AN EXERCITATION CONCERNING USURPED POWERS: WHEREIN The Difference betwixt Civil Authority and Usurpation is stated.  
That the Obedience due to lawful Magistrates, is not owing, or payable, to USURPED POWERS, is maintained.  
The Obligation of OATHS, and other Sanctions to the former, notwithstanding the Antipolitie of the latter is Asserted.  
And the Arguments urged on the contrary part in divers late Printed Discourses are Answered.  
Being modestly, and inoffensively managed: By one studious of Truth and Peace both in Church and State.  
Tyrannus sine titulo ille est qui imperium ad se, absque legitimâ ratione rapie, huic quisque privatus resistat, & si possit è medio tollat.  Vide sacram Theologi per Dudleium Fennetum cap. 13. de pol●t civili pag. 80. 
Si Invasor impetitum arripuerit neque pactio u●la seq●…ta sic, aut fides illi data, sed sola vi retineatur possessio, à quolibet privato jure potest interfici.  Grotius de jure pacis ac belli. p 86. Luke 21.8. 
But when ye shall hear of wars, and commotions (or seditions) be not terrified.  
Printed in the Year, 1650.   

●…sper, practice, and destroy the mighty and holy people. Dan. 8.24, 25.  
This Author's zeal for the obligation of solemn Oaths, Vows, and Covenants may well be born with; if it be a fault, there is but little (too little) of it in England. But the good man though he sweareth to his own hurt, changeth not. Psal. 15.4.  
I will say no more, but Tolle lege, take up and read, understand what thou readest; Remember and practise what thou understandest to be the will and mind of God, and pray for such (whether of the Gentry, Ministry, or others) as long, and labour for thy information, and reformation, if thou wanderest; and for thy confirmation, and consolation if thou walkest aright. The God of truth and peace be with thee. Amen.   

CHAP. I. Of Usurpation, what it is; a Case propounded, wherein it is not hard to determine whether Usurpation be chargeable, or not.  
USurpation is an intrusion into the Seat of Authority, a presuming to possess, and manage the place & power thereof without a lawful calling, right, or title thereunto. A lawful call or title to that rule, and Government which is supreme (of which I have to speak) is derived, or comes from God, There is no power but of God, (saith the Apostle) the powers that be are ordained of God: Rom. 13.1. It were a sense too large, and not to be defended to take these words absolutely, and unlimitedly of all power, in regard either of title, or measure, and use. An unjust power in regard of Measure, or the stretching of Power beyond its due bounds, or the abuse of it is generally denied to be of God by way of warrant; and an unjust power in regard of title, or an Authority set up, and admitted against, or without right, God himself denies to be of him. They have set up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I knew it not: saith he, Hosea 8.4. Which speech is by the current of 
a Zanchius, junius, Geneva interpret. Pareus, Diodate: Anotations of Divines in jocum.  Expositors applied to Jeroboam, and his successors, coming in to be Kings of Israel in that manner as they did; For although Jeroboam had a prediction (yea, suppose it a grant) that he should be King of ten Tribes, 1 King. 11.29. yet the people, at Solomon's death, had no command, or direction from God to cast off Rehoboams government, and make him their King; it was therefore sedition, and rebellion in them; and both a manifest breach of the fifth Commandment; 
Vide Paraeum in Hos. 8.4.  and of the positive Law of God, Deut. 17.14, 15. and Jeroboam was faulty in that, though he had God's preconcession of a Kingdom over ten Tribes; yet having had no order from him about the time, manner, or the particular ten which they should be; he did not seek and tarry for a further direction, and calling from God; as David did in the like case 
b 2 Sam. 2.1. . And although the Lord, when it was done, testified that the thing was from him 
c 1 King. 12.24 ; yet we must understand it to have been so by his permissive counsel, and general concourse, or providence only, as all actions as they are actions, and all events that are evils of punishment; and as they are such, are, though the actors among men that bring them be never so sinful in them; but not by his approbation, appointment, or constitution; the event was from God; but not the sinful means by which it was accomplished; he ordered the evil carriage of men to that effect, but he gave them no order for that evil carriage: so that though, in a sense, it was of him; yet in regard of authorising, it was without, and against him, and, in the Apostles sense, none of God's ordinance. But of this we shall have occasion to speak again hereafter.  
God giveth a calling, or invests with a right to Sovereignty, either immediately, by making and declaring the choice, and designing the person himself; or mediately, by committing it to the people to elect, and constitute both their form of Government, and the persons that are to sway it over them, which he hath done to all Nations; yet with a reservation to himself of power to interpose with his own immediate designation when he pleaseth: and when he doth not so, the vote of the people is the voice of God, (ordinarily) and they passing their consent when a Magistrate is to be set over them, that power, so constituted, is of God, as his ordinance. And this may be the reason why that, which in one place is called the ordinance of God, is, in another called the ordinance of man, or an humane creature: 1 Pet. 2.13. By the former way the Judges and Kings of Israel had, or aught to have had their admission to rule, 
d Deut. 17.14.  and that was extraordinary, and peculiar to that people; the latter is the only ordinary, lawful, and warrantable way of creating a right, and title to the helm of Magistracy in other Nations. And as in the former the call of God was sometimes personal, or of one single person; as was that of Moses, Joshua, Samuel, Saul, and others: and again, sometimes lineal, or of a whole race: as was that of David and his seed 
e 2 Sam 7.12. : So it is in the latter, 
f Prin● 〈◊〉 ●in mu●● appe●unt, nec boni ipsi. nec boni fine, quos repress●● tamen mos sive le● Gentium repagulo duplici, Elect onis & lu●cessionis, etc. justi Lipsi polit: l. 2. c 4.  the people's constitution of their Governors may either be individual, or intransient; as in those kingdoms, or States which are called (in a strict acception) Elective; or it may be continuated, and successive; as in those Kingdoms, or Principalities which are called hereditary, and possessed by descent: both ways Princes are by the people's Election, and Consent; and the latter is preferred, by many wise Statists, before the former 
g Minore discrimine sumi principem qu●m quaeti. Tacit. Hist. l. 2 .  
I shall not insist on the distinctions, that might be observed touching the manner of the people's passing their consent; nor determine which of them is sufficient, and which not, to make this right or title, whether it must be antecedent to possession, or may be consequent, express, or : collective, or representative: absolute, or conditionated: free, or enforced: revocable, or irrevocable. The consideration of these is not material to the resolution of what is in question; it sufficeth that it be yielded, that the people's consent is (besides that which is by commission immediately sent and signed from heaven) the only derivation of a lawful call, or claim to Government 
h Quirtum ver● regalis Monarchiae genus est quae iam temporibus Heroicis voluntate civium, & patriis legibus atque institutis approbata est. Aristot politic. li 3. num. 8●. Luk. 12.13, 14 . When our Saviour Christ (who being such an extraordinary person, might have warrant to do what would have been presumption in any other) was appealed to in a cause that appertained to the civil Magistrates decision; he refused to deal in it, with these words, Who made me a Judge, or a divider over you? according to which words of him, who was the truth, he that may rule, must be placed in that office by some body, and may not undertake it of himself: no man may take this honour to himself, or be his own advancer to the Throne; but he must be installed by another: and what other creature, besides the Nation itself, can challenge a power to appoint over it its Rulers is not to me imaginable. Angels are not of this Oeconomie, do not intermeddle in this business, and for other people, or foreign States they are but in an equality, and have no partnership in this matter; they have no more to do to impose Governors over their neighbours, than they have reciprocally over them; and to whichsoever may attempt it towards the other, by the analogy of our Saviour's words, it may be said, 
Luk. 12.13, 14.  Who made thee a Judge, or Rule maker over me?  
A calling from the people, who are to be subject being so necessary, and essential to a humanely constituted Magistracy; it is easy to discern what is Usurpation, viz: that which is opposite to it, or privative thereof, which is a snatching hold of the Sceptre, and wresting it out of the hands of those who are to dispose of it, or have it committed to them: it is ordinarily termed, a tyranny in regard of title, or without title: The distinction betwixt lawful Magistrates and Tyrants is thus given by Aristotle: 
h 
Reges enim non solum secundum legem, sed etiam volentibus, Tyranni autem invitis imperant. Aristot. polit. l. 3. num. 87.  
Etenim si nolentibus imperatur, regnum protinus esse desinit. Tyrannis efficitur quae vi dominatur.  
Verum regnum est imperium voluntate civium delatum: at si quis vel fraud, vel violentia dominatur manifest● Tyrannis est. idem. li. 5. num. 112.   Kings do reign, not only according to the Law, but over them that consent to them; Tyrants rule over men against their wills. If any govern against the mind of the governed, it ceaseth to be a Kingdom, and becometh a Tyranny which ruleth by force. All lawful power than is founded upon the wills of those over whom it is set; Contrariwise Usurpation is built upon the will and power of them that hold the Government; it is a selfcreated, or self authorised Power, such was that of 
i Deinde Cinna, Carbo s●se, sine comi●iis consules creabant in biennium. Chro. Carion. li. 2.  Cinna, and Carbo, who made themselves Consuls, without any Court-election, in the time of the Roman social war betwixt Sylla and Marius; and that of 
k Ex Dictatore Consulem se cum P. Servilio ipse facit. Cluver. Hist. li 7. pag. 235.  Julius Caesar who made himself Consul, together with Publius Servilius; such was that of the Chaldeans over the Jews, Hab. 1.7. Their judgement and their dignity shall proceed of themselves, saith the Prophet, that is, as Deodate expounds it, they received no Law, nor assistance from any; their right consists in their will, and the execution in their power.  
Usurpation being defined, we may proceed to distinguish of it according to several heights, or degrees it is capable of; as 1. It is either where the Throne is vacant, and undisposed of (which may happen sundry ways, as when a Commonwealth is new erected, or the possessors of the Government resign, or are extinct, and none left to lay claim to it) or, where it is full, and possessed de jure, and the Rulers are only violently extruded, and kept out.  
2. Usurpation is either merely in point of Title, and administration of a received and settled Government; or by way of innovating in the Government itself; overturning the constitution of it, and forming it a new.  
3. It may come to be acted either from those without, viz: Foreigners, and strangers to the State; or by Natives, and natural Subjects of the Kingdom.  
4. It is done by these, either against the single tye and duty of obedience and Allegiance owed to the present lawful Authority; or against Allegiance bound with Oaths and sacred Covenants. All the sorts of each of these distinctions are direct, and formal usurpations, but the latter of each far surpasseth the other respectively, and a conspiration of them all makes an Usurpation of a meridian altitude; when a party owing obedience and subjection to a long continued, and undoubted lawful power, and solemnly sworn to submit too, and support that Government, shall rise up, and presume to thrust out the possessors, and invest itself, yea, and not only seize on the Power; but of its own mind, and will, or, by its force alone, abolish the settled, and set up a new mould of government; this is Usurpation to the culmen or height of it.  
Having thus found out what Usurpation, and what the Zenith of it is; we may put a case wherein it will be easy to give a Judgement clearly. Suppose a Nation in America, whose fundamental government is, and hath been anciently and confessedly constituted, and placed in a King, an House of Peers, and an House of Commons sitting in a collateral, or coordinate rank, in regard of supremacy of power; the King being the supreme in order (unto whom, in such an association, Oaths of Allegiance and supremacy are generally sworn) next to him the Peers as the Upper, and the Commons as the Lower House of Parliament. Suppose also, the King, according to his place, summoning them, and they conformably assembling together in Parliament, and he and they personally concurring to act in the highest affairs of government; in the process whereof differences arise betwixt the King, and the said two Houses; which grow to that height, as that he in person departs from them, a war breaks out betwixt them; the Kingdom is divided by partieship with them, on the one side or the other; the two Houses continue acting jointly, no: only in managing their military defence; but in the other public, both religious and civil affairs of the Kingdom; they petition, remonstrate, and declare for a necessity of an association, and conjunction of the King and the two Houses as the fundamental constitution, and government of the Kingdom; they enter into, and prescribe to the people. Protestations, Vows, Oaths, and Covenants, for the upholding of the Authority and Power of both so constituted: they professedly fight for that associated Power, they proclaim them Enemies and Traitors, they prosecute them with fire and sword, sequestration of estates, and other punishments, that go about to divide them asunder, or oppose the aforesaid Authority; and all this they do, and avow as the indispensably necessary discharge of their trust. Suppose after all this, the Army raised and employed by the said two Houses in the aforesaid war, confederating in their Leaders (as by the immediate sequel manifestly appears) with a small party in the Lower House; Remonstrates to that House (without any address to the other) many high and strange things they would have done by them, and amongst the rest, that the King be proceeded against, as for treason, and other capital crimes; in like manner his two eldest Sons, if they render not themselves within a day to be set them: that it be declared that the people's Representatives in the House of Commons shall have the supreme Power, and all other shall be subject to them; in which demands, that House not being so obsequious to them as they expect, but standing upon the collegueship of that Government, which they with their associates, the King, and the House of Peers are entrusted with; the Army, forthwith, marcheth up to the doors, and by force of Arms seizeth on, and shuts up in hold one sort of them; and by a strong guard set at their doors shuts out another, suffering only a small number of them, and such as please them to sit in the House. Suppose lastly, this little number, left in the House, shall approve of, and second these proceed of this Army; and by their act, or Vote confirm the seclusion of that greater number of the Members of that House; and, taking upon them to Act in the name of that House, shall Enact or declare themselves to be the only Supreme Authority in the Nation, and by that pretended solitariness, and supremacy of power shall take away, and abolish the other House of Parliament, destroy the life of the King, deny, and disannul the Title of his Heirs, and Successors, to the Crown and Kingdom; abolish the office of a King, and ordain and govern solitarily over the people, as their only supreme Power, and require their obedience, and subjection as to such. The quaere, in this case thus propounded is, whether this said party, as thus acting, and as to this latitude of Authority, be usurpers, yea, or no? whether this their removing others from the Seat of Supreme Power, and assuming it peculiarly to themselves, be, or be not Usurpation (as Usurpation hath been before prescribed) and that to the very apex, or highest pinnacle of it; yea, whether they be, or be not guilty of a double Usurpation?  
First, in usurping the name and Authority of that House. It may haply be said for this. 1. That possibly they may make a quorum, or as many in number as are required to act. R: But are they not supposed to be under actual and present force, which hath been, without contradiction by any, adjudged a ground of nullity to Parliamentary proceed. For though all are not required to be present, yet the House must be free for all to come to, that their acts may be free and authorative.  
2ly, That perhaps they may be most willing, voluntary, and free in their acts, and the force that hath taken away others may be no force but a security to them, being of the same principles, apprehensions, and designs with them. R: But though they as men may be free, yet taking upon them the name of the House, are they free as an House? the House includeth virtually every Member of it, many whereof being violently excluded by those that guard the meeting place, how free soever those persons are that sit, how can the House be said to be free? nay, doth not their voluntariness and free compliance make the Usurpation completer? Can they be said to be enforced to declared, and act such things, we might by a favourable interpretation, only judge their Acts to be null; but when their proceed flow from their own wills, and they so concur to the exclusion of others more than themselves from the exercise of the power they with them are entrusted with, and assume to themselves a power, never confirmed on them by the people, but merely of their own creation, how can this be less than Usurpation to the life?  
2ly, In usurping (in the name of that House) the sole supremacy of Power in the Nation. It will be pleaded: perhaps, that the House of Commons, in the supposed case, is the only Representative of the people, to whom alone the Nation hath committed the Supreme Power. R: 1. That House is not a Representative of the whole Nation, but only of the Commons, which though the bulk, and far more numerous part; yet cannot stand for the whole in choosing a Representative, but only for themselves. 2. If it could be made good, that to that House, the whole Nation, in the original constitution of Government, had committed the sole Power; the quaere would easily be cast in the negative: but how will that be proved? The case, at it is put, presupposeth Antiquity, and by past practice: and the actings of the present House of Commons, until brought under force, to proclaim the quite contrary. 3. If nothing, ab origine, can be showed for that, did the King that summoned this Parliament, or the People that chose this House of Commons, supposed in the Case, pass over any such prerogative to them de novo; If either of them did, let us hear how. 4. It is too gross an absurdity to be charged upon the supposed present, and all former Representatives; that being intrustsed by the people with the sole Supremacy, they have of themselves associated to them the King, and the House of Peers, it being beyond the power of the constituted, and only in the Constitutors to make such an alteration in the fundamental Constitution; as Representatives cannot make Representatives or Proxies, so can they not take in Associates, or advance others, not impowered by them that impowered them into a Collegueship with them. I leave it therefore to every Reader to determine the Case, and pass Judgement. Whether the sole supreme Power, in the presupposed party, be derived to them legitimately, or be not a Selfcreated power, and so a mere Usurpation, and that of the fullest dimension; being against a lawfully settled Government, in prejudice both of the just Magistrates and the people: and in contradiction to both the single tye of Subject's Allegiance to Sovereignty, and the sacred sanction of Vows, Oaths, and Religious Covenants.   

CHAP. II. Of yielding obedience to a Power usurped as abovesaid. That it is not lawful to give up ones self to the Allegiance of such a Power.  
COncerning Obedience to an usurped Authority, I meet with two opinions, which I shall severally examine. 1. Is of those who hold obedience as due, and necessary; and that in as full a manner to such, as it is to the lawfullest Power. This is held, and argued for in a Tract, entitled, The lawfulness of obeying the present Government: as also in A Discourse, wherein is examined, what is particularly lawful, etc. By Ant: Ashcam Gent: See in his 2d. Part. cap: 9 Although indeed they both propound their opinion in the Title of their Discourse for obedience as lawful; yet, in the prosecution, they plead for it in that fullness of latitude as due, and necessary. This their Tenent they strive to maintain in relation to the present State of England. I shall deal with it in reference to the case above proposed, and in thesi: 2. Is of those who, reserving their obedience as due and devoted to the lawful Power, supposed to be still existent; do yet conceive they may submit and act under a usurped Power for the time, and during the interval of its prevalency.  
I begin with the former; wherein it is asserted by one of the foresaid Authors 
a A Discourse, wherein is examined. etc. by Ant: Ashcam Gent: Part. 2. Chap. 9 pa. 84. , (●nd the other comes not short of him in the sense and current of his Discourse) That upon the issue of a war, and the Expulsion of a just party, a man may lawfully give up himself to the final Allegiance of the unjust party. Against this Position must my Judgement stand, which dictates to me that I own no obedience to an Usurper; and to yield up myself in obedience or Allegiance unto Usurpers, who have no other title but their usurpation, is unjustifiable, and unlawful, and that upon these grounds.  
1. I cannot (if I would) yield up myself in obedience to him that hath no authority over me; take him as a Usurper, and my Allegiance is incompetible to him; obedience and authority; Magistrate, and Subject, are terms of relation, and do Se mutuo ponere & tollere: they are inseparable from one another; if there be no Magistracy in him, there can be no obedience properly, and formally in me to him. I may (either warrantably or unwarrantably) do an act possibly which he commandeth, but that cannot be truly and properly said to be an act of obedience to him: his authority is null, of no reality 
b Tyrannus absque t●tulo, qui est invasor, quilibet privatus potest, debet e medio tollere: neque enim ille Rex est, sed privata persona, etc. Alsted. Theol. Case cap. 17. Regul 8.  He is no Magistrate, but a private person; my fellow Subject, (if one of the Nation) or a foreigner to me; his commanding over me and others is, as if a private Soldier should take upon him to give orders to his Company, or an inferior Officer to an Army; or a servant should offer to rule over his fellow servants.  
In saying he is a usurper, you say enough for the nullifying of his Authority, and my obedience; whatever strength he may have to compel, he hath no Authority to command me: He is a Magistrate that hath the Subjects committed to his charge and care, say the Leyden Divines 
c Magistratus subditos fidei, ac curae suae commissos tanquam Dei minister guber. nat. S●nops. pur. Theol disput. 50. thes. 3.  in their Synopsis, and principality, Lypsius 
d Principatus est imperium moribus aut legibus delatum susceptum, gestumque parentium bono. Iust. Lips. polit. li. 2. c. 3.  defines to be, A government delivered by Custom, or Law, and constitution to him that sustains it; and undertaken and managed by him for the good of the Subjects. Another defines a Magistrate to be 
e Magistratus est publica persona successione, sort, aut suffragio electa, &c Io: Cancrone Sphaera, Cin l. 4. cap. 15.  A public person, elected by succession, lot, or suffrage; which hath the right and power of Consultation, Judgement, and Command.  
2. I may not (if I could) yield up myself as a Subject to the Usurper; in so doing, I should take away the right of the lawful Magistrate which he hath over me, and injure him in the allegiance which I stand tied in to him, and he still retaineth the claim of at my hands. The Magistrate is (in the case in hand) granted to be in being; he is but deprived of possession and enjoyment, not of property or title; he is yet standing in the relation of a Magistrate to me; and is only outed of his station perforce. The obedience of a Subject is not so arbitrary, or lose a thing, as that I may place and remove it at pleasure, or as affairs go; 
Rom. 13.7.  but it is a debt which I must render to him unto whom it is due. Neither is Sovereignty so common, ambulatory, or prostitute a matter, as that its title ceaseth unto him that is violently extruded, or dispossessed of it, and becometh any one's that by force captivates it to himself; the expulsed Magistrate still standing upon his claim and right, and the power in possession having no title but his injurious and forcible entrance; the Subject is not disobliged from him that is expelled, nor at his choice to transfer his obedience to another, neither can the violent intruder challenge it. But in respect of the consequence of that which I here assert as unto resolution in this case, and for that I find the Gentleman, in the afore-named Discourse 
f Discourse of Ant: Ashcam part. 2. ca 9 page 88  positively delivering the direct contrary to it; and that which is (as I think) very strange doctrine both in Christianity and politics, viz: That we are bound to own Princes so long us it pleaseth God to give them power to command us; and when we see others possessed of their Powers, 
Part. 1. Chap. 5 page 22, 23. Part. 2. cap 9 page 90.  we may then say, that the King of kings hath changed our Viceroys; And further, that the point of right is a thing always doubtful;— possession generally is the strongest title that Princes have. And if possession was really the truest evidence to us of their (to wit, the expelled Princes) rights, than it is equitable to follow it still, though it be perhaps in a person of more injustice than they were. And the other book, I before cited, (viz: The lawfulness of obeying the present Government) maintains the same thing (both whose arguments, for what they say, I shall take notice of, when I have laid down mine own sense and Reasons) I shall therefore here labour to make good these two things: 1. That mere forcible extrusion deprives not any lawful Magistrate of his right and title to supreme Power. 2. That violent possession gives no right to the Seat of Authority; and consequently the Subjects allegiance is not turned about by the changes of powerful possession, and dispossession.  
1. Forcible extrusion or dispossession divests not of Dominion, that the state of the Subjects allegiancec should be altered by it.  
