ANIMADVERSIONS Written by the Right Reverend Father in God JOHN, Lord Bishop of SARISBURY, upon a Treatise entitled God's love to Mankind.  
Alma Mater  HINC LUCEM ET POCULA SACRA  printer's device of Roger Daniel 
CAMBRIDGE: Printed by Roger Daniel Printer to the University. 1641.   

I Have perused these Animadversions upon a Treatise entitled God's love to Mankind, and now acknowledge them thus corrected for mine own.  
JO. SARUM.   

Addenda & Emendanda.  
Page 13. line 6. add, It is truly said by Abulensis. 107.21. after Being add, As for death, it is a privation of bodily life and bodily pain, but it is no absolute privation of the being either of body or soul. 129. title, read men's sins. 149. 20. they would never. 169. 3. as an. 185. 15. three Indignities. 202. 3. put-in (H). 218. 4. add, We in this place think it rather respecteth all mankind, unto whom God offereth life upon the condition of believing. 224. title, The Sublapsarian doctrine. 246. 30. add, Pelagians only excepted. 255. 28. for eligendos reade fideles. 263. 28. putout must. 303. 16. was therein.  
In the margin.  
Page 86. for Comment. read, Sent. super. 97. for aetern. read, occulta. 157. 8. put O. 161. 15. P. 240. 3. A. 305. 16. M. 355. 28. Vide Calvin. in Hoseam, c. 14. v. 1. pag. 340. lin. 1. K. 379. for Doct read, Decl. 416. ●3. C. 433. 30. L. 462. 5. C.   

ANIMADVERSIONS upon a Treatise lately published and entitled,  

God's love to Mankind, Manifested by disproving his Absolute decree for their Damnation.  Hos. 13.9. O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself: but in me is thy help. Wisd. 1.12, 13. 
Seek not death in the error of your life; and pull not upon yourselves destruction with the works of your hands.  
For God made not death: neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living.  

Concerning the Title of this book.  
THe general love of God towards mankind is so clearly testified in holy Scripture, and so demonstrated by the manifold effects of God's goodness and mercy extended to every particular man in this world, that to doubt thereof were infidelity, and to deny it, plain blasphemy: yet for all this, if any shall go about to magnify the common love of God extended promiscuously to all men, that thereby he obscureth the special love and mercy of God prepared from all eternity and bestowed in due time upon elect men, this may lead the ignorant and unlearned into a dangerous error: And therefore obliquely to oppose the eternal, free and absolute decree of Predestination or Election under colour of disapproving an absolute decree for any man's Damnation, befitteth not any Divine who acknowledgeth the truth of that doctrine which the Scriptures have delivered, St Augustine cleared, and the Church of England established in the xviith Article. But if the Author of this treatise had no other aim, than the overthrowing of such an eternal decree of Predestination and Preterition as is fond supposed will save men whether they repent or not repent, believe or not believe, persevere or not persevere; and such an absolute decree of Reprobation as will damn men though they should repent and believe, or will hinder any man from repenting and believing, or will 'cause and work any man's impenitency or infidelity; we both wish, and shall endeavour together with him to root such erroneous fancies out of all Christian minds.  
The place cited out of Hosea, with many others which might be alleged, will easily prove that Man is the author of his own sin and the procurer of his own damnation, and God only the Judge and punisher: But withal they prove as clearly that Man is not the procurer of his own Predestination, nor the deserver of his own Salvation by his foreseen faith and perseverance: but God is he who according to his absolute and infallible purpose giveth in time that grace unto his elect which before all time he decreed should be an effectual means to bring them unto glory.    

To the Reader.  
THe Author of this Treatise was persuaded to pen the reasons of his opinion against absolute Reprobation, that he might satisfy a worthy friend of his, who required it. What satisfaction that learned gentleman, his friend, hath received by these reasons, I know not: but sure I am, they have given good content to some others, who have read them, and do still desire a copy of them for their further use. To ease whose pains in transscribing this treatise, it doth now appear in this form. If any of contrary opinion shall undertake to answer or refute it, I wish he would set down his opinion and reasons with that perspicuity and modesty that our Author hath set down his. Such a course of disputing will gain more credit to himself and his cause, than voluminous vagaries about impertinent things. If any shall use railing speeches, or unnecessary diversions from the cause, I shall ever interpret that to be a strong sign of a weak cause; or at lest I shall think it to be an argument of an obstinate mind, who neither knoweth how to yield to the truth nor to defend his error. I hope the Reader who loveth his own salvation will be a more indifferent judge in a question which concerneth him so nearly. And so I leave him to God's blessing.  

An answer to the Preface, with some propositions concerning the true nature of Predestination or Election.  
THe Title of the Book justly rejecteth an absolute Decree for the damnation of any particular person: for such a decree was never enacted in Gods eternal counsel, nor ever published in his revealed word. But for absolute Reprobation, if by this word be understood only that Preterition, Nonelection, or negative decree of Predestination, which is contradictorily opposed to the decree of Election, the one is as absolute as the other, and neither dependeth upon the foreseen difference of men's actions, but upon the absolute will of God. For if God from eternity absolutely elected some unto the infallible atteinment of Grace and Glory, we cannot but grant that those who are not comprised within this absolute decree are as absolutely passed by as the other are chosen. The decree of Damnation therefore must not be confounded with the decree of negative Predestination, which (according to the phrase of the School rather than of the Scripture) is usually termed Reprobation. By which term of Reprobation some understand only the denial of Election or Predestination. And because the negation is to be measured by the affirmation, unless we be agreed what is meant when we say, Peter was predestinated before the foundations of the world were laid, we can never rightly judge what is meant when on the contrary we avouch, Judas was reprobated before the foundations of the world were laid. Some others under the name of Reprobation involve not only the negative decree of preparing such effectual grace as would bring men most certainly unto glory, but an affirmative decree also for the punishing of men eternally in hellfire.  
So fare forth as this Author seemeth to oppose the absolute decree of Predestination, and the absolute decree of negative Reprobation or Nonelection, reducing them to the contrary foreseen conditions of good or bad acts in men, he crosseth the received Doctrine of the Church of England. But if he intent only to prove, that the adjudication of men unto eternal life or eternal death, and the temporal introduction of men into the kingdom of heaven, or casting of men into the torments of hell, are always accompanied with the Divine prescience or intuition of contrary acts or qualities in those which are to be saved or condemned; we hold it and acknowledge it a most certain truth. Yet we must here add, that Predestination and Preterition are eternal acts immanent in God the Creator, whereas Salvation and Damnation are temporal effects terminated unto the creature: and therefore the latter may be suspended upon many conditions, though the former be in God never so absolute.  
The Treatise ensuing would have had much more perspicuity, if the Author had briefly and plainly set down what he understandeth by this word Predestination or Election, and whether he conceive it to be an absolute or a conditional Decree. If conditional; he should have showed us with whom God conditioned, upon what terms, and where the conditions stand upon record. If he grant absolute Predestination, his plea for conditionate Preterition will be to little purpose with those who understand that the absolute Election of such a certain number doth in eodem signo rationis as absolutely imply a certain number of men not elected.  
The wisdom of our Church of England in the xviith Article layeth down the doctrine of Predestination, and doth not so much as in one word meddle with the point of Reprobation; leaving men to conceive that the one is the bore negation or denial of that special favour and benefit which is freely intended and mercifully bestowed in the other. Would to God the children of this Church had imitated the wisdom of their Mother, and had not taken a quite contrary course, balking the doctrine of Predestination, and breaking-in abruptly upon the doctrine of Reprobation.  
I know not whether I should think him more defective, who in disputing about Reprobation runneth out into impertinent vagaries, or him that undertaketh the handling of this question without premising and opening the true nature of Predestination.  
And no man need fear but (with all that are judicious, religious, and loving their own salvation) that manner of handling this controversy will be best accepted, which so reduceth man's Sin and Damnation to himself, as withal it forgetteth not to reduce his Justification, Sanctification, Glorification not to any foreseen goodness springing out of man's freewill, but to the free mercy of God, according to his eternal purpose effectually working in men those gifts and acts of grace which are the means to bring them unto glory.  
Having thus briefly spoken of the Title and Preface, I will lay down such fundamental doctrines concerning Predestination or Election as I conceive are grounded upon the xviith Article, and have always been taken for the common received doctrine of our Church; the contradictory by our Universities and reverend Bishops (when they were broached) having been always held and censured for erroneous. This done, I will go along with the Treatise itself, not intending to defend the particular opinions of any foreign or homebred Divines, exorbitant from the doctrine of our own Church, but only to defend our well-settled doctrine against all opposers of what names or sects soever.    

Propositions concerning the nature of Predestination, and wherein it properly consisteth, with certain Corollaries apperteining thereunto.  
Propos. 1 PRedestination is an eternal decree or purpose of God, in time causing effectual grace in all those whom he hath chosen, and by this effectual grace bringing them infallibly unto glory.  
For proof of this proposition these places of Scripture might serve; Rom. 8.29, 30. Ephes. 1.4, 5, etc. Luke 12.32. Matth. 24.24.  
The definitions of Predestination prove the same. As that of St Augustine, De Bono Perseverantiae, c. 14. of the Schoolmen; Praeparatio gratiae in praesenti & gloriae in futuro. Amongst the rest, of Aquinas; 
a p. 1. q. 23. art. 2.  Praedestinatio est ratio ordinis aliquorum in salutem aeternam in ment Divina exsistens. of the Jesuit Vasquez; Praedestinatio est propositum aeternum Dei quo gratiam alicui praeparat in vitam aeternam. And lastly Arminius himself giveth us this description; 
b Disp. publ. Thes. 15.  Praedestinatio est decretum beneplaciti Dei in Christo, quo apud se ab aeterno statuit, fideles quos fide donare decrevit vitâ aeternâ donare. In all these descriptions, Predestination containeth an eternal, absolute, infallible decree, as well for the giving of grace effectual unto certain persons here, as the bringing of the same persons unto glory hereafter. Arminius perceiving this, in his private disputations 
c Thes. 40.  wipeth out those words, quos fide donare decrevit, which he had used in his public.  
Predestination being an immanent and Coral. 1 eternal act of the Divine understanding and will, cannot be conceived as dependant upon any foreseen temporal acts of Man's freewill.  
A prime and eternal cause cannot depend upon the selfsame temporal effects which are thereby caused. If therefore Predestination be the prime and eternal cause from whence Peter's faith, repentance and perseverance were derived, his foreseen faith, repentance and perseverance cannot in any good sense be imagined antecedent causes, merits, conditions or motives unto the Divine Predestination.  
The Jesuit Vasquez, 
d In 1. disp. 89.  though he found Predestination unto glory upon foreseen merits, yet in this he is sounder than the Arminians, in that he maketh the differencing of the Predestinate from the Reprobated to begin before all absolute prevision of their freewill consenting the one way or the other. And our learned Bishop of Norwich Dr Overall explaining the xviith Article hath these words, Nostra Ecclesia conjungit particulare decretum absolutum, non ex praescientia humanae fidei aut voluntatis dependens, sed ex proposito Divinae voluntatis & gratiae de his quos Deus elegit in Christo liberandis, cum generali & conditionata voluntate, seu generali promissione, etc. Where he evidently acknowledgeth an eternal, secret, absolute Decree, predestinating particular persons unto eternal life without all dependency upon their foreseen faith or perseverance; though therewithal he conjoin an open, revealed and Evangelicall Decree of bringing men into the possession of eternal life by the way and upon the condition of their faith, repentance and perseverance.  
Propos. 2 Election or Predestination findeth or considereth all mere men in one and the selfsame condition: and it is the grace prepared for them in Predestination which maketh the predestinate become holy & happy men.  
If Predestination be conceived as antecedent to the fall, than it taketh all men in statu innocentis, and so alike. If it be considered in statu lapso, than it also findeth all the sons of Adam alike miserable and damnable.  
They who will have God in his Divine Coral. 2 Predestination to behold all men, and elect those men consequently whom he considereth as believing and persevering in faith and holiness unto the last gasp, are in an error. For 1. this is to elect or predestinate men not considered in statu integro, nor in statu lapso, but in statu reparato, & tantùm non glorificato. 2. Again, this is not to bring Faith, Holiness, Perseverance, out of the gracious benefit of Election, but to bring Election out of the foreseen acts of Believing, Obeying, Persevering, quite contrary to the doctrine of our Church and of the truth. 3. Last of all, if we admit this opinion of conditionate Predestination, following upon the eternal foresight of men's final obedience and perseverance, we must of necessity grant that the grace or benefit of Predestination affordeth no man any help at all in the way unto eternal salvation or glorification: which not Christian ear can patiently hear. For how can that be the cause leading infallibly in the way unto eternal life, which cometh not so much as into consideration until a man have run out his race in faith and godliness, and be arrived at heaven-gates? Such a falsely-named Predestination might more truly and properly have been called a Postdestination. But call it how they please, it enacteth only per modum legis, That men thus living and dying shall be received into the kingdom of heaven: but it doth not per modum decreti operantis infallibly work those graces and gracious actions whereby men are brought unto heaven.  
Propos. 3 The grace prepared for the Elect in Gods eternal Predestination, and bestowed upon them in the temporal dispensation, so causeth their belief, repentance, perseverance, as that it imposeth no necessity or violent coaction upon the wills of men, but causeth their free and voluntary endeavours.  
That the grace prepared in Predestination is an infallible cause producing faith and perseverance in all the elect, appeareth from the nature and essence of Predestination: which being a special part of the Divine providence, is distinguished from that more general providence, by appointing and applying such means as never fail to produce the end whereunto they are fitted.  
So that St Augustine feareth not to infer, That if the grace prepared for the elect in their Predestination should not work the intended end, which is their glorification; aut vinceretur aut falleretur Deus, God himself must either be overcome or deceived. Yet he withal defendeth, That this effectual grace hath no violent coactive operation upon the will, but causeth it to work by its own freedom. 
e Abul. in 3. Reg. cap. 12.  Stat libertas arbitrii cum Divina motione voluntatem nostram ad id quod vult applicante. And St Augustine to the same purpose, Deus omnipotentissimâ facilitate convertit, ac volentes ex nolentibus facit. In which few words he conjoineth the invincible operation of the grace of God with the free operation of man's william. Nay the grace flowing from the decree of Predestination is so fare from putting a necessitation upon the will, as that it is the very cause which freeth the will from the slavery of sin, and maketh it freely to move and work in all good acts. It giveth the will and the deed; and therefore it implieth a contradiction to say, it maketh a man do any good by way of necessitation. 
f Bern. De lib. arbitr.  Vbi consensus, ibi voluntas: ubi voluntas, ibi libertas. Whenas therefore God had eternally predestinated Peter to believe in Christ, to repent, to persevere, he did by special grace move him and work him to the most free and willing performance of all these things; according to that of St Augustine, Cùm Deus vult fieri quod non nisi volentibus hominibus oportet fieri, inclinat eorum corda ut hoc velint. They who refuse to acknowledge this power of Gods will over man's will, do not perceive how they stumble at the first article of the Apostles creed.  
Coral. 3 Those horrible consequents which the ancient Semi-Pelagians would have forced upon Augustine's opinion of absolute Predestination, are of no force: As for example; 
g Faust. Rheg.  If the Divine Predestination be absolute, nemo vigilet, nemo jejunet, nemo libidini contradicat, etc. And again; If Predestination be absolute, ad vitam rectam non suo ductu, sed violento tantùm Dei imperio homines pertrahuntur. In a word; If absolute Predestination unto grace and glory be granted, intra gratiae vocabulum absconditur fatale venenum. These with many other inferences of the same stamp Faustus & others of the Semipelagian sect would needs thrust upon the doctrine of Predestination: and as for themselves, they boldly maintained these propositions, as it were in defiance of God's absolute and free Election; 
h Prosp. Epist. ad. Aug.  Hoc propositum vocationis Dei, quo eligendorum & rejiciendorum dicitur facta discretio secundùm quod placuit Creatori, lapsis curam resurgendi adimit, sanctis occasionem affert, etc. Prior est hominis obedientia quàm Dei gratia. Initium salutis ex eo est qui salvatur, non ex Deo qui salvat. And Faustus Rhegiensis hath the like or worse: Salus hominis non in praedestinatione Factoris, sed in operatione famulantis collocata est. Non est specialis circa credentes Dei munificentia. Praedestinatio ad justitiam pertinet. Nisi praescîentia exploraverit, praedestinatio nihil decernit. Justitia periclitabitur si sine merito indignus eligitur.  
Unto all these and the like inferences and opinions we briefly answer three things. First, That Predestination is absolute, not because it intendeth the bringing of any man unto eternal life without performing the conditions which God requireth in the Gospel, as Repenting, Believing, Persevering, and the like; but because God in his most gracious decree of Election doth as absolutely and certainly ordain men unto saving grace as unto everlasting glory. Secondly, That in the Divine Predestination there is always included a prescience of the faith and perseverance of all such as are elected: yet so, that this prescience is not the antecedent motive unto their Election; but this foreseen faith and perseverance is a consequent fruit or effect of the Divine Election. Lastly, That there is a decree conditional established by God concerning man's salvation, namely, That if any man repent, believe and persevere, he shall most certainly be saved. But we say it is an abuse of the Word, to call this the decree of God's Election or Predestination. For the truth of this decree may stand good and firm though no man living should believe or attein unto eternal life. But the Divine Predestination or Election is such a decree as infallibly in some men produceth faith, and bringeth unto eternal life a certain number of persons known only unto God himself.  
To shut up this Corollary; We do not only avouch the doctrine of S. Augustine concerning absolute Predestination to be true, allowed by our Church, and easily cleared from all those absurd consequences which the Adversaries would feign fasten upon it; but we further avouch, That the new-devised platform of Predestination grounded by Arminius upon foreseen faith and perseverance, is false, vain, and disagreeing from the notion of Predestination rooted in the hearts of all catholic and orthodox Christians. For his Predestination is settled upon these four pillars.  
1. The first is, an absolute decree of giving Christ for a Mediator and Redeemer unto mankind considered as fallen, in the state of sin.  
2. Another absolute decree, To receive into favour all such as shall repent and believe, and to save them persevering unto the end; as also, To leave the impenitent and unfaithful under God's wrath, and to condemn them as men out of Christ.  
3. A third decree, Effectually to afford and administer unto all men sufficient and necessary means of breeding faith and repentance.  
4. The fourth and last, a decree, To save or condemn certain singular persons, grounded upon the Divine foresight who will repent, believe and persevere, and who will not.  
To this platform in general we say, That the marshalling of the eternal immanent acts of the Divine understanding or will into First, Second, Third, Fourth, is a weak imagination of man's brain, and so uncertain that amongst twenty who give us such delineations of Gods eternal decrees, you shall not found two who agreed between themselves in numbering them and ordering them; but where one maketh four, another maketh five, six, or seven, etc. and that which one man setteth in the first place, another setteth in the last: and in brief, every man ordereth them secundùm suum modum imaginandi. To build therefore any doctrines of faith upon the Priority or posteriority of such decrees, is to build castles in the air. For as Hilarius speaketh, 
i De Trin. lib. 12.  Omnia penès Deum aequabili aeternitatis infinitate consistunt.  
Now to come more particularly to Arminius his decrees. Whereas the true decree of Election or Predestination is an Operative Practical decree, preparing from all eternity and in time certainly causing grace and glory in singular persons elected; Arminius hath given us Enunciative Doctrinal decrees concerning the general causes and means of salvation, apperteining promiscuously unto all men, whether elected or not elected, conjoined with an act of Divine prescience, which causeth not Peter's Faith, Repentance, Perseverance, Salvation, but rather Peter's Faith, Repentance and Perseverance cause or draw after them his Predestination. So that in the whole series of Arminius his Predestination there is not one decree to be found which causeth infallibly in any singular man Justification, Sanctification or Glorification.  
1. His first decree is very defective, because it giveth us a predestinated Mediator and Redeemer in separato signo rationis from the persons predestinated infallibly to participate the benefit of this Mediator and Redeemer, which is reconciliation and effectual grace in this world, and eternal glory hereafter. For as it were an absurd imagination to conceive that God first decreed to make Adam's head, and than by another decree to make him members subordinate to his head; so is it, to frame a particular decree for the Predestination of Christ, and than to device another for the Predestination of his subordinate members.  
2. His second decree is a decree revealed about the manner how many in time must be brought unto heaven, and not the secret decree wherein God from all eternity predestinated those whom he pleased unto the infallible obtaining of the kingdom of heaven: so that this eternal decree, Quicunque crediderit & perseveraverit salvus erit, might stand true though no man in the world should either believe or be saved. But the decree of Election or Predestination doth imply, per modum causae infallibiliter operantis, the faith, perseverance and salvation of a number of singular persons known unto God, and cannot be verified otherwise.  
3. His third decree hath the same fault: For God may (in his sense) sufficiently and effectually administer the means of grace and salvation unto millions of men who notwithstanding will never attein salvation. But that administration of grace which floweth from the decree of Predestination never failed to bring those particular persons unto whom it is mercifully vouchsafed, unto the state of glorification. These decrees hitherto concern Cain as well as Abel, and Judas as well as Peter; and therefore as yet we see in them no decree of Election.  
4. His last decree is it wherein only the Divine Predestination is formally and essentially placed by Arminius: and yet this hath as little in it of real Predestination or Election as the former. For, First it is a decree for the temporal and actual introduction of certain singular persons into the kingdom of glory; whereas Predestination is a decree fore-appointing and preparing that effectual grace whereby those persons were infallibly brought unto glory. Secondly, this decree is founded upon the prescience of man's right use of God's grace: But the decree of Predestination causeth the right use of grace. 
k Aquin. Qu. De Praedestin.  Hoc ipsum velle accipere gratiam est ex praedestinatione Divina.  
This discourse concerning Predestination is necessary for the true understanding of Reprobation: And it is probable that those who err in the one are not free from error in the other.   

God's Love to Mankind.  
SIR,  
I Have sent you here the reasons which have moved me (A) to change my opinion in some controversies of late debated between the Remonstrants and their Opposites.  
I do the rather (B) present them unto you,  
1. That I may show the due respect which I bear your Worship with my forwardness to answer your desires, as I can with regard to conscience.  
2. That you may see that I descent not without cause, but have reason on my side.  
3. That if I can be convinced that my grounds are weak and insufficient, I may think better of the opinion which I have forsaken than I can for the present.  
In the delivery of my motives I will proceed in this order: 1. I will state the opinion which I dislike. 2. I will lay down my reasons against it.  
Touching the first your Worship knoweth these two things very well: 

1. That (C) the main 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and question in these controversies, and that on which the rest do hung, is, What the decrees of God are touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered.  
2. That the men who have disputed these things, may be reduced to two sorts and sides.    
The first side (D) affirmeth, That there is an Absolute and Peremptory decree proceeding from the alone pleasure of God, without any consideration of men's final impenitency and unbelief: by which God casteth men of from grace and glory, and shutteth up the fare greater part (even of those that are called by the preaching of the Gospel to repentance and salvation) under invincible and unavoidable sin and damnation.  
The other side disavowing any such decree, say, That God's decree of casting men of for ever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sin and unbelief, both avoidable by grace, and consequently inferring no man's damnation necessarily.  
The first side is divided: For  
1. Some (E) of them present man to God in the decree of Reprobation, looked on out of or above the Fall; and say, That God of his mere pleasure antecedent to all sin in the creature, original or actual, did decree to glorify his Sovereignty and Justice in the eternal rejection and damnation of the greatest part of mankind, as the end; and in their unavoidable sin and impenitency, as the means. And this way go Calvine, Beza, Zanchius, Piscator, Gomarus, and some of our own countrymen.  
2. The rest (F) of that side thinking to avoid the great inconveniences to which that Supralapsarian way lieth open, fall down a little lower, and present man to God in his decree of Reprobation, lying in the Fall and under the guilt of original sin, saying, That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in Adam's sin, did decree the greatest number of men (even those whom he calleth to repentance and salvation by the preaching of the Gospel) to hell-torments for ever and without all remedy, for the declaration of his severe Justice. This way went the Synod.  
The difference (G) between them is not much, and even in their own account too small a discord to 'cause a breach. Notwithstanding this petty difference therefore, they agreed well enough together, as we may see in the Hague-Conference and Synod.  
In the Conference at Hague the Contra-remonstrants have these words; 
(a) Col. Hag. Brand. pag 37. Quoad sententiarum diversitatem in hoc argumento, quòd Deus respexit hominem in hoc decreto nondum creatum, vel creatum & lapsum; quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrin●e non pertinet, libenter alii alios aequitate Christianâ toleramus.  As touching the diversity of opinions in this argument, viz. That God looked at man in this decree, not yet created, or created and fallen; because this belongeth not to the foundation of this doctrine, we do in Christian equity bear with one another.  
After this in the Synod at Dort they permitted Gomarus to set down his judgement in the upper way. And the Delegates of South-Holland were very indifferent which way they took: For these are their words, 
(b) Act. Syn. part. 3. pag. 48. An Deus in eligendo consideraverit homines ut lapsos, an etiam ut nondum lapsos, existimant non esse necessarium ut desiniatur, modò statuatur Deum in eligendo considerasse homines in pari statu.  Whether God in choosing considered men as fallen, or else as not fallen, they (the Delegates of South-Holland) think it is not necessary to be determined, so it be held, that God in choosing considered men in a like estate. 
(c) Antidote. Remonstr. pag. 32.  Maccovius (H) also Professor of Divinity at Franeker, a violent and stiff maintainer of the most unsavoury speeches which have been uttered in this Controversy, and one that undertook in the very Synod to make good against Lubbert his fellow-professour, That God did 
(d) Velle peccata, ordinare homines ad peccatum quà peccatum, & neutiquam velle ut omnes homines salventur, &c▪  will sins, ordain men to sin, and would not at all that all men be saved; and besides this, openly and peremptorily affirmed, That except these things were held and maintained by them, they could not possibly keep their own ground, but must come over to the Remonstrants: this man was not only not censured, but publicly declared in the Synod to be pure and orthodox, and dismissed only with this kind and friendly admonition, That he should hereafter take heed of such words as might give offence to tender ears, and could not well down with those who are yet uncapable of such mysteries.  
By these instances it appeareth that they of the first side can easily bear one with another in this difference. And (to say the truth) there is no reason why they should quarrel about circumstances, seeing they agreed in the substance. For they both (I) contend,  
1. That the moving-cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sin of man, original or actual.  
2. That the final impenitency and damnation of Reprobates are necessary and unavoidable by Gods absolute decree.  
These two things are the maxima gravamina, principal grievances, that the other side stick at. So that these two paths meet at last in the same way.  
Both these opinions of the first side I dislike.  
My reasons why, are of two sorts; 

1. Such as first made me to question their truth.  
2. Such as convince me of their untruth.    

Answer.  
THe Remonstrants in this controversy concerning Election, Preterition, or negative Reprobation, have not only the Contra-remonstrants for their Opposites, but the Church of England also; which holdeth the middle way, as the learned Bishop of Norwich hath plainly showed: The change of your opinion, therefore is not to be blamed, unless where from one extremity you have run into the other.  
A friend might have been satisfied in this kind by private conference, or writing, though his Majesty's Declaration had not been broken by printing and publishing such controversial points.  
The main 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not, What are the Decrees of God only concerning the final conditions of men; but, What are the Decrees of God concerning the different preparation of grace, whereby some are guided infallibly unto salvation, others are permitted through their own corruption or voluntary transgression to fall into damnation. As for the ordering of such eternal Decrees by first, second, third, fourth instantia rationis (as they term them) it is a School-devise unknown to the Ancients, and never attempted by any with good success.  
No side affirmeth an absolute decree by force whereof Persons not elected are cast of from grace: for the non-elect Angels and many millions of men not predestinated have had a great measure of grace bestowed upon them. Reprobation is not a denial of sufficient grace, but a denial of such special grace as God knoweth would infallibly bring them to glory.  
Neither doth the decree of Preterition shut up any man under a necessity of sinning and being damned; but it permitteth men voluntarily and freely to run into damnable sins, and through their voluntary impenitency to incur eternal damnation. 
a Prosp. ad Obj. Vinc. Resp. 10.  Non cursus ruentium, nec malignitatem iniquorum, neque cupiditates peccantium praedestinatio Dei aut excitavit, aut suasit, aut impulit, etc. 
b Resp. 15.  Nemini Deus correctionis adimit viam, nec quenquam boni possibilitate despoliat.  
And last of all, absolute Predestination, and absolute Reprobation or Nonelection, do not exclude or deny the eternal intuition of Faith and Perseverance in the Elect, nor the eternal consideration of Infidelity and Impenitency in the Non-elect; but they deny such a consideration of good or bad acts foreseen in men as causeth or precedeth the different decrees of God in electing some men mercifully unto salvation, and leaving others through their own default to plunge themselves into eternal damnation.  
If by casting of men for ever you mean the eternal exclusion of the damned from the blessed presence of God, and their eternal tormenting in hell, no side will deny but this is grounded upon the foresight of their final continuance in sin: yet so, that as the final continuance of Peter in faith was not a cause, condition or motive foreseen, and so determining the Divine will to elect him; but the Divine Election was the cause which afterwards produced in him that foreseen faith. So the foreseen final continuance of Judas in sin and infidelity was not it which determined the Divine will to passe-by him in his decree of electing singular persons unto the infallible atteinment of eternal life; but being thus passed-by, God forseeth that through the voluntary obstinacy of his own will (not by any necessitating violence of God's decree) he will live and die in sin and impenitency, and for his voluntary sin and impenitency deserve and undergo eternal torments.  
Those who in ordering the eternal Decrees, place Predestination and negative Reprobation before the consideration of the fall, are not few for number, nor men of any late sect. 
c Lib. 1. dist. 41. Lib. 3. dist. 19  Scotus with the whole army of Scotists, the greater number of late School-Divines, are of this opinion: And Suarez by name; whose words are these, 
d In 3. disp. 5. p. 103.  Probabiliorem existimo communem sententiam Theologorum asserentium electionem hominum praedestinatorum antecessisse permissionem originalis peccati.  
As for Calvine, he never troubled himself with these imaginary Priorities and Posteriorities in the eternal immanent operations of God: but all that he aimed at was to prove, That the fall foreseen could not be cause or motive unto God of some men's Election and others Reprobation. As for the intuition or Divine consideration of all mankind in statu lapso, Calvine in plain terms avoucheth it; 
e De aeterna Dei Praedest.  Postquam Paulus, Deum ex perdita massa eligere & reprobare quos illi visum est, docuit, quare & quomodo id fiat adeò non expedit, ut potiùs expavescens, etc.  
And this Presupposition of sin considered in persons, whether elected or not elected, whether to be saved or to be damned, is most convenient for helping our understanding in this deep mystery. But if any shall thereby conceive that the eternal Volitions or Intuitions of God have any real posteriority or priority in the Divine will and understanding, he deceiveth himself, and troubleth others with vain jangling. 
f Ruiz. De volunt. p. 250.  Vtilitas distinguendi haec instantia rationis, non est, ut ille modus intelligendi retineatur, sed ut viam aperiat veritati, quae aperta relinquatur.  
God did eternally decree to glorify himself in the salvation of some and damnation of others; which the event doth plainly demonstrate: But for those in whose salvation he decreed to glorify his Mercy, he worketh in them the means of their salvation, faith, repentance, perseverance in faith and godliness, by an influx of grace into their souls, by a powerful yet not violent, by a most sweet and yet most infallible guidance of their wills; in and over which God hath a more predominant power than themselves. As for those in whose damnation God glorifieth his Sovereignty and Justice, he doth it not by an influx of malice into their souls, nor by unavoidable wresting of their wills unto any particular sin; but leaveth all sinful defective actions to their own sinful defective wills, which wanting the special grace and effectual guidance proceeding from Divine Predestination, never fail to run themselves willingly and wittingly upon their own damnation. The means whereby men are brought unto salvation, are real effects of the Divine Election wrought by God's Spirit; as the light and heat of the air is by the sun: But the means whereby men are carried to their damnation, grow from themselves; as coldness and darkness of the air is from itself.  
As for those whom you term Sublapsarians, you should have taken notice, that in this number you must put all who embrace S. Augustine's doctrine, and who have subscribed to the XVII Article of our Church. Now these do as well oppose themselves against the conditionate Election and Preterition, built upon the foresight of men's good or bad acts, lately brought in by Arminius, as unto the extreme harsh opinions of Piscator, Gomarus, or whomsoever. So that by joining yourself with the Remonstrants, you have as clearly forsaken the doctrine of the Church of England, as of Beza, Zanchius, or Piscator.  
The description of their opinion whom you term Sublapsarians, will not agreed unto all who reject the conditionate Predestination and Reprobation of the Remonstrants. For many with S. Augustine & our Church, condemn this as erroneous who notwithstanding make no absolute decree adjudging men to hell-torments with an excluding of all preconsideration of sin: But they grant an absolute decree of not effectually freeing many men from their estate of Sin, and an absolute decree of permitting many men to want the joys of Heaven, and an absolute decree of punishing such men's foreseen sins voluntarily committed and voluntarily continued by eternal torments in Hell.  
Those who are passed-by in the eternal decree of God are not by any force of the decree left without the benefit which the Scriptures promise' upon condition of repentance, not more than those whom God hath eternally elected are by virtue of that decree freed from the punishment which supposing their impenitency must light upon them. Notwithstanding the absolute eternal decrees of Election and Reprobation, the revealed Evangelicall decrees stand in their full force. If Cain repent and live well, he shall be pardoned and saved: If Peter repent not, and persevere in his sin, he shall be damned. And yet farther (not to determine whether sufficient grace be offered to every particular person in the world or not) we may resolutely determine, that the distinct absolute decree of Electing some infallibly unto perseverance in grace and atteinment of glory, and of Passing-by and rejecting others, is no good argument to prove that therefore the non-elected are left without all remedy or sufficient means of salvation. Adam was not predestinated to stand in the state of his innocency, yet he was not thereby excluded or bereft of sufficient means of standing. From the decree of Preterition or Reprobation, it well followeth, Judas is reprobated; Therefore he will not use the remedies or means which God offereth for his salvation. But it is not good consequence to say, Therefore God hath not given him sufficient remedies or means to escape damnation, were not his own wicked will the only hindrance.  
The Synod of Dort enjoined men to set down their particular judgements concerning Predestination and Reprobation; and therefore they had no reason to forbidden any man to set down plainly his own opinion. And since the Divine understanding doth not consider or behold this after that, but all together in one instant of eternity, there is no cause why men should stiffly contend about these Priorities and Posteriorities, which are human imaginations, or intellectûs nostri fictiones, as some truly term them.  
Maccovius was upon a by-occasion brought before the Synod; and the business betwixt him & Lubbertus was committed to the examination of some few Delegates, according to whose report he was dismissed.  
Unto the objection of ordaining men unto sin, his answer was, That God did not ordain any man unto sin efficiendo, but permittendo.  
For his denying of a will in God for the saving of all men, he understood it of the absolute effectual operative will, not of the conditional and approbative will of God.  
They both confess, that the Divine understanding could not but eternally foresee the original and actual sin which should finally cleave unto every particular man who should afterwards be born into this world: but they for all this deny, that the moving causes whereupon God distinguished men into Elect and Non-elect, was the foreseen faith of some, and the foreseen infidelity and impenitency of others. The state of men under sin was common to all: the mercy of God in effectually freeing from sin was due to none.    

MY reasons of the first sort do indifferently respect and make against both, and I will set them down against both together. My second sort of reasons I will divide, delivering some of them against the upper and more rigid way, others against the lower and more moderate way.  
I begin with those reasons which first moved me to question the truth of absolute Reprobation, as it is taught both ways. They are these four which follow.  

1. Reason NOVELTY  1 The Novelty (A) of this opinion. Absolute and inevitable Reprobation hath little or no footing in Antiquity. The upper way was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers (even the stoutest defenders of Grace against the Pelagians) for the space of six hundred (I may say eight hundred) years after Christ: nor the lower way till the time of S. Augustine, which was about four hundred years after Christ. They did generally agreed upon the contrary conclusion, and taught men in their times, That it was possible (B) for them to be saved which in the event were not saved, and to have repent, which repent not; and, That there was no decree of God which did lay a necessity of perishing upon any son of Adam. This that I say Mr Calvine himself doth freely acknowledge, speaking of Election and Reprobation according (C) to God's foreknowledge; 
e Calv. Inst. lib. 3. c. 22. Sect. 1. Neque haec vulgò recepta opinio solius vulgi est: habuit enim seculis omnibus magnos autores.  This commonly received opinion, saith he, (of a conditional respective decree) is not the opinion only of the common people, but hath had great authors in all ages. Reverend Beza likewise speaking of the same opinion, hath these words to the same purpose; 
f Beza, in cap. 11. ad Rom. v. 35. In quem errorem sanè turpissimum Origenes veteres plerosque tum Graecos tum Latinos adegit.  Into which surely most foul error Origen hath driven many of the Ancients both Greek and Latin. To the same effect also Prosper, S. Augustine's follower, hath a remarkable speech: 
g Prosper, in Epist. ad Aug. prope finem. Penè omnium parem inveniri & unam sententiam, quâ propositum & praedestinationem Dei secundùm praescientiam receperunt: ut ob hoc Deus alios vasa contumeliae, alios honoris vasa fecerit, quia finem uniuscujusque praeviderit, & sub ipso gratiae adjutorio in qua futurus esset voluntate & actione praescierit.  Almost all the Ancients, saith he, did grant with one consent, that God decreed men's ends according to his foresight of their actions, and not otherwise. To these speeches let me add that of Remigius Archbishop of Lions, who to Rabanus Archbishop of Mentz, objecting that S Augustine wrote a book called Hypognosticon against Pelagius and Caelestius, wherein he denied that Reprobates were properly 
h Ush. hist. Gott. pag. 107  praedestinati ad interitum, predestinate to destruction, answereth, That S. Augustine said not so: but some other man (as it is supposed) to purge the Church of that calumny which some illaffected ones did cast upon it, namely, That it taught that God by his Predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing, did withdraw the word PREDESTINATION from the point of Reprobates, and gave it only to the Elect; and so gave great occasion of further error and mistake. In this speech of his is clearly implied, that it was (D) the constant doctrine of the Church than, that Reprobates lie under no necessitating decree of perdition.  
The truth of this charge may further appear by a few particular instances. Minutius Felix bringeth in the Pagans' objecting to the Christians, That they held the events of all things to be inevitable, and did feign and frame to themselves an unjust God, who did punish in men their unavoidable destinies, not their ill choises. This is the objection; 
i Min. Felix, pag. 23. Quicquid agimus, ut alii fato, ità vos Deo addicitis: iniquum igitur Deum singitis, qui sorte in hominibus puniat, non voluntatem.  Whatsoever we do, as others to Fate, so ye ascribe to God: ye make therefore to yourselves an unjust God, who punisheth in men their lot, not their william. To this he answereth, 
k Idem, pag. 116. Illud farum est, quod de unoquoque Deus fatus est.  Christians hold no other Fates than God's decrees; 
l Ibid. Qui cùm universam praescit materiam, pro meritis & qualitatibus singulorum etiam sata determinat, & ità in nobis non genitura plectitur, sed ingenii natura punitur.  who foreknowing all men and their actions, did accordingly determine their retributions.  
S. Hierome an eager opposer of the Pelagians, in many places of his writings saith the same thing; 
m Hieron. ad Galat. c. 1. v. 15. Ex praescientia Dei evenit, ut quem justum futurum scit, priùs diligat quàm oriatur ex utero; & quem peccatorem, oderit antequam peccet.  From the foreknowledge of God it cometh to pass, that who he knoweth will be righteous, him he loveth before he cometh out of the womb; and who he knoweth will be a sinner, him he hateth before he sinneth. In another place he speaketh to the same purpose, 
n Ad c. 1. Malac. Dilectio & odium Dei vel ex praescientia nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus; alioquin novimus quod omnia Deus diligat, nec quicquam eorum oderit quae creavit.  The love and hatred of God ariseth either from the foresight of future things, or from the works; otherwise we know that God loveth all things, nor doth he hate any thing that he hath made. And in his book against Pelagius he saith, 
o Lib. 3. contra Pelag.  Eligit Deus quem bonum cernit, God chooseth whom he seethe to be good.  
The sum of all which speeches is but this, That (E) there is no decree of damning or saving men, but what is built upon God's Foreknowledge of the evil and good actions of men. Fulgentius is plain for that too: 
p Fulgent. lib. 1. ad Monimum; Quos praescivit Deus hanc vitam in peccato terminaturos, praedestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos  Those whom God foresaw would die in sin, he decreed should live in endless punishment. I may takein S. Augustine and Prosper also, who are judged to be the Patroness of the Absolute decree, as it is set down the Sublapsarian way: Even they do many times let fall such speeches as cannot fairly be reconciled with absolute Reprobation. I will only cite Prosper: (for S. Augustine speaketh in him.) He discoursing of some that fall away à sanctitate ad immunditiem, from holiness to uncleanness, saith, 
q Prosp. ad Object. 3. Gall. Non ex eo necessitatem pereundi habuerunt quia praedestinati non sunt; sed ideo praedestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntaria praevaricatione praesciti sunt.  They that fall away from holiness to uncleanness, lie not under a necessity of perishing because they were not predestinate; but therefore they were not predestinate, because they were foreknown to be such by voluntary prevarication. Not long after speaking of the same men he saith, 
r Prosp. Resp. ad Object. 7. Quia illos ru●turos propriâ voluntate praescivit, ob hoc à filiis perditionis nullâ praedestinatione discrevit.  Because God foresaw they would perish by their own freewill, therefore he did not by any predestination sever them from the children of perdition. And again in his answer to the xiith Objection he hath these words, 
s Ibid. Resp. ad Object. 12. Vires obedientiae non ideo cuiquam subtraxit quia eum non praedestinavit; sed quia recessurum ab ipsa obedientia esse praevidit, ideo eum non praedestinavit.  God hath not withdrawn from any man ability to yield obedience because he hath not predestinated him; but because he foresaw he would fall from obedience, therefore he hath not predestinated him.  
I will shut up the instances of that age with the judgement of the Council at Arles against the Pelagians in the year CDXC, or thereabout. This Council subscribed to the letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Predestinarian, and made the Anathemaes (F) and curses which therein he denounceth against him and such like, to be their own: Some of which were these; 
t Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepisse ut salvus esse possit.  Cursed be the man that shall say that the man that perisheth might not have been saved▪ and again, 
u Anathema illi qui dixerit quòd vas contumeliae non possit assurgere ut sit vas in honorem.  Cursed be the man that shall say that a vessel of dishonour may not rise to be a vessel of honour.  
A testimony or two▪ I will borrow likewise from some persons of note, and those S. Augustine's followers too, who lived about four hundred years after S. Augustine's time. Remigius the great patron of Gottschalk the zealous preacher and publisher of Absolute reprobation in those times, in his answer to that epistle which we suppose to be the Epistle of Rabanus, to Rabanus saying That God did 
w Bishop Usher, hist. Gottsc. p. 53, & 54. Sanabiles facere nationes orbis terrarum.  make the nations of the world healthful, and that he doth velle omnes homines salvos fieri, will that all men be saved; he giveth such an answer as cannot stand with Absolute reprobation: 
x Ex hoc omnino verum est, quia nemini Deus imponit necessitatem pereundi, sicut nemini imponit necessitatem malè agendi.  This, saith he, is very true, because God layeth on no man a necessity of perishing, as he hath laid on none a necessity of sinning. And a little after he is plainer: 
y Quos verissimè praescivit impios & iniquos futuros, & in sua impietate & iniquitate permansuros, justis & rectissimis de causis decrevit, statuit & ● praedestinavit perituros: sicut ipse ait, Qui peccaverit mihi, ipsum delebo de libro meo.  Those whom God did foreknow would live and die in their wickedness, for reasons most just he decreed should perish: as himself saith, Him which sinneth against me, even him will I blot out of my book.  
In the Valentine Synod assembled in favour of Gottschalk we may found these words, 
z Can. 2. Nec ipsos malos ideo perire, quia boni esse non potuerunt, sed quia boni esse noluerunt, suóque vitio in massa damnationis vel merito originali vel etiam actuali permanserunt.  Therefore do the wicked perish, not because they could not, but because they would not be good, and by their own fault original or actual also, remained in the mass of perdition. And in the end of their third Canon they denounce Anathema to those that hold that men are so predestinated unto evil as that they cannot be otherwise: 
a Can. 3. Verùm aliquos ad malum praedestinatos esse Divinâ potestate, ut aliud esse non possint, non solùm non credimus, sed etiam si sunt qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione, sicut Arausicana Synodus, illis Anathema dicimus.  That any should be (saith the Council) predestinated to evil by the power of God, so as he cannot be otherwise, we do not only not believe, but also if there be any that will believe so great an evil, with all detestation we denounce them accursed, as the Arausicane Council also did. By these testimonies (which are but a few of many) it appeareth that absolute and inevitable Reprobation found but cold entertainment from Antiquity.  
Which considering, I began to call it into question. For albeit I make not the decisions and determinations of the Fathers or Counsels the rules of my faith, because they are but men, and therefore subject to error; yet I honour their grey hairs, and their grave assemblies, and do vehemently mistrust those doctrines which they never taught or approved, but misliked and condemned.  

Answer.  
ABsolute negative Reprobation is no novel opinion: But on the contrary, That God's immanent and eternal acts of Predestination and Reprobation can be in potestate praedestinatorum & reprobatorum, is novel and false.  
The Ancients before S. Augustine granted a Prescience in God of all the future good and bad acts of men: but their good acts they derived from Predestination; their bad, from their own , and not from the Reprobation. And as for the sentence of Damnation, it layeth hold upon them, non quà non-electi, sed quà impii. In all this Augustine differeth not from those Fathers that went before him.  
The terms of Possible and Impossible being taken in divers senses afford the Remonstrants many advantages amongst the ignorant, in their disputes against absolute Election and Reprobation. It is therefore to be observed, that in Scriptures, Fathers, Schoolmen, and all manner of Authors, and in the common use of all languages, many acts or events wherein no necessity or enforcement is laid upon men's wills, are notwithstanding said impossible to be otherwise than they are. But for the eternal Divine decrees of Predestination and Reprobation, to say that they are or ever were in potestate praedestinatorum aut reprobatorum, is contrary to the very essence & formality of Decrees. Those things wherein men may agere or non agere, are said to be in their own power: But Predestination and Reprobation are immanent acts of the Divine will and understanding, and therefore it is impossible that they should be either way in potestate voluntatis humanae. 
a August. De Spir. & lit. c. 31.  Hoc quisque in sua potestate habere dicitur, quod si vult facit, si non vult non facit.  
Now for the acts of believing, repenting, and attaining unto salvation, we say not that these are simply impossible, or that the decree of God leaveth a necessity of perishing upon the non-elect. Perditio tua ex te, is as true in their Doctrine which maintain Absolute and oppose Conditional Predestination and Reprobation, as in the Decree of the Remonstrants.  
The Remonstrants grant an eternal Prescience of many men's infidelity and impenitency, and thereupon an eternal immutable decree of their damnation: and yet they hold (and that truly) that thereby no necessity of infidelity or impenitency, no impossibility of believing or repenting is laid upon men. They must give us leave to say the same of Predestination, until they can demonstrate how this doth more infringe the liberty of man's will than the other. If we respect that necessity which is called Necessitas Infallibilitatis, Anselmus maketh it alike in both: 
b De Concord. c. 2.  Necesse est fieri quae praesciuntur & quae praedestinantur. If we call that an impossible act or event which cannot stand in sensu composito when the contrary is presupposed, the Divine prescience maketh believing, repenting and being saved as impossible unto Cain, Judas, or any person reprobated upon prescience, as when they are reprobated upon God's mere william. But the truth is, neither the one nor the other can stand cum eventu contrario; and yet both the one and the other do stand cum possibilitate ad eventum contrarium.  
Conditional decrees of Salvation and Damnation have been published in the Gospel, and are acknowledged by all Divines: but conditional Decrees of eternal Predestination and Preterition are not found in Scripture, nor allowed of by the Church of England. Every man knoweth where to found these conditional decrees, If any man believe and repent, he shall be saved; If any man continued in infidelity and impenitency, he shall be damned: But it will be hard for any Remonstrant to show these other, If any man believe, he shall be predestinated; If he believe not, he shall not be predestinated. Faith is a temporal effect produced in those which were elected from eternity, not a foreseen condition drawing after it Gods eternal Election. And infidelity and final impenitency are faults voluntarily proceeding out of the wicked hearts of men eternally reprobated, not preceding the eternal act of Reprobation but the temporal act of their judicial Condemnation. As for the Fathers which grounded Predestination upon Prescience, they understood 
c Vide Aug. De bono persever. c. 18.  a practical Divine prescience, not a bore speculative.  
Not Divine that acknowledgeth the Omniscience of God and his eternal Prescience of all future actions and events, will deny, that God in the same eternity wherein he elected some and passed-by others, foresaw both what the one and what the other would do, and what contrary ends they would come unto. But the question is not, Whether God from all eternity had such a foresight, but, Whether the different actions of men foreseen caused the different decrees of their Election and Preterition. As for their different ends, namely, that the one attaineth salvation after this life, and the other undergo eternal damnation, this we confess to follow upon their contrary actions of Believing, Repenting, and Not-believing, Not-repenting. Neither were they otherwise by any eternal decree appointed unto damnation, than with respect unto the just desert of their sin. It is truly said by Calvine, 
d In 2. ad Thess. cap. 2.  Reprobi suo delicto morti devoti sunt; non pereunt nisi qui digni sunt. & Zanchius, 
e De Natura Dei, l. 5. p. 712.  Peccatum non est causa rejectionis, sed est causa damnationis.  
For the phrase, Praedestinati ad interitum; it is manifest that Augustine and his followers applied it unto all such as were not praedestinati ad gloriam: though the word Electi was never used by them in that sense 
f Vide Aug. tract. 48. in Joan. & De Civit. l. 15. c. 1. & Enchir. c. 100 & in Psal. 13. .  
That which Augustine denied was a Predestination of reprobates unto sin: But as for their Predestination unto the just punishment of their sins, namely death and destruction, Augustine, Prosper 
g Vide Prosp. ad Cap. Gall resp. 19 & ad Object. Vincent. resp. 10, 11. , Fulgentius 
h Vide Fulgent. ad Mon l 1. c. 7. 14 & 18.  were never afraid to acknowledge it.  
As for Hincmarus his fancy, that the book called Hypognosticon or Hypomnesticon, was written by S. Augustine himself, and that in the sixth book thereof he retracted what before he delivered concerning praedestinati ad interitum, is false and frivolous, and sufficiently confuted by Remigius. Yet we willingly grant, that in the most strict and proper sense the word Predestination doth only respect the good supernatural qualities and acts which God worketh in men elected, and the supernatural blessed end whereunto he bringeth them by the foresaid means. And the reason hereof is, because 
i Aquin. 1. q. 23. art. 1.  Destination is the direction of a thing unto such a scope as by its own strength and nature it could never move unto. Thus the arrow is destinated unto the mark, whereunto of itself it could never move. Now men are too ready to move in the way of wickedness, and to carry themselves unto destruction: and therefore as God cannot predestinate men unto sin, so he doth not properly predestinate them unto their damnation (for than he should be a working cause thereof) but he preordinateth their just damnation as a recompense of their sin and rebellion 
k Vide Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1. c. 17 Bed. l. 1. qu. art. 13. . So that if by Predestinating ad interitum we understand the causing and effectual working of any man's destruction, God cannot be said praedestinare ad interitum: But if we only understand the preordaining of those to damnation whom God foresaw deserving and working the same, we neither think nor speak otherwise than the orthodox Fathers did.  
It is still the constant Doctrine of those that teach absolute Predestination and Reprobation, That neither persons elected lie under a necessitating decree of doing well and being saved, nor persons not-elected under a necessitating decree of doing ill and being damned. The eternal decrees of Gods will take not away the liberty of man's will; and therefore the Pagan objections were Paganish.  
The eternal decree of saving or damning men is conjoined with an eternal foresight of the obedience of men saved, and disobedience of men to be damned; but with this difference: The foreseen good actions of the elect were neither antecedent conditions moving God to elect them, nor meritorious causes of their salvation: but the foreseen final estate of the wicked in their sins, was the intuition of a most just and meritorious cause of their damnation. As for Election and Preterition, all men being represented unto God electing as in the common mass of sin and misery, there can be found no opposite qualities or actions in men whereupon to ground the opposite decrees of Gods eternal Election and Reprobation. And therefore we think that saying of Calvine warrantable, 
l Instit. l. 3. c. 22.  Deus in negotio praedestinationis non egreditur extra seipsum. To which we add another of the same Author; 
m Ibid. c. 23. §. 3.  Si judicio mortis obnoxii sunt omnes naturali conditione quos Dominus ad mortem praedestinat, si ex corrupta massa desumti sunt omnes, non mirum si damnationi subjaceant.  
There needed no such pains in heaping up Fathers for proof of this conclusion, That there is no decree of damning men otherwise than upon the guilt, and for the misdeserts of their sins. Not only Fulgentius, Augustine, Prosper, but Calvine, Beza, and others whom you make Supralapsarians, have constantly defended this true doctrine. Calvine; 
n Deaeter. Praed. p. 709.  Quisque sibi propriâ incredulitate est damnationis author. Beza; 
o Annot. in 9 ad Rom. ver. 15.  Ineptè faciunt, qui Reprobationis decretum cum Damnatione confundunt: cùm hujus causa manifesta sit, nempe peccatum; illius verò, sola Dei voluntas. Zanchius; 
p Lib. 5. De attrib. qu. 3. pag. 506.  Certum est, Deum, sicut propter peccata impios punit, sic etiam decrevisse illos propter haec peccata punire.  
This Author is doubly mistaken: First, in that he conceiveth a conditionate Predestination or Election grounded upon Prescience of men's good actions; whereas no such good actions can be foreseen in men considered in statu massae corruptae, but as they are caused by that grace which was eternally prepared for them in their Predestination, and actually bestowed upon them in their effectual Vocation, Justification, Sanctification. This conditional Predestination upon foresight of men's goodness or holiness, was the error which Augustine ascribeth to the Pelagians: 
q Aug. De Praedest. Sanct. l. 1. c. 18.  Praesciebat ergò, ait Pelagianus, qui futuri essent sancti per liberae voluntatis arbitrium, & ideo eos ante mundi constitutionem in ipsa sua praescientia, quâ tales futuros esse praescivit, elegit. But what saith S. Augustine to this point? 
r Ibid.  Non quia futuri eramus sancti, sed ut essemus, nos elegit. Ideo quip tales eramus futuri, quia elegit ipse praedestinans ut tales per gratiam essemus.  
Secondly, he is mistaken, in thinking those speeches of the Fathers cannot fairly stand with absolute Nonelection, Preterition or negative Reprobation, which import a decree of positive or punitive Reprobation, that is, of damnation, not otherwise grounded than upon preconsideration of sin. For though God out of the corrupted mass of mankind electeth some men unto the means and end of salvation, merely of his own gracious good pleasure in Christ, yet he enacteth no decree of damning men for his pleasure, but for their own sin and misdeserts. And as for negatio praedestinationis; it is not a working cause of any man's sin or damnation, though it contain a decree of not working their delivery, of not working their effectual salvation. But fare be it from God that it should import a decree necessitating their perdition and eternal destruction. As men not comprised within the decree of Predestination commit sin willingly and greedily, so they run on to their own destruction voluntarily, and not carried by any necessitating force flowing out of the decree of Reprobation.  
Whereas Augustine or Prosper 
s Ad Ca●. Gall. resp. 3.  seem to fetch the cause negatae praedestinationis or negativae reprobationis (as some call it) from the foreseen disobedience of men, their purpose is to show, That the final continuance of any man in the state of sin, and his final falling into the state of damnation is not caused by the negative act of Predestination: and further, That where men are foreseen of God as ending their lives in sin, there is a sufficient reason to infer, Ideo non fuerunt ex praedestinatis, or, Ideo Deus eos non praedestinavit. But that this foresight of their personal sins was the cause of the Divine decree of their Nonelection whereby they stand distinguished from the elect, was no part of the Father's meaning. So that the eternal prevision of some men's perseverance in faith and godliness, and of other men's perseverance in infidelity and ungodliness, was not the ground, cause or reason of the opposite decrees of Election and Preterition; but a proof that there are such distinct or different decrees concerning men.  
Last of all, this foresight of God concerning men left to the deficiency of their own wicked wills, and through infidelity and impiety procuring their own destruction, is not alleged as a cause why this man rather than another was not predestinated, but as a certain note and an infallible consequent of men not predestinated; causa probationis, non rei ipsius.  
Those curses may be most just, granting that positive Reprobation, which is peremtorium decretum puniendi, never proceedeth ex solo Dei beneplacito: though we hold therewithal, that negative Reprobation, which is absolutum decretum non praedestinandi, dependeth only upon Gods free pleasure. For it is no error to say, that nonelection or negative Reprobation may stand together with a possibility of avoiding sin and damnation. The non-elect angels had this possibility; all mankind generally in Adam had this possibility: and yet every singular person was not predestinated. And if God were so pleased to give as sufficient grace to every particular man in the world as he gave to Adam in his creation, yet the opposite decrees of Election and Preterition or negative Reprobation may stand firm and good. The reason is evident: Because Predestination is not a bore ordination of men unto eternal life by sufficient means, which make the event only possible; but a merciful providence in ordering such means for the elect as make the event infallible and infrustrable. On the other side, Preterition or negative Reprobation is not a decree necessarily excluding persons not-elect from all possible means of salvation; but a decree permitting such out of the freedom of their own wills to neglect and abuse such means of their salvation: which abuse foreseen of God, is unto him a just cause of their damnation.  
As for vessels of Honour and Dishonour; we grant, that not only men may but do continually from vessels of Dishonour rise to be vessels of Honour. For when any man whatsoever, who hath lived in infidelity & uncleanness of life, believeth, repenteth, and leadeth a holy life, than a vessel of Dishonour becometh a vessel of Honour. But if by vessels of Honour you understand the Elect, and by vessels of Dishonour the Non-elect; and conceive such a change, that men not-elected may by acts of their own make themselves elected; this is a fancy contrary to truth, and rejected of all orthodox and judicious Divines: who consent, Nec praedestinationem esse in potestate praedestinati sed praedestinantis, nec reprobationem in potestate reprobati sed reprobantis. For we understand the Divine Reprobation, where there is not a Predestination unto effectual and infallible means of eternal life. Now who can say, that it is in the power of man's will either to procure or hinder such a decree?  
All the testimonies of the ancient Fathers here cited, do not prove the eternal decrees of Election and Nonelection to be conditional, or to depend upon the contrary foreseen actions of men's will; But they prove two other things, which we willingly grant: 1. That these decrees necessitate not man's will unto good actions, much less unto wicked. 2. That wicked men are not therefore damned because they were not predestinated, but because they lived and died obstinate in sin.  
As for the possibility which men non-elected have, either to believe or to eschew this or that sin, and so to escape condemnation. The Fathers, when they consider that the wills of men not-elected do commit all their evil acts freely, usually say, that they had a power to have done the contrary: But when they consider the infallible certainty of their impiety and infidelity, than many times they pronounce it a thing impossible that they should unfeignedly repent, perseverantly believe, and finally attein salvation: Of which manner of phrase of speech we have frequent examples in Scripture, Fathers, Schoolmen, and all kind of Authors.  
He that embraceth the opinion of the orthodox Fathers, cannot hold Predestination to be grounded upon the prevision of perseverant faith, since they confess Perseverance to be an effect of Election; nor the decree of negative Reprobation to be grounded upon foresight of infidelity, since Infidelity is a consequent thereof.    

Treatise.  

2. Reason Unwillingness to be tried.  II. It's Unwillingness to abide the trial. I found that the authors and abettors of it have been very backward to bring it to the standard; not only when they have been called upon by their adversaries to have it weighed, but also when they have been entreated thereto by their chief Magistrates, who might have compelled them: A shrewd argument (me thinks) that it is too light.  
In the disputation at Mompelgart, Anno 1586. held between Beza and Jacobus Andreae, with some seconds on both sides, Beza and his company having disputed with the Lutherans about the Person of Christ and the Lords Supper, when they came to this point, did decline the sifting of it, and gave this reason among others, That it could not than be publicly disputed of 
b Beza in Coll. Mompelg. p. 373. Sine grayi eorum offendiculo qui tanti mysterii capaces non sunt.  without the great scandal and hurt of the ignorant, and unacquainted with these high mysteries. 
c Brand. Coll. Hag. pag. 57  The Contra-remonstrants also in their Conference with the opposite parties at the Hague, in the year 1611, could not be drawn to dispute with them about this point, but delivered a petition to the States of Holland and West-Friezland that they might not be urged to it, resolving rather to break of the conference than to meddle with it. In the Synod likewise at Dort, in the years 1618. and 1619, the Remonstrants were warned by the Precedent of the Synod 
d Acta Syn. part. 1. pag. 133. Ut de Electione potiùs quàm de odiosa Reprobationis materia agerent.  That they should rather dispute of the point of Election than the odious point of Reprobation.  
Can this Doctrine be a truth, and yet blush at the light, which maketh all things manifest? especially considering these things: 1. That Reprobation is a principal head of Divinity, by the well or ill stating and ordering of which the glory of God and the good of Religion is much promoted or hindered. 2. That there is such a necessary connexion between the points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of Predestination) that the one cannot well be handled without the other. 3. That the Doctrine of Reprobation was the chief cause of all the uproars in the Church at that time. 4. That it was accused with open mouth and challenged of falsehood, and therefore bound in justice to purge itself of the crimination. 5. That the Remonstrants did not at that time desire that it should be talked of among the common people, who might have stumbled at it, but disputed of among the judicious and learned, who (as the threshing oxen which were to beaten the corn out of the husk) are to bolt out those truths which are couched a●● hidden in the letter of the Scriptures.  
That the Doctrine which is loath to abide the trial even of learned men, carrieth with it a shrewd suspicion of falsehood, the heathen Orator shall witness for me: who to Epicurus, saying that he would not publish his opinion to the simple people, who might happily take offence at it, answereth thus; 
e Cicero, de fin. bon. & mal. l. 2. pag. 115. Aut tu eadem ista dic in judicio; of't si coronam times, dic in senatu, Nunquam facies. Cur nisi quòd turpis est oratio?  Declare thine opinion in the place of judgement; or if thou art afraid of the assembly there, declare it in the Senate-house, among those grave and judicious persons. Thou wilt never do it: and why, but because it is a foul and dishonest opinion?  
This striving to lie close is (peradventure) not infallible argument of a bad cause, yet it is a very probable one. For true religion (as Vives saith) is not a thing guild●d over, but gold itself: The more that is scraped and discovered, the brighter and goodlier it is; and so is the truth. 
f Vives, De ver. fidei, l. 1. p. 16. Puriorem ac nitidiorem illam reddit belium, quàm pa● adversùs gentes.  Disputations illustrate and set forth true opinions more than silence can. Let us not fear therefore (saith he) jest our Faith when it is laid open, appear filthy to the eyes of the beholders. 
g Metuant hoc aliae religiones falsae & umbratiles  Let false and superficial religions, in which there is no soundness, be afraid of this. The Jew is loath to reason with the Christian touching his Law, and the Turk is forbidden to dispute of his Alcoran, because their Religions are brittle, like glisse broken with the lest touch: But the Christian, 
h Vives, l. 4. pag. 429. Qui veritate suâ sidit, nihil reformidat examen ingenii, imò advocate & quantum potest exacuit.  who is confident of the goodness of his Faith, feareth no examination, but rather as much as may be, soliciteth and provoketh his adversary to the combat. Truth, whether it be in men or doctrines, is best when it is uncovered: it coveteth no corners, though Error do; but it is willing to abide the trial. 
i Psal. 139.23, 24.  Search me, O Lord, and know my heart; try me, and know my thoughts, and see if there be any way of wickedness in me, saith the Prophet David, knowing his heart to be without guile. And our Saviour telleth us, 
k John 3.20, 21.  That every one that doth evil, hateth the light, and cometh not to it, jest his deeds should be reproved: but he that doth truth, cometh to the light, that his deeds might be made manifest that they are wrought in God. As St Paul saith of an heretic, 
* Tit. 3.11.  He is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-condemned; so we may say of heresy and untruth, It condemneth itself, and by nothing more than by refusing the touchstone. He is to be thought an empty scholar, who is loath to be opposed; and his gold to be light and sergeant, who will not have it touched and weighed; and those opinions to be but errors, which would so willingly walk in a mist and devil in silence, when it concerneth the peace of the Church so much to have them examined.  

Answer.  
IF Unwillingness to abide the trial be an argument of a bad cause, never men shown themselves more unwilling to abide the trial of their doctrine in this controversy of Predestination and Reprobation than the Remonstrants. At the Synod of Dort, it being ordered by all the power Civil and Ecclesiastical which was in the Commonwealth or Church, that the Remonstrants cited should lay down their opinion concerning Predestination and Reprobation, together with their reasons, and so expect the answer of the Synod; they first, contrary to all reason and to the duty which they aught to their chief magistrates, would begin at the point of Reprobation, or do nothing at all. And as if this had not sufficiently expressed their perverseness, they refused to set down their own tenants, and to confirm them; and would needs make themselves opponents, and put the Synod to answer such objections or cavils as for the most part were scraped together out of the writings of men either dead long since, or not there to answer for themselves: with whom the Synod had no reason than to meddle.  
It was intended and yielded unto them, that the point of Reprobation should also be treated upon in due place and time. That which was denied them, was their preposterous demand of setting Reprobation before Election; whereas Reprobation, being the negative act of Election, cannot be well stated, ordered or understood, if men will needs begin at the wrong end.  
It is true that the doctrine of Reprobation was the chief cause of uproars on the Remonstrant party: But the doctrine of Conditional Predestination, whereby they endeavoured to set the rotten Dagon of man's  before and above the Ark of God's special predestinating Grace, was it which chief offended both the orthodox ministers & people in the Belgic Churches. And if any were ever bound in justice and duty to purge themselves from crimination, it lay than upon the Remonstrants, who were cited unto the Synod by public Authority, so to do; and not upon the Synod, to submit themselves unto the wilfulness of those who appeared there as delinquents. If here in our Church of England the Non-conformitants summoned to lay down their own opinions concerning their Presbyterial Parity together with their proofs and arguments, should refuse to do it, and stiffly stand upon it that they will first oppose the Episcopal authority, which hath given all the offence, and hear what the Bishops can say for themselves, it would be deemed an insolent part, and not so long tolerated as it was by the Synod of Dort. And yet this was just the case and behaviour of the Remonstrants: which this Author doth not only endeavour to justify, but to cast an aspersion upon the Synod for not obeying those who in such a case owed obedience unto them.  
And yet that it may further appear how fearful the Remonstrants were of clearly and plainly opening their own tenants at that time; When by reason of their obstinacy the Synod was resolved to dismiss them, and yet desired withal to know their doctrine concerning the controversed articles, it was asked of them severally, whether they now acknowledged for their doctrine that which formerly they had set down in Collatione Hagiensi, and since published in print unto the world; not one of the fourteen could be drawn to say in plain and express terms, that he either held that doctrine for true, or that he held it not. If Unwillingness therefore to come to open trial be a sign of false doctrine, you had small reason to become a Remonstrant.  
The question was not, Whether the controversy of Reprobation were to be treated upon or not, but, Whether the Remonstrants were to prescribe the Synod their order and proceeding, or the Synod them. And than the Remonstrants devised another shift to put of the declaring and opening their own doctrine; and that was, That unless they might be promised beforehand a liberty 
a Act. Syn. Dordrecht. Sess. 42.  eo modo causam suam proponendi, explicandi & defendendi, prout ipsi necessarium judicarent, they refused any farther to proceed in laying down their opinions. If the Synod had been so foolish as to make the Remonstrants the moderatours, in all likelihood they had sat there till this day, perchance to their lives end, and yet never have brought one controversy to an end.  
If this Author had been truly informed how the Remonstrants carried themselves in suppressing their own opinions, and only aiming at the exagitating of other men's, he would have forborn his excursion into this common place. But it should seem he was more willing to believe what he desired should be true, than to inquire what indeed was true.  
If Striving to lie close be a probable argument of a bad cause, those who are afraid to deal with the more lightsome part of this controversy, which concerneth Election and Predestination, and thrust themselves, without borrowing any light from this, into the other (which taken by itself is much more dark and obscure,) are the men who strive to wrap themselves and others in an obscure and dark cloud. Our Church of England was more willing and desirous to set down expressly the doctrine of absolute Predestination, I mean of Predestination causing faith and perseverance, than it was of absolute negative Reprobation, I mean of such Reprobation as implieth in God a will of permitting some men's final impiety and impenitency, and of justly ordaining them unto punishment for the same: And yet the latter doth plainly follow upon the truth of the former. It was wisdom, & not Jewish or Turkish fear, which made our Church so clear in the Article for absolute Predestination, and yet so reserved in the other; easily perceiving that Predestination of some men cannot be affirmed, but Non-predestination or Preterition or negative Reprobation (call it as you please) of some others must needs therewith be understood.  
Though Truth be best uncovered, yet all truths are not of the same nature, nor alike profitable to be debated upon: Yet for the truth of absolute Reprobation, so fare forth as it is connexed and conjoined with absolute Predestination; when the main intent of the Remonstrants is by opposing of the former to overthrew the latter, it importeth those who have subscribed to the xviith Article not to suffer it to be obliquely undermined.    

Treatise.  

3. Reason INFAMY.  III. The (A) Infamy of it. It is an opinion (especially as it is defended the upper way) odious to the Papists, opening their foul mouths against our Church and Religion; abhorred (maintained either way) by all the Lutherans, who for this very Tenet call us damned Calvinists, think us unworthy to be above ground, and in their writes protest that they will rather unite themselves to the Papists than to us: And it is also distasteful to all the Greek Churches, which are very many. Molin in his Anatomy, speaking of the Supralapsarian Doctrine, saith, 
l Molin. Anat. Arm. c. 12. de Praedest.  If it should be so that God hath reprobated men without the consideration of sin, or hath ordained them to sin, yet it is the part of a wise man to conceal these things, or not to know them, rather than to utter them; 
m Quia enunciata injiciunt scrupulos, & ansam praebent adversariis infamandi veram religionem. Sir Edwine Sandys, pag. 172.  Because when they are taught and defended they fill men's heads with scruples, and give occasion to the adversaries of defaming the true religion. The same may as truly be said of the Sublapsarian way: For (as I have said) they are in substance all one. And Sr. Edwine Sandys is of the same mind too: For in his most excellent Book called A Survey of the state of religion in the Western parts of the world, speaking of the deadly division between the Lutherans and Calvinists in Germany, he hath these words, That though the Palsgrave and Landtgrave have with great judgement and wisdom, to asslake those flames, imposed silence in that part to the Ministers of their party, hoping the charity and discretion of the other party would have done the like; yet it falleth out otherwise: For both the Lutherane preachers rail as bitterly against them in their pulpits as ever, and their Princes and people have them in as great detestation, not forbearing to profess openly, that they will return to the Papacy rather than ever admit that Sacramentary and (B) Predestinary pestilence. For these two points are the ground of the quarrel, and the latter more scandalous at this day than the former. And in the same book, pag. 194. and 198. speaking of men whom he commendeth for singular learning and piety (whose judgement he so setteth down as that he declareth it to be his own) he saith, that they think it were no blemish for the (C) Reformed Doctors to revise their doctrines, and to rebate the rigour of certain speculative opinions (for so he is pleased to call them) especially touching the eternal decrees of God: wherein some of their chief authors have run into such an extreme to all Romish doctrine, as to have exceedingly scandalised all other Churches withal, yea and many of their own to rest very ill satisfied.  
At the closing up of the Conference at Mompelgart, 
* Coll. Momp. p. 566, 567. Osiand. Hist. Eccles. p. 1040. Cent. 16.  when Frederick Earl of Wortenberg exhorted his Divines to acknowledge Beza and his company for brethrens, and to declare it by giving them their hand, they utterly refused, saying they would pray to God to open their eyes, and would do them any office of humanity and charity, but they would not give them the right hand of brotherhood, because they were proved to be guilty errorum teterrimorum, of most pestilent errors, among which this they reckoned for one.  
Hemingius left his own side, and joined with us in the point of the Sacrament: but he would come not nearer, maintaining always a distance in this.  
And as for the Grecians, we learn also by Sir Edwine Sandys his Relation, 
* Pag. 237.  that they do mightily descent from that doctrine touching the eternal counsels of God which Calvine (as some conceive) first (D) fully revealed or rather introduced into the Christian world, and since some of his friends and followers have seconded, as thinking it very injurious to the goodness of God, and directly and immediately opposite to his very nature. In regard of which one of their Bishops hath written a book against it, which hath been sent to Geneva, and there received.  
It is a morsel which the greatest part of Christian Churches cannot swallow: and therefore (I think) it should not very easily without suspicion down with us.  
And to say one thing more; Besides this infamy of it among Christians, it is very probable, that among the too many scandals given to the Jews by Christians, among whom they devil, this doctrine is not one of the lest rubs in the way of their conversion. 
* Pag. 223, 224.  For they think it a (E) bad opinion (saith the same judicious & learned Gentleman) which some of great name have seemed to hold, That God in his everlasting and absolute pleasure should affect the extreme misery of any of his creatures for the showing of his justice and severity in tormenting them, or that the calamity, casting-away and damnation of some should absolutely and necessarily redound more to his glory than the felicity of them all; considering that his nature is mere goodness and happiness, and hath no affinity with rigour or misery. This is my third reason.  

Answer.  
Whereas this Author goeth about to make men believe that there lieth a common infamy upon the opinion of the Supralapsarians; if that which he calleth the Supralapsarians upper way be only that way which conceiveth the decrees of Predestination & Preterition in order of priority antecedent to the Permission of sin, & therefore much more to the Prevision, it is so fare from being odious to the Romanists as that it is an opinion commonly received amongst them, as before hath been showed. But if he bring this under the name of the Supralapsarian Doctrine, That any men are ordained unto damnation without all consideration of sin, this is a calumny of their Adversaries, not an infamy sticking to the opinion itself. And indeed it is impossible, that God, who by his infinite knowledge seethe not one thing after another as we, but all things together by one infinite and eternal act, should predestinate or reprobate without prevision or consideration of sin. That only which is maintained by the judicious in the upper way, is this, That original sin though eternally foreseen by God, yet neither was nor could be the cause why Peter was predestinated, and Judas not; seeing it was foreseen in both alike, and made them both ex aequo reprobabiles: Which showeth that it was Gods free pleasure to make a difference by Election and Not-election, where there was not foreseen difference in regard of original corruption.  
So likewise for actual sins, as Infidelity, Impenitency, and the like, and for all good acts, as Repenting, Believing, Persevering; no man can truly say, that God electeth some men and passeth-by others without the eternal cognition or consideration of these future actions. This were either to make God ignorant, or discursive, considering first one thing, than another, as we ourselves do.  
But the consideration of good or bad actions which is denied in the point of Election and Nonelection, is such a consideration as procureth and draweth after it the distinct opposite decrees of Election or negative Reprobation.  
As for the introduction of some men into the kingdom of heaven, and the abjection of others into the torments of hell; it is willingly granted, that the holy and good acts of the one are foreappointed and foreseen as the way and means whereby God will bring them thither; and the voluntary wicked actions of the other, as the means whereby, and the misdeserts for which they are brought into hell, and there justly tormented.  
As for the Lutherans, that bring-in a conditionate Predestination; No man can look into Luther's works, but must needs see they have forsaken their own Master: and therefore they are less to be regarded when they rail upon the Calvinists.  
For the Greek Churches; If they tread in the steps of the learned and ancient Greek Fathers, they may found Predestination upon Prescience, but not upon the Pelagian or Arminian Prescience, which they make merely intuitive, and caused by the object foreseen; but by a Prescience practical or factive of that good which it forseeth in the Elected, and permissive of those voluntary evil actions which are foreseen in the Non-elected, and also preparative of their just punishment.  
The Sublapsarian way of considering this high mystery of Predestination and negative Reprobation, is the way which the Church of England taketh, as the more easy for our understanding. And it so walketh in this way, that it maketh Predestination an absolute decree of giving grace and glory unto the predestinate, and not a conditionate decree foreseeing their gracious actions, and thereupon predestinating them: And by this it silently teacheth us what to think of negative Reprobation, which cannot be severed from Election.  
If you embrace the late Lutherans opinion, and bring within the compass of the Predestinary pestilence the doctrine of Predestination which they disallow, you manifestly brand the Church of England with this note of infamy, and might as well charge us with the Sacramentary pestilence for denying their feigned Consubstantiation and Oral manducation of the flesh of Christ, as with the Predestinary pestilence for denying their Conditional Predestination upon foresight of men's belief in Christ. The Lutherans make Predestination or Election nothing else but a revealed decree of bestowing eternal life upon those which shall perseverantly believe in Christ; and consequently they make Reprobation nothing else but the revealed will of God to condemn all those who shall continued in their infidelity and obstinacy. Our Church acknowledgeth the truth of such decrees; but it placeth not Election or Reprobation in such general conditionate decrees. The decree of Election or Predestination is by us conceived 
a Vide Penott. pag. 398.  an act of Gods absolute will by effectual grace mercifully ordaining certain persons unto the infallible atteinment of glory. In this decree, Faith, Perseverance, and all saving graces are not in order of nature the foreseen conditions but the afterseen effects of Predestination.  
So likewise our Church conceiveth Reprobation to be 
b Vide Penott. pag. 393.  negativus actus praedestinationis, a free act of the Divine will denying the special benefit or favour of Predestination (which is the preparation of grace, infallibly bringing men unto glory) to some certain persons. As for positive Reprobation (which is eternal damnation) this our Church foundeth upon the guilt and demerit of man's sin. We say therefore with a learned writer of the Romish Church (to whom you think this opinion to be so odious) 
c Ruiz. De Praedost. & Repr. disp. 2. §. 2. pag. 19  Omnibus hominibus consideratis sub esse possibili priùs ratione quàm praedestinarentur aut reprobarentur, nulla fuit ratio discriminis quae potuerit Divinam voluntatem inclinare ut praedestinationem Judae negaret potiùs quàm Paulo. And again, 
d Ibid. pag. 22.  Nulla scientia visionis ultimò formalitérque constituit reprobationem, sed potiùs totam reprobationem supponit ex parte objecti. So that all they, whether Lutherans or Remonstrants, who make Predestination nothing but the will of God to save believers, and Reprobation or Preterition nothing else but the will of God to damn unbelievers, retain for fashion's sake the old words, but obtrude a new notion of those words upon the Christian Church.  
In vain therefore it is to dispute with those about Election and Preterition who reject all the definitions or descriptions given by ancient Divines, and bring new ones of their own coining.  
If in explicating the decree of Predestination (which is a decree preparing special and effectual grace for the predestinate) and handling the opposite decree of Preterition or negative Reprobation (which is a Decree, not of denying all grace, nor of causing any malice, but only of denying special grace) some of the Reformed Doctors have run into any extremity, it becometh judicious Divines not to run into another extremity, by founding Election and Preterition upon the foreseen acts of man's will, but to keep the middle way, and to remember the old saying, Ità fugias nè praeter casam.  
That which exasperateth the Lutherans against Calvines doctrine, was their own collection, That it made God the author of sin, and a damner of men to hell-torments only for his mere pleasure, which opinions are justly to be detested: But Calvine both by his own writings, and by divers learned writers 
e Vide Crakanthorp. Defense Angl. c. 35. & Bishop of Ely his Defense of the orthodox faith, p. 228.  of our Church hath been sufficiently cleared from these false and malicious calumniations.  
Jacobus Andreae is no competent judge over Beza his antagonist: and if he were, yet we deny, that the rejecting of conditionate Predestination is to be reckoned amongst his errors.  
They are grossly deceived who think Calvine was the first that defended Absolute Predestination and Reprobation, and who opposed Conditionate Predestination and Reprobation grounded upon the prescience of the good and bad acts of the Elect and Non-elect. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, all who opposed the Semipelagians, were of this mind: And amongst the Papists themselves 
f Vide Carthusianum, in 1. Sent. disp. 41. p. 549. & Valentianum, tom. 1 disp. 1. qu. 23. De reprob. punct. 3. ubi agnoscit multos scholasticos idem sentire cum Calvino. V●de Suarez. Opusc. l. 2. pag. 174, etc. Ex nostris, Paul. Fer. Scholar orth. c. 28. & Fr. White, Defense of the Orthodox way, p. 231.  the fancy of conditional Predestination and Reprobation is commonly rejected. Any man who understandeth that God out of his own freewill and special mercy hath elected some unto the infallible means and blessed end of eternal life, may as easily conceive that out of his own freewill he hath denied the said special mercy unto some others, and so permitted them to fail in the atteinment of eternal life: For if that 
g Penott. p. 393.  be true (which all orthodox Divines are agreed upon) that both the material and formal number of men elected, or (as other term it) the numerus numerans and numerus numeratus, is eternally designed according to Gods own good pleasure, it must needs be acknowledged, that in eodem signo rationis there is a number also of men not elected, who are left out in this gracious designation. Suarez giveth a satisfactory reason why there can be no cruelty or injustice in this negative Reprobation, 
h Opusc. l. 2. pag. 175.  Quia haec non-electio non est poena, sed est solùm quaedam negatio gratuiti beneficii quod Deus ut supremus Dominus negare potest.  
This may well be esteemed a bad opinion: But non-praedestinatio, non-electio, or negativa reprobatio importeth no such thing; as is evident in angelis non-electis.  
It is one thing to affect the extreme misery of his Creature for the end of showing his justice in tormenting it; another, for God to 
i Pen. pag. 398.  suffer some of his Creatures through their own default to fall into extreme misery, to resolve not to free them, and to decree their just punishment. And if any one will go about to bind God to prepare effectual grace for all men we answer, It is lawful for God to do as he listeth with his own. And it is usual with God to dispense aswell supernatural as natural benefits according to his own absolute will and free pleasure. If God should necessitate any man's final impenitency, that so he might afterwards cast him into hell, this were to affect his misery: but the sin and obstinacy in sin of all the damned, was their own and voluntary, not of Gods causing, much less necessitating.  
God is not to learn of us what maketh most for his own glory. He could have upheld the Angels which made a voluntary apostasy from him; he could have upheld our first Parents; he could by his special and effectual grace have brought every particular man in the world unto salvation: and all this he could undoubtedly have done without prejudice to the Creatures freewill: But since we know and see he hath done otherwise, we must confess that this order of Divine Providence, whereby he hath decreed to guide and bring some infallibly unto eternal happiness, and whereby he hath decreed to permit some infallibly to fall into eternal misery, doth make most for his glory.    

Treatise.  

