A VINDICATION OF THE Oath of Allegiance IN ANSWER TO A Paper dispersed by Mr Sam: Eton, pretending to prove the Oath of Allegiance void, and non-obliging.  
Wherein his POSITJONS Against it are Examined and Confuted.  
By the Author of the Exercitation concerning Usurped Powers.  PROV. 20.25. 
It is a snare to a man after Vows to make enquiry.  
Printed in the Year, 1650.   

Mr Eaton's Positions against the Oath of Allegiance.  

POSITION. I.  
EVery Oath, to make it lawful and warrantable, aught to be taken in judgement and Righteousness, Jerem. 4.2. The Oath then of Allegiance, that it may be in Righteousness and judgement, must be  
First, Conditional, not Absolute; mutual, not single; taken by both parties, not by one only; by the Ruler or Governor, not alone by the Ruled; by the Prince, as well as by the Subject.  
Reas. It is against the Ground and Reason of the Primitive Institution of Government, which is the good of the Subject, that there should be any Oath to bind the Subject absolutely, whether the Prince or Governor rule for the Subjects good or not: Therefore such an Oath cannot be taken by the Subject in Judgement or Righteousness; Therefore such an Oath is not lawful. So again, it is against Equity and Reason, and against the good of the Subject, That he should be further or longer bound to the Prince or Ruler to submit to him, than the Prince or Ruler is bound to the Subject to rule well, and administer Justice rightly: If therefore the Obligation be not mutual, but single, it is not lawful.  
Consequence. Then if the Oath of Allegiance, taken to the late King, were in judgement and Righteousness, and so lawful, the King was, or aught to have been, as strongly bound to all the Subjects by Oath, as any of them to him: Then if he break his Oath, all the Subjects are absolved if they will: Then at what time the King levied War against his Subjects, they were discharged by that breach of Oath in him of their Allegiance, else the whole Parliament and Parliamentary party were both perjured persons, so many of them as have taken this Oath; and are Rebels, that have taken up Arms against the King.  
Secondly, Nor to His Heirs.  
Reas. Because who knoweth (as Solomon saith, Eccles. 2.19.) whether the Heir will be a wise man, or a fool? a just, or righteous man? or a wicked man, and Tyrant? Now if no man know this, than it is not an Oath in judgement, if any man swear Allegiance to an Heir, nor is it a righteous Oath; for the Subject may bind himself to his own hurt, yea ruin and destruction.  
Conseq. Then the Oath of Allegiance was, in that branch of it that respected Heirs, an unlawful Oath: for who knows what any of the late King's posterity might have proved? whether they would have upheld Religion, or changed it? whether they would have upheld the Liberty and Property of the Subject, or subverted it? We know what their education was, who then could take an Oath in Righteousness and judgement in reference to them? It is good to know first, and swear afterwards.  
Thirdly, Nor to any one kind of Government, Monarchical, or any other, to uphold and continue it in a constant way, without changing of it.  
Reas. Because though civil Government in general be an Ordinance of God, tending to man's good, therefore to reject it would be sinful; yet this or that kind of Government is not an Ordinance of God, but an Ordinance of man, 1 Pet. 2.13. and if an Ordinance of man, than man may change it, for his own greater good and benefit; and must change it, when he hath proved any kind of government inconvenient and hurtful: Then to swear not to change it, is sinful, and in Righteousness and in judgement may not be done; for all kinds of Government are not equally good, nor are they equally suitable to all people: and experience makes persons wise, to discern what is better, and what is worse, for themselves; and therefore an Oath to uphold any one kind of Government longer than it continues to be most safe and profitable, is unlawful.  
Consequ. Then the Oath of Allegiance, serving to uphold Kingly Government against all others, was an unlawful Oath; for who knows not what a plague this kind of Government hath been to this Nation? and who knoweth not that the most of our Kings have been Tyrants? and who knows not what a Blessing the Change of Government hath brought to the united Provinces?  
Object. But suppose there was some unlawfulness in the taking of such Oaths, yet is there not a necessity of keeping them, being taken?  
Answ. If that Oath, taken against the life of one man by Herod, because unrighteous and cruel, was not only sinfully taken, but more sinfully kept: then such Oaths of Allegiance which are absolute, and not conditional, which are single, and not mutual, which are to Heirs, whether wise men, or fools, whether of just men, or Tyrants, which are to uphold Monarchy, the woeful fruits whereof, though they have been long tasted and felt by this Nation, seeing they are dangerous, and may prove (as often they have done) destructive to the lives of many men, they are not only unlawful to be taken, but unlawful to be kept.   

POSIT. II. Suppose the Oath of Allegiance to be a Lawful Oath, yet the Subject is now absolved from it by those that have Power to absolve from it.  
Reas. Because the Representative of the People, which in Reason are the Supreme Power of the Nation, imposed this Oath upon the Subject by an Act made in Parliament, by which they obliged the Subject to Allegiance to the King then in being, and to his Heirs: And this Act done by their Representatives, was their own Voluntary Act, to which they were not obliged by any Law of God or Nature: for there is no Rule requiring them to accept of such a person to be their Prince, and his Heirs after him, and to swear Allegiance to him and them: but this was the Subjects free Act in their Representatives; Therefore if the Representatives take away this Act, and repeal it, they thereby set the Subjects at liberty from such Allegiance, and from their Oath by which they are bound unto it: Abraham that imposed the Oath upon his servant, might acquit him of it, because not bound by any Rule from God, but obliged by Abraham only.  
Consequence. This Present Parliament having taken away that Oath of Allegiance which which was enacted to be imposed, there remains no more Conscience of it to such who have taken it: But than it will come to this. Whether the Parliament be the Supreme Power: Whether the Representative of the People be the Parliament: Whether the present Representatives, that now sit in Parliament, be the Representatives of the People?  
To the first, I say, it is evident that the Norman Kings, coming in by Conquest, had never any true Right to the Crown of England, but what the Parliament gave them: Then the Power of the Parliament was greater than theirs, because that Power that is the cause of Power, is greater than that Power that is the effect of Power. Secondly, The Power of the Parliament is the Power of the People: Now in Reason the Power of the People is the Supreme Power, because thence, as from the root, all Power first sprung and proceeded.  
To the second, I say, if the Parliaments Power be the People's Power, and the Supreme Power; Then the Representatives, or the People, are the Parliament, and none else: for the Representatives are the People in them, and there is the root of Power; therefore they are the Parliament.  
To the third, I say, That the present Representatives, that now sit in Parliament, are, first, all of them chosen by the People, therefore of right they sit in Parliament. Secondly, The present Representatives are all that are left to sit in Parliament: for the most of the rest have deserted their Trust without any force upon them: For though some were secluded and secured, yet the rest were not at all interrupted, but have voluntarily departed from the House. Thirdly, The Representatives, that remained and continued to sit in Parliament, were always, when fewest, and still are, above the number allowed of by Law, and therefore are a Parliament. There is one Objection that may be urged against the Parliament absolving men from their Allegiance to the King's heirs, and against their abolishing Kingly Government.  
Object. It may be said, That Kings have the same Rights to their Kingdoms, Crowns, and Revenues, as others have to their Manors and Demains.  
Answ. Such Right as Kings have had, they never justly came by it, but by force and flattery have obtained it, and have usurped upon the birthright of the People, to whom it belongs to choose them that must rule over them; and Kingdoms, with their appurtenances thereto, were never intended for particular men's advancement, to lift up such Families in glory and greatness, or that the Hereditary Right of any should be in them: but Wisdom, Righteousness, and Virtue was to lift up men unto them; and crowns & revenus were to encourage them in acting in such places; and men that were so qualified, were to be Heirs & Successors, set up by the People after them; and the People themselves, nor their Representatives, could neither give, nor sell away this privilege from their posterity, in which the welfare of the People is so mainly concerned, and without which a People are given up, and sold to ruin. This cannot be said of Manors and Demains, which are things fall under Commutative Justice, and are things vendible, and wherein particular men are concerned, and not the Commonwealth.   
FINIS.   

An Answer to a Paper pretending to prove the Oath of Allegigiance void, and non-obliging: Containing two Positions, the substance whereof is repeated in the process of this Answer.  
THe drift of the first Position, and the prosecution thereof (with which I begin) is to show the said oath to have been unlawful & unwarrantable in the taking of it, and so void in the fact or making.  
First, I shall premise, for the clearing partly of what follows, That an Oath may be unlawful 
* Dr Sandos. de Juram oblige. proel. 2. sect. 14. : 1. Either in regard of the matter, or thing sworn, as if a man swear to do any impossible or sinful act. 2. Or in the manner or circumstances of swearing, as if a man swear unadvisedly, or with a false intention, or otherwise unduly for manner. The former way of unlawfulness makes an Oath void in the taking, but not the latter. So that though a man swear an Oath (in some sort) not in truth, that is, not intending to be tied to, or to keep it; or not in judgement, that is, not considerately enough; yet if the Oath be in Righteousness, that is, of a just and lawful matter or thing, it is of force, otherwise no Oath could bind in foro externo, or be of any use for confirmation; for who can discern with what mind another man swears? Again, this evidently appears by the validity of that unadvised Oath of the Princes to the Gibeonites, Josh. 9.15, 18, 19 2 Sam. 21.2. and of that Oath of Zedekiah and his people to Nabuchadnezzar, 2 Chro. 36.13. Ezek. 17.13, 21, 23. which they entered into treacherously, 
* Anotat. of Divines, & Dioda:. on. Hos. 10.4.  Hos. 10.4.  
Secondly, I observe, what a gross imputation the first Position layeth upon the King and Parliament, that framed and ordained the Oath of Allegiance, and all other Parliaments since, that have Conscience, and the Successive Houses of Commons that have sworn it, with those multitudes of Magistrates, Ministers, and of other professions in the Kingdom, that have taken, and still hold themselves bound by it (having had all the while so much Divine and Gospel Light shining forth to, and in them) as if they had published, pressed, taken, and justified (as against the Papists by writing) an Oath in the matter of it unjust and sinful: This man had need bring clear Reasons for what he here thus chargeth upon so many WORTHIES for Place, Piety, and Judgement; and declare them more publicly then by a PRIVATE PAPER, that he may call to repentance the whole Nation that is (as he supposeth) involved in this impiety of an unlawful Oath. But let us first by the trial of his Reasons, see whether he hath not more need to repent of this his charge.  