First, if the vindication or recovery of a Princes, or people's right of Dominion, out of which he, or they are ejected, or excluded be a justifiable ground for his, their, and others in their behalf levying and waging war, and prosecuting with the sword those that withstand the said recovery; then the right of him that is expulsed by force is not canceled, or disannulled. The reason of this consequence is of itself evident, for nothing can be the ground of a war but a just and real title, either to be defended, or recovered; but I assume, the recovery or redemption of a Princes or people's right to a Kingdom withheld, or wrested from him or them, is a just ground of drawing the Sword, and commencing a war. This is proved (if it needeth any proof) by the war of the Judges & people of Israel, against the Kings and Nations that at several times invaded and ruled over them; against whom they risen up, and rescued themselves, and the Dominion of their Land from them: the story of which acts, we have in the book of Judges, and by the wars of Samuel and Saul against the Philistines recorded in the 1. Book of Samuel: as also by David's warlike undertaking against, and suppression of Absolom, who had carried away all Israel after him, into a Rebellion against David, & expulsed him out of the Land, 2 Sam. 15. etc. and 19.9. In like manner by Jehoiadas and the people's rising in Arms against Athalia, the usurping Queen, 
1 Macca. chap. 1. etc.  in the right of Joash; and their suppressing, and destroying her, and enthroning him by force of Arms. 2 King. 11. And by the wars of the Maccabees against Antiochus, Epiphanes, and his successors. 
g joseph. de Bell: judaic. lib. 1. cap. 1. Cron. Carion. lib. 2.  And the many undoubtedly lawful wars of other Princes and States in such causes as these, which to insist on is superfluous in so clear a matter.  
Secondly, If right and title to Sovereignty be not built upon possession, but upon the Law of the Land, or other consent of the people, than it is not lost by dispossession; this consequence is founded upon that which a learned Statist 
h Considerations touching a war with Spain, written by Francis Lo: Ve●ulam, etc. pa. 3d.  saith, Is a received maxim almost unshaken, and infallible, Nihil magis naturae consentaneum est, quam ut iisdem modis res dissolvantur quibus constituantur: There is nothing more agreeable to nature, than that things should be dissolved by the same means they are constituted. From which he infers, very pertinently to our case in hand, That if the part of the people, or Estate be somewhat in the Election, you cannot make them nulloes or cyphers in the prorivation or translation. But the right and title of Sovereignty is not built upon possession, (which the proof of the latter Position will clear) but upon the people's consent, which hath gone for so currant an axiom, especially of late, that it will certainly pass without contradiction.  
Thirdly, If a private property be not lost by loss of possession, neither (or rather much less) can such a public property be lost by that means; there can be no such difference made betwixt them as to enervate this consequence, and however, who sees not the incongruity of this, that that which is the conservatory and protection of a private man's property, should be of a so much more slippery tenure than it; but a private property is not lost by dispossession, if it were, for what use serveth the Law, or Magistracy? one main end of which hath been, to vindicate the Subjects right from usurpation, or what call you property? But he that either hath any, or granteth such a thing to be as property, will let this assumption pass.  
Fourthly, If violent extrusion take away a Sovereign's right, than rebellion where it prospers and prevails is no treason; for there can be no treason, or other crime imputed as against the Crown, dignity, or authority of them, whose right therein is extinct and null; so that they are only (according to this opinion) traitors or rebels, that rise up in Arms, and rebellion against the lawful Power, and do not succeed and speed according to their desires. By this account, treason and rebellion shall consist, not in the maliciousness of the intent or attempt; but in the misfortune of success, or impotency of the prosecution of it.  
Fifthly, If force dissolve Magistracy; then that prohibition of resistance under pain of damnation: Rom. 13.2. is in vain, in that it concerns only them that cannot resist effectually, and is no more than if he had said, resist not ye that want power to do it, lest if ye do, ye incur damnation: for they that have power, and please to use it to the deposing of the Magistrate, being that in so doing they put an end to his right, how can guilt remain on them?  
2. Violent intrusion into, and possession of the Seat of Authority gives no right to it; and consequently neither draws allegiance after it, nor evacuates it in relation to another.  
First, an unjust action cannot produce, or create a right. 
i Non est aequum ut ex actu injusto, ius sibi quis acquirat D. Sand. de juramenti oblige. Praelect. 6. Sect. 4.  Moral good, and evil are at such distance, that the one cannot be the cause, the other the effect; but violent intrusion into Authority is an unjust action: Luk. 12.14. Man who made me a Judge, etc. and that whether it be by one that should be a Subject to that power, Rom. 13.2. Whosoever therefore resisteth, etc. ver. 5. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, etc. Tit. 3.1. 1 Pet. 2.13. or by a Foreigner, Judg. 11.12.27. 2 Chron. 20.10.  
2ly, If violent occupation made a right; 
k O pubes domitura Deos, quodcunquaevidetis pugnando dabitur: praestat victoria mundum. Cl. Claudianis Giganto machia.  than it were lawful for any, that could make a sufficient strength for it, to rise up in Arms, invade, and seize on any Kingdom or Territory, he can prevail over; yea to kill and destroy men and Countries for Empire and Dominion, as 
l Cicero scribens de officiis tertio libro semper Caesarem in ore habuisse Euripidis versus, quos sic ipse convertit: nam si violandum est ius regnanti gratia violandum est. aliis rebus pietatem colas Sucton. in lul. Caes.  Caesar inclined to hold; for that which is of itself the way and means to place a man in a lawful estate, or calling, and makes him a lawful possessor of it, must needs be lawful: but it cannot be held lawful for any, that can find power, and advantage, to invade Crowns and Countries, as is evident by the proof of the Assumption of the preceding Argument.  
3ly, If possession by power give a title; then it's unlawful for an oppressed Prince, or people to raise war, or use any other means to expel an Invader, or remove such as have come in, and hold merely by force; for its unlawful to resist, or fight against a just Magistrate, Rom 13.1, 2. But it is lawful for an oppressed Prince or people, by Arms, or otherwise to free themselves from a forcible Usurper, as manifestly appeareth by those precedents given in the proof of the assumption of the first argument for the former Proposition, to wit, the wars of Israel in the book of Judges, and 1. of Samuel, of David, Jehoiadah, and the Maccabees, and by the known Law and practice of all Nations, and consent of all Divines, and Christians, who with one vote allow defensive and recuperative Arms, excepting the Anabaptists, and some ancient Heretics of their stamp.  
4ly, All force ought to presuppose a right in that about which it is conversant; whether for the defence or recovery of its wars (saith Francis Lord Verulam, 
m Considerations touching a war with Spain. pa. 2d.  etc.) (I speak not of ambitious predatorie wars) are suits of appeal to the tribunal of God's justice, when there are no superiors on earth to determine the cause, and they are as civil Pleas, either Plaints or Defences: Force therefore cannot create a right, seeing it is to follow it, and both give it the precedency in time, and own it as its groundwork; Add to this, that the Sword is committed to the Magistrate (and to him alone, saith Peter Martyr 
n Gladius (ut ad Romanos habetur) potestatibus duntaxat est datus. Loc. common. ●l●ss. 4. ca 20. loc. 12. ) as its subject or owner; so that the Magistrate is before it, not made by it. The Sword makes not the Magistrate, (that is, it is not its principle of Generation,) but the Magistrate à warranto authorizeth the Sword; the sword may make for his conservation, but not for his Creation.  
5ly, If force give a title (renitente populo) then that late so much decantated Aphorism, All Power (to wit, Authority) is from the People, must be called in again; yea all Donations, Elections, Compacts and Covenants betwixt Prince and people are void, and null businesses. A third person that can get hold or power, and lists to usurp, may dissolve and evacuate them all; yea the Prince that comes in by them, when once he hath possession of the Power, holds by his power, and not by them, and can no longer, nor further look to retain his right to Authority than he can enforce it; and what Turkish and tyrannical practices doth this doctrine put him upon of necessity, if he will sit fast.  

Mr. Ashcam part. 1. ca 2. Sect. 4.  6ly, No man naturally is more a Magistrate then another: Magistracy being in truth not a natural, but a civil relation; as is that of husband and wife, master and servant: it must therefore be founded on some mutual and reciprocal act, or agreement of both parties, to wit, Rulers and Subjects; and cannot result out of the action of one alone of them, nor can neither party be merely passive, in contracting such a relation. A mutual civil obligation cannot arise but of the joint or interchangeable concurrence of both.  
7ly, Power and right, as also possession and right, are separable, as all experience demonstrates; so it was in the controversy betwixt David and Absolom, and so it frequently happens to be: success and victory doth not seldom follow the wrong party; and he would be thought irrational amongst all men, wheresoever in the world, but where reason itself is brought under tyranny, that should say, success is the only Arbitrator of Controversies of right, and is ever infallible.  
8ly, Strength and Authority also are two distinct and separable things, and rarely meet in the same subject, but where either brutishness, or all miseries prevail; man hath dominion given him over the beasts, many whereof are (and were by creation) stronger then he; What is a General's natural strength to that of the Army over which he commands? What is a Kings, or a Counsels personal strength to that of the body of the people over which it sways? yea what is the hand in the natural body to all the members under its government, in point of force? We see a small board or two, put in the place of a rudder, guides the whole vessel. Amongst some beasts indeed the strongest rules; but amongst men it is not regularly so: yea, among some unreasonable Animals, not force, but fitness designed by Election obtains the rule. Bees, they say, choose their king, of whom 
o Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. 11. Chap. 17.  Pliny observes, that either he hath no sting, or Nature hath denied him the use of it; being only armed with majesty. And Aristotle saith, 
p Arist. politic. lib. 1. num. 8. Naturali enim jure meritoque fit ut qui provida ment sagacique fuerir, is imperet, ac dominatur, qui autem corporis viribus & lacertis haec ipsa obire possit, is contra subjiciatur, & serviat.  It is by a kind of natural equity and merit, that he that is of a sage and discreet understanding should rule; on the other hand he should obey, and be in subjection, that hath more strength of body, and Arms to perform service.  
9ly, Where there is no title but power, there can be no rule for Government but power and will: only that which gives right to Magistracy must set bounds to it; how can they be tied to Laws, in exercising Government, that are tied to none in coming by it? If the basis or bottom of Government be power, that must also be the measure of it; 
q Nec quisquam imperium flagitio quaesitum bonis arti●us exercuit. Tacit. Histor. 1.  so that a Magistrate, so holding, is confined to no justice, or Law; restrained from no violence, or sacrilege that his Power may extend to. That power, against whose forcible intrusion the Laws, and Constitutions made by Prince and people, for the settling of the Crown or Sovereign rule, are of no validity, can reasonably have no obligation upon it from any other Laws made by the same parties; 
r Magistratus est lex animata. P. Martyr.  the Authority that makes the Law is the Soul that quickens it; the Law springs from Authority, as the act doth from its habit or principle; so that grant, or prostitute Authority to the Sword as its right, and you subvert all settled Laws, whether fundamental or superstructory; and this all experience, as well as reason, dictates; for where, or in what Age did mere force assume the Empire without a lawless arbitrariness challenged to itself?  
10ly, If you yield the Sword such a right where it can be master in the public or civil State; why should it not have the same interest in the private, domestical, and personal? So that pirates, thiefs, and robbers, may justly claim a right to that which they can lay their hands on, and be accountable to none for their spoil and rapine.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  11ly, Whereas the Apostle to the Romans Chap. 13.2. forbiddeth resistance (or contraordination) to the lawful power ordained of God, and that upon pain of damnation to be received by him that doth it, if force give a right to that power; his action, that resists with victory, shall be justifiable, and the resister shall gain a Crown instead of receiving damnation; and none shall fall under the guilt and penalty of resistance, but he that offers to resist, and cannot make it good. The sense then which this Position puts upon this text is catachrestical, and it glosseth the words so, as to be an encouragement to resist the power, for he that resisteth the power prosperously (according to it) possesseth justly that ordinance of God, and in truth purchaseth to himself (not damnation, but) domination.  
Having thus, I hope, sufficiently cleared the duty of Allegiance to be not the violent intruders, but the oppressed and violently extruded Magistrates; I shall proceed to other Reasons against Subjects giving up themselves to the obedience of a usurping party.  
3. If I should do that, I should yield assistance to the Usurper in his wrong doing, and usurpation; and so become a partaker of his sin: obedience to one, as the supreme Magistrate, is a comprehensive thing, and includes many duties towards him at a power, viz: Receiving Commission from him for offices, or acts otherways not compatible to me; maintaining and defending him in his power by pay, counsel, intelligence, Arms, and prayers; all which I am bound to yield the Usurper, to my power, if I resign mine allegiance up to him: and how shall I do these things, and not 1. support, and have communion with him in his wickedness. 2. Combine against, betray, and resist the right of the injuriously dethroned Magistrate. 3. And make myself uncapable of obedience, or being a Subject to the lawful Power hereafter.  
4. It were a public wrong to the Nation I am a member of so to bestow mine allegiance; were I and the Country free from all tye of subjection (in the presupposed Case) to the expulsed Magistrate; yet I could not lawfully make such a private bargain of my allegiance, it's the part and duty of a particular person in a Nation (that is joined together as one body politic or Commonwealth) not to choose his head, or supreme Governor by his single election, or vote, but, when a new Magistracy is to be erected, or Magistrate advanced, to attend the common and general vote of the people, or body politic he is of; solitarily, or with a small party to alter the state and posture of my public allegiance (in this case) would be sedition, and faction; the current of the people or community I am of is to be followed, at least where they justly dispose of the Sovereignty over them. It was in itself a loyal, and right resolution (had it been in such a case as this, and not misapplyed) which Hushai expressed, Nay, but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose; his will I be, and him will I follow; It would be to me (I confess) a difficult case, and harder than I will here undertake to resolve, if the body of the Kingdom (in the case in hand) should either collectively, or representatively conspire; notwithstanding their oaths, vows, and Covenants, to abrogate the ancient Sovereign Power, and to set up the Usurpers; but that's not the present case, here is no general consent of the Kingdom presupposed, or pleaded for in behalf of the Usurper; the dispute is about obedience to mere Usurpation. And in this state of things, to leave every man free, to make over his allegiance by himself, is to open a door to more divisions than ever yet were in any Age, or Nation, and would confound all, not an heptarchy; but a chiliarchy, 
1 Sam. 10.27. 2 Sam. 19.41.20.1.  or myriarchy might follow. When Saul had a general vote of the people to be King, they were children of Belial that refused him; and at David's re-investing after Absoloms' treason, and fall, the men of Israel challenged them of Judah for going about to restore the King without them; the far greater part of the Kingdom, and that man of Belial, Sheba, the son of Bichri, was justly pursued with the sword unto death, for blowing a trumpet of defection from David, when they both had consented to re-advance him.  
5. But there is a bar yet behind, of as main a strength as any yet stood on, to keep back such a submittance to the Usurper, and that is the Oaths, Vows, Protestations, and Covenants presupposed above to be taken by the people, for their owning, obeying and defending the power or Magistracy displaced, and in opposition to whose right the Usurper comes and continues in.  
I have hitherto discussed the question in a case without reflection upon any particular Kingdom, or real Subject; and so I shall do still, only I shall borrow leave, in the prosecution of this Argument, to presuppose, in the aforesaid Case, the Oaths and Covenant were the same that have been taken in this Kingdom of England. The Author of the book called, The lawfulness of obeying the present Government, in his 11. page moveth an inquiry thus: It were good to consider whether there be any clause in any Oath, or Covenant, which, in a fair and common sense, forbidden obedience to the Commands of the present Government, and Authority: and proceeding, he only makes enquiry into one clause of the Oath of Allegiance, which he strives to bow to his sense, and passeth by all besides. I shall speak to what he saith on that clause anon; and shall here only interrogate, or propound by way of quaere, concerning divers clauses in the Oaths, Protestations, Vows and Covenants.  
First, concerning the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, whereas in the former, it is sworn, I shall bear faith, and true Allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs, and Successors: and him and them will defend to the uttermost of my power, against all conspiracies, and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his, or their persons, their Crown, or dignity. And in the latter, I shall bear faith, and true allegiance to the King's Highness, his Heirs, and lawful Successors: and, to my power, shall assist, and defend all jurisdictions, privileges, preeminencies, and Authorities granted to the King's Highness, his Heirs, and Successors; or united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm. First, do not these Oaths bind, whomsoever hath taken them, clearly, plainly, and in terminis to an Allegiance, overliving his Majesty's person, and pitched upon his Heirs and Successors; so that he is not tree from the Oaths at his Majesty's decease, or then left at random to pay his allegiance to whom he will choose? 2. Do they not intent, by His Majesty's Heirs and Successors, the same persons, joining them together with the copulative (and) and not using the discretive (or) and the former Oath twice comprising both in the following clauses under the same term or pronoun, (viz: them, theirs) so that, according to these Oaths, His Heirs, are of right his successors, and none can be his Successor, (whilst he hath an Heir, and longer the Oath lasts not) but his Heir; and if any conspiracy or attempt should be made to prevent his Heir from being and continuing his successor, or to make any one his successor that is not his heir, (if he hath one) is not the Subject sworn, by virtue of this Oath, to continue his allegiance to his Heir as the right successor, and to defend him in that his right to his uttermost? 3. And doth not the term (lawful) annexed to Successors (in the Oath of Supremacy) manifestly exclude all cavil of a distinction betwixt Heirs and successors; the word (lawful) (whether you interpret it of legitimation of birth, or proximity of succession in regard of line, according to the Law of the Land, entailing the Crown upon his Majesty's issue; or rather both the latter including the former, restraining successors from meaning any other than his heirs? 4. And do not both these Oaths bind the swearer to assist and defend to his uttermost power, against all attempts, Monarchy, or the Kingly Office, and Government (in the race of his Majesty) clearly expressed by many terms, to wit, Their Crown or dignity, all jurisdictions, privileges, preeminences, and Authorities, granted to the King's Highness, his heirs, and successors, or united, and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm. How then can he yield obedience to them that are not his heirs, nor lawful successors, nor do so much as wear his Crown, or sway the Regal Sceptre? How can he not oppose, and withstand them in the assistance and defence of the right of his Majesty's heirs and lawful successors?  
2. Concerning the Vow and Protestation of the 5. of May, 1641. and the Solemn League and Covenant. 1. How can any that hath taken the said Protestation according to it, maintain and defend the true Protestant Religion, expressed in the Doctrine of the Church of England, against all Popery, and Popish innovations within this Realm, contrary to the same Doctrine; and yet yield obedience to an usurping authority, coming in, and holding in derogation of, and opposition to the lawful Prince; when as the public doctrine of that Church (laid down in the 2. Tom of Homilies, and the last Homily thereof approved of by the 35. Article of Religion) fully and flatly refuteth, and condemneth any Subjects removing, or disposing their Prince, upon any pretence whatsoever?  
2ly, How can any man according to the Protestation, maintain and defend, the power and privileges of Parliament, and according to the Covenant preserve the rights and privileges of Parliament; and yet yield obedience to a small party of one of the Houses of Parliament, as the Supreme Power, the said party excluding the rest of that House, and the other House wholly; and deposing the lawful Prince, and abolishing the Office of the King, whose presence, personal, or legal, and political, hath been declared inseparable from the Parliament, and joining with an Army, that with force hath demanded, and carried on these things?  
3. How can be, according to the Protestation, maintain and defend the lawful rights, and liberties of the Subject; and, according to the Covenant, preserve the liberties of the Kingdom; and yet obey, and own a merely usurped power. Whereas the most fundamental civil Liberty of a Kingdom, and Subjects is to have a Government over them, set up by the constitution, or consent of the people; not obtruded on them by those, who of their own will and power, without any calling from them, assume it to themselves?  
4. How can he, according to the Covenant, preserve and defend the King's Majesty's Person, and Authority, etc. and yet yield obedience to those usurpers, who, after his death, cast down his Authority, and place themselves instead thereof as the Supreme Power; whereas his Authority, in the plain intention of the Covenant, is to be preserved and defended beyond the term of his life, and in his posterity; as it appears from this clause compared with those words in the preface, Having before our eyes the glory of God,— the honour and happiness of the King's Majesty, and his posterity?  
5. Lastly, how doth he, according to the Protestation, to his power, and as far as lawfully he may, oppose, and by all good ways, and means endeavour to bring to condign punishment all such as shall either by force, practice, counsels, plots, conspiracies, or otherwise, do any thing to the contrary of any thing in this present Protestation contained; and, according to the Covenant, not suffer himself directly, or indirectly, by whatsoever combination, persuasion, or terror to be divided, or withdrawn from this blessed Union and conjunction; whether to make defection to the contrary part, or give himself to a detestable indifferency, or neutrality in this cause, which so much concerneth the glory of God, the good of the Kingdom, and honour of the King, but, all the days of his life, zealously, and constantly continue therein against all opposition, and promote the same, according to his power, against all lets and impediments whatsoever, that yields allegiance, and obedience to a party standing, and leading all those that agree to obey them in so palpable contradiction, and opposition to some material points, and concernments of Religion, divers most fundamental rights of the Parliament and people, and all the Authority and whole being of the King, contained and covenanted for, in the aforesaid Protestation and Covenant respectively.   

CHAP. III. The question discussed, Whether submission to, and acting under a usurped Power for the time, be lawful, with a reservation of Allegiance to the lawful Power supposed to be expulsed.  
I Now come to inquire into the other opinion before mentioned, viz: That one may submit, and act under a usurped Power, for the time, and during the interval of its prevalency; with reservation of allegiance, as due and cordially devoted to the lawful Power expulsed. And about this we shall not insist long, because we find not much contestation or difficulty.  
In regard of the justness, and necessity of some things which may be the subject, or matter of the Usurpers command, and the Arbitrariness of others, and the lawfulness of either, not depending upon the command or warrant of a superior, but resulting out of the nature of the action itself; so that a private man might do it, were there no Magistrate to command it, or no command from the Magistrate for it. We must needs grant, there are things which may be done upon the Usurpers command or injunction, (though not because or by virtue of it) for the command of him that unwarrantably assumeth power, cannot, by itself, make that unlawful which were lawful if that were not. For instance, the performance of acts of common equity, charity, order, public utility, and self-preservation is requisite: suppose it be in concurrence with a Usurpers command, and in thus doing we do materially, but not formally obey him; the ground of acting, in such things, being not at all any relation, or principle of subjection to him; but conscience of obedience to the will of God, and due respect to others, and our own safety, and good. Under this sort of actions I comprehend:  
1. Taking up Arms for the preservation of ourselves and the Country against a common Enemy, upon the Usurpers summons; the which we might do of ourselves, were there no Authority; or if a just Authority were in being, yet if it could not, or did not, maturely enough call us forth to it.  
