A REMONSTRANCE OF HIS EXCELLENCY Thomas Lord Fairfax, Lord General OF THE PARLIAMENTS FORCES.  
AND OF THE General Council OF OFFICERS Held at St Alban the 16. of November, 1648.  
Presented to the Commons assembled in Parliament, the 20. instant, and tendered to the Consideration of the whole KINGDOM.  
LONDON, Printed for John Partridge and George Whittington; in Black Friars at the gate going into Carter Lane, and at the blue Anchor in Cornhill. MDCXLVIII.   

TO The right Honourable THE COMMONS of ENGLAND Assembled in PARLIAMENT;  
The humble Remonstrance of his Excellency Lord General Fairfax, and his general Council of Officers held at St Alban, Thursday the 16. of Novemb. 1648.  
OUR Tender regard to the Privileges, and Freedom of Parliament on which our hopes of common Freedom and Right do so much depend, and our late experience what Offence many, (even honest men) seem to have taken, and what advantage evil men have made of our least interposing, in any thing of Civil consideration to the Parliament, hath made us for a long time hitherto, (as it should always make us even to utmost extremity,) to attend in silence the Counsels and determinations of Parliament concerning all matters of that nature whatsoever; but finding you to have been of late upon those transactions of highest moment, whereupon the life or death of all our Civil Interest does depend, and that the public affairs in your hands (not without the influence of forcible Impulsions from your Enemies, and such as have been stirred up by them) are brought to the utmost crisis of danger (which calls upon every man to contribute what help he can) and seeing no effectual help from elsewhere to appear, we cannot be (because in conscience and duty to God and men, we hold ourselves Obliged in such case not to be) altogether silent, or wanting in aught we can honestly say or do to hold off impending ruin from an honest people, and a good Cause.  
We are not ignorant, that that Rule of Salus populi suprema Lex, is of all others most apt to be abused, or mis-applyed, and yet none more surely true, it is too ordinary, (especially of late times) for men who either from intentions of evil, or inordinate temper of spirit, would break those bonds of Law and Magestracie which they find to restrain them, to frame pretences of public danger, and extremity thereof, and from thence immediately to assume a liberty to break or else neglect, and fly above the due bounds of Order and Government, and stir up others to the same, pleading privilege from that vast large rule of Salus populi, etc. from such misapplications, whereof great disturbances do oft arise and confusion is endangered; and yet we know the same may be justly pretended and followed, and that (where it is from honest public intentions, and upon clear grounds) with very happy effects: We have seen, in this our age, several instances in both kinds, and the hand of God bearing testimony, and giving Judgement for some, and yet against others where the pretensions have been the same, or so like as it was hard for humane judgement to distinguish. And indeed since the right or wrong of such proceed depends chief upon the good or ill, public or selvish, sircere or corrupt intentions of the parties pretending (which humane judgement cannot ordinarily reach into) and partly upon the justness, or caussesness, necessity or lightness, of th' occasion taken from those against whem the pretence is (which again depends partly upon their carriages, and partly upon their intentions, the latter whereof is not clearly or properly under man's judgement and the former without a full knowledge of particulars not easy for man to give a certain judgement of) therefore as the engaging upon such pretences and principles does always imply, and is for most part expressly accompanied with appeals to God for judgement, so 'tis the proper work of God to bear true witness and give righteous judgement in such cases; and as he is always engaged to do it sooner or later, clearer or darker, so in this Age and part of the world he hath seemed both to make haste to judgement in such cases (to give it quick and speedy) and also to make bare His Arm therein that men may see it; and hath appeared, as a severe avenger against such pretenders, (where it hath been in falsehood, and with evil or corrupt intentions) so also a discountenancer thereof (even where't hath been with good intentions, if not necessary in the grounds, or from impatient temper of spirit,) and yet in other Cases (where, as the ends have been public and the intentions upright, so the grounds weighty, the case necessary in relation to those ends, and the proceeding sober, temperate, and but proportionable to the ends, grounds, and necessity) a just assertor and Patron of the Right and Vindicator of the hidden Truth and simplicity of the pretenders by a glorious presence with them, and success to them in such proceed. Neither wants there ground for men to make some judgement therein. For certainly he that engageth upon such pretences really for public ends, and but upon public necessity or extremity, and with a sober spirit, (all which must concur to their full justification therein) will both try first all honest ways possible (with safety in those ends) whereby he may accomplish them and avoid the danger (if possible) with due regard to, and by concurrence or with preservation of the Magistracy and Government unwhich God hath set him, before he will fly to ways of extremity, neither will he (when engaged therein) proceed further or longer in that way against or without the Magestracie than that first necessity or some other (emergent upon the proceeding) does justly lead, and the security of the ends require (not driving that pretence of necessity further to serve or advantage himself or perpetuate those ways of extremity) but when the necessity or danger is over, and the public ends secured, will return to Magistracy and Order again, and mean while so act in all as carefully to avoid both injury to the innocent and offence to the weak, and as subjecting or expecting, and ready to subject all to an indifferent and equal judgement, (even of men) if and when it can be found and really endeavouring to find it. For our parts both prudential considerations, and the experience we have of the danger that is in the least breaking or letting lose or entangling the reins of Order and Government, upon such pretences makes us most tender of it, (as that which is never otherwise to be used or admitted, then as a desperate cure in a desperate case, and at the utmost peril as well of them that use it, as of those for whom) and the experiences we have seen of God's righteous Judgements in such cases as it makes us not apt (without trembling and fear) to think of such proceed, so much the more strict to observe all the aforesaid cautions concerning them, and yet where just occasion and a real public necessity calls thereunto, not to fear such appeals to God for any outward difficulties or dangers appearing to ourselves therein; But both from divine and humane considerations as we do and ever shall avoid the occasions by all means possible (even to utmost extremity) and do pray and hope we may never come to it, so (if ever such extremity do happen to us) we hope (through the grace of God) we shall be careful and enabled, both in the engaging and proceeding therein; so to act as before the Lord, and to approve ourselves both to God and good men, and as submitting to the judgement of both. And therefore though we are full of sad apprehensions of present dangers to the public interest, and the extremity even at hand, yet we shall first in all humbleness and soberness of mind, and with all clearness (as God shall enable us) remonstrate to you our apprehensions both of the dangers at hand, and of the remedies, with our grounds in both.  
First therefore, we must mind You of Your Votes once past concerning no more Addresses to the King, etc. and our Engagement to adhere to you therein: Concerning which we shall not invite you to look back to any grounds thereof, further than to what yourselves declared and published thereupon, and what we in that our Engagement did summarily lay down as our satisfaction therein: We shall only wish it may be remembered how free you were therein, and what state You and the Kingdom were in then, and how it fared with You thereupon, until you began to recede, and how upon and since your receding.  
For the first (what ever evil men may slandrously suggest in relation to other matters, yet) in this surely none can say you were acted beyond your own free Judgements, we are sure, not by any impulsion from the Army; since nothing that ever past from us to you before did look with any Aspect that way, but rather to the contrary; (we may speak it with sorrow and shame in relation to that unbeleef or distrust in God, and those carnal fears of public disturbance from which we had before been acted, so much the other way) so that in that particular the juster Resolutions of this House did not only lead us, but help to reclaim us, from thoughts too much wand'ring the contrary way.  
For the latter you may remember, that when you took those resolutions, discontent (even to distraction) did abound all the Kingdom over, in the people, for the burden of numerous and unsettled Forces, and the oppression of Free quarter by them, and in the Soldiers for want of pay and satisfaction or security in point of Arrears and indemnity (their discontents increasing with their Arrears) and indeed the Soldiery (in regard thereof and of some harsh provocations to them and your former uncertainty in any way of settlement) something lose towards yourselves, and their proper Government, and disposed too much, to disturbances amongst themselves. But upon those Resolutions of yours against any further Addresses to the King, etc. (which all men understood to imply some further intentions of proceeding in Justice against him and settling the Kingdom without him) immediately the unsettledness of men's minds and jealousies of several parties (concerning one's compliance with and seeking advantage from the King's party against the other) were greatly allayed, and (together with his opportunities and advantages to cajole, or insinuate with one or other) did seem to be taken away, and it pleased God, instantly to lead you into such other Counsels and ways, whereby the burden and grievances of Free quarter were immediately taken off, supernumerary Forces disbanded, the rest put into an established way of pay, the Arrears in some measure secured, and further growth thereof prevented, the distempers amongst the soldiery quieted, and they resettled in good Order and Discipline, and their hearts (with all honest and sober men's) firmly knit unto you, and the whole affairs of the Kingdom in an hopeful posture for a settlement.  
But when, the House being called (as it were) on purpose for a settlement, in stead thereof, upon what jealousies of some amongst yourselves, what private animosities, envyings and vindictive desires of others (giving up themselves, with dispending or neglect of the common and public interest, to mind particular interests and parties, and to seek and take advantages against their opposites even from hoped (if not form) compliances of common enemies and appearances from Foreign parts on their behalf, whereby to work out revenge against those they immediately maligned,) or from what crafty insinuations of corrupt members and always false to the public interest or upon what other evil principles, we are unwilling to remember or imagine; when (we say) upon those (instead of a settlement upon the former foundation) you began to entertain motions tending to the unsettlement of what you had resolved, and when by that uncertainty and unsetledness of Counsels appearing within yourselves, and the answerable insinuations and influences of several Members (according to their several bents and desires unto their respective Correspondents and Friends abroad, the minds of men without also became proportionably unsettled, tossed too and fro with various apprehensions & expectations which way things would bend, and all to see such vast uncertainty of any settlement or end of troubles upon the Parliamentary account alone: then (and not till then) began the generality of the people to be apt for any new motions, especially such as looked towards a settlement any way; and then began your enemies to conceive fresh hopes and confidences, and bestirred themselves accordingly, to work your trouble, and their own advantages. The most subtle and sober of them (dissembling the interest of their own party, and reserving that at the bottom, as close and unseen as might be, and taking their rise even from that unsettledness, and those grounds of jealousies and division they found amongst yourselves, and the several parties pretending to Parliamentary interest, and from that disposition they found in one party by any means to take advantage and revenge against the other) they made pretences partly of public Interest, and partly of the very particular Interests of that party which they found most discontented amongst yourselves, the foundations whereupon to raise new disturbances, and therein to engage a numerous and mixed party; but upon such grounds, and in such a way, wherein the Interest of the King and his party were so incorporated throughout, as that the prosecution of all the other Interests pretended (in the way that was laid) should carry on, and at last set up that of the Kings and their own above all others. Thus, the Army (which after all possible trials and temptations they found would never be won to be their friends, so as to desert the Parliamentary and Public Interest to serve their turns,) being therefore industriously by them (with the furtherance of discontented parties amongst your friends) rendered the only common Enemy, and they themselves (as it were) friends to all but it, and that supposed party in Parliament and Kingdom that cordially upheld it: they and their busy promoters of Petitions (stirred up by their Emissaries or Agents in all Counties, for the engaging and cementing of this new formed and intended general party) being all taught the same language, at first profess fair. For the Parliament, or nothing against it; but to be for a full and free Parliament, and to deliver it from the force of an Army; pretend for the Liberty of the subject also (to free them from the oppression and tyranny of an Army) to be for the Law of the Land against the Arbitrary power of a Faction in parliament setting up and supporting themselves above Law by the power of an Army; (whereas, in truth, their great and latest quarrel against the Army, was, That it would not force the Parliament to comply with the will and interest of the King, to the prejudice of the Kingdoms Liberties, and of the power of Law therein, nor desert the Parliament in their adherence to these against the King.) They pretended likewise to be much for the ease of the people, to free them from Taxes and Contributions to an Army, to be for the settlement of peace in the Kingdom, that there might be no need of an Army; (whereas, 'twas indeed, their restless workings, and watching all advantages, by parties within this Kingdom, or Foreign aids, to set up their own and the King's Interest, to the ruin of the Parliament, and enslaving of the Kingdom, that did necessitate the Parliament to continue an Army and taxes to maintain it.) They pretended for Religion too, and for Reformation, and the Covenant, against an Army of Sectaries and opposers thereof: yea, they yet pretended even for the Army itself (as to the Body of it, and all but a faction of Officers in it, supporting themselves in power and dominion by it) that the Army might be satisfied their Arrears, and go home: And for all these fair ends, (presuming upon the Parliaments unsettledness and weakness, as not able, or not knowing how to provide for any of these things of themselves without the King) a personal Treaty with the King must be held forth as the only sovereign salve. Thus the people being made to depend mainly upon the King for all, and his Interest made necessary to all, the other pretences were but made use of to serve his ends, and an easy way made to set up him and his Interest above all. As to the hypocrisy of these pretences, we need say nothing more; The Lord himself in our silence (even when by such pretexts, and their quick proceed upon them, they had made such engaging work for us in all parts, as gave us no leisure to say any thing for the undeceiving of men, or vindicating ourselves, or so much as to make any public verbal appeal to him for it) hath yet from heaven judged them, and born a clear testimony against them in defeating, with a small handful, the numerous parties, they had thus engaged within the Kingdom, and drawn from elsewhere, (under the very same pretexts) to invade it; and breaking the force of those designs, so cunningly and takingly laid, and so strongly backed with advantages, as 'twas scarce imaginable (in humane reason,) all things considered, how to avoid them.  
But however (working upon that unsetledness in the people's minds, which the uncertainty and Divisions in your own Counsels had occasioned; and having the advantage of that general disposition, in a burdened and troubled people, to entertain any motions, and follow any party, pretending to end their troubles, and ease their burdens, against the present party in power, from whom immediately they apprehend them,) they made a shift to engage multitudes to Petition for these things; and thence, under the pretence of freeing the Parliament from force, to raise Arms and levy War against it (at best) to enforce their Petitions, and under the notion of freeing the people from taxes to the Parliament, and quarter to the Army; to make them incur greater charges and burdens, for the King and his party, and (by withholding their taxes from the Parliament) to necessitate free quarter again upon themselves (which before they were delivered from) and under the notion of settling Peace, and the Liberties of the Kingdom, to break that we had, and engage the people in another War on the King's behalf, against the Parliament and their own Liberties, and to get his party, (with Commissions derived from him,) into the conduct and manage of it.  
