THE EXERCITATION ANSWERED, In the Assertions Following made good against it.  

1 That the usurpation pretended by the Exercitator is really no usurpation, by any thing that he hath said to prove it such.  
2 That former Oaths in controversy oblige not against obedience to present Powers.  
3 That obedience is due to Powers in possession, though unlawfully entered.   
Duobus modis aliquis est Tyrannus; uno, quia licet sit verè Dominus Reipublicae, injustè eam administrat. Nesas est privatis isium interficere; at pro sui defensione licet; & Respublica quoad capita convenire potest, & deponere & depositum punire.  
Tyrannum secundo modo, quivis de Republica potest licitè interficere nisi ex ea interfectione major a mala Reipublicae imminerent; nam tune contra Reipublicae charitatem peccaret illum interficiendo.  Molina de Justitia, Tract. 3. Disp. 6. 
LONDON, Printed for John Wright at the King's Head in the old Bailey. 1650.   

THE EXERCITATION answered, in the ASSERTIONS following, made good against it.  

CHAP. I. A taste of the Exercitator and Exercitation.  
Public obedience to Powers ordained by God, next to immediate obedience to God himself ordaining those Powers, is a Duty that should have the first place in the heart, as it hath in the second Table of the Law, which the New Covenant writes in the heart. And therefore he that shall break this Commandment of obedience (not one of the least but greatest Commandments) and shall teach men so, had need of a light within him to warrant both himself and his Doctrine, as clear as the Meridian Sun; lest while he thinks to resist the usurpations of men, he indeed resist the Ordinance of God.  
They that favour the Doctrine of disobedience to the present Powers, commend to us as the most clear and able if not irrefragable Discourse upon that Subject, a Book entitled, An Exercitation etc.  
The Author we must profess we know not, nor any thing of his personal ability or integrity, but certainly if in other matters he have had the repute of one defective in neither, we are sorry we are enforced to say that in this of the Exercitation, He hath showed a miserable want of both. To make this apparent, we shall not need to tyre the Reader or ourselves, to follow him in his wild extravagancies, by a particular enumeration of his tedious impertinencies and manifest contradictions: It will suffice (before we come by an examination of his foundation and groundwork, to shake the main Pillars of his Philistine-Fabrick) that we premise a taste, and but a taste (for ex pede Herculem) of the strength and candour of this so much admired Piece.  
The Title page runs, An Exercitation, so we may justly expect an accurate Tract; yet page 75. the Exercitator tells us, he hath not by him divers of the Books cited by the Author whom he there undertakes to answer. Hath he not? it may be they are hard to be got; or it may be they are not worth the getting, who are they? let the Reader judge, Bucer, Peter Martyr, Calvin, Gualther etc. these are the Authors that our learned Exercitator says he hath not by him; and have we not here a proper Exercitator, that thus like a freshwater Soldier enters the Lists without his Arms? But what want of Arms, where there is no want of confidence? for he proceeds magisterially to tell the Reader (and he must believe him gratis, without the least syllable of reason for it) that the Authors say set down by his Antagonist reach not the case at all. And comes he not learnedly off? The Reader need not scruple to believe him that he answers without book. Such an answer were fit for Solomon's sluggard, Prov. 26.16. than an Exercitator. For surely Replies of this nature need no great Exercitation, and are like to afford as little satisfaction, unless it be to such as are so kind hearted to him, that they have before hand resolved to believe him (or indeed any of his Bias) out of pure charity. But you will say, it may be, as he alleadges they were, so they were indeed, impertinently quoted; and what need he trouble himself with them, so long as they speak nothing to the purpose? How much to the purpose they speak, let the Reader judge, when he shall first have heard the Position to be proved, and afterward one or two in stead of all the rest, speaking to it in his Antagonists Quotation. The Author of the lawfulness of obeying the present Government (with whom our Exercitator in the place in question hath to deal) asserts that a Government unlawfully erected, may yet lawfully be obeyed; and the foundation upon which he builds his judgement in the Position, is Rom. 13. For he argues that the Apostle writing to the Christians of that age, gives them command to be subject to the Powers that then were, because even those Powers were of God, though (as our Author conceives) they were usurped Powers, being either Claudius Caesar or Nero, both Roman Emperors; from whence he concludes that unlawful Powers in point of Title, may lawfully be obeyed; and for proof by way of testimony of the godly reform Divines concurring in judgement with himself, citys Peter Martyr, page 8. in these words: It shall not here be scrupulously disputed, 
Nihil hîc anxie disputandum est, quo jure quâve injuriâ, principes adeptisint potestatem suam. Illud potius agendum est, ut Magistratus praesentes revereamur. Haec enrm Epistola scribebatur, cum Romant jam adepti essent imperium orbis terrarum, quod eos per vim scimus occupasse, & postea Imperatores artibus nihilo melioribus rerum summam ad se pertraxisse. Paulus tamen sine omni exceptione praecipit, obediendum esse Magistratilus. Per. Martyr in Rom. 13.  by what right or by what wrong Princes have gotten their Power; this rather is to be done, that we reverence the PRESENT Magistrates; for this Epistle was written when the Romans had now gotten the Empire of the world, which we KNOW they did possess by FORCE; and that afterward, the Emperors by Policies, nothing better, drew to themselves an universal Power; yet Paul doth command that Magistrates, without all exception, must be obeyed. And now let the Reader judge, whither it be not so far from being nothing, that indeed nothing can be more to the purpose; for who sees not that he asserts the self same thing, and upon the same ground with our Author, without a hairs difference save in expression? And with him do all the rest agree; but Bucer is more full and peremptory upon the point, 
Quum igitur quaeritur cui paerendum, non est spectandum qualis sit qui potestatem exercer, nec quo jure vel injuriâ quis potestatem invaserit, quave ratione eam administret, sed tantum si potestatem haheat; si enim quis potestate pollet, jam indubitatum est illum à Deo illam potestatem accepisse, unde sine omni exceptione, illi te permittas oportet, & pareas ex animo.  expressing himself in these terms: When a question is made whom we should obey, it must not be looked at what he is that exercises the power, or by what right or wrong he hath invaded the power, or in what manner he doth dispense it, but only if be have a power. For if any man doth excel in power, it is now out of doubt that he received that power of God. Wherefore without all exception, thou must yield thyself up to him, and hearty obey him.  
'tis therefore plain that the reason why the Exercitator makes such a sorry shift to rid his hands of those approved Divines, was not because they speak too little, but rather too much to the purpose; for being resolved, right or wrong, to maintain his own conceit, he knew not how to decline the Authority of opposites so learned and judicious, and which no judicious man but himself would have slighted, save by thus turning them out at the back door.  
But again, though this Exercitator had wanted Books, (for he says he had not the Authors by him) he should not have wanted reason for overthrowing the Reasons that were alleged to maintain the Position of Obedience which himself did oppose. The Reasons of the Casuists, and particularly that of Salon, were at large expressed, so that he needed not to be at charge for Books to find them, being there found to his hands. But indeed if many Exercitators were in this one, they cannot stand under the weight of those Reasons; and therefore he did wisely not to take these Gates of Azzah on his shoulders, being no Samson, lest he should sink under the weight of them. But in the mean time, till they be sound answered, the Position of obedience stands strong and unshaken, and his Discourse doth fall (with Dagon) before it.  
And yet our Exercitator superciliously says (and he thinks it enough, though never so apparently untrue, to say) it reaches not the Case at all. But to return to our Exercitation.  
We are told in the Title Page, that the Discourse is modestly and inoffensively managed, (men's consciences tell them what they should do, and their works tell us what they have done) by one studious of truth and peace. If he be so good a student, 'tis strange he should be so bad a proficient. For if we may make a better judgement of him by his works then his words, we doubt not but the Reader will find him a very truant in the study of truth, at least in the present controversy, when it shall be brought to the Touchstone. And for the peaceable and inoffensive modesty whereof he would bespeak himself an opinion, let but the heart and design of the Exercitation be compared with the Quotations out of Fenner and Grotius confronting his so candid profession, and they will speak him far from the pretended temper of peace and an inoffensive modesty. The Exercitation endeavours (though in truth by arguments no less false than frivolous, and as injurious as either) to fix Usurpation upon the Parliament; and thereupon decries all obedience to them, and cries up disobedience as meritorious in the hearts and affections of the people: the Quotations to add more light and heat to the business, must insinuate, That any private person may lawfully kill an usurper. Though in truth he puts a dangerous wrong upon the Reader, and indeed upon the Authors quoted, whilst he racks their Tenet to so evil an end, and brings forth their words upon the stage by halves, without those Cautions and Qualifications usually annexed, and requisite to so tender a point, whereof we have here given a taste.  
One well skilled in Cases of Conscience says: 
Id curare debet occisor ita cautè & consultò facere, ut non pejores exitus & scandula ex tali occisione sperentur. Sayr. Cas. Cons. lib. 7. cap. 10. n. 4.  He that shall kill a Tyrant, must have a care that he do it with such caution and wisdom, as the kill itself give not cause to sear that worse consequences and scandals may follow thereupon.  
And another of no mean esteem for learning, 
Tyrannus Titulo, ut appellatur, ad tempus est tolerandus; omnibus autem mediis & remediis frustra tentaris est tollendus; sed non nisi ab ordinibus five Optimatibus. Alst. Reg. Theol. cap. 23. Artic. 8.  and cited by the Exercitator himself, says: That a Tyrant in Title, as we call it, is to be tolerated for a time; but after all means and remedies tried in vain, is to be taken away; yet by no others than the States or chief Rulers.  
And to see the fidelity of this Exercitator; even to that very sentence which himself out of the same Author hath cited page 74. 
De hoc etc. liceat illunn è medio tollere, st quidem hoc faciat Autoritate publica. Idem. Syst. Pol. sec. cap. 12. Reg. 4.  De hoc etc. there is annexed this qualification by him most in juriously omitted, That a private person in taking away a Tyrant, may not act but with public Authority.  
Neither hath he dealt altogether faithfully with Fenner, 
Dudl. Fenner Sacr. Theol c. 13 De polit. Civit. p. 80.  as he that peruses him will find in the place cited, whither for brevity's sake I refer him.  
But of all the rest he hath most palpably abused Grotius. For after divers qualifications and cautions both prefixed and affixed by him, but omitted by the Exercitator, yea and some in the very sentence quoted, 
Maximè autem in re controversa judictum sibi privatus sumere non debet, sed POSSESSIONEM sequi. Sic tributum solvi Caesari Chrtstus jubebat, quia ejus imaginem nummus praeferebat, id est, quia in possessione erat imperii. Grotius, De jure pacis ac belli, lib. 1. c. 4. §. 20.  Grotius thus concludes upon the whole matter: But most certain it is, that in a controverted case no private person may presume to make himself a Judge, but must give way to POSSESSION. Thus Christ commanded that Tribute should be paid to Caesar, because the money bore his Image, that is, because he was in possession of the Empire.  
And what can the meaning of the Exercitation in all this be (charity itself being judge) but on the one side to blow the Trumpet to open Rebellion against the Authority of Parliament in general? and on the other side to strengthen the hands of private assassins against the lives of the Members in particular? And is not this modestly and inoffensively managed? are not these the designs of one studious of peace? 'Tis strange the Exercitation itself should not blush, to pretend to a peaceable and inoffensive modesty, whilst it exposes the blood of the Powers against whom it disputes, to the lust of every bloody miscreant. And yet the Exercitators conscience could not but tell him, that many if not most of the Commons now sitting, possess their seats within those walls by virtue of an Election unquestionably, legal, and by the sanction of a Law to perpetuate them (till themselves shall consent to their own dissolution) as unquestionable. And therefore he might have considered (for being an Exercitator, sure he could not be ignorant) that according to that generally known, and as genarally received Maxim, In re dubia tutior est conditio possidentis; which might have taught him to forbear such unchristian insinuations in an affair of so solemn and sovereign concernment, both in religious and civil respects.  
But we shall now come to particulars, and first to that of the pretended usurpation, and we shall absolve it in the ensuing Chapter.   