2. Payment of taxes, and bearing other impositions for the usurping Power, where, and while we are under his compulsive power, because such contributions may, and will be taken whether I will pay them or not; and I yield them under his enforcement, as a ransom for my life, or liberty, or somewhat else that is better to me then the payment; and consequently I am to choose the parting with it as the less evil, rather than with that which is better, which to lose is to incur a greater evil for the avoidance of a less. In this point Mr. Ascham, the afore named Author, (Part. 2. Chap. 1. page 35.) determineth well (had he not contradicted (as I understand him) that he delivers in this and the next Chap. with that assertion of his part. 1. cap. 6. page 25.) distinguishing rightly betwixt that which cannot be had, nor the value of it, unless I actually give it; and that which may be taken whether I contribute it or no. Of this latter kind is paying of Taxes in this case; 
a Nolite igitur fortunam in culpam convertere; neque regis injuriam hujus crimen putare; nec consilium ex necessitate, nec voluntatem ex v● interpretari. Cicero Orat. 39 pro C. Rabino postumo. So he defendeth Posthumus his changing his Roman gown for a cloak at Alexandria as compelled by K: Ptolemy.  herein I am but morally passive, as a man that is fallen into the hands of a pack of bloody thiefs; and, being demanded it, takes his purse out of his pocket, and delivers it to them, though with his own hand (saith that Author) he puts his purse into their hands, yet the Law calls not that a gift, nor excuseth the thief for taking it, but all contrary. Or a man, apprehended by a party of the invading Enemies, or Usurpers Army, walks or rides along with them to their muster or battle, when as he cannot escape them, and otherwise they would draw him. But it is commonly objected thus. Obj. This payment or other charge is taken, and will be used to an evil use as to maintain Usurpation. R: But that's beyond my deliberation, not in my power to prevent; it will not be avoided by putting them to force it from me, but rather more gain will accrue to them, and damage to me, if I stand out; my denying will be made an occasion by them to take more: this case is like that of entering into a Covenant with those that in covenanting we know before hand will swear by a false god, wherein, Divines 
b Augustinus ad publicolam. Epist. 15 4. Gen. 21.31.31.31.  resolve, the party swearing by the true God participateth not in his sin that swears by a false one, in as much as he communicates with him in the Covenant, not in the oath taken on his part, and provides thereby for his necessary security; and thus did Abraham, and Jacob, in their respective Covenants with Abimelech and Laban.  
3. Complaining, petitioning, or going to Law before the Magistrates or Courts authorized by the Usurpers. (Provided, you give not the Usurpers, to whom you petition, such Titles as you give to the lawful Magistrate.) In thus doing, I seek my necessary self preservation; neither do I yield, 
Excusantur à peccato inducendi tyrannum ad actum, & opus illicitum petentes ab illo iustitiam, quia non petunt actum illicitum, sed justitiam illius actus illiciti pre interpretandae sunt petitiones tam iustitiae quam honestae gratiae quae esterantur Tyrannis, scilicer si vis, seu ex quo vis detinere, & exercere hoc deminium, utere illo just, utere honest, utere pie, utere ad utilitatem publicam, & privatorum, prout deceret dominium nec intendunt, nec petunt actum usurpatum, sed qualitatem sanctam inactu usurpato exercendo. Ca●etan summula, Tit. Remp. tyrannice, etc.  or ascribe to them to whom I have recourse any just power of judicature, or participate in their sin of usurping it; only I acknowledge they have might and ability in their hand to right me; which, though they ought not to assume, yet I may take the benefit of their unjust use of it; as a poor man may receive relief at the hands of him that hath gotten those goods he distributeth unjustly; and I may receive my money, with a good conscience, from the hands of a thief that is willing to return it to me, though he took it by robbery, from another thief that rob me of it; and if the party, with whom I have a controversy for my right, will agree to refer the matter, betwixt us, to a private person as an Arbitrator, and stand to his arbitrement; that is a lawful means of coming by my own, though by his help, and award that hath not claim of Authority over me; my submitting therefore my private right to the judgement of an usurping Magistracy, is no placing or owning a public power of judicature to be in him. It hath been ordinary (and there is no doubt of the lawfulness of it) for a Soldier to ask quarter, a prisoner liberty, a man his plundered goods of his Enemy: yet in all this there is no concession of a legal power in that Enemy to be a Judge over the said Petitioners, either in case of life, goods, or liberty; only in the form of address to the Usurper, we had need be cautelous that such a style be not used as will be a plain concession of his title to the power which he usurps.  
But, in granting liberty of concurrence with some commands of an usurped Authority, we neither yield any obedience at all to be due, or performable to it; nor can we allow a correspondence with it in divers things, and therefore we are to put a difference.  
First, betwixt things that are in themselves necessary, and those that are of a middle or an indifferent nature in themselves considered. In the latter, though, in some cases, I may act upon the Usurpers injunction; as our Saviour paid tribute where he was not bound to it, to avoid scandal; yet I must be cautious, 1. of owning, justifying, or upholding the usurpation, or injustice of the party commanding, the very appearance whereof I must as much as I can avoid. So did our Saviour, in paying the tribute gatherers their demand, by declaring his freedom, and the consideration upon which he paid, viz: not the equity of the demand, but his willingness to prevent scandal. And therefore in the observing of a duty of Religion, necessary in itself, and appointed, by unjustifiable Authority, to be kept on such a set day, which is in itself, arbitrary; the best way is, to take another day for it, for the shunning of the appearance of the evil of obeying an unjust power. 2. Of doing any thing that I may foresee will bring a worse scandal being acted, than the omission of it would; it being required of a Christian, where scandall-takeing lies both ways (as not seldom it doth) to shun the offence that is of worse consequence, which is usually that which is more generally taken, or by persons more considerable, or worthy of tender respect. The Apostle Paul, condemning Judaisme in Peter, and others at Antioch, practised in favour of a few, where the most part were Gentile Christians, Gal. 2.11. etc. but admitted it at Jerusalem, where the greater sort were believing Jews, Act. 21.20, etc.  
2. Betwixt moral, or prudential acts compatible to private men, or subjects, and political acts, or judicial proceed that flow from power, and Authority inherent in the person that acts them, or are the issues of distributive justice, and either come forth from a person clothed with Government, or unto which is requisite a stamp of Authority to make them lawful, and justifiable: as to bear the office of a Magistrate, or Commander in Civil or Military affairs, or to be any under Agent, or servant in carrying on, or assisting the Government. An Usurper, in giving out Commissions, Commands or Warrants for proceed of this nature, I conceive may not, in this kind, be obeyed. Men are not to act as subordinate rulers, or agents, under such a power, or as sent by him as supreme in the Apostles sense, 1 Pet. 2.14. For,  
1. The Usurpers authority being indeed null, and of no effect, he being in truth but in a private man's capacity, as to the power he assumes; he cannot communicate, or derive any authority unto me, whereby I may act, that which before I could not; so that those actions, which require the seal of Authority to make them lawful, and which without it would be irregular and sinful, it must needs be clearly unlawful for me to do, by virtue of his Commission. Conscientious advised men will generally judge it presumption, violence, oppression, bloodshed, respectively for a private man to take upon him of himself, to imprison, chastise, amerce, or put to death any supposed, or really manifested malefactor; and if I have no other humane warrant but the Usurpers, it leaving me but in a private man's capacity, will leave my actions of that nature under no better a character. If I should, being about such undertake, be asked that question of our Saviour, Luk. 12.14. Man, who made thee a judge, or a divider over us? What satisfaction would it be to him that so enquireth, or to mine own conscience to allege the name of the Usurper, who, as to supreme Authority, and consequently to the making of a competent Officer of Justice, is as good as no body.  
2ly, So to act would make me a usurper also, and bring me in to be a partner in the supreme usurpers sins; in as much as political or State instruments, to wit, their subordinate agents, share together with the superior in the moral qualification of the work of Government.  
3ly, This were manifestly to uphold, and maintain Usurpation; thus I should contribute assistance and support to the unjust power, and oppose the right of him, or them against whom he holds it; they that favour this kind of acting as requisite, in regard of the subjects protection, and safety, seem not to consider, that a subordinate officers acting looketh upward, as well as downward; and he that is such a one to the Usurper, serves his turn of subsistence in an unlawful possession as much, or more than the subjects benefit. For first, he acknowledgeth and justifieth his authority as sufficient and valid by officiating under, and by it. 2. He keeps up that authority, and extends it to as many as he hath to do with. 3. He gives an example and encouragement to others to embrace and propagate it, as he himself doth. 4. He lays an engagement upon himself to stand or fall with the Usurper; and so to do his utmost for him. 5. He involves himself, either wittingly, or blindfoldly in a concurrence with those counsels, and actions, which both in their own nature, and in the intention, and projection of the Usurper, directly tend to the Usurpers establishment, and the impeachment of the lawful Governors claim, and re-advancement.  
Upon these grounds, and the like, the secluded and the sejoined members (in the case stated, Chap. 1.) had need be advised well before they enter, or act among the presupposed Usurpers: though they might be admitted by them without questioning, or purging, I question how they can enter amongst them without self-soyling: though they should, in going in, resolve to act honestly, yet, I see not how they can be untainted in a concession with those, who in their present comprehension or totality, assume a power not legally in them, and act legislatively, and otherwise in the highest sphere of supremacy: a force being upon the House, and the majority of Members, and the Authority of the King, and the Lords-House being professedly excluded by them. They that are out may do well to resolve, before they join, how it can be lawful for them that sit to act at all (though never so just things) the whole, or body, to which they belong, being so mangled in its Members, and manacled in its freedom. And, if at all they may act, how according to Law, conscience, and their Oaths and Covenants, they can govern in that solitariness of supremacy, and deposition of their compeers: if they think these things unjustifiable in them that sit, have they not cause to be wary how they involve themselves in such men's actings, whilst they stand in that posture? Besides, that they in coming in help to strengthen the usurpers by increasing their number, and giving them countenance in the eye of the Kingdom, as much as if they in all things concurred with them; for without the House, who knows how men sway, or give their votes? And, on the other hand, they weaken and much prejudice the claim of the lawful Power, by appearing on the contrary party, putting themselves into an incapacity to act for it, as otherwise they might, and engaging themselves to assist, or at least, not to oppose the Usurpers.  
Finally, let them recollect, before they enter that door, what they have sworn to his late Majesty, his Heirs, and lawful Successors; what to the Parliaments Power, rights and privileges, and what to the Kingdom, 
Et magnum sit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, veniendumne sit in Consilium tyranni, si i● aliqua de re bona deliberaturus sit. Quare si quid ejusmodi evenerit ut accersamur, quid censea● mihi faciendum, utque scribito. Nihil enim mihi adhuc accidit, quod majoris consilii est. M. T. Cicero, epist. ad T. Pomp. Atticum. l. 10 ep. 1.  and Subjects lawful rights and privileges; and deliberate how they, keeping of those things, and sitting down with these men, will be reconciled. I find that even wise Heathens have scrupled at this, without the supposition of such Oaths.   

CHAP. FOUR The obligatorinesse of the Oaths and Covenant, urged in the 2d. Chap: against obedience to Usurpers, made good against divers late Authors.  
BEfore I take in hand to answer Arguments that are brought for the confirmation of those two opinions for obedience to Usurpation, and against which I have argued in the preceding Chapters; it will be convenient in this place to take notice of such allegations and Exceptions, as are made against the obligation of the Oaths and Covenants before urged as binding out from that obedience: sundry late Authors having pleaded that the Oaths, and Covenant either are not now in force, but expired, or do not extend too, and bind in the case to which they are applied. I begin with the Remonstrance presented to the House of Commons, Novemb: 20. 1648. which unto the clause in the Solemn League and Covenant, Art: 3. obliging to endeavour to preserve and defend the King's Majesty's person and Authority, in the preservation and defence of the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdom: allegeth divers things, some of which concern only the obligation to the preservation of the King's person, those are past consideration, other reflect upon it in relation to his Authority, as unto which I have urged it to be still in force, and therefore shall examine what the Remonstrance saith for the invalidating of it as unto that, bringing in only so much of its argumentation, as can be construed to tend to this purpose: and of this nature I observe two Allegations.  
1. The words (in the preservation and defence of the true Religion, and Liberties of the Kingdoms) are a restriction to the engagement for preservation of the King's person, and Authority, so as to oblige them to no further, nor in any other way then shall be consistent with the preservation and defence of the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdoms, but if by reason and experience we find the preservation and defence of his person to be not safe, but full of visible danger (if not certainly destructive) to Religion, or public interest, then surely (by the Covenant itself) the preservation of his person or authority is not to be endeavoured so far, or in such a way, or at least the Covenant obligeth not to it, but against it: page 55, 56.  
1. It is not necessary nor proper to take the words, in the preservation, etc. as restrictive to the engagement either way, that is either for the preservation and defence of the King's person and Authority on the one hand; or of the true Religion and Liberties of the Kingdoms on the other: It is not necessary (I say) for those words in the Article (in our several vocations) are an express, and fully sufficient restriction, taking in, and binding to all lawful and just ways of preserving and defending each of them, and excluding all unlawful. Neither is it proper, [in] there being clearly conjunctive, and as much as [with] and equally looking both ways, that is, both to the preservation and defence of that which goes before, and that which follows, unto the preservation and defence of all which (though they be not of equal worth or interest, so that one of them must come behind the other in the order of our endeavours of their preservation and defence, yet) the Covenant binds equally (in regard of the firmness of the obligation) yet if any shall still contend, that clause to be restrictive in that manner which the Remonstrance saith, I will not strive in a verbal contention with him; for the taking of it so no more lesseneth our obligation to the preservation of the King's Authority, then if it had not been inserted; we being tied notwithstanding it, to all just ways of preservation thereof, and no more had been involved if it had been left out.  
2. But the sinews of this Argument lieth in the pretended or employed inconsistency betwixt the preservation and defence of Religion and the Kingdoms liberties; unto which I say:  
1. There is doubtless a fair consistency, non-opposition, or agreement betwixt the safety of every one of these, the being of each of them may and can stand with the other, it is a groundless surmise, and gross absurdity to imagine an inconsistency betwixt the just interests of any of them, our taking of them together into the Covenant yields thus much; if there were any incoexistency amongst them, we could not have sworn to their joint preservation; or if we did, the Oath was of impossibles, and so (as to this branch) both unlawful and void, or non-obliging in the making of it 
a Regula juris rei impossibilis nulla obligatio. .  
2. An endeavour to preserve the one and the other will well enough stand together; a lawful power indeed actually and effectually to preserve them all may happen to be wanting, and any one of them may fall under danger, and I may want just means to relieve it, but an endeavour (which can only import a doing what is within power and warrant) may be yielded still to the preservation of every of them.  
3. Seeing then that an inconsistibility either of the things one with another, or of the endeavouring their preservation cannot be pleaded as possibly incident or occurrent, evident it is, that there cannot at any time lie a necessity of taking a way of any of them, and that the obligation of the Covenant to the endeavour of preserving every of them continually stands in force during their respective existence, and consequently it bindeth out from intending, seeking, attempting, or prosecuting the abolishing or destruction of any of them; for that is indeed truly inconsistent with the said endeavour, and therefore a palpable violation of the Covenant.  
It must here be granted, that the lawful and necessary defence and preservation of one of them, sometimes may so employ me that I cannot at that time by the same means act for the others safety; ye● what I act for one, may put the other in hazard, and in the issue not only be accompanied with, but (though against my will, and endeavours to the utmost of my lawful capacity) contingently, and besides my intention prove the loss and ruin of the other: and this is incident not from any contrariety or inconsistency that is betwixt them, but both because they are distinct, and separable things, and so cannot always, and by the same medium be concurrently prosecuted: and because some of them are more worthy than the other, which must therefore have the preeminency thus far, that if they cannot altogether with my best endeavours be secured, I am to prefer the security of the most precious, and expose any of the other rather to danger than it. As for instance, it will (I suppose) be admitted to be agreeable to the Covenant, for the Kingdoms rather to omit the safeguarding of their Liberties, and put them to the hazard then the true Religion,, where both cannot be jointly put out of danger: but all this amounts not to a disobligement from the endeavour of preserving them all; nor to a liberty upon any emergency of active, direct, and purposed making away, or removing of any of them, though under pretence of securing the other. I have read of one Alcon, who finding his son fast on sleep upon the grass, and a Serpent creeping upon his breast, he not apprehending how otherwise it was possible to save his son, took his Bow, and shot at the Serpent upon the boy's breast, which (though to the manifest endangering of his life) yet the chose rather to take that course, then by suffering the Serpent to leave his life to a more certain destruction; and either his art or good hap was such, as that he prevented and slew the Serpent, and preserved his Son: 
b Ars erat esse patrem●cit ●tura pe●ic ●m: Et par●er ●●venem somnoque & mort● levavit. Manilius li 3.  those whom we are bound and most solicitous to preserve, we may upon an extreme exigence put in some hazard that we may preserve them; but there is a great difference betwixt this, and a deliberate purposed, declared prosecuting them to destruction.  
3. But how doth the Remonstrancer prove the Assumption, viz: The inconsistency pretended betwixt the endeavour of the preservation of the King's person and Authority, and the preservation of Religion and liberty? thus he saith, By reas●n, and experience we find the preservation and defence of his person and Authority, to be not safe, but full of visible danger (if not certainly destructive) to religious or public Interest.  
If the one could be said to be certainly destructive to the other, you would have said it without an [if not] but it seems you have not confidence to assever so much, and yet they cannot be purely inconsistent without such a destructiveness; so that your own extenuation sufficiently discovers the weakness of your proof; all that you affirm is, That there is no safety, but a full visible danger in the preservation which you impugn.  
1. The danger you pretend is in the disposal and use of the things to be preserved, not in the nature of the things. For instance, the King's Authority is politically and morally good, the ordinance of God, and if well used may be eminently advantageous; if evilly used may be dangerous enough to Religion and liberties: the like may also be said or the privileges of the Parliament, and of the liberties of the Kingdoms in relation to Religion, and to each other; will you thence infer an inconsistency of these with Religion, or a disobligement from the Covenant for preservation and defence of these?  
2. As there may be danger that way to the things specified, so there may be danger and insecurity to the same things on the other hand, viz: in the destruction of the King's person (suppose it were undone) and Authority, and let impartial Reason and Experience judge, whether the preservation or destruction thereof hath more danger in it to Religion, and the Kingdom's Liberty.  
3. But seeing there may be some danger on each side, and in the preservation of the King's Authority, there is no more pretended but danger, and that but of suffering, not of sin, it is apparent, that as there is no such inconsistency as is intimated, so the obligation of the Covenant to the preservation of the King's Authority stands good, and our safest way is to avoid the horrid sin, and greater danger of Covenant-breaking, by standing upon the said preservation.  
2ly, The other thing which the Remonstrance allegeth, and is to be cleared is this. Where several persons joining to make a Covenant, do make a covenanting clause therein to the good or benefit of another person not present, no party to the agreement, but whom, and whose Interest they would willingly provide for as well as for their own, to the end be might join with them in the agreement, and partake the benefit thereof as well as themselves, if this absent party (when it is tendered to him for his conjunction) shall not accept the Agreement, but refuse to join in, and oppose it, and begin, prosecute and multiply contests with all the Covenanters about the matters contained in it. Surely that person in so doing by his once refusing upon a fair and full tender, sets the other Covenanters free from any further obligation, by virtue of that Covenant, as to what concerns his benefit or interest therein. Now whether this be not your case, etc.  
1. True indeed, a releasement from Covenants and promissory oaths, which concern matters betwixt man and man is granted lawful some ways: But, 1. this must be done by the party with whom the Covenant, and to whom the Oath is made 
c Si is cui juratur ratum habuerit iuramentum, & veli● servari, non potest ab alia quacunq, tertia persona relaxari ratio est, quia nemo potest ius alteri acquisitum, nisi ipse consenserit adimere. D Saunderson de iuram: 1. rome oblige. praelect. 7. Sect. 8. , but as the Remonstrancer acknowledgeth, this Covenant was made the King being not present, nor a party covenanting, or covenanted with but a third person, the persons covenanting, and covenanted with mutually (as by the Introductory part is manifest) were the Noblemen, Barons, Knights, etc. in the Kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, it was it may be desired, and hoped that the King and his Issue would afterwards approve and join in it, but the Covenant was actually plighted, and therefore did actually bind in every branch of it they not taking it; and (the parties with whom we covenanted not releasing us) the pretended refusal of the King could be no discharge from it. 2. A releasement can be made by the party covenanted with and sworn too, only where the Covenant is for the particular and proper interest of that party, or so far only as concerneth him, but not to the prejudice of a third party's concernment without his consent 
d Dico sexto, relaxationem partis valere ad vinculum juramenti solvendum, quantum ipsius interest: non tamen valere in praeiudicium tertiae personae. Ratio est, quia potest quilibet per actum suum de iure proprio quantum vult remittere: sed non potest quisquam de alieno iure quicquam demere, ipso vel inconsulto vel invito, si alterius cuiusquam intersit ex aliquo suo iure obligationem non solvi, obligatio non solvitur. Ibid. ; but the Covenant (even in that part of it) was not merely or chief of a private or personal importance to the King himself, but was, and is of a public interest to the Covenanters themselves and the Kingdoms; the King's refusal therefore and opposition to it could be no release from it: we say on all hands, the King is for the Kingdom as the means is for the end. We have ten parts in the King, said the men of Israel of David; and at another time they said and swore, Thou shalt no more go out with us to battle, that thou quench not the light of Israel. What portion have we in David? and we have none inheritance in the son of Jesse, the ten Tribes said, when they made a revolt from, and rebelled against Rehoboam.  
The Introduction of the Covenant in laying down the concernments and ends for the making of it, expresseth itself thus: Having before our eyes the glory of God, and the advancement of the kingdom of our Lord, and Saviour Jesus Christ, the honour and happiness of the King's Majesty, and his posterity, and the true public liberty, safety, and peace of the Kingdoms wherein every ones private condition is included. And a little afterwards, We have for the preservation of ourselves, and our Religion from utter ruin and destruction, resolved, and determined to enter into a mutual and solemn, League and Covenant, etc. And Art: 6. it styleth its cause, This Common cause of Religion, liberty and peace of the Kingdoms: which cause, it saith presently after, so much concerneth the glory of God, the good of the Kingdoms, and honour of the King.  
2. The King never refused to agree to, nor did he oppose the matter of this particular clause: as touching this there could be no dissent on his part, his prescribing and standing upon the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, wherein this clause is contained, his avowing the difference and war on his part to be for the defence of his person, and authority; his putting forth Oaths to them that adhered to him for the preservation of these, makes it as clear as noonday that he refused and opposed not this branch. Now upon this consideration, the Remonstrancer hath not only failed in his allegation, but overthrown his own argument; he saying in the place before cited, Although the Kings refusing sets the Covenanters free from any further obligation by virtue of that Covenant, 〈◊〉 to what concerns his interest and benefit therein, yet the Covenant as to other matters concerning the right and benefit of the Covenanters one from another stands still obliging, and in force. I may by the same reason say, the Kings refusing the Covenant upon exception against other clauses, not this, and his opposing other matters in the Covenant, not this, could not disengage or release the Covenanters from this, about which there was not the least dissent or reluctancy, but a concurrence full enough on his part; so that the Covenant must stand still obliging and in force as to this part.  
