CONSCIENCE EASED: OR, The main Scruple which hath hitherto stuck most with conscionable Men, against the taking of the Engagement removed. Where amongst other things is showed, First, How fare the Oath of Allegiance, and the Nationall League and Covenant are Obligatins; either in their legal intents unalterable or at this time no more binding and alterable. Secondly How fare in a free People the Subordinate Officers of the State, have a right to judge of the Proceed of a King in that State. Thirdly, How Zedekia'es case in breaking his Oath to the King of Babylon, and our case in making use of our freedom from the Oath of Allegiance, and Supremacy to the King of England do differ. The Author, John Dury. LONDON, Printed for T. H. in russel-street, near the Piazza of the Covent-Garden, 1651. The Errata. In page 1. line 10. for out soon after, read but soon after. p. 2. l. 22. for ease, r. case. p. 3. l. 1. for cause, r. clause in the note for summoned, r. summed. p. 5. l. 1. for must, r. most. l. 8 for many intentions, r. main intention is. p. 6. line 22. for cease, r. cross, in l. 27 for oppress, r. oppose. p. 7. l. 6. for of, r. to. line 9 for that, r. what. P. 10. l. 21. for out yourself, r. not yourself. p. 11. l. 4. for laws r. lawless. p. 12. l. 24. for Salvus, r. Salus p. 14. l. 14. for show, r. Sphere. p. 16. l. 21. r. in our places. p. 17. l. 16. for revealed, r. resolved. p. 20. l. 22. for have, read make. line the last, for Representations, r. Representatives. p. 25 l. 16. for accepted, r. I excepted. l. 23. r. they are not set. p. 28 l. 26. r. from under them. p. 33. l. 2. for instructed, r. entrusted. p. 36. l. 14. for him, r. us in the same line, for towards the K. of Babylon, r. towards our K with Zedekiahs' condition, and his Oath binding him thereunto towards the K. of Babylon, line 16. for master, r. matter. l. 17. for master r. matter. l. 35. for imposed, r. employed. p. 4. l. 19 for oblige, r. alleged. CONSCIENCE EASED; OR, The main Scruple which hath hitherto stuck most with conscionable Men, against the taking of the Engagement, removed. Loving Friend, and Brother in Christ, I Had occasion a few days ago, to be with your Son in Law, which put me in mind of the discourses, which you had with me when we met last at his house: whereat I found myself under a guilt of some neglect of duty towards you, which now I am willing to confess, to deprecate and amend. All that I have to say for myself is, that soon after you were gone from hence; I did indeed, as I promised, put my thoughts concerning your Scruple to Paper; out soon after I went out of Town, & all this last Summer, having been variously distracted, and several times in the country, I could not atrend the ripening & transcribing them to be imparted unto you: once I did set upon it to do it, but was by a very pressing occasion taken off The occasion of this discourse. again, and some time since I have thought upon my promise, but I know not how I was willing to believe that happily you were satisfied, and should not now need any suggestions which I could offer; and thus I have protracted the discharge of this Duty, till the other day I was struck with some remorse, and found cause to be ashamed of myself, that all this while I had not made good my promise, made to you so long ago; nor done that which was befitting my love and friendship to you in Christ; when as I did not certainly know how fare your spirit was now quieted, which happily might lie as much under a doubt as ever: but that which doth now more effectually waken me to this performance, is that among all the objections against the Engagement; which I have been obliged to reflect upon since I saw you; I do not remember that the matter of your scruple, hath been so deeply pressed by any as by yourself, and two or three days ago, by a very honest and Godly Gentleman, who is pinched just as and the scope there of which is to rrsolve the chief Scruple about the Engagement. you were, and brought your ease fully again to my mind; which I find when I lay it seriously to heart, the deepest, most inward, & weightiest Scruple of any that doth belong unto this business: Therefore I shall now are last (rather thus late, then never) acquaint you with what I have to say unto it to clear it. I find by your Paper which I have, that your Scruple which doth rise from two causes, viz. 1. from the misinterpretation of the Engagement. doth rise from two things. First, from your interpretatiou of the words of the Engagement, when you put the whole Emphasis in the latter clause thereof, viz. As it is now established, without a King, und House of Lords: which you conceive is the cause intended to be more directly obligatory than the foregoing; viz. To be true and faithful to the Commonwealth of England. Secondly, because you conceive that the sense of the 2. From the contradiction between it, and the Oath of Allegiance. Engagement, as you understand it, doth contain a direct contradiction to the true meaning of the Oath of Allegiance, and of the Nationall Covenant; for your difficulty lies in this, how to bring the intentions which you had in the former Engagements, to a Righteous consistency, with the intention which you conceive you aught to have in this Engagement; all which difficulty you reduce to this practical Syllogism, under which your conscience is concluded at present. He that is under a lawful Oath and Covenant of both are summoned up in one practical Syllogism. the Lord, may not lawfully do any such thing as tendeth directly to take him off from acting in righteous ways, according to his Oath and Covenant: But I am (say you under a lawful Oath and Covenant of the Lord, to assist the jurisdictions annexed unto the Imperial Crown of this Realm, in the preservation of the true Religion, and Liberties of the Kingdom; and to endeavour to preserve the Rights and Privileges of Parliament, as they were at the taking of the Covenant, and the entering into the present Engagement (as the proper sense thereof is obvious to me) tendeth directly to take me off for ever from acting even in righteous ways according to this Oath and Covenant: therefore I cannot lawfully enter thereinto, Prov. 4. 27. To enlarge your spirit from this straight, I conceive there is none other way but to clear your apprehension from the mistakes wherein you are concerning The way to resolve the Scruple. the intent of the Nationall Covenant, and of the Oath of Allegiance, compared with the true intent of the present Engagement: for if it shall appear that you run upon a clear mistake, concerning the true and righteous intents of any of these, than your Scruple will be found groundless, because the opposition which you imagine to be between them (under which imagination your Conscience is straightened,) will be removed. To this effect then let me recommend unto your serious perusal, that which I have said to the Cheshire & Lancashire Ministers plea for non-subscribers; where I show their mistake about the main object of truth and faithfulness required in the Engagement:; for although their mistake doth rise from the misconstruction of the word Commonwealth, whereat you seem not to be staggered, so as they are, yet the grounds which are there obliged to clear the sense of the Engagement, may be of use to let you see that the Emphasis The resolution of the first part thereof. cannot be there where you place it; but that the chief Emphasis must be placed there, where the proper disposition of the words, the nature of the matters expressed therein, and the public Declarations given out to that very purpose, place it; for if their public Declarations tend mainly to this, that to show themselves true & faithful to the good of the Nation, they have constituted it to be a free State, or Commonwealth, by the removal of the King, and House of Lords, who did usurp upon the Liberties of the Nation, and if the disposition of the words and matters of the Engagement, in their Grammatical and Rational Construction, are must consonant to this pla●ne intent of their Declatations; then we ought to place the Emphasis of the words, not in the latter but in the former clause of the Engagement, because the end wherefore the establishment hath been made without a King, and House of Lords is, to make England a Common wealth, or free State; and therefore their many intentions to oblige every one, who shall live in it and enjoy the Liberties thereof, to be true and faithful thereunto; and I am sure you understand by Truth and Faithfulness, not a mere negative, but a positive durifulnesse: now to make the privative part of the establishment to be the proper and principal object of such a dutifulness, when the positive establishment is directly and immediately both in the position of the words, and in the property of the things set before it, seems to me to proceed rather from a spirit of Jealousy against their persons, then from reason and ingenuity, in considering the meaning of their words. If than nothing but an injurious Jealousy doth put the Emphasis where you place it, you may free yourself from that ground of your Scruple, if you will be but so equitable, as to take the words of the Engagement, in a sense containing a just Duty which it clearly bears; and if you can do this, which I hope you will not find a Scruple to do; then in the next place I shall entreat you to weigh these following Propositions in Thesi without prejudice whether yea or no they are not sound and without all exception; which if you do, I hope they will conduce somewhat to the clearing of the rest of your Scruple. 