4. Reason AFFINITY to Fate  iv The fourth, its Affinity with the old exploded errors of the Stoics and Manichees.  
The opinion (A) of the Stoics was, That all actions and events were unavoidable, determined either by the revolutions of the heavens, and the qualities of such stars as reigned at men's births, or by the concatenation of natural things and the disposition of the first matter, all things being so put together from eternity that one thing must needs follow another as it doth; and the prima materia being so disposed, that things cannot successively come to pass otherwise than they do, but must of necessity be as they are, even invito Deo, though God would have some things to be otherwise than they are.  
The Manichees held, That all men's actions, good or evil, were determined too; good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things that were created, and of all good actions that came to pass in the world; evil actions by an evil God, who was the primum principium mali, the prime author of all evil things or actions that were extant in the world.  
The maintainers of the absolute decree do say one of these two things, either, That all actions, natural and moral, good and evil, and all events likewise, are absolutely necessary; so the Supralapsarians: or, That all men's ends (at lest) are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their wills; so the Sublapsarians: And this is upon the matter all one with the former. For first, (B) in vain is our freedom in the actions and means, if the end at which they drive be pitched and determined; sigh all actions are for the ends sake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not. And secondly, the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the means that precede that end; as if a man be foredetermined to damnation, he must avoidable sin, else he could not be damned.  
Now in these three opinions we may note two things.  
1. The Substance and formality of them, which is an unavoidableness of men's actions and ends whatsoever they be. In this all of them agreed, all holding that in all things, at lest in all men's ends, undeclinable Fates and insuperable Necessity do domineer. And therefore (C) Melanchthon doth not stick sundry times in his Common places to call this Absolute decree fatum Stoicum & tabulas Parcarum, Stoical fate and the Destiny's tables. He also chargeth the Church of Geneva (the great Patron of it) with a labour to bring-in the Stoics error, as we may see in a certain Epistle of Melanchthons' to Peucer, where he hath these words; 
n Melanch. in Epist. ad Peucer. Scribit ad me Laelius, de Stoico fato usque adeò litem Genevae moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus si● propterea quòd à Zenone differret. O misera temporal Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur.  Lelius writeth unto me, that in Geneva there is such strife about the Stoics Fate, that one was cast into prison because he dissented from Zeno. O miserable times! etc. And by the testimony of Beza too, who speaking of Melanchthon saith; 
o Beza in vita Calvini; Philippus de his rebus ità scribere coeperat, ut Genevenses quasi Stoicum fatum invehentes notare quibusdam videatur.  Philip hath so written of these things, as if he meant to tax the Geneva-Divines for bringers-in of Destiny.  
2. We may note the Circumstance or the grounds of their opinions. The Stoics (D) derive this necessity from the stars or the first matter; the Manichees from two prima principia, aeterna & coaeterna, first principles of all things eternal and coeternal; these last, from the peremptory decree of almighty God. So that they differ in their grounds indeed: but in this difference the Stoics and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive this necessity of evil actions and unhappy events from an evil God or the course of nature, than from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of their opinions is all one: the ground wherein they differ is but accidental to the error.  
Which being so, for this very reason alone may this doctrine of Absolute Reprobation be suspected: because those dreams of the Stoics were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts; and this of the Manichees was generally cryed-down by the Fathers, not only as foolish, but impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian heart or christian Commonwealth, not so much for any thing circumstantial in it, as for the substance of the error, because it made all things and events to be necessary, and so plucked up the roots of virtue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments.  
These are my reasons of the first sort.  

Answer.  
YOu are mistaken in the opinion of the Stoics. For though they held a necessary concatenation of causes overruling all external events, yet they were of a near kind to the Pelagians, and thought man's will such an absolute Commandress, that for his goodness, virtues and happiness a man need be beholding only to himself. Vide August. de Civ. lib. 5. cap. 10. & Plat. 10. de Republ. pag. 617. & Senec. Epist. 31.41.93. The Remonstrants in a manner acknowledge this mistake, Exam. Censurae, pag. 79. The maintainers of the Absolute decree hold that nothing is acted in this world good or bad, without an eternal determination or decree of Gods will for the being of such a particular act: But they detest the Manichees; and make this difference betwixt good actions and bad, That good and holy actions have God not only a determining cause for their event, but an effectual working cause in their production; bad actions have God the determining cause of their event, but the permissive cause only of their malice 
a Vide Fr. White, Desense, p. 224, etc. .  
The maintainers of the Absolute decree, whether Supralapsarians or Sublapsarians, hold not more necessitation to lie upon men's actions, ends, or upon any events depending upon man's freewill, than the maintainers of the Conditional decree of Election and negative Reprobation. Both hold the actions, events and ends of all things whether predestinated or foreseen to imply 
b Vide Aquin. contra Gent. 1.67.  necessitatem infallibilitatis aut consequentis: Neither hold that they imply necessitatem coactionis aut consequentiae. For example; To reason thus, God hath eternally foreseen Judas his impenitency, and thereupon decreed him unto eternal damnation; therefore Judas shall infallibly and unalterably continued impenitent, and at length be damned, is a true inference, But this, God hath eternally foreseen Judas, etc. therefore Judas shall by coaction or compulsion of his will be made unalterably impenitent, and so be damned, is a false conclusion. In like manner to reason thus, God in his absolute decree of Reprobation or Nonelection hath determined not to give Judas the special grace of repentance and perseverance, not to bestow upon him the benefit of eternal life; therefore Judas infallibly and unalterably will continued impenitent, obstinate, and will draw upon himself eternal death and damnation, is a good inference: But this, God in his absolute decree, etc. therefore Judas is compelled to be impenitent and obstinate and finally damned, is not only a weak and false but a wicked inference. For as the infallible prevision of God seethe from all eternity the actions of men and their ends, and yet this maketh not the modus agendi to be necessary or compulsory, but maketh the agent most free, as if he had never foreseen it: so the absolute decree of God to work repentance, faith and perseverance in Peter, and so to bring him infallibly to eternal life, maketh not the actions of believing, repenting, persevering necessary or compulsory, but maketh the agent most free in performing these actions; because it giveth him that Spirit of which the Apostle saith, Vbi Spiritus, ibi libertas. And for the contrary absolute decree of Not-giving faith, final perseverance and eternal life unto the Non-elect, it denieth them that grace which would effectually and infallibly make them produce good actions; but it depriveth them not of their own natural freedom and liberty, neither doth it compel or constrain or necessitate them unto their bad actions. 
c Aquin. Quaest. de vol. Dei, art. 5.  Divina voluntas non imponit necessitatem rebus volitis, quia ex voluntate ejus sequitur aliquid eo modo quo voluntas disponit, non eo modo quo voluntas habet esse. And, 
d Ibid.  Divina voluntas in contingentibus non tollit potentiam ad oppositum voluntatis, sed actum. S. Augustine showeth us the reason of this: 
e De Civit. 7.30.  Deus ità ordinat omnia, ut ipsa proprios motus exercere sinat. From hence it appeareth how weak their judgement is who think Gods absolute decrees must needs absolutely destroy the freedom of men's wills; or, that where God is absolutely determined to permit any men to fail in the attaining of the blessed end of eternal life, there he must needs be the author of the sins whereby they incur eternal death.  
In good actions the freedom of men elected is not vain, though the end be determined; because God hath together with the end determined that by their free actions they shall attein unto it. In bad and wicked actions of the reprobate their freedom of will is not vain; because thereby their consciences are convicted of their guiltiness and misdeserts, and God's justice is cleared in their damnation. Neither is there any indeclinable or insuperable necessity domineering over freewill, more than in the opinion of the Remonstrants.  
Melanchthon took offence at the manner of delivering the doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation which some insisted upon, but for the substance of doctrine he acknowledgeth his agreement with Calvine. That men must come to knowledge of their Election from their faith and holy life, was Melanchthons' opinion: but, That their foreseen faith and holiness was the cause or condition or motive upon which God founded his decree of Election, was fare from his mind 
f Vide Melanch. Enarr. in epist. ad Rem. p. 23, 24. & Calvin. Epist. p. 384. .  
For the Stoics, it was before showed that they were the Patroness of freewill, and of virtue and happiness growing out of man's freewill, as it is to be seen in tully's Stoical Paradoxes.  
For the Manichees, who derived evil from an evil God; they were in a foul error: But those who derive the evil actions of men from their own freewill as the proper efficient cause, & the exsisting or coming of such actions in eventum à decreto Dei permittente & ordinante, are in no error at all 
g See Defense of the way, p. 228, 229. . But if any shall go about to set man's will at liberty, & to tie up short the decreeing & determining will of God, as if this had not the determining stroke amongst all possible evil actions or events, which shall infallibly be, & which shall infallibly not be, he may avoid the suspicion of Stoicism or Manicheisme, but he will hardly avoid the suspicion of Atheism. For the greater number of men's actions being wicked and evil, if these come into act without Gods determinate counsel and decree, human affairs are more overruled by man's will than by Gods.  
The Stoics maintained freewill and free power in man to make himself virtuous and happy: From whence those Axioms of theirs, 
h Cic. Parad. 2, & 5.  Seipsâ contentam esse virtutem ad beatè vivendum; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the like: And that of Seneca, 
i Epist. 31. & 41.  Beatae vitae causa & firmamentum est sibi fidere. Turpe est Deos fatigare: Quid votis opus est? fac te felicem. 
k Epist. 77.  Bonam mentem stultum est optare, cùm possis à te impetrare. Ratio recta & consummata felicitatem hominis implevit. Whether the substance of these opinions belong to the Remonstrants or to their opposites, let any man judge.  
As for the Manichees, concerning a good God and an evil God, no man more cried it down than S. Augustine, no man more strongly confuted it; and yet the Remonstrants cannot deny but he held absolute Predestination and absolute negative Reprobation, and always opposed that Election and Nonelection which the Semipelagians fetched from foreseen merits and demerits, or (as the Remonstrants change the words but not the substance of the opinion) from the foreseen good and evil actions of men. As therefore we grant it a foolish and impious opinion, to father evil actions and unhappy events upon an evil God; so we avouch it a more foolish and impious opinion, to hold that absolute Predestination and Reprobation do either necessitate the wills of the elect unto their good actions, or the wills of the non-elect unto their wicked actions. Aquinas giveth this reason of both; 
l In disp. de Proph. art. 1.  Quia omnis effectus in necessitate & contingentia sequitur causam proximam & non primam.    

Treatise.  
THe reasons that have convinced me of the untruth of absolute Reprobation now follow. And first of those that fight against the upper way.  
They are drawn ab incommodo, from the great evils and inconveniences which issue from it naturally: Which may be referred to two main heads: 1. The Dishonour of God; 2. The Overthrew of religion and government.  

1. Inconvenience.  It dishonoureth God: For it chargeth him deeply with two things no ways agreeable to his nature: 1. men's eternal Torments in hell; 2. Their Sins on earth.  
I. FIRST, it chargeth him with men's eternal Torments in hell, and maketh him (A) to be the Prime, Principal and Invincible cause of the damnation of millions of miserable souls: the Prime cause; because it reporteth him to have appointed them to destruction of his own voluntary disposition, antecedent to all deserts in them: and (B) the Principal and Invincible cause; because it maketh the damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoidable through Gods absolute and uncontrollable decree, and so necessary that they can not more escape it than poor Astyanax could avoid the breaking of his neck when the Grecians tumbled him down from the tower of Troy. Now this is a heavy charge, contrary to Scripture, God's Nature, and sound Reason.  
1. To Scripture: Which (C) maketh man the principal, nay the only cause (in opposition to God) of his own ruin. Thy destruction is of thyself, O Israel: but in me is thy help, Hos. 13.9. As I live, saith the Lord, I will not the death of the wicked, etc. Turn ye, turn ye: why will ye die? Ezek. 33.11. He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men, Lam. 3.33. To which speeches for likeness sake I will join one of Prospers; 
p Resp. ad 12. Object. Vincent. Praedestinatio Dei multis est causa standi, nemini est causa labendi.  Gods Predestination is to many the cause of standing, to none of falling.  
2. It is (D) contrary to God's nature: 
q Exod. 34.6.  Who setteth forth himself to be a God merciful, gracious, long-suffering, abundant in goodness, etc. and he is acknowledged to be so by King David; 
r Psal. 86.5.  Thou Lord art good and merciful, and of great kindness to all them that call upon thee, and by the Prophets Joel, Jonah, and Micah: 
* Joel 2.13.  He is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, saith Joel. I know, saith 
* Jonah 4.2.  Jonah, that thou art a gracious God and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness. and, 
* Micah 7.18.  Who, saith Micah, is a God like unto thee, that taketh away iniquity? etc. He retaineth not his wrath for ever, because mercy pleaseth him.  
3. It is contrary also to (E) sound Reason: Which cannot but argue such a decree of extreme cruelty, and consequently remove it from the Father of mercies. We cannot in reason think that any man in the world can so fare put of humanity and nature, as to resolve with himself to marry and beget children, that after they are born and had lived a while with him, he may hung them up by the tongues, tear their flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones with burning pincers, or put them to any cruel tortures, that by thus torturing them he may show what his authority and power is over them. Much less can we believe without great violence to reason, that the God of mercy can so fare forget himself, as out of his absolute pleasure to ordain such infinite multitudes of his children made after his own image to everlasting fire, and (F) created them one after another, that after the end of a short life here, he might torment than without end hereafter, to show his power and sovereignty over them. If to destroy the righteous with the wicked temporally, be such a piece of injustice, that Abraham removeth it from God with an ABSIT, 
Gen. 18.25.  Wilt thou destroy th● righteous with the wicked? That be fare from thee, O Lord. Shall not the judge of all the world do right? how deeply (may we think) would that good man have detested on● single thought, that God resolveth upon the destruction o● many innocent souls eternally in hellfire?  
Object. But God (say some) is sovereign Lord of all creature and men: they are truly and properly his own: Cannot b● therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth, and do with hi● own what he will?  
Answ. The question is not, what an Almighty Sovereignty an● power can do to poor vassals; but, what a power that is Ju● and Good may do. By the power of a Lord, his absolute an● naked power, he can cast away the whole mass of mankind▪ for it is not repugnant to omnipotency or sovereignty: bu● by the power of a Judge, to wit, that actual power of hi● which is always clothed with goodness and justice, he cannot. For it is not compatible (G) with these properties i● God, to appoint men to hell of his mere will and pleasure, n● fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternal mind.  
1. It is not compatible with Justice: Which is a constant will of rendering to every one his proper due, and that is vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. 
s August. lib. 3. cont. Julian. c. 11. pag. 164. Bonus est Deus, justus est Deus: potest aliquem sine bonis meeritis liberare, quia bonus est; non potest quenquam sine malis meritis damnare, quia justus est.  God is good (saith S. Augustine) and God is just: he may without any deserts free men from punishment, because he is good; but he cannot without evi● deservings condemn any man, because he is just. In another place also he saith, 
t Aug. epist. 106. add Bonifac. Quenquam verò immeritum & nulli obnoxium peccato si Deus damnare creditur, alienus ab iniquitate non creditur.  If God be believed to damn any man that by sin deserveth it not, he is not believed to be free from injustice.  
2. Nor is it compatible with Goodness: Which is an inclination in God of communicating that good which is in himself to his creatures, as fare as he can without wronging his Justice: And therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) good to all, it cannot be that he should of himself without any motive in the reasonable creature provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it or bestowing any good at all upon it.  
It is further objected, Object. 2 
Perk. De Praed. pag. 25.  (H) That we do and may slaughter our beasts for our daily use without any cruelty or injustice; and therefore God may as well, nay much more, appoint as many of us as he pleaseth to the torments of hell for his glory, and yet be just and good notwithstanding: for there is a greater disproportion between God and us than between us and beasts.  
For answer to this we are first to premise thus much, Answ. 1 namely, That our slaughtering of our beasts for our daily use, is by God's ordinance and appointment: We had not this authority of ourselves, but God of his bounty towards us gave it us, as we may see Gen. 9.2, 3. where we may observe, First, that God delivereth up all creatures, beasts, birds, and fishes, into the hands of men; Secondly, that the end why he doth so, is, that they might be meat for men, and consequently that they might be slain. Which being so, our slaughtering of oxen, sheep and other creatures for our daily use, is to be accounted Gods doing rather than ours. And therefore the objection should have been made thus; God may without any breach of goodness or justice appoint brute creatures to be slain for man's use, therefore he may ordain men to be cast into hell-torments for ever for his own use, that is for the declaration of his sovereignty, etc.  
This being premised, I answer further, That this comparison holdeth not: For there is little proportion between the Objects compared, and less between the Acts.  
1. There is but small proportion between the objects, Beasts and Men, creatures of a different nature and made for a different end. Beasts are voided of reason and liberty in their actions, creatures whose beings vanish with their breath, made only for the use and service of men upon earth: But Men are reasonable and understanding creatures, able through the Creators' bounty to discern between good and evil, and according to their first principles to choose the good and forsake the evil: they are the very image of God's purity and eternity, and were made for the service of God alone upon earth, and his blessed and everlasting society in heaven. So that albeit there be a very great distance between God and Man, yet nothing so great as between God and Beasts. It followeth not therefore, that if God may appoint beasts to be killed of his own free pleasure for man's use, he may with like equity and reason appoint men of his own will to destruction for his own use. We read that God required of his people many thousand beasts for sacrifices, but not one man: the firstborn of other creatures he challenged for burnt-offerings (except they were unclean beasts) but the firstborn of men were to be redeemed: Which showeth that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beasts. Besides, in the ninth of Genesis he giveth men power to kill and feed upon all living creatures, but he straight forbiddeth them to shed man's blood, and giveth this reason of the prohibition, Man is the image of God. So that we may well conclude that there is but small proportion between the objects compared, Men and Beasts, in respect of this act of killing or slaughtering.  
2. There is fare less or rather no proportion at all between the acts compared, Killing and eternal Tormenting. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous injustice and cruelty torment his beast, and prolong the life of it that he may daily vex and torture it, to show what power and sovereignty he hath over it: 
Vid. Molinaei Enodat. quaest. graviss. p. 125.  So I doubt not (though there be some that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely against God for affirming it) I doubt not (I say) but (I) God may kill a man of his own free pleasure, yea and resolve him into nothing, without any cruelty or injustice; because in so doing he doth but take away what he had given him: but he cannot without both these antecedently decree to keep him alive for ever in hell, that he may there torment him without end, to show his sovereignty. For this is to inflict an infinite evil upon a guiltless creature, to whom he had given but a finite good. And so is the comparison most unequal too in the acts compared; and therefore proveth just nothing.  

D. Twisse his Vindic. great. l. 2. part. 1. dig. 1. pag. 17. edit. 2.  But it is replied by some (who will rather speak unreasonably & against common sense than lay down the conclusions which they have undertaken to maintain) That (K) it is better and more eligible to be tortured in hell than to want or loose a being: for he that wanteth a being, enjoyeth no good; but he that is tormented in hell, hath a being, and by consequence something that is good. If therefore God may take away a man's being that is innocent, and turn him into nothing for his pleasure, much more may he torment him in hell.  
I. To the first part of this Reply, namely, That it is more Answer 1 desirable to be in hell than to be nothing, I oppose three things.  
First, the [L] speech of our Saviour concerning Judas; 
Matth. 26.24  Woe be to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed: it had been good for that man if he had never been born. Two things especially are set forth in these words of our Saviour: 1. The misery of Judas the betrayer of his Lord; Woe be to, etc. 2. The greatness of his misery, It had been good, etc. It [M] is as much as if our Lord had said, Judas the Traitor shall be damned: and therefore so woeful will his condition be, that it had been good and happy for him if he had never received a being: good in earnest, as Interpreters do generally expound it; not in the opinion and esteem of weak-minded and faint-hearted men only, as some few understand it. For First, let it be granted that the Scripture speaketh of things sometimes according to men's opinions; yet without reason to fasten such an exposition upon any Scripture, is to do as Dunces do in the Schools, who being not able to answer a place in Aristotle wherewith they are charged, shifted it of and say, Loquitur eu aliorum sententia, He speaketh according to the opinion of others. Secondly, This Scripture [N] cannot in reason be thus expounded, 1. Because it is an argument and ground by which Christ declareth the truth or greatness of the misery of Judas, Woe to the man, etc. And why woe? Because it had been good, etc. But it were no argument to show his woeful estate by, to say that it had been good for him that he had never been born in the opinion of men who mistake the case, but not in truth. 2. Because this exposition would teach and [O] encourage men to be Atheists and Epicures. In the second of Wisdom we read, how voluptuous men do stir up one another to enjoy the good things that are present, to fill themselves with wine and ointments, to leave some tokens of their jollity in every place, and to practise all manner of wickedness: and what is their motive? A false persuasion that their souls should the with their bodies, and that they should have no being after death. If this conceit could flesh them thus in their impious and voluptuous courses, how freely and eagerly (may we think) would they pursue their carnal and sinful delights, if they could be but once persuaded, that after all their pleasures they shall be in a better case than if they had no being?  
Secondly, I oppose common consent. Where shall we pick out a man but will say (P) (if he speak from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thousand nothings than to be cast into hell? What is the reason why men are so afraid of hell when they are touched to the quick with the conscience of their ungodly lives and the expectation of eternal vengeance, that with Job they curse their birthday, and wish an hundred times over that they had never been, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into the place of torments; but because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse than no being anywhere? And why are men who are sensible of hellfire, so strongly kerbed and heldin by the fear of feeling it, even from darling and beloved sins, but because they apprehended it to be the most terrible of all terribles? Fear of being annihilated can never do that which the fear of hell doth.  
The third thing which I oppose is common sense: which judgeth (Q) pains when they are extreme to be worse than death. Hence it is that Job being tormented in his body by the devil, cursed his birthday, magnified the condition of the dead, and wished himself in the grave, plainly preferring the loss of his being before that miserable being which he than had. And hence it is that men even of stoutest and hardest spirits (as we see by daily experience) would (if they might enjoy their opinion) choose rather to have no bodies at all, than bodies tormented with the stone, or gout, or any other sharp and sensible disease. It is a known saying grounded on this judgement of sense, Praestat semel quàm semper mori, Better it is to die once than to be always dying. This the Tyrant Tiberius known very well: and therefore he would not suffer those towards whom he purposed to exercise his cruelty to be put to a speedy death, but to lingering torments as Suetonius reporteth of him in that chapter where he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruel practices. 
u Sueton. vit. Tib. cap. 61. Mori volentibus vis adhibita vivendi.  Those (saith he) who through the extremity of their torments would have died, he used means to keep alive. Nam mortem adeò leve supplicium putabat, For he accounted death so light a punishment, that when he heard that one Carnulius, a man appointed to torments, had prevented him, he cried out, Carnulius me evasit, Carnulius hath escaped my hands. To a prisoner entreating him to put him quickly to death, he gave this answer, Nondum tecum redii in gratiam, I am not yet friends with thee; accounting it great kindness to put him quickly to death whom he might have tortured. Many (K) that were called into question, did partly wound themselves in their own houses, ad vexationem ignominiámque vitandam, to prevent that pain and ignominy which they known they should endure; and partly poisoned themselves in the midst of the court as they were going to their arraignment for the same cause. Seneca speaking of one Maecenas, who was so afraid of being dead that he said he would not refuse weakness, deformity, nec acutam crucem, not nor the sharpest crucifying, 
(w) Seneca Epist. l. 17. Epist. 101. Dummodo inter haec mala spiritus prorogetur.  so that he might live still in the midst of these extremities, he calleth his desire turpissimum votum, a base and most ignoble and unnatural wish, and censureth him for a most effeminate and contemptible man; 
(x) Quia distulit id quod est in malis optimum, supplicii finem.  because in all his evils he was afraid of that which was the end of all evils, the privation of his being. And certainly we must needs conceive and censure them to be stocks and stones rather than flesh and blood, who can so put of all feeling and sense, as to think a tormented being in hell to be a lighter and lesser evil than no being at all.  
II. To the reason on which the Reply is grounded, which Answer 2 is, Melius est esse quàm non esse, It is better to be than to have no being, I answer that it is a sophism or fallacy à non distributo ad distributum. To be in itself is better than Not to be: but it is not universally true in all particulars. Again, it is true in some cases, & ex hypothesi, si caetera sint paria, if there be any equality in the adjuncts. It is so fare from being simply true, that our Saviour limiteth it, and putteth a case wherein it is not true, but the contrary to it is true; and that is the case of Judas, of which we have said somewhat before: It had been good, etc. Which words S. Hierome expounding, saith, 
(y) Hieron. comment. in Matt c. 26. v. 24. Simpliciter dictum est, Melius est non subsistere quàm malè subsistere.  It is simply and plainly averred by our Saviour that it is better to have no being than an ill being. This was the judgement too of Job, chap, 3. v. 11, 12, 13. Why died I not, saith he, in the birth? why did the knees prevent me? and why did I suck the breasts? For now should I have lain still and been quiet: I should have slept than and been at rest. In which words he plainly implieth, that he thought it fare better to have had no birth and bring than such a painful and miserable being. This was also the opinion of Solomon, Eccles 4.1, 2, 3. So I returned, saith he, and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun; and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter, etc. Wherhfore I praised the dead which are already dead, more than the living which are yet alive: yea better is he than both they which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil work that is done under the sun. The words do clearly show (S) that Solomon did think it better to be dead, and to be deprived of being, or to have always wanted a being, than to be oppressed by the mighty, and to be without comforters; that is, than to have a miserable and a mournful being.  

Sr. Francis Bacon's Colours of good and evil, the last Colour.  To this assenteth Sr Francis Bacon in his Colours of goo● and evil: Where against this mathematical position (as h● calleth it) That there is no proportion between Something and Nothing, and that therefore the (T) degree of privation seemeth greater than the degree of diminution; he excepeth, That it is false in sundry cases, and among the rest i● this, namely, when the degree of diminution is more sensitive than the degree of privation. In this case a total privation is much better than a diminution. Hence these usual forms of speech, Better (V) eye out than always ache; Make or mar, etc. Some evils and pains (perhaps) either for their lightness, because they may be well endured, or for their shortness, because they are quickly over, are less the● resolution into nothing; and a man had better for a whil● endure them than loose his being to be rid of them, because his being may afford him presently or afterwards such and so many desirable good things as will more than recompense his pains: But when his pains are so many and violent that they leave him no other good than a poor being, or so pinch him that he cannot enjoy or joy in the goods th● remain, it were a thousand times better for him to have no being. And such are the pains of hell: which for their greatness are infinite, producing many miserable weep and wail and gnash of teeth, all symptoms of intolerable griefs; and for their length, eternal: The wor● never dyeth, the fire is never quenched: but the breath of the Lord, as a river of brimstone, doth kindle it for ever. And therefore it is incomparably better to cease to be, than to live in those torments, which cannot be equalled by any good which a being can make us capable of; much less by that poor little entitative good, which is all the good the damned do enjoy in hell.  
This (X) sophistical evasion therefore and all others of the like sort notwithstanding, I doubt not but I may safely say, that the unavoidable damnation of so many millions cannot be absolutely and antecedently intended by God without the greatest injustice and cruelty, which may in no wise be imputed to God. 
a Plut. De sup●rst. prope finem. ●  Plutarch speaking of the Pagans', who to pacify the anger of their Gods did sacrifice to them men and women, saith, It had been much better with Diagoras and his fellows to deny the being of a God, than confessing a God to think he delighteth in the blood of men. How much rather may we say, It were better to be an Atheist and deny God, than to believe or report him to be a (Y) devourer of the souls of men. The like argument is pressed by Eusebius against those cruel and merciless Gods of the Pagans'; 
b Euseb. de praeparat. lib. 4. cap. 16. pag. 161. Edit Graecol. Enimvero, si boni vestigium in iis ullum èsset, quamo brem bonorum appellationem jure sortirentur, eos utique cùm naturâ suâ benignos ac salutis omnium cupidos, tum verò amantes justitiae, hominúmque studiosos ac defensores esse oporteret, etc.  Doubtless, saith he, if there were any footstep or spark of goodness in them, for which they might deserve to be called good, they would be disposed to do good, and desirous to save all men, they would love justice, and take a care of men. And being such, how could they delight in their slaughter? etc. Yea, he concludeth that they were 
c ibid. c. 15. pag. 153. Non bonos sed malos fuisse daemons, vel hâc ipsâ ratione confici existimo: Quicquid bonum est, prodesse solet; nocere verò contrarium.  Devils or evil spirits, and not Gods or good spirits; Because if they were good, they would do good; whereas those which are evil use to do hurt. I will therefore shut up my first reason with the speech of Prosper; 
d Prosp. ad Object. Vincent. resp. 3. Omnium quidem hominum Deus creator est: sed nemo ab eo ideo creatus est ut periret; quia alia est causa nascendi, alia pereundi.  God is the Creator indeed of all men, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be damned: The reason why we are created is one; and why we are damned, another.  

An Answer to the first Inconvenience inferred upon the decree of absolute Predestination and Reprobation.  
ABsolute Reprobation is (in the true sense of S. Augustine and his followers) the eternal decree or act of Gods will Not to confer upon some men his effectual grace, Not to guide some men infallibly unto glory, but To permit them through their own voluntary default to live in sin, and To determine their eternal torments in regard of their sins. All this put together doth not make God the Prime, Principal and Invincible cause, nay, it doth not make him any cause at all, in working the damnation of any one soul, not not of the soul of Judas himself. Not the Prime cause: For by negative Reprobation no man is adjudged unto hell-torments, otherwise than for his own foregoing sins As for the imaginary antecedencie of one act of the Divine volition or intuition unto another, because it is imaginary, and no such real priority or posteriority of eternal acts to be found in God, there is no building of firm conclusions upon such a tottering foundation. And yet for further illustration of this point we add, That as when a sovereign King considering two of his subjects enwrapped in the guilt of rebellion, determineth in his mind that the one shall be freed the other hanged, it is not his determination, but the others rebellion, which is the prime and true cause of his hanging; though the Prince's absolute will be the prime cause why he was not freed aswell as the other: so God considering all mankind enwrapped in the guilt of Adam's rebellion, absolutely determineth to free some both from their sin and punishment, and as absolutely determineth not to free some others; and yet their own sin and not God's will was the prime cause of their being tormented, though Gods was the prime cause distinguishing and determining who should be delivered and who should be condemned.  
Whereas it is further objected, That absolute Reprobation is a principal & invincible cause of many men's damnation, in that it maketh it necessary and unavoidable; all this proceedeth from an erroneous and false imagination, That God's absolute will of not producing such a good act or event is an invincible cause of producing the contrary evil act or event: Whereas this negative will of God is no cause at all of man's sin or misery, but his own positive will is the cause both of his wickedness and of his wretchedness. He is the true and principal cause of any effect or event, who employeth his faculties and endeavours to bring it into being; not he who only resolveth not to hinder such evil effects, though he foresee they will come into being if he prevent them not. For first, this decree of negative Reprobation tumbleth no man down necessarily into the pit of destruction: 
m Prosp. ad Cap. Gall. comment. 14.  Non●●praedestinatus perit infidelitate voluntariâ non coactâ. Secondly, though this decree contain a denial of that grace which effectually freeth men from sin and so consequently from destruction, yet it containeth nothing which causeth effectually their impenitency, their infidelity and their destruction. 
n Ad object. Vinc. resp. 15.  Non est consequens, sicut putant qui talia objiciunt, ut Deus, quibus poenitentiam non dederit, resipiscentiam abstulerit; & quos non levaverit, alliserit; cùm aliud sit insontem in crimen egisse, quod alienum est à Deo; aliud, criminoso veniam non dedisse, quod de peccatoris est merito. Lastly, he is said to be invincibly drawn into sin and plunged into perdition, who fighteth against sin with all his strength, and striveth to avoid damnation, and yet by the overmastering power of another is thrust into the one and hurled unto the other. The consciences of the most wicked men in the world can tell them, that there is no such forcing power in Nonelection or Reprobation. The non-elect angels (which are now devils in hell) cannot upon their Nonelection charge God, that either their transgression or damnation was invincibly forced upon them, they endeavouring to escape it.  
The Scriptures make man the only cause of his own ruin: But the Scriptures teach not, That God by his absolute will of preserving some from ruin, and permitting others to runne-on unto their own ruin, is the invincible cause of any man's ruin. God hath given some creatures sufficient means to preserve themselves from ruin, whom notwithstanding by the decree of Reprobation he permitteth to procure and work their own ruin.  
It is contrary to God's nature causelessely and cruelly to afflict or destroy his creature: But it is not contrary to God's nature to decree out of the richeses of his mercy to bestow grace and glory infallibly upon some, and to decree out of the liberty of his will to permit others through their own voluntary default, by abusing such means of grace as are afforded them, to fall into eternal misery. And this is all which the decree of absolute Election and Nonelection doth involve. Of the grace or benefit of Predestination S. Augustine saith as much; 
o De Grat. Christ. 1.12.  Haec gratia praedestinatos & secundùm propositum vocatos ad glorificationem perducit. And for the denial of this special grace, which we term Negative Reprobation, Prosper confesseth, That it is not the foresight of any iniquity in men which causeth this denial: 
p De vocat. l. 1. c. 17.  Nulla sunt tam detestanda facinora quae possint gratiae arcere donum. And yet more expressly, 
q Ibid. c. 15.  Liberatur pars hominum, parte percunte: Et si hoc voluntatum meritis voluerimus adscribere, ut malos neglexisse gratia, bonos elegisse videatur, resistet nobis, etc. 
r Ibid.  Latet discretionis istius ratio, sed non latet ipsa discretio. Non intelligimus judicantem, sed videmus operantem: Quid calumniamur justitiae occultae, qui gratias debemus misericordiae manifestae? etc.  
It is not sound but blind reason, which forbiddeth God to elect and passe-by according to the good pleasure of his own will, and bindeth him to proceed according to his eternal foresight of the good or bad actions of man's william. As for those tragical exaggerations of Resolving to created that he might torment, etc. they are all beside the purpose, and must not drive us to deny that Apostolical decision, Miseretur cujus vult; & quem vult indurat. And when they can show us that Faith, Perseverance, or any quality or act of saving grace, was foreseen in Peter and Paul, and thereupon their following Election grounded, we will grant that antecedent infidelity in Cain and Judas was the cause of their negative Reprobation aswell as of their positive or punitive.  
As for the creating of any persons to the end or intent that they might be eternally tormented, we deny that the opposite decrees of absolute Election and Preterition, whether considered in angels or men, imply any such thing. It is true, that the Elect are severally created to the end and intent that they may be glorified together with their Head Christ Jesus: But for the Non-elect, we cannot truly say that they are created to the end that they may be tormented with the devil and his angels. For we may than say, God maketh such a thing for such an end, when he giveth the thing a nature and qualities fitted to such an end. Now no man is created by God with a nature and qualities fitting him to damnation. Nay, take every man as he is created by God, and he is a capable and fitted subject for salvation: But, when he was at his best, so fitted, that he might run himself into the pit of perdition. But neither in the state of his Innocency nor in the state of the fall and his corruption doth he receive any thing from God which is a proper & fit means to bring him to his damnation: And therefore damnation is not the end of any man's creation.  
We say with Prosper, 
s Resp. ad Cap. Gall. resp. 13.  Vniversos homines non ignoramus à Deo sigillatim creari; & de hac universitate alios damnandos cum diabolo, alios regnaturos esse cum Christo. Quòd ergò etiam hi creantur qui aeternae vitae participes non erunt, nulla est culpa Creatoris; qui naturae autor est, non vitii quod natura contraxit. And again, 
t Ad object. Vinc. resp. 3.  Omnium quidem hominum Deus creator est: sed nemo ab eo ideo creatus est ut periret; quia alia est causa nascendi, & alia est pereundi.  enim nascantur homines, conditoris est beneficium; ut autem pereant, praevaricatoris est meritum.  
God created some Angels not-predestinate unto eternal life whom he foresaw would run themselves upon the rock of eternal death; concerning whom he decreed absolutely to permit their apostasy, and to damn them for their apostasy: and yet no man that understandeth what he saith, will say that God created them to the end he might torment them. There is the same reason of Nonelection or Non-predestination of men; and it is as much against sound reason to say, that their Nonelection inferreth, that God created them to the end he might damn and torment them.  
The root from whence this gross mistake springeth is this, That some falsely conceive, that God in the decree of Reprobation or Nonelection doth by as effectual means intent to bring men to their damnation as in the decree of Election he intendeth to bring others to salvation. But the thing is fare otherwise: salvation is a benefit undue to any man: therefore God may absolutely intent the bestowing of it upon any man, and the withholding it from any man: But damning or torturing of men in hell is a punishment; and therefore the inflicting thereof cannot be intended but with relation to a fault. Again, the means whereby men are brought to salvation, are bona & dona gratuita; and therefore they must be derived unto us by an influence and effectual operation of God: But the means whereby men are carried unto damnation, are mala spiritualia & voluntaria, they are their own defective, and depraved actions; and therefore they are not means whereby God directeth them unto their damnation (who cannot be the author of any sinful act or defect) but they are the misdeserts which God permitteth them to fall into, and in the due punishment whereof he intendeth to exercise his justice. No cruelty therefore in the decree of Nonelection or negative Reprobation.  
God never resolved upon the eternal destruction of an innocent soul: But God resolved to permit some of those Angels and men whom he created innocent and righteous, to do that which procured their own destruction; and he resolved to preserve some others from procuring their own destruction, and infallibly to bring them to the state of glorification. And unto these different decrees we give the different names of Election, Preterition or negative Reprobation.  
To Elect or Not-elect is an act of Gods Sovereign power and absolute liberty; but To crown or damn is an act of Judiciary power, and proceedeth according to the tenor of the revealed Gospel. The one he doth, not taking men's different actions for the ground thereof: the other he doth according to men's different actions.  
The Goodness of God is as it were a firm●tie upon him, to do no man injustice: but it toeth him not in beneficiis gratuitis, to do all the good unto every singular man which he could do without any violating of his Justice. He that shall avouch, that God could not have elected Cain or Judas unto glory, by preparing for them effectual grace, without wronging of his Justice, maketh Election and Nonelection to be necessary and not free acts in God. For the perfection of the Divine nature is such, as necessarily excludeth a clashing of any of his Attributes one against the other. And therefore if God should have wronged his Justice if he had not predestinated Peter, his Predestination was not an act of mercy but of necessary justice: And if God could not have predestinated Judas without plain wronging of his Justice, than the Preterition or Reprobation of Judas was not an act proceeding from that liberty which God useth in the eternal preparation and temporal donation of his supernatural benefits, but from such a necessary determination of the Divine will as could not do otherwise. I am sure this is new Divinity; and I think it is untrue. The general goodness of God unto all is sufficiently shown by doing good unto all, and by wronging none: but it bindeth him not either to do or to intent the same measure of mercy unto all. He may therefore without any prejudice to his Goodness, in special mercy prepare for some from everlasting, and in time bestow upon them, that grace which he knoweth will and intendeth should infallibly bring them unto glory: This we call his decree of their Election. He may also without any prejudice to his Goodness or Justice, out of the liberty of his own will absolutely resolve not to prepare nor bestow upon some men that grace which he knoweth would bring them unto glory; and may further justly decree to permit such to fall into those sins which he knoweth will deserve and for which he decreeth to inflict upon them eternal torments: And this we call Nonelection or negative Reprobation.  
As for that wild fancy of providing for any men their eternal misery, and that from everlasting, & before he thought of making them, or bestowing any good upon them, we hold absolute Election and Reprobation, and yet utterly disclaim it. First, because it lieth not upon God to provide means for men's damnation, these springing from their own free and defective william. If he by the effectual grace prepared in Predestination do not furnish them with the infallible means of salvation, they will voluntarily and infallibly furnish themselves with the means of their damnation, as the example both of angels and men non-elected doth clearly prove. Secondly, that conceit of Before and Behind in the everlasting decrees or cogitations of God hath no solid or real truth in it. The immanent acts of Gods will and understanding are not one before and another after, as ours are which proceed upon discourse; though in things willed and seen there is Before and After, First, Second, Third, according to the nature of dependence. Last of all, no instant can be assigned in eternity, when God thought of providing misery for his creature, excluding the cogitation of bestowing any good upon it.  
For the objection of Slaughtering beasts without injustice, we grant it is of no force to prove that God may appoint many to be tormented in hell without all respect unto sin: because the Slaughtering or Saving of beasts alive is no act of justice or injustice; but the Crowning of men in the kingdom of glory is an act of remunerative justice, and the Tormenting in hell an act of vindicative justice: and therefore both the one and the other are exercised according to that rule of remuneration and vindication whereunto God hath tied himself in his word. But to decree the infallible bringing of some angels and some men unto eternal glory, and to decree the infallible permission of others to fall into the desert of damnation, and thereupon to fore-appoint their eternal punishment in hell, is consonant to the justice of God, and to the doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation, as it is delivered in the Scriptures, explained by S. Augustine and other orthodox Fathers and Writers of late time, and allowed by our Church.  
If any man think that Nonelection or negative Reprobation implieth, that some men were made to be tormented in hell for Gods absolute pleasure, and not for their own sin, he is in a foul error. God made all things for himself and for the illustrating of his glory. And he eternally saw that he could illustrate his glory in most excellent manner, by making all men capable of salvation, and yet by permitting some men to incur damnation. This he eternally and absolutely decreed to do, by preparing special grace for some; and bestowing it upon them in due time he infallibly worketh their salvation: and these only in Scripture are termed men predestinated or elected. And on the contrary, by not preparing and not bestowing effectual or special grace upon others, they do wilfully and willingly work their own damnation and destruction: And these we call not-elected, not-predestinated, or (in the most harsh term) reprobated.  
This doctrine taketh away all boasting in themselves from those which are saved; because it was Gods special grace mercifully and eternally prepared for them, and not their special goodness eternally foreseen, which caused their salvation. It taketh away also all pretence of murmuring against God, or traducing him as unjust and cruel. For no man is to be condemned upon this evidence, Because he was a man not-elected; Because he was a man unto whom special grace in the richeses and height of God's mercy was not afforded; but, Because he is convicted to have been sinful and wicked, and out of his own freewill partly to have resisted and repelled the good motions of the Spirit of grace which were vouchsafed him, and partly to have abused those initial gifts of supernatural grace which God had actually conferred upon him.  
And as for Calvine, who both whilst he lived & since his death hath been slandered to have been a defender of this position, Deus maximam mundi partem nudo puróque voluntatis suae arbitrio creavit ad perditionem, hear what he saith for himself, 
u Vide Calv De aetern. Dei prov. pag. 735.  Etsi quid toti humano generi futurum esset Deus ab initio decrevit, haec tamen loquendi ratio nusquam apud me occurret, FINEM CREATIONIS ESSE AETERNUM INTERITUM. And in the same treatise he granteth, that both angels and men were destinated to destruction 
x pag. 737.  futurae defectionis respectu. If therefore any writers amongst the Protestants have made the Creation of the Non-elect a means by God himself subordinated unto their damnation, and the Damnation of such an end desired and aimed at by God, and consequently the means of men's damnation (namely sinful Corruption and voluntary Rebellion) procured or wrought by God as the author thereof; they deserve rather to be branded than patronised by any judicious Divine. Yet it becometh orthodox Divines to be careful as well in maintaining the free and special mercy of God in giving faith, repentance and perseverance to the Elect, as in maintaining the justice of God in the punishment and damnation of the Non-elect. The defenders of conditionate Predestination may suppose they clear themselves well in the latter; but we are sure they stick in the Semipelagian briers as concerning the former. For if God upon the foresight of men's faith and perseverance be induced to predestinate them, God's Predestination is no cause at all of faith or perseverance or any saving grace, this prevision not causing things, but supposing them as already produced by other causes.  
To dispute what God may do by his absolute sovereignty, is for the most part a fruitless disputation; especially in questions concerning his dealing with mankind: wherein having revealed in his word what he will do, and by what rule he will proceed, it is certain that now he can neither annihilate a sinner, nor torment a righteous man in hell, only to show his sovereignty. Not that he wanteth power or strength to do either the one or the other, but because his constant and immutable will hath decreed that sinners shall be tormented & not annihilated, & that righteous men shall be crowned not tormented. It is therefore utterly denied, that the absolute decree of electing some and not-electing othersome containeth in it an antecedent decree to inflict an infinite evil upon any guiltless creature.  
This problematical question is needless amongst those who so hold absolute Predestination and Reprobation, and so reject conditional Predestination and Reprobation grounded upon the foreseen acts of man's freewill, that withal they hold the decree of damnation, whether of reprobated angels or men, always to carry a just respect unto their future corruption and rebellion. Calvine (howsoever ranked by this Author) was plainly of this judgement: his words will show it; 
y De aetern. provide. pag. 710.  Cùm de praedestinatione sermo habetur, indè exordiendum esse constanter semper docui, atque hodie doceo, jure ìn morte relinqui omnes reprobos, qui in ADAMO mortui sunt ac damnati; jure perire, qui naturâ sunt irae filii: ità nemini causam esse cur de nimio Dei rigore queratur, quando reatum in se omnes inclusum gestant. And jest that old cavil should be revived, That God appointed the reprobate unto their damnation before he considered them as lying dead in sin and corruption, Calvine doth in this also clear himself, and subscribeth to the opinion of S. Augustine; 
z Ibid. pag. 704.  Augustinum ridet [Pighius] ejúsque similes, hoc est, pios omnes, qui Deum imaginantur, postquam universalem generis humani ruinam in persona Adae praesciverat, alios ad vitam alios ad interitum destinasse. We leave therefore those to wrangle amongst themselves, who think that God may without crossing his declared will, for his mere pleasure either annihilate an innocent man or torment him in hell. I persuade myself that neither the one nor the other can stand well with the goodness of God, as in the word it is made known unto men.  
For the question itself, Which is better for any man, Annihilation or Torment, it carrieth a double impropriety of speech: first, in that it supposeth some kind of eligible goodness in things which rightly considered have none at all. For neither to be annihilated nor tormented have any goodness at all in them for him who is supposed to choose the one before the other. Again, non entis nulla affectio: and therefore annihilation cannot be said to be good or bad, better or worse for any man; since all these terms require a subject or person in whom they must be verified, which by annihilation is become nothing.  
For our Saviour's speech; It is according to the vulgar manner, who, when they see a man extremely mischievous or miserable, use to say, It had been happy for such a man if he had never been born. And in the opinion of some good writers both ancient and modern, the words of our Saviour give no just occasion to raise a curious controversy concerning the Goodness or Betterness of Annihilation and eternal Damnation. 
a Bar. tom. 4. lib. 2. c. 11. p. 45.  Euthymius and Hieronymus interpret the words, IF HE HAD NEVER BEEN BORN, If he had perished in his mother's womb. And Cajetane, Bonum erat Judae si natus non fuisset, quia mortuus in utero incurrisset solùm poenam damni, etc. These words in this sense concern not absolute Annihilation, but Abortion, much like those of Job, chap. 3. v. 11, 12, 13, 14. The question here than is not, Which of the twain is better or greater good; but, Which is the lesser of the two evils. And yet in this sense it is improper to say annihilation is the lesser evil, because it leaveth no subject wherein good or evil can be received. To be nothing is not more desirable than To be in hell: Both of them are extremely hateful, and have in them nullam rationem bonitatis aut appetibilitatís.  
It is as much as if Christ had said, When Judas shall feel the eternal misery whereinto he shall be plunged, he will break out into that impossible wish, O that I had never received a being! If such a wish could take place, no degree of goodness or happiness could thereby accrue unto the person, because the person thereby is made nothing.  
This Scripture will import thus much, That whereas ablatio mali hath rationem boni, the condition which removeth the greater evil is to the intellective appetite more welcome or desirable. Now the greatest evil imaginable, are, To be stained with sin eternally, To be eternally subject to the wrath of God for sin, and, To be eternally tormented for the same. A tormented soul therefore cannot upon a deliberate election desire to have never been, which it apprehendeth as merely impossible; but it may in a passionate wish prefer the condition of not being before the condition of such a woeful being. And the reason hereof is, because man's understanding doth not only conceive ens & bonum naturae, but ens & bonum rationis. And thus though Not-being or Annihilation after being received, contain in them no positive or natural goodness for which they can be desirable, yet they may be represented to the understanding as negations or ablations of the greatest evil, and so per accidens they may be wished rather than lying under those eternal evils before mentioned. But if in cogitation we separate the infinite evil of Sin and of the Divine Hatred, and should leave a man under never so great torments, Annihilation were in right reason to be conceived a greater evil than those torments: neither aught a man to desire the loss of his being (in which many benefits both corporal and spiritual are involved) to escape the sense of pain by not being, which is a total deprivation of all God's benefits, and an abolition of the person who desireth it 
b Vide Ruiz. De volunt. Dei, disp. 34. §. 3, n. 16 p. 620. .  
Atheists and Epicures, who believe no such thing as the Immortality of the soul, or enduring eternal punishments after death, will scoff and laugh at the question itself, and will be neither encouraged nor discouraged which way soever it be decided. Yet it is discretion in Divines so to temper their disputations that they give no occasion unto any of slighting or extenuating the infinite misery of hell-torments, which no understanding of man conceiveth unto their full height.  
Those who defend the state of man in Hell-torments to have more good in it, than the estate of Not-being or Annihilation, ground themselves upon this main reason, That Ens & Bonum convertuntur, and whosoever retaineth a being is not only capable of good, but is actually endowed with some good; whereas that which is resolved into nothing, is neither endowed with any good, nor capable of the lest good. And it is indeed abusiva comparatio to say, that Judas never created, or after his creation annihilated, is in a better case than Judas eternally tormented; because Judas never created, or Judas annihilated, cannot be compared with Judas exsisting, either in happiness or unhappiness. The former Judas is only a feigned imagination in the brain, and hath no reality answering the name of the person: the latter Judas is a real subsistent person capable of real happiness or misery. Non sunt comparabiles res quae non sunt ejusdem generis. Omne comparabile est univocum. Judas being is a true man, but Judas annihilated whom they put in the other scale of comparison, is neither man nor creature, but a mere nothing clothed with an empty name.  
I make no question but the damned wish many things impossible, and amongst others (it may be) their own annihilation: not because they conceive the state of annihilation to be capable of good or bad, of better or worse, but because they conceive their present estate to be so bad, that the freeing them from the evils wherewith they are oppressed (upon what terms soever) would make it somewhat better: So that their perplexed understanding conceiveth themselves (and that truly) to be in an extreme miserable condition; & thereupon conceiveth (but falsely) that themselves should be in a better case were they once annihilated, whereas than themselves should not more be themselves, and therefore be no subject of more or less misery.  
There is a great difference betwixt Death and Annihilation. Some dead man may properly be said to be in a better case after his death than he was whilst he lived: thus it fared with Lazarus; and thus it would presently have fared with Job, had God parted his soul from his body. But no annihilated man can properly be said to be in a better case than he was before; because a Better being supposeth some being which Annihilation contradicteth.  
Had God yielded unto Jobs passionate wish, the comparison would not have stood betwixt his Being and Not-being, but betwixt his Being miserably vexed in one state and his Being acquit from those vexations in another.  
Though the Being of any thing is a kind of goodness, and the foundation or receptacle of all other good, yet take Being praescindendo ab omni super addita bonitate, and burdened with all sorts of evil, and than there is in it no motive unto appetibility for a reasonable creature. This is clear in those external things which we possess and use. If a man's horse have the mere goodness of Being left him, and be troubled with manifold incurable diseases and perpetual lameness, the owner rather desireth his not-being than his sobeing. It is clear also in a man's bodily members; for no man is so in love with the bore Being of a leg or an arm, but if it want the goodness of strength and motion, and be affected with the evils of rottenness and extreme anguish, he would rather choose to loose the Being of those members, than to hold them under condition of a perpetual and so ill affected Being. And to come to the soul itself, the mere Being thereof in rerum natura, utterly and eternally separated from the natural & supernatural Well-being thereof, and burdened with the evils of sinful pollution, of the Divine detestation, and of the hellish vexations, is not nor cannot be presented unto the understanding and will of a damned man as an object lovely or desirable. It is likely enough therefore, that all the damned are weary of their Being, and wish rather their Not-being: yet even to them in their woeful estate, Not-being is not per se and properly the object of their desire, but only per accidens, in as much as the removal of evils hath rationem boni; and this they conceive will be effected in their annihilation. And the very ablation of evils is not properly and primarily desirable for itself, but it is desired out of a love to those opposite good things whereof those evils have deprived a man: As he that desireth to be freed from sickness, is properly in love with the Being of health, improperly with the Not-being of sickness: for that which hath no being cannot have a good being; and that which hath no kind of good being considerable in it, hath no power to draw the will to affect it. It is not therefore simply Not-being which any damned and tortured man preferreth and electeth before Being, but it is Not-being in pain and torments which he preferreth before Being in pain and torments. This is it which Saint Augustine intended in saying, 
b De lib. arbitr. 3.6.  Si quis dixerit, Non esse quàm miserum me esse mallem, respondebo, Mentiris.  
It is better and more eligible to be in torture or pain for a little time than for a long time: But Not-being in itself is neither bonum nor melius, nor eligibile nor eligibilius.  
Men who kill themselves, do it out of an opinion that thereby they shall attein a lesser degree of miserable being; not out of desire of no being. It is also the abolition of all good, and of that good which all creatures strive to retain, namely their being. Torment in hell, with the concomitant evils, is the greatest evil or misery that can befall a reasonable creature: yet it is improper to say, that Not-being is a lighter and lesser evil, since Nothing is neither lighter nor heavier, neither good nor bad.  
If this be a good collection, it had been better not only for the wicked, but for many of God's saints, to have wanted a Being.  
The sense of the degree of diminution, and the not-sense of a total deprivation, maketh an impatient man rather wish the latter than the former: but notwithstanding in judgement of right reason the total deprivation may be the greater evil.  
That which is made better than formerly it was, must be bettered by adding some perfection thereunto which formerly it wanted, or by taking some imperfection from it, wherewith formerly it was encumbered; and in both changes the subject must remain: Now Annihilation or Not-being bringeth no perfection to any man nor taketh any imperfection from him, but it taketh him quite away from being the subject either of good or evil: and therefore it cannot give a true denomination of being better or worse.  
As for the rule, Melius est esse quàm non esse; it is most certainly and universally true. For otherwise God would never from Non-esse or out of nothing have produced all things which are into that Being or esse which they have neither would he preserve the esse of men damned. Yet we confess withal, that this or that particular person may be through his own default under so many evils contrary to his Wellbeing, that he may fancy a Not-being more eligible for him than that lamentable and woeful Being wherein he subsisteth. I call this a fantastical rather than a real and true election: For if such a man should be asked, What is it which you have preferred in your choice? he must answer, Nothing. 
c Aug. De lib. arb. l. 3. c. 8.  Nam qui eligit non esse, profectò se nihil eligere, etiamsi hoc nolit respondere, convincitur. Not-being therefore is but out of a mere deceived fancy of the man in torment conceived to be it which he preferreth before Being: whereas in deed and truth it is (as Augustine speaketh) 
d Ibid.  naturale desiderium quietis, which is the desirable object the will of a damned man longeth for, and not the state omnimodae defectionis, or annihilationis. Now he that desireth his ease or quiet, doth not aim at a Not-being, but at a Not-being-tormented. 
e Ibid.  Nam quod quietum est, non est nihil; imò magìs est quàm id quod inquietum est.  
Though we hold it an abusive comparison to say, Judas is better when he hath no being, than when he hath an ill being; yet because evils are measured by the degrees of the opposite good things whereof they deprive men, and supernatural good things, such as are the fruition of God and heavenly joys, are infinitely better than the fruition of natural Being; we must needs judge the privation of supernatural well-being, which consisteth in being eternally banished from the beatifical presence of God, and eternally tortured in hell, to be a greater evil than the loss of our natural Being. If therefore God should put it to the choice of Judas, or any damned man, and say, Choose whether thou wilt have me abolish thee into nothing, or continued thy being as it is, in the state of sin, and thy person as it is, in the state of enmity with me, and thy body and soul in the state of endless torments; I think he would & should rather choose abolishment, annihilation or Not-being, than continuance of being so hateful a person unto God, and so sinful and woeful a person in himself. And this is it, and all which may be inferred from the words of S. Hierome, or of our Saviour.  
For all that a wise and patiented man would think it better to have both his eyes always aching than to have both quite put out.  
If the comparison of better and worse be put to the disordered judgement and will of the damned person, who looketh only at himself, no doubt but he will judge that best which maketh most for his own ease: But if better and worse be considered with respect of the true judgement of God, Judas his being tormented is better than Judas his Not-being. And if Judas himself in his choice of Being or Not-being had a well-ordered will, his Being (though in torment) would seem better, wherein he serveth to illustrate the glory of God's power, truth and justice, than his Not-being, wherein he can be useful or serviceable to no good end. Not-being cannot be the scope of regulated election: for 
f Aug. De lib. arbitr. l. 3. c. 8.  quod quisque rectè eliget appetendum, cùm ad id pervenerit, necesse est melior fiat: melior autem esse non poterit, qui non erit. Nemo igitur rectè potest eligere ut non sit. It is therefore only amor inordinatus proprii boni, which maketh a damned person prefer Not-being before being in pains and eternal torments.  
Whatsoever be determined concerning the problematical question itself; I willingly grant, that God had never such an absolute antecedent intent of damning millions of innocent men as this author chargeth the Supralapsarians withal. And I further add, That those who imagine the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation to be secundùm nostrum modum intelligendi before the decree of permitting, and consequently before the absolute prevision of man's sin, do easily clear themselves from this accusation, as hath been already shown. Paulus Ferius hath these words tending to this purpose, 
g Scholar orth. cap. 28. p. 48.  Voluit quidem Deus non beatificare Judam, sine ullo respectu peccati; tamen non habuit voluntatem infligendi poenam, nisi propter peccata, quae in eo praevidit. And he showeth there, that many Schoolmen have embraced this opinion.  
He who in regard of God's eternal and absolute decree of electing whom he pleaseth, and not-electing whom he pleaseth to passe-by, shall term God a devourer of those souls whom he permitteth to fall into eternal misery through their own default, neither speaketh nor thinketh so reverently of God as he should. God delighteth not in the slaughter of any man; but God willeth the just punishment of many men. God is willing to save all men, if they repent and believe. And God hath an absolute will of working repentance and faith in some men, and so of working their salvation. Were God thus desirous to save all men, he were not absolutely happy, for he wanteth part of his happiness that wanteth his desires.  
Too much pains hath been taken to prove a conclusion, which those who hold absolute Predestination and negative Reprobation may as safely grant as those who hold conditional upon the foreseen good and bad acts of men; which Prospero himself opposed as a Semipelagian error, and our Church hath always rejected.    

Treatise.  
SECONDLY, this opinion (A) chargeth God with men's Sins on earth; and maketh him the Author, not of the first sin only that entered by Adam into the world, but of all other sins that have been, are or shall be committed to the world's end: Not murders, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, heresies, persecutions, or any other abominations whatsoever, fall out at any time or in any place, but they are the necessary productions of Gods almighty decree. The Scriptures, I am sure, teach us another lesson. Thou art not a God (saith David) that hath pleasure in wickedness. 
Psal. 5.4.  And the Prophet Esay telleth the people that when they did evil in the sight of the Lord, 
Esay 66.4.  they did choose the things which he would not. 
Jam. 1.13, 14.  Let no man say when be is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: But every man is tempted when he is drawn away with his own concupiscence. And S. John having referred all the sins of the world to three heads, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the ●yes, and the pride of life, telleth us that they are not of the Father, but of the world. To which speeches let me add the speech of Siracides, though not of the same authority; Say not thou, It is through the Lord that I fell away: for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou, He hath caused me to err: 
Ecclus' 15.12.  for he hath no need of the sinful man.  
Pious Antiquity hath constantly said the same, and pressed it with sundry reasons: Some of which are these that follow. If God be the author of sin, than  
1 He (B) is worse than the devil, because the devil doth only tempt and persuade to sin, and his action may be resisted: but God (by this opinion) doth will and procure it by a powerful and effectual decree, which cannot be resisted. This is Prospers argument; 
a Prospero resp. ad obj. 11. Vincent.  Who to some objecting that by S. Augustine's doctrine, when Fathers defile their own daughters, and mothers their own sonn●s, servants murder their masters, and m●n commit any horrible villainies, it cometh to pass, because God hath so decreed; answereth, that if this were laid to the devil's charge, he might in some sort clear himself of the imputation; 
b Quia etsi delectatus est furore peccantium, probaret tamen se non intulisse vim criminum.  because though he be delighted with men's sins, yet he doth not, he cannot compel them to sin: 
c Quâ ergò insipientiâ, quâve dementiâ definitur, ad Dei reserendum esse consilium, quod nec diabolo in totum asscribi potest, qui in peccantium flagitiis ille cebrarum adjutor, non voluntatum credendus est esse generator?  What a madness therefore is it to impute that to God which cannot justly be fathered upon the devil?  
2 He cannot be a punisher of sin: For none (C) can justly punish those offences of which they are the authors. This is Prospers argument too; 
d Prosp. resp ad object. 4. Vincent. Insanum omnino & contra rationem est, dicere, damnatorem diaboli & ejus famulorum velle ut diabolo serviatur.  It is against reason to say, that he which is the damner of the devil, would have any man to be the devil's servant. This reason Fulgentius useth likewise; 
e Fulgent. lib. 1. ad Monim. c. 19  Illius rei Deus ultor est, cujus autor non est, God is the avenger of that of which he is not the author. Tertullian also before them hath said, 
f Tert. l. 2. cont. Martion. c. 9 Nec idem habendus est delicti author, qui invenitur interdictor & condemnator.  He is not to be accounted the author of sin, who is the forbidder, yea and the condemner of it.  
3 He cannot be God; because he should not be just, nor holy, nor the Judge of the world, all properties essential to God. And this is S. Basils' reason, who hath written a whole Homily against this wicked assertion: 
g Basil. homil. quòd Deus non est, etc. Tan●undem est Deum asserere esse autorem peccati, & negare esse Deum.  It is all one, saith he, to say that God is the author of sin, and to say he is not God.  
Upon these and the like considerations I may well conclude, That the opinion which chargeth the holy God with the sins of men, is neither good nor true. But this opinion doth so. For albeit the writers that have defended it (Piscator and a few more of the blunter sort excepted) have never said directly and in terminis, That God is the cause of sin; yet have they delivered those things from which it must needs follow by necessary consequence, that he is so. For they (D) say,  
1 That as the decree of Reprobation is absolute, so it is inevitable: Those poor souls which lie under it, must of necessity be damned. 
h Marlor. Comm. in Joh. 15. v. 2. Stat igitur firma sententia, Quencunque Deus ante conditum orbem elegerit, eum non posse perire; quem verò rejecerit, eum non posse salvari, etsi omnia sanctorum opera fecerit: usque adeò i●retractabilis est sententia.  It is (saith Marlorate) a firm and stable truth, That the man whom God in his eternal counsel hath rejected, though he do all the good works of the Saints, cannot possibly be saved.  
2 That without (F) sinne this decree of Reprobation cannot be justly executed. 
i Piscat. l. count. Schafm. pag. 29. thes. 27. Deus hoc consilio condidit homines, ut re ipsâ laberentur: quip cùm nisi hâc ratione pervenire non potuerit ad fines illos suos principales.  God (saith Piscator) did created men for this very purpose, that they might indeed fall: for otherwise he could not have atteined those his principal ends. He meaneth the manifestation of his justice in the damnation of Reprobates, and of his mercy in the salvation of the Elect. Maccovius also saith the same: 
k Macc. disp. 17. p. 11. Locus misericordiae & justitiae manifestandae nullus fuisset futurus, si peccatum non exstitisset.  If sin had not been, the manifestation of justice and mercy (which is as much to say, as the damnation of Reprobates) had never been.  
3 That therefore God decreed that Reprobates should unavoidably (F) sin, and sin unto death, that his eternal ordinance might be executed and they damned: 
l Zanch. lib. 5. De nat. Dei, c. 2. De praedest. part. 4. Resp. ad postr. arg. prope finem. Damus reprobos necessitate peccandi, eóque & pereundi, ex hac Dei ordinatione constringi, atque ità constringi ut nequeant non peccare atque perire.  We grant (saith Zanchius) that reprobates are held so fast under God's almighty decree, that they cannot but sin and perish. A little after he saith, 
m Non dubitamus itaque confiteri, ex immutabili reprobatione necessitatem peccandi, & quidem sine resipiscentia ad mortem usque peccandi, eóque & poenas aeternas dandi, reprobis incumbere.  We doubt not therefore to confess, that there lieth upon Reprobates, by the power of their unchangeable reprobation, a necessity of sinning, yea of sinning unto death without repentance, and consequently of perishing everlastingly. Calvine also saith that Reprobates obey not the word of God, partly through the wickedness of their own hearts, and partly because 
n Calv. l. 3. Instit. cap. 24. Sect. 14. Inscrutabili Dei judicio suscitati sunt ad gloriam ejus suâ damnatione illustrandam.  th●y are raised up by the unsearchable judgement of God to illustrate his glory by their damnation. I will end this with that speech of Piscator; 
o Pisc. Resp. ad Dupl. Vorst. part. 1. pag. 220. Reprobi ad utrumque hoc malum à Deo praecisè destinati sunt, ut in aeternum puniantur, & necessariò peccent, & quidem ideo peccent quò justè puniri possint.  Reprobates are precisely appointed to this double evil, to be punished ever lastingly, and to sin, and therefore to sin that they might be justly punished.  
4 That as he hath immutably (G) decreed that Reprobates shall live and die in sin, so he procureth their sins in due time by his Almighty hand, partly by withdrawing from them grace necessary for the avoiding of sin, and partly by moving and inclining them by his irresistible and secret workings on their hearts to sinful actions. 
p Calv. Instit. l. 1. c. 17. Sect. 11.  Calvine saith, that devils and reprobate men are not only held fast in God's fetters, so as they cannot do what they would, but are also urged and forced by God's bridle ad obsequia praestanda, to do as he would have them. And in the next chapter these are his words, 
q Ibid. cap. 18. Sect. 1. Quòd nihil efficiant homines nisi arcano Dei nutu, nec quicquam deliberando agitent nisi quod ipse jam apud se decreverit, & arcanâ suâ directione constituat, innumeris & claris testimoniis probatur.  That men have nothing in agitation, that they bring nothing into action, but what God by his secret direction hath ordered, is apparent by many and clear testimonies. In the Section following he saith, 
r Ib. Sect. 2. Et certè nisi intus operaretur in mentibus hominum, non rectè dictum esset, auferre labium à veracibus, & à senibus prudentiam, etc.  And surely unless God did work inwardly in the minds of men, it would not be rightly said, that he taketh away wisdom from the wise, etc. In those two chapters that which he mainly driveth at, is to show, that God doth not only behave himself privatively in procuring the sins of men, but doth also put forth powerful and positive acts in the bringing of them to pass. And in his second Book and fourth chapter after he had said, that God may be said to harden men by forsaking them, he putteth in another way by which God hardeneth men, and that (he saith) cometh a great deal nearer to the propriety of the Scripture-phrases, namely, by stirring up their wills: 
s Instit. l. 2. c. 4. sect. 3. Ad exsequenda sua judicia per ministrum itae suae Satanam, & consilia eorum destinat quò visum est, & voluntates excitat, & conatus firmat.  God doth not only harden men by leaving them to themselves, but by appointing their counsels, ordering their deliberations, stirring up their wills, confirming their purposes and endeavours by the minister of his anger, Satan. And this he proveth by the work of God on Sihon king of the Amorites, Deut. 2.30. and than insinuateth the end too why God thus hardeneth men in their wicked courses, which is, That he might destroy them; 
t Quia perditum Deus volebat, obstinatio cordis Divina fuit ad ruinam praeparatio.  Because God intended his ruin, he prepared him for it by his induration.  
The sum of all these propositions is this; God who from all eternity appointed many miserable men to endless and unavoidable torments, decreed for the bringing-about of their intended ruin, that they should without remedy live and die in a state of sin: and what he thus decreed from everlasting, he doth most powerfully effect in time, so governing, overruling, and working upon the wills of those reprobates, that they have no liberty or ability at all in the issue of avoiding their sins, but must of necessity commit them. Thus they teach: And therefore by just consequence they make God the author of sin; as it will plainly appear by these following considerations.  
I. It is ordinary to impute sin to those who have not so great a hand (H) in the production of it as hath the Almighty by the grounds of this opinion. For,  
1. The devil is called a father of lies, John 8.44. and by the like reason, of all other sins; and therefore he that committeth sin, is said to be of the devil, and to be a child of the devil, 1. John 3.8, 10. and sin is called a work of the devil, which the son of God appeareth to lose vers. 8. And why is the devil so called, but because he doth egg and allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sin? This is all he doth or can do. But God doth much more, if he necessitate and by his decree first, and next by his powerful and secret working in the souls of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sin. For to determine, is infinitely more than barely to persuade; for as much as sin must needs follow the determination, but not the persuasion of the william. God is therefore a truer cause of sin (by this doctrine) than the devil.  
2. Wicked men are esteemed authors of their own offences, because they plot, purpose, choose and commit them, and are immediate agents in the acting of them. But God (by this opinion) doth more: For he (I) over-ruleth the projects and purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontrollable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choises and actions precisely that very way; so as they cannot choose but do as they do, whatsoever they may think to the contrary. They have indeed potentiam in se liberam, a power in itself free, to choose what they refuse, or to refuse what they choose, to determine themselves this way or that way as liketh them best: but they have not liberum usum, a free use of this their power. God doth determine their will before it hath determined itself; and maketh them do those only actions which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions have prescribed. Moore rightly therefore may God be called the author of all those offences: for 
u Opera magìs pertinent ad imperantem quàm ad exsequ●ntem.  deeds whether good or bad, are owned more truly by him that over-ruleth them, than by the servile instruments that only execute and do them.  
3. Wicked counsellors (K) and they who allure and advice men to sin, are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sins to which they are the persuaders, and have been punished for those misdeeds which others through their instigations have committed. J●z●bel Ahabs wife was reputed and punished as the murderer of Naboth, because she counselled and contrived the doing of it, as we may see 1. Kings 21.23, 25. But wh●t is Counselling to Enforcing? Evil counsels may be refused; but an Almighty power cannot be resisted. God therefore that useth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of sins, is much more an author of them than he that only useth the other.  
II. If we could found out a King (L) that should so carry himself in procuring the ruin & the offences of any subject as (by this opinion) God doth in the effecting of the damnation and transgressions of reprobates, we would all charge him with the ruin and sins of those his subjects. 
w Molin. Anat. c. 12. De praedest. p. 73. Quis non regem abominetur sic loquentem.  Who would not abhor (saith Moulin) a King speaking thus, 
x Ego hunc hominem addico suspendio; sed ut justè suspendatur, volo patret homicidium vel peculatum.  I will have this man hanged; and that I may hung him justly, I will have him murder or steal? This King (saith he) should not only make an innocent man miserable, said & sceleratum, but wicked too; and should punish him for that offence, cujus ipse causa est, of which himself is the cause. It is a clear case. 
y Sueton. vit. Tib. cap. 61.  Tiberius (as Suetonius reporteth) having a purpose to put certain virgins to death, because it was not lawful among the Romans to strangle virgins, caused them all to be deflowered by the hangman, that so they might be strangled. Who will not say that Tiberius was the principal author of the deflowering of those maids? In like manner (say the Supralapsarians) God hath a purpose of putting great store of men to the second death; but because it is not lawful for him by reason of his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame, he hath decreed that the devil shall deflower them, that afterwards he may damn them. It followeth therefore, that God is the main cause of those their sins.  
III. That God (M) is the Author of men's salvation and conversion, all sides grant: and yet he doth no more in the procuring of them, than these men report him to do in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation. The salvation and conversion of the Elect (say they) he hath absolutely and antecedently, without the foresight of any deservings of theirs, resolved upon, and by irresistible means in their several generations draweth them to believe, repent and endure to the end, that so they might be saved, and his absolute decree accomplished. On the other side, the damnation, the sins and the final impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleasure peremptorily decreed; that his decree he executeth in time, drawing them on by his unconquerable power and providence from sin to sin, till they have made up the measure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternal vengeance which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the course which God taketh for the conversion and salvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of Reprobates? And therefore what hindereth but that God (by their grounds) may as truly be styled the prime cause and author of the sins of the one as of the conversion of the other?  
The Fathers (N) thought it a plain case: and therefore they did generally make sin an object of prescience, not Predestination, and bend the most of those arguments by which they refuted this soul assertion, against an absolute, irresistible and necessitating decree, as I could easily show, but that I fear to be overlong. Only I will cite some few of those authors words, whom the learned and reverend Bishop hath alleged in favour and for the defence of the Predestinarians and the maintainers of Gotteschalks opinion.  
The Church of Lions in their answer to the positions of Johannes Scotus which he framed against Gotteschalk, hath these words, 
z Bishop Usher his hist. of Gottesc. pag. 138. Qui vim & necessitatem peccandi Deum intulisse homini vel inferre dicit, manifestè & horribiliter in Deum blasphemat, quem ad peccata compellendo utiqu● autorem peccati esse confirmat.  Whosoever saith, that God hath laid a constraint or a necessity of sinning upon any man, he doth manifestly and fearfully blaspheme God, in as much as he maketh him by affirming that of him, to be the very author of sin. Remigius Archbishop of that Church, explaining his Church's opinion in the point of Prescience and Predestination in seven several rules; in the fifth of those rules he hath these words to the same purpose. God (saith he) by his Prescience and Predestination hath laid a necessity of being wicked upon no man, 
a Id. ib. p. 173 Hoc enim si fecisset, ipse utique esset autor malorum, etc.  For if he had done this, he should have been the author of sins.  
And thus (in my judgement) doth it plainly appear that by absolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cause of men's sins.  
Many distinctions are brought to free the (O) Supralapsarian way from this crimination: all which (me think) are no better than mere delusions of the simple and inconsiderate, and give no true satisfaction to the understanding.  
I. There is (say they) a twofold decree: 1. an Operative, Distinct. 1 by which God positively and efficaciously worketh a thing; 2. a Permissive, by which he decreeth only to let it come to pass. If God should work sin by an operative decree, than he should be the author of sin; but not if he decree by a permissive decree to let it come to pass. And this only they say they maintain.  
1. It is true that God hath decreed to suffer sin: Answ. For otherwise there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder? He suffered Adam to sin, leaving him in the hand of his own counsel, Ecclus 15.13. He suffered the nations in times past to walk in their own ways, Acts 14.16. And daily doth he suffer both good and bad to fall into many sins. And this he doth, not because he standeth in need of sin for the setting forth of his glory; for he hath no need of the sinful man, Ecclus 15. but partly, because he is summus provisor, supreme moderator of the world, and knoweth how to use that well which is ill done, and to bring good out of evil; and especially for that reason which Tertullian presseth, namely, 
Tertull. l. 1. contr. Martion.  Because man is made by Gods own gracious constitution a free creature, undetermined in his actions till he determine himself, and therefore may not be hindered from sinning by omnipotency, because God useth not to repeal his own ordinances.  
2. It is true also, that a permissive decree is no cause ●f sin, because it is merely extrinsecall to the sinner, and hath no influence at all upon the sin: it is an antecedent only, and such a one too, as being put, sin followeth not of necessity. And therefore it is fitly (P) contradistinguished to an operative decree. And if that side would in good earnest impute no more in sinful events to the Divine power than the word Permission importeth, their main conclusion would fall, and the controversy between us end. But,  
1. Many of them reject this distinction utterly, and will have God to decree sin efficaciter, with an energetical and working william. 
Colloq. Mompel. 2. per pag. 177.  Witness that discourse of Beza, wherein he averreth and laboureth to prove, that God doth not only permit sin, but will it also: And witness Calvine too, who hath a whole Section against it, calling it a carnal distinction, invented by the flesh, and effugium, a mere evasion to shifted of this seeming absurdity, 
Calv. Instit. l. 4. c. 18. Sect. 1, & 2.  That that man is made blind volente & jubente Deo, by God's will and commandment, who must shortly after be punished for his blindness. He calleth it also sigmentum, a fiction, and saith they do ineptire, play the fools, that use it. By many reasons also doth he endeavour to lay open the weakness of it, taxing those who understand such Scriptures as speak of Gods smiting men with a spirit of slumber and giddiness, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts, etc. of a permission and suffering of men to be blinded and hardened. 
b Idem, ibid. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3.  Nimis frivola est ista solutio, saith he, This is too frivolous a gloss. In another place he blameth those that refer sin to God's prescience only, calling their speeches argutiae, tricks and quirks which Scripture will not bear; and those likewise that ascribe it to God's permission: and saith, 
c Similiter quod de permissione afferunt, dilutius est quàm ut subsistat.  What they bring touching the Divine permission in this business, will not hold water.  
2. They (Q) that admit the word Permissive do willingly mistake it, and while (to keep of this blow) they use the word, they corrupt the meaning. For 1. Permission is an act of Gods consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedom, and committing such sin's day by day as they might have avoided, and to which he proceedeth lento gradu, slowly and unwillingly, as we may see Psalm. 81.11, 12. Israel would none of me: so I gave them up, etc. Ezek. 18.39. Go and serve every one his idol, seeing ye will not obey me, etc. Rom. 1.21, 24. Because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God: therefore God gave them up to their heart's lust, to vile affections, and to a reprobate mind. Revel. 22.11. He which is unjust, let him be unjust still. In these places and many more we may see, that persons left to themselves are sinners only; and not all sinners, but the obstinate and wilful, which will by no means be reclaimed. But the permission which they mean, is an act of God's antecedent will, exercised about innocent men, lying under no guilt at all in God's eternal consideration. 2. Permission, (R) about whomsoever it is exercised, obstinate sinners or men considered without sin, is no more than a not-hindring of them from falling that are able to stand, and supposeth a possibility of sinning or not-sinning in the parties permitted: But with them it is a withdrawing or withholding of grace needful for the avoiding of sin, and so includeth an absolute necessity of sinning: for from the withdrawing of such grace sin must needs follow, as the fall of Dagons' house followed Samsons plucking away the pillars that were necessary for the upholding of it. Maccovius in two disputations, 
Maccov. Coll. Theol. disp. 9 pag. 10.  expounding this word Permission, circumscribeth it within two acts: the first of which, is a subtraction of Divine assistance necessary to the preventing of sin. And having proved it by two arguments, that none may think he is alone in this, he saith, that he is compassed about with a cloud of witnesses, and produceth two: The first of them is our reverend and (S) learned Whitaker, some of whose words alleged by him are these, 
d Pag. 15. Permissio peccati est privatio auxilii Divini, quo posito peccatum impediretur.  Permission of sin, is a privation of that aid, which being present, sin would have been hindered. The second is Pareus; for saying that 
e Subtracto auxilio Dei homo [Adamus] istis facultatibus ad standum bene uti non potuit.  that help which God withdrew from Adam, being withdrawn, Adam could not so use his endowments as to persevere. And this doctrine (saith he) is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of Pareus, lib. De gratia primi hominis, cap. 4. pag. 46.  
Their permission therefore of sin being a subtraction of necessary grace, is equivalent to an actual effectual procuring and working of it; (For causa deficiens in necessariis ●st efficiens, a deficient cause in things necessary is truly efficient.) and so is but a mere fig-leaf to cover the foulness of ●heir opinion.  
II. There are (T) two things (they say) in every Distinct. 2 ●ll act: 1. The material part, which is the substance of the action; 2. The formal part, which is the evil or obliquity of it. God is the author of the action itself, but not of the obliquity and evil that cleaveth to it: as he that causeth ● lame horse to go, is the cause of his going, but not of his lam● going. And therefore it followeth not from their opinion That God is the author of sin.  
Answ. 1. All sins receive not this distinction: because of man● sins the acts themselves are sinful, as of the eating of th● forbidden fruit, and Sauls sparing of Agag and the fat beast of the Amalekites.  
2. It is (V) not true, that they make the decree of Go● only of actions and not of their aberrations: for they mak● it to be the cause of all those means that lead to damnation and therefore of sinful actions as sinful, and not as bore action's. For actions deserve damnation not as actions, but ● transgressions of God's law.  
3. To the Simile I say, That the rider or master that sh● resolve first to flay his horse or knock him on the head, a● than to make him lame that for his halting he may kill hi● is undoubtedly the cause of his halting: and so if God determine to cast men into hell, and than to bring them into a st●● of sin, that for their sins he may bring them to ruin, 〈◊〉 cannot conceive him to be less than the author as w● of their sins as of those actions to which they do inseparably adhere, and that out of God's intention to destr●●● them.  
Distinct. 3 III. The will (X) is determined to an object two way● 1. By compulsion, against the bent and inclination of it; 2. ● necessity, according to the natural desire and liking of ● Gods Predestination (say they) determineth the will to sin● this last way, but not the first. It forceth no man to do th● which he would not, but carrieth him towards that which ● would: When men sin, it is true they cannot choose; and is as true they will not choose. It followeth not therefore fro● the grounds of their doctrine, That God's decree is the ca● of men's sins, but their own wicked wills.  
Answ. 1. The Ancients made no distinction between these t●● words necessity and compulsion, but used them in this argume●● promiscuously; and did deny that God did necessitate men ● sin, jest they should grant him hereby to be the author o● sin, as I have touched before, and shall intimate again afterwards. Nor did the Schoolmen put any difference between them, 
Calv. Instit. l. 2. c. 1. sect. 5.  as may appear by the testimony of Mr Calvine who speaking of the School-distinction of the Wills threefold liberty, from Necessity, from Sin, from Misery, saith, This distinction I could willingly receive, but that it confoundeth Necessity with Coaction.  
2. That which necessitateth the will to sin, is as truly the ●ause of sin as that which forceth it; because it maketh the ●inne to be inevitably committed, which otherwise might be ●voided: And therefore if the Divine decree necessitate man's will to sin, it is as truly the cause of the sin as if it did ●nforce it.  
3. That which necessitateth the will to sin, is more truly ●he cause of the sin than the will is; because it overruleth ●he will, and beareth all the stroke, taketh from it its true liberty, by which it should be lord of itself and disposer of ●ts own acts, and in respect of which it hath been usually ●alled by Philosophers and Fathers too, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a power which is (Y) under the insuperable ●heck and control of no lord but itself. It overruleth (I ●ay) and maketh it become but a servile instrument, irresistibly subject to superior command and determination: and ●herefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sins as proceed from the will so determined, than the will is. For when too causes concur to the producing of an effect, the one a principal overruling cause, the other but instrumental and wholly at the devotion of the principal; than is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principal, which by the force of its influx and impression produceth it, rather than to the subordinate and instrumental, which is but a mere servant in the production of it. We shall found it ordinary in Scripture, to ascribe the effect to the principal agent: It is not ye that speak, saith Christ, but the Spirit of my Father that speaketh in you, Matth. 10.20. I laboured more abundantly than they all: yet not I, but the grace of God which was in me, 1. Cor. 15.10. And, I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me, saith S. Paul, Gal. 2.20. In these and many other places, the effect or work spoken of is taken from the instrument, and given to the principal agent. Which being so, though man's will work with God's decree in the commission of sin, and willeth the sin which it doth; yet seeing what the will doth, it doth by the commanding power of God's almighty decree, and so it doth that otherwise it cannot do; the sin committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to man's will the inferior as to Gods necessitating decree the superior cause.  
4. That which maketh a man sin by way of necessity only, that is, with and not against his will, is the cause of his sin in a worse manner than that which constraineth him to sin against his will: As he which by powerful persuasions draweth a man to stab or hung or poison himself, is in a grosser manner the cause of that evil and unnatural action than he that by force compelleth him; because he maketh him to consent to his own death. And so if God's decree do not only make men sin, but sin willingly too, not only cause that they shall malè agere, do evil, but malè velle, will evil, it hath the deeper hand in the sin.  
Distinct. 4 IU. Sin (Z) may be considered as Sin, or as a Means of declaring God's justice in men's punishments; God doth not predestinate men to sin as it is Sin, but as a Means of their punishment. He is not therefore (say they) the author of sin.  
Answ. 1. A good (Γ) end cannot moralise a bad action: it remaineth evil, though the end be never so good. Bonum oritu● ex integris: End, manner, yea and matter too must be good, or else the action is naught. He that shall steal, that he may give an alms; or commit adultery, that he may beget children for the Church; or oppress the poor, to teach them patience; or kill a wicked man, that he may do not more hurt with his example; or do any forbidden thing; though his end be never so good, he sinneth notwithstanding: And the reason is, because the evil of sin is greater than any good that can come by sin; for as much as it is laesio Divinae majestatis, a wronging of God's majesty, and so Divino bono opposita, directly prejudicial to the good of almighty God, as much as any thing can be. This S. Paul knew very well: and therefore he telleth us plainly, that we must not do evil that good may come of it, Rom. 3.8. Whosoever therefore willeth a sin, though for never so good an end, he willeth that which is truly and formally a Sin: And consequently God▪ though he will sinne for ends never so good, yet willing it with such a powerful and effectual will as giveth a necessary being to it, he becometh author of that which is formally sin.  
2. The members of this distinction are not opposite: For sin (Δ) as Sin, and in no other consideration, is a means of punishment. If God therefore willeth it as a Means of punishment, he willeth it as a Sin: his decree is terminated at the very formality of it.  
3. This distinction fasteneth upon God a further aspersion, and loadeth him with three special indignities more. 1. Want (Θ) of Wisdom and Providence. His counsels must needs be weak, if he can found out no means to glorify his justice, but by the bringing-in of sin, which his soul hateth, into the world, and appointing men to commit it, that so he may manifest justice in the punishment of it. 2. Want (Λ) of Sincerity and plain dealing with men. Tiberius (as Suetonius reporteth) having a purpose to put the two sons of Germanicus, Drusus and Nero, to death, 
f Sueton. in vit. Tiber. c. 54. Variâ fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur.  used sundry cunning contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death; and herein is justly censured for great hypocrisy. And so if God having appointed men by his absolute will to inevitable perdition, do decree that they shall sin, that so they may be damned for those sins which he decreeth and draweth them into; he dissembleth, because he slaughtereth them under a pretext of justice, for sin, but yet for such sins only as he hath by his eternal counsel appointed as the means of their ruin. 3. Want (Ξ) of Mercy in a high degree; as if he did so delight in blood, that rather than he will not destroy men's souls, he will have them live and die in sin, that he may destroy them: Like to those Pagan Princes, of whom Justine Martyr Apolog. 2. two or three leaves from the beginning, saith, 
g Videmini vereri nè omnes colant justitiam, atque ità desint in quos animadvertatis. Verùm haec cura fuit magìs carnificum quàm bonorum principum.  They were afraid that all should be just, jest they should have none to punish. But this is the disposition of hangmen, rather than of good Princes. And therefore fare be these foul enormities, and in particular this latter, from the God of truth and Father of mercies.  
And thus notwithstanding these distinctions, it is (in my conceit) most evident, That the rigid and upper way maketh God the author of men's sins as well as punishments. And so much for the first general Inconvenience which ariseth from this opinion, namely the Dishonour of God.  