But whilst therein (with open force) they do their utmost to destroy and subdue you, they omit not the driving on of that surest part in their design (a personal Treaty) to deceive you. To promote which, they had (besides numerous, and daily Petitioners from all parts, deluded and drawn in by the aforesaid specious pretences) the deluded multitude and rabble about the City, with the old Malignants, new Apostates, and late discontented party, both in the City and Parliament itself; the one at your elbows, the other in your bosoms, pressing you incessantly: The Lords, in every thing (relating to the Treaty) closing readily with the desires of the City Malignants, the Prince, and all your Enemies; and in their Votes for the same, going before you, and haling you after (although in things concerning the prosecution of the War in your own, and the Kingdoms necessary defence; (especially in declaring with you against those visible Enemies and Actors therein. (The Scots Army and others) they would neither lead nor follow.) And when, at any thing propounded towards the Treaty (wherein you found the very life of your Cause, and the Kingdoms to be concerned,) you were loath to give up that, and thereupon made some stick; then clamorous Petitions for a concurrence, come thick from the City, with menaces insinuated; many debauched Reformadoes, the desperate Cavaliers, and rude multitude about the City, ring in your ears with raylings and threats, many faithful Members, particularly frighted, or driven out of Town, forces listed and gathering daily about you; and this, the City, neither taking course to restrain, nor suffering their Major General to do it; but opposing and encountering his and your Authority, in what he, by it, attempted for your safety and freedom; and these courses never ceased, until you had fully agreed to a Personal Treaty, on such terms, as His Majesty Himself was pleased to entertain.  
By these means, and such continued usage, from the City, and those in and about it (at whose mercy, you were, while your Army was engaged at distance against your Enemies in arms) by that time God had broke all their forces, delivered most of them into your hands and crushed all their hopes of availing that way: We find them at last, drawn into this miserable inconvenience of a personal Treaty with him, and his adherents, who had so long and uncessantly tried all Interests, and wearied all friends in this, and many foreign Nations, by force, to destroy or subdue you. In which, though we see more utter and less avoidable danger to the Kingdom's Cause, and to all the godly and honest people engaged with you, than before, in your lowest or worst conditions, we ever yet apprehended.  
Yet considering the premises, and how great the change is from Votes of no more Addresses, to (not your wont positive sending of Propositions anew, but) a Treaty, a Personal Treaty, without any previous satisfaction or security, and a Treaty upon what Propositions he should make, as well as your own (all which, both Houses, yea, both Kingdoms have so often, and always before declined, voted, and declared against, as delusive and dangerous, yea destructive, while the Parliament was unquestionably most free.)  
We cannot but conceive, That at that time, and in those Resolutions for such a Treaty, the judgement of Parliament, was not with due, and former Freedom. And therefore not despairing, but that (as men drawn or driven into dangerous straits) you may readily entertain, or at least, favourably resent, any thing of Light, or encouragement, that may be offered towards the saving or extricating of yourselves, and those you are entrusted for: We shall, with all plainness and faithfulness, represent to you our Conceptions, where the main danger seems to lie, and where any way to escape. And we hope, 'twill be thought no arrogance in us, or disparagement to your Wisdoms, since lookers on may (possibly) see something, the gamesters do not.  
For the evils and dangers of this Personal Treaty, had it been admitted to be indeed with his person in Parliament (especially at London,) and in a full condition of honour, freedom, and safety, (which had employed, That after all the trouble, loss, hazard, and the expense of blood, and treasure he had put the Kingdom unto, he should be admitted to his Throne, and Office, without any satisfaction before given for what was past, or security against the like in future,) the evil and danger thereof had been so visible, as nothing had need to have been said to unfold it. As it is now admitted and qualified for circumstances (the case being as't has pleased God to make it, That the King has no power in field whereby to take advantages during the Treaty,) we shall say nothing to any dangers of that kind (supposing no agreement) save to wish you consider the opportunities of laying Designs for his escape, or otherwise, and of settling future correspondences, which the company and confluence of such persons about him does afford: But we shall chief consider, the great evil or danger of seeking to him by Treaty, in your present case, and of an agreement or accommodation to be thereby made with him, including his impunity and restitution to his freedom, revenue, dignity, office or government.  
Now, as to that, the great Questions will be,  
1. Whether (as your, and this Kingdom's Case stands) such an Accommodation would be: (First,) Just or good, and so , or (if not,) where the injustice or evillies? (Secondly,) Whether safe, and to be admitted, or (if not) where the danger lies?  
2. (Admitting that upon some suppositions, it might be good or safe,) Whether yet it can be so, or such a one can be had in the way and conditions of this Treaty, as the case stands?  
If either in the General, or in respect of your and the Kingdoms present Case, and of the way and conditions of this Treaty, it cannot be safe, than it concerns the Parliament not to admit such an accommodation or agreement upon this Treaty; and (though it might be safe, yet,) if it be otherwise evil, or not good, than you have no reason, but to use any freedom or just grounds remaining to decline it.  
To these Questions therefore, because the safety or danger, good or evil in Question, is chief in relation to the Public Interest of the Kingdom, and not so much to particular men's, (though even the particular safety of such as have engaged for the Public, is not to be neglected,) to lead ourselves and others to the clearer judgement in the point; we shall premise a stating of the Public Interest in Question, in opposition to the Kings, and of his particular Interest opposed thereto.  
The sum of the Public Interest of a nation, in relation to common Right and Freedom, (which has been the chief subject of our contest,) and in opposition to tyranny and injustice of Kings or others, we take to lie in these things following.  
1. That for all matters of supreme trust or concernment to the safety and welfare of the whole, They have a common and supreme Council or Parliament; and that (as to the common behalf, who cannot all meet together themselves) to consist of Deputies or Representers freely chosen by them, with as much equality as may be, and those Elections to be successive and renewed, either at times certain and stated, or at the Call of some subordinate standing Officer or Council entrusted by them for that purpose, in the Intervals of the supreme, or else at both.  
2. That the power of making Laws, Constitutions, and Offices, (for the preservation and government of the whole) and of altering or repealing, and abolishing the same (for the removal of any public grievance therein) and the power of final Judgement concerning War or peace, the safety and welfare of the people, and all civil things whatsoever, without further Appeal to any created standing power, and the supreme trust in relation to all such things, may rest in that supreme Council: so as;  
1. That the ordinary ordering and Government of the people may be by such Offices and Administrations, and according to such Laws and Rules, as by that Council or the Representative body of the people therein, have been prescribed or allowed, and not otherwise.  
2. That none of those extraordinary or Arbitrary powers , may be exercised towards the people by any, as of right, but by that supreme Council, or the Representative body of the people therein, nor without their advice and consent, may any thing be imposed upon, or taken from the people; or if it be otherwise a tempted by any, That the people be not bound thereby but free, and th'attempters punishable.  
3. That those extraordinary power or any of them, may be exercised by that supreme Council, or by the Representative body of the people therein, and where they shall see cause to assume and exercise the same, in a matter which they find necessary for the safety or well-being of the people, their proceed and determinations therein, may be binding and conclusive to the people, and to all Officers of Justice and Ministers of state whatsoever: and that it may not be left in the will of the King or any particular persons (standing in their own interest) to oppose, make void, or tender ineffectual such their determinations or proceed; and especially (since the having of good constitutions, and making of good laws were of little security or 〈◊〉, without power to punish those that break or go about to ●●●●throw them; and many such cases may happen, wherein one former laws have not prescribed or provided sufficiently for that purpose, or the ordinary officers entrusted therewith may not be faithful or not able, duly to execute such punishments on many offenders in that kind; that therefore the same Council or Representative body therein (having the supreme trust) may in all such cases where the offence or default is in public Officers (abusing or failing their trust) or in any person whatsoever (if the offence extend to the prejudice of the public) may call such offenders to account and distribute punishments to them, either according to the Law, (where it has provided) or their own Judgement (where it has not, and they find the offence, though not particularly provided against by particular Laws, yet, against the general law of reason or Nations, and the vindication of public interest to require justice) and that in such case, no person whatsoever may be exempt from such account or punishment, or have power to protect others from their judgement or (without their consent) to pardon whom they have judged.  
These things contain the sum or main of public interest, and as they are the ordinary subject of civil contests in all mixed states, where they happen betwixt the people, and those that have assumed or claimed a standing privilege or prerogative over them, so they have been in this of ours. And against these matters of public interest this King hath (all along his reign) opposed, and given himself up to uphold and advance the interest of his and his posterities will and power; first, That there might be no such Common Council (no Parliaments) at all, to restrain or check him, but that all these matters of supreme trust concerning safety and all things else might rest in him and his breast alone, without limit from or account to any on Earth, and that all those extraordinary and Arbitrary Powers over the people, their Laws, Liberties, Properties (yea, their persons and consciences too) might be exercised at pleasure by himself, and such as he pleased to derive the same unto; and as they were assumed, so how vastly and sadly ill they were exercised by him to the prejudice and oppression of the people in general, and the ruin or persecution of all the godly of the Land; yea, even of those that were but sober and honest to civil Interest, surely (unless the greater pressures here hath since wrought himself or brought upon us, by necessitating the Parliament thereunto, have swallowed up the former in Oblivion) we need not yet make any verbal remembrance: To support himself in that state or height of Tyranny and make it absolute, He raised his first and second Arms against his people in both Kingdoms, when he found he could not keep up to that height, to have all those extraordinary powers and matters of Supreme absolute trust in himself alone, them be fell to play lower; that at least none of them might be exercised by any other without him, no not by all the trusties of the Land, nor in any case though never so necessary for the relief or saving of the people. That if (according to his former claim) his people and Parliament would not admit him positively to oppress or destroy them at his will, yet by this latter, they should have no power to redress agrievance, to provide for the freedom welfare, or so much as immediate safety of themselves or the Kingdom, but at and according to his pleasure; and for this (when the Parliament did otherwise assume in point of immediate safety and punishment of Delinquents without him) he raised his third Arms, and held them up so long and so much, to the spoil and near desolation of the Kingdom, till God wholly broke them, and brought himself captive into your hands. And in this, though he raised them with the pretence only of opposing the exercise of those extraordinary and Arbitrary Powers by yourselves or any other without him, (which would not be allowed himself to exercise alone,) yet in the raising and having raised that force, he did by it assume and exercise all kinds of absolute and Arbitrary Powers at his own will alone without Parliament; and how much further he would have gone in exercise of the same, (had he prevailed as you) we may easily imagine. But as to that part of his claim against the public Interest, viz. That there might be no power in Parliament to provide for immediate safety, or do aught else for the people but at and according to his will) how obstinately (even since God gave him and his party wholly into your hands) hath he maintained and persisted in it, (even so long as from foreign parts, or Allies, from Irish, Scots, from your own divisions or discontents of the people (at the burdens he necessitated you to continue upon them) he had any hopes by force to prevail against you or avoid any concession against that claim) and of this his so many denials to the Propositions of Peace, which both Houses and both Kingdoms have so often tendered and renewed, yea, of those four only Bills, (concerning purely that public Interest, and but a small part of it, together with essential precautions for a Treaty,) do aford abundant evidence; As to which last tender, it is apparent he had no pretext left for refusal, from either scruple of Conscience, matter of harshness to his party, or aught else, but the mere Interest of will and power, to himself and his, which some Scottish and other correspondencies (it seems) then gave him hopes, yet by force to uphold; insomuch as upon that refusal (added to all the former) you found it necessary at last to take up those resolutions of no further addresses to him, but to settle the Peace of the Kingdom without him, and secure it and yourselves against him, and in order thereto to keep his person in safe Custody at Carisbrook Castle. But when (his other claims so fare failing) it came to this, He that before would not have allowed the Parliament or Kingdom a Power for safety but at his will, would (at least,) make you know, that, nor You nor the Kingdom should have any Peace or quiet without him, and that neither Parliament nor any Power on Earth (what ever ills he had done,) might for it attach or meddle with his Sacred Person, no not so much as to secure him from opportunities of doing more; and for this last part of his Interest his fourth Arms, (the last war) was raised (by Commissions from himself to the Prince, and from him to as many more as would take any) and for the same, the Scotish Invasion was procured. The pretext or quarrel in this last Engagement, seemed (as it were) to reach no higher than only to rescue his privileged Person, and force the Parliament, yet in a Personal Treaty, to seek Peace at his will, and to let them see they could not otherwise have it, not might do aught against his person (no not to secure him from doing further mischief) though he make War and refuse Peace never so long: And for this last piece of his Interest (as opposite and destructive to that of the Public as any of the former) though a Divine Testimony has been born against it, as full and more glorious (if possible) then before, against any of the rest as if God would thereby declare his designing of that Person to Justice; yet the Parliament after all this, restoring him (without any presatisfaction or security) unto a kind of Liberty and State, only that he might appear in a capacity to Treat, and then by Treaty seeking their Peace, and all their matters (before contended for, and (though God) gained against him) to come now as concessions from his will, do clearly yield back that last piece of his claimed interest into his hands again, and indeed (therewith) seem to render a more real acknowledgement and yielding to him, and against Parliament and Kingdom (as to the precedent just right of what ever's now demanded or granted as from him,) then all his verbal wrested concessions or confessions will be understood, to be unto Parliament or Kingdom, as to any future clearing or assurance of those things.  
