A REPLY UNTO SEVERAL TREATISES PLEADING FOR THE Arms now taken up by Subjects in the pretended defence of RELIGION AND LIBERTY.  
By name, unto The Reverend and Learned Divines which pleaded Scripture and Reason for defensive Arms.  
The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy.  
The Author of the Fuller Answer his Reply.  
By H. Fern D. D. etc.  
OXFORD, Printed by Leonard Lichfield Printer to the ●niversity. 1643.   

The Contents of the several SECTIONS.  

SECT. I. The Preface. In which the contradictory Assertions of the Adversaries, pag. 2, 3. The General Resolution of the Cause, pag. 4. Doctrine of Sedition, pag. 5. 6.  
SECT. II. Cases of Resistance, in regard of times of peace or War; and in regard of Persons, Private or public, pag. 7. etc.  
SECT. III. A defence of Subject's Arms in vain, sought by the distinction of Monarchy, pag. 11. 12. The Governing Power is so derived from God upon Him, who is Supreme, that the People cannot lessen or limit it, but only in the exercise, pag. 13, 14. Of an Absolute and Limited Monarch, pag. 15. Limitation and Mixture may be by after condescent of the Monarch, and only reach the Exercise of the power, pag. 15. 16 17. Mixture differs from Derivation of Power to substitute Officers, pag. 17. 18. Of Monarchy by Conquest, pag. 18. Providence may so fare discover itself by Conquest, that the People Conquered shall be bound to consent and yield obedience to the Conqueror, as to a Prince set over them by God pag. 19 20  
SECT. FOUR The Constitution of this Monarchy; The Entrance of the Saxon and Norman Conquerors urged, not to prove our King's absolute, but to disprove such an Original Limitation and Mixture, as the Adversary phansyeth in this Monarchy, pag. 21. to 28. Reasons for such Original Limitation and Mixture answered, pag. 28. 29. Proofs for it from His Majesty's Grants answered, pag. 30. 31. 32.  
SECT. V Of Resistance in relation to an Absolute Monarchy, pag. 33. 34. 35. in relation to a Limited Monarchy, pa. 36. 37. 38. Limitation and Mixture in Monarchy doth not infer a power of Resistance in Subjects pag. 39 40. etc.  
SECT. VI A Refutation of the most considerable passages of His Reply, that first styled himself Author of the Fuller Answer, pag. 43. to 56.  
SECT. VII. Places of Scripture out of the Old Testament. The Institution of the Israelitish Kingdom, in which the Jus Regis employed a security from Resistance, pag. 56, 57, 58, 59 The Rescue of Jonathan, pag. 60. David's demeanour towards Saul infers not a power of resistance in Subjects, pag. 61, 62. His enquiry about the intent of the K●ilites, pag. 63. Something extraordinary in the example of David, pag. 64 65. The Prophets never called upon the Elders of the People for this pretended duty of Resistance, pag. 66.  
SECT. VIII. Of Resistance forbidden in the 13. to the Romans. The place is considerable, as it speaks of Government in Gener all, and as it relates to those Times and Governors, pag. 67 That it is Powers in the plural and in the Abstract, vainly observed and applied by the Reverend Divines, pag. 67, 68, 69. That Subjection is not here restrained to Legal Commands in Civil matters only, as they would have it, pag 69. to 77. That Christians might not resist, because Religion than was not established by Law, and because the Emperors than were Absolute (as the Author of the Treat. of Monarchy would have it) is not the reason of the Apostles prohibition, pag. 77. 78. Of the absoluteness of those Emperors before Vespasians time, and of the Power of the Senate, and of the Lex Regia, pag. 79, etc.  
SECT. IX. Nine Reasons against Power of Resistance in Subjects, drawn from the Consideration of the wisdom of God, who put his people under Kings without power of Resisting them, in the Old and New Testament. pag. 84. Of the Ordinance of God, that places the Power of the Sword in Him that is supreme, which cannot be eluded by saying, they resist not the Monarch, but misemployed fellow Subjects about Him, pag. 85. 86. 87. Of the mischiefs and inconveniences that would follow upon such a power of Resistance in Subjects, etc. pag. 90. 91. Their reasons to the contrary answered,— pag. 93. etc.  
A brief consideration of the Case: That they are far from (what they pretend) the defence of Religion, Laws, and Liberties, by these Arms, and the Resistance now made, pag. 96. 97.    

A REPLY TO SEVERAL TREAtises, pleading for the Arms now taken up by Subjects in the pretended defence of Religion and and Liberties.  

SECT. I. THE PREFACE.  
IF it be enquired, why any Reply at all, or why so late? I may say, I had determined not to be any more troublesome, and that there was no just cause why I should be, were it well weighed what was said on both sides: but I must once again beg leave to say something (the Importunity of Adversaries or the expectation of Friends enforcing it) by way of Answer to some Books not long since issued forth.  
There are two especially which have drawn the eyes of many upon them; the one bears this title, Scripture and Reason pleaded for defensive Arms, by Divers Reverend and Learned Divines. Who by laying their heads together have not found out any more forceable Arguments or satisfying Answers, than they which went before them; but only some newcases of Resistance to amuse the Reader, and new instances to enforce former Reasons, and some popular amplifications to set off the old Answers, thereby making the book swell to that bigness it appears in.  
The other book bears this Title, A Treatise of Monarchy, by whom I know not: but surely the Author (however he looks not with a single eye upon what I had written, misconstruing it many times) doth with much ingenuity disclaim, and with no less reason confute several Assertions of those Learned Divines, and other Writers of the Party; assertions that have very much helped forward this Rebellion: such as these, That the King is Universis minor. That the People, which make the King, are above Him, by the Rule, Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale. That the final judgement of this State is in the two Houses. That the Christians in the Primitive times might have resisted, had they had force. These and the like he ingenuously disclaims, but being engaged he sets up his Rest upon a groundless fancy of such a mixture and constitution of this Monarchy, as mustinable the Houses to restrain the exorbitancies of the Monarch, by the Arms of the Kingdom: and to induce a belief of this, he has prefixed a discourse of Absolute, Limited, and Mixed Monarchies, so framed as is most appliable to his purpose.  
He that wrote the Fuller Answer to my first Treatise had this conceit of Mixture, whereby he placed the Houses in the very Supremacy of power, and did thence (as one falsehood being granted doth necessarily infer another) conclude, that the Members of the Houses were the King's Subjects divis●m, taken severally, not conjunctim, as they are gathered together in their Houses; for indeed how could they be His Subjects, and He their supreme Head, if they be fundamentally mixed or joined with Him in the supremacy of power? The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, did see that this was repugnant to Law and Reason, and therefore doth acknowledge them to be subjects conjunctim, under the King as their Supreme Head, yet being engaged he holds the ground upon which that absurd assertion is raised, affirming and endeavouring to prove, that the Mixture is in the supremacy of power, pag. 40. How then will he make the King supreme, and they His Subjects? for this; he gives the King Apicem potestatis, the top or Excellency of Power: that is, the King is the Crown or top of the head, but the two Houses must be our head too and our Sovereigns, if they be joined with the King in the very Supremacy of power: and so the matter will be well mended. Again, The Full Answer, did from the same false supposed mixture infer, that the final Resolution of this State's judgement resided in the two Houses, when the King refuseth to discharge His trust for the safety of the Kingdom; the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, did see and confess, that it plainly overthrows the Monarchy to place such judgement in the Houses: Yet being engaged, He gives them power to take the Arms of the Kingdom; but lest they should seem Authoritatively to judge or command in that case, they must declare and make the appeal to the Community, as if there were no government, and as men are in Conscience convinced they are bound to give aid and assistance; so he pag. 8. 29. and elsewhere. A ready way to confusion; but of these and such like contradictory conceits of the Assertors of Resistance more below.  
Of this Mixture there was not a little spoken in my Reply to the Full Answer: but this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, and Reverend Divin's take notice only of my first Treatise, Having therefore made some short Animadversions upon their Books as they came to my hand, I still waited to meet with something directly against the Reply, but as yet have seen nothing, besides two trifling Answers; the one a wild discourse by whom written I know not, but by such a flirting fancy, I am sure, that he who reads one part, will not cast away his time upon the rest: the other by him that styled himself Author of the Fuller answer, still like himself; if he can be but witty or fasten a seeming contradiction upon his Adversary it is enough; what he has material about the Mixture of Government (which is the whole business of his book) is more accurately delivered and urged by this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy; yet because he is extremely confident, I shall bestow a Section upon him below, and that is more than he deserves.  
Therefore what the Reverend Divines, or the Author of this Tract of Monarchy have drawn from Scripture or Reason, to justify their grounds of Resistance, I shall briefly examine, after that I have declared my intent at first, and my purpose now of proceeding in this Argument.  
It was the intent of that first Treatise of mine, to resolve the Consciences of misled People, Touching the unlawfulness of Arms now taken up against the King: and because Conscience, if it resolve for them, must conclude upon these premises (Subjects may take Arms against their Sovereign for defence of Religion and Liberties, apparently in danger of Subversion. But such is the case now,) and must be certain of the truth of both of them, for if either of the premises be false or doubtful, Conscience is misguided in the conclusion; therefore the whole Resolution of the case was to this purpose, as here it lies  to the sight in these two assertions.  
First, Were the case so as they suppose, that is, Were the King, as they would have people believe, seduced to proceed in a way tending to the subversion of Religion and Liberties, it were not safe to bear part in the Resistance of Arms now used against him, there being no warrant for taking Arms upon such a case, but evidence against it both from Scripture and Reason. So that at the best the case can be even to them, that plead for resistance, no better indeed then doubtful, and then Conscience according to its two Rules (what is not of Faith is Sin, and, in doubtful cases, the SAFER WAY is to be chosen) will tell them they should forbear and suffer, rather than resist, for they may be sure that is a SAFE WAY, were the King indeed what they suppose him to be.  
Secondly, Seeing the case is not so as they suppose, nor is it so with the King as they would have the People believe, but most apparent, that He is constrained to take Arms for the defence of His just Rights, and the Protection of His Subjects; Every man may be clearly persuaded in Conscience that the Resistance now made is unlawful and damnable, and that he is bound not only to forbear from resisting, but also to assist His Majesty in so just a cause.  
The contrary Resolution (which concludes, That it is Lawful upon such a case supposed to take Arms: & that the Case is now:) I doubt not to call a Blaspheming of God and the King; Of God, in charging such an imputation upon his Word, as if it taught Subjects to take Arms for the defence of Religion and Liberties against their natural Sovereign: Of the King, in casting such aspersions upon His Majesty, as if He were seduced to the subversion of Religion and Liberties.  
Now although His Majesty's Cause be justified not so much by the falsehood of this their Principle and ground of Resistance (it is lawful in such a Case to take Arms) as by the clearness of His innocency, He being fare from what they suppose or proclaim of him to be: Yet because the very seeds of Rebellion are sown upon that ground, and there cannot want either made pretences to bring them forth, or Fears and Jealousies to cherish and ripen them; it is needful to show, that as Rebellion is not a plant of Gods sowing, so neither is that ground a Truth of His Laying.  
The Author of the Fuller Answer, in his late Reply Pag 27. & 28. imputes the beginning of this controversy (whether Subjects upon such a Case may take Arms?) to my first unhappy and unchallenged Treatise (as he calls it) which has exposed the other party to a necessity of a Reply, and caused so much to be said, especially by Divines, in this sad and unwelcome subject. So he. These men are loath to be called to account for what they say or do, as if they were the very rule of Justice and Truth. They have Preached and Printed this seditious doctrine over and over, wellnear a twelve month before that unhappy Treatise was published, thereby persuading the People into Arms, under pretence of defending their endangered Religion and Liberties; and now they think much it should be called in question or be made a Controversy. It had been happy for them if they could have carried the matter so clearly without being put to a Reply; or if now being put to Answer, they could make others the Incendiaries for the kindling of that fire which they have begun, and fomented with seditious doctrines, blown over all the Kingdom. Surely if the Divines and Lawyers, that are of contrary judgement to them throughout the Kingdom, had in good time declared themselves herein, it would have given a seasonable and happy check to these seditious principles, and to the unhappy Rebellion that has been raised thereon; I for my part thought it concerned me to examine a doctrine so much Preached and published, and could not think it possible that Conscience should be truly satisfied in the Conclusion, without being secured of the truth of both the Promises, of which this seditious doctrine is the first, That Subjects may take Arms against their Sovereign for the defence of Religion and Liberties, when in danger of subversion: for which as then I could see no warrant that Conscience might rest on, no more can I now, but do find it a Doctrine destitute of Scripture and true Reason, as will be cleared in the process of this book. For,  
First, Upon the examination of places of Scripture, it will appear, that God's People were continually under such Kings, against whom they might not resist, and that God's word as it affords us no precept, so nor any just example for resistance, but much every way against it.  
Secondly, Upon the Examination of Reason it will appear, how inconsistent such a power of resistance in Subjects is with Government, and that (which seems to be the reason of the Wisdom of God, putting his people under Kings without any power of Resistance) more inconveniences and mischiefs would follow upon such a power placed in the People, then if they were left without it.  
I must needs say it doth at first sight seem unreasonable, that Subjects should be left without this Remedy, and I confess my own thoughts (according to that natural inclination we all have to Liberty) have been heretofore ready to suggest as much: till seeking warrant for conscience from God's word, I could meet with none, but found Reason presently checked with that saying of our Saviour, Mat. 10.25. It is enough for the Disciple that he be as his Master. It is enough for us now, if by the denial of Resistance and Arms we can be in no worse condition than our Saviour was, and the Christians of the Primitive times, and God's people were ever in.  
Likewise when I expect the Adversaries should bring express Scripture (without which they profess not to attempt any thing of such moment) for commanding or allowing this supposed Duty of Resistance, I find them altogether failing, and in their Answers to places of Scripture, much disagreeing among themselves. So that indeed all their faith and persuasion here is resolved into an appearance of Reason, raised upon Aristotle's grounds or Principles, laid for the framing of a government, and the means of restraining Tyranny.  
Upon those grounds and Principles, Buchanan, and junius Brutus go so fare as to the Deposing and taking away of an Exorbitant or Tyrannous Monarch,— The writers of these days though they will not seem to harbour such an intention, and the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy doth expressly pronounce it unlawful; yet do they all agree to use what force they can against such a Monarch for the suppressing of his Tyranny, to give him battle in the field, and make him accessary to his own death, if he fall by their hand.  
To clear the way in the entrance of this Cause, I am called by the Learned Divines, and the Author of the treatise of Monarchy, in the first place to consider the several Cases of Resistance, and the several kinds of Governments and Monarchies.   

SECT. II. Cases of Resistance.  
THe Reverend and Learned Divines, (who plead for Defensive Arms) to show what great pains they have taken for the satisfying, or rather troubling of the Consciences of the people, do every where blame the Resolver as indiligent and careless. First in the explication of the Question propounded, that he undertaking to resolve Conscience about Resistance, did not set down all possible Cases, which they by laying their heads together have found out. Then in the clearing of the 13. to the Rom. that he mainly insisting upon that place did not Analyse the Chapter, as they have done by breaking it into so many pieces, as if they had meant to draw out so many points to preach upon, rather than arguments to dispute by.  
My Answer is, I did not intent that Treatise as a just Tractate of Resistance, but as a Resolution of a particular Case; and therefore did not undertake or endeavour to satisfy all doubts which every working brain (that has strained itself to the disturbance of this State and people) might raise concerning Resistance in general, but to resolve the Consciences of misled People in relation to the resistance now made. Now because they must have things delivered in gross to them, if we mean they should apprehend them, I did therefore think it sufficient, first, in the Explication of the Question to direct their thoughts upon the notorious Resistance then used, viz. by setting up a Militia, raising Armies every where, and using them in Battle against His Majesty, for unto that Resistance the Case propounded did relate, as was intimated SECT. I. and then in the clearing of the 13 to the Rom. it seemed sufficient to let the people understand, That the King was the Higher or Supreme power in this Kingdom; that All under the higher power were forbidden to resist; that Tyranny and persecution were not sufficient causes of Resistance, which appeared upon the consideration of those times; lastly, that the prohibition of Resistance concerned all times, because the Apostle's Reasons against it, being drawn from the institution of the Power, and the end or benefit of it, are perpetual and concern all Governments. These few necessary particulars deduced out of the Apostle, I thought more fit to let the People understand, then to puzzle them with many needless terms of analyse and division.  
And now let us consider the Cases propounded by the Pleaders; amongst them all, that only is pertinent which inquires, whether the resisting of a Captain of the Soldiery having his commission from the King, and coming to act any illegal commands with his bands of armed men, be a resisting of the King, and so forbidden? pag. 1. Ans. They might easily have answered themselves, who, I know, are persuaded that the resisting of Captains having Commission from the Houses, and coming to plunder or take away the Estates of Malignants, is a resisting of the Parliament; but more to this case presently. Only let us consider their leading Cases first: What if it be doubted, say they, whether a King be distracted, or bewitched, or forced by such as have him Prisoner, or otherwise a command upon him; are Subjects bound from resisting His illegal commands? pag. 2. Answ. If it be clear that a King is so, I suppose it is clear in Law what course is to be taken; but being doubted only (as the case is put) and that perhaps upon as little ground as some have endeavoured to make the People believe, their King is now held Prisoner by his Cavaliers, and forced to do what he doth; then the Safer way is to be taken, which is to do no more by way of resistance, then is Lawful to do, when it is clear He is not Forced or distracted, and that will better appear by the Case following: suppose it be certain a King is not forced or distracted, yet doing as bad as any distracted person can do by commanding Tyrannical Acts, why should His Subjects hands be bound from resisting his followers, offering to act His Tyranny more than if he were forced or distracted? Pag. 2. Answ. This is needless and odious, and cannot concern the Case in Question, but by reflecting upon His Majesty, but put this case of any King so doing: I Answer. 1. There is much difference twixt habituate distraction, and actual extravagances or Tyrannical attempts, for by that a Prince is not master of his Will, and is made unfit to bear the Power (i) the administration of it, but by these he is not so. 2. Because this falls in with the Case, as it is propounded in better terms by the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, whether the forceable resistance of inferior Persons misemployed to serve the illegal destructive Commands of the Prince be unlawful? pa. 51. I answer, if by those misemployed persons be understood, the Commanders and Soldiers of the King's Armies, I cannot see (nor any man else, I think) but the resisting of them by a contrary Militia or Arms raised by Subjects, is a resisting of the King and unlawful; and unto this Resistance the Case, as I propounded it did relate, and accordingly the first Resolution was, That were the King what they supposed him to be, there was no warrant for such resistance. But if by those misemployed persons be understood other instruments of oppression in times of Peace before it come to Arms, such as the pleaders for defensive Arms do suppose (in their last Case, pag. 2.) to have counterfeited the King's Seal or Warrant, and by it to Spoil and Murder all the Kings faithful Subjects if they be not resisted; or such as the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, doth (in his instances pag. 57) suppose indeed to have the King's Seal or Warrant, wherewith they might range through the Kingdom, wasting and spoiling, taxing and distraining, yea might destroy the Members of Parliament as they sit in their Houses, if they might not be resisted. Ans. For that of the counterfeited Seal, it is not to the purpose; if there be cause to doubt or suspect such a Seal, there are undoubted Ministers of Power and justice to makestay of it till it be made known above; as we see those dealt with, that bring counterfeit Briefs, and as some years ago, he that counterfeited a Commission for taking up Children for Virginia, was stayed by authority and brought to justice. But suppose such instruments of oppression have indeed the King's Seal, and Warrant to Tax, distrain, &c, May not private men resist such in their murdering assaults, and the Ministers of Power and Authority suppress them in each County by Force? I answer. This is an enlarging of the Case, which concerns the present resistance as now it is undertaken by Subjects with Armies in the field. Yet for farther satisfaction, and without prejudice to that which clearly convinceth the present resistance as unlawful, I conceive it reasonable to say. First, if private men be suddenly assaulted in their Persons by such instruments, without any foregoing pretence or reason (as of Taxing, Distraining, Arresting) so that their life is imminently endangered, and no means of avoiding by slight, then is personal defence Lawful; for such sudden assault carries no pretence of authority with it; but if such misemployed instruments come first to Tax, Distrain, Arrest, (as it is supposed) private men ought not to resist, and so draw on the endangering of life, but to seek redress above from Authority, and, if it may not be had, yet not to resist. Secondly, If the Ministers of Power in each County do at first stay, restrain, and commit such misemployed instruments, and so represent the matter again to the King; if the two Houses of Parliament also, deal in like manner with those that by virtue of any such Warrant should notoriously trespass upon them, this is not to resist; for here is only a desire of informing the King aright, not a will of contending with him, if he will not be of another mind. Now (as the pleaders for defensive Arms say pag. 2.) The Law supposing the King can do no wrong supposeth wrong may be done in His name, and therefore teacheth the Ministers of Power and justice under him, to presume such illegal Warrants and surreptitiously or by fraud procured, and so at first to make stay of such misemployed instruments, and to bring the matter again to the knowledge of the King.  