Observations premised for the more clear understanding and answering this Authors Objections.  
THe opinion here aimed at is the doctrine of absolute Reprobation, concerning which all disputes are frivolous, if it be not first agreed upon what is understood by these two words, absolute Reprobation.  
Observe. I For the understanding whereof, observe first, what our Church conceiveth under the term of Predestination. If a decree of God first beholding and foreseeing certain particular persons as believing and constantly persevering unto the end in faith and godliness, and thereupon electing them unto eternal happiness, than we will grant that the Remonstrants (whom this Author followeth) embrace the doctrine of the Church of England. But if in our XVIIth Article, God in his eternal Predestination beholdeth all men as lying in massa corrupta, and decreeth out of this generality of mankind, being all in a like damnable condition, to elect some by his secret counsel, to deliver them from the curse and damnation by a special calling according to his eternal purpose,, and by working in them faith and perseverance; than it is plain that the Remonstrants and this Author have left the doctrine of the Church of England in the point of Predestination, and therefore may well be suspected also in the point of Reprobation, which must have its true measure taken from that other.  
Secondly, take notice, what the word Observe. TWO Absolute importeth, when it is applied unto the eternal and immanent acts or decrees of the Divine Predestination. Not (as the Remonstrants continually mistake it) a peremptory decree of saving persons elected whether they believe or not believe, nor yet a decree of forcing or necessitating predestinate persons unto the acts of believing, repenting, persevering, or walking in the way which leadeth unto everlasting life; but a gracious and absolute decree of bestowing as well Faith, Repentance and Perseverance, as eternal life, upon all those to whom in his everlasting purpose he vouchsafed the special benefit of Predestination. And that God can and doth according to his eternal purpose infallibly work faith and perseverance in the elect without any coaction or necessitation of man's will, is agreed upon by all Catholic Divines, and was never opposed but by Pelagius. And this absolute intending of eternal life to persons elected, and absolute intending of giving unto such the special grace of a perseverant Faith, is that Absolute Predestination which our Mother the Church hath commended unto us, and which we must defend against the error of the Semipelagians and Remonstrants, who strive to bring-in a Predestination or Election wherein God seethe faith and perseverance in certain men going before Predestination, and doth not prepare it for them in eternity by his special act of Predestination, nor bestow it upon them in due time, as a consequent effect of his eternal Predestination.  
Observe. III Thirdly it is to be observed, that ou● Church, in not speaking one word of Reprobation in the Article, would have us to be more sparing in discussing this point than that other of Election; quite contrary to the humour of the Remonstrants, who hung back when they are called to dispute upo● Predestination, but will by no authority be beat-off from rushing at the first dash upon the point of Reprobation.  
But further from hence we may well collect, That our Church, which by Predestination understandeth a special Benefit out of God's mercy and absolute freedom absolutely prepared from all eternity, and in time bestowed infallibly upon the Elect, would have us conceive not further of the silenced decree of Reprobation, than the Not-preparing of such effectual grace, the Not-decreeing of such persons unto the infallible atteinment of Glory, the decreeing to permit them through their own default deservedly and infallibly to procure their own misery. All this is no more than God himself hath avouched of himself, 
h Exod. 33.19.  miserebor cui voluero, & clemens ero in quem mihi placuerit. And that which the Apostle attributeth unto God Rom. 9.15, 16, 17, 18.  
Fourthly, this non-praedestinatio, non-electio, Observe. IV praeteritio or negativa reprobatio (for by all these names Divines speak of it) doth as absolutely leave some out of the number of the predestinate, as Predestination doth include others within the same number. And the number of both formally and materially is so certain, that the diminution or augmentation of either is by the general consent of orthodox Divines condemned for an erroneous opinion: though the Semipelagians spurned against this truth. If under the name of absolute Predestination any conceive a violent decree of God thrusting men into an estate of grace and glory, and under the name of absolute Reprobation, a violent decree of God thrusting men into sin and misery, let who will confute them: for their opinion is erroneous concerning the one, and blasphemous concerning the other. But under colour of opposing such imaginary decrees, to bring-in a conditionate Predestination, to exclude this negative Reprobation, to settle them both upon prevision of human acts, is opposite to the doctrine of S. Augustine approved anciently by the catholic Church, and till this new-fangled age generally and commonly allowed and embraced both by the Romanists and by the Protestants. Penottus, who would feign deny negative Reprobation, yet is driven to confess, 
i Lib. 7. cap. 17.  Doctores communiter admittunt reprobationem negativam, doc éntque communiter obdurationem, seu permissionem manendi in peccato usque ad mortem, effectum esse hujus reprobationis. If the common opinion of Divines be, That permission of final continuance under the guilt of sin followeth after the decree of this negative Reprobation, than this Author together with the Remonstrants, who acknowledge no decree of Reprobation but that which followeth upon prevision of men's final continuance in sin, are wandered into a singular opinion of their own.  
These things premised concerning the absolute Predestination and Reprobation which our English Divines maintain, and the conditionate Predestination and Reprobation which some of ours have lately received out of Dutchland, all objections so fare as they concern us are easily answered.   

An Answer to the Objection, That this opinion chargeth God with men's sins.  
THe doctrine of absolute Predestination doth make God the Author of man's holiness and happiness, of all saving grace wherewith he is endued here, and of that eternal glory which he obtaineth hereafter. And for this cause especially we deny the Arminian Predestination built upon foreseen acts of man's freewill, because it doth not fully and truly acknowledge the special mercy of God either in the election or salvation of the predestinate. But for the doctrine of absolute negative Reprobation, we utterly deny, that it chargeth God with or maketh him the author of any sin. It maketh God the determiner, not to prevent any men's sins; which easily he could do, if he were resolved to show them special mercy: but it maketh not God the author or necessary producer of any man's sins; which is a thing as impossible, as for the sun to be the author or producer of darkness. And therefore we willingly subscribe unto all which the scripture or pious Antiquity have said against this error.  
The comparison made between God and the Devil is very odious and irreverent; and so much the more, because it is grounded upon a false imagination, That whatsoever events come into act according to the eternal and absolute decrees of God, are produced by an irresistible power forcing the agents unto such actions how wicked soever. But God's providence doth fare otherwise decree the production of good actions, and the permission of bad actions to be produced by defective agents. Of the former he is a powerful and effectual worker: Of the latter he is only a voluntary sufferer, and a powerful and irresistible orderer or disposer. Thus God powerfully wrought Faith, Repentance, Perseverance in the will of Peter, according to his decree of absolute Predestination: and according to his decree of negative Reprobation, he suffered Judas to split himself voluntarily upon the rocks of Covetousness, Treachery, Infidelity, Impenitency, and he turned those very sins to his own greater glory. Predestination is a cause effectual in the producing of all salutiferous actions; but Reprobation is no effectual cause in the producing of any wicked actions: and neither the one nor the other implieth compulsion, coaction or necessitation to actions whether good or evil. And this was the effect of the answer which Prospero made to the Semipelagians, when they objected against Augustine's doctrine of absolute Predestination, as the Remonstrants do now against ours. I wonder therefore that this Author could not see, that Prosper, whom he allegeth, holdeth this objection for a mere calumniation.  
We acknowledge with Prosper, that God punisheth not those actions whereof he is the author or effectual working cause: for such actions are always holy and rewardable, not malicious and punishable: But God, who according to the doctrine of Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and all other orthodox Divines of that age, absolutely out of his own free mercy predestinated some unto grace and glory, and as absolutely out of his own freewill passed-by others, not-electing or predestinating them to saving grace and glory, is notwithstanding denied to be the cause of any man's sin. Therefore in their judgement absolute Predestination and Reprobation maketh not God the cause of sin.   

Answers to the Arguments endeavouring to prove that the defenders of absolute Predestination and Reprobation make God the author of sin.  
TO the first in general we answer, Ad 1 that our Church in establishing absolute Predestination and absolute Non-predestination, and in rejecting that Election and Nonelection which the Semipelagians anciently, and lately some Papists and some Protestants have founded upon the opposite acts of men's freewill foreseen by God from all eternity, doth not tie us to maintain whatsoever Piscator, Marlorate, Maccovius, or any other private Doctor holding absolute Predestination and Reprobation hath uttered. We leave them as well as we do the Remonstrants, where they leave the old way, and stray into crooked by-paths.  
Moore particularly; We grant the decree of negative Reprobation to be absolute: But we deny that thereupon it will follow, that the damnation of singular persons not-elected, or in this sense reprobated, is by way of necessity and by virtue and efficacy of this decree imposed upon any. A great part of the Angels were under this decree of Nonelection or negative Reprobation, and yet not one of them by virtue of this decree was necessitated unto damnation, but by an act of voluntary rebellion fell thereinto.  
And if by Necessity this Author meaneth nothing but that which the Schoolmen term necessitatem immutabilitatis, 
Vid. Coll. Hag. Berti●, pag. 111.  than he must know, that the Election and Reprobation of singular persons such as it is acknowledged by the Remonstrants, is as certain from all eternity, as immutable, and in this sense as necessary as that which we defend.  
Last of all, To inquire whether the decree of Reprobation be evitable or inevitable by men, is a strange Quaere; since evitabilitie or inevitabilitie is a thing which may be well questioned in our own temporal acts, but in the eternal immanent operations or decrees of God, which were established before the foundations of the world were laid, it is improper to say they were inevitable by us, and false to say they were evitable. Take the judgement of a learned Jesuit (no favourer of the opinions of Calvine, Beza, or any Protestant Divines) concerning the immutability of the Divine volitions or decrees: 
Ruiz. De volunt. disp. 16. §. 2, 3.  Imperfectio foret, si Deus in futurum tempus reservaret decretum liberum. And again; Turpe Deo esset non statuere ab aeterno quicquid facturus esset vel non facturus in tempore.  
And for the immutability of all such eternal decrees; Si Dei volitio libera mutaretur, sequeretur per mediatam illationem mutatio Divinae substantiae. And finally, he setteth down this general conclusion; 
Ibid. §. 7.  In quolibet instanti temporis tam est simpliciter necessaria quaelibet volitio Dei, etiamsi respiciat creaturas in tempore futuro producendas. The Remonstrants therefore must either deny that the decrees of electing Peter and Not-electing or Reprobating Judas are to be accounted eternal volitions of God, or confess that their debating of the Mutability or Vitabilitie of all such decrees, proceedeth from ignorance of the very nature of that about which they contend.  
Ad 2 For the secret decree of absolute Election and Nonelection, or (in other terms) of absolute Predestination and absolute negative Reprobation, they are to be distinguished from the revealed and published decrees of the Salvation of all singular persons upon condition of their faith, repentance and perseverance, and damnation of all singular persons, if they continued in unbelief and impenitency. We acknowledge these latter to be the eternal and immutable decrees of God, as well as the former; and no man attaineth salvation, or incurreth damnation, but according unto these: But we say the Remonstrants err in confounding these conditionate decrees, which make no distinction betwixt man and man, with the absolute decrees of Election and Preterition, which are distinguishing decrees. The decree of damnation cannot be justly executed without man's sin, because God established from all eternity no decree of damning any man but for sin. As for the decree of Nonelection, it had the same absolute dependence upon God's free pleasure which the opposite decree of Election had.  
Ad 3 As the former, so this argument is grounded upon a false supposition, namely, That the decree of damnation is the selfsame with the decree of Reprobation or Nonelection, which is only that absolute decree we now speak of. The eternal decree of Judas his damnation, or of the very devils, was never in voluntate Divina without the prevision of their sins, nor determined to be executed otherwise than for and upon their own misdeserts. But the Nonelection or negative Reprobation of Judas and of the apostatical angels, or (in plainer terms) the Not-preordaining them to the infallible attaining of eternal happiness, and the decree of permitting them finally to loose eternal happiness by their own deficient, voluntary, final wicked actions, is such an eternal absolute decree of the Divine will, as dependeth not upon any foreseen acts of man's will, though it exclude not the eternal prevision of all future acts of men whatsoever. We grant not therefore, that by this absolute Reprobation, God decreeth that men not-predestinate should unavoidably sinne, that so they may justly and certainly be damned: but we grant that together with this absolute Nonelection, God foreknoweth that person's not-elected will voluntarily commit those sins for which he intendeth to condemn them, and to glorify himself in the manifestation of his justice upon them, and the more clear manifestation of his mercy towards the elect.  
For harsh or false propositions of particular authors who dispute about Predestination and Reprobation, I will not justify them. Only I would have this Author consider, whether their errors were a sufficient cause to make him run into the contrary erroneous doctrine of the Remonstrants; who to avoid the absolute decree of Election and Nonelection or Preterition thrust upon the world a decree founded upon the prevision of men's distinct acts, good or bad, thereupon making God distinguish them into Elect and Non-elect, or Predestinated and Not-predestinated. A mere Semipelagian doctrine, grounding Election and Reprobation upon the merits or demerits of men; as both the orthodox Fathers and Semipelagians used the words Mereri or Meritum, when the one contended that Predestination and negative Reprobation were mere acts of free Mercy and absolute Liberty, preparing for some denying to other the infallible means of beatitude; and the other would make them acts of the Divine Justice, passing differently upon both according to the foreseen difference of their future actions, good or bad: which the Ancients without scruple termed merita and demerita.  
Ad 4 The immutability of God's eternal decrees is a thing unquestionable: But that God hath made any decree of Reprobation whereby Reprobates are necessitated or caused either to live or die in sin, is utterly false. Negative Reprobation implieth no such causality. And as for the decree of damnation (which some call Positive Reprobation) it procureth no man's sins, though it import a necessity of undergoing just punishment for sin.  
The peremptory decree of excluding men out of heaven and tormenting them in hell, is one thing; and the absolute decree of Permitting men by their own defective freewill to fail in the atteinment of heaven, and to fall into the torments of hell, is another. 
Penott. lib. 7. cap. 13. §. 4.  The former is a judicial act or decree, and respecteth men as Gods eternal knowledge findeth them in egressu ex hac vita. The latter is an act of Gods absolute and sovereign dominion, freely disposing of the preparation and donation or of the withholding and denying of that which he oweth unto no man, according to the liberty of his own william. 
Penott. lib. 7.3. §. 10.  Quis tam imprudens qui dicat voluntatem excludendi efficaciter aliquem à fine, & voluntatem permittendi illum pro sua libertate deficere à fine, non esse voluntates distinctas.  
What is alleged out of Calvine to prove that God, to effect his decree of absolute Reprobation, procureth or worketh in reprobates their sinful actions, proveth no such matter. Calvine saith that the devils, totámque improborum cohortem, non compedibus tantùm teneri ligatos, sed etiam ad obsequia praestanda fraeno cogi. What could be spoke in this point more truly and judiciously? Is to hold them so fettered that they cannot move a finger without God's permission, all one with procuring and by an irresistible power working in them their malicious actions? or rather a restraining and limiting of their wickedness? Is fraeno cogere ad obsequia sibi praestanda, all one with compelling them to wicked actions? or rather, by the admirable act of Divine providence, making their disobedience to Gods revealed will serve to the fulfilling of his concealed will? Read the whole Section, and you shall see the point admirably well expressed by learned Calvine, and quite mistaken or miserably wrested by this Author.  
For the other places cited out of calvin's works, they import thus much; That wicked men cannot bring to effect any wicked action according to their own will, unless God hath foredecreed that such an act, for some good which he meaneth to draw out of it, should be acted here in this world. And furthermore, they import, That God doth not only behave himself privatively in sinful acts and events, but that he therein exerciseth positive and powerful acts. The very decree of permitting that sin to be committed which lieth in Gods will to hinder, is a positive act of the Divine will, which is positively conversant about all the sins of men, though not working them as effects, yet working upon them as material objects, and using them to such purposes as make best and most for his glory. This is not a mere privative demeanour. And last of all, in the stirring up of their wills, even unto those actions which are malicious in the doers, there may be and often is a positive act of God, and yet most pure and free from infusing the lest drop of malice into the wills of such wicked agents. It is a positive act of God, to stir up a particular cogitation in the mind of a wicked man, which otherwise would never have come into his mind: It is a positive act of God, to order and dispose the concurrence of all circumstances according to his own good pleasure. When God certainly foreseeing that such a cogitation good in itself, or such circumstances in themselves not bad, will infallibly through the ●bred malice of wicked men stir them up to wicked actions; God procuring such thought to arise in bad minds, and ordering the concurrence of such harmless circumstances to be presented unto bad men, is thereby even in the phrase of holy Scripture said to stir them up to those actions.  
I want paper-room here to explain a point of so deep consideration. I will only say this on the behalf of Calvine, that he attributeth unto God no other positive act in the sins of men than the Scripture doth, and in no other meaning than it doth. And it were no hard matter to show, that S. Augustine, the ancient Schoolmen, yea, the very Papists and Jesuits themselves, when they have railed against Calvine for making God the author of sin, are at length forced by evidence of Scripture to grant as many positive acts of God conversant about the sins of men, and if not in the same words, yet in words equipollent and as express as ever Calvine used. It is therefore a weak inference and a false collection which this Author maketh from calvin's forenamed propositions. For God, who (according to calvin's doctrine) appointed no man to torments but only in respect of his misdeeds, did not tie himself to bring about any man's ruin; neither did he thereby debar himself from furnishing any wicked man with sufficient means and remedies; neither doth he so overrule by any decree of his the wills of wicked and reprobate men, that their liberty is extinguished, or a necessity of committing this or that particular sin imposed upon them. These are dreams and fancies which by the occasion of the doctrine of absolute Predestination and Reprobation have risen out of the addle heads of the Remonstrants: they are no necessary consequents arising from the doctrine itself: And therefore by no just consequent can it be proved or concluded, that absolute Predestination and absolute Preterition or negative Reprobation make God the author of sin.   

An Answer to the Considerations pag. 116, etc.  
GOd hath no hand at all in the production of sinful actions as they have formalem Ad I rationem peccati or mali moralis, which consisteth in the deficiency or obliquity of the will opposite to the strait rule of God's law. Of this defect or malicious crookedness God neither is nor possibly can be a Physical or Moral causer. But all sinful and defective actions have a substratum peccati; which is a natural action of the mind, or of the body, or both. This natural action whereunto the formal reason of sin cleaveth, hath a positive and real being: and therefore it must be reduced unto God, as Augustine hath truly concluded against the Manichees; to whom he giveth this admonition, 
a De duab. anim. count. Manich. c. 6. in fine.   eos sequi mallent qui omne quicquid esset, quoniam esset, in quantúmque esset, ex uno Deo esse praedicarent.  
If any, disputing for absolute Predestination and Reprobation, make God the cause of that which giveth unto the free actions of men the formal reason of their sin, let him be anathematised: But if they make God the cause of that inward or outward natural action wherein this malicious defect of man's will is found, they hold nothing but what their very Adversaries are forced to grant. Vide Penot. lib. 8. cap. 11. §. 9 p. 477. & Ruiz. De volunt. disp. 27. §. 3. num. 17. Vbi tres modos agnoscit quibus actionem peccati ess● à Deo tradunt scholastici. And Suarez saith, Omnes conveniunt proprio & real influxi concurrere Deum ad hos actus liberi arbitri● ut reales actus sunt, etiamsi pessimi & intrinsecè mali sunt: And yet 
b Opusc. l. 2. c. 1. p. 126.  Omnes etiam conveniunt, Deum absolutè, & simpliciter non ess● causam peccati. So Valentianus; 
c In 1. Aquin. q. 19 pag. 436.  Entitatem pravae actionis omnes fatemur cadere in voluntatem Divinam cùm fit, & esse à Deo tanquam à causa universali concurrente cum voluntal● humana.  
I wonder how that should be blasphemy when it cometh from Calvine or Beza which is found divinity when it cometh from their adversaries. As for that which is added, concerning Gods necessitating by his decree, and the determining of men's wills to sin, and that irresistibly; they are chimerical fancies. For the absolute decrees of God determining amongst possible actions and events, which shall be and which shall not be, altar not the natural operation of the agents. God absolutely decreed to give Peter faith, repentance, perseverance: and because these are good supernatural acts, God was the true effectual working cause of them all; yet not by way of necessitation, but by giving Peter that spirit which made him most freely perform them all. For wicked actions, which according to God's eternal determinate decree come into act at the time appointed, as the betraying of Christ by Judas, the murdering of him by the Jews, in these and such like the Divine decree moveth no man, much less irresistibly determineth him unto those wicked actions: The devil and his own freewill are the only moving and determining causes: But the Divine decree, which for the good of mankind and God's glory fore-appointed the death of Christ, and willingly permitted these Agents to effect their malicious actions, powerfully so ordered all circumstances as God foresaw and foreknew would infallibly by the free and wicked actions of men effect the just and holy purpose of God. Where than is the irresistible necessitation of man's will, which this Author always presumeth (and never goeth about to prove) must needs follow upon God's absolute decrees of infallibly working good actions in the elect, and absolutely permitting and powerfully disposing of all the future bad actions which devils or men shall commit to the end of the world?  
Ad TWO It is false that the doctrine of absolute Predestination and Reprobation maketh God either so to overrule the supernatural good actions of the elect, as they cannot choose but do as they do, or the bad and wicked actions of the Non-elect. Absolute Predestination doth by the virtue of effectual grace so rule and affect the freewill of the predestinate, that it causeth them freely to do as they do. And absolute Nonelection or Reprobation doth so permit the reprobate to the guidance of their own defective will, that freely and upon a deliberate choice they do as they do. Neither do they only think or dream they have such a freedom, but their own experience and conscience assureth them that they have it. And therefore Ruiz 
d De scient. Dei, disp. 2. §. 1, & 3.  hath not unfitly described the Divine permission, which is made an effect of negative Reprobation, to be decretum manens in Deo quo decernit non impedire peccatum, & decernit aliqua bona facere, licèt sciat illorum occasione committendum esse peccatum. And he further granteth that 
e Ibid.  all the sins of men in time to be committed, might be and de facto were foreseen by God, in decreto hoc praedefiniente permissionem illorum. And last of all he addeth, Dei voluntate, consilio, decreto, definitione fieri peccatorum actiones, significat scriptura. To which purpose he bringeth-in the very selfsame places of Scripture which Calvine and our Protestant Divines usually allege. By all which it appeareth how weakly and falsely, upon the infallibility of future actions decreed by God quoad ipsum eventum, the necessitation of man's freewill to the forenamed actions is collected.  
Augustine, who was a stiff maintainer of the absolute decree of Predestination and Preterition, and a stiff opposer of the Semipelagian Election and Nonelection founded upon good or bad actions of men eternally foreseen by God, doth  shake-off this Pelagian objection, That by such decrees man's freewill is necessitated, and all freedom extinguished.  
He hath not only potentiam in se liberam, but liberum usum potentiae, who committeth his wicked actions with deliberation and election, and can upon other deliberation resolve to do otherwise, or to suspend such wicked actions, and cease from them for a time. Which freedom is evident in adulterers, thiefs, and all manner of sinners, who being resolved to commit this or that sin, when they perceive some great danger, presently choose to abstain from it till they have sitter opportunity to commit it.  
As for the predetermination of men's wills, which this Author harpeth upon, it is a controversy between the Dominicanes and Jesuits: With whose Metaphysical speculations our Protestant Divines love not to torture their brains. In brief we acknowledge no such predetermination flowing from God's absolute decree, as either in good or bad actions taketh away the natural dominion which free agents have over their own actions. And yet if this dominion be conceived so absolute as that it excludeth the dominion of God over man's will, we hold it an erroneous fancy.  
Ad III God is our Counsellor either by his word or by his Spirit: by neither of these counselleth he any man to commit sin.  
Yea, but he enforceth wicked men, and by an almighty power which cannot be resisted causeth the production of all their sins.  
If the absolute decree of electing some and not-electing others make God enforce the non-elected or reprobated unto any wickedness, we grant that it maketh God the Author of sin. But this is Petitio principii, a miserable begging of that which will never be granted, and which this Author perpetually presumeth to be a plain consequent of absolute negative Reprobation, but never dareth attempt the proving of it.  
His error springeth from ignorance of the different means and manner of the Divine operation in persons mercifully ordained unto eternal felicity, and persons not comprised in this merciful decree of Predestination, but passed-by and left by their own defective and wicked actions to plunge themselves into endless misery. Persons ordained unto eternal felicity stand in need of the infallible direction and effectual operation of the Almighty: Otherwise their own will is such a broken bow, as that by it they never attein the scope whereunto God hath preordained them. God therefore taketh upon himself to be a powerful worker and author of all those supernatural acts whereby they tend unto the kingdom of Glory. But the case is quite otherwise with men not-elected. Defective actions cannot proceed from the operation of an almighty and holy God: they are the productions which defective causes of themselves freely bring forth, where they are not guided and acted by that special grace which guideth and acteth all Gods elect.  
And notwithstanding, though God cannot be an Author or a producer, much less an Inforcer, in regard of any sinful action, yet God may be a Decreer, a Determiner, in permitting persons not-elected to fall voluntarily into sins, to continued voluntarily in them unto their lives end, and for them to undergo endless misery in another life. And this is all which can truly be inferred upon the decree of absolute Election and Nonelection. Bonaventure in effect saith the same; 
f Lib. 1. dist. 46. quaest. 5.  Malum non subest potentiae Divinae producenti, subest tamen potentiae providenti.  
The comparisons of a King procuring the ruin of his subjects, or of Tiberius causing virgins to be deflowered, that so they might be strangled, with God absolutely electing some both to the end and to the effectual and infallible means of salvation, and absolutely not-electing others, but decreeing to permit them by their own default to fail in attaining salvation, is as frivolous as odious. For God's absolute decree of Nonelection doth neither make men miserable nor wicked, but only (for ends best known to himself) absolutely willeth the permitting of such men to be the causes both of their own sins and miseries. Neither had God ever an absolute purpose to put any innocent man to death, or to damn any sinner, but upon the respect unto his foregoing sins.  
All sides grant that God is the Author of Ad IV man's salvation and conversion: But the Arminian side flatly denieth that God by the grace prepared for men in their Election or Predestination, is the author or cause of any man's conversion, faith, perseverance, or salvation. Nay, they stiffly maintain that conversion, faith and perseverance to the last gasp are things foreseen by God in man before any man is elected or predestinated unto salvation by God. It is therefore clear, that according to the doctrine of the Remonstrants, Predestination or Election is no cause of any man's conversion: For an effect foreseen is never caused by that which followeth after it, but is rather the cause of that prevision, and of what is consequently done thereupon.  
The Remonstrants may justly be taxed with that error which this Author goeth-about to fasten upon their adversaries. For in their opinion God doth no more in procuring the conversion of the elect than he doth in procuring the conversion of the reprobates, who notwithstanding remain unconverted. For procuring the conversion, faith, perseverance of Judas, God took order that sufficient means should be ministered unto him, God gave him a power to elicit the act of his conversion and those other supernatural acts required unto salvation, though God never absolutely decreed the conversion of Judas, or the making him a faithful and perseverant Christian. Thus say the Remonstrants. In like manner (say they) God administered sufficient means of grace unto Peter, God gave him a power to convert, to believe, to persevere, but God never absolutely decreed the converting of Peter (or any man else) or the saving of Peter; but he left Peter's conversion depending upon the contingent act of his own freewill; and upon the foresight of this contingent act God predestinateth Peter unto salvation. Just so he left the conversion of Judas, and upon the selfsame terms he had decreed the salvation and the predestination of Judas. But to urge this not further: God doth much more in procuring the salvation of Peter than he did for procuring the salvation of Judas. And as for the procuring and working the impenitency or infidelity of reprobates, God doth not at all work any vicious dispositions or defective and sinful actions in such men. Wicked habits or dispositions are diseases bred within men's own souls, not infused into them by the Physician of our souls: Wicked and sinful actions are the productions of their own corrupted freewill, and not produced by any Divine operation working in them: for it is only in good and holy actions that God giveth us both the will and the deed. Yea but (say they) as God hath absolutely and antecedently without the foresight of any deservings resolved by irresistible means to 'cause the elect to believe, repent and persevere, that so his decree of their salvation may be accomplished; even so, in the doctrine of those that teach absolute negative Reprobation, God hath of his alone will and pleasure peremptorily decreed the damnation and the final impenitency of reprobates, and by unconquerable power, etc. In both this Author is utterly mistaken. For the Elect; God hath absolutely and antecedently without any prevision of their merits, graciously elected and ordained them unto eternal life: And this hath ever been maintained by Catholic Divines against Pelagians and Semipelagians, and is at this day the common doctrine both of the Protestant and Roman Church; though by some few it be gainsaid in both.  
But for those words, without the foresight of their deservings, if by the name of deservings this Author understandeth repentance, faith, persevering, and such supernatural acts required to salvation; we grant it is not only untrue but impossible that God should decree the salvation of any man without the foresight of those acts; because in Predestination the effectual and infallible producing of all those acts is resolved upon, 
Vide Mald. Antis. pag. 9, 10. etc.  and God cannot but from all eternity foresee what himself hath from all eternity decreed to work. We deny not foresight of faith and perseverance in the Catholic sense, that is, as of effects and consequents of the Divine Predestination or Election; but in the Arminian sense, 
Vide pag. 13, 14.  that is, as of antecedent motives, reasons, causes or conditions foreseen in men, and drawing after them the decree of Predestination.  
As for those terms by irresistible means, they are merely captious. It is sufficient to establish absolute Predestination, that such means are prepared for the predestinate cui nullum durum cor resistet: whether there be a metaphysical possibility of resistance left in them or not, let those dispute who love endless wranglings.  

Vide Mald. Antis. pag. 13.  Now to come to the Non-elect: In their Preterition or negative Reprobation there is no decree involved of damning any man upon Gods alone will and pleasure, but only upon the guilt and misdesert of the persons, whom the decree of negative Reprobation permitteth (and that with infallibility of the event) to procure their own condign punishment. Neither doth God draw any man on unto sin by an unconquerable power; but he permitteth some men by the devil and their own lusts to be drawn from sin to sin, till at last they perish in their sins; of whom Perditio tua ex te notwithstanding is most truly verified. The difference therefore which God in the course of his providence taketh with the Elect and with the Non-elect is as different as possibly can be imagined. The conversion, perseverance and salvation of the Elect, he worketh by such a special grace, as in his infinite wisdom he knoweth will, and out of his infinite goodness and mercy he decreeth shall work in them all those blessed and saving effects.  
As for the final sins and damnation of the Reprobate, the providence of God permitteth them both, whereas he could (as he doth in his Elect) hinder the one, and prevent the other. But as God worketh not their sins (being effects of a finite deficient and not of an infinite efficient cause) so he did never upon mere will and pleasure decree their damnation, as he did the salvation of his Elect. And therefore he cannot be called the author of any man's sin or damnation, though he may truly be styled the author of all good graces and actions, as also of salvation unto all the Predestinate.  
For the Fathers; It is most true that they deny a Predestination unto any sinful acts: And the reason was that which was even now touched-upon, Because they conceived Predestination to be such a decree as prepareth from eternity and in time infallibly and most effectually worketh all those graces and gracious acts whereby men are brought to eternal life. So that Predestination implieth an effectual production or operation of those good things which are intended unto the predestinate. Now because the evil of sin cannot fall under the Divine causality or operation, the Fathers granted a prescience in God of all men's sins, but truly denied a Predestination of any man's sins, and as truly a necessitation or necessitating decree forcing any man unto sin. But what of all this? If there be no decree of Predestination forcing men unto sin, is there therefore no decree of negative Reprobation or Nonelection, resolving to permit some finally to sin and eternally to perish? Is there no decree of absolute Predestination, not permitting others out of their own defective will finally to continued in sin and perish, and absolutely resolving to draw them out of the state of sin, and advance them to the state of glory?  
I conclude, that unless this Author under the name of absolute Reprobation mean the absolute judiciary decree of Damnation, and an absolute decree of necessitating men unto the deserts of their damnation, he hath said nothing at all to evince that absolute Reprobation maketh God the Author of sin. If he mean such a decree when he fighteth against absolute Reprobation, he fighteth with his own shadow, and opposeth that which no judicious Divine will endeavour to uphold.   

Of the Supralapsarians Distinctions.  
THis term of Supralapsarians, which is truly fastened upon some Protestant Divines, but falsely upon Calvine, if it design all those who place the decrees of Election and Reprobation before the Prevision or decree of permitting original sin, it taketh-in Scotus and all his followers, it taketh-in a great number of the Romanists, for (if Suarez say true) it is the more common opinion amongst them. This I note to show the private spleen which our Remonstrants carry against some Protestant writers of good desert in God's Church, whom they foully handle for the selfsame opinion which they wink at in the Romanists. But to come to their Distinctions.  
The first Distinction of the Supralapsarians Dist. I whereby they clear themselves from making God the true cause of men's sins though they teach absolute Election and Nonelection or negative Reprobation considered before the fall, is, That God's decrees may be Operative or Permissive. This decree of Reprobation is not a decree to work any man's sinful actions whereby he incurreth damnation, but to let them come to pass by the free operation of his own william. This Distinction of God's decrees is not denied; but it is objected by this Author, That God standeth in no need of man's sin for setting forth of his glory; as if the doctrine of the Supralapsarians concerning absolute Election and absolute Nonelection or Reprobation made sin so absolutely needful that God's glory must suffer an eclipse if sins be not committed by his own procuring and working. But absolute Reprobation implieth only, that God knew he could turn the sins of men and angels (yea and their damnation) unto his own glory; and that he decreed so to do in some, not out of any necessity of setting forth his glory by permitting or punishing their sins, but out of his  determining so to manifest his glory. The glory which eternally and essentially belongeth unto God, needeth not the creature itself, much less than the sin of the creature. God's glory had been the same that it is if man had never been made; and so consequently if he had never sinned, if he had never been condemned unto Hell for sin. Nay further, if no man had ever been elected, sanctified, or saved, God's glory is a thing which could not possibly have been lessened or any way blemished. The outward and temporal manifestation of God's glory being in itself a thing of no necessity in regard of God, it is fond to imagine that God standeth in need of any such means for setting-forth of his glory, seeing the very temporal setting-forth of his glory is a thing no way needful unto him. We agreed therefore, that God stands in no need of sin either for his glory as it is considered in itself, or as it is to be manifested unto the creature: For God in his infinite wisdom could (without the permission of sin) have found means enough for sufficient illustration of his own glory.  
Two other reasons are assigned by this Author of the permission of sin: The one is, the great good which the most wise God forseeth he can, and the most gracious God determineth that he will bring out of the evil actions of men. The other is, because man is by God made a free Creature, undetermined in his actions till he determine himself, and therefore may not be hindered from sinning by omnipotency. The former reason we gainsay not: The latter is neither fitly nor truly set down. The full reason is, Because God who gave man a Free and yet a defective will, hath thought it fit that this will should produ●● her own acts per modum liberi agentis, and yet so that the defectiveness as well as the freedom should be manifested. Now had not God established any such permissive decree, the frailty and deficiency of the Creatures freewill could not have been discovered either in men or angels. Now it is false (which is supposed and here implied) that God's determination of man's will unto every particular action is a necessary hindering of the liberty of the will unto all actions so predetermined. The Jesuits themselves, who oppose the Dominicanes in their Physical Determination or Predefinition of man's will unto all acts of what kind soever, do notwithstanding grant a Predefinition or Predetermination unto good supernatural acts, and that without all impeachment to the liberty of man's william. To think therefore that God should repent his own ordinance concerning man's liberty unless he leave all his actions unto himself undetermined, and that Gods permissive decree is founded upon this reason, is a flat mistake.  
And here I must add unto what hath been said, That the Divine permission which adhereth unto the decree of Reprobation may be understood two ways. It may be taken either for that immanent and eternal decree quo decernit Deus non impedire peccatum, 
Ruiz. de scient. Dei, disp. 26 §. 1  & decerni●●●●iqua bona facere, licèt sciat illorum occasione committendum esse peccatum; and this is called increata permissio: or for the temporal accomplishment of this decree, in producing those occasions and circumstances, good in themselves, which God foreknew would be abused unto sinful actions, and permitteth so to be; and this is called creata permissio. Absolute Election and Reprobation cannot be defended without this absolute permissive decree: But this absolute permissive decree may and is easily and perspicuously defended by Divines both of our Church and the Roman from making God the cause or Author of any man's sin.  
This is so clear that it is here confessed, that such a Permissive decree is truly and fitly contradistinguished to an Operative decree. But it is objected, that the Defenders of the absolute decree in sinful events ascribe more to the operative power of God than this permission importeth. How is this proved?  
I. Because many who defend absolute Predestination and negative Reprobation do utterly reject this former distinction of a Permissive and Operative decree. I dare boldly say not many, and I think not one man will be found who dareth utterly reject this distinction. And if some should, doth it therefore follow that the Doctrine itself of absolute Election and absolute Nonelection maketh God the operative cause of sin, because some maintaining this Doctrine do ignorantly and falsely maintain together with it an erroneous opinion? As for Beza and Calvine, whom this Author challengeth to make God to decree sin with an energetical and working will, and not only with a permissive, and therefore to make God the cause of sin, he should first have considered that the permissive decree concerning sinful actions implieth an infallibility of the events so permitted. 
Ruiz. Descient. disp. 69. §. 10.  Positâ permissione certissima est futuritio peccati quod permittitur, & omnium circumstantiarum quae permittuntur in illo. Secondly it should have been considered, that there can be no infallible knowledge of such permitted events unless an energetical and Operative will be conjoined with the Permissive william. But how fare forth is this energetical will or decree conversant about sinful actions whose event is decreed by a permissive will or decree?  
First, It eternally decreeth and accordingly at the very time when sinful actions are committed it giveth the sinner the power and use of understanding and , without which he could not sin.  
Secondly, God thereby eternally decreed to concur, and accordingly at the instant doth concur, ad materialem actionem peccati, which otherwise could not come into act or being.  
Thirdly God also decreed to make a collection and concurrence of those circumstances and occasions (good always as they come from God) whereupon God foresaw that the sinner would infallibly fall into sin.  
Fourthly, God decreed to deny all such means as in his infinite wisdom he knew would have prevented such sins, and to afford them only such means as he certainly knoweth they will voluntarily abuse unto the committing of sin.  
Fifthly, God limiteth and ordereth their sins, that they shall break forth in no other measure, at no other time, upon no other persons, than himself hath fore-appointed.  
And lastly, God ordereth all the permitted sins of the reprobate to his own glory and the good of his elect.  
All these may in a good sense be called operative decrees or volitions of God, and not barely permissive: In all these which are conversant about the sins of men, there is a positive will of God which doth not only permit men to work their sinful actions, but above and in those sinful actions hath his own good and holy work. And this is that energetical will which Calvine and Beza attribute unto God in men's sinful actions; which their very adversaries are forced to acknowledge. As for any energetical will which should so have a working in sinful actions as that it should be the cause quòd talis actio sit cum tali defectu, or (in plainer terms) that should work the contrariety or repugnancy of the sinners will unto the law of God, this Calvine and Beza utterly disclaim. And as for the very terms which they use in referring sinful actions unto the will of God, the very same in substance are used by all other Divines, though some in words are more strict than others. I now quote that of Ruiz, 
g De scientia Dei, p. 219.  Dei voluntate, consilio, decreto, definitione fieri peccatorum actiones significat Scriptura. And that of Penottus, 
h Lib. 8. c. 22 §. 2.  Hoc solùm fit in mundo, & eo modo, & ad eum finem, Quod, & Quemodo, & ad Quem finem Deus vult illud fieri. And, 
i Lib. 5. c. 9 p. 255.  Ipsa Divina causalitas aliquo modo extenditur ad ipsa mala, non sicut ad effectum constitutum in esse per ipsam Divinam causalitatem, sed sicut ad objectum circa quod versatur Divina causalitas, vel illud impediendo nè fiat, vel illud permittendo fieri, etc. So that the question is not, Whether God have only a permissive decree about sinful actions; for most grant he hath also an operative decree but all the difficulty is, In what manner and measure and by what means this decree hath his work upon the william.  
Calvine and Beza than might well tax all who grant only a permissive decree concerning the events of sin, and deny an operative, and truly avouch that many places in Scripture cannot be understood of a bore permission, but of necessity they import some kind of effectual operation.  
II. It is further objected, That the maintainers of absolute Reprobation, though they admit the name of a permissive decree, yet they corrupt the meaning: For whereas Permission is an act of Gods consequent or judiciary will, they make it an act of God's antecedent will exercised about those who as yet lie under no guilt of sin.  
It is true that there is such a permission as this Author speaketh of, which is judiciary, and layeth hold only upon those who have long abused the mercies of God: but he is deceived in thinking that no decree of Divine permission can be antecedent unto the guilt of sin. The Non-elect angels were permitted to commit their first sin; which could not possibly be a judiciary permission in punishment of any former sin. Adam and Eve were permitted to fall into their first transgression; which permission cannot without evident absurdity be deduced from any foregoing or foreseen sin of theirs. And to speak generally of all persons not-elected, the permissive decree of their final perseverance in sin must in reason be antecedent to the absolute prevision of their impenitency. And though God may justly decree to punish the abusers of their freewill by letting them fall from one sin to another, yet there can be no one sin insisted upon in which the permissive decree of God is not antecedent to the prevision of the same sin.  
But let us hear what Calvines adversaries themselves say concerning this point of Permission. 
k Molina, Quaest. 23. pag. 398, 399.  Voluntas permittendi peccata, permissióque ipsa, esse potest non propter culpam aliquam quasi in poenam, sed ex sola libera voluntate Dei. Prius est Deum denegatione (specialium) auxiliorum permittere peccatum quàm peccatorem in illud incidere. And this is properly that permissive decree or that Permission which we understand when we dispute about Nonelection or negative Reprobation. Of this Suarez speaketh in this manner; 
l Opusc pag. 178.  Hinc intelligitur, voluntatem illam permittendi peccata reprobi, si ad totum ejus lapsum comparetur, non habere causam ex parte illius. And Vasquez; 
m In Im. qu. 23. Disp. 9 §. 4.  Sicut primae vocationis nulla datur causa, ità neque permissionis in eo qui permittitur, post quam ab originali justificatus est. Nullum peccatum est quod non praecedat aliqua permissio, hoc est, Negatio vocationis congruae quâ novit Deus peccatum impediendum si concederetur. I could bring many more speaking to this purpose: but the mistake of this Author is so evident in making the permissive decree which cohereth unto Nonelection or negative Reprobation to be a judiciary decree, that it needeth no further confutation.  
He further telleth us, That Permission is no more than a not-hindering of men from falling that are able to stand, and supposeth a possibility of not-sinning: But those who defend absolute Reprobation make it a withholding of grace needful for the avoiding of sin, and so including a necessity of sinning.  
In this dispute about absolute Predestination and Reprobation or Nonelection, we are not to regard what every particular Doctor saith or writeth, but what is in deed and truth a consequent of the doctrine itself. And first we answer, That the permissive decree upon which Reprobation dependeth containeth in it somewhat more than a bore not-hindering of men to fall into sin, though it be no real positive efficient or working cause of their sin. For whereas God hath infinite ways whereby he could prevent the sins of any Reprobate person, and that without forcing their freewill, it containeth a positive and peremptory resolution of denying them all such grace as he knoweth would prove effectual to their salvation were it afforded them. And which is more, it containeth a positive decree of putting them into such circumstances, conditions or occasions as God knoweth will infallibly induce them to sin. This is not done by a bore permission, but by some kind of operation. And this is out of all question amongst judicious Divines whether Protestants or Papists. And yet withal they maintain, that men thus reprobated, and thus permitted to fall into final impenitency, thus placed by Divine providence in circumstances and conditions which he knoweth will by them infallibly be abused unto sin and obstinacy in sin, were not thereby spoiled of their possibility of standing, or of their possibility of not committing this or that sin permitted. The Reprobation therefore which is maintained by orthodox Divines, and the Permission thereunto annexed, importeth not a withholding of grace absolutely necessary for the avoiding of sins so permitted, much less a necessitating of sinners unto their several sins, but a withholding of all grace which would be de facto effectual unto the avoidance of sin, and such an ordering of circumstances and occasions as God certainly knoweth will make them freely run into their sins and obstinately continued in them.  
Now whereas it is further objected, that from the withdrawing of such grace sin must needs follow; we answer, That sin doth infallibly follow upon this Reprobation, permission, and withholding of effectual grace; yet not an as effect floweth from the proper and true cause, but as a Consequent is deducted out of an Antecedent, by a true form of reasoning. As for example, if we reason thus, God absolutely decreed to withhold from the non-elect angels all such effectual grace as he knew would have upheld them, and without which he knew infallibly that they would fall away; and he further decreed to permit them to fall away: Therefore God by these his decrees necessarily caused their sin, it is a false collection or inference. But thus to argue, God absolutely decreed, etc. therefore their sin and voluntary apostasy certainly followed necessitate infallibilitatis, this is a true inference.  
That which occasioned the Remonstrants' error in this point, is an equivocation in the word Cause or Causing. For one may be said to be the cause of such an evil action or event, really, truly, and properly, when he doth directly work the production of that evil; or abusively, improperly, and falsely, when he doth not work as he could to the preventing and hindering of such an event. Thus ignorant men may suppose that when the sun withholdeth his beams, it really & truly worketh or causeth that darkness, coldness, fogginess, wherewith the air is presently possessed: but in truth there is no such matter.  
2. And further we say, That this Reprobation or Permission whereof we speak in this controversy concerning absolute or conditionate Election & Nonelection, implieth not a Subtraction of any graces or helps obtained, much less of any absolutely necessary to the preventing of sin; but a Non-preparation, a Nondonation of such graces and helps without which God foresaw and foreknew that the Reprobates out of their own free and perverse will would infallibly delight and perish in their sins. The Subtraction of some measure of grace already given, and permission of a man to fall into more sins, in punishment of a former sin voluntarily committed, is not always a sign of Reprobation, nor of the permissive decree thereunto appendent. For many of the elect have thus been permitted to fall from one sin into another, as David was from adultery unto murder; and yet at length all turned to his greater good. But when we speak of a permission inseparably and properly belonging to the Non-elect, it is not a Subduction of needful grace in poenam peccati, much less a working of any malicious quality in them whereby they are necessitated to sin, but a Not-preparation or Nondonation of such grace without which God knoweth most infallibly that they will live and die in their sins. And this is it which S. Augustine intended when he said, Deo reprobante non irrogatur aliquid quo homo fit deterior, sed tantùm non erogatur quo fiat melior.  
For the saying of learned Whitaker, it is true, the permissive decree, as it properly concerneth Reprobation, being nothing else but a negation of all such gracious helps quibus positis peccatum impediretur: which must be understood of final sin, if it be applied unto the permission which is only proper to the Non-elect: For the Elect oftentimes are denied such helps, which if they had been afforded, this or that particular sin had certainly been prevented; and the Non-elect may have such help of grace afforded them, whereby they do actually avoid this or that sin, unto the committing whereof they were before strongly inclined.  
As for the phrase used by Pareus, That Adam could not use his endowments to persevere; This non posse is in Scriptures, Fathers, Schoolmen and all manner of Authors usually applied unto such actions wherein the Agents had a free power not to have done what they did. It is therefore a weak inference, to gather from the bore words Necesse, Impossibile, Non posse, Non possibile, or the like, a necessitation of man's will unto such acts, or an absolute impotency unto the opposite acts, as this Author and the Remonstrants ordinarily do. Jerem. 13.23. The Jews are said to be under the same impossibility of doing good which the Black-moor is of making his skin white: yet no necessitation of doing evil actions is thereby employed. Joan. 12.39. Propterea non poterant credere, etc. and yet according to Prospers determination, 
n Ad Cap. Gall. sent. super 14.  Non-praedestinatus perit infidelitate voluntariâ, non coactâ. Matth. 18.7. Necesse est ut veniant scandala: and yet the giving of scandals is not enforced upon any man's william. Nemo potest corrigere quem Deus despexerit: and yet the Reprobates continued incorrected in their sins through their own voluntary obstinacy. Rom. 2.5. Thou after thine hardness and heart that cannot repent: and yet this CANNOT doth not free the wicked from voluntary impenitency. 2. Pet. 2.14. Having eyes full of adultery and that cannot cease from sin: and yet nothing hereby is employed or intended which taketh away the freedom of man's will in committing sin. The Father's use the same words, and yet never intending thereby the destruction of freewill, or the necessitation unto any sinful act. Augustine speaking of a wicked man saith, 
o Vide Ruiz Descient. disp. 66. §. 1. pag. 634, etc.  Cogenti cupiditati bonâ voluntate resistere non potest: yet he never imagined a necessitation or coaction unto any particular sinful act, De perfect. Just. Resp. 5. Speaking of Pharaoh, he saith he was so hardened, ut obtemperare Deo non potuerit, Propos. 62. in Epist. ad Rom. And he useth the same phrase concerning the Jews, Tract. 54. in Joan. and yet non posse in neither place importeth a coaction or necessitation of the will unto any sinful act. Not to heap up any more allegations, it may be generally observed, That wheresoever there is an infallible Divine prescience of any future act or event, there it is not unusual to affirm that act to be necessary, and the opposite event to be impossible. And Ruiz giveth a reason of this manner of speech, 
* De scientia Dei, disp 80. §. 6.  Quia infallibilitas actûs est aliqua impotentia omittendi, & infallibilitas omittendi est aliqua impotentia operandi talem actum.  
I have insisted the longer upon this because it is presumed always a good inference against Calvine, Beza, or any of our Protestant Divines, They say such an action or event is necessary, such an one is impossible; therefore they overthrew freewill, and put a necessitation unto sin upon men not-elected. Whereas when Scriptures, Fathers, Schoolmen, and modern Papists use the same terms, our Remonstrants can give them a right interpretation.  
To conclude; Albeit the Permissive decree do infer an infallibility of final infidelity and impenitency in persons not-elected; and albeit in this regard their not-believing and not-repenting be sometimes termed necessary, and their believing and repenting impossible; yet it aught not to be gathered from such phrases of speech, That God by taking away their liberty enforceth them upon their sins.  
Dist. TWO The second distinction opposed by this Author is that which considereth in Sin the Material and the Formal, which is, the substrate act, and the obliquity of the act, and so granteth God to be the cause of the material part, as it denieth him to be any cause at all of the formal, which is the repugnancy or disconformity which the will of the Agent hath with the law or will of God. This distinction is a sound and a necessary distinction, and approved by all judicious Divines whether Papists or Protestants. 
p Penot. lib. 8. cap. 11.  De malo culpae quoad substratum & materiale, quod est actio naturalis cui malitia est annexa, nulla est difficultas in inquirendo & explicando quidnam illud sit, quoniam ex hac parte malum culpae non est malum, sicut nullus actus naturalis alis est de se malus. 
q Ibid. 477.  Omnes Theologi conveniunt, quòd Deus est autor entitatis naturalis ipsius peccati.  
Against this is excepted, That all sins receive not this distinction. If all sins subsist in some actual motion of the soul, body, or both, and this motion abstractively considered be the material part of every actual sin, and hath God for the prime cause in whom we live, move, and have our being; than no sin can be assigned wherein this material part may not be found. In eating the forbidden fruit the material part of the sin in regard of the soul was the Appetition thereof; in regard of the body, the Mastication and Manducation and other bodily acts: Separate these from the formal part, which is Modus appetendi, and containeth a repugnancy to God's command, and God was the prime author thereof. The Act of desiring and of eating must of necessity be reduced to God, without whom there neither is nor can be any motion of body or soul: but the disorderly Manner of desiring and eating contrary to the law of God, this is reducible (as being a defect) only to the defective will of man. This is well observed by Ruiz; 
r De vol. disp 39 §. 3.  Aliqui modi se habendi in voluntate non reducuntur in Deum tanquam in causam, praesertim quando culpabilis est modus se habendi. And more fully; 
s Disp. 6. §. 2  Potest voluntas Divina amando quamlibet actionem sub ratione actionis non amare differentiam monstrositatis per quam positiuè repugnat Divinae legi.  
He proceedeth in opposing this distinction, and saith that the defenders of absolute Election and Nonelection make God an author not only of the action but of the aberration or formal obliquity thereof, in making him the true cause of those means which lead to damnation, which are sinful actions as sinful, not as actions.  
We answer, It is very true, the means which bring reprobated men unto their damnation are sinful actions considered as sinful or as repugnant to the law of God, and not considered barely and abstractively as actions: But we deny that the decree of reprobation maketh God a cause of those means or wicked actions whereby men procure their own damnation. For though Predestination maketh God a proper efficient cause of those means whereby men are brought to salvation, because they are good, holy, supernatural acts; yet Reprobation maketh not God the cause efficient of those means which carry men unto damnation, because they are evil, impure, defective acts, & such as it is repugnant to the very essence and nature of God to be a causer of them. It is certain that infidelity, impurity, impenitency follow the decree of Reprobation; but they follow it not as means prepared or wrought by God for compassing the damnation of the Non-elect, but as the matter presupposed unto their just damnation, growing out of their own perverse freewill, Deo permittente, praevidente, & circa hanc materiam justitiam suam vindicativam exercere decernente. We assent unto that judicious determination of Cajetane; 
t In 1m m qu. 23 art. 5.  Non est idem judicium de reprobatione & praedestinatione: quoniam in reprobatione est aliquid extra totum reprobationis effectum, scilicet culpa; non sic autem est in praedestinato, in quo totum ordinans ipsum in vitam aeternam, est praedestinationis effectus.  
For the simile retorted; If the decree of negative Reprobation be supposed by any to make God deal with men as the master is here said to do with his lame horse, we leave such wild imaginations to the forgers thereof, as not worth the trouble of confutation, being senseless and godless.  
To what is here alleged we answer, That Dist. III the Predestination of God doth not determine man's will to sin either by Compulsion or by Necessity: Let them be different, or let them be the selfsame, all is one to our present purpose. Predestination did not compel or necessitate Judas to betray and cell his Master: Predestination did not compel or necessitate Absalon incestuously to defile his father's concubines: The like may be said of all other sinners who commit such sins upon deliberation, and so proceed to election, having in themselves a natural power of understanding, whereby they were able otherwise to have deliberated, & thereupon otherwise to have chosen. And we see by experience that Traitors & Adulterers fully bend to commit such wicked acts, can and oftentimes do refrain putting them in practice upon better deliberation. This is a demonstration, that they can choose the doing or the forbearing to do such wicked acts: and when they choose to do them, it is not the decree of predestination which forceth or necessitateth them thereunto; but they are directed thereunto by the deliberate use of their understanding, and resolved to do such acts by the free election of their own corrupt william.  
S. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius were all defenders of absolute Election and Nonelection, and adversaries to that Election and Reprobation which the Pelagians and Semipelagians founded upon contrary good and bad actions foreseen in men, yet all of them disclaimed this Necessitation. Let Prosper speak for them all three; 
u Ad Cap. Gall. sent. 14.  Qui dicit quòd qui Evangelicae praedicationi non credunt ex Dei praedestinatione non credant, & quòd Deus ità definierit ut quicunque non credunt ex ipsius constitutione non credant, non est catholicus. Non praedestinatus perit infidelitate voluntariâ, non coactâ. That which is here determined concerning Infidelity, may as well be applied to Treachery, Adultery, or any other transgression of God's law: for in all such actions non-praedestinati pereunt transgressione voluntariâ, non coactâ.  
The reasons which the Author brings to prove that what necessitateth man's will to sin is the cause of sin, make nothing against S. Augustine's doctrine of absolute Predestination, until he can prove that such a Coaction or Necessitation doth absolutely follow thereupon. Which because it was an harder matter than he was able to undertake, he letteth it alone; and so may we his arguments.  
Yet we must needs tell him his Philosophical fancy, That man's freewill is under the insuperable control of no lord but itself, is but unsound Divinity. It is under the insuperable control of him that made it; & so fully, that Gerson was not afraid to use the word Necessity by this Author so much abhorred; 
x Part. 3. fol. 333.  Etsi Deus non cogit liberum arbitrium, potest tamen inducere necessitatem ad illud volendum quod sibi placuerit. And Abulensis; 
y In 3. Reg. cap. 12.  Stat libertas arbitrii cum Divina motione voluntatem nostram ad id quod vult applicante. This S. Augustine termeth 
z Epist. 107  Omnipotentissimâ facilitate convertere, & ex nolentibus volentes facere. If this doctrine of the supreme Dominion of man's will be maintained, God's supreme power in bending and turning men's hearts at his own pleasure, witnessed through the whole body of Divine Scripture, must be abandoned. Yet for all this we utterly deny that God by his insuperable & unconquerable power doth at any time make the wills of men not-predestinate servile instruments unto the committing of sinful actions. It is the devil's suggestion, their own lustful provocations, their voluntary wicked elections which make them servile instruments (not of God but of the devil) in committing their abominable sins. God maketh both the devil and them, even by their wicked actions, to be instruments unwittingly and unwillingly accomplishing his most wise just and holy purposes, and serving to the illustration of his glory.  
The Divine dominion which Gods will hath over man's doth not nor cannot show itself by any such influx or impression as should instill any malicious quality into man's will, or wrist and force it unto any malicious action; neither doth the decree of absolute Reprobation import any such matter. Whatsoever therefore is here further discoursed concerning this Necessitation and Servile usage of man's will by God unto the committing of sinful actions, we passe-by, as presumed and not proved to be a consequent of absolute Predestination and Reprobation.  
The doctrine of Aquinas is in this point of Predestination and Reprobation far more sound than the doctrine of the Remonstrants: 
a Part. 1. quaest. 23. art. 3. ad 2m.  Aliter se habet reprobatio in causando quàm praedestinatio. Nam praedestinatio est causa & ejus quod exspectatur in futura vita à praedestinatis, scilicet gloriae, & ejus quod percipitur in praesenti, scilicet gratiae: Reprobatio verò non est causa ejus quod est in praesenti, scilicet culpae; sed est causa derelictionis à Deo. Est tamen causa ejus quod redditur in futuro, scilicet poenae aeternae. Sed culpa provenit ex libero arbitrio ejus qui reprobatur & à gratia deseritur. If the Remonstrants could be brought to a true understanding of this short decision, all their quarrels were at an end.  
Sin is considerable either formally and Dist. IV in its own nature, as it is sin, or as it is a means of declaring God's justice in men's punishments. God doth not predestinate men to sin as it is sin, but as a means of punishment. This distinction is either not well conceived or at lest not clearly expressed by this Author.  
Those who defend the decree of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do not say that God predestinateth any man unto sin, but that God by his secret counsel ordaineth what sinful events he will permit to be brought into act, and what good uses he will apply them unto. Their distinction standeth upon these terms: That in sinful actions we may consider that which properly and formally maketh them faulty, namely their Repugnancy unto God's law; and of this God is not the Author or causer: Or else we may consider in them that which maketh them just punishments unto other men or unto the party himself that committeth them, or profitable corrections; and thus God challengeth unto himself the causing of them. For example; The theft of the Sabeans and Chaldeans was a sin, as it was a wilful and free taking away of another man's goods, proceeding from their own will, and contrary to the will or law of God: and thus their own malice and not any influx of God into their will caused this sinful and deformed act: But the same sinful outward act materially considered might be a punishment of Job, an exercise of his patience, and an experiment of his virtue unto the setting forth of God's glory: and in these regards God taketh upon him the causing of it; Deus dedit, Deus abstulit. The defiling of David's concubines by Absalon, as it was a sin contrary to God's express law, had no other true cause than the defective freewill of Absalon who committed it: But as it was a just punishment of David for his former defiling the wife of Uriah, God maketh it his proper act and deed; 
2. Sam. 12.11, 12.  Tu fecisti occulté; ego facturus sum coram toto populo. And the reason hereof is easily conceived: for peccatum quatenus peccatum is an unjust defective and monstrous action; and therefore cannot be reduced unto God a most perfect agent, but unto man an unjust defective and disordered agent: Yet peccatum quatenus poena or judicium, as it is made a punishment or judgement lighting upon another, is a just and orderly action, and therefore reducible unto God the just Judge of the world. Suppose a Judge so ordereth the matter, that such a traitor shall be strangled or beheaded by such an executioner: suppose withal that the same executioner strangleth or beheadeth him not out of obedience to the Judge but out of the malice of his own heart: here the same act, which is the kill of a man, as it proceedeth from the wicked will of the executioner, is a sin, and not caused by the Judge; but as it is a punishment inflicted upon the traitor, it is good and just, and caused by the Judge himself. And this is all which Calvine maintaineth in saying, 
b De occulta Dei provide. pag. 747. Γ.  Pravos improborum affectus ad exsequenda sua judicia destinat & regit Deus.  
Whereas it is objected, That a good end cannot moralise a bad action, because the evil of sin is greater than any good can come by sin; it is true, if the bad action and the good end be both referred only to the sinner: But if the badness of the action be referred only to the sinner as the proper cause, and the goodness of the end or good use only which God maketh of it be reduced unto God alone; than it doth moralise it, making it a just and good act so fare as it respecteth God the ordainer and causer thereof. Neither is the evil of a particular sin greater than the good which God can extract out of it (for than he would never permit it) though it be greater than any good which a sinful man doth intent by it. That which the Jews did in putting Christ to death was laesio Divinae majestatis Divino bono opposita: But that which God did in causing the punishment of our sins to light upon Christ was not Divino bono opposita, but such an action as tended to the setting forth of God's goodness and glory. We do not grant therefore, that God for any good end either willeth or worketh any sin quà peccatum: but we only say, that God willeth, ordereth, causeth those outward actions or events whereunto sin cleaveth ex parte impiorum agentium, as by him they are made just punishments or great benefits unto men.  

Δ.  Whereas it is yet further urged, If God willeth the sin as it is a means of punishment, he willeth it as sin; for in no other consideration it is a means of punishment: and so God's decree is terminated to the very formality of sin; here is a plain mistake. If God should will sinful actions as they are deserts of punishment unto the sinner himself, than it were clear he willeth them sub formalitate peccati: for they not otherwise deserve punishment than as they are formally repugnant to the law of God: But in willing the material acts of divers sins as they are inflictions of punishment upon other persons, they are good and just, as all God's punishments are; and they have nothing to do with the formality of sin, which is a privation of rectitude in the will of such sinful agents, and can be no otherwise caused than by themselves.   

An answer to the Indignities.  
TO the first we say, That Ortus and Vsus 
Θ  peccati are things of a quite different ●ature. It is want of wisdom to cause sin ●uoad ortum, or to be a cause breeding and acting it: But it is an high point of the Di●ine Wisdom, to 'cause sin bred in the ●efective will of man and acted by the will ●f man, to be a just punishment either unto himself or others. And this is all which ●ajetane intended upon 2. Kings 12. in denying God to be the author of sin as ●nne, and yet granting that he may be the ●thour of sin quà poena peccati. Which opinion of his, though it be quarrelled by some ●her Papists in regard of the word Author, yet it is defended by Canus lib. 2. De Loc. Theolog. cap. 4. where he hath these express words, 
e Resp. ad 7.  Rectè, ni fallor, dici potest Deus autor esse operis mali, non quà est malum culpae, sed quà est malum poenae. But whether Cajetane and Canus have retained formam sanorum verborum in terming God the author of that sin which he causeth and maketh to be a punishment either to the party committing it or others, I do not decide; but I rather think they have not. As for our Divines, who think that party only to be the true author of sin ex cujus voluntate egreditur sub ratione peccati or quatenus peccatum, they use not to term God the author of any sinful act or work; and therefore Calvine 
d De occulta Dei provide. in Resp. 5, & 6. pag. 736.  detesteth it as a prodigious blasphemy, Maleficia non tantùm Deo volente sed etiam autore perpetrari. But that God willeth and causeth hominum maleficia to be vindicative afflicting punishments to the offenders or others, which is causare subratione poenae, is generally admitted by all Divines: And it maketh not God the author of them secundùm rationem culpae, but the operative cause of them only secundùm ordinem quem illis indit ad finem providentiae suae. And as God is more than a permissive cause in men's wicked actions as they do subire rationem poenae to themselves or others, so likewise as they become means of good to others: 
e August. Enchirid. ad Laurent. cap. 101.  Deus quasdam voluntates suas utique bonas implet per malorum hominum voluntates malas: Sicut per Judaeos malevolos bonâ voluntate Patris Christus pro nobis occisus est. In which regard the same S. Augustine speaking of Judas useth not the word, permisit Deus, but, elegit ad fundendum sanguinem suum. This is not out of want of wisdom to bring-in sin for the glorification of his justice, but to 'cause sin conceived in the wicked heart of man and acted by his wicked hand to become a means for manifestation of his justice. And therefore whensoever God concurreth to the causing of any outward sinful act as it serveth to any good end of his own intendment, he appointeth not men to commit (nay he forbiddeth them the committing of such acts) but he in himself decreed and fore-appointed his own permission, and therewithal the causing of all such real and positive effects without which the act could not be produced, and of all such good ends or consequents as he produceth out of it.  
To the second we answer, 
Λ  That to will the event of sinful actions for good ends argueth no want of sincerity in Gods dealing with men. As to will the torturing of martyrs by tyrants to the end that Christian religion might by their patiented sufferings be advanced & Gods name glorified, or to will that Paul should be buffeted by Satan to the end his soul may be kept humble; is not to appoint the devil or tyrants inevitably to commit such actions that so they may be damned for them, as is falsely supposed, but to let lose the reinss unto their wicked wills out of which these actions did voluntarily flow, and to 'cause whatsoever positive good can be conceived either in such material acts or from them.  

Ξ  To the third: The permissive decree, or decree of Reprobation, as it respecteth the sins of Reprobates argueth no want at all of mercy in God, though it import a denegation of some mercy which God (were he so pleased) might have bestowed upon them: but here is no cruelty at all. 
f Aqu in.  Rationabiliter negatur quod nullâ ratione debetur. Neither doth it flow from a desire of destroying souls, or 'cause the wicked to live and die in their sins. All these are false inferences, and have been formerly confuted. And therefore we conclude, That it is not yet proved that the Doctrine of Reprobation maketh God the Author of sin.    

The Treatise.  

TWO Inconvenience.  THe second inconvenience (A) is, the Overthrow of true religion and good government among men.  
To this this opinion seemeth to tend, for these reasons.  
I. Because it maketh sin to be no sin indeed, but only in opinion. We use to say, Necessity hath no law: creatures or actions in which Necessity beareth sway, are without Law. Lions are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fishes to swim, or any brute creatures to do according to their kinds, because their actions are natural and necessary: they cannot upon any admonition do otherwise. Among creatures endued with reason and liberty Laws are given to none but such as can use their principles of reason and freedom: Fools, mad men, and children are subject to no la, because they have no liberty. To men that can use their liberty Laws are not given neither but in those actions which are voluntary: Not man is forbidden to be hungry, thirsty, weary, sleepy, to weep, to laugh, to love or to hate; because these actions and affections are natural and necessary: the will may govern them, but it cannot suppress them. And so if To deal justly, To exercise charity, etc. with their contraries, be absolutely and antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principle within, or a Mover without, we are as lawless in these as in the other. Now if Necessity have no law, than actions in themselves evil, if under the dominion of absolute necessity, are transgressions of no la, and consequently no sins. For Sin is a transgression of the law, 1. John 3.4.  
This that I say, hath been said long ago. For Justin Martyr speaking against the Destiny, hath these words, 
h Just. Mart. Apol. 2. a little beyond the middle, Si fato fieret ut esset aut improbus aut bonus, nec alii quidem probi essent, nec alii mali.  If it be by destiny (that is, by absolute necessity; for that the Fathers do generally call by the name of Destiny;) that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad. A speech like to this he hath a little after; 
i Videretur verum esse, nihil esse virtutem nec vitium, sed opinione solùm bona & mala judicari: quae, ut vera ratio docet, est maxima impietas & injustitia.  It would seem, if ●his be so, that virtue and vice are nothing, but things are ●udged to be good or evil by opinion only: which, as good ●eason teacheth, is very great injustice and impiety. And ●urely well might he say so: For to what purpose was the Son of God made man, and being man, made a sacrifice of sin? why was the ministry of the word and sacraments ordained? ●o what end are heaven and hell propounded? why are exhortations, dissuasions, or any other means to hinder men from sin applied, if sin be nothing but a mere opinion? Christ, the Christian faith, the word and sacraments, and whatsoever according to the Scriptures hath been done for ●he applying of the pardon for sin, are all but mere fables, nay very impostures, if sin be nothing. And by consequence ●t is no matter at all whether men be Christians, Jews, Turks, or pagans, of what religion, or whether of any religion at all. Now whither tendeth this but to the overthrew of religion?  
II. Because it taketh away (B) the conscience of sin. Why should men be afraid of any sin that pleaseth or may profit them, if they must needs sin? or what reason have they to weep and mourn when they have sinned, seeing they have not sinned truly, because they sinned necessarily? The Tragedian saith, 
k Pati ista culpa est: nemo fit fato nocens.  when a man sinneth, his destiny must bear the blame. Necessity freeth him from all iniquity. Sins are either the faults of that irresistible decree that causeth them, or no faults at all. If either; than sorrow, fear, or any other act of repentance whatsoever, may as well be spared as spent. This conceit being once drunk-in, religion cannot long continued: for the affections have been the strongest planters and are the surest upholders of it in the world: Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor.  
III. Because it (C) taketh away the desert and guilt of sin. Offences if fatal, cannot be justly punished. The reason is, because those deeds for which men are punished or rewarded, must be their own, under their own power and sovereignty: but such are no fatal actions or events. Neither temporally nor eternally can sin be punished, if it be absolutely necessary.  
1. Not temporally; as God himself hath given us to understand by that la which he prescribed the Jews, Deut. 22.25. which was, That if a maid commit uncleanness by constraint, she should not be punished. His reason was, because there was no cause of death in her: what she yielded to, was through compulsion, being overborne by power: as a man that is wounded to death by his neighbour, so was a virgin in that case, a sufferer rather than a doer. This particular la is of universal right: Not just punishment can be inflicted for sin where there is no power in the party to avoid it. The speech of Lipsius is but a mere crotchet contrary to reason, Fatali culpae fatalis poena, Fatal faults must have fatal punishments. Did Magistrates think men's offences unavoidable, they would think it bootless and unreasonable to punish them. Nay not only so, but we see by daily experience, that Judge's following the direction of reason, have very remissely punished such faults as have been committed through the power of headstrong and exorbitant passions: yea, we may read of some who have not thought it fit to punish such faults at all. 
Val. Max. l. 8. c. 1.  Valerius Maximus telleth that Popilius a Roman praetor sitting in judgement on a woman who had in a bitter passion slain her mother, because she had murdered her children, neque damnavit neque absolvit, neither cleared her nor condemned her. And Aulus Gellius reporteth of Dolabella the Proconsul of Asia, 
Gell l. 12. c. 7.  that when a woman of Smyrna was brought before him who had poisoned her husband and son for murdering a son of hers which she had by a former husband, he turned her over to the Areopagus, which was the gravest and most renowned judgement-seat in the world. The Judges there not daring to acquit her being stained with a double slaughter, nor yet to punish her being provoked with just grief, commanded the accuser and the offender to come before them an hundred years after. And so 
l Neque absolutum mulieris venesicium est; quod per leges non licuit: neque nocens damnata punitàque, quae digna veniâ fuit.  Neither was the woman's fact justified, the Laws not allowing it; nor yet the woman punished, because she was worthy to be pardoned. If wise Magistrates have spared such offenders as have been over-swayed with passions, which did but incline not determine them to their irregular actions, they would never have punished any trespassers, if they had thought them to be such by invincible necessity. Or if offenders did think that their offences were their destiny's, and that when they murder, steal, commit adultery, make insurrections, plot treasons, or practise any other outrageous villainies, they do them by the necessity of God's unalterable decree, and can do no otherwise; they would and might complain of their punishments as unjust, as Zeno's servant did: When he was beaten by his master for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten, because he was fato coactus peccare, constrained to make that fault by his undeclinable fate. The Adrumetine (D) Monks, miss by S. Augustine, Epist. 105. ad Sixtum Presbyterum, (which he calleth a book wherein he setteth down his opinion concerning God's grace) did so teach Grace that they denied Freewill. And this S. Augustine confuted in his book De gratia & libero arbitrio. And thinking the grace of God (as S. Augustine taught) to be such as could not stand with freedom of will, they thought that no man could be punished for his faults, but rather prayed for that God would give him grace to do better. Against this S. Augustine directed his other book, De Correptione & gratia: In which discourse though it be Grace that is still named, yet Predestination is included. For as Kimedoncius saith truly in his Preface to Luther, De servo arbitrio, between Grace and Predestination, there is only this difference (as S. Augugustine teacheth l. De Praedest. Sanct. cap. 10.) That Predestination is a preparation of Grace, and Grace a bestowing of Predestination. As Zeno's servant and these Monks did, so would all men judge, did they considerately think that men could not choose but offend. And what would be the resultance of such a persuasion, but an inundation of the greatest insolences, & a dissolution of all good government?  
2. Nor, if this be true, can sin be punished eternally, or that tribunal be just on which the sentence of eternal fire shall be denounced against the wicked at the last day. To this I have the Father's bearing witness generally and plainly. Tertullian hath these words, 
m Tertull. lib. 2. contr. Martion. Caeterùm nec boni nec mali merces jure pensaretur ei qui aut bonus aut malus necessitate fuit inventus, non voluntate.  The recompense of good or evil can with no justice be given to him who is good or evil not freely but of necessity. S. Hierome saith, 
n Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus; nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur: Alioquin ubi necessitas est, nec damnatio nec corona est.  Where necessity domineereth, there is no place for retribution. Epiphanius saith, 
o Epiph. advers. haer. l. 1. haer. 5. num. 3. Sanè quidem justiùs à stellis quae necessitatem pariunt poenae repetantur, quàm ab eo qui quod agit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, necessitate adactus aggreditur.  The stars which impose upon men a necessity of sinning, may be punished with better justice than the men themselves. 
p Aug. l. 2. contr. Faust. c. 5. Et nos quidem sub fato stellarum nullius hominis genesin ponimus, ut liberum arbitrium voluntatis, quo bene vel malè vivitur, propter justum Dei judicium ab omni necessitatis vinculo vindicemus.  We place men's nativities under no fatal constellations, saith S. Augustine, that we may free the will by which a man liveth either well or ill, from all bands of necessity, because of the righteous judgement of God. Prosper speaking of the judgement of God by which he decreed to tender unto every man according to his works, saith, 
q Prosp. ad Obj. 10. Vinc. Quòd judicium futurum omnino non esset, si homines Dei voluntate peccarent.  This judgement should never be, if men did sin by the will and determination of God. Fulgentius also saith the same; 
r Fulgent. l. 1. ad Mon. cap. 22. Nec justitia justa dicetur, si puniendum reum non invenisse sed fecisse dicatur. Mayor verò erit injustitia, si lapso Deus retribuat poenam, quem stantem praedestinasse dicitur ad ruinam.  It is great injustice in God to punish him whom he doth not found but make an offender. This was S. Bernard's opinion too; 
s Bern. l. De great. & lib. arb. p. 908. Sola voluntas, quoniam pro sui ingenita libertate aut dissentire sibi aut praeter se in aliquo consentire, nullâ vi, nullâ cogitur necessitate, non immeritò justum vel injustum, beatitudine seu miseriâ dignam ac capacem creaturam constituit, prout scilicet justitiae injustitiaeve consenserit.  It is only a will free from compulsion and necessity, saith he, which maketh a creature capable of reward and punishment.  
Out of these testimonies laid together may be collected three things. 1. That the Ancients did use to call a necessity of human actions good and bad by the name of destiny, from what external cause soever this necessity did arise. 2. That they did use these two words, Necessity and compulsion, promiscuously: and therefore thought that necessity as well as compulsion did take away the wills liberty. 3. (Which is for our present purpose) That they believed and contended that the judgements of God on sinners could not be just, if they were held by the adamantine chains of any absolute necessity under the power of their sins.  
I will therefore conclude this argument with the words of Epiphanius writing of the error of the Pharisees, who believed the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the dead, and yet held that all things come to pass by necessity: 
t Epiph. lib 1. adv. haer. 16. p. 35. num. 3. Est illud verò extremae cujusdam imperitiae, nè dicam amentiae, cùm resurrectionem mortuorum esse fateare, ac justissimum cujusque facti judicium constitutum, fatum nihilominus esse ullum asserere. Quî enim duo ista convenire possunt, Judicium atque Fatum?  It is, saith he, a point of extreme ignorance or madness rather, for him that confesseth the resurrection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of God's righteous judgement, to say that there is any destiny, any necessity in men's actions. For how can the righteous judgement of God and Destiny comply and stand together? And (let me add) how can the belief of this and true piety stand together? For where this persuasion, That men's sins are necessary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgement, is rooted in, religion will quickly be rooted out.  
iv It tendeth to religions overthrew, because it maketh the whole circle of a man's life but a mere Destiny. By it all our do are Gods ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his Predestination, and all events in Kingdoms and Common-weals the necessary issues of the Divine decree: All things whatsoever, though they seem to do somewhat, yet (by this opinion) they do indeed just nothing: The best laws restrain not one offender; the sweetest rewards promote not one virtue; the powerfullest sermons convert not one sinner; the humblest devotions divert not one calamity; the strongest endeavours in things of any nature whatsoever, effect not more than would be done without them: but the necessitating overruling decree of God doth all. And if laws do nothing, wherefore are they made? If rules of Religion do nothing, why are they prescribed? If the wills of men do nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, scared from another? And if good endeavours and onsets do nothing (being excited, continued, limited, controlled, and every way governed by an active, absolute and almighty decree) to what purpose are they used? Who seethe not plainly whither these things tend? to nothing more than the subversion of piety and polity, religion and laws, society and government? This did the Romans see full well: and therefore they banished Mathematicos the teachers and abettors of destiny out of Rome. These and the like inconveniences which come from the upper way, did work so with Prosper as that he calleth him no Catholic who is of this opinion; 
u Prosp. ad Cap. Gall. sent. 1. Quisquis igitur ex praedestinatione Dei, velut fatali necessitate, homines in peccata compulsos cogi dicit in mortem, non est Catholicus.  Whosoever saith that men are urged to sin and to be damned by the Predestination of God as by a fatal (unavoidable) necessity, he is no Catholic. They did also make the Arausicane Council denounce a curse against such; 
* Concil. Araus. 2. can. 25. Aliquos ad malum Divinâ potestate praedestinatos esse, non solùm non credimus, sed etiam si qui siut qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione illis Anathema dicimus.  That any are predestinated by the Divine power to sin, we do not only not believe, but with the greatest detestation that we can, we denounce Anathema to such (if there be any such) as will believe so great an evil.  
Thus fare of my reasons against the upper and more harsh and rigorous way.  

An answer to the second Inconvenience inferred upon the Decree of absolute Predestination and Reprobation.  
THis Authors discourse concerning this second Inconvenience, which is the Overthrow of all true religion and government amongst men, and is divided into several branches (taking up six pages at the lest) is briefly answered thus; That whatsoever he hath discoursed concerning Fatal necessity and Coaction of men's wills following upon the absolute decrees of Predestination and Reprobation, is a vain fancy of his own, a beggarly Petitio principii, which because he knoweth not how to prove, he never goeth about it. Let him prove that absolute Predestination and absolute Non-predestination or negative Reprobation draweth after it such a Necessitation or Coaction of man's will to good or evil, and we will presently renounce it. But when he cannot do this, to bring reasons and Fathers against the Coaction or Necessitation of man's will in actions good or evil, is pains taken to no purpose, as being a thing which no man defendeth. Let this brief reply therefore serve to this long discourse.  
1. To his first reason. When he hath proved that men reprobated sin as necessarily as Lion's prey, birds fly, etc. and that men absolutely predestinated perform their holy and just actions by the same necessity, let him explode absolute Predestination and Reprobation, and setup instead thereof the Remonstrants' conditionate Predestination and Reprobation upon foresight of men's opposite acts good or bad, and we will presently subscribe to his opinion.  
2. To his second we answer, That absolute Predestination and Reprobation do no more take away the conscience of sin than that conditionate Predestination and Reprobation which anciently the Semipelagians and of late the Remonstrants found upon prescience of men's holy or wicked actions. For as the eternal Prescience of God putteth no necessitation upon actions foreseen, not more doth the eternal Predestination of God. God's decrees are immanent in himself after one manner, and the temporal effects or events decreed are produced by men after another, that is, contingently and freely according to the nature of the agents. They themselves feel and found this by their own experience in all predestinated events, and therefore God's eternal and secret decrees cannot nor do not take away the conscience of men's sins. Judas his conscience told him that he had sinned in betraying innocent blood, though the Scripture telleth us that being delivered by the determined counsel of God foreknown, 
Act. 2.23.  they took Christ, and by wicked hands they crucified him and slew him. Aquinas resolveth the point thus; Ordo praedestinationis est certus, & tamen libertas arbitrii non tollitur ex qua contingenter provenit praedestinationis effectus. And this is the same which S. Augustine long before had taught; 
Vide Esti●ms in 1. Sentent. dist. 39 §. 7. ●ag. 136.  Deus ità ordinat omnia ut proprios motus exercere sinat.  
3. To his third reason there needeth no answer: It is in effect the same with the former, and standeth upon this petitio principii, That all effects and events predestinated are fatal, and that the Agents have no liberty or choice in doing them: which is a gross error, and rejected by School-divines and by modern Papists as well as Protestants. His further amplifications are all to the same purpose, and therefore we let them pass.  
What Augustine writeth for rectifying the judgement of the Adrumetine Monks, this Author might have done well to have made use of for rectifying his own erroneous judgement. They supposed that absolute Predestination could not stand together with man's freedom unto actions predestinated; but Augustine taught them the contrary, and so reclaimed them. And we wish that this Author would out of S. Augustine learn that his supposition is false and erroneous as theirs was.  
For the Fathers which he bringeth to prove that it is injustice to punish men for acts to which they are necessitated and enforced by God's Predestination and Reprobation, we subscribe unto their judgement, and we retort it against this Author thus: Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, Bernard, and others named by him, were defenders of absolute Election and Nonelection, and yet they held that men elected were justly rewarded for their good acts, and men passed-by justly punished for their bad acts; and therefore they supposed not Coaction or Necessitation to follow upon Election and Reprobation.  
The conclusion, that men in their own actions do no more than would be done without them by the necessitating decrees of God; is altogether false and vain. For God's decrees are not necessitating, though the events decreed are infallible; and they leave the wills of men to as much liberty as the Divine Prescience doth. And this is the general opinion of Divines, though they differ about the manner of according man's liberty with God's Predestination.    