His general exception against the lawfulness of the Oath, is: That it is not according to the rule, Jer. 4.2. in judgement and in righteousness. Were it defective in judgement, that is, in deliberatenesse of taking, that would not be (as I have said) a ground to invalidate its obligation ipso facto, seeing it were but a failing in the manner, not a corruptness in the matter; a fault in the person swearing, not in the Oath sworn; and in the person a defect internal, or of the mind, not externally visible in the Act, and to be presumed to be found only in some persons swearing, not in all: That part therefore of the Allegation, were it true, might have been left out, and as often as it is brought in to prove the Oath unlawful, so as not to bind, it adds no strength to the conclusion: But to descend to his particulars.  
1. To manifest the Oaths disagreement with the said rule of Jeremiah, his first particular exception is, That it ought to have been conditional, not absolute; mutual, not single; his argument in effect runs thus: That it may be in judgement and righteousness it must be conditional, not absolute, mutual, or taken both by Ruler and ruled, not single, or taken only by one party, but this Oath is not so: Ergo,  
That the Reader may understand us both, and I may more clearly pass on in my Answer, I must interpose a distinction or two upon the terms.  
First, saith he, the Oath must be conditional, not absolute: First, I conceive the words conditional, and absolute, may be taken,  
1. Either in reference to the thing sworn, which is Obedience or Allegiance to the King; thus the Oath must be conditional, not absolute, that is, the obedience which we bind ourselves to, must be with limitation and condition, restraining it (as all obedience to men in any relation is to be) to just, honest, lawful things, or so as to consist with our obedience to God, not absolute or illimited in that sense.  
2. Or in reference to the tie or obligation of the Oath, as the qualification thereof: and so I say, it may be absolute, and must not of necessity be conditional, that is, the subordinate and limited obedience, which is due to the Prince or Magistrate, I may swear unto absolutely, or without any special condition annexed to my Engagement. Special condition I say, for I must once again distinguish, to wit, of conditions.  
1. Some are general, and such as no promissory Oath that is lawful can be without; those are, I think, all of them reduced to these two heads: namely, that the thing sworn be honest and possible; these conditions are presupposed, and not wont to be expressed, and notwithstanding the including of them an Oath may be said to be absolute.  
2. Others are special and proper conditions, which are ingredients in some Oaths, the which (by reason of them) termed conditional; they are usually either somewhat that is contingent, as when a Merchant covenants, and swears to give a hundred pounds to another man, or to a public use, if his ship (that is gone to Sea) return home safe with her Merchandise, or that which is arbitrary, or in the choice of man's will, his (commonly) to whom the Oath is engaged, as if a Master covenant and swear to maintain his servant with meat, drink and such wages, if he be a true and diligent servant to him: It is not the former, but this latter conditionality which he requireth in the Oath of Allegiance, to wit, that the Subject be only bound to his duty of Allegiance, if, and so long as the Prince observeth his duty of Government inviolate; and this in truth is not in that Oath, nor is it necessary to make the Oath lawful. The Major therefore of this Oath-impugners Syllogism I deny in that first part of it, viz. It must be conditional, not absolute: To make good my denial, first, I will ananswer what he saith to prove it. Secondly, bring in my reasons against it, and leave the Reader to judge betwixt us.  
1. All that he saith for proof of that assertion, is this: It is against the ground and reason of the Primitive institution of Government, which is the good of the Subject, that there should be any Oath to bind him absolutely, whether the Prince rule for the Subjects good or not. This were something if it were proved, but the Reader is left either to take it upon his word, or to remain unsatisfied both of it, and the conclusion which depends upon it; if he like to do neither, let him try whether I can satisfy him to the contrary.  
1. The Parliament that enacted this Oath, and all subsequent Parliaments who were entrusted with, and most able (in all probability) to judge what would be for the Subjects good, and who (without all controversy) were more sufficient and competent Judges thereof then this man, have adjudged it not against, but for the Subjects good.  
2. It hath consisted with the public good (yea contributed to it, or else the Papists would not have so opposed it) from the time it was first set forth, until now, in impartial men's judgements, and no complaint hath been at all heard against it from the Kingdom, nor scarcely if at all from particular men, till within these few days, what the suppressing of it on the other hand will tend to, a little time may fully enough manifest.  
3. A thing may be said to be against the people's good in two very far different senses: 1. Either in itself of its own nature or simply considered: of this sort are injustice, impunity of offences, sedition, conspiracy, hostile invasion, and the like; such things are in their own nature opposed to the public good. 2. Or accidentally and contingently, thus any thing almost that falls under a political consideration, and comes under the deliberation of the Lawgivers, though lawful in itself, and for the present probably, yea, or necessarily good for a Commonwealth, may prove in the event somewhat incommodious and hurtful. There is a goodness of the end, which is one and the same in all States and Governments, viz. the happiness of the Community, and this is intended, not deliberated on, or chosen by the Lawgivers: 
* Ac deliberamus quidem non de finibus sed de tis quae referuntur ad sins. Aristot. Eth. l. 3. c. 3.  And there is a goodness of the means tending to that end, and this is variable in relation to times and people; that may be good in the nature of a means for one people, or time, that is not so for another. 
† Est enim genus hominum natura varie comparatum atque affectum, aliud servile, aliud colendis regibus accommodatum; aliud Democraticum & populare; atque horum generum suum cuique est ac distinctum commodum. Aristot Polit. l. 3. c 12. num. 112. Itaque manifestum est ejusdem disciplinae esse considerare, non solum quae sit, & qualis optima Respublica, cujus status si nulla vis obstiterit, maximè desideretur, & optetur; sed etiàm, quae cuique congrua & consontanca est, permulti enim optimam consequi nequeunt, quare neque Legislator, neque is qui verè civilis habeatur, ignorare debet quae respub. tam absolutè perfecta sit, tum pro statu rerum praesentium maximè laudanda, tum denique quae pro conditione aliqua non sit improbanda. Idem lib. 4. cap. 1 num. 2. Itaque cognoscendae erant rerum publicarum species, ac differentiae, & quot modis inter se commisceantur, cumque hac eadem prudentia optimarum legum scientia & unicuique Reipub. convenientium conjurgenda est, ad respublicas enim leges sunt accomodauda non autem ad leges res ipsa publicae. Idem eodem Num. 6.27.  It is the means and its goodness which falls under the consultation of the Legislators, and because of the uncertainty thereof, they are occasioned often to change their advisements and Laws: But by reason that in things which approach near the foundation, or do constitute it, changes are very perilous in a State, and in those things it is better to bear an inconveniency, then run the hazard of an innovation; therefore it hath been the honest and necessary wisdom of most States to settle them by a firmer Sanction than they use in other things, and to ordain a kind of immutability in them, and consequently to ratify them by Oaths, foreseeing that no inconvenience in the Constitution of a Government, in itself lawful and eligible, can match the mischief of an alteration; and therefore that the uncertain danger of that is rather to be chosen, than the inevitable miseries of this: Such things as may by reason of their changeable nature prove in the issue somewhat disadvantageous, may yet, if for the present good, and probably hopeful so to continue, be sworn to absolutely, as in voluntary Promises, Leagues and Contracts, both public and private, among all Nations hath been the practice, and by good Scripture-presidents it is justified, 
* Genes. 47.31. Exod. 13.19. Iosh. 9.15.14.9. judg. 21.5.18.15.12.13. 1 Sam. 14.24.19.6.20.12.17. 1 King. 1.13.29. 2 Sam. 29.23.  and the reason is, because if any future prejudice do redound, it can be (the obligation of the Oath remaining) at the worst, but in outward incommodity, the which is compensated by the avoiding of a greater evil, which the leaving of the matter free and unsecured would more certainly breed and bring. To apply all this to the case in hand: If any Impeachment of the Subjects good can be supposed to result out of his swearing to his Prince absolutely, whether he rule well or no, it is but accidental, and such as it is, it is overbalanced with a greater mischief which would accrue by leaving the Subjects uningaged: for the shunning of which the lesser evil, to wit, the being bound to a King, though he should prove a bad Governor, is to be chosen; for that, in comparison of a greater evil, hath the consideration of good, and is so eligible: It is a less evil for a people to be bound to a Prince that possibly may prove bad, then to be so lose, as to be at the liberty to cast him off when they shall judge him to rule ill, that is, when they please; the former doth not so nearly and probably tend to the Subjects hurt as doth the latter: For, first, the Prince may prove just and virtuous. Secondly, the Subject is only bound by his Allegiance to legal obedience, which obedience (be the Prince never so bad) can do the people no harm. Thirdly, in his lawless Acts there may be a remedy (as the punishment or resistance of his bad instruments by the Parliament, without whom though he may will unjust things, yet he cannot execute them) and yet his Government be continued. Fourthly, and suppose the case that there be no remedy, as when he hath got a party stronger than can be resisted, or subjected to punishment, then to cast off his power and depose him (suppose it lawful to do) will be no relief, his strength will command subjection. Fiftly, the miscarriages of a Prince ordinarily (unless it come to public contestation, wherein the Subjects sworn and unsworne, if their cause be just, and the Parliament authorise their standing up, are in the same capacity of resistance) extend but to the detriment of some particular persons, rarely doth any Nero-like, seek the destruction of the whole. But on the other hand, set the people free to shake off the reins of their present Government, when they shall think it unequal, and first, you destroy the nature of Government, as will afterwards be showed. 2. You expose the people to an immediate loss of the very use and enjoyment of any Government, the power of mobility and change being sure to invite all ill disposed persons immediately to put that power in ure, and hurry all [if they may prevail] into confusion. In short, a bad Government is better than none; it is more tolerable for a people that one or a few, then that every man do that which is right in his own eyes. To be bound to Allegiance, may lay the people open to the former; to be lose, will precipitate them into the later: The former inconvenience cannot be so universally extensive, speedily destructive, and remediless, or unresistible, as the later.  
2. The later thing I premised, is to give my Reasons for the contradictory to his major Proposition in that first part, It must be conditional, not absolute: Against which I say, the Oath of Allegiance may be absolute or unconditional, in the sense before given, and for this Assertion I render these Reasons:  
1. Were there no Oath, the limited obedience which is due to Princes and Magistrates is due to them absolutely, that is, whether they rule well or no, and that which is absolutely due, may be absolutely sworn; the former Proposition I ground thus.  
1. The Precept of obedience to Civil Governors, is without any condition or reserve of a disingagement of the Subject in case of the Governors' miscarriage, read the fifth Commandment, and those other Injunctions, Rom. 13.1.2. etc. Tit. 3.1. 1. Pet. 2.13. etc.  
2. God commands his people to be subject to Heathen Princes, and the most absolute and oppressive tyrants that likely ever have been, jer. 27.12. Mat. 22.21. 1 Pet. 2.13. I speak not here of Tyrants in regard of Title, or Right, that is, Usurpers; but of Tyrants whose title is just, but their Government unjust and oppressive.  
