The GROUNDS of the LAW OF ENGLAND; Extracted from the Fountains of all other Learning: And digested Methodically into CASES, for the Use and Benefit of all PRACTISERS, and STUDENTS. With a Commixtion of divers scattered Grounds concerning the reasonable Construction of the LAW. Major haereditas venit unicuique nostrum a jure & legibus, quam ab iis, a quibus illa bona relicta sunt: Nam ut perveniat ad nos fundus, testamento alicujus fieri potest: ut retineamus quod nostrum factum est, sine jure civili fieri non potest. Cicero pro Cetinna. The Common Law is the best, and common Birthright that the Subject hath, for the safeguard and defence, not only of Goods, Lands, and Revenues, but of his Wife and Children, his body, fame, and life also, Coke Com. f. 142. By M. H. of the Middle-Temple. LONDON, Printed for H. Twyford, T. Dring, Jo. Place, and W. Place, and are to be sold at their Shops in Vine-Court Middle-Temple, at the George in Fleetstreet, at Furnivals', and Grays-inn Gates in Holborn, 1657. Magno, magnae BRITANNIAE, & HIBERNIAE, etc. Principi, Patri Patriae, & semper AUGUSTO. Illustrissime princeps, QUI & Hispanorum, & papicolarum es Horror, sicut & piorum principum, & protestantium amor: Cujus solum nomen alteros (uti de Caesaris hostibus olim dictum) somnum capere non sinit; Alii vero vestra ope, & authoritatis scuto tecti, & muniti, aut victores, aut incolumes plerumque evadunt, Macte virtute esto, sententia dia Catonis. Accedit etiam praeclara vestra prudentia in administratione turbulentae hujus reipublicae: Ex quo enim gubernacula imperii & fraena reipublicae in te suscepisti, Britannia sub vestro principatu hoc didicit, quantum refert, gravissimis, & difficillimis temporibus aliquem reipublicae praeesse. Qui sic suo fungitur officio, ut bonorum hominum non solum expectationi, sed votis satisfacere sciret. Cui adjicienda est vestra frugalis aulae vestrae domesticae cura, quae non uti Craesi regia magnificè, & sumptuose est exornata, sed sicut platonis domus mundo nitore splendida: Cujusque mensa non saliaribus dapibus, aut Vitellii patinis est referta, sed satis liberalis, & bene necessariis quidem rebus instructa: Ita ut lauta sit, & sobria, omnisque luxus expers, & vacua, nullaque sit familia melius morata, aut sanctius instituta quam aula vestra. Quid autem memorem Justitiae vestrae solemnia exemplaria, quae per totum nostrum orbem diffusa, in propatulo sunt, & sub omnium oculorum ictu. Nequeo tamen silentio praeterire, gratissimum vestrum nobis opus, quod leges nostras antiquas, patrias, & haereditarias, Invitis, & reluctantibus nonnullis innovatoribus, stabilire, & Juramento vestro confirmare dignatus es: Ita quod recte appelleris legum nostrarum fulcrum, & columna: In eo aequans Themistoclem in acie, qui fortissimus, & Aristidem in pace, qui Justissimus erat: unde saniorum omnium sententia constat, summum pro merito vestro imperium vestrae Celsitudini Jure deberi: Nam naturae lex est omnibus Communis, ut deterioribus imperent meliores. Dyonis. Halicarnassaeus. Hor. Sume superbiam Quaesitam meritis. Haecque omnia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & sine fuco profiteri non erubesco, nec pertimesco, quia non est adulatio, vel supparasitatio, vera asseverare & praedicare, sed potius pusillanimitas, & immodesta modestia, veritatem tacere, & celare. Licetque summa petit livor, & eminentia invidia non Carent, sit tamen Celsitudini vestrae, erectus, & undique quadratus animus uti semper, qui instar cubi, nullis fortunae ventis, & procellis divelli, aut prosterni poterit. Quod ut faxit summus ille Jupiter Stator, & Jehova noster. Orat & obsecrat vester observantissimus & fidissimus subditus, Mich. Hawke. To the Candid and Courteous Gentlemen and Students of the Colleges and Seminaries of the LAW, Originally styled the INNS of COURT and CHANCERY. IT is the Theorem of the Prince of Philosophers, That every Discourse, or Speech standeth and dependeth upon these three Pillars, Qui, de quo, ad quem loquitur, The Author, the Subject, and the Auditor. And a Compendious Page of every one of them may not be distasteful, nor incongruous to the intended scope of this Codicill. In the handling of which, the Author deemeth it not inconducent to invert the Order, Homeri more 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and to take his Exordium from the subject, or matter itself, as the more worthy, and to place the person of the Author in the arrear, as the less worthy; for the matter itself is more certain & evident, Et res ipsa loquitur, is the the firmest Argument, and far surmounting validity of Authority; As Teste me ipso, or ipse dixit: For all Authors do often seem to strive and contend for supremacy, Patric. l. 2. de princ. unius f. 65. and sometimes accuse one another of falsity: as Caustrius and Lysymachus accused Ephorus: Apollonius and Nicagoras, Theopompus: Phylostratus Sophocles, and Pollio Herodotus; Neither have some abstained from Plato, whom Aristole though his Scholar perstringeth in many passages, whom therefore Plato wittily called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a mad Colt for kicking against his Dam and Master: Nay Aristotle himself, who for his natural Reasons is of greatest authority, was taunted and opposed by Vives, and Charronius, Ramus, and Mirandulanus, and in this latter age by Paradoxical Gassendus. First therefore of the Subject, or the Matter subjected, which the Philosopher's part into the thing considered, or the matter handled, which they call subjectum materiale, or the manner of considering the matter, which they call subjectum formale, of both which the subject is constituted, which is called Adaequatum. Now to apply this to our present purpose, The matter considered in this Treatise is the grounds of the Laws of England, which in the Volumes of our Reports, and other writings have divers names, Et primo de nomine conveniat, quia res quidem verbis natura priores, sed disceptatione posteriores: And first let us agree about the name, because things by nature are before words, but by desceptation and discourse words are before them. Sometimes they are called Principles, as 8 H. 7. 4. It is a Principle, An Estate of Frank tenement doth not pass without Livery, but this name Originally cometh from the Grecians, and in this sense was used by Aristotle in the first of his Physics, Contra negantem principia non est amplius disputandum. And sometimes they are called Maxims, as 34 H. 16. 33. It is a Maxim in our Law, that in every action personal, the Non-suite of one, shall be the Nonsuit of both; but this name is borrowed of the Latins, and is so used by Boethus in his Logic, Both. Dialect. Sce. in Ar. Top. f. 3. and is all one as Sceglius saith, with a Topical Axiom; for which reason Sir Edward Coke giveth it this latin Etymoligy, that they are called Maxims, Quia maxima est eorum dignitas, Coke come. & certissima authoritas, atque quod maxime omnibus probetur. They are also sometimes called Eruditions, as by Dyer f. 66. It is a common erudition, that in that County where the wrong is commenced, the Action shall be brought; which name also received its Origin from the Romans. But they are many times called grounds, as Dyer f. 30. There is another ground of Tenure in chief, that it ought to be immediately from the King, and aught to begin and take his Original creation by the King himself, and by none of his Subjects, with infinite others, which name only hath the sound and sense of an English Notation, and therefore is this name prefixed to the Title of the Author, most proper to our Law and Language: For a ground is a foundation in Law, upon whose reason the structure of many particular Cases doth stand. But now the Name, or Shell is cracked and opened, the Kernel and nature of the thing may more clearly be discovered, And this also must be by distinction, which is the prime way of instruction: for qui bene distinguit bene docet, and therefore premise that there are grounds and principles of essence and being from which things have their beginning and constitution: and so are all causes the grounds and principles of their effects, and there are grounds and principles of knowledge, which are universal propositions, by which as the more worthy and better known, other things are conceived, which are the material subject of ●hi● Treatise. Arist. 1. post. And these are either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, natural, or positive, as the Philosopher distinguisheth them, natural grounds and principles are those, to which the humane intellect by its native propensity doth assent without any ratiocination, and are either speculative, or practic, speculative are those which immediately appertain to contemplation, as impossible est idem esse, & non esse, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, & totum majus est sua parte, the whole is greater than the part, and practical are those which reflect on the honesty and manners of men, as parents sunt colendi, Parents are to be honoured, & non est faciendum alteri, quod tibi non vis, you ought not to do that to another you would not have done to yourself: So vim virepellere licet, it is lawful to repel force by force; both which are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, common notions, & these, saith the Philosopher, are called prime principles, quia non ab alijs, sed a seipsis fidem habent, because they have not their credit and authority from others, but from themselves, and of these especially is the rule cited by Sir Edward Coke, to be understood, principia probant, non probantur, Coke come. 343. because the proof ought to be from an higher cause, and there is nothing more supreme than a principle, yet if any be so absurd to deny them, they may be proved a posteriori, or by induction, as if one should deny, totum esse majus sua parte, it may be proved by the examination, and proportion of every particular part, and if any one should deny the fire to be hot, let his hand be put to it, and it is proof sufficient. Thetick and positive grounds and principles are those, which are placed in Arts and Sciences to manifest, and prove their propositions and conclusions, and are drawn from the secondary Law of nature and reason, Dod. Eng. Lawy. 208. and therefore by Cicero are called, consequentia naturae, as the others prima naturae, and by Sir John Doderidge, primary, and secondary propositions, primary which are known notions, whose clearness, and evidence causeth every one to yield to their consent; and secondary, which are descended and derived from the branches as from a root, or rivers from a Fountain, as sublata causa tollitur effectus, the cause being taken away, the effect also ceaseth, & qui tacet, consentire videtur, he which is silent seemeth to consent. And these general grounds and propositions, are the foundations of all Arts and Sciences, for the course and proceeding in every one of them is deduced from general grounds and precepts, which are so necessary, that without them we cannot attain to the knowledge of the Species, Dod. Eng. Law. f. and individuals, for the Physician when he undertaketh the cure of a malady in some singular person, he effecteth it not by sense and Symptoms, but by reason and Aphorisms, and so also doth the Legist, who though he exerciseth his practice on particular men's cases, yet doth he judge of the right by universal grounds and maxims, Coke come. f. 11. which therefore by Sir Edward Coke are called the grounds of Art and conclusions of reason, Ployd. f. 29. and by Mr. Ploydon, the foundation of the Laws, Fortesc. de Leg. Ang. f. 21. and conclusions of reason; so also saith Sir john Fortescue, that the principles, and efficient causes of our Laws are certain universals, which the learned in the Laws of England call grounds and maxims. Yet is not the Art and Science of the Law of the like certainty with other Arts and Sciences, by reason of the variable condition of the subject whereupon it is employed, consisting only upon a man's changeable, and inconstant conversation, from whence the grounds and knowledge of all Laws are in generality derived, and upon which they are commonly exercised, and therefore to that purpose saith the Philosopher, Arist. 1. Eth. c. 3 that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, honest and just things of which the politic, and civil Science considereth, contain in them, so great differences, and errors as they seem only to consist by Law, and opinion, and not by nature, whereupon Sir John Doderidge judiciously collecteth, that it is almost impossible to make any secondary ground of Law, but that it will fail in some particular case, whence springeth this often used assertion, non est regula quin fallit, there is no rule but faileth, and therefore the ordainers, Dod. 3. L. f. 209. and interpreters of Laws, respect rather those things which may often happen and not every particular circumstance, for which, though they would, they should not be able by any positive Law to make provision. By reason whereof they do permit, the Grounds and Maxims of the common Law, upon argument and disputation of reason to be restrained by exceptions. Yet doth not the exception so framed upon any ground or rule to which it is annexed, impeach the credit of the said ground, but as Sir Edward Coke, and Sir John Doderidge, firmat regulam in omnibus casibus non exceptis, Coke come. Dod. E. Laws f. 210. corroborateth the rule in all cases which are not excepted. Melancton in his Logic addeth another ground and principle which exceedeth the Philosophers apprehension, to wit, principium patefactionis divinae, the principle of divine revelation, which our Law also holdeth to be the prime principle, and ground of all the rest, for as Prisot a principal Justice of the common Pleas saith, 24. H. 8. 46. 1. we ought to give credit to all such Laws as are taken out of the holy Scriptures, for that it is the common Law upon which all Laws are founded, and from which all other Laws do proceed, and therefore may be called divine Laws as they are conjoined with the moral Law, and have divine authority, as also humane Laws as men by their knowledge do judge all humane affairs. It followeth that we now inquire, of the manner of considering the grounds and rules of our Laws, which is by the extraction of them out of the root, and fountain of other Acts, and Sciences, for as reason is the mother of the rules, and grounds of all Acts, and Sciences, so are they by the same reason united, and cemented together, as that the grounds and rules of one Science are adjuvant, and auxiliary to another, which the Author hath fully & expressly demonstrated in the preamble, and frontispiece of the first Book of this treatise, to which he referreth the Reader; And to which may be annexed the method which also may be called a manner, and form of considering, concerning which the Judges and Sages of our Laws do descent and vary, whether any, or what manner of method is to be used in the sustemes and digests of our Laws, for the antique, and neoterique reporters and writers of our Laws respect more the matter then the method; And Sir Edward Coke, being advised by King James at some opportune time to reduce the common law into a more commodious method, Coke l. 4. Ep. ad lectorem. did much doubt of the fruits of his labour, if he should undertake it, and so doth Sir Francis Bacon freely profess, that though he could have digested the rules of our Laws into a certain method, and order, yet doth he of purpose avoid so to do, but Sir Henry Finch hath endeavoured, In his preface to his rules and maxims of the Law. and fairly proceeded in reducing not only the body of our Laws into a compendious method, but also the grounds and rules of the same into an Academical order, for which rarity he hath merited this Elegy, rara avis in lege rubicula. Haecque alter cantipotior sententia visa est, Order being the ornament of all things, and method the best art of memory to which purpose Sir John Doderidge asserteth, that if there be any way extant, Dod. E. Law. 253. to purge the English Laws, from the great confusions of tedious, and superfluous reiterations; wherewith the reports are infested, it may be brought to pass by the way of grounds and rules, or by none, for by rules and exceptions, all Sciences are, and have been published, put down and delivered, and whereas Galene proposeth three ways, reasons, and methods of teaching and learning, the one way by composing, and proceeding from the parts to the whole, and the other by resolving the whole into parts, and the third by defining, which by explication of the nature of the whole, examineth every particular appertaining to the whole. This third and latter may aptly be applied to the grounds and rules of Sciences; as in Physic, to the Aphorisms of Hypocrates, and more especially to the grounds and rules of the Law, which by the newer Civilians is taken for a definition, who accordingly do define a rule to be a short definition, or a sentence, whenas indeed many like cases are concluded in a short delivery, not by the expression of the particular cases, but by the assignation of the same reason, and is nothing else but a compendious oration, Br. in regulas juris, f. f. 15. & 346. wherein many things are briefly and absolutely delivered and declared, and so do the Greek interpreters call a definition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which also may be orderly disposed into a Methodical, and an Alphabetical Table, fit and convenient both for the speedy finding of that we would seek, and wish for which the Author in the Table of this treatise hath accurately observed. And besides hath been diligent to reduce them into a more artificial order, by drawing the grounds and rules of our free and Municipal Laws, from the Springs and Heads of the liberal Arts and Sciences, and by that means hath brought them into a more convenient form, and method, which he ingenuously acknowledgeth to have borrowed of Sir Henry Finch, and Mr. Noy, quia ingenuum duxi, profiteri per quos profecissem, and to which according to his slender skill he hath added, a copious amplification, seriously upon mature, deliberation, conceiving that all the Grounds, and Principles of our Laws may be placed, disposed, and contained under some of those Heads; and consequently every particular case under the general, and several grounds in every one of them, for as Sir Edward Coke, principium est quasi primum caput, Coke come. f. 345. a. a principle is the prime Head, from the which many cases have their beginning, and original, and therefore hath the Author disposed as many particular and several cases under every general and several Heads, as he could conveniently collect, and accumulate having learned of the said Author, that there is no particular case in the Law so sterile, but that the Student at one time, or another may make use of it, for the defect of which Sir Francis Bacon taxeth the Civilians in his preface to his Maxims, which though the Author hath not completed, yet hath he endeavoured so to do, and made way for others to effect it, Et sit nobis voluisse fat. But now Gentlemen the Author turneth his stile towards you who are the coronides of his labours, and lucubrations, and to whom they are devoted, and directed; for ye are legum nostrarum alumni, fed and nourished with the teats and tra●●ates of the Law, and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as proper and idoneous auditors of the Grounds and Principles thereof, and did forbear to commend them to the Rabbis, and Papinians of our ●awes for that were to instruct Minerva, or to submit them to the Judgement of illiterate Lozel's, for they would contemn what they did not conceive, so as he may say of these writings, as Caius Lucilius did of his quod ea que scriberet, neque ab indoctissimis, Cicer. de oratore l. 2. neque a doctissimis legi velle, quod alteri nihil intelligerent, alteri plus fortasse quam ipse de se, that those things, which he should write, would not be read of those were most learned, nor of those were not learned at all, because these understood nothing, and the others perhaps more than himself, & sic, Pro captu lectoris habent sua fata libellis, To your therefore indifferent and debonair Judgements hath the Author destinated this discourse, as the immediate, and adequate object of the same, it neither transcending, or surmounting your capacities, nor being inferior, or subordinate to your conditions, or proficiencies whence he is used to presume on your affable and gracious acceptance, because by nature all men are rapaces similium, and covetous of those things are conformable to their conceptions and conditions, and for this reason confidently assumeth to himself, that the consideration of these grounds and principles will be consonant and pleasing to your affections, especially when you shall perceive the great and various utility, which from the election of them may proceed, for as in natural operations, the necessity, and utility of the thing is predominant, so in moral and civil affairs, the use and commodity is prevalent, and as Galen in all things, Vincat utilitas, The prime use therefore which accrueth from the collection of these Grounds & Principles, is the confirmation of our memory, which is the treasury and perfection of all learning and erudition, for whereas our annals, and reports do consist of particular cases, and every particular case hath his several circumstance, and circumstances are singular, and in regard of us infinite, and therefore hardly, if not impossible to be retained in memory, according to the dictate of Bracton, omnia in memoria tenere divinum est potius quam humanum, yet by these Grounds and Principles, is this oblivious defect salved and re-remedied, for by the observation of these grounds, he will be instructed to remember the reason of them, by which he shall resolve all doubts of like degree, as if he had remembered the express cases from which the same reason and ground is reduced; so as by their brevity they strengthen us, and coroborate the memory: Quintil. l. 2. For as Quintilian, sententiae feriunt animum, & uno ictu frequenter impellunt, & ipsa brevitate magis haerent, Sentences strike the mind & with one blow, commonly conquer it, and by their brevity stick more firmly, that, is in the memory: And therefore did Pythagoras, and the ancient Philosophers deliver their moral and civil Discipline by Aphoristicall Precepts, and Laconicque sentences, that they might more easily apprehend and retain them in memory, which also may appear by the Proverbs of Solomon, and by the Aphorisms of Hyppocratis, and the Precepts of Theognis, Bacon in his Preface to his Rules and Maxims. & Phocilides, but chief as Sir Francis Bacon observeth by the Praecedents of the Roman Civil Law, who have taken the same course with their Rules: Dod. E. l. f. 56. From whence as Sir John Dodridge collecteth that many Axioms & Rules are borrowed and usually frequented in our Law, which do more aptly and fitly express the same reason in shortness of speech: which by Mr. Ployden are sometimes cited and called the Text of the civil Law, Ployd. f. 368. & by Sir Ed. Coke oftener, but for the most part by him concealed, in sometimes altered, which may be observed or the passages of the Author, who commonly conjoineth the Civil Rule, with our Common Law ground. Besides, it is not unknown almost to every Puny, what a laudable and difficult task it is to argue a case accurately upon a Quaere, or Demurrer in Law, wherein by the election of Grounds and Maxims, the Lawyer is taught to abound in matter fit for Argument; For as Mr. Ployden, Ployd. f. 27. b. there are two principal things upon which Arguments may be made, to wit, Maxims and reason the Mother of all Laws: and Maxims, saith he, are the foundations of Laws, and conclusions of reason; whereby is manifested the help and assistance, that Grounds and Maxims do yield in the discussing of such Arguments, which consist in the apt application of the said Grounds and Maxims, unto such particular Cases falling in debate. To which the Author will only add one Use more, lest he should exceed the limits of a better, which according to Cicero's example, aught to be short and pithy, and that is the accumulation of the Grounds and Maixms, into a breviary, and compendium collected out of the classic and authentic Authors of our Laws, which as Politian eligantly, Laboriosius ille fuit quam sibillae folia colligere, was more laborious to him, then to collect the scattered leaves of the Sibyls: and in framing of which he may say with the witty Poet, Saepe caput scaberet & vivos roderet ungues. And of which he may not unfitly say with Lucretius, Floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant, Omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta, Aurea perpetua semper dignissima vita. All which though through the brevity of time and importunity of the Press, he could not compose into a compendious lump, yet hath he gathered together the chiefest and choicest of them, and more than any other Collector before him, to the number two a hundred. All which comprised, Tanquam in pala annuli, into a little compass the Author affectionately presenteth to your benign animadversion, which you have here, Ad manum, prepared to your hand, to make use of them upon any fit and opportune occasion. But now is it high time for the Author to appear on the Stage, who though in the flower of his age was initiated into the honourable house of the Middle Temple, and for the space of these twenty Summers, hath principally devoted his studies to the knowledge and practise of our Laws: Et sic tractent fabrilia fabri: yet doth he modestly acknowledge, that the theme of this Tractate, is an Obje● too high for his inferior flight, and not to be reached by a Musket, or a Sparrow-Hawk, but by an Eagle, or Birds of a more soaring, or surmounting flight. Howsoever proposing unto himself the Pattern and Protestation of Cicero, Quod omnes two sumus, Cic. l. 2. de Orat. ut sine studiis nullam vitam esse dicamus, That we are all of that opinion, that without study and labour there is no life: And the advice of Sir Edward Coke, Omnes debere jurisprudentiae libris componedis animum adjicere, That all men ought to addict their minds to the composing of Books of the Law. He did rather choose to incur the censure of temerity and audacity, then to undergo the ignominy of oscitation and idleness, of which, as Cato saith, Every one ought to give a reasoable account, especially those who are stepped into years, in whom nothing is more dishonourable, and ignominious, according to the sentence of Sedulous Seneca, Cricitas de hon. dis. l. 1. c. 8. Nihil est turpius, quam grandis natu senex, qui nullum habet vitae suae argumentum, quo diu se vixisse dicat, praeter aetatem, There is nothing more fowl and filthy than a very aged man, who hath no other argument of his life, by which he may signify he hath lived, beside his old age. And though it is the observation of the Philosopher, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. All men love their own Works, Arist. 4. Eth. c. 1. as Parents and Poets do: yet doth the Author acknowledge with Cicero, Quod nihil meorum magnopere miror, That he never admired any of his own works, but saith with Ovid, Ipse mihi nunquam Judice me placui. That he could never as yet by his own Judgement please himself, though it always hath been his ambition to please others, according to the option of the Consular Poet, Optabam ut placeam, sin minus ut taceam. And this modest lesson hath the Author learned of the great Legist Sir Edw. Coke, Nulla scientia, Coke come. f. 494. nulla virtus locum suum, & dignitatem conservare potest sine modestia, no science, nor virtue can preserve its place, and dignity without modesty, and accordingly doth he close up his discourse with the conclusion of Bracton, postulans a Lectore, Brac. l. 1. f. 1. ut siquid superfluum, vel perperam positum in hoc opere invenerit, illud corrigat, vel emendet, vel connuiventibus oculis pertranseat, requesting this of the Reader, that if he shall find any thing superfluous or placed amiss in this work, that he will either correct or amend it, or with conniving eyes pass it by. Or rather with our great Master Littleton. Si componere magnis, Ovid. Parva mihi fas sit. That he would not have you believe, that all that he hath said in this Book is Law, for he will not presume to take that upon him, but of such things, which are not Law inquire, and learn of his Sage Masters learned in the Law. THE GROUNDS OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND. Extracted out of the Root and Fountain of other ARTS & SCIENCES. LIB. I. SECT. I. IT is the observation of Cicero who excelled in the knowledge of all humane Arts and Sciences, Cic. 3. de. orot. Omnes a●tes quae ad humanitatem pertinent habent commune quoddam vinculum & quasi cognatione quadam inter se continentur. All Arts and Sciences which appertain unto humanity, have a certain common bond and tye, and are as it were contained by a certain alliance and affinity amongst themselves, and truly, for they are the issue of one Womb descending from the same intellect, and are by nature so linked and chained together, that those principles which are true in one Art and science are reciprocally true in the other, for truth, absolutely and materially is one and the same, though formally or relatively, either in respect of the Artists or the divers objects of Sciences, it be severed, which proceeds from the various mode of the application and consideration of it. Neither is Theologicall and Philosophical truth opposite but subordinate, and Theologie is not against Philosophy but above it, neither do the principles of one science supplant the principles of another science, but mutually aid and assist each other with their principles in searching and sifting out of the truth, which is practically apparent in the art and discipline of the Law, Nomot. f. 6. which borroweth most of her principles from other sciences; in so much, as Sir Henry Finch elegantly, The sparks of all Sciences are raked up in the ashes of the Law, for which reason Sir Edward Coke aptly styleth it scientia socialis, L. 5. ●8. a sociable science because it agreeth with other excellent sciences both divine and humane, and therefore the Author deemeth it operae p ecium, a work worth the labour, to demonstrate as it were in a mirror and blazon the affinity and alliance that the grounds of the Laws of Eng●and have with the principles of other arts and sciences, who by an intellectual chain are divinely linked and conjoined: and because Theologie is the prime and divine Metaphysics, ars ●rtium, & scientia scientiarum, and the cynosure of all laws, for as Augustine, in illa temporali l●ge nihil est justum ac legitimum, quod non ex hac aete●na homines derivaverint, in this temporal Law nothing is just and lawful, that men have not derived from the law eternal, and therefore doth the Author deduce his exordium from it, because as Sir Edwa d ●oke, it is causa causarum, and that the common law is grounded on the Law of God, and as the mirror of justice, the common Law is nothing else but ancient usages warranted by Scriptures, from hence are drawn these grounds and maxims. 1. Summa ratio est quae p●o religione facit, Reg. l. c. Coke l. 5. f. 18, a. it is the chiefest reason which makes for religion, as in many cases the King is bound by Act of Parliament, though he be not named in it, nor bound by express words. And therefore all Statutes which are made for suppressing of wrong or to prevent the decay of religion, shall bind the King though he be not named, lor religion and justice are the sure supporters of the Crown, and diadem of Kings. So the act of 1 Eliz. which restraineth ecclesiastical persons from spoiling and wasting their possessions, which were given to maintain the service of God, shall bind the King unless that special provision had been made to the contrary by the said Act 2. Coke l. 11. f. 70. a. b. magdalen's College Case, the Master and fellows of magdalen's College by Indenture inrowlled, did grant to the Queen an house paying fifteen pounds rend yearly, etc. and it was resolved by all the Judges that the Act of the 13. Eliz. did extend to restrain them to convey the said house (parcel of the said college) to the Queen, though she was not in that expressly named, because it was for the advancement of Religion etc. for out of those Colleges the Church was furnished with grave and reverend Divines, for the instruction of Christians in the true Religion, which is a main Pillar of the Crown, and if the King should be exempted out of it, the utter impoverishment of the successors, and by consequence, the decay of Religion would ensue, vide. 3. Coke l. 2. f. 44. b. A lay man concerning payment of Tithes, may prescribe in modo decimandi, but not in non decimando, because he is not but in special cases capable of Tithes by the common Law, and therefore without special matter showed, he shall not be intended to have a legal discharge: And therefore in favour of religion and the Church, though he may have a legal beginning, yet the law will not suffer such a prescription in this case, nor put it upon the trial of the lay people, who will rather strain their consciences for their own private gain and benefit, then give the Church its due: And the Law hath great policy in it, for the decay of the Revenues of the Church in the end will be the subversion of Religion and the service of God, etc. vide. 4 Ecclesia fungitur vice minoris, meliorem facere potest conditionem, deteriorem nequaquam, Cok. Com. 141. a. The Church exerciseth the Office of a minor & can make its condition better but not worse, for it is the chiefest reason which makes for Religion: And therefore in all cases a Parson or Vicar of the Church for the benefit of the Church hath a qualified fee, but in many cases to do any thing to the prejudice of the Church he hath in effect but an estate for life. As a Parson, Vicar, etc. may have an action of Waste, and in the Writ it shall be said, ad exheredationem Ecclesiae. So the Parson that maketh a Lease for Life shall have a consimili casu during the life of the Leasee, and a Writ of Entry ad communem legem after, or a Writ ad terminum qui preterijt, or a quod permittat in the debet, which no man can maintain but Tenant in Fee-simple or Fee-tail, vide. But a Parson cannot make a discontinuance, for that should be to the prejudice of his Successor to take away his Entry and drive him to a real action, but if he die, the Successor may enter notwithstanding the discontinuance. And if a Parson make a Lease for years reserving rend and dyeth, the Lease is determined, neither will the acceptance of the Successor make it good, vide. 5. Prelatus Ecclesiae suae conditionem meliorem facore potest sine consensu, deteriorem vero nequaquam sine consensu, Coke Com. fol. 103. a. As neither Bishop nor Parson cannot disclaim or divest any fee is invested in his house or Church. But an Abbot or a Prior with his Covent, or a Bishop with his Chapter, or a Parson with his Patron and Ordinary, may pass away any Inheritance, for the wisdom of the Law would not trust one with the Inheritance of the Church; which always maketh for religion and the good of the Church. 6. Dies dominicus non est dies juridicus, Ployd. 265. The Sabbath day is no day for Law: As upon a Fine levied by Proclamations according to the Statute of 4. H. 7. C. 24. If any of the Proclamations be made on the Sabbath day, all the Proclamations be erroneous, for the Justices must not sit upon that day, but it is a day exempted from such Businesses by the Common-Law, for the solemnity of it; to the intent that the people may apply themselves that day to the service of God. No Plea shall be holden Quindena Pasche, because it is always the Sabbath, but shall be Crastino quindenae Pasch. Fit. Nat. fo. 17. f. Upon a Scire facias out of the Common Bench, an Error was assigned because the Teste of the Scire facias was upon a Sunday: And it was adjudged Error, because it was not Die Ju●idicus, Dyer 168. No sale upon a Sunday shall be said to be sale in a Market overt to alter the property, 12 E. 4 8. Although Sunday is not Dies Ju idicus, and that no judicial Act ought to be acted on that day, yet ministerial Acts, as to arrest or serve Process are allowed, for otherwise peradventure they should never be executed, and God forbidden that things of necessity should not be done on that day, for bonum est bene facere die Sabathi, but this distinction and exception is taken away by a late Act made in the long Parliament of England, yet did that Parliament in case of necessity once sit upon the Lord's day, which is the high Court of Justice, and from which there is no appeal. By the Statute of Magna Charta, Cap. 14. no spiritual Parson shall be amerced according to his spiritual benefice but according to his Lay fee, Fitz. Nat. br. f. 76. b. And that in favour of Religion. 7. Omnia quae movent ad mortem sunt deod inda, Coke l. 5. fol. 110. b. any unreasonable thing killing a man by misadventure is forfeited to the King, and every thing moving with it is forfeited also to the King: As if a man being upon a Cart carrying Faggots, and as he is in binding them together falleth down by the motion of one of his Horses in the Cart and dyeth of that, both that and all the Horses in the Cart, and the Cart itself are forfeited, 8. E. 2. 307. A man falleth from a stack of Corn and dyeth, it is forfeited, 2. E. 3 140. If any Horse strike one and I ●lien my Horse, and he dyeth, my Horse is forfeited, because the forfeiture shall have relation to the stroke given, Ployd. 260. b. K●llaway, 68 b. but it is not forfeited until the matter be found on record, and therefore it cannot be by prescription, and the Jurors that find the death must also find and apprise the goods, Coke l. 5. fol. 11. b. And therefore are they called Deodands, quasi deodanda, that is, El●emosynas eroganda, to be disposed in Alms and works of Charity, 17. E 4. 2. and for that reason doth the King grant them to his Almoner, to the intent they should be disposed of by him accordingly. Actus dei nemini facit inju●iam, Cok. Come fol. 148 So much is the reason of the Law ruled by Religion, as it will not permit the Act of God to prejudice any one, as if Tenant for another man's life granteth a Rent-charge to one for one and twenty years' cesty que vie dyeth, the Rent-charge is determined, and yet the Grantee during the years may have a Writ of Annuity for the Arrearages incurred after the death of cesty que vie, because it determined by the Act of God. Cok. l●b 8. fol. 72. Hales Case. An Office is found that the Heir is in ward, who after he was of full age tendereth his Livery, and was admitted to it, the Heir within three months, which is the usual time to sue out his Livery, bargaineth part of his Lands by Deed enrolled, and within the three month's dyeth, the bargain was adjudged good, and that the Heir should have no prejudice, because the suing of his homage, and suing out of his Livery, without default in him was become impossible by the Act of God, & Impotentia excusat l●gem; and is all one as if the King had taken the Homage of the Heir, when the Heir made his tender, vide ibidem p●u●a. Coke lib. 8. fo. 63 a. If an House fall by tempest or other Act of G●d, the Lessee for life or years hath a special interest to take Timber for the building of the house again, if he will, for his habitation, but if he pull down the house he shall not have Timber to build it, because it is his own Act, and the Lessor shall have an Action of Waste. Coke lib. 1. 98. a. If a Lessee Covenanteth to leave the Wood in as good plight as it was at the time of the Lease, and after the Trees are subverted by Tempest, he is discharged of his Covenant, causa qua supra, Cok. l. 5. fol. 86. a. B●unfeilds Case. If the Defendant in debt, dyeth in Execution, the Plaintiff shall have a new Execution, by Elegit or Fieri facias, because the death of the Defendant is the Act of God, which prejudiceth no man. Nunquam prospere succedunt res huma●ae ubi negliguntur res divinae, Cok. Com. fo. 54 b. humane affairs never succeed well where divine rites are neglected. And therefore doth that great Legist prescribe these Rules, to the Students of the Law for their daily practice. Sex horas somno, totidem des legibus aequis, Quatuor orabis, des epulisque ●uas, Quod super est ultra sacris largire Camaenis. To sleep six hours allot, to the Laws twice three, Four to your prayers, two to your Feasts may be, And what remains, give to the Muse Divine. Sect. 2. IN the next place the art of Grammar is to be ranked, which amongst the Liberal Sciences hath the Precedency, for it is Janua omnium artium, the portal by which we enter into the knowledge of all Arts, and by which we communicate ourselves and studies to others; hence proceed these rules and maxims. Ignoratis terminis ignoratur ars, Cok. Com. 177. a. As in School Divinity, Civil Law, Logic, and other Arts, there are words of Art, which are more significant, then Grammatical, so are there in our Law terms drawn from the Legal French, which are more apt and significant to express the sense of our Laws then any other. Which words of Art being not conceived, that Art cannot be comprehended. Whence he inferreth that the significations of words in all Arts and Sciences are necessary, which Mr. Littleton in his Tenors ordinarily observeth, for certainly names which are instituted and imposed according to the rational Analogy with things by wise & understanding men are as Plato calleth them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 instructive instruments by which we are guided and directed to the knowledge of the thing: And therefore in our discourse and disputation this ever is to be observed, principium in omni re, & disputatione est nomen, the words are first to be considered, Cok. Com. 68 a. 2. Loquendum ut vulgus, Coke l. 4. fo. 46. a. words shall be taken according to their vulgar and ordinary construction, as though a person attainted be a person convict and more. Yet in the Statute of 25 E. 3. c. 2. It is said that an attaint by virdict is taken as convict by virdict, so also it is taken, 3. H. 7. c. 1. and oftentimes in common speech, the person convict is termed Attaint, for we are to speak as the people use to speak; a grant of one hundred Acres of Land in such a Field, and sixty in such a Field, and twenty Acres of meadow in such a Meadow, the Acres shall be taken as they are known by estimation. But if I have a Close by estimation twenty Acres, and by the Statute eighteen, if I grant ten of these Acres, he shall have them according to the measure of the Statute, Popham fol. 191. And therefore saith Ployd. fo. 169. It is the part of Judges to know the common Language of the people, and to adjudge of those only according to the common course. For he that taketh a Lease for Lands in the North Country called a tack, and in Lancashire it is called a firme-holte, and in Essex a Week, and if he have taken it by these words used in that Country, there is no reason that he should lose his Farm because he hath used no other Language than is used in his own Country: But the Judge ought to search and know the sense of these words, and shall judge them according to the common usage, otherwise he shall make great disturbance and confusion in the Common Wealth, ib. for verba valent usu sicut nummi, and Cok. l. 6. fol. 64. b. concludeth that it is well said in Hills and Granges Case 170. It is the office of Judges to take and expound the words which the common people use to express their intent, according to their intent and not according to the true definition, vide ibidem plura, Sr. Moyle Finches Case, and so Coke lib. 7. fol. 11. b. calvin's Case, whereas divers books and acts speak of the Leagiance of England, all these and others speaking briefly in a vulgar manner and not pleading are to be understood of the Legiance due from the people of England to the King; and therefore loquendum ut vulgus sed sentiendum ut docti for no man will affirm that England itself taking it for the continent thereof doth owe any legiance and faith, or that any allegiance, or faith should be due to that: But it manifestly appeareth that the Legiance and faith of the Subject is proprium quarto modo, to the King, ibidem. 3. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, Dyer fo. 14. b. It is a rule in the Grammar, that when a thing is dubious and may be referred to a double intent, let the relation be to the next Antecedent: As the Condition of the Obligation for marriage money, was: That if the wife die before Michaelmas, without Issue died, adjudged the Obligation was void, for then living relates to the first Antecedent that is Michaelmas, and not to the death of the woman, ibidem. Dyer foe 46 b. A man was indicted of Felony per nom●n I. S. de in C m. pray. serviens W. B. in eodem Com. Yeoman, and for defect of a sufficient addition to I.S. he was discharged upon the indictment, for Yeoman ought to be referred to the master as the next Antecedent, and not to I.S. and servant is not a sufficient addition 9 E. 4. So one Sibylla Batersby nuper de T. in Comitatu Ebor. uxor Johanis Batersby nuper Spinster was indicted of Felony and murder, and for defect of the addition, she was discharged, for Spinster being an indifferent addition for man or woman (for in Norfolk there are divers men which are worsted spinsters) must be referred to Johanis Batersby the next Antecedent. Tenant for life, the Remainder to B. in Tail, the Remainder to C. in eadem forma, this is a good estate Tail, for idem refertur proximo antecedenti, Cok. Com. fo. 20. b. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia, Cok. l. 2. fol. 71 a. Sr. Cromwell's, Case and Dyer. fo. 13 b. although the rule be true, that the relation for the most part aught to be ad proximum antecedens, yet many times if it be hindered by the sense and meaning it is otherwise, for sensus est anima legis. cock l. 5. f 2 sense is the soul of the Law, and hath a special sway and rule in all Cases, so a man is bound to abide the award of I. S. and he awards that the one party shall pay before such a feast ten pound to another, and that then he shall make him a release, Tunc shall not be referred to the Feast but to the time of the payments clearly. So I.S. bargaineth and selleth his Land to I N. for ten pound & predictus Johanes Covenanteth to deliver the Evidences of the Land, it shall be understood of the first johanes S. the vendor, who by common intendment hath the Evidences, so a man granteth to one a pension, that I. B. had donec sibi provisum fuerit de competenti beneficio: this word sibi shall be referred to the grantee, and not to I. B. so in a cui vita, brought by a Feme, the Writ is cui ipsa in vita contradicere non potest, the word shall not be referred to the next antecedent ipsa but to the husband, otherwise the sense should be imperfect, Dyer, Ibidem f. 15. b. So Dyer f. 46. b. I. G. was indicted before the Coronor of the death of Emelin Gager his wife, and the Indictment was that the said Emelin was in pace domini regis, quousque ante dictus johanes Gager vir prefate Emelin Gager de Hambridge predicta in commitatu predicto, Yeoman, and the Indictment was held good, and that there was no defect in the addition, for the word Yeoman could not be addition to the Feme, though the next antecedent, but must necessarily be referred to the husband, according to the sense and meaning A Writ brought of rescuing goods, and denying to pay toll contra pacem, shall be referred to the rescouse and not to the toll 30. E. 3. 15. because in it consisted the breach of the peace. Coke l. 8. f. 119. Adam de Clidrow brought a praecipe against john de Clidrow, and the Writ was quoth just etc. reddat manerium de Wincomb & duas carrucatas terre cum pertinentiis in Clidrow, in this case the Village of Clidrow shall not relate to the Manor, because it wanteth not it, for a Manor may be demanded without mention made, that it lieth in any Village, but cum pertinentiis though it come after the Village relateth to the Manor, because it wanteth it, Quia verba posteriora propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae certitudine indigent sunt referenda, 6. E. 3. 12. Impersonalitas non concludit nec ligat, Cok. come. 352. b impersonals do not conclude or bind, and therefore every estopple ought to be a precise affirmation of that which maketh the estopple and not to be spoken impersonally, as if it be said ut dicitur because impersonality doth not conclude any man; for impersonalitas dicitur quasi sine parsona, ibidem. Negatio destruit negationem & ambo faciunt affirmationem, Coke Com. f. 146. b. according to Grammatical construction a double negative maketh an affirmative, a distress was pro infecto servicio, the Defendant saith, quod non fuit infectum, and ruled as good as if he had said it was done, but Grammatical curiosity shall not prevail in like cases, to avoid a Grant, as upon a Rend charge issuing out of Land, the Proviso was, quod non presens scriptum nec aliquid in eo specificatum non aliqualiter se extendat ad onerandam personam meam. Nec non, in Grammatical construction doth make an affirmation, but the Law that principally respecteth the substance doth judge the Proviso to be a negative according to the intent of the parties, so as the sense of those words according to the construction of the Law is, provided that this present writing nor any thing therein specified shall any way extend to charge my person, Coke Com. f. 146. a. b. so ibidem f. 223. b. If Lands be given in tail, sub conditione quod ipse nec heredes sui non alienarent, that he nor his heirs shall not alien, in legal construction shall be taken negatively, notwithstanding the double negative. In disjunctivis sufficit alterum esse verum, Coke lib. 10. f. 59 a. The Bishop of Sarums case, whereas the avowant did avow that the Office supervisoris omnium maneriorum suorum, had been granted to such person or persons as it pleased the Bishop, and the Defendant pleaded in the negative, that the said office had not been granted, but for the life of one; that exception was not allowed, because in that the advowant did not allege that the said office had been granted to divers, but only to such person or persons, and in disjunctives it is sufficient that one of them be true, ibidem. So Coke Com. f. 225. a If the condition be in the disjunctive it is sufficient to obey either of them, according to the rule Si plures conditiones ascriptae fu●rint donationi divisim cuilibet, vel alteri eorum satis est obtemperare & in disjunctivis sufficit alterum esse verum. If many coditions be annexed to a gift severally or disjunctively it is sufficient to obey every one or any one; & in disjunctives, it is sufficient if either of them be true. Si plures conditiones ascriptae sunt donationi conjunctim, omnibus est parendum, & ad veritatem copulati●vam requiritur quod utraque pars sit vera, Bracton lib. 2 f. 19 Coke come. f. 225. a. If many conditions be jointly annexed to a gift, all of them must be obeyed, and to a copulative truth, it is required that every part be true, & in a condition consisting of divers parts, in the conjunctive both parts must be performed, as if a man give Lands in tail upon condition that if Tenant in Tail, or his heirs, alien in fee or in tail etc. and also if all the issues coming of tenant in tail be dead without issue, that then it shall be lawful for the Donor and his heirs to enter, if tenant in tail in this case, or his heirs make any discontinuance, he in the reversion and his heirs may enter after the estate tail is determined for want of issue, for the reason abovesaid. But if the condition or limitation be both in the conjunctive and disjunctive, what then? as a Lease to the husband and wife for 21 years, if the husband, wife, or any child between them shall so long live, and the wife dieth without issue, the Lease shall continue during the life of the husband, for the disjunctive referreth to the whole, and disjoineth not only the latter part as to the child but also to the Baron and feme. And so it is that if an use be limited to certain persons until A. shall come from beyond the Seas, and attain to his full age, or die, if he do come from beyond the Seas, or attain to his full age, the use doth cease, Coke ibidem f. 225. e. Grammatica falsa non vitiat instrumentum, Reg. I.C. decius, 3. f. 10. mala grammatica non vitiat cartam, & sensus abreviationis accipiendus est, ut concessio non sit inanis Coke l. 9 f. 48. a. false latin doth not destroy a Deed, or a Charter, and the sense of dashes, or abreviations is so to be taken, that the grant be not void, as if the King grant tat. il. mannur. of C. and D. and in truth there is but one Manor, than those abreviations shall be taken in the singular number, totum illud manerium, and if there be two distinct Manors, then shall they be taken in the plural number, tota illa maneria, that the grant be not void, and 32. E. 3. A Fine was levied de maneriis B. and H. and the conclusion was quare praedictum manerium B. and H. ingressus est, and good by averment, that B. and H. were but one Manor, and though a Writ shall abate for false Latin, because any one may purchase a new Writ at his pleasure, yet in a grant it shall not, because he cannot purchase a new grant at his pleasure. As 4. H. 6 f. 16. the Writ was Henricus dei gratia Rex Angliae & Does Heberniae, whereas it should have been Dns and for it in congruity the Writ did abate, but in a Deed that should have been good enough, and so in a fine 9 E. 3. warranty was made in a fine eidem galfrido & uxori suae, where that should have been iisdem, and yet good, vide ibidem plura, & Co. l. 11. f. 3. and Coke come. f. 146. ab. but because such exceptions do properly appertain to Writs, Deeds, and Fines, which have heretofore been composed and levied in the Latin tongue, and that by the Act of 9 April. 1651. it is enacted that all Patents, commissions, and all proceed whatsoever, in any Courts of Justice within the Commonwealth of England, and which concern the Law and administration of Justice, be made, and framed into the english tongue. I will cease to heap more cases upon this rule they being chief in use, for preterite Deeds, conveyances, and proceed, though not altogether useless in our English language, for it also hath its grammatical constructions, and sometimes abreviations, and therefore it is also in the above said Act enacted, that mistranslations or variation in form by reason of Translation or part of proceed already begun being in Latin, or part in English, shall be no error or avoid any proceed by reason thereof. Sect. 3. THe Law hath little relat ionto Rhetoric, and is too strict an argumentative for that copious, various, and tropical art. Ornari res ipsa negat contenta doceri. Doctum genus in doctorum hominum ad doceberniam vix docti. But like rugged and knotty timber rejects the rhetorical plain and outward ornament, which moved the critic Erasmus to deride it, and the civilian Hottaman to despise it, not apprehending the depth and profundity of it, for the Law as Sir Edward Coke is a deep well, out of which every one draws according to the strength of his understanding, Cok. come. f. 7.1 a.. he which reacheth deepest seethe the admirable secrets of the Law, which though in the beginning it seemeth difficult, yet when the student diveth to the depth, it is delightful, and therefore as the same Author in another place saith, The generous student, Cok. come. f. 5. a. ought not to be discouraged when he meeteth with knotty cases, nescit enim generosa mens ignorantiam pati, but will proceed on his reading with alacrity, to know how to work into with delight, those ruff Mines of hidden Treasure, Coke come. f. 235. to which work as he also saith, the knowledge of the liberal arts is requisite, especially the art of Logic to labour in that various and intricate Labyrinth, for it teacheth a man not only by just argument to conclude the matter in question, but to discover between truth and falsehood, and to use a good method, and reasonably to speak to any question, for it is nothing else but ars rationandi, the act of reasoning, Coke come. f. 344. h. and then we are said to know the law when we apprehend the reason of the law, from whence arise these grounds and maxims, and first from notations which by the consent of all Writers appertain to Logic. Notationes sunt quasi verae rerum notae Fons. log. and Bracton L. 4. c. 20. Ideo imposita sunt nomina ut demonstrent voluntatem dicentis, & utimur notis vocis ministerio, notations are as it were the true notes of things, sor therefore were they imposed that they might demonstrate the will of the speaker, and we use them as notes in the ministry of our Language, as Socage is servitium socae i.e. carucae, the service of the Blow, because that the word soca was used for the Blow and the name of the court of Pypowders was derived from the dusty feet of the comers, markets and fairs being most frequented in Summer, Lam. Arch. so religious houses were called monasteria, of the solitary life therein led, which in latter days was nothing less, quia, as one, pleraque monasteria nihil minus sunt quam solitudines, Dod. so the feudists in the civil law deduce homagium from hominium, for by that name he doth profess himself his man and Client. And such notations and etymologies are not to be wrested, but must be answerable to the sound of the words, and applied to the sense, of which it is said by Coke come. f. 68 b. that the right interpretations and etymologies of words are necessary, which not only demonstrate their native conceptions, but from them often produced arguments, which are frequent among the Civilians, as well as by the common Lawyers, as Cicero arguing for Opimius, than Consul, useth this notation, si Consul est qui consulit patria, quid alius est Opimius, & Ployden 343 b. Testamentum est testatio mentis, for of those two words is it compounded, and there is no other testation of the Testators mind here, but for the twelve Acres, in Rigdens' case, So cock l. 8. 37. a. a Barrator is derived of two legal words, bar which signifieth the bar in Court where causes are debated, and retium which signifieth a crime and offence, because a common barrator is chiefly an offendor, in moving and maintaining of quarrels at bars in Courts, and Coke l. 10. f. 128. a. reditus dicitur a reddendo quia retro it, to wit to the Lessor or Donor, and that is the reason, that the Rent so reserved is not due before the day of payment, because it is to be rendered and restored of the issues and profits, vide. Yet as Doderidge, such arguments are not to be used at all times, and occasions, but when necessity requireth the same, or apt consequence doth offer a fit occasion, or rather as Coke l. 7. f. 27. b. calvin's Case. Arguments drawn from Etymologys are too weak, or too light for Judges to build there Judgements on, yet when they agree with the Judgement of the Law, Judges may use them for Ornaments. From the Predicable. GEnerale nihil ponit, generale nihil certum implicat, Cok. l. 2. f. 33.34. in Doddingtons' Case, a generality determineth nothing, and a generality implieth no certainty, as if a common person be bound to devise, or grant all his Lands which he hath within the tenure of I. B. in W. the Obligor may say that he hath no Land there, for general words imply no certainty: and with that accordeth 21. E. 4. If a man be bound to be nonsued in all Actions, that he hath against him in the Common Bench, he may say that he hath no action therein, otherwise if the condition be particular to wit that he shall be non-sued in a Formedon, etc. so as that it appeareth, that general words imply no certainty, neither do they conclude any person to say that he hath nothing there, vide ibidem plura. Cok. lib. 8.78. a. Bospols' Case. In an arbitrement when the submission is general of all Actions and Demands, etc. that may well stand with the generality of the words, that there was but one cause depending in controversy between them. For general speeches imply no certainty, and the award for one is good, notwithstanding the generality of the words, for though there were many matters in controversy, yet if one only was made known to the Arbitrator, he may make an award of it: For the Arbitrator is in place of a Judge, and his office is to determine secundum alligata, & probata, & the duty of the parties which are grieved, and know their particular griefs is to make known the causes of controversy to the Arbitrator, for they are privy to them, and the Arbitrator is a stranger, and every one is to do that which lieth in his knowledge, but when the condition is in special, and with a proviso and condition that an award shall be made of the premises, or words which amount to so much, there the Arbitrator ought to make Arbitrement of all, or else the award is void. Generalibus semper specialia derogant, Reg. f. c. Derg. 180. Quando charta continet generalem clausulam, posteaque descen●it ad verba specialia, quae clausulae generali sunt consentanea, interpretanda est charta secundum verba specialia. f. 134. b. in Edward Althams' Case. Which rule is almost word for word put, and agreed of by both parties, In. 7. E. 3. f. 10. Margery Mortimer's Case, to wit, where a Deed speaketh by general words, and then descendeth to special words if the words special agree with the words general, the deed shall be understood according to the words special: As if a man grant a rent in the manor of P. to be taken in an hundred Acres of Land parcel of that Manor, with a clause of distress in those hundred Acres, the Rent shall issue out of the hundred Acres only, and the general words shall be construed according to the words special, so if a man grant a Rent and go no further, those general words shall create an estate for life, but if the Hab●ndum be for years, that shall qualify the words general, 7. E. 3. So if a man give Lands to one and his Heirs Habendum to him, and the Heirs of his body: He shall have only an estate tail, and no fee expectant, for the Habendum qualifieth the general words precedent, Ployd. f. 541. a. A man maketh a Feoffment by Deed to one to have, and to hold to him and his Heirs, and if it happen that the feoffee dyeth without heir of his body, that then the Land shall revert: The generality of that gift to him, and his Heirs shall be corrected by the special branch after, so as the Donee shall have but an estate tail, 13. R. 2. in Formedon. Dyer 261. b. A man seized in fee deviseth all his Lands in one village, and in one of the two Hamlets by name, and there were two Hamlets in the said Village. The opinion of divers Justices was, that none of the Lands in the other Hamlet should pass, for it is intendable that the intent, and meaning of the devisor was, that nothing more should pass, than what he had expressed. A. acknowledgeth a fine of the manor of P. with an advowson, and regrants the manor with the Appurtenances, the advowson shall not pass, Temp. E. 1. F. title grants. Ployd. 173. b. If I give or lease all my Lands to one and stay there, he shall have all my Lands in England, but if I say further, in the manner of Dale there it is now restrained, but if the specialty limiteth a thing which is void, and so appeareth, it is otherwise, as if I lease to one all my Lands in Dale, which I have by descent of the part of my mother, and in truth I have no Lands in Dale, which I have by descent of the part of my mother, if the Lessor have other Lands in Dale he shall not have those. Ployd. 160. a. A man giveth Lands to two, Habendum to one for life, and after his decease to the other and his Heirs, the one shall have the entirely for his life only, notwithstanding the Jointure given in the Premises, by the better opinion in term M. 8. E 3.427. Generalibus semp●r specialia insunt, Reg. f. c. Specialls are always contained in the generals, and the universals always comprehend the particular●, Ployd. f. 68 a. The plural number containeth the singular and more, and therefore was it resolved by all the Judges: That a pretenced right and title was within the penalty of the Statute of 32. H. 8. for the buying of pretenced rights, and titles, for pretenced rights and titles in the plural number did contain a pretenced right and title in the singular number. And whereas the Statute of 5 R. 2. c. 5. forbiddeth that none make entry into any Lands, or Tenements unless in case where entry is given by the Law, yet if one enter into a Tenement he shall be punished, though the Statute speaketh in the plural number, and likewise whereas the Statute of 1. H. 5. speaketh of false Deeds in the plural number, yet if one bring but one false Deed he shall be punished by the Statute as it is holden in many Books. Ployd. f. 467. b. The Statute of Gloucester giveth an Action of Waste against him which holdeth for years, which is spoken in the plural number, yet may it be taken for him which holdeth for a year, or half a year, vide ibidem plura. Generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea, quae sunt specialiter comprehenfa, Coke l. 8. 118. b. It is a ground and maxim in the Law, that a general clause is not extended to those things, which are specially comprehended, Doctor bonham's Case, by the Statutes of 10 & 14. H. 8. it was enactd, that no man should exercise the faculty of Physic within the City of London, or within seven miles of the said City unless he be admitted thereunto by the Precedent, and College of the faculty of Physic, and there is another special clause contained in the said Acts, that any who evilly and not well exercise the said faculty, etc. shall be punished by Fine and imprisonment, etc. and it was adjudged that the said general clause, that none should exercise the said faculty of Physic, unless he be admitted, &c shall not be extended to the special clause for the punishment of fine and imprisonment, etc. but that it specially shall be limited to such only as did offend only in not well executing and using the said faculty of Physic, for a general cl●●●● is not to be extended to those things are specially comprehended, so 34. Eliz. f. 120. ubi A. seized of the manor of Stable in O. in the county of S in fee, and also of other lands in the said O. in fee, suffereth a common recovery of all, and declareth the uses by Indenture, that the recoveror shall stand seized of all the lands and tenements in O. to the use of him and his wife, and the heirs of his body, and dieth, and after his death the wife entereth into the said Manor, by form of the said general words, but it was adjudged that those general word● did not extend to the Manor which was specially named. Coke l. 4. f. 8●. b. Nokes case, clausula generalis non refertur ad expressa, a general clause is not referred to those things are expressed, as where the Assignee of a Lease shall have a Writ of Covenant upon those words demise, and grant, yet if there be an express covenant that the Lessee shall enjoy it without eviction of the Lessor, or any claiming under him, this express Covenant qualifieth the generality of the covenant in Law, and restraineth it by mutual consent of both parties that it shall not extend to the assignee. Clausula generalis non porrigitur ad ea quae antea sunt specialiter comprehensa, Coke, l. 4 131. l. 4. when the deed at the first containeth special words, and then concludeth in words general, both the words as well general as special shall stand, as Lands given to one and the heirs of his body, Habendum to him and his heirs, he hath an estate tail, and a fee simple expectant, for as Dier. f. 56. b A deed by words subsequent may be qualified and abridged, but not destroyed. Dolosus versatur in universalibus & generalibus. Coke l. 3. f. 8. a. Twins case, it is one of the Ensigns of fraud in a Deed of gift, if the gift is general without the exceptions of his apparel or any thing of necessity, for it is commonly said that the fraudulent is conversant in generals. Coke l. 3. f. 57 b. Specots' case, A Bishop ought not to show a general cause for the refusal of a Clerk, as that he is criminosus, or non idoneus, for they are too general, and the fraudulent is exercised in generals, and therefore so incertain that no issue can be taken of them, as 2. E. 3. f. 6. The heir ought to allege some certain cause of refusal, whence issue may be taken. Generalia sunt praeponenda singularibus, it is a rule in the Register, that in a Writ the general shall be put in demand, or plaint before the special, as the Mesuage before lands, the Land before Meadow, Meadow before Pasture, and Pasture before Wood, and Wood before Juncary, F. a. b. f. 2. E. Ex verbo generali aliquid excipitur, Coke come. f. 47. a. An exception is part of the thing granted, and in esse as exceptis, salvo, praeter, and out of a general, a part may be excepted, as out of a Manor an acre, but not a part out of a certainty, as out of 20, Acres one, Ployd. f. 361. a. A Lease of all my Lands in D. except white acre, is void for white acre, and a gift of all my horses except my black horse is void for my black horse. Coke l. 10. f. 101. b. quando verba statuti sunt specialia ratio autem generalis, generaliter flatutum est intelligendum, where the words of a statute are special and the reason general, the statute is generally to be understood; as the reason of the statute of 23 H. 6. whereby it was ordained that no Sheriff should take any obligation by colour of their office, but only to themselves, and upon condition that the Prisoners appear at the day contained in the writ, was for the avoiding of extortion and oppression, and therefore is to receive a benign and favourable construction, and that in equity not only a bond but an assumpsit is within the reason of that statute; and so was it adjudged 27. Eliz. Trin. in the King's Bench between Danhigh and Hothcot, that if a Sheriff or Gaoler for ease, or enlargement of any who is in his custody, doth take a promise of him to save him harmless, that though the statute doth only speak of an obligation, yet it is in equal mischief, otherwise as Wray chief Justice said, the statute should serve for little or nothing. Multa transeunt cum universitate, quae per se non transeunt, Coke come. f. 142. a. If a man seized of land as heir of the part of his mother, make a gift in tail, or a Lease for life reserving a rent, the heir of the part of the Mother shall have the reversion, and the rent also as incident thereunto, for many things pass with the generality which by themselves do not pass, so if a man hath a rentseck of the part of his mother, and the Tenant of the Land grant a distress to him and his heirs, and the Grantee dieth, the distress shall go with the rent to the heir of part of the Mother, as incident and appertenant to the rent, for now is the rentseck become a rend charge. Singular distributive sumptum e aquat plurali, Dier. 328. b. a singular distributively taken, equalleth a plural, as in an assize, the Plaint is of two Acres of Land, the Tenant pleads two bars several for the two Acres at large, and the Plaintiff makes two several titles at large, to wit for every acre one, the Tenant pleads, let the assize come upon the title in the singular number, and the assize found one title for the Plaintiff and the other for the Defendant against the Plaintiff, and judgement was given that the Plaintiff should recover for one Acre, and be barred for the other. Coke l. 10. Br. Lifiels case, A Lease is for one year, and that if they agree, the Lessee shall have the Land for three years, rendering, during the said term ten pounds yearly, this reservation goeth to both terms. Propria res est, quae solius est, sive uni soli convenit, Tholoss. Syntag. lib. 5. c. 1. A propriety is that which is one man's only, and appertaineth only to one man, Ploid. f. 308. b God made man the Sovereign over all living creatures, and gave the rule of them all to man, Terram d●dit filiis hominum, and so men by the endowment of God were made Lords of the earth and possessors of all things in the earth, but how much land or things upon the earth one man shall have and how much another, God hath leased to man by laws by them to be made and provided, and by such laws in every Realm and Country they are provided and divided, and every man holdeth his Lands and things by the Laws of the Land wherein he liveth, and this commonly called the law of proeprty. Nihil dat quod non habet, Arist. nemo potest plus juris in alium transferre quam ipse habet, Coke come. f. 309. b it is a common erudition in the Law, that no man can grant that he hath not, Perkins f 15. for that is requisite that he who by his contract shall make another possessor of any thing, should be the proprietor of the thing itself, otherwise his contract is void, Ployd. f. 432 b. as if I possessed of an horse, sell the Horse upon condition to another, that he pay to me at the feast of Christmas forty shillings for it, and before the said feast I sell the horse to another, and after the feast, the first Vendee fails of payment, by which I reseise the horse, the second Vendee shall not have the horse, for at the time of the second contract I had neither interest nor property nor possession of the horse, but only a condition which is not sufficient to make me able to contract for the property and possession, therefore it is merely void, Ployden. So if a man grant a rend charge out of the Manor of Dale, and in truth he hath nothing in the Manor of Dale, and after purchaseth the Manor of Dale, yet he shall hold it discharged, Perkins H. 15. So if one not seized of Lands, maketh a Lease to another, it is a good Plea for the Lessee to say that the Lessor had nothing in the Tenements at the time of the Lease Litt. and the reason of this is for that in every contract there must be, quid pro quo, for contractus est quasi actus contra actum, and therefore if the Lessor had nothing in the land, the Lessee hath not quid pro quo, nor any thing for which he should pay his Rent, and in that case he may plead that the Lessor non dimisit, Coke Com. ibidem f. 41. b. vide ibidem plura. If the Conusee of a Fine, before any Attornement, bargaineth and selleth the Signiory to another, the Bargainee shall not distrain, because the Grantor could not distrain, for no man can transfer more right to another than he himself hath, Coke Com. 309. b. Coke l. 6. f. 57 b. He that hath no seisin in the Land charged cannot give seisin of Rent, vide plura Bredimans'; for no man can give that he hath not. The King pardoneth one for making a bridge, this is only good for the fine, and he must make up the Bridge, because the King's Subjects have interest in it, 37. H. 8.4. Da tua dum tua sunt, post mortem tunc tua non sunt, Ployd. 280. a. when one hath property in goods, the property cannot be in him no longer than he liveth, for after his death the goods belong unto another. Nemo videtur rem amittere cujus propria non fuit Reg. I. C. no man can lose that of which he hath no property, and therefore in a Replevin if the Defendant claim property, the Sheriff cannot proceed, for it is a rule in Law, the property ought to be tried by writ, and therefore in this case where the trial is by plaint the Plaintiff may have a writ de proprietate probanda directed to the Sheriff to try the property, and if thereupon it be found for the Plaintiff, the Sheriff shall make deliverance, Coke Com. f. 145. b. F. n. b. f. 77. If A. endict B. for stealing of Horses, or other goods he must say de bonis, & catallis cujusdam, A. For if there were no property there could be no stealing, or injury, for nemini vim facere videtur, qui suo, & non alieno utitur, Reg. I. c. Nemo reditum invito domino percipere, & possidere potest, Coke Com. 303. b. no man can receive, or possess another man's Rents against the will of the Lord, as if one hold of me by Rent, which is service engross, and another which hath no right, claimeth the rent, and receiveth it of my Tenant by coercion of distress, or otherwise, yet by the payment of my Rent to a stranger, I cannot be disseised, or ousted without my will or election, but that I may distrain my Tenant for the Rent, or have an assize against the pernor, Lit. for a man cannot be disseised of a a Rent-service in gross, Rent-charge, or Rentseck, by Attornment or payment of Rent to a stranger, but at his election, for the rule of the Law is, no man can receive, or possess an other man's rent against his will, Coke ibidem. Quod meum est id amplius meum esse non potest. Coke Com. f. 49. b. And therefore if lessee for years, enter, he is in actual possession and then Livery cannot e made to him, that is in actual possession, whereby the Franketenement or fee may inure to him in the remainder, for that which is once mine cannot be more mine, ibidem. Thirdly, From the Anteprecedents. Aequivocum and Univocum. AEQuivocum denoteth words of ambiguous, and many significations, which as Boetius, signifies nothing, nisi ad quasque res secundum voluntatem significantis applicetur, unless they be applied to the thing according to the will of him that declareth, or expoundeth them, of which the Law taketh notice, and giveth these grounds, and maxims, Nobiliores, & benigniores presumptiones in dubijs, sunt praeferendae, Reg. P. C. And Coke l. 4. f. 13. b. Benignior sententia in rebus generalibus, & dubijs est praeferenda. In doubtful speeches, and sentences, the more presumption, and opinion is to be perferred. As if one doth charge another that he hath forsworn himself, by the Law it is not actionable, for it may be he hath forsworn himself in usual conversation, but an action is only maintainable against him that hath forsworn himself in Court of Record, so ibidem f. 21. An Action upon the case was brought for these words, for my Lands in Dallinson they seek my life, adjudged not actionable because he may seek his life upon just cause, which are the more constructions. So verba accipienda sunt in meliori sensu. Hub. f. 106. Coke l. 4. f. 13. Words are to be taken at the best for the speaker, though some of them cannot stand with that construction. As, thou art a Thief, and hast stolen a Tree, it shall be adjudged of a Tree standing, not felled which is not actionable. But as it is said, there in Hubberd 106. This rule holdeth not in Deeds, and Pleas, for in those words are taken more strongly against the speaker, of which this reason may be given, because commonly words in common language proceed of a sudden from choler and heat, whereas words in Deeds and Pleas are grounded upon mature deliberation, and consideration, and therefore in Deeds this is a general ground. Ambiguum pactum contra venditorem interpretandum est, Reg. I. C. and Ambigua verba contra proferentem accipienda sunt, Bacon Eliz. f. 11. As if I demise omnes boscos meos in villa de Dale for years, this passeth the soil, 14. H. 8.28. H. 8. Dyer 17. And if I sow my Land with Corn, and let it for for years, the Corn passeth to my Lessee. And if I grant ten pounds rend to Baron and Feme, and if the Baron die the Feme shall have three pounds rend, because these words rest ambiguous, whether I intent three pounds by way of addition, or three pounds by way of deduction out of the rent of ten pounds, it shall be taken strongest against me, that it is three pounds' addition to the ten pound; of which more hereafter. So Coke fol. 303. b. Ambiguum placitum interpretari debet contra proferentem. An ambiguous Plea shall be taken strongest against the pleader, for every one is presumed to make the best of his own Case, and Coke l. 10. f. 50. Ambigua responfio contra proferentem est accipienda, the Bishop of Sarums Case, vide ibidem. In obscuris secundum magis similius est judicandum, vel quod plerumque inspici solet. Regula. I. C. and Coke l. 4.13. & 14. Sensus verborum ex causa dicendi accipiendus est, & sermons semper accipiendi secundum subjectam materiam. In obscure and dark say we are to judge according to that which is most likely, and which is wont to be, and the sense of the words is to be collected from the cause of the speech, and to be taken according to the subject of the matter. which rule seemeth to qualify, and moderate the other two, vide ibidem. S. Cromwell's Case, as first in words, the Plaintiff bringeth an action upon the case for calling of him Murderer, to which the Defendant said that as he was speaking with the Plaintiff concerning unlawful hunting, the Plaintiff confessed that he had killed divers Hares with Engines, to which the Defendant answered that he was a murderer, innuendo a murderer of Hares, and it was resolved that the justification was good, for upon an action of slander the likeliest sense of words is to be taken, and collected out of the occasion of the speech, Coke ibidem. And so in Deeds, as if I have a free Warren in my land, and let my Land for life, not mentioning the Warren, yet the Lessee by implication shall have the Warren, 32. H. 6. which is the more likely meaning, for otherwise the Lessor would have excepted the Warren. Vnivocum denoteth words of a certain and distinct signification and expresseth the thing clearly without any obscurity, or Ambiguity of which the Law taketh especial notice, for that certainty in all contracts, and conveyances is the cause of quiet and setlement of estates, but incertainty is the author of variance, and dissension, from whence we have these notable grounds and maxims. Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum, Coke l. 5. f. 42. a. God forbidden that the inheritances of men should depend upon incertaines, and it is a miserable servitude where the Law is wavering, and therefore Ployd. f. 28. a. In every Commonwealth it is necessary and requisite that things should be certainly conveyed, for certainty engendereth repose, and incertainty contention. The occasions of which contention, our Law foreseeing hath prevented, and therefore ordained that certain ceremonies should be used in the transmutation of things from one man to another, and namely of Frank-tenements which are of greatest estimation in our laws, to know the certain times, when things do pass, and therefore in every Feoffment, the Law ordaineth that livery and seisin shall be made, and in every grant of a reversion or rents that attornement should be made, which are points certain containing time, wherefore it is well observed by Sir Edward Coke in his Preface to the second part of his Reports, that in all his time there have not been moved in the Courts of Justice of England, two questions touching the rights of descent, escheats, or the like fundamental points of the common-Law, so certain, sure and without question are the principles and grounds thereof. That as Sir John Davis in his preface, there is no art nor science which standeth upon discourse and reason, which hath her Rules and Maxims so certain and infallible, and so little subject to divers interpretations as the common Law of England. Whence Sir Edw. Coke is bold to pronounce that the Common Law of England is not incertain in the abstract, but in the concrete, and that the incertainty thereof is hominis vitium non professionis, the imperfection of man and not of the profession, and lib. 6. f. 43. a. in particular blameth he the subtle inventions, imaginations of men in the practice of uses, which have introduced many mischiefs & inconveniences, contrary to the ancient common law, which hath certain rules to direct the estates and inheritances of men, and therefore is it without comparison better to have Estates and Inheritances directed by the certain rule of the common Law, which hath been the ancient, true and faithful servant to this Commonwealth, then by incertain imaginations and conjectures of any of those new inventors of uses without any approved ground of law or reason, Coke l. 6. f. 43. a. And therefore in all cases law and equity will that incertainty be avoided, as the author of contention, and that there be an end of all controversies according to equity and right, which is the final intention of all Laws, Coke l. 8. 53. And Coke l. 1. f. 85. a. The Judges ought to know the intention of the parties by certain and sensible words which are agreeable and consonant to the rules of Law, as if Land be given by deed to two, to have and to hold to them and haeredibus, it is void for the insensibility and incertainty, and though it hath a clause of warranty to them and their heirs, that shall not make the first words which are incertain and insensible to be of force and effect in Law, although his intent appeareth, but his intent ought to be declared by words certain and consonant to Law. So Coke comment. f. 20. b. If a man letteth Lands to A. for life, the remainder to B. in tail, the remainder to C. in forma praedicta, the remainder is void for the incertainty. And therefore Ployd f. 272. a. giveth this ground, that every contract sufficient to make a Lease for years, aught to have certainty in three limitations, in the beginning of the term, in the continuance, and in the end of the same, all which ought to be known at the beginning of the Lease, and the Lease that wanteth them, Mr. Brown, said is but bibble babble, vide ibidem Fuller's case, and Coke l. 6. f. 35. the Bishop of Baths case. Ployd. f. 14. a. If I give all my money in my purse to I. S. he cannot have an action for it, unless he allege the certainty of it, so as without certainty the action is not maintainable according to the rule given by Bracton, incertae rei nulla est donatio, l. 5. c. 4. Ployd. f. 273. b. If a Lease be made until I. S. who hath execution of a Statute Merchant, is satisfied of the duty for which he hath sued execution, this is not a good Lease and shall not be called a term for years, for it is not certain how long the Lease shall endure, either for six years or for twelve years, so there is an incertainty of time at the end of the Lease, for a term containeth certainty. So if a Lease be made from three years to three years, and so from three years to three years duering the life of I. S. it shall be but a Lease for six years, for for six years there is certainty, and when he saith, and so from three years to three years it is all one as if he had said the first three years, during the other three years, which containeth certainty, but when he goeth further and saith, and so from three years to three years, for the life of I. S. that containeth no certainty in it, for it is incertain how many three years I. S. shall live, so that in the beginning the end is not known of the number of years intended, which is contrary to the nature of a Lease for years, Coke comm. f. 45. b. and Browne, and Dier said it had been so adjudged, vid. ibid. Ployd. says, and Fuller's case. So if a parson maketh a lease of his glebe for so many years as he shall be parson there, this cannot be made certain by any means, for nothing is more uncertain than the time of his death, terminus vitae incertus est, & quanquam nihil est certius ipsa morte, nihil tamen incertius est hora mortis, Coke come. 45. b. A grant to I. S or I. N is void for the incertainty, and if it be delivered to I. S. the delivery of the deed will not make a void grant good. 11. H. 7. 13. Noy. Max. f. 67. Coke come. f. 310. b. If a reversion be granted for life, and after it is granted to the same grantee for years, a●●●he Lessee attorne to both grants, they are void for the incertainty. So if the Lord by Deed granteth his signiory to I. Bishop of London, and his heirs, and by another Deed to I. Bishop of London, and his Successors, and the Tenant attorneth to both grants, the attornment is void for both grants, for albeit the grant be but to one, yet he hath several capatities, and the grants are several, and the attornment is not according to either of the grants, ibidem. A gift made to one of the Infants of I. S. is void for the incertainty 11. E. 41. and Dier. f. 91. A grant is made for so many trees as may be reasonably spared, it is void for the incertainty, for who shall be judge of the sparing, the Vendor or the Vendee, and it seemeth that neither of them, yet by common intendment, the Vendor hath most knowledge which may be spared. So if I bargain with you that I give you for your Land so much as it is reasonably worth, it is void for default of certainty. So a grant seniori & dignissimo filio is void for the incertainty, for some will say that he who is most learned and knowing is the most worthy man, and some will say the most valiant man, and some the most liberal man, and so the multitude can never agree. Scinditur incertum studia, ●●ontraria vulgus. And by that the most potent man was always preferred which is contrary to all Laws, inde datae leges ne fortior omnia possit, Dau. l. 33.36. case of Tanistry vide. Coke come. So a release doth not discharge Bail before judgement because it is contingent, and incertain. Coke l. 5. samon's case. B. in consideration of six l. assumes to pay twenty pound to A. If he do not perform the award of I. S. which was that he should enter in obligation to A. that A. and his wife should enjoy the Lands were in controversy between them. B. would not enter into obligation, and it was adjudged the award was void, for the incertainty because it doth not appear of what sum the obligation should be, for the Arbitrators are Judges, and their award must be certain to decide the controversy. Certum est quod certum reddi potest, Coke come. f. 43. b. Though it be Bractons' rule Terminus annorum debet esse certus & determinatus, as in every lease for years the term must have a certain beginning and a certain ending, yet albeit there appear no certainty of years in the Lease, if by reference to a certainty, it may be made certain, it sufficeth, for that is certain which may be made certain. As if A. leaseth his Lands to B. for so many years as B. hath in the Manor of Dale, and B. hath then in the said Manor a term for ten years, this is a good Lease to B. for ten years. If a man make a Lease to I. N. for so many years as I. N. shall name, this at the beginning is incertain, but when I. N. hath named years then is it a good Lease for so many years Ployd. f. 273. b. For it is my demise and my contentment that he name the years, which by my reference to his nomination, is as much as if I myself had named. But if a Lease be made for so many years as my Executors shall name, and then I die, and my Ex●●●●s name the years, the Lease shall not be good, because they neither did nor could name the years during my life ibidem. So if I make a Lease until I. S. who is in Prison for hunting, shall be in Prison for it by order of Law, that is all one as if he had made the Lease for two years, for by the statute of W. 1. c. 10. he shall be imprisoned so long, so if I make a Lease for years, rendering five pound rend by the year, and then I grant the rent and reversion to another until he hath received of the rent twenty pound, that is all one as if I had granted the reversion for four years, and therefore the Lease containeth such certainty of time by the reference. So if a Lease be made during the nonage of I. S. who is of the age of fifteen years, it is a Lease for six years, if I. S. live so long, for the reference to the time certain, is as much as if he had expressed the nomination of the time contained in the reference. So if I make a Lease for ten years, and so from ten years to ten years, during a 100 years it is a good Lease, Ployd. ib. E. Coke l. 6. f. 20. The Bishop of Baths case. So a Lease for years after the Lessee shall make such an act is good, so a Lease for twenty years if the coverture between I. S. and his wife continue so long, although in one case, it was incertain when the Lessee would do the act to make the Lease to begin, and in the other it was incertain when the coverture would be dissolved, for a lease certainly limited might begin, and determine upon uncertainty well enough, Ployd. ib. If a man maketh a Lease for twenty one years, if I. S. live so long, this is a good Lease, if I. S. so long live, yet it is certain in incertainty, for the life of I. S. is incertain, Coke come. f. 25. b. It is a Maxim in the Law, that no distresses can be taken that are not put into certainty, nor can be reduced to any certainty, for, id certum est, quod certum reddi potest, as the Lord cannot distrain them which hold their Tenements in Frankalmoine, if they will not do such divine service, because it is not put in certain what service they shall do, neither can it be reduced to a certainty, for upon an avowry damages cannot be recovered, for that which neither hath certainty, neither can be reduced to any certainty, and yet in some cases there may be a certainty in uncertainty. As a man may hold of his Lord to shear all the sheep depasturing in his Manor, although the Lord hath sometimes a greater number and sometimes a lesser number, yet this is certain enough, the incertainty being referred to the Manor which is certain, and the Lord may distrain for this incertainty, Coke come. f. 96. a. Incertainty may be reduced to a certainty by matter, ex post facto, Ployd. f. 6. a. b. Raingers case. As a Lease for years rendering for every acre twelve pence, though the number of Acres be not certain by the Lease, yet by admeasurement or other trial may the rent reserved be certainly known, by which he may bring his action of debt. So if one gives two Acres to one Habendum, one for life, and the other in fee, it is incertain, in which he shall have the fee, and which for life, yet if after he make Feoffement of one acre, it shall be said to have fee, in the other ab initio, so if one sell W. Acre, and B. Acre for life, the remainder of one of them in fee, it is incertain which Acre he in the remainder shall have, but if he licence the Tenant for life to cut down the trees in white Acre, than he shall be adjudged to have the remainder of that Acre ab initio. So 14. H. 8. f. 17. A grant of a term upon condition that the Grantee shall obtain the favour of the Lessor, and pay so much as I. S. should arbitrate, was good when the condition was performed, and the second grant adjudged void. So 17 E. 4. f 1. in trespass for corn taken, there the Defendant & the Plaintiff had bargained, & agreed that the Defendant should go to the place where it grew and see the corn, and if it pleased him upon the sight, that then he might take it, paying to the Plaintiff forty pound for every Acre, and it was holden a good contract notwithstanding the incertainty and quantity of the Corn, and of the gross sum shall be paid for it, because upon the circumstance the certainty might appear, Ployd. ibidem. Dyer. f 91. b. If I bargain with you that I will give you for your Land as much as it is reasonably worth, and it is referred to the judgement of a third person, he shall ajudge it and then it is good, so if I sell trees which then may easily be spared, and refer the judgement of the sparing to a third person, if he give judgement of it, it is good enough, because by him it is reduced to a certainty with the Vendors consent. In our law the time, the estate, the thing, and the person not being sufficiently expressed, by necessary coherence and relation to matter precedent, they are sometimes made certain enough, first for the time, if I. S. is bound to me in twenty pound upon condition that I infeoff him of B. Acre, that then he will pay me ten pound, if I infeoff him presently after, he ought to pay the ten pound notwithstanding there is no time limited when it should be paid, for Perkins puts the rule, if a condition hath a relation to the Act precedent, and no time is limited when it shall be done, it ought to be done, when the Act precedent is done. Secondy for the thing, though it be put incertainly, yet the communication precedent makes it certain, Dier. 42. a. where one was bound to warrant I. G. and doth not show what thing he should warrant, the Law shall make construction that he should warrant the land of which communication was made. Thirdly, for the estate though it be uncertain, yet sometimes it is made certain by the matter precedent, as steward-ship was granted for life, and afterwards an annuity was granted for the exercise of that office, without declaring what estate he should have in the annuity, and resolved that he should have the annuity for life, because he had the Office for life, Coke l. 8. Fourthly, for the person, the consideration sometimes ascertaines the person, and therefore if lands be given to one by deed, Habendum sibi una cum filia donatoris, in frank marriage, this shall enure to both, because the feme is causa donationis, and by devorse she shall have the whole Land, and shall be given together to the man for the advancement of the woman, Dier. 126. a. A man by intendment of Law the Land and the woman deviseth that his lands shall be sold for the payment of his debts, and doth not say by whom, they shall be sold by his Executors, because they are liable for the payment of his debts. Licet id certum est, quod certum reddipotest id tamen magis certum est quod de semetipso est certum. Coke l. 9 47. a. The Patents of the King ought to be extended certainly to the thing of which the Patentee will take advantage, as 2 R. 3. 7. If the King grant to me that I shall not be High-Sheriff without showing of what County, it is void for the incertainty. Quia concessio per Regem oportet fieri de certitudine, but if the grant was that he should not be Sheriff of such a County, there such a grant is good. Ployd. f. 395. a. If a Lease be of the manor of Sale in Dale, which he had by descent of the mother, and he had the manor of Sale by purchase and not by descent of his mother, in this case the Lessee shall have it, because the manor of Sale in Dale is enough without further certainty expressed, and his saying that he had by descent is not requisite, in that it was sufficiently certain before, for it is rather super-abundance, than certainty, so M. 2. E. 4. f. 27. If one release all his right in white Acre in Dale that he had by descent, but had it by purchase there he shall not avoid the release by saying that he had not white Acre by descent, but had it by purchase, for the relation to the descent was in vain, in that certainty appeared before ibidem, vide Coke l. 3. Doughtys' case, f. 18. Oportet quod certae personae, certae terrae, & certi status comprehendantur in declaratione usuum, Coke l. 9 f. 9 a. Every declaration of uses upon Recoveries, Fines, etc. of Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments ought to be certain, for otherwise there shall be no certainty of inheritances, and that certainty ought to be principally in three things, in persons to whom, in Lands, etc. of whom, and in estate by whom uses shall be limited, and declared, and if certainty fail in any of them, the declaration is insufficient. Certa debet esse intentio, & narratio, Bractton, lib. 2. All declarations ought to be certain, so as the Defendant may know to what thing he ought to answer, Ployd. 84. a. As 3. E. 4. f. 21. A man retained in husbandry brings an action of debt against a Prioress for his salary, and declares that he was retained with her Predecessor, and doth not show what person retained him, and by the better opinion the count shall abate for the incertainty, for that it might be that one that had no Warrant retained him. And so is it in a Writ, Ployd. ib. vi. a. 22. E. 4. f. 47. It was granted by Parliament that Ashby should have a writ with Proclamations out of the Chancery against one Griffeth to answer for divers Trespasses which were contained in the Act of Parliament, and the Writ by award was abated because he made no mention of the Trespasses in certain, and there it varied from the Act, but that was a private Act, and therefore the non-recitall of it makes the Writ naught, and so should the misrecital, but the recital of a general act, or the misrecital of a general Act is not material, but the Judges are bound to take notice of it without the monstrance of the party. Oportet ut res certa deducatur in judicium, Coke l. 5. f. 321. a. Playters Case, P. brought an action of Trespass against W. Quare clausum suum fregit, & pisces suos cepit, without showing the number or nature of the Fishes, and it was resolved that the count should have comprehended the Fishes in certain, that the Defendant might have a certain answer, and upon which a certain judgement might be given, as 4. H. 6. n. the writ was quare piscem cepit, and counts of so many Pikes in certain, and though the writ was piscem in the singular number, yet good because per se est nomen collectivum, in which the plural number is comprehended, and great inconvenience otherwise would ensue, for unless the issue hath certainty with which the Jury may be charged: upon such a general incertainty, if they give a false verdict, they may be charged in attaint, and f. 38. a. Teyes case, In a fine the same thing was granted and surrendered to several persons, and of several estates, and so repugnant and erroneous, for a fine is like unto a Judgement, for a Scire facias lies to execute it as of a Judgement, and oportet, as Bracton saith, quod certa res deducatur in Judicium. Ployd. Manhells' Case, f. 10. b. If three issues bring three several Formedon●, he whose writ is first returned shall have the Land, for by it he hath first attached the possession in the hands of the tenant, and the writ is not of Record before the return, but if all the three Writs be returned on the same day, they shall all abate, because it is incertain by the count, if the Tenant confess the actions, to whom they shall award seisin, because all their titles are alike, and all returned on the same day, and for that incertainty the writs shall abate, as 21. R. 2. Fit. avowry p. l. 262. In a Replegiare against two, the one avows for Damage-feasant, and the other avows that he had common in the Land, and took the beasts as a commoner Damage-feasant, and by the award of the Court both the avowry was abated, and the Plaintiff recovered damages against them, because every of them could not have the return, and who should be preferred, and who rejected would be incertain to the Court, vide. Ployd. f. 84. a. b. Partridges case, In some cases the count and the writ may be general without certainty as in assizes, but there the certainty must be shown by the replication, and in some cases the writ, the count, and the replication also may be incertain, but the certainty shall appear by verdict. As in a Quare impedit the value of the Church doth not appear in the count, nor in the replication but it shall appear by verdict, for they shall assess double damages, or damages for half a year according to the value of the Church as the case requireth, so in a writ of Ward, the Jury shall find if the heir be married or not, and shall assess damages for it, and yet in the count, and replication, no such matter appeareth. So in a detinue the value of the goods appeareth by verdict, and in many other cases. So as the certainty always must appear to the Court, and if it be requisite to be shown in the count; than it ought not to be left out, or omitted in the count, as Ployd. f. 85. a. In decies tantum he must show the certainty of the sum received, because he shall recover ten times more, and that he cannot unless he show how much it is. And in Trespass if the Defendant plead that it is his Franktenement, and the Plaintiff entitles himself by a lease for years made by him, and if the Defendant will show that he made a Feoffment, and that he entered for the forfeiture, he must show the name of the Feoffees, and certainty of the Feoffment, for in all cases the privy aught to show the certainty, and in case of forfeiture, the Lessor in the reversion is privy to it. So if the heir will plead in bar in a writ of Dower, the detainer of evidences, he must show the certainty of the evidencies, for he is privy to them in that he affirmeth that they appertain to him, but if he say a bag ensealed with Charters, that is good without showing the certainty of them, 18. H. 8. f. 1. B. Dower. And if one be bound in an obligation to serve I. S. for seven years in mandatis omnibus suis licitis, he shall pretend that he did serve him lawfully, without showing in what service, or in what commandment, for no servant can remember all, 20. E. 4.13. So a man may aver a thing to be done by Covin without showing how the Covin was, for Covin is a secret thing contrived between two or three to the prejudice of another, 4. E. 6. 46. And a man may plead that he was chosen Knight for the Shrie, by the greatest number without showing the number, for the election may be by voices, or hands, or in oth●● sort, and it is hard to discern the certain number, and yet easy to see who had the greatest number, 2. M. 128. vide Ployd. f. 121. b. Coke Com. f. 303. c. Every Plea must be direct and not by way of argument or rehearsal, and an argumentative Plea is not good, Ployd. f. 122. a. b. for there is a ground in the Law, that in declarations certainty ought to be alleged by apt words of affirmation, otherwise the declaration is not good. As in debt upon an obligation I declare that it appears by the obligation that the Defendant is bound to me in twenty pound, the declaration is not good, because it was alleged in matter of fact quod tenebatur mihi in twenty pound, for bond is alleged for recital only. So 11. H. 6. In an action of debt against a gaoler, who had let one at large who was in execution under guard for the sum in demand, and declareth that he let him at large by which the Plaintiff exclusus fuit de debito suo, and the declaration not good, because he did not say that he was not satisfied when he let him at large, which is the cause of the action, which he hath not alleged but by implication, for by implication it is alleged, for if he let him go at large by which he is barred of his debt against the prisoner, by it is employed, that the debt was not then paid, but the count was not good, because it was not affirmed by precise words, and 38. H. 6. f. 14. The Plaintiff in an action of debt counts that the Defendant retained him in his service for eight years, to serve him in all occupations, taking for every year 20 s. and the Defendant gageth his Law, and though the Plaintiff was retained in husbandry, and the service of husbandry was employed in the words all occupations, yet the Defendant was received to his Law, because it was not fully expressed that he was retained in husbandry, but only by implication, which would not suffice, So Ployd. f. 143. b. The Covenant in the Indenture was, if one moiety of the Rent was behind and unpaid after two months since the Feast, etc. that then, etc. and in the rejoinder it was alleged that one moiety was behind per duos menses, by the space of two months, which was no answer, because the Indenture is if it be behind after two month's post duos menses, and he said it was behind per duos menses which is no affirmation that it was behind after two months, but by implication, and argumentation, and not otherwise, and therefore not good. Every Recovery had in our Law must be pleaded certainly to every intent, Ployd. 65. a. as in 22. E. 4. f. 8. in a Scire facias to have execution of two hundred Acres of Land, the Tenant pleaded that since the Scire facias sued that I. B. brought a Formedon of one hundred Acres inter alia, and recovered and had execution, judgement of the brief for parcel, and there the opinion was, the Plea was not good, for every Recovery ought to be pleaded certianly to every intent, and those words inter alia are certain to no intent, and it is good reason, for every Recovery is entire, and there is one original, and one judgement upon it, and so the judgement is one and entire, and therefore to say that inter alia he did recover is not good, but aught to plead certainly. If a Bar hath matter of substance, and is good to a common intent, it shall suffice, although it be not good to every special intent, Ployd. Colthersts Case, f. 26. a. and as Coke Com. 303. There are three sorts of certainties, first to a certain intent in general as in counts, replications, and other plead of the Plaintiff, 2. A certain intent to every particular as in Estopples, 3. A certainty to a common intent, and this is sufficient in a Bar which is to defend the party, and to excuse him; and of this certainty it is said the Bar shall be good, if it be good to a common intent, Ployd. f. 31. a. but this common intent is not such an intent, which may be indifferent, but such an intent that hath more vehement presumption in intendment, than any other intent hath, as fully to administer all the goods which were to the testator the day of his death, is a good Bar, yet it may be he had other goods which were never in the hands of the Testator, which are Assets, as debts paid after, or goods which come in lieu, etc. but that is not the most common intent, but the more common intendment is, that he had not any other goods but those which were the Testators; So in a Formedon in descender, ne donna pass is a good Bar, yet it may be he hath recovered in value, in which case other Lands were given, and yet the Formedon lies, but that shall not be intended, but the common intendment is to express the plain gift by livery, but if I plead in Bar a lease for another's life, there the Bar is not good without averring the life of cefis que vie, for it was indifferent whether he was in life or no, and hath no more strong intendment the one way then the other, & therefore his life must be averred by express words, so in debt upon an obligation, if the Defendant plead in Barr a release, bearing date since the obligation made, that Bar is not good, if he doth not show by express words that it was delivered since the obligation made, for prima fancy one will presume that it was delivered when it bore date, but of the other part it shall be presumed also, that the other would not bring an action of debt, if the release was delivered since, and so one way it hath as vehement presumption as another, and for that the intendment is indifferent, it is not good unless it be shown by the Plea that it was delivered since the obligation made, Ployd. ibidem vide plura f. 26. Grounds and Maxims proceeding from the Predicaments. From the Predicament of substance. SVbstantia prior & dignor est accident, Arist. 2. de anima, the substance is more worthy, and before the accident, and therefore doth the Law prefer matters of substance before form and circumstance, as 21. H. 7. 24. b. Pleas in Bar, and replications, though the Plaintiff be afterwards nonsuit, make an Estopple, for they are express allegations, and substantial, as in debt upon an obligation if the Defendant plead in Bar, an acquittance made at D. or if the Defendant plead an acquittance, and the Plaintiff replieth that it was made by duress of imprisonment at D. now in another action, neither the Defendant shall plead that the acquittance, nor the Plaintiff that the duress was at another place because they were material. But the matter in the writ, and the count maketh no Estopple, for they are but supposals. As in a Pormedon, one claimeth by descent from I. S. or a Mortdancester as son, and Heir of I. S. yet in another Formedon, he may claim from I. D. and shall not be estopped. No more shall a recital make an Estopple, for they are not material, as 33. H. 6. 10. b. where A. reciting that he is seized in fee of the Manner of D. granteth a rent out of it to B. this shall not estoppe A. to say that he had nothing in that Manor, Finch, nomotec. f. 32. Neither shall counts and declarations abate, so long as the matter of Action, is fully showed in the Declaration, and the writ, as by the Statute of 36. E. 3. c. 15. it is provided. And therefore in Demurrers it is alleged that the matter contained in the count, is insufficient in Law, and so of a plea, and accordingly in the reign of Queen Eliz. provision is made, that after demurrers the Judges shall give Judgement according to the right of the cause, and matter in Law, without regarding any imperfection, defect, or want of form in any Writ, Return, Plaint, Declaration, or other plead, or course of proceed whatsoever, which Sir Edward Coke styles an excellent, and profitable Law, Coke Com. 304. b. All which are more fully contained in the late Act of 11. Mar. 1649. by which it is enacted, that no judgement shall at any time or times be arrested or stayed in any Court of Record for want of any matter of form, or defect whatsoever except only for matter of substance which shall be found or shown pulickly to the Judas or Judges sitting in the said Courts of Record, to be in the declaration, Plea, replication or other proceed after appearance. And besides in common recoveries no formal errors shall be allowed to reverse them unless they be substantial and material, as by the statute of 23. Eliz c. 4. it is provided that for the avoiding of the danger of assurance of Land, and for the advancement of common recoveryes, that not any common recovery shall be avoided for any want of form in words and not in matter of substance, so much doth the Law respect matter of substance, before matter of form & circumstance, Coke c. f. 40.2. From the predicaments of action and passion. Idem non potest esse agens & paciens. 14 H. 8. 31. b. nihil agit in seipsum. Arist. 1. de gener. no man can do an act to himself. No man can sue himself, and therefore when a man having right to Land hath the freehold cast upon him by a latter title, he shall be said to be in of his ancient title, because there is no body against whom he may sue but himself, and he cannot sue himself, Lit. A man cannot present himself to a benefice, or make himself an Officer, 13. H. 8. 32. No man can summon himself, 8 H. 6.29. And therefore if a Sheriff suffer a common recovery, it is error, because he cannot summon himself, Dier. 188. But when two Sheriffs are, the one may summon the other with special direction in the Writ, that the other shall summon him, 14 and 15. Eliz. If a Sheriff be Conusee of a Statute he cannot execute a liberate himself, 9 E. 4. 33. Plaintiff and Defendant, Exception. and Actor and Reus are relative opposites, and cannot be properly in one, and the self same action, except in some special cases, as in a writ of detinue where garnishment is required, there the Defendant is to become actor against the garnishee, 3 H. 6. 18. so in a quare im●edit where the Defendant maketh title to have a Writ to the Bishop, the defendant is become actor, 20 H. 6. 29. In a Replevin upon an avowry made, the avowant is become actor, 3 H. 6. 19 a. 23. H. 6. 45. a. 12. E. 4. 10. a. So in a Quod deforceat the demandant or Plaintiff shall defend his estate against such recovery as shall be pleaded against him and become defendant, and may vouch ac si tenens esset in priori brevi, by the statute of W. 1. A Sheriff who is demandant, may execute all process till it come to the Venire facias, otherwise if he be Tenant 20. E. 4. 7. A Sheriff is Plaintiff, for he may take pledges himself and execute a Replevin against himself, 5. H. 7. 2. The Sheriff is in seisin of a Balywick of a liberty, he shall command himself as Bailiff of that liberty to execute that process, 8 E. 3. 21. F. B. N. f. 4. E. There is a Writ of prohibition in the Register directed to the Sheriff to inhibit himself that he hold not plea in the county upon a sorreine Plea pleaded, or the Mice joined to be tried by grand assize. Actori incumbit onus probandi & stabilitur praesumptio donec probetur in contrarium, the burden of proving lieth on the Plaintiff, and the presumption is confirmed until it be proved to the contrary, Cok. l. 4. f. 70. There is a bargainor and a bargaince, if this bargainor contend to avoid the bargain by reason of the non enrolment within six months, he must make manifest proof thereof, or else it will be presumed that it was inroled within the six months, omnia praesumantur legitime facta, donec probentur in contrarium, Coke come. f. 233. b. As whereas the feoffee giveth or granteth to the feoffor the deed pol, such grant is good, and the property of the deed shall appertain to the Feoffor, and when the feoffor hath the deed in his hands and pleadeth it in Court, it shall be rather intended that the feoffor cometh unto it by lawful means then by a tortuous means. For all things are presumed to be lawfully done until they may be proved to the contrary. A. and B. Tenants in common of a Manor, A. purchaseth a frank tenement mixed with the demesne Lands, which were not certainly known. B. brings a writ de partitione facienda of the Manor only, and judgement given, that partitio fieret and a Writ to the Sheriff accordingly. It is held by the Justices that A. must show the bounds of the franktenement purchased, for the Jury shall be discharged, if in conscience they make partition de tanto quanto praesumitur & dignoscitur per praesumptiones & verisimilia of so much as shall be presumed and known by presumptions and likelihoods, Dier. f. 266. Pendente lite nihil innovetur, Let nothing be innovated hanging the suit, Coke come 344. b. if hanging the quare impedit against the Ordinary for refusing his Clerk, and before the Church was full, the Plaintiff brought a quare impedit against the Bishop, and hanging the suit, the Bishop admitted and instituted a Clerk at the presentation of another, if judgement be given for the patron against the Bishop, the patron shall have a writ to the Bishop, and remove the incumbent that came in pendente lite by usurpation, for hanging the suit nothing is to be innovated. Qui semel actionem renunciaverit amplius repetere non potest, n. f. 139. a. As a Retraxit is a bar of all other actions of the like or inferior nature, for he which once renounceth his action can no more renew it. It is a general rule that non-suite before appearance is not peremptory in any case, for that a stranger may purchase a writ in the name of him who hath cause of action, and regularly a non suit after appearance is not peremptory, but that he may commence an action of like nature again, for it may be he hath mistaken something in that action, or was not provided of his proofs or mistaken the day or the like. But yet for some special reason's nonsuit in some actions is peremptory, as in a quare impedit, if the Plaintiff be nonsuit after appearance, the Defendant shall make a title and have a Writ to the Bishop, and this is peremptory to the Plaintiff and is a good bar in another quare impedit, and the reason is, because the Defendant had by the judgement of the Court, a writ to the Bishop and the incumbent which cometh in by that writ shall never be removed, which is a flat bar as to that presentation, and for the same law and upon the same reason, so it is in the case upon a discontinuance, Coke come. f. 139. a. vide ibidem plura. Actio personalis moritur cum persona, a personal action dieth with the person, Went. off. of executors f. 1. 97. As if a keeper of a Prison, suffereth one in execution to escape and dieth, no action lieth against his Executors. If Lessee for years doth waste, and dieth, an Action of waist lieth not against his Executor or Administrator for waste done before that time, Coke come. f. 53. b. so if the tenant doth waste, and he in the reversion dieth, the heir shall not have an Action of waist, for the waist done in the life of his Ancestor, nor the master of an Hospital, or a parson for w●st done in the life of the predecessor. ibidem. The Lessor covenants to pay quit rend during the term, and dieth, his Executors shall not pay it, because it is a personal covenant in the Lessor only, Dier. 114. Yet if there be three copartners, and they Lease the land, and one of them die, and hath issue, and the Lessee commit waste and one of them die and hath issue, the Aunt and the issue shall join in an Action of waist, and the issue shall recover one moiety of the Land wasted and the Aunt the other, notwithstanding that actio injuriarum moritur cum persona. But in favorabilibus magis attenditur quod prodest quam quod nocet, in indifferent and favourable things, that which profiteth is more respected than that which hurteth. Relatio tunc fieri non debet si per eam actus destruatur, Reg. I. c. Decius. 363. Quando dispositio referri potest ad duas res, ita quod secundum relationem una vitiatur & secundum aliam utilis sit, tunc facienda est relatio ad illam ut valeatdispositio, & semper ita fiat relatio ut valeat dispositio, C. l. 6. f. 76. b. a. A relation than ought not to be when by it an Act is destroyed. As in the statutes of 32. and 34. H. 8. concerning Wills, whereof is provided that every person having any Manors, Lands, etc. holden in capite shall have full power etc. to dispose by his last will in writing, or otherwise by any Act or Acts lawfully executed in his life, two parts of the same Manor, etc. for the advancement of his wife, preferment of his children, and payment of his debt, or otherwise, at his will and pleasure any Law statute etc. those words or otherwise at his will & pleasure have reference & relation only to the last will & not to the acts executed, for otherwise none might have devised two parts but only for the advancement of his wife and preferment of his children, or payment of his debts, which is not the intention of the Act, but that he may devise two parts to whom he will, so that the third descend, and it was in vain to refer those words, or otherwise at his will and pleasure to Acts executed, for he can do that without any authority given to him by that act. And therefore when the disposition may be referred to two things, so as according to the relation one of them may be destroyed, and according to the other shall be commodious, than the relation is to be made to that, that the disposition may be of force, and always the relation is so to be that the disposition may avail in Sir. G. Cursons case. So Coke l. 3. f. 28. b. Butler and Baker's case, relation is a fiction in law to make a nullity of a thing from the beginning to a certain intent which in truth had being, and the rather for necessity's sake, ut res magis valeat quam pareat. As if a man make a gift in tail to Baron and feme, and afterwards grants the reversion of those Lands, and since the Baron dies, and the feme to have her dower, waiveth and disagreeth to the estate tail, now in regard of her, it is a nullity of the estate from the beginning, and to such an intent the Law feigneth that the estate was only made to the baron, but as to the grant of the reversion, that is a collateral Act, and her refusal shall not have such relation, for she may be endowed though that estate stand, and so no necessity, and therefore without necessity, ut res magis valeat, the Law will not feign any nullity, but in a destruction of a loyal estate vested, the law will never make any fiction, vide ibidem plura. So relation shall make things have been, as if as if they never had been, 1. H. 7. 