Treatise.  
THe arguments by which for the present I stand convinced of the untruth even of the milder and lower way (A) too, I will take from these five following heads; namely, from 

1. Pregnant testimonies of Scripture, directly opposing it.  
2. Some principal Attributes of God, no● compatible with it.  
3. The end of the Word and Sacraments with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it.  
4. Holy endeavours much hindered, if not wholly subverted by it.  
5. Grounds of comfort (by which the conscience in distress should be relieved) which are all removed by it.    

It is I. Repugnant to SCRIPTURE. Ezek. 33.11.  FIrst, it is repugnant to plain and evident places of (B) Scripture even in terminis, as will appear by these instances.  
As I live, saith (C) the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of a sinner; but that the wicked turn from his ways, and live.  
And jest men should say, It is true; God willeth not the death of a repenting sinner, the Lord in another place of the same Prophet extendeth the proposition to them also that perish; 
Ezek. 18.32.  I have no pleasure in the death of him that dyeth.  
In this Scripture we may note three things:  
1. God's affection to men, set forth— 

Negatively; I have no pleasure in his death that dieth.  
Affirmatively; but that the wicked turn.    
2. The persons in whose destruction God delighteth not; Wicked men, such as for their rejecting of grace die and are damned. If God have no pleasure in their death, much less in the death of men either altogether innocent or tainted only with original sin.  
3. The truth of his affection; As I live. Cupit credisibì, 
Tertull. lib. de poen. c. 4.  God would feign have us believe him, saith Tertullian, when he saith, I will not the death of him that dieth: and therefore he bindeth his speech with an oath. 
x O beatos nos, quorum causâ Deus jurat! o miserrimos, si nec juranti Domino credimus!  Happy are we for whose sake the Lord vouchsafeth to swear; but most unhappy, if we believe him not when he sweareth!  
Now if God delight not in the destruction of wicked men, certainly he never did out of his absolute pleasure seal up so many millions of men lying in the fall under invincible damnation: For such a decreeing of men to eternal death is directly opposite to a delight in their repentance and everlasting life.  
God hath (D) shut up all in unbelief, 
Rom. 11.2.  that he might have mercy over all.  
In these the Apostles words are two ALLs of equal extent, the one standing against the other; a ALL of unbelievers, and an ALL of objects of mercy. Look how many unbelievers there be, on so many hath God a will of showing mercy. And therefore if all men of all sorts and conditions, and every man in every sort be an unbeliever, than is every man of every condition under mercy: and if every man be under mercy, than there is no precise antecedent will of God of shutting up some, and those the most, from all possibility of obtaining mercy. For these two are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and cannot stand together.  
God so loved (E) the world, 
John. 3 16.  that he gave his onely-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, etc.  
God loved the world, saith the Text, that is, the whole lump of mankind: therefore he did not absolutely hate the greatest part of men. Again, God loved it fallen into a gulf of sin and misery: For he so loved them as to sand his Son to redeem them; and a Saviour presupposeth sin. He did not therefore hate the most of them lying in the fall: for love and hatred are contrary acts in God, and cannot be exercised about the same objects.  
Many expositors (I know) do take World here in a restrained sense, and understand by it the company of the Elect, or the world of Believers only: But they have little reason for it, in my opinion. For,  
First, I think there can be no place of Scripture alleged wherein this word World, especially with the addition of whole, as 1. Epist. of John chap. 2. vers. 2. (a place equivalent to this for the matter of it, and a comment upon it:) I say no place (I think) can be produced where world doth signify only the Elect, or only Believers: but it signifieth either all men, or at lest the most men living in some certain place and at some certain time, but without distinction of good and bad. Or if it be used anywhere more restrainedly, it is applied only to wicked and reprobate men, who in their affections are wedded to the world and its transitory delights; and therefore do most properly deserve this name.  
Secondly, Suppose it be granted, that World in some Scriptures is restrained to the Elect; yet it cannot bear this signification here: Because  
1. The words than would have a senseless construction: For thus would they run, God so loved the elect, etc. that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, etc. And if they run thus, this would follow; There are two sorts of the Elect, some that do believe and shall be saved, others that do not believe and shall be damned: which is a division or distinction unknown in Divinity.  
2. Believers and Unbelievers, Damned and Saved, comprehend all mankind: for there is no man but he is one of these. Now World in this place includeth believers and unbelievers, the saved and the damned, as appeareth most plainly to him that layeth the 16, 17, and 18 verses together. Therefore it signifieth here all mankind without exception of any.  

●. Tim. ●. 4.  Who would (F) have all to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.  
In these words the Apostle delivereth two things: 1. That it is Gods will that men should enjoy a happy end, and be saved; 2. That it is also his will they should have the means, and make a good use of them in coming to the knowledge of the truth, that so they might be saved. There is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be saved; and therefore there is no absolute will that many thousand men shall die in unbelief and be damned.  
Two answers are usually returned, which I confess give me little satisfaction.  
I. That by ALL here we are to understand all sorts, and not every particular man in those sorts.  
It is true, that ALL is sometimes so taken in Scripture; but (I believe) not here: For the very context showeth that we are to understand by it the individuals, and not the kinds. In the first verse there is a duty enjoined; I will that prayers and supplications be made for all men: and in this verse the motive is annexed, God will have all to be saved: As if he should have said, Our charity must reach to all whom God extendeth his love to. God out of his love will have all to be saved; and therefore in charity we must pray for all. Now in the duty ALL signifieth every man: for no man, though wicked and profane, is to be excluded from our prayers. Pray for them, saith our Saviour, that persecute you, and, Pray, saith the Apostle here, for kings and all that are in authority; men in those days, though the greatest, yet the worst, the very Lions, Wolves and Bears of the Church: Pray for them. And if for them, than for any other. Thus in the duty it signifieth every man: and therefore it must have the same extent in the motive too, or else the motive doth not reach home, nor is strong enough to enforce the duty.  
II. The second (G) answer is, That God will have all to be saved with his revealed will, but millions to be damned with his secret will;  
But if this answer stand, than (in my apprehension) these inconveniences will follow. 1. That God's words (which are his revealed will) are not interpretations of his mind and meaning; and by consequence are not true: for the speech which is not the signification of the mind, is a lie. 2. That there are two contrary wills in God, a secret will, That many sons of Adam shall irrevocably be damned; and a revealed will, That all the sons of Adam may be saved. 3. That one of God's wills must needs be bad, either the secret or the revealed will. For of contraries, if the one be good, the other is bad: and so of God's contrary wills, if one be good, the other must needs be bad. For malum est contrarium bono.  

2. Pet. 3.9.  Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, etc.  
This Scripture is not so liable to the exceptions against the former testimony. For it is a negative proposition, and must be taken distributively: and therefore speaketh that in plain terms which is contrary to absolute Reprobation.  
That which is usually replied, is, That the persons here spoken of, are the elect only and such as truly believe; God is not willing that any of them should perish.  
But the contrary appeareth in the text. For the persons here mentioned are those toward whom God exerciseth much patience and long-suffering, as it is in the words next going before. And who are they? Are they the elect? are they believers only? Not, but reprobates rather, who die for their contempt of grace. For it is apparent by Scriptures, that God doth patiently expect the conversion even of them that are never changed but die in their sins: as we may see 1. Pet. 3.19, 20, where we read that the patience of God was exercised towards those who in the days of Noah despised it, and went to prison, that is to hell, for it. Yea of all men reprobates are the truest and most proper objects of God's patience, as we may see Rom. 2.4. where S. Paul speaking of such as go on in sin, and treasure up wrath to themselves against the day of wrath, saith, that God useth patience towards them that he might lead them to repentance. And Rom. 9.22. He endureth, saith the text, with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. In the fifth of Isaiah v. 2. and the 65. chap. v. 2. we may see the same thing. Reprobates therefore as well as others, nay rather than others, doth Peter here speak of, and saith that God would have none of them to perish: If they do perish, it is through their own fault and folly, and not God's absolute pleasure, who would have no man to perish.  
To these testimonies I may add these (I) conditional speeches:  

1. Chron. 28.9.  If thou seek him, he will be found of thee: but if thou forsake him, he will cast thee of for ever.  

2. Chron. 15.2. Gen. 4.  If you seek him, he will be found of you: but if you forsake him, he will forsake you.  
If thou do well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou dost not well, sin lieth at the door.  

Heb. 10.38.  The just shall live by faith: but if any man withdraw himself, my soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, shall have no pleasure, in him; shall not like him: he shall be a reprobate.  
By all these and many other places that speak conditionally (for aught that I can see) it is clear, that (K) God forsaketh no man considered simply in the fall, till by actual sins and continuance in them he forsake God. Now if God reject no man from salvation in time and in deed till he cast of God, than surely he rejecteth no man in purpose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw would reject and cast of him. For God's acts in time are regulated by his decrees before time: Ephes. 1.11. He worketh all things, saith the Apostle, according to the counsel of his own will: and therefore there must be an exact conformity between them as between regulam and regulatum, the rule and the thing squared thereby. By whatsoever therefore God doth in the world, we may know what he purposed to do before the world: and by his actual casting men of when they grow rebellious and impenitent, and not before, we may certainly gather that he decreed to cast them of for their foreseen rebellion and impenitency, and not before.  
Besides, it is in substance all one, to cast a man of indeed and to entertain a resolution to do it. Our velle and facere are all one in God's account: and the reason is, Because where there is a deliberate and settled will, the deed will follow if nothing hinder. Much more is God's will and deed all one, seeing his will is omnipotent and irresistible, and whatsoever he willeth directly and absolutely, is certainly done when the time cometh.  
Well; all these plain and express Scriptures, with the whole course and tenor of God's word, this opinion flatly contradicting, though it do (perhaps) shroud itself in some dark & obscure speeches of holy Writ, I take it to be an untruth. For what S. Augustine saith in another case, I may safely say in this; 
y Nunquid ideo negandum quod apertum est, quia comprehendi non potest quod occultum est.  Shall we contradict plain places, because we cannot comprehend the obscure? 
z Secundùm plura pauciora sunt intelligenda: & nè unus sermo subvertat alios, secundùm omnes potiùs quàm adversùs omnes intelligendut erit.  A few testimonies, saith Tertullian, must receive an exposition answerable to the current of Scripture, not contrary to it.  
This is my first reason.  

An Answer to the objections against the Lower way.  
BEfore we come to answering particular objections we must put this Author in remembrance of these few things which he hath not well considered.  
1. First, whereas he troubleth himself with distinguishing the Supralapsarian and Sublapsarian Doctrine, calling them Supralapsarians who in ordering the eternal decrees of God concerning Election and Preterition or Reprobation place them before the consideration of the fall, and those Sublapsarians who place them after; this pains might well have been spared. For Priorities and Posteriorities in the eternal immanent decrees of God are but imaginations of man's weak reason, and framed diversely (nay contrarily) as well by Schoolmen and Papists as by Protestants or those which are termed Calvinists; and finally they have little or no use in this controversy, as hath been formerly showed. Aquinas thought it no such matter of moment whether Predestination be considered before man's fall and state of misery or after: 
a Part. 1. qu. 23. art. 1.  Motus non accipit speciem à termino à quo, sed à termino ad quem. Nihil enim refert quantum ad rationem dealbationis, utrùm ille qui dealbatur fuerit niger, aut pallidus, aut rubeus: & similiter nihil refert ad rationem praedestinationis, utrùm aliquis praedestinetur in vitam aeternam à statu miseriae vel non. And for Reprobation, he seemeth rather to incline to their opinion who place it in order of consideration before the fall in making it such a part of the Divine providence as permitteth some men 
b Ibid. art. 3  deficere à fine. So that this Distinction of Supralapsarians and Sublapsarians hath served this Author to no other purpose but to the inculcating of the same objections again and again.  
2. Secondly, this Author should have considered that there is no medium assignabile ex parte Dei betwixt the decrees of Predestinating some men and Not-predestinating some others; nor ex parte hominum, betwixt men absolutely predestinated unto the atteinment of life eternal and absolutely pretermitted and left infallibly deficere ab adeptione vitae aeternae, which we call absolute Reprobation. As for example, let us suppose the number of mankind to be two millions of men: If out of these by the decree of election one million only be infallibly appointed or ordained to eternal life, and these certainly and absolutely distinguished from others not only quoad numerum, but quoad personas, who can deny but one million also, and those certain quoad personas, are as absolutely comprised under the decree of Nonelection or Reprobation as the others were under the decree of Election or Predestination?  
It is true that the manner of Gods bringing the elect in time unto eternal life is by giving them repentance, faith and perseverance; and the manner of Gods permitting the Non-elect to run themselves upon the rock of eternal death, is by suffering them to continued in their infidelity and impenitency. But the formal decree of Predestination containeth an absolute eternal preparing of this effectual grace for some; and the formal decree of negative Reprobation or Non-predestination an absolute eternal decree of not-preparing this effectual grace for any others. From whence it is plain that the Divine prevision of final perseverance in the elect, and final impenitency in the non-elect, doth not nor cannot go before the forenamed decrees, as the Remonstrants imagine. Let him be judge who is no friend to Calvinists: 
c Vasq. in 1. qu. 23. dist. 95.  Praedestinari est gratiam illam quam Deus novit in nobis effectum habituram nobis praeparari: & non praedestinari, gratiam illam nobis non praeparari. No mention of foreseen faith or infidelity in the one or in the other.  
Thirdly, I could wish this Author had more advisedly weighed that proposition whereupon he groundeth his whole discourse, namely, That God's eternal and absolute decrees of Producing such and such good actions in some men, and his opposite eternal and absolute decrees of Not-producing the same good actions in others, cannot stand with the liberty of man's will, but is a coacting and necessitating cause in men's doing or not-doing the foresaid actions. This he taketh as a postulatum unquestionable through his whole book: and if this be not freely granted him, he hath said little or nothing against absolute Predestination or absolute Reprobation. Now I must tell him, that this postulatum which he so boldly presumeth upon is generally held for an erroneous and false opinion. I will cite only the testimonies of Calvine's & Beza's known Adversaries. Bellarmine; 
d Tom. 3. De great. & lib. arb. cap. 8.  Credimus Deum absolutâ voluntate velle salvare multos, & absolutâ voluntate alios non velle salvare. Here you see an absolute will in God to save some, and a negation of this absolute will in God concerning the salvation of others. Now what is this absolute will of saving some (which we call Predestination) but that special providence of God 
e Ibid. cap. 9  Quâ per infallibilia media in vitam diriguntur aeternam? Doth this absolute Predestination take away the freedom of the predestinate in the actions of repenting and believing? 
f Cap. 15.  Respondeo; Potest ille liberè gratiam repudiare; sed certum est non repudiaturum, quia Deus vocabit illum sicut videt congruum illi esse ut vocantem non respuat.  
Now for negative Reprobation; This is absolute as well as Predestination: 
g Cap. 16.  Nulla datur ejus causa ex parte hominum, sicut neque praedestinationis. Doth this Reprobation draw after it a coaction or necessitation unto wicked actions for which the Reprobates are afterwards condemned? Not: 
h Bell. De lib. arb. l. 3. c. 6.  Si peccat, liberè peccat, quia potest deponere pravum affectum si velit gratiae Divinae cooperari. Bellarmine than was of opinion that absolute Predestination and Reprobation might be defended, and yet no necessitation of man's will thereupon inferred. Suarez; 
i De Auxil. 2. c. 5. p. 174  Si sermo sit de non-electione (quam nonnulli Reprobationem negativam vocant) verum est causam illius esse solam Dei voluntatem, nullâ exspectatâ causâ ex parte hominis. But will not this Reprobation make all the evil and damnable acts whereinto the Reprobates infallibly fall subject to coaction and necessitation, by depriving the agent of his freewill in the exercise thereof? Not; 
k Ibid. lib. 3 c. 17. p. 354  Divina providentia impletur interdum solâ permissione actuum liberorum, quando illi malè facturi sunt. Deus non est autor mali actûs; but out of general and special reasons flowing from his providence he so disposeth of causes and circumstances as he withal permitteth a wicked man by his freewill to abuse them unto evil actions. Ruiz proveth at large, 
l Ruiz. De praedest. disp. 7. Sect. 4. & disp. 53. Sect. 8.  Nullam esse causam ex parte nostra concessae aut negatae praedestinationis. Here you see absolute decrees of Predestination and Non-predestination maintained, and yet all coaction or necessitation of the wills of persons not-elected, unto their sinful actions is by him denied. Vide De voluntate Dei, disp. 20. §. 5. pag. 223. Vide Aquin. par. 1. qu. 22. art. 4. & Cajet. ibid. & qu. 23. art. 3, & 6.  
Having thus laid open the false supposition whereupon this Author hath founded his discourse, let us now consider the following reasons against absolute Reprobation.   

Answer to his five Reasons against Absolute Reprobation: and First, to his Testimonies of Scripture.  
Whereas these five reasons are bend generally against the Sublapsarian doctrine, he should have done well expressly to have excepted the doctrine of Augustine and all his followers of the Church of England, and many other Divines, who are Sublapsarians, and maintain the absolute decree of Predestination and Nonelection or negative Reprobation, utterly rejecting the Remonstrants' doctrine, who make these decrees of Predestination and Reprobation to follow upon the final good or bad acts of men eternally foreseen of God. If his five reasons be intended against these, I see not how he can be excused from the opposing of the settled doctrine of our own Church. If they were intended only against some particular Divines, either of foreign Churches or of our own, he should have called this discourse, A disproving of their erroneous opinion who from the absolute decree of Nonelection or Reprobation infer an absolute prime decree of particular men's damnation. Amongst which exorbitant Divines he showeth himself to be one of the principal.  
Now to come to his testimonies of Scripture. The question being, Whether Gods eternal decree whereby men stand distinguished in Electos & Non-electos, or in Praedestinatos & negatiuè Reprobatos, be an absolute prime decree, or a subsequent decree built upon men's foreseen goodness and badness, all such testimonies as confounded the judicial decree of man's Damnation with the negative Reprobation, will be impertinent: For though the former be absolute, yet the latter is respective unto man's sins. Again, all such places as prove God hath a will of saving all men under this condition If they believe and persevere, and of Damning of no man but for his iniquity or infidelity, prove sufficiently that the temporal bringing of men unto eternal life standeth upon conditionate decrees; and so likewise the temporal adjudging of men unto eternal death: but they are of no force at all to prove that Election and Nonelection are conditionate decrees, or to disprove an absolute decree of negative Reprobation. Last of all, such places as prove a general love or a general mercy extending to every singular man in the world, do not overthrew the decree of absolute Nonelection; because love and mercy may be shown even to the Non-elect. This in general. Now in particular to every testimony alleged.  
To the first out of Ezek. 33.11. and the 18.32. we answer, This Author quite Add 1 forgetteth the very question in hand. When we dispute of that special providence which is called Predestination, and which concerneth the bringing of some men unto eternal life, and the freeing of them from eternal death, we speak of such a will as (by the confession of all Divines) standeth not upon uncertain conditions, but is most infallible and immutable, and that not only certitudine praescientiae Divinae but ordinis & causalitatis, as the Schoolmen speak. Now the will spoken of in the testimonies alleged is that voluntas simplicis complacentiae, or voluntas conditionata, which in regard of the good intended and promised unto men dependeth upon the good behaviour of their own freewill for the obtaining of life and avoiding of death. Notwithstanding, this will which extendeth unto all, it is the Divine will and decree, that in some men 
m Ruiz. De volunt. 18. Sect. 4.  Creata libertas possit impedire effectûs consecutionem; Et hoc vult permittere Deus propter majora bona. So that this will of exempting Judas or Cain from eternal death under condition of Turning from their wicked ways, and yet permitting them finally to run on in their wicked ways, is so far from proving that they were not under any such decree of Reprobation, as we maintain that it evidently demonstrateth the truth thereof. It proveth strongly that neither man's sin nor man's eternal death do fall sub voluntate simplicis complacentiae: for than they should be bona & amabilia per se: But it proveth not but God may decree the permitting of some men finally to die in their sins, and eternally to be punished for their sins: wherein we place the decree of Reprobation.  
The inference or collection, That God delighteth not in the destruction of wicked men, we willingly grant. For he is only said to delight in that whereunto he hath a natural inbred propension: But this putteth no necessary obligation upon God by special mercy to free all men from destruction, though he could most easily do it.  
As for sealing up of many millions under invincible damnation; it doth manifestly import an invincible act of God thrusting men first into sin and than into hell, and both out of his mere pleasure. We utterly deny that Reprobation inferreth any such dealing of God with men Not-elected.  
And for the Scriptures alleged, or others of the same kind; they do not affirm a conditionate Election upon foreseen faith and perseverance, but they show us 
n Calv. De aetern. Dei Praedest. p. 706.  Quid omnibus ad fidem & paenitentiam adductis facere paratus sit Deus.  
To the second. The main scope of this Add 2 whole Chapter being to show, That whosoever obtained salvation, whether Jew or Gentile, 
* vers. 4, 5, 6.  obtained it by virtue of that free Election which worketh upon some, enlightening, mollifying and converting their hearts, leaving others to the voluntary blindness and hardness of their hearts; a man would think that nothing could have been picked from hence to establish Election and Nonelection founded upon the good and bad acts of men.  
But the Apostle expressly saith, That God hath shut up ALL under unbelief, that he might have mercy upon ALL. The two ALLS are of an equal extent. How many unbelievers there be, on so many God hath a will of showing mercy. And if every man be under mercy, than there is no precise will of shutting out any from possibility of mercy.  
The Apostles meaning is this; That God in his providence permitted both Jews and Gentiles to be entangled in the guilt of just damnation, that so whosoever is saved might ascribe his salvation not to any foreseen merits or any good works of his own, but to the free mercy of God. So that every man being by nature sinful and incredulous, all men lie alike at his mercy, and he may have mercy upon whom he pleaseth. The Apostle is so fare from affirming that God showeth this special mercy unto all unbelievers which he showeth unto some, namely the Enlightening of their dark minds, and the Mollifying of their obdurate hearts, that he saith the quite contrary; 
o vers. 7.  Electio consecuta est, caeteri vero excaecati sunt. 
p Estius, in locum.  Maluit dicere Electionem quàm Electos, ut vim gratuitae electionis innueret, à qua totum habent electi quod habent. The Apostle meant not to contradict his former doctrine, 
q Rom. 9.18.  Miseretur cujus vult, & quem vult indurat: and not to make the mercy of Election of equal extent with the misery or guilt of sin; but to show that it is mercy on God's part, and not worth or desert on ours, whensoever any saving grace is bestowed upon any of us all. And yet if this Author pled for no more than a general mercy, we will easily grant him, That all men are not only in an estate needing mercy, or in a possibility of obtaining mercy, but have an actual participation of many and great mercies from the hand of almighty God. But when from hence he suddenly concludeth, That there is no precise antecedent will of God of shutting up the most men from all possibility of obtaining mercy, he hath forgot the question. He should have concluded, Therefore there is no absolute will of God mercifully electing some to the infallible atteinment of grace and glory, and by a negation of the same special mercy leaving others through their own default infallibly to fall into final sin and misery. Till he conclude this he concludeth nothing against absolute Reprobation or Nonelection.  
God so loved the world, etc. Therefore he Add 3 did not absolutely hate the greatest part of men.  
We grant the conclusion, and more than he asketh: For God did not absolutely hate any one man in the world. Neither will we make advantage of that opinion defended by many Schoolmen, 
r Aquin. contra Gent. 1.96.  Non propriè sed similitudinariè dici Deum odire. But our answer is, That absolute Reprobation, which is nothing else but God's absolute will of denying the special benefit of infallible direction unto eternal life, and permitting some men by their own defective freewill deservedly to fall under the misery of eternal death, is not an argument of hatred towards any man, but of a less degree of love towards some men than towards others; which less degree of love is sometimes expressed by the name of hatred. Thus God is said to have loved Jacob and hated Esau, and that before they were born, or had done either good or evil. 
s Vasqu. in 1. q. 23. disp 95. c. 8.  ODISSE idem est quod MINUS DILEXISSE. Thus Lea was said to be hated by Jacob, because she was less beloved than Rachel, Gen. 29.31. In this sense we grant that the decrees of absolute Predestination and absolute Reprobation do clearly prove that amongst Angels and men God hath loved some more and some less: but that he hath absolutely hated any creature of his own making, they do not prove. Diligis omnia quae sunt; & nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti, Wisd. 11. God hateth sin, because he made it not: And this hatred doth redundare in peccatorem quà talem, because God made him not so. But God hateth not non-electum, non-praedestinatum, or negatiuè reprobatum quà talem: neither doth he condemn him, or decree to condemn him propter reprobationem, which is God's act, but propter transgressionem, which is man's act.  
Let us hear what Calvines most deadly Adversaries the Jesuits hold in this point:  

t Ruiz. De Volunt. Dei, disp. 54. §. 3. Vide eundem, De Praedest. disp. 2. §. 3. & disp. 8. §. 2. & disp. 15. §. 6.  Nullum Reproborum prosequitur Deus odio inimicitiae, sed tantùm ejus peccatum odio detestationis. Suarez 
u Opusc. 2. c. 5. §. 7. p. 174.  also maketh Reprobation a sign only of a less degree of love, and not of an absolute hatred, as this Author conceiveth. Nay Molina 
x Concord. Quaest. 23. art. 4. disp. 4. pag. 402.  himself maketh this Reprobation we now speak of to be only a lesser degree of love.  
Whereas it is further urged, That God did not only love the whole lump of mankind; but that he loved it even after it was fallen into the gulf of sin and misery, this also is granted. But to prove God's love, it is sufficient that he extendeth his goodness unto every man, though he extend not the top and height of his goodness unto every man, which consisteth in the eternal preparation and temporal donation of such special grace as God knoweth infallibly will and decreeth infallibly shall bring them unto glory. Reprobation importeth a denial of this rich grace and of this special love of God, but importeth no absolute denial either of grace or love, much less an absolute hatred of any person not-elected, 
y Aquin. 1. part. qu. 23. art. 3. resp. ad ●m.  Deus diligit omnes homines, in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum: non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus. In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod est vita aeterna, dicitur eos Odio habere vel Reprobare.  
We stand in no need of their exposition who by the WORLD understand the Elect: Let them therefore defend themselves if they can.  
Ad 4 1. TIM. 2.4. Who would have all to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth, Hence this Author gathereth two things 1. That it is Gods will that men should be saved; 2. It is his will that they should mak● use of the means of salvation, that so they may be saved; and God hindereth no man from believing and being saved: therefore there i● no absolute will that thousands should die unbelievers and be damned.  
We answer, That 
z Ariba, p. 112.  in this act or decree o● God's will, Volo hunc salvum fieri, or, Vo●● hunc fidelem fieri, is not comprised or expressed the proper act of Predestination: but it requireth a further determination of the Divine will, 
a Ruiz. De Praedest. disp. 1. § 7. n. 12.  scilicet, Volo hunc salvum facere; Volo hunc fidelem & perseverantem facere. That which includeth not the will of Predestination doth not exclude the opposite will of Reprobation, as it respecteth the same persons, whether few or many▪ But this proposition, Volo Judam salvum fieri, or this, Volo omnes homines salvos fieri, doth not include a particular Predestination of Judas or a promiscuous Predestination o● all men either unto the end or means o● their salvation: & therefore the Reprobation of Judas and of many millions more may be defended, and yet the truth of this admitted.  
I, but where God hath such a will as is here intimated (saith our Author) there he is no let or hindrance to any man from believing, and so being saved.  
These men have too high an opinion of the strength of man's freewill that conceive, if God will be pleased not to hinder them, they will upon such grace as is offered believe, and so attein eternal life. But as we (with the common consent of orthodox Divines) place Election and Predestination in such a will of God as infallibly worketh faith and infallibly guideth the elected unto eternal life, 
Ruiz. De Praed. disp. 2. §. 3. n. 10. & §. 4.  and not in the will of Not-hindering them from the means or end of their salvation; so we place the Nonelection or negative Reprobation of others not in a will of Hindering them from believing or walking in the way which leadeth unto life, but in a will of Not-preparing for them and Not-bestowing upon them those infallible means which would certainly bring them to eternal life. He whom God thus permitteth to run into perdition, to whom he giveth (as I may so term it) pereundi licentiam, it is clear he is not comprised within the number of the elect: and therefore (there being no middle sort of men) it is as clear that he appertaineth unto the number of the Non-elect.  
That which hath bred this man's mistake, is, the not-conceiving of any difference betwixt the will of God termed voluntas simplicis complacentiae and that which is termed voluntas absoluta or efficax, which infallibly worketh that good which it willeth and intendeth unto any man.  

Vide Ruiz. De volunt. disp. 20. pag. 215, 216. etc.  These two may well stand together; Deus vult ut omnes credant & salvi fiant, voluntate Complacentiae; Deus vult & decrevit permittere ut quidam increduli maneant, & salvi non fiant sed pereant, voluntate Absolutâ. The former will is in effect but a conditionate will: As if the Apostle had said, God will have all men to be saved, if all men shall believe in Christ: and to believe in Christ is an act so wellpleasing and so agreeable unto God's will that wheresoever it is found it shall be rewarded. But notwithstanding the extent of this will unto all men, there is in God an absolute will of permitting some to continued in their unbelief, and so perish: and this we call Reprobation.  
For the two Answers opposed by this Author we need not much trouble ourselves. If we understood the place de voluntate efficaci & infallibiliter producente effectum volitum, as many do, we would answer with them, that by ALL of necessity we must understand genera singulorum, not singula generum: But because we conceive it spoken de voluntate simplicis complacentiae, we allow the extent unto all, but deny that it contradicteth the decrees of Predestination or Reprobation: because they imply a will in God of infallibly working or not-working the same in singular persons.  
For the second Answer which he taketh upon him to confute, namely of the revealed and secret will of God; he should first have rightly set it down, and than have tried his strength in confuting it. We say that there is in God a true will revealed in the Gospel of Saving all men that shall believe; and a true will Liking, Embracing, Rewarding faith, holiness, perseverance in all men whomsoever without any distinction of persons: And this is the will called voluntas simplicis complacentiae; which neither decreeth nor determineth any thing infallibly concerning the being or not-being of such good acts in this or that singular person. This will we know; and therefore we call it his Revealed william. There is also in God a secert will of Bringing some men unto faith, unto perseverance, unto the kingdom of heaven; of Not-bringing some others unto any of these, and of Permitting them to fall into the contrary evils through their own default: This will we know not; and therefore we call it the secret will of Election and Reprobation. Notwithstanding the former will of God many millions of men are neither saved nor brought to the saving knowledge of the truth: but the latter will is always answered by the infallible event. This no Divine can deny: 
Vide Ruiz. De Vol. disp. 19 §. 12, 13. & Penott. lib. 4. §. 20.  And therefore under pretence of the former general conditionate will, which is voluntas Approbationis in regard of the object, and which faileth of the event oftentimes in regard that many singular persons fail in performing the conditions, to go about the cancelling of a secret and more effectual will of God, which decreeth the production of that good in some persons which he liketh and alloweth in all, is no fair dealing. Albeit therefore we grant a general declared will of God for saving all men which shall believe in Christ, yet therewithal we maintain a special and secret will of God extended unto some part only of mankind, purposing eternally and in time working faith and perseverance in all those which the facto are saved. 
b Prosp. De vocat. 2.31  Est pars quaedam humani generis quae specialibus beneficiis ad aeternam salutem provehitur. And of these we say with Augustine, 
c De Praed. sanct. 1.18.  Tales erant futuri, quia elegit Deus praedestinans ut tales per gratiam ejus essent.  
The inference, That God's word is not true unless he will have all men to be saved, is granted de voluntate Complacente, denied de voluntate Decernente. Unless we admit of this distinction we make that word of God untrue, Quicquid voluit fecit in coelo & in terra.  
Neither are these wills contrary; Volo omnes fieri salvos, Volo omnes fieri credentes; Nolo aliquos facere salvos, 
August. Enchir. ad Laur. c. 97.  Nolo aliquos facere credentes. For the event proveth the truth of the latter, and the Scripture of the former. Vide Ruiz. Disput. 17. §. 3. 5.  
2. PET. 3.9. God is patiented towards us, and Ad 5 would have no man to perish, but would all men should come to repentance.] This is a negative proposition, and must be taken distributively: and therefore it flatly contradicteth absolute Reprobation.  
Take it distributively, yet it no way contradicteth that absolute Reprobation which is opposed to absolute Predestination. Ruiz describeth it thus; 
d De Praed. disp. 2. §. 4.  Reprobatio formaliter & ultimò constituitur per imperium intellectûs Divini ordinantis tali modo per talia media cum talibus circumstantiis permittendum esse peccatum, & finalem reprobati impoenitentiam, & propter illam ordinantis aeternam ejus punitionem.  
If the Apostle had said, God never decreed to permit that any man should finally perish in his impenitency, he had quite overthrown the difference which we make betwixt men predestinated and not-predestinated: but telling us only what God would have us do and what God would not have us wilfully to run upon, here is nothing at all which maketh against absolute Predestination or Reprobation. They are decrees containing what God is resolved to work in some men and not to work in others; these are words showing what God would have men do or not do: and therefore they cannot be contradictory or contrary one to the other. Powerfully to work the conversion of singular persons, is a certain proof that they were never under the decree of the Divine Reprobation: But voluntate complacentiae only to will their conversion, and patiently to expect it, using such means as they frustrate, is so fare from evincing that such men were not under the decree of Reprobation, that it is a strong argument to prove it. Vide Estium in 1. Sent. Dist. 46. Malderus (a professed enemy to the Synod of Dort) granteth 
e In 1m m 2. quaest. 79. memb. 4. p 247.  that the final obduration or impenitency of Reprobates is not a foreseen antecedent condition but a following event of negative Reprobation. He was not of this Authors judgement than, who thinketh Gods patiented expectation must needs cross the decree of Reprobation.  
In a word; If this Author will bring Scripture to overthrew the absolute decree of Predestination and Reprobation, he must bring such places as prove God hath not decreed the infallible conversion and salvation of certain singular persons, and God hath not decreed the permission of some men's obduration and perdition: which we know he can never do.  
His sixth Testimony out of Scripture is Ad 6 taken from certain conditional propositions, which promise' God's favour and eternal life unto men upon conditions; namely, If they seek him, If they do well, If they believe, If they persevere, etc. and which suspend his wrath and utter desertion upon their Sinning and Forsaking of God. Upon these premises whereas we expected this conclusion, Therefore in God there is no eternal decree of absolute Predestination and absolute Non-predestination, Preterition or negative Reprobation, he starteth aside from the question, and inferreth, That God forsaketh or rejecteth from salvation no man in time and in deed till he have first in time and deed castoff God. Upon the truth of which conclusion we shall not much stand with him.  
But to answer more clearly to the point in hand; We must first consider that mere or purely conditional decrees or conditional volitions agreed not with the perfection of the Divine nature. 
f Ruiz. De volunt. disp 20. §. 1.  Volitiones purè conditionales sunt alienae à sapientia & prudentia Dei. 
g Vasq. in 1m. disp. 83. pag. 511.  Voluntas Dei conditionata dici potest, non quia actu feratur in objectum sub conditione, sed quia ex illa voluntate quae praesens est alia oriretur si conditio in objecto poneretur. The speeches therefore  out of Scripture do not imply a Conditional will in God suspended for any moment of time, and than post purificatam conditionem becoming an Absolute and Effectual will, 
Vide Ruiz. De scient. disp. 71. §. 7  as the like conditional propositions do in us, who have neither knowledge whether the condition will be certainly performed or not, nor yet power in ourselves to work the condition whereupon the future act of our will was suspended. 
Ruiz. De volunt. disp. 8. §. 7.  But in God, who knoweth eternally what every man will do or not do, and who in himself hath an absolute power and freedom to make men do any good whereunto he maketh promise of reward, and to leave them to their own defective  in doing those things for which he hath threatened desertion and destruction, these conditional decrees or volitions must be fare otherwise conceived; namely, not purely but mixtly conditionalia, that is, grounded in some absolute revealed decree of God to the performance whereof he hath tied himself. For example; It is an absolute decree of the Divine will published in the Gospel, That whosoever repenteth, believeth, persevereth, shall be saved: From hence is derived that mixed conditional decree, If Cain, if Judas, if any other repent and believe, they shall be saved. Now such mixed conditional decrees carry no contradiction to the absolute decrees of Election and Nonelection or Reprobation. For who seethe not that these two propositions may well stand together, I will that if Judas repent and believe he shall have remission and salvation; I will not give unto Judas the gift of repentance, of faith, and of eternal life? The former conditional proposition containeth all which this Author can truly collect from the testimonies alleged; and the latter doth as truly infer that absolute Reprobation for which we contend. For the absolute decree of God resolving not to give faith, repentance, and eternal life unto Judas, is that which we understand by the word Reprobation: and this is never abrogated by any conditional promise founded in any universal absolute decree of God.  
Now for this inference, That God forsaketh no man considered in the fall, till by actual sins and continuance in them he forsake God; (as before was intimated) it is not the concluding of the true question. Temporal Desertion or Damnation is one thing; and Nonelection or negative reprobation, another. Temporal forsaking is a withdrawing of grace or favour formerly bestowed upon a man in regard of his ingratitude and other sins. And here we assent unto Augustine & Prosper, the strong maintainers of Absolute Predestination and opposers of Conditionate; Deus non deserit nisi desertus. Temporal rejecting from salvation is an adjudging of men unto damnation as being liable thereunto for their own sins and misdeserts. And here we accord with the same learned Fathers; Misericorditer liberat, justè damnat. Now Reprobation is Gods absolute decree of not-preparing for some that grace which would preserve them from forsaking God, and consequently permitting them to loose eternal life; even as Predestination is Gods absolute decree of preparing for others that effectual grace which will keep them from falling away from God, & so consequently infallibly bring them unto the kingdom of God. These decrees be they which we deny to be founded upon any different foreseen acts of men: and therefore we refer them to the absolute will of God. As for temporal Desertion or eternal Punition or Damnation of any man, we grant they all wait upon Sin as the antecedent deserving cause thereof.  
Whereas this Author further replieth, That God's acts in time are regulated by his decrees before time; and therefore by what God doth in the world we may know what he purposed to do before the world: But he actually casteth no man of till he grow rebellious and impenitent; therefore he decreed to cast no man of before his foreseen rebellion and impenitency.  
This reply runneth upon the selfsame error with the former, namely the confounding of the decrees of eternal Predestination and Preterition with the decrees of temporal Desertion and Damnation, which are founded upon distinct causes, and aught to be distinguished. But let us retort his reason against himself. By what God doth or not doth in time we may know what he absolutely purposed to do before all time: but God in time gave to Peter repentance faith, and eternal life; and God in time permitted Judas to die in unbelief and impenitency▪ and to incur eternal death: Therefore he decreed before all time to give Peter all those benefits, and he decreed before all time to permit Judas to die in unbelief, impenitency, and in an estate liable to damnation. Grant this, and absolute Predestination is clearly granted. For as it were senseless to say God's decree of giving faith and perseverance unto Peter was suspended upon Peter's foreseen faith and perseverance, so as senseless it is to say the decree of permitting Judas to die in unbelief and final impenitency was grounded upon his foreseen unbelief and final impenitency.  
We may now conclude, That absolute Election and Nonelection is surely founded in the authority of many and manifest places of Scripture; but for conditional Election and Preterition, it hath neither many nor any, clear nor obscure.    

Treatise.  

II. It is incomp●ti●●e with God's ATTRIBUTES.  SEcondly, it crosseth (A) some principal Attributes of God: therefore it cannot be true. For God useth not to make decrees contrary to his own most glorious nature, and such as are incompatible with those excellent Attributes by which he hath discovered part of himself to men. Voluntas Dei semper sequitur naturam suam, is a rule among Divines, Gods will always followeth his nature. The reason why, is given by the Apostle, 2. Tim. 2.13. God cannot deny himself.  
Two things are here to be premised:  
I. That God's chief (B) attributes are those perfections in the manifestation of which by acts conformable to them God is most glorified: which are Mercy, Justice, Truth, and Holiness. For God is more honoured by the exercise of these among men than by the putting forth of his unlimited Power and Sovereignty; as a King is more renowned among his subjects for his equity, candour and clemency, than for his dominion and authority, or any thing that is done only for the manifestation thereof. And there is good reason for it. For  
1. Power is no virtue; but Holiness, Mercy, Justice, and Truth are. Acts of Power are not morally good in themselves, but are made good or evil by their concomitants. If they be accompanied with Justice, Mercy, etc. they are good; if otherwise, they are naught. For justum oportet esse, quod laudem meretur; Nothing deserveth praise, unless it be just.  
2. Power and Sovereignty may as well be showed in barbarous and unjust actions as in their contraries. Saul shown his Authority and Power to the full in slaying the Lords Priests; and Nabuchadnezzar in casting the three children into the fiery furnace, and Daniel into the lion's den; but no Mercy, nor Justice, nor any thing else that was good.  
II. The second thing (C) to be preconsidered, is, That Justice, Mercy, Truth, and Holiness in God are the same in nature with these virtues in men, though infinitely differing in degree; (as light in the air and the sun are the same in nature, not degree:) and that which is just, upright and merciful in men, is so in God too: And by these virtues in ourselves with acts conformable to them, tanquam ex pede Herculem, we may safely measure what are so in God. For otherwise these things will follow;  
1. The common and received distinction of Divine Attributes into communicable and incommunicable would fall to the ground. For against it this might be said, That the Holiness, Mercy, Justice, and Sincerity, with other virtues that are in us, are not the perfections of God in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature.  
2. Men cannot be truly said to be 
a Gen. 1.27.  made according to God's image; nor when they are regenerated to be 
b Col. 3.10.  renewed after the same image, and to be 
c 2. Pet. 1.4.  made partakers of the Divine nature. That picture cannot be the picture of such a man, which doth not in his parts and lineaments truly resemble him: no more can we be truly called the picture or image of God, if in our graces (in respect of which we are principally so called) there be not a lively resemblance of God's attributes.  
3. We may not safely imitate God, as we are commanded, 
d Matth. 5.48  Be ye perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect: and 
e 1. Pet. 1.16.  Be ye holy, as I am holy. Nor when we show forth holiness, mercy, justice and sincerity in our do, can we be properly said to imitate God, if these be one thing in God and in men another.  
These two things being thus premised, viz That God's Holiness, Mercy, Justice and Truth are four of his chief attributes, in the exercise of which he taketh himself to be much glorified; and, That we are to measure these attributes by the same virtues in ourselves: I come to the proof of my second reason against absolute Reprobation stated even in the mildest and most plausible way.  
It opposeth Gods principal Attributes; particularly his 

Holiness.  
Mercy.  
Justice.  
Sincerity.    

Answer. Whether Absolute Reprobation cross God's Attributes.  
WE grant that God maketh no decrees contrary to his nature: If therefore we must needs cross God's attributes unless we admit the Remonstrants' conditionate Predestination and Reprobation, we will subscribe to it.  
We acknowledge these to be chief attributes: and therefore what contradicteth any of these we will presently renounce. As for an absolute unlimited power separated from Justice or other Divine attributes, we say with learned Calvine, 
a De aetern. Dei Praed. pag. 728.  Sorbonicum illud dogma in quo sibi plaudunt Papales Theologastri detestor, quod potentiam absolutam Deo affingit. Solis enim lucem à calore evellere facilius erit quàm Dei potentiam separare à jùstitia. Nay it is as impossible for any unjust action to proceed from God, as it is for the Creator to become a creature.  
The second thing preconsidered is more doubtful. For that may be unjust in men which is not unjust in God. As in a King it is an unjust action to set up Judges and Magistrates over the people whom he knoweth will unjustly oppress them: it is not so in God. In a Man it is want of mercy not to hinder a desperate wretch from destroying himself when easily he might do it: Not so in God. Under the name of Virtues, when we ascribe them to God, a permanent propension or inclination unto good actions conformable to the perfection of the Divine nature must be understood. I say a propension in actu primo. For if God had never wrought any outward work of mercy or justice, he had notwithstanding been as virtuous as now he is. He wanted neither mercy nor justice before he created the world.  
We may safely affirm that there is an analogical conformity betwixt Divine and human virtues: but that there is an identity of nature, is not so easily to be proved. Pictures of men resemble those whose pictures they are: but they are not the same in nature with them. We may and must imitate God in the actions of such virtues as he hath commanded: but from hence it will not follow that the word virtue applied to God signifieth the selfsame thing which it doth when it is applied to men. But to come to particulars: we will not contend about words. Let this Author only look to it that he take his measure right, which must be resecatis omnibus omnium virtutum partibus quae involvunt imperfectionem inferioritatis, etc.    

Treatise.  

I. Repugnant to God's HOLINESS.  FIrst, it fighteth (A) with God's Holiness, and maketh him the principal cause of sin in the greatest number of men. I know that the defenders of it do not think so. For the main reason which moved the Synod at Dort (B) and some other Divines before and since to bring down Predestination thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall, was that they might maintain a fatal and absolute Reprobation of m●n, & yet avoid this imputation as 
* Dr Twisse Vind. Grat. l. 1. part. 1. c. 4. initio.  Dr Twisse hath noted. But what they intended (for aught that I can see) they have not compassed. For it followeth evident enough, even from their conclusions too, that of all the sins of Reprobates, which are the greatest number by many degrees, God is the true and principal author.  
Two things (C) they say, which taken together (me thinks) infer it: 1. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they cannot avoid sin. 2. That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it.  
I. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they cannot possibly avoid sin: that is, into the estate of original sin, which consisteth of two parts: 1. The guilt of Adam's transgression; 2. The corruption of nature. In both these they say mankind is interessed, not through the force and efficiency of natural generation, because we all derive our nature from Adam as our first principle; but by Gods free and voluntary order and imputation: 
a Calvin. Instit. l. 3. c. 23. sect. 7. Non enim factum est naturaliter, ut à salute exciderent omnes unius parentis culpâ.  It came not to pass by any natural means (saith Calvine) that all men fell from salvation by the fault of our first parent: 
b Cunctos mortales in unius hominis persona morti aeternae mancipatos fuisse Scriptura clamat: hoc cùm naturae nequeat asscribi, ab admirabili Dei consilio profectum esse minimè obscurum est.  that all men are held under the guilt of eternal death in the person of one man, it is the clear and constant voice of Scripture. Now this cannot be ascribed to any natural cause: it must therefore come from the wonderful counsel of God. A little after he hath the same again with as great an emphasis; 
c Quomodo factum est, ut tot gentes unà cum liberis eorum infa●tibus, aeternae morti involveret lapsus Adae absque remedio, nisi quia Deo ità vis●m est?  How is it, that so many nations with their children should be involved in the shall without remedy, but because God would have it so? As roundly doth Dr Twisse affirm the same; 
d Twisse Vind. great. l. 1. part. 1. digr. 4. v. 3. prope finem; Originalis peccati reatus non nisi imputatione, lues non nisi propagatione ad nos derivatur: quorum utraque non nisi à liberi Dei constitutione proficiscitur.  The guilt of original sin is derived to us only by imputation; the filth only by propagation: and both these only by God's free constitution. A little before he hath these words, 
e Etenim naturae vitium non est cuique suum voluntate propriâ contractum, sed solâ imputatione aut propagatio●e derivatum; quarum utraque sit voluntate Dei. Deus enim nullâ necessitate, sed pro mera sua voluntate nobis imputat peccatum Adae.  The fault of our nature cometh from God's free appointment: for he doth not out of any necessity, but of his mere will only impute the sin of Adam to us. To this purpose he speaketh a great deal more in the same place. To these say S. Bernard hath the like: Speaking of Adam's sin, he saith, 
f Bern. Serm. 1. Dom. 1. post Epiph. Aliena est, quia in Adam omnes nescientes peccavimus; nostra, quia etsi in alio, nos tamen peccavimus, & nobis justo Dei consilio imputabatur, licèt occulto.  Adam's sin is another's, because we knew not of it; and yet ours, because it was through the just though secret judgement of God reputed ours.  
And this that they say is agreeable to reason. For if we be fallen into the guilt of the first sin and the corruption of nature, only because we were in Adam's loins when he sinned and derive our being from him, than these two things will follow.  
1. That we (D) stand guilty of all the sins which Adam committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were virtually in his loins as well after his fall as before, and in every passage and variation of his life he was still a principle of mankind. But where do we read that we are guilty of any other of his sins? To the first sin only doth the Scripture entitle that sin and misery which entered into the world and invaded all mankind, as we may see Rom. 5.15, 16, 17, etc.  
2. That children (E) are guilty of the sins of all their progenitors, especially of their immediate parents: For they were in their loins when they sinned, and more immediately than in Adams. But children are not guilty of their parents faults, nor obnoxious to their punishments, because they are their children, as we may see Exod. 20.5. where God saying that he will visit the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation in them that hate him, plainly implieth, that children are not simply charged with their father's sins, but conditionally if they be haters of God as their fathers were; if by imitating their wicked parents they become partakers of their sins. In Ezek. 18.14. etc. The Lord signifieth thus much in his apology against the cavil of the Jews. For first he saith, That if a wicked man beget a son that seethe his father's sins, and doth not the like, he shall not die for the iniquity of his father. This implieth that the derivation of being from the parent doth not tender the child obnoxious to the punishment of the father's sin, nor consequently to the sin. For the good child is not obnoxious, and yet the good child is equally in the father's loins with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and being from him. And than vers. 20. the Lord telleth them expressly thus much in two propositions: 1. Affirmatively, The soul that sinneth, it shall die. And that it may be known that he speaketh exclusively, Only the soul that sinneth, shall die, he delivereth his mind 2. Negatively, The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son, etc. Our Saviour in that woeful speech of his to the Pharisees, Matth. 23.32, 34. Fulfil ye also the measure of your fathers.— Behold I sand unto you Prophets, etc. them ye shall kill and crucify, that on you may come all the righteous blood, etc. intimateth apparently, that the Pharisees were not inheritors of their father's sins and punishments by birth; but by the commission and imitation of their father's sins, they came to inherit both their sins and plagues. Miserable would our case be on whom the ends of the world are come, if children should be guilty of all their ancestors prevarications. What a world of sins should we be to answer for, Personal sins, Parents, progenitors sins, to a thousand past generations? A thing with no reason to be imagined. This is the first thing.  
II. Secondly, they say (F) that God had immutably decreed to leave the fare greatest part of mankind in this impotent condition irrecoverably, and to afford them no power and ability sufficient to make them rise out of sin to newness of life: and this decree he executeth in time: and both these he doth out of his only will and pleasure.  
Of this proposition there be three branches:  
1. God decreeth to leave them. 2. He doth leave them. 3. He doth both out of his alone pleasure.  
1. God (say they) hath (G) decreed to leave them without sufficient grace, and consequently under an everlasting necessity of sinning. This is the very Helen which they fight for, the main act of that absolute Reprobation which with joint consent and endeavour they labour to maintain.  
Most of them cast their Reprobation into two acts: a Negative, which is a peremptory denial of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall; and a Positive, which they say is a preordination of men thus left to the eternal torments of hell. Others among them define Reprobation by an act merely negative, and call it Non-electionem, decretum quo statuit non eò usque misereri, etc. Thus our Divines 
* Suffrag. Brit. Art. 1. de Repr. thes. 1.  in their Suffrage define it: and in their explication of the definition which they give, they say that the proper acts of Reprobation, as it standeth opposed to Election, are no other than a denial of that same glory and grace which are prepared in the decree of Election for the sons of God. But in this (H) they all agreed, that by the decree of Reprobation grace necessary for the avoiding of sin is flatly denied to Reprobates. And if at any time we hear them say that God hath gratified Reprobates with some grace; (for so saith Walaeus, Reprobates are left 
g Wal. Defence. Anat. Armin. c. De Repr. In statu pristino & sub exercitio arbitrii sui, & administratione communis providentiae.  under the common providence of God, and consequently under some common endowments: And our Divines in the Synod say, 
h Suffr. Brit. thes. 4. de Reprob. Hos etsi non electos, percipere tamen multa gratiae Divinae effecta non negamus.  Reprobates though they are not elected, yet receive many of God's graces) they are to be understood of such gifts and graces as are insufficient to make them avoid sin, as we may see in these two cited places and many more.  
2. God doth (I) actually according to his eternal and unchangeable decree leave the Reprobates in their several times and generations, without his grace, under a necessity of final sin and impenitency. This is the second branch of that second proposition. And this must they needs say. For God's decrees cannot be frustrated: What he purposed before time, without fail he doth in time. I shall not need therefore to prove that they say so. Nevertheless, to let it be seen how positively and categorically they say so, I will give an instance or two. The Divines (K) of Geneva at the Synod among their Theses of Reprobation have this for one, 
i Act. Syn. Suffr. Genev. de Reprob. Easdem personas in tempore, ex eodem placito voluntatis vel non vocat, vel vocatos in Ecclesiam Spiritu regenerationis non renovat penitissimè, non inserit Christo mysticè, non justificat, etc.  Those whom God hath reprobated, out of the same will by which he hath rejected them, either he calleth not at all, or being called, he reneweth not throughly by the Spirit of regeneration, ingraffeth not into Christ mystically, nor justifieth, etc. Like to this is the speech (L) of Lubbert, who speaking of Reprobates, saith, 
k Act. Syn. Suffr. Lubbert de Reprob. jis vel non revelat viam salutis, vel non donat eos side & cognition Jesus Christi, non regignit eos, non justificat, sed relinquit eos in peccato & miseria, etc.  To them either he revealeth not the way of salvation, or giveth not faith and regeneration, but leaveth them in sin and misery. The same Author speaking against the position of the Remonstrants, viz. that God doth supply to all men sufficient and necessary means of salvation, with an intention of saving them, setteth down this antithesis,— 
l Deus non subministrat omnibus hominibus necessaria & sufficientia media ad salutem, ídque cum intentione servandi.  God doth not administer to all men means needful and sufficient to salvation, and that with an intention of saving them. And to this his antithesis Polyander, Walaeus, and Thysius, three other Professors of Divinity in the Low-countrieses, did set their hands.  
3 God both (M) decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themselves, of his alone absolute will and pleasure.  
This is the third branch. That they say so, witness the Suffrage of our English Divines; 
m Suffr. Brit. art. 1. de Reprob. explic. thes. 1. orthodox. Hanc non-electionem in liberrima Dei voluntate fundari dicimus.  We affirm, That this Nonelection is founded in the most free pleasure of God. And, 
n Ib. thes. 3. heterodox. Neminem post lapsum merâ Dei voluntate praeteritum esse.  That no man lying in the fall is passed over by the mere will of God, is numbered by the same Divines among the heterodox positions. To this purpose also speak the Ministers of the Palatinate, 
o Act. Syn. Jud. Palat. thes. 3. Causa reprobationis est liberrima ac justissima Dei voluntas.  The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God.— 
p Ibid. thes. 4. Quòd Deus nonnullos praeterit gratiâ praedicationis evangeliis, ejus causa est idem beneplacitum sive eadem libera voluntas.  That God passeth over some and denieth them the grace of the gospel, the cause is the same free pleasure of God 
q Judic. Theol. Hassiac. Decrevit Deus quosdam in lapsu & miseria relinquere pro suo beneplacito.  God decreed to leave some in the fall, of his own good pleasure. Thus the Divines of Hessen. The proof of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time; 
r Deus in tempore quosdam è genere humano derelinquit in miseria sua, nec media ad fidem & conversionem ipsámque etiam salutem obtinendam necessaria eye consert, etc. idque pro liberrima sua voluntate.  God doth in time leave some of mankind fallen, and doth not bestow upon them means necessary to believe, etc. and this out of his most free pleasure. This they jointly affirm, and prove it by this reason especially; All men were lookedon as sinners: If sin (N) therefore were the cause that moved God to reprobate, he should have reprobated or rejected all. But he did not reprobate all: Therefore for sin he reprobated none, but for his own pleasure, in which we must rest without seeking any other cause.  
Now from these two things laid together, viz. 1. That God did bring (O) men into a necessity of sinning; 2. That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity: it will follow that he is the author of the reprobates sins.  
1. Because Causa causae est causa causati, The cause of a cause is the cause of its effect, (if there be a necessary subordination between the causes and the effect;) whether it be a cause by acts negative or positive: But God is the chief or sole cause (by their doctrine) of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sins of Reprobates, namely their impotency and want of supernatural grace: Therefore he is (by the same doctrine) the true and proper cause of their sins.  
2. Because Removens (P) prohibens, etc. That which withdraweth or withholdeth a thing which being present would hinder an event, is the cause of that event: As for example; He that cutteth a string in which a stone hangeth, is the cause of the falling of that stone; and he that withdraweth a pillar which being put-to would uphold a house, is the true cause in men's account of the falling of that house: But God (by their opinion) withholdeth from Reprobates that power which being granted them might keep them from falling into sin: Therefore he becometh a true moral cause of their sins. 
s Tertull. l. 1. contr. Martion. c. 22. In cujus manu est quid nè fiat, ei deputatur cùm jam fit.  In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed when it is done, saith Tertullian.  
It will not suffice to say, that God by withholding grace from Reprobates becometh only an accidental not (Q) a proper and direct cause of their sins. For a cause is than only accidental in relation to the effect, when the effect is beside the intention and expectation of the cause. For example; Digging in a field is than an accidental cause of the finding a bag of gold, when that event is neither expected nor intended by the husbandman in digging. But when the effect is looked for and aimed at, than the cause (though it be the cause only by withholding the impediment) is not accidental; as a Pilot who withholdeth his care and skill from a ship in a storm, foreseeing that by his neglect the ship will be drowned, is not to be reputed an accidental but a direct and proper cause of the loss● of this ship. This being so, it followeth, that God by this act and decree of removing and detaining grace necessary to the avoiding of sin from Reprobates, not as one ignorant and careless what will or shall follow, but knowing infallibly what mischief will follow, and determining precisely that which doth follow, namely, their impenitency and damnation, becometh the proper and direct cause of their sins.  

Whether Absolute Reprobation fight with God's Holiness.  
THe absolute Reprobation which we maintain is nothing else but an absolute purpose in God of not-bestowing grace infallibly bringing unto glory upon some men, which he hath absolutely purposed to bestow upon others. And this we evidently ground upon the Doctrine of our Church, which acknowledgeth Predestination to be a special favour or benefit extended to ● certain number known only to God, from whence faith, perseverance and eternal life do flow as effects from the cause. And because the affirmation ferveth to measure the negation, our Church speaking in the article nothing at all of Nonelection or Non-predestination, leaveth it obvious to every man's understanding that all not comprised within the number of the elect must needs fall within the number of the non-elect, as being permitted deficere à gratia & gloria by their own default. And further, our Church in adding, Notwithstanding the decree of Predestination and Election God's general promises must be received as they are propounded in the Gospel, intimateth, That the decrees of Election & Nonelection or Reprobation may stand firm cum possibilitate ad eventus contrarios though not cum eventis contrariis. For Peter notwithstanding his Predestination might have been damned if he had voluntarily continued in his impenitency, and Judas notwithstanding his Reprobation might have been saved if he had not voluntarily continued in his impenitency. The absolute decrees of Election and Nonelection are not contradictory to the general conditional promises of salvation or threats of damnation. As therefore we condemn the opinion of the Remonstrants, who by reducing Election and negative Reprobation unto foreseen good and bad acts of men err upon the one hand, so we condemn also their opinions who confounded the decree of Damnation with this of Nonelection, or who derive the causes of damnation, namely sin, infidelity, impenitency, from the forenamed decree; which is to err further upon the other hand. These things premised we will now go along with this Author, and see how he proveth this absolute Reprobation or Nonelection which we defend to oppose any of God's principal Attributes.  
He saith it sighteth with his holiness, because it maketh him the principal cause of sin in all person's not-elected or not-predestinated.  
If he can prove this we yield. His nibbling at the Synod of Dort, and charging them with maintenance of a fatal decree, is to little purpose. If he call that fatal which is certain and immutable, we are not afraid to affirm that all Gods eternal decrees are certain and immutable; and that very eternal decree of Reprobation which he imagineth to follow upon the foresight of men's final impenitency is as absolute, as immutable, and in this sense as fatal as that which we defend. S. Augustine did not abhor Fatum: 
a De great. lib. 5. c. 1.  Si propterea quisquam res humanas fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem Fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. Others admit the word, and give this definition of it, as Boethius; Fatum est immobilis dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens. Aquinas; 
b Part. 1. qu. 116. art. 4.  Fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus Divinitus provisos. I might cite infinite Authors who rejecting Fatum astrologicum admit Fatum Theologicum or Catholico sensu acceptum. Vide Parisiensem 1. part. De universo, part. 3. cap. 24. pag. 746, 747. Halensem part. 1. quaest. 27. Albertum part. 1. tract. 17. Durandum, lib. 1. dist. 39 quaest. 4. I have quoted all these because this Author through his whole book thinketh he hath beaten down absolute Predestination to the ground if he can but fasten the name or bore conceit of Fatality upon it.  
As for the Synod of Dort, it considered not Predestination and Reprobation in massa corrupta to maintain a fatal decree. For consider it before or after the decree is alike fatal, if immutability of events decreed by God be termed fatality. And put it before or after, it neither way maketh God the principal cause of sin: which is clear in non-elect angels, in whom Reprobation considered before the fall is by no judicious Divine conceived to make God the cause of their sin.  
But he goeth about to prove that absolute Reprobation maketh God the Author of sin, because some defenders thereof say two things from whence (he thinketh) it may be inferred That God is the principal cause of sin. Suppose some who hold absolute Reprobation should therewithal hold not two only but ten false tenants, is the falsity of these a necessary medium to conclude the falsity of the other? As if he that holdeth two false propositions, might not for all that hold a third which is true.  
His first Proposition wherewith he chargeth the defenders of absolute Reprobation, is, That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they cannot avoid sin, namely, into the estate of original sin, and that both in regard of the guilt and of the corruption.  
This is both odiously and falsely set down. No man holdeth that God brought Adam's posterity either into the estate of their guilt or of their corruption: but all maintain that it was Adam himself who by his voluntary prevarication enwrapped himself and his posterity both in the guilt and contagion of original sin. 
Rom. 5.12.  Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, & per peccatum mors. So that both the sin and the punishment were brought in by man and not by God. Or if a further cause must needs be found of bringing-in sin and death, the devil must be charged therewithal. 
Wisd. 2.24.  Invidiâ diaboli, etc. It is true, and acknowledged generally by Divines both of our Church and of the Roman, That it was not by any natural necessity that Adam falling his posterity should be either universally tainted with original sin or liable unto death, but that both these depended à libero Dei decreto, or as some call it à pacto, wherein it was agreed that if Adam persevered in his righteousness he should transmit it to his posterity, if he rebelled he should make his whole posterity liable both to the corruption of sin and danger of punishment.  
And that this Author may see that others (who deny God to be the cause of sin) do hold as much as Calvine, or Dr Twisse, I will quote him some Authors. And first to begin with the Master of the sentences; He teacheth that not God but Adam brought men into their estate of sin. 
c Lib. 2. dist. 30.  Per Adamum peccatum simul ac poena transiit in posteros. Ex Adamo damnationem simul ac culpam suscepimus. Nemo nascitur nisi trahens poenam & meritum poenae. Ex Adami inobedientiaemanavit & in posteros demigravit. So that there is no question Who brought in this sin: All the question is, How it cometh to pass that so avoidable and generally it layeth hold upon all the sons of Adam. Here even the Roman Divines are driven to confess with Calvine, that this dependeth upon a free constitution or decree of the Divine will: because natural propagation would not have stripped Adam's posterity of any habitual righteousness which God had bestowed upon him, or charged them with the guilt of any sin personally committed by him, had not God enacted and constituted a decree that so it should be. Vasquez is clear of this opinion; 
d In 1m m 2●, qu. 23 disp. 132. cap. 9  Primo parenti ità fuit gratia & justitia donata, ut non tantùm sibi sed etiam posteris transmittendam illam acceperit, non quidem ex natura rei, sed ex Dei pactione. And more plainly; 
e Disp. 133. cap. 1.  Causa originalis peccati fuit primus parens ratione suae transgressionis, non quidem physica & naturalis, quia nihil reale in posteros traducere potuit virtute propriâ aut virtute peccati quod commisit. And a little after; Negare non possumus ex voluntate sola Dei constitutum fuisse ut gratia originalis traduceretur in posteros si Adamus in gratia perseveraret, & amitteretur si peccaret. Malderus also granteth that the contagion and guilt of Adam's sin is not derived unto his posterity but by Gods free constitution; 
f In 1m m 2 c, qu. 81. art. 1.  Notandum, cùm Deus totum humanum genus in uno homine condidisset, indebitam naturae justitiam originalem isti homini dedisse, non pro se tantùm, sed pro tota posteritate; adeò ut si ipse perseverasset, omnes posteri nascerentur justi. Paulô pòst; Deus cum Adamo quasi pactum quoddam iniit, quo praevaricanti statueret non tantùm ipsi sed toti naturae mortem animae & corporis. 
g Ibid.  Fuit quoddam Dei decretum, ex quo decreto accessu peccati superfuit illud chirographum decreti contrarium nobis. And last of all he addeth, 
h abide. pag. 260.  Voluntarium voluntate primi parentis sufficere ad veri nominis peccatum in parvulo: est enim illa voluntas Adae quodammodo voluntas parvuli, ex Dei decreto. These and many more agreed with Calvine, in attributing the unavoidable imputation of Adam's offence and transmitting of his corrupted nature unto a voluntary and free constitution of God, in whose power and pleasure it stood (if in his wisdom he had seen it more fit) to have ordered it otherwise. If this decree make God the principal cause of sin in Adam's posterity, not only Calvine but all other Divines lie open to this Authors accusation.  
But he is utterly mistaken, and pinneth a false consequent to a true antecedent. For though God's will was the cause of making the former decree, That all Adam's posterity should be liable to the loss of righteousness and punishment of sin upon Adam's disobedience, even as if themselves had singularly and personally transgressed; yet neither God nor this decree of God was the cause either of Adam's transgression personally committed by himself, or of the corruption and guilt of damnation which seized upon his posterity. The law or decree, That if a noble man become a traitor, he with all his posterity shall be tainted in blood, and stripped of the privileges of nobility, is not the cause either of the father's treason or of the childrens loss and punishment: but the true proper working cause thereof is the rebellious will and act of the father. Even so here, Gods decree revealed unto Adam, That if he sinned all his posterity should be liable to corporal and spiritual death, was so fare from being the cause of his sin or his childrens misery, that it was in its own nature a strong retractive or preservative to have kept him and his children out of sin and out of misery.  
If Adam's disobedience (which was the only true cause of his own and childrens misery) had followed as a necessary consequent effect upon such an antecedent law, than had God been the cause both of the sin and misery whereinto he plunged himself and his children: But the law which enacteth a certain punishment against sin committed, is by no wise man made the cause of sin committed against that law, but a rule only according unto which, if the sin be committed, the punishment shall be inflicted. Albeit therefore natural generation considered alone in itself without the forenamed free constitution of God, would not have propagated Adam's sin or misery unto his posterity, yet we acknowledge (and so did Calvine) that it is now propagated by way of natural generation; because God had enacted that Adam should beget children in his own likeness, that is partakers of the same original righteousness which he had, supposing he kept it; and partakers of his sin, supposing he infected himself with the act and guilt of sin.  
As for his objections; If we be fallen into the guilt of the first sin and the corruption of nature, only because we were in Adam's loins when he sinned, than are we in like manner guilty of all the sins he committed afterwards:  
We answer; Though Adam's voluntary rebellion was the only cause why he lost his original righteousness both for himself and for his children, and though his children be entangled in his sin and guilt only by being in his loins when he sinned, or because they are his children, yet it will not follow that his posterity stand in like manner guilty of all the sins which Adam committed from the fall unto his lives end. The reason is; Because though natural propagation be the means of conveying Adam's sin unto us, yet (as before was touched) it would not have done so had there not been a liberum decretum established by God to that purpose. And therefore Adam's sin can not further concern his posterity than is regulated by God himself. Now the Divine decree or constitution did not so order it that any sin of Adam should be imputable to all that were virtually in his loins, but that his first sin only, in which he did sustinere personam generis humani, should be imputed. And therefore Aquinas excluding his after-sins committed when he was himself fallen and corrupted; saith, 
i 1a. 2●, q. 81. art. 1.  Secundùm fidem catholicam est tenendum quòd primum peccatum primi hominis transiit in posteros. And he is so fare from collecting (as this Author doth) that by being in his loins his posterity becometh guilty of all his other sins, that he accounteth it impossible. 
k Art. 2.  Impossibile est quòd aliqua peccata ●roximorum parentum vel etiam primi parentis (praeter primum) per originem traducantur. 
De amiss. great. 4.10.  Bellarmine giveth the reason; because whilst Adam stood invested with original righteousness, totius humani generis gessit personam: and therefore that first sin which alone put him out of this estate was only imputable to us, as being voluntary to us voluntate primi parentis. Malderus more clearly and punctually; 
m In 1m m 2ae q. 81. art. 2.  Nulla peccata primi parentis praeter primum per originem traducuntur in posteros. Quando enim amisit nobis semel justitiam, jam amisit qualitatem capitis, & non ampliùs in ipsius tanquam capitis voluntate mansimus. Ratio est, quòd decretum sive pactum Dei, quo in Adamo constituebantur posterorum voluntates, non extendebat se ad alia ipsius peccata, utpote qui gratiam capitis moralis primo peccato amiserat. I might quote many more; but by these it is clear that whilst this Author thinketh he disputeth only against Calvine and Calvinists, he opposeth the received doctrine of the Catholic Church.  
His second inference, That children should be guilty of all the sins of their other progenitors, is like the former, and upon the same grounds rejected by all Divines: and therefore it needeth no particular answer.  
And when he goeth about by testimonies of Scripture to prove it, that they are not guilty of their Parents sins, he maketh himself work in proving that which no man denieth.  
All that I will say is this; That the Pelagians from such testimonies of Scripture went about to overthrew the imputation of Adam's sin unto his posterity, and the derivation of his corruption; but for their pains they were held and condemned as heretics. Vide Bellarm. de amiss. Grat. lib. 4. cap. 8. & Mald. 1.2. q. 81. art. 1. pag. 254. where he bringeth in the Pelagian objections.  
Our own IXth Article of Original or Birth-sin insinuateth a guilt and a corruption caused by Adam's first transgression; and yet our Church never taught that there was the same or like guilt proceeding from his after-sinnes, or from the sins of our other progenitors. Vide Vasq. in 1.2. quaest. 83. disp. 135. cap. 2. p. 883. Thus much of the first.  
He would in the second place prove that absolute Reprobation must needs make God the principal cause of sin, because the patroness thereof hold, That God hath immutably decreed to leave the greatest part of mankind in this impotent condition irrecoverably, and to afford them no sufficient power to make them rise out of sin: and this decree he executeth in time, and both these he doth out of his own will and pleasure. A bundle of words, but little substance in them. We answer first in general; That many who stoutly defend absolute Predestination and Reprobation, and oppose the conditionate Election and Preterition of the Remonstrants, do notwithstanding detest and confute that blasphemous error, That God is the cause of sin. Neither do I now speak this of Calvinists, but of Jesuits, Dominicanes and Romanists of all sorts. Again, the greater part of those who hold absolute Predestination and Reprobation and reject the Predestination and Reprobation which by the Remonstrants is founded upon prescience, do hold notwithstanding a general sufficiency of grace, Si per homines non steterit quo minus: Which is all the Remonstrants themselves do defend.  
As for the executing of God's decree out of his own will and pleasure, I wonder it should be objected as false and offensive. For by God's decrees concerning man's Election and Preterition absolute or conditional, it is certain they are executed as they were enacted, that is, according to the will and pleasure of God, and not of the creature. But to come to his propositions particularly.  
His first. God (by those which oppose the Remonstrants' conditionate Election and Reprobation, and make them both depend upon God's absolute will) is said to leave the Non-elect without sufficient grace, and consequently under an everlasting necessity of sinning. This is the Helen, etc.  
The most of those who defend absolute Predestination and Reprobation say and teach, Answ. that God decreeth to leave no man unprovided of sufficient grace that repelleth it not by some demeritorious act of his own william. It is therefore a manifest untruth, that with joint consent they labour to maintain that which with joint consent a great number of them labour to confute. Again, they which maintain absolute Reprobation will not more grant that it putteth or leaveth any man under everlasting necessity of sinning, than that absolute Predestination putteth men under a necessity of not sinning. God's decrees (as hath been often said and proved) carry along with them necessitatem infallibilitatis quoad eventum, but not necessitatem compulsionis quoad modum agendi & eveniendi. The decree of Reprobation left not Cain under the necessity of killing his brother, nor Absalon under a necessity of defiling his father's concubines, nor Judas under a necessity of betraying Christ: All these sinful actions and the like are committed by Reprobates out of their own free election, having a power whereby they might have abstained from committing them. And therefore to think that the decree of absolute Reprobation must needs leave them under a necessity of committing their several sins, is a false and vain imagination, as every man's conscience is able to witness.  
Those who cast Reprobation into two acts do not by the negative act thereof understand a peremptory denial of all grace, but a peremptory denial of all such effectual grace as infallibly would bring them unto glory, and a peremptory permitting them in the use of grace to their own defective freewill. This negative Reprobation in the judgement of most Divines doth stand with the actual administration of sufficient grace, and in the judgement of all it may stand with it, 
Vide Jacob. Bayum, Institut. lib. 1. cap. 116.  as it did in the Nonelection of the apostatical Angels. It is doubted both by some Protestants and Papists, whether sufficient grace be de facto prepared for and offered to all the Non-elect: But that God's absolute decrees of Election and Nonelection might stand firm though it were so, there is no great cause of doubt.  
For the positive act, which this Author describeth to be to a preordination unto hell-torments; those who comprise them both under this one word Reprobation, do notwithstanding make this act or decree respective unto sin, as we have already showed. As for those of our Church in this controversy; whether Predestination and Non-predestination be grounded upon the prime absolute will of God, or upon his prescience of good and bad acts to be performed by men, they do and must understand by the word Reprobation not the decree of damning any particular persons, but only the absolute decree of not-preparing for them that effectual grace quâ certissimè liberarentur, and of leaving them to such means of grace under which by their own default infallibiliter ruunt ad interitum voluntarium. Thus our English Divines in their suffrage have described it, and thus the reverend and judicious Bishop of Norwich conceived it, when he made both Remonstrants or Arminians and Contra-remonstrants or Puritans (as he termeth them) to err out of the true middle way which the Church of England holdeth in opposition to them both. In Election he maketh this the error of the Remonstrants, That they ground the absolute decree of men's particular Elelection upon the prescience of their faith and perseverance (as this Author doth) whereas that reverend Prelate holdeth with the Church of England, and S. Augustine, Electio non invenit eligendos, sed facit. As for the errors of the Puritans about Predestination or Election, he reduceth them to these heads, the excluding of the conditionate decree or evangelical promise, the disordering of the decree of Predestination by bringing it in before the fall and the decree of Christ's incarnation. As for the preparation and donation of such a special grace per quam non solùm possint credere aut obedire si velint, sed & jam actu velint, credant, obediant, he maketh it the proper fruit and effect of Election: whereas he granteth unto the Non-elect only salutem gratiámque communem & sufficientem in mediis Divinitus ordinatis, si verbo Dei spirituique sancto deesse noluerint. Unto which add that wherein all Divines of all sides agreed, That God administereth this common grace with an eternal and infallible prescience that it will be rejected or abused by the Non-elect, and with an absolute decree of permitting it so to be; and than it is clear, the English Divines with the Church of England nec divertisse ad dextram in illorum sententiam qui ex praescita fide & perseverantia per liberam cooperationem arbitrii humani gratiae praevenientis & sufficientis auxiliis instructi praedestinationem deducunt, nec ad sinistram deelinasse in illorum opinionem qui promissionem generalem & gratiam sufficientem tollunt, etc. They are the words of that reverend Prelate Dr Overall. To return to our Author; Whereas he saith that all the defenders of absolute Predestination and Reprobation (that is, all who oppose the Remonstrants' conditionate Election and Nonelection) do agreed, that by the decree of Reprobation necessary grace for avoiding sin is flatly denied to Reprobates, it is quite otherwise. For saving grace, many confess that in causis universalibus it is sufficiently prepared for all men: They confess that under the Evangelicall covenant, Si credideris, salvus eris, every man hath a true claim unto eternal life: They confess, that wheresoever is Christ's Church, there is such a sufficient administration of grace as would have saved the Non-elect, had they not opposed a malignant voluntary act of their own will against the motions and operation of Divine grace; according to those words of our Saviour, John 3.17. & 12.47, 48. & Acts 13.46. Calvine saith as much; 
n In Joh. 3.  Mundi nomen iterum iterúmque repetit, nè quis omnino arceri se putet, modò fidei viam teneat. We therefore, as well as the Remonstrants, grant a conditional possibility of grace and salvation to all men: but here is the difference; We say the Elect by a special mercy of God are so guided and ruled that they and they alone perform the condition, and that the Non-elect are always permitted to fail in the performance of the condition.  
Now whereas this Author saith, that whatsoever we speak of grace afforded to persons Not-elected must be understood of such grace as is insufficient to make them avoid sin, he is a very bad interpreter of ou● meaning. We think and teach, that God hath not prepared for them, and therefore never giveth unto them such grace as finally freeth them from sin: but we say, that God doth give them oftentimes such a● measure of grace as keepeth them from committing many particular sins whereunto they are prove and bend of themselves▪ We say further, that God giveth them such a measure of illumination, such excitations unto doing good and eschewing evil, as leaveth them convicted in their own consciences (whatsoever brabblers may say to the contrary) that wittingly and willingly they commit their several sins, not out of insufficiency to avoid the acts of adultery, robbery, theft, deceit, etc. but out of malignity desirng and choosing to do them.  
For the second branch; Whereas he will have the defenders of absolute Nonelection or negative Reprobation to say and hold, That God doth actually according to his eternal and unchangeable decree leave the reprobates in their several times and generations without his grace, under a necessity of final sin and impenitency, surely they never chose him to be their speaker. If this man will give them leave to speak for themselves, this it is they say, That God doth in time according to his eternal decree withhold from all person's Not-elected that special mercy or effectual grace which he knoweth would infallibly free them from final sin and impenitency, and leaveth them (not without all grace, nor under a necessity of living and continuing in the practice of their sins, but) under grace committed (as the Remonstrants would have it) to the dominion and good usage of their own freewill, and under a permission of their final sinning and impenitency out of their own freewill: From both which God infallibly foresaw their final impenitency, and respectively thereunto decreed their eternal punishment.  
But how doth he prove that they must needs say as he would have them? His reason is, Because God's decrees cannot be frustrated: What he purposed before time, without fail he doth in time. We agreed that quoad eventum Gods decrees cannot be frustrated. But this impossibility of frustration ariseth not from a necessity put upon the agents to do thus and not otherwise (as this Author perpetually but most falsely doth suppose) but from that infallible providence of God, who can and doth bring into act events decreed according to the nature of the next causes or immediate agents. Natural agents work naturally in producing decreed events: necessary agents work necessarily: and free agents such as are Angels and men, work freely. It is a flat Nonsequitur, Events decreed cannot be frustrated; Therefore the agents are under a necessity of sinning. And it is further to be considered, that albeit all God's decrees are infrustrable, yet there is a main difference betwixt God's decrees of producing good saving acts in his Elect, and of permitting the Non-elect to produce their wicked actions, and finally to continued in them. The former he doth by using his own hand in framing their hearts unto such good actions, and guiding their wills indeclinably in the voluntary practice thereof: but as for the latter, their wicked hearts are not wrought by God, nor their wicked wills guided by God unto their wicked actions, but they are permitted out of their own freewill to commit such wicked actions. Here is no necessity put upon the agents by either of the forenamed decrees.  
For the Divines of Geneva; they have set down nothing in their testimony alleged, but either that God calleth not the Non-elect, or that he calleth them not vocatione secundùm propositum, which always followeth Predestination, and draweth after it Justification, Sanctification and Glorification. In the first they speak of an Evangelicall vocation, by revealing Christ in the preaching of the glorious gospel, which vocation experience showeth hath been denied to many. 
o Prosp. ad Cap. Gall. Resp. 4. & Sent. super 4.  Vocati non sunt qui nec spem vocationis audiverunt. In the latter they speak of that special grace which the Catholic Church hath defended against the Pelagians to be a special gift, and not prepared for all nor given to all. Vide Aug. De Praed. Sanct. cap. 9 & Epist. 167. Prosp. De Voc. 1.13.  
Lubbertus saith the same in effect, and no more. And S. Augustine hath said as much De great. Christi contra Pelag. cap. 12. And not he alone, but the Synod of Bishops in Sardinia, De gratia non dignè sentit, etc. For the other saying of Lubbertus, That God doth not administer unto all men necessary and sufficient means unto salvation, with an intention of saving them; It is to be observed 1. first, That he doth not speak of a provision in universalibus causis, nor of means sufficient, Si non defuissent sibi, si non fecissent inutilia interveniente libero actu propriae voluntatis: for all this he may well grant; but he speaketh de Mediis Divinâ providentiâ applicatis. And here, if the Remonstrants think faith to be a necessary means to men's salvation, and the word preached a necessary means to the begetting of faith, 
Rom. 10.  they must (will they nill they) subscribe to Lubbertus. 2. Secondly, it is worth the observing, That when the Remonstrants have said all they can for the universality and sufficiency of saving grace, they are forced by convincing arguments and evidence of Scripture to retreat unto the same universality and conditional sufficiency which I spoke of but now, and wherein no man opposeth them. Nay we are of opinion, that to have sufficient means of salvation administered, which shall prove no otherwise effectual than under this condition, Si homines sibi non desint, is an argument of the Divine Nonelection: as on the contrary, not to have their salvation thus suspended upon their own freewill, but upon that special mercy of which S. Augustine spoke when he said, Deus nullius frustrà miseretur, is a demonstrative argument of the Divine Election. 3. Last of all, whereas Lubbertus saith that God doth not administer sufficient grace unto all with an intention of saving them, nothing more true, nothing more clear. For what God doth eternally decree or intent to do, that he in time infallibly doth: For he doth all according to the eternal counsel of his own william. But he doth not in time save the Non-elect by that sufficient grace whereof this Author speaketh: therefore he had not an eternal intention of saving them by that grace which from all eternity he knew would never save them. The intention of God's will cannot but take effect; 
p Vide August. Enchir. cap. 95, & De Cor. & Grat. c. 14.  quia nec in se nec in mediis potest impediri. An omnipotent will always obtaineth its intent, because the willing is the working, the Fiat is the Factum est. Aquinas hath well expressed this efficacy of the Divine will, 
q 1. part. qu. 19 art. 6.  Est impossibile, quòd Divina voluntas non effectum consequatur suum. 
r Ibid.  Quicquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; licèt illud quod antecedenter vult, non semper fiat. 
s art. 8.  Cùm aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur causam, non tantùm secundùm id quod fit, sed etiam secundùm modum fiendi. This Author therefore mistaketh Lubbertus, who by the Divine intention of saving this or that particular person understandeth that absolute will which never faileth in producing the effect willed, not a will affected with this exception, Nisi per homines steterit quò minùs salventur. The former intent of saving all men by the means of salvation tendered unto them, is only denied; not the latter, which is improperly called the Divine intention of saving any man, because it includeth an intention of permitting his own freewill justly to procure his ruin.  
We must come to the third branch; where his charge is this; That God (in our opinion) decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themselves of his alone absolute will and pleasure. If he mean the leaving of men Not-elected utterly forlorn of all such grace as would save them if themselves were not in fault, and the necessitating of them to their transgression and perdition, we acknowledge no such decree, no such manner of executing any Divine decree, no such absolute will and pleasure in God to follow upon the decree of Nonelection. Our English Divines affirm that this Nonelection is founded in the most free pleasure of God: So our Spanish Divines, our Italian Divines, French Divines (who never saw the Synod of Dort) and in a word, all Divines who know what they affirm when they dispute of Nonelection or negative Reprobation. And yet neither the English Divines nor they ever dreamt of such a passing-over the Non-elect by the mere will of God as this Author would fasten upon the decree of Nonelection. He hath already been fully answered, that the absolute decree of Nonelection implieth not an utter denying of sufficient grace in the limited and conditional acception of Sufficiency, which the Remonstrants themselves are content to admit of.  
It is to as little purpose which he hath out of the Palatine Ministers Suffrage, or the Divines of Hessen, the sense of which propositions hath been already cleared, and the truth proved: and therefore we let them pass.  
As for sin, which is considered equal ●n all men tanquam communis affectio subjecti, whether elected or not-elected, it is plain, ●hat it maketh all and every man reprobabiles: but it must needs be out of his own pleasure and freewill, that all being in a state unworthy of the richeses of Gods special mercy, he should notwithstanding prepare it for some, and decree the giving it in due ●ime, which we call their Predestination, ●nd not prepare nor decree to bestow it upon others, but to leave them under common grace, and to permit them to the deficient ●ule of their own will, which we call negative Reprobation.  
The ground of the Remonstrants' error ●s a false fancy, which they have entertained ●nto their understandings concerning the very nature, formality or essence of the decrees of Divine Predestination and negative Reprobation. For whereas in deed and in truth they are decrees finding all men in a miserable and damnable estate, and out of it determining to bring some and to fit them for eternal happiness, and not to bring o●hers by fitting them thereunto; these men make them decrees finding and seeing some by the acts of their own will fitted for heaven and hell, and thereunto appointing them according to their deserts and misdeserts. This is with Faustus the Semipelagian to make Predestination an act of remunerative justice, and to make Non-predestination or Nonelection an act of vindicative justice: both which are rejected as erroneous not only by Calvinists or Contra-remonstrants, but even by the common consent of the Roman Divines. God at the last day shall crown the Elect and condemn the Non-elect according to their final perseverance in faith or infidelity and impenitency. But this difference of their final estates absolutely foreseen is a consequent not an antecedent to the decrees of Election and Preterition.  
I might passe-by what he further addeth upon his own false inferences, of Gods bringing men into a necessity of sinning, and leaving Reprobates under this necessity, because I have showed no such thing can be deduced from that absolute negative Reprobation which we defend. But let us hear what he will say. He reasoneth thus; CAUSA CAUSAE EST ETIAM CAUSA CAUSATI, where there is a necessary subordination betwixt the cause and the effect, whether it be a cause negative or positive: But by the doctrine of absolute Reprobation we make God the chief or sole cause of the sins of Reprobates, namely through their impotency or want of supernatural grace. For the ordinary Axiom, we admit it ubi secunda causa non egreditur ordinem primae, that is, where the second cause worketh or doth any thing by virtue of that influx or motion that it hath from the first.  
As for this distinction of Negative and Positive causing, it is obscure and improper. The air hath heat and light from the positive causing of the sunne-beams; darkness, fogginess, coldness followeth upon the negation of the sunne-beams: and yet neither the sun nor his beams nor the retractions of his beams, are true or proper causes of coldness or darkness in the air. The reason himself hath touched upon, Because those dispositions or qualities in the air issue not from the sun per subordinationem effecti ad causam, but out of the nature of the air only: That is a cause per quam res est id quod est. Thus the sun is the true cause that the air is hot and light. If by virtue flowing from the absent sun it be made dark, than might we call the sun a cause of the darkness. In proportion we say the same of God: If from his decree of Nonelection there flow any darkness or pravity into man's will, or any crookedness and sinfulness into his actions, there were some colour in terming him a negative cause of man's sin: But this he shall never be able to demonstrate.  
He saith, that God by his decree of negative Reprobation is the sole or chief cause of that impotency and want of supernatural grace which is the necessary and immediate cause of all the sins which they commit. Want of the grace of Predestination is neither chief nor sole, nor any cause at all of the sins of the Non-predestinate. Nonelection or negative Reprobation doth not involve any such impotency of avoiding sinful acts, or any such necessity of committing sinful actions, as this man imagineth. For though Preterition or Nonelection be not a preparing or bestowing of such grace as would infallibly make men better, yet it must not be conceived to be the working of any thing in them whereby they are made worse. Again, though negative Reprobation be a denial of such grace as doth effectually produce the faith, perseverance, and eternal happiness of the Elect, yet it is no such absolute subtraction of grace as is a necessary and immediate cause of any man's particular sins, or of his final perseverance in sin. The Non-elect Angels were under the eternal decree of negative Reprobation before they were created; yet were they not by want of sufficient grace at their creation made impotent to stand, much less constrained by any necessity to rebel and sin against God. Adam in the state of his innocence was not predestinated to perseverance; nay, (which is more) God had positively decreed the permission of his fall: yet the want of a decree predestinating his perseverance in that estate did neither affect him with an impotency of standing nor with a necessity of falling. Vide Prosp. ad Vincent. Resp. 10. 15.  
REMOVENS PROHIBENS, That which withholdeth a thing which being present would hinder an event, is the cause of that event: But God withholdeth from Reprobates that power which being granted might keep them from falling into sin: therefore he becometh a true moral cause of their sins. His mayor proposition is a most inconsiderate and false assertion; which if he will justify, he unanswerably maketh God the cause of all sin. For no Divine will deny but it lieth within the compass of God's power to give unto any man that effectual grace which both might and infallibly would make him freely and voluntarily believe and persevere, and which both might and would infallibly hinder the event of unbelieving and final perseverance in incredulity and impenitency. And it is as evident, that God doth withhold from some that grace which being present would hinder those bad events: Who seethe not what the conclusion must be, were the mayor proposition true? Christ withheld from Lazarus that Divine operation which being present would have hindered the event of his death: Yet Martha saith only unto him, Lord, 
Joh. 11.  if thou hadst been here, my brother had not been dead. She saith not, Lord, thou didst withhold a thing which if it had been present would have hindered this event of my brother's death: and therefore I found thee t● have been the moral cause of his death. If Judas had had a sister, she might truly have said unto Christ, If thou hadst been present in my brother's soul by the special grace of Predestination, this might and would have hindered these woeful events of his sinning unto death of his dying impenitent in sin, of his being damned for sin: But she could not charge God to be the cause of those events only for withholding that which would have hindered them.  
As for the example he useth, of cutting a string where●n a stone hangeth and so causing the fall thereof, it were to some purpose if the decree of Preterition had been it which cut the string, and so caused man's fall into sin. But it was the devil and man's voluntary defective act which cut the string. Reprobation or Preterition was only a decree of not giving such a string as neither the devil nor the sinner himself should be permitted to cut?  
As for that which he further urgeth, that God must needs be a direct cause of the event when it is not beside his intention or expectation, We answer, that God is no otherwise said to intent outward events than by providing orderly means for producing such events. Nonelection provideth no means of making men sin, and therefore it includeth no intention of God to make men sin, though it include a prevision of sinful events, and a decree to permit them. We say the same of expectation, which is only metaphorically attributed unto God, and cannot respect wicked actions. God is said even from the Non-elect exspectare uvas non labruscas, because he affordeth them ordinary means for producing the one, but they themselves by abuse of the means are the only causes producing the other. So that neither intention nor expectation of sinful events can be ascribed to God, because both have a reference unto good things not unto bad.  
A Pilot withholding his care and skill from a ship in a storm, foreseeing it will be drowned, is a proper cause of the loss of the ship: therefore God by this act and decree of Reprobation, etc. I answer, If one pilot wilfully hath brought a storm upon his ship, if wilfully he run her upon the rocks, though another look on and foresee she will split herself, he maketh not himself a cause of her drowning, unless he were necessarily bound to preserve her. Thus the case fares betwixt God and the Non-elect: therefore he is no proper cause of their Sin or Perdition.    