But (to return to our purpose) The matters aforementioned being the main parts of public interest originally contended for on your parts, and theirs that engaged with you, and thus opposed by the King for the interest of his will and power, many other more particular or special interests have occasionally fallen into the contest on each party; As first on the Parliaments part, to protect and countenance religious men and godliness in the power of it, to give freedom and enlargement to the Gospel, (for the increasing and spreading of light amongst men) to take away those corrupted forms of an outside religion and Church government, (whether imposed without Law, or rooted in the Law in times of popish ignorance or idolatry, or of the Gospel's dimmer light) by means whereof, snares and chains were laid upon conscientious and zealous men, and the generality of people held in darkness, superstition, and a blind reverence of persons and outward things fit for popery and slavery; and also to take away or loosen that dependence of the Clergy, and Ecclesiastical affairs upon the King, and that interest of the Clergy in the Laws and civil affairs, which the craft of both in length of time had wrought for each other; (which several things were the proper subject of the Reformation endeavoured by the Parliament.) Contrary wise on the King's party, the interest was to discountenance and suppress the power of godliness, or any thing of conscience obliging above or against humane and outward constitutions, to restrain or lessen the preaching of the Gospel, and growth of light amongst men, to hold the community of men (as much as might be) In a darksome ignorance and superstition, or formality in Religion, with only an awful reverence of perions, offices, and outward dispensations (rendering them fit subjects for ecclesiastical and civil tyranny) and for these ends to advance and set up further forms of superstition, or at least hold fast the old which had any foundation in the Laws, (whereby chains and setters might be held upon, and advantages taken against such in whom a zeal or conscience to any thing above man should break forth) and to uphold and maintain the dependence of the Clergy and Church matters upon the King and greatness of the Clergy under him, and in all these things to oppose the Reformation endeavoured by the Parliament. Also on the Parliaments party, their interest (as well as duty) was to discountenance irreligion, profaneness, debauchery, vanity, ambition and time serving, and to preser such especially as were otherwise given, [viz. conscientious, strict in manners, sober, serious, and of plain and public spirits.] Contrary to these, on the King's party, it was to countenance or connive at profaneness, looseness of manners, vanity, and luxury of life and prefer especially such as had a mixture of ambition, and vainglory with a servile spirit, rendering them fit to serve another's power and greatness, for the enjoying of some share therein to themselves; in all or most of which respects, it has been the great happiness and advantage to Parliamentary and public interest, that it hath been made one (very much) with the interest of the godly, or (for the name whereof it has been so much derided) the Saints: as on the otherside the King's, one with their greatest Opposites, by occasion whereof God hath been doubly engaged in the cause, (viz. for that, and for the righteousness of it.) And to this indeed (through the favour and presence of God therewith,) the Parliament hath cause to own and refer the blessing and success that hath accompanied their affairs, which (accordingly as they have held square, and been kept close to this) have prospered gloriously, and (wherein, or so oft as this hath been thwarted, swerved from, or neglected in their manage,) have suffered miserable blast.  
Thus have we endeavoured to give a just and plain state of the Parliamentary or public interest, and the several parts of it, and of the Kings in opposition thereto, which have been the grounds or subjects of contests all along this King's reign, and especially since this Parliament began, as may appear in the beginnings, progress, and several steps of the contest. And by what hath been occasionally said herein, some judgement may be made, how far safe or good the accommodation is like to be that can be expected by the present Treaty But the several and opposite interests being thus stated, we shall proceed more clearly to speak a little to the questions stated before,  
First therefore, as to the goodness (which first implies the justness) of such an accommodation, we cannot but suppose,  
1. That where a person trusted with a limited power to rule according to Laws, and by his trust (with express covenant and oath also,) obliged to preserve and protect the Rights and Liberties of the people, for, and by whom he is entrusted, shall not only pervert that trust, and abuse that power to the hurt and prejudice of the generality, and to the oppression, (if not destruction) of many of them, but also by the advantage of the trust and power he hath, shall rise to the assuming of hurtful powers which he never had committed to him, and indeed to take away all those foundations of Right and Liberty, and of redress, or remedy too, which the people had reserved from him, and to swallow up all into his own absolute will and power, to impose or take away, yea, to destroy at pleasure; and declining all, appeal herein to the established equal judgement, (agreed upon as it were betwixt him and his people in all emergent matters of difference betwixt them,) or to any judgement of men at all, shall fly to the way of force upon his trusting people, and attempt by it to uphold and establish himself in that absolute tyrannical power so assumed over them, and in the exercise thereof at pleasure; such a person in so doing, does forseit all that trust and power he had, and (absolving the people from the Bonds of covenant and peace betwixt him and them) does set them free to take their best advantage, and (if he fall within their power) to proceed in judgement against him, even for that alone if there were no more.  
2. That if (after he is foiled in such an attempt, brought to quit that claym, to confess his offence therein, and give them some verbal and legal assurances of remedy and future security, and his Parliament and people thereupon remitting or willing to forbear that advantage against him) the same person, so soon as he finds himself a little freed from the advantage which drew those Confessions and Concessions from him, shall go about to avoid or overthrow all again, shall deny them necessary redresses or security, stop or oppose them in going thereabout, deny them all power either of redress or immediate safety, but at and according to his will, and assume the power to avoid and oppose any thing they should do without him (who had so lately forfeited all the power he had unto them) and for all this fly to force again, raise it without limit, by it protect Delinquents from judicial proceeding, and resume and exercise again alone (even fitting a Parliament) all the exorbitant and unlimited powers he so lately disclaimed, proclaim that suppream Council (by which he ought to govern himself and the Kingdom) Traitors and Rebels (who had indeed so lately indulged him his first Treason and Forfeiture) and on these terms maintain a war many years against them (to the spilling of much blood and desolation or spoil of a great part of the Kingdom) try all means and interests by divisions and parties stirrred up within, and invasions from abroad to lengthen it out longer, and (after he was subdued, wholly in their power, and at their mercy) to revive and renew it, multiplying disturbances, and never ceasing till he had wearied all friends in his own and neighbour nations, or so long as any hopes were left whereby possibly to prolong it; and all this merely to uphold the interest of his will and power against the common interest of his people; such a person in so doing (we may justly say is guilty of the highest Treason against the highest Law among men, but however) must needs be the author of that unjust war, and therein guilty of all the innocent blood spilt thereby, and of all the evils consequent or concomitant thereunto.  
Now (to assume hereupon) whether the King have not, in the same case, acted all these things and more, we dare appeal to the story and evidence: If he have not, or can justly allege and make it appear, that what he has acted thereof has not been for the interest of his will of power, or not against the public in terest of his people; or that the Parliament or any particular party in the Kingdom have raised or continued the war for private interests of their own, and not for that public interest of the Kingdom (which we have before stated) but that they might have had all that cleared and assured to the Kingdom with quietness, and would not accept it, let him then be acquitted in judgement, and the guilt and blame be laid where else it ●s due. But if indeed he hath acted such things and in such case (as before expressed) and all for the particular interest of his will and power against the Public Interest of the Kingdom, than (without mention or consideration of aught he has done against God and godliness, or godly men, and though we have touched but a few of those many moral or civil Evils acted by him, (which have been judged capital in several of his predecessors from whom he claims, yet) from that alone which is before spoken of we may (without need of his late implicit Confession) conclude that he has been the Author and Continuer of a most unjust war, and is consequently guilty of all the Treason it contains and of all the innocent blood, rapine, spoil, and mischief to the Kingdom acted or occasioned thereby; and if so, how fare the Public justice of the Kingdom can be satisfied, the blood, rapine etc. avenged or expiated, and the wrath of God for the same appeased without judgement executed against him, and consequently, how far an Accommodation with him (implying a Restitution of him, when God hath given him so clearly into your power to do justice) can be just before God, or good men, without so much as a judicial Trial, or evident remorse, appearing in him proportionable to the offence: We thus recommend to your saddest and most serious consideration, who must one day be accountable for your judgements here on earth, to that which is the highest and most just; indeed both as to the justness and Public benefit of such an Accommodation, we shall confess if there were good evidence of a proportionable remorse in him, and that his coming in again, were with a new or changed heart (as to these things he hath formerly fought against, and from those he hath contended for) his offence being first judged according to Righteousness, his person might be capable of pity, mercy and pardon, and an Accommodation with him, with a full and free yielding on his part, to all the aforesaid parts of Public and religious interest (in contest) might in charitable construction be just (possibly) safe and beneficial; or if the heat of War (before God had so clearly given his double judgement against him in the cause, or delivered him into your hands for yours) and while affairs stood in some equal balance, you then in love of peace (which 'tis good to seek with all men) & for saving of further bloodshed and misery to the kingdom (which in that case you could not otherwise avoid) had upon a full provision for the matters in question, and good security for future against him, made a by Accommodation with him (as by your many Addresses, you endeavoured,) it might have been  in point of prudence, (though you had incurred a more remote future hazard, because thereby you had avoided another more immediate and present; yea the hazard had been less, because to what he had then agreed, all men would have accounted him bound, being then unquestionably free,) and the point of Justice had not then been so clearly required at your hands, because not yet altogether in your power: But, as this whole latter Supposition is, by time and the good hand of God towards you, excluded the case, so neither is there any colorrable ground for the former, but evidence of the contrary: For, as to that only colour of any change of heart in him, with his implicit confession of a fault, in yielding to your first Proposition does import; First, how slight and slender that confession is, the tenor of the Proposition may show; And yet, had he timely, freely and clearly confessed but so much, as from conviction, or remorse, or from a sense of the hand of God against him, or had left us but a ground of charity to believe it so, we should have thought ourselves bound to regard it with proportionable tenderness towards him; or at least, should have thought it not ingenious nor Christian to take advantage, from such confession, the more to prosecute him for it; but having so long and obstinately, both in word and practice, till now, denied it; and never confessed it, until all his other ways of force, policy, or fraud (whereby he hath attempted to justify himself) had failed him, and no other shift left, but by this forced (yet seeming yielding) acknowledgement to save himself, and delude the people, (until he can find or work out some new advantage) and confessing it now but conditionally, viz. so as you agree with and satisfy him in other things (which kind of confession, where the mat in question is concerning true or false, just or unjust, and extending to innocence or horrid sin, does seem to imply such Hypocrrisie as (we think) was never yet so proclaimed before God and the world) and when, at the same time, while thus in words he confesseth it, yet in practice he denies it still, by his continuing, and not recalling his Commissions to the Prince, and other English Rebels, and Revolters; yea to Ormond and his associated Irish Rebels also (all which are so contrary to that verbal Confession) and by his trying all Interest still, to make a party, against it; in this case, it were stupidity (rather than Charity) nay indeed (we think) a wrong to his intentions, to understand that confession as from inward remorse or conviction; so that (as the case stands) it goes only so far, as may serve for further ground of condemnation against him, but not at all of satisfaction from him.  
And admitting no such change or conviction (even when there are verbal confessions and concessions carrying a semblance thereof) but that his restitution would be with the same principles and affections, both as to civil and Religious interest, from which he hath acted the past evils; and after some former like acknowledgements and agreement, hath returned to the same by ass upon his next advantages; then, besides the unrighteousness of the Accommodation, and readmission (which is before already cleared) and besides matter of danger, (which we shall show in its place) we desire all good men to consider: As to the other point of good, (viz. the public benefit (what fruits can be hoped from such a Reunion or renewed communion betwixt those contraries, God hath once so separated, viz. of principles or affections of liberty, with Principles of Tyranny, Principles of public Interest, with Principles of Prerogative and particular interest; principles of zeal, and the power of godliness, with principles of formality and superstition in Religion (we might say indeed, of light with darkness, of good with evil) as would be employed in his restitution to be, (as it were your Head) your King again, and to have that high trust and influence in relation to our Peace, Rights, and Liberties (civil and religious) with the same Principles and affections, from which he hath so much and so long opposed them? For, if his Kingly Office be not of use or trust in relation to them, what needs his restitution? if it be, than this doubt holds just.  
Next, to the other part of the preceding Question, (viz. Concerning the safety of an Agreement, for his restitution, especially supposing no real remorse, or change, but the same principles and affections) although in the terms of the Accommodation and Restitution, you had a more ample concession of the public interest in question, than you are like to have when he hath granted all you have demanded, and as full security for future observance of the agreement as words or Letters, (yea Oaths) can give; and though we might suppose him as true and just in the observance of such an agreement as other Kings or Princes (once given up unto, and engaged upon such principles and ways of tyranny, or self-interest) use to be; yet first in general we might make a just appeal to the experience of Ages and Nations, what danger there is in any such Accommodations, both to the public interest in contest, and to the persons or parties that have engaged for it, and we might challenge all Story for one instance in the like case, viz. where any such King claiming and assuming such Powers and Prerogatives over a people beyond his bounds, and (upon opposition from the people the rain) flying to force, and in a war upon them, endeavouring to gain the same by conquest, but instead thereof losing both what he so claimed, and all he had before in a full conquest, on their parts, over him (we say in such case) we would feign see an instance where ever (after so long a war, so much blood spilt, and such spoil made) the people having at last wholly subdued him, and gained their own Cause in that way of force and conquest, to which he had so appealed, and having him and his party captivated, and in their power, did either willingly subject all to question again in a Treaty with him of their own tendering, or by it seek both that public interest, (or rather but a slender portion of that which God had so wholly and freely by his righteous judgement given unto them) and even their own safety and Indemp nitie therewith, to be had (all) as Concessions from that their enemy's hand, and (balking him as a person not punishable or acconntable for whatever evil he had endeavoured or done) to restore him upon such Concessions to his Throne again: we say, we would gladly have a parallel instance, where ever indeed any people before this were in the like case given up to such a preposterous and selfe-deserting way, or an instance of (almost) any Accommodation of like kind at all, with a readmission of such a person to the same Office, State, and Revenue, (with the least shadow of the same power) or to the least footing therein, upon the same account or claim of right, (on the foundation whereof, he had before assumed such powers) wherever such accommodations proved safe either to the public interest in contest, or to the persons engaged therein, or did not prove ruinous to the one and the other, or at least end, in the eruptions of new and more bloody and bitter contests about the same things either in the same or succeeding age, and those with more hazard and disadvantage to the public interest and party adhering thereto, than the former; or where indeed any people contending and once engaging in war against a Tyrant for their Liberties, did ever fully redeem and hold the same with a readmission of him, or without (first or last) disclaiming and renouncing all dependence on him, or accord with him for the same, and an utter rejection, expulsion, and deposure, either of his whole race, and all that claimed upon the same account of right, or at least, of his particular person, and execution of justice upon him, if he fell within their power: With this latter way of proceeding we have heard many instances of people, fully recovering their Liberties, and happily retaining the same; but without it, or in the former way of accommodation and restitution, we have not heard, or read of any so succeeding; there is abundant experience to reach us how ordinary (yea, we may say constant) a thing it hath been for Kings and Princes in such cases, when they could not prevail in the way of force, to leave that, and apply themselves by fraud to accomplish their ends and wills upon the people; and when in such contests with them by the Sword they have been brought into straits, then to cry up peace, and under that glorious golden bait, which the people wearied with war, and the troublesome and chargeable concomitants thereof, are most apt to catch at, having drawn them into ways of accommodation, to make some feigned yielding up of those Prerogatives and advantages, they find, they cannot hold, and by large promises, Concessions, and assurances on any terms, to make agreements with them, whereby to quiet the people, and get themselves into the Throne again; and yet afterwards, upon on their next advantage, to break, and make void all again, and prosecute such advantages to the overthrow both of the public interest, and those that had engaged for it, without regard of Faith or Oath, (further than necessity hath held them thereto) where any advantage for the accomplishing of their ends hath lead them to a breach; how apt first such Princes are to this, and next how easy it is for them, when they find advantages, to find occasions also, and pick quarrels to make a breach, even with a colourable saving to their faith and honour, engaged in such agreements; and lastly, how easy also, after they are so got into the saddle again, and the people by their fair Concessions, Promises and Engagements, lulled into a security, to find or work out such advantages to themselves, and prosecute them to greater prejudice both of the public and the particular persons engaged for it, then before such contests begun, or without such accord thereupon, they could have done, as experiences do abound, so there wants not reason enough to teach us.  
