The Divine RIGHT and ORIGINAL OF THE Civil Magistrate From GOD, [As it is drawn by the Apostle S. Paul in those words, Rom. 13.1. There is no Power but of God: the Powers that be are ordained of God] Illustrated and Vindicated In a Treatise (chief) upon that Text. WHEREIN The procedure of Political Dominion from God, by his Ordination; The direct line by which the said Ordination descendeth from him upon the person of the Magistrate, And the way of such a persons becoming and claiming thereby to be the Power in the Text, which is of God, ordained of God, is endeavoured truly and plainly to be laid open. Written for the service of that eminent Truth, Order, Justice, and Peace which the said Text, in its genuine sense, holdeth forth, and supporteth: And for the dissolving of sundry important Doubts, and mistakes about it. By Edward Gee Minister of the Gospel at Eccleston in the County Palatine of Lancaster Zanchius de Nat. Dei lib. 4. cap. 8. quaest. 3. Thes. 3. Ad verum enim, legitimum, liberumque dominatum constituendum necessarium est liberum, absolutumque jus, libera, absolutáque potestas, quam Graeci 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocant, quâ res quarum dominatum quaeris Tuae fiant London, Printed for George Eversden, at the Maidenhead in Pauls-church-yard, 1658 THE Divine Right and ORIGINAL of the civil MAGISTRATE from God. Illustrated and Vindicated By Edward Gee Sold by Geo: Euersden at the Maidenhead in St. Paul's Church yard 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. Sam: 18 2. Sam: 20 engraved title page THE PREFACE. THis Treatise (it must be confessed) Sect. 1 hath undertaken, as a high, and weighty, so a tender, and quick-sented Subject. Insomuch that at the first blush peradventure the subject may be looked upon as a burdensome stone, and the discourse upon it as pregnant with an obliqne design. To anticipate such unmerited surmises, let me at this threshold advertise the Reader, that this Treatise handleth its subject, held forth in the Title, and not the persons of any, nor the interests of any. And its subject is a general truth, or a Scripture-Maxime of perpetual, and common authority, concernment, and use. It is true, every such general verity hath its descent to particulars; and hath its consequences, both of obligation, and eviction. But, let every man take heed how he buildeth thereupon; that is, what consequences he draweth thence, what particulars he reduceth thereto. Such inferences, and such references are made by the discourse of man; and are variable according to the ability, or disposition men have to reason. And they all come to this reckoning. They are either native, genuine, and virtually comprised in the general axiom; or they are alien, and but imposed. What is genuine to such an abstract Truth, or Doctrine itself will own, as it will also the assertors of it, neither needs the weakest, or lowest avower of it distrust its patronage. But neither it, nor the hand that holds forth it, and no more stands chargeable with either deductions from, or reductions to it, which are of others collection, or effiction. Such a Scripture canon as this, is like the Sun which scatters its light, and beams every way, and upon all: and all its rays are ever most sound and pure: not one stricture of its influx (whatever Astrologers tell us) h●th the least corrupt, or malignant tincture. If any fetide vapour be either discovered, or raised thereby, we must not blame the sun for shining; the rise thereof is from the earth, and the ascent is by its repercussion of the sunbeam, and not from the sun, by any direct emission. And if the sun-rayes conduce by reflection either to the detection, or drawing up of any such matter, the earth may fault itself for the breed of such an exhalation, but thank the sun both for the said discovery, and extraction. That the whole discussion of the following book is precisely bounded within the premised compass, and taketh in no more than general truth, either comprised within the text, or relating to it, I leave the perusal of it to manifest. And for the intention of the Author, he professeth solemnly, as in the divine presence, and with recognition of his giving an account hereof before the same, that (exception of indeliberate, and unallowed motions of selfseeking, partiality, and such other incident to humane nature (as now depraved) being admitted) the sole special, and immediate aim by him consented unto, proposed and fixed, to be the clearing up of the important doctrine of that Text, and in it the satisfaction of conscience: and for more remote, and general ends, those to be no other but such resultancies of this labour as all sorts of lookers into this book will confess to wish and approve. If it come forth after notable revolutions of State have newly been, or while some Trepidations, or grudge of distemper, growing upon such occasion, do remain; the Author could not think the publication for that less seasonable, or useful And further considereth that the holy Apostle Paul lived in a time of as great Commonwealth differences and changes, nevertheless he had the confidence, and his prudence directed him to write, and publish the political assertions, and precepts, among which the Text lieth, and is one; and this his writing not only passed (for any thing I presume appears from antiquity) without ill construction of either Superiors or Subjects, but doubtless was very suitable, acceptable, and advantageous to the Christians, for both their resolution and vindication in the matter it concerns. The like (in its measure) me thinks should a discourse now be, that meddleth no further than with an enquiry into the sense of his Text, and dealeth but with the terms of it, and with the expositions, doubts, and arguments that have been upon it; without the least application to, or bringing into question, the title unto the warrant of this Scripture, of any in place of power, or any other person now extant in the world. This manner of process the Author promiseth in this Treatise: and doth thereupon expect in some proportion (though with abatement, for the worsenesse of this age in comparison of the Apostles, and for the far greater disparity of the persons writing) the like success. It is certain that when the Apostle composed this Epistle, there had been lately, and about the same time were divers contests about sovereignty, and transversions of Government within the Roman Dominion; some about the whole, others about some parts, or provinces of it: and concerning them there were opposite sidings, and dissatisfactions among the people. There were about, and presently upon the writing of this Scripture several competitions for the Empire. Galba in Spain is raised up by Julius Vindex against Nero; and he being confirmed by the Senate, and Nero suppressed, presently Vitellius is set up against Galba. And after Galbas' violent death Otho is made Emperor at Rome, whilst Vitellius stands up in Germany. Otho being quickly gone, Vespasian is promoted in Egypt, and Judea; and the competition betwixt Vitellius and him is prosecuted by the sword in Italy, and even in the City of Rome (whither this Epistle was sent) and that with diversity of success vicissitudinarily to both parties. As to particular Provinces; Vologeses the Parthian takes Armenia from the Romans; thence grew wars betwixt the invader, and the invaded. In Judea the Jews generally rebel against the Roman, and set up an Autonomie. In England the Britain's seize on the Roman Colony at Camalodunum (or Maldon in Essex) cut off the Roman Soldiers, and possess themselves of it. It may be deemed there were Christians in all these controverted places, and under each of the respective contestants. It is certain by Scripture there were in Jewry. And to let pass what Dorotheus his Synopsis tells us of the Apostle Thomas his preaching the Gospel in Parthia, Media, and Persia; Josephus witnesseth the conversion to Christianity of many in Parthia * Joseph. Ant. lib. 18 cap. 12. ; and it is noted out of Augustine that the first Epistle of St. John was called anciently the Epistle to the Parthians † Dr. Hammond in preface to that Epistle. . The Christians that then were at Rome, and in those other places were concerned either as Soldiers, or Subjects in these commotions, and counterseisures: and as there is no question but they made this concernment a matter of conscience, so there is little doubt but they, or some of them, especially in the beginnings of those several contests, and mutations were scrupled in conscience which way to take. Our query concerning them is not which of the Collitigants respectively they were to own and obey as their Sovereign Magistrate (for I shall not take in hand the interest of particular persons, to debate the justness of any of their causes, or titles) but, what standard, rule, or light of God's word they had to go by, and by which to determine what to do under the scruple and temptation of contrary demanders of their subjection and assistance. If anything were delivered to them by this Apostle, or any other of their instructions that is not in holy writ we have no record or notice of that: but within the compass of those Scriptures which were directed to any such Christians in those times there is none (I think it will be acknowledged) so likely to be written for that use, or to afford ground, and matter for their guidance therein as this; wherein the Magistrates authority is not only asserted, but derived, and defined; and as to them, so it may be to others in any the like case. Having given this account of the subject, Sect. 2 and of the manner of handling it in this Treatise; I shall now touch upon the inducements leading to it. In the doing of this, though I shall reflect something upon the late passed occurrents, yet it shall only be on such as are free, and of common application, not any thing personal, or belonging to any one party singled out from the rest. The great subject of debate, difference, exagitation, and contrivement in the late Commotions, that which the most stir hath been about is the matter of Authority. Divers other things, indeed, have (scarce any thing but hath) been in dispute with some, or other. No principle so plain, no right so manifest, but some have been to stand up in question or contradiction of it. But in all the controversies that have risen, there is nothing (to my observation) that hath been so universally, really, and continuedly insisted on as this matter of Power. This hath been singled out as the Helena of contention, the bone of strife, the hall of litigious agitation, and that which men may be noted to have most generally, cordially, and constantly prosecuted. The Controvertists, and unquiet spirits in the modern Perturbations, when they have had their short velitations, their slight skirmishes in other points, they have ordinarily settled, centred, and joined issue in this subject. This may be observed by a transient view of the debates in their several kinds. They have been various both for the manner of managing, and for the matter concerned. For the manner of managing, some have been military, some mental; some in the field, others in the closet; some acted by the hand, others by the head; some by the sword, others by the pen. But in all these ways, whatsoever hath been first started, or begun with, the stairs of Superiority, and Dignity have been the thronged and beaten road, the garland of honour, the common and standing mark which the aims, and altercations of men have at length fixed upon. And for the matter concerned, some of the differences have been of a Religious, others of a Civil importance. Those in Religion have been either betwixt the Romanists, and the Protestants, or of these latter among themselves. For Popish controversies, the distinct discussion of the many points of Faith, and Religion (each whereof had formerly its particular, and exact traverse) is now reduced in a manner to this as the only or main head, the power of the Pope, to wit, the prerogatives of his Crown, and Chair, or the universality, and supremacy of Jurisdiction, and the infallibility of judgement he claimeth over the whole world, or over all Christian States and consciences. In the latter, those of the Protestants among themselves; many uncouth, and Heterodox tenants, and bicker about the same, there have been raised, especially in these Islands: but the thing which (I think) hath abidden most contention (the most both for the multitude, and vehemency of contenders) and which hath been still held up, and disceptations have been continuedly (under some, or other notion) renewed about it, is the matter of Church Order, and Ecclesiastical Power. One while the question hath referred to the Form of Government; another while it hath been about the Censures in the Church, their warrant, kinds, or extent; another while about the Maintenance, another while about the Office and calling of the Ministry. And for matters Civil, though the oppositions therein were begun upon several interests, as about Laws, about Property, about Liberty, and about Magistratical Prerogative, and Power; yet at length this last hath taken the place of all the rest, and set itself up alone. And in the upshot, what have the cross devisings, and debates of men's heads, and tongues fixed upon? and about what have their conflicting, and counterworking hands all clasped, but this rocky Pyramid of worldly power? Sect. 3 As it cannot be denied that the contentions about this above all others have proved the most general, violent, multiplying, and lasting; so perhaps it will not be wholly impertinent to consult a little what may be the cause, or how it comes to pass so to be. Something, as the reason or rise of this may be observed, in the nature of the thing itself; something in man; and something in what may be probably apprehended to be the fate, or predicted lot of the present times. In the nature of the thing itself, we may take notice, not only that it is a matter of humane temporal interest (about which through the earthliness of men, and every one's partiality of judgement, and immoderation of affection to himself, men are most subject to precipitancy of passion, and dazzling of reason, and consequently to mutual discord) but that it is that humane interest which of all others is most controvertible. It is easy to see that the precepts, and relative duties comprehended in the fifth Commandment are more than any other of that table subject to diversity and opposition of judgement, practice and claim. When our Saviour would give an instance of the Pharisees wide, and palpable variation from, and elusion of the sound sense of the Commandments of God, he made choice to do it in this of Honour tby Father and thy Mother. Mat. 15.3. To note the Seminary and spring of this matter a little more particularly. 1. Every humane interest is so much exposed to Controversy as it is of worth, or concernment real or reputed. Now the duties, and rights of this commandment have in this respect the preeminency. Thence we may take it to be that they have the priority of place in the order of the precepts of the second Table; and deservedly, for the other Commandments of that Table give order about the adjuncts of man, but this disposeth of his person to a certain state, relation, and personal obligation. The other Commandments respect each some one interest; this hath a supereminent influence upon all, to wit, for their securement to the proprietors, and the mutual communication of them to others behoof, by the superintendency of a superior respectively. The other Commandments provide for the interest of men as single, or several persons, this projecteth for them by and in society. 2. Another occasion of controversy is the peculiarity, or appropriation of a thing. What every man is in some proportion a partaker, or capable of (such are the matters of the other Commandments) is not so exposed to emulation, and simulty, as what is confined to one, or a few, as is the state of Superiority in this Commandment. That which in this kind can be owing, and payable only to one is usually desired, and many times claimed by many. It is observed that there were thirty competitors once on foot for one, and the same throne, to wit, that of the Roman Empire, who confounded one another * See Matth. Prideaux Period 4. Sect. 33. pag. 205. It was anno Christi 260. in the time of Galienus the Emperor. . And I think our age hath seen a greater number of aspirers for a narrower Territory. Now this comes to create both interruption to him that should receive, and distraction to him that ought to pay duty: when the latter is to strive, not only with his own loathness to part with any honour, gain, or labour from himself to another, but with the doubts and dangers arising from contrariety of demandants. In such a case, to avoid wrong to another, and peril, and scruple to himself, to discern whose the right is, and duly to render it, how difficult a thing doth even he find it whose mind is most honestly, and impartially disposed: and if this cause such demurs, and distractions in an upright breast, how much more will it in partial and self-interested spirits, who are far the greater number? 3. It addeth to the controversarinesse of the subject of this Commandment, that the thing enjoined to be yielded always, or for most part is, that which is out of the hands of the proprietor, and in the hand of him that is to render it to him. Honour, we say, is in the honourer, and not in him that is to be honoured. Other Commandments do assert that to a man, that is, or may be already in his occupation, but this attributes that which one man still hath to receive, another to part with. And besides, much of the return consists not in the transferring, but in the immanent act of him that yields it; in which kind of matter there is prone to be on the one part (his that is to receive advantage, or respect) forwardness, freeness, largeness of expectation, and claim: on the other (his that is to expend, or part with duty) slowness, delay, and retentiveness. In the former there is apt to be cavilling, and jealousy: in the latter a propensness to questioning, and grudging; on both sides an inclination to arbitrariness in favour of itself: all which are the next matter, and seed of division, and strife. So much of rise we find for this had Symptom in the thing itself. 2. But a greater, and stronger reason, or Sect. 4 root of this is in man's nature, viz a keen, and earnest appetite of Rule, which of all other desires in man is most common, and predominant. The incendiaries, and foment of all contentions among men (the Scripture teacheth us) are their lusts. Every man hath an armed, and fight multitude of these in him (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) But the leader of all these lusts; James 4.1. the commander, chief, and master of them is the desire of command, chieftainship, and masterdom. Ambition with greatest probability is conceived to have been the first sin, as well of degenerating man, as of the falling Angels. This is the Captain, and so the most active and domineering of all other lusts; not only by virtue of its first entry (as Joab obtained the Generalship by being first in scaling the fort of the Jebusites;) but from hence, that man being a rational creature, he would have himself, and others governed by reason; and being in that faculty corrupt, & prejudicated, he esteems his own judgement, whatever it be, to be the only right, and sound reason; and therefore most worthy to take place, and give order to all others. And moreover, this affection hath no little nourishment in him from the sense of the consequents, or attendants on Superiority, which are honour, and glory, things which men are generally excessively in love with; and besides, not only these, but all other things come within the beck, and verge of Government. Dominion (as was said) according to its proportion, being comprehensive of all the acquisitions, and possessibles of man; and standing seized of the command thereof is furnished to be the purveyor, and accommodator of all other lusts: the which it usually becomes when it is sought, and attained from an inordinate principle, and hath strength to its will. 3. An aitiologicall observation likewise Sect. 5 occurreth from what may be taken to be the fate, or predicted lot of the times. It may be probably conjectured that the days we live in have a share (if not a peculiar property) in the Scripture predictions which import this event. As first we are forewarned of the more than ordinary breaking forth of such vicious qualities, as where they prevail do produce this effect, and make it very rife. The Apostle fortelleth that, in the last days (and if any shall be latter, these doubtless are of the last) men will be boasters, proud, 2 Tim 3.2, 4. disobedient to parents, highminded: and when, not one man only, but men are so, that is the greater sort, or it is the common complexion and mood of men's minds, how should it be but contentions (the natural, and immediate issue of elation, and refractoriness of Spirit) should be very ingruent; and th●t, whatever is the object of pride, boasting, immorigerousness to Parents, and highmindedness (as, if any thing State dominion is) should be the object of contention? Jo. Barclai Euphorm. par. 1. — Sedet axe superbo Infoelix Bellum, motisque accenditur Armis. Ambition is the sturdy beam, above The which wars-chariot doth sit, and move. And moving once, the clash of Arms Beats sparkles out to greater harms. To this may be put, that the Apostles Peter and Judas, 2 Pet. 3.2, 10, 14. Judas 8, 11. do both foretell Christians that among them shall be those who will be despisers of Government, presumptuous, selfwilled, that are not afraid to speak evil of dignities: and that, many shall follow the pernicious ways of these, and that, they shall beguile unstable souls; and Judas addeth to their character, the gainsaying of Core. Now these two, the ardent affection (even to jealousy) unto Dominion ordinary in those that are possessed, or candidates of it, and this rebellious, irreverent, contemptuous, stubborn, and reproachful humour, and carriage in them who should yield honour and subjection to it, meeting together, cannot choose but kindle the flames of discord, even to the height of fury. As the Holy Ghost predicteth this event in the causes, so doth he it in the effect itself. This, as I understand, he doth in the Prophecy of the seven vials, Rev. 16.10. which contain the seven last plagues, in which is filled up the wrath of God, and which is not improbably applied by many Expositors to our days. The fifth of those Vials is poured out upon the Seat or Throne of the Beast. I cannot receive their interpretation who understand by the seat of the beast, the City of Rome: much less can I theirs who take it for a certain form of Church Government. Among other reasons against the former, which is the more common Exposition, this is one, that it placeth the Beast upon that City, as his seat, whereas the best Expositor, the Text itself contrariwise seats the great whore, Rev. 17.1, 3, 7, 9, 18. the woman which it interpreteth to emblemise that great City which reigneth over the Kings of the earth (and which the consent of Expositors both ancient and modern, and of these, both Protestant, and Popish interpret to be the City of Rome) upon the Beast, and makes the Beast to carry her, and the Beasts seven beads to be seven mountains on which the woman, that great City sitteth, and his ten horns to be those Kings over which she reigneth. And further, for our rejection of both the aforesaid Expositions, the Text itself gives us very plainly, and appositely another application of the seat of the beast. For what is the Seat or Throne of the Beast, but that upon, or over which he is set, or placed? But the Angel that first showeth, and then explaineth the Vision, and mystery of the woman, and of the Beast that carrieth her, and of his seven heads, and ten horns, saith expressly unto John, the waters which thou sawest, where the whore sitteth (and consequently upon which the beast that carrieth her is placed, the ubi where she sitteth being properly the seat of him that carrieth her.) are peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues, vers. 15. Nay, which makes this yet clearer, in the visionary description of the great whore, which precedeth this explanation of the Angel, she is said to sit upon many waters, vers. 1. so that these many waters (so applied as hath been showed in vers. 15.) are not only the ubi where, but expressly the seat upon which this woman (this City) sitteth. It is further to be observed, that in this Vision three seats are attributed to her; 1. She sits upon many waters, vers. 1. 2. She sits upon the Beast, vers. 3. 3. She sits upon seven mountains, signified by the seven heads of that Beast, verse 9 It may without either show of contradiction, or much difficulty be conceived how all this diversity may be accorded. If we take the Angel's Exposition of the woman to be the great City, and that City to be Rome, we may thus apply it to those three seats. Those seven heads, as they import seven mountains, are the Natural or Topical seat, or site of that City, the seat on which it standeth, or is built The Beast, that is, the Dominion, Power, or Sovereignty which that City possesseth, and which bears it up (for by the Beast is commonly interpreted the Roman Sovereignty, or Empire) is the immediate political seat of that City. And the many waters, explicated to our hand, to intent peoples, multitudes, nations, and tongues, are the mediate political seat of that City, that is, they are the seat of the Beast, or they are the several Communities, or Republics which once were all one, and belonged to, and were under the Dominion of the Roman Empire, possessed by that City. The issue than is, as to our purpose, the Woman, that great City is immediately seated upon the Beast, the Roman Empire, and mediately upon the waters, that is, upon those people's, and multitudes, etc. once (that is, in the Apostles time) under the power of that Empire: and the Beast is immediately seated upon those waters, those people, etc. These then in all likelihood (not to say certainly) are to be taken to be the seat of the Beast. Which the more confidently to affirm, the words next following these in the Narration of this Vial induce me; which are, and his Kingdom was full of darkness. It can be no otherwise construed but that the Beasts kingdoms, and his Seat here, should be both one thing: the one being that on which the Vial is poured out, the other that which is said to be affected by the said pouring out. Now for the word. Kingdom, it both i● Scripture, and in ordinary speech, sometimes signifies authority, or government, and sometimes the people, or subjects ruled, or the governed. The latter signification can only suit here, for the former (as was aforeshewed) is meant by the Beast himself. The Kingdom ruling is the Beast, the Kingdom ruled is the seat of the Beast; this latter then is the Kingdom here meant, the seat of the Beast, the people governed: and agreably to this sense sound the words following, these, and they gnawed their tongues for pain; who can be understood by this relative they, but a plurality, a multitude, these are the seat of the Beast upon which the Vial is poured out, his Kingdom which upon that is full of darkness, and those, they, who upon it, gnaw their tongues for pain. Some clearness appearing in this point, what is understood by the seat of the Beast, which is the subject of this Vial, the meaning of the effect which it hath upon this seat (for the observing of which, as pertinent to our purpose, I make this reflection upon this place) will easily follow. The effect is, that his Kingdom is (or, the people anciently of the Beasts Empire are) full of darkness, and they gnaw their tongues for pain, and blaspheme the God of heaven because of their pains, and their sores, and repent not of their deeds. This Kingdom-filling darkness may import a delusive obfuscation, erroneousness, giddiness, and dotage, which shall at the time, and in the place of this Vials pouring forth (and may not its time, and place be the present?) possess, and prevail over the minds and judgements of men about the matter of Power and Authority, Civil, in the first place, and Ecclesiastical consequently, and by way of participation. And this darkness must needs cause a Chaos of confusion, commotion, and contention. The tongue-gnawing pain, and that which follows, blaspheming, and impenitency, I interpret of worldly griefs, and dolours, arising from all sorts of sufferings, and dangers upon bodies, estates, and other temporal interests; and of conscience-tortures by deceptions, scruples, and guilt; which the said obscurity will breed unto people; and which being incumbent on them will (especially in the faeces, the worse, the more hardened sort of them) boil up unto extreme vexation, and anguish, yea unto rage, and fury, whence they will break forth into blasphemy against God, by casting (in their spite, and madness) the blame, and scandal of all their sufferings, and distempers upon the Gospel, Religion, and Reformation, and upon the faithful, and zealous friends, and followers of the same; accusing them of Rebellion, and bringing ruin upon Church, and State; and charging them as the causes of the public Commotions, and Convulsions, and of their own private adversities, and agonies flowing from them; which, indeed, are the fruits of their own error, and the recompenses of their own sins; and which should have wrought on them for their repentance, but prove ineffectual to that, and occasional to the contrary, the continuation, and heightening of their sin, and an addition to their judgements. Having upon the occasion of observing this effect gone so far in looking into this Vial, I cannot well let pass the noting (but it shall be in one word) the correspondency which is betwixt this, and the next foregoing Vial, and the apt sequency of the one upon the other. That fourth Vial I suppose to bear this sense. The Sun, upon which it is poured out, is the Sovereign or Royal dignity residing in the several Princes, or Estates signified by those ten horns, Rev. 17.12. It's effect, to wit, that upon it power is given to the Sun to scorch men with fire, may signify the passions of those Princes, their inordinate, and boundless appetite of rule, their emulations, and jealousies transporting them above it, their immeasurable aspiring, ambitions and avarices', from which they are in special stimulated, and inflamed to an exorbitant stretching, and heightening of their power, and prerogative over their people, for the advancing, enlarging, and maintaining whereof they proceed to those precipitate counsels, and violent courses, which do exceedingly waste, and crush, and in so doing discontent, exasperated, and enrage their subjects. And these are the heats, and flames by which men under this Vial (as by a Zenith Sun) are scorched. Upon that effect of the fourth Vial this of the fifth very suitably, and even naturally ensues. As the Summer-sun-beames by their glowing heat having a good while together penetrated, and even toasted the earth, thereupon the earth comes to send up many gross fumes, and vapours to the bemisting, and enveloping of the air; by which means the Sun being overcast, the earth itself is deprived both of its shine and light; so it is betwixt Potentates and people. The abuses, and excesses of Princes by which they overtop, gall, and excruciate their Subjects, raise, and retort clouds upon themselves, and their own power, and dignity; their people thence conceiving, and venting many blind, inconsiderate, and gross mistakes, many heady, and mutinous contestations about their Sovereign's power, and prerogative; and this to the reciprocal, mighty prejudice both of Prince and Subjects; the one coming thereby to be eclipsed, if not disorbed: and the other, while they by such reflections seek to allay, and cool the heat, darted upon them by the too great elevation, and vertical influence of their Sun, having thereby changed their day into darkness, are overwhelmed with confusions, night-wandring, and horrors, and do pine away in black, pensive, and hopeless obscurity. To this that hath been said of these Vials portending the more than ordinary inclination of the times allotted to them unto disceptations, and clashings about Government, I shall add a touch upon another Prophecy looking somewhat the same way, the rather because much looked upon now by some men. It is part of the matter of the third woe, and seventh Trumpet, Rev. 11.15. in those words, There were great voices in heaven, saying, the Kingdoms of the world are become the Kingdoms of the Lord, and of his Christ. 1 Cor. 15.24. To which may be joined that of the Apostle, Then cometh the end, when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power. There is much recourse had to these, and the like prenunciations, nowadays, and strange use made of them. I am none of those that have the confidence to define, either the time when, or the means, or manner how these passages shall be accomplished. Much less do I sort with those who upon presumption that they shall receive their completion before the world's end, or while time is yet current, and in a worldly, and temporal manner, and by humane means, and force, do thence conclude it a necessary, and prime duty of Christians, to lend their assistance to the bringing of them to effect, by laying their heads, and conserting their hands together to plot, and act the pulling down of all Civil Powers humanely constituted, and so to the making way, and entry to that Kingdom of God, and of Christ. But this may be said with sobriety, who knows what prelude, or preparative may be in, what use the unsearchable wisdom of God may make of, the many unsatisfiable, and unappeasable stir, and jarrings both of the men of this, and of divers other spirits, and principles about Government, to the bringing about of his own counsels predeclared in those Prophetic passages? One thing may be affirmed without pretence of supernatural light, either from Scripture prediction, or from private Enthusiasm, as that which comes within common experience, and reason; that debates, and competitions about authority (especially when so multiplied, and obstinate) do bode, and tend to its downfall. The more discussions, and stirs are raised about it; the more climb up to, and corrivalships for it, the more still the Majesty, and lustre of Authority is defaced, the foundations, and strength of it are shaken, the more it tottereth, and inclineth unto ruin. Moreover, as this is the natural effect of that, so it may be taken some notice of, that the prevision, and presage of a time of horrid violence, and confusion, and of spoil, and expilation by the subversion of all Laws, and humane Authority, restraint, and reverence, to come upon the latter ages of the world, hath sadly possessed the minds of many sage, and learned Christians, both ancient, and latter. To give some instance, as that of Tertullian, Est & alia major necessitas nobis orandi pro imperatoribus, etiam pro omni statu imperii, rebusque Romanis, quod vim maximam universo orbi imminentem, ipsamque clausulam seculi acerbitates horrendas comminantem Romani imperii commeatu scimus retardati. Itaque nolumus experiri, & dum precamur, differri Romanae diuturnitati favemus. Tertull. Apolog. cap. 32. who declares in behalf of the Christians of his time, that they took themselves bound to pray for the Emperors, and Roman state, though then Heathen, and persecuting, because that by means of the continuance thereof, the great crash, or conquassation, threatening the world's ruin, and the most dreadful calamities, was retarded. And Lactantius Vide Lactantium in Institut. lib. 7. cap. 15. presageth that a little before the glorious restoring of the Church by him divined of to come ere the world's end, there shall antecede those desperate confusions, and overturnings of order, right, and laws, as never were before in the world. And in the Harmony of Confessions, Confession of Saxony in the Harmony. Artic. 23. of Civil Mag. pag. 596. that of Saxony gives warning, that in this last age of the world great confusion is to be feared. But enough of the causes of the Tumultuations Sect. 6 of the present age about Government: Let us turn a thought toward something of remedy. Amidst the many factions about political order (not a few whereof bespeak themselves religious, but are indeed seditious) my persuasion is, it is not only the worldly man's interest, but the Christians, and not only his interest, but his bounden duty, both to submit to Civil Authority, and to support it: and that (suitably to the conjunction of the second and third petitions of the Lords-prayer) we have no other way of active promoting the coming of the Kingdom of God, but by doing his will. The which will I understand to be, not so much, if at all, his dispositive, or decreeing will, unto which his Prophecies belong (for that, in many things, is to-us unrevealed, and that ever shall, and cannot but be done, as well in earth, as in heaven) as his preceptive will, delivered in his Law of nature, and the rules of his word. Which will of his is (as much as for any thing) express for the perpetual, and indeterminable, both authorization of Civil Magistracy (viz. that which is by ordinary, or humane creation, or constitution) and obligation of all men, all Christians in homage to it * Nos judicium dei suspicimus in imperatoribus, qui Gentibus illos praefecit. Id in eyes scimus esse quod Deus voluit. Ideoque salvum volumus esse quod Deus voluit. Tertull. in Apolog. cap. 32. . For the better disposing, and drawing of men's minds to the doing of this will of God in this particular, and for the abating of the pernicious contentions abovesaid to be now so incident, and rife about it, and which are the great obstacles of men's performing the Divine will in this matter, Two things (I suppose) will be easily admitted to be chief desirable, and contributory. One on the part of the Government itself, which is, that it be evidently laid upon a ground of conscience, a just foundation, or which is the same, that it apparently be by divine authority, or according to that rule, or will of God which we are to do. The other (which also is conducible unto that) is on the part of those that are concerned in, or upon its being settled, to wit, that it be clear, and understood wherein consisteth that regularity, and how the divine authorization held forth by it is passed, or conveyed unto men's investure in it. For the requisiteness, and usefulness of these two a little may serve to be said. The former is, that Government be laid upon a bottom of conscience. This is the only genuine, true, and connatural, and this is the surest, and firmest groundwork for it. Without this there is little hope for it to prove either beneficial, or permanent, little likelihood of either a real regular, or durable subjection to it. The discernible standing of Government upon conscientious grounds, is the only thing that can bring in conscience, and a conscientious submission to it. Conscience (that is, a persuasion of the thing to be done, that it is as it ought to be, or is right and just) is the highest, and most kindly principle of any humane, or moral act. It is both the strongest, and most lasting obligation to any relative duty. It is the strongest, and most inducing tie, because it is the dictate of the supremest faculty in man, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, his mind, or intellectual part, and that upon the powerfullest persuasive, a Law received from nature, and from God. And it is the most lasting tie. 1. In being upon a consideration which is in itself certain, and immutable, viz. the everlasting rule of righteousness. 2. Inasmuch as it doth most engage the will, and so procures the most voluntary, and free accord unto that which it imposeth. There is scarce that thing which is more necessary to mankind (considered in society) than Government; but nothing would be more free in its imposall, and reception. It is true, a coercive power is (in the present depravation of man) requisite to it, both for its conservation, and effectual administration, but this is not proper, nor can it serve to be its procreative, or constitutive, no nor sole conservative cause. It is easy to discern that the personal strength of one man or a few Chieftains of a Community is not sufficient to this coercion: and that Magistracy cannot have, or validly put forth without the cordial concurrence of a multitude. For a Magistrate to hold, and put forth this power by the strong hand of a consenting multitude distinct from, and opposed to that he rules over, who sees not the unnaturalness, and unstableness of such a command? This will never incorporate the governing, and governed, or joint them in one political body, but shall always keep them dispartite, and set them in a state of jealousy, discontent, and counter-working each of other. If force be all that interveneth to the relation, and correspondency of ruler, and ruled, how should that hold? an aversation of wills, and affections will work out itself, and either dissever, or dash them together. Vim vi reprimere is a practice which begets the like to it in the other on whom it is practised and that is Vim vi rependere, & repellere. These two are principles, and studies that sit deep, and keep the subject they possess respectively in continual motion. He that is up, and stands by the former hath but little ease, and less staidness; he that is down, and meditates the latter is like a vapour under ground swelling, and searching to rend out its passage into the open air, with the breach, or fall of what ever is betwixt it, and its freedom. The right, and durable basis then that is left unto Magistracy is that which is cemented with a composure of the wills of them over whom it is. Now the will is two ways conciliated, or won. One is by the sense of an external, or temporal accommodation, or advantage. The other is the innotescency of a moral obligation, or tie of conscience. The former is but an inferior, and low attractive, and it is beneath a rational faculty to be taken with it by itself alone, or as the commanding principle. That were as if the servant should govern his master, the beast its rider, or the body overpower its soul. And for the point of continuance; though the motion of it be impetuous, and it strongly worketh upon the sensitive conceit, and appetite, yet it participates of the nature of its object, in being variable, and uncertain. To incline the will to obedience is but accidental, and contingent to the sense of a temporal good, it is as prone to oppose, and withdraw from it, being indifferent, and equally poised to dispose the mind, either to subjection, or contumacy, as the one, or the other may seem to favour its object. But the latter, the evidence of a conscience obligation that's the most weighty, and meriting persuasive, that's always the same, that takes an immediate, and deeper hold on the rational faculty, yea, and is of as general extent, and influence as the other; all men, and nations retaining some touch of religion, and conscience, and of it as much, and as universally in this of Civil authority, and obedience as in any particular. And in truth, if we should make a reflection upon ourselves in this Nation (which is so naturally addicted to Laws, and liberties, that hath received the knowledge, and profession of the true Religion, that hath been of late so much busied in looking up Scripture moulds, and dictates of this argument, that hath had almost all the questions that can likely be raised in this behalf laid open, and agitated to, and fro, that hath had so often in this business tendered such conscience-pressing adjurations, and engagements, and hath showed (if recitations, urge, and disputes about them be arguments thereof) to be solicitous of them, and lastly, that hath both by words, and actions both declared, and had declared to it a conscientiousness in this matter) it cannot (I s●y) be rationally expected that any other way of settling then upon clear grounds of conscience should here take. The requisitnesse of the first of the two afore proposed expedients appearing, the necessity of the second immediately follows upon it; and is evident by the concession of the other. For if it be admitted needful that a ground, or principle of conscience be the basis of Government, it will be confessed as needful that a rule of Gods revealed or preceptive will (which is the only cynosure, guide, and empress of conscience) touching the founding, and erecting of Government be laid forth, and that, both verbo tenus, & re, both the words, and the thing, that is, both which is the rule, where delivered, and also what it saith, or ordereth, or what is its genuine sense, and meaning. In the want, or uncertainty of this all settlement upon this groundwork will be to seek. Though the thing settled be right, yet the beneficial influence of that rectitude upon the conscience, and will shall be superseded; and in stead thereof it will be attended with a disrelish, muttering, and discompliance in the same. M●ny illusions, and fallacies shall be obtruded upon the conscience to bottom it wrong; and many pretensions of conscience will be held forth to the eyes of the world where there is no conscience stood upon. These two things being granted needful Sect. 7 to the premised end, I would stay my Reader no longer in the Introduction, then while I a little more specialize the subject and procedure of the ensuing Discourse in reference to these two. The former of them, which lies on the part of the Government itself, to wit, that it be set upon a conscientious bottoming, I shall intermeddle no further with. To see that this, or th●t authority be so, or publicly to determine, or pronounce any so to be, or not to be, containeth in it matter of fact, and descendeth to a circumstantiated, and individual case; I pass it over as too high and hard for me, and leave it to the Statesman, as proper to his immediate inspection. The latter, which is the enquiring out of the rule, with its interpretation, and meaning, is that I only take in hand; and this will not be denied to lie within the precincts of my calling. Might it be evident ere I have done to be as well within the compass of my performance, it would be something of satisfaction both to my Reader (possibly) and to myself. This, I say, is the whole reach and limit of what followeth; and it will be by itself enough. For as the making plain of this will be acknowledged to be singularly conducing to the allay, and pacification of much discomposure, and to be preparative and productive of obedience to the will of God in this behalf; so it cannot be denied, but that the rule itself, the investigation whereof we are upon, falleth under some controversy. The plainest, and fullest passage of Scripture for the holding forth of this rule, and the way how the Divine Authorization is conveyed to particular persons, for their investing thereby with Civil authority, I take for granted to be the prefixed text, [There is no power but of God: the Powers that be are ordained of God.] And therefore having for that reason, laid down that for the ground, and centre of my discourse, I shall immediately proceed to it. In the late times of dispute about state government much recourse hath been had to this Scripture. Each different way hath sought to it for patronage, and endeavoured to make it of its party. This hath raised a variety of senses, and interpretations, and thereby some obscurity upon it. That which hath been said of some other Scriptures may be of this. This text had been plain, had there not been so many Expositors upon it. I cannot ascribe the controvertiblenesse of it, so much to any Grammatical, or Metaphysical difficulty of the terms, as to the value, which the matter it consisteth of, beareth. 1. The subject of it: nothing higher in place, or more in esteem with men than it, viz. Civil power. 2. The predicate: nothing more sublime can be spoken of any thing (as to its origination) than it, to wit, that it is of God, ordained of God. The desireableness of the subject, and the divineness of the predicate seem in their conjunction to occasion the disputeablenesse of these words. In the beginning of our Commotions the sentence next before this [Let every soul be subject to the higher powers] underwent the debate: and therein the extent, or latitude of the power, and subjection it asserteth. Since that the question hath passed on to the next, which are these words, and upon them the main queries are, who the persons are that are here termed the Powers, which are of God, ordained of God? and (in order thereunto) what is meant by the Powers? what by of God and ordained of God? The exceeding (and in my opinion excessive) wide-stretching of this style, The power of God, ordained of God, by some Authors anteceding these times, hath to me seemed strange, and to have given some rise to the late diversity of applications of it. Besides the peculiar (and I am confident the only intended) application of it to the Civil Magistrate there are that have imagined in it much broader accommodations. That great light of the Church in his times, and since, St. Augustine (the authority of whose example hath perhaps led others to do the like) extendeth this proposition, There is no power but of God, to take in all power whatsoever that can be named, and is in any creature. As the power to put forth any good work, or act of grace * Aug. de Spir. & lit. cap. 31. To. 3. ; the power to do any wrong, or act any sin † Aug. Enarrat. in Psalmos, Psa. 32. Conc. 2. To. 8. the power of Satan to tempt, or sway men to evil * Aug. ad Simpli●ian. lib. 2. qu. 1. To. 4. . After him comes the Pope with his Doctors, and they make bold to insert into the sense of this text, not only the Papal, with all the rest of their Hierarchies Spiritual, or Ecclesiastical power, but the Pope's power in Temporals over Sovereign Princes. Pope Boniface 8 (who is said to have come into the Popedom like a Fox, reigned like a Lion, and died like a D●g) makes this use of this Scripture † In extravag de major. & obed. cap. unam Sanctam, etc. So doth Pighius. Bellarmine, and others endeavour to impose their Popes, and Prelates powers, and to defend their Clergy-exemptions from the Temporal Magistrate by putting that sense upon this Text * Bellarm. To. 1. Cont. 3. lib. 2. cap. 29. . After these arise the Munsterians, and having expelled their Prince, and taken the power of the City into their hands, and set up of themselves a pageant King (but too tragical) they declare, that he is not so much of their as of Gods ordaining † Regem non tam ab ipsis quam a Deo constitutum esse scripserant. Jo. Sleiden lib. 10. pag. 256. . And yet farther, and which is more to be regarded, Some of our Protestant Divines (and of chiefest note) as Bucer, Calvin, and Pareus, have drawn forth the authority of this text to any person that by any means gets in, or hath possession of rule, or the upper hand over a Civil State * Bucer, Calvin, Pareus in loc . There is none of those uses of this text, or of the Divine warrant it hold forth to the Civil Magistrate, but (with reverence to those authors of any of them who are acknowledged with us to deserve it) I look at as going beyond the just bounds thereof. This Treatise doth not propose the distinct, or particular examination of each of them. But its inquisition into the positive importance of this Text will manifestly discover the disinterestednesse of every one of them therein. And the last, being it is commended by such names; being it hath been taken hold of, and confidently insisted on by many of late, both upon the account of the deserved esteem of those Authors, and by other arguments; being it hath some more shadow, or appearance then the rest of approaching near the meaning of this Text, and so standeth more in our light, or way to the clear view of it; being it hath been currently received, and patronised by divers; and being it is of the concernment which will easily be discerned to be in it; this Treatise (with all due respect to those who may be entertainers of the said sense, and wish submission to the further sifting of the Judicious) doth professedly deal with, and bring it under a hearing, and Trial. I might here insert the allegation of many absurd consequences and pernicious tendencies which wait upon the admittance of this sense, to make the profit, and necessity of its discussion the better to appear; as also the recital of sundry other questions of some abstruseness, and of special use, with other contents, as instances of the usefulness of the untertaking in this Book. But these I omit, for the Readers speedier passing on to take his own survey of the things themselves, as they are delated in what followeth. Humbly submitting what I have written to his censure; and committing the same to the blessing of the Almighty. The Author having not opportunity to survey this Impression until past, humbly requesteth the Readers excuse for, and pains to correct the following errors in it. 1. In sentences. PAge 87. line 15. after particular insert, Persons, and Families are in of public association, protection, order, and administration of justice, calls men into civil societies, and to the erecting of G●v●rnment: and more particular, p. 136 l. 19, 20, 21. expurgo. The transactions about them enjoined a rule of right, and equity to be kept, and forbidden. 2. In one, or a few syllables. Page 2. line 22. f. quality r. quantity, p. 7. l. 10. f. 23. r. 22. p. 10. l. 23 r. offered unto, etc. p. 11. l 13. r. compass, p. 20. l. 17 r contemned, p. 24. l. 15. r. persuading, ibid. l. 16. r 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 26. l. 19 r. lawfully, p 28. l. 26. r. in the person, p. 29. l. 12. f. awful r. lawful, p. 31. l. 12. r. Marcionites, p. 36. l. 40. f. universal r. unjustifiable, p. 37. l. 37. r. and for the matter, p. 43. l. 7. f. proceeding r. producing, p. 45. l. 26. f casually r. casualty, p. 52. l. 2. r. receives, p. 54. l. 4. r. totally, p. 55. l. 24. r. agency, l. 41. r. peculiarly, p. 65. l. 22. f. is r. it, p. 66. l. 15. r. Trade-adventurers, p. 70. l. 36. 37. r. positives, p. 72 l. 1. r. to us, l. 21. r. drowsy, l. 33. r. knew p. 73. l. 2. r. very guilty, p. 76. l. 38. f. 2. r. 4. p. 82. l. 3. 4 expunge or a master, l. 8. f. to r. of, l. 36 after solely insert which, p. 83 l. 40. r. this, or that, p. 84. l. 39 r. not to be taken, p. 85. l. 7. f. while r. which, l. 23. r. of the thing, p 87. l. 24. r. those whom, p 91. l. 11. r. there being, l. 35. after employing insert force, l. 38. r. founded, l. 39 f. profession r. poss ssion, p. 92. l. 27. r. to be a rule, p. 93. l. 41. r. do come, p. 94. l. 4 f. clear r. clean, p. 95. l. 7. r. uniform, p. 99 l. 33. r. take, p. 103. l. 37. f. or in r. in or, p. 110. l. 33. r. a working, p. 111. l. 15. f. mortality r. moral tye, p. 122. l. 21. f. living r. lineage, p. 123. l. 10. after his insert fall, p. 126. l. 24. r. names, p. 136. l. 14. f. and r. be, p. 139 l. 8. r. according to h laws, l. 14. f. where r. were, p. 140 l. 1. r. inquire, p. 157. l. 31. f. as r. us, p. 159. l. 31. r. of an usurp, p. 164. l. 5. r. Tractu, p. 165 l. 18 r. it allows p. 171. l. 4. r. sociatis, p. 173. l. 4●. f. extensively r. exclusively, p. 176. l. 32. r parties, p. 178. l. 8. f. eng ne r. enemy, p. 179. l. 28. expunge to be, p. 183. l. 14. r. distinguished, p 187. l. 36. f. hold r. take, p. 189 l. 1, 2 r convention, p. 193. l. 14. r. and abstract, l. 33 ●. the act and the, p. 194. l. 4. r. wherein it is, p. 202. l. 37, 38. ●. authority r. power, p. 206. l. 25. r. determined, l. 34. r. take it. Understand, p 207. l. 17 r. propositions, p. 210. l. 5 r. variety, p. 214. l. 7. r. it the, p 223. l. 14 r. hold, p. 229. l. 38. r. so far as they, p. 235. l. 40. r. indifferent, p. 238 l. 32. r. 2 Ki●gs, p. 239. l. 4. r. predominant, p. 241. l. 16. r. unpublished, p 248. l 7. r. Gen 9 6. p. 255. l. 8. r. where, p. 257. l. 13. r. Herdonius, p. 259. l. 21. f. sight r. Sat, p. 277. l. 19 r. afford it, p 283. l. 6. r. strictures, p. 291. l. 1, 2. r. command, p. 297. l. 16. r. capacity includes in, p. 300. l. 15. expunge externally. In Margins. Page 28 line 9 r. superior est jure, p. 52. l. 2. r. that of same of th●, p 71. l. 3. r. 9 31. p. 123. r. Pareum. p 13●. r. W●ddrington, p. 251. l 5 r. contigit. A Direction to such Scriptures as are somewhat explained in this Treatise, after the figures noting the Chapters and Verses of the Books of Scripture, the figures that follow signify the pages, and sometimes the places referred to are noted by Chapters, Sections, and Subsections. Gen. 9.6. p. 20. in marg. &. p. 248. 10.25. p. 175. 49.10. p. 229. Deut. 17.14, 15. Cap. 10. Sect. 4. Subsect. 1. 32.8. p. 33. 1 Sam. 20.26. p. 208. 2 Sam. 7.12. Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Subject. 1. prope finem. 1 King. 2.4. Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Subs. 1. 19.10. p. 209. 2 King. 2.11. p. 238. 18.7. Cap. 10. Sect. 6. 1 Chron. 29.26, 27. p. 238. Psal. 41.11. p. 72. 115.16. p. 32. Prov 8.15. p. 214. Eccles. 8.4. p. 20. 10. p. 261. Isai. 19.18, 19 p. 49. 42.24. p. 198. Jer. 21.8, 9 27.1. to 18. 28.14, 16. 29.7. 38.17, 20. Cap. 10. Sect. 4. Subsect. 1. 33.7. Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Subs. 1. prope finem. Ezek. 21.27. p. 244. 29.21. p. 230. Dan. 11.14. p. 49. Habak. 1.14. p. 287. Matth. 3.15. Cap. 10. Sect. 5. 4.23, 24. p. 208. 5.39, 40, 41. p. 284. 9.10. p. 209. 17.24, 25, 27, Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Subsect. 2. 19.6. p. 131. 22.21. Cap. 10. Sect, 2. Subs. 3. 26.52. p. 20, 250. Mar. 1.5. p. 207. Luke 4.6. p. 11. John 8 51. p. 2●8. 10.35. p. 25, 133. 12.32. p. 207. 19.10. p. 8. 11, Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Subs 4. Act. 2.17. p. 208. 11.26. p. 189. 17.26. p. 33. Rom. 12.17, 19 p. 283: 13.1. first part, p. 111, 112, 253, to 263. latter part per totum. 2. p. 114, 263, to 274. 3. p. 117, 274, etc. 4. p. 21, 117, 274, etc. 6. p. 279. etc. 1 Cor. 2.15. p. 209. 6.12. p. 209. 10.25. p. 208. 11.30. p. 73. 12.14. p. 131. 14.33. p. 105. 15.24. Prefac. Sect. 5. Ephes. 6.12. p. 14. Philip. 2.21. p. 207. Col. 2.15. p. 14. 1 Tim. 2.1. p. 213, 208. 6, 8, p. 208. 4.4. p. 208. 2 Tim. 2.4. p. 209. Heb. 5.4. p. 211. Jam. 1.13. p. 59 1 Pet. 2.13. p. 132. Reul. 11.15. Prefac. Sect. 5. 13.2. p. 11. 4. p. 11. 13. p. 12. 17. p. 12. 16.8. 9, 10, 11, Prefac. Sect. 5. 17.1. 3, 9, Prefac. Sect. 5. 17. pag. 11. 18. Prefac. Sect. 5. THE ORIGINAL OF THE Civil Magistrate From God, [As it is drawn by the Apostle Paul in those words, ROM. XIII. 1. There is no Power but of God: the Powers that be are ordained of God] Endeavoured to be Illustrated and Vindicated. THere is no question but the Apostle doth in these words own and attribute the Civil Magistrate unto God, as his Author 〈◊〉 unto an act of God, as his Production. But it is made a question, How this deduction is from God? or, What this derivation of the Magistrate from God, here called his Ordination or Ordinance, doth mean? For the discovery of this ou● disquisition must be, What the true sense and just extent of these words, There is no power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God, may be. The Method I have proposed to myself here●n is, first, and principally to insist, by way of Exposition, on all the terms of this sentence, one by one, which may seem to bear any part, either in the making up of the sense, or in the extending, or confining of the latitude of it. Those are, 1. The subject spoken of, Power, the powers. 2. The predicates enunciated of the same. 1. Of God. 2. Ordained of God. 3. The quality of the enunciations, whether universal or indefinite; There is no power but of God the powers that be, etc. 4. The adjunct of being put to the subject of the latter position, the powers that he are ordained of God. And to then annex some considerations from the context, and from other principles coherent to the assertion of this text. Each of these forenamed particles, as they have somewhat in them which may deserve either opening or observation; so they, have something said of them by those who have had recourse to this Text by way either of Comment, or of Controversy, which may deserve examination. I proceed forthwith to the enquiry, in the order proposed. CHAP. I. Of the Subject here spoken of, Power, the Powers. SECT. I. An Enquiry whether Power be put for the Person invested with Power, or for the abstract, the Office seated in him? IT may be of some use for the understanding of the meaning of this word Power, to take notice whether it be put here for the Officer, or for the Office, for the Magistrate, or for Magistracy. The Scripture useth the term both ways. Sometimes in the abstract, or for the form, office, or state, which makes and denominates one a Superior to others. [So Luk. 20.20. Joh. 17.2. Rev. 17.13.] Sometimes in the concrete, or for the person in whom that abstract form, or office is subjected. [So it is Luk. 12.11. Rom. 8.38. Eph. 1.21. & 3.10. & 6.12. Col. 2.15. Tit. 3.1. 1 Pet. 3.22.] That it is this latter way to betaken in this place, not only Commentators agree, [for which see Augustin Tom. 4. part. 2. Expos. propos. ex Epist. ad Rom. Piscator, Rollock, Pareus, Dr. Hammond, Essius, Vignerus in loc.] but the Text itself may lead us to resolve. Power in the abstract cannot be the subject, or recipient either of the duties required, and argued for in this text to be paid to the Power therein mentioned, or of the offences forbidden, and threatened (if done) against it: neither can it be the agent, or administrant of those acts which are ascribed to the Power here intended. It cannot be the object of that Fear, nor the author of that Praise mentioned vers. 3. The accident, or abstract power is, indeed, the Reason of men's Obligation to the performance of those duties, and the refraining of those injuries to the person empowered; and it is the form, or principle which those acts do flow from in him. But it cannot be that suppositum which is the object of the one, and the agent of the other. Moreover, that the concrete, the person in power is here meant, may be clear from the following words in the context, in vers. 3. the Apostle puts the title of Rulers, and this of Power identically, Rulers are not a terror, etc. wilt thou not then be afraid of the Power? and in vers. 4, 6, 7, 8. his arguments for the subjection to the Power in this vers. enjoined run all upon the person, for he is the Minister of God— he beareth not the sword in vain, etc. SECT. II. The main enquiry, to wit, What kind of Power it is which the Apostle intends in those words, Power, the Powers. Subsection 1. Of the force of the word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Pour signifieth here the person empowered. Yet in as much as the Text must needs suppose, imply, and refer unto Power in the abstract, as the form which doth constitute, and denominate the person in whom it is seated a Power, and only he can be said to be the Power, who is endued with that Power: the way to explain this term, and to understand who are the Powers here intended, will be, in taking the Apostle to speak of the concrete, or person, to cast our eye upon the abstract, or the habit of Power placed in him, and to inquire what kind of Power is that which the text presupposeth, and referreth unto, as that endowment which makes the persons here spoken of to be termed the Powers. The notation of the propriety, or use of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, may be somewhat conducing to this enquiry. The observation of a distinction betwixt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; betwixt potentia and potestas, and that the former is of a larger acception, and ordinarily signifies a mere mightiness, or ability; the latter is of a stricter use, and usually signifies such a Power as consists in right, interest, or property, is an observation not only given us by some of late, but avowed by Divines and Critics of chiefest note, and will upon due search (I believe) be found to hold good. It must be remembered, that the propriety of a word is not a thing of so precise a nature, as that it is ever and invariably kept, or so as the word may never be observed to be otherwise used. There is not (I think) any term that is frequently made use of, but sometimes it is taken out of its proper and peculiar sense; and so perhaps may be sometimes this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; but as far as I can learn, either by mine own observation, or from the incomparably more mature experience, and judgement of other Authors, the propriety of this word is of this measure, that properly taken, it only signifies that power which consists in right, and when it intends a power of Superiority of one person over another, it signifies an Authorized power only, or that Superiority which is lawful, or justly entitled to rule. And I believe (if possible) it will not be easy, or obvious to meet with it in any other acceptation in the New Testament. For the former, mine own observation; I shall not trouble the Reader with reciting the places of Scripture in which the word is found, whereby the constant use of it may appear; but shall sum up under a few heads the variety of use which I have noted in the word in respect of divers objects it is applied to, and refer to the several places for perusal. I have noted that in the new Testament this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is applied, 1. Sometimes to things privately possessible. 2. Sometimes to matter of action. 3. Sometimes more specially to matter of command, or authority over persons. 1. It is applied to matters privately possible: and so it signifies a right, or just interest in a thing, so as the person in whom the Power is, may lawfully dispose of, or enjoy it. [So Job. 1.12. Act. 1.7. & 5.4. & 8.19. Rom. 9.21. 2 Thess. 3.9. Rev. 23.14.] 2. It is applied to matter of action, and so it signifies a Warrant, Commission, Licence, or Rule, enabling a man to the doing, or executing of any action, or work in the said Rule determined. [So Mat. 9.6. & 10.1. & 21.23. Mark. 13.34. Luk. 9.1. Joh. 10.18. Act. 26.12. 1 Cor. 8.9. & 9.4, 5, 6, 18. 2 Cor. 10.8. & 13.10] 3. It is applied more specially to matter of Command, or Authority over persons, and so it signifies an Authority, or lawful calling to rule and bear sway over others. [So Mat. 28.18. Mark. 1.27. Luk. 4 36. & 12.5. & 19.17. & 20.20. Joh. 17.2. & 19.10. 1 Cor. 11.20. & 15.24. Col. 2.10. Jud. v. 25. Rev. 17.13.] These are the several kinds of objects or matters (in my observation) to which the Power signified by this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 relateth in Scripture. And by the many instances under each of these heads may be gathered the propriety of the word in Scripture-accep●ation. And the Reader that will please to search all these tex●s, and examine the currantness of my citing of them, will (I doubt not) upon impartial view, find also these two things true which I shall further observe unto him of them. First, That in all these places, the sense of this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is confined within the limit of a just and lawful Power, and cannot be extended to the bare act of mere Occupation, or forcible possession, or command: hence it is rendered by our Translators, not always by the word Power, but (in the forecited places) sometimes by this term, Right, [as Joh. 1.12. in marg. Rev. 22.14.] sometimes Authority, [Mat. 21.23. Mark 13.34. Luk. 4.36. & 9.1. & 20.20. Act. 26.12. 1 Cor. 15.24. 2 Cor. 10.8.] and sometimes Liberty, [as 1 Cor. 8.9.] And further in divers of those Texts it is put to signify the Right, or Warrantedness of a thing, when as the point of Right is either questioned, or asserted in a contradistinction to an arbritrary, and unwarrantable assuming, or usurping. [So in that of Mat. 21.23, 24.] the chief Priests and Elders ask Christ, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; By what authority dost thou these things, and who gave thee this authority? The authority here demanded to be shown is a warrant; or lawful commission for the do of our Saviour; the things done they had seen, his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the act of Power, or force he had put forth, in his Doctrine, Miracles, and imperious driving out of the Temple the traffiquing profaners of it; but they call in question, and therefore demand of him, and accordingly he conditionally promises to tell them by what authority he did those things, and who gave him that authority. So again [in that of Mat. 9.6.] our Saviour asserteth to himself the having, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the power on earth to forgive sins; they that were present had heard him executing the act towards the Palsie-sick person, in his saying to him, thy sins be forgiven thee. But they doubted of, or rather denied his authority or lawful power to do it, and that was the thing therefore which he there avoweth. In like manner [in that of Joh. 19.10.] Pilate thought Christ now standing before him, and not making any answer to his examinations of him, employed that he took him to have no lawful power over him in that cause; and therefore asks him, Knowest thou not that I have power to crucify thee, and have power to release thee? [Where by the way the allegarion which some make of this Text, as though the word here signified an abusive, or unlawful pours in as much as what ever power Pilate might have to release Christ, he had none to crucify him, is utterly impertinent. For it is not material to the use of the word here to say, what power Pilate really had, or what he had not; but the matter is, what power he thought and meant to assert that he had; for the word there must needs bear that sense which the speaker meant it in: and for that there is no doubt but Pilate looked on himself, as the lawful, Governor of that place, and at Christ as a common person of that Nation, and so intended; that himself was the competent Judge, of the person and cause of Christ then before him, and that he had therefore power to crucify him, and power to release him, viz. respectively, accordingly as he should find his cause to deserve.] So [in that of Rom. 9.21.] the Apostle disputing for the equity and justness of God's purposes, and proceed in his acts of Free Election and Reprobation, in order to the benefits of his Grace, and in his excutions thereof, he alleadges by way of comparison the example of the Potter's power over his clay, to make a vessel of it to what use he pleaseth. Where if the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were ambiguous, and did not clearly signify right and just power, the argument were of no force or evidence. Secondly, The other thing I observe is, that this word is in those forequoted places put for such a power, as doth not necessarily import, or require to its being, or depend upon possession, actual tenure, or exercise of the matter, or object of the power, but is in some of those instances de facto separate, and in all separable therefrom; yea in some of them the power is so affirmed, as that the act or exercise of it is expressly secluded, and laid aside, as neither done, nor to be done in the particular case. That universal Power which Christ assumeth to himself [Joh. 17.2. Mat. 28.18.] was then in him in regard of grant and investure, and in respect of right and title to all the things to which it referreth, but a jus in re, a seizure or possession of them he had not. For before his passion, being then in the state of humiliation, he was far from an actual dominion, or command over all; nay after his rising again, and his ascending up unto, and session at the right hand of God in heaven; the Apostle saith of him, We see not yet all things put under him, [Heb. 2.8.] That power of Believers to eat of things unto Idols, And that of Paul and Barnabas to marry, and to take with them in their travail Wives, and to receive maintenance for themselves, and them of the Churches of Corinth and Thessalonica, [1 Cor. 8.9. & 9.4, 5. 2 Thess. 3.9.] these were powers inherent in those persons respectively, but they were not acted, no nor could lawfully be put forth by them as the case then stood with those Christians. It is against this Observation of the force of this word objected by some, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is put for a Power unlawful as to title, in two or three places, [viz. Luk. 4.6. Rev 13.2, 4. Ephes. 6.12. Col. 2.14.] Unto which I say, 1. It should still be remembered (what was before said) that the propriety of a word is not a thing of so precise a nature, as that it is ever punctually kept; and that it is to be judged, not by its use once or twice, but by its common and frequent use. 2. Let the Texts brought for this be severally looked into. For that [of Luke 4.6.] I can see no reason to conclude the word is there used for a rightless power. Who can think but that Satan there intendeth to assume to himself a good title, and just interest over this world's kingdoms, and not a false or usurped claim? and according to his intention that speaks must the sense of the word be construed to be. Indeed he lied in taking that large composs of power to himself, and this he had done whether he had spoken of that power in point of right, or in point of fact, for in neither sense had be all that power either given to him, or to give to others; but his lie had not been so specious or to his purpose, had he not meant of a real and good authority. For that [of Rev. 13.2, 4.] where it's said The Dragon gave the beast his power, and his seat, and great authority; and the Dragon gave power unto the beast: presupposing that by the Dragon is meant Satan, and by the Beast the Roman Empire, as distributed into ten Kingdoms, or States, upon the dissipation of the Monarchy of the Caesars, by the wars of the Barbarians; which ten are therefore, it may be, called one Kingdom, Rev. 17.17. or that part of the said Empire, which is called the Western Empire, as reduced partly in regard of secular State and Title into the hands of the Exarch of Ravenna first, then of the French, and after of the Germane Emperor, but acted, and over-swayed by the Pope of Rome * See Mr. Mede on Revel. come. part. 2. cap. 13. Napier. Simson. Ds. Annot. in loc. . Now where it is said, this Dragon gave this Beast his power, and seat, and great authority, the possessive his, is I take it necessarily to be referred to the Dragon, not to the Beast, for the pronoun 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 carries it to the agent, or giver. Now the Dragon might be said to give his power and authority to the Beast two ways. 1. By way of surcease, or surrendry. The Devil when he saw the authority of the Heathen Emperors come to an end, upon the rising up of Constantine, he laid down that sway he had held in the use of them, in whom he had played the Dragon, by instigating them, and their people by them, to gross Paganish Idolatry, and to open enmity against Christianity, and now gave way to the Beast. 2. By way of allurement and assistance. Satan seeing he must perforce leave that his way of working, and leading the world which he had long held by means of the Heathenish Empire, he now applies himself to the present Secular powers, the Christian Potentates, risen up in the room of the former, to draw them over to his interest of Idolworship, and Saint-persecution, though in another form and method; unto which be makes it his design first to persuade, and then to assist them, in the promoting and executing thereof. In reference, to the latter his assistance, especially, may those words be understood of the Dragons giving his power and authority to the Beast q. d. Satan joineth his power unto the Roman State or Magistracy, become Christian, and after a while degenerate in Religion, by Heresy, and Superstition, to further them in their way (which was also his own main work) of Blasphemous Idolatries, and cruel persecutions, drawing in also the Nations of the world to follow them therein. A like manner of speech to this we have, Rev. 17.13, 17. where the ten Kings are said to give their power and strength unto the Beast; that is, by way, not of investing it in him, but of assisting him with it. And thus it may be plain how the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is here used. For what is that Power, Seat, and Authority which Satan hath in humane affairs? Verily none properly so called; that is, he hath no temporal Government, no formal, professed, open, and acknowledged rule amongst men, either by commanding in word, or compulsion in deed, as Princes have over their Subjects, Masters over their Servants. The term therefore cannot here be put to signify any Civil Empire, either lawful or unlawful, as to title. The Devil hath indeed a physical power, or potency in material or elementary things, to produce effects in them above the ordinary course of nature; and there is in him a properly political or governing Power, in relation to his fellows, the evil spirits, and hence we read of his Angels; and him called, the prince of Devils: But in moral, and humane proceed, he hath no more but a suggesting or counselling, a tempting or persuasive power: the only way he hath to sway men after him (that we know) is by illusion and enticement. When therefore we find these titles, the God, and the Ruler of the darkness of this world, the prince of this world, and the prince of the power of the air, ascribed to him, and here a power, seat, and great authority, which he lends in assistance to the Beast; we must take these attributions figuratively, and improperly spoken; and to import no more, but that, as it were, and in effect, he is, and hath these things, in as much as by his stratagems, or subtle arts, he leadeth men both of high and low degree, in a manner at his pleasure; and by crafty insinuations, he is as prevalent, and bringeth men as wholly to his bent, as if he had a direct Empire over them, and they owned him as their Lord. Satan's power being then spiritual, not temporal, persuasive or precarious, not imperious, his giving his power to the Beast, whether by resignation at the Beasts advancement, or by way of assistance to him when in authority, and in relation to his use thereof, as it could no way concern the Beasts temporal title, or interest in his civil authority, in point of lawfulness or unlawfulness, so it affords no instance for the taking in of an unentitled Civil power (whether in the Dragon or in the Beast) into the signification of this word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lastly, for those places [Eph. 6.12. Col. 2.15.] Principalities, and Powers, are the titles both of good and evil spirits, in reference to other spirits; there being an order, and a distinction of superior and inferior, in respect of dignity and rule, among them by creation; the which the fallen Angels do still retain among them; and this they do (in all probability) both by virtue of their first ordination, the present dispensation of God, and their own mutual consent: now what power is in any Angel by creation, and primitive institution, cannot be unlawful. Secondly, for the observation and judgement of the Learned concerning the notation of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I will not detain my Reader so long as to cite to him all that I have found in such to this purpose, nor to rehearse the words of any, but I shall only mention these following Authors thus interpreting this word, and refer him to the places in them. Zanchius To. 2. de natura Dei, lib. 4. cap. 8. quaest. 3. Thes. 3. pag. 424. Beza in Marc. 1.27. Piscator, & Elnathan par in Loc. Jansenius Concord. cap. 113. pag. 822. Daniel Heinsius exercit. in Mat. 7.28. Gataker Dissertat. cap. 43. pag. 457. Ms. Leigh. Critic. Sacra in voc. Subsection 2. Power distinguished into Natural and Moral. BUt it is not the mere notation of a word that will lead to the distinct and adequate conception of the matter, or thing thereby signified. Wherefore let us proceed to a more real consideration of this subject Power. I will not run through the whole scheme of distinctions upon the word. There are many sorts of Power which may easily appear to be of a remote and disparate consideration to what this Text will bear. To omit therefore the Explication of those divisions of Power, into increate and create; of create, into active and passive; of active into immanently and transiently active. That Power which is in a created and corporeal substance, and is transiently active, or importeth the influx of one body, or suppositum upon another, may be twofold: 1. Natural. 2. Moral * Of this Distinction see Mr. Whites Way to the tree of life, pag. 45. The Treatise of Monarchy part. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 2. pag. 19, 20. 1. Natural, or physical power, is the same which we call (more distinctly) strength, might, and vigour. It consisteth in an ability to enforce or make impression upon another thing, or to cause it to yield or give way. 2. Moral power, is that which we call property or dominion; it consisteth in a right, title or interest, to order, dispose or govern. This Moral Power, as seated in man, may be taken either more extensively, so the object of it may be things inanimate, or brute beasts; for over them man hath a dominion given him of God * Gen. 1. 2●. Psal. 8.5. : or more strictly, as it respecteth man only; and this Power this related we peculiarly call Authority: And this again is distinguishable according to the diversity of humane societies, some whereof are private, and domestical; and some are more public. But as it is found in, or related to a public civil community, or body politic its termed Magistracy, or political power. That there is a real difference to be found betwixt those two powers, the Natural, and the Moral; as in general, so as they may be seated in man as the subject, and respect man as the object, and particularly as they are compatible to a body politic; and that the difference lies, as was said, herein, that the one consists in a mere impetus, or prepotency, or a sufficiency of strength to impose, or make impression on another; the other in a right, or imerest to bear sway, may be easy to fe●. 1. The reality of the difference is evident, Natural power is found not only in man, but in brute beasts, yea in inanimates: Moral is proper to reasonable creatures. Again, although reasonable creatures be enduable with both, yet among men the natural and the moral, might, and right to rule may be, and for the most part are distinct or separate each from other in regard of the subject of inherence * Potestas in populo, Authoritat in Senatu. Cicero de leg. lib. 3. . The Natural power is ordinarily in them that do not, ought nor to rule, but to obey and be in subjection. There is a Moral power, or right to rule in Man over the other Creatures, yet in natural power he is inferior to many of them. And amongst men, in Natural power, that is strength, or might of body, the family in greater than the Master, the Subjects excel● their Sovereign, the Souldiert overmatch their Leaders; whereas the Moral power in relation to each of these is in the Master, the Sovereign, the Leader. It is very seldom seen, if ever, in any humane Society, that Natural, and Moral power do meet in the same persons, as the subjects of inhesion. Suppose a City or Nation ruled by some strong hand, or a military force: even in that force there must needs be some one head, or council of a few to guide, and command it, some Praetorian Magistracy to govern the Army, and in that head or Praetorian office (far inferior in Natutal power to the Army, as the Army possibly is to the City, or Nation under its beck) would the supreme Power lie, and the military force would but be subordinate, and ministerial to that command, in like manner as the unarmed people are to that force. And although it be both right, and necessary to the well-being of a political Society, that the Natural and Moral power do concur, the former to serve and support the other, and the discord of these is the high way to the ruin of both; yet it is not simply necessary to the being either of the Moral power, or of the community. Every sudden mutiny, or temporary Sedition, which is the Insurrection, and prevalency of the Natural power against the Moral, doth not dissolve the present Society or Magistracy, Political, or Military. The uproar at Ephesus [Act. 19] was within a few hours quelled, and the City remained in its former state. Although upon the death of Ahaziah [2 Chron. 22.9.] his house had no power (viz. natural) to keep still the Kingdom, but Athaliah usurped it, yet within a few years it removed the usurpresse, and repossessed both Power and Kingdom as in its former right. 2. And that the difference twixt those two Powers lies (as was said) in the mere forcibleness or prevalidity of the one, and the right or legitimacy to command of the other; that the one can, the other only may or aught to rule; the one possibly hath the appetite and act of governing, the other hath only the commission and warrant, should me thinks easily be conceived. Natural power we oppose to impotency, weakness; Moral power we oppose to illicitness or wrong. Thence that saying, Id tantum possumus quod jure possumus; whereby it appears that Natural power consists in strength, Moral in rightfulness. And indeed wherein else should the difference be placed? What difference is there to be made betwixt the power of one Brute prevailing over another, or over a Man, and that of the owners ruling over that Brute? or betwixt that of a Man-stealer that hath gotten another's child into his hand by stealth, and that of the true father over his child? or betwixt that of a Rout, or Band of Rogues, or drunken companions that may have assaulted and beaten the Magistrates officers, and perhaps himself too, and that of the Civil Magistrate? each of these may de facto be Master; each of them may be found assuming, and exercising rule; they cannot therefore be distinguished by their acts: The d stinction then betwixt them must be taken from the ground, rise, or principle from which the acts of rule are put forth; which in the one and the other are divers. In the one those acts are from mere force and will; in the other, they are from authority, or a will authorized to prescribe or command. Each of these Powers (I say) may be found exercising rule; for we cannot call any power moral, merely because it acteth in, or manageth those we call Moral or Civil affairs; for that a Natural power in a subject endued with reason may do: there may be an intermeddling with Civil matters, where there is no moral power, as in case of Sedition, where they that are to obey will needs rule: as on the other hand there may be a Moral power, that is, a right to command, or dispose where the object is not moral, or civil; such is the power of man, given him of God, over other creatures (animate and inanimate) of disposing according to his reason and will, of their natural acts of feeding, generating, labouring, etc. But that is a moral power in relation to any of these objects or matters about which power is exercised, which hath a moral rise or deduction, viz. an authorization, and right, and what hath not so is merely natural. The proper character then, or formal difference of each of these two Powers is, that the Natural power is no other than a brutish predominancy or violence * Potentia est id quod per si est effican.— Vit est majoris rei impetus, qui repelli, vel saltem ex arbitrio, & commode non potest. Greg. Tholos. Synt. Juris. lib. 11. cap. 2. Sect. 3. & cap. 1. Sect. 4. : the reason of its superiority, is its own might and will; it knows nothing of any civil liberty, order, or right; its proper act is ruere, impetere, or impellere, to rush in upon, assault, or bear down before it what stands in its way: if it use reason so far as to give out commands, to ordain, or proceed by any laws, or to take cognisance of causes by any rule, it is but ad libitum, without any obligation, certainty, or constancy, only as far as stands with its own humour or interest; for as its rise is its own force and appetite, so its end is its proper and private accommodation, and safety. The Moral power (to speak of it only as seated in, and relating to man, and more particularly that of the Civil Magistrate) is a special state, or function, or administration amongst men. It's original is not its own inherent, or adjacent robi●, or main strength, but positive constitution. It consisteth in, not only an ability, but a right to command. It hath indeed the jure, and should have de facto, a Sword as well as a Sceptre; a coactive, as well as a directive power; the Natural power joined to its Moral: but its Moral power lieth in its word, Eccl. 8.4. not in its sword; Where the word of a King is, there is power, Solomon saith. It is its reason, not its might which gives law, and its reason is legislative, whereas another's not Ratio cujuslibet non est factiva legis, saith Aquinas * Aquinas 1. 2a. quast. 96. artic. 3. & Cajetan in quaest. 96. artic. 5. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 4. pag. 46. . It's proper, primary, and genuine act is to prescribe, guide, and direct: the sword is requisite to it, but ex accidenti, upon occasion of others pravity; compulsoriness is not of its essence, but an after addition to it, for its preservation and efficacy † It's probably conceived that the sword is a superaddition to the Civil power, annexed to it, Gen. 9.6. See Dr. Hammond of Resisting, etc. pag. 27. It could not be from the beginning, for in the state of integrity there was no use of it. . It never useth the sword, but where equity and dignity are consemned; where, by reason of the subjects either viciousness, or defect of reason, bare authority cannot take place. The special reason of its erection by men, is the proneness of some to take the advantage of their natural power to invade, and the inability of others to defend themselves against such; and a prime end of it is to prevent or remedy the ●xorbitances of Natural power in ill disposed persons; and thereby to secure the community, in order to the general, and each ones particular good. Again, it doth not take the Sword in the sense of our Saviour. [Matth. 26.25. * Per accipere gladium intelligitur propria authoritate, & voluntate uti gladio. Principes enim, & judices non accipiunt quasi a seipsis, sed concesso sibi gladio a deo utuntur. Cajetan Jentac. 6. quaest. 3. ] but beareth it [as Rom. 13.4.] that is, it doth not snatch it up, or wrest it from another to itself, but hath it delivered. It hath the Sword not only in its hand, but in its commission, and the Sword that it hath is not the cause, but the consequent of its superiority: It doth not assume, or hold its authority by virtue of the sword, but it assumes and holds the sword by virtue of its authority. The Sceptre goes before the Sword, and is that which legitimates it * Potentia vero debet sequi justitiam, non praire. Aug. To. 3. de Trinit. lib. 13. cap. 13. Observemus jus glad●i magistratibus esse a deo datum, tanquam necessarium adminiculum & nervum suae potestatis. Pareus in Rom. 13.4. : when it draweth the sword, the difference betwixt its Sword, and another's, (that is armed only by natural strength) is, that its edge is not merely backed with metal, or in an arm of flesh, and sinews, but with warrant, and commission, and that signed by God. Let me add by way of Supplement, to what hath been said, to demonstrate both that there is a real difference betwixt Power Natural, and Moral, and what it is, this further. That even in God we distinguish betwixt his Power by which we mean his arm of strength and might, and his Power by which we signify his throne of authority, or Sovereign rule: betwixt his power of command, and his power of efficiency: betwixt his working power, and his legislative or willing power: betwixt the power of his right hand, and the power of his sceptre of righteousness: in the Lords-Prayer, Kingdom, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Power, ascribed to God are distinguished: and though both be natural, that is essential to God; yet the one we may call his Physical, the other his Moral power † Vide Zanchium de Nat. Dei lib. 4. cap. 8. qu. 3. Thes. 3. Arminium Dis. priv. Thes. 22. Sect. 2. & Thes. 27. Sect. 2. . Answerable to this twofold power in Man, there is a twofold subjection; one of the body only, which respecteth the Natural power: the other of the body with the mind also, relating unto the power which is Moral * Duplex est servitus, corporis, & animi. vis quippe in corpore, in externis, prohibitio autem Juris animum po●issinum cogit. Greg. Tholos. Synt. Jer. lib. 11. cap. 1 Sect. 4. . The Moral power layeth an obligation upon the conscience: to it a man doth or aught to submit, as of right and duty: It may challenge our obedience though, and where it cannot compel to it: and we are to subject though there be nothing to overaw us to it: and this is the property of this Power in distinction from the natural: that which is but natural reacheth not the mind: the acts it putteth forth may lay a coaction on the body, but not a tie on the conscience. What ever be the natural, or armed power of one person, or party above another; no man is under any obligation to obey, nor hath he any claim to rule by virtue of it: if he had, there could be no such thing as Moral power in the world, this being (as was before said) for most part, if not ever, seated in those persons who in regard of Natural power, are inferior to them whom they should reign over. If Natural power could oblige to obedience, the Monarch were bound to resign his Crown to the multitude; and the Senate or Parliament must receive laws from the community. Every heady commotion, or rout of a multitude risen up, were to be submitted to, and were not to be repressed: the Town-clerk did not well to check the tumult at Ephesius, or to refer the plaintiffs from the present uproar to a court or lawful assembly, he should have let them go on, and have both submitted to, and assisted them. But this is absurd enough to appear so to any man; the commonly received maxim is, By nature men are (in regard of Civil jurisdiction) all equal, no man a Ruler, or servant to another * Hooker Eccl. posit. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 26, etc. Ascham Discourse, etc. part 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. Hobbs Elem. part. 1. c. ●. 1. . So that the effect of a natural power, where it conquereth is but to involve them that are under it in an actual subduedness, that they touch down, as a man doth to a Lion being under his paw, or as a traveller doth to a high-way-robber that hath set his pistol to his breast, that is, without either will or duty owed to the prevailer, or obligation to go any further in subjection then self-preservation, or the like considerations (irrespective to the invader) may suggest. This then is the different effect or relative state produced by Natural and by Moral power in the persons to whom these respectively are extended; the Natural power involveth men in an actual subduedness: the Moral reduceth them to a rational and conscientious subordination. Subsection 3. That Moral Power only is intended in this word Power in this place. HAving observed and explained this distinction of Power, it may perhaps remain a question with some, Whether this term Power, in the text, be not of so general an extent as to contain both the members of this division, or whether it be to be restrained to Moral power only. The word indeed is put indefinitely, or without express limitation; but it may nevertheless be doubted whether it can here bear a sense as illimited as the words are. My apprehension is (and I think I shall make it good) that only Moral power can be meant by this Text; that is, not that which merely hath might, force, or bodily masterdom; but that which, besides that, hath right, title, or warrant to govern. My Argument for it (besides what shall afterwards be said) shall here be this; Political, or Magistratical power, or the power of the Civil Ruler only is intended in this Text, but this is only a Moral, warranted, or authorized power; Therefore it is only a Moral, or warranted power which is here intended in the Text. For the first, or Major proposition, That the Political or Magistratical power only is intended in this text; this, I suppose, will not be stuck at. The subject of this Proposition, There is no power but of God, is the same, and of equal extent with that of the rest of the context, viz. the discourse from the beginning of the Chapt. to vers. 8. but therein, it is manifest, the Apostle speaks only of the Civil Magistrate, as the adequate or the sole object of the duty he is therein persuaded to. What power else can he call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Higher Powers, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Rulers? of what power else can it be said, that he beareth the sword, he is the Minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, a receiver of tribute, custom, fear, honour? Our Divines both Commentators and Controvertists, do strongly evince this against the Romanists, who would upon this text found the Pope's power; and against this text defend a superiority for him over, and an exemption for his Clergy from the power of the Civil Magistrate. Against both which our Protestant Authors do make good that in this text Political, or State power only is intended, and unto it subjection is enjoined universally, or unto all persons, whatsoever other power they be endowed with. Vide Whitakar To. 2. Controu. 4. cap. 3. pag. 647, 648 & quaest 7, 720. Pet. Martyr loc. come. ●las. 4 cap. 13. Sect. 22. pag. 906. Chamier To. 2 lib. 15. cap. 17. Sect. 8. etc. pag. 637, 638. For the Minor, that Political or State powe● is only a Moral, warranted, or authorise power; or, which is equipollent, all Political or Civil power is Moral, warranted, or authorized * Facultas moralis civitatem gubernandi potestatis civilis vocabulo nuncupari solet. Grot. de Jure lib. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 6. : this also may be evident. They are called Gods, that is, Civil Magistrates, unto whom the word of God came (saith Christ) [Joh. 10.35.] that is, to whom the commission came to put them in the place wherein they were [So Mr. Burroughes paraphraseth it † Mr. Burroughes on Hos. lect. 1. pag. 10. ] and they are Judges of Israel whom God commanded to feed his people, [1 Chron. 17.6.] Political or Civil power (as this text will tell us) is in genere ordained of God, is his ordinance: By Ordination here (as I shall after undertake to prove) is to be understood the Institution, warrant, approval, or authorization of God, or his appointment by his revealed Will, Law, or Word: and if Policy or Magistracy in its general concept or nature be ordained, that is, authorized of God, then is all Political power in specie, and every particular Civil Government, contained under or reducible to this Genus, warranted and authorized by God: and what is by him unwarranted, unauthorised or illegitimate, is in truth, no Political or Magistratical power. When a person becomes a Magistrate, or a Magistrate is made, what is the change or effect that is thereby wrought in that man? or what new habit, or endowment doth the investing of a person into Magistracy, either by election, succession, or otherwise, produce in him? He hath no more Natural power in him, than he had before; neither hath he ordinarily more understanding, judgement, reason, counsel to govern, than was before in him. Where is the change then? what doth this office add or put into him? why this is it, It gives him a moral capacity, or a warrant, right, authority to rule: it legally empowers, or enables him to command over, and obliges to be subject to his command all the natural power that is in the multitude, or body politic, however vastly superior to his own personal, innate, and natural power. I am confident beyond all doubt, that no man shall be able to give a perfect definition of Civil Magistracy, or Political power, which shall solely belong to it, and distinguish it from all other power, but he must take into his definition, warranted, authorized, lawful, or some other term that is equivalent thereto. In this I am confirmed in that I find the concurrence of learned Authors in their definitions of Magistracy expressly going this way. I shall give some instances. Augustinus To. 3. De Trinitate lib. 13. cap. 13. Potentia quippe adjuncta justitiae, vel justitia accedens potentiae, judiciariam potestatem facit. Augustine. For Power joined to Justice, or Justice added to Power, makes a judiciary power. Polanus Partit. Theolog. lib. 1. pag. 330. Est autem Magistratus politicus persona publica, potestatem in subditos legitime gerens. Polanus. The Political Magistrate is a public person lawful bearing sway over the Subjects. Bucanus Instit. Theolog. loc. 49. quaest. 13. pag. 853. Magistratus est officium politicum a Deo institutum, quo ceria persona, vel plures cum dignitate, & potestate legitime accepta, totam Rempub. vel ejus partem, quoad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (i. e.) res quae ad hujus vitae usum pertinent, honestis legibus regunt. Bucan. Magistracy is a political office, instituted of God, by which one certain pertain person or more do rule, with dignity and power lawfully attained, the Commonwealth whole or part with honest Laws, as to the things that concern this life. The professors of Leiden in their Synopsis. Synopsis purioris Theolo. per. 4. profess. Leid. Disp. 50. Sect. 29. Forma Magistratus posita est in legitima potestate ipsi a Deo concessa, haec enim inflar anima functioni ejus vitam inspirat, atque efficacitem largitur. The form of the Magistrate is placed in the lawful power granted to him of God: for this like the soul breathes life into his function, and gives it efficacy. Zanchius. Zanchius de Nat. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 8. quaest. 3. Thes. 3. Ad verum enim, legitimum, liberumque dominatum constituendum necessarium est liberum, absolutumque jus, libera, absolutaque potestas, quam Graeci 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocant, qua res quarum dominatum quaeris tuae fiant. For unto the making of a true, lawful, and free dominion, is necessary a free and absolute right, a free and absolute power, which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by which the things of which thou wouldst have the dominion, are made thine. Grotius. Grotius de jure belli, & pacis lib. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. Jus est qualitas moralis personae competens ad aliquid juste habendum, vel agendum; qualitas autem moralis perfecta, facultas nobis dicitur, minus perfecta, aptitudo. Sect. 5. Sub facultate continetur potestas, tum in se quae libertas dicitur, tum in alios, ut patria, dominica, etc. Right is a moral quality belonging to a person, whereby he may have or do a thing justly; a perfect moral quality we call a faculty, an unperfect, an aptitude. Under a faculty we comprehend Power, both that which is over a man's self, which is called Liberty, and that which is over others, as the power of the Father, of the Master, etc. Sect. 6. Sed haec facultas rursum duplex est, vulgaris, sc. qui usus particulalaris causa comparata est, & eminens, quae superior est in re vulgari, utpote communitati competens in parts, & res partium, bon● communis causa. Sic regia potestas sub se habet, & patriam, & dominicam potestatem. But this faculty is again twofold, viz. Vulgar, which is for particular use; and Eminent, which is above the said Vulgar, as that which belongeth to a Community over its members, and their things for the common Good. So the Kingly power hath subject to it that of the Father, and of the Master. Mr. John White his way to the Tree of Life, Chap. 3. pag. 46, 47. In Scripture as well as in other Authors the name of Authority, and Power are used indifferently, as if they were one, and the same thing: although in strictness of signification we may find a real difference between them; for Power implies that strength by which any thing not only subsists, but withal bears out itself against whatsoever opposeth it, and besides is enabled to work any notable effect. Authority being most properly restrained to the government of reasonable creatures, is that power by which a superior hath right to prescribe unto such as are under him. By Right in this description we exclude Tyranny, which is, the usurping of authority without and against right. To these I may add that of Tacitus, Agricolae vita cap. 10. he speaking of the person of Galgacus our own Country man, Ausetre, trucidare, rapere falsis nominibus imperium appellant; To despoil, to kill, to snatch away they miscall by the name of Empire. Subsection 4. What is required to the making of a Moral Power. BEing come to this resolution that only Moral, viz. authorized or lawful Power, and that species only of it, to wit, Political, or Magistratical power is meant in the text; It may make for the further illustrating of this subject we are upon, and the confirming of what hath been said upon it, to consider what it is that makes a Moral Power, or a Power to be warranted, authorized, and awful: and for that end to take notice of the divers ways wherein a power may be said to be warranted or unwarranted, lawful or unlawful. Unto a moral or authorized power, and so to the power intended in the Text, it is necessary not only that the thing to be had and held, or to be acted and done, be in itself lawful, but that it be lawful to the person in whom you subject the power, that it be lawfully invested in him, or that there be a due authorization, or call of the person to it. For the yet clearer understanding of this, let it be observed that there are four several ways wherein Power may be said to be lawful or unlawful, warranted or unwarranted. 1. In regard of Matter. 2. In regard of Person. 3. In regard of Title. 4. In regard of use. Let us take notice wherein each of these consisteth, and differeth from the other, and how far they, or any of them conduce to the making up of a Moral power. First in regard of Matter. Power is in this respect lawful and warranted, when the work or act to be done by it is in its own nature allowed, or approved of God to be done by man. The Scripture declares to us a multitude of things which are put into man's power, or are made lawful or warranted to him; as, for instance, there is a power to eat, and to drink, to eat flesh, to eat without discriminating betwixt clean and unclean; and to eat without respect to an idol consecration. [1 Cor. 9.4. Gen. 9.3. Rom. 14.14. 1 Cor. 8. ●. & 10.23, 27.] On the contrary many things are for their matter unlawful, and also the power of them is unwarranted or forbidden to men. Such is the power claimed by the Pope many ways, as the power of dispensing with divine laws, or of making of new in matters of Faith and Religion; the power of judiciary binding the conscience, or forgiving sins; the power of an Ecclesiastical supremacy over all Christians; the power of disposing of souls in another world: these are super-humane acts, or such as were never concredited to man. Such again is the power of Witchcraft, Sorcery, false miracles, Divination, and the like prestigiatory delusions, or pernicious seats, practised by men from their own presumption with the assistance or instigation of the Devil. Secondly in regard of Person. There are in Scripture some Powers lawful for the matter of them, but variable in point of warrant as to the person, the tenure of them being allowed to one sort of persons, and inhibited to others; some persons only are made competent, and others are disenabled to assume them; and consequently in the persons capable to hold them they are lawful powers, in others not so. The Priesthood of the Law was invested in the sons of Aaron, with exclusion of all other: if any therefore besides them should have taken to them that function (as did Korah and his company) there was a power unlawful in regard of person. The Ministry of the word, or Office of teaching in the Church is expressly forbidden to women. 1 Cor. 14.35. 1 Tim. 2.11, 12. If then a woman should take up this work (as some, they say, of late have done, and as the Pepasians, Quintillians, and Maxionites are said to allow and practise * Augustine de Haeres. cap. 22, & 27. Et Daneus in cundem. ) there were a power in this sense unlawful. Master Knox of Scotland held a woman uncapable (otherwise then by extraordinary call) of Civil Magistracy, or Supreme rule † History of the Reformation of the Church of Scotland, pag. 220. & 311. . So did the Jews, as Mr. Selden tells us * Jo. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 7. cap. 6. pag. 812. : and others conceive it simply prohibited by our Saviour unto a Minister of the Gospel, by those words of his [Matth. 20.26.] According to these opinions if a Woman, or if a Minister should undertake the Civil power (however humanely admitted to it) their power would be unlawful in regard of Person. This is a second way of a powers lawfulness and unlawfulness. Where note, that under this head the person is considered in specie, or in some common condition, or rank, for as ●o persons individual warrant, or the want of it, that's reducible to the next particular. Thirdly, in regard of Title. A power may be in itself, or for matter abstracted from persons lawful, and a person may be in common qualified for investure with it, that is, as capable to receive it as another, but all this makes not this or that man a Moral power. There must be put one thing more to both these to constitute an authorized or lawful, and so a moral power; and that is a right or title to rule. This is of the nature and essence of Moral power; for what is Authority, but a right to Rule? As private dominion or property consists in a right to employ, and dispose of the thing owned; so public dominion or authority consists in a title to rule. That right or title is necessary to all tenure, or to Civil dominion in general; or, that such right in most worldly things consists in a special property, or sequestration of the things from common claim, and use to one, or some peculiar persons, it may seem too much digressive and not needful to go about here to prove. For however some things by reason either of their vastness, and inexhaustibleness, or their joint-occupyableness by all without interruption to any, are exposed to the common, arbitrary, and promiscuous use of every man, as are the great Ocean, the light, the air; and however at the beginning of the World, and for some time after, by reason of the fewness and simplicity of mank●nde, dominion or right, in respect of the objects, was not reduced to distinct property; yet now, upon the multiplication of occupants (besides the emergent pravity, into which men are lapsed) in most things dominion, or right is stated by sequestration, or peculiar appropriation; and that doubtless agreeably to the law of Nature, and from the dictate of right Reason, and the general agreement of all men that are but sound witted, and any thing moralised. Yea it is delivered to us by Scripture to be the act of God, The earth hath he given to the children of men, [Psal. 115.16.] he hath given it, as the experience of this, and all precedent ages discoverable to us, tell us, not to be catched up as fodder and harbour are by brute beasts in the Wilderness, among whom the stronger and fiercer seize on what, and where they please, the weaker take only what the other leave them; but under a rule of equity and right apportionated or distributed by property: according to that of St. Paul, He hath determined the bounds of thei● habitation, [Act. 17.26.] and that of Moses, When the most high divided to the nations their inheritance, when he separated the sons of Admetus m, he set the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel, [Deut. 32.8.] But to follow this Argument only with application to our particular subject. Amongst the things that are subjected to property, or a sequestered right, all authority of one person over another must needs be one, yea, and that more, or rather than other things. For, though other things in the first age of the world might have been common: as soon as ever matrimony, or other domestic or civil societies were instituted, he rights of the correlatives of these societies were distinguished, and appropriate; neither could it be other ways: for whereas there was possible to be a community of right, or use at the beginning in things of ordinary and external possession, whether movable or , yet in matter of authority this could never be: It is repugnant to the nature of the thing; it cannot exist without the subjection of some determinate persons to it; and you must of necessity put, and tie up authority, and subjection in distinct and several subjects, so as it may be said, this man is to command, and these are to obey; whereupon it is inevitably to be yielded, that authority consists in a right or title to rule appropriate to one, or some certain persons, & reserved from others. That to the producing, or constituting of a moral power (whether Civil Magistracy, or any other) there must go the entitling or interesting of the persons to it, or an investing him, or them with a right thereto, may be thus further manifest. All Moral power is derived from God as the fountain or Author. That which the Apostle here saith of the Civil Magistracy in specie; There is no power but of God, the powers that he are ordained of God, is true of all power in general, and he might have so expressly extended it, had his scope in this place been so large. God's derivation of authority to men must needs import two things. 1. His institution of authority in the general, with the several species of it, as conjugal, parental, herile, magistratical. 2. His communicating, conferring or conveying that power, which he hath so instituted to be, to particular persons. There must be this latter as well as the former to the real & actual constituting of an authority, or putting it into existence. God's ordaining at the first the conjugal, parental, herile, and political power, that is, his appointing that the husband, parent, master, or prince shall have authority over their respective correlatives (suppose by those words of the commandment, Honour thy Father, etc.) doth not of itself put any of those authorities in being, or in one person more than another; or it makes no man a husband, father, master, or Prince. Wherefore, if we will make this good, which cannot be denied, that all Power, viz. Authority, is derived from God, we must say God doth by some act of his (besides his allowing or prescribing Government, with such and such species of it to be) convey authority to individuals, or particular persons. It must further be acknowledged that this act of God must be such as that by it, not only the person authorized, but the rest that are concerned in that estate, in point o● use of it, or duty to it, may understand that such an one is singled out by God to sustain this authority. How else could any in conscience of God's ordinance, either assume such authority over others to themselves, rather than yield it to others, or others attribute it to them rather than to others, or to themselves? Now can it be imagined how such an act of God so humanely intelligible should be passed, but either it must be by his immediate revelation from heaven, and thereby indigitating, or pointing out (as it were) such a person, or persons to such an authority, in such a place; or by chalking out a way to men, or giving rules in general to them, how such and such authorities, shall accrue unto men; which ways or rules shall serve in all cases (unless where himself shall immediately interpose) to create superiority, or convey power to men, and to discover the empowered. The former way, God's designation of particular persons unto authority by immediate revelation from heaven, is not now exercised or expected, neither was it ever in ordinary, or constant use. The latter therefore is the way remaining to us. That there are such ways stated, or rules prescribed by God for men's entry into relations of power over others, and those necessary to the being thereof, so as without them all ordinary claims to such conditions are null, is very evident, and confessed in the relations of parents, masters, husbands, pastors of the Church, and many others; and there is no reason in the earth (to me excogitable) to think it is not certainly so also in the Magistratical state; What those rules or ways in particular are, in reference to Civil Magistracy, here is not the fit place to enter upon the set enquiry, but I shall for this have fuller opportunity (as also for the proving more largely that such rules there are given of God) afterward in this discourse. But if thus much be admitted (as I see not how it will be gainsayed) it sufficeth to prove the thing we are about, viz. that the essence of Moral power consists in a title, or right to rule. For if all power be from God, not only as appointing, the office to be among men, but as appointing the person, or persons to the office: and his ordinary, constant way of appointing the person to the office, be the prescribing of a rule for men's ingress into the authoritative relation, or accession to power, by which way he communicates that power to them which is not in others, and which otherwise is not in them, it must needs be that as such admittance unto power most certainly gives right and title to it, so upon men's having, or not having such entrance to it depends the reality, or nullity of the power they too) themselves challenge. We have seen this third kind of lawfulness or warrantableness of power (viz. in regard of Title) and the necessity of it to the being or constituting of a moral power. Fourthly, there is yet behind another way wherein power may be said to be lawful, or unlawful, viz. in regard of use. That power which in respect both of matter, and of person, and of title is lawful, is yet to undergo a further qualification to regulate it, which concerns the use, or employment of it: a power lawful, and right for its composure must also be legal, and right for its practice; its course, and process in government must be altogether just▪ it may decree, and do only equal and right things, and in this respect that power is unlawful, or culpable which doth enact, or execute any injustice or wrong. So were those ten Kings, [Rev. 17.13, 14.] who gave their power up to serve the Beast, and to make war with the Lamb. But among these four ways of the lawfulness and unlawfulness of a power, which we have thus distinguished of and explained, there is this difference to be noted. The three first ways do concern the being, composition, habit, and constitution of an authority or Moral power; the fourth only concerns the act and exercise thereof: and consequently the three first conditions of lawfulness are simply necessary to the making of the power, the fourth is but accidental; and exterior to its making; an unlawfulness in any of those three respects is inconsistible with, destructive to the nature of a moral power, and consequently secludeth the power that is in any of those things peccant from any claim to this text; whereas that power which only offends in its use, or acts of power, may well, as to its being, and constitution be moral, and interested in the text, and its universal actings only be accounted foreign, or disallowed ground therein. For this is (as far as I have observed) yielded by all, and is very certain, that every unlawful power, so far as it is unlawful, must be excluded out of the meaning of this text * See the Authors quoted by Mr. Prinne, his third part of the Power of Parliaments, p. 14. . The power therefore that is unlawful as to its being, and constitution, is wholly and absolutely secluded; the power that is unlawful only as to exercise may be for its habit, or being included in it, and its irregular acts only discarded from it. To make this observation (if need be) yet more evident, as to that lawfulness which concerns the being of a power. Unto the constitution of a power in its individual essence and existence, you must necessary take in these three things: 1. The matter of the power. 2. A subject or person to sustain it. 3. An investure or conveying of that matter of power unto that subject or person. If all these three must go to the making of a power, than a legitimacy in every of these must go to the making of a Moral power; or a power lawful in its constitution or being; and an illegitimacy in any of these is an illegitimacy in the very being, and so a nullity to the power as moral, or a making of it no authority. 1. An unlawfulness in the matter of a power destroys its moral being. The Pope assumes to himself a power to dispense with the consciences of Christians in divine Laws. This power, we say, is unlawful for the matter, or in the whole kind of it disallowed to all, and every one of mankind: and therefore we say its null; we deny any such power to be in him. 2. An unlawfulness in regard of person evacuates the power. Korah and his company arrogated to themselves the office of the priesthood; this power, lawful in itself, as for the mat, was not lawful, but prohibited to be in them; their Priesthood therefore was a nullity, they were indeed no priests. 3. Let there be a power lawful for matter, and a person capable, or induable with it, yet if there be not a lawful investure, or conveyance of this power to this person, there is yet in him no moral power; an unlawful, entry, or tenure nullifies the power in that respect. John Becold (called John of Leyden) takes upon him in Munster to be King, and as King acteth and ruleth all at his pleasure; this King being destitute of a just call, title, or tenure, was therefore but scenical, and nothing as to a moral power, or real magistracy; he was in truth no King, but a traitorous Villain; the unlawfulness here is in the constitution of the power; that his having, and holding the pretended Sovereignty, that his being in power was unlawful. In any of these three ways of unlawful power, you cannot sever the unlawfulness from the being of the power; take away that which is unlawful in any of them, take away the matter, or take away the person, or take away the tenure, and you destroy the very being of the power. For example, in the third (which most concerns our purpose) where one takes and holds the place of Power without right, or title, the thing which is here unlawful is the very tenure, or holding of power; if then you will take away that which is unlawful, you must take away the persons tenure, or holding of power, and so you take away the being of this power. No otherwise is an unentitled tenure taken away, but either by deposing the unlawful possessor, or by creating to him de novo, a just title, and conferring on him a right: now either of these two ways the power that was unlawfully occupied ceaseth. If then it be granted that from this Text is excluded every unlawful power so far as it is unlawful, or whatever in the power is unlawful; Seeing the unlawfulness of a rightless, or unentitled power, is in the being of it, not in the exercise merely, and for that reason the unlawfulness is inseparable from the power, it must needs be that an unentitled power is utterly and absolutely excluded from the meaning of this Text: or, in short, seeing the being of the power is unlawful, the being of the power must be shut out of our text. In this respect the reason is the same betwixt an act of injustice of a power lawful as to title or constitution, and an unjust occupants' act of being in, or holding the power; betwixt Ahabs seizing of Naboths vineyard, and Athaliahs' intruding into Joash his kingdom, the one is an act of Tyranny as to exercise, the other is an act of Tyranny as to title. You cannot otherwise either give admittance to the Text, and to the ordination of God, or deny it unto the one, than you may do to the other: if you say the unlawfulness of oppression excludes Ahabs' act from this Text, I may with as good reason say the unlawfulness of wrongful occupation excludes Athaliahs' act, which is her being in power from the same. CHAP. II. Of the term of GOD. THese words, of God, ordained of God, are the two Predicates or things which in this sentence are enunciated, or spoken of the subject, the power. And they are the medius terminus, or the bottom or ground of the argument; the first and principal argument which the Apostle in this his discourse of the subjects duty to the Civil Magistrate, bringeth for subjection to the higher powers. And they are a medium of a very great force and authority: being they offer to consideration the highest descent, origination or derivation of the powers here pleaded for, viz. that they are of God, ordained of God. These terms than are of a very main, and material importance; and the defining and clearing of the sense of them cannot but be chief necessary and useful. It will easily be granted only those Powers are here intended unto which these predicates (of God, ordained of God) are truly, and in the sense of the Apostle in this place attributable. The business than will be to inquire, How these words must be here taken, and what is their special meaning in this place. Both of these terms refer the subject they are spoken of, the pow rs that be, unto God as the author of them; but the former doth it in a more general word, Pareus Tolet. the latter more expressly; the latter therefore may be, and is by Expositors taken as the explication and limitation of the former. We will first examine the former, the more general term, of God, and after descend to the following, the more special notification of the powers derivation, ordained of God. SECT. I. The divers Scripture-acceptations of this term, of God, recited. THere is no power but of God. This phrase, of God, is of a divers acceptation and use, both in Scripture and in Theology. That we may come the more clearly to the meaning of it in this text, I shall endeavour, first to sum up the different uses of it in Scripture, as I have collected them. In the general all the ways of the being of things of God may be reduced under two heads, that is, [1. Of his hand. 2. Of his mouth.] or, [1. Of his work. 2. Of his word.] or, [1. Of his doing. 2. Of his declaring.] But then each of these may be subdistinguished. Of the former, the being of a thing of God's hand, work, or doing (which we ordinarily call his Providence) we must again distinguish. It may be taken either, 1. In a more general and large sense, so as to import only that some disposings or proceed of God, are the antecedent or occasion upon which certain things come to pass. And thus the sinful actions of the creature are said to be of God. Judg. 14.4. Samsons unlawful desire to have to wife a daughter of the Philistims: 1 King. 12.15. Rehoboams either unjust or imprudent refusal to satisfy the ten tribes in their desire of easement of their former burdens: 2 Chron. 25.20. Amaziahs' insolent, and foolish rejection of the peaceable overture and advice returned him from Joash: these sinful courses of these persons are said to be of or from God; that is, in the same sense wherein God is said to hearden the heart; Exod. 7.11. Ezek. 14.9. 1 King. 22.23. Judg. 9.23. Isa. 29.10. Mat. 6.13. 2 Thess. 2.11. 2 Sam. 16.11. 1 Kin. 11.14, 23, Isai. 10.5. Psal. 105.25. Rev. 17.17. Zeph. 3.5. Jam. 1.13. to deceive; to put a lying spirit in the mouth of some; to send an evil spirit between men; to pour out upon men the spirit of deep sleep, and to close their eyes; to lead men into temptation; to send men strong delusions that they should believe a lie; to bid a wicked man curse a righteous; to stir up and to send men when they enterprise, and go on sinful achievements; to turn the hearts of men, and to put in their hearts to do evil. Not as if he positively acted these things, or efficaciously infused them into men, he will not do iniquity, he tempteth not any man, but in as much as he leaveth men to themselves and to Satan, he layeth no impediments upon their power, or active restraint upon their wills; yea, he so ordereth outward occurrences, as that they meet with fit occasion and suitable inducements to those evils, (which his carriage to men he predetermineth before to use for holy ends, and most righteously, and forseeth infallibly what men will thereupon do) hence therefore their running into those sins is (in a large and less proper sense) said to be of God. 2. Secondly, things are said to be of God providentially, or of his hand, work, and doing, more directly, or in a more proper and positive acception, that is, so as he is the author, or efficient cause of them, or so as they are not merely from his working providence, as the hint or occasion only, but from him as the worker, or agent producing them, or putting them in rerum naturâ. Thus all positive beings are of God. [Rom. 11.36. 1 Cor. 8.6. Heb. 2.10.] that is, the existence of all individuals or singulars, with all their motions, effluxes or actions, Act. 17.28. whether the agents be irrational, Mat. 10.29 or moral, rational and free, [Isa. 28.29. Prov. 16.1, 9 & 20.24. & 21.1.] and all the conditions, and events; all the evil; and all the good that befalls any creature, [Psal. 75.7, 8. 2 King. 6.33. ja. 1.17.] and these whether they be from second causes advisedly and intendedly, or they be merely casual and contingent in respect of them [Prov. 16.33. 1 King. 22 34. 2 Chron. 22.7. Gen. 50.20.] And things are this way of God, viz. of his direct and positive proceeding two ways: 1. By his ordinary providence, or as he worketh in, and by natural causes, and in a natural course, as in the aforegiven instances. 2. In a way of supernatural efficiency, or working of Grace. So persons are of him in their estate of Grace, [1 Joh. 5.19. 3 Joh. 11.] and so the gracious effects that are in persons, are of him, [2 Cor. 5.18: & 2.17. 1 Chron. 29.14.] the former way the Schools call his general, the latter his special concourse. Secondly, of God, signifies of God's mouth, word, or declaring: a thing is said to be of God that proceedeth out of his mouth, or is spoken, or uttered by him. Now we must note, the things that proceed out of the mouth of God are more principally of two sorts, in as much as the mouth or word of God is a declaration of his will, and the will of God is distinguished by a twofold acceptation. 1. The first is, his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or will of Decree, or that will which himself purposeth to execute, or have to be. 2. The second is his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or his Legislative or preceptive will, which delivereth the rule or law which man is to do, or walk by. Hence it is, that the declarations of the mouth of God are suitably twofold, and of two sorts of things. [1. Narrative or manifesting. 2. Imperative or regulating.] Under the first sort are comprised all the discoveries of Gods own ways, and works, or of what God himself hath done, doth, or will do; all the revelations or prophecies of God's proceed, past, present, and to come; all Divine histories, promises, threaten, or other predictions. That (saith the Prophet) which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, have I declared unto you, [Isa. 21.10.] Under the latter head, the declarations of his Imperative, or regulating will, are contained all his Commandments, or concessions unto men; whatsoever God enjoins or allows man to do, or not to do; all divine warrants, commissions, precepts, or permissions touching humane actions and affairs. According to this last acception that is of God that is authorized by him unto men; that is not of God, which he disapproveth, prohibiteth, or warranteth not unto men. Let us, in reference to the latter, the being of a thing of God's mouth by way of declaring his approving or authorising will, observe, for explications sake, some instances of both sorts, viz. both Positive and Negative out of Scripture. 1. According to this sense both persons and things are affirmed to be of God. 1. Persons are owned thus to be of God; that is, to be authorized, and approved of him to be in their respective states and places. Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God, saith Nicodemus unto Jesus, [Joh. 3.2.] and Christ saith, He that is of God, he hath seen the Father, [Joh. 6.46.] If this man were not of God, he could do nothing, saith the blind man of Christ, [Joh. 9.33.] And the Apostle John often hath this phrase, Try the spirits whether they are of God, every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God. Ye are of God little children,— we are of God, [1 Joh. 4.1, 2, 4, 6. & 5.19.] 2. As persons, so ways, doctrines, and practices are in this acceptation said to be of God. If any man (saith our Saviour) will do his will, he shall know of the Doctrine whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself, [Joh. 7.17.] If this counsel or this work be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, quoth the Doctor in the council at Jerusalem, [Act. 5.38, 39] And David said of his enterprise of bringing up the Ark of God to his C●ty; If it seem good unto you, and that it be of the Lord our God, Let us send, etc. [1 Chron. 13.2.] A parallel phrase to this of being of God is that of being from Heaven, in distinction from that which is of men. As in that question of our Saviour to the chief Priests, [Mat. 21.25.] The baptism of John, whence was it? from heaven, or of men? 2. Negatively, in this sense many both persons, and things are denied to be of God. 1. Persons are said not to be of God. Whosoever doth not righteousness, is not of God. Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God. He that is not of God heareth not us, [1 Joh. 3.10. & 4.3, 6.] This man is not of God because he keepeth not the Sabbath, [Joh. 9.16.] 2. Ways are denied to be of God. All that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, etc. is not of the Father, but is of the world, [1 Joh. 2.16.] I have thus endeavoured to gather together, and lay down distinctly the several ways wherein persons and things may be said to be of God, and so the various senses of this phrase, of God. The sum is, of God is first either of his hand, and providence, and so a thing may be of God, 1. Either occasionally: 2. or, casually. And this latter way things are of God, either, 1. By his general, or, 2. By his special concourse. Or secondly of his mouth, and word, and so a thing, may be of God, 1. Either Narratively: 2. or, Legislatively, and by way of authorization, approbation, or warrant to men. And this last way Scripture declares, 1. Some both persons, and ways, to be of God. 2. And some both persons, and ways, not to be of God. SECT. II. For the clearing of the Question which of these acceptations are proper to this Text, divers things discussed. BUt now the Question is, in which of those senses the term of God must be taken in this Text? Some of these acceptions are so plainly, and remotely distant from the purpose of the Apostle, that they need not at all come under this enquiry. Of this sort is the being of a thing of God's hand, or providence occasionally, as the sins of men are, which I shall therefore pass over, as also the being of a thing of God's mouth narratively, or prophetically. Subsection 1. The difference betwixt the Narative, and the Legislative word of God: and that Scripture predictions are not a warrant for us to act upon in the things predicted. ONly to give this note of difference betwixt the Narrative and Legislative expressions of God's mouth. 1. The former is the scheme or platform of Gods own ways, and of his will of purpose or decree so far as he pleaseth to reveal it. And the same things which are of his hand acting, are thus of his mouth declaring, either the history of them, as things done, or the prediction of them as things to be done by him. The latter, that which is Legislative is the model, or rule of man's duty and ways. This is one difference. 2. The Narrative word is the object or matter of our faith: the legislative of our practice. These differences are well to be observed. When God reveals in his word that such a thing is, or shall be done by himself; that such things have been or shall come to pass: these revelations are the objects of our faith; we may, yea must believe them to be as they are revealed, either past, or future. But they are not therefore, or by virtue of such revelation, a rule or warrant for us to walk by; that is, we are not authorized or obliged thereby to act, or put our hand to the effecting, or promoting the execution of such things * Vide Amesium Medulla. Theolog. lib. 2. cap. 1. Sect. 22, 23. Grotium de Jure Belli. lib. 2. cap. 22. Sect. 15. cum Annotat. . God foretold he would raise up evil against David out of his own house, 2 Sam. 12.11. Luk. 24.46. Act. 3.18. & 13.27. and he would take his wives before his eyes, and give them to his neighbour, and he should lie with them. But this was no allowance for Absalon, Ahitophel, or any of that party to counsel, or act to the accomplishing of these things. The people and Rulers of the Jews did most wickedly, and undutifully in the sufferings, and death of Christ: But they did nothing therein but what God before had declared he would bring to pass by them. There are some now a days who make it not only lawful, but a duty of the Saints of this present age, yea their main work or masterpiece, to stickle against Civil Powers, both with tongue, and hand, both to cry and to pull them down; and their ground which they lay for this so strange a Position, is this double supposal; First, That the Prophecies and predictions of Scripture declare the ruin of all eart●● potentates to be a work which God will effect 〈◊〉 this time. Secondly, That whatsoever be notified to us ●y Scripture prophesy to be the purpose, cour●●▪ or dispensation of God in our generation, that we are bound to act for, and promote to our uttermost, and are to take the said dispensation of God for our call, rule, and warrant for the same. Both these supposals and that conclusion inferred from them, I find laid down and insisted o● in the books of one Mr. Tillinghast * The former of the supposals is in his Generation work, part. 1. pag. 42, 55. the latter, pag. 19, 43. 63, 72, 73. and part. 2. pag. 7. The conclusion is in his knowledge of the times, the Appendix, conclus. 30. pag. 344. and Gener. work part. 1. pag. 55, 66. To debate these positions with him is not my enterprise here. This only will I say to them, The former of his two supposals is a thing to me very inevident, and will (I think) scarce be cleared so well as to be made a principle upon which a practical conclusion may be built. The latter is a most unsound and presumptuous position † See this well discussed in Dr. Sclater his Sermon on 2 King. 9.31. pag. 25, etc. . The Scripture aboundeth with multitudes of instances of divine predictions, and humane executions; the former expressly owned, the latter as plainly disowned and condemned by God. The examples above given of the sufferings of David, and of Christ, may serve to be produced instead of all. And I shall add only, that Baasha had a prophecy for all that he did against Jeroboams house, yet is he not excused by that, but condemned nevertheless * See 1 King. 14.14. & 15.29. & 16.7. . It is very strange that men of sober heads, and savouring of Godliness, should in these days under the name of Saints, lick up the vomit of Hacket, of Mountzer, and of John of Leyden † See Camdeni Annal. To. 2. p. 37. Joh. Sleiden Comment. lib. 10. pag. 253. Muntzers life in Rosse his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. . If divine providence and dispensation of itself make out a rule to us to walk by, their horrid miscarriages, CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subsect. 2. and fatal ends should have taught the men of these Notions quite otherwise. I will but make up this (somewhat necessary) digression with a passage in Daniel, and the explication of it given by Expositors. It is said [Dan. 11.14.] Also the robbers of thy people shall exalt themselves, to establish the vision. This sentence expositors apply to Onias the Priest, and certain Apostate Jew's, who in the days of Antiochus the great his reign over Judea fell from him, and went into Egypt, and sided with the King thereof, his enemy, and by petition obtained of him, that they might there in the Country of Heliopolis, build a temple, and an altar unto God, like that at Jerusalem. And for this their both civil and religious Apostasy they pretended the fulfilling of the prophecy of Isaiah [Cap. 19 v. 18, 19] In that day shall five Cities in the land of Egypt speak the language of Canaan, and swear to the Lord of Hosts; one of them shall be called the city of Destruction, (in the margin of the Sun, that is, Heliopolis.) In that day there shall be an Altar to the Lord in the midst of the Land of Egypt, &c] And because of the Apostasy of those men upon that pretence the tex saith, (as Commentators refer it) they shall exalt themselves to establish the vision * Divines Anno. & Diodate in loc. Vide Usser Arnal. part. post. de M. 3854. Edw. Simsons Chron Cath. A. M. 3853. . Subsection 2. Certain Propositions to explain those several ways wherein things are said to be of God. BUt the question will be concerning the being of a thing of God's hand by way of efficiency, and the being of a thing of God's mouth by way of warrant, rule or precept; whether both of these, or but one of them, and if but one, than which of them is it which is intended by this clause, of God? Before I come to determine this question, as it lies betwixt these two in particular, it may be somewhat conducible to compare them together, and to explain them a little more, and the reduceableness of things to both, or each of them. For the which observe▪ 1. Sometimes a thing is both these ways of God, viz. both of his mouth authorising, and of his hand working it. That which his mouth enjoins, his hand sometimes effects. [2 Chron. 30.12.] In Judah the hand of God was to give them one heart to do the commandment of the King and the Princes by the word of the Lord. The like see [1 Chron. 29.14. Phil. 2.13. 2 Cor. 5 5, 18.] 2. Sometimes a thing is of God's mouth commanding, but not of his hand working, God shows, enjoins to men their duty m●ny times when as it is not performed in them, [see Jer. 7.23, 24.] 3. A thing is sometimes of God's hand, but not of his mouth. Many things come to pass by divine providence, or working, which though himself effect, and that by man's agency, yet he allows not of that agency of man in them. Take for instances Gods sending of Joseph into Egypt, by his brethren's selling of him [Gen. 45.5, 7, 8. & 50.20.] the expulsion of David out of his Kingdom, and the ravishment of his Wives by Absolom, [2 Sam. 12.11, 12.] The destruction and captivity of Judah by Nebuchadn●zar, [Isa. 10.5, 6, 15. Jer. 51.7. & 25.9. compared with Chap. 47.6. Jer. 50.17, 18. & 51.24, 34, 35, 36.] The sufferings of Christ by the Jews, [Act. 2.13. & 4.28.] with many other things [as 1 King. 11.14, 23. 1 Sam. 26.19. Judg. 2.14, 15. Hab. 1.6, 13.] 4. Some things are neither of God's mouth, approving; nor of his hand, acting. So are the sins of men in their formal, precise, or abstract consideration, [Jam. 1.13. Gal. 5.8. 1 Joh. 2.15.] Subsection 3. CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subsect. 3. Of God's working in humane actions, whether good or evil; and the difference betwixt the being of the one of God, and of the other. FOr the better understanding of these four particulars, especially the two last of them, upon which there may lie some obscurity, let these Propositions be thereto added. 1. All beings, or things; whatsoever hath subsistence or existence; all events, effects and productions, as to their matter, or positive entity, are of God's hand, and working, [Rom. 11.36. 1 Cor. 8.6. Ephes. 1.11.] 2. Of those things that are of God's hand, of working, 1. Some are of him as the sole efficient of them. So are those things which receive their being by creation, regeneration, or other such like supernatural, or miraculous production. 2. Others are so of God, as to be also the work, and effect of second agents. So are all those things which come to pass here below, and in the order of nature, or the ordinary course of providence. 3. In the causing of the latter sort of effects, viz. those which are both of God, and the creature, these two are not coordinate agents, or set collaterally, or in parity, or equality of order; for that would import that both were first, and but partial, social causes, and as well the one as the other to be independent, or to have their causality in, and from themselves alone. But the one is subordinate to the other, that is, God is the supreme and first, the creature is the inferior, and second cause, and is dependent on, and receive its physical efficiency, or attingency of the effect from God, and that not partially or by way of addition or supply, but wholly. [Act. 17.25, 28. Isa. 54.16. Ezek. 30.24. & 32.3.11, 12.] and this holdeth in all acts of the creature, whether holy or sinful, good or evil, as to the natural being of the action. That which the Apostle saith of his gracious workings, Not I, but the grace of God which was with me, [1 Cor. 15.10.] the same Joseph saith of his brethren's sinful deed, It was not you that sent me hither, but God, [Gen. 45.8.] The creature acteth, yet not it, but the power of God with it. The creature hath truly, and really in it an active principle, and that principle truly and really exerteth or putteth forth acts, but it hath both the principle, and the activeness put into it of God. His influence not only toucheth the effect, but the second cause, and moveth it * Contrary to this some of the Schoolmen. Molina de lib. Arbitrio. qu. 14. Disp. 26. pa. 111. & Disp. 32. pag. 133, . He worketh not only with, but by it, and that though in some sense mediately, in regard of his elevation, and use of the second cause, yet immediately also in regard of his nearest attingency, and that both by immediety of person and of virtue. 4. It behoves us to consider the subordinacy of the second to the fi●st cause, of the creature to God somewhat more distinctly. Observe therefore it is twofold: 1. Physical. 2. Moral. The former simply and absolutely concerns the being of every real effect, and the virtue, or power by which it is produced by any second cause. The latter respecteth the manner of the procedure of an effect f●om a rational agent, and the relation, and correspondency it bears to the revealed, and preceptive will of God given unto him. All creatures in all their actions are physically subordinate to God; but reasonable creatures moreover are, and particularly man is morally subordinate to him; viz. as he receives all his activity from him, so he is to act by his Commission, and in a conformity to his direction, or command given forth by word: the ground and reason of the former subordination is his being a creature; for as such he totally depends on God for his being and operation; the latter is from his being a creature endued with reason and will, and therefore working with deliberation and free volition; thence his person and actions are qualifiable with a moral goodness, and evilness, and are capable of being regulated by a law, and prosecuted with rewards and punishments. Man therefore in respect of his moral actions, stands in this twofold subordination unto God, physical, and moral. 5. There are divers differences twixt these two subordinations of man unto God, some of which it is to our present purpose to consider. They are different. 1. In the formal respect, or term to which they refer; the physical subordination respecteth God's will of purpose, and hand of providence; the moral respecteth Gods revealed will, or word of precept. 2. In point of necessity, the physical subordination is certain and immutable, so necessary as that it cannot be otherwise, it is impossible the creature should not be in all things subject to, dependent on God's decree and hand of providence, both passively and actively: the moral is not so, but may be, and is varied from, though this subordination be necessary de jure, and aught to be kept inviolate, yet it is not the facto, but it is oftentimes infringed. And here comes in sin; what is sin but the creatures breach, and transgression of the moral subordination he stands in, and owes unto God his preceptive will or word, either by a non acting, or by a contrary acting to the same? 6. By these differences it may appear (for I shall not strive to take notice of all) that these two subordinations are in humane actions, not only distinguishable, but separable and dissociable. Man may be subordinate to God physically in those actions wherein he is inordinate morally. And Gods will of purpose, and work of providence may go on, and be done, when his preceptive will takes no place, but is directly crossed, as it is in all the sinful motions of man. And hence it may appear of the sinful acts of men, as they are something in rerum naturâ, how it may be said (as in the third Proposition above) the thing is of God's hand working, but not of his mouth warranting it to man. If it be here asked, Why God makes use of such agents to act by, as are displeasing and cross to his preceptive will, when as he hath such choice of other ministerial agents, yea, and makes use of his creatures agency merely of choice, not of necessity? I answer, though man's sinful acts cannot but be displeasing and dishonourable to him, yet the use he can, and doth make of them, is not so. It is for his honour to work by variety of instruments, and the commendation of his workmanship to bring to pass a strait and perfect work, with crooked and untoward tools. His providences of this nature are the probations of men, both good and evil; and hereby he both worketh out more good than there is evil in the act of the subordinate agent so peccant, and accomplisheth the just punishment, both of others and of those he so employs. 7. We must observe in the subordination of the creature to God in its production, though it receive all its efficacy and working from God, yet the causality of the first and second, of the superior and inferior cause, and the efflux of the effect as from the one, and the other, are distinguishable. As the creatures essence, and existence are wholly in and from God, yet far enough different, and distinct from Gods: so the creatures power and operation, unto the causing of an effect, is totolly received of God, yet God's agency therein is one, and the creatures is another. Hence our sense tells us the sun shines, the fire warms, chalk whitens, and it is so really. If we should say (as many Schoolmen do) that in this subordinate agency of the creature under G d, and their working together unto any effect, Molina. Suarez. the action of God, and the creature is the same strictly and properly, as action is taken for productio activa (for as taken for productio passiva, or the effect, it may be clearly granted) yet, (although I see not why total dependency, and derivation should more infer, or be a reason for the confounding, or identifying Gods and the creatures actions, than it is for the identifying of their beings) we must understand it of the materiale, and not of the formale of their actions, and so must be forced to put some distinction, betwixt the creatures causality, and the virtue by which he causeth; betwixt the divine influx to the creature agent, and the creatures 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or efflux to the effect; betwixt the creatures taking in the concourse of the first cause, and his issuing or putting it forth. That God and the creature are different agents in their producing of the same effect is granted, but how should they be so, if their action or agents were altogether the same? Besides, if it were so, than the same action must be said to be morally good (viz. as from God) and evil (as from man) to be subordinate to a law (●s from man) not subordinate (as from God). Again, if in this concurrence of these two agents to the causing of the same effect, the action of each were wholly the same, than the same action would denominate them both, which we see it doth not. When a stone falls downward, a plant grows, a beast goes, eats, sleeps, we do not (nor can properly) say that God falls, grows, goes, eats, sleeps. For although all these acts are in and from his concourse, yet, as they only are in the creature, as their subject, so they are also from the creatures natural principles, from which there is a procedure of these acts different formally from that of the divine cooperation, for which they peculiar denominate the creature and not God. In man, whose actions have a moral 〈◊〉 different from their physical, and who acteth with deliberation and choice, this difference (though it 〈◊〉 in all creature acts) is more apparent. Let it be granted that in all his actions he is physically ●●●ed by God, (though some admit it only of his imperate, transient and productive actions; unto the immanent and illicit acts of his understanding, and will, they will only allow a moral motiveness * Jo. Cameron Resp. ad Epist. viri Docti. cap. 1. in operibus eius pag. 736. a, & 737. a. , but whether way soever it be (let the physical influence be supposed of all) in these humane actions the strength and virtue is from God, the actuosity or agency is formally man's. Though the action be good, and so more peculiarly of God (he not only sustaining the will in the use of its freedom, but determining and carrying it (whether by a physical or moral influence, is not here to be disputed) to the willing and working of that good) yet the formal agency is only ascribed to man. Hence he is said to believe, hope, pray, and do the like gracious acts, and not God. Hence it may appear (which is the reason I have travailed so far in these School intricacies) how in the sinful acts of man, the usual distinction betwixt the action and the moral obliquity of it, and that the former is from God, the latter is man's only, may hold. For, 1. Take it only in its natural or physical consideration, and so the action is both from God, in as much as from him is the energy, or force that goes to it; and from man also, in as much as he hath an hand, or activity in it, distinct, though inseparable from that of God. 2. And take it as a moral act, in which the creature oweth subordination and conformity to God's law, and which floweth from a moral faculty in man, and so it is only from man, from his own will, according to that of our Saviour, That which cometh out of a man that defileth a man, for from within, out of the heart of men proceed evil thoughts, etc. All these things come from within, and defileth man. And that of the Apostle, CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subsect. 4. God gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies.) God not at all inclining or drawing, or intrinsically determining the will in the election of evil, as neither doth he in its act of aversation, or refusal of good, or in a sin of omission. And thus it is manifest (according to our fourth proposition above) it may be said that some things (taking the term Thing in a vulgar sense) are neither of God's mouth (approving) nor of his hand (working.) For man's sinful action, though the matter, virtue, or activity be of God's hand, yet in its formal and moral stamp, it is neither of God's hand nor mouth. Subsection 4. How the hand of God is clear from the sin of man when it acteth in man's sinful action, and from injustice in punishing him for that action. IF it be here asked, How this may be, that God may use, and be the author of those actions, or motions of his creature in subordination to his working providence, which in their formal and moral habitude are evil, and so deordinate or repugnate to his word, and yet his hand and providence be as clear from the sin, as his word is clear against it: and how the creature is in this case justly punishable by God? I answer briefly: 1. For the former, How God is clear from being the author of the sin? 1. It is not the sin formally taken which God makes use of to the production of any natural effect, but the physical motion of the creature to which the sin is adherent. 2. Let it be considered how man acteth in this physical subserviency to God. He is not impelled by God, but he moveth of his own accord, and free choice; he is not moved (as I think it may be affirmed) physically of God, till he first move himself morally. Unto every moral act of man that is transient, and productive of any thing, there are required two things to be in him, Will and Power; the power, how great soever, doth nothing of itself, it is the wills injunction that educeth the act; though both concur to the action or effect, yet the power doth not lead or draw forth the will, but the will actuates the p●we●. The power in itself is neither good nor evil, posse peccare was no fault in Adam, he had it in his integrity; a defectibility was both in him, and in the nature of Angels originally: neither doth the power make the action to which it is exerted, either good or evil; but the moral tincture is wholly from the will, and so entirely doth it result thence, that the will in some sort (whether to good or evil) stands for, or is equivalent to the deed in God's account. The question than is, Whence is the will moved to this or that sinful act? God indeed useth the creatures hand or power, but who or what is the mover or swayer of the will? The Philosopher saith, and it's true, God is primus motor, the first mover, but this he understands of physical motion, and therefore in the external execution of that deed which is sinful, let it be granted that God gins, but in humane actions, there is a moral act which goes before the natural, an elicit act precedes the imperate, an election of the will before an elevation of the power. Now for the volition of the will in reference to a sinful work, that's of itself, and its counsellor or dictator, the practical Intellect, as they may be each in their kind morally excited, or induced by their objective attractives without, or the suggestions of Satan; It must necessarily be acknowledged unto an evil course the will is not intrinsically determined by God: he neither morally persuades, nor physically impels it to such resolution, purpose or choice. God tempteth not any man, etc. [Jam. 1.13.] all, I think, that can be said of God, as to that act of the will, is that he abandons, or leaves the man to himself, and to his objective and injective temptations, which though it may be an antecedent, yet is not in the least a positive cause of the wills default; and yet he never doth that, but very righteously, both in regard of his disobligation from any debt of assistance to his creature, and in regard of just provocation from him, ever since his first defection. 3. There are causes imaginable wherein even one man may honestly join in the same act with another, when it is to his knowledge in that other a sinful action: the diversity of the principle and end making the concurrence of the one just, of the other wicked. Take for instance Reubens counselling and acting with his brethren in the casting of his brother Joseph into the pit, which they did for a mischief, he for a deliverance to him, [Gen. 37 21.] and Hushaies counsel to Absalon (which Absalon and his companions embraced) in show for Absaloms' service against David, but in intention and real tendency quite contrary [2. Sam. 17.11, etc.] And this is seen in the guiltless concurrence of one that is necessitated to enter into any contract that is unlawful in the party voluntarily contracting, whether usury, or other * Vide Grotium de Jure Belli lib. 2. cap. 26. Sect. 5. & lib. 3. cap. 1. Sect. 22. . How much more may it be yielded to be so betwixt these two, in this respect, as in other infinitely dispar agents, God and man; especially when we know there is no less distance betwixt the end which the one hath, and that of the other: according as Joseph expresseth it in the case between his brethren and himself. But, as for you, ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good to save much people alive, [Gen. 50.20.] could it not be so betwixt man and man; that one might lawfully join his hand in that act wherein another joineth sinfully, yet God, though most righteous, is unconfined to the bounds of man's righteousness: it is his prerogative, as the supreme cause, not to be tied within those rules, which subordinate agents are. 4. Let it be added, when God useth man's efficiency to inflict that upon one which from the subordinate agent is sinfully inferred, as suppose slaughter, robbery, defamation, or the like, there what is wickedly done by man, is always justly from God upon the patiented: he no less righteously (as to the sufferer) takes away a man's life by the hand of an assassinate, then if he did it by a disease, or any other means: and being so, if we think it no impeachment to the justice of a supreme magistrate to take away the life of a capital offender by such a judge, or executioner as may act corruptly in it, as doing it with a mind merely acted by cruelty, or mercenary respects; much more may we absolve the providence of the Almighty in the employment of a sinful instrument to the accomplishment of his most just purpose and act. 2. For the other part of the question, The punishableness of a person by God thus serving his providence by his sinful action: the same things will serve for answer. 1. Man hath a concurrence or agency of his own formally different from Gods in the action. 2. That his concurrence is free, from his own will, without all compulsivenesse. 3. He therein proposeth to himself, not God's end, or the serving of God in it, but he hath his own proper aim different from, and often contrary to that of God * Who so forlorn or impudent amongst miscreants as to say, that in his damned ambition, or covetousness, or luxury he had respect to the will of God, which no man lightly knows but by the event? Dr. Sclater Sermon on 2 King 9.31. pag 27. . CHAP. III. CHAP. III. A Digressive Enquiry concerning the voice, or declarative use of Divine Providence. I Have here done comparing and explaining those two ways of the being of things of God, betwixt the which the question lies. But before I can come up to the dissolving of it, there is another question shows itself in the way, which I know not well how to avoid the speaking somewhat to. For whereas our enquiry is, Whether of these two ways of the being of a thing of God (viz. of his mouth approving, and of his hand working) both, or but one, and if but one, than which of them is meant in the Text? A question may here be started, whether these two be not coincident? that is, whether the working hand of God have not a mouth or voice, or be not vocal, and declarative of the will of God to us, and if it be, then how far, and wherein? CHAP. III. SECT. I. SECT. I. The usefulness of the said Enquiry. THe question intervenient, and first to be spoken to then is about the use of Providence in the discovery of God's preceptive, or approving and disapproving will. This question I thought not good to omit, being of concernment to the subject we are now upon, and having here a fit place to discuss it, and its discussion being of more than ordinary necessity in these days; wherein there is not only much variety and manifold revolutions of Divine Providence in the greatest affairs, and those very unusual and amazing, but a very frequent, studious, and solemn reference to it, as the voice of God, and as a Guide, Judge, and Interpreter of God's will of command, or warrant for the regulating of our persuasions and actions in matters of chiefest difficulty and difference. We see how much Providence is pointed at, produced, alleged to justify and condemn ways and causes; and to entitle courses to God's approval or disapproval, and to induce men upon that account to own or disown persons and proceed. I have long desired hearty, that this question might be religiously, judiciously, and impartially debated. And to occasion it I shall here seriously deliver my weak thoughts upon it. I confess myself to have entered upon, as a useful, so an high and intricate question, especially as the tract of men's pens, and notions of their minds of late hath run: Therein therefore it behoves a man (especially such an one as I) to speak with great caution and humble submission. SECT. II. CHAP. III. SECT. II. III. In what sense the word Providence is taken in this enquiry. I Take up the word Providence because it is the ordinary term; and I take it in the vulgar sense, for mere active, operative, or productive providence. Divines do use it in another sense * Vide Molinam de lib. Arbitrio qu. 22. Disp. 1. pa. 287. Synopsis profess. Leid. Disp. 11. Sect. 2. , (and the genuine signification of the word doth so import) viz. for that immanent or internal act in God, whereby he doth within his own thoughts order and contrive the affairs of the world, as they shall be accordingly acted and issued in the creature. But the ordinary acceptation, and so our present use of it, is to mean only effective or eventual Providence; and so I here use it. SECT. III. The Question discussed, Whether Divine Providence be, and wherein it is regulating, or declarative of the will of God to be done by us. THe question than is, Whether Providence in producing visible effects in the creature, be legislative, or declare the mind of God by way of rule to men, CHAP. III. SECT. FOUR Subsect. 1. or be a testimony of Gods commanding and prohibiting, approving and disapproving will, which men are to follow, or square their actions by, in like manner as his oracles, or dictates by vision, dream, or inward inspiration were to them that received them so immediately of God, and still are to us that have the record of them in the Scriptures; and if it be, in what things and how far? Subsection 1. That Providence doth declare something of God. IT is not to be doubted or denied that Providence hath a voice, and doth declare something of God to us. As God hath a working word, [Psal. 33.6. & 147.18. Luke 7.7.] so he hath a speaking hand. Hence it is that his works are said to be declarative and instructive, [Psal. 19.1, etc.] too be signs, [Jer. 32.20.] and men are willed to hear the rod, and who hath appointed it, [Mica. 6.9.] too come, and behold the works of the Lord, [Psal. 46.8.] which would not be to any purpose if they did not show us something remarkable of God. But the question is, of what and how these are declarative to us? As it is a sort of Atheism to deny Providence a voice, so it is a great presumption, and high impiety for man to take upon him to assign it its voice, or to make it speak to his own mind and turn; and an error of very dangerous consequence it is to misunderstand Providence, or construe it in any other language than its author imposeth and annexeth to it. For the discovery therefore of the truth in this particular, I shall endeavour by the light of Scriptures (as well as I can apprehend them) to set down what Providence doth, and what it doth not discover. Subsection 2. CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 2. That Providence doth declare somewhat of God's counsels. 1. THe Providence of God is the image or express of his counsels; It doth therefore disclose unto us somewhat of Gods will of purpose, counsel or decree. Two ways God makes known to us his will of Decrees, ●o wi●, by Predictions, and by Providences. The fo●mer looks at, and reveals the things of Gods Will as future, this latter discovers them to us as p●st, or present. Providences are the effects, executions, or acomplishments, and so the copy, print, or transcript of God's purposes. Our God is in the heavens, he hath done whatsoever he pleased. Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he, [Psal. 115.3.136.6.] First, that is, from all eternity, his Will of good pleasure determineth, and then in the foreset time his Providence effecteth things. Only here we are to beware we stretch not this discovery beyond its own line, that is, beyond the past and present time. We must not conceit, or pretend to understand from is that of the purpose of God which it tells us not, or to see by it that which it shows us not. Some there are that will proceed further than this mark, and merely out of their own airy imagination presume by it to divine of things to come. I mean of moral and contingent futurities: (for where experience hath discovered a natural connexion of causes and effects, there a probable conjecture and expectation of future events near at hand by the intuition of their particular and immediate causes may be gathered; as that a pregnant woman will bring forth a child; that the evening or morning face of the sky will be followed with such or such weather the day next ensuing:) thus the Astrologer, and the self-interested Statist foully overlash and exceed their bounds in interpreting the providences of God. The ginger pretends a cunning to read in the great Ordinances of the heavens (whose huge volumes in regard of variety, distinction, and distribution of influences (as to this use doubtless) are to them, as the hand writing of the wall before Belshazzar was to the Caldean Astrologers, altogether illegible, and unintelligible, yet) they pretend (I say) to read, and to be able to draw out from them a map of the disposition of the air of every day for whole months, and years to come, and of the temper of living bodies, of the successes of Husbandry, Trade-adventurers, and political-enterprises, yea, and of the very propensions, contrivements, counsels of men's minds about Civil, Church, and spiritual affairs, with the revolutions that will attend men's lives, estates, names, and societies, temporal and ecclesiastical, yea, what will pass not only betwixt man and man, but betwixt God and man; and (which is very strange) this map to be every year new, and for every Country, Nation, City, yea for every distinct sort or condition of men, whether they live far dispersed from one another, or promiscuously intermixed with others, yea for each single person, different. The self-interested statist from God's present proceed, either in punishing or prospering a way, person, family, profession, or Nation will needs fancy, and confidently conclude that he doth foresee, and can presage what God hath determined, and will do with the same hereafter. Forgetting with what reason Solomon hath cautioned us against boasting of to morrow, to wit, for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth; and not minding that men, and Nations, even in regard of their visible worldly condition, are in the hands of God, as the clay is in the Potter's hand, soon made, and soon marred; now moulded into this frame, and quickly turned into another, and that as the grace of God may suddenly, unexpectedly, and wonderfully change men's hearts, CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 3. or men deprived thereof may strangely alter themselves, so God hath reserved out of what he hath clearly threatened in his word concerning men's temporal punishments, much more out of what his Providence at present dispenseth, a power to alter his proceeding in an instant. Subsection 3. That Providence doth declare to us that God is, and what he is. 2. PRovidence is the Index or Character of the Divine Nature, and so it is Doctrinal, or delivers to us matter of faith, or what we are to know, and believe concerning the Divine Essence, to wit, as it is absolutely considered, or abstracted from distinction of personal relations. God is made known by his works, as the workman is by his artifice, the cause by its effect, [Jer. 32.20. Rom. 1.19, 20. Psal. 19.1, etc. Act. 14.17.] Hence we find that so frequently added in the prophets to the comminations and promises of God, as the end of the execution of them, and so of his providences, And they shall know that I am the Lord. CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 4. Subsection 4. Certain distinctions premised for the discovery how far Providence is declarative of the will of God, which we are to do. 3 BUt to come nearer to the thing in question. Providence is in some sort preceptive, and directive in matter of practice. Now for the opening of this use of Providence, we must distinguish, 1. Of preceptiveness, or the delivery of Divine precepts to us. This may be, 1. Either by way of original institution. 2. Or by way of abrogation of what is already in force. 3. Or, by way of declaration, remembrance, or monition of that which is already ordained. And again this third may be, 1. Either solitarily, 2. Or jointly and by way of concurrence with other means, or the delivery of them otherways. 2. Of divine precepts, 1. Some are of the law of nature. 2. Others are positive, or subsequently instituted. And of both those, whether natural, or positive, 1. Some contain our duty to God. 2. Some our duty to man. 3. Distinguish of the use of Providence. This is, 1. Either ordinary, which the general rules of the word of God allow and direct us in. 2. Or extraordinary, the which special ●arrants in the word, given on special occasions have allowed, or prescribed. 4. Distinguish betwixt the giving of a rule, or law, and the determining of it to this or that particular matter, or case. Subsection 5. CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 5. Five Propositions explaining wherein Providence is, and wherein it is not declarative of Gods will to be done by us. I Shall apply these distinctions, and make use of them to our purpose in these following propositions. 1. Providence (as I understand) cannot be said to deliver us the will or precepts of God for our practice by way of original institution: neither can it of itself abolish or make void any rule, or law of God before ordained: or draw a warrant for us to proceed contrary to the same. Suspend it may, or disenable from doing in point of affirmative precepts, but to the doing of the contrary it cannot dispense, nor can it dissolve a law. 2. Providence may by itself without the help of any other Index or Law-book deliver to us somewhat of the law of nature, that is, so much of our duty to God as is contained therein. Divines distinguish betwixt cultum naturalem, & voluntarium, Ames. Medul. Theol. lib 2. cap. 5. & 13. seu institutum; the natural worship of God, and that which is voluntary, or instituted. The natural is that which belongs to him as Gods or by virtue of what he is, or the consideration of his nature; and this is taught by the law of nature. The instituted is that which is given him by virtue of his own voluntary appointment. The former is simply necessary and immutable, one and the same in all ages and to all persons. The latter is arbitrary and variable (as he pleaseth to order) and hath been diversified: It was appointed to be one w●y under the Law, another way u●d●r the Gospel. The former we say Providence my lead to, or (as it were) dictate to us. For in as much as of itself it reveals, that there is a God, and of what nature and perfections he is, it hence infers, or by force of that principle of faith teacheth us, that he is to be worshipped, and in particular, that he is to be feared, loved, trusted in, called upon, praised, and obeyed, and to receive from us whatsoever else may be deemed an act of his natural worship. And this is all (I conceive) which Providence can of itself, or taken alone, and apart, teach, or inculcate. There being nothing else of duty which can be imagined necessary, and immediately to follow upon that knowledge of God which Providence reveals. That it goes thus far, will need little proof. The Apostle Paul told the Lystria●s that the living God left not himself without witness, Acts 14.7. in that he did good, etc. that is, by his good and merciful Providences he testified against the Idolatry of the Heathen, and called for their service to be yielded to himself alone. And he informs the Romans, Rom. 1.20. that the same persons are left without excuse (for their sins, and therefore they must needs be taught somewhat of their duty) by the discovery of the Godhead in the creation. 3. For other duties (besides the forementioned general rules which immediately refer to God) whether of the law of nature, to wit, those which respect man, or of positive institution, Providence doth not by itself dictate, or declare them to us. Observe here. 1. I say it doth not declare God's mind to us in these things. It was before said the works of God, in as much as they discover the Divine nature, they of themselves tell us thus much, that God is to be, obeyed in all his commandments, but what his will- or commands are in particular, as touching the posi●tives of his own worship, or concerning either the natural or positive rights and relations which may be between man and man; and what our own concernments are; the particulars of these it doth not dictate or deliver to us. 2. I say this it doth not solitarily or apart, or by itself, or by its own single light or voice. For this must be acknowledged, though it doth not declare or promulgate, yet it doth confirm; and though it doth nor of itself discover, yet it doth second, and set on that which is before discovered of the mind of God. In reference to the whole revealed will of God Providence hath the use of a Testimony, that is, by way of association, or concurrence: See Dr. Sclater Serm. on 2 Kin. 93.1. pag. 25. though it be not Nomotherick, or Legislative, nor yet in the matters limited in this proposition the original, or primary dictator of the will of God, yet where a declaration thereof is made, and the same is actually known, understood, end apprehended, there Providence comes in, and gives a secondary sanction. Let the light of nature, or book of God written in the heart, or his word in the Scriptures first tell a man, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal; then, if the hand of God remarkably break out in some notable curse or punishment upon a murderer, or thief, this Providence seen and noted doth by way of Item, or Second (in that it holds forth the displeasure of God against theft or murder) prohibit, admonish and warn him and others from those sins. But in matters of this nature Providence solitarily or by itself alone is not significant, or declarative of Gods approving or disapproving will. Where both the law of nature, and the Scriptures are either silent, or (which is all one as to this) not understood, or apprehended, there providence (as to these things) is dumb, or, if it must be said to speak, its language cannot be understood. Providence in these matters may be resembled unto consonants; as these without vowels make not any words, or speech, but compounded with them are vocal, and significative; so Providence in concurrence, and concomitancy with the written law speaks out to us, backing and confirming what the word declares, but of itself, or apart from this it cannot do that office in these things of moral or positive precept. Providence is in this respect like an echo, which reitera●es, and resounds to what the word of God in Scripture, or Conscience saith before, it doth rather consignificate, then signify Gods will to us, When God hath made known to us by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or enunciative word what his mind, or commandment is in this, or that particulars, than the providence of God, which before, and of itself could only tell us that God is to be obeyed in all his commandments, now bespeaks our obedience in these particulars, and adds its stamp, or sanction to the commands of God so revealed. In things which the conscience is already informed of to be either agreeable, or repugnant to the law of God, providence coming in with any remarkable, either crosses or blessings, beareth witness to that law, and exciteth the conscience by way of Memento to take special notice of it. And thus it is a good second though not a solitary testimony. It hath vocem tonantem, an awakening, or startling efficacy, to rouse up the dowzie consolence to attend to the rule already received See Deut. 4.3, 4. 2 Chron. 30.7. Mal. 3.18. . But this office holdeth only in concurrence with the word. We cannot simply and singly conclude from any providence thus, God crosseth men in this, blesseth them in that way, therefore he disallows that; approves this. But having a precedent light in the conscience from the testimony of God's law of what he allows and disallowes, his so crossing or blessing may be an accumulative witness. Thus David argues, By this I know thou favorest me, because mine enemy doth not triumph over me, [Psal. 41.11.] He know before from the written word, and from the particular messages that he had received by the Prophets Samuel and Gad both what God had promised, and what he willed him to do; and thereupon this mentioned Providence of God toward him was an additional testimony. And thus joseph's brethrens metting with a shrewd and sudden cross were prompted out of the light, and sentences of their own consciences cleared, and called forth by that cross Providence (as they took it) in Egypt to say, we are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of his soul, when he besought us, and we would not hear: therefore is this distress come upon us. And Reuben sureably was enabled to say, Spoke I not unto you saying, Do not sin against the child, and ye would not hear? therefore, behold also, his blood is required, [Gen. 42.21, 22.] And the reason of the necessity of the antecedency of the knowledge of the will of God unto the voice of Providence is very obvious. For before we can gather, or draw inferences from Providences, we must be able to understand their meaning, and to make an interpretation of them. We must first know for what they come, ere we can say what they direct us unto; but now the word of God, and the conscience in form thereby, are the interpreters of Providence. It was that sentence of the Apostles Epistle, which expounded the hand of God upon the Corinthians unto them, For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep, [1 Cor. 11.30.] their own sense could tell them of the event that many were weak and sickly, and many died among them. And their Religion and conscience touched by it would tell them these evils were of God, and perhaps it might suggest to them that they came for sin; but that they might discern it was for that sin in particular; viz. their eating and drinking unworthily at the Lords-table, and consequently infer, that for this sin they must judge themselves, this they must reform, the word of God must be the expositor of that providence; and therefore did the Apostle write that saying to them. Having insisted here on the extent of the use of Providence in dictating to man his duty by way of secondary testimony to the word; and of the necessity of a conjunction of the word, or law of God written, or otherwise made known with Providence, that so the voice of Providence in moral, humane and positive duties may be particularly applied and understood: It will not be impertinent here to note the different ways wherein Providence is, or hath been added to the word as confirmative thereof. 1. This hath been sometimes in a way extrordinary, and that, 1. Either when an ordinary act of Providence hath been by an extraordinary and immediate direction from God appointed to such use, viz. to back and second his word: as Ezekiels removing his goods out of his house to another place in the people's sight, was a sign to them to confirm his predictions of their captivity. And the Potter's disposal of his clay to one mould first, then to another, was an emblem set up by God of his power to order, and alter the conditions of Israel, (and of all other Nations) as he should see good, and as he had declared he would do concerning that people, [Ezek. 12.11. Jer. 18.5, 6, etc.] 2. Or when a Providence extraordinary, or miraculous, for nature hath been by express assignation of God given unto the ratification of his word. So was unto Moses the turning of his rod into a serpent, and of the Serpent into a rod again, and his hand being made leprous, and whole again by putting it once and again into his bosom. So was unto Gideon his wet and dry Fleece, and the Angels consuming his meat by fire out of the rock. So was unto Hezekiah the return back of the shadow of the Sun upon the Dial of Ahaz. And so were unto the world in the primitive age of Christianity, the miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost given unto the Apostles, [Exod. 4.1, etc. Judg. 6.17, 36, etc. 2 King. 20.10, etc. Heb. 2.4.] 2. This is more often in a way of ordinary dispensation, that is without any either miraculousness of the act of Providence, or immediate, particular pointing out of it, by an express word to such or such a use. And this is, 1. Either when Providence is given us for a pattern or ●op●y, and we are required to imitate it i● the same kind. Thus Mercy, Love, Beneficience unto the evil, and to our enemies are recommended to our practice by the example of Gods own proceed, [Ephes. 5.1. Luk. 6.36. Mat. 5.44, etc.] 2. Or when Providence is employed to give a hint unto some duty suitable to it, for us to practise, but not of the same nature as i● the act of Providence which speaketh to us. For instance: In the day of prosperity be joyful; but in the day of adversity consider. Is any among you afflicted? let him pray: i● any mer●y? let him sing Psalms. In that day, viz. in the day of trouble, and of treading down, and of perplexity, did the Lord God of hosts call to weeping and to mourning, etc. [Eccl. 7.14. Jam. 5.13. Isa. 22.12.] When Providence disposeth these conditions into act, it doth call for the respective duties appropriate to them at their hands whose conditions at any time they are. But this distinction must be kept; for some acts of Providence are showed us to imitate them in their very kind. Some again by reason of the Lords transcendency and absolute power over us may not be paralleled by us. God may do that to man, and make that use of him, which man may not do either to God again, or to another man. Only such unimitable● providences may yet be not unuseful, but may dictate respective duties, correspondent and seasonable, though not identical in kind to the act of God. The difference also must not be confounded betwixt the two members of the former distinction, viz. the extraordinary and the ordinary use of Providence in point of backing or reinforcing the will of God already made known; which is, that the latter way God daily and continually makes use of Providences as memorials and testimonials to assure, and bring to mind his will in matters vulgarly known, and of a moral and ordinary use and importance. The former he hath taken up to illustrate or enforce some commandment of an extraordinary nature, or some doctrine or prophesy new, and strange to them to whom the sign is given, and therefore standing more in need thereof to prove its divine authority. In reference also to the secondariness of the Testimony of Providence and the necessity of the antecedency of the words light to it in the matters whereof this proposition speaketh, this let me add. Some that have long stood upon the argument of Providence now begin to say, The Spirit makes out by Providence the mind of God without the word▪ Unto this I shall only here interpose this; 1. I see not how this differeth from Quakerism in the opinion of a sufficiency of light from Christ, which every man hath in him. 2. But I ask; Is not every spirit (that is, every dictate or doctrine fathered on the Spirit, or apprehended by the conceiver thereof to come from the Spirit of God) to be tried? and is not the word of God in Scripture the rule of Trial? If any motion come then without express direction from Scripture, it is not made out, that is, cleared as necessary, or safe for us to follow, or to be of God, until it be examined or warranted by the word. 3. We usually distinguish of the Spirits speaking to man, viz. 1. Ordinarily. 