3. If the Kings said refusal and opposition could have discharged us from this member of the Covenant as to his own person and interest in the Authority, yet with all your straining you cannot stretch them to our release from preservation and defence of the Kingly Authority in relation to his posterity, who were in proximity to him interested in it; and for whose interest therein the Covenant was also made 
e Having before our eyes the honour & Happiness of the King's Majesty, and his posterity. ; and whose refusal of it, nor yet a tender of it to them, you do not, cannot once plead.  
I have done with the wrong gloss of the Remonstrancer endeavouring to impeach the obligation of this clause of the Covenant. I find another (a dear friend of his) tampering with it also to elude the tye of it; and he offers it no less violence, but in a more unhandsome and gross manner. It is that Polemic, or Army-Divine, Mr. J.G. in his Defence of the Honourable Sentence, etc. The man in that book undertaketh, and bends his skill to a double unhappy, and cross design, to wit, to varnish and gild over that which is very foul, and to besmear and obscure that which is very clear. In his prosecution of the latter he falls upon this sentence of the Covenant, in dealing with which he correspondeth with the Remonstrancer, and as this hath challenged to himself a prerogative to enforce men and Magistrates, so doth he arrogate to himself to be a bold enforcer of words and Covenants; a more strange and presumptuous perverting of plain words, I never read nor heard, then that which he useth to this clause, when he saith, page 51. Evident it is, that those words in the Covenant in the preservation and defence of the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdoms, import a condition to be performed on the King's part, without the performance whereof, the Covenant obligeth no man to the preservation or defence of his Person or Authority. And this condition he makes to be, page 52, 53. That he preserve and defend the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdom: and of this his paraphrase of the words he saith, If this be not the clear meaning and importance of them, the Covenant is a Barbarian unto me, I understand not the English of it. The vast exorbitancy, audaciousness, and impiety of this his wresting, and straining of these plain words, I leave the Reader to take the measure of: I shall only endeavour to free them from this his distortion.  
1. Let the words themselves speak, they do not say in his preservation and defence, etc. but in the preservation and defence, etc. plainly referring to the same preservation and defence of Religion and Liberties which is before promised, and sworn in this and the preceding Articles, and as evidently referring to the same persons preservation, and defence of them here, which are to preserve and defend them in the former clauses, and which are to preserve and defend the King's Majesty's person and Authority in this, viz: the Covenanters. If the Covenant had intended to pitch the preservation and defence in this clause upon another person, or persons, as the performers besides those to whom the same actions are referred immediately before, it would have pointed them out distinctly; but when it expresses no other, ordinary construction will attribute them to the parties before nominated; and no regular construction can put them upon any other. This reading is plain English to him that knows the language, and will understand, and Mr. G. proves himself a barbarous dealer with the covenant, in that he will have it, either to admit of his antigramaticall sense, or to be a Barbarian to him. I dare appeal to Mr. Gs. own conscience, if it be not either speechless, or a Barbarian to him, whether, when he took this Covenant, he understood this clause in the meaning he would now thrust upon it; or rather hath not played the Doedalus since, in shaping, and bringing forth this sense to serve his turn, and defend what hath been since acted.  
2. In making this the importance of those words, Mr. G. contradicts his friend, or Patron the Remonstrancer, in his expounding of them, and takes away the very medium, or ground of his argument before brought in out of his book, page 55, 56. and answered above. For he page 55. takes those words either as a restriction to the engagement for preservation of the King's person and Authority, to wit, as obliging no further than is consistent therewith: yea he proposeth whether the said engagement may not be so understood as to be fulfilled in the preservation of Religion and Liberties; neither of which senses can carry that clause to the King as the performer: and in page 56, he explaineth this preservation, and defence of Religion, and liberties to be the Parliaments Covenanted utmost endeavour to preserve them. Let Mr. J. G. then leave endeavouring to reconcile the Covenant and his cause which are at too great odds to be reconcileable, and go make the Remonstrancer and himself friends, who differ so diametrically in their sense of these words.  
3. How will Mr. G. make this sense of his, and the proceed against the late King stand together? for before the King was so proceeded against, he had consented to all that was positively proposed to him for Religion, at least for 3. years; and for the privative part propounded, to wit, the Abolition of Episcopacy he had not denied it, but granted the present suspension, and referred the utter extirpation of it to the deliberation of the Assembly, and ordering of Parliament; against whose consent he had agreed nothing should be done for the restoring of it: and had granted fully the Parliaments overtures for Liberties. Neither doth the Remonstrancer, or any other (as far as I have observed) insist on the shortness of the King's concessions in any particulars of either nature, as the ground of those capital proceed, but on the inexpiablenesse of his former facts, and the unsafeness of trusting him for future upon any terms. If then the King, immediately before the fatal prosecution against him, did (as his present state would permit) concur so amply in the preservation of Religion and Liberties, they were bound that had taken this Covenant by virtue of this clause taken in Mr. Gs. sense, whatever had been his former carriage) then to endeavour the preservation of his person and Authority. The Covenant in this branch is indefinite, and unrestrained in regard of time; it doth not say (suppose Mr. Gs. meaning had been its words) we shall preserve the King's person and Authority, if he shall (within a year or two after this) preserve Religion, and Liberties; but obligeth the Covenanters whenever the King should join in preserving Religion and Liberties (as Mr. G. understandeth it) to the preservation of his person and Authority. Here then Mr. G. instead of weakening the Covenant, as to the end it was urged by those whom he opposeth, hath by wring turned it against himself, and that his adored cause which he would have defended, and that with more strength than is in any of those reasons (or rather shifts and colours) brought by himself or any other Roscius— for it.  
4. If that indeed were the sense of that clause which he would outface us into the accepting of, what can be said against the binding of it to the preservation and defence of the kingly Authority still? (though the then King be deceased) it being before proved, that this clause obligeth to it in reference to the King's posterity, against whom there can be Objection of a fail in this supposed condition, it being unperformable without default whilst possession of the Authority is withheld; and the Authority being withheld before, either any refusal of the supposed condition, by him that should perform it, or any overture to him, for the obtaining of it be made.  
I have thus done with the exceptions made against the obligatorinesse of the Covenant, in the matter in hand; I now pass to the Examination of what is pleaded against the force of the Oaths of Allegiance amongst the impugners of them; I'll begin with him whom I had last to deal with, Mr. J. G. who in the same book, pag: 58, 59, 60. thinks to discharge us from these bonds, with a Reason framed as followeth.  
(In recital whereof I shall rehearse as much of him as expresseth his Argumentation, omitting those two hetorogeneous instances [of keeping back a mad man's sword, and of a State's dis-engagement from league with another State that hath first broken league with it] as impertinent both to his reason and our case.)  
Peter Martyr (saith Mr. G.) well observes concerning the promises of God [that they are to be understood according to the present state and condition of things when they are made] meaning that no performance of them is intended ●y God in case men shall decline from that integrity under which, and in relation unto which such promises were made unto them: so neither are the promises of men, whether made with oath, or without to be so understood, as if the makers of them stood bound to perform the terms of them under any possible change or alteration what soever in the persons to whom they are made. chrysostom writing upon those words, Matth. 19.28. shows, that Judas, though the promise of sitting upon a throne was made unto him as well as unto any other, yet by reason of that change which afterwards appeared in him, through his wickedness, forfeited and lost his right of interest in that promise, nor doth any promise though confirmed with an oath, of allegiance, obedience, or subjection unto a King, and his Successors, or posterity, bind any longer or otherwise, either before God or men, then whilst, and as this King or his successors, shall continue in the same deportment of themselves in the discharge of their trust, and administration of their power, whereby they commended themselves to us at the time when we swore such allegiance to them, and in consideration and expectation whereof the same was sworn by us; therefore the King being so notoriously changed, etc. evident it is that God himself by the tenor and importment of his promises, and Jesus Christ by the like tenor and import of his, fully and fairly acquits us from all engagements, and ties which the Oath of Allegiance at the time of our taking it laid upon us.  

2 Pet. 1.4. Psal. 138.2.  What? and must the exceeding great and precious promises of God, and his fidelity and truth therein, which he hath magnified above all his Name, be thus traduced? must the honour of God, which is so much concerned in taking, and violated in breaking an Oath, be yet much more impeached in the bringing in, and misreporting of his example to patronise men's falsehood and perjury therein? And when an Oath cannot lawfully be dispensed with, or justly rendered non-obliging, must the forcible and ungodly bursting of it asunder be fathered on him, who is the Truth, the Amen, the faithful and true witness?  
But to endeavour a vindication briefly.  
1. Mr. G. you have here done that learned and solid Divine P. Martyr a double wrong. 1. In curtailing his sentence, and breaking it off in the middle, suppressing those following words which would have cleared his sense to be none of yours. 2. In mis-translating the words which you cite, his words truly rendered and rehearsed out are these, Therefore those promises of God, (to wit, that of our Saviour, Matth. 19.28. which he had in the Section last before brought in, with Chrysostom's interpretation upon it, quoted by you, and those of Gen. 9.2. Jer. 18.7, 8. with chrysostom also upon them) are to be understood with reference to the present state of things, wherefore when we bear the promises of God, it behoves us thus to conceive, either they have some condition annexed, or they are laid down absolutely; Furthermore either they are of force only for the present time, or they must be fulfilled in after time 
f Promissiones itaque illae De● prostatu praesenti rerum intelligendae sunt. Quamo●. rem cum Dei promissiones audimus sic oportet cogitare: vel conditionem aliquam conjunctam habent vel abso u●è ponuntur. Dei● vel in hoc tantum tempus valent velin posterum sunt implendae. P. Martyr loc. come class. 3. ca 13. Sect. 5. miscited by him ca 12. . It is by this recital evident, how you by leaving out the word [illae] have falsified P. Martyr's text, who is speaking only of some particular promises, conditionally made, and (as he saith) respecting the present time which he distinguisheth from others; but you would have him understood of any promises, and draw an universal negative from his words.  
2. You are not content to misconstrue this servant of God, but you dare to , and mistate the mind of God himself; you say indefinitely of the promises of God, That no performance of them is intended by God, etc. whereas the Scripture is clear, (and most unhappy were men if it were otherwise) that 1. there are absolute promises wherein performance is intended by God, notwithstanding men shall decline in their said integrity, and whereunto such promises have no relation as to their validity or fulfilling. Take for instance, Psal. 89.33, 34. Hosea 14.4. Ezek. 36.25. etc. Heb. 8.10. etc. 2. In conditional promises, though there may be partial and temporary declinings in men from their said integrity (as there was eminently in Peter, one of those parties to the promise, Matth. 19.28.) yet God performeth the promise to true believers, through, and for Christ's sake, In whom all the promises are yea and Amen, and that always, 
2 Cor. 1.20.  if it be a promise of the life which is to come; and often, if it be a promise of the life that now is, namely, when it is good for them, according to those promises, Psal. 84.11. Rom. 8.28. 1 Cor. 3.21. And if there be a performance by God, certainly there was an intention in him of that performance, notwithstanding such declining, For he worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. And for this you might have harkened to P. Martyr your own Author, in the place whither he referreth you in the Section quoted by you, speaking thus. But because the conditions of legal promises could not be performed by men, God out of his own mercy hath substituted Evangelicall promises in their place, which though they have conditions annexed, yet they are held out gratis. And a little further he saith, The Evangelicall promise may stand good without those conditions. How this is, he presently after explains thus. Therefore impossible conditions are annexed, that men warned of their infirmity, and fully understanding it, they may betake themselves to Christ, of whom they being received into favour, and justification being obtained, they may obtain those very promises, for as to them they of Legal are made Evangelicall 
g Sed cum illae ab hominibus praestari non potuissent, Deus ex sua misericordia subjecit promissiones Evangelitas illorum loco: quae quam vis conditiones adiectas habent tamen efferuntur gratis. Promissio Evangelica fine illis conditionibus constare potest, idcirco enim conditiones impossibiles adiecta sunt, ut homines suae infirmitatis admonerentur ea que penitus intellecta, se conferent ad Christum à quo recepti in gratiam, adepte iam iustificatione, illa eadem promissa possent obtinere. Nam quod ad ipsor attinct, iam ex legalibus redduntur Evangelicae. P. Mart. loc. come. Class 3 c. 12. Sect. 4. .  
3. You rest not in this mis-alledging of God's promises, (though in it, you bewray audaciousness, and unsoundness enough) but you rise higher in presumption, making an odious comparison, or rather equality between God and man, in promises and covenants, whereas the case of the covenanting of these two is far enough different; for if it were granted, that God in some of his conditional promises intendeth no performance nor obligation on his part, but upon condition of man's perseverance, must there needs be therefore an equivalency, or conformity throughout thereunto in man's Covenants with man? must they therefore be all of them so made or understood? or rather is there not of right a vast disparity? God is no man's debtor, he is not bound to man, there is no right in the creature from God, he can claim nothing from him, otherwise then by promise: God may do what he will with his own, and all is his own. But with man it is not so, 
Alia enim ratio est obligationis ubi debitum fundatur inpromissione, ubi vero promissio fundatur in debito longè alia. D. Sand. de jurament. praelect 6. Sect. 9  either towards God, or man, he stands in divers relations, and is tied in many duties, even towards men, before he covenant or swear, unto which single tye, the bonds of Oaths and express and solemn Covenants are often in weighty matters added, for confirmation and greater security. And thus it is in the point in hand, there is Allegiance due without the interposition of an Oath, or any such engagement by particular persons; we are in a settled State, born Subjects, and both claim the immunity and protection, and own the duty of such, without personal indenting, or oath-taking; and this obedience is owing to Princes, or Magistrates without condition of Religion, or Justice on their part performed; the Scripture is clear for an irrespective (and in regard of the Ruler's demeanour) absolute subjection: Exod. 20.12.21.25. Rom. 13.1, 2, etc. Tit. 3.1. 1 Pet. 2.13. 1 Sam. 24.6, 7. 26.9, 10, 11. Jer. 27.12.29.7. Matth. 22.21. And the Doctrine of orthodox Divines generally is, that obedience is due to the most degenerate, tyrannical, and oppressive Magistrates 
h 
Cal. Instit. l. 4. c. 20. Sect. 24.25. etc.  
P. Mart. loccom. clas. 4. ca 20. Sect. 12.18 19 Alsted.  
Theol. cas. cap. 17. Reg. 8. num. 9  
Schar. ●ymph. 5. epot. Quaest. 44. & 45. cur Perk. cas. consci. B. 3. cha. 6. Sect. 1.  . When therefore this necessary and unconditionated duty (as to the party's behaviour) becomes the subject of an oath, or personal engagement, it is not capable of capitulations or conditions to be performed by the persons sworn to, upon which the obligation of the oath shall be dependent; to admit such qualifications, would frustrate the end of a promissory oath, which is to give assurance and security (and that the strongest men can give) to the party unto whom the oath is made, of what, either was before, or is then made due by promise; instead whereof the inserting of conditions of this nature in this case would make what was before clearly owing now more dubious and uncertain to the expectation of the proprietor: and would be apt to beget in the debtor a persuasion, (upon non-performance of conditions) of a discharge as well from the matter, as from the obligation of the Oath.  
4. Of Humane Covenants, or promissory oaths, whereof the subject or matter is arbitrary, and we are not otherwise bound to then by Covenant, or Oath, there are several sorts, 
i Vide Alsted. Theol cas c 5. Reg. 2. num 3.  some are absolute, having no express condition annexed, but are simply undertaken, saving that those general and constant provisoes of every promise or oath which need not expressing, are to be understood therein, viz: that the thing when it comes to be performed be lawful and possible, and notwithstanding the understanding of which the obligation is absolute. As for instance, such was that promise and oath of Joseph to his father Jacob, Gen. 47.29, 30, 31, etc. and that of the children of Israel to each other, Judg. 21.5. And that of Jonathan to David, 1 Sam. 20.12, 13. Others again are conditional, wherein something future, that is contingent, or depending upon man's will is particularly, and expressly comprised as a qualification of the matter to be performed, the failing of which is a discharge of the person engaging from the promise or oath. Such was that of the servant to Abraham, Gen. 24.2.3.4.8.9. And that of the Spies to Rahab, Joshua 2 12. to 21. Now then for Mr. G. to say generally of all oaths and promises whatsoever, whether they be of things in their own nature necessary, or of things arbitrary; whether they be absolute, or conditional; and to say specially of all promises and oaths of Allegiance, or subjection, and particularly of these oaths in question, that they are conditional, and bind no longer, nor any otherwise then whilst, and as the party covenanted with, or sworn to, behaves himself as he did at the time of covenanting, is both in itself, and by what is here said, as also by the ordinary practice of men in Indentures, and oaths apparently inconsistent, and absurd; and to infer such an universal loosening of men from Oaths and Covenants, of what nature soever, upon the party's miscarriage to whom the engagement is made, from the conditionality of some divine promises, is (besides the impiety of it above denoted) an insupportable non sequitur, and by Mr Gs. sophistry never to be maintained; yet this is all the Logic of this Argument.  
Having thus (I hope) sufficiently taken away the Exceptions of this Author against the force of the Oath of Allegiance, I leave him straining and travailing about that stone of Sisyphus, (to wit, the guilt of Royal blood) which he labours to ●oul away in that his book, and proceed to another.  
The next I meet with that strikes at the obligation of this Oath, is one that asserteth himself to be of those whom he that I had last to do with, professeth himself a Champion against, that is, the Presbyterian part, but in this (as far as my ken will reach) he is alone for them: I mean the Author of The lawfulness of obeying the present Government, who in his 11. and 12. pages pleadeth against it with the Reasons which follow, being here set down by parcels, with my Answer to them so distinguished.  
1. It were good (saith he first) to consider, whether there be any clause in any Oath or Covenant, which in a fair and common sense forbids obedience to the Commands of the present Government, and Authority, much less when no other can be had, and so the Commonwealth must go to ruin.  
1. The many clauses of several Oaths, and of the Covenant and Protestation, which strictly forbidden such obedience, I have urged [Chap. 2.] whither I refer him.  
2. But by his last sentence recited [much less when no other, etc.] together with his marginal quotation [of a Popish Schoolman or Casuist telling us, When a thing sworn is too difficult, or he that swore is by the change of abilities or estate rendered less apt to perform: or lastly, when the thing sworn is an hindrance to the swearer from consulting the public good, then there is a lawful cause of dispensing in the Oath] he seems as if he would insinuate a cessation of the Oath in our case, unto which I say.  
1. Take dispensation, in the usual Popish acception, and all power of dispensing in Oaths and Vows, in whomsoever it be supposed to be, is denied with one consent, (as far as I have observed, or ever heard) by Protestant professors: and it is a mere popish doctrine, and papal arrogation exploded from amongst us. 
k Vide D. Sanderson de jur. oblige. praelect. 7. Sect. 3. & 4. They say, in omni voto, aut juramen to subintelligi debere illam conditionem si Domino Papae placuerit.  And this Oath hath itself precluded and cut off all use of this shift of a dispensation in these words. I do believe, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, nor any other person whatsoever, hath power to absolve me of this Oath, or any part thereof. And this I the rather note, upon occasion of this Authors quoting a Doctor of the Papacy for the dispensabilitie of an Oath, in regard that some of late (if I mistake not) have taken upon them to discharge people from this Oath, or (which is all one) from the Allegiance therein sworn to. Unto which act I shall only speak thus much, either they assume power to do this as the party to whom the Oath is taken, or as a superior, by the analogy of that Law, Numb: 30.3, 4. But, 1. they cannot do it as the party sworn to in that Oath, for they are not that party in the Oath, the King, and his Heirs, and Successors are the only persons to whom, and in whose behalf the Oath is taken, and consequently they only that can release from it as parties; nay they are the party swearing, and therefore far from a capacity of discharging others from that Oath, as presently I shall show. 2. Neither can they do it as a superior by the equity of that Law, Numb: 30. For, 1. their lawful superiority in the case they now stand, is the matter under question. 2. The power of a superior to undo the Oath, or bond of the inferior, prevails only in those matters wherein the party is under the power of the superior, and not in other matters, which are without the extent of the superiors authority 
l 
Vide D Saunder. de iuram. oblige. praelect. 5. Sect. 5. & praelect. 7. Sect. 6.  
Animadvertendum tamen est penes hos non esse facultatem rescindendi quodlibet iusiurandum subditorum; sedillud duotaxat, cuius materia est corum potestaal subiecta Alstod. Theol. Cas. cap 15. Reg. 2. num. 16.  . Now this Oath concerns a duty owing to another, which they that interpose to discharge from it have no right to dispose of. 3. But however the superior can only by the Law cited, or any other right come in to make void the Oath of the inferior, which was taken without his knowledge and consent, and that also he may only do in the day that he hears of it; but if he either allow the making of it, or declare not against it presently, when he comes to know of it, he hath no power thenceforth to recall it, as is clear by the Text. Now the Oath of Allegiance was so far from being disallowed, or declared against as soon as it was known, that it was enacted and enjoined by both Houses of Parliament, and moreover it was constantly to be taken by all the Members of the Lower House at their entrance into that House; so that besides their incompetency to discharge from the Oath who have assented to it; Let any man show how they who are parties to the oath, and have themselves taken it can disannul it; the obliged parties disannulling is a strain above Papal dispensation.  
2. But to speak to these causes of dispensing with an Oath according to the Casuists Divinity, which the Author applieth to the case in hand. 1. When the thing sworn is too difficult, or the swearer is by the change of ability, or estate, rendered less apt to perform. If by this difficulty of the thing, and unaptness of the person sworn, he mean, the thing is become impossible, and the party utterly unable to observe it. All reasonable men will grant so far as the impossibility lies and so long as it continues the Oath binds not, but this is not to our Author's purpose, for to cease from an act, that is, from obedience to the present Government, can never be impossible 
m 
Qui facit quod in se suit ut adimpleret quod promiserat iuramenti fidem exolvit. D. Sanders de iuram. oblige. praelect 2. Sect. 10.  
Obligatio tollitur quoad id solum quod est factu impossibile quoad reliquum vero manner, & qui non potest omne quod debet, debts tamen omne quod potest. Idem Sect. 12.  
Est regula inris, rei impossibilis nulla est obligatio.  . But if he intent by difficulty and unaptness, that the thing sworn to will bring hard terms upon the swearer, or breed him temporal loss, and trouble, this is no cause to infringe the tye of an Oath, or give a discharge from it; He that hath sworn to his own hurt, must not therefore change from it: Psal. 15.4.  