16 The husband disagreeth to a Feoffement made by his wife, it is void from the beginning, so that he may plead ne infeosse pas so 14. H. 8. 10. A devise is that the Executors may sell land etc. when they sell, all mean charges made by the heir in the interim shall be avoided by relation, to the time of the death of the Testator, so 14. H. 8 18. I disseise A. to the use of B. the dissiesee releaseth to me, and then B. agreeth with the disseisee, this agreement by relation shall be as if he had agreed before the release, and so shall defeat it. Jurors alien their Lands away between the teste of the Writ of attaint and judgement, yet they shall be charged to the King for the estreptment by relation, 22. E. 3. 16. Caufe of Assize brought for rescuing a distress taken for rent, and then an Office is found which entitleth the King, who seizeth the Land, and then an Ouster le main is sued, the Assize is gone for ever, because the King shall be said to be in possession at the time of the rescous, upon whose possession no distress could be made, 31. Ass. 1. Ployd. 281. a b. If one taketh letters of administration of the Ordinary, of the goods of one which died intestate, and after the Metropolitan committeth the administration to another, because the intestate had goods to the value of ten pound in divers Diocese, there it disproveth the authority of the first administrator, and shall make the second Administrator to avoid the act of the first Admistrator, for the relation after the probat taketh away all imperfection that before may be alleged, and shall overreach the administration and the authority of the Administrator, as the Lord Dier terms it, and Keble said in this case W in H. 7. that the second Administrator shall have an Action of trespass against the first Administrator, for taking of the first goods, for the first Ordinary which committed the administration had not authority to do it, when the intestate had goods to the value of ten pound in divers Diocese, but the administration and all dependence upon it were utterly disproved by the commission of the second administration, vide ibidem plura, in Greisbrookes' case. So 38. H. 6. 7, Goods taken out of the possession of an Executor which refuseth, and an administration is committed to I. S. I. S. may have an action of trespass supposing they were taken out of his possession, for he by relation shall be said to be an administrator from the very time of the death of the testaor. Relation is a fiction in Law, and a fiction in Law is a feigned construction, when in a similitudinary sort the Law construeth a thing otherwise than it is in truth Finch nomot. f. 66. and is of the person or the thing. Of the person. QVi facit per alium per se ipsum facere videtur, Coke come. f. 258. a. He that doth any thing by another seemeth to do it by himself, As the servant by command of the Master may make claim from the Land for his Master, if the servant doth all that which he was commanded, and which his Master ought to do, there it is as sufficient as if his master did it himself. And if the disseisor levy a fine according to the statute, with proclamations, and a stranger without any command precedent, enter in the name of the disseisee to avoid the fine, if the disseisee after assent to the said entry of the sad stranger, it shall be as sufficient as a command, for omnis ratihabitio retro trahitur & mandato aequiparatur, Reg. 1. C. Every ratification or approving of any thing looketh back, and is all one as if a man had give commandment at the first. Ployd. f. 290. a. Chapman's case. If I will by my last will that I. S. alien my Land, and he doth so, it is my alienation by him, and if I give authority to my Bailiff to sell my sheep or other cattle, and he doth so, it is my sale by him, and Ployd. 475. b. In Sanders case. If I command one to beat another, and he beats him so as he dieth of it, I shall be accessary to the murder, for my commandment was the foundation of it, and my commandment outreacheth to all that which followeth the fact. So if I command one to burn an house feloniously in the night, and he doth so, and the fire thereof burneth another house, I shall be accessary to the burning of the other house, and if I have a pardon for the one, I shall be hanged for the other, but if I command one to burn such an house which he well knoweth, and he burneth, another I shall not be accessary, or if I commanded him to rob a Goldsmith, going to Sturbridge fair, and he breaketh open his house in Cheapside and stealeth his Plate, I shall not be accessary to that burglary, because there is no affinity between the fact and my command, but if I command one to kill him with poison and he killeth him with a Sword, or to kill one in the field, and he killeth him in the city, or to kill him such a day and he killeth him another day, it is murder in me, because the death is the principal matter that hath ensued upon my commandment, and the place, the instrument, and the time, and such like are nothing, but the manner, and form, how he should be slain, and not the substance of the matter, and the variance in manner and form shall not discharge him from being an accessary, ibidem. So an accessary before the fact is subject to all the contingencies pregnant of the fact, if they be pursuances of the same fact, as if a man command, or council a man to rob another, or beat him grieveously, & murder ensueth, in either case he is accessary to the murder, quia in criminalibus praestant accidentia, 18. E. 175. If I command one to do a trespass, I shall be a trespassor, or if I consent, for there are no accessaries in trespasses, N. Max. f. 99 In trespass against A. the indenture is that B. did strike me by A. invitation, and well, 39 H. 5. 42. If a man have a Bailiff or servant, who is known for his servant, and he send him to fairs and markets to buy, to sell, or do any thing marketable, his Master shall be charged with the payment, if the thing which is Merchandised comes to his use, and so if a man send his boy to Market, consideratis considerandis, 2. R. 2. det. 3. per curiam. And if a man maketh another his factor to buy things for him, if he buy Merchandises of any, the master shall be charged by this contract, though the goods come not to his possession, because he gave him such power. 4. E 2. det. 168. by Pigot. If a servant borrow or receive money in his master's name, the master shall not be charged, unless it be done by his master's commandment or come to his use by his consent, and it is a rule in the civil Law, quod jussu alterius solvitur pro eo est, quasi ipfi solutum sit, Noy, Max. f. 99 A promise made to the wise in consideration of a thing to be performed by the husband, if the husband agree and perform the consideration in an action of the case, etc. he shall declare the assumption made to him, Ib. f. 19 An annuity is granted to one until he be promoted to a benefice by the grantor and his heirs, in a Writ of annuity he showeth that the Plaintiff was promoted by his brother at his request, and well, 35. E. 3. 51. Dier. 241. It is no good return for the Sheriff, Mandavit baliivo Itineranti, who answereth, that he is arrested and made a rescous, for it is the arrest of the Sheriff himself, and if it were a capias ad satisfaciendum, or a capeas utlegatum after judgement, the Sheriff himself shall be charged with the escape, unless it were by the enemies of the King, and he shall have his remedy over against him who made the rescous by action of the case, but if he had been a Bailiff of a Liberty it had been a good return. The Prior of St. Joanes had a privilege from Rome, that he shall pay no Tithes for any Land, quae propriis manibus aut sumptibus excolitur, which is tilled with his own hands or at his own charge. The Prior maketh a Lease for years before the dissolution, the King after the dissolution granteth the reversion, it was holden that after the term expired the Patentee should hold it discharged, si propriis manibus aut sumptibus excolitur, if it be tilled by him or his servants, but if he make a Lease to a farmer he shall pay tithes by the Stat. of 31. H. 8. c. 13. Dier. Entry with my beast is my entry, and so the Plaintiff shall declare upon a clausum fregit, 15. E. 4. 29. 1. E. 4. 15. If a man's servant selleth to me cloth, and warranteth it to be of a certain length, the action will lie against the master only and not against the servant, and if A do assume to cure B. of a wound, and he sendeth his servant to B. to lay medicines to the wound whereby he is hurt, and emparied, B. shall have an action against the Master and not against the servant, Fulb. l. 1. f. 4. 11. E. 4. 6. By Choke and Brian. The Chancellor of the Augmentation Court, delivered an obligation made to Queen Mary, to his Servant to deliver to the Clerks of the Augmentation; The Obligor, and his servant conspire together, and cancel the obligation, the Master was held in this case to be chargeable, Dyer 161. If a receiver, or Bailiff make a deputy, the Writ of account shall be brought against the Bailie only, because the money was received to his use, 18. H. 8. 2. Fulb. l. 2. f. 43. A lease for years is made, and a letter of Attorney, to deliver possession to the Lessee, if the Attorney deliver possession to the Attorney of the Lessee, it is a good possession, and pursuing his authority, 25. Eliz. The Earl of Leister's Case. Yet many personal things cannot be done by another, as Suit real at the Leete, Exception. or the Sheriff's turn cannot be done by another, Fu●b. l. 25 2. A man cannot excuse himself by an Attorney for contempt, as for not serving the King's Process, but in proper person, 22. E. 4. 34. An action of debt upon an obligation, the Defendant confessed the Deed, and said that he had paid the sum to one C. the general receiver of the Plaintiff, who said he was ready to receive the money, and shown to the Court the acquittance, but because he shown no warrant of the Plaintiff to pay the money to C. the acquittance that was showed could not be the Deed of the Plaintiff, and therefore the Plaintiff recovered his debt and damages, 5. E. 3. 63. Fulb. l. 1. f. 4. Quod per me non possum, nec per alium, Coke l 4. 24. b. What I cannot do by myself, I cannot do by another, Custom hath so established, and fixed the estate of the Copyholder, as by the severance of the inheritance, the Copyholder of the Manor is not destroyed, for in that the Lord himself cannot oust the Copyhold, no more can any one claiming under him do it, for what I cannot do by myself I can do by another, vide ibidem, the case between Marrell and Smith. Coke l. 11. f. 87. a. In the case of Monopolies, A patent was granted by the King unto Edward Darcy for the sole making of Cards, who had made a deputy, but it was held void to both, for in that it was void to the Grantee because he was inexpert, and the grant made void to him, he could not make any expert deputy to supply his place, for what I cannot do by myself I cannot do by another. Accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur suum principale. An accessary doth not lead, but followeth the principal, Co. Com. 152: a. The incident shall pass by the grant of the principal, but not the principal by the grant of the incident. As a lease for term of life rendering rend, the Lessor granteth a reversion to another, the tenant aturneth, all the rents and services shall pass by the word reversion, but if he grant the rent to another, the Reversion shall not pass by it, Littleton ibidem, a Lease of a Manor wherein is a Park, and Fishponds, excepting the game, and after the Lessor grants the reversion, the Deeres and Fish shall pass as incidents with the reversion. A Statute new made gives an action where none lay before, the same Process, Judgement and Execution shall be in the same action as was in other cases at the common Law, though the Statute say no such thing, 10. H. 7. 10. Coke l. 5. f. 21. b. A Parson is bound to a Prior in one hundred pound, upon condition that he resign his Church within a certain time to the Prior for a certain pension, as they should agree, etc. and afterwards the Prior, and the Parson agreed of a pension of an hundred shillings, and yet the Parson refused to resign, and by the whole Court it was holden that he needeth not to resign until he was sure of his pension by Deed. Ployd. 235. a. When a man hath a thing by reason of another, the thing which comes by reason of the other shall be said to be had in the same capacity as the other was which was the cause of it, as 41. E. 3. f. 21. If a Bishop having a villain in right of his Church, enter into the Land purchased by the villain, he shall retain it as in right of his Church. So if the King have a signiory in right of the Crown, and the Tenant seize, and disclaim, by which the King recovereth the tenancy, he shall hold it in right of the Crown, because in that right he held the signiory which was the occasion of the Recovery, ibidem, William's case. Noxa caput sequitur, & accessorium sequitur suum principale, Reg. I. C. The offence looketh on the head, and the accessary followeth the principal. Coke l. 4. f. 44. b. Every Felon is either a principal or an accessary, and if there be no principal, there cannot be any accessary, because the accessary followeth the principal, and therefore was Vaux held by the Court to be a principal murderer, although he was not present at the time of the receipt of the poison, and if any other had procured Vaux to do it, he had been accessary, vide ibidem plura, Vaux Case. Coke Com. 57 a. b. In the highest and lowest offences, there are no accessories but all principals, as in Riots, Routs, and forcible Entries, and in other transgressions vi & armis, So in the highest offence as crimine laesae Majestatis, there are no accessories. And by our Law in murder all that be present, aiding, abetting, or comforting him doth the murder, are principal offenders though they give no stroke, for the stroke of him that woundeth is the wounding of all the others in Law, 4. H. 7. 18. Ployd. 100 a. Facinus quos inquinat aequat. An offence equalleth those are tainted with it. If one receiveth the goods and not the fellow, he is accessary to the Felony, if he knoweth the goods to be stolen. If a man receive a man is attainted of Felony by Outlawry in the same County, though he be ignorant of it, yet is he accessary to the Felony, because the Outlawry is a matter of Record of which every one ought to take notice. A Servant procureth another to kill his Master, this is no petty Treason in the Servant, because it is but Felony in the other which is the principal, 40. Ass. Pl. 25. For things accessary are of the nature of the principal. Principio dato sequantur c●●comitantia, Reg. I. C. A Parson granteth an Annuity with a nomine poenae, the Successor shall be charged with a nomin poenae, due in his Predecessors life, and not his Executors, 7. H. 6. 190. The profits of the office of Filizer cannot be put in Execution upon a Recognizance, or Statute, because the office itself being an office of trust cannot, 26. H. 1. Dyer. 7. b. Tithe is not payable of Okes, Ash, and Elm, usually lopped, and topped, though it be every seven or eight years, for the branches are of the nature of the principal, for which no tithes are to be paid, if they be of twenty years standing, according to the Statute of 5. E. 3 c. 3. Ployd. f. 470. b. Molins' Case. Ployd. 381. a. If one grant estovers to another to be burnt in such an house, it is appurtenant to the house, so if common be granted in such a place to one for his beasts levant and couchant in his Farm of Dale, the common is appurtenant to it, so as he who hath the house after, by what title soever he cometh to it, shall have the estovers, and he that afterwards cometh to the Farm shall have the common, and they shall not be severed unless by extinguishment, vide ibidem plura, 12. Eliz. 381. 5. H. 7. 7. 26. H. 8. 4. common. Lord and Tenant by fealty, and homage, the Lord releaseth his fealty, this is void, for fealty is incident to homage, 7. E. 4. 11. Courtbaron is incident to a Manor, Court of Pypowders to a Fair, therefore one cannot grant the Manor or Fair reserving those Courts, 19 H. 8. Bro. Incidents. Coke Com. f. 3 49. b. If a man be remitted to the principal, he shall be remitted to the appendent and accessary, as if Tenant in tail of a Manor whereunto an advowson is appendent be disseised, and the disseisor suffereth an usurpation, if the disseisee enter into the manor, he is also remitted to the advowson, vide ibidem plura. Quod non valebit in principali, in accessorio & consequenti, non valebit, what doth not avail in the principal, shall not avail in the consequent, and accessary, Coke l. 8. f. 78. b. As tenant in tail, the Remainder in fee, and the Tenant in tail suffereth a common Recovery: The reason of the Bar for the estate of him in the Remainder who is an estranger to the Recovery, is by consequence, because a common Recovery barreth the Estate of Tenant in tail who is a party to the Recovery, and by consequent all the Reversions, and Remainders of common persons expectant upon it: But when the Act of 34. H. 8. provides, that no common Recovery had against Tenant in tail, who is party to the Recovery shall not bar his Issues when the King is in Reversion, by it it is included that the Act preserveth the reversion, and remalnder in tail of the grant of the King, for they cannot be barred, but when the estate tail upon which they depend is barred; for that which not availeth in the principal will not avail in the accessary, and consequent, vide. Ployd. f. 38. c. b. The office of the King of Heralds was granted to Garter, cum feodis, & proficuis ab antiquo, & etiam concessit illi 10 l. pro officio illo, and the question, was whether if the office be gone, the Annuity was expired, and it was affirmed by all the Justices that it was gone, and is determinable by the office determined. And Choke said that he was of Council with one I. who had an Annuity granted unto him by the King in these words, to I. Clerico coronae pro termino vitae, and after he was discharged of the office, and the opinion of all the Justices was that the Annuity was determined, for it shall be intended that the Annuity was granted by reason of the office, and so it appeareth in these cases, that a fee, though newly granted is annexed to the office, and determinable with the office, and shall continue with the office as an incident inseparable, for the principal failing the accessary also faileth. Agentes, & consentientes pari paena plectuntur, Coke l. 5. f. 80. a. b. As Tenant for life, the Remainder to his Son and Heir apparent in tail by Covin and agreement between him, A. and B. maketh a Lease for years to A. who maketh a Feoffment in fee to B. to whom the Father Tenant for life releaseth with warranty, and after the Father dyeth, and the Warranty descended on the Son, and it was resolved that the Warranty did not bar the Son, for the Feoffment of the Lessee for years was a disseisin, and that though the disseisin was to the Father himself, who made the release, yet in that the Father agreed, and consented to the disseisin, it shall not hinder, but that the Warranty shall begin by disseisin, vide ibidem, Fitzherberts' Case. A. maimeth B. by the consent of C. An appeal lieth against A. and C. and Damages equally against both, 22. Ass. Pl. 82. From the Post-praedicaments, or as Kekerman, from such terms as are series of the Predicaments, and yet conduce to the fuller understanding of them. AND first from the principle, and then from the cause, for every cause is a principle, but eevery principle is not a cause, as punctum is the beginning of a line, but not the cause of the line. As Aquinas in his Sam. part 1. q. 33. a. 1. Omnis causa est principium, sed omne principium non est causa, ut pater in divinis est principium filij, sed non causa, & omnis causa importat diversitaem substantiae & dependentiam unius ab altero, sed nomine principij ordinem solum significamus, and every cause imports a diversity of substance, and a dependency of one thing from the other, but by the name of the principle, we signify only the order, as the Father in the Deity is the principle, or beginning of the Son, but not the cause. Cujus que rei potissima pars principium est, Coke l. 10. f. 49. a. The beginning is the principal part upon which all others are founded, & quando diversi desiderantur actus ad aliquem statum perficiendum, plus respicit lex actum originalem, when to the perfection of an estate or interest, divers Acts or things are required, the Law hath more regard to the original Act, vide ibidem, Lamperts Case. When a man seized of Lands in Fee-simple or Fee-tail general, taketh a Wife, to the perfection of her Dower two things are requisite, lawful matrimony, and the death of her husband, and if baron and feme levy a fine, the feme is barred of her Dower, because that the intermarriage, and seisin are the fundamental causes of Dower, and the death of the baron only the execution of it, for the beginning is the principal part upon which all others are founded, and therefore in such case if baron and feme grant a rent by fine out of the Land, or make a lease for years rendering rend to the baron and his heirs, and then the feme recovereth Dower, she shall hold that charge with the rent, and with the term, and the opinion of Ployden in Stowells case, 373. is not holden for Law, as appeareth by Dyer f: 72. and in Damports case, Dyer 224. it was adjudged to the contrary, 2. H. 4. and now common experience without contradiction is against it, and so Littleton in his Chapters of conditions f. 83. holdeth, that if the Feoffee upon condition taketh a wife, the Feoffee may enter for the condition broken, and the reason is for that the Law hath a principal regard to the original, and fundamental cause, and yet it may be said that the title of dower is not consummate until the death of the husband, and peradventure the feme might die before the Baron, vide ibidem plura. So things are construed according to that which was the beginning thereof, as one maketh me swear to bring him money to such a place or else he will kill me, and I bring it him accordingly, this is felony in him, 44. E. 3. 14. b. So if he make me swear to surrender my estate unto him, and I do so afterwards, this is a disseisin to me, 14. Ass. Pl. 20. One imprisoned till he be content to make an obligation at another place, and afterward he doth so being at large, yet he shall avoid it by duresse of imprisonment, 21. E. 4. 68 b. Outlawry in trespass is no forfeiture of Land, as outlawry of felony is, for though the not appearing is the cause of the outlawry in both, yet the force of the outlawry shall be esteemed according to the heinousness of the offence which is the principal cause and foundation of the process, 3. E. 3. 84. A man and feme sole have a villain, and afterwards entermarry, and the villain purchaseth Land, they shall not have lands by intierties, but by moieties jointly, or in common, as they had the villain in the beginning. Coke l. 5. f. 47. a. In Littleton's case, upon the general pardon of 35. Eliz. Whether upon a bill exhibited in the Star-chamber, before the Parliament, and process awarded returnable after the Parliament, the suit shall be said to be hanging by bill, before the return or serving of the process, and it was resolved that it was, because the bill is origo & caput sectae, the bill is the beginning and head of the suit. Cujusque rei potissima pars principium est, & origo rei inspici debet, Coke come. f. 298. b. whereof he saith you shall make great use in the reading of our books, A disseisor hath issue, and entereth into religion, by force of which the tenements descend to the issue, in this case the disseisee may enter upon the issue, because the descent of the issue was by the Act of the father and not by the act of God, and the Law respecteth the original Act, which is his entry into religion, whereas a descent doth not take away entry unless it cometh by death, Littleton ibidem. An escrowe is delivered by a feme sole; if she marry or die, yet by relation to the beginning it shall be good, 14. 4. H. 2. Lessee for years is bound to I. S. to make him the best estate he can, and afterwards the reversion falleth to him, the Lessee shall be discharged of the Bond, if he grantteh the estate he had at the bond making, 12. H 8. 5. A stranger abateth after the death of the father, the son dieth, his wife shall not have dower, for this abatement shall relate to the death of the father, 21. E. 4. 60. An attainder by Act of Parliament hath relation to the first day of the Sessions, 35. H. 8. b. Presentment, tempore belli, is not good to gain possession from the right patron, though the induction was tempore pacis, Coke l. 2. Binghams' case, and l. 11. f. 99 b. And such an usurpation shall be construed to be in time of War. A blow given by one at the time of non sanae memoriae, though the party die, when he is fanae memoriae, it is not capital, Ployd. D. Hales case. So if a man of non sanae memoriae giveth himself a mortal wound, and becometh sanae memoriae, and dieth, he shall not be felo de se, Coke l. 1. Shellies' case, f. 99 b. A man buyeth certain beasts in Market, which were stolen, and selleth them out of the market, and the Vendee giveth him a Crown in earnest, and afterwards they are brought into the Market, and agreeth to his bargain and payeth all his money, and also payeth toll for the beasts, the property is not changed, for the bargain shall have relation to the first communication, Dier. f. 99 b. Tenant for life upon condition that if the Lessor die without issue the Lessee shall have see, the Lessee entereth into religion, and the Lessor dieth without issue, the Lessee is dereyned, he shall never have fee because at the time of the performance of the condition the fee could not vest in him, Ployd. f 489. a. In case of attainder by verdict for felony, it shall have relation to the time of the fact done, 30. H. 6. 5. Lands given in franke-marriage, reserving a rent, the reservation is void until the fift degree is passed. 26. Ass. Pl. 66. One hath a Rend charge going out of his wife's Land, the grantee leaseth to the husband and his heirs, the husband shall not have it, but it shall inure to him by way of extinguishment only as seized in right of his wife. 14. H. 8. 6. The wife endowed by the heir is said to be immediately in by the husband, and if the husband were a disseisor and the heir in by dissent, yet the disseisee may enter upon the wife, Littleton. The executor refuseth; the Administrator may have an action of trespass for the goods taken out of the possession of the Executor, supposing they were taken out of his possession, 38. H. 6. 7. A Recovery without an original is void, and judgement given in Chancery without original is void, and an outlawry without an original is void, Kel. f. 19 b. A remainder is limited to the King, and before the enrolment of the deed, the King granteth it over, and then the deed is enrolled, this will not make the grant good, Coke l. 3. f. 29. An executor assigneth auditors to one who was accountant to the testator, and his auditors find him in arrearages, the Action of debt shall be brought in the Detinet only, and hath respect to the beginning, 11. H. 6. If I have a villain for years as executor, and the villain purchaseth land, the executor entereth, the land shall be to the use of the testator, and assets in his hands, because the villain which was the cause of it was to such use, Ployd. f. 292. a. Chapman's case. Causa & origo est materia negotii, cock l. 1. Shellies' case f. 99 b. vide. As if a servant hath an intent to kill his Master, & before the execution of his intent departeth out of his service, & being out of his service executeth his intent, and killeth him which was his Master, it is petit treason, for the execution respects the original cause, which was the malice conceived when he was his servant, vide ibidem plura. I. S. buildeth a shop on the waist of a Manor of which the Queen was seized, the Queen granteth the Manor to the Earl of Leicester, and he never entereth nor taketh rend, I. S. dieth and his son entereth, there is no descent against the patentee, because there was no disseisin against the Queen, Dyer. 266. b. Yet when the law giveth power and authority to do any thing, Exception. the law adjudgeth of the thing by the act subsequent not precedent, Coke l. 8. f. 146. b. As the law giveth me power or licence to enter into a common Hostlery or Tavern, or to the Lord to distrain, or to the owner of the soil to distrain, for damage pheasant, or to him in the reversion to view if wast be made, and to the commoner to enter into the land to see his beasts, but if he that entereth into the Hostlery or Tavern maketh trespass, or if the Lord that distraineth for rent, or damage pheasant, beat or slay the distress, or if he that entereth to see waist, breaketh the house, or remaineth there an whole night, or the commoner cut down trees, in these cases the Law shall judge by act subsequent, that they entered to that purpose, and shall be trespassors from the beginning, for acta exteriora indicant intoriora secreta, the outward acts show the inward secrets, and with what mind, and with what intent he did enter. So if a purveyor take my beasts for the hostile of the King by force of his commission, it is legal, but if he sell them in Market, than the first taking is injurious. Coke l. 9 f. 11. a. Tenant in tail hath issue two daughters and dieth, and the elder entereth into the whole, and after entry maketh a feoffment with warranty, which is a lineal warranty for the one and collateral for the other; the law judgeth by the act subsequent that the entry was not general for them both, but that it was only for herself, and that it shall be a warranty to commence by disseisin for the one moiety. Quod initio vitiosum est, tractu temporis non convalescet, Reg. I. Civ. Quod initio non valet, tractu temporis non convalescet, Coke come. f. 35. a. That which in the beginning is vicious or invalid, cannot by tract of time be made good, or valid, as tenant for life of a carve of land, the reversion to the father in fee, the son and heir apparent endoweth his wife of this carve by the assent of the father, tenant for life dieth, the husband dieth, this is no good endowment, ex assensu patris, because the father at the time of the assent had but a reversion expectant upon a freehold, whereof he could not have endowed his own wife. Ployd. f. 432. b. A. possessed of an horse, selleth the horse, upon condition that he shall pay him at Christmas forty shillings for it, and before the said feast he selleth the horse to another, and at the feast the first buyer faileth of payment, whereupon A. reseiseth the horse, yet the second buyer shall not have him, because at the time of the second contract A. had no interest nor property, nor possession of the horse, but only a condition which was not sufficient to make the contract good. A. seized of Lands in see maketh a lease for twenty years, rendering rend, to begin presently, and the same day he maketh a Lease to another for the same term, the second lease is utterly void, so as if the first Lessee surrendreth his term to the Lessor, or loseth the same by breach of condition, or forfeiteth it by making a feoffment upon entry of the Lessor, the second Lessee shall not have his term, because the Lessor at the making of the second lease had nothing in him but the reversion, ibidem. A feoffement to the use of the husband for life, the remainder to I. S. the remainder to the wife for her jointure, this is not a jointure to bar dower, because it did not take effect immediately after the death of her husband, Hut. Rep. f. 50. An infant or a married woman makes a will, and publisheth the same, and afterwards dieth being of full age or sole, notwithstanding this both Wills are void, 10. Eliz. 344. Noy. Max. f. 4. A lease for life the remainder to the Major and commonalty of B. whereas there is no such, it is void, though the King doth create such a corporation during the particular estate, so a remainder limited to John the son of I. S. having no such, son, and afterwards a son is borne to him whose name is John during the particular estate, it is void Doder. Que malo inchoata sunt principio, vix bono peraguntur fine. Those things which have a bad beginning can hardly have a good end. Coke. l. 11. f. 78. As a man seized of Lands in fee by deed, upon good consideration granteth the Land after his death to the Queen, her heirs and successors, such grant is not made good by the general words of the act of 18. Eliz. because it was void in the beginning, and with it accordeth 38. H. 6. f. 33. The Abbeffe of Zions case, and the Earl of Leicester's case, Ployd. f. 4000 a stronger case than it, vide ibidem plura, Magdalen Colleges case, Coke l. 4. f. 90. a. If a son and heir apparent of a Baron retain a Chaplain, and giveth to him his letters under sign and seal, and after his father dieth, and this Chaplain purchaseth a dispensation, this retainer and those letters will not serve him, in that they were not available at the beginning, vide ibid. D●uries case. Coke c●m. f. 352 b. If a fine be levied without any original it is voidable but not void, but if an original be brought and a retraxiis entered, and after that a concord is made, or a fine levied, this is void in respect the verity appeareth on record, for where the verity is apparent in the record, the adverse party shall not be estopped to take advantage of the truth, for he cannot be estopped to allege the truth: an impropriation is made after the death of the Incumbent to a Bishop and his successors, the Bishop by indenture demiseth the parsonage for forty years to begin after the death of the incumbent, the Dean and Chapter confirmeth it, the incumbent dieth, this demise shall not conclude, because it appeareth that he had nothing in the appropriation till after the death of the incumbent, ibid. Coke l. 10 f. 62. a. If a Bishop maketh a Lease of Lands for four lives and one of them dieth in his life, so as now there be but three, and after he dieth; yet it shall not bind the successor, for those things which have a bad beginning can scarcely be brought to a good end. Ployd. f. 344. a. If a Feme covert giveth Lands devisable by the common law by will, and publish it, and after the Baron dieth, & after the wife dieth, the devise is void, because the foundation is founded on the first parts, to wit, the making and publishing which are void, though at the time of her death she was discovert, but the death without a good beginning giveth no effect; so if an infant maketh a Will and publish it, and after is at full age, it is not of effect, causa qua supra ibidem. Ployd. f. 344. a. If one disseise one of two acres in Dale, and the disseisee releaseth to the disseisor all his right he ha●h in all the lands in Dale, and delivereth the release as an escrowl to be delivered to the disseisor as his deed the last day of May, & before that time the disseisor diseiseth him of another acre in D. and after the deed is delivered to the disseisor the last day of May the right which he hath in the third acre shall not pass, for the beginning, and the intent is to be respected in all acts. So if one have a reversion in fee of two acres which I. S. holdeth for life, and granteth to another the reversion of all the acres that I. S. holdeth for life, and then the grantor purchaseth the reversion of another acre, I. S. holdeth for life, and after I. S. attorneth to the grantee for all the three acres, the third acre shall not pass for the reason abovesaid. If a man devise the manner of Dale or white acre, Excepton. and have nothing in it at the time of making the Will, and after purchaseth it, there it shall pass to the devisee, for it shall be taken that his intent was to purchase it, Ployd. f. 344. a. If I let B. acre by deed indented, in which I have nothing, and I purchase it afterwards, it is a good Lease 8. f. 3. 24. F. n. b. f. 73. c. If a man be distrained in any liberty, and he sue a replevin there by plaint or by Writ, and after hanging the plaint in the Liberty, he be distrained again for the same cause, by the same person who distrained, he shall not have a Writ of recaption, because the plaint is not holden before the Sheriff, etc. nor before the Justices, but if the plaint be removed by pone, and out of the Liberty before the Justices, there the party shall have a Writ of recaption as well for the reprisal before the Writ as for the reprisal after, whereas otherwise before the removal a recaption did not lie upon the reprisal of a distress in case a replevin was sued in a Manor or Liberty, and not in the County. Coke l. 8. f. 78. a. Tenant in tail is, the remainder in tail of the grant of the King, if tenant in tail acknowledgeth a fine or suffereth a common recovery, it shall not bar the issues because the reversion was in the King, but if after the reversion be granted and put out of the crown, the fine shall bar the issues. Coke come. f. 14. a. Quod prius est, dignius est, & qui p●ior est tempore potior est jure, Eract. l. 2. c. 10. and therefore among the males the eldest brother and his posterity descending from him shall inherit before any younger brother, because Littleton saith, he is most worthy of blood: and Bracton, Siquis plures filios habuerit, jus proprietatis primo descendit ad primogenitum, eo quod inventus est primo in rerum natura, whosoever hath many sons the right of propriety shall descend to the first borne, in that he first is found in the nature of things: and in King alfred's time Knights fees descended to the eldest son; Glanvill. l. 7. c. 3. vide ibidem plura. Coke l. 4. Druties' case, f. 90. a. Though a Countess may have as many chaplains as she will by the Common Law, yet by the statute can she have but two, capable of dispensation, and reason requireth, that he that hath served longest should be first preferred, for he that is the former in time, is the more worthy in Law. Ployd. f. 259. a. D. Hales case, Baron and Feme are joint-tenants of a Lease for two years, there are no moieties between them, but every of them hath the whole, and if the husband charge the Land, she after her death shall avoid it, 7. H. 6. f. 1. for she is remitted to the term, and is in upon a title parameunt the grant. So if a man alien trees growing upon the ground entailed, or in land which he hath in right of his wife, and dieth before they are cut down, the alienee shall not fallen them, because the issue in tail is in upon a title paramount the alienation, P. 18. E. 4. f. 5. 14. H. 4. f. 32. The Lord may take his Ward which is an apprentice out of the possession of his master, because his title to his body accrueth in respect of his signiory, which is more ancient than his apprenticeship, Ployd. ibidem. When one hath a presentment to a Church two turns, and another a third turn, if he that hath the third turn bring a ●uare impedit, he shall not begin with his own turn first, but with the other two turns. Vnumquodque principior um est sibimetipsi fides, & cum ea negantibus non est disputandum, quia ad principia non est ratio. Fortescue de laudibus legum Angl. f. 11. Dyer 271. a. There are principles of being, so all causes are the principles of their effects, and there are principles of knowledge, so a proposition by which as the more known, another is conceived, is a principle, and of this principle it is said, That every principle is of credit to itself, and that we ought not to dispute against deniers of principles. As arrearages of Rent-charge being due to a woman sole, and after she taketh an husband, and then another day of payment incurreth, for which day the husband maketh an acquittance supposing the receipt of the rent for the said year last passed, and notwithstanding that acquittance, his servant distraineth for the rent of half a year of the first year being behind, but though the last arrearages before the last term were due to the feme dum sola fuit, yet Harper and Dyer were of opinion that all the arrearages were discharged by the acquittance of the last term, because it is an ancient principle, That all the arrearages are discharged by the acquittance of the last term, and we ought not to deny principles. Coke l. 10. f. 40. a. No man ought to dispute against recoveries, the legal pillars of common assurances, because we are not to dispute against principles, and which St. Germain's Doctor and Student, c. 26. approveth to bind both in Law and conscience, and by the Statute of 23. Eliz. C. 4. That for the avoiding of the dangers of assurances of Lands, and the advancement of common recoveries, it is provided that any common recovery shall not be avoided for any want of form in words, and not in matter of substance. And Sir James Dyer then chief Justice did with great gravity, and some bitterness reprove an utter Barrister, who rashly inveyed against common recoveries, not knowing the reason and foundation of them, and said that he was not worthy to be of the profession of the Law, who durst speak against common recoveries, which were the sinews of assurances, and inheritances, and founded upon great reason and authority, Marry Portingtons' Case, vide ibidem ●lura. Coke Com. f. 343. a. Principium est quasi primum caput, a principle is as it were the first head, from which many cases have their beginning, which is so strong as it suffereth no contradiction, and therefore is it said in our Books, that ancient principles of the Law ought not to be disputed, 11. H. 4. 9 2. As that of every Land there is a fee-simple, and that every Land in fee-simple may be charged in fee by one way or other, Littleton ibidem. Cessante statu primitivo cessat derivativus, Coke l. 8. f. 34. a. The primitive state ceasing, the derivative doth cease. As if Tenant in tail maketh a lease for lives, according to the Statute of 32. H. 8. c. 28. and then dyeth without issue, the lease being derived out of the Estate tail shall not continue longer than the Estate tail, against the opinion in 33. H. 8. 48. Dyer, which was granted by the whole Court. Derivativa potestas, non potest esse major primitiva. Noy. max. f 4. A derivative power cannot be greater than it f●om which it is derived. As the Attorney of one that is disseised cannot make claim of the Land, it the disseisee durst have gone to the Land, Littleton. The Bailiff of a disseisor shall not say that the Plaintiff never had any thing in the Land, for the Master himself shall not have that Plea, because he is not Tenant of the , 28. Ass. Pl. 4. The Servant shall be estopped to say the is his Masters, by recovery against his Master, though the servant himself be a stranger to it, for he shall not be in better condition t●an he whose right he claimeth, 2. E. 4. 16. He that gaineth a thing on high, shall neither have gain nor loss thereby, Noy. Max. f. 11. As if one Joyntenant maketh a lease of his Joyntee, and dyeth, the heir which surviveth shall have the reversion of his Jointure, but not the rent, because he cometh in by the first Feoffor, and not under his companion, Dyer 187. So when the Husband is Lessee for years in the right of his wife reserving a rent, if he dyeth the wife shall have the residue of the term, but not of the rent, ibidem. An executor recovereth, and dieth intestate: Administration of the goods of the Testator is committed to I. S. I. S. shall not sue execution upon this recovery. Dower cannot be assigned reserving a rent, or with a remainder over, for she is in from the husband, and not from him who assigneth Dower Finch, f. 13. Quod dignius est, prius est minus digno. The Law preferreth every thing according to its worthiness, Ployd. f. 169. a. and therefore is every thing placed in Writs by the rule of the Register according to its dignity, as the Message is placed before Lands, the Land before Meadow, and the Meadow before Pasture, and the like, and this dignity is taken from necessity, for to have an house to inhabit, and to defend his body from tempest and violence of weather, is more necessary than to have Land to blow it for bread, and also to have Land for bread is more necessary, than to have Meadow for Hay to feed Cattles, and likewise to have Meadow for Hay, which will serve all the year, is more necessary than Pasture, etc. ibidem. And so in the Register the entire thing which is more worthy shall be demanded before the moiety, part, or parts: As in a Replevin, if it be of two beasts, the one quick & the other dead, the living thing shall first be demanded, Register. Quod prius est, verius est, & quod prius jure est, potius est tempore, Coke Com. f. 347. b. As in a remitter the Law preferreth the first and ancient right before the latter, and a sure right though it be little before a great estate by wrong, which jumpeth with the rule of the Civil Law; Quoties duplici jure defertur alicui successio, repudiato novo jure quod ante defertur, superest vetus, Paulus 17. quest. As if Tenant in tail discontinueth the tail, and after disseiseth the discontinuee, and so dyeth seized; This is a remitter to the tenant in tail, because the Law shall put and adjudge him to be in by force of the tail, which is his ancient title, for if he should be in by force of the descent, than the discontinuee may have a writ of Entry sur disseissin in the per against him, and recover the tenement, and his damages, but being in by force of the tail, the title of the discontinuee is quite nullified. Qualis causa talis effectus, Ployd. f. 292. a. Things are construed according to that which is the cause thereof, as if an Executor assign Auditors to one, who was accountant to the Testator, and the Auditors find him in arrearages, the Action of debt, which the Executors shall have, shall be in the detinet only, for the debt shall be in them as Executors and have respect to the foundation and cause, 11. H. 6. f. 16. by Paston and Newton. So if one have a villain for years as Executor, if the villain purchase Land, and the Executors enter, the Land shall be to the use of the Testator, and it shall be assets in his hands, because the villain, who was the cause of it, was to that use, Ibidem, Pas. 32. H. 8. E. villainage 146. Ployd. f. 524. & 525. b. a. If Tenant for years of Land granteth a rent-charge to another for the life of the grantee, the grantee shall not have an estate of Franktenement in the rent, in that he cannot have an estate of Franktenement derived out of the Chattel real, but he shall have the rent during all the years, though the Lessee had forty years in the Land, for term of life is greater than years, and therefore the Grantee shall have all the rent for all the years, if he shall live so long. And f. 525. b. An Executor cannot devise a term to another, which he hath as Executor, for so soon as the Executor is dead, the term is to the use of the first Testator, and his Executors have it as Executors to the first Testator, and to his use, and not as Executors of the last Testator, nor to his use, for the Executors have them by relation as immediate Executors to the first Testator. A. Covenanteth with B. and his Executors, to make a lease of white acre before Michaelwas, and the Covenantee dyeth before, and A. maketh a lease to his Executor, the lease shall be to the use of the Testator, and assets in the Executor, for the Covenant, which was the cause of the Lease, came to the Executor in right of the Testator, and to the same use shall the lease be, Ployd. f. 292. a. Chapman's case. Cessante causa cessat effectus, Ployd. 268. Sir John Radcliffs case, the cause ceasing the effect also ceaseth. An office was found that after the decease of Robert Earl of Sussex, and Mary the Countess his mother, certain Lands did descend to Sir John Radcliff Knight as Son and Heir male of the body of the said Robert engendered, and the body of the said Mary, and Sir John Radcliff Knight was then of the age of eighteen years before the finding of the office, and the Lands were holden of the King, and Queen by the tenth part of a fee of Knight's service in Capite: And when Sir John Radcliff became of full age, he prayed his livery, but the Court of wards required of him for the Queen, the value of his marriage; but it was alleged that because he was made Knight before the title of the Wardship accrued, and the Wardship was due to the Lord in respect of his imbecility to do the service of a Knight, and that the making him a Knight, did admit him able to do the service of a Knight, his body ought not to be in ward for defect of such ability, for the cause ceasing, the effect also ceaseth, and that if his person was not in Wardship, no marriage, nor value for it shall be due to the guardian, and so was it adjudged by the Court contrary to Magna Charta c. 4. which was said to be made for the advantage of the Lords, vide ibidem plura. Coke Com. 312. a. Cessante causa, vel ratione legis, cessat lex. The cause and reason of the Law ceasing the Law also ceaseth; as at the common Law no aid was grantable of a stranger to an avowry because the avowry was made of a certain person, and now the avowry being made by the Statute of 21. H. 8. upon no person, therefore the reason of the Law being changed, the Law itself is also changed, and consequently in an avowry according to that act, aid shall be granted to any man, vide ibidem plura. Coke Com. f. 76. a. Cessante causa cessat causatum. As if the Lord after he hath the Wardship of the body, and the Lord doth release to the infant his right in the signiory, or the signiory descendeth to the infant, he shall be out of ward both for the body and the Land, for he was in ward in respect he was not able to do those services which he ought to do to his Lord, which now are extinct, for the cause ceasing the thing caused ceaseth, and there must be a tenure continuing or no Wardship. So if the Conusee in a Statute merchant be in execution, and his Land also, and the Conusee release to him all debts, this shall discharge the execution, for the debt was the cause of the execution, and of the continuance of it until the debt be satisfied, therefore the discharge of the debt, which was the cause, discharged the execution which was the effect, Coke Com. f. 76. a. So if the heir female within the age of fourteen years be in ward and after the age of fourteen years expired, the Lord by the Statute of W. 1. c. 22. hath two years more to tender her a convenable marriage, but if the Lord marry her within the two years her husband and she shall prefently enter into the Lands, for the cause ceasing the effect also ceaseth, Coke ibidem, 7 5. b. The King granteth an office to one at will, and ten pound fee during life pro officio illo, now if the King put him from his office, the fee shall cease, 5. E. 4. 8. b. The executor, or husband after the death of the wife guardian in socage shall not retain the Wardship, for the guardian hath it not to his own use, but to the benefit of the heir, and the executor or husband hath not that affection which the testator, or wife had, which was the cause that the Law giveth them the Wardship, 7. Eliz. 293. b. If a stroke be given the first day of May, and the King pardon him the second day of May for all felonies, and misdemeanours, the party smitten dyeth the third day of May, so as this is no felony till after the pardon, yet the felony is pardoned, for the misdemeanour is pardoned, and therefore all things pursuing are also pardoned, 13. E. 401. If two coparceners make a lease reserving a rent, they shall have this rent in common, as they have the reversion, but if afterwards they grant the reversion, excepting the rent, than they shall be joint-tenants of the rent, Finch mono. f. 9 It is no principal challenge to a Juror, that he hath married the party's mother, if she be dead without issue, for the cause of favour is removed, 14. H. 7. 2. The King disparking the Park, the office of the keeper is determined, and all such offices as are presumed in Law to be for the commodity of the King as well as the Patentee, and if one granteth a Stewardship of a manor, and dismembreth that manor, the office is determined; if a corporation granteth the office of a towne-clark, and surrendreth their patent to be renewed, all their offices are determined, Huttons Reports. Upon a divorce, the woman shall have the goods given in marriage not being spent, for the goods were given in advancement of the woman, and therefore it is reasonable that she should have them, in that the cause and consideration of that gift is now defeated; for the cause ceasing the effect also ceaseth, Dyer f. 13. p. 61. Coke l. 5. f. 59 b. Vaughan's case, The original cause of the amercement being pardoned the amercement is pardoned, vide ibidem. The husband and wife make a lease by Deed, the husband dyeth, the wife accepteth the rent, if the Lessee lose the Deed of the Lease, the wife shall avoid it, 15. E. 4. 17. Coke l. 1. f. 2. Buchu●sts case. If the Feoffor make a Feoffment with warranty, the Feoffee shall not have the Charters, unless by express grant, but the Feoffor shall have all the Charters, and Evidences which are material for the maintenance of the title of the Land, and upon which he may maintain his warranty paramount, but if the warranty be determined he shall have them no longer. Ployd. f. 382. a. nevil's case. The King grants to two for their lives, and the life of the survivor of them, the Sheriff-wike of Chester, and one of them was attainted of high Treason, all the Office was forfeited, because the Office was entire, and could not be severed, ibidem. The King granteth the Office of the keeper of a Park to two, and the one faileth in discharge of his duty, the whole fee shall determine; so it is if an annuity be granted to two for Counsel, and one of them refuse, because the Office and Grant is entire, and cannot be severed, and the cause ceasing but in one, the whole annuity shall cease. Exception. Dyer. 320. Pl. 13. An Arbitrement was between two of divers things, and among others, there was one article that one party should have yearly for the space of six years twenty shillings toward the keeping and honest education of A. B. and A. B. dyeth before the fourth year of the sixth year, yet the payment of the 20 s. shall not cease during the six years, which is a certain term, and is a duty to the party himself towards the finding of A. B. Dier 141. Pl. 44. King Ed. 6. granteth to the Lady Mary his Sister the Manor of D. for term of her life, according to the Tenor and effect of the last Will of H. 8. which was that she should have it so long as she was unmarried, afterwards she granted a rend charge out of that Manor, after which grant K. E. dieth, by whose death the reversion came to her being Queen, and afterwards she married Philip King, etc. and it was doubted whether the rend charge should remain or no. Davis 3. a. b. In ancient times a great part of tenements were holden of their Lords by Socage, which was that the Tenants ought to come with their soaks by certain days by the year to blow, and sow the demesne of the Lords, and because such works were made for the livelihood and sustenance of their Lords, they were quitted of all other services: and after such services were changed into moneys by consent of the Lords, though the Lords did alien their demesnes and had no lands to blow or sow, yet paid they their rents yearly to the Lords: so the Church and religious houses after the procuration of Victuals was reduced to a certain sum, did pay it to the Ordinary yearly, though he made no visitation, so as the rule, The cause ceasing the effect also ceased, held not in those cases. So Coke l. 4. in Capulets case, it was resolved that where a man held certain land by rent for Castleguard, though the Castle was ruined or decayed, yet the rent remained, and pro doth not import a condition, as in the case of an annuity granted pro consilio impendendo, but a full and perpetual recompense and satisfaction, Vide Davis plura ibidem. In jure non remota, sed proxima causa spectatur, Bacon Max. f. 1. 2. In the Law the next and not the remote cause is respected. For it were infinite for the law to judge of the cause of causes, and therefore judgeth of acts by the immediate and next cause, as Bar. Empsons' case f. 2. An annuity is granted pro consitio seu impendendo, and the grantee committeth treason whereby he is imprisoned, that the grantor cannot come unto him for counsel, yet the annuity is not determined, by this non fesans; for the law looketh not on the remote cause, to wit, the grantors' offence which was the cause of the imprisonment but excuseth it, because his not giving of counsel was compulsory, and not voluntary in regard of the imprisonment which was the immediate cause. So if a parson maketh a Lease, and be deprived, or resigneth, the successors shall avoid the Lease, for the law regardeth not the cause of the deprivation, or the resignation, which is the act of the party but the act of the Ordinary in the admission of the new incumbent, 2. H. 4. 3. 26. H. 8. 2. A foeffment in fee upon condition that the Feoffee shall enfeoff over, and if the feoffee be disseised, and a dissent case, and then the feoffee bindeth himself in a statute, which statute is discharged before the recovery of the Land, this is no breach of the condition, because the land was never liable to the statute, and the possibility which was the remote cause that it should be liable upon the recovery, the law doth not respect. Coke l. 2. Winningtons' case, This rule faileth in covenous act, where the law taketh heed to the corrupt beginning and also in criminal acts, where the law principally regardeth the first motive, vide ibidem plura. Nihil magis consentaneum est, us iisdem modis res dissolvatur quibus constituitur. Reg. I.C. and Bracton, Nihil tam conveniens est naturali aequitati unumquodque dissalvi eo ligamine quo ligatum est, Cok. l. 2. f. 53. a. There is nothing more agreeing to natural equity then that every thing should be dissolved by the same means it was bound. As no estate can be vested in the King without matter of record: so no estate can be devested out of him without matter of record, Ployd. f. 553. Walsinghams' case, and 180. Nevil's case, 12. H. 7. and many other books, for nothing is so convenient to natural equity then that every thing should be dissolved by the same band it was tied, and Coke l. 4. f. 57 b. In case of attainder and office, the King is entitled by double matter of record, and therefore the party grieved aught to avoid it by double matter of record, and not by single travers or Monstrans de droit but is driven to his petition, vide ibidem. plura. But when a man avoideth the King's title by as high a matter of record as the King claimeth, though the King be entitled by double matter of Record, he may have it by way of Plea, as one is attainted of treason by Parliament, an office findeth his lands by which the King seizeth them, the party may allege restitution by Parliament, and a repeal of the former Act, 4. H. 7. 7. b. Finch Nomot. 12. Coke l. 5. f. 26. a. Indentures being made for declaring of the uses of a subsequent fine, recovery, or other assurance to certain persons, and within a certain time, and to certain uses, are but a directory and do not bind the estate or interest of the land, yet if the fine or recovery or other assurance be pursued according to the Indentures, there cannot be any bare averment against the Indentures to be taken in such case, that after the making of the Indentures or before the assurance by mutual agreement of parts was concluded, and agreed that the assurance shall be to other uses, but if other agreement or limitation of uses be made by writing or by other matter so high or more high: then the last agreement shall stand, for every contract and agreement must be dissolved by a matter of as high a nature as the other was, vide ibidem plura, in the Earl of Rutland's case. Coke l. 6. f. 43. b. Blakes case, A writ of Covenant, and the breach was for not repairing of the house: and the Defendant pleaded accord between him and the Plaintiff with satisfaction, and though it be regularly true that arbitrement or accord with satisfaction is no plea where the action is founded upon a deed, for every thing is to be discharged by a matter of as high a nature as it is obliged, yet there is a diversity where the duty accrueth by the deed in certainty, tempore confectionis, as by covenant, bill, or obligation to pay a sum of money, there it is a certain, duty and aught to be discharged by a matter of as high a nature, but where there is no certain duty accrueth by deed, but only a wrong or default subsequent together with the Deed, which only giveth an Action to recover damages; as for default of reparations, there an accord with satisfaction is a good Plea, because the end of the action is only to have damages in the personalty, for the action is not merely grounded on the deed, but also from the deed and the wrong subsequent and generally in all Actions where damages are only to be recovered, arbitrement or accord with satisfaction is a good plea, vide ibidem plura. Vnum quod que dissolvitur eo modo quo constituitur, Nay. Max. f. 4. As an obligation or matter in writing cannot be discharged by an agreement by word but by writing, and though in abatement as a receipt of part upon a deed, it shall not be admitted without a deed of it, 19 E. 4. 1. b. In an annuity growing by prescription, rien arreare is a good plea, for a prescription is no matter in deed, but in an annuity by deed, it is no good plea without showing an acquittance, 3 H. 7. 33. An Act of Parliament cannot be avoid but by Parliament. The submission of an arbitrement by deed, must be countermanded by deed. Things may be avoided, and determined by the ceremonies and Acts, like unto those by which they were created, Bacon uses etc. as Livery and Seisin by entry, a grant by claim and charge by discharge, and an use which is raised by declaration and limitation, may cease by words of declaration and limitation. Non impedit clausula derogatoria sine clausula de non obstan●e de futuro quo minus ab cadem potestateres dissolvantur a quibus constituuntur, Bacon, Max f. 67. Acts which are in their nature revocable, cannot by strength of words be fixed or perpetuated, the law judgeth it to be idle, and of no force, to deprive men of that which is most incident to humane condition, and that is alteration and repentance. As if I make my will, and in the end thereof add this clause: Also my will is, if I shall revoke this present will, or declare any new will, unless it be in writing, subscribed with the hands of two witnesses etc. that such revoration shall he void, any such pretended will to the contrary notwithstanding, yet may I by paroll without any writing repeal the same and make a new one. So if a statute be made that no sheriff shall continue in his office above a year; and if any patent be made to the contrary though it be with a clausula de non obstante, it shall be void, yet notwithstanding such a Patent of the Sheriff's Office made by the King with a non obstante, will be good in law, because it is an inseparable prerogative of the Crown to dispense with politic statutes, and of that kind notwithstanding any derogatory clause, 28. E. 3. c. 7. 24. E. 3. c. 9 2 H. 7. 6. If the Parliament should enact, that there should be no Parliament, but that the King should have the authority of Parliament, and rule by the ancient lege regia, it were good in Law, quia potestas suprema seipsum dissolvere potest, because the highest power may dissolve itself, Bacon. From the matter. DEbile fundamentum fallit opus, Noy. Max. f. 5. when the foundation faileth all goeth to the ground. As when an estate to which a warranty is annexed, is defeated, the warranty also is defeated, as if Tenant in tail discontinue, and the discontinuee is diseised, or maketh a Feoffment upon condition, in whose possession a collateral ancestor of the issue in tail releaseth and dieth, the issue is barred: but if the discontinuee enter upon the disseisor or upon the Feoffor for the condition broken, the issue is restored to his formedon, Lit. Coke l. 6. f. 14. a. Burton was deprived for adultery, and afterwards by a general pardon adultery was pardoned, and though the deprivation was in force, and that he that after the deprivation was admitted, instituted and inducted, remained Parson, yet by force of the said pardon is he become Parson again without any sentence declaring the deprivation to be void, for by the pardon the adultery which was the foundation of the deprivation was discharged, and by consequence all that was depending on the said foundation is discharged, for sublato fundamento corruit opus. So if an execution be sued upon a statute: and then the connusee maketh a defeasance upon the statute upon the payment of twenty pound, if the twenty pound be paid the execution shall be defeated as well as the statute, 20. Assize Pl. 7. If there be a disseisor of Lands in ancient demesne, and the Lord confirmeth to him to hold at the common Law, the disseisee reentreth: now the land shall be ancient demesne again, for the estate whereupon the confirmation should enure is defeated, 49 E. 3. 8. A Church appropriated to a spiritual corporation becometh disappropriate if the corporation be dissolved 3. E. 3. 74. b. Licet tenenti vetus opus reficere non novum facere Febl. 2. f. 51. A Tenant may repair an old work, but not make a new one. As by our law the Tenant may cut down trees for the amendment of houses or reparation of them, 44. E. 3. 21. and 44. 11. H. 4, 32. But if the necessity of a new house cometh in question, as to build a Stable, or no house be built upon the Land at the time of the Lease, the Lessee may not cut down trees to make a house. 11. H 4. 32. From the Form. MVtata forma prope interimitur substantia rei, Ulpian reg. I. C. Doderidge f. 132. 133. The English Lawyer. The form being changed, the substance and essence of the thing is destroyed. If a man take my Barley and make Malt thereof, it cannot be seized by the former owner, and yet neither quantity nor outward form is lost, but it is become a thing of another nature and use, because the inward form upon which depended the use is changed. So if a man, of any piece of cloth which he had to keep, containing twenty yards in one whole piece, will cut the same into twenty several yards and pieces, the matter nor the quantity is not changed, and yet if he will restore the same pieces, I am not bound to receive them. So if a man possessed of twenty packs of Wool, by his last will, deviseth all the said Wool to I. S. and after the Testator converteth all the said Wool into cloth, and dieth possessed of the same cloth, I. S. the devisee shall not have by law the cloth made of that Wool, for that the form of the Wool is changed, though the matter remain and is turned to a thing of another nature, and the turning it into cloth is a Countermand of the Testators Will. So if a man have a dwelling house, whereunto there is a Common of Estovers belonging, if this house by casualty of fire, or tempest be burnt, or blown down, or taken down, and a new be built in another place near, or in another form, the Common of Estovers is lost, and not to be used in this new house, but if the first house were not wholly pulled down but repaired, or another new house be built upon the same foundation, and in the same form with the former, the Common of Estovers remaineth with the new house, for that in Judgement of Law is the same house, for the building on the same foundation is but a reparation, ibidem. So 22. H. 6. 28 It is not sufficient in a bar of a Writ of Waste of an house, to say that, the Defendant hath built a new house in lieu of that which is fallen, but the Defendant must say that, it is as much in length and as much in latitude as the other was, or at the least he must say, that it is as profitable, but when an house is ruinous at the making of the lease, and after falleth, and the Defendant buildeth a new, it is not necessary that he make another house of equal longitude or latitude, Fulb. l. 2. f. 51. From the end. SApiens incipit a fine, Coke l. 10 f. 25. b. Et quod primum est in intention, ultimum est in executione, Suttons' Hospital case. A wise man beginneth from the end, and that which is first in intentions is last in Execution. The pious and charitable end of Sutton was the grand motive to the King to give to him means by creation of a capable body politic by way of incorporation, to have a perpetual succession, to perfect, and perpetuate so pious and charitable a work, Ibidem. Finis rei attendendus est, & fines mandatorum domini regis per rescripta sua deligenter sunt observandi, for the end in all humane actions is of singular regard, for that all things attempted by wise men have their end, and the virtue of the thing is measured by the end, Doder. Coke l. 5. f. 87. a. In Blunfeilds' case. The end and fruit of a suit is satisfaction, but the execution of the body is no satisfaction, but a gage for the debt, 4. H. 7. 8. 33. H. 6. 47. And therefore after his death he shall resort to another execution, for it should be mischievous to the Plaintiff to lose his debt without any default in him, neither is the execution of the body a valuable execution, and therefore after his death he shall have a new execution, until he hath had a valueable execution out of his Lands and Goods, which in Law and Equity ought to be subject to the payment of his debts, but where no other satisfaction is to be had thereby: Qui non habet in aere luat in corpore, ne quid peccetur impune, Hob. Rep. f. 133. He who hath no money, let him be punished in body, lest he should offend without punishment, vide ibïdem. Exitus acta probat, finis, non pugna, coronat, Dod. E. Law●. f. 143. Coke l. 9 f. 82. b. Finis coronat opus, the Law favoureth the consummation and prefection of things, for the end crowneth the work, and doth all: as the end of an Attornment is to perfect a grant, which the Law therefore favoureth, according to the resolution of the Books, 12. E. 4. 3. & 4. where it is holden that Tenant in tail, Infant, or Feme-covert may be bound by an Attornment gratis in pais: and in 18. H. 8. Fortescue holdeth, that if one granteth the service of his Tenant which is within age, who within age attorneth, shall he after in an avowry be admitted to say that he was within age at the time of the Attornement? I say no, for he did nothing but that which he ought to do, Ibidem. Ployd. f. 18 a. The scope and end of every matter is principally to be considered in all things, and when the scope and end of the matter is satisfied, than the end of the matter is accomplished, as here in Renigers' case, as the end of the Statute of 7. E. 6. c. 2. is, that the King shall have his subsidy, and if the agreement be here sufficient to give him the subsidy and to assure the King of it, than the end of the Statute is performed, and so here it is, for the agreement authoriseth the King to weigh the Woad by his collector at what time he shall please, and when that is done the King hath title to action, and so is in surety. So 33. E. 3. joinder in aid 10. Vouchee cometh into the Court to be viewed, and being viewed is awarded of full age, yet he shall not be driven to answer till he come in to the same intent by another Process, So 19 E. 4 3. The Vouchee upon a Grand Cape ad valentiam, shall not lose the Land, though he cannot save his default, for the Process is only to this end to have him to appear. So 51. Ass. Pl. 2. A man is warned by writ to answer to a matter, he shall not be driven to answer to any other matter than is contained in that writ, though the King be a party. As if by office it be found that Lands in chief descended to I. S. a fool natural, and that A. occupieth them, whereby a Scire facias goeth out against A. to answer why the Lands should not be seized into the King's hands for the ideacy of I. S. A cometh in and pleadeth that I. S. when he was of perfect memory made a release to one B. who enfeoffed A. this is good enough, without showing any licence of alienation, to discharge himself for the purchase of those Lands. Exitus acta probat, & acta exteriora indicant in teriora animi secreta, Coke l. 8. f. 146. b. when entry, authority, or licence is given any one by the Law, and he doth amiss, he shall be a trespassor from the beginning, as the Law giveth authority to any one to enter into a common Hostlary or Tavern, to the Lord to distrain, to the owner of the soil to distrain for Damage-feasant, to him in the reversion to view whether wast be made, to the commoner to enter into Land to see his Cattles; but if he which entereth into a Tavern doth trespass, as if he import any thing, or if the Lord who doth distrain for rent, or the owner for Damage-feasant work or kill the distress, or he who entereth to see waist doth break the house, or remain in it one whole night, or if the Commoner cut down a tree, in these cases the Law shall adjudge him to enter to that intent and purpose, and because the act which demonstrated it is a Trespass he shall be accounted a Trespassor from the beginning, so if a purveyor take my Cattles by force of commission for the hostile of the King, it is lawful; but if he sell them in Market the first taking is tortuous, 18. H. 6. 19 b. Coke l. 9 f. 59 Lamb's case. Any one shall be convict of a publication of a Libel, if he knowing it to be a Libel, writ but a copy of it, unless afterwards he can prove that he delivered it to a Magistrate to examine it. Coke Com. f. 100 a. The mesne is to acquit the Tenant of any manner of services, that any Lord paramount will have or demand of the Tenant, and if the Tenant be distrained without default of the mesne, yet if the mesne doth not afterwards put his own beasts into the pound instead of the beasts of the Tenant, the distress shall be said to be in his default, and the Tenant shall recover his damages, and costs, vide ibidem plura. Destinata tantum pro factis non habentur, Dod. E. Lawyer f. 143. Things destinated to an end, not being applied thereunto, altar their nature and become of another consideration, as if a man cut down my Timber Tree, and square it of purpose to make a Beam for an house, I who am the true owner may seize the same, but if it be laid in the building it may not be seized by the owner, although the building be not perfected, for now it becometh parcel of the house or building, but if a man prepare all materials for building upon his Land, and is ready to build therewith, but dyeth before it be erected, those materials shall go unto the Executor, or Administrtaor, and not unto the Heir, who should have had them had they been lain in the buildings, and it may not be seized by the owner although the building be not perfected, for now it becometh parcel of the house or building; but if a man prepare all materials for building upon his Land, and is ready to build therewith, but dieth before it is erected, those materials shall go unto the Executor or Administrator, and not unto the Heir, who should have had them had they been lain in the building, because they were destinata tantum quae profactis non habentur, intended only, which are not taken for acts. Qui adimit medium dirimit finem, Coke Com. f. 161. a. Sometimes the Law respects the beginning, and sometimes the end, and sometimes the means to the attaining it. As to turn a stream is running to a Mill, is a disseisin to the Mill itself, and to disturb one from entering and manuring his Land, is a disseisin of the Land itself, so rescous and replevin is a disseisin to the Lord, because by them the Lord is disturbed from coming to his Rent, and so also is enclosure, because the Lord cannot break down Gates, or break down the enclosures to take a distress, and all these are disseisins after an actual seisin had, and when the rent is behind; otherwise not any of them. Finis sinem litibus imponit, Ployd. f. 357 a. Many times in our Law, the name and denomination of a thing is drawn from the final cause, as a Fine used for the assurance of Land, dicitur finis quia finem litibus imponit, because it putteth a period and end to suits, Dod. E. Lawyer. f. 143. and therefore as Ployd. f. 357. a. Fines have been of very long antiquity, and as Long as any Court of Record hath been, and were at the common Law the more stronger assurance, because they carry in themselves the end of the Law, which is repose, for the Law hath no other end but repose, for it was ordained to cease contention, and to make peace, as the Statute of 17. E. 1. showeth that therefore they were called Fines, quia finem litibus debent imponere & imponunt, and therefore in the commencement of a Fine, there is concord and peace, haec est finalis concordia, and the chief cause is by which it maketh peace, because it bindeth all strangers unless it be those which have defect, if they enter not their claim within a year and a day, and Brown said, that a Fine for its haughtiness, and for the peace and repose that it bringeth, it may be termed finis Legis, fructus Legis, exitus Legis, & effectus Legis, the end of the Law, the fruit of the Law, and the effect of the Law; and after the Plea of non-claime of Fines was made no bar, by the Statute of 34. E. 3. c. 16. because the people in those troublesome times of Wars, could not attend to know the Fines, and make their claims, Fines did lose their force, and were in effect, but Feoffments of Record, which was the occasion of great contention among the Subjects of the Realm; whereupon the Statute of 4. H. 7. was enacted to reform them, as by the preamble appeareth, by which five years after Proclamations made upon the Fine, are given to him that right hath to make his claim or pursue his action, whereas the common Law gave him but a year and a day, and also if a Fine be levied without Proclamations, or without so many as the Statute requireth, than the Statute of non-claime doth extend to such a Fine, Coke Com. 262. a. by which Statute the ancient strength of Fines is renewed, and made to be as they were heretofore; the final end and conclusion of all strifes and debates, as the Statute phraseth it. From the effest. EVentus est, qui ex causa sequitur, & dicitur eventus quia ex causa evenit, the event of a thing is that which followeth the cause, and it is called an event because it cometh from the cause. Coke l. 9 f. 81. b. Agnes Gores case. Who did secretly put poison into an electuary, which one Martin the Apothecary had made, with an intent to kill her hushand, part of which her husband and her Father having eaten were greivously sick; whereof her Father complaining to the said Martin, Martin stirring the electuary did eat part of it the one and twentieth of May, and died the 22th. of May, and it was resolved that Agnes was guilty of the Murder of the said Martin, for the Law conjoineth the murderous intention of Agnes in putting poison into the electuary to kill her husband, with the event that followed upon it, to wit the death of the said Martin, for the putting of poison in the electuary was the cause of the poisoning, and death of the said Martin was the event, for that is the event which followeth the cause, and are called events because they come from the cause, and the stirring of the electuary by Martin without putting in the poison by Agnes could not have been the cause of his death, ibidem. Frustra expectatur eventus, cujus effectus nullus sequitur, it is in vain to expect the event, where no effect followeth, Coke l. 5 f. 15. b. Cawdrys case. As if an excommunication under the Pope's bull is not of force to disable any man in England, and that if it, being the extreme and final end of any suit in the Court of Rome, be not to be allowed in England, it consequently followeth, that by the ancient common Law of England, no suit for any cause, though it be spiritual arising within this Realm, aught to be determined in the Court of Rome, for in vain an event is to be expected of which no effect followeth, and that the Bishops of England are the immediate Officers, and Ministers to the King's Courts, ibidem. Plus virium habent argumenta ex effectis, Fons. Log. Arguments from the effects are of greater force, and therefore doth the Law commonly construe things according to the effects. As if a Deed be delivered by an infant, it cannot be delivered again at his full age, for it took some effect before, and was but voidable, 1. H. 6. 4. But a deed delivered by a Feme-covert, or a release delivered to one, who had nothing in the Land may be delivered again, to wit, when she cometh to be sole, or the party to have somewhat in the Land, for the first delivery was merely void and of no effect at all. From the whole, and the part. TOtum praefertur unicuique parti, the whole is preferred before either part, Coke l. 3. f. 41. in Ratcliffs case. As the blood which is between every Heir and his Ancester maketh him Heir, for without blood none can inherit, and therefore it is great reason, that he who hath the whole, and entire blood shall inherit before him who hath but part of the blood of his Ancester, because by the order of nature the whole is to be preferred before the part. And therefore saith Bracton, Propt●r jus sanguinis duplicatum dicitur haeires tam ex parte matris quam ex parte patris propinquior soror, quum frater de alia uxore, that from the double right of blood, as well from the part of the father, as from the part of the Mother, the Sister is said to be the nearer heir, than the brother of the other wife, and Britton saith, that the right of blood in this case maketh the Female to exclude the male, ibidem. And therefore by the common Law of England, if a common person have issue a Son, and a Daughter by one venture, and a Son by another venture, and dyeth seized of Lands in Fee-simple, and the eldest Son entereth into the Land, and dyeth without issue, the Sister of the whole blood shall inherit to him, and not the brother of the half blood, Coke ibidem, 40. b. Vbi major pars ibi totum, where the major part is there is the whole, 21. E. 4. 27. & 14. H. 8. 27. The Dean and major part of the Chapter maketh the Croporation, and their act is the act of the Corporation, though the others do not agree, which accordeth with the rule of the Canon Law, authoritas, & potestas capituli consistit in majore pare ejus, & sani●ri & sic totum capitulum facere dicitur quod facit major, & sanior pars, Panor●●tanus. The authority and power of a Chapter consisteth in the greater, and sounder part, and so the whole Chapter is said to do what the major and sounder part doth. But here this difference is to be taken, that in Colleges and Corporations the major part of the Members ought to give their voices in a distinct number, and not in a confused, and incertain number, as in the election of the Knights of Parliament, or the Coronors, or Virderors in the County Court, the greater voice and acclamation is sufficient to show the assent of the greater part of the Freeholders', who make the election, Ployd. 126. a. So as the major part of the Chapter doth consent in making this confirmation, and this consent ought to be expressed by the fixing of the Seal, 14. H. 6. 17. So ought they to sit in one place and at one time, for otherwise it may be called an assent, and not a consent, where the lease ought to be confirmed by the assent and consent of the Dean and Chapter; for as the body natural cannot make any perfect act if it be dismembered, no more can a body politic, but the persons which are members of it ought to be capitulariter congregati, in a certain place, otherwise if they be scattered, or dispersed in several places, that which they do shall not be said to be the Act of the Corporation, but factum singulorum, as 15. E. 4. 2. a. where the major part of the Monks had subscribed their hands to a deed of the Abbot, but it was not expressed, that it was done with the assent and consent of the Covent, it was said to be done by those particular persons which had subscribed, and not by the Corporation, and such a deed shall not bind the house, yet the Dean and Chapter are not confined to their Chapterhouse, but they may meet to and make their Acts elsewhere; and therefore it is holden, 21. E. 4. 26 That where a Deed did bear date in dom● capituli, averrement might be, that the deed was delivered at another place, yet the major part ought to be present in the same place, and therefore the election of Coroners ought to be in pleno comitatu, as appeareth by the Writ de coronatore eligendo. So the consent of the major part of the Chapter, aught to be at the same time, simul & semel, and not scatteringly and upon several days, for it is not a consent unless it be simul, for consensus est voluntas multo●um ad ques res pertinet simul juncta, for consent is the will of many joined together, concerning those things which appertain unto them, Davis f. 48. vide ibidem plura. Turp●s est pars quae cum suo toto non convenit. It is a foul and deformed part which agreeth not with the whole, Ployd. f. 161. a. And therefore every part of a deed ought to be conferred with the other, and one entire sense thereupon to be made, as if I release all actions and stay there, all actions are gone, but if I say further, which I have as Executor to I. S. there the generality is restrained. So 17. E. 4. f. 22. The King granteth to Garter King of Heralds ten pounds for the term of his life, if he had stayed there, he had had it absolutely for term of his life, but where he faith further, by reason of his Office, by it he hath restrained the generality, vide ibidem plura, in Throgmortons' case, so as if he be removed from his Office he shall lose his annuity. Parte quacumque sublata integrante, sive necessaria tollitur totum, the substantial or necessary part of any thing being taken away, the whole is destroyed, Coke l. 3. f 41. in Ratcliffs case, As none can be procreated but of the father and the mother, and aught to have in him their two bloods: which bloods commixed in him by lawful marriage constitutes and makes him heir, so none can be heir to any unless he hath in him both the bloods to whom he shall be made heir, and therefore the heir of the half blood shall not inherit, because he wanteth one of the bloods which make him inheritable, for the blood of the father and mother are but one blood inheritable, and both are necessary to the procreation of an heir, and therefore if there be Baron and Feme, Donees in special tail, and the Baron is attainted of treason and executed having issue, and the Feme die, the issue shall not have the Land because the father is attainted, for he ought in his lineal conveyance to make himself heir as well of the part of his father as of the part of his mother, Dier, f. 332. b. And that bar and forfeiture is made by the Statute of 26. H. 8. c. 13. which provideth that every offender convict of high treason shall forfeit to the King etc. All his Lands, etc. saving to every person all his right, title, interest etc. so as the issues in tail are barred by that statute, because the heir is disabled, and cannot make himself heir in his lineal conv●yance, as well to the father as mother, Coke l. 9 f. 140. a. upon which reason Britton saith, that if one be attainted of felony by judgement, the heirs engendered after the attainder shall be excluded of all manner of succession of inheritance, as well of the part of the father as of the part of the mother, because at the time of the generation of him, the father's blood was corrupted, et ex leproso parente leprosus generatur filius, Coke l. 3. f. 41. vide plura. From the circumstances of time and place. MOmentum & instans est unum indivisibile in tempore, quod non est tempus neque pars temporis, ad quod tamen partes temporis copulantur, Ployd. 110. b. The distinction of a moment cannot be discerned or observed in the actions of men, who cannot do any thing without the space of time; yet as Ployd. f. 258. b. in Madam Hales case, in things of instant there is a priority of time in the consideration of the Law, as in a fellow of himself, the forfeiture shall have no relation but to the time of his death, and the death precedeth the forfeiture, and notwithstanding the forfeiture cometh at the same instant when he dieth, yet in consideration of Law one shall be said to precede the other, though both shall be said to come at an instant, for every instant hath the end of one time, and the commencement of another, and so in the death of a Felon of himself, the death and the forfeiture cometh together and at the same time, and yet there is priority, to wit, the end of his life is the beginning of the forfeiture, and yet the forfeiture is so near the death that there is no mean time between them, but are conjoined, for a moment or instant is one indivisible thing in time, which is not time, nor part of time, to which notwithstanding the parts of time are conjoined, vide ibidem plura, and in the case between Fulmasten and Steward, foe 110. So Fulbeck in his Pandects, L. 1. f. 9 b. The existence of a moment cannot possibly be discerned, and therefore is not so much as the twinkling of an eye, yet the Law doth operate without compass of time in an instant, but man never, for every act of man must have space longer or shorter, but the nature of such instants as the law doth imagine, is such and so sudden, that as the Civilians, omnom respuunt mo●am, and the reason is, because in the operation of the law that which is imagined to be done is dicto citius, presently done, and whereas the act of man is mixed with the act of Law, though in regard of the same thing the act of Law is momentary, yet the act of man must needs bear some delay, as those things by the civil law which are taken from the enemies do incontinently become his, who doth seize and take them, the law doth give them unto him presently, yet there must be a time to take them, that the Law may give them. So if a Lease be made to A. for the life of B. and A. dyeth, C. entereth into the Land and enjoyeth it as occupant, the Law because it will not have the freehold in suspense, doth imagine that it was presently and immediately in him after the death of A. and that he entered presently: but if we respect the entry as the Act of man, we must needs conceive that he had some time to enter into the Land, and by his entry which is an act of motion to gain the free hold, ibidem. Quae incontinenti fiunt in esse videntur, Coke l. 8. f. 77. a. Those things which are done in an instant seem to be in esse, or in being, in Staffords case, as a particular estate, and the increase of a particular estate ought to take effect by the same deed or grant or ●y two deeds delivery at the same time, which is all one in effect, for those things which are done in an instant and at the same time, seem to be in being. And the particular estate and the increase of the estate upon it, is but one grant to take effect out of the same root, and though that it vesteth at several times, yet when it vesteth it hath the vigour and force of the same grant, 27. H. 6. f. 7. So l. 2. f. 71. a. A condition cannot precede an estate, but aught to be in the said conveyance, or comprised in another deed, delivered at one and the same time, as the books are agreed in 17. Ass. 2. and 34. Assize, for the above said reason, vide ibidem S. Cromwel's case. But Coke come. f. 236. putteth a difference between inheritances executed, and inheritances executory: as if Lands be executed by livery, they cannot by Indenture of defeasance be defeated afterward, or if the disseisee release to a disseisor, it cannot be defeated by Indentute of defeasance afterwards, but at the time of the release or feoffment the same may be defeated by Indentures of defeasance: for it is a Maxim in law, quae inconunenti fiunt in esse videntur. But Rents, Annuities, Conditions, Warranties, & such like, that be inheritances executory may be defeated by defeasances made either at that time or at any time after, & so is the law of statutes, recognizances, and obligations, and other things executory, ib. Agreeable to this rule is the reason of the case put by Bro. judgement 148. That if a Feme suffer a recovery of her jointure against the statute of 11 H. 7. without the assent of him in the reversion, and after he in the reversion releaseth to the recoveror by Fine, that assent cometh too late, and cannot make the recovery good was once void, and for the same reason the consent of the major part of a Chapter must be done at one time simul, & semel, and not scatteringly or at several days, vide Davis Rep. f. 48. b. So Pl. f. 135. a. b. A Lease by deed for 11. years, and in security of the term, the Lessor made a Charter upon condition, that if he was disturbed of his term he should have fee, and livery and seisin was made, as well upon the one Charter as the other, & then the Lessee was disturbed, and it was adjudged that he should have fee, because the Charters were delivered at one and the same time, T. 10. E. 3. f. 521. Tempus est mensura motus secundum prius, & posterius, A●ist. 4. Phys. Time is the measure of motion according to priority and posteriority, for as the motion doth measure the place, so doth time the motion, as a days journey is measured of a day, and an hours of an hour, and because all contracts and matters of intercourse do fall within the lists and precincts of time, therefore the moments and measures of time should be publicly and familiarly known to popular conceits. For tempus est mensura rerum, time is the measure of all things, and as Ployd. f. 555. b. the diversity of estates proceeds from the diversity of time, for the estate in Land is the time in Land, for he that hath a fee-simple in Land hath time in the Land without fine, or the Land for time without end, so he that hath land in tail hath time in it, or the land for time, so long as he hath issue of his body, and he which hath an estate in Land for life, hath time no longer than that he shall live, and so for another man's life or years. And as the time measureth things, so doth the law measure time, as by the true computation the lesser year consisteth of 865. days, and six hours, whereby in every fourth year there is die excrescens, which maketh that year to have 366. days, which is called the greater year, yet by legal computation, a quarter of a year containeth 91. days, & half a year containeth 162. days for the odd hours in legal computation are rejected: And in the statute de annob. Sextil. it is provided, Quod computetur dies ille excrescens, & dies proxime praecedens pro uno die, that the day excrescent and the day precedent shall be computed for one day, so as in computation the day excrescent is not accounted, so a month is regularly accounted in law for twenty eight days, and not according to the Solar month, nor according to the Calendar, unless it be for the account of the Lapse in a Quare impedit or the right of the Patron. Coke come. f. 135. b. And Kellaway 21. H. 7. f. 75. A feast in our law beginneth in the morning and endeth at the night, and the natural day beginneth ad ortum solis, and endeth ad occasum solis, and so is it taken and adjudged in our Law. But the feast by the law of the Church beginneth at noon in the Vigil, and lasteth until the midnight of the next day, and the night which maketh burglary, beginneth ad occasum solis, and lasteth until the rising of the Sun, for where a man hath broken an house after the setting of the Sun, it hath been adjudged burglary, for if the night should begin so soon as the day is ended, and last until the morning of the next day, it would be too hard a thing to try &c. ibidem. In omnibus stipulationibus id tempus spectatur, a quo contrabimus, Reg. I.C. Paulus 62. ad edictum, in all assumpsits and contracts, that time is respected from which we contract, as a man seized in fee, maketh a lease for ten years, and after selleth the land and taketh it back again to him and his wife: and then the husband and wife letteth it for twenty years, reserving a rent, the husband dieth, the wife accepteth the rent for the first ten years, by this the second lease is not affirmed, for the acceptance of the rent before the lease beginneth, and is not due, is no acceptance, 1. E. 6. 37. Coke l. 5. f. 1. a. b. in Claytons' case, From henceforth in a Lease shall be accounted from the delivery of the Indentures, and not from the computation of the date, for from henceforth is all one to say as from the making of the Lease. Et traditio loqui facit chartam, delivery maketh the deed to speak; where a Lease is to begin from the making of a Lease, there the day of the delivery shall be taken inclusive, and the day itself is parcel of the demise, but if it be made to begin from the day of the making or the day of the date, than the day itself shall be taken exclusive, and excluded. And whereas the statute of 27. H. 8. Of enrolment, saith, That all such writings shall be enroled within six months after the date of the same writings indented, if the writings have date, they shall be accounted from the date, but if the date be wanting, the six months shall be accounted from the delivery, vide ibidem plura. In obligationibus in quibus dies non ponitur presenti die debetur Pomponius, & nulla temporis designatio praesens denotat, Reg. I. C. And it is a ground in our Law, that when a man's bound in twenty pound to pay ten pound, and no day of payment is limited, the lesser sum is due presently, and ought presently to be tendered, 20. E. 4. 8. 21. E. 4. 8. In the case of the Mayor of Exeter by all the Sergeants and of some of the Justices, yet by the opinion of Starky the discretion of the Justice shall limit a time, having regard to the distance of the place, and to the space of time wherein such a thing may be performed, for the Obligor is not compellable to pay the money within an hour, neither may he defer the payment for seven years, but the time must be adjudged by law, Ib. So if I prescribe to have common by vi●inage in such a village, namely every year after the Corn is severed and carried away to put my beasts into the field, and all the terr tenants of the village have carried away their corn and hay except one man only, the law shall adjudge whether he had sufficient time to carry away his corn and hay, when his neighbours did carry it away, Ibidem by Starky and Fairfax, and so in the case before, the discretion of the Judges ought to measure the time, and surely his opinion seemeth reasonable unto me, though I dare not affirm it to be Law, for every man's business ought to be rated by a convenient time, Fulb. l. 1. f 14. a. So Coke l. 3. f. 28. b. Whereas by the statute of 34. and 35. H. 8. of wills, and the statute of 32. H 8. of wills shall be expounded, that the King shall take for his full part etc. of all such Manors and Lands, as shall by any means descend or come by descent etc. immediately after the decease of the same devisor etc. It was said that the word immediately shall not have a strict construction, that i● ought to be done in ipso articulo temporis, in the same instant of time, but shall be satisfied if it be done in convenient time, as in 18. E. 4. 22. If a man be bound to make an obligation immediately, yet he shall have convenient time to make it, Ibidem. And by the civil law when no day of payment is limited, when the Vendee is to pay his money, etc. the law doth limit a time, and assign to the p●rty charged with the payment the space of threescore days, Fulb. f. 14. l. 1. a. Quam longum debet esse rationabile tempus non definitur in jure, sed pendet ex discretione justiciorum, Coke cam. f. 56. b. A reasonable time shall be adjudged by the discretion of the Judges, before whom the cause dependeth. As if a man be seized of a Mesuage in fee simple, fee tail, or for term of life, who hath certain goods within the same house, and maketh his Executors, and dieth, yet the executors shall have free entry, egress and regress to carry out of the same house, the goods of their testator by a reasonable time, which reasonable time shall be adjudged by the discretion of the Judges. And so it is if the Lessoroust his Tenant at will, he shall have free entry, egress and regress into the said house by reasonable time to carry away his goods and Utensils. So also is it of reasonble fines, customs, and services upon the true estate of the cause depending before them, for reasonableness in these cases belongeth to the knowledge of the law, and therefore to be decided by the Justices, and this being said of time, the like may be said of things incertain, which ought to be reasonable; for nothing that is contrary to reason is consonant to law, ibidem. Proprietas temporis fingenda est secundum subjectam materiam, Reg. I. C. The propriety of time is to be feigned or fitted according to the subject of the matter. As if one deviseth, by will in writing, land to one and his heirs, and after in another clause, he deviseth out of that Land a rend charge to one and his heirs, that shall be good, and the rent in construction of law shall be taken to be first devised, though it be last in words, Ployd. f. 541. a. So if one deviseth a term for years to his son, and that the wife shall have it during the son's minority, this is first a devisere the wife, and afterwards to the son when he cometh of full age, vide ibidem plura. Qui male agit, odit lucem, Coke l. 7. f. 66. a. and therefore it was resolved by all the Justices, and Barons of the Exchequer, that an arrest in the night was lawful, as well at the suit of the Subject, as the suit of the King, for the Officer and Minister of Justice ought to arrest him when he can find him, for otherwise peradventure he shall never find him, for he that doth evil hateth the light; and if the Officer doth not arrest him when he findeth him, and may arrest him, the Plaintiff shall have an action upon the case, and shall recover all his loss and damages, and it is like unto the case for Damage-feasant, and therefore one may distrain in the night, or otherwise peradventure he shall not distrain, vide ibidem, in Mackallyes case. He that doth evil hateth the light, quia nocte latent mendae because offences are hidden in the night, and therefore as the Civilians, fur diurnus differt a nocturno, a nocturnal thief differeth from a diurnal, and receiveth a different and more grievous punishment, with which the common Law accordeth, for he that breaketh a dwelling house in the night, although he carrieth away nothing, committeth felony and burglary, and by the Law is deprived of Clergy, and suffereth death without mercy, whereas if it had been committed in the day, he had been capable of mercy, and clergy. Qui male agit, odit lucam & omnia delicta in aperto leviora font, Coke l. 8. f. 127. a. He that doth evil hateth the light, and all open offences are the more lightly to be punished, as a Foreigner who keepeth an inward shop, is a greater offender than he that keepeth an open Shop, for hidden places and corners are more dangerous and offensive, for there they may use deceit, and not be subject to the search, and therefore if a foreigner which hath an open Shop shall forfeit forty shillings, he that is a Foreigner and offender in secret places is worthy to forfeit five pound, for it is the rule of Law and reason, quod clam del●nquens magis punitur qu●m pa●am, he that privately offended shall be more punished than he that offendeth openly. Tempora mutantur, & nos mutamur in illis, Coke l. 6. f. 78. Times and seasons are changed, and so in them are we, as at the first the Leases were distributed in decurias or decennas, and therefore were called decennarij, and out of every ten one of them was called capitalis plegius, the Chief pledge, and every of them were pledges for another, and at this day in some places, is called the Tithingman, and in Yorkshire Tenmantale in respect of the other inferior pledges, so as the return of the Constable, or the presentment of the Jury doth not make a man a chief pledge, but the times are changed, and the true institution of this Court is vanished, vide ibidem, Boulogne's case. At the common Law upon a Fine, the party had a year and a day to make his claim, but now by the Statute he hath five years, and if the disseisor had continued a year and day in possession, by the ancient Law the entry of the disseisor for his negligence had bee● taken away, which now is only by descent, many a●● continual are the mutations of the Law, according to the changes of the time. For the rule and ground holdeth, quod perpetua lex est nullam begem humanam, ac positivam esse perpetuam, that it is a perpetual Law, that no humane, or positive Law is perpetual. Bac. Max. f. 70. Tempus edax rerum, Coke l. 3. f. 21. A. maketh a lease for years to B. and when the Term is ended the remainder to C. the reversion is good, for it is certain enough that every term shall end, for time is the consumer and divourer of things. Distingue tempora, & concordabis leges, the times being distinguished, the Law will be reconciled, Coke l. 9 f. 16. b. The King by the Statute de bigammis, 4. E. 1. when the heir was of full age, had nothing but primam seisinam capiendo exitum, the profits of the Land in effect for one year, but could not endow the Feme, because after the Heir was of age, he was not guardian, and for that reason he could not endow the Feme at the common Law, no more than guardian in chivalry might, who though after the Heir was of full age did hold the Land further for the value of the marriage, no Writ of dower did lie against him, because he was not guardian, yet afterwards by the Statute de praerogativa regis 17. E. 2. the King had power to endow the Feme, although the Heir were of full age, si vidua illae voluerint, so as the Statute leaveth it to the election of the Feme, whether she will be endowed in the Chancery, or at the common Law, so as by distinguishing the times, the difference of those Laws are apparently agreed and reconciled. Omnia tempus habent, & haben● sua tempora tempus, Coke l. 10. f. 82. a. All things are subject to time, and time itself hath also its times: as by the Statute of 34 H. 8. three several Times ought to concur in a devise, whereby the King may have the value of the third part, the first is tempus habendi, every person having; the 2d. is tempus tenendi, holding of the King; the third is tempus disponendi, may ●ive and dispose, as if a man be seized of one acro●●f Land in fee in chief by Knight's service and of two other acres in fee holden in socage, and the Tenant infeoff his youngest Son of the acre holden in chief, and of one of the other acres, to have to him, and his heirs, and afterwards purchaseth Lands holden in socage, he may devise all his Lands newly purchased holden in sooage, because he had no Lands holden of Knight's service in Capite at the time of the devise, for the acts have made a conjunction of the Lands which the Tenant holdeth in socage with the Land which he holdeth of the King by Knight's service in Capite, so as when the Tenant hath conveyed the Land holden in Capite to his youngest Son, now when he made his Will of the Lands so newly purchased, he had no Lands holden of the King in Capite at the time of the devise, and the Statute restraineth only those Lands in socage, which he had at the time of having of the Lands holden in Capite, vide ibidem plura, in Loveys case. For Judicis officium est ut res, ita tempora rerum Quaerere, quaesite tempore tutus eris. A Judges part it is to ponder things with time, And by the square of time sure Judgement so to find. Coke Com. f. 202. a. If a rent be granted payable at a certain day, and if it be behind, and demanded, that the Grantee shall distrain for it, in this case the Grantee needeth not to demand it at the day, but if he demand it at any time after the day, he shall distrain for it, for the Grantee hath election in this case to demand it when he will, to enable him to distrain. But upon a Lease for years, reserving a rent, upon condition that if the rent be not paid at Michaelmas, or within one and twenty days after, that then he may re-enter, the tenant is not bound to pay the rent, or tender the money before the last instant of the last day, but if he do not, than the Lessor may re-enter and have the Land and the rent also, but if the Lessor be not at the time there to receive the rent, he cannot re-enter though he demand the rent before, Brook. Intender 41. unless before the Lessee meets the Lessor upon the Land, and tender the Rent on the same day, Coke Com. f. 22. a. Ployd. f. 392. & 393. a. Where a thing is referred to a time, which declareth certainly, if it be mistaken all shall be void, as Trin. 7. E. 3. 26. One bringeth a Writ and reciteth that it is contained in the Articles made in the time of Edward the second, and declared further according to the statute, and the writ was abated by award, for that those Articles articuli super chartas, C. 9 were made in the time of Edward the first. So Tr. 18. E. 3. f. 25. A statute Merchant was made to be paid in the sixteenth year of E. 3. and the party sued execution, and the Writ supposed the sum to be paid in the fourteenth year of E. 3. and by the suit the Feoffee was outed, whereupon he sued a Writ of error in the King's Bench, and the writ was abated, and it was said, that the time declared certainty, for it might be that there were two statutes payable at divers several days, and therefore the day of payment was material, ibidem. So if a defeasance be made of a statute which reciteth it to be made the tenth day of May, where it beareth date the first day of May, the defeasance is void for the misprision of the time, for the law saith, that it may be that there was two statutes, the one bearing date the first day, and the other the tenth day, vide ibidem plura, in the Earl of Leicester's case. A loco, from the place. LOcus pro solutione reditus aut pecuniae secundum conditionem dimissionis aut obligationis est stricte observandus, Coke l. 4. f. 73. a. in Burchers case. The place for the payment of money or rent, according to the condition of a Lease or obligation, is strictly to be observed. As if a common person maketh a Lease of Lands in R. reserving a rent to be generally paid at such a feast, upon condition of reentry if it be not then paid, the demand must be upon the land, for the land is the debtor, and therefore that is the place of demand appointed by the law: and if there be an house upon the land, he must demand the rent at the house, and not at the back door but at the fore door, because the demand must be made at the most notorious place, and it is not material whether any person be there or not, and if one place be as notorious as another, the Lessor hath election to demand it at which he will, and if the Lessor demand it at a place which is not notorious, or at the back door of the house, and in pleading allege a demand of the rent generally at the house, the Lessee may traverse the demand, and upon the evidence it shall be found for him, for that it was a void demand, Ibidem; and Coke come 201. and 202. b. a. But if a rent be reserved upon the demise, to be payable at a place out of the land, he that shall take advantage for nonpayment of the rent ought to demand the rent at the place where it is limited to be paid, and therefore the opinion in Kelwellies' case, Ployd. f. 70. that he in the reversion may enter for the non payment of such rent without any demand made, was utterly denied by the whole Court, Ididem, and Coke, come 202. a. But if there be no place appointed where the rent is to be paid, there the rent is to be tendered on the Land, Coke 210. a. b. Because it issueth out of the Land, but otherwise it is in such a case of a Feoffment or Mortgage, for it is not sufficient for the feoffor to be upon the land, there ready to pay the money to the feoffee at the day set, but he must seek the feoffee if he be then in another place within the Realm of England: and so it is if a man be bound in an obligation of twenty pound, upon condition that he pay to the obligee at such a day 10. l. that then etc. The obligor ought to seek the obligee if he be in England, and at the day appointed tender the ten pound, otherwise he shall forfeit the twenty pound, Coke come. ibidem, and therefore as he adviseth, it shall be good and a sure way upon such a feoffment or mortgage to appoint a special place where the money shall be paid, and the more especial it is the more better it is, Coke come. f. 211. b. And so is it also upon an obligation. Ployd. f. 71. a. and b. If the obligee be in his own house, and the obligor come to him there, and tender the money, he shall not be a trespassor for his coming there, for in that by the taking of the obligation, the obligee was assenting that the obligor should pay him the ten pound, by necessity of reason he ought to be assenting to come to him to offer unto him the 10. l. for to come to his person precedeth the offer which he was assenting to; & therefore ex consequenti, he shall not punish him for that thing to which himself was agreeing. But if he had entered into the house of another man, there he shall be a trespassor to the said man, if the same man will take him so, vide plura ibid. Kedwellies case. Exception. Though a common person in reversion cannot enter for nonpayment of rent without demand, yet if the King make such a Lease for years, rendering rend with such a condition ut supra, the King shall take advantage of the condition without any demand, because the law, which always observeth decorum, and conveniency, appointeth the subject to attend upon his sovereign, and in such case to make the first act though it be in case of condition, which trencheth upon the destruction of his estate. But if the King granteth the reversion over, his grantee shall not take advantage of the condition without demand, for it is a personal prerogative annexed to the person of the King, and not in respect of the nature and quality of the land, Coke l. 4. f. 23. A So the King maketh a Lease for years, rendering a rent, payable at his receipt of Westminster, and after the King granteth the reversion to another and his heirs, the grantee shall demand the rent on the Land, and not at the King's receipt at Westminster, for though the law without express words doth appoint the Lessee in the King's case to pay it at the King's receipt, yet in case of a subject the law appointeth the demand to be on the land, Coke come. f. 201. b. and Coke l. 4. f. 72. 73. Burroughs case, vide ibidem plura. Circumstantia loci est testis veritatis, & certitudinis, Ployd. 393. a. The place is material and is a circumstance and witness of truth and certainty: As if a man will plead the Letters Patents of the King, bearing date at Westminster, and indeed they did bear date at another place: it seems in 38. H. 6. by Choke, f. 34. by Littleton f. 36. and by Redsham, Moil and Prisot f. 37. That for the variance of the place it failed, and the Plea shall be adjudged against him. So if the King give authority to one to arraign one upon indictment taken against him at Dale in such a County, when indeed the indictment was taken at another place in the same County, he cannot arraign him, for the place declareth the certainty what indictment the King intended, for it may be there were two indictments of the same matter, and thing, and the one of them taken in one Village, & the other in another, and by it the expresment of the Village declared the certainty of it. Dier 105. a. An outlawry was reversed because it was ad comitat. Lancaster ibidem tent. and did not say at Lancaster or such certain place, to which ibidem might be referred. Ployd. f. 191. a. The place must be shown by the Plaintiff where the things were done, because the visne should come thence, if the things be traversed, as H. 6. E. 4. 11. Brooke lieu 55. The place ought to be shown in the count in debt upon an obligation, where the obligation was made, and M. 39 H. 6. 32. Brook lieu 45. If an attornement be alleged, the place ought to be pleaded where it was made, and in such like things of effect, that may be traversed, the place ought to be shown where the thing was done for the certainty of the trial, and f. 149. b. the place ought to be shown where the attornement was made, if the attornement be pleaded, 15. H. 7. 24. Coke l. 6. f. 47. Dowdales' case, when the place is material, as when it is parcel of the issue, there the Jurors cannot find the point in issue in any other place, for by especial pleading the point in issue is restrained to a certain place, but when the place is named only for conformity and necessity, and when it is parcel of the issue, as in the case of 10. Eliz. 271. in debt against the heir, he pleaded rie● by descent generally, in that case the Plaintiff cannot reply in such general manner, for then no trial can be had of it, but in case for conformity and necessity of a trial, he ought to name a certain place, as there he did in the Parish and Ward within Lond. but God forbidden but that the Jurors may find assets by descent in any other county within England, for the Law is, that the Plaintiff in such case shall have execution of all the Lands the heir had, and peradventure he might have Lands in divers counties: and therefore though a place be named for necessity sake, yet the Jurors may find all that which by law may be chargeable in such a case, in whatsoever City and County it lieth; and so was the principal case resolved after in 10. Eliz. though it be not reported there, and with it agreeth 10. H. 6. 13. And the conceit of Brook. 2. Mar. Attaint 104. that the jurors of one county are not compellable to find transitory things in another county, was altogether denied by the whole Court, for they are bound under the pain of attaint to find assets in any other county whatsoever, for it may be that the executors have goods of the Testators in divers several counties, and that in none of those counties had by him there is assets, vide ibidem plura: And if the Excutors have any goods of the Testators in any part of the world, he shall be charged in respect of them, or if Merchants and others which have goods of great value beyond the Seas, be indebted in England, if those goods should not be liable to their debts, it would be a great defect in Law, Ib. Coke come. f. 282. a. It is an ancient principle of the Law, that for transitory actions the Plaintiff may allege the same in what place or county he will, and the Jurors upon not guilty pleaded are to be made to find for the Plaintiff, neither can the assault, battery, or finding of goods &c. alleged in another county be traversed without special cause of justification, which extendeth to some special place, as if a Constable of a town in another County arresteth the body of a man that breaketh the peace, there he may traverse the County, but he must not rest there, but all other places saving in the town where he is Constable, vide ibidem plura. But in the case of felony the trial shall be by the common Law in the same place where the offence was, and shall not be supposed in any other place, for in criminal causes the rule holdeth, Ubi quis deliquit ibi punietur, Coke l. 6. f. 47. b. where one offendeth there he shall be punished, yet this rule faileth in treason, to adhere to the enemy of the King without the Realm, which is declared to be treason by the common Law, by the statute of 25. E. 3. de proditionibus, for least there should be a want of trial in matter of such consequence, the adherence without the Realm must be alleged in some place within England: and if upon the indictment they shall find any adherences out of the realm they shall find the Delinquent guilty, 5. R. 2. trial 24 but commonly they did indite him in that county where his Lands did lie, which were to be forfeited, and so it is declared by the statute of 35. H. 8. c. 2 vide Coke come 261. f. b. Saepe locus in delcto auget vel minuit culpam Reg. I. C. The place doth often augment or diminish the offence, as he who striketh a man in Westmin. Hall, shall have his right hand cut off & his Lands & Chattels forfeited, so if he strike a Juror; and besides shall be committed to perpetual Prison. Finch N●mot. f. 25. If men tilt or tourney in the presence of the King, and if two masters of defence play their prizes on the stage, and kill one another, it is not felony, Heb. Rep. f. 89. So t●e felonious taking of goods out of any Church or Chappel is sacrilege, and a felony more heinous than ordinary, and therefore more severely punished. It was King Alureds' Law, Qui in templo quid clepscrit, valorem solvito, mulctampretio rei congruam pendito, & manum quacumque furatus est praecidito nec redimere manum potest nisi propria capitis aestimatione, whosoever shall steal any thing in a Church, let him restore the value, let him pay a fine answerable to the worth of the thing, let that hand with which he did steal be cut off, neither could he redeem his hand but with the price of his life, which in those ancient times wherein offences were not so frequent, was a grievous punishment, wherein their was chief censured with satisfaction, but in the succeeding worse times by the statute of 23. H. 8. It was made capital without the benefit of Clergy. So to kill the King's Chancellor, Treasurer, Justices in Eyre, and Assize of Oyer and Terminer being in his place, and doing his Office is high treason Dalt. 226. Si desit obedientia non adjuvat locus, Coke l. 7. f. 24. b In calvin's case, If obedience be wanting the place furthereth not. Samaria in Syria was the chief City of the ten Tribes, but being conquered by the King of Syria, and the Jews taken Prisoners, and carried away into captivity, was after inhabited by the Paynims, yet because the people of Samaria were not under actual obedience by the judgement of the chief Justice of the whole world, they were adjudged alienigenae, Aliens, Luke c. 17. Where one of them who was cleansed of his Leprosy by our Saviour, being a Samaritan, returned, and gave praise to God, and is by our Saviour called an alien, that is, a stranger borne, because he had the place but wanted the obedience, and where obedience is wanting, the place helpeth not. And this agreeth with the divine saying, Si locus salvare potuisset, Satan de coelo pro sua inobedientia non cecidisset, Adam in Paradiso non cecidisset, Lot in Monte non cecidisset, sed potius in Sodom. If the place could save one, Satan for his disobedience had not fallen from heaven, Adam had not fallen in Paradise, and Lot in the Mountain had not fallen, but rather in Sodom. A Paribus, from equals. PArium eadem est ratio, things are to be construed according to equality of reason, Coke l. 3. f. 12. b. As upon a recognizance acknowledged by the Ancestor, or in a judgement upon an action of debt given against him: if he dieth seized of two Acres, whereof one is holden in Burrough english, or having issue two daughters which make partition, in this case if one be only charged the other shall have contribution, because they are in aequali jure in equal right. So if a man be bound in a statute or recognizance, and after his death some of the land descendeth to the heir of the part of the father, and some to the heir of the part of the mother, in this case one only shall not be charged, and if he be, he shall have contribution against the other. So in dower if the tenant vouch the heir in three several wards, every one shall be equally charged, as it is agreed, 11. H 7. 