1. That no humane Engagements, are, or aught to Grounds to clear the second part of the Scruple, showing, be binding to the conscience of those that take them; further, than the meaning of those that give them is declared and assented unto by the taker. 2. That no Engagements, whereof the meaning is 1 1. How fare humane Engagement are binding. declared, aught to be further binding to the conscience, than the intent declared is lawful and allowable in the presence of God. 3. That the intents of no Engagements amongst men can be further lawful and allowable in the presence of God, then as they are subordinate unto the main rules of our Christian Profession, and to the principles of natural equity in humane societies, whence this Corollary will follow. That if upon unfore-seen accidents and emergences 2 2. What may alter them. (which altar the nature of all humane affairs) one and the same intent and design, may be at one time agreeable to these Rules and Principles, and at another time become disagreeable thereunto: then that intent and design, not only may, but must be laid down; for it is wholly unlawful to maintain any purposes which cease the practice or the profession of duties flowing from these Rules and Principles. 4. That the intents and designs of the Oath of Allegiance, 3 3. What the intents of the Oath of Allegiance, and National Covenant are. and of the National Covenant, were never made by the Parliaments, which framed them to contradict one another; or in their proper times to oppress the rules of our Christian profession, or the principles of natural equity by which our society is upheld: although in respect of certain expressions, which relate to the circumstances of several times, wherein they were framed, they are clearly different one from another. Whence this again will follow. That to be obliged to different intentions (though contrary) upon several occasion (if both agree in their proper times to the forenamed Rules and Principles) this can be no breach of Duty, or prejudice of Conscience. 5. That it doth belong only to the Superior 4 4. To whom it doth belong to Judge of public intentions and designs and forms of Government. powers of Humane societies to judge and determine at all times that the public Engagements and Designs ought to be, and what the form of Government is, which is most proper for the times, and agreeable to Natural Equity to be yielded unto by all for common preservation in Humane societies. 6. That the Supreme Powers cannot be bound 5 5. What power the supreme governor's have in altering government. up unalterably to any particular design or Humane Engagement; so as not to be free upon Emergencies to entertain other designs and Engagements; when they shall think it most expedient for Common safety, and agreeable to Christianity, nay, they are not only free to do this, but they are bound to it: else they are not faithful to the Charge which God hath committed to them. 7. That Subjects (that is, particular men in private 6 6. By what rule private men should order their thoughts about the intents of public engagements to Judge thereof. stations) ought not to make themselves interpreters of the intents of public Engagements, otherwise then as they are agreeable to the Rules of Christianity, and the Principles of Natural equity; and so fare as they bear a sense agreeable unto these; so fare they are bound in conscience professedly to own them, but if a sense be imposed upon them contrary to any of these, than they are not obliged to own that sense. From whence I suppose this will follow. That whatsoever any man's private intention or 7 7. By what rule humane intents about public engagements are altergble. sense of any public Engagement may be, when he takes it: if afterward he finds clearly and convincingly that either his intention was not subordinate unto the public at all, but only to some private aim; or though it was truly in his thought subordinate thereunto, but not agreeable to the Rules and Principles of Christianity and equity; (I say) if he finds himself mistaken either way; he is bound to rectify his mistake, and bring his sense in observing the same unto the proportion of the forenamed Rules and Principles of Christianity and natural equity. If these Propositions are to you, as to me they are, The application of these grounds to the scruple in hand, showing generally that to come out of it we must consider sound and without exception, I suppose they may show you a way to come out of the straight whereinto your conscience is concluded: for if you apply them to the case in hand; concerning this present engagement, with respect to former engagements; and do make all their intents, according to the circumstances wherein they were begotten commensurable one to another, by the rules and principles of Christianity and natural equity; you will find either no cause at all to take up in your mind such contradictory intentions, as you have imagined to be therein: or if the circumstances of affairs shall be found such, as will enforce by these rules and principles to allow of a change of intentions in the latter which was not in the fo●mer engagements; then your spirit will be set at liberty, from the straight wherein it is; which proceeds only from the want of this due consideration, as I conceive; for when I put myself in your case (which to give you an unpartial advice, I must do) I find but two ways to be rid of the scruple 1 1. That the same main intent is to be in all public engagements. wherein you are ensnared; the one is by looking upon the main intent and fundamental duty which is the life and soul of all these engagements. a thing unalterably one and the same in them all, viz: common safety and welfare: to the prosecution of which (by the law of God in right reason) all public engagements are at all times subordinate; though the means and ways diversely mentioned therein do . The other is by looking upon the evedent emergencies 2 2. That the means are to be alterable by emergencies and the rules and principles of proceed still the same. which bring a change upon the means and ways of prosecuting that intent, for it is undeniable that as the Circumstances of Humane affairs alter, so the Engagements to prosecute Common safety and welfare therein are alterable. If then I can see that notwithstanding the changeableness of Emergencies, and the variety of means resulting from thence, the same end is prosecuted by the same Rules and Principles, I am still where I was; and no more out of my way, then if in a Voyage at Sea, whiles I am steering the same course; I have sometimes fair, and sometimes foul weather; or a wind sometimes on this, sometimes on that side of the Ship; which doth oblige the Mariners to nothing else but to trim the Sails somewhat in another way, and stand more or less carefully to their tackling. Now to make some application of this to our Particularly that we should consider. case, I conceive whiles the King and Parliament did agree, and the trust of Common safety was reposed in him by his observance of the Laws; The Oath of Allegiance like a fair gale in fair weather, did carry us on peaceably towards the Haven of common safety: but when he was judged to manage his Trust unfaithfully, as intending