2. When the thing sworn is an impediment to the swearer from consulting the public good.  
1. If the thing sworn should become privative of, or opposite to, the public good, or well-being of the Nation in its own nature, & necessarily, it were unlawful, and consequently the oath would be void, for to a sinful thing there can be no obligation. But if it be only of that nature which they call impeditive of a greater good, that is, if it stand in the way (not of the good of the Kingdom simply, and absolutely respected, but only) of some higher degree of good supposed to be attainable; this consideration will not bear that weight, as to frustrate an oath. As for example, when a people that hath sworn obedience to a lawful form of Government, which yet is not absolutely the best, as suppose to a Democracy, or Aristocracy, or that hath sworn obedience to a lawful Prince, who yet is not simply the ablest that can be found for regal parts and qualifications, such may not take themselves discharged from their Oath, because there may be a better model of Government, or a better qualified person to make a Prince sound out, and for that cause cast off their present Government and King, and set up another because comparatively better. It was doubtless better for the people of Israel, that the Gibeonites had been destroyed, as the rest of the Canaanites were (if there had been no oath to the contrary) then that they were spared (besides that the sparing of them was against an express positive Law: Deut. 20.16.) and so the congregation judged, and therefore grudged at the sparing of of them: yet in that case the Oath for sparing them stood inviolable. Josh. 9.15.18, 19 2 Sam. 21.1, 2, etc. It was in like sort for the Kingdoms greater good, that Zedekiah and his people should be free from Nebuchadnezars subjection, yet that was not a dissolution of that King's Covenant and Oath, Ezek. 17.12, 13, etc. 2. It will at no hand be granted, that to withhold obedience from a usurped Power is in itself impeditive of the public good at all, I know inconveniencies are by this Author urged to follow, if such a Power be not obeyed; as that, Else all Authority must fall to the ground, and so confusion, (which is worse than titular tyranny) be admitted. But all Authority hangs not upon the back of Usurpation, this may come down shortly again, and that recover itself, and stand upright. Present quietness and security are like to be but in a sickly state, obey, or obey not; and for justice, as there is none where every man is left to himself, so there is usually little to be had from the hands of an unjustly gotten Power; Dominion being wont to be worn as it was come by 
n Nec quisquam impetium flagitio qu●situm boni● artibus ex●●cui●. Tacit. . An Issachar-like bowing down under the Commonwealth's oppressions is not for public good (neither were we told thus when the Parliament began to stand up, and awaken the people to shake off Expilation and oppression) the Orator will tell us, Servitude is the worst of Evils, and to be repelled at the charge not only of war, but death 
o Et nomen pacis dolce est, & ipsa res salutatis, sed inter pacem & servitutem plu●imum interest; pax est tranquil●a libertas: servitus malo●um omnium postremum, non modo bello sed morte etiam repellendum. Cicero in M. Anton. Philip 2ae. Prov 14.34.16.12. . Nay Religion will dictate to us in the words of the wisest earthly King, That righteousness exalteth a Nation; and, The throne is established by righteousness. Under Usurpation than we can expect no settlement; and to submit to it, is to help to fasten that which is certain to fall, and to fall with the greater confraction, by how much it is more favoured. Commotion and tumultuousness is sure (in reason) to follow violent domination. Let Israel's many and turbulent changes of their Kings (after their departure from the house of David) be a precedent for it, of whose kings for their speedy and fatal ends, it may be said, as it was of many of the Roman Caesars, that they rather seemed to be kings in a Scene, or personated on the Stage then real Authorities. The standing off from obedience is but like to speed the Commotions, and make them easier. To persuade men to couch down under Usurpation, when it is gotten up to ●ave troubles, is as if a man that is got into the briers should stick therein, because he may rake himself in offering to get out; or he that hath a festered sore, or grown disease in his body, should let it alone, and go on, because it will stir the humours, and cost him some pain to be cured.  
2. The same Author proceeds, And whether it, (to wit, any clause in any Oath or Covenant) forbids obedience to the present Authority, more than to Laws that have been formerly enacted, by those which came into Authority merely by Power. 1. You have not yet produced any former Princes that had any hand in the making of a Law, that came into the regal Authority merely by power; for although some of them got possession by the Sword, yet (to omit the alleging of other title) they were confirmed, by the Kingdom's consent in Parliament, before they concurred in Enacting Laws for the Kingdom. 2. The Laws you reflect on were not merely made by those Princes whom you pretend to have come in merely by Power, but were constituted by Parliamentary Enacting; And for any former Parliaments coming into the Authority merely by force, you neither do nor can allege any thing.  
3. He urgeth further. If it be said, that in the Oath of Allegiance, allegiance is sworn to the King, his heirs and successors, if his heirs be not his successors, how doth that Oath bind? Either the word successors must be superfluous, or it must bind to successors as well as to heirs; and if it bind not to a successor that is not an heir, how can it bind to an heir that is not a successor? And if you will know the common and usual sense (which should be the meaning of an Oath) of the word Successors, you need not so much ask of Lawyers and learned persons, as of men of ordinary knowledge, and demand of them who was the successor of William the Conqueror, and see whether they will not say W: Rufus, and who succeeded Rich: the 3d: and whether they will not say, Hen: the 7th: and yet neither of them was hei●: so in ordinary acception the word Successor is taken for him that actually succeeds in Government, and not for him that is actually excluded.  
This Author in these lines raiseth much dust, that it may serve him for a double end: 1. To obscure the genuine sense of this clause of the Oath, that it may not seem to make against him, as indeed it doth; and then to detort and wrest it, to the advantage of his Usurpers interest. 1. He would cast a mist upon the words of the Oath, to over cloud its true sense, and this he attempts in the forecited Discourse until you come to this mark ‖: he endeavours it by placing an ambiguity in the word [Successors], and setting it at odds with the word [Heirs] whereas this clause of the Oath is clear enough in itself, and far enough from the use he would make of it; and firm enough to the sense which he opposeth. Which that I may evince, I desire the Reader to observe these two things.  
1. That the Oath intends by Heirs, and Successors, the same persons which may evidently appear, 1. By the manifest drift of the Oath, and intention of the Authority that prescribed it, which is the continuance and assurance of the Crown (upon concession of his then Majesty's just title) to his Heirs in succession after him, and one another lineally, and the defence of them therein against all other corrivals or opposers; this I cannot see which way will be gainsayed; and being so, it will enforce us to grant the Oath, and Oath-giver, could not mean by successors any other than heirs. 2. In that the words [heirs and successors] are joined by the copulative [and], whereas if they should have intended different parties, the discretive [or] should, in true syntaxis have been put betwixt them. 3. In that his heirs and successors are immediately in the Oath denoted by the same pronounce [them], and again by the same possessive [their] in those words, (and him and [them] will defend to the uttermost of my power, against all conspiracies and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his or [their] persons, [their] Crown or dignity) but if they be not the same persons, how come they to be thus particled together? especially how can they immediately after his Majesty be instituted to the same Allegiance, and defence therein in relation to the same Crown and dignity; admit them divers, and the Oath will import a contradiction: and will any man imagine, so irrational a thing as that Authority hath so long imposed, and the Kingdom, especially the most intelligent persons in it, have universally taken an Oath so irreconcilable to itself. 4. The Law of the Land (unto which this Oath must needs be yielded to be consonant) ordains his Heirs to be his Successors.  
2. That the Oath understands by Successors, those only that are so de jure, and not any others, that contrary to right may intrude into the royal Seat, and injuriously make themselves successors only de facto. For, 1. In the Oath we swear Allegiance, and defence to Successors; now what man of conscience would ever impose, or take an Oath of this nature to any (but in his intention) a just party, for to such a one alone could he swear in righteousness according to Jer. 4.2. 2. The Oath appropriates the Crown and dignity to Successors, as theirs, in these words, [their Crown and dignity] now theirs, and their right are all one. 3. The Oaths of Allegiance, and Supremacy must needs accord, and this may be the best Explanatorie of that: now this, viz: the Oath of Supremacy prefixeth the word [lawful] to Successors, and confineth our allegiance to his lawful Successors in these words, The King's highness, his Heirs, and lawful Successors: which epithet will not permit the word Successors, either in that or in the Oath of Allegiance (unless you will unreasonably make them jarring) to be carried to any successor but him that is such of right. And this reason will also irrefragably confirm the former Proposition, viz: that the Oath intends by Heirs and Successors, the same persons, for who are his lawful Successors? the Law will tell you, his Heirs.  
By these two Propositions (sufficiently cleared I hope) we may understand how the Oath (in that clause) binds; and that, 1. There is no superfluity in the word Successors; for an Identity in sense of divers words is no vain Tantalogie, many words signifying the same thing being ordinarily used (and especially in Oaths, and such like punctual forms, and particularly in the Oaths of Allegiance, and Supremacy in divers other clauses) for explication, and significancies sake. And though heirs and successors in the clause in hand mean the same persons, yet it may be in a divers consideration, as thus: They are Heirs in his Majesty's life time, and Successors at his death respectively. 2. That the Oath binds neither to his Heirs, nor Successors disjunctively, or the one taken from the other, but to both conjunctively, as one: and taking Successors aright, that is, for lawful successors, we need not, cannot say that it binds either to a successor that is not an heir, or to an heir that is not a successor, viz: de juce, though perhaps he may be prevented, or delayed from actual succession, or rather possession.  
2. But this Author will have [Successors] to signify such as are so de facto, and do actually succeed in Government; And by this means this passage of the Oath shall make for the Usurper if he be in possession. I have said (I think) that which is enough to forestall this already, but let his Argument be heard, and receive a formal Answer; it is in effect thus.  
The common and ordinary acception of the word Successor, means him that actually succeeds in Government; but the word Successor in this Oath, must be understood in the common and ordinary acception: Ergo, the word Successor in this Oath must mean him that actually succeeds in Government.  
1. I answer to the major by denying it if taken universally; and if it be not, the Syllogism is false: the major not being universal in the first figure. For although one common sense of the word Successor, is he that actually succeeds whether by right or wrong, yet that's not the sole usual acception of the word, and this I shall evince the same way that he goes about to prove his acceptation to be the common one; and in so doing, confute also his proof of his major which is thus. If you would know (saith he) the common sense of the word Successors, ask not so much Lawyers and learned persons, as men of ordinary knowledge, and demand of them who was William the conquerors successor? they will say, W: Rufus. Who succeeded Rich: the 3d: they will say, H: the 7th: and yet neither of them was heir. R. Although I yield not his rule to be the best (for if Successor be a term used in the Law (as it is in this Oath prescribed by Law) Lawyers, and learned men in the Law, were there any obscurity would be the fittest Interpreters of it; for it is a maxim, we must believe every one in his own faculty or Art 
p Credendum est cuilibet artifici in arte sua. ) yet I shall refer the matter to it so the question may be rightly propounded, and as the case in hand will allow. This Author propounds it fallaciously, and unapplicably to the present purpose, in that he demands de praeterito, and so as the question only interrogates of an actual Successor [who was successor, or did succeed such a one?] and then the answer (whether made by men learned or unlearned) must needs bring in him that did succeed in fact. But let the question be put de futuro, and thus only it is suitable to a promissory oath which respecteth the future time, and a thing to be done in it; and consequently to this Oath which is promissory, and runs de futuro. I shall bear faith and true Allegiance; and I will defend, etc. and was taken of a successor not that had succeeded, but that was to succeed, and it will be this, who is to be his Majesty's successor? and than let even the man of ordinary knowledge answer it, and see whether he will not say, not every one that can catch it, but he that hath right to the Crown. And by this fitting of the question to the current of the Oath, and the resolution that the thing itself gives to it, as the proof of his Proposition is taken off, so the contradictory to it is necessarily inferred, to wit, that the sole, common and ordinary acception of the word Successor, is not him that actually succeeds in Government. But if the word Successor be capable of a divers acceptation, what obligation can there be to successors in the Oath? R: Although Successor in common usage may be taken two ways, to wit, either for a successor in fact, or a successor in right, yet in the Oath it can be taken but in the latter sense. For, 1. It is a rule for the finding out of the sense of an Oath agreed on among Casuists, that in Oaths enjoined, or imposed by others, we must construe them in that sense which is known, or may most probably be judged to be the prescribers 
q 
Vide D Sanders. de juram. oblige. praelect. 6. Sect. 9  
Ant. Ashcams Discourse 2d. part. Chap. 41.  ; but his end in this Oath being the support of his Crown in a lineal succession from himself, according to his right settled by the Laws, his sense intended by Successors could only be, they that are such de jure, and the same that are his heirs. 2. To take the word in the other sense, viz: for Successors de facto, how unjustly soever possessed is inconsistent. 1. With the nature of an Oath, which must be taken in righteousness: Jer. 4.2. that is, to oblige only to that which is just. 2. With the word Heir, which being placed first in the Oath, must first be served; and successor can be only understood in congruity with it. 3. With the Oath of Supremacy, which bindeth us to the lawful Successors. 4. With the Law of the Land, which appointeth succession to the Heir. 5. With a possibility of keeping the Oath, for if heirs and successors mean divers persons, how can the Oath of Allegiance, and defence of the Regal dignity be observed towards both?  
Having vindicated this passage of the Oath of Allegiance from this Author's distortion, I cannot let him pass without without a brief animad version or two more. 1. Whilst he contends about the sense of Successors, and would have it understood of actual succeeders, that it may favour the Usurpers, he forgets what is the object of that succession, viz: a Crown, and regal dignity, wherein by virtue of that Oath those Successors are to be defended: whereas they whose power he pleads for, (and in whose behalf he undertook to answer this clause, as not forbidding obedience to them) have not only put by the rightful Successor, but abolished the Crown and Regal dignity itself; unto what then would he have his mecenates to be successors? or how will he reconcile obedience to them with defence of the Crown, and royal dignity? 2. It is to be admired, that a person of so fair a character (as is given him by the worthy Authors of the Religious Demurrer) should begin this Section of his with a general deliberative, (It were good to consider, whether there be any clause in any Oath or Covenant, which forbids obedience to the Commands of the present Government,) and yet take no notice of any thing in this or the other Oaths and Covenants, save of this clause only in this Oath, which it seems he thought he could not only loosen from obliging against him, but draw over to be accident to him, which how well he hath performed, I leave the Reader to consider. And I further admire how (seeing he accounteth Oaths sacred bonds, and reverend obligements) he feared not to use such enforcement to the clear letter of so tender and sacred a thing; for though any body can say a tyrant sine titulo, or a Usurper is a Successor de facto when he is in, yet that he is such a successor as the Oath intends, viz: one that we are sworn in allegiance to, and are bound by that Oath to defend to the uttermost of our power, etc. Having withal (probably at the same time) sworn in the Oath of Supremacy Allegiance to the lawful Successors, and to our power to assist, and defend all jurisdictions, privileges, etc. belonging to those Successors, is a grosser interpretation, than I hope he himself will own when he considers it, or any considering and conscientious men can receive. And I could wish he would consider, whether when he took the Oath he had this sense in his mind, or rather it be not newly excogitated, upon the coming into question of these late transactions; and how nearly this practice entrencheth upon perjury 
r Alterum perjurii genus est ubi recte jura. veris, non syncerè agere, sed novo aliquo excogitato commento iuramenti vim (salvis tamen verbis) declinare & cludere D. Sanders. de juxam. oblige. praelect. 6. Sect. 7. .  
4. But having said what he thinks fit to the clause, he will have one glance at the urgers of it. Yet withal this quaere may be added, while the son is in the same posture in which the father was, how comes this Oath at this time to stand up, and plead for disobedience in regard of the Son, that was asleep, and silent in regard of the Father?  
1. They that plead this Oath for disobedience, or rather denying obedience to the present Power in regard of the Sons right, did the same in regard of the Father; when it was apparent, that not a mere defence of Religion and Liberties, and a recovery of the King's personal presence to the Parliament was the end of the war, but the Father's death, and the Son's disinheriting, with the deflowering of the Crown, and overturning of the Throne itself. Witness (amongst other testimonies) what the London, Essex, Lancashire, and Banbury Ministers have declared publicly in their respective writings, they are alike sworn to, have according to their power and vocations, stood for the Authority of both, and not allowed the deposition of either, or the usurpation of their Power by others: they have prayed against, bewailed, stood astonished at, witnessed against the proceed that have been against both of them: and to this day they lament that the clear Word of the Lord, held forth by their testimonies, hath not prevailed for the prevention or retractation of those direful, and (the world throughout) scandalous courses.  
2. The Son cannot yet be in the same posture his Father was in, whilst an overture or proposal for satisfaction hath not once been made to him, wherein he is in the view of the Kingdom more harshly and extremely dealt with then even his Father was; and as his Father's sufferings as to life were without precedent, so are his as to succession to the Crown.  
Mr. Ashcam (whom I had in hand before, Chap. 2.) hath divers strange, and unapproveable passages reflecting upon the Oaths under debate; which I shall cull out as I meet with them in several places. In his 2d. part, Chap. 8. Sect. 6. he lays down four Cases, wherein he saith, Subjects are freed from their sworn Allegiance. His three first, (viz: 1. If a Prince abandon. 2. If he alienate. 3. If Nero-like through mad fury or folly, he seek in an hostile way the destruction of his whole Kingdom) will I presume be taken not to concern our case in hand; the fourth possibly may be judged applicable to it, which therefore I shall take notice of: and a brief animadversion will serve, he delivering it (as he doth other odd and unsound stuff) with a pythagorical magisteriousnesse, and without the assistance of reason to induce a persuasion to it in the Reader.  
Fourthly, (saith he) if the Prince have part of the supreme right, and the people the other part, then notwithstanding an Oath of Allegiance to him, he may be opposed if he invade the other part of Supreme right. And a few lines after he affirms with Grotius, He may lose his right by the Law of War. And in the next Section he saith of all those four Cases, and therefore of this, That they show how we are absolved in our own consciences from all Oath and Contract, when one party forfeits his Conditions first.  
The defensive opposing of a Prince, invading his Compeers part by the party invaded where the Supreme right is so shared, (supposing the Oath of Allegiance to be cautioned according to that sharing) I shall not dispute, it being beside the present question; but his losing his right by the Law of War; and the Subjects absolution from Oath upon that his supposed forfeiture of conditions, I shall a little call into question. 1. He tells us (if we will take it upon his word) if the Prince invade the others right, he may lose his right by the Law of War. What the Law of War means (if divers, or varying from Gods, and other humane Laws) I understand not, nor is it material; in discerning into the permanency, or cessation of right, and of an oath concerning it, we are to have recourse to the Law of God, and Nature; and if by these the Prince's title, and Subjects oath remain firm, notwithstanding his invading the people's right, the Law of war like Alexander's Sword may violently cut in sunder, but it cannot unloose either the single tye of right, or the superadded of an oath. How should this forfeiture come? if any ways, by way of satisfaction for the trespass upon the others right. But theological Justice appoints not, that where one invadeth another's right, the Invaders right should thereupon be canceled; and that it may be lawful for the invaded, upon that injury received, to invest himself therewith, and finally to alienate and dispose him of it. A liberty of defence it permitteth to the Invaded in relation to his own right, and a prosecution of the Invader unto his full satisfaction for the wrong inferred by him, and for that end (if there be no other mean but war left to effect it) the invaded (if he have power of war) may seize the Invaders right unto a just recovery or restitution of his own; but that being compassed, and proportionable satisfaction for the trespass being given or gained, the Invaded party must sit down therewith, and not extend his line over all his late Invaders right. Every transgression towards man calls for satisfaction; and whoso doth wrong, is bound to make reparation; and his right is responsible, or obnoxious so far: but it is more than summum jus to carry this compensation to a total and perpetual translation of the Injurers possession to the Injured: total confiscation is too high a penalty to be set upon every encroachment. Look into the laws and rules of satisfaction in Scripture, as Exod. 22.1, 2, etc. Levit. 6.4, 5. 2 Sam. 12.6. Luk. 19.8. and it will appear the deepest amounts but to a fourfold restitution of the damage. Nay look into that order (which comes home to our Case) concerning the Princes of Israel, who having formerly used oppression, violence, spoil, and exaction towards the people of God, are not therefore adjudged to be deprived of their whole Inheritance (Office, and all) but are only reduced to their own portion: Ezek. 45.7, 8, 9 But because this Gentleman flies to the Law of War for this his extreme dealing with Princes, hear what a learned Judge, and profound Statesman delivers, in the case, in relation to that very rule. It is the Lord Verulam, who (insisting on the justness of a war on the King of England's part with Spain, for the recovery of the Palatinate, although the Paulsgrave in whose behalf that war should be commenced, should be accounted to have made an unjust war in Bohemia, 
Considerations touching war with Spain, written by the right honourable Francis Lord Verulam pag. 3, 4, 5, 6.  by means whereof he came to lose the Palatinate) resolves thus: An offensive war is made, which is unjust to the Aggress●ur, the prosecution, and race of the war carrieth the Defendant to assail, and invade the ancient and indubitate patrimony of the fi●st aggressor, which is now turned Defendant, shall he sit down, and not put himself in defence? or, if he be dispossessed, shall he not make a war for the recovery? No man is so poor of judgement as will affirm it. This resolution he confirms with many instances worthy to be perused in the Author; and in the end with this Reason: Wars are vindict; revenges, reparations; but revenges are not infinite, but according to the measure of the first wrong or damage. And within a few lines after he saith of the case he is arguing: It is the more clear on our part, because the possession of Bohemia is settled with the Emperor. For, though it be true, that Non datur compensatio injuriarum, yet were there somewhat more colour to detain the Palatinate, as in the nature of a Recovery in value, or compensation, if Bohemia had been lost, or were still the stage of War. According to the rule of Justice then, yea even that of War, the people's right being recovered, and satisfaction given or tendered for the securing of it for future, the late invasive Prince should enjoy his right again, and the oath that was given for the securing of it stands in force, and obligeth to it. And this may be further cleared, in that the Solemn League and Covenant was prescribed, and taken when the King was judged to be in the actual invasion of the people's rights; when the people could not be reasonably required to swear the said Covenant in behalf of the King's right, if such an invasion did forfeit it, and absolve the Subjects from their oaths to him; and if they did then swear, they cannot afterward plead an absolution from their Oaths by virtue of that invasion. And if the late King's actions could be a forfeiture of all rights, and dissolution of all Oaths as to himself (which I cannot yield) yet how can either of them be said to be disannulled in relation to his Heir, upon whom the right legally descends, and unto whose title the Oaths were sworn. If it be said, he was partaker in the same actions, the Religious Demurrer will tell you, 
2. part. pag. 8.  that the right and title to the Crown upon his Father's death, doth quit him from all stain by the Laws of the Land.  
2ly, Whereas he would infer this absolution from all oaths, by the Prince's forfeiture of his Conditions first. What Conditions doth he mean? 1. If he understand any conditions to be in the Subject's Oaths which are to be fulfilled by the Prince, upon which terms the Subject's Oaths shall bind, he is besides the book; the Oaths of the people put no conditions upon the Prince, but are all absolute and irrespective, and run without ifs, or and's; in like manner as the obligation of Subjects allegiance to their Sovereign is irrespective according to Divine Institution, as I have before (in this Chap.) proved. If this Author fancy any such conditions in the people's Oaths, let him show where they lie, and what they are. 2. If he mean conditions in the King's Oaths of Government, they are also unconditioned, or not dependant on terms to be kept on the Subjects part: and, as the Subjects miscarriage is not a releasement of the King from his Oath of Government, so the Kings failing is no discharge of the Subject from his Oath: the validity, or obligation of either cannot be said to hang on the performance of the other; unless it could be proved that each part swore with respect to the others observation of his duty and oath, which neither the tenor of the Oaths, nor the subject matter of them will permit to be granted; nor hath this or any other Author that I have seen, said any thing to prove that.  