2. Extraordinarly. The former is by the word: the latter is without it, solitary or by revelation. And we say the latter is not now afforded to any on earth; but he that will say it is, and that he hath it, as the layeth claim to a very strange and high thing, immediate, and extraordinary revelation; so he must evidence i●t● others very plainly ere they can credit him in, it * Thus Luther answered the Seditious Boars of Germany of Muncers and Phifers raising Simo mandatum aliquod habetis a Deo vestri facti necesse est hoc Ips●●●n a vobis aliquo illustri miraculo demonstrari. Apud ●leid. Comment. lib. 5. pag. 120. . 2. Besides the use or significancy of Providence which it hath to confirm, and second a rule, or duty before enacted and declared; it is found (even in matters of a moral or positive nature) sometimes in a further use, viz. to declare the will of God by itself alone, but than it must be withal said, this is not the general, common, or natural, but a particular, extraordinary, and institutive use of it; this is never but in case, and by virtue of a previous, special warrant or appointment of God, This is not common to all, or usual in many, but proper to some Providences, unto which it hath pleased God to annex such a use. Where God hath given out his warrant concerning one sort, or one single act of providence, and one singular and circumstantiated case, that in this case such an event or act of Providence shall declare what the mind of God is, there this use of providence obtains, and there alone, as far as my observation can go. Some few such dispensations of God to some persons, in some special cases I find in Scripture, and but some few, yet for distinctions sake I thought it necessary to take notice of this use of Providence. When God would have the Land of Canaan divided among the Tribes, Num. 6.55. and Families of the Israelitish nation, he appointed the distribution to be made by Lot. When therefore Joshua and the heads of the Fathers cast lots upon the several portions of that land, the coming forth of those several Lots to this or that tribe, family, or person severally, was the signification of Gods will concerning such or such a parcel of the Land, and the making over of the property thereof by donation from him, unto such persons. The same way was appointed, and of the same use was the Providence of God in the disposal of the lots at the election of an Apostle in the place of Judas. Act. 1.24, 2●. By a Providence of this sort was the congregation of Israel guided in their journeys and stations in the wilderness. God appointed them for their motions and pitching to attend the settling or moving over them of the cloudy and fiery pillar: hence it is said, Num. 9.18, 20, 23. that they observing that course of the cloud, at the commandment of the Lord they journeyed, and at the commandment of the Lord they pitched. A like resolution did Abraham's servant obtain of God, when he went by his Master's command, and with his assurance of extraordinary divine conduct to seek a wife for Isaac. When he was come to the City of Nahor he prayed, and the Lord granted him to know what damsel he should choose, and have for that marriage by the token of her granting him water out of the well for himself, and for his Camels, which sign therefore being accomplished in Rebecca, not only he, but Laban and Bethnel her brother and father (when they heard the servants relation of it and of the event) acknowledge the thing (or word) proceeded from the Lord, and that in it the Lord had spoken * Gen. ●4. 27, 50, 51. . 1 Sam. 14.10. Such a sign had Jonathan to go by in his (otherwise desperate) attempt upon the Garrison the Philistines. Luk. 22.10. And a token of this nature had Peter and John from Christ to guide them in pitching upon the place where he would have them prepare for his, and their eating of the Passeover. And as the mind of God for men's practice, so his meaning in matter of faith, when there hath been ambiguity or obscurity in the apprehending thereof, hath this way been discovered. The Shepherds at the birth of Christ, being told by the Angel of the good tidings of great joy, Luk. 2.10, 11, 12. viz. the birth of a Saviour Christ the Lord that day in Bethlehem; God gave them by the Angel moreover a providential sign to know him by, to wit, the special place and posture they should then find him in, In his swaddling , and lying in a manger. So did he point out to the wisemen which came from the east to seek him that was born King of the Jews, Mat. 2.9, 10. how and where they should find him, by a Star. But this way of resolution concerning either the will or meaning of God: was even then extraordinary, and out of course, and but rarely afforded, much more is it so now, and besides the significancy which Providence had in these extraordinary cases was not by virtue of itself, but from the institution, or special word given forth for it. When God gives no such particular warrant, as in those cases he did (and as now, for any thing I know, he doth not at all) we may not expect, or attempt to find out Gods will by such means. If we do, it will not be an allowed enquiring, but a tempting of God * Vide Ames. medul. Theol. lib. 2. cap. 11. Sect. 18 & cap. 12. Sect. 17, 18, 19 & De conscient. lib. 4. cap. 23. Sect. 1, ●. . 5. And lastly, there is yet another use of Providence to be noted. We before distinguished betwixt the delivery of a rule or law, and the determining of it to this or that particular. We have said before, Providence is not originally institutive, or preceptive, yet it may deliver us the law, or the will of God already enacted by way of declaration, index, or remembrance; and this in some things solitarily, and in some only jointly and concurrently with other means. Besides all this, Providence hath another use in promoting our knowledge and obedience to the will of God; and that is by way of application or determination of the obligation, or authority of the Law of God unto particulars. And this use of Providence, together with the way and divers manners of its tending thereunto will here require a distinct discovery, that it may neither lie under a confused notion, nor fall under mistake. First, That Providence hath this use, to determine general rules to particulars, is very obvious and evident. It brings home the law, which in itself runs in terms universal, or indefinite, to its singular matter, by applying it to particular persons, things and times; and by that means that commandment or direction which is delivered generally to all of the like case and condition, it gives occasion or call to this or that man in particular to put in practice. For instance; the law of God commands, suum cuique tribuere, to do right to every man; now Providence comes with its disposing hand, and distributeth to every man his right in particular, as this house, or field, this honour, dignity or authority to this or that man. And by this hand of Providence so disposing is determined that general rule to these particulars; whereby it comes to pass that every other man is required to yield these perquisites, or have to this or that man, and is forbidden to take, or detain them from him. Again; the word of God saith, Is any among you afflicted? Let him pray. Is any merry? Let him sing Psalms. As we have opportunity, let us do good. Now Providence comes in, and at this time disposeth this condition of sadness, or that of joy to me, or it putteth into my hand an opportunity of almes-giving, and thereby it comes about that it is, now my part to perform that duty of Prayer, sing, or giving alms. The word of God hath instituted diversities of estates and relations amongst men, as marriage and single life; Magistracy, and Subjection; Mastership, and servitude: not imposing every one, or any one of these c●nditions upon every man, for that were not consistible; but appointing one for some, another for other persons. Now besides this institution, God by his Providence immediately (without his word, otherwise then mediately) ordinarily calls men forth particularly, some unto this, others to that estate: and those particular persons, whom his Providence so calls, the general rules of his word concerning those respective conditions come thus to be in force unto, requiring them to undertake those conditions, and to perform the several duties annexed to them respectively. Here then by the intervention of Providence it is that the general rules concerning this or that special state or relation, either the entrance upon it, or the discharge of the duties of it, become necessary to this, or that man. Providence, under this use I shall call Ordinative, in distinction from that which is merely Eventual. Secondly, as it is plain that Providence hath this use, so it will be requisite to inquire how Providence calls men into this or that state or relation, and so effects this determination of general rules to their particulars. For this I shall observe somewhat concerning, 1. The different senses wherein God by his Providence is said to call. 2. The means. 3. The manner. 1. For the different acceptions, or senses wherein God may be said to call men into such a relation or state we say by his Providence God calls to the same, either directive, or constitutive. Either by directing them to such an estate, or by constituting them in it; that is, either by setting before them the estate as requisite for them to enter into: or, by leading and putting them actually into it. The former is when those occasions and inducements, or exigencies are occurrent to a man which (when they are put, or in being) it is his duty according to the rule of God's word to enter into such a state, or relation. The latter is when by the acting of Providence by those means whereby such a state or relation is produced, or emergent, men are actually brought and placed in that estate. These two ways are manifestly different, and necessary to be distinguished. For instance; In the former sense persons are called to the state of marriage when they have not the gift of continency, that is, it is their duty then to marry, according to that [1 Cor. 7.9, 36.] and he is called to a single life thus that hath that power over his own will that is mentioned [1 Cor. 7.37. Mat. 19.11.] according to that of our Saviour [Mat. 19.12.] In the latter sense, they are called to a married estate that are already bound, or entered into wedlock. He is called into the single estate that is loosed, [1 Cor. 7. ●4, 27.] And in like manner may it be said of domestical Mastership and servitude; and of political dominion and subjection; and of domestical and political freedom. It is one thing to say a man is by Providence called to be a Master, or a Servant; a Prince, or a Subject the former way; that is, he hath the previous inducements to any such estate presented to him; and another thing to say he is called the latter way, viz. that those acts are passed upon, or by him which make him a Master, or a Master or a Servant, a Magistrate, or a Subject. By the former he is but invited or directed to such a state, by the latter he is invested or enstated the facto in it. This distinction is observable in them that dispute to the validity of absolute conquest, or captivity to make a man a domestic servant, or a multitude, the patrimonial kingdom of the conqueror. They say the conquest or captivity doth not make the parties actual servants or subjects, and consequently doth not make their conquerors their Masters, or Sovereigns; but it doth lay a duty upon them to give their consent (if they be free from others, and not pr●obliged and so can dispose of themselves) to their conqueror or captiver, and so by their own act to contract that relation * See a Book called, A vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy. pag. 17, 18. Hobbs Elements pag. 92, 93. . As in like manner it is in the case of a single person that hath not the gift of continency, he is called to marriage, but is unmarried, and hath the power, and right to dispose of himself, yet in regard he wanteth the said gift he is obliged to marry as soon as a fit match is offered. Secondly, concerning the means by which Providence may call one into any state that is, invest, and enstate him in it; for this consideration will have relation to the latter acception only of the providential call, of which even now, viz. that which is constitutive or actually setting a man in a state. Providence is working in all moral affairs, and civil stations, and conducing to the bringing of men into the several relations they are in, but 〈◊〉 it is the word, or law of God, and not providence by itself which ordains or authorizeth those states, so ordinarily it is not Providence solely constit●tes men therein, but providence employing and acting by certain means, and those concurring with it. Now the means may (as to our present consideration) be two fold. 1. Some relative states are such as providence calls, that is, brings persons into them, by means , as to the persons called, or without the act of their own wills. So persons come into the relation and obligation of children to their Parents by procreation, say some; by preservation and education, say others * Grot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 1. Hobbs Elements part. 2. cap. 4. Sect. 3. : but by which soever it be, they are passives in incurring that relation and duty. So are others, through the defect of reason, as Orphans, Fools, and Madmen brought into the condition of pupils and minors in relation to Guardians and Tutors; and so are Delinquents or Malefactors through their vicious miscarriages, against their wills, reduced into subjection or slavery † Grot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 32. . 2. Other relative states Divine Providence leads men into with, and by the will, choice, or consent of the parties in whom the relation is subjected. Thus by their own contract persons become associates in private Traffic, fellow-citizens are incorporate in one Commonwealth, and Nations become confederates in one league: thus two by marriage become man and wife, and persons by arrogation or adoption become the children of those who begat them not. Thus freemen make themselves servants; and thus Commonwealths, or bodies politic come under this or that form or constitution of Government * Vide Grot. ut suprà Sect. 8, 17.23, 26, 27, 30, 31. . Thirdly, For the manner how (we may say) Providence calls into any estate or relation. First, In general this is a principle to me most certain. A providential call is included within the rules of God's word. We have already said (and I take it as a clear truth) that in matters of this nature Providence by itself or alone is neither legislative nor declarative of the law of God. It remains therefore that the utmost use and force it is of in the moral sway of these affairs is either to second and set home the rule already given, and made known, or to apply and determine the general obligation and authority of such a rule to particulars. Hence we must needs yield that the determination of Providence to this of that act, estate or relation, as it is not from itself, but by virtue of the rule so it keeps within the bounds, and confines of the rule, and cannot be construed to go any further. This than may be for a general Canon to us. We cannot say Providence calls this, or that man to that, whether act or estate, which the word of God forbids or warrants not unto him. Providence must not be used as a countermand to the rule, or as a reserve or dormant warrant to carry us out farther than the word goes before us, or to lead us there where the will of God in Scripture revealed opens us not a way. This were by consequent to destroy the authority of the word, and to make the most pure and perfect ways of God the occasions and patronizers of every obliquity. Secondly, for somewhat more particular resolution concerning a providential call to any undertaking, let these (I suppose plain) Propositions and Cautions be considered, the which I lay down with room reserved for, and submission to the necessary addition, and just correction of the Reader. 1. The matters, or things about which this use of Providence (of applying, or determining the general rule to its particulars) may be conversant, we may (I suppose) reduce to these heads. 1. Either opportunities inviting. 2. Or necessity's urging. 1. The former, opportunities inviting, may be, 1. Either to our attaining. 2. Or to our doing good. Or, either to a good of utility to be enjoyed; or to a good of virtue to be done by us. 2. The latter, necessities urging, may be, 1. Either danger of sinning. 2. Or danger of suffering. 2. Every opportunity inviting to, or offering us the attainment of somewhat we esteem good, is not taken to be a determining Providence, or a Providence calling to the prosecution, and laying hold on that offer. Providence doth ordinarily present us with opportunities to be shunned, as well as with opportunities to be embraced. And by its ordering real evils, with the appearance of good cast upon them by our own mistaken judgements, are set before us, as well as the things that are truly good. There is a proving trying as well as a guiding Providence, [see D●ut. 8.2, 3. & 13.3. 2 Chr. 32.31.] So that it is a perilous thing for men to be taken and led by the first blush, or fair face, or kind invitation of every outward occurrence. Many Providences which our heady passions and lusts are apt to account invitatory, our reason and religion should prompt us to be but exploratory, or the trials of our obedience to God's commandments. Such (for example) may we reckon that opportunity to be which David had set before him (and whilh his men would so fain have had him to have taken as eminently held out to him by God) of killing Saul, once in the cave, 1 Sam. 23.3. & 26.7. and again in the Camp asleep. The call therefore of God's Providence must be gathered, not by the facility, commodiousness, or rarity of the opportunity, but by the lawfulness of it. 3. Opportunities of doing what is in itself good, whether permissively good, that is, lawful, or preceptively good, that is, necessary, are not presently of themselves the call of Providence to us, nor until it can be determined the good to be done is good to us, or the good we are to do. 4. Thence, and in as much as the goodness of an action with application to individuals ariseth much from the particular state and condition of the person. Somethings belonging to the rich, somethings to the poor; some to the married, some to the single; some to the superior, some to the inferior; to be done by them respectively, it benooyeth each to know first, not only what is permitted, or imposed on this or that estate, but what is the proper estate, place, or relative condition we are set in: God neither by word nor by Providence calling any to the act or duty of such a state till he hath called them into that estate * See Mr. Simonds Case and cure of a Desert Scul cap. 23. pag. 280. . 5. Unto every estate there must needs be (the nature of the thing is self requires it) something constitutive or essential to the putting of it, or the enstating of a man in it. There cannot be order or a distinction of estates without somewhat to make the difference. The same authority that ordains different estates among men, appoints to each the peculiar way of entering into, or founding those estates. The different acts which are proper to each estate cannot be constituting or differencing characters of them: both because they are subsequent to, and resulting from the estate, and therefore must needs suppose it in being ere they can flow from it: and because others not called to these estates do sometimes presume to put forth those acts: and because the regularity of those acts must be proved by the persons being in the estate; and therefore his being in the estate cannot be proved by his doing of those acts. That there is such a peculiar foundation or ingress to every relative state, which gives it bring, and distinguisheth it from other states, hath been partly showed before, and will be insisted on after. In all domestical, civil, martial, and ecclesiastical relations and orders, the professors of the disciplines of each conclude it so to be. Now this constitutive or formal reason applied to particulars will serve to discover in what station, or place each man stands, and unto what relation or state any man is called of God. 6. Where the divine rule or law of God hath prescribed a special way of entering into any estate, and constituting one in it, there providence cannot be understood to call, or lead into it another way, or in a course cross or subversive to that order. 7. Providence may call a man without the act or concurrence of his own will into this or that estate, that is, make it his duty (by virtue of the divine rule) to enter into it (as he is thereby called to be a servant, who hath not either wealth or skill whereby to subsist in, and manage a free estate. He is called to marry whose temperament, or complexion leaves him not that power over himself as to contain) when nevertheless it doth not without his own will constitute him in that estate. Where therefore to the being of a man in any estate, or relation is prerequired the act or assent of the party, there Providence (though it invite, order, or give occasion to enter into that estate) doth not anticipate the persons consent. Providence may of itself without the said act of will be directive to, but is not constitutive of such an estate. It is (I conceive) no otherwise in the subject matter of this Treatise, in civil policy and Magistracy. Providence by virtue of that need many ways that particular emergencies of Providence may invite, lead, or call a Nation to make choice of this form of Magistracy before another, or of this, or these persons to rule over them rather than others: but, nevertheless, people are not incorporate into distinct societies, nor societies reduced into a moral relation, or subjection unto any particular Magistracy, or Magistrates without their own transaction or agreement, their own I mean transacted, either by themselves or those whom they may be involved in. 8. Where Providence presents with any urging necessity, whether of sin or of harm to be avoided, there we must not think Providence to call, either for the shunning of a harm to commit a sin, or for the avoiding of one sin to run into another. They that thus understand it, in stead of making a virtue of necessity they make a vice of it: and they do not follow Providence, but falsify it. 9 There is a superseding as well as a leading, a suspending as well as a moving, a recalling as well as a calling Providence, Where to a work or end in itself good, necessary or all prescribed or warranted means, all honest and justifiable ways of advancing, or compassing the same are wanting, Providence there must be understood to give a stop to our prosecutions; and to determine (during the incumbency of that defect) a surcease of proceed. There Providence (if we will understand it aright) bids stand, go not forward. There we may apprehend Providence meeting us in the way, as the Angel of the Lord in Balaams' way, with a drawn sword in his hand. Thus much shall serve to be spoken of the use of Providence which is determining or applicative of the rule to its particular cases, in the general the particular conce●nments of it unto civil Government, the subject we are upon, will be spoken to in the nex● Chapter. I have thus endeavoured to take a particular view of that guidance, light, or instruction that is in Providence, and how far it goes, what of God, and of his will it doth discover to us, and what it doth not. The sum of all that I have gone over is, Providence is the image, or index of God's decree, or counsel, that is, as to things that are, or have been, not concerning future things. It makes known that God is, and what he is, and that he is to be honoured, served, and in all he commands obeyed. The will of God extraordinarily revealed it doth sometime by special appointment confirm, and that which is known by the ordinary means, it doth constantly, and of ordinary course second, and set home upon the conscience: yea, in some cas●s, by extraordinary designation; it hath revealed the will of God de novo, or not otherwise made known. And it doth continually determine, or apply the will of God in general rules laid down in Scripture, to particular times, and persons; or, the obligation which the law of God hath in it, by itself considered, in actu signato, it brings to be binding in actu exercito, or pro hic, and nunc. But on the other hand, it doth not of itself either enact or annul a divine law, or dispense with the breach of, or contrary act to it: neither doth it alone, or by itself declare or reveal the will of God, or what Gods approving, or disapproving mind, or pleasure is, either in the things of God that are instituted, and of positive precept, or in the rights and relative duties that are moral, or of humane concernment, CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 6. whether they be of the law of nature, or of positive sanction. So that the negative part of our resolution is this, Where the law of God, either written in the heart of man, or in the book of God, is silent, or prescribes not any thing, either in the matters of God that are institutive, or in any humane rights whatsoever, there Providence regulates not, or is not, either institutive, or declarative of Gods will to be done by us. And where the said law of God doth ordain, or deliver a rule to us, there providence gives no relaxation, allowance, or countermand to the contrary. Subsection 6. That Dominion is not founded in Eventual Providence. IN opposition to the negative part of this resolution of the Question about the use of Providence there are two positions, or opinions now on foot, both which would make out a wider, or larger sense, or use of Providence than is here allowed. They are, 1. That Providence of itself may (without extraordinary appointment) in the matters above specified, and specially in humane rights, deuce, or transactions, deliver and declare what the will of God is, or may justify or condemn a way: or, where Scripture evidence is wanting, or a warrant out of the word of God cannot be produced, there we may collect or infer God's approval, or disapprovall of an humane action, course or proceeding by Providence. 2. That dominion is, or may be founded merely in eventual Providence; or, that a person or persons attainment, and occupiation (by whatever means) of sway or command over a people makes him, or them the Sovereign or higher power, which is, of God, the ordinance of God, the minister of God. For the latter, that Dominion is, or may be founded in eventual Providence, or, (which is all one) in a persons being in place of rule or actual command, the confutation of it, and the vindication of this Text from admitting it, is a main drift and subject of this whole discourse: and therefore I refer the Reader, for his satisfaction about it, to that which is before, and will be after said; only this I shall put in, upon its mention here. If this be so, It must needs be affirmed (I suppose) so to be, 1. Either because possession, or occupation in every case, or in any thing possessible, or in every sort of Tenure gives a title; But this is so wild an assertion, as I know not who will own it; or, 2. Because God hath declared in his word, or made it a law, that it shall be so in this particular matter of Civil authority, viz. that whosoever is master shall be the Magistrate, or he whom his hand of Providence raiseth up to a domineering prevalency in any place shall have the authority there, or be interested in the style or office of this text, viz. shall be the higher power, the ordinance, the Minister of God. But unto this; 1. If so it were, it would be not Providences disposing possession of rule into this hand that of itself constituteth him a power, but that declaration of God in his word. Providence would be only the determinator, or applyer of that general rule to its particular matter. 2. But where is this found, that God hath so expressed or declared himself, or made such a law touching. Civil Magistracy? We must first see such a declaration produced, or proved, ere we may grant it so to be: I know this text is alleged as the only or main place to imply such a declaration, but, de hoc quaritur: I hope by this treatise it will be manifest that there is not such a thing to be extracted thence: and in short, I think it will be proved that, 1. By power, is not meant a mere force or strong hand. 2. That by being is not meant a mere act of possession of such a force. 3. That by of God, ordained of God, is not intended a mere being by eventual Providence. And to give the Reader here a small earnest of Reason for the improbability of their being either in this, or in any other Scripture any such thing declared by God, I shall suggest these few things in this place. 1. The power of Magistracy may be in one, and actual rule by Providence in another. God's word hath owned them for the power that have been out of possession, whilst others have had the actual command. Take for instance what is in [2 Chron. 22.9, 12. with Chap. 23.3.] 2. God hath expressly disowned for being of him them that have been in present possession of command, [Hos. 8.4. Isa. 52.4, 5. Joel 3.2, 4. Hab. 2.5, 6.] 3. He hath expressly authorized and owned the act of rising up in arms to expulse them that have been in actual rule, in them that have been de facto, subject to them, the which this text [ver. 2.] expressly and severely forbids in reference to the power here intended [Judg. 2.16, 18. & 3.9, 15. & 4.6. and in many other places of that book, and in other Scriptures.] 4. We have many examples (of unquestionable justifiableness) in the word of God of persons taking up and employing for the recovery of persons, goods and countries of the hands of them that have had the Mastery and possession of them, which could not be done if dominion were found by God in providential profession, [Gen. 14.14, etc. 2 Sam. 18.1, etc. 1 Sam. 7. ●, &c, & 13.3. & 14.1, etc. 2 King. 11.3, etc.] CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 7. 5. To yield this would be to say that usurpatition is no sin; or that in the tenure, or holding of power, or command over others (under the name of civil authority) is, or can be no transgression.) But this shall serve for a touch on this argument here. Subsection 7. That Providence alone, or without the Rule of God's word doth not signify to us the allowing, or disallowing will of God in matters either of humane right, or positive institution. FOr the eviction of the groundlesness of the former position [that Providence alone, without Scripture evidence (or, extraordinary appointment and warrant) may be, in the matters above specified, the interpreter of Gods will to us, unto the justifying or condemning of a way, or unto the signification of God's approval, or disapproval] I would offer these reasons. 1. That which is in this position attributed to Providence is by Scripture plainly denied to it [Eccl. 9.1, 2.] No man knoweth either love, or hatred by all that is before them ● all things come alike to all; there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked, etc. 2. The putting of any thing to be rule beyond, or further than Scripture goes, or so as to make out such an approving, or disapproving will, or law of God as is not delivered in Scripture, is to derogate from, or deny that sufficiency and perfection of the Scripture which the holy Ghost ascribeth thereto, and which we, upon his authority, maintain against the Papists. The written word of God is affirmed to be perfect [2 Tim. 3.15. Psal. 19.7.] we have very strict prohibitions of adding to, or diminishing aught from it, [Deut. 4.2. Prov. 30.6. Rev. 22.18, 19] we find men are sharply blamed by God for doing that his word gave them no command or commission for, [Jer. 7.31. & 19.5. & 32.35.] and persons are challenged for following the appearance or promising face of Providence without recourse to him [Isa. 30.1, 2. with 31.1. Josh. 9.14] We upon these and the like authorities, conceive that the good, the acceptable and perfect will of God is contained in the Scriptures; that the word of God hath completely and unalterably delivered what is necessary, what lawful; and therefore that it appears to be high presumption and strong delusion to set up any thing to be a rule, either by way of crossing, or uttering more than is read in Scripture. Either we must say the Scriptures are imperfect, or the doctrine therein is repealable by Providence; or that there is nothing left for Providence to declare anew. And which of these to admit, I think is easy to choose. 3. Providences are both in themselves so indistinct and various, and in relation to men's ways, and the rule by which they are to walk, so unanswerable (for the most part in this life) and disproportionable, that it is not (I think) to any man conceivable how they should be employed for such a signification. 1. They are in themselves so indistinct and various, in respect of rise, end, and manner of proceeding, that they appear altogether unapt for such a use. 1. Providence is many times the same to persons and ways directly contrary; that is, to them that are approved, and to them that are disapproved of God, the course of Providence in present event is all one: the same judgements or evils do befall the same outward benefits to come upon righteous and wicked persons and ways, [Ezek. 21 3. Mat. 5.45.] 2. The same same ways or proceed of men may meet with clear contrary Providences, either in the same person at divers times, or in divers persons at the same time. He that follows a course of sin, may at one time prosper, at another time fall in it. The path of the righteous may at sometime be (as Joh speaks) washed with butter, attended with smooth and sweet successes, and at other times be stuck with thorns, entangled with sharp and piercing crosses: they that walk or join hand in hand together in the same ways or designs whether good or evil may be accosted with quite contrary events at the hands of Providence. Like as it fared with Pharaohs chief Butler, and chief Baker; both it may be guilty in the same offence, and measure, yet the one raised to honour, the other hanged on a tree. 3. The same kind of Providence may proceed from far different or quite contrary dispositions, and intentions in God: the same gift, or outward, and, in our esteem, happy success, and on the other hand, the same cross or blow may come from him unto divers persons, to one in favour, to another in displeasure; to one for good, to another for harm. 4. Providences contrary in their face, and visible appearance, may agree, and be coincident, or be the same in respect of the mind of God from which they proceed. Notably good, and notably bad events, both these may spring from his love, and be accompanied with his approval both of the person and of the way upon which they come: and either of these may issue from his hatred, and be attended with his dislike both of the person and way. 5. The thing which Providence in bringing good, or evil may respect, reflect upon or aim at in special may be, not the present actions or ways of men, but either those of times past, or those which be probable, and in likelihood to come: to the former by way of recompense; to the 〈◊〉, either by way of prevention of a sin; or of encouragement or furtherance to what is good; or of probation and experiment what men will do, how they will demean themselves. 2. Providences (eventual) as they are in themselves so uniform, so they are very often during this life, and in the things of it, found unanswerable and disproportionable to men's ways, and the rule by which they are to walk. Solomon's observation in this is commonly verified [Eccl. 8. ●4.] There be just men unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked: again, there be wicked men unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous. The present visible ways of God are not in point of retribution correspondent to the ways of men. It is not always or ordinary to be seen that good men, and actions are presently, and constantly shined upon, speaded, and followed with the promised felicity; neither that the contrary ways have the contrary fare. All the proceed of God towards all person● and courses are ever most just, but they are not ever juridical: ever most just in that justice which is commensurable to the justice of the divine nature, or will; but not ever juridical or compensatory to men according to their conformity or difformity to the rule of righteousness he hath enacted for them to live by. 3. And in both these considerations, and the several particulars reducible to either of them, it may appear how unsuitable and insignificant eventual Providence is to the discovery of the will of God in the matters abovesaid, by itself alone, or without a prediscovery by the 〈◊〉 law of God, what the justifying, or condemning, the allowing or disallowing will of God is. 4. All signs, Testifications, or interpretations of a rational faculty, whether it be the understanding or will of any person; whether the sign be in words, gestures, or actions, have their signification by institution, or voluntary appointment. There is this difference betwixt natural, or necessary and voluntary agents; that of the former the inward principle, appetite, and instinct is discovered by the act, or effect, because the said principles, and operations are always uniform, and the same: but in rational agents, the faculty being free, and indeterminate, and in different to divers or contrary conceptions and motions, the outward act cannot naturally, or necessarily with any certainty, or any otherwise then ad placitum, or by arbitrary imposition and appointment signify the meaning or dictate of such a faculty. If then we will say that Providences are the interpreters of Gods will, we must produce an institution for it, or manifest where and how it hath been appointed by God to such a use. Common reason will tell us that arbitrary actions without some known designation intervening are of no aptitude to express, or signify such a thing. CHAP. IU. CHAP. IU. The Question [how the Text saith, The Power is of God] Stated and Resolved. HAving taken so large a scope in discussing the Question about the voice and use of Providence, it is now high time to return to, and to come to some resolution in the enquiry above proposed, concerning the clause of the text under present consideration, (viz. Of God) The several ways wherein things may be said to be of God, have been above distinguished of, and explicated, and the matter of civil dominion hath been found among the things which eventual Providence by itself doth not declare: the Question than is, concerning the being of a thing of God's hand by way of efficiency, and the being of his mouth by way of warrant, or approval, whethere both of these, or but one, and if but one, which of them is meant by that clause in this place. That the Apostle, when he saith, there is no power but of God, may intent to include within his meaning a providential being, or a being of the disposing hand of God, I will not gainsay, but withal I think it must be affirmed, and granted, that such a being of God is not the whole, or special meaning of his words; but that he hath some eye (if it be not his primary aim, which I rather think; and let the Reader judge when he hath perused what shall be said for it) unto a being of the mouth of God, approving, warranting and authorising the power. Moreover, that being of his hand or Providence which may be here intended, I would understand, not after the common notion, viz. of mere eventual Providence, or a persons bare possessing, or getting into the place of rule, and command by any means whatsoever; but I understand it of that course of Providence which is before specified to be ordinative; or such a disposing hand of God as gives the person a call, or an allowing admission to the place; or such a Providence as doth apply and determine the general rule or Warrant of God's word concerning civil Magistracy to the particular case. This ordinative course of Providence, in distinction from that which is merely eventual, was in the general opened even now, and in reference to our present subject in particular, to wit, the Civil power, will be illustrated in the next Chapter; unto which also, and some other following Chapters I shall reserve the proof of this sense that I here give of this clause, to wit, that it imports the being of the power of God's mouth or word (not excluding the disposure of providence, but taking it in, being understood of such a procedure of Providence as is conjoined, and concurrent with the authorising word of God, and is the execution, or effectuating thereof, and that a bare possessory act; or a persons occupancy of the seat of power by a mere eventual Providence, is not the true and proper importance of the words. Only here, to give some light to the discerning of the difference betwixt those two, and to show a little the necessity of understanding the words as I have expressed, take a view of both in a Scripture example. It is the case as is stood betwixt those two Brothers Solomon and Adonijah in relation to the Kingdom of Israel. The case may well be stated in the words of Adonijah himself unto Solomon's Mother, as they are set down [1 King. 2.15.] thou knowest that the kingdom was mine, and that all Israel set their faces on me, that I should reign: Howbeit the Kingdom is turned about, and become my Brothers, for it was his from the Lord. Here are two persons represented as having been claimers and competitors of the same kingdom, at one and the same time. Now let me ask, in as much as both could not be, which of these two must we say was the power which was of God, in the sense of our Text? The one Adonijah, he hath to allege for himself a being in it by eventual Providence: All Israel set their faces on me that I should reign. This was as much as if he had said, he was gotten into the throne, and had full admission and possession by the people. And so by the story it appears he had [see 1 King. 1.5, 7, 9, 11, 18, 25.] and upon this ground he built to himself a Title; The Kingdom was mine, saith he. On the other hand there was for Solomon the Lord's designation of him by word of mouth to David beforehand [1 Chron. 28.5, 6, 7. & 22.9, 10.] and an ordinative Providence of God disposing David first to promise and to swear to Bathsheba his Mother, and after to decree and give out command to Zadok, Nathan, and Benaiah to anoint him King; though even then Adonijah stood seized of the Kingdom, [1 King. 1.17, 32, etc.] and therefore Adonijah himself having surceased and become a private person again, upon this ground acknowledgeth that Solomon had the better of him in point of title, for it was his from the Lord. Of these two different pleas, if we lake the eventual Providence by which Adonijah was possessed of the Kingdom to bear the sense of this Text, of a being of God, by virtue whereof every soul is to be subject to the person so being; then must we lay aside Solomon from being the power of God; and the enterprise of David, Bathsheba, Nathan, and the rest of seating him in the throne, must be disallowed as contrary to the rule of this Text, and settle Adonijah when he was in: but this were to null and disallow the express direction and donation of God, appointing the Kingdom to Solomon, and the lawful proceeding upon it before cited out of the story. On the other hand if we take that warrant of God's word unto David, seconded by that his ordinative Providence which moved the persons above mentioned, who in that case were interested, to advance Solomon to the Crown, to answer this phrase in our text of the powers being of God, then must we say that a mere eventual Providence is not the right, and proper importance of the words. But this shall be more at large discussed in the next Chapter, wherein I shall proceed to the opening of the next phrase in the Text, viz. Ordained of God. CHAP. V CHAP. V. Of the term, Ordained of God. HAving in the last Chapter treated of and explicated the former attribute or predicate which in this Text is spoken of the Powers, expressing their author and original, viz. of God: I am now to proceed to the other, which saith, The Powers that be are ordained of God; answerably unto which in the second verse the power is denominated, the ordinance of God. This word, Ordained, I take to be a term somewhat more specifical, and definite, and to bring the matter intended by the Text unto a clearer view. Yet because they that seem to have a mind to widen the sense of it, and to make it comprehensive of the power that I suppose to be alien to it, choose rather to bring this clause to the former's indefiniteness (if simply, and by itself taken) then to contract that by any limit which may appear in this, or in the rest of the text and context; I must therefore proceed by steps. 1. Delivering the force of this word ordained, and distinguishing of the several acceptions which it is capable any were to bear. 2. Laying down then positively and particularly the sense I understand the phrase here to intent, and the reasons to confirm and conclude that to be the sense. 3. And then explicating (to prevent further doubts) that special sense which I ascribe to this clause in this place. CHAP. V SECT. I. SECT. I. Of the several acceptions of the word Ordained, being put for an action of God. THe first thing to be done for the investigation of the meaning of this clause, ordained of God, is to take notice of the force and use of the word Ordained, and the different use of it. The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to ordain, constitute or appoint. It is commonly applied, 1. Either to matter of business. 2. Or to persons. To matter of business or action, and then it is usually put to signify the appointment or alotment of the circumstances of a thing to be done, as the certain time, or place for it, [as Act. 28.23. Matth. 28.16.] 2. To persons, and then it imports the ordering or setting apart of a person to some special benefit, office, work or rank among others, [as Act. 13.48. & 22.10. Luk. 7.8. 1 Cor. 16.15.] Here it hath respect to persons (for Powers are put for the persons invested with power) the Powers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are ordained of God, or ordered, set apart, appointed to their office, work and dignity by him. In the next verse the Apostle saith, the power is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the ordinance of God, or, as the word bears, his edict, sanction or constitution. To them that are conversant in Scripture, and other books of Divinity, it is at first sight evident that there is a sense wherein all things that be, or fall out in the world, even the sins of men, are said to be ordered or disposed by God: and there is a sense whereby it is peculiar to some things to be disposed or ordered by him. If we here take the word in the former sense, there is nothing peculiar, no more spoken of, or for the powers here argued and pleaded for, then is universally extensible to every other matter, and in special to all humane occurrences, or affairs, be they in themselves never so inordinate and irregular. The Magistrate that is here said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ordained or ordered of God, and the Rebel that is said vers. 2. to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a resister, or opposer of himself to this order of God in the Power, both are in this large acception ordained of God. Wherefore to me it seems necessary that we think of a more restrained sense of this word, and discern what that is, and for this purpose thus to distinguish of it. There is a twofold order, ordination or disposition to be ascribed unto God, as set down by him. 1. The order of his counsel, and working, or of his purpose, and proceeding in Providence. 2. The order of his word or law, or the order which he instituteth for his creature, particularly for man. Of the former, the order of his own counsel, way, and working we read, [Act. 13.48. Psal. 119.91. & 8.2. Jer. 31.35, 36. Isa. 30.33.] Of the latter, the order of his word, revealed will, or law given to man [1 Cor. 9.14. & 14.30. Col. 2.5. Heb. 7.11. Psal. ●1. 5.] Of the former we may again distinguish. By the order of his purpose, and providence God ordereth, 1. Things either effectively or operatively; when by his working will and concourse he positively and immediately acteth to or in upon them; thus he ordereth all positive effects in their natural beings. 2. Or privatively, or by way of permission, or non impedition, and so he is said to order, that is decree and dispose the being of sin, in that he leaves his reasonable creature to himself, under an objective temptation. And the former of these two, his effective, operative ordination is again distinguishable. He effectually orders things, 1. Either productively, or to the causing of a thing to be. 2. Or directively, that is, by prescribing to the thing that already is, or disposing of its state and course. And thus he is said even to order sin, to wit, in its progress and consequents; for although as to the being of sin, his ordination be only permissive, or non-impeditive, yet as to its progress, end, and consequents his Providence is effective * Aliud est facieus, aliud factum, aliud utrumque ordinans. Qui facit malum facinus, is auctor est mali: qui ordinem disponit in faciente & facto malo, is non auctor est mali, sed mali ordinator bonus ad bonum. Malum non vult Deus, sed ordinem vult, & servat in malo. A voluntate hominis accessit malum: a Deo ordinatio est universalis, atque singularis providentiae ipsius, etiam quae summe mala sunt disponens, & in ordinem cogens sapientissimè. Junius in Collatine. cum Arminio, in Arminii oper. pag. 385, 386. . These two, the order of God's counsel and hand of Providence, and the order of his word, law, or institution given to man, are manifestly different, and in reference to the present subject necessary to be distinguished. The difference may be taken thus: 1. The former order is the rule, model, or platform of Gods own ways, the latter is to be the rule and pattern of man's do. 2. The former extends to all creatures and beings; the latter only to the reasonable creature, and his moral acts, as being only capable of a law. 3. The former ordination is always accomplished, and takes place without fail; the latter is not seldom put back and contradicted † See Mr. Caryl on Job c. 11. v. 10. pag. 67. . 4. The former orders all actions and things; the latter always appoints that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God, and only that. In a word, to illustrate this matter by some instances suitable to the subject we have in hand. By the latrer kind of ordinance, Israel should have continued under samuel's government, when they rejected him, and desired a King. Absalon should have been subject to his father and Sovereign David, when he risen up against him to seize his kingdom. Jeroboam and the ten tribes should have kept in allegiance to Rehoboam, when they cast him off. Athaliah should have yielded obedience to the posterity of Ahaziah, when she took the Kingdom from them into her own hands. The King's rulers and people of the earth, of whom [Psal. 2.1. Act. 4.25.] should have paid homage unto Christ when they conspired against him: and by it the Angels that sinned should have kept their first estate (or principality) when as they left their own habitation. Judas 6. For so God had ordained to each of these respectively by the order of his law, precept or institution. Unto this ordinance, or order of God is opposed all that atáxie, confusion, and dislocation which any sin brings into the world. And in reference unto this order it is that all indecorum or sedition in any relation or society among men is disclaimed of God, and said not to be of him, [1 Cor. 14.33.] For, God is not the author of confusion, but of peace. Whereas by the former, the ordination of God's counsel and providence, the contrary to the order of his law, and will revealed to man for his rule often cometh to pass; even the things which (in respect of God's ordinance given to man to observe) are most disordered, confused and preposterous, are done * See Mr. Caryl on Job c. 9 v. 24. pag. 331. . By this order of God, the Israelites rejection of Samuel, Absaloms' rebellion against David, Jeroboams, and the ten tribes defection from Rehoboam, Athaliahs' usurpation to the dethroning of Ahaziahs' children, the confederacies of the ●●lers and people against Christ, yea the Apostasy of the evil Angels, and all other irregularities are (as above was said) ordered and disposed by God. Who knoweth not (saith Job of such events) in all those, Job 12.9, 10. see also vers. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. that the hand of the Lord hath wrought this? in whose hand is the soul of every living thing, and the breath of all mankind. For although these considered in their own nature, being obliquities and depravements, are most cross to the order of his word, and to the rectitude, and holiness of his nature, and therefore as such we cannot (without blasphemy) attribute them to his working will or hand; yet in as much as his wisdom, and power can extract excellent things out of them when once they are occurrent, his justice, and goodness may will their sufferance, and when they are emergent, his wise and powerful hand may direct, bound, terminate, and with other ingredients, so can temperate them, that much good may be educed from them, and therefore so he order, or ordains them. Take for instance of the divine ordination about the evil acts of the creature, and also of the difference betwixt the order of God's commandment, and the order of God's Counsel and Providence above noted, that passage concerning joseph's selling into Egypt by his brethren, [Gen. 45.5, 7, 8. & 50.20.] and peruse the words in the text itself. There was in that event the order of justice, and of that mutual love, care, help which God hath prescribed to Brethren, broken on the part of those sons of Jacob, as also that order of God's counsel concerning joseph's preeminency above his brethren, which God had declared was intended to be broken by them; but the order of God's counsel about that and other things is by his most wise, potent, and holy Providence therein, yea and thereby kept and performed; theirs is an act of selling, Gods is an act of sending Joseph into Egypt; their act is sinful, God● is righteous; their act in the intent of it on their part in pernicious to Joseph, God's act both in the purpose and event of it is most eminently preservative and beneficial both to Joseph, to his Father, CHAP. V SECT. II. to those his sellers, and to the Egyptian King, and people: with many others. Thus the order of God's commandment may direct one course, the order of his counsel and Providence may steer quite another. SECT. II. What the special and proper acception of the term Ordained of God, is in this text. HAving thus expressed the importance in general, and distinguished the several acceptions of this clause, ordained of God; our next work is to discern positively and particularly the purpose of it in this text. There being this variety in the use of it in divers places of Scripture, as it's brought in on divers occasions; the question is, how we are here to take it. For this, my resolution is, that in this sentence of the Apostle, ordained of God, importeth not merely the proceeding of the things from God providentially, as Providence is put to signify God's counsel and acting, but such a being from God as carrieth in it his instituting or appointing of it by the warrant, or sanction of his word, law, precept, or commandment. Although it be true, and may be said, that the rise, the standing, and the falling of every civil power is, as all other occurrences in the world whatsoever, are ordered and disposed by the counsel of God's will, and the hand of his acting. Yet I conceive this not to be the thing which the Apostle here only, or specially (if at all) takes in, or intends; but the main thing within his purpose, and aim to be the asserting of God's preceptive ordination of the Civil Magistracy. My assertion then is, that this Proposition, The Powers that be are ordained of God, is a positive declaration of the divine right, property, or title which those powers which are meant in, and are the subject of this text, have to their place of dignity, and rule, and to the obedience of every soul within the Civil state by virtue of the Law, revealed will, or warrant of God delivered in his word, or otherwise promulgated. And this I assert in opposition to that claim or title which some would build upon this text for such as obtain the upper hand, or a prevalent possession, by virtue of a mere eventual Providence, understanding this term ordained, of such a being of God. They that would found the power upon mere eventual Providence, by virtue of these words, do not well agree what it is that they would build upon them. Some of them understanding the words to give a title, property or right to any person or persons that hold possession of the place of rule, in as much as they are in by Providence. Others admit the mere occupant to be an unwarranted, unlawful, unjust Ruler, but they say, he being in place by the order, or ordination of divine Providence, he is therefore a Power to be obeyed. But my assertion stands against both these, affirming this ordination of God not merely to import a providential possession, but withal, and especially a preceptive institution or legislative sanction. Which if it hold and be made good, will infer, that mere eventual Providence doth not by the authority of this text, either create a title, or command obedience to an unentitled power. The Power which this text intends it doth justify, or imply necessarily to be a lawful, enrighted, or entitled power: but than it bottometh this right and title, not upon eventual Providence, CHAP. V SECT. III. or a mere possessory act, but upon the warrant of the word, or law of God, here called his Ordinance. SECT. III. Reasons to prove that God's Ordination of the Power is preceptive, or warrantative, not merely providential. ANd this now remaineth to be proved, viz. That the ordination of God in this text is an authorising, warrantative, or preceptive, not merely a providential dispositive, factive or operative Ordination. 1. The first thing I shall say for this interpretation is, that it is, as far as I can observe, the sense which our Divines commonly give of this word ordained, in this place. I shall name and refer the Reader to some Commentators upon it, so taking this word, viz. [Beza, Piscator, Melancthon, Aretius, Willet, (and in him Haymo, Fajus, Hyperius) Tolet, Estius, Pareus, Eluathan Par, and the late Annotations of our English Divines] adding to them these other, that citing the words occasionally, so expound it. Calvin Instit. lib. 4. cap. 10. Sect. 5. fol. 420. B. [and in 1 Pet. 2.14.] Perkins discourse of conc. vol. 1. pag. 527. A. Althamerus Conc. loc. 179. fol. 192. B. Martyr loc. come. clas. 4. cap. 15. Sect. 3. pag. 932. cap. 13. Sect. 17. pag. 904. Synopsi. Theol. Disput. 5. Sect. 17. pag. 752. Grotius De Jure belli. lib. 1. cap. 2. Sect. 2. pag. 23. Jo. White his way to the tree of life, cap. 3. pag. 47. Fuller Answer to Dr. Ferne, pag. ●8. And let me also note that our Divines do from these words fetch their main ground to prove against the Anabaptists the warrant and lawfulness by the word of God, of the Office of the Magistrate in a Christian, and over Christians, which argument were void did not ordained of God, here intent an authorization by the warrant of his word. Some of them that make this their main ground I shall name. The Harmony of Confessions, in that of Auspurg. Artic. 16. and in that of Saxony Artic. 23. Pisc●●or in locum inter observat. Bucan. loc. 45. quest. 18 pag. 856. Synops. pur. Theologiae. Disput. 50. Sect. 18, 17. pag. 751. But let us pass from humane testimony or opinion unto matter of proof by Reason. 2. The nature of the Power here spoken of, argues this to be the sense of the words, ordained of God. The Power here is not a mere natural or physical, but (as was before showed) a Moral power. Now the text undertaking to describe to us the procedure, or origination of this power, or to tell us whence it is, viz. of God, and how of him, viz. by way of ordination; it must intent such an ordination of God as is agreeable to the nature of the power, or suitable to produce such a power. But natural power is one way from God, Moral power another. Natural power is from the hand of his providence, his efficiency or active concourse: Moral power is from the mouth of God, from his mouth commanding or authorising the thing. We ascribe unto God, as two distinct faculties, or qualities, dominion, and strength; authority, and a potency; right to rule, and ability or mightiness to act and enforce; a willing or legislative, and working power * See above Chap. 1. Sect. 3. And Zanch. de Nat. Dei lib. 4. cap. 8. qu. 3. pag. 424. . And suitably to these two faculties we may attribute to him a twofold act, viz. a Moral, and a Physical act; a moral act proceeding from his supreme dominion, authority, or right to command; and a Physical act issuing from his Almightiness, or infinite potency. The former is the act of his mouth; the latter the act of his hand. And accordingly from these two distinct faculties, and their respective acts in God there is communicated to the creature a double power: a Moral power, that is a derivative right, or warrant, or authority to have, or to do this or that; and this comes from the said Moral act of God: a Natural, or Physical power, a force, ability, or prevalency to this or that operation, derived from that Physical act of God. Now then, when it is said here, the powers are from God, ordained of God, these powers being moral, the meaning must be they are of God's mouth, ordained by his precept or word, calling, and authorising them to their dignities, and functions. The truth is, nothing hath any obligation or morality, but by virtue of the law of a Superior; a mere Physical act of itself cannot introduce a moral obligation; as Mr Selden, and others have well manifested, unto whom I refer my Reader * Selden de Jure Natur. lib. 1. cap. 7. pag. 93, 94. & cap. 8. pag. 106, 107. Vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy. cap. 3. Sect. 6. pa. 18. . 3. I argue from the subjection which is in this verse commanded to be paid unto the powers here spoken of, to persuade whereunto is the Apostles scope in these words, and for the urging on of the same, this is his first and principal reason, The powers to be subjected to, are ordained of God. Now let be considered what the nature of this subjection is in the intent of the Apostle, and it will help well to lead us to his meaning in these words, ordained of God. The subjection enjoined is not a passive succumbency, or patiented submissiveness under the thing to be subjected unto, as under a burden or cross; but it is a free, willing, voluntary and active submission, or subordination; the former hath an eye directly unto a thing as being by Providence or the hand of God; and were that the sense of the subjection here required of Christians, it would be suitable and convenient to understand this ordination of God of a mere providential being of him. But evident it is, that the precept, Let every soul be subject to the higher Powers, bears the latter construction, to wit, of a voluntary and active subordination. The verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so signifies. Divines observe upon the word, it imports a subjection according to order, and such a subjection as is that of persons, that stand in a relative inferiority to their superiors, as wives, children, servants, and subjects to their respective correlatives; who are not only to bear them that are over them, but to be subordinate to them with good will, and in many duties and offices to act under and serve them. They note also the word is of the middle voice, and therefore signifies actively, as well as passively, and is therefore in other places translated in the active, as, submit yourselves, submitted themselves, &c * See Rom. 10.3. 1 Cor. 16.16. Eph. 5.22. Jam. 47. 1 Pet. 2.13. & 5.5. . The quality of this subjection is further characterized in the subsequent verses, as, that it must extend so far as to exclude resistance of the power, we may not resist, or cast it off though we could (vers. 2.) Yea, but on the other hand, we are to support and maintain it, we are to minister unto it the materials whereby it may be kept up, and continued to rule over us (vers. 6, 7.) and the subjection to it must be of conscience, as the principle of conscience is contradistinct from terror, and compulsory punishment (vers. 5.) and further the aforesaid support and maintenance must be yielded to it, as a due, and debt, and that owing not only to God the imposer or ordainer, but of justice to the power itself ordained. Now can a subjection of this nature, containing all these things he built upon the being of a thing by mere eventual Providence? the coming forth of a thing so of God can be no cogent, or solid reason for such a subjection unto it. There are many things thus proceeding from and ordained of God, which we are not bound to acquiesce in, or let be as they are, much less to maintain and uphold in their posture; but our wills, our desires, our prayers, our endeavours may be, yea of duty must be against them. Death, sickness, persecution, wrongs, famines, plagues, predatory wars, and innumerable more things are providentially ordained of God at certain times here, and there to fall, and never come but by such an ordination, yet may they be endeavoured to be repelled, or removed. And this is the reason which authors commonly give for their understanding the words not of a sole providential, but of an institutive ordination * Tolet in loc. & Grotius de Jure Belli lib. 1. cap. 2. Sect. 7. pag. 23. . There is indeed due unto every providence of God, though never so inflicting or heavy, some kind of subjection, that is patience, or a contented and composed mind and behaviour under it, but there is a great deal of difference betwixt this, and the subjection here due to the power. The work or office of the former, viz. of patience, is not to form the mind to will, or desire the being or coming to pass of the thing which is to be born, nor to command the person to a concurrence in procuring or continuing it upon himself, but presupposing it must needs be so, it is to frame the heart to bear it in a right manner, to wit, quietly, and without grudging; innocently, and without evil doing, or speaking; confidently, and without despondency or casting away hope in God. And this bearing it bindeth unto only for present, or during the known incumbency of the evil, that is so far as it appears necessary and inevitable, as being from the will of God's purpose, and imposition of his hand; which kind of subjection well admits and consists with the use of means for the repelling, and of remedies for the ceasing, and ending of the evil sustained, the use of those means, respecting not that which appears to be the will of God's counsel, but that which is to come, or that part and duration of the evil which is behind, & therefore uncertain to the bearer, whether God will have it to be or no. This is the subjection of patience, which therefore properly hath reference to a providential divine ordination, but the subjection of a relation of inferiority in a civil state, whereof the text treats, is of another stamp; it must sway the mind to consent to the power, to act for, & contribute to its standing, and to refrain all counter workings of hand, or spirit against the same: and the ground hereof is, because it hath respect to a divine ordination of institution, the which institution hath prescribed the power both to be, and to have such a posture of subjection yielded to it. To say the power is ordained of God providentially, and therefore to be subjected to with a subjection of this latter kind, to wit, which bars out all resistance, or attempt to alter, or order any thing against its standing, or proceeding, is to say, that whatever is ordained of God providentially is so to be subjected to: and what were this but to forbid and put a Supersedeas upon all humane actions, and to bind all the men in the world to be as still and void of motion as if they were dead, so that none of them in any affair may once stir, either hand, foot, tongue or thought? for there can be no motion of any of these, but it must carry in it an alteration, change; or ordering of something otherwise then Providence hath already ordained it. For this we all say; the present posture of all the things in the world, even to the placing of a Sparrow upon the ground, or the hair of a man's head, is ordered by divine Providence; now no creature can move without altering in some particular the present posture of things; if than whatever is ordered by Divine Providence, must be so acquiesced in, or under, that none may attempt to counter-order, or alter any thing in it, every man is bound to a surcease of all action, even to the very drawing of his breath. 4. I argue again from the prohibition of resistance of the power, and the due and proper sense wherein it is to be understood. For I ask, Is resistance absolutely, or in every sense imaginable, or all manner of resistance whatsoever, here forbidden? There are none but they will, or must confess that some resistance is to be excepted out of this prohibition, and is allowable * See Dr. Willers He●capla●on Rom. 13. qu. 7. pag. 583. . It is lawful for a Subject to defend himself in person, and estate by Petition, and plea in the Court against his Sovereign. Likewise if his Prince personally and wrongfully assault him to the manifest and immediate peril of his life, it is permitted him to ward off, and defensively put back that undeserved, and extrajudicial violence. Yea further, it is not only lawful, but a duty to deny obedience to some of the Magistrates commands, backed with penalties, and not only so, but to act to the contrary of them, as is manifest by the example of the Apostles doing contrary to the prohibition and threats of their Rulers, and the warrant they alleged for their so doing [Act. 4.19. & 15.29.] What then is the resistance which is here forbidden, and how to be circumscribed? The ordinary, (and I suppose rational and expedient) restriction put upon the words is, the Power may not be resisted, that is, the lawful being and proceeding of the power, that which is of God, is irresistible; or all resistance is forbidden which can be said to be a resistance of the ordinance of God (as to destroy the person in whom the power is placed by G●d, or to deprive him of the authority committed to him, or to hinder the just exercise of it.) Now if we take the words, of God, ordained of God (which are the strongest reason and meetest circumscription of the irresistance here insisted on) to signify a providential efflux from God, there is no limitation in them, but an absolute illegitimation of all acts of resistance, even of those abovesaid to be generally, and justly allowable, as well as any other, and an imposal of subjection, without any manner of resistance, to all the outrages of the immanest Tyrant. All the injuries and illegalities of every Superior are providentially disposed of God, and therefore as wrapped up within this term Ordinance, so understood, would be irresistible. It remains necessary therefore that we here take Ordained, and ordinance, in an institutive, or legislative, not in a mere providential way of ordination. 5. A reason also may be taken from the penalty annexed to that resistance of the ordinance of God which is here disallowed, they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. An ordination of Providence may be resisted, (that is, endeavoured to be prevented or altered) and not damnation incurred, yea oftentimes such a resistance is the fulfilling of a man's duty. The evil which God in his secret purpose intends, and his Providence is visibly working to bring or to continue, it may be lawful, yea a duty for us to labour the not falling, or our escape of; as on the other hand we may, and aught to seek the attainment of those good things, which God wils never to bestow upon us. Wherefore if an endeavour to resist, and frustrate an ordination of Providence be a matter of no guilt, or demerit of damnation, it must not be simply that; but an ordination of precept which the Apostle here threatens with that sentence. 6. Once more I argue from the resistance, and the resister of the Power condemned in the second verse. That cannot be the sense of the term ordained of God, which may be said of him that resisteth the power, then when he resisteth, and in respect of his so doing, and that cannot be the sense of that attribute the ordinance of God, which may be spoken of the resisters act of resistance of the power; but to be in the place of power by eventual Providence may be said of the resister of the Power, then when he resisteth, and in respect of his so doing; and the resisters act of resistance of the power, may be said to be by a providential disposal: Therefore a being in the place of power by eventual Providence cannot be the sense of those terms, ordained of God, the ordinance of God. Both the premises I take to be so clear as not to need confirming. If the minor should be stuck at, I would ask what branch of it can be denied, or counted any thing obscure? I will only illustrate it by instance. Was not Absalon, was not Athaliah in the place of power by eventual Providence? and was not both the one and the other a resister of the power, the former of David, the latter of Joash? and was not their very being in, or occupying the place of power (as they did it, viz. by Treachery and violence) an act of resistance of the power, in that thereby they kept out the power that was truly of God, CHAP. V SECT. III. viz. David and Joash? 7. To be ordained of God must needs be taken in such a sense as that the term may always be predicated of, or agree to every power that is intended in the Text; but if we take ordained of God to mean an actual being in possession, or place of rule by divine Providence, this cannot always be predicated of, or agree to every power that is intended in the text. As it did appear in the last foregoing argument, that such a being in the place of rule may agree to some that are not the power, but are the resisters of the same; so here it may be evident that it may not agree to them that indeed are the power. The Providence of God doth so order it sometimes, that the Power or Civil Magistrate is not only disturbed and disquieted in, but outed and extruded from actual rule, or possession of the seat of Magistracy, he still remaining the power. That he that is the power may be providentially out of possession will be fully argued a little after. Here I will only point at those two even now mentioned instances. Who can deny but that David and Joash at what time they were disseised by Absalon and Athaliah, were yet such powers as the Apostle here means to command subjection to, and to persuade thereto by this argument, because they be of God, ordained of him? and that which befell those two Princes may, at the pleasure of God, be the providential lot of any other. Those whom the precept of God (in this verse) requireth to be obeyed, his Providence may at the same time ordain their disseisure. Wherefore if it cannot be said universally of all the powers included in this text, that they are providentially ordered of God in an actual rule or domination, we must take the text to intent some other kind of ordination, and that will be no other but an injunctive imposal. 8. I argue from the end for which the power is ordained of God, expressed (vers. 3. & 4.) which is to be a terror not to good works, but to the evil. To be a Minister of God to thee for good, to be a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. Commentators observing upon the words that the powers in their proceed do not always hold correspondency to these ends or uses, Calvin. Pareus. but not seldom do act directly counter to them, they therefore rightly tell us, the Apostle herein speaks not what the Magistrate always is, or doth, but what he is ordained to be, and do; not what his action, but what his office or institution is; not what is de facto, but what ever ought to he, and de jure, is his level and scope. Here then is an evident ground to conclude it is not providential, but preceptive ordination which the Apostle intends. Providential ordination doth ever take effect, or indeclinably accomplish its end. The difference (as was before noted) betwixt these two ordinations (preceptive, and providential) is, that the former is often disobeyed, and departed from by men to whom it is given, but the latter holds on its course, and attaineth his purpose without sail; it never comes short, or is defeated of its end. If we will say the ordination here meant is by Providence, and the Providence of God in the giving of all Magistrates proposeth; and makes at this, that they be a terror not to good works, but to the evil, etc. We must thence say, it would then so come to pass, and be universally verified in every power, and in every administration of every power. But the contrary to the whole strain of those two verses (viz. the 3. and 4.) experience finds to be the practice of divers Rulers. Whence I infer the ordination of God here intended is institutive, or preceptive. 9 And lastly, Another argument there is to be raised from the consideration of the end which the Apostle declares the Civil powers to be ordained for; and it is this, The ordination that is here meant doth set up Powers, to be a terror not to good works, but to the evil; to be a Minister of God to thee for good; to be a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil: and this we must understand to be their constant, and perpetual end: but Providence doth not seldom ordain powers (in judgement, and for correction to people) for quite contrary ends to these * 1 Sam. 8.11, to 18. Hos. 13, 11. . So it is often that Rulers are not a terror to evil workers, but to the good, Ministers of God for evil, executors of wrath not upon the evil, but upon the well-doer. And if so it come to pass, we must needs say it is so ordered by God in his Providence: and if the Providence of God doth so oftentimes intent and dispose that Magistrates are a scourge to virtue, and indulgencers of wickedness, than we cannot say, unless we may speak contradictories, that the ordination of the powers, by which they are set up constantly, and only for the punishment of evil doers, and the praise of them that do well, is an ordination merely by Providence. Thus I have discharged (as I could) the Second thing I proposed to do for the opening of this term ordained of God, which was to lay down positively the sense which I conceive it to bear in this place, with my Reasons confirming and concluding the same, I go on to the Third. CHAP. V SECT. iv SECT. IV. Gods preceptive ordination of the Power explained, particularly how it is communicated to this or that particular Magistrate. GOds ordination of the powers being supposed to be preceptive, or to involve an act of warrant, authorization or commissionating of them by his word or law: The third thing I promised is an explication of this special sense which I give of the words, ordained of God. That which I take to need some explication is, what this act of ordination thus construed imports, and especially how particular powers may be said to be thus ordained of God; or, how Gods preceptive, or legislative ordination descends, or is derived to this, or that individual power, which hath not his express, extraordinary, or immediate nomination to the place of rule, as Saul, David, and some others, found in Scripture, had. Ordination here, I conceive, intends as much as creation, production, or putting of the power in being. So that when the Apostle saith, the powers that be are ordained of God, his meaning is, they are by him made, created, or put into the state of Powers. Whatsoever therefore goes to the enstating or erecting of a Magistrate, or the investing of a person in that office, or function, that I take to be imported in this word Ordination, and that I understand by these words to be ascribed unto God. This is it then, the Power is ordained of God, that is, CHAP. V SECT. iv Subsect. 1. whatsoever is effective or productive of a Magistrate is derived from God. Subsection 1. Ordination contains Institution, and Constitution; and what each of these signifies. THis ordination or creation of the power must needs, I conceive, have in it two things. The first is institution, or the ordaining of Magistracy to be in the state, or civil society. It is Gods preceptive ordinance that men in every politic body should have, and live under a Government. In this act of institution may be contained not only the simple appointment of Magistracy to be, but the defining also of the office, or the prescribing what shall be the end, and what the measure, compass, or bounds of its authority; how the Sovereign power shall rule, and be obeyed, what shall be necessary or allowable for him to do, and what to have. The other is Constitution, which is the bringing of that Institution into act, and execution in particular states. And this may have ascribed to it two parts. 1. Specification, or the determining of the special kind of Government, comprehensible under that general institution, or the setting down, which shall be the form● of policy pro bic & nunc, or here and now, in this or that state; whether Monarchy, Aristocracy, or another. And unto this Specification may be reducible the designment of the proportion, or latitude which this or that magistrate shall have. I shall not here enter into the dispute, whether the supreme power be limitable otherwise then the general institution itself confines him. But I will suppose (the which is to me the more probable opinion) that there is a latitude in the allotment of power by that general institution, and as some things are necessary, and of the essence of supreme power, so other things are allowable or lawful; and being so, are left arbitrary, and referred to the choice and agreement of the parties concerned in the constitution: and these may be the subject of that designation, or apportionating; as may be also the several shares or measures of power which each party shall have, where the supreme power is either mixed, or compounded of several simple forms, or is distributed into several hands. 2. Individuation; or the investure of the power, or the assignation of it to the person, or persons that shall sustain it, or the concrediting, and committing of it to this or that man, or number of men, or to one living, or stock of persons in whom the designed fram of Government shall reside. That these acts must necessarily go to the creating or putting of the particular power in being, I think will not be questioned. It remains then to show that they are, and how they are every one of them from God, and by his ordination, understanding ordination in this sense in which we have before construed it. Subsection 2. CHAP. V SECT. iv Subsect. 2. That Institution of the Power is of God, and whether by the law of Nature in man's Innocency. FIrst, The institution of the Power; the ordaining in general, that Magistracy shall be, and what shall be the office, power, and preeminencies of the Magistrate, this is, with one consent acknowledged to be of God. Whether its institution by God was in man's innocency, or it was since his; whether Magistracy be of God, by the law of nature; or by a positive or postnate law, is not agreed upon by all learned men: but most Divines, (as far as I observe) both ancient and modern, Protestants, and of the Scools conclude it to have been instituted of God in the state of man's innocency, and to be from the light and law of nature * Vide Aquin. part. 1. qu. 97 art. 4. Durand. in Sentent. lib. 2. Dist. 44. qu. 2. fol. 157. A. P. Martyr loc. come. clas. 4. cap. 13. Sect. 5. Bucan. loc. 49. qu. 16. Pareus in hunc loc. Scharp. Symph. Epo. 1. pag. 39 Estium & Willet in loc. Aristot. pol. lib. 1. num. 8, & 17. . And to their authority I may add that of the Prince of Philosophers, and also that of the Jewish Doctors. These (as Mr. Selden tells us † Selden de Jure Natur. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 118, 119, 127. & lib. 7. cap. 4. p. 804. Dr. Hammond of Resol. centrov. Quaer. 1. Sect. 7. pag. 6. .) deliver seven principal heads of the law of nature, which they call the seven precepts of the Noachidae, and the sixth of them is concerning the being of Civil Government, and of obedience to it, and this tenant of the original of the law of Magistracy may be confirmed. 1. By this that we find the duty of all inferiors to their superiors enjoined in the Fifth commandment of the moral law (as it is generally expounded: by which it must needs be presupposed that the being of superiority, in every state is enacted. 2. In that all nations, and people that are, or have been, and have owned reason, and morality, as they have inclined to entertain civil society, and communion, so they have been guided to esteem it necessary to have a Government in every society, and accordingly have erected, and submitted to it. 3. God hath (as is evident by Scripture) by his law of creation set other reasonable creatures (as spirits) in a distinction of order and superiority of some over others; and there can be no reason given why it should not be so in mankind, by the same original law. 4. Though there appear not what use the state of integrity could have, of punishment, or a coercive sword; yet it is not to me conceivable how there could be either distinction or communion in humane societies, or actions without the commanding and leading power of some over others. Subsection 3. That constitution of the Power, or putting in of the particular Magistrate is of God, and how, or by what means he doth it. SEcondly, The constitution of Magistracy, this, both as to the determination of the form, and composure of the Government, and as to the individuation or investure of the person is from God. Yet not always, and in every state after the same manner. 1. We read God did sometime, CHAP. V SECT. iv Subsect. 3. unto the Commonwealth of Israel, ordain both the special form of Government, and the particular persons in whom it should reside, by peculiar revelation. So it was in the government of Israel by Moses, Josuah, Gideon, Deborah, Saul, David and his posterity. 2. But besides that way of peculiar Revelation, proper to that people, and those persons and such other as are in like manner mentioned in Scripture, God hath another, which is his ordinary, and constant way of determining the special form of Government, and designing the persons for it, to wit, by giving order and direction to men how to proceed in their vacancy of Magistracy, and by leading and steering men according to that his order unto the constitution of it among them. For our right understanding, and evidencing of this way of God's ordination of particular Magistrates in particular States, let these few particulars be considered. 1. God's ordination of Powers must needs import Constitution as well as Institution; that is, wherever there is a power ordained of God, not only that Magistracy shall be, but the special form, and particular person is ordained of God; he ordereth what shall be the platform, and who shall be the Magistrate * Existimo Apostolum primum quidem testari in genere jus ipsum, & potestatem Magistratus a Deo esse; deinde hujus potestatis distributionem eidem Deo vindicare. Beza in loc. Men have no title to Authority, but by deputation from God, as the Apostle expressly testifies, Rom. 13.1. Jo. White his way, etc. cap. 3. pag. 47. . This is the sense of that which is ordinarily said, that the Magistrate hath his power by deputation from God. And this must needs be acknowledged; otherwise we could not say of the Powers that be, or (as some urge the words) are existent, that they are of God. It is constitution that puts Magistracy in being. By virtue of the general rule, or command given to all States, that there be a government in the Commonwealth, no man is, or c●n claim to be the power more than another, nor is this man bound to be a subject more than that; CHAP. V SECT. iv Subsect. 6. nor are the people tied to own, and subject to this man as their Magistrate more than to another, or then he is to any of them, or is any special form, or kind of government expressly either justifiable, or reprovable more than another; nor is the setting up of Magistracy the work or interest of any in particular more than of others: So that if many persons should start up, and claim the seat of Magistracy each to himself in peculiar over the same. Commonwealth, or if in it divers parties, either of that body politic, or foreign to it, should enterprise the erection of Magistracy, each of them in their own way, and oppositewise to one another, no one of them could be owned, or binding, or entitled to the ordination of God, by virtue of that general command more than another. It were to ascribe to God a bootless, void, frustraneous act to say he hath ordained Civil power to be, but taken no order in whom it shall be, or how it shall be conveyed to any man, without an order or rule for constitution, that law, that there he a Magistracy, may stand written in the word of God, or in the heart of man by nature, and never take effect or be acted. God doth not ordain name or notions of things, but their beings and realities, and in ordaining them, he must be supposed to ordain the acts, method, and course of their production. We say of his will of decree, and it must hold also of his will of command, God not only ordains the end, or that a thing be, but the means also, or how, and by whom it shall be. Civil power being one of those things which the law of God both by nature, and in Scriptu●e hath subjected to property, or affixed to a peculiar having and holding, by virtue whereof this man is enstated and entitled to this office, and another is not, such a property, or peculiarity of tenure, or reservedness cannot be without a law for the circumscription of men's wills & hands in the acquisition and possession of it. Now if such a law be fixed by God, it must needs be supposed that some rule, or direction is given by him for the founding and transferring of this property, CHAP. V SECT. iv Subsect. 7. and for the discovery of it in whom it is. We must therefore come to this conclusion; viz. To say God ordains the Powers, is to say he regulates, and prescribes by a law men's wills, and actions about it, and in reference to the giving, taking and using of the Magistracy. The words of Pareus (and with him of Willet) upon the place are to this effect, Ordained, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ordinatae, significat esse potestates a Deo ordinatas, h●e certis limitibus juris, & honestatis circumscriptas, intra quas nisi se contineant, ab ordine divino exorbitent. Pareus in loc. signifies that the powers are of God ordained, that is, are circumscribed by certain limits and rules of right and honesty, within which rules unless they contain themselves they degenerate from the ordinance of God. And this circumscription doubtless must necessarily be admitted as well in relation to the assuming as to the using of the power. Once more, If it were not so that Gods ordaining of the powers doth import, not only that he institutes magistracy to be, but that he constitutes every particular Magistracy, we could not say that an insurrection against this, or any particular Magistrate, or to depose him, and occupy his place were a sin or a trangression, and resistance of God's ordinance (as the Apostles words vers. 2. without question intent) for to take away or control a particular Magistrate cannot otherwise be an entrenchment upon God's ordinance then upon the particular Magistrates being ordained of God. So much (that God institutes Government to be) would stand unshaken by such an act, or would consist well with it; for still, it notwithstanding, it would be undetermined who were the power, and so it would be left as free and lawful for the resister to take the place, as for the resisted to hold it; the institution would be satisfied if any possessed it. Wherefore we must needs suppose God doth in every Commonwealth constitute the proper and particular Magistracy, where ever it can be said to be ordained of God. 2. In regard God doth not ordinarily by any special revelation determine the constitution of the Civil state, that is, point out what shall be the special form of Government, CHAP. V SECT. iv Subsect. 