade will be drove, and then 'twill not be in b● being open, to fall into the hands of the Dutch, which its very likely to d● if it continues in this Company; the Dutch don't desire to have East-India Good sold so cheap here to ruin us, for they will get little by that way of Trading the Charge of their Trade so much exceeding ours, by reason of the great Garrisons, which they are forced to maintain to secure their Cinnamon and Spice Trade and 'tis undeniably certain, that the Dutch desire nothing so much, as the continuant of this Company, nor fear any thing more, than a Regulated Company for this Trade  
This Objection may as well be made against all Trades which are not driven by Joynt-Stocks. It may probably happen, that those who may Trade in a Free and open Trade, under a regulated Company, may not get 2 or 3 for one, o● the Goods which they may import, as the Company now do, by reason of the excessive Prices they Sell at, by being Engrosses into one Hand, and their having ftarved the Trade: But in time of Peace, may get 20 or 30 per Cent. only, and they will be very well contented to get no more, which small Profit, must in a little time, quite beat the Dutch out of all, (except the Spice Trade,) for it's well known, they dealt but very little in Calicoes, and other Manufactures, till the Prices of East-India Goods, were enhanced to such extravagant Rates, as they have been of Late. Nor did they or we get so much, on those Goods formerly, when a larger Trade was driven, nor can the Profit be so great, on that Trade hereafter, which way soever it shall be managed. But it's better for the Nation to have 10 l. per Cent. gained, on 300 l. employed in Trade, then to have but 100 l. employed, by which the Merchant shall get 30 l. per Cent. The making a great profit on a particular Trade, may be fit for particular Men to consider that drive that Trade, but was never yet thought a Consideration, worthy the Legislators providing for; so as the Nation in General got by the Trade. For the great Profit which particular Men may make, is for the most part, directly opposite to the Interest of the Public, and it is contrary to the Author's Maxims laid down, in p. 84, 85, and in his Preface, as is already observed.  
For we must distinguish, says he, between the Profit of the Merchant, and the G●●● of the Kingdom, which are so far from being always Parallels, that frequency they run counter the one to the other.  
The more Taders there are, the better it is for the Public, though perhaps it 〈◊〉 be worse for the private Merchants, that drive those Trades. The more ●ds are exported and imported, the more Ships employed, the more Custom paid, 〈◊〉 cheaper our Manufactures are abroad, and the greater the Consumption of our 〈◊〉 Goods, the Nation in general will have the Advantage, though the Traders may 〈◊〉, and the cheaper East-India Goods are, the Subject will pay the less, what is consumed at home, and the more of them will be again exported road, for other Nations and Countries, who will thereby be encouraged to Trade to us.  
But it may very well seem strange, that the cheapness of Commodities should be ●…de an Argument against that method of Trade, which will make them so, seeing what the Author chiefly aims at in his Treatise, in respect of all other Trades, the lowering Interest, and making Ingenuity and Industry necessary; and is what lays down, as an essential Maxim to be observed, which will enable us to Cope Trade with our Neighbours, and especially the Dutch, and yet this is the ●…in Objection against an open Trade to the East-Indies, by a regulated Company, ●…out a Joint-stock. But this when it's considered, is so far from being an Object against it, that it is one of the strongest Arguments which can be used for it; 'tis one of those general Rules which the Author lays down, for the Enlargest of the Trade of England, in fol. 159.  
To make it the Interest of other Nations to Trade with us, we must be sure says he, to furnish them as cheap or cheaper than any other Nation can or doth, etc. ●s for the instance, that it has already been found by Experience, that when this 〈◊〉 was formerly open, People ruined themselves by Trading to loss. There 〈◊〉 not one tenth part of the Calicoes and other East-India Goods consumed there is now, and has been of late years, and if that be an Objection allowed ●ast an open Trade for the East-Indies, it will likewise hold against any Trade being driven thither, because that there was formerly a loss by it, even whilst Trade was managed by a Joint-stock, as well as there was when it was open; as appear in Fol. 41. of that Treatise:  
There are, says the Author, some Men yet living, who do remember a greater Trade to East-India, and a far greater Stock employed therein then we have now, and yet we were so far from thriving upon it, that we lost by it, and could never 〈◊〉 our principal Money again.  