3ly, If by conditions he mean the capitulations which the Kingdom may be supposed to have made with him at his Instalment in the Throne, upon the keeping, 
At si duo homines mutuo se obligent promissis diversi generis, aut non codem tempore, aut alias citra mutuum respectum: violata ab uno fides non liberat alterum obligatione; sed uterque tenetur id servare quod ipse juravit, etiamsi alter qoud suarum erat partium non effecerit, exempligratia. Rex aliquis simpliciter, & citra respectum ad fidelitatem subditorum iurat se regnum administratum iustè & secundum leges: subditi alio tempore simpliciter & citra respectum ad Principis officium iurant se ei debitam fidelitatem, & obedientiam praestituros, utrique obligantur quod suj est officii fideliter facere, et si defecerit altera pa● à suo o licio: ita ut neque Rex solutus sit a suo iuramento, si subditi debitum obsequi● non praestiterint; nec subditi suo, si Rex a ●ustitae tramite dost x●rit. D Sanders de jurament. oblige. praelect. 4. Sect. 8.  or breaking whereof he should enjoy, or lose his dignity; there are no such capitulations made either with him personally, or with any of his predecessors to be alleged; they are inconsistent with the Supreme Power entrusted with him. The truth is, it is a weak error, though somewhat apt to possess the minds of unconsidering men, that in those estates of life ordained of God for the help of man, wherein there is a mutual relation, and answerable offices to be performed (as of Magistrate, and Subject; parent, and child; husband, and wife, Master, and servant) where there is a departure from duty on the one side, there is a cessation of the debt of duty on the other. If this were so, it were a frivolous thing for men, subject to corruption, to contract any relations; and there would be no place left for the exercise of gentleness, patience, charity, betwixt relatives, nor for the inferiors passive obedience in case of innocence; but this is directly contradicted by that of the Apostle Peter, 1 Pet 2.18, 19, 20. and those rules of the Apostles, Rom. 12.17. 1 Thes. 5.15. 1 Pet. 3.9. There are indeed some particular cases wherein the beneficial duty of those relations is expireable, as is that of the married in case of adultery; that of parents when their children are rebellious un●e●cla●mably; that of Magistrates towards a Subject capitally offensive. But such particulars are warranted by Scripture; otherwise, wherein God hath not given a discharge, man may not. Now let any case, wherein the Subject is dis-engaged by Divine Warrant upon the Magistrate's misadministration, be produced, and made out to extend to the point in hand, and it will be yielded; But this is yet to be done. But I go on to another passage of the Author.  
In the same Chap: Sect: 7. he hath these words. Now I shall endeavour to show how a man may take an Oath from an● just invading party, contrary to those Oaths which perhaps he to●k fl●s● from the just party, who possibly broke no conditions with him. This his undertaking he prosecutes in Sect: 10. where he saith thus. I conceive but two ways of taking such opposite Oaths. To take an Oath in contradiction of a former Oath, is so high a matter, that the way to it had need to be very clear; and it can be no way allowable save one, that is, when the former Oath ceaseth to oblige; let us examine therefore whether his two ways fall under this ●ne●. When it is in a thing wherein a man may justly presume that the right party for a time releases him of his former Oath or duty to him. 1. The swearers presumption that the party sworn to, doth release him from his former Oath, un●esse he hath actually released him, and declared so to him, is unto him no dis-obligation; there can be no just presumption of such a releasement, without such an antecedent act of the same party; without it evidently appearing, it is but a groundless presumption, and highly impious: if it carry on to the taking of an opposite Oath, the content of the party 〈◊〉 to being not passed, o● made known to him, this presumption is but the swearers own act, and his own act cannot discharge him; what is it that must be the ground of this presumption? The obliged persons persuasion of the equity o● reasonableness of the thing? that's but his own judgement, the party he is bound to may haply judge otherwise; however it is at the best but a probable, not a certain ground to conclude upon, that another doth a thing because it is just, and that the party thereupon consents to a release is but his own fiction, till he hath so expressed himself to him. This were an easy way of escaping out of any promissory oath to man, and would be ordinary if it would hold; for men would be apt to induce themselves to believe an expediency and justness of an absolution from the party, when their oaths pinch them in the performance; but this presumption is but a superficial device.  
2. The party sworn (in the case in hand) standing upon his title, preventeth this presumption, and plainly declareth the contrary: 3. In the Solemn League and Covenant, the party sworn to (as before hath been manifested) is not the King, 
Dico relaxationem istam in juramentis, faederibus, pacti, alusque contractibus humanis locum habere, non item in votis. ratio discriminis est, quia vota Deo fiunt ut parti: ab homine autem ea sola rel●xari fas est quae homini facta sunt D. San●. de jurament. oblige. praelect. 7. Sect. 8.  but the people of all ranks within the three Kingdoms entering into the same Covenant: and how can they be presumed to release one, whilst they hold themselves bound by it? 4. The Protestation of the 5. of May, 1641. is a Vow; now Divines resolve, that though an Oath may be canceled by the party to whom it is made, yet a Vow no man can remit, because it is made to God as the party, and no man hath to do in altering the right wherein we are bound to him. The things therefore concerning the Government included in that Vow, cannot so much as be pretended to be unloosed by this way.  
2. His other way he thus lays down. A man cannot by Oath be obliged further to any power, then to do his utmost; and the Oath is to be understood conditionally, if the action, or passion may be for that Powers advantage. In an Army each man being obliged by Oath to lose his life for the Prince, rather than turn back, or avoid any danger; this Army having done its utmost, is beaten; and now the Soldiers can do no more for their Prince then die; in these straits therefore it is not repugnant to their Oath to ask quarter, or a new life, and having taken it, they are bound in a new and just obligation of fidelity to those whom they were bound to kill few hours before. They who live under the full Power of the unjust party, may be said to take quarter, and to be in the same condition with the former: and so have the liberty to oblige themselves to that which the Prince now cannot but expect from them, viz: to swear to those under whose Power they live, that they will not attempt any thing against them. All that this amounts to is, it is praeter, non contra prius juramentum; and as the condition which is the ground of this promissory Oath is such, that it is impossible for a man in it to advance his party's cause, so it is impossible for him to be bound to an impossibility. Here is much strength of confidence in asserting, but none of Reason to a warrant, and prove what is here intended to be concluded. That a Soldier, or Subject, being sworn to serve his Prince to the utmost of his power, may ask, and take quarter, and passively submit to a captivating Enemy, when he is fully under his power, I shall not call into question; his Oath binding him to do what he can, for his Sovereign forbids him not to yield when he can do no longer; and for him to suffer death, or harder usage by contesting with his enemy, when he lies at his mercy, as his Oath binds not to it, so it is for his Prince's disadvantage, there being yet hope that his life may be reserved, and his liberty recovered, for his Princes further service according to his Oath, in regard whereof he is rather in that case bound to ask, and take quarter, then bound out from it, but what of all this? will it thence follow, That the Soldier, or Subject thus brought under an adverse party to his Prince, oweth fidelity, and may oblige himself by Oath to that party not to attempt against him? If his Allegiance and Oath were expired, there were some probable way for it; but here is little said, or can be said for that. Let us particularly examine, what this man allegeth.  
1. He hath done what he could, and the Oath bond him to no more. R: He hath done what he could hitherto, and so far hath kept his Oath; but if the Oath was (as the Oaths in the case under debate are) not limited to that particular design, or battle, wherein the Prince hath the worse, and his sworn followers are fallen into the unjust parties hands, but to endure whilst life lasts, and the Prince hath any service for him, he hath not done what possibly he may yet do, nor hath he satisfied his Oath, so that it can demand no more of him.  
2. He hath a new life given him of his conquering Enemy, and thence becomes bound to him. This is but a rhetorical flourish, or compliment, and hath no Logic in it, his life is the same it was, and therefore the man is still under the same obligation of his duty and oath which he was before under. If this Author can prove his life to be really another, I will grant an evacuation of all his former contracted obligations. And in truth although the custom of War calls an Enemies sparing of the life of a worsted person Mercy, yet if that persons cause were good, though he hath found bad success, he hath not forfeited his life to his prevailing Enemy, neither is he beholding or in debt to him for it, no more than a true man oweth his life to those thiefs that only rob him; or a weak man is indebted for his life to a strong man, because he kills him not. 3ly. This is besides, and not against the former Oath. 1. If it be not against it, you are besides your undertaking, and prevaricate it, for you promised to show how a man might take an Oath contrary to his former Oaths. 2. But it is plainly against the former, for to swear to do the utmost that can be for, the Prince, and to swear not to attempt any thing against that Prince's Enemy which hath dispossessed him of his right can be no other than contraries. 4. It is impossible for him to be bound to an imp●ssibility, 
Sed rei impossibilis ex accidente tantum aliquantum diversa est ratio.  si quis ●uratus solv●re centum infra mensem, quod non est per se impossibile casu aliquo in opino in●rim impediatur, ut non possit tantum pecuniae summam tempore p●aefi●to consi ●●●●et si non obligetur in foto conscientiae ad faciendum quod promisit, scil: ad solv●ndum totum debitum debito tempore quod i●m redditum est e●●mpossibile; obligatur ●●men ad facen●um quod in se est, viz. ad sulvendum qu●ntum potest, & quam cito potest Ratio ut●iu●que est q●a cum in hoc casu sola impossibilitas impediat obligationem: obligatio tollitur quoad idso●um quod est factu impossibile, quoad reliquum vero manet, & qui non potest o● quod debet, deb●t tamen omne quod potest. D. Sanders. de jur. oblige. praelect. 2. Sect 12.  and it is now impossible for him to advance his party's cause. That which is in itself, or in its own nature impossible, an oath cannot bind to; but that which is in itself probable, and therefore promised under an Oath, may by accident, or by the interposition of some casual impediment become impossible, this is very ordinary, and this kind of impossibility doth not dissolve an Oath, but only suspends it for the time, until the present impediment be removed: so that though the Oath bind not to the hic and nune of the accidental impossibility, yet it stands in force still, and obligeth to the thing is it is in itself possible, and may (the obstacle being removed) be hereafter fealible. 2. Whilst it is impossible for him to advance his party's cause, it is a frivolous thing for him to swear that he will attempt nothing for his party against the Enemy, for so he only swears not to attempt an Impossibility; and when this impossibility ceaseth, the former Oath to his Prince taketh place: so that this objected Impossibility can be no warrant for such a latter oath.  
Our Author in his Chap: 9 Sect. 3. thus opposeth the obligation of the Oaths: God saith, By me Princes reign: the governing Powers which are, are of God. God hath declared that he will chastise, and change Princes, and Governors; and when we see the changes and chastisements, we may be sure they are by God's order, yea, though the invading or succeeding Governors be like Jehu, Nabuchadnezzar, or those who by cruelty show us nothing but God's wrath. Wherefore it can be no less than sin in us, or treason against God, to swear we will never obey any, but this, or that Prince, or State, or any but of such a Family: for this depends on God's Providence and Justice, which sets bounds to the duration of Governors, and Governments. 1. It is certain that all the Kings and Potentates of the Earth are set up and pulled down by God, and every change of Governors, even the advancement of those who are heavy scourges to the people, is in a sense by and from him; and it is as certain, that some Princes in some sense are not of God, as is clear enough, Hosea 8.4. We must therefore distinguish thus. 1. A thing is said to be of God, in that it was fore-seen, and preordained of him before it came to pass; and falleth out by his providence and disposal. And thus every act or event is by him, whether it be right, or wrong, agreeable or repugnant to his revealed will or Commandment: 2 Chron. 25.20. 2 Sam. 24.1. So are all thefts, robberies, oppressions, murders, violent dispossessions, and occupations. Thus even Antichrists power that is derived to him by the devil is yet given him of God, Rev. 13.5.7.17.17. And so was pilate's pour to crucify Christ: Joh. 19.10, 11.2. To be of God, importeth the thing to be enjoined, warranted or approved by his word, or revealed will; and thus Gamaliel useth the terms, when he speaks hypothetically of the Apostles preaching and working miracles. If it be of God, in opposition to that which is of men, although in the former acception nothing is of men, but it is of God also. Act. 5.38, 39 Now to discern what is of God, so as to impose upon us, we must not go to his secret will or providence, many things come about to us that way which we are not bound to embrace and acquiesce in, but may, yea ought to use remedy against, and strive to avert, or remove, such as are tentations to sin, diseases of the body, captivity, oppression, dishonour, defamation, and such like. These evils, albeit we are patiently and submissively to bear them for the present, as they come from Gods correcting hand, when they are come to pass; yet we are allowed and required to seek the preventing of them when threatened, and the removal of them when befallen; Unjustly advanced Magistrates are of this nature; A passive submission under whom as a divine castigation, whilst we can find no redress, is expedient; but an embracement of them (as those that are authorised and warranted by God) active obedience to t●em, and maintenance or support of them (which is the matter in question) cannot upon this ground be inferred as necessary. To do evil, because it is in the power of our hand by Providence, or to persuade others, or ourselves to sit down under intolerable wrongs, because they are come to pass that way, is an ungodly and foolish construction of Divine Providence, and of a late invention in these every-way erring times.  
2ly, This Author in urging obedience upon this account, not only crosseth Scripture and reason, but cont●adicteth himself in what he saith elsewhere: for the making good of this, I shall only present the Reader with his own words pa. 79. God many times finding some Nations grossly peoc●nt, and obnoxicus to his severest just●●●e, instead ●f beshining gives them up as a prey to another Crown ● thus were the seven Nations; and afterwards Israel itself was thus in the hands of Nabuchadnezzar: which particular case is not a general argument, or consequence (as some a●oue it) for the manner of Government, or latitude of subjection in all Kingdoms. And pag. 89. he speaking of Antichrists dominion, saith, There is one kind of Usurpation which by no possession or prescription can ever become lawful; and a Christian can never submit himself to it, without wounding his conscience and faith. And yet let this man say if this power of Antich●ist be not of God, and by his providence in the sense wherein his Argument runs. 3. Who ever said, that men might swear they will never obey any but this or that Prince, State, or Family? or who ever knew it required, or done? All oaths, and particularly those of obedience, carry still in them a caution of possibility; and when the matter becomes in itself impossible, the Oath ceaseth, and is void: We therefore swear to obey Princes, and States, whilst it pleaseth God to continue them to us; and this tie a present interruption of Government (though to an Invaders full possession) cannot dissolve: the oath, and allegiance of Israel contracted with David, 1 Chron. 11.4. continued till his death, though Absalon risen up against him, drew all Israel after himself, and drove him out of the Land: 2 Sam. 19.9. But when a Prince or Family is irrecoverably lost to a Kingdom the Oath expireth.   

CHAP. V The Reasons brought for obedience to the Usurpers, answered.  
THe next, and last part of my work is to answer those Arguments that I have met with, which are brought for the obedience which I have disallowed in the 2d. and 3d. Chapters: the book entitled, The lawfulness of obeying the present Government, saith the most for such obedience of any that I know; it therefore I shall chief deal with.  

1 Argument.  First, his first and main Argument is taken from that of the Apostle, Rom. 13.1, etc. from this text his Argument set in frame is this: If the Apostle commands submission and obedience, and that for conscience sake unto those in his time that came unlawfully into their power, and authority, than obedience to such may be now lawful. But the Apostle commands submission, and obedience, and that for conscience sake unto those that in his time came unlawfully into their power and authority. Ergo. The major will not be stood upon. The minor is to be denied; And for his full confutation therein, and vindication of the Apostle in this text, I shall, 1. by way of Elenchus make good the contradictory to this Proposition. 2. Answer what he brings for the maintenance of it.  
1. Then I am to clear this contradictory to his minor, viz: That the Apostle in commanding obedience to the higher powers, can only be understood of such as possess their Authority lawfully, or have a just title, and regular calling thereunto. And this I shall undertake to do out of the Apostles own words, or by the characters he gives of the Powers he would have obeyed.  
1. There is (saith the Apostle) no power but of God.  
1. To be of God here must import not merely a permissive counsel, or providence, but a divine approbation, authorization, and vocation; they are said to be of God thus, that come in by God's way, or are called to their places as God hath appointed in his Word; and that, not the former only, but this stricter sense of being of God must be here taken, appears thus. 1. Otherwise the Apostle had said no more for Magistrates in this Character than the Scripture saith of plagues, famines, and other judgements 
a Fanatici dicant potestates omnes sic a Deo esse, sicut pests, morbi, & paenae a Deo sunt. Pareus in loc. , yea of the sins of men, which in the first and larger sense are said to be of God, 2 Sam. 24.1. 2 Chron. 25.20. 2. A derivation of them from God in regard of providence merely, could be no argument for obedience, nonresistance to them, and maintenance of them; for we are not to subject ourselves to, support, and refrain from resisting a thing merely upon this ground, because it comes by providence; then a foreign Enemy that invades us, or a robber must be submitted unto, and may not be resisted; the plague or other sicknesses in the body, nay the outward temptations to sin might not be prevented or removed, for all these come by proidence But the Apostle allegeth their being of God, here as an argument for subjection to, nonresistance, and maintenance of them.  
2. By Powers in this place, this Author tells us, he means not merely power, or authority abstracted from persons, but persons clothed with that Authority. Now that persons clothed with Authority may be said to be of God, there must be not only God's institution of the office, or magistracy in the abstract, for the mere ordaining of the office makes not this or that man a Magistrate more than another, but also his ordering of the persons to the office, but they that are thus ordered of God (viz: not providentially alone, but by way of vocation, approbation, and authorization, as it is above proved, the sense of the words [of God] must import) to the Magistrate's place, must needs be granted to be lawfully possessed of it, or to have to it a just title. This universal negative therefore of the Apostle, There is no power but of God, must not be taken in the simply universal sense, as if there were no other power in the world but such, but as a restrained universal, to wit, There is no lawful power but of God: and so alone can I conceive it consistable with that of the Prophet, 
Hosea 8.4.  They have set up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I kn●w it not. These two say of the holy Ghost must needs be true, and therefore must not be contradictories; which they are not, if you take them uttered in a divers respect, the former of a lawful, the latter of an illegal magigracie.  
2ly, The powers here are said to be ordained of God: and v. 2. to be the ordinance of God; 
Jud● 4. jer. 33.25.  that is, not by his decree, or handie-work merely, as ungodly men are said to be ordained to condemnation: and the being and posture of heaven and earth are said to be God's ordinances, but by his word or written sanction, a person in this acception is to be termed God's ordinance, that is, by divine rule put into a place, or state: those Magistrates then only can be said to be ordained of God; and his ordinanance, that (for the substance at least) enter by the door that he hath made, or the means and manner he hath prescribed. The sons of Aaron in their priesthood, and the Levites in their ministry were God's ordinance, in as much as they were ordained according to God's appointment. Whereas Korah, and his company, 
Levit. 8. Numb. 8.  though they officiated as Priests, yet they were not so, because they wanted that ordination. A man and a woman are by God's ordinance husband and wife, who are espoused together according to divine rule, and not they who only perform the acts of such one to another. In like manner, not whosoever can get into the Seat of Authority by any means are Gods ordained, but they who come in according to God's prescript and regulation. Abs●l●m, and Adenijah, though they got into the kingdom of Israel, were not God's ordinance; but David, and Solomon, whose places they usurped were, these being put into the place by God's direction.  
3ly, The Power here may not be resisted under pain of damnation: v. 2. But, 1. An usurped Power, or they that get men under their command by force without right, may be resisted, and subdued. 
Gen. 14.  Abraham and his confederates justly took up Arms, and by them rescued Lot, and the Sodomites from Chederlaomer, and his participhants. The Judges and Tribes of Israel righteously warred against, and vanquished the Nations that successively obtained and exercised dominion over them, in the book of Judges: so did Samuel and Saul against the Philistines, that were for a time their masters: 1 Sam. So did David, whilst he was king in Hebron, with the house of Judah, against Ishbosheth, Abner, and all Israel: 
2 Sam. 2.8, 9, etc. 3.1. 2 Sam. 18. 2 King. 11.  so did David and his men against Absolom and the people that followed him: so did Jehoiadah in the right of Joash, against Athalia. Lastly, thus did the Maccabees against Antiochus and his race; Which examples I but mention, having urged the most of them before 
b Tyrannum absque titulo qui est invasor, quilibet privatus potest, debete medio tollere, neque enim ille Rex est, sed privata persona. Alsted Theol. Case ca 17. Reg. 8. . And indeed to imagine the Apostle here to tie men conscientiously, and under pain of damnation to obey, and sit down without any reluctancy under, yea to maintain, assist, and sight, for them, who do by force, without any right at all, usurp Authority over them; though they were Turks, theives, Irish, Rebels, Papists, or whoever, the worst of men, and cruelest of Tyrants, and though the sufferers should come to have strength in their hands to relieve themselves, is an imposition (I think) beyond the thoughts of any sober mind, and that which none, but they of the anabaptistical spirit will advisedly own, and them also we may rather find saying, then doing so; the proceed of the Parliament, yea of all parties on both sides in the late war disclaim this doctrine; yea the Army itself may be judge in this matter, who must either condemn this sense, or all their own warlike actions: this would make the Apostle not only to put an insupportable passiveness upon people, but to discourage just Magistracy, if opposed, and grown weak, whereas his manifest scope is to uphold it. 2. They that come in by mere force, with expulsion of the just Magistrate, have apparently committed this crime of resisting the Power that is the ordinance of God, and so have incurred the sentence of damnation, or condemnation (which may be understood of punishment by men) and it's a strange conceit to think, that the Apostle dosh here at once both condemn their act, and confirm their authority gotten by it, and that the same persons should by the same means be both the resisters that are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or set in an opposite order to that ordinance, and condemned for it, and the power and ordinance itself that is to be obeyed, and not resisted. 3. If they that come in by force against the just Magistrate are the resisters of the Power here to be submitted unto, than those that shall obey those resisters in the full latitude of obedience here enjoined (which comprehends assistance and maintenance of them) do become therein resisters of the said just Power also: so that obedience to the Usurpers is rather forbidden, then taught in this text.  
4ly, The Power here to be obeyed, is the minister of God to thee, a revenger to execute wrath, etc. v: 4. 1. No man can be called a minister of God, but he that is called of God to that service, wherein he is his Minister, not only the office must be authorized, but the person must be invested with it by God; there must be some act of God, either immediately or mediately put forth towards the person, or this relation to him of being his Minister cannot be founded; now whosoever is the subject of such a divine act or vocation, hath without controversy a just title to Magistracy. 2. He that is a Revenger to execute wrath under and for God, (that is not by providence only, as thiefs, robbers, and foreign invaders are, but by place and calling) not for destruction, but for good, he must receive a warrant from God for it: vengeance is Gods alone, by property, so that none can take it in hand but by deputation from him: others whatever power they have to do it, are expressly prohibited to be avengers, immediately before this text, Chap. 12. 17. Now he that receives a warrant from God for it, is lawfully impowered.  
