Politic MAXIMS AND OBSERVATIONS Written by the most learned hugo grotius Translated for the ease and benefit of the English statesmen.  
BY H.C. S.T.B.  
LONDON, Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and are to be sold at his Shop at the Prince's arms in Saint Paul's churchyard, 1654.;   

To the Reader.  
I Shall not beg pardon for this address to the English Readers. What is here presented to view, is the Digest of the immortal HUGO GROTIUS. The Subject matter was first lent by that learned friar CAMPANELLA but he was rather the Occasion than the Author. For CAMPANELLA'S share of this work, was only a piece of his Philosophia realis, which had slept forgotten, had not GROTIUS' waked it by these admirable Observations. And these speak the Author so fully, that you'll confess he travailed farther, while he sat still, then ever Ulysses was feigned to do; and (without the Encounters of Circe and the Sirens) not only {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, but {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}  
Now if you suspect the English falls short of GROTIUS own Latin, I would gladly know who it is that can reach it? but if you look for the sense faithfully rendered (and-reasonably you can expect no more) I assure you 'tis done; and that on his word who hath chosen rather to lose his livelihood, than to subscribe to a lie.  
Farewell.   

To the most learned HUGO GROTIUS the Author.  
OUr age's Wonder, by thy Birth the Fame  
Of Belgia, by thy Banishment the Shame:  
Who to more knowledge younger didst arrive  
Than forward Glaucius, yet art still alive:  
Whose Masters oft (for suddenly you grew  
To equal and pass those, and need no new;  
To see how soon, how far thy Wit could reach)  
Sat down to wonder, when they came to teach:  
Oft then would Scaliger contented be,  
To leave to mend all times to polish thee,  
And of that pains effect did highlyer boast,  
Than had he gained all that his Fathers lost:  
When thy Capella read (which till thy hand  
Had cleared, grave and learned did under stand,  
Though well thou might'st, at such a tender age  
Have made ten lessons of the plainest page)  
That King of critics stood amazed to see  
A work so like his own set forth by thee:  
Nor with less wonder on that Work did look,  
Than if the bridegroom had begot the book,  
To whom thy age and act seemed to unite,  
At once the Youth of Phoebus and the Light.  
Thence loved thee with a never dying flame,  
As the adopted heir to all his Fame.  
For which care, wonder, love, the riper days  
Paid him with just and with eternal praise;  
Who gained more honour from one verse of thine,  
Than all the Canës of his Princely line.  
In that he joyed, and that opposed to all,  
To Titius' spirit, to hungry Schoppius gall.  
To what (with cause disguised) Bonarcius writes,  
To Delrio's rage, and all his Loyolites  
But though to thee, each tongue, each art be known,  
As all thy time that had employed alone,  
Though truth do naked to thy sight appear,  
And scarce can we doubt more, than thou canst clear,  
Though thou at once dost different glories join,  
A lofty Poet and a deep Divine,  
Canst in the purest phrase clothe solid sense,  
Scaevola's Law in tuli's eloquence.  
Though thy employments have excelled thy pen,  
showed thee much skilled in Books, but more in men.  
And proved thou canst at the same easy rate.  
Correct an Author and uphold a State.  
Though rare praise, do a full truth appear  
To Spain and Germany, who more do fear  
(Since thou thy aid didst to that State afford)  
The Swedish counsels then the Swedish sword.  
All this yet of thy worth makes but a part,  
And we admire thy head less than thy heart;  
Which when in want was yet too grave to close  
(Though wooed) with thy ungrateful country's foes.  
When their chief Ministers strove to entice,  
And would have bought thee, at what ever price:  
Since all our praise and wonder is too small,  
For each of these, what shall we give for all?  
Above the reach or stroke of Fortune live,  
Not valuing what she can take or give;  
For low desires oppress the loftiest state,  
And who looks down on vice, looks down on Fate.  
FALKLAND.   

Manipulus Politicus OR, politic maxims and Cautions.  

PART I.  

CHAP. I. Of politic Communities.  
1. THE Sense and Apprehension of man's self-insufficiency, 
Aphor. 1.  was the first thing that linked men into communities. For Man finding himself unable to stand alone, was compelled by Necessity to betake himself to the support of others.  
2. Dominion therefore requires the Union of many into one Body, which is called thence a Community, a Policy or Body; because no Man can Politically be his own Lord nor the Lord of any one singular person.  
3. Dominion is two fold.  

1. Natural, or  
2. Violent.   
By the natural, the soul rules the Body, Parts, and Affections.  
By the violent, the Affections sometimes Lord it over the Reason.  
Observator.  
4. Man is borne to hold Society with All Men: an evident sign whereof is, his Speech, and natural tender affections, if they be not corrupted by Education.  
5. 6. There is a threefold Community 

1. Of souls or minds.  
2. Of Bodies.  
3. Of Fortunes.    
First, the Community of Minds, which is called RELIGION, and that is the chief community, which is the very soul of Policy, & the shield of natural Justice: and it is the great Tye that links man to God, and man to man, whence Religion hath its name, à Religando.  
Observat.  
This Religious Union, is evident amongst the Jews, but more amongst True Christians: amongst Mahometans very little: amongst pagan's none at all: unless we rather regard the bare sound of the Name, than any moral effect.  
2. The Community of Bodies. This stands in the second rank of Tye's or Combinations. By this the Great Turk rules over Mahometans, Jews and Christians, which under his Empire are united in Body, although in soul and Religion far differing.  
3. Community of Fortunes or Goods, obtains the third place. By this the Turk rules over the Turks, and Ragusians too, and the King of Spain over the Genoese, Neapolitan and Spaniard: for the Geneoese have estates lying in that King's Territories, and traffic there.  
Some Communities there are mixed of all these three.   

CHAP. II. Of the Function and Degrees of Lords and Rulers, whence flows the divers kinds of republics and regiments, &c. Of their Circulations, &c.  
He Naturally Rules, that excels in virtue. 
Max. 1.  He naturally serves that is inferior in virtue, or has none at all. Where the contrary is, there the dominion is violent.  
2. Politic Excellency consists either in the 

1. Mind, or  
2. Body, or  
3. Both.    
3. He rules best that excels in both, as CAESAR did.  
He Rules next-best that excels in Mind, as Ulysses.  
Thirdly, He that excels in Body, that is, in strength and activity, as Ajax.  
Observator.  But being it is natural for the soul to excel the Body: He that by strength of body overrules them that excel in mind, rules violently: as of old the Giants, and afterwards Brennus, and Attila, and many more. 
4. The first thing that gained Dominion amongst Men, was 

1. POWER.  
2. wisdom.  
3. LOVE.    
Addit.  
The mixture of all three is rare, and admirable. Power without wisdom is Brutishand Barbarous. Tyranny, this is lion-like Dominion. Wisdom without Love, is but a Cheating Hypocritical Dommion. This is foxlike. Hence Lewis the II. of France, gained the title of Lewis the Fox. But Love cements all, and makes Dominion durable.  
Hence Poets say that Cupid (or Love) is the ancientest of all the Gods, for indeed Love made the World and Harmony preserves it.  
5. The Supreme Power is the Power of the Sword, that is the Power of Life and Death, which resides in them to whom the last appeal in criminals is referred.  
6. Dominion of one Good man is called Monarchy  
Dominion of one evil men, Tyranny.  
The Dominion of many Good ones, Aristocracy.  
The Dominion of many Bad ones, Oligarchy.  
The Dominion of all Good ones, Policy.  
The Dominion of all Bad ones, Democracy.  
It is the Office (or Duty) of those that Rule  

1. To teach and instiruct Their subjects  
2. Defend Their subjects  
3. Nourish or feed Their subjects  
4. To maintain the rights of Their subjects   
Which seeing no King can undergo of himself alone, he does the 

1. By Priests, Doctors, and laws.  
2. By soldiers.  
3. By husbandmen, Merchants and Artificers.  
4. By Judges, that judge according to Law.    
On the other side, the people owe to their Prince two things 

1. Reverence &.  
2. Obedience.    
8. Those are called Kings which prefer the public before their own private good: but Tyrants which do the contrary.  
9 A Kingly Government, does very rarely degenerate (except by degrees) into a Democratique, yet in Athens it did so: which Originally was a Monarchy.  
10. When a Popular State, by misgovernment, is corrupted; there springs up in lieu of it, either a Tyrant, as Pisistratus, at Athens, or a 
* He was a Dubs equal to a King.  King: as Cosmo Medici's, at Florence. Or Vassalage under strangers, those of Pisa, by this means, became slaves to the Florentines. commonwealths by Luxury and Pride, shrink and contract themselves into an Oligarchy. So Some fell into the hands of a Decemvirate or Government by Ten-Men: which lasted not long, but was quelled (observe it!) by the People Rising under the conduct of Virginius: so the Athenians, under the conduct of Thrasybulus, cut off and suppressed the thirty Tyrants.  
11. Strife betwixt Commons and Nobles, increaseth a commonwealth: but if the Commons be conqueror, so as To draw the Nobles to their Bent: The republic goes to wrack: as it happened in Florence: a state of all others most subject to changes. But if the Noblest win the day, Tyranny forthwith steps in: as heretofore in Genoa: and the republic falls to ground. But Contentions about the Change of Religion, or the Sharing of State (which by a new Name, we call Levelling) is ever the utter undoing of all, especially where the Conquerors are but few. Yet in Flanders, Holland, and Friesland; they are not so much wasted by varieties of Religion, as the French, Polack, and English are: because they are compelled into Union by the common enemy the Spaniard.  
Observator.  
The strife of pears and people, so long as they keep from downright blows, may be reckoned in the number of those which Herod calls, 
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}  Good and advant ageous contentions: but when by Ambition and Avarice the Sedition of the Apuleij and the Gracchis, and after them the wars of Sylla and Marius crept in, the republic of Rome began to look Monarchish: which as Jul. Caesar! invaded upon a Popular account: so would Pompey have probably done, upon the SENATES.  
In some places, such is the Education of divers that are called noblemen; that you may expect virtue from any men, sooner than from Them.  
Strifes about Religion are there most Pernicious and Destructive, where Provision is not made 
* Grotius favours Toleration , for Dissenters:  
That they may live secure: and the Supreme Magistrate makes not their security good to them in good Earnest, whereupon Tumults and jars about Religion have risen that have vexed Germany, but almost quite destroyed both France and the Netherlands.  
So much for Internal changes.  
External follow. Such are foreign Invasion, Plagues, 
Corruptions external.  Inundations, and Conflagrations Uuniversall.  
Which Disasters ofttimes so change the face of things, that Inhabitants are glad to begin the world again.  