Yet it's evident, by the Author's Opinion, p. 148, 150, and 154.  
That the Mer●t may lose in a Trade, and the Nation still gain; and that there is a great difference ●een the Gain of the Kingdom, and that of the private Merchant.  
Pag. 148. Says he, If our Trade and Shipping increase, how small or slow soever the profits are to private Men, it is an infallible indication, that the Nation in general ●…ives. For I dare affirm, that catagorically in all parts of the whole World, wherever ●rade is great, and continues so, and grows daily more great, and increases in ●hipping, and that for a Succession, not of Years but of Ages, that Trade must 〈◊〉 nationally profitable.  
Page 150. The Author says further.  
Where a great Trade is driven, especially where much Shipping is employed, whatever becomes of the poor Merchant that drives the Trade, multitudes of people will be certain gainers, as his Majesty, and his Officers of Customs, be●●… Shipwrights, Butchers, Brewers, Bakers, Rope-makers, Porters, Seamen,  
〈◊〉 Manufactures, Carmen, Lighter Men, and all other Artificere, and People T●● depend on Trade or Shipping, which indeed more or less, the whole Kingdom d●●  
And Pag. 154. as has been already observed, he calls it, the following his own Principle, That if Trade be great, and much English Shipping employed, it will be good the Nation in general, whatever it may be for the private Merchants.  
But to answer this objection more fully, it's very observable that there is a greater Trade drove from Port to Port in India; and from thence for the Red 〈◊〉 Persia, the South Sea, China, the Manillus, which goes from thence to the Spa●● West-Indies, than what is driven to Europe, and the particular Merchants buy th● Goods in all those Trades without a Joint-stock, and yet they do not ruin the selves, nor do they lose the Trade, or give away all the profit to the Nati●● sometimes they get more; sometimes less, as there is a greater or less qui● of Goods at the Market, and as there is more or less, demand for them, like manner, as in all other Trade; and it may not be amiss to observe, that 〈◊〉 have neither Forces, Forts nor Castles in India to drive their Trade. I shall on add, that many of the Members of this Company, do publicly declare themsel●● favour of an open Trade by a regulated Company, if the present Company she be dissolved, which shows plainly that it is nothing but private Interest, 〈◊〉 makes them now against it.  
2d. Object. Private Merchants will only look to their present Gain, etc.  
This Joint-Stock Company, instead of discovering any new Trades, has lost seve●● Trades which the English Nation had formerly, they have given the 〈◊〉 the whole Spice-Trade. We had the Islands of Pelleroon and Amboine, and 〈◊〉 ctory at Maceassar, which if they had recovered back from the Dutch, accord to the Treaty of Peace, would have furnished us with Spice enough for our 〈◊〉 and wherewithal to supply other countries'; and they have likewise lost the 〈◊〉 of Bamam, and thereby given the Dutch an opportunity to engross not only Pepper Trade, but likewise in time to shus us quite out, of the South-Sea and 〈◊〉 Trade; which last, though it has been in a manner wholly neglected by them; 〈◊〉 be made more beneficial to this Kingdom, than most of their other Trade.  
They have in a manner lost all other Trades, excepting only their Trade in the 〈◊〉 gull's Dominions, which if it had been possible to lose, and for the Dutch to 〈◊〉 engrossed, the Company have taken a great deal of Pains to give them an opportunity to do it, all the new Trade which they have discovered, instead of the which they have lost, is our Settlement at Bencooben, a place which finds a 〈◊〉 Vent for our Manufacture, (if the Lives of poor English Men may be called Manufacture) as they have been accounted by some of the great Men of 〈◊〉 Company, upon the occasion of our first settling there, that Place has proved Golgotha to our English Men, and let it cost what it will the fortifying, that's the morally speaking, impregnable Asylum, as they call it, to the English Nati●● which it's ever like to be; if this be all the Improvement which has been made a Joint-Stock in the East-India Trade, during 36 years, it had been well for 〈◊〉 land there had been no Joint-Stock in the Trade, or none of this Improvement; had saved several hundred poor English men's Lives, which have been sent thither Dye like Dogs.  