For the first: Where a Prince is once given up to that self-interest of his Will and Power, so as to make it his highest end, or (at least) to prefer it above the public Interest, and welfare; yea above the safety and peace of his People (as where he makes War against them for it, it is apparent he does,) and to prefer it above Religion too, (as is evident, when he attempts the moulding and forming of Religion to subserve that end,) such a person sure cannot want any principles of falsehood, cruelty, or revenge suitable to such an end; neither in reason is it like, that he will regard any Engagements of Faith, or Oath; or stop, or boggle at any thing of that kind, further than necessity does hold him thereto, or where a necessity or advantage, for the accomplishing of that his highest end, does lead to a breach: And indeed, when the bonds once accepted by him with unquestionable freedom (at his admission to the Throne) the bonds of Law, yea the fundamental bonds of trust betwixt him, and his People, the very Covenant of peace, yea the Oath of God betwixt them would not hold him, but of his own mind (without occasion before given) have been all violated by him; and (to justify himself, and protect his Instruments in that) the law of Force (admitting no bounds but power) hath been chosen and set up by him, and prosecuted to the utmost in a long and bloody War; how can it be expected, that the bonds of new Concessions and Agreements (with what ever assurances that are but verbal, or literal) being imposed by force upon him, or yielded to from nothing but an invincible or powerful necessity, can be of more awe or regard with him, or power to hold him, when an advantage to gain what he sought, or recover what he lost, does offer itself? And as for revenge, how natural it is for a Prince, so given up to that self-interest of will and power, and how necessary to his interest to seek and prosecute revenge against all eminent opposers, and much more the oppugners thereof; we wish your own reason, and the experience of others may rather warn you, then that you should put it to trial in your own cases.  
And hath your and our experience of this King with whom we have to do, given cause to hope better things from him, in these respects, than other Ages or Nations ever found from other Priuces in the like case? First, for point of Faith-keeping (besides his first numerous breaches of his original Faith to his Kingdoms in the whole manage of his government and trust, before the Wars,) witness his Accords with the Scottish Nation, and how he kept them; his seeming compliances in part with this Parliament (in the time of his straits) and feigned acknowledgements of past errors, with promises of redress, and future amendment, until your bounty, in paying off the Scots and English Armies at that time, had delivered him from those straits; and then, so soon as you came to those particulars which should have effectuated that redress, and assured future remedy, by tying his hands, and deterring others from the like exorbitances, immediately flying out again to higher and greater; and (first by policy, then by force) going about to overthrow those foundations of remedy which he had granted, in the ascertaining of this Parlinment, etc. And let those many particulars of hypocrisy, dissimulation and treachery, couched under his fairest Overtures, Professions and Protestations, which yourselves in several Declarations have observed and recorded, bespeak what cause there is, to confide in his promises or Engagements. As to his innocency in point of revenge, witness those petty revenges, after several Parliaments (and yet some of them extending to death through hardship of imprisonment) which were sought and taken against such Patriots as had, in them, appeared but to assert the common Liberties against his Interest: Witness his attempts of higher in the proceed against the Members he impeached; and let the several Designations of some to the slaughter, some to exile, others to prisons, all to misery of one sort or other, which, upon any hopes of prevailing in the former or later War, have been made against his eminent opposers amongst you, suffice to teach you and your adherents, what mercies might be expected from him and his Party, if he ever had, or yet shall gain the advantage over you.  
Next, for the facility of a Princes finding occasion and quarrel after such an agreement, to make a breach, when he finds his advantage; and yet, with some colourable saving to his Honour: We know, in all mutual Agreements (where each party grants and takes, and something is to be made good on each party towards the other) how easy it is to find, or pretend a failer of full performance, and thence to avoid the obligation to th' Agreement; and especially, in Agreements of State, if all matters of power, trust and right are not fully cleared and determined so as to state the supreme trust, and conclusive judgement to all intents and purposes fully and absolutely in one party or other, but that something be left divided, or at least suspended betwixt them, in such case how easy is it for the party that is loser by the agreement to find or feign an entrenchment of the other beyond the stated bounds, and thence to make a new breach when be sees his advantage for it? But however when any thing within the compass of what was so left suspended does in practice, come to question, and difference, and neither party trusted singly to conclude, there is a clear Foundation for a breach, unless they either agree to lay the matter aside, (which perhaps the gaining party cannot, and so (by the loser's mere standing off) may be necessitated to appear the first Actor in a breach,) or else come to a new Agreement upon every such particular: We know besides, what Court Maxims there are amongst the King's party concerning some fundamental Rights of a Crown, which the King cannot give away; and their common scruple, whether a King, granting away such or any other hereditary Crown-Rights, can oblige his Heirs or Successors, or exclude their claim; But if all other pretexts fail, their Non-obligation to what is wrested from them by force, in a powerful Rebellion (as they count it) will serve such a King's Conscience for a shift, to make a breach, where he finds his advantage. And are not all these occasions or pretexts obvious in our case? To say nothing of the matters of Supreme Power and trust which (though all your Propositions be granted, will yet be left divided or suspended, not only betwixt the several Houses, but betwixt them both and the Kings; nor yet of the imperfect bargaining for several parts of it (which by the tenor of the Propositions are taken some, (as it were,) by Lease, all by grant from the King, so as to confirm rather than weaken his claim of the Original right to be in him and his,) from both which kinds of defect or uncertainty in th' Agreement there will be left many apt occasions and particular grounds for a breach when time shall serve; Is it not apparent, that from that more general consideration of the condition of the King in this Treaty, and the force or necessity lying upon him, a ground of evasion or exception lies to the whole agreement as not obliging to the King, whatever Concessions or assurances are so drawn from him? what account the King and his party do upon that ground make of the Treaty, besides the common voice of them all in all corners, that the King (good man) is merely forced to what he grants, we may see it publicly and authentically avowed by the Prince and his Council, in his Declaration in answer to the Earl of Warwick's Summons of the revolted Fleet at Goree, where (besides other passages hinting the same thing) the Prince clarely says: [The KING in truth is still in prison, with such circumstances of restraint, as (to say no more) are not usual in the case of the most private person, & whose delivery and freedom therefrom all his Subjects are obliged to endeavour, by the Laws of God and man, to their utmost hazard, and afterwards invites the Earl of Warwick to join with his Highness in the rescue of his Royal Father from his unworthy imprisonment. This, being in answer to that summons, wherein the Earl of Warwick invited the Ships to come in upon that very ground, (that the King and Parliament were in Treaty for Peace) we can take to intent no less than a plain dissavover of this Treaty, and disclaimer of whatever shall be concluded thereupon, and (coming from the Prince and his Council) consider him as heir apparent, it serves at least to acquit himself and posterity, from being concluded by what his Father in such case shall consent unto, to the prejudice of the Crown; and (consider him as having by his unlimited Commission, as Generalissimo, the highest power of the Kingdom, which the King could devise to give, and so he and his Council, while the King is in durance, being the next visible head of the King's party, and having the highest trust in relation to the interest of the King, his Crown, & party) it is also (on the Kings and their behalf) the most Authentic Declaration of their sense of the Treaty, which could well be expected in the case (while the King and his Council here being supposed under force as to all things else cannot be supposed free in that point to declare his real Judgement) and so it may serve in behalf of the King, his Heirs, and whole party, as a Protestation against any conclusion by this Treaty, or what ever shall therein be drawn from him to his own, or their prejudice. And indeed the King himself in divers of his Papers, that have come from him to you in relation to this Treaty, ha●s (in such loft Language as might befit the condition of your prisoner) insinuated the same sense of the Treaty, and his condition there'n and of the validity or repute of any conclusions thereupon, while his condition should remain the same, and not more free; And these several Declarations and insinuations hereof being sent, those from the King immediately to yourselves, that from the Prince, (his General) to your Admiral, and from him to your own hand and both being sent you during the Treaty before any conclusion upon it, will remain upon record before you perpetual witnesses against the validity thereof, or any obligingness a to rhema. Nor is it his or their sense alone, or without grounds to gain belief, but (considering he is but so small a step removed from the Castle, where he was your absolute prisoner, and still confined within the Town or Island, (which is your Garrison) and so remaining under the power of your Guards, and even in that condition being but upon his Paroll) we doubt the same sense and judgement thereupon will be aptly made and received both by intelligent spectators of this and neighbour Nations, and by ages to come, and that the degree of enlargement you have afforded him (with the pettit State added) will be understood but as a Mock-liberty, and counterfeit of State, intended only to set him up in some colourable Posture and equipage to be the more handsomely Treated with, but not as a setting him free from your force or leaving him free in what he grants, so as to render it obliging when granted; But though, as to the reality of the case, there might be freedom enough to make his concessions in honesty obliging, or his absolution therefrom (at least) disputable, yet he and the Prince in his behalf having (as is before expressed) in the b●st way they could, declared to you before hand, that their sense to the contrary, as to his on their part (his condition in the Treaty standing as it was,) if you after such fair and timely warning would needs yet proceed in Treaty, without alteration of his condition or the terms of it, and come to conclusions therein to bind up yourselves who will not say he and his party had reason so far to comply with your proceeding upon it, and yet account that as to any obliging on their part (whether he were really under dures or not, yet) their timely precaution to you concerning their contrary sense of it, was a sufficient acquittal of them, not only from being bound by any agreement upon it, but from any imputation of deceitful dealing with you, (though they observe not what shall be so agreed upon) since (after such precaution from them) it was your own fault, and at your own peril, if you would proceed with them upon so rotten a foundation, so as if you be cozened you cousin yourselves and cannot blame them, or any body else for it.  
And truly this consideration as (when we first took notice of those passages in that Declaration from the Prince and the King's Papers) it did more awaken us to consider your hazards in this Treaty then before, so it serves most clearly to set forth the miserable straits and snare you are thereby entangled in; to look no further into particulars, that great and dangerous evil, of old so much declined and abhorred by you and our Brethren of Scotland, and more lately so much struggled against by yourselves in the previous debates concerning this Treaty, (viz. the King's return to London and to his Parliament and Throne again, without satisfaction and security before given,) is thus, at last like to come upon you, and that upon worse terms (if you proceed in this Treaty to conclude yourselves and re-admit him) then if you had let him come without any foregoing agreement at all, for had you let him come so, (both yourselves, and he being free) if then he had granted any thing of satisfaction or security, all men would have accounted him bound by it, and the concession valid, or if he had denied you necessary things in that kind, your further proceeding in other ways to secure yourselves and the Kingdom against him, would have been thought more necessary, just and clear, and though (being at liberty) he had personally headed his party in the City, and elsewhere with greater advantages than ever, to assert once more his old quarrel in a new War, yet you had known the worst on't (viz, To fight it over again, but so much the sooner,) but in the way you are now engaged in, the King has the advantage to yield to any thing at last which he cannot get you to abate, and yet when (having granted all) he gets (upon your own terms, (to his beloved Sear and Throne again; behold he is free, (as if he had granted nothing) to take the best advantage against you when he sees his time, and mean while may rest secure in a good condition and wait his advantage, having got your hands bound, till he finding it, shall strick the first stroke again, which ('tis like) he will make a sure one (if he can) to disable you from a return, and so we proceed to the next consideration, Viz. how easy 'tis for a Prince, after such accommodation (admitting him either not bound, or not conscientious of his bonds, or having occasions or pretexts for a breach) to find or work out advantages, whereby to overthrow all he has granted to the public interests, and (in the ruin of those that engaged against him for it,) to set up his own above all, which for brevity we shall not so much consider generally in the common advantages which Princes in such case usually have, as particularly in those which this King clearly has or is like to have in this of yours.  