Secondly, Should a King be so obstinate, as to perfist in the maintenance of those illegal courses, and to that end employed the Militia or power of Arms, wherewith he is invested, it is neither Legal nor Reasonable, that the Ministers of power under him, should pursue the opposition to the setting up of a Militia or contrary power, to the introducing of a Civil War. For though such Ministers of Power ought to use all fair and Lawful means for the restraining of such misemployed instruments, and it is not for me to set bounds how fare they may proceed in preserying the King's Peace, by using that Power against misemployed Persons, yet surely they cannot proceed so fare as to a contestation of Power with Him whose Ministers they are, much less to a Levying of War, as at this day, and an apposing of Armies against Armies. This is the Resistance supposed in the Case, and in this Case to resist the King's Forces is to resist Him.   

SECT. III. Several kinds of Monarchy.  
IN the next place we are called to a consideration of the several kinds of Monarchical government, that it may appear, whether in any of them this Resistance by force of Arms may find allowance or otherwise.  
The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, observing there was but little pretence from Scripture, either by precept or Example, for Resistance, confesseth that the Kings, under which the People of God were in the Old and New Testament, might not be resisted, and therefore lays all the defence of Resistance upon reason, drawn from the several condition of an Absolute and of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy. For which purpose he spends the first part of his book, in clearing the point according to his own principles, and then coming to apply what he had said, touching Limited and Mixed Monarchies, to the Government of this Land, he complains of us Divines, that we plead for Absolutenesle of Monarchical power in this Kingdom, never making any difference of Powers, but bringing proofs for Subjection and against Resistance from places of Scripture (a sore fault) and examples which concern the manner of the government of judah, Israel, and the Romans: as if that which holds in our government, did always hold in another, so he pag. 33. And then he endeavours to prove this Monarchy, to be so mixed, as that the Houses of Parliament be originally joined with the Monarch in the Sovereign Power. Whence he thinks he has both an answer to places and examples taken out of Scripture, that they belonged to absolute Monarchies, are not appliable to ours; and also a demonstration of his conclusion for Resistance. viz. that by the Mixed condition of this Monarchy (as he phansyeth it) the two Houses are vested with power to restrain with force of Arms the Exorbitances of the Monarch.  
Ans. It was never my intent (nor was, I suppose, of other Divines) to plead for absoluteness of Power in the King, if by absoluteness of power be meant (as it should be) a power of Arbitrary command, but if by Absoluteness of Power this Author means (as he doth sometimes) a Power not to be resisted or constrained by force of Arms raised by Subjects, such a power we plead for, and do say, That as those places and examples out of Scripture did forbid resistance then, and show, no warrant for it can be had either by precept or example out of God's word, so do they condemn resistance in this Government, though Limited, as shall be shown.  
We allow a distinction of Monarchies, and admit the Government of Kingdoms to be of divers Kind's, and acknowledge a Legal restraint upon the Power of the Monarch in this Kingdom; but when this Author has made all the advantage he can of his Limited and mixed forms of Monarchy, it will not avail him for the Countenancing of Arms taken up by Subjects: for this will appear to be truth, agreeable to Scripture and Reason. That government is not the invention of man, but the institution of God, whereby he rules men by men set over them in his stead; and though he doth not now immediately design those his Vicegerents, but by other means, be it by the choice of the People; yet have they their power not from the People, (to whom it belongs to be governed, and do by choosing a Governor, seek a benefit safely) but from ●od, by virtue of his institution of Government. Also, that the Governing Power, is one and the same, which God gives and settles upon the Person that is Supreme, and stands immediately next to God, between Him and the People: only that Power may be Limited in the exercise of it, as the People by agreement at first, or by Petition after can procure. Also, that where the Prince stands Supreme, and next to ●od above all the People, there Subjects may not take Arms, and make forceable Resistance, notwithstanding he be exorbitant in the exercise and use of that Power, to the invasion of such Rights and Privileges, as they enjoy by first compact, or after procurement.  
The pleaders for resistance on the other side, do wilfully embrace and rest upon the Opinion of Heathen writers, touching the beginning of Government, and the derivation of the Governing Power from the People, as if they had not Scripture (which the Heathen wanted) to give them better direction herein.  
The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy seems to refer the beginning of Government to God's ordinance, and to affirm the power to be from God, Pag. 2. but in the process of his book, we shall find him deriving it indeed from the People, and Pag. 4. he concludes thus for both. They, which say that Sovereigns have their Power from God, speak in some sense truth, as also they Which say that originally power is in the People, may in a sound sense be understood; and in these things we have D. Fernes consent in his discourse upon this Subject, Sect. 3. Answ. you had not his consent in your sense; for in that Sect. it was his intent to show that the Governing Power, (i) such an Authority or sufficiency for command and coercion, was from God, though the designation of the Person be by choice of the People, and the limitations of that power in several kinds of Monarchy be by their consent and agreement. Now if to design the Person, or procure limitation of the power in the exercise of it, be in your sound sense to give the power, there's no great harm to us, or advantage to you: you must have the power originally from the people in another sense, or else you can make no pretence by it for your grounds of Resistance; and so you do, when you tell us, Pag. 16. they sometime reserve a power to oppose or displace the Magistrate: sometime they make the Monarch Supreme, and then they divest themselves of all Superiority, and have no power left to oppose him in Person, and Pag. 63. you call them architectonical powers, committing the power of Government and Arms, etc. This is the riddle of this governing power originally in the people, they are Architect. powers, but build upon foundations laid in the air; they are invested with Superiority, but none can tell over whom, besides themselves; they reserve a power, but such as they never had; for before Government established, they have not any power of a community or politic power, whereby a command may be laid upon others, but only a natural power of private Resistance, wherewith every one of them is in particular endued, which power they cannot use against the public Magistrate, when once they have designed him.  
Now let us take a nearer view of the forms of Monarchy spoken of by this Author, and make a few observations upon such particulars, as will be of more necessary consideration, when we come to the examination of Scripture, of Reason, and of the Constitution of this Monarchy.  
First, he tells us, Absolute Monarchy is when the Sovereignty is so fully in one, that it hath no limits or bounds under God, but the Monarches own will: so it is when a People are absolutely resigned up or do resign up themselves to be governed by one man, pag. 6. We allow this description, but must remember it below, when this Author will tell us, the Israelitish Kings were absolute Monarches, which will not appear by this description, also when he tells us that to make a Monarch irresistible, is to make him absolute, for we see by this description it is not the denial of resistance that makes a Monarch absolute, but the denial of a Law to bond his will.  
In the next place he tells us, He is a limited Monarch who hath a Law besides His own will for the measure of His power, pag. 12. This also is true. But he supposeth first, that this Monarch must be limited in the very power itself, not only in the exercise of the power, for an absolute Monarch may stint himself, in the exercise of his power, and yet remain absolute. Answ. True, if such a Monarch limit himself to such a Rule in such a case, reserving power to vary from it when he shall see good cause: but if he that is Originally absolute and unlimited do in some particular cases fix a Law with promise not to vary from it, he is so fare forth, and only so fare as concerns those cases, limited and not absolute. Secondly, he supposes, such a Monarch must be Radically (i) Originally invested with such a measure of limited power, and that he must have his bounds or limits of power ab externo, not from the free determination of his own wil pag. 12. yet at the beginning of the next page, he tells us, that soeveraignty comes thus to be defined to a rule, (i) to be limited, either by Original constitution, or by after condescent, when a Monarch, originally absolute, descends from His absoluteness to a more moderate power. That which he has to salve it is, that this limiting by after condescent, is equivalent to that which is by Original constitution; for there is in it a change of title, and a resolution in the Monarch to be Subject to in no other way, then according to such a Law, pag. 13. Answ. Where here is such a change of title as this man supposeth, it is done at once, and by express and notorious resignation of the Monarches former title and power. But it is not necessary that an Absolute Monarch should come to a limited condition after that manner, for a Monarch that was unlimited at first, by degrees may limit and bind up his power, and give oath for greater security, that he will rule accordingly, and requires not to be subject to, but according to such limitations or Laws; and so it will appear that the pious Princes of this Land have anciently done. Only when it is said, they require not to be subject to but according, etc. it must be understood in regard of Active subjection, which they cannot expect, if they shall command against those Laws, nor in regard of Passive subjection, as if they allowed their Subject to resist upon such commands; for it can scarce be imagined, that any Prince should condescend to a limited use of his power, and blind himself by Oath not to transgress the limits, he should also have the bands of force and constraint cast upon him, for the keeping of Him within those limits.  
The other distinction, which most concerns the business in hand, is of Monarchy into simple, without any Mixture of Aristocracy or Democracy, and Mixed, that has an allay from one or both of those. In the explication of which, that he may lay convenient grounds for such a Mixture as he would make in this Monarchy, he tells us; if the composition be of three, then must the sovereign power be in all three Originally, and not one holding his power from the other, but all equally from the fundamental constitution; His Reasons are. 1. Because else it would be no Mixture but a Derivation of Power to others, which is seen in the most simple Monarchy. 2. Because the end of Mixture (which ●s to keep each state from exorbitancy) could not be obtained by a derivate power; for such a power cannot turn back, and set bounds to its beginning, so he, pag. 25.  
Answ. We see by thi● where he will place the two Houses, in a Society of the Sovereign Power, and that by Original constitution, which will appear but a fancy when we come to examine it below; but for the grounding of it, he supposes that Mixture must be in the very sovereign power, and that originally, or from the beginning of the government; neither of which is necessary: for I conceive that as Limitation in government, is in regard of a Law or Rule, which bounds the will of the Monarch for those particulars that Law concerns; and such limitation may be only of the exercise of the power not of the power itself; so Mixtures is in regard of Persons joined to the Monarch for certain Acts and purposes; but that such Persons should have a share with the Monarch in the Sovereign Power, is so fare from being necessary to that mixture which Monarchy will admit of, that indeed it cannot consist with that Supremacy which is supped to be in the Monarch, for it would make several independent powers in the same State or Kingdom, which is most absurd. If therefore the concurrence and consent of such persons be required as necessary to the exercise only of the Sovereign power in such or such Acts, it is sufficient to make a Mixture in the Government.  
In like manner as it was said above of Limited Monarchies, that it is not necessary they should be so Originally, but may become such by after condescent, so may it be said of Mixed Monarchies. And it is clear that in most Monarchies of Europe, which have been parts or branches of the Roman Empire and by force of Arms broken off from it, the Monarch at first had absolute power, (like as the Roman Emperors had over their conquered Provinces) but by degrees have received Limitations to govern according to such and such Laws, and have admitted Mixtures by a concurrence of such and such persons, whose consent should be requisite and necessary to some exercises of their sovereign power.  
Now to his Reasons I answer, Derivation of power is either upon substitute Officers and Ministers, which supply the absence of the Monarch in the execution of Power and Justice for him upon his People, and such derivation of Power is in the most simple Monarchy: or else it is upon such Persons or such an order of men, whose concurrence and consent is required to certain Acts of Monarchical Power, and this makes a Mixture, though they have no share in the very power, but concur to the exercise of it only, and have not that neither Originally, but upon condescent of the Prince; yet have it certainly and irrevocably by Law settled upon them. Now if this Author will not call this a Mixture, because it is not Originally in the power itself, we cannot help it; we are sure it makes a large and real difference in Government, and may obtain its end (the keeping of each State from exorbitancy) in that way it's intended to do it in; which will give answer to his other Reason. For though a Derivative power can 〈…〉 bounds to the Sovereign power, yet may it stand to 〈…〉 way, those bounds, which the sovereign power has set to itself, and made the Derivate power the keeper of. The Kings of the M●des and Persians were in most things absolute, yet in this had they bound themselves, not to alter a Decree made by the advice of the Septemviri, or the Princes and chief Counsellors of the Kingdom, as we see Dan. 6.14. and Est. 1.19. So may it be easily conceived in any other State; the Prince, though unlimited at first, may bind up his Power from such or such Acts, unless he has the consent of such Counsellors unto them; which consent and concurrence does not give them a share in the Sovereign power, but makes them as Bounders in the Exercise of it; nor does it imply in those Persons a power of forceable constraint, but only of Legal and Moral restraint, as will appear in the fifth Section.  
I will conclude this Section with a brief consideration of what he delivers concerning Monarchy by Conquest. First, If the Invasion, saith he, be made upon pretence of Title, and the Pretender doth prevail, it is not conquest properly, but a vindication of a Title, and then the government is such as the Title is by which he claimed, pag. 21. I will not dispute whether a people so standing out do forfeit those Privileges and Liberties they formerly enjoyed, or whether a Prince so forced to vindicate His Title ●y subduing the People be not free from the former Limitations, to which Princes peaceably entering bound themselves, and whether He may not use such a People as a Conqueror? I should commend the Clemency and Piety of that Prince, that would not, but I do not see the injustice, if he should so use them.  
Secondly, He blames the Censure, which the Fuller Answer gave of Conquest, that the title of it was such as Plunderers have, etc. and tells us, the Right of Conquest is such, as the precedent War is, if that he Lawful so is the Conquest, yet is it not the Conquest that makes them Morally bound, but their own Consent in accepting of the Government, pag. 22. Well, but a forced consent will suffice, and such will scarce be wanting to a Conquest, and they that plead title of Conquest do not divide it from such a forced consent of People, but from a free limiting election.  
Thirdly, He grants that while their natural Sovereign is in being, the People cannot by consent devolve a Right to the Conqueror: But suppose they have not that tye upon them, may they perpetually stand out against the Conqueror, or rather are they not bound to consent and yield to His yoke, after they see they are wholly subdued, and he has settled a frame of Government among them? He tells us Conquest may give title and power to dispose of the Country, goods, and lives of the Conquered, but still it is in the People's choice to come to a Moral condition of Subjection: if they will suffer the utmost of Violence from the Conqueror rather, then consent to any terms of Subjection, as Numantia in Spain, they die or remain a free people, nor do they resist God's Ordinance, if at any time of advantage, they use force to free themselves from so violent a possession: so he pag. 22. It is an uncontrollable truth in Policy, that the consent of the People, either by themselves or their Ancestors, is the only Mean in ordinary Providence, by which Sovereignty is conferred upon any Person or Family; so he concludes pag. 23. Answ. That consent of People is the only mean, in your sense, may be an uncontrollable truth in the Policy lately framed; but it is certain, that God has power to dispose of us in ordinary providence, without expecting our consents and choice; it is plain by Scripture, that Conquest is a Mean of translating Kingdoms and disposing of People in the way of ordinary providence; it was so when God gave Egypt to Nabuchadnezzar as an hire for his service done upon judah, so when the Ammonites and Edomites were subdued by David, of which see below, Sect. 6. against the Fuller Answer. Had these no right over those conquered Nations, but by expecting their consent? Yea, will he say, a Right to dispose of their Lands and Goods, and lives, but not to challenge their Moral Subjection, Well, we doubt not but such Conquerors could force their consent; but I ask, were they not bound to yield it? is there no way for that providence, which translates Kingdoms, to discover itself, but by the consent of the Conquered People, that if they please to be obstinate, his providence shall give no Right? his setting up a King by Conquest over such a people shall be no institution o● Ordinance? this is good Policy but bad Divinity: I conceive it all 〈◊〉 controuleable truth, that when the invading Prince has perfectly subdued a People (there being no present Sovereign or apparent Heir of the Crown, to whom they are bound) as has settled & disposed all things and constituted a frame of Government, than I say providence doth sufficiently discover itself, and such a people ought to submit, and consent, and take their Prince as set over them by the hand of Providence; so that, if they will persist finally to resist (as this Author saith they may) they resist the Ordinance of God. If he will not believe me, let him hear Calvin, who in his Instit. l. 4. c. 20. nu. 26, 27. doth enforce obedience to that Prince which is over us, by a reason drawn from that Providence of God, which disposeth Kingdoms, and sets up over us what Kings he pleases, and from the example of Nabuchadnezzar, jer. 27.8. doth infer; Cuicunqve ergo delatum fuisse regnum conslabit, ei serviendum esse ne dubitemus: But how shall we discover his providence and will herein? the next words tell us: Atque simul ac in Regium fastigium quempiam evebit Dominus, testatam nobis facit suam voluntatem, quòd regnare illum velit. So in his Comment upon 1 Sam. 26. Licet multi avaritiâ, ambitione, crudelitate invascrit regna & imperia, tamen Dei voluntatem pluris esse, quam omnia illa, faciendam sciamus; ac proinde nos illis ultro submittamus, quos Deus Reges nobis praefecit. This is very home against this Author's assertion, wherein he denies Conquest to confer a Sovereignty, and will not suffer God in the ordinary way of Providence to dispose of a people without their own consents. But enough of this; We come now to make Application of what hath been said to the Particular Monarchy of this Land.   

SECT. iv Of the Constitution of this Monarchy.  
BEfore we come to examine how this Author has stated ●he point of Resistance in relation to the several kinds of Monarchy, it will not be amiss to consider unto what kind this Monarchy belongs; whether it be such a Limited Mixed Monarchy, as this man would have it, Originally and Fundamentally, by the placing of Nobles and Commons, as sharers with the Monarch in the Sovereign power. It would be seem the skilful in the Law to speak to this point (if they could be induced to deliver what they know) but seeing there is enough in History and Reason, which speaks the Frame and beginning of this Monarchy otherwise, than this Author or others before him have sansyed: it will not be hard to say so much, as may (which was heretofore endeavoured in ●●y Reply) let Conscience see, it can have no plea for Resistance from the supposed grounds, upon which these men lay the platform of this Monarchy.  
I had twice occasion in my first Treatise to speak of the beginning of this Government, in the Arms of the Saxons and Normans, which was not (as this Author feigns, pag. 33. 34.) to prove our Kings Absolute; herein I challenge his ingenuity, if either I proposed this as a Conclusion to be proved, That our Kings are Absolute, or urged the entrance of the Saxons and Normans, as an argument to prove it by; but only all adged it twice by way of Answer to what was spoken by them, touching a right in the People by virtue of such a capitulating election at first, as they suppose to have given beginning to this Monarchy; in both which places I expressly intimated, those Conquests were not mentioned to win an Arbitrary power to the King, but only to exclude Resistance and such a supposed election.  
The beginning of this English Monarchy, and the root of succession of the Monarches we must fetch from the Saxons, and this Author bids us look so far back, when (to cut off the advantages that may be made against him from the Normans entrance) he tells us, pag. 35. that Duke William came upon the old limited Title, whereby the English Saxon Kings his Predecessors held this Kingdom.  
How the Saxons entered upon the Kingdom is well known: they made themselves masters of this Kingdom by Arms, which although it doth not infer our Kings are now Absolute, (an inference as fare from my intention as his) yet doth it plainly overthrow such an original Mixture in the sovereign power, as this Author has phansyed: and herein (because I have spoken to this point, as occasion required, in the third Sect. of my Reply to the Full Answerer (who had the like conceit of such an Original Mixture, though not so refined as this Author has given it us) I shall be the briefer in my Answer to this.  
First, This Author saith, It was not a Conquest that the Saxons made, but an expulsion, pag. 35. Ans. This is neither true nor greatly material. Not true, for it cannot be imagined but a great part of the Britons remained under the Saxon yoke; so M. Cambden tells us, they were the fewer that fled towards Wales, and defended themselves against the Saxons in the West: his words are, Victi omnes in gentem, leges, nomen, linguamque vincentium, praeter paucos, quos locorum asperitas in occidentali tractu tutata est, concesserunt. Camb, Britan. Saxon. Nor is it greatly material, for if we could imagine that the Britons were not brought under the yoke, but expelled, yet can we not imagine, that the Government of those Saxon Kings (being made such by the acclamation of their Soldiers, as when the Praetorian guard, or some Army abroad saluted a Roman Emperor) was at first any other, then is the government or command of Generals over their Soldiers, that is unlimited; much less so Limited and Mixed, as this Author phansyeth it, who looking upon the Model or Platform of this Monarchy, pag. 44. 45. doth admire their Wisdom (as more than humane) that had the contriving of it; but can any one suppose such a Platform laid, that considers the beginning of the Saxon Monarchy, or imagine such admirable Wisdom more than humane, in those rude and violent beginnings?  
But he tells us in the second place, the Saxons planting themselves here under their Commanders, no doubt continued the freedom they had in Germany, and so changed their soil not their government, pag. 35, but what proof to put this out of doubt? a conjecture out of Tacitus, that wrote of the Germans some hundreds of years before this entrance of the Saxons; Among the Germans saith he, Nec Regibus aut infinita aut libera potestas. True, but we may see by those Authors, that M. Cambden alleadges for the Original of these Saxons, that in probability these Suxons were not then among those people of Germany, that Tacitus speaks of, but did afterward break out of the Cimbrica chersonesus, into that part of Germany where now we find the Saxons, and into this Land; But why should we rest upon such dreams and uncertainties, as these men would put us upon? this is certain, that the Saxons being entered, and having vanquished the Britons did by degrees, as they could win upon the Britons, raise seven Kingdoms or Monarchies independent, yet so as that still one of them, the most powerful, was Monarch of All, or King of all England, as Mr Cambden and others show out of Bede, till at length the King of the West Saxons, Egbert, vanquished the rest, and settled the Succession of the sole Monarchy in his Line, and those that should come after him.  
