A VINDICATION OF THE Treatise of Monarchy, CONTAINING An Answer to Dr Fernes Reply; ALSO, A more full Discovery of Three main Points; 

1. The Ordinance of God in Supremacy.  
2. The Nature and Kind's of Limitation.  
3. The Causes and Means of Limitation in Governments.    
Done by the Author of the former Treatise.  
LONDON, Printed by G. M. for john Bellamy, and are to be sold at his Shop at the Sign of the three Golden-Lyons in Cornhill near the Royal-exchange, M.DC.XLIV.   

A VINDICATION OF THE Treatise of Monarchy.  
The Preface.  
PErusing with a sad heart and conscience, desirous of Information the Papers made public by the Defenders of both sides in this woeful division; I found divers of them running out into irreconcilable extremes: among which this Resolver, the Author of the fuller Answer, and the Divines pleading for Defensive Arms were the chief. In which I conceived there were passages contrary to all true policy, and the particular Frame of this State. Hereon a desire of allaying men's spirits, and reducing them to a moderate compliance in one Truth induced me to a composing of that Treatise, In which how fare I have attained my aim, I leave it to the world to judge.  
But it falls out with me, as it did with Moses endeavouring to set at one his contentious Brethren, I have hard words and censures laid on me for my labour. This Doctor tells me, I have sown seeds of sedition, opened a way to Rebellion, and terms me an engaged man. But to whom I am engaged, unless to Truth, I know not: Engaged indeed I am to defend the King's Supremacy against one part by my Oath of Allegiance; and engaged to defend the Privileges of Parliament, and lawful Liberties of the Subject, against the other part, by my Protestation: beyond these I know none, and perhaps if this censurer knew my condition, he would acknowledge as much. No, those men are rather engaged, whom, aiming at Mitres and a dominion over their fellow-Presbyters, it much concerns to prove the Power of Kings unlimited, that so they may be able to satisfy their unlimited desires, and uphold them in a boundless jurisdiction over the consciences of men; but for this Doctor, I know him not, I judge him not.  
Then, for Sedition and Rebellion, The searcher of all hearts knows how fare they were from being the scope of that discourse, rather it was an utmost assay of appeasment, by showing the way to a discreet moderation. These Masters of controversy take a right course to subvert the Kingdom by disputing men into a degree of Opposition beyond all Atonement, for as I am persuaded the high spirit of Kings will rather incur the worst hazard than submit to such terms, as to be Vniversis minores, that is, subject to their Subjects, common servants and Officers of their Kingdoms, tied up to an absolute necessity of assenting to the Determinations and Votes of the States: So I am as confident, that these two British Nations, yea very many now being in his Majesty's Armies, will spend their last blood rather than come down to this Doctor's terms, sc. a mere passive non resistance of subversive instruments of arbitrary commands, a simple moral liberty, which the basest slaves in the Turks galleys enjoy, because it cannot be taken from them.  
For my part, I do not reckon my life and liberty worth so much pleading for; but the liberty of my Country is dear to me: The established Government is dear to me, because in it is bound up Religion, the public Good, yea the very Title of the King to this Crown. These I plead for against a man, who by his unconscionable resolves of Conscience, hath done what by a pen can be done, to dissolve them: who in three whole books hath undertaken the Patronage of Subverters of Religion, Laws and Government: and thinks it worth his pains if he can procure them an irresistibility.  
I thought I had weighed out Truth to both sorts with so even a balance in that Treatise, that none had any cause to complain. But, I see, this man must have all go his own way: He hath a high design, no less than a full conquest of all States; To bind the Consciences and hands of Nations, and deliver them up to the Executioner to inflict on them the capital doom of subversion, if at any time the supreme Magistrate please to give the word. To this purpose having made some animadversions on scattered passages of my Book. He is pleased to publish them under the stile of a Reply; I may well call it a negative Reply. He denies what I have asserted; and lays down his own contradictory Notions, and that is all; no Scripture nor Reason, but what is fully answered in my former: It is so hollow a discourse, that an ordinary eye may see through it, without the light of any further Answer; yet because he gives me occasion of fuller illustration, and justifying my supposals; and discovering the vanity of his, I have made him this Return, in which I have to my knowledge, left unanswered no passage of moment which concerns me, in his Reply; other parts of it have I left untouched for them to whom they belong.  
And now with prostrate humility I beseech that sacred Authority, which here again, is made the matter of this dispute, not to impute iniquity unto me presuming, for Truth and Conscience sake, to make inquiries into it. The Sunbeams strike not dead the poor Mathematician, who standing on this molehill, assays by his instruments to take the dimensions of that glorious body. Yea the great God of Power permits men without the guilt of sin, to search into his Perfections, and to set, not positive, yet negative bounds to Omnipotence itself. Let not then his Vicegerent be incensed to disdain, if we search into the limits of his Power. I envy not its extent, let it be as large as Truth and Law can stretch it: And my duty binds me to believe that he would not have it larger. Princes require a reasonable subjection, and that is best performed where the nature and measure of Power is best known: which to find out is all the drift of my former and this Treatise, unto which now we will pass over.   

The Contents of the several Chapters and Sections.  

CHAP. I. THE Case mis-proposed by the Doctor in his Resolution, Sect. 1. His uncharitable rash Censures. His Intents in this Reply come not home to the Case in question, Sect. 2. How far Scripture proof is to be expected in these Cases, Sect. 3.  
Chap. 2. In the Question of Resistance the Doctor's Distinction of Times and Persons is vain. How fare Resistance is asserted by me in this and the former Treatise.  
Chap. 3. The Doctor and other of his sort abuse Scripture in this Question, Sect. 1. Scripture warranting this resistance: but having not a word against it. The Doctor in words professing against Absoluteness, but indeed pleading for it, Sect. 2. Government not only from God: but subordinately from the people, Sect. 3. irresistibleness a Consequent of Absoluteness. Limited Monarchy is in the very Power, Sect. 4. Mixture must be in the very Power. The Doctor's strange and senseless conceit of Mixture, Sect. 5. Conquest gives no moral title before consent, Sect. 6.  
Chap. 4. The Doctor's vain and false supposals about God's Ordinance in Sovereignty. It doth not exclude Limitation of Power, Sect. 1. His false supposals about the Nature and Quality of Limitation, Sect. 2. His false supposals about the Causes and Means of Limitation, Sect. 3.  
Chap. 5. The Sovereignty of this Kingdom Limited in the very Power, and from its first Original. The vanity of the Doctors three Titles by Conquest, Sect. 1. Arguments for Limitation and Mixture vindicated, Sect. 2. Seven Queries concerning this Government; Sect. 3.  
Chap. 6. The stating of the Question of Resistance asserted. The Appeal ad conscientiam generis humani, in the utmost contention vindicated, Sect. 1. His arguments against Reservation of Power of Resistance, are answered, Sect. 2.  
Chap. 7. The vanity of his conceit about jus Regis. His deceitful citing of Calvin. The Government of the Kingdom of Israel proved absolute, Sect. 1. Instances for Resistance out of the Old Testament justified, Sect. 2.  
Chap. 8. The Text, Rom. 13. nothing concerns this Resistance. His unjust charging of me in this Question. His slighting of Doctor Bilson, and other Divines. Resistance of exceeding Acts, no Resistance of the Power, Sect. 1. Emperors of Rome in S. Paul's time proved absolute, Sect. 2.  
Chap. 9 His nine Reasons against Resistance answered, Sect. 1. The five reasons for Resistance made good, Sect. 2. The Doctor recedes from his first Assertions, And yields us the Question. No evils follow this Resistance; but many its denial, Sect. 2. The Conclusion of the whole, Sect. 3.    

A VINDICATION OF THE Treatise of Monarchy. OR, An Answer to Dr FERNES Reply.  

CHAP. I. An Answer to the first Section of his Reply.  
THE first Section contains his Preface, where p. 2. He Sect. 1 taxes me, that I look not with a single eye on what he hath written, misconstruing it many times: but whether I have so done or no, it will be manifest in the sequel. Then more than once, he censures me for being engaged. What engagements I have, appears before in my Preface: But, I set up my rest upon a groundless fancy of such a mixture and constitution of this Monarchy, etc. Whose supposals are groundless fancies, his or mine, I doubt not will fully appear in this ensuing discourse. Neither had I any other purpose to which I have fitted that Treatise than the simple finding out of truth, God knows how ever the Doctor pleaseth to censure the purposes of my heart, Viewing this resolver's discourse, for the satisfaction of my conscience, I found it confused, and not approaching the Case which now troubles the world: Men inquire about the Lawfulness of Resistance of Instruments: He answers concerning Resistance of the King: Men demand, Whether Resistance of subversive Instruments be the Resistance of God's Ordinace forbidden, Rom. 13. He supposeth that which is the Question; and makes that the ground of his Resolve which is the sole thing at which the conscience scruples. This put me on a Discourse of Monarchy, that so by a distinct considering of the grounds of true Policy, I might both satisfy myself and others: and not suffer men's consciences, seriously desiring found information to be either puzzled or misled by so confuse and indirect a Resolution. Yet something there is which he likes in me, that is, as much as serves his own turn. I do with much ingenuity disclaim, and with no less reason confute several Assertions of other writers, etc. in p. 2. Would he could as well have seen my confutation of his, as of other errors: What I have said against him, as it proceeds from the same impartial spirit, so it contains the same truth; as, I doubt not, the judicious Reader will discern. But yet I hold the ground on which their Absurd assertions are raised, sc. that the Mixture is in the Supremacy of Power, only I give the King, apicem potestatis, the top or excellency of Power, that is, the King is the crown or top of the head, etc. Thus is he pleased to jeer me, but how justly, it will hereafter appear. And whereas I place the Authority of determining the last controversies in a mixed Government, not in the two Houses, this he commends in me: but that I do not ascribe it to the King; This he exclaims against, as a ready way to confusion, but why, and how it is so, he tells us not; only promiseth to speak of it more below, but where that below is, I cannot find.  
