A Disengaged Survey OF THE Engagement. In relation to public Obligations.  

1. Precedent,  
2. Present,   
In the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, the Protestation, and Covenant, and under the present juncture of affairs.  
Bucer in Rom. 13. Summun jus omnium potestatum, regum, principum, & Magistratuum in eo situmest, quod à Deo ordinatae sunt. Et hujus ordination is Vnum & indubitatum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est, esse potestates.  
Pacem debet habere voluntas bellum necessitas. Aug.  
If it be POSSIBLE, as much as lieth in YOU, live peaceably with all men. Rom. 12.18.  
London printed for John Wright, at the King's Head in the Old-Bayley. 1650.   

A Disengaged Survey OF THE Engagement, IN Relation to public Obligations.  
FUlly to satisfy Conscience concerning the present Engagement, two Questions would be propounded and cleared.  

1. Whether ex Licito of right we may subscribe when called to it.  
2. Whether ex dibito of duty we must subscribe when called to it.   
For as we sin by way of Commission if we subscribe, when of right we ought not: so we sin by way of Omission if we subscribe not when of duty we ought to do it. The reason of the first Question is, because it is objected that we are under the obligation of precedent Engagements, which bear a contrariety to the present. The reason of the second is, because it is asserted that the present Engagement comes to us in the name of Authority, and as an Act in law. The first reason stands upon 〈◊〉, First the Contrariety: Secondly the Obligation. Of these neither can stand if either fail, but both, with the whole weight of the objection must of necessity fall to the ground. For if those former Engagements be either contrary, but not binding; or bindding, buy not contrary, nothing can hinder but that we may as lawfully subscribe the present Engagement as if they were neither binding nor contrary.  
The former Engagements which minister matter of scruple concerning the present, are the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, the Protestation and Covenant.  

The Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy considered.  The first scruple arises from the Oaths of Allegiance, and Supremacy; both in effect one. Their parts are two 1. Declaratory. 2, Promissory. The Declaratory part consisting of an Act merely transient leaves no ground of doubt; the Promissory part is only scrupled, and therein the word Heirs (or as the Oath of Supremacy) Lawful beires and Successors, for what concerned the King is extinct with his person.  
The doubt may be thus stated, Whether a promise made and sworn to bear faith and true Allegiance to, id est. (as 'tis afterwards interpreted) to defend the King's lawful heirs and Successors, their Crown and dignity, to uttermost power, be not contrary to and obliging against a promise to be true and faithful to the Commonwealth as it is now established without a King? for the Lords in this place signify nothing.  
The parts of the quere be two. 1. the Contrariety, 2, the Obligation. And first for satisfaction to the point of Contrariety. It may be considered that all Oaths being to be taken in their sense that give them, the intention of the first giver, must certainly be the most proper key to open their true meaning. And therefore such subsequent emergencies, as at first had no place in the intention of the giver, ought not afterwards to be screwed into the meaning of an Oath; seeing they do not properly fall under it, but rather beyond, or beside it. Now the intention of the giver will appear from two things. First, from the Occasion. Secondly, From the equity of the Oath. The one shows us what first was; the other, what still should be in the intent of the giver. And first for the occasion, 'tis evident concerning the present Oaths, that they were at first occasioned by, and by consequence intended against the frequent and pernicious attempts of Papists chiefly, and collaterally other Delinquents, by foreign invasions and domestic Conspiracies, against the then peaceably established Princes in Conjunction with Parliaments; And certainly that Parliaments should provide by Oath, for the security of Princes joining with Parliaments, against Papists and other Delinquents, is but reason and justice: but that the same provision should also intent Princes joining with Papists and other Delinquents, against Parliaments, or their Heirs and Successors, in courses of that nature, can no way stand with either. Fortis plain that such case neither did, could, nor aught to fall under the intention of the Legislators; and therefore must fall beyond and beside the meaning of these Oaths. So that when Princes prove untrue, and unfaithful to their places; 'tis of right that we may, and of duty, that we must be true and faithful to the Commonwealth, though established without them, (yea and bless God that we have an establishment) notwithstanding any thing really intended; however pretended, in these Oaths to the contrary.  