Add.  These we may not (as the Author here seems to do) impute to any magical Fatality, in the Numbers of 7. or 9 (which yet he lays, have been Experimentally found ominous) nor yet to the ill-complexion of stars, that (as I may say) attend the Horoscope of such and such kingdoms and Commomvealths: (though I will not deny, but God (the great Demiurgus) brings many Plagues upon men, and Cities, by the Ministry of the Planets) but ascribe these Calamities to the FINGER of GOD: which writ the PERIOD of the ASSYRIAN EMPIRE upon the Wall. Dan, 5. and leveled Sodom and Gomorrah, with the plain whereon they stood. Gen. 19.25.  
Cities and Countries are sometimes destroyed by natural Causes, but yet the hand of God may set them on work: as if AEtna (by its Eruptions) should destroy Sicily, or Vesevo, Campania: (as it has sometimes done) Earthquakes in Italy are Naturally frequent: by reason of the many hollow Grots and mountains in that Country, but if they bring destruction to whole Countries, or Cities, (as they have not long since done) vere Digitus Dei— fiery sins of that Sodom, &c.  

Venice subject to Oblimation.  The City of Venice is subject to Oblimation: or the casting up of Mud, and Sands; which may in time choke her up, and be her ruin: which of herself is so admirably complexioned, that she can never Perish.  
Observator.  
Some remedies for this disease (though perhaps not strong enough) she has already invented: and may devise more and better: Yet this advantage her Seas bring, that they are her Bulwark against strangers: upon confidence whereof, she has no Militia of her own; yet fears a Tyranny from her own strength: and hence perhaps it may fall out, that by hiring of foreign Commanders, she may at last come to ruin.   

CHAP. III. Of the Essence, Constitution, and Division &c. princedom and Dominion, &c.  
THE Romans, upon the sudden Emergencies of danger, by War, or seditions, did choose themselves an extemporary Monarch: 
Addit.  which they called a dictator:  
whence at last (by the Authors leave) we may infer thus much: That a Monarch is the best & safestengine for any People, in time of War or Danger. Hence Homer makes his wiseman, [Ilysses vote clearly for that; to carry on the Grecian war  
— It is not good to have many heads (says he) let there be one Chief, one King! For  
1. The Dominion of one good man, is always better than the Dominion of many, nay, of all good ones. Yea,  
2. The maladministration of One, is much to be desired, rather than that of Many, or of all in a princedom, or Rule.  
3. Simply and naturally, God is the Sole Lord Paramount: as having Power-Absolute over all: whose Will (as most wise) is a law to itself, and transcends the whole Scale and Predicament of things. But  
4. Man is only Lord in Degree and Measure: because his Will cannot be a Law; unless Regulated and bound up by the Law of God, either natural, or Positive.  
5. 
An Excellent Gradation.  he knows not how to rule a kingdom, that cannot manage a Province nor can he wield a Province, that cannot order a City; Nor he order a City, that knows not how to Regulate a Village: nor he a Village, that cannot guide a Family: Nor can that man Govern well a Family that knows not how to govern himself: neither can any Govern himself unless his reason be Lord, Will etc. and Appetite her vassals: Nor can Reason rule, unless herself be ruled by God, and [wholly] be obedient to him.  
Ergo.  

Conclusion thereupon.  Without the Divine Rule, no Man is truly a King, or Prince, according to Nature, but rather to be counted, a Scourge of God, etc. Executioner of men.  
But neither, according to the Divine Rule, is any Prince simply a LORD: but a RULER and PASTOR of his People: 
* Victrii Domini De, &c.  and the vicegerent of the LORD GOD by whom King's Reign.  
6. Therefore ought a good Prince so far to excel his Subjects in virtue, as the shepherd does his Flock: who is of a superior species to them: Now seeing all men are equal as to the Species, it must here follow that Princes (as such) must have somewhat of God, etc. peculiar Impresses of Elohim, the Deity in them. Therefore  
7. Wisdom alone Rules best of all: not sophistical, but philosophical [yet] not the wisdom of the Cloister, or the* Cell, but Civil wisdom, not opposite, but Subservient to God.  
8. The Dominion of The The 1. Male Over 1. The Female is natural. 2. Father 2. His Children 3. Oldmen 3. Young men 4. Strong 4. The weak 5. scholars 5. Master 

Nature doth bring forth men.  
1. Of strong Intellectuals, though weak in constitution of Bodies to be Priests, Philosophers, councillors.  
2. Active and strong bodies, with courageous minds to be— soldiers.  
3. Gross brains and rude hands to be husbandmen.  
4. Heavy and robustuous for the Cavalry or Horsemen.  
5. Laborious and nimble-handed to weaving, and other Manufactures.  
6. Ready tongues, and learned, for Embassies, and Orations.  
7. Other sharp wits for merchandise.  
8. Just men for the Bench, or tribunal.  
9 Weak in Body and mind, for 
* Animadvers. They are like to make but sorry servants and instruments: that are weak bath in body and mind.  service, and to be instruments for their betters.  
10. Men of abilities both of body and mind, to be Commanders, Kings, and Masters of the Militia.    
10. That therefore there is the best republic, where every man bends himself to those duties and employments which Nature hath fitted him for: For then Reason and Wisdom bear sway: and that the worst, where men are put upon employments, which are contrary to thein grain, and Genius: for then Fortune, and Chance, (that is the force of Ignorance) rule the roast.  
11. Whence Magistrates are chosen, because they are the Sons of Nobles, or Sons of ☞ friends of such as are in present power, or for their Wealth, or bought Honour, and not because they are good, or wise men; There the republic falls to ground.  
12. A commonwealth goes to wrack soonest, when the Portion makes marriages, and Equality of Wealth, and not an equal 
* valour Lat.  strength of body and mind, whence (according to the Pythagorean) the best Issue is to be expected: 
* Observator.  though Plato think (more rightly) the best breed to be of strong bodies, and good wits: or on the contrary.  
13. All mischiefs sway, where women have the Liberty to do, and say what they please, &c.  
14. These we count CITIZENS who not only are capable and partakers of dignities and honours, in the republic, but such, as by any Function, be it never so mean (as the members of the body) contribute to the use and advantage of the whole. The rest we count strangers, Excrements of a commonwealth: such as are many noblemen now adays.  
15. The [true] Office of the nobleness or Peereage [in any republic] is to defend that, and private persons.  
The Office of the Commons to seed, and sustain it.  
The Office of the Wiser sort, to rule and Instruct it.  
He that takes no procession, or calling at all upon him is to be looked upon, as an Excrement, or Drone: But they that mediate betwixt God and Man, are to be esteemed as the Diviner part of a commonwealth: Such are the Legitimate priesthood.   

CHAP. IV. Of Laws and customs, and that which is called the Reason of State.  
1. THat 
* Lat. Optimis nascuntur.  Good Men may be borne, and employed in those Offices and Functions, to which they were born, every Community stands ever in need of a Law.  
2. As Virtue is the Private Law, of individuals [or singular Persons] so Law is the public virtue of a Community. Therefore being Virtue is the rule of Actions, and Affections in a particular Person, ordained by the Decree of a Potent and 
* Volentis.  pliant Reason, for a chief private good: so Law is the Rule of affections, and Actions public: Constituted and published from the Dictates of Common Reason, which respect the chiefest common good.  
3. The chief good is Preservation: & that either Private or public. which is (as far as may be gathered) from Conservatives [simply] or Expulsives of Destructives. Simply to Coserve is to eternize [or perpetuate] therefore simply, both the Private & public chief good is from [GOD] that eternal chief Entity. But partial from other things: as namely, Instrumentally and Dispositively from the Rules of Reason.  
4. Wherefore— No republics ☞ can make Laws, where there is not common Reason and common consent; unless where by common Reason (and consent) The Matter is put into the hands of the Wise-men; Such as were Solon, Lycurgus, and Numa.  
Or unto one whom God has Delegated [for his Vicegeret] as Moses, &c.  
As for Minos and Mahomet, either Craft or the the devil led them on, to be Apes of the true messengers from God, as Moses was.  
Observat.  
Here the Observator steps in and says, I see no reason why the Edicts of one or many Rulers may not deserve the name of laws, not at all awaiting the people's Consents: For neither in prescribing medicines, do Physicians require the consent of their Patients.  
5. 
1 Yhe Divine Law.  The eternal and first Law is that, whereby God did Fashion, Create, Govern, and change all things and bring them about to his own ends: Even changeable things, unchangably.  

2 Law natural.  From this is derived the Law natural planted in the minds of men, and in the whole volume of nature which is* God's Art, and nature's Directory: 
Qua est Ars Dei: Ejusdemque Directrix.  Neither can it be violated but by God: [and that by him] as a Lord, not as a Legislator.  