By every one of these Characters affixed by the Apostle, to the Magistracy spoken of in this text, it must needs be evinced, That the Apostle in commanding obedience to the higher Powers, can only be understood of such as possess their Authority lawfully, or have a just title thereunto: and this is the contradictory to his Minor, which I undertook to make good.  
2. I come in the 2d. place to give Answer to what he urgeth for the proof of his Minor, which may be gathered up thus. The Roman Emperors, Claudius and Nero, came unlawfully into their Power, or Authority: but the Apostle commands submission and obedience to them: Ergo.  
In this Syllogism both his premises are peccant, and may be denied. 1. For the minor the Apostle speaks in the general of powers, without particular application to the Roman, or any other 
c Non de hoc vel il●●●rincipe loquitur, sed de ipsa re. Chrysost. apud Parcum in loc. ; the carrying of them to the Roman Emperors is this Authors own. If he shall say he may safely argue a thesi, ad hypothesin, or from the general to the particular, 'tis true, if he hold to such hypotheses, or particulars as are contained under the thesis or general: but it is not granted to him, that the Apostle in this text speaks illimitedly, and without exception of all men that by any means may get power into their hands; but on the contrary it is stood upon, that he intends his precept only of lawfully called Magistrates, (the which I have above proved) he cannot therefore include under the Apostles general, them whom he supposeth to have unlawfully got into their power, this were Transire à genere in genu●, or to argue A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Neither can he be allowed to argue after that manner here, seeing he hath begun his Argument ab hypothesi, ad thesin, or from the particular to the general, for this were to walk in a round, and to prove this by that, and that by this circularly. As for that which he hinteth on as if he would prove the minor by it, viz: this Epistle was written in the time of Claudius, or Nero, it hath no shadow of proof in it: for they were not the only Powers then in being: there were others even among the Romans as well as they, himself nameth the Consuls, and Senate, as those to whom the power of right belonged, and they were then existent, and in some possession and use of the power: although the Emperors ruled with them, and in some things overruled them, as they were haply in other things ruled by them 
d Quinetiam speciem quendam libertatis induxit, conservatis senatui & Magistratibus, & maiestate pristinâ & potestate: neque tam parvum quidquam, neque tam magnum publici privatique nego●i fuit, de quo non ad P. C. referretur, etc. Vide Sueton. Tibet ca 30, 31, 32. Heb. 13.7.17. ; there being a kind of mixture of power, and alternatenesse of prevalency betwixt them. Now that the Emperors were then in place (whereas others also were in power) is no more a proof that the Apostle commands obedience to the Emperors, than the being of false Apostles, and Ministers among the Churches, when the Apostle wrote to Christians to obey, and follow them that had the rule over them, proves that he commanded them obedience to those false Apostles and Ministers.  
2ly, The major Proposition (That the Emperor's Claudius and Nero came unlawfully into their Authority) must also be denied: taking [unlawfully] in the sense of the question, or case in hand, that is, in regard of title: for, although the tumultuousnes of the Soldiers, and the craft of the persons interested, were ingredients in the manner of their entrance, yet they were not the basis of their claim, or groundwork of their title: but they had, or came to have, before this precept of the Apostle could intervene, sufficient challenge thereto, otherwise; we must therefore distinguish betwixt an error, or unlawfulness in the way, or manner of a Princes coming in, or obtaining possession of the throne, and an unlawfulness in regard of title, or of that which is of the substance or essence of his calling to that place. The former is that which can only be objected against these two Emperors; the latter is the unlawfulness in the case, or question, viz: when the Rulers hold merely by usurpation, or have no other colour of claim but force, or other intrusion: and to argue from the former to the latter, is plainly fallacious, being A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. But let us hear what unlawfulness the Author urgeth against the Emperors, and see whether it be not short of that which is under debate, multis parasaugis.  
The Consuls and Senate (he saith) anciently had the chief power of Government, these at the death of C: Caligula entered into a consultation how they might restore the Commonwealth to her ancient freedom, which by the Caesars had been taken from them, Claudius in the interim is proclaimed Emperor by the Soldiers, and takes it upon him: 
 Nero his successor was also first saluted Emperor, by the Soldiers: Britannicus, who was Claudius' Son being kept in by the cunning of Nero's Mother.  
Unto all this the Answer is easy. Notwithstanding all these disorderly proceed, these two had a title (for substance) sound and good enough to the rule they bore: take for this a short narration out of History.  
The Roman State was often changed, and received many forms of Government successively 
e Tacit. Annal. l. 1. c. 1. , the beast in the Apocalypse wherein the great Whore sitteth, is by the current of Expositors understood to be the City or State of Rome: and his seven heads are construed to be seven forms of Regiment that have been in it, viz: Kings, Consuls, Tribunes, Decemviri, Dictator's, Emperors, and Popes. 
f Brightman, Mede, Symonds, Napier, Forbs, est Apuc. 17.  If Antiquity must decide which of these Governments had the best title to be over the Romans, it will give it to the Caesars, for the kingly (from which that of Emperors essentially differs not) was the first in time among them 
g Vthem Romam a principio Reges habuete. Tacit. Annal. l. 1 c. 1. . If possession must determine it, the Emperors were at this present in the Throne, and had been for a considerable time, for four of them had reigned in succession to one another before Claudius came in. It the consent and constitution of the people (which is the truest groundwork) must carry it, the Emperors also were supported with this title, both originally, as to the form of Policy, at the first setting up of kings, in the infancy of this State, and personally at their respective come in. By what means this consent was gained from the people, it is not necessary to insist, it were easy to prove, that if there were any unworthy carriage in it, it was as much at least on the submitters as on the Caesar's part. 
* Vide Tacit. Annal. li. 1. ca 1, 2.  Julius Caesar (the first of them) had a concurrent agreement of the State which was (for substance) valid enough; 
h Tum vero abs●ns Romae Dictator creatus pacisque & belli dominus. Cluveti Histor. mundi, lib 7. pag. 236. Vide Chronicon. Carrion l. 2. pa. 180, 181. Muneribus, monumentis, longiariis, epulis multitudinem impertitam lenierat: suos praemiis, adversarios clementiae specie devinaerat. Quid multa? attulerat jam liberae civitati, pattim metu, partim patientia consuetudinem serviendi. Cicero in N. Anton Philip 12. Orat. 44.  so had Augustus after him 
i Caesari quia arma sump●erat Reip: pro ●op. Romano imperium à Senatu datum, cum Consularibus ornamentis. Cluveri Histor. lib. 7. pag. 240. : the same had Tiberius his next successor. 
k Sex. Pempeius, & Sex. Apuleius Coss primi in verba Tiberii Caesaris iuravete; apudque eos Seius Strabo, & C. Turranius: mox Senatus milesque & populus Tacit. Annal. l 1. ca 2. Vide Sueton in Tiber. c. 24.  Caligula the next to him had the cheerfullest, and most affectionate assent that ever Prince had 
l Sic imperium adep●●s, populum Romanum, vel ut ita dic●m, hominum genus voti compotem fecit, exoptatissin us Princeps, &c Vide Sueton. in Caligula. c. 13, 14. . By this time the Government of the Caesars had by these reiterated acts of consent, establishment from the people sufficient to give it a just title, and free it from usurpation; The next that followed was Claudius, who was left by Tiberius' joint Heir with Caligula 
m Vide Sueton in Tiber. c. 76. , but was put by for the time by the excessive love which the people bore unto Caligula 
n Vide eundem in Calig c. 14. ; after whose death, the Consuls, Senate, and City Regiments talked indeed of standing up for a public liberty. But Claudius being saluted Emperor by some of the watch, and the cry of the City Soldiers being at length that one should have the rule; the Consuls, and Senate, perceiving the Soldiers bent that way, and thereupon fearing a combustion, and suspecting their own inability to make good their design, they being divided also among themselves, and other competitors for the Empire beginning to start up, and Agrippa the king of the Jews, strongly counselling and persuading them to it, they withered, and shrunk in with their undertaking, and at last accepted of Claudius 
o Verum postero die Senatu segniore in exequendis conatibus, per taedium, ac dissentionem di versa censentium, & multitudine quae circumstabat unum rectorem jam, & nominatim exposcente, armatos pro concione jurare in nomen suum passus est. Su●ton in Claud c 10. Ad firmandum eius imperium non parum contulit Agrippa Rex judaeorum, author & Claudio retinendat dignitatis, & Senatui non offendi veteranos. Itaque Senatu segniore in exequendis conatibus, & milite urbano Praetorianis se aggregante, in Claudii nomen iuratum est. Cluver. Histor. lib. 8. pag 267. Hoc exemplo optimates deserti in magno metu esse caeperunt, ac deinceps videntes sibi adversationem tutam non esse, secuti milites ad Claudium transierunt. Claudius' susce pit in castris advenientem senatum, & indulgenti honore complexus, egreffus cum patribus confestim obtulit Deo hostias, ut mos est pro imperio supplicari. joseph. de bello judaie. lib 2. ca 10. Vide eundem Antiq. judaie. lib. 19 c. 3. : as for Nero who came in next, Britannicus indeed was nearer to the Empire in succession than he, but Agrippina, mother to Nero had prevailed with her husband Claudius to adopt Nero, and prefer him before his own Son Britanicus; which he did with the Senate's consent p: Nero accordingly succeeded him, and had the consent of the State at his inauguration, without any reluctancy 
q Sententiam inclitam secuta pattum consulta; nec dubitatum est apud provincias. Tacit. Annal. lib. 12. c. 14. .  
It appears by all this, that the Caesars, and particularly Claudius, and Nero, (insisted on by this Author) had other foundation for their Empire besides the Soldier's promoting, and sufficient to give them a lawful calling, and title to their rule, and to excuse them from Usurpation, such as hath been afore described. And that Claudius came in (though cross to some unripened motions, and consultations of theirs, yet) not against any Act or Decree of the Senate; but with their concurrent or subsequent approbation.  
If it be objected in behalf of the Usurpers in our case, that they also have a consent of the people, by the act of the presupposed House of Commons. I answer, besides what hath been said in the close of the first Chapter, of the people's noncommittance of any power to their Representees, to alter any thing in the constitution of the Supreme Power, or to erect a new one; all that they have to do, being to manage that proportion which is committed to them: there are moreover two main things that impeach that Acts validity. 1. That the Lords who are an eminent integral part of the Kingdom, as also the far greater part of the elected Commons, are, not only absent (so that a very small part of the Kingdom, even locally considered is represented by them that sit) but not permitted to come in, and professedly shut out (and consequently the parts of the Kingdom which they represent are excluded) at the passing of this consent. 2. That the object and actors in this consent, the promoted and promoters are the same persons; on whom is the new Supreme Power conferred, but on themselves that confer it? You cannot find two parties in this act, an agent, and a patiented; so that it is so far from being a legitimate contract, or transaction, that it is no political act at all. What reckoning shall we make of that consent which men bestow on themselves, in relation to an interest of power over others? if such a grant could create a right, few men that could get strength would lack preferment.  
Having thus answered this Authors main Argument, I shall in the rest be briefer. 2. He allegeth, In this Nation many persons have been settled in supreme Authority by mere force, without title of Inheritance, not any three immediately succeeding each other have come to the Crown by true lineal succession. Five Kings on a row (the Conqueror being the first) had no title at all by proximity of blood, Hen: the 7th by mere power came in, was made King, in, and by an Army, upon this foundation of military power he got himself crowned at Westminster, and called a Parliament, wherein the Crown was entailed upon him, and his Heirs. Those that came in thus, the main body of this Nation did obey, yea doth yield subjection unto their Laws to this day. Not to stand to examine what he asserts in these premises: 1. The mistake of this Argument is, that because the Kings by him mentioned came not in by true succession, or proximity of blood, they therefore must needs be granted to have come in by force alone, or otherwise unlawfully; whereas though, some of them entered by the Sword, others by anticipation, yet they all, whose persons were, and Laws now are obeyed, had the concurrent, or subsequent consent of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, and that without their Houses being dismembered, and a force set at their doors. 2. The Laws made by those Princes were not made by them alone, but by them with the Parliament; and by them, not as so entering, but as received by Parliament, and so legally invested. 3. The three last Princes of this Realm did come in by an indubitate lineal succession, and proximity of blood, and the Son of the last is in being, and claiming by that title. It is observable then that this title should be denied, and cut off, when it was at the clearest state. 4. No doubt there have been unjustifyable proceed about the Crown by some of the former possessors of it: which have been followed with remarkable punishments, and public calamities sufficiently pointing out their injustice, and forewarning others from making them their examples to practise by. What hath been, is no warrant to conscience that the same may be done.  
3ly, He citys some Divines, and Casuists as concurrent with him in his opinion. Their words are too many for me to recite, and the nature of this kind of Argument exacteth no long Answer. In a word therefore. 1. Azorius his words allow obedience to Tyrants in regard of title, with restriction, and in some cases, (such as are granted by me, Chap. 3d.) But your part is to prove obedience to them, in its full latitude as you have propounded your thesis, without limitation, and concluded (though not validly) by your first Argument.  
2. Alsted distinguisheth of Tyrannus, titulo, & exercitio, a Tyrant in regard of title, and in regard of use: and his words immediately before these alleged by you are spoken of the latter, and so may therefore these be understood; but the former only is the subject of our question. Besides within a few lines before he hath this passage: A Tyrant without title, who is an invader, every private man may, and aught to destroy, for he is not a Prince but a private person 
r Alsted: Theol: cas cap. 17. reg. 8. . Which will not stand with the words quoted by you, if understood of a Tyrant in regard of title.  
3. Paraeus in your place speaks nothing pro, or con, of obedience to Usurpers, but is explicating how the Apostle is to be taken in those words, The powers that be, are of God, ordained of God: and he distinguishes thus in the words brought in by you. The power which is of God is one thing, the getting, and use of the power is another, which is indifferent, sometimes lawful, sometimes unlawful, ut in dublis 
s Aliud est potestas quae a Deo est, aliud acquisitio, & usus potestatis, quae indifferens, alias legitima, alias illegitima. Par. in Rom. 13. . Whither if you had followed him, you should have found him answering the doubt about Nimrods' power thus We must discern betwixt the power which is ever of God, and betwixt the getting and usage of the power, which as to men is often most unjust not of God, but of men's lusts, and Satan's malice 
t Discernendun est inter potestatem quae ●emp●… d● Deo est, & inter acquisitionem. & us● pationem quae quoad hominessae potest iniustissima non a Deo sed ab hominum affectibus, & Satana malitia. Ib. in Dub. 3. . By which words it is evident, you have but half quoted him, as well as impertinently; and if his Authority may sway with you, unjustly gotten power is not of God, in regard of the person, or man, owning it, and consequently not to be obeyed by virtue of Rom. 13.  
4. For the rest I have not their books to peruse, but their say set down by you reach not the case at all. This therefore I offer you produce any one, or more Authors, of any account amongst Protestants, that allow obedience to an unlawful Power, [in the full latitude of obedience to a Magistrate, where there is a ●…e-ingagement of conscience pleaded by Law, ancient inheritance, and oaths sworn to another Power in being, claiming, and endeavouring to recover his right] and I will (by God's assistance) return you a particular Answer.  
4ly, His next Reason is, Either that authority which is thus taken by power must be obeyed, or else all Authority and Government must fall to the ground, and so confusion be admitted.  
First, why must this needs follow? 1. May not Usurpation fall to the ground, how strongly soever it be set up, and lawful Government be raised up again? The experience of former times hath observed, That no ill gotten power can be long lived 
u Nulla quaesita scelere potentia diuturna esse potest. Q Curt. apud Lips. Poli●. li. 2. c 4. Quamvis enim demersae sint leges alicujus opibus quamvis tremifacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando— nec vero ulla vis imperil tanta est quae premento metu possit esse diuturna. Testis est Phalaris, cuius est preter caeteros nobilitata crudelitas— in quem universa Agrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit Quid? Macedones nun Demetrium reliquerunt, universique se ad Pyrrhum contulerunt? Quid? Lacedemonios' in just imperantoes nun repent omnes fere socit deseruerunt, spectatoresque se otiosos praebuerunt leuctricae calamitatis? Cicero de officiis lib 2. Ad tempus fortasse insidiosa & violenta valere possunt inventa hominum, sed absque iuslitia, & aequitate prevalere non possunt diu: quip vana & infirma sunt stratagemata civitatis quae columna virtutis non fulciuntur. Boter. Tractat. lib. 8. cap 6. . Although (saith Cicero) Laws should be plunged over head, and Liberty's overawed by the power of a party, they will sometimes recover again. There is no strength of any power so great, that it can continue by keeping men in awe, etc.  
2ly, If Usurpation have a party to join with it, that party will suffice to administer such justice as that Authority will afford; if it have no party, it falls to the ground (for it subsists only perforce) and a clear way is open for the right Government to take place: which will be so much the more readily entertained, by how much it hath been interrupted 
* Arciores autem morsus sunt intermissae libertatis, quam tetentae. Cicero de offic. lib. 2. .  
2ly, However things succeed, evil of sin must not be done, that good of profit may be attained. It must first be proved lawful to obey, before this Reason can be heard, which will only plead its expediency, if it be honest. Though commodum may be consulted, especially publicum, yet we must first be satisfied of the justum of it. It was not long ago pleaded, Fiat justitia, ruat coelum. And we were not told thus, when the late wars for Laws and Liberty were first begun: If this be a cogent reason now, it was to have been so then; and we might better have prevented the miseries of a war by henning to it, then by refusing it, have, by so dear a means, purchased to ourselves an harder condition, and now be bound to bide under it for that very reason.  
3ly, If Government fall, and Confusion come, let them bear the guilt that have wrought these effects: we that detract from obedience shall only bear the misery of it, which will be lighter to us, it may be hoped, than their greatness with the guilt it is gotten, and kept by, will be to them.  
Fifthly, he adds, Otherwise the King being for the Commonwealth, and not the Commonwealth for the King, the end should be destroyed for the means, the whole for a part. First, the King as a man, yea as a royal person, or most noble part of the Commonwealth, is not the prime matter to be laid on the balance; but if the King may be looked at as ours, and so as we are in piety, and justice bound to him, to seek his preservation, and yield him our obedience; thus considering him, equity and a good conscience are the things stood for as the end; which although they may undergo the notion of means in reference to the Commonwealth's good, yet they are desirable, and to be sought absolutely, and for themselves; and the subordinate means of the Commonwealth's political good, must be subordinated or submitted to them, and that end is only so far, and by such means to be pursued, as will consist with these. 2ly, The Parliament, and the Army also, a● no more than a means, or a part in relation to the collective Commonwealth. Must not the rights of these therefore be stood for, with the hazard of the whole? If this rule might have guided men in relation to their claims, such courses and events as have been, had been prevented. 3ly, Though certain destruction of the end, or whole, must not be run upon for the means, or part, yet those may be hazarded for the saving of these from certain destruction. As we see it ordinarily, men do adventure their lives and liberties for the preservation, or recovery of their estates by war; and their whole bodies for the regaining of their healths, or one wounded, or festered member, by Physic or Chirurgery. 4ly, We are not active in the destroying of the end, or whole (if they be destroyed) and we were better both to suffer their destruction, and suffer in it, then sinfully to concur in destroying the means, or a part, or in substituting an unlawful means, or part for the legitimate, that we might preserve them.  
Sixthly, If a master's mate had thrown the master overboard, and by power would suffer no other to guide the ship but himself, if the mariners will not obey him, commanding aright for the guiding of the ship, the ship and themselves must needs perish. 1. I conceive the mariners may in this case obey the Master's Mate for self-preservation, till they come to shore; in like manner that we may obey an Usurpers power, that is, act according to his command in a thing which is not only lawful, but simply necessary both to be done, and to be done by us, as in the case of self-preservation, by repelling a foreign Enemy, or common danger of certain and important consequence; but shall it be inferred from hence, that the mariners are bound to obey the Mate, or we an Usurper, in all other things of his own concernment, or separable from self-preservation, and every other necessary duty. I am bound to submit myself to the wholesome, and necessary direction of my Pastor, and Physician in their respective ordering, touching my soul and body: must I say therefore I must resign up myself in obedience to them in all other matters? 2ly, The case is not parallel. For, 1. The mariners (without respect to their exigence) in that posture are bound to obey none, the Master being dead, and so are conscience free. But the people (in the case) have a Magistrate surviving, and challenging power over them, to whom they have sworn Allegiance. 2ly, The Mariners are supposed without obedience to the Mate, to be sure of destruction: but by what hath been above said, it cannot be pleaded that the Nation, or the scruplers at obedience without obeying are sure to perish.  
Seventhly, you quote a saying out of Cajetan 
x Summula. Tit. Rempub. Tyrannice, etc. , but it suits not with the obedience you stand for; he in all that Discourse speaks nothing at all for any obedience to Tyrants in respect of title, his subject being the point of going to such Tyrants for Law and Justice 
y Nunquid gubernanto Tyranno peccent illi qui recurrunt ad ipsum pro justitia. , (of which I have spoken Chap. 3.) and his whole speech being confined to it.  
Eightly, lastly, (for I will not follow you in repeating again what you had said before, and I have answered above) What can the common people do in this case? they cannot judge of titles; but they see who doth visibly, and actually exercise Authority. 1. Bruit beasts do indeed only see him that actually leads, or drives them; and therefore they follow without making difference betwixt the owner and a thief: but are men, though but common people so stupid? The people you speak of are not altogether so brutish, they themselves disprove you, if you observe (as it is easy to discern) whom they generally abhor from, and whom they look towards: and whoso shall compare their visible bent with your present book, they whom you make but like Balaams dumb Ass, yet in this case do speak with man's voice, and forbidden the madness, etc. 2ly, If they be so incapable of discerning of titles, wherefore hath not only the late King, but the Parliament published so many Declarations, and Appeals to the people, wherein they plead for the justness of their title, to what they stood and fought for? yea why hath the Parliament drawn the people into the Protestation, the 2d. Vow, and Oath, and the Solemn League and Covenant, all which concern the several claims and rights of King and Parliament? either they are thereby supposed to be somewhat competent to judge of those titles; or it was both vainly, and irreligiously done to lead them into such sacred bonds, which we may neither take, nor cause others to take, but in judgement. Jer. 4.2.  
3ly, Although they, yea the primest Statesmen, may find it difficult enough to judge of titles in some nice, and intricate cases that may happen, yet the present case is not so deep or doubtful, the right of title in this question is written with clear and capital letters, in Laws, Oaths, and actions open before all. Yea this Author in the title and current of his book, (as doth Mr. Ashcam in his) plainly enough grants where the right of title is.  