Secondly, It is to be considered, that where the Letter binds to a thing that is dubious, and cannot stand with reason and justice, not it, but the equity of a Law is to be regarded. In omni dubio praesumendum est pro aquitale legis. And the reason is, because the Letter is variable; but the equity is immutable and eternal. Now it's impossible that two pretending to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or public authority, commanding things contrary, should both command things just at once in the same place; and therefore the equity of the Law (in which both the precedent and present engagements agree) requires us (in order of the Salus of that Society, whereof we are Members) to be true and faithful to the obtaining 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or public authority, commanding things lawful and just, because in the peace thereof, ourselves shall have Peace. And the truth of this will further appear, if we consider that the obligation in the Oaths scrupled, so fare as it concerns the persons, must be taken only Conjunction with the Crown and Dignity. i e. the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or public authority, because the formalis ratio, under which they are capable either of requiring, or receiving the performance, is, qua invested with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or public authority; for the persons that act the Authority, give nothing to, but take all from it; and therefore without it, are not the formal object, to whom the obligation ought to be performed. Whereupon it follows, that in case the King, his Heirs, and Successors shall divide, and separate their persons from the Crown and Dignity; and prostitute them to the patronage of the most opposite indignities, they put themselves into an incapacity of receiving the obligation, in the Oaths in question. Which division & separation; The Parliaments of both Nations have long since declared to have been the case of the Father, and the Kirke of Scotland have lately declared to be the case of the Son. And indeed upon this account, it was that when the person of the King removed with Papists, and Delinquents to Oxford; the conscientious of the Nation thought it their duty▪ (notwithstanding any obligations in the Oaths now scrupled, and then pretended by the other side, to the contrary) to abide with the Crown & dignity at Westm. judging it more agreeable to their Obligation in the Oaths mentioned; thus to keep it in the intention and equity, by seemingly breaking it (if it must needs be called so) in some part of the expression and letter; then otherwise really to break it upon a bare pretence of keeping it. Although now (such is the power of passion, or interest, or both) some of the same persons could almost persuade themselves, that the Crown and Dignity which remained at Westminster, while the person of the late King kept Garrison at Oxford, hath of late (I know not by what wind) taken sail for the I'll of Jersey, which if in any thing it differ from Oxford, it is in this; That as it hath not any more of the thing, so it hath much less (if any thing at all) of the appearance of the Crown and Dignity. For really if men were free to use their own reason, they might easily discern that as to the Crown and Dignity in a right acceptation, neither is any thing present THERE, nor any thing absent HERE, but an empty name. Neither certainly can any satisfactory reason be given, why we may not with as little contrariety to the present Oaths, 
Master Pym's speech at a conference.  promise to be true and faithful to the Commonwealth, as now established without a King, as formerly engage to, and with the Parliament exercising the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or public Authority wholly without him; 
Votes against Hamiltons' Army  yea and in some things without the Lords. And which comes up fully to the present case, avowing the doing the like in all cases, if they should find it requisite for the good and safety of the Nation. And if it shall be objected, that however they never changed the Government, but left a door open for the King to enter in at; 'Tis answered in the first place, That makes the matter worse, rather than better; for to acknowledge a part of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or public Authority in the King, and to make addresses to him accordingly, and yet to exercise the whole wholly without him, however it could not, the cause duly considered, render such Engagements any thing the less lawful, yet it could not (at the first appearance) but render them so much the more doubtful; and the adverse party constantly endeavoured to make advantage of it accordingly.  
Secondly, As they left a door open, so they prepared suficient locks for that door, and (not without cause neither) to shut him up fast enough when entered; so as he had as much share in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or public authority, without doors, as he was like to have had within. But to speak the truth in plain English, or rather Scotish; hath not the Kirke of Scotland lately told their proclaimed King, that unless he intent to be forever shut out, he must make his entrance into that Kingdom, by the door of the Covenant, and an universal compliance with the religious Party there. Which when it shall be cordially performed, with a Demonstration of the sincerity thereof, clear and convincing, then there may be some show perhaps of a ground to scruple the point in hand, but till than it may well become all peaceably godly men, not to scruple, to promise to be true and faithful to the present Government, until they see a better; for at present, there appears none other; and if that return which is by some desired, it is like to prove worse, (if there can be a worse) than none?  
The result of all that hath been said, is, That the r●-Oathes of Allegiance, and Supremacy, so fare as they are binding, which is according to the legislators intention, and their own equity, are not contrary to the present Engagement; but as in the one respect not contra, but praeter, so in the other neither, but rather full for it: which may satisfy as to the point of contrariety.  