Sect. 2 After he hath thus touched upon those things which he is pleased to tax in my Treatise. He proceeds, p. 4. to show us what his intent was of first undertaking and now proceeding in this Argument. Well: let us hear what it was. The intent of his first Treatise was to resolve the Consciences of misled people, touching the unlawfulness of Arms now taken up against the King. He errs in his proposing of the very Case. I believe he knows no conscience misled touching this matter: The Case which he should have resolved, if he had done any thing, was touching the unlawfulness of Arms now taken up against subverting instruments of the Government of the Kingdom; and that the resisting of these is a Resisting of the King; No wonder if he who shoots at a wrong mark looseth all his arrows. This wrong proposing and prosecuting of so weighty a case (which I doubt was purposely done) set me first on work in this business. Hear then the case more simply proposed: and I refer me to the consciences of men, whether I come not nearer the truth of it, than this proponent hath done. The Houses declare Religion and established Government to be in apparent danger, by means of some subversive Counselors and Instruments about the King. This being supposed, they proceed according to Vote to the Ordinance and execution of the Militia, so to resist and apprehend those Counselors and Instruments from whom they had declared the danger to spring. This put on the Doctor to his first book, to resolve the consciences of men, that it was unlawful: Now see what course he tells us he took to resolve men in this case. He undertakes to make good two Assertions. 1. Were the King so seduced, it were not safe to bear part in the resistance of Arms now used against him. 2. That the case is not so, as they suppose, but rather apparently contrary. In the proof of these two, he spends his whole book. Concerning the latter I intent no controversy with the Doctor: Would he could make it clear to the satisfaction of the consciences of all men; that were the way indeed not only to satisfy men's consciences, but to calm the Kingdom into a blessed peace. But the Doctor is but slight in that part; and says nothing, but what, as appears in the Debate in the end of my Treatise, may soon be answered out of the Declarations of the Houses, and the fresh memory of past occurrents: And in this reply he hath not so much as touched upon that Chapt. of my book: But that which in his first Tract he mainly, and in this Reply he solely labours to make good is the first Assertion, which is a universal one, and worthy to be examined in all Ages and Governments, whatsoever becomes of this present contention in this Kingdom. Now concerning that Thesis, in my Treatise of Monarchy I have affirmed and confirmed two things. 1. That if he could make it good, yet it were nothing to the business he hath undertaken; which is to satisfy the conscience concerning the unlawfulness of Resisting Instruments, not the King, of which he hath spoken very little or nothing at all. 2. That if he could prove that in some Kingdoms where the will of the King is the people's Law, Resistance of Instruments were unlawful, if actuated by the Sovereign's will: Yet in Legal and Limited Governments, it doth not follow to be true: yet this he must make good, if in our present case he satisfy men's consciences as he undertakes. These two are the sum of my Answer to the Doctor in that Treatise, and if in this Reply he doth any thing, he must speak to these points. Something he hath here spoken concerning the Ordinance of God in Supremacy, Of Cases of Resistance; of Kind's of Monarchy, of the Constitution of this Monarchy; but how truly and satisfactorily, it is my part to examine, and let the world judge.  
But as if he had already cleared the matter, he proceeds to give sentence before the cause be heard: And doubts not to call the contrary Resolution a Blaspheming of God and the King, p 4. I answer, If there be any which will defend the lawfulness of taking Arms against the King, and in any case to resist the Powers, They cross the evident truth of Scripture, and I condemn them: Yet me thinks the Doctor deals somewhat severely with them, to call them Blasphemers of God, for every error about the word is not Blasphemy; but a wilful and obstinate speaking evil of the things of God. Likewise concerning a King, if it be true that he be seduced; then it is no blasphemy, which always is a falsehood. If it be false, yet it is inhuman to call it a blaspheming, when it imputes nothing to him, but to be seduced, which the best and most innocent Prince may be; sure, if it be a blaspheming, it is of the Counselors and seducers, for to them the evil is imputed.  
Then p. 6. He comes to speak of what he intends in this present book: sc. that he will clear this point, That the Doctrine teaching that subjects may take Arms against their Sovereign for the defence of Religion and Liberties, when in danger of subversion, is destitute of Scripture and true reason. As I said, still he drives at a vain scope; to prove that which none denies: Let him prove, that in our Kingdom, Resistance of subversive instruments is a taking Arms against their Sovereign, and he does the work; else he proves in vain. But let us see how in the process of this book, that will be cleared which none doth deny. First upon examination of places of Scripture it will appear, that God's people were continually under Kings which they might not resist, etc. What then? must it needs follow, that all other people must too? But whether the word contains any thing against Resistance, and how far, we shall inquire in the process of this dispute. Secondly, Upon the examination of Reason, it will appear how inconsistent such a Power of Resistance in subjects is with Government, etc. Indeed he will make appear a great matter; would he would speak something to the Question, and not proceed so indistinctly; I hope in the process of his book he will come nearer to the business then here he promiseth, or else all our labour will be to little purpose.  
After he hath told us what great matters we are to expect in his Sect. 3 book; he complains how much his expectation hath been deceived by his Adversaries. He confesses, They have great appearance of Reason raised on Aristotle's grounds or principles; so that at first sight it seemed unreasonable that subjects should be left without this remedy. If he speak all this of Resistance of their sovereign, sure it seems not at all unreasonable, but agreeable to all reason that subjects should be without this remedy: It is directly against the word and all sound reason, that a people lifting up a Person above themselves, and by sacred Covenant giving him a Power above themselves, should afterward on any pretence assume a power of Resisting that Person and power, and violate their own Covenant and Oath of due subjection. But if that Person be invested with a limited Power: and he proceed to acts of mere arbitrariness without the limits of that Power conferred on him: Then it is all the reason in the world, that the Limiting States should exercise an effectual restraining Power by resisting instruments of such arbitrary and subversive acts, and we have not a syllable of Scripture contradicting it. But if it seemed so unreasonable to the Doctor, that subjects should be without this remedy; why doth he contradict Reason in a business within its compass? He tells you, He found Reason presently checked with that saying of our Saviour, Mat. 10.25. It is enough for the Disciple that he be as his Master. And was this all the check. your Reason had? It is a very weak Reason which would yield to such a check. What? is every Christian bound for his outward state to be in no better case than Christ was? If he were pleased to be borne under an absolute Government, to be of low and poor condition, doth this impose a necessity on all to be no freer, no richer than he was? A man would think his Reason were not only checked, but broken, which should so argue. Let it be proved that by the providence of God we are brought forth under such a Government as our Master was, then will we hold ourselves bound by his example, to abide quietly in that condition we are borne to; but if God, as he hath dispensed to many a richer estate than Christ was pleased to have, so hath to us a freer Government; then the Apostle adviseth us to use it rather, and not to be trifled out of it, by a show of our Master's example, in a case in which it binds not man.  
But in what hath his Adversaries so much deceived his expectation? He expected express Scripture, but he finds them altogether failing; only their faith and persuasion is resolved into an appearance of reason raised upon Aristotle's grounds and principles, p. 6. Mr Hooker might have taught him that the intent of the Scripture is to deliver us credenda; but in matters within the compass of Reason, it is enough if we have evident reason for it, Scriptura non contradicente: and I am confident the Scripture hath not a tittle against such a Resistance as I do maintain; and we have reason enough for it. The Scripture was not given to prescribe frames of Policy, which are various according to the disposition of people; General Rules there are for Government, which being observed, Particulars, which fall under no settled Rule, are left to reason and the positive Laws of Nations to determine. Yet we are not wholly destitute of warrant from Scripture, as the Doctor affirms, but are better furnished than he, as it will appear in the sequel. If Buchanan, and Junius Brutus, or any else have raised any doctrines on Aristotle's grounds which will not consist with God's Ordinance set down in Scripture concerning Authority, I am not bound to make good other men's excesses: This Replier knows, that as I repudiate his Assertions tending to the ruin of all Liberties of States: So I hold it unlawful to use any force against the person, or Authority of the Supreme, even in the most Legal and limited Monarchy. Therefore he doth me exceeding wrong in the close of his first Section, to say, that, I agree with the rest to use what force they can against such a Monarch for suppressing of his tyranny, etc. All I say is, that Force may be used; but neither against the Person nor Authority of the Monarch, which in all Governments of that nature are to be held sacred and inviolate.   

CHAP. II. An answer to the second Section concerning Cases of Resistance.  
