RIGHT And MIGHT well met, OR, A brief and unpartial enquiry into the late and present proceed of the Army under the Command of His EXCELLENCY the LORD FAIRFAX.  
Wherein the equity and regularness of the said proceed are demonstratively vindicated upon undeniable Principles, as well of Reason, as RELIGION.  
TOGETHER With satisfactory Answers to all material Objections against them.  
By JOHN GOODWIN.  
Judge not according to the appearance, but judge righteous judgement,  John 7. 24. 
He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination unto the Lord,  Prov. 17. 15. 
Plus togae laesere Rempublicam, quàm loricae,  Tertul. 
Necessitas, quae cogit, excusat.  Sen. 
LONDON, Printed by Matthew Simmons, for Henery Cripps in Popes-head Alley, 1648.   

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE LORD FAIRFAX, And his Honourable Council at Wars,  
I make no question but your EXCELLENCY, and Honourable Council; have, without putting any stumbling-block of iniquity before your faces, consulted all Oracles of Conscience & Honour, about your present, and late proceedings, before you lifted up an hand unto them. The clearness and integrity of your hearts herein, cannot (I presume) but laugh to scorn all the hard say, and clamorous imputations of men, who●…ot the knowledge of Truth, 
Facundum saciebat amor.  but love to themselves; makes eloquent i● diclaiming against you. The import of your actions standing in full conjunction with that great and public Interest of the Kingdom, must needs carry in it an opposition to the irregular and by interests of such men, who fear that they must scatter, if the Kingdom once gins to gather. And it need not seem at all strange to you, that men of wit and parts otherwise, having the advance of such an antiperistasis, as the tenor of your proceed accommodates them with, 
Grande doloris ingenium est.  should be able to misfigure the liberal and ingenious face of your actions into an absolute deformity. There is no heart of Oak, or other timber, though never so sound, but that a cunning Painter, especially under some particular elevation of fancy for such a work, will put into a colour of rottenness, and make it look as if it were stark naught. That the glorious work of casting out Devils by the finger of God, was represented unto the people under the notion of as vile and hateful an action, as lightly can be imagined; no better, than a working by Belzebub the chief of the Devils. But the best is, that they that speak evil of worthy actions, double their reward in heaven.  
Hearing and observing the tongues of your enemies hard at work on every side, in making your sweet things, bitter, your smooth things, rough, and your straight things, crooked, in the imaginations of men, I betook myself to my Pen to Counter-worke them, what I may, by resolving your actions into their proper and clear principles of righteousness and honour. If I had only the reasons and judgements of men to encounter, I should not question a conquest by satisfaction; but when men's judgements are steeled with interest and affection, force of reason and dint of argument, prove (for the most part) but like arrows shot against a wall of brass. The Holy Ghost takes special notice, that the Pharisees, being covetous, 
Lu. 16. 14.  derided our Saviour, notwithstanding his most heavenly and convincing Doctrine and discourse against that sin.  
I make bold with your Names for countenance to these papers, and humbly present them unto your hand, not to inform you of the righteousness of your Actions (wherein I doubt not but you were satisfied from Heaven, before they were in being) but partly to obtain the safer conduct for them to pass abroad, and partly to account with you for those respects of honour which are, and have been long due unto you from  
Your Faithful Servant in the Lord 
 JOHN GOODWIN. From my Study Jan. 1. 1648.   

Right and might Well met.  
THat the children of prey, and men lately under hope of dividing the spoil of this miserable Kingdom, when it should be reduced under the iron rod of enslaving tyranny and oppression (between which sad condition, and it, there was now but a step) should rise up with passionate outcries, and be ready to curse the Army and their late proceed, with bell, book, and candle, is no matter of wonder, or much observation. But if the body of the people of the Land, or such who have no mind to be gratified with the sorrows or sigh of innocent men, should profess any dissatisfaction, or stoned in conscience about the lawfulness or justness of such their engagements; it would argue, either first, that they always lived not only free from oppression, but from the fear of it also, & so never had occasion to inquire, either upon what grounds, and by what means, oppression imminent may lawfully be prevented, or incumbent, be shaken off and suppressed; or else, in case they have suffered under oppression, that they never saw any visible or probable means of deliverance, and so wanted an inviting opportunity to consider, whether these means might lawfully be improved in order to such an end, or no. For certainly the grounds and principles upon which the said proceed of the Army stand clear and justifiable, are no parables, no dark, or disputable notions, or conceptions, but such, wherein even he that runneth, may read equity and truth; and which have been asserted for such, by grave, learned, and judicious men, who neither lent, nor took upon usury; I mean, who were no ways interested in any such concernment, or case, as that now upon trial.  
Though some other things have been of late acted by the Army, 
Sect. 2.  wherein many pretendingly complain of want of conscience and justice; yet I suppose they have done nothing, either more obnoxious to the clamorous tongues and pens of their adversaries, or more questionable in the judgements and consciences of their friends, than that late garbling of the Parliament, wherein they sifted out much of the dross and soil of that heap, intending to reduce this body, upon the regular motion whereof, the well being, indeed, the (civil) life of the whole Kingdom depends, to such members, who had not manifestly turned head upon their trust, nor given the right hand of fellowship to that most barbarous, inhuman, and bloody faction amongst us, who for many years last passed have with restless endeavours procured the deep trouble, and attempted the absolute enslaving, (which is, being interpreted, the utter undoing) of the Nation. So that if this action of theirs shall approve itself, and appear to be regular and conformable to such laws, and rules of justice, which all considering and disengaged men conclude aught to be followed and observed in such cases, as that which lay before them; especially if it shall appear to have been the legitimate issue of true worth and Christianity; I presume all their other actions of like tenor and import, will partake of the same justification, and honour, with it.  
Let us first take into consideration the substance of such exceptions, 
Sect. 3.  which can with any pretence of reason, or colour of conscience be levied against the lawfulness of it; Afterwards if it be needful, we will consider further, whether those that be with it, be not more, or at least more weighty and considerable, than those that are against it.  
The firstborn of the strength of those, who condemn the said act of the Army, as unlawful, lieth in this; that the Actors had no sufficient authority to do what they did therein, but acted out of their sphere, and so became transgressors of that Law, which commandeth every man to keep order, and within the compass of his calling.  
To this I answer 1. 
Sect. 4.  as our Saviour saith, that the Sabbath was made for man (1. for the benefit of man) and not man for the Sabbath 
a Mar. 2. 27. ; so certain it is, that callings were made for men, and not men for callings. Therefore as the law of the Sabbath, though enacted by God, was of right, and according to the intention of the great Lawgiver himself, to give place to the necessary accommodations of men, and ought not to be pleaded in bar hereunto; in like manner, if the law of callings at any time opposeth, or lieth cross to the necessary conveniences of men, during the time of this opposition, it suffereth a total eclipse of the binding power of it. It is a common saying among the Jewish Doctors, that peril of life drives away the Sabbath; yea Master Ainsworth citeth this saying out of the Hebrew Canons: 
Pericusunt vitae pelli Sabbati●….  Circumcision in the time thereof driveth away the Sabbath; and afterwards, that peril of life driveth away all 
b Gen. 17. 12, 13. . So that as there were several cases, wherein (as our Saviour's expression is) they who polluted the Sabbath were blameless 
c Mat. 12. ; In like manner, there are very many cases, wherein men may transgress the ordinary law of Callings, and yet be no transgressors. Therefore unless it can be proved, that the Army had no necessity lying upon them to garble the Parliament as they did; their going beyond their ordinary callings to do it, will no ways impair the credit or legitimateness of the action.  
2. 
Sect. 5.  Nor did they stretch themselves beyond the line of their callings, to act therein as they did. Their calling and commission was, to act in the capacity of Soldiers for the peace, liberties, and safety of the Kingdom. What doth this import, but a calling to prevent, or suppress by force, all such persons and designs, whose faces were set to disturb, or destroy them? Nor did their Commission (I presume) limit or conclude their judgements to any particular kind of enemies, as if they had only power, or a calling thereby, to oppose or suppress, either such, who should confess themselves enemies, or such, who by the Interpretation or vote of any one party, or faction of men in the Kingdoms, should be reputed and deemed enemies: but all such, without exception, whom they, upon competent grounds, and such, as upon which discreet men in ordinary cases are wont to frame acts of judgement, and to proceed to action accordingly, should judge and conclude to be enemies. Or if it shall be supposed, that by their Commission they were limited to judge only those enemies to the Kingdom, with their abettors and supporters, who were in Arms with the King, or on the King's behalf against the Kingdom, in their Representatives; those Parliament-men, whom they have excluded from sitting in that house, having notoriously discovered themselves to be men of this engagement, friends and abettors of those, who very lately were, and yet in part are, in arms against the peace and safety of the Kingdom, in this consideration fall directly and clearly under their commission; and consequently, by warrant hereof, they have, and had a calling, to proceed against them as they did.  
3. 
Sest. 6.  If the calling which the Parliament itself had to levy Forces against the King and his Party, to suppress them, and their proceed, as destructive to the peace, liberties, and safety of the Kingdom, was warrantable and good, then was the calling of the Army to act as they did in the business under debate, warrantable and good also. But the antecedent is true, therefore the consequent also. The minor proposition, viz. that the calling of the Parliament, to levy Forces against the King and his Party, in order to the ends mentioned, was every ways warrantable and good, I presume will not be denied by the Parliament-men themselves. Or if they should deny it, they would but deny the Sun to be up at noonday, inasmuch as the truth thereof hath been brought forth into a clear and perfect light, by many pens, 
Mr. Prynne Sooner. Power of Parliaments and Kingdoms.  yea and by their own (in many of their Declarations) yea, and Mr. Prynne himself hath set it up in a great Volume as upon a mountain, that it cannot be hid; though by the fervency of his late Devotion to the King's interest and cause, he hath attempted the melting down of that mountain.  
The connexion in the major proposition is valid upon this consideration. 
Sect. 7.  The Parliament (or at least the Parliament men who did the thing) had no other calling, to oppose the King and his, by force, but only the general call of the major part of the people, by which they were enabled to act in a Parliamentary capacity, [i. more effectually, and upon more advantageous terms, then singly, or out of such a capacity, they could] for their good. By this call by the major part of the people, they were enabled only in a general, implicit, and indefinite manner, to raise forces against the King and his complices, for the safety, and behoof of the Kingdom. So that the particularity of this action was not warranted simply by the nature, or tenure of their call, but by the regular and due proportion which it had to the accomplishing of the end, for which they were chosen or called, viz. the people's good. From whence it follows, that whether they had been in a Parliamentary capacity, or no, yet if they had been in a sufficient capacity of strength, or power for matter of execution, their call to do it, for substance, had been the same, though not for form. And suppose there had been no Parliament sitting, or in being, when the King and his party risen up in arms against the Peace, Liberties, and safety of the Kingdom; doubtless if any one man had been able to have secured the Kingdom in all these against them, his action had not been censurable for want of a calling to it; in as much as every member, as well in a body politic, as natural, hath a sufficient call, yea an engagement lying by way of duty upon it, to act at any time, and in all cases, according to its best and utmost capacity, or ability, for the preservation and benefit of the whole. Now then, supposing the same proportion to the peace, benefit, and safety of the Kingdom, in what the Army did in purging the Parliament, and in what the Parliament itself did, in opposing the King by force (which is a point of easy demonstration, and is ex super abundanti, proved in the large Remonstrance of the Army lately published) let us consider, whether the call of the Army, to act for the Kingdom as they did, be not as authentic, clear, and full, as that of the Parliament to act as they did, in reference to the same end.  