The second part of the quaere, was concerning the Obligation of the premised Oaths; And 'tis whether bindging or not binding, so fare as it crosses the present Engagement. In which Particular to arrive at the truth; we must set out at the consideration of such cases as have power to null the Obligation of an Oath. Not to speak of any but what are pertinent, and unquestionable; When the performance becomes either; First, unlawful: or Secondly, Impossible. In these two cases the obligation is rendered null. For as to bind to what ought not to be done, makes sin a duty; so to bind to what cannot be done, makes duty a sin; because 'tis a duty that the creature aswell willingly, as of necessity, contain himself within those lists, wherewith, in actions of this nature, the providence of God, ordering things contingent to us, by a power and wisdom infinitely above us, contrary to our expectations, is pleased to circumscribe it.  
The unlawfulness may arise two ways, either in respect of the persons first to to whom; or secondly, by whom, the Obligation is to be performed. First, to whom, As put case a Ship designed to public service, putting forth to Sea, the whole company (other Officers and Mariners) swear to be true and faithful to the Captain, and to defend his person, Place and Authority. Afterwards the Captain with others of the company, forsake their own Vessel, and shipping themselves with the common Enemy; the Captain require the rest of the company, with their Ship to attend his person, and submit to his authority, by virtue of the Obligation of the former Oath: Mean while the other Officers joining together in the Government of the Ship, require the rest of the Mariners to enter into an engagement, to be true and faithful to the public service under their Government. Can it be doubted that the obligation of the first Oath, in this case became null? And need it be scrupled, whether it be lawful to enter into the second? And is not the reason evident, because if the former Oath should oblige in the letter, against the intention and equity; a necessity would be laid upon them by pretended fidelity to their late Captain, to be really false to their Country. Now a Ship being as it were a little Commonwealth, and a Commonwealth, no other but a great Ship; the application will need no explication, especially the case to which the allusion looks being sufficienty known, and decided both by God and Man.  
Secondly, The performance may be unlawful, and consequently the obligation null in respect of those by whom it is to be performed: And that in two cases, when way must be made to the performance by them; either first through the Commission of a greater evil, than the non-performance. Or secondly, through the omission of a greater good, than the performance.  
For first, if no Obligation can bind to that which is evil, much less of two evils, can it bind to the greater. And therefore when God hath given a Nation the substantials of Government, Righteousness and Peace, to throw them into blood and confusion, for that which is but a circumstantial (or scarce so much) the bare Title of a pretender, is that which the world by sad experience can witness to be the continued practice of tyrannical Princes, but never can be proved, to be the duty of true Christians, upon pretence of any obligation whatsoever. Neither can it be denied, that in such a case, were the cause of the pretender never so just, yet it were not to be prosecuted by a cruelty so unjust; but rather in reason and Religion (if either could be expected from such) a strong obligation would lie upon him, to desist from his claim; but not the least show of any obligation upon that people, by means so inconsistent with humanity, to be assisting (not so much to his cause, in a condition so desperate) as to their own miserable and unavoidable ruin. But than put case the pretenders cause be unjust in itself, how desperately wicked will it be rendered by the accession of that guilt which will eternally cleave unto it by so horrid a prosecution! Were the non-performance of such an Obligation, to such a pretender in regard of the justness of his cause evil, as was said before, yet it ought to be chosen before an evil, so beyond all controversy greater; But when not the non-performance, but the performance is the evil (as 'tis in an unjust cause) then 'tis to endeavour to set the Crown upon the head of wickedness, and by a violence no less bloody than unjust to attempt, to place unjustice in the throne of righteousness. Concerning the cause of the present Pretender, continuing in those ways wherein he is so deeply and desperately engaged, there needs no more but this, if it be (as certainly 'tis) the same now that was at first; it either then was unjustly, or now may be as justly, as formerly opposed.  