22. Ibidem f. 13. a. If two, four, or more men being severally seized of land, join in a recognizance, all their lands must be equally extended, because they are in an equal condition and case, 26 Assi. Pl. 37. Now custom hath created inheretances in copy-holds, and that the lands shall be descendable, the law doth direct the descent according to the Maxims and rules of the common law, as incident to every estate descendable, Coke l. 4. f. 22. So now uses have the reputation of inheritances descendable, the common law shall direct the descent of those; and that there shall be possessio fratris of an use as of other inheritances at the common law, 5. E. 4. 7. And of lands in Burrough English, the use shall descend to the puisne, and now also these uses being turned into estates shall be determined in all respects as estates in possession, 23. H. 8. Finch. Nomot. But this difference is put between inheritances in copy hold lands and inheritances in uses, in that such customary inheritaners shall not have by the Law any other collateral qualities which concern not the descent of inheritance, which uses and other inheritances at the common law have, as tenancy by courtesy, or asse●s to charge the heir in an Action of debt upon an obligation made by his Ancestor for him and his heirs, Coke l. 4. f. 22. a. or descent to take away entry; as if a copyholder in right of his wife surrender it to the use of another in see, and dieth, that shall not be any discontinuance to the feme, but that she and her heirs may enter, Ib. f. 23. Neither shall the feme of customary tenant be endowed, unless it be by special custom, Ib. f. 30. b. and generally copyhold estates shall not have such qualities which estates at the common Law have, without special custom, Ib. f. 23. a. A Simili, from the like. NVllum simile currit quatuor pedibus, Coke. l. 7 f. 34 no like thing runs upon four feet, and Coke l. 4. f. 18. b. Nullum simile est idem, nothing that is like is the same, Sir Gilbert Gerrard's case, upon an action of slander, the Plaintiff counteth, that he was seized of a Manor etc. in fee, and that he was in communication to demise the said land to R. E. and that the Defendant not ignorant thereof said, I have a Lease of the said Manor for ninety years, and that by reason of the said words the said R. E. did not accept of the said Lease, to the damage etc. The Defendant pleaded, that t●lis indentura qualis in the Count was alleged, came to the hands of the Defendant by finding: and it was resolved that that manner of pleading was not a direct answer to the indenture mentioned in the Count, for talis indentura, is not eadem indentura, for no like is the same. Eadem & simili ratione suadente, idem jus statuendum est, Reg. I. C. Vbi eadem est ratio ib● est idemjus, Coke come. f. 191. a. It is one of the Maxims of the common Law cited by Littleton, that in all cases where there is the like reason there is the like law, for reason is the soul of the law, and ratio potest allegari deficiente lege, and reason may be alleged where the Law is wanting, and then as B●act●n De similibus ad similia eadem ratione p●o●●dendum est. From the like unto the like by the same reason we are to proceed, and so argumentum a simili i● good in law, Et quod in uno similium valet valebit in altero, what availeth in one of the likes shall avail in the other; as one shall recover in value against the heir upon the Ancestors warranty, Lands which the heir took in exchange for Lands descended, 1●. H. 3. rec. va. 26. for the similitude of the same reason. A Manor is given by Fine, A Sc●●e facias lieth of a tenancy that after escheated to the said Manor, 48. E. 3. 11. If a Manor descend to an heir within age, and after a tenancy escheateth, he shall have his age of it in a praecipe of the manor, it shall be assets by descent, and he may vouch of this tenancy, by reason of a warranty made of the Manor, for the same reason. 6. H. 4 1. And for the same reason a Lease for a thousand days is a Lease for years, 14. H. 8. 13. And a Lease for years, and a release amounteth to a feoffment Brook. The Maxim of a Bastard is eigne, that the mulier puisne must make an entry upon him, or else he gaineth the right, yet a continual claim made by the mulier puisne destroyeth his right, for it is all one as if he had entered, 14. H. 4. 9 If a man licenceth one to occupy his Land for a year, this is a Lease for a year, 5. H. 7. 1. And, this is also according to the rule of the civil law, ubi est eadem ratio & eadem equitas ibi debet esse eadem juris dispositio, where there is the same reason and the same equity, there ought to be the same disposition of right, Coke come. f. 10. a. As in Feoffments, and grants, the word heirs maketh an inheritance, so doth it in exchanges, releases, and confirmations, which enure by way of enlargement of an estate, as also in warranties' bargain, and sales by deed indented and enroled, and the like, in which the word heirs is also necessary, because they stand upon the same reason, that feoffements and grants do, for where there is the same reason, there is the same law. Coke come. f. 55. 56. If Lessee at will soweth the Land, and the Lessor after it is sown & before the corn is ripe put him out, yet the Lessee shall have the corn, and shall have ingress, egress, and regress to cut and carry away the Corn, and if the corn be ripe and ready to cut down, and the Lessor before the Lessee reapeth it, enter and putteth out the Lessee, without all question the Lessee shall have the corn, for by the same reason that he shall have it where he is put out before it is ripe, he shall have it where he is put out after it is ripe, for where there is the same reason there is the same law. A majori & minori, From the greater and the Lesser. IN eo quod plus est, semper inest minus, Reg. I. C. Omne majus continet in se minus, Coke l. 4. f. 46. a. The greater always containeth in it the less, as whereas by the statute of 3. H. 7. c. 1. It is provided, that if Murderers and accessaries or any of them be acquitted upon indictment, or the principal is attainted etc. the wife or heir to him slain may have their appeal against the persons so acquitted or against the principal so attainted, and that the benefit of his Clergy thereof before be not had: It was resolved, that the word Attaint of murder in that act shall not be intended only of a person who hath judgement of life, but also shall be extended to a person convict by confession or verdict, for a person attainted is a person convict, and more and every greater containeth the lesser. Coke l. 5. f. 115. a. It was resolved in Woods case, that if a man tendereth more than he ought to pay, it is good enough, for every greater containeth in itself the lesser, and the other aught to accept so much of it, as is due unto him, Quando plus fit quam fieri debet, v●detur etiam illud fieri quod faciendum est, & in m●j●ri summa continetur minor, when more is done then ought to be done, that seems to be done which was to be done, and the lesser sum is contained in the greater. Ployd. f 349. b. The disseisor maketh a Lease for life, and the Disseisee confirmeth the estate of the Disseisor, the Disseisee cannot enter upon the tenant for life, for his right was to all the estate of the Land, and if he be barred of the Fee simple he is barred from the estate for life, for every greater containeth in itself the lesser. An action of battery is brought, and the evidence proveth it a maim, and well, because it is battery, and more, 31. Ass. pl. 1. Omne majus continet in se suum minus. 28. H. 8. b. By a pardon of Murder, Manslaughter is pardoned, and and an attaint supposing a verdict to have passed between two Justices, whereas it passed before three good enough. A recovery pleaded of three acres, where it was of six, is good enough, Finch. Nomot. f. 31. Where the Custom is, that a man shall not devise his Lands for any higher estate then for life, yet if the devise be in fee, and the Devisee claimeth but for life, the devise is good. Dyer 150. b. Vpton by his last will in writing deviseth an entire manor holden by Knight's service in fee, and it was adjudged a good will for two parts and not void for all. A Qu●re impedit in the Register is praesentare ad Ecclesiam, by this he may count pro tertia parte, Coke l. 10. f. 136. b. in Richard smith's case. A Procedendo supposeth an Assize before Stouse and Burton Justices, and it was also before Shared, and good, because three containeth two, Ployd. Where, by the Custom of a manor a man may demise for life, he also may demise to his Wife durante viduitate, because the greater containeth the lesser, Coke l. 4. Non debet cui plus licet, quod minus est non licere, Regula I. C. Cui licet quod majus, non debet quod minus est non licere, Coke l. 4. f 23. a. To whom it is lawful to do the greater thing, to him it is not unlawful to do the lesser. As where the Custom of the manor is, that Copyhold Lands may be granted to any one in Fee-simple, there the grant to one and his Heirs of his body is within the Custom: for he that may lawfully do the greater, it ought not to be unlawful but that he may do the lesser. Coke l. 9 f. 48. b. There is a great diversity between an Assignee and a Deputy of an Office, the Assignee hath an interest in the Office, and maketh all things in his own name, and for whom his Grantor shall not answer, unless it be in some special cases; but a Deputy hath no interest in the Office but is but a shadow of an Officer, and doth all things in the name of the Officer, and for whom his Grantor shall answer, and when an Officer hath power to make Assigns, he may implicitly make a Deputy, for to whom that which is greater is lawful, to him that which is less is not unlawful, and by consequence, when an office is granted to him and his Heirs, by it he may make an assignee, and by consequence a Deputy. Sicut beatius ita majus est dare, quam accipere, Coke l. ●. f. 57 b. There is a manifest diversity between a receiver, and giver of seisin, for he that hath a term for years, may receive seisin to the benefit of him which hath the Franktenement, and all our Books are, that the possession of a Lessee for years, or guardian is a sufficient seisin for him in the reversion, but he that giveth seisin is tenant of the Franktenement, and therefore greater than Tenant for years that receiveth, for it is a greater thing to give then to receive, and therefore Tenant for years by his payment cannot give seisin to bind him, which hath the Franketenement, vide ibidem plura, in Bredimans' case. Omne magis dignum trahit ad se minus dignum, Coke Com. f. 44. a. b. The more worthier thing draws unto it the less worthy, the Charter granted by H. 3. in the ninth year of his reign was of force and validity, notwithstanding his nonage, for that in judgement of Law, the King, as a King, cannot be said to be a minor, for when the royal politic body of the King doth meet with the natural capacity in one person, the whole body shall have the capacity of the royal politic, which is the greater, and the more worthy, and wherein there is no minority, for the more worthier thing draweth unto it the less worthy, vid. Coke l. 2. f. 68 in Tooker's case, ibidem f. 285 a. Three joint-tenants are disseised, and they arraign an assize, and one of them releaseth to the disseisor all actions personal, this shall bar him, but not the other, for having regard to him, the realty as the more worthy shall be preferred, and the greater worthy draweth to it the less worthy, & ibidem 355. b. It was said that upon a recovery had by default in an action of Waste against Tenant in Dower, a quod ei de forceat did not lie, because in an action of Waste, Damages were the principal, as most ancient, and that therefore clearly no quod ei deforceat did lie, but it was answered, that the place wasted was the worthier being in the realty, than Damages that be in the personalty, though more ancient, & omne magis dignum trahit ad se minus dignum, quanquam minus dignum sit antiquius, & a digniori debet fieri denominatio, and every more worthy draweth unto it the less worthy, though the less worthy is more ancient, and a denomination ought to be from the more worthy, vide ibidem plura. Coke l. 6. f. 43 b When an action is in the realty, or mixed with the realty, accord with satisfaction is no Plea, for accord with satisfaction is a bar for the personalty, but not for the realty, and when the personal is mixed with the realty it is no bar for the personalty, for always the greater draweth unto it the less, vide ibidem plura. in Bl●kes case. Charters are put into a box, this altars the nature of the box from being a Chattel, and shall go to the heir, and as the writings are so is the chests and the box they are in, because the Charters and Writings are the more worthy, Noy Max. f. 7. 11. H. 4. 30. If one be instituted and inducted, the trial shall be by the Jury by reason of the induction, because the realty as the more worthy is to be preferred, 22. H. 8. 27. 43. E. 3 13. A Lease is of a Chamber, and a Bed, rendering rend, in debt for the rent, the Defendant shall not wage Law for the rent, because the Chamber is magis dignum, 21. E. 4. 3. An adulterer taketh away a man's wife, and putteth her into new clothes, the husband may take the wife with her clothes, 11. H. 4. 31. A base mine where there is royal ore shall be the Kings, for the worthiness of the ore, Ployd. 318. A villain shall make free Land to be villain Land, but villain Land shall not make a Freeman to be a villain, for the body of a man is more worthy than Land, and therefore the Land shall follow the nature of the person, 3. Eli. 238. So the King's Land which he hath in his natural capacity, shall be demeaned according to the privilege, and prerogative of his body royal. If a man be condemned in trespass, or re-disseisin, and is in execution for the fine of the King, or if he be outlawed of Felony, his body shall not be in prison at the suit of the party, for that the King hath an interest in his body, who is magis dignus. A majori, & digniori fieri debet denominatio, Coke Com. f. 355. b. As Husband and wife are joint Executors, the Writ shall be executoribus, & non executricibus, 22. H. 6. 30. A convenient proportion of Gold, and Silver, over shall give the name to be a Mine royal, Ployd. f. 323. The grant of the Office of the King's Tennis-Court, the Play of the House is included in the grant, because that only giveth the name, Coke l. 8. f. 45. in Woods case. Dyer 314. Where speech is of a will, it shall be intended of the last will, for the will and the last will are taken for all one Quod in minori valet, valebit in majori, what is of force in the lesser, shall be of force in the greater, Coke come. f. 260 a. As if a man in prison shall not be bound by a Recovery by default, for want of answer in Court of Record in a real action, which is matter of Record, a multo fortiori, a descent in the Country, which is matter of deed, shall not for want of claim bind him that is in prison: specially seeing he could not go out of prison to make his continual claim, and the argument a minori ad majus doth ever hold affirmatively, and the argument a majori ad minus doth ever hold negatively, for it is also a rule quod in majori non valet non valebit in minori, what is not of force in the greater shall not be of force in the lesser. Magis, & minus non diversificant, speciem Arist. 2. Top. the greater and lesser doth not make the species and essence of things to differ, the reason why great woods of the age of twenty one years are exempted from the payment of tithes, is not because they are part of the freehold, or inheritance, and that men use not to pay their tithes out of their freehold, but out of those things which spring out of their freehold, as out of corn, grass, fruit, and the like; for the greatest Tree is no more part of the freehold, than the lowest bramble, and are both equal part of the ground wherein they grow, & do take a like sustenance and nourishment from the same, neither do they differ as they are Trees one from the other secundum magis & minus, but that the one Tree is a great Tree, and the other a small shrub, for the greater and the lesser do not diversify the species. But the cause of the provision in England by the Stat. of 45 E. 3. Ployd. f. 470. b. why great Trees of the age of twenty one years do not pay tithes is, for that the one yields more profit to the common wealth, and are Timber, and serve for any use for building, and therefore the cutting down of them is made more penal than the other, as in the like case by the Civil Law, whosoever privily cutteth down, or barketh a Vine, an Olive or a Figtree, and doth any other unlawful act, whereby any fruitful tree, or any Timber tree doth perish and decay, it is theft, and is punished in the double value of the hurt which is done, and if he be tenant of the ground, who hath done it, he loseth his hold, because the Law respecteth the necessary use of them, Ridleys' view of the Law, f. 207. Actus repugnans non potest in esse produci, Reg. I. C. A repugnant act cannot be brought into being, Ployd. f. 355. a. Any man who is a legal owner of Land may give it unto any person, in what manner, and at what time he pleaseth, so that his gift be not contrary to Law, or repugnant. As if an entail be made upon condition, that if the Donee alien, that then it shall remain unto another, that is repugnant, and therefore void, for when he hath aliened it to a stranger, than it is contrary to the alienation of a remainder over by it. Coke l. 1. f. 84. a. Corbets case, upon an estate, the proviso was that if tenant in tail, etc. be resolved, &c, to procure, or attempt any act by which the estate tail may be barred, and determined that then the uses and estates to him limited, in respect of such person so attempting shall cease as if he were naturally dead, the said proviso was adjudged repugnant, and contrary to Law, for the death of the tenant in tail is not the ceasing of the estate tail, but the death of the tenant in tail that hath no issue of his body, vide ibidem plura. A Feoffment in fee of two acres unto two men, Habendum one acre to one, and the other to the other, this Habendum is void for the contrariety; for the Premises give him an interest in both acres, and the Habendum e●cludeth him from one, 2. P.M. 153. In a trespass de domo fracta, & muris ejusdem domus fractis, the Defendant cannot plead guilty to the breaking of the house, and justify the breaking of the Walls, for the house and the walls are all one, and cannot of the same thing both justify, and plead not guilty, for the one is contrary, to the other and according to the rule, cantraria alleg●ns non est audiendus, 21. H. 7. 21. He is not to be heard, who allegeth contrarieties; an obligation is made, solvendum nunquam, this Solvendum is void for the contrariety, and the thing presently due, 21. E. 4. 36. A. is bound to B. Solvendum eidem A. the Solvendum is void for the contrariety, and the obligation is good, and the Obligee may declare upon a Solvendum to himself, 4. E. 4. 29. for contraria non possunt simul esse in eodem subjecto, Arist. 5. Phys. contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Omnis privatio presupponit habitum, every privation presupposeth an habit, Coke come. f. 341. b. and l. ●0. f. 86. b. To many purposes a Parson hath in effect, but an estate for life, and to many a qualified fee, but the entire fee and right is not in him, and that is the reason that he cannot discontinue the Fee-simple that he hath not, nor ever had, for every privation presupposeth an habit. From authority and example. ARgumentum ab authoritate firmissimum est in lege, an argument from authority is the strongest in Law Coke come 254. a. our Book cases are the best proofs what the Law is, and after the example of Littleton, Book cases are principally to be cited for deciding the cases in question, and not any private opinion, according to the rule, Nulla hominis authoritas tantum apud nos valere debet, ut meliora non sequeremur si quis attulerit, no man's authority ought to prevail so much with us, as that we may not follow the better whosoever shall allege it, as Littleton here rejecteth the opinion of Newton, and followeth the better authorities in Law, Coke come. f. 383. a. And whereas by the Civil Law, as Sir John Davis observeth, every Doctor's opinion is vouched, and cited of them as good authority, it must needs breed distractions of opinions, and variations, according to which sense the logical axiom, is to be taken locus ab authoritate est infirmissimus, Boethius. An argument from authority is most weak, and prevaileth little or nothing in resolving the question, as the Poet pressely Nile agit exemplum, litem quod lite resolvat, to clear a quaere, example stands for nothing, whereas our Law arguments are deduced from the strength of cases apt to the purpose, and precedents of former times founded on the discourse of reason, and consideration of the wisest and sagest Judges, and are no inartificial arguments, as ipse dixit, or teste me ipso, but are drawn out of the terms, and bowels of the issue by arguments, and conclusions of reason. Nullum exemplum est idem omnibus, Coke come. 212. a. & 317. b. No example is the same to all, and therefore it is the best means in all assurances to take counsel of learned and well experienced men, and not only to trust without advice to precedents for as the Aphorism holdeth in the state of a man's body, nullum medicamentum est idem omnibus, no salve is the same to all: so doth the rule in the estates and assurances of Lands, no example or precedent is the same to all. Periculosum existimo, quod virorum bonorum non comprobatur exemplo, Coke. come. f. 81. b. I deem it dangerous that is not approved by the precedent of good men, and therefore it appeareth how safe it is to be guided by judicial precedents. Littera scripta manet, Coke come. f. 115. a. A written word remaineth, and therefore a record or sufficient matter in writing is a good memorial, whence it is said, when we will by any record or writing, commit the memory of any thing to posterity, tradere memoriae, and for this reason it is that regularly a man cannot prescribe a custom against a statute, because it is matter of record, and is the highest proof and matter of record in Law, yet a man may prescribe against an Act of Parliament, when by prescription and custom it is saved by an other Act of Parliament. Nihil in lege intolerabilius est eandem rem diverso jure teneri, Coke l. 4. f. 93, in Slades' case. There is nothing more intolerable in law, then that the latter judgement should contradict the former, and therefore 37. H. 6. f. 22. Ask said, such Charters have been allowed in the time of our Predecessors, who were as sage and learned as we, and Markham, 5. E. 4. f. 41. It is good for us to do as it hath been used in former times, and not to keep one way one day for one party, and another day the contrary for another party. The former presidednts are enough for us to follow. So 11. E 3. Title Formedon, 22. It was holden that ancient forms and manner of precedents are to be maintained and observed, and 34. Ass. Pl. 7. That which hath not been according to usage shall not be permitted, and in 2. E. 3. 29. The ancient form and order is to be observed, and 39 H. 6. 30. The opinion of Pris●t and all the Court was, that they would not change their use, notwithstanding that their opinion was to the contrary, and 4. E. 4. 44. All the Justices said, we cannot change the course hath been before, for it should be inconvenient, and it is said 3. E. 4. 1. That the course of Courts maketh a law. And therefore all the Justices in ancient times, and from time to time, being as well in matters of form as in deciding of doubts, and questions, and as well at the common law as in construction of Acts of Parliament, have given great regard to the ancient precedents and judgements of the preceding judges, as Ployd. f. 99 b. It was advised by the Court according to the book of 7. H. 4. That an accessary shall not be arraigned as an accessary to one principal until the other principals may be attainted, because it did seem the better way to the Court to pursue the same order that the Sages before had used. And so here in Slades case in respect of the infinite precedents which the Secondary of the Prothonotaries of the King's Bench did show to the Court, it was resolved before all the Judges of England in the Exchequer chamber, that though an action of debt lieth upon a contract, yet the Bargainer may have an Action of the case or an Action of debt at his election, Coke ibidem. Mos retinendus fidelissimae vetustatis & quae praeter consuetudinem, & morem majorum fiunt neque placent neque recta videntur, & frequentia actus multum operatur. The ancient manner of the most faithful antiquity is to be retained and what are contrary to the custom and use of the Elders do neither please nor seem right, and the frequency of acts worketh much, Coke l. 4 f. 74. and therefore it was there resolved by the chief justices Popham, Anderson, and by Pyriam chief Baron, and other justices, that the ancient and usual elections of Mayors, Bailiffs, etc. by a certain selected company of the principals of the commonalty and Burgesses, commonly called the common council etc. were good and well warranted by their Charters and by their laws also. Multa ignoramus quae nobis non laterent si veterum lectio nobis fuit f●miliaris, Coke l. 10. 73. We are ignorant of many things which would not be hidden to us if the reading of the ancients were more familiar to us. As though one peradventure may know the Law upon the ancient statutes, yet will he never know the true reason of the interpretation of them, if he know not what was the law before the making of them. Majorum precepta justa vel injusta non sunt contemnenda, Reg. I. C. And Coke l. 7. f. 3. Calvin's case. Interroga pristinam generationem, The precepts of the elders, be they just or unjust, are not to be contemned, and inquire of the former age, for out of the old fields must come the new Corn, for we are but as yesterday, and therefore had need of the wisdom of those which were before us, and we had been ignorant if we had not received light and knowledge from our forefathers, and our days upon the earth are but a shadow, in respect of the ancient days and times past, wherein the laws have been by the wisdom of the most excellent men in many succession of ages, by long and continual experience fined and refined, which by no man being of so short a time, although he had in his head the wisdom of all the men in the world, in any one age could ever be effected and attained unto, and therefore it is the best rule, than which there is not one more true and firm, Neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus, no man ought to take upon him to be wiser than the laws, vide ibidem ●lura. Monumenta quae nos Recorda vocamus sunt veritatis & vet●statis vestigia. Cok. come. f. 117. A record and enrolment are the footsteps of antiquity and truth, and is a memorial and monument of so high a nature, as it importeth in itself such absolute verity, that if it be pleaded, There be no such record, it shall not receive any trial by witness by Jury, or otherwise but only by itself. And every Court of record is the King's Court, though another may have the profit, in which if the judges do err, a Writ of error lieth, but the county Court, the Hundred Court, and the Court Baron, and the like, are no Courts of record, and therefore the proceed there may be denied and rayed by Jury, and upon a judgement a writ of error lieth not, but a writ of false judgement, because they are no Court of record, for that they can hold no plea of debt or trespass, if the debt or damage amounteth to 40. s or of any trespass vi & armis. Coke l. 4. f. 71. in Hind's case, Records contain in themselves truth, and do conclude all men to deny any apparent thing in the record as antedate, etc. 37. H. 6. f. 21. but to take averrment of that which standeth with the record, and that doth not impugn any thing apparent in the record, the law well admitteth and alloweth. As against a fine upon release, to say, that the Connusee had nothing at the time of the fine levied, 16 H. 7. So against letters Patents of the King under the great Seal showed in Court, none can them deny, but non concessit per predictas literas patentes, he hath not granted by the said Letters Patents, is a good Plea, for though there be such Letters Patents, yet peradventure nothing may pass by them, and so by consequence he hath not granted, and though an enrolment or matter of record shall not be tried by the country, yet the time when the enrolment was made shall be tried by the country, but the enrolment itself shall not be drawn in question, but only the time of it, as when one pleadeth a grant of the King by his Letters Patents under the great Seal, and the other pleadeth non concessit, by the same his Letters Patents, the Letters Parents are confessed, but the effect and operation of them is denied, and therefore the trial shall not be where the Letters Patents bear date, but where the land lieth, as it was adjudged, Coke l. 6. 15. b. So if profession be denied it shall be tried by Court Christian, but if the time of his profession be in issue, it shall be tried by the Country, 9 H. 7. f. 2. ibidem. Multitudo errantium non pa●it errori patrocinium, Coke l. f. 94. a. The multitude of them who err doth not produce a Patronage to the error. As returns and precedents, which peradventure pass without challenge of the parties or debate of the Judges, though they be many, if the Court adjudge them contrary to reason, they shall be amended, and in this case according to 5. E. 4. f. 112. precedents and course do not rule the law, but the law shall rule them, and therefore it was there said, That an Outlawry was reversed because that it was ad come. Lancast. ibid. tent, and doth not say, at Lancaster, or such place certain, to which ibid. might be referred, and though there were 100 precedents of such returns, yet notwithstanding it was reversed. A fortiori, if there be but one or two precedents, for una hi●undo non facit ver, Dier. 105. a. but otherwise it is when precedents are judicial, and Justices by divers successions of ages have given judgements in Actions brought there, for it shall be intended that some of the counsel with the Defendant, or some of the Justices before whom the action was tried and the record read, would have excepted against it; but returns of Sheriffs in case of Outlawries or entries of Clerks, the records pass in silence without exception of parties, and therefore are not so authentical as judgements upon demurrers or verdicts, Coke l. 4. f. 94. a. And whereas the latter judgements do many times cross and contradict the former, there are very few precedents of such contrary judgements, scarce two in an age: But yet if the reasons of the latter judgement did appear upon record, we should find them grounded upon mischiefs and inconveniences arising since the former judgements or other weighty considerations, respecting the good of the Commonweal in general, Sir John Davis in his Preface. From Propositions. A Proposition is an oration affirming or denying aliquid de aliquo something of something, and is called of the Philosopher 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pronouncing speech, showing the thing either to be true or false. Negativum nihil implicat, 11. H. 7. 23. Dod. E. L, f. 111. There are propositions negative which imply an affirmation, and those we call negative pregnants, which we do refuse in all issues of trials by Jurors, except in some cases, where the necessity of the cause doth require the same, and there are also propositions merely negative which are mere negations, of which we commonly say, negativum nihil implicat, a negative implieth nothing. As the Tenant wageth law of non Summons, this doth not imply that he was tenant, neither shall conclude him, 22. H. 6. 41. One pleadeth ne Chasa pas he did not hunt in the free Chase of the Plaintiff, this is no granting that the Plaintiff had a free Chase, but he must prove it, 10. E. 3. 20. Affirmativum negativum implicat Ployd. f. 206. b. An affirmative includeth a negative, for every statute limiting any thing to be in one form, although it be spoken in the affirmative, yet it includeth in itself a negative, as the statute of W. 2. c. 4. Of a quod ei deforceat giveth that the demandant shall vouch, ac si tenens esset in priori b●eve, includeth a negative to wit and not otherwise, for it hath been taken since it, that if the first writ was a Sci●e facias and the tenant in the Quod ei de forceat maintaineth the title of it the demandant shall not vouch, for he shall vouch ac si tenens esset in priori breve which is as much as to say, that he shall vouch ac si tenens esset in priore breve, and in no other manner, and then in the first writ it being a Scire facias he cannot vouch no more than now. So the statute of W. 2. c. 11. Provideth that upon an account ended before auditors assigned, and arrearages found upon the accountants, they have power to send and deliver their bodies to the next Goal of the Lord the King in those parts, and upon it is taken 27. H. 6. f. 8. That the auditor ought to commit him to the next Goal though it be in another County, for they cannot vary from the place limited by the statute, and is as much as if be had said, and in no other Goal. So the statute of W. 2. c. 3. giveth a Writ of second deliverance out of the Court where the first replevin was granted, and a man cannot have it any where else, for where the statute appointeth the place, order and, form of suits, than they cannot sue in any other place or any other form, if they should, it shall be contrary to the purview of the statute. So if tenant in tail make a feoffment to himself for life, and after to the use of his issue in tail, and dieth since the statute of 27. H. 8. The issue in tail shall not be remitted, for the statute executed the possession in the same manner and form as he had the use, which is all one, as if he should say and in no other manner and form, and he had the use as a Purchaser, and so he shall have the land here, and not be remitted. 2. M. 1. ante 114. vide ibidem plura. From Division. DIvisio est oratio qua totum in parts distingui●ur, a division is an oration by which the whole is divided into parts. Argumentum a divisione est fortissimum. Coke l. 6. f. 60. a. An Argument drawn from division is most strong, as there are four sorts of commons, common appendent, common appurtenant, in gross, and by reason of Vicinage, but common residentiae & commorationis of residence and dwelling is none of them, therefore no common. Res per divisionem melius aperiuntur, Eract. And the Civilians, per divisionem melius materia intelligit, by division things are more clearly opened, and by it the matter is the, better understood, and therefore saith Plato speaking in the person of Socrates: Si nactus fuisset autem qui bene partiri sciat se i●sias tanquam Dei vestigia cons●cuturum esse, if he had obtained a leader who knew well to divide, he had followed him as the footsteps of God, for by division the Clouds of confusion are cleared, and the distinct and true nature of the thing manifested; and as Lodovicus, all falsehood proceedeth from conformation, when through rudeness we know not how to discern confused things, so as we are deceived with the like or things near unto them. Quae in parts dividi nequeunt solida a singulis praestant, Coke l 6. f. 1. Those things which cannot be divided into parts ought wholly to be performed of every one. As Lord and Tenant of three Acres of Lands by homage fealty and annual service of a Spurrier and suit of Court, if the Lord maketh a Feoffment in fee or one Acre, the feoffee shall hold by homage fealty, a spurrier and suit of Court by the common Law, for those things which cannot be divided shall entirely be performed by every single person, vide ibidem plura, of which nevertheless some certain ones are appointed by the statute to avoid trouble to be performed by the eldest coheir, for ●h● rest as homage, Dod. 104. En. L. If an Ox be devised to one, and the Ox dyeth without any default of the Executor, whether is the Skin o● Hid of the Ox due to the Executor or the Devisee, by the common Law, the Devisee shall have the hide, for it is parcel of the Ox, and the Ox was an entire thing and cannot be divided, but by the civil law the executor shall have it, because the Ox did perish and was no Ox before the Skin was taken off, but the skin was taken off from the Carcase, Fulb. 1. f. 45. b. Frustra sit per plura quod fieri potest per pauci●ro, 9 H. 7. 24. Coke l. 8. f. 167. a. Division is a resolution of the whole into parts and aught to consist of as few parts as may be, for it is vain to do that by more, may be effected by fewer; and therefore the peripatetics approve a dicotomy or a two fold division non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not that we should be restrained to make a division always of two parts, but that we may divide it into as many as the nature of the thing requires; As Littleton divided rents into rend charge, rent-service, and rentseck, and very well, because it was according to the several nature of rents, and so also did he divide warranties into lineal, collateral, and comminenting by disseisin, so are actions divided into real, personal, and mixed, and also the division of fewer parts or more is to be admitted, if the nature of the thing so divided doth requi●e it & therefore were the Ramists so curious in their strict observing of a Dicotomy. Coke l. 6. 167. a. If the King by his Patent reciting the estate tail, doth grant the reversion, and further granteth the lands in possession, those several grants in one Patent are as good and strong in law as if the King by one patent had recited the estate tail, and granted the reversion, and by another Patent had granted the Lands inpossession, for vainly that is done by more which may be done by fewer. Ploud. f. 191. b. If I release all the right I have in all my Lands in Dale, which I have by descent of part of my father, and I have no Lands die descent of part of my father, the release is void, for he must aver that I had such Lands in Dale by descent of the part of my father: But if the release had been in white Acre of D. which I had by descent of part of my father, and I haec no lands by descent of part of my father but otherwise the release is good without any averrment, for the thing was certainly expressed by the first wo●ds, in which case other words were needless and superfluous, and in vain were it to express that by more words which may be expressed by fewer, and 30. Ass. Pl. 8. Lands given to two, & uni eorum diutius viventi and to the longer liver of them, they make partition, and one of them dyeth, the Lessor shall have again the moiety of him that died, for uni eorum diutius viventi, are but idle words. Omnis propositio est aut verae, aut falsa, every proposition is either true, or false, truth as it is a congruity of an entity with the intellect, instrumentally appertaineth to Logic, because it directeth the mind to apprehend the truth of things, and is opposite to falsity contradictory, especially in propositions, for all propositions are either true, or false, Quae ad idem, secundum idem similiter & eodem tempore nunquam possun● simul esse verae, which to the same, according to the same, after the same manner, and in the same time, never can be both true. Fucatus erro●●uda veritate in multis est prohabilior, & sepenumero multis rationibus vertiatem vincit, Arist. Coke l. 2. f. 72. Painted error in many things seemeth more probable than truth, and oftentimes with many reasons overcometh the truth, therefore hath the Law a great respect to verity and requireth that it be acknowledged and confessed in all actions, under the penalty of a mercement, and accordingly if the tenant doth not render the Land to the demandant, as he was commanded by the Writ, but persist●th in defence of it till judgement be given against him, by the Law he is to be amerced, Coke. l. 5. f. 49. Va g●ans case. And therefore one of the chiefest things which the Law requireth in counts, is verity, and if it appear to the Court, that falsity is uttered in lieu of verity, the party which showeth it, hath annoyed and confounded himself, Ployd. f. 84. b. And therefore if a man bring an Action of debt for two payments at two days, where one of them is not come, by the showing of the Plaintiff himself he hath by it abated his own writ, because that he hath shown a falsity, T. 9 H. 7. 3. And so in our case he hath grounded his matter upon a Statute by him recited, where it appeareth judicially, that there was no such Statute made at that time, and so he hath abated his count by his own showing, ibidem, Partridges case, and s●. p. 20. H. 6. f. 30. A writ of Champerty was brought, which was not warranted by any Statute, and there Newton said, that if the party cannot show unto them any Statute, by which it was warranted, that they will award that the writ shall abate. And therefore abundance and reciting more than needeth, shall many times hurt the party, as T. 20. H. 6. f. 42. A man brought a writ for forging of false deeds, and the writ was diversa facta, & munimenta, and he counted but for one only and by the assent of all the Justices, it was awarded that the writ shall abate, because the writ was for divers Deeds, and he counted but for one, vide ibidem. If the Writ vary from the Obligation, or other specialty in name, or surname or such like, the Writ shall abate, 11. E. 4. 2. As in an action of debt for twenty pound, and he declareth but for ten pound, both shall abate, 8. E. 4. 2. An Essoine or protection, varying from the original Writ in the quantity of the tenancy, or the name of the party, shall be quashed, 4. Ass. pl. 1. 2. H. 6. 3. A Chancellor's servant bringing a Writ of privilege varying from the original Writ, as if the original be a Writ of Trespass, and the privilege in a Plea of debt, or the original be in an action of debt of 44 l. and the Writ in a Plea of debt 42 l. it shall be disallowed, 7. H. 6. 22. Lex non requirit verificari, quod apparet curiae, Coke l. 9 f. 54. b. The Law doth not require that to be verified which appeareth to the Court, though the Law of England be more precise in the form of pleading then any other foreign Law, as well in counts, as bars, wherein averrements and offers of proofs are commonly concluded, as in counts the course of declaration is, in the beginning of every action to offer their witnesses, and therefore the conclusion is always, & inde producit sectam, which secta or suit in Law language is nothing but witnesses, to prove his action, as Mr. Selden upon Fortescue accurately observeth, c. 21. f. 23. And so also in bars the Law doth also require, that all affirmative plead in defence (to the intent the issue, and point which cometh to be tried might be evident, and clear to the Jury) should be averred, that is, an off●r made of proofs. Yet, Quoth constat clare non debet verificari, that which plainly appeareth ought not to be verified, Coke l. 9 f. 54. b. in Batens case. As if an infant bring an assize of Mortdancester, it is needless to aver that he is within the time of limitation, for it appeareth by the infancy of the Plaintiff, and 46. E. 3. In Trespass of taking moneys, it is needless to show the value, because it appeareth, vide ibidem plura. Floyd f. 87. b. It is pleaded that the Lessee did surrender to the Grantee of the reversion, it is needless to plead an atturnment, for a surrender is an atturnment, and more, H. 13. H. 7. 11. by Keble, vide ibidem plura, in Partridges case. Et manifesta probatione non indigent, Coke l. 7. f. 40. a. b. M nifest things need no proof, as if the Father, tenant by Knight's service, enfeoff his Son, and Heir apparent within age, it needeth not to aver it to be collusion, for it is apparent, Wimbich case, Ployd. & 27. H 8. Dacres case. So if I covenant to stand seized to my Wife, Son, or Cousin, it is good to raise an use without express words of consideration, for sufficient consideration, and his Fatherly love appeareth, vide ibidem plura. Non refert quid ex aequipollentibus si●t, it is a rule of Law and reason, It mattereth not what is done by equipollent, or words which amount to such a value, Coke l. 5. 122 a Longs case. It was an exception taken to an indictment in that case, that they gave him unum vulnus mortale, one mortal wound, whereas it should have been plagam, one mortal stroke but it was disallowed by the whole Court, and said, that these words were Synonimas, and signified the same, though that plaga is the most usual word in an indictment, f. 121. vide ibidem plura, & Coke l. 5. f. 89 a Frosts case. A Capias Vtlegatum was brought to the Sheriffs of the city of London against B. who was in custody of Laborne in his house, being one of the Sergeants of the City of London, Frost cometh to Laborne with a Warrant from the Sheriffs to arrest the said ●. upon the Capias Utlegatum, which he utterly refuseth, but suffereth him to go at large upon an action of the case brought against the Sheriffs, supposing that the Sheriffs arrested him, and suffered him to go at large, the Defendants pleaded that they did not suffer him to go at large, and judgement was given for the Plaintiff, and the verdict warranted well the count, for in judgement of Law the Sheriff, and his Sergeants are words equipollent, & amount to so much, and is all one as if the Sheriffs had arrested the said B. vide ibidem plura. A Writ is to the Sheriff, and he returneth virtute praecepti, he hath done well, for it is equipollent virtute brevis, 11. H 6. 16. In a Writ it is said quam clamat esse jus, this equipolleth with a Fee-simple, and therefore in the subsequent part of the Writ if he instanceth in a lesser estate, as ex dono for life, the Writ shall abare, 39 H. 5. 38. Upon an indictment for celebrating Mass, contra formam Statuti, 1. El I was holden that under this term Minister, a Priest was included, because a Priest is bound to celebrate and minister the holy communion, etc. and also it was holden by all, that the term Clerk is sufficient to prove him a Priest, or a Minister, Dyer f. 203. b. Coke l. 5. f. 4. b. Verus, & antiquus redituus, the true and ancient rent is not to be understood of the quality incident to it, but of the quantity of the rent, for that is the effect, and substance of the thing reserved, as if the ancient reservation was of rent to be paid in Gold, and the novel reservation was to be paid in Silver, or if a quarter of Corn was anciently reserved, and now the lease is made, rendering eight bushels of Corn, it is all one, for the Law respecteth not the forms of words, or their quality, but the substance, and effect of the matter & parum differunt, qui re concordant and they differ little, which agree and equipoll in substance. If one maketh his Will, and committeth the Administration to one, by it he shall be Executor, because it is all one in substance, 3. H. 6. so by the grant of a Church the advowson shall pass, 7. E. 3. 15. One granteth the nomination of an Advowson, Habendum the advowson, the Habendum is good, for it is the same thing, so one granteth the remainder whereas he had a reversion, it is good enough to make the thing pass, 6. E. 6. Ante 134. vide Ployd. 157. b. If a man lease to one an acre of Land for life, reserving to himself the herbage, the reservation is void, because he hath leased the same thing in substance, and the profits of the Land, and the Land itself, are all one, 38. H 6. 34. Words of substance, and not usual, are equivalent to words of substance, and usual, Ployd. 140. b. As if tenant for life, and his Lessor make a Feoffment in fee, it is the Feoffment of the Lessee for life, and the confirmation of the Lessor, though there be not a word of a confirmation in it, and if tenant for years, and the Lessor make a Feoffment in fee, it shall be the livery, and Feoffment of the Lessor, and the surrender of the Lessee, and yet there was not one word of surrender; And if a commoner maketh a deed to the tenant of the Land, by which he renounceth the common unto him, it shall enure as a release, because the words are equivalent to a release. So if Land be leased by Indenture for years, and Covenants made to render and pay for the tenements such a sum, it is all one as a reservation of a rent, and if the Lessor say I will have twenty pound rend, and the Lessee agree, or if the Lessee say, I will give twenty shillings rend, and the Lessor agree, it is a good reservation of a rent, so if a man be bound by Obligation to en feoff I S. and he maketh a lease for years, and a release in fee, he hath performed the condition, because they are all one, vide ibidem. Yet words of art may not be supplied by equivalent and equipollent words, though they bear the same sense and substance, as in an indictment of murder, voluntary & ex mulitia praecogitata interfecit, is not sufficient, but the word murder avit must be, so in an indictment, quod quoddam tormentum in H. L. exoneravit dans eidem, H.L. cum pelletto plumbeo predicto vulnus mortale. Dans ei vulnus mortale, etc. is not sufficient but it should have been percussit which is the word of art, Coke l. 5. f. 222. b. Lunges case. And the reason of this is given by Coke in his Preface to Littleton, that words of art are so apt and significant to express the true sense of the Laws, and so woven into the Laws themselves, as it is in a manner impossible to change them, neither aught legal terms to be changed. SECT. 4. From natural Philosophy. NExt to Logic by whose principles as by many hands, we are conducted to the knowledge of the Laws and other Sciences, natural philosophy is to be placed, which is the prime and principal part of other Sciences, for by the knowledge of natural things we are instructed to observe the diversity of the actions and manners of men, according to the difference of climates and various conditions of them, of which any one ignorant will be altogether unable to judge of civil, and aeconomical affairs, and therefore as Mr Ployden, Have the Philosophers searched so deeply into the law of nature, in their laws and writings, and for the government of the people by them, given precepts to follow the rule of nature, and have taken nature to be, as it were, a foundation to all laws? Neither have the Founders of our laws been remiss in searching out the law of nature, neither were they void of the understanding of it, for their laws argue the contrary, and show, that those who made them, were of more great and profound judgement, and as well learned in the law of nature as in all reason, and in the Law of God also, for nothing in our Law is ordained contrary to nature, or contrary to reason, or contrary to the Law of God, but according to them all, Ployd. 304. a. and b. And according to it hath the law established divers grounds and maxims. 1. Quae rerum natura prohibentur nulla lege confirmata sunt, Reg. I. C. Marcellus. Laws which are contrary to the Law of nature lose their force and are no laws at all, Finch. Nom. f. 75. Such was that of the Egyptians to turn women to Merchandise, and Common wealth affairs, and men to keep within doors, and of the Thracians, who counted idleness an honest thing, and stealing very commendable, Ibidem. Naturae vis maxima, and Catiline said, Natura bis maxima. The force of nature is very great or more than superlatively great, Ployd. 309. b. and therefore all things proceeding from nature are not only respected in Philosophy but also in our law, and are of efficacy in our law, and taken for a consideration sufficient, Ployd. 305. and accordingly in Sharingtons case, f. 309. It was adjudged that the affection of Andrew Bainton for the provision to his heirs males, which he had engendered, and the affection that he had, that the land should remain in his blood, and name of Bainton, and the brotherly love that he bore to his brothers, were causes sufficient to make uses in the land, vide ib dem. So consideration of marriage and brotherly love are greater than m●ny or matter of recompense to raise an use without transmutation of possession, because every one of them is merely founded on the law of nature, ibidem 3 9 a. If a man seized in fee of Lands holden of I. S. by fealty and ten pounds of rent, and he giveth it in frank marriage to one with his daughter, the father shall pay the ten pound yearly until the fourth degree is passed, and shall have nothing of the Donees for it, because it was given to his daughter in marriage for her advancement, and for that reason the charge is translated from the daughter to the father, and the consideration of it is nature, Ib. f. 305. a. If I make a contract with another, that if he will take my daughter to wife, that I will give him twenty pound, if he take her to wife, he shall have action of debt for the twenty pound in our Law 22. E. 3. Ass. P. 70. and yet I have nothing by it, and if a man hath not regard to nature, it shall be nudum pactum, Ibid. Yet the Law hath such respect to nature and conjunction of blood, as in divers cases it matcheth necessity of blood with the consideration of profit, as the son may maintain his father, and one brother another, 19 E. 4. 5. and Brothers and Cousins shall not wage Battle in a Writ of Right. The statute which maketh it felony to receive or give meat to one which committeth felony, he knowing it, extendeth not to a woman that receiveth and giveth meat and drink to her husband in such case, Ployd. Dyer. f. 300. A feoffment to the use of himself, and after his decease to the use of Alice which he intended to marry, until the issue which he doth beget of her shall be of the age of 21. years, and after the son cometh to such an age, then to the use of his wife during her widow hood, the husband dieth without issue, it was adjudged the wife shall hold the fee, it being by way of use, otherwise it had been by estate executed. If my brother hath a suit against my Cousin and Nephew I may maintain the cause of my Cousin though my brother be nearer 4. H. 6. 17. 14. H. 7. 2. If a man menace me that he will imprison or hurt my father or child, if I make him not such an obligation, and I make it, I shall avoid this by duresse as if he had menaced me, 15. H. 6. 17. and 21. E. 4. 13. Exception. Yet a consideration of blood in a personal contract, as to give money, is not good. Lex respicit naturae ordinem, Coke come. 197. a. b. The law will not suffer any one to demand any thing contrary to nature and reason. As a tenant in common may have an assize for the moiety of twenty shillings, and the moiety of a pound of Pepper, but for a Hawk and an Horse, albeit they be tenants in common they shall join in an assize, for the law will not permit any one to make his plaint in an assize contrary to the order of nature, and which by nature he cannot recover as the moiety of an horse, or any other entire thing, for that were a vain thing, & lex neminem cogit ad vana & inutilia, and the Law compelleth none to vain and unprofitable things. Coke come. f. 9 2. a. The law respecteth the order and course of nature, as if the tenant hold by a rose or a Bushel of Roses to pay at the feast of Saint john Baptist, because they are flowers not to be kept, therefore are they to be delivered at the time of growing, and the Lord may demur to distrain till that time: neither is the tenant driven by law artificially to preserve Roses, for the law in these cases respecteth nature and the course of the year. For as Littleton here saith ars imitatur naturam, art doth imitate nature, Ployd. f. 540. b. when divers things are done at one and the same instant, and the one cannot take effect without the other, the common law shall adjudge it to precede, & it to follow which aptly ought to precede or follow, as if a disseisor maketh a Lease for years, and then he and the disseisee release by deed to tenant for years, there the law shall adjudge the release of the disseisee first to take effect, and then the release of the disseisor, for there is no privity or estate in the Lessee upon which the release of the disseisor may enure, if the release of the disseisee doth not first inure. So if tenant for life maketh a Lease for years, and he and the other in the reversion in fee confirmeth the estate of tenant for years, to have and to hold to him and his heirs the estate of him for life shall pass first, and then he in the remainder, vide ibidem Paramours case. Sicut natura in suis operationibus non facit saltum ita nec lex Arist. 9 de motu animalium, Coke come. 238. b. as nature in her operations maketh no skips so also doth not the law, as the writ de ingressu super discesinam, is upon a disseisin made to the demandant or some of his Ancestors, of which there are four kinds, the first is against the disseisor upon a disseisin done to himself, and this is called a writ of entry, of the nature of an assize sur disseisin en le p●r, when the heir by descent is in the per by his Ancestor, or when the disseisor maketh a Feoffment in fee, gift in tail, or lease for life: the third is entry, su● disseisin en le per & cui, as where A. being the feoffee of D. the disseisor maketh a feoffment over to B. there the disseisee shall have a Writ of entry sur disseisin of lands etc. in which ●. had not entry but by A. to whom D. demised the same, who unjustly and without judgement disseised them. These are degrees which are to be observed, or else the writ is abateable, for as nature, so the law doth nothing by skips, but by degrees. The fourth is the entry sur disseisin in the post, which lieth, when after the disseisin the law is removed from land to land beyond these degrees, which writ is given by the statute of Marlebridge, c. 18. though before at the common law in respect of such long possession, the demandant was driven to his writ of right, vide ibidem plura. Vis unita fortior, Ployd. f. 307. a. united force is more strong, as in Sharingtons case. There are three causes premised to make and raise uses in lands, the first is his affection for the provision of his males, the second is his affection that the lands he had should remain in his blood, the third is his Brotherly love he bore to his brother, whereas every one of them had been sufficient to raise uses, yet when all are put together, they are of the greater force, for forces united are more strong. Conjunctio maris & feminae est de jure naturae, Coke l. 7. f. 13. Arist. 1. Polit. Nuptias non concubitus sed consensus facit. Ulpian, & consensus non concubitus facit matrimonium, Coke come. f. 33. a. In matrimony there is a conjunction both of the bodies and the minds, and in contracting matrimony, the consent of the mind obtaineth the chief and substantial parts, and corporal copulation the second, and therefore is it said, that the consent and not the copulation maketh the marriage, for every denomination is from the greater, and a woman by the common law cannot consent before she is of the age of twelve years, nor a Man until the age of fourteen years, and these are called annos nubiles, because at that age, either of them may disagree from a former marriage, Coke ibidem, for a marriage infra annos nubiles, underneath the marriageable years, is inchoate and imperfect to all purposes, except her dower, and accordingly was it resolved in Ambrosa George's case, Coke l. 6. f. 40. a. Who being married, and her husband dying before she was of the age of ten years, was notwithstanding the former marriage adjudged to be in ward to the Queen, because the former marriage was no marriage before consent, and they could not consent, ante annos nubiles, for the consent and not the copulation maketh the marriage. And therefore is matrimony defined by Britton to be assemblee del home, & feme alieur deux volunts, a conjunction of a man and woman according to both their wills, f. 246. And which as Bracton saith, l. 1. c. 5. fit per mutuam voluntatem, for their mutual consent is the efficient and necessary cause of marriage, and therefore a marriage enforced, contrary to the will of either party, is unnatural and illegal, as Kelway 19 H. 7. 52. b. Where the case is, that Margaret the now wife of Keble brought an action of trespass against Vernon, to which the defendant said, that he heretofore at the Church of S. in the said county took the Plaintiff to wife, and there were married according to the laws of the Church, and demanded judgement if action: to which the Plaintiff said, that those espousals were made by menaces and duresse of imprisonment, and against the will of the said Plaintiff in another county, and prayed her damages, and after great debate whether the espousals were avoidable by duresse or no, Frowick said, that he had seen the books, and that it seemed clearly that the espousals were well avoided by duresse, and the replication, vide ibidem plura: And which also seemeth to be the resolve and determination of all nations, for for it Romulus himself was upbraided, to wit, for forcing the Sabine Virgins against their wills to marry the Romans, and was declared by his successors the Roman Authors, to be a barbarous act, and a crime equivalent to a rape, as Propertius l. 2. El. 6. Tu criminis author, Nutritus duro Romule lacte lupae, Tu rapere intactas docuisti impune Sabinas'. Thou hardy Romulus nursed by brutish care, And Wolvish milk, was so fierce to dare To snatch the Sabine Virgins from their Sires, And force them to the nuptial of their friends desires. A Savage crime unpunished. And by Virgil more fully, Raptas sine more Sabinas', That is, ravished contrary to the custom of all nations, for in that age when Rome most flourished, the customs of the Romans were the laws of all nations, as Claudian l. 4. Still. Armorum legumque parens quae fundit in omnes Imperium, primique dedit cunabula juris. Rome by the power of Arms and laws doth sway The spacious universe, and did wisely lay The Platform and the grounds of law and right. And therefore not long after by the Roman civil law, the consent of the espoused parties was ratified by an oath, which being but a contract, was called sponsalia de futuro, which also in our law at this day is of great force, for by it a precontract is a sufficient cause of divorce, a vinculo matrimonii, Coke come. f. 285. a. Virro & uxor sunt quasi unica persona quia caro una & sanguis unus, cock come. f. 187. b. The husband and wire are but one person in law, Littleton. because they are one flesh and one blood, as the Scripture saith, and as the Philosopher, are by nature conjoined. As if a joint estate be made to the husband and wife and to a third person, the husband and wife shall have one moiety, and the third person the other moiety, because the husband and wife are but one person in law, so if an estate be made to the husband and wife and to two others, the husband and wife shall have but the third part, Lit. If an estate be made to a villain and his wife, being free, and to their heirs, they have several capacities, the villain to purchase for the benefit of the Lord and the wife for her own, yet if the Lord of the Villain enter and the wife survive, she shall have the whole land, because there was no moieties between them, 40. Ass. Pl. 7. If a woman marry with her obligor, the debt is extinct, and she shall never have action against the Obligor, because the suit against her husband by inter marriage was suspended, and therefore being a personal action and suspended against one it is discharged against both, 21. H. 7. 29. h. So is it If a feme sole bail goods to one, and marry with the bailee, they are the bailees good, so it is if the wife buy goods of one 33. E. 3. If husband and wife purchase lands to them and their heirs and the hsband alien the land etc. she shall recover the whole in a cui in vita, after his death, and the warranty of one of them, or his Ancestors, is a bar of the whole against them both, 39 H. 6. 45. 21. R. 2. Judg. 63. And for the same reason the husband cannot enfeoff the wife, but upon a feoffment made unto her by a stranger, he may deliver seisin unto her by a letter of attorney, for thereby he giveth nothing himself, Perk. 40. If a feoffment be made to a man and a woman, and their heirs with warranty, and they inter marry, and after are impleaded and recover in value, moieties shall not be between them, for though they were sole when the warranty was made, yet at the time when they recovered and had execution they were husband and wife, at which time they cannot take by moieties Ployd. 483. Nichols case. So if a reversion be granted to a man and a woman and their heirs, and before attornement they intermarry, and then attornement is made, they in this case shall have no moieties. No more if a Charter of feoffment be made to a man and a woman with a letter of Attorney to make livery, and they intermarry, and then the livery is made secundum formam chartae, they shall have no moiety, Coke come. f. 187. a. Although at the common law, a man during the coverture could neither in possession, reversion, or remainder, limit an estate to his wife, yet a man now may by the statute oh 27. H. 8 Covenant with others to stand seized to the use of his wife, or make a feoffment or other conveyance to the use of his wife, for by it the estate is executed to such uses, for an use is but a trust and confidence, which by such a mean may be limited by the husband to the wife, but a man cannot covenant with his wife to stand seized to her use, because they are one person in Law. And if cesty que vie doth devise that his wife shall sell his land, and make her Executrix and dyeth, and she take another husband, she may sell the land to her husband, for she doth it in anter droit, and her husband shall be in by the devisor, Coke come. f. 112. a. If a free man marry a woman which is a neife, she shall be free for ever, although the husband dyeth and she surviveth because they are but one person in law, unless there be some special Act made by the wife afterwards, as devorce or cognisance in Court of record F. N. B. f. 78. g. If an english man marry an alien borne, she shall be a Denizen for the same reason, Abri. of Ass. by Brook, Demzen. I● the husband and wife ●aile goods to one, they shall not join in an Action of Detinue, for it is the bailement of the husband only, and void as to her. The husband may have an Action of trespass for taking away his wife, F. n. b. f. 53. b. A man may have an Action at the common law, de muliere abducta cum bonis viri, if she hath attained to the age of consent, and hath actually consented to the marriage, because it is not properly a marriage till she doth consent, 13. E. 1. c. 35. Yet Brook 4. 47. E. 3. trespass f. 420. rather thinketh that it shall be intended a good marriage till she doth disassent, but where the marriage is complete, though the wife is dead or divorced at the time of the Action brought, the action is maintainable, but the word rapuit must be in the writ as well as abduxit, 43. E. 3. and therefore it will not lie against a woman, because one woman cannot ravish another, 43. E. 3. 23. Fulb. l. 1. f. 79. Hereupon it is that the wife can never answer in any Action without her husband, and if upon an Action of trespass the wife cometh in upon a cepi corpus, and the husband doth not appear, she must be set at large without any mainprize, till her husband doth appear, but he appearing may answer without her, and therefore a protection cast by the husband serveth for the wife also, Finch. Nomot. f. 41. If tenant in tail enfeoff a woman and die, and his issue within age taketh her to wife, he shall be remitted, for he cannot sue a Formedon in this case, unless he will sue against his wife, because by the enter-marriage he is seized in her right, ibid. Si mulier nobilis nupserit ignobili desinit esse nobilis, Coke l. 6. f. 53. b. and l. 4. f. 118. b. If a noble woman marry an ignoble man, she ceaseth to be noble, as when a Baroness marrieth under the degree of a Baron, by such marriage her dignity is determined, but that is to be understood of a woman hath attained her nobility by marriage of a Duke, Countess or Baron, and if such an one marry with one is ignoble, she loseth her dignity to which she hath attained by the marriage with one of nobility, but if a woman be noble by descent, as a Duchess etc. though she marry one under the degree of nobility, yet her birthright shall remain, for it is annexed to her blood, and it is a Character indelebilis, ibidem. And if a Duchess marry with a Baron of the Realm, she remaineth a Duchess, and loseth not her name, Coke come. f. 16. b. Vir est caput mulieris, Bracton. Coke come. 1 2. a. The husband is the head of the wife, for God, saith Ployd. f. 305. hath divided reasonable creatures into two sexes, male and female, and the male is more sovereign, and the female more base, as Aristotle l. 1. Polit. Mass est praestantior, deterior vero faemina and therefore doth the female change her sir name into the name of her husband, and also men for the greater part are more reasonable than women, and have more discretion to guide things, than women have, and therefore Aristotle in the same place saith mas ad principatum aptior est natura, quam faemina, the man is more apt by nature to rule then the woman, and as the woman is not so apt to govern in high matters, so is she not in things of a lower degree, and therefore saith Bracton, l. 2. c. 15. Omnia quae sunt uxoris sunt ipsius viri, non habet uxor potestatem sui sed vir, all things which are the wife's are the husbands and the wife hath not power of herself, but her husband, for all personal things she hath are merely his, and at his disposing; and as the office of an executor f 210. are so settled in the husband upon the marriage as any other that were his own before, so as if goods be given to a Feme-covert, and another the jointure is severed, and the husband, and the other are tenants in common, and the executor of the husband shall have all the goods that were given to the wife, 21. H. 7. 29. All the real Chattels of the wife, are also the husbands, for as Hoberd f. 4. Radfords' case, though the lease were at the first the wife's, and that the husband was possessed in her right, so as though he had purchased the Fee-simple, the Lease had not been extinct, yet by the inter-marriage he had full power to alien it, and if he survive the wif●, he is to enjoy it against her Executors or Administrators, vide Ployd. 191. But where the wife hath a term for years, the husband cannot devise it to another by his Will, or grant a rent-charge out of it (for she hath an estate in it before, and at the time of his death, which shall prevent the Devisee) and she surviving is remitted to the term, and therefore shall avoid the rent-charge, 14. Eliz. Ployd. 418 b. If Lessee for years granteth his term to a Feme-covert, and another, or if a feme-sole, and another are Joyntenants for years, and she taketh an husband, the Jointure is not dissolved but continueth, and the Survivor of the feme, or the stranger shall have all the term, because the term is a Chattel real, and the marriage of the feme shall not divest the term out of the feme, but she had an estate in it, as she had before, so that if an estranger oust them, the feme ought to join with the baron in the suit of ejectione firm, and the feme shall have judgement as well as the baron, Ployd. ibidem. So in an action of debt upon arrearages of account against one who was receivor to the feme whilst she was sole, they both must join, though the Auditors were assigned during the coverture, for the very cause of action, that is the receipt, was in her right, 16. E. 4. 8. The husband hath power also to dispose of things in action, and his release of an obligation made to the feme, or where goods were taken from her whilst she was sole, shall be good against the wife, and he die, 87. H. 8. 1. But if he die without making such a release, the Wife shall have an Action upon the Obligation, and not the Executors of the husband, likewise the wife, or her Executor if she die shall have those things in action, and not the husband, but she may make her husband her Executor, and then he shall recover them to her use, 39 H. 6. 27. The wife is unable to contract with any, without the consent of her husband, and upon a Feoffment to a feme covert, she taketh nothing unless her husband will agree, and where one is bound to enfeoff the husband and wife, the husband's refusal is the refusal of them both, Finch. Nomot. f. 44. And where the husband and wife are joint Purchasers, the husband may make a Feoffment and livery upon the Land, which shall work a discontinuance, though the wife be in presence upon the Land, and will not agree. But if the husband and wife bargain and sell the wife's Lands by Indenture, and the Vendee grant unto them for the same a yearly rent, her acceptance of this rent after her husband's death doth not bar her of the Land, although the acceptance be an agreement to the bargain, but the bargain being but a contract is the bargain of the husband only, and not of the wife, for a wife is sub potestate viri cui invita contradicere non potest, and therefore is the Writ cui invita given to the wife by Law, for the recovery of her Land after her husband's death, being aliened by him, and therefore it is that Judges, when a woman is to acknowledge any fine of any Lands, do examine her apart from her husband, to know whether she be willing or come to do it by compulsion of the husband. Offi of Ex. f. 210. And upon a joint purchase of the husband and wife during coverture, if the husband alien, she shall recover the whole after her husband's decease, unless she acknowledge a Fine, and a cui invita is given to the feme by the Statute of Westminster 2. c. 3. upon a recovery by default against baron and feme, and by the equity of it a feme divorced shall have a cui ante divortium to recover the Land lost by baron and feme by default before the divorce, Ployd. f. 58. a. And if Lands be given in Frankmarriage, and a divorce had afterwards, the feme shall have all the Land, ibidem. & the reason that he there giveth, is because the marriages of women, and their advancement by it are much favoured in Law, as if a woman give Lands to a man causa matrimonij praelocuti, and he will not marry her, she shall have a Writ to recover the Land, ibidem, and Dyer f. 13. A man giveth certain goods to his Daughter in marriage, upon a divorce the feme shall have all the goods so given that are not spent, because they were given for her advancement, so as it is regularly true. In omnibus fere uxori sub potestate viri succurritur, Coke l. 9 f. 84. b. In all things almost the Law helpeth the wife, because she is under the power of her husband, as if baron and feme, as in right of the wife, have right to enter into Lands, and the Tenant dyeth seized, the entry of the husband is taken away upon the heir which is in by descent, but if the husband die, the wife or her heirs may well enter upon the issue, for the laches of her husband shall not turn to the prejudice of the wife, or her heirs, Littl. but otherwise it is if the wrong was done to the feme sole before she took husband, Coke Com. f. 24. a. vide ibidem plura, and unless it be for the performance of a condition annexed to the estate of Land, as if a feme be enfeoffed either before or after marriage, reserving a rent, and for default of nonpayment a reentry, in that case the laches of the baron shall disinherit the wife for ever, ibidem b. Ubi nullam matrimonium ibi nulla does, Bracton Coke come. f. 32. a. where there is no marriage there is no dower, Ployd. f. 375. a. for the marriage of the woman is the principal cause of her dower, and though the seisin of the baron, and death of the husband are causes, sine qua non, without which a dower cannot be had, yet the procatartique and impulsive cause of the dower of the woman, is the pains and burden she endureth under the power, and yoke of matrimony, for as Tholosanus, Tholosanus Synt. L. 9 c. 11. matrimonium is quasi matris munus & a matre potius, quam a patre dictum, because she beareth the burden in her womb, and with painful labour delivereth it, and is very indulgent to nourish it, and for those reasons as Bracton saith, dowers were instituted for a competent livelihood for the wife during her life, to wit, propter onus matrimonij, & ad sustentationem uxoris, & ad educationem liberorum si vir premoriatur, for the burden of matrimony and sustentation of the wife, and education of the children if the husband die before, l. 5. c. 22. which Ockam expresseth in a more affectionate term, and calleth her dower praemium pudoris the reward of her chastity, and love, f. 40. And therefore though it be not necessary, that the seisin of the land shall continue during the coverture, for notwithstanding the alienation of the husband, the wife shall be endowed, yet is it necessary the marriage shall continue, for if that be dissolved, the dower ceaseth, where the husband and wife are divorced a vinculo matrimonij, as causa precontractus causa metus, causa impotentiae, seu frigiditatis, causa affinitatis, causa consanguinitatis, and William Chadweth was divorced, for that he did carnally know the Daughter before the marriage of the mother, All these are causes of divorce preceding the marriage and dissolve the dower, Coke Com. f. 32. a. & 235. a. Yet it is said that if the assignment of dower ad ostium ecclesiae be specified, to wit, that notwithstanding any divorce shall happen, yet that she shall hold it for life, that this is good, ibidem but divorce a mensa & thoro doth not dissolve the matrimony nor bar the feme of her dower, Coke l. 7. f. 43. b. As it was adjudged, T. 2. Jac. 18. 5. C. 23. S so well, and Wilby, dower Coke come. f. 33. b. Yet if the wife elope from her husband and leave him, and goeth away with the adulterer, she shall lose her dower, until her husband willingly without coercion ecclesiastical be reconciled unto her, and permit her to cohabite with him according to the vulgar verses, Sponte virum mulier fugiens, & adultera facta Dote sua careat, nisi sponsi sponte retracta. And this is true although she remaineth not continually with the adulterer, or if she tarrieth with him against her will, or he turn her away, or cohabiteth with her husband by censure of the Church, in all these cases she loseth her Dower, Coke ibidem, 32. b. yet though she be barred of her dower, she may have an appeal, and the reason is because the Statute of W. 2. c. 34. barreth her of her dower, but not of her appeal, Coke come. f. 33. b. And for the abovesaid reasons, dower is one of the three things are principally favoured in our Law, and the Law by that name doth give her many freedoms, for the very name Does doth give her a freedom, as according to the custom of the Kingdom, mulieres viduae debem esse quietae de tallagijs, Regist. 142. 143. and tenant in dower shall not be distrained for the debt due to the King by the husband in his life time, for the Lands, which she holdeth in dower, of which Ockam yields this reason: Doti ejus parcatur, quia praemium pudoris est, let her dower be spared, because it is a reward of her chastity, Coke come. f. 31. a. By the Statutes of 1. E. 5. c. 2. & 5. E. 6. c. 31. A wife shall not lose any title of dower, which to her was accrued, by the attainder of her husband by misprision of treason, or any manner of murder, or felony whatsoever, but if the husband be attainted of high treason or petit treason she shall be barred of her dower, at this day so long as the attainder standeth in force, which is more favourable to the woman then the common Law was, Coke come. f. 392. b. vide ibidem plura. And a woman shall be endowed of a seisin in Law, as where Lands, or Tenements descend to the husband, before entry he hath but a seisin in Law, and yet the wife shall be endowed, albeit it be not reduced to an actual possession, for it lieth not in the power of the wife to bring it to an actual possession, as the husband may do of his wife's Land when he is to be tenant by courtesy, Coke come. f. 31. a. If a man taketh a wife of the age of seven years and alieneth his Land, and after she attaineth to the age of nine years, the husband dyeth, the wife shall be endowed, for albeit she was not absolutely dowable at the time of her marriage, yet was she conditionably dowable, to wit, if she attained to the age of nine years before the death of her husband, ibidem, f. 33. a. An husband seized in fee of Lands, giveth it in exchange, and taketh others in exchange, so as he was seized of both, the wife shall not be endowed of both, but she may take her election to be endowed of which she will, Coke ibidem, 31. If the wife be of the age of nine years, and her husband dyeth, she shall be endowed, though her husband be but four years old, ibidem, or of what age soever the husband be, quia non obstabit mulieri petenti dotem minor aetus viri, because the inferior and lesser age of the man shall hinder the woman from demanding her dower, and that albeit consensus non concubitus facit matrimonium, and that a woman cannot consent before twelve, nor a man before fourteen, yet this inchoate, and imperfect marriage, from the which either of the parties at the age of consent may disagree; after the death of the husband shall give dower to the wife; and is accounted in Law legitimum matrimonium quo ad dotem, a lawful marriage in respect of her dower, Coke come. f. 33. a. If the husband alien his land, and then the wife is attainted of felony, now is she disabled, but if she be pardoned before the death of her husband she shall be endowed, ibidem. Does de dote peti non debet, Coke come. f. 32. Dower ought not to be demanded of Dower, as if there be Grandfather, Father, and Son, and the Grandfather is of three acres of Land in fee, and taketh wife, and dyeth, this Land descendeth to the Father who dyeth, the wife of the Grandfather is endowed of one acre and dyeth, the wife of the Father shall only be endowed of two acres, for dower must not be demanded of dower, but otherwise it had been, if the father had come to the Land by Feoffment from the Grandfather, or by gift in tail, the wife of the Father, after the decease of the Grandfather's wife should have been endowed of that part assigned to the Grandmother, for that the seisin that descended after the decease of the Grandfather is avoided by the endowment of the Grandmother, whose title was consummated by the death of the Grandfather. Non debent mulieribus assignari castra in dotem, quae fuerunt virorum suorum, & quae de guerra existant, Coke come. f. 31. a. Castles ought not to be assigned to women for their dower, which appertained to their husbands, and which are for war, and therefore of a Castle which is maintained for the necessary defence of the Realm, a woman shall not be endowed, because it ought not to be divided, and the public shall be preferred before the private, but of a Castle which is only for the use, and private habitation of the owner, a woman shall be endowed, and that in the 7 th'. of Magna charta, nisi domas illa sit castrum, is taken for a Castle of public defence. De nullo quod est sua natura in divisibile, & divisionem non patitur, nullam partem, habebit uxor pro dote sua, sed satisfaciat ei ad valentiam, Bracton Coke come. f. 32. Albeit of many Inheritances which be entire, and whereof no division can be made by meats and bounds, a woman cannot be endowed of the thing itself, yet the woman shall be endowed thereof in a special, and certain manner, whereby she may have satisfaction, as of a Mill a woman shall not be endowed by meats and bounds, nor in common with the heir, but either she may be endowed of the third tole-dish, or of the whole Mill by every third month, and so of a villain, either the third day's work, or every third week, or month. So a man shall be endowed of the third part of the profits of stallage, of the third part of the profits of a Fair, or of the third part of the profits of the marshalsea, of the third part of the profits of keeping of a Park, of the third part of the profits of a Dove-house, and likewise of a third part of a Piscary, by the third Fish, or the third cast of the Net, or the third Presentation to an advowson, and a Writ of Dower lieth for the third part of the profits issuing out of the custody of a Goal, of the third part of the profits of Courts, Fines, and Heriots, and a woman shall be endowed of tithes, and the surest endowment of tithes is of the third sheaf, for what Land shall be sown, is uncertain. Exception. But in some cases of Lands and Tenements which are divisible and which the heir of the husband shall inherit, the wife shall not be endowed, as if the husband maketh a Lease for life of certain Lands, reserving a rent to him and his heirs, and after taketh a wife, and dyeth, the wife shall not be endowed neither of the reversion, because there was no seisin in Deed or in Law of the freehold, or the rent, because the husband had but a particular estate therein, and no Fee-simple, Coke come. f. 32. a. vide ibidem plura. Impossibile est unum corpus in duobus locis esse simul. it is impossible for one body to be at two places at one and the same time, Pop. Rep. 58. 3. & 4. Eliz. As if a man make a lease of two Barns rendering rend, and for default of payment a reentry, if the tenant be at one of the Barns to pay the rent, and the Lessor at the other to demand the rent, and no body be there to pay it, yet the Lessor cannot enter for the condition broken, because there was no default of the tenant, he being at one Barn, for it was not possible for him to be in two places together, and Popbam, Walmest●, and Fenner said that also perhaps that the tenant had not money sufficient to pay it at either of the places, but it is sufficient for him to have and provide one rent, which cannot be at two places together, ibidem. Jura naturalia sunt immutabilia, Bracton l. 9 c. 23. Coke l. 7. f. 15. b. The Laws of nature are unalterable, as if a man have a ward by reason of a Signiory a signiory and is outlawed, he forfeiteth his wardship to the King, but if a man have the ward-ship of his own son or daughter which is heir apparent, and is outlawed, he doth not forfeit this ward-ship, for nature hath annexed it to the person of the father, 33. H. 6. 55. In the same manner, maris & faminae conjunctio est de jure naturae the conjunction of a man and a woman is of the law of nature as Bract. l. 1. c. 33. Dr. and Student, c. 31. do hold; now if he that is attainted of felony or treason, is slain by one who hath no authority, or executed by him who hath authority, but pursueth not his warrant, in this case his eldest son can have no appeal, for he must bring his appeal as heir, which being ex provisione hominis, he loseth it by the attainder of his father, but his wife, if any he have, shall have an appeal, because she is to have her appeal as his wife, which she retaineth, notwithstanding the attainder, because the conjunction of man and woman is by the law of nature, and therefore it being to be intended of true and right matrimony is indissoluble, and this is proved by the book 33. H. 6. f. 57 So if there be mother and daughter, and the daughter is attainted of felony, now cannot she be heir to her mother for the cause aforesaid: yet after her attainder if she killeth her mother, this is parricide and petit treason, for yet she remaineth her daughter, for that is of nature. All which accord with the rule of the civil law, jura sanguinis nullo modo dirimi possunt, the laws of consanguinity and the laws of blood can no way be broken, and therefore the corruption of blood taketh away the privity of the heir, which is nomen juris, and not the privity of the son, which is nomen naturae, as if an attainted person be killed by his son, this is petty treason, for the privity of the son still remaineth, but if a man attainted be murdered by a stranger, the eldest son shall not have the appeal, because the appeal is given to the heir for the youngest sons shall not have it, 36. H. 6. 57 58. 21. E. 3. 17. If the son be attainted and the father covenanteth in consideration of natural love to stand seized of Land to his use, this is a good consideration to raise an use, because the privity of natural affection remaineth. So if a man attainted have a Charter of pardon, and be returned on a jury between his son and I. S. the challenge remaineth, for he may maintain any suit of his son though the blood be corrupted. If a villain be attainted, yet the Lord shall have the issues of the villain borne before or after the attainder, for the Lord hath them jure naturae, as the increase of a flock, Bacon's Maxims f. 49. and 50. vide ibidem plura. If the father be slain, the son shall have an appeal of it, for it is a loss to the son to lose the father, and the common law giveth the appeal to the son before any other, for the earnest intent of revenge, which the law supposeth to be in him against the offender for the kill of him, and that the son by presumption had the more great love and affection Ployd. ibid. f. 304. b. And from thence Bromly said, that it was an ancient usage when a fellow was found guilty in an appeal of murder, that all those of the blood of him was murdered, should draw the fellow with a long cord to execution, which was grounded upon the loss, that all the blood had, by the murder of one of them Ployd. 406. b. Ed. 6. 3. The father being impleaded made a feoffment to his eldest son and heir apparent hanging the suit, and the King brought a writ of Champerty against the father and son, and by the opinion of most, the action was not maintainable, because by any law the son is to aid the father, and yet it is in danger of the words of the Act. In an appeal brought by the wife of the death of her husband, the son being an abettor shall not render damages but shall avow the abettment, as near in blood. Cuique natu●ale est id quo'd procreavit tueri, Ployd. 304. a. As matrimony is necessary between man and woman, and that there is a natural desire in them and all other living creatures to procreate and relinquish a thing like unto themselves, & id non animi judicio, not by the arbitrement of the mind nor as a thing indifferent, which a man may do or not do, but is a natural appetite, to which nature urgeth us, so hath nature instilled love in the procreator to the thing procreated, which urgeth him to have a care to the education of the thing procreated, to provide for him all things necessary, and to defend him against all perils, and therefore hath the common law given to the father, the custody and education of his son, and if any one take him from him he shall have the writ against him Quare filium & heredem suum rapuit, and that law is in satisfaction of nature, but in his writ he must say Cujus maritagium ad se pertinet, because the marriage of his son and heir and of his daughter and heir appertaineth to him, who being once married, he cannot have this Writ, 11. H. 4. 23. M. 33. H. 6. 55. Fulb. l. 1. 80. And if a man taketh way another man's son and heir apparent, and bestoweth upon him good apparel, and the father seizeth his son, he shall not be impeached for taking of the apparel, for in that he may make a good justification for the taking of the body, it must needs extend to the apparel of the body, because the law considereth not bare and elemental bodies, but bodies apparelled, 12. H. 4. 16. 8. E. 2. Trus. 31. 32. E. 3. Guard. 32. Ibidem. Amor descendit, Ployd. 293. b. Osbornes case, it is an old saying that love descendeth, which by experience is found to be more true then to ascend, and for that reason the law which greatly tendereth the preservation of infants, hath appropriated the custody of them and their lands in Soccage to their parents, because they love their children best, and in default of them, to their other Ancestors more near in blood and in natural affection to them, and that is for the profit of the infant: for the guardian must keep the infant with the land, and of the rest of the profits give an account to the infant, and if the guardian die, the executors shall not have the guard of the infant, because they are void of such natural affection, but the nearer Ancestor shall have it. Quaelibet haereditas naturaliter quidem ad haeredes descendit, nunquam autem naturaliter ascendit, Glan. l. 7. c. 1. Every inheritance doth naturally descend to the heirs, but never naturally ascendeth, Coke l. 3. f. 4. in Ratcliffs ease, of which Bracton giveth this reason, quod quasi ponderosum quiddam jure naturae descendit, nam omne grave fertur deorsum, that as a certain ponderous thing, it by the law of nature descendeth, for every heavy thing descendeth downwards, to which this reason may be added, that as the affection of love so doth the effects of love descend; for as Aristotle, the reason why parents love is so fervent and permanent to their issues, is, because love doth descend, and their descending love appeareth, in that they make provision for the present sustenance of them, and future maintenance and continuance of their name, and therefore as Mr. Ployden saith, it is a great blessing of God upon Parents to have issue male, to whom they may leave the fruits of their labours, and establish their estates and inheritances in their names, Ployd. 305. b. to which by love and natural instinct they are incited. But on the contrary, as the love and provision of children, towards their Parents doth not naturally ascend for the thing procreated, doth not actually provide for the procreator where it is sui juris, so there estates and inheritances should not ascend, and therefore, as Mr. Littleton, it is a maxim in our law, that inheritance can lineally descend, but not lineally ascend, wherein the civil law unnaturally differeth from the common law, for the civil law alloweth lineal ascension as well as lineal descent, lineal and collateral descent, but not lineal ascension of inheritances as it doth, which, as Coke, is one of the causes of such diversities of opinions in cases of descents in the civil law, and the contrary is one of the causes of the certainty of the rules of the common law in cases of descent & inheritance. Coke l. 3. f 49. b. If there be father, Uncle, and son, and the son dyeth, the Uncle shall be heir to the son, because inheritance cannot lineally ascend; for by this maxim only lineal ascension in the right line is prohibited, and not in the collateral, Coke ib. & come. f. 11. b. but otherwise it is in case of purchase, as if a lease be made to the son, the remainder to the next of blood, the father in this case shall have the remainder, because he is next of blood, and so administration may be granted of the goods of the son or daughter to the father and mother, as next of kin, 5. E. 6. Coke ibidem. Haeres est alter ipse & filius est pars patris, Arist. Coke l. 3. f. 12. The heir is another son, and the son is a part of the father, and for that reason if a man be seized of three Acres of Land, and acknowledgeth a recognizance or a statute etc. and enfeoffeth A. of one Acre, B. of another, and the third descend to the heir, in this case if execution be sued only against the heir, he shall not have contribution, for the heir sitteth in the seat of his Ancestor, and though the father be dead, yet is he as it were not dead, because he hath left his like, and the heir is a second same, and the son is part of the father, and therefore the heir shall not have contribution against any Purchasor, though in truth the purchasor came to the land without any valluable consideration, for the consideration of purchase is not material in this case, and though in the case of a recognizance, statute or judgement, the heir is charged as terretenant, and not as heir, 27. H. 6. Execu. 135. because in either of them the heir is not bound, yet he shall not have contribution against the purchasor, contrary to the opinion of Finchden in 48. E. 3. f. 5. b. for the reason abovesaid, yet is the heir not charged merely as terretenant, for he shall have contribution against those who are heirs, as himself, Popham, f. 171. And for the like reason, if a man bindeth him and his heirs, to pay a certain sum at a day, and dieth, it is at the election of the obligee to sue the heir, Executors or Administrators of the obligor, and if the executors have assets in their hands, yet the obligee may sue the heir if he will, because he hath bound the heir as well as himself, neither can the heir plead that there is assets in the hands of the executors, day of the writ purchased as heretofore in some ancient books it hath been done, but he must plead rien by descent, 10. H. 7. f. 8. Ployd. f. 440. Davis case, For now the law is changed, and it is accounted his own debt, and debt will lie against the heir of the heir to many generations, as Dier affirmeth f. 868. albeit of this Mr. Ployden maketh a doubt, but his plea, that he had nothing at the day of the writ purchased, nor ever after, is good, for if he before aliened the assets he is discharged of the debt, Popham. f. 151. But if the heir doth not confess the Action, and show the certainty of the assets, but pleadeth rien by descent, is condemned by default of answer, the Plaintiff shall have execution of his other Land, or of his goods, or of his body by capias ad satisfaciendum, as he might have had for the debt of the heir himself, if he had made the obligation, vide 21. E. 3. f. 9 & ibidem plura, and Coke l. 3. Sir William Herbert's case, where the case is upon a Scire facias against the heir. But otherwise if the executor in debt pleadeth rien entre mains etc. and is found against him, nothing shall be put in execution, but the goods of the dead, because the debt is not the debt of the executor, but of the testator, and is charged in another's right, and hath the goods in another's right, whereas when the heir denieth assets &c. and it is found that he hath assets, the debt of his Ancestor is become his debt, in respect of the assets which he hath in his own right, and so the property which he hath in his own right of the land, maketh the debt his own proper debt, and for that reason the writ shall be in the debet and detinet, and the Plaintiff may have execution by elegit of the moiety of all his Lands, as a fieri facias of his goods, Ployd. ibidem f. 441. But in Popham f. 151. it is said by jones and Crew that a general judgement shall be given against the heir, if he doth plead falsely, that he hath no assets, and not upon a nihil dicit. Haeres non tenetur in Anglia ad debita antecessoris reddenda, nisi per antecessorem ad hoc fuerit obligatus praeter quam d ebita regis tantum, Flet a. l. 2. c 55. An heir is not bound in England to pay the debt of his Ancestor, unless it be the debts of the King, Coke come. f. 386. a As if a man bind himself by warranty, and bindeth not his heir, they are not bound, for he must say, Ego & hae●edes mei warrantiabimus, I and my heirs will warrant, ibidem. Coke come 144 b. If a rend charge be granted to one and his heirs, he shall not have a writ of Annuity against the heir of the grantor, albeit he hath assets, unless the grant be for him and his heirs. And the heir by the grant of an Annuity by the Ancestor, shall not be bound, unless he have assets And it is a Maxim at the common law, that the heir shall never be bound to any express warranty, but where the Ancestor was bound by the same warranty, for if the Ancestor be not bound, it cannot descend upon the heir, as if a man maketh a feoffement in fee, and bindeth his heirs to warranty, this is a void warranty, because the Ancestor himself was not bound, as also if a man bind his heirs to pay a sum of money, this is void, Coke come. f. 386. a. Exception. Customary inheritances shall not be assets to charge the heir in an Action of debt upon an obligation made by his Ancestors, although he bind him and his heirs. And for the same reason issue in tail shall never avoid things done by his Ancestor, but such things which are, or may be to his disadvantage, and not for the benefit of the issue, as T 44. E. 5. f. 21. Where tenant in tail was upon a defeasible title, and to have a release of right of him that had right, he granted to him a Rent-charge of twenty pound, and that the charge should be levied upon the issue in tail, and because the rent was for the release of right, and the issue had benefit by it, it was adjudged that the issue shall not avoid the grant, and 46. E. 3. f. 4. If Lands be given in tail, so as the Donee may alien for the profit of his issue, that is a good condition or power limited to him; And so if tenant in tail suffer a common recovery, in which he is vouched, and hath recompense, the issue shall be bound, and so if he alien with warranty, and leaveth assets to his issue, the issue shall not avoid the warranty, because it is not to his disadvantage, Ployd. f. 437. b. in Smith's case, vide. Semper praesumitur pro legitimatione purorum, & filiatio non potest probari, Coke l. 5. f. 98. b. Burys case. Legitimation of Children is always presumed, and begetting of Children cannot be proved, Bury was divorced from his first wife, a vincul● matrimon●j, causa frigiditatis, and as he lawfully might married a second wife and had issue by her, and it was adjudged that the issue of the second wife was legitimate, for notwithstanding his natural imbecility deposed before the divorce, it was said, that a man might be habilis and inhabilis diversis temporibus, and that though the second marriage was, yet it remaineth a marriage until it is dissolved, and by consequence the issue which was had during the coverture if no divorce was had in the life of the parties is lawful, for lawfulness of Children is always presumed, and filiation cannot be proved, Ibidem. Coke Com. 126. a. A man leaveth his wife enseint with child, issue shall not be taken that she was not enseint by her husband, for filiatio non potest probari, but the issue must be, whether she were ensciut at the day of her death, & ibidem. f. 244. If the husband be within the four Seas, that is, within the jurisdiction of the King of England, if the wife hath issue, no proof is admitted to prove the child a bastard, for filiatio non potest probari, unless the husband hath an apparent impossibility of procreation, as if the husband be but eight years old, or under the age of pro-creation, such issue is a bastard, albeit he be born within marriage. The Law supposeth that to be true, which is false, because it may be true, as a man marrying a woman that was with-child before marriage, the Law supposeth the child to be the husbands, because it is possible for the husband to have got it, and whose soever the Cow is, his is the Calf also, Swinwood f. 18. And if the issue be borne within a month or day after marriage between parties of a full lawful age, the child is legitimate, Coke Com. f. 244. a. And in the legal understanding of the common Law, he is said to be haeres, who is ex justis nuptijs procreatus, borne of lawful matrimony; & haeres legitimus est quem nuptiae demonstrant, and he is a lawful heir, whom marriage demonstrated so to be, Coke ibidem. f. 7. b. Coke l. 7. f. 44. a. One who is engendered in avowtry during the coverture, is a mulier by the temporal and common Law, though a bastard by the spiritual Law. Jus sanguinis, quod in legitimis successionibus spectatur, ipso nativitatis tempore quaesitum est, Reg. I. C. The right of blood which is regarded in lawful successions or inheritances, is found in the very time of the nativity, and therefore, jus primogeniturae, the tied of the elder Brother-ship in the cause of inheritance is principally to be respected, because it is in the eldest Son and his issue, per modum substantiae, and that which is in any person per modum substantiae, is inseparable from him, and cannot be extended to any other, besides it is against the Laws of proximity of degrees, that those which are in a remote degree should be preferred before those of the next degree, and therefore in all common weals for the most part proximity of blood hath been preferred, of which we have a notable example confirmed by the act of Lycurgus the judicious Lawgiver, as when Eunonus King of the Lacedaenonians had two Sons, Polydectes the elder, and Lycurgus the younger, and Polydectes deceased leaving no Son living, at the time of his death, the Sceptre of the Kingdom was seated in the hands of Lycurgus, afterwards when Polydectes Widow had brought forth a Son, Lycurgus did willingly and peaceably yield to him the Sceptre, which act of Lycurgus agreeth fully with our Laws, whereby it is ruled, that if a man have a Son and Daughter, and the Son purchaseth Land, and dyeth, the Daughter entereth, and after the Father begetteth another Son of the same Wife, this Son shall have the Land, 19 H. 6. b, and is also ratified by divers examples in the successions of our Kings, I will instance only in one and the most illustrious one, King Edward the third, being deceased, Richard the second the Son of his eldest Son obtained the Kingdom, and was preferred before John, Edmund, and Thomas the sons of the same King, whereas any of them was more worthy and fit for the Sceptre, yet is it granted, that in succession of regal dignity, jus primogeniturae is not constantly observed, because in that case the good of the commonweal, and commodity of the people is politically to be respected, and as the Civilians, the good estate of the Kingdom and Subjects is more to be heeded, quam sangninis series, than the pedigree of blood, and so Solomon the younger Brother was advanced before the elder by the hand of David his Father, and Roboam preferred Abias' his younger Son yet this must be done cautiously, and with a good conscience and intention, and probably for the utility of the State, otherwise it will neither please God nor man, yet in the disposing of private estates, the Law of Primogeniture is more strictly to be observed, because by it confusion and dissension is avoided, which from the contrary doth proceed, as is intimated by Coke l. 3. f. 40. b. Wherein our Law excelleth, which preferreth the elder Brother and his issue before the younger Brother and his issue in case of descent, and that jure sanguinis, by his birth right, as he is most worthy of blood, and therefore as Coke in his come. f. 14. a. The male and all descendant from him shall inherit before the female, and among the males, the eldest Brother and his posterity shall inherit Lands in Fee-simple as heir, before any younger Brother, or any descending from him, whereas by the Civil Law the inheritance is divided among the males, Lutleton. l. 1. c. 1. There be three Brothers, and the middle Brother purchaseth Lands in Fee simple, and dyeth without issue, the elder Brother shall have the Land by descent, so also it is if the youngest purchaseth Lands in Fee, and dyeth without issue the eldest shall have it jure sanguinis, because he is the worthiest of blood, Little. So if a man enfeoff another upon condition, and the condition is broken, and then the Feoffor dyeth without issue, his wife privement ensaint, and the Brother of the Feoffor enter for the condition broken, and after a Son is borne, he shall avoid the possession of the Uncle, and may lawfully claim the inheritance, 9 H. 7. 25. And 9 H. 8. 23. It is said, that after two, or more descents the heir afterwards born claiming by descent, may enter into Land, but he shall not have a Writ of account for the mean profits. And though Littleton in defence of the custom of Gavelkind, by which the issues may equally inherit, allegeth the reason, that every Son is as great a Gentleman as the eldest Son is, yet as Sr. Edward Coke, come. a. f. 14. saith, Gentry and arms doth not descend to all the brethren alike, for the eldest, jure primogeniturae, shall bear, as a badge of his birthright, his Father's arms without any difference, because he is more worthy of blood, but all the younger brethren shall give several differences, & additio probat minoritatem, and the addition demonstrateth and proveth the minority of the issue, but by the Statute of 31. H. 8. A great part of Rent is made descendible to the eldest Son, according to the course of the common Law, for that by the means of that custom divers ancient and great families, after a few descents came to very little or nothing, according to the simile of the Poet, In plures quoties rivos deducitur amnis, Fit minor, ac unda deficiente perit. A Flood deduced into little streams Coke ibid. Soon groweth less and falleth by that means. But in cases of purchase it is otherwise a. 15. E. 4. If a man devise land to a man and his heir, and the devisee dieth having issue a daughter, his wife privement enseint with a son, who is afterwards borne, the daughter shall enjoy the Land in perpetuum. And 9 H. 6. 23. It is said, that if the remainder cannot vest at any time when it falleth, it shall not vest in him is borne afterwards, where another hath entered before, 2. Eliz. 190. Pl. 18. If a lease for life be made, the remainder to the right heirs of I. S. and I. S. is then alive, the inheritance passeth presently out of the Lessor, but cannot vest in the heir of I. S. for then living his father, he is not in rerum natura, for non est haeres viventis, and the remainder is only good upon this contingent, if I. S. dieth during the life of the lessor, Coke come. f. 378. a. But if lands be given to A. and B. so long as they jointly together live, the remainder to the right heirs of him which dieth first, and warranteth the land in forma praedicta, A. dieth, his heir shall have the warranty, and yet the remainder vested not during the life of A. for the death of A. must precede the remainder, and yet shall the heir of A. have the land by descent, vide ibidem, 378. b. Justum non est aliquem ante natum, mortuum facere Bastardum, qui toto tempore suo pro legitimo habebatur, Coke l. 8. f. 101. a. b. It is not just to make any one a Bastard, borne before marriage, being dead, who all his life time was accounted legitimate. For by the law of England, if such a Bastard which the law termeth Bastard eigne, doth continue possession in peace, (that is, if the mulier make no entry for the Bastard eigne, or continual claim) and so dieth in peace, his issue is become right heir and will bar the mulier, because he was legitimate by the laws of the holy Church. For though the subsequent marriage doth not make a Bastard legitimate, quoad consuetudinem regni, as ●ract. phraseth it, in regard of the custom of the Realm, yet quoad sacerdotium in respect of the Canon law it doth, and in this case of legitimation, which in law is so precious, and of so great estimation, the law respecteth neither infancy or other defects in the mulier, but preferreth legitimation of blood before any benefit of temporal inheritance, and therefore the law saith, that by the death of Bastard eigne in peace, his issue is become right heir, and by consequence the mulier is barred, and the descent doth not only take away the entry but the right also, and therefore descent in this case shall be a bar to right, as descent of services, rents, reversions expectant upon an estate tail, shall bar the right of the mulier, 14. E. 2. Bastardy 26. but not the entry or claim of the disseisee. But if a Bastard eigne dieth without issue, so as the land doth descend, the mulier shall have it, ibidem, and if the Lord by escheat entereth, this shall not bar the mulier, because no descent, Coke come 244. If there be Bastard eigne and mulier puisne, and the father maketh lease for life, reserving rend, and the bastard eigne receiveth the rent and dieth having issue; this shall bar the mulier, Coke come. f. 15. a. If a man hath issue a son being a Bastard eigne, and a daughter, and the daughter is married, the father dieth, and the son entereth and dieth seized, this shall bar the feme covert, and the descent in this case of services, rents, reversions, expectant upon estate, or for life, whereupon rents are reserved etc. shall bind the right of the mulier, but the descent of these shall not bind them that right have to an Action, Coke come. f. 244. a. So if the Bastard dieth seized, and his issue endoweth the wife of the Bastard, the mulier cannot enter upon tenant in dower, for his right was barred by the descent, ibidem. If the Bastard eigne entereth into land, and hath issue, and entereth into religion, this descent shall bar the right of the mulier, ibidem. If a man hath issue two daughters, the eldest being Bastard eigne, and they enter and occupy peaceably as heirs, the law shall not adjudge the whole possession in the mulier, so as if the Bastard had issue and died, her issue shall inherit, and if they make partition, that partition shall bind the issue for ever, Coke come 244. a. b. And such a Bastard being impleaded or vouched shall have his age. If a man hath issue a Bastard eigne, or mulier puisne, and the Bastard in the life of the father hath issue and dieth, and then the father dieth seized, and the son of the Bastard entereth as heir to his Grandfather, and dieth seized, this descent shall bind the mulier, ibidem b. If the Bastard enter, and the mulier dyeth, his wife being privement with a Son, and the Bastard hath issue, and dyeth seized, the Son is borne, his right is bound for ever, but if the Bastard dyeth seized his wife enseint with a Son, the mulier entereth, and the Son is borne, the issue of the Bastard is barred, ibidem. 244. a. If the bastard eigne entereth, and the King seizeth the Land for some contempt committed by the Bastard, for which the King receiveth the profits of the Land, and the Bastard dyeth, and his issue upon petition is restored to the possession, the mulier barred for ever. But when the King seizeth for a contempt of the Father, etc. if the issue of the Bastard eigne upon petition be restored, for that the seizure was without cause, the mulier is not barred, for the Bastard could never enter, but the possession of the King in that case, shall be adjudged in the right of the mulier, Coke ibidem f. 245. b. Bastardus nullius est filius, Littleton. Coke come. f. 203. a. aut filius populi, Coke l. 6. f. 6. A bastard is the Son of none, or the Son of the people, according to the common report, Cui pater est populus, pater est sibi nullus, & omnis. Cui pater est populus, non habet ille patrem, To whom the people Father is, to him is Father none, and all. To whom the people Father is, well Fatherless, we may him call. For as the civilians, pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant, he is a Father, whom the espousals, and nuptials show so to be. And therefore if a wife have a bastard it shall not be a villain, or if a villain have a bastard, by a woman, and marrieth her, the bastard is no villain, because he is nullius filius, though some hold the contrary, as Bracton, and Britton, for in both cases the issue at the common Law is a bastard, & quasi nullius filius, Coke come. f. 123. a. And though a bastard be a reputed Son, yet is he not such a Son, in consideration whereof an use may be raised, because in judgement of Law he is nullius filius, Dyer 374. And for the same reason, where the Statute of 32. H. 8. of wills speaketh of children, bastard children are not within that statute, and a bastard of a woman is no child within that Statute, where the mother conveyeth Lands unto him, Dyer 313. Qui ex damnato coitu oriuntur inter filios non computantur, Coke come f. 3. b. Who are borne of condemned, or unlawful copulation, are not to be reckoned among children, as a man maketh a lease to B. for life, the remainder to the issue male of B. and the heirs males of his body, B. hath issue a bastard Son, he shall not take the remainder, because in Law he is no issue, for he that is born of unlawful copulation, is not to be accounted among children, so it is if a man make a lease for life to B. the remainder to the eldest issue male of B. to be begotten of Jane S. whether the same be legitimate or not legitimate, B. hath issue a bastard on the body of Jane S. this Son or issue shall not take the remainder, because he is no issue, ibidem, and for the same cause if after the birth of the issue, B. had married I. S. so as he became bastard eigne, and had a possibility to inherit, yet he shall not take the Remainder. Ibidem. And though a bastard having gotten a name by reputation, may purchase by his reputed and known name, to him and his heirs, yet he can have no heir but of his body, and if he hath no issue, the Land shall escheat, if he purchase any, Finch Nomot. f. 130. The Pope, Emperor, and Prince himself, cannot legitimate a bastard to enjoy any benefit of our Law, the Parliament hath only that power, Com. of England, f. 242. And it is related by Bodin, l. 2. de repub. That one jeane Navarre calling himself Count Palatine, by virtue of the power he said he had of the Pope made many bastards of France legitimate, for which he was condemned by arrest of Parliament as laesae majestatis reus, wherein their Law seemeth to accord with ours, for it is only in the power of the King and Parliament to make a bastard legitimate, but the King may dispense with a bastard to be a Priest, Davis Reports f. 37. a. The civil Law depriveth the adulterous issue of all benefit, the Ecclesiastical Law alloweth things needful for sustentation, but by the Laws of this Realm one may give or devise all to a bastard. Swinborne testaments, f. 230. And by our Law if a grant be made to a bastard by the name of him who is supposed to engender him, it is good if he be known by that name, so if a remainder be limited to Richard the Son of Richard Marwood, it is good, although he be a bastard, so in case of purchase, a bastard eigne in respect of the subsequent marriage is capable of his reputed Father's gifts, for though by the civil Law his right of Primogeniture is remitted by the subsequent marriage, according to the rule subsequens matrimonium tollit peccatum praecedens, yet by the common Law he is in it rejected, and he made uncapable of any inheritance by descent, though in case of purchase it may be sufficient, as 39 E. 3. Richard Thompson having issue by one joane before marriage one Agnes, and after intermarried with joane, and made a Feoffment in fee, and re-taked the estate unto himself for life, the remainder to Agnes the Daughter of the said Richard and joane, and agreed that it was a good remainder without any averrement that she was known to be their Daughter, but it was there objected, that a bastard is not their Daughter in Law, and therefore the remainder void; but Finch den gave the rule, and said it is found that the Daughter was borne before the espousals, so that by their espousals after she is their Daughter, so as though by the common Law she was not their Daughter, yet in so much that she hath colour by the Ecclesiastical Law, which saith, that subsequens matrimonium tollit peccatum praecedena, it is sufficient in case of conveyance to make the remainder good, Coke l. 6. f. 65. a. vide ibidem plura. Dominum a possessione cepissi dicitur, Reg. I. C. paulus, Dominion is said to have his beginning from possession, and that jure naturali, for we gain Dominion of some things by the Law of nature, that is, as Cicero hath it, veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt, by long occupation and possession of those things into which being void we have entered, which no man can take from us but by injury, and therefore do the Civilians derive possession, a pedum possessione, from the fixing our feet upon any particular thing, and by long possession is turned into right, longa enim possessio est pacis jus, Bracton, f. 50. Long possession is the right of peace. And therefore in the case of a Charter of Feoffment, if all the witnesses to the Deed be dead (as no man can keep his witnesses alive, and time weareth all things) then violent presumption, which standeth for a truth, is continual, and quiet possession; for ex d uturnitate temporis omnia praesumantur solenmiter esse acta, Glanvill, for by long continuance of time all things are presumed to be solemnly acted, Coke come. f. 6. b. And thereupon Bracton giveth the rule, Longum tempus & longus usus, quiexcedit memoriam hominum sufficit pro jure. Long possession, & long occupation, which doth exceed the memory of man, sufficeth for a right, l. 4. f. 230. But what measure of time maketh such a right, by which a Fee-simple may be attainted divers have differed in opinions, some judging the same to be according to the computation of years from the time of King Henry the first, to the Statute of Merton, which amounteth to seventy six years, and others have limited it to an hundred years, which according to the civil law is longissimum vitae hominum tempus, the longest time of the life of men, but the true measure of it according to Mr. Littleton, is, where things have been used so long as the memory of man cannot remember the contrary, that is, either by the knowledge, and memory of proof, or by record, or sufficient matter in writing, so as if there be any sufficient proof of record or writing to the contrary, albeit it exceedeth the memory, or knowledge of any man living, yet is it within the memory of man, Coke come 115. a. And as by the course of nature, time is the measure, and consumer of all things. Nullaque res, majus tempore rebor habet, There nothing is which hath more strength than time. So doth Art and Law imitate nature, which giveth unto it such power and authority, as to change, to raise, to alter, and to establish titles, wherein the Civil, and the common Law do square, for by the civil Law there is required a just title bona fides, and continual possession, to make a title of prescription, but the common Law only requireth, continual possession, and that naturalis possessio ad praescriptionem sufficit, natural possession sufficeth for a prescription. As if a man prescribe to have a rent, and likewise to distrain for the same, it cannot be avoided by pleading, that the rent hath always been paid by coercion, or that it began by wrong, Coke come 114. a. So Jeptha pleaded prescription against the Ammonites, these Lands, saith he, have we possessed these 700. years. And the reason why this long usage and prescription was brought in to be of the force and strength to make a right, and a Law, was, that thereby there might be certainty of titles, and a peaceable possession without contradiction, and as a Civilian saith, ut sit finis litium, that there might be an end of suits, and therefore were the Statutes of limitation made, within which the demandant that bringeth the action must prove himself, or some of his Ancestors to be seized, and in ancient time the limitation in a Writ of right was from the time of H. 1. after that by the Statute of Merton the limitation was from the time of Henry the second, and by the Statute of Westminster the first, the limitation was from the time of Richard the first, but because that limitation of the writ of right was for so long time passed, the limitation of a writ of right was changed by the Statute of 32. H. 8. and reduced to threescore years' next before the Teste of the Writ, and so of other actions, Coke come. f. 115. a. vide ibidem plura. And afterwards another Act was made, 21. Jacob. that for the avoiding of suits, all writs of Formedon in Descender, Formedon in Remainder, and Formedon in Reverter for any Manors, etc. shall be sued and taken within twenty years, and that after the twenty years expired none such, or any of their heirs shall have any such writ, and that no person that hath right or title of entry into any Manors, etc. shall thereunto enter but within twenty years, vide ibidem, cap. 6. plura But it is to be observed that time of limitation is twofold, first in writs that is by divers acts of Parliament, the second is to make a title of inheritance, and that is as hath been said, to plead a prescription, de tempore cujus contrarium memoria hominum non existit, Coke come. f. 14. & 15. which is by the common Law. And this also accordeth with the rule of Bracton, Longa possessio sicut jus parit jus possidendi, & tollit actionem a vero domino, l. 2. f. 52. Long possession, as right begetteth a right, and taketh away an action from the true Lord and owner. And so in ancient times, if the disseisor had been long in possession, the Disseisee could not have entered upon him, neither could the Disseisee have entered upon the Feoffee of the Disseisor, if he had continued a year and a day in quiet possession, and though the Law be now changed, yet at this day the Disseisor dying seized, being an act in Law, barreth the disseisee of his entrance upon the heir, and for that many advantages follow the possession and tenant, the law taketh away the entry of him that would not enter upon the Ancestor, who is presumed to know his title, and driveth him to his Action against the heir that may be ignorant thereof, Coke come. f. 237. b. And for the above said reason the law yieldeth divers utilities and advantages to the possessor, for it is better to be a possessor, then to complain of others who are possessors, because it imposeth the burden of proving on the Plaintiff, so as if he can prove nothing, he which possesseth shall be acquitted, neither can possession be avoided but by possession, Ployd. 