not to steer his course by Law, but by will: the Covenant first like a side-wind on the one hand came in with foul weather, and then the Engagement came in after it, as a change of wind on the other side of the Ship; both winds (as it is natural to all side-windes) may serve to carry the Ship safely to her harbour, if the Mariners trim the Sails well, and the Passengers do not disturb them in their functions: for if the same aim of common welfare is really intended by all three Engagements, though they put it under different expressions; than you are not out of your way by taking any of them, if contrary to the rules of Christianity, you must put out yourself out of it; For that which in the Oath of Allegiance is required to be performed towards the jurisdictions annexed 1 1. That wherein all former engagements have one aim. unto the Imperial Crown of this Realm, is termed in the Nationall Covenant, the defence of the King's Person and just Authority in the preservation of the true Religion and liberties of the Kingdoms; all which in this present Engagement is summed up and expressed by truth and faithfulness to the Commonwealth of England. The King, whiles he was in place of Trust, was looked upon as the Centre of all common interests, and the Guardian of public safety; next unto the Laws & Legislative power, (for indeed he is no King, de jure, further than he agrees with these, and is a living Law in all his deportments) but when he made himself Laws, and would by power have set himself up instead of the 2 2. What the emergency was which did alter our relation to the King. Law, the trusties of the Nation, to whom the Legislative and the Executive power doth primarily belong; thought it necessary to express the forenamed Interests entrusted to his management, (and therefore by the Oath of Allegiance fixed upon his name) more directly, properly, and immediately, by the name of a Commonwealth, the safety of which was mainly intended by the Oath of Allegiance, although the words thereof mention our relation only to the King. If then when you took the Oath of Allegiance, your intention was not so much to oblige yourself to the welfare of the Nation, in that way of settlement, Or to that way of settlement in order to Common welfare; as to the maintaining of a mere Royal greatness for itself, or to the maintaining of the King's person in his Royal 3 3. What the mistake was might be at first in taking the oath of allegiance which now is to be rectified. greatness without respect to Common welfare; you did wholly mistake the true and Legal intent of your Oath; and because that such an imagination had crept insensibly upon the spirits of many, by whom the King thought he could have exalted himself to be absolute above the Nations liberties; therefore the Parliaments of both Nations finding that the name of a King was made an Idol to the prejudice of that for which it was entertained, joined in the Covenant, to rectify that mistake, by determining that the true notion of Common welfare and safety, did mainly and more nearly stand in the maietenance of Religion and Liberty, with the Rights and privileges of Parliament, then in the having of a King; And since the Covenant hath been made void, as to the Nations, by reason of the hostility which hath been used between them; the Supreme power of this Nation, hath for itself (as distinct from Scotland) determined in reference to the emergencies sprung up since the making of the Covenant, that the true notion of Common welfare and safety, as to us, doth now stand in the maintaining of the Commonwealth by itself, immediately, without a King and House of Lords; For the having of a King and House of Lords, were never by the rules of Christianity and natural equity, understood otherwise to be useful, but in order to the Commonwealth: If therefore at any time, they whereby any taken up for themselves, without a due subordination to the Commonwealth: It is a clear mistake of the true meaning of their constitution; and by the principles of Natural equity, it is in the power of the trusties for the Commonwealth to rectify it, not is there any rule in Christianity which is not consonant unto this, that Salvus populi is Suprema Lex, therefore they who are entrusted with Authority and power to see this Law kept: it according to the best of their understandings upon different emergencies they altar the means of procuring it, and determine the way of prosecuting it; I cannot see what should move the consciences of particular men to be offended at 4 4. And what obligation lies them for so doing; or what warrant they can have in Christianity or natural equity to cross them in upon private men to follow their rulers in the way of rectifying this mistake. their proceed; If they prescribe nothing to those that are in subjection, which is in itself impious or unlawful; for if they do prescribe any such thing, the Law of God is clear; but if nothing of this kind be enjoined, but only that which is in its own nature alterable, according to circumstances, (of which circumstances they by their places are made Judges (and not I) than I suppose it is undeniably clear, that my conscience ought not to be bound up so to any one particular circumstance of proceeding towards the public safety, as that I may not have the liberty, upon the change of circumstances, to follow them whom in alterable matters God hath made my Leaders for the public good. For if it belongs to their proper charge to judge when, and where, and what change is to be made in the State; and how the public good by Public Resolutions is to be advanced therein: and if I am bound to trust them with this, and am not permitted by the law of God in Christianity or common equity to take upon me to be their judge, or to rule them, or to overrule the judgements of other men under them, against their sense therein; then my conscience is at liberty and under no guilt; Although I follow their dictates in affairs which are changeable: I must only look to this, that in my private station, my course upon all emergencies whatsoever be made answerable to the rules of Christianity and equity, in the circumstances of mine own way whereof I am to be a judge for myself: and if in these circumstances I subordinate by these rules my proceed to common safety, I discharge the duty of a true and faithful Subject; and need not to trouble my spirit further with higher matters: for if I do trouble myself with them, I bring myself into a snare; because I observe not the bounds wherein I am at liberty. but go beyond them. If these grounds cannot be contradicted Rationally; then I suppose you will see thereby, that you The conclusion of the main scruple need not to be concluded so as you think you are obliged to be unalterably under the precise terms of the former Engagements, in opposition to this; because the true and Legal intent thereof is fully made out, so fare as concerns the show of your judicature in this last Engagement. Therefore when you say in your discourse to me, that the Oath of Allegiance and the Nationall Covenant are such Sacred and everlasting Obligements The consequence inferred upon the main scruple is proposed. upon the consciences of these that are under them, that they can never lawfully by enterring into any after-Ingagements bind up themselves from acting in good and lawful ways (if the Lord be pleased to open any such in after times) for the assisting of the jurisdictions formerly annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm; and for the preserving of the Rights of Parliament then acknowledged, when the Covenant was taken, as fare forth as the Imperial jurisdictions and And then opened and resolved to show. Parliamentary Rights are Consistent with the true Religion and liberties of the Kingdom. I say, when you assert this, you mean either to make every particular man a Judge of the restrictive clause how fare the Imperial Jurisdictions and Parliamentary Rights, are consistent with the true Religion and Liberties of the Kingdom, or not; If you will make every particular man a competent judge of Imperial jurisdictions, of Parliamentary Rights, and of the consistency thereof in reference to all public emergencies, with the true Religion and the Liberties of the Kingdom, you will be obliged to show me some grounds for this your opinion; and to make it appear that I have erred in my fifth proposition, which I suppose is not to