First, 
Sect. 8.  the authority and power of the people [or rather the present exercise and execution of this power] to act for their own preservation and well being in every kind, was as well formally, and according to the ceremony of the Law, as really, and according to the true intentions and desires of the people, vested in the Parliament. So that the Parliament by virtue of this investiture, and during the same, had the same right of power to raise an Army, and to give unto it what Commission they judged meet, in order to the benefit of the people, or to act any other thing of like tendency, which the people themselves had, to choose for themselves a Parliament. Therefore whatsoever lieth within the verge of the Army's Commission derived from the Parliament, relating to the Kingdom's good, they have as full and formal a call, or warrant, to act, and put in execution, as the Parliament itself had, either to raise an Army, or to do any other act whatsoever. If then first, the ten or of their Commission stood towards any such point as this, (which I presume is no way questionable) viz. to suppress by strong hand, all such persons, whom upon rational grounds they should judge enemies to the peace and welfare of the Kingdom; and secondly, that those Parliament Members, whom now they have cut off from that body, were upon such grounds judged such by them, (of the truth whereof they have given a supersufficient account in their said late Remonstrance;) it is as clear as the Sun that their calling to act as they did in cutting off these Members, is every whit as legitimate and formal, as that of the Parliament itself is to act any thing whatsoever, as a Parliament.  
Nor is it of any value to pretend here, 
Sect. 9  and say, that it is not to be believed, that a Parliament should give any Commission unto men, to act against themselves, or in a destructive way to their privileges, or honours. For to this I answer.  
First, that Lawgivers, whilst they are sober, and in their right minds, may very probably make such Laws, for the ordering and restraint of persons distracted and mad, which, in case they afterwards become distracted, may, and aught to be put in execution, upon themselves. And in case any of those Parliament men, who joined in granting that Commission unto the Army, by which they were enabled to fight, slay and destroy all those that were in arms against the Parliament, should afterwards have turned Cavaliers themselves, and been found in arms against the Parliament (as some of them, If my memory faileth me not, were) they might very lawfully have been encountered and destroyed by the Army, by virtue of that Commission which was granted by themselves.  
Secondly, 
Sect. 10.  what only one Emperor explicitly spoke to an inferior Officer created by him, when he delivered him the Sword; 
Si justè egero, hoc utar is pro me: Si injustè, contrà me.  If I do justly, use this for me; if unjustly, use it against me; the same implicitly, and according to the exigency of the turst committed by Office, doth every superior Magistrate say unto him, whom he chooseth and admitteth into a place of subordinate office, or power under him. For the punishment of evil doers, and so the procurement of the public good, doth notlye by way of Office, or duty, upon the chief Magistrate only, but upon all subordinate Magistrates also, and Officers whatsoever. This is evident from this passage in Peter: Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King, as supreme; Or unto Governors. [i. inferior Magistrates or Officers] as to them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well. 
a 1 Pet. 2. 13, 14.  So then, the punishment of evil doers, and this simply. without all partiality, or distinction of persons, (which are things sinful in all Magistrates whatsoever, as well subordinate, as supreme) and likewise the protection and encouragement of those that do well, lying by way of Office and duty, upon all those, who by the King, or supreme Officer, are invested with any power of authority, though subordinate; evident it is, that whensoever a King, or other Supreme authority, creates an inferior, they invest it with a legitimacy of magistratical power to punish themselves also, in case they prove evil doers; yea and to act any other thing requisite for the praise or encouragement of the good. Nor is there any pretence here for such an exception, as the Apostle Paul finds, in the grand Commission of Christ. But when he saith all things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted, which did put all things under him. 
b 1 Cor. 15. 27.  God the Father being uncapable of sin, is not capable of losing that sovereign dignity, which is native and essential to him; and consequently, not capable of coming into subjection under any creature, as Christ Mediator, in respect of his humane nature, is. But Kings and Magistrates of the highest, being very capable even of such sins, which are destructive to the peace and welfate of the people under them, and repugnant to the encouragement of those that do well, and consequently, which appertain to the cognizince of every Magistrate, to whom the care of such things is entrusted, are very capable also of forfeiting that dignity, which is natural and essential to them, as Kings, or Supreme, and of rendering themselves obnoxious to those authorities and powers, which out of such cases, are under them, but upon such miscarriages, are above them; as Reuben forfeited that excellency of dignity, which appertained to him, as the first borne of his Father, by going up unto his Father's bed. 
b Gen. 49. 3.  Upon this very ground Calvin himself, Zuinglius, and other reformed Divines, and the Scottish Ministers themselves (more generally) and Master Prynne more voluminously than they all, determine and adjudge it, not only lawful, but matter of duty and charge lying upon the subordinate Magistrates, to curb and bridle the tyrannous extravagancies and incursions of Kings and Princes against their people. 
c See Calvin & Zamglius cited by Mr. Prynn, with approbation, upon the account. Sooner. Power of Parl. & Kingdoms, p. 199. And the Scottish Ministers in their brief Thesis de majestatis jure, M. S.  But  
Secondly, suppose the Army had not a call to act as they did, in the case under debate, every ways as full of formality, as the call of the Parliament to act as they did, in opposition to the King, yet might their call be (and indeed was) as material, as weighty, as considerable, and as justifyable in the sight of God, 
Sect. 11.  and of all unprejudiced intelligent men, as the other. The call of the Parliament we spoke of, was from the persons of the people, expressed by formality of words, or other ordinary gestures, testifying such a call from them: and this call they (or most of them) received from the people, whilst as yet they (the people) were in no visible, at least in no imminent or present danger of being fwallowed up in slavery and tyranny. But the call of the Army, to deny the opportunity of the house, to those Members of Parliament, whom they sequested, was from the strong and importonate cries of the people's Liberties, yea and of many of their lives, being now laid upon the Altar, ready to be offered up in sacrifice upon the service of the lust and revenge of a most inhuman gencration of men, who (it seems) thirsted after them with that furiousness of thirst, that they made no spare of their own dear lives themselves to make the purchase, and were now under a great additional enragement, as having been for a long time chased up and down in their own blood, and by a strong hand kept fasting from their desires. Now the calls of the miseries and extremities of men for relief, are more authorising, more urging, pressing, and binding upon the consciences of men, who have wherewithal to afford relief unto them, than the formal requests or elections of men to places of trust or interest, when the electors have no such present or pressing necessity upon them, for the interposal of the elected on their behalf: The necessities of men call more effectually, than men themselves; yea, the truth is, that the calls of men, calling there's to help or assist them, being in a tolerable condition of subsisting, without receiving the help they call for, are but dallyings, or sport, and shadows of calls, in comparison of the loud, vehement, and importunate cries of the exigencies and extremities of men, though the men themselives should hold their peace.  
Fourthly, 
Sect. 12.  (and last to the first objection) the common saying, 
In casu extremae necessitatis omnia sunt communia.  that in case of extreme necessity all things are common, extends unto callings also. In cases of necessity, all callings are common, in order to the supply of the present necessity. David and his men being hungry, 
Aqu. 22ae: qu. 32. art. 7.  were all Priests, in reference to the satisfaction of their hunger, and did, and that lawfully, eat that bread, which (as our Saviour himself affirmeth) was lawful only for the Priests to eat. 
a Mat. 12. 4.  Polanus a reformed Divine of good note, granteth, that when Bishops and Ecclesiastiques are defective either in will, or skill, for the reformation of Religion, and the Church; laics or private men may law fully supply their defect herein, and act the part of Bishops or Ecclesiastical persons, in such reformations. 
b Laicis licet curam de Reformand â Religione, & Ecclesiâ suscipere, cessantibus, vel non facientibus officium, vel facultate destitutis Episcopis & Ecclesiasticis. Polan. Symph. c. 19 Thes. 2.   
When the Pilot, or Master of a Ship at Sea, be either so fare overcome and distempered with drink, or otherwise disabled, as through a phrenetical passion, or sickness in any kind, so that he is uncapable of acting the exigencies of his place; for the preservation of the Ship, being now in present danger, either of running upon a quick sand, or splitting against a rock, etc. anyone, or more of the inferior Mariners, having skill, may, in order to the saving of the Ship, and of the lives of all that are in it, very lawfully assume, and act according to the interest of a Pilot, or Master, and give orders and directions to those with them in the Ship accordingly, who stand bound at the peril of their lives in this case to obey them. By such a comparison as this, Master Prynne himself demonstrates how regular and lawful it is for Parliaments, yea and for particular men, to turn Kings, I mean, to assume that Interest and power, which the Law appropriates to the Office, and vesteth only in the person of the King, when the King steereth a course in manifest opposition to the peace and safety of the Kingdom.  
The passage in Master Prynne, though it be somewhat large, yet being through and home to the point in hand, I shall present Verbatim. Go too now (saith this Anti Protyrannieull Spirit) in this our Politic Ship, the Master gluts himself with Wine, most of his Assistants either asleep, or drunk with mutual cups, sportingly behold an imminent rock. The Ship in the mean time, either holds not that course, which is expedient for the owner, or seems speedily to be wracked. What thinkest thou is here to be done under the Master, by one who is vigilant and solicitous? Shall he pull those by the ears, who are asleep, or only jog them by the sides? but in the mean time, lest he should seem to do aught without their command, shall be not afford his help and assistance to the endangered Ship? Truly what madness, or rather impiety, will this be? Seeing then (as Plato saith) TYRANNY IS A CERTAIN FRENZY and drunkenness, the Prince may utterly subvert the Republic, the most of the Nobles may collude, connive, or at least are fast asleep; the people, who are Lords of the Republic, by the fraud and negligence of their Ministers, which is their fault, are reduced into greatest straits: in the mean time, there is one of the Nobles, which considers the encroaching tyranny, and detests it from his soul: what thinkest thou is now to be done against him by this man? Shall be only admonish his Colleagues of their duty; who themselves do as much hurt as they may? But besides, as it is perilous to admonish, and in that state of things it may be deemed a capital crime: shall he do like those, who contemning other helps, casting away their arms, shall cite Laws, and make an Oration concerning Justice, among thiefs, in the midst of a wood? But this truly is that which is commonly said, to be mad with reason. What then? shall he grow deaf at the people's groans? Shall he be silent at the entrance of thiefs? Or shall he finally grow lazy, and put his hands into his bosom? But if the Laws appoint the punishment of a Traitor against one wearing buskins on his legs, who counterfeits sickness for fear of the enemies, what punishment at least shall we decree against him, who either through malice, or slothfulness, shall betray those whom he hath undertaken to protect? But rather he shall command those things that are needful to such as are wary, by a Mariner's shout: he shall take care lest the Commonwealth receive any detriment, and shall preserve the Kingdom even against the Kings will and resistance, by WHICH HE HIMSELF BECOMES A KING and shall cure the King himself as a frantic man, by BINDING HIS HANDS AND FEET, if he may not otherwise do it. Thus fare Mr. Prynne; and full far enough to justify whatsoever is said in these papers for the justification of the Army in their binding the hands and feet of some frantic Parliament men (as himself in a Platonic strain phraseth those, who either thorough malice, or slothfulness, shall betray those, whom they have undertaken to protect.)  