Treatise.  

2. Contrary to his MERCY.  SEcondly, it opposeth God's Mercy.  
God (A) is merciful: A part it is of his title, Exod 34.6. merciful and gracious. He is Mercy in the abstract, 1. Joh 4.16. God is love; a Father of mercies, and God of all consolations, 2. Cor. 1.3. a Saviour of men. 1. Tim. 4.10. And thus th● Church hath always taken him to be: And therefore hath o● old styled him in her Liturgy, A God whose nature and property is always to have mercy and to forgive.  
Two ways is God's mercy spoken of in Scripture, absolutely and comparatively. 1. Absolutely; and so it is set o● (B) in high and stately terms. It is called rich mercy, Eph. ●4. great kindness, Jonah 4.2. Abundant mercy, 1. Pet. 1. ● love without height or depth, length or breadth, or any dimensions, love passing knowledge, Eph. 3.18. So great it is, that Jonah could not entreat him to punish the little, infant, harmless Ninevites with temporal death for the sins of the● guilty parents, Jonah 4.11. 2. Comparatively. With tw● things it is compared; 1. His own Justice, 2. The Lo●● that dwelleth in the creature: and is advanced above both.  
I. With his own Justice it is compared, and advance above it: Not in its essence (for all God's excellencies an● infinitely good, and one is not greater than another) but i● its expressions, and some things that have relation to it; particularly in these;  
1. In its naturalness (C) and Dearness to God. It i● said of Mercy, it pleaseth him, Micah 7.18. But Justice is called his strange work, alienum à natura sua, Esay 28.21. He dot● not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men, Lam. 3.33  
2. In the frequent Exercise (D) of itself. He is said to b● slow to anger, but abundant in goodness, Exod. 34.6. Mercy are bestowed every day; judgements inflicted but now an● than, sparingly, and after a long time of forbearance, whe● there is no remedy, 2. Chron. 36.15. All the day long have stretched out my hands to a gainsaying and rebellious people Esay 65.2. that is, I have been patiented a long time, and in that time I have not been idle, but employed in exhorting, promising, and showing mercy, that so I might do you good. God waiteth a great while for the conversion of sinners, as mariners do for their tide: and at last with much ado, if there be a necessity, he chideth and fighteth.  
3. In its (E) Amplitude or Objects to whom it is extended: Visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the THIRD and FOURTH generation, but showing mercy to THOUSANDS, Exod. 20.5. In these words God implieth that his mercy reacheth further than his justice, and that look how much three or four come short of a thousand, so much doth his justice come short of his mercy in the exercise of it.  
4. In the Occasions (F) that move God to exercise them. It is a great matter that moveth God to punish, as we may see Gen. 6.5, 6, 7, 12, 13. When the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and all flesh had corrupted his way, than God thinketh of a flood. He would not destroy the Amo●ites till their wickedness was full. How  would I have gathered thee (saith Christ to Jerusalem, Matth. 23.37. ●hat is, I have not taken advantages against thee, nor upon the first, second or third unkindness cast thee of: small matters have not moved me to destroy thee, O Jerusalem. But how small an occasion doth God take to spare men? When he had examined Sodom, and found their sins to be answerable to the cry, yet than for ten righteous men's sakes would he have spared Sodom, Gen. 18.32. Nay, he would have spared Jerusalem, if the Prophet could by his searching have found one man who did execute judgement and seek the truth, Jer. 5.1. What a slender humiliation made him to spare wicked Ahab and his house a long time? 1. Kings 21.29. And the repentance of Nineveh, whose wickedness cried to the Lord for vengeance, Jonah 1.2. did easily procure her a pardon. Thus is God's Mercy advanced above his Justice.  
II. It is compared (G) also with the Affection of a father ●o his son, of a tender mother to her child, and of the most affectionate bruits to their brood, and set above them all. It goeth beyond a fathers to his son, Matth. 7.11. If ye that are evil, can give good gifts to your children, how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to them that ask him? What doth this quantò magìs imply, but that God's ●ove outstrippeth a fathers! And so it doth a mothers too, Esay 49.15. Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion upon the son of her womb? yea, they may forget, yet I will not forget thee. Women are compassionate toward their children, because they are the fruit of their wombs, and a part of themselves: but most indulgent are they towards those children to whom they are Nurses as well as Mothers, to their sucking children: and yet mothers may forget even their sucking children: But as for God, he can never forget his children. Again, God compareth himself with one of the most affectionate females among unreasonable creatures, the Hen, Matth. 23.37. O Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thee, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings? etc. No Bird (saith S. Augustine) expresseth such tender love to her young ones as the hen doth: 
t Aug. tract. 15. in Joh. pag. 46. Videmus nidificare passeres quoslibet ante oculos nostros; hirundines, ciconias, columbas quotidie videmus nidificare; quos nisi quando in nidis videmus, parents esse non agnoscimus. Gallina verò sic infirmatur in pullis suis, ut etiamsi ipsi pulli non sequantur, filios non videas, matrem tamen intelligas. Ità fit alis demissis, plumis hispida, voce rauca, omnibus membris demissa & abjecta, ut (quemadmodum dixi) etsi filios non videas, matrem tamen intelligas.  Not fowls discover themselves to be mothers so much as hens do. Others, when we see them in their nests with their young, we know them to be mothers, but no way else: but the hen discovereth herself to be so even when her chickens do not follow her: her feathers stand up, her wings hung down, she clocketh mournfully and goeth feebly; so that we may know her to be a mother, when yet we cannot see her brood. Such another speech he hath in another place, and concludeth it with these words, 
u Idem in Psal. 58 p. 212. B.C. Quare ergò Dominus, nisi propter hoc, gallina esse voluit, in sancta Scriptura dicens, O JERUSALEM, JERUSALEM, QUOTIES VOLUI TE CONGREGARE UT GALLINA, etc.  Our Lord did therefore compare himself to a hen rather than to any other creature, because of her singular expressions of love to her young ones, even when they are out of her sight. By these things we see how highly the Scriptures speak of God's mercy, especially in its expressions to mankind, to whom he hath born a greater love, and for whom he hath declared himself to have done fare greater matters, than for the angels; the wisdom of God delighting itself in the children of men, before the world was, Prov. 8.31. and gratifying them in the fullness of time with the assumption of their nature; Heb. 2.16. and the redemption of their souls with his blood, 1. Pet. 1. etc. Now with such a Mercy cannot stand such a decree: Absolute Reprobation being once granted, we may (me think) more properly call God a Father of cruelties than of mercies, and of hatred rather than of love: and the devils names, Satan, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an adversary, a destroyer, may be fit for him than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Saviour: which I tremble to think. Doth mercy please him, when he hath made a decree which showeth fare more severity toward poor men than mercy? Is he slow to anger, when he hath taken such a small and speedy occasion to punish the greater part of men for ever, and for one sin once committed hath shut them up under invincible sin and damnation? Is his mercy abundant, doth it reach further than justice, when it is tucked up so short, limited to a very few selected ones, when a hundred for one at lest (takein all parts of the world) are avoidable cast away out of his only will and pleasure? Or doth his love pass knowledge, when we see daily fare greater love than this in men and other creatures? What father (H) and mother (that have not only cast of fatherhood and motherhood, but humanity too) would determine their children to certain death, nay to cruel torments worse than death, for one only offence, and that committed too not by them in their own persons, but by some other, and imputed only to them?  
But to deliver (I) things a little more closely; Four things (in my conceit) being well and distinctly considered, do make it apparent that this decree is incompatible with God's mercy. 1. That Adam's sin is the sin of man's nature only, and no man's personal transgression, but Adam's: It was neither committed nor consented to by any of his posterity in their own persons. 2. That it was the sin of our nature, not by generation (as I have showed) but by Gods own voluntary imputation. 3. That God did pardon it in Adam, (for so it is generally believed) who did actually and freely commit it in his own person. 4. That Christ came into the world to take away peccatum mundi, the sin of the world, Joh. 1.29. That God either did or might have satisfied his wronged justice in the blood of the Covenant for all mankind, and without any impeachment to justice have opened a way of salvation to all and every man. These considerations (I think) being well digested, will make any man to think, that either there is no decree of (K) absolute Reprobation, or that God is not merciful to men at all, much less more merciful to them than to other creatures, but more sharp a great deal and severe than he is to 

1. any creatures in the world.  
2. the very devils themselves.    
1. Than to any other creatures. For they, even the basest among them, though perhaps they have but a despicable being, yet they have such being as is fare better than no being at all: whereas men are determined by his omnipotent decree to such a woeful being as is a thousand times worse than no being at all. What man would have accepted of life, when first he entered upon possession of it, if he had known upon what lamentable conditions it was to be tendered? Or (did mwn firmly believe this doctrine) they would at a venture with Job curse their birthday, be released willingly from the right of creatures, and desire their immortal souls might vanish into nothing. Malunt exstingui penitus quàm ad supplicia reparari, as Minutius Felix speaketh in another case. 
Minut. Felix, pag. 113.  And parents out of mere compassion to their children would wish that they might be born to adds and serpents rather than men, creatures whose beings at last shall be resolved into nothing, rather than immortal spirits.  
2. To the very (L) devils also (supposing this decree) is God more merciful than to men; and yet the devils are set forth in Scripture for the greatest spectacles of Gods ireful severity. In one thing this decree maketh most men and devil● equal; Vtrisque desperata salus, they are both sure to be damned: but in three things men are in a far worse condition by it.  
I. In their (M) appointment to to hell, not for their own proper, personal sins, for which only the devils are damned but for the sin of another man that lived and sinned long before they were born.  
II. In their (N) unavoidable destination to endless misery, under a colour of the contrary. The devils, as they are decreed to damnation, so they know it, they expect it, they look for no other: but men, who are appointed to wrath, are yet fe● up with hopes of salvation, and made to believe that th● whole business is put into their hands; so as if they perish, it i● not defectu misericordiae, because God will have no mercy o● them, but defectu voluntatis propriae, because they will not b● saved: when yet indeed there is no such matter. Now if it be worse to be deluded in misery than simply to be miserable, the● is the condition of men in this respect (by this decree) much worse than the state of devils.  
III. In their (O) obligation to believe, and the aggravation of their punishment by not believing. The devils, because they must be damned, are not commanded to believe in Christ nor is their punishment heightened by their not believing: bu● miserable men, who by this decree have not more liberty t● escape hell than the devils, must yet be ti●d to believe in Christ and have their torments increased if they believe not. These things being so, (I think) I may conclude with the words (P) of Prosper; 
x Sent. super 8. c. Gall. Qui dicit quòd non omnes homines velit Deus salvos fieri, sed certum numerum praedestinatorum, duriùs loquitur quàm loquendum est de altitudine inscrutabilis gratiae Dei.  He which saith that God would not have all men to be saved, but a certain set number of predestinate persons only, he speaketh more harshly than he should of the height of God's unsearchable grace. Nay, he speaketh that which cannot stand with his infinite grace and mercy, especially to the sons of men.  
Nor doth that give me satisfaction which is usually answered, namely, that God by this absolute decree doth fully manifest (Q) his justice and his mercy too, his justice toward Reprobates, his mercy toward the Elect; and that it is necessary his decrees should so be ordered as that both these may be clearly declared by them. For, 1. God's mercy is revealed to be rich mercy abundant, long-suffering, surmounting justice, and beyond understanding. Now such a mercy set forth with such titles, clothed with such properties, is no ways manifested by this decree. 2. Neither is God's pure and spotless Justice set forth by it, as I now come to show: This being my third argument drawn from God's Attributes against absolute Reprobation.  

Whether absolute Reprobation oppose God's Mercy.  
What the Author discourseth in general concerning God's Mercy considered absolutely, comparatively, in its naturalness, in the amplitude of its object, etc. is to no great purpose, unless upon such antecedents this conclusion will certainly follow, Therefore Predestination and Reprobation cannot be absolute acts of God's freewill, but must needs proceed according to his prevision of men's future acts and deservings. The weakness of these consequents shall in particular be showed hereafter, when I have first set down some general considerations concerning the Mercy or Justice or other virtues in Scripture ascribed unto God.  

Vide Ruiz. De vol. disp. 3. §. 3. Et disp. 35. §. 1.  And first we must know, That though the names of habitual virtues be attributed unto God, yet it is impossible that any such habits should truly and really belong unto the Divine will; Quoniam habitus non dantur, nisi tanquam supplementa potentiarum earum quae intra ordinem potentiae non sunt perfectae. Unless therefore we hold God's power of willing in itself to be imperfect and to want supervenient rectifying habits, we must not avouch with this Author tha● Justice, Mercie, Holiness, etc. are in Gods will the same in nature which these virtues are in men, and only differing in degree.  
Secondly, though in God there be a permanent inclination or natural disposition to produce those outward effects which in us proceed from habitual virtues, as To endow his creatures with many good things, which we term Bounty or Liberality; To help them out of their miseries, which we term Mercy; To punish them according to their misdeserts, which we call Justice, and the like: yet God should not have been covetous or niggardly, had he never diffused drop of his bounty to any creature, but kept and enjoyed his goodness within himself, as he did before the creation: He should not have been cruel or unjust, had he freed no man out of that misery whereinto all mankind was fallen: neither should he have wanted any virtue, or done contrary to justice, had he freed all men out of their misery, and brought them to eternal felicity. The outward temporal acts therefore of Divine Justice or Mercy may be terminated or not terminated unto any man according to the absolute freewill of the most wise God, and that without opposing any attribute of his. To this purpose Carthusianus, 
a In 4m m, dist. 46. Vide Aquin. part. 1. q. 2.  Cùm Deus sit bonorum omnium dominator, & in ipsum peccat qui peccat, ipse potest plus confer de bonis quàm sit alicui debitum, & minus infer de malis, seu totam poenam relaxare, nec in hoc contra sed praeter institutum facere. Vide Halens. part. 1. quaest. 39 art. 4. & 5.  
Thirdly, it is to be observed, That howsoever mercy and justice are by us considered as distinct virtues or operations in God, yet his remunerative justice should never found a fit object, had he not by some benefit of free mercy and grace himself fitted it thereunto: And this is the benefit which we call absolute Election or Predestination. Neither should his vindicative justice found any objects fitted for it to pass upon, had he been pleased to grant the said free benefit to all men: And therefore we term the negation of this benefit or free favour, absolute Nonelection, Preterition, or (in a more harsh word) negative Reprobation. The foreseen faith and perseverance of Peter had not made him an object fit by way of remuneration to be invested with eternal life, had not a former absolute and free act of God's mercy fitted him with the gifts of faith, holiness and perseverance. Aquinas hath well set down and demonstratively proved this theorem, Opus Divinae justitiae semper praesupponit opus misericordiae, & in eo fundatur. There is the theorem itself: now for the demonstration. 
b Part. 1a. q. 22. art.. 4.  Creaturae non debetur aliquid nisi propter aliquid in eo praexsistens vel praeconsideratum. Et rursus, si illud creaturae debetur, hoc erit propter aliquid prius. Et cùm non sit procedere in infinitum, oportet de venire ad aliquid quod ex sola bonitate Divinae voluntatis dependeat, quae est ultimus finis. Let all the Remonstrants lay their heads together, and tell us what is primum indebitum which dependeth upon the will of God alone, but the grace of absolute Election or Predestination, for which we pled. Again, Judas his final damnation had not been fore-appointed, had not his final impenitency been preconsidered. His final impenitency had not been foreseen, had that primum indebitum which dependeth only upon God's absolute will and free mercy been bestowed upon him as it was upon Peter. 
c Aquin. qu. 23. art. 4.  Nam voluntas Dei quâ vult bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quòd illud bonum ab eo prae aliis habeatur. And without all prejudice to his justice he might out of his absolute will thus have elected Judas, and by the grace of election have freed him both from final impenitency and eternal misery. And therefore Carthusianus truly saith, 
d In 4m m, qu. 1a. dist. 46.  Causa naturae & proprietatum ejus est Divina voluntas: ideo totus ordo justitiae originaliter ad Divinam voluntatem reducitur. And again, 
e In 1m m Sent. dist. 41.  Dico quòd Deus ordinavit A ad effectum praedestinationis, & non B, etc. Quamuìs si voluisset, ità potuisset misericordiam manifestare in B, ipsum praedestinando, sicut in A. All this tendeth to show that the preparing and giving of that which we call primum indebitum beneficium in ordine ad infallibilem vitae aeternae consecutionem, is an act of Gods absolute will and love or free mercy, and yet not contrary to his justice: and on the other side, the not-preparing and not-giving of the same benefit is also a decree or act of his absolute will, and yet no act of cruelty, or contrary act either to the nature of the Divine mercy or justice. But let us see how he will prove that absolute Reprobation cannot stand with the mercy of God.  
His premises are these: God is so merciful, that mercy is a part of his title. God's mercy absolutely is set forth in high and stately terms, RICH, GREAT, etc. God's Love and Mercy is his natural work, his Justice a strange work: He is more frequent in the exercise of his Mercy than Justice: He extendeth it to more objects, upon less occasions, etc.  
All this granted will not infer this conclusion, Therefore Election and Nonelection (or negative Reprobation) depend not upon God's absolute will, but upon the different foreseen will and acts of men. What a vain labour is it to amplify and exaggerate premises which are of no force to induce the conclusion intended, nay which for the most part are rather of force to overthrew it? Let us weigh the particulars.  
God is merciful. True: but the dispensation of his mercy is different, to some more, to some less, according to the absolute purpose and counsel of his own william. This absolute Nonelection is not a denial of all mercy, much less an act of unmercifulness or cruelty. It is only a purpose of not bestowing upon some persons that choice mercy and effectual grace which would infallibly bring them unto glory, and a permission of them by their own freewill to abuse those means of salvation which are afforded them. And hereupon followeth God's absolute prescience of their final impenitency, and his fore-appointment of them to their just punishment. The Master of the Sentences speaketh fitly to this purpose; 
f Lib. 1. dist. 40. lit. D.  Reprobatio Dei quâ ab aeterno non-eligendo quosdam reprobavit secundùm duo consideratur: quorum alterum praescit, & non praeparat, id est, iniquitatem; alterum praescit & praeparat, scil. aeternam poenam. I would know what can be found in this negative Reprobation, quâ Deus non-eligendo quosdam reprobat, which proveth him unmerciful. Not the negation summi & indebiti beneficii; for that is an act of absolute liberty, not of cruelty and injury: not the foreseeing of their future iniquity; for that is an act of the understanding, not of the Divine will: nor the resolution to punish them; for that being with respect unto their sins is just, not cruel.  
God is Mercy in the abstract, a Father of Mercies: His nature and property is always to have mercy and to forgive. These and such like places prove two things: First, that acts of mercy flow unto us many times from Gods natural bounty, unpromised, undeserved, undesired on our parts. But we answer, that this prime mercy, which is not promised upon condition to any particular person, is at Gods own absolute will for the bestowing or withholding: and this we retort against the Remonstrants. For the mercy which showeth itself in Election being of this kind, it is an error to make either the bestowing or not-bestowing it to depend upon conditions foreseen or not foreseen in men. Secondly, the Scriptures above alleged prove that God extendeth his mercy at all times and to all persons indifferently according to the tenor of the promise: that is, He never faileth to forgive the penitent sinner, to bestow the crown of eternal life upon the faithful and constant believers. If he could have alleged any Scripture which had avouched that it is God's nature and property to give repentance, faith, perseverance to all men, he had quite overthrown absolute Election and Nonelection: But since God, who could have prepared and bestowed the gift of faith and perseverance as well upon this man as upon that, and who according to his ordination and promise hath bound himself to forgive and to save this man if he repent, if he believe, if he persevere, as well as that, and yet neither decreed to give nor giveth to this as to that, surely he hath elected some, and not-elected others, out of his own absolute will and pleasure.  
God's mercy is set out in high and stately titles, RICH, GREAT, ABUNDANT, WITHOUT DIMENSIONS, etc.  
Most of these places speak of that rich and special Mercy which God hath extended to some in their effectual vocation, justification, sanctification, and which he will most certainly extend towards them in their glorification; as will appear to any man that shall particularly weigh them. From these places if I should reason thus, God hath showed GREAT, RICH, ABUNDANT mercy unto some, in choosing them before the foundations of the world were laid, in effectually calling them, even when they were dead in sin, in freely justifying them, in mercifully glorifying them; and he hath not done thus for many others: Therefore Election and Nonelection depend upon the absolute will of God, and not upon the foreseen acts of men, this were a good conclusion: But to conclude, Therefore there is no decree of absolute Election and Nonelection, it is not only inconsequent, but contrary to the premises. And yet further, if such places of Scripture should be applied to that rich mercy which God is ready to extend to every man who performeth the conditions of repenting, believing, persevering, they make nothing against the decrees of absolute Election and Preterition, unless he can show that God hath prepared the same richeses of his mercy to make all men fulfil the conditions. For if this preparation be made for some and not for others, and that according to God's absolute will, and not according to the foreseen differences of good and bad wills in men; this rich mercy of God which this Author hath mentioned for the confuting of absolute Election and Nonelection is rather a confirming thereof.  
Mercy is more natural and pleasing unto God: vindicative Justice is a strange work. He doth not willingly afflict, etc.  
That is said to be natural and pleasing unto God, which cometh originally from himself, & is not an act depending upon the misdeserts of the creature. But this naturalness of God's mercy and bounty doth not show itself in the outward effects thereof, as natural agents do, who work according to the uttermost of their power, and as fare as the sphere of their activity can reach. Let bounty and mercy therefore be never so natural to God, it forceth him not in the same measure and manner to extend the effects of his mercy unto all, but he always guideth the dispensation thereof according to the absolute and free decrees of his own will: So that the naturalness of his mercy hindereth not the limiting of that special mercy which floweth from Election unto such singular persons as himself intendeth it unto; neither doth it forbidden him to withhold the same from such singular persons as he hath decreed to passe-by in the dispensation thereof. And this absolute liberty and supreme dominion which God hath in the preparing or not-preparing of effectual grace, wherein the absolute decrees of Election & Nonelection do show themselves, is a thing as natural and as pleasing unto God as his Mercy.  
As for vindicative Justice, it may be called a strange work, because it is opus occasionatum by man's transgression. But as Predestination is no act of remunerative Justice, not more is negative Reprobation or Nonelection of vindicative Justice: but they are both acts of Gods absolute dominion and free liberty, in giving or withholding his own according to his own will and pleasure.  
God is more frequent and forward in the exercise of his Mercy and Bounty than of his Anger and vindicative Justice.  
A strange argument, grounded upon a manifest error, namely, That the absolute decree of Nonelection is the exercise of God's anger and vindicative justice upon persons not-elected. There were Angels elected and not-elected according to God's decree, before the world or Angels were made: but there was no exercise of anger or vindicative justice upon them till after they had rebelled. Nonelection is an absolute decree of withholding an undue favour, but it is no absolute decree of inflicting any undeserved punishment. Neither doth it follow from the absolute decree of Nonelection, that God is less frequent in the acts of Mercy than of Anger. For though he have not exercised this special act of Mercy, yet he exerciseth daily innumerable acts of Mercy towards the Non-elect beyond all desert of theirs.  
In the amplitude of objects to whom it is extended Mercy surmounteth Justice. God visiteth the third and fourth generation; showeth mercy to thousands. His mercy reacheth as much further, etc.  
Showing of mercy to those which love God, and punishing those which hate him, are the exercising of God's remunerative and vindicative Justice according to his own ordination: But the preparing of that special grace for some men which being given them causeth them to love God & constantly to walk with God; and the not-preparing the same for others is the act or decree of Election and Nonelection. Now what a lose and wild manner of reasoning is this? Remunerative Justice reacheth further than vindicative; therefore there is no absolute decree of Nonelection. Justice in the number of objects cometh short of Mercy; therefore there is no absolute decree of Nonelection? Justice must needs come short of mercy, because (though not the special mercy of Election, yet) mercy, yea manifold mercies are bestowed upon every singular man in the world. So that the Elected by special grace being freed from becoming objects of Gods vindicative Justice, and both Elected and Non-elected being objects of his Mercy in divers measures and after divers manners, we may grant a larger extent of Mercy than of vindicative Justice, and yet without all prejudice to absolute Election and Not-election. For as long as God dealeth unjustly or cruelly with no man, his dealing more mercifully with Peter in preparing effectual grace for him by the decree of Predestination, and less mercifully with Judas in not preparing for him such grace by an opposite decree of Preterition, is no denial of the generality of his mercy, but an affirmation of more mercy to one than to another. 
Carth. in 4. dist. 46. qu. 1.  ᵍ Misericordia respicit absolutè Divinum effectum, non concernendo aliquam aequalitatem in ipso. Vnde secundùm majorem vel minorem misericordiae effectum dicitur misericordiùs cum uno quàm cum alio agere. And yet he deals unmercifully with no man.  
In the occasions that move God to exercise Mercy or Justice, Mercy hath the preeminence. It is a greater matter that moveth God to punish, a smaller, etc.  
All this is quite beside the question, unless it be first proved that Preterition, Nonelection or Non-predestination are acts of vindicative Justice. This hath formerly been denied, and as yet was never proved; and therefore whatsoever is here discoursed of Gods deferring punishments, of small occasions which he taketh to hold his hand, and the like, are impertinent.  
God's mercy or love is compared with the affection of a Father, nay, of a tender Mother, and with the most affectionate females, as with the Hen, etc. Now with such a Mercy cannot stand a decree of absolute Reprobation.  
This Author (by his continual manner of speech) seemeth to attribute unto God such a natural affection towards men as is found in Fathers, Mothers, in Birds and brute Beasts towards their young. But we must know first, that 
h Halens. p●rt. 1. q. 29 memb. 1.  Misericordia ponitur in Deo, non secundùm affectum, sed secundùm effectum. Secondly, as where love or pity is found secundùm passionis affectum, there it doth the uttermost it well can in relieving the persons pitied or loved; so where it is only secundùm relevationis effectum, there it worketh more or less according to the free determination of the agent. Thirdly, the natural affection of love or pity towards their young ones doth not in brute beasts so equally determine their affection, but they inwardly may bear and outwardly may show more affection and more effects of their affection to one than to another. And in men the natural affection of love doth not so determine Fathers or Mothers, but it leaveth Jacob free to love Joseph more than his brethrens, and to give unto him more effects of his love than unto the rest: It leaveth Rebecca free to love Jacob more than Esau, and to do more for him than for Esau. If the natural affection in Beasts towards their young ones excludeth not all difference of more and less in their love; if the natural love of Parents to their children be no hindrance but they may show more effects of this love to one, and less to another; than God, in whom Love or Mercy are effections and not affections, may freely both in natural and supernatural things do more for some, and less for others. The decree therefore of Nonelection or negative Reprobation, being not a decree which denieth all effects of Love or Pity to the Non-elect, but a decree only denying them that high and choice effect of infallible direction unto eternal life, this decree may well stand with the Mercy and Love of God.  
For those inferences therefore, that if absolute Reprobation be granted, God may mor● properly be called a Father of cruelty, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 marvel how he trembled to think of them, an● never trembled to utter them. That wherein he perpetually is mistaken, is the makin● of Nonelection or negative Reprobation 〈◊〉 vindicative act, the confounding it with th● judicial sentence of Damnation, the conceiving it to work in the Non-elect an invincible necessity of committing sin, with suc● other monstrous fancies which he taketh fo● principles needing no proof; whereas the● are such gross errors as need no confutátion. Nonelection taketh not up God's Mercy so short, but every man in the world hat● a share in it, though not an equal share. An● if God's Mercy & Love must be understood secundùm effectum and not secundùm affectum let him found out any man or any creature i● the world which hath conferred so man● and so great effects of mercy and love upo● his young ones as God did upon Cain, Judas, or any other reprobate, and than let hi● advance their love above the love of God.   

An Answer to his objections taken from imputation of original sin.  
WHat Father or Mother would determine their children to certain death, Object. for one only offence, and that committed too not by themselves in their own persons, but by some other, and imputed only unto them?  
Three things are here presupposed: First, Answ. that God in his decree of Reprobation dealeth with the greater part of men after such a cruel manner as is described. Secondly, that he doth this for no personal offence committed by themselves. Thirdly, that he doth it for a sin or offence imputed only unto them. Grant him all this, and than he conceiveth absolute Reprobation cannot stand with the mercy of God. But all his three presupposals are false. The decree of negative Reprobation is no determination of any man to cruel torments worse than death, but an absolute determination immanent in the Divine will of not-bestowing upon some angels and men that special effectual grace which would certainly bring them to the incomprehensible joys of eternal life. And the judicial decree of Damnation unto eternal torments is a distinct decree from this of negative Reprobation, and dependeth respectively upon the guilt of the party preconsidered, who for it is justly to be punished, as hath already been shown. Again, whereas he supposeth that Adam's sin cannot be truly accounted a personal offence in his posterity, both the Scripture and the common consent of Divines run against him. For though it be not personal in the same sense wherein actual sins done by men having the use of reason and freewill are said to be their personal actions, yet it is in another sense voluntary and personal, because it was so done that every singular person of mankind is involved in that very voluntary sin and in the guilt of punishment or death due thereunto. So saith the Apostle, 
Rom. 5.  Sin and death entered into the world by one. but how? In quantum in eo omnes peccaverunt. And again, By one man's disobedience many were made sinners. Halensis to this purpose saith, 
i Part. 2. qu. 105. memb. 1. pag. 296.  Secundùm Augustinum concedimus quòd non punitur parvulus pro culpa patris, sed pro culpa sua, propriè loquendo. Non enim dicit Apostolus quòd solùm Adam peccavit, sed dicit quòd omnes peccaverunt in Adam. Erat enim in Adam non solùm voluntas unius singularis personae, sed voluntas universalis naturae. Adamo cadente à justitia originali, cecidit etiam quaelibet voluntas posterorum. Caret enim voluntas cujuslibet illâ rectitudine quam habuisset si Adam stetisset. Aquinas and Cajetane hold Adam's sin to be voluntary unto all his posterity, 
k 1 2 2ae qu. 81. art. 10.  in quantum sunt membra Adami. Bellarmine, 
l De amiss. great. l. 5. c. 18.  Peccavimus alienâ voluntate, id est, Adami: quae tamen voluntas nisi fuisset aliquo modo totius naturae, ac per hoc etiam nostra, nullo modo verè peccavisse diceremur. Last of all, Malderus (as professed an enemy to the Synod of Dort as this Author) dareth not deny Adam's first actual transgression to be voluntary in regard of every singular person propagated from him. 
m In 1m m 2 a qu. 81. art. 1. pag. 260.  Patet voluntarium voluntate primi parentis sufficere ad veri nominis peccatum in parvulo. Est enim illa voluntas Adae quodammodo voluntas parvuli ex Dei decreto. Last of all, whereas he taketh it for granted, that Adam's sin is only imputed unto his children, and so they are determined to death and eternal torments for a sin only imputed, he is contrary to the judgement of the Catholic church. For it is generally held against the Pelagians, That as Adam's sin was the sin of every person that was a member of him, so likewise Adam's crookedness of will was not barely imputed but actually propagated to every singular person derived from his loins.  
But this Author promiseth to come more closely to the point: let us follow him as closely. The reasons which he is now to press, are in effect the same which have before been urged and answered, and therefore a shorter answer will serve.  
Adam's sin is the sin of man's nature Object. 1 only, and no man's personal transgression but Adams: It was neither committed nor consented to by any of his posterity in their own persons.  
Answer. Adam's first sin committed in the state of innocency, wherein by God's appointment gessit personam generis humani, was every man's personal sin, and was consented unto by every man's will; because in Adam there was not only the will of one singular man, but the universal will of all mankind and of every singular person, as before hath been declared. And I would feign know, if Adam's first transgression was his only and no man's else, how every singular person is by God himself for that very transgression esteemed liable unto death. Durandus answereth the doubt: Though it were not 
n Lib. 2. dist. 30. qu. 2.  voluntary actu personali infantium (who were not yet in rerum natura) yet it was voluntary voluntate primi hominis, quae fuit interpretatiuè voluntas omnium. And if God himself and the catholic Church interpret this will of Adam in disobeying God's commandment to be so fare forth our personal sin, that every singular person standeth culpable of it, and liable unto punishment for it, we must not give credit either to the old Pelagians or new Remonstrants, when they tell us that such a decree cannot stand with God's mercy.  
That it was the sin of our nature, not by Object. 2 generation, but by Gods own voluntary imputation.  
Original sin sometimes noteth that Answer. voluntary and free transgression of the Divine commandment whereby Adam's personal disobedience made every singular person a sinner in the sight of God, as before hath been said. 
Vide Bellarm. De Amiss. great. 5. 17.  Sometimes again it noteth that corruption or pravity of the will and of the whole soul which remained in Adam after his rebellion, and which by him is traduced unto every singular person descending naturally from him. Neither of these becometh the sin of any particular person otherwise than by generation, though not without a free constitution of Gods william. And as for the latter, it is in all singular persons of mankind, not only by imputation but by real inhesion or contagion, as the whole Church confesseth.  
God pardoned Adam who did actually and Object. 3 freely commit it in his own person: for so it is generally believed.  
God pardoned Adam, Answer. but not otherwise than upon his repenting and believing in the promised Seed: which being acts performed by him after he had lost his original justice, in them he sustained not the common person of mankind, and therefore they were available only to himself. Any of his posterity upon the same conditions shall assuredly obtain the like pardon. The conclusion which he should prove is this, Absolute Nonelection or negative Reprobation cannot stand with God's mercy: His reasons are, Adam's sin is the sin of man's nature only; It is ours, not by generation, but by imputation: It was pardoned in Adam. Were all these true, show me any necessary connexion betwixt the premises and the conclusion, and take the cause.  
Object. 4 Christ came to take away the sin of the world; God either did or might have satisfied his wronged justice in the blood of the Covenant for all mankind, and have opened a way of salvation unto every man.  
Answer. Christ by shedding his blood redeemed the world of mankind, satisfied God's justice, and obtained a way of salvation for every man: But God never intended that the outward act should presently put every man in possession of pardon or of a state of justification and salvation. But the way which he opened for every one of us to partake the fruit of our redemption and of his plenary satisfaction, is by repentance and faith to come and lay hold of the Redeemer. The decrees of Election and Nonelection are no obstacles unto the doing of this, or exceptions against any man which shall do this, and therefore they may stand in their full force though this last consideration of his be admitted.  
Admit of absolute Reprobation, and we make God less merciful to men than to any other creatures.  
Admit not only of absolute Nonelection, which (as hath been often said) is neither any penalty nor any misery of the creature not elected, but let us further admit, that angels and men not elected or negatively reprobated do always infallibly draw upon themselves by their own default extreme and endless misery; yet it will not follow that God hath been less merciful unto such persons not elected (suppose Cain or Judas) than to the brute creatures. First, because in every person not elected there are innumerable effects of God's mercy and goodness whereof the other creatures are uncapable. Secondly, because what effects of God's goodness or mercy are found in the other creatures, are mercies or benefits rather bestowed upon men for whose uses they serve, than upon the creatures. Now these serving to the use of the Non-elect, as much and oftentimes more than of the Elect, the mercy or goodness of God imparted to the creatures redoundeth more unto them. Suppose therefore the creatures are in a better condition of being than the Non-elect finally bring themselves unto, yet this good being of the creature is a mercy of God principally exhibited unto the men who have the use thereof. But this lose manner of reasoning cometh from the false conceit, That Nonelection is the determining of persons not-elected by an omnipotent decree to their woeful being: Whereas Nonelection or negative Reprobation is an eternal decree in the will of God of not doing that for the advancement of some men unto a supernatural blessed being which he hath freely and graciously determined to do for others, and containeth not any thrusting of them into a woeful being by an omnipotent operation, but a permitting them to fall into such a woeful being by their own voluntary default and transgression.  
As for his questions, What man would have accepted of life, if he had known upon what lamentable conditions it was to be tendered? or who would not curse the day of his birth, if he did firmly believe that there were any absolute decree of Election and Nonelection?  
To the former I answer, That eternal Election and Preterition are no capitulations with the creature, no conditions tendered unto the creature, but only immanent absolute resolutions in the Creator. And yet if God had revealed unto Cain or Judas the decree of his Preterition when they first entered upon possession of this life, it had not been an act of right reason or an orderly will to have refused it with many other good things freely given unto them by God, for fear of a future bad condition which they might cast themselves into by their own voluntary wickedness. If God had revealed his decree of Nonelection to the angels which proved apostatical, it had been folly and madness to have refused that excellent being which God bestowed upon them, for fear of that woeful being which by his permission they brought wilfully upon themselves. Lastly, God in his wisdom hath made the decrees of Election and Nonelection secrets to be concealed only in his own bosom: and therefore it is vain and idle to frame arguments upon supposal that God should make them revealed and commonly known to singular persons.  
Now to his latter question; Who, if he did believe the decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation, would not curse his birthday? etc. I answer, No well-instructed Christian who understandeth what the absolute decrees of Election and Preterition do import. If the decree of Reprobation imported a necessary causing of any man's sins by the Divine powerful operation, or an absolute decree of damning any singular person, whether innocent or sinful, whether a believer or not-believer, there were some reasonable motives for men Not-elected, knowing such a decree, to curse their birthday. But this false imagination hath been often refuted. 
o Lomb. l. 1. dist. 40. D. & didst. 41. E.  Non sicut praeparavit Sanctos ad justitiam percipiendam, sic praeparavit iniquos ad justitiam amittendam; quia pravitatis praeparator nunquam fuit. I add Carthusian; 
p Lib. 10. dist. 40. qu. 3. pag. 580. Vide Aquin. part. 1. qu. 23. art. 3.  Bonum subjacet providentiae Divinae tanquam ordinatum & causatum ab ea: ideo praedestinatio est causa gratiae & gloriae. Sed quoniam malum culpa non subjacet providentiae Divinae ut intentum & causatum, sed solùm tanquam praescitum & ordinatum, hinc reprobatio est solùm praescientia culpae, non causa, etc. Lastly, the eternal decree of Reprobation (as the Remonstrants themselves hold it) is as unchangeable, as fixed, as certainly drawing after it the woeful being of Cain and Judas and all other Reprobates, as that which we admit. We may therefore ask of the Remonstrants, What man would accept of life, or who would not curse his birthday, if he knew that upon an eternal and infallible prescience of his final impenitency God had passed the sentence or decree of his Reprobation?  
Suppose absolute Reprobation, and God is more merciful unto the very devils than unto men. They are equal only in this one thing, UTRISQUE DESPERATA SALUS; but in three things men are in worse condition than the devils.  
The decree of Nonelection or absolute negative Reprobation truly understood is a denial of special mercy which by God's power and freewill might have been prepared both for men and devils, and might have been bestowed upon them as well as it was for and upon the elect. The withholding of this mercy is no unmerciful cruel decree, no vindicative or punitive act: and therefore it is a bad consequence to say, God was less merciful to men than to the devils; Therefore cruel or unjust to either. More or less mercy is a confession of mercy unto both: and therefore from less mercy to one than to the other to conclude cruelty or injustice towards, either, is to infer a conclusion contradictory to the premises.  
Whereas he further saith that the decree of Nonelection or absolute Reprobation is equal to men and devils in this, quòd reddit salutem utrisque desperatam, he is quite besides the matter. For the decree of distinguishing angels into Elect and Non-elect was established in voluntate Divina before the creation of either, and at the instant of their creation (notwithstanding the forenamed decree) their salvation was so fare from being desperate or impossible, that it was most easy and possible, and never was desperate till their wilful rebellion had made it so. What more easy to be obtained than that which cannot be lost unless the party himself by a wilful act of his own loose it? Upon these terms stood the salvation of the Non-elect angels, now (by their own default) devils. As for the decree of nonelection concerning men; it made the salvation of no children of Adam desperate as they are considered in him according to his estate of justice and innocence; for in that he had both a possibility and a sufficiency to have atteined salvation for himself and them. Neither doth it now make any man's estate desperate, as he is considered lying in the fall: for by Christ sufficient means of salvation are provided for all sinners whatsoever; and God secundùm legem ordinariam may apply them to any singular person whatsoever, whilst he is in statu viae. And he now adjudgeth no man to the woeful estate of torment or damnation in hell, that doth not willingly put himself out of the way which leadeth unto heaven. It is not the secret and eternal decree of Nonelection or Reprobation which maketh God do this; but the open acts of man's voluntary rebellion 'cause his damnation and torments in hell. Nothing doth or can make any man's salvation desperate but his own desperate wickedness and obstinate wilfulness. 
q Aquin. part. 1●. qu. 23. art. 3.  Cùm dicitur quòd reprobatus non potest gratiam adipisci, non est hoc intelligendum secundùm impossibilitatem absolutam, sed secundùm impossibilitatem conditionatam, quae non tollit libertatem arbitrii.  
But let us now see how he will prove that God is more merciful to devils than to men, supposing the absolute decree of Nonelection or negative Reprobation.  
Men were appointed to hell, not for their Object. 1 own proper personal sins, but for the sin of another that sinned before they were born: whereas the devils are damned only for their own proper personal sins. Ergó.  
This Author runneth continually upon one string, Answ. and that continually quite out of tune. For whereas the question is concerning the eternal immanent acts or decrees of Election and Preterition or negative Reprobation, he always talketh of the judiciary decree of Damnation, or appointment of men and angels unto hellfire. The eternal decree distinguishing angels into Elect and Non-elect was neither grounded upon the righteousness of the one nor upon the wickedness of the other; though the judicial decree distinguishing them in glorificandos & damnandos were respective to the loyalty of the one and rebellion of the other. The same we say of men. As for the very damnation of men not-elected it is for a proper and personal contagion of sin, and for a transgression which God and the catholic Church esteemeth to belong personally to every child of Adam as hath been already declared. We mus● not therefore be so addicted to the new fangled opinions of the Remonstrants treading in the very footsteps of the Pelagians, as for their sakes to think the condemning of men for original corruption and Adam's transgression, is hard, unmerciful, cruel dealing; since the Scriptures and the judgement of the catholic Church and of our own particular Church hath acknowledged this decree. And yet were al● granted which this man asketh, this conclusion would not follow, Therefore God is more merciful to angel's not-elected than unt● men. For the more or less mercy of God must not be weighed by any one singular act or decree of God towards angel's an● men, but by the universal course of hi● deal with both. Now cast all the merciful decrees and deal of God with men into the one balance, and all the merciful deal of God with devils into the other, and it will easily appear that God hath showed more mercy to any non-elected or damned man than to any of the non-elected angels, now damned devils.  
Men not-elected are unavoidably destinated Object. 2 unto endless misery under a colour of the contrary; whereas the devils decreed unto damnation, know it, expect it, look for no other. But men are fed up with hopes of salvation, and made believe, etc.  
Nonelection is not a destinating of the person not-elected unto endless misery or torment: Nay, Answ. the non-elected angels were, notwithstanding their eternal Nonelection, at their creation sufficiently ordinated (though not infallibly predestinated) not only to have avoided endless misery, but to have atteined endless felicity. So the Preterition or eternal Passing-by of some men, and electing others, was no destinating of the Non-elected unto hell-torments. For notwithstanding these distinct eternal decrees, at Adam's creation, both himself, and in him all and every particular child of his, was sufficiently ordinated (though not infallibly predestinated) unto the avoiding of hell-torments, and to the attaining of eternal happiness.  
Whereas he maketh the case of the non-elected angels better than of men, because they know and expect damnation (he might have added, and feel the torments of damnation) and men not-elected are fed up with vain hopes, and made believe that they cannot perish but defectu voluntatis propriae; We answer, First, That those which are now damned devils, were not damned for their Nonelection, or because they were not elected from eternity, but for the temporal act of their apostasy. And the same we say of men not-elected. Secondly, we answer, That the now-damned devils did not know or expect their damnation when they were first created, and whilst they were viatores; though now they be under damnation, they must needs both know it and feel it. And the same we say of men not-elected. Thirdly, Whereas he saith devils are in a better case, because they are out of hope, and men are deluded with vain and impossible hopes of salvation, he is deceived in both. The devils themselves, though not-elected, were in a fare better case when at their first creation they had hope of happiness, than they are being quite out of hope under the state of their irrecoverable damnation. And Judas though eternally not-elected or eternally reprobated in God's decree, yet he was in a better condition whilst he lived upon earth in the company of Christ, and might hope for happiness, than now he is actually damned and out of all hope. And lastly we answer, That the Non-elect are not thereby appointed to wrath, but the wrath of God layeth hold upon them for being children of Belial and disobedience, and not for being persons not-elected. And it is most true, that if they perish, they perish not defectu misericordiae Divinae, who hath offered them means of grace, pardon, and salvation; but defectu voluntatis propriae, wherein there is always found a voluntary pravity, a neglect, a contempt, or a wicked abuse of the means of salvation tendered unto them. This Authors saying only, There is no such matter, is no material proof.  
Men not-elected or reprobated are obliged Object. 3 to believe, and their punishment aggravated by not believing: the devils are free from such a command, etc.  
A strange argument to prove God less merciful to men not-elected than to devils already damned, Answ. because he offereth salvation to the one under condition of faith in Christ, which he never would do to the other. Some there were that turned the grace of God into wantonness; but the Remonstrants only go about to turn it into cruelty. Those who have so fare forth a power of being saved by faith in Christ, that the event is hindered only by their own malignant rebellious will, have more liberty and possibility to escape hell than the devils, unto whom salvation after their fall was upon no condition ever offered.  
We say with Prosper, God would have all men saved: but we say not with the Remonstrants, That God would have all men predestinated or elected.  
As for the manifestation of God's justice and of his mercy, no man supposeth that the immanent secret eternal decrees of Predestination and Reprobation can in themselves manifest the justice and mercy of God; but in the temporal effects and consequents they serve to set forth God's merciful dealing with the Elect and his just dealing with the Non-elect, misericorditer liberando hos, justè damnando istos.    

Treatise.  
THirdly, this absolute Reprobation is incompatible with God's Justice. 
3 Against God's JUSTICE.   
The Lord (saith (A) David) is righteous in all his ways, Psal. 145. The judgements of the Lord (saith Solomon) are weight and measure, Prov. 16.11. exact and without exception. So apparently just is God, that he offereth the justice of his decrees and ways to the trial of human understanding: Esay 5.3. Judge, I pray you, between me and my vineyard. Those to whom the vineyard was committed, slew their master's heir being sent unto them: What will the Lord of the Vineyard, think ye (saith Christ) do therefore, when he cometh, to those husbandmen? Matth. 21.40. In which words he appealeth to their judgement. Nay, he is content to prove himself and his deal to be just by plain and evident arguments, Ezek. 18.25. etc. Are not my ways equal, and yours unequal, O ye house of Israel? And he permitteth Abraham when he was in his greatest humility, acknowledging himself to be but dust and ashes, yet to reason with him about the equity of his do; Wilt thou slay the righteous with the wicked? Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? Gen. 18.23, 25. And Moses also is suffered to argue God's justice in the same manner; Shall one man sin, and wilt thou be wroth with all the congregation? Numb. 16.22. In a word, so evidently just is God in all his proceed, that many both good and bad, who have felt his justice, have cleared God, and deeply charged themselves. Witness Ezra, Nehemiah, and Daniel in their ninth chapters, and Adonibezek, Judg. 1.7. and the Emperor Mauricius, who having seen his children butchered, and waiting every minute for the bloody stroke of death, broke out into these words, 
y Osiand. Eccl. hist. cent. 6. pag. 261. Justus es, Domine, & justum est judicium tuum.  Righteous art thou, O Lord, and just is thy judgement.  
With this inviolable justice of God cannot absolute Reprobation (of such especially as are commanded to believe and are called to salvation) be reconciled. My reasons (B) are these.  
I. Because it maketh God to punish the righteous with the wicked.  
The Supralapsarians say directly in plain terms, that God decreed to destruction men considered without sin, and therefore yet righteous. And the Sublapsarians say as much in effect; for they say two things: 1. That God did lay a necessity upon every man of being born in original sin, as I have noted before; 2. That he hath a determined for that sin to cast away the greatest part of mankind for ever. And so they make God to do that by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other say he did by one. This is so clear a case, that Calvine with some others have not sticked to say that God may with as much justice determine men to hell the first way as the latter. See Instit. l. 3. c. 23. §. 7. where against those who deny that Adam fell by God's decree, he reasoneth thus; All men are made guilty of Adam's sin by God's absolute decree alone: Adam therefore sinned by this only decree. 
z Quid eos prohibet fateri de uno homine, quod inviti de toto humano genere concedunt? Quid enim tergiversando luderent operam?  What letteth them to grant that of one man which they must grant of all men? And a little after he saith, 
a Bonos istos justitiae Dei patronos perplexos haerere in festuca, altas verò trabes superare, nimis absurdum est.  It is too absurd that these kind patroness of God's justice should thus stumble at a straw and leap over a block. God may with as much justice decree Adam's sin and men's damnation out of his only will and pleasure, as, out of that will and pleasure, the involving of men in the guilt of the first sin and their damnation for it: that is the substance of his reasoning. To the same purpose speaketh Maccovius; From hence we may see, saith he, what to judge of that opinion of our adversaries, viz. That God cannot justly ordain men to destruction without the consideration of sin. 
b Maccov. disp. 18. p. 16. Nam dicant, quaeso, nobis quid majus sit, imputare alicui culpam alterius, & propter ipsam illum morte aeternâ plectere; an verò ordinare ad interitum. At hoc potest sine ullá laesione justitiae suae: ergò multò magìs potest illud posterius.  Let them tell me which is greater, to impute to one man the sin of another, and punish him for it with eternal death, or to ordain simply, without looking at sin, to destruction: Surely no man will deny the first of these to be the greater. But this God may do without any wrong to justice: much more therefore may he do the other. To these consenteth Dr Twisse, and saith, 
c Dr Twiss. V●nd. great. l. 2. digr. 1. pag. 15. Quod potest Deus intercedente liberâ suâ constitutione, illud etiam absolutè poterit vel sine aliqua constitutione intercedente.  If God may ordain men to hell for Adam's sin, which is derived unto them by God's only constitution, he may as well do it absolutely without any such constitution. And it is most true, it is all one in substance, simply to decree the misery of an innocent man, and to involve him in a sin that he may be brought to misery. Neither of these decrees (I take it) are just.  
II. The second reason why it is (C) against God's justice, is, because it maketh him to require faith in Christ of those to whom he hath precisely in his absolute purpose denied both a power to believe and a Christ to believe in. That God bindeth Reprobates to believe as well as others, it is the constant doctrine of Divines: Among whom Zanchius delivereth it for a Thesis, 
d Zanch. l. 5. De natura Dei, cap. 2. q. 1. de praed. sanctorum. Quisque mandato Dei tenetur credere se ad salutem aeternam in Christo suisse electum; maximè autem is qui sidem in Christum profitetur. Cùm dicimus unumquemque teneri hoc credere, neminem, nè reprobos quidem, qui neque unquam credent nec credere in Christum possunt, excipimus; & nisi credant, gravissimè omnium peccant.  Every man (especially he that professeth Christ) is bound to believe that he is chosen in Christ to salvation; every man without exception, even the reprobate himself: and if he believe it not, he committeth a most grievous sin above all others. This he proveth by that speech of Christ, John 16.9. The Spirit shall convince the world of sin, because they believe not in me. Reprobates therefore are bound to believe. Mr Perkins also saith something to the same purpose; 
e Perk. lib. De Praed. pag. 89. object. 3. Quisque in Ecclesia mandato Dei CREDE EVANGELIO tenetur credere se redemtum esse per Christum, etiam improbus perinde ac electus, sed aliâ tamen & alia ratione: Electus tenetur credere, ut credendo particeps fiat electionis; reprobus, ut non credendo fi●t inexcusabilis, etiam ex intentione Dei.  Every one in the Church by virtue of this commandment BELIEVE THE GOSPEL is bound to believe that he is redeemed by Christ, as well the reprobate as the elect, though for a different reason: the Elect, that by believing he may be saved; the Reprobate, that by not believing he may be without excuse: and this out of the very purpose of God.  
But now they cannot in (D) justice be bound to believe, if they be absolute Reprobates, for three causes.  
1. Because they have no power to believe: they want it, and must want it for ever. God hath decreed they shall never have any to their dying day. Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia, No man can be justly tied to impossible performances. Because no man can fly like a bird, or reach heaven with the top of his finger, therefore God cannot with justice exact of any the performance of these actions: nor can he of Reprobates the obedience of Faith, if it be not possible to them.  
2. Because it is (E) not Gods unfeigned will they shall believe. No man will say that it is Gods serious will that such a man shall live, when it is his will that he shall never have the concourse of his providence and the act of preservation. Nor can we say that God doth in good earnest will that those men should believe, whom he will not furnish with necessary power to believe. It may rather be said, it is Gods unfeigned will they shall not believe, because it is his will they shall want power to believe. For it is a Maxim in Logic, Qui vult aliquid in causa, vult effectum ex ista causa profluentem, He who willeth a thing in the cause, willeth the effect that necessarily floweth from that cause. Now if it be the certain will of God that Reprobates shall in no wise believe, he cannot with reason and equity tie them to believe: for than he toeth them to an act contrary to his determinate william.  
3. Because they have (F) no object of faith, not Christ to believe in. Credere jubet, & fidei nullum objectum ponit, He commandeth to believe, and affordeth no object to believe in: this soundeth not well. The devils have no part in Christ or the new covenant: we will not therefore say that God can justly bind them to believe, or punish them as transgressors of the covenant because they believe not: How than can we say that God can justly require faith of Reprobates, or destroy them for not believing, if they have indeed no more part in Christ or in the covenant than the devils have? If a man should command his servant to eat, and punish him for not eating, and in the mean time fully resolve that he shall have no meat to eat, would any reasonable man say that such a man were just in the command or punishment? Change but the name, and the case is the same. Again, that Christ died for Reprobates (by the doctrine of absolute Reprobation) is a lie; and can God justly bind men to believe a lie?  
This is the second reason.  
III. The third reason why the absolute decree infringeth God's justice, is, because it will have him (G) to punish men for omission of an act which is made impossible to them by his own decree: not by that decree alone by which he determined to give them no power to believe, having lost it; but by that decree also by which he purposed that we should partake with Adam in his sin, and be stripped of all that supernatural power which we had by God's free grant bestowed upon us in Adam before he fell.  
These are the reasons which move me to think, that this absolute decree is repugnant to God's Justice.  
Three things are usually answered.  
I. That God's ways may be very just, and yet seem unjust to man's erring understanding: and so is this decree, though flesh and blood will not yield it to be so.  
This answer (H) I take to be false, and the contradictory to it to be true; namely, That nothing is truly just which human understanding purged from prejudice? corrupt affections and customs, hath in all ages, places and persons judged to be unjust. The reason is, Because God hath by the light of nature, and those general impressions of good and evil, honest and dishonest, just and unjust, made in the hearts of men, sufficiently instructed and enabled them to judge what is just and what is not. When a thing is done, reason so qualified is able to say, This is just, or, This is unjust, whether it be done by God or man. For (virtues in men being but the image of those perfections that devil in God) Justice in men and God are for substance but one and the same thing, though infinitely differing in degree, as the greater and lesser light. That this power is ingraffed in men, God himself (who best knoweth with what endowments he hath beautified his creature) hath sufficiently signified in those Scriptures where he calleth on men to be judges of the equity of his ways: Judge, I pray you, between me and my vineyard, Esay 5. Judge, O ye house of Israel; are not my ways equal, and your ways unequal? Ezek. 18.25. God would never put them upon the trial of reason, if he had not made it able to examine them. The incarnation of the Son of God, his birth of a virgin, his dying, the resurrection of the body, and such mysteries as are peculiar to the Gospel and the proper objects of the Christian faith, God hath not offered to the trial of our understandings, but rather derideth those that presume to judge of them by reason: 1. Cor. 1.20. Where is the scribe? where is the wise? where is the disputer of this world? And the reason is, Because these things being supernatural, and therefore not discernible by natural power, man is no competent judge of them by his natural understanding, nor may adventure upon the trial and judgement of them with less danger than Uzzah looked into the ark: for scrutator majestatis opprimetur à gloria, He that prieth into God's majesty, will be overwhelmed of his glory. But of the justice of his decrees and ways he maketh him a judge, because the common notions of just and unjust being imprinted in nature, he ●s able by natural reason to apprehended what is just in Divine acts as well as in his own.  
II. It is answered, That these decrees are set down in Scripture to be the will of God; and therefore they must needs ●e just: For Gods will is the rule (l) of all righteousness.  
To this answer I have these things to reply.  
1. This rule in Divinity is much abused by the maintein●es of absolute Reprobation, and may not be admitted in their sense and meaning. For God's will is not a rule of justic● to himself, as if things were therefore just because he willeth them and worketh them: but his justice rather is a rule of hi● will and works, which are the expressions of his will. H● therefore maketh decrees and executeth them, because the● are agreeable to that justice which dwelleth in the Divine nature. As he maketh nothing which hath not potentiam objectivam, a power of being created without implying contradiction to himself or any thing in him, so he willeth and doth nothing but that which may be willed or done saluâ j●stitiâ, 
Hieron. Prooem. in Hoseam.  without wrong to his justice. S. Hierome speaking o● the Prophet Hosea's taking a wife of fornications, Hos. 1.2 saith it was done in typo, typically, not really; quia si fiat, turpissimum est, because if it had been indeed done, it had been ● most foul thing. But thou wilt answer (saith he) Deo jubenit nihil turpe est, God commanding it, nothing is dishonest Thus much we say, saith the Father, That God commandeth nothing but what is honest: but he doth not by commanding dishonest things, make those things honest which are abominable: plainly giving us to see what he thought, viz. that G● doth not will a thing, and so make it good; but willeth it because it is in itself good antecedently and before the act o● God's will about it. And thus much doth Zanchie (though a rigid maintainer of absolute Reprobation) not obscurr● confess in his Treatise De natura Dei: Where he letteth s● such speeches as make God's justice antecedent to his will, an● therefore the rule of it, rather than a thing regulated by i● 
f Zanch. l. 3. De nat. Dei, c. 4. qu. 9 thes. 2. Neque aliquid velle potest quod justum non sit.  Neither can God will any thing, saith he, which is not j●● And again, 
g Quod placet principi, legis habet vigorem.  The Prince's pleasure hath the strength of a l●● is a rule, saith he, among the Canonists: but 
h Ibi maximè verum est, ubi rex justus est, & nihil vult nisi justum. Quantò magis in regno Dei, etc.  this is true where the King is just, and willeth nothing but what is j●● In which words he plainly maketh the justice of the King antecedent to that will of his which must be a la. Many mo● speeches he useth there to the same purpose. God's will therefore is not a rule of justice to himself, To whom than? 〈◊〉 us. For by it we are 1. to square all our thoughts, words, 〈◊〉 deeds; 2. To examine them when they are spoken 〈◊〉 done: Primum in aliquo genere est regula posteriorum, & supmum inferiorum.  
2. I reply, That these absolute (K) decrees of men● evitable salvation and damnation are no parts of Gods vealed will. The Scriptures teach us no such matter. A● therefore to say they are, is but a mere begging of the que●on. It hath always been ordinary with false teachers to make God's word a father to their false opinions, that they may stand the faster and win the greater credit. The Papists ground their Transubstantiation, and the Lutherans ●heir Consubstantiation and Ubiquity upon the Scripture, HOC EST CORPUS MEUM, This is my body, Matth. 26. And the defenders of absolute Reprobation do so too: They make their cause to be Gods, and entitle his word to it, because they see it is the surest way to defend it; being herein like to some contentious people, who being in la and having a bad cause which they are like to loose, they entitle the King to it, that they may the better uphold it.  
3. Absolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revealed will. The reason is, Because it is odious to right reason, and begetteth absurdities. For nulla veritas parit absurda, no ●ruth begetteth absurdities. Divers truths are revealed in Scripture which are above but not contrary to right reason, whether they be matters of faith or life. Faith and Reason, Nature and Scripture are both Gods excellent gifts: and therefore though there may be a disproportion, yet there can be no repugnancy between them. The worship which God requireth is cultus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a reasonable service, Rom, 12.2. and the word of God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, milk reasonable and without guile, 1. Pet. 2.2. These things therefore being laid together, it will appear to be but a mere shift and evasion, when absolute Reprobation is proved to be unjust, and therefore unworthy of God, to say, Gods will is the rule of justice: this is part of Gods revealed will; and therefore most just, whatsoever reason may cavil and say to the contrary.  
III. Their third answer is, That (L) God is not bound to restore men power to believe, because they once had it and have lost it through their own fault; as a master is not bound to renew his servant's stock, if he have wasted it by bad husbandry.  
This answer doth not satisfy me. For I grant that God is simply and absolutely bound to no man, because he is agens liberrimum, a most free dispenser of his own favours, where, and what, and to whom he will; and no man is aforehand with God: Quis prior illi dedit ut retribuatur? Who hath given unto him, and it shall be recompensed again? Rom. 11.35. But yet he is conditionally bound: For he hath determined and tied himself three ways especially.  
1. Decernendo, by Decreeing. The Almighty is eternally subject to his own ordinances, or else he should be mutable. And therefore what gifts soever he hath decreed to men, he is bound to give them by virtue of his own decree.  
2. Promittendo, by Promising. We use to say, Promise is debt: It is justice to perform what it was free to promise'. And whosoever he be that promiseth and payeth not, is guilty of a trespass (witness Ananias and Sapphira) and unworthy of the kingdom of heaven, Psal. 15.4. If therefore God hath made a promise of any gift or grace to men, his promise bindeth him to performance.  Nam semel emissum volat irrevocabile verbum. 
3. Legem ferendo, by Giving men a Law to keep which without supernatural grace they can not more keep than they can eat a rock. By such a la the supreme Lawgiver bindeth himself to his people to give them such power as may enable them to keep that la, or else he becometh (as the evil servant in the parable styled him) a hard master, reaping where he sowed not, and the very true and proper cause of the transgression of that law. We shall found God always giving strength when he giveth a command. When he commanded the creatures to increase and multiply, he gave them a multiplying virtue: When Christ bade the lame man arise, take up his bed and walk, he put into his limbs an ability of walking. When Adam had a spiritual la given him to obey which without spiritual strength he could not, God gave him strength answerable to the law, as Divines agreed, consenting to that noted speech of S. Augustine, That Adam had posse non cadere, though he never had non posse cadere, a Power and Possibility though no Necessity of continuing in obedience.  
That I may bring this home to my purpose, I say, That God is bound to restore unto men power to believe, supposing these things that follow: 1. That he hath vouchsafed to enter into a new covenant of peace with men, when he needed not; 2. That in that covenant he requireth obedience at men's hands, even at theirs that perish; 3. That he promiseth eternal life to every man, if he obey and keep the covenant; 4. That he punisheth the disobedient with everlasting death. These particulars supposed, the most free God, who is absolutely bound to none, is engaged to give ability of believing unto men: Nor can he justly without this gift punish the disobedient, any more than a Magistrate having put out a man's eyes for an offence, can command this man with justice to read a book, and because he readeth not, put him to death; or than a Master (that I may return the Simile in the answer) when he hath taken away from his servant the stock which he hath misemployed, can afterwards exact of him a just employment of the same stock, and punish him because he employeth it not.  
I conclude therefore, That the absolute and inevitable Reprobation of such men as are called to believe in Christ, and punished if they believe not, is utterly repugnant to the Justice of God, and therefore can be no part of his word.  

Answer. Whether absolute Reprobation may stand with God's Justice.  
WE have often said, that by absolute Predestination and absolute Reprobation or Nonelection we understand only that eternal immanent act whereby God doth freely and absolutely purpose to give unto some of Adam's posterity that effectual grace which shall infallibly bring them unto glory, and whereby he doth as absolutely out of the sovereign freedom of his own will purpose not to give effectual grace unto others, but to permit them under the means of common grace deficere ab aeterna beatitudine. These are the decrees which we affirm to be absolute, and which we deny to be conditionate or dependant upon the different temporal acts of men, foreseen eternally by God. If this Author will overthrew these absolute decrees, he must not go about to prove that God cannot justly decree the damnation of any man but with respect to his foreseen sins, which we have always acknowledged; but he must oppugn that of the Apostle, Miseretur cujus vult, & quem vult indurat, and he must say that God had never any absolute decree of bringing Peter by the way of faith, repentance, holiness, and perseverance unto the kingdom of heaven, but only out of Peter's freewill he foresaw him a penitent, faithful, holy, perseverant man unto the last gasp. And he must likewise defend, that there was no absolute decree in God of withholding from Judas that effectual saving grace which was mercifully prepared for Peter, and had it been prepared for Judas, would as infallibly have wrought his salvation as it did Peter. Here is the very knot of the controversy, which this Author in his whole book never cometh near. But now let us come to his discourse of the Divine Justice: Whereunto before we give particular answers, some things must be premised in general.  
Justice in a general sense is an equality or conformity cum obligatione seu debito cujusque. And he is just that hath a constant and perpetual will of giving unto every one his due.  
Now because the 
a Albert. p. 1a, tract. 19 qu. 77. p●g. 181.  words debet and debitum do not properly agreed unto God, the virtue of Justice must needs belong unto him otherwise than unto men: And injustice must not be ascribed unto him, in doing many things, or not doing, in which we should be unjust if we should use the like liberty. God's Justice is, 
b Ibid.  Agere secundùm condecentiam bonitatis aut veracitatis suae. Whilst he doth this, though he tie not himself to the rules of human justice, it is blasphemy to charge him with cruelty or injustice. From whence we infer these corollaries which are undeniably true. 1. That God may without any injustice absolutely decree from all eternity to give in time more natural gifts, more civil honour, more supernatural graces and mercies to one man than to another, without all respect to foreseen differences of goodness or badness in the persons. The reason, Because it neither crosseth his goodness nor his truth. 2. That God cannot justly subject men to the torments of hell but for their sins and final ending of their life in sin. The reason, Because if he should either punish an innocent man or a penitent sinner, he should do an act contrary both to his goodness and truth: And this is only it which may be termed injustice when we speak of God.  
Unto the places of Scripture which he setteth in the front of his discourse, I answer in a word, That Predestination and Non-predestination, or Election and negative Reprobation, as they concern this or that singular person, are not promised or revealed: and therefore to elect Peter and not to elect Judas is not contrary either to the goodness or truth of God, and so not to his righteousness or justice. For those places of Scripture which aim at God's vindicative justice, as it is threatened only against men guilty of sin, they no way concern the point in question. For the absolute distinct decrees of the Divine Predestination or Preterition are no acts or parts of his vindicative Justice; but they are free and absolute acts of that sovereign dominion which he hath in preparing and dispensing the effects of his goodness (which by promise are due to no man) according to the rule of his absolute will and pleasure.  
All which he saith in the 312 page requireth no new answer: It all runneth upon the old and usual mistake of the decree of Damnation in stead of the decree of Nonelection or negative Reprobation. Nonelection or negative Reprobation is no decree of damnation, neither in the Sublapsarians nor Supralapsarians opinion, neither did it lay a necessity of original or actual sin upon any man.  
It is Calvines opinion, 
c De occult. Dei provide. resp. ad 2m.  Lapsum Adae non fortuitum fuisse, sed occulto Dei decreto ordinatum. God foresaw Adam's fall: he had power to have hindered it; but he would not, because himself had decreed otherwise. This is the effect of calvin's doctrine. But as for the involving of men in sin and damnation out of his only will and pleasure, these are consequents falsely inferred upon calvin's doctrine, by himself disclaimed, and formerly refuted. 
d Ibid resp. ad 1m.  Totum illud de nudo puróque Dei arbitrio ex malitiae officina productum est. It was not God's absolute decree of Preterition but Adam's voluntary act of rebellion which brought sin and the guilt of sin upon himself and all his posterity. God having justly decreed that Adam's children should participate with him in his state of righteousness, did as justly decree that they should also participate in the state of sin.  
If this Author deny the propagation of sin from Adam, he must acknowledge himself a Pelagian. If he say it is unjust, which all Divines acknowledge to have happened according to the decree of God, I see not how he can clear himself from that crime wherewith he chargeth others.  
His whole discourse concerning original sin and the propagating thereof unto all mankind, is erroneous, in that he falsely presumeth that the Divine decrees must needs be effective or causative of all the events decreed: Whereas if the events be actions sinful, God's decrees are permissive and ordinative, not decrees of causing, much less necessitating, such evil actions, as hath been often told him. Be it granted that it is all one in substance to decree the misery of an innocent man, and to involve him in a sin that he may be brought to misery: We deny that the opposite decrees of Predestination and Preterition are decrees causing any innocent man's misery, or decrees involving, that is, (as this man understandeth it) necessarily causing any man's sin whereby he is brought to misery. For in calvin's opinion (with whom now he dealeth) the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation found all men in the state of sin and misery: That which cometh after is never the cause of that which went before. As for those who consider Election and Preterition before the absolute prevision of sin, they will never grant that negative Reprobation or Nonelection was the adjudging or decreeing of innocent angels or men unto eternal misery or punishment, but a decree of permitting innocent angels and men to incur eternal misery and punishment, and of not delivering them or freeing them out of that miserable estate. He is but dim-sighted in this controversy, who seethe not a formal difference in these decrees: So that God may justly do the one, though he cannot without crossing the ordinary revealed course of his Justice do the other.  
His second reason why absolute Reprobation is against God's Justice, is, Object. Because it maketh God to require faith in Christ of those to whom he hath precisely in his absolute purpose denied both a power to believe, and a Christ to believe in. And Zanchy saith, That every man is bound to believe that he is chosen in Christ to salvation, etc.  
I hold it improper to say that God commandeth or bindeth any man to believe his own Predestination or Election, Answ. though some learned Divines spoke in that manner. My reason is, Because we are bound by way of command to believe that only which the Prophets and Apostles were bound to preach unto us: Now God's Ministers never had, neither now have, any commission to preach the Predestination of this or that singular person unto any man, though they are bound in the judgement of charity to exclude no singular person out of the number of the elect. That which the Ministers of the Gospel require of us for the attaining of salvation is faith in Christ: and that which they command us concerning Predestination or election, is not the immediate believing of it as of an article of faith which they have in commission to preach unto us, but the doing of those things from whence à posteriori, the Spirit of God bearing witness unto our spirit, we come to have a comfortable and lively persuasion or assurance of our Adoption and Predestination: So that this persuasion, assurance, or believing of a man's singular Election, is rather solatium then mandatum, a comfort which God by his holy Spirit worketh in those who endeavour to live a sober, just and godly life, than a command which God by his Ministers enjoineth this or that man particularly to believe.  
As for believing in Christ, we grant that God by the Ministers of the Gospel commandeth all men to whom Christ is preached to believe in him: And in this command our common and wel-known conditions of being sinners and standing in need of a Saviour are only to be respected, not the distinct unknown conditions of men in Gods eternal and secret counsel predestinated or not-predestinated.  
But why is this command unjust quoad non-electos? The decree of Preterition neither taketh away any power of doing well, wherewith persons not-elected are endued; as we see verified in the non-elect angels, who were not stripped of their power of standing by God's decree of Not-electing them: neither is it a decree binding Gods hands from giving them sufficient grace to do many good acts, which they wilfully refuse to do. For Sufficient grace may stand with Nonelection or Reprobation; though Effectual grace doth not, as Divines commonly teach.  
And last of all, for power of believing; I would know what power many millions of men have to believe in Christ (though reprobated no otherwise than the Remonstrants acknowledge eternal Reprobation) who never heard nor ever shall hear of Christ? When he hath showed me what power of believing these men have, I will more easily show him that any not-elected person living in the Church hath the same, if not a nearer and greater.  
As for his terms of Possibilities and Impossibilities; they are so full of equivocations that it is hard to ground a good argument upon them. That is not impossible for any Viator to do for doing whereof it is possible for God to give sufficient grace. Now it is easy for God to give any not-elected person sufficient grace to repent and believe without any infringing of the eternal decree of his Nonelection. Again, that is not to be judged absolutely impossible for a man to do which, if himself by a voluntary act of his own hindered not, might by him be done. And thus we say the Non-elect have a power or possibility to believe or repent at the preaching of the Gospel: which power might be reduced into act, if the voluntary frowardness and resistivenesse of their own hearts were not the only hindering cause. Other power than this the Remonstrants know not how to found in all those whom themselves acknowledge to be under the immutable decree of eternal Reprobation. In their opinion therefore as well as in ours, when God commandeth reprobated or non-elected persons to repent, believe and finally to persevere, his commands should be contrary to justice, because supposing the perverseness and voluntary resistance of their wills (which God hath decreed to permit) their believing and persevering is impossible.  
It is not God's unfeigned will they should believe, Object. because he will not furnish them with necessary power to believe; and therefore he cannot justly tie them to believe: For than he should tie them to an act contrary to his determinate william.  
Answ. God's unfeigned will is that will of approbation wherein he maketh known to us in his holy word what he would have us do and what he would have us not do. God was as fare from feigning or simulation when he called Cain and Judas to repenting and believing as when he called David and Peter. But there is another will of God, ●hereby he decreeth in himself infallibly to produce the good acts of repenting in David ●nd Peter, and to permit Cain and Judas out ●f their own perverse wills to continued in ●heir unfaithfulness and impenitency. This ●ill is not revealed unto men, nor known ●ill it be effected; and therefore feigning or simulation being ad alterum, it is ridiculous ●o charge these decrees with simulation. So ●hat if God voluntate approbante doth unfeignedly like those things which he commands, there is no feigning in that william. ●f God voluntate decernente do infallibly ●ork or not work according to his own se●ret counsel, there is no falsity in that de●ree neither. Nor is there any contrariety ●n these wills: for many actions are in their ●wn kind and nature wellpleasing unto God, which notwithstanding God hath not determined to produce in this or that man. And yet we hold not that God hath determined to produce any bad actions in men, as impenitency, unbelief, or the like; because God willeth not that perverseness or pravi●ie which is the effective or productive cause of them, though he hath decreed the permission, or not remotion, of that pravity ●n omnibus non electis. 
e Altissiod. lib. 1. c. 19 p. 22. b. Vide Carthus. in 1m m, dist. 10 q. 3.  Deus est causa non-ap●ositionis gratiae quodammodo, scilicet per mo●um quiescendi, non agendi.  
The decree of Reprobation or absolute Nonelection is unjust, Object. because the non-elect have no object of faith, not Christ to believe in, and yet they are commanded to believe.  
Answ. Christ is an object of faith unto all who have a possibility and promise of salvation. Si crediderint, Si perseveraverint; these promises are general, and shall be truly performed unto all and every singular man that performeth the covenants. Nonelection or negative Reprobation is not an absolute denial of Christ as an object of faith to be propounded unto any man, nor a denial of salvation unto any man performing the condition; but a denial of that special grace and mercy without which God forseeth they will trample the blood of the covenant under their feet, and resolveth to permit them through their own voluntary wickedness so to do. Such men have part in the covenant, and are capable of the benefit of the covenant, if they perform the articles of the covenant: And the elect themselves are no otherwise capable of the benefit thereof than by believing and persevering. Here is the difference; The elect have faith and perseverance infallibly wrought in them by the grace prepared for them in their Predestination; the non-elect, having not such effectual grace prepared for them, continued voluntarily in their sins and unbelief. What the Remonstrants have to say against this I know not: I am sure S. Augustine saith, 
f De Gen. ad lit. 11.10.  Posset Deus horum voluntates convertere, quoniam omnipotens est; posset plané. Cur ergò non fecit? Quia noluit. Cur noluerit penès ipsum est. Neither are such men in the same case with the devils: For unto them Christ is not propounded for a Saviour upon any conditions: unto them God giveth no means inducing them to repentance; no encouragement, though they should repent: And yet (if 
g De perf. Divin. lib. 13. fol. 31.  Lessius, no enemy to the Remonstrants' doctrine, may be credited) the devils, if they might have had but that favour the non-elect have, would have repent, and not traduced it for cruelty and injustice as the Remonstrants do.  
And that this Author may see that the Contra-remonstrants put a difference betwixt the damned devils and the reprobates, dum sunt in statu viae; In the Collation at Hague, 
h pag. 124.  Non negamus Christum, say they, mortuum esse pro omnibus. Etsi infideles promeriti sunt condemnationem, 
p. 154.  tamen est adhuc via & ratio per quam condemnationem possunt evadere, nimirum, si credant: 
p. 155.  Neque enim ●ulli homini praecisè resecta est salutis spes. Potest peccator aliquis, etiam antequam credat, 
p. 156.  scire Christum pro se mortuum esse, quod ad sufficientiam meritorum attinet, imò verò quoad applicationem, si crediderit. The Remonstrants dare not promise' salvation unto any persons reprobated according to their decree founded upon prevision of their final infidelity and impenitency, but under these conditions, Si crediderint & poenituerint: We assure them of salvation under the same conditions, notwithstanding the absolute decree of their Nonelection. The Remonstrants cannot assign any grace or gracious operation of the Spirit of God which may stand truly with that decree of eternal Reprobation which they admit, and will not stand with that which we admit. It is therefore as true that Christ died for all men according to our doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation as according unto theirs.  
Absolute Reprobation maketh God unjust, Object. because it maketh him punish men for omission of an act which is made impossible by his own decree, etc.  
Answ. A fallacy obtruding that for a cause of men's sin which was no cause. God's decrees go before the events decreed: But in malis it is only antecessio ordinis non causalitatis. The decree of Reprobation as the Remonstrants put it, is eternal and immutable, it is antecedent to their act of sinning or misbelieving, which are all temporal; and yet they would say we wronged them if we should charge that eternal decree with causing their temporal rebellion or destruction. They wrong us as much. For let Reprobation be absolute or conditionate, it leaveth the same possibilities and the same liberty unto the agents. And there are the same difficulties in according the liberty of man's freewill with the infallible prescience of God, which are in according it with the absolute decrees of his Predestination. Those who are versed in the writings of the ancient Philosophers, Divines or Schoolmen, cannot be ignorant of this, though such as have confined their reading or (at lest) their belief to Arminius, 
Vide Ruiz. De scientia Dei, p. 252, 253, etc. & 265. 273. 285.  Corvinus, and men of that stamp, think when they have founded Gods eternal Predestination and Preterition upon an eternal prescience that they have removed all difficulties.   