Now would I fain know, how this Author, or any other of their best fancies can conceive, that such a Mixture, as joins Nobles and Commons in the Sovereign power with the Monarch (for so they would have it) can possibly consist with such a beginning of Government? was it in them all seven? or could it consist with that soleness or height of Monarchy which was still in one of them, and transferred from Kingdom to Kingdom, not by any fundamental constitution, but by power, and the personal Prowess of the Monarch? Or did Edgbert (that settled that condition of sole and chief Monarch upon his own successors by the subversion of the other Kingdoms) know any Subjects of His to be sharers with him in the Sovereign power?  
This Author indeed tries what his fancy can do, pag. 44. Where by six suppositions he endeavours to bring the Reader to an apprehension of the platform of this Monarchy; When you have made these suppositions (saith he) in your mind, you have the very Model and Platform of this Monarchy, Pag. 45. So the Reader must rest upon his suppositions against the Credit of all Histories and Chronicles; and those his suppositions begin thus pag. 44. Suppose a People (1.) Nobles and Commons set over themselves by public compact one Sovereign, & resign up themselves to Him and His heirs, to be governed by such and such fundamental Laws; then suppose them Covenanting with their Sovereign, that if cause be to constitute any other Laws, he shall not do it by His sole power, but they erserve at first, or afterwards it is granted them (which is all one) a hand of concurrence therein, that they will be bound by no Laws, but what they join with him in the making of. and so he goes on with six suppositions; but first he must have a strong fancy that can conceive (as I said) this consistent with the beginnings of the Saxon Government, as if it could be laid in such a platform. Secondly, in giving us the brief of this Platform he still tells us that by the Admirable wisdom of the Architects of this Government, the Nobles and Commons have their power and Authority, not depending on the Monarch, but radically their own, by fundamental Mixture, so pag. 41. and elsewhere: but in the six suppositions wherein he would lay this platform open to the view, he brings up the Houses to this power they have, by steps of time; and coming to make those suppositions, he speaks doubtingly of the Original contriving of this government, whether (saith he) done at once, or by degrees found out and perfected, pag. 44. but this contriving must be made at once and at first, when they chose the first King, or else they cannot have this power and Authority radically their own. And we cannot imagine but Bede, and other Historians, would have observed such convention of Nobles and Commons (as this Author supposed) for the contriving of this Government, in which they demeaned themselves with such admirable wisdom; or if they could not tell us of such a convention of them at first, for the contriveing and beginning of the Government, they could not but observe some meetings of them after, for the use of this power in the managing of the Government.  
Assemblies doubtless there were for representing of grievances to the Monarch, and for giving advice in the redress; and among the Orders, of which those Assemblies did anciently consist, there were Procuratores cleri, the representatives of the Clergy, (as I have heard good Lawyers affirm, and one of my former Answers had it in his Margin, though little to his advantage) but here we are called by this Author to believe or rather suppose an assembly consisting of Nobles and Commons, vested with part of the Sovereign power by orginal constitution; when as neither he nor any other Author could bring any one Record for it above the Norman Conquest; and those Histories or Chronicles, which mention the beginning of Parliaments as now they stand in Authority, do not rise so high as those times; Now seeing the Parliament itself, 24 H. 8. c, 12. doth declare, that this Realm of England has been ever accepted for an Empire, governed by one supreme Head etc. and tells us, that Histories and Chronicles show as much, why should these Chronicles be so many ages silent in the original Constitution, by which this author gives the two Houses their power from the beginning of this Monarchy, if either such a constitution ever was, or indeed could consist with this Empire, and this one supreme head?  
This Author tells us, pag. 36. that the Trial by twelve men and other fundamentals of Government, wherein the English freedom consists, were left untouched by the Conqueror. But why could not he tell us as well, that this power which he asscribes to the two Houses was left untouched? he would if he could have made it appear to have been before the Conquest; Mr. Cambden names the King before the Conquest, that first ordained the trial by twelve Men, but what Chronicle can do as much for the other? the like original to that of the trial by twelve men, had other Liberties of the Subject, to wit by after condescent of the Prince, and yet this Author calls that Trial a fundamental: and so it is, not of the Monarchy, but of the Subjects liberty, or, as he said, of the English freedom.  
We need not after all this (which has been spoken of the beginning of the English Saxon Government (into which this Author saith Duke William succeeded, and in the same right of those Saxon Kings) seek advantage from the entrance of that Norman Conqueror▪ Yet this we can say (and it appeare● out of several Authors cited by Mr. Cambd●n in his Britan. Norman) that the Conqueror invictoriae quasi Trophaeum, as a Trophy and memorial of his Conquest, disposed of the Lands of the Conquered, changed, their tenure, abrogated what English Laws and Customs he pleased, and gave them what Laws he thought good, and unto this the People were content to yield, which is more than can evidently be said by this Author for the stating of the Roman Emperors in a condition , as we shall see below upon the 13. to the Rom. as we can say this to the overthrow of their ground of resistance (that fundamental mixture or joining the Houses with the Monarch, as sharers, in the Sovereign power) so do we say, that what Limitations, Laws, Privileges, Customs, have been after procured by, or restored to the People, all those the King as He is sworn, so is He bound to observe, because of the Oath of God.  
So that this Author speaks but his own Phansyes, when he concludes thus upon William the Conqueror. By granting the former Laws and Government, he did equivalently put himself and his successors into the state of Legal Monarches, and in that Tenure have all the kings of this Land held the Grown unto this day, when these men would rake up and put a Title of Conquest upon them, which was never made use of by him who is the root of their succession, pag. 37. How fare Duke William made use of his Title by Conquest, & how he granted the former Laws and Government appears, by that which was spoken even now out of M. Cambden, that is, he made use of it so fare forth as he pleased, and granted what Laws he pleased of the former Government, and what new ones he pleased, those he imposed on the people; and unto this they agreed, willingly or unwillingly it matters not, as is sometimes granted by this Author. But by this he did equivalentlie put himself (saith he) and successors into the state of Legal Monarches: He did so in a good sense, but not as this Author means it; for we know (by that which was observed above Sect. 3 concerning a Monarch originally unlimited, but falling off into a more moderate and limited condition) that his meaning is, that Duke William by granting such Laws did put himself in such a Condition, as if at first he had been limited so by the people, they reserving to themselves power of resisting his exorbitancies, which should be destructive of those Limitations and Laws; this is a Legal Monarch in his sense: but we say he became a Legal Monarch, that is bound himself to rule according to such Laws as he had granted. Nor do we rake up a Title of Conquest for his Successors, or would have them any other then Legal Monarches; but by that (which has been shown, and cannot be denied) it appears, that the Root of Succession, whether English or Norman, sprang up by conquest, and that the Privileges and Powers, wherewith we see the Subject invested, were of an after spring, that is, of after agreement, or by condescent of the Monarch; which Powers & Privileges, grants, Liberties, though not original, yet are they irrevocable, the Prince is bound, as was said, to observe them because of the Oath of God. I will but add M. Cambdens' expression of the Monarchical power. The Kings of this Land have potestatem supremam & merum imperium, so he in his Britan. which as it excludes all Subjects from having share in the Sovereign power, for in that respect it is Merum imperium not mixtum; so doth it not exclude such limitations and mixtures as have been by after condescent, for the bounding of that Sovereign power in the exercise and use of it.  
But now this Author will endeavour, against the credit of History and Antiquiry, to reason us into a belief of such a frame as he has moulded this Monarchy in. First he would prove, That the Sovereignty of the King is radycally and fundamentally Limited, not only in the use and exercise of it, but in the power itself, pag 31 then, That the Authority of this Land is Mixed in the very root and constitution of it. pag. 39  
This were an argument fit for a skilful Lawyer to Labour in, yet so much in consequence I can at first sight perceive in his prooses, that I dare pronounce them insufficient to clear what he undertakes. His proo●es are either his own reasons, or drawn from the Kings own grants in his late expresses.  
His reasons for the Limited condition of our Kings, are from the denomination of Liege and Legal Sovereign, and from Proscription, which evinceth, that in all ages beyond record, the Laws & Customs of this Kingdom have been the rule of Government. pag. 32 Answ. This proves that our Kings are limited in the use or exercise of their power, and no more for neither that Denomination, nor any prescription can make us believe that the Limitations of their power had any other beginning, then from their voluntary and pious condescent to such or such moderations and alleys, which by constant usage and custom, or else by express Laws were made ever after inevitable and irrevocable by the Monarches themselves; the Oath also of succeeding Monarches, binding them to the observing of such Laws and Customs.  
His reasons jikewise for the mixed constitution of this Government do prove a mixture, but not such as he would have, nor from the beginning or first constitution of the Monarchy; they are these: 1 Because it is a Monarchy mixed with an Aristocracy in the Lords, and Democracy in the Commons, but the●e is no Mixture which is not in the root and supremacy of power, pag. 40. 2. Because it is a Monarchy where the Legislative power is in all three, and therefore mixed in the very root and essence of it, ibid. 3 Because it is a Monarchy in which three Estates are constituted to the end that the power of one should moderate and restrain from excess the power of the other, and therefore mixed in the root and essence of it, ibid. the same reasons he uses, Pag. 43. to prove the Authority of both Houses to be no derived authority, but equally original and fundamental with that of the King; and saith, he cannot devise, what can reasonably be said in opposition to these Grounds proving a fundamental mixture. Answ. And I must say, I cannot devise what should move a man of reason, (as this Author seems to be) so often to prosfesse as he doth, that he is convinced of such a fundamental constitution of this Monarchy; for I cannot be convinced but his grounds are false supposals.  
For first, it is not necessary, the mixture should be in the root or Supremacy of power: but it is sufficient, if there be a concurrence of Persons, whose consent is required to the exercise of that Supreme power, as was explained above, Sect. 3. when we spoke of mixture. Nay, if it must be in the Supremacy of power, as he will have it, how can he make the King the only Supreme, and that one Head, to which the whole Body politic is bound and united, as he grants, pag. 42.43. He cannot salve it with his Apex potestatis, which he there gives to the King, uniesle the King must be the Crown or top of the head only; for they also must be our Head and our Sovereigns, if they be mixed or joined with him in the Supremacy of power, as this Author would have it,  
Secondly, the phrase of Legislative power, ascribed to the two Houses is satisfied and explained by that concurrence and consent of theirs in and to the exercise of the Supreme power, as above; but I cannot be convinced, that it argues the power itself, which gives life to a Law, to be in them, but their assent to be requisite and necessary, so that without it no Law can be made; which is enough if men could be content. So when it is said, Be it enacted by the Authority of this Parliament: None denies, but to have such Vote or power of affenting is a great Authority, but not such as makes them sharers in the Supremacy of power, for than should they also be our Head and our Sovereigns, as was said above; before that phrase was used, we find it r●n thus, The King by the advice and assent of the Prelates, Earls, and Barons, and at the instance and request of the Commonalty has ordained. &c: which tells us plainly, where the fountain of the ordaining or Legislative power is; & how that power is excited or stirred up to Act, by the instance and request of the Commons representing to the King the grievances of his People; and that the efflux of that fountain, or the exercise of that power is not solely in his Will, that is, comes not to the Act of ordaining without the consent of Lords and Commons.  
Thirdly, to his third Reason I answer; The end of this mixture or concurrence is to restrain from excess; but the restraint is moral and legal, not forcible by power of Arms, Parliamentary by way of assent or descent to the ordaining power, not military by Armies in the Field; as will more clearly appear by the next Section concerning resistance in mixed Monarchies: Now such a moral restraint doth not argue the Monarchy mixed in the Root and first constitution, for the Houses may be vested with such a power afterward; but the Restraint that this Author intends is a forcible restraint by Arms, a mere fancy, for if the fundamental Constitution had intended them such a power, it would not have left a power in the Monarch to call them or dissolve them, which would make this pretended power of theirs altogether in effectual, but would have left them continually existing and in being.  
His proofs from the Kings own Grants for the Radical Limitation of this Monarchy are these, Pag. 31. His Majesty who best knows by his Counsel the nature of his own power, saith, That the Law is the measure of his power, and in his Answer concerning the Militia, says, If more power shall be thought fit to be granted them, then by Law is in the Crown, etc. whereby it is granted, The King has no more power than by Law is in him: so he. Also for such a mixed Condition of this Monarchy as these men would have, they usually urge what His Majesty has graciously said in His Answer to the 19 Propositions, That there is a power Legally placed in the two Houses, more than sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of Tyranny. To this purpose it is also, that some make advantage of the Kings speaking of Himself, as of one of the Three Estates.  
Answer  
1. It is well known, when the king was first forced to make his defence by writing, how few he had about Him, being driven from his learned Counsel, or they one way or other kept from Him. Yet trusting to the justness of his Cause, & integrity of his own intentions, He returned such Answers as did for the present much sattisfie all reasonable people, and will one day (what ever advantage is now picked out of them) be witnesses against those Troublers of our peace, that put him to his defence.  
II. It is very unjust, that the gracious Expressions, which his Majesty has had of his Intentions and desires to rule and Command no otherwise then according to law, should be set upon the Rack and drawn out to his disadvantage, for the gaining of such a power to the Houses, as the law speaks not to be in them. If Trajan, fully purposing to rule justly, doth out of such Confidence give a Perfect his Commission and power, delivering him a Sword with these words, Hoc prome utere sirecte impero, si male cotra me; If I Command aright, use this sword for me, if not against me. Shall it be concluded, that Officer might accordingly use his Sword against the Emperors? ' And if the King speak of himself as of One of the three Estates, shall any Subject diligently watch what falls from Him, and return him his words again to his own disadvantage, (as Ben. hadads' Messengers did 1. Kings, 20.33. Thy Brother Benhadad (your fellow State's Sr?  
III. That which can fairly be gathered out of these expressions as intended by his Majesty, doth not come up to these men's conclusions; the first and second speeches do show, how tender he is of doing any thing he may not do by law, acknowledging his power is bounded and limited by Law; but it doth not follow, that his power or Sovereignty, wherein it is not limited by law, is not absolute and full; for so it is clearly, wheresoever a Monarchy, at first unlimited, doth afterward receive Limits and Mixtures; of which Condition this Monarchy appears to be by that which has been spoken in this Section.  
So in his Answer to the 19 Prop. His Majesty acknowledges a power Legally in the Houses to restrain— which can not be extended beyond a Moral, Parliamentary restraint; otherwise let them produce any law that inables the Houses to restrain Tyranny by the Arms of the Kingdom; for as for their deductions from supposed Fundamentals, we can deny them, as fast as they bring them, either as failing in thire Antecedents and false suppositions, or as altogether inconsequent. Also when this author of the Treatise of Monarchy doth in regard of that power, which is placed in the two Houses to restrain the ex●●bitancies of the Monarch, so much admire the frame of this Government, as composed by more than Humane wisdom pag. 44. Does he fall into this admiration for the placing of a power of restraint by forceable resistance? nothing admirable in that, were that the frame of this Government. That which is commendable indeed and admirable in the Limitations and mixtures of this Government, is that Way of Legal, Moral, or Parliamentary prevention and Restraint, which is established by law fo● our security.  
Lastly when his Majesty hath spoken of himself, as of one of the three Estates, he has but spoken to them in their own phrase (for they first styled him so) and that usually in the point of his Negative Voice; for every Bill comes to him in the third or last place, the Lords spiritual and Temporal, who indeed are two of the three Estates, making a Concurrence in one Vote or Voice. But his Majesty did never use that phrase with any intent of diminution to his Supremacy or Headship; for properly the Prelates, Lords, and Commons, are the three Estates of this Kingdom, under his Majesty as their head.  
Thus if we will trust our own Eyes for what we read in History and Chronicle, or stand to Reason for the clear Inferences which may be drawn from the known laws of this Land, or use any ingenuity in the interpretation of His Majeslies Gracious Expressions, We can never be persuaded that the beginning of this Monarchy was such, as these men suppose, that is, so Limited and mixed radically and fundamentally, as these Authors and others have described it.   

SECT. V Of Resistance in relation to the several kinds of MONARCHY.  
WE are now to consider, how this Author states the point of forceable Resistance in these several kinds of Government, Which we shall find to be in away that lies very open to Rebellion.  
First, He grants the person of the Monarch in all those several kinds of Monarchy to be above the reach of all force or positive Resistance. This is true: but if this Author will allow as he doth, Subjects to raise Arms, and with them to give battle to those that are about the Person of the Monarch, as his Guard, how shall His Person be secured from the Force and violence of the meanest hand? Nay the joining of Battle with Him, as it is necessary consequence of Refistance by Arms, which must come to that, if it be pursued, so is it a direct Force intended and offered against His Person.  
Secondly, Concerning an Absuolte Monarch, he resolves it thus.  
If such a Monarch should so fare degenerate as apparently to seek the destruction of the whole Community subject to him, than might such a community constrained by the last necessity resist by force of Arms against any instruments employed to effect the same, pag 9 for such an intention cannot be the Act of a reasonable will, pag. 10. But first, if he means by the whole Community, the whole body over which the power is placed, as he speaks, pag. 10 I grant it the Act of a most unreasonable will, but cannot conceive, how such an intention should fall into the mind of the worst Tyrant, as to leave himself no people to reign over. Secondly, if he means by that community a certain sort of people, as were the jews in the Kingdoms of Ahasnerus, and the Templars in these Western Kingdoms; the destruction of such a people may be the Act of a reasonable will; Haman makes a fair pretence and reason for the extirpation of the jews, Est. 3.8. and Ahasuerus his decree was the act of a reasonable, though misguided will; but that such a Community, upon the knowledge of such an intention may take Arms, is not proved by this Author; for to prove it as he doth) by Davias' example, who was but a particular man, is to show that a Community may do it because David in his own particular might do it, and so to prove it by afferting a greater absurdity, viz. that a particular or private man may take Arms against an absolute Monarch. His other example he would prove it by, is the Revolt of the United Provinces from the King of Spain, who resolved to extirpate the whole people, pag. 10. But it is evident, the Spanish King intended the extirpation of the Protestants only; and as this Authoress told us here his opinion of the Revolt thereupon in the United Provinces, so I would desire him to deliver his opinion of the Revolt and Rebellion of the Papists in Ireland upon their certain knowledge that their extirpation was contrived here, this Author knows by whom; I plead not for them but could wish that the assertions and practice of These times did not give them too much advantage; I could tell him the opinion and Resolution of the jews under Ahasuerus, that they would not take Arms for their defence till it was permitted them by the King, ●st. 8.11. and the opinion of the Primitive Christians, that they allowed not resistance, although the destruction of their whole Community was evidently attempted. This may be objected against his Resolution of the point, to make it doubtful; I must needs say this Case of general destruction and Extirpation (which some call extreme Necessity) is a very hard case; and whether ●t will excuse a people, that in such necessity shall take Arms, I dispute not, nor is it needful I should: for it neither concerns the Cas●, as now it stands between our King and his Subjects, He inviting them by all fair offers to return from their obstinate disloyalty, promising assuring them the Preservation of Religion Laws, Liberties; and what not? Nor doth it concern the Question now in hand which supposes not Extirpation of a People as cause of their Arms, but only Exorbitancies of the Prince tending to a subversion of Religion and Liberties, which Exorbitancies, if they should be patiently born for the time that they shall cortinue, do not take away the being and subsistence of a people, as Extirpation doth; but only put them, for that time, under the inconveniences of arbitrary government; under which the people of God in the old Testament, and the Christians in the New, were left without remedy by forceable Resistance.  
Again, if any particular man's life be invaded without any plea or Reason for it, he thinks that such a one may use forceable Resistance against any Agents in such assault of murder, and that it is justified by the fact of David, and rescue of jonathan from the Causeless cruel intent of Saul, pag. 10. The Rule here seems to speak no more than a Personal defence against a Murdering assault, which was allowed above Sect. 2 provided that it be sudden without any foregoing reason or pretence of Authority, and also inevitable: but in the Examples he would infer more than he speaks in the Rule; for he supposes the people would have rescued lonathan by force, i● Saul had persisted in his intent, and upon that false supposal, insinuates thus much, that if particular men's lives be sought after, others may interpose with Arms for their defence; and the Learned Divines do expressly infer from it, that Countries may aslociate and bind themselves by oath not to suffer any of the impeached Members to be cut off: good doctrines these from Scripture, as we shall see when we come to that place. So in David's Example he would insinuate that if particular men's lives be sought after, they may raise and entertame Forces for their defence, as David did; but ●f this seem most absurd & dangerous (a● indeed it is) and if the Jsraelitish Kings were absolute (as this Author often grants) then must be acknowledge (what he accounts but one of my shifts, pag. 57) that David's example is not herein appliable, but in this way of defence, extraordinary. Of which more particularly below, when we come to places of Scripture, that concern David's behaviour towards Saul.  
Lastly, he tells us, (which he should have done in the first place) that Subjects of an absolute Monarch must without resistance submit their estates, liberties, and persons to his will, so it carry any plea or show of reason and equity, pag. 11. Ans. Here the way is open enough to Rebellion, for every man will be ready to think there is no reason or equity in the will of the Monarch, when he is oppressed by him; and if the plea or show of reason and equity must be the bar to Resistance, it will little avail him to answer below, that the Roman Emperors might not be resisted, because they were absolute, for never was there less plea of Reason and Equity in the will of any Tyrants, then in theirs. But he will close up the way by telling us, absolute Monarchy resolves all judgement into the will of the Monarch; so that if his will judicially censure it just it must be yielded to as just, so he, pag. 11. But did not Saul censure David is one affecting the Kingdom, and therefore worthy to die, which was the act of a Reasonable will, though following a 〈◊〉 ormed understanding; and did he not use a 〈…〉 ●●dicary process in the Cause of Ionath●n, sentencing him upon the trial of Lots, why then were these examples brought, th● Author in the former page for Resistance, if such a will o● th● Monarch must be yielded to? and why is there such a condition added in the Rule, so it carry any plea of reason and 〈…〉? this is fast and lose; he that would have erection for resistance is here left upon uncertainty.  
