THE NECESSITY OF The Absolute Power of all KINGS: And in particular, OF THE KING OF ENGLAND.   printer's or publisher's device 
At LONDON, Printed in the year, 1648.   

THE NECESSITY OF The Absolute Power of all KINGS: AND In particular, of the KING of ENGLAND.  
TO Majesty or Sovereignty belongeth an Absolute Power not subject to any Law. It behoveth him that is a Sovereign, not to be in any sort subject to the command of another; whose office is to give Laws unto his subjects, to abrogate Laws unprofitable, and in their stead to establish other, which he cannot do, that is himself subject to Laws; or to others which have command over him: And that is it for which the Law saith, that The Prince is acquitted from the Power of the Laws.  
The Laws, Ordinances, Letters Patents, Privileges, and Grants of Princes, have no force but during their life; if they be not ratified by the express consent, or at least by sufferance of the Prince following, who had knowledge thereof.  
If the Sovereign Prince be exempted from the Laws of his Predecessors, much less shall he be bound unto the Laws he maketh himself; for a man may well receive a Law from another man, but impossible it is in Nature for to give a Law unto himself, no more than it is to command a man's self in a matter depending of his own will; There can be no Obligation which taketh State from the mere will of him that promiseth the same; which is a necessary reason to prove evidently that a King cannot bind his own hands, albeit that he would: We see also in the end of all Laws these words, Because it hath so pleased us. To give us to understand, that the Laws of a Sovereign Prince although they be grounded upon reason, yet depend upon nothing but his mere & frank good will. But as for the Laws of God, all Princes and people are unto them subject; neither is it in their power to impugn them, if they will not be guilty of High Treason against God; under the greatness of whom, all Monarches of the world ought to bow their heads in all fear and Reverence.  
Question may be, Whether a Prince be subject to the Laws of his Country that he hath sworn to keep or not? If a Sovereign Prince promise by Oath to his subjects to keep the Laws, he is bound to keep them; not for that a Prince is bound to keep his Laws, or by his Predecessors, but to the just Conventions and promises which he hath made; be it by Oath, or without any Oath at all, as should a private man be; and for the same causes that a private man may be relieved from his unjust and unreasonable promise, as for that it was so grievous, or for that he was by deceit or fraud circumvented, or induced thereunto by error, or force, or just fear, or by some great hurt: Even for the same causes the Prince may be restored in that which toucheth the diminishing of his Majesty: And so our Maxim resteth, that the Prince is not subject to his Laws, nor to the Laws of his Predecessors, but well to his own just and reasonable Conventions.  
The Sovereign Prince may derogate unto the Laws that he hath promised and sworn to keep, if the equity thereof cease, and that of himself, without consent of his subjects; which his subjects cannot do among themselves, if they be not by the Prince relieved.  
The foreign Princes well advised, will never take Oath to keep the Laws of their Predecessors, for otherwise they are not Sovereigns.  
Notwithstanding all Oaths, the Prince may derogate from the Laws, or frustrate or disannul the same, the Reason and equity of them ceasing.  
There is not any bond for the Sovereign Prince to keep the Laws, more than so fare as Right and Justice requireth.  
Neither is it to be found that the Ancient Kings of the Hebrews took any Oaths, no not they which were anointed by Samuel, Elias, and others.  
As for General and particular, which concern the Right of men in private, they have not used to be otherwise changed, but after General assembly of the three estates in France; not for that it is necessary for the King to rest on their advice, or that he may not do the contrary to that they demand, if natural Reason and Justice so require. And in that the greatness and Majesty of a true Sovereign Prince is to be known, when the estates of all the people assembled together in all humility, present their requests and supplications to their Prince, without having any Power in any thing to command, or determine, or to give voice, but that that which it pleaseth the King to like or dislike, to command or forbidden, is holden for Law. Wherein they which have written of the duty of Magistrates, have deceived themselves, in maintaining that the Power of the people is greater than the Prince; a thing which oft times causeth the true Subjects to revolt from the obedience which they own unto their Sovereign Prince, and ministereth matter of great troubles in Commonwealths; of which their opinion, there is neither reason nor ground.  
