THE STUMBLING-BLOCK OF Disobedience and Rebellion, Cunningly laid by Calvin in the Subjects way, Discovered, Censured, and Removed.  
By P. H.  ROM. 14. 13. 
Offendiculum fratri tuo ne ponas.  
Let no man put a Stumbling-block, or an occasion to fall, in his brother's way.  1 SAM. 24. 6. 
And David said to his men, The Lord forbidden that I should do this thing unto my Master the Lords anointed, to stretch forth my hand against him, seeing he is the anointed of the Lord.  
LONDON, Printed by E. Cotes for Henry Seile over against St. Dunstan's Church in Fleetstreet, 1658.   

THE PREFACE.  
IT will appear to any who shall read this Treatise, that it was written in the times of Monarchical Government, but in the later and declining times thereof, when the change of that Government was in agitation, and in part effected. In which respect I doubt not but the publishing of this Discourse at this present time may seem unseasonable unto some, and yet it may be thought by others to come out seasonably enough for these following reasons.  
1. To give warning to all those that are in Supreme Authority to have a care unto themselves, and not to suffer any Popular and Tribunitian Spirits to grow amongst them; who grounding upon calvin's Doctrine, both may, and will upon occasion, create new disturbances.  
2. To preserve the Dignity of the Supreme Power, in what Person soever it be placed, and fix his Person in his own proper Orb, the Primum Mobile of Government, brought down of late, to be but one of the three Estates, and move in the same Planetary Sphere with the other two.  
3. To keep on foot the claim and Title of the Clergy unto the Reputation, Rights, and Privileges of the Third Estate, which doth of right belong unto them; and which the Clergy have anciently enjoyed in all, and to this day in most Christian Kingdoms.  
4. To show unto the world, on whose authority the Presbyterians built their damnable Doctrine, not only of curbing and restraining the power of Princes, but also of deposing them from their Regal Dignity, whensoever they shall please to pretend cause for it. For when the Scotch Commissioners were commanded by Queen Elizabeth to give a reason of their proceed against their Queen, whom not long before they had deposed from the Regal Throne; they justified themselves by those words of Calvin, which I have chosen for the Argument of this Discourse. By the authority of Calvin (as my Author hath it) they endeavoured to prove, that the Popular Magistrates are appointed and made to moderate and keep in order the excess and unruliness of Kings; and that it is lawful for them to put the Kings that be evil and wicked into prison, and also to deprive them of their Kingdoms. If these reasons shall not prove the seasonableness of this Adventure, I am the more to be condemned for my indiscretion, the shame whereof I must endure as well as I can. This being said in order to my justification, I must add somewhat of the Book or Discourse itself; in which the canvasing and confuting of calvin's Grounds about the Ephori of Sparta, the Tribunes of Rome, and the Demarchi of Athens, hath forced me upon many Quotations both Greek and Latin; which to the learned Reader will appear neither strange nor difficult. And for the sake of the unlearned, which are not so well versed and studied in foreign Languages, I have kept myself to the direction of St. Paul, not speaking any where in a strange tongue without an Interpreter, the sense of every such Quotation being either declared before, or delivered after it. Lastly, whereas the Name of Appius Claudius doth many times occur in the History of the Roman Tribunes, it is not always to be understood of the same Man, but of divers men of the same Name in their several Ages; as the name of Caesar in the New Testament signifieth not one man but three, that is to say, the Emperor Tiberius in the Gospels, Claudius in the Book of the Acts, and that most bloody Tyrant Nero in the Epistle to the Philippians. Which being premised, I shall no longer keep the Reader in Portch or Entrance; but let him take a view of the House itself, the several Rooms, Materials, and Furniture of it; long Prefaces to no long Discourses, being like the Gates of Mindum amongst the Ancients, which were too great and large for so small a City.   

The Argument & occasion of this following Treatise.  
Joh. Calvini Institution. Lib. 4. cap. 20. sect. 31.  
NEque enim si ultio Domini est effrenatae dominationis correctio, ideo protinus demandatam nobis arbitremur; quibus nullum aliud quam parendi & patiendi datum est Mandatum. De privatis hominibus semper loquor. Nam siqui nunc sint Populares Magistratus ad moderandum Regum libidinem constituti (quales olim erant qui Lacedaemoniis Regibu● oppositi erant Ephori; aut Romanis Consulibus Tribuni Plebis, aut Atheniensium Senatui Demarchi; & qua etiam forte potestate, ut nunc res habent, funguntur in singulis Regnis tres Ordines, cum primarios Conventus peragunt) adeo illos ferocienti Regum licentiae, pro officio, intercedere non veto, ut si Regibus impotenter gr●ssantibus, & humili plebeculae insultantibus conniveant; eorum dissimulationem nefaria perfidia non carere affirmem, qua populi libertatem (cujus se, Dei ordinatione, tutores positos norunt) fraudulenter produnt.  
NOr may we think because the punishment of licentious Princes doth belong to God, that presently this power is devolved on us, to whom no other warrant hath been given by God but only to obey and suffer. But still I must be understood of private persons. For if there be now any popular Officers ordained to moderate the licentiousness of Kings (such as were the Ephori, set up of old against the Kings of Sparta; the Tribunes of the people against the Roman Consuls, and the Demarchi against the Athenian Senate; and with which power perhaps, as the world now goes, the three Estates are seized in each several Kingdom, when they are solemnly assembled) so far am I from hindering them to put restraints upon the exorbitant power of Kings, as their Office binds them; that I conceive them rather to be guilty of a perfidious dissimulation, if they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants, or wantonly insult on the common people, in that they treacherously betray the Subjects Liberties; of which they knew they were made Guardians by Gods own Ordinance.   

Syllabus Capitum.  

CHAP. I. The Doctrine of Obedience laid down by Calvin; and of the Popular Officers, supposed by him, whereby he overthroweth that Doctrine.  

(I) THe purpose and design of the work in hand.  
(TWO) The Doctrine of Obedience unto Kings and Princes, sound and piously laid down by CALVIN.  
(III) And that not only to the good and gracious, but even to cruel Princes and ungodly Tyrants.  
(IV) With Answer unto such Objections as are made against it.  
(V) The principles of Disobedience in the supposal of some popular Officers ordained of purpose to regulate the power of Kings.  
(VI) How much the practice of calvin's followers doth differ from their Master's doctrine in the point of Obedience.  
(VII) Several Articles and points of Doctrine wherein the Disciples of CALVIN are departed from him.  
(VIII) More of the differences in point of Doctrine between the Master and his Scholars.  
(IX) The dangerous consequences which arise from his faulty principles in the point or Article of Disobedience.  
(X) The Method and distribution of the following work.    

CHAP. II. Of the Authority of the Ephori in the State of Sparta; and that they were not instituted for the ends supposed by Calvin.  

(I) The Kings of Sparta absolute Monarches at the first.  
(TWO) Of the condition of that State when Lycurgus undertook to change the Government.  
(III) What power Lycurgus gave the Senate; and what was left unto the Kings.  
(IV) The Ephori appointed by the Kings of Sparta to ease themselves and curb the Senate.  
(V) The blundering and mistakes of Joseph Sc●liger, about the first institution of the Ephori.  
(VI) The Ephori from mean beginnings grow to great Authority; and by what advantages.  
(VII) The power and influence which they had in the public Government.  
(VIII) By what degrees the Ephori encroached on the Spartan Kings.  
(IX) The insolences of the Ephori towards their Kings altered the State into a Tyranny.  
(X) The Spartan Kings stomach the insolency of the Ephori, and at last utterly destroy them.  
(XI) An application of the former passages to the point in hand.    

CHAP. III. Of the Encroachment of the Tribunes on the State of Rome; and that they were not instituted for the ends supposed by Calvin.  

(I) The Tribunes of the People why first instituted in the State of Rome.  
(TWO) The Tribunes fortify themselves with large immunities before they went about to change the Government.  
(III) The Tribunes no sooner in their Office, but they s●t themselves against the Nobility and the Senate, contrary to the Articles of their Institution.  
(V) The many and dangerous Seditions occasioned by the Tribunes in the City of Rome.  
(VI) The Tribunes and the People do agree together to change the Government of the State.  
(VII) By what degrees the People came to be possessed of all Offices in the State, both of Power and Dignity.  
(VIII) The Plots and practices of the Gracchis, to put the power of Judicature and Supreme Majesty of the State into the hands of the People.  
(IX) The Tribunes take upon them to commit the Consuls, and bring all the Officers of the State under their command.  
(X) The Office and Authority of the Tribunes reduced unto its ancient bounds by Cornelius Sylla, and at last utterly destroyed.  
(XI) An Application of the former passages to the point in hand.    

CHAP. IU. Of what Authority the DEMARCHI were in the State of ATHENS; and of the danger and unfitness of the instances produced by CALVIN.  

(I) Athens first governed by Kings, and afterwards by one Sovereign Prince under other Titles.  
(TWO) The Annual Magistrates of Athens what they were, and of what Authority.  
(III) By whom and by what degrees the State of Athens was reduced to Democraty.  
(IV) Of the Authority of the Senate, and the famous Court of the Areopagites.  
(V) What the Demarchi were in the State of Athens, and of what Authority.  
(VI) The Demarchi never were of power to oppose the Senate, nor were ordained to that end.  
(VII) Calvin's ill luck in making choice of three such instances, which if true would not serve his turn.  
(VIII) The danger which lieth hidden under the design of such Popular Magistrates, as are here instanced in by Calvin.  
(IX) What moved Calvin to lay these dangerous Stumbling blocked in the Subjects way.  
(X) The dangerous Seditions and practices which have hence ●nsued in most parts of Europe.  
(XI) The Sect●●f Calvin professed Enemies to Monarchy, and the Power of Princes.    

CHAP. V What are the Three Estates in each several Kingdom, of which CALVIN speaks; and what they are particularly in the Realm of ENGLAND.  

(I) Of the division of a people into Three Estates; and that the Priests and Clergy have been always one.  
(TWO) The Priests employed in Civil Matters and Affairs of State, by the Egyptians, and the Persians, the Greeks, Gauls, and Romans.  
(III) The Priests and Levites exercised in Affairs of Civil Government by Gods own appointment.  
(IV) The Prelates versed in Civil Matters and Affairs of State in the best and happiest times of Christianity.  
(V) The Clergy make the third Estate in Germany, France, Spain, and the Northern Kingdoms.  
(VI) That anciently in the Saxons times the ecclesiastics of this Realm were called to all public Counsels.  
(VII) The Prelates an essential fundamental part of the English Parliament.  
(VIII) Objections answered, and that the word Clerus in the Legal notion doth not extend unto the Prelates.  
(IX) That the inferior Clergy of the Realm of England had anciently their votes in Parliament to all intents and purposes as the Commons had.  
(X) Objections answered, and that the calling of the Clergy to Parliaments and Convocations were after different manners, and by several Writs.  
(XI) The great Diffranchisement and Slavery obtruded on the English Clergy, by the depriving of the Bishops of their Votes in Parliament.  
(XII) A brief discussion of the question, Whether that any two of the three Estates, conspiring or agreeing together, can conclude any thing unto the prejudice of the third.    

CHAP. VI That the three Estates of every Kingdom whereof CALVIN speaks, have no authority either to regulate the power, or control the actions of the Sovereign Prince.  

(I) The Bishops and Clergy of England, not the King, make the third Estate; and of the dangerous, consequences which may follow on the contrary Tenet.  
(TWO) The different influence of the three Estates upon conditional Princes, and an absolute Monarch.  
(III) The Sanh●drim of no authority over the persons or the actions of the Kings of Judah.  
(IV) The three Estates in France of how small authority over the actions of that King.  
(V) The Kings of Spain not overruled or regulated by the three Estates.  
(VI) Of what authority they have been anciently in the Parliaments of Scotland.  
(VII) The King of England always accounted heretofore for an absolute Monarch.  
(VIII) No part of Sovereignty invested legally in the English Parliaments.  
(IX) The three Estates assembled in the Parliament of England, subordinate unto the King, not coordinate with him.  
(X) The Legislative power of Parliaments is properly and legally in the King alone.  
(XI) In what particulars the power of the English Parliaments doth consist especially.  
(XII) The Kings of England ordinarily overrule their Parliaments, by themselves, their Counsel and their Judges.  
(XIII) Objections answered touching the power and practise of some former Parliaments, and the Testimonies given unto them.  
(XIV) No such Authority given by God in holy Scripture to any popular Magistrates, as Calvin dreams of and pretends.  
(XV) The Application and Conclusion of the whole discourse.     

THE STUMBLING-BLOCK OF Disobedience and Rebellion, Cunningly laid by CALVIN in the Subjects way, Discovered, Censured and Removed.  

CHAP. I. The Doctrine of Obedience laid down by CALVIN; and of the Popular Officers supposed by him, whereby he overthroweth that Doctrine.  

(I) The purpose and design of the work in hand.  
(TWO) The Doctrine of Obedience unto Kings and Princes, sound and piously laid down by CALVIN.  
(III) And that not only to the good and gracious, but even to cruel Princes and ungodly Tyrants;  
(IV) With Answer unto such Objections as are made against it.  
(V) The Principles of Disobedience in the supposal of some popular Officers ordained of purpose, to regulate the power of Kings.  
(VI) How much the practice of CALVIN's followers doth differ from their Master's Doctrine in the point of Obedience.  
(VII) Several Articles and points of Doctrine, wherein the Disciples of CALVIN are departed from him.  
(VIII) More of the differences in point of Doctrine betwixt the Master and his Scholars.  
(IX) The dangerous consequences which arise from his faulty Principles, in the point or Article of Disobedience.  
(X) The method and distribution of the following Work.   
SOme Writers may be likened unto Jeremy's Figs, 
b jerem. 24▪ 4.  of which the Prophet saith, that if they were good, they were very good; if evil, very evil, such as could not be eaten they were so evil. Of such a temper and esteem was Origen amongst the Ancients, of whom it was observed (not without good cause) that in his Expositions on the Book of God and other learned Tractates which he writ and published, where he did well, none could do it better, and where he failed at all, no man erred more grossly. And of this sort and composition was Mr. Calvin of Geneva, than whom there is not any Minister of the Reformed Churches beyond the seas, who hath more positively and expressly laid down the Doctrine of Obedience unto Kings and Princes, and the unlawfulness of Subjects taking Arms against their Sovereign; nor opened a more dangerous gap to disobedience and rebellions in most States of Christendom. In which it is most strange to see how prone we are, (such is the frailty and corruption of our sinful nature) to refuse the good, and choose the evil; to take no notice of his words when it most concerns us, when we are plainly told our duties both to God and man; and on the other side to take his words for Oracles, his judgement for infallible, all his Geese for Swans, when he saith any thing which may be useful to our purposes, or serve to the advancement of our lewd designs. The credit and authority of the man was deservedly great amongst the people where he lived; and in short time of such authority and esteem in the world abroad, that his works were made the only rule to which both Discipline and Doctrine was to be conformed: and if a Controversy did arise either in points Dogmatical, or a case of Conscience, his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was sufficient to determine in it, at least to silence the gainsayers. And as it is observed in the works of Nature, that corruptio optimi est pessima, and that the sweetest meats make the sourest excrements; so the opinion and esteem which some of the Reformed Churches had conceived of him (which to say the truth was great and eminent) and the ill use they made of some words and passages in his writings, which most unfortunately served to advance their purposes, have been the sad occasion of those wars and miseries, which almost all the Western parts of Christendom, have been so fatally involved in since the times he lived. Which words and passages as they are cautelously laid down, and compassed round with many fair expressions of affection to the Supreme Powers, that they might pass without discovery, and be the sooner swallowed by unwary men: so by his followers (who are exceeding wise in their generations) have they been hidden and concealed with all art that may be. For though they build their dangerous Doctrines upon his foundation, and toss this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, this ball of discord and dissension from one hand to another; yet do they very cunningly conceal their Author, and never use his name to confirm their Tenets. And this they do upon this reason, that if their Doctrine give offence unto Christian Princes, and any of their Pamphlets be to feel the fire, or otherwise come under any public censure, (as not long since happened to Paraeus) the Patron of their Sect might escape untouched, and his authority remain unquestioned, to give new life unto their hopes at another time. In which respects, and withal seeing that the heads of this monstrous Hydra of sedition do grow the faster for the cutting, and that the lopping off the Branches keeps the trunk the fresher; I shall pass by the petit Pamphleteers of these times, and strike directly at the head; and without meddling with the boughs or branches, will lay my Axe immediately to the root of the tree, and bring the first Author of these factious and Antimonarchical Principles (which have so long disturbed the peace of Christendom) to a public trial. A dangerous and invidious undertaking I must needs confess; but for my Countries and the Truths sake, I will venture on it: and in pursuance of the same will first lay down the doctrine of Obedience as by him delivered, which I shall faithfully translate without gloss or descant; and next compare his Doctrine with our present practice, noting wherein his Scholars have forsaken their Master, with application unto those who do most admire him: and finally I shall discover and remove that Stumbling-block which he hath cunningly laid before us, (but hid so secretly that it can hardly be discerned) at which so many a man hath stumbled, both to the breaking of his own neck and his neighbours too. This is the race that I am to run; the prize I aim at is no other, then for as much as in me lieth to do good to all men, to those especially who think themselves to be of the household of Faith. And therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Let us on in God's Name.  
" 2. Subditorum erga suos Magistratus Officium primum est, 
Calvin. Instit. l. 4. c. 20. sect. 22.  de eorum functione quàm honorificentissimè sentire, etc. The first duty of the Subjects towards their Magistrates, is to think wondrous honourably of their place and function, which they acknowledge to be a jurisdiction delegated by Almighty God; and therefore are by consequence to respect and reverence them, as the Ministers and Deputies of God. For some there are, who very dutifully do behave themselves toward their Magistrates, and would have all men do the like, because they think it most expedient for the Commonwealth, and yet esteem no otherwise of them then of some necessary evils which they cannot want. But St. Peter looks for more than this, 
1 Pet. 2. 17.  when he commandeth us to honour the King; and so doth Solomon also where he requires us to fear God and the King. 
Prov. 24. 21.  For the first under the the term of honouring, comprehends a good esteem, a fair opinion; the other joining God and the King together, shows plainly that in the person of a King there is a ray of sacred majesty. And that of Paul is richly worth our observation, where he commands us to obey, not for wrath only, 
Rom. 13. 5.  but for conscience sake. By which he means, that Subjects are not only to contain themselves within the bounds of their obedience, for fear they should incur the anger and displeasure of their Prince or Governor (as men submit themselves to an armed enemy, whom they see ready to chastise them, if they should resist); but also to persuade themselves that the expressions of their duties which they make to them, are made indeed to God himself, from whom what ever power they have is devolved upon them. Nor speak I of the men themselves, as if the vizard of authority were enough to hid either their follies or their sloth, on their lusts or cruelties, or gain the name of virtues to their filthiest vices, but that the function is so venerable and so full of honour, that they who execute the same and bear rule over us, are to be worthily esteemed and reverenced for their Office sake.  
" The second duty of the Subjects doth arise from this, 
SECT. 23.  which is that we express the reverence and respect which we own unto them by the actions of obedience; whether it be in yielding obedience to their Laws, or in paying tributes, or undergoing such public services and burdens, as do relate unto the preservation of the public, or executing such commands as are laid upon us. Let every soul (saith Paul) be subject to the higher powers; 
Rom. 13. 1.  for he that doth resist the power resists the ordinance of God. Put them in mind (saith he to Titus) to be subject to Principalities, 
Tit. 3. 1.  and powers, to obey Magistrates, and to be ready to every good work. And Peter thus, Submit yourselves to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake, 
1 Pet. 2. 13.  whether it be to the King▪ as Supreme, or unto Governors as to those which are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well. And to the end the subject may not think that it is sufficient to counterfeit or pretend obedience in the outward show, but to perform it truly and sincerely from the very heart, Paul adds that we commend the health and flourishing estate of those under whom we live, 
1 Tim. 2. 1.  in our prayers to God. I exhort (saith he) that first of all supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men; for Kings, and for all that are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty: Let no man here deceive himself. For seeing the Magistrate cannot be resisted, but that God is resisted also; though the unarmed Magistrate may possibly be contemned and slighted without fear of punishment, yet God is armed sufficiently to revenge those insolences, which are thus offered to himself in them. Now under this obedience, I also do include that moderation and discretion, which private persons ought to have and to impose upon themselves as a rule or law, that so they neither intermeddle in affairs of State, nor invade the office of the Magistrate, nor put themselves on any public undertake; if any thing be amiss in the public Government, which stands in need of Reformation, it appertains not unto them to be tumultuously active in it, or to put their hands unto the work, whose hands are tied (and to be tied) on all such occasions; but that they make it known unto the Magistrate, whose hands are only left at liberty to effect the same. My meaning is, that they do nothing uncommanded. For when the power or precept of the Governor doth intervene, they are then armed with just authority, and may do accordingly. For as the Princes Privy Council are said to be his Ears, and Eyes, so those inferior Ministers, by whom he executeth his commands or mandates, are not unfitly called his Hands."  
" 3. The Magistrate being such as he ought to be, 
SECT. 24.  and as before we have described him, that is to say, The Father of the Country, the Shepherd of his people, the preserver of the public peace, the great distributer of justice, and the avenger of the innocent; he must be somewhat more than mad who is not pleased with such a Government. But seeing that all Ages do afford examples of negligent and slothful Princes, who have no care at all of the public safety; of others who are so intent of their private profit, as to make markets of all laws and privileges, and to expose their justice and their favours both unto open sale: of some who drain their people's purses to no other end, but to maintain a vain and wasteful prodigality, and some who spend their time in nothing more, then either the rifling of the subjects houses, the deflowering of their wives and daughters, or in the slaughter of the innocent: that these should be received for Princes, and their commands obeyed at all, even in lawful matters, is such a thing, as some will hardly be persuaded to consent unto. For where men find so much unworthiness, and such filthy facts, as do not only misbecome a Magistrate, but a private person; when they see no resemblance of that Image of God, which ought to shine most brightly in a Christian Magistrate; when they behold no tract nor footstep of such a Minister of Gods, as is ordained for the encouragement and praise of those that do well, and for the punishment of those that are evil doers: they take him not for such a Governor whose office and authority is extolled so highly in the Scriptures. And to say truth, it hath been always naturally implanted in the souls of men, not more to love and reverence a just virtuous Prince, then to abominate and detest an ungodly Tyrant.  
" But if we look into God's Book, 
SECT. 25.  we shall there be taught not only to submit ourselves to the command of those Princes, who faithfully and as they ought do discharge their office; but of all those who are advanced unto the highest place of Government, though they do nothing less than perform their duties. For though the Magistrate be one of the greatest blessings given by God for the good of mankind; and that he hath confined the Magistrate within certain limits: yet he declares, that whatsoever they are they do receive their power from no hand but his▪ that if they principally do intent the public good, they are the greatest testimonies and examples of his goodness to us; if they prove insolent and unjust, they are the executioners of his wrath and judgement for the sins of the people; that all are equally invested with that sacred Majesty wherewith he hath apparelled the most lawful powers. I shall proceed no further in this present business, till I have made some proof of that which is said before. Not that I mean to spend my time in the proof of this, that a wicked King is one of God's curses on the earth: for besides that there is none who gainsay the same, we should say no more in this of Kings, then of the Thief that steals thy goods, or the Adulterer that defiles thy marriage bed, or the Murderer that seeks thy life, all which are reckoned for God's curses in the holy Scripture. The point we purpose to make proof of, goeth not down so easily; that is to say, That in the vilest men, and most unworthy of all honour, if they be once advanced to the public government, there doth reside that excellent and divine authority, which God hath given in holy Scripture to those who are the Ministers of his heavenly justice: who therefore are to be reverenced by the subject, for as much as doth concern them in the way of their public duties, with as much honour and obedience, as they would reverence the best King, were he given unto them.  
" And first the reader must take notice of the especial Act and Providence of Almighty God, 
SECT. 26.  (not without cause so oft remembered in the Scriptures) in disposing Kingdoms, and setting up such Kings as to him seems best. 
Dan. 2. 21, 37.  The Lord (saith Daniel) changeth the times and the seasons; he removeth Kings, and setteth up Kings. And in another place, That the living may know that the most High ruleth in the Kingdoms of men, and giveth them to whomsoever he will. Which kind of sentences as they are very frequent in the Scriptures, so is that prophesy most plentiful and abundant in them. No man is ignorant that Nabuchadnezzar who destroyed Jerusalem, was a great spoiler and oppressor, yet the Lord tells us by Ezechiel, that he had given unto him the land of Egypt, for the good service he had done in laying it wast on his commandment. And Daniel said unto him thus; 
Dan. 2. 37.  Thou O King art a King of Kings, for the God of Heaven hath given thee a Kingdom, power and strength and glory; And wheresoever the children of men dwell, the beasts of the field, and the fowls of heaven hath he given into thy hand, and hath made thee Ruler over them all. Again to Belshazzer his son, 
Dan▪ 5. 18.  The most high God gave unto Nabuchadnezzar thy father a Kingdom, and majesty and glory and honour; and for the majesty that he gave him, all people, nations, and languages trembled and feared before him. Now when we hear that Kings are placed over us by God, let us be pleased to call to mind those several precepts to fear and honour them, which God hath given us in his Book; holding the vilest Tyrant in as high account, as God hath graciously vouchsafed to estate him in. When Samuel told the people of the house of Israel what they should suffer from their King, he expressed it thus, 
1 Sam. 8. 11.  This will be the manner of the King which shall reign over you, he will take your sons and appoint them for himself, for his Chariots, and to be his Horsemen, and some shall r●n before his Chariots; And he will appoint him Captains over thousands, and Captains over fifties, and will set them to ear his ground and to reap his harvest, and to make his instruments of war, and instruments of his Chariots; And he will take your daughters to be his Confectionaries, and to be Co●ks, and to be Bakers; And he will take your fields, and your Vineyards, and your Olive-yards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants; And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your Vineyards, and give to his Officers, and to his Servants; And he will take your men-servants, and your maidservants, and your goodliest young men and your Asses, and put them to his work; He will take the tenth of your sheep, and ye shall be his Servants. Assuredly their Kings could not do this lawfully, whom God had otherwise instructed in the Book of the Law: but it is therefore called Jus Regis, the right of Kings upon the subject, which of necessity the Subjects were to submit unto, and not to make the least resistance. As if the Prophet had thus said, So far shall the licentiousness of your Kings extend itself, which you shall have no power to restrain or remedy, to whom there shall be nothing left but to receive the intimation of their pleasures, and fulfil the same.  
" But most remarkable is that place in the Prophet Jeremy, 
SECT. 27.  which (though it be somewhat of the longest) I will here put down, because it doth so plainly state the present question. 
Jer. 27. 6.  I have made the earth (saith the Lord) the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power and by my outstretched Arm, and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me; And now have▪ I given all these lands into the hand of Nabuchadnezzar King of Babylon my servant, and the beasts of the field have I given him also to serve him; And all Nations shall serve him, and his son, and his son's son, until the very time of his land come; And it shall come to pass that the Nation and Kingdom which will not serve the same Nabuchadnezzar King of Babylon, and that will not put their neck under the y●ke of the King of Babylon, that Nation will I punish, saith the Lord, with the sword, and with the famine, and with the pestilence; Wherefore serve the King of Babylon, and live. We see by this how great a measure of obedience was required by God towards that fierce and cruel Tyrant, only because he was advanced to the Kingly throne, and did by consequence participate of that Regal majesty, which is not to be violated without grievous sin. Let us therefore have this always in our mind and before our eyes, that by the same decree of God, on which the power of Kings is constituted, the very wickedest Princes are established: and let not such seditious thoughts be admitted by us, that is to say, that we must deal with Kings not otherwise then they do deserve; and that it is no right nor reason, that we should show ourselves obedient subjects unto him, who doth not mutually perform the duty of a King to us."  
" 4. It is a poor objection which some men have made, 
SECT. 28.  viz. that that command was only proper to the Israelites; for mark upon what grounds the command was given. I have given, saith he, the Kingdom unto Nabuchadnezzar, wherefore serve him, and ye shall live: and thereupon it needs must follow, that upon whomsoever God bestows a Kingdom, to whom we must address our serurce; and that assoon as God hath raised any to the Regal Throne, he doth sufficiently declare his will to be, that he would have that man to reign over us. Some general testimonies of this truth are in holy Scripture; 
Prov. 24. 2▪  For thus saith SOLOMON, For the transgression of a land many are the Princes thereof; 
Job 12. 18.  and JOB, He looseth the band of Kings, and girdeth their loins with a Girdle. Which if confessed, there is no remedy at all, but we must serve those Kings, if we mean to live. There is another text in the Prophet jeremy, by which the people are commanded, 
Jer. 29. 7.  to seek the peace of Babylon, whither God had caused them to be carried away captive, and to pray unto the Lord for it, for in the peace thereof was their peace to be. Behold the Israelites being despoiled of their estates, driven from their houses, carried into exile, and plunged in a most miserable thraldom, are yet required to pray for the prosperity of the Conqueror: not only as we are commanded in another place to pray for them that persecute us, but that his Empire might continue in peace and safety, that they themselves might quietly enjoy the protection of it. Thus David being appointed King by the Lords own Ordinance, and anointed with his holy Oil, when undeservedly he was persecuted and pursued by Saul, would not give way that any corporal hurt should be done to that sacred person, whom God had raised unto the Kingdom. 
1 Sam. 24. 6.  The Lord forbidden, saith he, that I should do this thing unto my Master the Lords anointed, to stretch forth my hand against him, seeing he is the Anointed of the Lord. Again, But mine eye spared thee, a●d I said, I will not put forth my hand against my Lord, for he is the Lords Anointed. And again, who can stretch forth his hand against the Lords Anointed, and be guiltless? As the Lord liveth, the Lord shall smite him, or his day shall come to die, or he shall descend into battle and perish. The Lord forbidden that I should stretch my hand against the Lords Anointed.  
" This reverence and dutiful regard we ought to carry towards our Governors, 
SECT. 29.  to the very end, however they may chance to prove. Which therefore I repeat the oftener, that we may learn not to inquire too narrowly into the men, but to rest ourselves content with this, that they sustain that place or person by the Lord's appointment, in which he hath imprinted and ingraved a most inviolable character of sacred Majesty. But some will say, that Rulers own a mutual duty to their Subjects. That hath been formerly confessed: from which if any should infer, that no obedience must be yielded but to their just and legal power, he were a very sorry disputant. Husband's are bound in mutual bonds unto their Wives, and so are Parents to their Children. Suppose that both neglect their duties, that Parents who are prohibited by God to provoke their Children unto wrath, be so untractable and harsh to them, that they do grieve them above measure with continual sourness; and that husbands who are commanded to love their wives, and to give honour to them as the weaker vessel, should use them with contempt and scorn: should therefore children be the less obedient to their Parents, or wives less dutiful to their husbands? We see the contrary, that they are subject to them though both lewd and froward. Since therefore nothing doth concern us more, then that we trouble not ourselves with looking into the defects of other men, but carefully endeavour to perform those duties which do belong unto ourselves; more specially ought they to observe this rule, who live under the authority and power of others. Wherefore if we are inhumanely handled by a cruel Prince, or by a covetous and luxurious Prince despoiled and rifled; if by a slothful one neglected, or vexed for our Religion by a lewd and wicked: let us look back upon our sins, which God most commonly correcteth with this kind of scourges; the thought whereof will humble us, and keep down the impatience of our angry spirits. Let us consider with ourselves, that it appertains not unto us to redress these mischiefs; that all which doth belong to us is to cry to God, in whose hands are the hearts of Kings, 
Prov. 21. 1.  and he turneth them whither soever he will. He is that God which standeth in the Congregation of the mighty, and judgeth amongst the Gods: before whose face all Kings shall fall and be confounded, and all the Judges ●f the earth who do not reverence his CHRIST, but make unjust laws to oppress the poor, and offer violence to the man of low condion, and make a spoil of Widows, and a prey of Orphans.  
" And here we may aswell behold his goodness, 
SECT. 30.  as his power and providence. For sometimes he doth raise Avengers from amongst his servants, and furnisheth them with power sufficient aswell to execute vengeance on such wicked Rulers, as to redeem his people so unjustly vexed, from the house of bondage: and sometimes useth to that end, the fierce wrath of others, who think of nothing less than to serve his turn. Thus he redeemed his people Israel from the tyranny of Pharaoh, by the hand of Moses; from Cushan K●ng of Syria, by Othoniel; from other thraldoms by some other of their Kings and Judges. Thus did he ●ame the pride of Tyre by the arms of Egypt, the insolence of Egypt by the Assyrians, the fierceness of Assyria by the Chaldeans, the confidence of Babylon by the Medes and Persians, after that Cyrus had before subdued the Medes. Thus did he sometimes punish the ingratitude of the Kings of Judah and Israel, and that ungodly contumacy which they carried towards him, notwithstanding all his benefits conferred upon them, by the Assyrians first, the Babylonians after. But we must know that though these several instruments did the self same work, yet they proceeded not in the self same motives. For the first sort being thereto lawfully authorized and called by Almighty God, by taking up Arms against their Kings, did nothing less t●●n violate that sacred Majesty, which is inherent in a King by God's holy Ordinance, but being armed from heaven, did only regulate and chastise the lesser power by the help of the greater; as Princes use sometimes to correct their Nobles. The later sort, though guided by the hand of God as to him seemed best, so that they did unknowingly effect what he had to do, intended only the pursuit of their own designs."  " 
5. But whatsoever their designs and intentions were, 
SECT. 31.  the Lord did justly use them to effect his business, when by their means he broke the bloody Sceptres of those insolent Kings, and overthrew their wicked and tyrannical Empires. Hear this ye Princes, and be terrified at the hearing of it. But let not this afford the least encouragement unto the subject, to violate or despise the authority of the Magistrate, which God hath filled so full of majesty, and fortified by so many Edicts from the Court of Heaven, though sometimes an unworthy person doth enjoy the same, and such a one as doth dishonour it by his filthy life. Nor may we think because the punishment of licentious Princes doth belong to God, that presently this power of executing vengeance is devolved on us▪ to whom no other precept hath been given by God, but only to obey, and suffer. 
De privatis hominibus semper loquor. Nam si qui nunc sint populares magistratus ad moderandum Regum ●libidinem constituti (quales olim erant, qui Lacedaemoniis Regibus oppositi erant Ephori; aut Romanis Consulibus Tribuni Plebis; aut Atheniensium Senatui Demarchi: & qua etiam fortè potestate, ut nunc res habent, funguntur in singulis Regnis tres Ordines, quum primarios conventus peragunt): adeo illos ferocienti Regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto, ut si Regibus impotenter grassantibus, & humili plebeculae insultantibus conniveant, eorum dissimulationem nefariâ perfidiâ non carere affirmem; quia populi libertatem cujus se Dei Ordinatione tutores positos norunt, fraudulenter produnt.  But still I must be understood of private persons. For if there be now any Popular Officers, ordained to moderate the licentiousness of Kings, (such as the Ephori of old set up against the Kings of Sparta, the Tribunes of the people against the Roman Consuls, and the Demarchi against the Athenian Senate; and with which power, perhaps, as the world now goes, the three Estates are furnished in each several Kingdom, when they are solemnly assembled): so far am I from hindering them from putting a restraint on the exorbitant power of Kings, as their Office binds them, that I conceive them guilty rather of a perfidious dissimulation, if they con●ive at Kings when they play the Tyrants, or wantonly insult on the common people; in that they treacherously betray the subjects Liberty, of which they know they were made guardians by Gods own Ordinance and appointment.  
" But this must always be excepted, in the obedience which we have determined to be due to the commands of our Governors, and first of all to be observed, that it draw us not from that obedience which is due to him, to whose will all the commands of Kings must be subordinate, to whose decrees their strongest mandates must give place, and before whose Majesty they are bound to lay down their Sceptres. For how preposterous were it to incur his anger, by our compliance with those men, whom we are bound no otherwise to obey, then for his sake only? The Lord is King of Kings, who when he speaks, is to be heard for all, and above them all. We must be subject to those men who have rule over us, but in him alone. If against him they do command us any thing, it is to be of none account. Nor in such cases is the dignity of the Magistrate to be stood upon, to which no injury is done, if in regard of the more eminent and supreme power of God, it be restrained within its bounds. 
Dan. 6. 22.  In this respect Daniel denied that he had trespassed any thing against the King, in not obeying his profane and ungodly Edict, because the King had gone beyond his proper limits, and being not only injurious against men, but lifting up his horns against God himself, had first deprived himself of all Authority. The Israelites are condemned on the other side, for being so ready to obey their King, in a wicked action, when to ingratiate themselves with Jeroboam, who had newly made the Golden Calves, they left the Temple of the Lord, and betook themselves to a new superstitious worship. And when their Children and posterity with the like facility applied themselves unto the humours of their wicked Kings, the Prophet doth severely rebuke them for it. So little praise doth that pretence of modesty deserve to have, with which some Court-Parasites do disguise themselves and abuse the simple, affirming it to be a crime not to yield obedience to any thing that King's command: as if God either had resigned all his rights and interess into the hands of mortal men, when he made them Rulers over others; or that the greatest earthly power were a jot diminished, by being subjected to its Author, before whom all the powers of heaven do trembling supplicate. I know that great and imminent danger may befall those men, who dare give entertainment to so brave a constancy; considering with what indignation Kings do take the matter, when they once see themselves neglected, whose indignation is as the messenger of death, saith the wise man Solomon. But when we hear this Proclamation made by the heavenly Crier, 
Act. 5. 29.  that we ought to obey God rather than men; let this consideration be a comfort to us, that then we yield that obedience unto God which he looks for from us, when we rather choose to suffer any thing, then to deviate from the way of godliness. And lest our hearts should fail us in so great a business, S. Paul subjoins another motive, 
1 Cor. 7. 23.  that being bought by Christ at so great a price; we should not re-inthral ourselves to the lusts of men, much less addict ourselves to the works of wickedness."  
6. These are the very words of Calvin, from which his followers and Disciples most extremely differ both in their doctrine, and their practice. First, for their practice, CALVIN requires that we should reverence and respect the Magistrate for his Office sake 
a Sect. 22. ; and that we entertain no other than a fair esteem, an honourable opinion both of their actions, and their Counsels. His followers (like filthy dreamers as they are) do not only despise dominion 
b Judas 8. , but speak evil of dignities; that is to say, they neither reverence the persons of their Supreme Magistrate, nor regard their Office: and are so far from cherishing a good opinion of those higher powers to which the Lord hath made them subject, that their hearts imagine mischief against them all the day long; and though they see no cause to condemn their actions, they will be sure enough to misconstrue the end. CALVIN requires that we should manifest the reverence and respect we bear them by the outward actions of obedience 
c Sect. 23. ; and to the end, that this obedience should proceed from the very heart and not to be counterfeit and false, he adds that we commend their health and flourishing estate in our prayers to God 
d Ibid. . His Followers study nothing more than to disobey them, in every one of those particulars which their Master speaks of, refusing to obey their laws, and to pay them tribute, and to undergo such services and burdens as are laid upon them in reference to the public safety, & spare not as occasion serves to manifest the disaffection of their hearts, by such outward acts as disobedience and disloyalty can suggest unto them: and a●e so far from praying for them, that many times they pray against them, blaspheming God because he will not curse the King, and making that which they call Prayer so dangerous and lewd a libel, that their very prayers are turned to sin. CALVIN requires such moderation in the subject, that they neither intermeddle in affairs of State, nor invade the Office of the Magistrate; and that if any thing be amiss in the public Government which stands in need of Reformation, they presume not to put their hands unto the work, or be tumultuously active in it 
e Sect. 23. . His followers will not trust the Magistrates in the performance of their own Office, but are all Counsellors and Statesmen; and think that nothing is done well, but what is done as they would have it, and by their own hands too, none other. Whether things be amiss or not, they must needs be doing. Not by presenting their desires for a Reformation, and making known the fault (if such fault there be) to their Supreme Magistrates, which was the way their Master taught them; but by raising tumults to affright them: The attempt of the French Hugonots at Ambois upon Charles the ninth, and the two tumults at Edinburgh, the one about the year 1593. against the person of King James, and the other in the year 1637. against the Ministers of King Charles, will not be forgotten whilst Calvin and his Institutions are in print amongst us. CALVIN requires that we should yield obedience not only to such Kings and Princes, which faithfully and as they ought do discharge their Office, but even to all those also which do nothing less than perform their duties 
f Sect. 25. , not only to the meek and gentle, but even unto the fiercest and most cruel Tyrant, if any such be raised by God to the Kingly throne 
g Sect. 27. . His followers resolve not to yield obedience to their Kings and Princes, though they can charge them with no fault but their too much lenity; unless it be that they have caused them to surfeit upon peace and plenty, or that the people grew too rich, and lived too happily, and drove too great a Trade, under their command: and are so far from yielding obedience to a Tyrant, or a severer and cruel Prince, call him which you will, that neither the innocent minority of Charles the ninth, nor the moderate Government of the Duchess of Parma, in the Netherlands; nor the mild peaceable temper of King James when he reigned in Scotland, could save them from their insolences and insurrections. Finally CALVIN doth declare that though we be inhumanely handled by a cruel Prince, or by a covetous and luxurious Prince despoiled and rifled; though by a slothful one neglected, or vexed for our Religion by a lewd and wicked, yet it pertains not unto us to redress these mischiefs; that all the remedy that we have is to cry to God 
h Sect. 29. , and till God takes the work in hand, to obey and suffer 
i Sect. 31. : and absolutely condemns those seditious thoughts, (which some men are too apt to harbour) that we must deal with Kings not otherwise then they shall deserve 
k Sect. 27. : His Followers, if they think themselves oppressed, though indeed they are not; or that Religion is in danger, though indeed it be not; or the honour of the State neglected, though never of so much repute, nor so bravely managed: will not descend so low as to cry to God, or be so pusillanimous and so poorly minded, as only to obey and suffer (that were a weakness fit for none but the primitive Christians); but take the sword into their hands (be it right or wrong) to force their Kings to come unto a reckoning with them, as if they would have reparation from them for their former sufferings, and could have reparation no way but that. And as for dealing with their Kings not otherwise then they do deserve, although the maxim be unsafe, and the very thought thereof seditious, as their Master tells them; would they would hold themselves to that, which had they done, so many Kings in Christendom had not been so unjustly handled, driven from their Palaces, expelled their Cities, rob of their Fortresses and Revenues, assaulted in the open fields, and forced sometimes to change both their Counsel and their Guards, (the ordinary practice by the Hugonots in France, the Presbyterians in Scotland, the Calvinists in the Netherlands, and indeed where not?) had they been dealt withal no otherwise then they deserved.  
7. Next let us look upon them in their points of doctrine, and we shall find the Scholars and their Master at a greater distance, then before we saw them at in point of practice. CALVIN determines very sound that Kings have their authority from none but God, non nisi a se habere imperium 
l Sect. 25. , that the supreme Magistracy is a jurisdiction devolved from God upon the person of the Magistrate or delegata a Deo jurisdictio 
m Sect. 22. ; that it is the singular work or act of God to dispose of Kingdoms, and to set up such Kings as to him seems meet, which he calls Singularem Dei actionem in distribuendis Regnis, statuendisque QUOS ILLI VISUM FVERIT REGIBUS 
n Sect. 26. , and finally that in every King or Supreme Governor, there is inviolabilis majestas, an indelible character of Majestia imprinted by the hand of God. His Scholars tell us that Kings are only creatures of the people's making; and that whatever power they have, is derived from them. The Observator, and the Fuller Answer unto Dr. Fern, and almost all our later Scribblers do resolve it so. They tell us secondly, (which must needs follow from the former) that the people have the sole power of disposing Kingdoms, and setting up such Kings as they list themselves; and being so set up, that there is no more Majesty, no brighter beam of God's divinity in them, then in other men. Buchannan so affirms for certain, Populo jus est, imperium cui velit deferat 
o Buchannan de jure regni. ; and confidently reckoneth those reverend attributes of Majesty and Highness, which usually are given to Kings and Princes, inter soloecismos & barbarismos Aulicos 
p Id. in Epist. ad , amongst the Solecisms and absurdities of Prince's Courts. CALVIN determines very Oxthodoxly, that though the King degenerate and become a tyrant, though he infringe the subjects liberties, and invade their fortunes, persecute them for their piety, and neglect their safety, and be besides a vicious and libidinous person; yet still his Subjects are to look upon him, in all things which pertain to their public duties, with as much honour and obedience, as they would do the justest and most virtuous Prince that was ever given unto a people. Eadem in reverentia & dignatione habendum, quantum ad publicam obedientiam attinet, qua optimum Regem si dare●ur habituri essent 
q Sect. 25. . His Scholars sing another song, and use all arts imaginable to excite the people to rise against them and destroy them. The Author of that scandalous and dangerous Dialogue, entitled Eusebius Philadelphus doth expressly say, that of all good actions the murder of a Tyrant is most commendable 
r Euseb Philadelph. Dial. . Buchannan accounts it a defect in Polities, proemia eorum interfectoribus non decerni 
s Buchannan de jure regni. ; that public honours and rewards are not propounded unto such as shall kill a Tyrant: and some late Pamphleteers conclude it lawful to rebel in the case of tyranny, because forsooth, If a King exercising tyranny over his subjects may not be resisted, (that is to say, if the subject may not take up Arms against him) he and his followers may destroy the Kingdom. And now we are fallen upon the business of resistance, CALVIN allows of no case (for aught I can see) in which the Subject lawfully may resist the Sovereign; quandoquidem resisti magistratui non potest quin simul resistatur Deo 
t Sect. 23. , for as much as the Magistrate cannot be resisted, but that God is resisted also: and reckoning up those several pressures whereof Samuel spoke unto the Jews, and which he calls jus Regis, as himself translates it, he concludes at last, cui parere ipsi necesse esset, nec obsistere liceret 
u Sect. ●6. , that no resistance must be made on the Subjects part, though Kings entrench as much upon them, both in their liberties and properties, as the Prophet speaks of. His Scholars are grown wiser, and instruct us otherwise. Paraeus saith, that if the King assault our persons, or endeavour to break into our houses, we may as lawfully resist him, as we would do a Thief or Robber on the like occasions 
x Paraeus in Rom. cap. 13. . And our new Masters have found out many other Cases in which the Subject may resist, and which is more than so, is bound to do it, as namely in his own behalf, and in God's behalf, in behalf of his Country, and in behalf of the laws; and in so many more behalves, that they have turned most Christian Kings out of half their Kingdoms.  
But to go on, CALVIN determines very rightly, that notwithstanding any contract made or supposed to be made between a King and his people, yet if the King do break his Covenants and oppress the subject, the subject can no more pretend to be discharged of his Allegiance, than the wife may lawfully divorce herself from a froward husband; or children throw aside that natural duty which they own their Parents, because their Parents are unkind, and it may be cruel. Those which do otherwise conclude from the foresaid contract, he calls insulsos ratio cinatores 
y Sect. 29. , but sorry and unsavoury disputants: and reckoneth it for a seditious imagination, that we must deal no otherwise with Kings then they do deserve, nec aequum esse ut subditos einos praestemus, qui vicissim Regem nobis non se praestet 
z Sect. 27. , or to imagine that it is neither sense nor reason that we should show ourselves obedient subjects unto him, who doth not mutually perform the duty of a King to us. His Scholars are grown able to teach their Master a new lesson, and would tell him, if he were alive, that there is a mutual contract between King and Subjects; and if he break the Covenant, he forfeiteth the benefit of the Agreement, and he not performing the duty of a King, they are released from the duty of subjects. As contrary to their Master's Tenet as black to white; and yet some late Pamphlets press no doctrine with such strength and eagerness, as they have done this: Nor have the Pulpits spared to publish it to their cheated Auditories, as a new Article of faith, that if the Ruler perform not his duty, the contract is dissolved, and the people are at liberty to right themselves. What excellent uses have been raised from this dangerous doctrine, as many Kings of Christendom have felt already, so posterity will have cause to lament the mischiefs which it will bring into the world in succeeding Ages. Finally CALVIN hath determined, and ex●eeding piously, that if the Magistrate command us any thing which is contrary to the Will and Word of God, we must observe S. Peter's rule, and rather choose to obey God, than men: and that withal we must prepare ourselves to endure such punishments as the offended Magistrate shall inflict upon us, for the said refusal; Et quicquid potius perpeti quam a veritate defiectere 
a Sect. 32. , and rather suffer any torments, then forsake the way of God's Commandments. The Magistrate, as it seems by him, must at all times be honoured by us, either in our active obedience, or in our passive; if we refuse to do his will, we must be content to suffer for it. His Scholars are too wise to submit to that, and are so far from suffering for the testimony of the Gospel and a good conscience, that they take care to teach the people that it is lawful to rebel in behalf of God, to preserve the true religion when it is in danger (or when they think it is in danger) by force of Arms, and to procure the peace of Jerusalem by the destruction of Babylon. Which being so, the difference being so great and irreconcilable between the Followers and their leader in the point of practice, between the Master and the Scholars in the points of doctrine: me thinks it were exceeding fit the man were either less admired, or better followed; that they who cry him up for the great Reformer, would either stand to all his Tenets, or be bound to none; that they would be so careful of the Church's peace, and their own salvation, as not to swallow down his errors in his points of discipline, and pass him by with a Magister non tenetur, when he doth preach obedience to them, and doth so solidly discourse of the powers of Government. 
b Tully Philip. 2.  Aut undique religionem [suam] tollant, aut usquequaque conservent, as Tully said of Antony in another case. But of this no more.  
9 Hitherto CALVIN hath done well, few better; of the Genevian Doctors none, ne unus quidem, not so much as one. But there's an herb which spoils the pottage, an HERB so venomous, that it is mors in olla unto them that taste it. The figs in the next basket are evil, 
jerem. 24.  very evil, not to be eaten, (as it is in the Prophet's words) they are so evil. In that before he did exceeding sound and judiciously lay down the doctrine of obedience unto Kings and Princes, and the unlawfulness of Subjects taking Arms against their Sovereign. In this to come he openeth a most dangerous gap to disobedience and rebellions in most States in Christendom, in which his name is either reverenced or his works esteemed of. For having fully pressed the points before delivered unto the conscience of the subject, and utterly disabled them from lifting up their hands against the Supreme Magistrate, or any occasion whatsoever: he shows them how to help themselves, and what course to take, for the asserting of their liberties, and the recovery of their rights, if the Prince invade them; by telling them that all he spoke before was of private persons 
c Sect. 31. , but that if there were any popular Officers, such as the Ephori of Sparta, the Tribunes of Rome, the Demarchi of Athens, ordained for the restraint of Kings, and Supreme Governors, it never was his meaning to include them in it. And such power he doth suppose to be in the three Estates of every Kingdom, when they are solemnly assembled; whom he condemns as guilty of perfidious dissimulation, and the betrayers of the Subject's liberties, whereof they are the proper and appointed Guardians, if they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants, or want only insult on the Common people. This is the gap through which rebellions and seditions have found so plausible a passage in the Christian world, to the dethroning of some Kings and Princes, the death of others. For through this gap, broke in those dangerous and seditious doctrines, that the inferior Magistrates are ordained by God, and not appointed by the King, or the Supreme Powers; that being so ordained by God, they are by him enabled to compel the King to rule according unto justice and the laws established; that if the King be refractory and and unreclaimable, they are to call him to account, and to provide for the safety of the Commonwealth by all ways and means which may conduce unto the preservation of it: and finally (which is the darling doctrine of these later times) that there is a mixture in all Governments, and that the three Estates convened in Parliament (or by what other name so ever we do call their meeting) are not subordinate to the King, but coordinate with him; and have not only a supplemental power, to supply what is defective in him, but a coercive also to restrain his Actions, & a corrective too to reform his Errors. But this I give you now in the generals only; hereafter you shall see it more particularly, and every Author cited in his own words for the proof hereof. Many of which as they did live in calvin's time, and by their writings gave great scandal to all sovereign Princes, but more as to the progress of the Reformation; so could not CALVIN choose but be made acquainted with the effects and consequences of his dangerous principles. Which since he never did retract, upon the sight of those seditious Pamphlets, and worse than those, those bloody tumults and rebellions which ensued upon it; but let it stand unaltered to his dying day: is a clear argument to me, that this passage fell not from his pen by chance, but was laid of purpose as a Stumbling-block in the Subjects way, to make him fall in the performance of his Christian duty both to God and man. For though the Book of Institutions had been often printed in his life time, and received many alterations and additions (as being enlarged from a small Octavo, of not above 29 sheets, to a large folio of 160) yet this particular passage still remained unchanged, and hath continued as it is from the first Edition of it, which was in the year 1536. not long after his first coming to Geneva.  
10. But to proceed in our design. What fruits these dangerous doctrines have produced amongst us, we have seen too plainly; and we may see as plainly, if we be not blind, through what gap these doctrines entered, on what foundation they were built, and unto whose authority we stand indebted for all those miseries and calamities which are fallen upon us. Yet to say truth, the man desired to be concealed, and not reputed for the Author of such strange conclusions which have resulted from his principles: and therefore lays it down with great art and caution. Si qui, and Fortè, and ut nunc res habent, that is to say, Perhaps, and as the world now goes, and if there be such Officers as have been formerly, are the three disguises, which he hath masked himself and the point withal, that he might pass away unseen. And if there be such Officers as perhaps there are, or that the world goes here as it did at Sparta, or in the States of Rome and Athens; as perhaps it doth; or that the three Estates, of each several Kingdom have the same authority in them as the Ephori, the Demarchi, and the Tribunes had, as perhaps they have; the Subject is no doubt in a good condition, as good a man as the best Monarch of them all. But if the Ephori, the Demarchi and the Tribunes, were not appointed at the first for the restiaint and regulating of the Supreme Powers, as indeed they were not; and if the three Estates in each several Kingdom have not that authority, which the Ephori, and the Tribunes did in fine usurp, and the Demarchi are supposed to have, as indeed they have not; perhaps and peradventure will not serve the turn. The subject stands upon no better grounds, then before he did. Therefore to take away this stumbling-block and remove this rub, I shall propose and prove these three points ensuing. 1. That the Ephori, the Demarchi, and the Roman Tribunes were not instituted at the first, for those ends and purposes, which are supposed by the Author. 2. If they were instituted for those ends, yet the illation thereupon would be weak and childish, as it relates to Kings and Kingdoms; And 3. That the three Estates in each several Kingdom without all peradventures have no such authority, as the Author dreams of, and therefore of no power to control their King. Which if I clearly prove, as I hope I shall, I doubt not but to leave the cause in a better condition than I found it. And in the proof of these, the first point especially, if it be thought that I insist longer than I needed on the condition of the Spartan Ephori, the Roman Tribunes, and the Demarchi of Athens, and spend more cost upon it then the thing is worth; I must entreat the Reader to excuse me in it. I must first lay my grounds and make sure work there, before I go about my building: And being my design relates particularly to the information and instruction of the English Subject, I could not make my way unto it, but by a discovery of the means and Artifices, by which some petit popular Officers attained unto so great a mastery in the game of Government, as to give the Check unto their Kings. Which being premised once for all, I now proceed unto the proof of the points proposed, and having proved these points, I shall make an end. Haec tria cum docuero perorabo, in the Orator's language.   

