AN ADMONITION TO MY LORD PROTECTOR AND HIS COUNCIL, Of their present Danger, WITH The means to secure him and his POSTERITY in the present greatness: With the general Applause and lasting tranquillity of the NATION,  
London, Printed in the year 1654.   

THE PREFACE.  
MY LORD,  
MY passionate inclinations to the lasting peace of my country, have made me so presumptuous, as to prescribe to your Highness and Council a more perfect remedy for its ill healed wounds, than I have se●en yet applied: But I would not be thought so impudent, as to offer at the instruction of so great Masters in the Art of Government, but only to put you in mind of those things, that the multiplicity of your greater Affairs have made you forget to consider. And lest your Highness should want leisure to peruse the papers of an obscure and unknown person, I thought fit to commit them to the Press, that some of your Council or Friends (at least) may inform your Highness how much is pertinent in them, not doubting but you will think those more your friends, that give you a timely notice of your own and your country's danger, than those, who by a servile flattery, becalm you to your ruin; which none shall be more ambitious to prevent, than  
My Lord, Your most humble, and faithful Servant, J. H.   

AN ADMONITION TO MY LORD PROTECTOR, and his Council, of their present danger, &c.  
TO begin such a business as this methodically, we are first to show the just Exceptions the people and soldiery have to this plausible elective form of Government, so well intended by your highness and council; next those to your persons, with the dangers ensuing thereupon to yourselves and the Nation: And lastly, the only means of a total and lasting prevention.  
And I must ingenuously confess, that there is so much seeming reason to prefer the continual Election of wise and gallant men, before the Succession of Kings or Protectors, who may possibly prove Children, or Fools, or Tyrants or Cowards, that it may seem a wonder that the experience of all Nations hath not driven them to the specious form of Elective Monarchies.  
But the trials they have had, have beaten them to the contrary; for though the renown of your Highness's many victories and great abilities, with your long and prosperous prepossession of the Generalship, did silence the ambitious pretences of any competitors in your Election, yet we must no more look for a man that hath no Equals after your highness; for the most eminent sort of men, are as near of a size in wit and courage, as they are in stature; and as they are equals in virtue, so will they be in interest, at least their factions will be so near an equality, that the weaker in an Army may by his cunning and industry draw in other factions from amongst the people to increase his numbers upon the common specious pretences of a Reformation in Religion and Government agreeable to those people's humours whom he courts, and so prepare himself to decide his pretensions by a Civil War, which I may justly call the great Sea of calamities that swallows up all the streams of other petty tyrannies, as not worth a name, in respect of the ruinous inundations of that many headed Monster, which commonly ushers in a foreigner with it to make our miseries almost immortal.  
And that this is like to be our sad fate upon the Election of every Protector, is as certain, as that all men (whether honest, or dishonest) have naturally an ambition to get as much power as they can to oblige or disoblige; and considering how natural men overvalue themselves, I think the designs of ambitious men to be commonly just in their own thoughts, out of the Confidence they have of themselves, of excelling others in good Government. But that those gallant men who run so many hazards to build up your highness' greatness, should not adventure as far for themselves apart, after your highness' death, were the greatest miracle that I have known.  
And to confirm this by an ancient example or two, of the wisest and most civilised people then in reputation in the world; we will begin with the great Alexander, who at his death (it seems intending an Election amongst themselves) told his great Officers, that he would leave his Empire to the worthiest; but they could so ill agree who that was, that they divided that invincible Army, and each seizing upon what he could, fought it out, till they were all destroyed but Seleucus: and Ptolemy: And so after the death of Julus Caesar, was the Roman Empire rent by the dissensions of Augustus, Anthony, and Lepidus, till the fortune of Augustus prevailed. And in the declining of the Roman Empire there were several times as many Emperors as the Legions in several Provinces were pleased to set up, which were sometimes three or four together for want of a due succession. And to come home to the present German Empire, though it be in effect Hereditary to the House of Austria yet the very pretence to a free election was the principal Cause of calling in the King of Sweden, and reducing that strong and flourishing Empire to such a wilderness as now it is. And doubtless, all Governments were to be rejected as pernicious tyrannies, were it not for avoiding the tyranny of Confusion, which subjects the Lives and Fortunes of every particular man to any small number of Rogues that shall assemble at such a time of Liberty. If then the public peace be the chief end of all Governments, those Forms must needs be the worst which are most subject to decline to Factions, though they do not immediately do so; and of Monarchies no doubt but the elective is most liable to this Confusion.  