3 Law of Nations.  From the Law natural is is derived the Law of Nations, Common to all men.  

4 Positive Law.  From the Law of Nations, the Positive civil Law is derived, and so far as it is agreeable to Nature, it is invariable: but as it serves present necessities, it may, and sometimes ought, to be altered.  
God himself also gave a Positive Law— which is immutable, where it contains the Law of Nature, where our necessities [only] mutable, as the Law of Moses in the Decalogue, remains [in full force] for ever, but not in the forbidding of Swines-flesh: which was made on purpose to 
* Lepram non] alendam. Lat.  avoid leprosy. Yet,  
☞ No man can alter laws, but he that made them, or he that is Created his substitute, for that very purpose.  
Observator. Note. This observation cannot refer to any thing in the Antecedent Paragraph.  
Nature is the work of Reason without us.  
human Reason, is the work of Nature within us . 
The will [of man] is (of its own Nature) mutable: but Reason Immutable, except improperly: namely, when the matter about which which she is conversant is mutable.  
6. Politic Reason, which some call the Reason of State: and of old, was the same with Equity, does transgress the [strict] Letter of the Law, but not the sense and scope of it: becauses it does not abrogate or interpret, etc. any thing but for a greater good: as in the case of Fabius Vitulanus: to whom the Roman Senate granted his life which was forfeited to the Law: and Horace that slew the three Curatis, 
* In the behalf of] or rather for the Empire.  in the quarrel of the Roman Empire.  
But the Reason of State, as it is now adays, is nothing else but a device of Tyrants, that carries the face of Equity, supposing it lawful for them to transgress, not only their own, but even the laws of God, either to gain or maintain their petty Dominions. But,  
The difference between Reason of State, and Equity is this. For Equity respects the public Good and Truth: but Reason of State looks upon [only] the private and seeming good of the Power in being.  
Now since Machiavel was found to play Achitophel, the name being confessedly impious, Princes began, (that they might cover the shame of it) to call it the Reason of good Government. Which names though given by a knavish Godfather, may bear an honest meaning. As for example.  
Cleonymus put to death the Ephori of Lacedamon by a right reason of State: but so does not the [Great] Turk his Brethren: because although he seem to do it for the Common good; yet being it is against the Law of God, and some other way might be found out to prevent their aspiring to the Throne, the fact is [Barbarous and] unreasonable.  
7. A good Prince wants not this Reason of State, because his own goodness is a perpetual shield unto him: and if any rise up against him: all the People stand for him: as for David: whom his rebellious Son had deprived of his Kingdom.  
But a thousand thousand Machiavillian Arts cannot protect a wicked Prince: because, cause, he is [both] Odious to the People, and to God the King of all [the World]  
Now, he that jars with [God] the Prime Cause, does foolishly depend upon second causes: as it happened to Caesar 
* Caesar, Valentine Borgia, Lat.]  Borgia: who under themost wary, and provident [Discipline and] Mastership of Machiavelli, lost, both his life, and Fortune.  
Thus are Machiavillians always taken in their own snare: for want of Divine and Heavenly Knowledge, and by conceiting that by their own wisdom they can fathom, and foresee, all things.  
10. Those laws are best, which are 1. short. 2. easy. 3. few. and 4. fitted to the Manners [or Genius] of the People and the public good. Tyrannical laws 02 are Many, and [those] obscure, difficult, like so many snares: that serve the turns of some one, or few, but not at all accommodated, either to the Manners, or advantage of the public.  
9 Where laws are often changed: they are the forerunners of the instant rain of a republic: as Florence found it therefore [by sad experience.  
Observator.  
laws belonging to Governments, ought not to be altered unless necessity compel: nor yet others, but where the profit is [very] evident, and [very] Great.  
10. Where there are more Laws to 
* Punitive quam Instructive.  punish, then to direct or instruct, it is a sign of an ill tempered Government.  
11. The Acts of Laws are: to command what is good: to restrain what is evil: and to tolerate things indifferent.  
12. Reward, and Punishment are the two [2] spurs of the Law [to prick men forward to observation] of them.  
Observat.  
No Law can stand without punishment [of the transgressors of] and where no punishment is expressed, there it is Arbitrary: otherwise it were rather a Counsellthen a Law: but whether a Reason ought to be annexed to every Law, it cannot universally be defined: Saleucus, and Charondas, and Plato too, followed this course; being to make Laws for Free People, they thought good to use persuasions. Where as Seneca (having an eye upon his 
* Under Nero.  own Times) affirms: A Law with a Preface to be a foolish thing: being a Law should command and not persuade: and Dio Chrysostom compares custom, to a King, but Law to a Tyrant: in that custom gives Law to men willing [to receive it] but Law binds the unwilling also.  
13. The three Guardians or Keepers of Laws are, 

1. Honour.  
2. Love.  
3. Fear.    
He that secures not his Law by these three, is either a weak or Ignorant Lawgiver, or elsea Tyrant &c.  
14. Where a thing which once was good, becomes hurtful, it is to be forbidden: Where an evil thing does prosit [the public] if it be evil of Punishment, and not evil of Offence, it is to be Commanded. Where in its own Nature indifferent as it falls out, Good or evil to the republic, it is to be [according] Commanded or Forbidden.  
15. The Laws of men make rather good Citizens, then simply good men. Yet Princes [and Rulers] aught to be simply good, because they are the 
* Aliorum Lux & Lex.  Light and the Law of others.  
16. The Law ought to make and ordain Equality as the Nurse of the commonwealth, but not a Levelling; for as the Observator says excellently, such strings make no Harmony but an Equality opposite to that destructive 
* Inequalitas Consumptrix. Lat.  consiming inequality, which is fatal to commonwealths. For example: extreme Poverty makes thieves, Insidious, perjured, Ignorant, and Instruments, of Rich wicked men. On the contrary, very Rich men are Proud, Luxurious, unlearned, Contumelious, [and I may add out of 
* Rhetor.  Aristotle, Injurious too]  
Very crafty men are [commonly] given to change. Very stupid, are voluntarily servants [or slaves] only moderatemen are Stable in their place, and stations where they live.  
The Florentine republic was ever the most unstable, by reason of the subtlety of their wits: The Venetian, the most firm and stable of all, by reason of a Mediocrity: and allay of Dullnesse.  
17. A good custom is a second Law: which does more preserve a commonwealth, than the Law itself.  
Five customs, made Rome, the Princess of republics: as Cato in Sallust witnesseth. 

1. Public Wealth.  
2. Private Poverty.  
3. Just Government abroad.  
4. Freedom of speech at home.  
5. Unliableness to fears, or designs.    
All these [customs] the Commonwealth of Venice observes as a Law: Except only that she lies open to Fear: yet not in her Counsels: but from foreigners, through want of a Militia of her own.  
For want of the first [public Wealth] the Genoesse, are not Lords of the Sea: nor of the new world, &c.  
For want of the fifth [that is unliableness to fear, and desire] the Genoesse are as it were servants to foreign Princes.  
For want of the Third [vix, Just Government abroad] the French could never fix their Dominion, without the Verge of France. In which the Spaniard is peccant too: everywhere severely and ceremoniously Lording it; not at all regarding the manners, [and Temper] of the People [they rule over.]  
For want of the Fourth [custom] [that is freedom of speech] the Florentine republic went to wrack.  
Observator.  
Manners doubtless (i.e. customs) can do more than Laws: and either add vigour to the, or take it from them.  
Customs have brought Laws under their subjection.  
Obs. Customs are either from 

1. Disposition of People or  
2. Institution and Education.    
1. For disposition: The French now have much of the old Gauls in them: Humanity and fickleness says the Observator: give me leave to add feverish Valour in war: (which L. Florus observes in their Progenitors the Gauls) 
* Primus Impetus Major quam Virorum; Secundus minor quam Paeminarum. Flor.  In their first onsets they are more than Men, in their second, less than Women.  
2. For Education: what power that has over Nature, consult Xenophon, about the Persians and Lacedomonians.  
18. Good governors bring in good customs, ill men and women ill customs. Ergo, neither ill men, nor [any] woman are fit to rule: the law of Nations is the custom of the whole species. (1) All mankind.  
19 Not a Rigid but easy government fit the N●rthern Nations, ☞ as being by nature a fierce people, and will hardly brook the Fetters of a republic; as Tartars, Muscovites, Suedes, Germans, Swissers, etc.  
Where they have Kings by succession, the people have much liberty, and the Prince little power; yet after the Roman Culture, they began to live more severely [and regularly, than before.] But  
For Southern People, especially those that live under the Tropics, no Dominion fits them but the Despotique (1) Lordly Rule: and the severest laws: because they are weak in strength: but strong in subtlety. For which Reason they were ever [very much] addicted to Ceremonies, Superstitions, etc.  
Observat.  
The Muscovite and Tartar are 
* Addictè Despoticè.  Slavishly Governed: for there the North bears Easterly. The King doom of Swethland is become Hereditary, by occasion of Religion: but under such laws, as are observed in Elective kingdoms.  
20. Eastern People incline much to the disposition of the Southern: as the Western to the Northern, by reason of the Sea adjoining to them: and for other Causes: but the Spaniard is like in conditions to the African by his Vicinity, or Neighbourhood.   

CHAP. V. Of Legislators.  
1. A Legislator is he, who Foundeth a New Empire: commonly upon new Laws, Religion and arms, Rites, and Fortunate essays, or Enterprises: as Moses, a good Legislator, Mahomet a 
* Perversus. L.]  wicked one.  
A Lawgiver therefore is either a God, as Christ: or the messenger of God as Moses: or a subtle Politician, ☞ that can counterfeit the good ones: as Minos, Osiris, Jupiter, Mahomet, Zamolxis, and the like: who to gain belief and love from the People, feigned themselves to be sent from God. For  
☞ A Lawgiver should be most renowned, most wise, most Divine, and most Reverend.  
Observator.  
To pretend the Commands of God might perhaps bring some success to a 
* Perito. Cunning]  skilful man, amongst a rude and ignorant People: as Sertorius amongst the Spaniards: or to the Spaniard (now 
* Iam Eruditis.  grown civil, and learned too) amongst the Americans: by the help of natural philosophy, physic, and Astronomic: But in a learned age, and place, This Plot and Artifice, is cold [and ridiculous.]  
2. Every Artist, because is wise, is a King in his own Art: for a Physician, he's Lord and Ruler over a sick King: and so a Mariner, in a Tempest, says to the Priests and captains, and the principal men, Sit you here; stand thou there, &c. Therefore must the Lawgiver be versed in all these Arts: at least understand their ends: how they conduce either to the prosit, or prejudice of the republic— to purge out the superfluous and retain the necessary. Hence it was Plato banished Poets out of his republic: because they were full of lies, and Ribaldry: and by crying up wicked men, cried down goodness, and discouraged virtue. Hence Moses expelled false Prophets and Painters (that pictured the Deity) and Hucksters, and whoremongers, &c.  
A Legislator must be throughly skilled, in the Temperament and manners of Countries, by the* Air and the Earth: as likewise happy or unhappy accidents that usually befall such and such a place, &c. as Inundations, Fires, Leprosies, Famines, &c.  
3. Legislators ought to reform and purify, not Exth pate Religion.  
4. The Noblest Profession in Mountainous Countries, are, 1. Shepherds, as in Switzerland, and Scythia.  
In plain Conutries 2. Husbandmen: as in Egypt.  
In Maritime Countries 3. Seamen and Merchants: who for the profit they bring in; the moneys that they return [and exchange] and arts and Trades they bring from foreign Countries: have ever been held in highest place and esteem. But Where other (especially superfluous) Arts are preferred before these, Imminent, both loss and ruin must needs follow after.  
5. A Divine Legislator hath the Idea of his own Repubque in the Court of Heaven.  
The human [Lawgiven] in the Government of the Universe: and man's Body.  