CHAP. II. Of the Authority of Ephori in the State of Sparta; and that they were not instituted for the ends supposed by Calvin.  

(I) The Kings of Sparta absolute Monarches at the first.  
(TWO) Of the declining of the Regal power, and the condition of that State, when Lycurgus undertook to change the Government.  
(III) What power Lycurgus gave the Senate; and what was left unto the Kings.  
(IV) The Ephori appointed by the Kings of Sparta to ease themselves, and curb the Senate.  
(V) The blundering and mistakes of Joseph Scaliger about the first Institution of the Ephori.  
(VI) The Ephori from mean beginnings grew to great authority; and by what advantages.  
(VII) The power and influence which they had in the public Government.  
(VIII) By what degrees the Ephori encroached on the Spartan Kings.  
(IX) The insolences of the Ephori towards their Kings altered the State into a Tyranny.  
(X) The Spartan Kings stomach the insolency of the Ephori, and at last utterly destroy them.  
(IX) An application of the former passages to the point in hand.   
I. I Know it is conceived by some that the Kings of Sparta were but titulary 
a Unlawfulness of resistance, p. 90. , that they were little more than Subjects, at best of no more power and influence in the public Government, than the Duke of Venice at this day in that Republic. And to say truth, they were but little better in the latter times, (though not altogether so restrained) after Lycurgus first, and the Ephori afterwards, had by their power and practices entrenched upon them; and pared away so many of the fairest Jewels in the Regal Diadem. But ab initio non fuit sic, it was not so from the beginning: the Spartan Kings being at first as absolute Monarches as any other of those times, ubi addictius regnabantur 
b Tacit. Annal. , when men were most devoted to the will of Princes. For if we look into the ancient stories of the States of Greece, it will there be found, that at the return of the Heraclidae into Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Temenus, Ctesiphon, and Aristodemus, the sons of Aristomachus of the race of Hercules; Temenus possessed himself of Argos, Ctesiphon of Messene, and Aristodemus conquered the City and Dominion of Sparta; which, dying very shortly after, he left unto his two sons Eurysthenes, and Procles 
c Pausanias' in Lacon. l. 3. , with the authority and name of Kings. So that acquiring the estate by conquest, and claiming by no other Title then by that of Arms, there is no question to be made but that they governed in the way of absolute Monarches: it being not the guise of such as come in by conquest to covenant and capitulate with their Subjects, but to impose their will, for a law, upon them; In the first times, and in Dominion so acquired, Arbitria Principum pro legibus erant 
d Justin. hist. l. 1. , as we read in Justine. 'Tis true, the Royal Family was divided from the very first, into two Regal Stems or Branches, both honoured with the name of Kings, both ruling the Estate in common by their mutual Counsels; of which the eldest house was that of Agidae, so called from Agis, son and Successor unto Eurysthenes; the second that of the Eurypontidae, denominated from Eurypon, the third from Procles 
e Pausanias' l. 3. . It was appointed so to be by Aristodemus, confirmed by the Oracle of Apollo, and so continued till the subjugating of all Greece to Macedon. But this concludes no more against absolute Monarchy, then if it should be said on the like occasion, that the Roman Emperors were no Monarches, or that State no Monarchy, because Carus and Numerianus, Diocletian and Maximianus, Constantius and Maximinus ruled the same together; as after Valentinian and his Brother Valens, and the two sons of Valentinian and Theodosius did by their example. And so it seems it was conceived by Cleomenes, who having rooted out the Ephori, and being grown almost as absolute in the State of Sparta, as any of his Predecessors, caused his Brother Euclidas (upon the expiration of the Eurypontidae) to be made King with him 
f Plutarch. in Agis & Cleomen. : which certainly he would not have done, had he believed that the assuming of a partner would have made him less. For that the Spartan Kings were as absolute Monarches as any others of those times (when there was almost no form of Government in the world but that) doth appear by Plutarch, where speaking of the condition of that Government in the time of Eurypon (whom he calls Eurytion) he saith that it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
g Plutarch. Lycurgo. , sufficiently Monarchical, if it were not more. And hereto Aristotle doth agree, who styles the Government of Sparta under Charilaus; before whose times (by reason of the negligence and connivance of some former Kings) the people were become too headstrong to be kept in order, by the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
h Aristot. Polit. lib. 5. cap. 12. , the tyranny or absolute command of Charilaus in the State of Sparta.  
But whatsoever it was in the first foundation, it held not very long in so good condition. For Eurypon the Nephew of Procles, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
i Plutarch. in Lycurg. , affecting to be plausible and gracious with the common people, improvidently let lose the reigns of Government, and was the first that laid aside that sole and absolute power of a King; whereupon followed great disorder and distraction, which continued long. For the people finding themselves at liberty, became very bold and disobedient; some of the Kings which did succeed being hated to the very death, because they did endeavour the recovery of their old authority; others being forced to dissemble and wink at any thing, either in hope thereby to gain the love of the people, or because indeed they were not strong enough to rule them. And this did so increase the stomach of the dissolute and rebellious multitude, that Eunomus the Father of Lycurgus, being the fifth King from Procles, and the third from Eurypon, was slain amongst them in a tumult. At such a dear and costly rate did Eurypon procure the favour and good will of the rascal rabble; by which he purchased nothing but the loss of Royalty, besides the empty honour of having the second house of the Royal Family to be called by his name, the Eurypontidae. Things growing thus from bad to worse, and both the Kings and people waxing weary of that disorder and confusion which did reign amongst them; both parties cast their eyes upon Lycurgus, of whose integrity and wisdom they had conceived a great opinion. For the people finding that their Kings had nothing but the name and title, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and nothing else whereby they differed from the rest, sent many a several message to him to require his counsel: And on the other side, the Kings were as desirous that he should return (being then gone abroad to travel) in hope that the authority of his presence would bridle and restrain the people from their insolency and disobedience towards them. 
k Id. ibid.  But herein they were both deceived. For Lycurgus seeing how things stood, resolved to apply himself to neither party; but presently began to project and cast how he might change and alter the whole frame of Government: which to effect, he armed himself and his Associates, and possessed the marketplace, and so proceeded to the alteration which he meant to make. 
l Id. ibid. et in Agis & Cleomen.  Charilaus who was then King, being forced to fly for sanctuary to the Temple of Juno. But Plato saith there was another motive which induced him to attempt this change, which was the ill success the other Kings his kindred of the house of Hercules had found at Argos and Messene; where by degrees degenerating from a Monarchy unto a Tyranny, they were in a fair way 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to overthrow themselves, their subjects, and their whole estates. To prevent this at Sparta, which he dearly loved, and to preserve his Family and the State together, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
m P●at. Epist. 8. , he set up the authority of the Senate as the only medicine, to cure the miserable distemper which the State was in. So far, and somewhat further Plato; of which more anon.  
3. What the authority and power of this Senate was, we see best from Plutarch. 
n In Lycurgo.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. " In this change of State (saith he) which Lycurgus made, his chiefest alteration was in the constitution of a Senate, which he made to have a Regal power and equal authority with the Kings in matters of the greatest weight and importance; and was to be the healthful counterpoise of the whole body of the Commonwealth. The other State before was ever wavering, sometimes inclining to tyranny, when the Kings were too mighty, and sometimes to confusion, when the people did usurp authority: between which two, the Senate was ordained as the fittest medium to keep even the scale, and fortify the State of the Commonwealth. For taking sometimes the King's part, when it was needful to pull down the fury of the people; and sometimes holding with the people against the Kings, to bridle their tyrannical Government; they were the means that neither of the two did oppress the other." This Court or Senate had the supreme direction and command in all things of moment, which did concern the Commonwealth, both for peace and war; and had the highest jurisdiction and dernier resort, from which there could be no appeal: in which regard Pausasanias calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
o Pausanias' in Lacon. l. 3.  the sovereign Court of the Republic. It consisted of 28. Senators, all chosen out of the Nobility and chief men of the City; who together with the two Kings (who were allowed their voices in it) made up thirty in all; and unto these it did belong to call the assemblies of the people, to propound that to them which they thought convenient, and to dissolve them too when they saw occasion. 
p Plutarch. ibid.  But for the people so assembled, it was not lawful for them to propound any thing to be debated or determined, nor to deliver their opinion in the point proposed: there being nothing left to them, but to testify their assent to the propositions, which either by the Senate or the two Kings had been made unto them. So that whatever the Kings lost, the people got little by the alteration, being left out of all employment in affairs of State, and forced to yield obedience unto thirty Masters, whereas before they had but two. And as for the authority which remained unto the Kings, it consisted especially in the conducting of the Armies, and the supremacy in matters that concerned Religion (for this hath always gone along with the Kingly office). 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 
q Xenophon de Repub. Lacedamon.  For it was ordered by Lycurgus, that the King should offer sacrifice for the prospetity of the Commonwealth, when the necessity of their affairs did require the same, as one descended from the gods; that they should participate of the thing sacrificed when the gods were served, and have a pig of every litter, that they might never want a sacrifice, if upon any sudden accident the gods were to be advised withal. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. It also appertained to them to command the Armies, as oft as they were sent abroad on any military employment; and had a Pavilion allowed them at the public charge, for entertainment of such company as repaired unto them. In these two points the honour and authority of the Kings consisted principally, which Aristotle also hath observed. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
r Aristot. Politic. l. 3. c. 10. . Supremacy in Divine, command in Military matters, was all in which they differed from the other Senators; and this command (I mean in military matters) was both perpetual and hereditary, as the same Author tells us there and in other places 
s Id. ibid. & l. 2 c. 7. & l. 3. c. 11. . For matters which were merely honorary, they had some prerogatives: the Kings being allowed a double Mess in all their Ordinaries, the Senators and all the people arising from their seats to do him reverence, when he came amongst them, yielding him more than humane honours when he was deceased, as to a Demigod at least. And for their maintenance and support when they were alive, there was allotted to them a proportion of the richest lands in many of the Villages and fields adjoining 
t Xerophon in Repub. Lacedaem. ; enough to keep them out of want, though not sufficient to make them either rich or powerful.  
4. The royalty and power of the Kings being thus impaired, the people absolutely discharged from having any hand at all in the public Government, and the authority of the Senate growing every day more insolent and predominant then at first it was, by reason that they held their place for term of life, as we find in 
u Plutarch in Agesilao.  Plutarch; the Kings resolved upon a course of putting the people into such condition as might enable them to curb and control the Senators. To this end Theopompus the ninth King of the second house, with the consent of Polydorus his Associate, ordained certain Officers, being five in number 
x Aristot. Pol. l. 2. 8. , and chosen out of the body of the common people 
y Id. Polit. l. 2. c. 7. , and annually renewed or changed, as occasion was 
z Plutarch in Agesilao. ; to whom authority was give, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, even in the highest points, and of most importance, as we are told by Aristotle 
a Aristot. Politic. l. 2. c. 7. , and shall see anon. These Offices he caused to be called by the name of Ephori, that is to say, the Overseers, and Superintendents of the State, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
b Snidas. , because they had the charge and oversight of the Commonwealth. And as amongst the Archontes in the State of Athens which were nine in number, one of them was called the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or the Archon in the way of excellency, after whose name the year was called, and their reckon made (as Titio & Sempronio Coss. in the State of Rome); so had the Ephori their Eponymus, one who by way of eminency was called the Ephorus 
c Pausan. lib. 3. in Lacon. . But for this first reason of their institution, take it thus from Plutarch, 
d Plutarch in Lycurgo.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. " Lycurgus' having thus tempered the form of his Commonwealth, it seemed notwithstanding unto those which came after him, that this small number of thirty persons which made the Senate, was yet too mighty and of too great authority. Wherefore to bridle them a little, they gave them (as he citys from Plato) a bit in their mouths, which was the authority of the Ephori, erected in the time of King Theopompus, about 130 years after the death of Lycurgus." A second reason which induced those Kings to ordain these Ephori, was to ease themselves, and delegate upon them that remainder of the Royal power, which could not be exercised but within the City. For the Kings having little or no command but in wars abroad, cared not for being much at home, and thereupon ordained these Officers, to supply their places. Concerning which Cleomenes thus discourseth to the Spartans' 
e Id. in Agis & Cleomenes.  after they had destroyed the Ephori, and suppressed the Office: " informing them that Lycurgus had joined the Senators with the Kings, by whom the Commonwealth was a long time governed, without help of any other Officers; that afterwards the City having great wars with the Messenians, the Kings were always so employed in that war that they could not attend the affairs of the State at home, and thereupon made choice of certain of their friends to sit in judgement in their stead, whom they called the Ephori, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and for a long time did govern only as the King's Ministers, though afterwards by little and little they took unto themselves the supreme authority." Another reason hath been given of the institution, which is, that if a difference grew between the two Kings in a point of judgement, there might be some to arbitrate between them, and to have the casting voice amongst them when the difference could not be agreed. And this is that which Lisander and Mandroclidas (too that had been Ephori) suggested unto Agis and Cleombrotus the two Kings of Sparta; declaring, 
f Id. ibid.  " That the office of the Ephori was erected for no other reason, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But because they should give their voices unto that King who had the best reason on his side, when the other would wilfully withstand both right and reason; and therefore that they two agreeing might lawfully do what they would without controlment; that to resist the Kings was a breach of law, considering that the Ephori, by law, had no power nor privilege, but only to arbitrate between them, when there was any cause of jar or controversy." And this was so received at Sparta, for an undoubted truth, that Cleomenes being sole King, upon the death of Agis of the other house, recalled called Archidamus the brother of Agis from his place of banishment, with an intent to make him King, not doubting but they two should agree together, and thereby make the Ephori of no power nor use. So then we have three reasons of the institution, (and more than these I cannot find) of which there is not one that favoureth the device of CALVIN; or intimateth that the authority of the Ephori was set up, to pull down the Kings. And to say truth, it is a most unlikely matter that the Kings of Sparta having so little power remaining, should need more Officers to restrain them then they had before; that they should make a new rod for their own poor backs, and add five Masters more to those eight and twenty, which Lycurgus had imposed upon them. Which makes me wonder much at Tully, who doth acknowledge that the Ephori were ordained by Theopompus, (as both Aeristotle 
h Aristot. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.  and Plutarch do affirm) and yet will have them instituted for no other cause, nisi ut oppositi sint Regibus, but to oppose and curb the Kings 
i Cicero de legibus l. 3. : but more that Plato (who had so much advantage of him both in time and place) should ascribe the institution to Lycurgus; and tell us that he did not only ordain the Senate, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
k Plato Ep. 8. edit. gr. lat. To. 3. , but that he did also constitute the Ephorate, for the strength and preservation of the Regal power.  
5. For out of doubt it is affirmed by Plutarch 
l Plut. in Lycurgo. , confirmed by Scaliger 
m Scalig. animadvers. in Euseb. Chron. , and may be gathered from some passages in Eusebius Chronicon, and the authority of Aristotle, who refers the same to Theopompus, as before was showed, that the first Institution was no less than 130 years after the death of Lycurgus. Who was the first that bore this Office hath been made a question, but never till these later times, when men are grown, such Sceptics as to doubt of every thing. Plutarch affirms for certain, 
n Plutarch. in Lycurgo.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the first Ephorus (that is to say, the first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who had the name of Ephorus by way of excellency, for otherwise there were five in all) was called Elatus: and hereto Scaliger did once agree, as appears expressly, pag. 67. of his Annotations on Eusebius, where he declares it in these words, Primus Elatus renunciatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But after having a desire to control Eusebius, he takes occasion by some words in Diogenes Laertius to cry up Chilo for the man: first positively, Primus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fuit Chilon, and next exclusively of Elatus, Quibus animadversis non fuerit Elatus primus Ephorus sed Chilon. To make this good, being a fancy of his own (and as his own most dearly cherished) he produceth first the testimony of Laertius, and afterwards confirms the same by a new emendatio temporum, a Calculation and account of his own inventing. The words produced from Laertius are these verbatim; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
o Diogen. Lae●t. l. 1. in Chilo.  Which is thus rendered in the Latin, and I think exactly. Fuit autem Ephorus circa quinquagesimam & quintam Olympiada. Porro Pamphila circa sextam ait, primumque Ephorum fuisse sub Euthydemo, autore Sosicrate: primumque instituisse ut Regibus Ephori adjungerentur, Satyrus Lycurgum dixit. If it be granted in the first place, that Chilo was not made Ephorus until the 55 Olympiad, as 'tis plain he was not, and Scaliger affirms as much, it must needs follow upon true account, that either Chilo was not the first Ephorus, or that the Ephori were not instituted in more than twice an hundred and thirty years, after Lycurgus had new moulded the Commonwealth, contrary unto that which is said by Plutarch, and out of him repeated by Joseph Scaliger. For from the time wherein Lycurgus made his Laws, which was in the 25 year of Archelaus, the eighth King of the elder house, unto the death of Alcamenes, which was the year before the first Olympiad 
p Euseb. Chron. lib. post. p. 114. of Scaligers edit. , were 112 years just, none under. From thence unto the last year of the 55. 220 years complete; which put together make no fewer than 332 years full, a large misreckoning. Whereas the second year of the fifth Olympiad, in which Eusebius puts the Institution of the Ephori, both in the Greek and Latin Copies set out by Scaliger himself 
q Pag. 115. of the Latin, & 35. of the Greek Edition. ; that second year I say being added to the 112 before-remembred, in which King Alcamenes died, makes up the full number of 130, which we find in Plutarch; and agrees punctually with the time of Theopompus, who as it is confessed by Scaliger, did first ordain them. Nor doth Laertius say, if you mark him well, either that Chilo was the first that was ever Ephorus, or the first that joined the Ephori to the Kings of Sparta, both which absurdities are by Scaliger imposed upon him. For unto any one who looks upon Laertius with a careful eye, it may be easily discerned, that he speaks not otherwise of the Ephorate, then of an Office instituted a long time before; with the condition of the which Chilo was well acquainted, and therefore thought himself more fit to undergo it then his Brother was, who very earnestly desired it 
r Laertius in visa Chilon. . All that Laertius saith, is no more but this, that Chilo was made Ephorus first, (not the first Ephorus which was made, as Scaliger would have it) under Euthydemus; and that as Satyrus affirmed (who therein questionless was misled by Plato) Lycurgus was the first who joined the Ephori to the Spartan Kings; which words, viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he hath left out of purpose to abuse his Author, and make him speak the thing which he never meant. His other blundering and mistakes to make good this business, first laying the dissolution of the Ephorate by Cleomenes, non multo ante vel post initium Philippi 
s Pag. 67. of the Animadvers. , either not long before or shortly after the beginning of the reign of Philip the last King of Macedon, but one (which indeed is true) and within nine lines, no more, laying it in the 13. year of the self same King Philip, (most extremely false) the changing of his Author's words from Fuit autem sub Regibus Lacedaemon annis 350, as they occur in the Translation of S. Hierom, printed at Basil, into Fuit sub Regibus Lacedaemoniorum Annis 350, against the Author's mind and the rules of Grammar, only to bring about his device of Chilo, and blind his Readers eyes with a new Chronologie; and others I could point to if my leisure served, I purpose to forbear at the present time. Nor had I been so bold with Scaliger at all, or at least not now, but that the proud man is more bold with the Ancient Fathers, whom he is pleased to look on with contempt, and scorn, as often as they come before him: for which see pag. 255 of his Annotations. And so I leave him with that censure which he gives Eusebius, as learned and industrious an Antiquary, as any Scaliger of them all, (no man dispraised): Erratis hujus Autoris enumerandis charta non suffecerit 
t Animadvers. in Euseb. p. 255. ; and so far him well.  
6. But to proceed, the Ephori being thus ordained by Theopompus, became not presently of such authority and power, as by degrees they did attain to: For being chosen by the Kings as their proper Ministers as before was said, and many times 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, even from their very nearest friends, as we read in Plutarch 
u Plutarch. in Agis & Cleomen. ; they were hard thrust at by the Senate, and forced to put up many an affront from that mightier body. And this was it that Chilo aimed at, when he told his Brother who at the same time desired the Office, and seemed offended that he lost it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
x Laertius in vita Chilon. , that he was better skilled in bearing injuries and affronts, than his Brother was. But this continued for no longer than whilst the Kings served their turns upon them to oppose the Senate, and kept the nomination of them in their own hands. For afterwards the King's relinquishing the election to the common people, upon a forlorn hope, of gaining their affections by so great a benefit; they began to set up for themselves, and in a very little time gained all the custom of the City. And of this new election I am apt to think that Chilo, whom before we spoke of, was the first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Which I propose not so much out of a desire to comply with Scaliger, who for aught I can see, aimed at no such matter; as on the credit of Eusebius, whom he so much slighteth. For in Eusebius Chronicon of Joseph Scaligers own Edition, after he hath put down the institution of the Ephori in the second of the fifth Olympiad, as before I told you; he gives this Item in the third of the five and fiftieth (which is the very same that Laertius speaks of) Chilo qui de Septem Sapientibus fuit, Lacedaemone Ephorus constituitur 
y Euseb. Chronic. lib. poster. p. 127. , dispositione communus gentis, that Chilo one of the seven wise Masters was ordained Ephorus at Sparta, by the general consent of all the people. But whether this were so, or not, I am not able to determine absolutely. All I observe from hence is this, that it is passed all question, that from this time they took upon them more than they had done formerly, and were intent on all advantages to improve their power. For whereas at the first they were appointed by the Kings to sit in judgement in their steeds, as before was said, by little and little 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
z Plutarch in Agis & Cleom. , they drew that power unto themselves, and exercised it in their own name, by their own authority: not as the Ministers of the Kings, they would none of that, but as the Officers of the Commonwealth. And to that end they did erect a Court of Judicature, which for power and greatness of authority was little inferior to the Senate; drawing unto them all such businesses as were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
a Pausan. l. 3. in Laconicis. , most worthy of care and consideration. By means whereof, as they drew many of the people to depend upon them, whose businesses and suits of law were brought to be determined by them 
b Aristot. Polit. lib. 3. cap. 1. ; so they increased that dependence, by husbanding such difference as did oft arise between the Senate and the Kings, to their own advantage. For it is well observed by Aristotle, that as long as the Senate and the Kings did agree together, they kept all the power in their own hands: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
c Id. ibid. l. 2. c. 9  but when they jarred amongst themselves, they gave the people opportunity to become their Masters. But that which raised them to the height, and made them terrible at last both to King and Senate, was the mutual tie and correspondence which was between them and the people: by whom they were not only chosen, and therefore cherished by them as their own de●r creatures: but for the most part chosen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, out of the body of the people, and sometime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
d Aristot. Polit. l. 2. cap. 7. : out of the very meanest and the neediest of them; which made them on the other side to court the people, and to apply themselves unto them upon all occasions. And though it happened many times, that some of them being indigent and needy men, were easily wrought upon by money, and apt to sell as well the justice as the honour of the Commonwealth, to enrich themselves and raise their families; whereof Aristotle much complains, and that deservedly 
e Id. ibid. et c. 8▪ : yet this corruption served to advance their power, and put them into a condition to be the better able to oblige the people. So that the common sort of people doing all they could to advance the power and reputation of the Ephori, whom they accounted for their own, as indeed they were; and the Ephori striving by all possible means to gratify the people, by obtaining new laws and large immunities to be enacted for them, as they saw occasion: they altered the whole frame of Government, and made it of an Aristocracy to become an oligarchy, and in conclusion a plain popular tyranny.  
7. For trusting to the power and interess which they had in the Commonalty, and the support they were assured from them, if the case required it; they drew unto themselves the managery of the State-affairs; and grew so powerful at the last, that if they did not all things of their own authority, yet they had such an hand on the Kings and Senate, that nothing could be done without them. Were any laws to be enacted, who but the Ephori must propound them? Or any Taxes to be levied for the necessary uses of the Commonwealth, who but the Ephori must impose them? 
f Plutarch in Agis & Cleomen.  When Lysander had reduced the City of Athens unto such extremities, that they were glad to yield unto such conditions as the Conquerors were pleased to impose upon them: from whom must the Capitulations come, but from the Ephori? It was the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
g Id. in. Lysandro. , the final resolution of the Ephori, from which they were to expect either bonds or liberty. Cynado is accused of Treason against Agesilaus and the State of Sparta, the Ephori must take the information and proceed accordingly 
h Xenoph●n. in vita Agesilai. : and if Pausanias be accused of holding correspondence with the King of Persia, the Ephori send out their commands, 
i Thucydides. l. 1.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and commit him presently to Prison. When any Ambassadors were sent forth on the public service, from whom must they receive their power, from whom be furnished with instructions, but from the Eph●ri alone 
k Plut. in Nicias. ? and who but they must appoint Commanders for the Wars, require account of their employments, and either punish or reward them as they have deserved? When Cleonymus was displeased because Areus was preferred before him in his pretensions to the Kingdom: the Ephori did not only take upon them to sweeten and demulce the man by great gifts and presents, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
l Pausan. l. 3. in Lacon.  but also to confer upon him the command of the Army, though of right belonging to the Kings. When Mindarus the Admiral of their Navy was miserably beat by the Athenians in the strait of Hellespont, an express is presently dispatched to Sparta, to give unto the Ephori an account thereof 
m Plutarch. in Alcibiades. : Lysander had no sooner revenged this quarrel, and beat the Fleet of the Athenians near the self same place, but he acquaints the Ephori with his good success, with all speed that might be 
n Idem in Lysandro.  And if the Wars prove fortunate, and the spoil so great, that part thereof be sent to Sparta, to be laid up in the public Treasury; the Ephori, and none but they must have the fingering of the money 
o Id. ibid. . Finally there was no Commander of the Armies, or other Officer employed by the Commonwealth, whom they called not to an account as their stomaches served; not staying till the Office was expired, and the Commander or the Officer become a private man again, as in other States; but even in the midst of their Command and Magistracy whatsoever it was: and whom they did not punish when they came before them, either by imprisonment or death 
p Xenophon de Repub. Lacedaem. , as to them seemed best. Thus have we brought them to their height, and seen them absolutely possessed of the Supreme Power, in making peace or war as they thought convenient; and in disposing of the goods, the liberties, yea and the lives too of the Spartan subject. It had been a strange temper in them had they tarried there, and not encroached as much (whilst the tide went with them) upon the persons and the power of the Kings themselves.  
8. For howsoever at the first they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Ministers of the Kings as before was told you, and accountable to none but them: yet after they were reckoned for the Officers of the Common wealth, they cast off all relation to the Kings, their Masters, and thought themselves their Equals at the best, and at last their betters. A point which Theopompus did but little dream of, when first he set them up to oppose the Senate, although his Queen a wise and understanding Lady, did evidently see, and tell him, what would follow on it. Of which we find this story in the works of Aristotle, and from him borrowed by Plutarch if I guess aright, that his wife seeing what design he was bend upon, and how unluckily he was carried on to effect the same, advised him to take heed that by erecting this new Magistracy, he did not leave the Kingdom in a worse condition to his Heirs and Successors, than he received the same from his Predecessors; and that he answered thereunto, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
e Aristot. Polit. l. 5. c 11. , that by this means he hoped to leave it stronger and more durable than it was before. But the event declared unto all the world that the woman was the better Prophet, and had the greater insight into things to come. The power of Sovereignty when once communicated to the common people, or otherwise usurped by such popular Officers, as depend wholly on the people for their place and being, is seldom times recovered into Regal hands. And though some Kings may be persuaded by some subtle artifices (as it seems Theopompus was) that by this means the Chair of State will stand the faster; yet the proceed of the Ephori in the State of Sparta will inform us otherwise, and easily lay open the apparent danger of such weak surmises. For being made Officers of State, one of the first points they obtained, was that the Kings made Oath unto them once in every month, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
q Xenophon de Repub. Laced. , that they would govern the Estate according to the laws established in the Commonwealth, and that they would preserve the Kingdom in the best condition that they could: the Ephori making oath to them in the name of the City, whose Officers they were, and by whom entrusted. Next they attempt to place such Counsellors about the Kings, as they might confide in, beginning with such Kings as were under Age; and the first trial which they made was in appointing one Cleandrides to be about King Plastonax, the 19 of the elder House, as his chief Counsellor and Director, without whose approbation nothing must be done 
r Plutarch in Pericles. . Another of their usurpations and encroachments was to restrain their Kings in the point of marriage, and to impose some fine or disgrace upon them, if they presumed to marry against their liking. Anaxandrides the 15. of the elder house, had married a Lady of brave parts, but it was her ill fortune to be barren a long time together. The Ephori command him without more ado 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
s Pausan. lib▪ 3. in Lacon. , to give her a Bill of divorce, and send her going. Archidamus the 17. of the second House married a wife which brought him children. But fault was found she was too little, and thereupon the Ephori condemned him in a sum of money; saying 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that she would not bring them Kings, but demi Kings 
t Plutarch. in Agesilao. . And that you may perceive, how difficult a thing it was to please them in this point, Leonidas had married one that was neither barren, nor too little; and yet was quarrelled by the Ephori, and in fine condemned, for marrying with a woman of another Nation 
u Id. in Agis & Cleomenes. . The fundamental laws of Sparta conferred upon the Kings the Supreme command over the Military men in all wars abroad. The Ephori did not only dispose it otherwise, and gave it unto such whom they desired to oblige unto them, as you heard before: but kept the Kings at such a bay, that they neither could lead forth the Armies without their consent, nor tarry longer in the camp than they li●t to let them; and if the action did miscarry, the Kings were either fined or imprisoned for it. Agesilaus being a very stirring Prince, and desirous to get honour in the wars, was not permitted to set forwards till he had bought the Ephori with a sum of money 
x Id. in Agesila●. : and yet being in the height of his good success was called b●ck again, and glad to be conformable to the said commands. And so it fared with Agis and Cleomenes both, on the like occasions. And for the fining of their Kings, besides what we have seen before in the former instances, Plisto●ax being betrayed by Cleandrides, (whom the Eph●ri themselves had placed about him) and his Army forced to disband and turn home again; is presently condemned in so great a sum, that he was not able to discharge it 
y Id. in Peri●les. . By means whereof the Kings were brought at last unto that condition, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Aristotle truly noteth 
z Aristot. Polit. l. 2. cap. 7. , that they were forced to court and bribe the Ephori upon all occasions, to the great disservice of the State, and sometimes to the fatal overthrow of their chief designs. So that it is no marvel, if considered rightly, either that the Ephori kept their state and risen not up to reverence their King, when he came before them, though all the residue of the people and the Senate did it, as we read in Xenophon 
a De Repub. Lacedaem. ; or that Agesilaus used to rise up to them, as often as they came unto him about any business, as we find in Plutarch 
b Plut. in Agesila●. ; or that the Kings esteemed it such a point of Sovereignty, that when they were commanded to attend the Ephori, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they did refuse to go upon the first and second summons, and stirred not till the third command, as Cleomenes bragged in the said Historian 
c Id. in Agis and Cleomen. . Which trust me was a point of no small importance.  
(9) And yet they stayed not here, they went further still. They thought it not enough to condemn their Kings in vast and unproportionable sums of money, unless they laid restraints on their persons also, and had command upon their bodies. And therefore it is noted by Thucydides not without good reason, that they did not only punish with imprisonment their great and principal Commanders; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
d Thucydid. hist. l. 1. , but that it was lawful for the Ephori to do the like unto their Kings. Which to avoid, Pausanias was enforced to retire himself, and live a voluntary exile in another Country 
e Plutarch in Lysander. . Nothing remains but they take authority to depose, and in fine to murder them; and if they gain not this, all the rest is nothing. And this they are resolved to gain, or be folulie foiled; nor did they fail in the attempt when they went about it. They quarrelled at Leonidas as before I told you, for marrying with a woman of another Country, without so much as seeking for their approbation. And that they may be sure to effect their business, Religion is pretended, and a star must fall, only to warrant their proceed. Which preparations being passed they cite him to appear before them, and on default of his appearance they deposed him instantly, and conferred the Kingom on Cleombrotus 
f Id. in Agis & Cleomenes.  B●t these men being out of Office, he came out of Sanctuary, and was restored again by the next years Ephori. Who to make proof that their authority was as great as their Predecessors, thought it not argument enough to restore one King, except they did depose and destroy another. And thereupon laid hands on Agis of the other House, and inhumanelie haled him to the common Prison, and there most barbarously murdered him with his Mother and Grand mother. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
g Id. ibid. . And this saith Plutarch was the first time, that ever the Ephori put a King to death. And so perhaps it was the first, but the last it was not. For Archidamus the Brother of Agis being recalled from banishment by Cleomenes, to the end he might enjoy the Kingom which did by right belong unto him; was preseutly seized on by the murderers, and dispatched in private, for fear he should revenge the death of his slaughtered Brother 
h Id. ibid. . By which it is most evident without further proof, that the Spartan aristocraty was become a tyranny, and of all Tyrannies the most insupportable, because meerlie popular. Or if more proof should be desired, both Aristotle, and his his Master Plato will not stick to say it; though they both died, before these two last Tragedies were acted on the stage of Sparta. For Plato being to declare what he conceived of the Government of that Commonwealth resolves that it did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
i Plato de legibus l. 4. , approach more near to tyranny then to any other form what ever; the power and empire of the Ephori being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, plainly tyrannical, and no otherwise. And Aristotle who had studied the condition of that State exactly, though at the first he seemed to think that it was very well compounded of the three good forms; yet upon full debate thereof, he concludes at last, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
k Aristot. Poli●▪ l. 2. c. 4. , that the dominion of the Ephori was an absolute Tyranny. Assuredly had they lived to have seen that day, wherein the Ephori embrued their hands in the blood of their Princes, under pretence of safety to the Commonwealth, they would have voted it to have been a tyranny in the highest degree; and then the most unsufferable Tyrants that ever wretched State groaned under. For though the Kings of Sparta were so lessened by Lycurgus' laws, that little more was left unto them then the name and title; yet they were Kings, and held so sacred by their neighbours, even their very Enemies, that none d●d ever offer to lay hands upon them in the heat and fury of their fights, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
l Plutarch. in Agis & Cleom. , out of the reverence they did bear to those beams of Majesty, which most apparently shined in them.  
(10) The Ephori being grown to this height of Tyranny, were the more ready for their fall; which followed not long after that most barbarous fact, upon the persons of their Princes. The Kings had long since stomached them and their high proceed, bearing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
m Id. in Agesil.  a kind of heritable grudge betwixt them (as my Author calls it) ever since they took upon them to control their Masters: but either wanted opportunity or spirit, to attempt any thing to their prejudice; and therefore thought it safer to procure their favours, then run themselves upon a hazardous experiment. Pausanias, the 20. of the Elder House, was the first that ever did attempt either by force or practise to subvert the Office: the insolences of the which were then grown so great, that being a stout and active Prince, he was not able to endure them. That he had entertained such thoughts is affirmed by Aristotle, where he informs us that Lysander had a purpose to take away the Kingly Government (or rather to acquire it to himself, as we find in Plutarch 
n Id. in Lysandro. ,) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and that Pausanias had the like to destroy the Ephorate 
o Aristot. Polit. lib. 5. c. 1. . But what he failed to bring about, his Successors did at last accomplish. Of which Cleombrotus and Agis, joining their hands and heads together did proceed so far, that going into the Market place well attended by their friends and followers, they plucked the Ephori from their seats, and substituted others in their rooms 
p Plutarch in Agis & Cleom. , whom they conceived would be more pliant to their present enterprises: which was the first actual attempt, that ever had been made against them by the Kings of Sparta. But evulgato imperii Arcano, when so great a mystery of State was once discovered, that the Ephori were but mortal men, and might as easily be displaced and deposed as any of the other Magistrates; Leonidas immediately upon his restitution to the Kingdom, made the like removal, and displaced those who had took part against him with the former Kings 
q Id. ibid. . So that the ice being broken, and the way made open, Cleomenes son unto Leonidas had the fairer way to abrogate the Office utterly, which at last he did. For being a brave and gallant Prince, and seeing that the project he was bend upon for the reduction of the Commonwealth to its primitive honour, could not be brought about but by their destruction; he fell upon them with his Soldiers as they sat sat at supper, and killed four of them in the place, the fift escaping shrewdly hurt to the nearest Sanctuary 
r Id ibid. . That done he went into the Market place, and overthrew all the Chairs of the Ephori saving only one, which he reserved for himself as his Chair of State, and sitting in the same in the sight of the people, gave them an account of his proceed, and the reasons which induced him to it: " Declaring how the Ephori were at first appointed by the Kings themselves; that for long time they governed only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the King's Ministers, and no otherwise; that many years after this, Asteropus one of the Ephori, building upon a new foundation, and being the first Author of that dangerous change, they took the Government unto themselves, and exercised the same in their own names only; that though they had usurped a power which belonged not to them, yet had they managed it discreetly, they might perhaps have held it longer, and with better liking; but that licentiously abusing the authority which they had usurped by suppressing the lawful Governors ordained of old, by taking upon them to banish some of the Citizens, and to put some to death without law and justice, and finally by threatening those who were desirous to restore the Government to its ancient form, they were no longer to be suffered: that for his part he should have thought himself the happiest King that ever was, if possibly he could have cured his Country of that foul affection without grief or sorrow; but being it was not to be done that way, he thought it better that some few should be put to death, than the whole Commonwealth run on to a swift destruction." This said, he presently dissolved the Assembly, and seriously betook himself to the Reformation which formerly he had projected, and in short time reduced the people to the ancient Discipline, the state and reputation of the Commonwealth to its ancient height.  
(11) Thus have we made a brief discovery of the Spartan Ephori, upon what grounds first instituted, and on what destroyed; by what foul practices and unlawful means they gained the Sovereignty of the State, and by what they lost it: how, and by what degrees they came from low and mean beginnings to so strange a tyranny, and with what suddenness they lost their power and their lives together. But in all this there is not any show or colour for that which is affirmed by CALVIN, no ground for, nor verity at all in that assertion, that the Ephori were at first ordained to oppose the Kings, to regulate their proceed, and restrain their power: but rather that they were ordained (as indeed they were) to curb the Senate, to be the Ministers of the Kings, and sub-servient to them; to sit in Judgement for them, and discharge such Offices, as the Kings pleased to trust them with, in their times of absence. If Calvin's popular Magistrates have no more authority, than the Spartan Ephori, according to the rules of their Institution, they will have little colour to control their Princes, and less for putting a restraint on the Regal power. The most they can pretend to must be usurpation, and that will hold no longer, if it hold so long, than they have power to make it good by blood and violence, which I hope Calvin did not aim at. And if they have no other ground then an unjust title, prescription will not serve the turn, (for nullum tempus occurrit Regi, as our Lawyers tell us) when a courageous Prince is concerned in it, and oppressed by it. If any Popular spirits entertain such hopes, if nothing else will satisfy their vast ambitions but to be equal with their Kings and Supreme Governors, and at last above them: let them remember what became of the Spartan Ephori, and that there was a Cleomenes which called them to a sad account for all those insolences and affronts which they had put upon himself and his Predecessors. And let all Kings and Supreme Governors take heed by the example of these Spartan Princes, how they let lose the reins of Government, and lay them on the necks of the common people: which if unbridled once, and left at liberty, will not be easily induced to receive that Bit into their mouths which before they champed on: and that they give no way to such popular Magistrates as Calvin hath presented to us, who whatsoever colour and pretence they make, aim at no other mark then the Royal power, though out of too much modesty they disclaim the title, and must be either Kings or nothing. Of which invasions and encroachments on the Supreme Power, our Author gives another hint in the Roman Tribunes; the truth and fitness of which supposition must be looked on next.   