And though it may be objected, that the follies of a weak hereditary King may introduce the same inconvenience, I shall first answer that there is seldom such a King; for their extraordinary educations make them knowing men, if it finds them not such. But if he be a fool, or coward, he hath subjects under him fit to command Armies, and no doubt a wise Council of his predecessors, who knows how to humour and govern him as well as any of his fellow fools; And if he be a child, his minority most commonly proves peaceable, if his Title be unquestionable. But it may be said he may prove a Tyrant, and that I must confess, but so may an Elective Monarch, though he seem a lamb at his first entry, I am sure he hath more reason to be so, because he hath more of his equals or superiors in birth to fear. And if we look upon other differences of these two kinds of Kings, we shall find the Elective King more necessitated to exhaust the people, both in respect of the charge of gaining and securing his present power, and leaving his posterity like the children of a Monarch, and so the Treasury shall be always emptied into private purses, and the people a new exhausted by the next hungry Prince with his necessitous kindred and dependants. So that I must conclude that every Election doth certainly threaten the worst of evils, and that the inconveniences of a succession are far less, and do very seldom happen by the concurrents of many ill accidents together. And I think this may serve for demonstration of the people's exceptions, who judge by the pressures they feel. And now let us examine the distastes of the soldiery and people together to your highness' person, and I doubt we shall find that the greater their love and admiration once was, the more is now their hatred and your highness' danger; for they both looked upon you as a zealous reformer not only of Tyranny, but of the very causes of it; and (though you acted beyond their reasons) they thought it was because you had more reason than they, and so with an implicit faith they expected from your highness such a settlement, as should recompense their great expense of blood and treasure. But after the spirir had moved you to break your oaths of allegiance and supremacy (which you took with all the Members at your first entrance into Parliament) and after that your trust from the two houses upon the score of the Covenant, and since again to destroy the King, weed the Parliament, and at last ●ear it up by the roots, and they in the end see no other fruits of blood and perjury, but the giving laws like a Conqueror, and imposing that kind of Government upon the soldiery which they have fought against, and indeed a worse: what can be feared from such a deluded Army and people, but that they should as boldly draw their swords together against a Protector, as the Presbyterians and all sorts of Independents did formerly against the King notwithstanding their own differences in opinion. Certainly they will be as little scrupulous of murdering Monarch by his own law, as one by all the Laws of the Land established, and will think your Highness as guilty of the bloodshed of the Nation, as they once thought the King, and there is no question but the people who find their Taxes and Dangers perpetuated (which were inconsiderable when they first quarrelled with them) will be as forward to assist the soldiery, as they can wish them. And I think this general disaffection of the people was so evident to your highness, before they were exasperated by the death of the King or Parliament, that you need not doubt their unanimous insurrection, if they shall be prepared and countenanced in it, when the people of single Counties ventured their lives and fortunes so freely as they did before the King's death; where it is remarkable, that a remnant of the broken and discouraged people of Kent, with some small additions in Essex, were able to divert my Lord Fairfax's Army at Colchester three months together; if the Nation had been then prepared for a general insurrection in a day, it is probable your highness' glories had been nipped in the bud, notwithstanding your renowned victories against the Scots at that time. But it may be asked, why the people did not show this readiness when the Scots with their King came to Worcester, and the Answer is, that their coming was unexpected, and in such haste, as showed they rather came to seek then give protection, and the forlaid designs, if there were any, were (as was then pretended) discovered: But howsoever, there was little more than was requisite for dispersing of Orders between the day of their arrival at Worcester, and that of their defeat.  