3. and who shall be the Governors in this or that place, we must therefore conceive him to manage this matter ordinarily, mediante homine, or by men, and that is, by his defining the way of erecting Magistracy, or giving order, and prescribing rules to men how they shall proceed in the setting up of it, and by men's proceeding accordingly. They that say the law, and light of nature enacteth Government, to be in the Civil society, tell us also that by nature no man is actually constitute a Magistrate more than another, and that nature hath left all men equal, and free, or unengaged (in actu exercito, they mean) to any one particul r form or person * Aristot. pol. lib. 3. num. 102. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 7. pag. 92. Hobbs Elements part. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 1. & cap. 4. Sect. 1. . Wherefore it must needs be concluded seeing God by the law of nature hath enjoined government to be, but hath ordered no particular in it with application to singulars, he hath committed it to the positive transaction of men, to be disposed according to certain general rules of justice, and prudence given by him. It is not imaginable how God should impose or require any distinct state, or special relation, and order to be amongst a multitude of men, or other his creatures, but be must be said either immediately by himself to create it, or to set down from what causes, or out of what principles it shall arise. 3. For the distinct understanding of the manner, or how many ways God interposeth and concurreth in the constitution of particular Magistrates, in regard of which interposal the individual, or particular power may be ascribed to God's ordination, I shall note. Some things God doth herein immediately, and some things mediately. 1. Immediately, and by himself he doth declare such, and such forms of Government to be lawful and eligible, and he doth order where and in whom the interest shall be to make choice which of those forms in particular, and who the person or persons shall be that shall be placed over this or that state respectively. 2. Mediately, and by men he doth enstate every special kind of Government, and every particular Magistrate, that is, he doth set them up according to those rules which we say are immediately given by him. And this his mediate concurrence is two ways. 1. The authority or warrant of his word, rule or law goeth along with those that act therein according to the same. And this is his moral concurrence. 2. His work or hand of Providence guideth the wills and exterior actions of them that proceed according to those rules; and this is his physical concourse. We do not therefore exclude the Providence of God from the ordination of the powers that be: but we attribute to it its proper place and use; which is to pursue, and execute the authority and rule of his word, from which in the production of Magistracy we cannot, neither aught by any means to separate or disjoin it, so as to make it constitutive of a Magistrate. And this act of Providence is far different from that which some would confound with it, and so put as the whole of sole basis of Civil government, as to constitution, to wit, a persons mere possession, or occupation of the seat of Majesty, or a bare physical predominancy: for this may be, and yet no Magistracy; and this, though it be due to the Civil Magistrate, yet it is separable from it, as this discourse I hope will manifest. The act of Providence which (as far as I can apprehend) may be productive of Civil power is that which disposeth of the title or right, and not of the mere possession of the throne; that which guideth men's wills to consent, or give a call, or confer on the one part, and to accept of it on the other; and not that which only swayeth men's hands, on the one side lifting up an arm of force, as a punishment over a people, on the other binding the hands, and leading away captive Princes, and people, that however disagreeing, or relucting they can make no effectual resistance. 4. Though God do not by immediate revelation assign to every particular State what shall be the special model of their government, and who the persons to sustain it, yet where men do act in the assignation of these for substance according to the prescript or rule given out by God unto all, there is a power ordained of God, and (unless when a special revelation comes from God determining these particulars) there only, or not otherwise. This Proposition hath two parts, a positive, and a negative. 1. The positive is, when men do act according to divine rule, in the moulding of government, and advancing of persons to wield it, there the constitution may be said (according to this text) to be of God, and the particular Government, and Governors to be ordained of God. Immediety of designation from God either of platform, or person is not necessary to the bestowing of this style, of God, ordained of God, upon the particular Magistracy. It is in this case as it is in the point of any ordinary right or property. God hath ordained a perpetual law of justice among men (thou shalt not steal) by which every man's property in his goods is required to be reserved to him; and he hath given, either in his word, or by the light, and law of nature a sufficient rule to determine, what shall be right, what wrong, and how property in any possessibles shall be acquirable; yet all this by itself invests no man in any right to any goods in particular: it is a humane qualification or transaction which supervening, and being bona fide passed, now enstates men in an actual right to any goods; and when this is emergent, this or that man's title or property in these particular goods is asserted by God, and then it may be said, it is God's ordinance that this man have and enjoy these goods, and a transgression against the same it is for another man without like warrant from God to disseise him of them. The truth is, the most, if not all, the moral precepts of God, and perpetual laws of nature are so made, and delivered to man, as that to the putting of them in practice, or the bringing of their obligation into act there must intervene some positive constitution either from God or man, and most commonly it is from the latter. The Schools tell us that humane positive constitutions do determine the law of nature as the form specificates the matter, or the particular matter determines the general * Vide Cajetan in Aquin. 1. 2aes. qu. 95. art. 2. Widdingtons' rejoinder cap. 8. num. 20. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 106. Hooker Eccles. polit. lib. 6. pag. 151, 152. Grotius de Jure lib. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 10. . That wives, children, servants, subjects own their respective superiors, and pay them their duties is the law of God, but there are certain humane acts which are the immediate foundation and rise of these relations, and so of persons lying under the duties, which severally belong to them; which acts once passed the bounds of relation, and duty do take hold of the persons respectively by virtue of the divine ordination. Our Saviour saith of married persons, What God hath joined together let no man put asunder. Marriage then in all married couples is a conjunction made by God; but how comes that seeing most that marry have no recourse to, or particular direction from God, when, whom, or how to marry, probably never think of any ordinance of God about it, but only to follow their own or others counsels and wills in it? Why thus it is, God in the beginning authorised marriage to be betwixt man and woman, and appointed how it should be transacted, to wit, by the mutual consent, or cleaving together of each party: and enacted other rules concerning it, as touching proximity of blood, etc. And now by virtue of this his ordinance, what ever couple do accordingly contract, are joined together by God. The same may be exemplified in the office of the Ministry of the Gospel. Christ hath given commission to certain in the Church to ordain Elders, and when such are accordingly ordained, they a●e then the Ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries of God, and are said to be made by the Holy Ghost * Act. 14.23. 1 Tim. 4.14. & 5 22. Tit. 1.5. 2 Tim. 2.2. with Act. 20.28. 1 Cor. 4.1. . In the natural body God is said to have given more abundant honour to that part which lacked, [1 Cor. 12.24.] How it is said God hath given this honour? it is not by his making that part more comely than other parts, for contrarily the words are spoken of those parts that by making are more uncomely, and less honourable than the rest. But, in as much as we by an instinct of nature do repute some parts naturally less honourable, and more uncomely than other, and thereupon do b●stow more abundant artificial honour and comeliness upon them, viz. do more cloth, and cover them with dress; in this regard, what is upon that consideration thought fit by man to be done in the distribution of honour to his natural parts in such an inequality as may fill up the natural disproportion, God is said to do, viz. by directing us by nature's instinct to do it. The Judges of Israel for those 450. years mentioned by St. Paul, are said to be given them of God, and to be raised up to them of God, and that he commanded them to feed his people * Act. 13.20. Jud. 2.16, etc. 1 Chron. 17.6. : and yet we read not of any immediate particular, express call from God given to them all, or to the most of them, none of them, I take it, can upon any evident ground be supposed to have had any such, except. Deborah, Gideon, and Samson; but a mediate call from God, by men, that all of them doubtless had: and of Jeptha his call of this nature the text at large informs us † Jud. 10.5. . from such an orderly call by men we may therefore take it to have been that they were given, raised up, commissioned to that people of God We all acknowledge Subordinate Magistrates to be ordained of God, and many of our Commentators include them as well as the supreme in this text, and Mr. Calvin, Calvin in loc. Spanhem. Dub. Evang. part. 3. Dub. 64. pag. 288. Estius in Ro. 13. Spanhemius, and Estius takes those words, [in 1 Pet. 2.13.] sent by him; to refer, not unto the King, but to God as the sender; yet those inferior Magistrates have their election, and deputation from the supreme humane power; but they are notwithstanding, reckoned to be of God, in as much as they are surrogated by them who are empowered by God to do it. Our Saviour speaking of all Magistrates, saith that unto them the word of God came, that is, Joh. 10.35. as Expositors interpret these words, God hath given out to them a warrant, and commission for their offices. But how is that? the speech certainly can have no reference to an immediate designation from God in relation to the most of them, but the word of God comes to, or authorizeth them, who are advanced to the seat of power by men according to his word. We may take this then for clear, that the conveying of power from man so man, may make a power ordained of God; only with this proviso be it said, this is not merely because it is done by men, for neither every humane action, nor every act of any whomsoever in this matter can entitle this effect to divine ordination; but it is because, and so far forth as this is done of men by virtue of a rule, and warrant from God, and therefore hath the authorization, and seal of God upon it. Wherever therefore such a platform of Magistracy is erected, and such persons are invested with it as God hath declared eligible, and this by them to whom God hath committed this management, and such power placed in the persons, as he hath legitimated, there is a power enstamped with this of the Apostle, of God, ordained of God. And this is the sentence of Commentators on the text, and others that treat on this subject. As Peter Martyr. P. Martyr loc. come clas. 4. cap. 13. Sect. 5. Sometimes this (to wit, the creation of the power) comes to pass by the consent of the Senate, sometime by the suffrages of the people, but these are but instruments, the proper cause of Magistrates is God himself. Pareus. P●reus in loc. sub. dub. 3. Neither do second causes exclude the first. In old time God by an immedia e call advanced some Magistrates, & Kings to the throne, as Moses, etc. But the rest, as the 70. Elders, he by man's act, and counsel placed in power, and yet ceaseth not so to do, and that according to the laws and custom received of every people; either by the election and consent of a Senate, as now the Roman Empire; or by the voices of the people, as the Governors of the Cities that are merely or mixedly democratical, etc. Tolet in loc. Toler. Of God, as of the first principle, and cause the powers proceed, although by the intervenient wills of men, as heat, cold, and the like are of God, but by intermediate second causes. Estius in loc. Estius. The secular power is mediately of God, by men, who by the instinct of the law of Nature, set over those of whom they may be governed in a community. For this instinct is of God, so that by reason thereof it may be truly and positively said, that this power is not but of God. Mr. John Selden. Selden ● de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 108. But whatsoever by that licence is constituted variously betwixt men civilly, and duly according to the several forms of Government, only by way of determination, as the Schoolmen speak, so as not to be contrary neither to the natural, nor the positive law of God; that also receiveth sanction and obligation, according to the several qualifications of the constitution, from the said law which is both natural, and divinely positive or written. Willet upon the place. As the fruits of the earth are brought forth by man's labour, yet are Gods gifts, so is Magistracy, etc. 2. The negative is, Whatever power (so named, or pretended) there may be, or whatsoever persons there be that take upon them to be the Power, or Magistrate over a State, and are not thereto appointed, or therein enstated, as is abovesaid (that is, either by special express revelation from God, or by men proceeding upon, and by virtue of a warrant, or authority from God) they are not a Power ordained of God. This will follow upon what is said already. For if it be so, that to the making of a particular Power, or Magistrate to be God's ordinance there goes not only a law of God universally enacting Civil Government to be, but a further specificating act of God, whereby be constituteth this special platform for this Commonwealth, and calls forth, or authorizeth this person, or these persons here to bear it; and that this he doth, either by immediate revelation, or by the intervention of men qualified, and instructed by his set rule to make the said assignation, than it must needs be yielded that none can be entitled to the plea, and privilege of being God's ordinance, but they that come in by that door, or ascend by that scale. It will (I think) be said by all, that Gods ordaining the power doth not necessarily import his designation immediately, by his own mouth, of the form and persons, but that he committeth the doing of this ordinarily to humane arbitration. And hereupon it will be to be inferred, that either God hath left this determination to men absolutely, indefinitely, and promiscuously, giving way to any that will, in any place whatsoever, to constitute what Magistracy, and whom in it they please, (and who hath so little understanding either of God, or of the matter hereby attributed to him, as to say this?) or else that he hath set a stint, and fixed rule to men in this matter, appointing certain to constitute the Government, and obliging people to the owning of the Government so constituted, as from him, with exclusion, and disallowance of any other to determine these things. And if this be the way (as to me it seemeth so clear as that no other is imaginable) then, if in the erecting of government a substantial deviation from it be, as when incompetent, or unallowed persons be the advancers of themselves, or others unto the place of power, in as much as in that case there lies the divine disapprobation, and men act besides the said prescript, it may be said there is no ordinance of God, but a contradiction, and contraordination to God's order. CHAP. V SECT. iv Subsect. 4. Subsection 4. That God's ordination is conveyed to the particular Magistrate by the consent of the community. BUt then (perhaps) there will remain one Question, viz. where hath God given out his warrant or rule to any to act, or proceed in this business? and who are they in every State respectively, whom God hath authorized, or qualified to determine the particulars of it? Unto this my Answer is, 1. That the said rule, or the special way by which men should be called, or attain to the place of Sovereign power, and expressly defined in Scripture is not necessary, or to be, as such, exacted. We all grant that God hath in reference to all the proprietable things of this life, and to all transactions about them enjoined a rule of right and equity to be kept, and forbidden the transactions about them, enjoined a rule of right, and equity to be kept, and forbidden the transgression of it, yet he hath not in his written word particularly stated the several ways by which the right, or title to a thing shall be acquired, nor yet the special laws, or rules by which the property of persons to such things may be determined, or adjudged. This the law and light of nature in man's heart as to many, or most things, or cases, is left to discover: and this it hath done, in most things indifferent clearly, and equally, in so much as the affairs of men about them are ordinarily, and both by vulgar maxims, and customs, and by public laws, and judgements regularly composed and determined. 2. And yet we are not without some Scripture-light in this particular. Even it doth not only prescribe an orderly call to the administration of Civil power, and condemn the unorderly and violent assumption of it; [Num. 27.26, 27. Luk. 12.14. Hos. 8.4. Jer. 30.21. Ezek. 23.16. Amos 6.13.] but doth also direct the way how men should be advanced to it, and by whom, in case of vacancy of Magistracy. This it doth in the particular case of that nation to whom God at first gave his written law, which may be a pattern to other Nations in this, as in other matters confessedly it is. See the direction to them, [Deut. 17.14, 15. & 16.18. & 1.13.] In which places the transacting of this affair is by order from God put into the hands of the community, over whom the Magistracy is set. Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates which the Lord thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes, and they shall judge the people with just judgement. And unto this order seems the speech of that good man, and wise Statist to refer, [2 Sam. 16.18.] Nay but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide. And according to this prescript runs the promise of God to the people of Israel concerning their state after the return of their Babylonish captivity, Jer. 30.21. And their Nobles shall be of themselves, and their Governor shall proceed from the midst of them. And answerable to this rule we find instances of the people constituting their Supreme Governor; as in the advancement of Jeptha, Jud. 10.5, etc. of David, 1 Chron. 11.1, etc. and others. And I would ask them who seem willing to deny that in the Bible any commission is given to a prople to choose themselves Governors, to what purpose is it that the Lord giveth by Moses directions, and rules what manner of person the Israelites should set up to be King over them, as it is [Deut. 17.14, 15, etc.] if they had no interest, or commission given them to set up, or choose any for themselves? 3. Besides this light of the text, the law of Nature is judged to dictate the same thing, to wit, that the right power, or interest, to transact this business of the constitution of Magistrates is in the community, or people of each Country, or State in relation to their own Magistracy. So that whether we look into the Scriptures, or into the Book of Nature's law, the way which God hath chalked out, the ordinary means he useth for the deputation of persons under himself, and over the people in the office of the Supreme Civil power, is the vote, elective act, or consent of the body politic, or people to be ruled. To testify the latter, viz. that the law of nature dictates this to men, 1. I shall in stead of many cite a few learned Authors of best respect that affirm it. 2. I shall allege the original, and primitive practice of Nations to have been conform thereto. 1. For the affirmation of it, to be so de Jure. Mr. Richard Hooker. Hooker Eccles. pol. l. 1. cap. 10. pag. 26, 27, 29. lib. 8. pag. 150, 151. To take away all such mutual grievance, injuries, and wrongs, there was no way but only by growing upon composition, and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some government public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquillity, and happy estate of the rest might be procured, without which consent there was no reason why one man should take upon him to be Lord, or Judge over another.— Over a whole grand multitude, having no such dependency (as is in the family upon the Father) upon any one, and consisting of so many families, as every politic society in the world doth, impossible it is that any should have complete lawful power, but by consent of men, or immediate appointment of God; because not having the natural superiority of fathers, their power must needs be either usurped, and then unlawful, or if lawful, then either granted, or consented unto by them over whom they exercise the same, or else given extraordinarily from God.— Of this point therefore we are to note that sigh men naturally have no full, and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living. Mr. Perkins. Perkins To. 1. pag. 762. A. Treat. of Callings. Every lawful King is placed by God; and by men that are appointed under God to set up Princes over them, according the laws and customs of several Kingdoms. Mr. John Selden. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 106, 107. Among these (viz. the acts of the permissive law of nature) every man seethe that the acts of making constitutions, entering into covenants, introducing of Customs, and forms of Government, and of rescinding, revoking, or altering all these, by the choice of those Societies of men whom it concerned, where likewise permitted.— In like manner it hath still been granted that by the said permission whatsoever it by men, joined in Society, limited, forbidden, or constituted, that they are bound to keep who have so consented, according to the conditions, and qualification with which it is prescribed, even as many as have, and so far as they have given their consent. But whence is it that they are so bound? from the authority of a deity, that is of man's superior, even in these things, the rise of the obligation is to be derived, and therefore from some heads of the obligative law of nature. For the acts whereof we speak were allowed to men, so as either they might use them at their pleasure, or they might by joint consent prohibit them, and confine their own liberty in them, either by covenant, naturally plighted, or by Princes constituted to govern in those matters; which thing seemeth not sufficiently conceivable how it should be, whilst we always lock at right, and owing of duty, unless then join this also to it, that the obligation to the said inhibition, or confinement of liberty doth accrue from his authority, and command who, as being man's superior, gives warrant to it. Mr. Jeremiah Burroughes. Burrougheses on Hos. 1. Lect. 4. pag. 111. see also Lect. 3. pa. 65. and on cap. 3. Lect. 2. pag. 704. There is no authority that we are subject to now, but according to the laws and constitutions of the Country where we live. We must require whether it be a power: It is not because the man that is in authority commandeth it, except he commandeth it by virtue of that authority which is according to the nature and condition of the foundamental constitutions of the Country where he liveth.— Otherwise we are not bound in conscience: bond we may be in regard of prudence, and in regard of preventing other disturbances, but conscience doth not bind to wills of men, but binds to laws. The Author of the treatise of Monarchy, Treatise of Monarchy chap. 1. Sect. 1. & chap. 3. Sect. 2. & 5. Vindication of that Treatise chap. 3. Sect. 6. (called by one in print, Mr. Hunton) God by no word binds any people to this or that form, till they by their own act bind themselves. They (to wit Sovereigns) attain this determination of authority to their persons by the tacit and virtual, or else express, and formal consent of that society of men they govern, either in their own persons, or the root of their succession.— I do conceive that in the first original all monarchy, yea any individual frame of Government whatsoever is elective, that is, is constituted, and draws its force, and right from the consent, and choice of that community over which it swayeth.— My reason is, because man being a voluntary agent, and subjection being a moral act, it doth essentially depend on consent: so that a man may by force, and extremity be brought under the force, and power of another, as unreasonable creatures are to be disposed of, and trampled on whether they will or no; but a bond of subjection cannot be put on him, nor a right to claim obedience, and service acquired, unless a man become bound by some act of his own will. I am persuaded it will appear an uncontrollable truth in policy, that the consent of the people, either by themselves or their ancestors, is the only mean in ordinary Providence by which Sovereignty is conferred on any persons or family: neither can God's ordinance be conveyed, and people engaged in conscience by any other means. The author of the fuller answer to Dr. Ferns Fuller Answer to Dr. Ferne ●ag. 17, 18. Treatise, etc. The meaning of the place (Rom. 13.) then must be this, The powers that be (i. e.) so, or so established by consent of man, are ordained of God to be obeyed; or it is God's ordinance that men should live under some government, and submit without resistance to that kind of government they have by consent established: just (as St. Peter follows him) to the ordinance of man for the Lords sake.— There are two kinds, we use to say, of Tyranny, regiminis, & usurpationis; that which is only of government, though never so heavy must be endured. That other kind, of usurpation, it hath no right, no ordination at all, and so no subjection due to it. In all power of government, Divinity tells us there are four things, the institution, the constitution, the acquisition, and the use. The constitution always from man's consent, the institution always from God. Mr. Thomas Hobs. Hobbs Elements part. 1. chap. 6. Sect. 6, 7. part. 2. chap. 10. Sect. 3. That this may be done (viz. the erection of a common power) there is no way imaginable, but only union, which is the involving, or including the wills of many in the will of one man, or of one counsel.— The making of union consisteth in this, that every man by covenant oblige himself to some one, and the same man, or to some one, and the same counsel by them all named and determined. Lastly, Polybius, as cited by Gregory Tholosanus. Greg. Tholos. Syntag. Juris lib. 47. cap. 15. Sect. 22. Neither yet ought every Government of one be presently called a kingdom, but that only which is granted by the subjects consent. 2. Besides these testimonies to confirm that of right, and by the law and light of nature so it is, viz. that the Supreme power be derived by consent of the people. I promised to show the matter of fact, viz. that so it was in the beginning of the erection of Government. For this I have the testimonies of Aristotle, Cicero, Justin, Ludovicus Vives, Polydor Virgil, and Calvin, speaking in general of all nations, and of Livy, Plutarch, and Juvenal, in reference to the Roman. Aristotle (polit. lib. 3. chap. 10. num. 89.) saith, For when those first heroes had obliged the people with great benefits, as by their invention of arts, or warlike powers, or bringings of men into society, and commerce or enlargement of their territories, these were created Kings by the free consent of the people. Cicero (de legibus lib. 3. pag. 452.) tells us, all the ancient nations in times past subjected themselves unto Kings, the which kind of Government was first conveyed, and given unto the justest and wisest men. But those who were not pleased with kingly Government, refuse they did not to submit themselves to any at all, but they were not willing to subject always to one. Justin. (lib. 1.) informs that, in the beginning the rule of nations was in the hand of Kings, whom not popular ambition, but their moderate carriage approved of the good advanced to that height of honour. Upon which words of Justin, Ludovicus Vives (in Augustin. de Civit. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 5, 6.) hath this note. In the beginning every family had its King, either the wisest, or the justest of the house; a little after that Kings began to rule over many families, and sometimes there were to one family divers Kings, whom the people elected to themselves as to be guides, governor's, and overseers of the public interest; and they were not compelled to take such a one as happened any way to them: neither did nobility, or the seeking of the party carry it: every man's own private good with the good of the public was so dear and near to him, that it made him to make choice of none but the best. Pol. Virgil. de Invent. Rer. lib. 2. cap. 2. Polydore Virgil followeth, and builde●h his relation upon Justin. And for the Roman state in particular, it is very evident in Livy, Florus, Stadna upon him, and Plutarch, that their five first Kings, Romulus, Numa Pompilius, Tullus Hostilius, Ancus Martius, and Tarqvinius Priscus, were chosen by the Senate, and People; and that their seventh King Tarqvinius Superbus was by them removed for his evident usurpation. Neque enim ad jus Regni quicquam praeter vim habebat, ut qui neque populi jussu, neque patribus autoribus regnavit; saith Livy. Unto whose testimonies I may add that of Juvenal, exprobrating the sloth and degeneracy of the Roman people in falling off from their ancient manners, and policy. — Nam qui dabat olim Imperium, fasces, legiones, omnia, Juvenal satire 10. pag. 94. nunc se Continet, atque duas tantum res anxius optat, Panem, & circenses.— At first the people's vote swayed all, the Crown, The rule of Court, and camp; now they sit down, For those not troubled, only grant, they say, To us but stomaches filled, and leave to play. Unto all these astipulateth that of Calvin (in Genes. 10.) Notandum in nepotibu● Noah tantum recenseri qui Gentium fuerunt principes. Nam ut quisque inter fratres ingenio, virtute, industria vel aliis dotibus excelluit, sibi peperit nomen, & potentiam, ut alii sub eorum umbrâ quiescentes primatum illis libenter concederent. It is to be observed that of the Grand children of Noah they only are recited who were Princes of the Nations. For as any excelled among his brethren in wisdom, virtue, industry, or other qualities, he purchased to himself name, and power; so that the rest voluntarily granted him the Sovereignty, and rested under his protection. CHAP. V SECT. iv Subsect. 5. Subsection 5. Three other ways of conveying unto persons a title to sovereign Magistracy examined; viz. 1. That of Fatherhood, and Primogeniture. 2. That of Conquest. 3. That of voluntary beneficialness by protection. BUt besides this I meet with some other ways by some held lawful and approved for the entry, and attainment of persons to Sovereignty, and consequently such as derive the divine ordination to it unto the persons qualified with them. Of these it will happily be expected he that is handling this subject should take some notice; together with what is said for them. 1. That which I shall take notice of, first is, the power or right of Fatherhood, which is supported or pieced out (by the maintainers of it) with that of primogeniture, or of the first born; both of these put together they style (as I understand them) by the name of Genarchy. The drift of their opinion that are for this is to make the rise, and right of Civil Government natural and native, not voluntary, or conventional. The Question here is not, Whether the Father, and the Firstborn have not some preeminency over their respective correlatives, to wit, the Father over his Children, the Firstborn over his younger brethren? But whether the preeminency be the same with Civil Magistracy: Or whether the political power in a Commonwealth be not one thing, and that superiority another, and those two be not really and essentially different ● Neither is the question, whether Fatherhood and primogeniture may not be coincident in regard of the subject with Civil Magistracy, that is, may not meet in the same person? Nor is the question, whether Civil Power may not be hereditary, that is, settled and kept in one family, and in it descend from the Father to his first Son, and after that manner successively forward? But the question is, whether Fatherhood and primogeniture, either of them apart, or both of them together be the proper title, basis, or root of Civil Magistracy? or, whether a natural, and original right, and title to political rule be in the Father, and firstborn, without any positive voluntary, humane constitution, or consent of the state; so that a person is in sovereign power not by virtue of any such law or paction, but merely, and originally by his Fatherhood or primogeniture? First, for the title of Fatherhood to Magistracy, there are these things that impugn it. 1. Although it is granted there is in the Father a power over his child, yet ever since the erection of the public State, or Commonwealth, as a distinct society from that of a household, and compounded of a multitude of families, and where ever these two are in being together, the paternal power hath been (and that duly, and necessarily) taken to be another, or a distinct authority from that of the Civil Magistrate, and inferior, or subordinate to it. 2. The power of the Father is in every Father over his children: and if from it you will raise a Civil Political power, then, either it must be said to be in, or to be the right of every Father; and if so, as soon as one begets a child, or becomes a Father, he becomes a Supreme Civil Power, gins a new Commonwealth, and he, and his children are exempt from his Fathers (if living) and all other Civil superiority; and the Father's power, and the Commonwealth he is over shall be dissolved by his having Nephews, or by his children's fatherhood: and this will make every family, though but of two persons, to be a Civil State, and that no Commonwealth can consist of more than the children of one Father, and for ever prevent or deny the compounding a Commonwealth of many families, and the distinction of the Commonwealth from the Family. And by this multiplication of the number, and abridgement of the extent of civil societies you disappoint mankind of that union, strength, security, and comfortable commerce that nature hath guided men to seek, and the experience of all ages and nations have found in large and populous societies. Or 2. The political power must be said to be in, or to be the right of every Father that is not Pater patratus, or that hath no Father; and this doth dissolve and divide the Commonwealth at the death of such a Father into so many parts as there are left persons fatherless, whether they be Wife, Sons, or Daughters, and into so many new Commonwealths as there are left Fathers in it that have not a Father. 3. The right or power of the Father can relate only to the children, and only to his own. Out of the extent then of this dominion, and consequently out of the Commonwealth it belongeth unto, upon this score you must exclude, 1. The Wife, and Servants of this supposed Monarch, though he be their superior, and they in a subordination to him, yet he is not their Father. 2. All other persons of any other stock; there can be no mixture of races, or lineages in this Commonwealth. 4. If Civil power be the right of the Father, than it must necessarily be in him in reference to all his children, wherever placed, or dispersed. So that how far soever Adam's progeny must be disseminated, or spread upon the face of the earth, during his life; or Noah's during his life; or any of the long lived Patriarches during their respective lives, all the posterity that sprang from such a head, must belong to, and be shut up within one Commonwealth while that common parent lasted. And how will this stand with that distribution of Noah's race into several countries' and Nations in his life time, as also with that of Shems, he being living? (of which in the 10 and 12 Chapters of Genesis) and with Abraham's sending away the sons he had by his Concubines into another Country while he yet lived? Gen. 25.6. Unless it will be said, such a Father hath a faculty, or warrant to strip himself of this his paternal Civil Dominion, and to transfer it, or any part of it to others during his life, But 1. Thus you unsettle and change the basis, and cause of civil dominion you had laid in the Father's natural right, and make it separable from it by humane choice, and will: and if you put it once upon arbitrary constitution you make it alienable for ever from that subject, and from that bottom. 2. This cannot be supposed at the confusion of languages (Gen. 11.6, 7.) when as they were one immediately before it; and the end of their building Babel was to prevent their dispersion; and upon that confusion they were scattered from thence upon the face of the whole earth; by which confusion, and dispersion the consent, or act of their common head, for the divesting of himself, and for the investing of those who should succeed him, in being the respective Sovereign powers of those several divided Countries and nations, was prevented. Secondly, But the inconveniencies of fixing Civil power in the paternal relation alone they endeavour to salve by eking it out with that of primogeniture. Unto this I say, 1. Primogeniture can never be supposed to derive any thing to the child, but what was in the Father; if the Father be a Supreme power, a Monarchy may by it be conveyable to his Son, and not otherwise. Thus primogeniture is not the rise of civil power, but supposeth it to be in being, and is only the mean of continuation, and transmission of it from person to person. 2. The natural right of the first born in succession from the Father, as we find it in Scripture, seems only to be a better, or double portion of what was his Fathers, in copartnership with his Brethren. If then you go by that, you must upon the death of every royal father, that hath a plurality of Sons divide the Commonwealth among them according to that proportion; whereby it would come to pass that a Kingdom by many descents probably shall be divided into numberless minute principalities, and every of them still new to be divided by every new succession. The conveying of a Kingdom whole and entire to one of many Sons is not from the law of the first born in Scripture, but is doubtless from positive institution. And this is to me a strong argument (and unanswerable to them that allow the transferring of Kingdoms undivided from Father to Child) that Supreme power is in a person by arbitrary constitution, not by natural right as in a Father or firstborn; for if it were, that right by itself would infer a division of Commonwealths according to the multiplication of the Regal stock, and so in time an easy dissolution of them. 3. If Primogeniture must carry it, than the right of Fatherhood a●ore insisted on went on no farther than the first man Adam, and was never in any after him; and upon his decease you put an end to, and destroy for ever your paternal right to Political power. For upon his death either the power must descend upon every one of his children distributively, as Fathers in reference to their respective children as their subjects; and then where is that you call the right of primogeniture, and what political power is accrued by it? or, it must descend upon his firstborn only, and then what becomes from thenceforth of the right of fatherhood? 4. If you set the Civil power upon the first born in succession from Adam, and so downward, than you must either set it upon every firstborn of every Father, and this will bring the absurdities, argued to follow upon setting it upon every father, or, you must fix it but on one firstborn only at once, that is, the eldest Son of the eldest house; and than you make it necessary that all men be kept within one Commonwealth, and that there be but one Monarch; for that primogeniture can but be in one race, and in one person still, and how opposite is this, not only to the practice of all ages, even from Noah's time, when the race of mankind was divided, as into divers regions, so into several. Nations or politic bodies; but to the state of mankind so far dispersed over the whole earth as it is incapable of being one earthly Monarchy. 2. Or you must say the firstborn, as he had in him a right to hold the power, so he had a power to alienate it to his younger brethren, or kin, and did put into act this power to the distribution of the world into many entire States and Principalities; but against this it will be said, a right in Adam's first begotten, and in every first begotten of the first begotten successively to the power, and a right to alienate the power either in whole, or in part, from descending to the fi●st in succession, are inconsistent; he that alienates and gives away power to any of the younger, unto so much as he gives, he cu●s ●ff ●he right of the eldest, and puts an end to this title of primogeniture. 5. Let it be considered what is in Scripture the right of the firstborn, viz. some domestical preeminency, or superiority of the eldest over his Brethren within the family, as Gen. 4.7. Vide Cartwright on Gen. 25.31. The firstborn were next in honour to their Parents (saith Ainsworth on Gen. 25.31.) what ever it was, it appears to be that which Cain might have over Abel during the life of their Father Adam; and was not therefore the Supreme Civil Power. It appears the first Son had precedency of place, Gen. 43.33. and a double portion of his Father's inheritance, Deut. 21.17. but all this, and if there be any thing more, amounts not to a political Power; but in the contrary we find it plainly distinguished, and separated from it. The right of jacob's firstborn descended upon one Son, the right of the Supreme Civil Power upon another, 1 Chron. 5.1, 2. Reuben was Israel's firstborn; for his incest he lost the birthright, and Jacob gave it to Joseph, but though the birthright was joseph's, yet Judah prevailed above his Brethren, and of him came the chief ruler. The blessing of Lordship over his Brethren which Isaac unawares bequeathed to Jacob, and the birthright were two distinct things in Esau's repute, Gen. 27.36, 37. Probably in the beginning of mankind, or of a family ere it was enlarged so far as to cause a full division into distinct Nations, and Civil dominions, and while by reason of paucity of persons, and proximity of habitation there was little difference observed betwixt a Family and Commonwealth, public power did reside in the Father over all that sprung of him; and after it had so gone on for a time, that communities by union might enjoy more strength, and security, it might by the joint consent of many families, and the Fathers and Grandsires of them be divolved to one which was the firstborn of the eldest house. But that this was by natural right, or that it was set down as a perpetual law, or rule for every Commonwealth, as the only warrantable rise or title to Supreme Government; and that it was not as free for them, or such as they, who first reduced themselves under the dominion of the firstborn, by agreement, to have with the same agreement constituted the power in another, or a younger stem, will (I suppose) never be proved, neither can hold, for the reasons above given. 6. We find that in the disposal of Government among Brethren this birth-order was not seldom inverted. As when Jacob was preferred before Esau; Judah before all the elder sons of Jacob; Ephraim before Manasseh; Solomon before Adonijah; 2 King. 23.30, 36. See Divines Annotat. Dio●ate, and Jackson in loc. Jehoabaz the younger, before Jehojakim the elder son of Josiah; and Judas Maccabeus 1 Maccab. 2.66. with vers. 2, 3, 4. the third son of Mattathias before his other elder brethren. And of Simri the son of Hosah, it it said, though he was not the firstborn, yet his Father made him the chief * 1 Chron. 26 10. . Yea it was anteverted by a standing law in the c●se of the elder brother dying childeless † Whereby the heirship did not descend upon the next Brother who then was his Father's firstborn, but was entailed upon a child to be begotten by him on the widow of the deceased, which child was to inherit his Uncle's estate, and so put by his own Father. Deut. 25 5. Mat. 22.24. If primogeniture had been the constant law, and channel of Government, why was it pronounced as a peculiar curse upon Canaan the son of Ham the younger son of Noah, that he should be a servant to his brethren. 7. Lastly, The preeminence of the firstborn is supposed at the first to have been as well in matters Religious, as Secular, and to have comprised the office of Priesthood * See the Chaldee paraphrase on Gen 49.3 Musculus and Ainsworth on the same, and the latter on cap. 15.31. . Yet that was (after a time) taken away from it perpetually, and was under the law put into one tribe, and family in Israel; and ever since the Ecclesiastical function hath been merely institutive, and not hereditary. Whereby it may appear that the preeminences yielded to primogeniture in the beginning were not all of them of the unchangeable law of nature, or any moral, or perpetual institution, but some of them (at least) arbitrary, mutable, and temporary. Having argued first the claim of Fatherhood, then that of Primogeniture, I shall add this further of them laid both together. Whatsoever respect, or reverence either the relation of a Father, or of a firstborn hath at any time carried any where; and whatsoever power was deferred to them at the beginning, they cannot be imagined to have been intended by God, or ordained by the law of nature as a fixed and constant basis, no nor to be of any permanent use so much as to give us light, either for the beginning; founding, or raising up of a Magistracy where it is wanting, or for the legitimating, or deducing, and deriving of an original right, or title to any that is already in being. 1. If we consider the multiplication, division, confusion, and extinction of families that hath been. 1. The multiplication: Now that mankind hath for so long a time been sprung forth into a world of families and kindreds, which are every day sprouting out into more. 2. Division: the stock or family of Adam is, and long since hath been not only multiplied, and disseminated into innumerable families, but those have been parted into a multitude of (yea almost innumerable) Nations, and distinct politic bodies. 3. Confusion: every one of those nations is not only constituted of numberless families, but those are so confounded, and shuffled together, that no distinction of any one stock in a continued descent from Adam, or Noah is left; and so the priority of geniture as reckoned from either of them, to be in one family, and person in relation to the rest of mankind, or of the same Commonwealth is utterly unknown, and unconjecturable. Length of time, want of records, removal, and shifting of habitations, the identity, variety and change of the names of persons, and places, and many other things have overwhelmed with dark oblivion all knowledge of such distinction, and priority. 4. Extinction of families: as the persons, so the stocks and lineages of men have a mortality upon them, and in time divers of them are worn out, and come to a period. Now then, when mankind is looked upon as at present, and for some thousands of years it hath been drawn out into so many lines, and races, and those some broken off, others transversed, interwoven, and mingled both in blood, and dwelling without any pale or difference of stock, or precedency of birth deduced from primitive antiquity, though the Father, and first-begotten, though both in the house, and in the Commonwealth as far as they are known, retain still a right, and respect at their hands, who stand in the relation of children, and younger brethren to them, and in the latter the title of dominion being once fixed in a stock or family, the paternal, and protogenial relations are of use to keep it on in succession, and to convey it from person to person, yet they are of no force to bottom, or raise a title to Civil Sovereignty upon, over, or in reference to those who stand not in any known relation of children, or younger brethren, or any juniority of descent to them. This may confidently enough be affirmed, It cannot be said of any person, or family in the world, nor could have been for these many ages, that he, or it claimeth, or holdeth the throne in such a nation by a right of Fatherhood, or Primogeniture derived from the first father, or first eldest son. 2. But if none of these obscurities were, but distinction of families, and their order of precedency, and subsequency of descent from the first head of mankind were clear; so that in every nation, or State, one family or race could be pointed out as the eldest, and first of the Nation in descent from Adam, or Noah, yet there shall lie difficulties incident to the pretence of succession by birth-priviledge, even within any one family, not to be extricated by the evidence of a natural pedigree, or any otherwise then by positive constitution. How many questions do Civilians agitate about the right of succession where the lineage is known? and what different rules and methods of succession do they observe in several Nations and Kingdoms? He that shall but read one Chapter in Grotius (viz. de Jure belli lib. 2. cap. 7.) may discover that variety of opinion, and practise in this point of succession that may satisfy him of the entangledness and intricacy of it. There is one way of succession which they call hereditary, and another lineal, and of the lineal there is one which they term agnatical, wherein males only are admitted, another cognatical in which females are included. There are some questions concerning what children shall succeed their Father, as, whether begotten only, or also adopted; and whether Legitimate only, or the natural, or bastard child also. There is a question about the matter into which the succession is to be; to wit, whether if a man have a plurality of issue, the dominion shall pass undivided to one, or be distributed into many portions, that is, to every child a share. There is some question of succession to him that hath issue; as, whether a man's firstborn dying before him, and leaving issue, the issue of that son, or his own second-born shall inherit. But there are many questions of succ●ssion to him that hath not issue of his body; as whether his dominion shall go to his own brethren, and their issue in order, or to the brethren of his Father, or to any other of his ancestors upwards; whether his Brother's child, or his Uncle: whether his Brother's daughter, or his sister's son; whether his younger Brother, or the son of his elder Brother; whether the Daughter of his elder Brother, or his own younger Brother be to be preferred. These questions, and such like, the positive laws, constitutions, or customs of Nations do determine several ways, each in reference to their own territories; so that by virtue of them successions may be carried clearly and quietly. But the paternal, or protogenial right by itself, abstracted from those arbitrary constitutions, and as only laid upon the law of nature, or looked into by the light thereof, is as to these particulars indeterminate. The result of all this is, that the authors of this title of Government must be driven to confess it now out of use, and to be an impossible thing, to build any sovereign power that now is, or can be expected to be, or for most of the ages of mankind past, hath been in the world, upon it. Hence is it that after all their discourses upon it they tell us, in relation to all Governments that have been since the confusion of families, of an elective primogeniture (a contradiction in adjecto:) and that those Supreme Magistrates the world hath now, or can have, succeed in the place of the Father and firstborn. But if they come into their place, and not by their title, I ask then quo jure? by this it is yielded that Fatherhood and Primogeniture make out no title to them. And why then are these so much urged as the only original, rise, and claim of all ordinary dominion; and that exclusively, and in opposition to any other title, and specially against that which is by the vote, consent, and constitution of the people? They that hold these to be the sole rest and basis of Civil Government, and confess that no Governors now extant can be said, or demonstrated to grow, or be built upon these, bring themselves to this resolution, that there neither is nor can be by any ordinary means, any known, lawful Government in the earth. And accordingly one of them is thus express * Observations of the original of Government, in the Anarchy of a limited, and mixed Monarchy pag. 12. ; All Kings that now are, or ever were, are or were either fathers of their people, or the heirs of such fathers, or the usurpers of the right of such fathers. But before he involve all the Princes of the earth that either are, or have been since the earth was divided (about a hundred years as I take it after Noah's flood) under this brand of usurpation, or a suspicion of it so strong as it lays every one of them under the odds of ten thousand to one to be deserving of it, I would desire his title of Fatherhood and Primogeniture, both, or either of them might be cleared of the incongruities and incapacities not only of being an evident, and knowable, but of being a practicable, and possibly existent way of carrying on a course, and succession of Government in the several states of the world from age to age, the which have been above in this paper imputed, and argued to attend them. I will only take a little notice of the main and cornerstone, which the friends of this opinion lay to found it upon, and so pass from it. This is the universal Monarchy which they presuppose Adam had from God; and which, or any part whereof none of his posterity could have, but by grant, or succession from him. But let this be supposed, what will be gained by it to their purpose? 1. Touching the universal Monarchy of Adam, it will be questioned how he had, or received it? Whether by natural right, as the Father of all, or by an immediate express and positive grant from God. 2. Besides the way of immediate and express grant from God, which it may be supposed▪ Adam, and after him some other special persons (as Moses, Saul, David had) there must be acknowledged a mediate, and ordinary way of Gods advancing of persons to authority, and power, which is standing, general and common to all times, and places. And of this our controversy is. I inquire therefore how this universal Monarchy of Adam passed from him unto others. 1. Whether distributively, and piecemeal to many, that is to his sons, cach a share, or whole, and solid to one? 2. Whether it passed from him to them, or any of them by his arbitrary and positive assignment, or by order, or law of nature, as to the heir, or heirs general. 3. If by his voluntary assignment it passed to whom, and in what proportion he pleased, than the natural right of Fatherhood or Primogeniture took no place at his death, carried not the Civil power from him, and so cannot challenge to convey it downwards. 4. If by order or law of nature it passed from him, than the question will be, 1. Whether they that succeeded to him had it by right of Progenitorship, that is, by reason of the Fatherhood which was in them in relation to their posterity, who were therefore their subjects, so that upon that title, every son of Adam was sovereign to the issue that came of him. But than it will be said, this course of deriving Supreme Magistracy could be but temporary, and must needs have a stop, for otherwise it would multiply Commonwealths in infinitum, according to the multiplication of Fathers, and confine Commonwealths to extend no further, then to comprise a Father and his children, which (as was argued before) is neither agreeable to the practice of men, even from the time of Noah, nor to the end of a Commonwealth, which is union of a multitude of households for strength, and security. When therefore this course of Genarchy ceased, what was the way of continuing Government? 2. Or it passed from Adam by right of inherence, to Adam's sons, as his sons, and so as heirs of their Father. And this is a way different from that of Progenitorship, and upon this point the right of Fatherhood and that of Primogeniture are at odds, and prove (as to the purpose of conveying power from Adam) inconsistible. For if the Civil power went by Fatherhood, than were all Adam's sons joint successors in it (as was before said) every one in relation to his posterity: if it went by primogeniture, but one of them could by that claim the power, and this will run as upon the necessi y of having but one Monarchy over all mankind, throughout all ages, which was above disproved. Unless we must say the first-begotten could but claim a double portion of power, and then the rest of the sons had each a single part in proportion to his double. But this, 1. Falls again upon the absurdity even now alleged of multiplying Commonwealths by the endless number of Fathers. 2. Out of what, or whom would you make the eldest son a double portion? without depriving some other of the sons of his single part, and so destroying the right of inheritance, to it you could make no addition to the single share of the first born, or give him dominion over more than he was superior to by virtue of his own Fatherhood. To make an end therefore with this point, if the insisting on the mere natural right either of Fatherhood, or Primogeniture will not beat us out a clear path for the derivation of Government from Adam, or carrying it on with some justifiableness of title among men, than we must return to that of voluntary agreement, and grant; unto which the true natural right of Fatherhood is not repugnant, but may very well be reconciled, yea, and assistant unto the founding, and continuing Civil Government. Some of them that insist on the Father's power as the only Civil Power in the world, do yet place in him a right to transfer it from himself, unto whom he pleaseth. If this be granted than I will say the way of settling Civil authority by the agreement, or consent of the governed, might thus come in. Suppose we Adam to have ruled as sole Monarch during his life; afterward some one of his sons in succession to him, or all his sons each over their own progeny as distinct societies; after by the confusion of languages they being forced to sever; or when those distinct races of Adam became so numerous, and dispersive over many countries that they were too vast to be continued in one society, they may be supposed each of them voluntarily to withdraw, or part themselves into several Commonwealths, and the Fathers of the families in every of these new erected Commonwealths having in them the interest of power each in relation to his children, and family, and agreeing together for themselves, and theirs to some one as their public civil-head, or King; and thus cometh in Magistracy to be voluntarily constituted in that way wherein the right of Fatherhood is preserved, and continued in subordination to the Civil public power; and this put in such a way, as both it, and politic societies of convenient amplitude might be kept up, and new ones (as need should require) might be erected; whereas by the mere right of Fatherhood, holding, and exercising the power it had in relation to those only who were natural children to it, it could not be, no not with the supplement of Primogeniture, as was before showed. And with this the Assertors of the sole right of Fatherhood are driven in a sort to comply * See the Anarchy, etc. p. 11. . 2. I come to the second way of attaining a title to Government above proposed to consideration, which is, that of Conquest. The jus gladii as it is understood, and qualified by many Grave, Learned, and approved Authors, I shall not here call into question; But that the Sword, and success of it unto victory, simply, and by itself, whatsoever the cause, or quarrel pursued by it be, or taken, as it may be, separate from, or contradictory to the choice, or consent of the people, can be a sufficient and justificatory title to Civil Government, I cannot yield. We know how Augustine August. de Civ. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 4. hath branded this claim with the style of Magnum Latrocinium. In supply of the halts, and defects which at every turn are detected to occur in the title of Fatherhood, and Primogeniture, an Author of that way (I even now quoted) findeth this shift, The obedience which all Subjects yield to Kings is but the paying of that duty, which is due to the supreme Fatherhood. Many times by the act either of usurper himself, or of those that set him up, the true heir of a Crown is dispossessed. In such cases the subjects obedience to the Fatherly power must go along and wait upon God's providence, who only hath right to give, and to take away Kingdoms, and thereby to adopt subjects into the obedience of another Fatherly power † The Anarchy, etc. pag. 12. . Hereby the Fatherly right, and power are made a mere Equivocum, or to signify power entitled, or coming in any way whatsoever, though it do not only not derive from the right of Fatherhood, but be privatively opposed to, or destructive of it: and thus he confounds, and makes to meet together in one name, and title, the thing that he had argued against, with the thing that he had asserted. And the saying that Providence in dispossessing of a Crown, him that is the true heir (and so hath the right) and disposing it to the hands of an unjust invader, doth put a fatherly power in that invader, and adopt the subjects to an obligation to it; is to deny the right both of paternity and birthright, and of the consent of the people, and of every other special way of conveying a title to Government, and to make the right thereof only to follow, come by, and consist in possession, and to die forthwith in the Father, and heir upon dispossession. And to what purpose then is all his plea for Fatherhood, and primogeniture, or any other man's for any other title? what a void distinction is that of his when he distinguisheth of a natural, and an a usurped right? According to him now there is no Power, but Fatherhood, no Fatherhood, but possession. But let us pass by this lax, and wide claim to dominion by the sword, which swalloweth up all other titles, and look into that which I noted to be qualified, and cautioned (and so admitted by learned authors ancient and modern) as it is distinguishable from this, and reconcileable with that of the consent of the ruled. Two ways I observe the Sword is admitted to conduce, or have influence into the disposal, or placing of Government, but by neither is it made the sole, or the immediate ground, or cause of a right or title to it, or any otherways then as concordant with that political constitution I have asserted. 1. Conquest (or the Conqueror rather) is admitted to be interested in Government where it is the effect of a real and just war. And so it makes no exception against my assertion. That Victory which is acknowledged justly to lay claim to a Crown is the issue of such a war as supposeth the equity and necessity of the war to be on the victor's part, and the default and provocation to be on the part of the conquered; and moreover that the default of the conquered is so high as either to detain from the Conqueror his right, or to forfeit into his hands by wrong offered their power, or liberty in the enjoyment, or disposal of the throne, and that there is a necessity on the part of the Conqueror in reference to his attaining and enjoying of his own right, and just security therein, that he take and use that forfeiture * Vide Gro●a Jure ●elli. lib. 3. ca 15. Sect. 1. . In this case conquest is only a means to the conquerors seizing and holding of that power, or rule, which was his own before he prevailed, and which the cause, and state of the war (before the success obtained) entitled him unto. By which it is evident that his right is not founded on his victory, but was in being before it, and had its rise from an antecedent investure or trespass. Upon this ground it is, that the title of the sword is alleged not by itself alone, but in subjunction to another title. A late Historian tells us that our King Henry the seven●h at his coronation was proclaimed with these titles, Hen●icus Rex Angliae, Bucks History of Richard the Third, lib. 2. pag. 54, 55. Jure Divino, Jure Humano, & Jure belli. And that the Pope (Innocent the 8.) in his bull to the said King, Anno 1486. hath the●● words, Hic Rex Angliae de domo Lancastriae originem trahens, ac qui notorio Jure, & indubitato proximo successionis Titulo, & praelatorum, & procerum Angliae electione, & successione, etc. etiam de Jure belli est Rex Angliae. And this way of ingress into the seat of Authority as it is not grounded on conquest as its title, so it is not privative of, or altogether another from that which was before affirmed to be the only ordinary way, viz. the consent of the people. Forfeiture as it is a singular exception that lies in many cases, so it presupposeth a law, or constitution that ordains it, and so in a sort involveth their consent of whom it is taken. Though there be no explicit, and present act of will in the conquered that the Conqueror shall reign over them, but an utter averseness, and all possible reluctancy against, and that brings the war: yet it is so allowed to be (when that case is put which is presupposed as the cause of the war) by the law of Nations, yea, of Nature: and being so, their wills have antecedently, originally, and implicitly subscribed to it, as such, and are therefore in this manner concluded in it. In like manner as we account that to be by a man's will, or consent, which his Predecessors (in whom he is virtually included) have willed, or himself hath formerly granted, though now he be quite of another mind. He that gives his vote, personally, or by proxy, to any penal law, or act to be binding to the community of which he is, though he do not formally, and absolutely will his own punishment, yet he doth it interpretatively, consequentially, and conditionally, if he himself shall fall under the provision of that Act: and his will so passed is, upon his offending after it, sufficient to make his punishment not only just in itself, but just ex ore proprio, and to have his own consent. 2. As Conquest may interest a person in Government by being an attainment of possession in pursuance of an antecedent right, so the other sort of conquest, to wit, that which is a seizing of another's right, or the setting of a man in meet possession, may have some tendency thereto, though not so directly, and that is thus; It may be an inducement to the conquered (if they be indeed free, and unengaged to any other) to a submission, and delivery up of themselves to be the subjects of the victor, and to take him for their Sovereign. The former way conquest is postnate and subsequent to the right of the Conqueror, and so doth not give him his title, but only introduce his possession; this latter way it is antecedaneous, previous, and preparatory to his title, but is not productive or constitutive of it. Of this latter way of conquests leading to a title to dominion, I have spoken before, and refer my Reader thither * Chap. 3. Sect. 3. Subsect. 5. Proposition 5. . Only, whereas some object, that the title of the Sword, or Conquest hath been the usual beginning of the Kingdoms, and principalities which now are, or have been in the world. I answer, 1. A facto ad jus non valet argumentum. We do not ask, neither is it to the purpose, what hath been done in the getting of rule, but what ought to be, and what is the rise of that power which can truly derive from God, as his ordinance. 2. I take this assertion to be too broad, that this hath been the usual beginning of Dominions. Though many unjust invasions have been, yet that hath not been the constant birth of Sovereignty. I have before alleged humane testimony of the best authority to the contrary. 3. And where unlicentiate intrusion into the throne hath been, it hath commonly not continued, but the dominion hath been shortly, either dispossessed, or settled upon a better groundwork, by the consent of the interested, sufficiently valid (in point of conscience) to such an act. 3. But if the sword by itself cannot create a title, Let us see what the third forenamed way will help, Non enim si quid alicui est utile, id statim mihi licet ei per vim imponere. Nam his qui Rationis habent usum, libera debet esse utilium, & inutilium electio, nisi al●●ri jus quoddam in eos quaesitum sit. G●otius de Jure lib. 2. cap. 22. Sect. 12. either added to it, or alone, viz. that of voluntary beneficialness by protection. There are some who would build a kind of claim to rule upon the consideration of the good, or benefit which the Governing may be said to bring to the governed; which they will suppose it equal for him to obtrude upon them, though against their wills, and in recompense of it to exact their obedience to him. But such pretences of benefit, besides that they are often without reality, and are made the visor of proceed of a quite contrary tenor; were they never so real, cannot reach to such an effect. The intention, promise, or actual collation of a good ●urn doth not create a right in the promiser over him, or any thing of his to whom the same is done, without his consent, or acceptance of it with such a condition. To bring some colour for this claim of Dominion, there are by an Author alleged some cases out of the Civil law; they are contained under that head of obligations which they call, ex quasi contracta, and particularly they are of those, ex negotiis gestis. There is, saith that law, an obligation, debt, or duty upon a man, when one's business is done, without his consent to his benefit. In this case the obligation is upon the owner of the business done, unto the Gestor or doer of it. The said Author, 1. Urges the case de neg●tiorum gestione, in general. 2. Insists on that particular one of the minor to his guardian, which, saith he, is the case of the Commonwealth, according to that maxim, Res publica semper est in curâ, & tutelâ * A R ply to Dr. sanderson's Letter, pag. 5. . 1. To the case in general, ex negotiis gestis, I say, there is a wide disparity betwixt it, as stated by the Civilian, and this, for which it is alleged. 1. In that case the ground of the obligation, and compensation awarded is because the thing done is behooveful, for the party obliged, to be done, and yet no consent can be possibly given, the person whose business it is being supposed by reason of absence, death, nonage, madness, or such like impediment incapable of giving consent. There is no such ground here where the parties he would have obliged are extant, present, and of age to declare their mind, and do either declare their dissent, or not declare their assent. 2. What is the extent, or matter of the obligation in that, ex negotiis gestis? not the passing of the beneficiary into the dominion of the benefactor, but only an obligation of debt to the repayment of such necessary charges, as the gestor hath been at; it being all reason that in doing another's business commodiously to that other, the doer should be indemnified. But no obligation here to a new personal state of subjection. By the law a Tutor, or Curator may oblige them under his charge without their consent in their goods to defray his layings out for them, but he cannot without their consent oblige them in a personal relation, as in marriage, or servitude, which are obligations of state. 3. The law acknowledgeth such an obligation as is specified but under those cautions as do exclude, and contradict the conclusion for which they are here brought. As 1. It denies that obligation if a man handle another man's business as his own. 2. If a man act another's occasions after that other hath forbidden, or disclaimed his acting. 3. If they be acted, no necessity requiring it * Vide Greg. Thol● sa●i Syntag. ●u●i●, lib. ●9. cap. ● Sect. 〈…〉 2. Sect. 8, 9, 11. . 2. To that of the Minor, or Pupil in particular. 1. Though the Law allows the Guardian his charges out of the Minor, yet it allwes not any one to be a Curator that will undertake it. That's against the very nature and end of Curatorship, which is to defend the minor from invasors. He that is a Tutor (that is a Guardian of one under the age of 14. years) must be either jure civili datus, or permissus; he must either be Testamentary, that is, assigned by the decaseds will; or Dative, that is appointed by the law, or magistrate. And he that is a Curator, (that is, over one above 14 but under 25 years old) must be chosen by the Minor, and constituted by the Law. The Civil Law expressly provides that they shall not be Tutors of Pupils who put themselves upon, or offer to buy or make suit for the employment, and lest this office should seem arbitrarily taken up, or by force put upon the Pupil or Minor, it ordains that military men be excepted from it. It gives both the Pupil, and the right Guardian an action against him that takes upon him that charge, being not lawfully ordained to it; yea, and against those that assist him in possessing, or exercising that place, and condemns the false Guardian in as much as the value of that wherein he deals amounts unto † Idem cap. 7. Sect. 2. lib. 13. cap. 1. Sect. 4. cap. 3. Sect. 1. cap. 10. Sect. 6, 16, 37, 38, 39 lib. 12. cap. 4. Sect 6. . Let these rules of the saw about Tutorship to a Pupil take place in the case of the Commonwealth, and its Guardian, and this title by arbitrary beneficialness will gain little by this parallel. 2. Whereas he saith, the Commonwealth is always in pupillage. It is but an allusive, or comparative speech; and is therefore unapt to be argumentative. A similitude must not be made run of all four. It can only import somethings appertaining to a Pupil may be in way of resemblance attributed to the Commonwealth. But it were easy to show divers things wherein there is also a dissimilitude, * Idem lib. 12. cap. 2. Sect. 2. lib. 13. cap. 10. Sect. 1. A Pupil cannot choose his Tutor, cannot call him to an account during his pupillage. But it's generally confessed, the Commonwealth may elect its Governors. And it's a publicly declared principle (I assert it not) the Supreme Power is accountable to the people. And himself breaks the correspondency most of all, in saying, the Commonwealth pupillage is everlasting, whereas the Pupil comes to puberty, and out of his pupillage at 14 years old. Subsection 6. CHAP. V SECT. iv Subsect. 6. A Solution of some Objections made against the passing of God's Ordination unto the person of the Supreme Magistrate by the consent of the people. HAving examined those other ways of conveying over unto persons the title unto Magistracy, and refuted them: It now remains, that we take notice of some allegations against the people's consent, being the ordinary medium of God's ordination of a person unto the sovereign power; which some, seeing they think them fit to be urged, will judge worthy either to be assented to, or answered. 1. Object. The Anarchy, etc. above cited, pag. 8. If no man have power to take away his own life, without the guilt of being a murderer of himself, how can the people confer such a power as they have not themselves, upon any one man without being accessories to their own deaths? Answ. This Reason seems to ground itself upon that common Axiom, Nihil dat quod non habet; whence it argues, the people cannot give the power of capital punishment over them unto any person, because they have it not, cannot inflict it, each upon himself. But it is misgrounded. 1. Here is ignoratio clenchi. For, as we yield it true that the people have not a civil authority every one over his own life, so we do not say, but here deny, that they can confer it upon another. The concession of a power in the people to nominate, or elect their Sovereign doth not infer so much, viz. that they in so doing give, or confer upon him the Magistratical power. They may be subordinate agents, and their vote, or consent may be the medium, or instrument used by God to convey that power to the person, but they cannot therefore be said to be the Creators, efficients, authors, or donors of that power, for that is the properwork or prerogative of God. When the young Prophet came to Jehu, and poured the oil upon his head, and said unto him, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, I have anointed thee King over the people; can we say, that Prophet made Jehu King? That young man was not the author, but the messenger only of that business. It is very clear in the conveyance of this, and of other powers, one may be the vehiculum, the hander over of that power to another, which he is not the possessor of himself. A single woman hath not in her the marital power over herself, yet by her consent in marriage she conveys it to her husband. The people of a Christian congregation, or Church have not each the power of a Pastor, or Minister to Preach, administer a Sacrament, or the Keys of Discipline to himself, yet by their election they may be instrumental to convey the same to another. When the King in whom the power of life, and death is, giveth commission to a Judge to have, and execute it subordinately from, and for him, and sends his order to the Keeper of his seal (required by the Law to make such a Commission authentic) to pass and seal the said Commission; we cannot say, the Keeper gives the Judge the said Commission, but it is the King ●hat confers it by this Officers hand. That which the people's consent doth when they agree that this person shall be their Supreme Governor, is to determine the general rule (that every Commonwealth shall have a Magistracy with power of capital punishment) to the particular person in relation to that people; but it makes them not to be conferrers efficients, or primary causes of that Magistracy. When a power or privilege is by divine institution annexed to the act of the creature, it is not the creatures act properly, or efficiently, but God by his institution that communicates that power, or privilege. 2. This Objection, in its proper tendency, doth not more argue against he people's capaci●y to confer the power over life upon any person (which is a thing we affirm not) than it doth against the people's giving their consent, that such a one shall have the said power over them. For upon the same medium it may be argued, if no man have power to take away his own life without the guilt of being a selfmurderer, how can any people consent to such a power in another without being accessories to their own deaths? But that the people may very lawfully give their consent to such a power in another, I hope the Objector will not deny; If he should, I would say the people of Israel did lawfully give their consent to such a power in Saul, David, Solomon, and others; yea it is the part of every people to consent to the Rulers to have it, unless we must say that all Subjects are to be under their Governors against their wills. 3. But how then must we avoid the Reason, If I may not take away or destroy mine own life, I may not agree that another shall have the power to do it? I answer, This is a very false assertion, that power which one hath not, and may not himself exercise, he may not consent to in another; If by power be meant (as it must needs be in the Objection) a power that is in its own nature lawful. Indeed that which is simply, or in itself unlawful, (as for instance, Murder) because it is so unlawful, as I may not do it myself, so I may not consent to another's doing of it: But that which is lawful in itself, but unlawful to me (as many things are) because though good in itself, yet I am not thereto called, or authorized, of that I cannot say, because I cannot do it myself, I may not consent to it in another. The Apostle Paul did give his consent to the taking away of his own life (conditionally if he deserved death, and the objection imports no other consent) when he was in question about it before his Judge * Act. 25.11. . If I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die. 4. From this antecedent, no man hath power to take away his own life without the guilt of self-murder, the conclusion would as well be, not only (ergo) the people cannot, but (ergo) no man can confer such a power on another, and thus the argument would run, as against the people's, so against any others conferring, (or consenting to, as to their sense who make the terms equivalent) such a power in another; so that by this it should be unlawful, 1. For a Prince, or any other Supreme power to transmit, resign, or put off their Government in their life time to another, which yet the Author of this objection allows. 2. For one that is a subject to no State, to desire or offer himself to, or accept of naturalisation, or incorporatien in any Commonwealth, under any civil power. 3. For one that is a member of a Legislative assembly, and out of it but a subject, to give his vote to an act for the punishing of a crime with death, by which his own life is concerned, as subjected to death by the said act upon his breach of the same. Yet I suppose no man can defend any of these to be unlawful. And for the last it is very ordinary, and generally allowed, and the reason is; Because such a persons vote, and the ordaining of such a law doth not create a power of life, and death, nor confer it de novo on the Magistrate to whom the execution of it is committed. It only doth determine, or apply that power which is already instituted by God, and inherent in the Magistrate, to its particular matter, such a fact: or, make that power which was in him in actu signato, to be in him in actu exercito, in reference to such a crime. As therefore a Parliament man's vote conduceth to determine, or apply that power which was in some sort in being before to its particular matter, this fact; so doth the people's vote determine that power which was in some sort ordained before, that is, instituted by God, to its particular subject, this person. I have thus dispatched their Herculean argument; let us see what more is said. 2 Object. The Anarchy. etc. pag. 11. This supposed right in the people to choose, or constitute their Government is a thing which it is not possible for them any way lawfully to exercise. To make this objection good, and to show the difficulty, or imp●ssibility of the said exercise they raise these scruples. 1. Sith nature must be supposed to have left mankind lose, or unreduced into civil, public societies, how come they distributed into distinct Commonwealths, so as this person, family, or people belong to this State, that to another severally? Answ. 1. It must be supposed that nature hath ordained (upon supposal of the multiplication, and spreading of men over the several regions of the earth) a partition of men into divers civil Societies, to be under distinct, and peculiar civil Governments. So that in actu signato, or in specie mankind is naturally bound, and is not in that respect originally free: but in actu exercito they are naturally free (as to political we mean, not as to paternal subjection) that is, originally the reduction of men into this or that Commonwealth distinct from others is yet to do, the union of them into one, or division into many civil States is yet unmade; and it is yet in facto undetermined of what society this, or that person, family, or people shall be, and so unto what civil Superior they belong. This is very apparent. A Commonwealth's Society is made by some act, constitution, or law, which ordinarily is humane, or transacted by men according to that of Augustine, August. de libero Arbitr. lib. 1. cap. 6. Ex hominibus una lege societatis populus constat: there must be men before there can be a family; the being of families is before that of a Commonwealth, the Commonwealth is before the Magistrate; and a distinction of Commonwealths before a plurality of Supreme Magistrates. There must be the matter before the form, the constituting parts before the constitution, the esse absolutum before the esse relativum of these respective societies, and correlatives; and therefore a natural freedom, or original unengagedness of men in actu exercito. Which yet we must not so understand, as if now every single person still were born free, and so remaineth until he by his personal act contract an engagement; for in the erection of communities, and Governments in them, the Master of the family, having the rule thereof, representeth all the persons of his house; and the persons then actually incorporate involve their posterity; so that only they in this respect are free who are not by the act either of themselves, or of their progenitors, or other representers compacted in society with others. They that think it irrational that the Father should represent & involve the family, must resolve us how the Religious and civil covenants of Israel, and Judah made in Moses, Josuahs', Davids, Asas, Joashes, hezekiah's, Josiahs, and Nehemiahs' days did comprehend, and bind as well the absent as the present, and their posterity born, and yet unborn; as also how the laws, and contracts continually passed by some do take in others not personally consenting. 2. Sith the partition of Commonwealths is acknowledged by the Objectors as well as by us, and both must say it is not determined, or brought to the actus exercitus by nature, it behoves not us, nor toucheth our assertion that this query be cleared, more than it doth them, and theirs: and possibly if they will resolve this their own Question, we shall accord with them in the Answer. And to make it somewhat more explicate, if they would please t● resolve us, how any one Commonwealth hat● been (without immediately divine direction, as was that of Israel) constitute, or raised out of a multitude of collateral families destitute of one natural Father, common to them all (as doubtless most, or all that are, or ever were have been) we might (I think) easily agree, how the distribution of mankind into many civil States hath come) and if I must here spend mine opinion it is brought to pass, or effected, 1. Not by Consanguinity, or tie of blood, for this is in some degree extensive to all mankind: and for a confinement of it within any certain degrees whereby to make a division of Commonwealths, 1. There is no direction from Nature or Scripture, either that any such confinement shall make out the bounds of a Commonwealth, or what such degrees are. 2. There is no ordinary means left, or possibility of knowing what persons (of any number near to that of a Commonwealth) are within such degrees, and what without. 3. It is contingent to a Commonwealth (and rarely if ever known) to consist of one distinct kindred, or stock: and it is contingent to such a kindred to be comprised within one Commonwealth: collateral lineages being ordinarily, either dissociated into several republics, or but intermixed with, and parcels of one. 2. Not by Cohabitation; for though that be convenient to be amongst them that are one Commonwealth: yet, 1. It is not always so, one part of a Commonwealth sometimes lying from another beyond the Seas, or beyond another, or divers other Nations, yea some imes one part in Europe, another in East-India or America. 2. How far that cohabitation must go, or to what compass to be the boundaries of a Commonwealth inclusively, and extensively, is not by any general rule, much less by any dictate of nature defined, or otherwise determined then by humane choice; and so it is not uniformly, or by one constant proportion, but variously, and unequally; every Commonwealth being of a different latitude of place from others; and one, and the same Republic often varying from itself by vicissitudinary contraction, and extension. 3. Naturalisation, or Denisonship is not tied to habitation, but ordinarily, some that live among are not of, and some that are of live not among this, or that Nation, or State. 3. Not by men's appertaining, or subjection to one Sovereign, or Civil head. For 1. A Commonwealth being ens aggregatum, and the term unto which a Magistrate is immediately referred being not a multitude of persons in their individual, or single beings, but as aggregate, and form into one body politic, the Magistrate cannot be, either in nature, or time, before the aggregation, or the republic union, and relation of the people one to another as one State, and therefore cannot be the procreant, or efficient cause thereof. 2. The same person we know may be the Civil head or Sovereign Lord of divers politic bodies, they under him still remaining divers. 4. It remains therefore to be done (as far as my imagination reacheth) only by consent; and this consent to be the consent of all that are interessed in the association, viz. of the parties themselves to be incorporate, and of those whether superiors, or people they are dissociated, or severed from. It is most congruous to say the distinction of politic societies, or distributing one into many cometh by the same means, or hath the same efficient, which the first contract, or entering into politic society hath: but that is the voluntary accord of the associated: as not only the learned agree * Boterus de Origin. urbium lib. 1. cap. 1. Bodin de Repub. lib. 1. cap. 6. Althusius polit. cap. 4. pag. 24. Grot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 6. Sect. 4. Dithmars' Polit. lib. 1. pag. 20. , but plain reason dictates. It is a common principle, which not only Scripture, and humane Authors tell, but our own experience suggests to us, That man is a sociable creature, fitted for, and affected to mutual converse, and is by his natural instinct, and bent led to seek acquaintance, cohabitation, and communion with his kind. To this we may add his necessity in man's vitiated state, of distributive Justice, and defence against occurrent injuries † Dum enim haec amittere timent, tenent in his utendis quendum modam aptum, vinculo civitatis, qualis ex hujusmodi hominibus constitui potest. August. de liber. Arbitr. lib. 1. cap. 15. . By these two inducements men were betimes, and still are moved to close together in large, and populous societies; and then to erect Government for the upholding of them in union, order, equity and safety; And beginning first with the aggregation of one politic body, when that, by multiplication of mankind, was grown over numerous, and unwieldy to its self and its superiors, if no distemper could have arisen to have made a violent breach; no such immediate, and miraculous hand of God should have interposed as was that of the confusion of tongues; yet mere populousness, and distance of habitation thence ensuing would have persuaded to a partition into more Commonwealths. It is very probable that the division of the earth made in the days of Peleg * Gen. 10.25. was a distribution, and alotment thereof unto several Nations, and Kingdoms, into which mankind were then severed; and that the first partition of Commonwealths (at least after the flood) was then made: and that it was occasioned by the confusion of Languages at Babel: for immediately before that it is said, the people were one. Occasioned (I say) for that occasion did but prepare men for that reduction into divers communities, in that it did dissolve their union, and parcel, and disperse them abroad upon the face of the earth, by making them uncapable of conversing together (and some of the Hebrew Doctors say, it did set them at odds and embroiled them in fight, and bloodshed: Vide Cartwright. in Gen. 11.7. ) but it did not mould, of incorporate the several parties so divided asunded into several communities; no, that was the effect of some other cause, and what should that be but the joint will and conspiration of the severally languaged, and severed parties each among and for themselves immediately acted? and therefore we read both of the sons of Japhet, and of all the sons of Noah, that they were divided by families, tongues, and lands into distinct nations * Gen. 10.5, 31, 32. . But though that were the occasion of the division then made, yet many after divisions in every age (almost) there have been of nations into new Commonwealths; as also unitings of more Republics into one: of which divisions though confusion, and discord, not of tongues, but of minds (even as a modern Author would have that at Babel to have been no more † Tho Anglus. Instit. peripat. Append. cap. 19 Sect. 5, 6. ) hath been as oft as any other thing the occasion, yet such discord could be but the introduction unto, not the former, or founder of new Commonwealths; the associating of them could only be accomplished by the will, and consent of the incorporated. As for the distinction of property in Lands and other possibles which must needs accompany this partition of Commonwealths when the first divisions after the flood, or any since were made, whereby the prrties distributed, left unto those they parted from the Country wherein they were, and entered into void regions, there could be no entrenchment upon the common right of mankind by such entry; there being a sufficient consent given to it by all others, in that the places were left, and exposed empty in regard both of occupation, and claim. The first property whether National, or personal unto Land or goods accrueing, if not by an Express declared consent, and agreement of the first multitude in whom a common-right promiscuously, or indiscriminately resided, yet doubless by their real accord, signified by their act of session, permission, or giving way unto the seizure and enjoyment of the first occupant. Vide Grotium de Jure Belli. lib. 2. cap. 2. Sect. 3. 