CHAP. II. That the Usurpation pretended is really no Usurpation.  
THat the Commons of England assembled in Parliament should be charged with Usurpation by any single person without doors, doubtless in all reason cannot but seem very irregular; and therefore it might well have become the Exercitator (whoever he be) by that Analogy of our Saviour's words, of which he speaks, pag. 3. modestly to have asked himself before he began this work, Who made him a Judge or a Rule-maker over the Commons in Parliament? But 'tis easier sometimes to see a mote abroad then a beam at home. All that he says to the point of Usurpation (and questionless his zeal makes him omit nothing that he can say) is comprehended in the first Chapter, containing both the Charge and the grounds thereof, in the ensuing description of Usurpation.  
Vfurpation (he says) is an intrusion into the seat of Authority, a presuming to possess and manage the place and power thereof, without a lawful calling, right, or title thereunto.  
In the prosecution of this description he tells us (though with much ado about nothing) that by Authority he means that which is supreme, and by a lawful calling, a calling from the People; and this he says is so essential to a humanely constituted Magistracy, that where it is, it makes a lawful Magistracy; and the privation or want thereof makes Usurpation. Again 'tis confessed by himself, pag. 5. that by the fundamental Government of this Nation, the Commons in Parliament have a lawful Title to supremacy of power jointly by way of coordination with the other coordinates' there mentioned; and by consequence it cannot be denied, that they have also a lawful Title to supremacy of power severally by way of supply without them. 
Fuller Ans. to D. Ferne. pag. 1. Ibid. pag. 6.  For in this particular, the learned Author of the fuller answer to D. Ferne, will tell him that coardinata invicem supplent, coordinates' supply each other. And he gives this reason afterwards, Because in a coordinate and mixed Government, one parts refusal exempts not the other from its duty, nor must it defraud the whole of its safety; so it should frustrate the very end of that its coordination, which is, supply for the more security of its safety. And he adds further in the same place, That in case of the absence and refusal of the other parts in coordination the supreme power of the whole is virtually in the part supplying. Neither is it material if it be objected; that he speaks of both Houses in the place last mentioned, for the reason in point of safety is the same whether both or but one supply, as was clear in the Votes against Hamiltons' Army.  
From all which grounds thus apparently deduced from our Exercitators own Doctrine, 'tis evident that the man is contradictory to himself, whilst he endeavours to bring the Commons in Parliament within the compass of Usurpation, as exercising the Supreme Power without a lawful calling; whereas himself hath plainly confessed that by way of coordination jointly, and therefore severally also by way of supply, they have a lawful calling to the exercise of the Supreme Power. What's objected to evade this palpable contradiction? 'tis alleged, That the Commons now sitting are not a House, and that's the only subterfuge, the old and threadbare shift of the late King's Party, of which if we can but uncase him, we shall allow him (besides the whole crowd of his other impertinencies) the Apex, Zenith, and Culmen of his highflown Rhetoric, with all the Poetica licentia of his tragical American scene; for we must acknowledge he were an Exercitator that deserved richly to be whipped, if he could not with some little handsomeness at least, so tell his own tale, as to make it serve his own turn.  
First therefore if they be no house, we would willingly know how they came to be none. We well know that once they were a House, and we know as well how they came to be a House; in a word, by a lawful calling from the People (to use his own expression) to constitute them, and the sanction of a Law to continue them a House, till their own consent should dissolve them; which till themselves shall have declared to be passed, we cannot easily believe any other that shall tell us of their dissolution. Yea but they are no House, for he says they are under a force, and he proves it out of all cry, because they are willing and consenting to that force. Now in truth they deserve to be pitied. What to be constrained to act against their wills with all their hearts! 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 1.  I dare say 'tis such a force as never men were under before them. He talks of an usupation, but I am sure here's a contradiction to the life. But besides the contradiction, how knows he they were consenting? did they ever tell him so? I am sure they have told the world the contrary, as appears by their Message to the General and Council of War. It will be said, that was but a mere formality; and, if they did not consent to the force, why did they not prosecute the Authors of it? I answer, By denying the consequence; neither can the Exercitator, were he as able as his admirers do or possibly can imagine him, ever prove, That to forbear the prosecution ad summum jus of the Authors, is to consent to the evil of an act. For instance, If a man remit a wilful trespass, that will bear action in Law to his Neighbour, doth he consent to the evil of that act? or to come a little nearer both to the Exercitator and the present case: When the Apprentices made a force upon the House, it was afterward moved in the House, whereof Mr. Pelham sat Speaker, That the Authors of that force might be prosecuted, and carried in the negative, will the Exercitator say that the House then sitting was therefore consenting to the force, and consequently was not a House? I am confident he loves them too well to think so. Yet, Aut haec cum illis sunt habenda, aut illa cum his amittenda sunt, either he must grant that the House then sitting was consenting to the force then, and therefore was not a House, or deny that the House now sitting is consenting to the force which is urged, and so conclude that they are still a House, notwithstanding the non-prosecution of the Authors of that force. But to help both him and his friends out of this difficulty, who may not perceive that will, that 'tis one thing to pass by, and another thing to consent to a miscarriage; the latter may not be done upon any consideration whatsoever; the former not only may, but must be done upon many, when the Reason of the State (which our Author says, 
Fuller Ans. pag. 25.  the Law makes to residein both Houses jointly by way of coordination, and severally by way of supply) shall think it fit. And in this final resolution of the State's judgement the people (he says) are to rest. 
Ibid. pag. 1.  But to give an unquestionable warrant to this distinction and the practice of the House of Commons upon it, 
Mica 7.18.  'tis said of God himself, that he passes by the transgressions of the remnant of his people, and yet it were blasphemy to say that he is in the least consenting to them; 
The Reader is desired 〈◊〉 notice that the misca iage here pretended is only supposed not granted.  and can there be a better precedent to warrant the Commons passing by a miscarriage (without out being guilty of consenting to it) rather than by calling for a strict account to sacrifice the peace and safety of the Commonwealth upon the service of those Privileges, which no man that hath his reason and a freedom to use it can deny to be intended in their own nature and by their first institution to be fences and ornaments for the good of the Commonwealth, not firebrands of contention for its ruin? Privileges are servants to the good of the public, not Lords over it, and therefore are to be respected in order to the public good, and in order to the public good are to be neglected, according as the Commons in Parliament (whose they are, either to use or not use, and who in such cases as concern their own privileges, are the only competent Judges) shall determine. Yea but for all this, 
As they have with common approbation laid them aside in giving way that Members shall be subject to the suits of Creditors.  he says that the House must be free for all to come to, that their acts may be free and authoritative. If he mean a freedom in respect of any Vote passed within doors, to exclude such as shall not conform to the Orders of the House, nothing can be more apparently untrue; for the House, as 'tis well known, past several Votes to exclude those that would not engage in the Vow and Covenant concerning the Lord General Essex; and upon the Votes for the taking of the Selemn League and Covenant, divers that before had sat in the House, were actually excluded for refusal. Yet I never heard of any, no not of the persons excluded, that thereupon denied the being and Authority of the House. It is therefore unquestionable, that the Commons in Parliament have a power to exclude such of their Members as shall not conform to the Votes and Orders of that House, and yet neither themselves be ever the less free, nor their acts any whit the less authoritative. But secondly, if he mean that all the Members must be free in respect of any restraint, save what is put upon them by the Votes and Authority of the House; 'tis absolutely answered so, they are; and let the Exercitator or any of his judgement prove the contrary if they can. Again, let it be granted that divers of the Members were sometimes under a force, can that hinder those from sitting and being a House, who never were either under or consenting to that force? If it could, 'tis desired the Exercitator would show how the Commons were a House, and their Acts authoritative, when the late King had divers of their Members in prison in his Quarters; for by his Doctrine if one Member be under a force, it nulls the Authority of the House. But who, unless he wilfully shut his eyes, canuot see the mountainous grossness of these absurdities? Wherefore to conclude this particular, 
Fuller Ans. pag. 7.  our Author in this case will tell him, That an injury cannot take away a right; which though in truth it never can, yet according to our Exercitators principles it must, if a force upon some of the Members could hinder the rest from being a House. Lastly, 'tis objected by the Exercitator, That the Commons now sitting are not the major part. And 'tis answered, What is that to the purpose, so long as they are a House? what if the major part of the Commons had deserted their trust, and gone to the late King, should that have hindered those that had stayed behind and continued faithful to their trust, from being a House? The contrary is apparent in the Lords, who while they sat, were never looked on as being ever the less a House because the greater part deserted them, and were afterward justly excluded the House by the far lesser number of Lords sitting.  
To conclude, the Exercitator acknowledges pag. 7. that if it could be made good, that the whole Nation had in the original constitution of Government committed the sole power to the House of Commons, there could be no Usurpation. Now it is as apparent as the light by his own grounds, that the whole Nation (for the Lords if they fall not under a Nationall, must fall under a personal consideration) hath committed the Supreme power to the House of Commons jointly, by way of coordination, and solely by way of supply; and therefore by his own confession, they can never be concluded under usurpation, as exercising that power without a lawful calling, for the exercise whereof they have by his own grounds a lawful calling from the People.   

CHAP. III. That the Oaths objected oblige not against obedience to the present Government.  
THe Assertion that we are now to make good against the Exercitator, is, That the Oaths by him objected obliges not against obedience to the present Powers. To demonstrate this truth with as much brevity as perspicuity, we shall first lay down certain generally received principles, by which as by so many rules, we may evidently discern in what cases, ex confesso, Oaths do not oblige. Secondly, we shall examine and answer our Exercitators objections, why those Rules should not take place in the Oaths in controversy. And a main reason inducing to the choice of this method, is, because truth and experience jointly tells us, that of commenting on words and sentences in controverted Oaths there can never be an end. For the fancy of man being of so various a working, and working a variety, hardly can that word or sentence be propounded, which it will not serve and wire-draw to its own sense, if it have not some clear and constant principles of truth, as a bright but unerring star, both to guide and fix it.  
In the first place therefore 'tis generally granted, as a Principle of truth that cannot be denied, 
Dr. Sanders, Pral. 2. §. 11. Juramentum non tollit obligationem prierem.  That no Oath can so oblige, as to take away the obligation of a former duty. The force by which all Oaths are said to bind, is constructive only, never destructive; they may impose a Duty where they find none, or dispose of certain circumstances about the performance, but they cannot destroy or take away a duty where they find it.  
As much with as much clearness may be said concerning the Oaths in controversle, and objected to obstruct our obedience to the present Government. 'tis most true, they had a constructive force to oblige according to their several limitations, to the former Government whilst it did obtain; but as true it is, they never had, nor ever can have a destructive force to oblige to disobedience, and disoblige from obedience to all other Governments in the future actually obtaining. For 'tis evident, that by such a destructive force they should (which 'tis confessed they cannot) take away the obligation of: a former duty, seeing we are first bound to obey all Government in gener all as the Ordinance of Ged, and so by a Divine right; before we are bound to obey any form of Government in particular, which is but the Ordinance of man, and so only by a humane right. 'tis observable, that the reason given why no Oath can take away the obligation of a former duty, is, because an inferior act of the person in duty obliged, cannot take away the superior right of the person to whom the obligation is due. How much less than can an inferior act of the Creature obliging himself by the Oaths in controversy, take away not the Superior but Supreme Right of the Creator, by virtue of which he stood obliged to God in duty to give obedience to all Government in general, before he obliged himself to man to give obedience to the then obtaining form of Government in particular? Yet this Supreme Right of God, and the obligation of duty in point of obedience to all Government in general by virtue of that Right, must actually be taken away, if upon the removal of the former Government and substitution of another in its stead, and both by that Divine hand which may and doth at pleasure dispose of all Governments, the Oaths objected oblige against Obedience, and enforce a non-subjection to the hand of God in the preceding change, and the Ordinance of God in the present Government. For whilst they still oblige to be subject to the Government that was but is not, and not to be subject to the Government that is, they indeed oblige to be subject to no Government, and consequently to Anarchy and confusion. But such an Obligation must needs be Null, because as is evident from all that hath been said, unlawful and wicked.  