The King comes in with the reputation (among the People) of having long graciously sought Peace (although indeed ever since he found you in condition to oppose his Force, It was his interest, and his best play, and especially since you had beaten his Force, it was his necessary and only play) he comes with the reputation of having long sought it by a Personal Treaty (which at last has proved as he Prophesied, the only effectual means) and so you having so long denied that, and only plied him with peremptory Propositions, and yet at last granting it, are (in that self Condemnation) rendered by his Friends as having deceitfully, or unnecessarily continued Burdens, and refused Peace so long, in refusing that the King's way, in which you might as well have had it sooner as now (although the truth is, neither the Treaty, nor the Personality of it have advanced the business one jot, since the King grants now the same things, and in the same terms which he has so oft in particular denied, yea protested and sworn he would not, and the alteration is fare enough from Conviction by Treaty (as is before demonstrated) and visibly from a greater necessity or advantage found now to induce the yielding then formerly. He comes also, with the reputation of having granted for Peace sake all that you (as unwilling to Peace) have rigidly stood upon (although when 'tis summed up 'twill appear very little of advantage, or security to Public interest, and (by a trick or reserve that he has) nothing at all as before is showed, yet however) with the People he carries these and the like points of Reputation before him, and wants not Trumpets every where to blaze them sufficiently to his renown, and your reproach, and (under such Banners of Love and Honour) He comes in, The only true Father of his People (you being proved their cruel Foster-fathers') he the Repairer of their breaches, (which you had made) the restorer of their beloved Peace, ease, and freedoms, (which you, as his Creatures render it, had ravished or cheated them of thus long) the Restorer of their Trade and plenty too (which you had thus long obstructed) He a Conqueror in sufferings and patience, a denier of himself for the good of his People, and what not that's glorious and endearing? And thus would the People be lulled (and indeed cheated) into a security, as to any further apprehensions of evil from him; yea posseit with acknowledgements and expectations of all their good from him, and their jealousies awakened against you and your adherents only. And yet (to heighten the same more into perfect hatred) you (as wise, yea as honest men for their safety and interest, though they see it not) must continue an Army and Garrisons still (and that) not the less, but much more for his coming in again, then if you had taken another course utterly to shut him out (as we shall show anon) and so you will be necessitated, notwithstanding the Accommodation, to continue Taxes and Impositions for the maintenance of that Force, to the burden and grievance of the People, and the greater increase of their discontents and hate towards you; For if after this accommodation to ease and satisfy them, you shall ever disband your Forces (while the King at's liberty, and in's Throne again) you give him his end or wished opportunity, in laying yourselves, your adherents, and the Public interest all level again with Him and His (as if you had never prevailed, nor had any advantage over them) and so for all your satisfaction and security you are at the King's courtesy still, and (if he will break) you are but where you were at first, and the Public interest nothing advantaged or secured, by aught obtained or done in the War; but the King in the same, and much fairer possibility to revive the old Quarrel, renew his Force with greater advantage, and put you to Fight it over again, or rather may carry it without Fight, since (after so much blood and cost, and trouble for nothing) 'tis not like you'll find a competent Party, for th' opposing of him ready to engage again on the same terms, and if he gain any strength to appear for him (which who can doubt when your Forces are disbanded, considering what a numerous Party he has engaged to it in interest and necessity, others inclined to it by principles and temper, others in humour and discontent against the present Government) the generality of people wearied with the former War (whereof they have found so great misery, and so little fruit) if they see a strength on his part threatening a new War, and none ready on your part to balance it, (which might hold them (at least) in neutrality) will surely be more apt to join unanimously with him, or let him have what he will that there may be no War, then join with you to maintain another War (to so much prejudice, and so little purpose as they have found the former.) And if to appease the King, and his enraged Party, a sacrifice of those that opposed him in the former, will serve the turn, the people ('tis like) will be so fare from sticking at that, as 'tis some Question to whom 'twould be more acceptable (the King or them?) the people by the Cavaliers clamourous and cunning suggestions, and the advantages you have given thereto (through the unsettled, endless, and fruitless ways of trouble you have held them in) being already pretty well possessed, and by that time like to be further persuaded against you, as if in all this War you had merely cozened them; so as you are like to have their hate no less (as for abusing them) than the Kings for opposing him.  
If to secure that little advantage to public interest (which in the present way you will have gained) or rather to prevent a total loss of all thereupon, you continue a sufficient strength, and therewith Taxes and Impositions to maintain it; those, as they are always grievous to the people, so they will (after the peace supposed to be settled) be so much the more discontenting by how much they may be then deemed unnecessary; for the King, having in the terms of Accommodation, granted what yourselves did ask, and therein such supposed security, as that you need not fear new troubles (though few will consider wherein that little security does lie) or at least (by his yielding as it were for peace sake, to all your demands) having given (in the people's apprehensions) such assurances of his love to peace, as that no danger of new war or trouble seems to be feared from him; in this case the continuance of Forces and Taxes will surely be thought no further needful for any public end (for, in common judgement, if War made Soldiers needful, then surely Peace must render them needless.) And therefore it will be aptly thought (if yet Soldiers be kept up, and Taxes continued) it is sure either for the gain, or advantage, or some private design of those that continue them, And upon these grounds (with unwillingness and backwardnesse to pay Taxes, and discontents at the burden of them) there must naturally grow up jealousies and heart-burnings against those that require them. These to foment and inflame to the height, and thereby to sweeten and endear the King with the people, will be his and the Cavaliers surest play, and otherwise to sit that while (if they have the patience) as still as Lambs. How colourable and plausible will it be, for them to suggest, and how apt for the people to receive, That the King is no way to be blamed for any of those burdens, he (Good man) has yielded to any thing, and done what he could, that there might be no need of them, and now he gives no consent to them, but the Parliament does them without him, and have bound up and excluded him from his wont Negative Voice therein, otherwise he would refuse and hinder them; but being not in power to help the People, he can only pity them in these things; And now they may see what they gain by their Parliaments, or how much it is to their common prejudice (as well as the Kings,) to have the King in any particular ex●●●ded from his Negative Voice, and the Parliament free to proceed in aught without him. And thus easily may the people (from their common unwillingness to part with Money (though for their real safety) be at once inflamed into a refusal and opposition therein, and deluded into a resentment of that which is the King's interest, as if it were their own, and so engaged with and for him and his Party; as having one common Cause with themselves. And if thus they be once heightened but into a resolved withholding of payments for the maintenance of that necessary strength you keep, for the common safety and peace, you must then either give the King his End and advantage, (as is before expressed) in dissolving your Forces, or else use extraordinary ways of power and rigour towards the People, to enforce such necessary payments, which will still enrage them higher against you, and serve to endear and engage them more to the King and his interest (colourably) in point of their Liberties then, as well as their ease before; until at last the People (for both) being raised against you, and therein joining with, and being headed by the King and his Party (whose interest so far seems one with theirs) you (unless you'll give up all) must come to make a War against the poor deceived people for that which is really their own cause: And the King by the People (as it were for their proper Liberties and Interest) may make War against you, to th'erecting of his own, and th'overthrow of the common Interest, both yours and theirs. For solution of which seeming Riddle, much needs not to be said, since that you contend for is, their general, Fundamental, and perpetual Liberties, for the preservation whereof you'll be forced to press upon them in particular matters, against their present ease and Freedoms; and the People being ordinarily more affected with the latter (as more immediate and sensible) and less with the former (which are more remote and only intelligible,) The King closing with them under pretence of the latter, (which they can feel) may easily engage them, to the prejudice of the former, (which they hardly discern.)  
By what we have here said, it may (by the way) appear how much it is for the King's interest and advantage (since he cannot carry all by force or war) to make a Peace on any terms, though in words never so much to the diminution of His Power, if thereby He can but secure Himself, and get into His Seat again; and consequently we may the better guess, how far Conversion or Conviction hath place in His present yielding to things He hath so often said and sworn He never would; and in His granting now, at the motion of His English Parliament, what He hath so oft denied at the pressing instance of both Kingdoms: For, having sufficient proof of your present Forces, that they will neither be drawn to serve His turn themselves, nor easily suffer others that would; and having found in the last Summer's Design, that it would not perfectly take with the Body of the People, to cry down your Army (though with decrying of Taxes to boot) while no seeming Peace was settled (no, though with the Cry for their Disbanding, they cried up Peace and a Treaty in order to it) He therefore now sees He must clap up a Peace on what terms soever, and (that done) His way is clear: The Parliament than may easily and soon be put to it, to denude themselves of their Strength in a Disbanding, and so set Him even with themselves again, or else (if they refuse) the People may be wrought to undo all for Him (whatever He hath granted) without His appearing for His own Interest to make any breach. And as upon this single ground many Nations before us (by like Accommodations with their beaten Tyrants) have from the fairest attempts and hopes of Liberty, fallen to an utter loss of it, yea to an absolute Bondage, and been made the Instruments thereof themselves: So by this one consideration (though there were no more) it may appear, how easy it is for any Prince, and particularly for ours (after such an Accommodation made, and Himself restored) to find, or work out advantages, whereby to overthrow what He hath granted, raise His own Interest higher, and depress the Public lower than ever before: And yet we have touched but one of those many advantages that, in such case, lie clear before Him. We might reflect upon that of His numerous party engaged by Interest, Necessity, and otherwise, to serve Him so long as He remains in possibility to Head them; towards whom proceed have been such, as have served to embitter and enrage them unto, and yet not to disable or discourage them from further Attempts against you, and towards whom (by His continuing King) you will be the more necessitated to proceed still upon the same strain in both Respects. We might mention also their great Families and relations, and their Interest of Influences within the Kingdom, and we might enlarge upon the consideration of the two other Kingdoms He hath to work by, from which we have found such powerful parties ready to serve His Interest, the one to make Prize and Advantage of this Kingdom, the other (at least) to deliver themselves from your Yoke, by helping to put His upon your and our Necks; All which, if they were to be feared, when He hath been in no capacity to Head them (as in the last Summer's War) then much more when He shall be; and though they be much to be feared in relation to His heading of them, while He, by His supposed impunity (what ever He does) hath encouragement to make all possible Trial of them, and they hopes, That if ever He prevail, He may make them amends, or procure their impunity at last; yet (that being once confuted by an Example of Justice upon Him for such Attempts) they would not then be (in Divine considerations) at all, or (in Prudential considerations) not so much to be feared, in relation to His Posterities heading of them. Besides these, we cannot but consider much more the vast possibilities, after His Restitution, to make Parties, Factions and Divisions amongst yourselves, and your now Adherents, and to set one against another, to make one betray another, by one to ruin another, and (by making use of all Interests) to set up His own above all. Have not you found Him at this play all along? And do not all men acknowledge Him most exquisite at it? If He have had the faculty to avail much in this kind when at distane from you, will He not much more when so near you, amongst you in your Bosoms and Counsels?  
For Divisions (we speak it with depth of sadness) He needs not come to make any amongst you, but to use them; they abound woefully already: And for His Opportunities of Advantage by them, they are great, beyond conception.  
First, From the Jealousies which each party is apt to have of the others strengthening themselves, to the prejudice of the other by Conjunction with Him and His, and which He and His Creatures have a faculty to feed in each of them, It's more than probable, That each party will be apt to strive, which shall most and first comply with Him: Have not you and we seen sad Experiences of this already? Give us leave to be the more affectionately sensible of this, as having had some Experience of Temptations towards it amongst ourselves (we say) Temptations towards it from the King and His party, as strong and substile as are imaginable, though (we bless God, by whom) we were preserved in our Integrity, and not given up to, but delivered from such wretched Apostasy. And we can truly say, That although through the Example of others partly necessitating us for the present prevention of that mischief to the Public they were running into in that kind, as we apprehended) we were drawn into some Negative Compliances, tending to Moderation (which we thought to be, and in its place is a real good;) yet first, we never sought, but were sought unto, and notwithstanding all Overtures and Temptations, we did abhor the thought of, and still profestly refused any thing of Conjunction with Him or His, in relation to the Affairs of that time, or aught of private Contract or Trust with them.  
Secondly, What we declared of Moderation was but Hypothetical, with careful Caution, and saving for the public Interest (according to our then understanding of it.) And  
Thirdly, We aimed not at the strengthening of ourselves thereby, to the ruin of any persons or party opposed (nor did drive at any such end) but merely to prevent any such from strengthening themselves in that kind (as we feared) to the prejudice of the Public, as may appear by the tenor of the City's Engagement, with the Concomitants and Consequents thereof, and by our carriage both in relation thereto, and since that Danger was over: And yet however in that degree of Compliance admitted in that kind, we find matter of Acknowledgement before the Lord, concerning our Error, Frailty, Unbelief, and Carnal Counsels therein, and we bless him that preserved us from worse: But, on the other side, give us leave to fear (and we hearty wish (as to any honest soul) That it may be a caufless and mistaken fear) That from such private Jealousies, and the Animosities or Hate of one party against another (who once seemed to be engaged in one Common Cause against a Common Enemy) there have been on the part of others evil Compliances, Negative and Positive, yea (we doubt) Contracts and Conjunctions too, by some sought, by others entertained with Him and His party (even while the acknowledged Enemy) to the neglect or dispending of the common public Interest, merely for the upholding or strengthening of their own, and the ruin of the party particularly opposed.  
We cannot but be sensible of this, because we have felt the effects of it in the loss of many our dear innocent Friends lives, with the hazard of our own in the last Summer's War: For even from this Root (as we have more than conjectural Grounds to understand) The Revolt in Wales had its Rise and Growth, The Scotish Invasion had its Foundation and Invitation, The Revolt of the Ships, The Rebellion in Kent, Essex, etc. and the several Tumults, Rise and Disturbances in and about London and the Southern parts had their Instigation and Encouragement; and from the same this miserable ensnaring Treaty, its conception and birth: And if from the divisions we have, such destructive compliances and conjunctions have been entertained with, and such advantages given to Him and His party, while professed and acknowledged Enemies, what worse may we not expect of that kind, when by a Peace made, they shall have the Reputation of friends, to give countenance and confidence thereunto?  