It were easy to multiply instances of like import. But by what hath been argued, the nullity of that argument against the proceed of the Army, drawn from the defect of a calling to act as they did, fully appeareth.  
A second Objection is this: 
Sect. 13.  They resisted Authority, or the powers lawfully set over them; 
The second main objection.  and therein, the ordinance of God: therefore their fact is to be condemned and cannot be justified: I answer,  
First, To resist Authority, imports either a detracting or denial of obedience to the just commands of Authority, or else the engaging of a man's self to dissolve, and take away Authority. Now certain it is that the Army, in that act of theirs now in question, neither did the one, or the other. First, the authority of Parliament, had made no such Act, passed no such Vote, that none of their Members, though voting, or acting never so palbably, or with never so high an hand against the Interest, peace, and liberties of the Kingdom, should be debarred sitting in their house. In which respect, the Army debarring those Members, which had thus voted and acted, from sitting in that House, did not resist Authority in the former sense. Or in case it should be supposed, that the authority of Parliament, had made such an act, or passed such a Vote, as that mentioned, unless the equity and justness of it could be sufficiently cleared, the crime of resisting authority could not upon any sufficient ground be imputed to those, who should decline obedience to it.  
Secondly, 
Sect. 14.  neither did the Army in the aforesaid act, resist authority in the latter sense; because what they did, no way imported any dislike of Parliament authority, nor had any tendency towards the abolition, or taking of it away; but only employed a disapprovement of the factious carriage of things in this present Parliament, as evidently bend against the safety, liberties, and well being of the Nation; and tended withal towards a prevention of the like, or worse, for the future. But as for their approbation of, and resolutions to maintain Parliaments, and Parliamentary authority (stared and form in a regular and due proportion to the behoof and benefit of the Kingdom) they stand abundantly declared to all the World in their late Remonstrance.  
If it be here yet further said; 
Sect. 15.  yea but though it should be granted, that they did not resist Authority, in either of the two considerations specified, yet they did that, which was worse, or every whit as bad, as either of them. For they offered violence to persons in authority, and would not suffer them to act in that authoritative capacity, which was lawfully vested in them; To this also I answer;  
First, it is lawful for any man, even by violence, to wrest a Sword out of the hand of a mad man, though it be never so legally his, from whom it is wrested. The reason is, because in case a man that is mad, should be let alone with a Sword in his hand, either until he be willing of himself to part with it, or until it can be recovered from him by a due process and course in Law, there is a probability in reason, and according to the frequent experience of the workings of such a distemper, that he will do much mischief with it in the mean time: and the lives and limbs of men, are to be preferred before the exorbitant wills, or humours of men underdistemper. This is the very case in hand. The Members of Parliament dis-housed by the Army, were strangely struck with a political frenzy (as Plato termeth it;) they acted as men bereft of their senses, that had quite forgotten the business committed unto them, and that knew, or understood nothing of matters relating to the peace or well being of the Kingdom, or of those who had entrusted them with their power: their counsels and votes of late still smiled upon their own enemies, and the grand and most inveterate enemies of the Kingdom, but frowned and looked ghastly upon their friends, and those that had constantly guarded them with their lives and estates. 
Hic furor haud dubius; haec est manifesta phrenesis.  i. 
This madness is without all doubt,  
And frenzy manifest throughout.   
Now then Parliamentary power being in the hands of these men, but as a sword or spear in the hand of a man distraught in his wits and senses, wherewith he is like to do little or no good but in continual danger of doing much harm, it might very lawfully, and with the full consent of all principles of reason, equity, and conscience, be se'zed upon, and taken from them by a strong hand, for the prevention of such mischiefs and miseries, which, remaining in their hand, it daily and hourly threatened to bring upon the whole Nation and Kingdom.  
Secondly, 
Sect. 16.  The King had as legal and formal in investiture into to the power of the Militia, of sitting in Parliament, etc. as these men had unto their Parliamentary places and trusts: yet did not the Parliament unjustly, or contrary to rules of equity, upon a plenary discovery of a bent in his will and counsels to suppress the liberties of the Nation, to deprive him, and that by force, of the enjoyment and exercise of those interests and privileges, notwithstanding the legality of their investiture in him. Therefore upon a like discovery of the same bent in the wills and counsels of these Parliament men, the lawfulness of their elections into their places of trust, cannot reflect any unlawfulness upon that act, by which they were removed from, or debarred of them.  
Thirdly, 
Sect. 17.  (and last) there is no Client that hath entertained a Lawyer, or Advocate to plead his cause, but upon discovery, yea or jealousy, of prevarication, and false-heartedness to him in his cause, may lawfully discharge him, his entertainment notwithstanding. There is the same liberty in a Pupil, or person in his minority, to dis-entrust his Goardian, how lawfully soever chosen, upon suspicion of maladministration, or unfaithfulness. And why should the like liberty be denied unto a people or Nation, for the removing of such persons, whom they have chosen for Guardians to their Estates and Liberties, from these places of trust, when they evidently discern a direct tendency in their proceed, to betray them, both in the one and the other, unto their enemies?  
But two things (it is like) will be here objected. First, that the Parliament were Judges lawfully constituted, of the King's delinquency against the Kingdom; but the Army were no Judges of such a constitution, of the miscarriages of the Parliament. Therefore there is not the same consideration, in point of lawfulness, in the proceed of the Army against the Parliament, which is of the Parliaments proceeding against the King. There is the same difference likewise between the act of a Client and Pupil, wherein the one dischargeth his Advocate, and the other his Guardian; and the act of the Army, in dethroning the Parliament men. To this I answer,  
First, 
Sect. 18.  That whether we place the lawfulness of a Parliamentary Judicature in respect of the King's Delinquency, either in their Election by the people, or in the conformity of this their Election unto the Laws of the Land, certain it is that the Army were Judges of every whit as competent, and lawful a constitution of their delinquencies in the same kind. For,  
First, If we measure the lawfulness of Parliamentary Judicature by the call of the people thereunto, the Army (as was formerly proved) hath every whit as lawful a constitution to judge who are enemies to the peace and safety of the Kingdom, as the Parliament itself hath. Nor doth it at all argue any illegality in their judgements about the Parliament men, that they had not the explicit and express consent of the people therein, or that they had no call by them so to judge; no more than it proveth an illegallity in many Votes and Ordinances of Parliament, that they were both made and published, not only without the particular and express consent, but even contrary to the minds and desires of the people, or at least of the major part of them. Besides it is a ridiculous thing to pretend a want of a call from the people, against the lawfulness of such an act, which is of that sovereign necessity for their benefit and good, which the actings of the Army were; especially at such a time, when there is no possibility of obtaining, or receiving a formal call from the people, without running an eminent hazard of losing the opportunity for doing that excellent service unto them, which the providence of God in a peculiar juncture of circumstances, exhibit's for the present unto us. men's consents unto all acts manifestly tending to their relief, are sufficiently expressed in their wants and necessities.  
If it be yet said; But the people do not judge the proceed of the Army against the Parliament men, as tending to their relief, or welfare in any kind, but as contrary unto both, nor do they give so much as their subsequent consents thereunto; I answer (besides what was lately said to the nullifying of this pretence) that Physicians called to the care and cure of persons under distempers, need not much stand upon the consents of such patients, either subsequent, or antecedent, about what they administer unto them. If the people be uncapable in themselves of the things of their peace, it is an act of so much the more goodness and mercy in those, who being fully capable of them, will engage themselves accordingly to make provision for them. It is a deed of Charity and Christianity, to save the life of a lunatic or distracted person even against his will. 
Porrò si paulatim idem populus depravatus habeat venale suffragiam, & regimen flagitiosis seeleratisque committat, recte adimitur populo talis potestas dandi honores, & ad paucorum bonorum redit arbitrium. Aqu. 12 ae. qu. 67. art. 1.  Besides it is a ruled case amongst wise men, that if a people be depraved and corrupt, so as to confer places of power and trust upon wicked and undeserving men, they forfeit their power in this behalf unto those that are good, though but a few. So that nothing pretended from a non-concurrence of the people with the Army, will hold water. Or,  
Secondly, If we estimate the lawfulness of that Judicature, by the conformity of their elections thereunto, to the Laws of the Land, the investiture of the Army into that Judicature, which they have exercised in the case in question, is conform unto a Law of fare greater authority, than any one, yea then all the Laws of the Land put together; I mean, the Law of nature, necessity, and of love to their Country and Nation: which being the Law of God himself written in the fleshly tables of men's hearts, 
Sect. 19  hath an authoritative jurisdiction over all humane Laws and constitutions whatsoever; a prerogative right of power to overrule them, and to suspend their obliging influences, in all cases appropriate to itself. Yea many of the Laws of God themselves, think it no disparagement unto them, to give place to their elder Sister, the Law of necessity, and to surrender their authority into her hand, when she speaketh. So that whatsoever is necessary, is somewhat more than lawful; more (I mean) in point of warrantableness. If then the Army stood bound by the Law of nature and necessity, to judge the Parliament men as they did, viz. as men worthy to be secluded from their fellows in Parliamentary interest, this judiciary power was vested in them by a Law of greater authority, than the Laws of the Land; and consequently the legality, or lawfulness of it was greater, then of that in the Parliament, which derives its legality only from a conformity to the established Laws of the Land. Yea the truth is, that that Law of necessity, by which the Army were constituted Judges of those Parliamentary Delinquents we speak of, cannot (in propriety of speech) be denied to be one of the laws of the Land, being the law of nature, and consequently the law of all Lands, and Nations whatsoever, established in this, and in all the rest, by a better, and more indubitable legislative Authority, then resides in any Parliament, or community of men whatsoever.  