CHAP. III. Of the Encroachments of the Tribunes on the State of Rome; and that they were not instituted for the ends supposed by Calvin.  

(I) The Tribunes of the people why first Instituted in the State of Rome.  
(TWO) And with what difficulty and conditions.  
(III) The Tribunes fortify themselves with large immunities, before they went about to change the Government.  
(IV) The Tribunes no sooner in their Office, but they set themselves against the Nobility and the Senate, contrary to the Articles of their Institution.  
(V) The many and dangerous Seditions occasioned by the Tribunes in the City of Rome.  
(VI) The Tribunes and the people do agree together to change the Government of the State.  
(VII) By what degrees the people came to be possessed of all the Offices in the State, both of power and dignity.  
(VIII) The Plots and Practices of the Gracchis to put the power of the Judicature, and Supreme Majesty of the State, into the hands of the people.  
(IX) The Tribunes take upon them to commit the Consuls, and bring all the Officers of the State under their command.  
(X) The Office and authority of the Tribunes reduced unto its ancient bounds by Corn. Sylla; and at last utterly destroyed.  
(XI) An application of the former passages to the point in hand.   
(1) ALthough the reasons which induced the people in the State of Rome to desire some Officers of their own, and the considerations which induced the Senate to give way unto it, are obvious to the eyes of every Reader, which hath perused the Roman stories: yet I shall briefly lay it down, the better to remove the intimation which we find in Calvin, that they were purposely ordained to oppose the Consuls. The story then in brief is this. The people having not long before expulsed their Kings, and got some reputation by their prowess in those petit States which bordered nearest to the City, found quickly that the liberty which they expected was nothing but a golden dream, not able to protect them from the common Gaols, and that their reputation in the wars would not pay their debts, or save them from the hands of their cruel Creditors. For serving in the wars at their own proper charges, and having little else to subsist upon but their trades or labour, they were fain sometimes to take up money upon usury. And though they did return from the wars with victory, and shown those honourable scars which they had received, fight in defence of their Country and the Commonwealth; yet this did edify but little with their hungry Creditors: 
a Plutarch in M. Coriolano.  who did not sell their goods, if they were not solvent, but apprehended their persons also, and either laid them up in the common prisons, or made them serve in stead of Bondmen, and made them subject to the whip and other base corrections fit for none but Slaves. And somewhat to this purpose the old man complained, as we read in Livy, declaring to the people (who were apt to hear it) how his Patrimony had been seized on by the merciless Usurers, his person apprehended by them, and that he was not only made a Slave, but marked out for slaughter: Ind ostentare tergum foedum recentibus vestigiis verberum 
b Livy. hist. l. 2. , showing withal upon his back the miserable prints which the whip had left. This made the people murmur, and at last to mutiny, and in tumultuous manner, minaciter magis quam suppliciter, rather with threats than supplications to require the Senate to take some course for their relief: resolving otherwise to go no more unto the wars, serve the State who would. The Senate promised fair, as there was good cause, (the Volsci pressing hard upon them to their very gates); and by that promise won the people, and obtained a victory. But when the wars were done, and performance looked for, in stead of finding a redress of their former grievances, the rigour of the law took place, & creditoribus tradibantur, and they were seized on by their Creditors as in former times: the Senate thinking it unreasonable to make the law submit to the necessities of particular men, and against law to defraud any man of the debts which were due unto them. 
c Dionys. Halicarnass. lib. 6.  But a new war approaching, a new promise made, and that neglected also when the war was ended; the people seeing no relief was like to come from the hands of the Senators, Longè aliâ quam primò instituerant viâ grassabantur, began to lend an ear to some desperate Counsels, and fell to entertain such hopes, as formerly they durst never dream of. For drawing themselves into a body under the conduct of Sicinius a troublesome and seditious person, they forsook the City, and encamped upon an hill adjoining: resolving as they gave it out, to seek new dwellings, and that there was no place in Italy but would afford them air and water, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and ground in which they might be buried. There is no question to be made, but if the Senate had beheld the action with neglect and scorn, as Appius 
d Dionys. Halicarn. l. 6. , and C. Martius 
e Plutarch in Coriolano. , did advise they should; the people out of love to their wives and children, would have returned to their houses: or if they had presented them in time with any tolerable mitigations of the former laws, they might have taken off their edge, and appeased the tumult. But giving way unto their fury till it grew too high, and showing in their resolutions far more fear than courage; the people got the better of them, and thought they stood upon the higher ground, as indeed they did. Which pride and high conceit of theirs was the more increased, by the authority and persuasions of one Junius Brutus, who came not to them till they were too far engaged, to go off with safety. A man, as the Historian noteth, of a turbulent and seditious spirit, more apt to kindle a rebellion, then to quench the flame; but otherwise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
f Dionys. Halicarnass. l. 6. , of very great foresight into business, and one that had a ready tongue upon all occasions. To him they gave the managing of the whole design, and he improved the trust to their best advange. Insomuch that when Menenius Agrippa was employed unto them to demand their grievances, and had brought the point to such an issue, that there was nothing wanting to make up the breach, but some security to be given on the part of the Senate, that the people should be no more deluded with such empty promises; this Junius Brutus took upon him to propose the terms: and no security would content him (as the plot was laid) but that some popular Magistrates should be forthwith made, for the protection of the people. Concedite nobis (inquit) Magistratus aliquot quotannis è nostro corpore creare, etc. 
g Id. ibid.  " Let us, saith he, have certain Magistrates to be chosen yearly out of our own body, on whom we shall not ask you to confer more power, then that they have authority to assist the Commons, when they are either injured or oppressed by violence, and to take order that they be not rob of their rights and liberties. Other security than this we will trust to none." Which when the people heard (for few of them were made acquainted with the plot before) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they made many a loud and joyful shout, praising the man unto the skies, and absolutely resolving to admit of no other terms, than what their Spokesman had proposed.  
(2) But yet the business was not done. It must first pass the approbation of the Senate, and there it met with very grreat heats and opposition before it passed, and passed not at the last but upon conditions. The people had a faction in the very Senate, and a strong one too, who laboured what they could to obtain the point. Of these Valerius was the chief, whose Brother had not long before expulsed the Kings, and from his courting of the people was surnamed Poplicola: a family that had been always favourable to the popular party, and more endeavoured their content, than the honour or profit of the public. In which regard Appius charged him to his face, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
h Id. ibid. , that the whole generation of them were so partial in behalf of the people, that they had almost destroyed the Commonwealth. Others and those of greater courage and Nobility, scorning that such an innovation should be made in the public Government, opposed it with all might and main; not sparing to assure the Senate that in the setting up of this new authority, they would in fine put down their own. And of these Appius and Caius Martius, (who after had the name of Coriolanus) were the leading men: who standing upon point of honour, advised the Senate that having shaken off the tyranny of their Kings, they should not prostitute themselves to the lusts of the people 
i Id. ibid. ; that they should stand on their own ground, and not do any thing unworthy of their place and dignity; that these were but the beginnings of sedition, and that the purpose of the Commons was to abolish law, and set up a parity 
h Plutarch in M. Coriolano. : Appius foretelling, as inspired with the spirit of Prophecy, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, how great a Seminary of mischiefs it would prove to the Commonwealth, and calling all the Gods to witness that he had done his best to prevent the same. But when they found it like to pass, and that the major part of the house did incline that way, it was advised that they should hold the people to the terms by themselves proposed, and give their Officers no more power but to relieve the people from unjust oppression, and that they should only interpose, if any thing were passed in Senate to the people's prejudice, but propose nothing of themselves, nor appear in any thing, until the Senate had before considered of it; that the election should be made in centuriatis Comitiis only, where the Patricii and their followers bore the greatest stroke; and finally that in their applications and addresses to the Lords of the Senate, in any business whatsoever, they should all agree upon the point, so that if any one dissented, the agreement and consent of all the rest should pass for nothing. For seeing that Tribunes must be granted, they hoped that by their disagreement the honour of the State might be kept upright, and that the Commonwealth was not quite past help, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
l Dionys. Halicarn. l. 10. , as long as any discord or dissension might be sown amongst them. Which last condition (for all the rest were broken assoon as they were agreed on) was most religiously observed till the very last, as we read in Plutarch, who gives it for a rule amongst them, that if one Tribune did oppose 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r; 
m Plutareh. in Caio. & Tiber.  the agreement and command of all the rest did effect just nothing. Things being brought unto this temper, and all points agreed on, the people went to the election, and chose five new Officers, (according to the number of the Spartan Ephori) which they called Tribunes of the people; of which Sicinius and Junius Brutus must be two at least. We may be sure they took not all this pains for nothing.  
(3) And yet all this was nothing if they got not more. The Articles and Conditions which they had agreed on had bound them too precisely to their good behaviour; and if they did not break those bonds, they were Prisoners still. But first they must be fortified with some special privileges, to keep their persons out of danger; that they might boldly venture upon any project without fear of law; and put themselves into such condition, that whatsoever wrongs they did, they would not be called to an account. To that end Brutus taking his opportunity whilst the heats were up, and the Senate in a disposition to deny them nothing, causeth a law to be propounded & obtained for the perpetual indemnity of the Tribunes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and for declaring of their Office to be sacred and inviolable 
n D●o●ys. Halicarn. l. 6. . The substance of the law was to this effect; " That no man should compel the Tribunes to do any thing against their wills, nor beat, or cause them to be beaten, nor kill, or cause them to be killed; if any should presume to do the contrary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he was to be pursued as an execrable person, and his goods confiscate, and whosoever slew him should escape unpunished, and do a meritorious service to the Commonwealth." A Privilege which they found good use of in the times succeeding, and made it serve their turns upon all occasions. Martius complained of them in the Senate for disobedience to the Consuls, and an intent to bring an Anarchy upon the State: 
o Plutarh. in Coriolano.  they vote this for a breach of privilege, and nothing but his death or banishment will give them satisfaction for it. Apptus being Consul sends his Lictor to lay hands upon them for raising tumults in the City 
p Livy hist. Rom. lib. 2. ; this is another breach of privilege, and he shall answer for it when his year was out. Caeso Quintius like a noble Patriot, joins with the Consuls and the Senate to oppress their insolences, when neither law nor reason would prevail upon them; this also is a breach of privilege, and his life shall pay for it 
q Id. l. 3. . But to proceed, having obtained this law for their own security, their next work was to break or pass by those laws by which the State was governed in all times before, and which themselves had yielded to at their first creation. It was the practice of the City from the first fnundation (and a continual custom hath the force of law) to give such respect unto the Senate, that the people did not vote nor determine any thing, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
r Dionys. Halicarnass. l. 7. , which the Senate had not first debated and resolved upon. This though no breach of privilege was a main impediment to the advancing of those projects which they had in hand, and therefore fit to be removed, as removed it was: and so a way made open unto that confusion, which did expose the State to so many changes, that it was never constant to one form of government. Which being obtained, the next thing to be brought about, was to bring the election of the Tribunes into the hands of the people (who had before the least part in it) that so depending mutually upon one another, they might cooperate together to destroy the State, and bring it absolutely under the command of the common people. For at the first, according to the Articles of the Institution, the Tribunes were to be elected in Comitiis Centuriatis as before was said, where none but men of years and substance (such as were of the Livery, as we speak in England) had the right of Suffrage; By means whereof the Patricians had a very great stroke in the Elections, Et per Clientum suffragia creandi quos vellent potestatem 
s 〈◊〉. hist. , and by the voices of their Clients or dependants set up whom they listed. They must no longer hold this power. The Tribunes were the creatures of the Common people, and must be made by none but them. A law must therefore be propounded to put the Election wholly into the hands of the people, and to transact the same in Comitiis Tributis, where no Patrician was to vote, but all things carried by the voices of the rascal Rabble. Which though it caused much heat and no small ado, yet it was carried at the last; Appius complaining openly as his custom was, Rempub. per metum prodi, that the Senate did destroy the Commonwealth by their want of courage. And whereas at the first they had so much modesty as not to come into the Senate 
t Valer. Maxim. lib. 2. c. 2. , Sed positis subselliis ante fores decreta Patrum examinare, but to sit without upon some benches, whilst they examined the decrees which had passed the house: they challenge now a place, though no vote in Senate t, and had free ingress and egress when they would themselves.  
(4) But their main business was to pull down the Nobles, and make them of no more esteem than the common sort. And upon this they set their strength, and made it the first handsel of their new authority. Martius had spoke some words in Senate which displeased the Tribunes, and they incense the people to revenge the injury: who promising to assist them in their undertake, an Officer is forthwith sent to apprehend him. This caused the Patricians whom the cause concerned, to stand close together, and to oppose this strange encroachment; and generally to affirm, as most true it was, that when they yielded to the setting up of this new authority, there was no power given them by the Senate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
u Dionys. Halicarn. l. 7. , but only to preserve the Commons from unjust oppressions. The like did Martius plead in his own behalf, as we find in Livy, auxilii non poenae jus datum illi potestati, plebisque non patrum Tribunos esse 
x Livy. hist. lib. 2. , that they were trusted with a power to help the Commons, but with none to punish, and were not Tribunes of the Lords, but of the people. And so much also was affirmed in the open Senate, that the authority of the Tribunes was at first ordained not to offend or grieve the Senate, but that the Commons might not suffer any grievance by it; and that they did not use their power, according to such limitations as were first agreed on, and as of right they ought to use it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
y Dionys. Halicarn. l. 7. , but to the ruin and destruction of the Laws established. Enough of conscience to have staved them from the prosecution, but that they had it in design, and resolved to carry it. For Brutus had before given out and assured the people, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
z Id. ibid. , that he would humble the Nobility, and bring down their pride; and 'twas no reason that such a man as he should be disappointed, and not be master of his word. Martius being banished at the last, their next bout was with Appius Claudius, a constant and professed enemy of the popular faction: one who had openly took part against them in behalf of Martius, and after seeing them apprehend some Gentlemen who opposed their insolences, had openly denied, jus esse Tribuno in quenquam nisi in plebeium 
a Livy. l. 2. , that they could exercise their power on any but the Commons only. Him therefore they accused of Treason, or at least sedition, in that he had entrenched upon their authority, which was made sacred by the Laws: and doubtless had condemned him to some shameful punishment, had he not died before his trial. Which victory on Martius, and the death of Appius, did so discourage the Nobility and puff up the Tribunes, that from this time forwards (as the Historian doth observe) the Tribunes cited whom they listed to answer for themselves before the people, and to submit their lives to their final sentence: which as it did increase the power of the popular faction in the depressing of the Nobles, and weakening the authority of the Senate; so did it open them a way to aim at and attain to all those dignities in the Common wealth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
b Dionys. Halicarn. l. 7. , which were most honourable in themselves and had formerly belonged to the Patricians, and to none but them. And yet the Senate and Nobility did not so give over, but that sometimes they put them in remembrance of their first conditions, and challenged them of breaking all those bonds and Covenants, which were so solemnly agreed on and accepted by them, at the first erection of their Office. For this did Fabius press upon them when they went about to make some Law for the restraint and regulating of the power of the Consuls, viz. that their authority was given them ad auxilium singulorum, for the relief of such particulars as did want their help, not for the ruin of the public; and that they should do well to bethink themselves, 
c Livy. l. 3.  Tribunos plebis se creatos, non hostes Patribus, that they were chosen Tribunes to protect the people, not enemies to oppress the Senate. And the expostulation of the Senate was both just and necessary, when they demanded of the Tribunes on the same occasion, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
d Dionys. Halicarn. l. 10. , who gave them power to introduce new Laws and subvert the old; and told them in plain terms they had broke their Covenants, and that they were not made upon such conditions as to do all things that they listed, nor to do any thing at all, but only to protect the poor, and preserve the Commons from oppression. Which put together makes it a most evident truth, that in the creation of the Tribunes there was nothing less intended then to curb the Senate, or to set up a power to oppose the Consuls; as vainly and seditiously is supposed by CALVIN, though true it is they did abuse their power with the Common people, and the authority of their office to suppress them both.  
5. And this they were resolved to do, although they had no other way to effect the same, then by raising seditions in the State, and putting the people into Arms upon all occasions: at which they were so perfect, and so constant in it, that seldom the whole year went round without some tumult or sedition of their setting forward, as will appear to any one who is versed in Livy. If they held quiet for one year, as they seldom did (till they had brought the City under their obedience) they broke out in the next that followed with the greater violence: and when the course of the distemper was so intermitted, that it held not always a Quotidian, it proved a Tertian Fever, or at most a Quartan, and therefore like to tarry longer with the afflicted Patient. How many seditions did they raise about the law Agaria, of which Livy tells us that it was never moved 
e H●st Rom. l. 2.  sine maximis motibus without great tumults and dissensions? How many tumults did they raise to oppose the Consuls, when they had any wars in hand, and were to press the Soldier to pursue those wars? How often find we in that Author, Tribunitium bellum domi territare patres 
f Id. lib. 3. , that when the Fathers had no wars abroad, they found a Tribunitian war at home which did more affright them? how often find we them complaining, non ultra ferri posse Tribunitios furores 
g Id. lib. 4. , that the insolences of the Tribunes were no longer sufferable; and that they could not look to be without continual alarms, and renewed distractions, whilst the seditions and the authors of them did succeed so prosperously? Nay they were so accustomed to it, that having had some intermission (and that no otherwise obtained, but by yielding all things to the people which they had a mind to) Livy takes notice of it as a thing observable, permultos annos esse 
h Id. lib. 10. , that many years had intervened since the Patricians and the Tribunes had their last contention. And all this while they managed their seditions by the tongues end only, seldom proceeding unto blows, and much less to blood. But when the two Gracchis came in play and attained the Office, they fell from words to blows, and from blows to murder: Tiberius one of the two Brothers, and many of his friends and followers being tumultuously slain in the Common Forum, as he was acting the part of a busy and seditious Tribune; whom Caius the other of the two not long after followed both in life and death. And this, saith the Historian, initium in urbe Roma Civilis sanguinis gladiorumque impunitatis fuit 
i Velleius Patercul. hist. , was the first time that the sword was suffered to range at liberty in the streets of Rome, and to be discoloured with the blood of the Citizens; their differences before that day (though not often afterwards) being determined by parleys, but not by bloodshed. Which being put together and considered seriously, it will appear to be no Paradox which we find in Florus, where he affirmeth, Seditionum omnium causas Tribunitiam potestatem excitasse 
k Florus histor. Rom. l. 3. , that the Tribunitian power was the source and fountain of all those seditions, wherewith the quiet of the State had been disturbed. Nor was it said by Quintius without very good reason, that the authority of the Tribunes, in seditione & ad seditiones nata, was born in a sedition and to raise seditions; 
* Cicero de Legibus l. 3.  that it was pestifera potestas, a pestilent pernicious office, and that Pompey did exceeding ill to reinvest the Tribunes with that height of power, of which they had been justly dispossessed by Sylla. Upon which grounds it had been formerly averred by the Consuls and the rest of the Senate, that the Tribunes were the cause of those distractions (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are the Author's words) which did so miserably afflict the Commonwealth 
* Dionys. Halicarn. l. 10. . But this, to say the truth, is so clear a point, that it needs no proof. I only shall observe and so pass it by, how justly the Nobility and Senate were punished by their own example; and for how little time they enjoyed that Sovereignty, which they had wrested from their Kings. From the expulsion of the Kings to the creating of the Tribunes were but sixteen years; and from the death of Tarquin to the reign of Brutus and Sicinius, but one year, no more, and in that little span of time the people profited so well in the school of rebellion, that they did not only beat the Senate at their own weapon of disloialty, but choked them with their own objection. For when it was objected against the Tribunes, that their authority was gotten and maintained by seditious courses; the Tribunes handsomely replied, that that objection might aswell be made against the authority of the Consuls; which had been introduced and established by no other means, 
m Id. lib. 10.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than the rebellion of the Nobles or Patricians against their Kings. A very shrewd retortion, if you mark it well; and fit to be considered of in these present times.  
(6) If any ask to what end all these stirs were raised, and these seditions set on foot, he may please to know, that there was an intent from the first creating of the Tribunes to change the government of the State, and to put the Supreme Power of all into the hands of the people; that is to say, to bring it under the command of a few factious persons, on whom the body of the people had devolved their power. And this is positively affirmed by Florus, where having told us that the Tribunes were the cause of all the tumults and seditions which had been raised within the City, he adds, that being at first ordained specie quidem tuendae plebis, 
Florus hist. Rom. l. 3.  under pretence of being Protectors of the Commons, and taking care for the preserving of their rights and liberties; they sought in very deed to usurp the Sovereignty, re autem dominationem sibi acquirere, and to get the Supreme power into their own hands. To this end as the Tribunes strove to oblige the people by causing new Laws to be made in their behalf, and for the increase of their authority; so did the people readily obey the Tribunes, and gathered into an head upon all occasions, aswell for the protection of their persons, as the confirmation of their power. When Martius had declamed against them in the open Senate for their factious and seditious courses, the Tribunes presently made complaint to the people of it, calling upon them to assist them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and to save their Tribunes 
n Plutarch in Coriolano. : at which the people were so madded, and ran on so furiously, that they were like to have fallen desperately upon all the Senate. And Appius found unto his cost, that in offering to attach a Tribune, (though he well deserved it) concio omnis coorta pro Tribuno in Consulem 
o Livy. l. 2. , the whole assembly risen against him as one man, to defend their Tribune, the rascal multitude gathering together out of all the City to do him right against the Consul. And Plutarch tells us in the life of Tiberius Gracchus, that the people were so sottishly affected to him, that many of the needy and seditious rout waited upon him all night long up and down the Town; 
p Plutarch in Tiber. & C. Gracchis.  some of them buying tents and lying about his house to watch it, as a guard to his person. And on the other side the houses of the Tribunes were kept continually open aswell nights as days, that they might serve as a Protection or a Common Sanctuary for men of all sorts to repair unto, whom either debt or misdemeanour, or some greater matter had made obnoxious to the Sergeants, or other Ministers of justice, to the great prejudice of the honest and well meaning Subjects in their suits and businesses. And besides this, the Tribunes never failed to flatter and bewitch the people by some piece of courtship, or by preferring some new Laws (as before was said) for their ease and benefit. They had no sooner way than that to advance their power, or to obtain unto that absoluteness of command and empire, which they projected to themselves. For doubtless that of the Historian is exactly true, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
q Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 6. , that he that means to be a Tyrant must be first a flatterer; there being no readier way to advance a Tyranny then by being popular, a professed servant of that people whom he would command. But this confederacy between the Tribunes and the people and the mutual ties that were between them, I cannot better lay before you then in Plutarch's words, 
r Plutarch in Agis & Cleomen.  who speaking of the Gracchis doth inform us thus, " That having received. many favours from the people's hands they were ashamed to be indebted to them, and therefore earnestly endeavoured to requi●e their courtesies, by making new Decrees and Laws which they propounded and obtained for the people's profit; and on the other side, the people for their parts were not wanting to admire and honour them the more, by how much they perceived them studious of their good and benefit. So that with like strife on either side, the one to gratify and oblige the other, their interesses were so mingled, and their intentions so concorporated, that they must needs hold on as they had begun, and either stand or fall together." By means whereof the people in conclusion became lords of all, the majesty of the State and the power of judicature being absolutely vested in them: which since they could not manage but by their Attorneys, nor otherwise execute and discharge then by their Proxies, who but the Tribunes their own creatures must be trusted with it? And this is that which Tacitus observes to be the issue of those quarrels which were kept on foot between the Nobility and the Commons, modo turbulenti Tribuni, 
s Tacit. hist. lib. 2.  modo Consules praevalidi, sometimes some factious Tribunes carried it away, and then again the Consuls had the better, and prevailed in power, according as they did comply with the people's humours; till Marius and Sylla first, and Julius Caesar afterwards by their example, by force of Arms subdued both parties, and introduced an absolute Government.  
(7) Now for the steps by which the people did as●end to this height of power, they were not raised at once, but were long a making. When first the discontented Nobleses had expulsed their Kings, and found they could not master all those difficulties which so great a business as that was did present unto them, without being sure to have the people theirs without fear of lapsing: Poplicola advised, and at last enacted it for Law, that no man should presume upon pain of death to take upon him any Office, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
t Plutarch. in Publicola. , unless it come unto him by the gift of the people; and that if any were condemned, and appealed to them, the execution should be respited, till the people should give sentence in it. But then withal the Nobility kept all Offices both of power and State in their own hands only, the people being uncapable of the meanest office which did relate unto the Government of the Commonwealth; until they gained the Tribunes and the two Aediles (which were under officers to the Tribunes) to be chosen out of their own body. Which once obtained, there was no place, how high soever, which they did not aim at, and which their Tribunes did not find some way to compass for them; the Nobles and Patricians still in vain complaining how much they were dishonoured in the competition. First therefore having gained a Law (but with much ado) that the Commons might be married into Noble Families, they presently propose another, ut populo potestas esset, seu de Plebe, seu de Patribus vellet, consuls faciendi, 
u Livy. l. 4.  that the people might have liberty to choose the Consuls out of which rank of men they listed: and at the first attempt did prevail so far, that in stead of the two Consuls which they had before, six Military Tribunes should be chosen by them, to be possessed of all the Consular authority, and they to be promiscuously elected out of the Patricians and the People, as they saw convenient 
x Livy. l. 4. ; and having got this ground they went on a main. For not long after, P. Licinius Calvus a mere Plebeian, is made one of these Military Tribunes; and shortly after that the Magister Equitum, or the Commander of the horse. Thus Silius and Aelius are made Questors, those of Patrician rank having had the canvas; and next that followed a Decree, that the Docemviri Sacrorum, who had the custody and charge of the Sibyls Books, partim ex Plebe, partim ex Patriciis, 
a Id. lib. 6.  should be indifferently chosen out of both Estates. In little time, the Tribunes pressing hotly for it, L. Sextus obtains the Consulship 
b Id. ibid. , C. Martius Rutilius is first made Dictator, afterwards one of the Censors also 
c Id. lib. 7. ; and P. Philo is advanced to the place and dignity of the Prator 
d Id. lib. 8. . Having thus took possession of all Civil Magistracy, which were of any power and dignity in the Commonwealth; the Tribunes would not rest nor content themselves, until the Commons were made capable of the Priesthood also: which after some slight opposition made by Appius Claudius (a Family that never yielded any thing to advance the people) was conferred upon them, five Augurs, and four Pontifexes being added to the former number, all chosen, and for ever to be chosen by and out of the Commons 
e Id. lib. 10. . There were only now two places of respect and credit, that of the Maximus Curio and the Pontifex Maximus, both which the Nobles did pretend to belong to them: but the Tribunes were resolved to have it otherwise. According to which resolution, C. Manilius got the Office of the Maximus Curio 
f Id. lib. 26. : and in the close of all, but a good while after, Omnibus honoribus plebi communicatis 
g Rofin. Antiq. Rom. l. 3. c. 22. , after all other honours were conferred upon them, or rather communicated to them, one T. Coruncanius was declared the Pontifex Maximus. All this and more they had, but it would not satisfy.  
(8) For there was wanting still both the power of Judicature, and the Supreme Majesty of the State to make all complete; and to gain this the Tribunes must bestir themselves both with art and violence; or else they could not hope to estate it on them. A business of so high a nature, that it was never in a way to be brought about, till the two Gracehi undertook the contrivance of it: who being men of excellent parts and great abilities, did most unfortunately fall on the undertaking; and being fallen upon it did devise all ways which either art or wit could present unto them to effect the work. Of these Tiberius was the eldest, who stumbling in the way on the Lex Agraria, as being a means to make the poor people more considerable, and the rich less powerful; and finding that Octavius one of his Colleagues did oppose him in it, deposed him from his Office by force and violence, only because he stood upon the right of his negative voice 
h Plutarch in Tib. & Caio. . He had before inflamed the people by making a seditious speech to prefer their business; and now he takes a course to inflame them more, for the advancement of his own. For one of his friends being found dead upon a sudden, not without some suspicion of poison, as he gave it out, he put on mourning apparel, and brought his sons before the people, into the Common Forum, beseeching them to have compassion on his Wife and Children, as one that utterly despaired of his own safety, having for their sakes got the hatred of the Noble men. And sometimes he would be the first man in the Marketplace, apparelled all in black, his face swelled with tears, and looking heavily upon the matter, would pray the people to stand to him, saying, he was afraid his Enemies would come in the night, and overthrow his house to kill him. By means of which devices he so wrought upon them, that many of them bought tents and lay about his house continually, to keep him from the hands of his deadly Enemies. So that being sure of their concurrence and assistance in any project which he should set on foot to advance himself, under pretence of doing service to the Commonwealth; he presently proposed a law, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that any man that would might appeal from the Judges to the people in what cause soever. And that he might be sure to embase the Senate, to the improvement and increase of the people's power, he had prepared another of an higher nature, which was to add unto the Senate an equal number of the Equites, or the Roman Knights, who were to be of equal power, and to have liberty of voting in all public businesses with the ancient Senators. In passing which and other of his Popular laws he got this trick, (and he was very constant to it) that if he found the sense of the house to be against him, and was not like to carry with him the major part of the voices, he would quarrel with his fellow Tribunes to spin out the time till his party were all come together; and if that could not do it neither, than he adjourned the Assembly to some other day. But yet for all these artifices and unworthy practices, he could not compass the design, but left it to be finished by his Brother Caius: Who taking the same course to engage the people, which his Br●ther had pursued before, brought those designs about which Tiberius failed in. 
i Id. ibid.  For first whereas the Senate were the only Judges in matters which concerned the affairs of the Commonwealth, which made them no less reverenced by the Roman Knights, then by others of the common people: Caius prevailed so far that he gained a law for adding three hundred of these Equites to as many Senators (for the Senate did consist of three hundred anciently) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, giving them equal power of judging in all causes which were brought before them. So that by gaining this and the former law of appealing to the people upon all occasions, the people were estated in the power of Judicature, and the dernier resort (as the Lawyers call it) was in them alone. The only point now left was the Supreme Majesty, and that did Caius very handsomely confer upon them without noise or trouble. For whereas all other Orators when when they made their speeches, turned themselves towards the Palace where the Senate sat: he on the contrary turned himself towards the Market place where the people were, and taught all other Orators by his Example to do the like. And thus (saith Plutarch) by the only turning of his look he gained a point of infinite consequence and importance; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, changing the Commonwealth from an aristocraty, to a mere Democraty: which was the matter so aimed at by his Predecessors.  
(9) The Tribunes had been insolent enough in the former times, but the obtaining of these laws made them more unsufferable. Before they used to quarrel all the greatest Officers, as if the State could not consist but by their contentions: there being no Magistrate so great, nor man so innocent, whom they exposed not sometimes to contempt and scorn, and made not subject to their tyranni●. The renowned Scipio himself, the very Atlas of the State when it was in danger, a man in whom there was not any thing but brave and gallant, could not scape so clear, but that he was accused by these factious Tribunes 
k Livy. hist. lib. 28. , and forced to live retired in his Countryhouse, far from the employments of that State, which did not otherwise subsist but by his abilities. Nor could they look on their Dictator's but with eyes of malice, although they had as much authority as that State could give them, or any of their Kings had enjoyed before, whom they endeavour to make subject to their pride and tyranny by all means imaginable. And to that end, sometimes denied him the honour of a Triumph, though he had deserved it in all men's judgements but their own; and sometimes making this Magister Equitum 
l Id. lib. 22. , to be of equal power and authority with him: and finally sometimes they declaim against him 
m Id. ibid. , to make him of no reputation with the common people. And for their dealing with the Consuls, it had been a complaint of old, even in the dawning of the day of their new authority, Consulatum captum & oppressum a Tribunitiae potestate 
n Id. lib. 2. , that the Consulship was suppressed and captivated by the power of the Tribunes; and we can no where find that they improved their modesty, as they did their power. Nor did they only quarrel with the Consuls, and proceed no further, (though that had been an high affront to the Supreme Magistrate) but threatened to commit them to the Prison also, and many times their threaten were not made in vain. For thus we read, that Caius Marius being Tribune 
o Plutarch in Mario. , threatened to send Cotta the Consul unto Prison, but afterwards was taken off by fair persuasions: and Sulpitus, one as violent as he, though not so valiant, assaulted both the Consuls as they sat in the Senate house 
p Id. ibid. , and killed one of their sons there, who was not so quick of foot as to scape his hands. Which though they were but bare attempts were yet lewd enough, sufficiently to the dishonour of such eminent Magistrates, and to the infamy and disgrace of the public Government. And therefore to make sure work of it, and that the world might see they could more than threaten, Quintius will tell you in the Dialogue with his Brother Cicero, Brutum & P. Scipionem tales tantos viros hominum omnium infimum & sordidissinum Trib. Pl. C. Curiatium in vincula conjecisse 
q Cicero de Legibus lib. 3. , that C. Curiatius, a most base and unworthy person, had caused such gallant men as Brutus and P. Scipio to be cast in Prison. And if we make a further search we shall quickly find, that M. Drusus being Tribune caused Philip the Consul to be cast headlong out of his seat, to the no small danger of his life, only for interrupting him in the middle of a factious speech; which was an insolency beyond imprisonment. To speak of their behaviour towards the other Magistrates were a thing impertinent. For if the Consuls and Dictator's could not scape their hands, there is no question to be made but that the Praetors, Censors, Quaestors, yea the Pontifices themselves, were most abundantly debased and insulted on by these popular Tyrants.  
(10) Thus have we brought the Tribunes to as great an height both for power and insolency, as were the Ephori before; and thereby made them ready for the greater fall. A fall which was not long a coming after they had made up the measure of their pride and tyranny. For Lucius Sylla having brought the estate of Rome under his command, and knowing full well how dangerous these men would be to him, if they were suffered to continue in their former power, set forth a law by which they were reduced to their ancient bounds; enabled only to relieve, not to wrong the Subject. Sylla Tribunis Pl●bis lege sua injuriae faciendae potestatem ademit, auxilii ferendi reliquit, as we read in Tully 
r Id. ibid. . A thing that much displeased the people, and the Tribunes more. But Sylla was no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, no great applier of himself to the people's humours, and therefore cared but little how they took the matter. Pompey succeeding him in power and in purpose too, took a course quite contrary; and reestablished them in that authority whereof Sylla had of late deprived them. For finding that the common people longed for nothing more than to see the Office of the Tribunes in the height again, and being resolved to lay the foundation of his greatness on the affections and dependence of the common people 
s Plutarch. in Pompeio. , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he gratified them in that point, and thought himself an happy man to find so fair an opportunity to oblige them to him. On which deceitful grounds (for they proved no other) he set them in their power again, as before was said; for which he stands accused by Quintus, 
t Cicero de Leg●bu●. l 3.  and I think deservedly: Certain I am that Pompey bought the short affection and applause of the common people at no less a price then his own destruction: the Tribunes being the very men which pulled down his p●ide 
u Plutarch in I. Caesare. , and set up Caesar to oppose him. Who going the same way to work that Sylla did, and knowing that a Tribune and a Tribunitian spirit were no friends to Monarchy, left them the name, but nothing else. The power and privilege of the Office he kept unto himself for his own security 
x Dion histor. Rom. lib. 53. ; as one that understood, none better, how many notable advantanges he should gain thereby, for the confirming of his Empire. Which course Augustus followed also, taking the Tribunitian power into his own hands, posito Triumviri nomine 
y Tacitus Annal. lib. 1. , assoon as the Triumvirate was expired by the death of his partners; and from thence reckoned the years of his Government, as Tribunitiae potestatis tertium, quartum, etc. which his Successors did after his example till the time of Constantine, when the name of Tribune was laid by as a thing forgotten 
z Rosin. Antiq. Rom. . The Empire was then cast into another kind of mould than it had been formerly; new Offices ordained, new forms of Government introduced, and a new Rome built: and to what purpose should they keep the name, when the thing was gone?  
(11) Let us look back on all that is said before, and we shall find but little reason to rely upon calvin's word. He saith the Tribunes were fet up to oppose the Consuls; but the best Writers do affirm that they were instituted only to protect the people, and to protect the people in such cases only when they did suffer any tort or unjust oppression. He reckoneth them for instances of such popular Magistrates as were ordained to moderate and restrain the vast power of Kings and other Supreme Magistrates; but the best Writers do affirm that the Tribunes were not instituted till the Kings were outed; nor instituted at the first to restrain the Consular power, though by degrees they did restrain it as they pleased; and finally that they were again abridged of their power and tyranny, assoon as Monarchy was restored, and the State brought to be obedient to one Sovereign Prince. He seems to intimate that the Consuls were not wronged by such oppositions as the Tribunes daily made against them, and that the Tribunes did no more in such oppositions then by their place and office they were bound to do. But the best Writers do affirm that the Consuls made complaint from time to time of those wrongs and insolences which those proud creatures of the people did afflict them with; and they complained not without cause, as their stories tell us. So that there is but little ground for the supposition, touching the first creation of these mighty Tyrants, which Calvin trimly puts upon us; less for the application of it to his end and purpose. What other power soever they enjoyed or exercised more than the power of interceding, when any Bill or Ordinance was to pass the Senate, by which the people might have suffered in their goods and liberties, was an encroachment on the Consuls, and wrested from them by strong hand, sometimes with blood, but never without dangerous tumults. The best use can be made of such false surmises, especially when they are false and factious too (and some good uses may be made of the strongest poisons) is that an Item may be taken by all Kings, Princes▪ and Supreme Governors to have a care of their Estates, and neither suffer any Tribunes, or men of Tribunitian spirits, or such as challenge to themselves Tribunitian power, to grow up under them, or live within the verge of their Dominions. The Tribune and the Tribunitian spirit are no friend to Monarchy; and have so much of Pompey in them (who restored the Office) that they will never be content to endure an equal, much less to suffer a Superior. For further proof of which (if more proof be requisite) and for discovering to the world with what arts and practices those factious and seditious spirits did attain their height: it would be a most excellent piece of service to all Sovereign Princes, if a just Tribunitian history were composed by some man of judgement, for the recovery of this Age from the present maladies, and a Memento to the future. But this I leave to those who have time and leisure, and other fit abilities to go through with it. I have another task in hand, and the Demarchi call upon me to pass on to Athens, where we are like to find worse work than we met with hitherto. Worse work I mean in this respect, that we are like to find less ground for the supposition; for otherwise we are like to find no work at all, as will appear more evidently by that which followeth.   

CHAP. IU. Of what authority the DEMARCHI were in the State of ATHENS; and of the danger and unfitness of the instances produced by CALVIN.  