What's objected here by our Exercitator? he tells us page 46. All Authority hangs not upon the back of Usurpation, so he terms the present Government, and says this [the present Government] may come down, and that [the former) recover itself and stand upright. To which we answer. First, It hath already been showed that if he have not contradicted the truth in his description of Usurpation, p. 1. he hath contradicted both himself and the Truth, in the Application of it to the present Powers. To which we shall only add, that among coordinate states and compeers such as he hath confessed, page 5. the present to have been, there can be no advantage of right in point of Title, save what arises from the advantage of a better cause, the one side faithfully endeavouring according to trust, the safety, and prosperity of the Commonwealth; the other faithlesly betraying trust and endeavouring its ruin and destruction; in which case the Common Tenet is, that the just party hath sufficient Title enough to save the Commonwealth, but the unjust none to destroy it, and therefore may justly be deposed and punished by the other coordinate in supremacy of Power. And certainly if in giving a Right judgement of the Merits of the present Cause, the interest of the reformed Religion and the public liberties of the Nation must (as what else must) by honest men be regarded, it cannot in reason be doubted, but all such will unanimously conclude, if the hour of temptation be not upon them, that the present powers have so fare the advantage of a better Cause, as the Cause of Christ is better than Antichrists, and the cause of Common liberty better than that of Tyranny. Neither is it probable that they will ever find Cause to reienquish their judgements in this particular, until our Exeroitator by a second and more sound Exercitation shall upon infallible evidence substantially and to satisfaction demonstrate, that the bloody & idolatrous Irish, are the best and most cordial instruments to carry on the work of Reformation, and the interest of the true reformed Religion; that prerogative Court-parasites are the truest Patriots and properest champions of the public liberty of the Nation; and in a word that Hamiltons' Army howeverdisclaimed by the Kirk, and all the truly religious of Scotland, invaded this Nation out of pure Zeal to the ends of the Covenant, and the interest of all truly religious Covenanters,  Atque idem iungat vulpes & mulgeat Hircos. 
But secondly, to do our Exercitator a courtesy let it be supposed (because he will needs have it so) that the pretended usurpation is real; what then? will he then maintain his ground any better, when he shall lie at his own guard & have the advantage to choose his own weapon? Let the Reader judge, Usurpation (he says) may shortly fall. It may? yes, and it may not; it may not fall shortly, not a long time, many years, ages, never; what then? certainly then either all authority must hang on the back of that which he is pleased to call V surpation, or else it must all fall to the ground. For by the [may be] of our Exercitators Doctrine, there not only is no authority in England at present, but neither themselves nor any man else knows, whither ever there will be any to the world's end. And what is this but by one dash of a ridiculous [may be] to subvert the Ordinance of God in Government and the Order of Mankind in obedience to it? The fuller Answer, 
Fuller Ans. pag. 3.  will teach him a better lessen, who according to the truth tells us, that there be in all societyes of men (and theresore in the present amongst us) a government capable of its end, safety, is out of question God's institution and moral. Nay indeed he might have taught himself a better lesson; for whilst he defines Usurpation, a presuming to possess the seat, and manage the power of the supreme Authority, he acknowledges even under Usurpation a seat fixed, and an actual Exercise of the supreme Authority, by the fixure of which Seat we see the Nation at present established in Order, and by the influence of which Authority, public justice is fully administered, both which being the ordinance of God, can no more be taken away by any act or oath of man, than it could at first have been instituted by any other than a divine wisdom, or could since have been constantly maintained, otherwise, then by the powerful, though secret influence of a Divine and Almighty hand.  
And therefore we doubt not but to make it evident as the Day, that however the Exercitator presume to make himself an accuser of others for presuming to the seat of Authority, there cannot easily be found a more presumptuous Usurpation, then that whereof he stands guilty, and obnoxious both to God and man. For whereas he charges most untruly, and therefore most ungratefully, those to whom he owes his protection, with presuming to the seat of Authority, himself, which is infinetely worse, presumes to overthrow the very seat of Authority, and fling the Authority itself wholly out of the Nation, so at once endeavouring to make void the supreme Ordinance of God, for the Civil welfaire of mankind, and leave the Nation without all Order or Government to be swallowed up of Anarchy and confusion, and in this most miserable estate must the Nation by his irreligious [may be] continue even to the world's end, unless the public enemy for whom he pleads, and upon whose back he makes all authority to hang, shall be pleased to give leave that God's Ordinance of Government may again take place among us.  
For the second, to answer him out of his own definition of Usurpation: First, we must distinguish between the Act of Intrusion, and the Person that makes the Intrusion; It's granted that the Act of Intrusion is not the Ordinance of God; but the Person of the intruder considered per se, and in actual possession of the supreme power, not only may be, but certainly is the Ordinance of God; whilst by God he is put into a capacity of being a Minister (and accordingly acts) for the good of those over whom the hand of God hath exalted him in place of higher power; although it be but for a time, and only by way of permission otherwise there must necessarily be a breach in that Golden Chain of Order and Government which God hath ordained, to bind up mankind, from inevitably, and by our Exercitators [may be] irrecoverably falling into Anarchy and confusion upon every concussion of State, and the frequent Revolutions of Governors and Governments, of which our own Nation hath not had the least experience. And upon those grounds we even now mentioned, 'tis, that even they that allow a removal of a Person in power without a Title, allow it only in an orderly way, and in clear and untroverted cases, and unquestionably conducing to the good of the Commonwealth. Again we must distinguish between the Act of Intrusion, and the Authority or Supreme power; the former as was granted, before, is not, but the latter ever is the Ordinance of God. For the Seat of authority being from the beginning, fixed by the hand of the most High; the authority or supreme Power annexed to, and issuing out of that Seat, can never cease to be the Ordinance of God, by what hand soever he is pleased to dispense it, who may, and doth dispense it by what hand he pleases; and therefore it may not be resisted in the hand of any whom himself hath put in possession, though by means extraordinary to us, without sin, and incurring the danger of receiving the damnation threatened by the Apostle, Rom. 13.2. Neither can the Obligation of any Oath whatsoever, either invalidate a Duty, or enforce a sin in this particular.  
But to come to a second principle, It's a rule beyond all exception, 
Indubijs sequendum est partem tutiorem D. Sands. Prael. 2. § 9  that indoubtfull cases the safer part is to be chosen. The doubt of which we are now speaking, may be either concerning the Explication, or the Obligation of an Oath; and that part is in all doubts out of all controversy the safer, which hath nothing of Sin, and most of Duty in it. The present doubt concerning the Oaths controverted, respects their Obligation, whether such as may justly hinder obedience to the present Government; and it hath been asserted against the Exercitator, that the safer part as including nothing of Sin, and most of Duty, is the Negative; that the Oaths objected, neither do nor can bind against obedience to the present Government. The reason is, because its a sin against the fifth Commandment implicitly, and expressly against Rom. 13.1. to be under no Government; it's consequently a necessary Duty to be under some, and no sin to be under any, because all Government is the Ordinance of God, Rom. 13.1. If therefore the Oaths in controversy should oblige against obedience to the present Government, they should bind from a necessary Duty, to a manifest Sin; but nothing can oblige unto Sin, and therefore no Oath whatsoever.  
2ly. If it be true that in doubtful cases the safer part is to be chosen, 'tis as true that in all such cases, 
In re dubia turior est pars possidentis.  the party in possession is the safter part. But that which in the present Contorversie, puts the doubt out of all doubt, is that the party in possession have ever had at least an equal Title, as coordinates' (ex confesso) with their Competitors. And therefore at present have a superior, or rather indeed the only Title, in regard of the justness of their own, and the unjustness of the adverse party's cause, unless (as was said before) a confederacy with the bloody Irish, and Hamiltons' invasive Army must be justined as the juster cause, and withal, as the safer part.  
What evasion hath our Exercitator here to extricate himself out of this difficulty? His old Tenedian axe still. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vid Erasin. Chiliad.  First, the pretended Usurpation, and then that Usurpation is not the Ordinance of God. For the first we have answered it once and again in the preceding part of this discourse; neither shall we write after his Copy, in his frequent and tiresome Tautologies; it were too great an affliction to the Reader to vex him, usque ad nauseam, with his Crambe his millies ●●cta.  
But the full prosecution of this will be proper in the third assertion.  
We come now to a third principle, 
In juramento semper jus superioris intelligitur exceptum. 2 Decret. 24 19  and it speaks as the rest ex confesso, (for we intent such only) thus. In all Oaths whatsoever the superiors right over the inferior, is ever understood to stand excepted, as that which can never fall under their Obligation. Or (it may be) more plainly thus, No Oath of an inferior, can bind against that Right of a Superior, by which he hath a lawful Power over him.  
There are two Superiors, or rather indeed Suprems, that have a lawful power over all men, by virtue of a Supreme Right, against which no Oath can oblige; in a word, God and the Commonwealth. This Right of God to begin with it in the first place, is not only supreme, but absolute, and therewithal universal, and extends over all men, in all things, by virtue whereof he claims a lawful power, 
Job. 33.13.  at pleasure to dispose of all, rendering no man an account of his ways; but certainly of all that he claims a power to dispose, there is nothing wherein he is more peremptory, there is nothing which with a more high hand under the name of the Most high, he asserts unto himself with a more sovereign majesty and absolute sovereignty, than the swaying stroke in the Kingdom of Men, 
Dan. 4.17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hwnillimum hominem. Hier.  and an undoubted right to give it to whomsoever he will, and set up over it the humblest of men. When therefore the most High actually puts down one, and sets up another Power, and so by virtue of his supreme absolute, and universal Right gives the Kingdom to whomsoever, HE, not WE will, (for such a contra-distinction the solmne enforcement of the words, must of necessity infer in the eye of any impartial judge;) who can plead a Right against God? or what Oath stand valid to invalidate his Right? Especially seeing all inferior Rights cease and determine (at lest pro tempore) upon the actual entrance, and interposition of the Superior; how much more shall the inferior right of man be no right, when not a Superior only, which yet itself might be subordinate and doubtful, but the supreme absolute and undoubted right of God, by an actual and powerful interposition takes place? 'Tis said, 
Si filius familias jurel se facturum aliquid in selicitum; pater autem rei  that in case a Son being under his Father's power, shall oblige himself by an Oath, to an Act in itself lawful; and the Father being ignorant of the thing, 
ignorus aliud ei faciendum imperet, quod impediat id fieri quod juratum est, filius non tenetur juramento: quia lege divina naturali tenerur parere imperio patris D. Sands Pral. 2. § 10.  command somewhat else to be done, that hinders the accomplishment of what was sworn; the Oath of the Son is not obliging; because by the law of God and Nature, he is bound to obey his Father. How much more than are the Sons of men obliged to obey the God both of that Law and Nature, the everlasting Father, by subjection to the powers that are, because they are Ordained of him: and how much less can any Oath bind against Obedience to him by such subjection? Seeing all Oaths at their first taking, are to take in the  condition of a salva potestate juperioris, an exemption of the Superiors Right, much more of the Right of the most high, by a si deus permiserit, if God say a men to the Oath taken.  
What says our Exercitator to all this? God gives no power to Usurpers he says; but surely 'tis safer to say with truth itself, Joh. 18.11. They could have no power unless he gave it them. And 'tis certain that our Saviour there speaks of a juriciall Power, and to a Person that was an Usurper, if ever yet there were any. For our Saviour himself (if we will receive the truth out of Godly and judicious Mr. Perkins mouth) was the true heir, 
Mr. Perkins Expos. on the Epistle of Judas.  and had the only title of Right to the Crown and Kingdom of the Jews. Besides, he must either contradict himself, and therewithal confess the truth, or the Scripture in express terms, and therein given his own opinion the fall, whilst he denies that God gives the Kingdom to Usurpers, whose 'tis to give to whomsoever he will. For he nndertakes to prove Jereboam an Usurper, page 1. and yet he is not ashamed there to quote 1 King. 11. where at verse 31. The Lord the God of Israel says, Behold I will rend the Kingdom out of theh and of Solomon, and GIVe ten Tribes unto thee. But our Exercitator not without manifest wrong to the express Text says; yea suppose it a grant, As if when God had in terms said to Jeroboam, I will give; there were not sufficient ground from the stability; of every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God, absolutely to conclude a full Grant. But we shall not here anticipate that which we intent hereafter more fully to discuss for the further confirmation of this particular, when we shall come to the third assertion, whither for the present we must still refer the Reader. Only for a conclusion, take the late judgement of our own Divines, with learned Mr. Diodati's concurrent in answer to the present Objection, in these words on Rom. 13.  