If the King should be subject unto the assemblies and decrees of the people, he should neither be King nor Sovereign, and the Commonwealth neither Realm nor Monarchy; but a mere Aristocracy of many Lords in Power equal, where the greater part commandeth the less; and whereon the Laws are not to be published in the name of him that ruleth, but in the name and Authority of the estates, as in an Aristocratical signory; where he that is chief hath no Power, but oweth obeisance to the signory; unto whom yet they every one of them feign themselves to owe their Faith and obedience, which are all things so absurd, as hard it is which is furthest from Reason.  
When Charles 8, the French King, then but fourteen years old, held a Parliament at Towers, although the Power of the Parliament was never before nor after so great as in those times; yet Relli then the Speaker for the People turning himself to the King, thus beginneth: Most High, most Mighty, and most Christian King; our Natural and only Lord: We poor, humble, and obedient Subjects, etc. which are come hither by your Command, in all Humility, Reverence, and Subjection; present ourselves before you, etc. And have given me in charge from all this Noble Assembly to declare unto You, the good will and hearty desire they have, with a most fervent resolution, to serve, obey, and aid You in all Your affairs, Commandments, and pleasures: All this speech is nothing else but a Declaration of their good will towards the King, and of their humble Obedience and Loyalty.  
The like speech was used in the Parliament at Oreans to Charles 9 when he was scarce eleven years old.  
Neither are the Parliaments in Spain otherwise holden, but that even a greater Obedience of all the people is given to the King, as is to be seen in the Acts of the Parliament at Toledo by King Philip, 1552. when he yet was scarce twenty five years old: The answers also of the King of Spain unto the Requests and humble Supplications of his people, are given in these words; We will, or else, We Decree or Ordain; yea, the Subsidies that the Subjects pay unto the King of Spain, they call Service.  
In the Parliaments of England, which have commonly been holden every third year, the estates seem to have a great liberty, (as the Northern people almost all breath thereafter) yet so it is, that in effect they proceed not but by way of supplications and requests to the King. As in the Parliament holden in Octob: 1566. when the States by a common Consent had resolved (as they gave the Queen to understand) not to entreat of any thing, until She had first appointed who should succeed Her in the Crown; She gave them no other answer, but that they were not to make her grave before She were dead: All whose resolutions were to no purpose without her good liking, neither did She in that, any thing that they required.  
Albeit by the sufferance of the King of England, Controversies between the King and His people are sometimes determined by the High Court of Parliament; yet all the estates remain in full subjection to the King, who is no way bound to follow their advice, neither to consent to their Requests.  
The estates of England are never otherwise assembled, no more than they are in France or Spain, then by Parliament writs and express commandments proceeding from the King: which showeth very well that the estates have no Power of themselves to Determine, Command, or Decree any thing, seeing they cannot so much as assemble themselves, neither being assembled depart without express Commandment from the King.  
Yet this may seem one special thing, that the Laws made by the King of England, at the request of the Estates, cannot be again repealed, but by calling a Parliament; which is much used and done as I have understood by Mr Dale the English Ambassador, an honourable Gentleman, and a man of good understanding, who yet assured me the King received or rejected the Law, as seemed best to Himself; and stuck not to dispose thereof at His Pleasure, and contrary to the will of the Estates, as we see Hen. 8. to have always used his Sovereign Power, and with his only word, to have disannulled the Decrees of Parliament.  
We conclude the Majesty of a Prince to be nothing altered or diminished by the calling together or presence of the Estates: But to the contrary, His Majesty thereby to be much the greater and the more Honourable, seeing all His people to acknowledge Him for their Sovereign.  
We see the Principal point of Sovereign Majesty and absolute Power to consist principally in giving Laws unto the Subjects without their consent: It behoveth that the Sovereign Prince should have the Laws in his Power, to change and amend them according as the case shall require.  
In a Monarchy every one in particular must swear to the Observation of the Laws, and their Allegiance to one Sovereign Monarch; who, next unto God, (of whom he holds his Sceptre and Power) is bound to no man: For an Oath carrieth always with it Reverence unto whom, and in whose name it is made, as still given to a Superior, and therefore the vassal giveth such Oath unto his Lord, but receiveth none from him again, though they be mutually bound, the one of them to the other.  