A body politic how actuteda.  6. Man (Male and Female) are the Elements of a republic: who consists of 

1. Soul.  
2. Body, and External.  
3. Goods.    
1. The Soul of a republic, is wisdom and Religion.  
2. The Body, a Senate or [Grand] council: or whoever bear any Office advantageous to the public.  
3. For external good [the republic hath] soldiers, Mercenary, and Auxiliary: and foreign Merchants and Artificers.  
For spirits, she hath laws.  
For Eyes, the searchers into Arts, and Sciences.  
For ears, Spies and Merchants.  
For a Tongue, Preachers, and Doctors, and ambassadors.  
For hands, her own Militia:  
For feet, Husbandmen and Tradesmen.  
7. As naturally the Soul rules the 
* Spiritus.] sing, I at.  Spirits Policically, but the Body Despotically [(1.) by an Imverious, and arbitrary way] and the Body rules the Estate as the soul dictates to it: so Religion has a politic Dominion over laws, and the Senate: but over soldiers, Tradesman, & such like, both* Senate, Law, 
Pro rata.  and Religion, rule proportionably.  
8. Goods of the Mind are first to be looked after: next, those of the Body. Those of Fortune, in the third place.  
Observat.  
The laws of friendship, have a stricter tie than those of civil society.   
Here endeth the first part of politic Maxims and Cautions.   

manipulus Politicus OR, politic maxims and Cautions.  
PART II.  

CHAP. VI. Of Colonies and Cities.  
THey that Rule over Countries lying under several Climes, must either govern them by distinct Laws, or make exchanges of Inhabitants, by mutual transplantations. So the Romans (to secure their Empire) carried Colonies over into Germany, that by their example, the Germans, (unaccustomed to Roman laws,) might be the better acquainted with, and subject to them:  
Observator.  
The Trans-Rhine (which are the true, and proper) Germans, for the much greatest part, were never conquered by the Romans: but retained (sans mixture) their own Language, and Manners, till, under Lotharius, they ●oluntarily submitted to the Roman yoke. You shall find more German Families in Italy, than Roman Families in Germany.  
2. Colonies are best made up of Citizens bred up in the Metropolis of the kingdom: or in the Neighbouring Towns: for example either of Romans or Latins; and because so many be planted, as will be able to defend the Province [and any Enemy whatever]  
3. If Colonies be sent from a Free-State, it is good to build their Cities on the tops of the Hills, for defence of their Liberty: if from a Monarch, better in the Plain.  
4. That Cities may wax great, 'tis expedient they be Situate [either] upon the Banks of Rivers, or [near] the seashore, and in a Plain; Where necessaries for life are easiest to be had: & commerce with strangers is most convenient: But, for the Defence of Liberty and laws, and the Non-impayring of Valour, they are more commodiously seated upon mountains and Rocks. Withal great respect is to be had to the wholesomeness of Water and Air, and Winds, and the Prospect to the several Quarters of the Heavens.  
5. Planters of Colonies are to be divided— into 

1. Governors: as Priests, and Judges.  
2. Protectors: as soldiers and Commanders.  
3. Artisans: and such as 
* Nutritios] Reip. L.  feed the republic. 
As Husbandmen, Shepherds, and the like.     
Observator.  
Nothing hinders but he that uses Husbandry, may also follow a Trade, either by himself, or his Wife  
Rules that prescribe exact proportions of allowances for every person in a Plantation, do often fail in the practic.  
Plains bear most Corn, mountain's most Wool, Hence etc. came Chaffering, and Exchanging and Merchandizing, and stamping of Goynes, etc. and for want of Souldery [hereupon] were Forts, and Guns invented.   

CHAP. VII. Of the instruments to gain & keep kingdoms, &c.  
TO gain, keep and govern kingdoms, there are three [principal l] instruments: The 

1. Tongue,  
2. Sword,  
3. Treasure.    
1. For the Tongue; 'tis the instrument of Religion, and Prudence. That is, of the Goods of the mind.  
2. The sword is the [proper] Instrument of the Body and its Goods.  
3. Treasure is more [the Instrument] of Fortunes, and Estates: which serves the Body and mind [only] Secondarily: but the true Instruments are the Tongue and the Sword.  
2. They that use the sword only, founding their power upon that, those quickly lose their dominion; as Tamburlaine, Attila, and Brennus, and most of the Northern nations.  
The Jesuits in Japan gain [first] souls, than kingdoms to Spain and the Papacy, by their tongues.  
There be that gain Dominion by crying up some new sect, built upon some specious colour of truth, by sowing discord betwixt the old Religion, & the new Sect, which shall be attempted and fitted to the gust and palate of the multitude: But such Dominion is of itself not very long lived.  
Ringleaders of Heresies, although [commonly] they gain much, they keep little: as for example, John of Leydon, Dulcinus & Theudas.  
Observat.  
John of Leydon was an ignorant fellow, a person of of no worth at all, who through the hatred against the Priests of his time (whose lives were abominable in the eyes of all men) gathered together a rabble of the basest people.  
They that use well the sword and tongue, do lay the foundations of durable Dominion; but then the sword must be just, and the tongue veracious. Thus did Moses build the Empire of the Jews, [namely, in veracity and justice,] which impious Machiavelli never took into consideration. p. 147.  
The Law of Moses survived the Empire of the Jews, but Mahomet's Laws shall sink with his Empire: Thus fell the laws of Alexander with his person and power; Thus Numa's, Belus, and Minos, Pythagoras, and Zamolxis his laws are extinct, even for want of justice and veracity. He, that knows not how to give laws to those he conquers, doth quickly lose the kingdom he has gained. Thus Charles the fifth lost Tunis and Germany which he had won, for want of skill to secure his conquest by the addition of laws and Colonies. This misfortune often befell King Pyrrhus; but not so the Romans.  
Observ.  
He had need be a very wise man, that can give laws to men of a different Religion, that shall be lasting and fitted to the disposition of them that receive them, as it appears by the Romans in Jewry, who did the utmost of their endeavour, & with all their skill strived, to establish the state and tranquillity of that untractable people, by laws, conform to their tempers and humours, as the excellent orations of King Agrippa, and Josephus made to their Countrymen, [the Jews] do witness.  
5. he that defends his Dominions by sword and tongue, preserves them better and more safely, than he that makes use but of only one. For  
6. Men of Arts are [usually] oppressed by Men of arms. Thus Saturn (being a Priest, as ancient Kings were) left his kingdom to Jupiter; and Perseus the warrior, dethroned Atlas the [scholar and] ginger: Thus was Pythagoras supported by soldiers; 
* Of Croton●.  and the Pope, till such time as he felt the use of his weapons, was often made a prey to his enemies, and many times (good man) to his friends.  
Observator.  
Here the thrice worthy Grotius, notes well upon this late passage, concerning the Bishop of Rome; that the benign aspects of opportunity, made way for that power which the Pope now enjoys: as for instance, the Christian World split into many petty kingdoms, Italy torn in pieces, and sluggish withal: an age too dull to apprehend the meaning of that Artifice in due time, and diverse other causes, which you may find in Guicciardin, and Machiavelli.  
7. He that uses only arms for the defence of his Empire, and neglects wit and eloquence, makes but a paper building, rules but weakly: and this is the reason why the Emperor of Germany prevails no more, having a people of different persuasions in Religion to rule over: and usually such Princes become a prey to those that make the best use of their wits. Hence came it that the Popes did so frequently make and unmake Emperors at their pleasure. Therefore (as Sallust observes) did the Romans [wisely] ever exercise both mind and body together. For,  
He that exerciseth both, makes his Empire last longest, as the King of the Turks, and Abassines, 
Dux. Lat.  and the Dake of Muscovy. Fabulous Philosophy affirms as much, whiles it gives Pallas (the goddess of wisdom) a Book and a Spear to make her invincible; but to Mars only Arnour, who (as the Poets sings) was therefore often Conquered. Hence was it that  
9 The Northern Nations that fell like swarms of Bees upon the Southern Regions, who excelled them in religion and Policy, received Laws from them they had conquered: So the Tartars and the Turks a Northern people, had laws from the conquered Arabians, and Religion too; and the Huns, Vandals, Lombards, and Goths, from the Romans, whose Territories they had invaded.  
Here the observator justly gives a check to the Author, and says that, Both the Goths that ruled in Italy and Spain, and the Vandals in Asrick, to alienate and estrange the minds of their own people from the Romans, Jeroboam-like , end: avoured with barbarous cruelties to promote the Arian Heresia, by all possible means they could.  
10. God that he might plant Religion and Learning among the Northern people, and arms and Numbers amongst the Southern, did often make an interchange, and engrafted them one into an other, like Plants to make them the more generous; but in both destroyed the degenerous Plants from the sons of Japhet: Empires descended from Sem, Priesthood and Laws from Cham, Servants, and as the Author (but mistakingly) affirms, Tyrants; for (as the observator notes) the greatest Tyrants that ever were, came rather out of Asia, than Africa, which was Cham's portion.   