Let us proceed to Limited and mixed Monarchies. In such, he tells us, if the Exorbitancies of the Monarch be of less moment, and not striking at the very being of the Government, they ought to be borne by public patience, rather than to endanger the being of the State by a Contention between the head and the body. pag. 17. but if they be such as being suffered do dissolve the frame of Government, and cannot be redressed by petition, then is prevention to be sought by resistance, pag. 18. and 29. Here I must first challenge the Ingeinuity of this Author, who citing my words pag. 49. taken out of my first Sect: (We may and aught to deny obedience to such commands of the Prince as are unlawful by the Law of God, yea by the established Laws of the Land) could give this censure upon them, here he says more than we say, yea, more than should be said; it is not universally true that we ought: considering, that the case was there put concerning exorbitancies, not of less moment, ●ut tending to the subversion of Religion, Laws, Liberties, ●nd the question upon it was, whether upon such a case might we resist, and the explication of the word Resist was into a denying of Active obedience, and an using of forceable resistance. Now my saying was, that to such commands of the Prince we ought to deny obedience, but not use forceable resistance; they say (as he doth here) we ought also forceably to resist; and yet I say more than they say. Secondly, we would know who shall be Judge of the subversive Exorb●tances of the Monarch. He grants there can be no Authoritative Judge to determine it, for that would overthrow the Monarchy, pag. 17. This is ingenuous, and doth indeed sufficiently overthrow the conceit of the Full Answerer, placing the final Resolution and Judgement of this State in the two Houses. But what then must be done? In a limited Monarchy, he tells us, the Fundamental Laws must judge & pronounce sentence in every man's Conscience, for in such a case as transcends the provision of the government, people are unbound and in state, as if they had no government, and the superior Law of Reason and Conscience must be Judge; so he, pag. 18. This is a ready way to Anarchy and confusion: The people by this have liberty enough to conceive of their fundamental Rights as they please, and of the Exorbitancies of their Prince, as may be most for their advantage, especially being upon such a case (which themselves may make) unbound and at liberty, as if they had no government. But these are fitting grounds for Resistance.  
Likewise, in mixed Monarchies, he tells us, the accusing and wronged side must make it evident to every man's Conscience; also the appeal must be to the Community, as if there were no government, and then as every man is convinced in Conscience, he is bound to give assistance, so, pag. 29. Here is good stuff; not altogether so bad indeed as we see in the practice of these times, for here is no forcing of men to a Covenant, no forceable taking of their estates away, but a leaving of them to their Consciences: yet is this bad enough; for he supposes it as a thing possible, that two. Estates may make a confederacy against the third, pag. 28. therefore so oft as they shall combine and declare against the Monarch, the people are at liberty, as if there were no government, and then it seems they have all the power again in themselves, which they had at first according to these men's principles. Also in this controversy, saith he, the appeal is to be made to the Community (i) the people; which though we have seen practised at this day in many Remonstrances, yet I think it was never given as a Rule before, it being in itself most unreasonable and disadvantageous to the Monarch, for the people will be more ready to believe their Representatives; and in the consequence most dangerous the high way to confusion, as will more sully appear when we come to Reasons against this Resistance.  
Lastly, we would know, what power there is in the community to make resistance. He tells us, if the Monarch invade the power of the other Estates, or run a course tending to the dissolution of the constituted frame of Government, they ought to employ their power to preserve the State from ruin; for that is the end why they have the power of restraint, and of providing for the public safety, so pag. 28. but what power ought they to employ? any other than they are expressly invested with by Law? which is a Parliamentary, not Military power, a Legal restraining power, not a forceable constraint by Arms.  
Yea bu●, saith he, it is not only Lawful for the other Estates to deny obedience to illegal proceed of the Monarch, as private men may, but it is their duty, and they are bound to prvent dissolution of the established frame, pag. 28. He doth not say to prevent it by Arms, but he means so by opposing their duty of prevention, to the duty of private men in den●all of obedience. But we must consider that the duty of pri●●e men is concerned when the Laws come to execution, the ducy of the public States is seen, when the making or abolishing of Laws is ta●en in hand; also we must consider that it is not the abuse of power in the execution of Law that dissolves the established frame, but the abolishing of old and making of new Laws; whereupon we say, that the persons that make up those states taken out of their Assembly or Parliament, are but private men, and then have no more power to withstand the illegal proceed of the Monarch, then as private men by denial of active obedience; in their Assembly or Parliament, they have power of restraint by denial or consenting, to prevent dissolution of the frame of Government, & indeed if they use that Legal restraining power, as they are bound in duty to do, the Monarch cannot alter the established frame; he may perchance make some actual invasions upon their Rights and Liberties (as they may often upon his Right and Prerogative) and run a course in itself tending to subversion, but altar the frame or change the Laws without their consent he cannot; and whether it be not better that such arbitrary illegal Acts of a Monarch (which are transient and six not new frame of Government) should not for some time be borne with, then to seek remedy against them, by a Civil war or contention of the body against the head, will appear more fully when we come to Reasons against such Resistance.  
I will conclude the examination of this part of his discourse, with the proof of this assertion; that Limitations and mixtures in Monarchy, do not imply a forceable constraining power in Subjects (as he supposeth) for the preventing of the dissolution of the established Government, but only a Legal restraining power, as was even now insinuated: First such a power must be in them by reservation, and then it must be express in the constitution of the Government, and in the Covenant twixt the Monarch and the People. But then, I must say, I cannot believe but such a condition is unlawful and unreasonable, against the order of Government, which will have the sovereign power secured, unprofitable for King and People, a seminary of jealousies and Seditions; we need not spend time about this, for it is confessed that in the constitution of this our government (to which all the contention relates) there is no Reservation or Law expressly enableing Subjects with such power of Arms. This Author acknowledges, pag. 63. that when the Houses by an Ordinance assume the Arms, wherewith the King is entrusted, and do perform the King's trust, such Ordinance is not formally Legal (●.) there is no express constitution for it: yet is it Eminently Legal, justified by the intent of the Architects of this Government, when for these uses they committed the Arms to the King; so he.  
Secondly, therefore let us see, whether it follows by implication upon the Limiting and Mixing of Monarchy. It is agreed, that an Absolute Monarch is free from all forceable constraint by Arms, and so fare forth as he is absolute, from all ●egall restraint of positive constitutions; now in Limitations and mixture there is only sought a Legal restraint upon the power of the Monarch; if any more were sought or employed, it must follow, either from the Nature of Limitation, or from the danger and inconveniencies of exorbitancy of the Limited Monarch, o● from the consent and intention of the People choosing the Mon●arch.  
But first, Limitation cannot infer it, for an absolute Monarch is limited also, not by civil compact indeed, but by the Law of God, of Nature and Nations, which he cannot justly transgress; if therefore an absolute Monarch, being exorbitant beyond his bounds, which the highest Laws have set him, may not be resisted, how shall we think a limited Monarch may, for transgressing the bounds set him by civ●ll agreement?  
Secondly, the inconveniencies of exorbitancy in Limited and mixed Monarchy cannot infer a power of resistance by Arms, because the inconveniencies and evils (which are pretended as causes of resistance in such Monarchies) are the same in Absolute; for Limitations and Mixtures, are but ●arres and s●●●itie, against injustice, cruelty and oppression, which are exorbitances also in absolute Monarchies, and evils that bring as much detriment and suffering to the Subject, as they do in Limited Monarchies; as for example, The imposing of Taxes, if it be done when necessity requires not, or 〈◊〉 very unequally in regard of Persons and estates, it is an injury and grievance even in an Absolute Monarchy; only when necessity calls for such Levies of Money, the Monarch (that is of a Limited and Mixed condition) is bound to take in the consent of others, to which the Absolute Monarch is nor bound. So in Trials for Life and Estate, an unjust sentence is an oppression in Absolute as well as Limited Monarchy, only the limited or Mixed Monarch is bond to pass sentence upon the verdict of twelve men, or the like, the Absolute is not. Suppose then a Prince in such a Limited or Mixed Monarchy should, when necessity doth truly require, impose taxes, lay them equally, expend them faithfully; and in trials for Life or Estate, should give right judgement without the verdictof twelve men, and in other points should rule most justly, though not according to form, unto which he is limited by positive Law; here would be the main Rule of Government observed, justice, and the end of Government (for which those limits and Civil bounds were set him) obtained, peace and welfare of the People; Will you then have such a Prince resisted by Arms, and the Kigndome embroiled in Civil War, because he observed not the form, when he gives you the substance? Yea but this would be an ill procedent and very dangerous; true, there is danger, but no present evil; and what are the dangers or evilly feared? Cruelty, Oppression, which other Princes might use, should they have such liberty; true, but these evils, when they are are evils in Absolute Monarchies, and for them residence is not to be used there.  
Thirdly, the consent and intention of the people choosing the Monarch cannot infer: that a Limited Monarch may be resisted by Arms. This consent and intention of the People is made by these men, not only the Ordinary mean of conferring the Power, but the very Measure of the Power it ●elfe, and the Bar or inlet of resistance; for by that consent is supposed, the people give what power they please, and reserve what they will. To which I say. 1. That the consent of the people, may be the mean of designing the person, and of yielding subjection to him, who else could not challenge it, more than another man; also a mean of limiting that power in the exercise of it, according to agreement or procurement: but it is not the measure of the power itself, which in such a measure is given of God to all Sovereigns, and is not according to the people's will resistible or irresistible but according to the will of God above resistance; overseeing that people have not of themselves, out of government, the main power, the power of life and death, how can they give it either for government, or reserve it for resistance?  
Secondly, That the intention of the People, in procuring Limitations of the Monarch's power, is, that they may be under a moderate use of the power; and what's their security for that? those limitations which the Monarch agrees upon Oath to observe; now this cannot infere resistance here, more than in absolute Monarchies: for when a people leaves a Monarch Absolute trusting to his prudence and moderation, they do not intent he should oppress them; yet is it granted, such intention cannot enable them to resist, in case he do oppress them. Now in agreeing for Limitations and set rules of Government, they gain a farther security of such moderate use of the power according to those limitations; for the observing of which, they have a tye upon their Monarch, not from a power of forceable resistance in themselves to constrain him by Arms if he exorbitate, but from His Oath or Covenant, and God's vengeance thereupon, if he falsify it.  
Thirdly, If the Architects (as this Author speaks) of a limited or mixed Monarchy, that is, the people setting up such a Monarch over them, did intent, that the states joined with the Monarch should assume the Arms of the Kingdom to restrain his Exorbitancies, surely they would not have left it in his power to dissolve them, and so make all such power ineffectual. It appears therefore, that by such mixtures and limitations no more can be inferred, than a Legal or moral restraint upon the power of the Monarch. And all this, that hath been spoken against the power of Resistance or assuming the Arms of the Kingdom, inferred from the Limited condition of the Monarch, as it is good and conclusive in Monarchies originally limited, so is it much more in Monarchies, that have afterward received those Limitations and Mixtures, upon which this power of resistance and assuming the Arms of the Kingdom is inferred; as it appears this Monarchy has done. And therefore I conclude here, as I did premise in the second Section, Where the Prince stands supreme, und next to God, above all the People, there Subjects may not by force of arms resist, notwithstanding he be exorbitant in the exercise and use of his Power to the invasion of such Rights and Privileges, as they enjoy by first compact or after procurement. And this being cleared already from those shadows of reasons (which could be pretended against it from the several kinds of Monarchy) will farther appear by that, which shall be said out of Scripture and Reason.   

SECT. VI A Refutation of His Answer, that first styled himself the Author of the Fuller Answer.  
ALthough the substance of his discourse is already answered, by that which hath been said concerning Mixture and Supremacy, against the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, yet because he is extremely confident, and many times unfaithful in his replies, I will briefly touch upon such passages, as may seem most material, or any way available to abuse the unwary Reader.  
It is his manner to gain seeming advantages upon his Adversary by his own wilful mistake; as in his Answer to the Preface; that which was spoken of some particular Members, the Con●aivers of this Revolt and Rebellion, is by him taken, and given out again to the Reader, as spoken of all the Members of the Houses, that have by the cunning of those Few been drawn to Vote any thing in order to this Rebellion. Also, what was spoken of private houses, where those few Contrivers held their close meetings (that it was Gods great forbearance, those houses did not break down, where the Consultations have been oft held for the direction of these ways) he renders as spoken of the Houses, where the Parliament sits & Consults. But let them all, that have been Leaders or followers in these perverse ways, look to it, and consider, how much they are concerned in that place of Esay, to which the allusion there was made; for every one that looks nearly upon it, (Esa. 30. vers. 10, 11, 12, 13.) will easily see, (what ever application this Author makes of it) who they are, that have silenced their Orthodox, and not long ago admired Teachers, suffering none to speak right things, but smooth; such new unheard off doctrines as please them; who they are that do trust in oppression and perverseness, and do stay thereon having no other way to uphold this Rebellion, but by perverse obstinacy, and horrible injustice exercised upon such, as have not yet cast off all Conscience of just and right, or caused the fear of the Holy one of Israel to cease from before them.  
I would advise this Answere● to look upon two places more of Esay, cap. ●4. v. 4. where they that have been oppressed, shall say of Babylon, how hath the Golden City ceased? and v. 10. art thou become weak as we, art thou he●●●● like unto us? and cap. 23. v. 8. where he may find 〈◊〉 threatened against Tyre, the Crowning City, whose Merchants are Princes, and then I would desire him to consider, whether he 〈◊〉 not cause to reflect upon that Golden, Crowning City, wherein he lives.  
In his second Section also, he would seem to gain advantages upon his Adversary, by fastening upon him several Contradictions or pieces of nonsense, as he calls them; but they are indeed so many wilful or gross mistakes of his own. The first he thus delivers, as in my word, It's better to be under the Arbitrary Government of One, that challenges not obedience but according to Law: so he repeats them and then descants, Arbitrary government, and yet according to Law. But the words run thus in my Reply; Every man will think it more reasonable to be under the Arbitrary government of One then of many: nay, under the government of One, that challenges not obedience as due, but according to Law, then of Many whose commands are Law unto us, as this Answerer makes them. In which the Comparison, as any man may see, is double, first between the Arbitrary government of One, and of many; then a fortiori, between the Legal government of One, and arbitrary Commands of Many.  
The second Contradiction he thus expresses. The Dr undertakes to satisfy Conscience, that the Parliament hath not this power, and yet saith, he does not undertake to set down, what power the Parliament hath. 'Tis true the Dr did undertake the first, and might do it without undertaking to set down the extent of the power and privileges of the Houses; though e were the words, and where is the Contradiction? This Answerer may undertake to show, the King has not such or such a power (as to make Laws himself, or the like) yet will not I hope, undertake to set down the extent of the King's power and Prerogative; it was the very Instance there used, and the Reddition of it was, so may we without offence conclude of the two Houses, that they have not such a power by the first constitation of this Government, etc. A particular Negative may be cleared by him, that cannot show the extent of the Universal Affirmative.  
A third Contradiction or Nonsense he has found in these words. This Coordination is but to some Act or exercise of the supreme Power, not in the power itself. I acknowledge the words, and do thank him, that he took notice of them for their sakes, who have mistaken that part of my Reply, as if I granted a Coordination of Subjects with His Majesty in the supreme power but then I must blame his ignorance. that cannot recontile this (as he speaks) to any truce of Sense; for they that have written of Government and Policy, could have told him, that the concurrence and consent of such or such persons, required to some Acts of the supreme power, doth not always argue a communication of the Power; and the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy doth every where teach him to make a wide difference between the Power and the Exercise of it. Out of this mistake and ignorance of distinguishing between the Power itself and the Exercise of the Power, he runs away with it as a thing granted, that the Houses are coordinate with His Majesty in the very Supremacy of Power, so fare as the Legislative and ordaining goes, which is the principal, and that it remains for him only to prove, they are coord●● with His Majesty in the other Act of power, as 〈◊〉 Em●assyes, appointing Officers, judges, etc. which h● undertakes in his fourth Section, where we shall m●● wi●● him. It was the work of my third Section to speak of the beginnings of Government in this Land, and to show they were inconsistent with his Conceit of the making of the first King, and the first Coalition of Government, as he called it. To which after some trifling, he replies in his third Section, pag. 17. If the Dr thinks the uncertainties of the British or Saxon Constitutions not fit to satisfy Conscience (as he speaks) how being uncertain, can he satisfy Conscience (which is the title of his book) that those Constitutions were not such? so he. Answ. 1. If those Constitutions be uncertain, it satisfyes Conscience that it can have no warrant from them, which was the task of that book. 2, The uncertainties, which I said he run Conscience upon, were in seeking the first King before the Saxons, for if we go no higher for the beginning of this English government (as indeed we should not) we have certainly enough to satisfy Conscience, that this Government was not such in the first constitution, as this Answerer would make us believe.  
But see him coming a peg lower in the very next words. 'Tis enough that the Constitution of our present Government was such, at least from the beginning of its being such; that by the same consent of the people, whereby the first such King was made, His Majesty, that now is, becomes such a King, that the same reason of state, which first contrived the Government (however sooner or letter) such as now it is, remains still specifically the same in that, which the law places it in, the Council of the Land to actuate and apply it. Answer, Nothing can be truer, then that the government was such from the time, that it began to be such, but he bore us in hand before, that it was such from the very first beginning of the Monarchy. & so he ought to prove it to be; for else it must become such by the consent of the King in being, condescending from unlimited condition to a more moderate way of Government by several fixed laws; as was showed above, when we spoke of Limitations and Mixtures, Sect. 3. but can we think that while there was a King in being, the Council of the Land had power to contrive and dispose of the frame of this Government, and that in a way soprejudiciall to the King, as this Answerer would make it?  
But he goes on. The truth is, the Doctor deals with us herein at Papists usually do with Protestants, if they cannot name the particular Reign and year when such a Doctrine took its first rise, however palpable it now be, we must believe there was no change at all: so if it be not assigned when such or such a part of the Governments Constitution began, however evident it be that it must have a beginning, because a being, we must confess it to have no beginning at all. No Sir, the Doctor deals with you as Protestants do with Papists upon that point; for as they show the Doctrine of the Romish Church was not from the beginning, and because the year and age when every error crept in cannot be named, do thereupon conclude certainly, That those errors came not in at once but by degrees: so we require not the particular Reign and year when each constitution came in, but do show that the Government was not such from the beginning, and because the time cannot be shown, when the Limitations and Constitutions came in, that made it such, we thereupon conclude, the Government did not become such at once, but by degrees, and by the after Condescend of Pious Princes. To that which was alleged out of the Preamble of a Statute, 24 H. 8. c. 12. His poor shifts are, 1. That it is a piece of a preamble, not part of the Statute. Answer. What then? it speaks never a whit the less truth, nor has it the less authority, but (which is more) speaks an anciently supposed truth always Confessed, and evident in Chronicles and Histories, that this is an Empire, Governed by one Supreme Head, etc.  
II. That the Title speaks it an Act against appeals to Rome. Answer. It matters not what the occasion was, we 〈◊〉 what it positively speaks touching the King's Supremacy and Headship. So they miserably shift off the obligation, which the Oath of Supremacy has cast upon them, as if the King's Supremacy were asserted in it, in opposition to the Bishop of Rome, not in relation to the whole body politic; that if they deny the Pope's Supremacy, they think they satisfy the Oath, what Subjects soever they join with His Majesty in the very Supremacy itself.  
So in the third place he saith; that those words in the Statute: To whom a body politic compact of all sorts and degrees of people, of the Spiritualty and Temporalty are bounden, &c. cannot properly be meant of the Parliament, but of the Kingdom at large. Answer, If of the Kingdom at large, then is it true also of their Representatives, if of the Kingdom in its defusive body, then of its Collective. But I turn him over to the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, who sufficiently Confutes this idle assertion, and doth show the Lords and Commons in their houses conjunctim are subjects, and the King their Head. And this is enough for his third Section.  
In his fourth Section, he endeavours to prove, the Houses are Coordinate with His Majesty in all other Acts of Supreme power, as the Calling of Assemblies, holding Treaties, sending Embassies, appointing Judges, etc. His proof is first by reason, because they are Coordinate with him in the Supreme power of making laws, which is the principal, and higher Cause to the Calling of Assemblies, Treaties, etc. Answer, This he takes for granted, that they are Coordinate with His Majesty in the Supreme power of Ordaining, or making laws, which doth proceed (as I noted above upon his second Section) from his mistake or ignorance in not distinguishing the Exercise of the power, and the Power itself, for they may concur to that, and yet not have share in this.  