I Can have wished, that if it had pleased this Doctor to reply any thing, he would have followed the steps of my Treatise; but sigh he intends no full return, but doth only catch at here and there a passage, without observing any order, I will frame my Answer to the course of his Reply; and clear the parcels of my book as I find them assaulted in my reading of his. The Title of this Section being Cases of Resistance, the first part of it is spent about such Cases as are put by the Divines who plead for Defensive arms. At length, p. 9, 10. He comes to the alone Case in which I defend Resistance, in the p. 51. of my Tract, where I put the Question of Persons misemployed to serve the illegal destructive commands of the Prince. And I affirm in such case, and of such Persons Forceable Resistance to be lawful by the two Estates of Parliament. This I prove by five Arguments, which here the Doctor doth not touch, but refers them to the p. 93. of this Reply. Only here he gives us a Magisteriall determination without any proof at all. But let us hear his Resolution upon the case. He dares not openly to pronounce it unlawful: but distinguishes of Persons and Times, as if he would yield it lawful in some, but not in others; Certes, if for any, then for the two Estates; if any, than Instruments of subversion: if simply none, why doth he with so great cautel distinguish. Well, audiamus distinguentem: If by those misemployed persons be understood the Commanders and Soldiers of the King's Armies, I cannot see (nor any man else, I think) but that the resisting of them by a contrary Militia, is a resisting of the King, and unlawful, p. 9 I answer, I cannot see, nor any man else, I think, why Commanders and Soldiers should have a privilege of subverting States and Governments more than other men: Can the Royal Power extend to give them an irresistibility, and not to others? Certes, if others may be resisted, much rather Commanders and Soldiers, because there is greater danger of subversion from them then from others: Their being Commanders and Soldiers makes them more dangerous, but not more privileged: But, he nor none else can see, how such can be resisted, but it must be a resisting of the King, and unlawful. Perhaps he is mistaken in others, they may have clearer eyes than he hath: In the p. 52. of my Treatise, I have made it luce clarius, that in a Legal Monarchy it is not a Resisting of the King. Then he proceedeth to another sort of men which I hope may be resisted. But if by those misemployed persons be understood other instruments of oppression in times of peace, before it come to Arms. What of these, may such be resisted? Here he resolves very cautelously and timorously, after many words, p. 10. without prejudice to other assertions of his of other resistance, He conceives it not unreasonable to say, First, if private men be suddenly assaulted, and life imminently endangered, and no means of avoiding by flight, then is personal defence lawful, for such sudden assault carries no pretence of authority with it. What is this to the matter? we inquire not of resisting assailants carrying no pretence of authority with them; but of subverters of Government warranted by the Kings will; and carrying pretence of Authority, though they have none. Secondly, If they come with pretence of Authority, there may be seeking redressement above from Authority, but if that may not be had, yet no resistance. And who then minding to kill or rob, may not make a pretence of Authority, that so he may effect his mischief without repugnance? But yet the Doctor will give us a little more, The Ministers of Power in each County, and the Houses of Parliament also (for with him they be equal) may at first stay, restrain, and commit such misemployed instruments, and so represent the matter again to the King. But is not this to resist them? No; he tells us, this is not to resist. No? if misemployed instruments may be stayed, restrained, and imprisoned, sure they may be resisted: Else what if they should choose, and will not be committed; The Parliament must not lay hands on them to compel them; for so there may chance to be fight, and slaughter in the apprehension; and then the Doctor would call it Resistance I think. But suppose the Houses of Parliament do commit such persons and represent the matter to the King, and a King should be so obstinate as to persist in the maintenance of those illegal courses, and to that end employ the Militia, it is neither Legal nor Reasonable, they should pursue the opposition to the setting up of a contrary Militia or Power, p. 11. Here we see the upshot of the English freedom, and privilege of Parliament. This is that which I said; Those men overturn all liberties, The result of their doctrine destroys all policies, reducing them all to that which is arbitrary: If the King should set Soldiers to destroy Laws and Parliaments, They may (if they be able) stay their hands till they go to the King, and know whether it be indeed his will and pleasure to have them destroyed or no; If he say, Yea; then they must return and submit to the vilest instruments of subversion, and not lift up a hand to resist them. But let us see, on what weighty reason the Doctor builds this fatal Resolution. This were a contestation of Power with him whose Ministers they are, a levying of war, an opposing of Armies against Armies. Sure this man doth much abhor a Civil War: I cannot blame him: but yet we may buy an immunity too dear, at the prize of a subversion of Religion, Laws and Government, which is the case in dispute. This were to choose to be killed, rather than to sight: To have a State subverted, rather than disturbed by a war to prevent it. I grant, There must be no contestation of Power with him whose Ministers they are: But this is the point to be proved, that in this case, it is so: I utterly deny the Royal Power in our State can be communicated to subverting Instruments: And I do in vain expect, while the Doctor proves that, which every where he supposeth: For he builds all on this foundation, sc. That God's Ordinance is an Absolute unlimited Power, investing the whole will of the Supreme, and cannot be determined in the exercise, but only morally; the vanity of which conceit will appear hereafter, yet note here in the close, that while he pretends a detestation of Civil War, he could do nothing more to foment it, then by defending such Positions of intolerable servitude: Did not such rigid Counselors of the King of Israel cause the greatest Rent and Civil War that ever was made in any Kingdom?   

CHAP. III. An Answer to the third Section which concerns several kinds of Monarchy.  
IN my opinion it had been fit to have treated first of several kinds Sect. 1 of Monarchy; and then of Cases of Resistance; for the subject in which should precede the Question whereof, in all methodical proceeding. Here again in the first place, this Replier would make his Reader believe that penury of Scripture-proofe put me upon distinguishing of several kinds of Monarchy, That so I might lay all the defence of Resistance upon Reason drawn from the several condition of Monarchies, p. 11. I have sufficiently before discovered my intention in that Treatise. The Resistance which I defend hath as much proof from Scripture, as a matter of that nature need to have. Then he abuses me, as finding fault with Divines, that pleading for absoluteness of Monarchical Power in this Kingdom bring proofs from places of Scripture, p. 12. I complain not of all Divines, but some, such as this Resolver is: Some, and that but of late years; and that but in this kingdom, where such doctrines are the road to preferments: nor do I blame them for bringing proofs for subjection, and against Resistance from places of Scripture, as he calumniates me; but I blame their gross perverting of Scripture; bringing prohibitions of Resistance of Powers against them who condemn it as much as themselves; And of violating the Lords anointed against them who hold them as sacred and inviolate, yea on more solid grounds than themselves do. And their fraudulent reasoning from one kind of government to another, as if all Political provisions of States for their Liberties did make no variation in the case; but that still they were in the same State, as the people subject to the most absolute vassalage.  
Sect. 2 But because he boasts so much of settling men's Consciences on warrant from Scripture, that he expects command or allowance of Resistance from Scripture, p. 6. That his Adversaries resolve all their faith and persuasion on an appearance of Reason drawn from Aristotle's grounds, ib. and here that I observe there is but little pretence from Scripture for Resistance; and thus would persuade men, as if he had all Scripture for him; we nothing but a few husks of reason for us: Let him not think to carry it thus away with vaunts and big words: I will profess here once for all. He hath not a syllable of Scripture or right reason to satisfy the conscience with in this controversy: If it please this Doctor, let us join issue upon it, and put the whole case on this point. The Question between us is, Whether in a limited Monarchy, Resistance of subversive Instruments be unlawful. He affirms, I deny. He undertakes to satisfy men's consciences that it is unlawful: bringing not one Text of Scripture, which speaks to the point: Something he brings to prove it unlawful to resist the Ordinance of God: that the Magistrate which is supreme under God is above all Resistance, p. 84. He doth great matters; who doubts of these things: Then p. 84. he accumulates nine Arguments, but all so non concluding, that ninescore of them will not make one sound proving Reason of the point in question, as it will appear when we come to consider them. On the other side we have both to settle men's consciences on. 1. Examples of Scripture, sc. The people's rescue of Jonathan: David's army against the cutthroats of Saul, that is, subversive Instruments: These being particular men, and in an absolute Monarchy prove the point the more strongly, so strongly that the Doctor is feign to fly to that ordinary evasion, of an extraordinary privilege. Besides all those places which prove it lawful to resist private men, seeking to subvert Laws and Religion, and the public good; sigh in a limited State they are but private men, though backed with a Commission from the Kings will and pleasure. 2. Then for Reason; I have set down five, p. 53. all unanswerably concluding the point in Question, as I doubt not the considerate Reader will acknowledge.  
He professes, p. 12. That it was never his intent to plead for absoluteness of Power in the King, if by absoluteness of Power be meant a Power of Arbitrary Command. What his intent is I know not, but he hath fully done the thing, or I have no understanding to see when a thing is done. In the precedent Section, he resolves all cases into the Arbitrium Regis, the mere pleasure of the King: allowing the Houses of Parliament only a power of staying the hands of destroyers, till it be expressly known whether it be the King's pleasure they shall be destroyed: And I am confident the meanest apprehension will discern, that they who make the Monarch's sole Will the last judge of all controversies: and simply deny in the last case of subversion, all Power of Resistance of Instruments, even to the supreme Courts of Law and justice, do without any controversy, resolve all government into an arbitrary Absoluteness. He adds, We allow a distinction of Monarchies and admit the Government of Kingdoms to be of divers kinds, and acknowledge a legal restraint upon the Power of the Monarch in this Kingdom. Verba datis, rem negatis; you allow indeed a kind of distinction of Monarchies, but all within the compass of Absolute: A legal restraint you seem to acknowledge; but such an one as resolves into the Arbitrary Will of the Monarch, as I have made it appear in my former Treatise; and you will never be able to wipe off by this, or any other Reply. Then he promises that in this Book certain points will appear to be truth, agreeable to Scripture and Reason: sc. That Government is not the invention of man, but the institution of God: That Governors have their Power not from the people, but from God: That Governing Power is one and the same in all supreames, and can only be limited in the exercise. And that where a Prince stands supreme, and next to God above all the people, there the Subjects may not take arms and make forceable resistance for any exorbitances. These several Propositions how fare they contain Truth, and how far not, I shall in the sequel make appear.  