CHAP. VIII. Of the causes of policies, and first of the first cause, God, and Religion.  
THere are three causes (if we speak politically) which found and govern Empires, that is 

1. God.  
2. Prudence.  
3. Occasion.    
But in some, one is more evident than the other. As  
In the kingdom of the Jews, God was most evident; in that of the Romans Prudence; in that of the Spaniard occasion: albeit (to speak Physically) God is the cause of all causes.  
2. All Dominations (except impious Machiavels) have confessed, that prudence hath not power sufficient to foresee the good and evil, which all ways and in all things do await them: Therefore did all Nations fly to God, some by a straight, others by a crooked way. Therefore,  
The Assyrian, Egyptian, and Persian Kings, consulted the will and pleasure of God, and implored his aid, by Astrology in the stars: The Greeks by Oracles of the sibyl's: The Romans by sooth-saying and Auguries, whom the Brasilians do but a little recede from: but the Christians in a direct path [seek God] and fly to the spirit of God in his Prophets, 
* Vicarium, &c. Papam.  and councillors, and his Ministry.  
3. Every princedom is protected by its own proper angel, and every Law as it is good is from God, neither can their be any Law established which is void of all good; as Divines and Nature teach us.  
4. The Priesthood supplies the place of God in every Dominion, and therefore no commonwealth, no assembly of men, either was, or can be, without a Priesthood, because not without God.  
5. Priest's ought to be wise, but rather in contemplatives than practicals; Valiant, but most in suffering; sober, liberal, ingenious, true, not lying so much as in jest, faithful, cheerful, but inclining more to austerity, than scurrility; gentle, prone rather to meekness then Rusticity, whose Character should be Piety, wisdom, charity, and tenderheartedness, without hypocrisy.  
Priests consult what is to be done, Rulers command that to be done, which is contemplated or cousidered, and soldiers and artificers put commands and consultations in execution.  
6. Religion ever ought to be had in high esteem and veneration, not in vulgar and mean account.  
7. The Priesthood ought not to be prostitute to the people, lest it lose its honour and reverence.  
Therefore Aristotle, no less ignorantly then impiously, would make old soldiers Priests. Here the Author puts the fool upon the Calvinists (under which notion he comprehends the worst of schismatics) who (saith he) both all and some, count themselves Priests, which the famous Observator here seems to prove, to defend, out of places (with reverence be it spoken) misurged both out of the Scripture and Fathers, in defence of common or universal Unction. and (by an injurious Concession) makes the Calvinist guilty of the schismatics frenzies: whereas 'tis most evident, both out of Calvin, and Beza, in their several discourses, and conflicts with the antiministerial Enthusiasts, that they were quite of an other temper, and opinion; ever bearing high for an Ordinate Ministry: though they brought not clean, or Primitive hands, to that great Work.  
8. That Religion which contradicts natural Policy, ought not to be retained. Therefore the Maccabees in time of necessity taught, that war might be piously made on the Sabbath day, when the Jews under Pompey and Antiochus (being that day assailed) not defending themselves, perished. God gives no Law to his People, [whereby his People should be destroyed] which is opposite to their own being.  
Observator.  
ritual laws, do easily give place to Occasions, and Times: whence comes the Hebrew Proverb: The life endangered, violates the Sabbath: and that [other] The Sabbath was given into the hands of man, and not man into the Hands of the Sabbath: Yet the foolish gloss of some Jews was such, that some of them kept themselves in the self same Posture, both night and day: and therefore paid dear for their Superstition; being not only by Pompey, but by Nabuchadnezzar, Sossius, and Titus, taken Captives upon the Sabbath day.  
9 The Doctrine of fatal Necessity is pernicious, in, and to Commonwealths: for it makes Subjects seditious, and Princes Tyrannous: both pleading Necessity for the Mischief they Act: and thus much Cicero acknowledged. But  
10. This Doctrine of Necessity does no hurt among the Turks, because they are rude, and illiterate, and are kept within compass by force, not by Law. But in Italy, where they are a sharp witted People, it would make them stark mad, and all turn Libertines, and lay all their sins upon God's score, as the Author of all evil: but above all, it would make their Prince's Tyrants, in Imitation (forsooth!) of God, craftily imputing their own offences to their subjects, that they might [godlike] Torment them, to their own glory: Then which, what can be more destructive to a Commonwealth?  
11. Sophistical Sciences that thwart Religion, aught to be banished the commonwealth: as Plato teacheth.  
Aristotle his School, did the Jews much mischief, under Antiochus; and now to Christians: as Averro did too, both to us, and his own Saracens. See S. Vincentius [Lirinensis,]  
Observat.  
What is spoken here of Aristotle does very well agree with the opinion of the ancient Christians. In whose judgement Aristotle was accounted Impious. In the judgement of all the Greeks, and (amongst the Latins) Saint Austin, Plato's Philosophy is more consonant to Christianity: Aristotle coming but very lately into esteem, and reputation, with the World.  
Animadversions.  
What the friar, or Grotius affirm of Aristotle is only true, Accidentally, & Vitio Utentis: and so all the Sect of Philosophers fall (as well as Aristotle) under Tertullian's Character, that they are PATRIARCHS of heretics: but I am clearly of opinion, that Plato's ideas in the head of an ENTHUSIAST, or NATIONAL THEOLOGUE, have done much more hurt to Christianity, than Aristotle's subtleties ever did: who being (as himself justly boasts) the Father of syllogism, and the first discoverer of Fallacy, might advance all Truths (both Natural, moral, and Sacred) more, (did not men abuse him to sophistical ends) than all the whole RACE of Philosophers ever did, or will do.  
12. Religion that is repugnant to common Policy, although it be beneficial to one particular City or Province, is subject to a change, or Reformation: and therefore cannot last long, as the decree of Moses, about the choice meats: and the Apostles, of abstaining from Idols, and things strangled. 

1. There are therefore some laws, convenient for time, and Place, [and Person] as abstinence from swine's flesh, for the Jews, subject to leprosy.  
2. Other laws are eternal, profitable for all Nations: as to Honour our Parents.  
3. Some again are pernicious to all places, and times: as that a man doth sin by destiny, and does profit in any thing without liberty [in some degree] of his own Wil.    
Observator.  
Here Grotius affirms that the Law of not eating swine's flesh is of so long continuance, that it not only remains in use amongst the Jews at this day, but with the Mahometan Arabians, and Abassin Christians: and not without good cause: for that food in those Regions begets the Scab.  
As for that ancient custom of abstaining from blood and strangled things, it was a long time observed by the Christians, either out of hope to gain the Jews, or out of Reverence to Antiquity: and that it has nothing in it contrary to republics, or Communities, the continued observation of it, through Christian Greece, and all the East, and the Edict of Leo the Emperor, make evident.  
13. All Religions and Sects have their proper Circles and Revolutions; as republics have from Monarchy into Tyranny: thence into Aristocracy, thence into Oligarchy, from that into a Polity, and so into a Democracy; and then revert back again into Monarchy at last: either by the same, or some other Track.  
So, when Sects arrive at atheism, the very Extremes of all mischief fall upon the people's head: and the fierceness of God's wrath breaks in upon them: upon which, (but through many affections) they return to their Pristine good Condition.  
☞ But when once they come to that pass, that they deny the Providence of God, and the Immortality of the soul, they must needs suffer either an [absolute] change, or a Reformation: because the Curb of Conscience is taken out of the people's mouth: and so being themselves wicked, they become a prey to no less wicked Princes: and thereupon, tired with evils past, they gladly embrace any Lawgiver, whether he be good or bad.  
14. The Sects of Philosophers, passed not from one opinion to an other, ☞ any further than Epicurus: and there they stopped: who denying God, and Providence, all their Sects were utterly destroyed, as Laertius [excellently] observes.  
The Religion established by Moses, when once the Sadduces crept in, that denied the Immortality of the Soul, suffered a Reformation by our Lord CHRIST 
* The Lat. is ambiguous.  who brought immortality to all our souls.  
When the Gentiles fell into downright Atheism, they fell into a world of miseries: as appears under the Roman Emperors: whose lawless licentiousness marred all: as Cato in Sallust, and Lucan, the Poet, observe.  
The Sect of the Libertines, that held sin to be no sin, spring out of the Calvinists, as the Author (but most slanderously) affirms.  
Most of the Transylvanians, deny the Immortality of the Soul, and the Holy Trinity.  
That most impious Book of the three Impostors, 
Add.  the friar would gladly fasten also upon the Reformed Churches: But, as Grotius notes, it was fathered long since upon the Emperor Frederick the second: but adds withal, that he never saw the man, that saw that Book.  
15. The Author (as it becomes a friar to do, Ex Officio) Pleados high for the temporal sword of the Pope, and an armed Priesthood: affirming that the great Turk, the King of Persia, Tartary, Moors, and the King of Fez, living all under an unarmed, naked Priesthood, are, by that means, split into so many heretical opinions: whereas the Kings of France, Spain, Germany, and the republic of Venice, and [many] other potent Princes united in one Religion under an armed Priest, the Pope, have no Heresies started amongst them, but with manifest hazard of their crowns and kingdoms.  
Observator.  
The sophy [of Persia] after many years, began to innovate some thing in the rites of Prayer and Fasting: & made white hats (or turbans) for the Cognizance of his Faction:— But at long running, the Posterity of this Sophy, by pretences of Sanctity, so bewitched the people, that in the end, they Translated the Crown of Persia from the Assumbetan Kings, to their own.  
16. & 17. These two Paragraphs, savour altogether of the Cell, and the Cowle: asserting the necessity, (at conveniency) of the papal Power, in temporals, over Christian Princes.  
Because (Says he) The Pope 

1. Poises the differences of Christendom, being Umpire of Peace and War.  
2. That he [always] takes part with those that suffer wrong: neither permits he any King to invade an other Christian Kings Dominion.  
3. He links and unites Christian Princes, 
Cruciatus Lat.  against the [Common] Enemies of the Christian faith. And,  
4. By his* crusadoes and Indulgences and Excommunications, for good, and against evil Rulers, he does erect and defend the Christian Commonwealth.    
So that without that Pope (to speak as a man, and politicly) Christianity had, ere this, gone to utter ruin. And the Author adds his opinion (in fine) That all Christian Princes, would be as one: secure from one an other, and from strangers too, and be always Victorious: would they but once make one Grand Senate at Rome. And, that the reason why never any one Prince could attain an universal Monarchy, over the rest of Christian Princes, was no other, than the temporal Power of his holiness; which was a Curb in their months. But (Says he in the close of all) 'Tis likely that the Monarchy of Christendom, will by little, and little, fall totally into the Pope's hands.  
The Observator answers thus, to these two Paragraphs.  
He that, with care and diligence, will look into story, shall find that [far] more wars have been raised amongst Christians by the Popes of Rome, then have been composed. But so far is it from them, that they either could or would oppose themselves against the Spaniard (that glutton of Empires) that, on the contrary, the papal Authority [always] gave colour and countenance to the Spanish avarice; as Navarre can [sadly] witness: and France, in the times of Henry the third. And lately, with most notorious injustice, arms were raised against the Duke of Mantua; yet would h●e receive no Assistance at all from the Pope, although no bad man. The papal [Bulls and] Edicts if they avail any thing at all, it is with such as are not able to resist them. They catch poor flies, but Eagles break through them. That Christendom fell not long since into the hands of an universal Monarch, it was no thanks to the papal Power, that hindered it: but the Germans were hindered by their own Discords, and Germany hindered France, and France Spain, just as the Persian and Tartar keep the Turk [from being Emperor of the World.]  
18. Charles the great, and Constantine declared themselves Defenders of the Pope; but Henry and Frederick enemies: for under Frederick those pernicious factions of Guelphs & Gibellines (that is, Imperialists, and Pontificians) arose in Italy.  