be contradicted. But if you will not make every private or particular man a public Judge of those things; & yet will allow them to be determined upon all emergent public occasions by some body in a public way; than it will I suppose fall to the share of the Supreme powers for the time being to make this determination: & if it be their right upon all emergencies to Judge what consistency there is between the true Religion & the liberties of the Kingdom) which to me are essential requisities of the common welfare and safety of a christian common wealth with the imperial jurisdictions and the Parliamentary Rights, than I suppose inferiors ought either to be concluded by their determination, or not. If not, how can it be supposed to be their right? what ground is there left upon such occasions, to avoid confusion and to keep a settlement of order and governments? But if they ought to be concluded by their superiors in these things; and if their superiors Judge it fit or necessary for common safety, to alter the terms of these former public engagements; how can their obligements as to these things be called everlasting and never alterable? for if these that have a right to alter the same, find cause so That all humane Constitutions being alterable no everlasting and unalterable obligement can be brought upon men's consciences thereby to do: and do as they find cause; and if none are to be Judges of the causes of that alteration but they themselves; and if the rest are to be concluded by them, how can the obligement of the conscience be made everlasting to a matter in it's own nature alterable? I conceive then that no everlasting obligement can be brought upon the conscience of any man but by God himself in things by his authority made unalterable in their nature: and except that you can show me that the Imperial jurisdictions mentioned in the oath of Allegiance, and the Parliamentary privileges and rights which then were, are made by his authority of a nature unalterable, I cannot allow you that by any engagement (though never so strong) whereby we are bound unto them, an everlasting and unalterable obligement can be brought upon any man's conscience: Our oaths never to alter; or to maintain a form of government in places and callings faithfully and truly, doth not make the form neither in its own nature, nor as to us and to the public unalterable by superior powers upon emergencies: they only bind us, nor to be accessary as private men, that is, by private practices unto the alteration thereof, so long as they are consistent with common safety, which is only determinable by the supreme power of a nation: for I suppose you never meant that those obligements should hold, although all public welfare and common safety should go to wrack for their sakes. If then they were at the very time of their making to be understood, as subordinate unto this condition; that is, to be alterable if upon emergencies they should be found contrary to common safety; how can they be counted an everlasting obligement as you would make them to be? can your particular oath predetermine you in humane affairs not to be obliged to yield to divine Providence therein? or not to follow what is determined by the rules of Christianity and equity? You see then upon what grounds to my understanding the present engagement and former oaths either agree; or are lawfully alterable without any just scruple of conscience to be made by me, in my place at the public alteration thereof. This is your main doubt; and thus to me it is revealed. The other doubts which (you say yourself) lie not near the heart of the business; I need not meddle withal: for if these principles which I have laid; and the application thereof which I have made, be without exception, than other by-matters cannot reach to the conscience in this business: yet Concerning some secondary doubts. ex abundanti; that I may pay you some interest for the long delay of discharging this debt: and that nothing may be wanting which may tend to clear your thoughts in this disquiry; I shall take the other doubts of your discourse as you have offered them into consideration, First you say that my assertion concerning the power of Subordinate officers is, Questionable. My assertion was; that Subordinate officers belonging to a State are bound to Judge of the rights of these that are over them; both by which 1 1. Concerning the right which subordinate officers have to Judge of the actings of superiors. they stand in their places of supremary; and by which they proceed in their actings towards Subjects, lest they be made the instruments of arbitrary power and Tyranny. This assertion you say is Questionable. But to clear the doubt which you may have of it, take notice, that I speak of officers belonging to a State, as immediately subordinate thereunto, and not depending upon a King, though the Supreme Officer therein: I suppose then that they are appointed by the Authority of the State itself, and placed in their Offices thereby, & not by the authority of the K. This being presupposed, that these officers are thus created & stand in their places, I conceive that which I have said of them to be a truth very material to be cleared, to show not only how a people may lawfully (I mean by the law of Nature) free themselves from the danger of Tyranny; but how private men who are in no public place of Trust; may be induced to discern what is most conducible for public Safety by the Authority of their Leaders. To have then this matter determined; we may reflect upon two things: First, what To determine that which is doubtful concerning this matter is considered. Constitutions and Customs the Nations pretending to Freedom have made, or keep up, concerning the subordination of Officers, under their highest Powers, Secondly, what the Ground and main Principle of subordination of Officers is in Nature, and what the end of their employment under Supreme Powers is. What sorts of officers are in use among free nations We find by the Constitutions or Customs of free Nations, three sorts of subordinate Officers in their States; Some are placed by the Representatives of a Nation in their Offices; Some by him that is in the place of Supremacy over it: some by both jointly. The first, although in respect of Power they are less, and in Order they are after him who is Supreme (because his place is first, and his Power is of a larger extent than theirs) yet because they receive not their places from him, but from the same 1 1. Such as are set up by the State itself. Authority whence he hath his; Therefore they are not accountable to him of their proceed, but unto those only who gave them their authority. Thus in Poland, Sweden, and Denmark, by the ancient constitution of those States, there are several offices of state, as chancellor's and chief justices, and Admirals who are appointed by Parliament; and so hold their places from it, and not from their Kings. Thus you had in England a Constable of the Kingdom, whom the Parliament did appoint. But King James never rested till he was removed. Thus in the Empire the electors are under the Emperor; not as his officers, but as Officers of the Empire itself; they are entrusted to be Judges of the right and title of him who is to be Supreme; and they have a power in their college to control him in his proceed if he become exorbitant; for they may say to him, what dost thou? this then is an allay of his imperial power; and so are all officers of this nature any where else; an allay to the absoluteness of the Royal power. The second sort of subordinate officers, are such as depend merely upon him that is supreme in a Nation: for he hath power in the charge wherewith he 2 2. Such as are set up by the Supreme Officer of State. is entrusted to make and unmake his own instruments; so that they are to be counted properly his officers subordinate to the charge, whereof he is the chief administrator: these are therefore responsable unto him first, and then also to the State, even as he himself is by whom they are employed. These officers although they have no paaticular trust reposedin them by the nation; yet because they are made instrumental in the administration of a trust which the nation hath reposed in him, who doth create them & set them at work, therefore they are responsable for the effects of their administration, to those from whom the first trust doth proceed; and to whose advantage or disadvantage the way of their administration doth finally redound: whence it follows that these officers are bound both for their own safety, & for the obligation which lieth upon them towards the state, to judge both of the power which their superior takes upon himself to exercise, and whereof he pretends to have a right to have them his instruments, and also of the manner and property of the work which they are employed in, lest they should under him at his will, being led blindfold to obey, become instruments of Tyranny and injustice, Thus the servants of Saul (though soldiers who are otherwise bound to a most strict obedience justly refused to be the executioners, of his cruelty in killing the priests of the Lord. 1. Sam. 22. 