Ordained of God, that is instituted of God among mankind, to Rule and Govern men in Order as in God's stead. For God is the Author of this Order in the world: and all those which attain unto this equity or excellency, do attain unto it either by his manifest will and approbation, when the means are just and lawful, or else by his secret providence, with permission and toleration, when the means are unlawful: and it is just and equal that man should approve and tolerate that which God himself approves and tolerates: and that he approves and tolerates, which we cannot by any lawful means appointed by him decline and avoid. All therefore who resist authority, make war after a sort with god himself. Ann. on Rom. 13.1. Didati. ibid.  
A Second Superior, or to speak more properly, among things of an inferior rank under the most high, Supreme, for salus populi suprema lex, is the Commonwealth, bonum publicum. Against the sovereign Right of this; superior, and that lawful power which it hath over us, no Oath can oblige, and consequently not the Oaths pretended. This is no denied by the Exercitator himself. For speaking to this Argument urged against the Obligation of the present Oaths, by the Author of the lawfulness of obeying etc. He grants page 44. If the thing sworn shall become privative of, or opposite to the public good, or well-being of the Nation in its own nature and necessarily, the Oath would be void; for to a sinful thing there can be no Obligation. But to assume upon his own concession in the premises, most certain it is, that where Order and good Government, public justice, and peace may be had, and surely it may be, nay it is generally had under the present Government, witness all the public seats of Justice in the Land, there to resist the powers administering this Order and Government, public Justice and Peace, is as much in its own nature, and as necessarily destructive to the public good and well-being of the Nation, as disorder and Anarehy is to Order, and Government, or war and consusion to public Justice and Peace; in a word, as much in its own nature, and as necessarily privative of, and opposite to the public good and well-being of the Nation, as the privation of, and opposition to the proper immediate and necessary means is in its own nature, and necessarily privative of, and opposite to the end itself. Whereupon it follows evidently and undeniably, that to such a sinful resistance of the Powers administering, there can be no Obligation; and consequently the Oaths objected in that respect are void by our Exercitators own concession. And to evince this yet more fully (if at least there can be a fuller eviction) from his own principles and expresions. We say on all hands says our Exercitator) page 33. The King it for the Kingdom, as the means is for the end; and the same in effect we have from the mouth of a King, confessing, and therewithal confirming this truth as a Royal Law, that the King is for the Commonwealth, and not the Commonwealth for the King; which granted, 
King James.  if Oaths and Duties (do, as indeed they must) oblige to respect things concerned, according to their own rank and dignity; and the rule hold always true, as indeed it can never fail, that finis quo ultimatior co influxu potentior, the highest end hath the strongest influence; and to that end, (as our Fuller Answer very fully) still all other subordinate ends stand but in the Office of means; 'tis clear that as both the Oaths were for the King, and both King and Oaths for the Commonwealth, as subordinate means for the ultimate End; so both the one and the other oblige only as condueing, but neither the one nor the other can oblige as destructive to the Commonwealth, or bonum publicum; for so the nature of the means, should be to destroy the End, which is a contradiction in nature, seeing the very essence and intrinsecall form of the means, consists in this that they are apra nata ad finent, naturally conducing to the End, else they are but equivocally termed means. In sum then, we already have the means sufficient (by experience) to the End; we have the end as the actual fruit and effect of these means; and therefore if the Oaths objected do oblige to destroy those meanus, and with them, the end by them already obtained; that is, if they oblige on the one side to subvert (and all disobedience tends to subversion) that Order and Government, public Justice and Peace, which is at present in the Nation; and on the other side in its stead to introduce disorder & Anarchy, War and consusion which all disobedience naturally tends to introduce; and all this upon pretonce to reobtain other means, if at least truly means, though such as according to the present posture of the parties concerned, probably are never, or if ever to be obtained, threatening to prove destructive to the end itself: in such case (and it cannot be denied but such is the present case if impartially stated) the Oaths objected apparently bind (if said to bind) to that which in its own nature, and necessarily is privative of, and opposite to the public good and well-being of the Nation; and consequently (the Exercitator himself being Judge) they are to be pronounced void, for to a sinful thing there can be no Obligation. So it remains that the true intent of the Oaths in controversy, is finally lodged in the good of the Commonwealth; neither have they any force to the destruction thereof, but must needs be void if ever so intended.  
By this times 'tis hoped, we have sufficiency expedited ourselves of the impeditive, which our Exercitator says will not be granted, and demonstrated the privative part of his distinction. We are now at leisure to hear what he says further. That of the Gibeonites is no way pertinent to the present case, the inconvenience of that Oath being quite of another nature, bends they were made servants, though there lives were spanned, which they acknowledged to be at themercy of the Israelites, who considering their servitude, were at no great loss by them. But that their Oath was unlawful Vrsums flatly denies nay he positively affirms, 
Non ideo servatur Gibeonitis iuramen ●tum quod ad illum obstingantur &c Vrsin. Cas. Tere. Pracept.  they were not bound to keep it. But to pass over his impertinences, and come to his weakness; here he tells us, and we had a glance at it before, hat all authority bangs not upon he back of Vsorpation. NO? How comes he then to define it an intrusion into the Seat of authority, and a possessing and managing of the place and power thereof? So it seems though they intrude into the Seat, yet they are out of the Seat; and though they possess and manage the place and power, yet they neither possess nor manage the place and power of Authority; which is a mere contradiction, and so must needs be false, because no contradiction can be true. He is so ingenuous afterwards as to grant the Doctrine of obedience, so much better than his own of disobedience, as that it will afford a little justice, but his own non. Well but he sales we were not taught this Doctrine of obedience, when the Parliamen began to stand up, and waken the people to shake off expilation and oppression.  
Certainly when the Parliament began, we were not taught by any, but such as pleaded for the cause of that expiration and oppression; whereof he speaks, that the Commons in Parliament were no House, were usurpers. And therefore 'tis plain, that either this Exercitator from the beginning was one of the Common Enemies against whom we Covenanted; or else contrary to the express Text of the Covenant in the fixed Article; hath made a defection to them, for the takes up their weapons and fights their Battles, however he would be thought a champion for he Covenant. Again. I cannot but wonder at the ignorance of this silly Objection; for had the Expilation which he takes of been tenfold more than was, no man that either had Knowledge or Conscience of what he taught, would have taught to have lifted up so much as a finger against the Expilator, had we not had the impreame power of the Nation in peaceable and plenary possession, to call us forth by Authority and Commission us into Order, and a cause unquestionably just to justify those Commissions; nay, the War on the Parliaments side being defensive, not offensive, the end could never be the subversion of that Order and Government, public justice and peace which the Nation then actually enjoyed, as our Exercitators end, though a pretender to be studious of Peace, really is, but indeed by a defence less necessary than just, to prevent the subversion of all these, apparently endeavoured, by the actual invasion of Delinquents of all sorts and Sizes. The Doctrine of disobedience than is peculiar to the Exercitator, and the rest of the Park, not as themselves say of old Puritans, but what might more probably have been said, new Pharisees, by the selfe-assuming still, had they not told us themselves, that they were a company of godly Ministers. But certainly for their new Doctrine of disobedience, it hath no affinity, with that of the good old Puritans; but is as contrary to it, as light is to darkness, as we shall show hereafter in one of the most eminent.  
He tells us with great cry, and little wool, that righteousness exalts a Nation, and the Throne is established by righteousness; what righteousness? a Titular righteousness without a Real, nay with a Real unrighteousness? The truth is a Real righteousness, may sometimes establish the Throne without a Tituler, but certainly a Tituler without a Real, or with a Real unrighteousness never. We may say in some sort, the coneatenations of providence considered, 
After noon preaching. Book of sports. Innovations Mass itself.  that if Saul had not reigned in unrighteousness, righteous David had never reigned. Had not unrighteousness been propagated through the Nation, by the public suppression, and profanation of what was holy, and authorization of what was wicked and profane; and the almighty thereby provoked as 'twere to his face, possibly the Exercitators Pen might have been idle, or found a better employment.  
Under Usurpation (he says, meaning the present Government in the American tongue) we can expect no settlement. 'Tis granted, how can we, what need we expect it? we have a settlement already, and Nthil appetit id quod habet. Desire and expectation end, where fruition and enjoyment begin. Well, but however, he says, 'tis certain to fall. Quod volumus facile credinues. Sure his certainty is but from an uncertain and simplicity faith, that hath its eye blinded by that ignorance which is the mother of his devotiton to his own cause. No, for he says commotion is sure in reasonte follow. Sure enough from such turbulent reason as he gives us in his Exercitation; for therein he doth what he can to prove himself a Prophet, as true in his false prediction, as false in his untrue Doctrine: but sure if the reasons for obedience be as truly, as truth would have them followed, commotion in reason can never follow. 'Tis such Doctrine as his own without Religion, however pretending to reason, that raises the evil spirit of Commotion, which the p●●e and peaceable wised me that is from above, would soon lay and bind up forever. But we shall follow him no farther in these minute impertinences, but return to the last principle, which we here intent to insist on.  
The case of impossibility is so evident in itself, and obvious to the meanest capacity, as no sooner can it be said, then assented to, that no Oath can oblige to do that which cannot be done. To this our Exercitator page 44. Answers, All reasonable men will grant so far as impossbility lies, and so long as it continues, the Oath binds not; but this is not to our Authers' purose, for to cease from an Act, that is, from obedience, to the present Government, can never be impossible.  
The impossibility which the Exercitator denies, and his opposite affirms, must concern either the Act to be performed, or the lawfulness of the performance. If both these be proved against him, the Author's argument stands good and the Exercitators exception against it falls to the ground. Now 'tis certain as the present case stands, 'tis both impossible to obey the former Powers, and unlawful to disobey the present. The former cannot with the least shadow of reason be denied, and indeed the Exercitator seems to grant it, whilst he puts the whole stress of his answer upon a bare cessation, or non-acting in obedience to the present Government. For 'tis plainly as impossible to give actual obedience to any power there, where there is no power actually to command, as 'tis for Caius being in the evening at London, to meet Titius thenext morning at Venice; or it you will, as impossible (to come nearer to the present case) as 'tis for caius being in England, to yield subjection there to the sovereign power of Titius being in Venice; when indeed others are actually and plenarily possessed of the sovereign power in England; and Titius hath actually no part in the sovereign power there. 