Julian [the apostate] endeavoured to make gentilism and Judaism emulate one the other, and vie for the Mastery, but perished under the attempt. 
The Mahometan Sect has many defects in it.  
First, because if their arms fail, they fall.   
2. Because it admits not of divers Princes.  
3. Because in many things it opposes God. And.  
4. Because it is as a place of torture to all its enemics.   
The Duke of Muscovy (a Country assailed by no man) defends himselfeby his situation and schism; and stands rather by the discords of Christendom, then upon his own bottom, as indeed the Turk himself partly doth.  
Charles the fifth, was a man that bid fairest for the universal Monarchy. When Constantius countenunced the Arians, and Julian paganism, the Pope was not a man in power, had no dominion then. Here therefore then is an error [or fallacy] of no cause, put for a cause.  
Here in this Paragraph, the friar seems to dream of the return of a Golden age, of Innocence, under one (I know not what) Monarch of all, as Adam was at first, and seems to point at the Spaniard for the man: the Observator suspects some poison here; but I think there is much more vanity than venom.  
20. That the world may be governed by one man, the Empire of Augustus does partly prove it.  
That the Spaniard does rule the 2 hemispheres by Religion, which is the very soul of an Empire, and Dominion, being all in the whole, and wholly in every part.  
21. If the World were governed by one man, as Alexander said by one Sun, wars would cease, and Pestilence, by communication of Arts and Medicines, and by transmigration from infected into wholesome air: By the same transmigrations might Inundations and fire be avoided; so famine likewise might be averted, by transportation of provision from plentiful into needy Countries, &c.  
Animad.  
These are but the fumes & fancies of an idle brain, doting upon the Spanish interest, and the papal; and so I dismiss them proceeding to   

CHAP. ix.. Of the second cause of gaining and governing kingdoms, which is prudence.  
A Monarchy is fitter to gain a commonwealth then to conserve Dominion.  
Monarchy is sooner depraved than many Rulers. Grotius confesses then a few (as Oligarchy) which I understand not; neither of them gives their reason, nor I my assent. The Observator adds.  
For duration, no commonwealth in the world is worth the naming, but the Venetian: and yet the Egyptian, Assyrian, 
Franceruns Franks.  and French kingdoms have lasted longer than that.  

Some are Kings  
1. By Nature rational [as it were Kings of wisdom] as Socrates and Cato.  
2. By Fortitude, as Domitian and Vitcllius.  
3. By both, as Alexander. Augustus. and David.  
4. More by Nature than Fortune, as Scipio, and Hannibal  
5. More by Fortune than Nature, as Tiberius & Galba.   
3. Prudence (the second cause of Dominion) does properly belong to those that are truly Kings; and to such next under God, is Dominion due which prudence is directly opposite to Craft or Subtlety, which is proper only to Machiavel's Tyrant.  
Prudence is consonant to God, that is to eternal wisdom.  
Craft agrees to nothing but a man's own will and pleasure: that is, acts all Arbitrarily.  
Prudence is magnanimous, Craft base, yet proud.  
Prudence [always] advances wise and valiant men, and puts them in place of power and trust. Craft depresses and destroys them, that she may rule over Bastard-Subjects, when the Legitimate are cut off.  
Prudence treasures up riches for the good of men's souls and that their numbers may increase: Craft aims at money and strong holds, and rejoices in the Diminution and lessening of her subjects.  
Prudence even in losing conquers, Craft by conquering is a loser.  
Prudence is merciful, Craft is cruel.  
Prudence is that of principal men and chieftains, such as Cesar, craft belongs to servile persons, such as Davus.  
Prudence has an eye to the Stern, but Craft to the oar.  
Prudence makes laws for every man's good, but Craft only for her own.  
Prudence punishes, and gains goodwill by it, and makes subjects the better; Craft punishes and becomes odious, and the people the worse for't. It is proper to magnanimity and valour, to gain Dominions, as to Cesar, and Charles the fifth; but to justice and temperance to preserve them, as to the Venetians: and he that is adorned with all virtues, is fit for both, as Augustus.  
5. He that acquires Dominions, must have such a Prudence as is magnanimous, stout, liberal, just, &c. but somewhat inclining to pride, boldness, prodigality; but severity mixed with it, &c.  
He that keeps and preserves Dominions, must have the same prudence, but inclining to Pusillanimity, to fear, Tenacity, and [some] licentiousness, &c.  
6. He that gains a kingdom, different from him in Religion: must either Translate the Seat of his Empire thither: as the Turk did into Constantinople: or else Translate the Inhabitants into an other Region, as Nabuchadnezzar did the Jews, into Babylon: and plant new Colonies, in the metropolitan Cities of the conquered Province; which shall be of thine own Religion, and Laws; place [new] Preachers there, change Laws, and bring down the chief of the People; as Cyrus did in Lydia, and the Spaniniard in America: But if they will buckle to thy Religion: thou Mayst make them Artists, and mechanics, serviceable to thy Colony: if not, doom them to slavery, and Transplant them far enough [be sure] from thy seat imperial.  
But if they embrace the same Religion with thee (as the Neapolitans with the Spaniards) treat them gently, receive them into Common friendship, and change not their customs, nor policy, but by degrees: let the Supreme Judges be made out of thine own men; the inferior out of theirs. If they did violently oppose thine entrance, level the Peers, with the People: but if they did receive the as friends: Transplant them out of their Native soil, and drill them with honours, Rewards, and Promotions; but be sure let not the chief heads be left behind: for they will either grow insolent, upon Familiarity, and render thee odious to the People, or else they will rebel. By these defects, Pyrrhus and Charles the fifth, lost all the Provinces they had gained, on a sudden. But beware, lest by Calumnies, and fraud, you depress any man; for by that means you [only] prepare ruin and Conspiracies against yourself, and so alienate their Affections, that upon the least occasion, they will rebel against you.  
7. He that invades an others' kingdom, must not stick at the mischiefs following. viz. To strike at the Head, change laws, pull down Forts, and Castles; Extinguish the blood-royal, or Translate it.  
Animad.  
This savours of Machiavel: whom the friar so much detests: or (which is worse) of the Jesuit.  
8. A Prince should be known to do no evil, except that of punishment: and that too, such as the People wish: as to Fleece Usurers, and ravenous Magistrates, to banish Superfluous, and effeminate Arts: doom the sluggish to the oar: to punish Adultery, Pride, and all Enormous sins and sinners.  
9 The People are kept in obedience, by [plenty of] Provisions, soldiers by good Pay: Nobles by honours.  
10. For the advance, and increase of republics, and kingdoms; these Rules following are to be observed.  

1. All persons must take upon them those Functions and callings, for which Nature has fitted them.  
2. Magistrates are to be chosen, rather by Nature then Fortune.  
3. The greater good is ever to be preferred before the less, and the Common before the Private.  
4. Let there be a free Community of Goods, of Knowledge, and of Religion.  
5. Foment the Emulations of aspiring to honours, by virtue.  
6. Prefer ever Divine things before human.  
7. Let every man learn this logic. viz. That God is: Ergo, He is wise, and good: Ergo, He has a tender care over us: Ergo, he is just: And we are his Children, and therefore after death, will reward or punish us. If this be not so, Ergo, God is not just, not good, Ergo, neither is he God: The contrary whereof; All Nature, the fabric of the Universe, and its several Parts, and the use. Order and function of cach Particle of it, do wonderfully [and loudly] proclaim. As also his revealing himself to his Saints [on Earth] angels, and devils, and Policies, and all Sciences in the World, [confessing it.]    

CHAP. X. Of the third Cause, &c. viz. Occasion.  
THE occasions of acquiring Dominion, are innumerable. But the chief are, 

I. Thine own Valour, and Numbers; and the imbecility of thine Enemies, and their Associates.  
2. The Division of the Province to be surprised, into petty Kings, or jarring. Republics; but especially into various Seots, and Schisms.  
3. But most of all, if any man call thee in, for his protector.  
4. If the Rulers Son be in his Minority.  
5. If the Ruler be hated of his People.  
6. If the People be covetous of change.  
7. If the Nobles [or Patricians] may be bought and sold [as those of Rome were, in jugurths' days.]  
8. If there be any Interregnum, &c.  
9 All gross and Enormous sins, and Vices, are so many Inlets, and doors for a Conqueror, to come in by: as Idolatry, and anthropophagy above the rest.     