3. Servants are to be subjects to their Masters, not only that are good and gentle, but those that are froward, that do them wrong, and from whom they suffer for doing well, 1 Pet. 2.18, 19, 20. and by analogy Subjects are tied in the same terms to their Governors.  
4. David would not stretch out his hand against Saul upon this ground, for that he was his Master the King of Israel, and the Lords Anointed, though he was then in actual, violent, and unjust pursuit his life, 1 Sam. 24.5. etc. 26.9. etc.  
5. Otherwise you leave no place for passive obedience to pray for, & patience towards Magistrates in case of their wrong doing, & your innocency, which yet is generally acknowledged to be a duty 
* Ames. medulla Theol. l. 1. c. 17. p. 57 Vrsin. Catech. pa. 3. qu. 104. .  
6. Else you dissolve all Magistracy, it will be impossible in man's corrupt estate to retain or continue any, in as much as no man, or men, can in the vast multitude, and difficulty of magistratical affairs avoid offending every day, 2 Sam. 23.3, 5.  
7. The Doctrine of Orthodox Protestant Divines generally is, that obedience is due (in lawful things) to the most degenerate, oppressing, and tyrannical Princes 
* Calvin. Instit. l. 4. c. 20. S. 24, 25. etc. P. Martyr loc: C. clas. 4. C. 2. S. 12. 18. 19 Alsted. Theol. case 17. Reg. 8. Mr. Perkins cases of Gonsc. l. 3. c. 6. s. 1. Bucan. Instit. Theol. loc. 49. quaest. 21. Synops puc. Theol. disp. 50. Thes. 18.27. Scharp. symphon. Epoch. 5. Quaest 44. 45. .  
2. We find Oaths of Allegiance in Scripture, sworn to Princes without any conditions inserted, Judg. 11.9, 10. 2 Kings 11.4. 2 Chron. 36.13. Ezek. 17.13. & Nehem. 10.29. their Oath was to observe all the Commandments of the Lord, whereof the fifth Commandment, with application to their present and future Magistrates, was one.  
3. It is a thing within our power to settle our allegiance absolutely, as well as it is within a man's power to dispose of himself to service so, whether his Master prove good, or evil, or as it is in a man or woman's power to bestow themselves in marriage, whether the mate be observant of duty or no.  
4. A Conditional Oath is not consistent with a necessary duty; obedience to magistrates is not less arbitrary, but commanded, and that though they be bad, but now the duty being necessary, if you would have it sworn with a proviso of the Rulers performing his duty, you nullify the end of an Oath, which is to confirm, put out of doubt, and give security of what is due. A thing sworn may become due, either by the Rule of Equity, or by a voluntary Covenant: that which is due the later way, if the Covenant be conditional; the Oath that is to ratify it, may be also so far conditional, but what is due in the former kind, to wit, by absolute and unalterable rule, or precept of Justice, cannot be sworn to conditionally; for that would be no ratification to it, nay it would be a debilitating, and rendering more insecure of that which was simply due without an oath, a condition being put into your Oath being a very probable medium to persuade the swearer that he is no otherways bound to the things sworn then upon that condition, which being broken by the party sworn to, he will easily conceive himself altogether free: thus the absolute Rule will receive impeachment, and not strength in its obligation by the conditional Oath: such an Oath therefore is in its end inconsistent with it.  
2. I come to the lrtter part of his Major which exacteth, That the Oath be mutual, or taken both by Ruler, and Ruled; not single, or taken only by the ruled. Some explanation of his terms, more than is here he might have used: for lack whereof I shall as I go observe some difference of sense appliable to his words, and so express how I deny this branch of his position, and why.  
1. His words sound, as if he would have the same Oath to be taken mutually both by Prince and Subjects, which (if he remember that the Oath spoken of, is the oath of a Subjects Allegiance, obedience, or subjection to be yielded to his Sovereign, and that the King is the person sworn to) he will not, cannot I suppose own to be his sense.  
2. But the apt sense, and that which I suppose was in his intention, is, that the Ruler and Subject should each swear to his respective duty; the Prince that he will command and govern lawfully, the Subject that he will perform all lawful homage, and obedience: and to this I say, although it be true it in fact, in our case, that the King hath sworn his duty on his part, as well as the Subject doth in this oath swear his, yet the Proposition is false in this, and it cannot be said, that thus it universally aught of necessity to be betwixt every Prince and his Subjects, much less can it hold that unless it be thus mutual, the Subjects oath is not in righteousness according to jer. 4.2. but that for want of this mutuality it it is null. for,  
1. We read of many undoubtedly righteous Oaths in Scripture undertaken in Covenants betwixt man and man, wherein one party only sweareth, and not both mutually 
* Gen. 24.2.47 31. Exod. 13.19. Iosh. 2.12.9.15.14.9 judg. 15.12. 1 Sam. 19.6. 1 Kings 1.13.29.51. 2 Sam. 19.23. Noh. 5.12. jer. 38 10. .  
2. We find in Scripture Oaths of Allegiance taken by Subjects to their Rulers, without the reciprocal swearing of the Rulers to them 
* 2 Reg. 11.4. judg. 11 10. Chron. 36.13. Ezek. 17.3. ; such was that engagement, Josh. 1.16, 17, 18.  
3. Oaths are never to be taken but necessarily, that is, when not only the matter is of great weight, but it cannot otherwise be sufficiently confirmed or assured then by Oath 
* D. Sanders. de juram. ob. pral. 7. S. 12. Tholos. syntag. dur. 1.50. c. 3. , but in solemn humane Covenants it comes to pass that sometimes the performance lies only on one party, the other is to receive advantage, but not to do any thing; sometimes the danger of breach lies only or more on one part then on another, sometimes there is other satisfactory assurance given besides swearing, and sometimes there is other remedy, if there should be a breach then the forfeiture of an Oath: in such and other cases an Oath on the one party may not need, and consequently is not be exacted.  
4 But suppose the case that it be as necessary for security that the King swear to the people, as that they take an Oath to him, yet if through over much credulity, or otherwise it be that the people do swear, and not the Prince, this cannot be the least colour for the nullifying of the People's Oath; for whether the King swear or no, that which makes the Oath obliging is, that in a just and possible matter promised, God is invocated as a witness of the promise.  
3. There is another sense of mutual swearing more strict than the former, and that is, when not only two parties swear to each other their respective parts, but they both swear with a mutual respect, that is, the obligation of the one party hath a respect to, & a dependence on the performance of the other party; as when one man swears to another to give him so much money for his land, that other swears to convey to him his land for so much money: in this kind a breach of the one is a releasement to the other. And here that Adage holds good, 
Frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem;  As also that Rule of the Law, Frustra quis fidem postulat sibi serv●…i ab eo, cui fidem à se praestitam servare recusat: But this sense 〈…〉 ll swearing cannot come in to be meant in our case: For, 〈…〉 an oath is plainly conditional, the one party swears not 〈…〉 the other absolutely and clearly so much money, but to give him so much for his land: the having of the land than is an express condition of his Oath, but the Oath of the Subjects Allegiance is granted to be absolute, and is as such disputed against by him here, and I have above proved an Oath of Allegiance cannot be conditional. 2. The King's Oath is also absolute, and binds without dependence on the Subjects Loyalty, no man will say (I think) that the King is discharged from ruling justly, and may become an absolute Tyrant, if his Subjects exceed the bounds, or fail of the bonds of their oath, or duty; nay, if the Subject transgress his duty, the King is bound by his oath to cause justice according to the law and tenor of his oath to be done, and cannot otherwise escape violation of his oath. 3. Such mutual oaths are entered into by both parties at the same time, and have their mutual respects expressed, but neither doth the King and Subjects swear to each other at the same time; neither is there any such mutual respect mentioned, or so much as implied in either of their oaths. 4. Such mutually respective oaths have only place in matters arbitrary, or that are in men's choice to do, or not to do until they bind themselves by Covenant, but such are not the relative duties of Kings and Subjects, there being a divine Law obliging each to the duties of their offices before they swear.  
We see no sense imaginable of mutual nor single will fit this man's turn, but it will make his Proposition false, either predicated of the Oath of Allegiance at all, so doth the first and third acception , or if predicated with that modus of a necesse est, so doth the third: But let us hear his Reasons for this clause of his major, whatever be the sense of it.  
It is (saith he) against equity and reason, and the good of the Subject, that he should be further or longer bound to the Prince, to submit to him, than the Prince is bound to the Subject to rule well, and administer Justice rightly. Grant all this, and it will no way follow: therefore the Oath of Allegiance to make it righteous must be mutual, in any sense; for the Prince may be bound, and that as long to his part, as the Subject is to his, (and so he is, and it is impossible to be otherwise; for Prince and Subject, his tie to rule in justice, and his to obey in just things, are relatives, and do infer necessarily each other) to wit, by the tie of Scripture, conscience, and positive Laws, and yet not be sworn at all. His major being thus (I hope) fully refuted, I need not to take notice of his consequences, as he calls them, but in a word I shall touch on them.  
The first is nothing but a hypothetical repetition of some part of the major Proposition, which I have been so long in disproving: If the Oath of Allegiance were in judgement and righteousness, the King was as strongly bound to the Subjects as any of them to him; this therefore I pass by, as the same that was said before, and no consequence from it.  
The second is, Then if he break his Oath, all the Subjests are absolved if they will. This consequence I deny; I have I think, fully made it clear before, that the Oath of Allegiance taken by the Subject is absolute, not depending upon any thing to be performed by the King, whether sworn or not sworn; and that it could not have been otherwise: and though the King and people have each sworn their duties mutually, 
See D. Sanders. de juram. oblige. Prael. 4. S 8.  yet not with a mutual respect, by virtue whereof a breach on one side might be a discharge on the other, and that neither the tenor of their Oaths hold forth any such thing, neither is the matter of them capable thereof, being necessary, not arbitrary.  
The third is, Then at what time the King levied war against his Subjects, they were discharged by that breach of Oath in him of their Allegiance. This is a consequence of the former consequence, and stands or falls with it; that therefore being answered and disproved, this vanisheth.  
The fourth thing is no consequence, but a reason of the two last consequences, and in method of arguing is therefore an antecedent to prove them, it is thus; ellse the whole Parliament and their party were perjured persons so many of them as have taken this Oath, and are Rebels in taking up Arms against the King.  