But the grand Objection is, that the fear of the Common Enemy (the King) will always keep the soldiery at unity in their Obedience under your Highness; but I answer, that if a few of them should but resolve to murder your Highness, and one or two more of your principal Officers, which no doubt they may easily and securely do, they would find time enough to settle any form of Government they pleased, before the Common Enemy (who hath neither Money, Shipping, Arms, nor Friends abroad, nor any footing in this Nation) could give them any disturbance. And how far zeal may prompt those who are religious, and the ambition of sharing the Government those of no Religion, a wise man ought to fear; but admit the King were landed, and considerable, the soldiery very well known by experience, how welcome even particular men are that revolt to an enemy in a doubtful condition; much more great bodies, which may not only make what advantageous conditions they please for themselves, But may impose upon him stricter limitations of his power, than your Highness is now tied to by your Protectorship, and no doubt may retain any places of benefit or strength they shall then be possessed of, for security of performance of conditions. But if the worst should happen, that he should come in a conqueror without their help, they know that a few of the great Ones will only be punished; for reason will lead any conquering Tyrant (for his own security) to sweeten the multitude with a general pardon and Act of Oblivion; and for any scruples they may have of betraying your highness' Trust, I doubt they will be wiped away by their apprehensions of your first breaking yours with King, Parliament, and Army, and so they may probably render you a bloody requital for the destruction of their Fellow soldiers, whom you call Levellers. Lastly, Consider the fondness of the people to their Old Forms of Religion, as well as Government, which you have abolished without giving the liberty to tender consciences they expected, and your Highness will conclude with me, that the world affords you few others than Enemies at home, and Emulators abroad: And if I have told you nothing but truth. I doubt not but your generosity will think me more worthy of thanks than any of your Flatterers, especially if I propose a just, safe, and honourable remedy for the mischiefs that threaten your Highness and the Nation. And now having sufficiently opened the wounds, I shall apply the promised Cure. And it is not the lessening of your highness in any thing, for I am one of those that believe Monarchy to be the best form of Government, so as it be hereditary: for admit a Monarch be a Tyrant, his Tyranny is mortal, and his care will be greater not to offend, than of a multitude of Governors, who may lay faults upon one another, and are as subject to cruelty and avarice as the single person, so that it is better to be preyed upon by one Family with its dependants, than by three or four hundred with theirs, and we may easier please the one, and have justice of him, than of the slow and factious great Body, who must most of them join to oblige, and yet any one can by his misinformation disoblige, because the accused shall be branded with the Title of a Malignant, when they have not so much as leisure to hear him. And since an arbitrary power will be in all Governments in those that have the possession of the Militia, it is better both for defence and offence, that the General and civil Magistrate should be all one, than that a gallant Army and Nation should be ruined, as Hannibal and his Carthaginians were by the delatory and malicious practices of Hanno, a Senator with his faction.  
But to return to our purpose for the satisfaction of all interests, and first for the soldiery, because they have fought hard for it, I should propose to your highness to have all officers of the Army above the degree of captains to have votes in your highness' council of State at those times that they are free from their more urgent employments in the field. So will each soldier of the Army be sure to endeavour by his extraordinary deserts to rise by degrees to the State preferment he sees his officers so justly rewarded with.  
Then for this next Parliament (though they should not have power to alter the Government) I could wish your highness and council would consult with them about your late establishment, and hear what objections they have against it. And if the Parliament and Army should join in a petition to this purpose, I presume you would not deny it. And it were better to offer at acts of Grace before they were asked.  
Lastly, if my reasons for an hereditary Monarchy be satisfactory, I most humbly beseech your highness and Council to consider whether the establishment of the succession after your highness in an usurping line, will not expose the Nation to all the miseries I have mentioned in an elective government, and if this be doubted, be pleased to look over our own Chronicles, and you shall find variety of examples, without going further than the time of the conquest. For first, Harrold by his usurpation encouraged and occasioned the Conquest of England; then was there another deluge of blood occasioned by the usurpation of Henry the first; and again what slaughters and rapines did this miserable Nation endure by the unjust ambition of King Stephen in detaining the Crown from Maud the Empress, which fire could not be quenched but by the succession of her son the right heir, which was at last agreed to by King Stephen. But to come nearer home, you shall find that Henry the fourth saw his country bleed in his life-time for his usurpation, though he came in with the general good liking of the people, and thought he ha● secured himself by the King's murder. But though his industry secured the Crown to his son, yet was his son's death conspired by his principal friends just as he was setting out for the invasion of France; but that conspiracy being detected, he by his unparalleled virtues and successes and the weakness of the true heir, avoided during his short life any storms at home. But they fell most heavily upon our flourishing country in his Successor Henry the sixth's time who could never have lost the Crown by his weakness if his title had been good; as appeareth by the notable contention between him and Edward the fourth, but between them were many thousands of Orphans and widows left weeping over their own and their country's desolate and bloody ruins; and at last the ambition of Henry the fourth was justly punished in the ruin of his Grandchild, and a hateful memory for his unjust Ambition and the sad consequences of it. But if these examples do not sufficiently convince, the reason of the thing doth, for there will always be a conscientious and a necessitous party for the true heir in any Nation against an Usurper; besides malcontents which are still the greatest number because many must necessarily be injured, and more unrewarded that think they deserve it, and even all men that are unconcerned will be for the true Heir, and be pretended lovers of Justice, and with much reason must hate precedents of wrong, lest they should time other time suffer it. And so I may conclude we are as certain of a civil war from an unjust succession as from an Elective Government. And the incomparable miseries and ill consequences of that I have already declared, though our own experience might partly have saved me the labour. But your highness may think an invincible Fleet a sufficient security for an Island against a foreign Nation that may interpose at such a time of our destructions. But I answer, that if none of your shipping should revolt, yet might our next neighbours the French (if they should then make peace with their other enemies) take the opportunity of the same storm that shall force your Fleet in the Winter into harbours to blow them over the short passage into England, if they have any party to secure their Landing here.  