2. This doubt being passed, the next is, Commonwealths being distinguished, how come these, each to set up their Supreme Rulers? In this matter, 1. It is Objected, That either it must be done by a universal consent, even to a man nemine contradicente, The same Author and Book, pag. 9 and this is impossible to be; or the major part must conclude the rest: and against this they say, The major part binds not the whole, unless either men first agree to be so bound, or a higher power so commands. Unto this I answer, It may be supposed that each community at their first coalition, either judge themselves bound by the law of nature (which is a superiors command) to stand to the vote of the major part, or are so wise as either to constitute that, or some other way of bringing their matters of public interest unto a result obligatory to the whole. Common reason will guide them to the one at least of these, or rather to both, for if it dictate the former, it must be presumed to bring on the latter, viz. either by , or express consent. The dictate of right reason, in materia morali, I suppose must be yielded to be the appointment of nature. But that the major part doth conclude the whole in those affairs the determination of which doth necessarily concern the whole, until su●● time as they have settled the determination of such affairs to be by other persons, or means, seems to be the plain dictate of right reason. For in this case, the very end of a multitudes associating, and becoming one Commonwealth, and the being, and interest of them as such is concerned that so it be. 1. From a people's becoming one society, there doth result in them a faculty, and interest to act some things politically: all being is in order to action, and every actus primus is for an actus secundus; and a Political being is for Political operation; and although such a body may put off its affairs to be acted not pierce totum, immediately, but vicariously by particular organs, or members, yet some acts it must needs put forth immediately, viz. such as conduce to the organizing of itself, and such also as are necessary to its own preservation, and cannot be, or are not transected by others; as suppose a common engine, or other calamity be seizing on a people destitute of, or neglected by particular subsidiaries. 2. In those matters that are to be acted immediately by the whole community, there must be some way for them to come to a resolution and conclusion about ●hem. If the concurrence of the whole multitude (very numerous and vast) to a single person be not at all, or not ordinarily possible, or likely, then cannot that he the way of determination: and if not that, than some other there must be: and what more obvious, natural, and congruous to reason then this, that the lesser part be swayed, and obliged by the greater? 3. Yea what other expedient can common sense suggest but this? When a thing is proposed to the determination of a multitude which requires a conclusion by them either positive or negative, and there is foreseen likely, or found to be a diversity of sense, and vote among them, 1. In case the major part consent, and the minor deny the thing, either the major part must carry it for the whole, or the negative of the minor by their dissent carries it against the major; which is against all Reason. 2. And if the major be for the negative, and the minor for the affirmative, either the minor must be overruled by the negative of the major, or standing to their affirmative they must secede, and be severed into another Common wealth: for to the nature of a community it is required that there be communio juris: and this secession, as it is unreasonable to be made by a lesser party without the others consent, so it, and the occasion of it admitted tends to the making void, and ruining of societies. This course then, of the minor parts obliging the whole, appearing so necessary to the acting, and to the subsistence of a community, why may we not conclude it in the cases, and matter above specified to be the dictate of nature * Vide Grotium lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 17. ? 2. If the major part be allowed to conclude the whole; it is next asked, Idem pag. 10. How shall the whole people be assembled? Here are two difficulties; 1. Where all are equally interested, and authorised what one or more, less than the whole hath power to appoint time, or place, or give summons to the rest; without which appointment it is unjust to bind the absent? R. It is to be presumed this scruple is practically precluded, by the people's proceeding when they agree to become one people; for, who can imagine but that than they have the end, and immediate necessary acts, for which they join to be a community, before them, and in order to them, either they forthwith make choice of the Government they shall be under, and provide for a succession in it, and the means by which it shall be continued; or if that be not at the first instant dispatched, they appoint how they shall come together, or p●sse their resolutions on that, or the like public occasion. We see there is a course to be taken for such assemblies in the polarchies that now are, as in the united Provinces of the Netherlands, in Venice, Genoa, and the rest. Yea the many distinct Republics of Germany confederate in one general interest, and band as one great community have their order how to assemble, and hold their public diets; as likewise have the thirteen united Commonwealths of the Swissers; who upon any occasion of universal concernment have referred it to the Burgomasters of Zurich to give notice to all the Cantons to meet at Baden. And in the ancient State of Rome, the Consuls summoned the Senate, the Senate the Assembly of the Centuries; and the Tribunes the Assembly of the Tribes. 2. But suppose this uncertainty settled, and a diet orderly called, with time, and place appointed; another difficulty there is, which may be subdivided into two; Idem ibid. 1. All cannot be present, one is sick, another is lame, a third is aged, a fourth under age: besides many are women, some are Virgins, all these are of the people, and how shall the consent of them be passed, or included? R. 1. These natural or personal defects are common to all mankind, and apt to incapacitate persons as much, or more for other humane affairs as for this, which yet are not therefore argued into a frustration. This occasion of a people's agreement about politic Government but rarely occurreth, but when a Government is settled, whether by our, or by the Objectors means, the daily management of it is much more obnoxious to these impediments in the person, or persons in whom it is seated; and when one of them seizeth on such a subject, it is prone to make a greater interruption in public concernments then all of them are wont to do in this, yet are Salvos in those cases ordinarily found out. 2. We have already seen that some acts at some time must needs be admitted to flow from a politic body immediately; now this objection doth not more lie against this of their agreement of Government then against any other. I say therefore a civil society having in it persons lying under all those occasions of absence, or non acting, and add to them one more, viz. that some list not to come, 'tis not thereby rendered actionlesse to this, or other purposes. But how are the exceptions removed? 3. Thus. 1. They that are absent are either incapable of giving a consent to any thing that concerns them, as are infants, and such as want the use of reason, or they are capable. 2. Of these latter, some are not personally interested in passing, or giving a vote in matters political, but are involved (as to these) in their Husbands, Parents, Masters, or Guardians; others have an interest personally to concur in them. 3. Of these some may be necessarily absent, as the sick, lame, decrepit, others are away volun arily. 1. For the necessarily absent. This is the case ordinarily, but of a few single persons in a great body, upon whom nature itself laying a present impediment, must needs be taken to lay a present suspense upon their interest of personal presence, and consent in the public business, and rather to will the divolving of it upon the other that can meet, then that they, and the whole community should be suspended from attaining, or effecting the dispatch of their public necessary affairs. As they to whom nature denies the use of reason, so they from she withholds the opportunity of bringing it to political exercise for want of bodily integrity may be comprehended by her in the actings of others in those things that appertain to the whole community they are of. 2. For the voluntarily absent, if some, yea many that may and should concur will not come, this must not prevent the whole, or the privilege of others; but rather by their default they put off their right as to the present act, and invest it in the rest * Vide Grot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 20. . We account (and justly) that a countrey-meeting a● which we choose our Parliament men, to which the people therein are called, though the twentieth part of them that are called do not appear. 2. Suppose all present, or the absence of those that are not, dispensed with, how can marry thou nds, or some millions of people, so m●et in one place as to communicate their minds to one another, and jointly deliberate, and come to a resolution in any thing? R. 1. Commonwealth's are usually very small at their beginning, which is the time of settling their Government for succession. 2. When they are come to growth they have another way of acting besides personal presence, and cognisance, viz. that of meeting, and transacting their concernments in, and by their Deputies, or representees. 3. As it is not very convenient, so it is not altogether impossible for the collective body (I mean those who make a collective assembly, to wit, grown men, and Masters of families, and especially so many of them as are disposed to come) to meet, and treat in an assembly. We have divers instances for it in the nation of Israel, and among the rest, one that was upon occasion of the Levites Concubine, mentioned in the history of the book of Judges Cap. 20, & 21. for the numerousness of, and universal accurrence to which assembly, let the Text be observed, Cap. 20. v. 1, 2, 12. Cap. 21. v. 5, 8. And the people of Rome, when come to a very large, and populous Commonwealth, had their meetings of this nature often in campo Martio. 4. And besides the Roman state found out ways of accommodating the difficulties of so vest an assemblies treating in one, by distributing themselves one way into distinct classes, and centuries; another way into several tribes, and giving their votes in those distinct partitions * Vide Tullium de legibus lib. 3. prope finem. . 3. Object. It's said, In case of a Commonwealth's want of a supreme Magistracy, Idem qui supra, pag. 11, 12. as when a King dies without heir, the power shall not escheat to the whole people, but to the supreme heads, and fathers of families, not as they are the people, but quatenus they are Fathers of people, over whom they have a Supreme power divolved unto them after the death of their Sovereign Ancestor; and if any have a right to choose a King it must be these Fathers by conferring their distinct Fatherly powers upon one man alone. Resp. It is well he acknowledgeth thus much, and we are so far agreed, that in case of a Kingdom's destituteness of a head there is an escheature of the power to some, and that it is to the heads, and Fathers of families, so as the right is in them to choose a King: only then upon this he thinks good to cast a thin shadow, or missed to make it seem, as if this were not the same with our tenant, & as it were to suborn another different way of introducing of Magistracy, which in truth hath no reality in it, but what is borrowed from, and built upon that our position. But 1. What means he by that Epithet Supreme, added to the heads, and fathers of families, as if he meant that all heads, and families are not interested in that Escheature, and election, but some only, distinguish by that title: And if this be his sense, I leave him to clear first how he differenceth those he calls Supreme from other heads, and Fathers. 2. Why he makes such a distinction, and limits the said power to some only of the Fathers under that notion of Supreme. 2. When he saith, The power escheates to the heads, and fathers of families. I ask, what power? the power which was before in the King, viz. a political, Supreme, Regal power? and how escheates, or descends it upon them, unitedly, or conjunctly, as copartners, and joint heirs of that whole, solid power in relation to the Community, or body politic? This indeed is the power of which the Question is, and which wants a lineal heir, or subject to bear it, upon the supposed death of the King: And if that descend upon them, it must either be in that manner specified, or else so as each person of them is the adequate possessor of the whole, and solid power, which I suppose will not be said: If that then be his meaning, lo here a Democracy yielded, and set up by him who elsewhere holds there is no ground for any such or any other polarchical form of Government, and that Monarchy is the only warranted form. Or, In his observations on Aristotle's Polit. doth be mean a private, Domestical, paternal power of each of those heads, and Fathers, not over the Commonwealth, but over their families severally, and respectively? But for this, 1. This is not the power which was in the King, and now by his decease without Lineal heir can be said to Escheat, or pass from him to any. 2. This cannot be said to come anew to them then, but must be acknowledged to have been in them whilst they had their King, to remain in them after they have chosen another in his place. 3 Where's he seems as if he would explain how there comes in this sense a supremeness into those persons, viz. They have a Supreme Power divolved unto them after the death of their Sovereign. Still it remains that he tell us what was above asked, viz. what that power is, whether Political, or Oeconomical, and how the power of either of those sorts can accrue De novo to them by such death. Indeed that domestical power which was in each of them before in relation to his particular, and private family they being left destitute of a Superior, or Political head, hath another habitude than it had before, being become negatively Supreme, that is, it hath none actually above it, but it is the same power still; or, if we shall say the power of the Pater familias in this vacancy may be put forth unto some acts in relation to the persons in his house, which he might not exercise while the Commonwealth had a Magistrate, I shall not dispute that, but only say, though the Economical power be somewhat larger, in actu exercito, when unsubordinate to a Political Sovereign than it is being subordinate, yet it is within the compass of Oeconomical still, and the same it was in actu signato. And that which he calls a Power divolved upon the head of the family by the Sovereign's death, is but the drawing forth into act of that which was in him before, but was suspended by the political relation, and subjection. That which then can be said to Escheat to the heads of families by such death of their King is a power to dispose of themselves in subjection to another, and of their votes for the election of him to be their Sovereign together (if you will, with a larger compass for the exercise of their paternal power in their families) during their want of Magistracy. 3. Whereas he saith, This power accrues to the heads and fathers of families not as they are the people, but quatenus, they are Fathers of people. 1. They are not Fathers, neither is any one of them a Father of a people, that is a Commonwealth, or body politic, but they are Fathers only of their respective families, and of the persons therein respectively; what power therefore is in them as in that relation can be but Domestical, and that which is in every Father. 2. What if those persons where no Fathers, but were single, and unsociate as to such a relation, that is, what if they were not over any other, or if they had no families, or children sprung from, or belonging to them, would not then the said power in the said case Eschear, or belong to them? If he say no, I demand his reason: if he say it would, than he must say it doth not Escheat to them as they are Fathers of people, but as persons and people of that Commonwealth. 3. Men that are Fathers of families cannot as such be in a capacity of choosing a King over them, they must besides that relation be moreover united, and confederate in one Commonwealth, or else they cannot put forth that act of election. Persons that are either non cives, or extraneae civitatis, have nothing to do in it. Whereby it is very manifest the reason why men have that power of Election of a Magistracy to this, or that Commonwealth is not because they are Fathers, but because they are Denizens, or freemen of that Commonwealth, and not comprehended or represented by any Domestical Superior, but immediately concerned to act for themselves in the common interests of the people of that Commonwealth. 4. Where he saith, The Power shall not escheat to the whole people, but to the Supreme heads, and Fathers of families. I say, in that it escheats, to them (who are every one a part in his own family the Supreme head, or Father, that is, having none in this case above him in the Civil State) and to such as, being without Domestical head, are capable of heading a family, whom I think he will not exclude, it escheates to the whole people; for who are the whole people to this effect, but they that are Masters of families with them who are Masters of themselves? As was before showed in answer to the second Objection, and the latter branch of it: and they choosing, the whole people choose their Sovereign, they being all the people, either personally, or representatively. 5. In that he says, These Fathers choose a King by conferring their distinct, fatherly power upon one; This is quite mistaken, for 1. They do not put off, or part with their Fatherly powers, but retain each their own still, when they have chosen their King. 2. The power which upon their election passeth into the hands of the Elected King, is more than all their Fatherly powers laid together, that is, a Supreme, Political, Civil, or Commonwealth power; which is a power of a higher Sphere, and differs not only in measure, but toto genere, or in kind from that of the Fathers, and unto which the paternal still continuing in the Masters of families is subordinate. 6. Lastly, As this Author cannot exempt these his words (if they must bear any sound sense) from a confession of that which he contends against, both in this Treatise against Mr. Hunton, (and in his other of Observations upon Aristotle's Politics) viz. the rise of Government from the people's consent; so can he not excuse himself think) from down right self-contradiction in some other particulars. As 1. How will his arguing against the people's capacity to choose their Sovereign by this Argument, That no man hath power to take away his own life, and therefore the people cannot confer this power upon another, consist with the right of the Fathers of families to choose their King, whereas the power to take away their lives is a part of the power to which they choose him? 2. How will this Escheature of the power to the heads of families, and their right thereby to choose their King, stand with what he saith presently after? viz. That all Kings are either Fathers of the people, or heirs of such Fathers or usurpers of the right of such Fathers: And that, when the true heir of a crown is dispossessed by a usurper, the subjects obedience of the Fatherly power must go along, and wait upon God's Providence who only hath right to give, and take away Kingdoms, and thereby to adopt subjects to the obedience of another fatherly power. For if the power (in defect of a right heir) escheat to the Fathers of families, than it passeth not to an usurper; and if those have a right to choose their King, he that is chosen by them hath the right to be their King, and not the Usurper; neither can the subjects be adopted to the obedience of another fatherly power supposed to be in him; neither is he that is chosen upon the fail of an ancient Royal line, or stock truly reducible to any of these three sorts, viz. Either a Father of the people, or an heir of such a Father, or an Usurper of the right of such a Father. 4. Object. The last objection I shall hold up, being the remainder of what I meet with is, But this way of settling Government by the people's consent cannot be proved ever to have been held, or practised. All powers that have reigned, have entered by the sword, or rule by virtue of such entrance. Resp. This is a very broad allegation, and the prejudice therein c●st upon all powers seems to proceed from partiality to s●me. But 1. The way of subject's election of their Government to have been practised and that anciently, or from the first, I have above brought testimonies unto from Authors of the best note, to wit, Aristotle, Cicero, Justin, Juvenal, Ludovicus Vives, Polydore Virgil, and Mr. Calvin Viz in this Sect. Subsect. 4. . To these I shall only here add the witness of one of our English Historians, giving a threefold instance of the subjects choice of their Sovereign, to wit, of three Kings. One of the ancient British, another of the Saxon, another of the Norman race. Mr. Speed Speed History, Book 5. Chap. 6. Sect. 2. Book 6. Chap. 2. Sect. 6. Book 8. Chap. 6. Sect. 1. Book 9 Chap. 2. Sect. 54. Chap. 3. Sect. 1, 2. tells us that when Julius Caesar first enterprised the conquest of this land, among the many Reguli, or petty Kings that then ruled in the several parts thereof Cassibilan was by a universal vote chosen the Chieftain and supreme. That upon the death of Hardicanute the third Danish King, Edward the Confessor, was by a general consent elected King. And that William the Conqueror appointing no heir at his death, his son William Rufus was by the consent and voices of the States made King. 2. When learned Authors tell us of fundamental laws, and constitutions of nations; and when the late Parliament so often mentioned ●nd insisted on the fundamental laws, and the ancient fundamental constitution, frame, and government of this Kingdom, in opposition to an arbitrary, and Tyrannical government, in their public votes, declarations and remonstrances, particularly in their preamble to the Protestation taken by them, and the whole Kingdom, of May the 3. 1641. and in the Declaration of the House of Commons of April 17. 1616. ordered to be published, set up and fixed in every Parish Church, what other thing do they mean thereby but this, to wit, the original establishment of policy and government by the mutual contention, CHAP. V SECT. V Subsect. 6. capitulation, and agreement of Governors and people. Aristotle Aristotelis Polit. lib. 3. num. 87. lib. 5. num. 112. often in his Politics delivers it as the difference betwixt a King, and a Tyrant, a Kingdom, and a Tyranny; that the one is founded upon the will of the Subjects, the other is against their wills, and held over them by force. Mr. Gregory of C. C. observes upon those words, Act. 11.26. And the Disciples were called Christians first at Antioch; that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, were called, is borrowed from a Roman custom, viz. when the Provinces submitted themselves to the imperial Government, the use was to cause a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or public edict to be drawn up, and proclaimed upon the place. And particularly there was such an one at Antioch, when the City yielded up itself into the subjection of the Roman Empire, in the time of Julius Cesar: In memory whereof that City fixed their aera or reckoning of time upon the date of that action; which they therefore called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because the Emperor did then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, publicly entitle them to all the privileges, immunities, etc. Here is a famous instance which the said Author brings out of Johannes Antiochenus, of the mutual agreement, and close betwixt Prince and People, at the first entrance into that relation. And I would ask further how it could be otherways, then by mutual consent, that Government was erected in the several Nations at the confusion of languages; when the several parties were in an instant rend asunder from that one community they were of, and from under that one head which perhaps had been until then over them, and left to themselves to associate each party into a distinct community, and under a new Government as they were severally languaged: there being no reason, or ground to conclude that to each of them there was still appropriate one natural Grandsire, and that he was by natural right to be the Sovereign, or that in defect thereof there was one eldest house, CHAP. V SECT. iv Subsect. 6. and one Parent thereof that was entitled to the regiment of all the other collateral, and younger branches of the same stock. The which supposals have been above refuted? And again, how can it be otherwise at the plantation of a new Colony, at the extinction of a Royal race, or at the Session of Kings or States, that is, when a people are deserted of their former Supreme Governors? as the Britain's of this Island sometime were by the Roman State, to wit, then when their perfect Aetius withdrew himself, and his legions from this Country, upon the decay of the Roman greatness, and exposed the rule of it unto who so might get it * See Speeds History Book 7. Chap. 1. Sect. 1, 2, 3. . And thus it was (some authors tell us) at the translation of the Roman Empire to Germany † widdrington's Theolog. Disput. in Admon. to his Reader Sect. 4. . 3. The Governments that either now are, or heretofore have been, 1. Many of them are known to have been established by the people's consent, as was even now showed. 2. Of many of them the original, first rise, or bottom, like the head of Nilus, is not known. Of these because nothing to the contrary appears, we have no just reason to think but they stand upon this basis: In all matters of tenure immemorial possession inculpably held, leads men to take the beginning to have been right. 3. Many are known to have a violent, and unjust beginning: Of these, 1. Some, though the entrance of them was such, yet they have after, come to be settled upon a better foundation. Thus it was (saith Fr. Junius Junius Animadv, in Bellarminum Controv. 3. lib. 5. cap. 8. Sect. 18. & ca 9 Sect. 20. Mr. Perkins To. 1. Tract. of Callings, pa. 762. A. ) in the Empire of Charles the first, as also in that of Julius Caesar, Ex post facto jus invaluit, cujus non ita fuerunt principia justa. Accordingly saith Mr. Perkins, A Prince enters into a Kingdom by war and bloodshed. Now by the bad entrance be is no lawful King— Yet if the people do willingly submit themselves to this usurper, and be content to yield subjection, and the King likewise to rule them by good and wholesome laws, CHAP. V SECT. V he is now become a Lawful Prince, though his entrance was but Tyrannical. And to the same sense, Chamier, Chamier To. 2. lib. 15. cap. 16. Sect. 9 Grotius, Grotius de Jure B. lib. 2. cap. 4. Sect. 14. Arnisaeus de Authoritate principis cap. 4. Sect. 14. and Arniseus speak. 2. Some as they come into power by mere force, and intrusion, so by it they still continue. But the number of these is not great, much less so great, as to give violent occupation of Dominion the plea of a universal practice and custom. SECT. V That distinction which some give betwixt the Power and the Acquisition, or Assumption of the Power; and its aptness to resolve the Question [Whether a violent intruder into Dominion be among the Powers in this Text that are of God, ordained of God] considered. THe sequel of the last Section, as of some others before it, is that in this Text there can be no room or footing for Usurped Powers. Howbeit, I meet with some Commentators, and others that deal with the text, when the Question cometh in their way (whether the Apostle in asserring the powers that be to of God, ordained of God, taketh in Usurpers;) that which they afford to assoil the difficulty is, a distinction betwixt the Power which they say is of God, is the ordinance of God, and the assumption or acquisition of the Power, which they say is not of God, CHAP. V SECT. iv but is of the Devil, as being by dishonest ways, fraud, violence, and the like. And upon this distinction thus ●●ven, some of them seem to affirm the Question [Seem, I say, for they do not all speak very clearly either way.] That these two, the Power which is ordained of God, and a violent another usurpative entry, and holding of the power, are two different things, not to be confounded, I shall easily grant; but that the distinguishing betwixt the power, and the acquisition, or assumption of power makes any thing to the answering of the Question, or if it do, that it tendeth to confi●●, or clear that the t●xt is inclusive of a Usurper, I can by no means understand, & therefore crave leave to show my reason for my refusal of that distinction so used. 1. Whereas they distinguish betwixt the Power, and the assumption of the Power, and tell us the former is of God, is his Ordinance; the latter in the Usurper is not of God, nor ordained of God, but being by unlawful means, is of the Devil; I suppose they must either mean that the power in the general notion, nature, or conception of the thing is of God, his ordinance, but this Power in particular that is pretended, this Usurper is not of God: and thus saying they resolve the Question negatively, and quite exclude the Usurper from ground in this text: and with this sense I have no dispute; only I think they might as well omit their distinguishing, and flatly deny the Question. Or, 2. They must mean that this individual power, this Usurper, or this Magistracy in particular which he pretends to, is of God, and his ordinance, but his usurpations or this his way of coming into, and holding of the Power, to wit, Usurpatively, is not of God, is not God's ordinance. But if this be the sense of their distinction, it, as so applied, can by no means with me be admitted. If it be asked, Whether unjust Judgement, Theft, Drunkeness, Whoredom, or any such lewd practice be of God, or the ordinance of God, CHAP. V SECT. V I should simply deny it; and it were an absurd thing for one in defence of any of these to say, I can distinguish betwixt the Judiciary sentence, which is of God, the ordinance of God, and wrong judgement, which is not of God, and in like manner I can distinguish betwixt possession, and thievish possession, betwixt drinking, and drunkenness, betwixt carnal, and whorish copulation; the former in each of these distinctions is of God, is ordained of God, but not the latter. For in thus distinguishing I should only acknowledge those acts of judgement, possession, drinking, copulation in specie, or in their universal an abstract conceit to be of God, not by any means that this act in particular wherein the judgement is unjust, the possession is thievish, the drinking is excessive, the copulation is adulterous, is of God (in this sense wherein we now speak) or ordained of God. So in that distinction betwixt the power, and the assumption of the power all that can be meant, with any favour of truth, is, that power in general is of God, is the ordinance of God, but of this the question is not; not that it may be said the Usurper, or the power which he assumeth, and usurpeth is of God, is ordained by him, but not the usurpation, or his way of assuming power: no more than it may be said, this wrong judgement, this thievish possession, this excessive drinking is of God, as his ordinance, but not the injustice, the robbery, the drunkenness, the whoredom, or not the way wherein the agents act those things. No man (I think) ever yet said that the act, and vitiosity of the act may be so abstracted, or distinguished from each other, as to say, the one in individuo may be morally good, and so of God, as his ordinance, and the other morally evil. It is easy to see that in an act whose matter is in specie good, or lawful, but other Ingredients which constitute its moral individual state, are evil, I cannot excuse the act in individuo, or entitle it to the Divine warrant or ordinance from the goodness, or allowablenesse of the matter in specie. And it is as plain that the abstract, and the concrete, the act, or habit, and the subject wherein it must needs have the same, and cannot have a contrary moral predicate, or denomination, if lying, or murder be a sin, and of the Devil, the liar, the murderer is sinful, and of the Devil too * Jo. 8.44. , and you cannot say the one is of the Devil, the other of God. In like manner of the Usurper, and of usurpation; if you condemn the one, you must condemn the other also, and you cannot entitle the one to the ordination of God, the other to the will, and work of Satan. 2. When they say (if so they intent to say) this power, the Usurper, or the authority which he arrogates to himself is of God, but not his acquisition of the power. I would desire to understand of them, how is he, or it of God? Can he be a power, or a power be in him of God any other ways, then by his acquiring or receiving his power from God? yet this is that which they deny in the latter branch of their distinction, where they say, His acquisition, or his way of having his power is not of God, but is of the Devil. Let the owners of this distinction bethink themselves how they can distinguish betwixt the being of the power from God, and the acquisition of the power from God, so as to affirm the one, and deny the other. In my dull conceit, the acquisition of a thing is no more, nor no other thing but the way whereby that thing is had, or received; and if the question be, how such a thing is acquired, and it be said it is of such a person, or such an author; this is to describe the acquisition of it. To me then, in those two propositions (whereby the distinction is applied) the power is of God, the acquisition of the power is not of God, but of the Devil, the subject of them is one and the same in sense, and ●e, and the predicates are contradictory, and so they predicate contradictories de eodem, of the same thing. If they again make a refuge from this absurdity of the general institution; and say in the former proposition they mean the Usurper is of God, his power is of God, in as much as God hath ordained Magistracy, and Magistrates to be; I answer; What is the Usurper the nearer for this, that God hath ordained Magistrates to be? if he receive not his power from God, can it be said nevertheless his power is of God by virtue of that general institution? We have forestalled this plea in our last Section, and say again, there is no consequence, or dependency of the one of these upon the other. God's ordaining Magistrates to be, infers not this, or that man that is in the place of command (whether justly or unjustly) to be a Magistrate, of God. Nothing can be more weakly or groundlessly said, then to argue this or that man is a power of Gods ordaining, because God hath ordained that there shall be a power, and that some body or other shall be it. We have (I take it) proved before that to the making of a Magistrate to be of God, and to be his ordinance, in actu exercito, there goes, not only the law of God appointing Government to be in each community, but that a person, or persons for his or their particular, be put into that office of God, that is in God's way, or by his warrant; and this is to say, the persons acquisition of the power must be of God; It must be said of them as Adonijah said of Solomon's Kingdom, it was his from the Lord. The former puts not any Government, or Governors in being, makes no man actually either a Prince, or a Subject; notwithstanding it all the Commonwealths in the world may be headless, or without Ruler. If a man should start up in the midst of a Kingdom, or a City, or of a Senate, or Parliament, and proclaim himself to be the Supreme power over that community, and being asked upon what he grounds his claim, he should allege but this, God hath ordained a Supreme power to be in every State, and that some be Rulers, and now I actually challenge it; how ridiculous would this man and his claim be? In the time when prophecy and prophets were sent out of God into the world, and into his Church, there were true Prophets, and there were false: the difference betwixt them was, that the one were Prophets indeed, were of God, ordained of God; the other indeed were no Prophets, were not of God. [Zech. 23.5. Jer. 23.16, 21, 26.] It would have been a senseless plea for the latter to have said for themselves, We are Prophets of God, because God hath ordained prophecy, and hath set in his Church some to be Prophets; And as reasonless an allegation it is to say, the Usurper, or the Usurpers power is of God, because God hath instituted powers to be in the Commonwealth. Suppose a couple be suspected to live together in whoredom, and being brought before the Magistrate under that accusation, they shall pretend, for their defence, that they are in a married estate, and being required to prove their marriage, they should allege that marriage is God's ordinance, God hath ordained men and women to marry, and they cohabite together as man and wife. Would this pass for truth, that these two are in the state and relation they pretend to? Much less would it serve if the one of the parties only should make this pretence, and plea, and the other quite disclaim it; and what's the reason this allegation would not pass, but because there is required, besides the general rule ordaining marriage to be, and the exercise of conjugal acts, that there be an entrance into this estate, and admittance unto these matrimonial acts, by such a covenant, or consent of the parties, as God hath appointed to be the way, and means of contracting this Relation? But some of the Authors of this distinction thus argue. Riches gotten by usury, extortion, etc. cease not to be good in themselves, yea and the gifts of God: and as the owner of these unjustly procured riches may be said to be a rich man, and he that hath Learning, though procured by unlawful means, may be said to be a Learned man; so the possessor of a most justly obtained authority may be said to be a Magistrate, and in authority. Unto this Reasoning I have this to say. 1. Riches gotten by usury, and extortion, cease not to be good in themselves; Say they, It's true, but what is this to the usurer, or extortioner, or to his possession of them, or to his denomination of being rich by them? Let it be distinctly observed, what the goodness of those riches is which ceaseth not by their ill getting. That goodness which is in them as considered absolutely, and in themselves, without respect to this, or that owner, or getter, and which was therefore attributable to them before they came into the usurers or extortioners hands, they still retain, that is a goodness in genere entis, or as Creatures, and a goodness in genere utilis, which is an aptness to serve unto a naturally, or civilly profitable use; but those Goods which taken apart from such, or any other particular owner's possession have that goodness inherent in them, are moreover susceptible, by way of relative denomination, of another goodness, which is not inherent in them, or in their nature, or necessary, and fixed to them, but is to them adventitious, or extrinsecall, and therefore is mutable, so that they are as well capable of an evilness opposite to it, as of that goodness. This goodness and evilness is moral, and it comes, or is imputable to them by means of their adjacency, or relation to their possessor. In this respect riches are said to be sometimes just, sometimes unjust, or to be honest, or dishonest according as they are gotten well, or ill, in this moral, or relative consideration of riches (wherein alone the similitude betwixt them and the matter in hand is pertinent) it is not true that riches gotten by usury and ex ortion are good. Ez●k. 22.13. Prov. 10.2. The H. Ghost calls them dishonest gain, and treasures of wickedness. 2. Neither are unjustly gotten goods the gifts of God, if you mean by the phrase such a gift as conveys a title, or right to the Donee, or receiver, which alone, can be strictly and properly called a gift, and can be parallel to the having of a thing of God, as by his ordinance. For, as for that larger acception, wherein things may be said by God to be given into the hands of men, when they are exposed by his providence to them, as their spoil, or the matter of other their acts of cruelty, or fraud, it is not of any collateral affinity with that kind of being of God, which the Text (as hath been proved) speaketh of; neither doth it import a deed of gift, such as makes over a property in the thing given to the Donee. Isai. 42.24. Job 12.6. God gave Jacob for a spoil, and Israel to the Robbers: and Job (whose goods were so given up to the Sabeans and Chaldeans, saith of the tabernacle of Robbers, that God brings into their hands abundantly. Shall we compare these men's have (in respect of the being of them of God) with the being of the power of God, as his ordinance, intended in this Text? 3. It is evident the Authors of the distinction take the being of the power of God in these words in a stricter sense than is that wherein wealth dishonestly gotten can be called the gift of God, whilst in the application of their distinction they tell us, the usurpers acquisition of the power is not of God, they would not (doubtless) deny it to be the gift of God (and consequently its acquisition to be of God) In the same acception wherein they affirm the gain of usury, and extortion to be the gift of God. Certainly it is not their meaning to make the usurers, and extortioners way, and title to their riches (by so much as the gift of God comes to) better than the usurpers way, and his Title to his power, whilst they say their goods are the gifts of God, but his power is not acquired of God. 4. But then they argue, As the owner of these unjustly procured riches may be said to be a rich man, and he that hath Learning, though procured by unlawful means, may be said to be a learned man, so the possessor of a most unjustly obtained authority may be said to be a Magistrate, and in authority. I answer each of these sentences severally. 1. The owner of these unjustly procured riches may be said to be a rich man, say they, but contrarily I say, 1. An unjust procurer and possessor is no owner. 2. Neither do riches denominate their unjust possessor rich. 1. An unjust possessor properly is no owner. There is in truth no propriety in an unjust tenure: for propriety is nothing but a separate right, and right and unjust possession are incompetible. There a●e many cases wherein one may have such a possession as the law of man in a sort protects him in, that is, it takes no cognizance of the injuriousness of his holding, Vide Augustinum de lib. Arbitr. lib. 1. cap. 5. Greg. Tholos. Syntag. Juris. lib. 21. cap. 3. Grotium de Jure, lib. 3. cap. 4. Sect, 2. et cap. 10. Sect. 1. & lib. 2. cap. 23. Sect. 13. & lib. 3. cap. 7. Sect. 6. & lib. 3. cap. 20. Sect. 48. but this notwithstanding, the possession being wrongful, neither it, nor its humane impunity, or indulgence, can create a right, or property in the p ssessor. There is a difference betwixt a presumed, or supposititious, and a true owner. Civilians confess, humane, positive laws do not take notice of all that is just by the law of nature, scripture, and conscience, either to establish it, or to correct the contrary. Hence those distinctions betwixt that licet, quod caret vitio, and that quod impune fit; betwixt licentiam interi●rem & exteriorem. That is, a lawfulness which is free from fault, and the lawfulness which is free from punishment: a lawfulness which is internal appertaining to the conscience, that is; and that which is external, or in respect of the Court of man. And in those things wherein the law of man interposeth, there are also many cases, wherein one holding a thing against all right, his possession is therefore irritable, or ejectable, and yet because the title must be first tried, and evicted, the law allows effectum quendam juris, where there is nullum jus; a kind of privilege of right without right: and for the present looks at him as (titular) proprieter, that is, no moral real, or warrantable proprieter, but only fictitious, and therefore upon eviction, it ejects him. 2. Neither do riches denominate their unjust possessor rich. This follows upon the former. For seeing the haver of unjustly gotten goods is a bare possessor, or a mere holder, and user of goods, and not the true owner or proprietor of them, he cannot from such riches, be truly termed a rich man. A possessor in fact, (or, in respect of that possession, which the Civilian calls a natural) deserves not to be called rich, neither is he in many cases vulgarly so esteemed. A thief may by robbery have gotten into his hands a great treasure; yea, a man may be a just occupant of a wealthy estate, he may be a depositary, a mutuary, or an usufructuary thereof, that is, he may have it in his custody, and use by way of trust, hire, or tenantry, yet such a one if he be wise, counts not himself a rich man in any such respect, neither doth the world (understanding how he hath it) so repute him. A mere occupancy that is eftsoon voidable by law, or that is determinable by a little time, or that is accountable, for to another proprietor, is not wont to denominate the occupant rich. But to make both these points a little clearer, we are to distinguish of injustice, or evil dealing in the getting of wealth. There is some wrong in getting, which is so deep, and intrinsecall to the substance of the title, as that it doth vitiate and destroy its being, and the contract, or other way of procuring the goods by means thereof is null as to the producing of a property to the procurer. And there is some injustice that reacheth not so far as to evacuate the title. Every slip, or deviation from the path of uprightness doth not make void a bargain, or title about which it is used. Casuists distinguish therefore betwixt that dolus malus, that evil dealing, which gives cause to the contract, and that which is only incident or circumstantial to it, and say, the former doth nullify a contract, but not the latter * Vide Bonacinam, To. 2. Tractat. de Restitut. & Contract. Disput. 3. qu 1. punct. 2. Sect. 2. Emanuel Sa Tit. Dolus. Alsted Cas. Consc. Cap. 20. Reg. 9 Bp. Hall's resolute. Decas. 1. Cas. 6. ; and hence we must say riches gotten with some failing of the latter sort may truly denominate a man an owner, and a rich man; because notwithstanding such an error, or tincture he, and the person of whom he receives them may have made a lawful contract, or agreement about the property of them, and that bonâ fide, or really; and which is therefore for substance valid. But wealth attained in the former way of injustice cannot entitle a man rich, because the transaction so qualified, doth not truly cause, or make a property: he that hath them but so hath no title to them, conveyed unto him. 2. They say, He that hath learning, though procured by unlawful means, may be said to be a learned man. Here I say, 1. Learning is no moral habit, and therefore the denomination by it is not concerned by the manner, or means of its acquisition: but a moral habit, as is the having of riches, and the having of civil power, must have a moral constitution. The difference betwixt these two in this matter will easily appear by comparing the natural relation of father and son, with the moral relation of husband and wife. He is truly said to be a father that begets a child, though it be in whoredom, and a bastard is truly called a son. But two cannot be called husband and wife from natural copulation, but there must be betwixt them, besides that, a consent, or contract for substance valid, and lawful to set them in that relation. The reason of this difference is, because the former, that of father and son, is a natural relation, in regard of its rise, or the act by which it is founded: the other is a moral relation as to the way of its production, and therefore must result from a moral act. 2. Our Philosophy will tell us, it is not every having that doth really denominate, but that only which is properly intended by the denominative, or concrete. We say, a man that is full of wine is drunk; but a Vessel, or Cellar being filled is not said to be drunk with wine. A Purse full of gold is not called golden, but we call it golden, if it be wrought with gold * Ad regulam istam, cui inest abstractum de eo praedicatur concretum, requiritur ut abstractum eo modo infit quem importat concretum. Marsupium non dicitur aureum, quavis in Marsupio sit aurum. Sthalii Axiomata, Tit. 6. Reg. 4. Sect. 11. pag. 163. . He that hath the arts, and sciences in his study, or in a book in his hand, or merely in his memory, so as he is able to rehearse the systemes of them by roar, is not said to be a learned man; but he that hath them in his understanding: and he that hath moral virtues not only in his study, book, or memory, but in his understanding, yet is not said to be virtuous, unless he have the habits (not the docentes, but the utentes) of them also subjected in his will. In like manner the having of command, or rule over a civil State merely in ones hand, doth not truly denominate one a Magistrate, or in authority. Having thus discovered the unsuitableness of the premises to infer that conclusion, that the possessor of a most unjustly obtained authority may be said to be a Magistrate, and in authority; that conclusion as to support by them, falls of itself: But I may add, as to the terms of it, as I said, and shown before that the unjust possessor of riches cannot be called the owner of them; so may I here reply, those words, [the possessor of a most unjustly obtained authority] are a contradiction in adjecto. A most unjustly obtained authority there can properly be none: a man cannot be a possessor of authority, that is authority indeed, but by lawful means. He that holdeth, and exerciseth command, rule, or sway most unjustly, (as to title) may pretend to authority, but the command he assumes cannot (but abusively and equivocally) be called authority. Authority (as hath been before made good) consisteth in a right, or call to rule, and is formally, and essentially contradistinct to unjustly obtained authority. I speak of that which is held, or standeth merely by unjust means: for, (as was before noted of injustice in the acquisition of Goods) there may be a miscarriage incident to, which is not of the substance of the Magistrates ingress into, or tenure of authority. There is a faultiness in the very nature, or essence, and constitution; and a faultiness in some circumstances of the acquisition of authority. A man may come into, or hold the throne by a just title of personal election, or hereditary succession, and yet some indirect, or undue passage may be interwoven in the election, or the actuating of that succession; which notwithstanding, the election, or succession, being for substance lawful, there is a true Magistracy, or real authority descending on that person. But where the place of power is merely usurped, (or as are the words of that conclusion we are refelling, most unjustly obtained) there is a Magistrate but verbo te●us; a style without truth; a barely pretended, nominal, equivocal authority; and therefore no real denomination. CHAP. VI CHAP. VI Of the universal negative note, in the words, there is no power but of God. THey that contrary to the sense I have endeavoured to give, and make good, of those terms in this Text I have hitherto handled, would take the subject of this proposition the word power in the largest sense, so as to comprise any strong hand that by its force lifteth up itself over a community; and by the predicates, of God, ordained of God, would understand any being of God, in what general, and large acception soever can be imaginable, so as to include whatsoever comes to pass, or occurreth in the world, or hath existence by eventual providence; they also endeavour to improve this universal negative annexed to that subject, no power; and the verb substantive, or rather its participle, in the other proposition, the powers that he, to the same purpose, of making way for their broad sense of the term power: arguing, that if there be no power but of God, then is an Usurper of God; and if the powers that be, or are in being be ordained of God, than whosoever gets a Kingdom into his hands, by whatsoever unjust means, yet he, seeing he is a power in being, is ordained of God to be the Sovereign there. Wherefore somewhat I shall also say to these minute particles, no power, the powers that be. Would they be content to let those words (of which already) the power, of God, ordained of God, CHAP. VI SECT. I. pass in their genuine and proper acceptions, which I suppose I have manifested to belong to them in this place; I should let pass the stretch which they also put upon these particles, and not dispute at all their sense: seeing that, take them as generally, and widely as they ●an, yet applying them to those main terms, the subjects and the predicates already opened, in the construction before stated, they could not thereby alter or wrong the sense of the whole sentence, or gain any advantage by it to that large extension of the words. But supposing there were not evidence enough for that stricter, and closer acception of the Apostles saying, which I have offered, I will examine, whether those other terms, which yet remain to be spoken to, must necessarily be taken as widely as they urge them, or as to be any thing compliant to their larger interpretation, and use of this place. The next thing then to be considered is that universal negative, no power. Here we are to inquire what weight there is in this universal particle, no, in the proposition, there is no power but of God. SECT. I. The Original is not in those words, [no power but of God] expressly universal. THe Original is somewhat less favouring their wider sense than is the translation: for it doth not in terminis sound so fully to an universal negative. It is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Which word for word signifies thus, The power is not but of God. It saith not absolutely, and simply, there is no power, but relatively, the power is not; looking back to the powers immediately before mentioned in the precept, the higher powers, willed to be subjected unto. Whatsoever power in the civil State can be involved in ●●at style, the higher powers, of it the Apostle saith; it is not but of God. And if every power imaginable is to be so styled, then may the words better pass in an equivalency to an universal, and might be all one as if the Apostle had said, there is no power but of God. But if there be any peculiarity in that phrase, the higher powers (of which something below * Chap. 8. Sect. 2. ) then must we stick to the relative reading of them, (which in truth is more literally consonant to the Greek, and is followed by those Latin Translations I have to peruse, to wit, those of Beza, Montanus, Tremel●us, and the vulgar) and lay aside that universal note. However needs it must be granted the safest, and clearest rendering is that which is word for word to the original, which expressly amounts not to an universal, but is, for its extent, formally indefinite; and being so, our Logic rule will tell us, that its quantity must be determinate (that is, whether it shall be taken equivalent to an universal, or to a particular proposition) by the matter, to wit, by the necessity, or contingency thereof; and the matter, to wit, the subject, and predicate, being in controversy, in what sense (whether in a larger, or a stricter) they shall be taken, it cannot be (until the sense of those terms, be concluded to be necessarily thus, or thus) determined thereby. Only thus I take it to understand by the power a moral power, and by the terms, of God, ordained of God, a proceeding of God by way of authorization, commission, call or warrant, and then this indefinite may be answerable to an universal: but cast off those restrictions, (which yet I apprehend natural, and proper to the Text) and then it cannot be spoken universally, but will amount only to a particular proposition. SECT. II. CHAP. VI SECT. II. The several qualifications which sentences in terms universal do admit. BUt admit the proposition to be formally universal, and that the Apostle had in terminis said, there is no power, but of God, or, every power is of God. Yet we know that each sentence that hath a note of universality put to it must not be understood in the utmost bounds that such a note may sound, or reach unto, at any time, or in any other sentence; words universally spoken must be construed with caution. It is a rule, dicta quantumvis universalis aequitatem recipiunt intepretem. It will behoove us for this purpose to consider a little how universal proposition (whether affirmative, or negative) as in ordinary discourse, so in Scripture very frequently, and familiarly must from the sense intended be qualified, and restrained within a shorter compass than the universal note would of itself bear * Vide Bezam in 1 Tim. 2.1. Mr. Needler his notes, p. 262. . 1. Sometimes the universal affirmative, or negative meaneth not simply all, and every one under the subject contained, but only the more part, or many, as [Mark 1.5.] there went out unto him all the land of Judea, and were all baptised of him. All, that is, many, not all to a man; [Phil. 2.21.] all seek their own, etc. that is, many, or the most do so. [John 12.32.] I will draw all men unto me: that is, a great number. 2. Sometimes it signifies indiscriminately, in reference to a multiplicity of persons, or things, all, that is, every sort, or of one sort as well as another; and not distributively every single person, or thing without exception, or not collectively all singulars, so as to leave out none under those sorts comprehensible. [1 Sam. 20.26.] Saul spoke not any thing that day; not as if he were quite mute all the day from all discourse, but he spoke nothing concerning that matter of David's absence; [Acts 2.17.] I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh; that is, not upon all and every person in the world, but upon all without distinction of nation, Jew as well as Gentile; [1 Tim. 2.1.] That supplications, etc. be made for all men; that is, for men of all ranks, and states, [ver. 6. ●.] Who gave himself a ransom for all. That men pray every where. Christ gave himself for all, that is, for all sorts and conditions of men, and of singulars under all those sorts for some of each, but not for all Individuals, or particular persons unto all those sorts reducible. And men must pray every where, that is, in one place as well as an●ther, importing the ceasing of that peculiarity of place, which was under the Law; yet they might not play simply every particular where without exception, they might not go and pray before an Idol, or amidst an assembly of Idolaters in the Idols Temple; [1 Cor. 10.25.] Whatsoever is sold, etc. that eat, etc. [1 Tim. 4.4.] Every Creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused. That is, any kind of those Creatures that are good for food might then be eaten; yet if any individual of those was strangled, or the blood of any they might not eat * Act. 15.29. ; [Mat. 4.23.] Jesus went about, etc. healing every sickness, and every disease. [and ver. 24.] They brought unto him all sick people; Every, and all, that is, some of each sort, for every disease of every person he healed not † Mark 6.5. . 3. The universal Note sometimes signifies every particular, or singular, but not of the Genus, or subject spoken of generally taken, but of one species, or special kind only contained under that genus; and so the universality must not be ex●ended absolutely, but secundum quid, or to one Classis, or sort only of the things, or persons named. [1 Cor. 6.12.] All things are lawful unto me;— all things are lawful for me, all things here means not simply all, not Idolatry, Adultery, Theft, Drunkenness, which he had been naming but a little before, [verses 9, 10.] and condemned, but all things of natural use for nourishment, to which point he [in this, and in verse 13.] is speaking. [1 Cor. 2.15] He that is spiritual judgeth all things. Not all things in general, but all revealed spiritual things, of which things his discourse in that Chapter proceedeth. And again in the same verse, he himself is judged of no man, not simply denying the spiritual man to be subject to any humane judgement or cognisance whatsoever; but meaning that negation solely in reference to his spiritual inward estate, [1 King. 19 10.] There is no Nation, or Kingdom under heaven whither my Lord hath not sent to seek thee. Not as if Ahab had sent to seek that Prophet in every Country on the earth, but the meaning of it must be, there was no neighbouring nation, or place whither it could be probably thought Elijah to have betaken himself, but he had sent to make enquiry for him. [Mat. 9.10.] No man putteth a piece of new cloth, etc. not intending absolutely to say, that was never done by any, but no man useth to do it, or no man doth it, that goeth wisely, or with common advisedness to work. [2 Tim. 2.4.] No man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of this life. Doubtless of every one that is a Soldier this cannot be denied, this age hath seen enough of the contrary, but it is denied only of the just, and faithful Soldier; no man that warreth regularly, or as he aught behaves himself after the manner that is here denied. CHAP. VI SECT. III. SECT. III. The suitableness of some of those qualifications of universals to this (supposed) universal in the Text. IN this variety of limitations to which propositions universal (whether affirmative or negative) are subject, we may reflect upon this sentence under debate, and consider (supposing it to be indeed an universal negative, and that the subject to which it is appendent, the term power, as here it is used neither doth carry in itself its own limitation, neither were by any other thing in the Text restrained to one certain and peculiar acception) whether some of these restrictions may not fitly be put upon it. I doubt nor, but, looking upon the words under that supposal, the universal note added to them may well, yea must needs admit of the second or third qualification. When therefore it is urged in behalf of a power that merely standeth by forcible possession, and is destitute of all just title, and call to authority, that this power is by virtue of this Text to be subjected unto, inasmuch as here it saith, there is no power but of God. It may be answered, Scripture universals oftentimes will not brook to be taken in the larg●st extent, to which the word, or thing spoken of doth sometimes reach; but must be understood with some qualification. Particularly, as the universal is to be taken in many Texts, so in this here, it doth not contain simply all power, nor doth it intent to assert that any sort of power whatsoever that can be named, or put forth in any creature, or in any man, is of God, in the sense wherein the Apostle here meaneth, but all that can be thought necessarily to be imported in it is, either, 1. That every lawful, or (which is all one) every moral power in the civil State is of God, is ordained of God. And for the congruity of taking this universal not simply, but secundum quid, or, for this one sort, or species of power only, I shall besides the Scripture instances already given, here bring two more, which are for form and matter of special affinity with this. The first is a universal negative of a parallel subject, or matter, an office of superiority, or rule, wherein though the words run as these are supposed to do, in the general without any limitation expressed, yet they must be taken in this manner. It is that of [Heb. 5 4] No man taketh this honour unto himself but he that is called of God, as was Aaron. This universal must not be construed to be an absolute, or illimited negation of the fact, as if no man at all doth, or ever did take unto himself the honour of the Priesthood uncalled of God. For Korah with his company, and Jeroboams Priests, and King Vzziah, and Amaziah the Priest of Bethel did it. But we must take it as intended to be said with this restriction, no man man that legally, rightly, or warrantably proceedeth, takes this honour unto himself, but he that is, as Aaron was, called of God. So here, there is no power but of God; not as if there was never any Dathan, or an Abiram to invade the Magistrate's office, as well as there was a Korah to usurp the Priests; or, as if though there were, yet the usurping Dathan and Abiram, were powers of God in the Apostles sense here, though Korah, and such like presumers were not Priests of God: but, taking these two places to run very parallel, for likeness both of matter, and of universal negativeness, we may say, as that of the Priesthood, so this of the Magistrate must be construed to intent there is no power legally, warrantably, or regularly set up, but it is of God. The Divines Annotations upon that of Heb. 5.4. give us a good rule to understand many such universals by, to wit, Verbs active in the phrase of the Scripture sometimes import; not the act itself, but duty, or office; no man taketh, that is, aught to take this honour upon himself, but he that is called of God. So here, though every particular power de facto be not of God, yet de jure there is none but that is. The power that is as it ought to be (as the high Priest that is in his office of right) is of God, ordained of God. The other Scripture instance is in the words that lie next to our Text, in the same Verse with it, to wit, the antecedent precept, Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. This universal imperative must not be taken absolutely, or to stretch to all men without restriction, for if every soul without exception were to be subject there could be none left to be the higher powers, and, besides, there are, or may be some that are not of, or within any Commonwealth, and perhaps some Commonwealths may be for some time destitute of rulers over them, [as Hab. 1.11.] but every soul must be limited within this circumscription, every person that is a member of a body politic, and is in the relation and state of a subject, every such soul must be subject. So in these words, there is no power but of God, that is, there is none in the relation, or state of a Magistrate, no moral, authorized or lawful power, but it is of God, set up, and ordained to it by him. 2. Or indiscriminately, in reference to the divers species, sorts and degrees also of lawful power; of them there is none but is of God; that is, whereas there are divers species of civil power, as Kings, and Potentates, Aristocratical, and democratical; and whereas there are divers degrees of powers, that is, supreme, and subordinate, in several gradual distinctions, and whereas there are divers sorts of power in regard of the qualifications of their persons, and governments; as for their Religion, some Christian, some Jewish, some Pagan; and for administration, some being just and propitious, others being unrighteous and persecuting. There are none of these kinds, degrees, or sorts (taking the universal to intent gen●ra singulorum, not singula generum) but they are of God; and this is the very construction which both Beza, and Pareus give of these words. And this construction, moreover, best suits with that which the whole stream of Interpreters (as far I can observe) judge to be the proper occasion, and scope of the Apostles discourse of this subject, of civil policy, in this place, to wit, that whereas the Christians then, or some of them did, or might make question of subjection to the higher powers, in reference to the Rulers, being unchristian, unjust, and tyrannical as to exercise of Government, his drift is to charge the duty of obedience upon them with relation even to such Magistrates: and to argue them unto a submission to it as applied to such, he reason's chief from the Divine ordination, and warrant of the powers unto their office, and plainly avers, whatsoever they be for personal qualification, or manner of Government, yet, if they be higher powers, indeed, they have their place, and calling from God, and therefore are to be obeyed. The Apostle elsewhere bespeaking Christians for one particular duty to these higher powers, to wit, to pray, and give thanks for them, he extends this duty universally to all them that are in authority, [1 Tim. 2.1.] yet, as Beza observes, this universal must be taken thus indiscriminately, that is, in reference to all sorts, and not distributively to all single persons in authority, to wit, that heathen as well as Christian, misgoverning as well as good Magistrates are to be prayed for. Otherwise (saith he) there may be found some one particular Ruler that may be excepted out of the verge of the Christians prayers (such an one as Julian the Apostate was) who may have sinned the sin un●o death. Me thinks there cannot be a place more parallel to these words, there is no power but of God, ordained of God, both for subject matter, and for illimitednesse in terms, or words then that of Solomon, Prov. 8.15. By me King's reign, and Princes decree justice: By me Princes rule, and Nobles, even all the Judges of the earth. Whether we understand these words of God, (as usually they are taken) or of Wisdom, unto him, or if the use, exercise and administration of the power is ascribed as general, and indefinitely, as is the being, and ordination of the power attributed unto God in this sentence of the Apostle. But from that indefinite speech of Solomon, no man may gather it was in his intention, and drift to own, or father every act of every King, Prince, Noble, and Judge, upon either God or Wisdom; the words must needs be understood only of such acts of those persons as are just, righteous, and prudential. Certainly there are acts of rule (such as are rehearsed, Psal. 2.2. the Kings, and Rulers of the earth set themselves, and consult against God, and Christ, and a thousand more unlawful courses of such) which must of necessity be excluded from that general saying. Now as from those indefinite words we must not infer that all acts of Magistrates are from God, so neither may we conclude from the like indefiniteness of these words of the Apostle, that simply, and universally every power that is in being (any way whatsoever) is of God, by his ordination. Whatever any one may judge of the congruity of any of these limitations unto the universal note supposed in this Text, yet I think no considerate Reader but will easily grant that some such restriction must be admitted to the words. We have before distinguished of a fourfold lawfulness, and unlawfulness in powers. Now it must needs be yielded that powers in some of those four ways unlawful must be debarred the Text, and consequently that the propositions in it must receive some limitation unto powers that are lawful. Among other false pretenders to power by virtue of the Text, the Pope comes in; and he offereth injury to this place more ways than one. Among the rest, he, and his Doctors for him, challenge power to make laws to bind the Consciences of all Christians; Bellarmin, To. r. Controu. Gen. 3. i. e. de Rom. Pontif. lib. 4. cap. 16. loc. 6. Whitaker, To. 2. Controu. 4. qu. 7. p. 710 b. Chamier To. 2. lib. 15. cap. 17. Sect. 3. and one warrant pretended to for it by them, is this Text; and in it they urge the indefiniteness, or unlimitedness of the words. Non est potestas nisi à Deo, (which they say) is equivalent to this universal, Omnis potestas est à Deo. All power is of God: and thence they argue, if every power be of God, than the said power of the Pope to rule, and bind the conscience of all Christians is of God. To his claim upon this ground we have no answer if we grant him the words to hold in an absolute universal form. But, to cut off this his forged pretence, we reply, the Text asserts not simply of every power, that it is of God, but of that power which is by other rules of Scripture justifiable, and lawful. If then to rid our hands of this corrupt gloss we must be driven to confess the indefinite, (or say it be universal) form of these words must needs admit of a confinement, to lawful, warranted powers; it is enough to bar out the argument, from the illimitednesse of the proposition. And further, than it will be said this lawful, must either exclude powers in any sense unlawful, or in some sense only, if the latter, than some good reason must be given why one sort of unlawful power should not be shut out of the Text by it as well as another; which I expect will never be assigned: If the former, then is power unlawful as to title, or usurped power chashiered the Text. But this may suffice for the discussion of the universal negative, there is no power but of God. CHAP. VII. CHAP. VII. Of the being of the Powers, in that proposition, the powers that be are ordained of God. THE only term in the Text remaining to be cleared, and vindicated is the being of the powers, in that indefinite affirmative, the powers that be are ordained of God. I will not insist on that reading of some which so placeth the words, and putteth the comma, as that it cuts off all pretence to that use of them which some make from this, or any other of the terms of this Text, in behalf of the unentitled, or usurping powers: Which is this, the powers that be of God, are ordained; but take them in their ordinary, and to them most favourable reading: and so the defenders of an obligation to unlawful powers do much lay hold, and insist on this term. For this purpose they observe the word to be in the participle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which they translate in being; the powers that are in being, putting an high emphasis upon that word, and urging that the being, or existence in rerum naturâ of any power brings it into this Text, and under this pred c●te of being ordained of God. Whereas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is but put for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it is wont often to be, and therefore translated by our Interpreters be. But however let them enjoy this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, let it be the powers that are in being, there would be in this no colour of an argument at all, did they (as was before said) take the subject spoken of, the powers in its proper sense; CHAP. VII. SECT. I. but let that be set aside also, and try we what they can make of this word. SECT. I. The question moved, wherein consists the being of the power, or, what it is that makes the power to be. THe question here will be (in the midst of all the strong urging of it) what must be meant by the being of the power? or, what it is for the power to be? or, wherein the being of the power, the Ratio formalis of it, consists? or, what it is that puts a power in being? There are that tell us the being of a higher power, or that which makes the power to be, or one to be a power, is his actual prepotency, or his present ruling, or his holding the sword de facto, or his plenary possession of superiority. In this Text (say they) the powers that be are the persons that occupy the place of rule, that have the Militia in their hand, or prevail with their sword, or that hold (however they come by them) the reins of Government in their hand. The taking up of this (at first sight or blush without further examining) to be the meaning of the words, is that which hath carried away some to a strong imagination, either of a Usurpers right, or of a duty of obedience to him, as the ordinance of God; and hath staggered others to an unresolvedness about it. Notwithstanding to me this seems to be an overhasty, raw, and indigested interpretation of the Text. CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 1. SECT. II. Reasons to prove that prevalency, or actual possession of the seat of Government doth not make or infer one to be the power. TO pass by what was above noted (Cap. 1. Sect 2.) that in Scripture we find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 put for such a power, as doth not necessarily import, or depend upon possession, but is separable from it, and that sometimes, not only de facto, but de jure: my Reasons for what I say of this definition of the being of the powers are these. Subsection 1. Argument 1. Taken from the nature of existence. THe being, or existence of a thing is eductio rei extra causas, the putting, or extraction of a thing out of its causes. Its causes, that is, those proper causes, that have a power or faculty to produce that thing. If then actual possession, or prepotency do necessarily carry with it the productive act, or acts of those causes which are qualified to produce the power in the Text, and that it can be said where ever there is a holding of actual Rule, or a mastering sword over a people, there must needs be the concurrence of those causes which constitute, or create a civil Magistrate, then is it true, that actual prevalency makes, or argues the said power to be in being. But I ask what cause, or efficient of the civil power doth actual regency necessarily, and individually import, or put into act? a man might be in that condition of actual prepotency if God had never ordained Magistracy to be, or though, having ordained Magistracy to be, yet, he should not have given this man any commission to be the Magistrate, yea though he should expressly have given out a prohibition that he should not be a Magistrate, and though the people over whom he bears sway, and all the world besides, (only himself, and his strong hand by which he carries it excepted) were utterly, and professedly dissenting, and opposite to it. That its evident that actual rule may be where there is no concurrence of the causes interested, and capable to produce a civil power, I shall need further to allege no other medium, but the nature, or definition of Usurpation (as the word hath reference to civil policy.) What is usurpation, but the assumption, and use of the preeminencies, and acts peculiar to the office of the Magistrate without a lawful call, title, or admission to that office; which lawful calling, entitling, or admission to that office is the proper act, or acts of those agents who are competent to confer this office? If then this be the nature of usurpation, and there be, or can be such a thing as usurpation in the world, there may be actual rule without the concourse of the causes whose place, and faculty it is to convey the civil power; and consequently it is not actual rule which doth put the civil power in being, or infer its existence. CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 2. Subsection 2. Argument 2. From the absurdity of admitting Satan's, and the Pope's usurped powers upon the ground of actual rule. 2. THe command, and rule of some over the Kingdoms of the world actually challenged, and possessed by them will (I doubt not) be disclaimed by the very authors, and urgers of this large exposition of the being of the power, and not admittable into this Text; and if so, than they must confess mere prevalency, or actual sway doth not give being to, or hold forth that power of which the Text speaks. The antecedent is proved by a double instance, one of Satan, the other of the Pope. 1. Satan we find claiming to himself the possession, and disposal of the power, and glory of all the Kingdoms of the world, [Luck 4.6.] and for the reality of his possession, or actual predominancy, when he made this challenge, yea, and ever since, certainly it was, and is true, if not of all, yet of many of this world's Kingdoms: for which reason he is styled, the God of this world, and principalities, powers, the rulers of the darkness of this world, the Prince of the power of the air. Now if he, or any from him should by virtue of this possession, and the authority of this Text so extended, demand the civil subjection of any Kingdom, or person, what should be said to this demand? If you say, though he have possession, yet he hath no right, that is to abandon mere possession from being that which makes or proves one to be the power, and to yield me the question. If you say, being not a humane person, he is not meant in this T●xt, this puts a limitation on the words beyond the bare being of one in possession of rule; and I shall require to have proved how a restriction in regard of person is more imposeable on the words, than a restriction in regard of title or right. 2. The Pope of Rome, and his Doctors, (both Divines, and Canonists) in his behalf lay claim to a temporal power, direct, or indirect, over all the Nations, and Potentates in the world, (as some of them) over all Christian Kings, and people, (as others say:) and as he claims, so it must not be denied but he hath generally, over Christendom, possessed and exercised this power, and doth still in many of the European Territories, and elsewhere: and one reason alleged for this his claim is this of possession, continued possession: He prescribes, and challenges to be the powe●, because he hath obtained, and held it. The Jesuit Parsons urgeth for the Pope's temporal power against King James (as appears in his Apology) * K. James his Epistle to all Christian Monarches, etc. pag 32. this reason. And it is observable, that at this time, now the argument from actual predominancy is so much in request, the Papists get hold of, and press it against us, in this very point of the Pope's Supremacy, as appears by Dr. Hammonds reply to the Catholic Gentleman's Answer † Dr. Hammond his Reply, etc. cap. 4. pag. 45. . Now if mere actual prevalidity make, or infer one to be a civil power, authorized by this Text, my demand is, how shall we avoid the argument, and reject this pretention of the Pope? Either we must suffer these words, the powers that be, to be more confineable then to signify only a bare act of rule, and sway, or else I am fully confident we shall be to seek for our defence against this allegation. 1. If any think to escape it by saying the Pope claims a power unlawful in itself, or for matter; or what is unlawful for any man to have. The reply will be ready: whatever be the exorbitant ex ensions, or presumptions of his Ecclesiastical power, that temporal power which he standeth for is another distinct thing from it (as appears by those Popish Doctors who assert the one, and deny the other * As Barclay, Widdrington, and others. ) and is not in itself unlawful, it being the same for substance which the Roman Emperor held before him, and the Germane now holdeth within his present precincts in reference to the free Princes and States of that Territory: in which respect the Pope is supposed to be the second Beast, which succeedeth, reviveth, and exerciseth the room, and power of the first † Mr. Medes Diatrib. To. 4. pag. 450, 451. , [Revel. 13.] and if in any thing he assumeth an excessive power in temporals, or which is not for matter allowable, this exception would seclude him from so much of his claim only as were in respect of humane competency unwarrantable, and leave him the rest. For that a Paramont dominion, or an Imperial power over a multitude of distinct Common wealths and Sovereign Princes is lawful in itself, I take to be an truth. 2. If it be further said, the Pope is a person uncapable of civil power; or of being a temporal Lord, as being an Ecclesiastical person or Clergyman. To let pass the question of an Ecclesiastical persons capacity of civil Magistracy; and the urging that many now (and perhaps most of those that are against me in this controversy) deny the distinction of Clergy, and Laity in that very sense wherein this objection intends it. It will suffice to reply against this evasion, 1. That it is not simply necessary to a persons investiture with the Popedom that he be (as they speak) a Priest. One may be chosen and made Pope that is not with them entered into the order of Priesthood. John the 20. (or, according to some the 21.) was of a Layman chosen Pope * Chamier, To. 2. l. 16. cap. 16. Sect. 13. Platina in vit. Johan. 21. p. 165. Spondanus ad An Dom. 1024. . Benedict the 9 is said to have been chosen Pope at ten years of age, and it is confessed by their own Authors he was no Priest † Spondanus ad An. 1033. Onulphrius, An. 1032. Dr. Featly, Roma ruene, p. 18. . I read also of Amadeus Duke of Savoy, that he was elected Pope by the Council of Basill when he was but a Layman, and that after his election (some distance of time) he received their ordination * For his election Platina in vita Eugenii 4. p. 310. Onuph. An. 1439. For his unordainednesse see Fox, Acts etc. To. 1. pag. 903. Rosses Hist. l. 4. c. 4. pag. 350, 351. : And though it be true that it's said before his Coronation he took the order, yet that altars not the case as to the reply, their Doctors teaching that a Pope is made, and hath all the rites of his Popedom by his election, and before his inauguration † Tolet. de instruct. Sacerdotis, lib. 1. c. 40. Sect. 3. p. 185. . Those Popes therefore that were chosen Laics had for that time before their Priesthood none of this objection, lying against their competency for a temporal dominion. 2. But suppose he could not be Pope with them that had not their Priesthood, yet they that held it a just exception against a persons capacity of bearing civil Magistracy, that he is a Minister of the Gospel, upon that of our Saviour [Luk. 22 26.] will not (I suppose) acknowledge the Pope by virtue of his Priesthood, or any other means to be a Minister of the Gospel. 3. It is commonly acknowledged by our Protestant writers (as far as I understand) that the Pope in the proper Territories belonging to his Signiory, as Romania, and the rest in Italy, called the land of the Church (the means of his Instalement therein, whether the consent of the Roman people upon the decay of the Exarchate of Ravenna, or the gifts of King Pepin, and of Charles the great his Son, or of the Countess of Mathilda, or whatever else is alleged * Vide Ch●mier, To. 2. lib. 16. cap. 19 Sect. 7. etc. , here is no place to search into) is to be owned, and obeyed as other lawful Princes are in their dominions, upon the supposal that he is the lawful Potentate thereof † See Par. on Rom. 13.1. pag. 246. . Accordingly then they that hold, that person is to be obeyed, and owned as the power in being, and so of God, in any Country that hath possession of the Supreme power there, they must acknowledge the Pope to be the power in being, (in the Supreme temporal Lordship) in all the Dominions where he actually prevaileth to have it. Suppose any of us now living had been in the time when the Pope's temporal power paramount that of the King, was questioned, and upon questioning abolished by an act of State, and our consent had been required to the said act, or our oath of abrenunciation of him, what should we in conscience have done? On the one hand the right was confessed to be in the King, on the other possession (by a long accustomed usurpation) was in the Pope. If this were the sense of the Text, mere actual possession makes one to be the power, to wi●, that power that is of God, ordained of God, we should have been bound in conscience by this Text to have opposed the King, and State in the same act, and sided with the Pope. To conclude this argument then, either we must refuse this position, actual domination makes a civil power, or we must allow to the Pope his Temporal supremacy, both unto the reproof, and condemnation of those Protestants who have cast it off; and to the establishing of him in it wherever he yet possesses it, by the disallowing of those that are de facto still under it to put it off; and these are the fruits of this (truly Popish) Doctrine. Shall we suppose him still to be the Antichrist, the man of sin, the Beast, and his City to be the whore of Babylon; and profess so much to be for the ruin of him under these names, and yet make him so large a Grant in the matter, and point which is most for his promoting, and securing? Subsection 3. CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 3. Argument 3. From the custom of hereditary Kingdoms accounting the succeeding to be King in the moment of the decease of his predecessor, without actual investure. 3. I Thus argue. If a government by hereditary succession be lawful, and in it the predecessor dying, or otherwise ceasing, the succeeding heir is immediately the power, or the supreme Magistrate, without, or before actual possession, acknowledgement, or investure by the Estates, or people over whom he is the power; than it is not actual possession which puts the power in being. But a government by hereditary succession is lawful, and in it the Predecessor ceasing, the heir is the power in being without further act done by him, or passed by the people, or any other. The first of these premises is evident, and the latter will need little proof. The first part of it, that an hereditary govergment is lawful, is attested by Scripture, by the general consent of Nations, expressed both by laws, and practise, by the laws of this Land, which have not only settled this government, but made it Treason to affirm the contrary, and by the votes, and pens (as of other Authors, so) of our best Protestant Writers, Divines, and others unanimously asserting it. And for the later, that in hereditary government the successor is the power in being immediately, and without more ado, upon the ceasing of his Predecessor, is a point also generally subscribed unto. * See Hooker his Ecclesiast. pol. li. 8. p. 154. Chamier To 2. li. 15. cap. 10 sect. 19 Treat. of Monarchy, part 1. cap. 3. sect. 7. Stat. of 1 Jac. 1. King James his Remonstrance against Card. Perron, p. 154. CHAP. VII. SECT. III. Subsect. 4. Subsection 4. Argument 4. From the lawfulness and usefulness of fundamental Laws, and provisions for the future continuance of Government by succession, and against encroachers upon the same. 4. IF it be lawful, and necessary (as well as it is the universal practice of Commonwealths) to make and ordain fundamental laws, constitutions, and provisions about government, for the upholding and continuing of it, and for the transmitting and transferring of it from hand to hand, whether by succession, election, or otherways upon the death, or other change of the present Magistrate, and for the preventing, resisting, punishing, and suppressing of the violators thereof, then is it not the mere in being, or actual seizing of rule, and command which makes the power. But the aforesaid course is lawful and necessary. This minor (I suppose) will be uncontested in all the parts of it * Vide Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 1. cap. 4, sect. 17. . If the latter part, the lawfulness of ordaining Laws for the risistance, and prosecution of intruders, and incroachers against fundamental constitutions, be questioned, the generality of this Nation, even every one that hath participated actively in the late Wars, (what party soever they have led, or followed) have manifested their consent to it. For the true state of the difference was the intrusions upon the fundamental Laws concerning the interest of government, which each accused other mutually of; which supposed intrusions, and encroachments were in things lawful in themselves, as the power of imposing taxes, disposing of the Militia, and interpreting laws, and the like; only the interest therein which on both sides the one assumed, the other denied to belong unto him, or them, CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 4. was that which each of the two opposites gave out to be the cause of their debate, and war. For the consequence of the major that may also easily appear good. For if the actual possessor be the power of God, than it must needs be both unlawful, and a frivolous thing to make such constitutions, and being made to in force, or vindicate them, either by the civil, or martial sword from violation: and, vice versâ, if such Laws be lawful, and necessary, then mere actual possession doth not constitute any one to be the power. It must (I say) needs be unlawful to make such lawe● if the Word of God determine the actual possessor to be the power; for the direct, and proper use, and formal reason of such constitutions is to inhibit all invasion upon the government, or entrance upon it otherwise then according to such constitution, and to disapprove, illegitimate, and condemn it, if it be done; the use then, and nature of such constitutions, is to cross and thwart that which the Word of God enacteth, and therefore they are in their making unlawful, and unjust. And it must needs be as frivolous, and vain to make them. For let us suppose the fundamental Laws of a Commonwealth to appoint a Prince, or Senate to the Supreme power, but for a limited term, as for a stinted number of days, months, or years, as the Roman Consuls, the Carthaginian Kings, and the Theban Boeotarchae were * Greg. Tholos. Syntag. juris li. 18. cap. 1. sect. 16, 17. : and at the end of the said term that Prince, or Senate should declare their will, and resolution to continue still in the power, and should accordingly hold it, notwithstanding such fundamental Law to the contrary; by this opinion such persons being actually possessed are the power ordained of God; and to what purpose then should such laws be made to confine, or dissolve their power by a prefixed time; & when they are made, of what force, or authority can they be? And if any execution be of such Laws, as if a Senate will, and do sit beyond the time prescribed in the fundamental order, and he, or they that are by it empowered upon the expiration of the time to dissolve the sitting, CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 5. do undertake to do it, what justifiableness can there be in such an act, seeing they are in possession of Rule, and therefore (according to this opinion) the ordination of God, and therefore to be owned, let to stand, and by no no means in or from their power resisted, deposed, or dissolved. Subsection 5. Argument 5. From the practice of Nations owning them for their Sovereign powers who have not actually ruled. 