(I) Athens first governed by Kings, and afterwards by one Sovereign Prince under other titles.  
(TWO) The Annual Magistrates of Athens what they were, and of what authority.  
(III) By whom and what degrees the State of Athens was reduced to a Democraty.  
(IV) Of the authority of the Senate, and the famous Court of the Areopagites.  
(V) What the Demarchi were in the State of Athens, and of what authority.  
(VI) The Demarchi never were of power to oppose the Senate, nor were ordained to that end.  
(VII) Calvin's ill luck in making choice of three such instances, which if true, would not serve his turn.  
(VIII) The danger which lieth hidden under the disguise of such popular Magistrates, as are here instanced in by Calvin.  
(IX) What moved Calvin to lay these dangerous stumbling-blocks in the Subjects way.  
(X) The dangerous oppositions and practices which have hence ensued in most parts of Europe.  
(XI) The sect of CALVIN professed Enemies to Monarchy, and the power of Princes.   
(1) THE State of Athens, as were all others at the first, was under the Government of Kings, all of them of the race of Cecrops, from whom his Successors were called Cecropidae: and they, as other Kings in those ancient times, ut libitum imperitabant 
a Tacit. Annal. lib. 3. , governed the people under them by no other rule then their own discretion. Theseus the tenth from Cecrops, was the first King of Athens which let go his hold, and parted with so many of the Regal rights, as made the King's weak and the Subjects wanton. For having a desire to incorporate all the Inhabitants of Attica into the City of Athens, the better to unite them against foreign force, and to assemble them together as occasion served, he was fain to win them to it by large promises of giving them some share in the public Government: without which bait, the wealthier sort, and such as had authority in their several Burroughs, could not be drawn into the City 
b Plutarch in Theseo. . Yet still he kept unto himself and to his successors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as we find in Plutarch, the chief Cnmmandery in the wars, and the preservation of the laws, together with a superintendency in matters which concerned Religion; the main points of Sovereignty. And in this State things stood till the death of Codrus, the seventh from Theseus, who giving up his own life to preserve his Country, became so honoured and admired amongst his people, that they resolved for his sake to have no more Kings, for fear they should never meet with any who might be worthy to succeed him: which was one of the prettiest wanton quarrels that ever was picked against a Monarchy. The Princes which succeeded after his decease, they called not Kings, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Governors; but the change was only in the name, and in the manner of their getting the Supreme authority. For being once invested with the Supreme power, they held it during life without check or censure; as is affirmed by Africanus, an ancient writer: who laying down the succession of the Kings of Athens, to the death of Codrus 
d African. apud Eusib. Chron. edit. Scaliger. , adds this, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that after them succeeded the perpetual Archonte●, who held the Government during life. The like Eusebius doth affirm 
e Euseb. in Chro. , and all Authors else, which treat of the affairs of Athens. The difference was, that formerly the Kingdom was successive merely, entailed upon the Princes of the line of Cecrops, now it began to be Elective, and to be given to them who best pleased the people: Et loco libertatis erat, quod eligi coeperunt 
f Tacit. hist. l. 1. , and it was some degree of liberty, (and a great one too) that they had power to nominate and elect their Princes. But long they did not like of this, although no doubt a great intrusion on the Regal dignity. The Princes were too absolute when they held for life, not so observant of the people as it was expected; because not liable to account, nor to be called unto a reckoning till it was too late, till death had freed them from their faults, and the people's censure. And therefore having tried the Government of 13 of these perpetual Archontes, of which Medon the son of Codrus was the first, and the last Al●maeon; In decem annos Magistratuum consuetudo conversa est 
g Euseb. in Chr. , they introduced another custom, and every tenth year changed their Governors. These they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
h African. apud Euseb. Chronic. , or Decennial Archontes; of which they had but seven in all, and then gave them over: and from that time were governed by nine Officers or Magistrates chosen every year, who for that cause waa called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or the Annual Magistrates. And yet it is to be observed that in both these changes, the Archon whosoever he was, and whether he was for term of life or for ten years only, had all the power which formerly was belonging to the Kings, save the very name; in which regard Eusebius doth not stick to call them by the name of Kings: where speaking of the institution of these Annual Magistrates, he doth thus express it, Athenis Annui principes constituti sunt cessantibus Regibus 
i Euseb. Chron. , as St. Hierom renders it.  
(2) Now for these Annual Magistrates, they were these that follow, that is to say, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
k jul. Pollux in Onomast. l. 8. c. 9 ▪ which we may call the Provost (who 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was called the Archon) the Bishop or High Priest, the Marshal, and the six Chief Justices. Of these the Provost was the chief, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of whom they did denominate the ensuing year, and by whose name they dated all their private contracts, and Acts of State. 
l Id. ibid. Sect. 2.  To him it appertained to have a care of celebrating the Orgies of Bacchus, and the great festival which they termed Thargelia, consecrated to Apollo and Diana; as also to take cognizance of misdemeanours, and in particular to punish those who were common drunkards; and to determine in all cases which concerned matter of inheritance: and furthermore to nominate Arbitrators for the ending of fuits and private differences, to appoint Guardians unto Orphans, and Overseers unto women left with child by their husbands. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whom we call the Bishop or high Priest, had the charge of all the sacred mysteries 
m Id. ibid. Sect. 3. , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the administration of the usual and accustomed sacrifices; together with the cognizance of sacrilege, profaneness, and all other actions which concerned Religion, as also power to inter●●ct litigious persons (or Common Barretters as we call them) from being present at the celebrating of the holy mysteries. And he retained the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because that anciently their Kings, (as in all places else) had the chief hand in matters which related to the public service of the Gods, and the solemn sacrifices. On the which reason and no other, the Romans had their Regem Sacrificulum, (whom Plutarch calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
n Plutarch in Problemat. , in imitation of the Latin, but Dionysius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
o Dionys. Halicarnens. hist. l. 5.,  in the true Greek phrase); of which Livy thus. Rerum deinde divinarum habita cura: & quia quaedam publica sacra per ipsos Reges factitata erant, necubi Regum desiderium esset, Regem Sacrificulum creant 
p Livy hist. Rman. lib. 2. . But to proceed, the Polemarchus whom we English by the name of Marshal, sat judge in cases of sedition, and such whereby the grandour of the State might suffer detriment; as also in all actions which concerned either Denizens, or Merchant-strangers: and unto him it appertained to sacrifice to Diana and to Mars, the two military Deities 
q Jul. Pollux in Onomast. l. 8. c. 9 3. , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and to prescribe the funeral pomp for such as lost their lives in their Country's service. Each of these had their two Assessors, of their own election; but so that they were bound to choose them out of the Senate of five hundred 
r Id. ibid. Sect. , from no lower rank. Finally for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whom we call Chief Justices, they were six in number, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
s Suidas in Lex. , and had authority to give judgement absolutely in all civil pleas, to judge of strangers which abused the privileges which they had in the City, of bribery, conspiracies, false inscriptions, in cases of adultery and public crimes; in points of trade, and actions which concerned the Stannaries 
t Jul. Poll●x in Onomall. l. 8 c. 9 sect. 1. ; as also to review the sentence of the Provost, and the decrees of the Senate if occasion were; and to give notice to the people, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Julius Pollux, if any man preferred a law which was not profitable and expedient for the Commonwealth. Such were the Officers, and such the duty of those Officers, ordained at Athens, upon the last alteration of the Government which before we spoke of: and amongst these we find not any popular Magistrate, who was to have a care of the Common people, and to preserve them in their rights and liberties from the oppression of the greater and more powerful Citizens; much less set up of purpose to oppose the Senate. And to say truth, we must not look for any such amongst the nine, nor in these times in which this alteration of the Government was first established. They could not fall immediately from a Regal State, to a Democratical, but they must take the aristocraty in the way unto it. They had been under Kings at first, or such as had the power of Kings, although not the name. And when they chose these Annual Officers, they chose them ex nobilibus urbis, out of the Nobles only, as Eusebius hath it 
u Euseb. Chron. : which Scaliger is forced to grant to be so at first 
x Scaliger in Animadvers. , though out of a desire to confute his Author, he would very fain have had it otherwise. Whether or no they had such Officers as Calvin dreams of, when they had settled their Democraty, we shall see anon: having first shown by whom and by what degrees the government of the State was cast on the people's shoulders, and the form thereof made merely popular or Democratical. For certainly it is most true, that never any Democratical State shown itself at the first in its proper colours, or came into the world by a lawful entrance; but crept into it secretly at the backdoor either of faction or sedition.  
(3) Now the first man that gave the hint to the Democraty, and made the people fall in love with a factious liberty, was Theseus, a valiant but unfortunate King, who the better to induce the people of Attica to desert their dwellings, and be incorporated into Athens, promised them (as before was said) that all of them should have some share in the public government, and after the form and manner of a Commonwealth. And so far he performed his promise, as to divest himself of some parts of Sovereignty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and laid the first foundation of that popular State, which was after built: but he paid dear for it 
y Plutarch. in Th●seo. . For the people who before had been so tractable, that they would do whatsoever their Kings commanded, at the first words speaking; began to take more state upon them, and became so stub born, that they would do nothing on command, but looked to be flattered with and courted, upon all occasions 
z Id●ibid. . Which being noted by Menestheus a popular man, but otherwise of the Royal blood, he so said that humour, and wrought so finely on them by his wit and cunning, that Theseus was in fine deposed, and his sons disherited, and the remainder of the Royalty conferred by them upon Menestheu●, as their deed of gift. And though no doubt the people did improve their power, both when their Kings became elective, and when their Governors were elected but for term of years, and specially when the Magistrates were no more than Annual; yet they could get no further than an aristocraty, till the time of Solon; which were about 170 years after the Annual Officers were first established: the Annual Officers being established in the first year of the 5. Olympiad, and Solon's reformation happening in the second of the 47. But Solon being chosen Provost (or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,) and finding the Republic much embroiled in dangerous factions which had been long since bred between the Nobles and Commons, in the change of Governments: took on him by the joint consent of both parties, the emendation of the laws, and the reducing of the State of the Commonwealth to a more peaceable and equal temper 
a Id. in Solone. . And he so ordered their affairs, that the chief Offices of the City remained in the hands of the Nobility, as before they were; which for the time contented them: but the election of those Officers, and the dernier resort, or the admittance of Appeals upon Writs of error (as we call them); that he confirmed unto the people; which did not only please the people for the present time, but put them into a condition of drawing to themselves the supreme authority. Insomuch that Aristotle though he seem to say, that Solon settled in the City a mixed form of Government, the Court of Areopagites (which he also instituted) pretending to an oligarchy, the Annual Officers or Archontes to an aristocraty, and the power of judicature being vested in the common people, unto a Democraty 
b Aristot. Politic. l. 2. c. 10. : yet he confesseth at the last, that this power of judicature, and the necessity which all men found of applying themselves unto the people, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, changed the Republic in conclusion to a mere Democraty, as it continued till his time. But yet it was not brought about but with great ado, Pisistratus first reducing the estate to an absolute Monarchy 
c Plutarch. in So●one. , (which because he got it from them by fraud and force, they called a Tyranny) and after Clisthenes freeing his country from that yoke (by driving his posterity out of Attica) restoring it unto an aristocraty 
d Id. in Aristide, in Pericle, et Cim●nc. , as before it was. At last it seemed good to Aristides, though for a time he concurred with Clisthenes in his form of government, to cast a more indulgent eye on the common people, who had behaved themselves exceeding gallantly in the dreadful war against the Persians: and to cause a law to be enacted that all authority and power of government should be communicated equally to all the Citizens, 
e Id. in Aristide.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and that they should be capable of all the Offices and honours in the Commonwealth. Which as it added much to the authority of the common people, so that authority was increased much more by the Arts of Pericles; who bearing a grudge unto the Court of the Areopagites, whereof he was never any Member, and finding that the power thereof, and of the Senate of five hundred, did derogate exceeding much from the power of the people, to whose faction he was wholly wedded: by the help and setting on of Ephialtes (a busy and popular man) took from them the hearing and determining of the weightiest causes 
f Id. in Pericle & ●imone. , and put them over to the judgement and decision of the common people, who had no more before but the last appeal: and thereby perfected and produced that pure Democraty, which had so often been desired, but in vain attempted.  
(4) The people being screwed to this height of power▪ and the dignity of the supreme Courts so much diminished, a man would think there was but little need of such popular Officers as Calvin speaks of, ordained of purpose (as he thinks) to oppose the Senate, and counterbalance their authority. Nor were those Courts at any time so inclined to tyranny, or likely in their constitution to oppress the people, when their authority was greatest, and their power most eminent, as that the people needed any special Officers to restrain their insolences, or to confine them to the limits of their Jurisdiction. Now for the Senate, it consisted at the first of 400 persons, an hundred out of every Tribe; and to that number was restrained by Solon, whose device it was 
g Id. in Solone. : but Clisthenes, having increased the number of the Tribes to ten, added one hundred more, which made five in all, (for each tribe fifty) and so continued till the expiration of that Commonwealth. A chief part of their business was, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. to deliberate and debate of all such matters as were to be commended to the care of the common people, that when the whole body of the people was assembled together, no point should be propounded to them but what the Council of five hundred had fitted and prepared for their resolution 
h Id. ibid. . It also appertained to them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. to consult about denouncing war and raising moneys, to advise upon the making of new Laws, to judge of any accident which at any time happened in the City, and of such matters which concerned their Allies and neighbours; to impose tribute on the Subject, and to take care both of the Navy and the Temples; and furthermore to inqure into the carriage of the City Magistrates, to appoint keepers unto Prisoners taken in the wars, to judge of suits concerning Orphans, and sometimes in such cases as belonged more properly to a Court of war 
i Xenophon de Repub. Athen. . Other particulars there are which they were to deal in, but these the principal: and these though points of great concernment, and arguments of the power and trust committed to them, were little like to tempt them to abuse their power in the oppressing of the people. For besides that they were chosen but for one year only 
k Xen●phon de Repub. Athen. , and that too not without a previous inquisition into their former life and conversation; which were sufficient to induce them to hold fair quarter with the people by all means imaginable: they were bound by oath at their admission to that honour, to consult the people's good and benefit in most special manner, and not to imprison any of them, how mean soever, unless he were found guilty of some practice to betray the City, and diminish the authority and power of the people; or that being one of the Farmers of the Tolls and Taxes, or a Collector of the Tributes, he became non-solvent, and had not cleared his account with the Commonwealth 
l D●mosthen. in oratione come. N●ce●am. . As for the Court or Council of the Areopagites, it consisted from the first beginning, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of such and such alone who had formerly been of the number of the nine chief Magistrates 
m Plutarch in Solone, & Pericle. ; and they being once admitted held for term of life: which made them, being men of eminence and reputation, to be more able to annoy the people, and to entrench upon them in their rights and liberties, had their mind been answerable. For unto them belonged the general superintendency of all things in the Commonwealth, and them did Solon trust with this special power, that they should be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
n Id. in. Solen. , and see the Laws to be maintained and to have their course: and in particular to judge in the case of murder, and manslaughter, and briefly in all Capital causes. And with these Courts or Counsels, call them which you will, the prudent Legislator thought that he had settled and confirmed the Commonwealth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as with two strong Anchors, in such a firm and constant manner, that neither the fabric of the State should be easily shaken, nor the people apt to take offence, or run themselves upon unpeaceable and seditious courses.  
(5) But if the Senate or the Council should abuse their power, and use that sword to the oppression of the common people, which was committed to their hands for their weal and benefit: might not, and did not the Demarchi take the people's part, and save them from the wrongs and injuries intended towards them? Calvin so intimates indeed, but he speaks without book, being more guided to that error by the sound and etymology of the word, then by the nature of the office. The best Greek Authors who have written the affairs of Rome, do call the Tribunes of the people by this name Demarchi, and their authority or Office by the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 also. Nothing more common in Polybius, Halicarnensis, Plutarch, and whosoever else have left us any thing of the Roman stories in that language. But the Demarchi of Athens were of no such power, and had but small authority (God wots) in affairs of State. Measure them by the definition which is given by Suidas, and he will tell you that they were certain Officers appointed in the Burroughs and free Towns of Attica, (being twelve in number) 
o Suidas in Lex.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And for his power, he tells us that it did especially consist in making a Terrier of the lands of every Township, and keeping of the public Registers which concerned the Burrow, in calling the people of the Town together when their occasions did require it, and calculating of their voices by the poll, or scrutiny, and sometimes in distraining on their goods and chattels, if any of them were indebted to the State either in amerciaments or contributions. But take his own words with you for the more assurance. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (saith he) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
p Id. ibid. . The Author of the Etymologicon magnum saith the same with Suidas, but in sewer words; and he describes this mighty man of whom Calvin dreams, to be no other than the Bailiff of some ancient Burrow is with us in England, his power being limited and confined within the perambulation of his own Parish, in which he could do little more than take the valuation of his neighbour's estate, and tell how much he was to be assessed at in the Subsidy Book 
q Etymologicon Magnum in De●archo. , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So he, which is in sum what we had before. 'Tis true, there was another Officer of the same name in the City also, and for each tribe one; the Alderman of the Ward we may fitliest call him; but not of much more power and reputation than the Countrey-Bailiff. Of these saith Harpocration an old Grammarian, that they were called Naucrari at the first, and had authority to arrest or destrain such persons as stood indebted to the Exchequer or the Commonwealth. 
r Harpocrat. in Demarcho.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so Harpocration briefly in his wont manner. But Julius Pollux in his Onomasticon goes to work more plainly, and telleth us of these Demarchi, that they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
s Jul. Pollux l. 8. c. 9 sect. 30. , the governor's or Aldermen of their several Wards, that formerly they were called Naucrari; that anciently the twelfth part of a Tribe or Ward was called Naucraria, and in the later times the whole Ward itself; that these Demarchi had the ordering of the Taxes raised in every Ward, and looked unto the issuing of them for the public use; and finally, that every Naucraria or Ward was to find two horsemen and one ship for the service of the Commonwealth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from whence in probability they derived the word. Add unto this from Suidas, as the close of all, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
t Suidas in Lex. , that they had also the setting forth of the great festival called Panathenaea; ordained by Theseus on the incorporating of all the people of Attica into the City of Athens 
u Plutarch in Theseo. .  
(6) Put all that hath been said together touching these Demarchi (and more than this I cannot find which concerns that Office) and we may easily perceive that they were men of no authority in affairs of State: so far from being likely to protect the people from the power and pressures of the Senate, that they were rather executioners, or Ministers of justice to afflict the people when the occasions of the Senate did require it of them. That the Demarchi were ordained to oppose the Senate, when it lay heavy on the necks of the common people; or actually did make head against them in behalf of the people if at any time they were oppressed and injured by it, cannot be found (I dare with confidence affirm) in any Author of good credit, either Greek or Latin. 'Tis true, there were some people-pleasers in the State of Athens, whom they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who by applying themselves to the people's humour, and seeming zealously affected to their power and profit, could lead them whither they would, and to what they listed: and sometimes did oppose themselves for the people's sake, not only against the Senate, but all other Magistrates. Of these it is that Aristotle doth make frequent mention in his books of Politics, and seems to prophecy, that if not looked into in time, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
x Aristot. Politi c. l. 5 c 5. , they would change the State into a Tyranny. But these were neither Officers of State, nor justice, nor indeed any Officers at all, though many times they did ill Offices to the Commonwealth, the better to advance the hopes of the popular faction, and by it themselves. And it is true which Aristotle tells us in another place, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the people had not only power to elect their Magistrates 
y Id. ibid. l 2. c. 12. , but to call them also to account, in case of maladministration; and had their proper Officers appointed to that end and purpose. But than it is true withal, that amongst them we meet not these Demarchi of whom Calvin dreams; or any others which stood up in behalf of the common people, but only in behalf of the Commonwealth. Of this sort were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superadded to the nine Archontes, and of authority to call them to an after-reckoning, if they found them guilty of extortion 
z Jul. Pollux. l. 8. c. 9 Sect. 16. : and of this sect were also those whom they called Logistae, some of the which (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
a Id. ibid. Sect. 13. , saith mine Author) were purposely appointed to observe and inquire into the Acts of the Senate, and to proceed against them when their time was out, according as they saw occasion: which kind of Overseers had an eye also on the Areopagites. And this is that which is observed by Aeschines the famous Orator, where speaking of the Fundamental constitutions of the Commonwealth, he tells us, that it was ordained by the Legislators, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
b Aeschin. in Orat. contra Dem●sto. & Ctesiphon. , that even the Senate of five hundred should give up an account of their ministration; and that the holy Council of the Areopagites should be obnoxious to the censure of the Logistae, for by that very name he calls them. Of any account they were to give to these Demarchi, or any thing they did the facto, or might do de jure, with reference to the ease and benefit of the common people, nothing but silence to be found in all Antiquity. And to say truth, it was not necessary that any popular Magistrates should be made of purpose, to save the people from the pride and tyranny of the higher Courts, which were accountable to the people upon all occasions, and were to be accountable to them according to the fundamental institution of the Commonwealth. The State of Athens being one of the absolutest Democraties which was ever extant, and so accounted of by all who writ of Politics, had little need or use of such popular Magistrates which Calvin fancieth in that place; which may be serviceable to the people in an aristocraty, but in a popular estate of no use at all. Which makes me wonder by the way, why Plato should affirm against right & reason, that the State of Athens in his time and the times before (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) was an aristocraty 
c Plato in Meneximo. : when by the current of all writers and the course of story, it appears most evidently that it was not only a Democraty, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
d Plutarch. in Cimone. , the purest and most unmixed Democraty that was ever read of.  
(7) Thus have we proved the first of the three points propounded in the beginning of this work, viz. that the Ephori, the Demarchi, and the Roman Tribunes were not ordained at first for those ends and purposes which are supposed by the Author: but more particularly, that neither the Ephori of Sparta were first instituted to oppose the Kings, nor the Tribunes first ordained to oppose the Consuls, nor the Demarchi of authority to oppose the Senate. And we have proved (which is directly contrary unto calvin's aim) that the Ephori were at first ordained to ease the Kings, and to be aiding to them against the Senate, who began sensibly to encroach on the Regal power: that the Tribunes were first instituted to no other end but to preserve the people from unjust oppression, and that their opposition to the Consuls was accounted always to be against the rules of their institution, and a breach of Articles: And as for these Demarchi whom we spoke of last, that neither by their institution nor by usurpation, they did oppose against the Senate in behalf of the people, but executed their commands upon the people, as their duty bound them. So that the great imagination which the Author had of showing to the world a view of such popular Magistrates, as might encourage men of place and eminence to think themselves ordained after these examples to moderate their licentiousness of Kings and Princes; is fallen directly to the ground without more ado, as being built upon a weak, nay a false foundation, not able to support the building. And more than so, in case the instances proposed had been rightly chosen, and that the Ephori in Sparta had been first ordained to oppose the Kings, the Tribunes to oppose the Consuls, and the Demarchi to keep under the Athenian Senate: yet these would prove but sorry instances of such popular Officers as were ordained ad moderandum Regum libidinem, to moderate the licentiousness of Kings & sovereign Princes, for proof of which they were produced. The Ephori were not instituted in the State of Sparta till the Kings were brought under the command of the Senate, and the State become an aristocraty, in which the Kings had very little left them of the Royal dignity but the empty name, and were in power no other than the Dukes of Venice; save that they were to have the command of the Armies, which those Dukes have not. And for the Tribunes, 'tis well known to every one who hath perused the Roman story, that there were no such creatures to be found in Rome, till the Romans had expulsed their Kings, & were under the command of Consul's; the Monarchy being changed to an optimaty, and the people bound by solemn oaths never to admit of a King amongst them. The like may be affirmed also of the Demarchi of Athens, supposing that they were of as great authority, as either the Ephori or the Tribunes; that they were instituted in a time when the affairs of State were managed by nine Annual Magistrates, all of them chosen by the people and accountable to them. In all these cases, ●um non in regno populus esset sed in libertate 
e Livy his●. lib. 2. , when the people had sued out their Wardship, and thought themselves to be at liberty, freed from those bonds which nature and allegiance formerly had laid upon them: they did no more than what a wise and understanding people had good cause to do, in taking the best course they could for their future safety. And in my mind the people pleaded most unanswerably in their own behalf, when they alleged, se foris pro imperio & libertate dimicantes, domi a civibus captos & oppressos 
f Id. ibid. , that fight valiantly abroad both for their own liberty and their Country's honour, against their Kings, they were oppressed and wronged at home by their fellow Citizens; that their condition as things stood, was better in times of war, then in times of peace; their liberty never more assured then when they were amongst their Enemies: and therefore being no otherwise bound to submit themselves to that change of Government, then as it had been introduced by their own consent, they had all the reason in the world to get as good terms as they could, and be no losers by the bargain. Which though it were the case and plea particularly of the people of Rome, might be used also very fitly by the Spartans' and Athenians on the self same reasons. But this can no way be pretended or alleged by those, who live in an established and successional Monarchy, where there is one only to command in chief, and nothing left to the Subject 
g Tacit. Annal.  praeter obsequii gloriam, but the glory of obedience only, and the necessity of submitting with a loyal heart to those commands and impositions which may be ●aid upon them with an unjust hand. So that admitting it for true (as indeed it is not) that the Ephori, the Demarchi, and the Tribunes were ordained for the ends supposed; yet it can follow by no rules of law or logic, that because such popular Officers have been sometimes instituted to keep the scale upright and the balance even, betwixt the Nobles and the People in an aristocraty, therefore the like are to be fancied in a settled Monarchy, for moderating the licentiousness, that is to say, (for that no doubt must be his meaning) for regulating the authority of the Sovereign Prince.  
(8) Thus have we seen a manifest discovery of calvin's purpose for setting up some popular Officers in every Kingdom to regulate the authority and restrain the power of Sovereign Princes; and we may see a secret and more subtle danger included in that short Parenthesis, than what is obvious at first sight to the unwary Reader. For by the instances proposed and presented to us, it seems to be his meaning, that these popular Officers should not h●ve power only to restrain their Kings when they transgress the bounds of law or equity, and either tyrannically oppress the Subject, or wilfully dilapidate the patrimony of the Commonwealth: but that they should set themselves against them and control their do, in the same way & after the same manner, as the Ephori did the Kings of Sparta, or the Tribunes did the Roman Consuls. Now we have shown before out of several Authors 
h Vide chap. 2. , that the Ephori did not only take upon them to appoint such Privy Counsellors about their Kings as to them seemed best, to limit and prescribe them in the choice of their wives; to send them out unto the wars and recall them home, as if they had been hirelings only and of no more reckoning; to put them upon fine and ransom, if they did any thing which was not pleasing to these humorous Gentlemen; to have them at command both to come and go as often as they whistled for them, or held up a finger, and finally to look for lowly reverence from them, whensoever they vouchsafed to summon them to attend their pleasures: but also to imprison; next to banish, and in fine to murder them. And we have showed you of the Tribunes 
i Vide chap. 3● , that after they had fortified themselves with large privileges, and grew predominant in the affections of the common people; they did not only quarrel and oppose the Consuls under pretence of setting forth new laws for the people's benefit, nor were content to put the people into the possession of all the offices and honours of the Commonwealth (which formerly belonged to the Nobles only) whether the Consuls would or not: but sometimes clapped them up in prison, and sometimes forced them to fly the Senate-house for their lives and safety, and sometimes threw them down headlong out of their Chairs of State, to the great danger of their lives, and disgrace of their persons. Prince's should be in worse condition than their meanest subjects, if they were under the command of such powerful masters, who being exalted from mean fortunes and ignoble families, little acquainted with good manners, and less with any thing which is brave and royal, would think themselves unworthy of so great an Office, should they not Lord it to the purpose, and exercise all kind of tyranny on their captived Kings, which insolence and malice could suggest unto them. If Jack be once in office he must be a Gentleman; and gallop to the Devil if he get on Horseback. Asperius nihil est humili cum surgit in altum, as the Poet hath it 
k Juvenal. S●i. . If once the bramble come to have Dominion over the trees of the Forest, he will not only rob the Olive of his fatness, the Vine of his rich Wines, and the Figtree of his sweetness, but also will devour the Cedars 
l Judg. c. 9 , even the Cedars of Lebanon. No King or other Supreme Magistrate shall dare to stand before them; or if he do, a fire shall come out of the Bramble, and consume him utterly. Such popular Officers as those of whom Calvin speaks, are of such credit and authority with the common people (whose Officers they are in name, but in fact their masters) that if they do but blow the Trumpet, and say, We have no part in David, nor no inheritance at all in the son of Jesse; 
m 2 Sam. ●0.  every man will unto his tents, and forsake the King or Supreme Magistrate to follow after them though men of Belial. And this I do believe the rather to be calvin's meaning, because G. Buchannan who built on his foundation, and pursued ●is Principles, doth not only exceedingly commend the act of Theopompus, in setting up the Ephori in the State of Sparta, and the Answer which he made his wife when she murmured at it: but thinks it very meet and reasonable that a free people (as all Subjects are in his opinion) should be armed with the like authority in reprimenda tyrannidis acerbitate 
n De jure regn● apud Scotos. , for the suppressing of tyrannical Government (in which themselves must be Judges) which the Ephori enjoyed at Sparta, and the Tribunes in the City of Rome. For though he durst not go so far in terminis, as to advise the instituting of such popular Magistrates as Calvin speaks of in this place; yet he comes very near it, to a tantamont. For that which Calvin doth ascribe to his popular Magistrates, Buchannan gives to the whole body of the people generally, to whom he doth allow as much authority over the persons of their Kings, Quod illi in singulos è multitndine habent 
o Id. ibid. , as they have over any one of the common people: and thinks it both unreasonable and absurd that they should not be called to account before the ordinary Judges of their several Kingdoms (which must supply the place of these popular Magistrates) as often as any of their subjects shall accuse them, of murder, or adultery, or neglects in government, or whatsoever else they shall charge them with; instancing in no fewer than twelve Kings of Scotland, who either were condemned to perpetual prison, or else by voluntary death or exile, Justas scelerum poenas ●ugerunt, escaped the punishment which was most justly due unto them (as he most impudently saith) for their wicked lives.  
(9) If any ask (as some justly may) what might induce our Author to these different courses, to la● so sure a groundwork for obedience in the first part of his discourse, and afterward to build upon it such a superstructure, as absolutely pulls up his own foundation: the answer is, that the man was very much distracted between his reason and his passion, his conscience and his private interess. Aliudque cupido, mens aliud suadet. His reason and his conscience told him, that every subject was to yield obedience to the authority and commands of the Sovereign Prince; and that if any other doctrine should be plainly preached, it would conduce both to the scandal and the hindrance of the Reformation. And his experience in the world could not choose but tell him, that many of the chief Reformers by their heat and violence had given too great advantage to the public Enemy; and made the Protestant Religion to be much suspected, Nil aliud quaerere & captare quam Seditionum opportunitatem 
p Calvin in Epistola Dedic. ad Franciscum. l. 1536. , for giving too much ground to seditious courses, and publishing some doctrines which were inconsistent with the rules of Government. This made him write so sound of the Subjects duty even to wicked Princes, and the unlawfulness of resisting in the way of Arms, though open force and violence were offered to them by ungodly Tyrants: and this he doth so well, that few do it better. Utinam sic semper errasset CALVINUS, as once the learned Cardinal said of him in another case. But then his interess in the cause and quarrel of Geneva, who by the help of some such popular Officers as he speaks of here, had not long before expelled their Bishop, who had also all the jurisdiction of a temporal Prince within the City and the territory which belonged unto it, inclined him to say somewhat which might serve to defend that action, and give the like advantage unto other Cities to follow the example which was laid before them. The case is briefly touched by Thuanus thus; 
q Thuan. Hist. sui temp. l.  Jus Supremi Dominii in Civitatem Genevae Episcopos semper penes se retinuisse, donec mutata religione, Syndici qui sub Episcopali autoritate libertatem antea tuebantur, illud proprium sibi fecere, & ejectis Episcopis sub imperii patrocinio Rempub. administrabant. The Sovereignty (saith he) or Supreme Dominion over the City of Geneva the Bishops still kept unto themselves, till in the alteration of Religion the Syndi●ks, who before preserved the liberty of the people under the government of the Bishops, assumed the same unto themselves, and absolutely casting out the Bishops governed it like a Commonwealth under the patronage or protection of the Germane Emperors. In which it is first clear on the Bishop's side, that they had jus Supremi Dominii, the Sovereignty or Supreme Dominion of the City. And so much is affirmed by Calvin, in another place, Habebat jus gladii & alias civilis juridictionis 
r Calvin in Epistola ad Sadoletum.  parts He had, saith he, the power of the Sword, and other parts of temporal jurisdiction; but as he thinks (but foolishly and against all records) Magistrat●i er●ptas, either by fraud or force extorted from the Civil Magistrate. Next it is clear, that the Bishops did continue the possession of this Supreme Power, till Viret and Farellus, two zealous Gospelers, came to live amongst them; who finding that those of Berne in the year 1528. had made an alteration of Religion, practised the like upon the City of Geneva. Which not being likely to effect with the Bishop's leave, and as little able to effect against his liking, considering the great power and sway, which legally and properly was inherent in him: they set the Syndicks (whom they had wrought upon before) to make head against him; who by a popular tumult made him fl●e the City, which presently they changed to a Commonwealth, after the manner of the Free or Imperial Cities. In which respect Calvin bestows upon Farellus the title of libertatis Patrem 
s In Epistola ad Minist. Tigurin. 1553. , the Father of that common liberty, which by his means the people of Geneva at that time enjoyed. As for the Syndicks by whose power and countenance they advanced the business, they were a kind of popular Officer, who had the care of looking to the conservation of the people's liberties, as Thuanus intimates; and were much used in many parts of France and Italy, as Bodinus tells us 
t Bodin de Repub. lib. ●. c. ●. . Their Office did consist of two special points: the one a Magistratibus rationem reposcere, to call the ordinary Magistrates to an after reckoning, 
u Id. ibid.  if they did any thing unworthy of their place and dignity, or to the hindrance and disservice of the Commonwealth; which had somewhat in it of the Ephori in the State of Sparta: the other was, prospicere ne tenuiores & infimae sortis homines a nobilibus, uti fit, ●premerentur, to have a care that the poor people be not wronged or injured (as many times it happeneth) by the power of the Nobles; which was the main reason for the institution of the Roman Tribunes. In this regard the Civil laws interpret Syndicus to be the same with defensor Civitatis 
y Calvin in Le●ico Jurid. verbo Syndicus. , the Conservator of the liberties of a Town or City, as full well they might: the Office being made up (as it seems it was) of that of the Ephori and the Tribunes mixed together. Now though this change was made before calvin's coming to Geneva, which was not till the year 1535, yet he affirms it of himself that whatsoever had been done in the alteration, suffragio meo comprobavi 
z Calvin in Epistola ad Cardinal. Sadolet. , he had confirmed and approved as a thing well done: and therefore thought himself to be no less obliged to defend the action, then if it had been done at first by his own command. For doubtless that of Tully is exceeding true, Nil refert utrum voluerim fieri vel gaudeam factum 
a Cicero in Philip. 2. : between the doing of a foul and disloyal act, and the approbation of it when it is done, is but little difference.  
(10) But to proceed; our Author being thus made a party in the cause and quarrel of Geneva, thought himself bound not only to justify unto others what himself approved; but also to lay down such grounds whereby the example might be followed, and their dislo●altie and rebellion the less observed, because they did not go alone without company. In which respect (and 'tis a thing to be observed) although that Book of Institutions hath been often printed, and received many alterations and additions (as before was noted) yet this particular passage still remains unal●ered, and hath continued as it is from the first Edition, which was in the year 1536. when the rebellion of Geneva was yet fresh and talked of as an ill example. Nor was the man deceived in his expectation; For as he grew into esteem and reputation in the world abroad, so he attained at last to that power and empire over the souls and consciences of his followers, that his errors were accounted Orthodox, his defects perfections, and the revolt of the Genevians from rheir natural Prince must by no means be called Rebellion, because projected and pursued by such popular Officers, to whom it appertained of common course to regulate the authority of Kings and Princes. And though he doth not say expressly that there either are or aught to be such popular Officers in every Realm or Commonwealth, but brings it in upon the by with his ifs and and's: yet ifs and and's are not allowed of in the laws to excuse rebellions 
b Bacon's history of King Henry the seventh. , and by the setting up of that dangerous Si quis (si qui sint populares Magistratus, as his words there are) he seems to make a Proclamation that where there were such popular Officers, it was their bounden duty to correct their Princes after the manner of Geneva; where there were none, the people were (God help them) in an ill condition, unless some other means were thought of, for their ease and remedy. Upon which Principles of his, his followers raised such Positions, and pursued such practices as have distracted and embroiled the most parts of Europe, and made it of a Garden to become a Wilderness. For finding that they could not easily create such Popular Magistrates to lord it over Kings and Princes who had not been accustomed to the like controlments; they put that power of regulating the Supreme Authority either upon the body of the people generally, whereof you were told before from Buchannan, or upon such to whom they should communicate or transfer their power, as occasion served, whereof you may hear further in that which followeth. And that not only in the case of civil liberty, for which the examples of the Ephori and the Roman Tribunes were at first found out, and that of the Demarchi thrust upon the Readers for the like foul end; but specially in such matters which concerned Religion, wherein the extraordinary calling of some men in the holy Scriptures must serve for Precedents and examples to confirm their practices. From hence it was that Buchannan doth not only subject his King unto the Ordinary Judges and Courts of Justice as before was noted: but fearing that Kings would be too potent to be so kept under, adviseth this, Eorum interfectoribus praemia decerni 
c Buchann. de jure Regni. , that rewards should publicly be decreed for those who kill a Tyrant (and Kings and Tyrants are the same as heretofore in the word and notion, so now in the opinion of the Presbyterian or Calvinian faction) as usually are proposed to those who kill Wolves, or Bears. From hence it was that the inferior or Subordinate Magistrate is advanced so high, as to be entitled to a power, adversus Superiorem Magistratum se, Rempub. & Ecclesiam etiam armis defendere 
d Paraeus in Epistola ad Rom. cap. 13. , of taking Arms against the King or superior Magistrate, in defence of himself, his Country and true Religion: which though they are the words of Paraeus only, yet they contain the mind and meaning of all the rest of that faction, as his son Philip doth demonstrate 
e In Append. ad Cap. 13. Epist. ad Rom. . Hence was it that John Knox, delivered for sound Orthodox doctrine, Procerum esse propria autorit●te Idololatrian tollere, & Principes intra legum rescripta per vim reducere 
f Camden. Annal. Eliz. An. 1559. , that it belonged unto the Peers of each several Kingdom to reform matters of the Church by their own authority, and to confine their Kings and Princes within the bounds prescribed by law, even by force of Arms. Hence that Geselius' one of the Lecturers of Rotterdam preached unto his people, that if the Magistrates and Clergy did neglect their duty in the reformation of Religion, necesse est id facere pl●beios, that then it did belong to the Common people 
g Necessaria Respons. , who were bound to have a care thereof and proceed accordingly. And as for points of practice, should we look that way, what a confusion should we find in most parts of Europe, occasioned by no other ground then the entertainment of these principles and the scattering of these positions amongst the people? Witness the Civil wars of France 
g Jean de Serres inventaire de Fr. , the revolt of Holland 
h History of the Netherlands. , the expulsion of the Earl of East-Friezland out the City of Embden 
i Thuan h●st. l. 114. , the insurrections of the Scots 
k Camden. Annal. An. 1559. , the tumults of Bohemia 
l Laurca Austriaca. , the commotions of Brandenbourg 
m Continuati. Thuan. hist l. 8. , the translation of the Crown of Sweden from the King of Pole to Charles Duke of Finland 
n Thuan. hist. l. 8.  the change of Government in England: all acted by the Presbyterian or Calvinian party in those several States, under pretence of Reformation and redress of grievances.  
(11) And to say truth, such is the Genius of the sect, that though they may admit an equal (as parity is the thing most aimed at by them both in Church and State) yet they will hardly be persuaded to submit themselves to a Superior; to no Superiors more unwillingly then to Kings and Princes: whose persons they disgrace, whose power they ruinated, whose calling they endeavour to decry and blemish by all means imaginable. First for their calling, they say it is no other than an humane Ordinance, and that the King is but a creature of the people's making; whom having made, they may as easily destroy and unmake make again. Which as it is the darling doctrine of this present time, so is it very eagerly pursued by Buchannan, who affirms expressly, Quicquid juris populus alicui dederit, idem justis de causis posse reposcere 
o Buchann. de ●ure Regni. , that whatsoever power the people give unto their King or Supreme Magistrate, they may resume again upon just occasions. Their power they make so small and inconsiderable, that they afford them very little even in matters temporal, and no authority at all in things spiritual. CALVIN professeth for himself, that he was very much aggrieved to hear that King Henry the eight, had took unto himself the title of Supreme Head of the Church of England, accuseth them of inconsiderate zeal, nay blasphemy, who conferred it on him; and though he be content at last to allow Kings a Ministerial power in matters which concern the Reformation of God's Public Worship, yet he condemns them as before of great inconsiderateness, Qui facerent eos nimis spirituales 
p Calvin in Amos cap. 7. , who did ascribe unto them any great authority in spiritual matters. The designation of all those who bear public office in the Church, the calling of Counsels or Assemblies, the presidency in those Counsels, ordaining public Fasts, and appointing Festivals, which anciently belonged unto Christian Princes as the chief branches of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction which is vested in them; are utterly denied to Kings and Princes in their Books of Discipline. In so much that when the Citizens of Embden did expel their Earl, they did it chief for this reason, Quod se negotiis Ecclesiasticis & Consistorialibus praeter jus & aequitatem immisceret 
q Thuan. hist. l. 114. , that he had intermeddled more than they thought fit in Ecclesiastical causes, and entrenched too much upon their Consistory. As for their power in temporal or civil causes, by that time Knox's Peers and Buchannans Judges, Paraeus his inferior Magistrates, and calvin's popular Officers have performed their parts, in keeping them within the compass of the laws; arraigning them for their offences, if they should transgress; opposing them by force of arms, if any thing be done unto the prejudice of the Church or State; and finally in regulating their authority, after the manner of the Spartan Ephori, and the Roman Tribunes: all that is left will be by much too little for a Roy d' Ivitot, or for a King of Clouts, as we English phrase it. Last of all, for their persons which God held so sacred, that he gave it for a law to his people Israel, not to speak evil of their Princes, saying, Thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy people; Let us but look upon these men, and we shall find the basest attributes too, good for the greatest Kings. Calvin calls Mary Queen of England by the name of Proserpina 
r Calvin in Amos cap. 7. , and saith that she did superare omnes Diabolos, that all the Devils of hell were not half so mischievous. Beza affords Queen Mary of Scotland no better titles than those of Medea and Athaliah 
s Beza in Epist. ad Jo. ; of which the last was most infamous in divine; the other no less scandalous in humane stories; the one a Sorceress and a Witch, the other a Tyrant and usurper. The Author of the Altar Damascenum, whosoever he was, can fin●e no better a tribute for King James of most blessed memory, then infensissimus Evangelii hostis 
t Didoclavius in Epistola ad L●ctor. , the greatest and deadly enemy of the Gospel of Christ. And Queen Elizabeth herself did not scape so clear, but that the zealous Brethren were too bold sometimes with her name and honour, though some of them paid dearly for it, and were hanged for their labour. How that seditious Huguenot, the Author of the lewd and unworthy Dialogue, entitled Eusebius Philadelphus, hath dealt with three great Princes of the House of France, and what reproachful names he gives them, I had rather you should look for in the Author then expect from me; being loath to wade too far in these dirty pudoles; save that I shall be bold to add this general Character which Didoclavius gives to all Kings in general; viz. Naturâ insitum est in ●mnibus Regibus Christi odium, that all Kings naturally hate Christ; which may serve for all. This is enough to let us see, how irreconcilable an hatred▪ these of the Calvinian faction bear against Kings and Princes; how well they play the part of the very Antichrist in exalting themselves against whatsoever is called God; and that the special reason why they affect so much to be called the Saints, is out of a strong probable hope to see the day in which they shall bind Kings in chains, and all the Princes of the earth in fetters of iron. Finally such is their disaffection unto sacred Monarchy, which they have sucked out of the grounds and principles here laid down by Calvin, that we may justly say of them what was most truly said of the ancient Romans, quasi nefas esset Regem aliquem prope eorum terminos esse 
u Justin. hist. l. 29. , they have bestirred themselves so bravely in defiance of the Regal Government, as if they did account it an unpardonable sin to suffer any King, though most good and gracious, to border near them. Which lest they should not be of power to compass by their popular Magistrates, or by the Judges, or the Peers, or the People severally; which make the main Battle for this combat: let us next look on the Reserve, and see what hopes they have to effect the business by the three Estates conjoined in Parliament, (or by what other name soever we shall call their meeting) which CALVIN in the last place doth reflect upon, but cautiously with a qua forte, or a peradventure, as in that before.   

CHAP. V What are the three Estates in each several Kingdom, of which CALVIN speaks, and what particularly in the Realm of ENGLAND.  

