CONSCIENCE SATISFIED.  
That there is no warrant for the Arms now taken up by SUBjECTS.  
BY WAY OF REPLY unto several Answers made to a Treatise formerly published for the Resolving of Conscience upon the CASE.  
ESPECIALLY Unto that which is entitled A fuller Answer.  
By H. FERNE, D. D. etc.  Speak unto the Elders of judah, saying, what? are ye the last to bring the King back to His House? seeing the speech of all Israel is come to the King. 2 Sam. 19.11. Let your Moderation be known unto all men; the Lord is at hand, Phil. 4.5 
OXFORD, Printed by LEONARD LICHFIELD Printer to the University, 1643.   

To the Conscientious Readers among the People.  
TO you especially this is intended, who professing to make a Conscience of your ways have hitherto been led on in the dangerous and perverse way of Resistance and disloyalty; to give you some check, and call you at least to a thought of the violent Course you were in pursuit of, there was a Treatise formerly directed to you, for your better help in the examination of your Way, and the Resolving of your Consciences, for it was marvelous to behold, how men pretending Religion and Conscience, should be so securely carried on without all warrant, so hood winked with an implicit faith, against the clear light of the Law of God and this Land meeting them in the face, which faith as by reason of its blindness, it is most contrary to a Conscience desirous to be informed, so the blinder it is, the stronger it is, and leaves a man miserably deceived with the conceit of a Conscience well satisfied.  
To hold you on in this blind devotion, Four Answerers have appeared for you against the aforesaid Treatise, that you may at least say, you have four for one; but if you take them all and bray them in a Mortar together you shall not beat out of them any true and real Causes of these your Arms, but Pretences only, nor any warrant from the Law of God, or of this Land to justify your taking Arms upon such Causes, were they never so true and real. That you may more easily discern what is in them, & thereby the truth, I have taken them in pieces for you, and by this Reply shown you what is adulterate. It is chief directed against M. Bridge his book, and the Fuller Answer; against that, because it appears under the Licence and Authority of Them he pleads for, and is framed more to the capacity of the Vulgar; against This, because it is cried up among the more Intelligent of the Party, and carries an appearing depth of Reason, though indeed no otherwise, then stained waters do, which seem deep through the darkness of their Colour. What is material in M. Burrowes you shall find repeated in Theirs, or his own words, and receiving answer. With that other Answer, which appears without name, but with a Margin full of Greek and Latin, I dare trust you, so that you will beware of one thing, that dangerous discourse he has for the suppressing and taking away of Tyrants, and will promise me another thing, that you will not proceed in this unjustifiable way without direct and positive warrant for Conscience to rest on; Yet shall you have something in particular to this Answerer in the 12. Section.  
Before that Fuller Answer came to my hands, I was told by one, that had reason to know, I should receive answer from a grave Divine; but having perused it, I found little of the Divine, less of his Gravity: but a fancy both ridiculous and dangerous. He has set before his book a Premonition (wherein he has painted out the Resolver under the several shapes of birds and beasts, as his flitting fancy led him) a very piece of Pictured Tapestry, fit to hang before the entrance of a Stage, then of a Treatise concerning Conscience: but which is worst of all, concerns not me only but every good Subject, in his book he has fancied such a frame of Government here in this Land, that he has marred it in the Making, for by an unheard of Coordination he has contrived it into a plain Popular State.  
I held myself many ways (though this Age has had books enough to teach it duty) engaged to answer, for my own, for yours, for Truth's sake; I found myself much abused by mistakes, and odious imputations, especially of the Full Answerer, but you worse by deceiving pretences, & Truth worst of all by false Principles, and Doctrines given out under its name.  
I desire you would understand, what was spoken by me in the former Treatise, by way of Assertion, Conclusion, or general Rule concerning the two Houses, was but a sacrificing to Truth from a Conscience not simply devoted to man; what was related as matter of Fact, did either not concern them, or not touch them with any such foul aspersion, as the Fuller Answerer would make you believe; My Conscience is clear, and my paper was not stained with such blots.  
For disaffection to Parliaments (wherewith I am charged) I will not say how far my heart went along with This in the way of approbation, but thus much I will say, I always had, and still have to Parliaments affection enough (though not to make me a Rebel to the light of Reason, and Rules of Conscience, or disloyal to His Majesty, yet enough) to ground any due obedience upon. My heart would fail me (as hers did upon the departure of glory from Israel, 1 Sam. 4.) to think, how the Name of Religion and Authority of Parliament would suffer in after Times, could they justly be entitled to the enquiry of these.  
But I take it to be the desire of all good men and Loyal Subjects, yea of the King himself, That Parliaments should flourish in their due power and freedom, knowing that neither he nor they can suffer by such; & I presume that many of the Thousands which follow his Majesty, have engaged themselves in the Cause, not only out of mere duty of Allegiance, but also out of a sense of that very desire, they are Confident is in Him, to the continuance of Parliaments; being such for the most part, as have no other hope of advantage by the service, then peaceably to enjoy what by the Law of the Land they may call their own; such whose hearts God hath touched as he did theirs, that went with Saul, when some children of Belial despised him, saying, how shall this man save us? 1 Sam. 10.  
Should I bring in the Kingdom (as joab did the suborned Widow of Tekoah) like a woman in mourning apparel to speak the truth, you would hear her Complaining, Her Sons have striven together in the field, and smitten and slain one another, but for the iniquity, let the King and his Throne be guiltless, 2 Sam. 14. and farther adding, Let the name of Religion be sacred, and the Authority of Parliament blameless; but there are certain Men upon whom the iniquity will lie heavy as the grave-stone, and upon whose tombs, if this Land give them burial, posterity will write, Better these Men had never been born.  
If therefore the Ambition, Envy or Avarice of any particular men have engaged you under the specious pretences of Religion and Liberty, look upon yourselves at length, and how you are used but as their sword and buckler to make way for their ends, and to defend them from the stroke of justice; And should they by your aid attain those ends (which God for bid) will they for your conspiring with them, give every one of you fields and vineyards, and make you Captains of thousands, and Captains of hundreds? hath not His Majesty offered enough for the restoring of your peace and happiness, if they would let you understand it? can you see to the end of these troubles, but by returning to your forsaken Loyalty? shall you not be divided again, and called to Faction and siding upon the disposing of the offices and revenues of the Kingdom amongst your Leaders? Or if that business could be settled, and the world provided for, shall you not be divided again when you come to think of a form of Religion? or shall you every man be recompensed with a freedom of his own way, for lending his help to unsettle that One Religion, which the Laws have established?  
However your vain hopes do at length succeed, or your Conscience in the mean time be satisfied, I am sure God cannot be well pleased, and will not (though he hath hitherto suffered it for the just punishment of this sinful Land) be long mocked after this fashion; for do but hearken to the Cry of Blood, to the Cry of the Fatherless and Widows, of this Land, of Ireland, to the complaints of the poor every where for want of that relief which they had from thousands of families, now dissolved by the causeless imprisonment of the Masters; if your Ears be not open to them, His are, or if you think you are not chargeable with this heavy account, look to the ways your Leaders drive you through, how they lie through blood and oppression, through the breach of your Faith, your Allegiance, your Protestation, of which it is strange to consider what advantage has been made, to the seeming performance of one clause in it, (the Privilege of Parliaments,) by the breach of all the rest, which concern the King's Rights, the Religion established, the Subjects Liberty and Property; and in all this consider, how your way is forced through the breach of many of God's Commandments; I need not tell you them, your very children (if ever you instructed them in their Catechism) can say your practice agrees not with what you taught them; but this I must tell you, if this be Conscience, it is a Conscience that is condemned of itself, and grown desperate; if this be Religion, it is a Religion that saith there is no God. If therefore there be yet any sense left of Conscience and Religion, any fear of God, ret●●● from these perverse ways, or else hear what he threatens to such wilfulness, Leu. 26.23. If you will walk contrary to me, then will I also walk contrary to you. & Esa. 30.12. Because you despise this word, and trust in oppression and perverseness, and stay thereon, therefore this iniquity shall be to you as a breach ready to fall, swelling out in a high wall, whose breaking cometh suddenly at an instant. A great forbearance of God hath it been, that Houses have not broken down, where the Consultations have been so oft held for the direction of these ways, or that Churches have not fallen, where so many blasphemous Prayers and Preach have been made, in order to the advancement of them. I suppose you are not prime Leaders in this way, yet the longer your Directors spin out the time, & you hold on to countenance the Action, ye do but increase the Cries of the distressed throughout this Kingdom against you, and cause that judgement on high to break down the sooner; Do not dally any longer with Him that can do it suddenly in an instant, but look what hangs over our heads, and read what is written, and the Lord give you understanding.   

CONSCIENCE SATISFIED.  
That there is no warrant for the Arms now taken up by the Subjects.  
By way of Reply to several Answers made to a former Treatise, especially to that which is called the FULLER ANSWER.  

SECT. 1. The case, and the Question upon it stated.  
IT is necessary I begin with the Author of that Fuller Answer, for he gins with a discourse of his own, and the better to set it off, will needs do me the favour to rectify the Case, and state the Question for me. Blowing aside, says he, the Pindust of the stile, which guilds but intercepts the letter of his Treatise, I find the Substance of it to be a groundless supposition of the Parliaments taking Arms, upon a bare supposition of the King's mere intention to subvert Laws and Liberties; for who ever maintained they might take Arms upon such a bare supposition? Pag. 1. also I am enforced to answer what he would have said, for he resolves upon a Question, that never came in question, pag. 2.  
First I must deprecate what here and every where this Answerer imputes unto me, as if I charged the Parliament (i.e.) the two Houses with this War; it was not where said, they did take up these Arms, but often insinuated and proved, that, if that were the Case, they might not do it, the more forceably to convince them that have now done it, under the name and pretence of Parliament.  
Then I must tell him, it is an easy but commonly deceitful way of Answering to say the Question is mistaken, and make the Reader believe all that was written is nothing to the purpose, when as the mistake is in him that complains of it. For if this Answerer in blowing aside the Pindust of the Letter, as he speaks, had not received much of it into his eyes, he might have seen (the Conscientious Reader will) that the Question for the Rational part of it, was put to the greatest advantage of them that plead for Resistance not as he renders it whether they may take Arms upon a bare supposition of a mere intention in the King to subvert Laws and Liberties? as if he knew not what the word (subpose) meant in putting of a Case, but to this sense, suppose or grant the King will not discharge the trust, but is bend or seduced to subvert Laws and Liberties, whether then may Subjects take Arms? this implies in the case as much or more, than he himself pretends here to be the cause of your Arms, viz.  
The actual invasion of Liberties, the invitation and detention of Delinquents from trial by Law, to be a party in Arms against the Parliament, to dissolve or remove it, the importation of foreign. Arms, and Soldiers, illegal Commissions to employ them, etc. so he, pag 1. To take no notice for the present of the falsehood of these imputations wherewith His Majesty is here charged, we must look upon them, as the supposed causes of their Arms.  
And first I cannot but wonder, why among these particulars here's no mention of Religion, when as the people are made to believe that's it they fight for; happily he included it in the &c. as indeed in the consultations of these unhappy days, the care of it (though timely moved by worthy Members of both Houses) has been cast off to the fag end of other more necessary occasions, that I may not say Designs, a likely way to make all prosper.  
When the people are dealt with by such men as these Answerers, than Religion is the main Engine to draw them into Arms, and indeed were they not abused with that plausible pretence, they could never have been so fare engaged against their Sovereign: but when these men enter the lists with an Adversary about the cause of this war, Religion is not insisted on, not once touched in this, expressly declined in the other Answers: but Nature is rather sought unto by them, for a ground of self preservation; for upon strict examination these men know, it will appear what actual invasions have been made upon Religion against the known Laws of this land, and who are to answer for them; they know also what offence it would give to several Sects (which are and will be always serviceable to new designs) should Religion be either countenanced, as it is by Law established, or any one way declared for.  
But secondly I would fain know, whether they can in Conscience be persuaded, that some actual invasions of Laws and Liberties can be a sufficient cause for Subjects to Arm and Resist, when it evidently appears their Sovereign is not bend to continue in that destructive way; will it not suffice, if he restore those Liberties, and withdraw the encroachments made upon them? If he promise security and pass several Acts of Grace for further assurance of them? If he be content that, All Arms laid aside, the Law shall judge who are Delinquents, and accordingly censure them?  
They that have formerly written for Resistance in some Cases, have thought it unreasonable that Subjects should pretend to Arms, till they find their Prince in such a Condition, as was insinuated in the case proposed, viz. Bent or seduced to subvert Laws, Liberties, Religion, or to make havoc of the Commonwealth or Church, as D. Willet has it in Rom. 13. q. 17 and as we see by the limitations, testimonies, examples in Paraeus upon Rom. 13. and in Phil. Par. his answer to Mr Owen.  
But our Pleaders for Resistance at this day, because they cannot find His Majesty in such a condition; or hope to make men (that know any thing of His Personal Vertucs, or His Acts of Grace passed this Parliament) believe, he is so bend, do now pretend they have cause enough for taking Arms, what ever the King's mind be and although there be no such horrible things intended by him as the Doctor speaks of, so Mr Bu●r. pag. 140.141. and to the same purpose this Fuller Answer insists upon actual invasions of Liborvies, Laws, as the cause of their Arms.  
Yet that they may seem to have better pretence of Reason for what they do, and more win upon the people, that least know the gracious disposition of their Sovereign towards them, they do endeavour to charge His Majesty with the like destructive intentions, as were to be supposed in the case.  
To this purpose we find this Answerer every where rendering the reason of their taking Arms to be, b●●●use the King refuses to perform His trust, and in the first page; because His Majesty has drawn in Delinquents to be a party in Arms thereby to dissolve or remove the arliament; where he puts the Cause upon His Majesty's intention. And we well remember upon His Majesty's first Guard at York, it was (I will not say voted above) given out among the people, He intended to make War against His Parliament, and still we have it urged as a Cause of these Arms, that His Majesty is seduced by wicked Council, and the like.  
Therefore the Case being so laid upon his supposed intentions to continue in a subversive way of Laws, Liberties, the question upon it was put to the full, for the rational part, whether, such a case being supposed or granted, it were Lawful for Subjects to take Arms and resist? Then for the other part of the question, which concerned matter of Fact, Whether that case were now? (i.e.) whether it were true of His Majesty which they supposed and took for granted, and endeavoured to make the people believe of Him? it was of a second consideration, and examined after by itself.  
Every mean understanding might easily conceive this to be the sense of the Question, the brief of the Cause, and of my Treatise.  
But this Answerer it seems, had a discourse of the power of Parliaments lying by him, (for no man will think it occasioned by my book, but applied to it) and therefore thought fit to quarrel at the Question as proposed by me, and in stead of my three Resolves, to give the Reader three Propositions of his own, he should have made them moe, but for observing number. And then he boasts, How many weeks soever the Doctor has been about the Treatise, it is well known to many, the Answer cost not many hours the doing, pag. 3. he means the applying of what was done before; but any one may perceive by his confused jumbling of things, and his frequent mistakes when ever he repeats and answers what I had written, that he was ambitious of doing the business hastily, rather than surely.  
we'll follow him as we may, first examining how he makes good his Propositions or grounds he goes on, then how he applies them to what I had written, where we shall taken in the other Answers, as occasion requires.   

SECT. II. The frame of this Government as it is fancied in the Fuller Answer.  
HIs whole resolution of the Cause is laid down in his first Proposition, which is this.  
The Parliament may with good Conscience in defence of the King, Laws, and Government established, when imminently endangered, take up Arms without or against the King's Personal commands if He refuse. His other two Propositions are subservient to this, tending to the proof of it; That the final result of this State's judgement, what those Laws, Dangers, and means of prevention are, resides in the two Houses of Parliament, Prop. 2. That in this final resolution the People are to rest, and in obedience thereto may with good Conscience bear and use Arms, Prop. 3.  
To make this good he first endeavours to show this Monarchy is mixed, by a Coordination of the two Houses with the King in the very supremacy of power itself, so he pag. 3. Whereupon if the King refuse to provide for the safety of the Kingdom according to their advice, than His coordinates'; the two Houses must according to their trusts supply, so he tells us, p. 3.8.10. And that this power was reserved by the people at the first constitution of this government, pag. 24.25. and that this constitution was made by consent of King and People in the first Coalition of Government, pag. 4. by the Consent of the People th●t first made the King, pag. 13. Contrived by the people in the first constitution ●f Gov●ernment, pag. 8.  
These Particulars we find in this his discourse confusedly spoken of, if we give his conceptions their due order, they stand thus. First, he supposes all the Power of government to be derived from the people, and that the Constitution of this Government was their contriument, when first they made a King; then, that by this first Constitution, such a Coordination of the two Houses with the King was contrived, by which they have power reserved, not only to consent in making Laws, but to supply the refusals of the King, as they shall think good for the safety of the State; and for this, the final result of the State's judgement is in them to declare what is Law without him, and unto their final resolution, and commands thereupon, though arbitrary (as this answerer acknowledgeth Pag. 17) the people ought to obey.  
Thus has he fancied the reason and constitution of this Government, but I suppose the honourable houses of Parliament will not thank him for raising them to that height of Supremacy, he has placed them in; I am sure we Subjects have not cause to thank him for that arbitrary power he has placed in them.  
If any man expect from this his discourse, satisfaction for conscience, he shall find nothing but uncertainties, and improbabilities, not fit grounds for it to restupon; and if conviction of Reason be looked for here, I suppose there is no man that upon serious consideration of what this Answerer brings us to, will not think it more reasonable to be under the arbitrary Government of one, then of many, nay, under the Government of one that challenges not obedience as due, bat according to Law, then of many, whose commands are Law unto us; as this Answerer makes them.  
And here we do not undertake to set down the extent of the power, and Privileges of Parliament; no more than of the King's Power, and prerogative. They are both of them beyond our skill, and we may not take the boldness to meddle with either of them, farther than the necessary information of Conscience doth enforce: to which purpose as we may by use of Reason certainly conclude, the King has not this or that Power, as to make Laws by himself, to rule arbitrarily; so of the two Houses without offence we may as certainly conclude, That they have not such a power by the first Constitution of this Government, as this Answerer every where begs for them, but no where proves it.  
It is granted that the two Houses of Parliament are in a sort Coordinate with His MAJESTY, ad aliquid, to some act or exeacising of the supreme power, that is to the making of Laws by yielding their consent; and that they have this by a fundamental Constitution. But that they have such a fellow ship with His MAJESTY in the Supremacy itself, as this man imagines, or such a Power of resistance reserved at first to supply His MAJESTY'S refusa's; or such a final and arbitrary Power and command, as he attributes to them, Conscience can never be truly convinced off.   