137, b. As if I make a lease for years of the lands of my wife and die, the lease is not void before entry made by the wife, for possession must be avoided by possession, and such possession must be gained by entry. But if my father die, and his land descend to me, a Lease for years made before my entry is good, because I have possession in law, and none hath possession in deed, but if a stranger abate, a lease made by me after is void, for the stranger hath possession indeed before my entry upon him, Ployd ibid. If an Executor bring an Action of trespass for goods taken out of his possession, it is not needful to show the Testament, but if he not ever was possessed of them, but doth demand the thing, than he ought to have shown the testament, Ployd. f. 46. a. And regularly it holdeth true, that when the naked right of Land is released to one that hath jus possessionis, and the other by a mean title recovereth the land from him, the right in possession shall draw the naked right with it, and shall not leave a right in him to whom the release is made, as if the heir of the disseisor being in by descent is disseised by A. and the disseisee release to A. now hath A. the mere right to the land, but if the heir of the disseisor enter into the Land, and regaineth possession, that shall draw with it the mere right to the land, and shall not regain the possession only, and leave the mere right in A. but the recontinuance of the possession, the mere right is therewith vested in the heir of the disseisor, Coke come 266. a. If a woman possessed of a term for years take an husband and the wife dieth, though during the life of the wife, the term was not devested out of the wife, yet by her death it is vested in the husband, and it is given to him by Act in law, because it is a thing in possession and not in Action, Pl f. 192. b. In pari causa possessor potior haberi debet. Reg. I. C. In aequali jure ●elior est conditio possidentis Coke l. 4. f. 90. a As the Lord who is allowed but three Chaplains, retaineth six by his letters testimonial at one and the same time, and all the six are preferred to six several plurallities, the three which are first promoted are warranted by the statutes, and yet the retainer was not according to the statute, for in aequali jure melior est conditio possidentis, In equal right better is the condition of him who is in possession, ibidem. If a man purchaseth several lands at one time which are holden of several Lords by Knight's service and dieth, the Lord who first seizeth the ward shall have him, because they are in aequali jure, and there is no priority between them, which if there were, the elder Lord shall have him, Perk. f. 6. If ten Manors be conveyed to two several persons by one deed, which of them happeneth to get the Deed first may detain it, Two Attorneys are retained conjunctim & divisim, jointly and severally, the plea of him that first pleadeth shall stand, because they are in aequali jure to plead. If there be two joint-tenants, and one of them taketh all the profits of the land, or all the rent, the other hath no remedy, Coke l. 2. f. 68 a. So the release of all Actions personal by one, barreth the other, but otherwise it is if the personalty be mixed with the realty: and if there be two joint-tenants Lords, and the tenant holdeth by Knight's service, and the tenant dieth his heir within age, and one Lord seizeth the Ward, and the other distraineth for the services, he that first seizeth or distraineth shall bind the other. And if an Action of waist be brought by two joint-tenants, the release of one shall bar the other, as it is holden, 9 H. 5. f. 15. by the Court, for in waste the personalty is the principal; and though one joint-tenant cannot prejudice the other in regard of the matter of inheritance or frank tenement, yet in regard of the profits of the franktenement they may, vide ib. plura. If husband and wife purchase socage lands to them and their heirs of their bodies, and they having issue within fourteen years of age do die, in this case if the grandmother of the part of the mother of the issue, first seize the Ward, she shall have the Wardship, and not the grandfather of the part of the father of the issue, 8. Eliz. 296. b. because they are in aequali jure, and where the right is equal the condition of the possessor is the better. To which obiter may be annexed the sage judgement of Augustus, who after the civil wars, being molested with the complaints of divers who demanded many places of ambiguous right, from the possessors, because they severally were given by the Senate, Pompey, Caesar, Lepidus, or Augustus to the Soldiers, gave sentence for the possessors. Duo non possunt unam rem in solido possidere, R g. I. C. Vlpiamus, & Coke come. f. 368. a. Two cannot possess one and the same thing fully and wholly, for dominion had its beginning from possession, and as there cannot be two Lords and Masters of one and the same thing fully and wholly, so cannot too fully and wholly possess one and the same thing. As if A. of B. be seized of a Mese, & F. of G. that hath no right to enter into the same Mese claiming the said Mese to hold to him and his heirs, entereth into the said Mese, but A. of B. is continually abiding in the same Mese. In this case the possession of the franktenement shall always be adjudged in A. of B. and not in F. of G. because where two be in one house or other tenements, and the one claimeth by one title, and the other by another title, the law shall judge him in possession that right hath, for two cannot possess one and the same thing fully and wholly. But if a man hath issue two daughters, Bastard eigne and mulier puisne, and dieth seized, and they both enter generally, the sole possession shall not be adjudged only in the puisne, because they claim by one and the same title. Coke ibidem. Yet though the possession of one thing cannot be fully and wholly but in one, yet the property may be in two, as Ployd. f. 5. 24. Manwood said, it is not strange in our law that two should have a several interest in one and the same term, and two properties in it, for if lessee for years grant over his term to another by deed indented rendting rent, and that for default of payment, that he shall enter and retain till the grantee hath paid to him the rent, if he do enter for default of payment and retain, he hath one property and the grantee also hath another property, for his interest is not gone; but hath a property tel quel, such as it is, and may have all the property upon payment of the arrears. So if one hath a term for years, and is bound in a recognizance or statute staple, and execution for non pay-ment is sued against him, and the term is extended, and a certain annual value delivered to the Connusee, as it well may be (for it may be sold outright, or extended to an annual value) there the connusee hath one property for the payment of his debt, and the lessee another property, and upon the payment of the debt shall have the term again. A woman made a lease for years of mills in Kent, with exception that she should have the profits, and there was a great debate, whether the exception were good or no, because the profits of the mills was all the benefit, and in effect the mills themselves, but at the last the exception was judged good in law, and that the woman should have the profits. There if she enter to have the profits she hath one property, and the lessee another property, and it is incertain how many years the property of the woman will continue. So if one Lease sheep for a time to manure his land, or pawn his dog, as the case was in 5. H. 7. The owner hath some property, and he to whom the Sheep is leased or the dog pawned, another, Ployd. ibid. Possessio fratris de feodo simplici facit sororem esse haeredem, The possession of the brother of a fee simple maketh the sister to be heir, Littleton. Coke come. f. 14. b. As if one hath issue a son and a daughter by one venture, and a son by another venture, and dieth seized of Lands in fee-simple, and the eldest son entereth into the land, and dieth without issue, the Sister shall have the land, and not the younger son, though the younger son be heir to the father, for the possession of the brother of the fee-simple maketh the sister to be heir, but the brother must be in Actual possession, and there must be pedis positio, a corporal fixing of his foot, and entry upon the land; and there must be some Act done to make her heir, for she is but haeres factus by the actual possession of her brother, for the younger son is, haeres natus to the father, and if the eldest son had died before he had taken actual possession, the younger son might have entered and had the land as heir to the father, but by the possession of the brother, she being of the whole blood, is made heir. But in dignities where no possession can be had, but such as descendeth to a man and his heirs, as in Dukes, Earls, Barons, etc. there can be no possession of the brother to make the sister inherit, but the younger brother being heir to the father shall inherit the dignity inherent to the blood as heir to him was first created noble, Coke ibid. And as Ploydon saith, there is a great difference between lands in fee-simple and lands tailed, in regard of possession, for the possession of a brother of an estate tail as heir to his father, shall not make the sister to be heir, but it shall descend to the younger son of the half venture, for he ought to have it, per formam doni, Ployd. f. 57 a. And if a Bastard eigne abare in fee-simple land after the death of the father, and dieth seized without interruption, and his issue enter, he shall hold it, and the right of the mulier puisne and his heirs, are bound for ever, Ployd. ibidem. So if a woman seized in fee, consent to a ravishor, and the daughter which is proxima de sanguine next of blood doth enter, there the son after borne shall not take away the title and possession of the daughter. So where a remainder is appointed in fee to the right heirs of I. S. who dieth having a daughter which entereth after the death of tenant for life, there the son after borne shall not recover the lands before vested in the daughter as purchased; for thereit is a fee simple to which the son after born hath no right, for the lands were in none of his Ancestors before. But where the estate is an estate tail, the son ought to have it per formam doni: As if a feme which suffereth a recovery by covin, contrary to the Statute of 11. H. 7. is defeated by entry of the daughter tenant in tail, the son borne may enter and oust the daughter, for that the title in tail is in him, because the statute saith, he shall enjoy it according to the title, which is in tail, and therein the common proverb is verified, One shall beat the bush, and the other have the bird. As if a man hath land by descent of the part of the mother, and maketh a feoffment on condition, and dieth without issue, and the heir of the part of the father entereth, the heir of the part of the mother may oust him, Ployd. 56. b. and 57 a. In Wimbish case, quod vide. Infinitum injure reprebatur, Coke l. 6. f. 45. What is infinite is reproved and rejected in law. As if a man have a debt by simple contract, and taketh an obligation for the same debt or any part of it, the contract is determined, 3. H. 4. 17. 11. H. 4. 9 and 9 E. 4. 50. 51. So if a man have a debt upon an obligation, and by course of law hath a judgement upon it, the contract by specialty is changed into a thing of record, for if he that recovereth should have a new Action or a new judgement, he may have infinite Actions and infinite judgements, to the perpetual charge and vexation of the defendant, and he shall not have a new Action or a new judgement, for what is infinite is rejected in law. So upon every judgement the defendant shall be amerced, and if he be a Duke, Marquess, Earl, Viscount, or Baron, he shall be amerced 100 l. and so the defendant should be infinitely amerced upon an obligation, which shall be mischievous, Ibid. And lib. 7. f. 45. b. It was resolved in the Court of Wards, by the greater part, that a Bill of reviver upon a bill of reviver shall not be admitted, by reason of the infiniteness, which is rejected in law. And lib. 8. f. 16. b. When the first office is found against the King, and the melius inquirendum also, the King is bound nor to have any melius inquirendum for the same matter, because there should be no end of it, and that such writs might issue infinitely, and infinity is condemned in law. Nihil tam conveniens naturali aequitati quam voluntatem domini volentis suam rem in aliam transferre ratam haberi, Bracton f. 18. God hath given to man all the land, terram dedit filiis bominum, So men by God's endowment are made Lords of the land, and what property a man hath in lands by law, by the law of God also he hath dominion of it, and therefore every man who is the lawful owner of land, may grant to what person, in what manner, and for what time it pleaseth him, for if the land be subject to man, then is it subject to his will, for the will cometh from the mind, which is the principal part of man, because it directeth the body and all things he hath, and if his land be subject to his will this his will is a sufficient consideration, by which his land may pass as his will is, and there is no greater consideration than the will, Ployd. f. 308. b. And nothing is more agreeable to natural equity then to ratify the will of the Lord, willing to transferr his substance and estate over to another. And therefore at the common law the intention and will of the parties was the direction of uses, for they were only determinable and to be adjudged by the Chancellor, which is the Court of conscience and equity, and there is nothing more agreeable to equity, then that the will of the Lord or owner, and the meaning of the parties should direct the uses, 31. H. 16. Tit. subpaena Fitz. 23. A man being ceste que use and having one sole daughter, declared his intent and meaning to the Feoffees, that after his decease, his daughter should have his land, and for it question was made in the Chancery, whether the limitation of that use made to the daughter might be revoked, and in reasoning of that case Fortescue held opinion, that if ceste que use had issue a daughter, and being sick declared his intention to his feoffee, that his daughter shall have his land after his decease, and after he recovered his health, he had issue a son, now saith he it is good conscience the son should have the Subpaena because he is heir, for conscientia dicitur a conset scio & quasi simul scire cum Deo, that is to know the will of God so near as reason will, and the intention of the parties, is to direct the uses according to a conscionable and benign construction, Coke l. 1. f. 100 a. b. vide ibidem plura. As a gift in tail may be made upon condition, that tenant in tail may alien for the profits of his issue and good, and he may alien, notwithstanding the Statute of W. 2. because in that case voluntas donatoris observatur, The will of the Donor is observed. Coke come 224. b. If Lands be given to B. and his heirs, Habendum to him and the heirs of his body, or if given to him and the heirs of his body, Habendum to him and his heirs, he hath estate tail, and a fee expectant, but if Lands be given to B. and his heirs; if B. have heirs of his body, and if he die without heirs of his body, that it shall revert to the Donor, it is an estate tail, and the reversion in the Donor, for voluntas donatoris in charta doni sui manifeste expressa est observanda, The will of the Donor manifestly expressed in the Charter of the gift is to be observed, Coke come. f. 21. a. If a common person doth without consideration give to I. S. his goods indefinitely, all his goods do pass, 21. E. 4. 25. Alba of Waltams case, by Brown and Genny. If the King do grant to one lands ex mero motu and though his Highness doth rehearse some consideration in the patent of his grant which is not true, as if the consideration be, that whereas the Grantee hath done his Majesty good service on the Sea or beyond the Sea, or in his Wars, though the consideration be merely supposed, and therefore no good consideration in Law, yet the words ex mero motu do make the Grant good, 26, H. 8. 1. by Fitz. And if a common person do by deed enroled enfeoff the King without any consideration, the King shall be seized to his own use, as having such prerogative in his person, that he shall not be seized to the use of any other, 28. H. 8. 7. Dier, Bokenghams' case by Knightley. cock l. 2. f. 71. b. It is not unjust but equal, that the bargain or shall annex such a condition to the State of the land as he pleaseth, for cujus est dare ejus est disponere, he that hath power to give hath power to dispose, ibidem. Coke l. 7. f. 6. Calvin's case. The King by his letters patents, or the Parliament by their votes may grant denizations without limitations or restraint, or else limited denizations, as to an alien and the heirs males of his body, 9 E. 4. f. 7. in Bagot's case, or to an alien for term of life, as to John Fenell, 11. H. 6. 3. Or else upon condition, whereof I have seen divers precedents, for who hath power to give hath power to dispose, ibid. Modus dat domationi, Fleta, Ployd. f. 25. a. The manor of the gift which the donor limiteth, maketh a law to the donee, for though in the preamble of the Act of W. 2. there be but three estates limited, to wit, especial tail, franke-marriage, and general tail, yet may the donor make other tails by his limitation, for his will is a law, as to the tail, and so heirs males of the body of the donee, and tail to the heirs females of the body of the Donee, and all other tails are within the purview of the Act, for the will of the donor is the effect of the stature, and from it, it followeth, that the alienation of the donee shall not bind the issues nor the donor. And the second wife shall not be endowed, neither can the donee charge the land with a rent-charge or other encumbrance; neither shall the land be forfeited for felony: and all these are included in the first purview to wit, that the will of the donor shall be observed and are but consequences, and explanations of the first purview, vide ibidem plura. But if a gift be repugnant or contrary to law, Exception. as a gift made upon a condition unlawful or impossible, it is void and of no effect, to gain any thing by the making of it in our law. As if the condition be to kill a man, Ployd. f. 34. b. Or if an obligation be made to save one harmless for killing a man, Ibid. f 64. b. these conditions are void. So a feoffment made, that the feoffee shall not alien the land, is void, because it is contrary to law, for by the law tenant in fee-simple hath power to alien to any man, for if such a condition should be good, than the condition should oust him of all the power that the law hath given him, which is contrary to reason, Littleton. The like law is upon a devise in fee, upon condition that the devisee shall not alien, the condition is void: And so it is of a grant, release, or confirmation, or any other conveyance, whereby a fee-simple doth pass, for it is absurd and repugnant to reason, that he that hath no possibility to have the land revert to him, should restrain his feoffee in fee-simple of all his power to alien. And so it is if a man be possessed of a lease for years, or of an horse, or of any other Chattels real or personal, or give, or sell his whole interest or property therein, upon condition that the Donee or Vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, because his whole interest and property is out of him, so as he hath no possibility of a reverter, and it is against trade and traffic, and bargaining and contracting between man and man, and against reason that he should oust him of all power given him, for regulariter non valei pactum de re mea non alienda, a contract or condition that I shall not alien that which is my own, doth not hold, and suiquum est liberis hominibus non esse liberam rerum suarum alienationem, it is unjust that freemen should not have liberty to alien their own estates. But these are to be understood of conditions annexed to the grant or sale itself, in respect of the repugnancy, and not to any other collateral thing, Coke come. f. 223. a. But before the statute of quia emptores terrarum, A man might have made a feoffment in fee, and added further, that if he and his heirs did alien without licence, that he should pay a fine, it had been good then, and then the Lord also might have restrained the alienation of the tenant by condition, because the Lord had a possibility of reverter, and so it is in the King's case at this day, because he may reserve a tenure to himself. If A. be seized of black Acre in fee, and B. enfeoffeth him of white Acre, upon condition that A. shall not alien black Acre, the condition is good, for the condition is annexed to other land, and ousteth not the feoffee of his power to alien the land whereof the feoffment is made, and so no repugnancy to the State passed by the feoffment, and so it is of gifts or sales of Chattels, reals, or personals, Coke ibidem. But if a feoffment be made upon condition, that the feoffee shall not infeoff I. S. etc. This is good, for he doth not restrain the feoffee of all his power, and in this case if the feoffee infeoff, I. N. of intent and purpose that he shall infeoff I. S. some hold that this is a breach of the condition, for, Quando aliquid prohibetur fieri ex directo prohibetur & per obliquum, for when any thing is forbidden to be done directly, it is also forbidden to be done collaterally or obliquely, Coke ibidem b. And a gift in tail that is made upon condition, that the donee nor his heirs shall not alien in fee in tail, or for term of another's life, is good to all those alienations which amount to any discontinuance of the estate tail, or is against the statute of W. 2. but as to a recovery the condition is void, for that is no discontinuance, nor against the said statute. Neither is a collateral warranty or lineal with assets in respect of the recompense restrained by the said statute, no more than a common recovery is, in respect of the intended recompense, Ibidem. If a man make a feoffment to Baron and feme in fee, upon condition they shall not alien, this is good to restrain them by feoffment or alienation by deed, because it is tortuous, but to restrain their alienation by fine, is repugnant, void, because lawful, ibidem. Voluntas reputabitur pro facto Bract. the will shall be esteemed for the deed. If no place be limited where money is to be paid in the condition of a Bond, and the Obligor at or after the day of payment happen in the company of the obligee, and offereth to tender him the money, and the other shifteth away to prevent him, it seemeth in this case he shall be excused, because he hath done his endeavour, 8. E. 4. 1. by Catesby. One was indicted quod burglariter fregit & intravit ecclesiam nocte ad depraedandum bona parochianorum in eadem existentia, and good, though he took nothing away, for his will was to have taken, Dier. f. 99 and 58. A man giveth a juror money to embrace him, though the verdict pass against him, he shall be punished for this, 28. H. 6. 12. A man carrieth his sick father into a croft, whereby he dyeth, it is felony. An Harlot hide her child with leaves in a thicket, and a Kite striketh it and killeth it, it is felony. A Bull, Bear, or Dog, accustomed to do hurt, of which the master and owner well knowing, doth not tie him up but suffereth him to go at large, and being so at large he killeth a man, this is held by Fitzherbert to be felony in the owner of the Beast, for thereby the owner seemeth to have a will to kill vide Wilson, office of Coroner f. 11. And by the civil law, if a man be bitten of another man's dog, the owner of the dog is chargeable unto him that is hurt, because he did not tie up his dog, and mussel him, Fulb. Pand. f. 76. For it is a rule in the civil law, voluntatem pro facto reputari, A wife after the death of her husband, being a copyholder came into the Court, and challenged her right of Frank-bank, and prayed to be admitted, but the steward refused to admit her, yet was it adjudged an admittance in law. So if a tenant alien and the feoffee tendereth his services and giveth a fine, and the Lord refuseth, the Lord shall be compelled to avow upon him, and so continual claim amounteth to an entry, Huttons rep. f. 18. And therefore the denial to do any thing is a breach of covenant, as if a man be bound to do an act when I request him, and I do request him, and he will not do it, he hath forfeited his band, 15. E. 4. 21. 34. H. 8. 23. Exitus plerumque in maleficiis spectatur, non voluntas, the act, and not the will, in evil facts is respected and considered, though in ancient times, the will was so material in felonious attempts, that it was taken for the fact itself, and so adjudged, as one intending the death of another man, woundeth him so grievously that he leaveth him for dead, and afterward flieth, and the man wounded revived, it was then adjudged to be felony, in so much as his will appeared to have killed him, 1. E. 3. with which Bractons' saying accordeth, in maleficiis spectatur voluntas & non exitus, but this law is not now in force, for he must be dead indeed before it be adjudged felony, and though the will be wanting the evil deed is always censured for felony. As if I hurt another, only with an intention to beat him and he dieth, it is felony. So upon the malicious words of a woman two men fought, and the one killed the other, the woman in this case was arraigned for the death of the slain man. Three men go together to diffame one, and one of them killeth a man, the other two are principals, though they had no such will and intention. Non efficit conatus, nisi sequatur effectus, & non efficit affectus nisi sequatur effectus, Coke l. 11. f. 98. b. A conation and an affection hurteth not, unless the Act and effect ensue. As those who have Offices of trust and confidences, shall not forfeit them by conations and intentions to do Acts, although they declare them by express words, unless the Act itself ensue. As if one who hath the custody of a Park, shall say that he will kill the game in his custody, or that he will cut down the trees in the Park, yet doth he neither kill the game, or cut down the trees, that is no forfeiture, & sic de similibus, for in all such cases there ought to be such a fact or a negligence which amounteth to as much, to wit, as to the destruction of the game. If a Bishop, Archdeacon, or Parson, &c, abateth all the trees, it is a good cause of deprivation, 9 E. 4. 34. If a Prior make dilapidation, it is a good cause to deprive him, 29. E. 3. 16. 20. H. 6. 36. But if it be but a conation or enterprise without any Act done, in none of these cases, it is cause of deprivation, for in these cases voluntas non reputabitur pro facto, the will shall not be reputed for the deed. So a conation or an enterprise cannot be the cause of the disfranchisement of a Citizen or Burgess, for he may repent before the execution of it, and then no prejudice will ensue, but the matter which shall be the cause of a disfranchisement must be an Act or a deed against the trust and duty of his freedom, or to the prejudice of the public good of the City or Burrow, vide ibidem plura, in James Baggs case. Affectus punitur licet non sequatur effectus, Coke l. 9 f. 56. 57 in the Poulter's case, The affection or will to do a thing is punished, though the effect followeth not. Though a Writ of conspiracy doth not lie, unless that the party be indicted, & legitimo modo acquietatus, for so are the words of the writ, yet false confederacy among divers persons shall be punished, though that nothing was put in ure, as 27. Ass. Pl. 44. Two were indicted of confederacy, either of them to maintain the other, though the matter was true or false, and though nothing was supposed to be put in ure, yet the parties were put to answer to it, for that such a thing is forbidden by the law. And in the next Article of the same book, enquiry shall be made of conspirators and confederators, which confederate among themselves &c. falsely to indite and acquit, and of the manner of their alliance, and between whom, which proveth that confederation to indite, and acquit, is punishable by the law though that nothing was executed. And it is holden 19 R. 2. title brief 726. A man shall have a writ of confederacy, though as they do nothing but confederate together, and shall recover damages and may be indicted for it also. Also the usual commission of Oyer and Terminer giveth power to the Commissioners, to inquire de omnibus coadunationibu●, confederationibus, & falsis alligantiis & coadunatio is an uniting them together, confederation is a combination between them, and falsa alligantia is a false alliance one with another by obligation or promise, to execute any unlawful Act, which the law punisheth before any fact is executed, to the end, to prevent the unlawful act, quia quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur & illud per quod pervenitur ad illud for when any thing is forbidden, that also is forbidden, by which one may come to that, and therefore, Hill. 37. H. 8. in the Star Chamber a Priest was branded with an P. and A. in the forehead, and put upon the Pillory, with a paper written, for false accusation, vide ibidem plu●a. Volenti neque injuriam neque vim fieri, Reg. I. C. Volenti non fit injuria. f. 501. No injury can be done to a willing man. If a Parson Emparsonee present another by it, he hath disappropriated the advowson, and maketh it presentable by his own Act, and therefore no injury. A man shooteth, giving warning to all, and one will go to the mark and is hurt, he is without remedy, 18. E. 4. 8. If I am bound to make an house, if you prohibit me to come upon the land, I may plead this bar, 19 E. 4. 2. If there be Lord, Mesne, and Tenant, and the King being Lord the mesne holdeth of the King in capite, and the tenant holdeth of him in Socage: if the tenant get a release of the mean, or fore-judge the mean, he shall now hold in capite, for volenti non fit injuria, and it shall be injurious to the King, if he should lose his tenure in capite and should have in place of it a tenure in Socage, Dau. 12. P. f. 67. a. If I exchange land with one hath a bad title, which is known to me, and if I know of a fraudulent conveyance, and buy the Lands, in both those cases the party shall have remedy, though they be willing to the wrong. Omne actum ab agentis intentione est judicandum, Reg. I. C. & Coke come. f. 49. Affectio tua nomen imponit operi tuo, every act is to be judged from the intention of the agent, and every affection or intention giveth the name to thy work. As if a man letteth lands &c. for term of years, the remainder over to another for life in tail, or in fee, if the termor enter before Livery of Seisin made to him, than the franktenement and the reversion is in the Lessor, but if the Lessor and the Lessee come upon the ground of purpose, for the lessor to make, or the lessee to take livery, the entry vesteth no actual possession in him till livery be made, because the purpose and intention giveth the name to the work, and therefore if it be agreed between the disseisor and the disseisee, that the disseisee shall release all his right upon the land, this is a good release, and the entry of the disseisee being for this purpose did not avoid the disseisin, for his intent in this case did guide his entry to a special purpose, Val. 19 Eliz. l. B. Coke ibidem. The intention and agreement of the minds of the parties is the only thing that the law respecteth in contracts, and such words as bewray the assent of the parties, and have substance in them, are sufficient, Ployd. f. 141. As if one make an obligation, and the obligation is endorsed, that the obligee doth will and grant, that if the obligor shall stand to the arbitrement, ordination, and judgement of A. and B. that then the obligation, shall be void, there an exception was taken to the condition, for that the words are the words of the obligee, and not of the obligor, but it was holden by the better opinion, that the condition was good, for there is sufficient substance of a condition, and the intent of the parties appeareth, and yet the words are not usual for conditions, for the words of the condition are the words of the obligors, 21. H. 6. f. 55. So a grant of an annuity to one, pro consilio impendendo, is a grant conditional, for if he will not give counsel, the annuity shall cease, and yet there is not one word of a condition. So T. 9 E. 4. f. 19 &. 22. where debate was for tithes between a Prior and another, and the composition between them was, that the Prior should have the tithes without challenge or contradiction of the other, and the Prior granted to the other forty shillings yearly, and by the better opinion, the grant shall enure conditionally, so as if the other disturb the Prior in receiving his tithes, the forty shillings shall cease. If one make a Lease for years by deed, and by the same deed covenanteth that the Lessee shall nor be impeached of waist, that word Covenant made at the same time, amounteth to as much as if he had said Habendum: for years without impeachment of waist, P. 21. H. 6. f. 7. I. S. did bind himself in an obligation of twenty pound, and the obligation was Noverint universi per presents me, I. S. teneri & obligari W. B. in twenty pound, solvendum eidem I. etc. and yet the obligation good, and the Court held that the Count shall be made solvendum to the Plaintiff, for the interest of the parties there appeareth, and the certainty of the bond before, shall not be taken away by the Solvendum after, M. 4. E. 4. f. 23. So if one have a remainder of land in him, and he granteth it to another, by the name of a reversion of land, that shall be a good grant, for there the certainty of the land appeareth, and then notwithstanding the misterming of the thing, the law regardeth the intention of the parties, and doth judge according to it. So if I be bound to pay you at the feast of Saint Michael which shall be in the year of our Lord 1555. 20 s. And at the same feast of Saint Michael than next ensuing other 20 s. The law will adjudge the same feast to have the meaning of such or the like feast, for it cannot be the same feast, if it come after it, so the law will take one word for another to supply the intent of the parties, vide ibid. Ployd. 141 b. browning's case. Carta non est nisi vestimentum donationis, Bract. and the intent directeth gifts rather than the words, Ployd. 160. b. As if a receivor be bound in an obligation to his master to pay to him omnia recepta & recipienda, all things received and to be received in his office, that by it he is not bound to pay all that he might receive, but only that which he shall receive indeed, and so his intent shall rather be taken then the word, H. 41. E. 3. f. 6. So where a man maketh a Lease of an house, so as the lessee may make his profit of the houses within, he cannot pull down the houses or make waist of them, for the intent was not such, although the words seem otherwise, T. 9 E. 4. f. 22. And it was said, to follow the words was summum jus, and that Judges ought not to do it, but to follow the intent rather, and Ployd. f. 161. b. saith, that such was the opinion of Bradwell in 14. H. 8. f. 22. That contracts shall be as it is concluded and agreed between the parties, and as their intents may be taken, and that cavillation with words contrary to the simple intent, as Tully saith in his Offices is calumnia quaedam & ninis callida & malitiosa Juris interpretatio, ex quo illud, summum jus summa injuria, a kind of a calumny and malicious interpretation of the law, from whence that saying proceeded, the rigour of right is the extremity of injury. As he putteth the example of one had made a truce for 130. days with his enemy, and in the night he plundered and depopulated his possessions, because he said the truce was for days, and not for the nights, which Cicero accounteth mere injury and injustice, and admonisheth men to avoid the like interpretation of the law, and to observe the intent of the words, and certainly words are but testimonials of the intent, and therefore Ployd. f. 107. b. It is said, it is the offices of Judges to take and expound the words, as the common people do use them, to express their intent according to their intent: As a Lease was made for life, and that after his decease the tenements redibunt to a stranger, it shall be taken as a remanebunt because to that purpose it was there used, and therefore by 18. E. 3. f. 28. It shall be taken by way of remainder. So a lease for life, the reversion to a stranger shall be taken as a remainder, for the reason abovesaid, 30. M. 1. ante 157. vide ibidem plura, in Hills case. And so Ployd. f. 291. a. Where a covenant cannot be performed according to the words, it shall be performed according to the intent as near as may be, as in the case of Littleton, where a man maketh a feoffment upon condition, that the feoffee shall make an estate in special tail to the Feoffor, and his wife, and the heirs of their bodies, if the Baron dieth before the estate made, the estate shall be made as near to the condition as may be, to wit, to the feme for life, without impeachment of waist, the remainder to the issues in tail, according to the first limitation, and if the feme be dead, than the feoffee ought to give the lands to the issues and the heirs of the body of his father and his mother engendered. If the words be performed, and not the intent, the agreement is not performed, Ployd. f. 291. b. according to the rule of the civil law, leges non ex verbis sed ex ment sunt intelligendae, laws are not to be understood and construed by the words, but by sense and meaning of the parties, as where the Defendant was obliged upon condition, that if his feoffees of his Manor of W. should grant to the Plaintiff an annual rent of forty shillings out of the said Manor, that then etc. and he had three feoffees, and two of them granted to the Plaintiff the rent: There the words of the condition were performed, for the feoffees had granted the rent, and yet he had not performed the condition, for all the Justices there held, that all the feoffees ought to have granted the rent, and so it should be sure, for there the third might have the land by survivor, and he might avoid the rent, and also more than two parts of the Manor were not charged with the rent, and so the intent is not performed though the words be M. 22. H. 6. f. 10. So if a man be bound to enfeoff me of the Manor of D. and he maketh a feoffment ro another of parcel of it, and then enfeoffeth me of the Manor, he hath performed the words, but yet he hath not performed the intent, which was, that I should have had all the Manor as it then was, H. 3. H. 7. 4. So a remainder was limited to B. Si ipse vellet inhabitare & residens esse, if he would dwell and be resident on the land during the term, there it is taken that if he was resident one week during the term, he had performed the words of the condition but not the intent, for the intent was, that he should be resident all the term, 4. E. 6. ante 23. So an Abbot was Parson Emparsonee of a time etc. and he had annuity for the time, of which no memory runneth in right of the Parsonage, and he as Abbot without naming himself Parson, brought a Writ of annuity, and counteth upon a prescription in him, and his predecessors Abbots, and the prescription traversed and found for the Plaintiff, there every word of the Verdict is true, and yet attaint lay against the Jury, because he brought the Writ in the name of the Abbey and so claimed the annuity, whereas he was not seized by that form, but as Parson, and for that he did not claim as Parson, they ought not to have found the issue with him, and so the words of the Verdict and the intent of the Verdict did not agree in one, M. 10. E. 4. f. 16. Ibidem, in Chapman's case. It is not requisite always that the agreement shall be performed according to words, because the intent is performed, which is the principal point of the agreement, Ployd. f. 295. a. b As if a man be bound to pay a lesser sum upon a day certain, if I pay the sum before the day, the condition is performed, H. 10. H. 7. 24. So if the condition be in a Mortgage, that I pay the money at such a place, if I shall pay it at another place, and the Mortgage accept of it, it is well enough, for the value is the effect. So if a feoffment be made, upon condition, that if the feoffee do not pay the Feoffor such a sum at such a day, that then the feoffor shall enter; If the feoffee before the day make a feoffment over, and at the day doth not pay the sum, there the second feoffee at the day may tender and pay the sum, though the agreement was no other but that the first feoffee shall pay the sum, Litt. vide ib. plura. If a man make a feoffment, on condition to enfeoff two in fee at such a time, and before the time one dieth, the feoffment ought to be made to the survivor and his heirs only, for the intent which appeareth in the condition, Ployd. f. 345. 4. H. 7. f. 127. Every one who groundeth an Act with discretion, hath an intention in the inception, and neither beginneth any thing but to some end, and in the progression hath the same intent, and so in the consummation; so as the same intention is the cause of every part, and therefore the intention is principally respected in all humane acts, and especially in those which concern the disposition of our estates, and in feoffments and grants: A feoffment by deed, of a Manor with an advowson appendent, and no livery made, the advowson passeth not, yet an advowson may pass without livery, but the intention and the meaning was, that the Manor and it should pass together, Finch Nomot. 58. A bargain and sale of Land, and a reversion by deed not enroled, the reversion passeth not, though a deed without an enrolment may pass the reversion, but it was meant they should pass together, if one disseise another of two Acres in Dale, and the disseisee release to the Disseisor all his right in all his Lands in Dale, and delivereth the release as an escrow to be delivered to the disseisor as his deed before the second of May, and before that day the disseisor disseiseth him of another Acre in D. and then the releafe is delivered unto him the second day of May, the right to the third Acre shall not pass, because it was not his intent to release it, Ployd. One reciting by his Deed, that whereas by prescription he hath used to find a Chaplain, because some controversy hath grown of it, granteth by the same deed to do it, this determineth not the prescription, for the intent of the Deed reciting the prescription, was to confirm it, and not make a new grant. 21. H. 7. 6. Though it be a general rule, that the words which the common people use to express their intent, aught to be taken according to the intent, and not according to the very definition, in Hills, and Granges case, f. 170. And that generalis regula generaliter est intelligenda, yet this rule is principally to be observed in cases of uses, which were only trusts, and confidences between man and man, Coke l. 6. f. 64. vide ibidem plura, in Sir Moil Finches case. And Coke l. 1. f. 100 Shelleys case, we find in divers cases of our Books, that the intention of parties is the direction of uses by a conscionable, and benign construction; as if a man seized of Lands of the part of his mother, maketh a feoffment in fee, reserving a rent to him, and his heirs by the common Law, the rent shall go to the heir of the part of the father, Lit. But if a man be seized of lands of the part of the mother, and maketh a Feoffment in fee to the use of him and his Heirs, such use shall not go to the heir at the common Law, but in regard the Land moved from the part of the mother, therefore in equity, the use, which is nothing else but a trust, and confidence shall also go to the heirs of the part of the mother, 5. E. 4. f. 4. And though Littleton saith, that a man in a Feoffment and grant shall not have a Fee-simple without these words Heirs, yet if a man before the Statute of 27. H. 8. had bargained and sold his Land for money without these words heirs, the bargainee had a Fee-simple, because at the common Law nothing passed from the bargainer, but an use which is guided by the intention of the parties, which was to convey Land wholly to the bargainee, for that the Law intendeth that the bargainee paid the true value of the Land for it is in equity, and according to the intent of the parties, the bargainee had a Fee-simple without these words heirs, 27. H. 8. f. 5. Coke ibidem. And as Ployd. f. 345. a. A fortiori, the intent, saith he, shall be observed in wills, where the words cannot be performed, for Testamentum est testatio mentis, but that which is other than the intention, is not the testation of the mind, and therefore as he saith also, f. 54. b. It is the office of Judges to marshal the words of wills, according to the intentions of the parties, for the most part of them are made in extremity, and when there is no counsel of Law ready, or present, and the testators themselves are not for the most part learned in the Law, and are accounted inopes consilij, neither have they knowledge to put words in good order, and therefore the ignorance, and simplicity of those which make their wills, require a interpretation of the words of the will according to the intent. As Lands were devised to one for life, the remainder for life, the remainder Ecclesiae sancti Audreae in Holborn, and since the death of tenants for life, the Parson of the said Church sued an ex gravi querela, and it was pleaded in Judgement, that the remainder took no effect, because the Church was not a Parson capable, and upon that was a demurrer; and adjudged, that the devise was good, and that the Parson shall have execution, and yet the Parson was not named in the devise, but was comprehended in it, Pas. 21. R. 2. If a man devise the Manor of D. and had nothing in it at the time of making the will, and that since he purchased it, it shall pass by the devise, for it shall be taken, his intention was to purchase it, and if it should not pass, the will should be void to all intents, Ployd. f. 344. a. So if one devise Land to the wife of I. S. and I. S. dyeth, and she taketh to husband, another and after the devisor dyeth, she shall have the Land, and yet she was not the wife of I. S., when the devisor died, nor shall not take it as his wife, but the intent was that she that was the wife of I. S. at the time of the making of the Will shall have it. And if a man devise Lands to Alexander Nowell Deane of Paul's, and to the Chapter there and their Successors, and Alexander Nowell dyeth, and a new Deane is made, and then the devisor dyeth, the land shall vest in the new Deane and Chapter, and yet it vesteth not according to the words, but according to the intent, for the chief intent was to convey it unto the Dean, and the Chapter, and their Successors for ever, and the singular person of Alexander Nowell was not the principal cause, but by chance was one of the causes, Ployd. 344. b. If one devise by will in writing, Land to one and his Heirs, and then in another clause after, he deviseth out of that Land a rent-charge, to him and his heirs, it shall be good to the one for the rent, and to the other for the Land, and the rent in construction of Law shall be taken to be first devised, although it be last in words, and so one part shall stand with the other, and good sense shall be made, and the intent of the testator shall be observed in both, Ployd. f. 541. contrary to the rule of the civil Law, ubi pugnantia inter se in testamento jubentur, neutrum ratum est. If in the Premises of a will one deviseth Lands to one in fee, and in the end of the will he deviseth it to another in fee, the latter part shall confound the former, because he had last such an intent, and as the last will shall repeal the former will, by the same reason the last part of the will shall repeal the former part of the will, which is contrary to it, ibidem vide plura, in Paramours case. Bendloes Rep. f. 209. B. Being sick sent for a Councillor, and desired him to write his last will and testament of his Lands, and declared unto the Counsellor what he should write, who took paper and ink, and writ notes briefly of his said will, and every legacy that he had then declared, and also the names of the Executors, and went home to his house, and immediately with his own hands did write the last will and testament of B. and when he had written it, he came again to the house of the said B. with the said will to read it unto the said B. but then the said B. was dead, and therefore the Counsellor delivered the said will to the Executor of B. who proved the same, and after the wife of B. did enter into the tenements devised to her by the said will, and the heir entered upon her, and upon the general issue, it was the clear opinion of all the Justices, that it was a good will in writing, according to the Statute of 32. H. 8. And as in Feoffments, Grants, Uses, and Wills, the intent shall be observed, so every Statute ought to be taken according to the intent of those that made them, where the words are doubtful, & not uncertain, according to the rehearsal of the Statute, Ployd. f. 10. a. b. As in 4. E. 4. there was an information in the Exchequer, that one shipped certain sacks of Wool, and had not found sureties according to the Statute of 14, E. 3. C. ultimo, to wit, to bring plate of Silver of two marks for every sack of Wool, and to take two marks of coin again for the bullion, and there were two Statutes alleged to bar the said finding of sureties, to wit, 36. E. 3. C. 11. Where it is recited, that the Commons of the Realm had granted to the King a great subsidy of every sack of Wool for three years, in consideration of which the King by the same Statute granted, that after three years' nothing shall be taken of the Commons, but only the ancient custom of half a mark of every sack, etc. and that also by the Statute of 45. E. 3. c. 4. It was established, that no imposition, or charge shall be put on Wools, other than the custom and subsidy granted to the King without assent of Parliament, and if any were, it should be repealed, and holden for nothing, but it was adjudged that the two last Statutes were not to discharge the bullion, but only the great subsidies, and great charges upon Wools after the three years, and the intents of the makers of the two last Statutes were not to discharge the bullion, for all things within the general words shall not be taken as the purview of the Statute, but such thing as the makers of the Statutes meant, so as the intent of the makers is judged by the words, and shall abridge the generalty of them. So the Statute of Waste is, if any one make waist in Land, which he holdeth ex dimissione, &c by lease, yet if his estate be ex legatione, by legacy, he shall be punished by equity, and the intent of the makers of the act. So the Statute of Quia emptores terrarum, restraineth men to make tenors of themselves, yet there where the words are, that every one shall hold of the Lord Paramount, secundum quantitatem terrarum, according to the quantity of their Lands, it is taken and ought to be understood, secundum valorem ter●a, according to the value of the Lands, vide ibidem plura. And Ployd. f. 57 b. It is an erudition in our Law that where the terms, and letter of any Statute be obscure, and difficult to be conceived, there we ought to resort to the intent of the makers of the Statute, vide ibidem plura. Where the intent appeareth the Law will include words, which are not apt, from their proper and common signification, to the intent, Ployd. 154. a. As if the Disseisee agree with the heir of the Disseisor, who is by descent to confirm his estate, and if he make them a Deed by these words, Dedi & concessi, the Land to him and his heirs, that cannot enure in his natural sense, for the nature of a dedi is to give one a thing which he had not before, but because it cannot enure, so it shall enure as a confirmation, and so inclineth the word out of his proper signification to the intent and so 17. E. 3. f. 8. It is holden that a Manor may pass by name of a fee de chivaler, for if the intent was that the Manor shall pass, the Law shall adjudge the better, to incline the word (de chivaler) to it, and in 10. E. 4. f. 4. Pasche, it was held by the better opinion, that a man may plead a demise to him of Land for a year, by the words, to licence him to occupy the Land for a year, and so may one apply a word out of his apt signification to another signification, in performance of the intent of the matter. And Ployd. f. 142. Words shall be construed according to the minds of the parties, where they are directed to a special intent, and those which do imply and contain the intent of the parties to be conditional, shall be sufficient to make a condition as well as the usual words. And therefore if a man make a Feoffment, ad solvendum, to pay 20 ●. at such a time, it is a condition, for the matter showeth that the intent of the Feoffor was to have twenty shillings for the Land. So if a man maketh a Feoffment in fee to one, to instruct his Son in such an Art, it is a condition, because the words purport such an intent, and yet they are not usual words, vide ibidem plura, in browning's case. But Ployd. f. 162. b. Exception. Though it be the rule of Bract. that words ought to be inclined to the intent, yet non estregula quin fallat, for one ought to have words apt for the meaning, or else the meaning will be void, for if a man will bend the Law to the intent of the party, rather than the intent of the party to the Law, it would maintain barbarousness and ignorance, to the decay of all erudition, and diligence, for if a man knew that what words soever they are, his meaning should only be thought on, he would be more negligent for words, and then such an incertainty would rise to discuss what was the meaning, that he would bring in great confusion, and therefore the phrases of speech commonly declare the intents of persons, as if I give you a cup of Wine you shall not have the cup, but if I give you an Hogshead of Wine, you shall have the Hogshead, because the phrase showeth the intent, Ployd. f. 86. a. 27. H. 8 27. And therefore we shall see in many cases, that the intent shall be destroyed, where it accordeth not with the Law, as 9 H. 6. f. 45. An Abbot and Covent by deed indented, gave a croft to W. in fee, and for that gift and grant, the said William, renunciavit toti communia, quam habere consuevit averiorum suerum cum averijs Abbot & Conventus renounceth all the Common which he hath used to have of his Cattle, with the Cattle of the Abbot and Covent, and that release of Common was there taken void, because he did not show to whom he renounced the common, yet there was a full intent, for he had common in the Land of the Abbots, and he had intent to release it to him, but for the incertainty it was void. And a Lease was made to Baron and Feme, and the reversion of the Land that the Baron held was granted, and it was held void, notwithstanding the intent, because it miss of the certainty of the particular estate, H. 13. E. 3. Fitz. grants 63. And so where there were Lord and tenant of three acres, and the Lord granted the signiory which he had out of one Acre, it was held void in 17. E. 3. notwithstanding the intent, because his intent did not agree with Law, and so where a man holdeth of one by Castle garder, Homage, and Fealty, and he granteth to another all his services, it was held in 31. E. 1. that the Castle-garder cannot pass, because he did not grant such a Castle, but reserved it, and therefore he who hath not the Castle cannot have the Castle guarder, & so his intent in granting all the services, could not make all to pass, because it was not according to Law, and so the Law ruleth the intent, and the intent not the Law, Ployd. ibidem, in Throckmortons' case. Coke l. 1. f. 84. b. A man giveth Land to M. and 1. his Sisters, and to the heirs of the bodies of them lawfully begotten (by which they had a joint estate for life, and several inheritances) and the Donor intending that neither of them should break the Jointure, but the Survivor should have all per jus accrescendi, added this clause, sub hac forma, that she that should longest live should have all the Land, but because his intent is contrary to Law, for this cause, if the Jointure be severed by fine, the Survivor shall not have the part so severed by the said clause, which he hath inserted of his conceit, and his own imagination, contrary to Law and reason, ibidem. But in Wills the intent shall be observed, and only thought of, because the Testator had no time to order all things according to Law by presumption, but is suddenly made oftentimes, and so the diversity, Ployd. f. 162. b. And therefore Ploy. f. 414. a. The intent in devises maketh estates to pass contrary to the rules of the common Law in deeds and other gifts. As if I devise Land to one A. for life, whereas there is not any such, the remainder in fee, he in the remainder shall take the Land, though there be no estate precedent. And 34. E. 3. one had issue a Son, and Daughter, and deviseth Land devisable to one for life, upon condition that if the Son disturb tenant for life, or his Executors of their Administration, that then the Land shall remain to the Daughter, and dyeth; the Daughter after the death of the tenant for life, bringeth a Formedon in remainder against the son, & allegeth that the tenant had disturbed the Tenant for life, and the Executors, and the Tenant traversed it, & upon it issue joined, and the condition took the fee out of the Son, and put in the Daughter by allowance in Law, in performance of the intent of the Devisee, though the remainder did not vest when the first estate took effect Ployd. ibidem. Coke come. f. 322. a. b. If a man lease Lands devisable for life, etc. the reversion by his testament in fee, etc. and dyeth, and then the Tenant maketh waste, the Devisee shall have a writ of Waste, although the Tenant never attorned, because the will of the Devisor, made by his will, shall be performed according to the intent of the Devisor, and if the Tenant will never attorne, than it shall never be performed, and therefore he shall have an action of waist, or distrain without Attornement, Littleton, for it is a maxim of the common Law, ultima voluntas testatoris est perimplenda secundum veram intentionem sufam, Coke ibidem, for if a man devise his Tenements to another by testament, Habendum sibi in perpetuum, and dyeth, and the Devisee entereth, he hath a Fee-simple, causa qua supra, and yet if a feoffment had been made to him by the Devisor in his life, of the same Tenements, Habendum sibi in perpetuum, and livery and seisin upon it made, he shall have an estate only for term of his life, Littleton, Ibidem. Coke come. f. 9 b. Though by the common Law an estate of inheritance may not pass without these words, Heirs, yet in devise it may, as if a man devise twenty acres to another, and that he shall pay to the Executors for the same ten pound, he hath a Fee-simple by the intent of the Devisor, albeit it be not the value of the Land, 21. E. 3 16. So if a man devise Lands to give or to sell, or in feodo simplici, or to him or his Assigns for ever, in all these cases a Fee simple doth pass by the intent of the Devisor, but if the devise be to a man, and his Assigns, without saying for ever, the devisee hath but an estate for life, if I devise Land to one, & sanguini suo, it is a Fee simple, but if it be semini suo, it is an estate tail, ibidem. Exception. Coke. l. 1. f. 85. 86. in C●rbets case. It was ruled by all the Justices, that such an estate which cannot by the rules of the common Law be conveyed, by act executed in his life by advice of counsel learned in the Law, such an estate cannot be devised by the will of man, who is intended in Law to be in ops consilij, as if I devise Lands to one by will in perpetuum, he hath a fee, for such an estate may be conveyed by estate executed, but if I devise further, that if the Devisee doth such an act, that then another shall have his Lands to him and his Heirs, that is void, because such limitation, if it was by act executed, is void, for as Dyer f. 33. pl. 12. A man cannot devise an estate in fee to one, and if he do not such an act, his estate shall cease, and another have it, for when he hath disposed the estate in fee, he hath not power in the same will to devise it to another, and f. 4. pl. 7. when the intent of man, who maketh a testament doth not agree with the Law, the intent shall be taken void, as if a man devise his Land to H. in fee, and that if he die without heir, that M. shall have the Land, this devise is void, because one Fee-simple cannot depend upon another in law, the same law is if the devise be to the Abbot of Saint Peter de W. where the foundation is to the Abbot of St. Paul. Coke come. f. 25. a. A devise cannot direct an inheritance to descend contrary to the rules of the Common Law, as if a man devise Lands to one and the heirs males of his body, and hath issue a Daughter, who hath issue a Son, the Son shall not inherit as heir male, because he must convey the descent from the heir's males, for though a devise may create an inheritance by other words then a gift can, yet can it not direct an inheritance to descend contrary to the rule of Law, and no intent of the devisor appeareth, that the Son of the Daughter should against the rule of the Law inherit, vide Ployd. f. 414. b. So if a gift be made to a man, and the heirs females of his body, and hath issue a Son who hath issue a Daughter, this Daughter shall never inherit, vide ibidem plura. Pr●ximus sum egomet mihi, Ployd. f. 545 a. It is the natural order to karve himself, before he karve another, and charity, beginneth at home. And therefore in legacies it is reason that the Executors shall have preferment of satisfaction before others, and the Law maketh allowance to them before any others, because as Lit. faith, they represent the person of the Testator, and Coke come. f. 209. b. The Executors do more represent the person of the Testator than the heir doth to the Ancestor, for though the Executor be not named in Mortgage, yet the Law appointeth him to receive the money, but so doth not the Law appoint the heir to receive the money unless he be named, and therefore if the Obligee maketh the Obligor his Executor, it is a release in Law, and if the Obligor make the Obligee his Executor the Action is gone, for they are as it were the same person in law, whence the law maketh allowance to them before any other. For if a man devise to A. 20 l. and to B. 20 l. and to C. 20 l. and maketh his executor, and dieth, having goods only to the value of 20 l. now it is in the election of the executor, to which of those, three he will pay the 20 l. and if he pay it to one, the other cannot contradict it, neither hath he any remedy for his legacy, so by the same reason, if one of the three be made executor to the testator, the law saith, he may and will retain the 20 l. in satisfaction of his legacy, and the law alloweth of it, for it is reason that he be next to himself, and have regard to himself before another. And this is the reason of the case in 12. H. 4. f. 21. where in debt upon an obligation against the heir, he pleaded that the Plaintiff was executor to Lancestor (which deed he put before them) and administered certain goods and Chattels to the value of the debt and more, and retained the same sum with him in the name of payment, and demanded judgement, if Action: And Hull said, that if he did not retain the same to himself, and might have retained it, and did not, he shall be barred, for a man is bound to be next to himself, and this was the opinion of some of them, for which he pleaded there that he administered no goods after the death of the Testator, vide ibidem plura, in Paramers' case. And for the same reason doth the law in all reciprocal acts respect mutual recompense and consideration, for if there be no consideration, why should they be made? Doct. and St. and it is supposed there was error in such Acts; because there is no consideration of profit, for every one is next unto himself, & ad suum lucrum satis sapit, is sufficiently wise to project his own emolument. And therefore have considerations a great effect in laws and customs, for consideration is the beginning of all customs, the grounds of all uses, the reason of all rights, and the causes of all duties. For without consideration nothing is wrought by any conveyance, no interest transferred, no right removed, nor duty accrued, and no custom hath continuance: As if the Lord of the Manner prescribe, that every one who passeth the highway, which lieth in his Manor shall pay 12. d. to him for his passage, this is void, and not upon good consideration, but if he prescribe to have a penny of every one that passeth such a Bridge which the Lord of the Manor doth use to repair, this is a good prescription, Calthrope, Copy-holds, f. 35. and 36. And therefore is consideration described by Dier. f 336. to be the cause or occasion of a meritorious recompense, either in deed or law, for all contracts and bargains have quid pro quo, & contractus est quasi actus contra actum, and must have quid pro quo, Coke come. f. 47. b. And so it is in exchanges, annuities, pro consilio impendendo, or service, rents, services, and tenors for d●meanes of Lands, as Frank-almoigne, Homage-auncestrell for warranty and acquittal, commons for cause of vicinage or service. Devise of a woman causa matrimonij praelocuti, so the manner of a gift to do such a thing, or to make such a thing. Considerations are either executory or executed, and in considerations executory, the recompense failing, the Feoffment or grant ceaseth, as a feoffment to instruct the feoffor in one mystery or Art, if the Feoffor dieth before instruction the heir shall re-enter, 21. E. 3. Grant of an Office, and for the executing it a fee, if the office be determined, the fee is determined, M. 5. E. 4. 7. and 20. E. 4. If a woman give land causa matrimonii prelocuti, and he will not marry her, she shall have a writ to recover the land, Ployd. f. 58. a. If a man make a lease for years rendering rend, the lessee needeth not pay any rent, if the Lessor had nothing in the land at the time of the lease, because he had not quid pro quo, Coke come. f. 47. b. If I grant an annuity pro consilio impendendo, if he will not give me council I must stay my annuity, Ployd. 144. b. An usual and accustomed attendance of a corodian upon the Sovereign of a monastery upon festival days, determineth the corodie, it being a reward for attendance. Exchanges not executed by each party, at the first is defeasible 9 H. 4. A portion of rithes granted by indenture for ever, without cavillation or contradiction, and an annuity granted for the aforesaid portion. So to have a way for my life, and I grant an annuity of 20 s. without limitation, the annuity shall endure but during my life, Dier. 336. 337. Where no consideration is expressed, there the consideration may be averred, Dier. 146. Vellies' case. A rehearsal of a consideration past, whether it be true or false, shall not dissolve the gift, as because he served me in the Wars beyond the Seas, although it be false it is not material, Bracton in modis donationum, and so in the case of the King, Dier. f. 337. If A. enfeoff B. upon a false consideration, the heir shall not be received to aver a false consideration against his ancestor, Dier. Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio, Ployd. 305. a. and 308. b. from a bare contract or promise no action riseth, for it is not much argued by the laws of England, what diversity is between a contract and a promise and a gift; for the intent of the law is to have the matter argued, not the terms. A Nude contract is where a man maketh a bargain and sale of his goods or lands without any recompense appointed for it: As if I say to you. I sell you all my lands or all my goods, and nothing is assigned, that the other shall give or pay for it, this is a nude contract, and is void in law, and the vendee cannot bring an action for them, Dr. and Student c. 24. And a nude promise is, when a man promiseth to give a man certain money at such a day, or to do him certain service, and nothing is assigned for them. As if I promise to give you twenty pound to make your house anew, there you shall have no action against me for the 20 l. because it is a nude promise, as it is affirmed by Townsend, T. 17. E. 4. Ployd. f. 308. b. So if a Carpenter by word covenanteth and undertaketh to make a new house, and he doth not, and for not making it, the Plaintiff bringeth an action of covenant against the Carpenter, and it doth not appear that he had any thing for making of the house, it was adjudged in 11 H. 4. f. 33. that the Plaintiff should not take any thing by his writ, Ployd. 309. a. And if I promise to another to keep his goods safely till such a time, and after I refuse to take them, no action lieth against me, but if I take them, and after they be lost or impaired through my negligent keeping, an Action lieth, Doctor and Stud. c. 24. But otherwise it is, if he to whom the promise is made, have a charge by reason of the promise, which he hath also performed, then in that case he shall have an Action for that thing is promised. As if a man give land in Frankalmoine, they are bound to make prayers to God for him, and in consideration of such prayers, he is bound to pay to the chief Lord, all the rents and services issuing out of that land, Lit. a. Frankal. And in 17. E. 4. 5. It is taken by divers, that if I promise a Surgeon a certain sum to cure such a poor man, or if I promise to a labourer certain money, to repair such a way which is in the high way, that he shall have an action of debt for it, for it is a thing of charity, and I merit thanks of them for it, and therefore shall not be called, Nudum pactum, Ployd. f. 306. a. If I contract with another, that if he will marry my daughter, that I will give him 20 l. in this case if he take her to wife he shall have an action of debt for the 20 l. 22. E. l. Assi. Pl. 70. by Thorp. and yet I have nothing for it, and if a man hath no regard to nature, it shall be nudum pactum, but because my daughter is advanced by it, that is a good consideration to me, Ployd. f. 305. a. So Dr. and Stud. c. 24. f. 104. It is a good promise, because he hath quid pro quo, the preferement of his Daughter for his money. But if a man promise to another 20 l. with his daughter in marriage, if he marry the daughter, and the money be not paid, he shall not have an action of debt or an action of the case at the common law, but he must sue for his money in the spiritual Court, for here is no good form of contract, F. n. b. f. 44. a. And as Bracton saith, matrimonium est principale & ejusdem juris id est jurisdictionis e●●e debet accessorium, matrimony is the principal, and the accessary aught to be of the same jurisdiction. Gardiner brought an assumpsit, and declared that the Defendant in consideration that he was indebted to the Plaintiff in 10 l. for pasturing, and feeding of certain beasts in the Plaintiffs grounds, and for wheat and other Merchandises had and received by the said defendant, did assume to pay to the said Plaintiff the debt that he had paid. Upon issue, non-assumpsit was found for the Plaintiff, and upon a Writ of error in the Exchequor-chamber, that there must be some certain cause of the debt assigned, for it is not sufficient to say generally, he was indebted, for it might be for rents upon leases, or for debts upon specialties, but it was adjudged certain enough, and required not so much certainty as an action of debt upon a contract, Hob. rep. f. 7. Wolastone brought an assumpsit against W. and declared, that whereas W. promised him 30 l. in consideration that the Plaintiff on the twentieth of August 1610. had given day to the said defendant for the payment of the same money until the ninth of October following, the Defendant did assume to pay him the same ninth day, and upon issue non-assumpsit it was found for the Plaintiff, and damages given, Hob. f. 26. Wolastons case vide ibidem. L. brought an assumpsit against B. and declared that whereas the defendant had feloniously slain one P. M. the defendant afterwards required the Plaintiff to labour and do his endeavour to obtain his pardon from the King, whereupon the Plaintiff upon the same request did labour etc. to obtain pardon for the said defendant, and afterwards fi. etc. in consideration of the Premises, the defendant did promise to the Plaintiff to give him a hundred pounds, and that he had not &c. upon non-assumpsit, it is found for the Plaintiff 100 l. ibidem f. 147. vide ibid. plura. B. bringeth an action of the case against C. executor of Reade, and counteth that whereas he had in M. term 14. Jac. presented an attachment of privilege against Reade, rerurn. in H. term, the testator knowing of it, in consideration that at his request the Plaintiff would forbear to prosecute the said writ, did promise to pay him 50 l. and then averred etc. and after verdict for the Plaintiff, and exceptions in arrest of judgement, the Court gave sentence. Bedwels' case, vide ibidem plura. A promise made for a thing past is void, as if I promise one ten pounds because he hath builded me an house, an action lieth not there, and if I promise to give another 10 l. in recompense of such a trespass that he hath done him, an action lieth not against him, & the reason is because a contract properly is, where a man for his goods shall have by the assent of the other party certain goods or some other profit at the time of the contract, or after, but if the thing be promised for a cause that is passed by way of a recompense, this is an accord rather than a contract, and upon such accord, the thing in recompense must be paid or delivered in hand, for upon accord there lieth no Action, Dr. and St. c. 24. f. 104. which accordeth with the resolve in cock l. 6. f. 43. Blakes case, accord with satisfaction is a good bar for the personalty, but not for the realty, vide ibid. plura. An implicit consideration is, when the law doth intent a consideration; so the Host of any common Inn may detain a man's horse if he will not pay him, Dier 30. And a Tailor may detain the apparel until he is paid for his labour, 5. E. 4. 2. Fulb. l. 1. f. 6. Hereunto belongeth contracts in law, though not arising from the consent of the parties, as he that findeth another man's goods, is chargeable by reason of the possession to him that right hath, so he that receiveth moneys to one's use, or to deliver over to him, is chargeable as a receivor, so is he that entereth into land and receiveth the profits, Finch Nomot f. 181. Exception. In an action of debt upon an obligation, the consideration upon which it was made is not to be enquired, for it is sufficient to say, that it pleased him to make the obligation, Ployd. 309. b. vide ibid. plura. Though it be probable that upon every bond there is a contract, because he confesseth the debt, but if there were none, the creditor needeth not to prove no more than the delivery of it. And for the same reason the law respecteth matters of profit and interest, more than matters of pleasure, trust, and authority, or limitation: for matters of profit shall be taken more largely, and may be assigned and not be countermanded, but matters of pleasure, trust, and authority shall be taken more strictly, and may be countermanded, Finch Nomot. f, 31. As a licence to hunt in my Park, or to walk in my Garden; extendeth only to himself and not to his servants or other in his company, for it is but a thing of pleasure, otherwise it is of a licence to hunt, kill and carry away the Deer, for that is a matter of profit, 13. H. 7. 18. A way granted to a Church over my land, extendeth not to any other but to himself, for it is but an easement 12. H. 7 25. b. A reversion granted to two jointly, and the meant attorneth to one, it is a void attornement, 11. H. 7. 12. b. If the Sheriff behead one should be hanged, it is felony, 35. H. 5 58. b. The King licenceth one to alien the third part of his land, and he alieneth all, it is a void alienation for all, 4. E. 6. 68 b. A lease is made to A. and B. for their lives, A: dieth, B. shall have all during his life, for it is an interest; but if a lease be made to I. S. during the life of A. and B. there if one of them die, the estate is utterly determined, for that is a limitation. A licence to come to my house to speak with me, 9 E. 4. 4. b. or goods bailed over to deliver to I. S. 1. E. 5. 2. or to bestow in alms, Dyer 22. or a letter of Attorney to deliver seisin, Perkins, all these may be countermanded before they be done, because they be matters of trust. By'r if I present I. S. to a Church, I cannot afterwards vary and present a new, for a kind of interest passeth out of me, 14. E. 4. 1. So if I deliver an obligation as an escrowe into a stranger's hand, to be delivered to the obligee upon condition performed, I cannot recall it, for the obligee is as it were a party, and privy to the delivery, Perk. 19 b. Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, Ployd. f. 32. b. The Law will not enforce any one to show that which is against himself. As if a man grant to one an Annuity pro consilio impendendo, the Grantee shall have a Writ of Annuity, without showing that he hath given him Counsel, for the showing of it is not for his benefit, and the denial Counsel goeth in defeasance of the Annuity, which ought to be shown by the Plaintiff, because he shall have the benefit of the defeasance, M. 39 H. 6. f. 22. So in 15. H. 7. f. 1. It is holden, if an Annuity be granted to one until he be promoted to a benefice, he shall have a writ of Annuity, and shall not show that he is not advanced to a benefice, for that goeth in defeasance of the Annuity, which must be shown by him who shall take advantage of the defeasance, but there it is holden, that if he had granted, that if the party had first done such a thing, that then he shall have an Annuity, that there he ought to show the performance of the thing in his count, to enable him to the Annuity, in that the condition precedeth the estate, and enableth him to to the estate, and so the diversity, vide ibidem plura, in Colthirsts case. Nemo tenetur turpitudinem suam detegere, Reg. I C. No man is bound to bewray his own shame and crime, and therefore the Law is, that if a man for fear or simplicity will confess himself guilty of a Felony, yet the Judges must not record that confession, but suffer him to plead not guilty, Finch. Nomos. f. 29. Accusare nemo se debet nisi coram Deo: Vasques, no man ought to accuse himself but before God, and therefore no man ought to be enforced to swear against himself before man, and the reason thereof is given by Coke l. 4. f. 9 5. Slades' case. Jurare in propria persona est saepenumero in hoc seculo praecipitium diaboli ad detrudendas miserorum anim is ad infernum, to swear in his own person is oftentimes in this world the precipice of the Devil to cast down the souls of miserable men into hell, and therefore in debt, or other action where wager of Law is admitted by the Law, the Judges without good admonition, or due examination of the party, do not admit him to it, and for this reason Coke is of opinion, that where one may have several action, to wit, an action upon the case, upon an assumpsit, or an action of debt, wherein the Defendant may wage his Law, it is better, and less mischievous to bring an action upon the case; then an action of debt, for now experience proveth, that the consciences of men grow so large, that the respect of their private commodity doth rather induce men, and principally those who have declining estates, to perjury, according to the censure of the Satirist — Jures licet Samothracum, Et nostrarum arras, Juvenall. contemnere fulmina pauper Creditur, atque deos. Swear by our Altars, and the Gods of Wonder For gain the poor will scorn them, and Jove's thunder. And therefore by the Civil Law Rejicitur pauper pro teste, a poor man is excepted against for being a witness, though in our Law he is a sufficient witness, if he be an honest man, Swimb. f. 210. It is an observation of a Divine, that oaths ex officio had their birth from Caiphas, Math. 26. who who first imposed it on our Saviour in the name of the living God, saying, I adjure or charge thee in the name of the living God, that thou tellest us whither thou beest Christ the Son of the living God. And Mr. Pryn saith, that Cardinal Woolsy the highest Priest in England was the first that invented oaths ex officio in England, and that they were much inveighed against by Latimer in his Sermons, and condemned by the express words of the petition of right, providing against such oaths, Prin. Vind. f. 42. Impotentia excusat legem, impotency excuseth the Law, Coke come. f. 29. a. The Law tendereth the weaknesses, and debilities of others, execuseth their un-abilities, ultra posse non est esse, because no man is able to do more than he can do. As if a man dyeth seized of Lands in fee-simple, etc. and these Lands descend to his Daughter, and she taketh an husband, and hath issue, and dyerh before any entry, the husband shall not be tenant by courtesy, because it was in the power of the husband to have entered, but if a man be seized of an advowson, or a rent in f●e, and hath issue a daughter who is married and hath issue, and dyeth seized, the wife before the rent became due, or the Church became void, dyeth, he shall be Tenant by courtesy because he could by no industry enter, or attain to any other seisin, than a seisin in Law, or bring it to an actual seisin. And f. 258. b Though an Hermit or an Anachorite, be shut up himself, so as by his order he is not to come out in person, yet to avoid a descent he may command one to make claim, and such a recluse may always appear by an Attorney in such cases, where others must appear in proper person, and f. 263. b. An Abbot of a Monastery dyeth, and during the vacation, one wrongfully entereth into a certain parcel of the Land of the Monastery, claiming the Land to him and his heirs, and dyeth seized, and the Land descendeth to the heir, and then one is elected Abbot, the Abbot may enter upon the heir, for by the death of the Abbot no person is able to make continual claim, and therefore a descent in that kind shall not prejudice the succession. Coke l. 1. f. 98. a. If the Lessee Covenant to leave wood in the same plight, the wood was at the time of the lease, and afterwards the trees be sub-verted by tempest, his is discharged of his covenant, by reason of his impotency, and l. 4. f. 11. a. If the Lord release to the Tenant so long as I. S. hath heir of his body, and sixty years pass, and then I. S. dyeth without heir of his body, in this case though the sixty years be passed, yet the Lord may distrain, for it was impossible that she should attain to any seisin within that time, and therefore the act of limitation made in 32. H. 8. doth not extend to such rent or service, that by common possibility could not happen or become due within sixty years, and so if Land holden by Homage, and Fealty, be conveyed to a Mayor and Commonalty, etc. in this case they cannot do their Homage and Fealty, yet though they have enjoyed the Land above sixty years, if they alien the Land, the Lord may distrain for Homage and Fealty, 33 H 8. Br. Tit. Fealty, 15. vide ibidem pluta, in Bevills' case, and lib. 6. f. 21. b. in Butler's case, It was resolved that legal imprisonment without Covin is a good excuse of nonresidency in any Parson by reason of his impotency. Quod remedio destituitur, ipsa revalet, si culpa ab sit, the thing which is destitute of remedy, availeth in the matter itself, if there be no fault or laches in the party, Coke. l. 6. f. 68 a. As if a man be seized of a manner, part of which is in lease for life, and part in lease for years, and levieth a f●ne to A. to the use of B. in tail, with divers remainders over, in this case B. shall avow for rent, or have an Action of Waste without any Attornement, for when the reversion is settled in any one in judgement of Law, and he hath no means to compel the tenant to attorne, and no laches or fault is in him, there he shall avow, or have an Action of Waste without Attornment: As if the Lord in Mortmain, or if a villain claimeth a reversion, by this claim the Law vesteth thiS reversion in him, and he hath no means to compel the tenant to attorne, and therefore he shall avow, or have an Action of Waste without Attornement, the same Law is of Letters Patents, and of the devise of a reversion, for in all those cases culpa abest, there is no fault, 9 H. 6. vide ibidem plura, in Sir Moil Finches case. And Coke l. 8. f. 172. b. in Hales case. If the heir at full age tender his livery, and dyeth within three months before he hath accomplished it, so as the making of his homage, or suing out of his livery, without default in him, is become impossible by the act of God, he shall have as much advantage by his tender, as if he had made homage, or sued out his livery, for impotency in this case excuseth the Law, and in the judgement of the Law, the interest of the King by the said limitation is determined, as if the Lord had taken homage of the heir, when he made his tender, vide ibidem plura. Coke l. 10. f. 139. b. If tenant for life, or for years, doth not repair a wall of dirt, so as by his default, the Land is surrounded, and becometh unprofitable, that is Waste, but if the Land be surrounded by the extraordinary rage and violence of the Sea, without any default in him, that is not Waste, no more than if an house was burnt by lightning, or subverted by the rage of the wind or tempest, without default of the Lessee, for impotency excuseth the party, vide ibidem plura in Kighleys' case. So as it is regularly true that the Law tendereth the infirmities of unable persons, and excuseth their impossibilities, as of men illiterate, out of the Realm, in Prison, Infants, Idiots, out of their sound mind, as also of blind and deaf, dumb, and blind. If a man illiterate, be bound to make a deed, he is not bound to seal, or deliver any writing that shall be tendered unto him, and if it be Latin, or other Language, which he understandeth not, he may demand that one read it, and expound it unto him, and if none be there present to read, and expound it, the party may refuse to deliver it, for his ignorance excuseth him, Coke l. 2. f. 3. Mansers' case. And for that reason if the Deed be read unto him, in other words than are contained within the Deed or writing, it shall not bind the party that delivered it, for it is at the peril of the party to whom the writing is made, that the true purport & effect of the writing be declared, if the party that shall deliver the writing doth require it, but if the party who shall deliver the writing doth not require it, he shall be bound by the Deed, though it shall be contrary to his meaning, and it mattereth not though a mere stranger readeth the writing, which is well proved by the usual form of pleading in such case, to wit, that he was a Layman, and not lettered, and that the Deed was read to him in other words, etc. generally, without showing by whom it was read, Coke l. 2. Thorowgood's case, f. 11. b. If a disseisor die seized, the Disseissee being within age, Covert Baron, in Prison, or out of the Realm, it shall be no descent to take away the entry, Finch. Nomot. f. 26. In omnibus fere minori atati succurritur, Coke l. 9 84. In all cases for the most part, there is favour showed to them within age. As, In a writ of customs and services, (which is in the nature of a writ of right in which final judgement shall be given) against an infant who is in by descent, in 6. H. 3. Tit. page 144. It is adjudged he shall have his age, so in a Cessavit against an infant who hath the tenancy by descent, he shall have his age, though it be upon his own cesser, because he cannot know what arrearages he shall tender before judgement, and that also is in the nature of a writ of right, for if he make not true tender he shall lose his Land, 28. E. 3. 99 But in a per quae servitia against an infant, who hath the tenancy by descent, he shall not have his age, because he hath benefit, and avail over and above the Premises, and therefore is he called tenant paravaile, and it is against reason, that when the heir hath profit by the tenancy, that he shall not pay annual rent, and it is no mischief unto him, for notwithstanding his Attornement within age, he may at his full age disclaim to hold of him, or to acknowledge that he holdeth of him by lesser or other services, Coke ibidem. And regularly it is true, that an infant may do any thing for his own advantage, and not to his prejudice, as to be an Executor, or to purchase without the consent of any other, for it is intended his benefit, and at his full age he may either agree thereunto, or perfect it, or without any cause alleged, waive or disagree to the purchase, and so may his heir if he doth not agree at his full age, Coke come. f. 2. b. In a writ of mesne the proceed shall not be stayed for the nonage of the infant, because it is not reason that the infant shall be distrained for the services of the mesne during his nonage, and shall not have remedy until he is at full age, Coke l. 9 f. 85. a. If an infant make a Feoffment in person, if he die without heir, the Land shall not escheat, but otherwise it is if it be by letter of Attorney, Dyer f. 10. Coke l. 4. f. 125. a. An infant shall sue by procheine amy, but defend by guardian, Coke come. f. 135. a. If an infant buyeth Lands in fee, with the money for which he did sell his own Land, yet may he avoid his own alienation, Doct. Stud 21. An Execution, Elegit, and Statute Merchant, etc. shall not be sued against the heir during his infancy, Coke come 290. a. An infant shall avoid matters in faite, either within age, or of full age, but matters of Record, as Statutes, etc. acknowledged by him, a fine levied by him, or recovery against him by default in a real action, must be avoided by him during his minority, to wit, Statute by Audita querela, and the fine and recovery by a writ of error, because they are judicial acts, and taken by a Court, or a Judge, and therefore the nonage of the party to avoid the same shall be tried by inspection of Judges, and not by the Country, and because his nonage must be tried by inspection, this cannot be done at his full age, but if that age be inspected by the Judges, and recorded that he is within age, albeit he come of full age before the reversal, yet may it be reversed after his full age, Coke come. f. 380. b. The Law doth provide for the safety of a man's or woman's estate, that before the age of twenty one years they cannot alien any Lands, Goods, or Chattels, or bind themselves by deed, Coke come. f. 171. b. Unless it be for necessary meat, drink, and apparel, necessary physic, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good teaching and instruction, whereby he may profit himself afterwards, but it must be pro nec●ssario vestitu, for convenient apparel, and not for Gold lace, 11. H 7. and aught to be suitable to his calling, Popham Rep. f. 152. But if he bind himself in an obligation, or other writing, with a penalty for the payment of any of these, the obligation shall not bind him, also all other things of necessity shall bind him, as presentation to a benefice, for otherwise the lapse should incur against him. Also if an infant be Executor upon payment of any debt due to the Testator, he may make an acquittance, and in that case a release without payment is void ibidem, f. 172. a. If a man inheritor taketh wife, who have issue a Son between them, and the Father dyeth, and the son entereth into the land, and endoweth the mother, and then the mother alieneth that which she hath in dower to another in fee with warranty, and then dyeth, and the warranty descendeth to the Son, this warranty collateral shall bar the Son, Little. but if the Heir be within age at the time of the descent of the warranty, he may enter, and avoid the estate, either within age, or at any time after his full age, but if he within age at the time of the alienation with warranty, and become of full age before the descent of the warranty, the warranty shall bar him for ever, Coke come. f. 380. b. Though no laches shall be adjudged in an infant in case of descent, as Littleton saith, yet in some other cases laches shall prejudice an infant, as laches shall be adjudged in an infant, if he present not to a Church within six months, for the Law respecteth more the privilege of the Church, that the cure be served, than the privilege of he infant, so the public repose of the Realm shall be preferred before the privilege of infancy in the case of a fine, where the fine beginneth in the time of the Ancestor; As if a fine be levied before the act of non-claime, and one of full age had right at the time of the time levied, and dyeth within the year, and the right descendeth to the heir within age, he shall be bound to that year commenced in his Father, and his nonage shall not avail him there, because his Father was of full age, Ployd. 372. a. So non-claime of a villain of an infant by a year and a day, who hath fled into ancient demesne, shall take away the seizure of the infant. And if an infant bringeth not an appeal within a year and a day, he is barred of his appeal for ever, for the Law respecteth more liberty and life then the privilege of infancy. If the King be seized of Lands, and the Land descend to the successor, this shall bind an infant for that the privilege of the infant, in this case holdeth not against the King, Coke come. f. 246. a. Though it be regularly true, that no laches shall be adjudged in infants, for not entry or claim to avoid descent, yet laches shall be accounted in him for not performing a condition annexed to the State of Land, for the laches of an infant for not performing a condition annexed to an estate, either made to his Ancestor or himself, shall bar him of the right of the Land for ever, as if either of them be enfeoffed reserving a rent, and for default of payment a reentry, the laches of either of them in not paying the rent shall disinherit either of them for ever. But if a man maketh a feoffment in fee to another, reserving a rent, and that if he pay not the rent within a month, ne shall double the rent, and the feoffee dyeth his heir within age, and the infant payeth not the rent, he shall not for this laches force it any thing, for that the infant is provided for by the Statute, non current usurae contra aliquem infra aetatem existentem, Merton, C 31. An infant is impleadable in Law, and for his contempt shall be punished as a man of full age, as an outlawry returned against an infant is good, and not erroneous so as he hath passed the age of fourteen years, 2. H. 5. Dyer 104. b. and 3 H. 6. An infant was forced to answer upon breach of a prohibition in an estreapment. An infant is bound by any Statute Law, if he be not expressly excepted in it, as in fore-judger, recovery in Cessavit, and fines with proclamations, Doctor Student, c. 45. 147. And that if he had not been excepted in those Statutes, they should have bound him, an infant prayeth to be received, and it is traversed, he shall find sureties of the mean profits as an heir of full age, Dyer 104. b. An infant under the age of fifteen cannot wage Law either for a debt, or default of any real action, Office of Exec. f. 346. If an infant be garden of a prison, and suffereth a prisoner to escape, he shall pay the debt because the Statutes are general, and by that reason he may by a penal Statute lose his Goods, Doct. and Stud. C. 46. 147. If one enter into a freehold of an infant with his consent, this is a disseisin, because an infant cannot consent to an entry. An infant under one and twenty cannot be a Bailiff, receivor, for want of skill, or ability, nor yet sworn in any Enquest, or Jury, and is uncapable of a Stewardship of the Court of a Manor in possession, or reversion, or any office concerning the administration of Justice, Coke come. f. 3. b. 157. a. And not capable to perform grand Serjeanty at the coronation, ibidem, 107. b. Actus non facit reum nisi mens fit rea, Coke come. f. 247. b. The act doth not make one guilty unless the mind be guilty, and therefore if an infant under the age of discretion, commit an act amounting to a Felony, shall stand free from the attainder, and punishment incident to a Felon, but if he be of the age of discretion, though he be not of full age he shall suffer as a fellow, and regularly the age of discretion accounted by the Law is fourteen years, and therefore shall such an one incur the like attainder os felony as one of full age, Office of Executor, f. 244. and Coke come. f. 247. b. But non est regula quin fallit, for one of much less years having attained the maturity of discretion, if he commit any felonious act, shall suffer as a Felon, as it was resolved in the time of King Henry the seventh, in the third year of his reign, f. 16. touching an infant but of the age of nine years, who killing another boy of the like age with a knife, and then hiding the slain boy, and excusing the blood found upon him, by saying that his nose had bled, it was held by the Judges, that he was to be hanged as a Felon, his such nonage notwithstanding, and by King Ina's Law, puer decem annos natus surto conscius arguatur, an infant of the age of ten years shall be attainted of theft, if guilty thereof, but Doctor and Student applieth an infant's discretion to the knowledge of the Law, so that if an infant do a murder at such years as he hath discretion to know the Law, he shall have the punishment of the Law, as if he were of full age, and this is by a maxim in the Law for eschewing of murders and felonies, and so it is of trespasses, cap. 46. f. 148. If a dumb person bring an action, he shall plead by procheine amy, Finch. Nomot. It was a time when Idiots and mad men, and such as were deaf, or dumb, were disabled to sue, because they wanted reason and understanding, but at this day they all may sue, but the suit must be in their names, and it shall be followed by others, Coke come. f. 135. b. A man that is borne dumb may make a grant by delivery of his hands or signs, and a man borne deaf and dumb, may make a gift if he have understanding, and though it be an hard matter that a man shall have understanding without hearing, yet there are divers such persons as have understanding by their sight, and a man borne dumb and blind, may have understanding, but a man borne dumb, deaf, and blind, cannot have understanding, Perk. f. 6. Furiosus furore suo punitur, Coke come. f. 247. b. The Law favoreth a mad man, by reason of his disability in criminal causes, and because he is amen, s●ne ment, without his mind and discretion, he shall not suffer for any felonious fact, for the intention is the form of Felony; that is, if it be done felleo animo, with a bitter and mischievous mind, and therefore is he punished only with his madness, there are four sorts of mad men, the first is an Idiot, which from his nativity by a pertual infirmity is non compos mentis, 2. is he that by sickness, or other accident wholly loseth his understanding, 3. A Lunatic who hath sometimes his understanding, and sometime hath not, aliquando gaudens lucidis intervallis, and is called non compos mentis so long as he hath no understanding, Lastly, he that by his own vicious act, for a time depriveth himself of his memory and understanding, as he is that is drunk, Coke come 147. a. Coke l. 4. 124. b. And for the three first sorts of mad men, the Law is, that they shall not lose their lives for felony or murder, because they want reason, and understand not what they do, neither can the punishment of a mad man who is deprived of reason and understanding, be an example to others. And therefore as Ployd. f. 19 a. If a man of non sanae memoriae, kill another, although he hath, broken the words of the Law, yet he hath not broken the Law, because he had not any memory nor understanding, but mere ignorance, which cometh unto him by the hand of God, and therefore it is called unvoluntary ignorance, to which the Law imputeth the act done, because no default i● in him, and therefore he shall be excused, in that he is ignorant by compulsion, and such an act is called, and termed ex ignorantia, to wit, in that involuntary ignorance is the cause, and God provided a special remedy, that he who doth such a thing by such ignorance shall not be punished for it, as Deut. 19 if a labourer be at labour with an hatchet, and the head of the hatchet flieth off and killeth another, that such a labourer shall not be put to death because he did it by un-voluntary ignorance, but if a man break the Law by un-voluntary ignorance, there he shall not be excused. As if at man be drunk, and kill another, this is Felony, and he shall be hanged for it, and yet he did this by ignorance, for when he was drunk he had neither memory nor understanding, but because that ignorance came unto him by his own act and folly, and he might resist this ignorance, he shall not be privileged by it, because he is voluntarius daemon, Coke come. f. 247. and as Aristotle saith, is worthy of double punishment, because he hath doubly offended, to wit, in being drunk to the ill example of others, and also in doing of the act, and this act is called and said to be done ignoranter, to wit, that he is the cause of his own ignorance, and so there is a diversity of a thing done, ex ignorantia & ignoranter, Ployd. ibidem, And Coke come. f. 247. a. Omne crimen ebrietatis incendit, & detegit, and what hurt or ill soever he doth in his drunkenness doth aggravate it, and that as well in case touching his life, his Lands, his Goods, or any other thing concerneth him, Coke l. 4. f. 125. Also for the same reason non compos mentis cannot commit petit treason, as if a wife non compos mentis, slay her husband, as appeareth, 12. H. 3. Tit. forfeiture, 33. But in some cases non compos mentis may commit high Treason, as if he slay, or offer to slay the King, this is high Treason, for the King is caput Reipub. the head and safety of the Commonwealth, and from the head good health is conveyed to all, and for this cause their persons are so sacred, that none ought to offer them violence, but he shall be reus laesae majestatis guilty of high Treason, Coke l. 4. f. 124. b. And likewise for the same reason many are the privileges, which the Law giveth to one who is not compos mentis and his heirs, as if an idiot, or non compos mentis maketh a Feoffment in person, and dyeth, his heir within age, he shall not be in ward, and if he dyeth without heir, the Land shall not eschcate, but if he make a Feoffment by Letter of Attorney, although the Feoffor can never avoid it, yet as to others, in judgement of Law the State was void, and therefore in such case if the heir be within age he shall be in ward, and if he dyeth without heirs, the Land shall escheat, and that is the true reason of the books, in 7. H. 4. 5. and 7. H. 4. 12. And so is there a great diversity between an estate made by the person of a mad man, and by his Attorney, Coke l. 4. 125. Also an idiot in an action brought against him, shall appear in proper person, and he that can plead best for him shall be admitted, 33. H. 6. 18. otherwise it is of him who becometh non compos mentis, for he shall appear by his guardian if he be within age, and by an Attorney if be be of full age, Coke ibidem, f. 124. b. So if a man of non sanae memoria ●ath cause to enter into tenements; and a descent is had in his life during the time he was of non sana memoriae, and then dyeth, his heir may enter upon him, is in by descent, Littleton, and though Littleton there saith, that the Ancestor who had the same title could not enter during his life, yet in case of a bar of his right he may. As if a man of non compos mentis be disseised, and the disseisor levieth a fine, in this case at the common Law, though the year and the day be passed, yet he that was non compos mentis shall not be bound by it, but that he might well enter, Coke l. 4. f. 125. vide ibidem plura. But if an Idiot or a non compos mentis by accident or qui lucidis gaudet intervallis, maketh a Feoffment in fee, he shall in pleading never avoid it, by saying that he was an Idiot, etc. at the time of the Feoffment, because it is a maxim in the common Law, that no man of full age shall be received in any Plea by the Law to disable himself, contrary to the opinion of some, that he may avoid his own act by Entry, or Plea, and others, that he may avoid it by Writ, and not by Plea, and others as Fitzherbert in his Writ of dum fuit non compos mentis, that he may avoid either by Plea, or by Writ, but Littleton here is of opinion, that neither by Plea, Writ, or otherwise, he himself shall avoid it, and herewith the greatest authorities of ou● Books do agree, and so was it resolved in Beverlyes' case, Coke l. 4. Though this Maxim holdeth not in criminal causes, as before hath been said, Coke come. f. 247. Yet doth not the Law leave one who is non compos mentis, destitute of remedy in this case, but that upon an office found for the King, the King shall avoid the Feoffment of him who is of non compos mentis, for the benefit of him, whose custody the Law giveth to the King, and all that he hath, for the King is bound by the Laws to defend his Subjects, and their Goods, and Chattels, Lands, and Tenements, as Fitzherbert saith, N. B. 232. and therefore the King of right aught to have, and to order him, his Lands, and Goods, and this was by the common Law, as appeareth by Britton f. 16. who writ in the fifth year of Ed. 1. before the Statute de prerogativa regis, which was made in the seventeenth year of E. 2. a long time after Britton writ, which was but a declaration of the common Law, Coke l. 4. f. 126. a. Neither doth this impugn the Maxim of the common Law, for in this case he that is non compos mentis, in no Plea that he pleadeth shall stultify or disable himself, but all this shall be found by office by the inquisition and verdict of twelve men, at the suit of the King, who are not concluded to say the truth, and such and office when it is found shall have relation, a tempore nativitatis, to avoid all mesne Acts made by one who is non compos mentis, as Feoffments, Gifts, Leases, Releases, etc. And after such office found if he be sued in an Action upon an obligation, or writing which he hath made, the King by his writ so long as the office be in force, reciting the office, shall command a Supersedeas to the Justices where the suit is commenced, but if one of non compos mentis die before office found, after his death no office may be found, and in this sense is the rule of Bracton true, furiosus stipulari non potest nec aliquid negotium agere, quia non intelligit quod agit. A mad man cannot promise or contract for any thing, or do any business, because he understandeth not what, he doth, but all such Acts may be avoided either by the King or his Heirs, Coke ibidem. f. 126. a. b. With which the civilian rule accords, furiosus nullum negotium contrahere potest. But in case of non compos mentis, the King hath not any interest in the Lunatic, as he hath in the Idiot, for that the Lunatic may recover the memory which he hath lost, and therefore in the case of an Idiot, the Law saith, Rex habebit custodiom, the King shall have the custody, but in the case of non compos mentis, Rex providebit, the King shall provide one to have a care and charge, that he that is non compos mentis, and his family shall be maintained, and that nothing shall be spoiled, without taking any thing to his own use, but all to the use of the non compos mentis, and his family, and that he shall not cut down trees but for necessary House-boot, Plow-boot, and Cart-boote, and to repair ancient Pales, as appeareth in the case of Dyer, 25. b. In Trespass against Homes, quare clausuum fregit, and did cut down Trees in Paddington, etc. of one John Francis, etc. the Defendant pleaded, that the said John Francis was a Lunatic, by which the King seized his Lands by commission, etc. and by his Letters Patents granted custodiam & gubernationem predict, Fr. sine computo reddendo, the custody, and government of the said Francis, without rendering an account, etc. and he prayed aid of the King, and upon demurrer it was denied, and the diversity taken between the seiser of the Lands of a Lunatic, and an Idiot, for in the first case the King nor the Grantee shall not have any profit, but they are bound to find necessaries for him, etc. by the prerogative of the King, but in the other case, the King and his Grantee shall have the Lands to his own profit, and Fitzberbert held that the Lunatic should have an account when he came to his good memory, sed fuit negatum, Ibid. f. 26. Pl. 164. But it seemeth by Coke lib. 4. f. 127. that he shall be accountable as a Bailie to him that is not compos mentis, or to his Executors, or Administrators. And the King shall have the protection of an infant as well as of his Land, F. n. b. 232. b. But the King shall not have the lands that the Idiot holdeth by copy, for that is but an estate at will by the common law, and if the King should have the custody of it, it should be a grand prejudice to the Lord of the Manor, and yet notwithstanding an alienation made by the Idiot of the copyhold after Office found, shall be avoided, Dyer 302. Coke ibidem, f. 126. b. But there are some acts done by a man of non compos mentis, that shall not only bind himself, but his Heirs and Executors also, and therefore if he levy a fine, or suffer a common recovery, or acknowledge a Statute or Recognisance, neither his Heir nor Executor shall avoid it, for those are matters of record, and cannot be avoided by a nude averrement of non sanae memoriae, for the inconvenience that thereupon may ensue, also such an averrement is against the office and dignity of a Judge, for he ought not to take any cognisance of a fine, or recognizance of him that is non compos mentis, and therefore all acts that he maketh in Court of record shall bind himself, and all others for ever, and shall not have a relief in equity, because it is against a ground and principle in Law, that no man shall disable himself, and if the Judge were not compos mentis, yet all the Fines, Judgements, and all other Records which are before him shall be good: because they are matters of Records, Cbichell, Copy-holds. Vim vi repellere licet, Coke come. f. 162. It is lawful to repel force by force, and that by the Law of nature, according to the civil rule, adversus periculum naturalis ratio permittit se defendere, natural r●●son permitteth to defend himself against danger, which is manifest in Beasts, which though they have not the substance and reason of the Law, yet have they a certain shadow of it, and which is not only observed in Beasts, but also in infants, and children. But yet as Coke in the same place saith, must it be done with this caution, moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non ad sumendam vindictam, sed ad propulsandam in juriam, with the moderation of an unblameable defence, not thereby to take revenge, but to repulse the injury. In trespass of an assault and battery for Beasts taken, the Defendant said, that to all but the assault he was not guilty, and for the assault he said, that before the trespass the Defendant was possessessed of an horse, as of his proper Goods, and of it was possessed till the Plaintiff took it out of his possession, and the Defendant the same day and year requested it of the Plaintiff, but the Plaintiff said that he would not deliver it, and the Defendant said, if he would not deliver the horse to him, he would retake it in spite of him, and presently took a staff which was lying on the ground, and went towards the Plaintiff with it, which is the same assault, of which the Plaintiff hath conceived his Action: Judgement if Action, and the opinion of the Judges was, that the assault was justifiable, Kelloway, 22. H. 7. f. 92. If two fight together on a sudden, and before a mortal wound be on either party, the one flieth to the wall, or to some other unpassable place to save his life, and upon the pursuit of the other he killeth him, this is manslaughter in his own defence, 3. E. 3.284. From moral Philosophy. NExt in order succeeedeth moral Philosophy, the exact knowledge of which, as Picolonomy, Inductio ad libros Civil. Philos. cap. 6. cannot be comprehended without the precognition of the natural, and therefore hath the precedency, for the moral faculty doth instruct men to avoid vices, and to cure the maladies of the mind, which cannot be completely accomplished without the natural contemplation of the affections of the soul, it is called Ethica by the Philosopher, or institutions of manners, by which the obliqne manners of men are rectified, and their Enormities regulated, and certainly from such exorbitances of manners originally proceeded the institutions of Laws, and from whence, as Doderidge, all Laws are in generalty derived, for in the primary age (which may rather be named the Iron, than the golden age) when men lived like beasts, Dod. English Lawyer. f. 250. the one praying on the other, according to the censure of the Philosophical Poet. Quod praedae obtulerat fortuna, cuique ferebat. Sponte sibi quisque valere, & vivere doctus. What fortune offered for a pray, each one Laid claim to it, learned to live alone, And serve himself. Then were Laws first excogitated to suppress the barbarous Savageness of such humane beasts, and to reduce them to a more civil association, as the Venusine Poet rightly, Jura inventa metu injusti, fateare, necesse est, Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi If we revolve the Annals of man's time, From the world's birth, we must confess and find That Laws were founded for fear of the unjust. Seeing then Laws were introduced, from the depraved judgements and corrupt manners of men, who will not acknowledge that the science by which they are form, and the principles deduced from it, are requisite and material to the fundamental knowledge of the Law; From which Fountain our Law doth draw these grounds and maxims. Illud possumus, quod jure possumus, Reg. I.C. We can do that which by right we can do, for as Boetius, potentia non est nisi ad bonum, ability and power is not but to good, for the power to have liberty to do wrong, is not by such liberty augmented, but diminished, & potentia injuriae est impotentia naturae, the power to do injury is the impotency of nature, as to decay, and die, is no power, but in respect of the privation and diminution in the thing, is rather impotency, as the Angels and Saints confirmed in glory and cannot sin, are more powerful than man, who through his impotency can sin. So a King ruling royally, and with whom whatsoever shall please him, hath the power of a Law, and may do what evil he lift is more impotent than he that doth all according to the rule and square of Law; and therefore doth the Law give this rule, Illud Rex solum potest quod de jure potest, Coke l. 3. 99 f. 123. & l. 1. 11. f. 7. Solum Rex hoc non potest quod non potest injuste agere. The King only can do that which by right he can do, and the King can only not do this, that he cannot do any thing unjustly, as 4. E. 4. 15. the King can be no disseisor, he can be no wrong doer, so if the King granterh and releaseth the services to the tenant and his heirs, that shall not extinct the tenure in all, for necessity of the tenure, and the King cannot by his charter alter the Law, and therefore it shall be expounded as near to the intention of the King as may be, and that is to extinguish all the services, but it only which is incident inseparably to every tenure, and that is fealty, for it the King cannot do by Law, Coke l. 9 f. 123. a. And Coke l. 11. f. 72. a. The King shall not be exempt by construction of Law, out of the general words of Acts made to suppress wrong, because he is the Fountain of Justice, and common right, and the King being God's Lieutenant cannot do wrong, and with it accordeth, 13. E. 4. 