To his oppugning our answers pag. 314, etc.  
FOr the decrees of Election and Reprobation; they have not reference to any capitulations, conditions, or promises, whereby God toeth himself to do thus or thus: but they are immanent eternal decrees, for affording or not affording indebita beneficia, or for affording them in greater or lesser measure, according to the absolute will and free pleasure of God the giver.  
There is no well-instructed understanding that will conceive it contrary to justice or contrary to mercy, for God in things o● this nature to do as he will with his own▪ Not human understanding purged from prejudice, corrupt affections, corrupt opinions and other impediments of right judgement, will think it unjust for God absolutely to decree the bringing of some men and angels unto eternal blessedness by preparing for them and bestowing upon them such means as he knoweth will and determineth shall bring them thereunto. And this we call absolute Predestination. Nor will he think it unjust for God absolutely to decree the permitting of some other angels and men to loose eternal blessedness by their own default, and to decree the putting them under such an order of providence as he infallibly knoweth they will abuse to the procuring of their certain misery. And this we call absolute Reprobation. Neither of these are decrees of remunerative or vindicative justice: they are not grounded upon any antecedent promise or indentment: And therefore his whole discourse to prove that God's justice is the selfsame with the civil or moral justice of men, is here altogether impertinent. I pass it over therefore with this animadversion, That if he extend divine justice to all acts and decrees of his absolute will, where by faithful promise he hath not bound himself to do the one way or the other, he will show himself much mistaken, if he accuse God of injustice for every act which would be very unjust were it done by men. Pride, fullness of bread, 
Ezek. 16.49.  abundance of idleness, neglect of the poor, were the sins for which Sodom was burned with fire and brimstone from heaven: But poor sucking infants guiltless of the same crimes were by God adjudged to undergo the same flames. Put this to the trial of reason, and it will seem cruel and unjust. Young indiscreet children for calling a Prophet Baldpate, were cast by God unto the bears: If an earthly judge should condemn children to be cast unto the bears or lions for the like fault, put him upon the trial of reason, and the judge himself will be found to have done contrary to justice, and to have deserved punishment. And to end in that example of infants, so often urged by this Author; If an earthly king or judge, being able to hinder, should suffer thousands of his harmless infant subjects to be tormented with pains, to be vexed by devils, to be snatched away with sudden death, he would be deemed careless, unjust, cruel: God seethe, and oftentimes suffereth all this to befall poor little babes, being most able to prevent it: call these do of God to trial of human reason, and it will never be able rightly to examine them. It is folly therefore to suppose that whosoever hath but the brain of a reasonable man, is able to fathom the depth of God's just judgements. We say rather with learned and modest Saint Augustine, 
i De civet. l. 2. c. 23. Vide l. 20. c. 2. & Gers. De cons. Theol. l. 1. prosâ 2. Judicia tua, o Deus, abyssus multa, Psal. 36.  Cujus judicia nemo plenè comprehendit, nemo justè reprehendit.  
This Author disliketh that we make Gods will such a rule of righteousness as that we may certainly infer, God willeth and worketh this; Therefore it is just he should s● will and work: Or, God willeth not or not worketh this; Therefore it is just he should neither will it nor work it.  
But he deceiveth himself, First, in that he will needs parallel and square the Divine justice unto the rule of civil and human justice, not only where God hath brought upon himself debitum fidelitatis, by promising or covenanting to do thus; but where he hath reserved unto himself liberriman potestatem of doing or not doing, of doing this or the contrary. For example, if God should not show mercy upon every sinner that repenteth, reason would say he dealt not justly; as it saith of men when they break their promise: But if God decree to soften one man's heart, and give him the grace of repentance and perseverance, and not to give the same graces to another, here it is not right reason, but blind and bold reason, which chargeth God with injustice. If God strike a petty sinner presently and spare a grand sinner till he be old in wickedness, suffering him to do much mischief, and knowing that he will do much mischief if he be spared, neither the sudden striking of the lesser sinner nor the longer sparing of the greater is contrary to Divine justice: and yet such dealing is not according to the rule of human civil justice allowable.  
Secondly, this man is deceived, in supposing the Justice of God (which is to do nothing contrary to the goodness of his own nature) to be such a rule as restraineth him, if he will be just in his deal, to one part of the contradiction. The rule of justice which toeth men to do justly, is such a rule as showeth them unjust when they do otherwise. But (as I noted formerly) in things where there is no express covenant or promise' on God's part, if he should pretermit that which he doth, and do that which he pretermitteth, if he should deal more mercifully with this man than he doth, or more severely with that, there were no injustice in it, nothing unbeseeming the Divine goodness. Impossible therefore it is to reduce God's justice in his decrees or acts to the rules of reason or human justice; since when these judge a decree or an action to hold square with the rule of justice, they judge the pretermitting of it or doing the contrary to be an act of injustice. But it fareth not so with God: and therefore by the general consent of all Divines the opinion of Abulandu● tending to this purpose is exploded: and th● Master of the Sentences concludeth against him, 
k Lomb. lib. 1. dist. 43.  Deus potest dimittere quae facit, & f●cere quae dimittit. God had not been unjust● if he had stricken David with sudden deat● in the midst of his adultery; neither was h● unjust in forbearing him and expecting hi● repentance. 
Acts 12.  God's will was just in executing present vengeance upon Herode for accepting the profane acclamation of the flattering people; and Gods will had been just if h● had decreed to have forborn him longer a● to have given him repentance. God needed not rules of human justice. 
l Altiss. tract. 19 quaest. 77.  Justitia D● essentia sua est, quae regula omnium est, & nul● regulatur. God's will is ordinatissima in se, ● propter hoc non indiget ordinante. Ordo eni● ordinante non indiget. And Carthusianus 
m In 4. dist. 46. qu. 1.  Totus ordo justitiae originaliter ad Divin● voluntatem reducitur. Quicquid Deus vul● justum est, nec propriè ejus voluntas restring●tur justitiâ. And our Anselmus telleth u● 
n Pros. c. 10  That when God punisheth wicked me● that it is just, because it is agreeable to the deserts; and when he spareth them, it is ju● too, because it is agreeable with his ow● goodness. No man therefore looking at th● rules of human justice only, can say of God, as we may of an earthly Judge, If he decree this, he decreeth justly; if he doth this, he doth justly: but if he decreeth or doth otherwise, he decreeth or doth unjustly; because where God hath not limited himself in his manner of dealing with men by his revealed word, there that is always 
o Vide Scot lib. 4. dist. 46. qu. 1.  just quod actualiter volitum est à Divina voluntate, & quia actualiter volitum est à Divina voluntate. It is true, God cannot decree nor will any thing but saluâ justitiâ; that is, He can do nothing contrajustitiam: yet he may decree and do many things praeter justitiam: he may freely decree and do many things where saluâ justitiâ he might as freely have decreed and done the contrary. God's will revealed is a rule of justice to us, & he commandeth us nothing contrary to this rule: But Gods own absolute will is it which regulateth his deal with us in all those things where he hath not made himself as it were a debtor by some revealed ordinance of his own making. Now the Predestination of Abel and the Preterition of Cain were decrees regulated by no former promises or indentments: and hence it followeth that it had been no act of injustice in God which way soever he had decreed. Hence Suarez, 
p Opusc. l. 2. c. 5. p. 174.  Cùm causa omnium aequalis esset, hunc elegit Deus suo arbitrio, illum non elegit.  
To his further reply we say, That the decrees of absolute Predestination and Preterition do no more draw after them an inevitable damnation of any man than the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation which the Remonstrants admit of. This hath been already proved, and therefore whilst he supposeth this, he beggeth a false principle which must never be granted him. We confess that absolute Reprobation clogged with those calumnies which he layeth upon it, of Making God the cause of sin, of Necessitating men's wills unto their inevitable damnation, must needs appear odious unto right reason: But it is calumniation, not right reason, which imposeth these consequents upon the absolute decrees of Election and Nonelection. Right reason rightly illuminated and sanctified will never forbidden a Christian to believe that God without any injustice might absolutely have elected and predestinated many whom he hath left inter non-electos, and might absolutely have left inter non-electos many whom he hath predestinated.  
What he saith to our third answer, is quite-besides the cushion. First, because we maintain that the absolute decrees do not more hinder God from giving any man a power of believing, or eschewing this or that sin, than the conditionate decrees for which he striveth. Secondly, because for Election and Nonelection, and for the preparation of effectual grace flowing from the one and denegation of effectual grace following the other, God was not tied either way by any revealed ordination or promise, as this Author erroneously conceiveth.  
As for God's law which cannot be kept without supernatural grace; we say, Men are as capable of any supernatural grace, considered under the absolute decrees maintained by S. Augustine and by the Church of England, as considered under the conditional decrees of late framed by Arminius and embraced by the Remonstrants.  
For his further pains in labouring to prove that God is bound to restore unto men power to believe; it needeth no answer till he have proved that the decree of Reprobation as it is fancied by the Remonstrants, affordeth God this liberty, and as it is taught by us bindeth Gods hands. We have declared already, that the decree of absolute Nonelection or negative Reprobation may stand with sufficiency of grace; and doth stand in our opinion with that kind of sufficiency which the Remonstrants themselves are forced to fly unto. For they never dare maintain, that God giveth unto every man reprobated in their sense proximam potentiam credendi; nor dare they maintain a sufficiency of saving grace administered and bestowed upon every singular person in the world. But they come in with limitations & exceptions; In causis universalibus, Nisi per eos steterit, Nisi defecerint gratiae oblatae, and the like. All this we can admit as well as the Remonstrants, and turn it to our advantage. For as it is a proof of absolute Predestination or Election, to have such grace prepared for a man as absolutely effecteth the end to which it is given; so it is a proof of absolute Nonelection or negative Reprobation to have such grace only prepared and given to a man as through the default of his own will worketh not that good end to which it aught to have served.  
I conclude therefore, That absolute Predestination and Reprobation are not more contrary to the Justice of God than the Arminian Predestination and Reprobation founded upon the prevision of such good or bad acts as men will do after they are born into this world.    

Treatise.  

4. Opposite to God's TRUTH.  FOurthly, it oppugneth the Truth and Sincerity of God.  
God is a God of truth, Deut. 32.4. Truth itself, John 14.6. so called, because he is the fountain of truth, and the perfection of truth without the lest mixture of falsehood. The strength of Israel cannot lie, 1. Sam. 15.29. Let God be true, and every man a liar (saith the Apostle:) that he might be justified in his say, and overcome when he is judged, Rom. 3.4. that is, Men may lie; for all men are liars: but God can never lie. If any man would go about to challenge him with untruth, his challenge would easily appear to be a calumny: The truth of God like the glorious sun will break through all the clouds of false accusations that seek to obscure it. Simile gaudet simili, Like loveth his like: God loveth such as are true of heart, Psal. 51.6. and hath an hypocrite in utter detestation: and therefore he must needs be true himself. No man (for aught I know) doubteth of it. But by absolute Reprobation God is made untrue and hypocritical in his deal with men, and in all matters apperteining to their eternal state; particularly, 1 in his Commands, ² in his Offers of grace and glory, ³ in his Threats, ⁴ passionate Wishes and Desires of men's chief good, and ⁵ in his Expostulations, and Commiserations also.  
I. In his (A) Commands. For by this doctrine God commandeth those men to repent and believe whom he secretly purposeth shall not believe. 
i Lib. contra Schafm. pag. 60. Etsi reprobos mandat Deus ut evangelio credant, non vult tamen ut credant.  Though God command reprobates to believe the gospel, yet he will not have them believe, saith Piscator. Now whom God commandeth to believe & repent; those he willeth outwardly should believe and repent; for by his commandments he signifieth his good will and pleasure: and he must inwardly and hearty will it too, or else he dissembleth. For words, if they be true, are an interpretation of the mind: when they are not, they are mere impostures and simulations.  
II. In his (B) Offers of grace and glory, which he maketh to such as refuse them and perish for refusing them, as well as to those who do accept them to their salvation. This is evident, Esay 65.2. I have spread out my hands all the day long. To whom? to a rebellious people. and Matt. 22. we read, that those men were invited to the wedding that came not. & Acts 3.26. there it is said to the Jews who had denied Christ, as vers. 14. To you hath God sent his son Jesus to bless you, in turning every one of you from your iniquities. How often (saith Christ) would I have gathered you? speaking of such as neglected their visitation, and so lost their salvation. It is evident also by reason. For as many as are under the commandment, are under the promise too, as we may see Acts 2.38, 39: Repent, and be baptised every one of you, and ye shall receive the gift of the holy Ghost: for to you and your children is the promise made. In which words Peter maketh the command and the promise of equal extent, both universal. And there is cause why: For he maketh the promise his motive to persuade obedience to the command: and it would not have reached home, if it had not respected all those to whom the command was given. No man, reprobate or other, thinketh any less, Every man that heareth the Gospel preached, taketh himself to be under the gracious offer of eternal life, and upon these thoughts hath some desires, some hopes of it, and stirreth up himself to forsake some pleasing sins which otherwise he would not part with, and do some unwelcome duties which otherwise he would not do. But now God's meaning is (by this doctrine) that the most of those to whom he offereth his grace and glory, shall have neither. And so Piscator saith, 
k De praed. count. Schafm. pag. 74. Gratia non offertur à Deo singulis (licèt vocatis) animo communicandi eam, sed solis electis.  Grace is not offered by God even to those who are called, with a meaning to give it, but to the elect only. In the same book he hath such another speech; 
l Non vult Deus reprobos credere, licèt linguâ Profiteatur se velle, pag. 143.  Though God in words protest he would have reprobates to believe, yet indeed he will not have them. They make God to deal with men in matters of salvation as the poets feign the gods to have dealt with poor Tantalus: They placed him in a clear and goodly river up to the very chin, and under a tree which bore much sweet and pleasant fruit that did almost touch his lips: but this they did with a purpose that he should taste of neither: for when he put his mouth to the water to drink, it waved away from him; & when he reached his hand to the fruit to have eaten of it, it withdrew itself presently out of his reach, so as he could neither eat nor drink. Just so dealeth God with reprobates, by their doctrine: He placeth them under the plentiful means of salvation, offereth it to them so plainly that men would think they might have it when they will, and yet intendeth fully they shall never have it, withholding from them either the first grace that they cannot believe, or the second grace that they cannot persevere. Did not those gods delude Tantalus? Yes doubtless. And if God do so with reprobates, what doth he but delude them and dissemble with them in his fairest and likeliest offers of salvation that he maketh them? And this do Zanchius and Bucer grant by evident consequence, as appeareth by a speech or two of theirs, which cannot stand with their conclusion, and therefore (I suppose) fell unwarily from them. Zanchius telleth us roundly, that every man who is called, is bound to think that he is elected, otherwise he doth offer great injury to God, and 
m Zanch. l. 5. De nat. Dei, c●p. 2. Perstringere Deum mendacii, qui illi in verbo dicit se velle salutem ejus, & in hunc finem ad Christum vocasse.  accuse him of lying, which saith to him in his word, that he desireth his salvation, and for this cause hath called him. In which speech he plainly implieth, that if God call a man whom he hath absolutely rejected, he doth but delude him when he calleth him. The like speech hath Bucer; 
n Bucer. in c. 8. ad Rom. qu. de praed. Primum quod Deo debes, est ut credas esse te ab eo praedestinatum. Nam id ni credas, facis eum tibi, cùm te ad salutem vocat per evangelium, illudere.  A man must believe that he is predestinate, or else he maketh God to mook him when he calleth him. A man therefore that is not predestinate but an absolute reprobate, when he is called to salvation, is but deluded: It is the necessary resultance of their speeches. If a creditor should resolve upon no terms to forgive his debtor one farthing of his debt, and yet make him offers to remit the whole upon some conditions, and bind his offers with a deep and solemn oath, would not we say that he were a rank dissembler and a mere deluder of his poor debtor? We can say no less of God, if it be true that he hath irrevocably decreed at no hand to save such particular men, and yet promiseth and sweareth that he will save them if they will believe his promises and repent. What can such oaths and promises be but mere delusions of miserable men?  
III. In his (C) Threats and Comminations also by this doctrine is God made to be hollow and deceitful. For against what sins are threats denounced? Always against actual sins: We never read that they are thundered out against us for original sin: They intimate therefore that the sins for which men go to hell, are their actual transgressions. But if it be true that God decreed men to hell for original sin, that which those threats import and signify is not true, and so God is not sincere in them. Besides, all threaten imply that the evil threatened may be avoided: for therefore are they denounced, that men might by them be brought to repentance, and so escape the evils threatened: But if some men be peremptorily ordained to destruction, than their destruction cannot be prevented: and so the threaten of damnation in this respect also do signify an untruth, and God in them dealeth not plainly with men.  
iv In all the (D) other things before mentioned is God full of guile too (by this opinion;) namely, in his 1. Passionate Wishes, that even those men might repent that repent not, and might be saved that through their impenitency are not saved. Of these we read, Deut. 5.29. O that there were such a heart in them to fear me, that it might go well with them. and Psal. 81.11. O that my people had harkened, and Israel had walked in my ways, etc. and Esay 48.18. O that thou hadst harkened to my commandments, etc. 2. In his mournful Expostulations. Esay 5.3. Judge, I pray you, between me and my vineyard: what could I have done more for my vineyard? And Jerem. 2. throughout the whole chapter, especially verse 31. Have I been a wilderness to Israel, or a land of darkness? and verse 32. Can a maid forget her ornaments, or a bride her attire? yet my people have forgotten me days without number. Ezek. 33.11. Turn ye, turn ye: why will ye die, O house of Israel? 3. In his melting Commiserations of the woeful condition of foolish men who would not be reclaimed. How shall I give thee up, O Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, O Israel? My repentings ar● kindled together, my heart is turned within me, Hos. 11.8▪ O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killest the prophets, and stone●● them that are sent to thee, etc. In all these there is but little sincerity, if there be a secret resolution that the most of those towards whom those wishes, chide and pitiful bemoning are used, shall be damned without remedy. God's fairest offers, his sweetest invitations, his greatest sympathies, and amplest courtesies, if this doctrine be true, come little short (I think) of Absaloms' feast, Joabs' congee, the kiss of Juda● and the hyena's tears. For in all these aliud animo vult, a●●ud verbis significat, he saith one thing and meaneth another▪ and therefore dissembleth.  
Nay, the whole Ministry (wherein God commandeth, offereth, chideth, entreateth, lamenteth, etc.) if this be true, is but a mere imposture, a giving of words without any meaning of answerable deeds, and an imposture so much the greater, by how much the show of kindness is the heartier. For how can a good thing be offered with stronger shows of a good meaning, than when it is offered with exhortations and entreaties to accept it, with clear demonstrations of the excellencies of it, with unfeigned wishes that the parties to whom it is offered would accept it, and bitter lamentations for their folly in refusing it? With all these enforcements i● Gods tender of salvation to reprobates accompanied, and therefore in show most hearty and serious. In a word, thus speaketh (E) God (by his doctrine) to reprobates in th● ministry; O ye reprobates, once most dearly beloved of m● in your father Adam, but now extremely and implacably hated, and by mine eternal and uncontrollable order sealed up under invincible sin and misery; amend your lives, and believe in the name of mine onely-begotten Son. If ye repen● and believe not, there is no remedy, ye must be damned: but if ye repent and believe, ye shall be saved; though your sins be as read as scarlet, I will make them as white as wool. Think not that I would have you die: for I swear, As I live, I will not the death of him that dyeth; I would have no man to perish, but all to come to repentance. I beseech you therefore be reconciled. I have cried and called unto you, I have a long time waited upon you, that ye might repent, and still am I knocking at the doors of your hearts for entrance. O that there were a heart in you to fear me and keep my commandments, that it might go well with you for ever. What shall I do unto you? how shall I entreat you? Will ye not be made clean? When will it once be? Can God speak thus to reprobates, who by his own decree shall never repent nor be saved, without the deepest dissimulation?  
That which is usually said to clear the absolute decree from this crimination, is, That God wisheth the salvation of the reprobate seriously, but not absolutely: he would have those men saved who are not saved, but yet upon condition they will repent and believe: And therefore, though they do perish, yet God is candid and sincere in his offers of salvation to them: for therefore do they perish, because they perform not the condition, and not because God offereth not salvation seriously unto them.  
But this answer is too short. It is true (F) indeed, God will have all men to be saved upon condition only that they will believe and repent, according to that speech of S. Ambrose, Deus vult omnes salvari, si & ipsi velint, God would have all to be saved, if they themselves would. For if he would absolutely have it so, what can hinder it? who hath resisted his will? And it is true likewise, that a conditional promise may be serious as well as an absolute: but than the condition must be possible to them to whom the promise is made, and the performance of the condition must be a part of Gods will as well as the salvation promised; or else the promise cannot be candid and sincere. Conditio est oblata potéstas aliquid eligendi, A condition is the offer of a power of choice. Where there is no liberty of choice afforded, there ●is no true condition appointed. In substance it is all one to offer a courtesy under a condition (G) not possible, and not to offer it at all; and in circumstance it is much worse. In substance all one. The Lawyers tell us that a contract made sub conditione impraestabili nullus aestimatur, under a condition not possible, is esteemed no bargain. And the Logicians rule is, That 
o Conditionalis propositio quae habet annexam conditionem impossibilem, aequipollet simpliciter neganti.  a conditional proposition which hath an impossible condition annexed to it, is equivalent to a bore negation. It is all one for me to offer a piece of money to on● blind man upon condition he will open his eyes and tell me what piece of money it is and what stamp it hath, and to deny it flatly to another: For the one hath it no more than the other. And it is all one for a man that hath a daughter to bestow in marriage, to tell her suitor, I will give you my daughter, i● you will span the earth, or touch the heavens with your finger, and to tell him plainly, Set your heart at rest; I will never bestow her upon you: For the suitor speedeth both ways alike. And it is in circumstance a great deal worse. For it is a denial under colour of the contrary, a denial joined with a scoff, a derision, as was that of the Jebusites, 2. Sam. 5.6. who told David that he should not enter into the fort of Zion except he took away the blind and the lame. Their meaning was, They would never deliver it up unto him: and because they thought it impossible for him to take away the blind and the lame, they told him if he did so, than they would yield it up. It was an ironical and scoffing denial of his demand. If the King should make an unrepealable law, that no German should be made a citizen of London or free denizen of the Kingdom, and than make a decree to give some bountiful gratuities, but to the citizens of London or to the subjects of the Kingdom only, and to none but them; and yet for all this should command it to be proclaimed, that he will give them to the Germans upon condition they will be made freemen of London, or be incorporated into the Kingdom: would not any man say, that the King in this case did dissemble and delude the poor Dutchmen? And if any should say, there would be no dissembling in it; for if they would become citizens or subjects, they should have the promised gratuities: a man might truly answer, that therefore the King doth sergeant and cozen them, because he maketh a tender of them upon a condition not possible by his own decree. In like manner, if God have made a decree, that such men shall never believe, and yet offer them heaven on condition they will believe; it may most truly be said, that God doth not only deny them heaven, but deny it with a bitter derision, which is fare from that candour and goodness that dwelleth in him.  
And thus have I shown the contrariety of this opinion to four principal Attributes of God: which is my second general reason against it.  

Answer. Whether absolute Reprobation oppugn the Truth and Sincerity of God.  
WE grant it is impossible for God to be either untrue in his say and promises, or hypocritical in his deal or actions: And here we might in one word cut the sinews of his whole discourse with this general Answer, That the eternal decrees of Election and Reprobation, as they were terminated unto singular persons before they had any being in nature, are not uttered or declared by any revealed word, promise, ordination, or convention made betwixt God and us. Be the decrees therefore whereby some are elected eternally, others eternally non-elected, never so absolute, they cannot oppugn the truth of God's word or fidelity of his promise, where no word or promise was ever revealed or made to any man. As for God's deal and temporal actions with men, there is no more difficulty in clearing them from hypocrisy holding Election and Reprobation as we do, than there is, holding it as Arminius doth.  
But let us come to satisfy his particular objections. First, absolute Reprobation argueth not hypocrisy in God, commanding belief or repentance unto any man. The reason is, Because when God commandeth any thing which is good, just and holy, he truly and unfeignedly liketh and loveth such actions, and can do no other, his own natural goodness and holiness terminating voluntatem Divinae complacentiae unto all holy actions by whomsoever performed. If God should command any person not-elected to believe, to live soberly, justly and godlily in this present world, and should dislike him for so doing, here were dissembling: but to command Cain or Judas to repent and believe, though God from all eternity purposed to deny them that special effectual grace without which he knew they would never repent or believe, here is no dissembling. God's commands intimate what is wellpleasing unto him, if it be done, not what himself by special grace prepared for some men hath eternally and infallibly purposed to make them do. God is not truly said to purpose that the reprobate should not believe, unless it could be showed that the causes of their unbelief flow from his eternal decree or purpose of Nonelection.  
The Remonstrants will not deny that the decree of Cains or Judas his Reprobation was both eternal & immutable; 
Corvinus.  neither can they affirm that God eternally and secretly in his own counsels purposed to make them repent or believe, but only to administer such graces unto them as should either convert them or leave them inexcusable. We say the same: and therefore a secret purpose of making them not believe, can be not more fastened upon our doctrines than upon theirs; because that is only a defect or an omission, and therefore must be reduced only to the defective will of man, and not to Gods will or purpose, which cannot be the cause of deficiency.  
Secondly, absolute Reprobation doth not oppose God's truth in his offers of grace and glory to such as refuse them and perish for refusing them. If it did, the Remonstrants were in no better case with their Election and Nonelection or Reprobation founded upon an eternal infallible prescience, than we that found the distinct decrees upon Gods absolute william. For this prescience supposed, Arminius himself granteth an eternal, immutable and absolute decree, 
a Decl. seat. pag. 47.  quo Deus decrevit singulares & certas personas salvare & damnare. And reason telleth us, that every conditional proposition, purificatâ conditione, transit in absolutam. God therefore, who eternally saw Judas as finally impenitent, and with whom Judas his final impenitency was not considered as a future uncertain condition, 
Vide Coll. Hag. 111.  but as a thing certain and present, according to the Remonstrants own doctrine) could pass no other than an absolute decree of Reprobation upon him. Now if this decree hindereth not the offers of Divine grace unto any man, nor falsifieth the universal promises, not more doth the other. For the absolute decree of Election as we conceive of it is not of this form or tenor, I will save Peter whether he will believe or not believe, repen● or not repent, but, I will save Peter by preparing for him such special grace as shall infallibly 'cause him to believe and repent. And the decree of Reprobation is not thus to be conceived, I will damn Judas whether he believe or not believe, repent or not repent; for this were contrary to the truth of the evangelical promises: but thus, I am absolutely determined not to give unto Judas that special grace which would 'cause him to believe and repent; and I am absolutely purposed to permit him to incur his own damnation by his voluntary obstinacy and final impenitency. These promises or indentments upon which the temporal atteinment of salvation is suspended, or the temporal incurring of damnation, are as universal, as firm, as truly on God's part performed according to our doctrine of absolute Election and Preterition as according unto theirs.  
For grace offered; God's meaning must always be interpreted according to the known nature of the means, and not according to the unknown will of God concerning the infallible event or success of the means. God's meaning when he offereth any grace unto men, is, that they should perform such actions whereunto such grace conduceth: And his meaning when he promiseth glory to any man if he believe and persevere, is, truly to perform it if he do so. But it is not always God's absolute will to cause men to use his grace unto their own good, nor to 'cause them to perform those conditions unto which eternal glory is promised. If the Remonstrants will have nothing termed God's meaning but this absolute will, in their opinion as well as in ours it will follow that God had no meaning to give Cain or Judas saving grace or glory.  
As for his poetical fiction, it will make not more against us than himself; because there is no power or grace by his conditionate Predestination and Reprobation afforded unto persons not-elected, which may not be as well afforded according unto our doctrine, as we have often already showed.  
For Zanchius and Bucers' opinion concerning the command of believing a man's singular Election or Predestination, I have formerly expressed my judgement, which I submit unto the learned. If there were such a necessary universal command, only upon this reason, because the grace of vocation is infallibly frustrated by all the Non-elect, this being true as well in the Remonstrants' opinion as ours, this mandate of believing a man's singular Election would reach unto them as well as unto us. And all which they talk of mere delusions of men not-elected (in regard there is an eternal purpose of God to permit them to make all grace offered unto them fruitless) fighteth against themselves as much as against us. For they dare not deny this evident truth; and they acknowledge an eternal, an immutable, irrevocable decree o● Reprobation as well as we. Which decre● being established (as they would have it upon the eternal Divine Prescience befor● the foundations of the world were laid they are as absolutely reprobated at th● time of their calling according to their opinion as ours.  
For his comparison of a Creditor and 〈◊〉 Debtor, it hath no more force against absolute Predestination and Reprobation the● against that Predestination and Reprobation which himself admitteth: For th● conditional offer of pardon standeth alike firm unto both. As for the power of believing, whether Judas be considered as eternally reprobated upon the eternal prescience or otherwise, nothing hindereth but God may give him the same power both ways. Last of all, for the decree of Damnation, it is every whit as irrevocable in Arminius his new opinion as in the opinion of S. Augustine. If than the offer of grace and salvation unto men eternally and irrevocably reprobated be not merely delusorie in their opinion, not more is it according to our doctrine.  
For Gods threatening of punishment against sin, I wonder how this Author dareth restrain it only to the actual sins committed by this and that singular person. Mortem morieris, 
Rom 5.14.  was in the judgement of the Catholic Church a punishment denounced against Adam's posterity as well as against himself; and by that personal sin of his every singular person descending from his loins is by nature the child of wrath. And, 
Eph. 2.3.  if this Author will give us leave to believe our ixth Article, that corruption of nature which we draw from Adam deserveth God's wrath and damnation. Unto what manner or degree of punishment infants unregenerate are condemned, we will not curiously debate; but for this man's reasons who goeth about to exempt them from all sin and punishment, they savour so ●ankly of Pelagianism that we will not meddle with them.  
For God's Wishes, Expostulations, Commiserations, and the like, it will not follow that they are feigned and mere delusions, because the eternal immanent decrees of Election or Reprobation are absolute and unchangeable: For were it so, the Remonstrants can not better defend themselves from these objections than we. But it must here be first of all considered, that Reprobatio aeterna nihil ponit in reprobato. It putteth only in God a firm decree of permitting such persons to fall into final sin, and for it a firm decree of condemning them unto eternal punishment. This being granted on all sides, it cannot reasonably be conceived that God should properly be said to wish the repentance or salvation of Cain, Judas, or any not-elected person. They are (as before hath been touched) things in the first consideration simply good; and therefore simplex complacentia Divina doth properly agreed unto them: and that is all which can be truly inferred from such wishes, either in our doctrine or the doctrine of the Remonstrants. And this is enough to defend them from being delusory, though God have eternally decreed to permit Cain and Judas to abuse the means of repentance, and to continued in their impenitency.  
For Expostulations, we say they imply displicentiam Divinam against such persons and actions as cross the revealed law of Gods will: and this is a true and not feigned displeasure: But they do not import that God wanted power to have converted such persons, and to have wrought their wills unto the practice of the contrary good actions, had he eternally decreed to show them this special mercy. Neither do they import that God had made no such decree of denying or withholding from Cain and Judas that special grace without which he knew they would rush upon their everlasting perdition.  
As for the Divine Commiseration of sinners, it showeth that their death and damnation are not things primarily wellpleasing unto God: but it showeth not that God must become an hypocrite and a dissembler, if he have eternally decreed to permit them to incur death & damnation by their own default. For God's mercy being actio sublevantis and not passio condolentis, it toeth him not to do all he can for redeeming any man out of his misery; but his action is ordered and limited by his own freewill. It is the height and richeses of God's mercy which from everlasting hath prepared for the Elect only, and in time bestoweth upon them only that special & effectual grace which infallibly bringeth them unto glory. It is a lower degree of mercy (and yet true mercy too) which is showed to the Non-elect or Reprobate, in preparing for them and bestowing upon them such means of grace as by their own default are made ineffectual.  
And it is not contrary to Divine mercy to decree this permitting of them to the deficiency of their own freewill, that so the Elect may see what a broken reed they lean upon, who will have the eternal decree of their Election and Salvation founded on their own foreseen good acts of repentance, faith and perseverance, and not upon any special mercy of God predestinating them to these good and gracious acts, and so infallibly bringing them unto the kingdom of glory.  
To discover briefly the main point wherein this Author deceiveth himself in this whole discourse, it is this; He thinketh all is feigned and hypocritical which God doth or offereth unto men not-elected in ordine ad salutem, if he have eternally decreed to permit them to fail in the use of such means and to continued impenitent, if he have eternally decreed to condemn them for this their voluntary rebellion. Other absolute Reprobation than this we defend not: and if this maketh God's deal with the Non-elect hypocritical, we must deny the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation, or at lest deny them to be eternal, which no judicious Divine will ever do.  
For his speech uttered in the person of God, from whence he would infer, that if in the decree of Reprobation it be certain & immutable that Cain, Judas, or any other persons not-elected, shall never repent and be saved, than all which God saith or doth for the converting or saving of such persons is deep dissimulation; many errors may be descried in those few lines.  
First, he supposeth the eternal acts and decrees of Predestination and Reprobation to be uncertain quoad eventum, and to be mutable in time into the contrary. A gross error even in the school of Arminius. Secondly, he supposeth Nonelection or Reprobation to be an act of hatred towards angels and men not-elected; which hath been proved false. Thirdly, he imagineth the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation to seal men up under a necessity of doing well and being saved, or of sinning and being damned: whereas they stand well with freedom of man's william. Fourthly, he implieth that whereas God useth means to effect any good end in men, if he have eternally decreed to permit them to abuse those means, & to condemn them eternally for abusing them, that this argueth dissembling in God. All these erroneous imaginations discover themselves in that short speech. And that which yet more discovereth the weakness of his inference; The eternal and immutable decrees of Predestination and Reprobation (as they are conceived by the Remonstrants themselves) should make all Gods temporal say and deal with reprobated persons, feigned and hypocritical, if there were any manner of strength in his manner of reasoning.  
The absolute decree of Reprobation truly understood doth no more oppose the truth of Evangelicall promises, than the Arminian or Remonstrants' Reprobation: neither doth it make the conditions one jote less possible than theirs: neither doth it deny any will in God of such men's conversion or salvation which they according to their opinion can truly affirm to be in God. We profess ingenuously, that the eternal decree of Nonelection or negative Reprobation, doth put in ment aut voluntate Divina, absolute denial of that special effectual grace whereby the Creator intendeth to bring his creature infallibly unto glory. And if the Remonstrants say that the eternal Reprobation of singular persons (as it is laid down by themselves) doth not contain the same negation, they say that which they are never able to maintain. Let us clear this by example.  
Before the foundations of the world were laid, and before the angels were ●reated, by an absolute decree of the Di●ine will they were distinguished in Electos & Non-electos. For all this the not-elect angels had a possibility of not-rebelling against God, a possibility of attaining eternal happiness had they not rebelled, a sufficiency ●f Divine grace given them to have preserved them from rebellion, had they not by 〈◊〉 voluntary act of their own abused that ●race. And to come to the eternal and im●utable decrees of Predestination and Reprobation, as they concern singular persons ●uoad numerum numerantem & numeratum, ●ernally and immutably distinguished in ele●os & reprobatos; This eternal decree hindered not God from creating Adam with a sufficiency of grace, with a possibility of ●anding, and by standing of preserving his posterity in the state of righteousness, and 〈◊〉 bringing them to an estate of happi●esse.  
So that it is evident, that Sufficiency and possibility of grace and glory may stand together with the absolute decree of Nonelection.  
As for particular persons considered in the state of sin wherein all mankind now li●h, the decree of Reprobation maketh not ●penting and believing impossible conditions unto them: It is some voluntary intervenient act or omission which maketh them so And if this Author term their final repentance impossible, because never any of th● Non-elect repent and by repentance attained salvation, he must yield that even tha● eternal decree of Reprobation upon prescience, which himself admitteth, maketh the● repenting, final believing, and salvation impossible. His rule of law therefore the cond●tione impraestabili doth no more conce●us, who place the distinct decrees of Predestination and Reprobation before the absolute prescience of men's final perseverant and men's final impenitency, than it do● those that bring them in after. For possibilities and impossibilities are just the sam● and neither greater nor lesser, in the one wa● than in the other. If the decree of Preterition or Reprobation were a decree of forbidding or hindering any man's repenting believing, or a decree necessitating the wi● of men to obstinacy and infidelity, his sim● of a King's unrepealable law were to so● purpose: But this being altogether fal● that is altogether frivolous, because no su● impossibility is caused by God's decree Reprobation.    

Treatise.  
THirdly, it is contrary to the use and end of God's gifts bestowed upon men: Which gifts are of two sorts: 1. 
III. It is contrary to the use and end of GOD'S GIFTS to men.  Gifts 〈◊〉 Nature; our Creation, Sustentation, Preservation, together with Health, Strength, Beauty, Wisdom, etc. 2. Gifts 〈◊〉 Grace; which have a more immediate relation to everlast●g life, and are means either of purchasing salvation or of ●plying it. Means of purchasing it, are the coming of ●hrist into the world, and the Sacrificing of himself on the ●osse. Means of applying it, are the Ministry of the word ●d Sacraments, the Long-suffering of God, the Enlighten●g of men's understandings, the Plantation of many excel●t virtues in their hearts, with many more of the like sort. ●ow of these endowments of Nature and Grace what the ●e use and end is, the Scripture doth plainly and particu●y show us.  
First, for gifts of Nature, we found (A) them bestowed ●n all that have them, for the encouraging and enabling them to serve God and save their souls. For Acts 14.16, the Apostle saith, that God (even in those times in which suffered the Gentiles to walk in their own ways, & withed from them the light of his holy word) did give unto the ople of the world rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, ●ng their hearts with food and gladness, and in so doing ●eft not himself among them without witness. This im●h, that therefore he gave them these good things that he aht make himself known unto them, and so might draw ●nto glorify him according to the knowledge which they 〈◊〉 of him. Acts 17.26. the Apostle saith directly, that ●efore men are made and placed in this world and appoint●● their several times and dwellings, that they might seek found God, that is, that they might serve him and save their 〈◊〉. For what is it to seek God but to serve him? and what to found God but to enjoy his face and favour here and in ●en? To this purpose Prosper, 
p Prosp. De voc. Gent. l. 2. c. 4. p. 828 Coelum quip, ac● & ●●rare, omnísque creatura quae videri & intelligi potest, ad hanc praecipuè ●sita est humani generis utilitatem, ut natura rationalis de contemplatione ●ecierum, de experimentis tot bonorum, de perceptione tot munerum,, ad cul● dilectionem sui imbueretur Autoris, implente omnia Spiritu Dei, in quo vi●, movemur & sumus.  Therefore, saith he, is ●y creature made and ordained especially, that mankind, ●h is endued with knowledge and ability to discourse, might by the sight of so many goodly sorts of creatures and th● taste of so many blessings be drawn to the love and service● his and their Maker. And a little after he saith, in the sa●● chapter, 
q Ibid. Quod ergò in Israel per constitutionem legis & prophetica eloquia gerebatur, hoc in universis nationibus totius creaturae testimonia & bonitatis Dei miracula semper egerunt.  Look of what use the Law and Prophets were to t●● Israelites, of the same use were the gifts of Creation & Providence to the Gentiles. God never intended to deal with th● Gentiles as the foulmouthed Manichees said he dealt wit● the Jews, to feed and fat them up with outward and mo●● common blessings, as so many hogs and swine with husks an● acorns, but to draw them up by these to an expectations better things and a careful endeavour to please God, that 〈◊〉 they might obtain them. The end of all creatures and of a● created gifts bestowed upon man is subordinate to the end 〈◊〉 man. Man's end is to glorify God upon earth, and enjoy perpetual society with him in heaven; and the end of those gil● is to direct and encourage man to achieve that high and excellent end to which his Creator had appointed him.  
Now for the gifts of grace, they likewise are given to 〈◊〉 them that enjoy them for the same use and end too.  
For I first, Christ came into the world, not that he might be a rock of offence at which the greater part of men sho●●● stumble and fall, but to shed his blood, and by that bloud● purchase salvation for all mankind, not only for those 〈◊〉 are saved, but for those also who through their wilful unbelief and impenitency are not saved; as we may see John 3.11. God sent his Son (saith the Son) into the world, not 〈◊〉 condemn the world, but that the world through him might 〈◊〉 saved. In which words the end of his coming is set dow● 1. Negatively, not to condemn the world; 2. Affirmatively but that the world through him might be saved: and therefore very fully. The like speech we have John 12.47. I ca●not to judge the world, but to save it. These negation joined with affirmations show that the salvation of all me● was the only end of Christ's coming, the end exclusively: o● other end was properly intended by it but this. The Sonne● man came to seek and to save what was lost, Luke 19 1● Therefore he came to save every man; for every man was lo●● And Acts 3.26. To you (saith S. Peter) hath God sent 〈◊〉 Son Jesus; to bless you, in turning every one of you fr●● your iniquity; every one of you, you that reject him as well 〈◊〉 you that receive him. The end than of Christ's coming in● the world was the Salvation of all and every man therein.  
II. The ministry of the Word and Sacraments is giv● also and appointed for the same end, and is in its own proper nature and use an instrument of conveying the Spirit of regeneration to those that live under it, and to all those. Better proofs for this I cannot have than those which our reverend Divines (B) at Dort gathered to my hand. Esay 59.21. 
Suffrag. Brit. pag. 30, 31. art. 2. Thes. 5  This is my covenant with them, saith the Lord, My spirit that is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not departed out of thy mouth nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor seeds seed for ever. HINC PATET (say they) From these words it appeareth, that the Word and Spirit are joined in the ministry of the Word with an inseparable band, by the promise of God. Hence is is that the Ministers of the new Testament are called Ministers not of the letter but of the Spirit; not of the letter that killeth, but of the Spirit that giveth life, 2. Cor. 3.6. And the ministry of the Gospel is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the ministry of the Spirit, in the same place, verse. 8. Hence also is the Gospel called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Grace bringing salvation, Tit. 2.11. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the word of reconciliation, 2. Cor. 5.19. To these let me add 1. Pet. 1.23. where the word is called the seed of the new birth; and 2. Cor. 5.20. where Ministers are called ●mbassadours for Christ to beseech men to be reconciled to God. They are so called, to show that the word preached is by God's appointment an instrument to make men new creatures, and that the proper matter of Ministers errands is reconciliation with God, and the natural fruit of it is in God's intent not the obduration and destruction but the conversion and salvation of men. The same Authors out of John 15.22. IF I HAD NOT COME AND SPOKEN UNTO THEM, THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE HAD SIN, do say it is evident, that Christ in his preaching did administer so much inward grace 〈◊〉 was sufficient (C) to convince those that rejected the Gospel of positive unbelief, and tender them obnoxious to just punishment; and by good consequence (say I) so much as sufficed by their good husbandry to have converted and saved them: for that grace leaveth none without excuse which is not sufficient to convert them. I will conclude what they say of this gracious intention of God in the ministry of the word with that speech of Prospers cited by them in the same place; 
r Prosper. ad cap. Gall. resp. ad obj. 4 Non omnes vocari ad gratiam eos, quibus omnibus evangelium praedicatur, non rectè dicitur, etiamsi sint qui evangelio non obaudiunt.  They that say that all those to whom the Gospel is preached (even those that obey not the Gospel) are not called ●o grace, they say an untruth. God looked for Grapes, saith ●he text, Esay 5.2. What doth this imply, but that it was Gods principal aim in the husbandry which he bestowe● upon the Church of Israel, that it should bring forth goo● fruit, though in the event it did not? How often would I hav● gathered you, saith Christ to Jerusalem, Matth. 23.37. These things, saith he, have I spoken to you, that ye might be saved▪ But ye will not come to me, that ye might have life, John 5▪ 34, 40. in those words intimating no less than this, That i● was his full intent by his preaching to gather and to save thos● very particular men that in the end were not gathered nor saved through the contempt or neglect of Christ's ministry.  
Touching the (D) Sacraments, this is also the use and end f●● which they were ordained: as we may see, Luke 7.30. where we have these words, But the Scribes and Pharisees and expounders of the Law despised the counsel of God against themselves, and were not baptised of John. In which words th● much is evidently included, That it was God's counsel & purpose in John's baptism to bring them to Christ, and in him to heaven. So much also is said of his baptism, Mark 1.4. John did baptise in the wilderness, and preach the baptism of repentance and remission of sins. If this were the end of Johns, much more is it the end of Christ's baptism; it being more excellent than Johns was, not in substance, but in the fullness of grace administered and dispensed by it. All that have be●● baptised into Christ (saith the Apostle) have been baptised into his death, Rom. 6.3. All ye that have been baptised into Christ, have put on Christ, Gal. 3.27. The very phrases there used show that Baptism is in its original intention an instrument of uniting men to Christ, and giving them communion with him in the benefits of his death. Except a man be born again of water, saith our Saviour, and of the Spirit, he cannot &c. John 3.5. In which words are these two things: 1. The necessity of regeneration, Except a man be born again. 2. The working cause of it: Efficient, the Spirit; Instrumental, the Sacrament of Baptism, there called Water from the outward matter of it. Baptism therefore is appointed to be a means of regeneration to all those that are baptised; & doth effect it in all who do not put an obstacle in the way to hinder it. So much doth the Apostle ascribe to Baptism, Eph. 5.26. and for this cause doth signify it with this title, The laver of regeneration, Tit. 3.5. I will shut up this with Acts 2.38. where Peter saith, Repent, and be baptised every one of you for the remission of sins, plainly implying, that therefore is Baptism ordained to be received, that those who do receive it might have their sins remitted.  
This is also God's intent in the Lord's Supper. This is my ●ody, saith Christ, and this is my blood, Matth. 26.26, 27. in ●hose words teaching us, That in that Sacrament there is an exhibition of Christ and his benefits intended on God's part, and received of those by whom no obstacle is interposed: and therefore doth the Apostle call it in express words, 1. Cor. 10.16. The communion of the body and blood of Christ.  
For this end also is the Patience (E) of God (another singular dignation of God) exercised among men: as we may see Rom. 2.4. Despisest thou the richeses of his goodness and forbearance, not knowing that the bountifulness of God leadeth thee to repentance? but thou after thy hardness and heart that cannot repent, heapest-up wrath to thyself, etc. In these words may be noted for our purpose 1. God's intent in forbearing sinners; which is the leading of them to repentance, and so on to salvation: for repentance is per se ordinata ad salutem, by him ordained to salvation, as a means to the end. 2. The persons to whom God intendeth this good by his forbearance: And they are such as despise the richeses of his goodness, and have hard and impenitent hearts. 3. The issue and event of this their contempt of God's patience, and that is a treasuring-up of wrath unto themselves against the day of wrath. Out of all which laid together ariseth thus much, That God by sparing wicked men who have hard and impenitent hearts, intendeth their everlasting good, though they by the abuse of his patience and refusal to repent do treasure-up unto themselves wrath and misery everlasting. The like to this is delivered in 2. Pet. 3.9. God is not slack, saith Peter, (as some men count slackness) but patiented toward us? that is, us men. And why patiented toward us? because he would have none to perish. The end therefore of God's patience is man's Salvation and Repentance.  
In the last place those other gifts of God, by which men's understandings are enlightened and their souls beautified, namely Knowledge, Faith, Repentance, Fortitude, Liberality, Temperance, Humility and Chastity, and such like, are bestowed upon all that have them (among whom are many who prove reprobates in the end) that by the exercise of them and continuance in them they might come to eternal life.  
That reprobates are adorned with many of these graces, appeareth by sundry Scriptures, especially Heb. 6.4. where the Apostle saith, That it is impossible for them that have been enlightened, tasted the heavenly gift, been made partakers of t● holy Ghost, tasted the good word of God and the powers of t●● world to come; if they fall away, to be renewed by repentance The graces which the Apostle here speaketh of, are not ordinary and common, but special and excellent graces, Illumination, Faith, a Relish of God's word, and a Taste of heave● and the persons spoken of are apostates, such as are under 〈◊〉 possibility of falling-away for ever (for upon a danger no● possible cannot be built a solid exhortation) and consequently reprobates; and the thing intimated, is that upon apostate and reprobates are these excellent gifts many times bestowe● The like speech we have Heb. 10.26. For if we sinne willing●● after we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin, etc. From whence we may collect, That men who sin willingly and unpardonably, may receive the knowledge of the truth, yea and be sanctified by the blood of the Testament and the Spirit of grace, vers 29. In the 2. Pet. 2.20. They may, saith Peter, escape the filthiness of the world; that is, be washed from their form● sins by repentance: The unclean spirit may go out of the●, Matth. 12.43. They may receive the word with joy, Matth. 13.20. And many more excellent graces they may have besides. Now all these virtues and graces are not therefore given them that they (F) might abuse them, and so purchase to themselves the greater damnation; or that they might do good to others with them, but none to themselves: but rather that (as by the former gifts of nature, so) by these of grace they may obtain salvation. For if God aim at this in those gifts that are farther of, much more in these which make those that have them (like the young man in the Gospel) not fare from the kingdom of heaven. My proof for this I borrow of our Divines (G) at the Synod, who in their Suffrage have these two positions: 1. 
s Suffrag. Brit. pag. 41. thes. 2. & pag. 43. thes. 3. Sunt quaedam effecta interna ad conversionem praevia, quae virtute verbi spirit ûsque in nondum justificatorum cordibus excitantur; qualia sunt, notitia voluntatis Divinae, sensus peccati, timor poenae, cogitatio de liberatione, spes aliqua veniae.  There are certain internal works preparing ● man for justification, which by the power of the word and Spirit are wrought in the hearts of men not yet justified; such a● are the Knowledge of God's will, a Sense of sin, Fear of punishment, etc. that is their first. 2. Their second position is this, 
t Quos Deus, mediante verbo, per Spiritum suum in hunc modum afsicit, eos ad fidem conversionémque, verè & seriò vocat & invitat.  Those whom God by his word and Spirit affecteth after this manner, those he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth 〈◊〉 conversion. Out of these two theses thus much ariseth, That God worketh the knowledge of his will, the sense of sin, fear of hell, hope of pardon, and consequently many other excellent graces in the hearts of men, that by these they may be converted, and so eternally saved.  
We see by these things what end God aimeth at in his gifts of men.  
But there are some Scriptures that seem to say the contrary; namely, Rom. 1.20. where God is said to reveal himself to the Gentiles by the creatures, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that they might be without excuse. and Luke 2.34. Simeon saith of Christ, that he is appointed for the falling and rising again of many in Israel. and 1. Cor. 1.23. I preach Christ, saith S. Paul, to the Jews a stumbling-block. and 2. Cor. 2.16. We are the savour of death to death, etc. By these places it seemeth that God giveth these things to some to make them stumble and that they might be left without excuse. What shall we say therefore to these places?  
Of all these places in general I may say this, That they are to be understood of the end which is many times effected by these gifts of God, and not of the end which is primarily intended in them; and they show what Christ, the word preached, and the gifts of nature and grace are occasionally to some men through their voluntary rebellion against God and his ordinances, and not what they are intentionally in God's first thoughts and resolutions: He intendeth them for their good, though many times they receive them to their hurt. It is with God's ordinances and gifts (and that very often too) as it is sometimes with physic; It is given (H) by the Physician for the patients good, but many times through the distemper of his body it doth him hurt: And as it is with the sun; God intendeth by the shining of it the enlightening and clearing of men and other creatures in this inferior world; and yet some men are hurt by the light of it, others are scorched by the heat of it accidentally, by reason of the climates wherein they live, or the ill-affectednesse of their eyes and bodies. So the blessings of God, which out of his abundant goodness are bestowed on men for their eternal good, through their ill frame and temper of heart do effect their hurt: partly because lighting on naughty hearts, they loose their edge; for quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis: and partly because of the severity of God, who as he hath an antecedent and gracious will to do men good, so he hath a consequent and judiciary will of giving-up obstinate men to their own hearts lusts, and of permitting them to dash against Christ and other means of eternal life, and so to fall into endless misery and mischief, as we may see Psal. 81.11, 12. and Rev. 22.11. Which made Prosper say, 
u Prosp. Resp. ad object. 16. Vincent. Qui voluntatem Dei spreverunt invitantem, voluntatem Dei sentient vindicantem.  They that have despised Gods inviting will, shall feel his revenging william. Now if this be the meaning of these Scriptures, than do they not thwart that which hath been said of God's gracious intent of promoting the eternal good of men by his blessings bestowed upon them. For argumentum ab eventu ad intentionem Dei non valet: because no sinful event is properly under God's decree, but his prescience only, or at most under a permissive decree; and many things hap in the world which are beside the antecedent and principal purpose of God: not because there is any want of power in God, but because his will is oftentimes conditional, and therefore not effected because the condition is not performed.  
But by the opinion of absolute Reprobation the gifts both of Nature and Grace have another (I) end: Either God doth not mean them to those that perish, although they do enjoy them, because they are mingled in the world with the Elect, to whom only they are directed; or if he do, he meaneth they shall have them, and be lifted up by them above the common rank of men, ut lapsu graviore ruant, that their fall may be the greater. And so much is said by the chief defenders of it. 
x Calv. Instit. l. 3. c. 24. n. 13. Ecce, vocem ad eos dirigit, sed ut magìs obsurdescant; lucem accendit, sed ut reddantur caeciores; doctrinam profert, sed quâ magìs obstupescant; remedium adhibet, sed nè sanentur.  God sendeth his word to reprobates, saith Calvine, that they might be made more deaf; he setteth up a light before them, to make them the blinder; he giveth them a remedy, that they might not be healed. And, 
y Bez. Praelud. in c. 9 ad Rom. p. 434. Absurdum videri non debet, Deum reprobis quibusdam, qui in Ecclesia Dei versantur, gratiam suam in verbo suo sive etiam per sacramenta sua offer, non eum in finem ut per eam serventur; sed contrà, ut minus habeant excusationis quàm reliqui, & tandem graviùs puniantur.  It should not seem absurd unto us, saith Beza, that God should offer his grace in the word and Sacraments to some reprobates in the Church, not to this end that they might be saved by it, but that they might be less excusable than others, and obnoxious to the sorer punishment. Speeches like to these hath Maccovius in his Disputations, 
a Macc. disp. 14. pag. 11, 12. Pulsat Christus ad ostium reproborum, quos novit nec posse nec velle aperire; non ut intret, sed partim ut exprobret illis impotentiam suâ ipsorum culpâ contractam; partim ut condemnationem in illis augeat, etc.  Christ, saith he, knocketh at the hearts of reprobates, who he knoweth neither can nor will open unto him; not that he may enter in, but partly that he may upbraid them for their impotency, and partly that he may increase their damnation. And immediately after to a place in John, 15.22. he giveth this exposition, 
b Nimirum ideo locutus est iis, ut ex contemtu odióque Filii unigeniti gravior condemnatio esset.  Therefore did God speak to them, that by the contempt and hatred of his Son they might procure the greater damnation. In another place likewise of his Disputations he speaketh the same thing four or five times over very positively; 
c Disp. 2. p. 3. Deus reprobis verbum suum proponit, non alio fine quàm ut inexcusabiles reddantur.  God doth propound his word to reprobates for no other end than that they might be left without excuse. 
d p. 16. Si Evangelium consideres ratione intentionis Dei, finem ejus esse per se & non per accidens inexcusabilitatem ratione reproborum.  If the Gospel be considered in respect of God's intention, the proper end of it, and not the accidental, in reference to Reprobates is their inexcusableness. And very consequently do these writers speak to their main conclusion. For how can God intent the means or gifts of grace for the salvation of them whom he hath by his absolute eternal decree rejected utterly from grace and glory?  
Moore particularly (K) by this Doctrine,  
I. Christ came not into the world to procure the salvation of them that perish, because they were inevitably ordained to perish.  
II. The word of grace is not sent to them; or if it be, it is sent that they might slight it or contemn it, and so increase their damnation by contemning of it. Which being so, these inconveniences will arise; 1. That God is a (L) mere deluder of miserable men, whom he calleth to salvation in the name of his Son by the preaching of the word. For what else can he be that fairly pretendeth their good whom he fully intendeth to ruin? 2. That Ministers (M) are but false witnesses; because in their ministry they offer salvation conditionally to many whose damnation is determined absolutely. 3. The Ministry of the word cannot leave men without excuse. For Reprobates may have this just (N) plea; Lord, dost thou punish us for not believing in thy Son, when ●hou didst call us to believe by the preaching of thy word? Why? ●hou didst decree to leave us (woeful men) in Adam's sin, to ●ive us neither power to believe, nor a Christ to believe in. How ●anst thou justly charge us with sin or increase our punishment for not believing in him whom thou didst resolve before the ●orld was that we should never believe in? Certainly that ● Ministry giveth men a fair excuse that is given for no other ●nd than to leave them without excuse. 
e Neque enim ea fingi potest homin●s ●eddere inexcusabiles per verbum & Spiritum vocatio, quae eo tantùm sine exhi●●tur ut reddat inexcusabiles; Suffrag. Brit. the 3. & 4. art. de Antecedaneis ad Con●●●s. thesi 3. pag. 43.   
III. The Sacraments (O) also (by this opinion) do signify nothing, seal-up nothing, confer nothing to such a● are not saved; but are mere blanks and empty ordinances a● the best unto them, not through the fault of the men, but by the primary and absolute will of God.  
IU. Lastly, Gods other gifts (P) which he bestoweth upon men, of what nature soever they be, are to the most tha● receive them in God's absolute intention, 1. Unprofitable, such as shall never do them good in reference to their eternal condition; 2. Dangerous and hurtful, given them not out o● love but extreme hatred; not that they might use them well, and be blessed in so doing, but that they might use them ill▪ and by ill using of them procure to themselves the great●● damnation. God lifteth them up (as the devil did Christ) ●● the pinnacle of the temple, that so they might fall; and loadeth them with knowledge and other goodly endowments, tha● with the weight of them he might sink them down to hell▪ And so by good consequence, God's choicest gifts are intende● and used as snares to entrap men's souls. Men that have th●● have little cause to be proud of them; for they are the mor● unhappy because they have them: or small reason to be thankful for them, or to love the giver of them, but to hate his rather; because they are but giftlesse gifts, of the same natu● with a griping usurers bounty, Jaels' courtesy, Sauls mar●ing of Michol to David, or a bait for a poor fish which 〈◊〉 swalloweth with a hook to boot: 
Munera magna quidem misit, sed misit in hamo:  
Num piscatorem piscis amare potest?   

Answer. Whether the decree of absolute Reprobation ●● contrary unto the use and end of God's gifts bestowed upon men.  
IN the following discourse concerning th● end and use of God's gifts these general● points are to be premised:  
1. First, That if we speak exactly and properly, 
a Aquin. part. 1. qu. 19 art. 1.  Nihil aliud à Deo est finis Dei sed ipsemet est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. It is therefore a false imagination to think that the Divine will is moved by any thing but by itself. And as God himself is the end cujuslibet volitionis Divinae, so is he likewise cujuslibet operationis Divinae. Prov. 16.4. The Lord hath made all things for his own sake, yea the wicked for the day of evil.  
2. Secondly, it is to be noted, That albeit God's eternal volitions or decrees depend not upon any temporal object or causes as the prime motives thereunto; yet God by his eternal absolute decree may and doth ordain that this event in the temporal execution shall not follow but upon that going before: as, that the benefit of eternal life, in the actual introduction unto the heavenly kingdom, shall depend upon the acts of repenting, believing and persevering; and that the punishment of eternal death, in the actual abjection of men into hell, shall depend upon their own final impenitency and sin-guiltiness. This is not to make the eternal decrees of Election and Reprobation dependant upon the foreseen contingent acts of man's freewill, as the Remonstrants do; but to make temporal events, acts, or things, one to depend conditionally upon another for their being or not-being in time, which we willingly acknowledge.  
3. Thirdly, It is to be observed, That when we say this or that is the end of such an action of God or of such a gift of God, we must not conceive that it was the end which caused the Divine volition, but it is the end whereunto men should use such gifts, and the benefit which they aught to make of such temporal gracious actions vouchsafed unto them. So that when we say, God giveth or doth such a thing to such an end, the meaning is, The things considered in their own nature, as they come from God, have a fitness or aptness to produce such an end. And thus God is said in his gifts or actions to intent an end two ways: The one is in the order of common Providence, where the means have a natural fitness to produce some good end, though abused by men they oftentimes produce the quite contrary, God foreknowing it and decreeing to permit it so to be. The other is the order of special Predestination, where such gifts or actions of God have not only a fitness in their own nature to produce such good effects or ends, but they have from the absolute will of God an efficacity actually and infallibly producing those intended ends. Of this intention only that rule must be understood, 
b Aqu. in 1. part. qu. 10. art. 6.  Quicquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; and that of Caietane, 
c In 1m m, qu. 23. art. 6.  Nullus ordo deficiens à proprio intento cadit sub praedestinatione.  
4. Lastly, no decree of God can truly be said to cross the good end whereunto his gifts aught to be used, unless it can be proved that by such a decree the abuse of them is enforced or at lest caused in wicked men. As for example; The honour and exaltation of Pharaoh unto a kingdom was a gift or a good means fitting him to the administration of justice; yet he abused it unto oppression: The plagues inflicted upon his country were fit means to have humbled him, and to have made him yield unto God's command; yet he turned them to greater pride and obstinacy: Yet because no decree of God caused the obstinate wickedness of Pharaohs heart, the decree of permitting him to abuse such gifts unto his own destruction was not contrary unto the use or end whereunto those gifts and actions of God had a fitting ordination in their own nature. These things premised we come unto our particular answers.  
What he saith concerning the gifts of Nature or Grace, namely, That they are given for the good of those upon whom they are bestowed, we willingly yield. And therefore we let the 363 and, 364. pages pass without contradiction. Only let this be remembered, That the intent, which is measured by the nature of the means, for the event is often frustrated by the default of man's will, and yet God's simple and absolute will never frustrated. Nay, it was Gods absolute will to permit some men to fail in reaping that good which by such means was intended unto them. Neither doth this infer any contrariety or crossing betwixt God's Decrees and his Gifts or Graces. We do not therefore deny that man's salvation is the end of those means, gifts and graces which God offereth unto any man in ordine ad suam salutem: But we affirm that this may stand with an eternal absolute decree of not-preparing for some men any such effectual grace as God knoweth would easily convert and save them, and with an absolute decree of permitting them by their own voluntary rebellion to incur eternal damnation. And this is the absolute decree of Reprobation, which is not contrary to the end of God's gifts: because to permit men to abuse them, doth neither altar the nature of the gift nor the ordination which it hath in itself to produce such an end, nor 'cause the sinner to turn those good means to his own perdition.  
Our Divines at Dort did truly teach, That the word, and the illuminations and motions of God's Spirit, are ordained by God for the producing of repentance and faith in men's hearts, and for the saving of their souls. And they further taught, That where such spiritual and supernatural means fail to produce those ends, no positive, actual, proper or true cause can be alleged besides their own defective and rebellious william.  
The saying of Prosper is unadvisedly brought-in by this Author. For every man knoweth that Prosper, as well as his Master S. Augustine, held absolute Predestination and Preterition or negative Reprobation; and therefore in his opinion the absolute decree of Reprobation is not contrary unto any ends which God hath in bestowing the means of grace and salvation upon those which abuse them: For it is impossible that God should cross himself in his decrees, gifts, or actions. Again, Prosper, in affirming a gracious vocation to be afforded unto all those who have been enlightened by the preaching of the Gospel, doth imply, that where the Gospel was never preached nor Christ known, there is no such vocation unto saving grace. How this will agreed with Arminius his new-moulded Predestination and Reprobation, who in his third decree bringeth-in God decreeing 
d Doct Sent. pag. 47.  media ad resipiscentiam & fidem necessaria sufficienter & efficaciter administrare, it will pass this Authors cunning to tell us. Prosper propoundeth a question which had been here more fit for this Author to have mused upon, namely 
e De voc. l. 1. c. 1.  Cur hoc donum sine quo nemo salvus est, ab e● qui omnes salvare vult, non omnibus conferatur.  
As for that sufficiency of grace which ou● Divines at Dort granted to accompany the preaching of the Gospel, it doth little advantage the Remonstrants, who undertake to prove a sufficient administration of saving grace where the sound of the Gospel and the name of Christ was never heard of. And they acknowledge no decree of Reprobation where such an administration hath not gone before. This is more than the Divines at Dort or the Jesuits at Rome dare avouch. But let us grant, that sufficient means to produce faith, and repentance and salvation were administered to every singular person in the world, yet the absolute decrees of Election and Nonelection may stand firm and good: For he is absolutely predestinated to whom God administereth grace with a merciful intent of making it effectual unto salvation: and he is absolutely not-predestinated or rejected, to whom God in time administereth grace with an absolute purpose of leaving the good success to the good husbandry of his own freewill, which is in nothing more careless or prodigal than in misspending, wasting and quenching God's grace. 
f Prosp. De vocat. l. 1. c. 6.  Ità humana natura in primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata, etiam inter beneficia, inter praecepta, & inter auxilia Dei, semper in deteriorem est proclivior voluntatem, cui committi non est aliud quàm dimitti. So that if in the establishing of the eternal decrees of Election and Reprobation God had been a foreseer only or a looker-on how every man committed to the freedom of his own will would behave himself in the using of grace sufficiently administered, the whole world (if Prosper tell us true) had been under the decree of Reprobation.  
That is said to be God's aim in bestowing means of grace upon any man, which the nature of the grace should lead a man unto, though God in giving that grace had not a simple and absolute will to make it effectual unto the salvation of the receiver; nay, though God had an absolute will of permitting the receiver to abuse it finally to his own damnation. Where Gods will is thus affected, there administration of grace may and doth stand with eternal Reprobation.  
Touching the Sacrament of Baptism, or any other benefits which God affordeth unto men not-elected; the end intended, is the good effect whereunto they were ordained. But with this end of the thing itself may stand an absolute decree of God, of leaving any man to abuse them unto a contrary end▪ And in this consisteth that absolute decree of Reprobation which we defend.  
I wonder this Author should make Baptism a necessary means unto regeneration, and so consequently unto the atteinment of salvation; since millions of children, capable of no other known and revealed means of salvation or regeneration, have not this means by Divine providence administered unto them, or so prepared for them that by any human care or industry it is appliable unto them. For from this must needs follow an absolute Reprobation of such children, and not a conditionate, grounded upon their foreseen bad acts. As for those who by God's goodness are engrafted into some visible Church, we concur with him, that Baptism is appointed to be a means of regeneration; and that it is so indeed where no obstacle is found in the person baptised.  
For the Lords Supper we say the same. And if he instance in a thousand other particulars, our answer will be, That Gods revealed ordination or intention that we should use such means unto such a good end, may stand with an absolute eternal unrevealed will of God To withhold from some men that more special grace which would de facto make them use God's grace unto that good end whereunto it is ordained, and hinder them from abusing it to their destruction.  
Let the Remonstrants grant us an absolute decree preparing from all eternity effectual grace, and in time mercifully working the conversion and salvation of Peter and Paul, and we desire no other absolute decree of Predestination. And let them grant us in God an eternal will or decree of not-preparing effectual saving grace for Cain and Judas, and of not-working by his special mercy their conversion, but permitting them to continued in their obduration, and we urge no other absolute Reprobation. How they can deny this I know not, unless they will deny that of the Apostle, 
g Rom. 9  Cujus vult miseretur, & quem vult indurat. Which induration is by some of our adversaries referred to this decree of Reprobation which we avouch, and was usually so applied by S. Augustine. Vide Ruiz. De Praed. & Repr. disp. 2. §. 2. num. 3. p. 19 where he hath these words, Non esset libera praedestinatio, 
Vide Penot. pag. 414. disp. 38. §. 4.  si non esset libera negatio praedestinationis. Porrò, negatio praedestinationis esset ipsa reprobatio negativa. And Malderus 
h Antisyn. pag 9 10, 11, 12, 13. usque ad 21.  ingenuously acknowledgeth these two eternal absolute decrees, the one of preparing saving grace for the predestinate, and of making it infallibly effectual unto their salvation; the other of preparing for the non-elect such helps of grace only as God eternally foresaw would never bring them unto salvation, albeit their damnation was not intended by God, but only with respect unto their foregoing sins. And for these eternal distinct decrees of Election and Nonelection or negative Reprobation, he foundeth them not upon any different foreseen acts of men, but subscribeth to Prospero, Cessat opus, cessat meritum, nihil editur impar; and doth in these few words quite contradict the Remonstrants' Election, 
i Pag. 12.  Homines non ideo quia perseverantes sunt, sunt electi; sed quia electi sunt, perseverant. 
k Pag. 13. Vide eundem in 1m m, 2ª, qu. 111. pag. 486.  Aliter Deus in hac vita agit cum electis, aliter cum reprobis. Reprobis offert quidem suam gratiam, sed efficaciter non facit ut acceptent oblatam. Quòd autem eam sibi oblatam acceptet electus, fructus electionis est. Permittit reprobos cadere, & in suo lapsu in finem usque manere jacentes, etc. I might add the ancient Schoolmen, who acknowledge the eternal distinct decrees of Election and Reprobation without founding them upon the contrary foreseen acts of men, as this Author with the Remonstrants do. All the forenamed Authors, with many more which might be cited, acknowledge an ordination of such means and graces as are afforded to the Reprobate unto the ends by this Author urged; and yet withal they acknowledge an eternal absolute will in God of permitting them to abuse them to their own destruction. In their judgement therefore such an absolute eternal decree is not contrary unto the end of God's gifts bestowed upon persons not-elect. Lessius, a stiff defender of Predestination and Reprobation founded upon prescience of men's final perseverance or final impenitency, when he is pressed with the argument taken from that special vocation of the Predestinate, which is termed vocatio secundùm propositum, he is forced to confess, 
l Opusc. De Praed. & Repr. pag. 573.  that others dicuntur vocati non secundùm propositum, quia non est tale propositum in Deo ad cujus impletionem illa vocatio referatur. Huic tamen non repugnat, quin sit in Deo sincerum propositum & desiderium salutis eorum conditionatum, si gratiae cooperari velint.  
I marvel how it should be contrary unto the end of God's graces or gifts, when we say, According to his eternal decree he calleth the Predestinate or Elect with an absolute purpose to make the means of grace effectual to their salvation; and he calleth the Reprobate, non secundùm tale propositum, but only under a conditionate decree, Si gratiae cooperari velint, which from all eternity he foreknew they would never do: I say, it is a marvel, how the same thing avouched by us should be contrary to the use and end of God's graces bestowed upon such men, and affirmed by themselves, no such inconvenience should follow upon it. Molina himself, when he cometh to the point, granteth in God such eternal distinct decrees o● preparing effectual grace for some an● not-preparing for others, as infer absolute Predestination and Reprobation in tha● sense wherein we defend it, and contradict that conditionate Election which the Remonstrants defend, depending upon an antecedent absolute prevision of the future good and bad acts of men. His words are these; 
m De Conc. pag. 368.  Punctum verò praedestinationis & abyssus inscrutabilis Divini consilii in eo sunt posita, quòd cùm Deus infinitas alias provident non-praedestinatis rationes noverit, quibus p●● eadem ipsorum libertate in vitam devenisse●t aeternam, fuisséntque proinde praedestinati; itémque infinitas alias noverit rationes providendi pradestinatis, quibus suâ libertate beatitudine● amitterent, fuisséntque reprobi: pro sua tantùm libertate, & non pro qualitate usûs liber● arbitrii praevisi, nè ut conditione quidem si● qua non, eum providendi modum utrisque eligerit per quem praevidit illos in vitam aeterna● pro sua libertate non perventuros, etc. If it b● not contrary to the end and use of God's gifts out of his own freewill to provide for som● men no other grace but such as he eternally knew would never bring them to eternal life; how doth it cross the end of such gifts & graces as are temporally afforded to the Non-elect, that God hath made an absolute decree to permit that abuse of grace which he could have prevented, and which he foreknew from all eternity would follow if by more special grace it were not prevented? Vide Jacobi Baii Institut. lib. 1. c. 118, 119, etc. usque ad 125.  
The end whereunto Gods long-suffering should serve, and whereunto it is fitly ordinated, is the leading of men to repentance. But there is no contradiction betwixt these two propositions, The end of God's admonition and patience towards Cain, was to lead him unto repentance; God had absolutely decreed, not to give unto Cain that special effectual grace without which God knew he would continued finally impenitent. In this decree Nonelection is involved, and this is antecedent to the absolute prevision of Cains final impenitency; and yet it made not the means of grace offered unto him delusorie or contrary to any decree of Gods william.  
The decree of negative Reprobation hindereth not but the gifts bestowed upon such persons may have a proper and fitting ordination unto the atteinment of eternal life, si tali gratiae cooperari velint. Thus were they ordinated in the non-elect angels, although before they were created God had absolutely decreed to permit their voluntary apostasy, and to punish them for it with eternal misery. Thus the end of those excellent gifts and graces which Adam had bestowed upon him in his state of innocence was to continued him in obedience to Gods will, and so to bring him with his posterity unto eternal life; and yet God had eternally decreed to permit both him and them to fall into the guilt of eternal death. Divine eternal decrees therefore, whereupon may infallibly be inferred the abuse of grace temporally offered, do not cross the end for which such grace is administered to persons not-elected. The Jesuits themselves cannot deny, that the eternal decree of negative Reprobation is 
n Ruiz.  a negation illorum mediorum quibus Deus praescivit adhibendum fuisse consensum; hujúsque primam causam esse liberam Dei voluntatem. To which purpose are these words of S. Augustine, 
o De bono Pers. c. 11.  Quibus non vult subvenire, non subvenit; de quibus in sua praedestinatione occultè quidem sed justè aliud judicavit. And elsewhere, 
p Ad Simpl. lib. 1. qu. 2.  Si vellet ipsorum (nempe non-praedestinatorum) misereri, posset ità vocare quomodo illis aptum esset, ut & moverentur & intelligerent & sequerentur. All these acknowledge an absolute eternal decree of withholding all such grace from all person's not-elected as God knoweth would effectually convert them and say them. And yet for all this they all agreed that those gifts and means of salvation which he is pleased to afford them, have a true and due ordination unto the bringing of such men to faith, obedience & eternal life. They have indeed no infallible ordination to such an end; for than they were consequent fruits of Predestination: but this hindereth not, but they may have a true ordination, as all such means have which by the Divine more common providence and general love are instituted and afforded for the good of men, howsoever by the voluntary perverseness of the wicked they are turned to their own hurt. And therefore God may truly say to these as the Apostle did to the Galatians, 
q Gal. 5.7.  Quis vos impedivit, non obedire veritati? It was not God's eternal decree of denying more abundant and effectual grace, nor his eternal absolute decree of permitting them voluntarily to abuse the grace bestowed upon them, from whence this contrary usage of Divine grace was necessitated or effected. That is but a cavil of the Remonstrants. Learned Prosper pointeth us to the true and only cause of this inverting Gods benefits contrary to their proper end; 
r De vocat. Gent. lib. 2. cap. 13.  Quae beneficia licèt obduratis nihil remedii & emendationis attulerint, probant tamen aversionem eorum non Divinae fuisse constitutionis sed propriae voluntatis.  
No grace or gift is bestowed upon any man for this very end, that he may abuse it; but many excellent graces and gifts have been temporally bestowed upon angels and men not-elected with an eternal decree or purpose of God Not to keep them from abusing them, Not to keep them from incurring eternal death by abusing them. This is that decree of Reprobation which we admit: and if this Author can rightly infer that this is contrary to the end and use of God's gifts, we will subscribe to his conditionate Election and Reprobation. If he hope to infer this conclusion, his premises must be, Every absolute decree of God to permit the final abuse of any of his good gifts or graces, is contrary to the use or end of bestowing them upon men: But that decree of absolute negative Reprobation which we defend is an absolute decree, etc. ERGO, it is contrary, etc. The mayor proposition will be denied by all judicious Divines, and can never be proved by the Remonstrants. 
s Tertull. advers. Marc. l. 1.  Non institutio bona rei, sed exorbitatio reprobanda est.  
That God willeth the good of men in bestowing any good gifts or graces upon them, needed no proof at all: We have always willingly granted this proposition. Yet for the true understanding thereof it must be observed, That when we say, This is God's will, This is God's aim or intent, these words have not always the same signification. This Author by confounding the divers meaning of these and the like words doth strangely entangle himself through his whole discourse. First therefore; any thing is said to be according to Gods will, which considered in itself is according to the goodness and pureness of the Divine nature. This is a perpetual and necessary volition in God, quâ Deo placet omne bonum. And this 
t Vide Ruiz. De vol. disp. 6. §. 2. pag. 38.  simplex complacentia towards all good actions of men, or events unto men, is possible circa creaturas omnes etiam nunquam futuras: For there is no goodness imaginable, which hath not an agreement with the good will of God, which we call amorem simplicis complacentiae. 
u Ruiz. disp. 19 pag. 214.  Satis constat hujusmodi complacentiam Dei versari circa poenitentiam, gratiam & gloriam possibilem Judae aut cujus libet damnati. But this is not it which we now speak of. 2. Secondly, God is said to will, desire, or aim-at that good, for the obtaining whereof he affordeth fitting means, though withal he willeth that it shall be in the liberty of the creature to hinder & frustrate those means, & though he have absolutely decreed to permit the creature to abuse them unto his own destruction. This is that which usually is termed by Divines voluntas antecedens, voluntas conditionata, voluntas simplicis complacentiae. And thus God is said to aim-at or to will and desire the conversion, justification and salvation of those who never shall be converted, justified, or saved. Neither must we think that by these men Gods omnipotent will is crossed, because his voluntas simplicis complacentiae is not fulfilled. For the absolute will of God was, that in such persons their own freewill might hinder the good effect of his gifts and graces, which he was absolutely resolved to permit for some greater good. Lastly, there is a will in God which strictly and most properly is called voluntas beneplaciti or his absolute will, which is not only a liking of the good willed unto the creature, and an ordering of fit means whereby the creature (if his own freewill hinder not) may attein it; but a merciful decree of so ordering the means and the very will of the creature, that it shall infallibly and infrustrately obtain the good end whereunto such means were accommodated. And of this will Ruiz truly affirmeth, 
x Disp. 18. §. 4. p. 185.  Sola haec voluntas absoluta simpliciter amplectitur objectum, & ideo sola simpliciter & absolutè meretur nomen voluntatis Beneplaciti. We grant therefore, that in the second acception of the word will God truly willeth, liketh, desireth the repentance, faith, perseverance, and salvation of all to whom the Gospel is preached and Christ offered. But in the last and most proper acception, God willeth the perseverance and salvation only of his Elect, in whom he never ceaseth working till the happy effect be produced.  
Our Divines at Dort granted a true and serious will in God according to the second acception of the word will, but not according to the last. Which will simplicis complacentiae may stand with absolute Reprobation.  
If this Author can be content to acknowledge that for a true, serious and no delusorie will, which affordeth the creature means of repenting, believing and being saved, though under an eternal absolute decree of permitting the final disobedience and perdition of the creature, we will free him from the trouble of answering the places of Scripture, and with him embrace the interpretation of Damascene, who telleth us, that albeit the Scriptures do in such places seem to make God's benefits causes of man's sin and ruin, yet they must be understood 
y De orthod. fide, lib. 4. cap. 20.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
A Physician doth give his patiented physic with an absolute will to cure, so fare as his skill and ability will stretch: But God doth not always give the means of salvation unto all men out of his absolute will: for than all should be cured and saved. 
z Psal. 135.  Omnia quaecunque voluit Deus, fecit in coelo & in terra▪ Fulgentius giveth the reason; 
a 1. ad Mon. c. 12.  Quia cui semper subest cùm volet posse, non aliud est in illo velle quàm posse.  
The will of God inviting or moving men to perform such good acts as tend to their salvation, is God's true and serious will, though he have not decreed by such means to produce their salvation: 
Vide Baii I●stitut. lib. 1. cap. 104, etc. etc. 115, 116.  This will is often despised by men to their own damnation. But there is a will not only ordaining means to the end, but of causing men to use the means unto the consecution of the end. And thus by giving them special grace God willeth the kingdom of glory only unto the Elect. The former will is not to be baffled with the name of dissimulation, because this latter is only it which bringeth men unto glorification. And we further add, That the Reprobates in resisting the former will, which is vera voluntas simplicis complacentiae, do always fulfil the latter, which is God's absolute will of permitting this resistance, and of gathering out of it a greater illustration of his own glory.  
The blessings and means which God out of his goodness afforded to the angels, to Adam, and which he continually affordeth unto wicked men, by the ill frame of their hearts may be and have been turned to their own hurt: and yet we cannot but acknowledge in them an antecedent and gracious will to do them good. But we do acknowledge, over and above this will of complacency, an absolute will of efficiency, by which God hath mercifully decreed to work in some persons the will and the deed, and by the means of grace de facto to bring them unto glory. These two different manners of willing and working the salvation of men, do demonstrate an absolute will in God of Saving some, which we call the absolute decree of their Election; and an absolute will of Permitting others to draw upon themselves damnation by voluntary abusing the means of grace, which we call absolute Reprobation. chrysostom (who is no depressour of man's freewill) was not ignorant of this absolute will of God, turning & bending man's which way he pleaseth: Si Deus voluerit, nullus impediet 
b Plura vide hom. 2. in Psal. 50. . And of this will S. Augustine speaketh, 
c Ench. cap. 97.  In coelo & in terra non quaedam voluit & fecit, quaedam verò voluit & non fecit, sed omnia quaecunque voluit fecit. And S. Hierome, speaking of the Samaritans, saith, 
d Apud Petr. Diac.  Si voluisset, ex indevotis devotos fecisset. And that prayer of Basil is famous, 
e De incarn. c. 8.  Malos, quaesumus, bonos facito; bonos in bonitate conserva. Omnia enim potes: quem enim volueris, salvas: & non est qui resistat tibi. Since therefore the Scriptures, and the Fathers, and all orthodox Divines, who confess that to be a true will which by affording ordinary means aimeth at the 
f 1. Thess. 4.3.  Sanctification and 
g 1. Tim. 2.4.  Salvation of all men, do notwithstanding intimate unto us an absolute will eternally predestinating and in time infallibly working the salvation only of some men; it is but a weak kind of reasoning, from the affirmation of the one to conclude a negation of the other.  
The doctrine of absolute Election and Reprobation inferreth, That God had not an absolute will by those means of grace which he bestowed upon the non-elect angels or men to bring them unto glory; and that he had an absolute will to permit themselves to abuse them, to the procuring of their own eternal misery: And yet he that should say, that God by giving the non-elect angels such excellent endowments, or by giving Cain and Judas such fatherly admonitions, did in those means aim at their destruction, speaketh both ignorantly & profanely. For the aim of God, and the end of any good gift which he vouchsafeth unto men, is to be measured by the nature of the gift itself, and not by the perverse use which God suffereth the receivers to make of it.  
Calvine usually speaketh in the Scripture-phrase, even in those points which seem harsh to the ears of the Remonstrants. But this Author having before truly explained ●ow such phrases are to be understood, ●amely of the end whereunto Reprobates always finally abuse them, and not of the end whereunto God hath ordained them, he had done much better to have afforded Calvines words this charitable construction. And as for Beza; he denieth not a proper and true ordination of the Divine grace unto the effecting of salvation in all to whom ●t is afforded, nor a true will of complacency in God, that by them it should be used to that good end: but he denyeth an absolute will in God of saving them by that grace; and he showeth the end which the wicked always come to by abusing it, which is, ut graviùs puniantur. That Calvine had no other meaning, appeareth by these words of his, which shut-up the section out of which the former are taken; Quid sibi vult Dominus eos docendo à quibus nè intelligatur curate? Considera ùnde vitium, & desines interrogare. In verbo enim qualiscunque sit obscuritas, satìs tamen semper est lucis ad convincendam impiorum conscientiam. The drift of Calvine is not to affirm that God worketh either by any positive action, or by proper ordination of his word unto any such end, that deafness, blindness, senselessness whereunto the Reprobate grow only by their own default: But because God, who could soften their heart● and would if they were in the number o● his elect, hath ordained not to do it, thi● ordination is intimated by the event whic● perpetually followeth upon it, namely deafness, blindness, etc. So that all whic● Calvine intendeth is this, 
h Vide. §. 14, 15. ubi mentem suam explicat.  That where Go● hath not comprised men within his merciful decree of Predestination, there he hath decreed to hold-off his hand from effectually opening their ears and eyes; and the● suo vitio obsurdescunt, etc. And Beza had no other intent, but to show, 
i Beza, Opusc. p. 30. & de Praedest. dist. pag. 434.  That the word preached unto the Reprobate, non eò usquè conjunctum cum Spiritûs ministerio, u● illos verâ fide, quâ propriâ notâ electi à reprobis dignoscuntur, Christo ut palmites frugiferos inserat. Whence followeth that woeful event, ut justo exitio devoti magìs ac magìs reddantur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
For Maccovius; if his speeches tend to show the intentional end of the gospel preached, and not the eventual success, we utterly disclaim his opinion. For God properly intendeth no end of his volitions or actions but himself; unto whose glory all things have naturam mediorum, not inten●i finis. The intention therefore of means by God unto any lower or inferior end, is nothing else but the fitness of such means considered in themselves (and not abused) ●or the producing of that end: And this in●ention is not altered by the decree of Reprobation; for that decree as it is immanent and eternal in voluntate Divina, nihil ●enit in reprobato: And when the temporal execution cometh, It putteth no malice in●o his will, it putteth no necessitation unto wicked actions upon his will; it only putteth in God an absolute will of not-giving ●ffectuall grace, and of not-working in him salutiferous actions; whereupon followeth Perditio tua exte.   