But if this be thought frivolous, I suppose I have said enough besides to make it appear that the true interest of your highness and your posterity with that of this kingdom to think of a treaty with Charles Stuart, if he will accept of the Crown after your decease upon the same terms you now hold it, I mean the same council and limitation of power, with a competent maintenance for him in the mean time, in some such remote place as you shall need less to fear him than you do now, if he should incline to the breach of such an agreement, as may be secured by Oaths, Hostages, and by the mediation of such States whose interest it is (in respect of their greater neighbours) to be always friends to the peace of England, and by stricter ties than are here necessary to be mentioned; besides the honesty, discretion and temper of the young man, who (notwithstanding his great courage) shows he inherits the mildness of his Father and Grandfather on the one side, and of his Mother and Grandfather on the other side, which great King Henry the fourth of France after he had victoriously broken the heart of that great Rebellion called the Catholic League, notwithstanding received the only head of it then living the Duke of Main, into his protection and favour, and never took the least revenge of him or any other of that Rebellious crew in all the time of his reign. But above all things the Kings own interest and the good of his country will oblige him to bury his resentments, and both to accept and keep such conditions as redeem him and his followers from misery at the present, and secure him and his posterity in the end to the re-enjoyments of all their rights, without the slaughter or destruction of any part of his kingdoms, which he is most tenderly sensible of; and what doubt can there be but that he will rather expect quietly the decease of an old man (as your highness is) then run an improbable hazard of all his fortunes for a few years, which he must have stayed for till his father's death, if he had not been untimely cut off: and that he was willing to do so, your Highness knows, by his pious and earnest solicitation then to you and the rest of the officers then with you for the saving of his life. And let me add a very late trial of him, when Wiseman and others proposed your murder to him, he refused to consent to it, notwithstanding his interest, and the exasperation of his wants; how then should he be feared when those motives are taken away?  
But admit this were not so, you have, still all the power in your own hands, and would have the affections of the people (which he now hath) if he should be perfidious to their disquiet anew. If then it be clear that you are secure on the King's side, where lies the danger of this accommodation? it is the undoubted interest of the military men to be always governed by a Monarch, especially if they be well provided of subordinate places under him, and the people are so passionately affected to the old line, as their only constant security from rapine and bloodshed, that they will never be at rest till they have an opportunity to destroy the rooter up of that three great fences, of their Religion, Laws, and that unquestionable succession which would entirely secure them from any more disputes; and even most of those who formerly fancied, better forms of Government, are now for falling into the old channel, out of despair of drawing the people's affections to their fancies, without which they know the peace of the Nation can never be long preserved; if your highness should yet prove one of that number, your name would be as good as it is great; for a man may be thought reasonably to undertake indirect courses for a great and public good, so as he leave those courses when he sees his end is not to be compassed: And if your Highness do so, your curses will be turned into praises, and you may sleep again without any fear of your own guards, who otherwise are not like to scruple the murdering of so unjust a master for a greater reward than you can give them, if the present seizure of your treasure were not sufficient for them: For men of no Religion will at any tine betray a person as wicked as themselves for their interest, and those that are zealous will do the same upon the score of Justice, and their Oaths and Covenants to other forms or persons; so that your Highness can be secure of nobody, nor any thing, but the rewards of injustice with infamy, for the preferring your son's advancement before your country's security, who if he were planted can never be secured by any Decrees or Oaths, since both have been so commonly broken, and aught to be so, if unjustly made or taken; and if his virtues be never so great his mere youth shall make him be despised by those that have had the start of him in successes, and the affections of the Army; and the seeming respect that is now paid him upon your highness' score, shall vanish with your death, and all your Family be destroyed (like that of the great Alexander's) by your own friends and followers, if you yourself should scape such a cup of poison as he met with on such a dagger as finished the ambition of Julius Caesar: And now my Lord, for a Conclusion, give me leave to wonder at the ambition of all ill men, though they believe in no other world, since their ambition is to gain esteem, and how they should be esteemed and hated at once for the same fact, I know not, without a contradiction. If they did but consider how even wicked men hate one another for fear of receiving the same injuries from their companions which they have inflicted together upon others, they would prefer the love and admiration of Mankind before the being admirably hated, which since your highness may so easily do, and cannot with justice, honour and safety do any thing else, it shall no more be doubted from your generosity by  
MY LORD.