CHAP. XI. Of the Decay, Downfall, and Change of Monarchies: and the cause and remedies thereof.  
ALL Monarchy dies, or sinks [at least] either  
1. Through want of virtue in him that succeeds in it: so the Assyrian Monarchy ended in Sardanapalus. Or  
2. For want of a Successor; which evil Augustus prevented, by adopting Sons, to succeed him.  
3. By Division, or Discord of many successors: so the Roman Monarchy under Constantius, became a Dyarchy under Constantine, and Constance, and afterwards, in Arcadius and Honorius, and the Spanish Monarchy was rivalled by Alonzo, Ferdinand, and Sanctius.  
The Turk prevents this mischief by killing his Brethren: but the King of China by banishing them into some Mountain: which the King of the Abassines does likewise.  
4. Because the King's Son is young and contemptible, as the Son of Scanderbag, and Antiochus, and Alexander the Great: and the last Duke save one, of the line of Sforza Duke of Milan: who all being Minors and pupils, were committed to Guardian Kinsmen, or Tutors, or strangers, and so, were either murdered or deposed.  
5. The Election of a King, if it be made by soldiers, is dangerous, and schismatical; because they are [easily] carried from one to another, in their affections. For,  
Soldiers are naturally a dull kind of People: and value them most, who pay them best, at present: not at all considering, the public good: as it happened in the times of Galba, Vitellius, Vespasian, and Otho in the Roman state; and under Omri in Israel: with very much damage [to the public.]  
6. Election also made by all the People, is dangerous: for they understand not the deep designs, of hidden, and disguised Tyrants: but are distracted, and carried away with smooth Orators, whithersoever they please to lead them. Besides, the People are ever at odds, with one another, and always changing opinions. Hereupon Florence by such Popular Elections, sustained a world of damage, and prejudice. Neither does the Populacy confide in their Nobles, but call in strangers to pacify their Tunmults; So the Florentines called in the Commander of Athens: by whom, they were more devoured than before.  
The remedy is: if only the heads of Families be summoned to Election: but this is a weak one.  
7. Elections are best made by a prudent Senate: out of the body of the Senate itself; as the Pope, out of the Conclave of Cardinals.  
8. If an Election suffer a Schism in it, or Fracture, viz. an Interregnum (or as they call it) a Vacant See; the Empire may go to wrack; and therefore the German Emperor doth make choice of his Successor before his death; as also the King of Fez, before he dies, advances one of his own Sons into his Throne.  
Observat.  
It often falls out otherwise: for the Roman Emperor of time dies and appoints no Successor: and the Polack cannot endure any such thing should be done in that Kingdom.  
9 The best is not always elected: but he whom the dying King loves best: as Solomon chose Rehoboam.  
Observat.  
The odd number over does best in Elections: and therefore the King of Bohemia was superadded to the six old Electors of Germany.  
10. A Monarchy may be ruined likewise, by the insolency and pravity of a man's Children [as in Tarquin the proud] or of his wife: who often hates the best deserving men: as Sophia, the Wife of Justinian the Emperor, hated Narses [the Gallant Eunuch] who therefore called in the Lombards into Italy, to the hazard of the whole Empire.  
☞ 11. Monarchy may be in danger also, and be ruined by the Authority of some Prophet, or [bold Popular] Preacher: that dares cry it down. The instance here is made in Samuel, and the Pope: which is an handsome comparison indeed. Here the friar draws the Curtain, and lays open the whole scene of the Pope's Encroachments upon temporal Princes: which part I leave the friar to Act by himself, and thither refer the Reader: only he tells us (pag. 198.) that never any Prince prospered that opposed his holiness, but fell at last; as Frederick of Swevia, Roger Guiscand, &c. Yet  
Some Princes called a council against Julius the second, and Pope Eugenius the fourth.  
All clergymen (under the Papacy) love the Pope in their heart, Princes only for preferment. Armed Religion was always Invincible, Vid. animad supr.  
It is better for a Prince to yield to the Priest, as Theodosius did to Ambrose, then to treat him ill, as Eudoxa did Chrysoctome; For he was confirmed in his Throne, whereas she died an infamous death.  
12. Division in Religion, albeit Monarchy be not preached down, does destroy ☞ it, as it appears in France, Germany, and Poland, &c. for it divides men's minds; and therefore both their bodies, and fortunes, and arms, and both parties hate the King: The evil, because he favours the good, and the good, because he does not extinguish the evil.  
Obser.  
Here Grotius (the great est advocate and favouror of toleration that lived in our age) opposes the friar, and affirms, That there does not upon difference in opinions, seem so much hazard of divulsion (as he calls it) of minds, or animosity amongst men, if the Magistrate would compel the Ministry to forbear mutual and public railings, 
Condemnationes Lat.  and resutations one of another, and if by a public Law of State, every man might be secure in the use and exercise of his own religion, as it is in Japan and Poland; which liberty the reformed Churches of France being abridged of, Tumults and wars, were occasioned by it.  
13. A Monarchy also fails by its own vastness and bulk, for which reason it cannot [well] be governed by One, and he is therefore fain to call to his assistance some to lend their shoulders to this great burden, who afterwards will admit no superiors, and so share the government; as we have often seen it fall out in the Roman Empire.  
The Remedy for this is, to keep an Empire within its own bounds, lest the commanders and governors, being at too great a distance, usurp the Dominion: As the Monarch of Japan [is a great example of this] who never sets foot beyond his sixty six kingdoms; and the King of China can 
* or possess  claim nothing beyond those bounds which he hath set himself, by walls and Rocks, Woods, and Seas. Another remedy for this disease is, for a Prince to keep the Wives and Children of Governors and provincials [abroad] at home with him [as pledges] and engage them by Oath to Fidelity and Allegiance, &c. which in part the King of Spain observes.  
14. Sometimes a Kingdom's lost for want of provisions, because it has no fruitful soil about it: This is the condition of Genoa, and Venice, and therefore they provide against this [mischief] by Merchants and Factors, and exchangers of commodities, by Granaries, Munitions, &c.  
15. A Monarchy may also fall by Pestilence; against which, 
* Civitatem portat idem. L.  the King of the Abassines has provided a movable City, and so removes his Seat at pleasure for the benefit of wholesomer air; which thing the Tartars [now] and heretofore the Veientes observed; nay the very Birds do the same: But with us there be Officers for health purposely appointed, which the Author calls Magistratus Sanitatis, like our Masters of the Pest houses  
16. A Monarchy likewise is ruined by invasion of foreign Princes, that overpower the right owner; as the King of Persia was by Alexander of Macedon; and the Sultan of Egypt by Selemus the great Turk.  
The best remedy against this, is the love of the subjects to their Prince, & their gallantry on his behalf; next is, to procure a strong & ready Militia, and to enter into league with many Princes, that may overpower the rival of his Crown: as the Macchabees did with the Romans, being afraid of Antiochus, and the Venetian with the French when they feared the Spaniard. Neither is it amiss to sow seeds of discord and hatred amongst the powers you stand in fear of; as the Spaniard does betwixt the Turk and Persian, this Abassine and Muscovite, Polack and Transylvanian, all around, &c. and amongst the Nobles of France, which is his rival.  
When the Nobility grow too rich and potent, as the Nobles of Japan, and often those of Naples, and the French likewise and the German Peers, they have destroyed the Monarchy under which they lived, defining every one to live for himself. The remedy for this is, to cut off entails of Land & Honours; The Author means in the words, Ne feuda transeant ad Haeredes that they be not established, as the Turk does. Next is to level their Forts and strong holds with the ground, or garrison them with the Princes own soldiery, and then under pretence of advancing, to humble the Nobles.  
18. A kingdom may be lost too, by the treachery of a Kings own soldiers, as it happened to Antiochus.  
The remedy against this is, to keep them in their duty by art and cunning, and divide them; and to fortify thyself with a strong guard of thy best friends, whom thou must oblige with perpetual favours, and benefits, as the Turk does his janissaries.  
19 A Crown may be lost by the sudden incu●sion of Barbarous people.  
The remedy against this is, to oppose wisdom and religion to barbarous folly: So Pope Leo opposed Attilla, and Jaddus the high Priest in Hierusalom, clad in his Priestly Robes, met, and adored, and so pacified Alexander the great.  
20. A man may lose his kingdom too for want of soldiery of his own, and by entertaining too many Auxiliaries and Mercenary men; which was the ruin of Lodovick Sforza, Duke of Milan, &c.  
The Remedy of this is to have a choice Militia of thine own always in readiness; to arm and unite thine own men, but to disarm and dissipate the strangers. For this reason also it is expedient, that none [of any Family] but the first-born inherit any estate, and let the rest be made soldiers; or else do as the Turk does, keep schools or colleges of Cloistered boys, to be trained up in Military Discipline, which shall know no other Father but the Monarch.  
21. Sometimes a kingdom is lost after a Victory, by the insolency of the Conquering Army; or after a truce [or league] as it happened to Carthage after the first Punic war, under Hamilcar.  
The remedy for this is, on a sudden to divide the Army into distant quarters: and not to be embodied till the general commands.  
22. A kingdom may bet lost for want of present pay for the soldiery, when the war is on foot, as it fell out to Maximilian of Austria.  
Public treasuries are the best remedy against this. Besides the Rich (at such a pinch) are to be compelied by Religion] be means sure anathemas and Terrors of Ecommunication] and other Penalties, to throw all their Money and Plate into the public Treasury: For so, neither can they rebel, and hereby is the kingdom confirmed, and Established: which was usual at Rome, and Venice. And it is lawful too, in extremity, to melt down Consecrate Church Plate: and to make the very soldiers themselves part with their Gold to this public purpose: but to sweeten them with fair hopes, and the Pillage of the Field. Thus did Caeser, in the beginning of the civil war: and thus did Henry (the third I take it) King of France the Frer advises too: to make leaden Coin (if need be) to be currant as long as the War shall last, as the Venetians have done.  
23. Kingdom's are lost too, by the Luxury of the conquering Army, that does break and effeminate itself: by the spoils, and delicates of conquered Provinces: as it fell out, to the Lombards, Goths, Huns, and Gauls; who possessing themselves of Southern kingdoms, full of delights and pleasures. They [quickly] lost, both their strength and Empire: Which happened also to all Kings of Naples; by reason of the soft delicacies of Air, and soil. Josuah found out a good remedy for this; who would not quite extinguish all the Natives, [of Canaan] that his People might [still] have some body, whereon to whet, and exercise their Valour. So [Scipio] Nasica advised [the Romans] not quite to destroy Carthage, lest Rome should grow effeminate [by losing her rival.]  
24. By joining in Commerce and traffic, etc. with two potent Princes. Thus came the Raguscan to serve the Turk, and thus the Genoesse, to be under the Spaniard: But the [Wise] Venetian prevented this. For he would never put to Sea with the Spaniard; neither would he ever traffic with him, nor hold any thing by way of Tenure or Homage, in the King of S'pains' Dominions, [as the Genoesse and others do]  
25. Heavy Taxes, and Impositions, often lose kingdoms, and enrage the People into Mutinies, and Rebellion; as it happened in Israel under Rehoboam; and the Duke of Alva in Flanders.  
26. The Cruelty of provincials: may be the loss of a Kingdom: which rule by pride and Avarice. This the Axe must cure, as Goesar Borgia did by Orcus of Cesena.  
Punishments must ever be exacted by the sword, Tributes by the tongue; the Militia by both.  
27. A Crown gained, may be lost, if the Issue royal find friends to help them to their right: as in the case of Joas: who was established in his Throne by the high Priest: against Athaliah and her usurpation, etc.  
28. A kingdom may be lost by the conspiracy of strong and Potent men; as the Tarquins were Erected by Brutus, and Lucretius, and the Magi of Persia by Darius and his Complices.  
Hidden virtue in any man is a dangerous thing, especially if it be afraid of the Prince that rules: for it will at last break out to the Prince's loss, if not ruin: as it did in Brutus and his confederate. Valour and Light must be ever set high on a Candlestick. Smothered Fire may do, and indeed ever does, most mischief.  
Observat.  
How dangerous it was for Tiberius to advance Sejanus [himself a well born Person] to so great honour: the Frince perceived and remedied: but not without hazard. Therefore both he from that time forward and others, took a course to cast honours upon meaner Persons: and those but Temporary.  
Animad.  
This observation becomes a man born in a popular state: But God himself seems to make it a curse: when the honourable person is overtoped by mean fellows. Isa. 3.1, 2. & 3.  
The conspiracy of one man with himself to murder a King, &c. is Inevitable, as that of Adad against the 
* He means. Ehud & Eglon. lud. 3.6.20.21.  King of Edom: and Pausanias against Philip of Macedon: and friar Clement against Henry the third of France.  
A conspiracy of many is hardly to be avoided: Therefore Probity and the people's love [when all is done] is the strongest Guard a Prince can have.  
26. Lastly, a kingdom may be lost, when the Subject are wasted by war: and so through want of Defendants, it lies open to Invasion; as now (Says the Author) Spain does.  
Enfranchizing, or Endenization, is the only cure for this disease: by admitting foreigners into your freedom: as the Romans did the Latins: and so fill up your number.   