1. If their taking up Arms against the King (as he terms it) were rebellion, their absolution from their Oaths (were it so indeed) by the King's breach of his could not unmake, or make it no rebellion; for the debt of obedience is existent in the Subject before any oath-taking, and is not founded on swearing, but only confirmed by it, and therefore survives after the pretended dissolution of it; and consequently makes that taking up arms which would have been (if the Oath had not been (as he supposeth) nullified) rebellion nevertheless.  
2. We must therefore say, (as the Parliamentarian party hath believed, declared, and in many Treatises in print maintained all along the late wars) that the Arms of the Parliament were not against any branch of the Subjects Allegiance, or the Oath for it, (which they professed still to owe, persist in, yea, and in the Act of their Arms-bearing covenanted to yield & maintain) but concordant with the same. In as much as they enterprised not against the King's Person, his State or Government, they went not against his Majesty, his Heirs, or Successors, they joined not against his Crown and dignity, the rights whereof, and the bounds of the Subjects obedience are prefixed by the Laws of the Realm: the ultimate interpretation whereof is in the Parliament, which declared their arms to be for, and agreeable to the Laws.  
The King as King acts only by his Court, and Laws, what he doth besides or against these is the man's, not the Kings acting, what is done by Order of the Courts of Justice, and by virtue of the Laws, is done (though against his personal presence or commands) yet for the King, his Crown and dignity.  
2. His next exception against the Oath of Allegiance is, That it is an unlawful oath, in that it is sworn to the King's Heirs; his reason for this Exception proceeds thus, Who knoweth (as Eccl. 2.19.) whether he will be a wise man, or a fool, a just, or a wicked man, and tyrant? now if no man know this, then to swear to an Heir, is not an Oath in judgement, nor is it righteous: for the Subject may bind himself to his own hurt, yea ruin. Consequence. Then the Oath of Allegiance was in that branch, that respected Heirs, an unlawful Oath, etc. I admit of the Antecedent, but utterly deny the Consequence. For the whole Consequence I answer.  
1. This inference is directly contrary to that which Solomon in the place cited, Eccles. 2.19. makes from the words: solomon's is, yet shall he have rule over all my labours wherein I have laboured, and wherein I have showed myself wise under the Sun, this man's inference is (in effect) because no man knows whether he will be a wise man, or a fool, therefore he shall not have Rule, etc. that is, we must not engage before hand that he shall rule, while it is uncertain what he will prove: though Solomon saith notwithstanding that is uncertain, yet he shall have Rule, and so Rehoboam (none of the wisest Princes) had Rule over Solomon's labour, yet they that cleaved to him, did much better than they that revolted from him, and I suppose this gentleman dare not say, that an Oath of Allegiance to Solomon and his seed, or to Rehoboam himself after the manifestation of his weakness was unlawful.  
2. The same reason (if it held) would lie against any Oath or Engagement to any Rulers, in being whatsoever they are, yea against the new Engagement to the present Government: for say that Rulers be come to maturity, and for time past and present have given proof that they are wise and (morally) just (which yet in some cases is not evident) yet who knows what they may hereafter be.  
The Scripture supposeth, that not only a just Father may have a wicked son, but a righteous man (in profession and external carriage) may turn from his righteousness, and commit iniquity, Ezek. 18.14. Nero's Quinquennium of reigning well is generally known, the good beginnings of joash and Ozziah, 2 Chron. 23, 24. & 26. and thereafter degeneracies are sufficient instances of the lubricity of men in authority. Yea it is well known how fearfully Solomon himself with Asa, 1 Kings 11. 2 Chron. 16. and others fell in divers particulars of a gross nature, if we must first know, and swear afterwards, we must naver swear promissarily.  
3. This consequence (were it of force) would equally condemn in general all promissory oaths, and other Covenants, and Engagements, betwixt man, and man, for it cannot be foreseen in any what the persons contracted with will prove, or whether the Covenant will be beneficial, or hurtful, and in particular the Laws and Sanctions of those Nations in all ages which have settled successive regality, or any other Government, for longer than the present possessors of the power endure, which yet is a way, not only more generally approved and practised then any other of vicissicudinary Election, but a warranted by the word of God. Israel offered a successive power to Gideon, judg. 8.22. and God himself instituted, and bound the people to a lineal Government in David and his seed 
* 2 Sam. 12.15. 2 Chron. 13.5. , The patriarchal power (which was political) was successive, and could not have been cast off at pleasure: so was the Government of the Jewish Nation, for about a hundred years in the lineage of the Maccabees.  
4. We have Scripture examples (of an uncontroverted integrity) of oaths, and Engagements to Princes and their Heirs, and to Princes in their young, unripe and untried years: Take for instance that of Abraham's swearing to Abimelech King of Gerar, his son, and sons son, 1 Chron. 23.29.22.29.1.22.5. and that of David's making Solomon King in his own life time, and engaging the people to him when he was yet young and tender, 2 King. 11.4.22. and that of jehoiadahs' and the people's making Joash King, and swearing to him when he was but seven years old.  
2. For the two parts of the consequence in several.  
1. The Oath is not in Judgement, because no man knows what the Heir will prove: I say, it may be in Judgement so far as a future contingency can be deliberated on: and this may be concluded on advisedly (as morally certain) that it's better to have the Crown settled in a line, whereby sometimes a vicious person may be advanced, then to have it under Election at every personal change: this hath been the experimented maxim of the wisest states, Judg. 21.7.15. Sam. 14.24.37. Josh. 9.14.16. If it were not in Judgement, this defect makes not an oath unlawful, as to the nullifying of it, a rash Oath, if of a lawful thing binds, as before was proved.  
2. Nor is it a righteous Oath, for the Subject may bind himself to his own hurt, yea ruin.  
1. Though the Subject may not bind himself to what is necessarily, or at the time of his swearing may appear probably to tend to his hurt, or ruin, yet he may swear (in ending the public good) to that which is of a mutual nature, and may in the event turn to his own hurt, and ruin; and might he not so swear, yet having so sworn, he is bound to stand to his Oath, Psal. 15 4. Josh. 9.15. Ezek. 17.13. 1 Sam. 14.26.28. Judg. 21.5.15.18. which is contradictory to what this man here saith.  
2. If the Heir should misprove, his power is bounded by the Law, and commixed with the Parliaments: If he vary, the power of Parliament, the Laws & Liberties of the Subject are the same. The late King confessed and declared a remedy against Tyranny to reside in the Parliament; there may be a prevention then of the Subjects ruin (whatever the Heir prove) if the Kingdom be faithful to itself.  
3. His third exception against the Oath as unlawlawfull, and void, is, That it is to uphold one kind of government for continuance, and in a constant way without changing. His argument to make good this exception, proceeds thus.  
If of the several kinds of government, all are not equally good, nor suitable to all people: And man may change the government he is under for his own greatest good and benefit, and must change it when he hath proved any kind of government inconvenient and hurtful, and must not uphold any one kind of government longer than it continues to be most safe and profitable; then to swear to uphold any one government continually and constantly, and not to change it is sinful, and in righteousness and judgement may not be done. But of the several kinds of government all are not equally good, nor suitable to all people, and man may change the government he is under for his own greatest good and benefit, and must change it, when he hath proved any kind of government inconvenient and hurtful, and must not uphold any one kind of government longer than it continues to be most safe and profitable. Ergo,  
For answer hereunto,  
First, I observe there is fault to be found with the whole argument, as somewhat transgressing the rules of arguing.  
1. In the consequence there is something of the error called ignoratio Elenchi; for we swear not in the Oath of Allegiance (indefinitely or indeterminately as his words import) to uphold one government continually, and not to change.  
First, we swear only to His Majesty, his Heirs and Successors: so that when ever they are all extinct, (which may be sooner or later, as divine providence disposeth) the Oath of itself ceaseth and determines.  
Secondly, Notwithstanding the allegiance sworn to the said persons, their Crown and Dignity, there is power of change in the government left to the mutual consent of both parties, to wit, the sworn to, and them swearing, as it is in all humane contracts and oaths of this nature 
* Alsted. Theol. cas. c. 15. Reg. 2. D. Sanders. de juram. oblige. prael. 7. S. 8. .  
Secondly, In the Minor there is somewhat of the fallacy called petitio principii, namely, that any kind of government (granted to be lawful) can prove inconvenient and hurtful to the subjects. The Governors indeed may prove bad and noxious, and so the government comes to be abused, but a perniciousness cannot therefore be charged upon the government itself, nor can that be a necessary ground for the change of government: if so, you will bring in a ground for endless mutations; a change in the persons, or a regulating of them is the apt remedy for that hurt; but the government, the abstract or essence of the thing never can prove hurtful, because it is an Ordinance of God for man's good, and that in specie, (as after will be showed) and as a government it hath a political goodness seated in its being, by the unchangeable law of Nature.  
Secondly, But admit the argument were not peccant in form, yet the assumption in the main of it, which is, that man may change the government he is under for his own greatest good, and must change it when he hath proved any government inconvenient and hurtful, and must not uphold any one government longer than it continues most safe and profitable, I must flatly deny. What position more anarchical could be delivered? for the disproof I offer thus. 1. He saith, man may change the government, etc. but the Holy Ghost saith, Prov. 24.21. My Son fear thou the Lord and the King, and meddle not with them that are given to change: He alloweth a change to be for greater good, but the Holy Ghost tells us in the next Words, vers. 22. for their calamity shall rise suddenly, and who knoweth the ruin of them both. 2. If men may change for the better and must change upon a supposed hurt, than all oaths, engagements, or promises of obedience, allegiance, or fidelity to Magistrates are unlawful to be undertaken, for all such bonds are in relation to a present and particular government, the Engagers are under: and they are not for the time present or for an instant, but for a future continuance. And there is in all such Engagements a making over of the right which the Engagers have in the matter covenanted, to the persons engaged to, according to that known rule, omne promissum cadit in debitum: either than such a change to be made by the persons under authority may not, must not be, or such engagements may not, must not, be by them undertaken: the former imports a power and duty inherent in the subjects to reserve in themselves a liberty to alter and to practise it when they Judge it convenient; the latter speaks a binding out from any such deed, and an abandoning of any such right, but the scripture is clear enough for such engagements, Eccl. 8.2. 2 Kings 11.4. Joshua 1.16 17, 18. jugdes 8.9.10. 2. Cr. 36.13.  
3. This position not only disallows all such engagements, but dissolves the natural, or moral bond itself of duty, and subjection to Magistrates for to be free to change when a man judgeth it best, is to be free when he will, and that is not to be tied at all, by this means any man is disengaged from subjection both in foro interno & externo, when he will say, he thinks the present government not safe or profitable, or another to be better, and having so resolved, he is absolved, he may now disobey the Commands, stand out against the Judgements, take up arms against the Person and Authority, and be exempt from the sword of the Magistrate: yea although he have sworn, or subscribed allegiance, because such an Oath or promise (saith this Doctor) was sinful, not in righteousness, but I would fain have him declare what thing magistracy and what subjection is.  