If it be here further objected; 
Sect. 20.  yea but what necessity was there lying upon the Army, to assume that judicative power unto themselves, which they exercised upon the Members of Parliament? It is an easy matter to pretend a necessity (almost) for every unjust, and unrighteous thing; but not so easy to judge what such a necessity is, which is authorized by God with a suspensive power over humane laws. To this I answer,  
First, That they cannot (at least in the ordinary signification of the word) be said to assume a power of judicature unto themselves, who only judge either of persons, or of things, in respect of themselves, and with relation to what concerns themselves by way of duty, either to do, or to forbear. The exercise of such a judging, or judicative power, as this, is imposed by God by way of duty upon all men: and woe unto them, who do not judge, both persons and things, in such a consideration, as this. The neglect, or non-exercise of that judging faculty or power, which is planted in the souls and consciences of men by God, upon such terms, and with reference to such ends as these, draweth along with it that sin, which the Wise man calleth, the despising of a man's ways, & threatneth with death. But he that despiseth his ways shall die 
a Prov. 19 16.  Now certain it is, that the Army did exercise no other judiciary power then this, about, or upon those Parliament men, nor in any other respect, nor with any other consideration, then to their own duty concerning them; which every other person in the Kingdom, either did, or aught to have done, as well as they. Every man is bound to consider, judge, and determine, what is meet, and necessary for him to do, either to, with, for, or against, all other men; or at least all such, to whom he stands in any relation, either spiritual, natural, or civil. That judgement then which the Army passed in their own breasts and consciences upon those Parliament-men, as viz. that they were such, whom they stood bound in duty, having an opportunity in their hand to do it, to cut off as unsound members from their body, was nothing else but the issue, fruit, and effect of that consideration of them and of their ways, which they stood bound to levy, raise, and engage themselves in, about the one and the other. If the judgement which they passed in this kind was erroneous, it was not erroneous through an usurpation of an unlawful power to judge, but either through a defect and weakness of those discerning, or judging abilities, which they stood bound (however) to use; or else through an oscitancy, carelessness, or sloth, in not improving or acting these abilities, as they might, and aught, to the discerning of the truth. Certainly they who judge these Parliament-men worthy Patriots or Members of their House, or meet to have been let alone without disturbance in their way, do assume the same power of judicature concerning them, yea and concerning the greatest and weightiest matters of State, which the Army did, when they judged them meet to be sequestered. Yea they who judge, and condemn the Army as evil doers, for what they acted about these men; and not only so, but smite them also with the sword of the tongue, reviling them without any just warrant or ground, do they not every whit as much usurp, and assume to themselves a power of judging, without any authority at all, as the Army did in that very act of judgement, at which they make themselves so highly aggrieved? Insomuch that to all such, that of the Apostle may be justly applied. Therefore thou art inexcusable O man, whosoever thou art that judgest. For wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself: for thou that judgest, dost the same things. Nay, if we speak of an authoritative power to judge, they who presume to justify and absolve the Parliament-ment from the crime charged upon them, and to condemn the Army for charging them, are fare deeper in the usurpation of such a power, than the Army. For the Army (as hath been said) had a legal commission from the Parliament itself, to oppose, slay, and destroy the enemies of the Kingdom, and therein a kind of authority derived unto them, to judge of these enemies, when they should mere with them (for a Commission or warrant to apprehend, or destroy such and such persons, without a liberty, or power, either granted, or supposed, to judge them such, when they are found, were a ridiculous nullity) whereas they, who being private men, shall undertake, not only to censure, judge, and sentence the Army as Malefactors in what they have done, but to proceed likewise to the execution of this their sentence by inflicting the penalty of stigmatical and opprobrious terms upon them; by casting them out of the affections of their friends, by firing the spirits, and strengthening the hands of their enemies against them, do all this without the least colour, shadow, or pretence of any lawful authority whatsoever. But  
2. 
Sect. 21.  That the judgement or sentence which the Army passed upon those men, as meet to be dispossessed of their Parliamentary interest, was not erronous in either of the considerations mentioned, or in any other, but every ways just, and according to the truth, stands clear upon this ground, viz. that they were become Renegadoes from their Trust, and acted by their counsels, debates, votes, and interests, in a diametral opposition to the peace and safety of the Kingdom, and to public good. Yea the tenor of their Parliamentary actings before their removal from the House, in the known dialect of political prophecy, presaged nothing but ruin and destruction to the liberties of the freeborn Subjects of the Kingdom in general, and to the lives and estates of many thousands in the Kingdom, whom they stood bound in conscience, in a special manner to protect. For what could that grand encouragement, which they administered by their Votes to a potent party of men in the Kingdom, who had so lately, and with so high an hand, acted hostility against the peace and liberties of the people, and against the lives of those who stood up to protect them, not having given the least overture of any relenting in their old principles, but were now through that extremity of pain which they lie under, having been so often, and so deeply bitten, and stung by the fidelity and valour of the Army, more enraged in their spirits, than ever; what could (I say) such an encouragement, given by such hands, unto such men, but portend, either a re-imbroyling of this already miserably-wasted Nation, in Wars and blood, or else the necessity of a patiented and quiet subjection of the Nation to the iron yoke of perpetual tyranny and bondage, together with the certain ruin of the lives and estates of those, who had showed most faithfulness and courage in the defence of the Parliament and the Kingdom's liberties, in opposing the King and his party, if the Army had not preventingly interposed, as they did? The by past actions of men, especially such, which they have for any considerable space of time enured themselves unto, are prophetical of what their future actions are like to be, if opportunity parallelth. The civil Law saith, that he that hath injured one, hath threatened many: and by the rule of proportion, he that hath injured many, hath threatened all. It is the saying of that late great Scholar and Statesman, Sir Francis Bacon; that men's thoughts are much according to their inclination: their discourse and speeches according to their learning, and infused opinions: but their deeds are after as they have been accustomed. Insomuch as afterwards he saith, as a man would wonder to bear men profess, protest, engage, give great words, and then do just as they have done before 
* Essays. Ess. 27,  Yea the Scripture itself giveth testimony to this maxim, that what men have been by custom, they are like to be by continuance. Can the Ethiopian (saith God himself to the jews) change his skin, or the Leopard his spots? then may ye also do good that are accustomed [or, taught] to do evil 
a Jer. 13. 23. . And elsewhere (speaking of the same people) they hold fast deceit, they refuse to return— no man repent him of his wickedness, saying, what have I done? Every one turned to his course [or race] as the horse rusheth into the battle 
b Jer. 8. 5, 6. , meaning, that as the warlike horse, having been for a while curbed and held in by his Rider with a sharp bit, & strong hand, rusheth with so much the more violence and fury into the battle, when he feels his liberty; In like manner these men, (and it is the case generally of all men) when they had been at any time restrained for a while, whether by my word, or my judgements upon them, from these vile practices; still upon the first opportunity that they found themselves lose, they repractised their former wickedness with so much the more eagerness and keenenesse of spirit.  
It were easy to bring Authorities in great numbers, 
Sect. 22.  both divine and humane, and these attended with a like train of examples, both ancient and modern, for the farther confirmation and credit of this axiom, that men generally are much more like to practise on their own vices, then to fall off to the exercise of other men's virtues. But by what hath been delivered in already upon this account, most evident it is, that the men deparliamented by the Army, were in their full carreire to the utter undoing of the Kingdom, when they were dismounted: and consequently, that the judgement of the Army looking upon them, as persons meet to be discharged from that great Trust, wherein they so prevaricated, was according to righteousness and truth. Therefore  
3. 
Sect. 23.  (And last as to the objection last propounded) it is no such great matter of difficulty, clearly to discern, and judge of such emerging necessities (at least of many of them) which are authorized by God with a prerogative interest of suspending humane laws. Hunger is by the holy Ghost himself enroled amongst those necessities, which are invested by God with a faculty and right of suspending his own laws, so fare and in such cases, as they oppose the relief of it. Have ye not read (saith our Saviour to the Pharisees) what David did when he was an HUNGRY, and they that were with him, how he entered into the house of God, and did eat the shewbread, which was not lawful for him to eat (viz. in ordinary cases) neither for them that were with him, but for the Priests only 
a 〈◊〉 at. 12. 3, 4, 5. ? meaning, and yet were innocent and unreprovable, notwithstanding the transgression of a divine law (as touching the plain & express letter of it.) Now if God hath asserted such a privilege unto the necessity of hunger, whereby to supersede the conscientious obligation of his own law, in order to its present satisfaction, much more hath he authorized it to the superseding of any constitution or law, merely humane, in reference to such an end; unless we shall think, that he is more jealous for the observation of the laws of men, then of his own. So than if it be no great matter of difficulty for a man to judge when he is an hungry, evident it it, that there are some cases of necessity obvious enough, whereunto the laws of men ought to give place, and to be content to be, as if they were not. For the reason why hunger is invested with such a privilege from God, as we speak of, is not simply, as, or because, it is hunger, i. such a peculiar and determinate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which in a way proper to itself, threatneth and endangereth the life of man; but in respect of the general nature of it, and as it simply threatneth and endangereth this life, if it be not timely healed by the application of food, or nourishment. It was the preciousness of the lives of men in God's sight, not any respect he bore to any paricular way, or means of endangering them, which obtained from him the grant of such a privilege unto hunger, that in order to it's necessary satisfaction, it should overrule his own law. So that whatsoever else it be, as well as hunger, which so apparently menaceth, or portendeth ruin and destruction to the lives of men, partakes of the same indulgence and grant of privilege from God, with hunger, and is facultated by him, in order to the prevention of the mischief menaced, to transgress a Law without guilt of sin. By the clear warrant of this consideration and deduction, the Jews extended that grant of privilege, which God (as we have heard) made, or indulged explicitly unto hunger only, unto all manner of things and cases whatsoever, whereby, and wherein life was exposed to imminent hazard and danger. Their common maxims were (as they were formerly mentioned, 
Periculum vitae pellit Sabbathum. Periculum vita pellit omnia.  Sect. 4) that danger of life drives away the Sabbath: Peril of life drives away all, etc. Now if the peril of the life of one man, or of a small parcel of men (as David, and those that were with him, were no great party) was privileged from heaven with a sinless transgression of a special law of God; certainly, the imminent danger of bloody combustions in the midst of a great Nation, wherein the lives of many thousands were like to be sacrificed, besides the hazard of beinging many other most deplorable and sad calamities upon the whole Land, which (as hath been proved) wrought effectually in the counsels and actings of the disseated Parliament-men, is a broad and unquestionable ground of equity and right, for the Army to build a prevention or diversion of them upon, though it be with a temporary disobedience to such laws of men, which were never (doubtless) intended by the Lawmakers themselves, for the binding, either of men's consciences, or their hands, in such cases.  
Only, 
Sect. 24.  lest the truth we assert, should possibly suffer through any man's mistake, I shall add one thing by way of caution, or explication about the premises. When we seem to approve of that principle of the Jews, wherein they say, that Peril of life drives away all, and speak many things concerning the privileges of necessity, we do not suppose, nor intent to say, that men may lawfully transgress every law or precept of God whatsoever, for the saying of their lives, being in danger, as for (example) that they may lawfully lie, forswear themselves, deny Christ, or the like, in such cases; for men (doubtless) ought rather to accept of death, than deliverance, upon such tearmts as these. But that which we suppose upon the account specified, is only this; that hunger, or any parallel exigence or necessity, have such an indulgency of privilege from God, which extendeth to the suspension of all such Laws, as well Divine, as humane, in order to the safety of men lying under them, which the light of nature, and that sense of equity and of what is reasonable, planted in men by God, may well judge to have been intended by the respective Lawmakers, not for Laws of an absolute and universal obligement, without all manner of exception, but only for the regulating of men in ordinary cases, and such as are of more frequent and usual occurrence. Now certain it is, that as there are some Divine Laws which fall under this consideration (as we have seen) so there are scarce any (if any at all) of humane constitution, but are subject unto it; I mean, which may not, according to the regular intentions of the Lawmakers themselves, lose their binding force and authority for a time, 
Sect. 25.  as cases may be; it being a true Rule, subscribed as well by Lawyers as Divines, 
Omnis Lex obligat secundum rectam voluntatem legislatoris obligantis. Daven. Determine. p. 100  that Every Law binds only according to the regular and due intention of the Lawmaker.  