After these great promises, he proceeds, p. 13. to speak somewhat of the Original of Governing Power: and accuseth me as if I seemed to Sect. 3 affirm it to be from God; but in the process of my book, he finds me deriving it indeed from the people. I perceiving two contrary opinions concerning the Original of Government, did in that Treatise endeavour to reconcile them, and to show in what sense both are true. To that end, as there is manifest, p 4. I distinguished 3 things. 1 It's constitution; 2 It's Limitation to one kind. 3 It's determination to one individual Person and Family. The first of these I did affirm to be from God: The two latter from Men, and then concluded, In these things we have Doctor Fernes consent. Let us see what exceptions he can take at this peaceable assay of Reconcilement. In the process of my Discourse he finds me deriving it from the people. What then? Do I deny it thereby to be from God? as if Subordinates' did exclude one another. God hath ordained that Powers should be: People by virtue of that Ordinance give them existence in this or that kind and subject. The Doctor acknowledges all this, but not in my sense, p. 14. He grants the Designation of the Person, and the Limitation of the Power to several kinds to be from the consent of the People. I say no more; why do we not then agree? The plain truth is, The Doctor will not have Limitation of Power to be at all from the people, what ever he pretends: How then the Limitation of the Power to several kinds is from the people, as the Doctor yields, I cannot tell. Is not Limitation of it into kinds, Limitation of the Power itself? But he is possessed that my sound sense is another sense from his; what other he doth not show: but it is another which he likes not. Why? Because sometimes I say, the people reserve a Power to oppose or displace the Magistrate: Sometime they divest themselves of all superiority. 'Tis true, I say so, but withal I say, that when they reserve such a Power, they constitute no Monarchy. Is it not so, in the highest Ministers of Power in Aristocracies and Democracies? What can he say against so apparent a Truth? 2. I call them, p. 63. Architectonicall Powers. This he derides and says, This is the riddle of this Governing Power originally in the people. They are architectonical Powers, but build upon foundations laid in the air, p. 14, Then he gives his reason, For before Government established they have not any politic Power, whereby a Command may be laid upon others, but only a natural power of private resistance. This is false, that they have only a natural power of private Resistance. They have indeed no formal politic power, for we speak of a people free from all government; but they have a virtual radical power, by public consent and contract to constitute this or that form of Government, and resign up themselves to a condition of subjection on Terms and after a form of their own constitution; so the Athenians, Lacedæmonians and Romans of old having expelled their Kings: and the United Provinces, with others of latter times have done: This is that which I called architectonical Power; and the Replier vainly carp at the name, when he cannot deny the thing. But I know what he aims at in all this, sc. That God's Ordinance is an absolute boundless Power in all Supremes, uncapable of any limitation, but in the exercise. Of which fully afterwards. Sect. 4  
At length He takes a nearer view of the Forms of Monarchy, spoken of by me, and makes a few observations upon such particulars at him pleaseth, p. 14. Let us follow his steps. First, for Absolute Monarchy, whereas I say it is, when Sovereignty is so fully in one, that it hath no limitation under God, but the Monarch's own will. He approoves my description; but threatens to remember it below, p. 15. Let him do so; and make his best advantage of it, only here he cannot forbear one note, that then it is not the denial of resistance which makes a Monarch absolute; but the denial of a law to bond his Will. I do grant it; but with all I say, that it is necessariò consecutivum, though it be not constitutivum: for sigh a Monarch which is obsolute hath no Law to bond his Will; but his very Will is the Subjects Law, than every act of his Will is God's Ordinance, and so by consequence it is unresistible. Also, p. 15. He allows it, when I say, A limited Monarch is he who hath a Law besides his own Will for the measure of his power. But yet he dislikes that I say, He must be limited in the Power itself, and not only in the exercise; and I added a reason, for an Absolute Monarch may stint himself in the exercise of his Power, and yet remain absolute. What says he to this? True, if such a Monarch limit himself and reserve a Power to vary,— but if he fix a Law with promise not to , then in those cases he is limited. Note the fraud of this Replier, he altars his terms and puts things as opposite which are not so: He should say, if be limit himself, and reserve a power to ; then he is absolute; but if he limit himself and reserve no Power to  (for then the opposition is direct) than he is limited. But in stead of saying (and reserve no power to ) he says, but [if he promise not to vary] I say that promise not to vary, if it be a simple promise of not varying, it doth not make him limited in his Power, any more than morally, and so every Absolute Monarch is limited. I affirm still, it is Limitation of the Power itself, not barely of the exercise, which constitutes a Limited Monarch: for Monarchy is a state of Power, and therefore it's specificative distinction must be from something which distinguisheth Powers, and not the exercise of Powers; but this is enough proved in the 5t page of that Treatise.  
Secondly, he blames me for that I suppose a Limited Monarch must be radically, that is, originally invested with such a measure of limited Power, and that limited, ab externo, and not from the free determination of his own Will. Here he adds originally of his own; that so he might seem to find a contradiction, when I afterward say, that it may be done by original constitution, or by after condescent; but yet he confesseth, I have a salve, when I make it such a condescent, as is equivalent to an Original Constitution, because amounting to a change of Title, and a resolution in the Monarch to be subjected to, no other way. I make no salve, nor do I need any; he who weighs the Uniformity of Truth in that Treatise will see it needs no salves: Only I distinguish those things which are in their nature's distinct, which if the Doctor had done, this Contention either had not been begun, or would soon have an end: Who sees not that a Promise, whereby a Monarch may bind himself may either be with a limitation of the bond of subjection, or without: And that this makes a real difference: for in this the Government remains the same, because the Duty of subjection received no variation; but in that there is for so much a Transitus into a limited condition. But these things cannot be more fully and clearly expressed than they are in the page 13. of that Treatise. But he answers, Where there is such a change of Title, it is done at once, and by express and notorious resignation of former Power; but it is not necessary that an absolute Monarch should come to a limited Condition after that manner. I say, if he will pass into a limited condition, it is necessary there be a limitation of his Power, else he is not truly limited: But that all such limitation be done at once and by notorious resignation, it is not necessary, as will appear afterward where this matter of Limitation is more distinctly handled.  
Sect. 5 His next complaint is against something I have in the page 25. sc. That in a mixed Government (if it be of three) the Sovereign Power must be in all three originally, and from fundamental constitution. He judges this not necessary, p. 17. and he gives a wonderful Reason: For as Limitation may be only of the exercise of the Power, and not of the Power itself; so mixture is in regard of Persons joined to the Monarch for certain acts and purposes; but that they should have any share in the Sovereign power, the nature of Monarchy will not admit. 1. Just so; for as a Monarchy is not limited unless there be a limitation of Power, for Monarchy is a Power; so a Monarchy cannot be mixed, unless there be a mixture of Powers, for Monarchy is a Power; and to say a mixed Monarchy, and yet the Power not mixed, is to speak contradictories. 2. If the mixture be not of divers concurrent Powers; whereof is it? He tells us, of the Monarch and certain other Persons joined with him for certain acts and purposes. These joined Persons, have they any concurring Power to do those acts for which they are joined? If not; then the adjoining is futulous and vain, and the Power of Monarchy is mixed of a Person having Power, and of others having no Power to do that for which they are joined. You will say, They have Power, but not distinct from that of the Monarch: that is, they have none; for in mixture, if it be not distinct, it is none at all. Again if they have any, it must be distinct, for subordinate it cannot be; if the Acts to which they concur be supreme Acts, unless we should be so absurd as to say, They may concur to supreme Acts, by a subordinate Power. But let us see, what a main Reason he hath for averring a conceit subject to such absurdities. Such a mixture would make several independent powers in the same State or Kingdom, which is most absurd. I grant it is absurd, if he speak of several complete independent powers; but to affirm several incomplete independent powers concurring to make up one integral mixed power, it is no absurdity at all for so it is, in all Aristocracies and Democracies, and must be acknowledged in all mixed States, where the supremacy is not wholly in the hands of one person. Yet here we do not so make them independent, but that we give a large predominancy to One, as, in nature, in all mixed bodies there is, as I have at large explained myself in the next Section, if the Doctor had been at leisure to have taken notice of it. I yield to that which he says, p. 17. that it is not necessary the Mixture should be so Original, but that it may also come afterwards by condescent: It matters not, so it be original, that is, radical: of Powers, and not of mere Acts: And indeed, there cannot be a mixture of Acts, unless it be also of Powers: for Acts are from Powers: and where Powers are subordinate, there can be no mixture in their Acts; the Acts of causes subordinate, are also subordinate, and not coordinate and mixed. But I there brought two Arguments to prove that in a Mixed Government, the Concurrents must have independent and distinct Powers. Let us see how he answers them. 1. Because else it would be no mixture, but a derivation of Power, which is seen in the most simple Monarchy. He answers, that derivation of Power is either upon substitute Officers supplying the absence of the Monarch in the execution of Power: and this is in the most simple Monarchy. Or else upon Persons whose concurrence and consent is required to certain Acts of Monarchical Power; and this makes a mixture, though they have no share in the Power itself, p. 17. I answer, 1. Absence or presence of the Monarch; whether they Act for him, or with him, varies not the case, If the Power they work by be derived from him, than it is his Power, and so constitutes no Mixture. 2. As if in the most simple Monarchy, the Sovereign doth manage the ardua imperij, the weightiest matters of State alone; and not by consent of his Counsel; without whom he is morally bound, (that is, on the sin of rashness) not to transact them, and that is all, which the Doctor yields to the Houses of Parliament, sc. that the King is morally bound to their concurrence and consent in certain Acts. This is nothing but the shadow of a Mixture; If the Power of Acting be so in one, that, if he please, he may do those Acts without the concurrence of those adjunct Persons, though he ought not, it is no Mixture, because the Power is simple and One; and mixed Acts cannot flow from one simple Power. This the Doctor sees, and therefore says, If this Author will not call this a Mixture, we cannot help it, p. 18. We do not inquire of Names, but of things; nor whether it make a difference in Government or no; We treat of a Mixed Government: and, I think, no man of common sense will affirm, that a Government can be really mixed, and yet the Power be simple. 2. Because the End of Mixture (which is Effectual Limitation) cannot be had by a derivate Power. He answers; Though a Derivate Power cannot set new bounds to the Sovereign Power, yet may it stand to keep in a legal way those bounds which the sovereign Power hath set to itself. Observe, He dares not to say, They may keep: but only stand to keep; nor stand neither, but by advice; that is morally: If he will exceed those bounds, the Act is valid, and hath all its Authority without them: Only he sins, if he do so; because he hath promised he would not do it without them: Here's excellent Limitation and Confinement from exorbitancies: A bare promise, without such ado, in constituting States and Mixtures, would be altogether as good a bounds; but of this we shall have more occasion to speak afterward.  