8. in the case of Alton woods, l. 1. f. 41. So Lands were given to Henry the seventh, and the heirs males of his body, and the question was, whether the King in regard that he was not expressly restrained by the Act of 13. E. 3. de donis conditionalibus post prolem masculam sussitatum, might alien, or no, and it was adjudged he could not alien, but was restrained by the said Act, for it were an hard argument to grant, that the Statute which restraineth men to do wrong and evil shall permit liberty to the King to do it, Ployd. f. 246. Signior Barklys case, Coke ibidem vide plura. Potestas regis juris est non in juriae, & cum sit author juris non debet inde injuriarum masci occasio, unde jura mascuntur, Bract. l. 2. The King's power is of right, and not injury, and as he is the author of right, there ought not from thence to arise occasion of injury from whence rights proceed. As if one who intendeth to sell his Land, and by fraud conveyed it by deed enroled to the King, to the intent to deceive the purchaser, and then he selleth the Land to another for a valuable consideration, & maketh conveyance accordingly, in this case the purchaser shall enjoy the land against the Queen by the Statute of 27. Eliz. c. 4. For though the Queen be not excepted, yet the act being general, & made in suppressing of fraud, shall bind the Queen. So if tenant in tail be seized of Land, the remainder over in tail, or in fee, and he in the remainder knowing that tenant in tail will alien the Land, and by recovery bar his remainder, to the intent to deprive the tenant in tail of his birthright, and power that the Law hath given him to bar the remainder, and of intent and purpose to deceive the purchaser, granteth his reversion to the Queen by deed enroled, and then tenant in tail for a valuable consideration alieneth the Land by common recovery, and dyeth without issue, the purchaser shall enjoy the Land against the Queen, by the Statute of 27. Eliz. the words of which are, that every conveyance, etc. made, etc. to the intent and of purpose to deceive a purchaser, & t. shall be deemed only against such purchaser, etc. to be utterly void, vide ibidem plura, in Magdalen Colleges case, & l. 2. in Cholmlys' case, f. 51.52. And the King hath a prerogative above all his Subjects, that where by fraud, or suggestion he is deceived, that he in that case shall avoid his own grant, jure regio. 22. E. 3. 47. in the Earl of Kent's case, Stanf. pr. regis. 84. a. As the King can neither do himself injury nor others. And therefore the Law favoureth right, and construeth all things according to right, from whence proceedeth the ground. Constructio juris non facit injuriam, Coke, come. f. 183. a b. The construction of right, or Law doth no injury. As though it be a maxim in the Law, that every man's grant shall by construction of Law be taken most strongly against himself, yet is it so to be understood that no wrong be thereby done, for it is another maxim in the Law, that the construction of the Law doth no injury, and therefore if tenant for life maketh a lease generally, this shall be taken by construction of Law, an estate for his own life that made the Lease, for if it should be taken for the life of the Lessee, it should be a wrong to him in the reversion, and so it is if tenant in tail maketh a Lease generally, the Law shall contrive this to be such a Lease as may be lawfully made, and that is for term of his own life, for if it should be the life of the Lessee, it should be a discontinuance, and consequently the State which should pass by construction of Law should work a wrong, Ibidem. When two are in one house, or tenement, and one layeth claim by one title, and another by another, the Law shall adjudge him in possession, that right hath to have the house, or tenement, Littleton. Coke come. f. 206. a. b. It is a general rule, that whensoever the words of a deed, or of the parties without deed, shall have a double intendment, and the one standeth with Law and Right, and the other is wrongful, and against Law, the intendment which standeth with Law and Right, shall be taken: As if tenant in Fee-simple maketh a Lease of Lands to B. to have and to hold for term of life, without mentioning for whose life, it shall be deemed for the life of the Lessee, for it shall be taken more strongly against the Lessor, for an estate of a man's own life is higher than for the life of another, but if tenant in tail maketh such a lease, without expressing for whose life, this shall be taken for the life of the Lessor, for the reason abovesaid, and also because the Law which abhorreth injury and wrong, shall never so construe it, as it shall work a wrong, and in this case if it should be for the life of the Lessee, the estate should be discontinued, and a new reversion gained by wrong, ibidem. Where tenant in tail maketh a Lease to another for term of life generally, and after releaseth to the Lessee and his heirs, albeit between tenant in tail and him, a Fee-simple passed. It hath been adjudged, that after the death of the Lessee, the entry of the issue in tail was lawful, which could not be, if it had been a Lease for the life of the Lessee, for then by the release it had been a discontinuance executed, Coke come. f. 42. b. The Law more respecteth a lesser estate by right, than a larger estate by wrong, as if tenant for life in remainder disse●se tenant for life, now he hath a Fee-simple, but if tenant for life dyeth, now is his wrongful estate in fee by judgement in Law changed into a rightful estate for life, Coke come. f. 41. etc. If a man retain a servant generally, without expressing any time, the Law consters it to be for one year, according to the Statute, 23. E. 3. C. 1. And for the same reason, what is contrary to right and good manners is void in Law, according to the rule of the Civilians, Contra jus, & bonos mores conventiones hominum non valent, which accordeth with the ground of the common Law, quod contra legem fit proinfecto habetur, whatsoever is done contrary to to Law or right, is accounted not done, Coke l. 3. f. 74. quod vide. As if a man maketh a Feoffment in fee, upon condition he shall not alien, this condition is repugnant, and against Law, and the state of the feoffee absolute, Coke come. f. 206. b. A Feoffment to A.B. his Heirs and assigns, with proviso, that he shall not alien to no person, is void, but that he shall not alien to I.S. is good, for upon the matter he hath given the Land to him, and his Assigns except to I. S. Ployd. f. 77. a. So if a man maketh a Feoffment in fee, upon condition that the feoffee shall not take the profits, this condition is repugnant, and contrary to Law, and the State is absolute, Ibid. If a man be bound with a condition to enfeoff his wife, the condition is void and against Law, Ibidem. A man giveth Land to two sisters, and the heirs of their bodies, under this form, that she which lived longest should hold the Land wholly, which is void because it is contrary to Law, for if the jointure be severed by fine, the survivor shall not have the other part, 8. Ass. Pl. 33. Coke l. 1. in Corbets case. So if a man maketh a Lease, upon condition that if the Lessor granteth the reversion he shall have fee, if the Lessor granteth the reversion by fine, he shall not have fee, because it is repugnant to Law, 6. A. 2. Pl. 28. Pletingtons' case. The Testator maketh a Lease of his house, and certain implements in it, for years, rendering Rend to him, and to his Heirs, and Assigns, The Executors received the Rent continually after the death of the Testator. The question was, whether it was Assets or no, and by the Judges adjudged no assets, because the whole rent appertained to the heir, Dier 360 b. An obligation taken by the Sheriff colore officij of any one in their custody by course of Law, with a condition then for the appearance at the day mentioned in the process, is void, because it is against the Statute of 23. H. 6. Coke l. 10. in Beawsages case, vide ibidem plura. And it is commonly holden, that if the condition of a bond be against Law, the bond itself is void, Coke come 206. b. But herein the Law distinguisheth between a condition against Law, for the doing of any act is malum in se, and a condition against Law, because it is either repugnant to the State, or against some maxim, or rule in Law, and that common opinion is to be understood of conditions against Law, for the doing of some act is malum in se. As if a man be bound upon condition to kill I. S. the bond is void, for an unlawful condition is not of effect to gain any thing by doing of it in our Law, Ployd. f. 34. b. But otherwise it is in a Feoffment upon condition, for a Feoffment upon condition that the Feoffee shall kill I. S. the Feoffment is good and absolute, and the condition void, Ployd. browning's case, 135. And though all Feoffments upon conditions repugnant to Law, are void, in bonds it is otherwise, for a bond upon such conditions is good. As if a Feoffee be bound in a bond, that the Feoffee and his Heirs shall not alien, the bond is good, yet he may notwithstanding alien, if he will forfeit his bond that he himself hath made. So a bond with condition, that the Feoffee shall not take the profits, is good, so a bond upon condition to enfeoff his wife is good, though it be against a maxim in Law, Coke come. f. 206. And if the husband be bound to pay his wife money, the bond is good. Non valet impedimentum quod de jure non sertitur effectuum, Reg. I. C. Coke l. 4. 31. a. The let or impediment availeth not, which taketh not his effect from the Law, as if the Lord be disseised, and the disseisor dyeth seized, or if the Land be recovered from him by verdict, or erroneous judgement, in these cases until the Land is recovered, or the judgement annihilated by the Law, the land is not demisable, and yet after the land be recontinued, it is grantable again by copy, but if copyhold lands be forfeited to the Lord, or escheat, and before any new grant made, those lands be extended upon a Statute or Recognisance acknowledged by the Lord, or if the wife of the Lord in a writ of dower hath that land assigned to her, though those impediments be acts in law, yet for that that those interruptions are legal, the lands shall never after be granted by copy, ibidem. The words of an Act of Parliament must be taken in a lawful and rightful sense, as where by the Statute of Gloucester, it is forbidden, that the husband shall not alien the lands he hath in right of his wife, whereof no fine is levied in the King's court; those words are to be understood, where no fine is lawfully levied in the King's Court, and therefore a fine levied by the husband alone is not within the meaning of that Statute, for that fine should work a wrong to the wife, but a fine levied by the husband and wife is intended by the Statute, and that is lawful, and worketh no wrong, for generally the rule is non praestat impedimentum, quod de jure non sortitur effectum, so the Statute of W. 2. c. 5. Ita quod episcopus ecclesiam conferat, is construed, ita quod episcopus ecclesiam legitime conferat, Coke come f. 361. b. Nullam iniquam in jure praesumendum, Coke l. 4. f. 71. No injurious thing is to be presumed in the law, for the law so abhorreth injury, that it granteth writs of anticipation to prevent them, quia timet, because a man feareth them, and that before any molestation, distress, or impleading, and there are six sorts of such writs, first a man may have his writ of Mesne before he be distrained, 2. a Warrantia Cartae before he be impleaded, 3. a Monstraverunt before any distress, or vexation, 4. an Audita quereta before any execution sued, 5. a Curia claudenda before any default of enclosure, and is a ne vexes, before any distress, or molestation, Coke come. f. 100 a. And such an Antipathy there is between the Law and injury, that no injury is to be presumed in the law, and as Coke l. 10 f. 56. a. Odiosa & in honesta non sunt in lege praesumenda, & in facto quod se habet ad bonum, & ad malum, magis de bono, quam de malo praesumendum est, odious, and dishonest things are not presumed to be in the law, and in a deed or action which hath in it both good and evil, it ought to be more presumed of the good, then of the evil, as there in the case of the Chancellor of Oxford, it was resolved that covin and fraud shall never be intended or presumed in the law, unless it be expressly averred, and in the case of Tier and Meriell, Trin. 10. Jacob. That if no fraud be found by the Jurors, the Judges shall not adjudge a Feoffment fraudulent, and that though the Jurors have found circumstances, and presumptions to entitle the Jurors to find fraud, it is but evidence to the Jury, and not any matter upon which the Court may adjudge fraud, and the office of the Jurors is to adjudge upon the evidence concerning matter of fact, and upon it to give their verdict, and not to leave matter of evidence to the Court to judge, which doth not appear to them, as if A. bring an action of the case against B. upon trover and conversion, of Plate and Jewels, and the Defendant pleadeth not guilty, now it is good evidence to prove the conversion, that the Plaintiff requested the Defendant to deliver them, and he refused it, and by it it shall be presumed that he hath converted them to his use, yet notwithstanding that is but evidence, and if it be found by a special verdict that the Plaintiff requested them of the Defendant, and he refused it, that is not matter upon which the Court can adjudge any conversion, for the conversion ought to alter the action of detinue into a trespass upon the case, which a denier cannot in law make, for in every action of Detinue there is alleged in the count a request, and a refusal, yet it is good evidence, and hath always been allowed to prove a conversion, that the Plaintiff demanded the goods, and the Defendant refused to deliver them, Coke l. 10. In the case of the Chancellor of Oxford, vide ibidem plura. Nomen non sufficit, si res non sit de jure aut de facto, the name of a thing is not sufficient, if the matter and substance be not of right or deed, Coke l. 4. f. 107. b. Pope Vrbane at the request of Ralph Baron of Greystack founded a College, of a Master, and six Priests resident at Greystock, and assigned to every one of his Priests, five marks by the year, besides his Bed and Chamber, and the Master forty pounds by the year, and this certified in the Book of first fruits, and tenths, Rectoriam, & Collegium of Greystock, and the said College was in being five years before the Act of 1. E. 6. And it was resolved by all the Judges that such a reputative College was not given to the King by the Act of 1. E. 6. because it had no lawful beginning, nor the countenance of a lawful beginning, for the Pope cannot found, or incorporate a College within this Realm, nor to assign, or licence others to assign temporal live to it, for it ought to be done by the King, and no other, for the name doth suffice, if the matter be not of right, or deed, Dier 81. Quando duo jura in una persona concurrunt, aequum est ac si essent in diversis, Reg. I. C. Ployd. f. 368. a. when two rights concur & meet together in one person, it is all one, as if they were in several persons. As if one hath an estate for the life of A. the remainder to him for the life of B. the remainder to him for the life of C. and he is disseised, and the disseisor levieth a fine with proclamations, now by the present right he hath five years by the first favant, and if after these five years A. doth die, he shall have other five years for the next remainder by the second savant, which giveth them, as to other persons, which have a future right, and if after those five years B. doth die, he shall have other five years by the other remainder, for saith he, it is the text of the civil Law, when two rights meet together in one person, it is all one as if they were in several persons, Ployd ibidem, vide ibidem plura, in the Lord Zouches case. Exception. Coke l. 7. Calvin's case, f. 14. b. This rule holdeth not in personal things, that is, when two persons are necessarily and inevitably required by Law, as in the ease of an alien borne there is; for in the case of an alien borne you must of necessity have two several legiaries to two several persons; and no man will say, that now the King of England may make a League with the King of Scotland, and that because in the King's person there concur two distinct Kingdoms, it is all one as if they were in several persons, vide ibidem, f. 2. Coke l. 4. f. 118. a. Though a Bishop when he is translated to an Archbishopric, or a Baron be created an Earl, now he hath both those dignities, and as it is commonly said, when two rights concur in one person, it is all one as if they were in several persons; yet the Act of 21 H. 8. was always construed strictly against Nonresidence, and Pluralities, as a thing much prejudicial to the service of God, and the instruction of his people; and therefore within that Act: an Archbishop shall have no more Chaplains then as an Archbishop; or an Earl, then as an Earl, for though they have divers dignities, yet is it but one and the same person to whom the attendance and service shall be made; and if a Baron be made Knight of the Garter, or Warden of the Cinque Ports, he shall have but three Chaplains in all: Et sic de similibus, quia difficile est ut unus homo vicem duorum sustineat, because it is an hard thing for one man to undergo or sustain the Place and Office of two persons. Coke l. 4. In the case of the death of one within the Verge, the Coroner of the household of the King, and the Coroner of the County, shall join in the Inquiry, and if one be Coroner of both, he shall well execute this authority. Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto, Coke Comment. f. 99 a. Every man may renounce or refuse a Law made or brought in for himself: as a man seized of lands may at this day give the same to a Parson, Bishop, etc. and their successors in frank-almoigne, by the consent of the King and the Lords mediate and immediate, of whom the Land is holden, for every one may renounce a Law brought in for himself, and f. 223. b. The Statute of 32. H. 8. giveth power to tenant in tail, to make a lease for three lives, or twenty one years, yet if a man make a gift, in tail upon condition that he shall not make a lease for three lives, or twenty one years, the condition is good, for the Statute doth give him power to make such leases which may be restrained by condition, and by his own agreement, for this power is not incident to the estate, but given to him collaterally by the act, according to that rule in Law, Quilibet potest, etc. Coke l. 10. f. 101. a. In the Act of 23. H. 6. c. 10. the words, upon reasonable sureties of sufficient persons, are added for the security of the Sheriff, and therefore if he will take but one surety, be it at his peril, for he shall be amerced if the Defendant appeareth not, and for it the Statute doth not make the obligation void in such case, for the said branch which prescribeth the form, requireth that the obligation shall be made to the Sheriff himself, etc. by the name of their office, and that the prisoners shall appear, in which clause no mention is made of the sureties, so as the intent of the Act was (that for that it was at the peril of the Sheriff) to leave it to his discretion to take one or more for his indemnity, and peradventure it may be better for him sometimes to take one that is sufficient, than two others, and though the sureties or surety have not sufficient within the same County as the Statute mentioneth, yet the obligation is good enough, for those words of the Act as to that point are more for counsel and direction of the Sheriff, then for precept and constraint to him, and that for the safety of the Sheriff, for if the Defendant cannot find two sufficient sureties, having sufficient within the same County, the Sheriff is not bound to let him to bail; and this resolution agreeth with the ancient rule, to wit, Quilibet potest, etc. An Orphan in London exhibited a bill in the Court of request against another, for discovery of part of his estate, Pheasant prayed a prohibition upon the custom of London, but it was resolved, that he might sue in what Court he would, and wave his privilege there, 19 C. B. R. But this case extendeth not to any thing that is against the Commonwealth, or common right, Coke come. f. 166. a. Summum jus, summa injuria, Ployd. 160. b. The rigour of the Law is the extremity of injury, if a man make a lease of a message, so as he may make his profit of his houses there within, he cannot abate the houses or make waist of them, by the opinion of the book, H. 17. E. 3. f. 7. for the intent was not such, though that the words seem otherwise, and said to pursue the words is Summum jus, which the Judges ought not to do, but ought rather to pursue the intent. And for the same reason the Executors of Tenant for life shall have reasonable time to remove his goods, after his decease: and a man shall have reasonable time, wherein he shall purchase a Writ of Journys account, Finch Nomot. Jus descendit, & non terra, 20 H. 6. 5. The right descended, and not the land; and Coke Inst. f. 345. a. b. There is a right which includeth an estate in esse, in Conveyances, which he in reversion and remainder hath, and hath jus in re, and may be granted to a stranger with attornement, or released to him in possession, as if Tenant in fee-sample maketh a Lease for years, and releaseth all his right in the Land to the Lessee and his heirs, the whole estate in Fee-simple passeth, and also the release to him in possession, with the reservation of a rent is good, and there is another right, which is called a bare, mere, and naked right, and jus adrem, when an estate is turned to a right by discontinuance, disseisin, abatement, etc. and of this right is the saying to be understood, that the right descendeth, and not the Land, which may be released to him in possession, and this right is also called jus proprietatis; as if a man be disseised of an Acre of Land, the disseisee hath jus proprietatis, and the Disseisor hath jus possessionis, and if the Disseisee release to the Disseisor, he hath jus proprietatis & possessionis, Coke come. 266. a. but the reservation of a Rent upon such a release is void; as if the disseisee release to the disseisor of Land, reserving a rent, the reservation is void, Coke come 144. b. Neither can a bare right, a right of entry, or a thing in action, be granted, or transferred to a stranger by the ancient maxim of the Common Law, Coke come. f. 166. for that thereby is avoided great oppression, injury, and injustice; but if a bare right happen to be forfeited to the King, he may grant the same by his Prerogative. Frustra est potentia, quae nunquam venit in actum, Vain is the possibility which never cometh into act, Coke l. 2. f. 501. There is jus proprietatis possessionis, & possibilitatis, and the right of possibility which dependeth upon the death of a man, hath a necessary and common intendment, to wit, necessary in regard that all the issues of Adam must die, for statutum est omnibus hominibus semel mori, and common, because the death may happen at such a time that the contingency may take effect; and this necessary and common possibility is called potentia propinqua, which may come into act, and is not therefore vain, or void in Law; as in 15 H. 7. 10. If Lands be given to a married man and a married woman, and to the heirs of their two bodies engendered, this is a good estate in tail, for it is of necessity that death shall ensue; and in common possibility that one shall die before the other, so as the marriage may ensue; but in the same case there shall not be possibility upon possibility: and therefore if land be given to one man and two women, there the Law shall not intent, that first he shall marry one, and then that she that he shall marry shall die, and that he shall espouse the other, and therefore in this case they have several inheritances at the beginning, as if Land be given to two barons and their femes, and the heirs of their bodies engendered, in this case the Law shall not expect second marriages, and therefore in this case they shall have joint estates for life, and one baron and feme one moiety in tail in common, with the other baron and feme of the other moiety, and so several inheritances; and with it accordeth, 24. E. 3. 29. for otherwise there should be possibility upon possibility, and if a man give Land to baron and feme, there is an apparent possibility, that they shall have issue, but if after they be divorced, causa praecontractus, so as the possibility is dissolved, the Law shall never expect the second marriage, for by the divorce they have but an estate of Franktenement, 4. H. 7. 16. 17. And a woman may enfeoff a married man, causa matrimonij prae locuti, for it is of necessity that death shall ensue, and in common possibility, that the Feme of the Feoffee shall die before the Feoffee: So in the common case of a lease for life, the remainder to the right heirs of I. S. the remainder is good for the necessary and common intendment, vide ibidem plura, in Lampets' case, Coke l. 10. f. 50. b. For the Law respecteth the right of possibility, and will have nothing to be void that by possibility may be good: As a mesnalty is given in tail, reserving a rent, this is good, for the tenancy may escheat to the donee, and then the donor shall distrain for all the arrearages, 1. H. 4. 2. A man hath issue a daughter, and leaveth his wife privement enseint, the wife may detain the Charters of her husband's Lands from the Daughter, for the possibility, it may be a Son she goeth withal, 41. E. 3. 21. b. But if A. be indebted to B. in two hundred pounds and delivereth goods to him to sell to pay his debt in the best manner he can, and he is proffered two hundred pounds for them, and refuseth, and after selleth them for an hundred pounds, A. shall answer the residue of the debt notwithstanding this possibility, 18. E. 4. 5. But the possibility must be propinque, and a common possibility, as death, or dying without issue, or coverture, or the like, but if it be a remote possibility, the Law doth judge it vain, because it shall not be intended by common intendment to happen, as a remainder to a corporation which is not at the time of the limitation and remainder, is void, though such a corporation was after erected, during the particular estate, for that was potentia remota, 9 H. 6. 24. For as Ployd. f. 345. a. b. It is a principle in Law, that all gifts, be it by devise or otherwise, they ought to have a donee in esse and not in posse, who hath capacity to take them given, when it ought to vest; as devise of Lands in fee, and so of goods, if the devise die before the devisor, neither his Heir or Executor shall gain any thing by this Will, vide ibidem plura, in Brets' case. So if a lease be made for life, the remainder to the right heirs of I. S. if at the limitation of the remainder there be not any such I. S. but during the life of tenant for life I. S. is borne and dyeth, his heir shall never take, as it is agreed in 2. H. 7. 13. And so in 11. E. 3. 46. the case was, that upon a fine levied to R. he granted, and rendered the tenements to one I. and F. his wife for their lives, the remainder to G. the Son of I. in tail, the remainder to the right heirs of I. and at the time levied I. had not any son named G. but after he had issue named G. and in praecipe against F. it was adjudged that G. should not take the remainder in tail because he was not borne at the time of the fine levied, but long after, by which another who was right heir of I. S. was received, for when I. had not any son named G. at the time of the fine levied, the law doth not expect that he shall have a Son named G. after, for that is potentia remota, a remote possibility. But if the remainder had been limited by a general name, as to the right heirs of I. or primogenito filio, such a remainder might have been good for the common possibility. But if a remainder be contrary to Law, the Law shall never adjudge a grant good by reason of a possibility, or expectation of a thing which is contrary to Law, for that is potentia remotissime & vana, which by the intendment of the Law never cometh into act, Coke l. 2. f. 5. 2. n. b. in Sir Hugh Chomleys' case, vide ibidem plura. And hereby the way may pertinently be observed, that a possibility cannot be released, as if before judgement the Plaintiff in an action of debt, releaseth to the bail in the King's Bench all demands, and after judgement is given, this shall not bar thee to have execution against the bail, because at the time of the release he had but a mere possibility, and neither jus in re, or jus ad rem, but the duty is to commence after upon a contingent, and therefore could not be released presently. So if the Conusee of a Statute release to the Conusor all his right in the Land, yet afterward he may sue execution, for he hath no right to the Land till execution, but only a● possibility, and so have I known it adjudged, Coke come. f. 265. b. So if A. grant to B. that if he do such an act, he shall have an annuity of twenty pounds during his life, before the Act done he cannot release the annuity, Coke l. 1. in Albanys case. Lex semper dabit remedium, the law so favoreth right, that it will suffer things against the principles of Law, rather than a man to be without his remedy. As a man who is outlawed may bring an action to reverse it, & an outlawry there is no Plea, 4. H. 7. 40. The Tenant shall have a replevin against the Lord that did wrongfully distrain, though the beasts be come back to himself (because he can have no action of trespass against him for that prisall) and shall recover damages for the tortuous prisall F. n. b. f. 69. H. A man (after judgement is passed against him) shall plead against the King a Charter of pardon, or any such thing done in the mean betwixt the verdict and the judgement, because against the King he can have no Audita querela, 11. H. 7.10. otherwise it is against a common person. And therefore is it a principle in Law, cuicumque aliquis quid concedit concedere videtur & id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest, Coke l. 11. f. 52. a. Which Ploydon thus expresseth, that it is held as a maxim, in 2. R. 2. in trespass, that if any man hath interest to any thing by the grant, and assent of another, and the party who hath such interest cannot have the principal thing without doing the other thing, that he may do the said other thing, and justify it, because it is a means to come to his profit, for there it is holden, That if one grant to me all his Trees growing in his Woods, I may cut them down, and carry them through all his Land, and though his Grass be spoiled with the carriage, he shall not have a Writ of trespass of it, for Trees are such things that if they be not carried by Carts, he cannot have them, nor make his profit of them. But if one sell all his Fish in his Pond, and the Vendee dig a trench so as the water may run out, that by such means he may take the Fish, an action of trespass will lie against the Vendee, because he might take the Fish by Nets, or other Engines, but if there had been no other means to take them, it had been otherwise, and to come to the banks to fish he may well justify it, for without it he cannot take them by any means, so as a man shall always justify the necessary circumstance, where he hath title to the principal thing, Ployd, f. 15. & 16. a. vide ibidem plura, in Renigers' case. So when a Lessor in the Lease except the Trees and after hath an intention to sell them, the Law giveth to him, and to those who will buy them power as incident to the exception to enter, and show the Trees to those who will have them, for without entry they cannot view, and without view they cannot buy, Coke l. 11. f 52. in Lisords case. So 19 H. 6.29. A man seized of a mese in a Burrow, etc. devisable, deviseth it to his wife in tail, and that if his wife die without issue, that his Executor may sell it, and it dispose for his soul, in this case the Executor may by the Law enter into the house, to see whether it be well repaired, or no, to the intent to know at what value he may sell the reversion. And the Law giveth power to him who will repair a Bridge, to enter in the Land, and to him who hath a Conduit within the Land of another, to enter into the Land for it, to mend as cause shall require, as it is resolved in 9 E. 4.35. Coke ibidem, vide plura. And Coke l. 5. f. 12. a. If a man hath Mines hidden within his Land, and leaseth his Lands, and all his Mines in it, there the Lessor may dig for them, for quando aliquis quid concedit, etc. and this accordeth with 9 E. 4.8. that if a man lease his Land to another, in which there is a Mine, to wit, an hidden Mine, he cannot dig for it, and if he do, it is waste, but if he lease his Lands, and all the Mines in it, it is otherwise, for the reason aforesaid, vide ibidem plura, in Saunders case. If tenant at will soweth Corn on the ground, and the Lessor out him, he shall have free entry, egress, and regress to carry it away, for when the Law giveth any thing to any one, it giveth implicitly whatsoever is necessary for the taking and enjoying of the same, and the Law driveth him not to an action for the Corn, but giveth him a speedy remedy to enter into the Land, and to take, and carry it away, and compelleth not him to carry it at one time, or to carry it, before it be ready to be carried, and if the Lessee be disturbed of this way the Law doth give unto him, he shall have his action upon the case and recover his damages, for whensoever the Law giveth any thing, it giveth a remedy for the same, Coke come f. 56. a. If there be Lord, Mesne, and Tenant, and the Lord purchaseth the tenancy in fee, the mesnalty is extinct, but whereas the tenant held of the mean by five shillings, and the mesne of the Lord by twelve pence, so as he hath more in advantage by four shillings, he shall have the four shillings as a rentseck yearly of the Lord, and yet he shall distrain for it, for seeing the mesnalty is extinct, the Law reserveth the distress to the rent, for quando lex aliquid concedit, etc. And therefore if a man maketh a Lease for life, reserving a rent, and bindeth himself in a Statute, and hath the rent extended, and delivered unto him, he shall distrain for the rent, because it cometh to him by course of Law. Multa constituuntur in lege, ne curia Domini Regis deficeret in Justitia exhibenda, Coke l. 7. f. 4. Many things are constituted in law, lest the Court of the Lord the King should fail in doing of Justice, by the Statute of W. 2. c. 8. It is provided, that so often as from henceforth there shall be found in the Chancery, that in one case there is found a Writ, and in the like case falling under the same right, and wanting the like remedy, no Writ is found, let the Clerks of the Chancery agree in making a new Writ, etc. or at the next Parliament, let there be a Writ by the consent of the learned in the law, and the estate concludeth with the effect of the common law, Quod curia domini Regis non debet deficere conquerentibus in Justitia perquirenda, That the King's Court ought not to be slack or deficient to the Complainant in seeking Justice, and therefore if there be Lord and Tenant, and the tenancy extend into two Counties, in this case, if the rents or services be behind, the Lord may have several Writs of customs and services, for each County a Writ, and shall have them retornable at one day in the common bench, and there upon count according to his case by the common Law, because otherwise the Court of the King should be deficient to the Plaintiffs in seeking of Justice, Coke come. f. 154. a. and Coke l. 7. f. 4. a. b. vide ibidem plura, in Bulvers case. If there be Lord, Mesne, and Tenant, and the Mesne doth truly his services paramount, and yet the Lord distraineth the Tenant paravaile for them, at that time the distress is tortuous, and the tenant is not distrained in default of the mesne, yet in this case if the tenant paravaile request the mesne to take his Cattle out of the ground, and to put in the proper Cattle of the mesne in place of them, or if the tenant had replevind his own Cattle, and requested the mesne to join, and to acquit him, and he refuse, by that matter ex post facto. the Law shall adjudge that the tenant paravaile was distrained in default of the mesne, and in a Writ of mesne, the mesne shall plead not distrained in his default, and it shall be found against him, or otherwise the tenant paravaile who is in no default shall have wrong, and yet shall be without remedy, and it is all one to the tenant, whether the distress was wrongful or right if he have not any distress, 39 E. 3.34 etc. By which it appeareth that the Judges in those ages did endeavour to put the rule of W. 2. in execution, Curia Domini Regis non debet deficere conquerentibus in Justitia exhibenda. Coke l. 9 f. 111. a. b. And Coke l. 9 f. 88 b. The Executors (which in truth hath the Goods in another's right, to wit, to pay the debts, etc. of the Testator) shall not convert them to their private use, without paying the just and true debts of the Testator, for that shall be against Justice and right, and against the Office of Executors, which are but the Ministers and dispensers of the Goods of the dead, and notwithstanding the death of the Testator, yet the debt remaineth, for death is not a discharge of debt, and it should be a great defect in Law that no remedy shall be given for it, & curia domini regis de ficeret, etc. Coke l. 9 f. 88 b. And therefore an action upon the assumpsit made by the testator, shall lie against the Executors, because in such case the Testator could not gauge his Law, for by it Justice and right is advanced, in that the creditor shall be paid his just and due debt, ibidem. So Coke come. f. 74. a. There are divers manners of trials appointed by the Law besides the common trial by a Jury of twelve men upon oath, lest the Court of the King should be defective in doing of Justice, as in the time of War out of the Realm, the trial shall be by the certificate of the Marshal of the host in writing under his seal, which shall be sent to the Justices, so in the time of peace out of the Realm, as if it be alleged for avoiding an Outlawry, that the Defendant was in prison at Bordeaux, in the service of the Mayor of Bordeaux, it shall be tried by certificate of the Mayor of Bordeaux, and in the like cases such trials shall be by the Marshal of the Army, or by a messenger of a thing done beyond the Seas, 2. Eliz. 176. In Barrys case. And for matters within the Realm, the custom of London shall be certified by the Mayor, and Aldermen, by the mouth of the Recorder, likewise by certificate of the Sheriff, upon a Writ to him directed, in case of privilege, if one be a Citizen or a Foreigner. And by trials of Records, by certificate of the Justices in whose custody they are by Law. So in causes ecclesiastical, as loyalty of marriage, general Bastardy, Excommengement, Profession, and the reason, that trials by certificate are peremptory, because if the Court should re-examine it, they have no other remedy, but to write to the same officer made the certificate, and it is not to be presumed, that they would differ from their former certificate, Bac. Max. f. 26. A Lord of Parliament upon an indictment of treason, or felony, shall be tried by his peers without oath upon their honours and allegiances, but in an appeal at the suit of the Subject, they shall be tried per probos, & legales homines juratores, 10. E. 4.6.8. Customs and Usages of every Court, shall be tried by the Judges of the same Court, if they be pleaded in the same Court, 11. E. 4.2.9. In dower, an appeal brought of the death of her husband, or in Assize brought by the feme, which was the wife of B. if the Tenant or Defendant plead, that the husband is alive, the trial shall not be by Jury, but by Justices upon Process made before them for the greater expedition, 6. E. 3. 29. etc. In a Writ of Error to reverse a fine for nonage, or in an Audita qu●rela to reverse a Statute, or Recognisance for nonage, there the age shall be tried by inspection of the Judges, and not by the Country, And so it is if tenant vouch A. as heir within age, and tenant for life vouch him in the reversion within age, and prayeth that the Plea may demur, &c If an infant appear by an Attorney, it is Error, and shall be tried by the Country, because the making of the warrant of Attorney is the act of the party, and yet the appearance of the Attorney is recorded in Court, but if the Plaintiff maketh an Attorney in Court, and the Defendant pleadeth that the Plaintiff is dead, and one appeareth and saith, that he is the Plaintiff, which is denied by the other party, the Judges shall adjudge, whether he that now appeareth be the same person, who at another time made the Attorney in Court, 34. H. 6. 43. And a maihme may be tried by the inspection of the Court, 28. Ass. 38. If question be made whether they be summoners, and viewers which appear, it shall be tried by the examination of the Justices. 33. H. 6. 10. So whether an Earl be an Earl, or a Baron a Baron or no, shall not be tried by the Country, nor by the Justices, but by the writ of the King, Coke l. 5. in the Countess of Rutland's case. And in Plea of an alien borne, the league between the King and the Sovereign of the alien borne shall be tried by the record of Chancery, for every league is of record, and generally all matters of record shall be tried by the record itself, and not by the Country, or otherwise, Coke l. 9 f. 31. vide de hoc plura ibidem. And when a man is found an idiot from his nativity by office, he who is so found may come into the Chancery, before the Chancellor, and pray that before him or such Justices, or sages of the Law, he may be examined whether he be an idiot or no, or by his friends may sue a Writ out of the Chancery, retornable in the Chancery, to bring him into the Chancery, there before us or our counsel to be examined, and if he be found upon that examination not to be an idiot, the office so found, etc. is utterly void, without any traverse or monstrans de droit, or otherwise, F. n. b. 233.10. E. 3. Title Livery, 30. An Apostate shall be certified by the Abbot, or other religious governor, to whom he oweth obedience, F. n. b. 232. In an appeal, or upon an approvement, the Defendant may plead not guilty, and try it with the Plaintiff by combat, or battle in person, before the Justices▪ 9 Ass. Pl. 1. But the Defendant is restrained from choice of battle, if there be any notorious presumption of the fact in him, Finch. Nomo●. f. 422. vide ibidem plura. And in a Writ of right, the tenant may join issue upon the mere right, and try it by combat or battle by his champion with a freeman the champion of the demandant, and not in person before the Justices, 9 E. 4.35. If it be in question which of the Sheriffs made such a return, it shall be tried by the Sheriff, 9 H. 4.1. If question be made if such a one be Sheriff, it shall be tried by the examination of the Sheriff himself, 10. H. 4.7. Yet is he made by Letters Patents on record, and therefore it also may be tried by record, 32. H. 6.27. A return made by the under Sheriff, if it be denied, shall be tried by the under Sheriff, and the Sheriff cannot disavow it, if he confess him to be his under Sheriff, 10. H. 4.7. If an approver say that he commenced his appeal before the Coroner, by duress, that shall be tried by the Coroner, and if the Coroner deny it, he shall be hanged, 12. Ass. 29. Trial, if the Statute shown forth, be a true Statute, or no, shall be tried by the examination of the Mayor, and Clerk of the Statutes who took the Statutes, F. N. B. 104. H. In Assize the Tenant saith, that the Lands are taken into the hands of the King, it shall be tried by the examination of the Escheator, 9 H. 4.1. To a petit Cape the Tenant saith, that he was in Prison three days before, and three days after, it shall be tried by the examination of the Attorney, 13. R. 2.22. Not attached within fifteen days in an assize shall be tried by the examination of the Bailie. So that the tenant was not summoned according to the Law of the Land, shall be tried by Law-gager, and the Law-gager doth countervail a Jury, for the tenant shall make his Law duodecima manu, to wit, by eleven besides himself, unless it be against a Corporation, for than it shall for necessity be tried by the Country, because it cannot wage Law. In a Writ of deceit upon a Recovery by default, the trial shall be (if the judgement was given upon the petit capit) by the Summoners, if upon a grand Cape by the Summoners, Pernors, and Viewers, 48. E. 3.11. So if a Recovery by default in a real action be pleaded, and the other saith, not comprised, it shall be tried by the Summoners, and Viewers, 10. H. 4.7. and yet their is no remedy if they speak falsely, and therefore ubi majus periculum ibi cautius est agendum, where there is a greater danger, there we ought to be more wary. The cause of challenge shall be tried by two tryers to be appointed by the Justices, 9 E. 4.5. But the trial of any one of the grand Jury shall be taken by four Knights. Trial may be in debt upon a simple contract, detinue, etc. either by Law, gager, by the Defendant himself, or by the Country at the election of the Defendant, 30. Ass. P. 19 Coke. l 9 f. 32.33. And Coke. come. f. 74. If a Subject of the King be killed by another of his Subjects in a foreign Country, the wife, or heir of the dead may have an appeal for that murder or homicide, before the Constable and the Marshal, whose sentence is upon testimony of witnesses or combat, and their proceed according to the civil Law, and not by the oath of twelve men, and so was it resolved in the twenty fifth of Elizabeth, in the case of Sir Francis Drake who struck off the head of Dowty in partibut transmarivis, that his Brother and Heir might have an appeal, but the Queen would not constitute a Constable of England, and therefore the appeal was dormant. And Coke come. f. 261. b. By the Statute of 25. E, 3. De proditionibus, it is declared, that it is Treason by the common Law to adhere to the Enemies of the King within the Realm, and without, if he thereof be proveablement attaint of overt-fact, and that he shall forfeit all his Lands, etc. But least the common Law declared by Parliament should be illusory, and that the Delinquent might not be attainted thereof, for necessity's sake the adherency without the Realm must be alleged in some place within England,, and if upon evidence they shall find any adherency out of the Realm, they shall find the Delinquent guilty, but most commonly they indicted him if he had Lands in some County where the Lands did lie, that were to be forfeited, and so it is declared by the Statute of 35. H. 8. And that it shall be tried by twelve men of the County where the King's Bench shall sit, and determined before the Justices of that Bench, or else before such Commissioners, and in such Shire of the Realm as shall be assigned by his Majesty's commission, and this Statute for this point remaineth in force at this day, and so was it resolved by all the Judges, 33. Eliz. in Orurks case, and 34 Eliz. in Sir John Perots case, for Treasons done in Ireland, for that it is out of the Realm of England. I have been too copious in the exemplification of this ground by so many notable cases drawn on by the variety and curiosity of them, they being exorbitant from the beaten tract of the common Law, from which for the better effecting, and doing of right, the Law deemeth it convenient, and necessary to swarve and deviate, and that in favorem juris et recti. To add one example more, if an obligation be made beyond the Seas, and it beareth date at Bordeaux in France, where shall it be sued? answer is made that it may be alleged to be made in quodam loco vocato Bordeaux in France, in Islington in the County of Middlesex, and there shall it be tried, for whether there be such a place in Islington or no, it is not traverseable in that case, Coke come 261. b. Executio juris non habet injuriam, Reg. I.C. & Hoba●t f. 266. The execution of the Law hath no injury. As if a man bringeth an action upon a false surmise in a proper Court, he cannot bring an action against him, and charge him with it as a fault directly, and ex diametro, as if the suit itself was a wrongful act, for the execution of the Law hath no injury. So Coke come. f. 161. a. It is regularly true, that a man shall not be punished for suing of Writs in the King's Court, be it of right, or wrong, ibidem. And therefore 11. Eliz. a man brought a Writ of forger of false deeds, the Defendant though he be found guilty, could not have a scandalum magnatum, and lay the charge contained in the action to be the scandal, for no punishment was ever appointed for a suit in Law, although it be false and upon vexation, vide Dyer f. 285. Pl. 37. And so we rule it every day, that if a man be imprisoned upon a formal suit, though there were no just cause of suit, yet if he give a bond for his release, he shall not avoid it by duresse, because it is incarceratio legitima. Hob. 1. l. And though every thing by nature is good, and as Saint Paul saith, The Law is good, if a man use it lawfully, yet the abuse of the Law is the fact, and therefore on the contrary part, if you charge me with a crime in a Court, that is no way capable of the cause, I shall have an action for it, and lay that very complaint to be the slander, as Coke l. 4. f. 14. b. Wood exhibited a bill in the Star-Chamber against Barkeley, and inter alia, charged him that he was a maintainer of Pirates, and Murderers, etc. B. brought an action of the case against W. and counted, that the said W. had exhibited a bill in the Star-Chamber containing inter alia, that the said B. was a maintainer of murderers and pirates, etc. and it was resolved, that for any thing contained in the bill, which was examinable in the said Court, no action lieth, although the matter was merely false, because it was in course of Justice, but for the said words, not examinable in the said Court, an action upon the case lieth, for that could not be in course of Justice, vide ibidem plura. And if a man sue me in a proper Court, yet if his suit be utterly without ground of truth, and that certainly known to himself, and thus as the Civilians, it be done animo injuriandi, I may have an action upon the case against him for the undue vexation, and damage that he putteth me unto by his ill practice, though the suit itself be legal, but I cannot complain of it as it is a suit, and therefore the sixteenth of E. 3. Fitz. deceit, 35. A Conusee of a Statute sued execution against his deed of defeasance, whereupon the Conusor had an action of deceit against him, and his Assignee, in the nature of an Audita querela, yet though he was imprisoned upon the Statute, could he not bring an action of false imprisonment, if he had paid the money before the day limited by the defeasance, because he was imprisoned by course of Law, 43 E. 3.33. And if a man sue me, and hanging that suit, commenceth another against me, to this I have a Plea in abatement, which proveth this latter suit unjust and vexatious, but if he discontinue the former he may bring a new action, 43. E. 3. for as Coke come. f. 130. a. It may be he hath mistaken some thing in that action, or was not provided of his proofs, or mistaking the day, or the like. Likewise I hold I may have an action of the case against him, who sueth me against his release, or after money duly paid, yea though it be upon a single obligation, Hob. ibidem. But in these cases, these two cautions are to be observed, that the new action be not brought before the other be determined, because till then it cannot appear that the other was unjust, 2. R. 1. And for this reason a Writ of conspiracy lieth not until the Plaintiff is acquitted. The other is, that besides the thing done amiss, there must also be a damage either already suffered, or else inevitable, and therefore 19 H. 6.44. If a man forge a bond in my name, I can have no action of the case yet, but if I be sued I may, for the wrong or damage, though I may avoid it by Plea, but if it were upon a recognizance or fine, I shall have a deceit presently before execution, for Quae incontinente aut certo fiunt in esse videntur, and 43. E. 3. 10. deceit against one who procured a Formedon, by collusion, vide ibidem plura in Waterers case. And this rule faileth in a Writ of Replevin against the Lord, as if the Lord distrain for rent, and the tenant bringeth a Replevin, whereby the Lord is disturbed of the means to come to his rent, this is in Law a disseisin, Coke. come. f. 161. a. Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria, Coke come. f. 147. b. No man shall take advantage of his own wrong, as if B maketh a lease of one Acre for life to A. and A. seized of another Acre in fee, granteth a rent-charge to B. out of both Acres, and doth waste in the Acre which he holdeth for life, B. recovereth in waist, the whole rent is not extinct, but shall be apportioned, and yet B. claimeth one Acre under A. and so it is if A. had made a Feoffment to B. in fee, and B. had entered for the forfeiture, the rent is not wholly extinct, but must be apportioned, and the reason hereof is, for that is a maxim of Law, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong. And therefore seeing the waist and the forfeiture were committed by the act and wrong of the Lessee, he shall not take advantage thereof to extinguish the whole rent, and the whole rent cannot issue only out of the other Acre, because the Lessor hath one Acre under the estate of the Lessee, and therefore it shall be apportioned, vide ibidem plura. If a man be bound to appear at a day before Justices, at which day the obligor casteth him into Prison, so as he cannot come, the bond is saved, otherwise if he were in Prison for Felony, or any other misdemeanour, for that is his own act and fault, 32. H. 6. Bar 60. Or if he cast himself into Prison, N●y. Max. f. 13. An infant's appeal shall not stay for his full age, for he shall not take advantage of his own wrong, 27. H. 8. 11. One in Execution escapeth, and the Gaoler taketh him again, the party if he will, may have him to remain in Prison in execution for him still, for the escape is his own wrong, 13. H. 7. 1. So Coke l. 3. in Britons case. If one in Prison upon execution escape, if he be taken he shall not bring an Audita querela to discharge himself of his imprisonment, for he shall not take advantage of his own wrong. He that is party to a wrong, shall not take advantage by the same wrong, Perk. 41. b. As if Lessor and Lessee for years join in the cutting down of twenty Oaks, the Lessor shall not punish him in a Writ of Waste, and take advantage of his own wrong. The heir which is party to the death of his Father shall not have an appeal of it. And if issue in tail disseise the Discontinuee of his Father, and then enfeoff his Father, and his Father then dyeth seized, and the issue in tail enter, he shall not be remitted. If Lessee for life of one Acre of Land, leaseth the same Acre to his Lessor for years, the remainder to a stranger in fee, and maketh livery and seisin to the Lessor accordingly, it is no forfeiture, Perkins ib. If tenant for term of life enfeoff the feme of the Lessor of the same Land leased, and maketh a Letter of Attorney to the Lessor to make livery and seisin, and he doth so accordingly, it is no forfeiture, Perk. ibidem. f. 42. a. If an house fall down by tempest, the Lessee for life or years, hath a special interest to take Timber to reedify the same if he will, for his habitation, but if the Lessee pull down the house, the lessor may take the Timber as parcel of his inheritance, and besides have an action of Waste, and recover triple damages, Coke l. 4 f. 63. a. in Harlackendems case. A deviseth lands to B. until eight hundred pounds be levied for the marriage of his daughters, his Son and Heir entereth, and concealeth the will & receiveth the profits before the will is discovered, than the devisee entereth, & receiveth the profits until they amount to six hundred and forty pounds, the heir is to supply the rent, for the heir shall not take advantage of his own wrong, Coke l. 4. Dormit Lex aliquando, jus moritur nunquam, Coke come. 279. b. For as Littleton there hath it, it is commonly said, that a right cannot die. For of such an high estimation is right in the eye of the Law, as that the Law preserveth it from death, and destruction, trodden it may be, but not trodden out, for where it hath been said, that a release of right doth in some cases enure by way of extinguishment, it is so to be understood, as here Littleton saith, in respect of him that maketh the release, or else in respect by construction of Law it enureth not alone to him to whom it is made, but to others also who be strangers to the release, which as hath been said, is a quality of an inheritance extinguished: As if there be Lord and Tenant, and the Tenant maketh a Lease for life, the remainder in fee: If the Lord release to the Tenant for life, the rent is wholly extinguished, and he in the remainder shall take benefit thereof, and even so when the heir of a disseisor is disseised, and the disseisor maketh a release for life, the remainder in fee: if the first disseisee release to the Tenant for life, this shall enure by way of extinguishment, because it shall enure to him in the remainder who is a stranger to the release, and yet in truth the right is nor extinguished, but followeth the possession, to wit, the tenant for life hath it during his time, and he in the remainder, to him and his heirs, and the right of the Inheritance is in him in the remainder, for a right to Land cannot die, or be extinct in deed, and therefore if after the death of tenant for life, the heir of the disseisor bring a Writ of right against him in the remainder, and he join the Mice upon the mere right, it shall be found for him, because in Judgement of Law, he hath by the said release the right of the Disseisee, for it is commonly and truly said, that right never dyeth, but is transferred and conveyed by Feoffments, Grants, Confirmations, Prescriptions, or Fines, etc. releases from one man to another, so as the Species of it continually remaineth. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, & factum unius alteri nocere non debet, Coke come. f. 152. b Things acted among others ought not to hurt either, and one man's deed ought not to hurt another, and Coke l 9 f. 59 It is the rule of Law, and reason, prohibetur ne quis faciat in suo, quod nocere possit in alieno, & sic utre tuo, ut alienum non laedas, it is forbidden, lest any one should do that in his own, that may hurt another, and so use your own, that you injure not another. If a man hath a Watercourse running in a channel of a River up to his house, for his necessary ules, and a Glover levy a Lime pit for Calve-skins, and Sheepskins so near his Watercourse, that the corruption of the Lime pit hath corrupted it, by which his tenants go out of his house, for it an action of the case lieth, as is adjudged in 13. H. 6. 26. b. So he who hath several Piscaries in his own Water, shall have an action of the case against him, who erecteth a Dye-house, by which he maketh slime, filth, and other dirty things to run out of the said house, into the said Piscaries, by which he hath totally lost the profit of the said Piscaries, vide in the Book of Entries, Nuisance. f 406. b. vide the same in Aldreds' case, for erecting of a Swine-house, & plura alia ibidem. And so also in Penruddocks case, Coke l. 5. and in Batius case, l. 11. 54. Where you shall find divers notable cases to the same purpose. Lessee for years shall so take his hedgeboote, that he doth not destroy common of Estovers, which another man hath there, 46. E. 3. 17. He which hath common in Land not enclosed, shall keep his Cattle out of a stranges Land, 20 E. 4. 11. If Beasts be driven by the high way, he ought at his peril to keep them out of the Lands adjacent to the high way, except in case where the Owner is bound to enclose, 4. E. 4 19 10. E. 4. 7. But if a man erect a wall, part on my Land, and part on his own, if I destroy that on my Land, and the rest by that means falleth down, it is excusable. If a Feoffment be made to two jointly, one of them cannot dereigne the warranty without the other, 48. E. 3. 17. Yet if a villain and another purchase jointly, and the Lord of the villain enter into a moiety he may dereigne the Warranty alone, for therein the severance groweth by act in Law. He that cometh into a Tavern, and will not go out in reasonable time, or distrain for rent, and killeth the distress, shall be a wrong doer, ab initio, 12. E. 4. 8. Because he misdemeaneth that the authority the Law giveth him. Otherwise it is, if I lend my horse to one to ride to York, and he rideth him further, yet the riding further is not unlawful, neither a general action of Trespass lieth against him upon the accord upon the case, because he misdemeaneth but the authority that another hath given him, Finch. Nomot. f. 47. If I be distrained and pay my rent, and after am denied to have my goods delivered, an action of Trespass, or detinue lieth, 21. H. 7. If I deliver a chest to one, who breaketh it, Trespass lieth, 2. H. 8. If a Sheriff maketh an arrest, and returneth not the Capias, an action of Trespass lieth, 8. E. 49. An executor commandeth the taking of the goods of the Testator and refuseth to prove the will, a Trespass lieth, 8. E. 4. 9 The Sheriff seizeth the goods of one outlawed, and doth not charge himself in account, the Outlawry being reversed, or the party pardoned, he shall have an action of Trespass against the Sheriff, 21. H. 7. 23. Injuria illata incorpus non potest remitti, Reg. I. C. injury which is offered to the body cannot be remitted, and the reason given by the Civilians is, quia nemo membrorum suorum Dominus, because no man is Lord, and Master of his members, but the power of them appertain to God our Creator, and the Prince our Protector, which accordeth with the reason of the common Law, which maintaineth, as Bracton saith, quod cita, & membra sunt in postate Regis, & as it is in the record of 19 E. 1. Rot. 36. vita & membra sunt in manu Regis, that the life and member of every Subject are under the safeguard, and protection of the King, to the intent they may serve the King, and their Country when occasion shall be offered. Nay the Lord of a villain for the cause aforesaid cannot maihme his villain, but the King shall punish him for maiming of his Subjects by Fine, Ransom, and Imprisonment, until the Fine and Ransom be paid, for that hereby, he hath disabled him to do the King service, Coke come. f. 127. a. And therefore also doth the Law more carefully provide for the preventing, and punishing of such forcible injury in particular between person and person, because as Coke come. f. 161. b. Max. paci sunt contraria vis, & injuria, forcible injuries are most contrary to the quiet, and repose of the Commonwealth, which is the public felicity both of Prince and people. As if one do but menace another with a weapon, or staff, or if he stretch out his arm, or give any other token, whereby his intention of striking doth appear, though never a stroke be given, yet is it actionable, 22. Ass. Pl. 60. And upon an assault, the Writ was Quare insultum fecit, vulneravit & maihemavit, and though the injury did not appear to be a maihm, yet was it allowed, 43 E. 4. For the Law favoreth the Plaintiff in such Actions. And though force be an enemy to peace, yet is it a maxim in our Law, Quod quisque in tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure fecisse videatur, Fulb. l. 1. f. 91. whatsoever any one doth in defence of his body, it seemeth to be done by Law, according to the opinion of the Poet. Judice me, fraus est concessa repellere fraud●m, A maque in armatos sumere jura sinunt. I do conceive it a good fraud to be To repel fraud, and lawful eke for me To take up arms 'gainst those I armed see. As 2. H. 4 8. Bract. If any man beat me, I may lawfully beat him if I cannot escape without strips, wounds, or maihmes. Nay, 9 E 4. 3. I may beat him in defence of my goods, or wife, contrary to the resolve of 43. Ass. 39 That it is not lawful for me to beat him, if I may escape with my life. And 9 E 4. A servant may justify a battery in defence of his Master, and 17. E. 4. 4. He that cometh in company of him who maketh the assault, or cometh in to aid him, is a principal Trespassor, and if a Justice of Peace see a man doing of an assault, he may presently arrest him by commandment or word, to the intent that he may find surety of peace, 9 E. 4. 3 And by the civil Law, if any one do keep or nourish a Masty Dog, Bear, or Fox, or some like beast, which doth hurt, or damnify another man, he that receiveth the hurt shall recover damages against the Owner of the beast, Fulb. l. 1. f. 81. And so at the common Law, if a man hath a Dog which killeth Sheep, and hath notice of the condition of the Dog, the master shall be punished for it, as may be gathered out of Dyer, 28. H. 8. f. 25. Pl. 162. Otherwise if he be ignorant thereof, or if it be done without the Master's incitation, ibidem. f. 19 And whereas in many cases that concern Lands and Goods, the Law doth deprive a man of present remedy, and rather than to suffer an inconvenience, turneth him over to a further remedy, yet if the question be of a personal pain, the Law doth give him present remedy, because he holdeth no damage a sufficient remedy for a corporal injury, which ground as Sir Francis Bacon ingeniously observeth, some of the Canonists do aptly infer out of Christ's sacred mouth; Amen corpus est su●ra vestimentum, verily the body is more worth than raiment, where they say vestimentum comprehendeth all outward things appertaining to a man's condition, as Lands and Goods, which they say are not in the same degree with that which is corporal, Bacon Max. f. 30. As if a Sheriff make a false return, whereby I lose my Land, yet because of the inconvenience of drawing things to delays, if the Sheriffs return should not be credited: I am excluded of my averrement against it, and am put to my action of deceit against the Sheriff, and Summoners, 5. E. 4. 80. But if the Sheriff upon a Capias return a Cepy Corpus, & quod languidus est in prisona, I may come in, and falsify the return of the Sheriff to save my imprisonment, 3. H. 6. 3. So if a man menace me in my goods, and that he will burn certain evidences of my Land, which he hath in his hands, if I will not make him a bond: and if I enter into bond by this terror, I cannot avoid it by plea, because the Law holdeth it an inconvenience to avoid a specialty by such matter of averrement, and therefore I am put to my action against such a menacer. But if he restrain my person, or threaten me with a battery, or with burning of my house, which is a protection to my person, or with burning an Instrument of Manumission, which is an evidence of my En-franchisement, if upon such menace or duresse, I make a bond, I shall ovoid it by Plea, 7. E. 4. 21. So if a Trespassor drive away my Beasts over another's ground, and I pursue them to rescue them, I am a Trespassor to him upon whose ground I came, but if a man assail my person, and I fly over another's ground, I am no Trespassor, 13. H. 8.15. & 21. H. 7. 28. Bacon F. Max. s. 29 & 30. vide ibidem plura. An injury is twofold, either in factis, or in verbis, in factis, as when a man is assaulted, or beaten, in verbis, when a man is slandered, and by terms defamed; the grounds of the first injury we have already surveyed, which consisted in assaults, and corporal injuries, now are those of the second sort to be set forth, which are grounded on slanders, and diffamations, from whence arise these grounds. Lubricam linguae non facile in paenam est trabendum R.I.C. The lightness and rashness of the tongue is not easily to be drawn into punishment. There are defamatory words, which proceed from the weakness, or lightness of the brain, or any rashness in the tongue, which because they are not thought to be spoken maliciously, pass for the most part unpunished, for in all such cases words of colour, and in heat, as to call one cozener, and crafty knave, common extortioner, and drunkard, witch, rogue, Pillory knave, villain, and unless he say villain to such a man, or regardant to such a manor, will bear no action, for these are not maliciously spoken, Finch. Nomot. f. 186. b. And by reciprocal reason, the malice of those which bring actions of slanders debilitateth their cases, and therefore Coke l. 4. f. 15. b. It was the resolutions of the Judges, that actions of slanders shall not be maintained by any strained constructions, or any favour shown for the supportation of them, because they abound more in these days, than heretofore, and the malice of men increaseth, & malitijs hominum est obviandum. But of such light, hasty, and rash speeches, the civil Law also taketh no cognisance, no though a man in this case speaketh ill of the Prince himself, and the civil Law is so far from taking hold of such words, that the Emperor himself hath said of them thus. Siquis imperatori malediceret, si id ex levitate processerit contemnendum est, si ex in sania, miseratione dignissimum, If any should speak evil of the Emperor, if it proceeded from lightness, it is to be contemned, if from madness it is most worthy of commiseration. But in case that such works be of hatred, and malice, as if one reproacheth another with any thing in his state and condition, wherewith he is not justly to be charged, then is it altogether punishable, for that thereby charity between man and man is violated, and the peace of the Commonwealth is many times broken and disturbed, and as Coke saith l. 4. f. 15. b. ad verbis ad verbera perventum est, and in this sense the rule of the Cannon Law may be taken to be true. Omnis qui detrahit fratri suo homicida est, every one who detracteth from his brother is a , to wit, in foe ropoli, for whosoever hateth his Brother is a murderer, 1. Joh. 3.15. And therefore at the common Law, if a man maliciously utter any false slander, to the endangering of one in Law, as to say that he hath reported that money is fallen, for he shall be punished for such a report if it be false, 9 E 1. Vttings case. Or if he touch him with some heinous crime, as that he went about to get poison to kill the child that such a woman goeth with, and yet it is no Felony. Or lie in wait to rob him, or procured another, or agreed with another to murder him, though he were not murdered in deed, or sought his life for his Land, 17. Eliz. Hacks case. Or for impairing his trade of life, as to call a Merchant a bankrupt (for it is his living, but so it is not of a Gentleman) or an Attorney an Ambidexter, or to say he dealeth corruptly, Finch. Nomot. f. 186. Or to call the Plaintiff thief, 27. H. 8.22. Or for calling a man a false or perjured man, 28. H. 8. B. or for calling the Plaintiff a false Justice of Peace, 4. E. 6. 112. An action of the case will lie, for those are words of eminent slanders, and of great import, and such as concern the estate, condition, and life of man, and therefore Coke l. 44.15. In our Books actions for slanders are most rare, and those that are brought are for words of eminent and great import. Albeit, diffamations and scandals properly consist in words, yet may they also be done by writings, as by defamatory Libels, which by Bracton are called Carmina famosa, and by Senica, Contumeliosi Libelli, infamous Rhimes, and contumelious Libels, which flow from malice and pride, and tend to contempt and dissension, and therefore Plato banished such out of his Commonwealth, and the Romans punished them with death. L. 1. de Civ. Dei. c. 12. St. Augustine, Romani probris, & injurijs poetarum subjectam vitam famanque habere noluerunt, capite etiam puniri sancientes tale carmen condere siquis auderet, the Romans would not have their lives and fame Subject to the scoffs and injuries of Poets, ordaining that whosoever should dare to compose any such verse, to be punished with death; which also was one of the Laws of the twelve Tables, ibidem c. 9 And they appointed the Aediles, and Triumvirs capitales, to foresee that no prejudice should grow to the Commonwealth by Libels, to sow the seeds of sedition, and novelty; whose prudent example, the wise King Henry the seventh was induced to pursue, Bacon. Hen. 7. f. 138. who as Sir Francis Bacon historizeth it, hanged and executed five mean persons for spreading of swarms & volleys of Libels against his Highness, and contriving and dispersing thereof, which as he saith are the females of sedition, and which also in conscience is a heinous crime, and little inferior to high treason, and therefore particularly prohibited by the Law of God, Exodus 22.28. Thou shalt not revile the Prince, and according to the original, Gods, nor curse the ruler of thy people; and Ecclesiastes 10.20. Curse not the King, no not in thy thought, wherein Magistrates are included, because it concerneth the scandal of government, and by the civil Law in general, this defamatory crime is made capital; as if any man do devise any slanderous Libel against one, and it happeneth that another find it, and he doth not cancel it, and tear it in pieces, but doth publish it to others, he is punished with capital punishment, and so is the author likewise punished, Fulb. l. 2. f. 27. Which description of a Libel accordeth with ours at the common Law, as in Lamb's case it was resolved, Coke l. 4. f. 59 b. That every man who shall be convicted for the publication of a Libel, either he ought to be contriver of the Libel, or the procurer of the contriving of it, or a malicious publisher of it, knowing it to be a Libel, and saith, it is a great evidence that he doth publish, when as he knowing it to be a Libel doth write a copy of it, unless that afterwards he can prove that he delivered it to a Magistrate to examine it, for then the act subsequent explaineth the condition precedent, and though our Law be a charitable dealing mother, and in all cases favoreth the life of man, (even above the other two, which are most favoured in the Law, There are three things most favoured in the Law, life, liberty, and Dower. Coke Com. ) so as it doth not punish this offence with capital punishment, yet doth it detest, condemn, and punish it as a step dam to rancour and violent speeches, the abortive children of malice, and as a more odious, and perilous crime, than other open scandals. For as Coke l. 5. f. 125. b. The nature of Libelling is secret, and robbeth a man of his good name, which ought to be more precious unto him than his life, and it is a very difficult matter to find out the Author, and therefore when the offendor is known, he ought to be severely punished; as one who poisoneth another secretly is a greater offendor, than he that killeth a man openly, because the offendor cannot be so easy prevented, or inverted: & it mattereth not whether it be true, or if the party against whom it is made be of good fame, or evil fame, for in a settled state of government, the party grieved aught to complain for every injury done to him in the ordinary course of Law, and not by any means to revenge himself, either by the unlawful course of Libels, or otherwise; and it is not material whether the Libel be in writing, or without writing, or whether in rhyme, or prose, or whether by Picture, as to paint the party in any shameful or ignominious manner, or by signs, as to fix a Gallows, or any other reproachful or dishonourable signs at the house of the party or elsewhere, and therefore for the reasons abovesaid, and that though the Libel be made against one, yet doth it incite those, who are of the same family, or society to revenge, and so tendeth to the breach of peace, and may be the cause of effusion of blood: It was resolved that a Libeler shall be punished by indictment at the common Law, or by bill if it be denied, or ore tenus, by confession in the Star-Chamber, and according to the quality of his offence, he may either be punished by fine or imprisonment, and in an exorbitant case, by Pillory and loss of his ears, vide ibidem plura. Veritas nihil veretur nisi abscondi, Coke l. 9 f. 20. b. Truth feareth nothing but to be hid and concealed. Truth considered principally, appertaineth to the Metaphysics, materially to natural Phylophy, instrumentally to Logic, but practically to the Ethics or moral Philosophy, and is nothing else, but an affection of our speech, and actions agreeing with the mind, and is properly called veracitas, that is a speaking of truth, and of this truth is the ground to be understood, that it is afraid of nothing then to be obscured, for covin is so mixed with truth, or truth with covin, that it often deceiveth a prudent observer. But though truth be so mixed with covin that evil herb, as Ploydon phraseth it, such a conjunction and mixture will prove unsavoury, and the goodness is turned to mischeivousnesse and the law will never permit covin, and falsity to suppress verity and fidelity, but in all cases laboureth to discover and censure them. As if there be Lord and Tenant by fealty and rent, and the tenant maketh a Lease for years, and the Lessor hath made fealty and paid the rent continually, and yet the Lord distraineth the Cattle of the Lessee for the rent, where in truth nothing is behind, and avoweth upon a mere stranger, who never had any thing, as if he were his very tenant, for the arrearages of rent, this false avowry of the Lord upon a stranger, that is not his tenant shall not hurt the Lessee against the truth of the case, but upon special matter disclosed, he shall have aid of his Lessor, who is the true tenant, and therefore if the Lessee in such case allege that his Lessor was and still is seized of the tenancy in his demesne as in fee, and so holdeth it of the Lord by the services, etc. of which services the Lord hath been, and yet is seized by the hands of the Lessor, and that the tenant hath leased the Land to him, and that the Lord hath charged the Plaintiff unjustly to avow upon one who hath nothing in the tenancy, and therefore he prayeth in aid of the Lessor, in this case upon the special matter, he shall have aid, for that without his Lessor he cannot plead this matter in abatement of the avowry, neither shall the Lord be compelled to avow upon the Lessor, and the false avowry of the Lord upon a stranger that is not his tenant shall not hurt the tenant, contrary to the truth of the case, for truth feareth nothing but to be concealed, and the Law will never permit falsity to suppress a truth, Coke ibidem vide plura. The Statute of W. 2. c. 3. giveth a Cui invita upon recovery by default, before which such recovery was a wrong to the feme, and an hard thing, as the Statute saith, and therefore a Cui ante devortium is given by the equity of that Statute, for it goeth in oppression of falsity, and advancement of verity, so the Statute of Marlebridge, cap. 6. maketh an ordinance against those who use to enfeoff their first borne and heirs within age, and yet if his first Son dyeth, and he enfeoffed his second Son, who is his heir, it is within the equity of the Statute, or if he levy a fine to him, which is matter of record, it shall be within the equity of the Statute, and yet the Statute speaketh of a Feoffment, and the cause is, for that covin is always abhorred in our Law, and states made in suppression of it are for the public good, and therefore shall be extended by equity: And therefore the Statute of 1. H. 7. c. 1. Which giveth a Writ of Formedon in the remainder against the pernors of the profits, was made for oppression of covin, for the Feoffment made to persons unknown to defraud them, who had right to the Land was a great covin, and deceit in Law; and therefore a Scire facias to execute a remainder, shall be maintainable against pernors of the profits, Ployd. f. 59 b. in Wimbishes' case. So in Twins case, l. 3. f. 82. It was resolved by the whole Court, that Statutes made against fraud shall be liberally, and favorally expounded to suppress fraud, because fraud and deceit abound more in these days, then in former times, where you may find in Pennyfeet case, and divers other cases to that effect and purpose. Quod alias bonum & justum est si per vim vel fraudèm petatur malum, & injustum est, Coke l. 3. s. 78. a. what otherwise is good and just, if it be acquired by force or fraud is evil and unjust, and as Ploydon saith, Covin may alter the martyr, though the title be good, and covin to have recovery may be as well where the title is good, as where it is faint and bad: And therefore the Book is, M. 15. E. 4.4. If a feme have cause of dower, and is of Covin that the tenant shall be ousted by A. against whom she recovereth, and hath execution, that her estate shall be adjudged against the Disseissee by disseisin, and shall not hold it, but shall be a Disseiseresse, and yet the title of recovery is good and true, but the Covin is the cause of it, Ployd. f. 59 & Coke l. 3. f. 78. a. So if issue in tail who hath good cause to have a Formedon in the Descender upon discontinuance, be of Covin, that A. shall disseise B. against whom he doth recover, he shall not be remitted, although his title is good, but shall be adjudged a Disseisor by reason of the Covin, M. 10. H. 8. And in 19 H. 8. Where one disseised tenant in tail by Covin, to the intent to enfeoff the issue in tail within age, who had no cognisance of the Covin, and he enfeoff him, he shall not be remitted by the better opinion, notwithstanding his good title, and the covenous intent is the cause only. Ployd. f. 51. & 54. And so is it there holden by six Justices, Coke l. 3. f. 78. in Fermors case. And the reason there given is, because he that is in by him that made the Covin, shall be in the same plight, as he that made the Covin, and yet infants are much favoured in Law. It was found by office, that one F. that had good cause of action of ad terminum qui praeterij●, against an infant in by descent, caused one H. to disseise the Heir by Covin, against whom he recovered by his Writ of Entry, ad terminum qui praeterjit, whereupon this Office found, the King of whom the land was holden, had restitution to the Land during the nonage of the heirs, notwithstanding the plea, and averment of F. in maintenance of his title; so as though the title was good, yet if covin was practised by him who had title to come to it, he shall not be remitted, Ployd f. 48. b. 41 Ass. 28. For the common Law so abhorreth fraud and covin, as all acts as well judicial as others, and those who of themselves are just and lawful, yet being mixed with fraud and deceit, are in judgement of Law injurious and unlawful, Coke l. 3. f. 78. a. And so Coke l. 4. f. 113. a. in Adam's case, A man deviseth Tenements to superstitious uses, and to good and charitable uses, as to teach a Grammar School; yet because the good and charitable uses were mixed with superstitious uses, and nothing in certain was limited to a good use, in such case the commixture of the evil use with the good use, infecteth the good use, as a little poison commixed with a great quantity of Wine, or as truth mixed with covin, turned the goodness of the one into the naughtiness of the other. And 19 H. 8. 12. If a man make a disseisin, with the intent to make a Feoffment with warranty, although he make the Feoffment twenty months after, yet it is a warranty commenceth by disseisin, Ployd. f. 51. So if one make a gift in tail to another, and the Uncle of the Donor disseise the Donce, and maketh a Feoffment with warranty, and the Uncle dyeth, and the warranty descendeth upon the Donor, and then the Donee dyeth without issue, the Donor bringeth a Writ of Formedon in reverter, and the Tenant pleadeth the Feoffment with the warranty, the Demandant shall avoid it, because it commenced by disseisin, and yet the disseisin was not immediately made to the Donor, but to the Donee, but by it his reversion was devested, and yet warranties are much favoured in Law. It is a rule in the Civil law, Neminem ex suo dolo, & calliditate relevari, that no man is relieved by his fraud and deceit: And it is an erudition in the common Law, Fraus & dolus nemini patrocinari, debent, Fraud and deceit ought not to be patronised in any, Coke l. 3. f. 78. b. There is dolus bonus, and dolos malus, say the Civivilians: dolos bonus is when a man doth devise any plot to entrap a thief or offendor, and this cannot properly be called fraud, but solertia and cunning, and such a kind of cunning is practised in war-fare by which more victories are atcheived, then by main force, as Tacitus, plura consilio, L. 1. An. quam vi geruntur. But dolus malus, is a subtle devise used to the deceiving another, or the Law, and this deceit doth not in out Law escape punishment, but affordeth a double remedy against such who endamage others by deceit, either a Writ of deceit, or action upon the case. As if I. present one to a Church being Patron, and one T. disturbeth me, and another in my name purchaseth a Quare impedit, without my knowledge against the said T. and after causeth the Writ to be abated, or I non-suite in the action, I may have a Writ of deceit against him, 55. E. 3. Quare impedit, 37.20. H. 6.20. And an action of the case is maintainable against him, who sueth an original in the name of the Plaintiff against his will, 7. H. 6.45. So if any one forge a Statute Merchant in my name, and sue a Capias thereupon, whereby I am arrested and had in execution, a writ of deceit lieth against him, 19 H. 6.44. So if the guardian of an infant vouch one by covin, who is not sufficient, or pleadeth a bad plea whereas he might have pleaded a better, the infant shall have a writ of deceit against him, and recover the full value in damages, 9 E. 4.34. A writ of deceit was brought against an Attorney for acknowledging satisfaction, whereas his Master was not in truth satisfied, 11. H. 6.34. In a Praecipe quod reddat, if the Sheriff return the tenant of the Land to be summoned, whereas he was not summoned, and the tenant looseth by default upon the grand Cape returned, the tenant may have a writ of deceit against the recoverer, and against the Sheriff for his false return, F. N. B. 97. C. and may defeat the judgement, and no damages shall be recovered against the Sheriff in such case, only he shall be fined, 5. E. 4. 4●. And if he die, his heir may have an action of deceit, and restitution of the Land, 8. H. 6.5. If a man bargain with another, and assume, upon consideration to enfeoff him of ceraine Land, and he enfeoffeth another, he to whom the assumpsit was made may have an action of deceit, or an action upon the case at his pleasure, 3. H. 7.14. If one selleth to another a horse, which he knoweth to have a secret disease in his body, or selleth Corn, which is full of gravel, an action of deceit lieth, 20. H. 6.36. without warranty, but F.N.B. 94. C. is of the contrary opinion. If the Sheriff arrest the body by a Capias ad respondendum, and returneth not the Writ, the party shall have an action of false imprisonment, Kell. way, f. 3. b. The Law ordaineth, that he who will be sure of his goods, shall buy them in Market overt, and that sale shall bind all strangers as well as vendors, and yet it is agreed in 33. H. 6. That sale in open Market, shall not bind him who hath right to the goods, if the sale be by fraud, or the Vendee hath notice that the property of the goods appertaineth to another. So the Law hath ordained the Court of the common Pleas as Market-overt, for the assurances of Lands by fine, so as he that will be assured of Land, not only against the Vendor, but against all strangers, it is good for him to pass it in this Market-overt by fine, yet Covin and deceit shall avoid it, overt by fine, yet Covin and deceit shall avoid it, 〈…〉 a Feoffment by Covin, which amounteth to a wrong and disseisin, Fine levied by him who is particeps criminis, and who had not, nor pretended to have, any right to the land, shall not be a bar to the Lessor, Coke l. 3. f. 78. Fermors Case. A resignation made by an Abbot by covin shall not abate the Writ, 4 E. 2. 22. A covenous Conveyance that assets shall not descend, is not of force, 34 E. 3. 19 19 E. 2. 3. And 17 E. 3.59. That an estate made to the King, and Letters patents granted over, and all it by covin, between him that granted to the King, and the Patentee, to make an evasion out of the Statute of Mortmain, shall not bind but shall be repealed. A presentation obtained by fraud and deceit, is void, Dyer 339. b. Letters of administration obtained by fraud and covin, are void, and shall not repeal the former administration, Dyer 339. a. & vide Dyer 295. many Cases there put concerning covin. If I sell to one cloth, and warrant it to be of such a length, and it is not of such a length, the buyer may have an action of the case against me by virtue of the warranty, although the warranty be by word and not written: but if the warranty be made at some other time after the bargain, he may not have a Writ of deceit, unless it be made by writing, F. N. B. 98. k. If a man sell to one Seeds, and warranteth them to be of another Country, if they be not, a Writ of deceit lieth; but if he warrant that the Horse which he selleth should go fifty miles in a day, or that the Seeds shall grow, it is otherwise. And a Writ of deceit lieth for selling of corrupt Victual without warranty, but not for selling of rotten Sheep though it be with warranty; but to warrant a thing which is evident to sense, as to be black, which is blue, is void, unless the buyer be blind, or the thing which is bought be absent, 11 E. 4 7. 3 H. 4. 1. If I sell one certain Pipes of Wine, and warrant them to be good, and they be corrupt, the Vendee may have an action of the case against the Vendor, F.N.B. 99 b. Yet according to the opinion of some, an action will lie without warranty, 7 H. 4. 14. But Master Fitzherbert saith, that there ought to be a warranty, and his taste ought to be his judge in such case; and where it is with warranty, the Writ must say, that the Defendant at the time of the warranty made, knew that the Wine which he sold was corrupt. A Writ of deceit was brought for selling a certain quantity of Wool, and warranting it to be fifty sacks, whereas it wanted of that measure; the Defendant pleaded in bar, that it was weighed before the sale, and the servants of the Plaintiff, being his Factors, did accept of it, and carried it beyond the Sea, whereupon the Plaintiff demurred, 13 H. 4. 1. Semper qui dolo fecit, quominus haberet, pro eo habendus est, ac si habet, Reg. J. C. Always whosoever shall give or grant any thing by fraud, whereby he may seem not to have it, he is to be esteemed as if he hath it: And therefore if a man by fraud make a Deed of gift of all his goods to one of his Creditors to deceive the rest, the gift by the Statute of 13 Eliz. is void, Twins case, l. 3. f. 81 quod vide, where you shall find the signs and marks of fraud accurately and fully discovered. And Coke l. 5. f. 60. a. b. debt against the heir upon an obligation, the Defendant pleaded Riens per descent, the Plaintiff replied, that he had Assets in D. etc. and the Plaintiff giveth in evidence, that the father died seized of lands in fee; the Defendant said, that he aliened before the Writ, the Plaintif averred by covin, and proved that it was done by fraud to defraud the Plaintiff; and therefore it was resolved to be void by the Statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5. and that the fraud might be well given in evidence, because the Statute saith, that the estate, as to the Creditors shall be void, and therefore shall be taken by favourable interpretation for to suppress fraud; and that it shall be mischievous to the Creditors, and increase maintenance and covin, if the Plaintif should be driven to plead, that the Feoffment was by fraud, because it is commonly hatched in arbore cava, and so artificially covered and concealed, that the party grieved hath no means to find and know it; and therefore judgement was given for the Plaintiff, vi●●e ibidem. And Burrels case, l. 6. f. 730. a. and l. 8. f 133. in Turner's case. So Hobart, f. 72. Humbertons Case: Humberton recovered a debt against T H. and died; and upon a Scire facias against the Ter tenants the Sheriff returned J. H. Tenant of an house that was his at the time of the judgement, and J. H. came in and pleaded, that T. H. enfeoffed him long before the judgement, in fee, absque hoc, that he was seized at the time of the judgement, or any time after: whereupon issue was taken, and the Jury found the Feoffment, and further said, That it was made by covin to defraud the Plaintiff, and other Creditors, and it was judged for the plaintiff, vide ibidem plura, and fol. 166. Fraus praesumitur si insolitae clausulae apponantur, Reg. J. C. and Coke l. 3. f. 81. Clausulae insuetae semper inducunt suspicionem. As there in Twins case, A Deed of gift was in part adjudged fraudulent, because an unusual clause was inserted in it, and for that the Deed contained, that the gift was made honestly, truly, and bona fide, vide ibidem plura. Dona clandestina sunt semper suspiciosa, Coke l. 3. f. 81. Gifts in secret are always subject to the suspicion of fraud, which there in Twins Case was one of the reasons alleged to prove a Deed of gift fraudulent, to wit, that it was made in secret: And so in Burrels case, l. 6. f. 72. the assignment of a Lease was taken to be fraudulent, because it was delivered in a secret manner to a person of mean quality: And for the same reason by livery and seisin in one County, the Lands in another County will not pass, Noys Max f. 3. Jus, & fraus nunquam cohabitant simul, Coke l. 10 f. 49. a. Right and fraud never cohabit or dwell together: As a Recovery cannot be said to be by collusion, where tenant in tail is in the Recovery, whether he be tenant in Deed or tenant in Law, as a Vouchee: For the Law hath made all the reversions and remainders, as incidents to his estate, subject to his pleasure, and he hath right and power to bar them all, ibidem. And Coke l. 8 f 132 b. Covin cannot be alleged in doing of a lawful act: As in a Writ of Dower against a disseisor, if the Tenant plead in abatement of the Writ, entry by the disseisee, the demandant shall not be received to aver the entry to be by covin to abate the writ, because the entry is congeable and lawful, and mixed with no wrong; as it is holden in 15. E. 4. f. 4. and if a disseisor, or an abator endow a feme who hath title of dower, it is good, because it is a lawful act, Coke l. 5. f. 30. b. Fraus meretur fraudem, Ployd. f. 100 and the Poet, Fraus est concessa repellere fraud●m. Fraud and subtlety deserveth fraud and subtlety, and it is a lawful deceit to repel a deceit. As in 19 E. 4. f. 27. In appeal of many, who pleaded not guilty, a Venire facias was awarded against them all; and the Court perceiving that the prisoners were in opinion to sever in the challenge of the whole panel, of subtlety to stay the trial at that time, and that every prisoner would challenge as many as they might without danger; to wit, twenty, and that every of them shall have his entire number of twenty, so that one shall not be excluded of his number by the challenge of the other, and that there was but a small number of men of sufficiency then in the City to be sworn, so as by that subtlety the trial should be stayed for the present. The Court agreed that the first panel and the Tales should be divided, and made several for every one of the prisoners: And accordingly said to the prisoners, We perceive your subtlety well enough, which deserveth little favour of the Court, and therefore tell us whether you will agree in your challenges, for if you will not, the Clerk shall sever the panel, and then they all agreed in their challenges, and after the inquest was full, evidence was given, and there found, and one subtlety prevented and repelled by another. And this fraud by the Canonists is called Benus dolus, of which they have this rule, Frangenti fidem, fides frangetur eidem. To him who breaks his faith, no faith is to be shown. And instance in the example of Solomon, who did use such cunning between the two Harlots, in searching out who was the true and natural Mother of the child, Fulb. 2. l. f. 23. Vendens eandem rem duobus falsarius est, Reg. I.C. Coke l. 1. f. 45. a. A man selling the same thing to two is a false dealer, and therefore in the grant of the King, it is dishonourable for him to grant the same possession to one, that he or his Progenitors had granted to another, for he that selleth the same thing to two persons is a deceiver. Fraudis interpretatio non semper ex ment duntaxat, sed ex consilio quoque desideratur, Reg. I. C. Dolus circuitu non tollitur, Coke l. 11. f. 74. a. nec purgatur, Bacon Max. f. 3. The interpretation of fraud is not always to be gathered out of the mind, but also from the council, and consent, and crafty dealing; and deceit is not taken away nor purged by the circuity of shifting it from one to another, and though covenous acts be conveyed through many hands, and mediations, yet the Law taketh hold of the corrupt beginning, and proceeding. As if I make a Feoffment of Lands held in Knight's service to I. S. upon condition, that within a certain time he shall enfeoff I.D. which Feoffment of I. D. shall be to the use of the wife of the first feoffor for her jointure, etc. this Feoffment is within the Statute of 32. H. 8. Bacon ibidem. So if one who hath an intention to sell his Land, by fraud conveyeth it by deed enroled, to the Queen, with an intent to deceive the purchasor, and after selleth that Land to another for a valuable consideration, and maketh a conveyance accordingly, in this case the purchasor shall enjoy the Land against the Queen, by the Statute of 27. Eliz. c. 4. For though the Queen be not excepted, yet the act being general, and made for the suppression of fraud, sh●ll bind the Queen, and whosoever maketh the Queen, who is the Fountain of Justice to be an Instrument of covin and fraud, and upon it obtaineth Letters Patents, such Letters Patents are void, or if the Queen be endeavoured to take away another man's right, and to that end a man obtaineth Letters Patents, they shall be repealed, though such covin and fraud be not contained in the grant made to the Queen, but appeareth only by averrement dehors, for fraud and deceit is not taken away or diminished by the subtlety of alienations, Coke ibidem, in magdalen's College case. Non facies malum, ut inde fiat bonum, it is the Law of God, thou shall not do evil that good may come thereof, Coke l. 5. f. 30. b. & lib. 11. f 7. 4 a. What hath been said of truth and falsity, may be said of good and evil, and are so semblable, that an apparent good is often mistaken for that which is real. Jun. s. 14. Fallit enim vitium specie virtatis & umbra. Vice fairly enbellished with virtues shape And shadow doth often men delude. H. 7. f. 2. As Richard the third did many, whose virtues as Sir Francis Bacon histerizeth it, were feigned, and affected things to seek his ambition, and not true qualities engendered in his judgement and nature; But though as Matchevill saith, such virtuous shows and shadows are sufficient to please and delude the people, yet the Law Divine, and the Law Humane, which dimaneth from the Divine, is able, and doth distinguish between good and evil; and as the great Legist of Rome, imperat honesta, & prohibet contraria, commandeth that which is good and honest, and inhibiteth that which is evil and impious; and so do the Justices and Judges of the Law, for as Bodin saith, Eodin M. hist. f. 50. Qui in litibus versantur Judiciorum communione omnia mala norunt, nec mala duntaxat siditiam bona sinc quibus illa constare, & percipi nullo modo possunt, bonorum autem, & malornm finibus omnis humana prudentia continetur, Those who are versed in suits of Law, by the participation of Judgements know all evil things, and not only evil but also good things, without which they can no way consist, or be perceived, but in the limits and bounds of good and evil, all humane prudence doth consist; and therefore by the Law, as the same Legist saith, are proposed and appointed, praemia virtutibus, & supplicia vitiis, rewards to virtues, and punishments to vices, and is so severe in the censure of vice and evil, that it will not permit any one to do evil, that good may come thereof. As the Law will not permit a Creditor who is not Executor, to take and retain the goods of the Testator, to pay and satisfy himself, though the payment of his debt be a good and honest thing, for by that means if the goods of the Testator be not sufficient to satisfy all the Creditors, the rest shall be barred, and if the Law should give him that power, it should be the cause and occasion of wrong; and the Law of God saith, you shall not do evil that good may come thereof, Coke l. 5. f. 30, b. And therefore doth our Law term such an one, an Executor of his own wrong, and so in 17. E. 3. 59 The Friars Carmelites who had then no habitation, obtained of one I. M. who was seized of ten Acres of Land of the Bishop of Winchester, to have those acres of Land for their habitation, and because the said I. M. could not grant to them those ten acres, by reason of the Statute of Mortmain; the said I. M. and the Carmelites by covin between them, to make an evasion out of the Statute of Mortmain, granted the said ten Acres to the King, his Heirs, and Successoers, by which the Signiory of the Bishop should be extinct, to the intent that the King shall grant it over to the Friars Carmlites, which was done accordingly, and for that it was by covin contrived before to take the Bishop from his Signiory, which was an evil act, it was adjudged that the Charter shall be repealed, and the Friars Carmelites should be constrained to render their Charter to be canceled, for though the Friars Carmelites were of the profession of religion, and had no habitation before, so as it seemed a work of piety and charity to provide an habitation for them, yet you shall not do evil that good may come thereof, Coke l. 11. f. 74. a. Contra jus na urale est malum pro bono reddere, Ployd. f. 405. b. It is against the Law of nature to render evil for good. As it was a Law in a City, that strangers, who did go or climb up to the Walls of the City, should be punished with death, but it happened that strangers innocently passing by the City heard a noise that the Enemy would suddenly assault and sack the City, whereupon the strangers more reddily than the Citizens got upon the Walls, and defending the City, now the debate whether they should die as the Law commanded, and it was answered not, because it is against the Law of nature to render evil for good, vide ibidem plura Beneficium nul●i obtrudi●ur, Pap. f. 212. The Law doth not obtrude, or do good turns to one whether he will or no, and therefore an alien borne shall not have medietatem linguae unless he request it, So Damages, ex incremento, are always to be assessed, ex petitio ne quaerentis, and so are costs ex incremento, and upon a Writ of Error, because in the beginning of the judgement, it was said, ideo ad petitionem quaerentis consideratum est, and not ideo consideratum est ad petitionem quaerentis, and the words were displaced, the Judgement was reversed, for the words misplaced will not supply this defect, for if the usual form should not be observed, all would fall into a confusion, and in as much as the words are misplaced, it is as if they had not been put in at all, and therefore void; like unto the case put in Walsinghams' case, in Ploydon, where an averrment misplaced is as if it were none, vide ibidem plura, in Goods case. Malum quo communius eo pejus, an evil thing the more common it is the worse it is, Coke l. 4. 109. b. For as the more common a good thing is, the better it is, so the more common an evil thing is, the worse it is, for contrariorum contra●ia est ratio, for as the true service of God which is in public Churches, is better than that which is in private Churches, for the general good that by it may accrue, so all superstitious uses which are in public Churches, are worse than those which are in secret Chambers, for the general prejudice which may accrue by them, v●de ibidem plura. Theft in the beginning in most Nations was not punished with death, but with satisfaction or some lessor punishment, the Praetors of Rome did punish a thief, paena quad●upli, with a four fold satisfaction, and the Jews with seven fold, or if his goods would not amount to so much with all the goods in his house, Pro 6. 31. The Misians did punish petit Larceners with whips, but if a thing of good value be taken away they must render the nine fold, or else be put to death, Fulb. Pard. f. 80. But when the malice of men did increase, an iniquity did abound, that as the Poet, in facinus jurasse putes, and that many turned the crime of stealing into a trade of living, and did not gain their livelihood with their hands by working, but with their fists by fight and stealing, as the Comedian facitely, ventri pugnae dant ventri suo, the detriment to the republic, and community of the offence made it capital, so as though the offence and the punishment being compared, that Law may seem unjust, yet as Metsner faith, Cum nullam aliud supersurit remedium, quo malitia hominum compesci, & tranquilitas conservari potuerit absolute injusta non est ideoque fures merito illi subjiciuntur, when no other remedy remained, by which the malice of men might be allayed, and tranquillity conserved, it is not absolutely unjust, and therefore deservedly are the eves subject unto it, for which reason most Nations of the universe, justly inflicted capital punishment on such notorious Delinquents, as by the Law of the twelve Tables, if any man did cause his beasts to feed upon, or himself did cut, and carry away Corn growing upon the ground, if he were of full age, he was ordained to be hanged, and to be sacrificed to Ceres; if not, he was whipped, and yielded either the damage, and if he were obstinate the double: So by our common Law the stealing of a Do which is tame and domestical, is Felony, but as Mr. Stanford, it seemeth that he that stealeth it, should have certain knowledge it is tame, but if the Do be killed, and then stolen, this certainly is Felony, Stanford, l. 1. c. 25. And likewise if a man cut Trees, and at the same time carry them away, this is a Trespass, and is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but if they lie upon the ground a long time, as the goods of the owner of the soil, this is Felony and is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 22. E. 3. Cor. 156. 10. E. 4. 15. and Stanf. 25. And for the like reason, as this offence is more nocumentall to the common good of some Countries, or some Cities, it is more severely and suddenly there punished, as among the Phrygians, he was put to death that stole any instrument of husbandry, or did kill an Ox was fit for the Plough, because the living of those Countries did much consist of husbandry, so in Hallifax, he that stealeth but a yard of cloth is presently put to death, because the whole livelihood of most of them consisteth in cloth. Malitia mutat legem, Dyer f. 104. b. malice altereth the Law, as an infant in case of murder shall be tried for his life where malice appeareth, and not otherwise, because as Dyer there saith, malitia supplet aetatem, 3. H. 7. And malice in homicide altereth the Law in those are of full age, as man's slaughter is a fact less heinous, because it is done on a sudden without malice precedent, as if two of a sudden fight together without precogitated malice, and after many blows given, the one flieth from the other, and the other goeth in the next house for a weapon, and incontinently pursueth and killeth him that flieth, this is but man slaughter by the common Law, because it was done in a continual fury, and shall have his Clergy, but shall forfeit his goods, Cromp. I. p. 23. So if two without any malice precedent, did fight together and one cometh to part them, and is killed by one of them, it is man slaughter in him that killed him, ibidem, but if they had fought together, ex malitia praecogitata, having a purpose to kill, it is Felony in them both, 25 Ass. 180. But where a man killeth another upon malice, forethought, whether he killeth him openly or secretly, or whether he that is slain be an English man, or of another Nation, if he live in this Realm under the Queen's protection, Stanf. f. 18 he cannot have the benefit of Clergy. So it is if one kill another upon malice employed, which is when one killeth another without any defence on the part of the other, as a Gaoler had malice to a prisoner in his custody, because he suspected he was too familiar with his wife, and the prisoner purposing to go out of prison, as he was wont, for his disport, the Gaoler suddenly struck the prisoner on the head, so that he fell to the ground, whereupon he died, and it was adjudged murder, Cromp. I. P. f. 20. So if a thief rob another man and kill him, this is murder, though he never saw him before, neither had any inveterate malice against him, yet he had malice before the murder to this intent, that he would rather kill him then be disappointed of his purpose, Ployd. come 474. If the Justice of peace with the Sheriff, come to suppress Riotors, and one of their attendance is slain by one of the Riotors, this is murder of him and all the Riotors, being present, Cromp. I. P. 21. And if one without quarrel killeth another standing by, this is implicit murder, ibidem, f. 22. A writ of conspiracy will not lie unless malice appeareth in the prosecution, and therefore the Writ saith, quod ipsum in prisona nostra detineri falso, & malitiose procuraverat, that he procured him to be falsely and maliciously detained in prison, F. N. B. f. 115. G. and 15. Car. B. R. A man indicted others at the Sessions in the old Bayly, who were acquitted, and the Defendants removed the indictment into the King's bench, and prayed a copy thereof, to the end they might bring a Writ of conspiracy, and it was denied by the Court, unless the Recorder will say, that there appeared malice in the prosecution, for a man shall not be punished for lawful prosecution upon a just surmise without malice. Semel malus semper praesumitur esse malus, Reg. I. C. who once is evil is always presumed so to be, which as the Civilians, is to be understood, in eodem genere mali, in the same kind of evil, as if a Soldier hath behaved himself ●ill in the Militia, he is no more to be trusted; and so perjured persons who have once forsworn themselves, and for it be convicted, cannot be admitted after to give Testimony in any cause, and this is so holden both in the Civil Law & the Common Law, no more also can another like infamous persons, as if one be attainted of a false verdict, or of a conspiracy at the suit of the King, or convicted of a Praemunire, or of forgery upon the Statute of 5. Eliz. c. 14. and not upon the Statute of 1. H. 5. c. 3. Or convict of Felony, or by Judgement lost his ears, or stood upon the Pillory or tumbril, or been stigmaized, or branded, or the like, whereby they become infamous, for some offences, for quae minoris sunt culpae majoris sunt infamiae, Coke come. f. 6. b. Malitiae vitium connexum est personae committentis malitiam, Reg. I. C. the vice of malice is connexed to the person of him who committeth the malice: As if I have a malicious intent to kill one man, and in the execution of my malice, I kill another, the malicious intent shall be connexed to my person, and I shall be adjudged a murderer, as if one of malice prepense, shooteth at another, intending to kill him, and his Arrow killeth another to whom he bore no malice, it shall be murder in him, for he intended in his act to murder, and that intention shall be connexed to his person, and it shall not be an excuse for him to say, that he had an intention to kill another person, Ployd. Com. f. 474. b. So if an empoisoned apple be laid in a place to poison I. S. and I. D. cometh by chance and eateth it, this is murder in him that laid it, because in the ministration of it, he had a malicious intent of death, which is still connexed to his person, because he was the original founder of his death. But if a man lay venom in divers parts of his house to kill Rats, and a person cometh and eateth it, and dyeth of it, it is not felony in him, because he was void of any malicious intent to hurt any reasonable creature, but otherwise it is if he had ministered it to kill a reasonable creature, and another reasonable creature had been slain by it, that he intended not, and he shall be punished for it, because he had an evil intent, vide ibidem plura, in Saunders case. And if a man persuade another to kill himself and he be present when he doth so, he is a murderer for his evil intent, Bac. Max. f. 60. If I discharge a Caliver with a murderous intent at I.S. and the piece breaketh, and striketh into my eye, and killeth me, I am felo de me, because I had a murderous intent, and yet had no intention to hurt myself, ibidem. Res profecto stulta est nequitiae modus, Coke l. 11. f. 86. b. In the case of Monopolies, it is a foolish thing verily to imagine any mean in iniquity. As the sole trade of any mechanical Artifice, or any other monopoly, is not only a damage, and prejudice to those who exercise the same trade, but also to all other Subjects, for the end of all those Monopolies is the private gain of the Patentees, and though provisions, and cautions be added to moderate them, yet it is mere folly to think that there is any measure in mischief, or wickedness, Ibidem. Excessus in requalibet jure reprobatur communi, Coke l. 11. f. 44. a. Excess in every thing is disallowed in the common Law, for all virtuous actions consisteth in the mean, and vicious, in the excess and extreme, and the Law advanceth that is good and virtuous, and suppresseth what is evil and vicious. Some Courts may fine and not imprison, as the Court of the Leet, and some can only amerce, as the County Court, Hundred Court, and Court Baron, and some Courts may fine, imprison, and amerce, as the case shall require, as the Courts of Record at Westminster, or else where, for no Court can fine and imprison, but a Court of Record, F. N. B. 37. b. Yet all Amercements and Fines which be in the excess, are contrary to Law, as Magna charta, c. 14. Excessive Amercements are against Law, Nullus liber homo Amercietur nisi secundum quantitatem delicti, no Freeman may be amerced but according to the quantity of his offence, if Fines of the Copyholder, of a Manor be uncertain, the Lord cannot exact expressive and unreasonable fines, and the Copyholder may deny to pay it, and the reasonableness of the fine shall be determined by the Justices, etc. Quam rationabilis debet esse finis non definitur, sed omnibus circumstantijs inspectis pendet ex justiciariorum discretione, how reasonable the fine shall be is not defined, but all the circumstances being inspected, it dependeth upon the discretion of the Justices. If tenant in dower hath villains, or tenant at will, which are rich, and they by excessive tallages, and fines make them poor, or exiles, it is adjudged to be contrary to Law, and to be waist, 13. H. 3. Title, Wast. 135. F. N. B. 178. b. because it is ad exhaereditationem to the dis-inheritance of him in the reversion. So excessive distresses are prohibited by the common Law, 41. E. 3. f. 26. For the act, de articulis super Chartas non capietur gravis districtio, extendeth to the King only: So excessive and outrageous aid is against Law, as appeareth by the Statute of W. 1. cap. 35. Plus peccat author quam actor, Coke l. 5. f. 99 the Author offendeth more than the actor. The Statute of 5. Eliz. c. 9 hath two branches, the first is against procurors of perjury, and that is in matter depending in suit, by Bill, Writ, Action, or Information, so as the procurement of perjury upon indictment is out of that branch, the second branch is a purview against those who commit perjury by his or their depositions in any Court mentioned or being examined, in perpetuam rei memoriam, & though that clause be general, and not restrained by any words to such particular suits by Bill, Writ, Action, or Information, as the first was, yet in good construction that branch shall have reference to the first, and shall be expounded by it, otherwise the party who suborneth perjury, and procureth him who committeth the perjury, shall pass without punishment, which shall be contrary to reason, and the intention of the makers of the Act, and some say, that the author offendeth more than the actor, and therefore was Flower who was indicted upon the Statute of 5. Eliz. for perjury, in giving false evidence to the grand inquest upon an indictment of Riot, by the Judgement of the Court was discharged of that indictment, ibidem. Peccatum peccato addit, qui culpae, quam fecit, patrocinia defensionis adjungit, Coke l. 5. f. 49. b. He addeth offence to offence, who adjoineth a Patronage of defence to a fault he hath committed; As he who doth wrong, and at the first confesseth the fault, and obeyeth the commandment of the King by his Writ, shall not be amerced, and therefore pendenter facit, praecepto legis obtemperat, he doth wisely who obeyeth the precept of the Law, but every one who doth wrong, and being commanded by the Writ of the King, quoth just, & sine dilatione reddat, etc. that he justly and without delay restore, etc. and he unjustly maintaineth the wrong of Record in the Court of the King, and with great delay constraineth the demandant by the course of Law, addeth offence to offence in his unjust Patronage of the defence of it, and therefore shall be amerced. Excusat aut extenuat delictum in capitalibus, quod non operatur idem in civilibus, Bac. Max. f. 314. In capital causes, in favorem vitae the Law doth excuse or extenuate the fact of the offendor, except the malice of the will and intention appeareth, but in civil Trespasses and injuries the Law doth rather consider the damage of the party wronged, than the malice of him which was the wrong doer. As the Law maketh a difference between killing a man upon malice forethought, and upon present heat, but if I give a man slanderous words, whereby I damnify him in his fame, and good name, it is not material whether I use them upon sudden choler and provocation, or of set malice, but in an action upon the case I shall render damages alike. So if a man be killed by misadventure, as by an Arrow at Butts, this hath a pardon of course: but if a man be hurt, or maimed only, an Action of Trespass lieth, though it be done against the parties will, and he shall be punished in the Law as grievously as if he had done it of malice, Stanf. 16.6 E. 4.7. So if a Chirurgeon authorized to practise, do, through negligence of his cure, cause the party to die, this Chirurgeon shall not be questioned for his life: yet if he do only hurt the Wound, whereby the cure is cast back, and death ensueth not, he is subject to an Action of the Case for it, Stanf. 16. So if Baron and Feme commit Felony together, the Feme in regard of the subjection of her will to her husband, shall neither be principal not accessary: but if they join in committing a Trespass upon land or otherwise, the Action may be brought against them both. So if an Infant wanting discretion, or a madman kill another, he shall not be impeached thereof; but if they do him any corporal hurt, he shall be punished in Trespass, 35 H. 6. 11. So in Felony, if the principal dye, or be pardoned, the proceeding against the accessary faileth. But in a Trespass if one commandeth his man to beat you, and after the Battery the Servant dyeth, yet you may have an Action of Trespass against the Master, 17 H 4.19. Aestimatio praeteriti delicti, post facta, nunquam crescit. Bac. Max f. 32. In penal Laws and Facts, the Law considereth the degree of the offence, not as it standeth at this time, when it is committed, but for any circumstance, or matter subsequent, the Law doth not extend or amplify the same. As if a man be wounded, and the Percussor is voluntarily let to go at liberty by the Goalor, and after the party wounded dyeth, yet it is no Felonious escape in the Gaoler, 11 H. 4.12. So if one conspire the death of one, who after cometh to be King, not being within the Statute of 25 E. 3. this is high, not high Treason; but otherwise it is in civil and common cases, vide ibidem Plur. Ipsae etenim leges cupiunt, ut jure regantur, Co. l. 2. f. 25. In omnibus quidem, maxim tamen in jure aequitas est, Reg. I. C. In all things, but especially in the Law, there is equity, and the Laws themselves desire to be ruled by equity. For inasmuch as no Legislators can foresee all things which may happen, it was therefore convenient as Ploydon saith, that that fault should be reform by equity. And is either an amplification or diminution of the Law, and no part of the Law but a moral virtue, which reformeth the Law; for dirigens and directum are divers things, and equity is not a Law but the emendation of the Law, and therefore the Laws themselves desire to be ruled by equity. As whereas, the Debtor after he is become Bankrupt, may prefer one and defraud others, the Act of 13 Eliz. c. 7. hath appointed certain Commissioners of indifferency and credit to relieve the Creditors of the Bankrupt equally, and that there shall be an equal and rateable proportion observed in the distribution of the Goods of the Bankrupt among his Creditors, having regard to the quantity of their several debts, so that one shall not prevent the other, but all shall be in aequali jure, and so we see in many cases, as well at the Common Law, as upon the like statutes such constructions have been made; for as Cato said, Ipsae etenim leges cupiunt ut jure regantur, and therefore is it holden, 35 H. 8. Title Testaments, V de plura in Herbert's case, lib. 7. Bro. 19 A man holdeth three Manors of three several Lords by Knights-service, every Manor being of equal value, he cannot devise two Manors and leave the third to descend, according to the generality of the Acts of 32. & 34. H. 8. of Wills, for than it shall prejudice the other two Lords, but by equal construction he cannot devise but two parts of every Manor, and so as equality shall be observed among them, and so at the Common Law an equality is required, as in 11 H. 7. 