But secondly, An Obligation may be rendered Null, because unlawful, when the performance cannot be, but by omission of a greater good; that is, Of a duty more immediately necessary. 'tis of immediate necessity that there be a Government; a duty immediately necessary, that they that live under it, be true and faithful to it; otherwise neither Governors nor Government can be secured against fraud and force, in the discharge of their duty; but that this Government must be continued; because once begun in the name of such a Family, though entering and possessing the place with approved justice, is no way necessary; no nor when providence hath otherwise determined it, lawful, for the Kingdoms of the Earth are the Lords, and he gives them to whomsoever he pleases; neither can any Obligation bind against his determination; which appears to us only by external providences. For secret things belong to God, but to us things revealed. And whereby can providence reveal the mind of God ●ore clearly, then by divesting the former, and investing the present Governors; with the plenary possession of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that public Authority, which is the foundation and formal object of all public Obligations of this nature, which we are there, and there only to perform where the Almighty, who is the Lord Paramount, shall be pleased to fix it. Wherefore to neglect a present duty by an overruling providence fastened upon us, upon pretence of ormer obligations to the contrary, when notwithstanding, God hath razed the foundations of those Obligations; what can it be but to rebel against the Ordinances, out only of men, but of God himself, against the universal good (with the universal confusion, if not ruin) of a Nation, against our Obligation, to that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that public Authority, under whose shadow we sit down in peace, and may (if our own frowardness hinder not) enjoy all the Ordinances of Righteousness, both divine and humane; and in a word, against that gratitude and obedience which we own to divine dispensations. To conclude; if the bare Title of a Pretender though just, cannot oblige against an immediate and necessary duty to present authority; much less where the cause is doubtful, or apparently unjust: Seeing that were to pull down that ruin upon our own heads, (by our own breach of duty) from which a divine hand hath in mercy rescued us, without leaving ourselves the excuse of so much at a good intention. Which whether it be the present case let the impartial judge.  
The second thing which nulls the Obligation of an Oath, is the Impossibility of performance. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. To which beside what hath been said, as to the unlawfulness (for id tantum possumus quod jure possumus) Upon which ground the limitation in the Oaths scrupled to uttermost power) was inserted. We may then lawfully conclude, that God hath shut men up under an impossibility, when he hath not only deprived them of all natural means and power, but also destroyed the foundotion, upon which the Obligation was built, and substituted another in its stead. And this also is more evident in the present case, then to need a demonstration, which yet will be more fully evinced, when we come to speak of the present Authority.  
And so we have done with the Oaths of Allegiance, and Supremacy, wherein we havee been the more large, because all that is scrupled in the other Engagements, save what concerns the Privileges of Parliament, is built upon the same foundation.  

The Protest. considered.  The next Scandal at which Conscience sticks, and until it be removed, cannot find its way clear to enter into the present Engagement, is taken from the Protestation and Covenant. And first for the Protestation; It promises the preservation and defence of five particulars: The Doctrine of the Church of England, The King's Person, Honour and Estate, The Power and Privileges of Parliament, The Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and lastly, The Union and Peace of the three Kingdoms; But with this limitation, To the power of the party protesting, and as fare as lawfully he may. The first, the last, and the second Branch (so fare as it concerns the Person of the King) are not here at all concerned. What concerns the King's Honour and Estate, if it be to be understood of the Heirs of his Person, hath already been considered in the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy. Neither may we, by the express Limits of the present Protestation, lawfully defend them in ways long since and still condemned for unlawful; or not lawfully be true and faithful to the Commonwealth without them, when their own posture will not admit us to be true and faithful (in a right sense) to them with it. But if it be (as in reason it may be) understood of the Public Authority, resulting from, and exercised by the Laws of the Nation, 'tis involved in the Commonwealth, and so this Branch in effect speaks the same Language with the Engagement. And for the thied and fourth: First, in a general consideration (if the substance of things, not circumstance of persons, be, as they must be, principally minded) why the Power and Privileges of Parliament should not be capable of the firmest preservation and fullest improvement, without a King or House of Lords (especially proving opposite) cannot easily sink into the head of any impartial man, that shall without prejudice consult the free vote of his own reason, together with the constant experience of former times. For 'tis reason to believe, That the Lords Temporal (in this personal consideration) are no more essential to the Power of Parliaments, than the Lords Spiritual, nor the King, then either. And what can be more plain, if we consider that in the Coronation Oath, the Office of the King (and the Lords