The reason why no humane Law, 
Omnis Lex ordinatur ad communem hominum salutem: Et in tantum obtinet vim & rationem legis: secundum verò quod ab hoc deficit, virtutem obligandi non habet. Aqu. 12ae. qu. 96. art. 6.  can reasonably be judged to be of universal obligation (no, not according to the intention of the Lawmakers themselves) is, first, because the adequate end and scope of Lawmakers in their Laws, is presumed to be, the public and common benefit and good of the community of men, who are to obey them. Now (as Aquinas the Schooleman well observeth) it often falls out, that that, which ordinarily, and in most cases is much conducing to common good, in some particular case would be most repugnant and destructive to it: 
a Contingit autem multoties, quod aliquid observari communi saluti est utile, ut in pluribus, quod tamen aliquibus casibus est maximè nocivum. Ibidem.  whereof he gives an instance; unto which many others might readily be added. Therefore in such cases, wherein the observation of a Law, cannot but be of dangerous consequence, and prejudicial to the public, it is to be presumed, that it was no part of the intention of the Lawgivers that it should be observed, or bind any man.  
Secondly, 
Sect. 26.  it being out of the Sphere of all earthly Lawmakers, to foresee, or comprehend all particular cases, 
Quialgitur Legislator non potest omnes singulares casus intueri, proponit legem secundumea, quae in pluribus accidunt, ferens intentionem suam ad communem utilitatem. Unde si emergat casus in quo observatio talis legis sit damnosa communi saluti, non est observands. Aquin. ubi suprà.  that may possibly happen, they generally content themselves with framing such Laws, the keeping whereof ordinarily, and in cases of a more frequent occurrence, is conducing to public benefit and safety, not intending by any of these Laws to obstruct or prejudice the public, in any anomalous or unthought of case, but to leave persons of all Interests and qualities at full liberty, to provide for the public in such cases, though with a practical contradiction to any, or all of their Laws.  
Thirdly (and last, 
Sect. 27.  for this) If it could, or should be supposed, that humane Lawgivers are able to comprehend and make provision for all possible emergencies and cases, 
Nullius hominis sapientia tanta est, ut possit omnes singulares casus excogitare: & ideò non potest sufficienter per verba sua exprimere ea, quae conveniunt ad finem intentum: & si posset Legislator omnes casus considerare, non oporteret ut omnes exprimeret propter confusionem vitandam: sed legem ferre deberet secundum ea, quae in pluribus accidunt. Ibid.  yet were it not expedient (saith my Author) for the Commonwealth, that they should multiply Laws to such a number, as the particular stating and regulating of all such cases would necessarily require. Confusion in Laws ought to be avoided, which yet could not be avoided, if particular and express provision should be made in them, for the regulation of all persons, of what different capacities, or conditions soever, under all possible occurrences, in a due proportion to the common interest and benefit of men.  
These things considered, 
Sect. 28.  evident it is, that there was never yet any Lawgiver amongst men, who, understanding himself, ever intended to impose any Law of a politic constitution upon men, without a reserve for those, on whom it was imposed, to provide for themselves, or for the public good in cases of necessity, besides, yea and against, the literal import of such a Law. Therefore peril of life, which is the most confessed case of necessity of all others, though it cannot claim exemption from under some of the Laws of God (such as were lately intimated) yet may it challenge this privilege in respect of the Laws of men. The reason of the difference hath been already in part signified, but more completely is this: viz. because those Laws of God, which we now speak of, prohibiting such actions, which are intrinsically, and in their proper natures, as being contrary to the essential purity and holiness of God, and not only because they are prohibited, matter of defilement unto men, must needs be of universal obligation, in as much as no necessity whatsoever can be greater then, nor indeed equal to, this, that a man refrains all such actions, which are morally, essentially, and intrinsically corrupting and defiling: whereas the civil or politic Laws of men restrain only such actions, the forbearance whereof, as in ordinary cases, it is commodious for the public Interest, so in many others, possibly incident, would be detrimentous and destructive to it. In which respect all the necessity of obeying such Laws as these, may for the time, not only be balanced, but even swallowed up and quite abolished by a greater necessity of disobeying them. And concerning such Laws of God himself, which we call typical, or ceremonial, because they restrain only such actions, which are not intrinsically, or essentially sinful, or defiling, as not being in themselves repugnant to the holiness of God, but had the consideration of sin put upon them by a Law, in reference to a particular end; hence it cometh to pass, that God was graciously pleased, and judged it meet, to subject such Laws as these to the pressing necessities of the outward man; or rather (indeed) to those other Laws of his, by which he commanded relief for them; as it is written; I will have mercy, and not sacrifice. This by way of caution. But  
Secondly, 
Sect. 29.  Another thing, that (its like) will be objected, upon, and against what hath been answered to the second main objection, is this: That the Parliament men disturbed in their way by the Army, at least many of them, were Religious and conscientious men; voted, and acted as they did, conscientiously, really judging the course they steered, to be the safest and most direct for bringing the great Ship of the Commonwealth into the harbour of rest and peace. And is it not contrary, as well to principles of reason, as Religion, that such men upon so fair an account as this, should be so foully handled? To this I answer;  
First (not to question that, which I make no question but will be sufficiently proved in due time, I mean, the religiousness of the Gentlemen spoken of) Religious men, are as well men, as religious: and consequently, are not yet baptised into the spirit of that divine prerogative, which should make them (in the Apostle James his phrase) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Jam. 1. 13.  persons un-temptable by things that are evil. They that are capable of receiving gifts, or of any inordinacy in their desires after earthly accommodations, how wise, or just soever they be otherwise, are subject both to have their eyes blinded, and their words perverted. A gift (saith God himself) doth blind the eyes of the wise [i. of those that are religiously wise, as well as others; the Scripture not often terming any men wise, but upon that account] and pervert the words of the righteous. 
a Deut 16. 19  A gift, or any thing equivalent to a gift, and that not only after it is received, but much more whilst it is yet desired, and expected, is apt to have both these sad operations even upon the best of men. For who can be better than those whom wisdom and righteousness join hand in hand to make excellent?  
Secondly, 
Sect. 30.  When men are religious only to a mediocrity, and withal servile in their judgements to some principles, which are commonly and with great confidence and importunity obtruded upon the consciences of professors, for sacred Truths, and yet are extremely discouraging, and full of enmity to a thorough, stable, and quiet dependence upon God, by being religious upon such terms as these, they become twofold more the children of fear, than otherwise they were like to be, and consequently, so much the more capable and receptive of sad and dismal impressions from the World upon all occasions. And it is not more commonly then truly said; 
Pessimus Consiliarius Timor.  that Fear is a bad Counsellor.  
Thirdly, 
Sect. 31.  When religious men sin against the common Interest and liberties of a free borne Nation, and make one purse with the known and thrice declared enemies of their Land and people, whether they do it, with, or against, their judgements and consciences, the Law of nature and necessity, cannot (for the present) stand to make, either a scrupulous inquiry after such a difference, or a regular assignment of favour to the qualifying circumstances of demerit; but calls, yea and cries out immediately, and commands all men without exception, that have a prize in their hand, to give it for the redemption of their Nation out of the hand of Oppression and Tyranny. And when this Law hath been obeyed to the securing of the Nation, she presently resigneth, and this freely and willingly, all her authority and command, into the hand of positive and standing Laws, calculated for the ordinary posture and state of things, until there be another cry of like danger in her ears. When these standing Laws come to resume their authority and power; there will be an opportunity to inquire, if it shall be thought convenient, who sinned, with, and who against, their consciences: and their assessments, which were we uniformly rated by the Law of necessity, may be reduced to terms of more equity by those other laws. But  
Fourthly, 
Sect. 32.  According to the Notion of that maxim in natural Philosophy, 
Corruptio optimi est pessima.  that errors of the best men, of worst consequence (in many cases.) The digressions of men religious, are many times worse, than the thorough discourses of other men. When conscience and concupiscence meet (as oft they do in religious men) the conjunction is very fiery. It was the saying of Gregory long since, When men conceive of sin under the notion of a duty, there it is committed with an high hand and without fear. 
a Cum vitium virtus putatur, culpa sine meta cumulatur, Greg. de Pastor. cur. l. 3. c. 1.  Nor ever was (nor is ever like to be) the persecution of the Saints more grievous, then when those that shall persecute them, and put them to death, shall think that [therein] they do God service. 
b Joh. 16. 2.  So that whereas the objection in hand pleads, on the behalf of those Parliament men, who were religious, that they followed the light and dictate of their judgements and consciences, in complying with the King and his complices; the truth is, that though it may reasonably be thought so much the less sinful in them, if they did it upon such terms; yet was it a ground so much the more justifiable for the Army to proceed upon to the disinteressing of them, as they did. For when religious men break out of the way of righteousness and truth, with the renitency and obmurmuration of their judgements and consciences, it is a sign that their judgements and consciences are yet at liberty, and in a condition to reduce them. But when these are confederate with their lust, there is little hope of their repentance. But  
Fiftly (and last, 
Sect. 33.  for this) whereas the objection intimates some hard measure offered unto them, being men of conscience, and acting according to their judgements, the truth is, that I know not how the Army could walk towards them with a softer foot, to secure the liberties of the Kingdom, together with their own lives and estates, against the menaces of their judgements and consciences, than they did.  
A third grand Objection, 
Sect. 34.  wherewith some encounter that action of the Army, 
The third main objection.  hitherto justified, is this: they therein (say these men) made themselves Covenant-breakers, and sinned against the Solemn Vow and Oath which they, or at least some of them, swore unto God with hands lifted up to Heaven, (if not with hearts also.) In this Covenant they promised and swore, that they would, endeavour with their estates and lives mutually to preserve the rights and privileges of Parliaments, whereas by that violent dismembering of the Parliament, they broke and trampled upon them. To this we answer (more briefly.)  
First, That most certain it is, that it is no right or privilege of Parliament to Vote or Act in opposition to the benefit and good of the Kingdom, and those who have entrusted them. It is impossible that any things that is sinful, should be the right or privilege of any person, or society of men under Heaven. Therefore if the Army did nothing more, but only restrain from acting in such a way, they did not herein violate a Right or privilege of Parliament.  
If it be replied, 
Sect. 35.  that though it be no right or privilege of Parliament to Vote or Act contrary to their trust; yet it is a right and privilege belonging to this house, that, in case any of the Members shall at any time so act, or vote, they should not be questioned, or suffer for so doing; at least not by any other power, but by that of the House itself only; To this also I answer.  