12. b. a man is bound in an Obligation, and his Heirs, and he hath Heirs, and hath lands of the part of his Father and part of his Mother, both the Heirs shall be equally charged, vide ibidem plura Co. Com. f. 10. a. If partition be made between Parceners of lands in Fee simple, and for novelty of partition, one granted a rent to the other generally, the Grantee shall have a Fee-simple without this word Heirs, because the Grantor hath a Fee-simple in consideration whereof he granted the rent, Ipsae etenim leges, etc. And Co. Com. f. 271. a. b. when a Feoffment is made to a future use, as to the performance of his last Will, the Feoffee shall be seized to the use of the Feoffor, and his Heirs in the mean time; for the Laws desire to be ruled by right and equity; And reason would, that seeing the Feoffment is made without consideration, and the Feoffor hath not disposed of the profits in the mean time, that by construction and intendment of Law, the Feoffor aught to occupy the same in the mean time: And so it is when the Feoffor disposeth the profits for a particular time in presenti, the use of the Inheritance shall be to him and his Heirs, as a thing not disposed of, Co. ibidem. Co. l. 5. f. 100 a. The Commissioners of Sewers by the Statute of 6 H. 6. c. 5. and 23 H. 8. c. 5. ought to tax all equally, which are in danger to be endamaged by not repairing the Banks, and not him only who hath land adjoining to the River; for otherwise the rage and force of the water may be so great as the value of the land adjoining shall not serve to repair the Banks: and therefore the Statutes will have all who be in the same peril, and are to receive commodity by it to be contributory; and the statutes require equality, which well standeth with the rule of equity, for equitas, in Bracton, est quasi aequalitas, and though the Owner of the Land next adjoining to the River, was bound by prescription to repair the banks of the River, yet the Commissioners ought not to charge him, only, with all, but to take all those which have lands in danger, for otherwise it may, that all the country shall be surrounded, before that one person only can repair the Banks, vide ibidem plura In Fooks case. Coke l 7. f. 123. b. When the King granteth any Land, without the reservation of any Tenure, or without any thing from thence to be rendered, or the like, that land by the operation of Law, shall be holden of the King in Capite, by the service of Chivalry, according to the rate and proportion of land that affereth to one fee of Chivalry, and so of more, more, and of less, less, for the Act in Law respecteth equity, and will never charge any one with more, or less, then in reason and equity it ought: For as Bracton saith, jus respicit aequum. If two, four, or more, being severally seized in land, join in a Recognizance, all their lands must be equally extended. An house that hath Copyhold, and other lands usually occupied with it, is let for years with the lands appertaining, yet the Copyholds pass not without special naming, for than it were a forfeiture of them, for the Law construeth all things according to equity, and constraineth a general Act, if there be any mischief, or inconvenience in it, Finch Nomot. f. 54. So a Corody granted to one, and his Servants to sit at his Mess, he cannot bring a Servant that hath some stinking and noisome disease. And if Estovers be granted out of a Manor, the Grantee shall not cut down Fruit-trees. So a Common granted to one for all his Beasts, he shall not have Common for Goats, and Geese, nor other Beasts, not Commonable, Finch ibidem. It is no Trespass for a man to beat his Apprentice, which is but reasonable correction; for equity moderateth the strictness of the Law. Finch Nomot. f. 57 No more is it to carry away a man's Wife against his will to a lawful end; as to sue a divorce against her husband, or to have the Peace of him before a Justice of Peace. So if the Lessor cometh upon the ground, it shall be intended that he came to see if Waste were done; for equity turneth all to the best, and maketh every Act to be lawful, when it is indifferent, whether it be lawful or not, Finch Nomot. f. 57 And if the Disseisee come, it shall be taken that he meant to be remitted. And in an Action of Trespass, if two Issues be joined, triable in two Counties, as one in London, and another in Middlesex (without saying which of the Issues it should try) this shall be taken to try the Issue in Middlesex only: for so the Venire facias is lawful, and not in both Counties, which is against Law, and therefore it is a discontinuance in the City of London, and no discontinuance, Finch ibidem. And such a desire hath the Law to be ruled by equity, as that it will feign a thing in show and colour, whereby the real right and equity of the thing may more certainly be found; according to the ground, Lex fingit ubi subsistit aequitas. The Law feigneth where equity subsisteth. Coke l. 10. f. 90. a. As the reason why the Law will give a colour in a Writ of Entry Sur-disseisin, Writ of Entry in nature of Assize, Trespass, etc. is that the Law which preferreth and favoureth certainty as the Mother of quiet, and repose (to the intent, that either the Court shall adjudge upon it if the Plaintiff demur, or that a certain Issue may be taken upon a certain point) requireth, that the Defendant when he pleadeth such a special Plea, that yet notwithstanding the Plaintiff may have right, the Defendant shall give colour to the Plaintiff, to the end that the plea shall not amount to the general issue, and so to leave all the matter at large to the Jurors, which shall be full of multiplicity and perplexity of matter, and though the colour be but a fiction, yet the Law feigneth where equity subsisteth. So f. 40. a. Common Recoveries are fictions in Law, and for the equity that in them is transacted, they are not only allowed by the Common Law, for the intended recompense, but warranted by statutes for their equitable use. And therefore the statute of 7 H. 8. c. 1. reciteth that divers as well Nobles as Commons have suffered Recoveries against them of divers of their Manors for the performance of their Will, for assurance of Jointures to their Wives, etc. The same act in approbation of common recoveries, giveth remedy to such recoveries in divers cases; And in Dr. & Student, c. 26. it is determined, that common recoveries do bind as well in conscience as in Law, for semper in fictione legis subsistit aequitas: And by the statute of 23 Eliz. c. 4. it is provided, that for the avoiding of danger to common assurances in lands, and for the advancement of common recoveries, that not any common recovery shall be avoided by any want of form in words and not in matter of substance, vide ibidem plura in Mary Portingtons' case. So Co. l. 11. f. 51. a. If one disseise me, and during the Disseisin he cutteth down Trees, Grass, or the Corn, and then I re-enter, I shall have an Action of Trespass against him, vi & armis, for the Trees, Grass, and Corn: for after my regress, the Law, as to the Disseisor and his Servants, supposeth that the Franktenement hath always continued in me; but if my Disseisor make a Feoffment in fee gift in tail, lease for life or years, and after I re-enter, I shall not have trespass, vi & armis, against them who come in by Title; for this fiction in Law that the Franktenement hath continued always in me, shall not have relation to make him that cometh in by Title to be a wrong doer, vi & armis: for in a fiction of Law always equity existeth, vide ibidem plura. And by these cases it appeareth that equity hath a vigorous use in the exposition of the Common Law. But this bright Star more clearly shineth, and showeth forth its lustre in the construction of Statutes: for as Co. Comm. f. 24. b. equity is a construction made by the Judges, what cases out of the letter of the Statute, yet being within the same mischief, or cause of the making of the same, shall be within the same remedy that the statute provideth; and the reason hereof is, for that Lawmakers could not possibly set down all cases in express terms: and Co. Com. f. 271. b. when Lands and Tenements are conveyed upon confidences, uses, and trusts, if any question groweth upon them, they are to be ruled and decided by the Judges of the Law; for they are within the intendment and construction of the Laws of the Realm: Rhet. l. 1. c. 3. And therefore Aristotle well adviseth Legislators and Makers of Laws, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to design and determine of things, and to leave as little as may be to the discretion of the Judges. But as Co. lib. 6 f. 40. b. Rerum progressus ostend●nt multa, quae initio praecaveri, & provideri non possint, The progress and proceeding of things do declare and show many things which at the beginning could not be heeded or provided for: and therefore is equity required to replenish and fill up those chinks and deserts which seem to be in the letter of the Law, which is therefore accordingly thus defined. Aequitas est verborum legis directio sufficiens, cum una res solummodo cavetur verbis, ut omnis alia in aequali genere iisdem caveatur verbis. Equity is a sufficient direction of the words of the Law, when one thing is provided for in the words, that every other thing in the like kind shall be provided for in the same words. And so when the words of a Statute enact one thing, they enact all other things which are in the semblable degree. As whereas the Statute of 9 E. 3. c: 31. ordaineth that in an Action of Debt against Executors, he that cometh in by distress shall answer, the said Act shall be extended by equity to Administrators; for whosoever of them cometh in first by distress shall answer by the equity of the said Act, because they are in the like degree. So the Statute of 4 H. 4. c. 8. giveth an especial Assize to him who is disseised, and ousted of his land by force against the Disseisor, and it is enacted that he shall recover against him double damages: And so it is in an Assize of Nuisance to turn the course of the water from the Mills of the Plaintiff with force, it was adjudged that he should recover double damages, and yet he was not put out of his land, neither was there a disseisin, but the Nuisance was to the damage of his Franktenement, and so by the equity of the said act the Plaintiff recovered double damages, because the Nuisance was in the like kind. So the Statute of Gleucester giveth an Action of Waste, etc. against him who holdeth for life, or for years, and by the equity of it a man shall have an action of Waste against him who holdeth for a year, or for twenty weeks (and yet it is out of the words of the act) because it is in the like degree, and the cases which are of such degree in our Law, are infinite, Ployd. f. 165. a. And there is another sort of equity which abridgeth, and taketh from the letter, and is a correction of the general words, Ethie. 30. l. 10. and is defined by Aristotle to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a correction of a Law wherein it is any way wanting, because of the generality of it, which also in our Law is of much use. As when an act of Parliament is made, that whosoever shall do such an act shall be a Felon, and be put to death, and yet a man non sarae memoriae, or an Infant of tender age who hath no discretion doth it, they shall not be Felons, etc. or if a Statute be made, that all persons who shall receive or give meat or drink, or other aid to one who shall do a felonious act shall be accessary to the Offence, and be put to death, yet if one doth such an act and cometh to his wife, who knowing it receiveth him and giveth meat and drink unto him, she shall not be accessary nor Felon; for in the generality of the said words of the Law, he of non sanae memoriae, nor Infant, nor a Wife shall not be included, and so equity correcteth the generality of the Law in those cases, and the words general are by equity abridged: so the Statute of Champerty, W. 2. l. 49. & Arti. super Chart. contra probatos, men generally do receive Lands and Tenements while the thing is in plea, yet M. 16. R. 2. accord it was said by the whole Court in a Writ of Champerty, that if I bargain any lands before any Writ brought, and after the Writ purchased I deliver Seisin. That the Writ of Champerty doth not lie, because it shall not be intended that the Bargain was made for such cause, and that by equity, for when he bargained and promised the land upon just consideration, before any action brought against him, it was his act to perform it notwithstanding the action And Costle promoter of the King, brought an action of Extortion. H. 21. H. 7. 16. against an under-Sheriff grounded upon the Statute of 23 H. 6. c. 10. which ordaineth, that neither the Sheriff, Goaler, or Ministers, nor any of them by colour of their Office shall take any thing, profit, etc. of any person for fine, fee or ease of prison, but for the Sheriff 20 d. the Bailiff 4 d. and the Gaoler 4 d. supposing that he had taken 20 d. above the same limited upon the Statute▪ and upon demurrer it appeared upon evidence to the Court, that all under Sheriffs of the same county, have used, from the time whereof memory doth not run, to have of every prisoner in their ward for suspicion of Felony, when they are acquitted, twenty pence, called the Bar fee, and the twenty pence supposed to be taken, were taken from the person named in the count, being acquitted for a Barfee; and the opinion of the whole Court was, that it was out of the raise of the Statute, though it was within the words of the Statute, for that the sum of a Barfee was assigned to the Sheriff, at the beginning by the order, and discretion of the Court, in respect of his labour and charge he had with the prisoners, and for his attendance, and for his ministry when the prisoners are brought to their delivery, and so that payment was with reason, and good conscience, which the intent of the makers of the act was not to take away, and so equity did put an exception to the generality of that text of the Statute Law. So the Statute of W. 2. c. 4. ordaineth that where a man, rat, or dog, escapeth alive out of a Ship, neither the Ship nor any thing that is within it shall be adjudged wrack, but all the things shall be saved, and kept by the view of the Sheriff, etc. in the hands of those of the Town where the things were found: so that if any one can prove that they are his within a year and a day, they shall be restored to him; and whosoever doth otherwise shall be awarded to prison, and remain at the will of the King, and render damages: yet if the goods within the Ship be such things as will not endure for a year and a day, the Sheriff may sell them and deliver the money taken, for them to the Town to answer for it, and that by equity, though it be against the words of the said Act. So the Act of 2. E. 6. c. 14. Which giveth to the King all Lands, and Tenements by any assurance, conveyance, given, assigned, or limited to find any preacher to have continuance for ever, etc. if the words of that act should be taken generally, they give to the King all the houses, and glebe Lands of all Parsons and Vicars: but equity putteth in that text, the exception of Parsonages and Vicarages; because it was not the intention of the makers of that Act, Ployd. f. 466. vide ibidem plura. There is another excellent use of equity which consisteth in guiding the grounds and maxims of of things which seem to cross, and thwart one another; for, as Sir John Doderidge, English Lawyer, f. 209. it is scarcely possible to make any second rule of Law, but that it shall fail in some particular case, whence springeth this often used assertion. Non est regula quin fallit, for as Cato saith, vix ulla lex fieri potest, quae omnibus commoda sit; sed si majori parti prospiciat utilis est; there can scarce any Law be made, which shall fit all men, but if it provideth for the greater part it is profitable; and therefore the ordainers, and interpreters of Laws, respect rather those things which may often happen, and not every particular circumstance: for the which though they would, they shall not be able, by any positive Law, to make provision; and for the like reason, Mr. Ploydon saith, that Law is reasonable, that provideth for the multitude, though that some persons lose by it, f. 369. b. By reason whereof they do permit the rules, actions, and propositions of the Common Law, upon discourse and disputation of reason, to be restrained by exceptions, which are grounded upon two causes; the one is equity, the other is some ground or rule proposed, wherein, for conformities sake, and that no absurdity, or contradiction be permitted, certain exceptions are framed, which do not only knit and conjoin one rule of reason to another: but by means of their equity, temper the rigour of the Law, which, upon some certain circumstances, in every of the said rules might happen and fall out, & omnia bene aequiparat, as Bracton saith, Nomot. f. 14. But as Sir Hen. Fi. saith, this crossing and encountering of one ground, and maxim with another, if the greatest difficulty we find in the arguing of our cases; but to help this, we are to prefer those, and those are to prevail that carry the more excellent perfect reason, and equity with them; and Sir Francis Bacon saith, it is a point worthy to be observed generally in the rules of the Law, that where they encounter or cross one another in any case, it be understood that the Law holdeth worthier, and which rules are of more equity, or humanity; but now to give you some examples of them, which always do illustrate, Coke come 183. It is a maxim in the Law, Quaelibet concessio fortissime contra donatorem interpretanda est, every grant shall be taken most strongly against himself, as if Lands be let, or a rent granted, an estate for life passeth, for that is most strongly against himself, which is to be understood that no wrong be thereby done, for there is another rule in the Civil Law, ea est accipienda interpretatio, quae vitio caret, and a maxim in our Law, that legis constructio non facie injuriam; the interpretative construction of Law shall wrong no man; and therefore if tenant for life maketh a lease generally, it shall be taken for his own life, or else it should work a wrong to him in reversion, and so it is if tenant in tail should make a lease generally, for otherwise it should work a discontinuance, and a wrong, vide ibidem. So if tenant in fee maketh a lease for life, without mentioning for whose life, it shall be deemed for the life of the Lessee, and shall be taken more strongly against the Lessor, but if tenant entail maketh such a lease for life without expressing for whose life, this shall be taken for the life of the Lessor, because otherwise it would work a wrong, Coke Com. f. 42. a. So if an Executor grant all his Goods and Chattels, the goods which he hath as Executor will not pass, because it may be a devestation and a wrong, yet against the trespassor he shall declare, quod bona sua cepit, 10. E. 4.1. So it is a rule, verba ita sunt intelligenda, ut res magis valeat, quam pereat, words are so to be understood, that the matter may prevail rather than perish, as if I give Lands to I. S. and his Heirs rendering five pounds yearly to I. S. and his Heirs, this implieth a condition to me, that am the Grantor; yet were it a stronger exposition against me, to say the limitation should be void, and the Feoffment absolute, Bacon. Max. f. 15. If the Chancellor dyeth before his servants privilege discussed in bank; 35. H. 6. 3. 172. b. yet it shall be allowed contrary to the rule, sublata causa tollitur effectus, but there is another rule, actus legis nulli facit injuriam, the act of the Law prejudiceth no man, and for that reason, the Court shall not prejudice him, where no folly was in himself. It is a ground, qui male agit odit lucem, and therefore the Law countenanceth more things done in the day, then in the night, as the party hath all the day till night to pay his rent, and if it be a great sum he must be ready as long before the Sun set as the money may be told; for the other, is not bound to tell it in the night, and a man must not distrain in the night time for rend behind, yet is there another ground in the Law, quod necessarium, est licitum, and therefore when there is a necessity of doing things, they may be done in the night time, as an arbitrement made, and delivered in writing the last day after the Sun set is good enough, for judgements, and arbitrements require long advice, so may goods be distrained for in the night for damage pheasant, and a man may be arrested in the night, for otherwise peradventure he shall not do it at all. It is a ground in the Law, nihil agit in seipsum, no man can do an act to himself, yet if one of the Chapter enfeoff the Dean and Chapter, by that he he himself shall take by his own livery, because the Law in that case cannot do otherwise; so a feme tenant in Socage may endow herself, and an Executor pay himself. It is a ground in the Law, certa debet esse natratio counts and declarations must be certain, yet things which contain a necessary implication are good enough, for it is another ground, non refert quid ex aequipollentibus fiat, it mattereth not what is done by equippollent, or words which amount to such a sense, as in an Ejectione firmae, etc. In a count of a lease made by tenant for life, it sufficeth to say that the Lessor is yet seized without the alleging of his life expressly, because it amounteth to the same sense by necessary implication. So in an information upon the Statute of usury, and he counts that the Defendant took, per viam, & medium corruptae mutnationis, by the way and means of corrupt borrowing, whereas it should be accomodationis plaudingo, and yet good enough. It is a ground qui facit per alium facit per se, things done by another are as it were done by himself, yet is there another rule, that corporal and personal things cannot be done by another, as suit of Court cannot be done by another, 7. H. 4.9. Otium est mater omnium vitiorum, Coke l 11. f. 53. b. As all virtue consisteth in action, so vice consisteth in idleness, for idleness is the mother of all vices, and as Coke there saith, principally in young men, who ought in their youth to learn profitable sciences, and trades which are profitable to the weal public, of which they may reap the fruits in their old age, for jeunesse oisense vilesse disettense, if in our youth we be idle, in our old age we shall be indigent, and for that reason the common Law detesteth all Monopolies, which prohibit any one to work in any Lawful trade, and that appeareth in 2. H. 5. b. A Dyer was bound, that he shall not use his Dyer's craft for two years, and there Hull said that the obligation was against the common Law, and that, by God, if the Plaintiff were here he should go to prison until he had made fine to the King, and so for the same cause if an husbandman be bound, that he shall not till and sow the ground, the obligation is against the common Law: And therefore the act of 5. Eliz. c. 4. that prohibited any person to use, or exercise any craft, mystery, or occupation, unless he had been an Apprentice for seven years, doth not make provision only to the intent that the artificers may be skilful, but that young men shall not be idle in their youth, but trained and brought up in lawful sciences and trades, and so by the same reason the common Law doth not prohibit any person to use many Arts, and Mysteries at his pleasure; for, nemo prohibitur plures negotiationes, sive Artes exercere, until it was prohibited by the Act of Parliament, 37. E. 3. 6. That all Artificers, etc. are bound every one to one mystery, and that none use other mystery but that he hath chosen; but because that restraint of free trade was prejudicial to the weal public, at the next Parliament it was enacted that all people should be so free as they were before that Ordinance, by which it appeareth that without Act of Parliament, no man can be in any manner restrained to work in any lawful trade. Non negligentibus sed impotentibus succurrendum, Reg. I. C. Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniant, Ployd. f. 357. b. The Law helpeth, and releiveth those are impotent, not those are negligent. As if you disseise me of my Land, and then A. bringeth a Writ of right against you, and you join the mice upon the mere right, and you make default after the mice joined, he shall recover to him, and his Heirs for ever, quit of you, and your Heirs for ever; and if I do not lay my claim within a year & a day, I am barred for ever, for the Law succoureth those that are watchful, and not sleepy: so as non-claime by a year and a day, upon a recovery by default, where final judgement is given was a good Bar by the common Law, 5. E. 3.222. by Hor. A descent cast during the Coverture (where the wife is disseised) barreth her not of her entry after her husband's death, but if a feme-sole be disseised, and then taketh an husband, there a descent during the coverture, taketh away her entry; for it was her folly to take such an husband, that entered not in time, Littleton. 95. Negligentia semper habet comitem infortunium, Coke l. 8. f. 133. a. Sa. Turnors' case. An Executor of an Administrator ought to execute his office, and administereth the goods of the dead, lawfully, truly, and diligently, Lawfully in the payment of all duties, debts, and legacies in such precedency, and order as they ought to be paid by the Law; truly to convert nothing to his own use, and ought not by any practice, or devise to bar, or hinder any creditor of his debt, but ought truly to execute his office according to the trust reposed in him; And diligently as in the case at bar, for when the Administrators which had judgement for one hundred pounds, for sixty pounds, and the Plaintiff offered a release, or to acknowledge satisfaction, and he deferreth it to the intent that the Judgement shall stand in force, by which the Plaintiff shall be defrauded of his due debt, and the Administrators to convert the goods of the debt to their private use: let the agreement be precedent before the recovery, or subsequent since the recovery, it is all one, as to the creditor who is a third person, for he is defrauded as well by the one as the other, and the creditor who is a stranger shall lose his debt, which is by the Law due to him; and if any prejudice accreweth to the Administrators, in this case it is in his own default, for the Plaintiff would have released to them, or acknowledged satisfaction, but they defer it to the intent to bar the Plaintiff of his just and true debt, and negligence hath always misfortune, or ill luck for her companion, Ibidem. Coke l. 2. f. 26. b. If a creditor upon a commission upon a Statute of Bankrupt, either by obstinacy do refuse, or by carelessness neglect to come before the Commissioners within the time limited, and to crave the benefit of the Act, he looseth the benefit thereof; for the Law releiveth those which are vigilant, and not dormant, for otherwise a debt may be concealed; or a creditor may absent himself, and void the proceed of the Commissioners, and every creditor ought to take notice of the commission, it being a matter of record. Coke l. 4. f. 10. b. in Bevills' case, it was said that the Act of 32. H. 8. c. 2. by express words extendeth only to actual possession, and seisin, and not to relieve those which for so long time had neglected to have actual seisin of their services, and namely of suit, which ought to be made twice every year, and it was said that it was crassa, & supina negligentia, which that Law did not intent to relieve, for as it is commonly said, vigilantibus, etc. Ibidem. Coke l. 4. f. 82. b. in Sir Andrew Corbets case, who deviseth Lands to R. C. and others to have and to hold to them, and the survivor of them, until such time that the sum of eight hundred pounds, etc. was received out of the issues, rents, etc. for the preferment of his Daughters, it was resolved, though the Devisee had notice of the devise, yet if a stranger had occupied the Land, the Devisee ought to take notice at his peril, for vigilantibus, etc. and none by the Law in such case is bound to give him notice, as in the case of arbitrement, 1. H. 7.5.8. E. 4.1. ibidem. And this is the reason of a lapse incurring for want of presentment, or of a warranty barring for lack of entry, or of descents barring for want of claim, and a title to tenant in courtesy is lost for lack of entry, and that Statutes of limitation do bar actions. One seized of Lands devisable deviseth that his Executors shall sell his Land, and distribute the profits for the use of the poor, and dyeth; If a stranger tendereth them money for the Land, and they intending to sell it more dear, defer the sale for two years, and take the profits themselves, the heir for the laches, and long delay may enter and put them out of the Land, 38. Ass. Pl. 3. 39 Ass. Pl. 3. A man indebted by specialty, or upon an account determined, tendereth the money to the Debtee after the day in which it was due and payable, and it is refused, and after money is embased: it seemeth to many that the debtor shall bear the loss, although he had made tender at the very day of payment, because he must say, uncor priest, Dyer f. 83. Pl. 76. Caveat Emptor, Coke Com. f. 102. a. Let the the buyer be vigilant, and wary what he buyeth, for though by the Civil Law, every man is bound to warrant the thing that he selleth, and conveyeth, yet the Common Law bindeth him nor, unless there be a warranty either in Deed, or in Law, Ibi. Coke l. 4. f. 26. a. A Copyholder who is out of possession ought not to sell his Land until he hath gained the possession, and if any one will purchase any title he is not to be favoured, but in such case Caveat Emptor, let the buyer take heed for if any one hath a pretended right and title to Copyhold Land, bargain and sell it to another, it is within the Statute of 32. H. 8. c. 5. vide ibidem plura. If I take an horse of another man's, and sell him, and the owner taketh him again, I may have an action of debt for the money, for the bargain was perfect by the delivery of the horse, & Caveat Emptor, Nay. Max f. 94. If I sell my Horse to another man, for ten hundred pounds, who taketh his horse again, I shall have all the money, Ibidem f. 95. Qui timent, caveant, & vitent, Offi. of Exe. 251. They who fear are wary to shun dangers, as an Executors office is dangerous, and therefore ought to fear what encumbrances fall on him, and to keep goods to pay, all debts, if any should be concealed. Non temere credere nervus est sapientiae, Coke. l. 5. f. 114. b. Not hastily to believe is the sinew of wisdom, and therefore the Law hath appointed the last time in the day to pay money, upon a condition that both parties may certainly meet together, which is founded on the experience of the sages, lest any of the parties should be constrained to make a Letter of Attorney; or repose confidence, or trust in any other to pay it for him when he will do it for himself: And it is wisdom not rashly to trust any. Caveat actor. Reg. I. C. Let the actor beware what he doth. One entereth into Bond to A. that he and A. shall stand to the Arbitrement of I. S. If A. refuse, he him-himselfe shall take the forfeiture of the Bond. If a man have a Chapel, which is his donation by Letters Patents, and he presenteth me his clerk to the Ordinary, he shall not make collation afterwards. If a Parson impropriate, presenteth one to a Church, it maketh it disappropriate. If he who holdeth his Land by homage, and fealty, taketh his Land of the King by office found that he holdeth it by forty shillings per annum, he shall pay the rent hereafter. Abundans cautela non nocet, Coke l. 11 f. 6. b. An abundance of circumspection doth not hurt, vide ibi. Qui sentit onus, sentire debet & commodum, Coke l. 1. f. 99 a. He who beareth the burden and taketh the pains ought to receive the profit, as if a Feoffment be upon condition, that if the Feoffor or his Heirs pay the sum of 20 l. or to do any act before a certain day, that they shall re-enter in this case, if the father die before the day of paymenr, and the daughter for the safeguard of the inheritance pay the money, or satisfieth the condition, in this case the Son after borne shall not divest it, for if the daughter had not performed the condition, the Land had been utterly lost, and therefore in this case a good argument may be made that the daughter shall detain the Land, for Qui sentit onus sentire debet & Commodum, ibidem, vide Hobart Rrep. fo. 4. in young's, and Radfords' case. Ployd. f. 514. Trevilian was Tenant in tail of Tenements, and he being only seized of such an estate, a common recovery was had against him, and Avicen his wife, who vouched over according to the course of common recoveries, and it was found that the wife had nothing in the Tenements: the husband dyeth, the wife shall have nothing of the intended recompense in the case; because she had nothing in the Tenements, and so could lose nothing. If Tenant for life or in Dower do devise the Corn growing on the ground upon the land at the time of their death, this is a good Devise, and he in the reversion shall not have it, 4 H. 3. Devise 26. And the Statute of Merton which saith, Omnes viduae possunt legare sua blada, is but an affirmation of the common Law, which was used in the time of H. 3. 19 H. 6. 6. A man seized of land in see, in right of his wife, leaseth the land to a stranger, and the Lessee soweth the land, and after the wife dyeth, the Corn being not ripe, the Lessee may devise the corn, and yet his estate is determined, 7 E. 3. 67. A man seized of land in the right of his wife, and soweth it, and deviseth the Corn growing on the ground, and dyeth before it is severed, the Devisee shall have it, and not the wife, 7. Ass. pl. 19 One seized of lands in fee, hath Issue a Daughter, and dyeth, his wife Privement Ensaint with a Son, the Daughter entereth and soweth the land, and before the severance a Son is born, and his next friend entereth: yet the Daughter may devise the Corn growing on the land. If a Manor be put in execution upon a Statute-merchant, and the Conusee sow the land, he may well devise the Corn growing on the ground, Perkins f. 100 vide ibidem plura. Qui sentit commodum sentire debet & onus, Cok. l. 5. f. 24. He that feeleth or reapeth the profit must bear the burden, and the charges. A man leaseth an house by Indenture for years, and the Lessee covenanteth for him, and his Executors to repair the house at all times necessary; The Lessee assigneth it over to H. who suffereth it to decay; the Lessee bringeth an action of Covenant against the Assignee, and it was adjudged the action did lie, in that the Lessee had taken upon him to bear the charges of reparation, the annual rent was the less, which trenched to the benefit of the Assignee, and he that enjoyeth the profit must bear the burden and charges, vide ibidem plura. Co. l. 5. f. 100 a. The Statutes will have all those which are in peril, and which are to take commodity by the making of the banks of a River to be contributory to it: for Qui sentit commodum etc. Coke l. 7. f. 39 b. If a man grant a Rent-charge for life out of his land, and the rent is behind, and the Grantor enfeoff A. and the rent is behind in his time, and after A. enfeoffeth B. and the rent is behind in his time, and then the Grantee dyeth, the Executor shall have an action of debt against every of them for the rent behind in his time, for qui s●ntit commodum, etc. and so was it holden in Ognels' case, l. 4. f. 49. a. 50. Baron's uses, f. 27. If a man bind himself and his Heirs in an Obligation, or do covenant in writing for him and his Heirs, or do grant an annuity for him and his Heirs, or do make a Warranty of land binding him and his Heirs to warranty, in all these cases the Heir after the death of the Ancestor is by Law charged with this Obligation, Covenant, Annuity, and Warranty, yet with these three cautions; 1. That the party must by special name bind himself and his Heirs. 2. That some action must be brought against the Heir, whilst the land or other inheritance rested in him unaliened, except the land was conveyed away by fraud, and one purpose to prevent the Suit intended against him: And 3. That no Heir is further to be charged then the value of the land descended unto him from the same Ancestor, etc. nor to be sold outright for the debt to be kept in extent at a yearly value, until the debt or damage be run out. Nevertheless for his false plea shall he be charged of his own lands, for this Deed of his Ancestor, and the reason of this charge is, Qui sentit commodum sentire debet incommodum & onus, vide ibidem plura. Dilationes sunt in lege odiosae. Ployd. f. 75. b. Delays are tedious in the Law, and therefore doth the Law favour Assize, because they are the more speedy Suits the Law hath given, as the Statute of W. 2. c. 25. in its recital saith: Et quia non est aliquod breve in Cancelaria, per quod quaerentes habent tam festinum remedium sicut per breve. Nove disseisinae. And therefore because it is the more speedy Suit, the Law the more greatly favoureth it, ibidem For, for speed to the Plaintiff, the Jurors shall have the view before appearance by the words of the Writ. And though Warranties are favoured in Law, yet none shall vouch in Assize any one, if he be not present, and that is for the speed of the Plaintiff, No. Nat. br. f. 178. And a protection will not defend the party against an assize, but assizes are accepted by the words of protection, p. 2. H. 6. 42. B●. protection 53. And all things and pleas which go in retardation, or abatement of Assizes, are esteemed odious, and therefore exceptions which will abate, other Writs shall not abate Assizes, if it be so, that there is a Disseisor and a Tenant, for it is the substance of the Suit, and therefore the misnaming of one of the Defendants shall not abate the assize, if there be another Disseisin and Tenant, and yet the Writ was always false, Ploud. f. 98. a. b. And if the Tenant plead joint-tenancy with a stranger not named, although the Plaintiff confess it, yet it shall not abate his assize, but for it only, & for the remnant, the Writ and Plaint shall stand in his force, and yet the Plaint was altogether false, and if there be a Disseisor and Tenant for any part, than it sufficeth, for other verity in the Writ or Plaint the Law requireth none, and to say that one named in the Writ is dead, before the Writ purchased, or that there was never any such in rerum natura is alone, and shall be adjudged no plea in abatement of the Writ, but if there be another Disseisor and a Tenant, the Writ shall be good against them, Ployd. f 90. a. vide ibidem plura. And though in actions real, as the weight of the cause requireth, there are longer times given in their proceed, then in personal actions, yet it appeareth by Fortescue, de lib. l. A. c. 5. 3. that they are not too long, nor admitted without just cause. Crebro enim saith he, deliberationibus iu●icia matur scunt, sed in accelerato processu numquam. And as Hobert saith, f. 133. Festinatio j●stitiae est n●verca infortunii, Festination of Justice is the stepmother of mischief; but many times by deliberations Judgements grow to ripeness, but in over hasty process never; yet the Demandant shall come to a final end by these actions, which he shall never do by prosecution of personal actions for the trial of a Freehold or Inheritance, Co. ep. ad lectorem, lib. 8. And in all cases the Law favoureth speeding of men's Causes, and hateth delays, as 3 H. 6. 15. b. He that pleadeth a Record in delay, as to prove the Plaintiff excommunicate, must have it ready to show, but otherwise it is if he plead in bar. In dilatory pleas both Defendants must join, 12 H. 7. 1. A Plea in bar that is dilatory must be good to every common intent, 8 H. 7. 9 One who is in Court ready to join with the Defendant may do it without process: As the Vouchee the Plaintiffs Lessor being prayed in aid of, when the Defendant in a Replevin avoweth upon him or the Mesne, when the Lord Paramount voweth upon him. But joinder in aid cannot be by an Attorney without process 2 H. 6. 1. b. One who is a Debtor to the King of Record in the Exchequer, if he be seen in the Court may be brought in to answer, 2 H. 6 4. b. An assize of Darrein presentment was brought, and it was pleaded in abatement of the Writ, that the same Plaintiff had brought a Quare impedit against the Defendant for the same Church, and the Court was of opinion that it was a good plea, for the Quare impedit is of an higher nature for the right and possession: and the Statute of W. 2. l. 5. saith, that it may be in the election of one to have an assize of Darrein-presentment, or a Quare impedit, ergo not both: And it was adjudged p. 15 Jaco. that one cannot have two Quare Impedits of one Church, for one avoidance, Hutton f. 403. When the Law giveth a man several remedies for a thing, he cannot have both of them together, as Littleton saith, for than he should recover one thing twice, which should be a double charge and a double vexation to the Defendant, Co. Com. 145. a. as if I grant by Deed a Rent-charge to another, the Grantee hath election to bring a Writ of Annuity, and charge, the person only to make it personal, or to distrain upon the land and make it real, but he cannot have both after the Grantee hath determined his election, but this determination of election must be by action in Court of Record: for albeit the Grantee bringeth a Writ of Annuity, he may distrain and discharge the person, but if he bring a Writ of Annuity, and thereupon appear and Court, this is a determination of his election in Court of Records, albeit he never proceed any further: as if the Wife be endowed ex assensu patris, if she, after her Husband's death, bringeth a Writ of Dower at the Common Law, and Count, albeit she recover not, she shall never claim her Dower ex assensu patris, because she hath determined her election. So if the Grantee bring an assize for rent, and make his Plaint, he shall never after bring a Writ of Annuity, and if he distrain and avow the prisall of the Distress in a Court of Record, it is a determination of his election before any judgement given, according to the rule, Electio semel facta & placitum testatum, non patiter regressum, Co. Com. 220. a. But otherwise it is where a man hath election to have several remedies; for a thing is merely personal, or merely real from the beginning: as if a man may have an action of debt or an action of account at his pleasure, and appear to it, and after is nonsuit, yet may he have an action of debt afterwards, because both actions charge the person, the like Law is an assize, and a Writ of Entry in the nature of assize, ibidem. W. brought an action of the case against F. and declared that the Defendant had sued out a Fieri facias upon a judgement given against him for the Defendant, and by virtue thereof took Goods of the Plaintiff to the value of the Damage, and so made his return pro def●ctu emptoris, and that the Defendant, well knowing this, to the intent to trouble, vex, and charge him, did afterwards sue out another Fieri facias to the same Sheriff, and delivered it to be exexecuted, who did thereupon levy the money of other Goods of the Plaintiff, and paid it over to the Defendant, whereby the now Plaintiff was double charged; whereupon the Defendant pleaded not guilty, and it was found against him, and it was adjudged for the Plaintiff, because he was twice vexed and disturbed, and that wilfully by the Defendant, who had first one execution inchoate, which he ought to have followed, we all knowing it, and not to have taken another:) but if he had been ignorant and had not known of the Goods first taken, he had not been liable to the other action, Hob. 37.3. Waterers case. Euilibet in sua arte perito est credendum: & omnes prudentes eos admittere solent, qui probantur ab iis qui in sua arte bene versati sunt, Arist. 1. Topic. c. 6. Co. l. 7. f. 19 a. The reason of the wisest man which professeth not the Laws of England, in cases which concern the Laws of England, is not to be believed, but the legal and profound reason of such, who by diligence, study, and long experience and observation, are so learned in the Laws of this Realm, as out of the reason of the same they can rule the case in question, in this sense this rule is to be taken, that we are to believe every one in his art, and all wise men are wont to admit those things which are approved by them are well versed in their own Art. Coke l. 4. f. 29. a. Agnes was contracted to Bunting, and after married, tweed Bunting libelleth against Agnes in the Court of Audience upon the said Contract, and upon the proceed of which Libel, it was decreed that the said Agnes should undergo marriage with the said Bunting, and thereupon it was pronounced, decreed, and declared the said marriage with tweed to be null: And though that tweed being de facto husband of the said Agnes, was neither party to the said Suit, nor to the sentence in the Spiritual Court which dissolved the marriage between him and the said Agnes, but the said Agnes only, yet the sentence against the Feme only being only declaratory, was good and shall bind the Baron de facto; and in regard that the Cognisance of marriages appertain to the Ecclesiastical Court, and the same Court had given sentence in this case, the Judges of our Law ought to give faith and credit to their proceed, and sentence, (although it be contrary to the reason of our Law) and to think that their proceed are consonant to the Law of the holy Church, for we are to believe every one is skilful in his art, vide ibidem plura, Coke l. 5. f. 7. in Caudries case. Quod quisque norit, in hoc se exerceat, Co. l. 9 f. 13. a. Let every one exercise himself in that which he hath knowledge and skill. It is the wisdom of the Law to refer things to persons in which they have knowledge and shall be expert; and therefore the Law will not constrain the Jurors which have no knowledge in the Law, to take upon them Cognisance of the points in Law, or in cases which concern Life, Member, or Inheritance, Frank tenements, Goods, and Chattels, but to leave them to the consideration of the Judges, nor the Judges to give their opinion of questions and doubts in Law upon a sudden, but in all cases to have the truth of the case, and upon conference and consideration to adjudge according to the Law. Coke l. 8. f. 130. a. The intent of the act of 5 Eliz. c. 4. was, that no man should take upon him any Art, Mystery, or any Occupation, but such in whom is science and knowledge, and therefore the statute intended, that he that used any Art, Mystery, or any occupation at the time of the act, might use the same art, or mystery; for every one is to exercise himself in that art which he knoweth: And it was said, that the Brewers should have science and skill in brewing good and wholesome Beer, for it greatly conduceth to the health of men. Ployd. f. 128. b. Always our Predeceossors, for the sense of latin words have consulted with the Grammarians and others who have knowledge therein, and that sense which the Grammar warranted they have allowed, as 9 H. 7. 14. One was bound in an Obligation upon the condition that he should pay five pounds in fine Gold, and the Obligation was puri auri, and there it appeareth that the Masters of Grammar were sent, for to give their counsel what was latin for fine Gold, vide ibidem plura. Coke l. 11. f. 10. b. Matters in Law shall be put in issue to be tried by the Country, for sicut ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices, ita ad quaestion●m Juris non respondent juratores: As the Judges do not answer to the question of fact, no more do the Jurors answer to the question in Law: and if the Jurors take upon them the Cognisance of the Law, and find the special matter mistake the Law, the Judges of the Law shall give judgement upon the special matter according to the Law, without having regard to the conclusion of the Jurors, who ought not to take upon them the judgement of the Law, for quod quisque novit, etc. Plo●d. C●m. Amie Townsdens' case, 5 H. 17. Carus case, etc. Coke Com. f. 3. b. If an office either of the Grant of the King, or subject which concerneth the Administration, proceed, or execution of Justice, or the King's revenue, or the Commonwealth, or the interest, benefit, or safety of the Subject, or the like: If these or any of them be granted to a man that is unexpert, and hath no skill and science to exercise or execute the same, the Grant is merely void, and the party disabled by Law, and uncapable to take the same pro commodo regis, & populi, for only men of skill, knowledge, and ability to exercise the same, are capable of the same, to serve the King and his people, ibidem. An Infant is not capable of the Office of a Stewardship of a Manor, either in possession or reversion, ibid. and the Civil Law, Impubes ab omnibus officiis civilibus debet abstinere. Coke l. 11. f. 87. a. The case of Monopolies, a Patent made to Sir Edward Bury for the making of Cards, was void, because he had no skill in making them, though the Patent was to him and his Deputy, yet if the Grantee himself be inexpert, he cannot make a Deputy who is skilful to supply his place: Quia quod per me non possum, nec per alium, for what I cannot do by myself, I cannot do by another. Imperitia culpae adnumeratur, Reg. s. e. Imperitia maxima est mechanicorum poena. Co. l. 11. f. 57 a. Ignorance and unskilfulness is accounted a fault, and is the greatest punishment of Artists and Mechanics. As 7 E. 3. 65. b. If he that taketh upon him to work be unskilful and ignorant, it is sufficient punishment to him, for if any man take upon him to work, and doth it amiss, an action of the case lieth against him. Ignorantia Juris non excusat. The ignorance of the Law doth not excuse, Dr. & Stud. l. 2. c 46. Ignorance of the Law though it be unvincible, that is to say, that they have done, that in them, is to know the truth, doth not excuse, as to the Law, for every man is bound at his peril to take notice what the Law of the Realm is, as well the Statutes as the Common Law, for all Statutes are made in Parliament, and Burgesses are the representatives of the Commons, and therefore is, alone, as if all the Commons had been there present. An Infant of the years of discretion may be a Felon and a Trespasser, according to the civil Rule; Pupillus qui proximus est pubertati capax est furendi, & injuriae faciendae, An Infant who is next to the age of puberty, that is of fourteen years, is capable of stealing and doing injury, though he be ignorant of the Law, but that is by the old Maxim of the Law, for the eschewing of Murders, Felony, and Trespasses, Dr. & Stud. l. 2. c. 46. vide ibid. plura. Coke l. 1. f. 177. a. b. Anthony Mildmay brought an action of the case against Roger Standish, because the said Robert had said and openly published, that certain lands which lawfully appertained to the said Mildmay, were lawfully assured for the term of a thousand years, to Ja. Talbot, and Olyff his wife, and that they of the interest of that term were lawfully possessed, and so, for slandering his estate and title showing all in certain, and how he was prejudiced by the said speaking, brought his Action: And Standish in his plea justified the words, upon which the Plaintiff demurred, and it was adjudged for the Plaintiff, although the facto, the said Talbot and Olife had a limitation of those lands, by the Will of Sir Henry Sharington in writing for a thousand years, which was the occasion that the said Standish being a man not learned in the Law affirmed and published the same: yet for that he had taken upon him the knowledge of the Law, and interposed himself in a matter not concerned him, judgement was given against him; for Ignorantia juris not excusat. If the Clerk mistake Debt for a Detinet in a Writ, his ignorance of the Law doth not excuse, 20 E. 4. 21. But the Civilians have a Rule, In paenalibus judiciis aetati, & imprudentiae succurritur, the Law doth help the party according to his age, or ignorance in criminal & penal causes, which accordeth with the grounds of our Law, as if an infant of tender years kill a man, it shall not be Felony, because he had no scretion, or understanding, and so it is if a man dedi non sanae memoriae, kill another, it is not homicide because he hath no memory nor understanding, and this as Ploydon saith is properly said to be done, ex ignorantia, where unvoluntary ignorance is adjudged the cause of the act, Ployd. f. 19 a. Coke l. 6. f. 54. a. A Capias was awarded against a Countess by the Court of Common Bench, that the Sheriff, or his Officer by his warrant, without any offence may execute it, for they ought not to dispute the authority of Court, but they ought to execute the Writs to them directed, and to it they are sworn, and though it was objected that it appeared by the Capias, that she was a Countess against whom by Law no Capias in such case lieth, & ignorantia juris non excusat, and principally the Sheriffs, and other Ministers of Law, and Justice, except in some cases, as in cases of contempt: yet it was resolved that the Sheriff, and his Ministers, ought not to examine the judicial act of the Court, but they ought to execute the Writ, ibidem, in the Countess of Rutland's case, so Dyer fo. 60. quod vide. Ignorantia facti excusat, Coke 2. f. 3. b. in Mansers' case, the ignorance of the deed excuseth, as if an illiterate man be bound to seal a deed, he is not tied to do it, if not any be present to read it, if required, and also to expound it, if it be written in Latin, &c for ignorantia facti non excusat, quae est, vel lectionis vel linguae, the ignorance of the deed excuseth whether it be of reading, or of the tongues. Doct. and Stud. l. 2. c. 47. If a man buy an horse in open Market of him that hath no property in him, not knowing but that he had right, he hath good right to the horse, and his ignorance shall excuse him; but if he had known the seller had no right, the buying in open Market had not excused him. So if a man retain another man's servant, not knowing that he is retained by him, the ignorance excuseth him both from the common Law and the Statute of 31. Ed. 33. and the penalty thereupon, to wit, pain of imprisonment, if any one retaineth one servant without licence, or reasonable cause, and so hath the Statute always been expounded, that they who were ignorant of the first retainer should not run into any penalty of the Statute. So whosoever retaineth one is a ward to another, not knowing that he is ward, also if homage be due, and the tenant after maketh a Feoffment, and the Lord not knowing of the Feoffment distraineth for the homage, his ignorance shall excuse him of his damages in a replevin, though he cannot avow for the homage but if he had known the Feoffment, he should have yielded damages, ibidem. If a resignation be made by an imcumbent to a Bishop, the Bishop is bound to give the Patron notice, or otherwise he shall not have the advantage of the lapse, and if the same Bishop die, his Successor shall be bound in the same manner, although the resignation was not made to him, for he shall have advantage by reason of the avoidance of the said resignation, than he is bound to do that thing his successor should do, upon the pain of a Quare Impedit, for it is intended, that the books of resignation to the successor remain with him, Calloway 18 H. 7. f. 49. f. by Frowick. If a Patron who is a Layman present his Clerk to the Ordinary, and he is not well lettered, it is lawful for the Ordinary to refuse him, and of it to give notice to the Patron for to present another before there shall be a collation by Lapse, because the Patron could not have Cognisance whether he be a Clerk or no, but if a Patron be a spiritual man and present one not well lettered, and the Ordinary refuse him, he shall not give notice of it to the Patron because it is intended that a Clerk may have Conusance of the sufficiency of another before he presentted him to the Bishop, ibidem by Frowick. So when a man doth an act, as to enter into Land, seize goods, take a distress, or such other he must, by the Law, see at his peril that it be lawfully done Doctor and Student, ibidem. As if a Servant cometh with his master's horse to Town, where by custom goods may be attached for debt, and upon a Plaint against the servant, an officer of the Town attached the master's horse, thinking it to be the Servants, that ignorance excuseth not, ibidem. So if the Sheriff by a replevin deliver other beasts than were distrained, though the party that distrained show him they were the same beasts: yet an action of Trespass lieth against him, for he shall be compelled by Law, as all Officers commonly be, to execute the Kings Writ at his peril, according to the tenor of it, and to see that the act that he doth be lawfully done, ibidem. But some say if upon a Summons, in a praecipe quod reddat, the Sheriff by information of the Detendant, summoneth the tenant in another man's Land, thinking it to be the tenant's Land, there he shall be excused, for he doth not seize Land, but only summoneth the tenant on the Land, and that upon the information of the Demandant, and though he be ignorant that that is the Land, yet that sufficeth to the Sheriff as to his entry for the summoning as they say, though it be not the tenants Land, Ibidem. SECT. VII. From the Politics. THe last Fountain from whence the law deriveth grounds is the political Science, which of all thereof, as Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & as Ar. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Queen and Regent, for she prescribeth certain Laws, by which they may be sound taught, and gloriously published, and graciously ministereth to them her protection, and she is the Lady and Mistress of all humane actions, for though other Sciences, and especially the ethical instructeth men how to live well, and happily, yet many Egregious Philosophers, which profess the protection of that Art and Science, are observed to live loosely, and viciously, and as Cicero alios esse pecunia Cupidos, gloriae non nullos, multos libidinum servos, some to be covetous of Gold, others ambitious of glory, and many to serve their lusts, so as if they were not restrained by the Sceptre of this Science, by which Magistrates and Laws are ordained to curb those who will not be adduced for the love of virtue, to do that which is right and just, and formidine paenae, for fear of punishment, to fright, and force them into 〈◊〉 more virtuous, and civil manner of living, & 〈◊〉 magisterio (as Camerarius fully) vita communis 〈◊〉 ur & constituitur jure, & legibus, ut societates ho● num, quae res publicae vocantur in terris conserventu●, ●n● by whose magisterial rule, the lives of all men are so ordered, and disposed by right, and Laws that the societies of men, which are called republics may be preserved on the earth. Without doubt therefore many principal and royal grounds of the Law must spring, and grow from this sovereign Science, from which the Law receiveth its constitution, and confirmation, as the grounds ensuing will manifest. Salus populi, prima lex esta, L●x. 12. tabularum, and Coke l. 11. f. 113. b. Salus populi suprema est lex, the health and welfare of the people, is the prime and chiefest Law, that is, the prime and principal scope to which all our actions ought to tend, is the public good of the people, and Commonweal, and therefore doth our Law favour things for the Commonweal, and as Dyer f. 36. Pl 40. In cases, which sound for the good of the Commonweal, a man may justify the doing of a wrong. As in time of War, a man may justify the raising of Bulwarks in another man's soil, and so may he justify the raising of an house that burneth, ●●r the safeguard of the houses of the Neighbours. So if the Sheriff pursue a Felon to an house, and for to have the Felon he breaketh the door of the house, he may justify it, because it is for the Commonweal, that such Felons should be taken; but it is otherwise in particular cases, as if the Sheriff break the house to arrest one in the house by virtue of a Capias, in debt or trespass, he shall be punished, for that was a particular case, and not for the good of the Common- If the Lessor have Villains, and one, or divers of them commit felony, and that the Lessee pursueth them as Felons, by which he exileth them of the Manor, he is not punishable in waist: but if the Villains slander him, for which he doth them exile, it is punishable, by Knightly. Fishermen may justify their coming upon land adjoining to the Sea, to dry their Nets, though it be another's ground, for fishing is for the Commonweal, and sustenance of all the Realm, 8 E. 4. 18. b. and upon this reason the Civilians say, Si piscator ligat navem ad arborem, dominus eam incidere non potest: If a Fisherman tieth his Ship to a tree, the Master of that soil cannot cut the tree. And for this reason the King before the Statute of Magna Charta c. 11. might enter into another's Woods and cut the Trees for reparations of Castles, but by that Statute he did restrain himself so to do, Ployd. 3. 22. b. vide ibidem plura. A Millstone that is lifted up to be picked and beaten, cannot be distrained, for it remaineth parcel of the Mill, which is a thing for the Commonweal. weal, 14 H. 1 25. Things brought into an Inn, Fair, or Market, shall not be distrained, 22 E. 4. 49. No more shall lying in a Tailor's Shop, or an Horse that is a shooing shall not be distrained for the rent issuing out of the Shop. Coke Com. f. 47. a. When a man and a woman are riding on a horse, or Axe in a man's hand cutting of wood, and the like, they are for that time privileged and cannot be distrained. Valuable things shall not be distrained for rent, for benefit and maintenance of Trade, which by consequence are for the Commonweal, and are there by authority of Law, as an horse in the Hostrey, nor the materials in a Weavers Shop for making of cloth, nor sacks of Corn, or meal in a Mill, nor in a Market, nor any thing distrained for damage pheasant, for it is in custody of the Law, and the like. So Beasts belonging to a Blow averia carucae shall not be distrained, and no man shall be distrained for the Instruments of his Trade, or profession, as the Axe of a Carpenter, or the Books of a Scholar, whilst Goods, or other Beasts may be distrained, ibidem. Coke l. 10. f. 139. b. An action of the case was brought against D. and counts that D. was seized of certain lands in Kent, by reason of which his ancestors, and all the Ter tenants from the time whence, etc. have made and repaired when it shall be material, so many perches of the walls of the Sea in K. etc. and for default of repairing, etc. the water entered, and over-flowed the lands of the Plaintiff, the Defendant traversed the Prescription; and it was found for the Plaintiff, and that there was a default in the Wall for not repairing; by which the Plaintiff recovered Damage, and a Writ awarded to the Sheriff to distrain B. to repair the wall there where it was material. Note this judgement in an action of the case, and the reason is, pro bono publico, for Salus populi est suprema lex and therefore is that part of the judgement in this action of the case, that the Defendant shall be distrained to repair the wall, ibidem. Publica utilitas privatorum commodis est praeferenda, Reg. I. C Publicum bonum privato est praeferendum, the public utility and good is to be preferred before private gain and profit and therefore shall be more favourably expounded by the Law, then when it is only for private, Coke comm. f. 181. b. As the Tenant holdeth of the Lord by fealty and one grain of wheat, etc. and the Lord purchaseth part, the whole shall be extinct, because it is entire, but if an entire service be pro bono publico, as Knights-service, Castleguard, Cornage, etc. for defence of the Realm, or to repair a Bridge, or a way, or to keep a Beacon, or to keep the King's Records, or for advancement of Justice and Fence, as to aid the Sheriff, or to be Constable of England, though the Lord purchaseth part, the service remaineth, and so it is pro opere devotionis, & pietatis, for works of devotion and piety, Coke comm. f. 149. a. Coke l. f. 63. a. In the Chamberlain of London's case, the Inhabitants of a Village may make Ordinances, or by-Lawes, for the reparation of a Church, or of an highway, or any such thing as is for the public good generally, and in such case the greater part shall bind all without any custom. So Corporations cannot make Ordinanccs, or constitution, or By-lawes without custom or charter, unless it be for things which concern the public good, as reparations of Churches, common-ways, or the like. So in Corporations such Ordinances or Bylawes are allowed by Law, which are made for the due execution of the Laws and Statutes of this Realm, and for the good or due government of the body Corporate. And the Ordinance of the Mayor, aldermans, and Commonalty of London, that all Citizens, Freemen, and strangers, shall not put any broad cloth to sale within the City, before it be carried to Blackwell Hall to be viewed and searched, so that it may appear to be vendible, and that hallage be paid for it, to wit, 1 d. was good and allowable by Law, because it was for the better execution of the Statutes made in that behalf, without deceit; and also that the assessment of the said penny for hallage was good and reasonable, because it was pro bono publico, vide ibidem plura. Coke comm. f. 181, b. If a Charter of Feoffment be made, and a Letter of Attorney to four, or three, jointly and severally to deliver Seisin, two of them cannot make Livery, because it is neither by the four or three jointly, nor any of them severally: but if the Sheriff upon a Capias directed to him, make a Warrant to four, or three, jointly and severally to arrest the Defendants, two of them may arrest him, because it is for the execution of Justice, which is pro bono publico, & jura publica privato promiscue decidi non debunt, and public Laws ought not promiscuously to be decided by the private, ibidem. Coke come. f. 165. a. If a Castle that is used for the necessary defence of the Realm descend to two, ot more Coparceners; this Castle might be divided by Chambers and Rooms, as other houses be: but yet that it is pro bono publico, & defension regni, for the public good, and defence of the Realm: it shall not be divided for the right of the Sword, as Britton saith, which suffereth not division, that the force of the Realm do not fail so much: but Castles of habitation for private use, and that are not for the necessary defence of the Realm, aught to be parted between Coparceners as other houses, ib. And for the same reason a woman shall not be endowed of a Castle that is maintained for the necessary defence of the Realm, because it ought not to be divided, and the public shall be preferred before the private, but of a Castle that is for private use and habitation she shall be endowed, Co. come f 31 b. vide ibidem plura. So a protection, cum clausula volumus, is of two sorts, the one concerneth services of War, as a King's Soldier, etc. the other wisdom and counsel, as the King's Ambassador and Messenger, pro negotiis regni, both these being for the public good of the Realm, private men's actions and suits must be suspended for a convenient time, for the public is to be put before the private: but the cause of granting the protection, must be expressed in the protection, to the end that it may appear to the Court that it is granted pro negotiis regni, & pro bono publico, for the common profit of the Realm: and as Britton saith, for our service, as to be in our force and defence of us, and our people, Coke comm. f. 130. And it is a rule in the Civil Law, which for the reasonableness of it all Nations follow, Eorum qui in potestate pai●●s ●unt, sine voluntate ejus, matrimonia jure, non contrahu ●ur, sed contracta non solvuntur. They who under the power of their Father cannot lawfully contract Matrimony without their will and consent; but being contracted are not to be dissolved: Contemplatio enim utilitatis publitae privatorum commodis p●aefertur, For the consideration of the public good is to be preferred before private profit, Ful●. Pand. f. 28. Finis legis pax est, Ployd. f. 388. The Justice said, that peace and concord were the end of all Laws, and for peace the Law was made: And Dyer said, that for peace Christ descended from Heaven on Earth, and the Divine Laws of the old and new Testament were given for peace: Bacon H. 7. f. 233. And Bacon saith, When Christ came into the world, peace was sung, and when he went ●ut of the world peace was bequeathed: And Weston cited S. Aug. Concordia stat, & augetur respublica, discordia ruil, & diminuitur, By concord the Common weal standeth and flourisheth, and by discord it is diminished, & runneth to ruin: And Catiline said, that the Chariot wherein Peace was carried, was unanimity, the Rector of the Chariot, Love, the Horses which drew it, Concord and Utility, and her company and consorts were Justice and Truth, and Diligence, and her incidents were the attainment and advancement of all Arts and Sciences; and therefore peace which bringeth so many commodities, aught to be preserved above all other things. And Dyer said, that it was one of the Atticles to which the King is sworn at his Coronation to his subjects to do, that he preserve the peace, for nothing of greater benefit he cannot grant to them. And therefore those Laws which bring the more peace, are the more to be esteemed, as the Law is touching fines, which bringeth to the Possessors of Inheritances security, and maketh the certainty, and therefore Carus said, they were the more worthy because certainty engendereth repose, and incertainty contention; and to avoid incertainty in Inheritances, Fines were devised by the Founders of our Laws at the beginning of Law, for no point of our Law is of greater antiquity, and for it Glanvill was cited by Catiline, who lived in the time of Richard the first, that Contingit aliquando loquelas motas in Curia domini regis per amicabi●em compositionem, & finalem concordiam te minari, sed ex licentia regis vel ejus justiciariorum, It happened sometimes that Libels and Suits moved in the Court of the Lord the King, were ended by a loving composition, and final concord, but by the licence of the King, or of his Justices. And Bracton, therefore is it called a final concord, because finis finem litibus imponit, because a fine putteth an end to all Suits, vide ibidem plura. And for the same reason are Recoveries advanced by the Law above all other assurances, even fines themselves: and as Bacon, are the greatest security Purchasers have for their moneys, for a fine will bar the Heir entail, but not the Remainder, but a common Recovery barreth as well Estates tail, as also all Reversions and Remainders expectant, an dependant, except in the King's case, where the Remainder or Reversion is in the King, and then by the Statute of 34 H. 8. it barreth neither the Estate tail nor the Remainder, saving where the King is the Giver of the Estate tail, and leaveth the Reversion to himself, Bac. Uses, f. 52. & 53. and Dr. & Student, l. 1. c. 26. And therefore by the Statute of 23 Eliz. c. 4. It's provided, that for the avoiding the danger of assurances, and for the advancement of common recoveries, that every common recovery shall not be avoided, for any want of form in words and not in matter of substance. So the common Law is the preserver of peace, and abhorreth all force as a capital enemy to it, and therefore is more severe against those which commit any force, and subjecteth their bodies to imprisonment, whereas at the common Law, upon a recognizance, or judgement for debts and damages, a common person only shall have execution of his Goods and Chattels, and of the Corn, or other present profit groweth upon the Land, but it is a rule at the common Law, that in all Actions, Quare vi, & armis, a Capias lieth, and where a Capias lieth in Process, there after Judgement a Capias ad satisfaciendum lieth, which is the highest execution by which he shall lose his liberty, until he hath made satisfaction to the party, and fine to the King, and the King shall have a Capias p●o fine, Coke l. 3. f. 12. a. in Herbert's case, vide ibidem plura. And therefore all actions upon the case for corporal injuries, as forcible Entries, Assaults, and Batteries, which tend to the breach of the peace, may not only be pursued by action, but indictment, and are more severely and largely taken and punished by the common Law: As if four men enter into Land, and one of them entereth by force, this is force in them all, and may be impleaded by action, or impeached by indictment, 2. E. 3. 12. Communis error facit jus, a common error maketh right, Dr. Stud. c 26 f. 46. The Law so favoureth the public quiet, that it will permit a common error to pass for right, and therefore though it be objected that common recoveries were f●rst had upon feigned, and unlawful ground, and against the good order of conscience, nevertheless for as much as they have been used a long time so as they have been taken of divers men that have been right well learned, in manner, as for Law, that the buyers partly are excused so that they be not bound to restitution, and therefore Ployd. in Manxells case, f. 2. wh●ther a common recovery barreth an estate tail, is not to be disputed, because a great part of the inheritance of the Realm depend upon it. So an acquittance made by a Mayor in his own name, (where the Town is incorporate by the name of a Mayor, Sheriff, and Burgesses) shall be allowed for good, if there be an hundred precedents, and more of like acquittances, & that is for common quietness, and accordingly the Civilian, Bodin saith, l. 2. de repub. Diuturnitas temporis efficere potest ut quod pernitioso more, & exemplo inveteravit, potentius ipsa lege dominetur, the long continuance of time may effect, that what by pernicious example, & Custom hath grown old, may rule more powerfully than the Law itself, and therefore as learned Patricius saith, Concedendum est aliquid consuetudini, quae quidem diaturnitate temporis efficit, L. 1 de repub. f. 2. ut nonnulla toleranda esse videantur, que contra jus boni, & aequi esse videantur, we are to yield something to custom, which certainly by long continuance of time doth effect, that some things may seem to be tolerated, which seem to be against the rule of right, and equity, so Moses tolerated and suffered the Jews, libello repudii, by a bill of refusal to forsake their wives, though the indissoluble bond of matrimony was ordained of God, and this dispensation as our Saviour saith, was permitted for the hardness of their hearts, because their hearts through inveterate custom were hardened against that divine ordinance. Consuetudo, more utentiam approbata, vim legis obtinet, Bract. l. 3. c. 1. & Coke l. 4. f. 21. Consuetudo est altera lex, a custom approved by the manner of the users obtaineth the force of a Law, and is another Law, Arist. 1. R. for those things are done by custom as the Philosopher saith, which therefore we do, because we have often done them, and when a reasonable act once done, was found to be beneficial, and agreeable to the people, than did they use, and practise it often, and so by the reiteration and multiplication of the same became a custom, and so being without interruption, time out of mind practised for the quiet, & by the approbation of the people obtained the vigour of a law, for as Bo. princep legum, Sod. de repub. l. 1. c. 1. pulus morum magister, the Prince is the master, & founder of laws, & ordinances, and the people of manners and customs, Just. l. 1. tit. 2. which accordeth with the description of Justian, quod quisque populus sibi jus constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est, what every people ordain to be a Law to themselves, that is a proper and municipal Law of the City, Cicer. in La. Maxima est vis consuetudinis, saith the eminent Legist of Rome, the force of custom is very great, in so much that as by the Law of nature, consuetudo est altera natura, so by the Law of Nations, consuetudo est altera lex, for as Coke l. 5. Epist. ad lectorem, of his own knowledge professeth, that at this time all Kingdoms, and common Wealths are governed by Laws, and that every Nation hath his peculiar and approved Customs, which are the most usual binding, and firmest Laws, so as it is said, per varios casus artem experientia fecit, it may be said, per varios usus legem experientia fecit, Co. come. f. 97. b. There are particular Customs, and general Customs, particular Customs are such as are used in some certain County, City, Town, or Lordship, and general Customs are such as are used throughout all England, which are the common Law of England, In his preface. for as Davis, the common Law of England, is nothing but the common Custom of the Realm, and Coke, the common Law is nothing else but a common opinion generally received, and Finch. the common Law is a Law used by prescription throughout the Realm of England, Finch. Nomot. f. 75. & Ployd. f. 95. a. The common Law is nothing else but common use, and the mirror of Justice, c. 1. l. 9 The Law is ancient uses warranted by Scriptures, and is called the common Law, Dau. pref. because given to all in general, and to conclude this point with this definition, which seemeth to me to include all. Custom is a reasonable act iterated, multiplied, and continued by the people, L. 1. R. c. 3. de temps dont memoire ne court, time out of mind, Aristotle saith, injustum est apud omnes praeter consuetudines patrias quicquam agere, all Nations hold it unjust to do any thing against the Customs of the Country, which is a principle in our Law, that Custom is another Law, Ennig. Frag. and that we may say with the ancient Roman Poet, as he sung of the Romans. Moribus antiquis stat resque, Britanna virisque, The state of England standeth on the ancient Law. And though it be jus non scriptum, and only written in the memory of man, yet as Sir John Davis, it doth far excel our written Laws; namely, our Statutes, or Acts of Parliament, which is manifest in this, that when our Parliament have altered, In his preface. and changed any fundamental point of the common Law, those alterations have been found to be so inconvenient for the Commonwealth, as that the common Law hath been in effect restored again in some points, by other Acts of Parliament in succeeding ages, as it is a fundamental principle of the common Law. Quod haereditarium jus omne per feodum simplex transit, that all estates of inheritance are fee-simple, which the Statute of 13. Ed. 1. de donis conditionalibus, intended to limit, and to give every man power to create a new estate in tail, and establish a perpetuity of his Lands, so as the same should not be aliened or let, but during the life of tenant in tail, whereupon these inconveniences ensued, purchases defeated, leases evicted, and other estates and grants, made upon good consideration, avoided, creditors defrauded of their just debts, and offenders enboldened to commit capital offences, etc. who therefore were first barred by common recoveries, and then docked by fines, 15. E. 3. 14. by Herb. & Coke l. 4. Ep. ad lectorem. So the Statute of non-claime of 34. E. 3. is against a main point of the common Law, whereby ensued the universal trouble of the King's Subjects, and therefore was it altered by the Statute of H. 7. c. 24. Coke ibidem. 32. So by the grounds of the Law, Lands were not devisable before the Statute of 32: & 34. H. 8. concerning which daily experience teacheth us that many subtle and intricate questions arise concerning the construction of Wills, to the ruin of many, and hindrance of multitudes, Coke ibi. And it is a politic axiom, that the alteration of any fundamental point of the common Law which is ratified, by use and experience is most dangerous, and therefore we ought to vote and resolve with all the Earls and Barons in Parliament, holden in the twentieth year of H. 3. against the Bishops who would have introduced the civil Law. Nolumus leges Angliae mutare, we will not change the Laws of England: To which purpose I add the asseveration of Cicero, ante nostram memoriam terterum morem, Frey. Cil. de repub. ac majorum instituta retinebant excellentes viri, before our memory excellent men did retain the custom of the ancient, and the institutes of their elders. Optimus legum interpres Consuetudo, Co. l. 2. f. 81. a. The best expounder of the Law is custom. If land holden by grand Serjanty be aliened without licence, it is forfeited by the Common Law, because the service of the body cannot be transferred to another, 14 E. 3. Quare Impedit 54. but at this day it is remedied by the act 1 E. 3 c. 12. by which it is declared, that because that many people may be grieved for it, that Lands and Tenements held in chief of the King (as all those which hold by grand Serjanty are) and alien without leave, have been held as forfeited, hereafter in such case let a reasonable fine be taken. So since that Statute at all times, when Lands holden by grand Serjanty have been aliened without licence, a fine hath been taken and no seizure ever made for the forfeiture, and therefore no forfeiture to be taken, for Custom is the best Interpreter of the Law, vide etiam, L. 10. f. 70. b. Consuctudo manerii est observanda, Co. come. f. 63. a. & consuetudo loci est observanda. Brac. l. 2. f. 76. l. 4. f. 28. The custom of the Manor and the custom of the place is to be observed: for there are different customs in many Manors, and places, and the customs of one Manor, in some particulars, commonly varieth from another: And these diversities of customs have grown by reason of the several Nations who have had government over this Kingdom, Britan's, Romans, Saxons, Danes, & Normans, which have left part of their Language, and part of their usage; which difference of usage and custom is to be observed in every place and Manor: for what a Copyholder may; or aught to do, or not to do, the custom of the Manor must direct it, and if there be no custom to the contrary, waist, either premissive or voluntary of a Copyholder, is a forfeiture of his Copyhold, Co, come f. 63. a. If a Copyholder for life surrender to another in fee, it is no forfeiture, for that passeth by surrender to the Lord, and not by Livery: And Copyhold Estates shall not have the collateral qualities that the estates of the common Law have without especial custom: for the custom of the Manor is to be observed, Coke l. 1. f. 22. a. & 23. a. vide ibidem plura, & f. 28. b. Coke l. 6. f. 67. a. In a common recovery which is had by agreement and consent of parties of acres of land, the acres shall be accounted according to the customable and usual measure of the Country, and not according to the Statute De terris mensurandis made in the 33 of Ed. 1. Sir John Buntings case, 1 Eliz. So if a man bargain and sell so many acres of wood, they shall be measured according to the usage of the Country, and that is according to twenty foot to the Rod, and not according to the said act, for the custom of tho place is to be observed, 47 E. 3. 18. Coke l, 10. 140. a in Kighleys' case, It was resolved clearly, that the several Commissioners of Sewers throughout England, are not bound to pursue the Laws and Customs of Romney Marsh, but in case where any particular place within their Commission have such Laws and Customs as Romney Marsh hath, there they may pursue them, for the custom of the place is to be observed. Consuetudo vincit communem legem, coke l. 4. f. 21. Custom overcometh and mastereth the common Law, and will not always be ruled by its grounds, for a custom and usage of time, whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, may create and consolidate Inheritances. Coke comm. f. 185. b. If a man be seized of an house and possessed of divers Heir Looms, that by custom have gone with the house from Heir to Heir, and by his Will deviseth away the Heir-looms, this devise is void, for the Will taketh effect after his death, and by his death the Heir looms by ancient custom are vested in the Heir, and the Law preferreth the custom before the devise, 1 H 5 Executors 108. And so it is if the Lord ought to have an Heriot when his Tenant dieth, and the Tenant deviseth all his goods, yet the Lord ●●all have his Heriot for the reason aforesaid: And it hath been anciently said, that an Heriot shall be paid before a Mortuary, wherein the Lord is preferred, because the Tenure is in him, Co. ibidem. Ployd. f. 36. b. Whereas the Statute of 1 R. 2. c. 12. doth ordain that the Warden of the Fleet shall not suffer any one who is in execution to go out of Prison by mainprise, bail, or baston, yet it is taken by equity of the said Statute, th●t if any other Gaoler who lets such a one in execution to go out of prison with mainprize, bail, or baston, that it shall be said to be an escape: But notwithstanding that it extendeth to all other Gaolers so fully, as though it had been expressed by plain words, yet those of London use to let such go at large with baston in any place, within their jurisdiction, and shall not be judged an escape in them, and the reason of that is not because the statute in equity doth not extend to them, but the reason of it is, their prescription in that point, and all their customs and prescriptions are confirmed by the Statutes, by which they may prescribe against the equity and words of the statute, which are contrary to their customs and prescriptions, as against the statute of Silva caedua, and to hold Leet at other times than the statute appointeth, and such others, ibidem. Obtemporandum est rationabili consuetudini tanquam legi, coke l. 4. 38. b. & Littleton, Sect. 170. consuetudo ex certa causa ratienabili usitata privat communem legem, We ought to obey a reasonable custom as a Law, and a custom used upon a certain reasonable cause depriveth or over cometh the common Law: but a custom introduced against reason, is rather an usurpation than a custom, coke comm. f. 113. a. and it is a Maxim in our Law, that all customs and prescriptions which be against reason are void, coke comm. f. 140. a. As if the Lord of a Manor prescribe a custom in general, that every Tenant in his Manor that marrieth his Daughter to any man, without the licence of the Lord, shall pay a fine, and have paid a fine to the Lord for the time being; this prescription is void, for none in such case ought to pay fines but Villains, vide ibidem plura. So if the Lord of a Manor do prescribe, that, for the time being, he hath used to distrain Cattles were upon the demeans of his Manor for Damage-feasant, and the distress to retain till fine were to him for damages at his will, this prescription is void, for it is a Maxim in Law, Aliquis non potest esse judex in propria causa, no man can be a Judge in his own case, ibidem 141. a. And therefore a Fine levied before the Bailiffs of Salop was reversed, because one of the Bailiffs was a party to the fine, because he cannot be a Judge and a party, coke ibidem. So a custom that the Lord shall take for Heriot the beast of a stranger levant and couchant upon the land of the Tenant, is void, Dyer. 199. b. Custom, that the Tenant shall be amerced, if he do not put his Cattles in the Pound of the Lord, 21 H. 7. 20. Malus usus est abolendus, Lit. Sect. 212. 9 Co. come. f. 141. a. An evil use is to be abolished, for every use that is evil is against reason: for virtue is an habit consentaneous to reason, Arist. 6. Eth. c. 13. & in consuetudinibus non diuturnitas temporis, sed soliditas rationis est consideranda: In customs the long continuance of time is not to be considered, but the soundness and solidity of reason; and for that reason the Brechon Law in Ireland was by Lionel Duke of Clarence wholly abolished, because it was not a Law, but a lewd custom and absonant to reason, for by that Law Bastards did equally inherit with legitimate Sons, which is contrary to the divine Law, and the Laws of Nations which is grounded on natural reason. So coke l. 4 f. 38. b. Two Lords of two several Manors, had two Wastes adjoining, parcels of their Manors, without enclosure or separation, yet the bounds of both Manors were well enough known by certain marks: In which Wastes the Tenants of both Manors had reciprocally Common, because of vicenage of time, whereof the memory of man did not run to the contrary. But yet in this case one may enclose against the other, and by it take away the Common for cause of vicenage, because the Tenants of one Manor could not put their beasts in the Wastes of another Manor, and that the Cattles of the Tenant of one Manor did stray into the wastes of the other Manor, and therefore the enclosure is lawful only to prevent the escape of the Cattles, & malus usus abolendus. Consuetudo tollit legem, coke come. f. 31. b. Custom taketh away the common Law, as by the custom of Gavelkind, the wife shall be endowed of the Moiety, so long as she keep herself sole, and without child, which she cannot wave, and take the Thirds for herself. The customs of Gavelkind, and Borough-english are against the maxim of descent of Inheritance, 35 H. 6. 26. a. And the Customs of Kent, The Father to the Bough, and the Son to the Blow, is against the Maxim of Escheats; And that the Lessee in tail shall enter notwithstanding the Feoffment of his Father with Warranty, is against the Maxim of Discontinuance, and there are many other customs which are contrary to the particular grounds of the Law, and yet are reasonable, for they may have a reasonable beginning, and are neither prejudicial to the Common-weal, nor to the present interest of any particular person, Davis Rep. f. 32. a. b. Custom and Prescription cannot take away an act of Parliament, Coke come. f. 113. a. Dr. & Student l. 1. c. 26. f. 47. A custom or prescription of this Realm, against the Statutes of the Realm prevail not in Law. But as Coke come. f. 115. a. There is a diversity between an Act of Parliament in the Negative, and in the Affirmative, for an Affirmative Act doth not take away a Custom, as the Statutes of Wills, of 32 H. 8. do not take away custom to devise lands, as it hath been often adjudged. Moreover there is a diversity between Statutes that be in the Negative, for if a Statute in the Negative be Declarative of the ancient Law, that is an affirmance of the Common Law, there, as well as a man may prescribe or allege a custom against the common Law; so a man may do against a Statue, for as our Author saith, Consuetudo privat communem legem: As the Statute of Magna charta provideth that no Leet shall be holden but twice in the year, yet a man may prescribe to hold it oftener, and at other times, for the Statute was but in affirmance of the common Law: So the Statute of 34 E. 1. provideth that none shall cut down any Trees of his own within a Forest, without the view of the Forester, but insomuch as this act is in affirmance of the common Law, a man may prescribe to cut down Trees in a Forest without the view of the Forester, vide ibidem plura. Consuetudo licet sit magnae authoritatis nunq●am tamen praejudicat manifestae veriti, coke l. 4. f. 18. a. Custom though it be of great authority, yet doth it never by prejudice hinder the manifest truth. As that the Plaintiffs bring an action in London, for that the Defendant called the wife of the Plaintiff Whore, and the Defendant by an Habeas corpus removed it into the King's Bench; and it was moved to have a Procedendo to remand it, because that the Action was maintainable in London for the same words, but not at the common Law; and the Procedendo was denied by the whole Court, for such a custom to maintain actions for such brabbling words, is against the Law and custom, though it be of great force, yet doth it never prejudice the manifest truth. Coke l 6. f. 6. b. In Sir John Moulins case, the question was, Whether a Manor was holden of the King, and though that divers Offices, Licences of Alienations, and other Records were shown, by which it appeared that the Law had always so taken it, that the said Manor was held of the King in Capite, acd that custom is the best Interpreter of the Laws, yet in so much as by construction of Law upon the Letters Patents it appeared, that there was no immediate Tenure of the King, the Offices, etc. should not alter the true Tenure that originally did appear to them as Judges of Record, and though custom be of great authority, yet doth it never prejudice the truth, ibidem. Consuetudo debet esse certa; nam incerta pro nullis habentur, Davis f. 33 Custom ought to be certain for incertainties are esteemed for nothing in the Law, and it must be as Littleton, ex certa causa rationabili usitata, for there are three essential qualities of a custom, reason, ableness, usage, and certainty: A Writ Dum fuit infra aetatem, was brought against an Infant, the Tenant pleaded custom, that when the Infant was of such an age that he could count twelve pence, and measure a yard of cloth, that his Feoffment shall be good. It was adjudged void for the incertainty, 13 E. 3. Fitz. dum fuit infra aetatem. 3. In trespass for Trees carried away, the Defendant pleaded custom, that the Tenant of the Manor which first came to the place where, etc. shall have the Windfalls there, that custom was void also for the incertainty, vide ibidem plura. Consuetudo semel reprobata non potest amplius induci, Davis f. 33. b. A Custom must have continuance without interruption of time whereof, etc. for if it be discontinued within the time of memory it is gone. As if a Copyholder be leased of the Lord of the Manor for life, or for years, according to the course of the common Law, it shall never after be demised by Custom, as a Copyhold, for as continuance maketh custom, discontinuance destroyeth it: for unum quodque dissolvitur eodem modo, quo ligatum est, ibidem. But a Title being once gained by prescription, or custom, cannot be lost by interruption of possession, for ten, or twenty years, but by interruption in the right. As a Modus decimandi was alleged by prescription time out of mind, for tithe Lambs, and thereupon issue joined: and the Jury found before twenty years' last passed, there was such a prescription, and that for these ten years, he paid tithe Lambs in specie, and it was objected, that the party by payment of tithes in specie, had waved the custom: but it was adjudged for the Plaintiff in the Prohibition, for albeit the modus decimandi had not been paid by the space of ten years, yet the prescription being found, the substance of the Issue is found for the Plaintiff, Mich. 43. & 4. Eliz. betwixt Nowell and Hicks, Coke comm. f. 114. b. vide ibidem plura. Vbi non est gubernator dessipabitur populus, Ployd▪ 177. b. Where there is no governor, the people will be dispersed, and where there is no King or governor every one will do what is right in his own eyes, that is, where there is no Magistrate fearing God, there is no true religion, or civil order, for when the reigns of government are let lose to the many headed multitude, an ataxy of all things will ensue, and every one by rapines, and robberies, and as Cicero, per caedem, Cicero. orat pro pub. Sestio. de jure magistratus, f. 15. & vulnera, by wounds, and slaughters will snatch, and catch what they can to themselves, so as one truly, totum genus humanum periret, si magistratus non constituerentur, qui bo●os tuerentur, improbos vero coercerent, all man kind would perish, if Magistrates were not constituted, which may protect the good, and restrain the evil, for government and obedience are the two Pillars of a Society, without which it cannot subsist; government is the office of a Prince, and obedience in the duty of a Subject, which are not only necessary but profitable, as the Philosopher, to rule and obey is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Arist. l. 1. Pol. c. 3. necessary that impious, and rebellious persons may be coerced by the sword, and profitable that the upright, and peaceable be encouraged by rewards, and therefore as Tacitus, L. 1. Histo. praestat esse sub malo principe, quam sub nullo, it is better to be under an evil Prince than none, and as Kekerman, Polit. f. 21. a Tyranny is better than an Anarchy, for where there is no governor the people will be out of all good order, for though in the multitude of people, is the honour and strength of a King, yet are they murmuring, gainsaying, stiffnecked and rebellious, if they be not by a Moses powerfully ruled, and as Florus in the like case of the Romans saith, F. l. 3. f. 68 Regum, & gentium arbiter populus, ipse se regere non potest, though the people be the Umpires of all Kings, and Nations, yet cannot they rule themselves. And therefore have the Laws of this Realm utterly exploded the election of the supreme governor, because after the fate of one, before another can be elected, usually, the seeds of dissension are sown, whereby the people's minds are dissipated, and divided, (the Hydra of which evils yet remaineth in the memories of men) wherewith the Nobles and people of Poland were greiviously distracted concernining the election of their governor, some demanding the Archduke of Austria, and others Sigismond for their King, which at this day are revived by the valorous and just sword of the King of the Swedes. But our Law to prevent such factions, mischiefs and many other dis-commodities have excluded interreguum, Coke l. 4. Ep. ad lectorum. Com. 177. and introduced hereditary succession, and such a King as Mr. Ploydon saith, whose name is a name of continuance, which shall last always as the head and governor of the people, so long as the people shall remain, and the King in that name shall never die, for as Sir Edward Coke it is a maxim in our Law, Coke f. 4. Ep. ad lectorem. Ployd. 177. b. Regem Angliae nunquam mori, that the King of England never dyeth, and therefore the death of such a person as is the King is called in Law the demise of the King, because that by it he demiseth his Kingdom to another, and leaveth another to have the function, and so the dignity continueth always whichs certainly is true, in respect of his political capacity which always endureth, and never dyeth. And as Sir Edwa●d Coke, Coke l. 4. Ep. ad lectorem. the State of our Kingdom is monarchical, and from the beginning by the right of inheritance hath been successive, which is the most absolute and perfect form of government, and therefore as Mr. Ploydon, the Heir, and Successor may have the term of Sovereign Lord and may be called our Sovereign Lord, ibidem, and for this same reason, the gift of a King without saying more, trencheth to his Successors, Finch. Nomot. f. 83. Yet sometimes have our Kings (wh●n as it might be upon reasonable ground presaged, that in case of succession and descent of the royal issue, or for some other States suspicions civil dissensions might arise, to avoid future combustions) have conferred their principalities to whom they pleased counting it as lawful to appoint their Successors after them, as substitutes under them. Ba. Cron. 4. 27. So Edward the confessor appointed the Crown after his decease, sometimes to William the conqueror, sometimes to Edgar Atheline, and sometimes to Harold, and Harold after his decease upon the title, and appointment of King Edward was Crowned by the Archbishop of York, and so shortly after William Duke of Normandy, when he had defeated, Ibidem. f. 31. and slain Harold at the battle of Hastings claimed the Kingdom by the nomination of Edward the confessor, as well as by his conquest, and in these latter times, the Duke of Northumberland prevailed with King Edward the sixth to appoint the Lady Jane Daughter to the Duke of Suffolk by his Letters Patents to succeed him, Ibid. 451. which were suddenly vacuated by Queen Mary, but the most authentical, and legal way and course in such cases was the nomination, and appointment of Henry the eighth, to whom the Parliament granted power by his last Will and Testament in writing, & signed with his hand to make conditions & limitations, what he would concerning the inheritance of the Crown, who by his last Will and Testament took order that his Son Edward should succeed him in the Crown, & he dying without ●ssue his Daughter Mary, and she dying without issue his Daughter Elizabeth, who all succeeded one another in the same order. Rex est vicarius, & minister Dei in terra, omnis quidem sub eo, & ipse sub nullo nisi tantum sub Deo, Bract. l. 1. c. 8. The King is the Vicar and Minister of God upon earth, every one is under him, and he under none, but only under God, and therefore the Lands which are in the King's possession are free from tenure, for a tenant is he, which holdeth of some superior Lord by some service, so as the King cannot be a tenant, because he hath no superior but God, for as Coke l. 8 f. 118. It would be against common right, and reason that the King should hold of any or do service to any of his Subjects, and therefore all Lands holden of him mediately or immediately▪ Co. come. f. 1. and for which reason cowel thought it not so proper in the King's case to say, that he is seized in dominico suo ut de feodo, as if feodum in our Law was taken as it is in the fendall Law only for the Lands held in Services: whereas feodum, as Bracton, Britton, Fleta, and Littleton tells us idem est quod haereditas: Davis case of Tenors, f. 30. Neither can the King be a joint-tenant with any though it be of land, or other things that he had in his body natural, for none can be equal with him. And therefore if two purchase lands to them and their heirs, and one be made King, they are no more joint-tenants, but Tenants in Common, 3 Eliz 339. Nay Acts of Parliament do not bind him, unless they concern the Commonwealth, or he be specially named, 4. E. 4 21. 1 Eliz. 223. And no man can declare against the King, but he must sue by way of Petition, Ployd f. 241. b. & 18 Eliz. 498. He hath the property of all Goods that are nullius in bonis, and shall have all Tithes out of Forests, and places out of any Parish, for rex est persona mixta cum sacerdote. In a Writ of Error upon false Judgement given for the King, no Scire facias shall go forth, ad audiendum errores, for the King is always in Court, and that is the cause that the form of Entry is in all Suits for the King, in the name of his Attorney general, F.N.B. 21. b. Rex semper praesumitur attendere ardua negotia regni pro publico bono omnium, Coke l. 5. f. 56. a. It is always presumed that the King doth attend the weighty and hard things of the Kingdom for the public good of all: And therefore have the Grants of the King a more beneficial interpretation, than the Grants of the Subject that may attend their private Affairs, which are always taken more strongly against them. As if the King do grant lands to I.S. and his Heirs, and in truth I. S. is the King's Villain, that shall not enfranchise the Villain by Implication: The same Law is of an Alien born, 17. E. 3. 39 The Advowson of Pravondry holden of the King was aliened to an Abbot, and his Successors, and that the Successors shall hold the Provandry to their own use. The King shall seize the Advowson for Alienation in Mortmain, and destroy the Appropriation, for he shall not be ousted of his right of Advowson by Implication. So 2 R. 2. 4. If two be indebted to the King, and the King release to one, it shall not discharge the other, for no prejudice shall accrue to the King by construction or implication upon his Grant, more than he truly intended by it, ibidem. So if a release be made by him of all demands, the right of Inheritance shall not be released, 6 H. 7. 15. If the King granteth lands in fee upon condition that they do not alien it is good, but in all these cases it is otherwise in the case of a common person. And in many cases the King who claimeth by a Subject, shall be in a better case in respect of the Prerogative incident to his Royal person, than the Subject himself, by whom he claimeth: As if the King have a Rentseck by Attainder of Treason, or by Grant, he shall distrain for it, not only in the land charged, but also in all his other lands, and yet the Subject by whom he claimeth shall not distrain. If a Subject have Recognizance, or an Obligation, and after is outlawed, or attainted, the King shall seize all the land of the Conusor or Obligor, where he himself can have but the Moiety, the King shall take advantage of a Condition broken without demand, whereas a common person who claimeth under the King, cannot re-enter for non payment of Rent without demand made: And if the King purchaseth a Lordship, of which land is holden by posteriority, the King shall have the priority, vide ibidem plura, in Knight's case. Davis f. 45. If a common person grant rend, or any other thing which lieth in grant only, without limitation of any estate, by the delivery of the deed only, a Franktenement shall pass, 17 E. 3. 43. a. If the King grant rend, or land, without the limitation of any estate, the Grant is merely void for the incertainty, 7 Ass. pl. 1. and the Grantee shall not be Tenant at Will, as it is ruled in the case of Alton Wood Ployd. f. 243. The Grant of the King is taken more strongly against a stranger, and more favourable to the King, although the thing granted come to the King by purchase or descent: Whereas it is otherwise of a common person. As a grant of a Manor by the King, the Advowson shall not pass without special words: So the King may grant a thing in action, which another cannot: So if the part of an entire thing cometh to the King, the Common Law hath given him all: As if an Obligation be made to two, and one is outlawed, the King shall have all the duty: So he shall have an entire Horse or Ox, which one who is outlawed holdeth in Common, ibidem, So Coke l. 9 f. 129. b. Quando jus domini regis, & subditi in simul concurrunt, jus regis preferri debet, when the right of the King and the Subject concur and meet together, the right of the King ought to be preferred; as in Dame Hales case, Baron and Feme, Joint tenants of a term for years, the Baron is felo de se, the Baron shall forfeit all. Ployd. Com. 262. vide ibidem plura, in Quicks case. The King may mend his Declaration that term that it is put in, p. 13 E. 48. So the King may wave his Demurrer and traverse the plea of another, M. 28 H. 6. f. 2. So if the King grant lands in fee, with Warranty against all, the Patentee shall not have value in recovery without express words to have value: So the King may make a Lease to a stranger, this reservation is good, and the stranger shall distrain for it, or have an action of debt after the Lease determined, M. 35. H. 6. f. 36. Ployd. f. 243. a. So for arrearages of Rent-charge granted to the King, he may distrain in all other lands of the Grantor, H. 13 E. 4. f. 6. So if the Title appeareth to the King upon Plea of other parties, the Court of Office shall adjudge it for the King, though he be not party to the Issue, Ployd. f. 243. b. vide ibidem plura. And as the Common Law cannot bind the King, no more can private Customs, and therefore the custom of that, if one pawn Goods that he that hath the pawn shall hold them whose soever they be, until the money for which they were pawned be paid unto him, shall not bind the King, where his goods were pawned by a stranger. So sale of goods made by a stranger ●n Market-overt, shall not alter the property, nor bind him, M. 3. H. 6. 28. And if a man have wrack of the Sea, if the Goods of the King be wracked, he shall gain no property by it against the King: And so it is of Prescription to have goods waved or estrayed, M. 35 H. 6. 27. Ployd. ibidem vide plura. Nullum tempus occurrit regi, Ployd. f. 243. No Prescription of time runs against the King: As if right of entry descend to the King▪ and the Disseisor dieth seized, it shall not take away the entry of the King, M. 35. H. 6. 27. So if a Villain alien his land the Lord may enter when he pleaseth. Coke come. f. 41. b. If Tenant for life, or Tenant in Dower grant over his or her estate, and the Grantee dieth, there shall be an Occupant, but against the King there shall be no Occupant, because nullum tempus occurrit regi. Coke l. 6 f. 29. b. At the Common Law if any one had usurped upon the King, and his Presentee had been admitted, instituted and inducted (for without Induction the Church is not full against the King) yet the King may have a Quare Impedit, and by it he shall remove the Incumbent, for no act of the Bishop, or any other can bar the King of his right, & nullum tempus, etc. vide ibidem plura, & Ployd. 243. a. Coke l. 7. f. 28. If Title to present by Lapse be devolved to the Queen, and the Patron presenteth a Clerk who is admitted, instituted, and inducted, and dieth, the King hath lost his Title to present by Lapse, for the King had but unam & unicam presentationem hac vice, which cannot be extended to the second avoidance, and the statute de prerogativa regis, quod nullum tempus occurrie regi is to be understood when the King hath a certain permanent interest, and not when he hath an interest specially limited, vide ibidem plura in Baskerviles' case. All which proceed from the Prerogative the Common Law giveth the Prince, which is so large, Nom. f. 85. Davis in his Preface as Sir Henry Finch saith, that you shall find that to be Law almost in every case of the King, that is Law in no case of the Subject: And therefore Sir John Davis confidently averreth, that the Common Law doth excel all other Laws in upholding a free Monarchy, which is the most excellent form of Government, exalting the Prerogative Royal, and being tender and watchful to preserve it. And yet maintaining all the ingenuous liberty of the Subject. Davis ibidem. But though the Common Law allow so many Prerogatives to the King, yet shall he not hurt others by them. As if a Bridge be repairable by the Subject, and is in decay, the pardon of the King shall not excuse him who ought to do it, because others, to wit the Subjects of the Realm, have an interest in it. So if one have Jewels in pawn for ten pounds, and he that putteth them to pawn is attainted, the King shall not have the Jewels unless he pay ten pounds, for his Prerogative will not prejudice another, Ployd. f. 487. a. b. So the Earl of Kent had the return of certain Cattles in Replevin in 13 R. 2. and the Proprietor of the Cattles was attainted. There it is holden that the Earl of Kent shall retain the Cattles against the King, until he is satisfied for the thing, and the Prerogative of the King will not discharge them of the return, because the Prerogative will not give prejudice to another, vide ibidem plura, in Nichols case. Rex est caput & salus reipublicae, & a capite bona valetudo transit in omnes, Coke l. 4. f. 124. b. The King is the head and safety of the Commonweal, and as from the head health is conveyed to the body, so from the King safety is conveyed to the Commonweal, which is the body of the Kingdom, for from him Justice is distilled to all, by which all men are preserved in peace and safety, as Ployd. f. 242. b. All justice, tranquillity, and repose is derived from him as the Fountain of it, and therefore by Bracton he is called Author juris, L. 3. c. 9 the Author of right, by whom right is separated from injury, equity from iniquity, that all subject to him may live honestly, that not one should hurt another, and that to every one, what is his, be by a right contribution restored. And by Homer, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God's Scholars, and by a more divine Poet, Gods themselves, especially because they sit on Gods own Seat when they minister justice to the people, Dixi quod dii estis. and that the Rules of Justice be their principal Lesson, Which like the Sun in the Firmament, to which Justice is rightly resembled, he is to communicate to all the Creatures of his Commonweal: And as the King is the Sun and Fountain of Justice, so are the Judges and Professors of the Law but Conduit Pipes to convey the streams of his Justice throughout all the Kingdom: L. 4 Ep ad l. A. Chron. 19.6, 7. Whereupon Sir Edward Coke hath this observation from the divine Text, videte Judices, Take heed you Judges what ye do, for ye judge not for man, but for the Lord, who is with you in the Judgement, wherefore let the fear of the Lord be upon you, take heed and do it, for there is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, nor taking gifts: And so, saith he, must every Judge be just, without respect, to give every man his own. Protectio trahit subjectionem, & subjectio protectionem, Coke l. 7. f. 5. Calv. case, Protection draweth subjection, and subjection protection. Legiance is the mutual Bond and Obligation between the King and his Subjects, whereby Subjects are called his liege Subjects, because they are bound to obey and serve him, and he is called their liege Lord, because he shall maintain and defend them. And as there ought to be a mutual connexion of dominion and fidelity between the Lord and Tenant, ita quod, quantum debet domino ex homagio, tantum illi debet dominus ex dominio, as Glanvil saith, so that how much the Tenant oweth the Lord by homage and service, so much doth the Lord own the Tenant by his power and protection, for the Law saith, he is to defend his Tenant; so is there an higher and greater connexion between the Sovereign and the Subject, for the Subject oweth to the King his true and faithful obedience, and the Sovereign is to protect and govern his Subjects. For as Fortescue, Rex ad tutelam legis, corporum, & bonorum erectus est. Del. l. A. C 13. the King is raised to defend the Laws, the Bodies, and Goods of his Subjects: and frustra feruntur leges nisi obedientibus, in vain were it to prescribe Laws to any but to such as are obedient, Coke ibidem f. 7. And as Coke l. 11. f. 100 obedientia est legis essentia: obedience is the essence of the Law, and therefore ought all Citizens and Burgesses to give obedience and reverence to the chief Magistrates in their Cities and Burghes because they derive their authority from the King, whom by leigiance we are bound to obey. judex bonus nihil ex arbitrio suo faciat, nec proposito domesticae voluntatiis, sed juxta leges, & jura pronunciet. A good Judge may do nothing of his own phantacy, nor according to the power of his own domestical will and affection, but is to pronounce sentence according to the Laws and right, Co. l. 7. f. 27. Calv. case. For Judges have not power to Judge according that which they think to be fit, but that which out of the Laws they know to be right, and consonant to the Laws, for Judex est lex loquens, a Judge ought to be a speaking Law, f. 4. and as Coke saith, l. 4. f. 33. b. Judicandum est legibus non exemplis, we ought to Judge by Laws, and not by examples, and therefore by Glanvill, is a Judge called Justitia in abstracto, because he should be as it were Justice itself, to put him in mind of their duty, and office, and now in the legal Latin are the Judges called Judiciarij in Concreto, and not Judices, because they should be just, Coke come. f. 71. b. Judicis est judicare secundum allegata, & probate. A Judge ought to Judge according to what is alleged and proved, Dyer f. 12. P. 50. As in a Formedon, if the Demandant count of a Feoffment in fee, and not in tail, if the tenant demur upon it, clearly, the Court cannot maintain the Declaration to be good, because the Judge is to Judge according to what is alleged, and approved. Ployd. f. 83. b. The Judges have a private knowledge, and a judicial knowledge, and Judges cannot judge of their private knowledge, but may use their discretion, as appeareth in 7. H. 4. f. 31. Where the Ring demanded of Justice Gascoine this question, that if he did see one kill I. S. and another that was guilty was indicted for it before him, and found guilty of the same death, what then would he do in this case, who answered that he ought to respite judgement before him, because he knew the contrary, and to make relation thereof to the King to show him grace, and mercy, and the King was well pleased that the Law was such, and further added that he could not acquit him, and give judgement of his own private knowledge▪ for as the Civilians, Judex non debet exequi sententiam nisi de veritate constat. a Judge ought not to execute judgement, unless it appear before him to be true, but where we have judicial knowledge, there we may and aught to judge according to it, as if one be arraigned upon an indictment for any offence, which is pardoned by Parliament, there we ought not to proceed in it, nor give judgement if he be found guilty, because it appeareth to us by judicial Science, that we ought not to arraign him, for the Judges ought to take cognizance of the Statutes, which shall appear to them judicialiter, although they be not pleaded, Ibidem. Officia magistratus non debent esse vaenalia, Coke come. f. 234. a. Offices of magistracy, and judicature ought not to be sold, and therefore by the Statute of 12. R. 2. c. 21. It is provided that no Officer, or Minister of the King shall be ordained, or made for any gift, favour, brocage, or affection, nor that any which pursueth by him, or any other privately, or openly to be in any manner of office shall be put into the same office, or in any other, but that all such Officers shall be made of the best, and most lawful men, and sufficient, a Law worthy to be written in Letters of Gold, saith Sir Edward Co. but more worthy to be put in execution, for certainly Justice shall never be duly administered, but when the Officers and Ministers of justice be of such quality, and come to their places in such manner as by this Law is required. Mich. 13. Jacobi. Sir Robert Vernon coferor of the King's house, who had a great pension out of the King's revenue, for moneys did bargain and sell the same to Sir Aug and agreed to surrender the said Office to the King, to the intent that a grant might be made to the said Aug. and thereupon the said office by the King's appointment was admitted, and sworn Cofferer, and it was resolved by Sir Thomas Edgerton Lord Chancellor, the chief Justice and others to whom the King referred the same by the Statute of 5. E. 6. c. 16. whereby it is provided that if any officers touching the Administration of justice, or Clerkeship in any Court of Record, or concerning the King's Treasure, Revenue, Custom, Alnage, Auditorship, King's Surveyor or keeping of any of his Majesty's Castles, Forts, etc. shall bargain, or sell any of the said Offices, or any deputation of the same, or take any money or profit, or any promise, covenant, bond, or assurance shall not only forfeit his estate, but also every person so buying, giving, or assuring, be adjudged a disabled person, to have or to hold the same Office, or Offices, deputation, etc. and that all such bargains, sales, promises, covenants, and assurances, as be before specified shall be void, except as in the said act, is excepted, quod vide, and that A. was disabled to have, or to take the said office, and that no non obstante could dispense with this Act, to enable the said A. for the reason before mentioned, and hereupon the said Sir A. was removed, and Sir Marmeduke Darnell sworn by the King's appointment in his place, and note that all promises, bonds, and assurances, as well on the part of the Bargainor, as the Bargainee are void by the said Act, Ibidem. And so by the Statute of 13. Eliz., all presentations, admissions, and inductions, upon any gift of the person presented, or any gift, or consideration without the consent or motion of the party shall be void, whereas before they were void only by deprivation, and the said Statute doth not only extend to benefices with cure, but to dignities, prebends, and all ecclesiastical live. Securius expediantur negotia, commissia pluribus, Co. l. 11. f. 4. a. in Auditor Carls case, offices committed to many are more safely discharged. And therefore by the Statute of 32. H. 8. it is provided that there shall be two persons named to the King's highness, which shall be called the Auditors of the Lands, of his grace's Wards, and the King cannot constitute one only, for the subject by the Act hath an interest in it, and more safely are the businesses dispatched which are committed to many and therefore though the words of the grant be conjuctim & divisim, & alterius eorum diutius viventi, yet are they not material, for if an office be granted to two, pro termino vitarum suarum, without more by the death of one of them, the grant shall be void, for being an office of trust, there shall be no Survivor: And in this case no Survivor shall be, because the Act saith there shall be two persons, and though the King may constitute one at one time, and another at another time, yet he that is first chosen shall have no judicial voice, until the other is constituted, and to this purpose there may be a Survivor of one of the persons to whom another shall be added. Plus vident oculi, quam oculus, & nemo potest supplere vicem duarum personarum, Coke l. 4. f. 46. a. Two eyes see more than one, and no person can supply the place of two, and f. 118. a. As if a baron be made Knight of the Garter, or Warden of the Cinque Ports, he shall have but three Chaplains in all, notwithstanding the Statute of 21. H. 8., for though he hath divers dignities, yet is he the same person to whom the attendance is to be made, for it is a difficult matter for one man to supply the place of two, and though it be a ground, quando duo jura in una persona conveniunt, aequum est ac in diversis, when two rights concur & meet together, it is all one as if it were in several; yet this Act was always construed strictly against non-residencies, and pluralities, as a thing very prejudicial to the service of God, and instruction of the people, and therefore if a Bishop be translated to an Arch Bishopwrick, or a Baron be created an Earl, and now hath both those dignities, yet by this act he shall have but so many Chaplains as an Archbishop, or an Earl may have for the reason abovesaid, Ibi. Minister legis non tenetur in executione officij sui sugere aut recedere, Coke l. 9 f. 68 a. in Makalies' case, a Officer, or Minister of Justice is not bound in the execution of his office to fly, or to go back, and therefore an Officer and Minister of the Law in the execution of his office, if there be any resistance, and assault, is not bound to fly to the wall, etc. as other Subjects are, for the life of the Law is more favoured then the life of man, and the execution of the Process of Law, and the offices of the conservators of the peace, are the soul, and life of the Law, and the means by which justice is administered, and the peace of the Realm guarded. Officia judicialia non concedantur, ante quam vacant, Coke l. 11. f. 4. in Auditor Curls case, judicial offices ought not to be granted before they are void, and therefore was it resolved in that case, that the grant made by the King to John Churchill, and John took in reversion after the death of T. and C. was void, partly, because it was a judicial office, for these Auditors are one of the judges of the Court, and as none can give any judgement of things which happen in future, so none can be a judge in future, and great inconvenience would thereupon ensue, for he who at the time of the grant of the reversion may be able, and sufficient to supply the place of judicature, and administer justice to the Subjects of the King before the office fall, may become unable, and insufficient to perform it, and it was resolved that neither the office of master of the Wards, nor of the Survivor, nor of the Attorney of the same Court may be granted in reversion, because they are judiall offices. But ministerial and secular offices may be granted in fee, in tail, for life, or at will, as the offices of the Constable of England, Martial, Vis-count, or the Warden of the Fleet, and the reason is because those temporal officers have their offices in their natural capacity, and the King in policy may suppress, and revive those offices, pro loco & tempore, and by consequence may limit temporal estates in them, Davis f. 45. b. So the office of keeping of our Lady of Lincoln was entailed, and a Formedon brought upon that gift of the Office by the Issue in tail, 18 E. 3. 