To conclude this point (concerning His advantages after accommodation and restitution, to overthrow or prejudice the public Interest) we'll confess our greatest fears, from the consideration of the Act for this Parliaments unlimited continuance, wherein (besides divisions amongst those that are, or profess to be for the public) if He shall ever be able by particular successions of new Burgesses, according to the present constitution, or any other way, to form a prevailing or balancing party for His Interest in the House of Commons (which even there He seems to have bid fair for already, and as to the Lords, we'll move no Question) we may then justly yield England's Liberties for defunct, when that which should be the Conservative, shall be turned indeed the Bane, and yet (it being in the place and repute of the only Conservative) we shall (through that Act) be debarred from change of Medicine, or use of other Remedy, yea, from the renewing or taking fresh choice of Medicine in the same kind, but must keep to that old Mass, which such putrefaction will have rendered deadly, and will probably vitiate all particular Additions of fresh ingredients that shall be made, while the old leven shall remain predominant. Neither can we see any possible help in the Case after his Restitution, though you should be willing to lay down your power: For indeed, to set a Period to this Parliament, and not therewith provide for a certain succession of Parliaments, and the certainty of their sitting also (without dependence on the King's will) were to leave the Kingdom without assurance of any remedy, or (at least) of power therein to help at all, and so in like condition as before this Parliament: And to make provision for such a succession, and certainty of sitting of future Parliaments, without like provision for a more due constitution, by more equal Elections (freed from such dependence on prerogative Grants, or from being so subject to prerogative Commands, as now by the number and nature of Burgessships' they stand) were to render the succession less hopeful or safe, or (at least) subject to no less corruption in the same kind, than the Constitution of the present is; And you having not in this Treaty propounded any provision for any of these things (which we dare boldly affirm, are of highest concernment to the vindication and preservation of public Interest in the very Fundamentals of it) if you go on to make a Peace upon such terms, as if this Parliament were to continue for ever, and set the rest of all our hopes upon that Basis: We may justly presume, That when a Peace is made, and the King testored, if afterwards you would come to considerations of laying down your Power, and making such provisions for succession, as is before expressed, The King (whose consent you still seem to make necessary to such things (though 'tis like He would readily consent to be rid of this Parliament, so as to have no more but at his Call for their meeting, and Will for their continuance; or perhaps so, as to have no better provision for the one, or larger for the other, than the Triennial Bill, yet, as to full certainty in the one, or sufficient enlargement in the other (without relation to His will) and much less as to the taking away of Burgessships' dependent on His grant, and subject to His, and His great men's command, and the reducing of Elections to full equality and freedom (we say) on such terms we may well presume (from the reason and nature of the King's Interest) He will not willingly (when after Peace made He needs not) give up His hopes of or against this Parliament; but rather than He will make, or bring upon Himself and Posterity such an Entail of Parliaments as He can never hope to avoid, and those to be so independent on His Will for their meeting or sitting (as he can never hope to avoid) and constituted so equally according to the Interest of the people (as He can never hope, or cannot design how to pack to His own) He will prefer and stand to His fairer hopes of making His party good with this Parliament one way or other, viz. Either in and by it (by making a party in it as before expressed) or else against it, by making use of discontents and impatience in the people towards it, and of divisions within itself, at last to destroy and overthrow it, and so to deliver His Crown once for all, from Wardship (as he counts it) to Parliamentary power, which, by th'other Conditions might have been perpetual: And if either in the one kind or the other He prevail upon this Parliament, His Monarchy and our Slavery will be absolute, and (probably) for ever; in the one by seeming Authority of Parliament (made immortally the same) in the other by th'utter extinction of it.  
But to proceed from probabilities of danger, to show the certain insecurity and perpetual prejudice to public Interest, that an Accommodation with Him, and Restitution of Him in the present case does imply: Suppose the best Constitutions and strictest Laws imaginable in any State, yet their insufficiency and impotency, as to the preserving of public Interest, without a power to punish those that violate it and them, or where persons in power to prejudice the same (especially if insixt and lasting power) shall stand privileged from being punishable what ever they do, is obvious to each considering man (that power of punishment, and the having of it in the most trusty hands, and no particular persons to be exempt from their Justice, being that essential part of public Interest, which is the fence and guard of all the rest in the depraved state of mankind) Now, in our present case, after so many, so great and lasting violations thereto, committed by the King, and by His procurement, and after His so long and obstinate maintenance thereof, and persistence therein, and so many refusals of that poor satisfaction and security you now desire, in so much as you once resolved against any more Addresses (we say, after all this) for you, the Supreme Judicatory of the Kingdom (when He is through the just hand of God in your power to do Justice upon) yet still to decline that way, and in stead thereof, to seek again to Him your Prisoner in the way of Treaty, to receive what satisfaction and security you can get as Concessions from HIm: and thereupon (having only some few instruments submitted to justice, and that by His Concession too) to readmit Himself to the Throne with Safety, Freedom and Honour: What can this be understood to speak less, then that (as Himself and His party for Him have still expressly assumed, and as the pretence and ways of your proceed towards Him heretofore, have too much employed) He is indeed above any humane Justice, and not accountable to, or not punishable by any power on earth, what ever he does: And to, besides the bar to any present proceeding of Justice against Himself (whose one example in that kind made, and not afterwards made ineffectual again, as others of that kind have been, by the flattery or degeneration of succeeding ages, would be of more terror and avail, than the execution of His whole party, yea, than all the satisfaction and security, verbal or literal, that you can obtain or imagine without it) you would also (by such exemption of HIm, and in such a case) proclaim the lke perpetual exemption to Him and His Posterity, what ever they shall do, or in what ever case (since none can be imagined more pregnant or ripe for justice then this already is) and would therein give the most authentic Testimony and Seal that ever was, to all these destructive Court Maxims concerning the absolute impunity of Kings, their accountableness to none on earth, and that they cannot err, do wrong, etc. which principles (in the sense to which they are applied) as they were begot by the blasphemous arrogancy of Tyrants upon servile Parasites, and fostered only by slavish or ignorant people, and remain in our Law-Books, as Heir-looms only of the Conquest; so they serve for nothing but to establish that which begot them (Tyranny) and to give Kings (who so far as they claim otherwise then by Conquest, are but Ministers entrusted for Righteousness and Peace) the highest Privilege, Encouragement and Invitation to do wrong and make War, even upon their own people, as their corrupt wills or lusts shall prompt them: If therefore our King's claim by right of Conquest, God hath given you the same against him, and more righteous, by how much that on their parts was extended to a forcible Dominion over the people (which originally or naturally they had not) and ours but to a deliverance from that Bondage, into that state of Right and Freedom which was naturally and morally due to us before: If they claim from immediate Divine Designation, let them show it; if from neither, but as by consent entrusted by and for the people, let them then embrace and partake the conditions of such, and not as if the whole people were made only for themm, and to serve their lusts, or had (if not their being, yet) all their civil endowments by and from them. But to return to our purpose, if you (by such Proceed as you are about towards the King in the present case, shall confirm and harden him and his posterity in their assumed privileges of impunity, etc. (what ever is or shall be done by them) what new agreement, or other Bond of man's framing, can you suppose to hold them, and especially himself that has broke the strongest of that kind already (and we appeal to your consciences upon the reasons before given, what inward change you ●●●de to be trusted in,) but that he and they (upon the same confidence of im●unity to themselves, what ever they do, or however they succeed) will still be ready to take all advantages, and try all means (so long as they can find any Instruments that will serve them) to set up their own interest, to the prejudice of the Public, a heretofore, and especially to avenge or vindicate themselves and it against the supposed wrong of enforced Concessions?  
And why shall we not think they will find Instruments still to venture for them (notwithstanding your punishing of some in that kind) since while your own proceed admit themselves unpunishable? Such Instruments may hope that (at the worst of success) they'll save all, or most of them, as now; and (themselves still surviving to renew the quarrel) it may well be hoped, that if ever they prevail, the Instruments that shall survive, and heirs of the rest will be repaired with honour to boot, so that the adventure of each Instrument in that kind (being but as of one amongst a multitude, where the most are sure to escape,) is of fare less hazard than a Soldiers venture in a field battle, and the hazard that is (especially to necessitous or ambitious men,) is abundantly compenst by those hopes which the certain impunity (besides probable advantages) of their head does give: We are sure, that, as to any Instruments venturing again for you and the public, the hazards infinitely greater, and in humane considerations, no encouragements comparable to those, which (after ●ll year Proposition-justice against his Instruments,) will yet, upon this ground, remain to them for any further Engagements in behalf of their great & unpunishable Master. And therefore, as in all cases of like rebellions, or civil wars, the prudence of most Nations and ages (as well as the Justice of the thing,) has lead to fix the exemplary punishment, first upon the capital Leader, and upon others, as nearest to him, and not to punish the inferiors, and exempt the chief; so in this your case, 'tis most clear, that to fix your Justice first upon the head, and thereby let his successors see, what themselves may expect (if they attempt the like,) may hopefully discourage them, from heading any more what Instruments they might find in the like quarrel, and so is like to be a real security (when such Instruments cannot find an head.) but to punish only Instruments, and let the head (by whose power, and in whose in terest all has been done,) not only go free, but stand in perpetual privilege and impunity to head such instruments again, as oft as he can find opportunity, and get any to serve him, is a way so fare from security, as it leads indeed to endless trouble and hazard, or the perfect loss of all. And besides, in point of Justice, with what Conscience inferior Ministers can be punished, and the principal set free, yea, restored to dignity and honour, for whose only interest, in whose only quarrel, and by whose Commissions and Commands they have acted, (which they might perhaps conceive to oblige, or at least to excuse them,) for our parts, since we have seriously weighed it, we cannot understand; we are sure it seems a most unequal and partial way of Justice, suitable to those aforesaid corrupt or abused Court-Maximes, whereon alone it has been grounded, (As that the King can do no wrong, etc.) And indeed what ever grounds or reasons can be imagined to exempt Kings from humane Justice, or to excuse them when they wilfully give Commissions and commands unto their inferior Ministers to do evil, (which we are sure can be no less than something of divinity, and absolute independency (as to men,) supposed to be in them,) The same Principles (if admitted and fully weighed) would equally extend to absolve and indemnify those Ministers for what they do in pursuance of such commissions and Commands, yea and bring those under condemnation too, that should forcibly oppose him or them therein: We would at least feign hear one princile sufficient for the one, which would not, by rational deduction, extend to both the other. And if there be none such, then, we beseech you consider, whether your readmission of the King in the present case and manner (without so much as his subjecting to Judgement or Trial,) will not be so fare from security, as that it will not only enervate the best fence of public interest (the power of punishing violators of it,) but in consequence shake the Foundations of all you have done in the war, and overturn or invalid all you seem to obtain in the peace.  
Upon this, and the rest of the considerations aforegoing, we crave leave to believe, that an accommodation with the King in the way and Terms you are upon, or any at all, as the case now stands, that shall imply his restitution, or shall not provide for his subjection to Trial and Judgement,  
Would first, not be just before God, or man, nor hopefully good; but many ways evil, and so not  by any honest heart that well considers it.  
Secondly, would not be safe, but full of hazard and danger, yea, certain prejudice, disadvantage, and destruction, both to the public interest in Question, and to the persons that have engaged for it (except such as, by base Apostasy from it, and treacherous services for the King against it, have or shall have emerited their pardons.  
And thirdly, If in another way or case it possibly could be safe, (which we see not,) yet in the present Treaty, and condition the King's in, it cannot.  
Now if any observe and object that the grounds aforegoing (upon which we conclude thus,) would extend as well against any accommodation with him since his Person came into the Parliaments power, or at least against any restitution of him thereupon (without his first submitting to judgement, and a change of heart and principles) and consequently would have served as well against that accommodation with him, & restitution of him, which the Army seemed once to plead for; we shall confess it, as to the main, and we have only this to say;  
1. That your whole pretence and way of proceeding towards him before, and at that time, the state you have kept him in, your particular engagement to the Kingdom of Scotland for another address to him, and your preparation towards the same at that time, had wholly led us on in the supposition of an Accommodation to be still endeavoured with him, and to that supposition only, our then Overtures to you were framed, and you had not then (as since) by your votes of No farther Addresses, and your Reasons for them, cleared our judgements from that former mist, and led us out to the thoughts of other ways of security against him, nor had pointed towards the way (as thereupon you have done) in taking off his state, and close imprisoning his Person.  
And we confess that since our thoughts have been thus set free, and led out that way (besides the good reasons you gave, and what they further discovered or employed, and besides what other pens have enlarged thereupon) the more we ourselves have considered, the more and further it hath pleased God to let us see, beyond what we did before: So that your bare retracting of Votes, or changing your course (without better, or any reasons giving) cannot put out the light which your former Votes with reasons have let in, and God hath given his seal and increase unto.  
2. Your then Counsels and (with them) our thoughts, being so fixed upon that way of Addresses to him, we thought in lawful for us to tender to your Consideration some things to be provided for therein, which were of highest and most fundamental concernment to the public interest, and not thought or not touched on in your former Addresses or then-preparations (as concerning the Succession, Constitution, & clearing the power of Parliaments in future, etc.) which accordingly we propounded to be taken in with most of your former Propositions, and what ever we expressed exclusively (as our private opinions at that time) yet our whole Overtures being but as Proposals to you, and not immediately to the KING; It was far from our Intentions (as it was apparently from our practice) to pre-judge or pre-clude your Counsels from any further or better provision for the public interest, or in any surer or better way.  
3. Since you had so fare engaged in the way of Addresses, we had some apprehensions then (as from the Covenant and other Considerations) That to acquit yourselves and Adherents before God and the World (in relation to the snare you seemed to be in) It did something lie upon you to make one Address for all, upon things concerning purely the public interest & only Essentials thereunto, without mixture of any by matters, from which either you with safety to the public could possibly recede, or against which he might have colour to boggle (as it were) from Conscience or other specious pretences, and not his own interest only; that so you might at once make a full and clear Trial, whether you could (with and by his consent) have such security to the public interest, as that you might with the preservation and safety thereof preserve also His Person and Honour (as in your Covenant) or whether he would refuse that security to public interest merely for the upholding of his own in opposition thereto, without other cavils, pretexts, or evasions: And accordingly, though we may truly say, we never pressed you so fare in point of Address to him, as that you did ever actually make any, at our instance, or according to our overtures; yet (after that he had escaped from the Army, and quitted any pretext of obligation upon it, in relation to their desire of any such Address) you did of yourselves make such an Address in the render only of four Bills, concerning singly the public interest, and but a small part of it, merely for necessary security to it, and yourselves, in order to a Treaty for all therest; In which tender of yours we found clear satisfaction in our Reasons and Consciences, as to our aforesaid scrupulous apprehensions: And answerably (when you upon his refusal resolved against any more Addresses to him, & began to take another course with him,) we did upon that very ground declare our acquiescence in your Votes and our Resolutions of adherence to you therein, (as may appear in the Paper then presented to you from the Army:) And yet when we have said all this, or what ever might more be said in our excuse, we will upon the grounds here before laid down (which have since been more clearly made out to Us) acknowledge it our weakness, our error, and our fault, both as to the matter and terms we propounded for an Address to him (in respect of deficiency or insufficiency therein;) and also as to our desire of any such Address at all, as the Case then stood (in respect of the needlessness and insecurity thereof, and want of Justice therein) although we see and own the providence of God, who ordered it for the best, that you did make such an one.  