(I) Of the division of a People into three Estates; and that the Priests or Clergy have been always one.  
(TWO) The Priests employed in Civil matters and affairs of State, by the Egyptians and the Persians, the Greeks, Gauls, and Romans.  
(III) The Priests and Levites exercised in afaffairs of Civil Government by Gods own appointment.  
(IV) The Prelates versed in Civil matters and fairs of State, in the best and happiest times of Christianity.  
(V) The Clergy make the third Estate in Germany, France, Spain, and the Northern Kingdoms.  
(VI) That anciently in the Saxon times the ecclesiastics of this Realm were called to all public Counsels.  
(VII) The Prelates an essential fundamental part of the English Parliament.  
(VIII) Objections answered, and that the word Clerus in the Legal notion, doth not extend unto the Prelates.  
(IX) That the inferior Clergy of the Realm of England had anciently their votes in Parliament, to all intents and purposes as the Commons had.  
(X) Objections answered; and that the calling of the Clergy to Parliaments and Convocations, were after different manners, and by several writs.  
(XI) The great disfranchisement and slavery obtruded on the English Clergy, by the Idepriving of the Bishops of their Votes in Parliament.  
(XII) A brief discussion of the question, whether any two of the three Estates conspiring or agreeing together, can conclude any thing unto the prejudice of the third.   
BUt first before we fall on the point itself, and search into the power ascribed by Calvin to the three Estates of every Kingdom, we must first see what kind of men they are, and of what condition, who constitute the said Estates: which being fi●st settled and determined, we shall the better be enabled to proceed accordingly in the inquiry after that authority which our Author gives them of regulating the proceed of the sovereign Prince, and putting a restraint on the exorbitant power of Kings. In which we shall presume for granted what our Author gives us, viz. tres Ordines in singulis Regnis, that in each several Kingdom there are three Estates; and those three we shall prove to be (though our Author is no otherwise to be understood) the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Common people: which distribution of the Subject into three Estates as 'tis very ancient, so was the distribution of them into three, neither more nor less, founded on good prudential motives and grounds of Polity. For as judicious Bodin very well observeth, should there be only two Estates, and no more than so, either upon such differences as might rise between them the one side would be apt to compel the other by force of violence; or else, aequatis Ordinum suffragiis 
a Bodin de Repub. l. 3. cap. u●t. , the balance being even between them, their meetings would be many times dissolved without producing any notable effect to the benefit of the Commonwealth. In which respect the counterpoise or addition of a third Estate was exceeding necessary, ut alterutri sese adjungens utrumque conciliet, that joining unto either of the other two, it might unite them both into one opinion, and advance the service of the public. And on the other side were there more than three, opinionum multitudo, the difference of opinions, and pretence of interesses, would keep them at perpetual distance, and hinder them from pitching upon any point, in which all their purposes and aims were to be concentred. So that the casting of the body of a people into three Estates, seems most convenient for the furtherance of the public service: and of those three three Estates the Priests (or Clergy, as we call them since the times of CHRIST) have generally been accounted one. For though Hippodamus (whom Aristotle justly taxeth for defects 
b Aristot. Politic. l.  in Politic) ordained his three Estates to be the Soldiery, the Handicraftsman, and the Husbandman: yet wiser Statists saw no reason that the two last should pass for several estates or ranks of men, being that both might be more fitly comprehended under the name and rank of the common people. And therefore the Egyptians did divide the people into these three ranks, the Priest, which is respondent to the Christian Clergy; the Soldier, who carrieth most resemblance to the State of Nebles; and those which lived by trades and labours, whom by one general name they called Operarii 
c Diodor. Siculus. , as we now the Commons: which coarse we find to be observed also by the ancient Gauls dividing their whole body into these three orders, 
d Caesar. de Bel ●o Gallico. l. 6.  the Druids, who had the charge of matters which concerned Religion; the Equites who managed the affairs of war; and then the Plebs, or common people, who were subordinate to the other two, and directed by them. How this division hath succeeded in the States of Christendom we shall see hereafter.  
(2) In the mean time we may take notice that the Priests of Egypt, the Druids of Gaul, and those who had the ordering of those services which concerned the gods, by whatsoever name or title they were known and called in other countries', were not so tied unto the Altars, and other ministerial Offices which concerned the gods, as not to have some special influence in ordering the affairs of the Commonwealth. The Priests of Egypt, as we read in Aelian (an Author of unquestioned credit) possessed the highest seats of judicature, and were the only Judges which that people had: Judices apud Egyptios iidem qu●ndam fuerunt qui & sacerdotes, 
e Aelian in Varia histor. l. 14. c. 34.  as that Author hath it. And so much is assured us by Synesius also a Christian Bishop of the East 
f Syn●sius Ep. 57 , where he resembleth them in this particular to the Priests of Judah. The like we find in Agathias of the Priests of Persia, men better known in ancient Writers by the name of Magis: of whom he telleth us, eorum consilio publica omnia administrari, etc. 
g Agathias in hist. Perfic. l. 2.  that by their counsel and advice the principal affairs of the State were ordered, rewards proportioned and conferred upon well-deservers, and several punishments inflicted on the Malefactors, according to the quality of the misdemeanour; and finally that nothing was conceived to be rightly done, quod Magorum sententia non sit confirmatum, which had not passed the approbation of these Priests or Magi. If we draw nearer towards the West, and look into the Government of the State of Athens, we shall find the chief authority thereof to consist in the Senate of 500, and in the famous Court of the Areopagites, as was no●ed in the ●ormer Chapter: in which the Priests, or at the least the principal of that rank or order had both place and suffrage. For in that honorary Edict which they made in favour of Hyrcanus, we may clearly see that Dionysius the son of Asclepiades was one of the Priests, and also one of the Prytanaei 
h Joseph. Judaic. Antiqu. l. 14. c. 16. , or Precedents of the Council, as we call them now; and that in calculating of the voices, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Dorotheus the chief Priest had the greatest stroke, and pronounced the Edict to be passed. And for the Court of Areopagites, it consisted as before we told you of such and such alone as formerly had boar the Office of the nine Annual Magistrates, whereof the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Rex Sacrorum, (whom we may English the chief Bishop) had the second place 
i Suidas in verbo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. . And this appears yet further by a passage in the life of Pericles, where we are told of his design for the abasing of the power of the Areopagites, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
k Plutarch in Pericle. , of which Court he was not any Member, as the Author tells us, in that he had never borne the Office either of the Provost, or the King, or the Polemarchus, or any of the six chief Justices. So that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Rex Sacrorum, or chief Bishop being of course to be admitted into the Court or Council of the Areopagites when his year was ended, it cannot be, but that there must be many of them in that famous Session; an equal number at the least, with those who had been Polemarchi, or the yearly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Add here, that we are told by Julius Pollux in his Onomasticon 
l Lib 8. cap. 8. sect. 3. , that it pertained to this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Rex Sacrorum, besides the service of the Gods, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to indite those before the Court who were guilty of murder; but then withal, that having put in the indictment, and laid by his Crown, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he sat upon the Bench with the other Judges and passed sentence on them. Thus was it with the Druids or the Priests of Gallia, who did not only take the charge of all sacred matters which did relate unto the service of the gods, but de omnibus fere controversiis publicis privatisque 
m Caesar de Bello Gallico l. 6. , they did determine in almost all suits and controversies, as well public as private; particularly in matters of inheritance, real actions, capital crimes, as murder and the like offences; and also had a power to decree both rewards and punishments as they saw occasion. And for the better dispatch of business both for their own ease and the people's too, they chose some certain times or Terms in which they met together not far from Chartres (being in the middle of the Country) whither all sorts of people who had suits and differences did repair unto them, eorumque judiciis & decretis parebant, and to their Judgements and Decrees did submit themselves. And thus it also was with the P●tifices or Priests of Rome who had not only a chief place in the holy Mysteries, such as concerned the public worship of their gods; but also a great power and sway, in the greatest and most important businesses which concerned the State: which Tully makes one of those Constitutions or Arts of Government, which seemed to have been devised by the gods themselves. 
n Cicero in Orat. pro Domo ●ua.  Cum multa divinitus a majoribus nostris inventa atque instituta sunt, tum nihil praeclarius quam quod Pontifices cosdem & Religionibus Deorum immortalium & summae reipub. prae●sse voluerunt. And as the principal Priests in Athens had their place and Vote not only in the Court of Areopagites, but in the Senate of five hundred as before was noted: so some of the more eminent sort of Priests had the like pre-eminence, of sitting and voting in the Roman Senate, which was as high an honour as that State could give them. For besides that Rosinus hath observed that some of the Priest's were chosen out of the number of the Senators 
o Rosin. Antiqu. Rom. , who doubtless did not lose the right of suffrage which before they had; there is a memorable case in Livy touching C. Flaccus: who was no sooner chosen the Flamen Dialis, or P●iest of Jupiter, but presently he put in his title to a place in Senate, which anciently belonged unto his predecessors in the right of their Office, though of late years it seemed to have been forfeited by discontinuance, The issue of which plea was this, that though Licinius the Praetor did the best he could to cross the business, alleging, Non exoletis vetustate Annalium exemplis stare jus 
p Livy hist. Rom. lib. 26. , that they were not to be guided in the case by worm eaten Precedents, but by the late practice of the Sta●e; yet it was otherwise determined by the Fathers generally, and Flaccus settled in his place in the Roman▪ Senate, Magno assensu Patrum Plebisque with the joint consent of all the people. But what need these particulars have been brought to confirm this point, when as it affirmed in generals by Synesius, a right godly Bishop of the Primitive times? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
q Synes. Epist. 57 , that in old times the same men were both Priests and Judges. Which said, he instanceth in the particulars of the Jews and Egyptians who for long time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, had been chief governed by their Priests.  
(3) This brings me on to the power and practise of the Priests in the land of Judah, who from the very first beginning of that State and Nation to the final dissolution of it, were of great authority; not only in composing of inferior differences which casually did arise amongst the people, but in the managery of the chief affairs both of State and Government: and that not gained by connivance of Princes, or by entrenching on the rights of the secular powers, but by the institution and appointment of the Lord himself. When Moses first complained that the sole Government of the people was a burden too heavy for him to bear, it pleased God to appoint a standing Consistory of 
r Numb. 11. v. 16.  seventy Elders, men of ability and wisdom, who were to have a share in the public Government, and to decide amongst themselves such weighty businesses, great matters 
s Exod. 18. v. 22. , as the Scripture calls them, which were reserved to Moses by a former Ordinance. Of these, the Priests, as men who for the most part were at better leisure than the rest to attend the service, and generally of more abilities to go through with it, made always a considerable number, and many times the major part. In which respect it was ordained by the Lord, when a matter did arise to be scanned in judgement between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and stroke and stroke, being matters of controversy within their gates, the people should arise and go unto the place which the Lord should choose, and come unto the Priests, the Levites, and unto the Judge that shall be in those days, and inquire and they shall show them the sentence of judgement 
t Deut. c. 17. v. 8, 9 . The like is also ordered in the case of false witness, where it is said, that If a false witness rise up against any man to testify against him that which is wrong; then both the men between whom the controversy is shall stand before the LORD, before the Priests and Judges which shall be in those days 
u Deut. 19 v. 17. . Which passages are not understood of any particular Priests or Judges, dispersed in their several dwellings up and down the Country; but of the Priests and other Judges united and assembled in that famous Consistory of the 70 Elders, convened together in that place which the Lord should choose; called by the Jews the Sanhedrim, by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and was the great Council of estate for the Jewish Nation. To this Josephus doth attest, where he informeth us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
x Joseph. adv. App●on. lib. 2. , that the Priests of Jewrie had the cogn●zarce of all doubtful matters; more plainly Philo, who knew well the customs of his native Country, where he affirms expressly and in terminis; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
y Philo de vita Mesis. , that the Priests had place and suffrage in this great 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Court of Sanhedrim. And this is that which Casaubon doth also tell us from the most learned and expert of the Jewish Rabbins, Non nisi nobilissimos ●e sacerdotibus, Levitis, caeteroque populo, & in lege peritissimos in Sanhedrim eligi 
z Casaub Exercit. in Baron. 1. Sect 3. , that is to say, that none but the most eminent of the Priests, the Levites and the rest of the people, and such as were most conversant in the Book of the Law, were to be chosen into the Sanhedrim. But to return again to the Book of God, the power and reputation of this Court and Consistory having been much diminished in the times of the Kings of Judah, was again revived by Jehosophat. Of whom we read, that he not only did appoint Judges in the la●d throughout all the fenced Cities of JUDAH 
a 2 Chron. 19 5. : but that he established at JERUSALEM a standing Council, consisting of the Levites and of the Priests, and of the chief of the Fathers of ISRAEL, for the judgements of the Lord and for controversies 
b Ibid. r. 8. : according to the model formerly laid by God himself in the Book of Deuteronomie. Which Court or Council thus revived continued in full force, authority and power, during the time of the captivity of Babylon; as appears plainly by that passage in the prophecy of Ezekiel, where it is said of the Priests even by God himself, in controversy they shall stand in judgement 
c Ezeck▪ 44. v▪ ●24. ; compared with another place of the same Prophet, where he makes mention of the seventy, of the Ancients of the house of ISRAEL 
d Id. c. 8. v. 11. , and Jaazaniah the son of Shaphan standing in the midst, as Prince of the Senate. And after their return from that house of bondage, they were confirmed in this authority by the Edict and Decree of Artaxerxes, who gave Commission unto EZRA to set Magistrates and Judges 
e Ezra c. 7. ●. 25.  over the people; not after a new way of his own devising, but after the wisdom of his God 
e Ezra c. 7. ●. 25. , declared in the foregoing Ages by his servant Moses. In which estate they stood all the times succeeding, until the final dissolution of that State and Nation: with this addition to the power of the holy Priesthood, that they had not only all that while their place and suffrage in the Court of Sanhedrim, as will appear to any one who hath either read Josephus or the four Evangelists; but for a great part of that time, till the reign of Herod, the Supreme Government of the State was in the hands of the Priests. In which regard, besides what was affirmed from Synesius formerly, it is said by Justin, Morem esse apud Judaeos ut eosdem Reges & sacerdotes haberent, that it was the custom of the Jews for the same men to be Kings and Priests 
f Justin. hist. l. 36. : and Tacitus gives this general note, Judaeis Sacerdotii honorem firmamentum potentiae esse, that the honour given unto the Priesthood amongst the Jews, did most especially conduce to the establishment of their power and Empire 
g Tacit. hist. l 3. . And yet I cannot yield to Baronius neither, where he affirms (the better to establish a Supremacy in the Popes of Rome) Summum Pont. arbitrio suo moderari magnum illud Concili●m, &c. 
h Baron. Annal. ●n. 57 , that the high Priest was always Precedent of the Council or Court of Sanhedrim: it being generally declared in the Jewish Writers, that the High Priest could challenge no place at all therein, in regard of his office and descent, but merely in respect of such personal abilities as made himself to undergo such a weighty burden; for which see Phagius in his notes on the 16. of Deuteronomie.  
(4) Thus have we seen of what authority and power the Priests were formerly as well amongst the Jews as amongst the Gentiles; we must next see whether they have not been employed in the like affairs, under the Gospel of Christ, and that too in the best and happiest times of the Christian Church. In search whereof it is not to be looked for by the ingenuous Reader, that we should aim foe high as the first 300 years after Christ's Nativity. The Prelates of the Church were suspected then to have their different aims and interesses, from those who had the government of the Civil State, and therefore thought uncapable of trust and employment in it. But after that, according to that memorable maxim of Optatus, Ecclesia erat in Republicâ 
i Deschismat. Denied'st. l 3. , the Church became a part of the Commonwealth, and had their ends and aims united; there followed these two things upon it: first that the Supreme Government of the Church depended much upon the will and pleasure of the Supreme Magistrate, insomuch as Socrates observeth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
k Socrat. Eccl. hist. lib. 5. c. 1. , that the greatest Counsels have been called by their authority and appointment; And 2ly, that the Governors and Rulers of the Church of God, came to have place and power in disposing matters that appertained to the well ordering of the Civil State. And this they did, not out of any busy or pragmatical desire to draw the cognizance of secular causes into their own hands, or to increase their power and reputation with the common people: but merely for the ease and benefit of those who did repair unto them for their help and counsel, and to comply with the command of the Apostle, who imposed it on them. S. Austin tells us of S. Ambrose with how great difficulty he obtained an opportunity of conversing with him privately, and at large, as his case required: Secludentibus ●um ab ejus aure atque ore catervis negociosorum hominum, the multitude of those who had business to him, 
l August. Confess. l. 6. c. 3.  and suits to be determined. by him, debarring him from all advantages of access and conference. Which took up so much of his time, that he had little leisure to refresh his body with necessary food, or his mind with the reading of good Authors. And Posidonius tel●s us of S. Austin, causas audisse diligenter & piè, that he diligently and religiously attended such businesses as were brought before him, not only spending all the morning in that troublesome exercise 
m Posidon. in vita August. c. 19 , but sometimes fasting all day long, the better to content the suitor, and dispatch the business. The like S. Austin tells us of himself, and his fellow Prelates, first that the Christians of those times pro secularibus causis suis nos non raro quaererent 
n August. in Psalm. 1: 8. serm. 74 & Epist. 147. , did ordinarily apply themselves unto them for the determing of secular causes, and cheerfully submitted unto their decisions: next that the Prelates did comply with their earnest solicitations and desires, therein Tu multuosissimas causarum alienarum perplexitates patiendo 
o Id. de ope●e Monach c. 29. , by intermitting their own studies to engage themselves in the determining of such secular causes as were brought before them, for the contentation of the people, and the discharge of their own duty both to God and man. And this is that which both S. Ambrose and S. Augustine tell us in their several writings, viz. that they did undergo this trouble for no other reason then out of a conformity and obedience to the words and intimation of S. Paul, 1 Cor. cap. 6. touching the ending of such suits and differences as did arise amongst the Faithful: S. Austin saying, Constituisse Apostolum talibus causis Ecclesiasticos cognitores 
p Id. in Psal. 118. serm. 174. , and iisdem molestiis eos affixisse Apostolos; 
q Id. de opere Monach. 29.  S. Ambrose, that he had undertaken the businesses which were brought before him, Secundum sacrae formam praeceptionis qua eum Apostolus induebat 
r Amb. Epist. 24. , which did impose such a necessity upon him, that he was not able to decline it. Both of them do agree, in this, and Posidonius doth agree with both in the same particular 
s Posidon. in vita August. c. 19 , that they were not only warranted, but obliged by S. Paul's injunction, to undertake the cognizance of such secular causes as were from time to time committed to their care and trust; and that they had not done their duty, had they made any scruple of the undertaking. But these being only private matters, let us next see, whether their service was not used in affairs of State, and we shall find that Constantine did always take some Bishops with him when he went to war; not only for their ghostly counsel in spiritual matters, but for advise in matters which concerned the occasion 
t Euseb. in vita Constant. l. 4. c. 54. , the prosecution of the war which was then in hand: that Ambrose was twice sent Ambassador from Valentinian the younger to the Tyrant Maximus, which he performed to the great contentment of his Prince, and the preservation of the Empire 
u Amb. Epist. 27. lib. 5. ; whereof he gives us an account in an express unto the Emperor: that when Firmus had rebelled in afric, and saw himself too weak to resist the Forces which were raised against him under Theodosius, Antistites ritus Christiani pacem oraturos misit 
x Ammian. Marcel. hist. l. 29. , he sent the African Prelates his Ambassadors to treat of peace: that Marutha Bishop of Mesopotamia was in like nature sent to the Court of Persia 
y Socrat. Eccles. hist. l. 7. c. 8. , in the time of the Emperor Honorius. I. as after that Epiphanius Bishop of Ticinum (which we now call Pavia) employed from the Ligurians to Athalaricus King of the Goths in Italy, from him unto the Court of Burgundy, as Cassiodorus and Ennodius do describe at large: that James the godly Bishop of Nisibis, (a frontier Town against the Persians) was also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, both Governor of the place, and Captain of the Soldiers which were there in Garrison 
z Theodoret. hist. Eccl. l. 2. c. 30. ; and did most manfully defend it, against all the force and fury of the Persian Armies, An. 338. or thereabouts: and finally (which was an argument of great power and trust) that the Bishops in Justinians time were by him appointed to oversee the Civil Magistrates, and to give notice to the Emperor if they failed in any thing which did concern the Government o● the Estate in their several places; of which the very Edicts are still extant in the Book of Novels 
a Novel. 56. & in Append. ad Novel. 8. .  
(5) The Prelates being grown into this esteem for their integrity and wisdom, with the Roman Emperors; it is no wonder if they were employed in the greatest Offices of trust and counsel, after the Empire was dismembered and shared betwixt such several Princes as grew up in the place of those mighty Monarches: And this they did on so good motives, and with such success, that in short time the Prelates were not only used for advice and counsel, but the inferior Clergy also were called unto employments of the highest nature, and in conclusion with the Prelates made up the third Estate in most Christian Kingdoms. For being that the study of Divinity is diffused and large, and that the knowledge of Philosophy and the Arts and Histories, is but attendant on the same and subservient to it; there was no question made at all in the times we speak of, but that a Churchman so accomplished might be as useful in the service of the Commonwealth, as those who wanted many opportunities to be so versed in Books the best guides to business: especially when to those helps in point of learning, were joined a suddenness of apprehension, a perspicacity of judgement, and which swayed most of all integrity of life and conversation. These when they met together (as they often did) in men admitted by the Church unto holy Orders, it was not either thought or found (and indeed how could it?) that their admittance into Orders did take off from any of those natural or acquired endowments of which before they were possessed, or that it was a disabling to them to make use thereof, in any matter of debate or action which concerned the public. And that it hath been so of old in all Christian Kingdoms, besides that it is intimated by our Author here, we shall clearly see by looking over such particulars as have most influence and power in the affairs of Christendom.  
And first beginning (as of right) with the Germane Empire, Thuanus gives this note in general 
b August. Thuan. hist. lib. 2. , Imperium in tria omnino membra dividi, that that Empire is divided into three Estates, over all which the Emperor is the head or the Supreme Prince. Of these the fi●st Estate is ex sacro Ordine, of the holy Hierarchy, composed of the three spiritual Electors, together with the residue of the Archbishops and Bishops, and many Abbots, Priors, and other Prelates. The second is of the Nobility consisting of the three temporal Electors, the Dukes, Marquesses, Lantgraves, Burgraves, Earls and Barons, of which there is no determinate number; the Emperor having power to add daily to them, as he sees occasion. T●e third Estate is of the free or Imperial Cities, in number 60. or thereabouts, who represent themselves at the General Diets, by such Commissioners or Deputies as are authorized to that purpose. Now for these Diets, (for by that name they call their Conventus Ordinum, or Assembly of the three Estates) they are summoned at the will and pleasure of the Emperor only, and at such place and time as to him seems meetest 
c Id. ibid. . Where being met, (as all the three Estates must meet either in person or by their Ambassadors) they use to treat of Peace, and War, of raising Subsidies and Taxes to support the State, of leagues and confederacies, of raising and decrying moneys, of making, abrogating, and expounding laws, and of such other points and matters as do pertain unto the honour of the Empire and the public sas●ti●. Nor is this any new authority which the Ecclesiastical Estate hath gained in the latter times; but such wherein they were entrusted ●rom the first beginning of that Empire: It being affirmed by Aventinus (a Writer of unquestioned credit) that long before the institution of the seven Electors, (which was in An. 996.) the Prelates, the Nobility, and the chief of the people had the election of the Emperor 
d Aventini Annal. Bo●o●um. l. 5. . And if the Prelates were entrusted in so high a point, as the election of the Emperor or the Sovereign Prince; no question but they were employed also in his public Counsels, in matters which concerned the managery of the Commonwealth.  
Next pass we over into France, and there we find the Subjects marshaled into three Estates, whereof the Clergy is the first. Rex coactis tribus Ordinibus, Sacerdotio, Nobilitate, Plebe, subsidia rei pecuniariae petiit 
e Paul. Aemilius hist. Franc. l 9 , that is to say, the King assembling or conveening the three Estates, viz. the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons, demanded subsidies for the support of his Estate; So Paulus Aemilius doth inform us: Out of these three are chosen certain Delegates or Commissioners, some for each Estate, as often as the King's occasions do require their meeting, the time and place whereof is absolutely left unto his disposing; and these thus met do make up the Conventus Ordinum, or L' Assembly des Estates, as the French men call it, in form much like the English Parliament, but in nothing else: the power and reputation of it being much diminished in these latter times, especially since the great improvement of the Court of Parliament, fixed and of long time fixed in Paris. Which Court of Parliament, as it was instituted at the first by Charles Martell, Mayre of the Pa●ace to the Merov●gnian line of France and Grandfather to Charle magne; so it consisted at the first of the same ingredients, of which the great Assembly des. Estates consisteth now, that is to say, the Prelates, and the Peers, and certain of the principal Gentry which they call La nobless, together with some few of the most considerable Officers of the King's household 
f An●●e du Chos●e. 8. . A Court of such esteem in the former times, that the Kings of Sicily, Cyprus, Bohomia, Portugal, Scotland, and Navarre, have thought it no disparagement unto them to be members of it: and which is more, when Frederick the second had spent much time and treasure in his quarrels with Pope Innocent the fourth, he was content to submit the whole cause in difference unto the judgement of this Court. But being at last become sedentaire and fixed at Paris, as other ordinary Courts of Justice were, (which was in An. 1286. or thereabouts) the Nobles first, and after them the Bishops withdrew themselves from the troubles of it, and left it to the ordering of the Civil Lawyers: though still the Peers do challenge and enjoy a place therein as oft as any point of moment is in agitation; the Bishop of Paris, and the Abbor of St. Denys, continuing constant members of it to this very day. But for the Assembly des Estates, or Conventus Ordinum, made up of the Clergy, the Nobility and the Commons, as before I told I you: he that would see the manner of it, the points there handled, and that remainder of authority which is left unto them, let him repair unto Thuanne 
g Thuan hist. sui temp. lib. , and look upon the great Assembly held at Bloys, An. 1573. He shall find it there.  
Pass we next over the Pyrenees, to the Pealms of Spain, and we shall find in each the same three Estates, whose meeting they call there by the name 
h Bodin. de Repub. lib. 3. c.  of Curia, the Court, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or by way of ominencie; consisting of the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commissioners of the Provinces and most ancient Cities. But we must tell you by the way, that long before the institution of these Courts, and long before the division of Spain into so many Kingdoms; the Prelates of that Church were of such authority, that a chief stroke in the election of their Kings did belong to them. For in the eighth Council of Toledo summoned by Recesvinthus the 25. of the Gothish race of the Kings of Spain, An. 653. so long ago, in which were present 52 Bishops, 12 Abbots, and the Delegates or Vicars of ten other Bishops, who could not personally attend the service; it was ordered with the King's consent, that from thenceforth the Kings of Spain should be elected in the Regal City, or in what other place soever the King should happen to decease, by the joint suffrages of the Prelates, and the great Lords of the Court, Majores Palatii as the Canon calls them 
i Concil. Tolet. VIII. Can. 10. . But take the whole Canon with you for the more assurance, and you find it thus. Abninc ergo & deinceps ita erunt in Regni gloria praeficiendi Rectores, ut aut in urbe Regia, aut in loco ubi Princeps decesserit, cum Pontificum Majorumque Palatii omnimodo eligantur assensu. But after Spain became divided into several Kingdoms, and that each Kingdom had its Court, or Curia, as they call their Parliament, the Clergy were esteemed in each for the third Estate (the first indeed of all the three) and either in person or by their Proxies, made up the most considerable part in those public meetings. For proof of which we need but look into the General history of Spain, translated out of French by Grimston, and we shall find a Court or Parliament for the Realm of Arragon, consisting of the Bishops, Nobles, and Deputies of Towns and Commonalties, having place in the said Estates convened by King James at Saragossa Anno 1325. for settling the Succession, and declaring the Heir 
k Gen. hist. of Spain. l. 14. , another at Monson, where the Estates of Arragon and Catalogne did conveen together 1236, to consult about the conquest of Valentia 
l Id. lib. 11. ; and before that another Assembly of the Bishops and Noblemen called at Saragossa by Alfonso the Great, touching the War against the Moors 
m Id. lib. 9 . And as for the Realm of Naples, and Sicily, being appends on this Crown, there is little question to be made but that the Bishops and Clergy of both enjoyed the place and privileges of the third Estate; both Kingdoms being anciently holden of the Pope, and of his Erection and the Italian Bishops (as lying directly under his nose) more amply privileged for the most part then in other Countries. Thus for Castille, we find a Parliament of Lords, Prelates, and Deputies of Towns summoned at Toledo by Alfonso the Noble, An. 1210. upon occasion of an invasion made by the Moors; 
n Id. lib. 10.  another before that at Burgos, under the same King, Anno 1179. for levying of money on the people to maintain the Wars n; that great Convention of the States held at Toledo by Ferdinand the Catholic 1479. for swearing to the succession of his Son, Don John, in which the Prelates, the Nobility, and almost all the Towns and Cities, which sent Commissioners to the Assembly, are expressly named 
o Id. lib. . Thus finally do we find a meeting of the Deputies of the three Estates of Navarre at the Town of Tasalla, Anno 1481. for preserving the Kingdom in obedience to King Francis Phoebus, being then a minor, under age 
p Id. lib. 22. : and that the Deputies of the Clergy, Nobility, Provinces and good Towns of Portugal, assembled at Tomara, An. 1581. to acknowledge Philip the second for their King, and to settle the Government of that Kingdom for the times to come 
q Id. lib. 30. .  
Now let us take a view of the Northern Kingdoms, and still we find the people ranked in the self same manner, and their great Counsels to consist of the Clergy, the Nobility, and certain Deputies, sent from the Provinces and Cities, as in those before. In Hungar●e, before that Realm received the Gospel, we read of none but Nobiles & Plebeii 
r Bonfinius in hist. Hungar. Dec. l. 1. , the Nobility and common people who did concur to the election of their Kings; but no sooner was the Faith of Christ admitted, and a Clergy instituted, but instantly we find a third Estate, Epis●opos & Sacerdotum Collegia 
s Id. ibid. De●. 2. l. 2. , Bishops and others of the Clergy superadded to them, for the election of the Kings, and the dispatch of other businesses which concerned the public 
t Id. Decad. 2. l. 3. , as it continueth to this day. In Danemark we shall find the same, if we mark it well. For though Pontanus seem to count upon five Estates, making the Regal Family to be the first, and subdividing the Commons into two, whereof the. Yeomanry makes one, and the Tradesman or Citizen the other 
u Pontan in Doriae descript. : yet in the body of the History we find only three, which are the Bishops, the Nobility, and Civitatum delegati 
x Id. in histor. Rerum Danic. l. 7. , the Deputies or Commissioners of Towns and Cities: Take which of these Accounts you will, and reckon either upon Five or on three Estates, yet still the Ecclesiastic State, or Ordo Ecclesiasticus, as himself entitleth it, is declared for one; and hath been so declared, as their stories tell us, ever since the first admittance of the Faith amongst them: the Bishops, together with the Peers and Deputies, making up the Comitia or Conventus Ordinum. In Poland the chief sway and power of government, next to the King, is in the Council of Estate. Secundum Regem maxima & Augustuissima Senatus autoritas, as Thuanus hath it 
y Thuan. hist. sui temp. l. 56. . And that consisteth of nine Bishops, whereof the Archbishops of Guisna and Leopolis make always two; of fifteen Palatines, for by that name they call the greater sort of the Nobility, and of sixty five Chastellans, which are the better sort of the Polish Gentry; who with the nine great Officers of the Kingdom, (of which the Clergy are as capable as any other sort or degree of subjects) do complete that Council. The Common people there are in no authority, (a procuratione Reipub. omnino summota) not having any Vote or suffrage in the great Comitia 
a Thuan. hist. sui. temp. l. 56. , or general Assemblies of the Kingdom, as in other places. For Sweden, it comes near the government and forms of Danemark, and hath the same estates and degrees of people as amongst the Danes, that is to say, Proceres & Nobiles, the greater and the less Nobility, Episcopi & Ecclesiastici, the Bishops and inferior Clergy, Civitates & universitates, the Cities and Towns Corporate (for so I think he means by universitates) as Thuanus 
b Id. lib. 131.  mustereth them. And in this Realm the Bishops and Clergy enjoy the place and privileges of the third Estate (notwithstanding the alteration of Religion) to this very day; the Bishops in their own persons, and a certain number of the Clergy out of every Sochen (a division like our Rural Deaneries) in the name of the rest, having a necessary Vote in all their Parliaments. And as for Scotland, their Parliament consisted anciently of three Estates, as learned Camden doth inform us, that is to say, the Lords spiritual, as Bishops, Abbots, Priors; the Temporal Lords, as Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Viscount's, Barons; and the Commissioners of the Cities and Burroughs 
c Camden in descript. Scotiae. ; To which were added by King James two Delegates or Commissioners out of every County to make it more conform to the English Parliaments. And in some Acts the Prelates are by name declared to be the third Estate, as in the Parliament, Anno 1597. Anno 1606, etc. for which I do refer you to the Book at large.  
(6) And now at last we are come to England, where we shall find that from the first reception of the Christian Faith amongst the Saxons, the ecclesiastics have been called to all Public Counsels, and their advice required in the weightiest matters touching the safety of the Kingdom. No sooner had King Ethelbert received the Gospel, but presently we read that as well the Clergy as the Laity were called unto the Common Council: which the Saxons sometimes called Mycell Synoth, the Great Assembly, and sometimes Wittenagemots 
d Coke on Lill. 2. sect. , the Council or Assembly of the Wise men of the Realm. Anno 605. Ethelbertus Rex in fide roboratus Catholica etc. Cantuariae convocavit commune concilium ●am Cleri quam populi, etc. 
e H. Spelman in Concil. p. 126.  " King Ethelbert, as my Author hath it, being confirmed in the Faith in the year 605. (which was but nine years after his conversion) together with Bertha his Queen, their Son Eadbald, the most Reverend Archbishop Augustine, and all the rest of the Nobility, did solemnize the Feast of Christ's Nativity in the City of Canterbury; and did there cause to be assembled on the ninth of January the Common-council of his Kingdom, aswell the Clergy as the Lay Subject, by whose consent and approbation, he caused the Monastery by him built, to be dedicated to the honour of Almighty God, by the hand of Augustine." And though no question other examples of this kind may be found amongst the Saxon Heptarchs', yet being the West Saxon Kingdom did in fine prevail, and united all the rest into one Monarchy: we shall apply ourselves unto that more punctually. Where we shall find besides two Charters issued out by Athelstan, Consilio Wlfelmi Archiepiscopi mei & aliorum Episcoporum meorum 
f Ap. eund. p. 402, 403. , by the advice of Wlfelm his Archbishop and his other Bishops: that Ina in the year 702. caused the great Council of his Realm to be assembled, consisting ex Episcopis, Principibus, proceribus, etc. of Bishops, Princes, Nobles, Earls, and of all the Wise men, Elders, and People of the whole Kingdom, and there enacted divers laws for the Weal of his Realm 
g Apud eund. p. 219. . Thus do we read that Egbert, who first united the seven Kingdoms of the Saxons under the name of England, did cause to be convened at London his Bishops and the Peers of the highest rank, pro consilio capiendo adversus Danicos Piratas 
h Charta Whitlafii Merciorum Regis ap. Ingulf. , to advise upon some course against the Danish Pirates who infested the sea coasts of England. Another Parliament or Council, call it which you will, called at Kingsbury, Anno 855. in the time of Ethelwolph the Son of Egbert, pro negotiis regni 
i Chart. Bertulfi. Merc. Regis ap. Ingulf. , to treat of the affairs of the Kingdom: the Acts whereof are ratified and subscribed by the Bishops, Abbots, and other great men of the Realm. The same King Ethelwolph in a Parliament or Assembly of his States at Winchester, Anno 855. Cum consilio Episcoporum & principum 
k Ingulfi Croyland hist. , by the advice and counsel of the Bishops and Nobility, confirmed unto the Clergy the tenth part of all men's goods; and ordered that the Tithe so confirmed unto them should be free ab omnibus secularibus servitutibus, for all secular services and impositions. In the reign of Edred we find this, Anno 948. In Festo igitur nativitatis B. Mariae cum universi Magnates regni per Regium edictum summoniti, tam Archiepiscopi & Episcopi ac Abbates, quam caeteri totius regni proceres & optimates Londoniis convenissent ad tractandum de negotiis publicis totius Regni 
l Id ibid. p. 497 edit. Lond. : viz. That in the Feast of the Nativity of the blessed Virgin, the great men of the Realm, that is to say, Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots, Nobles, Peers, were summoned by the King's Writ to appear at London, to handle and conclude about the public affairs of the Kingdom. Mention of this Assembly is made again at the foundation and endowment of the Abbey of Crowland 
m Id. p. 500 : and afterwards a confirmation of the same by Edgar, Anno 966. praesentibus Archiepiscopis, Episcopis, Abbatibus & Optimatibus Regni 
n Id pag. 501. & 502. , in the presence of the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots and Peers of the Kingdom. Like convention of Estates we find to have been called by Canutus after the death of Edmund Ironside, for the settling of the Crown on his own head, of which thus the Author 
o Rog. Hoveden. Annal pars prior. p. 250. . Cujus post mortem Rex Canutus omnes Episcopos & Deuces, nec non & principes cunctosque optimates gentis Angliae Londoniae congregari jussit. Where still we find the Bishops to be called to Parliament as well as the Dukes, Princes, and the rest of the Nobility; and to be ranked and marshaled first (which clearly shows that they were always reckoned for the first Estate) before the greatest and most eminent of the secular Peers. And so we find it also in a Charter of King Edward the Confessor, the last King of the Saxon race) by which he granted certain Lands and privileges to the Church of Westminster, Anno 1066. Cum consilio & decreto Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum, Comitum, aliorumque Optimatum 
p Ap. H. Spelman in Concil. p. 630. , with the counsel and decree of the Archbishops, Bishops, Earls, and others of his Nobles. And all this while the Bishops and other Prelates of the Church did hold their Lands by no other tenure, then in pura & perpetua eleemosyna 
q Camden in Brit. , or Frank almoigne, as our Lawyers call it: and therefore sat in Parliament in no other capacity then as spiritual persons merely, who by their extraordinary knowledge in the word of God, and in such other parts of learning, as the world than knew, were thought best able to direct and advise their Princes in points of judgement. In which capacity and no other the Priors of the Cathedral Churches of Canterbury, Ely, Winchester, Coventry, Bath, Worcester, Norwich, and Durham, the Deans of Exeter, York, Wells, Salisbury, and Lincoln, the Official of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Dean of the Arches, the Guardian of the Spiritualties of any Bishopric when the See was vacant, and the Vicar's general of such Bishops as were absent beyond the Seas 
r Selden Titles of hon. part. 2. c. 5. , had sometimes place and suffrage in the house of Lords in the Ages following.  
7. But when the Norman Conqueror had possessed the State, than the case was altered. The Prelates of the Church were no longer suffered to hold their Lands in Frankalmoigne as before they did, or to be free from secular services and commands, as before they were. Although they kept their lands, yet they changed their tenure, and by the Conqueror, were ordained to hold their Lands sub militari servitute 
s Ma●. Paris in Will. 1. An. 1070. , either in ●apite, or by Baronage, or some such military hold, and thereby were compellable to aid the Kings in all times of war, with Men, Arms, and Horses, as the Lay-subjects of the same tenors were required to do. Which though it were conceived to be a great disfranchisement at the first, and an heavy burden to the Prelacy▪ yet it conduced at last to their greater honour; in giving them a further Title to their place in Parliament, than that which formerly they could pretend to. Before, they claimed a place therein ratione Officii, only by reason of their Offices or spiritual Dignities; but after this, by reason also of those ancient Baronies which were annexed unto their Dignities; en respect de lour possessions, L'antient Baronies annexes a lour dignities 
t Stamfords' Pl●es, l. 3 c. 1. , as our Lawyers have it. From this time forwards we must look upon them in the House of Parliament, not as Bishops only, but as Peers and Barons of the Realm also, and so themselves affirmed to the Temporal Lords in the Parliament holden at Northampton under Henry 2. Non sedimus hic Episcopi, said Barones; nos Barones, ves Barones; Pares hic sumus 
u Ap Selden. titles of hon. p●. 2. c. 5. . We fit not here say they, as Bisho●ps only, but as Barons; We are Barons, and you are Barons; here we sit as Peers. Which last is also verified in terminis, by the words of a Statute, or Act of Parliament, wherein the Bishops are acknowledged to be Peers of the Land 
x Stat. 25 Edw. 3. c. 5. . Now that the Bishops are a fundamental and essential part of the Parliament of England, I shall endeavour to make good by two manner of proofs; whereof the one shall be de jure, & the other de facto. And first we shall begin with the proofs de jure, and therein first with that which doth occur in the Laws of King Athelstan, amongst the which there is a Chapter (it is Cap. 11.) entitled De officio Episcopi, & quid pertinet ad officium ejus; and therein it is thus declared. Episcopo jure pertinet omnem rectitudinem promovere, dei scilicet & seculi &c. 
z Spelm. council. p. 402.  et convenit ut per consilium & testimonium ejus omne legis scitum, & Burgi mensura, & omne pondus sit secundum dictionem ejus institutum, that is to say, it belongeth of right unto the Bishop to promote justice, in matters which concern both the Church and State; and unto him it appertaineth that by his counsel and award, all Laws & Weights, and Measures be ordained throughout the Kingdom. 2. Next we will have recourse to the old Record entitled Modus tenendi Parliamentum. In which it is affirmed, ad Parliamentum summoniri & venire debere Archiepiscopos, Episcopos, Abbates, Pricres, & alios majores cleri, qui tenent per Comitatum aut Baroniam ratione hujusmodi tenurae, 
* modus tenendi Parliament.  that all the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, and other Prelates of the Church, who hold their lands either by an Earls fee or a Baron's fee, were to be summoned and to come to Parliament in regard of their tenure. 3. Next look we on the chartularies of King Henry the first, recognized in full Parliament at Clarendon under Henry the 2d. where they are called avitas consuetudines, which declare it thus, Archipiscopi, Episcopi, & universae personae qui de Regetenent in Capite, habeant possessiones suas de Rege sicut Baroniam, etc. & sicut caeteri Barones debent interesse judiciis Curiae Regis cum Baronibus, quousque perveniatur ad diminutionem membrorum vel ad mortem 
* Matth. Paris in Hen. 2. . The meaning is in brief, that Archbishops, Bishops, and all other ecclesiastical persons which hold in Capite of the King, are to have and hold their lands in Barony, and that they ought as Barons to be present in all Judgements with the other Barons in the Court of Parliament, until the very sentence of death or mutilation (which was very common in those times) was to be pronounced. And then they commouly did use to withdraw themselves, not out of any incapacity supposed to be in them by the Law of England, but out of a restraint imposed upon them by the Canons of the Church of Rome. 4. In the great Charter made by King John in the last of his reign, we have the form of summoning a Parliament, and calling those together who have votes therein, thus expressed at large. Ad habendum commune consilium Regni de auxilio assidendo, etc. & de scutagiis assidendis, faciemus summoneri Archiepiscopos, Episcopos, Abba●es, Comites, & Majores Barones Regni sigillatim per li●eras nostras: Et praeterea summoneri faciemus in generali per Vice-Cemites & Ballivos nostros omnes alios qui in Capite tenent ad certum diem, sc. ad terminum 40 dierum ad minus, et ad certum locum, etc. 
a Id. in joh.  In which we have not only a most evident proof, that the Bishops are of right to be called to Parliament, for granting subsidies and Escuage, and treating of the great affairs which concern the kingdom, but that they are to be summoned by particular Letters, as well as the Earls and Barons or either of them; A former Copy of which summons issued in the time of the said King John, is extant on Record, and put in print of late in the 
b Pt. 2. c. 5.  Titles of Honour. And we have here (I note this only by the way) a brief intimation touching the form of summoning the Commons to attend in Parliament, and the time of 40 days expressly specified to intervene between the summons and the beginning of the Parliament; Which Commons being such as anciently did hold in Capite, and either having a Knight's fee or the degree of Knighthood, did first promiscuously attend in these public meetings, and after were reduced to four (quatuor discretos milites de Comitatu tuo, as 
c Id. ibid.  the writ ran unto the Sheriff) and at last to two, as they continue to this day. 5. We have it thus in the Magna Charta of King Henry the 3d. the birthright of the English Subject, according as it stands translated in the book of Statutes. First we have granted to God, and by this our present Charter have confirmed for us and our heirs for ever, that the Church of England shall be free, and shall enjoy all her whole Rights and Liberties inviolable 
d Magna Charta cap. 1. . But it was a known Right and Liberty of the Church of England, that all the Bishops, and many of the greater Clergy (and peradventure also the inferior Clergy whereof more anon) had their Votes in Parliament; and therefore is to be preserved inviolable by the Kings of England, their Heirs and Successors for ever. Which Charter as it was confirmed by a solemn Curse denounced on all the Infringers of it by Boniface Archbishop of Canterbury 
e Matth. Patis in Henr. 3. , and ratified in no fewer man 30 succeeding Parliaments: so was it enacted in the reign of Edward the first, that it should be sent under the great Seal of England, to all the Cathedral Churches of the Kingdom, to be read twice a year before the people 
f 25 Edw. 1. c. 2. ; that they should be read four times every year in a full County-Court 
g 28 Edw. 1. c. 1. , and finally that all judgements given against it should be void 