4. This Doctrine will acquit, and justify all the conspiracies and treasons that ever were enterprised against the power of the Magistrate since the World was. Was not the conspiracy of Absolom, 
2. Sam. 15 1. Kings 11.26.12.1. etc.  and that of Sheba against David, was not the Rebellion of Jeroboam against Solomon, and Rehoboam; were not the seditions of Thendas' and Judas the Gaulnite against Caesar; 
Acts 5.36  were not all the Treasons against Magistracy that ever have been, attempted for the parties (yea for the public) greater good, as the Conspirators judged?  
If it be said that not particular men or a less party are to Judge the expediency, and take in hand the change, but the whole people. Besides that the people under authority collectively taken have no such power (as I intent presently to show) it may be said. 1. Seldom or never doth a whole nation under a lawful government of themselves affect or move to a change, it is the flatterers, and deceivers of the people 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an. poli●. lib. 5. c. 5.  ordinarily that desire and misled the people to it, 2. How the Judgement and will of the whole body of a people should be known and declared unto Execution before particular men act to a change of their own private judgement, to me is a thing unimaginable.  
5. This necessity of retaining a power in Subjects to change, and of using it for a greater good, or removal of a temporal hurt, in opposition to an Oath sworn against, the change is directly against the Scriptures, tying men, that swear to their own hurt not to change Psal 15 4 Josh. 9.18.19. and condemning those that for such ends have receded from their oaths; Ezek 17 13, &c: Joshua 9, 15, compared with 2 Sam. 21.2.  
6. That position so much now adays insisted on of the People's power to depose, abolish, and alter the power of their Governors at pleasure, which is actually settled, and both in itself lawful, and lawfully set over them, I hold is a gross error, some of my Reasons in short are.  
First such a course (supposing the governor's dissent to it all along) is no other than that resistance of the ordinance of God, condemned Rom. 13.2.  
2. It is directly opposite to that subjection commanded every soul that is in the relation of a Subject, Rom: 13.1. and that 1. Pet. 2.13.  
3. If the people may do it, than it must needs be that they have a civil power and authority over their Magistrates. Which is contrary to those Scriptures which make the King supreme, and call the powers which the people are subject to, the higher powers higher in relation to them, who are below and put in subjection to them, 1. Pet. 2.12. Rom. 13.1 and indeed if the people have a power over their Magistrates to Judge, or displace them, how are they magistrates, their superiors, and rulers, the same persons cannot be under and over others in the same kind of order or power. If the Magistrates be under the people, whom are they over? If the people be above the Magistrates whom are they under?  
4. The Holy Ghost commands the people to render tribute, custom, fear, honour (not at random to a Magistracy leaving them at liberty to what they please, but) to whom they are due, they are a debt then, which respecteth a determinate object, the present Magistrate, no debtor can pay a debt by transferring it from one to another, or giving what he oweth to another besides the proprietor.  
5. Magistrates are of God, his ordinance and ministers, and they are Judges for him as his vicegerents. Rom. 13.1.24. 2. Cron. 19 6. and therefore tannot stand at the mere will of the people. God must have a hand in their removal as he hath in their admission: or else it is injurious, he removes and admits now, not by immediate revelation (as sometimes in Israel) but by the rule of his word executed by man; he hath given a rule for the setting up of Magistrates, but where hath he given any for their deposing. 6. If it were in the people's power to change at pleasure their magistracy, 
1. Sam. 8.6.7.8.12.17.  then how could it be such a heinous sin as it is challenged to be for the people to reject samuel's government, and desire and move for a King?  
But let us next hear what he allegeth for this his assertion of mutabllity. Though civil government (he saith) in general be an ordinance of God tending to man's good, therefore to reject it would be sinful, yet this or that kind of government is not an ordinance of God, but an ordinance of man, 1. Pet. 2.13 and if an ordinance of man, than man may change it etc.  
First Civil Government in the general cannot be said to be God's ordinance, and therefore unrejectable, but this, or this, or that kind of government that is a legitimate and true species of it, must necessarily be yielded to be also God's Ordinance, and unrejectable, for it is a sure rule, for whatsoever is directly and per se said of the genus, or general nature must be also said of the species or particular kind, and again the whole nature of the genus or general is contained in every species or kind. 
Quicquid oredicatur de praedicato praedi, catur de subjecto, Hist. 1. vala bados Tota natura generis continctur in una quae que specie.   
2. The Apostle cannot be taken to speak of power in general only; and abstractly, but must not be understood distributively of all lawful powers in their special kind, when he saith there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. Rom. 13.1.2. He that shall say of this or that kind of lawful government, as of Monarchy, it is not of God, it is not the ordinance of God speaketh direct Contradictories to the Holy Ghost here, no Subjects obedience to this or that government he is under could be urged upon him by virtue of this reason, There is no power but of God etc. If this, or that kind of government were not of God, and were not his ordinance. 3. And for his discretive, but an ordinance of man, it is no Inference of the former, therefore not the ordinance of God. For this, or that government is both an ordinance of God in Paul's style, and an ordinance of man in Peter, and you cannot say these two apostles, speak of government two different ways, the former in general, the latter in particular, for as I have proved Paul must be taken of particular kinds so it is clear Peter speaks first in general, submit yourselves to every ordinance of man etc. and then in particular, whether it be to the King as supreme, or unto Governors etc. This or that government Paul calls an ordinance of God. 1 In that it is instituted in its special nature by God, and warranted for any people, but not commanded or imposed (as Government in the general is) upon every nation. For it is with goverments in relation to Nations as with callings, in Relation to Persons; every man must have a calling, but it is distributively this, or that, or the other, all are not necessarily to have this one. 1. Cor. 77, 17  
2 In that it is invested in the particular person by God, when they are called to the government, according to his rule, though he do not point them out immediately by his own finger, but mediately by men, in like manner as they are the ministers of Christ in the Church, that are called according to his appointment, though men in the same office ordain them. And in this regard, the Magistrates (not the government abstractly) are called God's ordinance Rom 13 2. compared with 3.4. Peter terms it man's ordinance, either because both the special form of government, and the persons holding it, are chosen and so imediaaely constituted by men. Or rather because it is conversent about humane affairs, 
Beza Marlor est Divines Anotat. Diodat.  and man's benefit, not as if it were invented by, or had its original from men, for so it is of God, as expostitors interpret and compare that place of Peter with the other of Paul and that Peter excludeth not, but taketh in the Divine authoritation to that government he treats of, is evident, in that he willeth submission to it for the Lords sake. How for his sake, if it be not his Ordinance.  
Having thus answered the premises of his syllogism and what he brings to back the assumptions withal, his consequence or conclusion following goes to the ground, and the lawfulness of the oath of Allegiance remains unshaken. But as his manner is, he amplified his consequence with matters altogether in consequential, and independent on the premises. First he saith who knows not what a plague this kind of Government (viz. Kingly) hath been to this Nation? and that the most of our Kings have been Tyrants? I am one that know not these things but Judge the contrary and will he tried by the experience and voice of this Nation. And in the mean while, I request him to try these his words, by the scriptures following, 2. Pet. 2, 10, 11 12, jude 8, 9, 10 and to take heed of the verdict and Judgement therein given upon government-blasphemers.  
2. Who knows not what a blessing the change of government hath brought to the United Provinces? I am sure this man knows not, neither can say (if those Provinces excel in blessings) that they are brought by a change of their lawful Government, considering what Solomon observed of old, concerning the disproportion of worldly successes to men's ways: and the inevidence of the goodness or badness of persons, and actions if estimated by events, which every man's experience can second.  
Whether those provinces have changed or recovered their government as Hugo Grotius conceiveth. Or whether they yet stand but as our Parliament did with the late King in the first War, defending, and demanding the security of their just privileges, with the sword in their hand, I leave him further to consider, and I assure him this, there have been observations great store, of God's Judgements upon those that have rebelled against, cast off, or murdered their lawful Governors, gathered by worthy men, 
Theatre of God's Judgements by Doctor Beard, and Doctor Taylor. lib. 2. chap. 2.3.4.5.  but I never before met with any that made observation of divine Blessings upon any of those acts.  
Thus far his exceptions by way of proof of his first position, go; He in the close makes one Objection against himself, and giveth his answer to it thus. Ob; Suppose there was some unlawfulness, in the taking such Oaths, yet is there not a necessity of keeping them being taken? Answer, If Herod's Oath against the life of one man being unrighteous and cruel was sinfully taken, and more sinfully kept, than these of allegiance which are absolute not conditional etc. and which are to uphold Monarchy, the woeful fruits whereof seeing they are dangerous, and may prove, as often they have done, destructive to the lives of many men, they are not only unlawful to be taken, but to be kept. Not granting any unlawfulness in the taking of this Oath, (having (I hope) made good its innocency against all that hath been said; yet suppose I had made this objection, I would not take this answer. My reason is, he cannot parallel Herod's oath and ours in the matter wherein HEROD'S was unlawfulll both in the taking and keeping, what was that? it comprised as he interpreted it the shedding Innocent blood, the massacring of a guiltless and holy person. Now what is the matter of ours? To yield obedience in lawful things, to a lawful power. Is it any more? and are not the matters of these two oaths, as fare unlike as light and darkness? That which he heaps up to aggravate our oath to the height of the unrighteousness of Herod is nothing but the three exception, which all this while I have been answering, and therefore shall content myself with what hath been said to them. Only in the close he tells us Monarchy is dangerous, and may, as often it hath, prove destructive to the lives of many men, and therefore its unlawful to swear or keep the upholding of it. This is nothing but what may be as truly said of any kind of government how lawful soever: none that hath been as much practised as it can be affirmed to have been less destructive, or to be less dangerous than it; but the possibility of being, or experience of having been abused, is no valid reason why a government may not be upheld; if it be down must all government fall? and if yet it may be upheld, to swear to uphold it may be an oath lawful for the matter; and if it cannot in that respect be made a crime, it deserves not to be paralleled with Herod's oath. What parallel in point of unrighteousness Herod keeping his oath, & others violating theirs, his execution & theirs may have, it is not to my purpose in hand to show.  
I have done with his first position, and proceed to his second, which is this.  