his Creatures have for the most part the same) is neither to enact nor repeal Laws, save only by giving (pro forma, for he is bound by Oath to do it) his consent to both; both which (things thus standing) necessarily must, and possibly may be done without them, with more expedition and advantage, and less delay and difficulty. For 'tis well known, though by ill experience, that both King and Lords, partly by assuming to themselves in the House of Peers, an Arbitrary Jurisdiction over the Persons and Estates of the free People of this Nation; and partly by the perverse Engine of a Negative Voice, have exercised a power of their own, to enervate at their pleasure the power of Parliaments, both obstructing the progress of the best Laws, and measuring out the Rights and Liberties of the People, by the Line of their own Wills and Interests. It remains that to a real and substantial observation of these two Branches (especially when the circumstantial is not in our power) no better way appears then cordially to enter into the present Engagement. For from what hath last been said, thus much doubtless may with sufficient evidence of truth be affirmed, That the Power of Parliaments abstractly considered, and the Rights and Liberties of the People, may be preserved and defended by being true and faithful to the Commonwealth without (at least) AS WELL as with a King or House of Lords; and if the present Juncture of affairs will not admit it to be done with them, it not only may, but must be done without them; else it were to throw away the substance, because the circumstance cannot be preserved. But secondly, the only question therefore being concerning the Privileges as vesting some part of the exercise of the Power in the King and House of Lords, for there is nothing in the present Engagement, but what makes rather for then against the Preservation and Defence of other Privileges. And first for that part which concerns the King, it refers to what hath formerly been considered in the preceding Discourse, and shall be further in the succeeding, when we come to the Covenant, as being more express in that particular. The true state of the question therefore will only be: Whether having protested to preserve the Privileges of Parliament, and by consequence inclusively the House of Lords, to our power, and so far as lawfully we may; whether, I say, we may without breach of Protestation, promise to be true and faithful to the Commonwealth without them? Now to come to a clear resolution in the question; first let it be observed, that the present Protestation supposes the House of Lords actually in BEING, and accordingly the promise is to preserve and defend it. Neither is it possible to perform such a promise to that which IS NOT. And this is generally observable concerning the Engagements scrupled, that they all promise a preservation and defence of things as in BEING, not as surceasing to BE. Wherefore to conclude, either the House of Lords is not now actually in BEING, and then it must be a strong obligation indeed, that shall bind to preserve and defend that which is not: Or if it have yet a being, why doth it not appear? why is it not operative? for Non apparere & non operari sunt nec esse. To us, what appears not, acts not, IS NOT. Now to be true and faithful to that which is not, and not to be true and faithful to that which is; but by being untrue and unfaithful to that which is, to be true and faithful to that which is not; is such a riddle of absurdities, as I know no solution fit to be given it then this: That the only way to be true and faithful in preserving that which is not, is not to do any thing in its preservation; and so there may be a freedom left to be true and faithful to that which is.  
But secondly, put case the House of Lords were in a capacity of receiving, it must further be shown that the obliged also are in a capacity of giving their assistance in order to their preservation and defence. Now where is that power Natural or Moral, that warrant from Authority Divine or Humane, by which they may be armed both with might and right sufficient for such a work? If there be any, why is it not used? if there be none, why is the Obligation of this and other Engagements urged, which bind the obliged but to their power, and so far as lawfully they may? And lastly, if they be free in this respect from others, why not free to the present Engagement?  
Thirdly, supposing there were both might and right sufficient; it would still remain a question, Whether we might (or rather it would be out of question, that we might not) enter into blood to contend against the substance, the Authority, and peace of the Nation, for a circumstance (the exercise of some part of that Authority by some peculiary persons in such a peculiar manner) a circumstance I say so much out of our power, as 'tis not a little doubtful whether it will ever be within, or (if so) any way worth our recovery at so dear a rate. Beside in such a wretched, if not wicked pursuit of a circumstance, we run the present loss of the substance, the Government and peace, under which Providence hath placed us, and with so gracious a hand, that we feel not any want of the Circumstance lost, but rather enjoy the benefit of our loss, a freedom from the superfluous and unnecessary burdens of an Arbitrary Jurisdiction, and the obstructions of a Negative Voice.  
Lastly, if there may be a Delinquency deserving a dissolution, what might be thought of theirs, who have in the face of the Nation refused to disowne and declare against an Army of Foreigners in the bowels thereof, disowned and declared against not only by the Kirke of Scotland, and all the well-affected there, but also by the Commons in Parliament here, and owned them by Votes, etc. made public to the view of the whole world? And thus fare shall suffice to have considered the Protestation.  