Answers to his more particular objections.  
THe doctrine of Reprobation upon prescience denyeth not Reprobation to be an eternal, unchangeable, irrevocable decree of God, and therefore as inevitable as that which we refer to the absolute will of God. As for Christ's coming into the ●orld to save sinners, it was not to save the Elect, but under conditions of repentance and perseverant faith: And no decree of Reprobation excludeth any man from salvation, provided always that he repent and believe.  
But the Reprobate (in our doctrine) inevitably die impenitent and unbelievers. Infallibly they do: but no more inevitably than in theirs. I think, neither this Author nor any Remonstrant will show himself so ignorant, as to affirm that any one man eternally reprobated according to their sens● did ever die a true penitent and a perseverant believer.  
For the word of grace, it is in our doctrine sent unto all men to whom it is sent, not otherwise than it is in theirs. In both opinions it hath (in its own nature) an ordination to produce repentance, faith, salvation in all who obey, etc. In neither opinion it is sent to any not-elected with an absolute will of God to make it effectual unto their salvation, by working in them repentance, faith, true obedience. So that our doctrine is in this fare more sound than theirs; that we introduce such an Election and Reprobation as suspendeth all saving good actions of the Elect upon the special mercy and effectual operation of God himself, and all wicked acts of the Non-elect upon their own perverse and rebellious freewill; whereas the Remonstrants 
k Vide Coll. Hag. pag. 91, 92, etc. 95.  suspend both alike upon man's natural freewill, making God, as in the evil acts of the Reprobate only an eternal foreseer or looker-on; so in the salutiferous acts of the Elect, namely their repentance, believing, persevering, they ascribe unto God only an intuitive prescience of what they will do, but they deny any absolute eternal decree, or any temporal operation flowing from such a decree, and causing them to repent, believe, and persevere. Corvinus is so confident herein, that he doubteth not to affirm, 
l Coru. Resp. ad Bogorm. pag. 263.  Certum est, nullius conversionem praecisè intendi. Duo fines sunt spiritûs, etc. So that the Remonstrants, who at first pleaded for God's intention of converting and saving all men, come about at last to pled against his absolute will and intention of converting and saving any man.  
For his collection, That God is a mere deluder, if he call men to salvation by Christ, whom he intendeth to ruin; we say, That if God should call men to salvation by Christ, intending to ruin them though they obediently answer to his calling, this were delusion: Or if God calling them to salvation by faith in Christ, should intent to ruin them by forcing or causing their impenitency, infidelity and disobedience, this were worse than delusion. But if God in time calleth to salvation by Christ those whom before all time he decreed to permit to their own faltering and defective freewill for production of the very act of repenting and believing, and who he foresaw would voluntarily continued in their impenitency and unbelief, and whom with respect to this their final impenitency and infidelity he from all eternity destinated unto everlasting punishment; here is no delusion at all: And if there be, the Remonstrants' ar● in a poor case, who must of necessity according to their doctrine of Reprobation yield unto all this, and according to ours we need yield to no more.  
God hath absolutely determined from all eternity to permit some men to incur damnation for contemning the conditional promises offered by the Ministers. The Ministers witness nothing but this, That God will save every man that believeth in his Son. Where is there any falsehood in this testimony? where any contradiction to the forenamed determination? where any absolute determination contradicting the conditional offer of salvation? Let any Remonstrant show it in our doctrine, and I will presently show it followeth as well in his.  
His plea for Reprobates will not hold good. For (as hath been already often proved) Reprobation taketh away no power from persons reprobated according to our doctrine which it taketh not away according to theirs. It debarreth not God from giving any power to believe, or repent, or perform any good act, being admitted according to our doctrine, which it will permit him to give according unto theirs. For Reprobation may stand with Possibility of obeying God and being saved, as it did in the angels reprobated; it may stand with Sufficient grace: but the truth is, neither in the Remonstrants' opinion nor in ours it ever doth or can stand with Effectual grace. Before the world was, God had resolved never to give unto Cain or Judas or any other person reprobated according to the Reprobation allowed by the Remonstrants, that special grace which should 'cause them to believe in Christ, and free them from their voluntary impenitency. Yet it is a false assertion, That God willeth they should never believe, never repent: For here the word Will noteth voluntatem complacentiae; and the acts of believing and repenting are always wellpleasing and agreeable unto this will of God, though it be his eternal absolute will in some men not to work them.  
The Sacraments in the Remonstrants' opinion, do not seal an infallibility of special grace or salvation unto any man reprobated from before the foundations of the world were laid: for than they should seal a manifest falsehood. But let them show any grace or benefit which a reprobate may partake by the Sacrament, and is according to our doctrine excluded from it, without his own default, only by the absolute will of God, and than he speaketh to some purpose.  
God's gifts by the decree of Reprobation are neither made unprofitable nor dangerous. For (as hath been formerly manifested) the decree of Reprobation changeth not the proper nature or true ordination of God's gifts towards persons not-elected. If we speak of the future event only, it is most true, that they will never do them good in reference to their eternal glorification. And this Author cannot truly affirm that ever they shall, unless he can also truly affirm that some men reprobated, as the Remonstrants hold Reprobation, become afterwards glorified or saved. And yet he will not grant, that God out of hatred giveth his gifts unto reprobates, that they should use them ill, and so be damned: Not more will we. It is a weak or rather non-consequence, That God's choicest gifts are by God intended as snares unto men reprobated by his eternal decree, because he hath decreed to permit them so to abuse those gifts, and hath decreed to withhold from them that special mercy and effectual grace which only maketh men de facto use Gods grace to the attaining of salvation. So that I may now conclude, There is no one amongst so many objections brought against Reprobation, as we teach it, that is of any validity: or if it be, it maketh as much against that eternal immutable decree of Reprobation which the Remonstrants themselves are forced to acknowledge.    

Treatise.  
MY fourth general reason against this absolute Reprobation is, It is a hindrance to Piety. 
iv It is prejudicial to PIETY.  It is a doctrine that serveth greatly to discourage holiness and encourage profaneness: It maketh Ministers (by its natural importment) negligent in their preaching, praying, and other services which are ordained of God for the eternal good of their people: It maketh people careless in hearing, reading, praying, instructing their families, examining their consciences, fasting and mourning for their sins, and all other godly exercises: In a word, it cutteth asunder the very sinews of religion, and pulleth away the strongest inducements to a holy life. Therefore it is no true and wholesome doctrine.  
That it doth so, it will appear by these reasons that follow.  
I. It taketh (A) away Hope and Fear; Hope of attaining any good by godliness, Fear of sustaining any hurt by wickedness: and so it taketh away two principal props of Religion. This reason may be resolved into these two branches.  
1. Hope and Fear uphold Godliness. Were it not for these, it would come to ruin: by these are men strongly led on to virtue, and withheld from vice. Hope doth excitare, stir men up to begin, and corroborare, strengthen them in the doing of any good action begun. By this hope of heaven did our Saviour stir up himself to endure the cross, and despise the shame, Heb. 12.2. By this he heartened his disciples to do and to suffer for his sake, Matth. 5.11. and Matth. 10.32. By this have all the godly in all ages encouraged themselves in welldoing: as we may see in general, Phil. 3.20. Col. 1.9. Tit. 2.12, 13. and in particular, Heb. 11. Abraham left his country and kindred at Gods call, because he looked for a city whose builder and maker was God, vers. 8.9, 10. Moses left all the pleasures and treasures of Egypt, and endured afflictions with the people of God, because he saw him that was invisible, and had respect to the recompense of reward, v. 25, 27. The Martyrs (B) endured racks, gibbets, lions, sword, fire, with a world of other torments, because they looked for a better resurrection, vers. 35. Paul endeavoureth always to keep a clear conscience, through the hope which he had of a blessed resurrection, Acts 24.15. All the noble and heroic acts of active and passive obedience have sprung from the hope of eternal glory. Soldiers, Merchants, Husbandmen, all are whetted-on by hope to diligence in their callings, as daily experience showeth us. 
Aquin. 1.2, qu. 40. art. 8.  Hope, saith Aquinas, confert ad operationem, conduceth to action: and he proveth it, first by Scripture, 1. Cor. 9.10. He which eareth and thresheth, must ear and thresh in hope. and than he proveth it by a twofold reason; 1. From the nature of Hope's object, which is bonum arduum & possibile haberi, some excellent good atteinable by industry. Existimatio ardui excitat attentionem, Hope to get that by pains which is conceived to be a thing of worth, stirreth up to painstaking. 2. From the effect of Hope, which is delectatio, an inward pleasure, which the party that liveth under hope is affected with by his hope. There is not any man which hath an inward contentment and satisfaction of heart in the work he hath to do, but goeth on merrily. The Hope of heaven therefore is a great encouragement to piety.  
The Fear (C) of hell also is a strong curb to hold men in from impiety: And therefore (saith one) God hath planted in men a fear of vengeance, that by it, as the ship by the rudder, the soul may presently be turned aside from any rocks, gulfs or quicksands of sin, when it is near them, & may steer its course another way. For this cause fear of God and abstaining from evil are often joined together in Scripture Job 1.1. Exod. 1.17. and the want of this fear is made the root of all licentiousness in sinning, Gen. 20.11. Nor doth fear only hinder a bad action, but it promoteth a good. It hindereth a bad action directly, because it is fuga mali, a flying from that evil of misery which is annexed to the evil of sin: and it promoteth a good action accidentally, because men think that they are never so safe from the mischief which they fear, as when they are exercised in such employments as tend to the getting of a contrary state. Workout your salvation (saith the Apostle) with fear and trembling; implying that the working-out of salvation goeth not on handsomely, except the fear of missing it be an ingredient into the work.  
2. The second (D) branch of this reason is, That by the absolute decree Hope and Fear are taken away. For Hope is properly exercised about bonum possibile haberi, some good thing which may be obtained, not which must be obtained of necessity: and the object of Fear is malum possibile vi●ari, an evil that may be escaped. For metus est fuga mali, fear is a fleeing from evil; and therefore supposeth the evil to be avoidable. For no man will flee from an evil that cannot be prevented; but will yield up himself to it, as Cesar did his body to the murderers in the senate-house. Now, by this decree, heaven and hell are not objects possible but necessary: Heaven shall avoidable be obtained by those that are elected, and hell must as certainly be endured by those that are reprobated. For men have no power to altar their eternal states: All men by this decree are precisely determined ad unum, to one state, to necessary salvation or necessary damnation, without any power or liberty to choose whether.  
And from hence this conclusion is clear, That the absolute decree taketh away the chiefest inducements to holiness and deterrements from wickedness, and consequently hindereth a godly life exceedingly.  
II. The injuriousness of this doctrine to a godly life may further appear by these considerations that follow, one depending upon another.  
1. Absolute and peremptory (E) decrees are inevitable, whatsoever the things be about which they are exercised: and men's everlasting states if they be absolutely determined, are altogether undeclinable. Stat fati lex indeclinabilis, The la of Destiny is undeclinable. And the reason is, Because it hath an inevitable cause, the adamantine decrees of almighty God, which are indeclinable two ways. 1. Irreversible, liable to no repeal (as the statutes are which are made in our Parliaments) but fare more unalterable than the laws of the Medes and Persians'. As I have spoken, so will I bring it to pass: I have purposed, and I will do it, Esay 46.11. Men do many times bite-in their words again, because they utter things rashly; and do repeal their statutes and ordinances, because they see some inconvenience in them being made, which they could not foresee: but God never calleth-in his decrees, because they are all made in great wisdom. 2. Irresistible. It lieth not in the power of any creature to disannul them. Who hath resisted his will? Rom. 9.19. Our God is in heaven: he doth whatsoever he will, Psal. 115.3. Whatsoever is once concluded by his absolute will, is no ways alterable by the will of man. It is more possible for a man to hinder the rising of the sun or to stay his course in the heaven, to stop the revolutions of the year, and overturn the whole course of nature, than to make the lest change in any of God's absolute decrees.  
2. men's actions (F) about ends and things determined by an absolute decree are vain and fruitless: And the reason is, Because they cannot make them otherwise than they are determined to be. It is absolutely decreed, the devils shall be damned: Were it not a fruitless thing in them by prayers, tears, and endeavours to seek to altar it? It is also simply decreed, that the soul of man shall be immortal: Is it not a labour in vain for any man to use means that his soul may be annihilated? It is ordained that the sun shall rule the day, and the moon the night; that the one shall finish his proper course in a year, the other in a month: Would not a man's endeavour to make an alteration in these things be unprofitable and ridiculous? Without doubt it would. So likewise in vain do men labour to obtain everlasting life and avoid eternal death, if there be no power and liberty in their hands to choose life or death, but must of necessity take that which is assigned them, be it life or death: For by their labour they effect just nothing. If they be absolutely appointed to destruction, their hearing, reading, praying, , and mourning for their sins cannot possibly procure their salvation: damned they must be: And if they be absolutely ordained to salvation, their neglect of holy duties, their ignorance, their love of pleasures, and continuance in a course of ungodliness cannot bring them to damnation: they must be saved. If so many souls in a parish be in this manner decreed to heaven or hell, the Minister (G) preacheth in vain, and the people hear in vain. For there cannot one soul be saved by all his or their pains which is ordained to hell, nor one soul be cast away by his or their negligence which is appointed to heaven. It is hard for thee, said Christ to Saul, to kick against pricks, that is, to endeavour by thy persecutions and slaughters to root out my Church out of the world; because the preservation of it is absolutely decreed in heaven: teaching us by that speech, that a man's labour in any thing whatsoever is never profitable, except it be exercised about an end atteinable thereby, and without which the end may be lost.  
3. Men are not willing to be employed in fruitless actions, if they know it. I so run, saith S. Paul, not as uncertainly: so fight I, not as one that be ateth the air: But I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection, jest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway. The meaning is, I endeavour to keep God's commandments; I fight with the temptations of the devil, the allurements of the world, and mine own corruptions; I keep my body low by watch and fastings and other severe exercises of holy discipline. But cui bono? Do I all this at random? uncertain whether I shall obtain any good or prevent any mischief hereby? Not; but I do this, as one that is sure (H) that by so doing I shall attein everlasting life, and without so doing I cannot avoid eternal death: intimating in these words the common disposition of men, which is, to labour where some proportionable good is to be gotten, or evil prevented; otherwise to spare their heads and hands too. To be employed in fruitless (I) affairs, is both a Folly and a Misery. 1. A Folly: For de necessariis nemo sapiens deliberate, No man useth deliberation about things necessary, saith the Philosopher. And our Saviour speaking of things above our power, Cur estis soliciti? saith he to his disciples, Matth. 6.27. Luke 12.25, 26. Why take ye thought about such things? Which is as much as if he had said, It is an argument of folly in you to trouble yourselves about such things as lie not in your power. 2. It is a Misery in the opinions of all men, as the fable of Sisyphus implieth; Who (as the Poets feign) is punished in hell for his robberies, with the rolling of a great stone to the top of a steep hill, where it cannot rest, but presently tumbleth down again. The moral of that fable is, That it is torment, and a torment fit for hell, for a man to be set about any work that is fruitless and in vain. Men will rather be exercised in high and hard employments that produce proportionable ends, than pick straws, play with feathers, or with Domitian spend their times in flapping and killing of flies, or do any other easy work which endeth in nothing but air and emptiness, except they be fools or self-tormentours. And therefore when Balaam once saw that the Lord had fully determined to bless Israel, 
Num. 24.1.  and that all his sorceries could not effect the contrary, he presently gave-over and set not more enchantments. And reason teacheth every man to do the like. If any man were fully possessed with a persuasion that his temporal estate were determined in heaven, and that he should be worth just so much, neither more nor less; he would conclude in his thoughts, that his care and pains could nothing profit him, nor his idleness impoverish him: and so would quickly be persuaded to take his ease. And were it evident that every Commonwealth had terminum magnitudinis, a condition appointed for it which could not be altered, and a fatal period which could not be avoided, than would the King call no Parliaments, use no privy Counselors, make no laws and ordinances for the preventing of a Kingdom's ruin, or the procuring of its prosperity and continuance, (for it would be to little purpose, as once a famous privy Counsellor told our late Queen Elisabeth) but would follow the Poet's counsel, 

Manilius.  Solvite mortales animos, curisque levate,  
Tótque supervacuis animum deplete querelis:  
Fata regunt orbem, certa stant omnia lege.   
From these three premises (K) laid together it followeth directly, That the doctrine of an absolute decree, which determineth men's ends precisely, is no friend at all to a godly life. For if events absolutely decreed be unavoidable, if men's actions about unavoidable ends be unprofitable, if in unprofitable employments men will have no hand willingly; whosoever they be that believe and consider this, will have nothing to do with the practice of godliness: For their ends being absolutely pitched and therefore unavoidable, they will conclude that their labour in religion will be unprofitable, and so will not labour in it at all.  
III. That which hath been said may be yet confirmed by two witnesses. The one of them is (L) Mr Calvine: Who in his Institutions hath these words; 
f Instit. l. 3. c. 23. sect. 14. Si quis ità plebem compeller, Si non creditis, ideo sit, quia jam Divinitus exitio praedestinati estis; is non modò ignaviam sovet, sed etiam indulget malitiae.  If any man, saith he, should speak thus to the people, If there be any among you that believe not, it is because ye are ordained to destruction; this man would not only cherish slothfulness, but wickedness also. Which is as much to say (me thinks) as this, If a man should set forth the doctrine of Reprobation in its colours, and explain it to people in a clear and lively fashion, he would hereby open a door to liberty and profaneness. The other witness is a man of another stamp, the miserable Landtgrave of Thuring: Of whom it is recorded by Heisterbachius, that being by his friends admonished of his vicious conversation and dangerous condition, he made them this answer, 
g Heist. l. 1. De memor. hist. c. 27. pag. 38. Si praedestinatus sum, nulla peccata poterunt mihi regnum coelorum auferre: si praescitus, nulla opera mihi illud valebunt confer.  If I be elected, no sins can bereave me of heaven; if I be reprobated, no good deeds can help me to heaven.  
I conclude therefore, That by this opinion (which is taught for one of God's principal truths) Religion either is or may be made a very great loser: which is my fourth general Reason against it.  
But there are three things which are usually answered to vindicate this opinion from this crimination. First, That many (M) of them which believe and defend this doctrine, are holy and good men: and therefore of itself it openeth no way for liberty of life, but through the wickedness of men who use to pervert the sweetest and surest truths of Scripture to their own damnation.  
The like defence to this did the Epicures of old make in favour of their sensual and swinish doctrine; which was, That happiness consisted in pleasure. They said that many of their sect were honest men: and so much Tully granteth to be true, but with exception still against their doctrine; 
h Cic. l. 2. De sinib. bon. & mal. pag. 117. Ac mihi quidem videtur quòd ipse vir bonus fuit: & multi Epicurei fuerunt, & hodie sunt, & in amicitiis fideles, & in omni vita constantes & graves, nec voluptate sed officio confilia moderantes.  I take, saith he, Epicurus himself to be an honest man: yea and many Epicures have been and are faithful in friendship, square and constant men in all conditions of life, ordering themselves and their lives not by pleasure but by duty. But (saith he) 
i Hoc videtur major vis honestatis, minor voluptatis.  this proceeded not from the principles of their opinion, but from their own virtuous inclination: and the force of honesty by their so doing, appeared to be more prevailing in them than the force of pleasure, which they pleaded for. A little after he hath other words to the same purpose; 
k Atque ut caeteri existimantur dicere meliùs quàm facere, sic hi mihi videntur meliùs facere quàm dicere  As other men's doctrines are esteemed to be better than their deeds, so these men's deeds seem to me to be better than their doctrines. Like to this answer of Tully to the defenders of Epicurism, will I shape mine. It cannot (I confess) be denied that many of this opinion are godly men: but it is no thanks to their opinion that they are so (the true and natural genius of which is to (N) beget sloth, to drown men in security, and to countenance carnal liberty;) but to something else, either to God's providence, (who will not suffer this doctrine for his own glories sake and the good of men to have any great stroke in their lives;) or to men's incogitancy, who think not of reducing it ad praxim, to practice, and drawing conclusions out of it, but rest in the naked speculation of it, as they do of many others; or lastly, to some good practical conclusions which they meet with in the word of God and apply to their lives (as they do not the former deductions;) such as these are for example, Be ye holy as I am holy. Without holiness no man shall see God. If ye consent and obey, ye shall eat the good things of the land. Godliness hath the promises of this life, and of the life to come, etc. And hence we may learn to measure this opinion, not by the lives of some few of the men that hold it, but by the sequels which the Logic even of simple men, if they should apply their brains to consider it, would fetch out of it. No man that hath throughly sucked it in and understandeth the force of it, but will either quite relinquish it, or live according to the natural importment of it, that is, licentiously.  
Secondly, it is said, that albeit this doctrine teach, Th● men are absolutely elected or absolutely reprobated, y● 1. It telleth no man who in particular is elected, who rejecte● 2. It teacheth that men must get the knowledge of their Election by good works, and so by consequent doth rather encourage than stifle holy and honest endeavours.  
For answer to the first of these; The ignorance (O) of man's particular state (in my judgement) doth not altar incase a jote. For he that believeth in general, that many, a● they the greatest company without comparison, are inevitabl● ordained to destruction, and a few others to salvation, is about of these two general propositions to make these particular conclusions, and to reason (P) thus with himself; Either I 〈◊〉 absolutely chosen to grace and glory, or absolutely cast of fr● both. If I be chosen, I must of necessity believe, and be saved If I be cast of, I must as necessarily not believe, and be damne● What need I therefore take thought either way about mean●● end? My end is pitched in heaven, and the means too: 〈◊〉 final perseverance in faith, and my salvation; or my continuance in unbelief, and my damnation. If I lie under th● necessity of believing and being saved, or of dying in unbelief and being damned, in vain do I trouble myself ab●● means or end: I have my Supersedeas; I may take m●● ease, and so I will: enough it is for me to sit down 〈◊〉 wait what God will do unto me. Thus (it is likely) d● Tiberius (Q) reason with himself. For Suetonius report●● of him, that he was 
l Suet. de vit. Tib. cap. 69. pag. 180. Circa Deos & religiones negligentior, quip addictus Mathematicae, persuasionisque plenus omnia fato agi.  the more negligent in religion, because 〈◊〉 was fully persuaded that all things came to pass by destiny. An● in this manner (it is to be feared) do too many reason in the● hearts, and by this very ground (though they will not perhaps acknowledge it) encourage themselves in profaneness. Though men cannot hid their wickedness, yet they will hid the●● grounds which flesh them in it, either through modesty, or 〈◊〉 avoid some further ignominy: The fool hath said in his hear● There is no God, Psal. 14.  
To the second I answer, That men ordinarily will not thi● the getting of the knowledge of their Election (if that be al● worth all those painful duties of religion that are to be performed, and all those sweet and pleasing sins which are 〈◊〉 be relinquished: They will rest contented without it for a whil● rather than pay so dearly for it: and the rather, because 1. Wh● they have gotten it, it is in most but a weak and conjectural knowledge, obscured with many clouds and uncertainties. 2. It must be maintained with a great deal of pains and ●are, or else it will be lost again. To the retaining of it is required a continual endeavour to keep a clear conscience, which is irksome and tedious. Men therefore had need of a stronger motive to obedience than this is, or else they will do nothing.  
Thirdly, they that defend and teach this absolute Reprobation (say they) do earnestly exhort men to good works, ●nd deny that any man can be saved, except they live honestly.  
So much was also said in the behalf of Epicurus, viz. That he denied that any man that lived not honestly, could live pleasantly. But Tully answereth roundly, 
m Cic. Offic. l. 3. prope finem; Quasi ego id curem quid ille aiat aut neget? illud quaero, quid ci qui in voluptate summum bonum putat, consentaneum sit dicere.  As if I cared what he affirmeth or denieth: this I ask, what is meet for him to say who placeth happiness in pleasure. And so it mattereth not what these men teach, but what they should teach if they will speak consequently to their own conclusions.  

An Answer to his fourth Reason, That it is prejudicial to Piety.  
IF absolute Predestination and Reprobation taken in that true sense which formerly hath been explained, be of itself subject to these mischiefs, we will renounce it; or if it be more subject than their conditional Predestination and Reprobation, presupposing only that the decrees of Election and Reprobation are eternal and unchangeable quoad singulares personas electas aut non-electas; which not Remonstrant will or can deny who understandeth what the very terms of the Divine Election and Reprobation do import.  
That Hope and Fear lead men unto virtuous actions, and restrain them from vicious actions, we confess: There needed not s● much pains for proving of that which no man denieth. But the solemn practice o● this Author is, to be large in proving a● antecedent which would have been grante● without further proof, and to presuppose or beg the consequence which he is unable to make good.  
The Martyrs did not endure racks, gibbets, lions, etc. out of an hope that upon prescience of faith and perseverance they were elected or predestinated before the foundations of the world were laid, whereas others out of God's eternal prescience of their final impenitency and infidelity were passed-by, (which is the Election and Reprobation only allowed by the Remonstrants) but out of a certain belief grounded in the revealed word, that whosoever persevereth unto the end shall be saved. This hope of persevering is not less (nay it is more) strong in those who fetch their faith and perseverance from the special mercy of God extended unto them in their Predestination, than it can be in those who fetch their Predestination from God's foresight only of faith and perseverance, upon the condition of general grace growing out of man's own freewill.  
Yea, but (saith the Remonstrant) I am utterly ignorant what God hath decreed concerning me in his secret counsel of Predestination; this therefore can afford me ●o hope of salvation. I demand, Art not thou ●s utterly ignorant what God hath eternally foreseen concerning thee in thy conditionate Predestination? how than can more hope arise from this than from the other?  
If a Remonstrant shall further reply, I am uncertain whether it be Gods will to give me the grace of perseverance or not, and therefore I cannot build my hope of salvation upon his unknown william. I demand again, Art thou certain that thine own freewill, with help of that grace which is offered thee, will make thee persevere in faith and godliness unto thy lives end? how than canst thou build thy hope of salvation upon the prescience of that which is more uncertain than the other? Hear this very objection long ago answered by S. Augustine; 
a De Praed. sanct. c. 11.  Incerta est mihi (inquit) de meipso voluntas Dei. Quid ergó? Tuáne tibi voluntas de teipso certa est, nec times? Qui videtur stare, videat nè cadat. Cùm igitur utraque voluntas incerta sit, cur non homo firmiori quàm infirmiori fidem suam, spem charitatémque committit? And Prosper giveth the same answer in effect; 
b Ad excerpt. Genuens. Resp. 9  Absit à vobis ideo desperare de vobis, quoniam spem vestram in Deo habere jubemini non in vobis. We do not say therefore that hope of salvation or future blessedness can spring from an immediate knowledge of that Election which we ascribe unto God's absolute decree: And we do say, that no more hop● can arise to any man from the immediat● knowledge of that Election which the Remonstrants ascribe unto the conditionate decree founded in God's eternal prescience. In both opinions therefore, if we will have a lively hope of attaining the heavenly kingdom, it must immediately arise from an experimental sense in ourselves that we are walking in that way which leadeth unto the heavenly kingdom, and from a steadfast persuasion that God our Father will, notwithstanding our own weakness and all our mighty enemies, bring us safely unto the heavenly kingdom. And for this latter, our doctrine of Election or Predestination, built upon mere mercy, affordeth fare better hope than theirs, built upon mere prescience. 
c See Jer. 32.38, etc. John 10.28, 29. & Phil. 1.6.   
Now for the curb of fear; it is as strong, and more strong, to hold men in from vicious actions, in our doctrine, who held faith and repentance and holiness of life to be the fruits or effects of Predestination, than in the Remonstrants, who hold the Divine Predestination to be rather an effect of man's freewill preconsidered or foreseen by God as believing and persevering in faith and godliness. For suppose a man somewhat careful of his salvation; he will be fearful ●f living wickedly, when he beleiveth that ●o man shall de facto escape the torments of ●ell but he whom God out of mere mercy ●ath predestinated, and that no man can have ●ny comfortable assurance or taste of his Predestination, unless he have first a true constant endeavour to do good and eschew ●vil. Suppose a man careless and unmindful of his salvation; yet if he hold the forementioned doctrine, he must needs be many times in the midst of his lewd courses stricken with fear of hell, when he seethe none of those fruits in himself which he holdeth to be the effects of Predestination unto life and the only means to bring him to heaven. On the other side; Take a man of the Remonstrants' opinion, though not altogether careless of his salvation; yet he need not greatly to abstain in the present from vicious actions for fear of hell-torments or eternal damnation, because his Predestination dependeth upon his own freewill to the very last moment of life; and he hath such a strong persuasion of a continual power which he hath in his freewill to repent and believe, that he will not in all likelihood be very fearful of enjoying the pleasures of sin for a season. Suppose a Remonstrant careless of salvation; this doctrine, That Reprobation is founded upon prescience of what a man shall be found doing at the very last moment of his life, will make him more careless: for no man, but in his hopes of future amendment is overfavourable to himself, and so lesseneth the present fear which his wicked life might otherwise raise up in him.  
For the second branch of this reason whereby he goeth about to prove that absolute Predestination and Reprobation destroy both Hope and Fear; it is grounded upon an error confuted and rejected by the common consent of all Divines, namely, That the eternal decrees of God concerning future events do make the contrary events impossible, do make the temporal and immediate agents to do all they do out of an absolute necessity, having no liberty in modo agendi to abstain from so doing or to do the contrary. Were this true, the Remonstrants, who acknowledge eternal and absolute decrees upon presupposal of an eternal absolute prescience, should by their doctrine destroy hope and fear as well as we. For the Divine eternal prescience of future actions or events inferreth as absolute a certainty, immutability, necessity of such events, as the decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do. And therefore the Schoolmen are as much troubled in answering the question, An praescientia Divina, vel providentia, necessitatem afferat rebus praescitis, as in the other, An praedestinatio Divina imponat, etc. And the Philosophers, who never dreamt of Predestination or Reprobation, were yet much troubled to show how any thing could be fortuitum or contingens, admitting an eternal and infallible prescience of all future events in God. Aquinas first enquireth 
d Part. 1. q. 22. art. ●.  Vtrùm providentia rebus provisis necessitatem imponit? And here it is that subtle Cajetane is driven to confess, In ignorantia sola quietem invenio. And concerning Gods eternal Knowledge of future contingents he had before moved the like difficulties, Quaest. 14. art. 13. concerning Gods eternal Will, Quaest. 19 art. 8. The like may be found commonly in all the Schoolmen. So that if this Author, or any other Remonstrant, will but take the pains to consider how the School-Divines clear the eternal and infallible Prescience, Will and Providence of God from imposing fatal necessity upon events foreseen, willed, provided, he may with the same facility know how to clear the eternal absolute decrees of Predestination and Reprobation from imposing upon men's actions any fatal irresistible necessity. As God's absolute prescience doth not take away the possibility of the contrary action or event, not more doth his absolute decree. 
e Part. 1. qu. 14. art. 13.  Scita à Deo, saith Aquinas, sunt contingentia propter causas proximas, licèt scientia Dei sit necessaria. And so he speaketh concerning Predestination; 
f Quaest 23. art. 6.  Ordo praedestinationis certus est, & tamen libertas arbitrii non tollitur, ex qua contingenter provenit praedestinationis effectus. And concerning the decree of Reprobation; 
g Art. 3.  Quòd reprobatus non potest gratiam adipisci, non est intelligendum secundùm impossibilitatem absolutam, sed conditionatam. Men are not more precisely determined ad unum in our doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation than in that of the Remonstrants. In ment ac voluntate Dei the decrees are eternal, immutable, necessary, subject to no variation or contingency, as well in the one opinion as in the other: In temporali exsecutione, where men are the agents, the actions which lead to heaven or hell are subject to contingency in both.  
To all this we may add, That Hope or Fear cannot immediately arise from any decrees of God altogether unknown to men: But who shall be saved, or who shall be damned, as it is only determined in the eternal decree of Predestination and Reprobation, is a thing altogether unknown.  
What this Author meaneth, when disputing against us he saith, The eternal decrees of Divine Predestination and Reprobation are peremptory, inevitable, irreversible, irresistible, I cannot conjecture. It should seem, in his opinion the eternal decrees of Predestination and Reprobation are ambulatory, avoidable, reversible, resistible by the creature.  
Though the decrees considered in themselves are peremptory, inevitable, etc. yet the actions of men whereby at length they arrive at heaven or fall into the pit of hell, are free, contingent, etc. Reprobation includeth a will or absolute decree of God to permit such singular persons to fall into final sin-guiltiness, and to inflict eternal punishment upon them for their sins: doth this make their particular sinful actions necessary, inevitable, & c? Not: 
h Aquin. part. 1. qu. 23. art. 3.  Quòd in hoc peccatum vel illud labantur, ex libero illorum arbitrio contingit, unde & meritò imputatur in culpam.  
It is true, it lieth not in the power of any creature to disannul the eternal absolute decrees of Gods will: But yet it lieth in the power and choice of free creatures (such as are angels and men) to do or not to do those things whereby such decrees are in time accomplished. It was not in Davids or Peter's power to disannul the eternal decree of God concerning their Predestination and Salvation: Yet the actions of Repenting, Believing, Persevering were free actions proceeding from their freewill and upon deliberation. So it is true, it lay not in the power of Judas or Cain to disannul the eternal decree of their Reprobation & Damnation; for Omne aternum necessarium & immutabile: yet it lay in Cains power freely to commit or not commit a murder upon his own brother, and in Judas his freewill to betray or not betray his Master; and so in all other sinners, to choose or not to choose the doing of those things which procure their just damnation.  
That men's actions about ends and things determined by God's absolute unrevealed decrees are in vain and fruitless, is a vain and false opinion, and exploded by the very heathen under the name of 
i Cic. De fato.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or ignava ratio, cui si pareamus, nihil est omnino quod agamus in vita. For though our endeavours do not make them otherwise quoad eventum than God had foredetermined, yet the thing was so determined by God as it neither could nor should have ever come into effect without such actions and endeavours of men. His instances are as frivolous and fare from the purpose, as his opinion is from all truth. For his instance in the devils now damned, it is not to the point. He should have instanced in the angel's not-elected before their damnation, and have showed that their obedience had been vain and fruitless; and than he might have inferred that the good actions of men dum sunt in via are vain and fruitless. Now he can infer nothing, but that it were a vain thing for Judas damned in hell to hope by any endeavours of his to altar the decree of his damnation.  
For his instance in a decree of the immortality of man's soul and of the vanity of using means for the annihilation thereof, it is no whit better than the other. We do not deny but it is a fruitless and a vain thing for any man to goabout by his temporal endeavours to altar Gods eternal decrees concerning the nature or properties which he hath allotted unto his creatures, as to make an elementary body eternal, or an immortal soul mortal. And as ridiculous it is (though in another kind) for any Remonstrant to suppose that the eternal decrees of God's Predestination and Reprobation (as himself holdeth them) can be altered by any temporal actions which men shall do or not do.  
And yet though it be a vain and idle endeavour to refer our temporal actions to the alteration of any of God's eternal decrees (for 
k Vide August. Cons. l. 12. c. 13.  de ratione aeternitatis est immutabilitas;) yet it is no vain or idle endeavour for any man elected or not-elected to aim at eternal life by doing good actions and by abstaining from evil: For if a man be elected, there is no other way to come unto salvation: if he be not elected, some good endeavours would serve to mitigate his damnation; and every man continuing in his good endeavours may assuredly hope for salvation & shall assuredly obtain it. There is an eternal, absolute, immutable decree, revealed unto us in God's word, That whosoever believeth in the Son of God, and leadeth a sober, just and godly life, shall be saved; and whosoever doth not truly believe, but leadeth a lewd, unjust and wicked life, shall be damned. It is not the alteration of God's decrees which men's actions must aim at, but the obtaining of happiness and escaping wretchedness according to the tenor of his decrees. And herein no man's actions can be vain or fruitless. For God doth not by the absolute decree of Election absolutely determine to save Peter, whether he believe or not believe, repent or not repent; and therefore Peter's faith and repentance are not vain and idle actions. Neither doth he by the absolute decree of Nonelection or negative Reprobation absolutely determine to damn Judas, whether he believe or not believe, repent or not repent (such absolute decrees are the absolute mistake of the Remonstrants;) and therefore such good actions had not been vain and fruitless. We may truly say to every man in the world, elected or not-elected, as God himself spoke to desperate Cain, 
l Gen. 4.7.  If thou do well, shalt thou not be accepted? Yes questionless: for 
m Rom. 2.  to every man that doth good, shall be glory, etc. No man shall be damned quia ab aeterno non electus aut reprobatus, sed quia in tempore infidelis & impius.  
For the Ministers preaching; if this man hold it vain, 
Vide Aug. tract. 48. in Joann.  unless by it some souls of those whom God hath eternally reprobated be saved, will he nill he, of necessity he must confess, that the Predestination and Reprobation founded upon eternal Prescience by Arminius maketh all our preaching vain. For no Remonstrant can be so ignorant as to affirm, that any man eternally predestinated was ever cast away by the negligence of the Minister, or that any man eternally reprobated (as Arminius conceiveth of Reprobation) was ever saved by the pains of the Minister: And yet we say, the Minister laboureth not in vain. First, it is not in vain in regard of the elect: for it is unto them 
n ●. Tim. 2.10.  the power of God unto their salvation. And unto them (though unknown 
o Aquin. part. 1. qu. 23. art. 8.  quoad singulares personas) do the Ministers principally refer their labour and pains. For though the decree of Predestination, which is eternal, cannot be procured by any endeavours of men, yet the effects or benefits flowing from Predestination may be promoted by the Ministers. Secondly, it is not in vain in regard of the Reprobate: For though it bring none of them to salvation, yet sometimes it maketh them do some good things, and abstain from some evil, which otherwise they would not have done: and it is a means to convict their consciences that their damnation is just. Last of all, the Ministers painful preaching is not in vain in regard of himself: For hereby he escapeth that Vae mihi si non evangelizavero: he getteth comfort of conscience here, and a crown hereafter.  
If labour be to no purpose where the thing is not atteinable by man's labour, than to goabout by our labour to attein the decree of Election for ourselves or any other man, is a vain labour: But if labour be profitable when a good thing may be atteined by it, and without it cannot; than to labour to bring ourselves or others to the kingdom of heaven, is never a vain labour: for by this every man may, and without this no man can enter into the kingdom of heaven.  
Every man in the world by doing as S. Paul did, may be as sure of attaining everlasting life as Paul was. Neither will the eternal decree of Reprobation, be it absolute or be it conditional, ever stand an obstacle in any man's way.  
No man who by the preaching of the ●ord is excited to good works hath at any ●ime or ever shall found them fruitless or vain. De necessariis nemo deliberat; and therefore no man deliberateth how to get himself predestinated: but to be saved, is a thing depending upon our free actions, which require deliberation.  
Here he discovereth his erroneous conceit of Predestination and Reprobation, namely, That Predestination is an absolute appointment of men to enjoy the kingdom of heaven, whether they live well or ill; and that Reprobation is also an absolute appointment of some men to the torments of hell, whether they live well or ill. Such an absolute Predestination and Reprobation we disclaim and detest.  
If a wise man were persuaded (as he aught to be) that he shall never be one farthing richer than God hath determined, yet he would use the ordinary means, as knowing that men cannot be brought to the end determined by God but by using such means without which God hath also appointed that such an end shall not be effected. As if God had determined in heaven and revealed to man upon earth that he shall live fifteen years just, and neither more nor less, he were a fool or a madman that should conclude, I will neither eat nor drink these fifteen years; I will run when I list into the fir● etc.  
From all the premises which this Author hath hitherto enlarged, there is no colour of inferring this conclusion, Therefore the absolute decrees of eternal Predestination and Reprobation must be abandoned, and Arminius his conditional Predestination and Reprobation be embraced, otherwise all care of piety's and good living must needs be extinguished.  
First, because he is quite mistaken in the sense of this word Absolute. Eternal Predestination is not termed an absolute decree of saving David, Peter, Paul, or any man else, as if it absolved persons predestinate from the necessity of using the means of salvation which Gods revealed word hath enjoined; (This were rather a dissolute than an absolute Predestination.) but because God eternally predestinating David, Peter, Paul, and the rest, hath in his special mercy absolutely determined to give them that special grace which shall move, enable, and make them use all the necessary means unto their salvation. And for eternal Reprobation; it is not termed an absolute decree of damning Cain, Judas, or the Devil himself, as if God were absolutely resolved to damn them though they should never entangle themselves in any guilt of damnation, and should do all those good acts which God himself hath decreed shall be means to bring any who useth them unto salvation: but because God eternally passing-by them and not-predestinating them, hath absolutely resolved to withhold from them that special mercy, more abundant and most effectual grace, without which he infallibly knoweth by their own voluntary rebellion they will incur damnation, which he is absolutely resolved to permit and not to prevent.  
Secondly, all his premises are too weak to induce his conclusion, because eternal absolute determinations of God concerning events which shall betid unto particular men, do neither encourage nor discourage them from using the ordinary means of attaining good and avoiding evil, whilst they are only known in the general, and altogether unknown as they concern this and that singular person. No man doubteth but God hath eternally determined who shall be 
p Psal. 75.  promoted unto worldly honours and who shall not, who shall attein unto richeses and who shall not. The very Heathen were not ignorant of this truth, who ascribed these different conditions of men 
q Hesiod. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But because singular persons know not whether God have determined to advance them to honour and wealth or not, they judge not all care, pains and study to attein honour or wealth to be vain and fruitless. Yet i● temporal or external good things there were more colour a great deal to ground idleness upon God's eternal determination; because let a man take never so good courses and so true pains to attein honour or wealth, he shall never compass it if God have otherwise appointed: But in spiritual and eternal blessings, let any man take the course and use the means which God hath prescribed to attein them, and he may assure himself they are infallibly appointed for him.  
Thirdly, because experience teacheth the contrary to his supposition, though we admit the eternal absolute determination of God concerning this singular persons salvation were revealed unto him extraordinarily by God himself. For the certain knowledge of God's absolute determination to give eternal life, would not in a well-disposed mind produce carelessness or idleness, but a religious care and fervency of spirit in doing all such actions as further man in the way unto life, and of removal of such obstacles as would hinder them. It is commonly held by Divines, that the blessed Virgin, S. Paul, and some others had an extraordinary revelation of their absolute election unto eternal life; and yet none of these concluded that all their pains and labour for attaining it was fruitless and vain. And if God had revealed to Judas (which in his wisdom he hath judged unfit) the eternal immutable decree of his Reprobation, yet should none of his endeavours to do good & eschew evil have been unprofitable.  
Fourthly, because if men should reject the absolute, irreversible, irresistible decrees of Gods eternal Predestination and Reprobation which this Author opposeth, under pretence that thereby all actions and means are made vain and fruitless unto men where the ends and things are predetermined, the Predestination and Reprobation grounded upon God's eternal prescience would lie as open to the selfsame objection: Which if it be of no validity against the Remonstrants, neither is it against us. For first of all, as for the eternal decrees of absolute Election and Reprobation; nihil ponunt in electis aut reprobatis, they only suppose in God a determination of bringing the one infallibly unto eternal life, and of permitting the other as infallibly to come short of eternal life, and by their own sinful acts to plunge themselves into the gulf of eternal death. In the Remonstrants' decree of eternal Predestination and Reprobation the same determination of God concerning the same particular men with the same infallibility and immutability of their contrary ends is established. If therefore the distinct decrees of Predestination and Reprobation thus irrevocably established before the world was made, make all labour in religion unprofitable, the Remonstrants own doctrine doth it no less the● ours. Again, absolute and eternal determinations of God concealed in ment Divina, though never so infallible and immutable, cannot in singular persons hinder piety or nourish profaneness, where there are decrees as immutable, as infallibly revealed unto the same singular persons in God's word, promising life to all without exception that do well, and threatening death to all those that do ill. How can it probably be supposed that those unknown Divine determinations should work upon men's wills, when these so well known and so continually published do not.  
If any Remonstrant shall say, Make me sure of mine Election, 
Viol Thom. à Kempis, l. 1. c. 25. pag. 68  and that no immutable eternal decree of Reprobation shall keep me out of heaven, and than I will labour, I will toil, I will sweated to attein eternal life; I answer, Not other man can make thee sure of it: but do what thou sayest, and thou mayest make thyself sure of it. And if thou wilt not for such a price adventure thy pains unless God will first make thee of his privy counsel, eternal damnation is but a just reward of thine idleness and profaneness.  
Last of all, the immutability of all Gods eternal decrees whatsoever is a thing out of all question amongst orthodox Divines (I need not except Vorstius the Remonstrant, because no man reckoneth him amongst orthodox Divines:) I wonder therefore how this Author should think he hath said any thing against the Divine absolute decrees of Predestination and Reprobation, only because they are peremptory, inevitable, irreversible, etc. If God upon the eternal prescience of Judas his final impenitency conceived an eternal decree of his Reprobation and Damnation (as Arminius himself granteth) 
r Ruiz. De vol. p. 166.  implicat contradictionem, velle non facere eandem rem, aut revocare illud decretum, etc. 
s Fulg. ad Monim. l. 1 c. 12.  Sempiterna voluntas Dei nunquam mutabilitati subjacet, quia initium exsistendi non habet. It is a thing unbeseeming the Divine majesty, not to decree from all eternity whatsoever he will do or not do for men or unto men in time; or when he hath so decreed, to revoke or change any of his decrees. If therefore the Remonstrants' Predestination and Reprobation be reversible decrees, we will none of them; for we are sure they were never of Gods making.  
Calvines saying is most true: For the decree of Reprobation is no cause of infidelity; though the decree of Predestination prepareth for men that grace which worketh faith and sanctification in their hearts.  
The Landtgraves profane speech maketh as much against the Arminian Predestination as against that which we hold. For suppose a Remonstrant had told him, If you be elected, it is because God hath eternally foreseen that you will die a penitent and a faithful man: If you be reprobated, it is because God hath eternally foreseen you will die a faithless and a wicked man, this in all likelihood would have been so far from taking away his desperate profaneness, that it would have increased it: for God cannot be deceived in his foresight.  
We prove not the truth of our doctrine from any man's holiness, but from holy Scriptures: we therefore passe-by this discourse as wholly impertinent. All that he saith of the Epicures might as well be said by us against the Remonstrants' opinions: but we take no pleasure in idle vagaries.  
men's practice cannot be guided by decrees of God concealed from their knowledge, though they be decrees concerning their good or evil. But if men will show themselves reasonable men and not mad men, they must take their rules of practice from such revealed decrees as teach what actions are means to attein good, and what are means to draw evil upon ourselves.  
He hath a crazed brain that will draw practical conclusions or logical sequeles from decrees or antecedents whereof he knoweth not the particular tenor, or how in singular they concern himself.  
For his objection against the second answer, we say, Let him understand absolute Reprobation and absolute Election as by us it hath been formerly explained, and not according to his erroneous fancy, which hath been often confuted; and it not more begetteth sloth or carnal liberty than the Remonstrants eternal Election and Reprobation springing from God's infallible and eternal prescience, nay much lesser. For according to our position no man can have so strong a persuasion that he is elected and shall be saved whilst he continueth in sloth, carnal security or sinful actions, as he may in theirs. If it be once conceived that the eternal decrees, which distinguish men elected and reprobated, stand founded upon the foreseen final goodness of men, such is the vain confidence which most men have of their own freewill and of the sovereign dominion which their will hath over its own acts, that though they be never so wicked for the present, yet they are most ready to flatter themselves that they will turn good and holy men before their death. And thus they spend their whole life in sin and carnal security, whilst they hope to put themselves within the number of the Elect by their final penitency when they please. But he that believeth that Predestination is an act of Gods absolute will and free mercy, and that faith and holiness are the proper effects thereof, he can have cold comfort of his Election or Salvation whilst he continueth in his carnal and wicked conversation; nay he must needs be in fear of damnation: especially since he dareth not trust to the broken reed of his own freewill for his repentance and perseverance, as men of a contrary opinion are easily induced to do. He may have some slender hope of being converted at the length, because it is within the limits of God's power and mercy to do it: yet he cannot (in all likelihood) so securely and carnally presume upon his final conversion and perseverance as those who ascribe these good acts unto their own freewill, and the certainty of them to the intuitive prescience of the Divine understanding, and not to an operative effectual eternal decree of his william.  
To this may be added, that whatsoever for fashion's sake Remonstrants talk of eternal Predestination and Reprobation, yet 
t Vide Penot. p. 234. Et Grev. de Elect. pag. 136. Et Rem. Exam. Censur. p. 192.  some hold them such incomplete acts or decrees as are never established in ment ac voluntate Divina before man's freewill hath actually done all the good or evil which it doth in this life. So that the decree of Reprobation being conceived by them ad modum sententiae pendentis, donec per liberum hominis arbitrium omnia sint posita in esse & in actu quae per illud poni debent, every man may guess what boldness this is likely to breed in most men of deferring their repentance, and continuing in their carnal security till they think their end is drawing near: which few think of until it suddenly surpriseth them.  
The Remonstrants lately in plain terms affirm, Falsum est quòd electio facta sit ab aeterno: By which it is plain what they think of the decree of Reprobation. I have stood the longer upon this, that every man may see what the Remonstrants principally aim at, when they are so bitter against absolute Predestination and Reprobation, and so eager for their conditionate Predestination and Reprobation: namely these two things: First, that retaining the bore name of eternal Election and Reprobation, they may closely and obliquely oppugn the eternity of those distinct decrees. Secondly, that they may plainly reduce all the difference of those distinct decrees, as they are terminated unto singular persons, unto the different acts of men's freewill, and exclude that difference which the Apostle testifieth to have been in the Divine will towards the sons of men, and that before the foundations of the world were laid, Rom. 8. 30● & 9.11. Eph. 1.4. & 11. Acts 13.48.  
The ignorance of God's decree, whethe● this or that singular person be in the numbe● of the Elect or not, doth much altar the ca● in the matter which is now under debate We now inquire whether the Remonstran● doctrine or ours be more likely to nouri● carnal security in a man who hath yet ●●knowledge of his particular Election or Reprobation, of his future Glorification ● Damnation. We say, that though men● perverse minds, whilst they are occupied i● wicked courses, may out of both doctrine take occasion of carnal security and of slee●ing in sin, yet that doctrine which breede● a stronger presumption of being elected an● saved in the mind of a sinner continuing addicted unto his sinful courses, is that whic● most nourisheth and cherisheth men in the● present looseness and lewdness: And this ● evidently the doctrine of the Remonstrants' and not ours. For any Remonstrant (though never so wicked) may thus reason with himself leaning unto their principles, I am (f● all my present wicked condition) a man elected, and a man most certainly to be saved, if o● of mine own freewill excited and enabled by Divine grace, I shall repent and truly believe in the Son of God, and so end my life: But these being actions which God hath put within mine own power, I am resolved to perform them hereafter: Therefore I shall be saved. It is the minor proposition which nourisheth a man in his present lewdness, and yet maketh him presume upon his future happiness. And the minor containing nothing in it but a promise of doing that good for a man's own self which lieth (as he thinketh) in his own power to do, no man thus affected will greatly fear to continued in sin, or stand in any great fear of eternal damnation. But according to our doctrine a man of common sense will reason thus, I steadfastly believe that if God have elected me he will sanctify me with his grace, and bring me unto glory: and if I be not sanctified with grace whilst I live here, I was never elected, I shall never be saved: But mine own conscience telleth me, that as yet I am unsanctified, that I wallow in looseness and lewdness of life.  
The true and natural genius of these premises truly apprehended is to rouse a man out of sloth, and to quell groundless presumption of his future salvation, and (in a word) to make him conclude, Till I altar my course of life, I must not dream of any Election or Glorification.  
Now for the manner of reasoning which this Author will needs teach us, it is not worth the learning. Many, saith he, are ordained enevitably to destruction, and a few to salvation.  
If by an ordination to destruction and salvation he mean an absolute and peremptory will in God to damn some men whether they do well or ill, we hold no such absolute ordination. If he mean an eternal absolute decree of God to bring some men (lesser in number) unto grace and glory, and to permit some others (fare more in number) to abuse the means of grace, to loose the kingdom of glory, to procure their own damnation, we cannot deny it, unless we will deny our Saviour's express words, Multi vocati, 
u Matth. 22.14.  pauci electi: Many run in the broad way which leadeth unto death, few in the narrow way which leadeth unto life: which I think this Author will not say happened without God's eternal ordination.  
For the word inevitably, it is thrust into this proposition very unfitly. Things are said to be evitable or inevitable unto men, when by their actions they may or may not be avoided: But as for the eternal ordinations of God acted immanently in himself, he that termeth them evitable or inevitable in regard of us, who were not than in being, speaketh he knoweth not what.  
Now for his reason, Either I am absolutely chosen to grace and glory, or absolutely castoff from both. If chosen, I must of necessity believe, and be saved: If castoff, I must of necessity not believe, and be damned. If by absolute Election and Abjection he understand such an absoluteness as bringeth men to the means or end of either without their own voluntary acts, we utterly disclaim it. If he mean such an absolute Election and Preterition as prepareth effectual grace for some, and giveth it them in due time, and prepareth not such effectual grace for others, neither giveth it them at any time, we grant this absolute Election and Reprobation. But whereas he saith, If chosen, I must of necessity believe, and be saved, the contrary followeth, If chosen, I shall with a freewill work out mine own salvation. And whereas he saith, If reprobated, I must necessarily not believe, and be damned, the contrary likewise followeth, If reprobated, I shall out of the hardness of mine own heart, willingly and wittingly run in the broad way which leadeth unto my damnation. As for the Necessity of believing and not-believing, which he thinketh must needs follow upon absolute Election and Reprobation, in both we grant necessitatem infallibilitatis; in neither coactionis: 
Vide Albert. part. 1. tract. 15. q. 61. p. 138. b. & q. 63. pag. 144.  In both we grant necessitatem positionis or ordinis; in neither necessitatem eventûs, or impossibilitatem eventûs contrarii. God is according to his own essence and nature Causa necessaria: yet the second and immediate causes are not necessitated unto their actions, 
y Albert. part. 1. tract 16. qu. 63. pag. 144.  quia prima causa non tollit modum suae causalitatis à secundis. There is need therefore for any man to take thought both about the means and about the end, not to get a new ordination or decree from God, but because the eternal ordination of men unto glory cannot be effected without their own serious care and endeavour, and because the eternal ordination of men unto punishment cannot be avoided but by shaking-off sloth and carnal security.  

Vide Aug. De bono persev. c. 16. & lib. 3. De lib. arbitr. c. 2.  Unto all this I add, That eternal Predestination and Reprobation, as it is founded by the Remonstrants upon Gods eternal prescience, draweth the same necessity after it. For I reason thus after his pattern; I am either upon God's eternal prescience of my final perseverance in faith, absolutely chosen to grace and glory, or upon God's eternal prescience of my final impenitency absolutely castoff from both. If upon the Divine eternal infallible prescience of my believing and persevering I was ordained unto salvation, I must of necessity believe, and be saved: If upon the same eternal and immutable prescience of my infidelity & impenitency I was ordained to damnation, I must as necessarily not believe, and be damned. There is the same force in this manner of reasoning to induce a carnal sluggish soul unto carelessness which is in the other: There is as great necessity put upon human actions by the eternal Prescience of God as is by his eternal Predestination. And if any man have looked into School-divinity, he cannot be ignorant that the same objections which are made against Predestination, as overthrowing the Liberty of man's will, and putting a necessity and inevitability upon his actions, they are likewise made against the Divine Prescience, as doing the same: and the selfsame answers and distinctions which free the one from this calumny, free the other.  
Molina (no enemy to the Remonstrants' doctrine) plainly affirmeth, 
z Conc. qu. 22. pag. 299  In concilianda tam libertate arbitrii nostri circa actus peccatorum quàm evitabilitate eorum cum Divina providentia, non alius labor est quàm in iisdem conciliandis cum praescientia quâ Deus praevidet eos esse futuros nisi impediat. Malderus (no friend to the Contra-remonstrants) 
a Antis. p. 14, 15, 17.  granteth absolute Predestination both unto the actions of grace, as Believing, Persevering, and the like, and to the end thereof, which is eternal Life. And he detesteth their opinion who hold that the free acts of men cannot be predefined eternally by God; 
b Pag. 29.  Absit ut in illam concedamus sententiam quae docet actus nostros liberos non posse ullo modo à Deo praedefiniri.  
And to shut up all in a word; As Tiberius would have been as careless in religion, 
Vide Penot. pag. 231.  if he had thought that all things come to pass in time according to an eternal immutable prescience of God, as he was in thinking that all things come to pass according to an eternal immutable destination of God; 
Vide Ans. de conc. lib. arbit. cum Praed. cap. 1. & 2.  so it is as much to be feared, that many Remonstrants' ground their idleness and profaneness upon this fancy, That what God hath eternally foreseen will come to pass in time, must of necessity so come to pass, as that any of our opinion should ground it upon the like fancy, That whatsoever God hath eternally predestinated to come to pass in time, must of necessity so come to pass. And since whether we found Predestination upon prescience or otherwise, still the knowledge and comfortable sense thereof can no otherwise be had than in and by the temporal effects, no reason can be given why absolute Predestination (as it is taught by our Church) should breed more carelessness or presumption than the Remonstrants' Predestination.    

Treatise.  

V It is an enemy to true COMFORT.  I Come now to my last reason against it, drawn from the uncomfortableness of it. It is a doctrine (A) full of desperation, both to them which stand and to those that are fallen, to men out of temptation and to men in temptation.  
It 

leadeth into temptation.  
leaveth in temptation.   And therefore can be no doctrine of God's word: For that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, good news, to men, a storehouse of sweet consolations for us in our turbidis & lucid is intervallis, in our best and worst conditions and changes. These things are written, 
Rom. 15.4.  saith the Apostle, that by patience and comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope: implying that therefore was the word written and left to the Church, that by the comforts comprised in it those poor souls that look toward heaven might never want in any changes or chances of this mortal life a sweet gale of hope to refresh them and to carry on their ship full merrily toward the haven.  
I First, this doctrine (B) leadeth men into temptations, and into such a one too as is as sharp and dangerous as any the Tempter hath. The devil can easily persuade a man that maketh absolute Reprobation a part of his creed, that he is one of those absolute reprobates: because there are fare more absolute reprobates, even a hundred for one, than absolute chosen one's; and man hath a great deal more reason to think that he is one of the most than one of the fewest, one of the huge multitude of inevitable castawayes than one of that little flock for whom God hath precisely prepared a kingdom. Such a man is not only capable of but framed and fashioned by his opinion for this suggestion. Which is a very sore (C) one, if we may believe Calvine, Bucer and Zanchius. Calvine telleth us, 
n Calv. Instit. l. 3. c. 24. sect. 4. Nullâ tentatione vel graviùs vel periculosiùs sideles percellit Satan.  that the devil cannot assault a believer with a temptation more dangerous. And a little after he saith, that it is so much the deadlier, by how much commoner it is than any other. 
o Rarissimus est cujus non interdum animus hâc cogitatione feriatur, Unde tibi salus nisi ex Dei electione? electionis porrò quae tibi revelatio? Quae si apud quempiam semel invaluit, aut diris tormentis miserum perpetuò excruciate, àut reddit penitus attonitum.  So ordinary is this temptation, that he which is at all times free from it, is a rare man (we are to conceive that he speaketh of those who hold absolute Reprobation:) and so dangerous it is, that if it get strength, he which is under it is either miserably tormented or mightily astonished. And a little after he saith again, 
p Ergò naufragium si timemus, solicitè ab hoc scopulo cavendum, in quem numquam sine exitio impingitur.  He that will not wrack his soul, must avoid this rock. Bucer also hath a passage like to this; 
q Bucer. in 8. ad Rom. q. de Praed. Ut caput omnis noxiae tentationis, repellenda est haec quaestio, Sumúsne praedestinati. Nam qui de hoc dubitat, nec vocatum se nec justificatum esse credere poterit, hoc est, nequit esse Christianus.  This doubt, whether we be predestinate or not, must be repelled as the head of every pernicious temptation: For he that doubteth of this, cannot believe that he is called or justified; that is, he cannot be a Christian. 
r Praesumendum igitur ut principium fidei, nos omnes esse à Deo praescitos.  Every man therefore must presume upon it as a principle of his faith, that he is elected. 
s Zanch. l. 5. De nat. Dei, q. de Praed.  This very speech of Bucers' Zanchy maketh use of to the same purpose. We see than by the testimonies of these worthy men, that this temptation is very dangerous and ordinary too to such as think there be absolute Reprobates.  
The truth of both will further appear by the example of 
t Georg. Mayor, in 2. ad Tim. 2. fol. 1109.  Petrus Ilosuanus (D) a Schoolmaster in Hungary, who going to hung himself, signified in a writing which he left in his study for the satisfaction of his friends and countrymen, the true cause of that his unnatural fact. In that writing he delivered these three things. 1. That he was of calvin's and S. Augustine's opinion, That men are not dealt withal secundùm bona aut mala opera, according to their works good or evil; but that there are occultiores causae, more hidden causes, of men's eternal conditions. 2. That he was one of that woeful company of absolute Reprobates, vas formatum in ignominiam, a vessel prepared to dishonour; and that therefore (though his life had been none of the worst) he could not possibly be saved. 3. That being unable to bear those dreadful apprehensions of wrath with which he was affrighted, he hanged himself. For these are some of his last words there recorded, 
u Discedo igitur ad lacus infernales aeternum dedecus patriae meae. Deo vos commendo, cujus misericordia mihi negata est.  I go to those infernal lakes, an eternal reproach to my country. I commend you to God, whose mercy is denied to me. Out of this example, two things we may safely collect: First, That men who think there are many whom God hath utterly rejected out of his only will and pleasure, may be easily brought to think by Satan's suggestion that they are of that company. Secondly, That this temptation is very dangerous.  
I conclude therefore this first part of my last reason, which is, That absolute Reprobation leadeth men into temptation.  
II. It leaveth men in temptation: And this it doth two ways; by 1. Making (E) the tempted uncapable of true comfort; 2. Making Ministers unable to give true comfort.  
1. It maketh the tempted uncapable of true comfort: Like a Gorgon's head, it doth so trouble their fancies and amaze them, especially in their paroxysmes and fits, that the strongest arguments of comfort, applied with as much art and cunning as may be, will not fasten upon them. With David they say in their fear, that all men are liars, namely all such as come to comfort them in their temptation. The reason is, because it is an opinion incompatible with any word of comfort that can be ministered to the distressed soul in this temptation. God's Love to mankind, Christ's Death for all men, the Calling of poor sinners without exception to repentance and salvation, with all other grounds of consolation, the tempted will easily elude with the grounds of his opinion. Which that we may the better see, let us imagine that we hear a Minister and a tempted Soul reasoning in this or the like manner.  TEMPTED 
WOE is (F) me; I am a castaway: I am absolutely rejected from grace and glory.  MINISTER. 
Discourage not thyself, thou poor afflicted soul: God hath not cast thee of. For he hateth nothing that he hath made, but beareth a love to all men, and to thee among the rest.  TEMPT. 
God (G) hateth no man as he is his creature, but he hateth a great many as they are sinners in Adam. And God hath a twofold love, as I have learned: a general love, which putteth forth itself in outward and temporal blessings only; and with this he loveth all men: and a special love, by which he provideth everlasting life for men; and with this he loveth only a very few, which out of his alone will and pleasure he singled from the rest. Under this general love am I, but not under the special.  MIN. 
Nay, but God so loveth all men as that he desireth their eternal good: for the Apostle saith, He would have all to be saved, and be would have no man to perish, nor thee in particular.  TEMPT. 
ALL is (H) taken two ways: for all sorts & conditions of men, high & low, rich and poor, bound and free, etc. and for all particular men in these several sorts & ranks. God would have all men to be saved in the first sense, that is, all sorts: but he would not have all to be saved in the second sense, that is, all particular men of those sorts; some of my country, my calling, my condition of life, but not all & every one, nor me in particular. Or if it be true that God would have all particular men to be saved, yet he willeth it only with a revealed will, not with a secret: for with that he will have millions to be damned. Under this revealed will am I, not under the secret.  MIN. 
Nay, but Christ came into the world to seek and to save what was lost, and is a propitiation not for our sins only, viz. the sins of a few particular men, or the sins of all sorts of men, but for the sins of the whole world: Therefore he came to save thee, and to be a propitiation for thy sins: for thou art one of them that were lost, and thou art one of the whole world.  TEMPT. 
The WORLD, as I have heard, is taken two ways in Scripture; largely for all mankind, and strictly in a restrained signification, for the elect or for believers. In this latter sense Christ died (I) for the World, namely, for the world of the Elect, for the world of believers. Or if it be true that he died for all mankind, yet he died for them but after a sort: he died for them all dignitate pretii, he did enough to have redeemed all, if God would have had it so; but he did not die for all voluntate propositi. God never intended that he should shed his blood for all and every man, but for a few selected one's only, with whom it is my lot not to be numbered.  MIN. 
God hath founded an universal (K) covenant of peace with men upon the Mediators blood: and therefore he intended it should be shed for all men universally. He hath made a promise of salvation to every one that will believe, and excludeth none that do not exclude themselves.  TEMPT. 
God purposed that his Son should die for all men, and that in his name should be preached and offered remission of sins to every one; but yet upon condition they will repent, believe, and do that which he meaneth the greatest part of men shall never do, nor me among the rest.  MIN. 
God hath a true meaning that all men who are called should repent and believe, that so they might be saved. As he would have all to be saved, so he would have them come to the knowledge of the truth; and as he would have no man to perish, so he would have all men to repent: and therefore he calleth them in the preaching of the word to the one as well as to the other.  TEMPT. 
God hath a double (L) call; an outward by the preaching of the word in men's ears, an inward by the irresistible work of the Spirit in their hearts. The outward call is a part of God's outward will: with that he calleth every man to believe: The inward and effectual call is a part of his secret will: and with that he calleth not every man to believe, but a very few only, whom he hath inevitably ordained to eternal life. And therefore by the outward call, which I enjoy among many others, I cannot be assured of Gods and will and meaning, that I should believe, repent and be saved.  
By this (M) we may see, that no sound comfort can be fastened upon a poor soul rooted in this opinion, when he lieth under this horrible temptation.  
The example (N) of Francis Spiera an Italian Lawyer will give some further light and proof to this. This Spiera about the year 1548. against his knowledge and conscience did openly abjure his religion and subscribe to Popery, that thereby he might preserve his life and goods and liberty. Not long after he fell into a deep distress of conscience, out of which he could never wrestle, but ended his woeful days in despair. To comfort him came many Divines of worth and note: But against all the comforts which they applied to him, he opposed two things especially. 1. The Greatness of his sin: It was a sin (said he) of a deep die, committed with many urging and aggravating circumstances; and therefore could not be forgiven. This argument they quickly took from him, and convinced him by the example of Peter, that there was nothing in his sin that could make it irremissible: Peter, that committed the same sin, and with some more odious circumstances, repent and was pardoned, and so (no doubt) might he. 2. He opposed his absolute Reprobation, and with that he put-off all their comforts. Peter (saith he) repent indeed and was pardoned, because he was elected: as for me, I was utterly rejected before I was born; and therefore I cannot possibly repent or be saved. If any man be elected, he shall be saved, though he have committed sins for number many and heinous in degree: but if he be ex repudiatis, one of the castaways, necessariò condemnabitur, he shall be inevitably condemned, though his sins be small and few. 
u Nihil interest an multa an pauca, an magna an parva sint, quando nec Dei misericordia nec Christi sanguis quicquam ad eos pertinet.  A Reprobate must be damned, be his sins many or few, great or little, because God's mercy and Christ's merits belong not to him.  
In this story (recorded by Coelius Secundus and Calvine, with some others who lived at that time and wrote of it to their friends) as in a glass we may see the disconsolate condition of a poor soul that is strongly conceited that the greatest part of the world are absolute Reprobates, and that he is one of them: He sticketh so sast in the mire and clay that he can very hardly be drawn out.  
2. It maketh Ministers unable to afford true comfort to the tempted: And this it doth, because it 1. Taketh from them all solid grounds of comfort; 2. Leaveth them only weak and insufficient grounds.  
I. It bereaveth them of all solid arguments of comfort which are these; the universality (O) of God's Love, of Christ● Death, and of the new Covenant of grace. That Minister which doth explain and apply these three things sound an● wisely to him which is tempted in this kind, doth that whic● is abundantly enough for the relieving and releasing of hi● from this temptation. And he that doth not apply these, leaveth him as he found him, in the midst of the temptation still; whatsoever may be said to the contrary in the heat of disputation 
x Melanchth. Loc. come. p. 526. c. de Praed. Etsi multa disputantur duriùs, tamen necesse est in vero agone ad hanc arcem confugere, videlicet, quòd de voluntate Dei judicandum sit ex expresso verbo, & quòd promissio sit universalis, & quòd sit mandatum Dei aeternum & immutabile, Audire Filium, & assentiri promissioni.  Though (saith (P) Melanchthon (there be many things disputed in this point more harshly, yet when all is done, the universal promise of grace and salvation is a Christians only bulwark in this temptation and comb●●. 
y Obtemperemus igitur, nè vagentur animi quaerentes electionem extra verbum, & relicto Christo & omisso mandato de amplectenda promissione; sed teneamus certâ & indubitatâ fide promissionem gratiae non inanem esse fabulam, sed Deum verè patefecisse voluntatem suam in promissione, & verè praestare quod promisit.  Let us not therefore (saith he) leave Christ, and seek for an Election out of the word; but let us judge of Gods will of saving men by the promise and commandment, which are both universal. And in another place of the same book he hath these words, 
z P. 230. de prom. Evang. Sicut est necesse scire Evangelium esse promissionem gratuitam, ità necesse est scire Evangelium promissionem universalem esse. Hanc universalem tenere necesse est adversùs periculosas imaginationes de praedestinatione, nè disputemus hanc promissionem ad paucos quosdam alios pertinere, non pertinere ad nos. Non enim dubium est, quin omnium animos haec cogitatio exerceat.  As it is needful to knew that the promise of salvation is free; so it is needful to know that it is universal, against some dangerous conceits of Predestination. By these speeches we see clearly what this learned man thought to be the true balm of Gilead, whereby a wounded soul should be cured; viz. The universality of the Promise, and of God's Love, and of Christ's Death; for they all hung together, and cannot be disjoined.  
The reason why those grounds are able to help a man in such a case, is twofold.  
1. Because they are directly contradictory to the temptation. A will to save all, a giving of Christ to death for all, a serious offer of grace to all, cannot possibly stand with an absolute antecedent will and intent of casting-away the greatest part of mankind, or, to say the truth, of any one man in the world. Upon this followeth the second reason.  
2. Because they serve to convince the tempted, that he cannot be in that condition in which he supposeth himself to be. For if two contradictories cannot be true, he that evinceth the truth of the one, convinceth the understanding of the untruth of the other: and he that maketh it appear, that this contradictory, God would have all to be saved, redeemed and called, to repent and believe, is true, putteth it out of all doubt to the understanding, that the other contradictory, God will have most men to be absolutely and inevitably damned, must needs be false, and so raiseth up that poor soul which was pressed down with an erroneous conceit and fear that it was true. In this manner did (Q) Junius (though not in the same temptation) relieve a woman perplexed exceedingly with a strong persuasion that she and all her children should be damned, because she was busied about her children at a certain time when she should have been at Mass. Junius maketh short work with her, telleth her that her employment about her children was a duty pleasing to God, but the Mass was a mere will-worship; and so delivering her of her error upon which the temptation was built giveth her present ease and comfort. In like manner tell a man who feareth himself to be an absolute Reprobate, that there are no such absolute Reprobates, and that his fear is but mere fancy and his doubt a dream, convince him once by contradictory grounds, that there is no man in the world in that state in which he thinketh himself to be, and you drive out one nail by another, and expel the temptation. These are the sword of Alexander, which will cut asunder this Gordian knot of absolute Reprobation; and these are the true Nepenthes of a sick and sorrowful soul.  
But now these true grounds of hope and comfort no Minister can make use of that holdeth absolute Reprobation; nor, if he do usurp them, can he possibly maintain them against the replies of the tempted, unless he relinquish his opinion: because (as I have said) there is a plain contradiction between them, and no man is able to maintain two propositions which speak contrary things, to be both true, any more than he can make it good, that the same thing may have a being and no being at the same time. For example; A Minister cometh to comfort a man that thinketh himself to be an absolute Reprobate: and how doth he set about it? He telleth him, That God would have all to be saved, that Christ died for all, etc. But what right hath he to these grounds of comfort seeing he holdeth the contrary conclusions, viz. That God will have a great many to be damned and to have no part in Christ? Well; he usurpeth them notwithstanding: But is he able to maintain them against the answers of the tempted? or can he make a good reply? Not certainly. For thus answereth the tempted, God (R) would have all to be saved with a revealed, but not with a secret will: and Christ died for all men sufficiently, but not intentionally; or if God did intent that he should die for all, yet he intended it upon a condition which he purposed the most should never perform. What can the Minister reply to this? If he will make a direct reply which shall take away the answer, he must deny that God hath two wills, the one opposite to the other, a secret will that many shall avoidable be damned, and a revealed will that all men may be possibly saved. And he must also deny that God had an intent that Christ should not die for a great many, or that he intended he should die for all upon condition they would believe and repent, and yet purposed that the most should never believe and repent. But can he deny these things? He cannot, except he deny his own conclusion, which is, That there are many thousands eternally and avoidable rejected in God's absolute purpose from grace and glory. For that conclusion is all one with the answers of the tempted, and contradictory to those arguments of comfort which he is glad to make use of. Absolute Reprobation therefore bereaveth that Minister who believeth it, of all solid grounds of consolation, and so maketh him unable to recover a poor soul wounded with this temptation.  
II. Secondly, it leaveth a Minister some weak grounds only and insufficient to quiet the tempted: and therefore it maketh him unable to comfort him. The grounds which it leaveth him are insufficient, because they cannot (S) convince, and make it evident to the understanding of the tempted that he is not that which he feareth, that is, a Reprobate. Out of temptation probabilities will uphold a man's hopes (as they did Manoahs' wives, Judg. 13.22, 23. If the Lord would kill us, he would not have received a burnt-offering at our hands, nor shown us all these things;) because men are not so mistrustful than: But in temptation men are usually very suspicious and incredulous, like Jacob, who would not be persuaded that Joseph was alive and a great man in Egypt, till he see the chariots that were sent to fetch him thither, Gen. 45.25. and like Thomas, who would not believe that Christ was risen, till he see the print of the nails and spear, John 20.25. They will not believe any thing that is spoken for their comfort, till it be made so apparent that they have nothing to say to the contrary. Myself have known some, who in their temptations have often put their comforters to their proofs, to their protestations, nay to their oaths too, before they would believe their words of comfort. And in this temptation we speak of, men are so strongly possessed with the fear of eternal rejection from the face of God that they will not easily without manifest conviction believe the contrary. But grounds convincing and satisfying a Minister that maintaineth absolute Reprobation hath not in store. Nothing can he say that is able to make it appear infallibly and undeniably to the understanding of the tempted, that he is no absolute Reprobate. All that he (T) can say is, Be of good comfort: you are a believer, a truly repenting sinner; therefore no Reprobate. For faith and repentance are infallible fruits of Election, and arguments of a state contrary to what you fear. But this the tempted will deny: He will say, that he is no believer, etc. And how will the Minister convince him that he is? He must prove to him by the outward acts of faith and repentance (for they only are apparent to him) that he doth repent and believe. But this proof is not demonstrative, nor doth convince; because opera virtutum simulari possunt, the external acts of faith, repentance, or any other grace may be counterfeited. The devil may seem to be an angel of light; wolves may go in sheep's clothing; Judas may make the world believe by his preaching and following of Christ, that he is a true Apostle; and Simon Magus, though he remain in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity, may be thought by his receiving of Baptism to be a true believer: and so may any hypocrite by some exterior acts of faith and repentance delude the best discerner of spirits among men, and gain the opinion and esteem of a true penitent and believer. Actions externally good, or good in appearance, may be evil indeed for want of a good rule, manner, end, or some other good circumstances with which an action that is good must be clothed; (For bonum non oritur nisi ex integris:) and so by good consequence cannot certainly prove the man who doth them to be a good man, or to have the grace of faith, repentance, or any other truly planted in his heart. Which being so, I say that a Minister cannot (V) by the outward acts and fruits of faith and repentance which he seethe come from him, make it evident to the tempted, to the silencing of all replies, that he is without doubt a true believer and repenting sinner, and consequently no Reprobate. For still the tempted may say, You may be deceived in me: for you cannot see any thing more in me than hath been seen in many a Reprobate. And if this be all you can say to prove me to be none, I am not satisfied, I may be a Reprobate: nay I am a Reprobate, and you are but a miserable comforter, a Physician of no value.  
This that I say, Piscator (X) doth confess ingenuously in Disput. de Praed. contra Schafman. thes. 85. where he saith, 1. That no comfort can be possibly instilled into the souls of Reprobates afflicted with this horrible temptation: from whence it followeth, that the fare greatest part of men, even an hundred for one, must bear their burden (if they fall into this distemper and trouble) as well as they can: the Gospel is not able to afford them any solid comfort. 2. That the Elect being in this condition may indeed be comforted, but it must be by their sense of sin and their desire to be freed of it by Christ: which proofs are but only probable to the best, and to a man in temptation no proofs at all; and consequently either no comforts or very small ones. In the end of the same Thesis also, where he saith, that a man should reason thus with himself, Grace is offered to some with a mind of communicating it unto them; therefore it may be that I am one of those to whom it is so offered: in this place (I say) he implieth plainly, that the doctrine of absolute Reprobation, which teacheth the communication of grace to a very few only, affordeth but a fieri potest, a Peradventure I am Elected, (and that a very poor one too) for a poor soul to comfort himself withal.  