17. The third sort of subordinate officers, are such as are constituted by the joint consent & concurrence of both; as when the Representations of a free State; viz: the supreme council thereof, agree with a governor whom they call and choose; that he shall place none in special offices under him; The third by such as are set up by both jointly. for the administration of their public concerments but such as shall be taken out of a certain number whom they shall present unto him: so that the Election of two or three Persons, indefinitely, as capable of the place, is in the power of the Senate; but the distinct appointment and nomination of one who is to have the place, is left to the Supreme Governor. Thus in the Low Country's Burgemasters of Towns & Sheriffs of the Territories were constituted by the Prince who was their Governor; & in several Prounces, there & elsewhere, other Officers of State, are constituted by such a concurrence of Election on the one, and Nomination on the other side, that the power of conferring authority is divided; and the subordinate officers receive in their places a trust from both, and become accountable unto both in several respects. These are the Customs and Constitutions of 2 2. Concerning the principle & ground of subordination. free Nations, to prevent the abuse of Power in their Officers. As for the Principle whence naturally Subordination doth proceed; I conceive it to be the necessity of Unity and Order in a society, for the management of public affairs, wherein all are concerned, for to avoid the dissolving of Societies, joint Relations and Duties belonging thereunto, must be settled as a common interest, and to avoid the confusion which would follow upon the management of that interest, if it were left to every one to do in it, what he should think good; the Trust thereof must needs lie in some hands; and the nature of that Trust must be determined by a law, which should be the effect of the free consent of those that are interested in the Public to provide the welfare thereof, and because no single hand can be every where by itself; at the same time; to discharge a large Trust which hath many parts; whereof the one is to be made helpful to the other: therefore many are employed in order to one another, and all to the original of power by whom they are set a-work. And concerning the direct & Immediate end of subordination, 3 3. Concerning the end of subordination. it is to bring all transactions to one issue; namely to the safety & welfare of the Communalitie, by the a dministration of duties according to laws, whereby every one is to have his due from another; which is called Justice. And the Indirect and Accidental end of Subordination & coordination of Officers under a Supreme, is to prevent by the bounds of offices, and the distribution of Power belonging thereunto; the Tyrannical encroachment of Power into one single hand; lest an absolute Arbitrary dominion be taken up over those, who by the law of Nature and of Christianity being free, put themselves voluntarily in an orderly Subjection to a Superior power. For in my apprehension all humane actions, whether natural or spiritual depend upon power: (I mean by power a might and strength to produce an effect) and wheresoever God or men have disposed of power, and placed strength to act for a public interest; there What is properly meant by authority. is also a right to administer that power to that effect; that is to put it forth towards others to that end: This right I do call Authority; because it entitles a man unblameablely to become the Author of the undertake, for which he hath received power; and to be a leader of others who should concur therein with him: this right or authority is not unlimited or commensurable only to the utmost extent of what power is able to do; so that he who hath power may do with it what ever he will and can; but it is bounded in nature by the end for which it is given; and in societies of reasonable men by a law to become serviceable to a common good: and if upon emergencies no positive law be extant to determine the Circumstantial way of using power and authority; then the general law of Nature and of Christianity is to take place, which is the law of liberty, by which all cases may be determined so fare as to make our actions at least without offence, if not also acceptable to those to whom they are done. This law is, give no occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another; and the rule of this service is; what ever you would have others Gal. 5. 13. Luke 6. 31. do to you; do ye to them likewise. To be in authority is to have a right to act in a place for the public good, so as to be an author of some undertaking; and to be obliged to lead others therein: which obligation doth naturally arise from the trust of power put in the hands of him that hath received it, to act towards those and for those that give it; to the end for which it is bestowed: whereof there is a clear example in the power given to the constable of every parish; who is obliged to be the author of public undertake in the sphere of the Trust reposed in him, though otherwise he is a man of no respect. Upon these grounds the subordinate Offices of a State, may judge and act in their places for the public good, to prevent Tyranny, and the encroachment of absolute power in him who is entrusted with the highest power: and if these grounds be sound (as I suppose they are) they will clear the justice and equity of the Parliament proceed in their late Transactions with the King; whereupon a change of Government is fallen out in this State; which being brought about by the Supremacy of power in the Representatives of the people, and by a right to act for the public good in the subordinate Officers of the State; private Persons are bound to acquiesce thereat, and to regulate their intentions according to the Rules and Principles of Natural equity and Christianity in their several places, as Emergencies do require. This matter which you did call Questionable, but would not debate, I have thus endeavoured to open somewhat largely, because it is of use to undeceive us from the false Notion of Royal power, which doth insensibly breed many scruples; when it is taken up unawares, without a due examination of the right which it hath to Supremacy, in a Nation which is to be governed by Laws, and not by will of a Monarch But you have other matters in your discourse, which you thought more worthy of a debate; and you take them chief from three Passages of my considerations; to show that they are not satisfactory to resolve your present Scruple; to these I shall also impart unto you my present thoughts. In Pag. 6. I say, that private men cannot be counted 2 2. Concerning the guilt of breach of covenant in private persons. guilty of a breach of Covenant, because there was a change of Government brought upon the State by others in a way to them unresistable in their places. To this you answer: As I was not guilty (say you) of what others did (whether well or ill, I leave it freely to the judgement of the Lord and their own conscience) in a way unresistable as to me in my place; so I cannot lawfully bind up myself from acting in my place in lawful ways for the accomplishment of my Oath and Covenant, without guilt of sin, and despising the Oath of the Lord. To this I answer: That the present Engagement, if you look upon it as containing a perpetual Duty to be true and faithful to the Commonwealth; is That the engagement brings no such guilt upon any so fare from binding you up from acting that which in your place, is fitting for you to do, towards the accomplishment of your Oath and