SECT. III. Of the Original of Governing power, and of the beginnings of Government in this Land.  
WE will begin with his groundwork, Which lies scattered through all his discourse, That first Coalition or Consititution of Government in this Land, which he supposes to be framed by the agreement or Contrivement of the people when they made the first King; wherein they entrusted him with such Power as was thought fit, and reserved to themselves what power they held necessary for their own safety, upon extraordinary times and occasion of danger.  
So then Conscience, if it will obey the power of Arms now usurped by Subjects, must be clearly convinced (which is impossible) of these particulars, That the Governning Power is from the people, that Monarchy was here raised upon such a contrivement, wherein such a power of supply, and of resistance, was reserved to the People, and that all Kings since, do consent to such conditions, and are admitted under them.  
All the proof that I can any where find this Answer has brought for all this, is from the words of Fortescue, Hanc potestatem a populo effluxam, this Power the King has derived from the People; and from the mutual Oath of King and People, pag. 5. Let the Reader give me leave to speak a little of the Governing power simply; then of the beginning of Government in this Land, that Conscience may see what little satisfaction this or any man else can give it, to persuade either that the governing power is derived from the people, or that the Government of this Land began in such a Contrivement or constitution as this man fancies.  
It was said in my other Treatise, that the Governing power was from God, not only as an ordinance of the precept that commands Government, but also as an Efflux or issue of that providence, which sets up & pulls down, which translates Kingdoms, and governs the whole world, Creatures Reasonable and unreasonable; and this not obscurely in the Apostle, Rom. 13. where the powers are said to be not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from God, but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as orders ranked by him and under him.  
Well then, this Governing power was not a populo effluxa, as he above said, but flowed from that providence at first through the veins of nature in a paternal or Fatherly rule, and by that as by a pattern in a Kingly Rule or Government, upon the increase of people and Nations; for when the Reins of Paternal Government could not reach them for their extent, or hold them in for their unrulines, & injustice, it in larged itself into a Kingly power, which bore and used the sword; for that is given them to use straight after the Flood. Gen. 9.6.  
This is plain by the book of God, that the first Fathers of Mankind, were the first Kings and Rulers; for we see the Earth divided among Noah's three Sons, and upon the Increase of their Children many Colonies were sent into Countries fare distant, and thereupon many independent Governments raised; which must be by the direction and order of Noah, that first sent them out and assigned them those parts of the Earth; And still as they increased, they spread farther upon the face of the Earth, new Colonies being excluded and thrust forth (like swarms of Bees) under their Rulers, who were the chief Fathers of those new Progenies, and had the Government, both Regal and Sacerdotal by Primogeniture, unless the chief Patriarch, from whom they all issued, saw cause to order it otherwise.  
Therefore of all the Sons of Noah & the Nations sprung from them it is said, Gen. 10. these are the Sons of Noah— after their Families in their Countries and Nations. verse. 5, 20, 31. and we find many of those first Princes and rulers to leave their names to the people that came of them, and to the Countries they were seated in; as may be seen, Gen. 10.  
Hence it appears. First, that Monarchy was the first Government it being late ere any Popular Rule, Aristocratical or democratical appeared in the world. Secondly, that the first Kings were not by choice of the People, but that Monarchy (however we cannot say it is jure divino, by divine precept commanding all Nations to be so governed, or jure naturae by nature's law enforcing it) is plainly ductu naturae, by nature leading men from Paternal to Regal Government, and exemplo divino, as I may say, by divine example and insinuation; the Government that God set up over his people, being Monarchical still, in Moses, the judges, the Kings; whereas Aristocracy, and Democracy, (that I'may not call them Defections and Revolts from the Natural way of government) are mere inventions of man; In several Monarchies indeed we see divers limitations & qualifications of power, and several offices & ways of executing that power, these are mere inventions of man. And this I note for explication of what was in the other Treatise said of Monarchy in relation to Ius divinum, which by this Answerer is often interpreted, as if I granted Monarchy, and Aristocracy, and Democracy to be equally of humane invention.  
Thirdly, it appears that the power of Kings was as of Fathers, and that the people had no power of coercion over them, more than children over Fathers. Fourthly, that albeit within few ages after the flood, people began to choose themselves Rulers, (as likely they did that departed from the building of Babel in several companies, according to your several languages) yet was such popular election to be accounted a kind of defection from, and a disturbance of that natural way of the descent of governing kingly power, by a Paternal right; and this irregular way began in the progeny of Cham. Lastly, that albeit when a people are free, as upon the utter failing of the royal Line, they may choose a Governor, (there being then no other way to set up one but by choice) yet then do they no more give the power, than if they received a King by natural descent, or by God's designment, and still the King so chosen is a Father, as in the fifth Commandment, and the people as children in the same relation for obedience and coercion, as at first in the generations of Noah.  
Accordingly king's at first among the Nations though chosen, ruled as Fathers, arbitrarily, their discretion being law unto the people, as was observed out of justin, in the former Treatise, and as we may really see in the fiction of the Golden Age.  
Now for the beginning of Government in this Island, how shall conscience find any certainty, that it was so set up & contrived as this Answerer supposeth? If he will begin simply at the very first coalition of Government (as he phrases it) he must suppose a multitude of people meeting together to contrive a Government, and these either to spring on a sudden out of the earth, as Cadmus his race, but then in all likelihood they would not so well agree; or to live dispersedly in caves & woods, and so to be brought together by some Orpheus his pipe, but then we cannot imagine such rude men to be so politic and cautious as to make such a contrivement, for he tells us the reason which we see in this State, is that same reason that first contrived the Government when they made the first King; Or lastly, he must suppose this land was peopled by a colony from France or Germany, and then as likely they had the constitution of the Government from the King which sent them, or that the government which the first Kings used here was arbitrary, as it was every where else at first.  
But let us come down to times of more certainty, and, as the Declaration of Parliament, 24. H. 8. c. 12. directs us, look in Histories and Chronicles, which tell us, this Realm of England has been accepted for an Empire, governed by one supreme head; unto whom a body politic, compact of all sorts and degrees of people, of the spiritualty, and Temporalty, are bounden to bear, next to God, a natural obedience, so in that Statute. Now this first constitutionof government in this Land, (as this Answerer has fancied it) can neither consist with the substance of this Parliamentary Declaration, as we shall see anon, nor can it have any footing in Histories and chronicles to which that Declaration refers us.  
For those chronicles, and Caesar in his commentaries tells us, there were in this land then divers Princes independent, in which of them shall we look for this constitution? or shall we seek it among the British kings, whom the Saxons drove into Wales? if we could find it there, it would not concern us, for we are not now upon the British but English government, which followed the Saxons. If the Answerer will begin his constitution and first king at this period or revolurion of the Monarchy, (for higher he cannot, & lower at the conquest, I trust he will not) why did not he tell us so, that he might have given conscience some direction to find out his first constitution and first King? He knew well enough there was little help for him here.  
For we find this English Saxishgovernment at the beginning, branching itself into an Heptarchy, & rising in arms; it is likely those Captains took upon them as kings by the consent and acclamation of the soldiers, as when in the state of Rome the praetorian guard, or some army abroad saluted an Emperor, and thrust him upon the people. But what then will become of his first constitution by the contrivement of the people, when they made their first king? should any of these seven Monarches come in by such a popular contrivement; (which cannot be imagined) must our government needs be the same? Or can we think that Egbert who made himself sole Monarch was bound up by such a constitution & reservation as he says was contrived at their making of the first King? from that Egbert to King CHARLES, our Authentic Histories and Chronicles (to which the Declaration of Parliament above mentioned refers us) do show a glorious succession of Monarches, not one made by election, but Harold, who yet has not obtained the stile of Rex Haroldus, and his title, if any, died with him.  
We see upon what uncertainties and improbabilities, conscience is left for this first election and precontrivement; this Answerer has not directed it any ways how it should be assured of it, much less of that reservation of power, which he imagineth to be made by the people, at that first election of a King. He gives us no record to witness it, turns us to no authentic History or chronicle, shows us no constant practice or judgement of foregoing Ages; what he has from the mutual oath of King and people, pag. 5. may be good upon after agreement between them, as will appear; and his hanc potestatem a populo effluxam, out of Fortescue, although it supposes derivation of power from the people; (the usual mistaken principle of Government, which later times have given cause to examine and find unsound) yet doth it not imply, the people has reserved any power, much less such a paramount power, as he imagines.  
Conscience has this certain by the continual practice of this Government, that there is such a constitution as gives power of consenting to the two Houses in making and declaring Law, when ever the beginning of it was; it cannot see that it began by a contrivement of the people at the supposed choice of the first King, but rather that it was subsequent to Monarchy, and procured by the people for their greater security, not precontrived by them.  
If objected. The constitution is fundamental, therefore preceding the first King; we answer it follows not, for it may be a fundamental, yet not of Monarchy simply, but of government as now it stands, a fundamental not of the Regal power, but the people's security. For Government may receive a change & qualification by consent of King and people, from more absolute to mixed; & such a constitution is a fundamental, because all after-lawes are built upon it, but not a fundamental to the Regal power, for it gives no power to him as it doth to the two Houses, but rather lessens his power by limiting it upon agreement, that he will not impose any laws upon his people without their consent.  
But as for that reserved power of declaring law without the king, and of commanding all, when they shall judge it expedient for the safety of the kingdom, upon the King's refusal, Conscience has no assurance from this Answerer, that such a power was reserved (which is enough to leave it without excuse, if it obey such a power) but on the contrary, has strong presumptions and reasons against.  
For first, it cannot see how such a reservation of power can consist with the beginnings of government in this land, whether we consider the Norman or the Saxons entrance. Secondly, it cannot see how it can consist with the known established Government, for by such a power the Supremacy would be plainly settled in the two Houses, they may when they judge it necessary, use this reserved power, which transcends all ordinary power in the King.  
Thirdly, should the Kings of this Land be admitted upon such agreement for this reserved power, Conscience cannot but think it an unreasonable condition, and neither for the Kings nor people's security, but a very seminary of jealousies and sedition; as if in Matrimony (for the King is also sponsus Regni, and wedded to the kingdom by a Ring at his Coronation) the parties should agree, upon such and such neglect of duties, to part a sunder; or children (for the king is also a Father of the kingdom, and the body politic owes to him natural obedience, 24. H. 8. c. 12.) should condition with their Parents upon such or such usage to be acquitted of their duty and obedience; what our Saviour said of their light & unlawful occasions of Divorce, non fuit sic ob initio, it was not so from the beginning, when God at first joined man and woman, may be said of such a reserved power of resistance, it was not so from the beginning, when at first Rulers and Kings were Fathers, and so are still called in the fift Commandment, not to be resisted or abdicated by their children, their subjects.  
Lastly, this contrivement seems plainly to contradict itself, for it places this reserved power in the Comites and Barons, which cannot be before the first King, for Bracton tells us (as he is cited by Sir Edw. Coke in mag: Cart.) Reges associant sibi Comites & Barones ordinances eos in magno Honore, Earls and Barons are made by the King, and assumed for Council, therefore invested with a long Robe, and for defence, therefore girt with a sword; which shows the power they have, is not by a contrivement or reservation at the supposed making of the first King, but from the King by grant and of grace; much less is it such a transcendent and paramount power as this Answerer imagineth to be reserved in them, and the House of Commons, at the first constitution of government in this Land.  
We have hitherto searched into the groundwork of this frame of Government, as he had laid it in a supposed contrivement and reservation of the people when they made their first King, and have found it to be groundless, so that Conscience cannot rest upon it, to make resistance in obedience to such a reserved power which this man tells Us is in the two Houses, but gives no proof for it at all, nor indeed can. So that this which has been said against it, were enough to overthrow the Co-ordination, supply, Final resolution, and Arbitrary Commands, that he has built upon this fiction; but we will particularly examine his discourse upon them, which is but an opening and enlarging of his fancies upon the new Principles of these days, set off with plausible show of reason to deceive the unwary.   

SECT. iv Of the Co-ordination of the three Estates, and of the Supremacy of Power.  
HIs Co-ordination he has thus expressed, This mixture or Co-ordination is in the very Supremacy of power itself, and the Monarchy or highest power itself is compounded of three  estates, pag. 3. There is but one Highest, but that one is a mixed one, pag. 4. It was granted, there is a Co-ordination to some purposes, but not such as he urges it for, in the matter of Supremacy and Supply; which that we may the better discern, we must according to our skill (and that shall be no farther, than the common use of reason, and the Grammatical construction of what the known Law does plainly declare, may lead every man's apprehension) unfold wherein Supremacy of power doth consist.  
There is a power of Enacting and of Executing or administration; accordingly the Supreme power shows itself in making new Laws, and abrogating old, in calling assemblies to that and other purposes, in Treaties with foreign Princes, sending Embassies, appointing Officers of State, Judges of Courts, and other Ministers of justice through the Kingdom.  
Now if the Co-ordination of the King and two Houses of Parliament, were such as he doth express & would seem to infer by the supply they are to make upon the King's refusal, they should be Coordinati ad omnia, simply  and equal in those powers & acts of Supremacy, whereas in plain speech he cannot say they are  with His Majesty, but only in consenting to the making of Laws, pag. 4. in all the rest the King is solely supreme, and all power of administration derived from Him. So then their consent is required to one act or exercise of supreme power, but not to the denial of His Supremacy, for He is still by Law acknowledged the only supreme Governor, and the supreme Head; which being urged in my former Treatise, this Answerer should have shown us how the King can be so, and yet this co-ordination of his, stand good to all purposes as he would have it.  
If he restrain that only supreme Governor, and supreme Head, to supremacy of power in Execution or Administration, it would be plain that none can use power in this government, but derivatively from His Majesty, which were enough for the purpose, I urged Supremacy in the former Treatise, viz. to show His Majesty cannot be resisted; for resistance is a taking of the sword or power without him, and from him, and also a using of it against that power of administration which is settled in him, and therefore against him, as he is the only supreme Governor.  
This would be enough to check any man's conscience that will dare to resist, yet must not the supremacy be so restrained; for albeit, for the greater security of the people, Kings have bound themselves from imposing Laws upon them without their consent, yet may we also see the beams of His Supremacy shining in the power of enacting exercised with their consent. For he has the power of calling them to that purpose, and the constitution that has given them power of consenting, has left in him power of dissolving them: Also, anciently (as I have heard knowing men say) the Law enacted began thus, Rex statuit, the King ordains, and before the Laws and Statutes in each King's Reign, we find the title or introduction thus usually expressed, The King by the advice and assent of the Prelates, Earls, and Barons, and at the instance and request of the Commonalty has ordained, etc. And still for the procuring of his assent, we see them Petitioning under the stile of Loyal Subjects, and while they sit in that co-ordination there is still that other relation of Head & Body between them, and accordingly He was declared in Parliament to be Supreme Head of the body politic, He being instituted and furnished by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary, whole entire power, preeminency, authority, prerogative, and jurisdiction, to render and yield justice and final determination to all manner of Subjects within this Realm in all causes. Also that sundry Laws and Ordinances had been made in former Parliaments, for sure and entire conserving the Prerogative and preeminency of this Crown. 24. H. 8. c. 12.  
From all this so plainly declared in Law, & confessed, can we conclude with this man, that the two Houses are  with his Majesty in the very Supremacy? or that the highest & Supreme head is a mixed one? No! but that the Legislative power is Supremely in the King, only this power is excited by the instance and request of the Commons, representing to him the grievances of his people abroad, and cannot be exercised or come to the act of Ordaining, but with consent of them & the House of Lords. This may easily be conceived, if we consider, that Kings at first ruled arbitrarily, and then the Legislative power was solely in them, afterward the people obtained such limitations and qualifications of that power, as might make for their security; as for example, That they should not have Laws imposed on them without their consent: this does not make them  with their King in the very Supremacy of power itself, (as this man has conceived it) but still leaves the power of Ordaining supremely in him as in the fountain, though the efflux or exercise of that power be not solely in his will, but expects the consent of the People.  
Now let us gather up his scattered proofs as we can find them. Such a co-ordination there must be, or else, saith he, the Monarchy is not mixed, pag. 3. & 4. It doth not follow, if there be a mixture in it, therefore such an one of equal ingredients; or if it be mixed secundùm quid in some respect, therefore simply, or as he would have it; though we say not the Monarchy is mixed, as he, yet we grant, the Government is mixed; not as he, by placing such power in the  parts; but mixed, that is, not absolute or arbitrary in his Majesty, yet not without Subordination on their part, and predominancy on his; And to say the Monarchy itself is compounded of three Estates as he doth, is absurd.  
But the Treatiser himself calls it that excellent temper of the three Estates in Parliament, confessing them to be the fundamentals of this Government; and if Fundamentals, what subordination can there be in them, they admit not of higher & lower; all foundations are alike, pag. 3. The Treatiser acknowledged it a Fundamental of Government, that provided this temper of the three estates in Parliament as the reasonable means of our safety; therefore saith the Answerer, the three estates are Fundamentals, a good argument A genere adgenus; from the constitution that places this power in the two Houses, to the persons that bear the power; for when we speak of Fundamentals, we speak of Laws and constitutions, which may provide such a temper, and yet do it with subordination, that it be not temperamentum ad pondus, but ad justitiam, not with Arithmetical, but Geometrical proportion, not with exact equality of all, but with a predominancy of one; otherwise it would sometime fall out, that this body of the Commonwealth could not act or move any way, like as the natural body could not, if all the elements were equally tempered in it.  
And to show he is for an Arithmetical proportion in this temper of the three Estates, he wonders we cannot see that the King is Universis minor, when as we may easily reckon that of three, one is less than two. pag. 3. Very good, we shall have enough of such arguments as these for the present we will make a note of this in the Margin, and shall have occasion anon to call him to his reckoning upon it.  
Then he keeps a trifling to show how the two Houses are subjects divisim, taken singly, and not subjects conjunctim, in the co-ordination pag. 4. In one word, their consent is not subject to the King's command, yet they are subjects even collectively taken, for so they represent subjects that chose them; they are subject to his command still, to remove or rise, when He Prorogues or dissolves, and so they acknowledge themselves Subjects in all their addresses to His Majesty, which they make as a body collective. He is the Head of them not taken severally (for then He should be Head of many bodies) but as jointly making one body.  
And left he should seem to forget they are his Council, which would take off from that fellowship in the supremacy, where he has placed them, he grants they are his Council, but by the first constitution not to be elected by him, but assigned to him, not assumed as Moses his under Officers were upon Jethero's advice, pag. 4. How this of fes is pertinent (though often hinted in this book) I see not, for Moses did not assume them as Counsellors about making of Laws, for neither he, nor they, nor both together could make any, but as Officers to ease him in the execution, or judging of the people according to those Laws they received from God.  
As for the Commons in Parliament, they being a representative body, could not be chosen but by them they represent, yet are they sent upon his command and have a trust upon them, not only from those that elected them, but also from the King that sends for them to represent unto him the grievances of his people, and faithfully to consult about the remedies; accordingly it is in relation to his Majesty that they take the oaths of sup remacy & allegiance at their admittance into the House, and although they have there the power not only of consulting, but of consenting also, and denying for the security of the people whom they represent, yet who sees not by all this, in what relation they stand to his Majesty.  
For the Lords, they are assumed by the King, Bracton said above Reges associant sibi Comites & Barones, and we see the King calls by his Writ whom he pleases to that House; nor doth it help that he saith pag. 5. the Lords are Consiliarii nati born Counsellors to the State, for though Nobility in some be Native, yet was it at first Dative as they speak, by the grace of the King.  
We may add here what he saith in the same place, The very stile of Comites and Peers implies a  society with his Majesty in the Government, they are in Parliament his Comites his Peers. Yet Bracton tells us, Rex non habet parem has no Peer, & gives us another reason of the stile Comites (as he is cited by sir Edw: Coke in Mag: Charta) quia sunt in Comitatu, without relation to Parliament, because they are either in the Train of the King, or because set in each county adregendum populum, and so assumed by the King to the like end that Moses did his under Officers in ruling his people; So that other place of Bracton cited by this Answerer, pag. 4. Rex habet Superiorem— Curiam suam viz, Comites & Barones, is not meant of the Court of Parliament, for there's no mention of the Commons, but it follows in that place debent Regi fraenum imponere, it is likely he spoke this in favour of the Militia raised against Hen. 3. (for then he wrote) and might call that assembly of Earls and Barons then combined against the King, curiam, the higher Court or Council. But when he speaks like a Lawyer, he saith plainly, Rex in Regne parem habere non debet, cùm par in parem non habeat poteflatem, multo fortius non habeat superiorem, which how it agrees with that above, let this man, or the skilful in the Law judge.  
Let us examine what reason will conclude by his argument from the style Comites; it would follow thence, That the Commons must be his Comites, and Peers too, for they are  with his Majesty, as well as the other; and so this Answerer must set up three thrones, one for the King, another for the Lords, and a third for the House of Commons; I should not think any thing too honourable for the Houses of Parliament, but only Majesty. Now it is a rule in policy, Majestas cum supremà potestate conjuncta est, Majesty goes along with the supreme power, as in the popular State of Rome, it was usually and properly said, Maiestas populi Romani, and so might it be said here too, were this man's contrivement good, but I know the honourable Houses of Parliament look not for it.  
But we return to the beginning of pag. 5. In reading the first line of it, I was in hope he would have blest us with some demonstration of this constitution to be such as he has borne us in hand it is, how doth it appear that the constitution of this government is such? I answer, by the mutual oath that the King & people take to maintain the laws that have so constituted it; Altogether inconsequent; The King takes oath to maintain the Laws-therefore they are such as this man fancieth them; it shows indeed an obligation on his Majesty to perform, it does not show such a co-ordination, supply, reserved power, etc. surely never any King swore to it in that sense, or had reason to understand it so; for he finds he is expressly bound by that oath to preserve the immuimmunities & liberties of &c. to protect etc. which he should not be well able to do if his power might be taken from him at the pleasure of others.  
So when he answers to that which I have said, the King is King before he take the oath; True, but he is King but upon the same trust, which his Predecessors swore to, and the Oath, which the Law provides for the King to take, virtually binds him before he takes it. He Answers nothing, unless he could show that the trust which this Oath implies to be in the King, was such a trust upon which the people in their first contrivement (as he phansieth) conditionally admitted the first King, and that the Law which provided this oath, was that first constitution or contrivement, which would be absurd, for the oath speaks the Language of later times, and would not fit the Mouth of the first King in the first Coalition of Government, for it binds Him to preserve the immunities of Holy Church, which if it should be of an after addition to the Oath, yet surely Leges and Consuetudines Angliae were in it from the beginning; now those are customs of Government, and customs must have some continuance of time past to make them so, therefore the first King in the first Coalition of Government swore not this Oath; what he shows indeed by this argument we admit, that the King is bound to take the Oath, is bound to perform the duty of it, but this is nothing to prove such a first Constitution as he dreams of.  
He brings a proof out of Fortescue, Hanc potestatem a populo effluxam habet, etc. Principatu namque nedum Regali, sed & politico suo populo dominatur, now the word Politico implies the Principat of many, especially when opposed to Regali, pa. 5. This place tells us what manner of power the King has, does not tell us the two Houses of Parliament have such power as this man pretends; We examined that Effluxam a populo above, whether the power of the King was derived from the people by agreement in the first coalition of Government. Here we grant the King has a limited power, but not so limited as this Answerer would have it, which he might have read in the words cited: for he sees there the King has His Regalis potestas, but Rules not only by that (i.e.) by a power mere Regiased & politico principatu, by a political power also, in as much as in the making of Laws the advice and consent of many is required, and his power regulated by such Law.  
But this Principate of many, as it is ill rendered out of the Latin, so is it ill meant, to the excluding of His Regalis potestas, & so to make this government democratical, or Aristocratical, rather than Monarchical; Now there cannot be such a blend or mixture of the Forms of government, but that one must be predominant, and Supreme, because else the body Politic could not move or act any thing, as it was said above, when we spoke of the Temper of the three Estates.  
This Answerer, to free this body Politic, (when the three Estates lock and bind one the other by their Negative voice, as upon the King's refusal) and to make it active without him to all ends and purposes, places the Final resolution in the two Houses, to which all must obey, and so indeed places the Supremacy there, but why then should this be a Monarchy rather than a popular government, were it not for Supremacy in the King? or why should that first Constitution, which he saith placed this final resolution in the two Houses, leave such a power in the King, to dissolve them? which power, say we, loses the Body Politic, when through the aforesaid binding it cannot move a new way by a new Law, and gives it motion by the former Laws, which will appear anon to be with less inconvenience, then if in such a case it should be moved by such a final resolution.  
Having thus far spoken of his Coordination, before he comes to the Supply, the two Houses are thereupon to make, he spends two Pages, the 6th and 7th in repeating his Notes he has taken at Court-Sermons, where he saith, the Divinity of Monarchy, and the absoluteness of this in the King's sole person, has been usually cried up, as if there were no medium between such an absolute Monarchy, and such a co-ordinative one as he has fancied; Let them bear their burden that speak not their conscience at Court, I would they would now do it sincerely at S. Margaret's Westminster, for I could tell him what stuff is preached there too, what omnipotency is ascribed to some in the world, I would also this man would have used a conscience in repeating and interpreting my words, for he often makes me speak contradictions through his own inadvertency, and in this place he absolves me in the beginning of his relation, and charges me thus at the end;  
This and much more was preached, and all upon this error, that the Dr. resolves on, that the sole Supremacy of power was in the King's Person, and that His Judgement was the sole Supreme rule of Power. He should have done well to have cited the place where I resolve so, for they are not my words, nor do they render my sense any where expressed to that purpose. For when I say (as I did, and proved in my other Treatise) that the King is Supreme, or the higher power, I do not mean he is sole and absolute in making or imposing Laws (the contrary was often expressly acknowledged by me) but that He is still, notwithstanding the consent of the two Houses, required to that act or exercise of supreme Power, the only supreme Governor, according to the oath of supremacy, which was enough for the purpose I urged it; viz. not for his absoluteness, but against our resisting of him. It is well known the consent of the Senate and people of Roms was required to the Laws their Emperor would have enacted, and yet He was Supreme, so acknowledged, 1 Pet. 2.13. And it is well known, The King was in Parliament acknowledged the Supreme Head of the Body Politic.  
And now what can conscience conclude hence? First, that the two Houses of Parliament are in some sort coordinate with the King, by reason of that consent necessarily required in the making and declaring Law, and that's enough for our security against an absolute or arbitrary government. Also that the King, notwithstanding such their coordination and consent, is, and has been so declared in Parliament, the Supreme Head of the Body, Ecclesiastical and Civil, also the only Supreme Governor, and that is enough to deter conscience from resistance.   