1. By concession, that this is indeed a right and privilege of Parliament, taking the word Parliament in a due and proper signification; viz. for a Parliament consisting of a competent number of men not dead to their trust, who are in a capacity of faithfulness and integrity to discharge the office and duty of a Parliament, in endeavouring at least to relieve the pressures and grievances of the people, to protect their liberties, etc. It is the manner of the holy Ghost himself in the Scripture, frequently to deny the common Name of things, to such particulars in every kind, which are defective in those properties for use and service, which should be found in them, and which are found in other particulars of the same kind. Thus Paul expressly, He is not a Jew which is one outwardly, neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh: But he is a Jew which is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart in the Spirit, not in the letter, etc. 
a Rom. 2. 28, 29 . So elsewhere: when ye come together into one place, this is not to eat the Lords Supper 
b 1 Cor. 11. 20.  This is not, etc. meaning, that as they went to work, that which they did, deserved not the Name, of an eating of the Lords Supper. Therefore  
2. By way of exception, 
Sect. 36.  I answer further, that if by Parliament, be meant any number of men whatsoever, chosen by the people into Parliamentary trusts, and sitting in that House, where Parliaments (truly and properly so called) use to assemble about the great affairs of the Kingdom, whether these men, or the major part of them, love the interest of the Kingdom, and be cordially affected to the liberties of the people, or no, I know no such right or privilege of Parliament, as that specified. A Parliament that is unuseful and unserviceable for Parliamentary ends, is no more a Parliament, than a dead man, is a man, or a Virgin deflowered, a Virgin. And as a dead man hath no right or privilege of a man (truly so called) belonging to him, unless it be to be so ordered & dealt with, that he may not be an annoyance or offence unto others: so neither do I know any right or privilege of a Parliament indeed appertaining to a Parliament politically dead, and which is not animated with a spirit of faithfulness to the public, unless it be to be so entreated and handled, that it may not destroy the public Interest, or endamage their trusties (the people) in their liberties. 
A terminis dimiwentibus non valet argumeutatio.  It is a rule in Logic; that an argument drawn from terms of diminution, is of no validity, or force. As for example, when a man is dead, it doth not follow; that because he is a dead man, therefore he is a man, or hath the properties of a man, as that he is rational, risible, or the like. By the reason which rules in this principle or maxim, our Saviour denies that inference of the Jews, who argued themselves to be the children or seed of Abraham, because they were his carnal seed, or came from him according to the flesh. If ye were Abraham's children (saith he to them) ye would do the works of Abraham 
a John 8. 39 : implying, that because they did not the works of Abraham, they were not his children [viz. in that proper and emphatical sense, wherein the Scripture is ordinarily to be understood, when it speaketh of Abraham's children, and of the great promises and privileges belonging to them.) In like manner the Apostle Paul, when he speaks of the privileges and blessedness settled by promise upon Abraham and his seed, still understands the word, seed, not in that diminutive or equivocal sense, wherein it comprehendeth as well his carnal or wicked seed, as that of a more noble descent, but in that emphatical, weighty, 
Gal. 3. 7. 9 16. 29.  and appropriate sense, wherein it only signifieth the children of Abraham indeed, i. spiritually such, and who resemble him in his faith and holiness. 
Rom. 4. etc.  See the Texts in the margin. After the same manner, when either the laws or people of the Land, in their accustomed discourse, (and consequently the Solemn League and Covenant) speak of rights and privileges of Parliament, they (doubtless) do not take the word, Parliament in an equivocal and comprehensive sense, wherein it may be extended to any thing, which in any sense or consideration may be called a Parliament, but in an emphatical & restrained sense, viz. as it signifieth a political body, consistory, or court of men, chosen by the people into Parliamentary Trust, faithfully prosecuting and discharging the import of the Trust committed to them. If this property be wanting in them, they are but a Parliament so called, not having the worth or consideration, whereunto such Rights and Privileges which are called, Parliamentary, either according to principles of reason and equity, or according to the intention of the first Donors or founders of them, do belong or appertain. The premises considered, evident it is, that the Army did not violate or break any the rights and privileges of Parliament, properly, or Covenantly so called, when they reduced the Parliament to the true nature, dignity, and honour of a Parliament; by secluding such Members from it, who altered the property, and turned the glory of it into a lie.  
2. Be it granted, 
Sect. 3.  that the Army stood bound by their Covenant and Oath, to preserve the rights and privileges even of such Parliaments as that was, which they divided, yet they stood bound also by the same Covenant and Oath, to such a duty or engagement, the faithful application of themselves whereunto, in the case in hand, did fairly both in the sight of God, and men, discharge them from that other obligation: even as the duties of circumcising, 
Cùm duo praecepta concurrunt, majus debet servari: In ipso Decalogo, cum videmus duo inter se praecepta confligere et alterum ab altero impediri, illud, quod legis latoris ipsius sententiâ, videbitur esse majus, praserri debet. Pet. Mart. in 1 Sam. c. 21. 3.  and of sacrificing, when the seasons appointed for them by the law, fell on the Sabbath, privileged those from guilt in breaking the law of the Sabbath, who performed them on that day. It is a common rule avouched by the best of our Divines, and by the light of nature and reason itself, that when two duties or commands meet in such a straight or exigent of time, that they cannot both receive that honour of observance, which belongs unto them, that which in the judgement of the Lawgiver is the greater, aught to be observed, and the lesser to give place, for the time. Now in that Covenant and Oath which the objection speaketh of, there are these two duties or engagements (amongst others) imposed upon those, who take it. 1. An endeavour to preserve the rights and privileges of Parliament. 2. The like endeavour to preserve THE LIBERTIES OF THE KINGDOM. The Covenant in both these, at in all other particulars contained in it, the takers of it stand bound by the express tenor thereof (in the sixth Article) to promote according to their power against all lets and impediments whatsoever: and what they are not able THEMSELVES TO SUPPRESS or overcome, they shall reveal and make known, that it may be timely prevented or removed: all this they shall do as in the sight of God. Which last words (compared with the words mentioned from the third Article) clearly import, that the Covenanters stand bound, to promote the liberties of the Kingdom against all lets and impediements even in Parliaments themselves, if any be sound there: yea and further suppose, that they may THEMSELVES SUPPRESS and overcome what they are able (viz. of whatsoever opposeth the intent & end of the Covenant, which doubtless, was the benefit and good of the Kingdoms) especially when they know not where, or to whom to reveal or make known the obstructions they meet with, in order to any probable or likely prevention, or removal of them, in due time. Therefore if the duty of preserving or promoting the peace and liberties of the Kingdom, be greater, then that of preserving the rights and privileges of the Parliament; and the Army could not perform the former, without making such a breach as they did, upon the latter; evident it is, that in making this breach they are innocent and blameless. For the latter of these, it is as clear as the Sun from what was laid down Sect. 21. that had not the Army interposed to such a breach of rights and privileges, at is charged upon them, the peace of the Kingdom, had (in all humane likelihood) been swallowed up in blood, and the liberties, in oppression and tyranny. Concerning the former, there is full as little, or rather less, question. That common maxim, which rules especially in political affairs, Bonum quo communius, cò melius, the more common or extensive a good is, the greater or better it is, doth sufficiently confirm it. T●… preservation of the liberties of the whole Kingdom, is without peradventure a greater duty, than the maintenance or preservation of the liberties or privileges only of a part of it; especially of such a part, which, for number, is inconsiderable. Besides, that which gives a kind of sacred inviolableness unto the rights and privileges of Parliament, is that typical relation which they bear to the rights, privileges, and liberties, of the Kingdom, and Commonwealth. Now types are always inferior to the things imported, and represented by them, as servants are unto their Masters; and when they occasion, or threaten any damage, to their anti-tipes, they may and ought so far to suffer a defacement, as the brazen serpent was beaten to powder by Hezechiah, when it occasioned Idolatry against him, whom it represented.  
Thirdly (and last) suppose there had been no express clause in the Covenant, enjoining the preservation of the liberties of the Kingdom, as well as of the rights and privileges of Parliament, yet had the Army a more than warrant sufficient to have stood up for the preservation of them, as they did, and that without any breach of Covenant. Men by the tenure of their very lives and beings, which they hold of the God of nature, their great Creator, stand bound to obey the Laws of nature, and that against all other obligations or bonds whatsoever: yea the truth is, that all other obligations cease in the presence of this, all Laws, Covenants, and engagements besides, being homagers unto it. Now there is no Law of nature that speaks more plainly, or distinctly, than this; that the strong aught to stand by the weak in cases of extremity, and danger imminent, especially when relief cannot reasonably be expected from other hands. Nor is it credible that either the Covenant-makers, or the Covenant-takers, did thereby intent, either in the general, any disobligation from the Laws of nature, or from duties, otherwise then by the said Covenant, lying upon men: nor in particular, any such preservation of the rights and privileges of Parliament, which should be inconsistent with the liberties of the Kingdoms. 
Scire leges, inquiunt Jurisconsulti, non est verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem, quia prior atque potentior est, quàm vox, mens dicentis.  and it is a common rule amongst Lawyers, for regulating the interpretation of Laws, as likewise of all other Declarations of men by words, whatsoever; that the mind or intent of the speaker, is to be preferred before, and is more potent [and consequently rather to be obeyed] then his words.  
Nor doth the Act of the Army in that dissociation of the Parliament under debate, colour, or shadow (in the least) with the act of the King, breaking into their House, and demanding which, 
Hug. Grot. in Mat. 12. 3.  and how many of their Members he pleased, to be sacrificed upon the service of his will. For  
First, It was more civility in the Army, to deny admission, or entrance into the House, unto those Members, whose sitting there they judged of desperate consequence unto the Kingdom, than it would have been, by force and violence to have pulled them out from thence; which was the King's act, in actu signato (as the School men distinguish) though not in actu exercito, the providence of God and men comporting to prevent this. And we know the old saying, 
Turpius ejicitur, quàm non admittitur, hospes.  i. 
A guest we like not, 'tis more commendable  
To keep, then cast, out from our doors and table.   
Secondly, The Members which the King sought to lay hold of, and to disparliament, were such, who THAN were (or at least were so looked upon by him) as the greatest Patrons and Protectors of the Kingdom's Interest, and who, like the cloudy and fiery pillar of old, kept the Egyptian prerogative from coming at the Israelitish liberty, to destroy it. Whereas the Members, who were denied the House by the Army, were turned Proselytes to prerogative, and had renounced the Law and Doctrine of the people's liberties. Therefore  
Thirdly (and last) the clear tendency of the Act of the King, was the violation of the Law of nature, by seeking to advance the will and power of one, or of some few, above, and against, the peace and comforts of many, whereas the act of the Army held a loyal conformity with the royal Law, the face of it being manifestly set to subject the power, interest and will of one, unto their lawful Superior, the just Interest or comfort of many. Therefore to go about either to justify the King's act, by the act of the Army, or to condemn the act of the Army, by the Kings, is as if I should undertake to prove, that the night is lightsome, because the day is so, or that the day is dark, because the night is so.  