h 25 Edw. 1. c. 3. . 6. We have the Protestation of John Stratford Archbishop of Canterbury in the time of King Edward the 3d. who being in disfavour with the King, and denied entrance into the House of Peers, challenged his place and suffrage there as the first Peer of the Realm, and one that ought to have the first Voice in Parliament in right of his See. But hear him speak his own words, which are these that follow. Amici (for he spoke to those who took witness of it) Rexme ad hoc Parliamentum scripto suo vocavit, & ego tanquam major Par Regni post regem, & primam vocem habere debens in Parliamento, jura Ecclesiae meae Cantuariensis vendico, & ideo ingressum in Parliamentum peto 
i Antiqu. B●itan. in Joh. Stratford. , which is full and plain. 7. And lastly, there is the Protestation on Record of all the Bishops in the reign of King Richard the 2d. at what time William Courtney was Archbishop of Canterbury: who being to withdraw themselves from the House of Peers at the pronouncing of the sentence of death on some guilty Lords, first made their Procurators to supply their rooms, & then put up their Protestation to preserve their Rights; the sum whereof, for as much as doth concern this business, in their own words thus. De jure & consuetudine regni Angliae ad Archiepiscopum Cantuariensem qui pro tempore fuerit, nec non coeteros Suffraganeos confratres & compatres, Abbates & Priores aliosque Praelatos quoscunque per Baroniam de domino Rege tenentes, pertinet in Parliamentis Regis quibuscunque, ut Pares regni praedicti personaliter interest, ibidemque de regni negotiis ac aliis tractari consuetis cum caeteris dicti regni Paribus & aliis ibidem jus interessendi habentibns consulere & tractare, ordinare, statuere, & diffinire, ac c●etera facere quae Parliamento ibidem imminent facienda. This put together makes enough abundantly for the proofs de jure, 
(k) In vita Gul. Courtney.  and makes the Bishop's right to have Vote in Parliament to be undeniable: Let us next see whether this right of theirs be not confirmed and countenanced by continual practice, and that they have not lost it by discontinuance; which is my second kind of proofs, those I mean de facto. And first beginning with the reign of the Norman Conqueror, we find a Parliament assembled in the fifth year of that King, wherein are present Episcopi, Abbates, Comites, & Primates totius Angliae 
l Matth. Paris in Willielmo 1. , the Bishops, Abbats, Earls, and the rest of the Baronage of England. In the 9th. year of William Rufus an old Author telleth us, de regni statu acturus, Episcopos, Abbates, & quoscunque Regni proceres in unum praecepti sui sanctione egit; that being to consult of the affairs of the Kingdom he called together by his writ the Bishops, Abbots and all the Peers of the Realm 
m Eadmer. hist. Nou. l. 2. . During the reign of Henry the 2d. (for we will take but one example out of each King reign, though each King's reign would yield us more) a Parliament was called at London, wherein were many things dispatched aswell of Ecclesiastical as secular nature; the Bishops and Abbats being present with the other Lords. Coacto apud Londoniam magno Episcoporum, &. Procerum, Abbatumque Concili●, multa ecclefiasticarum & secularium rerum ordinata negotia, decisa litigia, saith the Monk of Malmes●ury 
n Malmesb. hist. reg. Angl. l. 5. . And of this Parliament it is, I take it, that Eadmer speaketh, Hist. Novel. l. 4. p. 91. Proceed we to King Henry the 2d. (for King Stephen's reign was so full of wars and tumults that there is very little to be found of Parliaments) and there we find the Bishops with the other Peers convened in Parliament for the determination of the points in controversy between Alfonso King of Castille and Sancho King of Navarre, referred by compromise to that King of England, and here determined by King Henry amongst other things, habito cum Episcopis Comitibus et Baronebus cum deliberatione consilio, as in Roger Hoveden 
o Hoveden Annal. pars poster. in Hen. 2. . Next him comes Rich. the first, his Son, during whose imprisonment by the D. of Austria, his Brother John then Earl of Moriton endeavoured by force and cunning in Normandy to set the Crown on his own head: which caused Hubert the Archbishop of Canterbury to call a Parliament (Convocatis coram eo Episcopis, Comitibus et Baronibus regni) 
p Id. in Joh.  wherein the Bishops, Earls, and Barons did with one consent agree to seize on his estate, and suppress his power, the better to preserve the Kingdom in wealth, peace and safety. After succeeded John, and he calls a Parliament, wherein were certain Laws made for the defence of his Kingdom, Communi assensu Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum, Comitum, Baronum & omnium fidelium suo●um Ang●iae, by the common counsel and assent of the Archbishops, Bishops, Earls, Barons, and the rest of his Liege's. (Remember what was said before touching the writ of Summons in the said King's time) From this time till the last Parliament of King Charles, there is no Kings reign, of which we have not many (though not all) the Acts of Parliament still in print amongst us. Nor is there any Act of Parliament in the printed Books, to the enacting of the which the Bishop's approbation and consent is not plainly specified, either in the general Proem set before the Acts, or in the body of the Act it themselves; as by the books themselves doth at at large appear. And to this kind of proof may be further added the form and manner of the writ by which the Prelates in all times have been called to Parliament, being the very same verbatim with that which is directed to the temporal Barons, save that the Spiritual Lords are commanded to attend the service, in fide & dilectione, the temporal in fide & homagio, and of late times in fide & ligeantia. A form or copy of which summons as ancient as King John's time, is still preserved upon Record, directed nominatim to the Archbishop of Canterbury 
r V Titles of hon. pt. 2. c. 5. ; and then a scriptum est similiter to the residue of the Bishops, Abbats, Earls, and Barons. Then add the Privilege of Parliament for themselves and their servants, during the time of the Sessions; the liberty to kill, and take one or two of the King's Deer as they pass by any of his Forests in coming to the Parliament upon his commandment 
s Charta de Foresta cap. ; their enjoying of the same immunities, which are and have been heretofore enjoyed by the Temporal Barons 
t Cambden in Britannia. : and tell me if the Bishops did not sit in Parliament by as good a title, and have not sat there longer by some hundreds of years in their Predecessors, as or than any of the Temporal Lords do sit or have sat there in their progenitors; and therefore certainly essential, fundamental parts of the Court of Parliament.  
8. But against this it is objected, first, that some Acts have passed in Parliament, to which the Prelates did not vote, nor could be present in the House when the Bill was passed; as in the sentencing to death or mutilation of a guilty person: as doth appear both by the laws & constitutions recognized at Clarendon, and the following practice▪ This hath been touched on before, & we told you then, that this restraint was laid upon them, not by the Common law of England, or any Act or Ordinance of the House of Peers, by which they were disabled to attend that service. It was their own voluntary Act, none compelled them to it, but only out of a conformity to some former Canons (ad sanctorum Canonum instituta 
x Antiqu. Brit. in Gul. Courtney. , as their own words are) by which it was not lawful for the Clergy men to be either Judges or Assessors in causa Sanguinis 
y Constitut. Othobon. fol. 45. . And yet they took such care to preserve their Interests, that they did not only give their Proxies for the representing of their persons, but did put up their Protestation with a salvo jure for the preserving of their rights for the time to come: jure Paritatis & interessendi in dicto Parliamento 
z Antiqu. Britan. in Gul. Courtney.  quoad omnia & singula ibi excercenda in omnibus semper salvo, as the manner was. Examples of the which are as full and frequent, as their withdrawing themselves on the said occasions. But then the main objection is, that as some Acts have passed in Parliament absentibus Praelatis, when the Bishops did absent themselves of their own accord; so many things have been transacted in the Parliament excluso Clero, when the Clergy have been excluded or put out of the House by some Act or Ordinance. A precedent for this hath been found and published by such as envied that poor remnant of the Church's honour: though possibly they will find themselves deceived in their greatest hope, and that the evidence will not serve to evince the cause. The Author of the Pamphlet entitled, The Prerogative and practice of Parliaments, first laying down his Tenet, that many good Acts of Parliament may be made though the Archbishops and Bishops should not consent unto them 
a Printed at London. 1628. p. 37.  (which is a point no man doubts of, considering how easily their negative may be overruled by the far greater number in the House of Peers) adds, that at a Parliament holden at S. Edmundsbury 1196 in the reign of Ed: 1. a Statute was made by the King, the Barons, and the Commons, Excluso Clero, & for the proof hereof refers us unto Bishop Jewel. Now Bishop Jewel saith indeed, " that in a Parliament solemnly holden at St. Edmunsbury by King Edward 1. Anno 1296. the Archbishops and Bishops were quite shut forth, and yet the Parliament held on, and good, and wholesome laws were there enacted, the departing or absence of the Lords Spiritual notwithstanding 
b Defence of the Apolog. pt. 6. c. 2. §. 1. . In the Records whereof it is written thus, Habito Rex cum Baronibus suis Parliamento, & Clero excluso statutum est, etc. the King keeping the Parliament with his Barons, the Clergy (that is to say, the Archbishops, and Bishops) being shut forth, it was enacted, etc." Wherein who doth not see, if he hath any eyes, that by this reason (if the proof be good) many good Acts of Parllament may be made, though the Commons either out of absence or opposition should not consent unto them? of whose consent unto that Statute (whatsoever it was) there is as little to be found in that Record, as the concurrence of the Bishops. But for Answer unto so much of this Record so often spoke of and applauded as concerns the Bishops, we say, that this (if truly sensed as I think it be not) was the particular act of an angry and offended King against his Clergy, not to be drawn into example as a proof or Argument against a most clear, known, and undoubted right. The case stood thus, A Constitution had been made by Boniface the 8th. Ne aliqua collecta ex ecclesiasticis proventibus Regi aut cuivis alii Principi concedatur 
c Matth. Westm. in Edw. 1. , that Clergy men should not pay any tax or tallage unto Kings or Princes out of their Spiritual preferments, without the leave of the Pope: under pretence whereof the Clergy at this Parliament at S. Edmundsbury, refused to be contributory to the King's occasions, when the Lay-Members of the House had been forwards in it. The King being herewith much offended, gives them a further day to consider of it, adjourning the Parliament to London, there to begin on the morrow after S. Hilaries day; and in the mean time commanded all their Barns to be fast sealed up. The day being come, and the Clergy still persisting in their former obstinacy, excluso e Parliamento Clero Consilium Rex cum solis Baronibus & populo habuit, totumque statim Clerum protectione sua privavit 
d Antiqu. Brit. in R. Winchelsey. ; the King (saith the Historian) excluding the Clergy out of the Parliament, advised with his Barons and his people only, what was best to be done, by whose advice he put the Clergy out of his protection, and thereby forced them to conform to his will and pleasure. This is the summa totalis of the business, and comes unto no more but this, that a particular course was advised in Parliament on a particular displeasure taken by the King against the body of his Clergy then convened together, for their particular refusal to contribute to his wants & wars, the better to reduce them to their natural duty. Which makes not any thing at all against the right of Bishops in the House of Peers, or for excluding them that House, or for the validity of such Acts as are made in Parliament during the time of such exclusion: especially considering that the King shortly after called his States together, and did excuse himself for many extravagant Acts which he had committed 
e Walsing●, in Edw. 1. anno 1297.  against the liberties of the Subject (whereof this was one) laying the blame thereof on his great occasions, and the necessities which the wars which he had abroad, did impose upon him. And so much as in Answer unto that Record, supposing that the words thereof be rightly sensed, as I think they are not, and that by Clerus there we are to understand Archbishops and Bishops, as I think we be not, there being no Record (I dare boldly say it) either of History or Law, in which the word Clerus serves to signify the Archbishops, and Bishops, exclusive of the other Clergy; or any writing whatsoever, wherein it doth not either signify the whole Clergy generally, or the inferior Clergy only exclusive of the Archbishops, Bishops, and other Prelates. Therefore in answer unto that so much applauded Cavil of Excluso Clero, from what Record soever it either hath been hitherto or shall hereafter be produced, I shall propose it to the consideration of the sober Reader, whether by Clerus in that place, or in any other of that kind and time, we must not understand the in●eriour Clergy, as they stand distinguished in the Laws from my Lords the Bishops. For howsoever it be true, that Clerus in the ecclesiastical notion of the word doth signify the whole Clergy generally, Archbishops, Bishops, Priests, and Deacons: yet in the legal notion of it, it stands distinguished from the Prelates, and signifieth only the inferior Clergy. Thus do we find the ecclesiastics of this Realm divided into Prelates, men of Religion, and other Clerks, 3. Edw. 1. c. 1. the Seculars either into Prelates and Clerks, 9 Edw. 2. c. 3. 1 Rich. 2. c. 3. or Prelates and Clerks beneficed, 18 Edw. 3. c. 2. or generally into the Prelates and the Clergy, 9 Edw. 2. c. 15. 14 Edw. 3. c. 1, & 3. 18 Edw. 3. 2. 7. & 25 Edw. 3. 2. 4. & 8 Hen. 6. c. 1. and in all acts and grants of Subsidies, made by the Clergy to the Kings or Queens of England since the 32 of Henry 8. (when the Clergy subsidies first began to be confirmed by act of Parliament) So also in the Latin ideom, which comes nearest home, Nos Praelati & Clerus in the submission of the Clergy to King Henry 8. 
f Regist. Wa●ham. , and in the sentence of divorce against Anne of Cleve 
g Regist. Cranmer. , and in the instrument of the grant of the Clergy subsidies presented to the Kings of England ever since the 27 of Queen Elizabeth, and in the form of the Certificates (per 
h Statut. 8 Eliz. c. 17. & ever since.  Praelat●s & Clerum) returned by every Bishop to the Lord High Treasurer, and finally, Nos Episcopi & Clerus Cantuariensis Provinciae in hac Synodo more nostro solito dum Regni Parliamentum celebratur, congregati 
i Stat. 1 Phil. & Mar. c. 8. , in the petition to K. K. Philip and Mary, about the confirmation of the Abbey lands to the Patentees. So that though many Statutes have been made in these later times, excluso Clero, the Clergy (that is. to say the inferior Clergy) being quite shut out, and utterly excluded from those public Counsels; yet this proves nothing to the point that avy act of Parliament hath been counted good to which the Bishops were not called, or at the making of which Act they either were shut out by force, or excluded by cunning. As for Kilbancies' book which that Author speaks of 
k Prer●g. & pract. of Pa●l. p. 38. , in which the Justices are made to say 7 H. 8. that our Sovereign Lord the King may well hold his Parliament by him and his Temporal Lords, and by the Commons also, without the Spiritual Lords, for that the Spiritual Lords have not any place in the Parliament chamber by reason of their Spiritualties, but by reason of their Temporal possessions: besides that it is only the opinion of a private man, of no authority or credit in the Common wealth, and contrary to the practice in the Saxon times in which the Bishops sat in Parliament as Spiritual persons, not as Barons; the reason for aught I can see, will serve as well to pretermit all or any of the Temporal Lords, as it can serve to pretermit or exclude the Bishops, the Temporal Lords being called to Parliament on no other ground, than for the Temporal possessions which they hold by Barony.  
9 If it be said that my second answer to the argument of Excluso Clero supposeth that the inferior clergy had some place in Parliament, which being not to be supposed makes the Answer void: I shall crave leave to offer some few observations unto the consideration of the sober and impartial Reader, by which I hope to make that supposition probable, and perhaps demonstrative. First then we have that famous Parliament (call it Concilium magnum, or Concilium common, or by what other name soever the old writers called it) summoned by King Ethelbert, anno 605. which my 
l Concil. Hen. Spelm.  Author calleth Commune concilium tam Cleri quam Populi, where Clerus comprehendeth the body of the Clergy generally, aswell the Presbyters, as the Bishops; as the word populus doth the lay-subject generally, as well Lords as Commons; or else the Lords and Commons one of the two must be needs left out. And in this sense we are to understand these words in the latter times, as where we read that Clerus 
m Matth. Paris▪ in Hen. 1.  Angliae & populus Vniversus were summoned to appear at Westminster, at the Coronation of King Henry the first, where divers Laws were made and declared, subscribed by the Archbishops, Bishops, and others of the principal persons that were there assembled: that Clero & populo convocato 
n Rog. Hou. in Hen▪ 2. , the Clergy and people of the Realm were called to Clarendon, anno 1163. by King Henry the second, for the declaring and confirming of the Subject's liberties: that in the year 1185 towards the later end of the said King's reign, Convocatus est Clerus & populus cum tota Nobilitate ad fontem Clericorum 
o Matth. paris in Hen. 2. , the Clergy, Commons, and Nobility were called unto the Parliament held at Clerkenwell: and finally that a Parliament was called at London, in which the Archbishop of Canterbury was present, cum toto Clero & tota secta Laicali 
p Quadrilog. ap. Selden Tit. of Hon. pt. 2. c. 5. , in the time of King John. Hitherto then the Clergy of both ranks and orders, as well as Populus or tota secta Laicalis, the Subjects of the Laity, or the Lords and Commons, had their place in Parliament. And in possession of this right the Clergy stood when the Magna Charta was set out by King Henry the 3d, wherein the freedoms, rights, and privileges of the Church of England (of which this evidently was one) was confirmed unto her 
q Magna Charta cap. 1. : of the irrefragable and inviolable authority whereof we have spoke before. The Cavil of Excluso Clero which hath been used against the voting of the Bishops in the house of Peers, comes in next for proof, that the inferior Clergy had their place or vote with the house of Commons; (if in those times the Lords and Commons made two houses, which I am not sure of) the Clergy could not be excluded in an angry fit, or out of a particular design to deprive them of the benefit of the King's protection; if they had not formerly a place amongst them: & if we will not understand by Clerus, the inferior Clergy, which much about that time (as before we shown) began to be the leg●l English of the word; we must needs understand the whole Clergy generally, the Clergy of both ranks and orders. But our main proofs are yet to come, which are these that follow. First it is evident that anciently the Clergy of each several Diocese were chargeable by Law for the expenses of their Proctors in attending the service of the Parliament; according as the Counties were by Common law (since confirmed by Statute 23 H. 6. c. 11.) to bear the charges of their Knights, the Burroughs and Cities of their Representees: which questionless the Laws had not taken care for, but that the Clergy had their place in Parliament, as the Commons had. And this appears by a Record 
z Rotul. Parent. 26 Ed. 3. pt. 1. M. 22.  of 26 of King Edward the 3d. in which the Abbot of Leieester being then, but never formerly commanded to attend in Parliament, amongst others of the Regular Prelates; petitioned to be discharcharged from that attendance, in regard he held in Frank-Almoigne only, by no other tenure. Which he obtained upon this condition, ut semper in Procuratores ad hujusmodi Parliamenta mittendot consentiat, &, ut moris est, eorundem expensis contribuat, that is to say, that he and his Successors did give their voices in the choice of such Procuratours, as the Clergy were to send to Parliament, and did contribute towards their charges as the custom was. Next in the Modus tenendi Parliamentum, which before we spoke of, there is amodus convocandi Clerum Angliae ad Parl. Regis 
r Modus tenendi Parl. M●. , a form of calling the English Clergy (that is the Prelates & Clergy as John Selden (e) renders it) to the Court of Parliament: said to be used in the time of Edward the Son of Ethelred, 
(s) V. Titles of hon. pt. 2.  presented to the Conqueror, and by him observed: which shows the Clergy in those times had their place in Parliament. Which being but a general inference shall be delivered more particularly from the Modus itself, which informs us thus, Rex est caput, principum & finis Parliamenti, etc. 
t Modus tenendi Parl. Ms. c. 12.  " The King is the head, the beginning and end of the Parliament, and so he hath not any equal in the first degree; the second is of Archbishops, Bishops, and Priors, and Abbats holding by Barony; the third is of Procurators of the Clergy; the fourth of Earls, Barons, and other Nobles; the fifth is of Knights of the Shire; the sixth of Citizens and Burgesses: and so the whole Parliament is made up of these six degrees." But the said Modus tells us more, and goeth more particularly to work than so. For in the ninth chapter, speaking of the course which was observed in canvasing hard and difficult matters, it telleth us that they used to choose 25 out of all degrees, (like a grand Committee) to whose consideration they referred the point; that is to say, two Bishops, and three Proctors for the Clergy, two Earls, three Barons, five Knights, five Citizens, and as many Burgesses. And in the 12th. that on the fourth day of the Parliament the Lord high Steward, the Lord Constable, and the Lord Marshal were to call the house, every degree or rank of men in its several Order; and that if any of the Proctors of the Clergy did not make appearance, the Bishop of the Diocese was to be fined 100 l. And in the 23d. chapter it is said expressly, that as the Knights, Citizens, & Burgesses in things which do concern the Commons have more authority than all the Lords; so the Proctors for the Clergy, in things which do concern the Clergy, have more authority than all the Bishops. Which Modus if it be as ancient as the Norman Conqueror, as both Sir Edward Coke conceiveth 
u Preface to the 9th. part of Reports. , and the title signieth, it showeth the Clergies claim to a place in Parliament to be more ancient than the Commons can pretend unto: but if no older than the reign of King Edward third, as confidently is affirmed in the Titles of Honour 
x Titles of hon. pt 2. c. 5. , if showeth that in the usage of those later times the Procurators of the Clergy had a right and place there as well as Citizens and Burgesses, or the Knights of the Shires. And this is further proved by the writs of Summons directed to the Archbishops and Bishops, for their own coming to the Parliament; in the end whereof there is a clause for warning the Dean and Chapter of their cathedrals, and the Arch-deacons with the whole Clergy to be present at it, that is to say the Deans and Arch-deacons personally, the Chapter and Clergy in their Proctors, then and there to consent to such Acts and Ordinances as shall be made by the Common counsel of the Kingdom. The whole clause word for word is this 
y Extant ibid. pt. 2. c. 5. , Praemunientes Priorem & Capitulum (or Decanum & Capitulum as the case might vary) Ecclesiae vestrae N. ac Archidiacanos totumque Clerum vestrae Dioceseos, quod iidem Decanus & Archichidiaconi in propriis personis suis, ac dictum Capitulum per unum, idemque Clerus per duos Procuratores idoneos plenam & sufficientem potestatem ab ipsis Capitulo & Clero habentes, praedicto die & loco personaliter intersint, ad consentiendum iis quae tunc ibidem de communi consilio ipsius Regni nostri divina favente clementia contigerit ordinari. Which clause being in the Writs of King Edward 1. and for the most part of the reign of his next Successors●, till the middle of King Richard the second, at which time it began to be fixed and formal; hath still continued in those writs (without any difference almost between the Syllables) to this very day 
z Id. ibid. . Now that this clause was more than Verbal, and that the Proctors of the Clergy did attend in Parliament, is evident by the Acts and Statutes of King Richard the second: the passages whereof I shall cite at large, the better to conclude what I have in hand. The Duke of Gloucester and the Earl of Arundel having got the mastery of the King, obtained a Commission directed to themselves and others of their nomination, to have the rule of the King and his Realm 
a Statur 21 R. 2. c. 2. : and having their Commission confirmed by Parliament, in the 11 year of his reign, did execute divers of his Friends and Ministers, and seized on their Estates as forfeited. But having got the better of his headstrong and rebellious Lords, in the one and twentieth of his reign he calls a Parliament, in the Acts whereof it is declared, " That on the Petition of the Commons, of the assent of all the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Proctors of the Clergy, he repealed the said Statute and Commission 
b Ibid. c. 2. , and with the assent of the said Lords and Commons did ordain and establish that no such Commission nor the like be henceforth purchased, pursued or made. This done, the heirs of such as had been condemned by virtue of the said Commission, demanded restitution of their Lands and Honours. And thereupon the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Procuratours of the Clergy (the Commons having prayed to the King before as the Appellants prayed) severally examined did assent expressly that the said Parliament and all the Statutes, etc. should be void, etc. and restitution made as afore is said. 
c Ibid. c. 12.  And also the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, the Procuratours of the Clergy, and the said Commons were severally examined of the Questions proposed at Nottingham, and of the Answer which the Judges made unto the same: which being read aswell before the King and the Lords, as before the Commons, it was demanded of all the States of the Parliament, what they thought of the Answers, and they said that they were lawfully & duly made, etc. And then it followeth, whereupon the King, by the assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Procuratours of the Clergy and the said Commons, and by the advice of the Justices and Sergeants, aforesaid (who had been asked their opinion in point of Law) ordained and established that the said Parliament should be annulled and held for none." Add unto this that passage in the 9 of Edward 2. where it is said, that many Articles containing divers grievances committed against the Church of England, the Prelates & Clergy, were propounded by the Prelates and Clerks of our Realm, in Parliament, and great instance made that convenient remedy might be appointed therein 
d Proem ad articulos Cl●ri. : that of the complaints made to the King in Parliament by the Prelates and Clergy of this Realm, 50 Ed. 3. 5. & 8 Rich. 2. c. 13. and that of the Petition delivered to the King in Parliament by the Clergy of England, 4 Hen. 4. c. 2. 
Selden hist. of Tithes. c. 8. 33.  And finally that memorable passage in the Parliament, 51 Edw. 3. which in brief was this. The Commons finding themselves aggrieved aswell with certain Constitutions made by the Clergy in their Synods, as with some laws or Ordinances which were lately passed, more to the advantage of the Clergy than the Common people, put in a Bill to this effect, viz. " That no Act nor Ordinance should from thenceforth be made or granted on the Petition of the said Clergy, without the consent of Commons; and that the said Commons should not be bound in times to come, by any constitutions made by the Clergy of this Realm, for their own advantage, to which the Commons of this Realm had not given consent." The reason of the which is this (and 'tis worth the marking) " car eux ne veullent estre obligez a nul de vos estatuz ne Ordinances faitz sanz leur assent, because the said Clergy did not think themselves bound, (as indeed they were not in those times) by any Statute, Act, or Ordinance, made without their Assent in the Court of Parliament." Which clearly shows that in those times the Clergy had their place in Parliament as the Commons had. Put all which hath been said together, and tell me if it be not clear and evident that the inferior Clergy had their place in Parliament; whether the Clause touching the calling of them thither, were not more than verbal in the Bishop's writs, and is true that in the writ of summons directed to their several and respective Bishops they were called only ad consentiendum, to manifest their consent to those Acts and ordinances, which by the Common counsel of the Realm were to be ordained. But than it is as true withal, that sometimes their advice was asked in the weighty matters, as in the 21 of K. Richard the 2. and sometimes they petitioned and remonstrated for redress of grievances, as in the instances and cases which were last produced. And 'tis as true that if they had been present only ad consentiendum, to testify their assent to those Acts which by the common Counsel of the Realm were proposed unto them: their presence was as necessary, and their voice as requisite to all intents and purposes (for aught I can see) as the voice and presence of the Commons in the times we speak of. For in the writs of summons issued to the several Sheriffs for the electing of Knights, Citizens and Burgesses to attend the Parliament, it is said expressly, first that the King resolveth upon weighty motives touching the weal and safety both of Church and State to hold his Parliament, 
e Fo●ma Brevis pro fammonit. Parliamenti.  et ibidem cum Praelatis, Magnatibus et Proceribus dicti regni nostri colloquium habere et tractare, then and there to advise and treat with the Prelates, Peers and Nobles of this Realm: Which words are also expressly used in the writs of summons directed to the Bishops, and to every of them; who also are required in a further clause consilium suum impendere 
f Titles of hon. part 2. cap. 5. , to give the King their best advice in his great affairs. So that the Prelates and Nobility convened in Parliament made the King's great Counsel, and were called thither to that end. What then belonged unto the Commons? 1. No more than did belong to the Clergy also, that is to say, the giving of their consent to such Laws and Statutes as should there be made. Which notwithstanding in tract of time gave them such a sway, and stroke in the course of Parliaments, that no law could be made, nor no tax imposed without their liking and allowance. And this is that which is expressed in the last clause of the said writ, by which the Knights and Burgesses are to come prepared 
g Form a Brevis, etc.  ad faciendum et consentiendum iis quae tune ibidem de consilio dicti Regni nostri super negotiis antedictis contigerint ordinari. Which is the very same which you had before in the writ directed to the Bishops, for summoning the Clergy of their several Dioceses, and that here is a faciendum which the other had not. A word which if you mark it well, hath no operation in the Construction of the text, except it be in paying subsidies, or doing such things as are appointed to be done by that great Counsel of the Kingdom; Which clause, though it be cunningly left out (that I may say no worse) in the recital of the writ by the Author of the Book entitled, the Prerogative and practice of Parliaments: is most ingenuously acknowledged in the Declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled at Oxon, 
h Declaration of the treaty P. 15.  where it is said, that the writs of summons, the foundation of all power in Parliament, are directed to the Lords in express terms to treat and advise with the King and the rest of the Peers of the Kingdom of England; and to the Commons to do and consent to those things, which by that Common council of England should be ordained. And thus it stands, as with the Common people generally in most states of Christendom, so with the Commons anciently in most states of Greece; of which Plutarch telleth us 
i Plutarch in Lyeurgo: , that when the people were assembled in Counsel, " it was not lawful for any of them to put forth matters to the Counsel to be determined, neither might any of them deliver his opinion what he thought of any thing, but the people had only authority 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to give their assent unto such things as either the Senators or their Kings do propound unto them."  
10. But against this it is objected, first, that it is not to be found at what time the Clergy lost their place and vote in Parliament, and therefore it may reasonably be presumed that they had never any there: and 2ly. that if they had been called ad consentiendum (though no more than so) we should have found more frequent mention of their consent unto the Acts & Statutes in our printed Books. For answer unto which it may first be said, that to suppose the Clergy had no voice in Parliament, because it is not to be found when they lost that Privilege, is such a kind of Argument (if it be an argument) as is made by Bellarmine, 
k Bellarm. de Eccl. lib. 4. cap. 5.  to prove that many of the controverted Tenets of the Church of Rome, are neither terroneous nor new, because we cannot say expressly, quo tempore, quo autore, when and by whose promoting they first crept in. And though we cannot say expressly when the inferior Clergy lost their place in Parliament, in regard it might be lost by discontinuance or non-usage; or that the clause was pretermitted for some space of time the better to disuse them from it; or that they might neglect the service in regard of their attendance in the Convocation, which gave them power and reputation both with the Common people: yet I have reason to believe, that this pretermission and disuse did chief happen under the government of the Kings of the house of Lancaster, who being the true heirs and successors of john of Gaunt, cast many a longing eye on the Church revenues, and hardly were persuaded to abstain from that height of sacrilege, which Henry the 8 did aftercome to. And this I am induced to believe the rather, in regard that in the confirmation of the Church's rights so solemnly confirmed and ratified in all former Parliaments; there was a clog put to or added in these times, which shaked the Fabric: the confirmation being first of such rights and liberties as were not repealed, 3. Hen. 5. cap. 1. & 4 Hen. 5. cap. 1. and afterwards of such as by the Common law were not repealeable, 2 Hen. 6. cap. 1. which might go very far indeed. And secondly I find that in the 8 of Henry the 6. an Act of Parliament was passed, that all the Clergy called to Convocation by the King's writ, and their servants and Family shall for ever hereafter fully use and enjoy such liberty and defence in coming tarrying and returning, as the great men and Commonalty of the Realm of England called to the King's Parliament do enjoy, 
l 8 Hen. 6. cap. 1.  etc. Which being an unnecessary care or caution when the Clergy had their voice in Parliament, and very necessary to be taken formerly, if they had never had such voice: makes me conceive, that it was much about this time that they lost that privilege. But this I leave as a conjecture, and no more than so. For answer to the second argument, that if they had been called of old ad consentiendum, we should have found more frequent mention of their consent unto the Acts and Statutes of the former times; besides that it is a negative proof, and so non concludent, it strikes as much against the presence and consent of the Knights and Burgesses in the elder Parliaments, as it can do against the Clergy. For in the elder Parliaments under K. Henry 3. and K. Edward the first there is no mention of the Commons made at all, either as present or consenting; nor much almost in all the Parliaments till K. Henry 7. but that they did petition for redress of greivances, and that upon their special instance and request 
m In the Proem to the several Sessions.  several laws were made for the behoof and benefit of the Commonwealth: which part the Clergy also acted in some former Parliaments, as before was showed. So that this negative Argument must conclude against both or neither. But secondly I answer, that in these elder times in which the Proctors for the Clergy had their place in Parliament, they are included generally in the name of the Commons. And this I say on the authority of the old modus tenendi Parliamentum, in which the Commons are divided in the Spiritualty and the Temporalty; and where it is expressly said that the Proctors for the Clergy, the Knights, the Citizens and the Burgesses did represent the whole Commonalty of the Realm of England 
a Cap. ult. . And this holds good in law (for aught I find unto the contrary) to this very day. Certain I am that Crompton in his book of the jurisdiction of Courts, where he fpeakes of Parliaments, doth tell us that the Knights, Citizens, Burgesses, and Barons of the Cinque ports, 
b Grompton Iurisd. des. Courts. ca●.  ove le Clergie qu' eux assemble au Pawles, represent le corps de tout le Comminalty Dengliterre, together with the Clergy which assembled at S. Paul's, do represent the body of the whole Commonalty of England. So then, the Clergy were not only called but were present also, according to that clause in the writ of Summons (which before I spoke of) directed to their several and respective Bishops, as the King's spiritual Sheriffs, if I may so say, enabled by the Laws to that end and purpose. Which some endeavouring to avoid, have at last found out that the clause before recited out of the Writ to the Bishops, is not a calling of the Clergy to attend in Parliament, but to command them to attend in the Convocation: which I have heard much pressed by those who pretend unto some knowledge in the course of things. Which though it be a gross mistake, and inconsistent with the words and circumstances of the Writ itself, which relates merely to the Parliament, and business of a Parllamentarie nature: yet for the clearing of the point, and undeceiving such as have been deceived, they may please to know, that besides this Writ by which the Clergy are commanded to appear in Parliament, there is another writ and another form of calling them unto the service of the Convocation, which is briefly this. The King sends out his Writ or Mandate to the Archbishop of Canterbury, requiring him super quibusdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis, etc. 
n Regist. Warham. . for divers great and weighty reasons concerning the King's honour, the Church's safety, and the public peace of his dominions, to summon all the Bishops, Deans and Chapters, Arch-deacons, and the whole Clergy of his Province to meet in Convocation at a day and place appointed. On the reception of which Writ the Archbishop sendeth out his Monitory to the Bishop of London (who by his place is Dean of the Episcopal College 
o Antiqu. Britan. in initio. , and to disperse the Mandates of the Metropolitan) requiring him to appear himself in person, and to send out his warrant unto every Bishop of the Province, to appear there also, and to take order that the Deans of the Cathedrals, and Arch-deacons personally, the Chapter by one Procurator, the Clergy of the Diocese by two, (whom we usually call Clerks of the Convocation) do attend that service (p). 
b Regist. Warham. . Which coming to the hands of each several Bishop they do accordingly give intimation to their Deans and Chapters, to their Arch-deacons and the Clergy; and they accordingly prepare themselves to obey the Monitory, and to return Certificate of their do in it. The like proceeding is observed also for the Province of York. So that the calling of the Clergy to the Convocation being by a different Writ and another form, which hath no reference to nor dependence on the writs directed by the K. to each several Bishop for their attendance in the Parliament, it must needs be (as I conceive it) that by that clause remaining in the Writs aforesaid, the Clergy have good right and title to a voice in Parliament, though they have lost their jus in re, the benefit, the use and possession of it.  
11. But I speak this as once the Apostle said in another case, not by commandment but by permission. For I persuade myself the Clergy do not aim so high at the recovery of a right so long antiquated and disused, but would be well enough content with the restitution of the Bishops to their vote in Parliament, of which they stood possessed by so strong a Title, as the very constitution of the Parliament, and the fundamental laws of the English government could confer upon them. For though the Bishops sat in Parliament in their own personal capacities, and not as the representative body of the Clergy; yet the poor Clergy found it some respect unto them to be thus honoured in their heads: and were the more obliged to obey such Acts as were established in that Court, wherein these heads had opportunity of interceding, if perhaps any thing were propounded which might be grievous to the Clergy, and many times a power of hindering and diverting if not by voice and numbers, yet by strength of reasons. They were not altogether Slaves and Bondmen whilst the Church held that remnant of her ancient rights; for whilst the heads retained that honour, the body could not choose but rejoice in it and be cherished by it. But since they have been stripped of that (by what unworthy Acts the world knows too well) they are become of such condition, that the most despicable Tradesman in a Corporate Town is more considerable in the eye of the State, and hath a greater interest in the affairs thereof, than the greatest Prelate, and to say truth than all the Clergy of the Realm. For being there are three Ingredients which make up a Freeman (as S. Francis Bacon well observed in his speech concerning the Postnati) that is to say, 1. jus Civitatis, which did enable a man to buy and sell, and to take Inheritances; 2. jus suffragii, a voice in the passing of Laws and Election of Officers; and 3. jus honoris, a capability of such offices and honours as the State could give him: the Clergy by this means are limited to the first right only, & utterly excluded from the other two, and thereby put into a worse condition, than the meanest Freeman in the Kingdom. Insomuch that whereas every needy Artisan if he be free of any Corporate Town or City, every Cottager that dwelleth in an ancient Burrough, and every Clown which can lay claim to forty shillings per Annum of free hold, either for life or of inheritance, hath a voice in Parliament, either in person or by Proxy; and is not bound by any law but what himself consents to in his Representatives: the Clergy only of this Realm (as the case now stands) being one of the greatest States of this Kingdom, as is acknowledged expressly in terminis by Act of Parliament 
p 8 Eliz. c. 1. , are neither capable of place there in their personal capacities, nor suffered to be there in their Procuratours, as of old they were; nor have so much as any voice in choosing of the Knights and Burgesses which represent the body of the people generally. I know it hath been said in reply to this, that the Clergy may give voices at the election of the Knights and Burgesses, and that it is their own neglect if they do it not. But I know too, that this is only yielded unto such of the Clergy, as are possessed os Lands and Houses in those several places where such elections are to be made, and not then neither in most places, except it be to make a party for particular ends, especially where some good man or the main cause itself is concerned therein: which as it totally excludeth the greatest part of the Clergy from having any voice at all in these Elections, (the greatest part of the Clegy (the more the pity) having neither Lands nor Houses to such a value in fee simple) so it gives no more power unto those that have, than what of necessity must serve (I am sure occasionally it may) to their own undoing. For to say truth, those that give out that the Clergy may give voice at such elections, use it but as a shift for the present turn: intending nothing less indeed (as hath oft been seen) than that the Clergy should be capable of so great a trust. The reason is, because there is not any Freeman of a City or a Corporate town who hath a voice in the election of a Citizen to serve in Parliament, nor almost any Cottager or Freeholder who hath a voice in the election either of a Knight or Burgess, but is directly eligible to the place himself. Of Citizens & Burgesses ●lected from the very meanest of the people, we have many instances, and shall have more according as they find their strength, and have received a taste of the sweets of Government. And for the choosing of the Knights of the seveveral Shires, it is determined by the Statutes that as 40 s. land of freehold per Annum 
q 8 Hen. 6. c. 7. , is enough to qualify a Clown for giving a voice at the election; so the same Clown if he have 20l. land per Annum is capable of being chosen for a Knight of the Shire, as appears plainly and expressly by the Statute law. For though the writ directed to the several and respective Sheriffs prescribe a choice of duos milites gladio cinctos; yet we know well that by the Statute of King Henry 6. which is explanatory in this case of the Common law, such notable Esquires or Gentlemen, born of the same Counties, as shall be able to be Knights 
r 23 Hen. 6. 15. , are made as capable as a dubbed Knight to attend that service; and he that hath no more than 20 l. per Annum either in Capite or Socage is not only able by the law to be made a Knight 
s 1 Ed. 2. c. 1. , but was compellable thereunto even by the Statute-Law itself, until the Law was lately altered in that point 
t 17 Car●l. c. 1. . And on the other side it is clear enough (for there have been of late some experiments of it) that though a Clergyman be born an Esquire or Gentleman (for they are not all born ex fece Plebis, as the late Lord Brook 
u L. Brook against Episcopacy.  forgetting his own poor extraction hath been pleased to say) and though he be possessed of a fair Estate descended to him from his Ancestors, or otherwise possessed of some Lands or Houses in Town, Burrough, or City, whereby he stands as eligible in the eye of the Law, as any Lay-Gentleman of them all; yet either he is held uncapable, and so pretermitted; or if returned, rejected at the House itself to his fowl reproach. It is a Fundamental constitution of the Realm of England, that every Freeman hath a voice in the Legislative power of Parliament: & it is an old rule in Politics, quoth omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari debet 
x And so acknowleged in a writ of Summons of K. Edw. 1. . Which being now denied to the English Clergy, reduceth to them to that condition which St. Paul complains of; and make them not otherwise accounted of by the Common people, than as, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the filth and off-scowring of the world to this very day.  
12. This tempts me to a brief discussion of a question exceeding weighty in itself, but not so much as thought of in this great disfranchisement, the slavery obtruded lately on the English Clergy: that is to say, whether that any two of the three Estates conspiring or agreeiug together can conclude on any thing unto the prejudice of the third. Bodinus that renowned Statesman doth resolve it negatively; and states it thus, nihil a duobus ordinibus discerni posse, quo uni ex tribus incommodum inferatur, si res ad singulos ordines seorsum pertinet 
z Bodin. de Rep. l. 3. c. 7. , that nothing can be done by two of the Estates to the disprofit of the third, in case the point proposed be such as concerns them severally. The point was brought into debate upon this occasion. Henry the 3d. of France had summoned an Assembly of the three Estates or Conventus Ordinum to be held at Bloys, Anno 1577. (The form and order of the which we have at large described by Thuanus Lib. 63.) But finding that he could not bring his ends about so easily with that numerous body, as if they were contracted to a narrower compass, he caused it to be moved unto them that they should make choice of 36, twelve of each Estate, quoss Rex cum de postulatis decerneret in consilium adhibere dignaretur 
a Thuanus in hist. temp. l. 63. , whom the King would deign call to counsel for the dispatch of such affairs and motions as had been either moved or proposed unto him. Which being very readily assented to by the Clergy and Nobility, who hoped thereby to find some favour in the Court, and by degrees to be admitted to the Privy Counsel, was very earnestly opposed by Bodinus, being then Delegate or Commissioner for the Province of Veromandois, who saw full well that if businesses were so carried, the Commons (which made the third Estate,) would find but little hopes to have their grievances redressed, their petitions answered. 
b Bodin. de Rep. l. 1. c. 7  And therefore laboured the rest of the Commissioners not to yield unto it, as being utterly destructive of the Rights and Liberties of the Common people: which having done, he was by them entrusted to debate the business before the other two Estates, and did it to so good effect, that at the last he took them off from their resolution, and obtained the cause. What Arguments he used in particular, neither himself nor Thuanus telleth us. But sure I am that he insisted both on the ancient customs of the Realm of France, as also of the Realms of Spain and England, and the Roman Empire; in each of which it was received for a ruled case, nihil a duobus ordinibus statui posse, quo uni ex tribus prejudicium crearetur, that nothing could be done by any of the two Estates unto the prejudice of the third. And if it were a ruled case, then in the Parliament of England, there is no reason why it should be otherwise in the present times, the equity and justice of it being still the same, and the same reasons for it now as forcible, as they could be then. Had it been otherwise resolved of in the former ages, wherein the Clergy were so prevalent in all public Counsels, how easy a matter had it been for them either by joining with the Nobility to exclude the Commons, or by joining with the Commonalty to exclude the Nobles? Or having too much conscience to adventure on so great a change, an alteration so incompatible and inconsistent with the Constitution of a Parliament; how easily might they have suppressed the potency, and impaird the Privileges of either of the other two, by working on the humours or affections of the one to keep down the other? But these were Arts not known in the former days, nor had been thought of in these last, but by men of ruin, who were resolved to change the Government (as the event doth show too clearly) both of Church and State. Nor doth it help the matter in the least degree, to say that the exclusion of the Bishops from the House of Peers, was not done merely by the practice of the two other Estates, but by the asse●t of the King, of whom the Laws say he can do no wrong, and by an Act of Parliament whereof our Laws yet say, quae ●ul doit imaginer chose dishonourable, 
c Plowden in Commentar.  that no man is to think dishonourably. For we know well in what condition the King was when he passed that Act, to what extremities he was reduced, on what terms he stood, how he was forced to fly from his City of London, to part with his dear Wife and Children, and in a word so overpowred by the prevailing party in the two Houses of Parliament, that it was not safe for him (as his case then was) to deny them any thing. And for the Act of Parliament so unduly gained, besides that the Bill had been rejected when it was first brought unto the Lords, and that the greater part of the Lords were frighted out of the House, when contrary unto the course of Parliament it was brought again; it is a point resolved both in Law and reason, that the Parliament can do nothing to the destruction of itself, and that such Acts as are extorted from the King are not good and valid, whereof we have a fair example in the Book of Statuers 
d 15 Ed. 3. . " For whereas the King had granted certain Articles pretended to be granted in the form of a Statute, expressly contrary to the Laws of the Realm and his own Prerogative and rights royal (mark it, for this is just the case) which he had yielded to eschew the dangers, which by denying of the same were like to follow:" in the same Parliament it was repealed in these following words; It seemed good io the said Earls, Barons, and other wise men, that since the Statute did not proceed of our free will, the same be void; and ought not to have the name nor strength of a Statute, and therefore by their counsel and assent we have decreed the said Statute to be void, etc. Or if it should not be repealed in a formal manner, yet is this Act however gotten, void in effect already by a former Statute, in which it was enacted in full Parliament, and at the self same place where this Act was gained, that the Great Charter (by which and many other Titles the Bishops held their place in Parliament) should be kept in all points, and if any Statute be made to the contrary, it shall be holden for none 
e 42 Ed. 3. c. 1. .   