The Exercitasays as much, p 9  The reason is evident in the Axiom, Relata mutuò se ponunt ac tellunt, Relatives (and such are sovereignty and subjection) stand and fall together. Where there is no power to command, it must needs be impossible to obey, because obedience properly presupposes a power commanding, and acommandment to be obeyed. The latter is as truly unlawful, as the former apparently impossible. For 'tis a sin against Rom. 13.7. Not to render honour, to whom honour is due; but honour is due to those that receive tribute, for they are Gods Ministers, attending continually upon this very thing, v. 6. to those that are Ministers under God for our good, and for vengeance and wrath to evil doers, and so both actually bear the Sword, and bear it not in vain v. 4. to those that being actually Rulers, are a terror to evil works, and a praise to them that do well, v. 3. In a word, to those that are Ordained of God, and they are the Powers that are; For there is no power but of God, and the power that are, are ordained of God, v. 1. to those honour is due. Can any thing be spoken more plainly for the duty of rendering honour to present powers? Let's see now our Exercitators Doctrine, how agreeable it is to this of the Apostle. Honour, he says, is not due to those that are Gods Ministers continually attending, not to those that receive tribute, not to those that are Gods Ministers for vengeance and wrath to evil doers; not to those that bear the Sword, and bear it not in vain; not to those that are Ministers under God for our good, not to those that being actually Rulers, are a terror to evil works, and a praise to such as do well; in a word, not to the powers that are. To those honour is not due No? to whom then? to those, says our Exercitator, that are not Gods Ministers continually attending, receive not Tribute, are not Gods Ministers for wrath, bear not the Sword, are not Gods Ministers for good; not Rulers, not a terror to the evil, not a praise to the good; finally to those that ARE NOT, to those honour is due. To those? why to those? why? because according to our Exercitators Doctrine, when the Apostle says the powers that are, are ordained of God, he means the powers that are not; and when he says, there is NO power but of God, his meaning is, there are some powers (supreme powers) that are not of God: lastly, when he says, let EVERY soul be subject, his meaning is, let some souls not be subject. Can any thing be spoken more ridiculously absurd in itself, more contradictory to the word of God by his Apostle, to the mind of God in his word, or indeed to reason and common sense? But hold a little, why must those that are not, be obeyed, and those that are, disobeyed? Why? because William the Conqueror had a lawful calling from the people, but the Commons in Parliament have none. And yet the truth is, it may with no less evidence than truth, and as much as both of is possible, be asserted, that there is not that supreme power this day under the Sun, which hath so express and full a calling from the people; the people in so full a latitude, as the Commons of England in Parliament; unless it be among the Macariens, not long since brought to light by the discoveries of Raphael, H●●●deaeus. But to return thither whence we digressed, 'tis evident by every stroke and lineament of the powers, which the Apostledescribes and limnes out to be obeyed, that he means powers actually empowered, and not a power actually dis-empowred, and in that respect, a mere Ens rationis. And therefore if honour (which compared with the fifth Commandment, takes in the full latitude of obedience) must in duty be given to those, to whom the Apostle says it is due, and it be due, by the Apostles Doctrine, to the powers that ARE and ACT; it follows, 'tis impossible to cease from an Act; that is, from obedience to the present Covernment, because, Id tantum possumus quod jure possumus, whatsoever is unlawful, is also in that respect impossible, and therefore we may not disobey the present Government, because the word commands to obey them; neither can any Oath disoblige from this duty of obedience, or oblige to the sin of disobedience, for Rei illicitae nu●●a obligatio. To a sinful thing (as our Exercitator speaks) there can be no Obligation. So it remains, that our Author's argument was full, and the Exercitators exception is nothing to the purpose.  
There is yet one Objection behind, which cleared, clears up this part of the controversy. For 'tis urged, that To obey Powers possessed by wrong, is to justify the Possessors wrong, and wrong the right of the dispossessed; and therefore such obedience can be no duty but a sin.  
The answer is clear. Obedience doth indeed justify, that to which it is properly and formally given. But the Obedience asserted is not so to be given, either to the Act of Usurpation in entering, or the person of the Usurper, as entering by such an Act into the supreme Power. But the truth is, the obedience maintained, is properly and formally to be given: First, to the Ordinance of God in the hand of the person actually entered. Neither can it, without manifest contradiction to the word of truth, be denied, that the Sword or supreme power, which is actually a terror to evil doers, and a praise to them that do well, and therefore is not borne in vain, is truly the Ordinance of God. And secondly obedience (as 'tis asserted) is properly and formally to be given to the person actually entered; not as entering by Usurpation, but as that person to whom the most High thinks meet to give the Kingdom of men, who by that sovereign absolute and universal right which he claims as sole Lord and maker of All; givesit both from, and to whomsoever he thinks meet; and who many times for causes best known to himself, thinks meet, both to give it from those who among men have an acknowledged right; and to those who have no other right among men, but what himself as the most High, that rules in the Kingdom of men, by virtue of his own supreme and absolute right, is pleased from his own actual gist and donation to confer upon them. And this also is a truth so manifest from the word of truth, in that 27. Chapter of Jeremy; as nothing can be spoken with a more transcendent majesty, both of evidence and authority. For we all know concerning the Kingdom of Judabh, that the unquestionable right, as to man was solely in the house of David: neither can we be ignorant, that therefore as to man, Nebuehadnezzar could have no right in the least to that Kingdom. Yet the most High God having first premised verse. 5. his absolute sovereignty, and sovereign right, (by virtue of his bringing forth all things, into their respective beings, by the exerted arm of his Almighty power) to the dispensation of all things according to his pleasure, acquaints us with the pleasure of his dispensation, concerning the Kingdom of Judah, and with it all other Lands that sunk under the weight and force of the victorious Sword of the Babylonian King, in these words vers. 6. And now have I GIVEN all these Lands into the hands of Nabuchadnezzar the King of Babylon my servant etc. And in the process, a universal obedience is peremtorily commanded, and disobedience threatened with severest chastisements. From all which it is evident, that God himself expressly, both owns the giving of power to those who have no Title in point of Right; and both commands obedience, and for bids disobedience to those who (though God hath always a design above them) possess themselves of power by force and Usurpation. And to the truth of this particular, and the deduction of this truth from the grounds before us, we have the testimony of Mr. Calvin, with that fullness as more cannot be said. Speaking of Nabuchadnezzar, hesays:  
Now What manner of King Nebuchadnezzer was, he that seekt Jerusalem, 
Jam qualis ren faerit Nebu chadnezar, is qui Jerusalem expugnavit, satis scitur, nempe strenuns aliorum invasor ac populator. Cal. Inst. lib. 4. Cap. 20. § 26. Videmus quantâ obedientia Dominus tetrum illum ferocemque tyrannum coli woluit, non alia ratione nisi quia regnum obtainebat. Ibid. § 27 Erustra objiciar quis mandatum illud fuisse Israelitis peeuliare, Observandum enim est quâ ratione ipsum Dominus stabiliat; Deiuli, inquit, Nebuchadnezari regnum quare servite ills. & vivite. Cuicuno; erge delatum fuisse regnum constalit, ei serviendum esse ne dubitemas. Atque semnlac in regium fastigium quempiam evehit Dominus, testatam nobis facis suam voluntatem, quod regnare illum velit.  is sufficiently known; to wit, a mighty Usurper, and oens that made speile of others. And after wards speaking to Jerem. 27. We see (says he) with what great obedience the Lord would have that cruel and fierce Tyrant to be honoured, for no other reason, but because he was in possession of the Kingdom. But that which follows, exceeds what hath been said, and is indeed as much as in the present case can be said. In voine may any one Object, that commandment [of obedience] was peculiar to the Israelites. For the reason must be considered upon which the Lord grounds it; I have given (says he) the Kingdom to Nebuchadnezzer. Wherefore serve ye him, and live. To whomsoever therefore the supreme Power shall appear to be given; let us never doubt but we must obey him. Seeing as soon as the Lord raises any person to a state of sovereignty, he gives us to know 'tis his express will that such a one have the Government.  
Upon he whole, the conclusion will be evident in its own light, and fairly untie the knot of the present Objection. For, to give obedience to the Ordinance of God, can never justify the disorder of man; neither can a submission to the supreme right of God, be in any sort an injury to the subordinate right of man. Which granted (as it cannot be denied) the obedience asserted can never be a Sin, but continues stilll a Duty, against which no Oath hath power to oblige. And thus far shall suffice to have asserted this Truth, that The Oaths objected oblige not against Obedience to present Powers.  
But before we proceed to the third Assertion, although (as we said in the beginning) our intention is not to enter into a logomachy, or word-wrangle with the Exercitator, wherein to give him his due, it must be confessed he hath deserved very well of the whole fry of Schoolboys, and given them much light into their true Syntaxis (as he speaks page 48.) in his large and exquisite Comments upon the Pronouns and Conjunctions Copulative, and disiunctive; Him and Them, and Her, and Their, and His, and Her, and Or, and And etc. Showing himself a most profound Grammaticaster: Yet seeing his impotence cannot think itself conspicuous enough in itself, without being injurious to others; we cannot but take notice and give the Reader a short account of his injurious, though impotent insinuation repeated (according to his usual vein of Tautologies) thrice over (Page 18.43, 52.) against the Author of The lawsulnesse of obeying etc.  
It is to be admired (he says) That the Author should begin with a general Deliberative [It were good to be considered etc.] And yet end with only a particular instance in one of the Oaths to be considered.  
Admiration ('tis usually said) is the child of Ignorance; and 'tis true (if ever) here of our learned Exercitators double, if not triple ignorance, in respect both of the present ground of his admiration, and his mistake about the meaning, both of the Author and Oath.  
For first, what necessity is, there I pray, that he that propounds matter worthy of general consideration to others, must therefore himself enter into a particular enumeration of particulars? As if he that should say, it were good to consider, whether the so much applauded Exercitation be not a piece that deserves better to be exploded, and instance only in page 88 where the Exercitator besides his falfifying the History alleged, and with it the truth itself, shows himself after all his discourse about true Syntaxis, unable to construe his own Latin; should yet be bound to follow him in a particular investigation of his perplexed impertinencies, from his first entrance into his Amercian deserts, Page 5. to Page 88 before mentioned, which shuts up his idle Exercitation. Obut he says, The Author seems to fasten on that instance, because he thoughthimselfes best able to loosen its Obligation. A piece of discretion i'll assure you, of which if the Exercitator had been guilty, he had never undertaken to loosen souls from subjection to the powers that are, by endeavouring to fasten on them the Doctrine of disobedience, though he were feign to sneak into America to fetch it. But he leaves the judgement of the Author's performance to the Reader; and so shall we of his.  
But first he falls into another fit of Admiration. What's the matter! He admires, Seeing the Author accounts Oaths sacred Bonds and reverend Obligements; how he feared not to use such enforcement, to the clear letter of so tender and sacred a thing. Bona verba! If (before we dismiss the Exercitator) we find not himself really guilty of an enforcement to learned Paraeus, not much better (for the nature of enforcement is the same, however the subject differ) then that which is here but pretended, and that too without the least ground given by our Author, but merely taken from his own ignorance, and hammered out into the deformed piece of perjury in the charge, upon the black forge of his own mistake; we shall allow him to fall into a third fit of Admiration. In the mean time whilst he endeavours wrongfully to fasten on our Author, an interpretation begotten (like Ixion's Centaurs) on the Cloud of his own misapprehension, what doth be but create a fault, that he may not want an accusation, though he bring himself within the guilt of bearing false witness against his Neighbour by it, which (as he speaks) borders upon Perjury; and surely is not very agreeable to that Hyperbolcall Character of the Exercitator, held forth in the glorious bush of the Epistle to the Reader.  
Wherefore of show the true intent of our Author, and with all the untrue, charge of this Accuser; Our Author (as we can speak from some that have reason to know) never intended the present Powers, as the Successors in the Oath, at the Exercitator ingorantly, or maliciously, or both (let him take his choice) mistakes him; his intention in truth (and his discourse testifies as much) was only to enforce a Dilemma, upon those that argue for the Obligation of the Oath. For he reasons, that if Heirs and Successors must, (as the Exercitator and all that are of his judgement, say they must,) be understood of the same persons, the Obligation of the Oath must needs ceasE upon such a juncture of affairs, wherein neither the Successors are Heirs, nor the Heirs Successors. And to take off the Objection of a Succession in Right, though not in Fact; He showed that that word usually is, and therefore truly must (as indeed it must) be understood in the Oath of actual Successors; unless a Nation may be Governed by, and give obedience to a mere Ens rationis; for a Successor in right only, though never so truly in right, as such, is such or no better. Behold the strength of the perjurious accusation, or more truly the weakness of the injurious accuser, after all those solmne aggravations, in which he hath dressed up his accusation, and his grave advice to the Author upon it; whereas indeed had himself been so well advised, as he should have been, he never had laid so heavy a charge upon so light, or in truth, no ground, on a person of whom he confesses to have received so fair a Character from the worthy Author of the religious Demurrer. And now after his threefold attempt on the word Successors, to wound the reputation of our Author, because here (at least) he thought he had met with a Flaw, what is all he hath gained, save only a fuller confirmation, both of our Author's integrity, and the truth asserted by him, and a further discovery both of the weakness of his cause, and the greatness of his little goodwill towards our Author?  — Fragili quaerens illidere dentem, Offendit solido. 