SECT. V Of the Supply which is fancied upon the former Coordination.  
NOw lest it should appear unreasonable, as needs it must, that the two Houses of Parliament should have power to make Laws and Ordinances without the King, which He acknowledges He cannot do without them, and to seize the Militia or power of Arms, with which His Majesty is entrusted, as this Answerer confesseth; the device to make this good, is by a rule misapplyed, Coordinata invicem supplent, which Rule he gave us, Pag. 3. and now comes to misapply it, Pag. 8. If the King fail in His trust, His coordinates' in the mixture of this Supreme power, must according to their trusts supply. But before we show how weakly this coordination infers the supply, let us first see wherein this supply stands, and when the time is for them to make use of it; this Supply, he tells us, is in applying the means of safety to its end, that is in settling the Militia as may be most safe for the kingdom; and the time when it is necessary to apply them, is in imminency of Danger; to this purpose, Pag. 8, 9, 10.  
The King acknowledges imminency of Danger in His Writ of Summons, Consideratis periculis imminentibus, Pag. 9 There may be imminent dangers sufficient to move his Majesty to call a Parliament, and require their advice, though not sufficient to cause them to use this Supply, by taking the Militia into their hands. Where by the way (saith he) we may take notice, that His Majesty is by Law to call a Parliament, when there shall be any imminent danger, ib: and by the way we may take notice, that the King is the sole Judge of those imminent dangers, when he calls a Parliament, and also (which is not the way to make him hasty in calling a Parliament) that according to this man's contrivement, so oft as his Majesty calls a Parliament, they may use this supply, and seize the Militia, because of those imminent dangers in the Writ of Summons.  
This imminency of danger has a competent Judge, the two Houses, (wherein the Law makes the Reason of the Kingdom to reside) who have by Vote concluded it. Pag. 9 so it was by Vote concluded, that his Majesty, upon the raising of a Guard at York, for the safety of his person, intended to make War upon the Parliament, are they competent Judges of his intentions too? indeed those horrible imminent dangers that were pretended, have been for the most part as invisible as Intentions are.  
But the King refused to pass the Bill for the Militia, according to the advice of the two Houses, which is (saith the Law) the same ever living Reason of the State that first advised the Government, and must still advise the way of applying it, pag. 9 His Majesty did not barely refuse, but gave his Reasons for it, and if they had their dangers and fears moving them to gain the Militia, so had he his to withhold it, as he had amply testified to the world. But here's a Reason of State, to which his Majesty's Reason must give way; and that surely is Law. Certainly the Militia is to be applied by the Reason of State, but we must not make the King no part of the State as he does, and as he saith the Law does, but we would fain see that Law; we are sure it is declared 25 H. 8.21. Your Royal Majesty, and Your Lords and Commons represent the whole Realm. This restraining of the whole Reason of State to the two Houses, is but the same device with that which made the first constitution of this government, to be the contrivement of the people when they made the first King, and was above confuted; So this necessity that is here laid upon the King, always to follow the advice of the two Houses, is but a strain of that device which places a final and Arbitrary resolution in them, and shall be handled anon.  
His Majesty will apply the Militia, but by the advice of them against whom it is to be secured, whom the Parliament has Voted enemies to the State, against whom especially it was called, pag. 10. This is shooting at Rovers; if he should tell who those voted one's were, and who those enemies against whom this Parliament was called, I do not think he would find any of them about his Majesty, when he refused to pass the Bill for the Militia; but he tells us a little after, pag. 10. The King gathers these voted enemies into an Army against the Parliament, that had voted them such; and a little after, What shall the two other States do, but use that power of Arms, which the government in such case of the King's refusal has entrusted them with, to its own preservation (that's always supposed, never proved) especially when 'tis but for the apprehending of such enemies to it, as (beside that voted delinquency) are sufficiently convinced by their own flight; Now we know who those voted delinquents are, against whom the Militia was by bill to be secured; some five or six that fled beyond sea. But these though beyond sea, are gathered together into an Army here by the King: to pass by this, let us see what is more material; The King's Army is raised against the Parliament, Their army against those delinquents to bring them to justice; But can any man in conscience be persuaded, that was the King's design? was that a time to provoke them that were so powerful with the people? or was the King in a condition then fit to enterprise against them that were so furnished with all the Arms of the Kingdom, he not knowing where to have sufficient for a small guard? Nay, let his offers, sent them from Nottingham many months after speak to Posterity, by whose refusal it was, that we are not now in safety; when as it pleased God within a few weeks after to raise him such an assistance, that he was able to appear against those forces that pretended they were sent from the Parliament.  
And now that it comes to blows, why should it be interpreted, that the King intends to overthrow the Parliament, because he fights against those pretended Parliamentary forces, more than that the Parliament intends to overthrow the Kingly power, because their force fight against those that assist him? certainly, as they desire the continuance of his Kingly power, so does he the continuance of free Parliaments; knowing he cannot suffer by such.  
And for the apprehension of those Delinquents which fled, being here pretended as the cause of their seizing the Militia, and taking Arms, Can we think them so considerable? or that they would have been withheld, when as those that were greater and nearer to His Majesty, had been delivered up to the justice of the Parliament? certainly this would not have made the Breach, if first a great Delinquent on that side had not been denied to be delivered up to trial, if the Militia had not been seized, and some further design thereby threatened according to His Majesty's apprehension.  
Having done with these pretences, we come to his argument for this supply, Coordinata invicem supplent, if the King refuse, His Coordinates' the two Houses must supply.  
We answer, Coordinates do supply each others failings, not always and to all purposes, but then and so far forth as is appointed by that constitution that makes them so, there are two parts of this Answer.  
First, they do then supply when it is expressed so in the constitution that has co-ordinated them, and not else; he gave us as an instance of this co-ordination, the example of a father and son, entrusted with lands to certain uses, pag. 5. Now put case, the father refuses to expend any thing upon such uses as his son presents to him, because he apprehends them not such as were intended; may then his son supply and do it himself, unless it be so expressed in the deed of Enfeoffment? which is improbable it should, for then the whole power would be placed in the son. So if this power of supplying may be challenged by the two  parts, upon the refusal of the third, it must be as express in the constitution of the Kingdom, as the co-ordination and power of the three is: We see such reservations express in merely conventionall Kingdoms, where the Prince is chosen and admitted on such conditions.  
He tells us indeed it is fundamental and of the first constitution, but proves it not, we see it not expressed in the Enfeoffment, as I may say, wherein we find three Estates entrusted.  
If any would know what are those fundamental Laws, so much jeered at in this and other Pamphlets; It is that original frame of this  Government contrived by the people in its first constitution, and since in every several Reign confirmed by mutual oaths between King and people; and in the Parliament summons of Ed. 1. this Law is called Lex stabilitata & notissima, pag. 8. If any man would know what jeering is, he may read the premonition before this fuller Answer, and the first leaf of the answer; but if he would know what these Fundamentals be indeed, he must not expect to know them truly by this Answerer, that lays the foundations of this Government, in the airy conceptions of his own fancy, such are, a contrivement of the people when they made the first King, A reservation of power to upply upon the King's refusal, and the like; such fundamentals as these were reasoned against (which is not jeering) from the analogy and proportion that must be between the foundation and the building, the fundamental constitutions and the Written Laws; in my former Treatise.  
It is a known and written Law that declares the King Supreme head of the body Politic, also that declares him the only supreme Governor in this Realm, can the fundamentals, as this man lays them bear this superstructure, or rather consist with this fundamental thus openly declared and laid in Law? So it is a known Fundamental Constitution, that the making of Laws is in three Estates, secured against each other by a power of denying, and that it is in the King's power to dissolve the Court; can this consist with the fundamentals of this man's laying? Also the contrivement of the people at the supposed election of their first King, was proved above altogether uncertain, improbable, and unreasonable.  
What is sworn to by the Mutual oaths of King and People, we granted above to bind them, but not to prove such a Constitution; What that Lex notissima is, he should have done well to have expressed it, for we know he is apt to deceive us with generals, and to conceive, where ever he meets with Fundamental Law or constitution of Government, it is his Law and constitution as he hath framed it.  
The Coordination of the three Estates, we grant is fundamental & Lex notissima, but this power of Supply would not be so strange and new a Doctrine now, if it had been then Lex Notissima. Nay the Rule of Coordination is against it, which, when three are expressly entrusted, gives not power to two, unless it be so expressly provided in the Orinall constitution; and this coordination is such that it gives us an argument against it too, that the original constitution of this Government, meant there should not be a supply by two Estates, because it hath settled the provision of the Kingdom in three, secured against each other by a Negative voice, and hath left the power of dissolving in the King, which would make such a power of Supply vain.  
Secondly, we Answer to the Rule, Coordinates' supply only in that whereunto they are coordinate. Now the two Houses are Coordinate with His Majesty only ad Consentiendum for the making new provisions of safety by new Laws, we do not find them Coordinate with him in command of the Militia, or appointing officers for it, or designing Ministers of Justice through the Kingdom, therefore the Supply cannot hold in these; for if one part of the body can supply the defect of another, yet cannot they supply the office of the head.  
But the Answerer may reply, though the King alone is ordinarily entrusted with the Militia, the designing of officers, etc. yet may these fall under their ordinance of Supply, as the substratamateria, the matter about which that ordinance may be conversant, as about the means of preventing imminent dangers. We Answer, that Ordinance cannot extend itself farther than Law will give it leave, it may not overrule known Laws; if it be Law and the Constitution of the Kingdom, that when the preventing of imminent dangers require new provisions, those provisions or new Laws be made by three Estates entrusted, and strengthened with power of denying, then it's plain, such supply or provision cannot be made by an ordinance; and better run the hazard of inconvenience by the refusal of one then to leave the whole power in the other two. Otherwise an Ordinance shall prevail to divest the King of all the power settled in Him by Law, what then will become of the property of the Subject? No marvel this proceeds on to an arbitrary power, as we shall have this Answerer confessing anon.  
But he told us above, Pag. 3. that the three Estates are fundamentals. If therefore the King be one of the Fundamentals, according to his phrase, then according to his argument, Pag. 8. the King is not to be stirred out of his Place, so long as the government stands, for there he tells us foundations are not to be stirred so long as the building stands; shall He then be like a lose stone in the Foundation, to be taken out and laid aside, when they shall judge He is not fit to bear his burden, the Trust the Law hath put upon Him? howsoever some stone in the side wall may be so used, the chief corner stone cannot.  
If he reply as he doth, Pag. 9 This Vote or Ordinance of the two Houses takes not away the Kings negative voice in making Laws, 'tis not an Act of Parliament, 'tis but an occasional supply of this Coordination, lest the whole should ruin. Yet will you tell us presently, The Houses in case of the other parts absence and refusal, are virtually the whole, and have the Parliamentary power, if so, why then can they not make an act of Parliament as well as such an Ordinance? but call it what you will, Act or Ordinance, whereby either King or Subject are despoiled of what is theirs by Law, it matters not greatly, seeing that Ordinance is of force so long as they please to judge necessary, who, according to this Answerer, have the final and arbitrary resolution; what will it satisfy the King to tell him this is but an occasional supply, if He see it is in their powers to take or make the occasion? or to let Him know, that ordinarily he hath the power and is entrusted with it, but upon extraordinary times and dangers it is theirs, He refusing their direction, if He knows it is in their power to make that distinction when they please, and to apply it? Or when will some think themselves safe enough to part with this power again? seeing greater fears are now likely to prevail with them for the holding it, than did at first for the seizing it.  
But he supposes, Pag. 11. That the two Houses upon the absence and refusal of the other part, are virtually the whole, and then asks, whether there be not a Parliament actually in England? if so, why have they not then a Parliamentary power? This term virtually doth often stand him instead, for under that he can enlarge the power of the Houses to the extent of his fancy; but let us know in this great point, wherein Conscience expects clear ground to rest on, whether the Law hath actually invested the Houses with such power.  
A Parliament we grant, and a Parliamentary power in it, and if any deny the two Houses to be the Parliament, it is because in proper speech and in truth the name and power of Parliament which belongs to three Estates, should not be restrained to two. The two Houses have still the power belonging to them, and what ever is now by them presented to the King, and by Him passed, it is done with full power of Parliament, what is done without his consent is not: it is no more now, then if the King were present in the House, and should deny to pass a Bill; for presence or absence is nothing, His power of denying is all.  
For put the case the King and the Lords should agree, and the Commons stand out, there were a Parliament still, but where is the Parliamentary power? I doubt he will not say the King and Lords have then the full power of Parliament; but where then is this Supply? will he say in the House of Commons? we must call him now to his reckoning, Pag. 3. where he tells us; Of three Estates one is less than two, and also to his rule he gives us, Pag. 4. Coordinates' supply each others failings, and Pag. 11. The refusal of one part exempts not the other from their duty; So that if this man hold to his own conceit, he must grant the King and Lords may Supply, if the Commons refuse. But if in that case he will not stand to his own reckoning and his own Rule, then must he quit his vain conceit of Supply by the two Houses, in case the King refuse.  
After this he seeks a reason of this Supply in the necessity of providing for the safety of the whole, which else would be frustrated of its safety. However this Resolver slight the Observators Argument, drawn from the highest end of Government, the people's safety, he cannot deny, but the Rule holds always, finis quò ultimatior eò in fluxu potentier; to that end all other subordinate stand but in the office of means, and this is evinced by the text, the higher power is a Minister for thy good, Pag. 11. The Observators argument deserved to be slighted by the Resolver as inconsequent, but it was confuted at large, by showing such means make not for that end (the safety of the State) but are remedies worse than the disease; Nor hath this full Answerer strengthened the consequence one whit; We grant the safety of the Commonwealth is the highest end, and unto that end all other are as means, and that the higher power ought to minister unto that end. But doth it follow, therefore such a Supply by divesting the Kingof His power, by turning the highest Minister out of His office, is the means to that end.  
The joint agreement of the three Estates is the means for new provision for that end; but in case they agree not about that provision, which may happen by the refusal of the Lords, or the Commons, or the King; then that the two agreeing parts, what ere they be, should supply the defect of the third, had been far more reasonable, then that the supply should be made only by the two Houses, (i.e.) by the body only without the Head; For this is not only to the notorious prejudice of the Supreme Head with whom the Kingdom is immediately and chief entrusted, but also it is alame provision, and argues the first Contrivement (as this man fancies it) very inconsiderate, in not providing, in case the King and Lords, or the King and Commons should join.  
Now as the not providing in such Cases, and the power of dissolving (which resides in the King) do plainly show that such a Supply is not the Contrivement of the first Constitution, but a fancy of late popular Statesmen, from whom this Answerer hath borrowed it; so in very deed this way of Supply would not be a means of safety, but of more inconveniency, as at this day experience teacheth us, and at large was showed in the former Treatise.  
Therefore if the three Estates cannot jointly agree, which is the reasonable means of making new provision for safety. There is in the King by the same Constitution power to dissolve, and protect His Subjects in their Religion, and properties, and Liberties, according to the former Laws established; And although His Majesty hath bound Himself from dissolving them without their consent, for this time, (of which this Answerer does vainly endeavour to make advantage in many places) yet have not they thereby any more power than what they should have had without that Grant, and so they have acknowledged themselves.  
To conclude, Conscience cannot be truly persuaded this power of Supply, is in the two Houses by the Constitution of this Government. But must needs see it is inconsistent with it, and with that power the known established Law declares to be in the King, and therefore Conscience cannot yield obedience to that power in making resistance against the King.  
The Answerer immediately after the text above cited by him, The higher power is a minister for thy good, hath these words, Pag. 12. Yes a fine way you'll say of preserving the King by fight against Him. So starting from the safety of the people (which was there spoken of as the highest end) to the Consideration of the King's safety, as if he had been struck on a sudden, with the terror of that Battle that was made against the King, or else because Truth itself upon the mention of the higher Power wrung from him a thought and acknowledgement of His Majesty in it. Well, let us see how he will have the King preserved by their fight against Him.  
No such matter (saith he) the King hath a double Capacity, Politic and Natural, in fight for the preservation of the Kingdom, they fight for Him in His Politic Capacity as King— in that He cannot be divided from His Kingdom or Parliament— They fight to disengage His Person from that unsafe and unworthy employment those Enemies to Him and His Kingdom put it to— however he be persuaded by them it is His cause that hath engaged them; it is their own guilt and danger, Pag. 12.  
So we are usually answered, when we tell them of their Hands so many times lifted up in Battle against the Lords Anointed, and of David's resolution upon it, who can lift up— and be guiltless? 1 Sam. 26. They reply it is but against the Cavaleir's and that unworthy Company that is about Him, and have thus engaged Him; and in so doing they fight for the Kingdom, and for the King too, in His Politic Capacity. A shift that will no more save them from the Gild, than it will do Him from their violence. If He had been taken away in His natural Capacity at Keinton Battle, had there been any such thing as a King at Westminster? had it not divided Him in His Politic Capacity from the Parliament there? take away the Body, and the shadow too, destroy Him in His Person or Natural Capacity, and you destroy Him in His Politic, and the Parliament too, which ceases upon it.  
Nor is that distinction of His double Capacity altogether vain, but only in this point of Arms and resistance by force; As just sentences of judges, against His Personal Commands, are for Him in His Politic Capacity; so all denials of active obedience to unjust personal commands; why! here's all this while no power taken from Him, or usurped against Him, No danger to His Person, to His Natural Capacity; but in resistance by force of Arms, especially in a Battle against Him, (which not only takes the sword out of His Hand and usurps the power, but may also take Him away in His Natural Capacity) the distinction is most vain.  
For the Enemies that are said here to enthrall His Person and persuade Him, I suppose he means those Voted one's of which we spoke above; if any of them be entertained lately; for one of them there's above a thousand of His good Subjects, whose Nobleness and honesty hath still engaged them honourably, though to the weaker side; before in behalf of the Subject groaning under former grievances, now in service to His Majesty opposed by popular fury, Subjects that out of Conscience of their allegiance cleave unto him, as they did to S●ul, whose hearts the Lord had touched 1. Sam. 10. On the contrary it is well known how the guilt and danger of some desperate persons have engaged the poor people and opposed them as a buckler betwixt themselves and the stroke of justice. And how ever this man thinks His Majesty is carried away; We are sure he hath spoken so much reason in His Expresses and Declarations, that it plainly appears, He is not persuaded by Enemies to Himself or the Kingdom, but hath been forced to this just and necessary defence of Himself; and hath cause to think, He may be safer every way by his own Army, then by that which pretends to preserve him in his Politic, but gave him Battle to the most imminent danger of His Person and Natural Capacity.   