Covenant (so fare as they are binding) that it rather doth oblige you to act in your present place, that which is the ground, by which your Oath and Covenant did Legally bind you to a Duty; and without which they could not at all be binding, which in the beginning of this Discourse and elsewhere also I have showed. As for me, I do not think it lawful to suffer myself to be bound up, by any Emergencies whatsoever, or any Resolutions of mine own, from the Intentions of performing known Duties; Nor do I think it lawful for any Christian to think himself tied by any Oaths or Covenants whatsoever, so, as at any time he should be thereby bound up from the performance of any clear and undeniable Duty towards God and Men in his place; therefore I plainly assert that the Allegation of Oaths and Covenants, which doth tend to take me off from an undoubted Duty, is undoubredly undutiful: for which cause, when the Engagement was offered unto me, I did set myself to look upon it, not as you do, to see what sense it might bear contrary to any former Duty; but to see what the Duty was which it did directly require, and which I was bound at this time, Rebus sic Stantibus, or at all times to intent: and having made a Declaration of my Sense in taking the Engagement to this effect; and my Sense being accepted, or not accepted against by those that were imposers thereof; I thought it my Duty to rest there, and not to trouble myself any further; either with the Conjectures of future Contingencies, as some do: or as others But that the prejudices which some entertain against the Authors of our change layeth the imputation of that guilt. do, with jealousies over the intentions of my Rulers; or with the Censures of miscarriages, which others imagine to be in those over whom they are set to be Judges; for although you leave it (as you say) freely to God to judge, whether the present Change be well or ill brought about; yet give me leave to tell you, that I cannot perceive that your Spirit is free without prejudice against them in reference to the change: for if you had no prejudicated thoughts that way; you could not make such a construction of the engagement as you do, relating to the change as it is opposite to a duty which you think lies upon you by the tye of an Oath and Covenant. Therefore if there be a clear and perpetual duty both in the former and latter Engagements in something wherein their senses agree, and yet if you will not own that, but take up that rather wherein their senses may seem to disagree; I may conclude that you either mistake the true meaning of the oath and Covenant; or that you understand not your tye at this time, in observing the same, how fare it is to be extended: for if it cannot be extended, to oblige you to neglect any present and seasonable Duty; than you misapply your sense thereof, to the present occasions, so, as to make it a snare unto your conscience; which for your own Peace sake you should endeavour to avoid. But to that which I say in pag. 8. concerning 3 3. Concerning the tye of former engagememts that it is extinct. the tye of the former Oaths that is extinct so fare as the things promised therein are become either impossible in themselves; or in reference to our calling unlawful to be prosecuted: you answer, that you cannot apprehend your obligation to be extinct towards the matter of the oath of Allegiance and covenant, whiles you may possibly in lawful ways consistent with the public welfare and liberties of the Common Wealth and agreeable to your calling (viz. by Petitioning, humble Remonstrance to the Parliament, or the like Peaceable course) have an opportunity offered you to endeavour the restitution and preservation of the ancient rights and Privilegdes of Parliament and the King's Authority, in the preservation of the true Religion and Liberties of the Kingdom. And then to that which I say pag. 9 that it is not lawful for any in a private calling to attend the restoring of that which by public Authority hath been abolished; you add further by the way of answer that is true in a way of force and fraud; but that it holds not as to ways humble, peaceable, and consistent with public welfare; to which the Oath and Covenant, immediately and undispensably extend. To all which I shall answer: that humane laws Because humane laws relare only to outward actions, and not to secret intentions. such as the Engagement is, respect only men's outward actions, and oblige us to be true and faithful therein to what we declare, but the inward purposes of the mind which occasionally may be framed, no laws of man can regulate: these are subject only to the general rules of equity which Gods law doth prescribe; therefore if emergencies be so circumstantiated as you suppose they may be, to incline your thoughts to such a purpose as you speak of, the rules of natural equity and Christianity must direct you then as then, in declaring your desires how to make them harmless and consistent with the public welfare: and what need you fear that any will harm you if you follow that 1 Pet. 3. 13. which is good? but that you should imagine still that your obligation to maintain Royalty, is not extinct, is somewhat a wonder unto me: for if the matter of the Oath of Allegiance and Covenant had any legal being, you might and ought to intent the preservation thereof in your place and calling; but since that doth clearly cease to have a being, it is not imaginable to me that any private man in his Sphere should be bound to in end or endeavour the restitution thereof. For that the form of a Because the matter of the Oath of Allegiance doth clearly cease. Royal government hath no real being amongst us to oblige us to maintain it; is so clear that none can make any doubt of it; and that the l●te King's progeny (though they have a being innature, yet) have no legal being in place of trust or government as to us; is no less evident; therefore what should be the ground to make you believe; that your former obligement to Royalty, or to the late King's heirs (who did forfeit his place of Trust, as for himself so for his posterity) should still be binding, is a kind of riddle unto me, upon what account you take up that obligation to continue: for if the Allegiance which you promised to the King, to his heirs and successors could oblige you, no more but to be a good Subject in your place, and to maintain him and them in their Legal standing over you, by your legal submission unto him and them; than it followeth, that in case either they should have no such standing over you, or you should remove under them; that your obligation comes to an end: for either way the relation ceasing the obligation is made void. Nor is there any clause to oblige you to restore them to such a state, in case they should come to fail of it; nor could any such clause be obligatory although you you had promised it, because no man can lawfully be obliged to that which is not in his power. to effect. Therefore I say, that by virtue of these former Because former Engagements bind not to a restitution of Royalty if abolished by public Authority. Engagements, it can be no part of your Duty to intent the restitution of those things, which are now by public Authority abolished; For if this should be an absolute Duty, than also it must be a Duty to prosecute the same absolutely; and if I am bound absolutely, (that is without any condition) to prosecute the restitution of a Royal Power over me; Then I cannot with a good Conscience acquiesce at the abolition thereof upon any terms whatsoever: nay, although the abolition be never so well and lawfully brought about: which to assert is a great Paradox, and yet except all this be granted, your position cannot stand. Therefore I am clearly convinced, not only by the Law of God commanding me to be subject to the Powers that are over me; but by the true and Legal intent of the former Engagements, that it is my Duty at this time to acquiesce at the abolition of things publicly removed: and if so, than it cannot be my Duty to prosecute the Restitution thereof; and if it is not my Duty now to prosecute their Restitution, than also it is not lawful for me to intent such a thing: for if I intent it, I am resolved in my heart to attempt that which is no part of my present Duty, and to work a change upon the present settlement, which the Word of God forbids me to meddle withal, Prov. 24. 