Secondly, He would prove it by Records, from pag. 22. to 27. Answ. 1. In these we must trust his honesty, which we find not very faithful in repeating the words of the book he undertakes to confute. 2. Were they truly alleged, they yield but an Argument a facto ad Ius, Parliaments have done this or that, therefore they have right to do so; it will be a bad argument in the next age to conclude any thing right and just, because it was so ordained by the Houses of this last Parliament.  
III. Though some particulars cited by Him, might of right belong to them, yet how doth it prove, it was so originally and fundamentally, and not by after condescent of the Prince, as we find many immunities, rights, and liberties of the Subject to be? But for these Records he is beholden to Mr Pryn's collections, who is said to be the Author of that book, which bears this title, The Sovereign power of Parliaments, or the treachery and disloyalty of Papists to their Sovereign; To their Sovereign? that is, to the two Houses, by the former part of the title— let him take heed, he proves them not good Subjects. But what shall we make of it? 'tis certain, he fetches his testimonies from times of Popery, showing what power Parliaments than have assumed and used against the Sovereign, if he will give us leave to style the King so; but how he should thereby show the disloyalty of Papists, and yet prove the Soveraign● power of Popish Parliaments, I cannot see, nor is it greatly material; for let all his instances be true, and his Records faithfully alleged, yet will the argument be inconsequent, that from them shall conclude the Sovereign power of Parliaments.  
After his Records, this Answerer enters a discourse of his own, touching the Mixture of this Government. That which concerns me in it, is pag. 28. The Dr in his former Treatise speaks of the excellent temper of the three Estates, and in his Reply acknowledges them as Fundamentals of Government; and if fundamentals, how not all alike principal, and supreme, he has not showed in his Reply though provoked thereto; so he. Answ. 2. The Dr did not any where call them Fundamentals of Government, but acknowledged the constitution was fundamental, that provided that Temper, and placed in the Houses that power which they have; this his mistake I told him of in my Reply, pag. 16. and shown him the absurdity it leads him into, by Concluding thence, that the Houses are alike Principal or Supreme with His Majesty; an excellent argument to provoke an Adversary upon; but this Answerer seems to have made his Reply to one Section, before he had read the next, and when he was come to that, to forget what he had read or writ before.  
In like manner he tells us presently after, that he had proved, that the Final Declaration and Resolution must remain beyond all further debate in the Council of the Kingdom, which by its number, trust, interest, is only fit to manage it: to all which the Dr hath not vouchsafed to say any thing, but that it wholly places the Supremacy in the two Houses, so he, pag. 31. Answ. If nothing else had been said, it had been enough, and so the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, doth sufficiently show, that to place such a final Resolution and declarative Judgement in the two Houses, doth make them supreme, and this no Monarchy; but there was more said, even the better part of three Sections was spent against that final declarative judgement and Supply, which he places in the two Houses, & against his persuasions from their Interests, Number, Trust; showing, how possible it is for them to lessen their number, to neglect their trust, to make the private Interest devour the public; I need say no more, these times speak sufficiently— But it seems this Answerer (as I said above) wrote down this, before he had throughly read those Sections, and when he came to them, either had forgot, that he had said, the Dr. vouchsafed to say nothing to his particulars; or else purposed to make it seem so, by answering nothing himself to that which the Dr. had said, touching that final declarative Judgement and supply, which he places in the Houses.  
But for this mixture of three Estates in the Supremacy of power, he has found a new Argument in the Kings Answer to the 19 Propositions; wherein His Majesty grants, That the Lords being trusted with a judicatory Power are an Excellent Screen betwixt Prince and people— and that the power legally placed in the two Houses, is more then enough to restrain Tyranny. Upon this he makes a long descant, and propounds six Quere's. I will for brevity's sake, without any wrong to Him that proposes them, reduce them to these two. 1. for the judicatory power; How can such be in the Houses, and yet not the declarative power of Law? For this, as before, I must turn him over to the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, who will ask him, how can such a final declarative power be in the Houses, and yet this be a Monarchy and the King Supreme? and I must farther ask him, why doth he not place the final Judgement only in the Lord's house, seeing that Judicatory power is only in that, & not in the House of Commons. 2. For the power of Arms; If the Houses have not such a power, how have they a power more than sufficient to restrain Tyranny? let the Dr. fairly resolve the Answerer in these plain inferences out of His Majesty's words, & erit mihi magnus Apollo, so he.  
Answ. I must first tell him, Apollo was more honoured for his Art, then for his bow, for his Rules of healing, then force of wounding; so the moral restraints of Rules, & limiting Laws, and the obligation of an Oath, are more reasonable and powerful for keeping the will of the Monarch within bounds, than the forcible constraint of Subject's Arms. But this Answerer thinks there can be no sufficient security for the people against the Tyranny of their Prince, unless they have him fast bound; is the tye of established Law nothing? the band of a Sacred oath nothing to restrain him, unless his Subjects have the mastering power? God himself thought less means of restraint sufficient for such security, as he was content his people should have under the Iraelitish and Roman Government; why should not greater be held sufficient for people under a Christian Monarch?  
Again, when it was proved, that the Members of the Houses were Subjects conjunctim, from their own addresses to His Majesty, wherein they style themselves his Loyal Subjects: this Answerer replies unto it, pag. 39 How weak is an argument from forms of addresses in words against a real Right? what Right? to the Supremacy? how real that is, appears by all that has been said: but we may here return him his own Answer, to his inference from His Majesty's words, how weak is the argument from forms of words against a real right! against His known Supremacy and Headship? Nay, how unequal is it to take such large and gracious Expressions, issuing from the conscience of his own intentions and desires altogether averse from tyranny, and stretch them on the rack of finister Construction, to make them speak to his disadvantage? for indeed no other power is granted to be in the Houses to restrain Tyranny then a Legal, Moral, Parliamentary power, not forceable and military. See above towards the end of the fourth Section, where these and other. Expressions of His Majesty were objected and vindicated.  
Now to his fifth Section: It was his Rule, Coordinates' do supply one the others failings; and thereupon he inferred, If the King refuse, the Lords and Commons may supply. This was retorted upon him in my Reply: If the Commons stand out and refuse, then may the King and Lords by his rule of Coordination, supply, and command all. He answers, No question they may supply, as fare as their representation and trust reaches, that is for themselves, not for the Commons of England whom they do not represent. Answ. Doth this man know or heed what he saith? doth not he make the safety of the Kingdom the Cause and end of such supply, when one of the Coordinates' stand out? and now he tells us the King and Lords may supply for themselves (i. e.) they may save themselves, if they can, but they have nothing to do with the Commons, whom they do not represent: but can the safety of the Kingdom be provided for by this supply, unless they also be commanded by the Coordinate parts, which are to make the supply? and will he upon better thought's deny, that in order to that end (the safety of the Kingdom) the King and Lords also are entrusted for the whole people of England?  
Again, this supply cannot be effectual without a judicatory power, but that power we find only in the Lords, not Commons house, as he himself cited it above out of the King's words; well then, must they exercise this Judicatory power upon themselves only, and not upon those that the Commons represent? or can the Commons by themselves supply? that's against his own rule of Coordination: but if he will forget that, us he does, yet will he not think, they can make the supply without a Judicatory power. I will add to this, what he has at the very end of this Sect. where we find him as considerate as before: In order to his former rule, Coordinates' supply one another's failings, he had said in his first Treatise, that he wonalted, we cannot see the King is Vniversis minor, when as we may easily reckon, that of three, one is less than all three. Upon this I called him again to his reckoning, telling him that, if the King and Lords concur and the Commons refuse, it is easy to reckon that of three one is less than two, repeating his words so, not for any advantage, but merely to make him speak sense; he because he cannot answer the retortion, complains of wilful and gross mistake of his words, which were, saith he, that of three one is less than all three (i. e.) a part then the whole. But is that your meaning of Rex est Vniversis minor (i. e.) the King alone is less than the King, Lords and Commons together? who cannot see that the Comparison is between the King and the other two? and that in your rule of three Coordinates', if one refuse, there remains but two to make the supply; and that thereupon you should have said (if you would speak sense) that of three one is less than two? I have heard Children, when their disorderly Babies have been taken from them and presently returned them again in frame and order, complaining, because they received them not, as they parted with them; so doth this Answerer of the putting his words into sense.  
Let us now see, how in the same Section he answers for the King's danger at Keinton Battle. A● in the making of Laws (saith he) the King presence or absence altars not the case, so in the executing of the Laws against Delinquents, the King's presence can no more hinder then his command.— Answ. His presence or absence does not indeed in the making Laws, but his Consent is all, which he may give either present or absent, but will you for the Executing of the Laws take arms without his consent, and use them too against him personally present? or will you say, that your giving him battle at Keinton, was an executing of the Laws against Delinquents? produce your Law that enables you to such a proceeding against your pretended delinquents. Nor were the hands of the Parliaments Army lifted up against the King more than david's (whom the Doctor citys) who resisted his and the king's enemies, though about the king's person. ibid. Ans. It doth not appear where David did make that resistance; but it is the unhappiness of these men to ground all their resistance upon false suppositions; first they suppose David would have done it, than they positively set down, that he did it, thence they conclude they may do it, and accordingly have done it, and much more.  
The rest of this Section he thought good (neglecting what was rational in mine) to spend in naming Delinquents in Yorkshire, for whose apprehension and the bringing of them to Justice, the Parliament took Arms. Answ. All those examples of Delinquents followed their putting of armed men into Hull, their seizing the Magazine there, their denying the King entrance, their denying eo bring Sir john Hotham to Justice; and in these, if any Delinquents were detained and protected from their justice, as he complains, he may read the carse of it: But these are matters of Fact, we are now upon the point of Reason.  
In his sixth Section, he altogether neglects the cases, which were put him, upon his placing the final resolution of this State's judgement in the two Houses, and only fastens upon that, which was spoken occasionally concerning Conquest. First, for his Answer touching the Ammonites subdued by David, That Abraham's posterity was entitled to their Land by God, Gen. 13.14. I would desire him to look into, Deut. 34.4. (where the Lord gives Moses a sight of that promised Land, saying. This is the Land which I swore to Abraham, &c) and to examine, whether he can find the Land of the Ammonites in that prospect. And surely if the Ammonites had been of the Inhabitants of that Land, David would not have held league and friendship with them, as we see he does, 2 Sam. 10.  
Next for David's subduing of Edom, he answers, The Doctor himself confesseth they revolted from Judah. What then? had they been before under judah, and upon their Revolt subdued by David, than indeed it had been not a Conquest but a Reduction; but the Doctor confesses they revolted from jehoram Ring of Judah, 2 Chro. 21. therefore they were justly subdued or reduced (that must be his inference) by David, 1 Chron. 18. doth he know what he saith? But God had given Israel (saith he) a special promise for it too, over Edom will I cast my shoe. Psal. 60.8. Answ. This Psalm was made upon that very expedition in which Edom was subdued, as appears by the title of it; and were those words spoken by the Spirit of Prophecy, yet do they not make a grant, but only speak the success of that enterprise, which then was undertaken.  
Nor had the Romans any right over judaea by Conquest, saith he, but by consent of the People Conquered; without which consent all his Momenta temporum, (he speaks of) to make a right or title, are like those Moment's of the Papists Antiquity to make a Truth. Ans. We find the jews confederate with the Romans 1. Mac. 8. and not long after, their Subjects, brought under by Pompey: we cannot think they changed their condition willingly, but that their consent was forced by the Conqueror; Conquest then will easily command that, which will give it Title in these men's opinion: And though no antiquity can make falsehood Truth, yet are there Momenta temporum, when providence (which translates Kingdoms and can give Title to the Conqueror) doth discover itself; and then the Conquered People ought to consent to, and receive the Government which the Conqueror settles among them; ●●e above at the end of the third Sect. where the Title of Conquest is examined.  
There is nothing in his seventh Sect. worthy of the Readers patience in hearing it refuted; only he makes show of some Statutes, which truly I could not find, nor was there cause why I should bestow much time in seeking them, for a little Logic will serve to discern, that the words, he citys out of them, will not infer any conclusions prejudicial to his adversary.  
His last and eight Section concerns Scripture; he mutters some thing in it, concerning David's fight against Saul, and the absoluteness of the jewish Kings; which shall be distinctly and largely considered in my next Section. And for the new Testament, he turns his Reader over to the interpretation which the Reverend and learned Divines having given on the 13th to the Romans, and which he so fare magnifies, that he beelieves the Doctor will not reply in haste; so he concludes his book, and he shall see he had cause so to believe, when we come to the consideration of that place.   

SECT. VII. Places of Scripture out of the Old Testament.  
NOw we come to the examination of what is alleged out of Scripture in this cause, whereby it will appear, that there can be no warrant derived thence for resistance, but that the Kings, we read of there, were such as might not be resisted, and that God's people were always under such. We begin with the Old Testament, and will be very brief, propounding only what is Material.  
This has been heretofore clearly proved by these two Arguments especially: 1. Because the Institution of the Israelitish kingdom was such, as doth plainly exclude resistance. 2. Because so many Prophets, bitterly reproving those wicked Kings for sub●cision of Religion and Justice, did never call upon the Elders of the people for this duty of resistance. I shall open the first, and enforce it alittle more, and then answer what is brought against either.  
In the first of Sam. c. 8 we have the institution of the Kingdom; where Samuel is commanded to tell the people, Ius Regis the manner of the King v. 11. He will take your sons.— your daughters— your field, etc. And ye shall cry out in that day etc. As if he should have said, you desire a King, and do not consider what power you put yourselves under, such an one, as if he command you ●●d yours at pleasure, you must patiently endure; this is the meaning of Ius Regis, which implyet not a Right of doing such unjust Acts, but a Security from resistance and force if he ●oes them. Moses did show the right and Manner of the King, what he should justly do, Deut. 17. Samuel the right of the King, not in doing, but in being secure from the people's force, if he did unjustly: Moses admonisheth the King of his duty, showing what a good king ought to do. Samuel endeavouring to dissuade the People, shows what they must patiently suffer from evil kings.  
Many Authors might be alleged (if need were) for this meaning of Ius Regis, I will name one without exception, Calvin in his Comment upon the place, and in his Institutions: He speaks to this purpose; Samuel, when he would show the People what great things they should suffer under Kings, tells them, this shall be Ius Regis the manner of the King, He shall take your Sons, etc. not that their Kings could do so jure justly, for the Law did teach them all moderation and justice, sedjus in populum vocabatur, cui parere ipsi necesse esset, nec obsistere liceret, so he, Instit. l. 4. c. 20. nu. 26. And in his Comment upon the place, he doth sufficiently set out those, as Tyrannical Acts, but showeth that for all that, Subjects ought not to resist, nec quicquam adversus Reges movere, licèt Tyrannidem exerceaxt, & rapinis sint graves subditis, nullamque nec Dei nec aequi rectique rationem habeant, what more full? which also appears by the 18. v. Ye shall cry out in that day, etc. That they were left without this remedy of resistance, Calv. in his Instit. the place above cited, thus, Eo so proripiet licentiae Regum libido, quam cohibere vestrum non erit, quibus hoc restabit unum, lussa excipere ac dicto audientes esse; and a little after, non westrum esse, his malis mederi; hoc tantum esse reliquum, Domini opem implorare, there can be nothing spoken more plainly against the power of resistance in Subjects, than this. We have Adversaries confessing the same, the Author of the Fuller Answer acknowledged, those Kings of Jsrael might no● be resisted; and this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy confesseth, that the People there had no other means to help themselves by, but cries unto the Lord, so he, pag. 58.  
By this appears what little weight there is in the exception which the Pleaders for defensive Arms make to this place, This was (say they) a prediction of punishment, that should befall them for their impetuous ask of a King, not a prohibition of resistance, pag. 18. And in the same page, This prediction of punishment doth not prove, it was unlawful, for them to defend their goods against their King's Tyranny, but that it should be vain to them, because if God would not hear their Cry, their defence would be to little purpose. Answ. The punishment foretold is, that they should be thus and thus evil entreated by their Kings, and that without remedy: but that in all this there is nothing to prove it was unlawful for them to resist such Kings, is a bare assertion against former proofs, which show there was on the King's part a Jus or right of security against such Violence. But to acknowledge, as they do, that this prediction of punishment doth prove their defence would be vain, i● God did not hear their Cry, is to confess, that, when God suffers Kings to exercise Tyranny and Oppression upon the People, over whom he has set them, it is a scourge and punishment from him upon that people for their sin, and that it is vain for them to seek remedy by resistance; which is a most true and pious argument against resistance, as we shall show, when we come to reasons against it.  
A second exception is, that the Israelitish Monarchy was Absolute, and therefore excluded the resistance of Subjects; so this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy. The pleaders for Defensive Arms, although they are against absolute Monarchy as unlawful, and therefore do not say this Monarchy set up over God's people was such, yet do they say, what was here foretold or enjoined to that people, cannot be a Law or punishment intended to other Nations under oppressing Kings, no more than that, which the Lord imposed on the jews and other Nations in Nebuhcadnezars' Time, their putting their neck under his yoke, Jer. 27. can prove that any Nation is bound to yield to a foreign enemy invading them, so they pag. 18.  
Ans I. Although this Monarchy of Israel were granted to be Absolute, and the instances brought should be peculiar to that people, not intended as Laws, and Rules to other Nations, yet do: they sufficiently prove what I intended in that part of my first Treatise, which was to show that there was no Warrant for resistance from Scripture, which still gives us examples of Kings set over God's people, who might not be resisted.  
TWO How the Author of the Treat of Monarchy can say the Israelites Kings were absolute Monarches according to that description of Absoluteness; which he gave above, I cannot see: for he told us, that Absolute Monarchy is, when the Sovereignty is so fully in one, that it hath no limits or bounds under God but the Monarches own will; It is true they were not so limited, as some Kings are now; but we know, there was a fixed judicial Law, which in many particulars secured the propriety and liberty of that people, there were special limitations for their Kings, Deut. 17. There was also a standing great Council, the Saned●im, whose sentence in many things the King could not at his own will and pleasure reverse, if we believe them that are skilful in the jewish Antiquities. Grotius in his first book de jure belli & pacis c. 3. places the Israelitish kingdom in a Middle condition between a mere absolute Monarchy, and that which is altogether limited and conditionate, that is, those Hebrew Kings were in some things absolute, in some things Limited, which may be said of every Limited Monarchy at this day, that was at first unlimited; and is true of the Monarchy of this Land, where I cannot but conceive the Monarch is free, and (if you please) absolute in all such things, in which he is not expressly limited.  
III. Instances drawn from that Monarchy against Resistance are forceable in this Monarchy, if we either consider what was now spoken against the mere absoluteness of that Monarchy, or look back to the Reasons which were given in the end of the fist Section to prove that Monarchies are not therefore exposed to resistance, because they are limited.  
iv Calvin upon this place 1. Sam. 8. doth apply it to other Nations, even to all that are under Kings, who have not Ephori or Magistrates over them, to whom they are accountable, as the Lacedaemonian Kings had, but our Kings have not; his words are these, Ex quibus apparet, subditos Regibus, nec posse nec debere adversus ipsos quicquam movere, licet Tyrannidem exerceant, etc. and in his Instit. l. 4 c. 20. nu. 27. He expressly takes away the Objection, (That this, which is imposed upon the Jews 1. Sam. 8. and jer. 27. was peculiar to that Nation) showing plainly it was not peculiar mandatum, but tells us thus much in General, cuicunque delatum est Regnum, ei serviendum, which being inferred from those places, doth imply, we must serve the King, as the People se●ved Nebuchadnezar, or their own Kings of Israel, viz. without resistance, for, for that purpose Calvin alleadges those examples. So that although this example doth not bind us to yield to a foreign enemy invading us, as the Pleaders needlessly replied, yet doth it in Calvi●s judgement bind us, to yield obedience without resistance to that King, whom it appears God has set over us.  
In the next place let us consider the Rescue of jonathan, urged by the Pleaders for Defensive Arms, pag. 11. It has been answered, that for this Rescue, they did not of themselves draw into Arms, but being present at saul's command, did rescue jonathan from saul's intended violence, not by force of Arms, but of a loving importunate violence by way of intercession, set off with a Soldierly boldness. The pleader's teply. The violence was outrageous enough, for Saul swore his death & they his life, what then? this was still but a Soldierly boldness of speech, But they make two collections thence. 1. That the people may swear an Association, that not one of the Parliament shall be put to death, unless found guilty, notwithstanding any Proclamation. A good inference! as if the Commanders of an Army do agree among themselves to intercede for a fellow Soldier, (one not so innocent as Jonathan, but justly sentenced to death) and in that intercession be more importunately bold than they ought, & through that importunity draw their King off from his resolution of executing that sentence: may I with any reason conclude thence that the several Counties of his kingdom may enter an Association against him for the rescuing of any unjustly sentenced to death? 2. They collect from thence, That if Saul by himself, or others, had attempted Jonathans' death, they would have actually resisted them even with Arms. Imagine they would have done so, you have but an uncertain supposition to secure your resistance, and the heat of a Soldierly boldness to defend the furious disposition of your spirit; how fare these Soldiers would have proceeded, I know not, but we shall see below, that the Christian Soldiers in julian's Army would not proceed so fare in the like case; and I dare say with Peter Martyr, si ist a sedit●●se fec●ri●t, quasi Jonathanum Regiper vim trepturi, nullo modo possunt excusari: if they had proceeded to force, they could not have been excused. How impertinently and inconsiderately the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy made use of this Rescue of jonathan, was shown above, Sect. 5. concerning resistance in absolute Monarchies.  