Suppose the Oath of Allegiance to be lawful, yet the subject is now absolved from it by them that have power to absolve from it. This position of a power in any to absolve from a lawful oath is new, (as far as I have read or heard) among protestants, and hath until now been accounted by Papists, the Popes and Prelate's prerogative, by us their antichristian presumption. But let us see where and upon what ground he builds such power.  
Reason. Because the Representatives of the people, which in reason are the Supreme power, imposed this Oath by an Act in Parliament; this was the Subjects free Act in their Representatives, no law of God, or nature obliging them to accept of such a person as his heirs, and to swear allegiance to them. If therefore the representatives take away and repeal this Act (as this Parliament hath done) they thereby set the subjects at liberty from such allegiance, and from their Oath binding to it, there remains no more conscience of it to such as have taken it, Abraham that imposed the Oath upon his Servant might acquit him of it etc.  
1 For the antecedent I shall only note. 1 he sets up a supreme power over us by reason, not by law, or the people's constitution, and this reason is not the Nations, but first either his own private judgement, and if that may treat a supreme power to him, than every other private man's reason is to set up on to him, even when there is one already over the people he is of. 2 Or is it the common reason that is in all men naturally, and if so, how comes it to pass that there is such variety of kinds in supreme government, and that Representatives have it not in all times and nations, yea that scarce they ever had it?  
2. That in citing the power that Enacted this Oath, he omits the King and House of Lords, who in the then Parliament concurred in this Enacting and Imposition.  
3. That although the King then was rightfully and actually enthroned in the Regal power, and Dignity, and both the Law, and the Oath of Supremacy obliged the people to him and his heirs, yet he dares to say no Law of God or Nature obliged them to accept of such a person and his heirs, is not the 5th. Commandment the Law of God and Nature, and those precepts. Rom. 13.1. Tit. 3.1. 1. Pet. 2.13. repetitions, and divine ratifications thereof: and doth not that Law command every people and person allegiance to their particular lawful Governors, and was not the King in being, his heirs in capacity, and designation such?  
2. But for the consequence there is no truth in it nor colour of reason, or inference from the Antecedent for it. Besides, that the act cannot (for aught appears to me) be repealed but by the same power that made it; and the allegiance sworn was not founded upon the Act or Oath, but due and paid before them both. The Oath in its own words terms itself a recognition and acknowledgement, and the first words of it are; I. A. B. truly and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify, and declare in my Conscience before God and the World, that King James is lawful King of this Realm. etc. Suppose the Representatives to be the supreme power, that the Imposing of this Oath was their sole act, and the Subjects in them, and that they did it voluntarily or unobliged to it: doth it thence follow, the Representatives repealing that act the subjects that upon their Enacting swore it, are now absolved from their allegiance, and from the Oath.  
1. They that have power to impose an Oath were never said (in any Divinity extant) to have power eo ipso to absolve from it, when the imposers are also the party sworn to, there it is granted (both by Protestants and Papists 
Doctor Sanders. de Juram. oblige. prael 7, S. 8. Tholoes. Syr. tag. Jur●, lib. 50. cap. 12. ) they have so fare as concerns themselves power to release from the Oath, not because they are not the Imposers, but because they are the party sworn to, for omnis qui promissit facit jus alteri, cui est facta promissio, the right of the thing sworn is theirs to whom the Oath is made, therefore they may release from it, and this is the true ground of that power he supposeth in Abraham to acquit his servant, being the imposer of his oath (if that was not rather the interpretation than relaxation of the oath) but where the imposers are a third party from the persons swearing, and sworn to, there they have no claim of power of relaxation. And thus the case is here, the Representatives (as he saith) impose the oath, which is sworn to the King, and bind in allegiance to him. If they that impose an oath may release from it, then may any Court or Magistrate release a juror or examinate from the oath they have given him, then if a man impose an oath upon himself (as in some cases he may) he may absolve himself when he will from it, though he therein obliged himself to God or another man. And this is truly the case here as he himself states it, the subjects by their own Act in their Representatives impose this oath, and by their own personal act swear it, and after by their own act in their Representatives absolve themselves from it.  
2 The repeal of the Act is no repeal or dissolution of the oath, the Parliament that framed by their Act imposed the oath, did not thereby make it an oath, but it was the subjects swearing, which made it an oath and an obligation to him, as the Ministers rehearsing and dictating the words of marriage, to the couple Marrying each other makes not the marriage, but the parties themselves declaring in those words. And as the clerk in a court reciteing the words of the jurors oath to them makes not the oath, but the jurors assent to it. The Parliament can enjoin, or punish the refusal, or manifest breach of an oath, but a promissory oath being the act and covenant of him that swears, and a part of Divine worship, the bond of conscience upon the swearer, and the validity of God's ordinance, and the obligation that is therein entered into unto God, as the invocated witness, and judge, cannot be within the Parliaments authority to nullify in all subject's oaths which may be made with or without their imposition. There are cases indeed, wherein a superior, as a Husband, Master, Father, Magistrate, may make void the oath of their respective inferior, by analogy, or equity of that rule Numb. 30. but those are 1 in matters that are belonging to the right or power of the superior to dispose of; as the Representatives may acquit from an oath in point of their own right, 
* Animadvertendum tamen est penes hos non esse facultatem rescindendi quodlibet jusjurandum subditorum sed illud duntaxat cujus materia est eorum potesta●i subjecta. Alsted: Theol. cas. cap. 15. Reg 2.  but the allegiance, in this oath sworn is none of theirs, but the Kings, and therefore sworn to him by the subjects, and in particular by them. 2. By that Law Numb. 30. the superior may interpose to nullify his inferiors oath made without his knowledge, and consent, and that must be done in the day that he hears of it, but there is no further power given by that law in the matter of oaths. Now in this our case the Representatives have been so far from being ignorant of the making of this oath, and disallowing it as soon as it was known to them, that they were the composers and commanders of it, yea and have taken it themselves. Let any the least warrant, yea or precedent be brought for releasing an oath in this case, and I shall sit down. Lastly for a close of my answer unto this position, I shall observe what the tenor of this oath hath in it. I do believe, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, nor any person whatsoever hath power to absolve me of this Oath or any part thereof. And do renounce all pardons and dispensations to the contrary. This is not only the swearers declaration, but the Parliaments, in compiling and imposing this oath, and all Representatives have personally thus declared in taking it, shall we believe them concerning their power in this matter, or this man?  
In the end he brings in three questions and answers to them, unto which though they have no immediate reference either to this latter position, or the proof of it, to which they are subjoined, nor to the question of the oaths obligatorinesse, which is the subject of the precedent discourse, yet lest the overpassing them should imply that they are unto me either currant, or difficult to be answered, I shall say somewhat.  
1. His first question and answer is after this manner.  
But than it will to this. Whether the Parliament be the supreme gower. R. It is evident that the Norman Kings coming in by Conquest, had never any true right to the Crown of England, but what the Parliament gave them, than the power of Parliament was greater than theirs: because that power that is the cause of power is greater than that power that is the effect of power. 2 The power of the Parliament is the power of the people, now in reason the power of the people is the supreme; because thence as from the root all power first sprung, and proceeded.  
The Norman Kings did not come in by Conquest, the first of them surnamed the Conqueror did indeed so come in: although even he laid other claim to the Crown besides Conquest, as the ground of the attempt thereof, namely a right both by virtue of the Covenant, and Oath of Harold, and the Donation of King Edward. 
Speeds H●st. Book 1. Chap. 7 Sect. 6. 13 14. 16. 30  
* Speed. B. 9 Ch. 2. S. 54 Chap. 3. S. 12.  The next to him William Rufus neither came in by Conquest, nor by lineal succession: his father on his deathbed being in remorse of Conscience for his cruel government of the Kingdom, durst not (as he said) dispose of the Land to any other then to God, only he wished (if it might be the will of God) that William his son might flourish in the Throne, 
* Speed. B. 9 Ch. 2. S. 54 Chap. 3. S. 12.  who accordingly notwithstanding (Duke Robert was his elder brother) by a general consent and vote was made King, The rest that have followed successiuly came in by descent, and title of inheritance [although in some happily it was wrested] and were the most of them peaceably, and without contest of any, seated in the throne, and that which the Parliament usually did, was not a creating of a title to them, but a recognition of that which they had, and a securing of it to their posterity, which was for the Kingdom's safety, as well as the King's interest. 2. It is well known this Land was governed by Kings in supreme power long before the Norman race begun, so that this exception from the manner of the Normans coming in lies rather against their title (who came in by Conquest) to be Kings then against the King's Title to be supreme. 3. If the Judgement of Parliaments themselves to whom he would appropriate the supremacy, may decide to whom it belongs, it will be yielded to be in the King (though not exclusively, in reference to Parliament) witness the Act of Parliament setting forth and enjoining the Oath of the King's Supremacy. 4 The causing or conveying of civil power, by way of consent or election, whether it be by the Parliament to the King, or by the people to them both, or to either of them, is no argument of a power in the said conveyors greater than that which is so conveyed by them: because they that by Election, or consent invest the Magistrate with power, 
Those axioms quicquid efficit tale illud est magis tale Nihil dat quod non habet, are not meant of Instrumental but of principal efficients.  are not the proper or principal efficient causes of that power but only the applyers of it to the person, and the instrumental means of giving him a right therein. God by his institution, and ordination is the efficient cause of the Magistrates power, and therefore he indeed is superior to him; and he alone. In the advancement of men to that office, God only acteth authoritatively men by the choice of the person, and consenting to him do it ministerially. This proposition, that which is the cause of power is itself of greater power may be true of the principal efficient, but cannot hold of the subordinate or instrumental cause, a wife as the means giveth the power of a husband over her to him whom she marryeth, by her consent in marriage of him, a servant in like manner giveth power to his master over him by his voluntary agreeing to be his servant; yet can it not thence be concluded that the wife or servant, are greater in power respectively then the husband or master, a over topping, or super-regall power then in the Parliament, or a super-parliamentary and super-regal power in the people cannot be bottomed on that reason. 5, As for that which is said as the ad. reason, the power of the Parliament is the power of the people, now in reason etc. I answer 1. There is a petition of a principle not to be granted, not offered to be proved, which is, that magistratical power or authority (even supreme) is seated in the people. I have brought reasons for the refutation of this before, and I shall only here say, first, Rulers are called the powers, the bearers of the sword, the revengers to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, we read of their commission and instructions for Magistracy in Scripture, but where find we any such thing spoken of or granted to the people?  
2 Rulers are styled powers of God, his ordained, his ordinance, his Ministers, Judges for him, but where read we that they are the people's power, or subordinate ministers?  
3 The people are the object about which, the subject over which the power is set, and therefore cannot be the agent or subject in which it is stated.  