SECT. VI Of the final Resolution of this State's judgement, and power of declaring Law.  
THe Answerer goes on to his second Proposition, placing the final Resolution of this State's judgement in the two Houses, unto which all must yield obedience. Pag. 13. How proves he this? In this mixture of Supreme power and trust of Government the two Houses make a part, what's their share? to consult? nay, but to consent with the King in making Laws. Be it so, that share we grant them; but if you will place the final resolution in them, you must not speak of a share, but challenge the whole, The King is but a cipher.  
Then he tells us again of the first Constitution of Government, when the people made the first King, but nothing at all to the proving of such a Constitution, or clearing of such a final resolution settled in the two Houses; And as if there were no way to overthrow the first Constitution of this Government, as he hath contrived it, but only by Conquest, he leaps from this Final resolution, of which he should give us some proof, to speak of the Title by Conquest.  
Conquest I confess may give such a Right as Plunderers use to take in houses they can master, Pag. 13. I had not mentioned Conquest, but to take away the exception made to the Apostles prohibition of Resistance from the absoluteness of the Roman Emperors, and to show they made themselves so absolute by force of Arms; but seeing this Answerer will make a business of it, he must take notice that Conquest is one of the means by which God translates Kingdoms; and that David being provoked by the King of Ammon, brought that people under, and had a right over them by Conquest, 2. Sam. 12. that the Edomites were so brought under the Dominion of judah, from which they revolted, 2 Chro. 21.8. The Romans also had a right over judou, by Conquest, our Saviour acknowledges it in Caesar, give to Caesar, etc. and in his substitute Pilate, that he had power given him from above. If this Answerer should look through all Christendom, he would scarce find a Kingdom that descends by inheritance, but it had a beginning in Arms, and yet I think he will not say the Titles of these Kings are no better then of Plunderers; for though it may be unjust at first in him that invades and Conquers, yet in the succession, which is from him, that providence which translates Kingdoms, manifests itself and the will of God; and there are momenta temporum, for the justness of such Titles, though we cannot fix them.  
If he say they begin to be just, when the consent of the people is yielded; were it so; and not so till then; yet is that in all likelihood an overawed consent (as he grants the consent of the people of Rome was to their Emperors, Pag. 21.) and little to the advantage of the people; however let their consent be free, what the people gain upon that consent, is by an after agreement, and grant of the Prince, not by precontrivement at their making of the first King; as he dreams it to be in this Kingdom; We need not look fare for instance, we see Mag: Char: gins each clause with a Concessimus to the ancient liberties of the Subject.  
By which we see how vainly he breaks into passion in the words following, How undoctor all, how unchristian, inhuman Barbarism it is, to talk of a right by Conquest in a Civil, a Christian State? Pag. 13. and a little after, how many ways doth this Resolver abuse His Majesty herein? I had indeed abused Him, had I talked of His Right as fond as this man hath done; I said, he King claims from the Conqueror, and that of uncertain plea of supposed first Election could not give Subjects such power against him, as is now pretended to. I shown the Emperors of Rome made themselves such by force of Arms, so did the Saxons here, so did the Normans after them master this people; this Answerer speaks nothing to these beginnings of this Government in the Saxon and Norman Lines, but still tells us of a first Election, and 'tis un-Christian to talk of Conquest, that is, to speak the truth.  
David, as it was said above, being provoked by the King of Ammon, took away his Crown, made that people to serve as sl●●es. The Conqueror had a Title from the Saxon Kings, being denied, he pursu's it, and in the pursuit of it by Arms subdues this Land; can we think he was bound to such a first Constitution, as this man conceives? We see it otherwise; and what has been consented to by succeeding Kings.  
My Collection then was, shall the pretended right of the people by such an Election be good against a King that claims not by it, but receives the Crown by succession, descending through several Conquests, and yet the right of the Roman people not good against their Tyrannical Emperors that made themselves of Subjects, Lords over them by force of Arms! I know not how this should be injurious to Christianity, unless it be un-Christian to restrain the resistance and rebelling of Christians against a Christian Prince, when as the Apostle did forbid Christians and all the people of Rome, to resist their Emperor, though Heathen and Tyrannical.  
Let us see whether it be injurious to His Majesty, How does he abuse His Majesty herein? A Title he yields Him by Conquest; and yet He must not rule by it, a King as Conqueror, and yet He must not rule as a Conqueror. How injurious does he make the King to His posterity, in that he subscribes and swears to a limited title, and has a free one the while to hold by? pag. 13. it was no injury to his Majesty, to say, He cannot rule as Conqueror, for he is not a Conqueror, but claims from him that was; nor is it injurious to His Majesty's posterity, that he swears to a limited power (that limited title, as this man has it, is a fancy) for he has not a free one as a Conqueror had, yet not limited by such a first election and contrivement, as this Answerer dreams of, but by privileges and immunities granted or restored to the people since the Conquest, unto which His predecessors bound themselves by oath, and so doth he.  
It is not for me to settle His Majesties Right, but should I do it, as this man hath presumed, I had been injurious to Him and His posterity, for as he says here of right by Conquest, though falsely, it may give ius in re, not ius ad rem, so I of the right by such an Election as he has contrived, however it might give His Majesty ius adrem, it seems to lend him but a slender ius in re, a weak assurance of holding it, making Him like a Tenant at will, to be outed of Possession, so oft, and so long, as they that have the final resolution, shall judge expedient; So has he conceived it.  
Now let us go on, and examine how he makes good this final resolution. The power of declaring Law, saith he, Pag. 14. must rest some where; true; In those, say we, that have the power of making Laws, (i.e.) in the King and both Houses.  
Here the Answerer puts two Cases. First, what if they be divided, as at this time? does it rest in the King or the two Houses? In neither say we, fully, and to the like purpose, as it doth in the three Estates, which power is suspended while one part suspends.  
He endeavours to show, Pag. 15 & 16. this final resolution should rest in the two Houses rather than in the King, from their ability and skill. their fidelity, their ends and interests, which do not interferre so with those of the Subject, Property, Privilege, etc. as those of the Kings do, absoluteness of Rule, Monopolies, Patents, etc. the comparison is odious, though we are to hope the best of the Members of the two Houses, yet we know they are men subject to like passions, as others are, and we are assured the King is entrusted with us as well as they, and has beside Rights and Privileges of His own to look to; But seeing this is Comparative only, rather in them then the King, not absolute, that it ought to rest in the two Houses; we may let it go.  
His second Case is, Pag. 17. What if either of the Houses be divided into equal parts? it is easily resolved, The Speakers voice casts it; True. But he should have put two cases more; First, what if an opportunity be watched, and one of these equal parts do not exceed the fifteenth part of the whole number, by reason of the absence of the rest; we are in an ill condition, when that must be the final resolution of this State's judgement; nay, of that number that prevails, may be scarce any Lawyer of known abilities, which was one of his prejudices he laid against the King in his Comparative between Him and the Houses for declaring what is Law.  
The other case is, what if the two Houses be divided in judgement the one from the other? where then resides this final resolution? It may be it will be replied, they ought to sit together and vote together; so indeed some would have it, but it is confessed that the Parliament consists of three Estates, and that the Lords and Commons are two several Estates. Well then, if the King concur in judgement with the Lords, why should not the final resolution be in them? for we must here call him again to his reckoning, and tell him as he did us, Pag. 3. it is easy to reckon the one is less than two.  
And the more strange this will seem, if we consider what it is, that is now to be declared, no case mis-judged in inferior Courts, no late written Law, whose sense is doubtful, but the very constitution of Parliament that has continued so many Ages, whether in that Consticution there be such a Law as gives this power of Supply by seizing and commanding the Militia; We understand the literal sense of the Oath of Supremacy and Allegiance, and have it confessed by this Answerer, that the Trust of the Militia is ordinarily in His Majesty, Pag: 10. and we suppose, no man can think that when the Kings of England swear to observe the Laws and Customs of, etc. they ever took the Oath in such a sense as to bind them to take for Law, what ere the two Houses shall, without them, declare to be so; or that when we bound ourselves by Protestation to maintain the power and privileges of Parliament, we meant what ever they declare to be such; for this were too much to resign up our faith to man.  
Well then, if there be a disagreement upon such a declaring, it is better we follow what the known Law commands us to, and that there be a suspension of such a declaring, till all that are entrusted for us can agree, then that such a power of declaring be assumed by any two of the three Estates, for in the same 17. Pag. it is acknowledged Arbitrary.   

SECT. VII. The final Resolution is not Arbitrary in the two Houses, but only in the three Estates.  
IT appears then, that this power is as arbitrary in the two Houses as it would be in the King, I answer, it cannot be denied nor avoided, etc. It would not be so in the King, so long as the two Houses have, what He denies them not, the power of dissenting; But to tell us plainly, The Power is arbitrary in the two Houses, is very ingenuous; this Answerer is seldom so, but here beyond all reason, for it follows as an admirable proof of what he hath confessed. As the Government in the form of it, was at first an act of the will, and so Arbitrary, so it still remaining the same, it must remain some where arbitrary still, else our forefathers should not convey that same government to us, which they began, they cannot bind us in that wherein they were themselves free, Pag. 17. when were they free? it must be before they set up the Government (i. e.) when they were without government. We cannot see when the people were so free, or that the frame of this Government was an arbitrary act of their will; enough has been said before against such conceits; The like we have in those words, the Government still remaining the same; the same with what? it must be with that arbitrary act of their will, which is supposed to frame that government, or else no force of argument in the Consequence, to prove our Government is still arbitrary some where; and if so, than no sense in the Antecedent, that our government should be said to remain the same with the arbitrary act of will, which at first framed it.  
But to pardon his antecedents, let us see what follows; They were free when they began, or set up this Government, therefore we are not bound, now it is set up; that frame of Government was an act of their will, and arbitrary, therefore the Government is still arbitrary in them; when people set up an absolute Monarchy over themselves (as he says the people of Rome did, when they consented to their Emperors) that form of Government was an act of their will, and arbitrary when they began it, therefore still it is arbitrary in them; These are good proofs, such indeed as this Answerer uses to bring, framed only to deceive the unwary.  
But sometimes he expresses that first Constitution, as made by consent of King and people, sure than that Consent of the King at first was an act of His Will, and Arbitrary; and so it follows, that the Government for making of Laws and Constitutions, is Arbitrary in the King and people (i. e.) in the three estates consenting and agreeing together, and that is the very truth. Only this depends not upon an arbitrary Act of the people's will, preceding all Government when they were free, as he said (for that is not imaginable in this Government) but must needs proceed from an after consent or grant of the King, admitting them to this arbitrament or freedom of will in the making of Laws, which is enough to bind Him and secure us.  
Nor is this Arbitrarines' best secured from doing hurt in the Votes of Parliament (that is of the two Houses) by reason of their number, trust, and self interest as he tells us, Pag. 17. But it is better secured in the three Estates, that is, in all that are entrusted for us; for Arbitratines' is likely to do least hurt, where it depends upon those that have several wills, and several private Interests, as the three Estates have, but whose public Interest is the same; so that if the King pursue His private interest, it is crossed by the private interest of the Subject, if they theirs, then will his private interest hinder the compass of it, if he may have, what for that purpose is left in him by the Constitution of this Government, the power of denying; that so being crossed in their private ways, they may meet in their public interests the good and welfare of the whole State, which is best for them both.  
But he tell us, in the body Natural the will follows the last dictate or resolution of the understanding, that being in this body Politic the wisdom of its Great Council, pag. 17. That I may not trouble him in his Philosophy by telling him, The will has an influence back again upon the understanding; I know what he means by the application of it, That the King must always follow the final resolution of the two Houses; which if so, what would he be better than a Duke of Venice, or this State other then Popular. And to this end have we so many discourses tending to the praise of Aristocratical Government; and he that put out the third Answer against my Book prefers the State of Venice before all for the surest Government. Give me leave to note this by the way, Although it be well known what inconveniences that State lies under, by reason of the several sactions and sidings of their great Families, yet this means of security they have, Their resolutions of high concernments are not carried but by such a number of the whole Senate, though many be absent; And let me take the boldness to say, We should conceive ourselves in a suret condition, if such businesser, which nearly concern the Kingdom and the very Constitution of Government, were not carried by the major part of those that are present, but by a more unanimous consent, that is by the better half, at least, of the whole number, that belong to each house; such businesses, if need were, had better stay till the trial could be made by such a number, then to run the hazard of a watched opportunity, when sew are present; and such resolutions would better sway with his Majesty, and better satisfy the whole Kingdom.  
Now to this Argument of the last dictate; The debates and resolutions of the two Houses are indeed great helps to inform His Majesty's understanding, but not as the last dictate immediately to determine his will, for they are extrinsecall to him, as the resolution of one House is to another, They being three several Estates: His will must needs follow the dictate of his own understanding, having received information from them. And whereas I said concerning the King's Judgement upon such an advantage, He sees with the eyes of Others, even of those that are of different Judgement from him, this Answerer makes me say, as he would have it, that the King is to see with the eyes of others, as if, should they present him with black for white, He were bound to think it so.  
Then for the binding of the Subject to obedience by this final resolution of the two Houses, he tells us, pag. 18. As their interests with us tie them more to do aright, so our elections of them tie us more to suffer what they do, if not aright. It would trouble this Answerer to give the Clergy any assurance from these mutual interests; for they have none to represent them, they have no voice in the election of them that vote there again; this reason from representation and Election concerns only one of the Houses; and how men of public trust may, and have pursued their private interests under pretence of the public good, Experience has heretofore shown it, and time will discover it ere long to eyes, that yet cannot see it. For their tye upon us we grant it, but not to all purposes without His Majesty's consent; who is entrusted for us as well as they, nay, in whom the Supreme trust of the Kingdom is. It is not a tie to bind us to obey their arbitrary commands. M. Burrowes will tell us in his Answer to the fifth Section, should a Parliament so far degenerate as to enslave us, he thinks the light of nature would show us a way to provide for ourselves by reassuming the power given to them.  
There is nothing more usual in these men's mouths then the Law is our inheritance, we are born unto it. It is true, and it concerns us to look to it; but shall our freedom and inheritance, our Petition of Right, our liberties and Privileges be only good against the King, and the resolution of the Houses inevitable to us for all our interests, all we have? So this Answerer would make us believe.  
In the pursuit of his third proposition, he tells us, pag. 18. They are not in themselves infallible, but to us inevitable; here is no Parliament Papacy, as the Doctor pleases to descant. Certainly the Pope himself does not believe himself to be infallible, nor do his learned flatterers, that would maintain it; but the deceived people believe it down right, and it is for the advantage of the other, that they do so; The Doctor said not there was infallibility in the great Council, but wished the misled people to examine whether they have not such a thought, to work them into an implicit faith of believing and receiving without Examination what ever is concluded there.  
He leaves us a private dissent of judgement from their determinations, but we are bound by them from gainsaying, or resistance, and so it is to us inevitable. Such a power of binding has a general Council to its decisions, and why should a Civil General Council of England have less power in it? So he, pag. 18. We Answer the great Council of England has such power of binding inevitably if you add the assent of the King; as all Ecclesiastical Counsels expect the Confirmation of the supreme Civil power for the binding of those, that are under them, to their Canons and decisions; But if we keep ourselves from gainsaying or resistance, will it satisfy? no, their Resolution or Ordinance calls us all to active obedience, to Arm, kill, and slay; and this we must believe after so many ages to be a fundamental Law; when as we hear the known Law (which is inevitable to us) not only binding us from being active against His Majesty, to the endangering of His Person, or diminution of His Crown and Dignity, but also not suffering us to be silent or sit still when the defence of His Rights, or Person requires our aid.  
We have now done with his propositions, and his discourse upon them, whereby he hath wound himself up to the pitch of Bractons' speech, which he brought and rejected as too high to be attempted, pag. 4. the King hath above him besides God and the Law, His Court of Earls and Barons. But this Answerer has placed both them and the House of Commons in that height, by this final Resolution and arbitrary inevitable Command; and this reserved by them in their first choice of a King, which according to the rules of Policy, makes the King to have but imperium communicatum, leaves the supreme commanding power in them.  
From the Premises he concludes his resolution for Conscience, pag. 19 This great Centurion of the Kingdom, the Parliament, says to one of this now necessary listed Army, Go and he goes, to another come and he comes— what other authority hath a Sheriff to put a Malefactor to death? We have had enough of the Centurion already, too much (God knows) of the Military Commands; we should have liked it better if he had likened the Parliament to that wise and peaceable woman which gave advice to throw the Rebels heads over the walls, and so the matter was ended, 2 Sam. 20.18. But hath the Sheriff no other Authority but such as a Centurion gives to Kill and Slay? He has it derived from the only Supreme Governor the King, and so should every one that takes the Sword.  
Conscience also has God's warrant too, first of Charity, by the sixth Commandment, which not only forbids Murder, but commands preservation of ours and our Neighbour's life; Secondly of Justice, Render to all what is due; to the great Council what is due to it upon the King's refusal; lastly, of obedience, Submit yourselves to every Ordinance of man— Hence every Soldier in this Army hath warrant enough for his Conscience if he apply it. I am sure his three warrants here from God's Law are misapplyed and will not secure their Soldier's Consciences. First, that warrant of self defence and preservation tells us we must not do it by murdering of others, which may happen when ourself preservation uses means not allowed by the Law, it is to be regulated by; if it be the defence of the body Natural, then must it be according to the Law of God and Nature; if of the body Politic, then according to its Law, which this man has not any ways proved to prescribe this way of preservation by Subjects taking Arms; we see by the Law, the King is the only supreme Governor, and so the Sword is put into His hand for preservation of order, and executing of wrath, from whom the Authority of the Sheriff and all other Ministers of power is derived. But he that takes the Sword by his own authority, and not by Commission from or under Him, commits murder, and shall perish by the Sword; The Law is yet to make, that may derive the warrant of killing and slaying from any other fountain of power.  
Secondly, ●ender to all what is due, is a good rule of Justice, and tells us what is due to the King by the fift Commandment, Honour, and Fear, and Tribute, as the Apostle goes on in that place, Rom. 13. but it's misapplied by the Answerer to urge the rendering of Obedience to the Arbitrary commands of the two Houses, for unto such it is not due (as has been shown) though this man fancy it never so strongly.  
Lastly, The submission to every Ordinance of Man is also misapplied by him, for there was never any such Ordinance or Contrivement, which reserved such a power at the first Constitution of this Government, as he supposes, but never could prove.  
Therefore I may conclude according to my first resolve in my former Treatise, Conscience cannot find any warrant or safe ground to go upon for making this resistance. For, according to the principles of the now pleaders for this resistance, It finds nothing but a pretended Constitution, at a supposed Capitulating Election, contriving and reserving for the people such a power; finds this un reasonable in itself, inconsistent with the usual and established government of this Land, and so cannot think it safe to rest on, or fit to give it warrant against the known Law which places the power of Arms in the King, which acknowledges him Only supreme Governor, which challenges, by Our Allegiance, aid and assistance from us for the defence not only of His Person but also of His Rights, His Crown and Dignity, which are most injuriously wronged by this Contrivement, or frame of Government, and exceedingly invaded by this resistance and power of Arms raised and used against Him at this day.   