But seeing he talks of an Enforcement to the clear letter of the Oath (though indeed the true sense of an Oath, more than of the Scripture itself, is not always to be finally determined by the Letter) what will he say, if it be proved against himself, that he is truly guilty of the enforcement, untruly charged by him on our Author? may he not then justly be struck into a worse fit than any of the former, not of Admiration, but astonishment? Yet peradventure this is not a thing altogether impossible nay possibly it may be done in very few words. Wherefore though we assert nothing Magisterially, yet to meet with our Exercitator in the same path which himself hath chalk tout, we shall commend the sequel to the serious and impartial consideration and judgement of the Reader.  
Out of his own mouth shall we judge our Exercitator. For page. 48. He tells us, that by Succession in the Oath, must be intended heirs in Succession. It follows then, that by his own confession, the Oath obliges not to Heirs out of Succession. And indeed herein he speaks reason, though afterwards he is so unhappy, as to contradict both reason and himself, when he lights upon it; for he would have those termed Successors which do not actually succeed, which may be with as much propriety of speech (for Oaths sure do not use to speak in Tropes) as Mons may be said à movendo. He pretends that our Author's interpretation borders upon perjury; but I am sure his own both borders upon it, and falls into the very bosom of nonsense. No he says, for there is a succession in Right, as well as in Fact. What then? A succession in Right, and not in Fact, is not better than no succession to the Nation. Doth the Oath bind to actual Obedience to a person that is not an actual Successor? An evident impossibility to give actual obedience to a person that doth not actually suicceed.  
Incidit in Scillam etc.  
But he hath yet another string to his Bow. For he says the Oath of Supremacy binds to a lawful Successor. Much to the purpose. How can he be a lawful Successor that (as K.) doth not succeed at all? Non entis nullo sunt accidentia. But the truth is, it had been good this Author had understood the true state of the Oath of Sapremacy, before he had adventured upon it. To do that he should have consulted with 5. Eliz. and that would have conducted him to an Injunction, in the premonition to which Injunction, he would have found that this Oath was to be interpreted and taken In this sense viz. To exnelude all foreign jurisdiction. And so he might have spared his Logic and Rhetoric both, concerning this Oath, which as is wholly unconcerned in the present case; for here is no question about Foreign juisdiction. But to omit this and proceed; what if by the laws of the Land, a Successor, in Fact, be a lawful Successor, at least until he be lawfully rmoved, hath he any whit advantaged himself by the word Lawful? Yet that so it is, seems to be very clear in the case of H. 7. If we will receive the verdict of the Sages of the Law, the company of Judges assembled in the Exchequer Chamber upon it, even when his Person was actually under an attainder of Treason, and before the Parliament conferred that right which the Exercitator contradicting himself (as we shall show elsewhere) would pretend; Heart their words as they are given us by the Lord Verulam; It was (says he) with unanimous consent resolved, That the Crown takes away all defects and stops in blood; from the time the King did assume the Crown, the Fountain was cleared, and all attaindours and corruptions of blood discharged. What can be more plain? 
Bacon H. 7. page 13.  From the time he assumed the Crown, that is, after his actual possession of sovereignty and Succession to the former King, although his Title had before been condemned by Parliament in H. 6. and the Succession in right, were then in the Lady Elizibeth, yet the Successor in fact is unanimousy acknowledged a lawful Successor in the sovereignty. Again, It was (says our Author) agreed and resolved by the same Judges, and their Resolutions were accordingly followed by the Parliament then fitting; That the Knights and Burgesses should forbear to come into the House, till a Law were passed for the reversal of those attainders, under which he had said before divers of them were, for a acting against, R. 3. whom all the world acknowledges to have been an Usurper. Where, beside the confutation of the Exercitators Doctrine, page 7. That, the House must be free for all to come to, that their Acts may be free and authoritative; It is worth the Readers most serious observation, that by the opinion of the Judges generally assembled, an attainder may be brought in for Treason against an Usurper, and stands good in Law, 

Nota, Diciair & non negaiur quod proditione facta tempore H. ●●qui fuit usurper del Crown le partie sera arraigne de ceau tempore E. 4. vel bujus modi, per compassant le more regis poet esse pune tempere alterius, Regi: Comment que l'un suet Usurp.  
Brook, Grand Abrigement Tit. Treason.   until by course of Law it be reversed, though the Usurper himself were removed. Which proves clearly, that Treason is truly Treason by the Law of the Land, though committed against an Usurper. And to this Brook, gives a full and clear testimony; for Note, says he, It is affirmed beyond contradiction, that for treason committed in the time of H. 6. who was an Usurper of the Crown, the party shall be arraigned thereof in the time of Edw. 4. Or such a person may be punished in the time of an other King, for compassing the death of a King that was an Usurper. By all which it is clear, that a Successor in Fact, by the Law of the Land, is a lawful Successor, until lawfully removed. And that passage concerning H. 6. is very remarkable. For when Richard Duke of York, had Seated himself in the Chair of State in the Lord's house in Parliament, and there laid claim to the Crown, and made good his claim and Title to the Parliament, 'tis said, When the Lords and Commons there assembled, had with mature deliberation and good advice, 
Marting History of the Kings and Queens of Engl. pag. 258.  sound debated on this important business, it was by them all enacted, that King H. should so long as he lived, retain the name and honour of a King etc. So great respect had our Ancestors to Successors in Fact, even where the Successor in Right, and of eminent worth and abilities was present, and claiming, and had judgement also given on his side. And upon the ground in Law before mentioned, was the Statute of 11. H. 7. Enacted, which frees from the guilt of Treason, for adhering to Successors in Fact. But the Exercitation espies yet another advantage in the Oath, by which he makes account easily to elude all this; for he says the succession is to a Crown and Dignity, but that is abolish; and therefore the Successors which he pretends our Author pleads for, can never be those intended in the Oath. Is it indeed abolished? How then can the Successor which he pleads for, be the Successor in the Oath, more than they? nay how can he indeed be either Successor or Heir? He that is either Heir or Successor to that which is a abolish, is such to that which is not; he that is such to that which is not, is such to that which is indeed nothing; much good do it him, both with his Heir and Successorship; the man hath fairly confuted himself. But then again, doth he know what the Crown and Dignity he talks on, is? Doth its essence consist in a Name or Thing? If in a Name, There is no body desires much to take it from him, provided he be contented with that only. If it consist in a Thing, than the name is only changed, the thing still remains, and so they of whom our Author (as he would pretend) speaks, may be the Successors in the Oath, notwithstanding what he Objects to the contrary, concerning the abolishing of the Crown and Dignity. Yet again he sales, the Oath intends by Heirs and Successors the James Persons, which he goes about to prove, too ridiculously to need an answer, and adds, admit them divers, and the Oath will import a contradiction. For he says, had the persons been divers, it must have been Heirs [or] not [and] Successors. Right. For you know in a Lease, we must not say Executors, Administrators [and] Assigns, but [or] Assigns, unless Assigns mean the same persons, with Executors and Administrators, else it will imply a contradiction. Where's his true Syntaxis now? will not every Scrivener tell him that this deserves the Ferula? Again, admit them divers, and the Oath will import a contradiction. A very weak exception, but a strong contradiction to the truth, and therein a real enforcement to the clear Letter of the Oath; his overhasty zeal making him truly fall into that very crime, which he had before wrongfully charged on our Author. For why I pray, may we not swear to perform the duty of the Oath, to divers sorts of persons, at divers times obtaining, and without a contradiction; seeing both cannot obtain at once, if the words bear adifferent signification? And that their signification is indeed different, The Exercitator himself cannot deny, whilst he grants the word [Successors] even in the present Oath to be a Term in Law, Page 50. For every Puisne will tell him that hath but read the first Chapter in Littleton, that words that make a different estate in Law, must in Law have a different signification. Besides reason itself will dictate, that they were at first intended different. For the Oath being made by the Kingdom in Parliament, was intended to make provision for the Kingdom, as well as the King; (and not for the King, without the Kingdom, as the Exercitator sondly imagines) in case the line obtaining should fail, or upon other emergencies whatever that might ensue. To conclude this particular; our Author to show the ordinary acception of the word Successor, bids ask the question, who was Successor to W. Conqueror. The Exercitator takes him up very Magisterially and says, 'tis fallaciously propounded. Rightly, he says, 'twill be this, Who is to be his Majesty's Successor? But surely he hath not more fallaciously, then foolishly propounded a question, which Friar Bacon's head would hardly have been able to answer him. For if it must be understood, as he tells us he intends it, Of the future time, and a thing to be done in it; He that shall give a true answer to the question so propounded, and so understood, must either answer by inspiration, or confess that our learned Exercitator hath clearly put him to a non-plns.  
Before we conclude this Chapter, we cannot but taste of one more dish of Objections served in (as indeed it is somewhat a homely o●e) our of a Homily. For he tells us the Homily is fully and flatly against Subjects removing or disposing (sure it should be deposing) their Princes upon any pretence whatsoever. This Homily he says is part of the Doctrine of the Church of England; and this Doctrine of the Church of England he says, we are bound by Protestation to maintain; and this sticks very much with him, for he knows not how the contrary can stand with the Protestation. Well, for this once I shall undertake with his own, and the help of the Fuller Answer to be his Oedipus. I answer therefore, If he please to call it to mind, he may remember he told us, that in his America the House of Commons, were coordinate with the American Prince; now if he do not understand his own Terms, the Fuller Answer will tell him, that where there is a Coordination, there is no Subordination, but Subjects are Subordinate; therefore he adds, that all the Members Collectine in their House, are not Subjects. Again, our Exercitator makes his coordinate Commons, the Fundament Us of his American Government. And in this case the Fuller Answer will tell him again, Fundamentals admit not of higher and lower; all foundations are principal alike, there can be therefore no subjection. So it is not much material, whether his Homily be part of the Doctrine of the Church of England or no, for the practice in America, is not contrary to the Doctrine in England. But certainly some that have reason to know, say that those Homilies are no part of the Doctrine of the Church of England: and that the Articles give them only this Testimony, that they contain wholesome Doctrine, and suitable to their times. But enough, if not too much of this we hasten to our third Assertion.   

CHAP. FOUR That obedience is due to Powers in possession, though unlawfully entered.  
IN answering the Arguments, from the Oaths objected in the former Chapter, against obedience to present Powers, when supposed to be unlawfully entered; there was frequent cause to demonstrate the Duty of such obedience, which properly should have been the work of the present Assertion, wherefore having as to the point in hand already spoken so much, so much the less will need now to be added.  
The Exercitator page 64. acknowledges, The lawfulness of obeying etc. hath of all others, spoken most for the obedience to be maintained; and upon that account tells us, he intends to speak most against what was by him spoken. We shall herein follow the path which he hath thus trod out to us, and if we do but make good our Author's part against his Antagonist, we shall defeat his main Battle by his own confession.  