The Covenant considered.  In the last place, among former Engagements, though not lest urged against the present, comes the Solemn League and Covenant, and the Scruples therein. The occasion seems to be taken from some expressions in the Preamble and the third Article: For the Covenanters having in the Preamble professed an intention to advance the Honour and Happiness of the King & his Posterity; and in the third Article, no intention to diminish his just Power and Greatness; and covenanted to preserve and defend his Person and Authority; apprehend that they cannot with truth and faithfulness to the Covenant in these particulars, promise to be true and faithful to the Commonwealth without a King. This is the first scruple. Now that we may come to a right understanding in the Premises, it would be soberly considered, that from present intentions to positive execution, in things de futuro, and of a contingent nature, we may not draw conclusions absolute and peremptory; but with subordination to the Divine Majesty, many times contrary to our expectations, by an overruling power, Wisdom and goodness interposing. Man purposes but God disposes, and frequently things fall out between the intention and execution, which may justly alter the one, and hinder the other, by rendering the performance either unlawful or impossible: Neither is an intention simply as such an Obligation. Wherefore that in this case we may come to a clear issue, two things would be remembered: First, That there is a  condition necessarily employed in all intentional Promises. Secondly, That there is an express limitation annexed with this. Was it not upon the account of a  condition, that Solomon when he had promised his Mother not to refuse her request, not only refused to perform his promise, but vowed the capital punishment of the party for whom the request was made, 1 Kin. 2.20, 24. And certainly if (in a case of the like nature) Herod had denied the Baptists head, he had been true to his duty, without being false to his Oath. 'tis true therefore, the intent of the Covenanters was, to advance the honour and happiness of the King and his Posterity; but with this condition, That in their respective capacities they should cooperate and assist, at least, not obstinately persist to resist the effectual means thereunto conducing. For what were it but to put ourselves upon a contradictory impossibility, if we should intent the honour and happiness of persons in ways directly opposite to, and inconsistent with either. 'tis said, Luke 7.30. That the Pharisees and Lawyers rejected the Council of God against themselves: And may not the Counsels of men concerning the honour and happiness of others, though never so really intended, be much more rejected by them against themselves? Shall the real intention of the Physician, for the recovery of his Patient be questioned; if the Patient obstinately join with the distemper of his disease, against the advice of the Physician to his own ruin? But secondly, What if the King and his posterity will not be so true and faithful, as could be wished, to their own honour and happiness; must that hinder us from being true and faithful to the honour and happiness of the Commonwealth without them? Must the Commonwealth be miserable, because they will not be happy? What if nothing will content others, but an unjust power and greatness; must the Commonwealth lose any part of its greatness, for want of the exercise of a just power, which may be a terror to evil doers, and apraise to them that do well? And can any thing be more equal and reasonable, then that they that are careful to see this just power executed, should be secured against turbulent spirits, and practices in the execution of this power, not only just but necessary? The truth is, this is so fare from being a question in the true intent and meaning of the Covenant, That the Covenant itself puts it clearly out of question, as will evidently appear, if in the second place we consider the limitation annexed. For when the Covenanters profess in the preamble, that they enter into this Covenant, having before their eyes, the honour and happiness of the King, and his posterity, it follows conjunctim, and the true public liberty, safety, and peace of the Kingdoms. And accordingly in the third Article (which mutually interprets, and is interpreted by the preamble) they engage to preserve and defend the King's person and authority, but how? In the preservation and defence of the liberties of the Kingdom.  