5. BY the common sentence, and judgement (both of States and Nations, and of Books, and Authors of policy) authority, or supreme power is separable from actual regency, or command. In the general account they are taken, & acknowledged for the higher powers, who do not at all exercise any authority, either by themselves, or others, personally, or by proxy. In the case of a Prince's deficiency of the use of Reason, as through infancy, madness, or dotage, and in case of his want of liberty to exercise government in his Dominion, being disenabled by captivity, or expulsion; In such cases, either the standing Laws of the Kingdom, or the act of the State pro re nata, appoints both the Tutelage of the impotent Prince, if he be with them, and the administration of his Kingdom, during that his deficiency, or restraint unto some others, as Curators, Regent's, or Protectors in his behalf. Hence they distinguish in this case Jus ab usu juris, the right of Magistracy from the use of it; and Actum primum ab actu secundo, the first act of power, which is the being of the power, the esse magistratus, from the second, which is the act of Rule. * Vide Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 1. cap. 3. sect. 15. & 24. And the case is the same in a disturbed estate, whether it be by intestine commotion of Subjects against their Sovereign, or by foreign, hostile invasion, or by competition of divers titulars to the Throne. In every of these cases the power suspended from exercise, either by an inherent, or an adjacent impediment, is yet in being; and though regnancy, or the second act of Magistracy be interrupted, yet the first act, the relation of Sovereign, and Subjects may exist, and remain. For instances of this nature, I shall refer to these few more largely to be found in their respective histories; The people of Israel, who had risen up with, and for Absalon against King David; at the same time when they said, David was fled out of the land, do yet own him for their King, and consult about his reduction from beyond Jordan into the repossession of his Kingdom, as upon that account, or ground: and they that did thus, the Text styles them, all the people throughout all the t●ibes of Israel: and all the men of Israel (it again saith) challenged a part, and right in him, as their King in that condition, yea, ten parts, and more right, in distinction from the men of Judah; and thereupon they contest with them of Judah that their advice was not first had in b●inging bacl their King. During the seventy year's captivity of Judah under the Babylonian, we find several persons successively named, and noted as the Princes of Judah: and, which is remarkable, they are put in the pedigree of Christ, that is drawn down from David: and it is further to be noted, that the line of Christ's pedigree takes in both them and others, who are generally accounted to follow the immediate predecessors to whom they are subjoined, not by natural generation, but by way of legal succession; to show (as it is conceived) that Christ was descended of those who were not only of David's blood, and stock, but of the Royal dignity, though not always in respect of possession, and enjoyment of the throne, yet in title, and right; and in the acknowledgement of the Jews, so far they could own them: and that the prophecy of Jacob (the sceptre shall not departed, etc. Gen. 49.10.) was fulfilled: For, though they had not always Monarchical Government actually swaying in the line of Solomon, nor in any of David's seed, nor in any of Judah's tribe, yet they had still some kind of polity, and royalty in being in the Jewish Nation, and kept up, or sustained either by the Eth●●rohs of David's stock, as their chief national Magistrates under, & after the captivity, or by some of the Jewish nation, though of another tribe, as it was by the Maccabean race, and after them by some Chieftains of that people, still continuing a dictinct Commonwealth, though in subjection to Herod, or the Romans, until Christ was born, and some time after until the gathering of the Gentiles unto Christ, as his Church, & the desolation of the Jewish Church & State by Vesp●sian. Accordingly we find Jehojakim in Babylon, when he had been in prison there 37 years, yet then, and in that condition styled the King of Judah, and withal, some state and dignity of a King yielded him by the Babylonian Emperor. [2 Kings 25.27. Jer. 52.31.] of which exaltation of Jehojakim the King must (I take it) be understood that of the Prophet [Ezek. 29.21.] In that day will I cause the horn of the house of Israel to bud forth. Which phrase (of the horns budding forth) being interpreted by that of [Psal. 132.17.] There will I make the borne of David to bud] must needs intent the reviving of the royal dignity in David's family. * See Divines Annotat. on Ezek. 29 21. After him Salathiel still at Babylon is called the captain, or prince of the people. † Princeps populi. Junius. Dux populi. Usher. Vide Usheri Annal. part 1. p. 138. [2 Esdras 5.16.] and the reason is taken to be, for that he was appointed, and declared by Jeconiah his heir, and next successor. * Mr. Lightfoot his Harmony of the O. Test. part 2. pag. 180. & Harmony of N. Test. page 56. This Salathiel (or Shealtiel) is named Jeconiah's son [1 Chron. 3 17. Matth. 1.13.] yet he was not his natural son, for Jeconiah was childless [Jer. 22.30.] and Salath●el was the natural son of Neri, [Luck 3.27.] but he is reckoned as his son in regard that Solomon's line ended in Jeconiah, and then came in nathan's posterity in right of legal succession to the throne of David, of which the next heir than was this Salathiel. † See D●v. Annot. & Diodat. on 1 Chr. 3.17. Ezr. 10 8. Mat. 1.12. & Luke 3.27. In like manner Zorobabel succeedeth Salathiel, as the prince of that people, and he was their leader out of Babylon into Judea, and the governor, CHAP. VI SECT. II. Subsect. 5. and chief actor in the restauration there. He is called Shezbazzar the Prince, (for Shezbazzar was his Chaldee name) [Ezra 1.8.2.2.3.2.] and he is styled the son of Salathiel, [Ezra 3.2. Matth. 1.12. Luke 3.27.] whereas it appears he was the son of Pedaiah, who was Shealtiels brother, [1 Chron. 3.17, 18, 19] So that naturally he was Shealtiels nephew, yet he is reckoned his son, as being his heir, and legal successor, in the head-ship of the Nation. Thus we see these three, Jehoiakim, Salathiel, and Zorobabel, successively sustaining the Princedom of that people during the 70 year's captivity, and until the reduction. Unto all which we may add that David (that is, the house and successors of David) is sundry times called the King of Israel, and Judah, even then during the captivity, and actual dispossession of the Nation, and Princes of Judah, Jer. 30 9 Hos. 3.5. * M. Lightfoot Harmony of N. Test. part 1. p. 56. Nabuchadnezzar King of Babylon during his seven year's frenzy, or brutishness, though then dispossessed of the use, not only of his Kingdom, but of his humanity and reason, yet he continued King still, and Historians account those seven years as part of his 43. or 44. years' reign: And they suppose that his Wife, or his Son, or his Nobles, or whoever governed the Kingdom during that space, were but as his Vicegerents, and the Protectors of the Realm for him; they expecting the recovery of his reason, and his return thereupon unto his Throne at the end of those years, upon the authority of daniel's interpretation of his dream * Vide Chronicon Catha. Edw. Simsoni. part 3. p. 112. An. M. 3437. Sir W. Rawl. Hist. li 3. 3. cap. 1. sect. 13. . And the Text tells us no less, then that the title to the Kingdom remained still to him, and the use of it was to be reserved for him. His dream saying, Yet leave the stump of the roots thereof in the earth (to wit, of the tree deciphering him in his Kingdom) even with a band of iron and brass. The which Daniel interprets thus, Thy kingdom shall be sure unto thee after thou shalt have known that th● heavens do rule. Alexander the great, at his death, leaving his Queen Roxane great with child, his Princes at their consultation about his successor determined to expect Roxane her bringing forth her child, and presently they elect for it four Protectors, to whom they swear obedience. * Justin. Histor. lib 13. pag. 145. Other examples of this kind the Reader may see in Grotius. † Grot. de jure Bel. li. 1. cap. 3. sect. 15. & 24. I will only add these few instances coming near to us in place, and time. In the Kingdom of France, anciently one of the three grand occasions for which the assembly of the three Estates was wont to convene (as their Historian tells us) was when it was necessary to provide for the governing of the Realm, during the captivity, or minority of the Kings, or when they wanted the right use of their senses. * Historical collection, &c in the life of H. 3. page 137. In England the sovereign power hath often resided in them who could not in any one act exercise it, by reason of their far d●stance from home, when the Crown hath descended upon them, or of their captivity, or of their childhood; which defect hath been supplied by the advice, and care of the Chieftains of the Realm: as it was in the case of King Richard the first, being prisoner to the Emperor of Germany: and in the cases of King Edward the third, Henry the six●h, Edward the fifth, and Edward the sixth, being but children at their first coming to the Crown: and in the case of King Edward the fi●st, being in War against the Saracens in Asia, at what time the Kingdom fell to him. † Speeds Histor. Book 9 cap. 7. sect. 44. cap. 9 sect. 3. cap. 10. sect. 6. cap. 16. s●●t. 1. cap. 22. sect. 24. Quum Roma a Gottis capta est, ●ccupatio fuit violenta, cui s●se interea imperatores opponebant, quantum patiebatur rerum status, & pe●secerunt denique ut ad se rediret. Itaque quemadmodum au● olim Carolus 7. occupata ab Anglis, aut nuper Henricus 4. ab Hispanis, Luteria, non d●sierunt esse veri Reges Francorum, nec desiit eorum juris esse Luteria, sic nec illi quidem d●sierunt ess● Romani imperatores. Chamier panstrat tom. 2. l. 17. c. 4. sect. 17. Chamier observes, when Rome was taken by the Goths, there was a violent possession, the which in the mean time the Emperors opposed as far as the state of things would permit, and at last prevailed to a recovery of it to them wherefore as in time past, Paris being seized by the English, or of late by the Spaniards, Charles the seventh, and Henry the fourth▪ ceased not to be the true Kings of France, neither did Paris cease to be of their Dominion; so neither ceased those to be Emperors of Rome. In the late differences betwixt the King, CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 6. and Parliament, it was often affirmed to be Law, That the King in his civil, or political capacity cannot be severed from his Kingdom, or Parliament, how far soever he is distant in person, or in dispesition of mind to act with them. * See fuller answer to Dr. Fern, p. 9 Mr. H. Potts his Cordial, p. 15. And to add no more, the late Parliament more than once found themselves fallen under force, yet after recovering their liberty did account themselves, and were accounted by the King, and Kingdom the Parliament still, and their constitution and session to have continued both under, and after the said force. Subsection 6. Argument 6. From another practice of Kingdoms, viz. their admitting some to the place of supreme command whom they acknowledge not to be the supreme power. 6 AS there are who are generally acknowledged to be the supreme power that rule not at all, that do not actually possess command, or exercise any act of civil authority; so there are that do lawfully exercise, and execute the same authority, and yet are not acknowledged, or taken to be the sovereign power, or Magistrate: Such are they who are placed as Protectors, or Vicegerents in the forementioned deficiencies of the Sovereign Prince. One may be the King, another, in regard of that King's Nonage, absence, durance, or dotage, may be the Regent; the latter executing the supreme authority in his behalf, or stead. And where the case is thus; suppose the King die in the said Condition, though the Protector, or Regent, be found in actual use, or execution of the sovereign power, (whether there be another legal Inheritor, & Successor of the dead King, CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 7. or the line fail, and there be none invested with right of succession) yet is not the said Protector the supreme power, nor is so taken, or acknowledged to be by the Realm; the right, or title to the Crown having never been conveyed, or made over to him: but rather, he having been but Regent in the name and behalf of the deceased Prince; that office which he had legally ceaseth upon the death of him in whose name he ruled, and he is now divested of it. Subsection 7. Argument 7. From the approved custom of determining Controverted titles unto Sovereignty by Arbitration. 7 IT hath been the custom of Princes, and other supreme States, or Potentates, both ancient and modern, when a Controversy hath been raised betwixt two, or more of them, about the title to the Sovereignty of a Kingdom, or Territory, and each part hath been confident of his right, and bend to vindicate his claim by the sword to the uttermost issue, and commonly one of them hath been in possession, and the other kept out by him, for the preventing of the miseries, and uncertain events of War, and for the clearer, and safer ending of the difference, to refer the matter to the arbitration of one, or more, as judge, or judges betwixt them. Which way of decision is approved, and commended as the most equal, wise, and moderate, and most becoming Christians. For instance, Atherbal, and Jugurtha, brought their contest about the Kingdom of Numidia unto the Roman Senate to be adjudged * Sallust. Bel. jugurth. num. 69. pag. 38. . Tygranes the Father, and Son, referred their strife about the Kingdom of Armenia unto Pompey the Great, for his decision † Usser. Annal part. poster. p. 238. . Hircanus and Aristobulus, the two Asm●nian brethren bring their difference about the dominion of Judea before the same Pompey, as the Arbitrator betwixt them * Idem page 248, 249. Rosse Hist. Book 1. Chap. 5. page 20. . Archelaus, and Antipas, the two Sons of Herod the Great, after his decease, repair to Rome, unto Augustus Caesar, to determine their several claims to their Father's dominions † Usser. Annal part. poster. p. 537. . Upon the death of Alexander King of Scotland, the Crown of that Kingdom being subject to the claims of many Nobles, the chiefest, and probablest of which were those of John Balliol, and Robert Bruce, the determination of this controversy was by all the parties referred to Edward the first, King of England * Speeds History. Book 9 chap. 10, Sect. 18. Rosse History, Book 5. Chap. 3. page 244. . And more examples of this na-may be seen in Bishop Usher, Usser. Annal. part postr. p. 247. and Hugo Grotius. Grotius de jure B. lib. 2. Cap. 23▪ Sect. 8. Et lib. 3. cap. 20. sect. 46. When the case is thus, the thing referred, and adjudged is not who is in possession, but in whom is the right: If this were a certain, and clear principle, that he is the power that is in possession, the difference were at an end, and would need no Arbitrator, where either of the litigants is in the place. And when it is thus referred, it were a frivolous proceeding for the Arbitrator to hear the arguments, and pleas of the parties, or to inquire into the grounds of each of their claims, by law, descent, election, contract, testament, or the like; all that he hath to do, is to ask which of them is in possession, and to judge for him, or at his own free choice to put the one of them in possession (if neither be already) and so to end the difference. Unto which business the parties need not travail or study to find out, and repair to the wisest, justest, and mos●●●different Arbitrator: or he to call in the ablest Civilians, or Causuists to assist him * As the Historian saith, the said K. Edward did in the Scottish controversy last mentioned. ; The first person they may light on, CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 8. be he the simplest man on earth, would serve to umpire the cause by that principle. Subsection 8. Argument 8. From the expressions of the Holy Ghost in Scripture, owning men for Kings, in relation to the Kingdoms of which they have been unpossessed. 8 THat persons may be out of the seat of rule both personally, and virtually, both in regard of residence, and in regard of actual command, and yet be higher powers, that is, Kings, and Sovereigns, may appear to be the dictate, not only of wise Statists, and Kingdoms, but of the Holy Ghost in Scripture, and this in that he mentioneth, enstyleth, or owneth persons as Kings, and as reigning, at the time, and in the condition wherein they had no actual rule over the places, or people, in relation to which they are said to be Kings, or to reign. There may be found in Scripture divers instances for this, viz many persons mentioned as Kings in such a place, or said to reign in such a Kingdom; at which time they were either carried away, and held captive, or expulsed out of their Kingdoms, or shut up, and besieged in some one City of their Dominions, and despoiled of the possession, and command of all besides by their invaders, and besiegers, or lying secretly hid, and unknown of their Subjects where they were, or whether they were alive, or no, or otherwise excluded, whilst others in opposition to their title, and regency possessed the Throne, and rule of their Dominions. I shall produce sundry examples for this. The sacred story relating to us David's disseisure of his Kingdom by his Son, and Subjects, doth nevertheless during that his outing mention, and own him as King. How full, or in how great a measure that dispossession was, both in regard of place, of power, and of the consent of the people, let the words of the Text speak [2 Sam. 10.12, 13, 14.16. Chap. 15, 16, 17, 18. Chap. 17, 1, 2, 3▪ 4.16.21, 22, 24 27. Chap. 19 9, 10, 11.15.6. By all which passages, it appears that David was wholly ejected, both out of the hearts, and out of the territories of Israel; and that both the land, and the wills of the people were totally given up to Absalon; and yet in this very state of things David is King still, being so reckoned, and styled all along the story; and that, not only in those words of the narration which are set down as the Language of them that adhered unto him, as his friends, and followers; not only in that acknowledgement of the other party, that risen up against him, which they made after the battle was lost, and Absalon slain; when they, both in their consultation among themselves, and in their address, as Subjects to David, own him a● their King; of which [Chap. 19, 9, 10.41.43] But in the proper words, and sentences of the penman of the story (and so of the Holy Ghost) when he himself makes mention of him in his own person, and not in another: In the perusal of the history, I have computed David is in this manner 43 times in the narration, betwixt the time of hi● flight from Jerusalem, and the people's consent given for his reduction, * Viz. Chap: 15.15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27. Chap. 16.2, 3, 4.5, 6.10, 14. Chap. 17.17.21. Chap. 18.2, 4, 5.25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33. Chap. 19 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, ●4. styled King. To this we may add the story of the other revolt by the instigation, and under the conduct of Sheba, which followed at the heels of that of Absalon. This was in like manner very general (as to the ten Tribes) the Text saith, So every man of Israel went up from after David, and followed Sheba, [Chap. 20.2.] yet David, during the rejection, is reckoned as King still by the sacred Historian, [Verses 3, 4.] And there is yet another instance for this in David, he is said to reign over Israel, yea over all Israel forty years; seven of which he reigned in Hebron, and the other 33 in Jerusalem, [2 King's 2.11. 1 Chr. 29.26, 27.] within which years there intervened, not only the space of time in which were the afore recounted interruptions by Absaloms, and Shebah's rebellions, but a fixed confinement of David's actual reign to the Tribe of Judah only, for the first seven years of the 40. in which he reigned in Hebron, for so the Text plainly saith. David was thirty years old when he began to reign, and he reigned forty years in Hebron he reigned over Judah seven years, and six months; and in Jerusalem he reigned thirty-three years over all Israel and Judah, [2 Sam. 4.5.] Of the means of this confinement of his actual reign for those seven years to that one Tribe, the second and third Chapters of the second Book of Samuel will inform us, to wit, the wars betwixt the houses of David and Saul. The same story will tell us, that within those seven years, which were the first part of David's 40 year's reign over Israel, Ishbosheth was made King over all Israel, and reigned two years, [see 2 Sam. 2.8, 9, 10, 11.] That Ishbosheth might well be said to be King, and reign over all Israel de facto, though he wanted the actual obedience of Judah, is easy to conceive, and yield; both because he had 11 Tribes of the twelve, and for that the name of Israel is often put to signify the ten Tribes, in distinction from Judah and Benjamin, much more may it be put for 11 Tribes, including Benjamin, as it plainly doth, [2 Sam. 30.10. and 5.5.] but that Israel, and all Israel in the forecited places [1 King's 2.11. 1 Chron. 29.26, 27.] should be put for the Tribe of Judah only, and divided from all the other Tribes, even then when the other 11 Tribes were in fact a disjoined and opposite Kingdom to it, and that under the title of Israel, I see not how it can st●nd. The question than is, how those Texts that reckon to David forty years' reign over Israel, can be reconciled to the other that allot to him seven of those 40 to reign over Judah only in Hebron, and give Ishbosheth within that time a reign over all Israel, as a distinct Kingdom from Judah? I think it can be no otherwise done then thus. Ishbosheth was King, and reigned de facto over, and by actual, & predominate possession held from David the 11 Tribes, whilst David enjoyed only the Dominion of the Tribe of Judah, but was the jure, or in title and right King over all the rest, which Ishbosheth detained: and therefore David at that time, not only expected, but justly waged war upon Ishbosheth, and his partakers, for the recovery thereof, and therein accordingly daily grew upon him, and won upon them: and upon this ground might well be that message of Abner to David, saying, whose is the Land? acknowledging David the Proprietor where he was not the possessor, [2 Sam. 3.12.] Here than we have two competitory Kings, mentioned as invested in the same territory at the same time (not as joint partners, but each as claymer in toto, & in solid●m:) with this difference, (for we must not make a contradiction of it) the one is invested with possession, the other with the right; the one is the occupant, the other is the proprietor. Now if we should bring both these Kings to this Text of the Apostle, and ask which of them during those two years of Ishbosheth might be said in reference to the 11 Tribes to be the power in being of God, ordained of God? would not any considerate Reader answer, not Ishbosheth, but David? not the possessor, but the Proprietor? And whereas both are said to have reigned; not he that is only said to reign, but he that is said to reign, and is likewise said to be chosen by God to it, and entered possession by his special direction, as it is said of David * 2 Sam. 5.2.2.2. . Thus we have seen this one King, and that, he who in a style peculiar, and above others is said to be the anointed of the God of Jacob, yields us a triple instance of a power in being, yet out of possession. Next to David was Solomon; yet when he, as David's immediate successor, should be installed, being thereunto assigned both by divine appointment, and by his Father, [1 Chron. 28.5. 1 Kings 1.17.] Adonijah, his elder brother, got the start of him, in respect of possession; and the said Adonijah not only exalted himself, saying, I will be King; but raised a very strong party, yea obtained (it seems) a general consent of the State, and thereby got into actual seizure of the Kingdom. There stood up for him, and gave him admission to the Kingdom Joab the General of the Army, Abiathar the Priest, and all his brethren, the King's sons, and all the m●● of Judah, the King's servants: Whereupon Nathan the Prophet, and Ba●hsheba tell David, Adonijah doth reign: and himself said afterward, The kingdom was mine, and all Israel set their faces on me, that I should reign. [1 King. 1.5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 18.25.2.15.] Yet for for all this the Kingdom in right of succession, upon the forementioned title, was Solomon's▪ which Adonijah after confessed, It was thine from the Lord, [1 Kings 2.15.] and therefore Adonijahs possession notwithstanding, Nathan the Prophet moveth Bathsheba, and they both together move David for Solomon's investure; and by his order Zadok, Bendiah, and Nathan, with the King's guard, proclaim, anoint, and inaugurate him in the Throne. [1 King. 1.32, 33, 38] The which, if Adonijah had been the power, because he was in possession, and Solomon had not been the power, because forestalled, and kept from possession, they could not lawfully have done; but both they, and Solomon, yea, and David also must have acquiesced in the duty of subjection to Adonijah, according to the Rule of the Apostle in this place, if to be understood as abovesaid. Let us go on to other examples. ● Chr. 22.9. Ahaziah King of Judah being slain by Jehu, the Text saith, his house had no power to keep still the kingdom; yet Joash, his son, and heir, being left alive, though he were powerlesse (both in regard of his own childhood, & Athaliah's strong hand of usurpation over the Kingdom, ceased not therefore to be King. For, whilst he lay hid with his Aunt in the house of the Lord, and was not known abroad so much as to be, being in common repute slaughtered amongst the rest of Ahaziah's sons, and Athaliah reigned over the Land; and when Jehoiadah the Priest, and those of the Levites, and people that were gathered to him in the Temple, were but privately confederating, consulting, and preparing to invest him in the possession of the Kingdom, the Penman of the sacred Story styleth him the King. I mean, not only when the said persons had set the Crown on his head, and observed the other Ceremonies of his Inauguration (though all that being done, he neither by virtue thereof, nor other ways, had the visible possession of the Kingdom, or the actual prevalency over, and reception of the people, all the transactions hitherto being contained within the Verge of the Temple, and published through the Land, or City; yea, so secret as that to Athaliah herself, vigilant enough doubtless, and who was so near to the Temple, and so much concerned to take notice, it was utterly unespied, and unheard of until the closing Plaudite of the people brought the confused sound of it to her ears, and so occasioned her looking forth, and knowledge of it) but even while they were yet intending, contriving, and ordering the way how to attempt, and execute their said design. [See 2 Chron. 23.3.5 7.10.] Here then is a King in being before in actual possession or regnancy. The suspensions of Rehoboam, Vzziah, Hezekiah, Manass●h, Zedechiah, and Hoshea, from the actual possession, use, and command of their respective Kingdoms, through the invasions made upon their Kingdoms by their several enemies, or by their own incapacities & the consistence thereof with their being Kings, and with the continuance of their Reigns still, as to right, and title, in the computation of Scripture, we shall need to do no more but mention cursorily, having already seen so many examples to this purpose. In the Reign of Rehoboam, Shishak King of Egypt entereth Judah with a huge host, and overpowers it, taking the fenced Cities thereof, and so coming to Jerusalem. Into it Rehoboam and his Princes were retreated for their defence, and were so enclosed there by him, as that the Lord tells them by his Prophet, for their forsaking him, he left them in the hand of Shishak. Yet in this condition the Text still taketh notice of Rehoboam as the King, and his Princes as the Princes of Judah, [2 Chron. 12.6.] Vzziah is reckoned to reign in Jerusalem 52 years; yet for some part of his time, being smitten with a Leprosy by an immediate hand of God, he was deprived of all exercise of regal power, and shut out even from civil communion; and his son Jotham administereth the Realm. [2 Kings 15.2, 5. 2 Chron. 26 3, 21.] For how long time was this deprivation of Vzziah the Scripture doth not expressly relate; but, in regard in one place Jotham is said to reign 16 years, and in another we read of his twentieth year, [See 2 Kings 15.13, 33.] It may be supposed that four of those twenty years, Jotham ruled in the life time, and within those 52 years of the reign of his Father, because of his said incapacity. When Hezekiah was King, Senacherib King of Assyria came up against all the fenced Cities of Judah, and took them, and sent his Commanders with a great Army against Jerusalem (wherein was Hezekiah) to summon it; so that he was Master of the whole Territory of Judah, Jerusalem excepted. [2 Kings 18.13.17. Isa. 36.1.33 8, 9] yet Hezikiah thus overpowered, and shut up is King of Judah still. [2 King. 19 1.5. 2 Chron. 32.9.] Manasseh is computed to reign 55. years, [2 King. 21.1. 2 Chron. 33.1.] yet, The Lord brought upon him, and his people the Captains of the host of the King of Assyria, who took him, and bound him with fetters, and carried him to Babylon. [2 Chron. 33.11.] In what time of his reign this fell out, & for how long this his dispossession, and captivity lasted, I find no certainty: but from his first seizing to his recovery (considering his journey to Babylon, his affliction there, the work it had upon him, his great humiliation before God, and the c●nsequents of it, his prayer, and the Lord working for his release out of the hands of the Babylonian, and his reduction from thence unto Jerusalem) it must needs be taken to have been some considerable space of time. How much soever it was, * See Divines Annot. on 2 Kin. 21.1. contained it was (as Expositors agree) within the current of those 55 years of his reign. Zedekiah is accounted to reign as King of Judah 11 years; yet for about two years † Archbishop Usher reckons it 2 years complete. Annal. part. 1. An. M. 3405. of those 11 years he was mured up by the King of Babylon's Army in Jerusalem; and the rest of Judea was either possessed, or in like manner besieged by the said enemy. [2 Kings 25.4, 5.34.7.] Hoshea reigned in Samaria over Israel nine years: yet, for at least three of those years, he was shut up, and bound in prison, and the whole Land was overrun, and Samaria was besieged until it was taken by Shalmanezer King of Assyria. [2 Kings 17.4, 5, 6.] But the number of Scripture precedents already recited is sufficient for the purpose before assigned. By all these it is (I hope) fully manifest, that a Sovereign Prince may be shut up in some strong hold within his Kingdom, or be carried away prisoner, or expelled out of it, or be forced to lie hid as one out of the world, or through some incapacity be excluded from actual regency, and yet be King still, and his reign (in the being, habit, or first act of it) continued. And whereas, during the interruptions of the rule of the several Princes above mentioned, there were others that, either by the will, & consent of them, or their respective Kingdoms, or against it, bore the actual sway, and command, unto whom the people were subject, yet it was either in behalf of those disenabled Kings, where it was with consent; or by way of compulsory, and passive subjectednesse, without any moral tie of allegiance, or of the duty of Subjects incumbent on them in reference to such compulsatory rulers. For, where the disenabled Prince's power, and reign was yet in being, there must needs be a reservation of the Relative bond of Allegiance on the people's part to them: The tye of the Relation, and Liege right being ever mutual, and reciprocal, so that it remaining in the one, it must needs remain in the other; and when ever the obstruction was removed, there being a postliminium or reduction into act of the one, there would be the same also of the other. I will shut up this argument, and enumeration of Scripture-instances with that which is found in Ezek. 21.27. I will overturn, overturn, overturn it, and it shall be no more, until he come whose right it is, and I will give it him. Who is that whose right the Crown of Judah then was? It is usually applied to Christ, and I shall not gainsay that Exposition: only I would say that, as the branch of the Cedar-tree which the Lord saith he will set and plant in the mountain of the height of Israel, Chap. 17.22, 23. is interpreted first of Zerubbabel, in whom the sovereign dignity was restored at the return from the captivity, and then of Christ * So Calvin, Diodate, and the Divines Annotat. : So may this parallel prophecy be understood. But whether we apply it to Zerubbabel, or to Christ, this must needs be granted, that after Zedekiah's removal, and the Lands captivity was consummate by Nabuchadnezzar, a right there was extant, and remaining somewhere, or in some person to the Crown, and Kingdom of Judah, though for the present suspended from actual exercise, both by the hand of God's providence in the full conquest of Nabuchadnezzar, and by his extraordinary direction, and dispensation by word of mouth, sent by his Prophet Jeremiah, as we find, Jer. 27.12, 16.21.8, 9 and that right did not descend upon Christ till he was born; nor then per saltum, or immediately from Zedekiah, or Jehoiakim to him, but by the interposal of those pe●sons in whom the race, and line of blood, or inheritance was continued down to Christ. Subsection 9 CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 9 Argument 9 Taken from the nature of Magistracy. 9 REason is to be drawn from the nature of Magistracy. It cannot agree thereunto, to say that actual possession, or rule, gives being to the power, or is an inseparable adjunct, or convertible attribute thereof. Magistracy is a relation of office. Every relation is founded upon something that is absolute. What should be the foundation of the relation of Magistrate, and Subject but the act of constitution of such a person, or persons in authority, or to be, and stand in the office of Magistracy to such a people? from this transaction as from its foundation results this estate, or relation: and then from this estate or relation result the mutual duties, and acts of Magistrate, and Subject, his actual superiority, and their subjection, his rule, and their obedience. Well then, actual superiority, and rule, being acts proper to, and resulting out of Magistracy, they must needs presuppose it to be first in being, ere they can be educed. First, (I say) not only in order of nature, but of time; for the civil transactions whereby Magistracy is produced, and the politcall acts which proceed from it are not immanent, or instantaneous, (such as are those whereby the forms of natural beings do produce their faculties, or properties) but transient, and succedaneous, and such as require some ●l●x● of time to be put forth in. It must needs be then an incongruous assertion to affis me, that the acts which fl●w from Magistracy in tim● d● g●ve being to, or are convertible adjuncts of it. A man is first a man, and then he reasons. A man is first an Artificer, and then he works in his Art. So a man is first a power, and then he rules; possession of the Throne, or Territory, and Regency, or coercion of the people by the sword are after, and latter in time then the Creation, or Investure of the power. Magistracy is the antecedent, the cause, the principle, the first act; and actual dominion, or coercion is the consequent, the effect, the effluxe, or the second act thereof. Men first are Kings, and then they reign; they rule, because they are the higher powers, and they are not the higher powers, because they rule. As, on the other hand, the state of inferiority in a political body is the cause, and principle of the Subject's acts of obedience. Men are first in the relation of Subjects, and then they act, or yield obedience. This precept of the Apostle [Let every soul be subject to the higher powers] though delivered in ●●arms illimitedly universal, is only intended, and given to them that are in the state of Subjects, and because they are in that estate, therefore it takes hold on them; they that are either supreme Magistrates, or within no Commonwealth, are not obliged by it. And as every person is not involved, so every act of submission which may be done to any kind of power in the civil State, is not that which is comprised in this precept, or contained within the matter of it: It is possible a man may submit out of a principle of humility, or policy, or be forcibly prostrated where he oweth no obedience, but it is a submission ex debito, and that stricti juris, or proper to the conscience of him that is in the state of a Subject that is hereby required. Let Solomon be our instance to illustrate this. Having been before designed, and chosen to be his Father Successor in the Kingdom of Israel, he is thereupon first anointed, and proclaimed King by Zadok, Nathan, and Benaiah; and then after this it is said, He sat on the throne of the King, in stead of David his father, and prospered, and all Israel obeyed him, and all the Princes, and the mighty men, CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 5. and all the sons likewise of K. David submitted themselves unto lomon the King. Here Solomon's constitution precedes his actual possession and rule, and the Subjects submission, and obedience, both in order of nature, and of time, as the ground and reason thereof. And the same is exemplified in Joshua. When Moses was to die, he spoke unto the Lord, saying, Let the Lord, the God of the spirits of all flesh, set a man ●ver the congregation, which may go out b●fore them, and which may lead them out, and which may bring them in. Here, in this petition there is first desired the setting of one over the Congregation, which is the calling & admitting of him to the Sovereign power, and then follows his leading them out, and bringing them in, his exercise of rule. And according to the order of this Petition, is the method of the Lords concession, and direction upon it. The Lord in the next words commands Moses to take Joshua, and lay his hand upon him, and set him b●fore Eleazar the Priest, and before all the congregation, and give him a charge in their sight, and puts some of his honour upon him, and then it follows, That all the Congregation of the children of Israel may be obedient. There may be a violent, brutish subduedness●, but there can be no rational, moral submission, and obedience as of Liege-people to their Liege-Lord in any other course. And as to this the case is altogether the same, and there is no d●fference, whether the Magistrate come in by extraordinary assignation from God, as Joshua, and Solomon did, or by the ordinary means. Those commands, and rules that are given in Scripture for the doing of public, distributive justice, as that, Defend the poor, and fatherless: do justice to the afflicted, and needy: and deliver the poor and needy: rid them out of the hand of the wicked, Psalm 82.3, 4. and many others * See Levit. 19.15. Deut. 1.16, 17.16.19. 1 Sam. 23.3. 2 Chr. 19.6, etc. . I would ask, ●o whom they are given? who do they concern? are they spoken to all without exception, or only to them that are Magistrates, and Governors? I suppose the latter. CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 9 By them it doth appear then, that the Scripture supposeth men Magistrates, before they may exercise any civil power: they must fi●st be Governors, and then they are called, and enabled to put forth the acts of rule. Look upon that law given by God unto Noah, [Gen. 6.9.] Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. In those words there is both a condemnation of bloodshedding, and a commandment for it: here is bloodshed strictly forbidden, and capitally judged, to wit, the blood of the innocent; and here is bloodshed commanded, to wit, the blood of the murderer. Here is a prohibition of blood-spilling to some, and a commission for it to others. The power of the Sword, or of capital punishment is neither forbidden to all, nor prostitute to all; but commanded to some, and reserved from some. The question than is, who are forbidden to shed blood, and who are authorized to shed that blood that may, and must be spilt? The Law, though it run in terms indefinite, yet must needs be limited; and as in the former words, whoso sheddeth, we must take in this restriction, whoso murderously sheddeth, so in the latter, by man shall his blood be sh●d, we must admit this limitation, not by every man that will, and can; not by any private person, but by the Magistrate. They that are not in his office may only prosecute by complaint, and testimony, but must let judgement giving alone * So Willet, & Pareus in Rom. 13. P. Martyr loc. come. clas. 4. cap. 13 pag. 898 Syropsis pu: Theol. Disp. 50. Sect. 38. . Should we say they that get the sword, can arm themselves with it, may use it, and are the authorized here, this were to set the stronger over the weaker, and to occasion (especially where there were any nearness to an equality, or question which part were the stronger) all combustion, and confusion among men, to determine where that authority shall be; and in stead of preventing, or punishing bloodshed, it were to open a gap to an universal, and endless overflow of it, and to make this Law an act of indemnity, and impunity for murder. We must therefore necessarily distinguish betwixt them that can, and them that may, and aught to shed the offenders blood: CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subject. 10. and say, this warrant of the sword, or putting to death (the first we find given) is only made to him that then was, and from thenceforward to him that is the Magistrate. A man then must first be a civil power before he can come by this Scripture-way to the sword; he cannot by the sword come to be the civil Power. Subsection 0. Argument 10. From God's express disallowance of some in actual command. 10 THis shall be my last Argument. If some are, or may be in place of actual command, and exercise of rule who are not (in the sense of our Text) of God, ordained of God, therein than it is not that, to wit, actual rule which makes, or proves one to be the power that the Text saith is of God, ordained of God. But this may be, viz. some may be in actual command, and exercise of rule, who are not in the sense of the Text of God ordained of God. This is thus proved. It is before made evident, and therefore must be here taken for granted, that, of God, ordained of God, signifies appointed, approved, authorized, allowed, or warranted of God. But there may be some in actual rule and command, who are not thereto appointed, approved, etc. of God. This is very manifest by sundry Scriptures, wherein G d doth expp●sly disallow, condemn, and threaten with punishment persons that are in actual rule, and command for their so doing, or being. [See Amos 6 13.] Ye which say, have we not taken to us horns by our own strength? [Ezek. 33.26.] Ye● stand upon your sword— and shall ye possess the land? CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect 9 Hab. 2.5, 6. He is a proud man, neither keepeth at home; who enlargeth his desire as Hell, and is as death, and cannot be satisfied; but gathereth to him all nations, and heapeth unto him all people. Shall not all these take up a parable against him, and a taunting proverb against him, and say, Woe to him that increaseth that which is not his? etc. Nahum 2.4. Because of the multitude of the whoredoms of the wet-favoured harlot, the mistress of witchcrafts, that selleth nations through her whoredoms, and families through her witchcrafts. By those whoredoms, and witchcrafts of Nineveh, Expositors understand the arts, and policies, by which she subjected the Nations of the earth. But especially would I have observed that of our Saviour unto Peter, [Mat. 26.52.] For all they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword. It is not questionless his drift by these words simply to disallow all use of the sword; but the qualification, or restriction of the words lies in that word, Take (as Augustine, Cajetan, and Luther (the last of whom applies this Text against the Boo●s of Swevia then in arms against their Magistrates, in his answer to their Articles) do observe * Augustinus Tom. 6. contra Manichaeum. li. 22. cap. 70. Cajetani Jentac. 6. qu. 3. Lutherus apud Jo: Sleid. Com. lib. 5. pag. 120. 122. ) by that term the Usurper of the Sword is differenced from the true owns. The one takes the Sword, the other hath it committed to him. The one snatcheth it to himself, the other hath it coming orderly into his hand. The former it is, and him only whom our Saviour here condemns, and declares the destructive judgement of God against. Whence it must needs be confessed that one may have the sword in his hand, and be for it disallowed, and threatened of God, and consequently cannot possess it, as thereunto ordained, appointed, authorised by him. I will conclude this dispute, and section with that of Saint Augustine, wherein he determineth this question to the sense which I have here argued for. When the Roman Empire under the Emperor's Arcadius, and Honorius, was so harassed by the Goths under the conduct of Alaricus, and Radagasus, and specially the Western part by Alaricus, and the City of Rome was taken by him, St. Augustine saith of it in that condition, Quanquam Romanum imperium afflictum est potius quam mutatum, quod et aliis ante Christi nomen temporibus ei con tgit; & ab illâ afflictione recreatum; quod nec istis temporibus desperandum est: Quis enim de hâc re novit voluntatem Dei? Augustine de Civ. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 7. Although indeed the Roman Empire be rather afflicted, then changed: the which also befell it at other times before Christ, and it was again recovered from that affliction; which neither is in these times to be despaired of; For who knoweth the purpose of God in this matter? CHAP. VIII. SECT. II. CHAP. VIII. Some Arguments to prove [that by the power in the Text is to be understood a power lawful as to Title, and not a mere possessory power] taken from the context. HAving now gone over all the Terms of the Text, and of the description therein of the original of the civil Magistrate, for the finding out of the true sense, and just extent thereof: and by the discussion of them, having come to this resolu●ion, That by the power is meant a power lawful, j●st, or warrantable, in respect of Title; and that by the ordination of God is to be understood a legislative, or preceptive ordination; & that the other words, and clauses in the Text do very well comport, and accord with the said sense of these: It now remains that, according to the method fi●st proposed, I add hereunto what considerations I have further conceived for the further clearing, and confirmation of the same. The which I shall place under two heads. 1. Observations from the other parts of this Text, concerning the civil Magistrate, contained within the seven leading verses of this Chapter. 2. The grounds or principles from otherwhere colligible, tending to conclude the present resolution. The observations from the Context giving light and strength to our conclusion are these. CHAP. VIII. SECT. I. A consideration of the duty to be yielded to the power in those words, vers. 1. Be subject. 1. THe first may be from the duty to be yielded to the power, the pressing whereof upon Christians is the plain drift of the Apostle in this discourse. And upon this my observation shall be twofold. 1. Of the original term in which the duty is laid down. 2. Of the thing itself thereby evidently intended. 1. The term is Vers. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Be subject. Used again, vers. 5. as the powers are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ordained of God, and the power is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the ordinance of God, and he that resisteth the power is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so he that is here instructed in his duty to the power must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, be subject. They are all words coming from one root. The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to be placed in order under another, to be subject according to order, to be under another orderly. Now an orderly subjection relates to an orderly superiority, and looks at them that are above, or over according to order. But, what is order? The definition of it common in the Schools, and received from Saint Augustine is, Ordo est parium, dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio, it is the disposal of things, whether collateral, or subordinate, whether of equal, and even, or of unequal and different rank, and quality, each to his due, CHAP. VIII. SECT. I. & proper place. To be subject then orderly or according to order, is to submit to him, who is orderly placed over us; or, to be regularly under him that is regularly above; or, to yield just, and lawful precedency, or command unto him, or them that are of right our superiors. The direct opposite to order among men is Atopy, desulto inesse, insolency, or undue elation. And, in the civil State, disorder is when men run into tumult, rise up in sedition, or aspire above their place by usurpation. To occupy the sea●e of Dignity uncalled, unauthorised, is an ataxy, a breaking, and violating of order, a bringing of the Commonwealth qui●e out of order, a casting down them whom order setteth up, and a lifting up them, whom order placeth beneath. Whereby it may appear, that in relation to an arbitrary Government, there is properly no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, no orderly subjection. There may be for public order sake, or in relation to the other parts, and proportionate positions in the Commonwealth, a submission and obedience performed to an unjustly possessing power, and this may be a duty, but this is not in behalf of, or with an eye, and respect to such a power, who being up against, and out of order cannot be the mark, or object of an orderly subjection. 2. The thing itself which is required in those words, Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers, Divines have observed, that under this term here, Be subject, there is much enjoined, a multitude of duties are contained, and commanded to be performed toward the Magistrate, to wit, not only a passive stooping endurance, or irresistance under his imposals, but an active inserviency, execution, and observation of his lawful commands: and further, to contribute our abilities to his support, and maintenance; and that both to the acts of his rule, officiating, and administration, and to his standing, continuance, and keeping of his seat, and station: and unto these assistances of him are required all our abilities both humane and christian; as those of pu●se, counsel, arms, and prayers: Moreover, CHAP. VIII. SECT. II. not only the external act of all these are to be yielded him; but the elicit, and inward motions of the heart, to wit, consent, love, reverence, and honour: and unto all these is to be added a special kind of fidelity or allegiance both in continuance under his jurisdiction, in concealing his secrets, and his disadvantages wherd the opening of them may be to his prejudice, and in discovering to him our knowledge of what may import his danger, or securement. Add hereunto the strict manner in which this precept of subjection is urged, vers. 2. to wit, under pain of damnation, and the ground, or consideration on which it is to be yielded unto the power, vers. 5, 6, 7. to wit, of necessity, not only for wrath, or terror, that is so ●ar, and so long as one is constrained by fear, and to avoid a greater evil, or damage, then is the rendering of what is required by him; but for conscience sake, that is out of conscience of duty, to wit, both that of piety to God, the ordainer of him to that special Ministry, and Vicegerency under him, and that of equity, and justice to him, whose due, and right in consideration of his office and work it may be. But now, can it be imagined that the Text doth in this form, and manner set up any violent, or predatory power, any Robber, or Pirate, any Tory, or Moss-trooper, Turk, or Tartar, Mamaluke, or Cyclops, that can raise, or steal himself into the Mastery over a people? and that it ordains every country, city, or person to yield, and pay a subjection of this extent to every such one that shall seize, and captivate them? The Roman Histories relate unto us divers stories of mighty, and strange successes, power, and command, which men of the vilest quality, and basest rank have suddenly attained, and for a time held within the body, and in defiance of the authority of that great Empire. The several stories of the high feats, and achievements of the Roman slaves under those three Ringleaders, Herdonius, Eunus, and Athenio are briefly remembered by Florus: CHAP. VIII. SECT. I. as is also that of the sword-players * Quis aequo animo ferat in principe gentium populo bella servorum? quis crederet Siciliam multo cruentius servili quam Punito bello esse vastatam? Quum servi militaverint, Oladiatores imperaverint: illi i●fimae sortis homines: high pessimam auxere ludib●io calamitatem. Florus lib 3. cap. 19 & 20. Vide Stadium in loca ista Flori. August deciv. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 5. ; this last is also mentioned by St. Augustine, and it was thus: A few slaves, employed in sword-playing, persuaded by one Spartacus a Thracian, rather to fight for their own liberty then the spectator's pleasure, and their own mutual destruction, break out from that bloody sport, raise great Forces, and not only free themselves from their slavery, but under three Captains (Spartacus, Chrysus, and Oenomaus) overrun all Italy, acquire great victories, and rule all at their pleasure, as Kings, and could not be overcome by some Roman Generals; these mock-kings did for a time absolutely command a great part, and much afflicted, and endangered the whole Roman Empire, when it was grown to its greatness, and had subdued many Natitions to itself. But could these successful eruptions of those gladiatory slaves entitle them to the style; and dignity of powers ordained of God in the Countries which they had got the mastery of? And will any man say, that the Roman people within those bounds were obliged to subject to them with a subjection of that siz●, and qualification, namely, that they were in their hearts to consent to, to love, and honour them as their civil Lords; that they were not only to acquiesce, and stoop quietly under their prevalency, but be at their beck to fulfil their commands (not in their own nature vicious) that they were to continue under, to assist, uphold, and maintain them in that seat of rule with all their abilities; and that they were to give over, and refrain all correspondency, and intell gence with the Roman State, and disclose to those their new, and strange Conquerors, whatsoever might preserve them from, and impeach the designs of the Roman Consul, Senate, and Armies against them; and all this, not only for the terror of their potency; and cruel violence, but out of conscience of their duty to God, and them as placed by heaven in the obliging office of Magistratical administration over them? That the subjection of every soul to the higher powers comprehendeth as much as is abovesaid, I need not make labour to prove in this p●ace, the terms of expressing it used by the Apostle in the subsequent verse, and the explication which not only Commentators, and other Divines, but other Scriptures give of this duty, deliver us all those particulars as parcels of the nature of it. And if any man doubt whether all those may not be due to a Spartacus, (or, to an Hordonius, Eunus, or Athenio) that is to an upstart slave by a tumult gotten to overtop a Nation; Let him consider, that, if such an one's tenure of head-ship be injurious, to assist him therein cannot but be so also; and that not only Absalon is by Scripture manifestly disapproved in his rising up against King David, but also those Israelites that joined to maintain him. [Psal. 3.1, 7.] Mr. Burroughes (in his fourth Lecture on Hosea, Chap. 1. ver. 10. pag. 111.) teacheth us in reference to the diversity of powers that may be, to distinguish betwixt obedience out of conscience, and obedience out of prudence. Take his own words that are very plain to the present purpose. Not to the commands, and mere wills of men till it be brought to a law are we bound in conscience to submit, no way, neither actively, nor passively: though it be a good thing that is commanded, conscience doth not bind to it, eâ ratione to yield to it because it is commanded, till it be brought to a law: Now when things are brought into a law, and be according to the agreements and covenants of the place and country wherein we live: and then suppose this authority be abused, and there be an ill law made, then (I confess) if the Law be of force, we must either quit ourselves of the Country, or else submit or suffer. When then it comes to be a power, to be a law, it is authority though abused, and we must yield obedience to it either actively, or passively. But we must inquire whether it be a power, etc. otherwise we are not bound in conscience; bond we may be in regard of prudence, and in regard of preventing other distuabrnces, but conscience doth not bind us to wills of men, but binds to laws. Melancthon Melancthon in loc. upon this Text distinguisheth also betwixt the extent of subjection to a predatory power, and that which is to a Magistrate. If thou canst escape from the hands of a robber, thou offendest not; but and if thou canst escape the punishment of the Magistrate, yet thou ought not withdraw from his Government, that is that which he saith, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. He that is a Magistrate indeed, and in authority, the Subjects are to pray, and to give thanks for him, not as a man merely, but as a Magistrate, that is, for his preservation, and prospering in his Government: accordingly Tertull. in his Apologeticks gives account of the constant, public practice of Christians. We constantly pray for all the Emperors, that they may have a long life, Precantes sumus semper pro omnibus imperatoribus, vitam illis prolixam, imperium securum, domum tutam, exercitus fortes, senatum fidelem, populum probum, orbem quietum, quaecunque hominis, & Caesaris vota sunt. Tertul. Apologet. a secure dominion, a safe family, valiant armies, a faithful Senate, a good people, a quiet world about them, and whatsoever may be desired by (or for) them, either as men, or as Caesar's. But a possessor of power by mere force, the people of God may complain, and cry out of in prayer, not for his misgovernment only, but for that he governs, and may pray to be delivered from him. This (if it be doubted of) may be evident by many Scripture examples of the practice thereof, being of undoubted warranty for imitation; For instance let these be taken [2 Chron. 6.38, 39 Psal. 79.1.89.42, 44.106.47.126.3. Lam. 5.2, 8.] unto which I shall add that passage of the Prophet Habakkuk, cap. 2. vers. 6. He is a proud man, neither keepeth at home, etc. woe to him that increaseth that which is not his. How long, etc. together with Mr. calvin's words upon them. Quousque, quousque? omnes clamant quousque? & clamour iste, quia nascitur ex naturae sensu, & regula aquitatu, ideo exauditur tandem a deo. Vnde fit ut taedio affecti omnes, clamant, quousque? CHAP. VIII. SECT. II. nisi quia agnoscunt non esse tolerabilem hanc perturbationem ordinis & justitiae? sensus autem ille, nun inditus est nobis a deo? perinde est igitur ac si Deus seipsum audiret, cum ita exaudit clamores, & gemitus eorum qui ferre nequeunt in justitiam. SECT. II. Of the term higher annexed to the powers, vers. 1. 2 THe second observation shall be upon the Epithet higher, given to the powers, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Beza renders supereminent; the vulgar, more sublime. Expositors generally note that this word here signifies a superiority of calling, office, or function. One may be said to be higher over, or above another two ways. 1. He is higher, or above that hath the upper hand, or prevaileth, and is in strength above another. 2. He is higher that is superior to another in regard of place, calling, or office. There is a superiority or celsitude in respect of mere sight, and might; and a superiority in regard of dignity and authority; the former any one may get over a person, or people: the latter is proper to the Magistrate. This word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here used occurreth also 1 Pet. 2.13. Phil. 2.3.4.7. And from it come the substantives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Phil. 3.8. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Cor. 2.1. 1 Tim. 2.2. And the use of the words in every of those places is to signify, not an overpowering act, of posture, but a moral excellency of one person, or thing above another, or such a precellency as draweth towards it a Recognition of honour, or an h●gh repute, veneration, or valuation of the mind. And this precellency is, 1. Either that of virtue, or absolute worth. As where Christians are required in lowliness of mind to esteem each others 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 better than themselves, Phil. 2.3. And where the peace of God is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 passing all understanding, Phil. 4.7. So also the Apostle when he came to the Corinthians, came 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not with excellency of speech, or of wisdom, 1 Cor. 2.1. And he counted all things but loss 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the excellency of the knowledge of Jesus Christ, Phil. 3.8. 2. Or that of office, or relative State, as when Christians are willed to submit themselves to the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 supreme, or superior in reference to the Governors, Precedents, or subordinate Rulers that are commissioned from, or placed under him. Though they be more, and stronger in natural force than he, yet he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superior to them in regard of order, authority, rank, and dignity, 1 Pet. 2.13. And Magistrates are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in authority, 1 Tim. 2.2. By comparing of those other places with this as to the use of this word it may appear, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is added to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for description, and discrimination sake, and to add some weight to the exhortation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifying the Magistrate, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifying the honour, and eminent dignity which is annexed to him, and which is a proper and inseparable adjunct to the true magistracy, by which it is distinguished from mere prepotency, or a predatory power. And in this I have the observation of Expositors going before me. Aretius' upon the place saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is to excel in dignity, and right Dr. Willet citeth it as Cajetans' observation, That this word is added to exclude tyrants who are not excelling Lords, taking the Apostle to speak de legitimis potestatibus. Mr. Prin, in his third part of the power of Parliaments, pag. 114. tells us, Dominicus Soto, Cajetan, Pererius, and other Popish Commentators of this place observe that Paul adds this Epithet of higher, or excelling powers of purpose to exclude Tyrants, CHAP. VIII. SECT. iv who are not excelling Lords, nor lawful powers. Dr. Whitaker (Controver. de Rom. Pontif. Quaest. 4. and 7. pag. 648. a. & 720. b.) insisteth on this term to prove against Bellarmine (who would find a ground in this Text for the exorbitant power which the Pope pretends to, and usurpeth) that the words of the Apostle can only be understood of a political, or civil power, and not simply of any power whatsoever, which he could have no advantage for from this word if it did leave the term power to signify superiority at large, so as to take in any predominancy, and did not contain its importance within the bounds of such a superiority as really deserves to be adorned with, and hath of due, and right belonging to it civil honour, and veneration; unto which sense agreeth St. Augustine's explanatory paraphrase upon this term sublimioribus potestatibus in this place. viz. hominibus res humanas cum aliquo honore administrantibus * August. Tom. 4. part 2. p. 727. . Higher powers, that is, men that administer humane affairs with some degrees of honour. The actual administration of humane affairs, and the degree of honour are two distinct things: the former may b● without the latter, but both put together make, and define a higher power. Honour is the attendant, or shadow of real virtue, and of relative authority, but not of mere predominant force. Unto this Epithet of supereminent, or more sublime, seems to be answerable that phrase of Solomon styling the seat of Magistracy, the place of the Holy [Eccles. 8.10.] the throne of Majesty is sacred, in that it is peculiar to the Magistrate, and sacred in that it is authorized by God; agreeable whereunto the seat of the lawful Magistrate is called, The Throne of God. [1 Chron. 29.23. 2 Chron. 9.8.] And, his kingdom the kingdom of the Lord [2 Chron. 13. ●. 1 Chr. 28.5.17.14.] and the Magistrate is said to be King, for the Lord his God, & to b● anointed unto the Lord [2 Chr. 9.8. 1 Chr. 29.22.] And this judgement is said to be, the judgement of God, and he judges not for man, but for the lord [Deut. 1.17. 2 Chron. 19.6.] And God is said to be with them in the judgement, and to stand in their congregation, CHAP. VIII. SECT. III. and to judge among them. [2 Chron. 19.6. Psal. 82.1.] All these are the high, and holy, and distinguishing prerogatives of the Magistrates state. Whereas there is a throne of iniquity (contradistinct to this place of the holy, this throne of God) which hath no fellowship with God. [Psal. 94.20.] SECT. III. Of the whole style Higher Powers, Vers. 1. 3 FRom the Epithet, higher, I will pass to a consideration of the whole title, higher powers. By higher powers Expositors understand Magistrates of every degree, or rank, and not only the supreme. So that they understand higher, not to refer by way of contra-distinction to lower powers, but to the people, to them that are to be subject to them. So Calvin, Beza, Marlorat, Pareus, P. Martyr, Methusius, Dr. Mayer, and Par upon the place. And Chamier (Panstrat. Tom. 3. li. 15. cap. 11. sect. 8.) And indeed the description of the Magistrate with all the Reasons given in the following words (unto vers. 8.) for subjection to him do as truly, and necessarily appertain to the inferior and subordinate Magistrate, as to the highest. And the parallel precepts of duty to the power: in other like Scriptures do involve all Magistrates, and some of them nominate the subordinate, [as 1 Tim. 2.2. Tit. 3.1. 1 Pet. 2.13, 14.] Now in the subordinate Magistrate we require a commission as a qualification to our receiving, owning, yielding him any duty of subjection. Otherwise we reject him, CHAP. VIII. SECT. iv if we understand he hath no authority from a superior power. If one come to us of his own accord merely, and do but take upon him the style, place, and office of a Constable, Justice of the Peace, Sheriff, Judge, and command our persons, demand our purses, or exact our oaths, we think (and that rightly) we may deny him. And if he have strength to extort his demands, yet either we obey him not, or we comply only out of fear, and prudential self-consultation, not taking ourselves to owe him any subjection, not owning any bond of conscience to him, as to a higher power ordained of God. And why is this? by reason he hath no lawful calling, warrant, or commission. Now if we require this qualification in the subordinate, why not in the Supreme Magist a●e also? If the Text admit of this caution, and restriction in reference to one sort of higher powers, will it not also admit it in relation to every one? SECT. iv Of the Resistance of the power concluded under the penalty of Damnation, vers. 2. 4 THe fourth thing in the Context, offering itself to consideration is in Vers. 2. to wit, the unlawfulness of resisting that power, which our Text holds forth. This unlawfulness is asserted in as much as the resister of that power is charged with the sin of resisting the ordinance of God, and concluded under the penalty of Damnation. Mine observation upon it shall be this. That resistance which undoubtedly is by this place intended, to be disallowed towards the power spoken of in our Text, is generally acknowledged to be warrantable, and lawful to be used towards an invasive, or mere possessory power, and consequently it must be as generally acknowledged that a mere possessory power cannot be intended in the text. A resistance unto, or for the deposition, repulsing, or removal out of place and rule, and a rescue of persons, and places out of the possession and command of him that occupieth them, will (I doubt not) be concluded to be here forbidden towards, or in relation to that power which the text meaneth. But such resistance is generally admitted to be just and lawful towards an invesor, or a forcible occupant of command and rule. This may be made evident 1. By sufficient testimony, which I shall produce. I will begin with King James, K. James his Remonst. p. 216. his words in his Remonstrance for the Right of Kings against the Oration of Cardinal Perron. The public Laws make it lawful, and free for any private person to enterprise against an usurper of the Kingdom. Every man, saith Tertullian, is a Soldier enroled to bear Arms against all Traitors, and public enemies. St. Augustine Aug. de Civ. Dei. li. 5. cap. 26. highly commendeth the piety, and fidelity of Theodosius, in that he took into his protection young Valentinian, the brother, Sozomen. Hist. lib. 7. cap. 14. & 24. heir, and successor of Gratian, slain by Maximus the usurper (the Governor of Britain.) against whom Theodosius, though the said usurper was grown terrible by success, yet, he undertook the cause of Valentinian, Socrates Hist. li 5. cap. 11, 12.24. and destroying Maximus, restored Valentinian to his Empire (in the West:) and in his enterprise he had encouragement, and certain promise of victory from one John an Anachoret endued with a prophetic spirit in Egypt. And that Valentinian being shortly after, ei●her by treachery, or some other accident taken away, another usurper Eugenius, starting up in his place, Theodosius Ruffin. Hist. li. 2. cap. 17. & 31. Theod. Hist. li. 5. cap. 14 & 24. (with the encouragement of the said Prophet) surprised him, against whose ●xceeding strong Army he fought rather by prayers, than strokes. A mighty wind snatching the weapons of his enemies out of their hands, and driving their own darts together with the darts of their Assailants upon them: on which occasion was that written by the Poet Claudian. O nimium dilecte Deo, cui militat aether, Et conjurati veniunt ad classica venti. Chamier At Cives omnes jus habent insurgendi contra Tyrannos qui vi apertâ regna occupant. Chamier Tom. 2. lib. 15. cap. 12. sect. 19 saith, All Citizens, or free Subjects have a right, or warrant to rise up against Tyrants, who by open force possess the Kingdom. Dr. Willet Dr. Willet his Hexap. on Rom. pag. 592. upon the place, in answer to this question, How far the Civil State may proceed in resisting a Tyrant? affirmeth, that where the Kingdom is usurped without any right, as by Athaliah; or where the land is oppressed by foreign invaders, as in the time of the Maccabees, in these cases there is less question to be made of resistance by the general consent of the States. Mr. Richard Hooker. Hooker Eccles. polit. Book. 8. pag. 155. In kingdom's hereditary birth giveth right unto Sovereign Dominion, etc. therefore in case it doth happen that without right of blood a man in such wise be possessed, all these new elections, and investing are utterly void: they make him no indefeasible estate: the Inheritor by blood may dispossess him as an usurper. Alstedius. Alsted. Caf. Consc. cap. 16. Reg 8. pag. 341. A Tyrant without title, who is an invader, every private person may, and aught to remove; for he is not a King, but a private man, who doth invade the country as an Enemy. Gro●ius. Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 16.18. Si bello injusto, & cui juris gentium requisita non adsint, imperium artipuerit (sc. Raptor imperit) neque pactio ulla secuta sit, aut fides illi data, sed solâ vi retineatur possessio, vide●ur manere belli jus, ac proinde in eum licere quod in hostem licet, qui a qualibet etiam privato jure potest interfici, etc. Nec minus licebit invaso 'em imperii interficere si deserta authoritas accedat ejus qui jus verum imperandi habet. Arnisaeus. Arnisaeus de authorit principis. cap. 4. sect. 12, Of the former (to wit, he who is called a Tyrant in title) the matter is plain, and determined by all without any difficulty, that he may be lawfully repulsed, or if by force he be gotten into the throne, he may be warrantably thence removed, because he hath not any ●o● of power which is legitimate, and unto which resistance is forbidden, for the fear of God, and for conscience sake: and therefore he is no further to be looked at then as an enemy. The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy. Treatis of Mon. part 1. cap. 3. sect. 5. Be they (to wit, a conquered people) captived, or possessed at pleasure, they own no duty, neither do they sin in not obeying, nor do they resist God's Ordinance, if at any time of advantage they use force to free themselves from such a violent possession. Mr. Bridge Mr. Bridge against Dr. Fern sect. 4. pag. 42. his Answer to Doctor Ferne. Which opinion of the Doctors (of the right of conquest) for my own part I must abhor from; what danger will it not expose our Dread Sovereign unto? Did not Athaliah remain as a Conqueress six years? and who knows not that she was lawfully thrust from the Throne again by a stronger hand than her own? mere conquest being nothing else but an unjust usurpation; and if the Conqueror rule the whole Kingdom, and keep them under by conquest only, why may not the Subject rise, and take up arms to deliver themselves from that slavery? Thus doth the Doctor open the door to greater resistance than those that he disputes against. Roger Widdrington, Widdrington Theol. Disput. in Admon. to his Reader, sect. 6. in his defence of the supremacy of Princes against the Pope's claim of a superiority in temporals over them, thus argueth (against Schulkenius, who will needs maintain Athaliah to have been a lawful Queen, notwithstanding Joas his survival, and claim to the Crown) Tell me O Schulkenius, may not every faithful Subject lawfully, and ought he not in the like case, that is, not by his own private authority, but by the public authority of the true King, and who is certainly known to be true King, the Commonwealth also consenting thereunto, kill an Usurper, who is not only reputed, but also certainly known to be such a one, and who plotteth Treason against the true King? Lastly, I observe to this purpose, that the Author, or Authors of Ladensium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in the Catalogue of Canterburian maxims of tyranny, do charge this position unto that Party as one tyrannical maxim. That all this, (to wit, absolute) subjection must be used not only to our Native King, but to any foreign usurper who can get footing among us, and it were the Kings of Spain. As also, that the title unto this Kingdom by conquest, attributed by Doctor Ferne unto our late Kings, See vindic. of a Treat. of Mon. chap. 3. sect. 6. is disavowed by the Authors defending the Parliaments cause against him, as unreasonable, and null, and that which exposeth Princes to the offensive Arms of the Subject. 2 They that state, and determine the question, what is a just ground, or cause of War, lay down the quarrel, de rebus repetendis, or for the recovery of what is injuriously invaded, or occupied, as one good, justifiable, and necessary occasion of the taking up of arms by a Prince, or people [for this see Augustine Quaest. super Josue lib. 6. cap. 10. in Tom. 4. part. 2. operum. P. Martyr. loc. come. clas. 4. cap. 16. sect. 2. pag. 935. Bucani Theolog. loc. 49. quaest. 46. pag. 873. Grotium de jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 1. sect. 2] But if title followed possession, and all they were the true Proprietors, or Lords, or the powers ordained of God that have the occupation, or actual command of persons, and places, it could not be so: there could be no war just for recovery: to dispossess men of what they hold, or to out them of what they are (without present, or actual superiority of any over them in it) seized on, could be no lawful enterprise, or warrantable cause of War. 3 Neither is it only the common Tenent of sound, and learned Writers that the injurious invader and possessor may be resisted unto deposition, and that recuperative arms are just, and lawful, but we have many instances of the practice hereof in Scripture, not only of undoubted warrantableness to the persons so acting in the story; but of a clear exemplariness, and imitablenesse to others; as having no other ground, or rise laid for them in the Text, but that which is of a common moral extension. The mention of these may serve. Upon the warlike conquest, captivity, and spoil of Sodom, Geneses 14. and Gomorrah, by the King of Elam, and his partakers, and their departure, and carrying away of what they had there gotten, Abraham together with his confederates, Aner, Eshcol, and Mamre make out with their Forces in pursuit of their Conquerors, and coming upon, they smite, and chase them, and rescue the people, and goods of Sodom, and Gomorrah, which they had so taken, conveyed away, and held in custody. The people of Israel during the government of the Judges, did many times under their conduct rise up in arms to cast off, and deliver themselves, and their Country from the power of several neighbouring Princes, and Nations, who had one after another invaded, and for some time held them under their Dominion * Of whom in general see Jud. 2.16, 17. & in particular through the rest of that book. . Neither (as far as my observation goes) can any immediate, or extraordinary command or word for what they so did be pretended to, or pleaded from the Text for many of them, or for any, save Barak, and Gideon. The same did they in the times, and under the commands of Eli, Samuel, Saul, David, and many of their following Kings, from to time until the Babylonish captivity. And in particular did Hezekiah against the King of Assyria. The Text saith, he rebelled against the King of Assyria, and served him not † See 2 Kings 18.7. . As also did some of the Kings of Judah in resistance of the Kings of Israel, as Abijah and Asa * 2 Kings ch. 11.2 Chr. ch. 23 : the latter of which was reproved by God for the means he used (the Syrian Auxiliaries) but not for his standing up against Baasha. Yea, the same did David and Jehoiadah the Priest, with some of Judah combining with them, the one against Absalon, the other against Athaliah, the wrongful possessors of the Crown, and Kingdom of Israel, CHAP. VIII. SECT. V and of Judah. And thus also did the Jews under the Asmonean government, against many of the Seleucian Kings * See the Books of the Maccabees. . SECT. V The opposition, and distance which the Text puts betwixt him that is the power, and him that is the resister of the power. 5 ANother thing to be observed in the words neighbouring, and coherent to the Text, is the difference, and contra-distinction which this Scripture makes betwixt him that is the power that is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ordained of God, and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the resister of the power, which is such as he that is the one cannot, at the same time, and in respect of the same place be the other. The Apostle puts them at so wide a distance, and direct opposition one to another, that it is not possible that they should meet in one person. In relation to one and the same seat, or station of Magistracy, he that is the power ordained of God, cannot be he that resisteth the power, and resisteth the ordinance of God, and he that is this Resister, cannot be that power. If then it will be found, and made good that the mere possessor, that comes into the Throne by dispossessing the lawful power, (that still layeth title to the Throne) is this resister of the power, it will thence follow, and be evident he cannot be that power. That the person in possession resisteth the other that is outed, and still claimeth possession (in respect of his enjoyment of the throne) is undeniable. How then can he be denied to be the resister of the power? the defenders of a mere possessory title will tell us, he that is in place by invasion, or insurrection against a precedent lawful power, was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the resister of the power when he first attempted, and perhaps while he was carrying on his design by some of the first, or lower steps of it; but when he hath brought it to a head, or having come up to the last, or highest step that is, the finishing of it, by outing the person he assaulted, and seating himself in the place, he is now no longer the resister of the power, but is become that which in his way to that achievement he resisted, to wit, the power himself. But this must needs seem strange, that when the Apostle saith plainly, the resisting of the power bringeth damnation to the Author, such an Exposition should be put upon the place as telleth us, that resistance purchaseth to the Author the dominion of that power whom he resisteth: and that he that resisteth the power in a lower, or lesser degree, doth in so doing fall under the sin, and guilt in those words described; but he that doth it in a higher, and fuller measure is in that act clear from that charge, and stands wholly excused: that the fieri of that act of deposing a lawful power should be so bad, and punishable, and the finiri, or factum esse, should be so excellent, honourable, and rewardable: that the success, and completion of an evil deed should have such a virtue in it as both to release it, and its author of its delinquency (though the deed be not only continued, but heightened) and to turn the scene, or case of the agent, and patiented upside down, so as that the resister, and the resisted shall change their places, and moral denominations in the Text: He that was under that brand of resisting the power, and the ordinance of God, and under the doom of damnation for it, shall thereby become the power, the ordinance of God; and he that was the resisted power, and ordinance of God, shall now (if he sit not still in his dethronement, but endeavour to repossess his dignity) incur the impeachment of resisting the power, and demeriting damnation. And this were a hard censure to be passed upon all ejected Princes, or Potentates that have sought or may seek to recover their Dominions, among whom David, Joash, and Ezekiah have been. But the exposition which makes the strange transversion would be a little looked into before it be received. 1. Two things must be made very clear ere it can be current. 1. That the supposed resisted power doth by the prevalency of that resistance, and his dispossession thereby cease to be the power. 2. That he that was the resister, by his prospering therein unto the occupation of the place of rule, doth thereby cease to be the resister. The former I have above disproved * Cap. 7. sect. 2. subsect. 5. & 8. & in the close of the 10. , and shall therefore here omit the repetition of its refutation; the rather, because were it not, or could it not be refuted, yet the latter would not hold, and consequently my argument would be good nevertheless. For, suppose actual disseisin to put an end to the power that was; or, that a person, or Senate overpowered, and dispossessed, ceaseth to be the power which the Text speaks for, yet the overpowering and disseising party would not therefore cease to be the resister by the Text condemned. If a man by violence, fraud, or other dishonest means get into his hands another man's goods, or estate, though the suffering party die, yet the injustice, and oppression of that injurious person (he keeping still those wrongful acquisitions) ceaseth not. He is still an oppressor in reference to that person, and the act committed against him though he be now dead. The reason is, though the wronged person, and so the property that was in him to those possessions, (as all accidents inherent in him as a man) be extinct, yet the Law, or rule which forbade, and condemned that act is still alive, or in force: besides, though the party injured, and so his right to the things unjustly taken from him, be dead, yet it is to be supposed the property, or disposal of them is passed to some other, either by virtue of relation to him, or escheature, and so the oppressors holding of them is a continued, or still renewed act of injustice. Thus it is with him that resisteth the power unto the ejection of him, and enthroning of himself; say the power outed by him were thereby extinguished, yet the act by which he did it still cleaves to him; and while he standeth in that posture, his resistance of the power ordained of God is continuated, and remains upon him: and the reason is, both because the ordinance of God which established that power, and commanded subjection, and prohibited resistance to it is still in being; and because that ordinance of God must be supposed to have ordained a way how a succession of M●●●stracy shall be continued (and by virtue of the same there is ordinarily either a lawful Successor assigned, or a course taken for the electing, and substituting one) in opposition unto which (suppose the divesture of the dispossessed power) the intrusive possessor cannot but be confessed to enter, and sit, and so still is in one, or both those respects a resister of the ordinance of God. 2. Take an act that is in specie, or kind, one and the same, but may be varied in regard of degrees; that moral evil, or goodness which is attributible to the action in specie may be said of every degree of that act; and especially it cannot be that the less, or inferior degree of such an action should be denominated good, or evil, and not the greater, or the full, and complete act be so denominated. As in this matter, If a lower, or more imperfect degree of withstanding, or opposing the power, or just Magigistrate be evil, and be the resistance that is disallowed, and condemned in this Text, than the higher, the perfecting act of that nature must be so also. If for a man to refuse obedience, or to make head against the present lawful Magistrate, and to draw in others therein to take part with him, and if to check, impeach, interrupt, and somewhat to diminish the authority of that Magistrate, and if to threaten, or attempt to rem●ve quite out of, and to take his place be a transgression, and a resistance of the ordinance of God here spoken of (as do all agree) then to go on further, and higher in the same kind, for the ●aid resister to checkmate that Magistrate, or to add that consummating act, or ex cution of that attempt, by wresting, and holding the whole command from him into his own hand, must needs be as well, or much more the breach and contradiction of the ordinance of God. Can any man say that this rule in the Text, or any commandment of God in any other matter disallows, and condemns the consulting, beginning, and carrying on of an undertaking, course, or action, and not the accomplishment, and finishing, or not the continuation, and upholding of the work when finished, or the persistency in it, when achieved. The truth is, the resister of the power is never more, nor so much the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as when he is possessed of the place; then is he completely counter-ordered, or contra-ordained to the ordinance of God, when he is got into the Throne, and disorderly placed in the Supreme command, guarding himself with his Military bands against the Title, and entry of him he hath dispossessed. What is the ratio formalis of this resistance, or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for which the withstander of the power is styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is it not his taking and holding the reigns, and rule of a civil S●a●e, against, and in contradiction to the Law of God? and this is plainly it which the excluder of the lawful Magistrate doth. In that there is a double contravention to the Law of God; one against that▪ law which forbiddeth every one to rise up against the power ordained of God: Another against that law which commandeth retractation, and restitution of whatsoever wrong hath been committed. The violent occupant, as he should not have seized on the Throne, CHAP. VIII. SECT. VI so, being in merely by intrusion, he is bound to surrendry, and redintegration of his injury. 3 It is the observation of Cajetan, and from him of Mr. Elnathan Par upon the words, That in this verse. the word resisteth is three times used; but in the Greek, only the first is in the present, the two last in the time past. As if you should render it: He that resisteth the power hath resisted the ordinance of God; and he that hath resisted shall receive damnation. By which it may be evident that any transient, and bypast act of resistance may term the person in praesenti, the resister: and much more is he the resister, who not only in times past acted a resistance, but stands up still in the same posture. SECT. VI Of the work of the power, described Vers. 3. & 4. THe next thing I take notice of in this discourse of the Apostle, is the character, or description of that power which he intends in the Text, by which he defineth what he is in himself, and distinguisheth him from all others. This description is taken from his proper work, or the peculiar duty of his place, and office. This we have delivered, Vers. 3.4. Rulers are not a terror to good works, but unto the evil. Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. He is the Minister of God to thee for good; but if thou do evil, be afraid, for he holdeth not the sword in vain: For he is the Minister of God, and revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. My Collection from these words is; He that is i● place of rule, and command in the Commonwealth without a just Title, call, and investure, and solely from his own power, and will, he cannot be the power meant by the Text. And I infer it thus. He that is the power intended by the Apostle must be susceptible, or capable of all this whole character. He must be capable (I say) for I know Expositors do well note upon it, these words intent to describe, not what the Magistrate is always de facto, but what he is de jure: The Magistrate doth not always in every proceeding hold correspondence with this Character, but not seldom acteth contrarily; yet notwithstanding the Character holdeth true, it delivering, not what the Magistrate still doth, but what he should, and aught to do, what he is called, ordained, and appointed to, what his work, and office is, and consequently what he is capable of being, and doing. But (I assume) he that ruleth without a just title, call, and investure, a selfcreated power is not capable of this; he, (while he remaineth such) cannot possibly answer this Character; that his tenure of power, and this description are incompetible: it can never be that one should observe, perform, and execute all that is therein said, and yet be an unlawfully possessing power. The third verse denyeth him to be a terror to good works, Vide Paraeum in loc. requireth him to be an author of praise to these, and a terror to evil works. These terms good works, and evil, take in all civil, or political good, and evil actions; whether they extend to all moral actions, as well religious, as secular (according to the usual application of those words of the same Apostle (1 Tim. 2.2.) I will not here debate. But this is certain, they take in all civil, or political actions, good or evil. Now usurpation must needs be acknowledged to be an action both politically, and morally evil, and that in a more than ordinary degree, and in relation to many persons. An act it is of manifold oppression, and injustice, to the wrong of the deposed, and of the Commonwealth in its public order, right, and freedom. It is commonly enterprised, accomplished, and upheld by a multiplicity of acts of treachery, and violence upon them that are expulsed, or brought under by it, yea, with the slaughter, and blood of many innocent persons, and the ruin of their posterity, and dependants, and with the overturning of public laws, and liberties. And as certain it is that one single person cannot bear up or give subsistence, and strength to this management, or, either perpetrate or maintain all or any of those facts, whosoever occupieth such a power must use a multitude of instruments, and partakers. Now who can imagine that he that is such an occupant of power, that comes in, and stands by such means, and instruments can be a terror to those many evil works, and flagrant offence which introduce, or establish his usurpation? or that he can be a terror, a Minister of God, and a revenger to execute wrath upon the actors of them? But, as he is the chief author of those evils himself, so he must necessarily (while he stands upon that bottom) be of all other a special abettor, yea, the saviour, patron, and Protector of such deeds, and doers. He that doth evil, in this kind shall not need to be afraid of him, but may expect praise, promotion, and reward from him. And on the other hand, whereas it cannot be denied to be a good work orderly to endeavour the prevention, redress, or giving a stop to those evils, he that should attempt any thing of that nature cannot look to have praise (that is, impunity, defence, and reward) of the same, but must expect him to be to such enterprises the highest terror. The greatest interest, and therefore the constant course of such a power is in those good, and evil works which touch the continuance, or disposal of the sea●e whereon he is, to be directly, and wholly cross, and contradictory to this Character, and rule of the Apostle. And it is not possible he should in every point conform to it, and yet continue still his rule upon the basis of usurpation. Furthermore, the fourth verse asserteth, and requireth the Magistrate to be the Minister of God to thee for good. To thee, that is, to every person, or member in the Commonwealth; For good, that is, for his natural, moral, civil, and spiritual good (saith Paraeus) however, for his civil, or temporal good without controversy let it be. But it is imp ssible he that bears the Sword in an usurping hand, should in every thing procure the civil good of all, that is, either of the whole joint community, or of all single persons in their private state. This good hath within it involved the vindication, and restoring of the public, and of every persons rights, and the satisfying and rectifying of all wrongs. Now this, and usurpation are together inconsistible. Moses his rule for the Magistrate is, Deut. 16.20. That which is altogether just shalt thou follow; but this an unjustly possessed power cannot do, and stand. It's own State will not afford i. Yea, the truth is, the violation of Justice, in which the foundation of this power is laid, and the root of it is planted, will, and is ordinarily seen to beget a cacexia, or ill disposition to justice, and propension to unrighteous administration in all causes, and proceed whatsoever; If a common gift hath such an influence as to blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous, Vers. 19 (as Moses in that place) what respect of persons, and wresting of judgement will the dishonest interest of a Kingdom breed in all judicial administrations? Scarce a man shall bring a cau●e before the Tribunal, but he will appear under the character, either of a friend, or foe to that interest of jealousy, and accordingly be looked at with the eye of partiality or prejudice. What a general depravement of Justice is the ordinary sequel of violent acquisition, and possession of Dominion, the words of the Prophet Amos will tell us. To have turned judgement into gall, Amos 6.12, 13. and the f●uit of righteousness into hemlock. But who hath done thus? Ye which rejoice in a thing of naught, which say, have we not taken to us horns by our own strength? The Magistrate's office is to procure that the Subjects may lead a life in all godliness and honesly. The Subjects cannot possibly be upon terms mutually honest, either with him, or with the instruments of his supportance, whose very being in power is injurious, and so they are barred out from living in all honesty: And for living in all godliness, both Scripture, and common experience gives that defection of Religion, is the individual consequent of defection in civil Government: Usurpation in State, and corruption in Religion are like a couple of Twins, you can seldom, or never take the former without the latter. Let the kingdom of Israel, or of the ten Tribes rend from the house, and Throne of David for all the while of its standing, and the reign of every King thereof be the instance for this. Of whom (in this behalf) not only do perusers of the story observe that, as they were wholly, and all along out in their civil policy; they were quite, and constantly wrong, and depraved in their Religion, but the Lord himself makes the same observation, giving us this short, but universal account. Hosea 8.4. They have set up Kings, but not by me: they have made princes, and I knew it not. Of their silver, and their gold have they made them Idols, that they may be cut off. Here we have an Epitome of the whole history of that Kingdom. S●ate-usurpation breeds, and brings in Idolatry in Religion: and as this is the genuine product, and issue of that, so are they both concauses of that people's ruin * The same observation makes the sacred historian, 2 Kin 17 21. And they made Jeroboam the son of Nebat King. And Jeroboam driven Israel from foll wing the Lord, etc. . Let me but add one word more of the incongruability of this Character to an unauthorised power. The power in this Text is appointed to be the Minister of God to thee for good. Now see how the contrary is to be said of the Usurper. He is appointed of God to thee for evil. The Scripture holding ●orth usurpation, or violent, enforced dominion as a judgement, [2 King's 17.20, 11.] and threa●ning it as the punishment of a Nation for their transgressions against God, CHAP. VIII. SECT. VII. and ranking it with the penalties of plague, famine, sword, wild beasts, etc. As on the other side, the removing of usurpation is promised as a mercy, Isa. 10 27.14.25. And the taking away of Magistracy is threatened as a judgement, Isa. 1.1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Zech. 11.6. Deut. 28.43, 44, 48. Psal. 106.41, 42. Now the giving, sending of a thing to be for the good, advantage, benefit of a people, and to be for their harm, punishment, and suffering: and the removal of a thing to be promised as a mercy, and to be threatened as a judgement (and these, per se, naturally, primarily, and directly so meant, and not per accidens) both these are such opposites as cannot be predicates of the same thing. Thus much I have observed from the Texts description of the Magistrates work, and duty. SECT. VII. Of the Magistrate's style, the Minister of God, vers. 4.6. 7 THere is besides another thing to the present purpose observable in this description of the Magistrate, and of his office: to wit, the special Title given him, denoting his peculiar relation to, and derivation from God. He is called the Minister of God, and that thrice over (viz. vers. 4, 6.) this style imports, not only the office, and work of the Magistrate to be a special service, and employment performed unto God, nor only it to be instituted, ordered, and imposed to be done in his behalf. But that the authority of managing it is by him invested in the certain person that may intermeddle with it; none can truly assume, or be taken to be in this office, but he that hath received a commission, call, or warrant from God for it. The title 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not only signifies action, and labour, but directly, strictly, refers to God as the Author of the persons mission, and deputation to it. We all confess him only to be the Minister of a Prince or State unto whom the Prince or State gives a Commission, and not him that of his own accord interposeth in the administration of the public, civil affairs: Now the same dependence that a subordinate Minister of State hath upon his Sovereign for his becoming his Minister, the same hath a sovereign Magistrate upon God for his being his Minister; It is one thing to call a man God's instrument, his rod, axe, sword, or hammer, another thing to call him God's Minister. Men may be the former when they get power, and prevalency over others by unlawful means, but the latter they are never called that are not lawfully admitted, or authorized to the place, or work. There is a wide difference (saith Dr. Sclater Dr. Sclater his Serm. on 2 Kin. 9.31. pag. 26. ) betwixt the instruments of God's providence, and the Ministers of his ordinance; those fulfil his purposes, these also do his commands. Herod, & Pilate, in the death of our blessed Saviour were unwilling instruments of his providence, no Ministers of his ordinance. SECT. VIII. CHAP. VII. SECT. VIII. Of the Magistrates bearing the sword, vers. 4. 8 THe last clause, or passage of the context I shall animadvert upon, is that in the same vers. He beareth not the sword in vain. 1. Who is this He that beareth the sword? The antecedent to which this relative is referred, is, the power, the Ruler. Observe, the Apostle doth not say, he that beareth the Sword, is the power, or Ruler, but he that is the power, or Ruler beareth the Sword. The Sword here, to wit, the power of coercive, or punitive justice, ascribed to the Magistrate, is not put as the cause, or constituent of his Magistracy, but as a consequent addition, or additament to it. A person hath not this Sword first, and then, or therefore is, or becometh a Magistrate; but he is first a Magistrate, and then, or therefore he hath, or beareth the Sword. 2. This word Sword cannot be put here properly for that material offensive weapon that is made of metal, but (by a Metalepsis) for a faculty of power, whereof that, and other forcible weapons are but instruments: and not for every faculty of compulsory power neither, for there is the sword of an enemy, the sword of a cutthroat, the sword of a common traveller, but for a faculty of political rule, and authoritative judgement; such a sword as imports him that hath it a Minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. CHAP. VIII. SECT. VII. 3. And of this Sword the civil Magistrate is here asserted to be the hearer. Bearing here cannot intent any whatsoever holding in the hand, or bearing by the side, for a private person; a Sergeant ushering the Magistrate, an Executioner, a Thief may hold a sword in his hand: but it must have a more special and strict sense, and must intent not a corporal, or natural, but a political act, not a mere manutenancy, or handling of a sword, but a civil tenure of it. 4. And again, the Magistrate is said to be the bearer, not the founder of the Sword. Gerit gladium, non cudit. He that is a Magistrate indeed, neither makes, nor takes the Sword by the force of his own arm, but receives, hath it delivered him into his hand, and so weildeth, and useth it. 5. Lastly, he beareth the Sword, not in vain, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by some rendered, without cause, or, in vain, is by others rendered, rashly. The former interpretation hath reference to the end: in vain, that is, to no end. The latter relates to the principle, and manner of bearing the sword; in vain, that is, without author, & reason. Neither way doth the Magistrate bear the sword, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For the latter, he bears it not rashly, that is, not without Author, and certain Reason, for he hath not snatched it to him of himself, neither hath it happened to him by chance, but it hath been given him into his hands by God's ordination. So Paraeus upon the place, pag. 103. and Dr. Willet, quest. 11. CHAP. IX. CHAP. IX. SECT. I. Some other Arguments for the conclusion insisted on in the former Chapter, taken from other Scriptures, and Mediums. I Have thus gone over the Context, and taken notice therein of the general clauses, or structures in it which add their light, or strength to clear, or confirm the sense of our Text above concluded on. There is yet another thing promised to be dispatched, to wit, a super-addition of some other grounds, or Mediums that may further prove the determination aforesaid. SECT. I. Argueth from the sense of Scriptures, forbidding the Retaliating of wrong. 1 THe first of these may be that which lies not far from this Text. Let us take notice of the meaning of those prohibitions, Rom. 12.17, 19 Recompense to no man evil for evil. Dear beloved, avenge not yourselves. The interpretation of these inhibitions (together with those given by Christ, Matth. 5.39, 40, 41.) by the general consent of all Orthodox Expositors that I meet with, is, that they do not simply, or absolutely disallow, or forbidden all humane punishment, or vindicative justice to be done by any man; for this is authorized, and commanded by God to be done by certain persons, (as Rom. 13.4.) no, nor every punitive act that may be done by e●●e in his own case, or behalf, (for that the Magistrate may do:) But that those Scriptures take vindicative justice out of the hands of private persons; who, though they receive, or suffer evil, yet they may not assume the penal sword, or the inflictive vindication of themselves, into their own hands. And to these prohibitions, lest it should seem an over-strait, and harsh confinement of the Christian (as importing a most free exposal of him to all bodily injuries, from all unreasonable men, without any remedy, yea an open invitation of them) the Apostle subjoineth. 1. An advertisement, what help a Christian hath, what his proper, and allowed remedy is in case of such sufferings. It is to give place unto wrath, viz. to refer the taking punishment unto God, to his judicial process, either by his special Minister ordained, and set up by him for that work (Cap. 13 4, 6.) or by other means he shall please to take (according to that supersedeas of David unto Abishai, 1 Sam. 26.10.) 2. A reason of both the foregoing prohibition of self-revenge, and of the prescription of the awaiting the said remedy. For it is written, Vengeance is mine, I will repay it, saith the Lord. This Reason, 1. Asserts the right, and propriety of punitive justice unto God: so that none may meddle with it but himself, either by himself, or by them that are expressly warranted, and deputed by him. Vengeance is mine. 2. Engageth his word, or undertaking to perform it. I will repay, saith the Lord. If we compare the words of this T●xt in this plain sense with what follows after (to wit, Cap 13.4.) For he is the Minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath, etc.) We shall find cau●e to distinguish of humane revenge, or that which is done by man, as being one way prohibited, and another way authorized: and to say there is, 1. A sinful, and inhibited. 2. A lawful, and commanded avengement. The sinful avenging is private, or that which is a man's revenging of himself; that is, when a man taketh vengeance, both in his own case, or behalf, and of his own accord, motion, or mind. The lawful, and commanded is that which is taken by him that is the Minister of God to execute it, by virtue of authority derived from God: and the distinction (Let this be observed as that wherein lies the sinew of the Argument) betwixt these two, is not in the act, or matter done, both may inflict the same kind, and measure of evil; nor in the having of power, that is, ability, or predominant strength in the hand to do it, for that may be supposed of them both, of the self-avenger, as well as of the other; but in the having of a call, commission, or warrant from God; In regard whereof, in the act of the one, God may be peculiarly said to be the avenger, and repayer, in the other the person may be laid to revenge himself. If we should understand Gods repaying merely of his doing it by any providential instrument, this distinction betwixt these two were destroyed; for when a private person recompenseth his wrong, it may be said of that way, that God so, that is, providentially repayeth. But if we construe it of, or apply it unto God's repayment by such an instrument as is by him authorized, commissioned, or warranted to that work, a revenge, or punishment, by such an one we can clearly call God's incontradistinction to that which is man's of himself. God's this is, not only by way of infliction, CHAP. IX. SECT. V but by his warranty and approbation; not man's, or a self-rev●nge: for in it, man only hath the execution, God the appointing; man the acting, God the enacting. In some cases, indeed, of the public Magistrates avenging, these two (viz. Gods, and selfs-revenge) may seem to be coincident, to wit, when the Magistrate punisheth, or judgeth in vindication of his own right; yet even here, in as much as he hath authority deputed to him by God, and he is to administer the justice of God to all, and besides him there is none to do it, and the asserting of his right and safety ordinarily no less concerneth the public, and common then his own personal interest, and is of much more importance than that of any other man's, what he doth therein falls not under that self-avengement which there is forbidden, but reduceth itself to that which is a giving place to the wrath of God, and to his repayment, as contradistinct to his own. For, though he here avenge in his own cause, yet, neither doth he it of his own accord, or motion, neither doth he merely, or formally vindicate himself, neither, if he rightly go about it, doth he therein so much consider, or consult himself as others. Now let the clear sense of this prohibition of self-revenge, and the commandment, of giving place to wrath, with the institution of the Magistrate to be a revenger to execute wrath, and the distinction betwixt these two revenging be considered, and the conclusion against the intrusive, unwarranted, mere possessory power will be thence very evident. SECT. II. CHAP. IX. SECT. II. Argueth from the Prophet's comparison of the Jewish State under the predatory power of the Chaldean unto that of such Animals as have no Ruler over them. 2 IN the Prophet Habakkuk (Cap. 1.14.) the state of the people of Judah, and of other Na●ions under the Chaldean Monarchy is resembled to that of fishes, and creeping things that have no Ruler over them. How were they said to be so, to be without Ruler over them, when the Chaldean actually commanded, absolutely ruled, and so grievously enslaved, and oppressed them? yea, the fishes, and reptiles, cannot be said simply to have none ruling over them; for the weaker are overpowered and mastered by the stronger, and fiercer, and by them made, either to give way, or to become their prey, or food: And in regard of this prevailing of the greater over the smaller by mere force, and impetuosity the condition of the Jews is compared to that of those Brutes. The meaning than is, these creatures have no Ruler over, them by order of nature; and the Jews had no Ruler * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the root of that Noun translated, Ruler, signifies, jus, authoritatem habuit. Pagninus. Piscator est Nebuchadonozorus, mare orbis universus, pisces sunt homines, rete, sagena, hamus vocàntur copia, vires, arts Chaldaeorum. Nam ut minuti pisces majoribus pro cibo sunt, ita homines infirmi a potentioribus opprimuntu●. Drusius in loc. over them, by any right, or any that was properly their Magistrate, or Sovereign, that is, by Divine authority, or ordination set over them; CHAP. IX. SECT. III. but, as it is among the fishes, and creeping things, if any command over other, it is owned by no direction, instinct, or intimation of nature, but wholly impetuous, savage, and by a preternatural encroachment: (understand we this either of those kinds of Animals whom the Text specifies, or indefinitely of any in respect of Individuals of one species overpowering those of another; for of some certain kinds, as of Bees, Cranes, and others, it is observed there is some image of order, and government among them, to wi●●ithin, or in relation to those of their own special kind, and particularly society, or herd:) and so it was with this people, there was none whom they could take as designed, or pointed out by warrant from God to be their Ruler, but mere confused violence took place; whosoever could, and listed, took the superiority, and bare sway over them. We see than it is one thing for a people to have an arbitrary masterdom, an enthralling tyranny, another to have a true Magistracy, or Principality over them: and that without some ruler of order, and justice, in point of constitution of government observed; Cities or Countries are but as mountains of prey, chases of wild beast, or pools of silly fish. SECT. III. Argueth from the nullity of a selfcreated power, declared negatively in Christ's, positively in Babylon's case. 3 OUr Saviour Christ delivers this as a commonly received, and a true Maxim [John 8.51.] If I honour myself, my honour is nothing. By which the nullity of a selfcreated Dignity is against all contradiction asserted. The Jews (unto whom he spoke these words) had objected to him, that the things which he had before declared of himself were but his own presumptions, or arrogations, Whom makest thou thyself? unto which he answers; First, by way of concession, if so it were indeed his claims were void, and of no force * Monemur his verbis, quicquid gloriae sibi homines a seipsis conciliant frivolum esse, ac nihili. Calv. in loc. . If I honour myself, my honour is nothing. Secondly, by way of vindication to himself of another, a contradistinct, and an indubitable valid title to his dignity, It is my Father that honoureth me. Here then is a twofold rise of honour distinguished of; the one real, & current, the other supposititious, and null; the one renounced, the other owned by Christ, viz. selfe-honour, and honour which is from God. As the honour which is from ones self, is thus in whomsoever disallowed by Christ as frustrate, and nothing, so it is the brand of Babylon, and charged upon her as one of her master-vices, that she glorified herself, [Rev. 18 7.] If by Babylon we understand the City of Rome (as not only our Protestant Expositors generally, but Ribera, and other Popish Commentators, yea, and some of the Fathers, as Tertullian, and Augustine apply it) that brand doth fitly and notably express the usurped power, both Ecclesiastical, and Civil, which that City, as the sea●e, and metropolis of the Pope, and the Pope in it doth claim, and in great measure exercise over all the Dominions of Christendom, as it is contradistinguisht from, and privative of the power of the respective civil Lords of those Dominions whose right they are: who are therefore said, in discrimination from her, to receive their kingdom, and power, Rev. 17.12. CHAP. IX. SECT. iv SECT. iv Argueth from sundry absurdities following upon the attributing of a mere possessory power unto God as his ordinance. 4 IT is a generally received, and most certain principle, All dominion, rule, and power of command over any creature, or any of mankind is absolutely, and originally in God alone; in the creature only derivatively, and by communication from him. Whosoever then may claim to himself, or be said, and taken by others to be in place of rule, or government over other men (in what society soever) must have and be able to show a delegation, or substitution from God for it. Now for this it being clearly repugnant, both to the nature of authority, and to divine proceeding about it, to say that God hath ordained it (whether it be that of a Father, or of a Husband, or of a Magistrate, or civil Lord) to be in every man; but contrariwise all must confess he hath to some appropriated, to others prohibited it, having commanded these the contradistinct duty of subjection; such a delegation must needs be required as doth fix such a sort of authority in such a particular man, in relation to such a society, or such persons, who are thereupon to yield their obedience, by virtue of a divine obligation to him. But to say God hath appointed any kind of authority, and particularly that of civil Magistracy, to be the certain, and inseparable result of possession, or to be his that can prevail, and doth possess himself (by w●at means soever) of a superior commaad over people is, 1. To bring a people to a loss, and to put an indeterminateness and disobligation upon them unto any Magistracy whomsoever, when the Throne comes to be de facto unpossessed, whether it be by the death, or absence of the Prince or otherwise, and to impose on them in those cases a continual uncertainty, and dissettlement of Government, and that as by divine ordination. 2. To give an equal warrant (in case of such vacancy) to all men to step up to, or stickle for the Throne, and to leave it to be attempted, aspired to, and scuffled for by whosoever pleaseth. 3. To cassate, disannul, and make vain all those preobligatious, cautions, restrictions, and rules which God himself hath at any time delivered beforehand for the determining, or directing of people's proceed about the erecting of Magistracy, as he hath given sundry to Israel, sometimes prescribing them the particular stock they shall fix upon * Deut. 17.15. ; and sometimes sending them to the use of Lots † 1 Sam. 10.18. , and sometimes to a certain race, or lineage * 1 Chron. 28.4, 5. 2 Chron. 23.3. , to find ou●, and receive thence the determination of their Magistracy. 4. To cancel, make impertinent, and trust aneous all other titles, or means of any men's coming into authority, and all consultations, provisions, constitutions or oaths of Senators, or people that look any other way, or digress from this path of actual possession, or prevalidity. Why should Moses have been so solicitous about his successor in the Government of Israel, Numb. 27.15, etc. and so earnest with God for the nomination of him before his death, if G●d h●d ordained (and then no doubt Moses would have known and should have acquiesced in it) that occupation, or possession must determine it. His own experience of the aspire of Korah, and the rest during his life, would tell him there was likely to be no want of a successor after his death, if it might be carried by usurpation. In like manner, to what purpose did Israel after the death of Joshua ask of God who should be their Leader? Or, did David inquire of God what he should do in relation to his obtaining the K ngdome of Israel before promised him when Saul was dead? Judg. 1.1. 2 Sam. 2.1. he might have known if this had been a received principle, that he had no more to do but gird on his armour, lead on his men, and take possession. If God hath ordained that possession shall be the basis or bottom of civil power, to what purpose is any State-constitution, law, or decree for the continuation or succession of government? according to this position upon any vacancy, or avoidance of the Throne, no person can by such constitution have any right to succeed, neither can any violent intruder be by it illegitimated. Though a person upon such vacancy come in, and the people receive him as their Magistrate by virtue of an antecedaneous civil constitution, or an oath of allegiance, yet upon that supposal the entry upon this ground, or title is but a Chimaera, a mere conceit, or airy phantasm, for it is not in t●u●h that title, but his possession which derives, and confers Magistracy upon him. And on the other hand, though a person be destitute of, or come in directly in opposition to, and violation, and eversion of such pre-obligations, yet if he any way get possession, he is a Magistrate true, and good enough; and if a person have all the laws, conventions, and pactions by man devisable for him, yet if he lack, or lose possession, he is no body, all is null. Yea, 5. This is to conclude all such constitutions, and obligations unlawful, and sinful in the making; for to what intent are they made? the very end of their enacting is to circumscribe and sense in the Throne, and to limit the way to it, to pre-dispose the property of it; and to exclude, and prevent, to illegitimate, and condemn the entry of any whomsoever to it in any o her way, or upon other account then that which is prescribed, and limited in the constitution; and therefore to disallow, and bar out one if not the only way, and title to it which God (if this position say true) hath authorized, to wit, mere prevalency, or intrusive acquisition, and possession. 6 To expose the Commonwealth as a common booty, and prize to all aspiring spirits, and to give an invitation (making God the author of it) to every ambitious, discontented, or disloyal party continually to be hatching, and attempting by power, or policy to undermine, or bear down the present Government, and to advance a new: by which means the civil power shall be always tottering, as in an Earthquake; the people's minds incessantly possessed with expectations of change; and the public State (together with every man's private) stand in perpetual jeopardy of falling under all violence, spoil, and confusion. The invitation is, he needs no more to make him the Sovereign Lord, and to lay a tye of subjection upon the consciences of the community unto him, as unto the power ordained of God, but to get into possession, or actual command of the territory: Unto which the next, and easiest way being the concurrence of the common people, or a stronger, or more successful party of them, any man that is of a working, crafty head, and of a high resolution may at any time be within the possibility, and by casting for it, not seldom have the opportunity of putting to a shrewd hazard the effecting thereof: as the example of Absalon, and Sheba in the reign of David, and of Jeroboam upon the death of Solomon do witness. 7. To say that there can be no unjust possessor, no unlawful, or disorderly occupant of rule in the Commonwealth, no such thing as we call usurpation, meaning by it a culpable, or injurious tenure of the place of civil dominion. For he that hath a warrant, ordination, or deputation from God for the place, must needs be rightly in, and authorised for it; and if this deputation infallibly come with, and by, and be the result of possession, than he that is in, must needs be rightly in. CHAP. IX. SECT. V Upon this account no man can be wrong, or out of his calling (in respect to government) that can get into command, quocunque modo: neither is there any possibility of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in this business: neither in this matter can any man justly be blamed in the words of Moses to Korah, and his company, Ye take too much upon you. Seeing, let a man take all he can upon him that he can grasp into his hands, he is commissioned by this that he doth take it upon him: neither did Moses do well to charge the said company as those that were gathered together against the Lord, or to defer the determination of the question of usurpation, which they charged upon Aaron, and him, and these again retorted upon them, unto God's former choice, and consecration of him, or them, or to God's manifestation of his mind, then to be made at the door of the Tabernacle of the congregation; for he should have pleaded, or decided it by possession, at least, so far as the question concerned Political rule. SECT. V Argueth from that State-maxime, Political power is originally in the people, and in the Magistrate, only derivatively from them. 5 THat principle, that civil power is originally in the people, or community, and from them passeth to the supreme Magistrate (if it may stand) quite overthroweth the possessory title. I shall not undertake to make it good, I had rather say, power is originally in God, CHAP. IX. SECT. VI and from him passeth by means of the people's consent to the Magistrate. But this I shall say for it, it hath gone of late for a chief Maxim in Politics, and hath been laid down as the principle to bear up, and justify the high proceed that have been, and to induce the owning of them; it hath received the stamp of public avouchment, and not only hath it obtained the said late authority, but it hath had before these times the approval of some of our learnedst men (as Mr. Richard Hooker, Mr. Hooker polit. Book 8. p. 150. & Mr. Banes. Mr. Banes, his Diocesans Trial. pag 83. ) That this principle quasheth the title of the mere possessor is very evident. A meet possessor is one that is in the place of power without any call, consent, or constitution of the people, or that is one that is in it only by his own act. If then the power be originally in the people, and in the Magistrate only derivatively from them, the mere possessor (whose very being, definition, or ratio formalis is, that he rules without the people's consent) is utterly destitute of it. SECT. VI Argueth from the Rise, or nature of civil government. 6 THere is nothing more directly opposite, or abhorrent to the nature of government than this pretention. For, what is government, but the subjecting, or resigning up of the community, and of every part therein, whatsoever their ability, or natural power is, to the arbitration, or rule of one, or a few c●rtain persons, for peace, and orders sake, and for prevention of those dangers, vexations, and violences, which single persons, private societies, and small parties are continually exposed to, and have no strength to repel, nor authority to over-awe, or reform the authors of them? And for what end is government ordained by God, and set up and upheld by men, but that the stronger may not domineer at pleasure over the weaker? and what is Anarchy, or sedition (the direct contrary to government) but the rising up, and the playing the Rex of a headstrong party of their own mind, and accord, without, or against authority. It is generally supposed that the mischief of rapine and sedition, or the dominion of the strong hand, was the inducement, and occasion that first led, and as mankind hath multiplied, and spread further over the earth, still hath prompted the people of the world to come out of that community, and equality which in the simplicity, and inoffensiveness of infant-times, and while societies have been but few, and small, they for a time lived in, and to agree upon a distinction of property, and a course of order, and of the political superiority, and dominion of some over the rest. And now to lay this principle, that the prevailer ought to be, or is the civil power, is to prostrate that order so erected, to reduce the world to that supposed original parity, and masterlesnesse, and to introduce, or give opportunity to all those confusions, and harms which Government was set up to fence out, to curb, and to suppress. SECT. VII. CHAP. IX. SECT. VII. Argueth from the received Distinction betwixt a Sovereign's public, or legal, and his personal, or private capacity. 7 BOth Lawyers, and Divines have found it necessary, in regard of many cases of law, and conscience occurrent to them respectively, to distinguish of a double capacity of him that is a Magistrate, viz. 1. His legal, civil, politic. 2. His private, personal, and humane capacity. And this distinction is grounded upon that of power before given (in Chap. 1.) to wit, that there is, 1. A natural, or physical. 2. A moral power. The difference betwixt those two capacities they have assigned to be, that his personal private capacity in it, all that he is, and doth, or may, and can do either naturally, or ethically, that is, by virtue of any natural, or moral power distinct from the Civil, or Magistratical. His politic capacity is conferred on him, and exercised by the Law; it is still inclusive of the Law, both as it is original, and instrument of working; and it signifies only that which he is, doth, and may do legally, or by the Laws of the Land. The necessity, and use of this distinction is to state the rise, and extent of the Magistrates authority, and both the ground, or reason, and the measure, or latitude of the Subjects obligation unto the power. This distinction hath been much used by them that have defended the late Parliaments cause. See it in the fuller answer to Dr. Ferne, pag. 9 16. And the answer to Dr. Fern's Reply, pag. 36. The vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy, pag. 27. The Answer to Doubts, and Queries upon the Oath, and Covenant, pag. 6. Mr. Burroughs upon Hos. cap. 1. Lect. 4. pag. 111. Yet had it not its effiction from them, but was unto the very same sense delivered by our Divines before; as Bishop Bilson, in his true difference of Christian subjection, &c pag. 520. Dr. Willer Hexap. 〈◊〉 Rom. cap. 3. quest. 17. pag. 593. Yea, the substance of this distinction hath been owned by both the Parliaments, and the Royal party. Yea, both by Prince, and People; hence these generally received maxims. The King hath no power in him, but what is invested in him by Law. The Law is the measure, and bottom of the King's power. He can claim nothing but what the Law gives him. He is our Li●ge, (that is, legal) Lord, we his liege, (or, legal) Subjects. Whatsoever power is exercised, and is not settled by Law, it is not authoritative. See the King's Declaration from Newmarket, March 9 1641. Judge Jenkins Judge Jenkins saith, The King's prerogative, and the Subjects liberty are determined, and bounded, and measured by the written Law what they are. We do not hold the King to have any more power, neither doth his Majesty claim any other but what the Law gives him. his vindication, pag 19 Treatise of Monarchy, pars 3. cap. 1. and sect. 2. pag 31, 32. and the vindication of that Treatise pag 58, 61. This distinction, and the import of it (if it may pass for good, as it is no less clear bo●h in ●eason, and Religion then generally acknowledged) doth quit, and clean disclaim, and shut out this potation, and title of the possessory power, and that so plainly, as it is superfluous further to form, or draw out the argument. For how can you distinguish of these two capacities in a mere possessor? where is his legal, civil, politic capacity (to wit, that which is conferred on, or exercised by him by the Laws) distinct from his natural, private, CHAP. IX. SECT. VIII. and personal capacity? and consequently, where is any ground, or rise of the people's obligation unto obedience to him, as their civil power? SECT. VIII. Argueth from the being of civil power, by the law of nature. 8 UPon supposal of the truth of that Position, that civil Magistracy is by the Law of nature, (for the proof of which I have said something before * Chap. 5. Sect. 4. Subsect. 2. ) I would thus argue, If the law of nature doth, and from the beginning hath dictated that civil Government be in politic societies; it must also be presumed to direct, and authorise a way, how in particular communities it may be erected; and that way which it hath determined is to be practised; and no other can (unless it derive an express positive rule from God) be admitted; especially none that is contradictory, or subversive to that: now no man can reasonably imagine that meeer possession, which must be ever supposed to be against the wills of the community, and for the most part is in prejudice, and wrong of another's title, yea which always is by unnatural, violent, and dishonest means introduced, and maintained, can be by order, or law of nature, or otherwise then by encroachment upon, and violation of it. CHAP. IX. SECT. IX. SECT. IX. Argueth from the general solemn disclaim of Arbitrary Government. 9 ARbitrary rule, & government is a thing that we (to wit, this kingdom generally) did condemn, and decry, as a public evil; and in opposition to it we entered into a public, and solemn promise, vow, and protestation (See the Preface to the Protestation of May 3. 1641.) I do not in the least reprehend that action, but upon it I argue. If that were well, and justly done, then is not Arbitrary government an ordinance of God, necessarily to be submitted to, and maintained, and that which may not be resisted: On the other hand, if Arbitrary government be an ordinance of God, etc. then were we externally extremely out in the said action: but then the question is, what is Arbitrary government? and wherein doth it, and that government which we owned, and took upon us to assert and stand for, differ? Doubtless, arbitrary, is opposed to lawful, or legal, or that which is settled by National convention, pact, and constitution. The government than we have in that Protestation obliged ourselves to, is that established by Law, and that which is otherwise (and without controversy mere possessory dominion is otherwise) we bond ourselves from, and against. SECT. X. CHAP. IX. SECT. X. Argueth from the impossibility of determining what measure of possession shall make a power. 10 LAstly, If possession will serve to make a power, and to breed an obligation in the people to it, I ask, what sort, size, or degree of possession is it that will do it? If you say, partial possession will suffice; I reply, possession of a part cannot give title to the whole. For that may at one, and the same time be in divers opposite competitors, as it hath been in England in our late Wars, and is in every Territory, where there are wars for Dominion. One contrary party may be seized on one City, or Province, another of another within the same Commonwealth. If then the title follow partial possession, it may appertain to many at once. But this cannot be; The entire title, or interest over a Kingdom cannot be wholly in divers contra-distinct, and opposite parties, neither can the people's allegiance be owing, or yielded to many contrary claimers. 1. It hath often come to pass that the forcible occupancy of one part of a Kingdom by one, and another by another power, hath been the occasion of dividing the same into several, and distinct Kingdoms or Principalities. So was the Greek Empire parceled after the death of Alexander the Great: and so hath the Roman Empire since been shared into a multitude of distinct sovereignties. Now this could not be, if possession of a part gave a title to the whole; for then, notwithstanding such distinguished possessions, and denominations, the body politic would (as when it was united under one Sovereign) be one still, and would remain entitled to one Sovereign, though but partial possessor; and how inconsistent would this be? and therefore we in Europe account that claim of the Turkish Emperor frivolous, and absurd, challenging a right to all the Dominions of the Western Roman Empire, as successor of Constantine, because he succeeded him in that of Constantinople, which was in Constantine's time one Empire with this of the West * Keckermani logic. lib. 1. cap. 23. pag. 203. & the Turkish history in Solyman pag. 615. . 2 If it be said, that it must be plenary possession that can give a title, and oblige the people to the possessor, I return: This is so tickle, and momentaneous a ground, as no civil authority can any while st●nd by it. For, how often, how easily is plenary possession interrupted? If a sorein enemy, or an intestine insurrection, or a small seditious Rout, or a band of Pirates, or Robbers seize but on one Town or Village in a whole Kingdom in opposition to the supreme Lord thereof, this breaks off his plenary possession, and so (by this opinion) annuls his Title, and disobeyeth his Subjects. There are few Dominions of any great extent, but are often infested in some part, or other with so much of commotion or invasion as may abate of plenary possession in the Sovereign. Witness the long continuing, or frequently renewed troubles of all, or most of the larger-Principalities of Europe in this age. Have the Emperors, Kings, and Princes of Germany, F●ance, Spain, Italy, etc. been so long divested, and deprived of their said Dominions, as their plenary possession hath been impeached in them respectively? But this conceit is utterly rejected by the general vo●e, and use of Nations, who do universally and constantly reckon their government to stand, and their Allegiance to hold notwithstanding partial counterseisures, yea, or the dismembering of some particles. You can scarce find in Scripture story a King whose reign is historified but at some time, or other, if not often, CHAP. X. and for much of his time he was by some or other occupant imped of plenary possession; yet did not that cut off his reign, or diminish his computed time. CHAP. X. Answers to some Objections, and Doubts concerning that sense of the Text which the aforegoing Chapters have stated, and confirmed. THis last Chapter is to return answer unto such Objections, and Questions, the solution whereof may seem necessary to the further clearing of that interpretation of this Text which this Treatise hath hitherto held forth, and ass●rted. CHAP. X. SECT. I. SECT. I. The objection [that this Text commandeth the Roman Christian's obedience to the than Roman Emperor, as the supreme power of God ordained in that Empire, and that he was a usurper] answered. Object. 1. WHen the Apostle wrote this to the Christians in Rome, the Roman Emperor that then was in the Throne, was an usurper: yet the Apostle, in willing them to subject to the higher powers in this Te●t, looks upon him as the higher, supreme, or Sovereign power of the Roman State; and meaneth him to be the power of God, ordained of God. Answ. There are two things, which make up the substance of this Argument, the which, could they be evidenced, would make this objection unanswerable, and carry the sense of this Text quite contrary to the whole Discourse I have hitherto made of it: But, if either of them be left inevident, or doubtful, the objection fails, and the sense given stands notwithstanding it. The two things that must be certain to make the argument good are, 1 That the Apostle in this exhortation unto subjection to the higher powers, and this affirmation of the power to be of God, ordained of God, intendeth, or hath his eye upon the Roman Emperor, as the supreme power of the Roman State. 2 That the said Emperor was then an usurper. As for the former: who so looks into the Roman Histories of those times will understand, that there was then (to wit, in the time of the Emperor's Cajus, Claudius, and Nero) a Roman Senate in being, a●d exercising authority; and that not merely subordinate, but Sovereign; sometimes without, sometimes against, and sometimes in conjunction with the Emperor. Sometimes (I say) without, sometimes against him. Without him, as upon the death of Cajus, and Claudius, and ere their respect ve successors were invested: against him, as about the depesall, and death of Nero. Yea, Mr. Prin hath undertaken to make good, and hath collected a plentiful store of testimonies out of antiquity, sufficient to render it more than p obable to any Reader, that in the Roman State, from the fi●st, continually, and par icularly after the Emperors came in, the supreme power resided in the Senate, and people, and not in the Kings, Consul's, or Emperors. Unto whom I refer the Reader in his forth part of the Sovereign power, etc. the Appendix, pag 2, etc. and his third part, pag. 109, 110, 111. See also Grotius, de ja●e belli lib. 2. cap. 9 sect 11. and his Annotat. on that Section. If H storians observe there was any debate at any time started betwixt the Senate, and the Emp●rou s about the title, or exercise of the sovereignty in a y point; or if the Emperou s overtopping the S na e in some things be set against the Senate's acting without, or against the Emperor in o●hers, t●● at the most will cause but the more uncertainty in this poin●, and leave both the precise matter of fact, or the then constitution of the Roman power, and the question whom the Apostles reflection, or intention was upon as the supreme power there, the mo●e to us dubitable, & in medio: or rather will induce us to conclude this as certain, that, what ever dispute, or alternatenesse of prevailing there might then be, or may now seem to us (by what the Authors now extant hold forth of th' se times) then to have been, betwixt the Emperor, and Senate about the supremacy; the Apostle relates not to that matter; meddles not with the stating, or determining of it; that being a question of civil right, which either might have little matter of doubt in it, as to the Christians practice, or might not be so doubtful to them that lived in those times, as it is now to us at this distance, or might have other ways of clearing it, in so far as the Christians conscience was concerned, then by the Apostles express writ in this Epistle. But taking the government that then was (in complexo) as just, and therefore necessary to be subjected to, he exhorts to that duty towards it, and that with this reason, because, of God, ordained of God. Indeed the questions which were now on foot among the Christians, in reference to civil obedience, and which lay more upon the Apostle to deal in, and resolve, (by the consent of Expositors, ancient, and modern) were not so much in whom the supremacy was, as, whether Christians were at all bound in obedience to any civil superiors? and, if at all to any, whether to Pagan, and persecuting Magistrates? For the other, (the presumed usurpation of the Emperor) It is true, sundry Authors, both Protestant, and Popish do occasionally instance in the Roman Emperors of this age, as usurpers: but, upon what evidence? as far as I can trace their censure in antiquity, all their ground for it is, the changes and simulties about Government that had then for a long space troubled that State, and the oppositeness of divers worthy Romans (such as Cato, Brutus, Cicero,) to the prevailing parties. But let the alterations which the first Chieftains made to the prejudice of the Senatorian, or Consular interest be admitted violent, and illegal, and the power which the first Emperor, or Emperors ascended to by them to have been in that its first rise, or emergency of the same character; I shall affirm there is yet alleged no good reason to pronounce, that the power of those forenamed Emperors, taken to have been Contemporaries with St. Paul's Apostleship, was of that nature: This I deliver, not upon any exactness of mine own search of History, but upon this twofold consideration. 1. The attestation of some Authors of this present age, very eminent. As Junius (of whom Scaliger is said have given this highest Elegy, That no age since the Apostles can show such a Divine * Ab Apostolorum temporibus hactenus parem Theologum nullum vidit seculum. Apud Gatakeri Cinnum, lib 2 cap. 9 pag. 267. ) In his controversy with Bellarmine about the Translation of the Roman Empire from the Greeks to Germany, and in them to Charles the great (Bellarmine endeavouring to defend it to have been the act of Pope Leo the third, and to have been done lawfully by him) he first asserts his opinion of that Translation. That a difference is to be put betwixt the translation in doing, and the translation after it was done. In the former there was a fault, which ceased in the latter. Though the beginning was injurious, there was a post-fact which made it right. And then he brings in as a parallel, to illustrate this the case we are upon, the Monarchy of Julius Caesar; Alia est ratio translationis in fieri quam in factum esse. Translatio in fieri fuit vitiosa, in quâ, nec Leo tertius, nec populus Romanus, nec ipse Carolus officium fecit. Sed translatio in factum esse desiit vitiosa esse, praesertim cum Irene imperatrix, & Constantinus filius, etc. quorum intererat, cedemes jure suo pacem cum eo statuerunt, etc. Nempe ex postfacto jus invaluit, cujus non ita fuerunt initia justa. Exemplo esto, si placet, Julii Caesaris Monarchia. Haec enim ortu iniqua sic fuit, ut constituta semel Rep. coeperit esse justa. Nec solvi, nisi per in●ustum ordinis publici conturbationum poterit. Junii Animad. in Bellarmin. Controu. 3. lib. 5 cap. 8. sect. 18. pag. 872. of which he saith, this was so unjust in its beginning, as that being once constituted, to the Commonwealth it became just, neither could be dissolved without an unjust disturbance of the public order. Chamier may second this of Junius. Whereas Pighius denies Pilate to have had any ordinary, or lawful authority over Judea, or over Christ, because Caesar had not: and Caesar (saith he) had not, because he got his powe● both over the Roman Empire, and over Judea unjustly Chamier thus answers him. What then? If that Authority were from bad, and unjust beginning, did therefore Christ untruly say it was from ab●ve? Quid tum? si a malis, & injujustis principiis ea authoritas fuit, an proptereà falso Christus dixit eam esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? an proptereà perperam docuit Caesari censum solvendum? an verò nulla potestas ab initio injusta, potest posted justa esse? Hoc verò si esset, tum sane aut nulla, aut paucissima regna erunt justa. Chamier panstrat. Tom. 2. lib. 15. cap. 16. Sect. 8. & 9 pag. 635. did he therefore ill to teach that tribute was to be paid to Caesar? Can no power at first unjust afterward become just? If that were so, then either none, or very few Kingdoms would be just. Another (to add no more) may be Arnisaeus, he, moving the question, Whether the act of a Tyrant (as to title) may be so rectified by the people's after-consent, that what was null before may become valid; even as Sylla got himself created Dictator for 80 years, and Caesar procured the same to himself for ever? Absque m●tu verò si populus, ad exemplum Romans, deponat omnem potestatem in principem, aut consensum tacitum confirmaris praescriptio immemorialis, quae vim habet privilegii, acquiescendum esse consilio illorum, qui censent inveteratas causas non esse renovandas. Arnisaeus de Authoritate princi●●m. Cap 4 Sect. 14. pag. 127, 128. resolves it thus. If the people, according to that example of the Romans, dispose of the power to the Prince: or if prescription of time out of mind convey a consent, that is to be acquiesced in without scruple. 2. The evidences I meet with in Historians of the vote or consent of the Senate, and people, which those Emperors had, giving them a just title, and assoiling their government from the brand of usurpation. Chronicon Carionis saith of Julius Caesar, that he was confirmed by a public decree in the supreme power. And the same saith Cluverus of him. Revera Julius Magistratus esset decret● publico confirmatus, quo ei tributa erat summa potestas, & quo sanxerat senatus eum esse inviolabilem. Chron. Car. part 1. lib. 2. cap. penult. pag. 187. Tum vero absens (Caesar) Romae Dictator creatus, pacisque & belli Dominus. Cluver. hist. lib. 7. p. 237. Of Augustus his entrance Tacitus witnesseth, both the Nobles and Provinces assent to it. And for further testimony (very luculent) of the Senates and people's hearty subsequent submission to him from time to time, and their conserting on him the honour, and power that he assumed, yea, and more than he fought, or accepted, I sh ll refer the Reader to the collections (out of their Historians) of Archbishop Usher, Vsseri Annal. part 2 pag. 379. 497, 498, 549, 554. Cluver. hist lib. 7. pag. 240. Em. Thesauri Caesares in Tiber. Vide etiam Sueton. Aug. vita cap. 58. & 70. Greg. Tholos. Synt. juris, lib 47. cap. 15. sect. 21. & cap. 20. sect. 4. in his Annals, and to Cluverus. Unto which let that be noted of the Elogist, Thesaurus. Doluit pat●ia cum principem fecit: gavisa cum habait. Of Tiberius his admission by the Senate, and people, let be consulted. Tacitus, Suetonius, Arch bishop Usher, and Emanuel Thesaurus * Tacit. Annal. lib. 1. cap. 2. Sueton. in Tiberio. cap. 24. Usseri Annal. pag. 549, 554. . Of whom the last saith, Sponte se Roma tyranno tradidit, tempori serviens, non Regi. Of the most cheerful coming in of Cajus Caligula, let Suetonius testify † Sueton. in Caio cap. 13, & 14. . And of Claudius, see Josephus, Cluverus, and Mr. Lightfoot * Josephus de Bel. Jud. lib. 2. cap. 10. & Antiqu. lib. 19 cap. 3. Cluver. hist. lib. 8. pag. 267. Lightfoot on Acts, Ann. Christi 42. Sect. 4, & 5. . Of Nero, Tacitus † Tacit. Annal. lib. 12. cap. 14. . If against the validity of the consent given to any of these it be alleged that it was enforced by arms, and therefore void, It may be said, 1. Unto some of them, as Augustus, Caligula, and Nero, the consent of the Roman S a e, is related to have been such as leaveth no colour for this objection. 2. It will be a very hard, yea, I think, an impossible thing for any at this distance of time, and in such an imperfection of historical narration of circumstances to bring sufficient ground upon which to conclude any such awe to have been upon the Senate, and people at the time of their consent given to any, or to such of them as might be in the Throne at the mission of this Epistle, as may serve to make the said consent invalid. Let the definition which Civilians and Casuists give of that terror which may annul a civil act (to wit, that it must be 1. From a cause extrinsical. 2. Probable. 3. Grievous. 4. Unjust. 5. Impressed on purpose to overawe to such an act * Metus 1. Extrinsecus. 2. Probabilis. 3. Atrox. 4. Injustus. 5. Incussus ad hoc. Vide Bonacinam Tom. 2. Tract. 2. de Restit. Disp. 3. qu. 1. punct. 2. sect. 3. Et Tom. 1. Tract. 2. qu. 3. punct. 8. Et Greg. Thol. Synt. Jur. lib. 21. cap. 2. sect. 3. Et lib. 36. cap. 25. sect. 5. ) he made out to have been then the case. There is no great ground of presumption for it that I met with in story, in any of them save in that of Julius Caesar, which will no way concern the title of them that followed, particularly of that Nero, in whose reign the writing of this Epistle is computed to fall. 3. There are that conceive, though in foro civili, promises made under some kind of fear, or force are voided, that is, are made politically null, yet by the law of nature, and so in the Court of Conscience, a contract, notwithstanding any force impelling the contractor, is obliging † Grotius de Jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 11. sect. 7. . SECT. II. CHAP. X SECT. II. Subsect. 1. Object. Of Christ's paying, and commanding Tribute-paying to Caesar: of his owning pilate's power: Of Soldiers serving the Romans without the disallowance of the Baptist, Christ, etc. Object. 2. CHrist himself paid, and commanded the Jews to pay Tribute to Caesar; acknowledged pilate's power, which was the Romans, to be of God: and we read of divers soldiers, and officers under the Romans, with whom John the Baptist, Christ, and his Apostles had to do, and none of them that we read of ever reprehended any of them for, or dissuaded them from that service. But the Romans were usurpers over Judea. Subsection 1. The question, whether the Romans were usurpers over Judea? discussed, and concluded negatively. Answer. 1. IF the Romans were usurpers over Judea, there is something of an argument, otherwise there is none in all this. But how will this be proved? Most of the Authors of this objection do no more for this than cite the names of some learned and good Authors affirming it, and so they take it f●r granted. But for their full answer, and the clearing of this I shall 1. Scan a little this their common proof by such humane assertion. 2. Then consider what reason may suggest to us in this matter. 3. And then remove some other reasons pretending the conviction of the Romans of usurpation. For the former, the assertion of sundry learned Authors, that so it was: though such do in transitis, & aliud agentes, affirm the Romans, in the days of our Saviour upon earth, to have been usurpers over Judea●, yet is not their bare affirmative to be taken for an evidence in such a business, viz. sufficient to state the sense of a Scripture in controversy, or to extend, or limit a Scripture rule of practice, such as this is. Their ground for so saying would be seen to such an end, and until than I shall with as good authority (I think) deny it. Not that I oppose mine own negation, as to be as firm, and credible as the assertion of any such learned men: but because I have the authority of (I deem) as learned, and good Authors denying the same, and asserting the lawfulness of the Roman government over the Jewish Nation, by consent ere this given to it, whereby it stood cleared of usurpation. There is a little Treatise (printed about 7 years since) called An exercitation concerning usurped powers; which (pag. 87, 88) hath cited some passages out of Josephus to prove the Jews giving up themselves to the Roman Dominion antecedently to this time which the objection concerns. I shall refer the Reader to these, adding here one or two more out of the same Author (whose testimony in this matter is absolutely the greatest of humane) and then produce the attestation of others of best note; and after that subjoin a sh●rt vindica i●n of what that exercta ion had before given. A further testimony out of Josephus is in these words of Agrippa, in his oration to the Jews at Jerusalem, a little before their siege, and destruction by the Romans for their rebellion. For servitude is grievous, when new, Joseph. de Bel. Jud. lib. 2. cap. 16. and it seems just to strive to avoid it; but he that is once brought under it, and then makes defection, appears to be rather a rebellious servant than a lover of liberty. Therefore it behoved, when Pompey entered into this Province, to have used all means against the Romans entry: but ye that have received an hereditary obedience, and are far inferior in means to those who first submitted, how can ye now think of making resistance to the whole Roman Empire? This passage is clear enough for the Jews reception of the Roman Rule, under Pompey. Another may be that which the same Author hath in the relating of an occurrence which happened about seven years after this first close of this Nation with the Roman in subjection; which was this. Alexander the son of Aristobulus (who was the head of that party that fell under the force of the Roman sword, and still repined at their government) beginning to make insurrection against the Romans, was suppressed by Gabinius the Governor of Syria, and upon that suppression Gabinius settled the government of the Jewish Commonwealth in another form, distributing the Province of Judea into five equal parts, and appointing so many several Cities in each of them for the people respectively to belong, and repair unto for justice; the which course of government took so well with the Jews, that the remaining grudges at the Roman Dominion were removed. The words of Josephus upon it are, Joseph. de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 6. The Jews being delivered from the government of one alone, were willingly governed by several Chieftains, or Aristocratically. I am to adjoin now some other W●iters testimonies, one of the most learned Antiquaries, especially in the Jewish affairs we have, is Mr. John Selden. And he hath purposely enquired into, and professedly debated this question: and he resolves it for us thus. It is not obscure to be seen that in the times of the Empires of the Babylonians, the Persians, the Grecians, and the Romans, the Jews, upon their respective victories over them, were (soedere, seu deditione subditi) subjects to them by covenant, or surrendering up of themselves: that by virtue of the said covenants, or deditions, they paid tribute, and they served as Soldiers under Alexander the Great. And particularly in reference to the Romans, he saith, concerning the public acknowledgement of the Right of the Romans by War, and arms over this Nation (the Jews) there is clear evidence from the leagues, and charters of Princes, which both Josephus, and Philo (in the Book de legatione) do hold forth. And that that Nation was received of the Romans by dedition, or by that league which is betwixt unequals. And that the tribute, which Judas the Galilean stood up to free that people from, was imposed by Augustus, by the law of victory and dedition. And that the sedition of those Jews (mentioned, Acts 5 37.) who mutinied upon occasion of that tribute taxed upon them by Augustus, by the law of victory, and dedition, was according to Ga●aliels speech disallowed of by that Sanhedrim or Council of the Jews, as St. Luke relates in that story (Acts 5.40.) as being by the delusion of a seditious incendiary, and not of God. And that the Jews had yielded themselves unto, and owned the Roman Dominion in Pompey, Caesar, Augustus, and Tiberius, ere this question about tribute-paying was proposed to our Saviour. And that be, from the inspection of that Denarius, the coin which upon the moving of this question, and his demand to have it shown, was produced, raised an irrefragable argument of that dedition, and from thence of their d bt of tribute-paying. And that they who ex animo, and really stuck at the payment of it, were a seditious party, dissenting from the Body of that Nation. All this may be seen more at large delivered by Mr Selden * Io. Selden de jure Naturae, etc. lib. 6. cap. 17. pag. 751, etc. . What an act dedition is, let Gro●ius inform † Deditio sponte permittit quod alioqui vis esset ereptura. Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 3. cap. 8. sect. 4. Dedition is a yielding voluntarily to that which otherwise force would extort. That there was on the part of the Jewish Nation a rendering of themselves up to the Roman government, yea, and a covenant of fealty, or subjection entered into by them upon Pompey's coming to Jerusalem in assistance to Hircanus, and his besieging and taking the Temple from Aristobulus his party (the opposites of Hircanus, and of the greater part of that nation) another of our most learned, and judicious searchers of Antiquity, Archbishop Usher, hath furnished us with divers testimonies out of History. One is of Eutropius, viz. Pompey passing into Jury, took Jerusalem, the Metropolis of that Nation, in the third month, killing 12 thousand of the Jews, and receiving the rest into fealty * Ad Judaeos transgressus (Pompeius) Hierosolymam caput gentis tertio mense cepit; duodecim milibus Judaeorum occisis, caeteris in fidem acceptis. Eutropius. . Another of Orosius, who speaking of Pompey, saith, He sendeth to the City of Jerusalem Gabinius with his Army, himself presently following, and being received of the Fathers into the City, but repulsed by the common sort from the walls of the Temple, he gins to besiege it; and hardly took it in three months. Thirteen thousand of the Jews are reported there to be slain. The rest of the people entered into a league of subjection † Ad Hierosolymam urbem eorum Gabinium cum exercitu mittit: ipse continuò subsecutus, & a patribus u●be receptus, sed a plebe muro Templi repulsus, oppugnationem ejus intendit, etc. vix tertio mense expugnavit. Tredecim millia Judaeorum ibi caesa narrantur. Caetera multitudo in fidem venit. Orosius. Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 262, 263. . Another testimony of the Jews consent to the Roman authority, the same Archbishop gives us out of Josephus, which is that I cited even now, of their willing embracement of an Aristocratical government settled over them by Gabinius * Usseri Annal. pert 2. pag. 281. . Another witness shall be Calvin, who upon the Text mainly referred to in the Objection, saith, The authority of the Roman Empire was by common use approved, and received among the Jews; whence it was manifest that the Jews had now of their own accord imposed on themselves a law of paying the tribute, because they had passed over to the Romans the power of the sword * Romani Imperii authoritas communi usu probata, receptaque erat, unde constabat Judaeos ipsos jam sibi sponte legem imposuisse solvendi Tributi, quia Romanis gladii potestatem concesserant. Calv. in Matth. 22.19. . For this voluntariness of the Jewish subjection to the Romans, and consequently the freedom of these from usurpation in relation to them, at what time our Saviour conversed on Earth among them, I have more testimony, of primest worth, but will spare the citing of their words, and shall refer my Reader to Weems, Weems Exposition of the Judic. Law, pag. 52, 53. Grotius, Gro●. de Jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 4. sect. 14. and Dr. Hammond, Dr. Hammond Annot. on Matth. Chap. 22. note B. the last of whom I shall have occasion to bring in by and by; and unto these may be put Chamier, before cited in answer to the first Objection. Let us n●xt see what is said in this matter against the exercitation above cited, and the Romans Title to Judea therein asserted, by the Book called, The Exercitation answered. He (page 51.) objects against the Maccabean title by the consent of one of which (Hircanus) the Romans came into the Dominion of Jew●y. But what if none of them of that race that ruled, what if the last of them Hircanus had not any good title? yet, if the Romans had the people's consent (as the exercitation asserteth they had) their claim might be good. But let us see how he avoids the Maccabean title. First, he objects, That the Maccabees came in by force into the Kingdom, when there was another King, a successor of Alexander. He saith, but proves it not; I answer him. 1 It is no concluding argument of the unlawfulness of any power that they come in by force. The question is, whether that force be just, or unjust? whether it be a mere force, or a force b●cked with a just title at its entrance? or, if it had no●, a question will be further, whether it had none subsequently conferred, by which means, though the force were unjust in its entry, yet it might be absolved in its continuance from usurpative tenure? But the justifiableness of the Maccabean arms against the Syrian Kings is commonly yielded, and ass●rted, although there may be some diversity in the way of making it out, of which the Reader may see in Grotius * Grot. de jure B●l lib 1. cap. 4. sect. 7. . For them there are rendered these reasons. 1 The allowednesse of the Subjects defensive arms against their lawful Sovereign in case of extreme necessity, as was that of the Jews under Antiochus. This is a ground undeniable by that answer. 2 But it is further to be said, that at what time Mattathias the Father of the Maccabean brethren, and after him his son Judas, and the other in succession raised arms against, and repelled the Seleucian oppressions, be that was then reigning of that race (Antiochus Epiphanes) was an usurper, the right of succession being in Demetrius the son of Seleucus, the son of Antiochus the G eat, and elder brother to this Antiochus. And that Demetrius being now an hostage at Rome, and by the Senate there detained from succeeding in the Kingdom, the Jews had some occasion given them to assume the administration of the affairs of their own nation, especially they being now under Tyrant not only as to title, but as to his imm●ne, (or Epimane, as his style is in Athenaeus * Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 1. Ro●●e his hist. lib. 1. cap. 1. pag. 2. ) government. And it may be noted also, that this Antiochus at his end vowed to God to grant the Jews an Autonomie, that they might thence forward use their own Laws, and constitutions, and moreover wrote supplicatory Letters in behalf of himself, and his son Antiochus, whom he left to succeed him, to pray, and beseech their fidelity to them both † Vide Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 47. and 2 Macc. 9 13, etc. . 2 As for the freedom of the Maccobeans Dominion in reference to their own Nation, Josephus gives very clear testimony of the Jewes election, and admission of them, and in particular of the fore-leaders of them, Mattathias, and his sons * Ios●ph. de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 1. Et Antiqu. lib. 13. cap 1, & 11. . 2. He questions, whether the High Priest were capable both of a Crown, and Mitre, wherein some say he was a pattern of Antichrist. To this blur of typifying Antichrist, it may be replied, Antichristianisme is now grown a very common, and stolen imputation, many having applied it to any thing which they please to asperse. 2 It's strange that under the Law not only Christ, but Antichrist should have his types. 3 How will he make it appear, that to wear both a Crown, and a Mitre is a property of Antichr●st, that is, that it doth competere to him, and to him (with his types) alone. 4 It is certain Christ is both King, and Priest, and so, in their model are all Christians. The Maccabees then, if in this they must be typical, being they were such faithful, and pious, as well as magnanimous persons, might rather be construed presidential in this good, then in so soul an application. 2 But to his question, let the examples of Melchisedech, Eli, Samuel, and Jehoiada (who sure were no patterns of Antichrist) be considered, as to the lawfulness of the conjunction of civil regiment with the Priesthood. Yea, I presume upon better enquiry it will be found that temporal power, to wit, the judgement of civil causes was the ordinary investure of the Priesthood of Aaron by institution * See Deut. 17.8, 9, 10, 11. & 19.17. 2 Chr. 19.8, 9, 10. . And certainly the Priests that were either precedents, or members of the Jewish supreme Council, or Sanhedrim were interested in such a power. 3 As for the pomp, or honour of a Crown, or Kingdom, the former Maccabees never assumed it. The first that did it was Aristobulus, say some, Alexander his brother, and next successor, say others; the latter was father to Hircanus, from whose hand the power passed upon Pompey's victory to the Romans; and the said Hircanus sat High Priest nine years ere the Kingdom came to him, which he had not enjoyed three months (say some † Monta●us. Apparatus 6. Sect. 24, 25, 26. pag. 229. Lightfoot of Temple cap. 4. sect. 3. pag. 29. ) when the difference broke out betwixt him, and his brother Aristobulus, which was the occasion of calling in the Romans by Hircanus, and his party, and so of their sovereignty there. 2. He allegeth, The covenant made betwixt Hircanus, & Aristobulus importing that the latter should command the Kingdom; the which disenabled Hircanus' forgiving away the Kingdom after to Pompey. Answ. 1. Hircanus indeed forced by Aristobulus, yielded him up the Kingdom by such a covenant; but the Chieftains of Judea not consenting, after set up Hircanus again upon d slike of Aristobulus, and by the assistance of Aretas the Arabian King first, and then of Pompey recovered it from him * Vide I●seph. Antiqu. lib. ●4. cap. 1, 2 7, 8. . And Pompey, before his coming in, was sought unto by both those parties to determine the controversy betwixt them † Vide Usse●i Annal. part 2. pag. 249, 250. 163. . Upon which he adjudging for Hircanus, and taking up his cause joined with him, and his party in the oppugning and suppressing of Aristobulus. 3. He excepteth against the Roman Title by surrendry of Hircanus to Pompey, upon that maxim, a King cannot pass away his Kingdom without their consent. This position is a truth acknowledged by Statesmen * See K. james his Remonstr. etc. p. 207, 208. The arraignment of the powd●r-Tr●tytors in the Earl of Nor●hampt. speech, pag. 273, 309, 314. Widd●ing. Theolog. Disput. adm. to Reader. sect. 10. , and others (save that some distinguish of a constitutive, and a patrimonial Kingdom, and deny it of the latte●) and from thence is voided his n●xt preceding objection of Hircanus his covenant; which for this reason could be no obligation to the people, or bar to the Romans title, coming in against Aristobulus. Neither doth the exercitation at all inf inge that maxim, by founding the Roman claim upon Hircanus his sole act; for it expressly takes in, and brings proof of the consent of the Nation. Which proof now comes in to be defended against this Answerer. 4. He allegeth the words of Jos●phus, That all the whole Nation were against both Hirc●nus, and Aristobulus for b●inging them under the servitude of a Kingdom, for they said their custom was to be governed by God's High Priest, but I hope (saith the Answerer) Pompey was no Priest, and there fore they did not choose him for thei● Governor. To this the answer is easy. The exception of the people in this narration of Josephus was not against the government of both those brothers; For the same Author relateth the people's acception of Hircanus to the Dominion immediately upon the death of Alexandra. And when he being of an over-sl●w, and modest temper, had given way to the turbulent spirit of Aristobulus his younger brother to reign, they risen up (in assistance of Aretas the Arabian King) for his restoring to the government * Jo●eph. Antiq. lib. 14. cap. 3. Usseri Annal. pag. 141. . But they were ill content with their government under the title, pomp, majesty, and expensiveness of a Kingdom, or they blamed the annexing of a Crown to the moderate Dominion of the ancienter Asmoneans. This was indeed an innovation (and so displeasing) first introduced by the Father, or Uncle or Hircanus. 2 This complaint of the people against those brethren is no argument to preclude the people's consent to Pompey afterward, had he taken upon him to be a King over them. That which a people now disliketh, they do not ever continue to disaffect or refuse. Who knows not the mutability of a multitudes minds? Sed quid turba Remi? siquitur fortunam, etc. 3 But as Pompey was no Highpriest, so he was not King. Neither doth the Exercitator say they chose him for their King. Neither doth the matter of this complaint make any thing against the complainers Dedition to the Romans. But in truth it did further it; For they affecting rather Hircanus his indulgent rule than Aristobulus an imperious, and warlike man; and not being able to keep down the latter, or enjoy the quiet of their Country under him, they submitted to the Romans, whereby they recovered Hircanus, freed themselves of the other brother, and had their desire of the Romans of being rid of a Crowned Highpriest; Pompey gratifying them in leaving Hircanus to govern them, but (secluso Diademate, say Hist●r●ans expressly) and in association with Antipater, as Procurator * Usser. Annal. pag. 261. Montacut. Apparatus, 6. Sect. 26. pag. 229. . And when about six years after Alexander the Son of Aristobulus infested Judea with new broils, in his Father's quarrel, Gabinius, the Roman Precedent of Syria, having subdued him, restored Hircanus to the H●gh Priesthood only, and set over the Country certain prefects in distinct circuits, wherewith the people rested very well satisfied † Joseph. Antiq. lib. 14. cap. 10. & de Bel. lib. 1. cap. 6. Uss●r. Annal. p. 281. . 5. Whereas to prove the Jewish dedition the Exercitator had brought out of Josephus, the words of Antipater to Caesar concerning Antigonus (the son of the aforesaid Aristobulus) his craving aid of Caesar against Hircanus, he falls foul upon the Exercitator, and charge h him with a false construction of the Latin sentence (for the Greek he had not) of Josephus. In defence of that Exercitator I shall but 1 Present the Reader with the words which the Exercitator had truly cited out of the printed Latin version of Josephus, which are [Non propter inopiam desiderare facultates; sed ut in eos qui dedissent Judaeorum seditiones accenderet.] and with the Exercitators Englishing of them; That he sought not relief (of Caesar) because he was poor; but that he might kindle Jewish seditions against those which had made a dedition of themselves. I leave the Reader to judge if there be any such fault in the construction: And whether the Answerer hath dealt fairly, either with the Exercitator, in challenging him of very untruly alleging those words of Antipater; or with Josephus, in his undertaking to correct the Exercitators version by translating him thus, He, that is, Antigonus, craved not maintenance for that he wanted, but that he might raise a rebellion among the Jews, and against them who would bestow any thing upon him. Which of these two have more faithfully translated the Latin above set, I need not take the umpirage of. 2 Propose betwixt them, that the concernment of the quotation in the point of validity lies in the congruity of the matter for which it is brought (viz. to prove a dedition of the Jews to the Romans) to the Greek of Josephus, which is, [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.] It may be the Latin (about the englishing of which the answerer quarrels with the Exercitator) follows not the original overstrictly, but the main question is, whether Josephus his own words do not bear a dedition as clearly as the Exercitators English. That this is their importance I will not seem to obtrude my assertion upon the Reader, now he hath the words before him. Only I shall let him know I am very much confirmed to take it so to be, having found an Antiquary, and Greek Critic of so great sufficiency quoting this very passage for the same purpose to which the Exercitator had done, I mean the singularly learned Dr. Hammond; Dr. Hammond Annot on Math. 22. Note B. who in his Annotations asserts of the Jews, that they had made a dedition of themselves to the Romans, and for it citeth the same place in Josephus (viz. de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 8.) in which place there is nothing to be found that sounds to that purpose, if these words do not. The same Doctor's testimony to the thing I am arguing for, which should have been given above, I have referred to this place upon this occasion, as being very pertinent. He affirms in the same Annotation, That the Jews, those of them that were of Hircanus' party, came under the Roman power by consent, and not by force; by a choice which the factious among themselves put them upon, and by way of dedition: while they of Aristobulus party looked upon the Romans as usurpers, and forcible possessors, and that this difference conntinued till our Saviour's time: When of the Jews some part acknowledged, and adhered to the Caesarean, or Roman authority: some part looked upon it as an usurpation, and of this generally were the Pharisees. And that Christ's answer is punctually in favour of the Roman Emperor, especially to those who took the tribute to be his right. Having thus weighed, and I think sufficiently counterpoised the opinion of those who are for the Romans, to have been usurpers over Judea, in the time of our Saviour, by humane testimony, I have only to add, 2. Somewhat of reason against their said opinion. 1 Had not so many learned men stood up for the justification of the Roman dition over the Jews by their dedition, and agreement, yet it is not with probability supposeable, that their Dominion in Judea having now been continued above 90. years, could have been exercised so long, without some consent sufficient to legitimate it to the present rulers; that is, either an express, or a tacit consent; eit oer a real consent, or such as was to be presumed, having been continued by immemorial usage. 2 To this title of the Romans, the confession of the Jews themselves made at this time, seems to astipulate. They said, It is not lawful for us to put any man to death. We have no King but Caesar. In the former sentence they disavow to be in them the power of capital punishment, and consequently the supreme authority civil; not only the natural, or compulsory, but the legal, and Justifiable power. In the latter, they own Caesar as their King, with an exclusive negation, or abrenunciation of all other. 3 To this also, that appeal of the Apostle Paul unto Caesar, adds some strength. When the Chieftains of the Jews had challenged his trial to belong to them, and F●stus also had moved him to agree to have had the cognisance of his Cause taken at Jerusalem; in return to them both, he asserteth that both his person, and his cause appertained to Ca●sars Tribunal; and that not only in fact, but o● right, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, where I ought to be judged. But there is one (the Answerer to the exercitation above dealt with) that pretendeth to some more matter of reason to evict the Roman usurpation. He opposeth to the lawfulness of their title, two other titles, which by reason of the venerablenesse of their names to whom they are affixed, will seem to deserve an examination ere that of the Romans can pass for indubitable. 1 He alleges the title of the house of David, and that promise, that there shall not want a man to sit on his Throne. Unto this I say, There was indeed such a promise given to David, 2 Sam 7.12. 1 Kings 2 4. which was the basis of the title of that house. But it is to be observed that the same promise was made, Jer. 33.17. with relation to the times after the seventy years' captivity. Now let the objector of this promise show when, and in what sort this in the Prophet did, or was to receive accomplishment after the captivity: and it will easily appear, that the civil dominion, either of the Roman now, or of the Maccabees before, or of any other person was, or would have been no impeachment to that promise taking place, or to that title built upon it: but the one, and the other might we●l consist together. The event showeth, that the said promise was applicable to a twofold fulfilling. 1 Temporal, or literal, in the natural posterity of David, and with relation to Israel that dwelled in Canaan. 2 Spiritual, or mystical in the supernatural seed of David, that is, Christ; and with relation to Israel in all Nations, viz. the Church of Christ. And that the time was now come that the latter impletion was to take place; the which superseded not, but rather made way for the civil title of any who might have a fair call to the Throne over that Nation. 2 So far as the promise's, and title was made to David, and his carnal seed, with relation to the Israelitish Nation, it was made with an express proviso, condition, and limitation, [of which see 1 King. 2.3, 4 Jer. 22 2, 3, 4, 5.] the which having been long ere this entry of the Romans often, and wholly broken, the promise, and title as to that sense of it, was void, and so could not stand as a bar to any other family's capacity of that Crown * Vide Montacut. Apparat. sect. 26 pag. 88 . 3 It is evident (what ever had become of that condition) that promise was made concerning the worldly K ngdome of that Nation to continue no longer in force then to the coming of Christ, in, and by whom the Kingdom of David, and his seed was to be changed from an earthly, to an heavenly Kingdom: which was meant by john Baptists, Christ's, and his Apostles preaching the kingdom of heaven. Matth. 3.2.4.17.10.7. By the prophecy of Jacob, the Sceptre (to wit, the temporal power) was assured unto Judah, but until Shiloh's coming. 2 The other title he brings to nullify that of the Roman is, of the great son of David, Christ himself, who, as Mr. Perkins acknowledgeth, Gen 49.10. was right heir to the Crown, and kingdom of the Jews. Let that pass f●r current, which is the comm●n opinion, that Christ was in a direct line David's next natural heir: yet, what ever right might descend upon him, a civil, or temporal title to the Crown, and Kingdom of the jews, cannot be concluded to pass unto him thereby. His succession to David (though he took upon him his nature) was not of a civil, or earthly interest: as was before noted from the tenor of his preaching: and is further evident by his own denying the title, and exercise of a worldly Kingdom to belong unto himself * John 18.36. Luke 12.14. . And this, our Divines insist on, denying there was any civil dominion residing in him; in answer to the Pope's advocates; who for the maintaining of a temporal power in their Pope, allege there was a civil title to the K●ngdome of Judea in Christ: but this ours impugn † Vide Mont. Apparat 2. sect. 47. pag. 9 Chamier Tom. 2. lib. 15. cap. 4. Sect. 7, etc. & cap. 16. sect. 3, 4.10. 2 Suppose any right had accrued to him to the temporal Kingdom, yet this could not remain as a b●t unto the Roman, in as much as he waved, and receded from it: voluntarily taking upon him a sta●e of poverty, and servitude, and shunning the offers of the Kingdom * joh 6.15, 12 36. compared with vers. 18, 19 . Which he doing, either we must say, that he assigned his title to some other certain person, or persons whereby all other were excluded from it: CHAP. X. SECT. II. Subsect. 2. or that he so declined the use of it himself, as that none other might assume it though by the jews agreement, but that they were necessarily, and of duty to be thenceforth headless, or without civil government; either of which there is no ground to affirm. Subsection 2 Of Christ's paying tribute, Matth. 17. HAving thus disproved the imputation of usurpation to the Roman Government over Judea, upon which the strength of this second Objection lies; I have yet something to say to the other part of the argument, the particulars brought to confirm the Romans power to have been of God, and the ordinance of God, although in truth, the matter thus confirmed, is not by me denied. 1. Christ himself paid tribute, Matth. 17.14. 1 It is a question much agitated for whom that tribute was gathered; whether by Caesar's Tribute-gatherers for his use; or by the officers of the Temple for its service. There are very learned men for each of these ways. That it was for Caesar say those two great Antiquaries, Montacut. Orig. Eccles. part post pag. 196. Selden de jure Nat lib. 6. c. 18. Baronius ad An. 33. Num. 31. Casaub●n Exe●cit. 15. Sect. 19 Cameron Myroth in Matth. 27.24. Weems Expos. of judic. Law. pag. 51. Dr. Hammond Annot. on Mat. 17 24. Selden ut supra. Bishop Montague, and Mr. Selden. That it was not at all for him, but for the Temple, is the resolution of Baronius, Cameron, Casaubon, Mr. Weems, and Dr. Hammond: besides those whom Mr. Selden citeth in his dispute upon it, to wit, Hillary, Beza, Hottaman, Villalpandus, and Lipsius. 2 That payment was made by our Saviour with such cau●ion (explaining the consideration upon which it was done, to have been, CHAP. X SECT. I. Subsect. 3. not any strict right acknowledged to be in the thing, as from him, but to avoid offence in an act in itself unobliging) as leaveth the title of them that claimed it (supposing it was for Caesar) unstated as to civil dominion over the place, or as it would have been if such a thing never had been moved to, or performed by Christ. Subsection 3. Of Christ's commanding tribute-paying to Caesar. 2 CHrists answer to the Question concerning the jews payment of tribute to Caesar, was, Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, Matth. 22.21. 1. Some are of opinion that the words of Christ do not bear a command in them of that payment to that Emperor of Rome, but a general precept only, that, whereas the matter in question was a payment by the Law of God due to the service of the Temple, but were now alienated from it by the Roman State * Vide Calvin in Matth. 22.15. Dioda●e in vers. 17. Dietericus in Evang. Tom. 2. pag. 601. ; and the Pharisees, and Herodians came in seditiously, and captiously upon our Saviour with this question, on purpose to render him by his positive answer to it, obnoxious, either to the Roman State, if he should deny † See Luke 20.20, 26. with cap. 23, 2 ; or to the jews, as an enemy to their Religion, and freedom, if he should grant it: Our Saviour Christ, being well ware of their conspiracy, and that he might both solve their question, and evade their snare, frames his answer by way of a general rule, of giving to God, and to Caesar, each their own, without defining, what this in any particular in relation to either of them was, or which of them had the right to the payment in question * For this interpretation see Marlor. in loc. Tostat. in loc. q. 104. Selden de jure Nat. lib. 6. c. 17. pag. 756. . And if it be granted that the tribute was usurped indeed from the service of the Temple to Caesar's secular use, this (me thinks) appears the most probable Exposition: and the Text seems to incline to it, making the issue of this answer in them that moved the query to be [Luk. 20.26.] And they could n●t take hold of his words before the people: and they marvailed at his answer, and held their peace. If they had understood in his words an express, and positive declaration (to the hypothesis, or particular case) of an obligation to make that payment to Caesar; why? whence did they wonder? in stead of admiration, and silence, they would have broke out into exultation, as having obtained their end; and they had not been prevented of a hold upon his words before the people, but had that very handle they wished for, in reference to the stirring up an odium in the multitude against him. 2. They that think otherwise, and suppose that our Saviour's speech in these words, accompanied with a demand of a sight of the tribute-money, and an exact taking notice of the image, & superscription upon it to be Caesar's, and with his finger (as it were) pointing at the portraiture, and style of Caesar upon the coin, doth hold forth a precise determination for the payment of the tribute in question unto Caesar; withal do, and must understand this his decision to be given in terms, not expressing the affirmative of the question, but wrapped up in a general reason for it, the giving to Caesar is due to Caesar, which laid down, and an assumption made out, from the inspection of the coin, the engraved name, and figure of the person upon it, with the consideration of the adjunct of it, the Nations act of reception of that coin, and that which by that act was signified, their entertainment of, and submission to the Roman Sovereignty, would make a complete, and concluding argument for the tribute to be paid to Caesar. Now the prosyllogisme, or proof of the assumption of this argument (which is that which makes it bear a particular determination of the case) doth no less expressly assoil the Roman Emperor from usurpation, CHAP. X. SECT. II. Subsect. 