SECT. VIII. A Confutation of what is replied by the Answerers upon the first Sect. of the former Treatise.  
NOw we come to the application of what hath been hitherto said, to see how it meets with what was written in the former Treatise, where we shall take in the other Answerers also; And first we must cast an eye over Mr. Bridge his grounds, which he lays for this resistance, before he enters upon the first Section.  
He tells us, there are three grounds of their proceeding by Arms. 1. To fetch in Delinquents to be tried in the highest Court. 2. To defend the State from foreign invasion. 3. To preserve themselves and their Country from the insurrection of Papists; And that all this is done as an act of selfe-preservation, not as an act of jurisdiction over their Prince, Pag. 2. That Delinquents should be brought to a Legal trial, and the State defended, is just and necessary, yet to be done in an orderly and Legal way; not by an Army raised by Subjects, taking the Militia and power of the Kingdom out of chose hands, in which the Law has in●●●sted it. And if Conscience were to speak the Truth, it could not say, that any Delinquents were denied or withheld, till the Militia was seized, and a great Delinquent in the matter of Hull was denied to be brought to trial at His Majesty's instance, of which see more above, Sect. 5. Neither can Conscience say, that Subjects have had cause upon fears and pretences of foreign invasion, or insurrection of Papists to Arm and resist,  
Whether this be done by an Act of jurisdiction, we may discern by the plea of the fuller Answerer, for he would have us believe, they are enabled to this by Law and the Constitution of this Government, and that they do it by an act of judgement, the State's judgement residing in their final resolution, and that this power of theirs is transcendent to any power ordinarily in the King, for it declares Law without Him, it does arbitrarily command the power of the Kingdom, and the obedience of the people without and against the commands of the King (so we found it in the examination of his discourse) and what is more required to an act of Jurisdiction I know not; let Him and Mr. Bridge agree it.  
Mr. Bridge gives us proofs for this way of preservation; First, from the Law of Nature, self preservation is natural for a Man, for a Community; and therefore when a Community shall trust a Prince with their welfare, that act of trust is but by positive Law, and cannot destroy the Natural Law, which is selfe-preservation, pag. 2. But the Fuller Answer will tell him there must be a Constitution to enable them to this selfe-preservation. And were this Argument good, then might private men, or the people without the Parliament, take Arms and resist; for selfe-preservation is natural to them, and no positive Law (which according to the Fuller Answer, restrains their resistance upon their trust given to the Houses of Parliament) can, according to Mr. Bridge his reason, destroy that natural Law. Also absolute Princes (with whom the people have entrusted their welfare without any resevation might be resisted, (which the Fuller Answer again denies) for that act of trust is but by positive Law, and according to Mr. Bridge it must not restrain them, for it cannot destroy the Natural Law of self-preservation.  
But he should have observed, that as the natural body is to preserve itself according to its Law, and no otherwise, so a Community or politic body, must do it according to its Law, which prescribeth the order, and way, and means of preservation; and for want of holding to that way, we see people often, under pretence of this selfe-preservation, drawn by seditious Leaders into Arms to their own destruction.  
Secondly, he proves it from the Law of God, by places of Scripture, but so wildly, that I am ashamed to repeat them; yet the judicious Reader must give me leave for the people's sake, that are abused by these men's abusing of Scripture.  
1 Chron. 12.19. It is expressly said, that David went out against Saul to battle, but he was saul's subject at that time, pag. 2. A desperate undertaking, to make people believe this is express Scripture, for Subjects to go out to Battle against their King, but he should have added what is expressed there, it was with the Philistines that he went out, and that He helped them not, for he did but make show of tendering his service to Achish. See below, Sect. 9 where this place is touched again.  
Rom. 13. Be subject to the higher powers. But the Parliament is the highest Court of Justice, pag. 3. this is well assumed; but we grant the Conclusion, there is a subjection due to them; and if he means by the Parliament, the three Estates concurring, than all manner of subjection and obedience is due to them. But he takes them as divided; for it follows, Though the King be supreme, yet they have the high power of declaring Law, pag. 3. this is a good explication of the Supremacy. Yea this Doctor confesseth they are most fit to judge what is Law. Take in all my words which were these (none so fit to judge what those fundamentals are, as They that have power to build new Laws upon them) and then make what you can of them, or look what is spoken above of Supremacy. Sect. 4. of the power of Declaring Law, Sect. 6.  
Then he undertakes to show out of Scripture, that Kings receive their power from the people, and has the ill hap to light on Saul, David, and Solomon, for examples, because it is said, They made Saul King before the Lord, 1 Sam. 11. and so of David and Solomon; which was the peoples not giving of power, but receiving and acknowledging him for King whom the Lord had designed.  
Lastly, he has found an example and proof for the trust of Parliament in David's time, 1 Chron. 13.1, 2. David consults with the Captains and Leaders, and with all the Congregation about the fetching of the Ark; what then? These were Officers not of the King but Kingdom, and though under him, yet were they with him trusted in the affairs of the Kingdom, pag. 5. Excellent Collections! The Fuller Answer will tell him presently, that the Kings of the jews were absolute Monarches; though I say not so, yet this I say, those were Officers of the King and Kingdom, merely designed by him, not the people, and called by him to that trust; what he infers, that the Parliament is entrusted by the people, though not deduceible from that place, I grant; yet so, as that they have a trust from the King upon them too; as was above shown, Sect. 4. But that in case they think the King misled, it belongs to their trust, to take the Arms of the Kingdom, as M. Bridge would infer, can neither be drawn out of that place of Scripture, nor any Law of this Land, that ever could yet be seen. The like rambling discourse he has upon the 5. Sect. touching the Monarchical Government which God set up over his people, wherein as he is for the conclusion altogether contrary to the Full Answerer, who held the Jewish Monarchy absolute, so for his proofs and places of Scripture alleged, altogether impertinent.  
At length he will seem to give us Law for it, Inferior Courts have power to send for by force, if need be, those that are accused, much more the Parliament, the highest Court, pag. 6. And therefore also inferior Courts have power to raise Armies to force in the Accused, if they refuse to come in upon Summons; that would make good work.  
But the Law has provided a force, if need be, a Posse Comitatûs, and the King's Officer or Minister for that is the Sheriff; but this new way turns both the King out of His power, and His Ministers out of their Office, sending Volunteers and listed Soldiers into every County to force in Delinquents.  
But he tells us, they may send a Sergeant at Arms for a Delinquent, therefore twenty if twenty be accused, and therefore an hundred, and so goes on till he has made an Army of 10000 Sergeants at at Arms, pag. 6. I did not know before, that the Soldiers pretended to be sent from the Parliament: were all Sergeants at Arms? what need so many? certainly before this Army of Sergeants was raised, very few would have served to have warned in Delinquents; it has made many a sorrowful Father in the Country to see his son called to such an employment, whom he had bound Apprentice in London to another trade; Nay, the whole Kingdom has rued the sending of such and so many Sergeants at Arms (who do not only arrest men's persons as they please, but also plunder their Estates) and does earnestly desire, that as it is pretended Delinquents must be brought to trial by Law, so they may be fetched or forced in, by the way and means, the Law (as was said) has provided.  
He concludes with an Answer to an Objection, If the power of the Prince be derimed from the people, than they may take it away, when abused, and depose their Prince. Answ. No, we do not say so, the people need not think of such an inference, because they never gave away the power of self preservation, pag. 7. These are but cold denials, though you say they need not go so fare, yet you have opened and paved the way for them, to be led on so far upon these principles: and what shall withhold them? because they have the power of self preservation by taking Arms, whereas if they had not that power, it were the way to break all in pieces, pag. 7. So it seems, the way to keep people in obedience, is to give them liberty of Rebelling; but what security has the Prince, that they will trust him with the power again, if a few seditious Preachers tell them, their Prince will not use the power well, if they trust him again with it? they gave it him at first, and now they may confer it upon another, who will manage it better in order to their safety; Or if they do lay down their Arms and trust Him with power again, it shall be to his prejudice, he shall be forced first to consent to what they please, and what this is called by our Law, every one, that understands any thing, knows.  
Then in Answer to what was said in the first Section of the former Treatise (that our Divines by denying resistance unto Subjects, do not endeavour to raise the King to an arbitrary power, for they allow the denying of Obedience to all commands unlawful by the Law of God, or the established Laws of the Land) M. Bridge first would seem to return me to a Catalogue of Protestant Divines, allowing resistance in some Cases, and then tells me, if we may not resist, we yield the King an arbitrary power. For His foreign Divines; the testimony of the Centurists, speaks not to his purpose; Of the French, and Low-country Divines he brings no testimonies, but for proof tells us, we know their practice; so I for Answer may return him his own words, we know what has been the practice of those Protestants, and so they are parties interessed, not so fit to give in witness; but this I will say for them, they can justify the cause of their Arms, better than M. Bridge can do his; Now for our English Divines, its plain they speak of such Government, such States, such cases as will not agree to this Kingdom, or this time; yet do some of them allow of resistance in some cases; true, for since the revolt of the Low-Countries, and the first motions of the Protestants in France. I find in many of our Divines a willingness to excuse, as much as may be. But if we look beyond those times into our Homilies, we shall find the Doctrine of our Church expressly against Subjects taking of Arms.  
Then he tells us, though we may deny Obedience to the King's unjust Commands, yet if we may not resist, but suffer, when He pleases to punish for not obeying, we raise him to an arbitrary power, Pag. 12. Answer: To say He may command any thing not repugnant to God's Law, and punish lawfully for not obeying, is to raise him to an Arbitrary power; but to say He may not command any thing against the Law of the Land, and if He punish for not obeying such His command, it is unjust and against the Law; yet unlawful also for us to take Arms against Him for it, is not to raise him to an arbitrary power; For Arbitrary and limited power is distinguished by the Restraint, which the Law or Constitution of Government casts upon the governing power, not by the abuse of that power, which sometimes in the most limited Governments may break out into a licentious arbitrarynes; If force and not Law must tell us what Arbitrary power is, and relieve us against it in the Prince, I fear we should too often feel it from the hand of Subjects.  
The Fuller Answerer would make me contradict myself, in denying the King an arbitrary Government, Sect. 1. and yielding him the final judgement, Sect. 5.  
Now the Reader will discern, this is not my failing, but his usual mistaking of what I say; the place he aims at, is Sect. 5. Pag. 26. where in answering the objection, many see more than one, and more safety in the judgement of many, then of one, it was said. The King sees with the eyes of those many, and all times have thought it reasonable to have Monarchy, which settles the chief power and final judgement in one. That was for the general, which I suppose is the reason and frame of Monarchy; how it was good in our King, by His power of denying, appears in that place, for the final Judgement was not otherwise challenged for him; Now if such a Judgement of the Kings be called a final judgement, because it is the last, and after the Judgement of many, it matters not, it will not infer an arbitrary power, as the final Resolution, which this man placeth in the two Houses, doth; for if it be dissenting from the Judgement of those many, it is only Negative, it is not Conclusive any other way. Such, I say, is the King's final Trust or Judgement, by consenting to those many, or denying, not by concluding, or commanding any other way, as he pleases.  
The last exception of these Answerers to the first Section, is against my interpretation of Omnes ordines consentientes, to imply a general and unanimous consent of the Members of the two Houses in this point of resistance; First; they say it is enough if the major part agree, or else many Acts of Parliament would be void. Answer: however it is enough to other votes and Acts, if the major part agree upon it; yet in the concluding for resistance, if the condition of it by there grants be, omnibus ordinibus consentientibus; and their reason for it be, Rex est universis minor, and resistance itself be an opposing of the body against the head; there must be in all equity an universality in the consent, and an unanimous inclination of the whole body, and not a part of the body against the head, and another part of the same body.  
Secondly, Mr. Bridge replies. If this be our sentence, why doth the Dr. object against us, that the Christians in the primitive times did not take up Arms against the Emperors, seeing they had not the consent of all the Orders of the Empire, Pag. 13. The Doctor never intended that objecting of the Christians for an argument by itself, and therefore to the Christians persecuted, did usually subjoin the Senate and people enslaved, showing they might not resist, being all under that higher power or Supreme (as St. Peter calls the Emperor,) and contained within that universal, whosoever resists.   