The first task he undertakes, is, to prove that the Apostle in the place urged by our Author, (Rom. 13.) can only be understood of a lawful Magistracy, and to make that good, compares it (as he had done before, in laying his foundation page 1.) with Hos. 8.4. Wherefore if here we find his foundation Sandy, his whole edifice will sufficiently appear to be ruinous To proceed then, from the comparison of those two Scriptures he concludes page 66. That the former speaks of a legal, the latter of an illegal Magistracy, else they would be contradictory. Wherein I am sure he is contradictory to his own Doctrine, as his own Doctrine is contradictory to the truth, and consequently needs no other Judge, but his own mouth to condemn it. For first, he is apparently contradictory to themselves, in that at the beginning, he would have Usurpers to be but private persons, Page 9 and Rom. 13. must be understood (how universally soever spoken) of a lagal Magistracy only; yet in conclusion, he finds a distinction between a legal and illegal Magistracy. But why? you will say there may be a fair answer to all this; the contradiction is only in terms, not in things, in appearance, not truth; by illegal Magistracy, he means no other than Usurpers. Does he mean Usurpers? then clearly he confutes, as well as contradicts his own Doctrine. For if he do (as indeed he does) here intent jeroboam and his Successors, whom as here, so before in the entrance of his discourse, he strongly proves to be Usurpers, both by this very Scripture, and the judgement of divers learned Divines upon the place; then certainly the confused pile of the whole discourse, like Babylon is fallen; and we need no other prospect to behold its ruin, than the light and advantage which the present Scripture will afford us. For first, whereas he would make Usurpers no more but private persons, who sees not that as himself here terms them Magistrates, though as to their Title and entrance into the Magistracy, they were illegal and Usurpers: So this very Scripture which he brings to prove them Usurpers; and their History in Scripture records them by the Name, Title, State, and Dignity, of the Kings and Princes of Israel? And secondly, whereas he would prove that obedience is not due to Usurpers, because as our Exercitator would pretend they are no Magistrates; who knows not that those Usurping Princes were the Magistrates of Israel, and Obadiah, Eliah, and divers other Prophets and Servanas of God gave obedience to them according yes to their Magistrates? Lastly, what doth he but Nodum in scirpo quaerere, in setting the Scriptures, mentioned at such a distance? Seeing Hos. 8.4. speaks expressly of Powers, in fieri in their entrance, concerning their making or setting up. But Rom. 13 speaks of Powers in facto esse, in possession and acting, as Ministers for the good of mankind, from verse 1. to verse 7. And so we may help his memory, for by his frequent contradictions he seems to need it, to untie this knot from his own words, Page 2. Where he tells us concerning Jeroboam and his Successors, That the Event and effect, that is (or I know not what it is) their actual possession of Power, and acting in a way of Government, for the good of the soul's subject, was from God; as how? certainly the other negative part of the contra-distinction considered, if he speak sense he must mean, by ordination, not permission only: but (he says) the sinful means by which it, that is, their actual possession of Power was accomplished, was not from God; as how? Surely, if he speak reason, reason will say, not by ordination, but permission only. As jacob's actual obtaining of the blessing, was that which God had ordained; but his obtaining it by deceit, was only by divine permission. And that the Reader may see, that when we affirm that the person of Jeroboam as a Magistrate, though not his practice as an Usurper, was from a divine ordination, and the power in his hand, though an Usurper, the Ordinance of God; we speak not that which none else ever spoke before; if the judgement of Paraeus may be of any moment in the point, no man can speak more expressly; for speaking of Gods rending the Kingdom from Rebohoam, and setting up the Kingdom of Israel in Jerohoam; hus he delivers himself, grounding his judgement upon 
* Nec fortuit ò aut hominnm ta tum concilio & pe-fidia, nec deo inscio aut invito, sed ita volente & ordinance illam 〈◊〉 Regni con●itu●i onem ●actam fuisse, Historia sa●●a ●esta●u●, 1 Reg. 11.31.35,37. 1 Reg. 12.15.24, Parae. in Rom. 13. Dub. 3. Ad. 1  the Scripture, the sacred History doth testify, 1 Kin. 11.31, 35, 37. 1 Kin. 12 15, 14. The constituton of a new Kingdom, came not to pass either by accident, or by the council and treachery of men only; neither was it without the knowledge, or against the will of God, but because he ordained and would have it so.  
Can any thing be spoken more plain from the express Text of Scripture, which was also urged before in the preceding Chapter, to prove, that Government though in the hand of an Usurper, is the Ordinance of God? and therefore the person of the Usurper, though not his sinful entrance by Usurpation, is by a divine ordination; and so a Minister of God for our good, which the Exercitator would deny. 'tis clear then and undeniable, that the Exercitator hath laid in a ●●l●e principle, as the Cornerstone of his whole structure, which being once shaken and removed, the whole with its whole burden, like a ruinous building, comes tumbling to the ground. For if (as hath already been proved) an Usurper in possession be a Magistrate, though in respect of entrance illegal; and if Government in his hand be (as it hath been proved to be) the Ordinance of God; than it follows beyond contradiction, that the Apostle, Rom 13. speaks of such inclusively; and therefore such in duty must be obeyed, and cannot without sin be resisted, which confutes the Exercitators Doctrine, and confirms the assertion of our Author.  
What hath our Antagonist to say to the Contrary? he would prove that Usurpers may be resisted; and instances most absurdly, in Chedorlaomer and his participants, who never were possessed of the Government of Sodom, only made an invasive War, and tooks some Prisoners; and who ever denied that an invader or intruder, in that action may be lawfully resisted or that to join with him in it, were to be equally guilty; but our assertion is not against residing au Usurper in the Act of intrusion, but against resisting Government in the hand of an intruder, when he is actually possessed of it, and so is the only person left us by the providence of God, to be his Minister to us for good, in the dispensation of that Ordinance, to whom we may be the clear and general Dialect of the Scriptures conclude, that the most High, who gives the Kingdom of men to whom be thinks meet, hath now (to the uttermost that were can judge) thought meet to give it.  
His other instances are as absurd as the former, for they speak only of a resistance, or rather indeed a defensive War managed by public and supreme Magistrates, and those too, all persons of an extraordinary Call, excepting the Maccabees; whereas if he would have spoken to the purpose, he must have given an instance from Scripture, of some private Saint, resisting a public Magistrate obtaining, upon pretence, that in his judgement the Title of the Magistrate was not good; but that indeed is a task too hard for the whole Tribe of Exercitators. In the mean time he hath sufficiently confuted himself in the instance concerning Athaliah, for seeing the Text fares expressly, Athaliah reigned six years, and all men know there can be no reigning without Subjection, it follows, private persons must be subject to Usurpers in possession. Again, whereas Jehoiada and those Rulers over hundreds, stirred not for Joash his Right, till the end of six years; nor then neither, but with such caution as prevented the embroiling of the Commonwealth, it's clear that public persons and chief Magistrates, may not remove an Usurper, in the most clear and uncontroverted case, with danger and disturbance to the Commonwealth. And lastly, whereas 'tis said Athaliah reigned; 'tis evident that the Scripture speaks of Usurpers in possession, as of Magistrates, and not private persons.  
But he urges, a lawful calling from the People, is essential to a Magistrate. It is answered. First, few Kingdoms in Europe have been so begun, or indeed otherwise then by conquest; and if a consent of the people come after, what is that but an effect of force? And herein is briefly, but clearly answered, all that he hath said for the lawful calling of his Roman Emperors; for what Tully (cited by himself) says of one, may with the same truth be said concerning all the rest, He had 
* Attulerat jam liberae civitati, partim meru, partim patientia, consuetudinem serviendi. Cicero in M. A Philip. 2. Orar.  now reduced the City [of Rome] from a state of liberty, to a custom of servitude, partly by fear, and partly by suffering. To which add that notable testimony of Tacitus, concerning Tiberius out of his own mouth. It is recorded (says Tacitus) That Tiberius as often as he went out of the Senate, was wont to use expressions aloud in Greek, 
Memorae proditur, Tiberum, quoties curia egrederetur, grecis verbis in bunc modum elequi, selitum, OHO MINES AD SERVITVIEM PARATOS! scilicet etiam illum, qui libertatem publicam nollet, tamprojectae servient ium patientiae taedehat. Tacit. An. l. 3.  and to this effect: O men prepared for servitude! the trnth is, though himself were against public Liberty, yet he loathed at their base patience, in submitting themselves to servitude. Behold his own Conscience condemning him of Usurpation upon the public liberty; and yet the Exercitator is not ashamed to enforce a Title upon him, though therein he oppose himself to the generally received judgement of the most approved writers of all sorts, as were easy to show, if time would give leave.  
But Secondly, what if it were granted, that the essence of a particular persons call to the office of Magistracy, is such as the Exercitator would have it, yet the essence of Magistracy itself, consists not in this call, and may therefore subsist without it; neither can the disorder of man, in the manner or circumstance about the person administering, make the matter or substance of the Ordinance of God of none effect, no more than the entering into the office of a high Priest among the Jews, by ways corrupt and unwarantable, did null and make void the Office self, Or to give an instance of our own clear and unquestionable; 'tis well known that persons unduly chosen Members of Parliament, have properly no Right to fit and Vote in the House; yet their Votes are never the less valid, in any Act of the supreme Legislative power, though afterwards the undunesse of the election be proved, and the persons discharged from further fitting in the House. The like may be said concerning Usurping Princes of this Nation, whose Acts in Law stand good at this day, and have a great influence into the present Policy among us.  
But here the Exercitator replies, thereiss a mistake in this argument, for though those Usurping Princes entered by force, or otherwise unlawfully; yet they had the concurrent or subsequent consent of Parliaments. Was ever man more grossly mistaken, that would pretend himself an Aristarchus over the mistakes of others? For first what power, by his own grounds hath one that enters by force, or otherwise unlawfully, (that is, an Usurper) to call a Parliament? an Usurper (if himself say true) is no more but a private person; and if a private person by force, or otherwise unlawfully call a Parliament; what is that Parliament but an effect of that force, and unlawful Act, and therefore itself unlawful? for the effect follows the nature of the cause. Nay secondly, what power (by his own grounds) hath a Parliament however called to give away the right from him, hat hath it, to him that hath none? The people (or the Exercitator is missed ken) have no power to give their Consent, being preing aged to another's right; nay their consent (unless the Exercitator be fill, in a mistake) is void and null, and a Parliament (he tells us) hath no power but what the people give them. But thirdly, granting Parliaments so called as hath been said, lawful; and the usurping Prince legally invested (as the grand corrector of mistakes speaks) by those Parliaments, and granting (which is also his own) that the Prince must have no hand in conferring any thing to his own Title, for that were (as he says) a selfe-created Titles, when all is past, the worst, is to come for the Exercitater; for from the premises, it will inevitably follow. First, that the supreme power is originally properly, and only in the House of Commons, for they only are the representatives, and by consequence the trusties of the people, and therefore they only can give a Prince a legal Title; because (if our Exercitator be not mistaken in his very foundation) a lawful calling from the people, is essential to a Magistrate rightly constituted. Secondly, it follows clearly, that the supreme power is so absolutely in the House of Commons, that they may without wrong take the Kingly authority from him, that had the right and give both right and it to him that had none. 3ly. It cannot be denied, but if they have (as by the premises the most have) an obsolute power to take the Kingly authority from whom, and give it to whom they think meet; they have also a power, when they shall think meet, to reserve the exercise thereof to themselves; if they shall judge it meet for the good of the Representees, otherwise they should be unfaithful to their trust. Lastly it follows, that the Commons sit not by virtue of the Princes call, but their own right; for an Usurper (as 'tis confessed such were the Princes in question, at the time of the calling) is but a private person; and no more (witness our Exercitator) and therefore hath no power to call a Parliament. And now let the Reader judge upon the whole, whether ever there were such a Felo de se, as is this wretched discourse of our Exercitator: or whether instead of correcting one, he hath not showed himself a thing merely made up of a heap of mistakes.  
But to proceed, he tells us page 74 75. That the Author of The lawfulness of obeying etc. hath but half quoted Paraeus, as well as impertinently; and that, according to Paraeus, unjustly gotten power is not of God, in regard of the person, or man owning it, and consequenly not to be obeyed, by verve of Rom. 13.  