An Answer to his last reason, drawn from the Vncomfortablenesse of this doctrine.  
LEt these few undoubted truths be always remembered; 1. That Predestination and Reprobation are eternal immanent acts in ment ac voluntate Divina before the foundations of the world were laid. 2. That as they are such immanent acts or decrees, they work nothing upon men, because the men themselves as yet had no being. 3. That when singular persons come into temporal being, the effects or consequents of those decrees are always wrought according to the nature of the subjects. 4. That the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation are irreversible & immutable. 5. That there is no reasonable ground of any particular man's persuasion that he is either under the one decree or the other, but only what is collected à posteriori, from the effects. These being agreed upon, it will easily be made appear that the doctrine of the Remonstrants is more uncomfortable to men than ours.  
That God's Predestination and Non-predestination or negative Reprobation are eternal, absolute, and irreversible decrees, and that they are founded in God's free pleasure of showing special mercy where he will and denying it where he thinks good, is a more comfortable doctrine than that of the Remonstrants, scilicet, That the forenamed eternal decrees were enacted and founded upon the intuitive prescience of men's perseverance in good or bad acts.  
Now whereas he supposeth it cannot be true Evangelicall doctrine which affords not consolation unto all men in their best and worst conditions and changes, this proposition of his must have many limitations, or it will prove utterly false.  
1. It must be understood only of those who seek consolation in the right way wherein according to Gods will and word consolation is to be found: otherwise a true doctrine may not only be uncomfortable but full of terror and affright. For example; He that would be comforted with hope of his Predestination, whilst he is resolved to sit idle or to run-on in the broad way, the Gospel neither doth nor aught afford him any sweet comfort: and it is a sign that their doctrine is false, if to men thus affected it affordeth any comfortable hope of being carried to heaven.  
2. A doctrine which in the event is uncomfortable to millions of men, is not by this convinced of untruth, unless it be so according to the nature of the doctrine and according to right reason and judgement. For if it be a man's own blind and corrupt reason, or his inordinate and distempered affection, which maketh it so quoad hunc, this is nothing to prove the doctrine untrue. Our Saviour's doctrine Luke 18.25. was so uncomfortable to his disciples, that it made them cry out, Who than can be saved? yet it was not untrue.  
3. Lastly, whereas we are now in a comparative question, Whether the Remonstrants' doctrine or ours be more or less comfortable; it is not enough to show that accidentally, through the false apprehension or disordered affections of men, disconsolation or desperation may arise from ours, unless he can clear the Remonstrants' doctrine from the same inconveniences; which we know he cannot, and which we can and will prove to be more liable thereunto than ours.  
Whereas he saith our doctrine leadeth men into temptation, because the devil may easily persuade a man that believeth absolute Reprobation, that he is one of those absolute reprobates, there being an hundred absolute reprobates for one absolute elect, and there being more reason for any man to think that he is one of the most than of the fewest: We answer, That absolute Reprobation is Gods absolute decree of not-giving unto many men that effectual grace without which he infallibly knoweth they will never attein unto glory. And by absolute reprobates nothing else can truly be understood, but persons thus absolutely distinguished from the elect in the immanent act of Gods eternal and immutable william. If this Author have any other meaning, when he so often inculcateth absolute Reprobation and absolute reprobates, we leave him to fight with his own fancies. Now the Remonstrants in this sense hold absolute Reprobation and absolute reprobates. For albeit they set three eternal decrees in order of consideration before they come to Election and Reprobation, yet they bring God in the fourth upon an eternal prescience eternally decreeing to save these singular and certain persons, and to damn these singular and certain persons, and no other. If this last decree be eternal and irreversible, if it be founded upon the eternal foresight of their final impenitency, God hath as absolutely rejected many men from special or effectual grace and glory in their doctrine as in ours.  
The devil may suggest, but he cannot more easily persuade a man that maketh it his creed, That ex statu lapso Godhath out of his good pleasure and mere mercy elected some unto the atteinment of salvation, and out of his absolute will left others to the losing thereof, than he may persuade those who make all men eternally reprobated whom God eternally foresaw would out of their own freewill live and die impenitent. A man must be persuaded that his own freewill was a more likely means to put him within the decree of eternal Election than the free mercy of God, or else our doctrine affordeth more hope to any man of being predestinated than theirs. Now there is no well-instructed and humble Christian, who knoweth the corruption of his own freewill and the inconstancy thereof, though aided with sufficient grace, but will easilier be persuaded to a comfortable apprehension of his Election or certain salvation, when he conceiveth it as depending on God's special and mere mercy, than if he should conceive it as depending upon the special good acts of his own freewill and foreseen perseverance therein unto his lives end: For this is, as S. Augustine speaketh, Firmiori potiùs quàm infirmiori spem suam committere.  
As for his instance in the small number of the Elect and great number of the Reprobate, though speaking of Christians, we allow not his account of an hundred for one, yet we acknowledge the number of the Elect (great in itself) to be smaller than the number of the Non-elect. But so it is likewise in the doctrine of the Remonstrants: & there is fare less reason for any sinful man to hope that he is rather one of the fewest than one of the most, when the discrimination must arise from the goodness of his own freewill, than when it is supposed to arise from the mere mercy of God. If God in his eternal decree of Election say, I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy, as every man is under the same estate of misery, so every man hath reason to conceive himself a capable subject of this mercy, though de facto it should be extended to never so few. But if in his eternal decree of Election he say thus, I will show this special mercy unto none but those whom I have foreseen using well the grace which I shall offer them, and continuing in the exercise of repentance, faith, and holiness to their lives end, few or none can with probability otherwise persuade themselves than they are reprobates; at lest none of those whom he imagineth to be under the forenamed tentation. For the devil may thus suggest, In your own opinion no man was elected out of God's absolute freewill and mercy, but all were reprobated before the foundations of the world were laid that were not foreseen embracing Gods grace when it was offered, exercising the same in the acts of faith and sanctification, and persevering in so doing till their lives end. You know that there is not one of an hundred that doth this, why should you think that you are rather one of the fewest than one of the most? Nay, you know that hitherto you have resisted the motions of God's Spirit, and obeyed your own sinful lusts; that if at any time your will hath had an inclination to do good, it presently started aside like a broken bow: how can you think that you are one of those in whom God eternally foresaw repentance, faith and perseverance, and so put you in the number of his Elect? Surely you are in the roll of Reprobates. The Remonstrants' doctrine doth so fashion men to receive this suggestion, that unless he will forsake his opinion of Predestination and Reprobation upon the foreseen good or bad acts of men, he hath nothing to keep him from despair, or to persuade him that he is not in the number of those who were eternally reprobated. But in our opinion, though a man for the present stick fast in the filthy mire of sin, and so cannot fetch any true comfort from the assurance of his Election, yet he is better armed against the devil suggesting the certainty of his Reprobation: For he may answer, I confess, I found myself tied as yet and bound in the chains of my sins; I acknowledge, I deserve nothing but eternal damnation. And if my Election or salvation had depended upon God's foresight what good courses out of mine own freewill excited by grace I should take and continued in, I could not otherwise think of myself than of a man reprobated and appointed unto damnation. But I know that Gods eternal Election is a decree of pure mercy and not of retributive justice; that the bending of men's hearts to believe, repent and persevere are the supernatural fruits of that eternal mercy, and not the natural fruits of any man's freewill. Albeit therefore I do not as yet found any signs or effects which can put me in comfort of my Election, yet so long as I am a capable subject of Gods saving mercy, all the devils in hell cannot prove my Reprobation. Nay, this very diabolical suggestion which by God's providence hath affrighted my soul with fear of Reprobation upon the view of my sins, I take as a token of God's eternal mercy, beginning to rouse me out of the bed of security, and intending to do me good. So that whatsoever Calvine, Bucer, Zanchius, or any man else hath said concerning the danger of this temptation, doth as nearly concern the Remonstrants as it doth us. For though this Author think to help himself by putting-in the term ABSOLUTE, when he speaketh of Reprobation as we defend it, & by leaving it out always when he speaketh of Reprobation as he holdeth it, this helpeth not his cause at all. For we are now disputing about the eternal decrees and immanent acts which Divines call Predestination and Reprobation, & not about the temporal effects and external accomplishment thereof, unto which some times the name of Predestination and Reprobation is also given. The Divine immanent act of reprobating Cain, Judas, or any other, is as absolute a Reprobation, as irreversible and immutable, being conceived after the Remonstrants' doctrine as after ours. For albeit they place an act of absolute prescience before Reprobation, which we place after, yet both they and we acknowledge it such an absolute decree as never was nor ever will be altered. If the temporal accomplishment, which is the actual Damnation of the Reprobate, be termed their Reprobation, we say as well as they. That this dependeth upon temporal conditions. For that one temporal effect should depend by way of condition upon another, is agreeable to truth and right reason: but that an immanent eternal act of Gods will should depend by way of condition upon a temporal act of man's will, is contrary to true Divinity. Reprobation therefore as it is eternally an act or decree immanent in voluntate ac ment Divina, must of necessity be absolute.  
His example of the Hungarian Schoolmaster is a poor proof against absolute Reprobation. For first Saint Augustine and Calvine and all orthodox Divines are of opinion, that though men be not predestinated or passed-by secundùm praevisionem operum bonorum aut malorum, (for all men are foreseen alike plunged in sin and misery as they are objects of Election and Nonelection or Preterition) yet for salvation and damnation at the day of judgement, all men shall be dealt withal secundùm bona aut mala opera. Secondly, if this man persuaded himself that he was one of the woeful company of absolute Reprobates, and that therefore he could not be saved I would know if he would have been otherwise persuaded had a Remonstrant told him, There is indeed an eternal and immutable decree of Reprobation, but it made no absolute Reprobates but such whom God eternally and absolutely foresaw would die impenitent; God foresaw that you would by the help of his mercy and grace die a faithful and penitent man. This cold comfort which the Remonstrants' doctrine giveth against absolute Reprobation could never have kept this wretch from hanging himself. For he would have choked his comforter with the same answer which made him choke himself, I commend you to God, but I found this mercy is denied to me, for I know I have an impenitent heart. Reprobation therefore which is God's eternal decree, being as absolute in their opinion as in ours, it affordeth the devil the same matter of suggestion.  
Now to his second argument, That absolute Reprobation maketh a tempted man uncapable of comfort, and a Minister unable to give true comfort, we answer, That the eternal Reprobation of Cain or Judas upon an eternal prescience is more liable to this objection than that which we defend, for the reasons above mentioned. No man aught to seek for comfort of his Election but in the fruits thereof, nor to be utterly discomforted with apprehending his Reprobation until he be uncapable of the fruits of Election. If any be so distempered in his reason or affection that upon the devil's suggestion he will like a wizard guess at his own Reprobation, and foretell his own Damnation, it will be as hard for a Remonstrant to remove this uncertain and ungrounded fancy as for us. The reason is, Because whatsoever he telleth him of God's love, Christ's death, general vocation, etc. the tempted will still delude with saying, These concern such whom God hath not upon his eternal and absolute prescience absolutely resolved to condemn: But I know that I am one of those in whom God hath foreseen final impenitency, etc. and thereupon from everlasting hath decreed me to damnation.   

To his imaginary Conference.  
IT is no hard matter to make any opinion seem absurd, where an Adversary frameth both objections and answers. If we shall take the same course, we can burden his opinion of Predestination and Reprobation upon prescience of the different acts of men's freewill with more and greater inconveniences. In general we say,  
First, that whereas he is only careful to prevent the devil's suggestions whereby he goeth-about to drive men into despair, there is fare more need to prevent those whereby he holdeth men in security. If one man have been perplexed or driven into despair by the doctrine of absolute Predestination and Reprobation, hundreds are emboldened unto carelessness and presumption upon the doctrine of conditionate Predestination an● Reprobation, For this maketh every ma● believe that he may be a predestinated ma● when he listeth. No man maketh any grea● hast to do that which he conceiveth he may do well enough at any time.  
Secondly, in this imaginary conference he supposeth always that a man must be rid out of dread and perplexity by the Minister assuring him that he is no Reprobate: wherein he himself is quite deceived. For no Minister hath any such commission, nor any such revelation. He must go another way to work; wherein our doctrine will further him better than that of the Remonstrants.  
Lastly, there is no man so foolish as to think that a Minister can show him whether he be in the number of the Elect or of the Reprobate; or that a wicked man perplexed with this doubtful cogitation, can be so freed from it as to incline to the more comfortable part, whilst he continueth impenitent. All that can be done for his good, whilst he continueth faithless and impenitent, is to persuade him to suspend the opinion of his Reprobation; whereof his own reason recollected is able to tell him he hath no certain knowledge. And it is a rule, De quolibet praesumendum bonum donec constet contrarium. That doctrine therefore must needs be more powerful to make a man suspend the opinion of his being a Reprobate, which is more likely to bring him into some probable hope of his future repentance. Now unto a man feeling the corruption of his own nature, and perplexed with the conscience of his continual voluntary rebellion, and thereupon conceiving himself a Reprobate, what hope of his future conversion can the Remonstrants' doctrine afford him? He must tell him, Thou art one of those whom God eternally foresaw repenting, believing, persevering, and who hast all these acts in the power of thine own will: and therefore there is great probability of thy future repentance. This poor tempted wretch finding in himself for the present all things seeming quite contrary to what the Remonstrant Minister telleth him, will rejoin, Thou liest unto me; God never saw any such goodness in me: he foresaw that in me which I now see in myself, a wicked will and a perverse heart, which will hold me fettered in sin unto my lives end. I am therefore one of those whom according to thine own doctrine God eternally reprobated. As for our doctrine, it cannot give such a tempted person a certainty of his future repentance, but it may give him a more probable and comfortable hope; because it will refer his hope to that unspeakable mercy of God which this Author hath so highly extolled) and to that omnipotent power whereby God is able to work for us beyond our hope, and to produce in us both the will and the deed of repenting when he pleaseth. There is somewhat more likelihood of future repentance, when a sinner is thus referred to God's absolute will for it, than when he is referred to his own absolute freewill: and therefore the fear of his Reprobation may in all probability be easiiyer diminished by our doctrine than by theirs.  
But I come to his Conference betwixt the Tempted person and the Minister: Where I will take leave to make our own answers: for I like not his.  TEMPT. 
Woe is me; I am a castaway: I am absolutely rejected from grace and glory.  MINIST. 
If thou speakest of Gods eternal secret decree of Election and Reprobation, why dost thou affirm that of thyself which thine own reason must needs tell thee is not known unto thyself? If thou speakest of an absolute rejection from grace and the kingdom of heaven which hath already seized upon thee in this life, why dost thou affirm that which thou knowest and seest to be false? God hath and doth continually afford thee gracious illuminations and excitations: and he will not leave thee destitute of them, if thou do not voluntarily harden thine heart against them. God hath promised forgiveness unto any sinner at what time soever he shall repent; nay, he hath promised eternal life unto any sinner who shall believe in his Son. Thou art not rejected from this covenant of grace nor excluded from the kingdom of glory until by voluntary final impenitency and infidelity thou excludest thyself.  TEMPT. 
God hateth no man as he is his ●reature; but he hateth a great many as they are sinners in Adam. He loveth all men with a general love; but he loveth only a very few with his special love, by which he provideth everlasting life for them. I am only under his general ●ove: I am excluded from his special love; and ●herefore I am a reprobate, and must of necessity be damned.  MINIST. 
It is true, that God hateth nothing which himself created; and yet it is most true, that he hateth sin in any creature of his, and hateth the creature infected with sin, in such manner as Hatred may be attributed unto God. But for all this he so generally loved mankind fallen in Adam ●hat he hath given his onely-begotten Son, ●hat what sinner soever believeth in him, ●hould not perish but have everlasting life. And this everlasting life or heavenly kingdom is so provided for men by God, that ●o decrees of his can bring any man thither without faith and repentance, nor no decrees of his can keep any man out who repenteth and believeth. As for the measure of Gods love exhibited in the external effects unto men, it must not be denied that God poureth out his graces more abundantly upon some men than upon others, and worketh more powerfully and effectually in the hearts of some men than of others; and that out of his alone will and pleasure: But yet where this more special love is not extended, his less special love is not restrained to outward and temporal blessings only, (as you falsely imagine) but it reacheth to internal and spiritual blessings, even such as will bring men to an eternal blessedness if their voluntary wickedness hinder not. As for your curious and impossible desire, to be now ascertained that you are under Gods more especial grace, 
Vide Thom. de Kempis, l. 1. c. 25. v. 2.  you aught not to desire the knowledge of it, neither have I any means or power to breed such an apprehension in your understanding, until the experimental sense of your repentance, faith, and resolution to cleave fast unto God, preach unto your own soul and conscience this special love of God towards you. In the mean time do not voluntarily harden your own heart, do not say unto yourself, I know I am a Reprobate, I know I am none of those unto whom God intendeth to show his special love, since you know well enough that you neither know it, nor can know it in the state you are.  TEMPT. 
God would have some out of all sorts of men to be saved, but he loveth not every man, neither would he have every particular in these several sorts to be saved: at lest not with his secret will; for with that he will have millions to be damned. And therefore though in his revealed will he would have me saved, yet I am one of those whom in his secret will he hath reprobated and appointed to be damned.  MINIST. 
You misconceive the difference betwixt God's secret will and his revealed will, and ignorantly feign a contrariety and contradiction where there is none. You must therefore know, that Gods revealed will teacheth men upon what terms or conditions he is willing to bestow eternal life upon them, namely upon the condition of their repenting, believing and persevering. And under these conditions God doth not only desire the salvation of some men out of every sort, but of every particular man in every sort of men. And he hath no secret will contrary to this revealed will, wherein he should purpose to damn any one man repenting, believing and persevering. But you must further know, that God hath an eternal secret will wherein he hath resolved within himself to have that special mercy upon some which shall bring them to repentance, to faith, to perseverance and eternal happiness. This will containeth not a contradiction of the former, but an accomplishment in such persons as God vouchsafeth this special favour. God hath not made his Ministers privy to this secret will of his: and therefore it is a vain desire in you to be assured of this from the Minister. By labouring to perform Gods revealed will you may attein a comfortable persuasion that you are under that his secret william. But whilst you neglect to do that, it is impossible that you should be freed from your fear of Reprobation and Damnation, and unprofitable for you to be possessed with a groundless comfort of your Election and certain Salvation.  TEMPT. 
Christ died only for the world of the elect. Or if he died for all mankind, he died for them all dignitate pretii; he did not die for all voluntate propositi. God never intended that he should shed his blood for all and every man, but for a few selected one's only: of whose number I am not, for I am a reprobate.  MINIST. 
Christ died for all and every singular person, who by repentance and faith in his blood may, according to the tenor of the Gospel, have eternal life given him through Jesus Christ our Lord. And Christ died thus for all, not only because his death was in regard of the worth a sufficient ransom for all and more than all, but because it is God's settled purpose, by Christ's bloodshed to save any man that shall believe truly in him, and to save no man that continueth an unbeliever. Christ died not to save any few selected one's without their repentance and faith: and Christ died not with an exception or exclusion of any one man in the world from the benefit of salvation, performing the condition of faith and repentance. When any man hath finished his course in faith and godliness, and is arrived in heaven, the event undeniably proveth that God had an eternal absolute purpose of giving the grace of repentance and perseverance unto such a man, and saving him by the blood of Christ. And when any other man hath finished his course in impenitency and infidelity, and is plunged into hell, the event also undeniably proveth that God had no eternal absolute purpose to convert, sanctify, or glorify such a man. If this be that voluntas propositi which you must be acquainted withal before you will seek after salvation by repenting and believing in Christ Jesus, God never made me of his counsel that I should be able to reveal such a secret unto you. But without the revealing of this, I assure you there lieth no such particular exception against you, that can hinder you from the benefit of Christ's bloodshed whensoever you shall repent and believe in him. Desire to do this, endeavour to do this, and than God's Spirit will in due time bear witness unto your spirit that you are the child of God, and no reprobate. Other course to free you from this horrible tentation I know none.  TEMPT. 
Notwithstanding the universal covenant of peace with men upon the Mediators blood yet this taketh no effect, but upon condition that men repent and believe. God never meant that the greatest part of men should do this: And I by name am one of those whom God never meant should do it: for I am a reprobate.  MINIST. 
It is most true, that Christ's blood is effectual to save no man, but upon condition of his repenting and believing. And as you have well apprehended this truth, so learn by it to apprehended another, namely, that Christ's blood is effectual to save any man who repenteth and believeth in him. And let not the devils suggestions make you so profane, as to say that God meaneth you should never do that which he commandeth you to do, and for doing whereof he affordeth you such means as cannot be frustrated but by your own voluntary default and wilful wickedness. God willeth that you should neither receive his word nor his grace in vain: say not therefore when he calleth upon you to repent, and inciteth you thereunto, that his meaning is you should not repent. But I am afraid you deceive yourself with a false construction of these words Gods meaning. You must know it is one thing to say, God truly meaneth that men should do what he commandeth, another thing to say that God certainly purposeth to make men do what he commandeth. The goodness of the action which God commandeth, the word commanding, and the Spirit exciting thereunto, are good proofs unto you that God meaneth (that is, liketh, desireth, willeth) that you should do those good things which he requireth: but they are not certain proofs that God intendeth or meaneth to remove all those wilful obstacles which yourself may put, or to make you do that which yourself careth not to do, nay striveth not to do. If you will not buckle yourself to do any of those good actions which God commandeth, until some Minister can assure you that you are one of those whom God absolutely meaneth or intendeth ex nolente facere volentem, your desire is a disorderly desire, and of a thing impossible to be known by man until it be wrought by God.  MINIST. 
God hath a double calling of men: an outward calling, by preaching the word in men's ears; an inward, by the irresistible work of the Spirit in their hearts. The outward calling is a part of God's outward will: the inward and effectual calling is a part of his secret william. He calleth me only with the outward call: and therefore I cannot be assured of God's good will and meaning that I should believe, repent, and be saved.  MINIST. 
You misconceive Gods calling. His outward calling by preaching the word in men's ears is a means to convey the sense of the word preached inwardly to their understandings, and mediante intellectu inwardly to stirre-up their wills to the doing of such things as they now see would make for their eternal good. And I appeal unto your own knowledge and experience; Did the word preached never pierce further than your ears? hath it not enlightened your understanding with the wholesome doctrine of the Gospel? Hath not God's Spirit at some time or other by the word inwardly moved you to break of your sinful and lustful courses, and to lead a sober, just and religious life? Why do you contrary to your own conscience falsely accuse God of affording you a bore outward calling, but no inward? Why do you traduce him as not willing that you should believe, repent, and so be saved? Take it for a certain rule; God always willeth men should do those things which by his word written he enjoineth them to do, and by his Spirit enlightening and inciting he so helpeth them to do, that it is only the voluntary perverseness and stubbornness of their own wills resisting the word and the Spirit which hindereth them from doing those things which they should. It is true, that God can make any hard and resisting heart a soft and obedient heart; and he doth it where he hath an eternal purpose out of special mercy so to do: And it is as true, that God may justly leave a stubborn heart to his own resistency and perverseness; and this he doth where he hath purposed in justice so to do. Deus miseretur cujus vult, & quem vult indurat. If you long to be assured of this secret meaning or purpose of God towards you in particular before you resolve upon your repentance, I can assure you that it is the devil who hath stirred up in you a longing after a thing impossible, that so he may procure your destruction. Strive therefore to bring this foolish and wicked fancy out of your mind, and to judge of the meaning of God, which belongeth unto you, according to his word revealed unto you, leaving his secret and unsearchable will unto himself.  
By this which hath been showed, we may see that it is impossible to comfort a desperate wretch, who will not be comforted unless he may first be assured of that whereof no mortal man can possibly assure him. For he that will go about to assure an unfaithful man, that he is not in the number of men eternally reprobated, must be able to assure him that he is in the number of men eternally elected. For the Remonstrants themselves, who acknowledge eternal Election and Reprobation as well as we, confess there is no middle sort of men which are neither eternally elected nor eternally reprobated; and therefore if they can assure a man he is not reprobated, they can assure him he is elected.  
For the example of Francis Spiera, it maketh no more against us than against any who hold distinct opposite decrees of Election and Reprobation established in ment ac voluntate Divina before the foundations of the world were laid. When the Devil suggesteth unto a man, that by God's decree he is in the number of persons reprobated, he troubleth him not with Jesuitical or Arminian disputations, whether a conditionate prescience or an absolute prescience must secundùm nostrum modum intelligendi be presupposed in the same eternity unto the eternal decrees of Election and Reprobation: but he taketh advantage upon that wherein we all agreed, that God is not now to make his decrees who shall he elected and who not, but that this was a thing immutably ordered from all eternity. Upon this true ground he troubleth the fancy of a man with a strong conceit that he is one of those singular persons not-elected. That this is a rash groundless conceit, both we and the Remonstrants may convince the party tempted: but to assure him that he is within the number of the Elect, it is more than we are able to do.  
I wish this Author had quoted the place in Caelius or Calvine, that so we might have judged how truly he reporteth them. Sleidan reporteth the same story, and telleth us, 
Vide Comment. lib. 21. pa. 255.  De misericordia Dei coepit desperare; That when his comforters urged such testimonies as express Gods great mercy, he denied not the truth of them, but said they belonged not unto him; Et quòd agnitam veritatem abjurasset, destinatum se cruciatibus aeternis, illósque jam animo sese persentiscere atque videre: neque Deum amare posse, verùm horribiliter odisse dicebat. As for the phrase or opinion of absolute Reprobation, which this Author here so often harpeth upon, it is not once mentioned by Sleidan. And it is more probable, that Spiera had his conceit of the doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation from the 
* Scotus and his followers.  Roman church wherein he was bred, or from the Lutherans by whom he had been converted, than from the Calvinists, with whom it appeareth not (in my Author) that he had any acquaintance. If therefore Spiera would admit of no comfort, until he were by the Minister assured that he was under the eternal decree of Election and not of Reprobation, all the Remonstrants in the world with all their new opinions could have done him no good: for he would still have opposed, I upon God's absolute and eternal foresight of my final impenitency was ranked amongst the reprobates, as you yourselves teach me all were whom God eternally foresaw should die impenitent: I am one of those; and therefore I shall never repent, I shall never be saved, I shall certainly be damned. Let any Remonstrant show me a way how to persuade a desperate impenitent faithless man, being in extreme fear that he is a Reprobate according to God's eternal decree made upon an eternal prevision of his final impenitency, and I will easily show him how to do the same, admitting that decree of absolute Predestination and Reprobation which we defend. Tell a man who is persuaded that he is a Reprobate according to the Remonstrants' decree of eternal Reprobation, that the thief upon the cross, that Mary Magdalene, that S. Paul repent, were pardoned, and saved, he will answer, These indeed did so, because God had eternally elected them, foreseeing this their repentance: as for me, God eternally foresaw my final impenitency, and ●hereupon passed in eternity a decree of Reprobation upon me: and therefore that cannot be reversed, neither can I repent and be saved. And if the greatness of the number of Reprobates make any thing for strengthening the tentation, in all likelihood the number of Reprobates must needs be greater, if Election and Reprobation be conceived after the Arminian doctrine. For if Election and Rejection be made ex massa corrupta & damnabili, more are like to be elected and fewer rejected when absolute and mere mercy maketh the discrimination than when the absolute prevision of man's good using the Divine grace offered unto him and constancy to the end of a man's life in this good usage make the distinction.  
The universality of God's love, of Christ's death, and of the covenant of grace are solid arguments of comfort to a man repenting, believing and persevering in the way of true godliness; and they bring with them a comfortable persuasion that such a man is an elect child of God: But unto a man into whose head, upon occasion of his lewd life and impenitent heart, the devil hath put this strong fancy, I am one of those whom God upon his eternal prevision of my final impenitency eternally reprobated, those arguments can do little good. For put them into form thus, God's love is universal; Christ's death an universal ransom for the sins of all men; The covenant, SI CREDIDERIS, SALVUS ERIS, universal: Therefore God did not foresee thy final impenitency, and thereupon decree t● exclude thee from eternal life. No man can be so perplexed by the devil suggesting unto him his eternal Reprobation, but he will easily see that such arguments can give him no assurance of his eternal Election: Nay, they will rather increase his fear of Reprobation: because at the very present he findeth in himself an hard and impenitent heart, and despaireth of the mollification thereof; which will induce him to imagine that God eternally foresaw him a final impenitent man, and upon that eternally reprobated him according to the Remonstrants' doctrine.  
Melanchthon spoke wisely and truly, that the promise of grace, pardon, and salvation (upon repentance and faith) is our surest refuge in tentation. For as for eternal Election and Salvation, God hath not absolutely promised them unto any singular person: and therefore no man can comfort himself from a decree altogether unknown unto himself; but his comfort in tentation must be drawn from the embracing of the conditions of life made known unto him in the Gospel. But whilst a man standeth possessed with a fancy of his own Reprobation and with a knowledge of his impenitency and fear of final obduration, the universal conditional promises cannot persuade him that he is one of the Elect, or dissuade him from thinking he is one of the Reprobate. Melanchthon therefore thought the Universality of the promise a good motive to encourage any man unto repentance: but he thought it not a good argument to prove that any man is a person elected, and shall most certainly repent, though he now think the contrary. This is the scruple, this is the devilish suggestion, which the conditional promises, though never so general, cannot remove out of the fancy of an impenitent & desperate sinner, such an one as Spiera was.  
These universal promises are not directly contradictory to the tentation. The tentation is, I Spiera am a Reprobate, and shall die in my final impenitency: The universal promise is, Whosoever believeth and repenteth, shall be saved. Let this Author show the contradiction.  
His often inculcated propositions, God will have all men to be saved, to repent, God will have none to be absolutely damned, etc. have so often been explained & proved impertinent to the purpose whereunto he applieth them, that they need not further answer.  
The story of Junius his relieving a perplexed woman is fare fetched: the application further of from the present point. The tentation supposed is not about the word Absolute, but about the very decree of eternal Reprobation. This Author should show that there is no irreversible or immutable decree, distinguishing men ab aeterno in electos & reprobatos: for this breedeth the scruple. To talk to a soul perplexed with fear of Reprobation, that there are no absolute reprobates, and than to expound absolute Reprobates to be men absolutely damned whether they repent or not, will afford him little comfort who hath a preconceit that God foresaw him finally impenitent, and upon this prescience decreed him a Reprobate. He that shall go about to cut the Gordian knot with telling a perplexed soul there are no men absolutely elected or absolutely rejected, can do him little good; unless he prove also there were no men eternally elected and eternally rejected upon the prescience of their final perseverance or final impenitency. For this man supposeth himself to be one of those whom God before the foundations of the world were laid foresaw finally impenitent, and thereupon he concludeth that he is one of those who must of necessity be eternally damned. 
Ruiz De volun●. Dei, disp. 12. art. 7. p. 175.  For in all Divines opinions these propositions are true; Deus nihil potest velle ex tempore; Deus non potest non habere volitionem quam habet; non potest habere volitionem quam non habet. Unless therefore it be demonstrated, that God neither out of his absolute will nor out of his eternal will guided by his absolute and eternal prescience hath distinguished men in electos & reprobatos, the perplexed soul cannot be rid from the forenamed tentation. And a Remonstrant must relinquish his opinion of the eternal Election and Reprobation of singular persons upon the Divine prescience, or he can never be able to satisfy a tempted person who acknowledgeth himself to be faithless and impenitent, and supposeth that God, eternally foreseeing he would so remain unto his lives end, hath eternally rejected or reprobated him. For example; a Remonstrant cometh to comfort a man who thinketh himself to be one of those whose Reprobation God hath decreed from everlasting upon the everlasting foresight of his final impenitency: He telleth him, God would have all to be saved; Christ died for all, etc. What can the Remonstrant Minister conclude hereupon? Therefore no man was reprobated from everlasting upon the foresight of his impenitency: Therefore not you. This were to cross his own principles. As for an orthodox Minister, he will never go about to prove unto the tempted person that there is no such thing in the world as some men absolutely elected and others absolutely not-elected: but he will show unto him, First, That absolute Election and absolute Nonelection or negative Reprobation are not (as he fearfully and fond imagineth) decrees of absolutely saving any man whether he repent or not, or of absolutely damning any man whether he repent or no. Secondly, That it is a foolish and devilish kind of divination for any man to put and place himself in the number of the Elect or Non-elect upon the mere uncertain fancy of his own mind, or upon the malicious suggestion of the Tempter. And therefore if he would be out of perplexity, he must not longer conceive himself certain of that whereof his own reason awakened will show him he cannot possibly be certain. His tongue must not say that wherein his own knowledge giveth him the lie. Lastly, when he is brought to confess, that he neither is nor can be certain what God in his eternal counsel decreed of him before the world was made, he is to be instructed to drive away the fear of his Nonelection, and to gain some comfortable assurance of his Election, by labouring to do those things which become the Elect children of God, and to avoid those things which are proper to the children of the devil. This was the old and only way which the Apostles knew to gain a comfortable persuasion of a man's Election, and consequently to drive away the fear or suspicion of being a Reprobate. If the Remonstrants have a new way of doing this, I dare confidently affirm it cannot be a good way.  
For his objections against us, of God's two opposite wills, the one secret, the other revealed; of some men's impossible salvation and inevitable damnation: they are his own erroneous collections. We have already showed that there are no such opposite wills in God: and that for possibility of attaining salvation and avoiding damnation, every man hath as much according to our doctrine as theirs. But because this Author never leaveth inculcating absolute Reprobation to be a doctrine that taketh away all grounds of comfort, I must tell him again and again, that if he admit eternal decrees in God, of giving repentance and perseverance unto Peter, and of not-giving it unto Judas, of giving eternal life unto Peter, and of not-giving it unto Judas, let him suppose or imagine what act of Divine prescience he pleaseth to be precedent unto the forenamed decrees, Judas was as absolutely under the decree of Reprobation, and so as absolute a Reprobate, in his doctrine as ours. For the eternal will of God is altogether absolute, which decreeth a future event, consideratis conditionibus adjungendis ut jam de facto adjunctis: But thus did God (by the confession of the Remonstrants) decree the Reprobation and Damnation of Judas from all eternity: The decree therefore of his Reprobation was absolute.  
Whereas therefore this Author presumeth that he is able to convince the understanding of a tempted man that he is no Reprobate; if he mean he can convince him that he shall not be damned if he repent and believe, we can do the same: But if he mean (as he must do, if he will free the tempted person from his perplexity after his way) that he is able to convince him that he is none of those in whom God eternally foresaw final impenitency, that he is none of those whom God upon this foresight eternally reprobated; I dare say, he is able to do that which neither S. Paul nor S. Peter were able to do: And therefore we are not ashamed to profess, that we cannot attein to this skill. And I think that if any tempted man should put a Remonstrant to his oath or protestation whether he indeed can assure him that he is no Reprobate, according to his own doctrine of eternal Reprobation, he would not dare to take such an oath. He might safely swear unto him, that he neither is nor shall be thrown from the face of God into hell, if he repent: but he cannot safely swear unto him, that he shall repent, or that God upon the foresight of his stubbornness did not from all eternity absolutely appoint him unto damnation.  
And were it possible for a Remonstrant Minister to persuade such a desperate wretch of his future repentanc and faith, yet this is not demonstrative to convince him that he is no Reprobate. For he might reply, You have taught me that a man may totally and finally fall away from faith, that he may loose regeneration, sanctification, adoption: I am one of those in whom God hath eternally foreseen this my final falling away: And therefore though I now felt repentance and faith stirring in my heart (which I do not) yet I know in the end I should relapse; and therefore you neither do nor can assure me that I am no Reprobate.  
We willingly grant, that we cannot, to the silencing of all replies, from the outward seeming acts of faith and repentance prove a man to be a true believer, to be a person elected, to be no Reprobate: But we can do as much upon the grounds of our doctrine as any Remonstrant can upon his, and somewhat more: because in his doctrine men justified, sanctified, adopted may become Reprobates, and so be damned in the end.  
What Piscator saith is thus fare forth true, That no comfort from assurance of Election, or from assurance of not-being under the decree of Reprobation, can possibly be instilled into the soul of any man elected or not-elected, so long as he continueth faithless and impenitent.  
And for this Author, if he can persuade but one of his hundred reprobates, whilst he lieth in impenitency, that he is no reprobate, he hath but brought him into a fools paradise, and comforted him with a lie, or at lest with that whereof the truth is to him who avoucheth it altogether unknown and uncertain: Which boldness becometh not the true Ministers of the Gospel of Christ.  
To shut up all; It is a gross error in this Author, to suppose that the Gospel teacheth a Minister how to comfort a desperate impenitent sinner, by assuring him that he is of the number of the Elect, or that he is not within the number of the Reprobate, or that God's eternal decrees of Election and Reprobation are yet unmade or unsettled. And it is a strange fancy which this Author hath conceived, that the Remonstrants' doctrine can give such a distempered and impenitent sinner proofs more than probable that he is no reprobate. Nay he further implieth, that his doctrine can give such a person more comfort than this FIERIPOTEST Peradventure I am elected. Belike it can assure him, Without all Peradventure, thou art an elected person. ●hose who can do this, are able to set up ladder, climb into heaven, pry into the ●ook of life, and bring men news that they ●re certainly appointed to be made partakers both of grace and glory. A religious Christian will never be thus comforted by ●uch bold and blind assurers. If at any time ●e hap to be perplexed, he will wait for comfort from the Spirit of comfort, and he ●ill not seek it in uncertain conjectures or divinations of his own or other men's, but in ●he real effects of the same Spirit experimentally found and felt in his own soul. Whilst we walk in the Spirit, we are sure ●o found comfort from the Spirit: Whilst we walk in the flesh, it is not an earthly Mini●er that can comfort us. Labour to eschew ●vil and do good, the fear of Reprobation will vanish, and the sweet comfort of Election will replenish thine heart.    

READER,  
The author thought good to close up these his Animadversions with a Conclusion touching the manifold abuse and use of the doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation.  
IT now remaineth that for a close of all we speak something concerning the abuse of the doctrine of Election and Reprobation, and of the right use of the same. Let us begin with the preachers and themselves, than proceed unto the hearers.  
First, those Ministers do very ill and indiscreetly who deliver this most true doctrine preposterously and not in its due place. Thus we conceive them to do who at the first step do bring carnal men to the contemplation of this great depth of Election and Reprobation, who aught in the first place to be called to faith in Christ and to serious repentance: which is all one as if a man should purposely give to a sick and weak person strong and solid meat which his stomach is not able to bear, contrary to that of the Apostle, Strong meat belongeth to them that are of full age, 
Heb. 5.14.  even those who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil. We aught therefore to imitate the practice of Christ and of the Apostles, and to preach the Gospel in the same order which our Master and those most skilful bvilders did follow. But in what manner did our Saviour Christ instruct men to life eternal? We have a notable example John 3.16. where in the first place he teacheth, That God so loved the world that he gave his Son for the redemption of mankind. Than he addeth, That every one who believeth in this Redeemer shall obtain life everlasting; but those that believe not shall therefore perish because they believed not in the Son of God. Hitherto we have not one word concerning the mystery of Election and Reprobation. But afterwards, when Christ saw some by the preaching of the Gospel brought to repentance, faith and holiness of life, jest they should attribute unto themselves these effects of special grace and mercy, he openeth unto them the deep mystery of Election, and telleth them how all those graces flowed from the decree of Predestination. This is the scope of these places, 
a Matth. 13.11.  It is given to you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given. 
b John 6.37.  All that the Father giveth me shall come to me. S. Paul treadeth in his Master's steps, and observeth the same method of teaching. For being about to preach unto the Jews the Gospel of Christ, he beginneth not at the point of Election and Reprobation, but promiseth in general 
c Acts 13.38.  forgiveness of sins to all believers, and teacheth that all unbelievers do by their own default 
d ver. 46.  put from the● everlasting life offered unto them. But after that divers of them had embraced Christ by a true faith, than at length the Evangelis● thought fit to lay down the cause thereof i● these words, 
e ver. 48.  As many as were ordained t● eternal life believed. If therefore we would not go to work preposterously, whensoever we have to do with such who for the greatest part it is likely are ignorant and carnal● men and not yet endued with true faith and holiness, we are to move them to faith in Christ and newness of life, and not to step into the doctrine of Election and Reprobation until we deal with those in whom we manifestly perceive the effects of Election, that is faith and the fruits thereof. S. Augustine to this purpose saith very wisely, 
f De Perfev. lib. 2. c. 16. Utile est ut taceatur aliquod verum propter incapaces.  It is good that some truth be concealed, for their sakes who are uncapable thereof. Whence that of the Apostle, 
g 1. Cor. 3.1.  I could not spea● unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal.  
Secondly, those do abuse this most tru● doctrine, who when they explain it unto th● people do wander into such question's a● through their too much subtlety do exceed the vulgar capacity, and are more fit for the Schools than the pulpit; yea indeed unfit even 〈◊〉 the Schools to be meddled withal, if the importunity of our adversaries and the necessity of maintaining our own cause did not sometimes drive us even against our wills to ●hese nice speculations. Such are the discus●ons which are made by Divines about the ●ignes of Priority & Posteriority in the eternal decrees of God, with great labour and ●ittle profit. Some affirm that the first decree ●n the Divine understanding and will was of ●ending the Redeemer; & than another, of sa●ing the Elect by this Redeemer. Others hold the contrary way. Yea, so boldly curious have some mortal men been, that when ●hey have laid down the order of the Divine decrees as a thing whereof they had certain knowledge, affirming this to have been the first decree of the Divine will, that the second, another the third, and so on, at length they stick not to avouch, that if God had not observed this very order which they approve of, he should have done either unwisely or unjustly. A wise Minister should wholly abstain from handling these thorny questions: however the business never aught to come to that point, that if we fail in these our speculations, any reproach should be fastened upon God himself. The Ministers of the word therefore, as often as occasion is offered of treating of Predestination before the people, must be content to contain themselves within those bounds which the holy Scripture hath clearly chalked out unto us. Let them teach, how God elected his own unto life eternal before the foundations of the world were laid. Let them teach, how this Election flowed not from the foresight of man's merits, but from the free will and gracious pleasure of God electing. Let them teach, that whatsoever saving good is found in us, is the effect of this free and gracious mercy. Let them teach, that the assurance of our Election is not to be sought in God's secret decrees or our own idle imaginations, but in the effects and operations of the faithful and sanctified soul. These and other such doctrines which are clear, sound and profitable, may and aught be preached unto Christians. But those which are either too knotty or else altogether fruitless (especially when they are not clearly grounded and revealed in the word of God) aught quite to be excluded out of vulgar congregations. And here I cannot but tax the folly and rashness of some (especially young) Preachers, who assoon as they hear any new controversy concerning Predestination started amongst Divines, be it never so intricate, never so unfruitful, yet presently they acquaint the people with it: This they press, this they daily stand upon, and think it an argument of great learning to discuss those points amongst the unlearned, which their auditors do not at all understand. Against these may we take up that of the son of Sirach, 
h Ecclus' 19.12.  A fool traveleth with a word as a woman in labour of a child: as an arrow that sticketh in a man's thigh, so is a word in a fools belly. This abuse therefore is chief to be avoided by the Ministers of the word; who as they may deliver the simple, clear and fundamental doctrine of Predestination with profit and edification to the people of God rightly trained up, so can they not run out into intricate questions, and curiously discuss both sides of the controversy after the manner of the Schools, but by this their superfluous diligence they must needs train up their people rather unto curiosity and itch of contention, than unto faith and zeal of a godly life. Yea, what Prudentius said of wrangling sophisters may well be applied unto these men; Fidem minutis dissecant ambagibus, They mince the faith into petty circumstances: Or rather that of the Apostle, 
i 1. Tim. 6.4  They dote (or, are sick) about questions or strifes of words, whereof comes envy, strife, etc.  
Thirdly, as we do worthily blame those who offend by doing too much, stretching this doctrine of Predestination to intricate & superfluous questions; so also are they no less to be taxed who seem to offend by doing too little, while they propound Predestination & Reprobation to the people in the effect only or the event, that is, the infallible salvation of the Elect, and the infallible damnation of the Reprobate; in the mean time little regarding, or at lest not with the same diligence acquainting the people with the means whereby the Elect are brought unto salvation, and the means whereby the Reprobates do rush headlong into destruction: whereas indeed it is a dangerous matter to lay open before the eyes of the vulgar the naked and bore doctrines of Predestination and Reprobation. A wise Minister therefore will never teach the people that some particular persons are absolutely predestinated unto life, but withal he will let them know that these persons are none other but such as by faith and holiness do walk in the way to eternal life. He will never teach that some particular persons were passed-by in this infallible ordination unto life everlasting, but withal he will also show that these are none other but they who by their own voluntary impenitency, infidelity and impiety did most deservedly pull upon themselves eternal destruction. So Paul delivereth this doctrine of Predestination, Rom. 8. where having made mention of Predestination, he presently annexeth thereunto Vocation, Justification, Sanctification, without which we aught not so much as to dream of our Predestination, at lest we cannot come to any certain evidence thereof. So likewise Ephes. 1. unto the doctrine of Predestination he joineth Sanctification and other spiritual gifts, which are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, manifest tokens, of the predestinate. In like manner the point of Reprobation is so to be unfolded, that all may understand, that although by his special mercy God do not free the Reprobates from death, yet he forceth not any unto sin, but they are carried headlong unto their destruction, and that by their own voluntary motion. So Paul in his epistle to the Philippians, when he speaketh of the Reprobate, 
k Phil. 3.19  whose end is destruction, he addeth, whose God is their belly, whose glory is in their shame, who mind earthly things. So Judas in his epistle speaking of some 
l Judas v 4.  who were ordained to condemnation, he strait addeth, that they were wicked men who turn the grace of God into lasciviousness, and deny the only Lord God and our Lord Jesus Christ. It is not therefore the duty of a Minister, so to urge absolute Predestination as in the mean time to forget the means: Because although Gods decree concerning the salvation of this man, suppose Peter or Paul, be absolute, yet the salvation of Peter and of Paul in regard of the event and fulfilling of the decree doth depend upon the conditionate use of the means. Neither on the other side is the Reprobation of any particular persons so to be pressed, as though they were infallibly to be damned whatsoever they do: Because the decree of Reprobating some doth not infringe the truth and steadfastness of the Evangelicall promises made unto all and every one. For they hold true when they are in general divulged in this form, Whosoever believeth shall be saved: And they hold true also when they are applied in special to any particular person, If thou believest and leadest an holy life, thou shalt be saved. To be short, the saying of that most wise and learned Father is very necessary to be observed by all Ministers of the word, who showeth, 
m August. De bono Persev. lib. 2. c. 21.  That we may speak that which is true concerning the absolute decree of the Divine will to save and reprobate men, and yet not in that due manner in which we aught to speak. For example; If a man should speak to his auditors to this purpose, Whether ye run or sleep, whether ye receive the word into your hearts or reject it, yet in the conclusion ye shall all be such as God who is invincible decreed ye should be, as God who is infallible foresaw ye would be, this is indeed a most true doctrine; But because in the manner of propounding it seemeth to separate the end from the means, and to invite men to slothfulness, in the judgement of S. Augustine 
n Ibid. cap. 22. Nempe hoc verissimum est: ità sanè, sed improbissimum, importunissimum, incongruentissimum, non falso eloquio sed non salubriter valetudini humanae infirmitatis apposito.  it is so most true that withal it is most wicked, unseasonable, inconvenient; not that the saying is false, but because it is not wholesomely applied to human infirmity. 
o Dolosi vel imperiti medici est etiam utile medicamentum sic alligare ut aut non prosit aut obsit, cap. 21.  Now it is the part of a deceitful or unskilful physician so to apply a good plaster that either it shall do no good or do hurt. And hitherto we have touched upon those abuses whereinto Ministers do sometimes run when they go about to preach unto the people the doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation. We comprised them all (as ye might observe) under three heads: For either they are preposterous, and deliver it to such as are yet uncapable thereof; or else they stretch their discourse beyond that fundamental and simple doctrine delivered by the Apostle, and run out into intricate and curious speculations fare unfit for the people's understanding; or lastly they deliver it defectively, barely and abruptly mentioning the infallible end and absolute event predetermined by God on either side, but speaking not a word of the several means, conditions or ways whereby those several ends are atteined. But the decree of the divers ends is secret, and concerneth God more properly than men; but the precept about the means is revealed, and belongeth to men rather than to God: This therefore aught chief to be pressed and inculcated by the Ministers of the word. But from the Preachers let us proceed unto the people.  
Now men are want to abuse this doctrine of Predestination two manner of ways; either unto presumption, or unto despair. The presumptuous, when they hear Predestination mentioned, as though they could guess what God before the creation of the world determined concerning them, strait without any premises at all they conclude themselves to be of the number of the predestinate. And to this rash conclusion they annex this profane inference, Live as I will, since I am predestinate I shall be saved. Thus from rashly presuming what they please they proceed to live licentiously as they please. On the contrary, the desperate, assoon as they understand how some were elected some passed-by by God before the foundations of the world were laid, presently conceiting ill of their own case they reckon themselves among the reprobate. And to this blind conjecture they add this wicked conclusion, Since I am none of the Elect, wherefore should I trouble myself by hearing God's word, receiving the Sacraments, mortifying my flesh, and bringing forth the fruits of new life? for do I what I can I shall at length be damned. Thus these by despair do fall into the same slothfulness and neglect of their salvation whereinto the others fell by presumption. Both these abuses aught most sharply to be reproved, and withal the remedies are to be shown whereby they may be avoided. For the former, those rash presumers are to be admonished, that although in thesi, in the general, it be most certain that God from all eternity elected some rejected others, yet if we come down to particular persons, it is a secret kept close in Gods own breast, which be those persons that were destinated unto life, which be those who are not comprehended in his gracious decree. It is therefore a very diabolical temptation which moveth men to dive into the depth of God's eternal decrees, and from thence to take up a rash persuasion of their Predestination. For the decree of Predestination as it concerneth others is altogether by us unsearchable. Whence that of Prosper, 
p De lib. arb. Nè impatienter feramus quòd electionis vasa non novimus.  Let it not much trouble us that we are ignorant who are vessels of Election. As it concerneth ourselves, it is unsearchable also à priori, in its causes, and is to be perceived only by its effects after our conversion and sanctification. Luther most excellently saith, 
q In Gen. 26. De Deo quatenus non est revelatus, nulla est fides, nulla scientia, nulla cognitio. Omit speculationem de Deo abscondito, si vis effugere blasphemiam Dei. Si credis in Deum revelatum, & recipis verbum ejus, paulatim etiam absconditum Deum tibi ●evelabit. Altiora te nè quaesieris, & fortiora te nè scrutatus fueris: Audi ●ilium incarnatum, & sponte se offeret tibi praed●stinatio tua.  Of God so fare as he is not revealed there is no faith, no science, no knowledge. Leave of to muse of God where he concealeth himself, if thou wouldst avoid being guilty of blasphemy. If thou believest in God revealed and receivest his word, he will also by little and little reveal unto thee God concealed. Sore not after things above thy reach, and search not for what is above thy capacity: Harken to the Son incarnate, and thy Predestination will quickly manifest itself unto thee. Thus Luther. They flatly dote therefore who, as if they were of God's privy counsel, presume that they can be assured of their Predestination before they have any knowledge of their conversion and justification. The only remedy for this madness is, that as they have been taught out of the word of God that some were elected, some passed-by, from all eternity, so they should learn out of the same word, that no man either can or aught absolutely conclude himself to be in the number of the elect before he found himself to be in the number of those who are converted and do truly believe. Thus S. Paul, 
r 2. Tim. 2.19.  The Lord knoweth them that are his. And, Let every one that nameth the name of Christ departed from iniquity. As if he had said, God himself knoweth who are elected by looking into the secret decree of his own will: but thou, O man, whosoever thou art, dost not know that thou art elected but by departing from thy course of iniquity. So saith Peter, 
s 2. Pet. 1.10.  Give diligence to make your calling and election sure. For though it be most sure and firm in the purpose of God electing, yet there can be no certainty of the Election of any particular man, but only of him that doth well. Lastly, Ephes. 1. (where the doctrine of Predestination is professedly handled) the Apostle teacheth both these points, viz. That God 
t Ephes. 1.4.  chose his before the foundation of the world; and, That we have not the assurance of this Election sealed in our hearts till after that we have received the Gospel into our hearts and believed in Christ. If thou obeyest Gods call, 
v. 13.  thou mayest rightly conclude that thou wast from all eternity predestinated: If thou persevere in thy unbelief and impiety, dream thou mayest or surmise that thou art predestinated, know or believe thou canst not. Away therefore with all rash presumption of Predestination, which is never begotten by the right unfolding of this doctrine, but by the foolish imagination of carnal men or the pernicious suggestions of the devil.  
Now let us weigh the inference which such presumptuous men do use to make: Live as I will, say they, since I am predestinated I shall be saved. I will not further stand to examine the rashness of this presumption, having spoken sufficiently thereof already. Let it be granted that such an one is indeed predestinated, yet nothing can be more wicked, nothing more foolish, nothing more false than this conclusion.  
First, it is a certain token of a wicked wretch, not of an elected person, to take occasion of sinning from that which should have encouraged him to holiness of life. He who saith in his heart, I am predestinated, what saith he else but this, God out of his mere good pleasure hath ordained me to eternal life? but he who hence doth gather, Therefore I may live as I list, what saith he but this, Therefore I may of set purpose run headlong towards hell? But how can he who is not more wicked than Wickedness itself reason thus, Because I believe that God was thus specially gracious towards me, therefore I will show myself exceedingly unthankful towards him: Because God hath decreed to bring me to the kingdom of heaven, therefore I will try if I can maugre his decree cast myself into the pit of hell.? Profane and godless men, who turn the grace of God into wantonness, may sometimes perhaps out of a conceited opinion of their Predestination fall into this desperate madness: But for a truly regenerate and faithful man, whose heart is assured by the holy Ghost that he is the son of God and ordained from all eternity to the participation of the kingdom of heaven, it is as impossible that he from the sense and persuasion of his Predestination should draw this wicked conclusion, as for wood to be cold in the middle of the fire, or the air to be dark when the sunbeams are diffused through it. 
u 1. John 3.3.  Every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, saith the Apostle. Therefore they that defile themselves with all manner of lusts, come fare short of a true persuasion of their being elected.  
Secondly, nothing is more foolish than the foresaid inference. For as it is an argument of wisdom to choose and use fit and proper means for the obtaining of the appointed end; so it is the height of folly, from the appointment of the end to infer a refusing or neglect of the means. We will explain this by some special examples. God had decreed from eternity, and moreover revealed unto Abraham, that in his seed all nations should be blessed. Now suppose that Abraham presuming upon this decree had resolved wholly to abstain from the company of Sarai his wife, and had thus reasoned with himself, Whatsoever I do or not do, God will take care for the accomplishment of his own decree; it would be hard to say whether such reasoning were more guilty of folly or of wickedness. In like manner, if Ezekiah, after notice of God's decree to prolong his life fifteen years, should thereupon have determined with himself from thence forward neither to eat nor drink nor do any thing else that is ordained for the preservation of man's life, who could excuse him from extreme madness? Accordingly, should we grant that such a particular man were elected by God unto life eternal; should we further grant the same man to have certain knowledge of his Election, not by faith only and the secret testimony of the Spirit, but by the voice of God himself clearly sounding from heaven; yet after such an extraordinary revelation of his Election to neglect the means leading to salvation, and supinely to expect by power of the Divine decree to be drawn to the use of them whether he will or not, would be a manifest argument not of an elected but of a brainless person.  
Thirdly, nothing is more false than this manner of reasoning, I am predestinated; Therefore whether I believe or not believe, whether I live well or ill, I shall be saved. For although the Predestination of a man being granted, his salvation must necessarily follow, yet it followeth not upon every condition. For example; That Paul was elected to salvation from all eternity, is most true: yet if any should argue thus, Therefore whether he had been converted unto Christ or had persevered in his blasphemy against him, he had been saved, he would infer a most false conclusion. For if these reasonings were true, the preaching of the Gospel would be in vain, the administration of the Sacraments superfluous, our conversion, justification, sanctification idle and frivolous: for Predestination alone would carry a man to heaven whether he would or no. But such dreams as these are to be avoided: For the decree of Predestination about the end to be obtained doth not exclude but include the means and ordinary way whereby men tend to that end. This conditional proposition therefore, Although Paul continued in unbelief, he shall be saved, is so fare from following upon the doctrine of Predestination, that the contradictory thereof may thence be deduced, namely, If Paul believe not, it is impossible he should be saved. The reason is manifest: Because the same God who decreed to save Paul, decreed to save him by faith, not by impenitence and unbelief. This may very well be illustrated by that purpose of God to save all those from shipwreck who sailed together with S. Paul towards Rome: For though God had infallibly decreed to deliver all these men, and by an 
x Acts 27.24.  angel had revealed this his decree unto Paul, yet the Apostle cryeth out, 
y v. 31.  Except the mariners abide in the ship, they cannot be saved. The same say we concerning the Predestination of any particular persons unto life eternal: Although it be infallibly decreed by God, although it be clearly evidenced to the persons themselves, yet can they not be saved except they abide in faith and godliness. The doctrine of Predestination therefore permitteth not any man to persuade himself that his salvation is certain before he found that he is truly converted, truly faithful, truly sanctified. Much less doth it permit men to presume, that following their lusts and living wickedly, they may nevertheless attein the kingdom of heaven. And thus much concerning the former abuse.  
Now let us come to them who from the doctrine of Predestination take occasion to despair, and conclude from thence, that although they believe in Christ, and lead their lives never so holily, notwithstanding by reason of the infallibility of the Divine decree they shall at length be damned. First let us consider how ill these men's persuasion of their Reprobation is grounded: Secondly, what an ill consequence this is, That though they believe and follow good works yet their damnation is certain. For the first, I would feign know what argument of despair any Christian can draw from this doctrine, That God before the foundations of the world were laid did pass those decrees of Predestination and Reprobation in the secret counsel of his own william. For first even reason itself forbiddeth us in matters whereof we are altogether ignorant to determine any thing on either side: Now what God did before the creation of the world is a point so deep and unsearchable, that to go about by conjecture to dive into it is even as if man a poor earthworm should attempt to scale heaven with a ladder. Here we may well take up that Exod. 19.12. Take heed to yourselves that ye go not up into the mount or touch the border of it: whosoever toucheth the mount, shall be surely put to death. Hilary saith very well, 
z De Trin. lib. 10. Ratio coelestis in tantum intelligenda est in quantum se permittit intelligi.  We are to pry not further into the Divine reason than it hath pleased to reveal itself to our understanding. Now this it giveth us to understand, that some were elected, some reprobated: but who are elected who reprobated, it suffereth us not to know. But further, though any man were so rash and heady as that he could not moderate himself but must needs peep beyond the written word into these eternal and hidden actions of God, yet from these his most uncertain conjectures to prescribe himself a rule what to do or not do, were madness voided of all reason. For let us put case, that a battle were to be waged between two armies, and God by some Prophet had revealed that the fare greater part of the soldiers should perish in the fight, and the lesser part should escape, without mentioning what particular persons he will by his special favour preserve from death or suffer to be slain, I demand now, if any man by occasion of the Divine will thus fare revealed would needs before the combat reckon himself in particular to be one of the number of those who must certainly perish, and hereupon out of a desperate humour throw down his weapons, run upon the enemy's swords, and voluntarily offer himself to be slain; I demand, I say, whether this wretch should rather be thought to be driven into this despair by the Divine revelation or by his own madness. Without doubt he may blame himself for taking occasion (where no just one was given) from the foresaid revelation. The very same we may think of those who from the doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation set forth in general do take occasion to thrust themselves into the number of those that are reprobated and shall certainly perish, and thereupon to neglect their spiritual armour, to offer their throat to the devil, and wilfully to plunge themselves into the pit of hell. 
a De nullius hominis salute desperandum quem Dei patientia sinit vivere; de suiipsius minimè omnium. Tanquam caput igitur omnis noxiae tentationis repellatur ab animo Christiani haec mortifera conclusio, Sum ex reprobatis.  A man aught not to despair, saith S. Augustine in a certain place, of the salvation of any one whom the patience of God doth suffer to live; lest of all of his own. This deadly conclusion therefore, I AM ONE OF THE REPROBATES, ●ught to be repelled by every Christian as the most dangerous temptation of all other. Last●y, although (as we touched formerly) before true conversion and sanctification no man can obtain either any certainty of his Election or any true feeling and lively comfort, yet the doctrine of eternal Election doth not afford to a Christian any probable conjecture whence he may gather that himself in particular is one of the non-elect: yea rather any one that liveth within the pale of the Church, although yet unconverted, may learn so much from thence as may and aught move him rather to conceive himself to be one of those whom God from all eternity elected to everlasting life. It is a commonly received rule amongst Divines, De quolibet homine praesumendum est bonum donec constet contrarium, We aught to hope well of every one until we know the contrary. If we aught not out of conjecture to conclude any thing amiss of others, than aught we not of ourselves. But let us see now how many reasons there be which may keep a Christian from thus despairing. If thou art a Christian, thou hast God by the Gospel calling thee; thou hast the Son of God in the Gospel offered unto thee, and together with him remission of sins and life eternal; thou hast the Spirit of God standing and knocking at the door of thy heart; thou hast many other things, which though they be not sufficient to demonstrate infallibly to a man that he is elected while yet he believeth not and remaineth unsanctified, yet they aught abundantly to demonstrate thus much to any man, that he neither can nor aught have any preconceit that he is reprobated. But they object, God indeed doth offer the outward means unto me; but since I am none of his elect, he will never impart unto me the precious gift of faith. How knowest thou that? Ask thou faith of God, and use diligently the means ordained for the begetting of faith, and thou mayst be confident that thou art neither shut out of God's Predestination nor shalt finally be kept destitute of the gift of faith. But if any do so stiffly persuade himself that he is a reprobate as withal to cast of all care of his salvation, he hath entertained this persuasion into his breast without all reason, and he neglecteth the means against all religion. But this doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation is no more to be concealed or relinquished because such as these do thus waiwardly abuse it, than the doctrine of the Trinity is because the Jews and mahometans deride and reject it.  
Having therefore confuted this rash and impious persuasion, let us examine a little the conclusion which they infer from it, viz. That although they do believe the Gospel, and live never so holily, yet for all that they shall be damned, by reason of the infallible decree of the Divine william. I answer, There was never in the Divine will any such decree as these men imagine, of damning any man though he should believe and live righteously. Yea, God hath established and published unto all men a quite contrary decree, That 
b John. 3.16.  whosoever believeth in his Son shall not perish but have everlasting life. And, That 
c Rom. 8.1.  there is no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit. The doctrine therefore of God's secret decree of Predestination and Reprobation can afford no comfort to any man before he knoweth that he is in Christ and is become a new creature: neither can it drive any man to despair who believeth the Gospel and is careful to lead a godly life; because such a care is a consequent fruit of Election. Whence S. Augustine, 
d De bono persever. c. 23. De ipso cursu vestro bono rectóque condiscite vos ad praedestina●ionem Divine gratiae pertinere.  From your godly and upright course of life ye may conclude that ye do belong to God's gracious Election. The sum of what we have said is this; That the doctrine of eternal Predestination and Reprobation is true, and quoad the sin, in the general, clearly delivered in the Scriptures: yet as it hath respect unto particular persons elected or reprobated, it is a most unsearchable mystery; which to go about by curious search or mere conjectures to pry into, is both extremely foolish and wicked. We must always therefore have recourse to the word revealed, the which when we believe and obey, we do safely draw out from thence this comfortable conclusion à posteriori, from the effects, That we are Gods chosen children: But as long as we abide in infidelity and unconverted, it is folly to presume we are elected, madness to conclude we are reprobated, whereas the will of God hath as yet by no external effect evidently manifested itself unto us on either side. Hitherto of the abuses of this doctrine: Now let us proceed to show the uses thereof.  
Here in the first place I premise this, That they are in no wise to be harkened unto who conceive that this doctrine of Election and Reprobation aught therefore to be quite buried in silence, because profane and wayward men do abuse it either to presumption and licentiousness or to despair and recklessness. If the former cautions be observed, That we neither deliver it unseasonably to those that are uncapable, nor immoderately stretch it to curious speculations, nor propound it to the people by halves and defectively, than it is clear and evident that this doctrine aught to be preached. First, because Christ and his Apostles taught it publicly, notwithstanding the wickedness of carnal men: And it is fare safer from their example to learn what is profitable to be taught and what not, than from human reasonings. Secondly, because Election is a singular benefit of God, and the foundation of all other gifts which tend to salvation: And it is the part of unthankful men to desire to conceal such an especial favour because wicked and ungodly men are troubled to hear of it. Lastly, because this very doctrine doth exceedingly encourage the faithful and godly to proceed in their course of faith and godliness, of whom more regard aught to be had than of profane wretches who are want to pervert all things to their own destruction. For we aught not so much to fear jest those who have no mind to embrace the truth should be offended at our doctrine, as jest while we conceal the truth of this mystery such as both are able and willing profitably to lay hold on it, should in the mean time be surprised with error. But now let us address ourselves to unfold the uses of this doctrine.  
In the first place it serveth to illustrate many of God's Attributes, and exceedingly manifesteth those Divine properties which every Christian aught rightly to know and acknowledge, and which they who impugn this doctrine can never acknowledge as is meet. I will briefly run over some of the chief of them. First, God's infallible and eternal Prescience of contingent events and of all the actions of free agents, is such a property as by granting or denying whereof we grant or deny a Deity. Wherhfore Isai. 44.7. God doth challenge the foreknowledge of future events to himself alone, and denieth it to all the gods of the heathen. Now this Prescience is so linked together with the doctrine of Predestination, that he who granteth or denieth either must needs by consequence grant or deny both. Further, an absolute Dominion and Sovereignty over all the creatures and their actions, especially over the wills and actions of men, is so proper unto God, that he is not to be held for a God who cannot bend and incline the wills of men which way he please, and that without any violence offered to their natural freedom. But if we reject the doctrine of absolute Predestination, we must withal of necessity abridge God of his absolute power over the wills of men. It is therefore no small use that we make of this doctrine, when we learn from thence that God hath an omnipotent power of turning the hearts of men which way he please. Moreover, the Immutability of the Divine will is held to be another of God's principal attributes. The Lord of hosts hath purposed, and who shall disannul it? Isai. 14.27. I am the Lord, I change not, Mal. 3.6. Now what is Predestination but the eternal decree of this unchangeable will of God? For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the immutability of his counsel, is seen in nothing so clearly as in it. Lastly, we aught to acknowledge and admire in God a free and gracious Mercy altogether undeserved on the creatures part: and this attribute also doth shine so clear in the doctrine of Predestination, that those who goabout to deny or obscure it must withal be guilty of denying or obscuring this mere and free mercy of God shown in the salvation of man. If therefore we mean not to coin a new God, we must not introduce a new Predestination, but retain that which the holy Scripture hath delivered unto us. Let us look a little on Arminius and his followers. These men retaining the bore name of Predestination, have indeed brought in a Postdestination; yea under the empty title of Predestination they understand nothing else but such a purpose in God to bring the faithful unto the kingdom of heaven and to shut out the unbelievers, as was than only conceived by him, as it hath reference to particular persons, when he foresaw that they would persevere unto the end either in faith or in unbelief. Now it is worth our pains to consider how these men handle the foresaid Divine attributes. Vorstius being 
e Not. ad Disp. de Deo, pag. 328. etc.  loath to admit of such a Predestination as agreeth with God's nature, hath shaped out a nature for God suitable to that Predestination which he dreamt of. Hereupon he questioneth all those forementioned Divine attributes. The universal Prescience he hotly opposeth under the person of others, not answering any thing to the objections alleged; but for the arguments of the orthodox side, these he confuteth with might and main, or at lest endeavoureth to confute them. We will give you a taste of the man. 
f Pag. 329. Infallibilis & prorsus universalis omnium futurorum praescientia nulli usui est in Deo.  An infallible and universal foreknowledge, saith he, of all future events is of no use at all in God. 
g Pag. 330. Admissâ hâc praescientiâ universali & prorsus infallibili, necesse est multa Scripturae loca mirabilibus glossis torquere.  This universal and absolute prescience being admitted, many places of Scripture must needs be wrested by strange glosses. And again, 
h Pag. 331. Absit ut Deo vel hypocrisin, vel temeritatem atque imprudentiam ejusmodi attribuamus cujusmodi per infallibilem illam omnium futurorum praenotionem induci omnino videtur.  God forbidden that we should attribute unto God any such either hypocrisy, or rashness, or folly, as by this infallible foreknowledge of all future things seemeth necessarily to be fastened upon him. Now let us hear whether he conceive any better of God's Sovereignty over the wills of men. 
i Amica Duplic. ad Jo. Pisc. pag. 55. Virtutes & bona opera liberè prorsus & contingenter in nobis esse aut à nobis fieri vult: eóque potentiùs aut efficaciùs eae ipsa quàm per modum voti ac desiderii velle non potest.  God would have virtuous habits to be in us, and good actions to be done by us freely and contingently: Therefore this will of God can import not more power or efficacy than agreeth with the nature of a bore wish or desire. And elsewhere he affirmeth that 
k Not. ad disp. de Deo pag. 355.  God doth procure our conversion, holiness, and perseverance, yet so as that he is rather to be conceived to wish and desire it, than to necessitate or absolutely & irresistibly to effect it. Hence floweth that common doctrine of the Arminians, 
* Positis omnibus gratiae Divinae operationibus quibus Deus utitur ad conversionem humanam, manet tamen ipsa conversio ità in hominis potestate, ut converti possit vel non possit.  When the Divine grace hath done all that it useth to do for the conversion of a man, yet still his conversion is so fare in his own power, that he may choose whether he will be converted or no. Yea further, since they are of opinion that the will of God cannot bear such sway over man's as to incline it which way it please without prejudice to the liberty thereof, therefore they avouch 
l Corvin. ad Bogerman. pag. 203.  that God did never absolutely will or peremptorily intent the conversion of any man. Neither can the immutability of the Divine will escape being violated by these impugners of absolute Predestination. For hereupon doth Vorstius take upon him thus to censure our Divines, 
m Not. pag. 195. Non satìs circumspectè loquuntur qui Deum ut essentiâ sic etiam voluntate prorsus immutabilem esse affirmant. Voluntas Dei ad extra non minùs in Deo quàm in Angelis & hominibus ad opposita vertibilis.  They speak but unadvisedly who affirm that God is absolutely immutable as well in his will as in his essence. The will of God ad extra, as it respecteth the creatures, is no less alterable than the will of angels and men. 
n Pag. 371. Nihil absurdi ex eo sequitur quòd Deus in tempore quaedam praecisè velle vel nolle dicitur quae fortassis antea non ità praecisè voluit vel noluit.  It is no absurd assertion to say that God did in time precisely and determinately will or not will some things which perhaps before he did not so precisely will or not william. But in another place he hath a speech that savoureth of most rank blasphemy; 
o Pag. 486. Poenitentia rectè Deo convenit, quatenus ipsa opera sua propter supervenientem aliquam causam insperatam verè improbat, deserit, aut mutat.  God may properly be said to repent, in as much as by reason of something intervening contrary to his expectation he doth truly found fault with, give over, or altar his own actions. Moreover, those men do flatly overturn Gods free Mercy who disallow absolute Predestination, and will have it to depend upon the foreseen actions of men. For it is not an act of mere mercy to ordain any man to salvation only upon foresight that he who is thus ordained will rightly use the freedom of his william. Hence S. Augustine saith, That Predestination is to be preached to the end 
p De bono persever. c. 21. ut possit vera Dei gratia insuperabili munitione desendi.  that God's true grace may have an invincible bulwark to defend it. It is manifest therefore that this is one special use of the doctrine of Predestination, To learn from thence to conceive aright of the Divine attributes, which they who reject it cannot possibly do. Wherhfore it is much to be feared, jest those who disallowing S. Paul's Predestination embrace that of Arminius, will at length also like well of Vorstius his God, hewed out and squared for the most part by the rule of Arminius his Predestination. Thus much of the first use of this doctrine.  
Secondly, the doctrine of Predestination doth serve to kindle in the hearts of the faithful a most ardent love towards God. For what more effectual motive can there be to move a man unto love than to be prevented by the love and bounty of another. Now only the orthodox doctrine of Predestination doth stirre-up this love in the hearts of the elect, because it alone doth teach that God did freely love them from all eternity, and of his special favour loaded them with his gracious benefits. On the contrary, the doctrine of Arminius showeth us how by believing and persevering in obedience men did first choose God before they were chosen by him, and did first engage God by their singular obedience before they were by him endowed with any special favours. That this fruit doth spring from the sense of our Election, Bernard hath observed; 
q Justus quis est nisi qui amanti se Deo vicem rependitamoris? quod non fit nisi revelante Spiritu per fidem homini aeternum Dei propositum super sua salute futura, Epist. 107.  Who is righteous, but he who requiteth the love of God with love again? Which is never done except the holy Ghost reveal unto a man by faith God's eternal purpose concerning his future salvation.  
3. Thirdly, this doctrine is a great spur and encouragement to the study of true godliness unto all those who are affected with a lively sense of their Election. For as soon as the heart of a man beginneth to glow with the love of God, presently he hath an ardent desire of glorifying God by his good works and of testifying his thankfulness. Howsoever therefore sometimes those that prattle much of their Predestination are negligent & sluggish, yet such as have obtained a true and lively sense thereof are fervent and zealous of good works. Neither indeed can it be otherwise: For no man can by the evidence of faith and testimony of the Spirit apprehended that he is elected, but withal he must apprehended thus much, that he is elected to the end he may be holy and unblameable before God through love; that he is created anew unto good works, which God hath prepared for him that he should walk in them; in a word, that he is ordained as well unto the works of grace as to the reward of glory. But he abhorreth and repelleth fare from him that profane cogitation, I am predestinated; therefore I may live as I list.  
The fourth use of this doctrine is this, That it is a special means to beaten down the pride of man, and to beget in him true humility. For whereas it is the nature of man to desire ever to have something in himself, though never so small, whereby he may seem to have deserved God's favour before others, or at lest by merit of congruity to have obtained it; this doctrine telleth us roundly, that whatsoever good any of us either hath or can, it all proceedeth from the special and free bounty of God. What man therefore can boast of his own strength who is forced to acknowledge that all the good that is in him hath God for its author, conserver and finisher, and that out of his special good purpose and love? What man can choose but think meanly of himself, and humble himself before God, who is persuaded that no man, though endued with angelical perfection, can ever attein life everlasting but by virtue of God's Predestination? Whence S. Augustine upon that of the Psalmist, 
r Psalm. 85.7.  Show us thy mercy, O Lord, saith thus, Happy is the man to whom God showeth his mercy: He can in no wise be lifted up with pride to whom God showeth his mercy. For by showing his mercy unto him, he persuadeth him that whatsoever good he hath, he hath it from none but him who is our universal good. And when he considereth that he hath all that he enjoyeth not from himself but from his God, considering hereof he waxeth not proud, not waxing proud he is not lifted up, not being lifted up he falleth not, not falling he standeth, standing he adhereth unto, adhering unto he abideth in, abiding in he enjoyeth and rejoiceth in the Lord his God. Thus Saint Augustine. And more briefly in another place, 
s De bono persev. lib. 2. c. 20. Praedicanda est praedestinatio ista beneficiorum Dei, ut qui habet aures audiendi, non in seipso sed in Domino g lorietur.  This decree of God of bestowing his benefits aught to be declared, that he that hath ears to hear may not glory in himself but in the Lord. This use of Predestination the Apostle himself intimateth in those words, Ephes. 1.6. He hath predestinated us to the praise of the glory of his grace.  
Fifthly, this orthodox doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation doth arm the faithful against diffidence, and against all the temptations and assaults of Satan whereby he laboureth to throw them into despair. This use of this doctrine our Saviour himself and his Apostles have in divers places commended unto us. Luke 12.32. Fear not, little flock: for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom. The same scope had the Apostle. Rom. 8. where having laid down the doctrine of Predestination, he strait endeavoureth from thence to encourage the godly and faithful against whatsoever any ways may molest and trouble them, and draw them into distrust or any danger. For what else do those comfortable speeches breathe out, If God be for us who can be against us? vers. 31. Who shall lay any thing to the charge of Gods elect? vers. 33. Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? vers. 35. In all these things we are more than conquerors through him that loved us. For I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels,— nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord, vers. 37. & c.? This therefore is the most true and wholesome use of our Predestination, not to feed our minds with the idle speculation thereof, but to sustain, refresh and strengthen them with firm hope and faith, when they labour and groan and are discouraged, under the pressures of the world, the infirmities of the flesh, and the assaults of the devil. I am not ignorant that the ancient Pelagians and some late adversaries of absolute Predestination do reason fare otherwise with themselves; namely on this manner, If Predestination and Reprobation depend upon the acts of our freewill; if grace be tendered promiscuously unto all men, and it be left to our choice whether we will believe or not believe, persevere or not persevere, than let us take good courage: for since our will is mistress of her own actions, no man can fall short of salvation unless he william. But than we must needs despair, when our salvation is wholly grounded upon the secret pleasure of God, not upon our own freewill. Here we may well cry out with the Psalmist, 
t Psalm. 62 9  Surely men of low degree are vanity, and men of high degree are a lie; to be laid in the balance they are altogether lighter than vanity. If thy salvation depended upon thine own will, than thou supposest thou shouldest rightly use the grace offered unto thee, and at length attein unto the kingdom of heaven. What Adam in his integrity did not, what the Angels placed in heaven and endued with heavenly perfections did not, when they were left unto their own liberty, that thou frail man, though overwhelmed with sin and battered continually with temptations, presumest thou shouldest be able to do if the Divine Predestination were quite removed, and the business wholly left in thy power. On the other side thou complainest that by this doctrine thou art driven to despair, because it placeth the whole economy of man's salvation in Gods free pleasure: As though than there were no remedy but men must despair when they are commanded to put all their confidence in God alone. But whatsoever hope the proud Pelagian can build upon the power of his own freewill, which is none at all, that and more can the righteous build upon the alone mercy of God, which is infinite. I demand of them therefore with S. Augustine, 
u De bono persev. lib. 2. cap. 22. An timendum est nè tunc de se homo desperet quando spes ejus ponenda demonstratur in Deo, non autem desperaret si eam in seipso superbissimus & infelicissimus poneret.  Whether there is any fear that a man should than despair of himself when he is told that he must place his hope in God, and not rather that he should despair when out of a wretched pride he placeth it in himself. What difference therefore there is in respect of true and solid confidence, betwixt those who will needs rely upon their own will excited by God's grace and than left to its liberty, and those who depend wholly on the grace of Predestination avoidable and invincibly working upon and ruling the wills of the Elect, we may learn of the same Father in his book De corrept. & great. chap. 11, 12, 13. Notwithstanding therefore all the calumnies of the Pelagians we avouch, that this is one special use of the orthodox doctrine of our Churches concerning Predestination, that by the shield of faith relying upon God's eternal and unchangeable good will towards us we arm and protect ourselves against despair and the fiery darts of the devil.  
Sixthly, the consideration of Election doth stir up the faithful to constancy in prayer. For having learned that all good tending to salvation is prepared for them out of God's good pleasure, they are hereby encouraged to call for and as it were to draw down from heaven by their prayers those good things which from eternity were ordained for the elect. For they know well, that prayer is the key of heaven, and that God doth not use to bestow his saving graces upon lazy sluggards, but upon such as duly seek after them. Moreover, the same Spirit of Adoption which beareth witness to our spirit that we are Gods chosen children, is also the Spirit of Prayer and Supplication, and inflameth our hearts to call daily upon our heavenly Father. Those therefore who from the certainty of their Predestination do pretend that the duty of prayer is superfluous, do plainly show that they are so fare from having any certainty of their Predestination that they have not the lest sense thereof. Aquinas speaketh very learnedly and sound, 
x Part. 1. qu. 23. art. 8. Praedestinatis conandum est ad bene operandum & orandum, quia per hujusmodi praedestinationis effectus certitudin litter impletur.  The Elect aught to labour in good works and in prayer: for hereby their Election is ascertained and accomplished. 
y Idem ibid.  For as natural effects, though foreseen by God, yet are brought into act by natural causes, without which they cannot come to pass; so the salvation of the Elect being decreed by God, whatsoever furthereth the same falleth under the same decree, as prayer, care to live godlily, and the like, without which the salvation of the Elect will never be accomplished. By how much therefore the firmlier any man is persuaded in his heart of his Predestination, so much the greater aught his care to be of praying frequently unto God. For example; There was never any who more strongly urged the doctrine of absolute Predestination, never any who had more clear apprehension of his own Election, than the Apostle S. Paul, and yet this doctrine and apprehension did not (as the Pelagians falsely affirm) withhold him from prayer, but made him more vehement and frequent in that duty. The same may we say of James, who is styled the brother of the Lord: Without doubt he (if ever any other) had a most firm persuasion of the love of God and of his own Election, yet (as 
z Hist. Eccles. lib. 2. c. 23.  Eusebius recordeth) so did he want himself to daily prayers, that his knees became hard and brawny like the feet of a camel. To be slack and sluggish therefore in prayer is not the property of those who by the testimony of God's Spirit have got assurance of their Election, but rather of such as have either none or very small apprehension thereof. For assoon as any one by believing doth conceive himself to be one of God's elect children, he earnestly desireth to procure unto himself by prayer those good things which he believeth that God prepared for his children before the foundation of the world.  
Lastly, it is manifest that when the doctrine of Predestination is rooted in our hearts, it doth exceedingly enable us patiently and meekly to sustain all adversity. Neither is this use lightly to be esteemed, seeing that Patience, as Tertullian 
a De patiented.  saith, is a grace so necessary in all religious duties, that he that wanteth it can neither keep any commandment, nor perform any work acceptable to the Lord. Now the consideration of Predestination doth work patience in the Elect three manner of ways. First, because from thence they conceive certain hope that their momentany afflictions being ended they shall infallibly attein life everlasting. Now what man into whose breast this persuasion is entered, that he was elected to life eternal before the creation of the world, can be of so low and cowardly a spirit as to be moved to impatience by the crosses & troubles of this temporal life? The Apostle encouraged herewith crieth out thus in the midst of his adversity, 
b Rom. 8.18  That the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us. Holy Prosper, a disciple of S. Paul, sustaineth himself with the same prop; 
c In Sent. Appendo quod patior contra id quod spero, & incomparabiliter majus est quod speratur quàm quod insertur.  I weigh, saith he, what I suffer with what I hope for, and my hopes do incomparably exceed all my sufferings. Again, the Apostle Heb. 10.34. allegeth the knowledge that the saints had of being elected to eternal life as a special cause of their patience in enduring afflictions: Ye had compassion of me in my bonds, and took joyfully the spoiling of your goods, knowing yourselves that ye have in heaven a better and enduring substance. As though he had said, Those only do patiently endure the loss of these earthly goods who know that there be heavenly goods appointed and prepared for them. Secondly, the consideration of Predestination doth wonderfully conduce to the begetting of patience in the minds of the faithful, because whosoever understandeth this doctrine aright, understandeth withal that he was elected not strait to be carried into heaven on a bed of down, but to become conformable unto the Head of the Elect Christ Jesus as well in the cross as in the crown, and first in the cross, after in the crown. For so saith the Apostle, 
d Rom. 8.17  If so be that we suffer with him, we shall be also glorified together. And S. Peter, 
e 1. Pet. 4.13.  Rejoice in as much as ye are partakers of Christ's sufferings, that when his glory shall be revealed ye may be glad also with exceeding joy. Afflictions therefore do not only not tyre the patience of the Elect, but they beget within them a secret and spiritual joy. 
Luther.  For being afflicted they rejoice, and embrace their sufferings like relics consecrated by the touch of Christ. And from this their conformity with Christ here in suffering the miseries of this life they do assuredly gather their conformity with him hereafter in the fruition of everlasting joys; according to th● of Gregory, 
f Moral. 1. 4. Quò malis praesentibus duriùs deprimor, eò de futuris gaudiis certiùs praesumo.  The more grievous and heavy my pressures are for the present, the greater is my certainty of future joys. Henc● not patience alone but joy also in afflictions doth spring up unto the predestinate Thirdly, by the doctrine of Predestination the faithful are trained up unto patience, because from thence they learn that all crosses and troubles fall out unto them not by chance but by God's determinate appointment, not according to the fury of the wicked but according to the will of their Father, lastly, not for their hurt but for their advantage. No man hath throughly learned the doctrine of Predestination but he also acknowledgeth all this: and no man is firmly persuaded of this, but he patiently endureth whatsoever misfortunes can befall him. But if at any time any impatience be found in the breast of the faithful, it is because they either not sufficiently believe or not attentively consider this most comfortable doctrine of Predestination. For if this persuasion be rooted in our hearts, That no man can do any thing against us but what the counsel of God determined before to be done, 
Acts 4.28.  we shall never impatiently grumble because God doth not altar his eternal decrees that so we might escape our momentany evils. Further, if this also be added, That the wicked are only as rods in the hand of God, and cannot scourge us as much and as long as they please, but as much and as long as seemeth good unto God our heavenly Father, who will not meekly suffer himself to be chastised by the powerful hand of so gracious a Father? Lastly, if we takein this also, That those very things which seem hard and sharp to be suffered do undoubtedly work together for our good, who would take I will not say impatiently but unwillingly a potion which, though bitter, yet is tempered and prepared for him by so wise, so loving a Physician?  
And thus you see how many excellent uses do flow from the orthodox doctrine of Predestination. What remaineth shall be dispatched in a word or two. If we will show that we have not a fleeting or uncertain conjecture only, but a true and solid knowledge of our Election, we must have recourse to the forenamed uses, and by them make trial whether our conceit of our Election be a deceitful illusion or a true persuasion springing from faith. We are to accounted it false and deceitful if it prove idle and unprofitable, much more if we found it to be the pernicious mother of presumption: But if it hath taught us to conceive worthily of God, if it hath inflamed our hearts with the ●ove of him, if it hath kindled in us a zeal of true godliness, if it hath beaten down our pride and begot in us true humility, if it defend us against despair, if it stir us up to frequent prayer, if it encourage us to patience under the cross, than we may be assured of our Predestination and of our future possession of eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.   
FINIS.