21. For as formerly I might not in my Sphere intent to bring a change upon the State from the settlement that then was; so now the same Rule holds, I may not intent to bring a change upon the State from the settlement that now is. And although I take this to be a Rule for me in my private place to order my purposes by; yet I do not think this Rule binds the Supreme Power of a Nation; the Representatives thereof, when they are in a body acting their public Trust; as if than it were not lawful for them Because the representatives of a nation may be obliged upon Emergencies to alter the form of Royal government. according to Emergencies to be obliged to alter the forms of Government in the Nation: for although every one of them in their private station and at their admission to their Trust, may have taken the Oath and promised to maintain the Government in that form wherein they found it when they took their oath, yet when they are upon the deliberation of the public; wherein Salus Populi is to be their Suprema Lex. No humane constitution or particular obligation, can bind them in a body from what they shall find most expedient in that case to be done. And if the emergencies may be such, as to oblige them in the discharge of their trust to alter the government for public safeties, notwithstanding their oath of Allegiance to maintain it: far more when the alteration is wrought publicly, may private men (who have no power to judge of such concerments; nor to act therein without their leader be dispensed withal, from being obliged to intent the restauration of that which by public authority hath been abolished, notwithstanding their Oath, binding them to maintain it whiles it was in being. Now because yougive me cause here to reflect upon that which was formerly alleged in your words, concerning the Oath of Allegiance and Nationall Covenant, that you count them such sacred and everlasting obligements that nothing can absolve Because the property of an everlasting obligement cannot be fixed upon mere humane engagements. men from acting towards the accomplishment thereof: therefore I think it expedient to suggest something further unto your consideration, for which I think those Oaths not to be such everlasting obligements as you apprehend them to be; which is this. That nothing can be an everlasting obligement upon the conscience to bind it unto a perpetual purpose of prosecuting the same, but that which is in its own nature a perpetual Duty, and that only is to me a perpetual duty, whereof the rule and the direct object is to men unalterable. But to assert the Jurisdictions formerly annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm, etc. is not in its own nature a perpetual Duty, in respect the object of that Action is not as to men unalterable: therefore it cannot be an everlasting Obligement upon the Consciences, to bind them unto a perpetual purpose of prosecuting the same. Now that to support Monarchy, or to endeavour any other Earthly thing, relating to State affairs, is not in its own nature a perpetual Duty; I suppose is to yourself so clear, that I shall not need to prove it; for no man can be ignorant that all Earthly matters and Relations are wholly alterable according to the Emergencies and circumstances: whence followeth immediately that the Conscience cannot be everlastingly bound to intent the prosecution thereof; but only conditionally, according to the main end for which such Obligements are allowed to be taken, and according to the Rule by which they are to be prosecuted, which in private men is not without the conduct of their Leaders, who are instructed with the Supreme management of public affairs; if then the Leaders, as heretofore they saw cause to abolish Monarchy, should see cause hereafter to set it up again, and thereupon should intent a new change in the State; I think it would in this Case be lawful for you to concur with them therein: whence we must conclude, that as the Rulers of this State by taking the Engagement, cannot intent to oblige themselves, never to intent upon what Emergencies soever to alter the present Establishment; so the Subjects thereof by taking the same Engagement, cannot be supposed to bind up themselves from following their Leaders in the resolutions which in that kind they may take; for if upon new Emergencies the Supreme Powers should lead the people to intent a new Change with them; without all doubt they may lawfully do it; but except you suppose the conduct and guiding of these; I see not how it can be lawful in the aim of any private man to precure it by any means whatsoever: because by so doing private men without their Leaders go beyond their Line. Therefore still I conclude that private men may not attempt the restoring of that which by public Authority hath been abolished, otherwise then under the conduct of their Superior Powers. The third and last thing which you question, is that which I say pag. 9 That if in order to the public good, I were bound by Oath to prosecute a business, and should find that by my prosecution of it, the public would rather be hindered then advanced; that in such a case my Oath would oblige me rather to desist from prosecuting 4 4. Concerning releasement from oaths upon a con●ition. the business, then to proceed therein. To which you say thus; That this being Dogmatically delivered, doth seem altogether unsound; which you endeavour to show by the Example of Zedekiah, who is condemned for breaking his Oath upon such a pretence to the King of Babylon; for you say; No question Zedekiah became subject, and And Zedekiah his Case & plea for the breaking of his Oath. was bound by Oath to the King of Babylon in Order to the common good of his Kingdom, and afterward apprehending (as we may be confident) that it would be more useful for the public good of the Commonwealth, to stand free from the Babylonian Yoke; by the assistance of the King of Egypt, he attempted the procurement of that freedom, contrary to his Oath; and became guilty of Oath and Covenant breaking before God; for which he is deeply charged and threa●●●● by the Lord, Ezech. 17. So then your Argument from hence is this; If Zedekiah did behave himself in breaking his Oath according to the Rule which you lay down; and yet was condemned by the Lord for so doing; Then the Rule which you own is not sound: But Zedekiah did so, Ergo, To answer this doubt; I shall confess, that if Zedekiah his Case was the same with that which I suppose; and if he followed the Rule which I give The argument raised upon Zedekiahs' case. in that Case; and yet is condemned by the Lord for following that Rule, than my Rule is not sound; but I conceive you will find (if you look somewhat nearer to the business) that his Case is not the same with that which I suppose; nor that he followed the rule which I gave in this Case, nor that he is condemned by the Lord for following that Rule. The case which I suppose is concerning a particular By showing the difference of the case in hand with that of Zedekiah. business which I am bound by Oath to prosecute as a private man in order to the public good: whereof I am supposed to be a competent Judge so fare as relates to that particular business: I say, if my Oath binds me to prosecute it in order to the public good; and I upon circumstances can judge that the prosecution will not advance but oppose the public good, than my Oath binds me not to proceed, but to desist; because the express condition of the Oath which is only binding to the prosecution, is desect●ve. But in Zedekiah l. is case this cannot be supposed: For first, his Oath was not concerning my particular business, but a general submission to be a faithful Subject to the King of Babylon: nor was he a private man managing his own business, but he was the Substitute or Vicegerent of the King of Babylon, over the public State of the Kingdom of judah: nor was it left to him to be the sole competent Judge of the matter, whether his submission to the Crown of Babylon should tend to the public goodyea or no; for that was already absolutely determined; and he was sworn to be subject without any other condition; but that he should be King to that effect. The case then as it is by me proposed, is not appliable to Zedekiah: Therefore it comes not to be considered by my Rule, nor had he the liberty left him to make use of my Rule, for my rule speaks of a conditional Oath; and no such thing can be supposed in this case. My rule