In the close of this Section he turns back to the p. 21. of my book, Sect. 6 and hath somewhat to say to my Assertions about Monarchy by conquest. There first I say, If the invasion be made upon pretence of Title, and the pretender doth prevail, it is not Conquest properly, but a Vindication of a Title: and then the Government is such as the Title is by which he claimed. He tells us, He sees no injustice in it, if such a one having prevailed should use such a people as a Conqueror, p. 19 The Lord keep us from this man's justice. What; No injustice? If the Pretenders Title allowed by a great part of the people, he by their aid subdues the rest, shall he for their labour crush them into servitude, and use the power of a Conqueror, without injustice? 2. Suppose the people not convinced of the right of his Title make at first some opposition; but yet the pretence of his Title, and apprehension that he seeks no more power than his Title imports, work a yielding disposition in them, so that they withstand not so universally, nor so long as they might have done; but at length submit to him on his pretended terms: were it not high injustice to take advantage on such a people, and having them under hatches to desert those terms on which they yielded, and use the full right of a Conqueror: This was England's case with Duke William. But the main thing which sticks by him is something I have delivered, p. 23. It is an uncontrollable truth in policy, that the consent of the people, either by themselves or their Ancestors, is the only mean in ordinary providence, by which sovereignty is conferred upon any person or family. Against this he is very angry; and opposeth it in many words; but to my Argument from the Moral bond of subjection, he says nothing at all. He terms it good policy, but bad divinity, p. 20. And sets up an Antiposition, that when the invading Prince has perfectly subdued a people (there being no heir to whom they are bound) and hath settled and constituted a frame of Government, than providence doth sufficiently discover itself, and such a people ought to submit and take this Prince as set over them by the hand of providence. As if these two were contrary: I say, They are not bound until they consent: He says, in such a case they are bound to consent, because then providence discovers itself: And he brings Calvin at large to prove that which none denies: I grant a people (not preobliged,) fully overcome should much sin against God's providence by obstinacy, if on a mere will, they consent not to reasonable terms of subjection: But this I say, There is no moral obligation to Authority, before that consent bind them: Conquest may be an Antecedent cause; but the immediate and formal cause is only the consent of the people; which he cannot say against; for that must be moral, and not merely violent. The call of providence challengeth a contented submission, if there be no reason hindering it; but if a precedent Oath or some other sound reason intervene, than it is no call requiring submission: Neither can the fullest conquest make a people debtors, but they remain free from any moral bond; for the providence of God being of itself external, can induce no moral state; but that providence which on one discovery calls to a submission: on a like discovery may free them again, if nothing else come between, to render them morally bound: A Traveller, by the providence of God shut up into the hands of a Robber, hath his life and protection promised him in his journey, if he will promise to pay him so much money: I say, this Travailor should sin against his own life, and the providence of God, offering him those terms, if obstinately he refuse submission: Yet no man will say he owes the robber so much money, because he hath him at his mercy, until he by promise make himself a debtor: Thus have I made good that maxim of mine to be an uncontrollable Truth, good Policy, and good Divinity too; maugre all the Doctor hath or can say against it.   

CHAP. IU. Wherein the vanity and falsehood of the supposals whereon the Doctor hath built all his discourses is made appear.  
Sect. 1 AFter a scattered gleaning of passages in the former Sections, the Doctor undertakes the two great Questions. 1. Of the Constitution of this Monarchy, in his Sect. 4. 2. Of Resistance, in the remainder of his book. Which two, we should now immediately pursue; but that another work more conducent to the ending of this contention will for a while divert me.  
Error in the search of controverted truths doth more often arise from the judgement, then from the reason: Men do more offend in laying false grounds; then in deducing false inferences from true grounds; This I have observed in the Doctor's books: He truly argues, but from false principles; and then the superstructure must needs be answerable, so that, overthrow his foundations, and then all his building will of itself ruin into apparent falsehood. I confess he every where says the same of my Grounds, on which I have built that Treatise: He calls them false and groundless supposals, and fancies, and what else he pleaseth: I will therefore make him a fair offer: Let us make a short work of it: let us join issue upon our supposals, on which both our discourses are built.  
This Doctor's supposals which he scarce ever makes show to prove and on which he hath built his Resolves and Discourses I doubt not to call unsound and false: and do profess the contrary to be my grounds whose truth I will maintain. His may be reduced to four heads. 1. Concerning the Ordinance of God in Sovereignty. 2. Concerning the Nature and Quality of Limitation. 3. The Means and causes of Limitation. 4. The Constitution of this Monarchy. And according to this order we will take them into examination.  
First, Of the Ordinance of God in Magistracy, 
Of God's ordinance in supremacy.  He proceeds on two false principles. 1. That the Governing power is one and the same which God gives and settles upon the person that is supreme, p. 13. that is, it is absolute and unlimited in the power itself; and may be limited only in the exercise thereof, p. 17. 2. Which follows from the former, that Consent of people may be the mean of designing the person, and yielding subjection to him, who else could not challenge it more than an other man; also a mean of limiting that power in the exercise of it; but not the measure of the power itself, which in such a measure is given of God to all Sovereigns, p. 41. so then; 
Question proposed.  let this be the Question, Whether it be God's Ordinance that Governing power in all Sovereigns be one unlimited thing; and can receive no measure from the people? The Doctor affirms it; and p. 84, tells us he hath often insinuated it; but he should once directly prove it, if he be able, so he might have prescribed to the whole controversy; for if he can make this good, in vain do we inquire about the constitution of this Monarchy; or the lawfulness of resistance of subversive instruments of the Princes will. Doth he think a covert insinuation would serve the turn to impose such an Assertion, which frustrates the intent of mankind in framing limitations of Governing power; and captives all into an absolute passive subjection to the vilest instruments of the will of him who is supreme. In all his reply I find but two places which have any show of proof of this overbold Assertion. One is p. 14. Before Government established the people have not any power of a community or politic power whereby a command may be laid upon others; but only a natural power of private resistance. The other is p. 42. The people have not of themselves out of Government, the main power, the power of life and death, how then can they give it either for Government, or reserve it for Resistance? Here be weak foundations to build such an Assertion, and three such insulting books on. What a nothing this is, I shall make appear anon.  

Question stated.  Now I hold the Negative of this Question; and doubt not to approve it firm truth: To that end, first I will premise such things as we agree in, that so the point in question may the more distinctly appear. Which I apprehend are or may be these. 1. That Governing power is originally from God's Ordinance. 2. That it being so, is unresistible in its whole latitude, in all the acts which flow from it. This the Apostle is clear for, Rom. 13. and for no more, that I know. Also that this is true as well in Limited as Absolute Governments; v. g. In absolute Monarchy, where Authority doth invest the whole will; the Monarch is unresistible in all the acts of his reasonable will; because all are acts flowing from God's Ordinance. So in limited Monarchy, where Authority doth not simply invest the will of a Monarch, but so far forth as it is regulated by such a law, the Monarch is unresistible in all the acts of his will which are according to that law; because they are acts flowing from God's Ordinance: Yea though either of these do limit himself in the exercise of his power, no way thereby diminishing the fullness of his power; and afterward exceed those limits, yet he is unresistible, and to be subjected to actively in lawful things, and passively in unlawful: my reason is, because even those acts, notwithstanding limitation, flow from God's Ordinance of Authority, which remains the same, and not lessened by such limitation. 3. This governing power is ordinarily conveyed to persons by public consent, which is a point made good in my former Treatise, and in the former chapter hereof. 4. That this public consent is not only a mean, but hath a causal influence in conveying Authority to persons. 5. That men working by such consent as second causes, do necessarily convey such Authority, as God hath ordained; so that, if it can be proved either by Scripture or sound reason, that it is God's ordinance, that supremacy should be unlimited, and as large as all the acts of his will which hath it, than whatever men capitulate about limitation of it, is vain, so that the Doctor need prove only that point; and for my part I will give him the cause. 6. Limitation of Power may be either of Acts, when Power is conveyed to Persons to do certain Acts of Power; but not all. Or else of Manner of working; when Power is conveyed to do all Acts of Authority, but according to such a prescribed Rule. Now I grant the former cannot be in the conveyance of Sovereign Power, an inferior Officer may be limited by commission to certain acts of Power; and have no Authority to do other Acts of power; but when Sovereignty is conveyed, and the Person is set up next to God, above all the people, as the Doctor saith. He must have an unlimited Power in respect of Acts of Government: for God's Ordinance is not only that there should be Power for such an end; sc. a Peaceable life in godliness and honesty; but sufficiency of Power for the attainment of that end: So that all Power of doing any Act needful for that end, must be in him who is supreme, and the comprehensive Head of Power to inferior Magistrates. So that all the Question truly stated is about the other sort of Limitation, sc. Whether Sovereign Power be so unlimited in its Rule of Acting, that it investeth the whole Reasonable Will of him who hath it: So that all the acts which proceed from him who hath it according to the rule of his own Reason, be potestative, and from God's Ordinance.  
Secondly, having thus punctually stated the Question, 
Question determined.  the Determination must proceed in a double way, sc. 1. In simple Governments. 2. In mixed Governments. I do maintain the Negative in both: and my proof shall be form accordingly.  
First then, In simple Government, Power is not one Unlimited thing Assert. 1 in the supreme: But may be limited in the very being and root of it. 1. The cause or mean by which alone it is conveyed, if it bestow or Reas. 1 convey only a limited Power, than it is limited in the very Being of it. For there can be no more than is conveyed: Now we know, the people by their public act of consent and compact, may either bind themselves to a full subjection to the Monarches Will guided by his own Reason; or by some constituted rule or law set him to govern by; which latter if they do, then is his Authority radically limited: For they owing no more subjection; He can have no farther Power. 2. If sovereignty may be so limited, that Active Obedience is not Reas. 1 due to the commands which exceed those limits, but may lawfully be denied to them (as the Doctor acknowledges it may, p. 16.) Then it may be limited in the Power itself: For in such case the Power exceeds not the limitation; for if the exceeding Acts were potestative, we own Active subjection to them, in as much as they are the Ordinance of God, to which in omnibus non prohibitis, Active subjection Reas. 3 is due. 3. If Power in the supreme be such, that it cannot be limited, then either because it is God's Ordinance; or else because it is supreme: but it's being God's Ordinance hinders not; for we see, Rom. 13. All Powers as well supreme, as subordinate are God's Ordinance, yet subordinate Powers may be limited, not only in the Rule of Acting, but in the kind of Acts; as none can deny. Neither its being supreme doth hinder its limitablenesse; indeed, as before it hinders it from being capable of confinement, in the kind of Acts: but in the measure or rule of working, it doth not hinder, in as much as a Sovereign Power may as well attain its end, by being confined to another Law from without, as by the Law of its own Reason, if not much better; also we no where find God's Word making any difference or giving power to confine subordinate Powers; but forbidding it of Sovereigns. Reas. 4 4. That is to be granted, which denied makes all Sovereign's arbitrary, and of equal Power; but to affirm that Power is one, unlimited, and investing all the Acts of the Sovereign's Will doth so, for than is sovereignty arbitrary, not when it hath no moral bounds, for than none were or could be arbitrary; but when Power is so fully in Reas. 5 one that every Act of his Arbitrium or Will is Potestative and sovereign. 5. I have the judgement of all the Reformed Churches and Divines in Germany, France, Belgia, Scotland, on my part; who have both allowed and actually used forceable Resistance against subversive Instruments of their Sovereign's Will; yea our own famous Princes Elizabeth, James, and our present Sovereign, both by edicts, and Assistance have justified the same: which they would not have done, had they been persuaded of such an unlimited Ordinance of God investing all the Acts of the Will of him who is supreme. So that by all this it appears that the Doctor's conceit of such an unlimited Ordinance of God, which he brings not a tittle of God's word to prove, is a mere chimaera and groundless conceit.  