Trajan swore to keep the Laws, although he in the name of a Sovereign Prince were exempted; but never any of the Emperors before him so swore; therefore Pliny the younger in a Panagyricall Oration speaking of the Oath of Trojan, giveth out a great novelty, saith he, and never before heard of, He sweareth by whom we swear.  
Of two things, the one must be, to wit, the Prince that sweareth to keep the Laws of his Country, must either not have the Sovereignty, or else become a perjured man, if he should but abrogate but one Law contrary to his Oath, whereas it is not only ptofitable that a Prince should sometimes abrogate some such Laws, but also necessary for him to alter or correct them, as the infinite variety of places, times and Persons, shall require: Or if we shall say the Prince to be still a Sovereign, & yet nevertheless with such condition as that he can make no Law without the advice of his Council or people; he must also be dispensed with by his subjects for the Oath which he hath made for the observation of the Laws, and the subjects again which are obliged to the Laws, have also need to be dispensed with all by their Prince, for fear they should be perjured: So shall it come to pass, that the Majesty of the Commonweal inclining now to this side, now to that side; sometimes the Prince, sometimes the People bearing sway, shall have no certainty to rest upon, which are notable absurdities, and altogether incompatible with the Majesty of absolute Sovereignty, and contrary both to Law and Reason: And yet we see many men that think they see more in the matter than others, will maintain it to be most necessary that Princes should be bound by Oath to keep the Laws and Customs of their Countries; In which doing, they weaken and overthrow all the Rights of Sovereign Majesty, which ought to be most Sacred and Holy, and confound the Sovereignty of one Sovereign Monarch with an Aristocracy or Democracie.  
Publication or Approbation of Laws, in the Assembly of the Estates or Parliament, is with us of great importance for the keeping of the Laws, not that the Prince is bound to any such approbation, or cannot of himself make a Law, without the consent of the Estates or people; yet it is a courteous part to do it by the good liking of the Senate.  
What if a Prince by Law, forbidden to kill or steal, is he not bound to obey his own Laws? I say, that this Law is not his, but the Law of God, whereunto all Princes are more straight bound then their Subjects; God taketh a stricter account of Princes than others, as Solomon a King hath said, whereto agreeth Marcus Aurelius, saying, The Magistrates are Judges over private men, Princes judge the Magistrates, and God the Princes.  
It is not only a Law of Nature, but also oftentimes repeated among the Laws of God, that we should be obedient unto the Laws of such Princes as it hath pleased God to set to Rule and Reign over us; if their Laws be not directly repugnant unto the Laws of God, whereunto all Princes are as well bound as their subjects: For as the Vassal oweth his Oath of fidelity unto his Lord, towards, and against all men, except his Sovereign Prince: So the subject oweth his Obedience to his Sovereign Prince, towards, and against all, the Majesty of God excepted, who is the absolute Sovereign of all the Princes in the world.  
To confound the state of Monarchy, with the Popular or Aristocratical estate, is a thing impossible, and in effect incompatible, and such as cannot be imagined: For Sovereignty being of itself indivisible, how can it at one and the same time be divided betwixt one Prince, the Nobility, and the people in common? The first mark of Sovereign Majesty is, to be of Power to give Laws, and to command over them unto the subjects; and who should those subjects be that should yield their obedience to the Law, if they should have also Power to make the Laws? who should he be that could give the Law, being himself constrained to receive it of them, unto whom he himself gave it? so that of necessity we must conclude, that as no one in particular hath the Power to make the Law in such a state, that there the state must needs be popular.  
Never any Commonwealth hath been made of an Aristocracy and Popular Estate, much less of the three Estates of a Commonwealth.  
Such States wherein the Right of Sovereignty are divided, are not rightly to be called Commonweals, but rather the corruption of Commonweals; as Herodotus hath most briefly, but truly written.  
Commonweals which change their State, the Sovereign Right and Power of them being divided, find no rest from Civil wars.  