III. Object. If Joint-Stocks are so prejudicial to the Public, etc.  
For Reply thereunto, it's to be Observed, that in the Infancy of Trade a especially of such as are remote, where particular persons would not 〈◊〉 ●…ear of the Disappointments that commonly attend the first Undertake, ●●●●t- Stocks have been thought necessary; but are not so when a Trade is fully ●●wered, and settled, and when it can be carried on as well or better by particular 〈◊〉 without a Joint-Stock: For as Joint Stocks may be useful, in making the 〈◊〉 discoveries and Settlements of Trades, and especially of such as are remote, so 〈◊〉 have always been prejudicial to the future improvements and Increase of those 〈◊〉 Trades after their first Settlement, by not leaving a full Scope to Industry 〈◊〉, as may plainly appear by the slow Progress, little Improvements, less Discoveries which have been made in the East-India and Guinea Trades 〈◊〉 their first being frequented; if compared with the Improvements of most 〈◊〉 since that time, where Industry and Ingenuity have had their full course, 〈◊〉 been freed from these Shackles; of which there needs no other Demonstration, those Vast Improvements that have been made in our own West-India Planta●●●●… which could have been in no manner of proportion so considerable, if they 〈◊〉 been managed by a Company; and especially a Company which an Exclusive Joint- 〈◊〉. And this the Author acknowledges, Fol. 84. We have (says he) declined more, 〈◊〉 least have increased less in those Trades limited to Companies, than in others 〈◊〉 there all His Majesty's Subjects have had equal freedom to Trade. And it's very remarkable how great Enemy's Restrants are to Discoveries and Improvements by 〈◊〉 great Countries and People which are yet unknown to us, towards the South 〈◊〉 compared with those towards the North Pole; which Countries being as ●●…ote from the Sun, might doubtless afford a great consumption to our Woollen manufactures, and supply us with some useful Commodities in lien of them: And 〈◊〉 want of these Discoveries can be imputed to nothing, but the Restraint 〈◊〉 Trade, occasioned by the English and Dutch East-India Companies, and the ●●…ity of the Spaniards, in Prohibiting Trade into their West-Indies.  
And though it's acknowledged, that the Dutch carry on their East India Trade 〈◊〉 a Joint-Stock, yet that's no Rule for this Nation to do the like, if it may be Ma●●…ed to more Public Advantage in some other Method. For the Question is not, 〈◊〉 the Dutch Manage this Trade, but, How the English may do it; so as to be ●ost beneficial to this Kingdom, and to enable us best to cope with the Dutch; 〈◊〉 Whether that may not be done better without a Joint-Stock, than with 〈◊〉?  
The Dutch, it's true, began their Trade to the East-Indies by a Company with Joint-Stock; and they first Settled themselves by Conquest, pursuing Dominion 〈◊〉 Empire; and are under a necessity of Continuing their Trade in that manner, ●●●…gh the Charge of their Garrisons and Governments is so excessive, that no●…ing but the Spice-Trade, and the Confining our East-India Trade to an Excusive ●●●nt Stock, could have hindered them from being ruined long since.  
Our first Settlement in the East-Indies, was by Trade, as Merchants; and must 〈◊〉 by a fair and upright dealing with the Natives; a just and punctual comply 〈◊〉 in our Bargains and Payments: there by preserving a mutual Intercourse, and Understanding with them: For we have no Territories, Garrisons, or Castles, ●●ich afford or secure us any Trade, but such as we might as well, nay better, be 〈◊〉.  