To do the Exercitator right, 
Nec refert quibus medijs vel artibus Nimrod Jeroboam aut alij regra sibi pa-averint. Nam aliud est potestas que à deo est, aliud acquisitio & usus potestaus', que indisserens, alias legitima, alias illegitina, Parae. 〈◊〉 Rom. 13.  we shall take his own whole quotation of Paraeus; and then let the most partial Judge, whether he hath not done Paraeus, and the Author quoting him; and herein the Reader and himself worng, in forcing a sense upon Paraeus, so much at enmity with his words. Paraeus says, It matters not by what means Nimrod, Jeroboam, or others got Kingdoms to themselves; for the power which is of God is one thing, the getting and use of the power is another, which is indifferent, sometimes lawful, sometimes unlawful. And again, dubijs, whether both Paraeus and the Exercitator himself, refers us so the fuller explication of this place: We must discern betwixt the power which is EVER of God, and betwixt the getting and use of the power, 
Discernendum test inter potesta em que semper à Deo est, & inter àcquisitionem & usurpationem, que quod homines saepe est injustissima, non à Deo, sed ad hominem affectibus & Statnae Malitia. Idem. Ibid.  which as to men is often most unjust, not of God, but of men's lusts, and Satan's malice. Wherefore to examine the true sense of the premises, and compare them with the Exercitators deduction. It matters not (says Paraeus) by what means or craft Nimrod. Jeroboam or others: what others? Our Exercitator shall answer other Usurper; for such he hath proved Jeroboam more than once, besides, such get Kingdoms to themselves by craft etc. Again, It matters not, says Paraeus, in what respect matters in not? Reason and truth shall answer in respect of their Authority to command, and the Subjects Duty to obey. For in the words immediately foregoing; he was proving that Civil power is the Ordinance of God, and adds, although in the hand of Nimrod, or Jeroboam, as he expressly affirms, concerning the former Ad. 2. De Nimrodo. And concerning the latter, as expressly Add 1 Hos. 8.4. Lastly, it matters not, says Paraeus: Why matters it not? Why? because the Power howsoever, and by whomsoever got, is EVER of God, and consequently from him derives its Authority to command; and for him requires our duty to obey, and thus to eye God in our obedience, is to obey according to Rom. 13.5. For Conscience sake, in the judgement of Paraeus, with whom the Annotations of our own divines concur. And yet our learned Exercitator says but Sure he sees not what he says) Paraeus in your place speaks nothing pro or con of obedience to Usurpers; when notwithstanding having travelled some then lines further toward the end of that Paragraph, forgetting that he had said in the beginning, (so treacherous is his memory) that Paraeus speaks nothing against obedience to Usurpers, he tells us (from the latter quotation, which himself as well as Paraeus makes interpretative to she former) he tells us (most grossly contradicting himself, and the truth) That Paraeus is against obedience to Usurpers, by virtue of Rom. 13. 

Non quecunque per vim vel dolum acquiruntur cum sint per se bona, cessant esse d● Deo. Dissere nendum est enim interjus dei quod in res bonas nun quam amittis, à quibuscunque teneantur: & teneantur; & inter judicia dei puibus bona sua sic distribuit, ut in eorum acqui suione & usu vitium hominum aliquando concurrere permittat etc.  
Sic igitur de acquisitione etiam imperiorem & regnorum, quoe Perce, quae Greci, quae Romani, iujustice fere bellis & oppressionibas acquisiverunt, est judicandum. Parae. in Rom. 13.   Once more and we have done. Paraeus says: Things that are good in themselves, cease not to be from God, bowever gotten by force or fraud. For we must discern betwixt the right of God, which he never lose in good things, by whomsoever, and howsoever possessed: and betwixt the judgements of God, by which he distributes his good things so, as he sometimes suffers the viciousness men to concur in the getting and use of them etc. Thus thereforo are we to judge of the getting, even of Empiers and Kingdoms, which the Persians, which the Grecians, which the Romans got, for the most part, by unjust wars and oppressions. And accordingly, Ad 2. De. Nimrodo, not far before the words cited by the Exercitator himself, Paraeus says, However Nimrod were an oppressor and Tyrant, yet it follows not, that HIS power was not of God: Yet nor modest Exercitator blushes not to affirm that Paraeus says, unjustly gotten Power is not of God, in regard of the person, or man owning it. Can any thing be spaken more apparently, untrue in itself, by one that professes himself studious of truth? more injurious beyond all modesty, both to Paraeus, and the Author quoting him, by an Exercitator pretending to modesty? yet if he had answered without book again, it had been tolerable. But to accuse his Antagonist of a partial and imperninent quotation; and yet himself after a professed consultation with Paraeus, to use such enforcement, to the clear letter of the Author, in the fairest language that can be given it, 'tis not fair.  
To conclude, 'tis observable here, that whilst Paraeus maintains the Authority of Nimrod and Jeroboam to be of God; he neither takes away Usurpation from them, nor gives them a right Title. And accordingly Salon, after he had fully and undeniably proved the Duty of obeying the just commands of an Usurper, yet counsel the Usurper to leave his Usurpation, and to get the express consent of the people. It is not necessary therefore (as the Exercitator would infer) that a  consent of the people to obey, take away Usurpation. For the consent can justify no further than it goes, and it goes no further (in this case) then to give Authority to the Usurpers just commands, for the present good of the Commonwealth. And upon this ground, 'tis that the Law gives Authority to a Lord of Manor, though a Disseisor, to hold a Court, and the Tenants may swear Fealty to him, and do him service, yet neither justify the Disseisors Tide, nor wrong the Title of the Disseised.  
There is therefore a Tacite, and Interpretative consent of the people (which our Author truly asserts, and the Exercitator in vain denies) when (as reason wills) they consent that the Power which is peaceably possessed should Govern pro tempore, rather than that confution and War should destroy the Commonwealth. And such a consent is sufficient to constitute such a Magistrate. Wherefore having made good our Assertion against such Objections in the Exercitation, as are any way material; We shall professedly omit the rest. Only we cannot but take notice of the wretched folly, and vanity of his empty challenge Page 75 wherein as he tacitly grants the whole cause; so he doth it in express words to any understanding Reader. For it obedience be substantially (as already it hath been) proved a Duty; all Circummstantial Objections vanish as a mist before the Sun.  
And now for a conclusion, (that our Exercitator may end as ill as he began) he goes about to make good the Title of the Romans, to the Kingdom of Judaea, even against the Title of the House of David, and of the great Son of David; Christ himself, who, as Mr. Perkins acknowledges, was right Heir to the Crown, and Kingdom of the Jews. And to bring this to pass, he leaps over the Beams of Massy, and mighty Arguments that lie in his way, and takes up little Motes, and Straws to bind up this forged Title.  
First, He passes by the whole Title of the House of David, and that great promise, That there should not want a man to set on his Throne.  
Secondly, He takes no notice, how the Maccabees came by the Kingdom, which was by force and power; when there was another King a Successor of Alexander, even of that beast in Daniel, whose Kingdom was divided into four parts, yet the Exercitators party condemns this, if now a Title be thus gotten by Subjects.  
Thirdly, He said nothing of the point, whether the High Priest were capable of a Crown, and could bear at once on his head, both a Crown and Mitre; wherein, some say, he was a pattern of Antichrist.  
Fourthly, He observes not, that there was a Covenant of peace and agreement made in the Temple, and bound with Oaths, and confirmed by mutual embrace, between Hircanus and Aristobulus; that Aris●●bulus should command the Kingdom; and this was done in the sight of all the People.  
Fifthly, He gives no proof that Hircanus having given away the Kingdom before, could give it after to Pompey; nor th●t a King at all can give away a Kingdom, without his Kingdom's consent. Yea, he cannot prove that he did it: yet this is one of the motes with which h●●inds up Pompey's Title; because Hircmus, whoin his opinion, had the better Title (though perchance none at all) untreated him to come to help him, and to judge the controversy between him and his Brother: And a second is this, as if Pompey had got the good will of the people, to give the Kingdom to him; whereas himself saith but this, that Pompey, after he had taken Jerusalem, did rather by good turns than terrors conciliate the People to himself, Now this speaks, what Pompey did to please the people, not what the people did to him; much less that they gave up the Kingdom to him, which they would have given to none. For the truth is, josephus saith; That all the whole Nation [mark the words ALL and WHOLE] were against both Hircanus and Aristobulus, for bringing them under the servitude of a Kingdom; For they said, their Custom was to be Governed by God's High Priest. But I hope Pompey was no Priest, and therefore they did not choose him for their Governor.  
And for the words of Antipater concerning Antigonus, when he craved assistance from Caesar, they are very untruly alleged, they being thus in the author: He, that is Antigonus, craved not maintenance for that he wanted, but that he might raise a rebellion among the Jews; and against them who should bestow any thing upon him; that is against Caesar, if he should give him any relief. But the Exercitators Latin, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  Non propter inopiam desiderare facultatem sed ut in eos qui dedissent Iudaeorum seditiones accenderet, is thus construed by him. He sought not relief of Caesar, because he was poor; but that he might kindle jewish seditions, against these had made a dedition of themselves. Behold, the foundation of a Kingdom laid upon a false construction of Latin. But is it not a desperate boldness, that this man should take upon him to be a writer, who cannot construe his own Latin; yea that he should put his Latin in the Margin, to shame his own english, especially there being an english Translation, that might have taught him to construe it? But to be short, the story is truly thus, Hircanus living quietly after the forementioned Agreement, between him and his Brother, was continually provoked by Antipater, (the Father of Herod) to stir for the Kingdom; to which at last yielding, and Pompey being in those parts, they sent to Pompey concerning their differences, who gave them audience, and promised to came into their Country, to determine their differences, and told them, that in the mean time, they should live in peace.  
But Aristobul us stirring to make himself strong, Pompey comes up and takes Jerusalem and Aristobulous also, And theu commits the Priesthood to Hireanus, and now see the goodly Title of the Romans in the words of Josephus, thus Hireanus and Arristrbulous through their dissensions and evil broils were the cause of that servitude and misery [not that voluntary subjection he speaks of] that fell upon the Jews. For we have lost our liberty and been subdued by the Romans. Behold and excellent Title of the Romans. Two Brothers being at odds, strive one with another, and desire Pompety to be an Umpire of their controversies, therefore the Romans by this, have a Title to the Crown of Judaea; or again, the two Brothers being at odds, Pompey comes in to help one against the other, and conquers him; who (as the Author says) had the worse Title. Therefore by beating him, he got a good Title to the Romans; just as if when the Nation desired help of the Scots against a Malignant party, the Scots prevailing against that party might get a good Title to this whole Kingdom; or because the Scots desired the Lieutenant General of England, to come for their assistance into their County against the Malignant party there; he might thereupon, or thereby have gotten for the English a good Title to Scotland. So upon the whole, the Romans had not other Title but mere Conquest; as Salon, and many others do truly affirm, we shall now conclude with the resolution of an holy, impartial, and reverend Author, and Author of our own above all exception; as he wrote before these times of exceptions; hear what he says, concerning the validity of the commands of an usurped Power and the duty of obeying them.   
The fault of the worker is when an action of a lawful calling is done by one that is not called lawfully, now then when the fault of an action is not in the work itself, but in the person that worketh is; it is not to be reputed a nullity, neither to be reversed as nothing, etc.  
This doctrine is agreed upon by the common consent of Divines, as also by the Laws, and orders, of Kingdoms, as may appear plainly in particular. Augustus Caesar a Roman Emperor invaded the Kingdom of the Jews, and brought it into a Province: and thus was he made King of the Jews, not by lawful means, but by intrusion. For all this the Actions done, and the Commandments given by him, were reputed Commandments of a King, not reversed by any Jew, but obeyed of all. For when he gave Commandment, that all the world; yea the Jews should he taxed, they yielded themselves to this Commandment; yea righteous Joseph, and Mary went to their own Town to be taxed, etc.  
Whereby it is manifest that if there be no fault in the work the defective calling of the worker, doth not make a mullity of the Action done. For howsoever the workers sins, in his unlawful entrance, and in that regard is not to be approved, yet the Actions in the calling, to which he is enured, are the Actions of that calling; For though he be called amiss, yet he stands in the room of one lawfully called. And we are to make difference betwixt him that is called, though unlawfully, and him that hath no calling at all. For the Actions done without calling, are indeed nullities, whereas if there be any calling, though entrance ●e badly made, it doth not make the Action void. And whosoever denieth this ground of truth over-turneth the Regiments of Kingdoms, Churches, States, and societies whatsoever.  Perkins Treatise of callings, Page, 742. 
FINIS.