If the Prince be an absolute Sovereign, as are the true Monarches of France, of Spain, of England, Scotland, Turkey, Muscovy, Tartary, Persia, Aethiopia, India, and almost of all the Kingdoms of afric and Asia; where the Kings themselves have the Sovereignty without all doubt or question, not divided with their subjects: In this case it is not lawful for any one of the subjects in particular, or all of them in general, to attempt any thing either by way of fact or of justice, against the Honour, Life, or Dignity of the Sovereign; albeit he had commited all the wickedness, impiety, and cruelty that could be spoke. For as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subject hath not such jurisdiction over his Sovereign Prince, of whom dependeth all Power to Command, and who may not only revoke all the Power of his Magistrates; but even in whose presence the Power of all Magistrates, Corporations, Estates and Communities cease.  
Now if it be not lawful for the Subject by the way of justice to proceed against a King, how should it then be lawful to proceed against him by way of fact or Force? for question is not here what men are able to do by strength and Force, but what they ought of Right to do; as not whether the subject have power and strength, but whether they have lawful power to condemn their Sovereign Prince.  
The subject is not only guilty of Treason in the highest Degree who hath slain his Sovereign Prince, but even he also which hath attempted the same, who hath given Counsel or consent thereto; yea, if he have concealed the same, or but so much as thought it: Which fact the Laws have in such detestation, as that when a man guilty of any offence or Crime, dyeth before he be condemned thereof, he is deemed to have died in whole and perfect Estate, except he have conspired against the Life and Dignity of his Sovereign Prince: This only thing they have thought to be such, as that for which he may worthily seem to have been now already judged and condemned, yea even before he was thereof accused. And albeit the Laws inflict no punishment upon the evil thoughts of men, but on those only which by word or deed break out into some Enormity; yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the Violating of the Person of his Sovereign Prince, although he have attempted nothing, they have yet judged this same thought worthy of death; notwithstanding what repentance soever he have had thereof.  
Lest any men should think [Kings or Princes] themselves to have been the Authors of these Laws, so the more straight to provide for their own safety and Honour, let us see the Laws and examples of holy Scripture.  
Nabuchodonosor King of Assyria, with fire and sword destroyed all the Country of Palestina, besieged Jerusalem, took it, robbed and razed it down to the ground, burns the Temple, and defiles the Sanctuary of God, slew the King, with the greatest part of the people, carrying away the rest into Captivity into Babylon, caused the image of himself made in gold to be set up in public place, commanding all men to adore and worship the same upon pain of being burnt alive, and caused them that refused so to do, to be cast into a burning Furnace. And yet for all that, the holy Prophet's [Baruch 1. Jeremy 29.] directing their letters unto their brethren the Jews, then in Captivity in Babylon, will them to pray unto God for the good and happy life of Nabuchodonosor and his children, and that they might so long Rule and Reign over them as the Heavens should endure: Yea even God Himself doubted not to call Nabuchodonosor his servant, saying, that he would make him the most Mighty Prince of the world, and yet was there never a more detestable Tyrant than he; who not contended to be himself worshipped, but caused his Image also to be adored, and that upon pain of being burnt quick.  
We have another rare example of Saul, who possessed with an evil Spirit, caused the Priests of the Lord to be without just cause slain, for that one of them had received David flying from him, and did what in his power was to kill or cause to be killed the same David, a most innocent Prince; by whom he had got so many victories, at which time he fell twice himself into David's hands, who blamed of his Soldiers for that he would not suffer his so mortal Enemy then in his power to be slain; being in assured hope to have enjoyed the Kingdom after his death, he detested their Counsel, saying, God forbidden that I should suffer the Person of a King, the Lords Anointed to be violated. Yea, he himself defended the same King persecuting of him, whenas he commanded the Soldiers of his guard overcome by wine and sleep to be wakened.  
And at such time as Saul was slain, and that a Soldier thinking to do David a pleasure, presented him with Saul's head, David caused the same Soldier to be slain which had brought him the head, saying, Go thou wicked, how dared thou lay thy impure hands upon the Lords Anointed? thou shalt surely die therefore.  