SECT. IX. A Confutation of what was replied upon the second Section of the former Treatise, touching places of Scripture pretended for, or alleged against Resistance.  
THe Fuller Answerer speaks confidently. The instances of Resistance (of the peoples in behalf of Jonathan, of David's, of Elishah's,) we make no use of, we need them not, and therefore need not Answer the refutation of them, Pag. 21. But all your fellows make use of them, who having not so fine a wit to contrive a power of resistance reserved by the people when they made the first King, did conceive they stood in need of Examples to defend the people's assuming of such a power.  
Well, however this Answerer pretends, he needs them not, yet does he stick upon the example of David, and tells us, Pag. 21. what use of His Army, but to fight against? nay, a reach above all his fellows, that David (though against the King) is said to fight the Lords battles, 1 Sam. 25. The words are Abigails, and the Comment is his, more than once given us in this book, he had before spent two pages, the fixth and seventh, in repeating what notes he had taken at Court-Sermons, now he gives us a taste of what is preached at St. Margaret's, and up and down the City. That to fight against the King now, is to fight the Lords battles, or as Mr. Burrows in his Sermon, that the Armies now against the King, are the Hosts of the Lord, and in his Epistle, he calls the Earl of Essex, the Lord of their Hosts, so usually do they interest the Lord in their quarrel, and are bold again with his Titles; We know that to fight the battles of the Lord, was against the Enemies of his people, Philistines, Ammonites, etc. and that David was designed to it; that he had done it already under Saul against the Philistines, and was to do it more fully after saul's death, against the enemies of Israel round about; and accordingly the words of Abigail have this meaning; though it be known that my Lord is appointed to fight the Lords battles, and to deliver his people from their enemies round about, yet is there risen up a man to pursue after, etc. Certainly if to fight against Saul had been to fight the Lords batrels, David had not fought them well, that declined all battle with him, made use of no advantages when he had Saul twice in his power. David knew the battles of the Lord, which he was to fight, were against the Lords enemies abroad, not against the Lords anointed at home.  
But this Answerer said, what use of an Army, unless to sight against? we see David did not put it, did not intent it for that use; yea, but he would have put it to that use at Keilah, if the Inhabitants would have been faithful to him: So they conclude upon David's intention, for defending of what was actually done at Hull; I called that an uncertain supposition not fit to ground Conscience on.  
Mr. Burrows tells us, the case is as plain for David's intention, as if Sir John Hotham, upon coming of the King's Forces against Hull, should inquire of the Townsmen, whether they would deliver him up or no, and upon knowledge that they would, should fly away; were this an uncertain supposition that Sir John would have defended himself there? In Sir John Hotham it would be a very probable supposition, because we know the inclination of his mind, and the intent for which he came thither, but in David it is not only uncertain but improbable, for we know his resolution and custom was still to fly as the King pursued, and to that end he inquires what they intended against him, and in case they were minded to deliver him up, he might more timely provide for his flight, and prevent their shutting of him up in that City, which, as the text notes, had gates and bars.  
M. Bridge upon the Answers in the former Treatise made to their instances of resistance, replies, that, in saying it was a loving violence by which the people rescued jonathan, and David's Arms were merely for defence without all offence, the Doctor gives away the Cause, and allows Subjects more than prayers and tears, Pag. 14.5. The Doctor had no where (though M. Bridge makes him often say so) prayers and tears, as the only remedy left to Subjects; but beside their Cries to God, he allowed them Petitions to their Prince, intercessions, reproofs, denial of Subsidies and Aids; and the people's rescuing of jonathan was by intercession set off with a Soldierly boldness, such as the people used to David, 2 Sam. 18.3. and joab to David, 2 Sam. 19.5. Nor is it the giving away of the cause to acknowledge David's Arms were for such defence; for the several answers returned to David's example were given, to show they that have now taken Arms may not do so much as David did, for his example was extraordinary, and also that they have done more than David did, for he used those armed men merely for his guard, without all offence to Saul or them that were about him; and so David's example can no ways be pretended to those that have now taken Arms, and use them as they have done.  
If his example be extraordinary, than he had an extraordinary command for what he did, if so, how doth the Doctor say, there is no command or warrant in Scripture for such a practice or kind of Resistance, Pag. 16. As if all extraordinary warrants and instincts given to special persons should be written in Scripture, Ehud sure had one to go and slay the Tyrant Eglon, judg. 3. yet not expressed; Or as if extraordinary Commands, though expressed, were warrants for all to do so; as that which the Israelites had for spoiling the Egyptians, were now good warrant for the pretended Parliamentary forces, to spoil all those they call Malignants, and esteem little better than Egyptians.  
But a mere defence, how then a work extraordinary in David? ibid.; if his were not an extraordinary example, then may private and single men do so too; But 'tis nor for Subjects private or public of themselves to draw armed men together. The Houses when they conceived it fit to have a guard, could not raise armed men for that purpose, but by desiring it of the King. Now we see Armies of Subjects raised by Subjects, fly up and down all Countries. giving the King himself and His men battle, where they can fall upon them with advantage, and yet David's example is pretended; And Mr. Bridge will yet give us one more instance from it, not much unlike what the Fuller Answer had above, concerning David's fight the Lords battles against Saul; it is this.  
David would have gone with the Philistines into battle against Saul, 1 Chron. 12.19. and said to Achish what have I done, that I may not go fight against the Enemies of my Lord the King? 1 Sam. 29.8. Now among those Enemies was Saul, Pag. 15. Desperate shifts that these men are put to, when pretences and simulations must be made Scripture grounds for Conscience to secure it in battle against the King; David a little before had made show of madness before King Achish, 1 Sam. 21. had pretended to Achish, he had made an inroad upon the South of Judah, 1 Sam. ●7. now might Mr. Bridge as well infer, therefore he was mad, therefore he did fight against the Subjects of Saul, and its lawful for Subjects to fight against Subjects of their King, but enough of this.  
In the example of the Priests, and King Vzziah out of 2 Chro. 26. he cannot see why they should be commended for Valiant men if not for resistance, nor how it appears by Scripture that Gods smiting him with leprosy should discharge him of the Kingdom, Pag. 17. Surely they deserve the Commendation of Valiant men, that when a King doth or commandeth unlawfully, dare withstand either by a home reproof, or by withdrawing from him the holy things, he is not to meddle with. For the other matter, he might have remembered, that by the Law the Lepet was to be put out of the Congregation and dwell apart, which is not consistent with Government, therefore it is said of this King, He was a Laper and dwelled in a several house, and Jotham his son reigned in his stead, 2 King. 15.5.  
What is replied by Mr. Bridge, or Mr. Burrowes upon the Answer to the example of Elisha, may be answered by what is said above, Sect. 8. concerning the preservation of the body Natural and body Politic, and concerning the sending for Delinquents.  
Now for the instances that were brought in the former Treatise against Resistance or Arms taken up by Subjects. To that of the power of the Trumpet placed in the Supreme Magistrate, Numb. 10. M. Bridge replies. The Parliament hath sounded no Trumpet for War, but what the Supreme Power hath given Commandment for; For it is an established Law that the Parliament should have power to send for Delinquents, and such Law is to be obeyed, because (as the Doctor saith, Sect. 1.) it has the King's deliberate consent, however he is pleased now to sound a retreat by his sudden will, pag. 20, 21. The King has given His consent to that Law, that gives power to the Houses to send for and censure Delinquents, and is still willing that accordingly, all Armies laid aside, Delinquents should be brought to a legal trial; but He never gave consent to a Law that should enable them to raise Arms under that pretence, for there is no Law prescribes them that way or means to bring in their Delinquents.  
M. Burrowes replies. That of the Trumpet was a judicial Law, and binds only in the equity of it; Else it would be a sin to put the Militia into any other hands for any time, for it might not then be done, no not with Moses his consent. True, it was a Judicial Law, and that might have told M. Burrowes his many exceptions from the circumstances and specialties of that Law were needless. But an equity he grants, and so there is in all Judicial Laws, and we require no more in this then the equity of it, which tells us (and we see it in all Governments) the power of the Trumpet, or calling assemblies for War, is still placed in the supreme Magistrate, and cannot be put into other hands, without His consent.  
To that place of 1 Sam. 8.18. The people had no remedy against the oppression of their unjust Kings, but crying to the Lord, M. Bridge replies, Samuel tells them not what should be their duty, but what their punishment. The Lord will not hear you, pag. 20. It seems their duty was to take Arms and bring their Kings into order; but he tells them not of their duty, he tells them of their punishment, It was indeed their punishment, because all the remedy they had (which was by crying to the Lord) should not help them; which had not been such a punishment, if they had means to help themselves by power of Arms, the power of self preservation, as these men call it.  
To that which was said of the Prophets, It is a marvellous thing, that none of them should call upon the Elders of Judah and Israel for this duty of resistance against their cruel and Idolatrous Kings, Master Bridge replies, see here is a Prophet Elisha calling on the Elders to imprison the King's messenger, Pag. 22. How happy are these men in their application of Scripture: But what Elders were these? of the City without doubt, where Elisha was. And I fear that some of the Elders of our chief City, have been animated by Preachers, that never were brought up in the Schools of the Prophets, upon such abused examples, to lay hold on the King's Messengers coming with not such an illegal commission, as this did, but lawful and necessary Commands and Proclamations; Again, what did Elisha call upon these Elders for? to imprison the messenger? that's more than the text will bear, unless to shut the door against a man be to imprison him; for this performance there needed not the authority of the Elders; had any else been with the Prophet they might have done it without command, had they known the Messenger's errand as the Prophet did. It is no more than any Debtor may do, shut the door of his house against a Sergeant though coming legally to arrest him; Had our City Elders (that now have Forces at their command to secure themselves against all Ministers of Justice, that have entered the King's House and Castles, keeping the gates shut against Him) done no more, but contained themselves within their own houses, keeping the door fast against the Sergeant, the King would not have had cause to complain of them.  
To that place, 1 Sam. 8.18. and to that observation (that none of the Prophets called upon the Elders for this duty of resistance) the sum of M. Burrowes answer is, Pag. 118. and 122. the Argument is Negative, and he brings several Instances negative, which hold not. Answ. It is true that many times such Arguments fail, yet may they be within their own compass very convincing, as in this case: It was said, the Apostles prohibition against resistance was very express, and that Conscience could find no warrant or exceptions against it from other places of Scripture; how should this be cleared, but by answering such seeming instances as they brought, and by bringing such places, as were most likely to have given allowance to this remedy which is placed in the power of resistance? for if Conscience cannot find allowance for it in Scripture, how should it adventure upon it against the express prohibition of the Apostle, delivered without any exception or limitation?  
One of his Instances I must touch, as seeming to concern the business more nearly, when the ten Tribes cast off Rehoboams Government for his oppression, no Prophet rebuked them, Pag. 122. They were not at that instant rebuked, for the thing was from the Lord, and to take effect; yet as it was from their licentious will of revolting, it is called Rebelling against the house of David, 2 Chro. c. 10. v. 19 and reproved by Hosea, c. 8. v. 4. which is enough to tell Conscience, what to think of it.  
Now we come to the Fuller Answerer. To the Instances brought against Resistance in the former Treatise he replies, They are all in simple and absolute Monarchies, those of the jews and Romans, nothing to our case, Pag. 21. This is short work; yet doth M. Bridge, Pag. 40. tell us by the example of the Jewish Monarchy, what government pleaseth him best: That, wherein the people have choice of their King, and make a Covenant with him at his Coronation, and have power to take up Arms against the Monarch when cause requireth, all this he endeavours to exemplify in the Jewish Monarchy, very imp tinently, I must needs say, yet enough to show his disagreement, with this Full Answerer.  
Let us then see what satisfaction Conscinece can receive from this Answer, either in the general, that Resistance is lawful in limited, not absolute Monarchies, or in particular, that those of the Jews and Romans were such. An absolute Monarch is he, that may impose Laws without consent of people; a limited or not absolute one is he that hath bound himself to require their consent, and to rule according to Law so made. Now Conscience finds in Scripture Manasses and such wicked Kings subverting God's worship. Justice, and all good government, and no resistance allowed, the Prophets never calling upon the Elders of the people for it; also among the Roman Emperors, It finders the like Tyrants, and still hears the Apostle forbidding resistance: Well, It is under a Christian King, one not wicked but commended by many virtues, yet one that has invaded some liberties granted to the Subject upon agreement; How shall it think it has warrant to resist this King, because he is limited by such an agreement, and the other not to be resisted? for it sees, that safety of the State (in order to which this power of resistance is challenged) is the end of government as well in the absolute as limited Monarchy. It sees also, that the absolute Monarch is bound by the Laws of God and nature, and by that duty of a Prince, which is upon him in order to that end, the safety of His people, and it cannot be satisfied how the breach of something due by a civil agreement or Nationall positive Law should more expose the so limited Monarch to this power or resistance, than those outrages against the Laws of God and Nature, against the very end of Government do the absolute Monarch; It will not think if it may not resist this for such heinous provocations that it hath power to take Arms against the other for the breach of some liberties due to the people by a civil compact.  
If it be replied that the King is limited by such a Condition as leaves power of resistance in the people, reserved to them in the first constitution: we answer, It has been cleared, that such a Condition is a mere fiction and most unreasonable, a seminary of Tumults and Sedition; The King is limited, yet not so, but (as above declared) by reason he cannot impose Laws by himself upon his people.  
Now in particular of your Jewish Monarchy; How appears it to be absolute? we know those Kings could not make any Laws either with or without the consent of people, but were limited by the positive Laws which God gave them for that policy or Government; and me thinks that this man should have conceived, it would make too much for the approving of absolute Government in Kings, to say God set up an absolute Monarchy over his people; and if it was the wisdom of God to entrust his people with absolute and unlimited Kings, why should not Christian Kings be trusted a little more than Subjects would now have them?  
But something he says by way of proof that it was absolute. The Jews desired to be governed after the manner of the Nations which was arbitrarily (as the Doctor observes out of Justine) and thereupon it is that God by Samuel tells them, what such a King would do to them, not what he might do, as the Doctor seems to infer out of that place, pag. 21. To say the Doctor seems to infer so, is a gross mistake, not to have been admitted by him, if he would have me or himself speak any sense; if I had inferred the Kings of the jews might do so, my argument thence had been none; but I concluded it plainly to be unjust violence and oppression, and thence shown such usage of a people was not just cause of resistance to them. As for his Argument, it concerned him to infer they might do so, or else how does he show they had absolute and arbitrary rule?  
But his other inference from the Text is as good, That the people in desiring to have Kings after the manner of the Nations, desired to be governed arbitrarily, and that arbitrary government was set out in what Samuel declares their King would do; As if the people here desired to have a King to oppress and spoil them, the thing they complained of in samuel's sons, vers. 5. The truth is, the people desired to have a King to judge them, we know in what meaning that phrase (to judge them) is used in the book of Judges, and explicated, Hos. 13. v. 10. viz. to go in and but before them, to save them from their Enemies, and how that God had raised up hitherto Judges among them to that purpose: Now they desire, not to have Judges extraordinarily sent them as before, for they saw they lay long under oppression many times ere such came, but to have a King among them as other Nations had by an ordinary succession, so they thought they should not be to seek upon all occasions for one, to go out before them against their Enemies; this is the sum of their desire, not to have a King to Rule arbitrarily, to use them as he pleased, or as Samuel told them he would, nothing here to prove the Kings of the Jews were absolute Monarches.  
The Monarchy of the Romans he tells us was absolute too, by the consent of the people, so doth M. Burrows also. And this is one of their Answers to the 13. to the Rom. They might not be resisted for they were absolute Monarches. It concerned them to bring proof, for I had spoken to this in my other Treatise; here again this Fuller Answer saith barely, they were absolute Monarch's; and M. Burrowes saith it rested upon me to prove they had not absolute power, and so puts it off; Indeed in strictness of dispute it is enough for the Answerer simply to affirm or deny, but in giving an exception to a place of Scripture by writing, and that for the satisfaction of Conscience, it had beseemed them to prove what they say, theirs being the affirmative, mine the Negative.  
I will therefore give my reasons against it, that there was not such a formal consent on the people's part, and such a total resignation of themselves to be governed by those Emperors, as is required to make them lawful absolute Monarches. First, because it's altogether improbable, that a people so addicted to liberty should so consent to such a subjection, and again set up that Regiam potestatem, that absolute Kingly power they so much hated; Therefore we see how Brutus and Cassius were honoured for restoring their invaded liberty; and how again they were sensible of that recovered liberty, when Nero was taken away; but they held it not, the Soldiers still putting Emperors upon them one after the other.  
Secondly, because unto all the Laws and Edicts of those Emperors, there was required the consent of the Senate and people of Rome; they could indeed force that consent upon all occasions, yet for form of Law still, Senatus Populusque Romanus was added. Thirdly, we find in Suetonius how Caligula intended to assume the Diadem, (which was the Sign of that Regia potestas) that is, to profess he would Reign absolutely; but He was dissuaded by his friends.  
This therefore being certain, that by force of Arms they made themselves masters of that people, my inference is, as it was in the other Treatise, If the Senate and people of Rome, who a little before had the Supreme Government, might not resist the then Emperors, that of Subjects had made themselves Lords over that people, much less can the people of this Land have power of resistance, against the succession of this Crown descending from the Conqueror, who by like force of Arms, but with more Justice, gained this Kingdom.  
But the Answerer excepts concerning our King. His Title of Succession ways excludes consent, for it began in the election and consent of the people, Tag. 21. The Roman Emperors by consent of the people were absolute (saith this man) and not to be resisted, our Kings by consent of the people are so limited that the people have reserved a power of resistance; one as true as the other. If we begin the title of succession from the Conquest, where is that election? that consent, and reservation? if higher, we run Conscience upon uncertainties; it cannot see how such an Election should give beginning to this Crown, but finds the beginnings still in Arms, as the entrance of those Emperors was; which beginnings might over-aw the consent of the people (as he saith of the consent of the Senate given to those Emperors, that it might be an overawed consent) or else draw it; but cannot be imagined to arise from such a capitulating Election such a pre-contriving arbitrary consent of the people, as this man feigns.  
M. Burrowes is very angry that I called Election, a slender plea, and saith, I cannot get a better and surer claim for the Kings of England, Pag. 129. But he might have considered, I called it a slender plea, not for succession of a Crown, whensoever it is made by a people that are free, as upon the failing of the Royal line, but for resistance against it; it being all the plea that is made for these Arms, or power of resistance, and a slender one, because it appears not how election gave beginning to this succession, but that such an election, & contrivement of the people reserving the power of resistance should do it, is altogether improbable and unreasonable.  
For the beginning of this succession at the Conquest, & the kings of England claiming from thence (against which M. Burrows here inveighs) see above, Sect. 6. and below, Sect. 11.  
The Fuller Answerer goes on with his replies to the 13. to the Rom. If not written particularly to the Romans who were under an Absolute Monarchy, and then not concerning us, yet suppose it refer to all Government in general; pag. 21. I would this Answerer would leave his uncertainties, now he deals with conscience; the reasons the Apostle gives us in the 3.4, 5, 6. vers. plainly show it concerns all times and Government, so long as in all government there is order to be preserved, there is a minister of God to execute Wrath, there is one that bears not the sword in vain; reasons essential to government, and perpetual against resistance, as was shown in the former treatise, if this man would have pleased to take notice of them.  
Well, now that it refers to all Government, what then? It makes (saith he) altogether for us, it requires obedience to ordained powers, that is, legal commands, not wilful pleasures of Governors. True, but we would know, not what is required, but what is forbidden; we spoke not of obedience, but resistance; we grant active obedience is to be yielded to ordained powers, and denied to the illegal commands; but we may resist their power, if they employ it tomake good those illegal commands? We must supply his Answer out of Mr. Burrows pag. 113. If one that is in authority command out of His own will, I resist no power, no authority at all, if I neither actively nor passvely obey. Also, we distinguish between the man that hath the power, and the power of the man, the power must not be resisted, the illegal will of the man may, and p. 124. the Apostle requires them not to resist their power their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, does not charge them not to resist their Tyranny. Between the power, and the person that bears it, as also between the power & the illegal will, or the abuse of the power, we may distinguish in conceit, abstracting the one from the other, and by our active and passive obedience we may distinguish them, yielding this to the power & person that bears it, denying that to his illegal will, but in resistance we cannot sever them, for the resisting of him that bears the power, though unlawfully commanding, is a resisting of the power also; it is plain by the Apostle, who speaks not here of power abstractly taken, for so it cannot be the objectof our obedience or resistance, but Concretely as in the subject or the Magistrate that bears it; therefore presently it follows in the Apostles reasons against resistance, for he is the Minister, he bears the sword; so St. Peter tells us what he means by the Ordinance the King as supreme, or they that are sent by him; for though the will and command be illegal, yet because he that bears the power lawfully, uses that power (though illegally) to compass that will and execute that command, the power itself is resisted in resisting him that so uses it; as Saul had lawfully the power and command of Arms, but that power he uses unlawfuly; in pursuing his unjust will against David; And I ask, when these Emperors took away lives and goods at pleasure, was that a pwoer ordained by God? no, but an illegal will, a Tyranny; therefore, according to M. Burrows, they might have been resisted in doing so; No, for that power and sovereignty they employed to compass those illegal commands was a power ordained and settled in them. When Pilate condemned our Saviour it was an illegal will, yet our Saviour acknowledges in it pilate's power that was given him from above.  
Again this answerer of theirs makes void that distinction of private men, and of public states in the point of resistance, it voids also their other distinction of absolute Monarches, & limited; For according to this answerer, it shallbe lawful for private men to resist their Princes, though absolute, if they command illegally, and to say as M. Burrows teaches them; We resist no power, no authority at all, but the illegal will and pleasure of man; and so might the Christians have resisted, and so replied, if then answer be good.  
The truth is, the lawful power is resisted, when arms are taken against Princes abusing that power to the compassing of unlawful commands; which also I insinuated often in the other treatise, & that from the Apostles reasons in this place against resistance, drawn from that order, that good, for which the power is ordained, though then the execution of the power in those Emperors was nothing answerable to that end.  
That which the fuller Answerer presently adds pag. 22 There are two kinds of tyranny, Regiminis and Usurpationis; that of Government must be endured though never so heavy; Not only to the good but to the froward also, 1. Pet. 2.18. That other of Usurpation hath no right at all. I know not what it means, if it be not a plain confirmation of what I have said against resistance, and a direct confutation of what himself and Mr Burrows has answered for it. M. Burrowes also tells us, pag. 113. We profess against resisting power and authority though abused. A man would think he came home to us, and so he must if he will speak reason; but his device is, If those who have power to make laws shall make wicked laws, and force obedience to them, there is nothing left us but flying or passive obedience. In this hole he often lurks to defend himself against the prohibition of resistance, by making us believe the abused power, that must not be resisted, is only seen when sinful laws are made and imposed; but I ask, have they power to make such Laws? No, for it is not of God; they have power from Him to make Laws, but such Laws and Commands are their illegal wills; then may they that resist say, in M. Burrowes words, we resist no power, no authority, but the illegal wills of men. Pilate had power from above to judge the accused brought before him, not to condemn the innocent, that was the abuse of the Legislative power; and the power itself is resisted by resisting the abuse of the one, as of the other.  
Now all this has been said against resistance, in case His Majesty's Commands, in the use of that power which is in Him, were unlawful; but Conscience, that knows He has by Law a power to command assistance for the defence of Himself, and protection of His Subjects, will easily conclude it a Legal power and command, not only not to be resisted, but also to be actively obeyed, as all Legal & ordained powers ought to be. Notwithstanding these Scriptures so plain against Resistance, or Arms taken up by Subjects, M. Burrowes professeth his Conscience is not one whit scrupled; I hope he will better consider it, ere he come to die and give an account of those poor souls he has seduced.  
Finally, we must subjoin M. Bridge his replies upon this 13 to the Romans, he, as if his conscience were as little scrupled with the Apostles prohibiting, as M. Burrowes his was, thus gins. The Dr. endeavours to sear the tender Conscience with the word Damnation; but it is rather to be translated judgement, & by it, is meant the punishment of the Magistrate in this life, pag. 14. M. Bridge might have had respect to our translation which renders it damnation, & with good reason, for resistance is a breach of the 5 Commandment, it is a resisting of the ordinance of God, as in this chapter, and M. Bridge knows it is no vain scaring of Conscience to tell it, the breach of God's Commandment & ordinance makes it guilty of damnation.  
And if we consider the condition of the Christians in those times, what great matter had the Apostle told them, in assuring them they should be punished by those Emperors if they resisted? when as they were sure of that, whether they resisted or resisted not; but he gives them to understand, however those Emperors were enemies to christianity, the resisting of them was an offence against the ordinance of God: or if we consider the principles of these days, which teach people to take the sword out of the Prince's hand, & seize the Arms of the Kingdom in order to their own preservation, what great matter would the Apostle threaten to such, in telling them they should be punished by the Madge strate? when as they have provided for their indemnity by taking the sword from their Prince, or causing Him to bear it in vain; therefore there is the stroke of a higher hand also to be expected, and those that have been lately taken in actual resistance, and through His Majesty's mercy escaped the deserved punishment of this life, must, if they continue not in obedience, look for a greater condemnation.  
Again, M. Bridge answers, That only active obedience to lawful Commands is there enjoined, not passive under unlawful Commands, pag. 23. Both say we, as appears by the injunction of subjection & prohibition of resistance; for if the Apostle had enjoined only obedience to just commands, he had given the Romans; that lived under such unjust Emperors, but a lame instruction; the refore in ease they had unjust commands imposed on them, he tells them how to behave themselves, that is, not to resist: what then remains but passive obedience.  
But he would prove it thus, The power they were to be subject to, and not resist; is the ordinance of God, and the minister of God for good: but when a Prince Commands a thing unlawful, He is not so, pag. 23. Answ. A lawful Prince, though commanding unlawfully, is still the minister of God for our good (i.e.) appointed for that end, and the power he is invested with, though abused to the execution of such a command, is the ordinance of God; And that is it which forbids our resistance according to the Apostles reasons here, which are taken not from the actual ministration of any prince, as if we ought to obey when he commands justly, and might resist when unjustly, but from the end, for which God has ordained him to minister for our good; from which end though princes sometime swerve (as these Emperors did usually) yet are they not to be resisted, for that strikes at the power and Ordinance itself.  
Yea, M. Bridge a little after acknowledgeth, that inregard of their place they are Gods ministers, but in regard of the unlawful thing commanded they are not. Therefore when princes command unlawfully we must look upon them with a double regard, the one to the thing commanded, the other to their place, to the unlawful command we must return a denial of obedience, but in regard of their place use no resistance. Denial of obedience can sever the illegal command from the place and power they bear, but resistance cannot; for it cannot oppose the unlawful command, but by usurping the power, and invading the place God hath appointed them in.  
But M. Bridge concludes, It is the Doctor's continual mistake to think the Apostle forbids the resisting of the higher powers in their unlawful commands, when as he forbids the resisting of them in things lawful. We must bear with the importunity of these men, who will not conceive the force of the Apostles reasons, though laid op●n to their eyes, which was so often done in the former Treatise, that they tell me, I had worn the place thread bare, and yet they will not see the web and texture of it. Once more therefore; if the Aoostle forbidden resistance only in things lawful, it would not have been a sufficient instruction, whether we respect the duty of subjection, which by this would not have been directed, how to answer the unlawful commands of Princes; or whether we consider those higher powers which then were tyrannical, usualy commanding things unlawful; also this would have been the way to leave the gap open to Rebellion, for how easy would be the inference, therefore we may resist, when they command unlawfully?  
These Answerers it seems, are still willing to keep the gap open, or else they might have seen how the Apostle brings reason enough to stop up the way against all resisting of power though abused, for he takes it not from the use of the power, but from the end for which God ordained it, the higher powers then being nothing answerable to that end, not ministering for good, but rather subverting of that which was good and just.  
We come now to the other scripture, 1. Pet. 2.13. To the King as supreme, or unto Governors, as those that are sent by Him. Out of which was proved, that the higher power, in St. Paul, not to be resisted by any, was the King in that state; and that in this Kingdom All, who have power, fall under that distinction of St. Peter.  
Now see how acutely M. Bridge replies (for these men have simplicity enough to abuse the people) Dr. Bilson (saith he) tells us by higher powers must be understood not only Princes, but all public States where the People or Nobles have the same intrust to the sword as princes have in this Kingdom. How then will the Dr. have the King only meant by these higher powers? As if the D. meant to prove that a King was the supreme or higher power in the republic of Vinice, or the Low-countries. But the Dr. acknowledges the Parliament is the highest Court of justice, therefore they fall under these words, the higher powers. It is the highest Court, but you must not then exclude the king, in whom is the fountain of power; we farther grant, the two Houses by themselves do also fall under the words higher powers in regard of the people, but not under the word supreme, so were those, that were sent by the Emperor, higher powers, yet subjects and inferior to him that is here called supreme.  
Yea, but (as Calvin and other Interpreters tell us) the prononn (him) is referred to God by whom all in authority are sent. ibid. 'Tis true, all are sent by God, which might serve to check the bad construction and use these men make of the foregoing words, every Ordinance of man. But it is as true, that the Governors of the provinces, where these scattered Christians lived, unto whom St. Peter writes, were sent by the King or Roman Emperor, and that he is here called supreme; which being a word including a relation, might have told M. Bridge, that all who had authority beside in the Roman Empire, were inferior to him, and immediately sent by him, though originally their power was also from God, or from above, as our Saviour acknowledgeth in Pilate the Governor of Judea under that Emperor.  
The Fuller Answerer replies. The D. takes advantage in the words Supreme and Sent, but the two Houses are called, not sent, a difference (at least) as great as between to and from, Pag. 23. Very good. It seems he will have the people suppream that sends them from the Country to the King; so are the Clerks of the Convocation also sent from them that choose them. We speak not of Terms of place but Reasons of Authority; if they be called by him, the authority is his, they come not of themselves but at his call, & therefore sent by him.  
But he adds, They are a Coordinate part with him in the supreme power, otherwise they could not hinder him from making Laws, nor finally declare Law without him, the two highest acts of supreme power. Declare Law without him? then are they supreme without Him, and he is sent by them, He must go and do as they declare; Can we think that he sends for them with such an intention? or that they, which are called to advise and consent, come to such a purpose, to do the business without him? But enough of this feigned Coordination, and of the Supremacy above, Sect. 4.   