Now we come to examine David's demeanour towards Saul; in which his taking of Arms, and the use he made of them is considerable. The Answers, that were made to this objected example of David, did in general insinuate thus much. That they, which now pretend it for the defence of their Arms, have done fare more than David did or intended to do, and that they have not warrant to do so much, (i) that there is nothing alike in David's Arms and Theirs. The particulars were these.  
First that David's purpose in having armed men about him, was merely to secure his person against the cutthroats of Saul, that is, against his private Emissaries, such as were sent to take away David's life, 1 Sam. 19.15 or against the surprise of ill minded people, among whom he should abide, such as the Ziphites, who else might have carried David himself to Saul, as well as the news of his being among them. The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, page 51. and the Divines that plead for defensive Arms, pag 12. reply, that this is enough for the resistance they plead for. But who sees not a large difference between securing a man's self from sudden surprises of private Emissaries or close Enemies, and appearing in the Field with Arms against the Armies of the Prince? if a private Gentleman do endeavour the former by more than ordinary retinue, no man will speak him guilty of the second; for the one is used but in order to an escape by flight, but the other is in order to a forceable constraint and final contestation with the Prince, if he will not change his mind; which is the Cause of these Times, and the thing supposed in the Question: as we explained above, Sect. 2.  
Secondly, we see that David did accordingly give place & fly as Saul pursued, using no violence against Saul, or his followers, when in his power. 1. Sam. 26. The pleaders for defensive Arms, reply, It was not wisdom in David to encounter Saul, for he was not strong enough to do it, page 12. Answ. so shall we see these Pleaders below finding the like wisdom in the primitive Christians, as if they forbore to resist, because they had not force enough: which wisdom does foolishly charge the doctrine of the Gospel, even in the judgement of the Author of the Treat. of Monarchy. But might not David with his 600 men have encountered 3000 sleeping? he kenws that a sleep was upon them from the Lord, and if he with Abishai alone durst go down among them, what might he not have done with 600 men? The Pleaders answer out of much compassion, That they which are upon the Defensive, ought not in cold blood to kill sleeping Enemies, or such waking, farther than appears much advantageous to the Defence. pag. 12. But do they hold to this practice? do any of the King's party sleeping or waking find this mercy? would they not think it much disadvantageous to the Defence, to let whole companies of them escape as David did here? for hear what follows, If the kill of as many, as they could that night, wouldhave given hopes of ending Saules pursuit and making Peace, than the Pleaders doubt not, but David would have done it: It's pity David had not then such Counsellors about him as these; Abishai was too bloody in advising to have Saul himself killed, but these men would have counselled him to slaughter the Soldiers, and take Saul prisoner, and force him to other Conditions; so would they do, if they had their King at the like advantage; and so if David would have done, he might have had hope of ending his troubles. If David would have used the means and practices of these days, if he would have proclaimed abroad what Saul was, and that he himself endeavoured only to reduce him to a Religious and just way of Government, and thereupon called in more forces, he might have quickly had an Army able to encounter & overmatch Saul in the open Field. But nothing is done by David to the countenancing of the Rebellious practices of these days. He gives not an ill word out against Saul, he invites none into his aid; he called not these men he had together, clangore tubae, as Calvin observes; he did not use them for the suppressing of any of saul's bad instruments, but he leaves him to the hand of God, 1 Sam. 26.10. and them to the curse of God. v. 19 he tells Abner, that he and his Soldiers are worthy to die, because they had not kept their master the Lords Anointed more carefully, v. 16. How can our defenders now pretend David's example for the lawfulness of their fight against the bad instruments of Oppression, that are (as they say) about the King's Person, when those, that were about Saul, are justly blamed for not carefully keeping and defending their master against any violence, that might come from some misguided hand of David's men?  
Thirdly, concerning David's intent to defend Keilab, against Saul, it was answered that such an uncertain and improbable supposition was not warrant for Conscience. The Pleaders reply, that David's second enquiry concerning the affection of the Keilites, and his going whither soever be could go, as it's said, 1 Sam. 23.11. do plainly show, it was his purpose to have stayed there, and that he was disappointed of his purpose, pa. 12. Answ. 1. If David had at first such a purpose of defending the Town against Saul we see he fell from it, as he did from his purpose against Nabal, 1 Sam. 25. and has I f●us in both an example of forbearance, no warrant to proceed to such extremities. II. He might inquire concerning the Keilites, not out of a purpose to defend the City against Saul, (for had he had such a resclution, he could have mastered the Citizens and turned out the disaffected, as they do now, that pretend his example) but for the more timely providing for his flight out of a City, (which as the text notes) had Gates and Bars; lest if he should stay till Saul drew near, the Townsmen by treachery might hinder or impeach his flight, that be should not get clear of the Town till Saul had begirt it. But his enquiry & his going whither, he could go, do show he depended on immediate direction from God in all these actions, and therefore his example not so imitable by these defendants; which gave occasion to a fourth Answer.  
FOUR It was answered: That David's example was extraordinary; he was Anointed and designed by the Lord to succeed Saul, and questionless had warrant for an extraordinary way of safeguarding his person. This concerns his having an Army about him for his guard; that as by the former particulars it was clear, that those, which have now taken Arms, have done far more in the use of them, than David did or intended to do; so by this last Answer it will appear, that they may not do so much, or that they may not pretend David's exampl, for the ra●sing or having an Army. The Pleaders reply. 1. Then might every successor or Heir to the Crown plead the like Authority in the like danger, pag. 13. Answer. David's right to succeed did not authorise h●m, but his being designed for saul's successor, as he was, makes it more than probable that he had special warrant from God (whose direction we see was not wanting to him) for this way of safeguarding his person: also, that (as some Interpreters have observed) seeing saul's posterity was to give way to him, he might not come to the Crown, as one crept out of an hole or some lurking place, but accompanied with a strength; for which he is called back by the Prophet into the Land of judah, 1 Sam. 22.5. that the eyes of the people might be upon him, even while Saul lived.  
II. They reply, It's a strange way of answering Scripture Examples, that such a thing is extraordinary, when no such thing can be gathered out of the Text. The ancient Rule holds good, Praxis Sanctorum est interpres praeceptorum: David did thus against saul's violence, therefore this is an Interpretation of the honour due by the fifth Commandment. Answ. Beside the former Reason, it is plain in every passage how David depended upon extraordinary direction. Calvin, 1 Sam. 22.2. finds something extraordinary and peculiar in David's receiving these men for his guard: Peculiare factum (saith he) in generalem regulam non trahendum; and shows how ready men are to pretend this example of David, for the maintaining of a just cause by unlawful means, saying, quare ego bonam & justam Causam agens, non uterer medijs qua so miloi offerunt? Where's now his praxis Sanctorum, to say David did this, therefore I may; nay David did not that against Saul, which these men pretend; and what David did, cannot be followed by another example to make it Praxin Sanctorum: whereas we have many examples of Kings as bad as Saul, and find the Saints living under them, never attempting any thing tending to resistance; there's praxis Sanctorum, imitable by us.  
III. They reply, David's unction ought rather to have strengthened his faith, but this was a disparagement to his faith and to God's honour, that His Anointed should be safeguarded for so long together only by a way, which in all others had been abominable,— this proves the means both lawful and ordmary, pag. 13. Answ. David's Unction did strengthen his faith, but under such means too, is it pleased God to vouchsafe him for the greater Corroboration, such a Guard of so many hundreds; God thought it no disparagement for his honour to bring out his people with the spoils of Egypt, and we must give him leave in the extraordinary dispensa●●ns of his providence, to take what way it pleases him; h● could have preserved David from saul's fury, as he did Eliah from Ab●bs, which was after a more private way, but he thought more fit to let David be strengthened by the accession of much people, as a praeludium to their falling off from the house of Saul into him. Lastly, if this way of preservation by bends of armed men were ordinary (as these men will make it) then may one single Subject, as David was, draw armed men together, be Captain over them, and lead them up and down for his own, & their preservation that do adhere unto him; which if they will not a low, then must there be in David's example something more than ordinary.  
And here I must challenge not only the Reason of the Author of the Treat of Monarchy, who calls it a shuffling Answer, to say David's example was extraordinary, pag 5.7. but also his Ingenuity, who confesses that the people under the Israelitish Monarchy might not resist, and had no other me●nes to help themselves, but cries to God, pag. 58. and yet urges the example of jonathans' rescue, of David's raising Forces, of his intent to defend Keilab, for the defending of arms taken up, and used by Subjects in making resistance. He deals with us herein, as the Popish writers do in the point of Invocation of Saints, they acknowledge the Fathers of the Old Testament were not then in a condition to be invocated, yet do they allege Testimonies out of the old Testament for the proof of that point to deceive the unwary.  
Elisha●s example was altogether impertinent, yet from thence occasion was taken to speak of Personal defence, upon which these Pleaders ma●e a long and tedious Reply, page 14, 15, 16. The substance of which is delivered in the Reasons, which the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy makes for resistance● and therefore because this Reply of theirs, is no way strengthened by Elisha's example, but is altogother rational, we will defer the examination of what is material in it, to the last Section.  
To conclude, It was a general collection, but yet a very forcible Argument against resistance; that among so many Prophets, bitterly reproving wicked Kings for subversion of Religion & justice, there was not one, that celld upon the Eiders of the pe●ple for this duty of making Resistance. The Pleaders reply, scarce like Reverend and learned Divines. That in the times of good Kings we find the Princes, Elders, and Nobles very Corrupt, who then can marvel if they were stark naught, where the King was maught, or why should it be expected, that the Prophet's should call upon them to resist the King being on his side, and be●on theirs● pag 20. Answ. If it were the Duty of those Elders and Princes (as these pleaders do conceive it was) with force to oppose the exorbitances of those Kings, than was it the duty of those Prophets to admonish them of it; and the more cause had the Prophets to recall them to it, the further they were from it; the desperate condition of such Princes and El●ers might take away hope of prevailing, could not excuse the Prophet's silence, and neglect. We conclude therefore, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament do not give any Warrant by precept or example, for the Arms & Resistance of Subjects now against their Sovereign.   

SECT. VIII. Of Resistance sorbidden in the 13. to the Romans.  
IN the new Testament, that of the 13. to the Rom. is most considerable, the full examination of which will also 〈◊〉 other places which may seem to concern the point in hand; lest Servants and Subjects, upon the doctrine of Christion Liberty, should conclude themselves free from Masters and Governor's, who then were cruel for the most part and Tyrannous, the Apostle doth often call servants to a continuance of their obedience, and here Subjects to the duty of subjection without Resistance: as likewise S. Peter doth, 1 Ep. cap. 2. The place is considerable: first in itself, as it teaches the Institution and the End of Government; by that the Power and Authority; by this the duties of Governors are seen, & from both the duty of Subjects in yielding Subjection and forbearing Resistance is inferred. Secondly, 〈◊〉 is considerable in relation to those times, as it is appliable to the then governing powers, and to the Christian Subjects, to whom S, Paul. then wrote; and thence we must conclude (if we will think S, Paul wrote pertinently, and meant that those he wrote to, should receive direction by what he commended to them) that however the Governors than were not answerable to the End of government, and were fare from the duties there specified, yet had they the Power and Authority, and those duties which are there enjoined for the yielding of Subjection, and forbearing of resistance, were to be performed by their Subjects then living under them.  
The Reverend Divines have written such for the explication of this place, to bring it to their purpose, and have in several places of their book, e●forced the same things upon the Reader, to persuade or weary him. What they have material I shall examine.  
First. They observe that it is Higher Powers in the plural; not Higher Power, as the Doctor, say they, usually had it, and in this they suspect a great fraud, Page 3. & take it to be a dangerous fallacy in the present question, as if the King only were not to be resisted, page 9 when as we may not resist the meanest Officer, not a Constable, arresting us, or distraining our goods, ibid., Answ, A dang ●●ous business. I promise you, and such an one, as it concerned these Learned Divines to give the Reader so often warning of as they do; but to answer the● once for all; The Higher power in the Singular was commonly used, not in alleging the Text, as if it were so in the Apostle; but in the applying of it to the present case, which laying the Hypothesis or Question between the powers themselves in this point of Resistance or Armer, might very well allow the King to be deciphered by the Higher power, or the Supreme, in relation or opposition to other Governors under Him, although they also be Higher powers, in respect of the people under them, and not to be resisted by their inferiors. It is but what themselves have expressed in the same page, 3. By Higher powers are meant All in Civil legal Authority, which in Saint Peter's phrase, is of the King as supreme, or Governors. for these are higher than the People, though lower than the King: the very same thing intended and spoken by me. But these men, when they have gotten a seeming advantage, and think the People cannot see the vanity of it, never know when to have done with it.  
Secondly. They obseive, that it is Power in the abstract, which notes the Authority, wherewich the Person is invested, and not the person in the Concrete; lest that might be understood of his personal commands beyond or against his authority, which the Apostle doth greatly prevent by using the word Power. So they page. 3. which is the groundwork of their distinction between Resisting the Personal Commands, and resisting the power of the Governor: but we shall see the Apostle gives no ground for it.  
I suppose they have taken the hi●t of this their Cavil from Th●ophylact, or rather from Chrysostom's words upon this place, who 〈◊〉, the Apostles speech is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of particular Princes, but of the thing itself (i.e. of the Office, which words are nothing to the meaning of these men: for Chrys●stome, observing that the Prince then governing were not such, 〈◊〉 the Apostle describes, v. 3.4.6. did therefore say the Apostle speaks of the Office not of them that bore it (i.e.) not of those individual Persons then in power, who were fare from the performance of those duties; out if we look to the duty there required of Subjects in regard of Obedience and resistance, it was never i● Saint Chrysostom's mind to think that the Apostle did not speak of that, as due to the Persons then Göverning. Well, to let the Commentator go, let us look into the Text, where it plainly appears, that it is the Apostles intent to show the duty of Subjects, and for that purpose he speaks of the power itself, and of the Person that bears it, that is from the power which he shows to be of God, he enforces obedience to the Persons that are in power, yea with respect to the Persons then governing.  
For first, Those words, the powers that are, do plainly include the Persons; because Power in the Abstract, cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 existent, so as the Apostle speaks of it here, making it the object of obedience. Again, those that he calls Powers in the first verse, he calls Rulers in the third, and the Ministers of God in the fourth v. And thou shalt have praise of the power, v. 3. What, can Power in the Abstract give Praise? or is tribute paid to the Power in the Abstract? In a word. The Power or Authority is the Reason why we yield Subjection and Obedience to any person, but the Person that bears the Power is the Object of our Subjection and obedience; and because he bears the Power and is set over us, we must not resist him, though he abuse the Power.  
Their third observation or Conceit (upon which their m●it. Answer to this place depends, and for which the Fuller Ausuerer has applauded them) is the restraint of Subjection enjoined here, to Legal commands in Civil matters only: their words are, The things, about which the Authority and so the subjection in this place is conversant, are Civil matters belonging to the Second Table, between Man and Man; for then the Magistrates commanded not for but against Religion and the first table; and therefore the Active subjection at least here required is limited to Civil Matters, or at least passive yielding to the pet nalty of the Laws, in case of not obeying actively; and neither active nor passive subjection farther, then to Legal Commands, so pag. 4. Ans. 1. How fare they extend those Civil matters, to which they will have this Subjection here confined, they have not distinctly skewen, whether to things only of indifferency determined by the Roman Laws, and belonging to the Second Table, in regard of the general end of it, forasmuch as they were so determined for the more convenient proceeding of Justice, and the better conserving of order and Peac●tor to thing also in themselves good or bad; for it is certain the Roman Laws also concerned these. There are indeed that say, by good works, in the 3. v. are not meant works Morally but Civilly good, which is very answerable to these men's restraint, whom it concerned to make the way they will go in for Obedience, as narrow as they can, for that will leave the way for Resistance so much the Wider; only I must return the blame of carelessness (which they would often cast upon me) upon themselves, that making such a restraint, they would not more distinctly fix the bounds of it.  
2. It is true, that the Apostle enjoins them Subjection here to all Legal Commands in Civil matters, but it is not to be so restrained; for put the case, If they that were in Authority, should command contrary to their own Laws in Moral things, or contrary to Religion & the first Table; were Christians bound to obey? for active obedience the point is clear, they were not bound: but were they bound then to suffer for not obeying actively? These Divines tell us the Subjection here enjoined by the Apostle concerns only Civil Matters, a thing of which there was less doubt; and so Christians are left altogether without direction, in regard of the other Matte●s, which more concerned them: unless they will take the desperate Resolution these men give, as we had it above, Neither active or passive Subjection is here required farther, then to Legal commands. So then, Christians, according to these Divines, were free and might resist, when they had such commands imposed on them; but can we think the Apostle should give them so lame an instruction, as to teach them Subjection only in Civil Matters, and leave them either without direction what to do in the other cases, or permit them to make the inference for resistance, as these men do, contrary to the very practice of Saint Paul himself, and all the Apostles, and all the Christians of those primitive Times, who did yield passive obedience under the illegal commands of the then governing Powers.  
But they endeavour to prove it; pag. 4. & 5. from the context by the inference, Whosoever therefore resists, etc. which is made, say they, from Gods ordaining the power; and if I be bound to be subject to Tyranny, or to suffer violence of a Tyrant by virtue of the commandment here, then is Tyranny the Ordinance of God, and Magistrates have power ordained of God to use Tyrannous violence pag. 4. Answ. It follows of Active Subjection, not Passive; If I be bound actively to obey such commands of Tyranny, then would it be truly inferred that Tyranny itself were the Ordinance of God; but if I be bound only to suffer patiently under the illegal commands of Tyranny, then doth it not follow, that Tyranny is theordinance of God, but that those Tyrants do bear the power ordained of God, though abufing it sometimes for the just punishment of those they are set over by God. I would also desire these Divines to consider, how finely they teach private men to resist, by arguing as they do here, If I be bound to be subject to Tyranny, etc.  
The like instances repeated over and over they have in the beginning of pag. 5. which are satisfied by the like Answer, but they inquire a little after in the same pag. Seeing the Doctor will not say, that the most pereusptory refusing to obey actively Tyrannous Commands is resistance, by what authority of Text or Context will he stretch the prohibition to the refusing to suffer Tyrannous Violence? Or how doth any resist unlawfully (though by Arms) when unlawful violence is offered him, which God no where gave Authority to use against him, nor ever commanded him to yield unto? Answ. 1. Seeing your Argument from those word words (the Ordinance God) would, if it were good, allow private mento resist, I pray you by what authority of Text or Context do your Patrons forbidden Resistance to be made by private men, but allow it to Magistrates or the infetior powers? is it from the consideration of those to whom the Apostle wrote, who had not then any Magistrates of their own profession among them? though that be no good ground to raise that distinction of private men and public in the point of resistance (for the Apostles reasons against resisting of Higher powers do concern all times) yet will the consideration of those persons to whom, and of those times in which the Apostle wrote, give us authority to stretch the prohibition to the refusing to suffer Tyrannous violence; for we must conceive, that he gave them instruction which did nearly concern them, which might in some reasonable manner direct them, which was agreeable to Saint Peter's advice, 1 Ep. 2. cap. which was consonant to the practice of the Apostles, and all other Christians of those and the following primitive times; but the instruction that the Apostle here gives them cannot be such, unless it forbidden the refusing to suffer under the Tyrannous violence of those times.  
2. Answ. If he that resists by Arms, doth not resist unlawfully (as you say) when unlawful violence is offered him, which God no where gave authority to use against him, where hath God, I pray you, given authority to Parents or Masters to use unjust violence to their Children or Servants? yet is not their resistance unlawful? for though God has not given those authority to do it, yet has commanded these to suffer it, if done. The like may be said of Kings and Subjects; for has not God put Kings, Fathers, & Masters all in one Commandment & enjoined this duty and reverence to them under one word, Honour? and S. Peter, next to the fear of God, has placed Honour the King, and advises Christians to suffer though wrongfully, under the then Tyrannous Governors, and froward Masters. Did not God put his People under this Subjection, when he put them under a King, 1 Sam. 8.? where this immunity of their Kings from their resistance & forceable Coercion is called Ius Regis, not because God gave them power and right to use unjust and oppressing violence, but because if they did so, they were by the Law and Ordinance of God secured from the violence of the People, and reserved for the judgement and vengeance of God, that ordained them and set them over his people; as appeared above in the former Section.  
But they go on; and seem to conceive, that by the powers not to be resisted, the Doctor means only the Supreme, and those that Act his will; but denies the like security to subordinate Magistrates, if they be Tyrannous, without any command from the Supreme pag. 6. Answ. The Doctor by maintaining, the Supreme power might not be resisted by the Subordinate powers under Him, did not thereby imply, that these might be resisted; but still the higher spower is not to be resisted by those that are under it.  
But if he say, that neither Supreme nor Subordinate may be resisted, then may every mean. Officer ruin the whole neighbourhood, and so the blessed Ordinance of God in Magistracy shall turn to the greatest Curse to mankind, so they pag. 6, Answ. There are superior powers that can protect, so that if the subordinate power do wrong, the complaint lies still to the higher power; if the Supreme or highest be engaged in the Violence, the redress is to be sought by petition & suit, if not succeed, the complaint lies to heaven, resistance is not the remedy.  