4 If Supreme authority be in the people, than they may manage it themselves (for in vain is that power that cannot be reduced into act) and hold it in their own hands, and need not choose or constitute any higher powers, or Magistrates over them, which cannot be if Magistracy be an Ordinance of God, and necessary by divine precepts, as it is Deut. 16.18. and to reject it would be sinful as this man tells us in his first position.  
5 If the people be a power, and that supreme, they must have some to be their subjects; and who are their subjects? either themselves or their Magistrates: not themselves, for every relation (and therefore Magistracy, and subjection) must have two terms; never was such a political state heard of, wherein the same men are both under and over themselves in the same power. Not the Magistrates for we read of no such ordinance of God as a humane power over the Magistracy; but contrariwise they are said in relation to the people, to be set over, to be the rulers, and heads of the people, and to be the higher powers and the supreme. 
* Deutr. 1 13.5.17.14.15. 2. Sam. 23 3. Ro. 13.1. 1. Pet. 2.13.   
6 If it be so, then there is no specifical distinction, or distribution of Government in general into divers Species, as into Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, as hath been generally held, and accordingly practised, but all government is democratical, Monarchy and Aristocracy are specifically the same with, and but subordinate offices under it. 2 Suppose the power were indeed supremely in the people, how can he say, or doth he prove that the power of the Parliament is the power of the people, more than is the power of the King? he cannot mean that the power of the Parliament is subjectively or formally the peoples, for the Parliament and people being two distinct subjects, the same individual power cannot totally be subjected or formally inherent to both, but he understands (doubtless) that the Parliaments power is effectively causally the peoples, that is, it is derived and received from them, and so (granting the supposition) is the Kings also, and that as immediately (in the constitution of the Kingly office) as is that of the Parliament, it was never yet I think said, neither is there the least warrant for it, that in the first constituting of the government, the people chose the Parliament and the parliament founded the Kingly office, but rather the people ordained both jointly and immediately, appointing kings to reign over them successively, who should govern with the advice, and authority of Parliament, which should be called by him, and consist of the Peers hereditarily, and the Commons by personal election. Which three estates are collaterally incorporated together in the fundamental constitution, and Government of this Kingdom (as even the Commons have declared 
* D●clarat. of Apr. 17. 1646. ) and therefore are not superstructory one to another.  
3 And whereas he saith, to prove the power to be in the people, that from the power of the people as from the root, all power first sprung and proceeded. The people are not the root from whence power first sprung: they are rather the soil in which it grows, by which it is fed and supported. God is the Root, Head, or Fountain from whence all power springs. There is no power but of God etc. The people are only a channel, or instrument of its conveyance to the Magistrate by their election and consent, which acts of theirs, do no more prove the supreme power to be in the people, than the Electorship of the seven Princes proves the imperial power, and dignity to be in them: or the choice of a Major of a City by the aldermen, or freemen; proves the office, or authotity of the Major to be in them.  
2 His second Question and Answer follows.  
Whether the Representative of the people be the Parliament? R. If the Parliaments power be the people's, and the supreme power, than the Representatives of the people are the Parliament, and none else: for the Representatives are the people in them, and there is the root of power, therefore they are the Parliament. Here is an antecedent, a consequence, a reason of the consequence: but very feeble all. First the Antecedent. If the Parliaments power be the People's, and the People's the supreme power.] This hath been disproved above in the discussion of the 1 question, I have therein manifested that the power of Parliaments as distinct from the King is neither the peoples, not the Supreme by way of peculiarity; and that the King's power derives as strongly and as nearly from the people as as doth the Parliaments, though both have their principal original from God, and are but instrumentally from the people.  
2. The Consequent is [then the Representatives of the people are the Parliament and none else] were the Antecedent granted, and most true, yet he that knows what an argument is, or hath but natural Logic, may see that this hath no kind of inference, or consequential force from it.  
We say that the Lords and Commons of England assembled with the political power and presence of the King are the Parliament: and for this we appeal to all the use of the word, since there was such a thing as a Parliament in England, till within these very few days and the general understanding of the word still; to the Law common and municipal; to the Titles of Parliamentary Acts, and Statutes; and to the Declarations, and constant language of Parliaments themselves, from first to last, He saith the Representatives of the people, meaning the said Commons, are the Parliament; for this he brings no proof in the world, from the application or use of the word by any, though he cannot but know that words signify according to the pleasure of some Imposer; all his medium is in those term. [The People's power, and the supreme power] Whereas it is a question betwixt us whether there be such a thing as power, or supremacy belonging to the people: and if that were granted, yet it is still a question betwixt us whether the peoples, and the supreme power be any more appertaining to the Commons, then to the King, and Lords; I cannot assent to either; the affirmative of both are his positions and but barely affirmed by him; so that in making this inference he doth but prove one of his principles by another improved, and in so doing doth but petere principium. 3. His reason of this consequence is [for the Representatives are the people, in them, and there is the race of power.] This is still but to infer the conclusion upon an unproved principle of his own, which I have denied, and refuted above: but I shall here touch upon the wide mistakes about this term and thing, Representatives, with which he, and others are, I see, overtaken. 1. he taketh for granted, that the Commons in Parliament are the people's Representatives, which me thinks cannot properly be said, if we understand by the people all estates, members or parties in the Kingdom (and if he doth not so understand it I ask, how can he (after his own sense) place the power, supremacy, & representablenes only in one part of the Kingdom?) for the said Commons are chosen but by, and in the name of the Commoners, in distinction from the Peers, and cannot, are not intended to represent any more than those by, and in whose name they are elected, and therefore are called the Commons in Parliament, besides the Peers are present, and therefore cannot be represented. If then all the people are not Commoners, nor represented, how are those Commons truly and completely the Representatives of the people?  
2. He seems to found the Commons power, (and that in a degree above others that are undoubted powers) upon their being Representatives of the people. Whereas (I think it will upon scanning appear that) their representativenesse is not the rise or ground of any magistratical power in them. 1. That which makes them, or any men a power (as I apprehend the matter) is that they are God's Representatives, and that which ordinarily makes them so is that they are chosen, or consented to by the people, either personally, or in the original constitution of government, unto the administration of an authority ordained by God; and thus are in this kingdom the Prince, the Peers, and the Commons in Parliament though not all the same way, but some personally, others hereditarily.  
The said Commons have indeed this addition (but it is not of magistratical power, but of popular action, and employment) that they are the Commons representatives, because the colective Commons cannot convene, or treat; which representation empowers them not to any public Magistracy, or Acts of distributive justice, but only entrusts and inables them to deeds of Commutative right or contract, on the Commoners behalf, as the agreeing on Taxes, Forces, or other requisites to be borne in an equal proportion, and which are due as far as proportionable from the people to the public Magistrates and service. 2. If the power of the Commons be grounded on their representativenes of the people, than it is necessary all the Members should be present to make them a representative of the whole Body of the people, and to enable them to act so as to bind the whole; because the Members compose a Representative; not so as that every one tepresents the whole, but each one represents a part, and all of them collectively represents the whole. 3 He placeth the dimension and prerogative of the Office of the said Commons in their Representativenes of the people, where it seemeth to me they are not mere (but more then) Representatives of the people. They that are merely Representatives are, 1. To act what they whom they represent might act if they were present. 2 To act nothing but what they have in charge from the represented. But this is not the latitude of the Commons in Parliament, they are not thus tied up. For first, If they be an estate endued with civil authority, they may act authoritatively, and so could not the people whom they represent if they were present: no such power being seated in them, as was a little before alleged. 2 If they be a power, they are empowered by God, and so have in charge from him to act the thing within their Commission, whether they are charged from the people to do them or not; yea though the people should command the contrary. If they be no more than representees, and so be bounden by the latter rule here given, perhaps some would ask what charge or Commission did the people ever give either to any Former, or to the present Representatives for some actings?  
Thirdly, His third Question and Answer is. Whether the present Representatives that now sit be the Representative of the people. R. First they are all of them chosen by the people, therefore of right they sit in Parliament. First, Whether they be all so chosen, I shall not inquire; but I have read in Master Prin (as I remember it is in his Speech upon the Treaty) who it is probable knew the house better than this Gentleman) the contrary of some whom he there names. 2 But if they all be legally chosen, that proves not that they of right sit in Parliament, unless there be a right Parliament to sit in. R. Secondly, the present Representatives are all that are left to sit in Parliamet, for the most of the rest have deserted their trust without any force upon them, for though some were secluded and secured, yet the rest were not at all interrupted, but have voluntarily departed from the House. First, he means they that sit are all that are left de facto to sit, I shall not gainsay him. But he might say thus if they were but two, and all the rest were excluded by force of arms, and those two were prisoners in the place, those two in this case would be a Representative, according to this his reason. If he would be understood, that they are all that are de jure left to sit; I would hear that proved; all that he brings for it here i●. The most of the rest have diserted their trust. 1 Say they had, would that prove they that are left are all that de jure are to sit, what say you to the less part of the rest whom you accuse not for deserters? what say you to the secluded, and ●ecured, whom you cannot accuse of deserting their trust? I do not know that the house, or those you call the present Representatives have tried, or Judged any, or all of either sort of them unto deprivation of the right of sitting: nay what say you to those most of the rest taxed by you as deserters of their trust, as voluntarily, and without interruption departing? are they actually divested of their right to sit? because they do not perform their trust, therefore ought they not to do it? 2 But I can look upon this charge of those most of the rest, no otherwise then as a railing occusation brought against men in dignity, and a presumptuous slander, intolerably cast upon those who have otherwise suffered so much in their trust.  
first, It hath been currently, and without contradiction (to my knowledge) published that were secured, or secluded in two or three days; and how can he, or any man be able to know, or say that there is so much as one man of that house left at liberty, that hath not come to discharge his trust and been actually debarred? much less can any one say that the most of them have not.  
2 I would ask whether all that disclaimed not the vote about the King's concessions were not declaredly excluded, and actually put back if they offered to enter, and if there be not still forces there ready to do the same?  