SECT. X. A Confutation of what is replied upon the third Section of the former Treatise.  
AT the beginning of that third Section it was said. The groundwork of their Fundamentals is this; Power is originally in & from the people, therefore if the Prince entrusted with the power will not discharge his trust, it falls to the people to see to it, they may reassume the power and resist. M. Bridge replies. Then indeed it falleth to the people to look to it, which they do as an act of self preservation, not of jurisdiction over their Prince, and this is not to reassume the power, or turn the Prince out of Office— as if we went about to depose our King, Pag. 52.53. For your act of self preservation, and Jurisdiction, we examined them above. Sect. 8. if we consider what power of Law and Arms is now challenged & usurped by subjects, I think it cannot but appear to be a resuming of the power entrusted with the King (for it leaves him none) and a turning him out of office for the time, though you intent not to depose him, but to trust him again, when and how you please.  
And according to M. Bridge his similitude (so much used amongst them) if the careless steersman, during the storm, be made to stand by, and another set at the stern by the passengers, then is that steersman out of office, or put from the execution of his office for the time but now for the application of this his similitude: The Prince is not as the steerseman (for he executes by his Ministers) but as he that stands above and commands to the Starboard or Larbord, & if the Prince command amiss, that is contrary to the Law, His Ministers under him for execution may deny actively to obey, and may give within the bounds of their place and office, direction according to the law and their oaths, this does not put him out of office.  
Then to that which was said in the same Sect: That the governing power, as it is a sufficiency of authority for command & coercion running through every form of government, is from God, though the limitations and qualifications of it for the several ways of execution. it be of man by consent: & proved, Ro. 13.1. The powers that are etc. M. Bridge replies. None denieth it, only he will make it inconsistent with what was said before. But if none deny it, why then upon this principle of derivation of power from the people, do you ground your resistance? for in doing so, what power or sufficiency of authority for command or coercion, do you leave your Prince, the thing he has received (as you deny not) from God alone?  
But let us see how its inconsistent. By those words, The powers are of God, Rom. 13.1.1. the D. must understand the power itself of Magistracy, distinguished from the qualifications thereof, and the person designed thereto, how then did he say, Sect. 2. that the higher power in Paul is the same with the King as supreme in Peter? Ans. The power of Magistracy, abstractively taken, may be these words be proved to be of God, though the higher powers here be understood concretely with connotation of the persons that bear the power, for they are here proposed as objects of our obedience, which cannot be directed but upon power in some person, and here it's said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the powers that are, now power cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 existent, but in some person. Yet do these words prove the power itself to be of God, for why else should these Magistrates or Princes chosen by the people be said to be powers ordained of God, but because the power and authority they bore was from God.  
In like manner the Dr. proves the power is of God, because the Magistrate is called the minister of God, slipping from the power itself to the Person designed to the power, for the power itself is not called the minister of God. Good stuff. I must come home to M, Bridge to make him understand the force of my inference; The Major of Norwich is the King's Minister, therefore his power is from the King; will M. bridged reply, no, for the power itself is not the Major, or called the Minister of the King.  
Then the Answerers come to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in St Peter, the Ordinance of man, which in the former Treatise was said to be taken subjectively in regard of the power itself, which is from God causally, and placed in man as the Subject; and if there be in that phrase any causality, or Creation, or invention of man employed, it is to be understood of the qualifications and several ways of executing that power in several forms of Government. Hereupon the Fuller Answer and M. Bridge every where takes it for granted by me, that Monarchy, Aristocracry and Democracy, are equally the inventions of man, which follows not, as was explained above, Sect. 3. concerning the original of the governing power, and the first beginning of Monarchy.  
Lastly, M. Bridge concludes, that my proving of the governing power to be of God, but the qualifications of it & the designation of the person to be of man, gaineth nothing against resistance, or deposing of a Prince that doth not discharge his trust; for still the peoplemay say, we may alter the government, and depose the Person, because he was of our designing, Pag. 55. Nothing so, for if they resist they usurp a power that God has not given them, and invade the power that God has given Him; if they depose Him, they quite take away that power which God, and not they, placed in Him, for although they elected and desgned the Person, yet is He the Minister of God, & from God he has His Power and Commission; as if Citizens should take upon them to turn the Major, that has his power and Commission from the King, out of office, because they chose him. For altering the government, unless they be altogether free (as upon the utter failing of the Royal Line) they cannot do it, no nor alter any Laws or qualifications of the governing power, for they were not made by them alone, but also, and chiefly, by the consent and authority of the Prince.  
Upon that place, Psal. 82. I have said ye are Gods, alleged in the former Treatise, the Fuller Answerer replies, all Rulers are Gods alike, that word of God comes to them All alike, to Pilate as well as Caesar, pag. 24. This text was brought to prove the governing power was derived from God, because Rulers were so called, as His Vicegerents, as having their Commission from Him, and in his stead over the people, this was urged to take off the derivation of that power from the people. He Answers, Inferior Magistrates are Gods too; that's nothing to the purpose, but Gods alike, that's plainly false; for that word and power comes first to the Supreme, and from Him to them that are sent by Him, from Caesar to Pilate. Inferior Magistrates are as Gods to the people under them, but the Supreme as a God to those Gods; Aaron was so to the people, but Moses was as God to Aaron, Exod. 4.16.   

SECT. XI. A Confutation of what is replied upon the fourth Section in the former Treatise.  
HIs fourth Section (saith the Fuller Answerer) is spent against the People's reassuming the power be trusted to the King, which no man maintains; what need they reassume that, which in the first constitution of Government they reserved? pag. 24. This man has often told us, the power of Arms is ordinarily entrusted to the King, & that by the people in the first Constitution of government to use it for the safety of the State. Well, He does not use it so, as they conceive; they therefore dispose of it, taking the Sword into their own hands, what is this but a reassuming, or (which is worse and more unreasonable) an using of an higher power reserved and inherent in themselves; which is to place the very Supremacy in the people, as has been often shown above.  
M. Bridge bestows more labour upon this Section; But first He complains, The Dr charges us, that we hold the people may reassume the power entrusted to the Prince, making the World believe we contend for the deposing of Kings, pag. 24. What some of you have contended for all this while, the Lord knows, that knows your Hearts, yet this we know, the same principles will carry you so fare. But there is a difference between deposing the Prince, and reassuming the power; for though you have not deposed the King, yet have you seized the Militia; and Arms of the Kingdom, have commanded obedience from all His people, have left Him nothing ye could take from Him, and what is this but, as much as in youlyeth, to reassume the power? if there be any impropriety in the speech, it is in calling that a reassuming, which indeed is rather a taking away or despoiling Him of that, you never gave Him.  
But if you do not reassume the power, what means the difference you make of things disposed by trust, from things disposed by donation, because they may be recalled, these may not; so you say, Pag. 25. and in applying it, you tell us the King has His Power by trust from the people, and should have proceeded to confess, they may recall (i. e.) reassume it, you must hold it, if you hold to your principles.  
But let me tell you, that God entrusts the Prince with the power, and with the people, and therefore the people cannot reassume it, And when they elect one to bear that power, they do commit themselves to his trust, not giving so much as receiving a benefit; and such elected Kings (as was said in the former Treatise) are the Lords Anointed and his Ministers.  
Then cannot Princes, whose coming to the Crown is merely pactional, be deposed, for they are also the Lords Anointed and his Ministers, but the Doctor granted, that the argument (speaking of the forfeiture of the Prince's power) has force in Government merely Elective and pactional, Pag. 26. The Doctor by way of supposition passed it over in these words (although such argument may seem to have some force in states merely pactional) to the undeniable clearing of this State from the danger of such forfeiture. But if M. Bridge will have me deliver my opinion absolutely, the reasons above mentioned will not suffer me to think, the people may depose any King they have chosen, upon what conditions soever they admitted him; and if they should choose & admit one upon such condition of forfeiture it were turpis Conditio, most unreasonable, the very Seminary of Jealousy and sedition; neither profitable for King nor people, a plain encroachment of the peorle upon the governing power, which was at first derived from God not through their hands, and should always be left in the Governor sufficient to rule them.  
The Doctor also confesseth, it is probable that Kings at first were by election here as elsewhere, yet will he not have the King claim by it, pag. 27. It is like they were so, as generally among the Heathen they began by election; what then? must our King now claim by the first Kings in this Land? and Conscience be put to drive into the obscure fabulous times before Caesar or Brute his entrance, for that firstelection? We are upon the English government, which followed the Saxons, or rather upon the Norman which followed the Conquest; and as I said in that place, how can Conscience be satisfied, that the argument drawn from the supposed first Election to prove the people's assuming this power, can have any force in this government, which began not so, but as we see by the entrance of the Saxons and Normans: Thus it is with our Prince, although he succeeded the Conqueror, yet doth he also take in the voluntary and free consent of the Commonwealth unto His Crown, pag. 28. That was not the Consent of the first supposed election, but an after Consent following the Conquest, as the Prince and the People could agree, which agreement was not likely to leave them a power of resistance.  
Now we see the Doctor's mind plainly that he contends for an Arbitrary government, for he saith, pag. 11. the Emperors ruied absolutely and arbitrarily, and here he saith, how came they of Subjects to be absolute Manarches, but by force of Arms, the way that the Saxons and Normans made themselves Masters of this people? The Doctor did not contend for an arbitrary government, but did often (because he knew he should meet with those that would made bad construction of his words) expressly declare the contrary; His intent was to answer the Reply there made (that those Emperors might not be resisted because they were absolute) by showing they made themselves so by Arms; and if the people could not upon any former right refist in that Empire, no more can they do in this, upon pretence of right by a first election, for here also the Government began in Arms. None of my Adversaries have bitten at the edge and strength of this answer, but only catched at the shadow of those two words Conquest and Arbitrary. More was spoken above of Conquest, Sect. 6. and this I may add, We see in the titles of many of our Kings before the Acts of Parliament made in their times, a reference to the Conquest, as Edward the third after the Conquest, which does relate not only to the Edward before the Conquest, but also to the Conquest itself, as to a beginning of claim and government, or else the number should have none on, and our Edward the third should have been numbered the fourth. So Henry the seaventh, and Henry the eight, after the Conquest, quest, which relates to no such name before, but only to the Conquest as a beginning of Claim and Government.  
Then the Doctor comes to the matter of Covenant, to which we say, Every breach of Covenant makes not a forfeiture, but we esteem a necessity of a Covenant, which we see in Kings designed by God, 1 Chron. 11.3. and that this binds as well the King to the People, as the People to the King, pag. 29. That Covenant was not there a Condition on which those Kings were admitted to the Crown, no more is it in this Kingdom, but a confirmation and strengthening of their natural duties by promises and Oaths. That every breach the Prince makes in that Covenant should forfeit his power, you cannot say indeed for shame, but you canenlarge the breach as you please till you have made it wide enough for Armies of seduced people to enter in upon Him. And we cannot but observe, how you prepare for it in those words, the King as well bound to the people, that is, they stand equally accountable to each other; for you immediately infer, Therefore it is as well unlawful for a King by force to oppress His Subjects & to take up Arms against them, as for Subjects to take up Arms against him. Both are unlawful and unjust, but not equally; for do not the mutual duties of the fifth Commandment run betwixt superior and inferior? and is it as heinous for the father to strike the son, as the son to lift up his hand against the Father? If a King oppress His Subjects, it is an abusing of that power which is in him, if people take Arms it's an usurping of power that belongs not to them, which is of more dangerous consequence; if the people do what is unlawful, the Magistrate bears not the sword in vain, God has appointed him to punish them; if the Supreme Magistrate do unlawfully, he is not to be punished by the people (for that were to overthrow the order God has set) but is reserved for a Divine judgement.  
In the Covenant twixt King and People though it be not expressed, that the state of the Kingdom may take Arms and provide for its safety, in ease the King will not discharge, yet must it in all reason be employed, that safety being the end of that trust, and ratio Legis is Lex; as in Marriage it is not verbally expressed, that the party committing Adultery shall he divorced, yet that Covenant carries the force of such a Condition, pag. 31. That the King ought to discharge is Law, and the end or reason of it is the safety of the state, but that, in case he does not, or not according to the opinion of the people, they by Arms should resist & provide for it, is neit her Law nor Reason of any Law, but an unreasonable condition, were any King admitted under it, and no rea onable means of safety, but the way of confusion and destruction, as experience has always shown.  
That Adultery is the breach of the Marriage Covenant and cause of Divorce, both in the institution of Marriage, They two shall be one flesh, doth in reason imply, and the Law of God doth expressly declare; and the like implication of reason and declaration of Law must appear, before we can see any warrant for Subjects to resist and provide for their own safety: for as of the parties married, so of a Prince and the people entrusted to him by God, it may be said; whom God hath enjoined let no man put asunder; and let not the woman usurp authority over the man, nor Subjects over their Prince.   

SECT. XII. A Confutation of what was replied upon the 5th. Sect: of the former Treatise.  
Upon that which was said, They sharpenmany weapons for this resistance at the Philistines forge, borrow arguments from the Papists, M. Bridge replies, There is much difference between them and us in this particular.  
I. The Papists contend for the Lawfulness of deposing Kings, we not. Difference there must needs be between you in this particular, for they Challenge such a power for the Pope, you for the people. But you do not contend for the power of deposing, or as you told us above, the people from their power of resistance need not make that inference; here is great security for the Prince. We see your party making use of those Examples, which the Papists bring for the deposing of Kings, as that of Saul, Vzziah, Athalia, and one of your fellow Answerers has endeavoured to prove such a power of deposing (with whom we shall meet at the end of this Section;) and we know your principles will carry the people so far if they will follow them, if, as you teach them, they have justly taken Arms in order to their own safety, so they shall think in order to th●●●fety they cannot lay them down, or any longer trust their safety with the former Prince.  
II. The Papists plead for power of deposing a Prince in case he turn Heretic, we hold a Prince may change his Religion, and yet the Subjects thereby not excused from their Allegiance. You will give him leave to change Religion himself, so will the Papists, if all His Subjects may have free liberty of their Religion; but in case he also endeavour to force that contrary Religion upon his Subjects (for that must be supposed) how then will your Allegiance hold? When you challenge the power of Arms in order to your own and the State's safety, will you think that the preservation only of your goods, Estates and out ward liberty is concerned in it, and not of your Religion too? How have you wrought the people into Arms against their Sovereign but by this name Religion? and that, not because He is turned Heretic and changed his Religion, or has imposed a Contrary Religion upon his Subjects, (that you could not tell them) but only by making them believe He favours Popery, and there is fear He will change Religion; which is as weak and low pretence as any jesuit can descend to for drawing People into Arms against their Sovereign.  
III. The Papists hold it lawful to kill a Prince, and that a private man invested with the Pope's Authority may do it; We abhor it. That is their new forge under ground, set up of late by jesuits; I did not mean you sharpened your weapons there, but at the old forge, where the Pope's power of acquitting people of their Allegiance, and commanding them into Arms has been beaten out some hundreds of years. And however you say you abhor this Doctrine of kill Kings, that is, of Butchering them by private hands, yet I fear, and tremble to think, if your Sovereign had fall'n in Battle by the edge of your sword or shot of your Artillery, ye would have acquitted yourselves, and found him guilty of his own death, in that he would not, being desired, forbear to go down himself into Battle against his Enemies. Some of your Fellows, M. Bridge, are much wronged, if they did not after the business of Brainceford, play the Popes in absolving the Soldiers, there taken, from the Oath, whereby they had again bound themselves from bearing Arms against his Majesty; and I can witness how the best of your party in Yorkshire had plited their faith for conserving of the Pea●e of the Country, and how they were dispensed with and commanded into Arms.  
Let us proceed. The Fuller Answerer also complains, The fift Section, is a plain begging of three Questions the Resolver would have us maintain, Pag. 25. To pardon your abuse of speech, we know what you mean, and must tell you, we need not put upon you more than you undertake to maintain, which is more than you can prove, more than former Ages have been Conscious of, enough to make your Religion, if you have any, hear ill in after times. But let us see what you say in vindication of yourselves. We say not that every State hath these meancs of safety by resistance unless reserved by them. Answer, Yet is the safety of every State as dear and hear to itself, as This; and for any thing you have shown for it, any State may pretend such a Reservation, as well as This; for you have not proved such a Reservation, and the general argument, your Party useth, is from self preservation, which is common to all.  
Then to the Argument of the Church's safety, (under pretence of which the Pope challenges a power upon the failing of the Civil Magistrate, as the people now upon the refusal of their Prince) you say The Church is not a State by itself, so also M. Burrowes and M. Bridge. It is not indeed the whole State, comprehending the Civil State too, yet is the good Estate thereof, of as great consequence as any Concernment of the body Politic. But the Church is not of its own Constitution but of Christ's. What then? therefore it must be preserved by the laws instituted by Christ; true, so must the Civil State by its established laws, we desire no more; yet will you not give Him leave to be as careful for the good Estate of His Church, in providing means of preservation for it, in case the Civil Magistrate fail in his trust, as you are to provide or reserve this power of resistance upon the King's refusal? But he did not provide such forceable means as are challenged by the Bishop of Rome, under that pretence; and these means of a reserved power for resistance are as unreasonable on your part: if both of you should be put to prove your Traditions, He for his Excommunicating or deposing of Kings in order to the Church's safety, and you for your reserved power of resistance in order to the State's preservation, Conscience would find as little satisfaction in the one as in the other.  
As for the matter of the Church, we turn (saith M. Bridge, pag. 33.) the Doctor's argument upon himself, thus. If the Church cannot be preserved where the officer is an Heretic, unless it has power to reject him, neither can a Kingdom; when the officer is unfaithful, unless it has power to reject him, neither can a Kingdom, when the Officer is unfaithful, unless it has power either to depose Him, or to look to itself. It was not my argument; I did but show how the Papists use the like argument for the Church's safety, as you do for the States; and if you back again will gather strength for your assertion from their reasons, be as like as you will one to the other, I cannot help it, but I am forry for you (at least for the Religion you profess) that you are put to such shi●ts. But the Church hath Excommunication granted to it by Christ for its own preservation from Evils and Errors; and the Body Natural hath power to deliver itself from its burden, therefore the Common wealth also cannot preserve itself, unless it have power to deliver itself from its burden, ibid. Then has this Church a Power of Excommunication still; so it should be indeed, and the power cannot be taken away by any mortal authority; but since the Act, which took away the High Commission, and (as the party, you plead for, would have it interpreted) all Ecclesiastical Censure too, where doth the Exercise of that power rest? upon whom now is the Argument turned?  
The Body Natural has power to disburden itself, so has the Commonwealth too, but will you have the natural body disburden itself of the Head, or work without it, and say I have no need of thee? Or will you use letting of blood for the disburdening of the Natural body, when sweeting or gentle purges may do it? So in the Body Politic, when a calm Reformation may purge out noxious humours, will you put the sword into the rough hand of the people, which in stead of opening a vein will cut the Arteries and Sinews of the Commonwealth? Ye are too desperate Physicians, and that is plainly seen by the Consumption and languishing Estate of this Kingdom.  
It was urged in the former Treatise, as a reason against these means of safety by this power of resistance. (If the representative body of the people upon the Kings sailing in His trust, may take this power, then may the multitude by the like rule, upon the failing of their representatives in the discharge of the trust they were chosen for, take the power to themselves, for it is claimed by them) the Fuller Answerer replies, They cannot do it, for the people have not resorved any power to themselves from themselves in Parliament, pag. 25. But it will be as hard for him to make them believe they have power no otherwise, as to make it appear to us, there was any such power reserved at all; for when the people come to be spoiled in their Estates and Liberties, they will think it most unreasonable, that they should entrust themselves, and all they have, to such Arbitrary disposing of their own Representatives; especially having been taught by this rule so easily to disclaim the Trust of their Sovereign.  
He that wrote the book called Plain English, saith expressly, that if the Representative body cannot or will not discharge their trust to the satisfaction of reason in the people, they may resume (if ever yet they parted with a power to their manifest undoing) and use their power so far as conduceth to their own safety; and M. Bridge (though here he brings reasons against the people's recalling their Trust given to their representative body, yet) by his argument of self preservation at the beginning of his book, has taught them to say, It is natural for them to provide for themselves, and the act of Trust given to their Representative body is but by positive Law, and cannot destroy the Natural.  
But forgetting what he said of the Natural Law of self preservation, he gives us reasons why the people should not take the power in such a case. 1. Because they cannot be so ready to think the Parliament (that is, the two Houses) neglect their trust, pag. 36. not think so? but if by Ordinances thence issuing, they be spoiled of their property and liberty (which is supposed in the Case) they will quickly feel it is so. 2. Because there is not that actual designing and election of the Prince to the present affairs of the Commonweal, as there is of the Parliament men chosen for these particular businesses. This is bold, and sets aside both King and house of Lords, putting all upon the Sentence of those that are chosen by the people for the present affairs of the Kingdom, those are his words; and unto their sentence the people bind themselves to stand as parties disagreeing to do the sentence of an Umpire or Arbitrator, that is his similitude. What can be said more to the dissolving of the temper of three Estates in Parliament, and to the overthrow of this Government? 3. Because if the people, upon such surmises, should call in their trust and their power, they would leave themselves naked of all authority, and be private men. pag. 37. Naked of all authority? to do what? to take up Arms? that must be your meaning; but what authority had they before the King calls them together? were they any other then private men? or does he by calling them give them authority to take Arms against him? And if the people should recall their trust, why should they think themselves in that condition more private men, than they were when at first (as you suppose) they elected a King? did they then being private men give (as you maintain) all power of Government, and will they conceive they cannot now use any? will they not as easily conclude they may free themselves from their Trust given to those Parliament men chosen by them, as renounce, according to your lessons, their Trust given to their Prince? in all reason they will hold their Representatives more accountable to them, than their Prince can be; who is entrusted for them immediately by God and themselves.  
To this we may add what he replies to the same purpose, pag. 42. The people do all acknowledge that we are to be governed by Laws, And they feel the want of it, and do earnestly desire they may once again see this Kingdom so happy; Now the Parliament (as the Doctor saith) is the judge what is Law. He never said so, unless you mean the three Estates of Parliament; How then can the People think the Parliament doth any thing contrary to Low, when they are the judges of it? This is to make them Arbitrary; and all their commands Laws, and to lead the people after them by an implicit faith; But enough of the power of declaring Law, and of these Arbitrary commands, Sect. 6. & 7.  
Finally, Mr Bridge endeavours to show how they can answer the Oath of Supremacy, and the Protestation, by taking of Arms. If the Popish party should prevail, who knows not that they will force the King to another Supremacy, or quickly make an hand of Him, Pag. 44. But who knows not that the King (by God's blessing) may prevail in the maintenance of His Crown and Right (for which he is now forced to fight) without any prevailing of the Popish party? And who knows not, if that party of Brownists and Anabaptists (which are now so prevalent in the Arms taken up against the King) should get the upper hand, what would become of the King's Supremacy and this Government?  
In the Oath of Supremacy we Swear Him our Sovereign to be Supreme, in opposition to the Pope, or any other particular person. How doth our Doctrine or Practice infringe this, ibid. Is this all you can say for your Sovereign's supremacy? the Declaration of Parliament (as was shown, Sect. 4.) teaches you another Doctrine, that He is Supreme not so much in opposition to particular Persons, as in relation to the whole Body Politic of which he is the Head, and accordingly you should regulate your practice and obedience.  
In our Protestation we protest to defend the King's Person, and hom can we say with a good Conscience we do it, if we do not take up Arms in this time of Popish insurrection? ibid. you protest also to defend his Honour and Rights, which your Arms invade. And if the coming in of some Papists, in the duty of Allegiance, to His aid against your violences may be called a popish insurrection, (as you have the Art to make all things seem odious on the King's part) it was caused by your ●al●ing up Arms first, which the next Age will truly call an Insurrection.  
Or can we (if we take not Arms) in Conscience say, we defend the Privilege of Parliament in bringing in Delinquents to their Trial, or the liberty of the Subject, or the truth of Religion? I presume every good man that makes conscience of his ways, will not be backward to advance this public design. You cannot in conscience say, but you have had the security of all those particulars offered and promised & might have had them better assured without your taking Arms, if you had not some farther reach in your Public design. However you can overrule your own, and your People's conscience, yet all good men, that seriously consider your ways, cannot but conceive, the privileges of Parliament, Liberty of the Subject, and truth of Religion have suffered most by this your pretended defence of them.  
And now it is high time I say something (there need not much) to the Answerer that would not be known by his name, but would be noted by his Margin painted with Greek and Latin. He gins with Scripture, but stays not long upon it, speaking indeed less from that, than any of the other Answerers to whom I have already replied. He insists chief upon the grounds of Reason borrowed from Anistotle, out of whom he would prove several conclusions; those, which concern us, are touching elective Kingdoms, touching a power in the State to bring Kings to an account, and to depose a Tyrant.  
We reply to what he has brought out of Aristotle touching those particulars; The Philosopher's reasons may be good and useful in the founding of a Government, but must they therefore obtain in this that is founded? If Aristotle like of Kingdoms that go by choice, and approve the power which the Ephori had over their Kings in Sparta, would this man have it so here? Let him speak his Treason plainly in his own, not Aristotle's words, and say, He would have a new Government, and Kings here made by choice, and some Ephori set over them; surely he thought, as many moe did, of a new erection, and had fitted himself to give advice for it out of Aristotle. But however that Philisopher gives us many fine hints of Political prudence, if this man were put to it, to draw up that frame of that Government, which Aristotle seems to approve, and by piece-meal to deliver, he would find the task very difficult, and we the Government very strange, such as I believe, never was nor will be, deserving almost as well to go into the Proverb, as his master Plato's did; as for example, He would have Government go by choice, and that choice to follow excellency, now seeing excellency, as he notes in 3. Pol. is in Riches, or Power, or Nobility, or Virtue, we cannot see now he provides for the contenting of those which excel in Riches, Power, or Nobility, that factions may be prevented, and yet they, that excel in virtue, to carry the Government and be willingly obeyed of all, as he would have it in that book; but where and when will it be so unless in Plato's commonwealth?  
Well; Aristotle's reason may be good, and yet my reasons, in the 5. Sect. of the former Treatise against this power of resistance now assumed, stand firm too; why? because if that power be used to bring this Government into such a Mould, as this man fancies out of Aristole, can we expect any thing but a succession of Givill war? for will it not always be more just for the Prince to endeavour the recovery of his Rights and power, where with he is invested by law, than it was for Subjects to force him from them? and this is not against Aristotle, who speaking of Kings in Barbarous Nations that have a power very near to Tyranny, those Kingdoms, saith he, have their security, because the Government is established by law and the Custom of the Nation. l. 3. pol. c. 14. Will this man than have Aristotl's reasons, belonging to such Governments as he described, take place here against the Regal power established by law and the Custom of the Nation? which establishment might give us Security too, but for such unquiet spirits as this man pleads for.  
One step farther; this Answerer has also a long plea against, Tyrants, for the forceable bringing them to account and taking them away, upon which, after he has spent many pages, he lays the conclusion thus, It is lawful for the Kingdom to depose a Tyrant, Pag. 25. but many of his proofs seem to allow, it may be done by assassination; I will not say it is his opinion, but he tells us of the praise of Cassius and Brutus, that they were Romanorum Vltimi, and accordingly styles some, in resistance now against the King, Anglorum Vltimos: he speaks of the taking away of Caligua, Nero, Domitian, of the sentence of Plotinus, Evil Kings rule by the Cowardliness of their Subjects, of which more below; so that the people had need to use more discretion in refusing such instances, than this man did in alleging them; but if it must be done by deposing, his fellow Answerers are against it: and for the two Parliaments which he citys, the Observatour tells us, No King was ever deposed by a free Parliament, let this man make the application.  
He tells me he cannot find what I spoke out of Tertullian his Apol. yet citys me words within two lines of it. It runs thus in the Author, Si hosts, non tantum vindices occultos agere vellemus, deesset nobis vis numerorum & Copiarum? Vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, Castilia, Castra; Cui bello non idonei, non prompti fuissemus, etiam impares copiis, si secundum istam disciplinam non magis occidiliceret, quàm occidere? Let the Answerer Construe these words, and he shall easily perceive they will render the sense that I gave of them, The Christians had number and force sufficient to resist; but they had not warrant; And if he had looked a little before these words, he might have seen Tertullian affirming, the Christians had none such as Cassius among them.  
Then out of his great reading, but small judgement (for he seems to turn his books by their Indices only) he tells us, He believes the primitive Divines held not such Tenets as are of late started up concerning Kings, for if they did, surely the Parliament should have heard of it, Pag. 22. I believe they did not indeed hold such, as are newly started up by those that the Houses have been willing to hear; for my part, it was not my purpose (though the performance had not been difficult) to tell the Parliament what the primitive Divines held, but only to let the people know, what Scripture and reason taught them to hold and rest upon.  
But you give us some instances out of antiquity. 1. Theodoret citys Plotinus his saying, Evil men reign by reason of the Cowardliness of their subjects, we must not so think of providence as to think ourselves nothing. Ans. If Plotinus had spoken to your sense for the Deposing of Tyrants, the Authority had rested barely on Plotinus; for Theodoret citys him not to any purpose concerning Kings, but only to show that Plotinus acknowledged Providence. Nor is your sense the meaning of Plotinus, for his drift is to show that Providence expects our endeavours (not to the deposing or killing of Tyrantrs, as you desperately insinuate, and therefore translate the word Cowardliness, which here signifies slothfulness, effeminacy, luxury, but) to the attaining of an happy and quiet life; unto which purpose he there shows, how some men do bear the punishment 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of their sloth and luxury; how others though evil, yet being laborious do reap more fruit of their tillage; and accordingly how evil men rule through the negligence and slothfulness of others, that is, they being sedulous do gain the Dominion, or being in it, they turn evil for the punishment of the sloth and viciousness of their Subjects, for it follows immediately, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (which you have left out) this is just; just? how? that they should be so punished; and no reason their happiness should be procured by providence or good Governors, when they will do nothing towards it themselves; this is the full and only meaning of Plotinus. Ennead. 3. l. 2. cir: med.  
Secondly, Nicephorus you say, tells us, of the Godly zeal of a Nobleman who took down Dioclesian's Proclamation, and tore it in pieces: I could also tell you out of Scripture of Peter's zeal who did strike with the sword in defence of his Master; but was rebuked for it; for the zeal may be good and commendable when the action is not so, but an excess, and not to be drawn into a Rule or example.  
Thirdly, That Nicephorus tells us, The Christians under the King of Persia fled to Rome for succour, and how Atticus then Bishop of Rome obtained aid for them— and they were denied to the Persian King demanding his fugitive Subjects— we acknowledge such a story in Nicephorus, though no such matter when Atticus was Bishop of Rome, unless you should mean new Rome, that is Constantinople; it seems Nicephorus his manner of Calling those of that Eastern Empire by the name of Romans deceived you; but what does the true part of your story prove? that Subjects may fly from their persecuting King? or that one Prince may protect the Subjects of another Prince, when they are come into his Dominions for relief? be it so, neither of them will help your cause. But enough of these impertinences.   