4, 5. and assert this title to the jewish dominion by that Nations consent given, than it doth infer their duty of yielding that tribute, and is so a clear dissolving of the objection we are upon * And so it is adjudged to be by Calv. in loc. vers. 18. & 21. by Mr. Selden de jure Nat. lib. 6. cap. 17. pag. 761. 763. 765. and by Doctor Hammond in loc. . Subsection 4. Of Christ's acknowledging pilate's power to be of God. 3 WHereas the Objectors say, Christ acknowledged pilate's power to be of God, john 19.11. This were something indeed for them, if it could be proved, that the Romans power over the jews was usurped. But the evincing of this I think is forestalled above: And I shall only add, as a further testimony of the contrary, the paraphrase of Dr. Hammond upon the words of Christ to Pilate, here cited, which is, All power of the lawful Magistrate is from God: and such I acknowledge thine to be. Subsection 5. Of the Soldiers serving the Roman without the disallowance of John the Baptist, of Christ, or of his Apostles. 4 LAstly, for our Saviour's, his Apostles and John B●ptists, not reprehending their followers that were officers or soldiers of the Romans, for their being so. It may make an argument (though but such a one as is from testimony in matter of fact negatiuè) for the lawfulness of Christians to war, CHAP. X. SECT. III. and to serve, and acknowledge, yea, and to bear civil Magistracy; but this doth not come up to any advantage of the objection: for it neither carryieth in it, or hath added to it any evidence against the Romans title to Judea: neither doth it justify any act but what might have been done if the Romans had been indeed usurpers. SECT. III. The prejudice which the requiring a good title to the making one a power ordained of God may cast upon all Governments (in as much as their beginning is ordinarily either unknown, or known to have been vioolent) objected, and answered. Object. 1. BUt if to the making of one a power of God, ordained of God, there must go, not only possession, or actual rule, but a Divine authorization by a just title, or orderly calling to the place; consequently to the acknowledging, or owning of one, or more to be such a power, there will be necessary a knowledge, or evidence of his, or th●ir just title, or orderly call. But this may suspend, or bring in question the owning of any civil power that is ordinarily to be found, to be of God, as his ordinance, and will make it a very hard matter to avow, or take any to be such. For, 1. It cannot be expected that the common people should be able, nor requisite that they should busy their be●ds, to look into the justness, or legality of their Sovereign's title, entry, or tenure of his power, or should be perfectly acquainted with the ancient Laws, or Histories, yea, or the present transactions which concern the disposal of Crowns, and Sceptres. 2. Divers governments are of a succession, or descent so ancient, that their first root, or rise cannot at all, or can but dubiously be discovered, or determined by the learnedst Antiquaries. Besides the certainty of the do of former ages will be still (in regard of the imperfection, and partiality of Authors of story) dubitable. Yea, the truth, equity, and reason of what is but emergent, and acted in our own time is often in State-affairs of a dark, and intricate appearance. 3. Most, or many governments that now are in being, are by Histories tainted with violence, or other indirect means of getting up at their first erection, and yet they are accounted, and pass for powers truly authorized, and to be of God as his Ordinance. Answ. This objection raiseth difficulties of some show, but little strength. It is in this respect in the holding of Thrones, and public authority, as it is in private possessions, and patrimonies. There are few, or none holder's of lands; or hereditaments that can make out an original title to them. The usual titles by which the present owners of them do stand upon (descent, purchase, or gift) are but derivative; they do not as such properly bottom a title, but convey, or transfer it. They cannot create a right, or constitute a thing just; only they transfer or convey the same title, which the Ancestor, seller, or donor had; the which, what it was in itself in point of justice is, notwithstanding the conveyance, or change of the person possessing, still questionable; and is to be determined by some other way. And the ways of stating the justness of private p ss ssions, whether movable, or , especially if of any durable, and ancient tenor seem to be altogether under as great obscurities, intricacies, and dispu●ablenesse, as are those by the objection attributed to public places; yea, to some more obscurity, in as much as the original seizures of these have not the memorials, and recognitions taken of them which the public have. But though this be generally the state, and account which can be given of men's titles to their possessions now adays, and so hath been of others before, time out of mind; yet no man scruples his ancient patrimony, or his late purchase, or grant upon this score: and, on the other side, neither may therefore any say, there is no such thing as honesty, or justice in the concernment of a man's tenure; actual possession, or occupancy is enough; nothing is to be regarded as requisite to one's becoming, or discovering the true owner of an estate, or goods, but present possession. No, this would make mad work both in the consciences, and in the deal of men. But notwithstanding all the darkness that is upon the original of titles, and all the inevidence, or disputeableness of subsequent contracts, or conveyances, every man is bound to see to his just, and righteous holding of his estate, and goods; Micah 2.1. and, woe to them that practise iniquity, because it is in the power of their hand. Tell me then how you will extricate an honest-meaning conscience from the pinch of the obligation to equity on the one hand, and the obscurity of the matter of fact on the other, in the case of a private possession: and this will facilitate the clearing of most that is in the objection. Thus the case (as I take it) is commonly to be resolved. It was a true Maxim, Quod non disprobatur, praesumitur. Where no wrong appears, we may ordinarily take it to be right. And again, In re dubiâ potior est conditio possidentis. Continued possession is a title, when it cannot be evicted, or where the beginning is unc●rtain. There is security enough in holding that which comes to my hand, and continueth in it without detection of injury. If a possession have run in a right current as fare as the notice of him whose conscience is concerned in it can reach, there is usually a satisfactory, or acquiescive title: and he that hath a thing so is called bona fidei possessor, an honest owner. The truth is, that which the Civilians call Vsucapio, or praescriptio, to wit, an immemor● l usage, or an occupancy good as fare as humane knowledge in looking back can go, stands up in stead ●f an original title, where that is out of ken. Not because such a possession may ever be positively concluded to have been originally right, but because nothing to the contrary doth appear, and therefore reason dictates, if any thing, this must pass for right. It being to be supposed that the thing possessed either hath come down from the first Proprietor to this hand by a clear transmission, or if any diversion hath been (unwitting to this occupant) the right owner letting it pass so long unclaimed, hath laid aside his title, and given his consent to that alienation of it. And thus I conceive the aforesaid uncertainties which are usually attendant upon the discovery of the positive ground, or rise of civil right, whether public, or private, are ordinarily avoidable; so as, on the one hand they shall not impose any real cause of perplexity to the conscience; on the other, they may not be drawn to patronise the neglect, or overthrow of justice, or order in present transactions, or to shelter what is manifestly, and evincibly wrong. The error of an act, or possession which lies hid, and buried in ignorance, or oblivion, Casuists, with one consent, absolve, as being involuntary, and therefore inculpable. Concerning this I shall only relate the resolution of a Casuist of our own, and well approved; and the rather because his words touch the special matter we are upon, as to the objection. It is Amesius * Si quis rem aliquam suam esse bonâ fide judicet, cum sit aliena, conscienti â dictante, potest, ac debet eâdem uti ut suâ. Si quis bonâ fide eum judicet esse suum Magistratum qui est Tyrannus, vel eum esse legitimum magistratum qui titulum illum falso sibi vendicat, obedientiam deb●tam tenetur ipsi praestare. Ames. de consc. lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 7. Vide etiam Grot. de jure Bel. lib 2. cap. 4. sect. 5, etc. . CHAP. X. SECT. iv If a man without collusion, or in simplicity of heart, judge a thing to be his own, when it is not, upon the dictate of his conscience he may, and aught to enjoy it as his own. If a man, in the same manner, judge one to be his Sovereign who is a Tyrant, or him to be the lawful Magistrate, who falsely claims that title to himself, he is bound to yield him due obedience. To the last branch of the objection, the tainture of most ancient Governments by history, with violence at their first erection, and yet that they may well now be accounted the ordinance of God, I have returned answer sufficient above * Chap. 5. sect. 4. subsect. 6. in Answer to objection the last. , and shall therefore, to spare my Reader, forbear repetition here. SECT. iv The examples of the Jews submitting to the Babylonian, Persian, and Grecian Kings, and of the Christians to others, and the command the Jews had of submitting to the Babylonian, objected, and answered. Objection 4. BUt have we not going before us the examples of the people of God, the Jews submitting themselves to the Babylonian first, then to the Persian, then to the Grecian powers? this appears in the Prophecies of jeremiah, and Ezekiel, and in the histories of Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, and the Maccabees. And were not these usurpers over them? As also the ancient Christians, when there were at sund●y times those that by no better ways than murder, force, and bribery ascended to the Roman Empire, ●hey yielded obedience to such. Yea, CHAP. X. SECT. iv Subsect. 1. we find s●verall commands, and exhortations which the Jews & with them also other neighbouring Nations had from God for submission to the Babylonian Monarch. And do not these Instances imply the present possessor to be the power? Subsection 1. Of the examples of the Jews, and Christians submission to these (supposed) usurpers over them. Answer. THis objection must be answered by pa●ts. 1. For the examples of the Jews submitting to those Kings of Babylon, Persia, and Grease, which the Histories mention, and of the Christians so doing to certain violent intruders into the Roman imperial dignity. 1 Some submission may be yielded and necessary to the present possessor, when he is not the power of God, ordained of God, yea, and when another is that power: of which divers precedents have been before given out of Scripture * Chap. 7. Sect. 2. Subsect. 5. & 8. . As there may be actual rule without authority, so there may be actual subjection, and no allegiance. But this submission is of another nature, different from that which is proper, and peculiar to divinely constituted powers. Of which difference somewhat ere I conclude. 2 That the Jews were Subjects by League, and dedition to the Babylonian, Persian, Grecian, and Roman Empires successively, was above testified by Mr. Selden, and others in answer to the second objection. And if so, than they were subject to them of right, as to their Magistrates, authorized by God. And whereas some have objected that rule of Deut. 17.14, 15. enjoining the Israelites to set to be King over them one of their brethren, and not a stranger. To hinder the justness of their title, or to illegitimate the said submission of the Jews to those Rulers. 1 If it did so, then is not that their submission to be urged as presidential to others, or as a proof, that those they submitted to were powers over them of Gods ordaining. 2 But I take that of Moses to be no disallowance of the Jews owning the Babylonian, etc. 1 That rule in Moses seems to point at no other time but their first establishment, or erection of their Kingdom. 2 It respecteth them only in the condition of the free possession of their own Land. 3 For their submission to the Babylonian, the Scriptures referred to in the objection, expressly deliver a command from God, the which (if that of Moses were still, and in that condition binding) was a Supersedeas to what was before given. 3 No particular instances are brought when, or who were the Christians that subjected, or, to whom, or who the Emperors that usurped; if any be to be given, either the like answer as is now made to those of the Jews may suffice, or a further may be to be rendered. But somewhat of the Christians carriage to some of the Roman usurpers will be said anon. Subsection 2. CHAP. X. SECT. iv Subsect. 2. Of the commands the Jews had of submitting to the Babylonian. 2 FOr the commands, and exhortations which the Jews had to yield to Nabuchadnezzar. 1. Those commands, Jer. 27.1. to the 18.28. 14, 16.38.17, etc. 21.8, 9 seem not to have been delivered until after the King, and people of Judah had first of their own accord, yielded up themselves to Nabuchadnezzar. Compare the said passages which reduce themselves within Zedekiah's reign, with 2 King. 24.1. Jer. 37.2. Ezek. 17.13, etc. 2. If those commands be extended to others besides to whom they were then personally given, they do directly contradict that which they are brought to prove, viz. That a present possessor is to be submitted to, as God's power, and ordinance. For when these commands were directed out, who was the present possessor of rule over the Jews? not Nabuchadnezzar, for Zedekiah, and his people had rebelled against him after they had sworn allegiance to him * King. 24.20. 2 Chron. 36.13. Jer. 52.3. Ezek. 17.13, 14, 15. : and Zed●kiah was now in fact the supreme Governor: yet are these commands given, and urged again and again by the Prophet from the Lord, both to Zedekiah to subject himself, and to the Priests, and people (in case Zedekiah would not) to surrender themselves to Nabuchadnezzar: For which he is therefore complained of to Zedekiah as an author of defection * Jer. 38.4. . These commands have been much of late alleged, but they make little for the allegers purpose: they holding forth one as proprietor of Dominion, to wit, Nabuchadnezzar, another as possessor, Zedekiah, and enjoining the jews to desert the possessor, and yield themselves to the proprietor, than out of possession. 2. For that command, Jer. 29.7. 1. The matter commanded is no more, but that the Jews, captives in the City of Babylon, should seek the public peace of that City, and pray unto the Lord for it. Which may be a duty ordinarily incumbent on the people of God in relation to any City, or Territory, whether themselves reside within, and be actually under the government of it, or not; and upon whatsoever terms the government thereof might stand; according to the Apostles rule * 2 Tim. 2.1. . But observe, the interest of the present government is not put into into that command, nominately; nor otherwise employed then as it might conduce to the City's peace; neither is the said interest employed to be necessary to the said public peace. 2 Such as that precept is, it is apparent to have been but of a temporary nature, and given upon a special occasion of their being captives in that City, and of their being declared to be sure so to be, and there to serve the Kings of Babylon until the end of seventy years, and it being declared they were sent from Judea thither by God for the better place, and their own peace to be bound up in that of Babylon † See this Text itself, and Jer. 24.5, etc. 25.11.21.8, 9.38.2, 17, etc. . For after the term of that captivity exp●●ed, they are called out thence again, and are taught the contrary carriage towards towards that City, to wit, not only to departed out of, but to pray against it, use imprecations upon it, and exultations in its ruin * Jer. 50.8, 28.51.35. Psal. 137.8, 9 . 3. It is in like manner to be said of all those forementioned commands of God to the Jews, and to the other Nations, for their submission to Nabuchadnezzar, that they were of an extraordinary, and peculiar nature, and not binding to others in like condition. They were such special Declarations of Gods will, and disposal as do not impose upon any but hose unto whom they were particularly made. I may leave it to the determination of any considerate man, whether if now the Turk, Tartar, Chinaois, or any other Mahometan, o● Pagan Prince, yea, or any one of the Princes of Europe, of a warlike spirit, and growing more potent in Arms then the rest, should discover his designs, make preparations, and give out threaten for the conquest of the Nations about (as then did Nebuchadn●zzar in reference to the Kingdoms of Palestina, and others) were the said Princes and States of Europe bound to surrender themselves as servants, or tributaries to him, and his posterity (either for the definite space of 70 years, or for the always of his, or their standing up) under pain of destruction from God, if they should not, by virtue of that which God declareth to the Kings, and people of Judah, and other Nations concerning Nabuchadnezzar by the Prophet Jeremiah * Jer. 27. per totum. . Or, if a Kingdom be invaded by a foreign Potentate, and the chief City, and strength of it be by him besieged, is the supreme Commander, or the people without him, necessarily bound to yield to their Invader, and besieger, because of what is declared, and denounced to Zedekiah, and them of Jerusalem † Jer. 21.8, 9.38.17, etc. ? Or let the urgers of these instances themselves be judges, whether, because Zedekiah with his people having been (formerly) the subjects of Nabuchadnezzar, and sworn to him, and lately revolted from him, and now summoned by him to redeliver themselves up to him; and they being reproved by the Prophets, Jeremiah, and Ez●kiel, for their revolt, and called upon for the said rendition, were thereupon obliged to submit to Nabuchadnezzar: therefore in like manner others that have been under the like obligations to a Prince, and have cast him off, are in conscience bound upon summons to render themselves to him by force of those Texts. CHAP. X. SECT. V SECT. V The Objection, from the supposed goodness which may be in the administration of a mere possessory power, answered. Object. 5. But though the ingress, the possession of a power be evil, yet the acts, and effects of that power, viz. The laws, judicial proceed, administrations, counsels, and designs thereof may be good. Answ. 1. What good of profit may be expected from such a power, hath been discoursed of above. 2 A government that is unlawful as to possession, cannot but be unlawful, and injurious as to exercise and action: The act cannot be good, if the principle be bad. A government for constitution good may for the acts it puts forth be bad; but a government for constitution bad, cannot for the acts it puts forth be good. The act which such a power puts forth may be good for matter, or in specie, or in the universal nature of it abstract from its circumstances, but it's bad in individuo, or as done by him. The act may be good i e. profitable to the person to whom it's done, but it's not good morally, or politically, it's still evil to the agent. It may be good to him too comparatively, that is, it's better, if he will govern, to exercise his power, to act what is materially and to others good, than what is per se, vicious, and to others pernicious * Vide Cajetan Summul. Tit. Remp. Tyrant. Et Navarri Compendium Tit. Tyrant. , but it's not good to him absolutely, and in itself, for it were simply his duty, if a just title will not be made out to him, to desist. To make a political action good, to wit, just, and legal, there must go, 1. The warrantableness of the matter done. 2. A warrantable calling of the person to do it. The former may be, and often is in the actions of men without the latter; by which means it comes to pass those actions are sinful: yea, and often, or for the most part, are more baneful than beneficial to others. The note of Sculietus, upon that saying of our Savour, Thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness, Decet nos implere omnem justitiam, h. e. decet me implere meam justitiam, & te implere tuam justitiam. Intelligit autem justitiam particularem, i. e. operas ministerii uniuscujusque: quemadmodum Plato justitiam hanc definivit, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Justitia est facere quae sui sunt muneris, & non curiosum esse in all enis negotiis. Scul●et. Delic. Evang. cap. 28. pag. 107. See also this point well discoursed in Mr. Symonds his Case, and Cu●e, etc. cap. 23. pag. 279. Vide etiam Aquinat. 22 ae. qu. 60. artic. 2. may be here pertinently remembered. We must understand this distributively, that is, it becomes me to fulfil mine, thee to fulfil thy righteousness. He means of praticular justice, that is, the deed of every one's place respectively: even as Plato hath defined this justice to be, every man's doing his own, and not meddling with another's office. 3. This allegation may be an inducement to the Subject to bear, and improve to the best what he cannot remedy: but it breeds no obligation on him to take such a Ruler to be a power ordained of God: neither gives him a warrant of engaging to the said Ruler as such, in all ties, and duties referring to a Magistrate. CHAP. X. SECT. VI SECT. VI Of the say of some Protestant Authors, interpreting this Text not only to require obedience to present Rulers, what ever their title be, but to justify their being ordained of God. Object. 6. But some of our Protestant Divines of chief note commenting upon this Text, have given their s●nse to be: That obedience in lawful things is to be yielded to the present Rulers without respecting by what right, or wrong they have gotten into power: and that who ever is in actual rule is the power of God, ordained of God, and that it appears he is so by his seizure, or possession. Answer. Here are two positions delivered as the judgement of such Authors. 1. For the former, viz. That obedience is (as lawful, and in many cases necessary) to be yielded, in lawful things to a possessory power: (for which are cited Peter Martyr, and Gualther in loc) I have no dispuse against it. It may be a position allowable in itself, though not built upon this Text, unto which I conceive it foreign. There are other grounds, besides God's ordination of the powers that are, and the supposal of a real Magistracy in him that governeth, upon which to found, and warrant such an obedience. 2. For the latter (that, whoever s in actual rule is the power of God, ordained of God, and is manifested so to be by such his command) though i● may seem to have the judgement, and a thority of Bu●er, Calvin, and Pareus, as they are alleged for it, and perhaps of some others, yet it is not the ●●ore to pass. But I shall for reverence sake to those Divines recite their words: and offer that which is (I think) sufficient to take off the strength which this argument would borrow from their authority. Buc●rs word● are. When therefore it is questioned whom thou must obey, thou must not look what a one he is that exerciseth power, nor by what right or wrong any hath entered into the power, nor how h● doth use it, but only whether he have power: F●r if any be possessed of power, it is without doubt he hath received that power from God * Quum igitur quaeritur cui parendum, non est spectandum qualis sit qui potestatem exercet, nec quo jure, vel injuria quis potestatem invaserit, quauè ratione eam administret; sed tantum si potestatem habeat. Si enim quis potestate pollet, jam indubitatum est illum a deo eam potestatem accepisse. Bucer in loc. . Calvin saith, Whereas men often inquire, by what right they have obtained their power, who have the rule; It should be enough to us that are in Rule. For they have nor ascended to this height by their own power, but are imposed by the hand of ●he Lord † Saepe solent inquirere quo jure adeptifuerint potestatem qui rerum potiuntur: Satis autem nobis esse debet quòd praesunt, non enim conscenderunt sua ipsi virtute in hoc fastigium, sed manu Domini sunt impositi. Calv. in loc. . Pareus hath it thus He that hath shed man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; but not by any man, for the prohibition is, thou shalt not kill: but by a Magistrate ordained of God. Neither matters it by what means or arts, Nim●od, Jerob●am, or others have gotten them Kingdoms. For the power which is of God is one thing, the acquisition, and use of the power is another * Qui sanguinem hominis fuderit ejus sanguis etiam fundetur ab homines: non utique à quovis, prohibuit etenim, non occides; sed a Magistratu divinitus ordinato. Nec refert quibus modis, vel artibus Nimrod, Jeroboam, vel alii regna sibi paraverint: nam aliud est potestas quae a Deo est, aliud acquisitio, & usus potestatis. Paraeus in loc. . I shall not controvert the sense of these sentences, or inquire whether they will bear aequivalence with the position. Neither will I take upon me to comment upon these Commentators, but having bestowed so much labour upon the Text itself, which is both their, and my subject, I shall leave the Reader to judge of what is said by either, as he shall find reason. Only somewhat to the weight of their authority. 1. The opinion, or averment of man (of the best for learning and piety) in a case of conscience, or in an enquiry what is the sense of such a Scripture, or such a divine precept, is not an oracle, neither will it pass for such in any controversy. The truth is, we are very prone to attribute some authority to it, and urge it upon others, so far as we find it concurrent with our own persuasion. But who is he that will be pre-judged, or concluded by it contrary to the opinion he hath received, or in what he is otherwlse doubtful? when we look upon it with an impartial eye, that is, in the case wherein we are not prepossessed, it bears no other value with us then what is allayed with the imperfections of fallibility in itself, and variableness from itself, and moreover is ordinarily contradicted by other humane testimony or sentence, as considerable. 2. This position, asserting the power that occupyeth his place by unjust acquisition, and tenure to be ordained of God, understanding by God's ordination his institutive, or preceptive will, Bucer stands charged for it by Pererius, and other Expositors of the best note of that party, as making God the author of Sin * See Dr. Willet in loc quest. 5. and Mr. Prin his third part of the Supreme Power, etc. pag. 114. . The assoiling the position of that charge I leave to them that may concur with him in it. 3. This argument from humane authority (though of such persons) in this case can signify little, being far from universal, or having the general, yea, or (as far as I have observed) the common, or the major vote of such Authors. For the satisfaction of those that may lay great weight on the judgement of those above cited, or may suspect my sense of singularity; I shall here set down the sentences of other Authors (in greater store, and of special esteem) who gainsay that which is said by Calvin, Bucer, and Pareus. In bringing in my Authors I shall reduce them to two heads. 1 Those that speak particularly to this Text. 2 Those that speak to the thing without reference to it. 1 Those that speak to the Text, denying it to include every possessory power, and limiting it to the lawfully entitled. I begin with chrysostom, Chrysostom. in loc. who commenting upon the Text, hath these words. What sayest thou? is therefore every Prince made of God? this, saith he, I say not; for I do not speak of this, or that Prince, but of the thing itself.— Wherefore he saith not, The Prince is not but of God, but discourseth of the thing itself, saying, the power is not but of God. My next is, Theophylact Theophylact. in loc. upon the Text, who repeating the words of Ch●ysostome, saith further, He speaks of the Prince's office, not of the Prince: as when a wise man shall say, a wise is joined to her husband of God, he doth not say, that what man soever lieth with a wife, hath her for his wife of God, but God hath joined her to him that is married. Next I shall bring out of the harmony of the confessions of the Christian, and reformed Churches, Harmony of Confess. in English, Sect. 19 pag. 588. 592, 593. the confessions of the Protestant Princes, and States of Germany, viz. Those of Auspurge, and Saxony That of Saxony saith: Although there be many horrible confusions, which grow from the Devil, and the madness of men, yet the lawful government, and society of men is ordained of God. As it is said, Rom. 13. That of Auspurge hath it thus. Such civil ordinances as be lawful are the good works and ordinances of God, as Paul witnesseth, The powers that be are ordained of God. God's wisdom is declared by order, which is in the discerning of virtues, and vices, and in the society of mankind under lawful government. To these I shall adjoin these Protestant Writers Musculus upon the Text. It is to be noted, he doth not say, the●e is not a Prince, or King who is not of God, but their power is not but of God. For he speaks not of the abuse of power, and the tyranny which many Prince's exercise, nor that of those who by force break into powers, but of the power itself divinely ordained. Although every power be of God, Notandum quod non dicit, non est princeps, vel Rex qui non sit a Deo, sed non est potestas nisi a deo; non enim loquitur de abusu potestatis, ac tyrannide quam plerique exercent, neque de iis qui vi i●rumpunt in potestates, sed de ipsa potestate divinitus ordinata.— Licet omnis potestas a Deo sit, non tamen mox omnis princeps est a Deo. Scriptum est de quibusdam, ipsi regna verunt, & non est a me. Musculus in loc. Officium subditorum erga Magistratus est obedientia, ut illi, si legitimus est, omnes pareant. Rom. 13.1. Nulla potestas, etc. Becanus loc. 49. qu. 13. pag. 853. yet every Prince is not presently of God. It is written of some, They ●ave reigned, and it is not of me. Becanus. The duty of Subjects towards the Magistrate is obedience, that, if he be a lawful Magistrate, they all obey him. Rom. 13.1. There is no power but of God. Dr. Mayer upon the place. He moveth the question, whether the subjection of the Text be due to any power once up, either by right, or wrong? His answer is, The conscience is not bound to usurpers, but they may be removed again; as Jehoiada removed Athaliah, and set up the right King. A King by birth, by election, or by law of Arms through conquest is to be served, though he be wicked, and tyrannical, as being given in God's anger, for punishment; but a Usurper may be resisted, and deposed again. Dr. Hammond upon the place, in his paraphrase, interpreteth it of obedience to the supreme powers rightly established, and constituted. And that every person under government of what rank soever he be, is to yield subjection to the supreme Governor legally placed in that Kingdom. And elsewhere he saith, obedience to Superiors is extended indefinitely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to the most heathen, provoking, oppressing (as long as th●y be lawful) powers. And again. By the words, he beareth not the Sword in vain, etc. is intimated, that the sword for vengeance, etc. is put into the hands of the lawful Magistrate, with commission to use it as the constitution of the Kingdom shall best direct. The Author of the fuller Answer to Dr. Ferne. Fuller Answer etc. pag. 17, 18. Mr. Prin his 3d part of the Sovereign power, etc. pag. 104. The powers that be (i. e.) so, or so established by consent of man, are ordained of God to be obeyed, or it's God's ordinance that men should live under some government, and submit, without resistance to that kind of Government they have by consent established.— That other kind of tyranny (viz. of usurpation) it hath no right, no ordination at all, and so no subjection due to it.— There is in every ordained power, as well God's institution of it, & injunction of obedience to it, as man's constitution of it. Mr. Prinne saith, The whole scope of this Text in sum is only this, that Christians ought in conscience to be subject to all lawful higher powers, etc. and not resist them in the execution of their just authority. Mr. Burroughs. Mr. Burroughs on Hos. Chap. 1. Lect. 6. pag. 157. & Lect. 4. pag. 111. & Lect. 3. pag 65. You must observe, that every one is subject to the higher powers. Mark, it is not to man first, but it is to the power. Let every soul be subject to the higher power, wherever this power lieth. It is not to the will of man that hath power, but it is to the power of that man. Now the power, the authority is that that a man hath in a legal way. He elsewhere tells us, There is no authority we are subject to now, but according to the Laws and Constitutions of the Country where we live. When things are brought into a Law, and be according to the agreements, and covenants of the place, and Country wherein we live, etc. then the power of God is in it, though it be abused (viz. by an ill law made) and we are to be subject to all powers. When it once comes to be a power, to be a Law, it is authority, though abused, and we must ye●ld obedience to it, either actively, or passively. But we must inquire whether it be a power. To these Authors may be added those others whom I cited before, who hold the resistance forbidden to be made against the power of God, Vers. 2. to be lawful against an un-entitled, or usurping power: to whom as they are before quoted * Chap 8 sect. 4. , I refer my Reader. And unto all these I may superadd the judgement of divers Commentators of the Popish party, yet of best note of that sort among us. Estius I shall recite. An usurped power, Potestas usurpata, cujusmodi est latronum & tirannorum, non est absolute potestas nec superioritas, sicut leges inutiles & mala, non sunt leges, Estius in loc. such as is that of Tyrants, and Robbers, is not a power absolutely, neither a superiority. As unprofitable, and evil Laws are no Laws. Dominicus, Soto, Cajetan, and Pererius I omit to cite in their words. They may be found in Mr. Prinn, and Dr. Willet. 2. And for those that speak to the thing (though not referring to this Text expressly) to wit, the nullity of a mere possessory power, or his no authority, I will for brevity's sake but name my Authors, who fully enough speak it, whom my Reader may peruse, or pretermit as he pleaseth. Mr. Prin his third part of the Sovereign Power, etc. p. 114. Dr. Willet in loc. qu. 2. 1 That a Usurper hath no authority in him, is a mere private person, see Alsted. Theolog. Cas. cap. 17. Reg. 8. pag. 34. Grot. de Jure B. lib. 1. cap. 4. Sect 11. Arnisaeus de Author. principis. cap. 4. sect. 12. pag. 124. 2 That no obedience is due to an un-entitled, or illegal power. Aquinas 22a. qu. 104. artic. 6. ad 3. Burrougheses on Hosea, Cap. 1. Lect. 4. p. 111. and Lect. 3. pag. 65. Vindication of Treatise of Monarchy. Cap. 3. Sect. 6. 3 That the Sword is peculiar to a Magistrate lawfully called. Becanus Instit. Theol. loc. 49. qu. 16. pag. 854. 4 That to the being of a Magistrate is required a lawful call. See those quoted before in this Treatise. Cap. 1. Sect. 2. Subsect. 3. 5 That to the making of a supreme Magistrate is to go to the vote, or consent of the people. Take those cited, Cap. 5. Sect. 4 Subsect. 4. To which I will here put in Mr. John Goodwin (as swaying much with some) In his Obstruct. of Justice. Sect. 25. pag. 27. SECT. VII. CHAP. X. SECT. VII. Many examples given of persons of good account, who have disowned, or opposed mere possessory powers in such Recognitions, or rights as are due to the powers that are ordained of God. 7 IN the next place, is asked, But can any instances be given of any of the people of God, or of such persons whose examples are of any commendable, or imitable note, who at any time have professedly detrected, or denied to those in actual dominion any duty, or acknowledgement due unto Magistrates; or that have practised the contrary to what this, or any other Text confessedly delivers to be observed in relation to those who are here entitled to be the powers ordained of God? Answ. A multitude (doubtless) of such examples there have been, as may be evident by the no small number of remarkable instances of this kind, which my short observation, and memory hath here recollected. 1. Of such as have practised the contrary to what is a plain, and confessed duty, or rule to be observed towards those who are the powers ordained of God. 1 And first examples of such as being under the present predominancy of mere possessory powers, and being private persons have either deserted such, and gone over to their opposites, or remaining under them have acted, or assisted against them. We find a large list of Captains, and their men of several Tribes of Israel, who being actually seated under the Dominion of the house of Saul, fell from it, and turned to David, both during the Reign of Ishbosheth, and upon his death, although there were then many heirs left of saul's line. See for this 1 Chron. 12.22. unto v. 39 We read of Hushai the Archite, of Zadok, and Abiathar the Priests, and of their two sons, Ahimaaz, and Jonathan, who after David's flight out of Jerusalem, and the main of the Kingdom both in respect of places, and people, seized by Absalon, and themselves being fully under the territory and command of Absalon, yet acted for David in his state of ejection, and against Absalon. 2 Sam. 15.32. to the end, 16.16, 17, 18, 19.17.6. to the 23. verse. When the men of Israel in distinction from Judah generally had cast off David, and followed Sheba the son of Bichri (upon that variance which fell out betwixt the Judabites, and the Israelites about David's return to his Kingdom, and in his way betwixt Jordan, and Jerusalem) the wise woman of Abel, and after the people in that City by her persuasion (though they were of those that had deserted David) and set up Sheba, and though he then had the supreme command there) consulted, and executed a rendition of themselves, and City to David, and the destruction of Sheba upon Joabs' pacificatory offer to them. 2 Sam. 20.1, 2.14, 16, etc. Upon Jeroboams usurpation, and the ten Tribes revolt from the Kingdom of the house of David the Priests, and Levites that were in all Israel, and other people out of all the Tribes of Israel which adhered to the true God, and his worship upheld in the Kingdom of Judah, forsook Jeroboam, and his Dominions, and joined themselves to Rehoboam, and so strengthened the Kingdom of Judah, and R●hoboam in it, 2 Chr. 11.13, 16, 17. In like m●nner did multitudes out of Israel fall from Baasha King of Israel unto Asa King of Judah. Although Baasha was an enemy to the Kingdom of Judah, and to that their revolt, and endeavoured by force to prevent it, 2 Chron. 15.9. 1 King. 15.17. To this I shall add, that the Prophet Jeremiah exhorts the people of Judah from God to relinquish Zedekiah, the present supreme Governor over them, and to yield up themselves to Nabuchadnezzar King of Babylon, Jer. 27.16, etc. 21.8, 9 And the ground of that appears to be, 1. Zedekiah, and his Kingdom had lately been subject, and tributary to the Babylonian, Ezek. 27. ●. to 16. and Zedekiah's, and their present standing up against him, by their own force of Arms, and the assistance of the Egyptian was but rebellion. Ez●k 17.6. 2 Kings 24.28. 2 The Lord had given unto the Babylonian the command of that Territory and people for 70 years by his express order and declaration, Jer. 27.12.28.14, 16. And the said seventy years were ere this (that is in the fourth year of Jehoiakim) begun, according to the computation of our best Chronologers * To wit, Archbishop Usher, Dr. John Reynolds, Hugh Broughton, Mr. Mede, The Divines Annot. and Mr. Light. who all of them begin the 70. years the 4. of Jehoiakim. . And unto these exhortations it's probable some harkened, and those might be they who fell to the Chaldeans, mentioned Jer. 38.19. To these Scripture-instances I shall adjoin one, or two observable ones out of other Histories. Ambrose being Bishop of Milan in Italy, at what time Maximus the Tyrant (of whom before † Chap. 8. sect 4 ) had deprived Valentinian of possession of his Empire of the West, he contested with Maximus about his said act, and that very sharply; and twice went Ambassador to him unto Triers, and pleaded the right of young Valentinian in that Empire against him, the present possessor. And when he could not so prevail, he discommunioned Maximus, to his own mighty peril, for Maximus threatened him with death. Upon which he was forced to to fly to Aquileia: whence he returned not until the said Maximus was repressed, and slain by Theodosius * Proximum ei (sc. Ambrosio) certamen cum Maximo fuit Tyranno; apud quem legarum pro Valentiniano juniore quem ex Galliis Maximus expulerat, bis egit in Urbe Trovirorum. Apud quem cùm acerrimè primum contendisser, ne adolescentem, cui successionis, & haereditatis jure deberetur regnum, imp●rii justa possessione pelleret: deinde communione etiam ei interdixit, non sine ingenti sui periculo: caedem enim ei Maximus minatus est: ob quam Aquileiam Ambros. secedere coactus est: ex quo loco rediit Mediolanum post, cum a Theodosio interfectus Maximus esset. Magdebur. C●nt. 4. cap. 10 pag. 1163. . It is also observed of the same Ambrose, that when that Maximus, to ingratiate himself by an office so just and good, offered to interpose his power in the defence of Ambrose, against Justina the Arrian Empress (the mother of Valentinian whom Maximus dispossessed) she being about to banish him from Milan; Ambrose would not accept of the help of Maximus, whose power he disallowed, and gainsayed * Grot. de jure Belli, lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 5. . Another is of no long distance from our own time. It is that of the Suffolk men, who were zealous confessors of the Gospel, and Protestant faith, and were the first that joined themselves to the Lady Mary, after the death of King Edward the sixth, and the advancement to the Crown of the Lady Jane. The sum of the Story I shall give out of Mr. Fox, and Mr. Speed in their own expressions. King Edward did by his Testament (or Letters Patent, signed with his own hand, and sealed with the great Seal, saith the Letter of the Lords to the Lady Mary) in the presence of the most part of the Nobles, Counsellors, Judges, with divers other grave, and sage Personages, assenting, and subscribing to the same, appoint the Lady Jane to be Inheritrix unto the Crown of England. To this order subscribed all the King's Council, and the chief of the Nobility, the Mayor, and City of London, and almost all the Judges, and chief Lawyers of this Realm. When King Edward was dead, the Lady Jane was established in the Kingdom by the Nobles consent, and was forthwith published Queen by Proclamation at London, and in other Cities where was any great resort, and was there so taken, and named. The Lord Mayor of London, six of the Aldermen, and twelve Commoners Merchants being sent for by the Nobility, take their Oaths for the Lady Jane, and unto her obedience they promise to secure the City. The Lords of the Council write to the Lady Mary (in answer to her Letter, wherein she had required their owning, and proclaiming her as Queen) telling her that the Lady Jane is, after the death of Edward the six●h, invested, and possessed with the just, and right Title in the Imperial Crown of this Realm, etc. The Lady Mary upon this Letter of refusal, speedeth her secretly away far off from the City. The Council, hearing of her sudden departure, gather speedily a power of men, appoint an Army, and ●end forth the Duke of Northumberland with it. Marry in the mean time tossed with much travail up and down, &c, w th-drew herself into the quarters of Norfolk, and Suffolk●, and there gathering to her such aid of the Commons as she might, keepeth herself close for a space in Framingham Castle. To her first of all resorted the Suffolk-men, who being always forward in promoting the proceed of the Gospel, promised her their aid, so that she would not attempt the alteration of the Religion which her brother King Edward had before established, etc. Thus Mary, being guarded by the power of the Gospe lers, did vanquish the Duke, and all those that came against her. The Lords after this proclaimed for Queen the Lady Mary, eldest daughter to King Henry the 8th. and appointed by Parliament to succeed King Edward dying without issue. The brief of this story, as to our present scope, is this. Here we have the Lady Jane in possession of the Crown, by her immediate Predecessors testament by proclamation, and by the consent and actual reception of the Chieftains of the Land, and having the first Military power on foot to uphold her therein. And the Lady Ma●y claiming the Crown by virtue of lineal succ●ssion, the Act of Parliament, and the Testament of King Henry the 8 h, which laid the ground of her title antecedent to (as well as more speciously (to say no more here) then) any thing the other could challenge, or be invested by. And, notwithstanding the said possession of the other, the Suffolk Gospelers are the fi●st comers in to Mary, and undertakers of her assistance, for the vindication of her Title, and the gaining her possession of the Throne: and this before she had any acknowledgement, or reception of the Nobles, or Commons, or other aid appearing for her. 2. Another sort of examples may be of such as being Princes, or communities have cast off, or by Arms repulsed the domination of them who have had present command over them. Scripture examples in this kind I have given before * Chap. 8. Sect. 4. : and shall therefore here but name them. Such are those of Othniel, Ehud, Deborah, and the rest of the Judges, with the Israelites rising up against Chusanrishathaim, Eglon, Jabin, and the other invaders, and captivers of them respectively, of which in the book of Judges. In like manner were the wars of the same people for their liberty against the Philistines, and the Syrian Kings, in the times, and under the conducts of Eli, Samuel, Saul, and David in the stories of both the Books of Samuel, and of the Kings; of the same sort were the recuperative Arms of David, and Jehoiada, against Absalon, Sheba, and Athaliah, in the said Books. As also were the stir of the Kings, and people of Judah from Solomon, unto the time of their Babylonish captivity, against the Kings of Israel, Syria, Assyria, and other encroachers, related in the second Book of Chronicles. And such, lastly, were the conflicts of the Jews under the Asmonean government, against divers of the Selencian Kings Of all these I will make particular narrative but of one, that is, that good King Hezekiah, and of him but shortly thus. 2 King. 18.7. It is said, That he rebelled against the King of Assyria, and served him not. Expositors observe the reason of these words to be, The kingdom was left to Hezekiah by his father Ahaz, in a subjection to Shalmantzar King of Assyria; but he being no way bound to serve at his father did, because he used his liberty, and cast that yoke from him, he is said to rebel. Mr. Lightfoot Divines Annotat. in loc. and Mr. Lightfoot his Harmon. of the old Test. pag 117. observes further, that, not only had Ahaz his father but himself reigned as an Homager to the Assyrian; who subdued, and deposed Ahaz, and set up Hezekiah on the Th●one in his stead: and, that Hezekiah being thus under the Assyrian for a time, he would bear it no longer, etc. A multitude of instances of this sort out of other stories are produceable. Among others, those of the Christian Princes, and Nations, on the Eastern confines of Christendom, who bordering upon the Turkish Sultan, have been by him subdued, and held under; and being in that condition, have at several times attempted, and sometimes prosperously effected a recovery from that subjection. As, for instance, have done sundry Princes of Hungary, of Macedon, and of Greece, and the State of Venice. Amongst them the achievements of George Castriot (surnamed Scanderbag) in his regaining of the Countries of Epirus, and Albania, from which his Father had been oured, and himself was excluded by Amurath the sixth: and of John Huniades, the Vayvod of Transylvania (under the shield of whose valour, and success, the Countries of Moldavia, and Valachia risen up for, and recovered their freedom from the same Turkish Signior) are very notable, and easy to be remembered. 3. There may be under this head another sort of examples given, to wit, of such as have not been under the command, and actual subjectednesse of the mere possessory power, but have assailed, and come in upon him from abroad, upon the quarrel of the disseisure of a just title, and for the reinvesting of it, the cause being either their own, or others, whom they have thought it just, and requisite to assist therein. The instance of Abraham's arming, pursuing, and fight in the rescue of his brother Lot, and the people of Sodom, and Gomorrah, and their goods taken, and carried away by, and remaining wholly in the possession of Chederlaomer, etc. went before: only I shall observe here upon it, that Mr. Calvin (in his Sermons on Gen. 14.13, etc. trans●●●ed out of French into English, page 5, 6, 7, 8.) moving this question, Whether these a●mes of Abraham were lawful, or no, being he was neither King, nor Prince, but dwelled in the Land of Canaan as a stranger? Answers thus. Howbeit here is one thing fi●st to be noted of us: that he had been already constituted, and ordained to be Lord, and Master of this Country: and, although the possession thereof was not yet given him, yet for all tha●, the right and title thereof belonged to him. By which wo●ds, Mr. Call't in pl inly teacheth, that the possession of a Country m●y be in one, the right thereof in another, and that the person in whom the right is, may lawfully war upon the possessor for the recovery of his said right. We had also before the instance of Theodosius the Emperor of the East, his coming in the quarrel of Valentinian, fi●st upon Maximus, who had took the Western Empire, and held it from Valentinian; and, after the suppression of him, upon Eugenius, who had a while after injuriously sensed the same Empire * See before Chap. 8. Sect. 4. . I will here add one more out of Scripture, and a few more out of other Histories. The Scripture instance is this. 2 King. 3.4. M●sha King of Moab rebelling against Jehoram King of Israel, not only doth Jehoram make an invasive War upon him for the recovery of his Dominion over Mo●b, but Jehoshaphat, that good King of Judah, assists him therein in his own pe●son: yea, and Elisha the Prophet was with them in that Expedition; and in their great distress for lack of water enquired of the Lord for them, and from the Lord gave them a promise, and direction for their obtaining, both of water, and of victory in their present War. The examples out of other H●stori s shall be set down but by way of b iefe remembrance. As first, the enterp ize of the Eastern Emperor Co●stantius, his invading, and destroying Magnentius, who had usurped the West by the murder of Constance the Emperor there † S●e Rosse his History, Book 3. chap 1. p. 82. . To this may be annexed the examples of many of the Western, or Italian Christian Emperors, as Honorius, Theodosius Junior, Martian, Leo, and other their Successors, who bring disseised of whole Countries, and Na●ions, by the breaking in of the Go●bes, etc. into Italy, Spain, and Africa, and sometimes of Rome itself, yet they c aimed, after such their dispossession, their right to those Territories, and prosecuted the same by force of Arms, wherein they somewhile prevailed to a recovery * Idem pag. 92, etc. . I shall refer also to the proceed of Elubean the Christian King of the Ethiopians against Dunaan the Jew, the usurper of Nargan a City in Arabia, whom in behalf of the Christian people of that Region Elisb●an invaded, and ●j cted * Vide B●ron. Annal. ad An. Christi 522, & 523. . As also to the several wars undertaken by the Christian Princes of Europe for the recovery of Palistine from the Saracens. Here may be also remembered that when the Anabaptists of Munst r, had dispossessed the Bishop, who was the civil Lord thereof, and taking into their own hands the rule of all, did after some time of their p pular disorder, put themselves under the absolute sovereignty of John Becold; the Protestant Princes of Germany (as the Duke of Saxony, the Landgrave of Hessen, etc.) joined in assistance to the said Bishop (a Papist) against the said pretended King in Munster, and his partakers, for the suppression of them (than the possessory power there) by the Sword, and for the re-investing of the Bishop, as the rightful Lord. And that both they, and the Protestant Divines (as Luther, etc.) condemned, and declared against them, as violaters of the civil order of that place † Jo. Sleiden Comment. lib. 10. pag. 255. . As also that up●n the death of Henry the third of France, when the Kingdom was generally possessed by the Leaguers (the Guisians, the Spanish, and the Pope's party) under the command of the D●ke of Maine, (who with the pretence of the title of the Cardinal of Bou●bon, by him proclaimed King, by the style of Charles the tenth, ruled all, and throwded his own usurpation) Henry King of Navarre, and with him all the Protestant Nobility, and people ●f France stood up for the recovery of that Kingdom out of the hands of those confederates, the possessors, in as much as the Crown of France lineally descended upon the said King of Navarre, and Henry the Third had immediately before his last breath nominated him his lawful Heir, and Successor. And unto his aid in that cause did out Queen Elizabeth send assistance of men, arms, and money * Speeds Hist. in Q. Eliz. Sect. 259. . The taking up of the cause of the Prince Elector, the Count Pa●atine, both the Father, and the Son, by many Protestant Princes, as of England, Swethland, Germany, when they were outed of the Palatinate, and it possessed by the Emperor, and the Bavarian, for their re-investing therein, is well known, and shall be the last example I will mention of this sort. For, besides examples, we have it generally acknowledged, that the recovery of a disseised title to Dominion is a just cause of wa● † Vide August. T●. 4. part 1. quest. 10. super Josua. Grot. de Jur. B. l. 2. c. 1. Sect. 2. If it be objected against the alleging of these examples, that being their acts are the acts of persons who are not in actual subjection to the mere possessory power, but such as assail him ab entra, they come not up to the purpose for which they are brought. I answer, 1. Resistance of that power which is the ordinance of God is in this place (ve●s. 2.) disallowed in all, without restriction (whosoever resisteth the power, &c,) and may therefore be ex●ended to any, as well Foreiners in regard of State-relation, or of residence, as those who are Members of, or residing in the Common wealth so possessed. 2. Though these be residers otherwhere, yet in their attempt, or in the act of their assault of the p ssessing power they enter within the bounds of the Commonwealth he is over; and so, were there indeed a real Magistracy in the actual possessor, they would come within the obligation of subjection to him. For this is certain, whosoever are, upon any account, within a Territory, whether as fixed Inhabitants, or as strangers, whether as friendly guests, or hostile invaders, yea, though they be Sovereign Princes in another Country, yet, being there, they own submission to the lawful power of that Country they enter into; they are subditi there, though not cives. 3 They that are actually under the command of another perforce, and they that assist them are involved in the same act. So that, if the former be bound to the duty of Subjects, than it is unlawful for any, (though Foreiners, yea, though Foreign Princes) to aid them in the violation, or casting off of any such subjection, or the rescue, or restoring of another's right to it. 2. But enough of exemplification in the point of opposition. In the second place I am to produce some examples of such as have professedly disowned, or denied to those that have had no more but their actual domination to claim by, any of the duties of Subjects' belonging to their civil Magistrates. It is a known duty of Subjects to their Sovereigns to stand by them (to their power) in defence of them and their possession of the Dominions, and Territories which they hold, against whosoever would deprive them thereof. Jo. 18.36. Our Saviour's acknowledgement to Pilate was; My kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews. But the contrary to this I find practised in reference to mere possessors. When the Jewish Nation had before the destruction of Jerusalem made a general defection from the Romans, and had under the conduct of their own Leade●s possessed themselves of the Forts and strength of all Judea, and held them against the Romans, and by that means had the ruling power then in that Region, the Christians that were in Jerusalem, deserted the defence of the Jews, and of their City, and cause, and removed out both of Jerusalem, and of Judea: so that Historians observe there was at the time of the last siege by Titus not one good Christian left in the City * Euseb. Hist. Eccles. lib. 3. cap. 4. Epiphanius de mensuris, cap. 15. Joseph. de B●l. Jud lib. 2. cap. 22. etc. Dr. Simson Chron. Cathol. lib. 7. An. Christi 67. pag. 46. Dr. Hammond Annot. on Matth 24 Note G. and on Revel 7. Note G. . Indeed the grand Sectaries among the Christian professors, the Gnostics (as one noteth) † Dr. Hammond on 2 Thes. 2. Note K. sided with, and adhered to the Jews against the Romans in that war, and by that means perished with them. But the Orthodox wholly relinquished them. Yea it is observed, that many of the more advised, and honest sort of the Jewish, both Nation, and Religion among them deserted their Nation's defence against the Romans, yea, and went over to their enemies, and with them took part against the Desendants * Usser. Annal. part. post. pag. 691. 693. and Dr. Simson ut supra. . The Jews that remained after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, made a City called Bitter in Arabia, the chief seat of their Kingdom, and made a Jew one Barcochebas▪ (or Barcochab, or Barcochah, as he is generally styled) their King. Under him they rise up in sedition against Hadrian the Roman Emperor: and over all Judea, and every where else they cast off the Roman government, and slaughter, and destroy whosoever stands against them. To them also join very many other Nations; and for that cause almost all the world are in an uproar. Hadrian sending out his Forces against them, a great, and continued War thereof ariseth. They say this Barchochebas reigned thir●y years, and a half, and that at the last he endured in the siege of Bitter three years and a half against the Romans to their great loss, ere he and his Jews were vanquished That which we chief observe in the story is, that this Barcochebas, being now the possessing and ruling power over Judea, and many other parts, the Christians that were in his precincts refused (notwithstanding) to own, or join with him against the Romans: yea, though for this refusal he slew them with all kind of tortures. Insomuch that Hugo Grotius, and Dr. Hammond t●ke him to be the beast that ascendeth out of the bottomless pit, and maketh war against the two witnesses, and overcometh, and killeth them (Rev. 11.) and answerably the two witnesses to be the Bishops, and Christians of the Jewish, and Gentile Churches which were at this time at Jerusalem. Some say indeed that he moreover gave himself out to be the Messi●h; others, that he pretended to be that Star in Balaams' vision (Num. 24.24.) and true it is that Justin Martyr relateth (who himself was an eye-witness of those Wars, and on that occasion fled the Country) he persecuted the Christians because they would not deny Christ. But his imposture, and enmity to Christianity was not the sole matter in which the Christians deserted him, or upon which he persecuted them. For both Mr. Mede, Dr. Hammond, and Spondanus observe out of Eusebius, that the Christians denied to aid him in his defence against the Romans, whose quarrel against him was about civil dominion; and la● down that their refusal as a distinct cause by itself of his persecuting them * Mr. Mede in Apocalyp. Com. part 1. pa. 43. Dr Hammond in Revel. 11.3, 7. and Note B. etc. M●. Calvert his Jew of Morocco, pag. 220. Mr. Bogan of Threats. p. 372. Spondanus Epitome Baron. Ann. 130. sect. 4 . He being the present actual Ruler over them, his Religion, or his enmity to their Religion was, they were bound to assist him in upholding his civil● possession and authority, if indeed the actual possessor always be (and consequently, he by virtue of present possession than was) the power of God, ordained of God. The then Roman Emperor, and State were no less distant in Religion, no nor enemies to the Christian then were Barcochebas, and his Jews. For under this Hadrian some reckon the continuation of the third, others begin the fourth of the ten persecutions † See Mr. Fox Acts. Vol. 1. Prideaux of Hist. pag. 199. Mr. Clarks Martyrol. p. 36. . The reason then of the Christians refusal of the Jews assistance against the Romans c●n be deemed no other than the civil right of the Roman, though disseised, and the nullity, and illegitimacy of the Jew, though the present All-commander. Our next example shall be out of Tertullian, who gives us a very remarkable testimony to our purpose, in a threefold instance of the Christians practice in relation to three possessors of the style, and power of the Roman Emperors, all of them in, or near about his time: The which he compriseth briefly (as his manner is) in one short sentence; and he remembers the same twice in his works, viz. in his B●ok ad Scapulam, cap. 2. Nanquam Albiniani, nec Nigriani, vel Cassiani inveniri potuerunt Christiani. The Christians could never be found to be Albinians, or Nigrians, or Cassians. And again in his Apologeticus cap. 35. unde Cassii, & Nigri, & Albini, etc. de Romanis ni fuller, i e. de non Christianis. Whence arose the Cassu, the Nigri, the Albini, &c of the Romans I take it, that is, of they who were not Christians. The Scholiasts upon Tertullian, viz. Zephyrus, Rhenanus, and Junius, do agree that these say of his do refer to Avidity Cassius, Pescenius Niger, and Clodius Albinus, their respective stand up, at several times, as Emperors, and each obtaining to be so named, and to have under their command a vast Territory of the Roman Dominions; but their assumption of the same being violent, as in opposition to other Emperors, who were chosen, invested, and received by the Senate, and people of Rome, (which was then the legal entry to the Empire * For this Title see Grot. de Jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 9 Sect. 11. :) as Cassius against Marcus Antoninus, Niger and Albinus against Septimius Severus; Tertullias drift in those sentences is to vindicate the Christians from disloyalty, by assoiling them of joining, having any h●nd with, or aiding any of those possessors, and titular Emperors in the Countries where they were generally followed, and maintained by the Roman Legions, and Subjects, against the right and lawful Emperors of Rome † Albinianos', Nigrianos, & Cassianos vocat Tertullianus defectionum istorum conscios. Rhenanus in loc. ad Scap. . He that shall consult those above named Annotators, with the Historians of those times shall find; That Avidius Cassius a Nobleman of Rome (of the Family of that Cassius who was a Conspirator against Julius Caesar) whilst Marcus Antoninus was in his wars in Germany, and the bordering Countries, (those wars where the famous victory and relief of water was obtained for him by the prayers of his Christian Soldiers, called upon that the Thundering Legion) gives out that Antoninus was dead; by which means the forces and people of the East, within the Mountain Taurus, generally, supposing the Empire vacant, set up Cassius to be Emperor. After this, Antonine to show himself alive, and to recover his Empire in the East, marcheth thither against Cassius, whose soldiers perceiving the error they had been caught in by his lie, kill him with his son, and presenting their heads to Antonine, the sedition is appeased * Vide Zephyrun & Rhenanum in loc. Tertulliani. & Rosse. Histor. Book 2. Chap. 2. . Also that Pescenius Niger Proconsul of Sy●ia, and Governor of the whole Eastern part, upon the people of Rome's general discontent at the corrupt entrance and maladministration of the Empire by Didius Julianus, is wished for by them to come, and take the Empire; and is thereto made choice of, and even sued to accept of it by the Roman Legions, and Subjects of the East, and is by them (as far as in them lay) made Emperor at Antioch. But in competition for it, Septimius Severus arises in Pannonia, being the praefect there, and by the soldiery and people at Illyricum, is set up as their Emperor; and being so, (whiles Niger taken up with sport and jollity, looseth his time in the East) he marcheth to Rome, and obtains the election of the Senate there; and having so sped, he goes up into the East against Niger, overthrows his power at Cyzicum, and so suppresseth, and slayeth him † Vide praeter Zephyr. & Rhenan. in Tertull. Herodianum Hist lib. 2. sect. 21, 22, 23, 25, etc. et lib. 3. sect. 3.12, 13, 14. Item Sum. Herod. ex Photii Biblioth. Epist. Herod. praefix. et Brev. lib. 2. Herod. praefix. & Speeds Hist. Book 6. Chap. 22. Sect. 3. . And that Severus the Emperor being upon his enterprise against Niger (as aforesaid) and conceiving jealousy of Clodius Albinus the Proconsul of Britain, his stirring against him in the West, during his absence; to make him the surer to him, he creates him Caesar, and after that his copartner in Government; but having overc me Niger, his jealousy against Albinus is made good, or retorted by Albinus his rising up in Arms against him. This brings the difference to an open war, which is ended by Severus his vanquishment and dost uction of Albinus * Vide Herod. Hist. lib. 2. Sect. 48. lib. 3. Sect. 16, etc. Speeds Hist. Book 6. Chap. 23. Sect. 2. etc. . Of the possession of the East by Cassius first against Antonine, and then by Niger against Severus, and of the West by Albinus against the same Severus, and by their respective accomplices in such manner as hath been related, Tertullian saith, None of the Christians were ever found to be Albinianes, Nigrianes, or Cassianes. That is, they none o● them interested themselves in the causes of Albinus, Niger, or Cassius, or were partakers with, upholders of, or sticklers for them: which yet it had been their duty to have been, had their respective Titles been as good as their possession was full in those Territories; or had their possession made them the powers of God, ordained of God. But contrariwise, these three having none of them any legal investure, and there being lawful Emperors claiming those Dominions against them, the Christians declined the possessors in a duty belonging to those who are powers of Gods ordaining, in recognition of the rightful c●aimers against them. It is likewise to be remembered, that at what time John of Leyden ruled as King in Munster, and stood out in defence of his pretended Kingdom against the Bishop, the Temporal Prince thereof, and his assistants, the Princes of Germany, (as was above related) there were some good men in that City, who would have no hand with him in the maintaining thereof in that manner, and cause † See Rosse of Religions in John of Leydens' life, pag. 18, 19 Jo. Sleiden Comment. l. 10. pag. 258. 259. These examples produced may be both for number, and pregnancy sufficient to satisfy the query unto which they are returned. For a conclusion of my answer to it, I shall observe, that with these examples of them of the true faith, and religion afore-given, some even of the prudenter Heathen have comported. To this purpose, I shall remember two, one of M ssala Corvinus, and his Heroical reply to Augustus. He being Colleague with Caesar Octavian in the Roman Consulship, Plutarch in vita Bruti sub finem. and Caesar (after his famous victory at Actium over Antony, the which raised him up to his Imperial Throne) taking occasion to give him a public encomium, hat although in the cause of B utus in the Philippick war he had been a stout enemy against him, yet now in the battle at Actium he had been his special fautor, and aider; he (to wit, this Messala Corvinus) returns this Answer to Caesar's Encomiastic. Tu me Caesar s●mper sectae, partiumque invenies meliorum, & justiorum. q. d. Whoever is the upper, thou shalt ever find me the friend, and follower of the better, and juster party. The other is that of the honest, and excellent Poet Juvenal, who thus whips the sordid servility, and compliance of the Roman common people in reference to prevalent success: — Sed quid Turba Remi? sequitur fortunam, ut semper, Juvenal satire 10. et odit Damnatos. Idem populus si Nurscia Thusco Favisset: si opp●essa foret s●cura senectus Principis; hac ipsâ Seianum diceret horâ Augustum.— But what way goes the Roman rout? they own, Or' bandon Princess still, as up, or down The wheel of Fortune bears them; for if she The Tuscan S●ian favoured had (even he That first Tibe●ius minion was, and then His Rival) and his jealous master fallen The crafty Fox Tiberius; at this hour, Their cry had been, Sejanus Emperor. CHAP. X. SECT. VIII. SECT. VIII. Three other Inquiries spoken to, viZ. Whether the power of a mere possessor may not be made use of? whether subjection to it be not lawful, or necessary? and if it be, whether the subjects conscience, or practice be at all concerned in the justness, or the unjustness of the power that is over him. IN the eighth place there comes in this threefold question. 1. But may not some use be made of, and recourse had to a mere possessory power for the obtaining of political redress, and safety? 2. Is not subjection to him lawful, or necessary? 3. And if so, then is it not all one, as to the subjects conscience, or as to his performance of obedience, whether the power be just, or unjust; be the ordinance of God, or be the presumption and intrusion of man? I answer, 1. For the first quaetie. Such is the necessity of order, justice, and place, and such is every man's title, and interest in them, that there is no scruple (I know) to be made of accepting, or seeking them at the hand of any, who may reach them out to us, though he that conveys them to us be not interested in the umpirage of them, yet are we, and every man is interested in the benefit, and use of them. And though one may not persuade, assist, or consent to any to take, or appropriate to themselves the public place, or office of administration of them to the community, that is not thereto lawfully called, and authorized, yet of them that have unduly possessed themselves of that place, and do exercise the same, they that are under them may request both in reference to public concernments, and to private, that the administrations which they have assumed into their hands, and are resolved to hold, may (for their matter and use to others) be just, and profitable. This I find resolved without dispute * Cajetan. Summul. Tit. Rempub. Tyrant. Navarri Compend. Tit. Tirannus. The Exercitation concer. Usurp. Powers, cap. 3. pag. 23. . 2. And for the next, It is also easily admitted, viz. That submission, and compliance with a mere occupant may, and in divers cases ought to be. Such may be the warrantableness, or the goodness, either in point of profit, or of moral duty, of the things, that obedience, or compliance with the commands of a superior in them will hear a commission, either of lawfulness, or of necessi y. 3. But than it must be said, It is not therefore all one as to the Subjects, either conscience, or act of obedience, whether the power be just, and of God's ordination, or it be unjust, and of man's prevarication. For there is a difference to be put betwixt the submission yieldable to the mere possessor, and that which is payable to a right authority. And the difference may be observed in more respects than one. 1. There is a difference in regard of ground, or in the reason; or consideration upon which it is yielded. We are to render obedience to a real authority, or to a lawful power, or potentate, as owing, or due to him. It is his right, and it belongeth to him up n the account of strict justice, the people are under that obligation to him which we call Allegiance, and by reason of it we call them his Liege people, and him their Liege Lord. Liege is as much as legal, and Allegiance imports a bond of obedience by virtue of the law; and it may refer either to the ordinative law of G●d, or to the constitutive law of man. But to the mere occupant there is no such ●ye: in acts of submission to him it is the matter prescribed, and not the precipient that obligeth: or, it is not the commander, or his commanding, but the condition of the commanded which is the rise, or reason of this subjection. Or, yet more distinctly, people may be led ●o obey such by force of other considerations besides Allegiance to them: and those may be either the more general moral ones, common to this with other cases, such as are, the lawfulness of the thing to be done in its own nature, or the coincidency of another just, and obliging authority, and command with that of the occupants; or, 2. And therewithal, such as are peculiarly arising from that state of subduednesse; as, the necessity that is incumbent to do, or part with the thing required for the avoidance of a greater loss, or suffering to come if the subject detract that; or, the greater conveniency, safety, or emolument which there is to ones self, to his neighbour, or to the public, in doing, then in denying, as the circumstances of the imposall, lie, though we●e it not so imposed, it would not be eligible. Though we a●e obliged to nothing jussu ejus, or upon the intuition of his command, yet we may do many things, ea jubente, he commanding, and should do eo prememe, he enforcing them; and we have many things to do, ipso seu volente, seu nolente, whether he will, or forbidden the doing of them. This difference in the ground the Reader may find set down by H. Grotius de Jure B. lib. 1. cap. 4. Sect. 15. And by the paper of Dr. Sanderson printed by a Replyer to it, in defence of Mr. Ascams' Discourse. And by Mr. Burroughs upon Hosea, Chap. 1. Lect. 3. pag. 65. and Lect. 4 pag. 111. And by the Author of the Observations upon Aristotle's Politics, pag. 46, ad sin. And by the Exercitation conc. usurp. powers, cap. 3. pag. 22. 2. There is also a difference in regard of the extent of the subjection; and that, 1. In relation to the acts, or attributions which the subjection reacheth to. Whatsoever duty we own immediately to G●d; whatsoever is due from us to the public safety, or weal; whatever act of justice, or of charity is owed to another; whatsoever is an office of our station, or place, or which we have any other way a call unto; whatsoever is within the rule of the virtuous culture of ourselves, or may make for our own honest interest, without the wrong of any other, that we may, or must do in concurrence with such a possessors command, yea, and if a necessity of precept lie upon it, though it be to his advantage in his unjust occupancy: a good and necessary action being not to be declined for such an ill effect as is accidental to it, and ariseth from the use which another makes of it. But there are sundry, not only personal, but political acts that may come to be the matter of a civil superiors command, which build not themselves upon any of these considerations; and there are actions which not only are destitute of such a ground to make them good, and necessary, but if done to a mere possessor, they have in them an access rinesse to his unlawful occupancy: and there may be some things then only to be done when there is for them the warrant, and injunction of a real authority: and some acts are lawful, or necessary to be put forth towards, or for a justly entitled Magistrate, which are warrantlesse, or sinful towards another, as being derogatory to the said Magistrates, or to the Communities right, or an entrenchment upon the divine institution of Magistracy, or a bringing of the agent into a participation of another man's sin. He that shall take a view of the just prerogatives of the civil Magistrate, and of the particulars of the subjects duty to him, may find that such there are * See before Chap. 8. Sect. 1. . In things of this sort there will lie a restriction upon the yieldance of that subjection to a mere possessor which is redditable to a lawful Sovereign. Without particularising what things are of this nature, that it is so may easily appear, if we but make a comparison by inverting the case, and putting the action on the Magistrate's part. Let two persons come before a lawful Magistrate, each with his cause, or suit, the one being a denizen of the Country, the other being a foreiner; or, suppose them both alike for that, but the one having a just cause, or suit, the others being bad. The Magistrate in hearing, and handling these divers causes, or the cause of these diversely qualified persons, may, and is to do in some kind the same things for them all, and to treat them all alike: but in some kinds again he is to observe a difference, and his process may not be altogether the same towards the severals of them respectively, his duty will require him in sundry things to put a difference betwixt the denizen and the foreiner; betwixt him that hath a just cause, and him that hath a bad. And thus is it on the subjects part, and in his actings: there is in many things a diversity to be found in the rule of his proceed in relation to those two sorts of superiors, the just, and the unjust; or the authorised power, and the intruder. 2. In relation to the case wherein subjection is performable, the extent of it may be to be diversified in reference to those two. A lawful, authorized Magistrate, one is required to subject himself unto voluntarily, frankly, and out of the case of terror, or external compulsorinesse, and though he had ability to contest, stand our, and make good a refusal; but not so to the mere possessor. It is then only necessary to comply, and sometimes doth a thing then only come to be lawful in reference to him, when matter of awe or menace is cast into one of the scales of the subjects consultation * See Dr. Sanderion, and Grotius as above cited. . SECT. IX. CHAP. X. SECT. IX. The conclusion is with a short view of the question, what kind of consent of the community it is which is requisite to the conveying of God's ordination to the power. HAving thus dispatched answer to these objections, and queries, I intent to proceed no further: but think it time now to close up this Chapter, and with it this Treatise. There is but one query more that occurred to my observation as for answer here, viz. Seeing we have found the only ordinary mean of conveyance of God's ordination to the person who is by that ordination the power of God, to be the consent of the Community * As it is laid down Chap. 5. Sect. 4. Subsect. 4. before. , what kind of consent is that to be? This question ariseth from the diversity of ways whereof the giving of consent seemeth to be capable of: as, 1. Touching the persons giving, consent may be either of the whole; or of a part; and that whole may, either contain all, and singular the persons united in one mind, or be the major part, admitted in virtue to be the whole. 2. Touching the manner wherein consent is signified; Civilians do deliver several ways of consent giving, as by word, by action, and by non-acting; and under these are reduced sundry particulars. 3. As to the time, the consent may either forerun, or follow actual investure. 4. As to truth, and reality, the consent may be either re●ll, or presumed, and pretended. 5. As to the freedom, and consequently as to the valid ty, it is susceptible of differences more than one: 1. There is a natural, or physical freedom; and opposite to it a natural restraint, or confinement. The natural freedom is a remotion or clearness of outward coaction; and this respecteth, 1. Either the body by actual stop, or impediment, 2. Or the mind, and this relateth to fear, from the menace, or danger of harm, or loss. 2. There is a moral freedom, or a freedom of conscience (●ruly so called). And opposite to it there is a moral restraint, to wit, by a preobligation, tye, or duty of conscience. The requisiteness of freedom, as the very formal reason, or constitutive essence of consent, and the requisiteness of both those freedoms, that i●, both the natural, and the moral; a freedom both from outward force, and terror, and from preobligation of conscience, are much insisted on. There is not much material difficulty in the positive determination of any of these differences except it be the last, the point of freedom: and for it I had rather suppose my intelligent Reader apprehensive of what is right therein, then entangle him or myself here in the dispute of it. The truth is, we commonly say Leave is light, and this proverb may be understood to hold, not only of the easiness either of the obtaining or of the carriage of it ordinarily; but of the discernableness, clearness, and apparency, which for the most part is in that leave, or consent which is unfeigned, and real. But if there be any whose interest, or will inclines them to pretend to a consent which is not, or to a freeness of consent where it is not, I shall not for their use enter into a debate of it; doubting them to be of the number of those who are condemned of themselves; and for that I cannot assume either that freedom to deal, or that hope to prevail with them, which I should promise myself in the undertaking. Deo laus omnis. FINIS. The Contents. THE entry and partition of the work, pag. 1. CHAP. I. Of the subject here spoken of, power, the powers, p. 3. Sect. 1. An enquiry w●●ther power be put for the person invested who power, or for the abstract, the office seated in him? p. 3. Sect. 2. The main enquiry, to wit, what kind of power it is which the Apostle intends in those words, power, powers, p. 5. Subsection 1. Of the force of the wo●d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 5. Subsection 2. Power distinguished into Natural, and Moral, p. 15. Subsection 3. That Moral power o●ly is intended in this wo●d power, in this place. p. 23. Subsection 4. What is required to the making of a Moral power, p. 29. CAHP. II. Of the Term, of God, p. 40. Sect. 1. The divers Scripture-acceptations of this term of God, p. 41. Sect. 2. For the clearing of the Question, which of these acceptations are proper for this Text, divers things discussed, p. 46. Subsection 1. The difference betwixt the Narrative, and the Legislative word of God, and that Scripture predictions are not a warrant for us to act upon, in the things predicted, p 46. Subsection 2. Certain propositions to explain those several ways wherein things are said to be of God, p. 49. Subsection 3. Of God's working in humane actions, whether good, or evil; and the difference betwixt the being of the one of God, and of the other; p 51. Subsection 4. How the hand of God is clear from the sin of man, when it act●th in man's sinful action, and from injustice in punish him for that action, p. 57 CHAP. III. A Digressive enquiry concerning the voice, or declarative use of Divine providence, p. 61. Sect. 1. The usefulness of the said enquiry, p. 62. Sect. 2. In what sense the word providence is taken in this enquiry, p. 63. Sect. 3. The question discussed, whether Divine providence be, and wherein it is regulating, or declarative of the will of God to be done by us, p. 63. Subsection 1. That providence doth declare something of God, p. 64. Subsection 2. That providence doth declare somewhat of God's counsels, p. 65. Subsection 3. That providence doth declare to us that God is, and what he is, p 67. Subsection 4. Certain distinctions premised for the discovery how far providence is declarative of the will of God which we are to do, p. 68 Subsection 5. Five propositions explaining, wherein providence is, and wherein it is not declarative of Gods will to be done by us, and how providence where it delivers not the rule, may yet determine its obligation to the particular matter, p. 69. Subsection 6. That Dominion is not founded in eventual providence, p. 89. Subsection 7. That providence alone, or without the Rule of God's word doth not signify to us the allowing or disallowing will of God in matters either of human right, or positive institutim, p. 92. CHAP. IU. The Question [how the text saith th● power is of God] stated and resolved, p. 97. CHAP. V. Of the term, ordained of God, p. 101. Sect. 1. Of the several acceptions of the word ordained, being put for an action of God, p. 102. Sect. 2. What the special and proper acception of the Term ordained of God, is in this Text, p. 107. Sect. 3. Reasons to prove that God's ordination of the power is preceptive, or warrantive, not merely providential, p. 109. Sect. 4. God's preceptive ordination of the power explained, particularly how it is communicated to this or that particular Magistrate, p. 120. Subsection 1. Ordination contains institution, and constitution: and what each of these signifies, p. 121. Subsection 2. That institution of the power is of God: and whether by the law of nature in man innocency, p. 123. Subsection 3. That constitution of the power, or putting in of the particular Magistrate is of God, and how, or by what means he doth it? p. 124. Subsection 4 That God's ordination is conveyed to the particular Magistrate by the consent of the community, p. 136. Subsection 5. Three other ways of conveying into persons a title to Sovereign Magistracy examined, viz. 1. That of Fatherhood, and primogeniture. 2. That of Conquest. 3. That of voluntary benefi●iallnesse by protection, p. 144. Subsection 6. A solution of some objections made against the passing of God's ordination unto the person of the Supreme Magistrate by the consent of the people, p. 167. Sect. 5. That distinction which some give betwixt the power, and the acquisition, or assumption of the power; and its aptness to resolve the question [Whether a violent intruder into Dominion be among the powers in this Text, that are of God, ordained of God?] considered, p. 191. CHAP. VI Of the universal negative note, in the words, there is no power but of God. p. 204. Sect. 1. The original is not in those words, [no power but of God] expressly universal, p. 205. Sect. 2. The several qualifications which sentences in terms universal do admit, p. 207. Sect. 3. The suitableness of some of those qualifications of universals to this (supposed) universal in the Text, p. 210. CHAP. VII. Of the being of the powers, in that proposition, the powers that be are ordained of God, p. 216. Sect. 1. The question moved, wherein consists the being of the power, or, what it is, that makes the power to be, p. 217. Sect. 2. Reasons to prove that prevalency, or actual possession of the seat of Government doth not make or infer one to be the power, p. 218. Subsection 1. Argument 1. Taken from the nature of 〈◊〉, p. 218. Subsection 2. Argument 2. From the absurdity of admitting Satan's, and the Pope's usurped powers upon the ground of actual rule, p. 220. Subsection 3. Argument 3. From the custom of hereditary Kingdoms, accounting the succeeding to be King in the moment of the death of his predecessor, without actual investure, p. 225. Subsection 4. Argument 4. From the lawfulness, and usefulness of fundamental Laws, and provisions for the future continuance of Government by succession, and against encroachers upon the same, p. 226. Subsection 5. Argument 5. From the practice of Nations, owning them for their Sovereign powers who have not actually ruled, p. 228. Subsection 6. Argument 6. From another practice of Kingdoms, their admitting some to the place of Supreme command whom they acknowledge not to be the Supreme power, p. 233. Subsection 7. Argument 7. From the approved custom of determining controverted Titles unto Sovereignty by arbitration, p. 234. Subsection 8. Argument 8. From the expressions of the holy Ghost in Scripture, owning men for Kings in relation to the Kingdoms of which they have been unpossessed, p. 236. Subsection 9 Argument 9 Taken from the nature of Magistracy, p. 245. Subsection 10. Argument 10. From God's express disallowance of some in actual command, p. 249. CHAP. VIII. Some Arguments to prove, that by the power in the Text is to be understood a power lawful as to title, and not a mere possessory power, taken from the context, p. 252. Sect. 1. A consideration of the duty to be yielded to the power in those words, ve●s. 1. Be subject, p. 253. Sect. 2. Of the term, higher, annexed to the powers, vers. 1. p. 259. Sect. 3. Of the whole style, higher powers, vers. 1. p. 262. Sect. 4. Of the resistance of the power concluded under the penalty of damnation, vers. 2. p. 263. Sect. 5. The opposition and distance which the Text puts betwixt him that is the power, and him that is the resister of the power, vers. 2. p. 269. Sect. 6. Of the work of the power, described vers. 3, 4. p. 274. Sect. 7. Of the Magistrate's style, the Minister of God, vers. 4, 6. p. 279. Sect. 8. Of the Magistrates bearing the Sword, vers. 4. p. 281. CHAP. IX. Some other Arguments for the conclusion insisted on in the former Chapter taken from other Mediums, p. 283. Sect. 1. Argueth from the sense of some Scriptures forbidding the retaliating of evil, ibid. Sect. 2. Argueth from the Prophet's comparison of the Jewish State under the Predatory power of the Chaldean, unto that of such Animals as have no Ruler over them, p 287. Sect. 3. Argueth from the nullity of a selfcreated power, declared negatively in Christ's, positively in Babylon's case, p. 288. Sect. 4. Argueth from the sundry absurdities following upon the attributing of a mere possessory power unto God, as his ordinance, p. 290. Sect. 5. Argueth from that State-maxim, Political power is originally in the people, and in the Magistrate, only derivatively from them, p. 294. Sect. 6. Argueth from the rise, or nature of Civil Government, p. 295. Sect. 7. Argueth from the received d●st nction of a Sovereign's legal, or public, and his personal, or private capacity, p. 297. Sect. 8. Argueth from the being of Civil power by the Law of Nature, p. 299. Sect. 9 Argueth from the general, and solemn disclaim of Arbitrary Government, p. 300. Sect. 10. Argueth from the impossibility of determining what measure of possession shall make a power, p. 301. CHAP. X. Answers to some objections, and doubts concerning that sense of the Text which the aforegoing Chapters have stated, and confirmed. p. 303. Sect. 1 The Objection [that this Text commandeth the Roman Christian's obedience to the than Roman Emperor, as the Supreme Power of God, ordained in that Empire, and that he was a Usurper] answered, p. 304. Sect. 2. The Objection of Christ's paying, and commanding Tribute-paying to Caesar: of his owning pilate's power: of Soldiers serving the Roman without disallowance of the Baptist, Christ, or his Apostles, answered, p. 311. Subsection 1. The question, whether the Romans were Usurpers over Judea in our Saviour's time, discussed, p. 311. Subsection 2. Of Christ's paying Tribute, Matth. 17. p. 326. Subsection 3. Of Christ's commanding Tribute-paying to Caesar, p. 327. Subsection 4. Of Christ's acknowledging pilate's power to be of God, p. 329. Subsection 5. Of the Soldiers serving the Roman without the disallowance of the Baptist, Christ, or his Apostles, p. 329. Sect. 3. The prejudice which it is alleged, the requiring a good title to the making one a power ordained of God, may cast upon all Governments, (inasmuch as their beginning is ordinarily either unknown, or known to have been violent) weighed, p. 330. Sect. 4. The force of the examples of the Jews submitting to the Babylonian, Persian and Grecian Kings, and of the Christians to others, and the command the Jews had of submitting to the Babylonian, viewed, p. 334. Subsection 1. Of the examples of the Jews, and Christians submission to the (supposed) Usurpers over them, p. 335. Subsection 2. Of the command the Jews had of submitting to the Babylonian, p. 337. Sect. 5. The Allegation of the supposed goodness which may be in the administrations of a mere possessory power, considered, p. 340. Sect. 6. Of the say of some Protestant Authors interpreting this Text, not only to require obedience to present Rulers, whatever their Title be, but to justify their being ordained of God, p. 342. Sect. 7. Many examples of exemplary persons disowning, or opposing mere possessory powers in such recognitions, and rights as are due to the powers ordained of God, p. 349. Sect. 8. Three other Inquiries spoken to, viz. whether the power of a mere possessor may not be made use of? whether subjection to it be not lawful, and necessary? and, if it be, whether the subjects conscience, or practice be at all concerned in the justness, or unjustness of the power that is over them? p. 364. Sect. 9 The conclusion is, with a short view of the question, what kind of consent of the Community it is which is requisite to the conveying of God's ordination to the power, p. 371. FINIS.