A fourth objection in the mouths of some, 
Sect. 40.  against which they conceive the Army cannot be justified in the business in question, 
The fourth grand Objection.  is, that all such actions are contrary unto, and condemned by the Laws of the Land. But to this objection, at least to the weight and substance of it, we have already answered over and over; and particularly have asserted and proved, First, that all humane Laws and constitutions, are but of a like structure and frame, with the Ceremonial Laws of old made by God himself, which were all made with knees, to bend to the Law of nature, and necessity. Secondly, That it is to be presumed, that the intent of all Lawgivers amongst men, is, notwithstanding any, or all their Laws seemingly commanding the contrary, to leave an effectual door always open for the common good, and in cases of necessity, to be provided for by any person, or persons, whatsoever. Thirdly, that all Laws bind only according to the regular and due intentions of the Lawmakers. Fourthly, that the Laws of nature, and necessity, are as well the Laws of the Land, as those commonly so called. Fifthly, that when any two Laws encounter one the other in any such exigent, or straight of time, that both of them cannot be obeyed, the Law of inferior consequence ought to give place to that of superior, and the duty enjoined in this, to be done, though that required in the other, be left undone. We now add,  
First, That we charitably suppose, that there is no such Law of the Land, which prohibiteth or restraineth any man, or for of men, from being Benefactors to the public; especially from preserving the public liberties in cases of necessity, when they stand in extremâ tegulâ, and are in imminent danger of being oppressed for ever, there being no likelihood of relief from any other hand. And if there be no such Law as this, there is none that reacheth the case of the Army, no not in the critical or characteristical circumstance of it.  
Secondly, That in case there be any such Law as this, that it is a mere nullity, and the matter of it no more capable of the form of a Law, i. of an obliging power, than timber or stone is capable of information by a reasonable soul, which according to vulgar Philosophy, rather than the truth is, the proper form of a man. The Laws of nature and of common equity, are the foundation of all Laws (truly and properly so called) and whatsoever venditateth itself under the name or notion of a Law, being built besides this foundation, wanteth the essence and true nature of a Law, and so can be but equivocally such.  
Thirdly, 
Sect. 42.  If there be a Law, which maketh force, offered to Magistrates, or persons in Authority, in any kind, or any interrupting or disturbing them in their way, punishable; yet neither doth this evince the act of the Army, we so much speak of, to have been contrary to the Laws. The reason is, because it is the constant genius and manner of Lawgivers and of Laws, to lay down only the general rule, and to conceal the exceptions; which they still suppose, are, or may be. Now the exception doth not break the Rule, nor is it properly contrary to the rule, I mean, so as to evince a nullity, or crookedness in it, only it is not comprehended within the verge or compass of the rule. All cases (saith the Roman Orator and Statesman) are not provided for by written Laws, but only those which are plain, the exceptions being left out, or omitted. 
a Non omnia scriptis, sed quaedam, quae perspicua sunt, tacitis exceptionibus caventur. Cicero. de Invent. l. 2.  Consonant hereunto is that of Grotius: In Law's prohibitorie (saith he) the words are commonly larger, than the mind or intent of the Law. 
b In legibus prohibitorijs plerunque verba latius patent, quàm mens ipsa legis. in Mat. 12. 3.  Upon which occasion, that virtue, which the Grecians call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, we, Equity, appears to be most necessary in a Judge, or any other, to whom it shall appertain to expound Laws; the property hereof being (as Aristotle long since observed) to rectify [or right state] the Law, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  where it is defective, thorough the generality of it. By rectifying the Law, he means nothing else, but a limiting and restraining the binding force of it to cases intended by the Lawmakers; together with an exemption of such cases from it, which upon grounds of reason and equity it may be conceived never were intended by them to be concluded in it. So that in some cases to press and urge the rigorous extent of the letter of the Law, is to turn the waters of the Law into blood, and to overturn the true intent and meaning both of the Law, and Lawgiver, at once. Such urge and press of Laws without due limitation, gave occasion to that Proverbial saying in Tully; 
Summum jus, summa injuria. Idem facit, ac is qui legem transgreditur, qui saeuâ verborum prerogatiuâ fraudulenter contrà juris sententiam abutitur. God. 1. tit. 1. le. 5.  that the Highest justice, is the Highest injustice. And the Imperial Law itself makes him no better, than a transgressor of the Law, who fraudulently abuseth the stern prerogative of words contrary to the sense and meaning of the Law. And elsewhere: no reason of Law, or fairness of equity will endure it, that through hard construction [of words] we should turn those things against the benefit of men, which were wholesomely brought in [amongst them] for their profit and good. 
b Nulla juris ratio, aut aequitatis benignitas patitur, ut quae salubriter pro hominum utilitate introducuntur, ea nos duriore interpretatione, contrà ipsorum commodum producamus ad severitatem. Digest. l. 1. tit. 3. de leg: leg 24. Sect. nulla.  Doubtless they stumble at this stone, who pretend to find any such Law amongst the Laws of the Land, by which the Army should be denied a liberty, or lawfulness of power to secure the peace and liberties of the Nation, by such a method and course, as they steered, necessity lifting up her voice, and crying unto them with such importunity, to do it. For (as the afore-named Grotius well observeth) amongst all the exceptions, which are tacitly included in Laws, there is none, either more usually, or more justly admitted, then that which ariseth from necessity. 
c Inter omnes autem exceptiones quae tacitè insunt legibus, nulla est aut justior, aut receptior, quàm eaquae fluit ex necessitate. Hug. Grot. ubi suprà.  By what we have argued, and related from learned and judicious men in this point, evident it is, both by the light of reason, as also from the testimony of very competent witnesses, that whatsoever the Laws of the Land be, the Army could be no transgressors of any of them in standing up, and interposing as they did, to vindicate the public liberties of their Nation, in such a case of necessity, as that before them.  
A fift Objection, 
Sect. 43.  wherewith some strengthen and comfort themselves against the deportment of the Army, 
The fift great Objection.  hitherto justified, is this. The example of the fact must needs be of very dangerout consequence to the Kingdom. For by the same reason, and upon the same account, that the Army opposed the present Magistracy, and proceed of the public affairs amongst us, any other party of men, making, and finding themselves strong enough for the undertaking, may at any time attempt the like disturbance, and confusion: and so the Kingdom shall be always in danger of the like combustions and broils. I answer,  
First, That the lawfulness or goodness of an action is not to be measured or judged, by what may follow upon it, by way of sequel or event, but by what is like to follow upon it, and this not by accident, or by misconstruction, but according to the native tendency, proper ducture, and inclination of it. It is wittily said by one, that he that goeth about to read the badness, or goodness of an action by the event, holds the wrong end of the book upward. Christ did not amiss in giving a sop to Judas, though presently upon the receiving of it, the Devil entered into him, and prevailed with him to betray him very suddenly. Nor would it argue any thing amiss in what the Army did, though never so many troubles, and tumultuous rise of people should break out upon pretence of it. The reason is, because, as the grace of God itself, though a thing of most incomparable sweetness and worth, may nevertheless be (yea, and daily is) turned into wantonness, and much sin and wickedness occasioned by it in the World; so, and much more, may the most worthy actions and services of men, be compelled to pretence the worst and vilest deeds that lightly can be perpetrated. Therefore,  
Secondly, 
Sect. 44.  Suppose the Army should have apprehended, not only a possibility, but even a probability, that that fact of theirs we speak of, would beget out of its own likeness, and occasion disturbances of quite another genius and spirit from itself; yet might it have been sinful and unworthy in them notwithstanding, to stand still, and not to have acted as they did. The reason is, because when seedtime is come, men must not observe the winds; nor regard the clouds, when it is time to reap. As men must not do evil, that good may come of it, so neither must they forbear the doing of good, because evil may come of it. Men are bound to sow the seed of good actions, though they had some cause to fear that an increase of Dragons would spring from it. But,  
Thirdly, 
Sect. 45.  That no action of any bad consequence to the Kingdom, can truly plead legitimacy of descent from this of the Army, is evident thus. Where there is not a concurrence of the same circumstance (I mean, either formally, or equivalently the same) there can be no place for exemplariness, or likeness of action. And when there is, or shall be, the like political constellation with that, under which the Army acted, the like action cannot in the direct and native tendency of it, be of any ill consequence to the Kingdom. The kill of a man by Titius being assaulted, and in his own defence, is no ground, so much as in colour or pretence for Sempronius to flay a man travelling peaceably by him on the way.  
Fourthly, 
Sect. 46.  Nor is it like, that the action of the Army we speak of, should by any backdoor of misconstruction whatsoever, let in mischief or disturbance into the Kingdom; considering that it was performed and done, in due order to such a provisional settlement of affairs in the Kingdom, that as far as is possible, there may, neither occasion be given, on the one hand, nor opportunity left, on the other, to any party or number of men, to attempt any interrupture, distraction, or disturbance therein. Therefore, to pretend or plead, that the said action of the Army, is like to cause future trouble or disturbance in the Nation, is as if a man should say, that to build an house strong, walls, doors, and windows, were of dangerous consequence to invite thiefs to assault, and break into it.  
Fifthly (and last) The action of the Army is not disparageable by any possibility or likelihood of evil, 
Sect. 47.  that it may occasionally bring upon the Kingdom afterwards, more than the preservation of a man from imminent death is reprovable, because by it he is occasionally exposed to die another time: They who conceive that it had been better for the Kingdom, and more conducing to the peace of it in after times, that the Army should have sat still, and not interpose, as they did, argue at no better rate of reason, than I should do, in case I should persuade my friend being dangerously sick, not to use the help of a Physician for his recovery, because in case he did recover, his recovery might prove a probable occasion of more sickness unto him afterwards. 
— Quis furor est, ne moriare, mori?  i. 
What madness is't, through fear of future death,  
To wish myself deprived of present breath?   
If the Army had not applied that plaster of fteele to the boil, or plague-sore of the Kingdom, which they did, there had been little, or no hope of the recovery thereof, from that political death, the symptoms whereof, had so strongly seized the vital parts of it. So that though the cure, in process of time should prove an occasion of a relapse, or bring the like distemper again upon it; yet, as Hezechiah was not without cause thankful unto God, who made an addition of fifteen years unto his life, after his sickness unto death, though this addition did not excuse him from dying afterwards. So shall the people of the Nation have just cause of thankfulness unto the Army for those days of freedom and peace, be they fewer, or be they more, which they shall enjoy, though slavery and oppression should return upon them afterwards like clouds after the rain.  
Another Objection, 
Sect. 48.  deemed by some impregnable, and above answer, 
The sixth main Objection.  is framed by way of inference from Rom. 13. 1, 2. Let every soul be subject to the higher powers— Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the Ordinance of God: and they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation. From hence the Army are concluded Transgressor's, and liable to condemnation, because they resisted the higher powers; and therein, the Ordinance of God. But with this Objection we are not behind hand, having given a sufficient answer unto it already, the substance of it being nothing but what the second Objection offered. Notwithstanding because we desire to give heaped measure of satisfaction, especially to such arguments, which pretend to the Scriptures; we thought it not amiss to lay the words themselves before you, out of which the objection is framed, and so to give in the surplusage of a further answer unto it. Therefore  
1. We answer, by distinguishing (with the Ministers of Scotland, in their brief Theses de Majestatis jure) between the power of Magistrates, and the abuse of this power The power (say they) is from God, and so his ordinance, but not the abuse of it. Yea, he no whit more allows the abuse of a lawful power in one Tyrant, then [the use of] an unlawful power in another 
a Secundò igitur distinguendum inter potestatem ipsam, & potestatis abusum: eam, non autem hunc, ordinavit Deus Imò non magis ab eo probatur abusus potestatis legitimae in uno tyranno, quàm potestas illegitima in altera. . So that if it were the abuse only of a lawful power, which the Army resisted, they resisted no Ordinance of God, nor are they, for such an act, made liable to any condemnation by the Scripture mentioned. Now that it was not any power, but the abuse of pewer, which the Army resisted, hath been more than once, clearly enough evicted in this Apology; and is further evidenced from hence; no other power, but that which is Parliamentary, can be pretended to have been resisted by them, in that act so often mentioned. But that they did not resist this power, but the abuse of it only, appears; 1. Because this power remains at this day quiet and undisturbed, in the midst of them. Yea 2. Their great care and desire is, to settle this power upon better terms for the due government of the Nation, than those, on which it hath been continued hitherto.  