This Author in the latter end of a second Edition of his book, viz: beginning at pag. 15. addeth some things upon the question of active obedience, and acting under this present power, and government. Although this Edition come in late, and in some passages is but an amplification in terms, not in matter, of what he had said before; yet I shall take a brief notice (whether sufficient let the Reader judge) of the things in it, that may seem material.  
First, he premiseth, That the present Power is in possession of the whole Land, and no visible force to oppose, and so it is not like that between David and Absolom, when David had an Army in view. Consult the text, and you shall find the case exactly parallel. 1. The present Power is in possession of the whole Land; you say, you mean of this side the Sea, not of Ireland also; suitable hereunto Absolom was possessed of all the Land unto Jordan, yea, and he went over Jordan, and pitched in Gilead, and all the people throughout all the Tribes of Israel had anointed him King over them: on the other hand David and his men fled out of Jerusalem, and out of the Land, beyond Jordan, and stayed not till he came to Mahanaim by the ford Jabock. 2 Sam. 15.14, etc. 17.22.24, 25, 26.19.9, 10.  
2ly, You add, And no visible Force to oppose, whereas David had an Army in view. David had no Army in view within that land before spoken of: all that he had was at Mahanaim. And though there be no visible Force to oppose in England, yet there is said to be a considerable Force in Ireland, and it may appear by the Preparations sent thither. Besides there is one thing indeed wherein David's condition, and his whom the present Power excludeth, differ, but not to the advantage of this Author's Reason, which is, that David had no other Kingdom to own, and declare for him, which yet he hath.  
Secondly, You come with Arguments. 1. Obedience to such a Power in good things is lawful. But acting for Justice and order is a good thing: Ergo: I have before distinguished betwixt moral acts which are for private men to do, though there were no Authority; and political acts, which flow from magistracy. The latter sort of acts may not be done in obedience to an usurped Power, for the Reasons given before. The execution of justice is a good act in itself, but it is not good to be done by every man, nor upon every man's command; but is only good in him that is lawfully authorized to it.  
2ly, You say, what reason is it, that those that will not act because they hold it unlawful, should expect that others should do an unlawful act to benefit them? To this let Cajetan (an Author cited by you, and that in the place you cited from him) answer you; They are excused from the sin of inducing the Tyrant to an act unlawful for him, that ask Justice of him, because they do not petition him for the unlawful act, but for the justice of that unlawful act: it is honestly done to persuade him to use his power less sinfully. This Petition is in effect thus much. Seeing thou wilt-hold and exercise this power, use it justly, use it honestly, use it religiously; use it to the benefit of the public, and of private men, as it would become the Power. It is plain such Petitioners intent not to ask the Tyrant to usurp the act of Judicature, because they had rather he would give it over: but seeing he doth usurp dominion, and judgement, they intent he should use justly and honestly his usurped Power and Judgement: and that which they intent, that they petition for: so that they neither intent nor petition for and usurped act, but an holy quality in the exercising of that usurped act 
* Excusatur à peccato inducendi Tyrannum ad actum, & opus sibi illicitum petentes ab illo iustitiam: quia non petunt actum illicitum, sed justitiam illius actus illiciti. Sanctè suadetur, quod minus mase utatur dominio illo; scil: si vis seu ex quo vis detinere, & exercere hoe dominium, utere illo just, utere honestè, utere pie, utere ad utilitatem public●m, & privatorum prout deceret dominium Constat ●●mque quod non intendunt ipsi petere, ut tyrannus utatur tyrannide, ut usurpet actum Judicis ●quoniam mallent ut cederant tyrannidi, & iudicio; sed ex quo usurpat libi dominium ac iudicium, intendune ut just, ut pi● utatur usurp●to dominio, & usurpato iudicio, & qu●d intendunt hoc petunt; ita quod nec intendunt, non petunt actum usurpatum, sed qualitatem sanctum in actu usurpato exercendom Caietan Summul Tit. Remp. Tyranni●e, etc. .  
Again, Why should others give right to them, that will not give right to others? A fallacious, and frivolous interrogation in the true meaning of it. In commutative justice (wherein the rule of doing as we would be done unto) only holds, with reference to persons that are to do it) they who refuse magistratical acts, are ready to render every man's right to him. But this question would have a private man (such as they are) to have no distributive justice, or right by the Magistrate done him, even when the Magistrate is lawful, because he cannot, and therefore will not vicissim administer distributive justice to the Magistrate. Every common Judgement knows that a private subject is to receive judicial right, but not to give it.  
3ly, It is cleared before in this Discourse, that those who have gotten to be Powers (though by force) ought to give justice to those whose government they have undertaken, but (supposing them to be but one, or a few) this they cannot do without subordinate agents; to disallow acting under them then, is to say in effect they shall not give justice. 1. Suppose them but one or a few, and they cannot get or keep the place by force. Suppose them many, & they have no need (in that respect) of others to be their under-agents. 2ly, If this that you say be cleared, or so much as said before, I have forgotten it, though I have read all that is before, and rest confident there is no such thing. When you show where this is said and cleared, I shall then find by what reasons it is maintained, and so give you an Answer thereunto. In the mean time, that which is here but barely affirmed, it is sufficient for me to deny. If you could clear this, the whole question were decided. If he ought to give justice, he hath a special warrant, and calling to it, and how Force can give such a calling you have not yet aslayed to clear, the contrary I have brought many reasons for (Chapter 2.) and am therefore before hand with you in this point. It will be confessed, that if a man will take upon him to administer judgement he were better, or it is a less evil in him, to do right, then wrong therein: but of two evils of sin, neither is to be admitted.  
4ly, This Doctrine of not acting is the very doctrine of Levelling. For when no man may act, every man may take freely from his neighbour, etc. 1. Levelling may be the consequent of non-acting, but it cannot be the consequent of it; it is the consequence of thei● do, who take away the settled Magistracy. 2. Levelling in point of goods, you like not it seems: but why do you not as well abhor from it in point of Government? that's but levelling the private, this is levelling the public Interest; that Levelling can never come in, till this Levelling go before, and lead the way, but who are Levellers this latter, and (as you see) worse weigh, but they that teach, or practise the deserting of the lawful, established Magistrate, and the competency, yea duty, of any that have force to play the Magistrate. Hence ariseth that which they call an interpretative consent of the people: because it is supposed every rational man doth consent that there should be order, property, and right, given under a tyrant, rather than all to be under confusion, etc. 1. Every rational man consents indeed that there should be order, property and right; and his being under a tyrant (by experience of the want) confirms his consent to the necessity thereof: but that such things should be maintained magistratically by a tyrant (in regard of title) you see (if all that are your Antagonists in this question be not stark Irrationals) some rational men deny. And in this they appear rational, in that they would hear some reason for it, before they consent to it. Which rather then you will strain yourself to give (for truly it is hard to do) you choose to suppose them that will not consent without it, to be out of the number of rational men. 2ly, This shift of an interpretative consent of the people, that the Usurper shall administer judgement, will not serve you. For, 1. It will be difficult to find out, and agree, when such an interpretative consent is given by the people. 2ly, What thing is it? as near as I can conjecture it is possibly. 1. Either that these men shall be the Power, or Magistrate; and then, 1. Either the people had power to give this consent, and this makes these men no Usurpers, but lawful Magistrates, & so puts them out of the compass of this question. 2. Or they had no power, being preingaged, and then this consent is void, and null, because it prejudicate another's right. 2. Or it is, that these men, though they have no consent of theirs to be Magistrates, but come in, and hold against their wills, and by their own mere force, and against another's right, yet they shall for present execute judgement, because it cannot be had otherways. This consent (suppose it really passed by the people) cannot bottom their acting, or others under them. For it is in the essence of it an unlawful act, and therefore of no force. It is of the same validity as was that of the people which joined with Korah, and his company, who gave consent, that though Korah, and the rest were no Priests, yet they should offer incense; or as that would be, if the people of a Congregation now, that can procure no lawful Minister, should take a private man, and say, this man is no Minister, yet he shall, in this defect of one, preach, and administer the Sacraments to us. Such consents are contradictions to the established ordinance of God, appointing that no stranger to those functions shall execute those acts. In like sort it is in this point of Magistracy.  
5ly, How could Ezra, and Nehemiah justify their acting under the Persian Monarch, who had no right to the Crown of Judah, either by blood or just conquest. 1. That the Persian Monarch had not that right, you say, but prove it not, but if just conquest give a title, Cyrus the first Persian King justly warred against Balshazer the last Chalcedon Monarch as Historians 
a Crusus fiducia potentiae inferi bellum Cy●o gerenti justum bellum adversus Tyrannum Babylonicum Chr. Carion. li. 2. pag. 69. 
Balshasar conspicatus Cyri, & Medorum potentiam coalescere, Craesum ad Infringendas eorum vi●es incitat.  
Cluveni Hist. li 6. pa. 64.   say, and therefore justly conquered him, and his Empire; under which the Jews were then subjected, and that by special warrant from God. Jer. 27.12. to 16.29.1. to 8.21.8, 9.38.17. to 21. 2ly, But Cyrus had both an indubitable title to that Empire, and an unquestionable Commission for what he did in reference to the Jews releasement from captivity, and restauration of their Temple, Keligion, and Civil State; and that from God himself, by immediate designation. Hear what he himself saith in his Proclamation, unto which he was stirred up in spirit by the lord Thus saith Cyrus' King of Persia, all the kingdoms of the earth, hath the Lord God of heaven given me, and he hath charged me to build him an house in Jerusalem which is in Judah. 2 Chron. 36.22, 23. Ezra 1.1, 2. And compare this with what the Lord saith not only of, but to this Cyrus. Isa. 44.28.45.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13. and a clear calling or title to the Empire of the world, and to the acting of what he did in reference to Judea, will appear to be in him. It is conceived that Cyrus had certain knowledge of this Commission, recorded and given to him by name, in that Prophecy of Isaiah, and that by means of Daniel the Prophet 
b Agnovit hoc ipse Cyrus, & publico est edicto ad hunc modum testatus: Haec dicit R●x Persarum, &c primo Esdra. Musculuin Isaiae 45.1. Cyrus' lecto vaticinio Isaiae de se nominatim edito Isa. 45. proposuit edictum quo judae is in Babylonia captivis, reditum in partiam, & facultatem, in staurandi templi concessit. Chytraei Chronol. in 〈◊〉 Herodat p. 147. Arbitror autem & tunc cum rexit Persiam Daniel, praesos in Susis fuisse ejus auditorum Cyrum adolescentem, & ●b eo dediciste veram de Deo, & de Mossia doctrinam, & praedictiones Isaiae in qua nomen Cyri express positum est. Chron Carion. li. 2. pa. 69. ; and that which is therein written he understood to be his charge given of God, which he mentioneth in the aforesaid Proclamation 
c See Annotations of ●ivn●s on 2 Chron. 36.22. & Ezra 1.2. Diodat. ibid. Musculu: in Isa. 45 1.13. . Add to this that Mr. Diodati interpreteth that speech of God to Cyrus, viz: I girded thee. Isa. 45.5. of the Lords making him King, and giving him power and authority: v. 1. And that of ver. 13. I have raised him up in righteousness, he understands thus. That is, by a firm decree of my justice, and by a just calling. Now if Cyrus the first of the Persians had a valid title, what can control his Successors right in Judea?  
2ly, If there had been no right in the Persian King over Judea, yet the acting of Ezra and Nehemiah, could be no precedent or warrant for a now acting under a usurped Power in the case we have in hand. 1. Consider the special qualification, and call of these two persons. 
Ezra 7.1.2.  1. For Ezra, he was a Scribe, and a Priest, and some think one of the highest, to wit, that he was that Josedech, who was the father of Joshua, the high Priest (this is Jerome opinion 
d Ludoviulves, in August. de civet. Dei lib. 18. cap. 36. ; and so might be authorized by virtue of that office, to transact all that he is said to have done in his book. 2. He is said by some of the Ancients to be a Prophet, Neither can he be denied so to be, (saith a late learned and solid Divine 
e Mr. Roberts his Clavis Bibliorum on Ezra. ) in that he was a Penman of Scripture. 3ly, And besides these functions, he seems to have had a special call of God in his undertaking what he did: it is said, The hand of the Lord his God was upon him, when he first enterprised his work: Ezra 7.6. which phrase is often rolterated upon the several passages of his employment. Chap. 7.9.28. etc.  
2ly, Nehemiah was the Governor, Neh. 8.9.10.1.12.26. it is not any where said (that I find) that he was sent with that power by the Persian King, but it is more probable he was chosen to that office by the people of Judah, both because he was one that was very zealous for the interest and public advantage of that Nation, and by reason he came thither some years 
* Ezra 7.7. compared with Nehe. 1.1.  after Ezra, and acted in conjunction with him. Neh. 8.9. Now in Artaxerxes letter to Ezra, at his first going up from Babylon to Jerusalem, it is committed to Ezra's trust, To set Magistrates and Judges up among the people: Ezra 7.25. with this proviso, After the wisdom of thy God that is in thine hand; by which is meant the Law of God. But by the Law of God the people of Israel were to create their own Magistrates and Kings, Deut. 16.18.17.14, 15. And besides his Governorship it seems he had (in like manner to Ezra) a divine instigation, and vocation to his work. It is said, That God put that in his heart to do at Jerusalem; 
Neh. 2.12.18.  which he went about, and when he was come thither, he told them of the hand of his God which was good upon him: upon which report, they said, Let us rise up and build.  
2. Let it be more narrowly observed, what Ezra's Commission was from Artaxerxes, and it will be found, 1. That he himself was not authorized to fine, imprison, and put to death, as this Author affirmeth; let the text be better marked, Chap. 7.26. 2. In the charge of setting up Magistrates and Judges, it cannot be thought he was intended to do it; otherwise then as a private man, or Priest might be instructed to do it, viz.: with the people's concurrence; For he (as I even now observed) was to manage that business after the wisdom of his God that was in his hand, to wit, according to divine Law, which appointeth the people to do it.  
3ly, That in all this Commission he and the rest that went up with him were authorized to do no more, and in no other manner than the Law of God required: Ezra 7.14.18.23.25. and consequently they were warranted before by it, to do all that they did, and this of Artaxerxes was but an encouragement, & strengthening of them to it. 4ly, Whatsoever he acted, Chap. 10. in the matter of the Oath, Proclamation and reformation in the point of marriage. Besides that there was nothing done by him in it, that was solely appertaining to the Magistrates office; all that he transacted was by the motion, appointment, and consent of the Congregation, the Princes and the Elders: Ezra 10.1.3.7.8. etc. ver. 12.19. yea even by the free assent of the parties. 3ly, As for all the authoritative actings of Nehemiah, which he allegeth they must be attributed to his place of Governor, and whence that is to be derived, I have spoken before.  
Lastly, You bring in the Judgement of two or three Popish Divines. Which I shall altogether pass over, for that their reasons taken from the , or interpretative consent of the people, the confusion that comes in by having no government, and the expedience of choosing the lesser of two evils, I have answered before. Only one thing brought in, by the last of them being not before answered, I shall here reply to; which is as followeth.  
It is manifest that the Romans by tyranny did possess Judea, in that very time wherein Christ and John Baptist did preach, yet Christ, Matt. 22. did teach, that tribute was to be given to Caesar, yea himself did give it, John Bapt: Luk. 3. commanded the soldiers this only, that they should do violence to no man, and he content with their wages, wherein he did rather persuade them to continue in the service of Caesar.  
First, To that of Christ, Matth. 22. wherein the main of this allegation lieth which is stuck at by many, I have two things to say.  
First, His Answer to the Question about the lawfulness of giving tribute to Caesar is to be weighed, and therein it may be questioned, whether he positively taught that tribute was to be rendered to Caesar. His words are, Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's: and unto God the things that are Gods. Here Christ delivers a precept of giving to God and Caesar each their right in the general, without asserting, or explaining what the right of either is in particular, or m●king application to the case, then before him; he seems to leave them that moved the question to do that. His words determine not the point either way expressly; all that can be inferred from the plain current of them, is a conditional rule equally favouring the affirmative, and negative; if it be Caesar's due, render it; if not, etc. Such a waving answer will not appear unbeseeming him, if it be considered who they were that propounded the quaere, to wit, the Pharisees, with the chief Priests and Scribes; and with what intention it was put forth by them, viz: to entangle him, and so to betray him to the Governor for his destruction: See v: 15. and Luk. 20.19, 20. and how well this was known to him: v: 18. The case was put not so much of conscience, as of design; and there was this biformed, or cornuted trap in it. If he should disallow that tribute paying, they would accuse and prosecute against him, before the Roman Governor as an enemy to Caesar; if he should hold with it, they would traduce him to the people, as one that consented to the Romans tyranny, and sacrilege 
a Marlorat. Muscul. Dieterius jansenius, Deodate. : Upon this ground he might prudently (and justly enough) give an Answer not to satisfy the doubt, but to silence the propounders. And unto this interpretation Mr. Calvin inclineth 
* Ita temperavit responsum admirabili sua sapientia, ut neutri parti se redderet obnoxium. Calv. apud Marlorat. in locum. . He so tempered (saith he) his answer by his admirable wisdom, that he might render himself obnoxious to neither party If he did indeed so expressly command tribute paying to Caesar in these words, which were publicly, and before all uttered in the Temple, with what face or colour could they, within two or three days after, accuse him unto Pilate; as one whom they found perverting the Nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Caesar. Luk. 23.2. This accusation would import to us, his Answer under question to have been so positive, and punctual, for tribute paying; for though no doubt these men accused him maliciously, and would not stick to do it falsely, yet they would have some hint, or appearance of occasion for it, as in other their accusations they by straining, and misconstruction had.  
2ly, But unto those who will not believe, but that in the said words he teacheth paying tribute to Caesar: I further answer. Let the notion under which he is supposed to enjoin it be observed, and the so understanding him will help not to strengthen, but to answer the Argument. He commands them to render that which he speaks of to Caesar as a due or right: 
b Render as a debt. Rom. 13.7. Anno● of Divines.  Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; now if tribute or any thing else belonging to a Magistrate were Caesar's due and right, than was Caesar no Usurper, but a lawful Magistrate, for tribute of due can only belong to a rightful Sovereign. A debt on the Subjects part of tribute must needs infer a right to it in the Magistrate, to whom it is payable; and a right in him to it must needs infer a right in him to all allegiance 
c 
Non dicit date ergo, cum illi interogassent, liceretur dare se dicit reddito tanquam caquae eius sunt, quaeque ab eo accepistis.  
Reddite, inquit, Caesari, sed quae Caesaris sunt, qu●que tunquam sua iure postulare potest. Jansen. come. in conc. c. 116.  . How it came about that the Romans were invested with the Sovereignty of Judea, is not necessary for me to clear, when there is (taking the words in this latter sense) so plain a proof that it was so in these words of our Saviour.  
But for the Readers sake, I will observe thus much out of History to him. About 152 ye●rs before the birth of our Saviour, the government of Judea came to be in the Maccabees who were Priests. At that time Judas Maccabeus being in fear of that grand Enemy of the Jews, Antiochus sought aid of, and entered into a League of friendship with the Romans; 
d joseph. de be●o judaic l. 1. c. 1. 2. Chro. carrion li. 2. pag. 138.  which continued till about 60 years before the birth of Christ, when Hircanus and Aristobulus, the Sons of Alexander falling into contention for the Kingdom; and Aristobulus the more warlike man having possessed himself of it, and usurped it from Hircanus the elder brother, in whom the right than was, the said Hircanus fled to the Romans for remedy, and by the mediation of Antipater, he procured Pompey (then nigh that Country with an Army) to undertake his aid; who thereupon besieged Jerusalem: Hircanus his party within the City immediately delivered it up to him, and Aristobulus friends withdrew into that part where the Temple stood, which was by Pompey taken by storm; and by this means that City came into the hands of the Romans, and Hircanus was restored to the high priesthood and kingdom of Judea. Who, with the party that cleaved to him against Aristobulus, having gained the upper hand of those that usurped over them, they were fain by the same means to k? ep it, by which they got it, to wit, by the Roman power and protection 
e jofe. de bello judaic l. 1 c 4. 5 6. Antiq. judaic l. 14 ca 1.2 &c chron. carrion li. 2. pa. 148. Stella in lo c 20.22. . Whence it may appear, that the Jews under Hircanus, were not brought under the Roman subjection by mere force, but (through the necessity of their affairs, whereinto they were driven by the factions within themselves) from their own consent and choice. And to this dedition of the Jews to the Romans, agreeth that saying of Josephus concerning Pompey, when he had taken Jerusalem 
f Per quae sicut bonum imperatorem decu●● bene volentia potius quam timore plebem conciliavit. De bello udaic. li. 1. ca 5. : He did as becometh a good General, rather by good turns, then by terror conciliate the people to himself. And another passage in the same Author plainly proves it. He telleth that Antipater replying to the accusations of Antigonus the Son of the aforesaid Aristobulus, laid in by him against Hi●canus, and himself before Caesar, 
Non propter inoptam desi d●rare facultates sed ut in eos qui dedissent Iudaeorum seditiones accederet. De bello judaic & li. 1. en 8.  complaineth of Antigonus, That be sought not relief of Caesar, because he was poor, but that he might kindle Jewish seditions against those who had made a dedition of themselves. And thus continued this relation and subordination of the Jews unto the Romans, to our Saviour's time, and that still with a faction, part of them adhering to the Caesarian Authority, and part reluctating; which division among themselves occasioned the question to be really controverted amongst them, which is here insidiously propounded to Christ about the lawfulness of giving tribute to Caesar; 

Nam divisi erant judaei interse, ita ut pars dandum censeret cributum Caesari, pars negaret qui negabant faciebant cum Pharilaeis, qui sentiebant populum Dei debere liberum esse, nec tributa pendere impiae potestati Caesatis, qui dandum sentiebant facicbant cum Herode, qui Caesaris partes tuebatur, atque ideo Herod●ni dicebantur.  
Muscul in loc. Vide etiam jans. in comment. in concord. ca 116.   the party that was for the negative were the Pharisees faction, whose reputing and speaking of the Romans as Usurpers, might occasion that vulgar opinion of their power which we meet with in some Authors, viz: that they were indeed in our Saviour's time Tyrants without title over Judea; Although it is evident (by what is here said) that they came into their Authority by the consent of the Juster, and better authorized party, and at this time had one part agreeing to them.  
2ly, That which is further alleged, viz: That our Saviour himself paid Caesar tribute, and that John Baptist persuaded the souldi●●s to continue in his service, is taken off sufficiently by what is already said; for if Caesar was a lawful Prince to the Jews, these things make nothing for the Arguer.  
I have thus gone through, and endeavoured to give a satisfactory Answer to every Argument, which by this Author, or any other I have observed to be urged for the obedience which in this Treatise I impugn. If I had been apprehensive of, or could have extracted any material argumentative grounds out of. Mr. Ashcams' Discourse, for his high assertions mentioned in my 2d. Chapter, I had here taken notice of them. If he hath any brief and slender hints of Reasons, I suppose them to be Answered in what I have already said.  
FINIS.