Now if yet any shall objet the Covenant, as perpetually obliging to endeavour the preservation of the King's Person and authority, and consequently not allowing any such way of security against him, as would be to the hurt of his Person, or prejudice of his Authority, and so concluding us under a necessity of perpetual Addresses to him for security, until he give it, as being the only way consistent with the preservation of his Person and Authority.  
To this we answer; That indeed the covenant, heaping together several distinct interests (which are, or possibly may come to be inconsistent, or one destructive to the other, or at least may be so made use of) and yet engaging positively for them all, without expressing clearly and unquestionably, which is chief and perpetual: and (for the rest) how fare, and upon what conditions the Covenanter shall be obliged to them, and what shall disoblige him, we find it is (as other promissory oather of that kind) apt to be made a very snare, serving to draw in many of several judgements and affections, each in respect to that interest therein engaged for, which himself does most affect, and so those that make least conscience of the Oath, make but an advantage of it upon all occasions, to cry up that interest which themselves prefer (though to the destruction or prejudice of the rest, yea of that which is really the main and best,) while those that make most conscience of the Oath, and affect the principal and honestest part in it, are oft withheld from what's just and necessary in relation thereunto, being staggered in regard of the prejudice it may be to the rest, to which jointly they seem obliged. But this Covenant, as it is drawn (though it have something of that ensnaring nature, yet as to this point) has not left the takers without an honest way out; or if it had, yet through the providence of God the snare is broken, and they may escape.  
For,  
1. The Covenant engaging to the matters of Religion, and public interests primarily and absolutely (without any limitation) and after that to the preservation of the King's Person and Authority; but with this restrict on, [viz. In the preservation of the true Religion, and Liberties of the Kingdoms.] In this case, though a Caviller might make it a question, yet who will not rationally resolve it, That the preceding matters of Religion, & the public Interest, are to be understood as the principal and supreme matters engaged for, and that of the King's Person and Authority; as inferior and subordinate to the other? And (if so) than we appeal to all reasonable men, whether those words [In the preservation of the true Religion and Liberties] can be understood, as a Restriction of our endeavours for preservation of Religion and Liberties (so as the same may not be endeavoured in any way that would be to the prejudice of his Person or Authority) or not (sure'y) as a restriction to the engagement for preservation of his Person and Authority, (so as to oblige thereto no further, nor in any other way then shall be consistent with the preservation and defence of the true Religion and Liberties of the Kingdoms,) Yea might it not justly be so understood, ●hat th'obligation to preserve his Person and Authority, should be fulfilled in (as well as not extended further then) the preservation of Religion and Liberties? In some of these senses those words must be understood, or else they have none, but are valne words, making a vain oath; If they were to be understood in the first sense, than (we are sure) the whole proceed of both Kingdoms in making and maintaining war against him for preservation e●ther of Religion or Liberties, were questionable for breach of the Covenant; since that way of preserving them did tend probably to the destruction, & was without any safe provision for the defence either of his person or of that authority that can properly be called his, or understood in conjunction with his person, but that therein his person might probably have been destroyed under the sword, or by a bullet (yea was ordinarily endeavoured to be so as well as the persons of others, in Arms with him) & that authority of his was certainly opposed, and endeavoured to be destroyed thereby in stead of being defended. If these words be to be understood in either of the latter senses, than it follows first, That if, by reason or experience (the ordinary light men are in human things to walk by) we find that the making of peace with him, and therein the preserving or restoring of his person or authority, is (as the case happens) either an unrighteous thing (in respect of the blood and spoil he hath caused in opposing that Covenant ever since it was made and tendered, and of his never coming in, or ceasing that mischief, till by force reduced, and by the hand of God delivered into the power of your justice,) and in these or other respects, not consistent with true Religion, or else that (no inward conviction, remorse, or change of heart and principles rationally appearing in him) it be not safe, but full of visible danger (if not certainly destructive) to Religious or public interest, or to the persons that have entered into that Covenant, or engaged in the common Cause, then surely (by the Covenant itself) the preservation of his person or authority is not to be endeavoured so fare, or in such a way; and consequently such a peace with him, in such a case, is not to be sought, or admitted, or (at least) the Covenant obligeth not to it, but against it; and whether the present case and consequences be not such, we refer to our several Reasons before given. Secondly, from that sense it also follows, That if, by the same light, we find, that (supposing no peace to be made with him) the continued preservation of his person in your hands (though close in Carisbrook Castle) or the letting him go whither he will to preserve himself, and your forbearing to bring him to account or judgement for aught he has done, (when God has so given him into your power, and given you so clear grounds of proceeding against him) would be either an unrighteous thing, (and so inconfistent with true Religion) or so fare inconsistent with the preservaton and defence of Religion and Liberties, or with your covenanted utmost endeavour to preserve them, as that it would visibly expose them, and those that have engaged in covenant for them, to perpetual danger, give perpetual occasion and advantage so new wars and designs, to the destruction of them, or to the multiplying of blood and oppression upon the kingdoms, give the King and his posterity a perpetual privilege of impunity, & therein an invitation or encouragement to multiply attempts of the like or greater mischiefs (though to th'overthrow of all Religion and Liberties) yea, would give encouragement also unto Instruments to serve them in such attempts, and thus would harden the hearts both of them and their Instruments in such things to the ruin or perpetual prejudice and danger of those higher things covenanted for, and persons covenanting, and (lastly) would in consequence debar you from that which is the best fence, yea essential to the defence of public Liberties, and positively covenanted so (viz. the punishment of any the violaters thereof, if his Ministers, and by his Commission) or would render your necessary proceeding against such unequal or scandalous, then surely to the exempting of him from justice and continued preservation of his person, so far, or in such a way, and in such a case the Covenant cannot be understood to oblige, but rather to the contrary; Or if it might be so understood, doth it not call for explanation to clear it from being understood in so wicked a sense? Yea, if it did (by the advantage of words) extend to such a sense past explanation, and if so (through error, inconsideration or deceit in the framing of it, or through flattery, evil custom, or unbeleif and carnal policy in the passing of it,) you had literally engaged yourselves, and drawn in others to be engaged unto so wicked and mischievous a thing; did it not call for Repentance when you find such wickedness in it? And rather then unnecessarily to continue your selus, and hold others under, but a colour of Obligation, to a thing so evil, so full of prejudice and danger unto, and so inconsistent with the security of so many other unquestionably good things (to which in the same Covenant, as well as by immutable duty you stand obliged,) would it not call for your utmost consideration and endeavour (so fare as providence has left you any occasion, without sin or wrong) to extricate and clear yourselves and others from such a snare? In order to which we proceed and say.  
2. That whatever, or how expressly soever the Covenant may seem to have engaged unto, or possibly might have said or purported any thing in the King's behalf, or to his only benefit, yet (as God has ordered the business) it does not now oblige you at all before God or man, in that matter. For first, (considering it only as a Covenant betwixt man and man, as for the civil parts it is,) where many or several persons joining to make a mutual Covenant or agreement, do therein covenant for some things to the good and union of themselves amongst themselves (who are present and parties to it,) and withal, do make a covenanting clause therein, for something else, to the good or benefit of another person, not present, nor party to the agreement, but whom and whose interest (in regard of some concernment of his in their business, or from good affection to him and desire of peace with him) they would willingly provide for as well as for their own, to the end he might join with them in the Agreement, and partake the benefit thereof as well as themselves, (we say in such case) if the absent party, as he never required it, (so when 'tis tendered to him for his conjunction,) shall not accept the Agreement, but refuse to join in it, (and conceiving his Interest prejudiced thereby,) shall oppose it, and begin, prosecute and multiply contests with all the Covenanters about the matters contained in it; surely that person in so doing (as he keeps himself free and no way obliged thereby, as to what concerns the rest, who concluded it of their own heads, so) so he excludes himself from any claim to any benefit therefrom at their hands as to what concerns himself, while he continues so refusing and opposing; and by his once refusing upon a fair and full tender (though he had done no worse,) sets the other Covenanters free from any furher obligation, by virtue of that Covenant, as to what concerns his Interest or benefit therein, although the Covenant (as to other matters concerning the right and benefit of the Covenanters one from another,) stands still obliging and in force; and what ever they shall afterwards do to him, (though indeed,) contrary to the letter or intention of such clause in their Covenant on his behalf, yet it cannot by virtue of that Covenant, be understood as a wrong to him, and consequently, not a wrong to any other (before God or man,) since none but he (though it had been made or accepted as mutual) could challenge the benefit of it. Now whether this be not your case in relation to the King in this Covenant, witness your making and taking of it without and against his consent; witness his oft and continued refusals to accept or join in it, his opposing and fight against yourselves and others both in and for the taking and prosecuting of it; and as for the intention of putting that clause concerning him into the Covenant, (though made in his absence, and without his consent) It cannot by the general nature of such Covenants be understood to be, that by it yourselves should be obliged to that of his Interest absolutely (whether he would accept or join in the Covenant, or refuse and oppose it,) but only to exhibit your care and show how willing you were (yea, really to go as fare as you could therein) that he and his Interest (so fare as just,) might be provided for therein as well as your own and the Kingdoms; and that you had no Design to exclude or prejudice his, if he would accept and join in the Agreement as to the other; And even so the words added to and closing up that clause in the Covenant do import, viz. [That the world may bear witness with our Consciences of our loyalty, and that we have no thoughts or intentions to diminish his Majesty's just power and greatness.]  
Secondly, (considering it as an Oath) the form of an Oath added to that of a Covenant, makes it no other than a Covenant still, but taken as in the presence of God, and only adds the calling of God to witness, as to the truth of your intentions and faithfulness of your endeavours to perform what it, as a Covenant, obligeth unto; and look how fare it in the nature of a Covenant, (as to any particular matter) obligeth, so fare, and no further, or otherwise, doth that calling of God to witness engage him the more, to avenge any falsehood in your intentions, or unfaithfulness in your endeavours to perform it? and this is all the enforcement which that form of an Oath addeth to that of a Covenant, without obliging to any further matter, or for any longer or more absolute continuance than it; as a Covenant doth oblige; and therefore wherein, and upon what supposition soever the Obligation ceaseth as a Covenant, that enforcement also ceaseth as an Oath; so that if, as a Covenant it oblige not to his benefit upon supposition of his refusal or opposal, upon the same, it enforceth nought to his benefit as an Oath.  
If any object, that in what we have here said, we (who profess to dislike the imposing of the Covenant with any penalty or Prosecution against refusers) do seem to take advantage against his Majesty for refusals; we answer, we say not, for, but upon; And if no other penalty be ever put upon Covenant-refusers, save not to claim benefit by it, we shall ever acknowledge that to be most just and reasonable against ourselves, (if refusers.)  
Having thus endeavoured to Remonstrate the danger and evil of the way you are in, and cleared the way unto what we have to propose, we shall with the same plainness and faithfulness give you our apprehensions of the remedies; for which purpose upon all the reasons and considerations aforegoing, we proceed to offer, as followeth.  
First, we conceive and hope, that from what hath before been said, you may find abundant cause to forbear any further proceeding in this evil and most dangerous Treaty, and to return to your former grounds in the Votes of Non-addresses, and thereupon proceed to the settling and securing of the kingdom without and against the King, upon such foundations as hereafter are tendered; but if notwithstanding all the evils and dangers remonstrated to lie even in the Treaty itself, you will yet proceed in such an evil way, we shall at least desire that you make sure to avoid that main venom and mischief attending it, viz. The King's restitution with impunity, etc. and that imperfect bargaining for partial justice against inferior offenders; And for the avoidance of these, we propound,  
1. That you would reject those demands of the King, sent to you on his and his Parties behalf, and (especially in relation to that concerning his restitution or return to London with freedom, etc.) that it may be expressly declared and provided by you, that, notwithstanding any thing concluded or to be concluded in this Treaty, the Person of the King may, and shall be proceeded against in a way of justice, for the blood spilt, and the other evils and mischiefs done by him or by his Commission, Command or Procurement, and in order thereto shall be kept in safe custody as formerly.  
2. That for other delinquents you would lay aside that particular bargaining Proposition, which as we understand, the King hath refused in the terms you offered, and whereby all your justice and mercy too would be rendered, (both for the matter, qualifications and circumstances thereof) to be dependant upon particular contract, with, and grant from the King, and not upon the judicial power of the Kingdom in Parliament; and that in stead thereof it may be declared and provided by you, that all Delinquents shall subject and submit to the aforesaid judicial power, to be thereby proceeded against, according to justice, or with mercy, as cause shall appear, and that none shall be exempt or protected therefrom, nor pardonable by any other power, then that of the Kingdom in Parliament, by which they shall be judged; this we propound, to the end that public justice, and the interest of the Kingdom therein, may be vindicated, salved and satisfied, and yet (when that is so provided for, (and in some fittest examples of justice upon chief offenders,) shall be effectuated) we wish as much mercy and moderation to the generality, upon their submission, as formerly we have both desired and used, or as can consist with the public interest and safety, and with competent satisfaction to those that have engaged and suffered for it.  
If (in relation to the former of these Provisions, viz. concerning the Person of the King,) it be thought an unreasonable or unbeseeming demand in a Personal Treaty, that one Party, (after Concessions to the other in all the matters of right, and other things in question,) should agree, besides, to be punished himself for having made the past contest about them, we confess it might be thought so in a Treaty, betwixt Parties standing both free, and in an equal balance of power or possibilities to obtain the cause; but so fare as a Treaty can rationally or properly be with a Party wholly subdued, captivated and imprisoned, or in the power of the other to such a Treaty, such demands, (if otherwise just) are very suitable and proportionable, and to any Treaty.  
It seems surely, no less suitable to demand the principal to justice then the accessories, (that were but his necessary and proper Agents in the Contest,) especially where he is as much, (if not more) within the other Parties power as they, and where it is not so much a demanding him to justice, as a Proviso, that (being already in the power of their justice,) they will not exempt him from it.  