CHAP. VI That the three Estates of every Kingdom whereof CALVIN speaks, have no authority either to regulate the power, or control the Actions of the Sovereign Prince.  

(I.) The Bishops and Clergy of England, not the King, make the third Estate, and of the dangerous consequences which may follow on the contrary Tenet.  
(II.) The different influence of the three Estates upon conditional Princes, and an absolute Monarch.  
(III.) The Sanhedrim of no authority over the persons, or the actions of the Kings of Judah.  
(IV.) The three Estates in France of 〈◊〉 small authority over the actions of that King.  
(V.) The King of Spain not overruled, or regulated by the three Estates.  
(VI) Of what authority they have been anciently in the Parliaments of Scotland.  
(VII.) The King of England always accounted heretofore for an absolute Monarch.  
(VIII.) 〈◊〉 part of Sovereignty invested legally in the English Parliaments.  
(IX.) The three Estates assembled in the Parliament of England, subordinate unto the King, not coordinate with him.  
(X.) The Legislative power of Parliaments is properly and legally in the King alone.  
(XI.) In what particulars the power of the English Parliament doth consist especially.  
(XII.) The Kings of England ordinarily overrule their Parliaments by themselves, their Counsel, and their Judges.  
(XIII.) Objections answered touching the power and practice of some former Parliaments, and the testimonies given unto them.  
(XIV.) No such Authority given by God in Holy Scripture to any such Popular Magistrates, as CALVIN dreams of and pretends.  
(XV.) The Application and Conclusion of the whole Discourse.   
I Have been purposely more copious in the former Chapter, because I thought it necessary to declare and manifest who made the three Estates in each several Kingdom, which are pretended by our Author to have such power of regulating the authority, and censuring the actions and the persons of their Sovereign Princes. And this the rather in regard it is thought of late, and (more than thought) presented to the world in some public writings, (especially as it relates to the Realm of England) that the King, the Lords, and Commons, make the three Estates: which brings the King into an equal rank with the other two in reference to the business and affairs of Parliament. A fancy, by what Accident soever it was broached and published, which hath no consistence either with truth, or ordinary observation, or with the practice of this Realm, or of any other. For the proof of this my position, that the King is none of the three Estates as is now pretended, if all proofs else should fail, I have one from Calvin, whose judgement in this point amongst many of us, will be instar omnium. For where he saith in singulis Regnis tres esse Ordines, 
e Calvin, inst●t. 4. cap. ult.  that there are three Estates in each several Kingdom, and that these three Estates convened in Parliament, (or by what other name soever they call their meeting) are furnished with a power Regum libidinem moderandi, of moderating the licentiousness of Kings and Princes; and that they become guilty of perfidious dissimulation, si Regibus impotenter grassantibus, etc. If they connive at Kings, when they play the Tyrants, or wantonly insult on the Common-people: I trow it cannot be conceived that the King is any one of the three Estates, who are here trusted (or at least supposed to be entrusted) with sufficient power, as well to regulate his authority, as to control his actions. If Calvin be allowed to have common sense, and to have wit and words enough to express his meaning, (as even his greatest Adversaries do confess he had) it must be granted that he did not take the King of what Realm soever, to be any of the three Estates: or if he did, he would have thought of other means to restrain his insolences, than by leaving him in his own hands, to his own correction. Either then Calvin is mistaken in the three Estates, (& if he be mistaken in designing the men he aims at, may he not be mistaken in the power he gives them?) or else the King is no●e, & indeed can be none of the three Estates, qui primarios conventus peragunt, who usually convene in Parliament for those ends and purposes before remembered. But not to trust to him alone, though questionless he be ideoneus testis in the present case; Let us behold the Assembly of the three Estates or Conventus Ordinum in France (from whence it is conceived that all Assemblies of this kind had their first Original) and we shall find a very full description of them in the Assembly des Estates at Bloys under Henry 3. Anno 1577. of which thus Thuanus. 
f Thuanus in histor. sui temp. l. 63.  " Rex insublimi loco sub uranisco sedebat, etc. The King, saith he, sat on an high erected Throne under the Canopy of State, the Queen-mother, and the Queen his wife, and all the Cardinals, Princes, Peers upon either hand. And then it followeth, Transtris infra dispositis ad dextram suam sacri Ordinis Delegati, ad laevam Nobilitas, & infra plebetus ordo sedebat, that on some lower forms there sat the Delegates of the Clergy towards the right hand of the King, the Nobility towards the left, and the Commissioners for the Commons in the space below." We may conjecture at the rest by the view of this: Of those in Spain, by those Conventions of the States which before we spoke of, at Burgos, Monson, Toledo, and in other places, in which the King is always mentioned as a different person, who called them, and dissolved them as he saw occasion. For Scotland, it is ordinary in the stile of Parliaments, to say the King and the Estates do ordain and constitute; 
g Statutes of Scotland.  (for which I do refer you to the Book of Statutes) which clearly makes the K. to be a different person from the Estates of that Kingdom. And as for England, besides what may be gathered from the former Chapter, we read in the History of Titus Livius, touching the Reign and Acts of K. Henry the 5th. that when his Funerals were ended, the three Estates of the Realm of England did assemble together and declared his Son K. Henry the 6. being an Infant of 8 months old to be their Sovereign Lord, 
h Tit. Liv. M. S. in Bibl. Bodl.  as his Heir and Successor. " And in the Parliament Rolls of K. Richard the 3d. there is mention of a Bill or Parchment presented to that Prince, being then Duke of Gloucester, on the behalf and in the name of the three Estates of this Realm of England, that is to wit, of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons by name: which forasmuch as neither the said three Estates, nor the persons which delivered it on their behalf were then assembled in form of Parliament, was afterwards in the first Parliament of that King by the same three Estates assembled in this present Parliament (I speak the very words of the Act itself) and by authority of the same, enroled, recorded, and approved: 
i Ap Speed in K. Rich. 3●  And at the request, and by the assent of the three Estates of this Realm, that is to say, the Lords Spiritual, and Temporal, and Commons of this Land assembled in this present Parliament, and by authority of the same, it be pronounced, decreed, and declared, that our said Sovereign Lord the King was, and is the very and undoubted heir of this Realm of England, etc." And so it is acknowledged in a 
k 1 Eliz. cap. 3.  Statute of 1 Eliz. ca 3. where the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in that Parliament assembled, being said expressly and in terminis to represent the three Estates of the Realm of England, did recognize the Queen's Majesty to be their true, lawful, and undoubted Sovereign Liege Lady, and Queen. This makes it evident, that the King was not accounted in the times before for one of the three Estates of Parliament, nor can be so accounted in the present times. For considering that the Lords and Commons do most confessedly make two of the three Estates, and that the Clergy in an other Act of Parliament of the said Queen's time, are confessed to be one of the greatest States of the Realm, 
l Statut. 8 Eliz. cap. 1.  which Statute being still in force, doth clearly make the Clergy to be the third; either there must be more than three Estates in this Kingdom, which is against the Doctrine of the present times, or else the King is none of the Estates, as indeed he is not, which was the matter to be proved. But I spend too much time in confuting that which hath so little ground to stand on, more than the dangerous consequences which are covered under it: For if the King be granted once to be no more than one of the three Estates, how can it choose but follow from so sad a Principle, that he is of no more power and consideration in the time of Parliament, than the House of Peers, which sometimes hath consisted of three Lords, no more; or than the House of Commons only, which hath many times consisted of no more than 80 or an hundred Gentlemen: but of far less consideration to all intents and purposes in the Law whatever, than both the Houses joined together. What else can follow hereupon but that the King must be coordinate with his two Houses of Parliament, and if coordinate, then to be overruled by their Joint concurrence, bound to conform unto their Acts, and confirm their Ordinances; or upon case of inconformity and noncompliance to see them put in execution against his liking and consents, to his foul reproach. And what at last will be the issue of this dangerous consequence, but that the Lords content themselves to come down to the Commons, and the King be no otherwise esteemed of than the chief of the Lords, the Princeps Senatus if you will, or the Duke of Venice, at the best no more, which if Sir Edward Dering may be credited, as I think he may in this particular, seems to have been the main design of some of the most popular and powerful Members then sitting with him, for which I do refer the Reader to his book of Speeches. Which dangerous consequents whether they were observed at first by these who first ventured on the expression, or were improvidently looked over, I can hardly say. Certain I am, it gave too manifest an advantage to the Antimonarchical party in this Kingdom, and hardened them in their proceeding against their King, whom they were taught to look on and esteem no otherwise than as a joint-tenant of the Sovereignty with the Lords and Commons. And if Kings have partners in the Sovereignty, they are then no King; such being the nature and law of Monarchy, that si divisionem capiat interitum capiat necesse est, 
m Lactant Institut. Diu. l. 1. c.  if it be once divided, and the authorities thereof imparted, it is soon destroyed. Such is the dangerous consequence of this new Expression, that it seemeth utterly to deprive the Bishops, and in them the Clergy of this Land, of all future hopes of being restored again to their place in Parliament. For being the Parliament can consist but of three Estates, if the King fall so low as to pass for one, either the Bishops or the Commons, or the Temporal Lords must desert their claim, the better to make way for this new pretention: and in all probability the Commons being grown so potent, and the Nobility so numerous and united in blood and marriages, will not quit their interest; and therefore the poor Clergy must be no Estate, because less able, as the world now goeth with them, to maintain their title. I have often read that Constantine did use to call himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
n Euseb. de vita Constant.  the Bishop or Superintendent of his Bishops; and I have oft heard our Lawyers say, that the King is the general Ordinary of the Kingdom: but never heard nor read till within these few yearrs, that ever any King did possess himself of the Bishop's place or vote in Parliament, or sat there as the first of the three Estates (as anciently the Bishops did) to supply their absence. By which device, whether the Clergy or the King be the greater losers (though it be partly seen already) future times will show.  
(2.) This rub removed, we next proceed to the examination of that power, which by our Author is conferred on the three Estates: which we shall find on search and trial to be very different, according to the constitution of the Kingdom in which they are. For where the Kings are absolute Monarches, as in England, Scotland, France, and Spain, 
l Bodin de Repub. l. 1. c.  the three Estates, have properly and legally little more authority, than to advise their King, as they see occasion, to represent unto his view their common grievances, and to propose such remedies, for redress thereof, as to them seem meetest, to canvas and review such erroneous judgements as formerly have passed in inferior Courts, and finally to consult about, and prepare such laws as are expedient for the public. In other Countries where the Kings are more conditional, and hold their Crowns by compact and agreement between them and their Subjects; the reputation and authority of the three Estates is more high and eminent, as in Polonia, Danemark, and some others of the Northern Kingdoms, where the Estates lay claim to more than a directive power, and think it not enough to advise their King, unless they may dispose of the Kingdom also, or at least make their King no better than a Royal Slave. Thus and no otherwise it is with the Germane Emperors, who are obnoxious to the Laws, 
m Thuan. hist. sui temp. l. 2.  and for their Government accountable to the Estates of the Empire: insomuch that if the Princes of the Empire be persuaded in their consciences that he is likely by his maladministration to destroy the Empire, and that he will not hearken to advice and counsel 
n Anonym. Script. ap Philip. Paraeu in Append. ●d Rom. 13.  ab Electorum Collegio Caesaria potestate privari potest, he may be deprived by the Electors, and a more fit and able man elected to supply the place. And to this purpose in a Constitution made by the Emperor Jodocus, about the year 1410. there is a clause, that if he or any one of his Successors do any thing unto the contrary thereof, the Electors and other States of the Empire sine rebellionis vel infidelitatis crimine libertatem habeant, 
o Goldast. Constit. Imperial. Tom. 3. p. 424.  should be at liberty without incurring the crimes of Treason or Disloyalty, not only to oppose, but resist them in it. The like to which occurs for the Realm of Hungary, wherein K. Andrew gives authority to his Bishops, Lords, and other Nobles sine nota alicujus infidelitatis; 
p Bonfinius de Edict. publs. p. 37.  that without any imputation of disloyalty, they may contradict, oppose, and resist their Kings, if they do any thing in violation of some Laws and sanctions. In Poland the King takes a solemn oath at his Coronation, to confirm all the Privileges, rights and liberties which have been granted to his Subjects of all ranks and orders by any of his Predecessors: and then adds this clause, quod si Sacramentum meum violavero, incolae Regni nullam nobis obedientiam praestare tenebuntur; which if he violates, his Subjects shall no longer be obliged to yield him obedience. 
q Bodin de Rep. lib. 1. cap. 8.  Which oath as Bodine well observeth, doth savour rather of the condition of the Prince of the Senate, than of the Majesty of a King. The like may be affirmed of Frederick the first King of Danemark, who being called unto that Crown on the ejection of K. Christian the 2d. An. 1523. " was so conditioned with by the the Lords of the Kingdom, that at his coronation, or before, he was fain to swear, that he would put none of the Nobility to death or banishment, but by the judgement of the Senate, that the great men should have power of life or death over their Tenants and Vassals, and that no Appeal should lie from them to the King's tribunal, nor the King be partaker of the confiscations; nec item honores aut imperia privatis daturum, &c 
r Id. ibid.  nor advance any private person to commands or honours, but by authority of his great Counsel." Which oath being also taken by Frederick the second, made Bodinus say, that the Kings of Danemark, non tam reipsa quam appellare Reges sunt, were only titular Kings, but not Kings indeed: Which character he also gives of the Kings of Bohemia. 
s Id. ibid. p. 88  But in an absolute Monarchy the case is otherwise, all the prerogatives and rights of Sovereignty being so vested in the King's person, ut nec singulis civibus nec universis fac est, etc. that it is neither lawful to particular men, nor to the whole body of the Subjects generally to call the Prince in question for life, fame, or fortunes: 
t Id. ibid. p. 210.  and amongst these he reckoneth the kingdoms of France, Spain, England, Scotland, the Tartars, Muscovites, & omnium paene Africa & Asiae imperiorum, and of almost all the Kingdoms of afric, and Asia. But this we shall the better see by looking over the particulars as they lie before us.  
(3.) But first before we come unto those particulars we will look backwards on the condition and authority of the Jewish Sanhedrim; which being instituted and ordained by the Lord himself, may serve to be a leading case in the present business. For being that the jews were the Lords own people, and their Kings honoured with the title of the Lords Anointed: it will be thought, that if the Sanhedrim, or the great Council of the seventy had any authority and power over the Kings of judah, (of whose jus Regni such a large description is made by God himself in the first of Sam. cap. 8.) the three Estates may reasonably expect the like in these parts of Christendom. Now for the authority of the Sanhedrim, it is said by Cardinal Baronius, that they had power of judicature over the Law, the Prophets, and the Kings themselves. 
u Baron. Annal. Eccl. An. 31. §. 10.  Erat horum summa autoritas ut qui de lege cognoscerent, & Prophetis, & simul de Regnibus judicarent. Which false position he confirms by as false an instance, affirming in the very next words, horum judicio Herodem Regem postulatum esse, that King Herod was convented and convicted by them; for which he citys josephus with the like integrity. I should have wondered very much what should occasion such a gross mistake in the learned Cardinal, had I not shown before, that as he makes the Sanhedrim to rule the King, so he hath made the high Priest to rule the Sanhedrim: which to what purpose it was done every man can tell, who knoweth the Cardinal endeavoureth nothing more in his large Collections, than to advance the dignity and supremacy of the Popes of Rome. 
x Id. in Epist dedicator.  But for the power pretended to be in the Sanhedrim, and their proceed against Herod as their actual King; josephus when he cite's is so far from saying it, that he doth expressly say the contrary. For, as Josephus tells the story, Hyrcanus was then King, not Herod; and Herod of so little hopes to enjoy the Kingdom, that he could not possibly pretend any Title to it. But having a command in Galilee procured by Antipater his Father, of the good King Hyrcanus, he had played the wanton Governor amongst them, and put some of them to death against Law and Justice. For which the Mothers of the slain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, did often call upon the King and people in the open Temple, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
y Joseph. Ant●q Judic. l. 14. cap. 17.  etc. that Herod might answer for the murder before the Sanhedrim, Which being granted by the King, he was accordingly convented by them, and had been questionless condemned, had not the King, who loved him dearly, given him notice of it; on whose advertisement he went out of the Town, and so escaped the danger. This is the substance of that story: and this gives no authority to the Court of Sanhedrim, over the persons or the actions of the Kings of judah. Others there are, who make them equal to the Kings, though not superior, (Magnam fuisse Senatus autoritatem & Regiae velut parem, 
z Grotius in Matth. cap. 5. v. 22.  saith the learned Grotius:) And for the proof thereof allege those words of Sedechias in the Book of jeremy: who when the Princes of his Realm required of him to put the Prophet to death, returned this Answer, 
a Jerem. 38. 5.  Behold he is in your h●nd, Rex enim contra vos nihil potest, for the King is not he that can do any thing against you. Which words are also cited by Mr. Prynne to prove that the King of England hath no Negative voice; 
b Prynne of Parl. pt. 2. p. 73.  but by neither rightly. For Calvin (who, as one observeth, composed his expositions on the book of God according to the doctrine of his Institutions 
c hooker's preface. ) would not have lost so fair an evidence for the advancing of the power of his three Estates: had he conceived he could have made it serviceable to his end and purpose. But he upon the contrary finds fault with them, who do so expound it, or think the King did speak so honourably of his Princes, ac si nihil iis sit nequandum 
d Calvin. in Jerem. c. 38. v. 5.  as if it were not to deny them any thing. Not so, saith he, it rather is amerulenta Regis querimonia, a sad and bitter complaint of the poor captivated King against his Counsellors; by whom he was so overruled, ut velit nolit cedere iis cognitur, that he was forced to yield to them whether he would or not: which he expressly calls inexcusabilem arrogantium, an intolerable piece of sauciness in those Princes, and an exclusion of the King from his legal rights.  
(4) Let us next take a view of such Christian Kingdoms as are under the command of absolute Monarches. And first we will begin with the Realm of France, the government whereof is merely Regal, if not despotical, such as that of a Master over his Servants: which Aristotle defineth to be a form of Government, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
c Aristot. Politic. l. 3.  wherein the King may do whatsoever he list, according to the counsel of his own mind. For in his Arbitrary Edicts which he sendeth abroad, he never mentioneth the consent of the People, or the approbation of the Counsel, or the advice of his Judges (which might be thought to derogate too much from his absolute power) but concludes all of them in this Regal form, Car tel est nostre plaisir, for such is our pleasure. And though the Court of Parliament in Paris do use to take upon them to peruse his Edicts, before they pass abroad for 
d View of France by Dallington.  Laws, and sometime to demur on his grants, and patents, and to petition him to reverse the same, as they see occasion; yet their perusal is a matter but of mere formality, and their demurs more dilatory than effectual. It is the Car tel est nostre plaisir that concludes the business, and the King's pleasure is the Law which that Court is ruled by. As for the Assembly des Estates, or Conventus Ordinum, it was reputed anciently the Supreme Court for government and justice of all the Kingdom; and had the cognizance of the greatest and most weighty affairs of State. But these meetings have been long since discontinued, and almost forgotten: there being no such Assembly from the time of K. Charles the eighth, to the beginning of the reign of K. Charles the ninth, 
e Thuanus hist. sui temp.  which was 70 years, and not many since. And to say truth, they could be but of little use, as the world now goeth, were the meetings oftener. For whereas there are three Principal, if not sole occasions of calling this Assembly, or Conventus Ordinum, that is to say, the disposing of the Regency, during the nonage or sickness of the King, the granting aids and subsidies, and the redress of the grievances: there is now another course taken to dispatch their business. The Parliament of Paris, which speaks most commonly as it is prompted by power and greatness, appointeth the Regent; 
f Contin. Thuani. An. 1610.  the Kings themselves together with their Treasurers and Under-officers determine of the taxes, 
g View of France.  and they that do complain of grievances may either have recourse to the Courts of justice, or else petition to the King for redress thereof. And for the making new Laws or repealing the old, the naturalisation of the Alien, and the regulating of his sales or grants of the Crown-lands, the public patrimony of the Kingdom, which were wont to be the proper subject and debates of these grand Assemblies: they also have been so disposed of, that the Conventus Ordinum is neither troubled with them, nor called about them. The Chamber of Accounts in Paris (which hath some resemblance to our Court of Exchequer) doth absolutely dispose of Naturalizations, and superficially surveyeth the King's grants and sales, 
* Andr. Du Mesn.  which they seldom cross. The King's Car tel est nostre plaisir is the Subjects law, and is as binding as any Act or Ordinance of the three Estates: and for repealing of such Laws as upon long experience are conceived to be unprofitable, the King's sole Edict is as powerful as any Act of Parliament. Of which Bodinus, doth not only say in these general terms, Saepe vidimus sine Ordinum convocatione & consensu leges à Principe abrogatas 
k Bodin. de Rep. lib. 1. cap. 8. . that many times these Kings did abrogate some ancient laws without the calling and consent of the three Estates: but saith, that it was neither new nor strange that they should so do, and gives us some particular instances, not only of the later times but the former ages. Nay when the power of this Assembly des Estates was most great and eminent, neither so curtailled nor neglected as it hath been lately; yet than they carried themselves with the greatest reverence and respect before their King, that could be possibly imagined. For in the Assembly held at Tours under Charles the 8. though the King was then no more than 14 years of age, and the authority of that Court so great and awful that it was never at so high an eminence for power and reputation, quanta illis temporibus, as it was at that time: yet when they came before the King, Monseiur de Rell being then Speaker for the Commons or the third Estate, did in the name of all the rest, and with as much humility and reverence as he could devise, promise such duty and obedience, such a conformity of his will and pleasure, such readiness to supply his wants, and such alacrity in hearking unto his Commandments, that as Bodinus well observes, his▪ whole Oration was nothing else, quam perpetua voluntatis omnium erga Regem testificatio 
l Id. ibid. , but a constant testimony and expression of the good affections of the subject to their Lord and Sovereign. But whatsoever power they had in former times is not now material, King Lewis the thirteenth, having (on good reason of State) discharged those Conventions for the time ensuing, Instead whereof he instituted an Assembly of another temper, and such as should be more obnoxious to his will and pleasure, consisting of a certain number of persons out of each Estate, but all of his own nomination and appointment, which joined with certain of his Counsel and principal Officers, he caused to be called L' Assembly des Notables, assigning to them all the power and privileges which the later Conventions of the three Estates did pretend unto; right well assured that men so nominated and entrusted would never use their powers to his detriment, and disturbance of his Heirs and Successors.  
5. But to proceed, Bodinus having shown what dutiful respects the Convention of Estates in France showed unto their King, adds this note, nec aliter Hispanorum conventus habentur, that the Assembly of the three Estates in the Realms of Spain carry themselves with the like reverence and submission to their Lord the King: Nay major etiam obedientia & majus obsequium Regi exhibetur, 
m Id. ibid.  the King of Spain hath more obedience and observance from his three Estates, than that which is afforded to the Kings of France. Which being but general and comparative, is yet enough to let us see that the Assembly of Estates in the Realms of Spain, which they call the Curia, is very observant of their King and obsequious to him, and have but little of that power which is supposed by our Author to be inherent in the three Estates of all the Christian Kingdoms, But this Bodinus proveth more particularly, ascribing to the King, and to him alone, the power of calling this Assembly when he sees occasion, and of dissolving it again when his work is done; according as is used both in France and England. And when they are assembled and met together, their Acts and consultations are of no effect, further than as they are confirmed by the King's consent. Which he declareth in the same form (eadem formulà quâ apud nos) that hath accustomably been used by the Kings of France, which is authoritative enough; that is to say 
n Id. ibid. p. 90.  decernimus, statuimus, volumus, We will, and we appoint, and we have decreed. The Kings of Spain, though not so despotical in their Government as the French Kings are, are as absolute Monarches, and have as great an influence on the three Estates, to make them pliant to their will, and to work out their own ends by them, as ever had the French Kings on their Courts of Parliament: a touch whereof we had before in the former Chapter. And this we may yet further see by their observance of the pleasure of King Philip the 2d. Who having married the Lady Elizabeth Daughter of Henry the 2d. of France, Convocatos Castellae & reliquarum Hispaniae Provinciarum Ordines, 
o Thuan. ●ist. sui temp. h 23. l.  calling together the Estates of Castille and his other Provinces of Spain, he caused them to swear to the succession of his Son Prince Charles, whom he had by the Lady Mary of Portugal, and after having on some jealousies of State put that Prince to death, caused them to swear to the succession of another son by the Lady of Austria. And for the power of his Edicts, which they call Pragmaticas, they are as binding to the Subject as an Act of Parliament, or any kind of Law whatever: examples of the which are very obvious and familiar in the Spanish Histories. For though there be a body of Laws in use amongst them, partly made up of some old Gothish Laws and Constitutions, and partly of some parts of the Law imperial: yet for the explanation of the Laws in force, if any doubt arise about them, or for supplying such defects which in the best colllection of the Laws may occur sometimes, the Magistrates and Judges are to have recourse to the King alone, and to conform to such instructions as he gives them in it. And this is it which was ordained by Alfonso the tenth, qui etiam magistratus ac judices Principem adire jussit, quoties patrio jure nihil de proposita causa scriptum esset 
p Bodin. de Rep. lib. 1. cap. 8. , as Bodinus hath it. 'Tis true that for the raising of supplies of money, and the imposing of extraordinary taxes upon the subject, the Kings of Spain must be beholden to the three Estates, without whose consent it cannot legally be done. But than it is as true withal, that there are customary tributes called Servitia 
q Id. ibid. p. 90.  which the King raiseth of his own authority without such consent. And their consenting to the extraordinary is a thing of course: the Spanish Nation being so well affected naturally to the power and greatness of their Kings, whom they desire to make considerable if not formidable in the opinion of their Neighbours, that the Kings seldom fail of moneys if the Subjects have it. Finally that we may perceive how absolute this Monarch is over all the Courts or Curias of his whole dominions; take this along according as it stands verbatim 
s Spanish hist. 67. by Tyrannell.  in the Spanish History. " The King of Spain as he is a potent Prince and Lord of many Countries, so hath he many Counsels for the managing of their affairs distinctly and apart without any confusion: every Counsel treating only of those matters which concern their Jurisdiction and charges: with which Counsels and with the Precedents thereof, being men of chief note, the King doth usually confer touching matters belonging to the good Government, preservation, and increase of his Estates, and having heard every man's opinion, he commands that to be executed which he holds most fit and convenient .."  
6. Next let us take a view of Scotland, and we shall find it there no otherwise (I mean in reference to the point which is now in question) than in France or Spain. For besides that Bodinus makes it one of those absolute Monarchies, ubi Reges sine controversia omnia jura Majestatis habent per sese, 
t Bodin. de Repub. l. 2. c. 7.  in which the Kings have clearly all the rights of Majesty inherent in their own persons only: it is declared in the Records of that very Kingdom, that the King is directus totius dominus, 
u Camden n Britan. deicript. ●  the Sovereign Lord of the whole State, and hath all authority and jurisdiction over all estates and degrees, aswel Ecclesiastical as lay or temporal. And as for those Estates and Degrees convened in Parliament, we may conjecture at their power, by that which is delivered of the form or order which they held it in; which is briefly this. 
x Form of holding the Parl. in Scotl.  " Assoon as the King's writ is issued out for summoning the Estates to meet in Parliament, he maketh choice of eight of the Spiritual Lords, such on whose wisdom and integrity he may most rely; which eight do choose as many of the Temporal Lords, and they together nominate eight more out of the Commissioners for the Counties, and as many out of the Commissioners for the Towns or Burroughs. These 32 thus chosen are called Domini pro Articulis, Lords of the Articles: and they together with the Chancellor, Treasurer, Keeper of the Privy Seal, and Principal Secretaries of state, and the Master of the Rolls (whom they call Clerk Register) do admit or reject every bill; [but not before they have been shown unto the King] if they pass there they are presented afterwards to the whole Assembly, where being thoroughly weighed, and examined, & put unto the votes of the house; such of them as are carried by the major part of the Voices (for the Lords and Commons sit together in the same house there) are on the last day of the Sessions exhibited to the King: who by touching them with his Sceptre pronounceth that he either ratifieth and approveth them, or that he doth disable them and make them void. But if the business be disliked by the Lords of the Articles it proceeds no further, and never comes unto the consideration of the Parliament, or if the King dislikes of any thing in it when they show it to him, it either is razed out or mended before it be presented to the public view." King James of blessed memory, who very well understood his own power and the forms of that Parliament, describes it much to the same purpose, in his Speech made at Whitehall, March 31. Anno 1607. " About twenty days (saith he) before the Parliament, Proclamation is made throughout the Kingdom to deliver unto the King's Clerk of Register all Bills to be exhibited that Session before a certain day. Then are they brought unto the King, and perused and considered by him, and only such as he alloweth of are put into the Chancellor's hands to be propounded to the Parliament, and none others. And if any other man in Parliament speak of any other matter than is in this sort first allowed by the King, the Chancellor telleth him that the King hath allowed of no such Bill. Besides, when they have passed them for Laws they are presented to the King, and he with his Sceptre put into his hands by the Chancellor, must say, I ratify and approve all things done in this present Parliament. And if there be any thing that he disliketh it is razed out before." So the eldest Parliament-man as he said himself, at that time in Scotland. This was the form of holding Parliaments in Scotland, which, whosoever doth consider with a serious eye may perceive most plainly, that it is wholly in the King's power to frame the Parliament to his own will, or at the least to hinder it from doing any thing to the prejudice of his Royal Crown and Dignity: in that the nominating of the Lords of the Articles did in a manner totally depend on him. Which being observed by the Scots, they took the opportunity when they were in Arms to pass an Act during the Presidency of the Lord Burley, Anno 1640. 
y Acts of Parliaments, 16 Carol.  for the abolition of this Order, and for reducing of that Parliament to the forms of England; as being thought more advantageous to their purposes, than the former was. So that the violent disloyalty of the Scotish Subjects, their Insurrections against their Kings, and murdering them sometimes when their heels were up, which makes that Nation so ill spoke of in the Stories of Christendom, are not to be imputed to the three Estates convened in Parliament, or to any power or Act of theirs, but only praefervido Scotorum ingenio 
z Rivet count. tenuit.  as one pleads it for them, unto the natural disposition of that fierce and headstrong people, yet easilier made subject unto rule and government. The three Estates assembled in the Court of Parliament, (when in the judgement of our Author they are most fit to undertake the business) have for the most part had no hand in those desperate courses.  
7. And now at last we eaten come to England, where, since we came no sooner, we will stay the longer: and here we shall behold the King established in an absolute Monarchy, from whom the meeting of the three Estates in Parliament detracteth nothing of his power and authority Royal. Bodin as great a Politic as any of his time in the Realm of France, hath ranked our Kings amongst the absolute Monarch of these Western parts 
a Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. . And Camden as renowned an Antiquary as any of the Age he lived in, hath told us of the King of England, supremam potestatem & merum imperium habere 
b Camden in Britan. descript. , " that he hath supreme power and absolute command in his dominions; and that he neither holds his Crown in vassalage, nor receiveth his investisture of any other, nor acknowledgeth any Superior, but God alone." To prove this last, he citys these memorable words from Bracton an old English Lawyer, omnis quidem sub Rege, & ipse sub nullo sed tantum sub deo, that every man is under the King, but the King under none saving only God. But Bracton tells us more than this, and affirms expressly, that the King hath supreme power and jurisdiction over all causes and persons in this his Majesty's Realm of England, that all jurisdictions are vested in him and are issued from him, and that he hath jus gladii, or the right of the sword, for the better governance of his people. This is the substance of his words, but the words are these, 
c Bracton de leg. A●gl. l. 2. c. 24.  Sciendum est (saith he) quod ipse dominus Rex ordinariam habet jurisdictionem & dignitatem & potestatem super omnes qui in regno suo sunt. Habet enim omnia jura in manu sua quae ad coronam & laicalem pertinent potestatem, & materialem gladium qui pertinet ad Regni gubernandum, etc. He adds yet further. Habet item in potestate sua leges & constitutiones 
d Id. l. 2. c. 16. , that the Laws and constitutions of the Realm, are in the power of the King: by which words, whether he meaneth that the Legislative power is in the King, and whether the Legislative power be in him, and in him alone, we shall see anon. But sure I am, that he ascribes unto the King the power of interpreting the Law in all doubtful cases, in dubiis & obscuris domini Regis expectanda interpretatio & voluntas, which is plain enough. For though he speaketh only de chartis Regiis & factis Regum, of the King's deeds and charters only, as the words seem to import; yet considering the times in which he lived (being Chief Justice in the time of King Henry the 3d.) wherein there was but little written Law more than what was comprehended in the King's Grants and Charters, he may be understood of all Laws whatever. And so much is collected out of Bractons' words by the L. Chancellor Egerton, of whom it may be said without envy, that he was as grave and learned a Lawyer, as ever sat upon that Bench. " Who gathereth out of Bracton, that all cases not determined for want of foresight are in the King, to whom belongs the right of interpretation, not in plain and evident cases, but only in new questions and emergent doubts; and that the King hath as much right by the constitutions of this Kingdom, as the Civil law gave the Roman Emperors, where it is said, Rex solus judicat de causa a jure non definita 
e Case of the Postnati. p. 107, 108. ." And though the Kings make not any Laws without the counsel and consent of his Lords and Commons, whereof we shall speak more in the following Section, yet in such cases where the Laws do provide no remedy, and in such matters as concern the politic administration of his Kingdoms, he may and doth take order by his Proclamations. He also hath authority by his Prerogative Royal to dispense with the rigour of the Laws, and sometimes to pass by a Statute with a non obstante, as in the Statute 1 Henr. 4. cap. 6. touching the value to be specified of such lands, offices, or annuities, &c, as by the King are granted in his Letters patents. But these will better come within the compass of those jura Majestatis or rights of Sovereignty, which our Lawyers call sacra & individua 
f Camden in B●it. : sacred, by reason they are not to be pried into with irreverent eyes; and individual or inseparable, because they cannot be communicated unto any other. Of which kind are the levying of Arms 
g Case of our Affairs. p. 3. , suppressing of tumults and rebellions, providing for the present safety of his Kingdom against sudden dangers, convoking of Parliaments, and dissolving them, making of Peers, granting liberty of sending Burgesses to Towns and Cities, treating with foreign States, making war, leagues, and peace, granting safe conduct and protection, indenizing, giving of honour, rewarding, pardoning, coining, printing, and the like to these. But what need these particulars have been looked into, to prove the absoluteness and sovereignty of the Kings of England, when the whole body of the Realm hath affirmed the same, and solemnly declared it in their Acts of Parliament. In one of which is affirmed, 
h 16 Rich. 2. c. 5.  that the Crown of England hath been so free at all times, that it hath been in no earthly subjection, but immediately to God, in all things touching the regality of the said Crown, and to none other. And in another Act, that the Realm of England is an Empire governed by one supreme head and King, having the Dignity and Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of the same, unto whom a Body politic compact of all sorts and degrees of people, divided in terms and by names of Spiritualty and Temporalty been bounden and ought to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience 
i 24 Henr. 8. c. 12. . And more than so, that the King being the supreme head of this Body Politic is instituted and furnished by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary whole and entire power, pre-eminence, authority, prerogative, and jurisdiction to render and yield justice and final determination to all manner of Subjects within this Realm, and in all causes whatsoever. Nor was this any new Opinion invented only to comply with the Prince's humour, but such as is declared to have been fortified by sundry Laws and Ordinances made in former Parliaments 
k Ibid. : and such as hath been since confirmed by a solemn Oath, taken and to be taken by most of the Subjects of this Kingdom, Which Oath consisting of two parts, the one Declaratory, and the other Promissory; in the Declaratory part the man thus taketh it doth declare and testify in his conscience, that the King's Highness is the only supreme Governor of this Realm and of all other his Dominions, and Countries, aswell in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal, etc. 
(l) 1 Eliz. c. 1.  And in the Promissooy part, they make Oath and swear, that to their power they will assist and defend all Jurisdictions, Privileges, Preeminences, and Authorities granted or belonging to the King's Highness, his Heirs and Succcesseors, or united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm. Put all which hath been said together, and it will appear, that if to have merum imperium, a full and absolute command, and all the jura majestatis which belong to Sovereignty, if to be so supreme as to hold immediately of God, to have all persons under him, none but God above him; if to have all authority and jurisdiction to be vested in him, and proceeding from him, and the material sword at his sole disposal for the correcting of offenders and the well ordering of his people; if to have whole and entire power of rendering justice and final determination of all causes to all manner of Subjects, us also to interpret and dispense with Laws; and all this ratified and confirmed unto him by the solemn Oath of his Subjects in the Court of Parliament, be enough to make an absolute Monarch: the Kings of England are more absolute Monarches than either of their Neighbours of France or Spain.  
8. If any thing may be said to detract from this, it is the new devise so much pressed of late, of placing the chief Sovereignty, or some part thereof, in the two Houses of Parliament: concerning which Mr. Prynne published a discourse entitled The supreme power of Parliaments and Kingdoms; and others in their Pamphlets upon that Argument have made the Parliament so absolute, and the King so limited, that of the two the Members of the Houses are the greater Monarches. But this is but a new devise, not heard of in our former Monuments & Records of Law: nor proved, or to be proved indeed by any other Medium, than the Rebellions of Cade, Tiler, Straw, Kett, Mackerel, and the rest of that rascal rabble 
m Prynnes book of Parl. etc. p●. 3. ; or the seditious Parliaments in the time of K. Henry the 3d. King Edward the 2d. and King Richard the 2d. when civil war and faction carried all before it. For neither have the Houses or either of them enjoyed such Sovereignty de facto in times well settled, and Parliaments lawfully assembled, nor ever could pretend to the same de jure. Or if they did, as many have been apt enough to raise false pretences, it would much trouble them to determine whether this Sovereignty be conferred upon them by the King or the people, whether it be in either of the Houses severally, or in both united. If they can challenge this pretended Sovereignty in neither of these capacities, nor by none of these Titles, it may be warrantably concluded that there is no such Sovereignty as they do pretend to. And first there is no part nor branch of Sovereignty conferred upon them by the King. The writs of Summons which the Declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled at Oxon. 1643. doth most truly call the foundation of all power in Parliament 
n Declaration of the Treaty. p. 15. , tell us no such matter. The writ directed to the Lords doth enable them only to confer and treat with one another, & consilium vestrum impendere, and to advise the King in such weighty matters as concern the safety of the Kingdom. But they are only to advise, not compel the King, to counsel him, but not control him; and to advise and counsel are no marks of Sovereignty, but rather works of service and subordination. Nor can they come to give this Counsel without he invite them, and being invited by his writ cannot choose but come, except he excuse them: which are sure notes of duty and subjection, but very sorry signs of power and sovereignty. 'Tis true, that being come together they may and sometimes do, on a writ of Error, examine, and reverse or affirm such judgements as have been given in the King's Bench: and from their sentence in the case there is no appeal, but only to the whole body of that Court, the King and both the Houses, the Head and Members 
o Case of our Affairs. p. 7, 8. . But this they do, not as the upper house of Parliament, but as the distinct court of the King's Barons of Parliament of a particular and ministerial jurisdiction, to some intents and purposes, and to some alone: which though it doth invest them with a power of judicature, confers not any thing upon them which belongs to Sovereignty. Then for the Commons, all which the writ doth call them to is facere & consentire, to do and consent unto such things which are ordained by the Lords and Common Counsel of the Kingdom of England, and sure conformity and consent, which is all the writ requireth from them) are no marks of Sovereignty, nor can an Argument be drawn from thence by the subtlest Sophister, to show that they are called to be partakers of the Sovereign power, or that the King intends to denude himself of any branch or leaf thereof to hid their nakedness. And being met together in a body collective, they are so far from having any share in Sovereignty, that they cannot properly be called a Court of Judicature, as neither having any power to minister an Oath 
p Id. p. 9 , or to imprison any body (except it be some of their own Members if they see occasion) which are things incident to all Courts of Justice, and to every Steward of a Leet, insomuch that the House of Commons' is compared by some (●and not incongruosly) unto the Grand Inquest at a general Sessions 
q Review of the Observat. p. 22. , whose principal work it is to receive bills, and prepare businesses, and make them fit and ready for my Lords the Judges. Nay so far were they heretofore from the thoughts of Sovereignty, that they were liable to suits and punishments for things done in Parliament, though only to the prejudice of a private Subject, until King Henry 8. most graciously passed a Law for their indemnity. For whereas Richard Strode one of the company of Tinners in the County of Cornwall, being a Member of the Commons House, had spoken somewhat to the prejudice of that Society, and contrary to the Ordinances of the Stanneries; at his return into the Country, ●e was arrested, fined, imprisoned. Complaint whereof being made in Parliament, the King passed a Law to this effect, viz. 
r 4 H●n. 8. c. 8.  That ull suits, condemnations, executions, charges and impositions put or hereafter to be put upon Richard Strode, and every of his Complices that be of this Parliament, or a●y other hereafter, for any Bill, speaking, or reasoning of any thing concerning the Parliament to be communed and treated of, shall be void and null: but neither any reparation was allowed to Strode, nor any punishment inflicted upon those that sued him, for aught appears upon Record. And for the Houses joined together (which is the last capacity they can claim it in) they are so far from having the supreme authority, that (as it is observed by a learned Gentleman) " they cannot so unite or conjoin as to be an entire Court either of Sovereign or Ministerial jurisdiction; no otherwise co-operating than by concurrence of Votes in their several Houses, for preparing matters in order to an Act of Parliament 
s Case of our Affairs. p. 9 : Which when they have done, they are so far from having any legal authority in the State, as that in Law there is no stile nor form of their joint Acts; nor doth the Law so much as take notice of them until they have the Royal Assent. So that considering that the two Houses alone do no way make an entire Body or Court, and that there is no known stile nor form of any Law or Edict, by the Votes of the two Houses only, nor any notice taken of them by the Law; it is apparent that there is no Sovereignty in their two Votes alone." How far the practice of the Lords & Commons which remained at Westminster, after so many of both Houses had tepaired to the King, etc. may create Precedents unto posterity, I am not able to determine: but sure I am, they have no Precedent to show from the former Ages. But let us go a little further and suppose for granted, that the Houses either joint or separate be capable of the Sovereignty, were it given unto them: I would fain know whether they claim it from the King, or the people only. Not from the King, for he confers upon them no further power than to debate and treat of his great Affairs, to have access unto his person, freedom of Speech (as long as they contain themselves within the bounds of Loyalty) authority over their own Members: which being custumarily desired 
t Hakewell of passing bills in Parliament , and of course obtained (as it relates into the Commons) shows plainly, that these vulgar privileges are nothing more the rights of Parliament, than the favours of Princes, but yet such favours as impart not the least power of Sovereignty. Nor doth the calling of a Parliament ex opere operato as you know who phrase it, either denude the King of the poorest robe of all his Royalty, or confer the same upon the Houses, or on either of them; whether the King intent so by his call, or otherwise. For Bodin (whom Mr. Prynne hath honoured with the title of a grand Politician 
u Pryn of Parliam. par. 2. p. 45. ) doth affirm expressly, Principis majestatem nec Comitorum convocatione, nec Senatus populique praesentia minui 
x Bodin. de Repub. , that the majesty or Sovereignty of the King is not a jot diminished either by the calling of a Parliament or Conventus Ordinum, or by the frequency and presence of his Lords and Commons. Nay to say truth, the Majesty of Sovereign Princes is never so transcendent and conspicuous as when they sit in Parliament, with their States about them, the King then standing in his highest Estate, as was once said by Henry 8. who knew (as well as any of the Kings of England) how to keep up the majesty of the Crown Imperial. Nor can they claim it from the people, who have none to give; for nemo dat quod non habet, as the saying is. The King (as hath been proved before) doth hold his Royal Crown immediately from God himself, not from the contract of the people. He writes not populi clementia, but Dei gratia, not by the favour of the people, but by the grace of God. The consent and approbation of the people (used and not used before the day of coronation) is reckoned only as a part of the solemn pomps which are then accustomably used. The King is actually King to all intents and purposes in the Law whatever, immediately on the death of his Predecessor. Nor ever was it otherwise objected in the Realm of England, till Clark and Watson pleaded it at their arraignment in the first year of King James 
y Speeds History in K. James. . Or grant we that the Majesty of this Kingdom was first originally in the people, and by them devolved upon the King by their joint consent: yet having given away that power by their said consent, and settled it upon the King by an Act of State, confirmed by Oaths and all solemnities which that Act requires; they cannot so retract that grant, or make void that gift, as to pass a new conveyance of it, and settle it upon their Representees in the House of Commons. Or if they could, yet this would utterly exclude all the Lords from having the least share or portion in this new found Sovereignty; in that they represent not the common people, but sit there only in their own personal capacities, and therefore must submit at last to these new made Sovereigns, who carry both the Purse & Sword at their own girdles. So then the people cannot give the Sovereignty, and if they have no power to give it, the Lords and Commons have no claim thereunto the jure. See we next therefore how much of this Sovereignty they or their Predecessors rather have enjoyed de facto, in peaceable and regular times, fit to be drawn into example in the Ages following. The chief particulars in which the Sovereignty consists we have seen before; and will now see whether that any of them been exercised and enjoyed in peaceable and regular times by both or either of the two Houses of Parliament. And first for calling and dissolving Parliaments, making of Peers, granting of liberty to Towns and Cities, to make choice of Burgesses, which anciently had no such liberty, treating with foreign States, denouncing war, or making Leagues or Peace after war commenced, granting safe conduct and protection, indenizing of Aliens, giving of honours unto eminent and deserving persons, rewarding, pardoning, coining, printing, making of corporations, and dispensing with the Laws in force; they are such points which never Parliament did pretend to till these later times, wherein every thing almost is lawful (I am sure more lawful) than to fear God and honour the King. Nor do I find that Mr. Prynne hath laboured to entitle them to these particulars. For levying of Arms and the command of the Militia, besides that the Kings of England have ever been in possession of it, and that possession never disturbed or interrupted by any claim of right made in the behalf of the two Houses, (which is as sure a title as the Law can make): the Houses have declared by a Act of Parliament 
a S●at. 7 Ed. 1. cap. 1. , that of right it belongs unto the King straight to defend (that is prohibit) all force of Arms, and that the Parliament is bound to aid him in that prohibition. Touching the Royal navy and the ports and forts, the King's prescription to them is so strong and binding, that in the 3d. of Edward 3. 
Edw. 3.  the House of Commons; did disclaim the having cognisance of such matters as the guarding of the Seas, and marches of the Kingdom: which certainly they had not done had they pretended any title to the ports and navy. As for suppressing tumults, and providing for the safety of the Kingdom against sudden danger, the Law commits it solely to the care of the King: obliging every Subject by the duty of his allegiance to aid and assist him at all seasons when need shall require 
b 11 Henr. 7. c. 18. . And for their power of declaring law in the House of Peers, wherein they deliver their opinion in the point before them, in true propriety of speech they have none at all 
c Case of our Affairs, p. 4. . And this is that which was affirmed by his Majesty at the end of the Parliament, Anno 1628. saying, that it belonged only to the judges under him to interpret laws, and that none of the Houses of Parliament joint or separate (what new Doctrine soever might be raised) had any power either to make or declare law without his consent 
d 3 Car. . And if it be done with his consent, it is not so properly the declaring and interpreting of an old law, as the making rather of a new, saith a learned Gentleman 
e Case of our affairs, P. 5. .  
9 Others have found out a new way to invest the Parliament with the robes of Sovereignty, not as superior to the King, but coordinate with him: and this say they appears sufficiently in that the two Houses of Parliament have not only a power of consulting but of consenting, and that too in the highest office of the Monarchy, (whereof they are a Coordinative part) the making of Laws 
f Fuller Answer to D. F. p. 2. . Which dangerous doctrine as it was built at first on that former error which makes the King to be one of the three Estates in Parliament, so it is superstructed with some necessary consequents; whether more treasonable or ridiculous, it is hard to say. For on these grounds the Author of the Fuller Answers hath presented us with these trim devises 
g Id. pag. 1. , viz. that England is not a simple subordinate and absolute, but a coordinative and mixed Monarchy; that this mixed Monarchy is compounded of three coordinate Estates, a King and two Houses of Parliament; that these three make but one supreme, but that one is a mixed one, or else the Monarchy were not mixed; and finally, which needs must follow from the premises, that although every Member of the Houses s●orsim, taken severally, may be called a Subject, yet all collective in their houses are no Subjects. Auditum admissi risum teneatis? Can any man hear these serious follies and abstain from laughter? or think a fellow who pretends both to wit and learning should talk thus of a Monarchy (which every one that knoweth any thing in Greek, know to imply the supreme government of one) compounded of three coordinate Estates, and those coordinate Estates consisting of no fewer than 600 persons? Or that a man who can pretend but to so much use of reason as to distinguish him from a beast, could fall on such a senselest Dotage, as to make the same man at the same time to be a Subject and no Subject; a Subject in the Streets and in his private House, no Subject when he sits in Haberdasher's Hall for advance of moneys, or in either of the two Houses of Parliament? And yet this senseless Doctrine is become so dangerous, because so universally admired and harkened to, that the beginning and continuance of our long Disturbances may chief be ascribed unto this opinion, to which they have seduced the poor ignorant people. The rather in regard that some who have undertaken the confutation of these brainless solies, have most improvidently granted not only 
h As in the book called Conscience satisfied.  that the two Houses of Parliament are in a sort coordinate with the King ad aliquid, to some Act or exercising of the supreme power, that is to the making of Laws; but that this coordination of the three Estates (of which the King is yielded every where for one) is fundamental, and held by the two Houses on no worse a title than a fundamental Constitution; which is as much as any reasonable Parliamentarian need desire to have. Therefore in Answer to the Fuller, (not taking notice of his foolish and seditious inferences) we will clear those points. 1. That the two Houses of Parliament are not coordinate with the King, but subordinate to him; And 2. that the power of making laws is properly and legally in the King alone. As for the first we had before a Recognition made by Act of Parliament, by which the Kingdom of England is acknowledged to be an Empire governed by one supreme head and King, to whom all sorts and degrees of people ought to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience 
i 24 H. 8. c. 12. : which certainly the Lords and Commons had not made to the dethroning of themselves, their heirs and successors from this coordinative part of Sovereignty, if any such coordination had been then believed. Or if it be supposed, to excuse the matter, that K. Henry the 8th. being a severe and terrible Prince did wrest this Recognition from them (which yet will hardly serve for a good defence:) what shall we say to the like recognition made in the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's reign 
k 1 Eliz. c. 1. , when she was green in State, and her power unsettled, and so less apt to work upon her people by threats and terrors? Assuredly had the Houses dreamt in those broken times of that coordinative Sovereignty, which is now pretended, they might have easily regained it, and made up that breach which by the violent assaults of King Henry the 8th. had been made upon them: which was a point they never aimed at. Besides, if this coordinative majesty might be once admitted, it musts needs follow, that though the King hath no Superior, he hath many Equals; and where there is Equality there is no Subjection. But Bracton tells us in plain terms, not only that the King hath no Superior in his Realm, except God almighty, but no Equal neither: and the reason which he gives is exceeding strong, Quia sic amitteret praeceptum, cum par in Parem non habeat potestatem 