They conclude; Therefore as the Apostle, in the following verses, doth banish Tyranny out of the context, describing, every where a righteous Magistrate: so is Tyranny banished out of the interpretation of this Text, which allows him that is a Tyrant no security that he shall be endured, and not resisted even with Armet; though it doth secure a just ruling Prince from all resistance under the heavyest penalty of Damnation, pag. 6. Answ. It is true that the Apostle banishes Tyranny out of the duty of a Magistrate by the following verses, but it is also true, that he banishesresistance out of the duty of Subjects by the former verses. He describes a righteous Magistrate; but could he then exemplity? were the Governors than such? If not such, as they were not then would this Text, according to the interpretation of these Divines, give but a lame direction to the Christians, how they should carry themselves towards the then unjust Governors; nor would this text, which forbids resistance, at all secure those Governors from their resistance; nay, I would feign see what any Jesuit can say or desire more from this text then that it gives a Tyrant no security, that he shall be endured. Lastly, if the penalty of Damnation laid upon the people, will secure a just ruling Prince from all resistance, as they tell us, why should not damnation laid upon every unjust oppressing Prince, secure the people from Tyranny? one would think it most equal that the Highest Power should have the greatest security, and so God in his wisdom thought fit, when he put his people under Kings without power of Resistance; as was she wen in the former Section, and will be a forceable reason against resistance, in the next Section.  
Now let us consider this Text with application to those Times, and to the Powers then ruling; upon that consideration it was inferred, that Tyrannous & oppressing Princes are not to be resisted by Arms, & that the Apostles reasons taught us; that for the good which is generally received by Ruling powers, we must bear with them, though abusing their Authority, as the Emperors than did; which also took away their distinction of resisting not the power, but the abuse of the power. These Divines in Answer to it, spend many pages, from page. 22. to 28. and again, from 47. to 51. where, (after some thing said of small moment concerning the King's Supremacy and the Roman Senate; page. 22.23, of which I have had, and shall have presently occasion to speak upon more weighty consideration brought by the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy) They tell us. First, The Doctor's vain Confidence will appear in thinking he has made void the distinction of resisting not the power, but the abuse of it; for when he grants that active obedience is to be denied to the illegal Commands of the Prince, he distinguishes himself hetweene the Power and the abuse of it; and why may not we distinguish upon the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the second verse, as well as he does upon the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the first, so pag. 26. Answ, You cannot so well make the distinction in in regard of resistance, as it may in regard of subjection or Obedience; for I can sever the power from the abuse of it, by denying my active obedience to the abuse or illegal command, & by yielding my passive obedience under such a command; but by making resistance you cannot sever them, for you cannot resist the abuse, but by resisting of the power in him that bears it.  
Secondly, they tell us, that the Apostles reasons forbidden only resistance to Legal Commands— and still they ask, doth the Apostle else know what he saith, when in his reasons ●e tells us, Rulers are not a terror to good works, and he is the minister of God to thee for good? can this be said of the Emperors then? therefore the Drs sense must be renounced, and it must be said, the Apostle medles only with Civil matters here, so pag. 47.48. Answ. That is, the Apostle medles with that, which did little concern them, and gives them no instruction in that which did most pr●sse them: the Tyrannous Commands and violences of the then Emperors: can we think he was well advised, if he had made them a discourse of Government, which they could make no use of, for the then urgent necessities? when therefore he saith, Rulers are not a terror,— and they they are Ministers of God for good, etc. it was true of the then Rulers in regard of some Civil good which they did in some measure procure, (for S. Paul did often find relief in that Government, and was often rescued from the violence and cruelty of his Enemies, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles) though it was true also, that their Government was full of Tyranny and injustice: what shall we say then to these reasons of the Apostle, but that he forbids resistance under those Tyrannous Governors, and urges it from the end of government, which was for good, and which their Subjects did in regard of Civil matters in some sort enjoy under them? but we cannot think, that he medles with Civil matters only, or forbids refistance to Legal commands only, unless we should also think, that the Apostle left the Christians to infer from these reasons, as these Divines do, that if Ruler's do not accordingly minister for good, but are a terror to good works, they may and aught to be resisted, and that the Christians, had they had force, might have resisted, so they affirm, pag. 49. We see then the conclusion they are necessitated to by their interpretation of this place, in restraining the prohibition of resistance only to Legall-commands: which conclusion (being so scandalous to Christian Religion, so opposite to the practice of the Apostles, and the express doctrine of those & after times) doth show, that these Divines did not know what they said, when they inferred from the Apostles reasons, that Resistance only to Legal Commands is forbidden, and that Christians might have resisted.  
Let them hear what Bucer saith upon the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be subject, the word, saith he, signifieth to be plenè sub imperio & in potestate, fully under the power of Rulers, and that the Apostle by that word gives us to understand opertere nostraomnia ponere in man's ●orum, qui publicam potestatem gerunt, sed propter Dominum, idèo quae Domino debemus, ea semper & ante omnia praestand● sunt: interim tamen si magistratsu ob id nobis non res odom, sed ipsam etiam vitam conetur eripere, ferendum est, neque potestati obluctandum; this is full, and forbids resistance under illegal commands and sufferings for obeying of God— Then upon the Apostles Reasons, He is the Minister of God to thee for good, etc. the same Bucer shows, They are drawn from the good & benefit for which government was ordained, which good is obtained 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the most part, and in some measure; the like saith Calvin upon the place— who persuading submission under Tyrannous Rulers concludes thus, Nulla ergò Tyrannis esse potest, qua non aliquâ ex parte subsidio sit ad tuendam hominum societatem, the like doth Peter Martyr upon the place.  
Let them also read how the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy censures these Divines for their inferences from the Apostles reasons; that the Apostle, according to such a meaning, should have taught them a Doctrine of resistance rather, then subjection, and that the received Doctrine of the Saints in ancient and modern times, could never find in that place of the Apostle such a licence for Christians, to use Arms in their defence, against the Tyranny of their Emperors, pag. 64. with several reasons which show the scandal of such Doctrine, pag. 66.  
What then will this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, that pleads also for Resistance, answer to the Apostles prohibition of it? he grants they might not resist in that Monarchy, but affirm, that Subjects may in this; why? Because Religion than was no part of the Laws, but here it is; Also because, that was an Absolute Monarchy & Sovereignty, this a limited and Mixed. So we have two exceptions of his as he dilivers them, pag. 59 64. and 66.  
His first exception is, Religion than was no part of the Laws, and so its violation no subversion of Established government,— Herein we have Doctor Bilson consenting, who saith, That the superior power forbidden here to be resisted, is not the Princes will against his Laws, but agreeing to his Laws. I think the day itself is not more clear. pag. 64. and 57 I do concur with Mr. Burrowes, professing against resisting of Authority, though abused: That if those who have power to make Laws, make sinful Laws, and so give authority to any to force obedience, there must be either flying or passive Obedience, and pag. 66. In the case of the Arms now taken up, there is no need of those offensive Grounds which the Reverend Divines run upon) Religion being now a part of our Nationall Law. So he. Answ. What Dr. Bilson and other of our Divines have written in favour of Resistance, they m●ane it of such States, as may by the known Laws use forceable restraint against the exorbitances of the Monarch; and as they were willing after those motions of the Protestants in France, and the Low-Countries, to excuse as much as might be, so had they lived to have seen the Commotions and Rebellion of these days, I make no doubt, but they would have spoken more cautelously; I am sure, the Homily against Rebellion speaks home, & will not admit such distinctions, that make way to the Resisting or Rebelling against evil Princes, which command against the Laws and Religion, for of such it speaks.  
But let us try the force of this exception; he professes with Mr. Burrowes against resisting of Authority, though abused; & with Doctor Bilson admits of Resisting the Princes will against the Laws; this is fast and lose, for what is the Princes will against the Laws, but abusing of Authority? It may be he would salve at, as M. Burrowes seemed to do, by telling us, that he means by Authority abused, the Authority, employed in Making sinful Laws; for such Authority though abused, this Author acknowledges to be the Ordinance of God and not to be resisted, and disputes it against the Reverend Divines, pag. 64. 65. I agree with him; but further would have him show why Authority abused in the Execution of Law, that is, in pursuing the Prince's illegal will, should not be also the Ordinance of God and secured from resistance? Indeed there is a great difference between Resistance made against a Prince commanding according to Law, and that which is against a Prince commanding contrary to Law, but it doth not make the business as clear as the day: nay it doth not at all satisfy him that will inquire—  
First, concerning that government under which the Apostle lived; might Subjects than resist, If the Higher Powers commanded contrary to Law, as they did often? we find that the Christian Orthodox Religion was part of the Laws in Constantine's and the succeeding times, and that Christians did not resist when julian persecuted them for it, nor did the Orthodox Christians resist when the Arrian Emperors endeavoured to subvert the faith. If he reply, they were Absolute Emperors, and that their Edicts made a change of the Law, by which such Religion was established: why then doth he, speaking of these absolute Emperors, distinguish the will of the Prince from the Law, and think to  us by telling us, Religion than was no part of the Law; when with one breath they could make any thing Law, and by another reverse it; according to this Author's acknowledgement of their absoutenesse.  
Secondly, Nor will this exception satisie him, that shall inquire concerning this Government. 1. Whether the first Parliament in Q. Elizabeth's Reign might have resisted her, endeavouring to change the then established Popish Religion? Had those Popish Lords and Commons, which Q. Mary left, been pleased to hold to that Religion which was then part of our Nationall Law, they might have taken the Arms of the Kingdom, and have used them in the defence of it, by the Rule of this Author, and the pretences of the Arms now taken up; I would very feign see, how they will make this as clear as the day. 2. How can they be justified, that did at first take Arms, and do still continue them (as themselves stick not to profess) for the pulling down of Episcopal Government (that I may not say, of the Church Liturgy and public service too) which is, and always hath been a part of the Law of this Nation? So little can this Author satisfy us in this first exception, by saying, Religion was then no part of the Law, and therefore Christians might not resist, but now it is part of our Nationall Law, and therefore allows the Resistance of these days.  
His other exception is; they were Absolute Monarches, and therefore not to be resisted; He who reads Tacitus (saith he) cannot but see the Senate brought to a condition of basest servitude, and all Laws and Lives depending on the will of the Prince;— They were become the sworn vassals of an absolute Lord, we the Subjects of a Liege or Legal Prince, pag. 59 Answ: This is the Sword to cut the knot when it cannot be untied: but the edge is easily taken off from it, by enquiring whether those first Roman Emperor's had de jure such absolute power; and by considering, whether the Apostle had any respect to such absoluteness of their power, in his reasons against resistance: and lastly, whether limitation of Power in the Sovereign, doth infer power of resistance in the Subject.  
1. It cannot be cleared that those first Roman Emperor's were so absolute the lure Legally, by such consent and surrender of the People and Senate, as is required to the estating them in such an absolute condition, There seems to be two Reasons inducing this opinion of their absoluteness. 1. Because they took upon them as absolute Lords. That cannot be denied indeed, but it makes no right; nay, they crept into the power by degrees, which argues, they had it not by such consent as is pretended, but got it by practice. 2. Because of the Lex Regia, which this man doth not mention, but it is much spoken of to this purpose; for thereby it is conceived, that they were estated in such Absolute sovereignty: thus it runs, as Ulpian gives it us, A Law, quâ populus ei (Principi) & in eum omne suum imporium & potestatem contulit. Tit. de Constitut-Principis. That there was such a Lex Regia, cannot be denied, but the Question is, when it was made, and what or how much is granted by i●? This has caused several opinions among the Civilians some thinking the people only gave away their power, making the Prince their perpetual Tribune. Some that the Senate also parted with their power. Some, that neither of them parted wholly with their power, but communicated it so fare forth to the Prince in the administration of the Commonwealth, that they still kept the Summum imperium in themselves. This variety of opinion is unfit to make a certain ground for Conscience, or to give interpretation to the Apostle, as if then be forbade Resistance, because those Emperors were Absolute.  
I conceive it to be clear that the draught of that Lex Regia appears no where before Vespasians time; that the people had before parted with their power, but the Senate not wholly; therefore Augustus (to whom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Principate was granted for life, as Srabo says towards the end of his last book) took upon him as Tribune of the people, and had it from ten years to ten years, as Al●iate shows in a little Tract, de Magistratib. Civilibus. That the succeeding Emperors encroached by degrees upon the liberty and power of the Senate, making their way by sear and flattery; but had not that power, which by fits they assumed, from such a Covenant and Consent of the State, as is required, to make that Legem Regiam, as Connanus shows out of Dion, Suetonius, and Tacitus. Also that the Emperors though they were, for the more ready execution and ministration of the affairs of the Commonwealth, sol●ti Legibus, which was first granted to Augustus, yet did they perquamdiu magnam potestatis partem cum Senatu communicare (as Hotoman shows, de Constitutionib. Princip and cut of that power, which the Senate did still conceive to be in them, they declared Nero an Enemy to the State. Add to this, that though we read not of Plebiscita after the beginning of these Emperors, yet we meet with Senatus Consulta; and of the power of the Senare in passing their Decrees, ●acitus saith, They did it sometime inscio & absent Principe, but never indeed invito, against his will; Suetonius also tells us that Caligula intended to assume the Diadem, which was a sign of that Regia potestas, and had been a profession that he would reign absolutely: nec multum abfuit, quin speciem principatus, in Regni formam converteret, but he was dissuaded from it by his friends, faith that Historian.  
During these Times the Apostles lived and wrote; for I go not so low as Vespasian, unto whom that Lex Regia seems to be solemnly granted by a formal consent; and yet after that we find Pliny in his panegyricke tell the Emperor Trajan, sedem Principis tenes, ne sit Domixo locus: which shows, they had not resigned themselves up to the Emperor, as sworn vassals to an Absolute Lord, but had set a Prince over them for the readier dispatch of the affairs of the Commonwealth, which often suffered (and in those times more than ever) by the cross and Divisions of the People and Senate. The form of the Government was thereupon, I acknowledge, changed, and the Supremacy settled upon the Prince: yet may it, I conceive, from the former allegations be as well concluded, that the Senate had their share in the Supremacy with the Prince till Vespasians time, as that the two Houses are Originally Mixed or joined with the King in the supreme or Sovereign power, which this Author undertakes to prove.  
2. It is to be considered that the Apostle in his reasons against resistance, has no respect to the Absolute or Limited condition of those Roman Emperors, nor to any consent or compact of the people, by which they should be made such, (for then he might have told them, If they resist they resist their own Ordinances) but draws his reasons from the Ordinance of God, who sets up rulers, and from the End and Benefits of Government, which are Reasons, common to all Government, not to be eluded by saying, Ours are limited Monarches, and therefore may be resisted; for those reasons tell us, that resistance against Him, that bears the Sword, (i.e.) against the Supreme power, (for that is signified by those words, as Musculus and Bucer show out of Ulpian) is unlawful in all governments.  
3. As the Apostle had no respect to the Absoluteness of Power in those Emperors, nor to the consent of the people, by which they are said to have such power, so neither indeed doth the limited condition of a Monarch infer he may betesisted for his Exorbitancies more than an Absolute may for his, whether we consider the Exorbitancies of an Absolute Monarchy, which may be destructive of the public, or look to the compact of the people (by which he is left Absolute) who did not thereby intent, he should oppress and destroy them, or command and judge them beyond Reason and Equity, as this Author acknowledgeth, pag. 11. But it was proved more largely above at the end of the 5. Sect. That limitedness of power in the Sovereign, doth not infer a power of Resistance in Subjects. So that absoluteness of power in those first Roman Emperor's is causelessly alleged by this Author as the reason, why they might not be resisted.  
This Author concludes, All that can be justly inferred out of the Text, we grant, but can any living man hence collect, that therefore no resistance may be made to Fellow-subjects, executing destructive illegal Acts of the Princes Will in a Legal Monarchy? Will he affirm that the Ordinance of God is resisted, and Damnation incurred thereby? God's Ordinance is the power, and the person invested with the power, but here force is offered to neither, pag. 59 Answ. The Question is not put of making no resistance to fellow Subjects, but of such resistance, as is made against them under the command of their Sovereign, by a contrary Army of Subjects, a resistance that undertakes a final contestation with the Sovereign, to constrain him to be of another mind, as it was explained above, Sect. 2. Now if he means, this Resistance cannot be collected out of the Text, because it is made in a Legal Monarchy, then is it the same exception, which even now he made from the Absoluteness of those Roman Monarches; but if he means it cannot be collected, because it is no resistance of God's Ordinance, from whence the Apostle draws his reason against resisting; then I say. 1. That when Subjects are drawn into Arms by the Sovereign, who has the power of the Sword, and do act and move under his command, to make opposition by a contrary army of Subjects is a resisting of the power, and a taking of the Sword without the Sovereign, against the Ordinance of God, and a shedding of blood without warrant. 2. This exception seems to be the same which was made by the pleaders above, where they objected, If I be bound by the Ordinance of God, to suffer violence of a Tyrant, then is Tyranny the Ordinance of God. This was answered above, and is rejected by that Author of the Treatise of Monarchy: yet doth he in effect argue to the same purpose, as we shall meet with him presently, among the reasons of the next Section.  
And thus much of the 13. to the Romaxes, in the asserting of which, it has been shown against the Rev. Divines who pleaded for defensive Arms, That forcible Resistance against the illegal and Tyrannous commands of the then ruling Emperors was here forbidden; and, That Christians, had they had force sufficient, might not resist. Also against the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, That his exceptions from the Laws being then against Religion, and from the Absoluteness of those Emperors, were not sufficient to satisfy, or make us believe, that therefore the Apostle forbade them to be resisted; for we find him to draw his reasons against Resistance, from that which is common to all Times and Governments, the Ordinance of God, the end and benefit of Government. There are many more places of Scripture usually brought, which may very aptly and powerfully persuade patience under evil Governors, but I have chosen to insist only upon such as are more pregnant and fi● to bear argument against the power of Resistance in Subjects.   

SECT. IX. Reason against the Power of Resistance in Subjects.  
IT is clear, that (as it has been often insinuated above) if a Prince stands supreme and next under God above all the People, His Subjects may not proceed to such Resistance by armed Forces, as is supposed in the Question, and at this day practised to the utmost; It is also most manifest that our King is so, being expressly acknowledged the only Supreme Head and Governor: and this might be sufficient Reason without more ado, to conclude against Resistance. The adversaries not well knowing how to divide Supremacy and irresistibility, have vainly endeavoured to join the Houses as sharers in the supreme or Sovereign power, for which we had so much concerning Mixture above; and do think to satisfy that Supremacy, they leave in the King, by yielding his person to be above the violence of Resistance; but as for the Forces about his person, the arms of the Kingdom may be employed against them, as against misemployed agents; and from the taking of those arms to make this resistance, they conceive they are not debarred by His being Supreaeme Head and Governor, but are enabled to it by a supposed reservation of the people, and by the necessity of the State's preservation, requiring such a power of resistance in Subjects, upon which grounds their Reasons for resistance do mainly proceed. I shall therefore so frame this trial of Reason, (to which we are now come) as it may best meet with the force of their Reasons and Exceptions.  
I. It was the wisdom of God to put his people still under Kings, without power of resistance, as we found it in the two former Sections: and that wisdom of God should be to us in stead of the most forcible Reason, and silence all gainsaying pretences.  
II. If this power of Resistance in Subjects were so necessary for the preserving of Religion and Justice, as is pretended, certainly the word of God would have given direction for it; but as in the Old Testament, we no where find the Prophets calling upon the Elders of the people sin th●● supposed d●●y of resistance, so in the New Testament we every where find patience in suffering for well doing no mended to 〈◊〉. This Author of the Treat. of Monarchy, doth often admire the wisdom of the Architects of this Government, that so provided for the safety of it, by placing such power of Arms and resistance in the two Houses: but we do not find such a provision within that wisdom and care, which it pleased God to show in the Government he put his people under; nor would we indeed find such a power of forcible resistance, provided in the constitution of this monarchy, when we examined it above.  
III. From the Institution and Ordinance of God, which gives the power, according to the Apostles argument, who draws his reason against resistance, not from any Compact of the people, but from the Ordinance of God, which cannot be E●uded by any reservation of the people (the pretended ground of resistance) but shows the power given by it must be borne with, though abused, as than it was, when the Apostle gave his reasons against resistance.  
FOUR To be Supreme and next to God over the people, or to have the power of the sword, implies a security from resistance; It is the Ius Regis which Calvin and most Authors acknowledge upon 1 Sam. 8.11. and is expressed, Prov. 30.31. A King, against whom there is no rising up. It is generally acknowledged, that Princes which be supreme are free from the Coactive power of the Law; It is apparent, that resistance cannot be made by Subjects, but by taking the power of the Sword which belongs to him that is supreme. Lastly, it is evident in reason, that if the two Houses be enabled to resist and constrain the Prince by force to his duty, then have they the power of the Lacedaemonian Ephori, which, as this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy acknowledges, does overthrow the Sovereignty of the Monarch.  