If it be said, 
Sect. 49.  that that the Parliamentary power now in being, in no lawful power, because it is under force; I answer, 1. that it is no more under force, than it was, whilst all the Members now secluded, had free liberty to sit and vote in that House. The same Army, which is now pretended to over-awe, or keep under force the present Parliament, was as near, and did as much to the Parliament then, in matter of force or awe, as now it is, or doth. Therefore if it were a lawful power then, it is no less lawful now. 2. Nor is the Parliament at this day under any more force, by reason of the Army, than it was for the space of about two years together before, by reason of the continual tumultuous engagements and practices, both in City and Country. Nay 3. I verily believe, that if the Members of Parliament now sitting, would please to declare themselves upon the point, they would acknowledge and confess, that they are as free from force, or fear (at least in respect of the Army) now, as they have been at any time since their first meeting in their House. But to the main objection in hand, I answer.  
2. 
Sect. 50.  The ordinance of God in magistratical power, being the adequate foundation, upon which that subjection, or obedience, which he requireth of men unto it by his command, is, and aught to be built; evident it is, that this subjection is not commanded or required to this power, beyond the ordinance of God in it; i. unto any act, or injunction of men invested with this power, which swerveth from, especially which opposeth, this ordinance of God (in the end and intent of it.) Now the end and intent of the ordinance of God in magistratical power, being (as the Apostle clearly asserteth, vers. 4.) the good of those that are subject to it [For he is the Minister of God to thee, for good] it is evident yet further, that there is no subjection commanded by God unto any higher powers, further, or otherwise, than they act and quit themselves in a due order and proportion to the good of men. And where subjection is not commanded, resistance is not prohibited; and consequently, is not unlawful. For where there is no law, there is no transgression. Therefore if those higher powers, the resistance whereof the objection chargeth upon the Army, were found acting, and apparently bend to act on, in a way of manifest prejudice and opposition to the good of those, from whom they expected subjection (which I presume, is little questionable to him; that hath read and weighed the premises) and consequently, quite besides the end and purport of the ordinance of God, the Army, in that resistance which they made against them, transgressed no law, or precept of God.  
Nor doth it follow from any thing that had been said, that a Magistrate for every error in the administration of his power, may be deposed from his place of Magistracy by any party of men: but this is that, which only follows, that, when the supreme Magistracy of a Kingdom shall be so fare, whether blinded in judgement, or corrupted in affection, that such counsels and actings put forth themselves in them from time to time, which are apparently detrimentous and destructive to the general and great interest of the due liberties of the people, reasonable security may be taken of them by any party of this people, having the opportunity, and all others wanting it, that they shall proceed and act no further in such a way.  
3. (And last) that resisting the ordinance of God in the Higher Powers, which the Apostle (in the Scripture in hand) condemneth, is not a detaining of men in Authority, though with a strong hand, from doing mischief in their places; but either (as was formerly said) a refusing obedience unto their lawful commands, or awards: or rather a complotting or attempt-making to shake off the yoke of all obedience unto civil Magistracy. Calvin upon the place seems to incline to the latter; Paraeus, unto the former, whose words are these: Yet every disobedience is not to be termed rebellion, or resistance; but only that, which out of malice is practised, or admitted, contrary to the laws, by those, who refuse to satisfy the law, by suffering such punishment, as they have deserved 
a Non quaevis tamen in obedientia, dicenda est rebellio, vel resistentia; sed ea solum, quae contra leges, ex malitiâ admittitur ab ijs, qui per poenam commeritam legibus satisfacere detrectant. . If either of these interpretations of the place be admitted, certain it is, that it reflects no bad colour at all upon the action of the Army; who neither refused obedience in what they did to any command (much less to any lawful command) of their Superiors, nor yet declined the giving of satisfaction unto the lawer, by refusing to suffer any punishment, which they had deserved. Pareus lays down this position upon the place, and maintains it by argument; v z. That it is lawful for subjects, though mere private men, in case a Tyrant shall assault or set upon them, as Thiefs use to do, and offer them violence, in case they want opportunity to implore the ordinary power for their relief, and can by no other means escape the danger, to defend themselves and theirs, in the case of present danger, against this Tyrant, as against a private robber upon the high way 
b Subditis tamen merè privatis, si tyrannus tanquam latro et grassator, aut stuprator, in ipsos faciat impetum, et ipsi nec potestatem ordinariam implorare nec aliâ ratione effugere periculum possint, in presenti periculo se et suos contrà tyrannum, sicut contrà privatumgrassatorem defendere licet. .  
But concerning the true sense of the place, 
Sect. 53.  Calvin's apprehensions are of best comportance with the words; which properly and primarily speak of magistratical power or Authority in the abstract, and this under such a circumscription and consideration only as it proceeds from, and is authorized by God, and not of the persons of Magistrates at all, otherwise than they administer this power in a regular and due order to the end intended by God in it, which is (as hath been showed from vers. 4.) the good of those, that live under it. First, he doth not say, let every soul be subject to the higher Magistrates, but, to the higher powers. 2. Nor doth he say, There is no Magistrate, but of God; but, there is no power but of God. Nor 3. doth he say, the Magistrates that are, but, the powers that are, are ordained of God. Nor 4. Whosoeer acsisteth the Magistrate, but, whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist [viz. the power, not the person] shall receive to themselves damnation, 5. He demands, Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? not, of the Ruler or Magistrate. chrysostom takes special notice of these expressions, and thereupon commentarieth the place, thus: What sayest thou [Paul.] Is then every Ruler ordained by God? No (saith he) I say not so: nor do I now speak of particular Rulers, or Magistrates, but of the thing [or, matter] itself [1. of the order, or power of ruling] For that there should be powers [or Magistracy] and that some should rule, and some be ruled, and that all things should not run loosely and hand over head, or the people be like the waves [of the Sea] carried hither and thither, I affirm it to he the work of the wisdom of God. 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪  Pareus himself likewise carrieth the words directly to the same point: He names powers (saith he) rather then Kings, Princes, etc. because he would be understood to speak, not so much of the persons, as of the order [or ordinance itself of ruling] For in the persons [of Rulers] vice oft times, and causes of not obeying, are found: therefore he would have the powers, to be differenced from the persons. 
b Vocat autem potestates potius, quàm Reges, Principes, etc. ut non tamed persoins, quàm de ordine ipso loqui intelligatur. Name in personis saepe sunt vitia & caufa non obediendi: ideò à personis discerni vult potestates.   
It is true, the Apostle names Rulers, ver. 3. where he saith, Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil: And ver. 4. of the Magistrate or Ruler he saith, that he is the Minister of God to thee for Good; and afterwards, that he is a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. But evident it is, that in these passages, he speaks of Rulers and Magistrates not simply, or at large, but under the precise consideration of persons exercising the power, which they have received, in a due subordination unto God, and with a single eye to the procurement of that good, which God intended unto those, who are to obey, in his ordination of such powers. So that nothing can be more clear, then that the adequate scope of the Apostle, in the Scripture before us, was to persuade Christians to own, and to subject themselves unto, civil Authority, as the ordinance of God, so fare, 
Sect. 54.  and in such cases, as it should be administered by the persons invested in it, in a regular and due proportion to the benefit and good of those. i. of those communities of men respectively, who live under them, and from whom obedience and subjection are, upon such an account, due unto them. This supposed, we may safely, and without the least occasion of fcruple, conclude, that there is nothing appliable in the Scripture in hand, to the ease of the Army hither to argued; unless (haply) it should be supposed (and the supposition will not be altogether without ground) that the Apostle enforcing subjection unto civil Authority, merely as, or because, the ordinance of God, and as administered according to the gracious intentions of the founder and ordainer of it, tacitly, and in a consequential way, implieth a liberty in men to decline this subjection, when the administrations of it are irregular, and the gracious intentions of God violated in them. For in many cases, when an action is pressed in the nature of a duty, upon a special consideration or ground, the consideration failing, the action loseth the nature and relation of a duty. Now if this supposition be admitted, it is a clear case, that the Scripture under debate, is altogether with, and not at all against, the Army.  
I know nothing of moment, 
Sect. 55.  that can be opposed against the lawfulness of the action, hitherto apologised and justified in these papers, beyond what hath been already bought and sold (I mean, urged, and answered) at sufficient rates. The lawfulness of the action we speak of, being supposed, the honour and worth of it are of much more easy demonstration. For what better savour can a Christianly-heroique Spirit spread abroad of itself, then when men shall put their lives in their hand, and in this posture stand up to take Lions by the beards, when they are ready to tear in pieces, and devouce the Sheep of the fold? to attempt the wresting of an Iron Sceptre out of those hands, which were now lifting it up to break a poor Nation in peecs like a potter's vessel? What the Army hath done in this behalf, calleth to mind the unparallelable example of the Lord Jesus Christ, blessed for ever, who descended into the lower parts of the Earth, went down into the chambers of death, from thence to bring up with him a lost World. It was the saying of Plato, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  that to do good to as many as we can, is to be like unto God. But to do good to as many as we can, as well enemies, as friends, by an exposal of our own lives unto death for the accomplishment of it, is a lineament of that face of divine goodness, which Plato (it is like) never saw. It was the manner of almost all Nations (as the Roman Orator observeth) to place the Assertors of their Country's liberties, next to the immortal Gods themselves, at the Table of honour. And I make no question, but when the Inhabitants of this Nation shall have drank a while of the sweet waters of that Well of liberty, which the Army have digged and opened with their Swords, after it had been for a long time stopped and filled up with earth by the Philistims, they will generally recover of that Mallgnant fever, which now distempereth many of them, and be in a good posture of sobriety and strength to rise up early, and call their Benefactors, Blessed. However, the good will of him that dwelled in the Bush, be upon the head of such Warriors, who pursue that blessed victory of overcoming evil, by doing good; and according to the method of the warfare of Heaven, feeke to reconcile a Nation unto themselves, by not imputing their unthankfulness, or other their evil entreaties unto them, but in the midst of their own sufferings from them, set themselves with heart and soul to set them at liberty from their Oppressort.   

Faulit escaped.  
P. 11. l. 19 for palbably, r. palpably. p. 19 l. 28. for these, r. their. p. 26. l. 11. deal, we. p. 35. l. 35. for dangerout, r. dangerous.  
FINIS.