3 Not long before the last breaking of the house, they that for fear of the Apprentices departed the house, were counted the best performers of their trust, and they that tarried behind in the house were accused as faylers of it. Must now the charge be inverted, because the persons are varied 2. If they that sit are all that are left to sit de jure, yet unless they be a number competent in Law to make a house, and free from force, I would be satisfied how they can be qualifyed to sit and act (especially in so high matters as the taking away the King, and House of Lords, and establishing a new power, and way of government, which if done by that house at the fullest, and freest would be at least questionable?) the suspension and annulling the acts of the house upon the proceed against the five Members, and the coming of the Apprentices to the Parliament doors are fresh in memory, and lively precedents. And if the power of an Army not only captivating some Members, but keeping the house that only a few (scarce the eighth part of the number of them that constitute the house) may enter, and sit, whom they distinguish by no known Character (much less by any open or legal sentence against the excluded) but only by a private roll of paper reserved in their own hands, be not a taking away of the houses freedom, I know not what can be so called: R. Thirdly, the Representatives that remain were always when fewest, and still are above the number allowed of by Law. What number is allowed of by Law, what Law that is, where written, and when made, that alloweth of that number, and what that number (suppose it were 40.) is allowed to do, this Gentleman tells us not; and yet these things should be set down and scanned before this reason can pass: There is a great difference betwixt forty and four or five hundred, betwixt some acts of the house, and others in point of concernment. If the Members of the house do not each of them represent the whole, but all of them aggregatively, in that some represent this part, some another of the nation, how can an eight part of them be said to make a representative of the whole Nation, wherein possibly there is not one representative from seven parts of eight of the Land? But the above alleged exception of a force upon the house must be wiped off, or else the clearing of this point of the number (could it be) will not serve.  
The last thing in the Paper (which he would, it may be, not have to be overslipped) is a new doctrine concerning the interest of the people in the appointing of their Governors. Wherein he saith. 1. Such right as Kings have had, they never justly came by it, but by force and flattery have obtained it. What a blasphemer of dignities is this, that presumes to revile the whole order of Kings as Usurpers, and unjust possessors of the highest civil property, Dominion? not one of them will he except from injurious attainment of their Crowns; no not Melchisedech himself, the interpretation of whose name bespeaks him King of Righteousness! Surely he that is the King of Kings would never have styled h●mself so, if the universality of them had been so bad: and the Apostle Paul's retractation Act. 23.5. The Angel's modesty, 2. Pet. 2.10.11. Nay the Prince of Angels his moderation, Judas 8.9. are high redargations of this insolent evil speaking of dominions. If his intention be to reflect more specially on the Kings of this Realm, he is yet therein reproved by the current of History, by which it is apparent the most of the Kings of this Land received their Crown by succession, which is neither force nor flattery.  
It were easy, besides that, to derive to many of them that title which he himself accounts the only just one, viz. The consent of the Kingdom, as for instance, thus were Cassibelan of the British, Edward surnamed the Confessor of the Saxon, and William Rufus of the Norman Kings invested. 
* Speeds Hist. B. 5. chap. 6 P. 8. c 6. S. 1. B. 9 c. 3●….  Yea all of them in a manner have had the Nations vote for their Crowns, either antecedent in their predecessors, concurrent in their personal entrance, or subsequent in their establishment by after acts of Parliament, and not a few have had this threefold consent.  
Lastly, the Parliament that Enacted the Oath of Allegiance, and all the Members of the house of Commons, with all other subjects that have taken that oath solemnly, give this man the lie (excuse it if it be incivility) in the first words of it declaring the King sworn to be lawful King of this Realm.  
I. A. B. Do truly, and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify, and Declare in my Conscience before God and the World, that our Sovereign Lord King James is lawful King of this Realm etc.  
Secondly, Kingdoms were never intended (saith he) that the hereditary right of any should be in them. With what forehead can he say that was never intended which the laws and statutes of Kingdoms have ordained and settled? Particularly this Kingdom hath for divers successions provided before hand both for acts, and oaths for the hereditary descent of the Crown. Will he aver that the estates of the Realm never intended that which they enacted, and caused to be sworn?  
3 He tells us, that men that were qualified with Wisdom, righteousness, and virtue, were to be heirs and successors, and set up by the people after them that last possessed them and neither the people themselves, nor their Representatives could either give or sell away this privilege from their posterity viz. of choosing, and setting up Kings, and rulers over them.  
He ●…eth still higher in absurdness of asserting, and in this passage he is not content to cross the common sense of others, but he will needs overthrow his own way. 1 As to common reason how in consistent is this that he delivers? for by this position the arising posterity must first give their consent and pass their elective vote to the power they find standing, before they can either owe allegiance and subjection to it, or enjoy the benefit of protection of it, so that Children (suppose ours of this age) whilst they are under years of consent, and after that too until they please t● consent (which is at their own choice and may be denied for ever if they will) are both accountable to the present Government, for any trespasses, or crimes they may commit, be it murder, or whatsoever is the worst, and left out of the law's protection, and redress, in any thing they may unjustly suffer. And suppose their judgement, or choice concur not with their parents, they must during their parents lives, either continue in that estate, or chose another government, and become another commonwealth, apart by themselves. Yea & by this reason all those that have sitten down under a present power, which they find in the throne, and have given no consent to it, are in the same condition of outlawednesse, and liberty to choose rulers for themselves, yea by this means a Kingdom may come presently to be divided into a thousand pieces of states, and petty commonwealths according as their different choices may sway them, to the inflaming of the whole with endless seditions, and the overthrow of all government.  
2 As to his own way I ask, 1 upon what constitution of the people doth the present House of Commons (so called) claim to be a power? not by any made in this age certainly, the present people having not as yet chosen any new government, but do either acquiesse in the old received from their forefathers, or are subjected perforce, without their consent to a new, if any such be. I appeal to the several proposers of the agreements of the people that have been lately published whether the people of this age have yet settled or chosen any government in their time. If it be here suggested, that the present people have chosen these Representatives, I say to that. True the Countries or Corporations have chosen them to be Parliament men, but in so doing they ordained not, founded not, any Parliamentary power; they acting distributively within their several precincts and only nominating two, or a few persons upon a writ sent out in the King's name, to consult on the difficult affairs of the Kingdom, according to a known, and ancient custom, and constitution of the Realm, cannot be conceived to constitute a new power, it must then be said they are a branch of the ancient and hereditary government of this Nation, and this is not opposed by me: but this Gentleman here contradicts this claim, and tells us this title is null, and could not be made by any of our predecessors in relation to us.  
Secondly, Upon what ground do the said Commons challenge to be the sole supreme power, without a King or house of Lords, in way of a Commonwealth or free-State? if it could be said that in former times the people have placed such a power in the House of Commons, that will be of none effect, according to this principle, which denyeth that the people may conclude their posterity in such an act. If it be said the present people in electing these Commons invested them with such a power, my simplicity cannot comprehend it, at the last elections of Parliament Members, the people (for aught I have ever heard) neither resolved on, nor so much as deliberated, or moved a word of making over any new power, they only elected them according to former custom, and trust which was (as I understand) to sit in the House of Commons, and to act in consociation with the King and the House of Peers, about the public affairs of the Kingdom. ●o that the upshot is, this Gentleman by giving the people the privilege is violably to choose their own government, personally and not by their predecessors, hath utterly overturned the present power.  
4thly. But to defend this his position, he instructs us in the last place thus. This Privilege the welfare of the people is so mainly concerned in, as that without it a people are given up, and sold to ruin. 1. Are not the Laws which must regulate both, the rulers, and the ruler of as great a concernment, as the choice of the rulers to the people, and yet the people by their Laws, do conclude their posterity, which are therefore called every man's birthright? Again, is not a man's estate of Lands and goods of as great a concernment to his Issue being their earthly subsistence, as is their share in the Election of the public Magistracy? yet a man may involve his posterity (undeniably) in any act concerning his estate. Yea is not Religion and Covenanting with God, a far greater concernment, than this of government? yet men may represent and act for their issue in settling religion, and entering into Covenant with God as is clear in the example of Israel. 
* Deut. 29 10.11.14.15. Joshua 24.15.   
2. This reason would make us believe the welfare of the Nation of Israel was mainly prejudiced, and that they were given up and sold to ruin, when there was an hereditary kingdom settled over them, as there was by the Lord himself in David and his seed. Nay we are rather to believe because he set such a government over his own people, therefore it was the better way.  
I have done answering this paper, and for a conclusion have only one word to the author of it. Seeing he hath undertaken to deal in the removal of men's doubts concerning their solemn engagements unto their Governors, I would propound to him a Quaery, and that of a necessary and seasonable importance, and which is occasioned by what he hath in this paper delivered being conferred with what at this time is publicly imposed. It is only this, what may conscientiously be resolved upon in relation to the lately enacted Engagement from the principles and premises laid down by him in prosecution of his first position?  
He therein avers that an oath of allegiance must be 1. Conditiall not absolute, or whether the governor rule well, or not. 2. It must be mutual, or taken both by rulers, and ruled (so as the ruler be bound to the Subject to rule well, and administer Justice rightly, as well as the subject is bound to him) and not single or taken only by the ruled. 3. It must not be to those whom no man knoweth how they will prove, whither they will be wise or fools, just or tyrannical 4. It must not be to any one kind of government to uphold and continue it in a constant way without changing of it, and that if it transgress in any of these qualifications, it is unrighteous, sinful, and unlawful.  
I will not Query whether or no, but assume it as undoubted and clear, if an oath to persons in authority must be thus regulated a Promise, Covenant, or whatever engagement of that nature must be so also; and if his reasons, or any other that can be brought conclude an oath failing in any of those rules to be unlawful, they will as strongly infer the sinfulness of an Engagement in that matter, if it be dissonant in any particular from them.  
Next, I will not doubt to say, the  Engagement is as far discrepant from these Limitations in every point as is the oath of Allegiance if not further, 1. It is absolute or without any proviso of their ruling well, that are, or may be in power, 2. It is single, or without the rulers Engaging to the subject to rule well and justly. 3. It is to those of whom we may be as unsatisfyed how they will prove hereafter, as we can be of an heir, 4. It is to one kind of Government called the Commonwealth, as it is now established, and that described with contradistinctions from, and exclusion of King and Lords. It is also to uphold and continue it in a constant way, for it is a Covenant de futuro, binding to be true and faithful to the government for future time in those words [I will be true and faithful] and binding to it, as established, and therefore is for some continuance and constancy, which being left indefinite and illimited is more extensible in duration then is the Oath of allegiance, which determines with the King's race, and it is without changing: the continuance how long soever it is to which it engageth (which must needs be some, it being as I said a tye for future) must of necessity exclude changing, for so long as it lasteth. It will easily (I hope) be yielded, he that binds himself to be true and faithful to this Government as it is now established, is bound out from attempting a change of it, while the Term of the same obligation endureth.  
I demand therefore how he will both stand to these principles, and justify the engagement? and whether he hath not, as to himself and all those who hold with his said premises, damned it; and so far as his reasons in that position can prevail, persuaded all others that they ought not to take it, but are in conscience bound to reject it.  
FJNJS