And afterwards, without all dissimulation mourned himself for the dead King: All which is worth good consideration, for David was by Saul prosecuted to death, and yet wanted not Power to have revenged himself, being become stronger than the King; besides, he was the chosen of God, and anointed by Samuel to be King, and had married the King's Daughter: And yet for all that, he abhorred to take upon him the title of a King; and much more to attempt any thing against the Life or Honour of Saul, or to Rebel against him; but chose rather to banish himself out of the Realm, then in any sort so seek the King's destruction.  
We doubt not, but David a King and a Prophet, led by the Spirit of God, had always before his eyes the Law of God, Ex. 22.28. Thou shalt not speak evil of thy Prince, nor detract the Magistrate; neither is there any thing more Common in Holy Scripture, than the forbidding not only to kill or attempt the Life or Honour of a Prince, but even for the very Magistrates, although saith the Scripture, they be wicked and naught.  
The Protestant Princes of Germany, before they entered into Arms against Charles the Emperor, demanded of Martin Luther if it were lawful for them so to do or not; who frankly told them, that it were not Lawful whatsoever Tyranny or impiety were pretended, yet was he not therein by them believed; so thereof ensued a deadly and most lamentable war, the end whereof was most miserable; drawing with it, the Ruin of many great and noble houses of Germany, with exceeding slaughter of the Subjects.  
The Prince, whom you may justly call the Father of the Country, aught to be to every man dearer and more Reverend than any Father, as one Ordained and sent unto us by God. The subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against the Prince, how naughty and cruel soever he be; lawful it is, not to obey him in things contrary to the Laws of God, to fly and hid ourselves from him, but yet to suffer stripes, yea, and death also, rather than to attempt any thing against his life and Honour. O how many Tyrants should there be, if it should be Lawful for subjects to kill Tyrants? How many good and innocent Princes should as Tyrants perish by the Conspiracy of their subjects against them? he that should of his subjects but exact subsidies, should be then, as the vulgar people esteem him, a Tyrant: He that should rule and command contrary to the good liking of the people, should be a Tyrant: He that should keep strong guards and Garrisons for the safety of his Person, should be a Tyrant: He that should put to death Traitors and Conspirators against his State, should be also counted a Tyrant. How should good Princes be assured of their lives, if under colour of Tyranny they might be slain by their subjects, by whom they ought to be defended?  
In a well ordered State, the Sovereign Power must remain in one only, without communicating any part thereof unto the State, (for in that case it should be a popular Government, & no Monarchy) wise Politicians, Philosophers, Divines, and Historiographers, have highly commended a Monarchy above all other Commonweals, it is not to please the Prince, that they hold this opinion; but for the safety and happiness of the subjects. And contrariwise, when as they shall limit and restrain the Sovereign Power of a Monarch, to subject him to the general Estates, or to the Council; the Sovereignty hath no firm Foundation, but they frame a popular confusion, or a miserable Anarchy, which is the Plague of all Estates and Commonweals: The which must be duly considered, not giving credit to their goodly discourses, which persuade subjects that it is necessary to subject Monarches, and to prescribe their Prince a Law; for that is not only the Ruin of the Monarch, but also of the subjects. It is yet more strange that many hold opinion, that the Prince is subject to his Laws, that is to say, subject to his will, whereon the Laws which he hath made depend, a thing impossible in Nature. And under this colour, and ill digested opinion, they make a mixture and confusion of Civil Laws, with the Laws of Nature and of Cod.  
A pure absolute Monarchy is the surest Common-weal, and without Comparison, the best of all. Wherein many are abused, which maintain that an Optimacy is the best kind of Government, for that many Commanders have more Judgement, Wisdom, and Council than one alone. But there is a great difference betwixt Council and Commandment.  
The Council of many wise men, may be better than of one; but to Resolve, Determine, and to Command, one will always perform it better than many: He which hath advisedly digested all their opinions, will soon resolve without contention; the which many cannot easily perform: it is necessary to have a Sovereign Prince, which may have Power to Resolve and Determine of the opinions of his Council.  
The End.