Object.  Now the only difficulty, which I can think on, is this. God's Ordinance in sovereignty, as before, is not only Power to such an end; but sufficiency of Power to the assecution of that end: now a limited Power seemeth not to be sufficient for the end of Government, because there are two Powers necessary to the end of Government, sc. Power of making and authentic Interpreting of Laws, which are not consistent with a Limitation of Power.  
I answer: It is true of Limitation in respect of Acts; 
Sol.  and therefore I aver, that such a Limitation cannot be where Power is supreme: but for Limitation to a Rule and defined way of Working, I cannot see how it with-stands the end of Government: So that supposing Power of making and Interpreting Laws be necessary to the end of Government, yet that they be Absolutely resident in him who is supreme, sc. To make Laws and Interpret Laws authoritatively without being bound to follow any Light or Rule therein, but his own Reason is not necessary to the end of Government: In these Acts a regulated Power is enough in the most simple State, sc. a Power to make new Laws, if any be needful; and Interpreting the old, if ambiguous, according to the Rule of the former established Laws; and by the advice of his learned Counsel and Judges of his supreme Courts of Justice. We see in matters spiritual, there is no Legislative Power resident, to ordain or give authentic sense in matters de fide, yet the Church stands well enough; one standing Rule of Scripture being sufficient with a ministerial Interpretation: So it is probable a State might, by a complete standing Rule of Law, and a Ministerial Power of Interpretation, were there no Legislative Power resident in any Supreme Magistrate thereof.  
But the matter is fare more clear in a mixed Government; so that Assert. 2 were it necessary in a simple Government, that the Supreme should be unlimited in his Power, yet in a Mixed (which is enough for us in this Kingdom) evidently it is not so: And to make this appear, I will lay down three grounds. 1. Such a Government may be established that the supreme Power may be placed in many persons, either of the same, or divers condition, that is, in a mixed Subject: else all forms were unlawful except simple Monarchy. 2. If this supreme Power be inequally placed in these Persons or States of men; so that a real sublimity and Principality be given to one, than the denomination may be taken from that Principal: and so it is a Monarchy, or Aristocracy, or Democracy mixed in the Power itself; however it pleaseth this Replier to deride it, with the top, or Crown of the head: of which more hereafter. 3. Where the Supremacy of power is thus in many, although all taken together have an unlimited Power, as in ours, yet neither of them several by himself hath, or can have; for it is a contradiction, that it be resident in many, and yet unlimitedly in One.  
Now to those two shows of Argument, which in the beginning I produced out of this Reply, I say, before Government be established it is true the people have no formal Politic Power of Life and Death; yet they have a seminal; that is, every one for himself, his family and posterity hath a power of resigning up their natural liberty, to be governed by One, or many; after this or that form as they shall judge fittest. God ordaining that Powers should be to such an end, hath thereby legitimated and ratified any Consent or Contract which people may make of parting with their liberty and giving Magistrates a common Power over them to that end. And Gods not prescribing any Rule or Measure of Power by his Ordinance of Authority, hath left it in the people's liberty, to resign up themselves according to such Rule and Termes, as they judge fittest, so it be such as the end of his Ordinance may be attained thereby. Thus although by itself, and excluding God's Ordinance they have no immediate Power to lay a command on others, nor Power of life and death, yet in virtue of God's Ordinance their common consent and contract is sufficient to set up such a Power which is endowed with a sufficiency of Command for Government and the end of Government over those which have, each man for himself and his, set it up. So although second Causes have no Power by themselves to produce their effects, yet working in virtue of the first Cause they have Power to produce effects, sometimes fare beyond their own Measure. Therefore I desire this Doctor either to bring some Ordinance of God expressly forbidding to set any bounds or Rule of Power upon the Will of the Magistrate; or else let him suffer Mankind to use their Right in resigning up that liberty which God and nature hath given them upon such terms and conditions as they apprehend best for their own good: and the due end of Government.  

Sum.  In the close of this Question, I will lay down three Conclusions concerning the Ordinance of God, and the Nature of Sovereignty.  
Conclus. 1 1. God hath ordained that in Societies of Men there should be a Politic Power, for a peaceable and godly life: This Ordinance hath put a Seminal Power in all the Societies of Men, sc. a Liberty and Power by common Consent to resign up themselves and theirs to one Supreme; thereby constituting a common Politic Power.  
2. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined any kind Conclus. 2 or form of Power; hath left it to the liberty of Societies of men to choose to which kind they will resign up themselves, either to a supreme regulated in the Acts of his Will by his own Reason, as in absolute Government; or to one regulated by a Common Reason or Law constituted by public consent, as in Limited.  
3. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined the subject Conclus. 3 of this Power, hath left it to the choice of Societies to invest with this Sovereignty, either one Person or many, and those either of the same, or divers sorts and ranks of men; Whence arise simple or mixed Governments, and this is the architectonical Power left in societies before they are engaged in a Government, which the Doctor doth so causelessly deride: Here is the sum of what I do aver concerning Gods Ordinance in Sovereignty, which I challenge the Doctor or any else to gainsay.  
The second sort of the Doctor's false supposals respect the Nature and Sect. 2 Quality of Limitation, 
Of nature and Quality of Limitation.  where also I observe that he proceeds on two false and fallacious Principles, sc. 1. He every where confounds Moral and Civil or Legal Limitation, so p. 18. 93. 39 2. That Sovereignty is capable only of a moral Limitation, p. 39, 42., So that if any other be in any State ordained, He cannot believe but such a condition is unlawful, and unreasonable against the Order of Government. p. 39 If the nature of Limitation be well known, it will appear that the Doctor hath done very inconsiderately, or rather very fraudulently (for he hath obscured the Truth much by it) in confounding moral and Civil Limitation. We will therefore consider the nature of Limitation something more accurately than I have done in my former Treatise; for it will be a great light to the whole controversy.  
First, We must consider a distinction of Power, which is either, A Pos 1 simple Power of Willing. or Doing, which is in every Moral Agent. 2. A Power of Authoritative and obligatory Willing or Doing; so that an act of it, whether a Will of Command or Censure expressed, hath in it a binding power to subjection, this is that which we call Magistracy, of whose Limitation now we treat.  
Secondly, concerning Limitation; we must know that it induceth Pos. 2 an absolute necessity of not producing any Act beyond those Limits. For a Power having bounds beyond which it can exceed, if it please, though with difficulty, it is not properly limited, but hindered.  
Pos. 3 Thirdly, This necessity of not exceeding those bounds is such as the bounds themselves are; so that it is ever true, That a Power in what way it is limited cannot exceed those limits.  
Pos. 4 
Of Moral limits.  Fourthly, There are of this Power but two sorts of Limits, sc. 1. Moral, and 2. Civil or Politic. Of which two we must distinctly consider. 1. Moral Limits is the Moral Will or Law of God; and a Power is said to be limited by this, not when it cannot produce any Act at all: but when it cannot morally produce it, that is, without sin. For the supervening of a moral bond, doth not take away the Power of doing, but of right or sinless doing: v. g. in Natural Powers. God's prohibition of eating Swine's flesh, did not take away from the Jew the natural Power of eating it; but the power of sinless eating it. So in Civil power a prohibition of God coming upon it, doth not take away the Power of Civil and Authoritative Doing; but of lawful, or sinless doing. And hence it follows, 1. That Moral Limitation is only of the Exercise of Power; not of the power itself: for the power is not thereby taken away, but remains equally extense and able to all its acts, as it was before; only now it cannot put forth itself unto certain Acts without sin, which it could before: Thus an Absolute Monarch who hath a power of doing, as extense as his Reasonable Will, promises to do but this, or in this manner: now he is morally bound, by virtue of this promise; and cannot without sin do otherwise: yet if he do, his Commanding Power is the same, and its act binding to the Subject. And so it is proportionably in Legal Governments. Cyprian Bishop of Carthage hath by the Canons a power of judging Ecclesiastical causes committed to him: He resolves and promises to do nothing of moment herein, but by the consent of his Clergy, now he is morally bound: and if afterward he do a thing by himself without their consent, he sins: yet no man will say his Episcopal power is lessened; or the act he so doth, is canonically invalid, and not obligatory. 2. Yea it follows also that it is not properly a Limitation of the Exercise of power neither: for by a moral bond, the Power is not so bound up, but that it can exercise itself, and that validly too, though not without sin, as appears before. 3. Also that it is no detraction from Absoluteness of Power; nor is it sufficient to make a distinction of it into Absolute and Limited. For, 1. It causes no real Limitation of power, either in the nature, or exercise of it. 2. It is not distinctive, being to be found in the most absolute power under heaven, 
Legal Limits.  all being bounded by God's Law, the Law of Equity, and many promises by themselves made.  
2. Civil or Legal Limits cause a Civil and Legal definement of Authority, so that, its exceeding acts are not Legal and binding, that is, are non Authoritative: for as a Moral bond induces a necessity of confinement in esse morali; so a Civil and Legal bond doth in esse legali & obligatorio. Hence follows, 1. It is these Legal and civil bounds which constitute a Government in a limited condition, not those moral; for this is distinctive and is never found in an absolute Government, for there the Sovereign by promise or Oath binding himself to a stated course doth put no Law civil upon his power, or the exercise of it; for though he sin in exceeding afterwards, yet his acts are truly Legal and Authoritative. 2. This induceth a real Limitation of power, neither can it be only of exercise; for sigh it brings an illegality and unauthoritativenesse on acts exceeding, that is, makes them none in esse civili & politico, it is a limitation of Power itself; for when a Power can produce no potential acts beyond such limits, than it is limited in the very being. 3. Acts exceeding politic and legal Limitation, being not Legal nor authoritative in that State can give no authority to the Instruments, and therefore they may be resisted without resistance or violation of Authority. Whereas it is otherwise in Acts exceeding moral Limitation; for being authoritative, they authorise the Instrument, and give him an unresistance.  