27. The Office of one of the Chamberlains of the Exchequer was entailed, 1 H. 7. 8. The Office of a Fostership was entailed, 4 H. 7. 10. 9 Coke comm. f. 20. a. vide ibidem plura. Aliquis non debet esse judex, in propria causa, immo iniquum est aliquem suae rei esse judicem, Coke l. 8. f. 118. a. No man ought to be Judge in his own case, yea, it is a partial and unequal thing that any one should be a Judge in his own matter: In Dr. Borhams case, in which case one of the reasons there alleged was, that the censors had not power to commit Dr. Bonham, because they could not be Judges, Ministers, and Parties; Judges to give sentence, Ministers to make summons, and Parties to have the Moiety of the forfeiture, for no man can be a Judge in his own case; one cannot be a Judge and an Attorney, 3 E. 6. f. 65. Dyer. If any act of Parliament give to any one power to hold, or have Cognizance of all manner of pleas before him, arising within his Manor of D. yet he cannot hold plea to which he himself is a party: for it is unequal for any one to be a judge in his own matter, vide ibidem plura. Yet in some cases one shall be his own Judge, Paymaster, and Carver. As if the Lessor covenant to repair the house, if he do not, and the Lessee do it, he may pay himself out of the rent, 12 H. 8. 1. Guardians of a Church at their own costs repair the Church, and for amends detain ten load of stones of the Parishioners, for which the Successors Guardians bring an action of account, and adjudged that they may lawfully detain them, 37 Eliz. Metholl and Winge. So Tailors and Ostlers may detain the Robe, or Horse, etc. until reasonable satisfaction is given. If one to whom the Testator is indebted, will not receive Goods in recompense, than it is lawful for the Executor to pay him with his own money, and retain so much Goods of the Testator, for it may be there is a penalty which will be forfeited before that he can sell the Goods of the Testator, Dyer f. 2. pl. 7. Quicquid non excutitur, justitia non putatur, Reg. I.C. & Coke l. 6. f. 52. a. Quicunque aliquid statueret parte inaudita altera aequum licet statuerit haud aequum fecerit, whatsoever is not discussed and tried, is not to be reputed Justice: and if any one shall decree any thing, one of the parties being not heard, though he doth decree that is right, yet hath he not done that is just and equal, in Bosewels case, where it was resolved, that no Incumbent shall be removed by a Quare Impedit, or an Assize of Darrein presentment purchased within the six months, unless the Incumbent be named in the Writ, although the Incumbent be in a defeasible Title, for than he shall be removed and adjudged not being heard, & Quicunque aliquid, etc. So Coke l. 11. f. 99 a. in James Baggs case, though the Mayor and Counsel-chamber of Plymmouth have lawful authority either by their Charter or Prescriprion to remove any one from his freedom, and that they have just cause to remove him, yet if it appear by the return that they have proceeded against him without hearing him to answer to what is objected, or that he was not reasonably warned, such a removement is void, and shall not bind the party. In ancient times, where any were found guilty by the good people, by Inquest for any mortal Offence, the King gave order to execute them without any answer. Mirror of Justice, which custom may seem to be derived from the Dictator's power among the Romans who had authority to cast any into prison, and to punish him with death indicta causa: And which also was a custom among the Gauls, De Laud. l. Aug. 4. 82. whom now we call French, which as Fortescue saith, in his time remained among them, to wit, That the King usually calling his Nobles into his Counsel-chamber, without any form of judgement, were adjudged criminous by the Conscience of the Prince, and thereupon were they presently by the Marshal's servants put into Sacks, and in the night by them precipitated into deep rivers and so drowned. And which custom also was used in Almain. But King Alfred in compassion of the frailty of man, who cannot keep himself from sinning without the assistance of the grace of God, abrogated that custom, and decreed that no Appelle, or Inditee should be condemned, or executed without answer, Mirror of Justice, l. 2 f. 3. which still continueth: and therefore saith Coke l. 2. Epist. ad lectorem, are our Laws commended above other, which punisheth not the greatest Offenders, though it be for Treason, but by just and equal proceed in Law, according to the ancient Laws of England declared by the general Charter, Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus justitiam & rectum. And therefore saith Fortescue, De Laud. l. A. f. 122. It is part of the charge of the Judge's Oath, not for any command of the Prince, either by Letters, or by word of mouth, to deviate from Justice, or to deny right to any, but to minister justice and right indifferently, to all as well enemies as friends: and accordingly saith he, Queen Elizabeth's charge to the Justices was, That for no commandment of hers common right should be disturbed, or delayed: Whereas in other Countries the Judges had rather misconstrue the Law, and do injustice, then to displease the King's humour, according to the old Sarchasme, Ad libitum regis sonuit sententia legis. For which unlawful and wilful perverseness, some of our later Kings have been blamed, and for which as Frossard saith, l. 2. c. 3. Edward the second was condemned, quoth in audita causa aliquos proceres de medio tollebat, that he did punish with death some of his Nobles without hearing their case, neither was the stupendious proceeding of Henry the vl against his new created darling the Lord Cromwell commendable, Hen 8. f. 71 or allowable, though acted by Parliament, who being accused of high Treason and Heresy, as Godwin saith, inauditus damnatur, is condemned without hearing his answer. Neither is David's unjust judgement, in condemning Mephibosheth being absent, 2 Kings 16. and unheard upon the false accusation of Siba approved, for whosoever shall decree any thing, the other being not heard, though the decree be right, yet it is not just and equal. Quicunque jussu judicis aliquid fecerit, non videtur dolo malo fecisse, quia parere necesse est, Coke l. 10. f. 70. b. He that doth any thing by commandment of the judge, seemeth not to have done any thing with a fraudulent intent, because he needs must obey. And therefore the Officers and Ministers of a Court are not to be punished for executing the precept and warrant of the Court, whereas if they had refused to do it, the Court would have punished them for their disobedience. As in 16 E 3. 70. it is taken for a Maxim, that the thing which the Officer doth by Precept or warrant of the Court, cannot be said to be against the peace, & Dr. & Stud. f. 150. The Officers of the King are bound to execute the Writs of the King at their peril. But this diversity is to be taken, that when a Court hath jurisdiction of a Cause, and proceedeth erroneously, there the party who sueth, or the Officers and Ministers of the Court that execute the precept and process of the Court, are not liable to an action: but when the Court hath no jurisdiction of the Cause, and all the proceeding is coram non Judice, actions do lie against them without any regard to the precept or process; for when he hath no jurisdiction he is no judge, and it is not of necessito obey him who is no judge, no more than a mere stranger; for it is a rule, Extra terratorium jus dicente, non paretur impune, He that obeyeth in prescribing Laws beyond his jurisdiction shall not go without punishment Co. ibid. f. 57 A, & B. And therefore 22 E. 4.33. Pigot said, that if the Court hath not power and authority, their proceeding is coram non Judice, As if the Court of the Common Bench hold plea in an appeal of death, robbery, etc. and the Defendant is attaint, it is coram non Judice: but if the same Court in an a plea of debt award a Capias against a Duke, etc. which by the Law lieth not against him, and it appeareth in the Writ itself, yet if the Sheriff arrest him by force of that Capias, because the Court hath jurisdiction of the Cause, the Sheriff is excused, though the writ is against the Law. And so if a Capias cometh unto him without an Original, and he serveth it, it is excusable in false imprisonment. Dyer f 60. pl. 26. So if a justice of Peace make a Warrant to arrest one for felony which is not indicted, though the justice of Peace err in the Warrant of it, yet he that maketh the Arrest by force of that Warrant, shall not be punished by a Writ of false imprisonment, because that he is judge of the Cause, 14 H. 8. 16. Factum a Judice, quod ad ejus officium non pertinet, ratum non est, Reg. I. C. & Coke l. 10. f. 76. b. Judicium a non suo Judice datum nullius est momenti. An act done by a judge, which doth not appertain to his Office, is not allowed, and a Judgement given by him, is not his proper judge, is of no weight nor moment,: As if the Sheriff who is prescribed by the Law to hold his Turn within a month after Michaelmas, holdeth his Turn after the month, and taketh an Indictment of robbery at the same Turn, and the Indictment is by a Certiorari removed into the King's Bench, by advice of all the justices, the party so indicted was discharged, because the Indictment was utterly void, & coram non judice: because at that time the Sheriff had no authority to hold it. And if a man have a Leet which is holden at a day certain, if he hold it another day, such Court so holden is void, and without Warrant; but it is otherwise of a Court Baron, Coke ibidem, but if the Court of Common Bench holdeth plea without an Original, it is not void, for they are judges of those pleas, and it cannot be said that the proceeding is coram non judice, 19 E. 4. 8. judgement in the marshalsea when none of the parties be of the household of the King, may be avoided by plea without any Writ of Error, which proveth that it is void, 6 N. 2. So in Trespass before the Marshal, if none of the parties be of the household of the King, it is coram non judice, because they pass their power, 29 E. 4. 16. If one of the Queen's household sue another of the same household, and the Plaintiff is put out of service, the plea depending, the other may show this and abate the Writ, but otherwise it is, if the Defendant be put out of service, Lib. de divers. des Courts f. 102. b. And if a man be impleaded in the common place, for lands within the Cinque-ports, the Tenant may show to the Court that the land is within the Cinque-ports, and by this plea the Court shall be outed of jurisdiction: but if the Tenant doth plead in bar, which is found against him, and the Demandant have judgement, to recover the land, t● is judgement shall bind the Tenant for ever, Ib. 107. b And so it is of land in ancient Demesne, if a Writ be brought for them in the common place, if the Tenant appear and plead the bar and taketh no exception to the jurisdiction, and the plea is found against him, so that the Demandant recovereth, he shall not reverse this by a Writ of Error, because he might have taken exception to the jurisdiction of the Court, and that should have been allowed, ibidem: But the Lord may reverse this judgement by a Writ of Deceit, and make the land ancient Demesne, as it was before. If a man devise to one, lands devisable, the Devisee cannot sue for these lands in the Ecclesiastical Court: but if he make a devise of goods and chattles real, as a term of years or of a ward, he may for such sue in that Court, F. N. B. f. 43. b. Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicendi, Coke l. 10 f. 73. jurisdiction is a power introduced by the public, for the necessity of decreeing and doing right. The jurisdiction of the Court of the Marshally was first instituted for the necessity of the rule and governance of the Servants of the King's household, and therefore was it anciently styled, placita corona aulae hospiti● domini regis, the Pleas of the Court of the household of the Lord the King, by which words it is proved that the one, or the other party ought at the least to be of the household of the King, for how can these words stand when neither of the parties be of the household of the King, and that is the reason that it is not necessary in suits before the Steward and Martial, to allege that the Plaintiff or Defendant were of the household of of the King, for the stile of the Court doth the same imply, ibidem. So the jurisdiction of the Court of Py-powders was introduced for the necessity of doing right in suits, and matters concerning Markets, and as that Court hath not jurisdiction, but for things concerning the Market, so hath it not jurisdiction for matters concerning the Market, unless they be done in the same Market, M. 42. & 42. Eliz in B. R. Hall brought a Writ of Error against Jones, of a judgement given in the Court of Py-powders, of the Market, etc. for Jones one of the Registers of the Bishop of Gloucester, because Hall had published slanderous words of him, etc. and the judgement was reversed for two errors, because those words did not concern any matter concerning the Market, and therefore the Court had no jurisdiction of it, but if one slander any that shall come into the Market in any thing which concerneth his trade, an Action well lieth against them and 2. it appeareth in the count, that the words were spoken before the Market, and not in it, for the Court hath only jurisdiction of those things which are done, and said in the Market, ibidem, a. & b. Where there is no colour to hold Plea, as in a Court Baron of Land, not holden of a manor, all is void, but where there is colour to hold Plea, though it be by plaint, where it should be by original, yet the judgement rendered is only voidable by a Writ of Error, ibidem. Non pertinet ad judicem secularem cognoscere de ijs, quae sunt spiritualibus annexa, Bract. l. 5. c. 2. It doth not appertain to the secular judge to take cognizance of those things, which are annexed to spiritual things: And therefore the branches of Trees which are privileged from Tithes shall be also privileged, but the suit for the Tithe branches of Trees which are not privileged, shall be in the spiritual Court, as well as the suit for the Tithe of Trees themselves. Res judicata pro veritate accipitur, Coke come. 103. a. The thing adjudged is taken for truth. As in an Action of debt upon an Obligation against an Abbot, the Abbot acknowledgeth the Action, and dyeth, the successor shall not avoid execution, though the Obligation was made without the assent of the Covent, for he cannot falsify the recovery in an higher Action, and the thing judged is taken for truth, and this is but a Chattel, and so is it of a Statute, or Recognizance acknowledged by an Abbot, and Prior, ibidem. And therefore doth the Law so much respect the certainty of judgement, and the credit, and authority of judges, as it will not permit any error to be assigned, that impeacheth them in their trust, and office, and in wilful abuse of the same, but only in ignorance or mistaking either of the Law, or of the Case, and matter of fact, according to the rule, de fide & officio judicis non recipitur quaestio, Bac. Max. f. 62. sed de scientia, sive error sit juris sive facti, there is no question to be made of the office, and faith of a judge, but of his knowledge whether it be error in Law, or fact, as if I will assign for error, that whereas the verdict passed for me, the Court received it contrary, and so gave judgement against me, this shall not be received, F. N. B. f. 21. So if I will allege, that whereas I. S. offered to plead a sufficient bar, the Court refused it, and drove me from it, this error shall not be allowed, 3. H. 6. 3. If an appeal of maihme be brought, and the Court by the assistance of the Chirurgeons adjudge it to be a maihme, the party cannot bring a Writ of Error, 1. Mar. 5. If a woman bring a Writ of Dower, and the tenant pleadeth her husband was alive, this shall be tried by proofs, and not by jury, and upon judgement given on either side, no Error lieth, 8. H. 6. 23. If nul till Record be pleaded, which is to be tried by inspection of the Record, upon judgement no Error lieth, 5 E. 4. 3. So if upon judgement given upon confession for default, and the Court do assess damages, the Defendant shall never bring a Writ though the damages be outrageous, F. N. B. 23. And the reasons of these cales are, that the Law will not have the judges called in quostion in the point of their office when they undertake to discuss the issue, and to examine again what the Court had tried, were to attaint the Court; yet there may be question of the Error in Law, or the Error in Fact, and Errors in Law, and Errors in Fact, or ever of such matters as were not crossed by the Record, as to allege the death of the tenant, at the time of the judgement given, and nothing appeareth on Record to the contrary; so when an infant levieth a fine, and it appeareth not upon Record that he is an infant, than it is error in fact, and shall be tried by inspection during nonage, F. N. B. 21. And you shall never allege an error in fact, contrary to the Record, as if a man will assign for error, that whereas the judges gave judgement for him, the Clerks entered it in the Roll against him, this error shall not be allowed, and yet it doth not touch the judges but the Clerks, but the reason is, if it be an error, it is an error in fact, vide Ba. Max. f. 65. Novum judicium non dat jus novum, sed declarat antiqum quia judicium est quasi jurisdictum, & per judicium jus est noviter revelatum, quod diu fuit velatum, Coke l. 10. f. 42. a. A new judgement doth not give or make a new Law, for judgement is the voice of the Law, and by judgement the Law is newly revealed, that hath long been covered, as that though it seemed to be a new opinion, that tenant in tail cannot be restrained from suffering a common recovery, yet it appeareth by the ancient Books, and Litt. also, that it is not of late invention, and it is true the Law sometime sleepeth, but judgement, it awaketh, and certainly these perpetuities were born under an unfortunate constellation, for in so great a number of suits concerning them in all the Courts of Westminster, they never had any one judgement given for them, but many judgements given against them, & by which those fettered inheritances of the Frank-tenements of the Subjects be set at liberty according to their original freedom, vide ibidem plura. Mandatum ita regulatur in superioribus sicut in privatis a voluntate mandantis, Reg. I. C. a commandment is regulated from the will of the Commander, as well in higher, as in private things, so as in every command the will of the Commander is to be considered and observed, and therefore Coke come 258. a. Regularly it is true, that where a man doth less than the commandment, and authority committed to him, there the commandment and authority being not pursued, the act is void. The King licenseth an Abbot, and Covent to alien, and the Abbot sole alieneth, it is void, 11. H. 7. 8. And the rule is given by Frowick, when the King maketh any grant, or licence, it ought to be executed accordingly, and strictly, as if the King granteth to me a licence to make a Feoffment by Deed, I cannot make a Feoffment without Deed, nor e contra, so that the licence must ever be pursued or otherwise the act done is not warranted by the licence, 18. Ass. Pl. ult. The licence was to levy a fine of the Manor of Dale, to find two Chaplains, and he would have levied the fine leaving out the Chaplains, and could not be suffered, 3. E. 3. 5. Davis in his case of tenors, f. 19 The Statute of Merton, c. 3. ordaineth, that in a re-disseisin, the Sheriff, assumptis secum custodibus placitorum coronae, do go to that tenement of which the complaint is made, if the Sheriff take but one Coroner it is not good, for the Act appointeth a number two at the least, which number ought to be satisfied, or else the authority given by them is not pursued, 23 Ass. 7 Ployd. f. 393. So as it is manifest a nude authority must be pursued strictly, both for matter or manner, or the act down by colour of the authority i● void, Dyer ibidem, f. 20. Coke come. f 52. a. b. If a man be disseised of black acres, and white acres, and a Warrant of Attorney is made to enter into both and to make livery here, if the Attorney enter into black acre only, and maketh a livery and seisin, secundum formam chartae, there the livery of seisin is void, for the estate of the disseisor cannot be devested in white acre without an entry. In a praecipe quod reddat, there must be two Summoners there, for Summons by one summoner is not good because he doth not pursue the authority of the Writ, and if there be but one, and the tenant make default, and lose by default, he shall have a Writ of deceit, Ployd. 393. 50. E. 3. 16. When a man assigneth Auditors to Accomptants, and they be found in arrearages, by the Statute of W. 2. c. 12. they may be arrested, and by the warrant of the Auditors sent to Goal, there if there be but one Auditor assigned, he cannot commit the Accountant to the Goal, for the Statute limiteth such power to two at the least, vide ibidem plura, in the Earl of Leicester's case, quod vide. A Letter of Attorney to four, or three jointly to make seisin, two of them cannot make livery, ibidem, f. 181. b. But there is a diversity between an authority coupled with an interest, and a bare authority, as for example a custom within a Manor, time out of mind of man used, was to grant parcel of the said Manner in Fee-simple, and never any grant was made to the heir of his body, for life, or for years, and the Lord of the said Manor did grant to one by copy for life, the remainder over to another, and the heirs of his body, and was adjudged that the grant and remainder over was good, because the Lord having a custom and interest withal might grant a lesser estate, for in this custom which enableth him to do the greater, enableth him to do the less, Coke come. f. 52. b. for omne majus continet in se minns, and regularly it is true, that where a man doth that which he ought to do, and more, there it is good, for that which is warranted, and void for the rest, Coke come 258. a. As if a Letter of Attorney be made to I. S. to make livery of seisin in white acre, and he maketh livery in white acre and black acre there he doth, idem, & aliud, and therefore it is good for white acre, that is according to his authority, and void for black acre which is aliud from his authority, Perk. 38. But otherwise it had been, if the Letter of Attorney were to make livery of one acre, and he maketh livery of two acres, there it is void for both, because it is not named in certain in the Feoffment of which acre livery shall be made according to 4. H. 7. And so regularly it is true, that where a man doth the same thing he is authorized to do, alio modo, in another manner than the authority doth warrant, there it is void for the whole, Davis in case of tenors, f. 21. As if I command a man to make a Feoffment in my name according to a copy showed in Latin, and he maketh a Feoffment to the same effect in English, it is without warrant, because he doth not pursue the authority in the same Manor, 10. H. 7. 9 So a Letter of Attorney is made to deliver seisin after the death of I. S. and the Attorney maketh seisin during the life of I. S. all is void, 40. Ass. 38. Authorities by Deed are to be pursued strictly and precisely both for matter and manner, Davis ibidem: f. 17. The Plaintiff did make a charter of Feoffment to the tenant, and a Letter of Attorney to deliver livery of seisin, the Attorney delivereth seisin upon condition, this livery is void, for the authority is not pursued in the same manner, 12. Ass. 24. 26. So on the contrary, if the Letter of Attorney had been to deliver seisin upon condition, and the Attorney maketh livery without condition, this is void, Co. Just. 258. 11. H. 4. 3. So where an authority is given to enfeoff, and he levieth a fine, 10. H 7. 15. It is void. Omne mandatum est temporaneum, Reg. I. C. all commands are temporary, and are extinguished by death, which is the difference, that the Civilians put between an authority, and a command, and that the command is determined by the death of him that commandeth, but not the authority, as by these verses is signified. Praeceptum non pracipitat mors praecipientis, Mandatum mandatore cadente cadit. But some hold opinion that they both expire by the death of him that commandeth, or giveth authority, which Fulbech saith, is more agreeable to our Law, especially in matters of Bailship, of which, notwithstanding these diversities may be observed. A man deviseth all his lands to his Sister, except one Manor which he appointeth to pay his debts, and he made two Executors, and dieth, the one Executor dieth, yet the other may sell the Manor and pay his debts, Dyer 371. But if a Letter of Attorney be made to deliver Livery of Seisin after the death of the Feoffor, the Letter of Attorney is void, Coke come. f. 52. b. And if a Mayor and Commonalty maketh a Charter of Feoffment, and a Letter of Attorney to deliver Seisin, the Livery and Seisin is good, after the death of the Mayor, because the Corporation dieth not. But if the Lessor by his Deed licence the Lessee for life or for years, to alien, and the Lessor dieth before the Lessee doth alien, yet is death no countermand of the licence, but that he may alien, for this licence was executed on the part of the lessor as much as may be, M. 3. Jac. c. 23. And so if the King doth licence to alien in Mortmain, and dieth, the Licence may be executed afterward, Coke ibidem. There is a diversity between authorities created by the party for private uses, and an authority created by Law for execution of justice: As for example, if a man deviseth that his two Executors shall sell his land, if one of them dies the Survivor shall not sell it; but if he had devised his lands to his Executors to be sold, there the Survivor shall sell it, coke come. f. 181. b. And if a man make a Letter of Attorney to two, to do any Act, if one of them die, the Survivor shall not do it: But if a Venire facias be made to four Coroners to impanell, and return a jury, and one of them die, yet the other shall execute and return the same, vide ibidem plura. And if there be two joint Attorneys to return Livery for another, and livery of Seisin is made to one of them, in the name of both, this is void, unless the Warrant be jointly, and severally, Coke come. f. 49. l. vide ibidem plura. Mandata licita strictam recipiunt interpretationem, sed illicita latam & extensam. Bacon. Max. 60. lawful Commands receive a strict interpretation, but unlawful, large, and extensive. In committing of lawful authority to another, a man may limit it as strictly as he pleaseth, and if the party authorised do transgress his authority, though it be in circumstance expressed, it shall be in most cases void in the whole act, as hath before been demonstrated and distinguished. But when a man is the Author, and advisor to another, to commit any unlawful act, than he shall not excuse himself by circumstances pursued. Therefore if I make a Letter of Attorney to I. S. to deliver Livery and Seisin in the capital Message, and he doth it in another place of the land, or between the hours of two and three, and he doth it after or before, in these cases the act of the Attorney as to execute the estate is void. Or if I express the Seisin to be delivered to I.D. and my Attorney deliver it to I.B. it is void, but if my Attorney maketh it to his Attorney, it shall be intended, for it is a Livery to him in Law. But on the other side, if I command I. S. to rob I. D. on Shooters-hill, and he doth it on Gadshill; or to rob him such a day, and he doth it not himself, but procureth another to do it, or to kill by poison, and he doth it by violence: in all these cases he is an Accessary. Ployd. 175. But if it be to kill I. S. and he killeth I. D. mistaking him for I.S. than he is no accessary, because it is different in substance. And if I bid I. S. to steal such things out of an house, without breaking of the house, and yet he breaketh the house, I am accessary to the Burglary. But if a man bid one rob I. S. as he goeth to Sturbridge Fair, and he rob him in his house, he is not accessary, for the variance is of substance, Ployd. ib. 175. Quando aliquid mandatur, mandatur & omne per quod pervenitur ad illud, Coke. l. 5. f. 115. b. when any thing is commanded, every thing is commanded, whereby we may come to it. Whereas a Writ of Estrepment will lie in an action of Waste, because he cannot receive more damages than are contained in the Count, and can assign no Waste after the Writ purchased; if a Writ of Estrepment cometh to the Sheriff, by virtue of it, he may resist those which will make waste, and if otherwise he cannot, yet it is lawful for him to imprison them, and to make Warrants to others to do the same, and if it be necessary he may take a Posse commitatus for his aid; though the words of the Writ only be, that he shall personally go to the Message, and altogether take order, that no waist, or estrepment of the said Message be, according to the fo●m of the statute, whilst the said plea hangeth indiscussed, because when any thing is commanded, every thing also is commanded, by which we may come to it. Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur & id per quod pervenitur ad illud, Col. 9 f. 57 a. then any thing is forbidden that also is forbidden, by which we come to it. As confederation, and combination among men, uniting themselves together either by obligation, or by promise, to execute any unlawful act is punishable by Law, before the unlawful act be executed: and the Law punisheth the combination, and the confederacy, to the end to prevent the unlawful act; and therefore the usual commission of Oyer and Terminer giveth power to the Commissioners to inquire of all combinations, confederacies, and false allegiancies, and false allegiance is a false binding of anya one to another by Obligation, or promise to execute an illoyall act Boni judicis est lights dirime●e, & expedit reipub. ut sit finis litium propter communem omnium utilitatem, Coke l. 5. f. 73. b. It is the part of a good Judge to cut off strifes; and it is profitable to a Common-weal that there be an end of Suits for the common good of all, in William's case. When a Chapel is not private to the Lord and his Family, but is public and common to all the Tenants of the same Manor, who may be many and of great number, there no action upon the case lieth against the Vicar who ought and is bound by prescription, by himself or some other, to celebrate Divine Service in his Chapel, etc. for then every one of his Tenants may also have an action upon the case, as well as the Lord himself, and so infinite actions for one default; but it is the part of a good Judge to break and put of suits and strifes, etc. and it is profitable to the Commonwealth, that there be an end of suits, for otherwise great oppression may be under the colour and pretext of Law. For as Coke l. 6 f. 9 a. If there should be no end of suits, than a rich and malicious man will by actions and suits, infinitely vex him who hath right, and in the end because he cannot attain to any end, compel him to redeem his charge and vexation, and to leave and relinquish his right, vide ibidem plura. And therefore Coke l. 9 f. 73. b. Accords with satisfaction are much favoured in Law, for the interest of the Common wealth, that there may be an end of suits, and Coke come f. 306 b. every plea ought to be tryable, for without trial the case will never come to an end, which would be discommodious to the republic. And therefore doth the Law eat circuity of actions, and such actions as are needless and may be saved: and as Coke l. 5 f. 31. Circuitus est evitandus; As if he that hath ten pounds issuing out of certain land, disseiseth the Tenant of the land: In an assize brought by the Disseisee, the Disseisor shall cut off the rent in the damages, insomuch as if the mean profits of the land were at the value of thirteen pounds, the Disseisee shall recover but three l. 3 H. 6. 18. and the Disseisor shall cut of all the damages he hath expended in repairing the houses, 14 E. 3. 92. and if Rent-service happen during the Disseisin, it shall be cut off, 9 E. 3. 8. and the reason of the cutting off in such case is, because that otherwise the arrearages of the rent-service, charge, or seck shall be revived, and therefore to avoid cercuity of action, the arrearages during the Disseisin shall be cut off in damages. Coke come. f. 265. a. If there be Father and Son, and the Father be disseised, and the Son living, the Father releaseth to the Disseisor all his right which he hath, or may have in the same Tenements, without clause of Warranty, and then the Father dieth, the Son may lawfully enter upon the possession of the Disseisor, because he had no right in the land in his Father's life, but the right descended to him after the release made, yet if there had been a Warranty annexed to the release, than the Son should be barred, for the Warranty may rebutt and bar him and his Heirs of a future right, which was not in him at that time, and the reason wherefore a Warranty shall bar a future right, is for avoiding of circuit of action, as he that made the Warranty should recover the land against the Tertenant, and he by force of the Warranty to have as much in value against the same person, ibidem. Upon the grant of a Ward with Warranty, the Defendant in a Writ of right of Ward, may rebutt the Plaintiff by that Warranty, and shall not be driven to bring an action of Covenant for avoiding circuit of action, Finch. f. 55. In an action of Waste upon a lease of years by Deed, and in the same Deed the Lessor granteth to the Lessee that he shall not be impeached of waste, the Lessee may plead this in an action of waste, and shall not be driven to bring an action of Covenant for avoiding circuit of action. When a Father enfeoffeth his Son and Heir with Warranty, and dieth; now the Son in a Praecipe brought against him may vouch the Feoffor of his Father, for the Law will not suffer him to vouch himself, and when he cometh in as Voucher, then to deign the Warranty for the circuity of Vourcher. Malificia non debent manere impunita, & impunitas continuum affectum tribuit delinquendi; & minatur innocentes, qui parcit nocentibus, Coke l. 4. f. 45. a. Evil do ought not to go unpunished, because impunity ministereth a continual affection of offending, and he threatneth the innocent who spareth the Delinquent: And Aristotle Pol. 7. Actiones justitiae sunt necessariae in civitate, licet non eligibiles. Though the actions of Justice, that is the sentences, and punishments of evil, and condemned persons, are not secundum se, of their own nature eligible; yet are they necessary in a City, that the City may be the better ruled and saved: for as Solon, there are two things, and ties by which a Commonwealth is contained, and preserved, praemium, & poena, reward and punishment, and it is truly said, Etsi meliores sunt quos ducit amor, tamen plures sunt quos corrigit timor, Thought they be the better persons whom the Love of goodness & virtue draweth, yet there are more whom the fear of punishment doth deter, and correct, and therefore the wisdom of our Law doth abhor that greater offences should pass unpunished: So as that if a man be convict either of verdict, or by confession upon an insufficient Indictment, and no Judgement upon it given, he may again be indicted and arraigned, because his life was never in jeopardy, and the Law wanteth his end, which provideth that no evil Deeds should pass unpunished, Coke l. 4. f. 45. a. for as Coke saith, l. 5. f. 53 b. Oderunt peccare mali formidine penae. The wicked to offend themselves refrain. And from the same are scared for fear of pain. And therefore by the Common Law is the offence of felony so severely punished, and though the Judgement against such a Malefactor, in that he shall be hanged by the neck until he be dead; yet implicitively he is punished, First in his wife, that she shall lose her Dower. Secondly, in his Children, that they shall become base, and ignoble. Thirdly, that he shall lose his Posterity, for his blood is stained and corrupted that they cannot inherit to him, or to any other Ancestor. Fourthly, that he shall forfeit all his Lands and Tenements, which he hath in fee, or in tail, or for term of his life. And fifthly, all his Goods and Chattels. And the reason was, that men should fear to commit Felony, ut poena ad paucos metus ad omnes perveniat, that the punishment might be inflicted on few, and the fear may come to all. But some Acts of Parliament have altered the common Law in some of these points; as by the Statute De donis conditionalibus, lands in tail were not forfeited neither for Felony nor for Treason, but for the life of Tenant in tail: And this Law continued in force from the thirteenth year of Edward the first, until the twenty sixth year of Henry the eighth, when by Act of Parliament Estates in tail are forfeited by attainder of high Treason, but as for Felons, the Statute De donis Conditionalibus, doth still remain in force, so as for attainder of Felony, Lands and Tenements in tail are not forfeited, but only during the life of Tenant in tail, but the Inheritance is preserved for the Issues: but being attainted of high Treason, or Petit treason, the wife shall not be received to demand her Dower, but in certain cases specially provided for, Ployd f. 195. Coke come f. 392. a. b. And now the wife of a person attainted of misprision of Treason, Murder, or Felony, is dowable by the Statute of 5 E. 6. c. 〈◊〉 etc. in that case made and provided, which is more favourable to the women, than the Common Law was, Coke ibidem. Receditur a placitis Juris, potius quam inju●iae & delicta maneant impunita. Bac. Max. f. 51. The Law will dispense with some grounds of the Law, rather than crimes and wrongs should be unpunished, quia salus populi suprema lex, the safety of the people is the supreme Law, and the safety of the people is contained in the repressing of offences by punishment. It is a positive ground, that the accessary in Felony cannot be proceeded against until the principal be tried; yet if a man by subtlety and malice set a mad man by some device to kill one, and he doth so; now forasmuch as the mad man is excused, because he cannot have any will or malice, the Law accounteth the Incitor as principal, though he be absent, rather than the Crime shall go unpunished, 13 Eliz 1. So it is a ground in the Law, that the appeal of Murder goeth not to the Heir where the party murdered hath a wife, nor the younger brother where there is an elder: yet if the wife murder the husband, because she is the party Offender, the appeal leapeth over to the heir, and so if the Son and Heir murder his Father, it goeth to the second brother, Ed. 4 M 28. 6. Stanf. l. 2 f. 60. But if the Rule be one of the higher sort of Maxims that are regulae rationales, and not positivae, than the Law will endure rather a particular Offence to escape without punishment, then violate such a Rule. As it is a Rule that penal Statutes shall not be taken by equity: And the Statute of 1 E. 6. enacteth, that those that are attainted for stealing of Horses, shall not have their Clergy: The Judge conceived that this should not extend to him that should steal but one horse, and therefore procured a new act for it in 2 E. 6. c. 33. for it is not like the case upon the Statute of Gloucester, that g●●●●h an action of waste against him for term of life, or years, and yet if a man hold for a year, he is within the Statute: for penal Laws are taken strictly and literally only in the point of defining, and setting down the fact and punishment, and in those clauses that concern them, and not in general words which are but circumstances and conveyances in the putting of the case, and so note the diversity; for if the Law be that for such an offence a man shall lose his right hand, and the Offender hath his right hand cut off in the Wars, he shall not lose his left hand, but the crime shall rather pass unpunished, vide ibidem plura. Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto, Coke come. f. 145. b. No man is punished for another man's fault. And therefore the Defendant in a Replevin, cannot claim property by his Bailiff or Servant, and the reason is, for that if the claim fall out to be false, he shall be fined for his contempt, which the Lord cannot be, unless he maketh claim himself, for no man shall be punished for another's fault. Dyer f. 66. pl. 14. It is the Law of God, that every one shall bear his own burden, and receive judgement according to his proper fact, and merit whether it be good or evil. As whereas the Plaintiff chargeth the Defendants with an escape made and suffered by them, they ought not to accuse their Predecessors, but excuse themselves, and answer for their proper fact, and demeanour: for it is a common erudition that the Defendant in his answer, and bar ought either to traverse, or confess, and avoid the Plaintiff, vide ibidem plura. Yet in Treasons and Felonies one shall be punished for another's offence, and by our Law, and not without good reason, the Sons of them which are disloyal Subjects and Traitors to their Prince, are barred from the Inheritance of their Ancestors, that their Father's infamy may always accompany them, and that their life should be a punishment to them, and their Father's fault a continual corasive, and that is done because their Father's Ulcers are feared in them, and that being bred and brought up of naughty Parents, they will be prone to do the like, and this penalty is used in the nature of a medicine, that by suffering shame he may be deterred from crime; and therefore as Coke come 5. f. 391. l. by his attainder of Treason or Felony is the blood so stained and corrupted, that his Children cannot be Heirs to him, nor to any other Ancestor. And therefore where the Tenant is outlawed of Felony; it is in the Lord's election to have a Writ of Escheat, supposing that his Tenant was outlawed of Felony, or that he died without Heir, for by the attainder the blood is corrupted, 48 E. 3. 2. But it seemeth by Nichols case, that the party attainted aught to be dead before the land can escheat, for according to Dyer and Brian in the King's case after the attainder, and till Office be found the Fee-simple shall in facto be in the person of the attainted so long as he shall live, for as he hath a capacity to take lands of a new purchase, so he hath power to hold his ancient possessions, and he shall be Tenant to a Praecipe, and if he died before Office found, and the land be held of the King, the land shall go to the King in nature of a common Escheat, Ployd. 477. Nichols case, but in case of Treason, the King shall be presently after the attainder in actual possession, without Office found by the Statute of 33 H. 8. c. 20. If the Father purchaseth land, and his eldest Son is attainted of Felony and dieth, the next in degree of descent, and worthiness of blood unto the Son attainted, shall not have the land, but it shall escheat to the immediate Lord of whom the land is held, for the blood is corrupted, otherwise it had been if he had died in the life of the Father, having no Issue, Dyer 48. An account is brought against two, the one entereth into an account, and it is sound against him, it shall bind both, 44 E. 3. 18. One is imprisoned in the marshalsea, and a stranger breaketh the Prison, and the prisoner escapeth, the Marshal shall be charged for the whole debt. If I have a way over the lands of twenty men, and one of them stoppeth the way in his land, I shall have an action against all those over whose lands the way was, 33 H. 6. 26. by profit. A rate is put upon a Town for the fees of a Knight of the Parliament, The Beasts of him hath paid his part are taken for the residue, he shall not have a Replevin, but the beasts shall be sold to pay his duty, 11 H. 4. 2. In quo quis delinquit in eo de jure est puniendus, Co. come. f. 233. b. In what one offendeth, in the same by right he is to be punished: As if any Keeper kill any Deer without warrant, or fell, or cut any Trees or underwoods, and committeth them to his own use▪ it is a forfeiture of his Office; for the destruction of the Deer is by a mean the destruction of the Venison. And so it is if he pull down the Lodge, or any house within the Park, for putting of Hay into for feeding of the Deer, or such like, it is a forfeiture, and the reason why the Office shall in such and the like case be forfeited, because in what one offendeth, in that he shall be punished. Dispensatio mali prohibeti est, de jure, Domino regi concessa, propter impossibilitatem providendi de omnibus particularibus; & dispensatio est mali prohibiti provida relaxatio, utilitate, seu necessitate pensata, Coke. l. 11. 88 a. The dispensation of a prohibited evil, is by right granted or allowed to the King, because of an impossibility for providing for all particular things; and a dispensation is a provident relaxation of an evil prohibited, recompensed with profit and utility. As where an Act of Parliament which generally prohibiteth a thing upon penalty which is popular, or where it is only given to the Queen) may be inconvenient to divers particular persons▪ in respect of the person, place, or time, etc. therefore in such causes the Law hath given power to the Queen to dispense with particular persons. But when the wisdom of Parliament hath made an Act to restrain pro bono publico, the Importation of any foreign Manufactures, to the intent that the Subjects may apply themselves to the making of the said Manufactures, etc. and by it maintain themselves and families: Now for private gain to grant the importation of them to one, or divers against the said Act is a Monopoly, and against the Common Law, and against the end and scope of the Act itself, vide ibidem plura in the case of Monopolies. Coke l. 5. f. 28. Cawdrys case; By the Ecclesiastical Laws of this Realm, a Priest cannot have two Benefices, nor a Bastard be a Priest, but the King by his Ecclesiastical power and jurisdiction, may dispense with both these, because they are mala prohibita, and not mala in se. The King by a clause of non obstante may dispense with the Statute-law, and that if the Statute saith, that dispensation shall be merely void, 2 H. 7. Grants 73. Finch. f. 82. Coke comm. f. 120. a. A party or Minister disabled by reason of any corrupt Contract, etc. by the Act of 13 Eliz. which is an absolute and direct Law cannot be dispensed withal by any Grant, etc. with a non obstante, as it may be when any thing is prohibited sub modom, as upon a penalty given to the King. Coke l. 4. f. 35. b. in Bozums' case, when the King by the common Law cannot in any manner make a grant, there a non obstante of the common Law, will not make the grant good against the reason of the common Law, as if the King granteth a protection in an assize, or Quod impedit with a non obstante, of any Law to the contrary that grant is void, for by the common Law, a protection doth not lie in any of these cases, 39 H. 39 But when the King may lawfully make a grant, but the common Law requireth that he may be so instructed, that he be not deceived, there a non obstante may supply it, as when the King granteth a lease for life, or years, he hath the reversion in him, which he may lawfully grant, but the Law requireth in this case, that he be not deceived in his estate and to grant the possession of the Land, whereas he hath but a reversion, and therefore when he granteth the Land, notwithstanding that it be in lease for life, or for years of Record, or otherwise the grant is good. When the words of a grant are not sufficient, ex vi termini, to pass the thing granted, but the grant is utterly void, there any non obstante cannot make the grant good, vide ibidem plura. Davis f. 75. In the case of Commendams, By our Law, what is wrong, and malum insert, and against the Law of God cannot be dispensed with, and therefore 11 H. 7. 12. a. It is said that the King cannot dispense with any that doth nuisance in the Highway, and if he doth it, that such a dispensation is void, & 8 H. 6. 19 The King cannot grant that if a man doth a trespass to me, that I shall not have an action against him, or that a man shall be his own Judge, and therefore it is often said in our Books, that the prerogative of the King shall do no wrong to the Subject, 13 E. 3. 8 So though the King may dispense with a Statute, which prohibiteth an indifferent thing to be done; yet he cannot change the common Law by his Patent, 37 H. 8. Patent 110. And as to the Pope it is often said in the Bishop of St. Davis case, that the Bulls of the Pope cannot change the Laws of England. Notwithstanding the word non obstante was first invented, and first used in the Court of Rome, which as Sir John Davis observeth, f. 69. b. was a mischievous precedent to all the common Weals of Christendom, for the temporal Princes perceiving that the Pope dispensed with his Canons in imitation of him, have used their prerogative to dispense with their penal Laws, and Statutes, and whereas before their Laws were religiously observed, as the Laws of the Medes and Persians. Davis f. 77. The Law which ordaineth that the first benefice shall be void by the acceptance of the second, may be dispensed with, and so is it of the Law that ordaineth, that when a man is made a Bishop, that his other Benefices shall be void, as Thrining saith, 11. H. 4. 213. b. For those Laws were made by Ecclesiastical policy, and therefore the same policy may dispense with those Laws. permissio non est officium legis, quia lex ad fert necessitatem, Reg. I. C. permission is not the office of the Law, for the Law bringeth necessity. As by the Statute of W. 2. Lands were permitted to be entailed, and usury also by many Statutes, yet can they not properly be termed Laws, and Statutes. Confessus in judicio pro judicato habetur, & quodam modo sua sententia damnatur, Coke l. 11. f. 30. He who confesseth in the Court of Justice, is holden adjudged, and in a certain manner is condemned by his own mouth or sentence. And therefore the Attainder in confession is the strongest attainder may be, for the vehement presumption it hath of truth, for it should be absurd to say, that he hath not done such a Felony, since the party himself hath confessed it to the destruction of him, and all his offspring. And the case of confession is a stronger case than guiltiness by verdict, for though he be found guilty by verdict, yet may he be innocent, and therefore at the common Law he may have his Clergy, and make his purgation, but if he had confessed the offence upon record he shall not have his Clergy at the common Law, because he could not make his purgation, when the Court findeth his confession on Record, for in the intendment of the Law he cannot contrary his express, and voluntary confession in Court, vide ibidem plura. In praesentia majoris cessat potentia minoris, Manhood, in Ployd. f. 498. a. In the presence of the greater power, the lesser power ceaseth. All the Justices agreed, that the Ordinary, the Patron, and King, aught to agree in making an impropriation, and the Ordinary is the principal aagent in it, in that he hath the spiritual jurisdiction, and the act of appropriation is a thing spiritual, and what the Ordinary of the Diasis, might do, that the Pope used to do in the Realm as supreme Ordinary, and was a long time suffered so to do, and did use to make appropriations without the Bishop which were taken to be good, and the Bishop never contradicted but accepted them as good, for in the power of the greater, the power of the lesser ceaseth, and in all Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, his authority was taken as absolute, and did bind the Bishop as his inferior in all acts, now such authority and jurisdiction as the Pope used within this Realm was acknowledged by the Parliament, 25. H. 8 and other Statutes to be in the King, and that he might lawfully do all that the Pope was accustomed, and used to do within this Realm, and from him it descended to his Son Edward, who as superame Ordinary did make the appropriation of his own authority and jurisdiction without the Bishop, and did put these words in his Charter, authoritate nostra regia, & ecclesiastica, qua fungimur, vide ibidem plura. Vectigal ab origine ipsa jus caesarum est, & patrimoniale, lex imperatoria, Custom from the beginning is the right and patrimony of Caesar, and Emperors and are called vectigalia a mercibus evectis, & invectis, from Merchandizes exported, and imported, for custom is a prerogative, and benefit, to which Kings and Princes are by the Law of Nations, entitled: And as the Law, Nations were before Kings, so Kings were made by the Laws of Nations, ex jure gentium originem suam traxerunt, Baldus, and as soon as they were made Kings, presently the Law of Nations did annex the prerogative of custom to their several Crowns, so saith Baldus, cum creatus fuerit Rex, omnia regalia ei conceduntur, & competit omnibus regibus jus imponendi vectigalia, when a King was created, all royal incidents were granted to him, and the right of imposing customs appertained to all Kings. Wherein the rules of our Law as Davis observeth, f. 12. are agreeable with those of the imperial Law, for we also say that custom is the ancient inheritance of the Crown of England, and that inheret sceptro, and is as ancient as the Crown itself, and is due by common right, and by prescription, and not by the grant, and benevolence of Merchants, or by Act of Parliament, Dier, 165. b. And whereas by the imperial Law, Primaria vectigalium causa, ac ratio fuit, ut plana tutaque mercatori praetereunti itinera praestarentur, Plin. l. 19 c. 4. The first cause, and reason of customs was that plain and safe voyages should be exhibited, and assured to the Merchants, and in our Law Wafrages and protection to the passing Merchants of the Sea was one of the principal causes of the payments of those duties, Davis ibidem f. 12. And Dyer f. 43. Putteth a difference between a custom and a subsidy, and saith that the custom for Merchandizes to be transported out of the Realm, is an inheritance of the King, and by the common Law, and not given by any Statute, and that appeareth by the Statute of 14. E. 3. which was the first Statute which maketh mention of any custom, and that Statute doth not give, or limit any Custom to the King but abridgeth and abateth the custom which was paid for Wool, or Leather; but a subsidy, saith he, is a Tax assessed by Parliament, and granted to the King by the Commoners during the life of every King only, which is made clear by the case reported by Dyer, 1 Mar. f. 92. where King Edward the sixth had granted a Licence to a Merchant stranger to transport all Merchandizes paying pro custumis & subsidiis tot, & tantas denariorum summas, quot & quantas, any english Merchant and Denizen should pay, and no more: And it was resolved by all the Judges after the death of Edward the sixth the grant was good for the Customs, but void tor the Subsidies, because the King had an Inheritance in the Custom, as a Prorogative annexed to the Crown, but in the Subsidies he had an estate only for life by act of Parliament. But there is a third kind of duty payable for Merchandizes which are called Imposts, or Impositions, and these were sometimes rated and assessed by Parliament, and then were they of the nature of Subsidies; and sometimes were imposed by the Prerogative Royal, to support the necessary charges of the Crown, and then as the ancient Senator of Rome said, Nihil magis justum est quam quod necessarium est, There is nothing more just than that which is necessary, Davis f. 12. vide ibidem plura. The Impost upon Wines was first assessed by Parliament, and limited to be paid for certain years, which being expired is now continued by Parliament, ibidem. Opo●tet patrem familias vendacem esses & non emacem, Cato major Davis f. 10. The Master and Father of a Family ought to be a buyer and not a seller: By the Grecians, Kings were called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Pastors of the people; and Emperors by the Romans Patres Patriae, Fathers of their Country, for their vigilant and Paternal care they were to take for the preservation and provision for the people, for he is the public Pater familias, and is to bend his thoughts to the utility and commodity of the public, and as he is reputed a provident Father of a Family, who hath more commodites to sell, than occasions to buy, so ought he to be a seller rather than a buyer; and to provide that more native commodities be exported for sale, and the less foreign Merchandizes imported to the buyer. And therefore the little custom of foreign Commodties was then accepted of the King, when but a little quantity of such foreign Wares were imported into England: For in the time of Edward the first, and after that in the times of Edward the third, the native Commodities of England exported, were of greater quantity and value by two parts of three at the least, than the foreign Merchandizes imported, by which King Edward the third raised so great a revenue out of the Native Commodities of his Dominions, that it was noted for good Husbandry in that King; for a Father of a Family ought rather to be a buyer then a seller, but now it is altogether contrary, for at this time the Out-gate is lesser than the In-gate, and the foreign Commodities imported are of greater quantity and value by two parts then our native Commodities exported, which is a great shame to our Nation to be so enamoured with Mercery and Grocery Wares imported by strangers, and to expend upon those more than the value of all the Staple Commodities of our Country, which will be in the end, the decay and ruin of the Commonweal, Davis, ibid. Thesaurus regis est pacis vinculum, & bellorum nervi, Coke l. 3. f. 12. b. The treasure of the King is the bond of peace, and the sinews of war. And therefore the Common Law preferreth and advanceth the right of the King, insomuch as Sir Henry Finch observeth, you shall find it to be Law almost in every case of the King, that is not Law in case of the Subjects, and that with an intention to enhance the King's Treasure, and to replenish his Coffers, whereby he may in time of peace advance the glory and honour of the Nation, and in time of War be enabled to protect the Commonwealth against foreign incursions and invasions; for the King's Treasure is the bond of peace, and sinews of war. And therefore in the case of the King, which is not so in the case of a common person, the body, the lands, and the goods of the Accountant, or Debtor of the King at the Common Law, were liable to the execution of the King, Dyer 234. before the Statute of 33 H. 8. c. 38. Coke ibidem, and upon the same reason is this principal grounded, Quando jus domini regis, & Subditi in simul concurrunt, jus regis preferri debet, Coke l. 9 3. 129. b. when the right of the King and the Subject concur together, the right of the King ought to be preferred. As in Dame Hales case, Ployd. 262. Baron and Feme were joint-tenants of a term for years, the Baron is selo de se, he shall forfeit all, and yet till the Office it surviveth, but after the Office it hath relation before, or at the least at the time of the death, vide ibidem plura, in Quicks case. So Ploud. f. 263. b. If a Feme take husband, and hath Issue, and the land descend to the Feme, and the Baron enter, so that he is entitled to be Tenant by the Courtesy, and then the Feme is found an Idiot, and her Estate in the land is also found; the King shall have the land, and if the Feme dye, the Baron shall never have the land by Courtesy: for by the first possession of the Feme, the Baron was entitled to be Tenant by Courtesy, and when the Office is found, the Title of the King shall have relation also to the first possession, and so both the Titles commence at the same time, but the King shall have the pre-eminence, and because the Title of the King is in this case to the Franktenement of the land, in that, that he shall have the custody of it during the life of the Feme, it shall utterly take away the Title of the Baron, which before the Office found was vested in the Baron, and therefore after the death of the Feme he shall not be Tenant by courtesy, but the Issue shall have the lands out of the hands of the King, if it be not holden of the King, and if it be, the King shall have it for the Wardship of him, during the nonage; and upon the same reason was this principal also founded. Thesaurus competit domino regi, & non domino libertatis nisi sit per verba specialia Fitz. Coro. 281. 436. It is a firm conclusion in the Common Law, that Treasure belongeth to the Lord the King, and not to the Lord of the Liberty, unless it be by special words. Adrianus Caesar made a Law, that if any man found treasure in his own ground, himself should have it, if in another man's ground, he shall give the half to the owner of the Soil, if in a public place, he shall divide it equally with the Treasury: but now, and long time ago the Civil Law hath transferred it to the Prince, which is thus defined by Justinian, Vetus depositio pecuniae, vel alterius metalli, cujus non extat modo memoria ut dominum non habeat: An ancient deposition or hiding of money, or some other metal, of which for the present no memory is extant, that it may have a Lord or owner. Wherein the Common Law of this Realm accordeth with the Civil Law, which holdeth that Treasure hid in the earth, not upon the earth, nor in the Sea, and Coin though not hidden being found, is the Kings, which we call Treasure trove, Stanf. f. 10. 27 Ass. pl. 19 10. Eliz. Ployd. 322. And Mr. Stanfords' reason why such Treasure should belong to the King is un-answerable, and it is this, Quia dominus rei non apparet, ideo cujus sit incertum est, because the Lord and Owner of the thing doth not appear, therefore whose it is, it is uncertain, 22 Ass. pl. 19 And it is a currant rule in all Nations, In ambiguis casibus semper praesumitur pro rege, and in doubtful cases it is always presumed and taken for the King. Many other benefits and prerogatives there be which the Common Law of England giveth to the King, in regard of the exceeding charge and cost he is at in the defending and governing the Commonwealth, of which I may plainly say as Cicero said of the Romans, That all the Revenue and Treasure is scarce able to, Lips. de Mag. Rom. l. 1. c. 4, 5. maintain the Army both by Sea and Land, and therefore hath need of many Prerogatives and benefits. It were tedious to touch them all, and will only name some, which I deem pertinent to the precedent principle. As the Mines of Gold and Silver, which by the Law of Nations, as well as the Common Law, belong to the King and Prince, for to whom should Gold and Silver appertain but to him that hath authority to coin it as his own, according to the answer of our Saviour, Matth. 22. v. 20. Date quod est Caesaris Caesari, and therefore moneta dicitur a monendo, quia impressione nos monit cujus est Moneta, Davis f. 19 And therefore the Judgement given in the case between the Queen's Majesty and the Earl of Northumberland, seemeth to be sound and grounded upon invincible reason, although the Grant was, Omnium & singularum Minerarum, of all and singular Mines: for the diversity is there well taken by Wray, that there be two sorts of Mines, Mines royal, and base Mines; and Mines royal may be subdivided into two other kinds, those which contain in them Silver; or Gold entirely, or which have Brass or Copper in them, and have some veins of Gold intermixed, both these belong to the Prince, for the Gold as the more worthy, draweth to its self the less worthy: But such as have in them merely Brass, Copper, or Led, may belong unto a Subject by a special Title. And that in such case the Proprietor of the land and Soil shall have the Ore and Mine, and not the King by his Prerogative; which was the opinion of all the Judges, and they all also agreed, that a Mine royal, be it of base Metal, or pure Gold, or Silver, may by grant of the King be severed from the Crown, and granted to any other, for it is not an incident inseparable to the Crown, but the King may sever it by apt and precise words, but not by the words, of all and singular Mines, Ployd. f. 333. & 335. vide ibidem plura, in the case of Mines. There is another special Prerogative which the King hath in the Sea, for the Sea is not only under the Dominion of the King, as it is said, 6 R. 2. Fitz. protection 46. The Sea is of the legiance of the King as of the Crown of England; but is also his proper Inheritance; and therefore the King shall have the land gained out of the Sea, Dyer 226. Also the King shall have the great possessions of the Sea, as Whales, Sturgeons, etc. which are royal Fishes, and no Subject can have them without special grant of the King, Prerog. regis c. 10. Stanf. 37, 38. And the King shall have wild Swans, as volatilia regalia upon th● Sea, and the Braches of the Sea, Coke l. 7. f. 17. in the case of Swans. So the wreck of the Sea is a perquisit royal, Coke l. 5. 107. Sir Hen●y Constable's case. And upon this reason, before the Statute of 18 E. 3. no Subject might pass beyond the Seas without special licence of the King: but there it is enacted that the Sea shall be open to all Merchants: And all Havens and Ports quae sunt ostia, & Janua regni appertain to the King, because he is custos totius regni, F.N.B. 113. a. And the King ought by right to save and defend his Subjects against the Seas, as against his Enemy: And therefore the Commission of Sewers was awarded by the King by virtue of his Prerogative royal, before any Statute made in such case, extendeth not only to the walls and banks of the Sea, but also to all navigable Rivers, and Fresh-waters; F. N. B. 113. a. And in the Statute of 25 H. 8. c. 10: The King by reason of his Prerogative royal, aught to provide that navigable streams be made passable. And the City of London by the Charter of the King, have the River of Thames granted to them, and purchased another Charter by which the King granted to them, solum & fundum, of the said River, by force of which Grant the City receiveth the rents of them which fix posts, or make Wharves, or other Edifices upon the Soil of the said River, so as the King hath the same Prerogative in the Braches of the Seas, and navigable Rivers, and fresh-waters, so high as the Sea floweth and refloweth in them, as he hath in Alto mari. And though the civilians say, that Flumina & portas publica sunt, ideoque jus piscandi omnibus commune est in portu fluminibusque, that Rivers and Havens are public things, and therefore the right of fishing is common to all in Rivers and Havens, which rule is found in Bracton l 2. c. 12. Yet by the Common Law of England, every navigable River, so high as the Sea floweth and refloweth in it, is flumen regale, and the Piscary of it is also royal Piscary, and belongeth to the King as his Prerogative, but in any other river not navigable: In the Piscary of such River, the Ter-tenants of either side of the water have an interest of common right, and the reason why the King hath interest in such navigable Rivers, so high as the Sea floweth and refloweth in it, is because such River participateth of the nature of the Sea, and is said to be a brach of the Sea, so far as it floweth or refloweth. 12 Ass. pl. 93. And though the King permitteth his people for their ease and Commodities, to have common passage, yet he hath the sole interest in the soil of such Rivers, as also in the Piscary, although the profit of it is not commonly taken by the King, and appropriated by the King, unless it be of extraordinary and certain annual value. So the King granted to Strangewaies, totam illam liberam piscarim, all that free Priscary called the Fleet in Abboesbury, which is a bay and creek of the Sea: And though the Abbot had the Piscary before the dissolution, it is to be understood that the Abbot at the beginning had it by grant of the King, it being a several piscary upon the brach of the Seas, and therefore by consequent royal piscary, vide Ployd. 315. b. And therefore in the case of the royal piscary of Bann, Davis, 57 It was resolved that the River of Bann so far as the Sea did flow, and reflow in it, is a royal River, and the fishing of Salmon there a royal piscary, which belongeth to the King as a several piscary, and not to those which have the soil, ex utraque parte aquae, on either side of the water, vide ibidem plura. Tributum est victoriae praemium, Cicero in vere. & poenabelli Tribute is the reward of victory, and penalty of Warr. A Conqueror may command tribute, and all that comes in under the Conqueror by the Law of Nations, and therefore the Roman General said unto the French men, Tac. l. 4. histro. Deut. 20.11. jure victoriae tributum vobis addidimus, by the right of victory we have imposed tribute upon you, and tribute for the same reason is due by the Law of God, which clearly appeareth by the answer of our Saviour to the jews, who because they would have Christ to have challenged their earthly Kingdom by that means to draw him into hatred with Caesar, demanded of him whether it were lawful to give tribute to Caesar, but he that always professed that his Kingdom was not of this World, Matt. 22. gave them a bone to gnaw, saying give unto Caesar, all the things which are Caesar's, and to God, the things that are Gods, for indeed tribute are allowed by the Law of God. So William the Conqueror, after his universal conquest was the first that commanded, and imposed tribute in England, and not unjustly, which as yet is continued as a remembrance of a conquest, yet do the English seem rather to offer a tribute to their Monarch, than the Monarch to command it, for the courtesy of England is great, and the clemency of their Princes greater, and as Fulbeck protesteth, since the conquest of England, tribute, and subsidy have been as justly by the Law of God, and the Law of Nations paid England as in Jury, Fulb. Pand. c. 10. f. 99 In republica maxime conservanda sunt jura belli, Coke come. f. 10. b. In a Commonwealth the Laws of Warr are principally to be preserved, for to invert the position of Justinian, and yet to retain the sense, imperatoriam Majestatem non solum legibus oportet esse armatam, Just. Institutes. sed etiam armis decoratam, ut utrumque tempus bollorum, & pacis recte possit gubernari, the imperial Majesty ought not only to be armed with Laws, but also adorned with arms, that the time of War and peace may be rightly governed, for experience the mistress of all Arts and Sciences teacheth us that there is nothing more necessary for the observation of peace, and Administration of Justice, than the conservation of the Laws of arms, and that in consideration of the ambition of the world, and factions of people, it is impossible for any Realm to continue in peace and tranquillity, where the protection of the Sword is not eminent, and imminent, and therefore Cicero, summus illo administrandae reipub. Magister, Buchan. de Cicerone. propoundeth the chiefest Master of the administration of a common wealth, propoundeth this sentence to be practised as a State Aphorism, Ideo suscipienda sunt bella ut in pace sine injuria vivamus, therefore are Wars to be undertaken that we may live in peace without injury, Tullys Offi. for without the assistance of the Militia, and Sword, a State cannot be constantly cleared, and freed from public or private injuries, and it was Cato's sage advice, by which the continual rebellions of the Spaniard might surely be suppressed, id uno modo caveri potest, si effectum erit ne possint rebellare, that by one only means may be prevented, if such course be taken that they cannot rebel, and the very like course did Lentulus prescribe against the Perfidious Carthaginians, quoniam illoram Persidiam non possumus tollere ideo debilitemus potentiam, because we cannot eradicate their perfidiousnes, therefore let us debilitate their power; both which by continuance, and force of arms was effected. Mavult princeps domesticos milites, quam stipendiarios bellicis apponere casibus, Coke come. f. 69. a. A Prince will rather employ Domestic and Native Soldiers, than Stipendiaries, and Forreners. It was the wisdom of the ancient Kings of England, to be served in the Wars by their own Subjects, and therefore did give Lands to their Subjects, to hold of them by Knight's services, that when the King did make a royal voyage to Scotland, Wales, etc. according to their several tenors they ought to be with the King for a certain time limited, conveniently arrayed for the War, and though they only who held immediately of the King were to do this service, yet every man by his tenure, is bound to defend his Lord, and he and his Lord the King, to which the military rule of Galba is consonant, optimum est militem deligere, non autem emere, it is the best course to choose a Soldier, but not to buy him, and then are Princes said to choose their Soldiers, when they conscribe their own Subjects, and to buy them when they purchase strangers with their pay: And as another, satius est erudire suos, quam conducere alienos, it is better to instruct your own people in arms, then to procure expert strangers, for which Machavell that subtle Secretary of State, extolleth the King of England, that when he invaded France for many years ago, would not accept any other Soldiers but English, L. 1. de repub. c. 21. though he had enjoyed and lived in peace for the space of thirty years, whereas the French were continually conversant, & exercised in the Italian Wars, yet that prudent King, who knew well that he had so ordered the Realm, that in the time of peace, the feats of arms were practised, and military discipline exercised, both attempted the conquest of France, and fortunately effected it: The same Encomium doth he give of Epominondas, who redeeming the Thebans from the servitude of the Spartans', so instructed them in the form of military discipline, that through their aid though effeminated by service, he gave the Spartans' a mighty defeat, and overthrow; for the care and faith of Domestic, and Native Soldiers, is greater and firmer, and for the honour of their Prince, and glory of their Country, will fight more fiercely, ita ut, consensu quodum, saith Seneca, protegendi, amandique regem, conspirasse intelliguntur; so as they are conceived to have conspired with an unanimous consent of protecting and loving their King. Whereas mercenaries, and strangers are commonly tumultuous, and refractory, and love not to be commanded, Tac. 4. hist. Tac. theagiae. or governed, but as Tacitus omniae ex libidine agunt, love to do what they lift, and which is most perilous are perfidious, non fide non affectu tenentur, are not held, nor kept by faith, and affection, but there faith dependeth on fortune, which inclining to the Enemy thither do they for the most part bend their minds and forces, by which means as one truly, externo pessundata milite regna, and as Curtius insidiosae fiunt illorum domini, Kingdoms are sometimes ruined, and by treachery they themselves become Lords and Masters of their leaders. L. 1. f. 13. Polybius relateth that Carthaginians waging War with the Romans, had their army mixed with Spaniards, French, and fugetive Grecians, and that having made peace with the Romans, intended to dismiss them who amounted to the number of twenty thousand, which they perceiving, suddenly drew themselves into a military body, and made head against the Carthaginians, and forced some of their Cities, to subject their Forts to their Forces in so much as the Carthaginians were compelled to crave aid of the Romans to resist, and repel them, through whose assistance Hamilcar circumvented and enclosed them in narrow streites and places, so as more of them perished by famine, than the sword, and Hamilcar by the consent of all was called salvator patriae, the Saviour of his Country, to this purpose I could plaustra exemplorum accumulare, accumulate Cart-loades of examples, how dangerous a thing it is to call in strangers to their aid, and especially in any great number, which plainly appeareth by the perfidiousness of the Saxons, who though they came at the first as Mercenaries, yet once admitted, and sensible of their own power, they soon grew Masters and Lords of the Britons, and therefore Livy giveth this sound counsel to them, who are necessitated to introduce the aid of strangers, that their Captains be so circumspect, quod non ita externis credant auxillijs ut non plus sui roboris suarumque p●oprie virium in castris habeant, Livy l. 25. that they do not confide so much in external aid, that they have no more of them in their army then their own strength, and power will keep in awe. Multum potest in rebus humanis occasio, plurimum in bellicis, Poly. b. Coke come. 71. a. Occasion, and opportunity prevail much in humane things, but most of all in Marshal affairs. In ancient time Kings had the supremacy over others of commanding, 2. Reg. c. 8. or commencing War as appeareth by the sacred History, yet sometimes upon necessary, cause if there be danger in delay, or the sovereign Commander be absent, War may be undertaken without the commandment of the Prince, if it be upon necessary occasion of just defence, which by the Law of nature is granted to every one: So though the Consul Marcellus had the supreme command in Sicily, yet, L. Pinarius who was Captain of the Garrison of Enna in Sicily, when he did foresee the revolt, and defection of the Citizens of Enna, to the Carthaginians, Livy l. 24. and he could not send Ambassadors to the Consul Marcellus though he was not far from thence, suddenly he did kill all the Carthaginians, by which Act Enna was still retained for the Romans, and Marcellus did not disallow the fact. And therefore Cicero commendeth the enterprise of Octavius Caesar, who not expecting the decree of the Senate, did of his own head make War against Antonius, for if he had then omitted the time of battle, he did well foresee that the common Wealth would be suppressed, and that then nothing could be decreed by the Senate, and the Senate did after allow by public authority the War undertaken by Octavius of his own private advice, so Scipio Nasica, did deserve exceeding commendation, who voluntary without any decreed authority did offer himself a Captain to all good Romans, for the suppressing of Tibe●ius Gracchus, and his treacherous confederates, for it is necessary in such perturbations, and tumults, rather to obey times, than customs, for in peace we must obey custom, in War the times, and occasions. Inter arma silent leges, Coke l. 9 Ep. ad Lectorem. When Arms and Weapons sway, The Laws are at a stay. War was first brought in by necessity, for in that decisions in Courts of Law, and the determining of controversies by their rules could not be between two strange Princes of equal power, unless they should willingly agree to such an order, because they have no superior nor ordinary Judge, but are supreme and public persons, and therefore the judgement of Arms is necessary, because such War against them cannot be bridled by Law, and by this and many other cases War is lawful, though many mischiefs do stain it, for good doth ensue of it, and Princes by it obtain their rights, and rebels are reduced to obedience, and peace accorded, and that whose end is good, is also good itself, to which and to common equity without bloodshed, and these injuries of war men do seldom attain. But when the Laws of War and Arms do rule, the civil Laws of peace are silent, and of little or no force: As in the Conqueror's time, the Laws did seem to be silent, for in all the time of his Reign, either his Sword was always drawn, or his hand was continually on the Hilt, ready again to be drawn; and as Bacon, the Conqueror got by right of conquest all the lands of the Realm into his own hands in demesne, taking from every man all Estate, Term, property, and liberty of the same, except Religious, and Church-lands, and the lands of Kent, and still as he gave any of it out of his own hand, he reserved some retribution of rents or services, or both to him, and to his Heirs, which reservation is that which is called Tenure of land, in which reservation he had four serviceable Institutions suitable to the state of a Conqueror. 1. Marriage of the Wards Male and Female. 2. Horse for service. 3. Homage and Fealty, And fourthly, Primer Seisin, Bacon's uses f. 30. vide ibidem plura. But Sir John Davis is of opinion, Davis 21. f. 41. that though William the Conqueror made a more absolute and entire Conquest of England, than Henry the second did of Ireland, yet he did not seize all, and had not the actual possession of all the lands within the Realm of England vested in him by the Conquest, yet he acknowledged that the book of doomsday which is an exact description of all the Realm, was made in the time of the Conqueror, and that by it appeareth, that the Conqueror had certain lands in Demesne, which lands were in the hands of Edward the Confessor, and are entitled Terrae Edwardi regis, and other lands which himself had seized upon the Conquest, and are entitled terrae regis, and called them the ancient Demesnes of the King, and of the Crown of England, but he maketh no mention of the lands which he conferred on the Normans, which without doubt were very great, and whom by Manors as well as by Honours he made predominant in England, as to Hugh Lupus the son of his Mother Lot, and one Hoclewin a Noble man of Normandy whom she had married, he gave the Earldom of Chester to hold of him as freely by his sword, as he held the Crown of England; by virtue of which Grant, the said Hugh ordained under him four Barons, B. Cr. f. 34. such an honour as no Subject in England ever enjoyed the like: which also is manifest by the Grant he made to Warren (a Norman of principal quality) of the Castle of Shirburn in Norfolk, B. cr. f. 33. which afterwards he restored to the Heir, because he had never born Arms against him, by which this consequence may probably be inferred, that notwithstancting his universal Conquest, he had such a moderate respect to those who were neither Actors, nor Opposites to his achievement of the Crown, that though upon suspicious informations he had by Grants deprived them of their estates, yet in consideration of their submissive homage and fealty he graciously restored them. But to the point in hand, upon this Conquest the ancient Laws did seem to be silent, Co. l. 3 71. ad lectorem. for he abrogated many of them, and in their stead brought in other Laws, which Sir Edward Coke confesseth, efficacissima ad regni pacem tuendam, were effectual and forcible to maintain the peace of the Kingdom, commanding them to be written in French, and also that all causes should be pleaded, and all matters of form dispatched in French, thereby intending to make the Normans Language as predominant as their persons, and therein intimating the Romans who upon their Conquest of any Country as well as England introduced, and used their Language in all matters of state, and Courts of Judicature, both which are altered and changed by our Parliaments, as an ancient badge of conquests and servitude. So Edward the first made a Conquest of the Dominion of Wales, and changed their Laws and Customs, as he hath expressed in his Charter, as the Statute of Rutland, whereas to their Laws and Customs he saith, Quasdam illarum de consilio procerum regni nostri de levimas, quasdam correximus, ac etiam quasdum alias adjiciendas, & faciendas decrevimus, etc. Some of them by the advice of the Nobles of our Kingdom we have abolished, some we have corrected also, some we have decreed to add and make. Optimi ducis est Scire, & vincer●, & cerdere prudenter tempori, Coke come. f. 71. a. It is the part of an excellent Captain to know and to overcome, and wisely to yield unto the time. Men must not fight only with Warlike Weapons and Engines, but with the force of his wit and ingeny, for dolus, cunning and policy is much used in military affairs, and standeth in equal balance with strength and might according to the poetical sentence. Nil refert armis contingat palma, dolove, Nam dolus, an virtus surit, quis in host requiret? By might and slight to conquer yea, or no, It is no matter for either in a foe, Who doth require, Nay, often times prudent subtlety prevaileth more in such Warlike enterprises than might and strength of hand, and therefore are Stratagems more commonly more commodious than plain and equal encounters, which a complete General will always practise upon a convenient occasion: as Vegetius prescribeth, Boni duces non aperto morte praelium, in quo est commune periculum, sed ex occulto semper attentant, ut integris suis viribus quantum possint hosts interrimant, certe vel terreant. Good Captains will not fight in open field, in which the danger is common and equal, but will invade them unawares, that with all their forces in what they can, they may either destroy the enemy, or otherwise put them into a fear and fright. And therefore the Lacedominans when they over-came the enemy by Stratagem, did sacrifice to Mars an Ox, but when by open strength a Cock, of which Plutarch, giveth the reason, that so they might accustom their Leaders that they should not only, be valiant, but also by subtle wiliness which is requisite in an Emperor, they should excel in Stratagems. And which by the Law of God is more to be desired, for God commanded Joshua Josh. 8. to lie in ambush for the City of Ay behind it, and so did David when he was to fight with the Philistims, Thou shalt not go up, but fetch a compass behind them, and come upon them over against the Mulberry Trees, So it is a cunning policy in the besieged, that they pretend to abound in those things which they most want. So the Romans when the Capital was besieged by the French, and were pressed with the extreme necessity of famine, did cast down loafes of bred among their enemies, Val. Max. l. 7. c. 4. that they might seem to abound in provision, by which device the enemy was induced by compact to leave the siege. And so in such a siege, it is a commodious thing to a Captain to move in treaty of agreement, and to make truce with the enemy for certain days, which usually maketh the enemy more negligent, so as he may the more easily get out of their hands: By this way Sylla delivered himself twice from the enemy, and by the same deceit Asdrubal in Spain got out from the force of Claudius Nero, who had besieged him, Match. l. 6. f. 89. vide ibidem plura. Lib. II. MISCELLANEA, or an Hodgepodge. Or divers scattered grounds concerning the reasonable construction of the LAW. SECT. I RAtio est anima legis, Coke come. f. 394. b. Reason is the life of the Law; for than we are said to know the Law, when we apprehend the reason of the Law, that is, when we bring the reason of the Law to our own reason, that we may perfectly understand in as our own, ibidem, and therefore we use to say in argument, that reason will that such a thing be done, or that reason will not that such a thing be done Noy max. f. 1. for as Ployd. f 34. our Law hath reasonable constructions in all things; As if I be bound to perform the Covenants in such an Indenture, it shall be intended all the Covenants, or that my Feoffees shall make an Estate, it shall be intended all my Feoffees. Lex est summa ratio, Coke come. 97. b. the Law is the chiefest reason, that is an artificial and legal reason, warranted by authority in Law, ibid. 62. a. and therefore Littleton saith, Semper quaere de dubiis quia per rationes pervenitur ad legitimam rationem. Always inquire of doubts, for by reason you shall come to a lawful reason, for reason is radius divini luminis, and by the reasoning and debating of grave learned men, the darkness of ignorance is expelled, and by the light of legal reason the right is discerned, and thereupon judgement given according to Law, which is the perfection of reason, Coke come. f. 232. b. Nay, the Common Law itself is nothing but reason, which is to be understood of an artificial perfection of reason gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every man's natural reasons: for Nemo nascitur artifex, No man is born an Artist. This legal reason is summa ratio: And therefore if all the reason that is dispersed into so many several heads, were united into one, yet could he not make such a Law as the Law of England is, because by many successions of ages, it hath been fined and refined by an infinite number of grave and learned men, and by long experience grown to such a perfection, as the old rule may be verified, Neminen oportet esse sapientiorem legibus: No man ought out of his own private person to be wiser than the Law, which is the perfection of reason, Co. come. f. 97. b. And though the Jurisdiction of the Court of Parliament, is so transcendent, that it maketh, enlargeth, diminisheth, repealeth, and reviveth Laws, Statutes, Acts, and Ordinances, concerning matters Ecclesiastical, Capital, Criminal, Common, Civil, Martial, Maritine and the rest, Coke comm. f. 110. a. yet cannot a Parliament confirm any thing which is against Law and reason: And therefore if a Town hath customs which are against Law and reason, and their customs be confirmed by Parliament. Danby chief Justice in such case saith, M 5. E. 4. f. 40. & 41. That such confirmation shall not extend to such customs: For a thing used merely against Law and reason, is not custom, notwithstanding the usage as the Law saith, and therefore the Act of Parliament which confirmeth their customs, is referred to that which is not, for they are not customs, and therefore shall be void, Ployd. f. 399. b. vide ibidem plura. Quod est contra rationem est illicium, Coke come. f. 97. b. what is contrary to reason is unlawful. And therefore Tenant in Franckmarriage shall do fealty to the Lord, before the 4th degree passed, for it should be inconvenient and against reason, that a man shall be Tenant of an an Estate of an Inheritance to another, and yet the Lord shall receive no manner of service of him, and therefore he shall do fealty for all service, ibid. And all positive Laws which are contrary to the Laws of nature, and the Law of reason lose their force, and are no Laws at all. Such was that of the Egyptians, to turn women to Merchandizes and Commonwealth affairs, and to keep men within doors. And such was the Law of the Thracians, who accounted stealing very commendable, and idleness an honest thing, Finch. Nom. l. 75. Quod est inconveniens, & contra rationem non est permissum in lege, Whatsoever is convenient and contrary to reason is not permitted in the Law, Coke come 178. a. If a man be seized of lands in Fee-simple, and hath issue two daughters, and the eldest is married, and the Father giveth parcel of the lands to the Baron with his Daughter in Franckmarriage, and dieth seized of the remnant, which are of the greater value by the year, than those lands given in Frankmarriage: In this case the Baron and the Feme shall have nothing for their pur-party of the said remnant, unless they will put their lands given in Frankmarriage in hotch potch, with their remnant of the land with the Sister: And if they will not do so, than the younger may hold and occupy the same remainder, and take to her the profits only, for if the other partner should have nothing of it is given in Frank marriage, of this a thing would ensue an inconvenience, and a thing against reason, which the Law will not suffer; and therefore if the Baron and Feme will not put their lands in Frankmarriage, in hotch potch, they shall have nothing of the remnant, because it shall be intended by the Law that she is sufficiently advanced, to which advancement she agreeth, & holdeth herself content, Littleton ibidem. Mutata legis ratione mutatar & lex, Coke l. 7. f. 7. The reason of the Law being changed, the Law itself is changed. As though by the Common Law a man cannot distrain for rent or service in the night, 12 E. 3.17.11 H. 7.5. accord: yet for damage-feasant a man may distrain in the night, for the necessity of the case, for otherwise peradventure he shall not distrain at all for before the day they may be taken or strayed out of the ground, 10 E. 3. f 37. In the Statute of Winchester it is provided, that in Cities or great Villages which are enclosed, the gates ought to be shut from the setting of the Sun, to the Sun rising; and since that Statute, if in such Village, or City enclosed, any murder or manslaughter be done in the day, or in the night, and the Offender escape, such City, or Village shall be amerced, which Act changed the reason of the Law, for at the common Law, if a man was slain in the night, and the Offender escape, there it was not any default in the City and Village, but now if they do not guard their Gates strongly, according to the Statute by which the Offender escapeth, than it is a default and negligence in them, 3 E. 3. tit. Coronae 290. So if divers commit a robbery by the Statute of 13 E. 3. those of the hundred ought to apprehend all the Felons, and though they apprehend any of them that is not sufficient to excuse them, for the words of the Act are, that they shall answer for the bodies of the Offenders: but now by the Statute of 27 Eliz. c. 13. it is provided, that none shall have an action upon the said statute, if not, that the party rob so soon as he can, shall give notice of the said felony to some of the Inhabitants of any Village, or Hamler next the place where the robbery was done, and that if in their pursuit they take any of the Offenders, that shall excuse them though they do not take all. See there in that Statute the reason of the alteration. Co. l. 6. f. 50. a. b. At the common Law a man that had once the benefit of the Clergy, shall have it another time, and so in infinitum, which was remedied by the Act of 4 H. 7. So as the burning in the hand was not to other purpose, but to notify to the Judge whether he had had his Clergy before, or no, ibid. So if one be attainted at the Common Law for forging false Deeds, the King cannot pardon it, yet the King may pardon the corporal punishment in case of forgery in the Star-chamber, because all Suits in the Star-chamber are but informations, for the King, though the Suit be exhibited by the party, ibidem. So before the Statute of 18 Eliz. c. 7. the King might in case of Indictment of Man slaughter pardon the Imprisonment, 15 H. 7.9. but not in an appeal, but after the Statute of 18 Eliz. by which it is provided, that after Clergy allowed and burning in the hand, the Prisoner shall presently be enlarged and delivered out of prison: It was resolved that that Act did extend as well to the case of appeal, as to the case of Inditements, otherwise the party shall lawfully be discharged of his punishment, and yet remain in perpetual prison, ib. vide examen legum Angliae, f. 29. Cessante ratione legis c●ssat lex, Coke come. f. 70. b. The reason of the Law ceasing, the Law itself ceaseth; As he that holdeth his land by Escuage, when the King maketh a Voyage royal into Scotland, to subdue the Scots, than he that holdeth by the service of one Knights fee, aught to be with the King conveniently arrayed for the War, for forty days, etc. yet needeth he not go with the King himself, if he will find another man, and this seemeth to be good reason, for it may be he is languishing, so that he cannot go, nor ride. Also an Abbot, or another man of religion, or a Feme-sole which hold by such services, ought not go in proper person, Littleton ibidem. Quia multa, In jure communi, propter rationabilem causam, omittenda sunt, for many things for a reasonable cause are to be omitted. If the King give lands to an Abbot, and his Successors to hold by Knight's service, this had been good, and shall do homage and fine a man, but there was no wardship or relief, or other incident belonging thereunto: but if the Abbot and his Heirs had conveyed the land to a natural man and his heirs, now the wardship, relief, or other incident belonged of common right to the King. So if the King give lands to a Mayor and Commonalty, and their successors to be holden in Knights-service, the Patentee shall do no homage, neither shall there be any wardship, or relief, only they shall find a man, but if they convey the land to any natural man and his heirs, now marriage, homage, ward, relief, or other incidents belong hereunto; for the reason of the Law being changed, the Law its self is changed, and the immunity which was in respect of the body politic, by conveyance over, ceaseth, Coke ibid. Qui rationem in omnibus quaerunt rationem subvertant: Theophrastus, Coke l. 2 f. 7.30. who do seek reason in all things, overthrow reason. As if a man make a Lease of Indenture for life of lands in several Counties, and maketh livery of seisin in one County, and divers days after he maketh livery in the other County, yet an entire rent shall issue out of the land in both Counties, and yet the livery by which the Estate passed was made at several times, and therefore it may be argued, that presently by the first livery the rent issued out of it: But the Law shall not adjudge by parcels, in subversion of the intent and agreement of the parties, but after all Acts are made in performance of the original contract and agreement of the parties, the Law shall adjudge upon all as done at one and the same time. So if a man make a Charter of Feoffment with warranty, and deliver the Deed to the Feoffee, and after at another time make livery secundum formam chartae: yet the Warranty is good, and yet it may be objected, that when the Deed was delivered no estate passed to which the warranty may be annexed, nor no estate was in the Feoffee by which the Deed might enure; and so by nice construction upon the distinction of time the warranty shall be subverted, but the Deed which comprehended the warranty took effect presently by the delivery of the Deed before livery and seisin, and therefore the sentence is true, that who do seek reason in all things subvert reason, ibidem. SECT II. A Verbis legis non est recedendum, Coke l. 5. f. 118. b. we ought not to go from the words of the Law, Edriches' casc. A. deviseth rend with distress to B. for the life of C. the heir leaseth the land for life to D. the remainder to E. in see, the rent is behind in the life of D. D. dieth, C. dieth, B. distraineth for the arrearages of E. in remainder, and resolved that he shall be charged by the second branch of 32 H. 8. c. 37. which giveth a distress for the arrearages upon such lands out of which the said rents were issuing in such manner and form, as if Cestuy que vie had been living. And the Judges said, that they ought not to make any interpretation against the express letter of the statute, for nothing can so express the intent of the makers of the act, as their direct words, themselves, for Index animi se●mo, and it shall be perilous to give scope to make construction in any case against the express words, when the intent of the makers appeareth not to the contrary, and when no inconvenience upon it shall arise, for we ought not to go from the words of the Law, vide ibidem plura. Coke l. 10 f. 105. a. b. If in an Assize so many of the Recognitors make default, that there be not twelve, the Justices of Assize cannot award Tales de circumstantibus; for though the Justices of Assize are named in the said Act of 35 H. 8. as well as the Justices of Nisi prius, yet insomuch as the said Act doth not give power to Justices of Assize, or Nisi prius, but where the trial shall be by twelve men in any Writ of Habeas Corpora, or Distringas, with Nisi prius, and it cannot be in an Assize, for Assisae capiamur in proprio Comitatu, and can never be taken by Nisi prius in proprio commitatu, and no exposition can be made against the express words, for that shall be viperina expositio, quae corrodit vistera textus, a viperous exposition which should tear the bowels of the Text, ibidem. Coke l. 8. f. 1. 7. a. b. The better Expositors of all Letters Patents, and Acts of Parliaments, are the Letters Patents and Acts of Parliament themselves by construction and conference of all the parts of them together: for optima Statuti interpretatrix est, omnibus particulis ejusdem inspectis, ipsum Statutum, & Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, una aliqua particula proposita, judicare vel respondere. The best expounder of a statute is the statute itself, all the parts of the same being looked into, and it is an unjust thing, One particular being propounded, to judge and answer, unless the whole Law be looked into, ibidem in Dr. bonham's case. Coke l. 10. f. 24. b The better exposition of the Charter of the King is upon consideration of all the Charter to expound the Charter by the Charter itself, and the Letters Patents in this case are the bowels of the Text, and therefore all the parts of the Letters Patents should be considered, and every part of it explained according to the true and genuine sense, for verba chartae regi aeque portant suam expositionem, For the words of the King's Charter do equally carry their own exposition, ibid. Divinatio non interpretatio est, quae omnino recedit a littera. Bac Max. f. 16. It is a divination, and not an interpretation which leaveth the Letter. As if I have a fee-farm Rend of ten shillings issuing out of White-acre, and I reciting the same reservation, do grant to I. S. the rent of five shillings to be received out of the aforesaid rent, and out of all my Lands and Tenements in Dale, with clause of distress. Though there be an Attornment, nothing passeth out of my former rent, because for that it is against the words, and the copulation of the words show the taking of them in another sense: but if I, reciting that I seized of such a rent of ten shillings, do grant five shillings to be received of the same rent, it is good enough without attornment, because percipiendum de, to be received of, may well be taken for parcella de, parcel of, without violence of the words, but if it had been of the aforesaid rent, it had been void, vide ibidem. But as Ployden saith, f. 162. Exception. Non est regula quin fallit, There is no Rule but faileth, and as hath been said, the more reasonable and equitable rule is always to be preferred when they encounter and meet in opposition: as contrary to this is the rule of the Civilians, Leges non verbis, sed rebus esse impositas. And Coke l. 11. 34. b. Qui haeret in littera haeret in cortice. Laws are not imposed upon words, but upon things, and he that sticketh in the letter, sticketh in the bark or outside of the matter, and not attaineth to the inside of the sense. As by the statute of 27 E. 3. c. 1. It was provided, that he that draweth one to the Court of Rome in a plea which was determined in the court of the King, or of other things whereof judgement is given in the Court of the King, etc. to defeat the judgements given in the Court of the King shall have day containing the space of two months, etc. and if they come not within the mean time in proper person, they shall be put out of protection, etc. and the question was moved in 30. E. 3. 11. If the Defendant appeareth, pleadeth and be condemned whether he shall have the Judgement of a Praemunire given by the said Act, but since, in 39 E. 3. f. 7. judgement was given against the Bishop of Chicester, who appeared, although the letter of the Statute is, that if they come not at the same day, etc. they shall be put out of protection, and therefore a multo fortiori, when the defendant in such case appeareth, pleadeth, and shall be found guilty, he shall have judgement upon the said Statute, 44. E. 3. 36. and yet it is out of the words of the Act, which speak only of a default, for Qui haeret in littera, etc. So by the Statute of 25. E 3. the kill of his Master is adjudged Treason, yet by construction is it extended to his Mistress as it is holden in 19 H. 6. 47. And whereas by the Statute of 25. H. 8. house burners were deprived of Clergy, and in the Statute of 5. & 6. E. 6 there was no mention of that offence in particular, but only that the said Statute should stand in force concerning the trial of offenders in another County, yet by another sentence in the said Act, that every clause, and sentence in the said Act touching Clergy, etc. shall from henceforth concerning such offences, remain and be in full strength and virtue, it was adjudged that the said clause should extend to all the Act of 25. H. 8. because by that construction such an heinous offence should not pass in effect without capital impunity, and that such Malefactors shall not be encouraged to burn not only Houses but Villages, and Cities. And it is frequent in our Books, that penal Statutes have been taken by intendment, beside the letter, to the end that they shall take effect, according to the express intention of the makers of the Act, to remedy the mischief in advancement of Justice, and suppression of heinous crimes, Coke ibidem, vide ibidem plura. And though it is a Maxim that penal Laws are to be taken, it may be conceived of such as concern inferior, and not heinous offences. Coke Com. 365. b. A man seized of Lands in fee, levied a fine to the use of himself for life, and after to the use of his wife, and of the heir males of her body, by him begotten for her Jointure, und after he and his wife levied a fine, and suffered a common recovery, the husband and wife died, and the issue male entered by force of the Statute, of 11. H. 7. And it was holden that the entry of the issue male was lawful, and yet this case was out of the letter of the Statute, for she never levied a fine being sole, or with any other after taken husband, but is by herself with the husband that made the loynture, but this case being in the same mischief, is therefore within the remedy of the Statute, by the intendment of the makers of the same, to avoid the dis-inherison of heirs who were provided for by the said jointure, and especially by the husband himself that made the jointure, which as it was said was a stronger case, than any set down in the Statute, for Qui haeret in littera, vide ibidem plura. Coke come 241. a. If there be Lord, Mesne, and Tenant, and the Mesne doth grant to the Tenant to acquit him against the Lord, and his heirs, the Lord dyeth, his wife hath the signiory assigned to her for the Dower, and distraineth the tenant, albeit the grant of Mesne was to acquit him against the Lord and his heirs only, yet because she continued the State of her husband, and the reversion remained in the heir, this grant of the acquittal did extend to his wife, for Qui haeret. Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba ipsa fienda est, Coke l. 7. f. 24. a. So often as there is no ambiguity, nor doubt in the words, there no exposition against the express words is to be made: If A. by Deed granteth rend out of the Manor of D. to have and receive it, to him and his heirs, and further granteth by the same Deed, that if the rent be behind that the grant shall distrain in the Manor of S. both the Manors are charged, the one with the rent, the other with the distress for the rent, the one issueth out of the Land, and the other is to be taken upon the Land, for here a rent is granted expressly to be issuing out of the Manor of D. and the parties have expressly limited out of which Land the rent shall issue, and in which the distress shall be taken, and the Law shall not make any exposition against the express words, and intention of the parties, when it can stand with the rule of Law, for where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no exposition to be made contrary to the express words, ibidem, in Calvin's case. Exception. Yet as Mr. Ploydon saith, f. 18. b. The words of the Law of nature, of the Law of the Realm, and the Law of God will yield, and give place to some acts and things done against the words of the same Laws, and that is when they are infringed to avoid greater inconveniences, or for necessity, or by conpulsion. For inconvenience: It is a rule in the Law, that factum unius alteri nocere non debet, no man's deed ought to hurt another, but there is another maxim that it is better to suffer a mischief, than an inconvenience which is to be preferred before it, Coke come 152. b. As if there be Lord, Mesne, and Tenant, and the Tenant holdeth of the Mesne by five shillings, and the Mesne holdeth over by the service of twelve pence, if the Lord purchaseth the Tenancy, the Mesnalty is extinct, because when the Lord hath the Tenancy, he holdeth of the Lord next parament to him, and if he should hold of him that was Mesne, than he should hold the same Tenancy immediately of two Lords, which should be inconvenient, and the Law will that we rather suffer a mischief then an inconvenience, Littleton, so as the rule is regularly true, res inter alios acta, alteri nocere non debet, what thing is acted among some must not hurt an other, but with this exception, unless an inconvenience should follow, Coke ibidem. So it is a Maxim in the Law, that a warranty of a collateral Ancestor if it descend upon him shall bar the heir, as if A. disseise B. of Land, and selleth the Land, and the Alienee obtaineth a warranty of the Ancestor collateral to the Disseissee after whose death the warranty descendeth upon the Disseissee, the Disseissee by descent of the warranty upon him is barred for ever in Law, Doctor and Student, l. 2. c. 501. but though they all offended in obtaining of the said collateral warranty, yet such an offence is not to be considered in the Law, for the inconvenience, that thereupon might ensue, for it is holden for an inconvenience, as Coke saith, Com. 152 b. That any of the Maxims of the Law should be broken, though a private man suffer loss, for that by infringing of a Maxim, not only a general prejudice to many, but in the end a public incertainty and confusion would follow, & lex citius tolerar● vult privatum damnum, quam publicum malum, and Law will sooner suffer a private injury, than a public evil, neither in such cases is there any remedy to be had in the Chancery, or in conscience, for it was resolved in Beverlys' case, Coke l. 4. f. 124. a. That against an express maxim of the common Law, no man shall have relief in Chancery, for it should be in subversion of a principle, or ground of Law, Doctor and Student, ibidem, vide ibidem plura. So Ployd. 18. b. It is against the Law of nature, and the Law of reason to beat the person of any man in any cases, yet when a man is mad, and of non sanae memoriae, and doth much evil, a man and his Parents also may take him, bind him, and beat him with rods, and may justify it, 22. Ass. Pl. 56. And by the Statute of Mar. it is generally prohibited, that none shall drive any distress out of one County into another, and yet it is adjudged that if one hold Land of a Manor in another County, that the Lord may distrain and drive the distress of the Land holden of the Manor in the County where the Manor is, and that is in avoidance of the inconvenience, for it should be a great damage to the Lord, if he should not drive the distress to his own manor, for the avoidance of which the Law is not offended, although the words of the Law be broken, M. 1. H. 6. Pl. f. 3. A man privileged in some Court is sued in London, and the Action is actionable no where else, yet upon a supersedeas, the Court shall surcease, Finch. Nomot. And we see also that necessity in all Laws shall be a good excuse, and that all Laws give place to necessity, according to the common proverb, necessitas non habet legem, necessity hath no Law, And therefore in a praecipe quod reddat, the tenant shall excuse his default by a flood of water, and yet every default is abhorred in our Law, because it is a contempt of the Court, but because by peril of death he could not come, the necessity of the chance in such case, in regard there was no default in him, shall excuse him, M. 38. H. 6. 11. So the words of the Law of God may be infringed by necessity without offence to God, and therefore in the old Law, by the Law of God it was prohibited that none should eat of the show bread, and yet it appeareth that David for necessity of famine did eat the said bread, and yet he did not break the Law, as our Saviour Christ declareth in the Gospel, so the Apostles of our Saviour did pull the ears of Corn of other persons, and did eat them, and that for necessity of famine, Ploydon f. 19 a. So if a man steal victuals to satisfy his present hunger, this is no Felony, nor Larceny, Stanford, because it is for the conservation of life. And if divers be in danger of drowning by the casting away of some Boats, or Barge, and one of them get to some Plank, or on the Beats side to keep him above water, and another to save his life, thrust him from it whereby he is drowned, this is neither se defendendo, nor by misadventure, but is justifiable, Bac. Max. f. 25. So if divers Felons be in a Goal, and the Goal by casualty is set on fire, whereby the prisoners get forth, this is no escape nor breach of prison, 15. H. 7. 2. by Keble. So if a man have right to Land, and doth not make his claim for fear of force, the Law alloweth him continual claim, which shall be as beneficial to him as any entry, 12. H. 4. 20. Lit. So where Baron and Feme commit a Felony, the Feme can neither be principal nor accessary, because the Law intendeth her to have no will, in regard of the obedience, and subjection she oweth to her husband, Stanf. 26 2. E. 3. 100LS. Cor. Fitz. So one reason why Ambassadors are used to be excused of practices against the State where they reside, (unless it be in point of conspiracy which is against the Law of Nations, and Society) is because it doth not appear whether they have it in Mandatis, and then they are excused by necessity of obedience, Bacon. Max f. 26. So if I be tenant for years of an house, and it by the Act of God, or a stranger be overthrown by great tempest, or by sudden floods, or invasion of Enemies▪ in all these cases I am excused in waist, 42. E. 3. 6. 19 E. 3. by Fitz. waist. Ployd. f. 9 b. Any man in his defence, or a Champion upon trial may kill others, and that is for the necessity of the salvation of his life in his defence, and by the common Custom of the Realm the Hostelers shall be charged with the Goods of the Guests lossed, and taken out of their houses; yet if their houses be broken by the King's enemies, and the goods of the guests lessened, or embezzled, they shall not be charged with them, because they could not resist them, ibidem, So for necessity the funeral expenses shall be first paid by the Executors, Broh. executor 162. So a man may milk a Cow that he hath by return irrepleaible, and that is for necessity, Finch. Nom. I. S. 35. Davis 122. 1. Nihil magis est justum quam quod necessarium est: Nothing is more just than what is necessary; So the King by his Prerogative for the necessary charges of the Crown may decree Imposts and Impositions payable upon Merchandizes, contrary to the petition of right and property. Though a man may not be punished for an act he doth by necessity of obedience; yet if the act be unlawful, he is not the less to be blamed, or if it be not necessitas culpabilis: As those which releived Sir John Oldcastle with provision, were not punished because they did it pro timore mortis, for fear of death. Steel in the C. of M. H. Coke come. l. 5. f. 40. b. Necessitas saepenumero vincit communem legem. Necessity for the most part overcommeth the common Law. As if two joint-tenants be of land to them, and the heirs of one of them, they shall not join in a Writ of Right: But two Joint tenants and the heirs of one of them in a Writ of Advowson, shall join in a Writ of right of Advowson: And the reason of the diversity is, because that in the first case they have several means and remedies, as it is agreed in 46 E. 3. 21. But in the other case if Tenant for life shall not join with him that hath the fee, neither the one nor the other shall have any remedy, and therefore in this case necessity overcometh the Law, ibidem. Coke l. 10 f. 61. a. Illud quod alias licitum non est, necessitas facit licitum, & necessitas inducit privilegium quod jure privatur, Bract. f. 247. that which is not otherwise lawful necessity maketh lawful, and necessity introduceth a privilege which is deprived by Law. As if a Bishop granteth an Annuity-out of his Bishopric that is restrained by the Statute of 1 Eliz, because it is a diminution of its revenues, and depauperation of its successors: But if a Bishop grant an Office to one only, that is not restrained by the statute of 1 Eliz. because such Grants are for necessity; for if the Bishop should not have power to grant such Offices of service, and necessity for the life of the Grantees, no sufficient persous would serve them in such Offices, or at the least would not discharge it with such alacrity if they had no estate for their lives, but that their estates did depend upon uncertains, as the death or translation of the Bishop. Bacon Max. f 17. Privilegium non valet contra rempublicam. The necessity of privilege prevaileth not against the Common wealth, for public necessity is greater than private: and therefore in all cases, if the act be against the Commonwealth, necessity excuseth it. And accordingly the Law imposeth on every Subject that he prefer the urgent service of his Prince and Country, before the safety of his life. As in a tempest, if those in a Ship throw over their Goods they are not answerable: But if upon command they have Ordinance and ammunition to relieve any of the King's Towns, they cannot justify the throwing of them over, ibidem. So in the case of Husband and Wife, if they join in committing Treason, the necessity of obedience doth not excuse the wife as in felony, because it is against the Commonwealth, 13 H 8.16. by Shelly. So if a fire be taken in a street, I may justify the pulling down of the Wall or House of another man's to save the row from the spreading of the fire, 12 H. 10 by Brook, 22 Assize pl. 66 But if I be assailed in my House, City, or Town, and distressed, and to save my life, set fire on my house, which taketh hold upon other houses adjoining, I am subject to their action of the case, because I cannot rescue my own life by any thing which is against the Common wealth, but if it had been but a private trespass, as the going over another's ground, or the breaking of his enclosure when I am pursued for the safety of my life, it is justifiable, 6 E. 4. 7. But necessitas culpabilis excuseth not, as to kill one se defendendo is not matter of justification, because quarrels are presumed not to grow without some wrong, and the Law supposeth the party not to be without some malice, and therefore it putteth him to sue out his pardon of course, and punisheth him with the loss of his Goods, Bacon Max. f 28. Compulsion also is a good excuse in our Law, against the words of the Law; And therefore whatsoever I do by duresse is not my act but may be avoided according to the rule. Actus, me invito factus, non est meus actus. An act done against my will is not my act, as when I am compelled for fear of imprisonment, to make a Bond or a Deed, such a fear sufficeth to avoid a Bond or a Deed, Coke come 253 b for the Law hath a special regard to the safety and liberty of man. If one make me swear to surrender my estate unto him, and I do so afterwards, this is a Disseisin to me, 14 Ass. pl. 20. One imprisoned until he maketh an obligation at another place, and after he doth so when he is at large, it is by duresse of imprisonment, 21 E. 4. 