The general exception, which the Adversaries make to these two last Reasons, is, that they resist not the Sovereign power, but only misemployed instruments and fellow Subjects executing his illegal commands. Answ. As if the Sovereigns could by himself execute his Commands without under Ministers of power; so that the resisting of them, acting by the power which he has committed to them, is a resisting of him. And such a resistance, as is supposed in the Question, necessarily proceeds to an opposing of Him personally, in giving of Him Battle, and forcing of Him from His Right and Power to new grants of Security.  
In particular, This Author of the Treat. of Monarchy, thus reasons from the Ordinance of God. To Resist such misemployed Instruments, is no resisting of the Ordinance of God; for it neither resists the Person of the Sovereign, for we spoke of resisting his Agents; nor His Power, for the measure of that in our Government is the Law, & therefore He cannot confer Authority to any beyond the Law, page 52. Answ. I would desire this Author to look again upon the two Assertions of the Reverend Divines, which he rejects, page 63. They run thus, Those Govern urs, whether Supreme or others, who under pretence of Authority from God's Ordinance, disturb the quiet & peaceable life in Godliness and honesty, are far from being God's Ordinance in so doing: also; This Tyranny not being God's Ordinance, they which resist it even with Arms, resist not the Ordinance of GOD: and then to consider, whether those Divines might not in defence of those Assertions answer, as he has done here, that to resist the misemployed Agents of Tyrants commanding against Law, is not to resist the Ordinance of God, for they cannot confer Authority to any against the Law; for my part I cannot conceive, how he can retain his own Assertion, and reject theirs.  
But to Answer him more particularly; He that bears the Sword (i. e) has the supreme power, giveth power and Commission to under Ministers for executing of Justice and to other Officers for the Militia; If those therefore, though abusing the Power, be resisted by them who are under them, it is a resisting of the Power; and if these, in time of War and insurrection, being drawn together by the Sovereign, and acting His Commands under Him, be opposed by contrary force and arms of Subjects, it is a resisting of the power lawfully placed in such persons, though illegally used and employed; it is a taking and using of the sword to the shedding of blood with u Warrant.  
The defence (which this Author makes, pag. 62) of their taking the sword without the Soveraign●, and against his Command, is grounded upon that former groundless supposal of their being joined with the King in the Sovereign power itself; of which abundantly in the 4th and 5th Sections above.  
V Because Obedience, Honour, and Subjection, ●ue to a Ponce are enjoined, and th' Contrary forbidden without any ●●stincti●n o● a Good or Bad Prince; S●. Paul shows, that h●ill must n●t he spoken of the worst Rulers, Act. 23. What is caesars, ●u● Saviour bids give unto Caesar, when he was as bad as m●ght be; and for this Cause pay you Tribute, and Honour, saith S. Paul, when the higher powers were extremely eund.— This cannot consist with taking Arms against a Prince: for they that do so, must speak evil of H●m, make Him appear O 〈◊〉 to His people, and will not, cannot let Caesar have what is His, His Revenues, Customs, Tribute, Arms, but w●ll tell Him, they are not His, but the King foams, to use as the State shall think sit, when he abuseth them, And as the Scripture doth not, so not her doth our Law make any distinction of good ●●d bad Princes in this point; It enjoins Honour, Subjection, Allegiance, Customs, without any such distinction, and determin●s Insurrection, and Levying of War to be Treason, not only against a good King, but indefinitely against any.  
VI It is good reason, that He which has the Supreme Trust next to God, should have the greatest security, but if the people have power of Arms upon such or such Cases, the strongest and last security is on their side. In other kinds of Government, we see the security is still upon the Governing Par●; Parents are secured from the force and violence of Children; and as unto the first Rule of Fathers, the Government of Kings did succeed, so unto Kings is Honour commanded under the Name of Fathers, that we might conceive the unnaturalness of War and forcible Resistance against them. The Husband also, who is the head of the Wife, had the advantage on his part in the point of Divorce; He might give the Bill to her upon Jealousies and displeasure, she could not to H●m; This Liberty was permitted to good and bad Husbands equally, notwithstanding the occasion, that evil Husbands might take thereby to be unjust and cruel; as it is usually objected against this Ius Regis, or advantage of security on the King's part.  
VII. From the end and benefits of the Governing power, for the enjoying of which it is good reason we should bear with the Exorbitancies of the power. The Divines, that plead for Defensive Arms, reply. This is as good a Reason, as if we should say, God hath ordained Ministers to Preach, and administer his Sacraments for the good of the people, that they may be saved, therefore be their Ministers never so careless, or perverting the Word and Sacraments, the people may not seek their Souls safety from some other, pag. 56. Answ. There's a great deal of difference between these two Reasonings, if we consider the Remedy which may be had against unfaithful, scandalous Ministers; for first, as these Divines suppose forcible Resistance, to be the remedy against Exorbitant Princes, when the Good for which Government was ordained, cannot be received by them, so should they in this their Reasoning, have concluded for a violent suppression of such Ministers, as an answerable Remedy against that mischief. Indeed this Age hath seen the proceed against both much alike, Ministers pulled out of their Pulpits by the people, cast out of their Houses, spoilt of the benefit of their Live, and Teachers drawn from the Lowest of the people, thrust into their places without any Legal process; and it is openly professed, that these Arms are still held up to pull Bishops down. These men forget what our Saviour said to the people, of the Scribes and Pharisees, They sit in Moses Chair; what then? pull them down? No: hear them, and do what they teach you out of Moses.  
As against their Pastors, so have they proceeded against their Prince, forgetting those many precepts and examples, which the Scripture gives us, of Obedience and subjection yielded even to Tyrannous Kings; now if they will reason thus, God has ordained Rulers for good, therefore we may use force to constrain them to their duty, that we may receive that good by them: So, God has ordained Ministers for good, therefore we may violently suppress them, and cast them out, if we cannot receive that good by them; then I confess, one Reason is as good as another, but both bad enough.  
Secondly therefore, we must consider there is a Remedy to be ha●against unfaithful scandalous Ministers, by complaining to their Superiors, who set them over the people, and can displace them; but the Remedy against Princes that Rule not well, is by complaint to God, that set them up, and can turn their Hearts; now if they will reason thus, Pastors are ordained for good, therefore if they do not minister unto that, we may use the remedy against them, which God and good Laws have allowed; so Rulers are ordained for good, and if they do not attend upon it, such remedy may be used as God and good Laws do approve of; then I confess, both Reasonings are good; but neither doth conclude for forcible Resistance.  
Now if we will consider the force of this seventh Reason against Resistance, which is drawn from the end and benefits of Government, we shall find it, however the Reverend Divines make light of it, to be the same that the Apostle makes, v. 7. Render therefore, etc. wherefore? because they are the Ministers of God for good, etc. But who were they, to whom Tribute, and Honour, and Custom, was then to be rendered as due? Those Rulers that were then fare from those duties; yet, because Rulers, appointed for that end, Render therefore, etc. Calvin upon the place tells us, Loquitur denativo Magistratus officio, à quo tame●se non rarò degenerant, qui principatum tenent, nihilominus deferenda est us obedientia, quae principibus debetur. For whether we consider Government in general, it does (as Bucer upon the place speaks) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for the most part obtame its end in some good measure: or any Government in particular, there is a benefic of protection from it beyond the particular injuries suffered by it; to this purpose Calvin upon the place, Quanquam ne sic quidem unquam abutuntur suâ potest ne Pr●●cipes bonos vexando, ut non in sua Tyrannide speciem al quam just● dominationis retineant; Nulla ergo Tyrannis esse pot●st, quae non aliqua ex parte subsidio sit ad tuendam hominum societate●. And P. Martyr shows it by the rescue, defence, and protection, which S, Paul found through the benefit of the power, and by the appeal he made to Nero the worst of Tyrants; all which appears by several passages in the Acts of the Apostles.  
VIII. This Power of Resistance in Subjects, would be a Remedy against the Exorbitancies of Princes, worse than the chsease, and more subver sieve of a state, then if they were left without it. This the Wisedom● of Go●, ●he God of Order did forefee, who put his people under King, wit on't such p●wer of Resistance, as was above 〈◊〉. This both Reason and experience doth show, that it is a remedy not to be managed without bringing greater danger; the being of such power in Subjects would be a continual Seminary of jealousies twixt Prince and People, for the using of it, they would not want pretences causelessly made, and in the using of it could not show moderation: they would not be content with the recevering of their Liberties, but seek to lessen the Prince's power for their farther secutity; they would not rest upon the Prince's promise for it, & then how would he upon theirs for obedience? they would fear his return to exorbitancy, and be their violence would proceed to a deposing of H●●; and what could be the issue but confusion through the continuance of the Mischiefs of Wa●te? The consideration of these times and of the persons that have had the managing of this forcible Resistance, show ●t to be a Remedy not to be used.  
The author of the Treatise of Monarchy, replies. It is strong that the Resistance of destructive disorder should tend to the overthrow of Order, or be a remedy worse than the disease; It may for a time disturb, as Physic doth the Natural body, while it is in working, if the p●ccant humours make strong opposition, but as this tends to health, so doth Resistance of disorder to Order pag. 6. Answ. It is not so strange, for there is Order under the greatest Tyranny, as was shown in the former Reason, and in the exorbitances of Princes, which in themselves tend to the subversion of the established Order, there is more Order, Law, and Justice, then in the use and effects of this Remedy by resistance. Such lewd Remedies (as it is in the first part of the Homily against Rebellion) are fare worse than any other Maladies and disorders, that can be in the body of the Common wealth.  
Now to his similitude. In the applying of Physic, we look to the Medicine or remedy itself, and do not use the Sword to those parts of the body, which will only admit of Fomentations and Lenitives, and patience for the cure of them: nor do we commit the applying of the physic to every hand and judgement, but the ●and and judgement, by which this physic of forcible Residence instance is that of the people, for this Author tells us, in such a case the Appeal must be to the Community, and they must aid and assist, as they are in Conscience conviced. But how shall they be persuaded to use a mean, who will be still applying and keeping this Physic working, when perchance the Houses, that called them to the C●●e, would have it cea●●? do we not see what Humours this physic hath s●irred in the body Politic? where there is any possibility, it is better to let Nature work it cut, though we give it a longer time to ●oe it in, then to think to help it by a poisonous purge.  
But if any shall think, the Art and wisdom of the Houses can correct the malignity of the Remedy, or the rashness of the people, that are used in the application of it, I appeal from his judgement to these Times; when could better and more 〈◊〉 success of this Remedy be expected? by whom could it better be applied and managed then by the Members of this late Parliament, so much extolled for their Religion, Prudence, and Equity? yet let the issue spe●k, what little good there is to be hoped for by the use of such mischicvous remedies. The fourth part of the Homily, above cited, speaks thus. Peaceable King S●lomon was judged of God more meet to build his Temple (whereby the Ordering of Religion is meant) than His Father David, who had shed much blood in his wars, though against the Lords Enemies: what Religion is it then, that such men, by such means would restore? Even as good a Religion as they are good Subjects, or as Rebellionis a good mean of redress and reformation, being itself the greatest deformation that possible may be. But as the Truth of the Gospel being quietly and soberly taught, though it cost them their lives that do teach it, is able to maintain the true Religion, so hath a frantic Religion need of such furious maintenance as is Rebellion.  
IX. Lastly, therefore we are taught to refer the Remedy to God, who has told us, that the hearts of Kings are in his hand, and he turns them whithersoever he will, Pro. 21.1. to make us apply unto him for the turning of them. He shows that he is the judge of the King, by that Conditionate covenant he makes with him, 2 Chron. c. 6. v. 16. Where the promises made to David for the continuance of his Kingdom, are repeated with this condition, Yet so that thy Children walk in my Law, So also 2 Chro. 7.17. But the Covenant 'twixt King and People, 2 Sam. 5. is not Conditionate to render him obnoxious to their judgement and force. To this purpose Nation, in his first Orat. against julian, showing how that wicked Emperor was repressed through the Mercy of God, doth blame those, who being too much intent upon the present, cannot depend upon providence & expect the execution of the Counfell of God in his punishing of wicked Princes: P. Martyr in his Comment on the 13 to the Rom. showing out of Dan. 4. that God translates and disposeth of Kingdoms, observeth this way of providence, that evil Princes are raised for the punishment of the wickedness of a People, sed postquam sic castin gatt homines ad Deum redierint, ille mitiores Principes, & justiores provides, and accordingly, saith he, we find in History of Kings, that God did, Tyrannis semper miscere bonos aliquos & justos Principes, Calvin likewise upon the 13 to the Romans tells us piously and judiciously, That an evil Prince is the scourge of God upon the People's sin, and therefore as we must acknowledge it is through our fault, that the great blessing of Magistracy is turned to our punishment, so must we nevertheless reverence the Ordinance of Power, which we shall easily do, si nobis ipsis quiequid mali in ipsa erit, impatemus, if we impute the abuse of the power, or the evil that we suffer by it, to ourselves. I will conclude with the like advice, given us in the first part of the Homily against Rebellion, The heart of the Prince is in the hand of God, wherefore let us turn from our sins to the Lord, and he will turn the heart of the Prince to our Wealth: Else for Subjects, when they have deserved through their sins to have an evil Prince, then to Rebel against Him, were a double evil, by provoking God to plague them more.  
The Reasons which the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy has brought for the power of Resistance i●. Subjects are such as follow.  
First. Because to resist misemployed instruments acting or assisting to the performance of the destructive commands of the Prince, is no resisting of the Ordinance of power, because power cannot be conferred to any beyond the Law. So he pag. 52. How far this concerns the question, was shown above under my third and fourth Reasons, where it was propounded and answered.  
His second Reason. Because without such power of Resistance in the hands of Subjects all Limitation of Government is vain; all forms resolve into Absolute and Arbitrary. pag. 53. Answ. Your Argument is inconsequent by your own descriptions of Absolute and Limited Monarchy, which you drew from the consideration not of force or resistance, but of Law to set bounds to the Monarches Will as was observed above, Sect. 3. So that the restraint of a limited Monarch is Legal and Moral, not forcible and military. Nor is there, by the Limitation of the Monarch's power, a power of Arms acquired to the people, but only a Moral security sought after by the restraint or bands of Laws and Oath cast upon the Monarch: which makes not a vain limitation of Government, but binds the conscience of the Monarch, and by his Conscience his hands are bound, more powerfully, then by a contrary power or force in the people, see above towards the end of the fifth Section, that Limitation of the Monarch's power infers not a power of Resistance in Subjects.  
He adds to the same Reason, If a Prince be taught, that he may take, what he pleaseath, from His Subjects without being resisted, cases and reasons will soon be brought to persuade him, etc. pag. 53. Answ. He is not taught he may Lawfully do so: but if Subjects be taught, that they may lawfully take Arms upon such or such cases, and take from their fellow Subjects, what they please, to maintain those Arms, pretences and cases will not be wanting, as at this day. In a word, some must be finally trusted when all is done, and who may better challenge it then the Supreme Governor that stands next to God above the People, as was said above in the fourth Rea●on: and it were fit we should for the redress of Evils in Government, trust God and depend upon his providence more, than these men would have us.  
H●s third Reason. Eccause such power is due to a public State for its preservation, as is due to a particular person, pag. 55. Answ. The Proposition is not universally true, but is thus fare granted, such power is due to a State for its preservation, as is allowed by the just Laws thereof; for as the body Natural defends itself from outward force by its Law, so the body Politic by its Law. Now though a particular person by the Law of nature has power of self preservation against the force of another private person, yet is this power yielded up in regard of the Civil power (by the benefit of which particular persons have protection from the injuries of all other) and not to be used against persons endued with such power, against such persons illegally and suddenly assuiting a man, where t●e danger is imminent and unavoidable by flight, there was no more allowed in my first Treatise, than a mere personal defence, by warding of blows without returning any: yet doth this Author complain. The Doctor is so heavy a friend to the State, that he thinks it not sit to allow it that Liberty, he gives every private man, pag. 55. As the Liberty which this Author allows a State for its preservation, tends rather to its suoversion, so are there many differences between it, and the Liberty or power allowed to private men.  
For first, That power of preservation which is allowed to a private man, against a private man, is against an our ward force, but this which is challenged for the State is by a Civil contention of the body against the Head, or of other part of th● body against the Head, and another part of the body. 2. That defence, which was allowed against Ministers of Power in their unavoidable assaults, was without all off●nee, but this defence by Armies, which is challenged, for the State cannot be so. 3. That power of defence is such as nature hath endued every particular man with, and the law of the Society hath not forbidden so fare forth, as was said, to be used: but this is such a power as no Law enables Subjects to, a taking and using of the Sword without warrant, as hath been often shown. 4. Such near personal defence is not destructive of Order, but this by the civil contention of the Head and body, is, as at this day.  
The Pleaders for Defensive Arms, make a long reply to that which in my first Trea●, was spoken, concerning this personal defence, the substance of it is. First, though the body natural can do nothing against, or without the guidance of the Head, yet the Body Politic can, being a company of Reasonable men, whose actions may be divided from their Head. Pag. 14.15. Answ. They are Reasonable men, but as they make up the body politic, the Law is their Reason, and they cannot move or act further than it directs them, nor can they divide themselves from the Head, to which the Law joins them, nor of themselves, perform the supreme Acts of Power belonging to the Head. 2. It is granted, the body Politic may defend itself against an outward force, then suppose the King employ Danes or Irish, against the Kingdom, may we resist, Pag. 15. Answ. I determine nothing of their supposition, which I hope will never come to pass; but they should have considered, when the Doctor said, the Body politic defends itself against an outward force, li●●e as the body natural doth, he did not take the body politic divided from the Head, as it is in the civil Contention. 3. The Doctor supposeth the Prince bent to subvert Religion, Liberties, Lowes, what greater destruction of Order can be feared by such antention or resistance. Pag. 15.16. Answ. What was meant by that supposition, hath been often explained, the Prince bend, or seduced to subvert, (i. e.) doing many acts arbitrarily, which of themselves tend to subversion, but indeed the Frame of Government & Laws cannot be subverted without the consent of the two Houses. It may happen, that actual invasions may be made upon them; and it is plain, that such had better be borne with, and other lawful and reasonable remedies sought, then to endeavour a forcible redress by a Civil Contention, for under such actual invasions, of the Subject's Rights, nay under the greatest Tyranny, there is more Order, Law, and Justice, then under such civil discords and Wars, as was fully evinced above, by the 7. and 8. Reasons.  
The fourth Reason of the Author of the Treat. of Monarchy is grounded upon that false supposal of the two Houses being joined with the King, in the very Sovereign Power, pag. 55. which was at large examined above. His last reason is from the Power of inferior Courts, where the Judge it to proceed to the Censure, and punishment of the Malefactor, notwithstanding the Kings Warrant to the contrary, much rather may the assaults of p●tvate men be resisted by the Parliament, pag. 56. Answ. The Argument from the process of inferior Courts to sentence and punishment, or from the Parliaments power to resist and commit such private men assaulting them, is altogether inconsequent to prove their power to raise Armies, and by them to oppose the Forces of their Sovereign, which is the resistance supposed in the Question, and condemned as unwarrantable by all that hath hitherto been spoken from the Constitution of this Government, from Scripture, and from Reason.  
And all this that hath been spoken hitherto, belongs to the Resolution of the first Question, That it is not lawful for Subjects, upon the supposed Ca●e of the Princes subv●rsive Exorbitances, to take Arms and resist as at this day, The other should follow: that the Case supposed is not now, or, That they have no, those Causes for their Arms, which they pretend. But of this there hath been so much said in so many Declarations, and Books, written to inform the world aright, that I need not be any longer troublesome, only I would desire the Reader, upon their pretending the defence of the established Religion and Laws by these Arms, to consider;  
First, that they cannot say, another Religion is commanded or enforced upon them, only they will say they fear a change, I would to God, that all offences, which the liberty of these unsettled times has produced, were taken out of the way: but was there ever any before these Times so desperare, as to maintain, Subjects might fight against their Sovereign, for a Religion they freely enjoy, only because they fear a prevailing of the Contrary? And if the Reader do consider, that this Army (which pretends the defence of the Established Religion) besides some Tr●●●es of Foreigners and Papists, and some Bands of unwilling Prest-men, has its chief strength from the prevalency of such Sects, as are condemned by Laws of this Land, he may well cry out in the words of the Homily above cited, What Religion is it that such men would by such means maintain?— A frantic Religion needs such furious Maintenances, as is Rebellion.  
II. They cannot but say, that the continuance of the established Religion, and of the Government of Church and State, together with a just Reformation of all abuses has been offered, promised, protested for by their Sovereign ●. but this will not content them, unless the established Liturgy may be abolished, the Government of the Church by Bishops, which has always been, may be no more, and the Power which by Law is his Majesties, put into their hands. And because these are not granted, their Arms are continued, and for the maintaining of them, the Liberty and Property of their fellow Subjects is invaded. So that if the Question be put, who are those misemployed fellow Subjects, that these men pretend to fight against? It is plain, they are such, as defend their Sovereign's Power and Rights, the Established Religion and Government of this Church and State, their own property and Liberty: in a word, such, as will not change their Sovereign, or the Established Frame of Government. The God of power and Wisdom cast out all Counsels, and defeat all designs, that are against the restoring of our peace, and the continuance of the true Reformed Religion. Amen.  
FINIS.