SECT. XIII. An Answer to what was replied upon the two last Sections of the former Treatise.  
IT was there said. The defence of Religion, and the Subjects Liberty can be no other than pretences of this War— and, It concerns them that will resist upon the Principles, now taught, to render their Prince odious to his people— To these and the like say Mr. Bridge Replies, These are sad charges, bold and scandalous assertions, to charge a Parliament in the face of the world with Hypocrisy; He declamed against uncharitableness in others, where is now the Charity of this man? These were not Charges upon a Parliament, but upon the chief Contrivers of, and Actors in this Resistance, as Mr Bridge might have observed in the former Treatise; upon these indeed they will lie sad and heavy, when he that knows the heart shall discover the Hypocrisy, and all those generous, and honest, and noble spirits, to whose ears the true information of things abroad is not suffered to come, shall see it (yea, and Mr. Bridge too, if his heart be right) to their amazement. Nor does Charity bind the Conscience to contradictions, or to judge against sense; or from condemning one part, when it must judge between two, as at this time between the King and Subjects in Arms against Him; which rules of Charity were laid down and applied towards the end of the former Treatise.  
Whosees not how tender the Parliament hath been of the King's Honour? therefore they charge all upon His Counsellors, as David ●id upon those about Saul, 1 Sam. c. 26. v. 19 If the Lord hath stirred the● up against me let him accept an assering; but if they be the Children of men, cursed be they before the Lord, for they have driven me out this day. And who sees not how tender His Majesty hath been of the reputation of Parliament charging the fault upon them that give the Counsel, and are the contrivers of all that is done against Him. Or who see● not how David's words agree more properly to the King that has been driven out and hunted up and down, then to His adversaries that have had their abode at pleasure, and Reigned without Him? but if they will needs speak the word, let them learn this lesson from them, If such as have unlawfully engaged a King, cannot otherwise be brought to Justice then by Subjects taking Arms and fight against their King, it must not be done that way, but by referring the matter to God, as David did here.  
The King is no more bound by virtue of His Oath to maintain the Government of the Church, as by Law established, than any other Law of the Kingdom, which if the King and Parliament think fit to repeal, They may without breach of the King's Oath. Suppose they should think fit to do it, is it no more to take away a Government, which had the consent of the Catholic Church, and has been received and continued in this Land ever since the planting of the Christian Faith here, then to repeal any Law made but yesterday in comparison, and in materia particulari, of no such concernment? A fundamental of the Government of the State may not be stirred, nor may the privileges of some men be touched, and may the government of the Church be so easily torn up by the root and foundation? the Estates and Immunities of so many free Subjects taken away? But the King doth not think fit to do it, shall he then by Arms be forced from that, which He is both by Oath and Judgement bound to maintain?  
Upon those words of the former Treatise (the Government of the Church by Bishops is simply the best; the abolishing whereof is one of those many inconveniences, which this Land is now threatened with, and which the King hath reason by power of Arms to divert) Mr. Bridge enters upon a lose discourse against Episcopal Government. I refor him for his better instruction to a book entitled, Episcopacy asserted, lately published and learnedly written. Then he breaks out. Now the Dr. shows himself, be had rather the Kingdom be imbrued in a bloody War, than Episcopacy should downe; judge ye, O all Englishmen, whether it be better for you, to have this order taken away, then for the whole Kingdom to lie imbrued in their own gore? Nay Mr. Bridge, you and your party in Arms show yourselves hereby what spirit ye are of, who will have this Land embroiled in a bloody War, rather than Episcopacy, and some other things by Law justly established, shall not down; for that is the case, and so proposed in the former Treatise: and then judge all ye English men, whether it be better for you to imbrue this Kingdom in its own Gore, then to hold the ancient and primitive Government of the Church; and hear, O Heavens, and judge upon whom the guilt will lie; upon the King that will continue that Government, according to Law and oath, or upon them that by Arms would force Him from it?  
To that of saul's spear restored, Master Bridge replies; Though restored before demanded, yet not before Saul had humbled himself to David, saying, I have sinned, I will no more do thee harm, because my soul was precious in thy sight this day.— We know what you look for; If you blush not yet to have expected it, His Majesty has not been ashamed to do it with a great condescension; He has even supplicated for Peace, He has redressed former miscarriages of Government with new additionals of Grace, He has promised and protested for the future; Oh that He could say, My Soul has been precious in your eyes this day, this whole year; or that He could find answerable humility in the hearts of Subjects, whose Ambition has caused His troubles and our miseries.  
The Doctor defends the King's entertainment of Papists by David's example; but he must prove that Ziba, or those that resorted to David in his distress were of another Religion, and by Law to be disarmed. What needs that? for the Doctor intended only by those examples to show, that a Prince in His necessary defence may entertain such men, as otherwise He would not make use of, and may give some countenance to such as have relieved Him in distress, though otherwise as ill deserving His Grace as a dissembling Ziba. And though, by Law, Papists are not to have Arms at their disposing, yet are they not quit of the duty and service of Subjects, they may by just authority bear Arms to use them according to the direction of that authority; and if a List of the Army against his Majesty were examined, there would be found, if not a considerable number of Papists; yet of such as they, that employ them, would have cause to be ashamed of, such as by Law are to abjure the Land, as men not to be held in with any government.  
Upon the former particulars the Fuller Answerer is more bitter and malicious, interpreting every thing, that had sharpness in it, as spoken of the Parliament. It was said, That in such a case the State would be unreasonably exposed to the danger, that every prevailing Faction might bring upon it; This is, according to this man's interpretation, to call the Parliament, a prevailing Faction. It was said, That the people are made to believe by their good teachers, that the King was so and so affected, to whom no more need be said then the Archangel did to he Arch-accuser, The Lord rebuke thee, also that their preach were the doctrines of this giddy age, and that many wicked Pamphlets, and books written by Enemies to Peace, were suffered to issue forth into every corner of this Land, This is according to this man's apprehension, to call the Parliament Declarations wi●ked Pamphlets, and scandalous imputations of this giddy ag●, and to liken them to the Devil the Arch-accuser. I had need say again to this man, the Lord rebuke thee.  
Lastly, it was said. If the Papist will show himself a good Subject, it is just and reasonable that the King, when He is put to it, admit his help, and the more shame for them, that profess the Protestant religion, to force him to it. This is, according to this man's sense, to call the Papists good Subjects, better than the Parliament, how will Romering of this? The Papists have no cause to applaud themselves for any thing spoken by me, but this I can say, and say it upon experience, that they take occasion to be confirmed and hardened in their way, by the principles and practice of the adverse party: for how will Rome ring of this, That Protestants should take Arms against their King professing the same religion? that a concealed Tradition of a reserved power of resistance should so fare prevail, and the people be so finely led on by an implicit faith to build upon it, that by virtue thereof the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance should be so easily dispenfed with? that the Jesuits themselves should be clean out done in the cunning of Lies and Forgeries to uphold a cause, that pretends religion?  
This Answerer after a fit of railing concludes with Prayer. I shall only ●dde this short prayer, and with my very soul I speak it, God bless the King and send us peace, and if it must not be till one side have prevailed, I pray God it may be that side that loves the King best. Truth would not let me bitherto accord with this Answerer, but Charity now bids me join with him, and to add unto his prayer; That it would please God to forgive that fide, which under pretence of love to the King, has so deeply wounded him in his Person and Kingly power, also that our peace may be restored, not through an absolute prevailing of either side by Arms, but through a loyal submission of that side, which has done the wrong to His Majesty and His People, by this Lawless resistance. Amen.  
We have done with this man; Let us see how Mr. Burrows concludes the business, pag. 140. to the two last Sections which concerned matter of fact, he briefly thus answers, The Doctor puts the case thus Whether Conscience can be persuaded that the King is such, and so minded, as that there may be sufficient cause to take up Arms against Him? In this he is as miserably mistaken as in all his other grounds from Scripture and Re●son; for we take up no Arms against the King, and whatsoever the King's mind be, there is sufficient cause to take Arms, to defend ourselves against others that seek our ruin. Is it so that the Law is in your hand, and it concerns you not, What ever the King's mind be? He is bound by Oath to protect you against those that seek your ruin, and accordingly has the power of the sword, and the defending of Arms; will you not then know whether it be his mind to defend you, but take the sword into your own hand? surely herein you are miserably mistaken, if you think this is not to take Arms against the King, and against that power which God and the Law entrusts him with, for your protection. Or have you not read how Arms taken up by some in the latter end of the Queen's time, to remove evil Counsellors, such as they pretended sought their ruin, were adjudged a levying of war against the Queen? it will not help you, to say Your Arms are taken up by authority of Parliament; those were not, for that's not the point, you may see by this, your Arms are against the King, and his power and authority, if without it, under what pretence soever you may take them up.  
If the King do but deny to assist in delivering us from such dangers, and in delivering up Delinquents, there is cause enough to satisfy our Consciences in taking of Arms. It seems now it concerns you to know, what the King's mind is, though not cause sufficient here to sati●●ie your Consciences, for you cannot say he denied this, till you put yourselves out of His protection, and were your own protectors in Arms; Nay after you appeared in this posture, what was denied you from Nottingham, that might give you cause to proceed in Arms till you brought them to give the King battle? you take away His Arms and power against His will, you use them in battle to the imminent endangering of His Person, and yet you take not Arms against him, and you can satisfy your Conscience of the lawfulness of it.  
See now whether you can set such a Conscience before God's tribunal, and there lay the plea as you do, pag. 142. Lord thou who art the searcher of hearts knowest we aimed at no hurt to our King, we desired to live in Peace, to deliver our Kingdom and Parliament from the rage of ungodly men, to preserve what thy Majesty, what the Law of Nature, and of this Land hath made our own. Dare you justify yourselves thus at his Tribunal? you may blush to speak it before man, that knows not your hearts, but sees, how you have actually invaded the King's Right and Power, and imminently endangered His Person, if the mercy of the Lord had not preserved Him; how you break through the Laws of God and Nature, not to preserve what is your own, but to gain the Lord knows what? Thou tellest us, that it is not the part of a Christian, but of an Infidel, not to provide for his family. Dare you thus entitle Him to your bloodshed and rapines, whereby you provide for yourselves? has he taught you to provide for the family of the Commonwealth by binding the master of the family, and smiting your fellow-servants? as those did, Mat. 24.49. For the substance of what we have done, it hath been in thy name, that we may be faithful to our King, Kingdom and Parliament, Pardon we beseech thee the failings. Let your ends which you pretend, be never so specious, if the means you use be not Lawful and Warrantable, as they are not, for the very substance of them, either by the Law of God or Man, your plea will not hold, but your account will be heavy for all the blood shed and miseries this Land has groaned under, which might have been prevented if Reason would have satisfied you: Now the Lord that is at hand, grant you moderation, and then we doubt not, but (with his blessing) we shall have Peace in good time, to the restoring of his truth, the King's Honour and Rights, the due Privileges of Parliament, and the Subjects Liberty.    

ERRATA.  
Pag. 2. med, your, for their. p. 9 l. 13. your for their. p. 49. l. 11. for 5. r. 15. p. 69. l. 9 natual r. mutual.   

The Contents of the several SECTIONS.  

Sect. I. The Case, and the Question upon it stated.  
Sect. II. The frame of this Government as it is phansyed in the Fuller Answer  
Sect. III. Of the Original of Governing power; of Monarchy, and of the beginnings of Government in this Land.  
Sect. IU. Of the Coordination of three Estates in Parliament, and of the Supremacy of Power.  
Sect. V Of the Supply which is phansyed upon the former Coordination.  
Sect. VI Of the final resolution of this State's Judgement, and of the power of declaring Law.  
Sect. VII. The final resolution is not arbitrary in the two Houses, but only in the three Estates.  
Sect. VIII. A confutation of what is replied by the Answerers upon the first Section of the former Treatise.  
Sect. IX. A Confutation of what was replied upon the second Sect. of the former Treatise, touching places of Scripture pretended for, or alleged against resistance.  
Sect. X. A Confutation of what was replied upon the third Sect. of the former Treatise.  
Sect. XI. A Confutation of what was replied upon the fourth Sect. of the former Treatise.  
Sect. XII. A Confutation of what was replied upon the fift Sect. of the former Treatise.  
Sect. XIII. An Answer to what was replied upon the two last Sections of the former Treatise.   
FINIS.