l Bracton de leg. A●gl. l. 1. c. 8▪ , because he could not have an Equal, but with the loss of his Authority and Regal Dignity, considering that one Equal hath no power to command an other. Now lest the Fuller should object (as perhaps he may) that this is spoken of the King out of times of Parliament, and of the Members of the Houses seorsim, taken severally as particular persons; but when they are convened in Parliament, than they are Sovereigns and no Subjects: first he must know, that by the Statute of Queen Elizabeth all of the House of Commons are to take the oath before remembered for the defending of all preeminences, and authorities united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm, and for bearing faith and true allegiance to the King, his Heirs, and lawful Successors, and that if any of them do refuse this Oath, he is to have no voice in Parliament 
m Stat. 5 E●iz. 1. . 2. He cannot choose but know, that even sedente Parliamento, both the Lords and Commons use to address themselves to his sacred Majesty in the way of supplication and petition, (and certainly it is not the course for men of equal rank to send Petitions unto one another); and that in those Petitions they do style themselves his Majesty's most humble and obedient Subjects. Which is not only used as the common Compliment which the hypocrisy of these times hath taken up, (though possibly it might be no otherwise meant in some late addresses) but is the very phrase in some Acts of Parliament 
n ●25 Hen. 8. c. 22. etc. , as in the Acts at large doth at full appear. 3. They may be pleased to know, how happy a thing it was for the Realm of England that this Fuller did not live in former times: For had he broached this Doctrine some Ages since, he would have made an end of Parliaments. Princes are very jealous of the smallest points of Sovereignty, and love to reign alone without any Rivals: their Souls being equally made up of Pompey's and Caesars, and can as little broke an Equul, as endure a Superior. And lastly, I must let him know what Bodinus saith, who telleth us this, Legum ac edictorum probatio aut publicatio quae in Curia vel Senatu fieri solet, non arguit imperii majestatem in Senatu vel Curia inesse 
o Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. , viz. That the publishing and approbation of Laws and Edicts which is made ordinarily in the Court or Parliament, proves not the Majesty of the State to be in the said Court or Parliament. And therefore if the power of confirmation or rejecting be of a greater trust and more high concernment, than that of consulting and consenting, as no doubt it is, the power of consulting and consenting, which the Fuller doth ascribe to the two Houses of Parliament, will give them but a sorry Title to Co-ordinative sovereignty.  
10. This leads me on unto the power of making Laws, which as before I said, is properly and legally in the King alone, tanquam in proprio Subjecto, as in the true and adequate subject of that power. And for the proof thereof, I shall thus proceed. When the Norman Conqueror first came in, as he won the Kingdom by the sword, so did he govern it by his power: His Sword was then the Sceptre, and his will the Law. There was no need on his part, of an Act of Parliament; much less of calling all the Estates together, to know of them after what form, and by what Laws they would be governed. It might as well be said of him, as in the flourish and best times of the Roman Emperors 
p Justin. Institut. l. 1. c. , Quod Principi placuerit legis habet vigorem, that whatsoever the King willed it did pass for▪ Law. This King and some of his Successors being then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and having a despotical power on the lives and fortunes of their Subjects, which they disposed of for the benefit of their friends and followers, Normans, French, and Flemangs, as to them seemed best. But as the Subjects found the yoke to be too heavy and insupportable; so they addressed themselves in their Petitions to the Kings their Sovereigns, to have that yoke made easier, and the burden lighter, especially in such particulars, of which they were most sensible at the present time. By this means they obtained first to have the Laws of Edward the Confessor, contained for the most part in the great Charter afterwards: and by this means, that is to say, by pouring out their prayers and desires unto them, did they obtain most of the Laws and Statutes, which are now remaining of the time of King Henry the 3d. and King Edward the first. Many of which as they were issued at the first either in form of Charters under the Great Seal, or else as Proclamations of Grace and favour; so do they carry still this mark of their first procuring, the King willeth, the King commandeth, the King ordaineth, the King provideth, the King grants, etc. And when the Kings were pleased to call their Estates together, it was not out of an opinion that they could not give away their power, or dispense their favours, or abate any thing of the severity of their former government, without the approbation and consent of their people: but out of just fear lest any one of the three Estates (I mean the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons) should insist on any thing, which might be prejudicial to the other two. The Commons being always on the craving part, and suffering as much perhaps from their immediate Lords, as from their King, might possibly have asked some things which were as much derogatory to the Lords (under whom they held) as of their Sovereign Liege the King, the chief Lord of all. In this respect, the Counsel and consent as well of the Prelates as the Temporal Lords, was accounted necessary, in passing of all Acts of Grace and Favour to the people: because that having many Royalties and large immunities of their own, a more near relation to the person, and a greater interest in the honour of their Lord the King; nothing should pass unto the prejudice and diminution of their own Estates, or the disabling of the King to support his Sovereignty. And this for long time was the Style of the following Parliaments, viz. 
q Preface, an. 1 Ed. 3.  " To the honour of God and of holy Church, and to the redress of the oppressions of the people, our Sovereign Lord the King, etc. at the request of the Commonalty of his Realm, by their Petition made before him and his Counsel in the Parliament, by the Assent of the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and other great men assembled in the said Parliament, hath granted for him and his Heirs. etc." To this effect, but with some little (and but a very little) variation of the words, was the usual Style in all the Prefaces or Preambles of the Acts of Parliament, from the beginning of the Reign of King Edward the third, till the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 7th. save that sometimes we find the Lords complaining 
r 10 Ed. 3. etc. , or petitioning 
s 21 Ed. 3. etc. , and the Commons assenting 
t 28 Ed. 3. etc. , as their occasions did require: and sometime also no other motive represented, but the King's great desire to provide for the ease and safety of his people, upon deliberation had with the Prelates and Nobles, and learned men assisting with their mutual Counsel 
u 23 Ed. 3. . And all this while there is no question to be made, but that the power of making Laws was conceived to be the chiefest flower of the Royal Diadem, to which the Lords and Commons neither joint nor separate, did not pretend the smallest Title more than petitioning for them, or assenting to them: it being wholly left to the King's grace and goodness, whether he would give ear or not unto their petitions, or hearken unto such advice as the Lords or other great men gave him in behalf of his people. And this is that which was declared in the Parliament by the Lords and Commons (and still holds good as well in point of Law as Reason) that it belonged unto the regality of the King to grant or deny what Petitions 
x 2 Her. 5.  in Parliament he pleaseth. But as the Kings came in upon doubtful Titles, or otherwise were necessitated to comply with the people's humours, (as sometimes they were) so did the Parliaments make use of the opportunities for the increase of their authority, at least in the formalities of Law, and other advantages of expression. So that in the minority of King Henry the sixth, unto those usual words by the advice and assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the special instance and request of the Commons (which were inserted ordinarily into the body of the Acts from the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 6th.) was added this, By the authority of the said Parliament 
y 3 Hen. 6. c. 2. & 8 H. 6. 3. etc. . But still it is to be observed, that though those words were added to the former clause, yet the power of granting or ordaining was acknowledged to belong to the King alone; as in the places in the Margin, where it is said, Our Lord the King considering the premises, by the advice and assent, and at the request aforesaid, hath ordained and granted by the authority of the said Parliament, 3 H. 6. 2. and our Lord the King considering, etc. hath ordained and established by authority of this Parliament, 8 H. 6. 3. And thus it generally stood, (but every general rule may have some exceptions) till the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 7th. about which time that usual clause, the special instance or request of the Commons, began by little and little to be laid aside, and that of their advice or assent to be inserted in the place thereof: for which I do refer you to the book at large. Which though it were some alteration of the former stile, and that those words By the authority of this present Parliament, may make men think that the Lords and Commons did then pretend some title unto the power of making laws: yet neither advising or assenting are so operative in the present case as to transfer the power of making laws to such as do advise about them, or assent unto them; not can the alteration of the forms and styles used in ancient times, import an alteration of the form of Government, unless it can be showed, (as I think it cannot) that any of our Kings did renounce that power, which properly and solely did belong unto them, or did by any solemn Act of Communication, confer the same upon the Lords and Commons convened in Parliament. And this is that which is resolved and declared in our Common law, where it is said 
z Cited in the unlawfulness of resist. p▪ 107. , Le Roy fait les loix avec le consent du Seigneurs et communs, et non pas les Seigneurs et communs avec le consent du Roy, that is to say, that the King makes Laws in Parliament by the assent of the Lords and Commoni, and not the Lords and Commons by the assent of the King. And for a further proof of this, and for the clearing of this point that the Lords and Commons pretend to no more power in the making of laws, than opportunity to propound and advise about them, and on mature advice to give their several Assents unto them, we need but look into the first Act of the Parliament in the third year of King Charles, being a Recognition of some ancient Rights belonging to the English subject. An Act conceived according to the primitive form, in way of a Petition to the Kings most excellent Majesty 
a Statut. 3 Carol. , in which the Lords and Commons do most humbly pray as their Rights and Liberties, that no such things as they complained of, might be done hereafter; that his Majesty would vouchsafe to declare that the Awards, do, and proceed to the prejudice of his people in any of the premises, shall not be drawn hereafter into consequence or example, and that he would be pleased to declare his Royal pleasure, that in the point aforesaid all his Officers and Ministers should serve him according to the Laws and Statutes of this Realm. To which although the King returned a fair general Answer, assuring them that his Subjects should have no cause for the time to come to complain of any wrong or oppressions contrary to their just Rights and Liberties; yet this gave little satisfaction till he came in person, and causing the Petition to be distinctly read by the Clerk of the Crown 
b Ibid. , returned his Answer in these words, Soit droit fait come est desire, that is to say, let right be done as is desired. Which being the very formal words by which the said Petition and every clause and Article therein contained, became to be a law and to have the force of an Act of Parliament, and being there is nothing spoken of the concurrent authority of the Lords and Commons for the enacting of the same, may serve instead of many Arguments for the proof of this, that the Legislative power as we phrase it now, is wholly and solely in the King; although restrained in the exercise and use thereof by constant custom, unto the counsel and consent of the Lords and Commons. Le Roy veult 
c Smith de Rep. Angl. , or the King will have it so, is the imperative phrase by which the Propositions of the Lords and Commons are made Acts of Parliament. And let the Lords and Commons agitate and propound what Laws they please for their ease and benefit (as generally all Laws and Statutes are more for the ease and benefit of the Subject, than the advantage of the King): yet aswell now, as formerly in the times of the Roman Emperors, Quod Principi placuerit legis habet vigorem, nothing but that which the King pleaseth to allow of, is to pass for Law: the laws not taking their coercive force (as judicious Hooker well observeth) from the quality of such as devise them, but from the power which giveth them the strength of laws 
d Hooker Ecclesiast. Pol▪ . I shut up this Discourse with this expression and comparison of a late leatned Gentleman, viz. " That as in a Copyhold Estate, the Copybolder of a mere Tenant at will comes by custom to gain an Inheritance, and so to limit and restrain the will and power of the Lord, that he cannot make any determination of the Copyholders Estate otherwise than according to the custom of the Manor; and yet doth not deprive the Lord of his Lordship in the Copyhold, nor participate with him in it, neither yet divest the Fee and Franktenement out of the Lord, but that they still remain in him, and are ever parcel of his Demesn 
e Case of our Affairs. p. 6. : so in the restraining of the King's Legislative power to the concurrence of the Peers and Commons, though the custom of the Kingdom hath so fixed and settled the restraint, as that the King cannot in that point use his Sovereign power without the concurrence of the Peers and Commons according to the custom of the Kingdom; yet still the Sovereignty (and with it the inseparable Legislative power) doth reside solely in the King."  
11. If any hereupon demand to what end serve Parliaments, and what benefit can redound to the Subject by them; I say in the Apostles words, much every way 
f Rom. 3. 2. . Many vexations often times do befall the Subjects without the knowledge of the King, and against his will; to which his ears are open in a time of Parliament. The King at other times useth the eyes and ears of such as have place about him, who may perhaps be guilty of the wrongs which are done the people: but in a Parliament he seethe with his own eyes, and heareth with his own ears, and so is in a better way to redress the mischief than he could be otherwise. Nor do the people by the opportunity of these Parliamentary meetings, obtain upon their Prayers and petitions a redress of grievances only, but many times the King is overcome by their importunity to abate so much of his power, to grant such points, and pass such Laws and Statutes for their ease and benefit, as otherwise he would not yield to. For certainly it is as true in making our approaches and petitions to our Lord the King, as in the pouring out of our prayers and supplications to the Lord our God: the more multitudinous and united the Petitioners are, the more like to speed. And therefore said Bodinus truly, Principem plaeraque universis concedere quae singulis denegarentur 
g Bodin. de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. , that Kings do many times grant those favours to the whole body of their people, which would be absolutely denied or not so readily yielded to particular persons. There are moreover many things of greater concernment, (besides the abrogating of old Laws and making new) which having been formerly recommended by the Kings of England, to the care and counsel of their people convened in Parliament, are not now regularly dispatched but in such conventions: as are altering the tenure of Lands, confirming the rights, titles, and possessions of private men, naturalising Aliens, legitimating Bastards, adding sometimes the secular authority to such points of Doctrine and forms of worship as the Clergy have agreed upon in their Comvocations, if it be required, changing the public weights and measures throughout the Kingdom, defining of such doubtful cases as are not easily resolved in the Courts of Law, raising of Subsidies and Taxes, attainting such as either are too potent to be caught, or too hard to be found, and so not tryable in the ordinary Courts of Justice; restoring to their blood and honours such, or the Heirs of such, as have been formerly attainted; granting of free and general pardons 
h Sir Tho. Smith, de Rep. Angl. Camden in Brit. Crompt. of Courts, etc. , with divers others of this nature. In all and each of these the Lords and Commons do cooperate to the public good, in the way of means and preparation, but their co-operation would be lost and fruitless, did not the King by his concomitant or subsequent grace produce their good intentions into perfect Acts, and being Acts either of special grace and favour, or else of ordinary right and justice, no way derogatory to the Prerogative Royal●, are usually confirmed by the Royal assent, without stop or hesitancy. But then, some other things there are of great importance and advantage to the Common wealth, in which the Houses usually do proceed even to final sentence (the Commons in the way of imquisition or impeachment, the Lords in that of judicature and determination) with the consent and approbation of the King, though many times without his personal assent and presence. The King may be abused in his Grants and Patents, to the oppression of the people, or the dilapidation and destruction of the Royal Patrimony; Judges, and other the great Officers of Law and Equity are subject to corruptions, and may smell of gifts, whereby the passages of Justice do become obstructed; The Ministers of inferior Courts as well Ecclesiastical as Civil, either exhaust the miserable subject by extortions, or else consume him by delays; Erroneous judgements may be given through fear or favour to the undoing of a man and his whole posterity, in which his Majesty's Justices of either Bench can afford no remedy; The great ones of the State may become too insolent, and the poor too miserable; and many other ways there are by which the Fabric of the State may be out of Order: for the removing of which mischiefs, the rectifying of which abuses, the Lords and Commons in their several ways before remembered, are of special use; yet so, that if the King's Grants do come in question, or any of his Officers are called to a reckoning, they used heretofore to signify unto his Majesty what they found therein, and he accordingly either revoked his Grants, or displaced his Servants, or by some other means gave way unto their contentment: the King's consent being always necessary, and received as a part of the final sentence, if they went so far. So that we may conclude this point with these words of Bodin, who being well acquainted with the Government of this State and Nation, partly by way of conference with Dr. Dale the Queen's Ambassador in France, and partly in the way of observation when he was in England, doth give this resolution of the point in controversy 
i Bodin. de Repub. l. 1. c. 8. , Habere quidem Ordines Anglorum authoritatem quandam, jura vero majestatis, & imperii summam in unius Principis arbitrio versari. The States saith he of England have a kind of authority, but all the rights of Sovereignty and command in chief, are at the will and pleasure of the Prince alone.  
12. And to say truth, although the Lords & Commons met in Parliament are of great authority, especially as they have improved it in these later times; yet were they never of such power, but that the Kings have for the most part overruled them, & made them pliant & conformable to their own desires: and this not only by themselves, but sometimes also by their Judges, by their counsel often. For such was the great care and wisdom of our former Kings, as not to venture single on that numerous body of the two Houses of Parliament, whereby the Sovereignty might be so easily overmatched; but to take with them for Assistants as well the Lords of their Privy Counsel with whom they might advise in matters which concerned them in their Sovereign rights, as their learned Counsel (as they call them) consisting of the Judges and most eminent Lawyers, from whom they might receive instruction as the case required, and neither do, nor suffer wrong in point of Law: and by both these, as well as by the power and awe of their personal presence, have they not only regulated but restrained their Parliaments. And this is easily demonstrable by continual practice. For in the Statute of Bigamy made in the fourth 
k 4 Ed. 1.  year of King Edward 1. it is said expre●ly, " that in the presence of certain reverend Fathers, Bishops of England, and others of the King's Counsel, the Constitutions under-written were recited, and after published before the King his Cowsel, forasmuch as all the King's Counsel, as well Justices as others did agree, that they should be put in writing and observed." In the Articuli super Chartas, when the Great Charter was confirmed at the request of the Prelates, Earls, and Barons, 
l 28 Ed. 1. c. 2.  we find these two clauses: the one in the beginning thus, Nevertheless the King and his Counsel do not intent, by reason of this Statute, to diminish the King's right 
m Ibid. c. 20. , etc. The other in the close of all in these following words, And notwithstanding all these things mentioned, or any part of them, both the King and his Counsel, and all they which were present at the making of this Ordinance, do will and intent that the right and prerogative of his Crown shall be saved in all things. In the 27th. of King Edward the 3d. 
n 27 Ed. 3.  The Commons presenting a Petition to the King, which the King's Counsel did mislike, were content thereupon to mend and explain their Petition, the form of which Petition is in these words following. " To their most redoubted Sovereign Lord the King, praying the Commons, that whereas they have prayed him to be discharged of all manner of Articles of the Lyre, etc. which Petition seemeth to his Counsel to be prejudicial unto him, and in disherison of his Crown▪ if it were so generally granted: his said Commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of him, which should fall in disherison of him or of his Crown perpetually, as of Escheats, etc. but of trespasses, misprisions, negligences, and ignorances', etc." In the 13 of the reign of King Richard the 2d. when the Commons did pray that upon pain of forfeiture, the Chancellor, or Counsel of the King should not after the end of the Parliament make any Ordinance against the Common law 
o 13 Rich. 2. , the King (by the advice of his Counsel) answered, Let it be used as it hath been used before this time, so as the Regality of the King be saved, for the King will save his Regalities, as his Predecessors have done. In the 4th. year of King Henry 4. 
p 4 Hen. 4.  when the Commons complained against Sub-poenae's and other writs grounded upon false suggestions, the King (upon the same advise) returned this answer, that he would give in charge to his Officers, that they should abstain more than before time they had to send for his Subjects in that manner. But yet (saith he) it is not our intention that our Officers shall so abstain, that they may not send for our Subjects in matters and causes necessary, as it hath been used in the time of our good Progenitors. Finally, not to bring forth more particulars in a case so clear, it was the constant custom in all Parliaments, till the Reign of King Henry 5. 
q Henr. 5▪  that when any Bill had passed both houses, and was presented to the King for his Royal Assent, the King by the advice of his Privy Counsel, or his Counsel learned in the Laws, or sometimes of both, did use to cross ou● and obliterate as much or as little of it as he pleased, to leave out what he liked not, and confirmed the rest; that only which the King confirmed being held for Law. And though in the succeeding times the Kings did graciously vouchsafe to pass the whole Bill in that form which the Houses gave it, or to reject it wholly as they saw occasion: yet still the Privy Counsel, and the Judges, and the Counsel learned in the Laws, have and enjoy their place in the House of Peers, aswell for preservation of the King's rights and Royalties, as for direction to the Lords in a point of Law, if any case of difficulty be brought before them; on which occasions the Lords are to demand the opinion of the Judges, and upon their opinions to ground their judgement. As for example, In the Parliament 28 of Hen. 6. The Commons made sure that William de la Pole Duke of Suffolk, should be committed to Prison for many treasons and other crimes 
r 28 Hen. 6▪ , and thereupon the Lords demanded the opinion of the Judges, whether he should be committed to Prison or not; whose Answer was, that he ought not to be committed in regard the Commons had not charged him with any particular offence, but with generals only; which opinion was allowed and followed. In another Parliament of the said King, held by Prorogation, one Thomas Thorpe the Speaker of the House of Commons, was in the Prorogation-time condemned in 1000 l. damages, upon an Action of Trespass at the suit of Richard Duke of York, and was committed to Prison for execution of the same. The parliament being reassembled, the Commons made su●e to the King and Lords to have their Speaker delivered to them, according to the privilege of Parliaments 
t The privilege of the Barons, p. 15. : the Lords demanded the opinion of the Judges in it, and upon their Answer, did conclude, that the Speaker should still remain in Prison according to Law, notwithstanding the privilege of Parliament; and according to this resolution the Commons were commanded in the King's name to choose one Thomas▪ Carleton for their Speaker, which was done accordingly. Other examples of this kind are exceeding obvious, and for numbers infinite; yet neither more in number, nor more obvious than those of our Kings serving their turns by and upon their Parliaments, as their occasions did require. For not to look on higher and more Regal times, we find that Richard the 2d. a Prince not very acceptable to the Common people, could get an Act of Parliament 
t 21 Ric. 2. , to confirm the extrajudicial opinion of the judges, given before at Nottingham; that King Henry 4th. could by an other Act reverse all that Parliament, 
u 1 Hen▪ 4.  entail the Crown to his posterity, and keep his Duchy of Lancaster and all the Lands and Seigneuries of it, from being united to the Crown; that King Edward the 4th. could have a Parliament to declare all the Kings of the House of Lancaster, to be Kings in fact but not in right 
x 1 Ed. c. 1. , and for uniting of that Duchy to the Crown Imperial, notwithstanding the former Act of separation; that King Richard the 3d. could have a Parliament to bastardise all his Brother's Children, to set the Crown on his own head, though a most bloody Tyrant, and a plain Usurper 
y Speeds hist. in K. Richard. 3. ; that King Henry 7. could have the Crown entailed by an Act of Parliament, to the issue of his own body 
z Verulam. hist. of K. Hen 7.  without relation to his Queen of the house of York, which was conceived by many at that time to have the better Title to it; another, for paying a Benevolence which he had required of the subject 
a 11 Hen. 7. c. 10. , though all Benevolences had been damned by a former Statute made in the short, but bloody reign of King Richard the 3d. that King Henry 8. 
b 65 Hen. 8. c. 22, & 28. c. 7. & 35 H. 8. c. 1.  could have one Act of Parliament to bastardy his Daughter Mary, in favour of the Lady Elizabeth; another to declare the Lady Elizabeth to be illegitimate, in expectation of the issue by Queen Jane Seymour; a third for settling the succession by his Will and Testament, and what else he pleased; that Queen Mary could not only obtain several Acts in favour of herself and the S●e of Rome 
c 1 Mar. s●s. 2. c. 1, 2. & 1. & 2 Ph. & M. c. 8. 10. , but for the settling of the Regency on the King of Spain, in case the Children of that Bed should be left in nonage. And finally that Queen Elizabeth did not only gain many several Acts for the security of her own Person, which were determinable with her life, but could procure an Act to be passed in Parliament for making it high treason to affirm and say, That the Queen could not by Act of Parliament, bind and dispose the Rights a●d Titles which any person whatsoever might have to the Crown. 
d 13 Eliz. c. 1.  And as for raising moneys, and amassing treasures by help of Parliaments, he that desires to know how well our Kings have served themselves that way by the help of Parliaments, let him peruse a book entitled, the Privilege of Parliaments, writ in the manner of Dialogue between a Privy Counsellor, and a justice of Peace, and he shall be satisfied to the full. Put all that hath been said together, and sure the kingdom of England must not be the place, in which the three Estates convened in Parliament have power to regulate the King, or restrain his actions, or moderate his extravagances, or where they can be taxed for perfidious treachery, if they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants, or wantonly insult on the Common-people, or otherwise abuse that power which the Lord hath given them. Calvin was much mistaken if he thought the contrary; or if he dreamt that he should be believed on his ipse dixit, without a punctual enquiry into the grounds and probability of such a dangerous intimation as he lays before us.  
13. But against this it is objected, that Parliaments have disposed of the Militia of the Kingdom, of the Forts, Castles, Ports, and the Navy Royal, not only without the King's leave, but against his liking: that they have deposed some Kings, and advanced others to the top of the Regal Throne: And for the proof of this they produce examples out of the reign of K. Henry 3. K. Edw. 2. and K. Richard the 2. 
e Prynnes Book of Parl. part. 2.  Examples, which if rightly pondered, do not so much prove the power, as the weakness of Parliaments, in being carried up and down by the private conduct of every popular pretender. For 'tis well known that the Parliaments did not take upon them to rule, or rather to overlook K. Henry 3. but as they were directed by Simon Montfort Earl of Leicester, who having raised a potent faction in the State, by the assistance of the Earls of Gloucester, Hereford, Derby, 
f Ma●. Paris, Henr. 3.  and some others of the great Lords of the kingdom, compelled the King to yield unto what terms he pleased, and made the Parliaments not other than a means and instrument to put a popular gloss on his wretched purposes. And 'tis well known that the ensuing Parliaments which they instance in, moved not of their own accord to the deposing of King Edward the 2. or King Richard the 2. but sailed as they were steered by those powerful Counsels, which Queen Isabel in the one, and Henry Duke of Lancaster in the other, did propose unto them. 
g Walsingham in Hist. Angl. & Hypodig. Neustriae.  It was no safe resisting those (as their cold wisdoms and forgotten loyalties did suggest unto them) qui tot legionibus imperarent, who had so manany thousand men in arms to make good their project, and they might think as the poor-spirited Citizens of Samaria did in another case (but a case very like the present) Behold two Kings stood not before him, how then can we stand 
h 2 Kings 10. 4. ? For had it been an argument of the power of Parliaments, that they deposed one King to set up another, dethroned King Richard to advance the Duke of Lancaster to the Regal diadem, they would have kept the house of Lancaster in possession of it, (for the full demonstration of a power indeed) and not have cast them off, at the first attempt of a new plausible pretender, declared them to be kings in fact, but not in right, whose lawful right they had before preferred above all other titles, and set the Crown upon the heads of their deadly Enemies. In the next place it is objected that Parliaments are a great restraint of the Sovereign power (according to the Doctrine here laid down by Calvin) in that the King can make no laws, nor levy any money upon the Subject, but by the counsel and assent of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament. But this objection hurts as little as the former did. For Kings, to say the truth, need no laws at all. In all such points wherein they have not bound themselves by some former laws made for the common use and benefit of the Subject, they are left at liberty, and may proceed in governing the people, given by God unto them, according to their own discretion, and the advice of their Counsel. New Laws are chief made for the Subjects benefit, at their desire, on their importunate requests, for their special profit; not one in twenty, nay, I dare boldly say not one in an hundred, made for the advantage of the King, either in the improvement of his power, or the increase of his Revenue. Look over all the Acts of Parliament, from the beginning of the reign of King Henry 3. to the present time, and tell me he that can, if he finds it otherwise: Kings would have little use of Parliaments, and less mind to call them, if nothing but the making of new Laws were the matter aimed at. And as for raising moneys and imposing taxes, it either must suppose the Kings to be always unthrifts, that they be always indigent and necessitous, and behindhand with the world (which are the ordinary effects of ill husbandry) or else this argument is lost, and of little use: For if our Kings should husband their estates to the best advantage, and make the best benefit of such escheats and forfeitures & con●iscations as day by day do fall unto them; If they should follow the example of K. Henry 7. and execute the penal Laws according to the power which those Laws have given them, and the trust reposed in them by their People; if they should please to examine their revenue, and proportion their expense to their come in, there would be little need of subsidies and supplies of money, more than the ordinary aids and impositions upon Merchandise, which the Law alloweth of, and the known rights of Sovereignty backed by prescription, and long custom have asserted to them: So that it is by Accident, not by right and nature, that the Parliament hath any power or opportunity to restrain their King in this particular; for where there is no need of ask, there is no occasion of denying; by consequence no restraint upon, no baffle or affronting offered to the Regal power. And yet the Sovereign need not fear (if he be tolerably careful of his own estate) that any reasonable demand of his in these money matters, will meet with opposition or denial in his Houses of Parliament. For whilst there are so many Acts of Grace and favour to be done in Parliament (as what almost in every Parliament but an enlargement of the King's favours to his people) and that none can be done in Parliament but with the Kings fiat and consent: there is no question to be made, but that the two Houses of Parliament will far sooner choose to supply the King (as allwise Parliaments have done) than rob the Subject of the benefit of his grace and favours, which is the best fruit they reap from Parliaments. Finally, whereas it is objected (but I think it in sport) that the old Lord Burleigh used to say, that he knew not what a Parliament in England could not do; and that King james once said in a Parliament, that then there were 500 Kings, which words were took for a Concession that all were Kings as well as he in a time of Parliament; they who have given us these Objections do either mis-understand their Authors, or abuse themselves. For what the Lord Burleigh said of Parliaments (though it be more than the wisest man alive can justify) he spoke of Parliaments, according as the word is used in its proper sense; not for the two Houses, or for either of them exclusive of the King's presence and consent; but for the supreme Court, for the highest Judicatory, consisting of the Kings most excellent Majesty, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Representees of the Commons; and than it will not serve for the turn intended. And what King James said once in jest (though I have often heard it used in earnest upon this occasion) was spoke only in derision of some daring Spirits, who laying by the modesty of their Predecessors, would needs be looking into the Prerogative, or finding errors and mistakes in the present Government, or meddling with those Arcana imperii which former Parliaments beheld at distance, with the eye of reverence. But certainly King James intended nothing less than to acknowledge a co-ordinative Sovereignty in the two Houses of Parliament, or to make them his Copartners in the Regal power. His carriage and behaviour towards them in the whole course of his Government, clearly shows the contrary: there never being prince more jealous in the points of Sovereignty, nor more uncapable of a Rival in those points than he.  
14. But yet the main objection (which we may call the Objection paramount) doth remain unanswered. For if the three Estates convened in Parliament, or any other popular Magistrate, whom Calvin dreams of, be ordaned by the Word of God, as Guardians of the people's Liberties; and therefore authorised to moderate and restrain the power of Kings as often as they shall invade or infringe those liberties, as Calvin plainly says they were; or that they know themselves to be ordained by God's word to that end and purpose (cujus se lege Dei Tutores positos esse norunt) as he says they do: then neither any discontinuance or non-usage on their parts, nor any prescription to the contrary alleged by Kings and supreme Princes, can hinder them from resuming and exercising that Authority which God hath given them, whensoever they shall find a fit time for it. But first I would fain learn of Calvin in what part of the Word of God we shall find any such Authority given to those popular Magistrates (by what name soever they are called in their several Countries) as he tells us of. Not in the old Testament I am sure, though in the institution of the seventy Elders there be some hopes of it. For when Moses first ordained those Elders, it was not to diminish any part of that power which was vosted in him, but to ease himself of some part of the burden which did lie upon him. And this appears plainly by the 18. Chapter of the Book of Exodus. For when it was observed by Jethro his Father in Law, that he attended the businesses of the people from morning till night, he told him plainly ultra v●res s●as negotium esse, that the burden was too heavy for him, vers. 18. and therefore that he should choose some Under-officers, and place them over Thousands, over Hundreds, and ever Fifties, and over Ten, Vers. 21. Leviusque sit tibi partito in alios onere: that so it might be the easier for him, those officers bearing some part of the burden with him. Yet so that these inferior Officers should only judge in matters of inferior nature, the greater matters being still reserved to his own Tribunal. Which counsel, as it was very well approved by Moses, so was it given by Jethro and approved by Moses, with reference to the will and pleasure of Almighty God, vers. 23. And what the Lord God did in it we shall find in the Book of Numbers chap. 11. For when Moses made complaint to God, that the Burden of all the people was laid on him, vers. 11. (where note it is the burden still which he makes complaint of) and that he was not able to hear all the people alone, because it was too heavy for him, vers. 14. God willed him to make choice of seventy of those Officers, which before he had placed over the people, and to present them to him in the Tabernacle of the Congregation, where he would give unto them the Spirit of Government, ut sustentent tecum o●us populi, to the end that they might bear the burden of the people with him, vers. 17. Nothing in all this, but the easing of the Supreme Magistrate of some part of the Burden, which was before too heavy for him, without any diminution of his power in the least respect. Nor doth it make for calvin's purpose, that God said to Moses, that he would take of the Spirit which was upon him, and put it on the seventy Elders, vers. 17. the Spirit resting upon Moses in as full a measure as at first it did, not lessened by the communication of it to those Under-officers. And so the point is stated by two learned writers, though otherwise of different persuasions in the things of God. By Estius for the Pontificians it is so determined, 
Estius in 〈◊〉 sacrae scripturae loca. Num. 11. v. 17.  Non significatur per hoc, quod minus haberet Moses de spiritu quam antea, sed significatur, quod ex eodem spiritu gratiae, quo repletus Moses populum illum regebat, etiam alii adjutorium essent habituri, ad eundem populum regendum. 
Deodat. Annot. in Num. 11.  The very same with that of Deodatus for the Protestant or reformed writers. Not that the gift of the Spirit (saith he) should be in any manner truly (or really) diminished in Moses, but because that infallible conduct of the Spirit of God, which until then had been peculiar to Moses, should be made common to all the seventy in the public government. And much less did it derogate from the spirit and power of Moses, that the seventy were endued by God with the gift of prophecy, vers. 25. that being but a personal grace, and perhaps but temporary to those persons neither, to gain them at the first the greater estimation amongst the people, whom they were to govern; never pretended to by any of their Successors in that Magistracy for the times ensuing. And therefore when Moses was told of it, he made light of the matter, and was so far from envying at it, that he seemed to wish that all God's people might be able to prophesy to one another, 
Estius in Num. 11. v. 29.  vers. 29. conceiving rightly nihil abesse dignitati suae personae, as my Author hath it, that it did nothing derogate from his power and dignity; though J●shua out of an honest zeal to his Master's greatness might fear it tended, or might tend unto the diminution of his Master's dignity and credit, as is observed by Deodate. What power these seventy Elders had in succeeding times, when they were drawn into a body, and made up that great Court which was called the Sanhedrim; and how far they were then from curbing and restraining the power of those several Kings under which they lived, hath been shown already.  
Now if the old Testament do give so little countenance to that great Authority which Calvin hath assigned so peremptorily to his three Estates, or any other popular Magistrates in their several Countries, I am sure the New Testament doth afford them less; in which obedience to the Supreme Magistrate, is punctually and frequently required of all sorts of persons. Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, saith the Apostle of the Gentiles, Rom. 13. 1. If every soul, than neither any Papal, Presbyterian or popular pretender can challenge any exemption from that obedience and subjection to the higher powers, which is required of them in this Text; and much less exercise any jurisdiction or Authority over them, whereby they may be brought in subjection to him. 
Hieronym. in Rom. 13.  " St. Jerome tells us that this rule is given by the Apostle, for fear lest some presuming on that Christian Liberty unto which they were called, might possibly refuse to yield obedience and pay their just Tributes to those higher powers to which the Lord had made them subject." And therefore he desires to humble them and bring them unto a better understanding of their Christian duty, ne forte propter superbiam, magis quam propter Deum contumeliam patiantur. Lest the reproach or punishment which they suffered for it, should be imputed rather to their pride and arrogancy, than their zeal to God. Now what St. Jerome tells us in the general only, is by St. chrysostom pressed particularly, with reference almost to all degrees and estates of men: Here the Apostle showeth (saith he) that these things are commanded to all men, 
Chrysost. in Rom. Hom. 23.  both Priests and Monks, and not to temporal men only, which he declareth in the beginning, when he said, Let every soul be subject to the highest powers: although thou be an Apostle, although thou be an Evangelist, although thou be a Prophet, although thou be whatsoever thou art. Which said he gives this reason for it, that Religion is not overthrown by this subjection. If no Apostle could pretend to an exemption from those common duties which Subjects own unto their Princes; then certainly the Pope who pretends to sit in Peter's Chair, and to challenge all the privileges which belonged unto him, must needs be in as great subjection to a Christian Emperor, as the Apostles were (in their times) to any Heathen King. If those things were required of Priests and Monks, as he says they were, then must the Papal Clergy, (whether they be monastics or secular Priests) perform those duties, and yield that due obedience unto those Kings and Princes under whom they live, which are here required. But so it is, that partly by strong hand, and partly by taking their opportunities in the darker Ages of the Church, the Pope hath not only freed his Clergy from the power of Princes, in matters even of Civil nature and concernment; but challengeth for himself a power above them, and exercised it for a long time with great pride and Tyranny, contrary to the Apostles Rule and the Father's Commentary. If no Evangelist or Prophet could challenge any such exemption as the Father plainly saith they could not; then much less can the Presbyterian Minister pretend unto it, though he be both a Prophet and an Evangelist also in his own conceit. Which notwithstanding, the Scottish Presbyterians had got unto so great a head in the minority of King James, in all matters, which related to Ecclesiastical cognizance (and to that cognizance they reduced all matters) they commonly declined the King's judgement, and his Courts of Judicature as altogether incompetent; appealing from them either to their own Presbyteries, or to the next general Assembly of their own appointing: and standing so wilfully to those Appeals, that some of them had like to have paid dear for it, (after that Kings coming into England) if the King had not been more merciful to them, than they deserved at his hands. If no man whatsoever he be, can lawfully acquit himself from this subjection as is said by chrysostom; what will become of calvin's popular Magistrates, and of the great authority which he gives them over Kings and Princes; those popular Officers being included equally with the rest of the people, in St. Paul's injunction? It's true that Calvin's popular Officers may seem to have some colour for it, both from our English Translation and the vulgar Latin; by which obedience is required sublimioribus potestatibus, to the higher powers; and all such popular Officers, whatsoever they be, may warrantably be looked upon as higher powers, in respect of the residue of the people. But first the words in the original, viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, do not so properly signify, the higher, as the supreme powers: and so the word is rendered in the first of St. Peter cap. 2. vers. 13. in which submission is required to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be unto the King, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as to the Supreme, or unto such as are sent by him, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith St. Peter in the singular, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith St. Paul in the plural number; both words proceeding from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in the Nominative Case, and consequently being of the same sense and signification. But secondly permitting them the benefit of these translations, yet will they find but little colour for that coercive power, that sovereign Authority and Jurisdiction, which Calvin hath assigned to the three Estates or any other popular Officers over Kings and Princes. For though such popular Officers may warrantably be looked upon as higher powers in respect of the residue of the people, as before was said, yet are they lower powers in respect of the King, from whom as they receive all the Authority which they have, whatsoever it be, so unto him they are to render an account of their actings in it, whensoever he pleaseth. So that these popular Officers may be compared not unfitly unto the Genera subalterna in the Schools of Logic; each of them being subordinate to one another (the Constable to the Mayor or Bailiff in a corporate Town, or to the Justices of the Peace in the County at large, the Majors and Justices to the Judges in their several Circuits, the Judges in their several Circuits and their Courts of Judicature to the Lord Chancellor for the time being, and he unto the three Estates when convened in Parliament) till they end all in genus summum, in that supreme power which is subordinate to none, and unto which the rest are Species subalternae (as the Logicians phrase it) in their several orders, till they end all in Specie infimâ, even in the lowest of the People.  
Less comfort can I give them from the Apostle of the Jews from the words of St. Peter, in which submission is required (as before was said) to every ordinance of man, whether it be unto the King as unto the Supreme, or unto Governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well. Now those which are thus authorised, and sent by Kings to the ends and purposes before mentioned, may very properly be resembled unto Jehosophats' Commissioners in the Kingdom of Judah, 
2 Chron. 17. 7.  or the itinerary Judges in the Realm of England; and can neither claim nor exercise any other Authority, than what in their Commissions and instructions is assigned unto them. And certainly no King did or will ever grant any such Commission whereby his Under-officers and inferior Magistrates, may challenge any power above him, or exercise any jurisdiction or Authority over him. If any thing in this Text may be thought to favour Calvin in this strange opinion, it is that Kings are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, humana creatura, saith the vulgar Latin, an ordinance of man, as the English reads it; and being but a Creature of the people's making, the rest may think themselves as good men as he. " The Rhemists will have Kings to be called humane creatures, because elected by the people, or holding their Sovereignty by birth and carnal propagation, ordained for the wealth, peace and prosperity of the Subjects; to put a difference betwixt that humane Superiority, and the spiritual Rulers and Regiment, guiding and governing the people to an higher end, and instituted by God himself immediately, Christ having expressly constituted the form of Regiment, used ever since in the Church." Whereunto Dr. Fulk for want of a better doth return this Answer, viz. That though there be great difference between the government of Princes, and Ecclesiastical Governors, yet the Apostle calleth not Princes an humane creation, as though they were not also of God's Creation (for there is no power but of God) but that the form of their Creation is in man's appointment. All the Genevians generally do so expound it, and it concerns them so to do in point of interest. The Bishop of that City was their Sovereign Prince, and had jus utriusque gladini, as Calvin signified in a Letter to Cardinal Sadolet, till he and all his Clergy were expelled the City in a popular Tumult, Anno 1528. and a new form of Government established both in Church and State. So that having laid the foundation of their Commonwealth in the expulsion of their Prince, and the new model of their Discipline in refusing to have any more Bishop; they found it best for justifying their proceed at home, and increasing their Partisans abroad, to maintain a parity of Ministers in the Church of Christ, and to invest the people and their popular Officers with a chief power in the concernments and affairs of State, even to the deposing of Kings, and disposing of Kingdoms.  
But for this last they find no warrant in the Text which we have before us, For first admitting the Translation to be true and genuine (as indeed it is not) the Roman Emperor, and consequently other Kings and Princes, may be said to be an humane Ordinance, because their power is most visibly conversant, circa humanas Actiones, about ordering of humane Actions, and other civil affairs of men, as they were subjects of the Empire, and Members of that Body politic, whereof that Emperor was head. Secondly, to make sovereign Princes by what name and Title soever called, to be no other than an humane Ordinance, because they are ordained by the people and of their appointment; must needs create an irreconcilable difference between St. Peter and St. Paul, by which last the Supreme Powers, whatsoever they be, are called the Ordinance of God. The Powers (saith that Apostle) are ordained of God, and therefore he that resisteth the Powers resisteth the Ordinance of God. Upon which words Deodate gives this Gloss or Comment. " That the supreme Powers are called the Ordinance of God, because God is the Author of this Order in the world: and all those who attain to these Dignities, do so, either by his manifest will and approbation, when the means are lawful: or by his secret Providence by mere permission or toleration, when they are unlawful. Now it is fitting that man should approve and tolerate that which God approves and tolerates." But thirdly, I conceive that those words in the Greek Text of St. Peter, viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are not so properly translated as they might have been; and as the same words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are rendered by the same Translators (somewhat more near to the Original) in another place. For in the 8. chapped. to the Romans vers. 22. we find them rendering 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by the whole Creation (and why not rather every Creature, as both our old Translation and the Rhemists read it, conform to omnis Creatura in the vulgar Latin?) which had they done and kept themselves more near to the Greek Original in St. Peter's Text, they either would have rendered it by every humane Creature, as the Rhemists do; or rather by all Men, or by all Mankind, as the words import. And then the meaning will be this, that the Jews living scattered and dispersed in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, and other Provinces of the Empire, were to have their conversation so meek and lowly (for fear of giving scandal to the Gentiles amongst whom they lived) as to submit themselves to all Mankind, or rather to every Man (unto every humane Creature, as the Rhemists read it) that was in Authority above, whether it were unto the Emperor himself, as their supreme Lord, or to such Legates, Prefects, and Procurators, as were appointed by him for the government of those several Provinces, to the end that they may punish the evil-doers, and encourage such as did well, living comformably to the Laws by which they were governed. Small comfort in this Text, as in any of the rest before, for those popular Officers which Calvin makes the Overseers of the sovereign Prince, and Guardians of the Liberties of the common people.  
If then there be no Text of Scripture, no warrant from the word of God by which the popular Officers, which Calvin dreams of, are made the Keepers of the Liberties of the Common people, or vested with the power of opposing Kings and sovereign Princes as often as they wantonly insult upon the people, or wilfully infringe their Privileges: I would fain learn how they should come to know that they are vested with such power, or trusted with the defence of the Subject's Liberties (cujus se Dei ordinatione Tutores positos esse norunt) as Calvin plainly says they do. If they pretend to know it by inspiration, such inspiration cannot be known to any but themselves alone; neither the Prince or people, whom it most concerneth, can take notice of it. Nor can they well assure themselves whether such inspirations come from God or the Devil; the Devil many times ensnaring proud ambitious and vainglorious Men by such strange Delusions. If they pretend to know it by the Dictate of their private Spirit (the great Diana of Calvin and his followers in expounding Scripture) we are but in the same uncertainties, as we were before. And who can tell whether the private Spirit they pretend unto, and do so much brag of, 
1 King. 22. 22.  may not be such a lying Spirit as was put into the mouths of the Prophets, when Ahab was to be seduced to his own destruction? Adeo Argumenta ex absurdo petita ineptos habent exitus, as Lactantius notes it.  
All I have now to add, is to show the difference between Calvin and his followers, in the propounding of this Doctrine; delivered by Calvin in few words, but Magisterially enough, and with no other Authority then his ipse dixit; enlarged by David Paraeus in his Comment on the 13. chapter to the Romans into divers branches, and many endeavours used by him (as by the rest of calvin's followers,) to find out Arguments and instances out of several Authors to make good the cause. For which though Calvin scaped the fire, yet Paraeus could not. Ille Crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic Diadema. For so it happened, that one Mr. Knight of Brodegates (now Pembroke College) in Oxford, had preached up the Authority of these popular officers in a Sermon before the University, about the beginning of the year 1622. for which being presently transmitted to the King and Council, he there ingenuously confessed, that he had borrowed both his Doctrine, and his proofs and instances from the Book of Paraeus above mentioned. Notice whereof being given to the University, the whole Doctrine of Paraeus as to that particular, was drawn into several Propositions; which in a full and frequent Convocation held on the 25. of June, 1622. were severally condemned to be erroneous, scandalous, and destructive of Monarchical Government. Upon which Sentence or determination, the King gave order that as many of those books as could be gotten, should solemnly and publicly be burnt in each of the Universities, and St. Paul's Churchyard, which was done accordingly. An accident much complained of by the Puritan party for a long time after, who looked upon it as the funeral pile of their Hopes and Projects; till by degrees they got fresh courage, carrying on their designs more secretly, by consequence more dangerously then before they did. The terrible effects whereof we have seen and felt in our late Civil Wars and present confusions. But it is time to close this point, and come to a conclusion of the whole Discourse; there be no other Objections that I know of, but what are easily reduced unto those before, or not worth the Answering.  
15. Thus have we took a brief Survey of those insinuations, grounds or Principles (call them what you will) which CALVIN hath laid down in his Book of Institutions, for the encouragement of the Subjects to rebellious courses, and putting them in Arms against their Sovereign, either in case of Tyranny, Licentiousness, or Maladministration, of what sort soever; by which the Subjects may pretend that they are oppressed either in point of liberty, or in point of property. And we have shown upon what false and weak foundations he hath raised his building; how much he hath mistake or abused his Authors; but how much more he hath betrayed and abused his Readers. For we have clearly proved, and directly manifested, out of the best Records and Monuments of the former times, that the Ephori were not instituted in the State of Sparta to oppose the Kings; nor the Tribunes in the State of Rome to oppose the Consuls; nor the Demarchi in the Commonwealth of Athens to oppose the Senate: or if they were, that this could not way serve to advance his purpose of setting up such popular Officers in the Kingdoms of Christendom; those Officers being only found in Aristocraties, or Democraties, but never heard or dreamt of in a Monarchical Government. And we have shown both who they are which constitute the three Estates in all Christian Kingdoms; and that there is no Christian Kingdom in which the three Estates convened in Parliament (or by what other name soever they do call them) have any authority either to regulate the person of the Sovereign Prince, or restrain his power, in case he be a Sovereign Prince, and not merely titular and conditional; and that it is not to be found in Holy Scripture, that they are or were ordained by God to be the Patrons and Protectors of the Common people, and therefore chargeable with no less a crime than a most perfidious Dissimulation, should they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants, or want only abuse that power which the Lord hath given them, to the oppression of their Subjects. In which last points, touching the designation of the three Estates, and the authority pretended to be vested in them, I have carried a more particular eye on this Kingdom of England where those pernicious Principles and insinuations which our Author gives us, have been too readily embraced, and too eagerly pursued by those of his party and opinion. If herein I have done any service to Supreme Authority, my Country and some misguided Zelots of it, I shall have reason to rejoice in my undertaking. If not, posterity shall not say that Calvin's memory was so sacred with me, and his name so venerable, as rather to suffer such a Stumbling-block to be laid in the Subjects way without being censured and removed, than either his authority should be brought in question, or any of his Dictates to a legal trial. Having been purchased by the Lord at so dear a price, we are to be no longer the Servants of men, or to have the truth of God with respect of persons. I have God to be my Father, and the Church my Mother, and therefore have not only pleaded the Cause of Kings and Supreme Magistrates who are the Deputies of God, but added somewhat in behalf of the Church of England, whose Rights and privileges I have pleaded to my best abilities. The issue and success I refer to him by whom Kings do reign, and who appointed Kings, and other Supreme Magistrates to be nursing Fathers to his Church; that as they do receive authority and power from the hands of God, so they may use the same in the protection and defence of the Church of God: and God, even their own God will give them his Blessing, and save them from the striving of unruly people, whose mouth speaketh proud words, and their right hand is a right hand of iniquity.  
FINIS.