supposes me to be free to prosecute or leave my business according to mine own judgement, as I shall see it subordinate to a publipue good; but the business to which he was sworn, was not left to him to judge otherwise of, than was already determined by his superior Lord the King of Babylon, viz. that his subjection to him should be the safety of the Nation; his Rebellion from him, should be his and their destruction: nor was the case when Zedekiah rebelled, altered from what it was at first when he swore subjection; which I suppose in my rule must fall out seeing therefore Zedekiah could not make use of my rule in his case; I conclude that he could not be condemned for making use of it. But because this matter is worth a further disquiry; and And how our obligation to be subject to the King by the Oath of Allegiance and the Covenant, differ from Zedekiahs' oath to the King of Babylon. I see that the case which I have proposed undefinitely, may be applied to the oath of Allegiance under which we stood for the public good; and to the Nationall covenant; concerning which you may say perhaps of us as I have said of Zedekiah, that they bind us absolutely to be subjects to the King, and leave it not to us to judge whether our subjection to him should tend to the public good yea or no: therefore to resolve this doubt also, I shall compare our condition of subjection, and our Oath binding him thereunto towards the King of Babylon, and then if the case be found alike; I shall confess that we are now, as much bound, to the master of our Oath as he then was bound to the master of his: but if his relation to the King of Babylon was wholly different from ours to our King; if his Oath of submission to that King was of another kind than ours was to our King, and if his way of freeing himself from his relation and from the bond of his Oath towards the King of Babylon was quite another thing then what hath been intended by us; then I hope you will not make our case parallel to his; but in all these matters a vast difference, will be found between him and us, ergoe his guilt cannot be made ours. First his Relation to the King of Babylon, was to be the vassal In respect of the relation wherein he stood to Nebuchadnezer and we to the King of England. of a Conqueror for the K. of B. having ruined the state of judah and subdued the Nation, made Zedekiah his vassal to rule it in his name, who bound himself by Oath so to do: but we stood not under our K. as a Conquered nation by him, but as free borne subjects under a King bound to rule by law. Secondly, the Oath by which Zedekiah did submit himself to the K. of Babylon, was prescribed according to Nebuchadnezars will, and no doubt it was absolutely to keep the Nation in his subjection In respect of the oath which he took, and we took. without any condition of Laws, of Privileges, of Liberties, or of any such thing supposed or imposed on Nebuchadnezars part; but the Oath by which the people of this Nation were bound to be subjects to their K. was by those that framed and imposed it, made to be taken and kept under certain conditions: viz. that we should be Subjects by Law and not otherwise; and that our subjection to him should be consistent with the privileges of Par. & the native liberties of the nation, & no otherwise: and to make this Oath binding, those who imposed it upon the people, had power to impose another Oath which was reciprocal thereunto upon the King, that he might be bound to them to rule by law, as well as they to him to be obedient according to law: by which means the tye of the Oath was several ways limited, and the K. himself as well bound up in his commands, as they in their obedience by a Law: but no such thing can be imagined between Zedekiah and Nabuchadnezzar. Thirdly, his way of freeing himself from his relation and oath, was In respect of his way of breaking of his oath and of our way of being freed from it. by a direct rebellion contrary to the intent of his Oath and Covenant; but our way of freeing ourselves hath been Legal, agreeable to the Tenor of the Law and to the sense of the Authority by which the Oath was given and made Legal: for the Oath in the sense of the Legislative power was never absolute, but conditional; it did not bind us to the King's personal and arbitrary will and command, but to his government and authority as he had a legal standing: and the sense of the Parl. touching the Oath of Allegiance, how fare we are thereby intended to be made subordinate to the K. is expressed in the Nationall Covenant which makes it clearly conditional: and the Parl. itself hath freed us long ago from the obligation of that condition, by declaring that he had forfeited his right to govern any longer. So that the difference between Zedekiah and us, is so vast in this point of being free from the Oath, that I can find no resemblance at all in the one to the other: for as in our case if the K. kept not his Oath to his Subjects, they were absolved De lure from their Oath to him, in Zedekiah his Case there was no such contract between the K. of Babylon and him, but the will of the Conqueror was his law; in our case there was a Law to Regulate both the K. and us in keeping of our Oaths; and trusties in Parl. to see that law kept; who herein were above the King, and in cases of aberration empowered, to see faults amended, both in King and Subjects; but in the case of Zedekiah there is no such thing; the Authority of Nabuchadnezzar was above all Humane positive Laws, and Zedekiah was sworn to be absolutely his Subject in such things, and to keep his people in subjection thereunto; In our Case, the King to whom we were sworn, deserted his Station of Government, and left his trust by leaving his Parliament, and levying war against it; but in Zedekiah his Case, no such thing is imaginable; In our case the Parliament having the Supreme Authority of the Nation, and having conquered the King, doth oblige us to be true and faithful to the free States without him; but in Zedekiah his Case no such thing is conceivable: and many other things of a different nature might be insisted upon in our Case, which cannot be brought home to Zedekiah his Case, to free him from his Oath, as we are freed from ours: for his whole action was directly opposite to the clear intent of his Oath; and to all the circumstances of the public good of the Nation oft he jews, as the Lord himself doth intimate in Ezech. Ch. 17. & 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. but our actions in following the Parliament, have been all along consonant to the Legal intentof our Oath, by which we are absolved from our relation to the King, as also by all the circumstances of his miscarriages, of his illegal proceed, and of his breach of trust towards the public: by all the circumstances of the public good to be procured without him; not according to the judgement of particular men (for in this Case my Rule, is not to make every private man a judge of the public good) but of the Supreme Authority of the Nation: and by all the circumstances of his removal from the Throne, and of our present standing under the Supreme power of the Nation which now is over us. So that to Oblige the conscience of private men to intent the restauration of a royal government upon the account of such an Oath, from which we are made so many ways Legally free; is to me a great mistake of Duty, and a dangerous snare to entangle weak spirits into the occasions of public disturbances; whereunto I know you are not inclined to give any the least Overtures: but the danger is that other men who are of a turbulent disposition, and by such a mistake of their dissolved relation, and seeming Obligation to that which is contrary to their present Duty, being otherwise personally discontented, may strengthen and heighten their distempers to a full resolution of public disturbance, and endeavours of destructive unsettlements; from which I am sure your genius and pious thoughts do abhor. Thus you have that which I can at present suggest, which I beseech the Lord so to address, as it may tend most to your comfort, if you be still unsatisfied; and if you be already satisfied, that it may be a means to confirm you in that which is agreeable to his holy Will, and profitable to the good of the Commonwealth of Israel, in the love of which, I subscribe myself West minster this 8. Decem. 1650. Your faithful and affectionate Servant, I. D.