The Dutch East-India Trade, and their Government, are so interwoven, that 〈◊〉 lessens the one, affects the other: And therefore it's not to be wondered 〈◊〉 they should be so solicitous to preserve and increase it, and to oppose any 〈◊〉 which might seem to lessen it.  
iv Object. Forts and Castles are so necessary, that the Trade cannot be carried on without them, etc.  
Their Forts, etc. are such as are to be regarded, either for the Revenue arising by them to the Company, or as they are necessary to carry on the Trade and all the Charges which have been disbursed on them, are not to be reckon●● as their Cost, for they have had the use of them, and the annual Charge ought, be placed to the Trade. If the Turkey, Hamburgh, East-Land or any other Regulated Company of Merchants, should make an Account of all the Charges their Ambassadors, Residents and Factories, since their first Foundation, it might probably, in some of those Companies, exceed the Charge of the East-India Company's Forts, etc. But the annual Trade has boar the annual Charge; 〈◊〉 they do not upon that score, increase the Charge of the Admission of any one 〈◊〉 their Company and Trade.  
If their Forts are so great a Revenue as they pretend, they need not part 〈◊〉 them, but may keep them, and have home the Annual Revenue from thence.  
And if they are necessary to carry on the Trade, Those who succeed them 〈◊〉 the Trade will consider the Necessity which they have of them, and in such 〈◊〉 cannot be without them, and their Value may be Adjusted by persons indifferently Chosen, as has been always formerly practified upon the like Occasions, 〈◊〉 the Money may be raised to pay for them either on the Trade, as all Imposition are in the Turkey and other Regulated Companies, or paid by the Government out of the Customs arising by the Trade, which would soon more than compensate that Charge by their increase.  
The Forts and Islands have hitherto gone along with the Trade and the Companies Successors have been accounted those who have succeeded them in the Trade and therefore they can't properly be called their , because of the National Property in them; nor can they, if they would, Sell them to the French 〈◊〉 Dutch as they pretend, Bombay and St. Helena being annexed to the Crown, and Holden of the Manor of East-Greenwich at a certain Quitrent; neither would the French or Dutch Buy them (because they would be of no use to them) thought the Company had as good a Power, as they might have a Will, to Sell them 〈◊〉 any who they thought might prejudice England most in Buying them; But it shows a great deal of Confidence as well as Ill Nature in them, to pretend to do it if they could. If they are not willing to part with their Forts, let them see who they will hurt most, for its plain the Trade may be as well, and better, carried on without them: At Bengall the Flower of all the Trade of India, we never had a Fort nor any thing like it, and yet the greatest and most profitable part of the East-India Trade has been from thence; we Trade in all parts of the Moguls Dominions with as much Security as any Foreigners do in London; and this is demonstrated by their own, and private Ships Trading in many other places where they have no Forts, for they have no Garrisons in any place where they have a Trade, but Fort St. George, and our New Acquisition of St. David's Fort and there they might have the same Trade without them, and be freed of the charge in maintaining them.  
Bombay is a good Harbour for our Ships, but affords no Trade, and we should have the same benefit of that Harbour, although the Island were under the 〈◊〉 Dominion.  
If we have Peace with the Natives, we want no Forts; and if we are encouraged our Forts to make War, we shall soon Repent, as the Company may, that ever had any; and on that consideration, as well as the necessary charge ●eeping them, it had been well for this Nation the Company had never had In time of War with the Natives we may perhaps with difficulty keep our 〈◊〉, but we cannot drive our Trade, the War we had with the Mogul has been 〈◊〉 Proof of this Assertion.  
Their Forts are of so little use, that after the Company have been for them, the best thing which could be done for the Advantage of Trade, would be to demolish them; Following therein the example of the Dutch, who have lately demolished Pollicate, a Fortification which they had Fort St. George, and of greater strength than any we have in India, and 〈◊〉 was the only Fort they had in all the Moguls Dominions, and thereby our 〈◊〉 would be freed of all the great and unnecessary Charge of maintaining and we should be better secured by an Entire dependence on the Moguls action.  