In sum: Limitation moral and civil or legal do differ in three main particulars.  
1. Moral, sigh it is no politic or Authoritative Act, Conclus. 1 makes no real detraction either in power or exercise of it, and therefore agrees with the most absolute Government: whereas Legal, being a politic and authoritative Act makes a real diminution; and so is the ratio formalis, or distinctive conceit constituting Limited government; nor can be found in absolute.  
2. Hence, Exceeding Acts notwithstanding moral limitation are Conclus. 2 authoritative, proceed from God's Ordinance, and challenge subjection: but they are otherwise which exceed a legal limitation. Conclus. 3  
3. Exceeding Acts in moral limitation being authoritative have the Sword or compelling power annexed to them, which may not be resisted: but in Legal, being not authoritative, they have not the sword or compelling power annexed, and therefore may be resisted in their Instruments: I will illustrate all this by a familiar instance. In our Government, a judge hath a Commission to hear and determine Causes according to the Verdict of twelve men. Here is a Power limited in the very being, that is Legally and Civilly. This judge useth indirect means to corrupt the jury to bring in an unjust Verdict; but judgeth as his Commission binds him according to their Verdict: Here is a moral exceeding, yet the Act of judgement is Authoritative, because according to his Commission, and must not be resisted. Again, He passeth sentence in another cause expressly against the Verdict of the jury, in an arbitrary way. Here is a Legal exceeding, and the sentence is non authoritative. He having no such Power committed to him, the sentence can have no binding power in it. Hereby it appears how without any ground of Truth, the former supposals are.  
Sect. 3 Thirdly concerning the Causes and Means of Limitation the Doctor's supposals are, 
Causes & means of Limitation.  1. That Radical Limitation, that is, of the Power itself requires an express and notorious act, it must be done in the beginning and at once. p. 15. 24. 39 2. That a Prince may so limit himself, as not to require to be actively subjected to, and yet be limited only in the exercise, not in the power itself, p. 16. 3. That no Limitation by after condescent, is of the Power itself, p. 28. this being a consequent from the first. Now that the falsehood of these and the like grounds every where scattered in his books may appear; Let us a little more diligently handle the Causes and Means of Limitation, which, as before, 
Causes of Moral Limitation.  being twofold, Moral and Civil; We will begin with Moral. 1. Now the Formal cause of a mere Moral Limitation, is that which morally bounds or makes sinful any act of Power. We are therefore to inquire what it is which can do that. And this is, 1. Principally the Moral Law of God forbidding such an exercise of Power. This is an universal, perpetual and invincible Limitation of all power of Government, either absolute or legal, yea of all Active Power of reasonable creatures. 2. There is another mean of Limitation moral, sc. a Promise, Oath or positive constitution, whereby a Prince puts a bond upon himself, making that now sinful to be done, which before was not so. This also induces a moral Limitation, as well in absolute as legal Governments; as if an Absolute Monarch promise to follow such a Rule, which hath a Power to use any which his reason shall dictate. Or if a Legal promise to abridge himself in a course, in which the Law hath left him indeterminate: in this respect, they come under a moral limitation. But concerning this positive mean we must note. 1. This promise, how solemn soever it be, must be a simple bond: It must extend to no diminution of power, or discharge from duty of subjection; for than it is not merely moral, it makes the exceeding act not only sinful, but none obliging: whereas it is the note of a mere moral bond, that it extends not to any lessening of Authority, or discharge of duty: as if a Captain take his enemy prisoner; he to save his life swears him a full vassalage afterward, his Master promises to command him only such services, never absolving him from his former bond of absolute slavery: here is a moral bond; yet still a full debt of subjection in case the Master should break his word, and put him on other employment. 2. If the matter be more throughly looked into, this positive means of limitation is either none at all; or else adds nothing to the former, of the moral law of God: For in such promise or Oath whereby a Governor limits himself there is an express or  condition, if it conduce to the end of Government, the glory of God, and public good: For if such Oath or bond hinder the end of Government, it is eo nomine, unlawful and invalid; but if conduce to it, than it was no more, than was virtually required of him before by the moral Law; this promise or Oath being but a more solemn profession and protestation to do that which before implicitly he was bound morally unto. Thus we see all that Doctor speaks of Moral and irrevocable limitation by promise and oath comes to nothing in the issue: so that this being granted that the Monarch's power in this State were only Morally limited in the Doctor's sense; We are as much under and owe as much subjection as the captive slave to his Master; and all our Laws and Statutes being but moral limitations of this second sort, are not so much as moral limitations any farther than the Prince sees them conduce to the end of Government, if any seem to stand in his way, and hinder him therein, he is no longer bound to it; but may account it an ill made promise or Oath which is better broke then kept. 2. 
Causes of Legal limitation.  Of the Causes and Means of Civil and legal limitation, whereby not only the exercise, but the power itself is confined. 1. The formal cause hereof is the limitation of the duty of subjection in the people: The duty of subjection is the original of the power of Authority. People by becoming debtors of subjection do set up Authority; and by stinting and terminating the duty of subjection do put bounds and terms to the power of commanding. 2. Let us see then by what means the duty of subjection may be terminated. I conceive it may be done two ways. 1. At first, when a people resigning up themselves to a state of subjection do it not absolutely, but impose only a limited bond on themselves; for if they impose no more duty: the Governor can assume no more power. Now this may be done, not only by positive, express and notorious act, as the Doctor speaks; but also by a negative; a mere not imposing of an absolute bond of duty on themselves is enough: so that if it cannot be proved either by records of the first institution, or present obligation that a people have put themselves into a state of absolute subjection, than it is to be held but limited: For whatsoever is ours by the law of nature, cannot be taken from us but by some positive act done by ourselves or Ancestors: Thus in private men; Liberty which is mine by nature, none can take from me, unless he can bring a title or right whereby it became his, and I his servant. Nor am I any farther his servant, than he can bring proof of his right. The same is true of a society of men. In this case it belongs to the challenger, and not to the defendant to bring his positive notorious act for proof of his title, and measure of his title: So that the Doctor's demand is unreasonable, who standing for a full right in our Government, puts on the people's part to bring evidence that they have not. Rather it is just, that he should bring some positive and notorious act wherein it appears that this people have fully resigned up their liberty to an absolute Government; or make it appear that it is God's ordinance that where ever a people do constitute a sovereign power, they must make an absolute resignation of their liberty. 2. By after-condescent, for this may be a mean of civil limitation, unless any will imagine that a people once putting themselves into absolute subjection, are irrevocably so. And thus a Monarch becomes limited, when the promise or Oath he limits himself by, is not simple, but amounts either expressly or equivalently to a relaxation of the bond of subjection: whether it proceed from mere grace, or conscience of equity, or by Petition, or importunity of the people, it matters not what was the ground of it, if it carry with it a relaxation of the duty of subjection, it is a mean of civil limitation, in the very root of power; for power can be no larger in the Prince, than duty of subjection is in the people; for these two have a necessary dependence, and relation of equality either to other. Thus if a Monarch, taking advantage of force of arms, impose a new Oath of full subjection on his people, who before were but legally bound; and prevail so fare, that the whole or major part of his people do take it for themselves and theirs, here is a change of Government from Legal into Absolute, an enlargement of power: so on the contrary. And for this matter we need look no farther, than the Nationall Oath, or Established Laws; for if they bind the people to an absolute subjection; such is the power; and though it have moral, yet it hath no legal limitation: And so on the contrary if they bind only to a subjection according to the Law; the Government is limited in the very power of it. Hence it appears to be false which the Doctor hath, p. 16. that a Monarch may so tie himself as to require not to be subjected to but according to such Laws, and yet not be civilly limited, in his very power; for if he so far require not to be subjected to, that he untie the bond of subjection beyond those Laws; then is his Authority limited, and can proceed no farther; neither are the instruments of his will exceeding those laws, authorized, but private persons, and resistible: And also false, which he says, p. 28. That limitation by condescent cannot be radical. Now if enquiry be made concerning the simplicity of ancient forms of assuming into sovereignty, as when the people are said to make one King; to endue him indefinitely with Kingly power; not confining his Government by any express limitations. Ans. I conceive in such case to know how far a people are bound by such an indefinite contract, these things are to be looked into. 1. If the intent of the people can be discovered in such a constitution, for if it can, doubtless the contract binds so far, and no farther. Thus Lyra concludes concerning the request of the people of Israel for a King, that it is to be understood of an Absolute King, by that clause in the petition, 1 Sam. 8.5. a King to judge us like all the Nations, for all those Eastern Nations having Absolute Monarches, they desiring to be governed like them; must be conceived to intent such a government. 2. If there be no expression of their intention: then a light concerning it must be borrowed for circumstances; sc. the kind of government whereunto they have been formerly accustomed; or that of the Nation from which they proceeded: And thus the Saxons giving Kingly state to their Captains in this Land, cannot in reason be interpreted to intent any other, then that whereunto they were accustomed, and which was the form of the Nation whence they came. This Rule is ever to be kept as well in public, as in private contracts of that simple indefinite form, that they are to be construed, as far as may be, in fovour of the granter.   

CHAP. V An Answer to the Sect. 4. concerning the Constitution of this Monarchy.  
Sect. 1 A Fourth sort of the Doctor's supposals are concerning the Constitution of this Monarchy, which in words he granteth to be limited and mixed, but coming to explain himself, he makes such a limitation of it and such a mixture as is indeed none at all, being to be found in the most Absolute and simple governments in the world: for he every where supposeth it limited only morally in the exercise, not in the power: And so mixed, that there is but one simple power; a mixture made of one simple principle, such a one as never was heard of in the world before. And this he delivers on his bare word, never bringing any proof of it, thinking it enough if he can except against that which I have set down concerning these things in my Treatise. Among other Assertions which I have there about the state of this Government: there are two which this Replyer doth oppose. One is p. 31. That the sovereignty of our Kings is radically and fundamentally limited: which I have made good by five Arguments, and added a solution to the two chief which may be made against it. The other is, p. 39 That the Authority of this Land is of a compounded and mixed nature in the very root and constitution of it. This I have confirmed by three Reasons; and have answered three Objections which may be made against it. Now I desire the Reader impartially to weigh what I have there said; and to compare it with this Doctors Reply; and then judge whether those truths stand not firm against all that is brought to infringe them. But let us see what he opposeth. He proceeds not in any orderly course, to set down his Antitheses and prove them; and to give Answer to what I have brought on the contrary; but first spends some time in considering what this Government was in its Original; as if it must needs remain still such as it was at first; and could not receive any alterations, and gradual accomplishment in process of time. And then he sets on my Arguments, but how feebly we shall easily discover.  