Upon the foundation of which expressions, we may fairly and firmly raise a twofold conclusion. First, That according to the sense of the Covenant, the liberties of the Kingdom are the greater, and more worthy part of this branch: and secondly, That thererefore they ought to have the precedence, in point of preservation and defence; For that which comprehends, is greater than that which is comprehended; and that which limits is greater, and more excellent than that which is limited; and by consequence in case of competition to be preferred before it. When therefore persons engage for the discharge of duties different in their worths, but yet consistent in their performance, at the time of Engagements; if in process of time they shall prove wholly inconsistent; both reason and Religion, and the Covenant accordingly obliges to prefer the more excellent and necessary, with the rejection of the lesser. And so we are come home to the present Case. For the Conscientious of the Nation after, yea and by the taking of the Covenant, accounted themselves obliged to preserve and defend the liberties of the Kingdom, without the Conjunction of, and against the opposition made by the King, and his personal authority, and acted accordingly. In short then, 'tis true, that at the entering into Covenant, such was the modesty and charity of the Covenanters, that they hoped and desired, and with a faithfulness answerable, a long time endeavoured, a compliance between the King and the people's concernments. But now, after much patience, being clearly convinced of their absolute inconsistency, (if the pertinacious opposition of the Father deceased; and the pernicious proceed of the living Son may be believed) no wonder if at last they think it time, to neglect what hath so long, but in vain been expected; and provide for what must no longer, if it might be so long neglected, the true public liberty, safety, and peace of the Nation, though (with as much justice as necessiity) without the concurrence of the active constant and implacable opposers thereof; which according to the Covenant is the chief; and according to the present juncture of affairs, the only duty in their power. And why all that follow peace with holiness, should not contribute their parts, to the preservation and defence of that true public liberty, safety, and peace of the Nation, mentioned in the preamble of this Covenant, by promising to be true and faithful to the Commonwealth, wherein (if any where) it is now involved, though without a King or House of Lords; Why, I say, they would not thus far contribute their parts to the public Peace at least, notwithstanding any scruple that may justly be grounded upon this, or any of the Oaths preceding in this discourse is difficult, if not impossible to discern, upon a sober & disengaged survey.  
What concerns the Rights and Privileges of Parliament, hath been spoken to in the Protestation.  
The endeavour of the foregoing discourse, hitherto hath been by a thorough disqusition, managed as in a matter of Conscience, with the greatest strictness and impartiality, to examine the true state of former Engagements, whether contrary to, and obliging against the present. And the result upon the whole matter, seems to afford a threefold conclusion. First, That as to the substantial part, their true intention and equity, there is no contrariety, there is an absolute harmony between both: both according to equity joining in this intention, by a promissory caution to oblige the engaged not to distrust by any unlawful practices, but by all lawful ways against such disturbances, to endeavour to preserve the obtaining 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or public authority, because 'tis ever the PRESENT Authority, that gives life to those laws of the Nation, which by the public administration of justice, propagate peace; and by peace the prosperity of the public, the proper and ultimate end, in to which all Governors and Government ought to be resolved. Secondly, That as to the Circumstantial part, the persons sometime vested with some part of the Authority; No Obligation doth or can lie against the present Engagement, because neither are they now vested with that Authority; the possession and exercise whereof is the sole thing that must both render them the formal object, and furnish them with a capacity of performing those reciprocal acts of public justice and protection, which are the fundamental reason, of all such relative Obligations, on which alone they do, and without which they cannot stand: neither secondly, ought they to be so invested, because engaged in ways inconsistent and destructive. And thirdly, That therefore no contrariety or obligation of former Engagements hinders; but that lawfully we may subscribe the present. And so answer is given to the first general question, and way made for the second. viz.  
Whether of duty we must subscribe the present Engagement (already proved lawful) when called thereunto by the present Authority.  
For order's sake, that we may proceed with the more clearness, we shall cast the answer into two positions. First, That the authority in question is, de facto, an Authority. 2ly. that an Authority de facto, is to be obeyed, ex debito in things lawful, and consequently in the matter of the present Engagement. Were it not that daily experience tells us, that men forsake their reason, to follow their affection; it could not with any reason be imagined, that any man should be so without all reason in the present controversy, as not to grant that the present Authority is, de facto an Authority. For to deny that, is to contradict, not only our own, but the sense and experience of the whole Nation, who in all matters of commutative and distributive 〈◊〉 derive all the benefit of the laws of the Land, only by mediation of such public ministers of State, as derive the Commissions by which they act from them, 〈◊〉 only from them, and their authority. And the truth is to deny the existence de facto, of a public Authority in a Nation, is the worst kind of that which men call Levelling. For if there be no Authority, there can be no Law, (for the Laws