Thus therefore the power of justice and mercy being saved or reserved, we proceed in order to the actual dispensing thereof, in relation to the late wars, and thereby to peace with God, and present quiet amongst men, to propound as followeth,  
1. That that capital and grand Author of our troubles, the Person of the King, by whose Commissions, Commands or Procurement, and in whose behalf, and for whose interest only, (of will and power,) all our wars and troubles have been, (with all the miseries attending them,) may be speedily brought to justice for the treason, blood and mischief, he is therein guilty of.  
2. That a timely and peremptory day may be set for the Prince of Wales and the Duke of York to come in and render themselves, by which time (if they do not) that then they may be immediately declared incapable of any Government, or trust in this kingdom, or the Dominions thereunto belonging, or of any kind of Right within the same, and thence to stand exiled for ever, as enemies and Traitors, to die without mercy, if ever after found and taken therein; (or if by the time limited, they or either of them do render themselves, that then the Prince for his Capital Delinquency (being in appearance next unto his Fathers) may either be proceeded against in justice, or remitted, according as upon his appearance he shall give satisfaction or not; concerning his being drawn into the rebellious engagements, he has appeared to head; and the Duke, as he shall give satisfaction or not concerning his carriage in and since his going out of the kingdom (being without leave) and in opposition or Contempt of the Parliament, and to the prejudice of the public Peace; may accordingly be considered as to future trust, or not; But (however) that the Estate and Revenue of the Crown may be Sequestered, and all the matter of costly pomp or state suspended for a good number of years, while the desolations and spoils of the poor people made, by and in behalf of that family, and for that vain interest (the state and greatness thereof) may be in good measure repaired or recovered; And that the Revenue (saving necessary allowances for the children's mainteynance, and to old servants and creditors of the Crown, not Delinquents) and also the 100000. l. per annum, Voted to the Crown in Leiw of the Court of Wards, may for those years be disposed towards public charges, debts and damages for the easing and lessening of the people's Contributions towards the same; so as the Estates neither of the friends to public interest, nor alone of the inferior Enemies thereto may bear wholly the burden of that loss and charge, which by and for that Family, the Kingdom or the good people thereof have been or (for future security) shall be put unto.  
3. That for further satisfaction to public justice, Capital punishment may be speedily executed upon a competent number of his chief instruments also, both in the former and latter War, and (for that purpose) that some such, of both sorts, may be pitched upon to be made examples of justice in that kind, as are really in your hands or reach, so as their exception from pardon, may not be a mockery of Justice in the face of God and men.  
4. That exemplary Justice being done in Capital punishment upon the principal Author and some prime instruments of our late wars, and thereby the blood thereof expiated, and others deterred from future attempts of the like in either capacity; The rest of the Delinquents (English) in relation to the wars, may upon their submission and rendering themselves to Justice, have mercy extended to them for their lives, and that only Fines may be set upon them (with reasonable moderation, but with respect to public damages) and their persons further censured and declared to be incapable of any Office or place of power or public trust in the kingdom, or of having any voice in Elections thereto (at least) for a competent number of years; that also a short and peremptory day may be set, by which time all such Delinquents may have final warning to come in and render themselves to Justice, and to tender their submissions to such Fines and cesures as aforesaid, and, that such of them as shall so do by the day assigned, and shall (withal) pay in or secure their Fine, according to reasonable time given, may have their Sequestrations taken off, and be restored to their Estates; and that to all such (as also to all those that have already submitted to Fines or Compositions, and paid in, or secured the same) a general pardon may be granted, made and published by Parliament, extending to absolve them from any further censure, damage, trouble, or question, (either in the behalf of the public, or at the suit of any private person,) for any thing said or done in prosecution of, or in relation to the late War or troubles, and to restore them to all privileges, benefits, and immunities equally with other people (excepting only, the capacity to places of power or public trust, or to voices in Election thereunto as aforesaid) that so they may not (as heretofore,) after Fines or Compositions to the State for their Delinquency, remain subject to any man's action for any particular act of their Delinquency to their endless trouble or undoing, or the driving of them to desperate ways of public disturbance for their own preservation; but that such of them as will for future live in peace and subjection to the Laws and Government of the Nation, may enjoy the benefit thereof, and have quiet and protection under the same & their posterities, (yea, or themselves in time) partake fully and equally with others of the common Interest contended for, and obtained. But as for such Delinquents, who (having mercy tendered to them for life, as aforesaid) shall not by the day to be set, come in, and render themselves, submit, and pay, or secure their Fines as aforesaid, That it be declared, their Estates shall from that day be absolutely Confiscated, and sold, or disposed of wholly to the public use, and their persons to stand perpetually exiled (as Enemies and Traitors) and to die without Mercy, if ever after found and taken within the Kingdom, or the Dominions thereto belonging, and upon their default of appearance, etc. as before, or at the said day, That they be from thenceforth proceeded against accordingly.  
5. That the satisfaction of Arrears to the Soldiery, with other public Debts, and the competent reparation of public Damages (especially and primarily of such as voluntarily engaged for, and have constantly adhered to the common Cause, and suffered for the same) may be put into some orderly and equal, or proportionable way; wherein (as to Debts and Damages) care may be taken for some precedency of satisfaction to such, whose Loans, or losses appear to have been great, and livelyhoods small, so as they can worst bear the want, or delay: And towards these things (not impairing any other security already given for Arrears to the Soldiery, in an equal way, or for just Debts of other kinds) we propound, That the Fines, or Compositions of Delinquents may be disposed of, and employed to those uses only, as also the Confiscations and proceed of their Estates who shallbe excluded from pardon, or not come in by the day to be assigned, as in the last precedent Article.  
Now (after public justice, and therewith the present quieting of the Kingdom thus far provided for) we proceed in order, to the general satisfaction, and settling of the Kingdom, as followeth:  
1. That you would set some reasonable and certain period to your own power, by which time that great and supreme trust reposed in you, shall be returned into the hands of the People, from, and for whom you received it; that so you may give them satisfaction and assurance, that what you have contended for, against the King (for which they have been put to so much trouble, cost, and loss of blood) hath been only for their Liberties, and common Interest, and not for your own personal Interest, or power.  
2. That (with a period to this Parliament, to be assigned as short as may be, with safety to the Kingdom, and public Interest thereof) there may be a sound settlement of the peace, and future Government of the Kingdom, upon grounds of common Right, Freedom, and safety, to the effect here following:  
1. That from the end of this, there may be a certain succession of future Parliaments (Annual, or biennial) with secure provision,  
1. For the certainty of their meeting, sitting, and ending.  
2. For the equal distribution of Elections thereunto, to render the House of Commons, as near as may be, an equal Representative of the whole People electing.  
3. For the certainty of the People's meeting (according to such Distributions) to elect, and for their full freedom in elections, provided, That none who have engaged, or shall engage in War, against the right of Parliament, and interest of the Kingdom therein, or have adhered to the enemies thereof, may be capable of electing, or being elected (at least during a competent number of years) nor any other, who shall oppose, or not join in agreement to this settlement.  
4. For future clearing, and ascertaining the power of the said Representatives; in order to which, That it be declared, That (as to the whole interest of the People of England) such Representatives have, and shall have the supreme power and trust, as to the making of Laws, Constitutions, and Offices, for the ordering, preservation, and Government of the whole; and as to the altering, and repealing, or abolishing of the same, the making of War, or Peace; and as to the highest and final judgement, in all civil things, without further appeal to any created standing power, and that all the people of this Nation, and all Officers of justice, and Ministers of State (as such) shall, in all such things be accountable and subject thereunto, and bound and concluded thereby, provided, That,  
1. They may not censure, or question any man after the end of this Parliament, for any thing said or done in reference to the late Wars, or public differences, saving in execution of such determinations of this Parliament, as shall be left in force at the ending thereof, in relation to such as have served the King against the Parliament.  
2. They may not render up, or give, or take away any the foundations of common Right, Liberty or Safety contained in this settlement and Agreement. But that the power of these two things (last mentioned) shall be always understood to be reserved from, and not entrusted to the said Representatives.  
5. For liberty of entering dissents in the said Representatives, That, in case of corruption, or abuse in these matters of highest trust, the People may be in capacity to know who are free thereof, and who guilty, to the end only they may avoid the further trusting of such, but without further penalty to any for their free judgements there.  
2. That no King be hereafter admitted, but upon the election of, and as upon trust from the People, by such their Representatives, nor without first disclaiming and disavowing all pretence to a negative voice, against the determinations of the said Representatives, or Commons in Parliament; and that to be done in some certain form, more clear than heretofore in the Coronation Oath.  
These matters of general settlement (viz. That concerning a period to this Parliament, and the other particulars thencefollowing hitherto) we propound, to be declared and provided by this Parliament, or by the authority of the Commons therein, and to be further established by a general Contract, or Agreement of the People, with their subscriptions thereunto, and that (withal) it may be provided. That none may be capable of any benefit by the Agreement, who shall not consent and subscribe thereunto; nor any King be admitted to the Crown, or other person to any Office, or place of public trust, without express accord, and subscription to the same.  
We have thus plainly, and faithfully propounded our apprehensions, how the evil and danger of the present Treaty may in good measure be avoided, and our further conceptions of a way, wherein, hopefully through the blessing of God (if most men be not given up, some to unjust domination, or particular Interest, the rest to servitude) the Kingdom may be quieted, future disturbances prevented, the common Kights and Liberties provided for, and the Peace and Government of the Kingdom settled, to a just public Interest; and this we have set forth in such heads and particulars, which (if you'll but set aside, for the time, less important matters) may most of them be brought to effect, and the rest assured, and put into a good way of effect, within a few Months, so as you might then ease the Kingdom from the burden of the greatest part of that force, which otherwise (in case of Accommodation with the King) you will be necessitated, for a much longer time (probably for many years) to keep on, upon the public charge, unless, upon the Accommodation you would give up all to the King's power again, and expose those that have engaged against him, as sacrifices to his and the Cavaliers Revenge: And (for our parts) let but that way of justice be effectually prosecuted, and the settlement of the public Interest (upon such foundations as are afore propounded) be assured to us and the Kingdom, and put into a course of effect (which as we said before, might well be in a few months) and we shall not only embrace with cheerfulness, but shall with eagerness desire discharge from our present service, and shall be most ready to disband all, or part, as shall be thought fit, the Arrears of the soldiery being satisfied. We shall therefore earnestly desire, that these things may be minded, and prosecuted effectually, and that nothing may interrupt them, save what shall be for immediate and necessary safety; And that (to avoid interruptions from such things as are not necessary, or less proper for Parliamentary considerations or Debates) you would leave all private matters, and things of ordinary Justice and right, to the Laws and present proper Officers, and Administrations thereof, until better can be provided, and commit all ordinary matters of State to the manage of a fit Council of State (sufficiently empowered for that purpose, and assisted with the addition of some Merchants, in relation to the balancing, security, and advance of Trade) so as you may be the more free for the present, to intent those aforesaid Considerations of public Justice, and the settlement of the Kingdom upon just and safe foundations of public interest, and that when you have effectuated them, or put them into a way of effect, you may (for the after time of this Parliaments continuance) more entirely apply your Counsels to such other things, as are the most proper work of Parliaments, and by, and for which Parliaments have had their esteem in this Nation, and the Kingdom most benefit by them, (viz: the Reformation of evils, or inconveniencies in the present Laws and Administrations thereof, the redress of abuses, and supplying of defects therein, and the making of better constitutions for the well Government, and prosperity of the Nation, as also the due proportioning of rates, and providing of moneys in the most equal, and least grievous ways for all necessary uses of the public, and the like,) and in Order to such things, that you would in due time and place (viz. after public justice, and the general settlement) consider such special overtures of that kind, as have been tendered to you in the Petitions of wellwishers to public good, and particularly in that large Petition from many about London, Dated the 11 of September last, and also what shall be tendered of like kind from others, that so what is really for the remedy of common greivances, or the advancement of common good may not be slighted, or neglected, but that evils in that kind being removed, and good things ordained, and provided by you, for the ease, benefit, and prosperity of the people (in all things possible,) you may (when you come to lay down your trust) leave a good savour behind you, both to the name of Parliaments, and also of men professing Godliness (so much as this House hath done) and therein (chief) to the Honour of Almighty God, who hath (in his rich Grace and mercy) done such wonders for you and us: And for furtherance to all these ends, (since the heart of man is deceitful, and corrupt above all things, and most apt to answerable Counsels and actings, where it can hope to walk in the dark, undiscerned, or undistinguished, though but to the eye of man) we must again desire, That even from henceforth the aforesaid liberty of entering dissents (as it is in the Scotch Parliament, where lately there hath appeared a most useful Effect of it so also) may be admitted amongst you, or (at least) that in these transactions, of such high moment to the public, and all honest Interests, and in times, so apt to deceit, defection, and Apostasy; that liberty may be taken by all honest faithful Members, that desire to appear (as their hearts to God, so) their ways to good men; yet still we wish not (whoever should by that means be detected for corrupt Counsels) that for his judgement there, any advantage should be taken without doors, but only that men may avoid the further trusting of such persons, and that the innocent may not be unjustly prejudiced or suspected.  
Thus, as the exigence of the case, and nature of the business requires, (being of such vast importance to all Public, Religious and honest interest, not in this Kingdom only, but in neighbour nations) we have dealt with all plainness and clearness, as God hath enabled us; and now to conclude, we hope, that in an age of so much light, mere will or resolution will not be held forth, or pursued against it; but that, what reason, or righteousness there is in the things we have said, will be considered and followed: nor let it find prejudice with you from any disdain towards those from whom it comes, (being in the condition of an Army, looked upon as servants under you) since servants may speak to their masters, and aught to be heard and regarded, even when they speak for their own right only, and rather when they speak for the good and safety of them they serve, but much more when they speak of that wherein they have some joint interest with them; and yet more, when (those their immediate masters being themselves also servants, and trusties for the benefit of others) they speak for the interest of those, for whom both are employed.  
By the appointment of his Excellency, the Lord General, and his General Council of Officers. Signed, John Rushworth. Saint Alban Novemb. 18. 1648.