28. If I threaten you in one County to make an Obligation of twenty pounds, and after I find you in another County, and demand the Obligation, the Obligation is avoidable, because it hath respect to the first threatening, Kelleway, f. 52. b. vide ibidem, 2 marriage procured by duresse to be avoidable. If a stranger threaten A. to make a Deed to B. A. shall avoid the Deed by such threatening, Coke l. 2. f 9 B. as well as if B. himself had made the threatening, but it is no plea without making the Obligee party to the plea. If the hand of any man be drawn by compulsion, and the weapon in his hand killeth another, it shall not be felony, Ployd. f. 18. a. Modus, & conventio vincunt legem, Coke come. f. H. 41 b. Manner and Covenant overcome the Law. As to every Tenant for life, or for years by Law, are incident three kinds of Estovers: House-boot which is twofold, aedificandi & ardendi. Plow-boot, estoverium arandi, and lastly Hay-boot, that is, estoverium claudendi, and these Estovers must be reasonable, and therefore are they ca●●ed rationabilia estoveria: and those the Lessee may take upon the land without any assignment, unless held or restrained by a special Covenant, for Modus & conventio vincunt legem, ibidem. Coke l. 2. f. 73. b. Though Recoveries and Fines do extinguish all other Rights and Titles, yet the Covenants and Conditions shall be saved, for modus, etc. vide ibidem plura, in Cromwel's case. Coke l. 7. f. 28. a. In Mands case, a rent granted to one, and his Assigns, pro consilio impendendo, it may be assigned over by the express words of the Grant, which granteth it to him and his Assigns, though otherwise it could not, for modus, etc. The Law doth not determine to whom the tender shall be made, when the parties themselves expressly agree to whom it shall be made, Dy. As it is resolved in Goodales' case, l. 5. f. 97. a. That the payment to the Assignee had not been good, because the Heirs, Executors, and Administrators are expressly named, and not Assigns: as Littleton upon a Mortgage upon condition that he pay to the Feoffee, or his Heirs, the tender aught to be made to the Heir, and not to the Executors, because the Heir was expressly named. Glanvil saith, Generaliter est verum, quod conventio vincit legem: & Magna Charta, conventio legi dorogat. An agreement overcometh and barreth the Law, and Ployd. f. 29. a. the manner and form of the Gift altereth the Law. As if houses let for years be overthrown by tempests and wind, the Law will excuse the Lessor in waist, but if he had covenanted to repair them, and leave them well repaired at the end of the term, an action of Covenant will lie against them. A Termor did covenant and agree pro se & executoribus, to repair and maintain the houses, and to find principal Timber, which is decayed by the default of him, or his Executors, and dieth, and the house is burnt in default of the Executors; and it was adjudged ●hat a Writ of Covenant in this case will lie against the Executors, and that damages should be recovered of the Goods of the Testator, and yet this happened by casualty, Dyer 324. but the reason is Modus, &c, Fulb. l. 2 f. 52. And Dyer 33. The Lessee of a Meadow did covenant and agree to keep and maintain the banks in good repair, and the said banks were drowned, or overflowen by high water or sudden flood, yet the Lessee is bound to repair and maintain them because of his Covenant, but according to the opinion of Fitz. and Shelley, because the decay of the banks were the act of God, he ought to have convenient time to repair them. If I be bond to I. S. to entermarry with such a Daughter before such a day, and before the day often tender myself to the Daughter of the Obligee to marry her, and she refuseth, yet I have forfeited my Obligation, Perk. f. 146. b. vide ibidem plura. Sheep are let, and the Lessee covenanteth to render the poles at the end of the term; if they die of Murren, he shall answer for them, 40 E. 3. 2. Et sic interpretari, & concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. And so to expound and to make Laws to agree together, is the best manner of expounding, is the general rule given by Sir Edward Coke, when the grounds and authorities of the Law seem to be at difference and variance between themselves, Coke l. 8. f. 169. a. and which Mr. Ployden also declareth, that Maxims by reason ought to be conferred and compared the one against the other, although they do not vary: or by reason ought to be discussed, what thing is more near to the Maxim, or the mean between the Maxims and what not, Ployd. f 29 a. Verba fortius acciptuntur contra proferentem; Bac. Max. f. 9 words are to be taken strongest against the Speaker, which rule as he saith, is drawn out of the depth of reason, for first it maketh a man watchful in his own business, and grants. And secondly, it is the Author of much quiet and certainty, because it favoureth conveyances executed, taking them beneficially for the Grantees and Possessors, as also because it maketh an end of many doubts concerning the construction of words, for if the intention of the parties should only be picked out, every Judge would have a several sense: whereas by this rule they may know the Law more certainly. And this rule hath a special force in Grants, according to the ground, Quaelibet concessio for●issime contra danatorem interpretanda est, Coke come. 183. a. As if lands be let, and a rend granted, the general intendment is, that an estate for life passeth, but if the Habendum limit the same for years, or for life, or at will, the habendum doth qualify the general intendment of the Premises, and the reason is, because every man's grant shall be taken by construction of Law most forcible against himself, and the reason thereof given by the Civilians is, because the Grantor might have expressed his meaning in more full, large, and manifest words; and therefore when the Grant is incertain, and the words of the Grant ambiguous, the Grant must be taken most strongly against the Grantor. As if a man grant an Annuity out of certain land, and he hath no land at the time of the Grant, yet the Grant shall charge his person, T. 9 H. 6. 12. by Babington. And if a Deed of a Grant be good in parcels, and for parcels not, that which is for the advantage of the Grantee shall be taken to be good. As if a man granteth unto me an annuity, provided that it shall not charge his person, the Proviso is void and the Grant good, 20 E. 4 8. by Townsend, 14 H. 4. 30. by Hank. And if an annuity be granted pro consilio impendendo, though the Grantee be well skilled in divers professions of art, yet counsel shall be given in that faculty only, which was intended at the time of the Grant, 4. 1. E. 3. 6. If the King grant to a man that he and his Heirs shall be quit of Tax for the lands which they have, this is a good Grant, though there be no Tax at the time of the Grant, 38 H. 6. 10. And so is the Law of Tenths and fifteen, ibidem. Ployd. f. 29. a. If a man maketh a Lease for life, and after the decease of Tenant for life, that the lands redibus to A. B. in fee, it is held a good remainder, because it is held for a principle that the Livery of every one shall be taken more strong against him, 18 E. 3. f. 28. If a man give land to one, & haeredibus, it shall be a Fee-simple without the word suis; and though he doth not give him a Fee-simple expressly, yet every man's livery shall be taken strongest against him, Ployd f. 18 b.a. If I make a lease for years upon condition, that one month after he shall have fee, he shall have it after the month accordingly, for the thing shall pass according to the convention more strong against the Donor, Ployd ibidem. So if I make a lease to two upon condition that if one doth die within seven years, that then after the death of the other it shall remain to a stranger in fee, that remainder is good, for the reason of the condition to give the estate to privies, or strangers, is all one, in regard that he had first given an estate, to which the condition may be annexed, for the livery and limitation shall be taken strongest against him that made it, ibidem. If I give land to one, & filio suo primogenito, and he hath no Son at the time of the gift, and after he hath a Son, that son shall have the land by way of remainder, and yet the remainder was not out of the Lessor, neither did it vest at the time of livery, but the Law construeth the livery and limitation more strong against the Lessor, P. 17 E. 3. f. 29. Ployd. vide ibidem plura. If two Tenants in Common grant a rent of ten shillings, this is several, and the Grantees shall have twenty shillings: But if they make a Lease and reserve ten shillings, they shall have only ten shillings between them. So an Obligation to pay ten shillings at the feast of our Lord God, it is no plea to say that he did pay it, but he must show at what time, or else it will be taken that he paid it after the feast, for every act shall be taken more strictly against him that made it, Noy. Max. f. 15. 2 E. 3. p. M f. 140 b. & 161. b. A general pardon ought to be taken more beneficially for the Subject against the King, 37 H. 8. f. 21. Coke l. 4. Vaughan's case. If I. S. submit himself to arbitrement of all Actions, and Suits between him, and I D. and I. N. it shall be intended collective of joint Actions, and distributive of several Actions also, because the words shall be taken stronger against him that speaketh, 2. R. 3. 18. 21. H. 7. 29. If I grant 10 l. rend to Baron and Feme, and if the Baron die, the Feme shall have three pound rend, it shall be strongest taken against me the grantor, for three pounds' addition to the ten, 8. Ass. Pl. 10. So if I sow all my Land with Corn, and let it for years, the Corn passeth to the Lessee, if I except it not: So if I have a free Warren in my own Land, and let my Land for life, not mentioning the Warren, yet the Lessee by implication shall have the Warren discharged, and extracted during the Lease, 8. A. 7 32. H. 6. If I. give Lands to I. S. and his heirs males, this is a good Fee-simple and the words, males, is void, Bac. Max. f. 12. vide ibidem plura. Yet this rule also faileth, when another which the Law holdeth worthier cometh in place, and which is of more equity, and humanity. It is a rule in the Civil Law, valeant eo modo quo valere possunt, and at the Common Law, Benignae faciendae sunt interpretationes chartarum propter simplicitatem laicorum ut res magis valeat, quam pereat, Coke come. f. 30 b. The interpretations of Deeds, and charters because of the simplicity of the people are favourably to be made, that the thing may rather stand and subsist, then fall and perish, and let all things stand by the same means they may stand. And therefore if I give Lands to I. S. and his heirs, rendering five pounds yearly to I. D. and his heirs, this implieth a condition to me that am the grantor, Littleton, yet were it a stronger exposition against me, to say that the limitation shall be void, and the Feoffment absolute. So if a man make a lease to A. for years, and after by his Deed, the Lessor, voluit quod haberet, & teneret terram pro termino vitae, willeth that he should have, and hold the Land for term of his life, this is adjudged by the word volo to be a good confirmation for life, Coke come f. 301. b. Though it were stronger to say those words are void, because they are not proper words of confirmation. So if the Disseisor granteth a rent to the Disseisee, and he by his Deed granteth it over, and after doth re-enter, in this case one, and the same words do amount to a grant, and a confirmation. So if the Disseisor maketh a Lease for life, or in tail, the remainder to the Disseisse in fee, and the Disseissor by his Deed granteth over the remainder and the particular tenant atturneth, the Disseissee shall not enter upon the tenant for life, or in tail, for than he should avoid his own grant, which amounteth to a grant of the estates, and a confirmation also, ne pereat Coke ibidem 302. So if A, enfeoffeth another upon condition, that he and his heirs shall render to a stranger and his heirs, a yearly rent of twenty shillings although this reservation be merely void, for that no estate moveth from the stranger, and that he is not party to the Deed, and therefore can be no rent, yet shall it be taken for a penalty, or for an annual sum in gross, so as if they will not pay it according to the form of the Indenture, they shall lose the Land by the entry of the Feoffor and his heirs, which is to be observed that words in a condition shall be taken out of their proper sense, ut res magis valeat, quam pereat, Coke come. 213. a. If one giveth Lands to two, and the heirs of their two bodies engendered, the Donees have joint estates for life, and several inheritances, for if one of the Donees hath issue and dyeth, the other shall have all by survivor during his life, but if the Survivor hath issue and dyeth, than the issue of the one shall have the one moiety, and the issue of the other, the other moiety of the Land, and shall hold the Land together in common, and the cause why they shall have several inheritances is, for that they cannot by any possibility have an heir between them engendered, and when the grant is impossible to take effect by the letter, there the Law shall-make such construction as the gift by possibility may take effect, Co. 83. b. If Lessor of an house for twenty years maketh a Lease for two years rendering rend, and after granteth all his term, and interest to another, if the Lessee atturne, the Reversion shall pass, and if no Atturnment be had, yet the ieterest in the Reversion shall pass, so as the Grantee shall have the Land after the two years determined, for the grant of one shall not be adjudged void, if to any intent it may take effect, Coke l. 4. f. 53. b. If a Termor grant his Term, Habendum immediate post mortem suam, the Grantee shall have it presently, ut res magis valeat, quam periat, Noy. Max. f. 16. So if a man make a Lease for ten years, and after for twenty years, the latter shall be a good Lease for ten years after the first is expired, Ibidem. A release of all Actions against a Prior, and Covent shall be construed, all Actions against the Prior, for an Action cannot be brought against the Covent. Coke l. 1. f. 76. Gardiner and Bredons' case. Tenant for life of Land, the Remainder in tail, Tenant for life, and he in the first Remainder in tail, join in a fine, sur conusans de droite come ceo, etc. to another in fee, who granted a Rend charge of forty pounds to tenant, for life, it was agreed by all the Justices that the fine levied by tenant for life, & him in the first Remainder was no discontinuance of the first Remainder in tail, nor of the second, because every of them did only give that they may lawfully give, and no forfeiture in the case be cause the law which abhorreth all wrong, shall construe it first to be the grant of him in the Remainder in tail, and then the grant of Tenant for life, ut res magis valeat, quam pereat, but if a Feoffment had been made by word, than it is the surrender of Tenant for life, and the Feoffment of him in the Remainder, Ibidem. Coke l. 1. f. 45 a. In 2. R. 3. 4. it is holden by Starky, and others, that if the Patent of the King may be taken to two intents good, than it shall be taken more beneficially for the King, but if it may be taken to one intent good, and to another intent void, than it shall be taken to that intent to make the grant good, and not to that intent to make it void, ut res magis valeat, etc. vide ibidem plura, in Alton Woods case. Coke l. 5. f. 8. a. In Cessavit where the Tenure is alleged by Homage, Fealty, and Rent, and the Demandant counteth, that in doing the said services he did cease, it shall be taken by construction, to such services only, of which a man may cease 6. H. 7. 7. as of Rent, and not of Homage, and Fealty, and the reason of this is, ne res destruatur, lest the thing should perish, vide ibidem plura. Ployd. f. 197. b. Anthony Browne Justice said, that it is an office of a Judge to expound the thing, ut res magis valeat, quam pereat, and to make all parts of the Deed, and intention of the parties also to agree together. Coke l. 4. f. 4. If I grant to you, that you and your heirs shall distrain for a rent of forty shillings, to wit, within my Manor of S. that by construction of Law, shall amount to a grant of a Rent, out of my Manor of S. for if it shall not amount to a grant of a rent, the grant would be of little force or effect, if the Grantee shall not have but a nude distress, and no rent in him, for than he shall never have an Assize of it, and for that reason it hath been often times ruled, that it shall amount to the grant of a Rent by construction of Law, ut res magis valeat, 3. E. 3. 12. etc. Benedicta est expositio, quando res redimitur a destructione, Coke l. 4. f. 25. b. Blessed is the exposition, when the thing is redeemed from destruction, every Manor which consisteth of Frank-tenements, and Copy-holders' hath two several Courts, the Court of Frank-tenements, wherein the Suitors are Judges, and is called the Court Baron, and the Court of Copy-holders', wherein the Lord, or Steward of the Manor are Judges, and if all the Tenements escheat, or the Lord release the tenure, and service of his Frank-tenements, yet the Lord may hold his Court of Copy-holds and make admittance, and grant of them, ne res destruatur, it is a ground in Law, verba debent intelligi ut aliquid operetur, Coke l. 8. f. 24, words must so be understood, that they must work some thing, and not be idle and frivolous, in Edward Foxes case, wherein it was resolved, that a demise and grant upon consideration of fifty pound for ninty nine years amounted to a bargain, and sale for the said years, for when a Frank tenement or tenement passeth by Deed indented, and enrolled, it is not necessary to have those precise words of bargain, and sale, but words which amount to so much are sufficient, as if a man covenant in consideration of money to stand seized to the use of his Son in fee, if the Deed be enroled it is a good bargain and sale, and yet there are no words of a bargain and sale, but amount to as much Coke l. 7. f. 40. So if a man, for money alien, and grant Land to one and his heirs, or in tail, or for life by Deed indented, and enroled, it shall amount to a bargain and sale, and the Land shall pass without any livery and seisin. It is a ground in Law, verba sunt accipienda cum effectu, Coke l. 4. f. 51. a. b. Words are to be taken with effect, as if a man hath in the right of his wife any estate in Fee-simple, Fee-tail, or for term of life, etc. the Baron shall have all the arrearages as well before marriage, as after the death of his wife by the Statute of 10. H. 6. 11. for though by the Common Law, the Executors, etc. of the wife might have an Action of debt for the arrearages before the coverture, yet when as the Statute giveth to the Baron an Action of debt for the arrearages, the words shall be taken with effect, and shall be construed for the arreages due before. It is a rule in the Law, that verba restringuntur ad habilitatem personae vel ad aptitudinem rei, Bac. Max. f. 14. General words are to be restrained to the condition of the person, or fitness of the thing, as if a man grant to another common, inter metas & bundas villa de Dale, and part of the vill is his several, and part of his waist, common, the Grantee shall not have common in the several, yet this is the strongest exposition against the Grantor, so by all the precedent rules, and grounds, it appeareth that the rule that words shall be taken more strongly against the Grantor, doth yield to them as the more worthy and equitable, vide ibidem plura, where this rule with its differences and exceptions is amply and accurately discussed. The grant of a common person shall be taken more strong against him, but the grant of the King shall be taken more strong against a stranger, and more for him, Ployd. f. 243. a. As a Manor granted by the King, the advowson shall not pass without special words, 2. H. 7. 8. So the King may grant a thing in action, Ibidem. And if the King grant a Manor or Land without limitation of any estate, the grant is void for the incetrainty, and the Grantee shall not be tenant, at the will of the Lord Davis, Rep f 45. vide ibidem plura. This rule hath no place in Acts of Parliament, Verdicts, Judgements, or Devise, Bacon. f. Max. 21. Expressio eorum q●ae tacite insunt nihil operatur, Coke l. 4. f. 73. b. The expression of those things, which are covertly employed worketh nothing, for the expression of a clause which the Law implieth operateth nothing, as in 30. Ass. Pl. 8. A Lease is made to two for term of their lives, & diutius eorum viventi, and after they made partition, and the one dyeth, and he in reversion entereth, and his entry adjudged lawful, notwithstanding the said words, & diutius eorum viventi, for without those so much was covertly employed by the Law, 17 E. 3. 7. Hulls case, whereupon Coke giveth this observation, that in case of lease for life, it is more beneficial for the Lessor to have the jointure severed, then to have it continue, but otherwise it is in a Lease for years, for if a man makes a Lease for years to two, with a proviso that if the Lessees die within the term, that the term shall cease, the Lessees make partition, or one alieneth his part, and dyeth, the Lessee shall not enter into his part that is dead, but the Grantee, or the Executors of the Lessee shall 〈…〉 So if the King maketh a Lease for years rendering rend, without limiting of any place, or to whose hands it shall be paid, the Lessor may by the Law pay it either to the receipt of the Exchequer of the King, or to the hands of the Bailiffs, or receivors of the King, whom the King hath authorized to such purpose, and therefore the usual and special limitation of the payment of rent, at the receipt of the Exchequer, etc. doth import no more than the Law will imply, and therefore nihil operatur, Ibidem. Coke l. 8. f. 26. b. If the King reciting that another holdeth the Manor of D. for life, granteth the said Manor to B. for his life, in this case the Law implieth that the second grant shall begin, and take effect after the determination of the first grant and therefore there is no incertainty in the grant, though it be not expressed, so for the expression of a clause which the Law implieth, operateth nothing, ibidem, in the Earl of Rutland's case. Coke l. 10. f. 39 a. By the Statute of 32. H 8. Tenant in tail may make a Lease for three lives, or ten years, and by the Statute of 4. H. 2. c. 24. he may levy a fine, and by the Statute of 32. H. 8. c. 36. by it bar the issues, and therefore if a man make a gift in tail, and further grant that he may lease for life, or for years, or levy a fine with proclamations to bar the Issues, nihil operatur, for when one maketh a tacit gift in tail, he giveth those incidents to it, Ibidem. And therefore are such conditions, and expressions called by Sir Francis Bacon, clausula vel dipositio inutilis, an unprofitable clause, and disposition, and to no use, because the act or the words do express no more, than the Law by intendment would have supplied, and that therefore the doubling, and iterating of that and no more, than which the conceit of the Law doth in a sort prevent, and preoccupate is reputed nugation. And therefore if a man devise Land at this day to that they must work some thing, and not be idle and frivolous, in Edward Foxes case, wherein it was his Son and heir it is void, because the disposition of the Law did cast the same upon the heir by descent, 32. H. 8. Gourd. 39 Ber. And yet if it be by Knight's service Land, and the heir within age, if he take by the devise, he shall have two parts of the profits to his own use, and the guardian shall have the benefit but of the third, Brook devise. 41. But if a man devise Lands to his two Daughters, haunig no Sons, than the devise is good, because he doth alter the disposition of the Law, for by the Law they shall take in coparcenary, but by the devise they all take jointly, Dyer 12. Bacon. f. 74.75. vide ibidem plura. Yet Littleton saith it is well done to put in such clauses to declare, and express to the lay people which are not learned in the Law, what the Law is in such cases, Co. lib. 4. f. 73. b. Expresum facit cessare tacitum, Coke come. f. 183. b. A matter, or thing expressed causeth that to cease or to be of no effect, which by intendment of Law was employed, and not expressed. As if one grant Lands to two without expressing what estate they shall have, they have a joint estate for term of their lives, but if a Lease be made to two, Habendum to the one for life, the remainder to the other for life, this doth alter the general intendment of the promises, so if a Lease be made to two Habendum the one moiety to one, and the other moiety to the other, the Habendum doth make them tenants in common, for that which is expressed, doth make that which is secretly intended to cease, Ibidem, for as he in another case saith, if the general words should stand without any qualification, than the special words should be altogether vain, Coke l. 8. f. 154. in Edward Althans' case, quod vide. Coke Com. f. 210. a. b. If the Feoffee in mortgage before the day of payment make his Executors and 〈…〉 die, and the heir enter into the Land as he ought, etc. the Feoffor aught to pay the moneys to the Executor, because the Executors as he saith, l. 5. f. 99 a. represent the person of the Testator for all Goods, and Chattels, but if the condition upon the Mortgage be to pay the Mortgagee, or his heirs the money, &c., and before the day of payment, the Mortgagee dyeth, the Feoffor cannot pay the money to the Mortgagee, but the payment ought to be made to the heir, for expressum, etc. and the Law shall never seek out a person when the parties themselves have appointed one, for designatio unius est exclusio alterius, the appointment of one is the exclusion of the other. But if the condition be to pay the money to the Feoffee, his Heirs, or Executors, than the Feoffor hath election to pay it either to the Heir or Executor, Coke come. ibidem. It is a sure ground in the Law, expressum facit cessare tacitum, Davis, 45. in the case of Tenors, and therefore the express reservation in Letters Patents excluded the reservations, and implication in Law, as if the King in his Letters Patents reserveth no tenure, it shall be a capite tenure, but if another tenure be expressed that shall prevail, as Coke l. 6. f. 6. where in a Patent the words of the Tenendum were, Tenendum de nobis per servittum unius rosae pro omnibus servitij: and whereas it was objected that no tenure can be without fealty, yet in this case fealty, that is an incident to all services, shall be admitted to stand with the words, and that then the tenure so expressly reserved was so complete, that it might well exclude the Knight's service tenure, which otherwise the Law would have employed, Davis Ibidem, where it was also resolved that although the express tenure be void, yet no tenure by implication of Law, shall arise against the express tenure of reservation. And so in the case of a void Habendum, which standeth upon the same reason, it was adjudged in B.R. between Higs and Cross, 33, and 34 Eliz. which in Bucklers case is cited by Coke l. 2. f. 55. Tenant for life maketh a Lease for years, and after granteth the reversion to A. Habendum from a day to come for life, after the day the Lessor for years atturneth▪ in that case the Habendum is void, and that void Habendum maketh void the whole Grant, and excluded the implication of Law in the Premises, and no Estate shall pass by implication of Law in the Premises, against the express limitation of the party in the Habendum, Davis ibidem. A man maketh a Lease rendering rend, and doth not say to whom the rent shall be paid, this by implication shall be to the Lessor and his Heirs: But if the words be to the Lessor, the Heir shall not have it, Dyer 45. 12 Eliz. 3. etc. So as an Estate by implication shall be controlled by an express limitation. But if I grant to another a rent which I have in fee, the grant shall be for life, but if I say further Habendum after the death of I. S. there all shall be void, Ployd. 52.156. So if the King granteth lands by Letters Patens, Habendum from a day to come, there the whole grant is made void by the Habendum, coke l. 5. f. 93. Barwicks' case. He in the reversion for life gtanteth his Estate, Habendum after Michaelmas, and after Michaelmas the Tenant attornes, yet resolved the grant is void, though if there had been no Habendum, it had been good by the Premises of the Deed, coke f. 2. c. 55. Davis f. 26.27. Coke l. 7 f. 41. b If the Father by Deed indented, in consideration of a hundred pounds paid by his son, covenanteth to be seized to the use of his son, there no use shall be raised to the son if the Deed be enroled by the statute of 26 H 8. c. 10. for that it is in the nature of a bargain and sale, and that which is expressed shall cause that which is implied to cease. ibid. Coke l. 4. f. 8. a. in Nokes case, It was resolved by the whole Court, that an express Covenant doth qualify the generality of the Covenant in Law, and restraineth it by the mutual assent of both parties, which shall extend to no further than the express Covenant. Quia clausula generalis non refertur ad expressa, because a general clause employed in Law, hath no reference to an express and particular Covenant in deed. Yet Quadam tacita habentur pro expressis: As if the Father, Tenant by Knights-service, enfeoff his son and heir within age, it is not necessary to aver by collusion, for it is apparent, Ployd. Winbichs case, and 27 H. 8. Dacres case, 33 H. 6. 14 etc. So if I covenant to stand seized to the use of my Wife, Son, or Cousin, that shall well raise a use without any express words of consideration, for sufficient consideration appeareth, because paternal love and affection appear. If in a Lease the express Covenant is, that the Lessee and his Executors shall repair the house demised: This shall not excuse the Assignee, who by an employed Covenant in Law adherent to the Estate, is tied to repair it, Coke l. A Warranty in Law is not destroyed by an express Warranty; as if a man lease for life rendering rend, and further bindeth himself and heirs to Warranty, there the express Warranty shall not take the Warranty in Law, but he may choose which he pleaseth, Coke l. 4. f. 81. a. vide ibidem plura. Lex neminem cogit ad impossibilia, Coke come. f. 231. b. & l. 5. f. 75. a. The Law compelleth no man to impossibility. If a Deed remain in one Court, it may be pleaded in another Court, without showing forth, for the Law doth not compel any one to impossibilities, ibidem. If a Lease be made, upon condition, that the Lessee dwell upon the lands demised, the lease being for forty years, and he dieth at the end of ten years, yet the Executor shall enjoy the land, because the condition is become impossible. Et nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. Dod. No man is bound to impossibilities, 37, & 38 Eliz. If a man make a Lease for years of woods, and it is covenanted that the Lessee shall leave the woods in as good plight as it was at the time of the Lease made; and during the term the woods fell down by sudden tempest, the Lessor shall not have an action of Covenant, because it is impossible the Lessee shall perform it, Perk. f. 142. b. Coke l. 1. f. 98. a. Coke come. f. 206. a. If the condition of a Bond be impossible at the time of making the Condition, the Condition is void because impossible, and the Bond good: As if a man be bound in an Obligation, etc. with Condition, that if the Obligor doth go from the Church of S. Peter at Westminster, to the Church of S. Peter at Rome within three hours, that then the Obligation shall be void; the Condition is void, & impossible, and the obligation standeth good. And so it is of a Feoffment upon condition that the Feoffee shall go as is aforesaid, the Feoffment is absolute, and the Condition void, because it is a Condition subsequent, for there is a precedent Condition, and a subsequent Condition. If a Condition subsequent to a Feoffment in fee be impossible, the state of the Feoffee is absolute: but if the Condition precedent be impossible, no state or interest groweth thereupon. As if a man make a Lease for life, upon Condition that if the Lessee go to Rome as aforesaid, that then he shall have fee, the Condition precedent is, and therefore no Fee-simple followeth, Coke ibid. The statute appointeth that in re-disseisin the Sheriff shall go to the place, and there shall take the Inquest. If then the re-disseisin is of several lands in divers Counties, so as he cannot be at all at once, it is sufficient to take the Inquest at one of them, because of the impossibility, 40 Ass. 23. If a man be bound by recognizance, or Bond, with Condition that he shall appear the next term in such a Court, and before the day, the Conuzee, or the Conuzor dieth, the Obligation is saved. And in all cases where a condition of a Bond or Recognizance, etc. is possible at the time of making of the Condition, and before the same can be performed, the Condition becometh impossible by the act of God, or of the Law, or of the Obligee, there the Obligation is saved But otherwise in case of a Feoffment, as if a man maketh a Feoffment, on condition that if the Feoffor shall appear in such a Court the next term, that then it may be lawful for the Feoffor to re-enter, and presently after the Feoffor dieth, the estate of the Feoffee is become absolute: And the reason of this diversity is, because the estate of the land is executed and settled in the Feoffees, and cannot be returned back but by matter subsequent, viz. The performance of the Condition: But a Bond or Recognizance is a thing in action, and executory, and whereof no advantage can be taken until there is a default in the Obligor, Coke come. f. 260. a. vide ibid. plura. Vltima prioribus derogant, Reg. I. C. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, Coke l. 11 f. 62. 63. The last Laws derogate and abrogate the first, which are contrary. Though the wisdom of the Judges and sages of the Law, have all wages suppressed subtle, and new inventions in derogation of the Common Law, and will not change the Law that hath been used, 38 E. 3. 1 so as if it be not altered by Parliament it remaineth still; yet as Cato said, Vix ulla lex fieri potest que omnibus commoda sit: And as Sir Edward Coke, rerum progressui ostendunt multa quae initio praecaveri & provideri non possint, It is impossible for any Law to be, which may be commodious to all, and the progress and proceeding of things show, and present many things which at the first could neither be presaged nor prevented: From whence it proceedeth, that no Law can be so absolute, but that may in some particulars prove defective, and amendable, and yet as Ployd. f. 369. that Law is reasonable which provideth for the multitude, though some especial persons lose by it, which hath been the occasional cause of the alteration of the Common Law in many points. Yet the Common Law hath no controller but the high Court of Parliament, and the wisdom and custom of this State hath always had such regard and respect to the Common law, that they would by no means change it, but by the great Council of Parliament, wherein all things are transacted not only by the prudency of the Prince, but by the chiefest and sagest Senators of the whole Nation, and that not upon the consultation and declaration of one or two hundred, but as Fortescue by more, and three hundred elect men, by which number the Senate of Rome was ruled, who always have been cautious, and vigilant not to introduce any foreign Law, as Sir John Davis in his Preface observeth: That in the Parliament of Merton when motion was made by the Clergy, that Children borne before marriage might be adjudged legitimate. The great and wise men of England made answer with one voice, Nolumus leges Angliae mutari. And again in 11 R. 2. when a new course of proceeding in criminal Causes, according to the form of the Civil Law was propounded in that unruly Parliament. Answer was made by all the States, That the Realm of England had not been in former times, nor hereafter should be ruled by the Civil Law: And therefore for the most part Magna Charta, which is the foundation of other Acts of Parliament, and other ancient Statutes, are but the affirmations and declarations of the Common Law; And that whereas the words of the Statute are general, the construction thereof shall be according to the reason of the Common Law, Coke come 81 b. & 282. b. So cautious have our grave and prudent Senators been, not to subject the common-law to any mutations, unless for necessary and impulsive causes reasonably arising from the public mischiefs and inconveniencies which happen in the Common-weal, through the injurious abuses of the ancient and former Laws, upon which grounds other Laws were constituted for the remedy of such mischiefs and inconveniencies, which did abrogate the former, from whence grew this ground, Leges postertores priores abrogant. To illustrate this by examples. It is regularly true, that Statutes in the affirmative shall not take away precedent acts affirmative, unless it be in special cases. As the Statute of Wills, 32. & 34 H. 8. doth not take away a custom to devise lands as often hath been adjudged. So it is enacted, that the King shall have Wreckum Maris per totum regnum; yet this shall not take the wreck from one who hath wreck by prescription, unless the prescription had been per totam Angliam, Coke l 5. in Sir Henry Constables case. So the Statute of 21 H. 8. c. 13. enacteth, that if one ●ath a Benefice of the value of eight pounds, and taketh another, and is inducted, the first is void; doth not take away the Law which was before; that if one who had a Benefice, with cure, did accept another, the first is void, only that in that case no lapse shall incur without notice, Coke l. 4. in Holland's case, and in this point is the Statute nothing else but a confirmation and affirmance of the Law before, ibid. So the Statute of 23 Eliz. that inflicteth the penalty of twenty pounds by the month, hath not taken away the Statute of 1 Eliz. which hath given the forfeiture of twelve pence for every Sunday and Holiday, but both shall be paid, the twelve pence only to the poor, and the twenty pounds to the Queen, and therefore doth the Statute of 3 Jac. c. 4. give a more speedy remedy for the said twelve pence, yet shall they not be punished but upon one of them. Yet when the latter affirmative Statute is contrary to the precedent Statute in matter, the former abrogateth the latter, as by the Statute of 33 H 8. c. 23 it is enacted, that if any person being examined before the Council of the King, or three of them, shall confess any Treason, misprision of Treason, or Murder, or be to them vehemently suspected, he shall be tried in any County where the King pleaseth by his Commission, and after by the Statute of 1 & 2 P. M. c. 10. it was enacted, That all trials hereafter to be had for any Treason, shall be had according to the course of the Common Law, and not otherwise: That latter act, and though the latter words had not been, had abrogated the first, because they were contrary in matter; But that doth not abrogate the Statute of 34 H. 8. c 2. of the trial of Treasons beyond the Seas, notwithstanding the words are in the negative, because it was not contrary in matter, for it was not triable by the Common Law, Dyer 132. Stanf. 89. 90. So the Statute of 1 E. 6. of Chanteries being in the affirmative, doth alter the Statute of H. 2. c. 41. which giveth a Cessavit cantaria also in the affirmative, for the one is contrary to the other in matter, vide plura, Coke l. 9 f. 63. a. But whensoever Laws are contrary in quality, that is, where the first is a material or express affirmative, and the latter an express or material negative, and when the first is a material or express negative, and latter affirmative, there the latter Law doth abrogate the former. As the Statute of 5 E. c, 4. which prohibiteth every person to use or exercise any craft, mystery, or occupation, unless he hath been an Apprentice for seven years, doth alter the Common Law, by which any one may in any manner work in any lawful Trade, without any service precedent: for without an Act of Parliament no man can be restrained to work in any Trade, Coke l 11. f. 54. a. in the Tailors of Ipsiches' case. And to conclude to this Argument with the general ground given by Sir Edward Coke l. 1. 11. f. 67. a. That for that Acts of Parliament are established with such gravity, and wisdom, and the universal consent of all the Realm, they ought not through any strained construction out of the general, and ambiguous words of a subsequent Act be abrogated, as where the Statute of 16. R 23 c. 5. enacteth, that all the Lands and Tenements, of any one attainted in a Praemunire shall be forfeited to the King, in the case of one Prudgion, Pasch. 21. Eliz. being tenant in tail of certain Lands and Tenements, who was attainted of a Praemunire, the question before all the Judges of England was, whether the estate tail was a bar, or no, and it was resolved by all the Justices, that those general words had not repealed the Statute de donis conditionalibus, but that only he shall forfeit them for his life, and that the issue in tail should inherit, vide ibidem plura. Lex non patetur fractiones, & divisiones Statuum, Coke l. 1. f 87. a. The Law will not suffer fractions, and divisions of estates. As if a man make a lease for life, upon condition that if he doth not pay twenty pounds, that another shall have the Land, that future limitation is void, Ployd. f. 25. c. M. 18. H. 8. 3. And if after the Statute of 1. R. 3. & before the Statute of 27. H. 8. A man had made a Feoffment to the use of one for life, or in tail, and after to the use of another for life, or entail, and after to the use of another in fee, they in the Remainder might not make a Feoffment, nor grant their estates by the general words of that act, for then there should be a fraction, and division of estates, which the Law will not suffer, vide ibidem plura, in Corbets case. Coke l. 3. f. 32. b. If a man be seized of a Manor to which a Leet waif, or stray, or any other hereditament which is not of any annual value is appendent, or appurtenant, there by a devise of the Manor with the appurtenances, those shall pass as incidents to the Manor, for in that the Statute enableth him by express words to devise the Manor, by consequence it enableth him to devise the Manor with all incidents, and appendants to it, and it was never the meaning, or the intention of the makers of the Statute, that when the Devisor hath power to devise the principal, that he shall not have power to devise it that was incident, and appendent to it, but that the Manor, etc. shall be dismembered and fractions made of things, which by legal prescription have been united, and annexed together, Ibidem, for the Law will not permit such factions in Estates. Coke come. f. 147. b. If a man hath a rent-charge issuing out of certain Land, and he purchaseth any part of the Land to him and his heirs, the whole rent-charge is extinct, because the rent is entire, and against common right, and issuing out of every part of the Land, and therefore by purchase of part is extinct in the whole, and cannot be apportioned. Coke come 309. b. If the reversion be granted of three acres, and the Lessee agree to the said grant for one acre this is good for all three, and so it is of an Attornement in Law, if the reversion of three acres be granted, and the Lessee surrender one of the Acres to the Grantee, this Attornement shall be good for the whole Reversion of the three Acres according to the grant. Apices juris non sunt jura, Coke come. f. 2 83. b. & nimia subtilitas reprobatur in Lege, Coke l. 4. 4●. b. The Law of England respecteth the effect and substance of the matter, and not every nicety of form or circumstance, and too much subtlety is reproved in the Law. As it was alleged for an exception in the indictment, that the indictment was taken before I. S. Coronatore in comitatu praedicto, and not the comitatu praedicto, or comitatus praedicti and every Coroner of one County, is a Coroner in every County of England, but not of every County, but it was not allowed, for the Coroner in the County, etc. shall in all reasonable intendment be taken for the Coroner of the County, and so it is used in the Writ de coronatore elegendo, ibidem vide plura. Coke l. 5. f. 120. 122. It is a rule in Law, that Enditements ought to be certain, but there are three manner of certainties, the first is to a common intent, and that sufficeth in Bars, which are to defend the party and excuse him, the second is to a general intent which is required in Inditements, Counts, and Replications, etc. for that they are to excuse or charge the party; the third is a certain intent to every particular, and this certainty is rejected in Law, for nimia subtilitas in jure reprobatur, and such certainty confoundeth certainty, vide ibidem plura, in Longs case. Coke l. 8. f 56. b. Whereas the Queen granted a Manor to B. and his heirs, to have and to hold the said Manor to B. and his assigns, omitting the words heirs, in the Habe●dum, it was resolved in Auditor King's case, by the whole Court, that the fee of the Manor passed by the Premises of the Letters Patents, and that the Habendum was void, for the Premises were certain enough to pass the Fee-simple, and the omission of his heirs in the Habendum, shall not subvert it was certain in the Premises, for the intention of the Queen appeareth to pass the Fee-simple by the Premises, and her grant ought to be interpreted, in intentionem, & none in deceptionem Regis, and when as a literal and strict construction, is made to make his grant void, contrary to the intention of the King, it soundeth in deceit of the King, and it is a great indignity to him, for niceties in Law to make his Charter under the great Seal of England of things, which may be lawfully granted, void, and of none effect, for Apices juris non sunt jura, and it was said by Coke Lord chief Justice, and affirmed by the other Justices, that of latter times such nice and strict constructions have been strained by some, of Letters Patents to subvert the force and effect of them, that many good Letters Patents are drawn into question, to the dishonour of the King, and disinherison of the Subject, contrary to the true reason and ancient rule of Law, for as it is said, Co. l. 4. f. 5. b. Simplicitas legibus amica. Coke l. 10. f. 125. b. In the Mayor, etc. of Lynns case, it is said, that until these latter times it was never read in any of our Books, that any body politic or corporate, did endeavour, or attempt by any suit to avoid any of their Leases, Grants, and Conveyances made to them, by the misnaming of the very name of the Corporation, but God forbidden that their Leases and Grants should be defeated for every curious and nice misnomer, vide ibidem plura, in the Mayor, etc. of Linns case, where it was adjudged that a bond made to the Mayor and Burgesses of Linn was good, though therein was omitted the Burrow of Kings Linn which was their name given them by their Patent, because it was idem re, & sensu, though not idem litteris & Syllabis. Fortior, & potentior est dispositio Legis, quam hominis, Coke come f. 224. a. The disposition of the Law is of more force, and stronger than the disposition of man. If a man grant to another by his deed, the office of a Parkship of a Park, to have and occupy the said office for term of life, he hath an estate in that office upon condition in Law, to wit, that the Parker shall well and lawfully keep the said Park, and shall do that which to such office appertaineth to do, or otherwise it shall be well lawful to the Grantor and his heirs to oust him, and grant it to another, and such a condition in Law annexed to a thing is as strong as if the condition had been put in wrting, Littleton, ibidem. If a man hath title to enter upon tenant in tail, if he maketh a claim to the land, then is the estate tail defeated, for this claim is an entry made by him, and is of the same effect in Law, and if the tenant in tail after such claim continueth his occupation, that is a disseisin to him that made such claim, and as often as his adversary doth wrong and injury to him, so often may he bring a Writ of Trespass, or a Quare clausum fregit, for the wrong & disseisin, Littleton, whereby it appeareth that continual claim, which is an entry in Law, is as strong as an entry in deed, Coke come. f. 236. b. Coke come. f. 338. a. A surrender in Law in some cases is of greater force, than a surrender in deed, as if a man maketh a lease for years to begin at Michaelmas next, this future interest cannot be surrendered, because there is no reversion wherein it may be drowned, that by a surrender in Law, it may be drowned, as if the Lessee before Michaelmas take a new Lease for years, either to begin presently or at Michaelmas, this is a surrender in Law of the former lease, and in this case Fortior, & aequior est dispositio legis, quam hominis, Coke l. 10. f. 67. b. 37. H. 6. 16. And if the Lessees be a corporation aggregated of many, so as they cannot make an express surrender without deed in writing under their seal, yet they can by act in Law surrender their term without any writing: So if the Prior by consent of the Covent maketh a Lease for years rendering rend, if the prior by Deed expressly releaseth the rent, and dyeth, the Successor shall recover the arrearages, but if the Prior oust the Lessee, and dyeth, that discharge in Law shall discharge the rent, which incurreth during the ouster against the Successor, 34. H. 6. 21. Coke l. 10. f. 67. If an heir within age assign more dower than he ought to have done, yet the guardian in right may have a Writ of Admeasurement of dower, but if he grant over his estate, his Assignee which is guardian in fair shall not have the Writ, because it was a thing in action given to the Lessor, F. N. B. 149. 9 Coke l. 6. 38. b. When a Deed is requisite, ex institutione legis, it ought to be shown, though it be collateral, and convey nothing, as a Mayor and Commonalty, Tenant, Pur autre vie, if he attorne to the Grantee in reversion, the Law requireth that it be done by deed, and that in pleading, the deed of Attornement be shown, but when it is requisite ex provisione hominis, not as when a man maketh a Lease for years of Land to A. upon condition, that he shall not assign it over, but by deed only, and not by word, in this case, ex provisione hominis, the Assignment ought to be by deed, but because ex institutione legis, the Deed is not necessary to the Assignee, he may plead the Assignment without showing of the Deed, and in quo minus by the fermor of the King, he ought to allege that he is a fermor of the King to enable him to sue there, but he need not show it to the Court, because a collateral action, ibidem. So the Collector shall not show it, 22. H. 6. 42. neither shall the Sub-Collector show it, 21. E. 4. 50. And the Devisor shall not show the Testament, for it appertaineth to the Executor, 4. Ass. 20. One Parcener may have a Quare impedit against another, if she be disturbed of her presentment by turn, so cannont Joyntenants, or tenants in common, F. N. B. 34 I. For equality of partition among Coparceners, a rent granted shall be a Fee-simple without the word heirs, Coke. come. f. 10. a. Coke come 102. a. Homage ancestrel is a special Warranty in Law, and the Lands generally, which the Lord hath at the time of the Voucher, shall be liable to execution in value, whether he hath them by descent, or purchase, but in the case of an express warranty, the heir shall be charged only with such Lands, as he hath by descent from the same Ancestor, so in this case, Firmior & potentior est operatio legis quam dispositio hominis. Lease upon condition, that if it happen that the Lessee make any waist in, or upon the Premises, it shall be lawful for the Lessor to re-enter, and the Lessee suffereth the house to fall in default of covering and reparations. Dyer and Wash said, that the Lessor might re-enter for such waist is punishable by the statute of Gloucester, for destructionem facere in domibus, Dyer 281. b. and so it is if he suffer waste to be done by a stranger, Doct. Stud. l. 2. c. 4. yet if the Tenant had been bound in an Obligation that he shall do no waist, he shall not forfeit his Bond by the waist of a stranger, for greater is the operation of the Law, etc. A man is seized of three Manors of equal value, and taketh a wife, and she taketh one entire Manor for her Dower, which is charged with a rent, she shall hold it charged; otherwise it is if she had recovered her Dower by a Writ of Dower, and had had a third part of each assigned to her. Inutilis labour, & sine fructu non est effectus legis. Non licet, quod dispendio licet. Sapiens incipit a fine. Et lex non praecipit in utilia, Coke come. f. 127. b. The Law commandeth no vain, chargeable, and unprofitable things. As a Villain by the Law shall not have an appeal of Mayhem against his Lord, for in an appeal the Mayhem man shall only recover damages; and if the Villain in this case recovereth damages against his Lord, and thereupon hath execution, the Lord may take it that the Villain hath in execution from the Villain, and so the recovery void, & inutilis labor stultus, and unprofitable labour, is foolish and idle, which the Law prescribeth not. Coke come. f. 197. a. Tenants in Common of an Hawk and an Horse, shall join in Assize, for otherwise they would be without remedy, for one of them cannot make his plaint in an Assize of the Moiety of an Hawk, or Horse, because the Law will never enforce a man to demand that which he cannot recover, as the Moiety of an Hawk, or an Horse, or any other entire thing; for Lex neminem cogit ad vana, & in utilia. Coke come. f. 319. b. If a Lease be made for term of life, the remainder to another in tail, the remainder over to the right Heirs of the Tenant for life, and Tenant for life granteth his remainder in fee to another by his Deed, the remainder shall presently pass without any Attornment, for none can atturn but himself, and it were in vain that he should atturn upon his own Grant, for quod vanum est lex non requirit. Coke l. 5. 84. a. Where a man is in custody of the Sheriff by process of Law, and after another Writ is delivered to him to take the body of him who is in custody, presently he is in his custody by force of the second Writ by judgement of Law, although he make not an actual arrest of him, for to what purpose shall he be arrested of him who is and was before in his custody, for the Law prescribeth no fruitless things. Actus legis nemini facit injuriam, Coke come. 178. a The Act of Law doth injury to none. As if the land out of which a rent-charge is granted, be recovered by an elder Title, and thereby the rent-charge is voided, yet the Grantee shall have a Writ of Annuity, because the rent-charge is avoided by course of Law. So if Tenant for another man's life, grant a rent-charge by Deed to one for one and twenty years, Cestuy que use dieth, the rent-charge is determined, yet may the Grantee have during the years a Writ of Annuity for the arrearages incurred, after the death of Cestuy que use, because the rent-charge did determine by the act of God and course in Law, which wrong no man. ibid. Coke l. 5. f. 87. a. If the Defendant in debt dieth in execution, the Plaintiff shall have a new execution by Elegit, or Fieir facias, because otherwise the Plaintiff should lose his debt without any default in him, and the act of God, and the act in Law will not prejudice any one. Trewgrijard being a Burgess of the Parliament, who was taken upon an Exigent post capias, and yet upon his Writ of privilege of Parliament the Sheriff let him go at large, for the King, and the Realm hath an interest in the body of every Subject, and the Commonwealth shall be preferred, yet the party of the Parliament may be taken in execution again, after the Plaintiff shall not be prejudiced in his execution by the act of Law which doth no man wrong, neither is the Sheriff chargeable because his Office consists chief in the execution and service of writs, and is sworn to do it, Dyer 60. Lex plus respicit acta sine verbis, quam verba sine acts, Coke l. 3. f. 26. The Law respecteth more acts without words, than words without acts. As at the Common Law, if lands be given to Baron and Feme in tail, or in fee, and the Baron dieth, there the Feme cannot divest the Franktenement out of her by any verbal waiver, or disagreement in pais; as if before any entry made by her, she saith, that she waiveth, and altogether disagreeth to the said state, and that she never will take, or accept of it, yet the Franktenement remaineth in her, and she may enter when she pleaseth, and waive it in Court of Record, for the Law more respecteth Acts without words, than words without Acts; and therefore if she entereth and taketh the profits, although she say nothing, it is a good agreement in Law. And so it is adjudged in Mich. 34 E. 1. Avowry 232. That if a man take a distress for one thing, yet when he cometh in Court of Record, he may make an Avowry for what thing he pleaseth: a multo fortiori, when a Franktenement is vested in him, it cannot be devested by nude words in pais, and with it accordeth 17 E, 3. 6. 17. Where the Baron alieneth his lands and retaketh the estate to him and his wife in tail, the Baron dieth, the Lord of whom the land was holden by Knights-service, supposing that the Baron died sole seized, by word assigned Dower to the Feme which she accepteth: yet was it adjudged that that refusal of the estate of inheritance, and acceptance of her Dower in pais shall not divest the Franktenement out of her. So 13 Ric. 2. joint-tenancy, a Charter of Feoffment was made to four, and seisin delivered to three in the name of all, and after the Seisin delivered, the fourth cometh and vieweth the Deed, and saith by word that he will have nothing in the Land, and it was adjudged that that agreement by word in pais, shall not divest the Franktenement out of him, and Thorp, 35 Ed. 3. Disclaimor said, that in such a case the Tenement remained in all until a disagreement in Court of Record. So if there be Lord and Tenant by Deed, enfeoffeth the Lord and a stranger, and maketh Livery to the stranger in the name of both, if the Lord by word disagreeth to the estate, it is nothing worth, but if he enter into the Land generally, and take the profits, that amounteth to an agreement to the Feoffment: but if he enter into the Land, and distrain for his signory, that act amounteth to a disagreement of the Feoffment, and shall divest the Frank tenement out of him, 10 E. 4. 12. by all the Justices. But if Lands be given to Baron and Feme, and after by the Statute of 32 H 8. the Baron alieneth the Land to the use of him and his heirs, and after deviseth it to his wife for life, the wife enters claiming by word the estate for life, this is a good agreement to the estate for life, and a good disagreement to the estate of inheritance, Dyer 351. b. And if A. maketh an Obligation to B. and deliver it to C. to the use of B. this is presently the Deed of A. But if he offereth it to B and he refuseth it in pais, by it the Obligation shall lose his force, Dyer 167. The same Law is of the gift of goods and chattels, and if the goods be delivered to the use of the Donee, the goods were in him presently, but he may refuse them in pais, and by it the property shall be determined, ibidem. SECT. III INclusio unius est exclusio alterius. Coke l. 11. f. 50. a. b The inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another; As when an act of Parliament giveth a power and interest to one certain person, by that express designation of one, all others are excluded, although such a statute be in the affirmative: As where the statute of 31 E. 3. c. 12. it was provided, that error in the Exchequer shall be corrected and amended before the Chancellor and Treasurer, and therefore it could not be corrected before any other; and the general Rule is put, that when any thing is to be done before any person certain, by any statute, it cannot be done before any other, and yet the statute of 31 E. 3. is in the affirmative, Ployd. 106. b. in Stradlings' case. So whereas by the statute of 8 H. 6. c. 9 forcible Entry is designed to the Justice of Peace to make restitution, by it others be excluded, though the statute be in the affirmative, and therefore neither Justices of Oyer or Terminor, or of Goal-delivery, etc. shall do it, Dallisan 3 Eliz vide ibid. plura. And this is true in all acts, which are the introduction of a novel Law, as the above said acts are; but where acts of Parliaments are no introductions of a new Law, it is otherwise. So the act of 35 Eliz. doth not exclude those to whom the Forfeitures are limited by the act of 23 Eliz, because by it they are not given to a new person, but to the same person, to wit the Queen, and is but an act of addition to give more speedy remedy. As the statute of W. 2. c. 9 in a Writ of Mesne, giveth more speedy process, and in the end fore-judger: whereas the process at the Common Law was but Distress infinite, yet the Plaintiff may take which process he will, either at the Common Law, or upon the statute, because they are both in the affirmative, Coke l. 11. f. 64. a. And also in many cases the designation of a novel person in a latter act of Parliament, shall not exclude another person that was authorized to do the same thing by an act precedent; As by the statute of 8 H. 6. c. 16. after Office found, he who found himself grieved might within a month after traverse, & take the Tenements to farm, & that then the Chancellor, Treasurer, or other Officer shall demise to him to farm, until, etc. 13 E. 4. f. 8. and yet by the statute of 1 H. 8. c. 16. he hath liberty by the space of three months, and after by the statute of 32 H. 8. c. 40. the Master of the Court of Wards by advice of own of his Council, is authorized to make a Lease of Land in Ward, or an Idiot, And though the latter act design another person, yet it is not the first altogether taken away, for before any Lease made by the Master of the Wards, the Chancellor and Treasurer may do it: and so e contrario, as Stanf. holdeth, Prerog. f. 69. a. b. Where he maketh mention of this Rule, ●eges posteriores, priores, contrarias abrogant, vide ibidem plura. Coke come. f. 210. a. If the Condition upon a Mortgage be to pay to the Mortgagee, or his heirs, the money, and before the day of payment the Mortgagee dyeth, the Lessor is not to pay the money to the Executors, but to the Heir, for in this case designatio unius personae est exclusio alterius. Consensus tolli● errorem, Coke come. f. 37. a. Consent taketh away error. As Dowment ad ostium Eclesiae, & ex assensu patris, seem to be good, albeit the wife be within the age of nine years: But without question for the same reason, a Jointure made to her under, or above the age of nine years is good, ibidem. Coke come. f. 125. b. a. If a Venire facias be awarded to the Coroners, where it ought to be to the Sheriff, or the Visne cometh out of the wrong place, yet by assent of the parties, and so entered of Record, it shall stand, for all consent taketh away error, ibidem, Coke l. 5. f. 36. b. Dyer. 367. in Bainhams case. Coke l. 5. f. 40. a. b. in Dormers' case. A common Recovery is not to be resembled to a judgement, or proceeding at the common Law, for by usage and custom it is become a common assurance, and conveyance of Lands, and because it is done by mutual consent, errors are not to be allowed, for consensus tollit errorem. If the Demandant and Tenant consent, that two of the four in a Writ of Right shall be Esquires, where by the Law they ought to be Knights, and well, because by consent. Trial of Villeinage was altered from the natural trial by consent. Pleader of a Feoffment upon condition without deed, and reentry is good, if the other party confess the condition. If twelve be sworn, and one depart, another of the panel by consent may be sworn, and with the eleven give verdict. The Court in a Quare impedit, by consent may give longer day than is limited by the Statute of Marlebridge. The Statute of 2. E. 3. & 20. E. 3. provide, that neither for the great Seal, or the petty Seal, Justice shall be delayed, yet when the matter concerneth the King only, if he command it, it may be stayed, F. N. B. 21. b. Tenure at this day may be created by consent of all, notwithstanding the Statute of Quia emptores terrarum, 27. H. 8. By special consent of parties, reentry may be made for default of payment of the rent, without demand of it, Dyer 78. vide, by all which cases it appeareth, that consent of parties altereth the form, and course of Law, ibidem, Coke l. 5. f. 40. Electio semel facta, & placitum testatum non patitur regressum, 20. H. 6. 24. Coke come. f. 146. a. An election once made, and testified by pleading, suffereth no return. As if a Rent-charge be granted to A. and B. and their heirs, and A distraineth the Beasts of the Grantor, and he sueth a Replevin, A. avoweth for himself, and maketh conusance for B, A. dyeth. B. surviveth, B. shall not have a Writ of Annuity, for in that case the election, and the avowry, for the rent of A. barreth B. of any election to make it an Annuity, ibidem Coke l. 4 f. 5. b. in Vernoms' case, If the Baron discontinue the Land of his wife, and dyeth, and the wife bringeth a Writ of dower against the discontinuee, and recover the third part, she is by it estopped to bring a cui invita, for by the Writ of Dower she claimeth Title of Dower only, and therefore shall be estopped to claim any other right by a cui invita, 10. E. 3. double Plea, 8. 10. E. 3. Scire facias, 13. F. N. B. 194 17 Ass. Pl. 3. For when she bringeth her Writ of Dower, and hath judgement to have the third part of all, by it she affirmeth that she hath but title of Dower, and by consequence no estate, and therefore she shall be estopped to claim any part of it, of which she hath demanded by her Writ to be endowed, and an acceptance of rent by her Deed indented, concludeth the feme of her right, 11. H 7. 10 vide ibidem plura, in Christians case. But here a diversity is to be observed, that a man may have several remedies for a thing that is merely personal or merely real; As if a man may have an action of account, or an action of debt at his pleasure, & he bringeth an action of account & appeareth to it and after is non-suite▪ yet he may have an action of debt afterwards, because both actions charge the person, the like case is of an assize, & of a writ of entry in the nature of assize, and the like, Coke come. f. 146 a. Multa conceduntur per obliquum, quae non conc●duntur de directo, Coke l. 6. f. 47. a. Many things are granted by the by, which are not directly granted. As when a Bar is pleaded in a real, or personal Action, as a release, etc. in a foreign County, there the Jurors which try it, shall assess damages according to the profits of the Land in another County, & so by that means inquire of things local in another County, for many things are granted by the by, etc. And when they try the matter of the Bar upon good, and pregnant evidence, they ought to find all dependants upon it, as damages, etc. vide ibidem plura. Dispositio ●e interest facturo lest inutilis, Bacon, f. 56. The grant of a future interest is vain, and void, for the Law doth not allow of grants, unless there be a foundation of an interest, for the Law will not accept of Grants, of Titles, or of things in Action which are imperfect interests, much less will it allow a man to grant or encumber that which is no interest at all, but merely future. As a Writ of Annuity was granted by a prebend, after collations, admissions, and institutions, but before installation, or induction, which though it was confirmed by the ordinary, who was the Patron, also was adjudged void, because he had but jus ad rem,, and a future interest, but not in re, for he shall not be said a prebendary to all intents, nor at the Common Law, without the real possession which is by induction, Dyer 221. Pl. 18. A. maketh a Lease of Land for years to B without reservation of the Woods and Trees, the Lessor cannot sell all the Woods and Trees, for the Woods and Trees are parcel of the Lease, and pass to the Lessee, as well as the Land, if they be not excepted upon the Lease▪ for all the fruits, and profits coming from the fruitful Trees belong to the Lessee, and the shadow and also the branches, and loppings for fire, or enclosure of fences, Dyer 90. Pl. 8. If I grant unto you, that if you enter into an obligation to me of one hundred pounds, and after procure me such a Lease, that then the same obligation shall be void, and you enter into such an obligation unto me, and afterwards do procure such a lease, yet the obligation is simple, because the defeasance was made of that which was not, 20 Eliz. 19 H. 6.62. So if I grant unto you a rent-charge out of white-acre, and that it shall be lawful for you to distrain in all my other Lands, whereof I am now seized, and which I shall hereafter purchase, although this be but a liberty of distress, and no rent save only out of white-acre, yet as to the Lands after to be purchased, the clause is void, 27 E. 3. If I covenant with my Son in consideration of natural Love, to stand seized to his use of the Lands, I shall hereafter purchase, the use is void, 25. & 27. Eliz. So if I devise the Manor of D. by special name, of which at that time I am not seized, and after I purchase it, except I make some new publication of my will, my devise is void, Ployd. Rigdens' case, vide, Bacon. ibidem plura, f. 57.58. Non refert an quis assensum praebat verbis, an rebus, & factis, Coke l. 10, f. 52. b. It mattereth not whether a man giveth his assent by words, or by things themselves, and Deeds. Whereas the assent of an Executor is necessary before any legancy can be had, for that debts are first to be paid, and that the Executor must look to it athis peril, Offi. of Exec. 234. the assent, consent, and agreement of John Morris, the Executor to the Legacy of William Taylor, and Elizabeth his wife, did appear, in that at the special instance and request of the said Morris, the said William Taylor, and Elizabeth his wife did release the said Legacy to the said Morris, first because he requested it, which implieth an assent, & secondly because he accepted it which also implieth an assent, for it mattereth nor whether one giveth his assent by words or by things themselves, and deeds, vide ibidem, in Lampeis' case. As if the Baron accept the Grant of a reversion, that amounteth to an Attornement, 44. E. 3. Fines, 37. Littleton, so 37. H. 6. 17. he which hath interest termini, to wit, a future interest cannot by express words surrender it, but the acceptance of a new Lease shall drown it, and in 7. E. 3. 50. The Lord demanded an heriot, and the heir delivereth a Beast in which himself hath property in his own right to the Lord, that amounteth to a gift, Ibidem. N.S. seized of Manors, for the preferment of Winif●id his wife, and Anne his Daughter, covenanteth to stand seized to the use of himself, etc. for life, the remainder in tail to A. his Daughter, with a proviso, that if he shall be disposed to determine, etc. the said uses, it shall be lawful for him so to do by writing indented under his hand and seal, subscribed by three witnesses, and to limit the said uses to any other, and N. S. after by indenture subscribed by three witnesses, in consideration of a jointure to his second wife, covenanted to stand seized to the use of himself, & his second wife, and it was resolved, though there was no express signification of his purpose to determine, etc. the former uses, yet his last Indenture to stand seized to himself and his second wife, should enure to the determination of the former uses, etc. and that by it, ipso facto, the former uses did cease, and also inure to the raising of other uses, etc. quia non refert an quis, intentionem suam declaret verbis, an rebus ipsis vel factis, because it is no matterwhether one declareth his intention in words, or in the things themselves, or deeds, for by the limiting of other uses he did declare his intention and purpose, to determine, and alter the uses before Coke l. 10. f. 144. a, Scroops case. Conditio beneficialis quae statum construit benign, secundum verborum intentionem est interpretanda, odiosa tamen, quae statum destruit, strict secundum verborum proprietatem est accipienda, Coke l. 8. f. 90. b. Prouisoes, and conditions which go in destruction and defeasances of estates are odious in Law, and are to be taken strictly, and shall not be construed to make void any other use or state, which is not within the words of the proviso, but beneficial conditions, which make an estate, are favourably to be taken according to the intention of the words. As if a Feoffment be made upon such condition, that the Feoffee shall give the Land to the Feoffor, and the wife of the Feoffor, and to the heirs of their two bodies engendered, the Remainder to the right heirs of the Feoffor, if the Baron die, living the Feme, the Feoffee by the Law must make the estate to the Feme so near the condition, that he can make it, as Littleton saith, to wit, to lease it to the Feme for term of her life, without impeachment of waist, and after her decease to the right heirs of the Baron, and of her engendered, the remainder to to the right heirs of the Baron, and so if the Baron & Feme dye before the deed made; And with it accordeth the, 2. H. 4. 5. But when conditions enure to the destruction of estates, than they shall be taken strictly, as if a man make a Feoffment in fee of certain Lands upon condition, that the Feoffee shall not give the Land to Baron and Feme, and to the heirs of their bodies engendered, if the Baron dyeth without issue, and the Feoffee maketh a lease for the life of the Feme without impeachment of waste, that is no breach of the condition, for it is taken strictly, because it runneth to the destruction of the Feoffment, vide ibidem plura, in Frances case. A lease made to one upon condition that the Lessee shall not alien to A. B. and he alieneth to R. B. and it seemed that the Condition was not broken, for every Condition must be taken strictly; for if a man maketh a Feoffment on condition, that he shall not enfeoff I. S. and dieth, and his Heir enfeoffeth I. S. that is no breach of the Condition, Dyer f. 45. Pl. 1. A man is bound to another in an hundred pounds, that he shall discharge the Obligee, and ●ave him harmless of all Suits and Encumbrances against I.S. and after the said I. S. sued the Obligee, and proceeded unto Judgement, and the Defendant pleaded non damnificatus; and Beaumon Sergeant said, That in the eye of the Law, until his Goods or Lands were actually charged, he was not damnified; But Walmesley Justice held, that there were two sorts of damages, executory, and executed, executory which a man may in future time sustain, executed, as if the Land or the person should be in present execution. As if the Disseisee maketh a release to the Disseisor, and a stranger cancelleth the the Deed of the Release, the Disseisor may have an action of trespass against him, and yet the Disseisor doth continue in possession, and is not actually damnified. And the Justices said, the Land in some sort was actually charged, for who would buy the Land of the party, but only under value, because of the Judgement executory, 33 Eliz. Ridgleys case. If a man be bound to make a sufficient estate in Land to one, according to the advice of I. S. if he make an estate according to his advice, whether it be sufficient or no, he is excused, 7 E. 4.13. A TABLE of the grounds and RULES contained in this Treatise. A. ABundans cautela non nocet, An abundance of circumspection doth not hurt, fol. 323 Actus Dei nemini facit injuriam, The act of God doth injury to no man, 6 Actio personalis moritur cum persona, A personal action dieth with the person, 48 Actori incumbit onus probandi & stabilitur praesumptio donec probetur in contrarium, The burden of proving lieth on the Plaintiff, and the presumption is confirmed until it be proved to the contrary, 46 Accessorium sequitur suum principale, An accessary followeth the principal, 56 Accusare nemo se debet nisi coram Deo, No man ought to accuse himself, unless it be before God, 222 Actus non facit reum nisi mens fit rea, The act maketh not a man guilty, unless the mind is guilty, 231 Actus repugnans non potest, in esse, produci, A repugnant act cannot be brought into being, 124 Actus, me invito, factus, non est meus actus, An act done against my will, is not my act, 434 Actus legis nemini facit injuriam, The act of Law doth no man injury, 463. & 317 Ad libitum Regis sonuit sententia legis, The sentence of the Law soundeth according to the Kings will, 393 Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, let the relation be to the next antecedent 9 Ad questionem facti non respondent judices, nec ad questionem juris respondent juratores, The Judges are not to answer to the question of Fact, nor the Jurors to the question of Law, 331 Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, nisi impediatur sententia, Let the relation be to the next antecedent, unless it be hindered by the sense, 10 Aestimatio praeteriti delicti, ex post facto, nunquam crescit, The estimation of a past fault is not amplified by any matter subsequent, 305 Aequitas est verborum legis directio sufficiens, qua una res solummodo cavetur verbis, ut omnis alia in aequali genere iis dē caveatur verbis, Equity is a sufficient direction of the words of the Law, when one thing only is provided for by words, that every other thing in the same kind may be provided for by the same words, 312 Aequitas est correctio legis generaliter latae, qua parte deficit, Equity is the correction of the Law, wherein it is any way wanting by reason of the generality of it, 312 Affectus punitur licet non sequatur effectus, The affection to do a thing is punished, though the effect doth not follow, 195 Affectio tua nomen imponit operi tuo, Every affection or intention giveth a name to the work, 197 ffirmativum negativum implicat, An Affirmative implieth a Negative, 132 Agentes & consentientes pari poena plectuntur, The Agent and the Consentor are to suffer the like punishment 60 Aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, immo iniquum est aliquem esse suae rei judicem, No man ought to be a judge in his own cause; and it is an unjust thing that a man should be judge of his own matter, 371. & 351 Amor descendit, Love descendeth 163 Ambiguum pactum contra venditorem interpretandum est, ambigua verba contra proferentem accipienda sunt, An ambiguous contract is to be expounded against the Seller, and ambiguous words are to be taken against the Speaker, 27 Ambiguum placitum interpretari debet contra proferentem, ambigua responsio contra proferentem est accipienda, An ambiguous plea shall be taken strongest against the Pleader, 27. and an ambiguous answer is to be taken against the Utterer, 28 A majori & digniori fieri debet denominatio, A denomination ought to be from the greater and worthier thing, Apices juris non sunt jura, The tittles or niceties of the Law, are no Law, 457 Argumentum a divisione est fortissimum, An argument from division is strongest, 133 Argumentum ab authoritate fortissimum est in lege, An argument from authority is strongest in Law, 126 A verbis legis non est recendum, We ought not to go from the words of the Law, 423 B. BEnedicta est expositio quando res redimitur a destructione, Blessed is the exposition, when a thing is redeemed from destruction, 443 Benignae faciendae sunt interpretationes chartarum, propter simplicitatem laicorum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Interpretations of Deeds and Charters, for the simplicity of the Laity, are favourably to be made, that the thing may rather stand and subsist, then fall and perish, 144 Benignior sententia in rebus generalibus & dubiis est praeferenda, In general and doubtful things, the most favourable exposition is to be preferred, 26 Boni judicis est lights dirimire & expedit reipublicae, ut sit finis litium propter communem omnium utilitatem, It is the part of a good Judge to cut off Suits, and it is good for the Commonwealth there may be an end of Suits, for the common profit of all, 387 Bonum est benefacere die sabathi, It is good to do good on the Sabbath day, 5 C. CHarta non est nisi vestimentum donationis, A Charter is nothing else but the apparel of the Deed, 199 Caveat actor, Let the actor take heed what he doth, 323 Caveat Emptor, Let the Buyer take heed, 322 Causa & origo est materia negotii, the cause and the beginning is the matter of the business, 65 Cessante ratione legis, cessat Lex, The reason of the Law ceasing, the Law ceaseth 421. & 46. Certum est, quod certum reddi potest, That is certain which may be made certain, 33 Certa debet esse intentio & narratio, Counts and Declarations ought to be certain, 38. & 318 Cessante causa, cessat effectus, the cause ceasing, the effect ceaseth, 75 Cessante causa, cessat causatum, The cause ceasing, the thing caused ceaseth, 76 Clausulae inconsuetae semper inducunt suspitionem, Unaccustomed clauses always induce suspicion, 291 Constructio juris non facit injuriam, The construction of Law doth make no injury, 244 Communis error facit jus, Common error maketh right, 344 Consuetudo est optimus legum interpres, Custom is the best Interpreter of the Laws, 348 Consuetudo manerii & loci est observanda, The custom of the manor and place is to be observed, 348 Consuetuto vincit communem legem, Custom overcometh the Common Law, 350 Consuetudo t●llit legem, Custom taketh away the Law, 352 Consuetudo privat commun●m legem, Custom doth deprive the Common Law, 353 Consuetudo, licet sit magnae authoritatis, nunquam tamen prajudicat manifestae veritati, Custom, although it be of great authority, yet it, shall never prejudicated a manifest truth, 354 Consuetudo debet esse certa, nam incerta pro nullis habentur, A custom ought to be certain, for incertain things are taken for nothing, 354 Consuetudo semel reprobata non potest amplius induci, A custom once cast off cannot again be brought in 355 Conjunctio maris & feminis est de jure naturae, The coupling of man and wife is of the Law of nature, 146 Confessus in judicio projudicato habetur, & quodam modo sua sententia damnatur, He that confesseth in the Court of Justice shall be taken judged, & as it were, is by his own sentence condemned, 397 Conditio beneficialis quae statum construit benign, secundum verborum intentionem est interpretanda, ●diosa tamen, quae statum destruit, strict secundum verborum proprietatem est accipienda, Prouisoes and Conditions which go in destruction and Defeasances of estates are odious in Law, and are to be taken strictly, and shall not be construed to make void any other use or estate, which is not within the words of the Proviso: but beneficial Conditions, which make an estate, are favourably so to be taken according to the intention of the words. 473 Cuicumque aliquis quid concedit concedere videtur & id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest, To whomsoever any one shall grant any thing, he seemeth to grant that without which the thing itself cannot be, 258 Cuilibet in sua arte perito credendum est, We ought to believe him that is skilful in his own Art, 329, & 330 Cui licet quod majus, non debet quod minus est non licere, To whom it is lawful to do the greater, its lawful for him to do the less, 120 Cujus que rei potissima pars principium est, The beginning is the principal part upon which all other things are founded, 6 Cuique naturale est illud quod procreavit tueri, it is natural to every one to defend that he hath gotten, 163 D. DE ullo quod est sua natura indivisibile nullam partem habebit uxor pro dote sua sed satisfacietur ad valentiam, Of that which of its nature is indivisible, the wife shall have no part for her Dower, but shall be satisfied according to the value, 159 Da tua dum tua sunt, post mortem tunc tua non sunt, Give yours whilst they are yours, for after death they are not yours, 25 Derivativa potestas non potest esse major primativa, The derivative power cannot be greater than the primative, 73 Debile fundamentum fallit opus, A weak foundation faileth the work, 84 Destinata tantum pro factis non habentur, Thing destinated only are not taken for things done, 89 De fide & officio judicis non recipitur questio sed de scientia, sive error sit ju is aut facti, There is no question to be made of the Office and faith of a Judge, but or his knowledge, whether it be error in Law, or in fact, 378 Divisio est oratio qua totum in parts distribuitur, Division is an Oration, by which the whole is divided into parts, 133 Dispensatio mali prohibiti est de ju●e domino regi concessa propter impossibilitatem p●●videndi de omnibus particul●ribus, The dispensation of a prohibited evil i● of right granted to the King for the impossibility of providing for all particulars, Dispensatio est mali prohibiti provida relaxatio, utilitate seu necessitate pensata. Dispensation is a provident relexation of a prohibited evil recompensed by profit or necessity, 385 Dies dominicus non est dies juridicus, The Sabbath day is no Law day, 5 Distingue tempora, & concordabis-leges, Distinguish the times, and you will agree the Laws, Divinatio non interpretatio est, quae omnino receditae litera, It is a divination and not an interpretation which altogether leaveth the letter 425 Dilationes in lege sunt odiosae, Delays in Laws are odious, 326 Dispositio de interesse futuro est inutilis, The Grant of a future interest is vain and void, 470 Dona cloudestina semper sunt suspiciosa, Close gifts are always suspicious, 291 Dormit aliquand● jus morietur nunquam, A Right sleepeth sometimes, but dieth never, 425 Dolosus versatur in universalibus & generalibus, A Deceiver is conversant about universals, and generals, 21 Dominium a possessione caepisse dicitur, Dominion is said to have its beginning from possession, 178 E. EAdem & simili ratione suadente, idem jus statuendum est, The same and the like reason persuading, the same Law is to be determined 117 Ecclesia fungitur vice Minoris, meliorem potest facere conditionem, deteriorem nequaquam, The Church exerciseth the Office of a Minor, and can make its condition better, but not worse, 4 Electio semel facta, & placitum testatum non patitur regressum, An election once made, and the plea testified, doth not suffer regress, or going back, 305 Eventus est qui ex causa sequitur, & dicitur eventus, quia ex causa evenit, The event is that which followeth the cause, and therefore is called an event because it cometh from the cause, 41 Exitus acta probat finis, non pugna coronat, The end proveth and crowneth the work, 87 Execu●io juris non habet injuriam, The execution of the Law hath no injury, 267 Exitus nonnuquam in maleficiis spectatur, non voluntas, The end sometimes in evil acts is respected, and not the will, 194 Expressum facit cessare tacitum, That which is expressed, causeth that which is employed to cease, 447 Expressio eorum quae tacite insunt nihil operatur, The expression of those things which are implied work nothing, 445 Extra terretorium dicenti non paretur impune, He that obeyeth one prescribing Laws beyond his jurisdiction, shall not go unpunished, 374 Excusat aut extenuat delictum in capitalibus, quod non idem operatur in civilibus, That doth excuse and extenuate an offence in capital causes, which doth not work the same in civil causes, 304 Exteriora acta indicant interiora animi secreta, The outward acts show the inward secrets of the mind, 88 Ex verbo generali aliquid accipitur, Out of a general word, something may be excepted, 22 F. FActum unius alteri nocere non debet, the deed of one ought not to hurt the other, f. 428. Factum a Judice quod ad ejus officium non pertinet, ratum non potest esse, an act done by a Judge which doth not appertain to his office, is not allowed, f. 375 Facinus quos inquinat aequat, an offence equalleth those are infected with it, f. 57 Festinatio Justitiae est noverca infortunij, the festination of Justice is the step mother of misfortune, f. 327. Finis rei attendendus est, & fines mandatorum domini regis per rescripta sua diligenter sunt observanda, the end of the thing is to be heeded, and the end of the mandate of the King by his Writs, are diligently to be observed, f 87. Fortior & potentior est dispositio legis, quam hominis, the disposition of the Law is more strong and powerful than the disposition of man, f. 459. Finis finem litibus imponit, a Fine putteth an end to suits, f. 90. Frustra expectatur eventus, cujus effectus nullus sequitur, in vain is the event expected where no effect followeth, f. 92. Frustra feruntur leges nisi obedientibus, in vain are Laws to be made unless to those who are obedient, f. 365. Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pavicora, in vain is that done by more which may be done by fewer, f. 134. Fraus, & dolus nemini patrocinari debent, Fraud and Deceit ought not to Patronise any one, 229. Frustra est potentia, quae nunquam venit in actum, vain is the power which never cometh into Act, 254. Frangenti fidem fides frangatur eidem, to him that breaks his faith, let faith be broken, f. 293. Fraudis interpretatio non semper ex ment duntaxat sed ex consilio quoque desideratur, the interpretation of fraud is not always collected out of the mind, but also from the council and consent, f. 293. Fucatus error nuda veritate in multis est probabilior, sed saepenumero multis rationibus vincit veritatem, painted error in many things is more probable than naked truth, and oftentimes with many reasons overcometh truth, f. 136. Furiosus suo furore punitur, a mad man is punished by his madness, f. 233. G. GEnerale nihil ponit, generale nihil certi implicat, a general thing determineth or implieth nothing certainly, f. 17. Generalibus specialia derogant, special things derogate, and diminish general things, 18 Generalibus semper specialia insunt, special things are always contained in generals, f. 19 Generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea, quae sunt specialiter comprehensa, a general clause is not extended to those things which are specially comprehended, f. 20. Clausula generalis non refertur ad expressa, a general clause is not referred to those things which are expressed f. 21. Generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea, quae antea sunt specialiter comprehensa, a general clause is not extended to those things, which before were specially comprehended, f. 21 Generalia sunt praeponenda singularibus, general. words are to be put before particular, f. 22. Grammatica falsa non vitiat chartam, false Grammar doth not destroy a deed, f. 13. H. HAeres est alter ipse, & filius est pars patris, the heir is another self, and the Son is part of the Father f. 165. Haeres non tenetur in Anglia ad debita antecessoris reddenda, nisi per antecessorem ad hoc fuerit obligatus, praeterquam debita regis tantum, an heir is not bound in Engla●d to pay the debt of his Ancestor, if he be bound thereunto, unless the debts of the King only, f. 173. Hae●es legitimus est, quem nuptiae demonstrant, he is a lawful heir, whom marriage demonstrateth so to be, f. 169. I. INclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another, f. 466. Illud quod alias licitum non est, necessitas facit licitum, that which otherwise is not lawful, necessity maketh lawful, f. 132. Illud possumus quod jure possumus, we can do that which by Law we can do. f. 241: Idem non potest esse agens, & patience, the same thing cannot be an agent, and a patiented, f. 45. Ignorantia juris non excusat, ignorance of the Law doth not excuse, f. 332. 334. Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorance of the fact excuseth, f. 334. Ignoratis terminis ignoratur ars, the terms being not understood, the art is not understood, f. 8. Impossibile est unum corpus duobus locis esse simul, it is impossible for one body to be in two places, at one and the same time, 160 Impersonalitas non concludit, nec ligat, impersonality doth not conclude or bind, 11. Impotentia excusat legem, impotency excuseth the Law, 223 Infans ab omnibus civilibus officijs debet abstinere, an infant ought to abstain from all civil offices, 332 Imperitia culpae annumeratur. Imperitia maxima est mechanicorum paena, ignorance and unskilfulness is accounted a fault, and is the greatest punishment of Artists, and Mechanics, 332 Inter arma silent Leges, Laws are silenced by arms, 412 In praesentia majoris cessat potentia minoris, in the presence of the Major, the power of the minor ceaseth, 394 Injuria illata in corpus non potest remitti, injuries made upon the body cannot be remitted, 274 In pari causa possessor potior habetur. In aequali jure melior est possessio possidentis, in an even and equal cause, and right, the possession of the possessor is the better, 182 Infinitum in jure reprobatur, infinity is rejected in the Law, 187 In omnibus quid●m, maxim tamen in jure aquitas est, In all things, but especially in the Law there is equity, 306 In eo quod plus est semper inest minus, the less is always in that which is more, 418 In omnibus fere minori aetati succurritur, in all things almost the Law favoreth infants, 241 In criminalibus praestant accidentia, in criminal acts accidents prevail, 531 In republica maxime conservanda sunt jura belli, in a common wealth, the Laws of War are principally to be preserved, 408 In ambiguis casibus semper prasumitur pro rege, in doubtful cases it is always presumed for the King, 403 In favorabilibus magis attenditur quod prodest, quam quod nocet, in and indifferent things, that which profiteth is more respected than that which hurteth, 49 In obscuris secundum magis similius est judicandum, vel quod plerumque inspici solet, in obscure say, we ought to judge according to that which is most likely, and which is wont to be, 28 In distjunctivis sufficit alterum esse verum, in disjuntives it is sufficient, if one of them be true, 12. In quo quis delinquit in eo de jure est puniendus, in what one offendeth in the same by right he is to be punished, 394 In jure non remota, sed proxima, causa spectatur, in the Law the next, and not the remote cause is respected, 79 In omnibus stipulationibus id tempus spectatur in quo contrahimus, in all contracts, the time is respected in which we do contract, 101 In omnibus obligationibus in quibus dies non ponitur praesenti die debetur, & nulla temporis designatio praesens denotat, in all obligations in which the day is not set, the debt is due presently, and no designation of time denoteth the time present, 101 Inutilis labour & fine fructu non est effectus Legis, an unprofitable labour and without fruit is not the effect of the Law, 462 Interpretari & concordare Leges Legibus est optimus interpretandi modus, to interpret, and agree the Laws with the Laws, is the best manner of interpreting, 436 Ipsa etenim Leges cupiunt ut jure regantur, the Laws themselves desire to be ruled by equity, 306 307 Jura naturalia sunt immutabilia, the Laws of nature are immutable, 160 Jus descendit, & non terra, the right doth descend, and not the Land, 253 Judex bonus nihil ex arbitrio faciat nec proposito domesticae voluntatis, sed juxta Leges, & jura pronuntiet a good Judge ought to do nothing of his own fancy, nor according to the purpose of his domestic will, but according to Law and right, 365 Judicandum est legibus non exemplis, we ought to judge by Laws and not examples 366 Judicis est judicare secundum allegata, & probata, it is the part of a Judge to judge according to that is alleged and proved, 366 Judicium non a suo Judice datum nullius est momenti, a judgement not given by his Judge is of no force, 373 Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate j●ris dicend●, jurisdiction is a power introduced by the public, for the necessity of doing right 337 Jus sanguinis, quod in legitimis successionibus spectatur, ipso nativitatis tempore quaesitum est, the right of blood, which is respected in lawful successions is found in the very time of the nativity, 169 Justum non est aliquem ante natum mortuum facere bastardum, qui to●o tempore suo pro legitimo habebatur, It is not just to make any one a Bastard, who all his time hath been taken for legitimate, 13 L. LEX est summa ratio, The Law is the chiefest reason, 4●7 Lex neminem cogit ad impossibilia, The Law compelleth none to impossibilities, 450 Leges non ve●bis, sed rebus sunt imposi●ae, Laws are not imposed on words, but on things, 425 Lex citius tolerare vult privatum damnum, quam publicum malum, The Law will sooner suffer a private loss, than a public evil, 429 Lex non praecipit inutila, The Law prescribeth no unprofitable things, 462 Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, The latter Laws abrogate the former which are contrary to them, 452 Lex non paetitur fractiones, & divisiones statuum, The Law doth not suffer fractions, and divisions of Estates, 456 Lex plus respicit acta sine verbis, quam verba sine acts, The Law respecteth more acts without words, than words without acts, 464 Lex semper dabit remedium, The Law will always give a remedy, 257 Lex fingit ubi subsistit aequitas, The Law feigneth where equity subsisteth, 309 Legis constructio● non facit injuriam, The construction of the Law doth no injury, 316 Lex non requirit verificari quod apparet Curiae, The Law doth not require that to be verified which appeareth to the Court, 137 Lex respicit naturae ordinem, The Law respecteth the order of nature, 144 Licet tenenti vetus o●us reficere non novum facere, it is lawful for the Tenant to repair an old work, but not to make a new one, 85 Locus ab authoritate est infi missimus, An argument from authority is most weak, Locus pro solutione reditus, aut pecuniae, secundum conditionem demissionis aut obligationis est stricte observandus, That place for the payment of money, or rend according to the condition of a Lease, or Obligation, is strictly to be observed, 108 Longum tempus & longus usus qui excedit memoriam hominum sufficit pro jure, Long professions, and long occupation which doth exceed the memory of man, sufficeth for a right, 178 Lubricium linguae non facile in penam est trahendum, The nimbleness and lubricity of the Tongue is not easily to be brought into punishment, 278 M. MVlta conceduntur per obliquum, quae non conceduntur de directo, many things are granted by the buy, which are not directly granted, 471 Manifesta probatione indigent, manifest things need no proof, 138 Mala Grammatica non vitiat chartam, & sensus abbreviationis accipiendus est ut coniessio non sit inanis false Latin doth not destroy a Charter, or Deed, and the sense of abbreviations is so to be taken, that the grant be not void, 13.14 Mandata licita strictam recipiunt interpretationem, sed illicita latam & extensam, lawful commands receive a strict limitation, but unlawful, large, and extended, 385 Malesicia non debent manere impunita, offences ought not remain unpunished, 387 Malitia mutat legem, malice changeth the Law, 299 Malum quo communius, eo peius, an evil the more common it is the worse it is, 207 Malitiae vitium connexum est personae committentis malitiam, the vice of malice is connexed to the person who committeth the malice, 301 Malus usus est abolendus, an evil use is to be abolished, 352 Magis, & minus non diversificant speciem, more and less do not diversify the species, 123 Mandatumita regulatur in superioribus sicut in privatis a voluntate mandantis, a commandment is regulated according to the will of the Commander as well in higher as inferior, and private things, 380, Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum, it is a miserable servitude where the Law is wavering, 28 Majorum praecepta, justa, an injusta, non sunt contemnenda, the precepts of the ancients whether just or unjust are not to be contemned 129 Monumenta quae nos recorda vocamus sunt veritatis, & vetustatis vestigia, 129 Mos sidelissimae vetustatis retinendus est, & quae praeter consuetudinem majorum fiunt, neque placent, neque recta videntur, & frequentia actus multa operatur, the manner of most faithful antiquity is to be retained, and what are made contrary to the custom of our Ancestors, do neither please, neither do they seem right, and the frequency of an act worketh much, 123 Modus dat legem donationi, the manner giveth a Law to the gift, 190 Modus & conventio vincunt legem, the manner and agreement overcome the Law, 35 Mutata forma prope interimitur substantia rei, the form being changed, the substance of the thing is destroyed 85 Multa transeunt cum universitate, quae per se non transeunt, many things pass with the universality, which of them seleus do not pass, 23 Multa ignoramus, quae nobis non laterent, si veterum lectio nobis fuerit familiaris, we are ignorant of many things which would not be hid from us, if the reading of the ancients were to us familiar, 129 Multa constituuntur in lege, ne curia domini regis deficeret in justitia many things are ordained in the Law, lest the Court of the Lord the King should fail in Justice, 260 Mutata legis ratione mutatur & lex, the reason of the Law being changed, the Law also is changed, 400 Mavult princeps domesticos milites quam stipendiarios bellicis exponere casibus, a prince desireth rather to employ in military affairs, domestic Soldiers, than Aliens, and Stipendaries, 409 Multum potest in rebus humanis occasio, plurimum in bellciis, occasion, and opportunity prevail much in humane things, but most of all in Marshal affairs, 411 Multitudo errantium non parit errori patrocinium, the multitude of those which err do not patronise an error, 151 N. NAturalis possessio ad prescriptionem sufficet, Natural possession is sufficient to prescription, 179 Naturae vis maxima, the force of nature is very great, Negativum nihil implicat, A Negative employed nothing, 132 Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, No man is bound to betray himself, 331 Nemo tenetur turpitudinem suam detegere, No man is bound to bewray his own filth, and shame, 222 Negatio destruit negationem, & ambo faciunt affirmationem, A double negative maketh an affirmative, 12 Nescit generosa mens ignorantiam pati, A generous mind cannot suffer ignorance, 13 Nemini vim facere videtur, qui suo, & non alieno utitur, He seemeth to do injury to no man who useth his own, and not another's, 25 Nemo redditum invito domino recipere potest, No man can receive the rent, without the Lords consent, 25 Nemo potest plus juris in alium transfer, quam ispe habet, No man can grant more right than he hath, 24 Nemo videtur rem omittere cujus propria non fuit, No man doth seem to lose that, in which he hath no property, 24 Nrcessitas saepenumero vincit communem legem, Necessity oftentimes overcometh the common Law, 432 Nemo nascitur artifex, No man is born an Artist. 418 Neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus, No man ought to be wiser than the Laws, 418 Nile agit exemplum, litem quod lite resolvat, An example is of no validity to decide a controversy, 133 Nihil dat quod non habet, He giveth nothing that hath nothing, 24 Nimia subtilitas in jure reprobatur, Too much subtlety is rejected in the Law, 458 Nihil est magis justum quam quod necessarium, There is nothing more just, then that is necessary, 432 Nihil agit in seipsum, nothing acts upon its self, 43 Nihil in lege intolerabilius est quam eandem rem diverso Jure teneri, There is nothing more intolerable in Law, than the latter Judgement to contradict the former, 127 Nihil magis consentaneum est ut iisdem modis res dissolvatur, quibus constituitur, & nihil tam conveniens est naturali aequitati, unum quodque dissolvi eo ligamine quo ligatum est, There is nothing more meet and convenient to natural equity, then that every thing shall be dissolved by the same means, or bonds it was first bound, or constituted, 80 Nihil est tam conveniens naturali aequitati, quam voluntatem domini volentis, suam rem in alium confer, ratum habere, Nothing is more convenient to natural equity, then to confirm the will of the Lord willing to transfer his estate to another, Non debet cui plus licet, quod minus est non licere, It ought not that to whom it is lawful to do more, that it shall not be lawful to do the less. 120 Non debet mulieribus assignari castra in dotem, quae fueraut virorum suorum, & quae de bello existunt, Castles ought not to be assigned to women for their Dower, which did appertain to their Husbands, and were fortresses of war, 150 Noxa caput sequitur, The offence followeth the head, Non est regula quin fallit, There is no rule but faileth, 315 Non licet, quod dispendio licet, That is not lawful, which is lawful to my loss, 466 Non valet impedimentum, quod de jure non sertitur effectum, The impediment availeth not, which taketh not effect from the Law, 247 Nomen non sufficit, si res non sit de jure, aut de facto, The name of the thing is not sufficient, unless the matter be of right, or fact, 259 Non valet pactum de re mea non alienanda, A Contract that I shall not alien what is my own, is of no force, 29 Non refert quid ex aequipollentibus fiat, It mattereth not what is done by equipollency, 138 Notationes sunt quasi rerum verae notae, Notations are, are as it were true signs of things, Nobiliores, & benigniores praesumptiones in dubiis sunt praeferendae, The most noble and favourable presumptions in doubts are to be preferred 26 Non impedit clausula derogatoria, sive clausula de non obstante, quo minus ab eadem potestate res dissolvantur a quibus constituuntur, Acts which are in their nature revocable, cannot with a non obstante be fixed and perpetuated, 63 Non pertinet ad Judicem secularem cognoscere de iis quae sunt spiritualibus annexa, It doth nor appertain to a secular Judge to take cognizance of those things which are annexed to spiritual things, 378 Novum judicium non dat jus novum sed declarat antiquum, A new Judgement doth not make a new Law but declareth the old Law, 380 Non refert an quis assensum praebeat verbis, an rebus, & factis, It mattereth not whether a man giveth his assent by words, or by things themselves, and Deeds, 471 Nullum simile currit quatuor pedibus, Nothing that is like runneth upon four feet, and is altogether the same, 116 Nullum exemplum est idem omnibus, There is no example the same to all, 126 Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria propria, No man can take advantage of his own wrong, 270 Nullus liber homo amercietur nisi secundum quantitatem delicti, No man ought to be amerced but according to the quantity of his offence, 301 Nunquam prospere succedunt res humanae ubi negliguntur divinae, Humane affairs never succeed prosperously, where Divine Rights are neglected, 7 Nullum tempus occurrit regi, No prescription of time prevaileth against the King, 350 Nullum iniquum in jure est praesumendum, No unjust thing is to be presumed by Law, 248 O. OFficia magistratus non debent esse vaenalia. magistratical Offices ought not to be exposed to sale, 367 Officia Judicialia non conceduntur antequam vacent, Judicial Offices ought not to be granted before they are void, 370 Omne mandatum est temporaneum, All commands are temporary, 385 Omnia quae movent ad mortem sunt deodanda, All things which move to death, or whereby death ensueth are Deodands, Omnia tempus habent, & habent sua tempora tempus, All things are subject to time, and time its self hath also its time, 105 Omne majus continet in se minus, Every greater containeth in it the less, 118 Omne majus dignum trahit ad se minus dignum, Every greater worthy draweth unto it the less worthy, 121 Omnis privatio praesupponit habitum, Every privation presupposeth an habit, 125 Omnis propositio est aut vera, aut falsa, Every proposition is either true or false, 136 Omne actum ab agentis intentione est judicandum, Every act is to be adjudged by the intention of the agent, 197 Omnis ratificatio retro trahitur, & mandato aequiparatur, Every ratification, or approving of any thing looketh back, and is all one, as if a man had given commandment at the first, 42 Oportet quod certae personae, certae terrae, & certi status compredentur in declaratione usuum, It behooveth that certain persons, certain lands, and certain estates be comprehended in the Declaration of uses. 37 Oportet ut res certa ducatur in judicium, It behoveth that a thing certain shall be brought into judgement, 38 Optimi ducis est scire, & vincere, & cedere prudentur tempore, It is the part of an excellent Captain to know and to overcome, and wisely to yield unto the time, 415 Optima statuti interpretatio, omnibus particulis ejusdem inspectis, est ipsum statutum, & injust m est nisi tota lege inspecta una aliqua parte proposita, Judicare, vel respondere. The best Expositors of Acts of Parliament, are Acts of Parliament themselves by construction and conference of all the parts together, 424 Oportet patrem familias vendacem esse non emacem, A Father or a Family ought to be a Buyer, nor a seller, 400 Optimum est militem deligare non eme●e. It is best to choose a Soldier and not to buy him, 409 Origo rei inspici d●bet, The beginning of a thing is to be looked into, 89 P. Part quacunque sublata tollitur totum, The substantial part of any thing being taken away, the whole is destroyed, 95 Paci sunt contraria vis, & injuria, Force and injury are contrary to Peace, 275 Parium eadem est ratio, There is the same reason of equals, 115 Periculosum existimo quod bonorum virorum non comprobatur exemplo, I esteem that dangerous which is not approved by the example of good men, 127 Per divisionem melius materia imtelligitur, By division the matter is better understood, 133 Permissio non est officium legis, quia lex ad fert necssitatem, Permission is not the Office of the Law, because the Law imposeth a necessity, 397 Pendente lite nihil innovetur, Nothing is to be innovated, hanging the suit, 47 Plus peccat author, quam actor, The Author offendeth more than the Actor 203 Plus vident oculi quam oculus, Two eyes see more than one, 364 Possessio fratris de feodo simplici facit sororem esse haeredem, A possession of the Brother of a Fee-simple maketh the Sister to be heir, 185 Potestas regis Ju●is sit non injuriae, & cum sit author Juris non debet inde injuriarum nasci occasio unde jura nascantur, The power of the King is of right, and not injury, and seeing he is the Author of right, there ought not from thence to arise the occasion of injury, from whence right doth proceed, 243 Praelatus ecclesiae suae conditionem meliorem facere potest sine consensu, deteriorem nequaquam sine consensu, A Prelate may make the condition of the Church better without consent, but not worse without consent, 4 Principio dato sequntur concomitantia, Things accessary are of the nature of the principal, 58 Prop●ia res est, quae solius est, sive uni soli convenit, It is a proper thing which is one man's, and belongeth to one man only, 23 Proprietas temporis fi●genda est secundum subjectam materiam, The property of time is to be feigned, according to the subject of the matter, 103 Protectio trahit subjectionem, & subjectio protectionem, Protection draweth subjection, and subjection protection, 365 Privilegium non valet contrarem publicam, A privilege is of no force against the ommonwealth, 432 Prohibetur ne quis faciat in suo, quod lae dat in alieno, & sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, It is forbidden, that no man doth that in his own, which may do hurt in another, and so use your own, that you do not hurt another's, 273 Pr●ximus sum egomet mihi, Every one is next to himself, 213 Q. QUalis causa talis effectus, such as the cause is, such is the effect, 74 Quae incontinenti fiunt in●sse videntur, What things are done in an instant seem to be in being, 90 Quaelibet concessio fortissine contra donatorem interpretanda est, Every Grant is to be taken strongest against the Grantor, 316. & 437 Quae rerum natura prohibentur nulla lege confirmata sunt, What things are prohibited by nature, are confirmed by no Law, 142 Quae libet haereditas naturaliter quidem ad haeredes descendit nunquam autem naturaliter ascendit. Every inheritance doth naturally descend to the Heirs, but never doth naturally ascend, 164 Quando charta continet generalem clausulam, posteaque descendit ad verba speciala quae clausulae generali sunt consentanea, interpretanda est charta secundum specialia, when a Charter containeth a general clause, and then afterwards descendeth to special words, the Charter is to be expounded according to the words special, 18 Quando verba statuti sunt specialia, ratio autem generalis, generaliter statutum est intelligendum, When the words of the Statute are special, and the reason general, the statute is generally to be understood, 22 Quando diversi considerantur actus ad aliquem statum perficiendum Lex plus respicit actum originalem, When to the perfection of an Estate, divers acts are required, the Law more respecteth the original act, 61 Quando jus domini regis, & subditi concurrunt jus regis praeferri debet, When the right of the King, and the Subject meet together, the right of the King ought to be preferred, 361 Quando duo Jura in una concurrunt persona aequum est ac in diversis, When two rights meet together in one person, it is all one as if they were in several, 369. & 250 Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur & id per quod pervenitur ad illud, When any is forbidden, that also is forbidden by which one may come to it, 386 Quam longum debet esse rationabile tempus non definitur in lege, sed pendet ex discretione justiciariorum, How long a reasonable time ought to be, is not defined in the Law, but dependeth upon the discretion of the Judges, 103 Quando aliquid mandatur, mandatur & omne per quod pervenitur ad illud, When any thing is commanded, that is commanded by which one may come to it, 386 Quilibet potest juri renunciari pro se introducto, Every one may renounce the Law, which was brought in for himself, 251 Qui rationem in omnibus quaerunt rationem subvertunt, Who seek reason in all things, overthrow reason, 422 Qui hae et in littera haeret in cortice, He that sticks in the letter, sticks in the bark, or the outside, 425 Qui facit per alium facit pierce, What one doth by another, he doth by himself, 318. & 52 Qui sentit onus, sentire debet, & commodum, He that beareth the burden ought to receive the profit, 90 324 Qui non habet in aere luat in corpore ne quid peccetur impune, He that hath no money, let him be punished in body, lest any offence be committed without punishment, 87 Qui adimit medium adimit finem, He that taketh away the medium, or mean, destroyeth the end, Qui male agit, odit lucem, He that doth evil hateth the light, 104 Quicquid non discutitur, justitia non putatur, Quicunque aliquid sta●uerit parte inaudita ultera, aequum licet statuerit, haud aequum erit, What is not discussed nor tried, is not reputed Justice; and whosoever shall decree any thing, the other party being not heard, though he decreeth that is right, yet hath he not done that is equal, 372 Quicunque jussu Judicis aliquid fecerit, non videtur dolo malo fecisse quia parere necesse est, He that doth anything by commandment ot the Judge, seemeth that he hath not done any thing deceitfully, or amiss, because he must needs obey, 374 Qui ex damnato coitu oriuntur, inter filios non computantur, who are born of unlawful, and damned copulation, are not accounted among Sons, 176 Qui semel actionem renunciaverit amplius repetere non potest, He who once renounceth his action, can no more receive it, 447 Qui timent cavent & vitant, Who fear, are wary, and shun dangers and damages, 322 Quod per me non possum, nec per alium, What I cannot do myself, I cannot do by another, 55 Quod initio non valet tractu temporis non convalescet, That which in the beginning is vicious, or invalid, cannot by tract of time be made good, or valid, 66 Quod non valebit in principali, in accessorio, & consequenti non valebit, What doth not avail in the principal shall not avail in the accessary and consequent, 59 Quod dignius est prius est minus digno, What is more worthy is before that which is less worthy, 72 Quoties duplici jure defertur alicui possessio, repudiate novo jure, quod ante defertur, superest vetus, When a possession is cast upon one by a double right, the new right being rejected, which was given before, the old remaineth, 74 Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra ipsa verba fienda est, Where there is no ambiguity in words, therein no exposition is to be made contrary to the words themselves, 427 Quod est contra rationem est illicitum, What is contrary to reason is unlawful, 419 Quod est inconveniens, & contra rationem non est permissum in lege, What is inconvenient and against reason, is not permitted in the Law, 419 Quod in minori valet, valebit in majori, What availeth in the less, shall avail in the greater, 123 Quod constat clare non debet verificari, What appeareth clearly ought not to be verified, 138 Quod remedio destituitur ipsa re valet, si culpa absit, What is destitute of remedy in the matter itself, it doth avail if the fault be absent, 225 Quod quis que in tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure fecisse videatur, Whatsoever any man shall do in defence of his body, it seemeth lawfully to have done it, 275 Quod alias bonum, & justum est, si per vim, vel fraudem petatur, malum & injustum est, What otherwise is good and just, if it be attempted by force, or fraud is evil and unjust, 284 Quod necessarium est licitum, What is necessary is lawful, 317 R. RAtio est anima legis, Reason is the life of the Law, 417 Receditur a placitis juris, potius quam injuriae, & delicta maneant impunita, We ought to recede from the grounds of Law, rather than offences and injuries may remain unpunished, 391 Res per divisionem melius aperiruntur, Things are better opened by division, 133 Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, A thing acted amongst some ought not to hurt another, 272 Rerum progressus ostendant multa, quae nec praecaveri aut provideri non possunt, The progress and proceed of things, demonstrate many things which in the beginning could not be foreseen, or provided for, 311. & 452 Res judicata pro veritate accipitur, The thing adjudged is taken for truth, 417 Rex est caput, & salus Reipublicae, & a capite bona valetudo transit in omnes, The King is the head and safety of the Commonweal, and from the head good health is conveyed to all, 364 Rex est vicarius, & minister Dei in terra. Omnis quidem sub eo, ipse sub nullo nisi tantum sub Deo, The King is the Vicar, and Ministor of God, every one is under him, and he under none, unless it be under God, 358 S. SAlus populi suprema lex, The safety of the people is the chiefest Law, Sapiens incipit a fine, A wise man beginneth with the end, 461. & 86 Sape locus in delicto auget vel minuit culpam, In an Offence the place doth often augment, or diminish the punishment, 113 Securius expediuntur negotia commissa pluribus, Offices and businesses committed to many are more safely discharged, 368 Semper praesumitur pro legitimatione puerorum, & filiatio non potest probari, at is always presumed for legitimation of Children, and filiation, or begetting of Children cannot be proved, 168 Semper qui dolo fecit quo minus haberet, pro eo habendus est ac si habet, Always whosoever shall give or grant any thing by fraud, whereby he may seem not to have it, is to be esteemed he hath it, 290 Semel malus semper praesumitur esse malus in eodem genere mali, Who hath once been evil, is always presumed to be evil, in the same kind of evil, 300 Sensus verborum ex causa dicendi accipiendus est, & sermons semper accipiendi sunt secundum subjectam materiam, The sense of the words is to be taken out of the cause of the speech and speeches are always to be taken according to the subject of the matter, 28 Semper ita fiat relatie, ut valeat dispositio, Let the relation be so, that the disposition may avail, 49 Si defit obedientia non adjuvat lotus, If obedience be wanting, the place releiveth not, 114 Sicut beatius ita majus est dare, quam accipere, As it is a more blessed thing, so it is a greater thing to give then to take, 120 Sicut natura in operationibus nihil facit persaltum. Ita nec lex, As nature in his operations doth nothing by skips, so neither the Law, 145 Si mulier nobilis nupserit ignobili de sinet esse nobilis, If a Noble woman marry an ignoble man, she leaveth to be noble, 151 Si plures conditiones ascriptae sunt donationi conjactim omnibus est parendum, & ad veritatem copulativum requiritur, quod utraque pars sit vera, If many conditions be jointly annexed to a gift, all of them must be obeyed, and to a copulative truth it is required that every part be true, 11 Singular distributive sumptum aequat plurale, A singular distributively taken equalleth the plural, 23 Solum Rex hoc potest de jure potest, The King can do only that that he can do by right, 242 Substantia prior, & dignior est accident, The substance is more worthy, and before the accident, 43 Suprema potestas seipsum dissolvere potest, The supreme power may dissolve itself, 84 Subsequens matrimonium tollit peccatum praecedens, The subsequent marriage taketh away the precedent Offence, 177 Sublata causa tollitur effectus, The cause being taken away, the effect always is taken away, 317 Summum jus summa injuria, The severity of Justice is the extremity of injury, 253 T. TEmpus est mensura motus secundum prius, & posterius, Time is the measure of motion according to priority, and posteriority, 99 Tempora mutantur, & nos mutamur in illis, Times are changed, and so in them are we, 105 Tempus edax rerum, Time is the consumer of things, 105 Thesaurus domino competit regi, & non domino libertatis, nisi sit per verba specialia, Treasure belongeth to the Lord the King, and not to the Lord of the liberty, unless it be by special words, 403 Tributum est victoriae proenuum, & poena belli, Tribute is the reward of Victory, and penalty of War, 407 Totum praefertur unicuique parti, The whole is preferred before every part, 93 Turpis est pars, quae cum suo toto convenit, Fowl, and deformed is the part, which agreeth not with the whole, 95 Vbi major pars est ibi est totum, Where the greater part is, there is the whole, 34 Vbi non est gubernator dissipabitur populus, Where there is no Governor the people shall be dispersed, 355 Verba ita intelligenda sunt ut res magis valeat, quam pereat, Words are so to be understood, that the thing may avail, and not perish, 317 Verba accipienda sunt in mitiori sensu, Words are to be taken in a favourable sense, 29 Veritas nihil ver●tur nisi absc●ndi, Truth feareth nothing but to be hidden, 282 Vigi an●ibus non dormientibus leges subveniunt, The Laws do help them that are watchful, and waking, and not those who are sleepy and negligent, 319 Unumquodque principiorum est sibimetipsi fides, Every Principle is of credit to itself, 71 FINIS.