Forts and Castles were of any use in India, it could only be in the Count 〈◊〉 of small Princes, but they can never be of any use in the Moguls Dominions is one of the greatest Princes in all the World. And if Forts, etc. were ne 〈◊〉, they might be maintained by a Regulated Company of Merchants, as well as Company with a Joint-Stock.  
●hat I have already observed, I hope may suffice to show that the East-India may be carried on by a Regulated Company like the Turkey and Hamborough manys, and that such a Constitution would Tend most to the increasing Hands ●●ock in Trade, and the encouraging Industry and Ingenuity, would be most 〈…〉 tagious to the Public, and which according to the Authors own Opinion in all other Trades, and therefore may be supposed to be so in this, and is 〈◊〉 Method to enable this Nation to Cope therein with our Neighbours, specially the Dutch, and to hinder their Engrossing that whole Trade. And author must either disapprove the present method of managing the East-Trade with a Joint-Stock Exclusive, or must give better Reasons for it, than his own Asserting, That it seems evident to him, that it ought for the Public Good carried on in that manner; or else he must Proclaim to the World, That his Private Interest is concerned, he can and will Contradict himself.  
〈◊〉 the Design of this Discourse was only to show that the East-India Trade might 〈◊〉 to much greater Advantage to the Public by a Regulated Company of 〈◊〉 than by a Company with a Joint-Stock; so what I have mentioned of the a Trade, has only been, occasional, because the Author has joined the East In-Trade and that together, when he says, fol. 81. it seems evident to me, that the 〈◊〉 of those Trades, aught for the Public Good, to be managed by Joint-Stocks; if been the Subject of this Discourse, to have shown that the Guinea Trade ought 〈◊〉 Public Good to be managed by a Regulated Company of Merchants, rather 〈◊〉 a Company with a Joint-Stock, there might have been much more said to 〈◊〉. But what has been observed concerning the East-India Trade, may I supconvince any imprejudiced person, whose Judgement is not biased by his own Interest.  
Regulated Company shall be thought by the Wisdom of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●●gement of the East-India Trade, its nor doubted but it will be settled in 〈◊〉 Method, and that some Provision will be made in such Man a● shall be the most 〈◊〉 to prevent the Companies dividing ill or more; than their 〈◊〉 until they have paid the Debts they own in India, that so the English Nation not hereafter suffer for their Embroils.  
Considering how small a Trade the East-India Company have driven for several Ye●● and how great the Dutch; there is a Necessity of some speedy Resolution in Matter.— I shall conclude therefore this Discourse as the Author dost his 〈◊〉 with a very small Alteration.  
I think no true Englishmen will deny that Season cries aloud to us to be up and doing before our Fields become 〈◊〉 cupied, and before the Dutch get too much the Whiphand of us, whom such a Case were they freed from their French Fears, which they labour u● at present) I fear we should find as severe Task masters as ever the Ath●● were to the lesser trading Cities of Greece.  
Neither are the Dutch the only Neighbours we have for Carrivals in T●● but the French King and King of Sweden are now as active, circumspect, dustrlous and perspective too in this Affair; and have, and are ordering the as prudently for promoting thereof, as the  themselves.  
There is nothing can be said for Public Good, but will cross the parti●● Ends, as well as Opinions, of many private Persons; and still the more is said more are disobliged; but my Duty to my Country, overcoming those C●● derations, I have adventured this second time to expose my Conception public Censure, with this confidence, that after these Principles have suf●● the accustomary Persecution of Tongues and Pens, naturally and con accompanying all new Proposals, they will at length, or something very then, come to be generally received and honoured with the public Sa●● concerning the Time whereof, I am not careful, but for my Countries I could wish it might be shortened.  
FINIS.   

London, Printed for Richard Baldwin, near the Oxford Arms Inn