CHAP. XII. Of the fall and change of republics where many Govern, &c.  
1. TO take off the dissensions, between Peers, and People, the Author would have them all participate of honours: as, at this time, it is amongst the Biscainers: Or, as amongst the Jews, that one Family chosen out of all the rest should rule.  
Observat.  
'Tis expedient, that betwixt the Peers, and the Plebeians, there should be a middle sort, and degree of Persons, as a Seminary of Nobility: such as were the Knights and Gentlemen of Rome: for this degree is a kind of tye, or Ligament of both the other.  
2. The peers contend with the people [usually] about honours, Offices, Tributes, and matrimony, and Lands, and the like: and if the Nobility get the day, the republic is ruined; for it is necessary for them to keep under a jealous and suspicious people, and thence comes their downfall. But if the people gain the day, the matter's worse than before, for either the Nobles are driven into banishment, or else they call in strangers, and so the people become a prey to every crafty Citizen, or foreign potentate, or valiant Commander.  
If once the Nobles mix and couple themselves with the Plebians, to the end they may partake of the government with them; they grow vile and despicable both together, and so the commonwealth falls to ground; as it always happened in the Florentine republic, and divers times in that of Genoa.  
The remedy is, if the People (of a middle Size betwixt the Nobles and the pelting Plebeian) get the upper hand, and share Magistracies and honours now and then, and Lands and Provinces also, By such contentions Rome flourished and grew great, and yet granted the honour of Victories, and the credit of them, to the Commons: but Florence perished under them.  
3. A republic is often destroyed, when laws are made to the advantage of great ones, and pressure of the people.  
4. When the Powers in being, usurp authority [over the people] and keep guards for their defence; as the Decemviri did at Rome, and the Thirty Tyrants at Athens.  
5. The Luxury of the Nobles, and their neglect of arms [and art's] makes them vile and cheap in the people's eyes; and so makes a republic sink into a base Democracy.  
6. When a Patrician grows too rich or potent, and Emulations grow rife about priority, than the republic's lost: So Sylla when he had subdued Marius, and Cesar when Crassus was slain, and Pompey conquered (who were then rivals in the Empire) carried all before them, and were Tyrants at pleasure.  
7. Correspondency with some foreign Prince, of any person in power, may ruin a republic.  
8. When any fawning Poplicola, in a time of famine, or other occasion, endeavours to gain the people by opportunity and advantage, and by such arts, gets the power into his own clutches; these must be looked to, and suppressed, as Metius was in Rome, &c. and Manlius &c. which King David neglecting in Absosom, run the hazard [of his life and Crown.]  
9 A republic falls: to ground ofttimes, because it wants a Militia; when the people & Patritians mutually fear one another, and thereupon call in foreign Commanders, which is usual in Venice.  
Which commanders after some signal Victory obtained, either themselves seize upon the common wealth (as Sforza did at Milan, 
* or Colion.  and Bartholomew Coline might have done at Venice) or else they betray it to foreign Princes, as Malatesta did Florence.  
10. The faction of Citizens, that bear affection to some faction of strangers, ruin a republic; so all the republics of Italy split themselves into Guelphs and Gibellins, or (which was worst of all) into Neuters; whereupon dire and dismal slaughters and times ensued.  
A republic must never be neutral, because it must necessarily be a prey to the Conqueror, not being supported either by friends or enemies [Nec amicis nec inimicis fota Lat.]  
11. A republic falls, when the People confide not in the Nobility, nor the Nobility in them; and therefore they call in a foreign Umpire, that will devour them both: as Florence called in King Robert, & 
* or general Dux. , the Duke of Athens.  
The remedy is, to commit the umpirage of the quarrel (not to strangers, but) to religious men, Priests that are Natives; as Moses did by God's command, and as the Observator well notes, The old Gauls did to the Druids, and oft times both they and the Germans, to [godly and] grave Matrons. But this latter is a crude observation.  
12. Changes of republic are innumerable, as their causes are. Read the Florentine History (for that City ran through all varieties of change) and in opposition to that the Roman.   

CHAP. XIII. Of the Fate and change of Popular, or Democratique state, &c.  
1. A Democracy, or Popular State assuredly goes to wrack, when Ignorant Plebeians rule, that canno agree amongst themselves, and determine all things ☞ by chance or affection.  
2. Popular elections are ever attended with jarring, and noise of the multitude, and obstreperous rabble.  
3. In the Senate or Parliaments of Popular States, he that has the smoothest tongue, is likeliest to cheat the people, and make himself be elected, [rules in chief] though he be the veriest Knave in the Pack  
4. It mars a Popular State, when the poorest of the people endeavour to grow rich by public Offices, and the wealthier sort grow Tyrannous by their riches.  
It is dangerous to call in a stranger to the administration of justice, as the Florentines used to do; for this is a symptom of dissension amongst the Natives, and oft brings ruin with it, [yet has it been practised elsewhere of late, but with like success.]  
5. This Paragraph about provisions and supplying the public necessities by Corn, &c. is treated of in the precedent Chapter.  
6. The next bar of a Democratique State is, the general that fights their battles abroad, and returns home a King as well as a Conqueror; as Sforza returned to Milan, and Cesar to Rome, &c.  
Observ.  
The Romans provided excellently against this mischief, they had ever at hand good store of sit and able men for the conduct of any war, and ever and anon changed their Commanders, whereby they both secured their liberty, and by emulation provoked them to virtue and valour.  
7. An other Engine to batter down Democracy, is a public Benefactor: that has got Power into his hands: and pretends himself in hazard of his life by Conspirators: and thereupon desires a kind of Life Guard for the safety of his Person, against his accusers & those he would accuse, and so being thus well provided, he invades the Throne, (if I may so say) and dubbs himself King; so did Pisistratus at Athens.  
To prevent this: The People must commit themselves, to the care and Providence of wise and religious men: reposing all trust, and confidence in them: For by not believing Solon the Philosopher, who discovered to them the design of Pisistratus, the Athenians lost their Liberty.  
8. A Common wealth may fall, by the approach of sudden [and unexpected] dangers: the Common people being dull & heavy in deliberations. So the Romans lost Saguntum whilst they [slowly] consulted, how to get it: and the Venetians Cyprus, whilst they coldly deliberate how to relieve it.  
In this case a Dictator must must speedily be pitched upon: to Rule, and dispatch every thing as himself sees most Expedient, without counsel or control of any man. Necessity itself will compel the people to pitch upon none, but the best and ablest man for that service: as the Practice of the Romans [in that case] does witness.  
9 A Popular State may miscarry too by some wealthy Citizen: who does favour and foster Poets and orators, and Preachers, & Grammarians, and all sorts of men, that have Eloquence or wit, and by his riches, keeps an Academy in his own house: of men that can Blazon, & Trumpet forth his praises and worth to the People &c. Thus became Cosmo Medici's Dake of Florence.  
Let no man, that sets his wits and tongue to sale, have any pare in any Senate or Parliament. Greece quite lost herself, by the Liberty of Orations: so did Germany and France [by sermons] and the Swissers too late provided a remedy against this disease.  

The Last Paragraph concerning the danger of change.  
All Change (be it never so little) of the ancient state of things, in a Commonwealth, or kingdom is either, a Sign, or Cause, or Con-Cause, or Preparation, to an universal change of minds: and (by consequence) of all the republic, or princedom revolting from its own Principles. As new meats, and new Exercise, beget a new habit of Body. So  
Darius by affecting to wear a Macedonian sword, did foretell that his kingdom should be ruined by the arms of Macedon. Therefore the change even of old Fashions in apparel, of Banquets and Marriages, and of womens' behaviour, and of old Discipline, and the Pravity and corruption of youth (as Censorinus notes) new laws and Tributes ought ever to be avoided: for they either suddenly, or totally, destroy a Kingdom: Whereupon the Venetian will not change so much as his old original garb in his clothes for (as Solomon says) he that fails in the least things, shall by degrees come to nought.     

The corollary, and Conclusion.  
It is probity, and piety, that preserves a King and People: and not the unlearned Craft, and subtlety of Machiavelli: For all virtue, and Power, derives its original from Hun: who is the essential Power, and Wisdom of his Father that Governs all things. To whom be all Glory.  
FINIS.