of the Land out of the hand of Authority, signify no more than the Laws of Solon or Lycurgus, in a Library or Study) and if there be no Law; neither first can there be any propriety, because 'tis only the Law in the hand of Authority, that determines propriety, unless every man may be his own judge; and then he will quickly make his own law, so fare as his power can reach: neither secondly, if there be no Law, is there any trangression; and so the Judges and Jury etc. that condemn men for Capital offences, are all concluded under the guilt of murder, which is enough to show the wicked absurdity of this wretched Doctrine. I shall therefore leave such erroneous judgements, to be rectified by the pious, and (I hope) peaceable ministers, the Authors of the Proposals, who ingenuously acknowledge a necessity of the existence of a Government de facto in a Nation. (Now a Government without Authority is such an Idol that as St. Paul speaks, we may say it is nothing.) And therefore I cannot but wonder at those godly and learned Ministers, that when they had gone so fare, as to acknowledge the necessity of an authority in a Nation, and an obedience in all things lawful unto that authority; that (I say) they could not proceed one step further upon the same ground, to acknowledge the lawfulness and duty of promising to be true and faithful to the authority in Being, which as it is agreeable to present, so it cannot be contrary to former public obligations, seeing nothing can bind to that which is not in Being; unless they would have those that labour not in, but rather against the proper work of magistracy, to have the wages of faithfulness, for being unfaithful; & those that are truly faithful, the reward of unfaithfulness; which I am sure they would not. For that were, as if the dumb and scandalous Clergy, justly sequestered by Parliament, should still have the double honour of their parishes and places, because of a former title in Law, and those godly ministers that are placed in their stead, and conscientiously labour in the word and doctrine, should be rewarded with double dishonour. 'Tis therefore a truth, both in reason and religion, that will never want ground sufficient to clear it, that they that possess the places and peforme the duty de facto, must de jure and ex debito, receive the dignity annexed to the public authority. And so we are come to the second position. viz.  
That Authority de facto, must be obeyed ex debito. The foundation of this Position hath already been laid, and in a great measure cleared in the precedent Discourse: For the consequences are co incident, and what lawfully may, of duty must be performed, when we are called to the performance by public Authority. And therefore (how properly soever the Demurrer was pleased to term it such) it was no absurdity in the learned Pen that wrote The lawfulness of obeying the present Government, jointly to infer those conclusions that were inseparably complicated in the premises that were the cause of those conclusions. And here, as most due, this Testimony must in justice be given to the worthy Author of that Tract, That had his mature abilities▪ and peaceable piety, met with the same spirit of wisdom from above, in the Readers, as breaths in all his works, not only this controversy might have been ended, upon the advantageous terms of truth and peace, but the Balm of love might by this time have closed up and cured in a great measure, the never enough to be lamented breaths among the truly godly of this Nation, and rendered them an united and an happy People: From those few glean therefore here, the Reader may be pleased to have recourse to his fuller harvest, and if himself be as free to receive, as the piously learned Author is furnished to give satisfaction in the present position, there is no doubt but he may abundantly find wherein to acquiesse, upon the clearest grounds of Scripture and reason, witnessed to by the suffrage of the most approved Divines, both Ancient and Modern, and the practice of the godly accordingly. But what need we, as to the practice of the godly in the present point, either seek far abroad, or farther at home, than the late days of Queen Mary: For which of the godly in her time, after her actual possession of the Crown, scrupled obedience to her in civil things, although she were the Issue of an incestuous Marriage, condemned by express Text of Scripture, and the suffrage of the most eminent Divines of that age, purposely consulted upon it. Wherefore to shut up this position, and with it the present discourse, (though practices may be questioned) with the unquestionable Authority of the Apostle, Ro. 13. If every foul must be subject, then certainly every power must be subjected to, else some souls must not be subject, because some powers are not of right; yea but though they have not a right to make themselves, yet God hath a right to make them powers; and we must be subject, nor because of the subordinate and doubtful rights of men, but the Supreme and undoubted Right of God, and so the premises are as large as the conclusion, which otherwise would be too narrow for it. Again, Every soul must be subject, yea but every soul cannot skill of the Titles of Governors. True, but no soul so ignorant, but can apprehend God's Title, at least when the Apostle shall have told him, that there is NO Power but of God, and the Powers that BE are ordained of God. And 2. No soul so in the dark, but can on the one side see who hath a power to give him praise for well doing, and to punish him for doing ill, and so bears not the sword in vain; and on the other, who either bears no sword, or in vain, an●●o no purpose; and lastly, who are continually attending on the work of Government, and who are discontinuers. So that in conclusion, the Apostle gives a rule of subjection, clear and obvious, and suited to the capacity of the meanest Christian; whereas if to examine the rights of Governors be the rule, most Christians would want the means fully to inform themselves; and they that could have the best in such cases to be had, might sooner find just grounds to scruple all, then to be satisfied in any.  
FINIS.