Here the first thing I did tax in the Doctor's book, was that he affirmed things contradictory: for he tells us he is against Absolute power in our Kings; and arbitrary Government: And yet he also affirms, that our Kings hold by right of conquest, yea of three conquests. And that the Houses of Parliament are more subject to our Kings, than the Senate of Rome was to their Emperors. Also that the final judgement is in One. Now how these so openly contradictory Assertions can stand together he doth not show us. Only he challengeth my ingenuity, if either he proposed this as a conclusion to be proved, that our Kings are absolute, p. 21. Neither do I affirm that he did: Only I say, he holds things contradictory; that he holds such grounds which make all King's absolute, sc. that no supreme is or can be more then morally limited. Indeed he speaks much of limitation moral; of limitation in the exercise of power; this makes a great noise of limitation, but indeed are but mere veils to cover over Absoluteness, and make it the more passable, which he is ashamed to propose to the world in express terms. Suppose he did not mention those conquests to win an arbitrary power to the King. Yet sure in affirming more than once, that he hath such a right, he doth as much as if he said he may use an arbitrary power if he will; for if he hath a right of Conquest, he hath an Arbitrary right, by the Doctors own confession, p. 22. and if he hath a right of Arbitrariness, it is his lenity he doth not use it. In the Answer to the first Argument which I brought for the Absoluteness of our Kings (which was that They hold by conquest, and therefore are Absolute.) I do not say, the Doctor draws such a conclusion: No; but he lays down the Antecedent; and then any body else may draw out the conclusion.  
I fetch not the root of succession, so fare bacl as the Saxons, 
Original of this Monarchy.  as this Replier traduces, to cut off advantages which may be made from the Normans entrance, p. 22. But because himself began there to make up a Trinity of Conquests: This drew me on that discourse of the Original of this Monarchy; nor that the cause had any need of it; for it is his work to prove the Government absolute, if he will have it so; also suppose it were as absolute as the Norman Conquest, by him improved can make it; yet that hinders not, but that it may become really and radically limited afterward, by condescent, as appears in the former chapter. Concerning the Saxon entrance, I said it was not a conquest, sc. properly and simply, but an expulsion. He answers, This is neither true, nor greatly material, p. 22. I say, it is both true and material: It is true; for all the Britain's which retained their name and Nation, were they many or few, were expelled into Wales: All the rest in gentem, leges, nomen, linquamque, vincentium concesserunt; as himself citys for me out of Mr Cambden. And it is very material; for if they which only remained here in gentem & leges vincentium concesserunt; Then the Conquerors, as I said, kept their old form of Government; the Saxons came not into the condition of the conquered Britons; but they into the old liberty of the Saxons. Hereupon grew there a necessity of inquiry into the Government of the Nation, before they came hither; that so we might know what a one they established here; and brought the remaining Britons into. And a record of more unquestionable authority than Tacitus I could not imagine; nor a more express testimony for a limited form in the very potestas of it; of which sort he affirms the Government of all the German Nations was. How ever the Doctor is pleased to call it a conjecture, a dream and uncertainty; No, the express testimony of such an Author is not so: Rather that probability of these Saxons not being then a people of Germany, but did afterward break out of the Cimbrica chersonesus, is so; which himself dares call no more than a probability. I say, 1. It is a greater probability, that they were a people of Germany before they came in hither; for the Angli which accompanied them in that invasion, were questionless Germans, and reckoned by Tacitus among that people, doubtless they were neighbours in habitation which were joined in that voyage and conquest. 2. Suppose the matter were not clear of the Saxons, yet is it of the Angli which gave denomination to the Land and people, who no doubt retained their Laws and Government, says Cambden; which was limited in the very royal power saith Tacitus. But this Doctor would make men believe, as if I endeavoured to deduce the very Model of our present Government from that Saxon ingress: Whereas all that I aim at, is to make it appear that in semine, in the rude beginnings it is so ancient; and shall affirm the limited power of the English Kings, and liberty of the subjects to have been from thence continued till now, unless he can bring some better proofs of its interruption, and induction of an unlimited power, then as yet he hath. Also to show that the Doctor's Tenure by Conquest is vain in the first of the Three, for the Saxons gave none such to their Princes, but kept their Laws, and came not under the Title of a conquered people. Next, the Doctor censures my delineation of the present platform of our Government, p. 44. (for it is nothing with him for advantage to skip over 9 or 10. Page's) that so he might make a show as if I set down that model as derived from the Saxons out of Germany; and so spends near two pages in this unreasonable way of traducing me; Whereas he cannot be ignorant, that in many places, yea at present is forced to confess, p. 24. that I acknowledge our Government came up to this exactness and full height by degrees and in continuance of time; but indeed he had nothing else to say against that Description of this platform or any one of those 6. Supposals of which it consists; and therefore when he had feigned as if I had derived it from the beginning of the Saxon Government in this Land, he calls it a fancy, against the credit of all Histories and Chronicles, p. 24. and so lets it go. Let the Reader judge, whether I do not there apparently set it down as a description of our now existent Frame of Government: And whether any thing therein is not according to past history, and present experience: Yea I challenge the Doctor to except against the least part of it, as not so: if he cannot, he doth wrong so to miscall and deride it. After this Excursion, he returns back to the 36. page of my Book, and the proper business of that Chapt. which was his three Titles by Conquest. I looked that after his first, he should have made good his second Conquest, sc. the Danish, and made good what he had said, that our Kings hold by that too, as one of the three. But not a word of that for shame: He passes p. 26. to the Norman entrance: And to prove that William held this Land by conquest, he citys out of Mr Cambden that in victory quasi Tropheum, he disposed of the Lands of the Conquered, changed their Tenure, abrogated what English Laws and customs he pleased, etc. Indeed when he had gotten full possession, he did what he pleased; but sactum non probat jus. I have proved, and the Doctor hath not gainsaid, 1. That his Title by which he claimed was a successive and Legal Title. 2. That this Title got the favour of a great party, and was a main Mean facilitating his acquirie. 3. That he was inaugurated by virtue of that Title. 4. After he had gotten the Kingdom, though he did many things arbitrarily, yet he settled himself and his successors in the state of Legal Monarches, as the Doctor confesses, p. 27. What then is become of his Triple Tenure by Conquest; when here's not one can be made good; when it comes to a due scanning? That of Mr Cambden, that the Kings of this Land have Potestatem supremam, & merum imperium, is no more than that of the Statute which the Doctor speaks of, p. 47. that it is an Empire governed by one supreme head, which we acknowledge; for that merum imperium must be understood in a moderate sense; else it says more than the Doctor himself professes to own: Though Mr Cambdens judgement in this case is not of the authority of a proof.  
Sect. 2 Then he passes to my Arguments, p. 28. But, by the way, let me tell him, 
My Arguments for Limitation and Mixture vindicated.  I brought 5. Arguments to prove this Government limited, and 3. to prove it mixed: and it had been meet he should have brought somewhat, beside his bare word, to prove it limited only in the exercise, that is, Absolute in the power; but he brings no proof, because he had none: Yet perhaps though he had not wherewithal to confirm his own, yet he hath to demolish my Assertions: Let us see therefore his solutions of my Arguments. But before we come to weigh them, because he tells us p. 28. it were an Argument fit for a skilful Lawyer to labour in, and slights my endeavour because I bring not History and Antiquity, but do go about to reason him into a belief of those Assertions, Let me premise something concerning that course of proving them. 1. The work of bringing History and Antiquity doth belong to him who affirms such a Title of Power in our Kings; Let him show how and when it was conveyed to them: He which challenges a right to that which was once undoubtedly mine, must prove his right and he can have no more than he can bring evidence for. 2. On his default, if I undertake a needless office to prove my Negative, there are but two ways imaginable to do it, one is by records of histories setting out the first constitution of a state, and the Terms on which 〈◊〉 people resigned up their liberty to a subjection. So in the Ancient Roman State, the Venetian, the late Belgik Union, and others which have at once, visibly and lately been composed, it is likely that way might be taken. The other is by demonstrative collections drawn from the institution of the present composure of a State. Thus alone is it possible to discern and prove the constitution of a Government which springs not up at once, but by unseen degrees and moments, whose fundamental constitutive acts stand upon no record. This is the condition of most Governments in the world which have sprung from small, rude and unknown beginnings. And of this in particular. For 1. A limitation of Royal Power was brought hither by the Saxons and Angli our Ancestors, hath been proved. This was, as those times were, very rude and unpolished, it is likely such as Captains in Armies have, who can do nothing of moment without the advice and consent of the Counsel of war. 2. This Limitation of Power and Liberty received some more formal and settled bounds afterwards by customs and Laws before the Conquest, as appears by the Common Laws, which are, as it were, the basis and foundation of this Government, the Statute Laws being but after superstructives; These Common Laws did not grow up at once, but by degrees, and were unwritten Customs and Usages gaining authority by unknown prescription, above all written Laws; and were afterward committed to writing by men skilful in the Laws. 3. At length, and after the Conquest it was perfected to this Parliamentary Form; and even this being at first but rude, grew to this exactness by length of Time, and infinite Contentions. This latter way only being left us; that I took, and the Doctor hath no cause to despise it. For when a thing of present State is made evident by Reason drawn for palpable experience of its present composure, it is madness to deny it to be so, because I cannot tell when it began to be so: Yea when the Question is of present state, it is a surer way to find out the Truth, then by records of its Original constitution: For in time the Frame of a State may receive real variations from what it was at first, as the Roman State, and most others have done; for the contracts of men are at pleasure alterable; and an argument drawn from Monuments of first coalition, would then be fallacious.  
Well; be the way never so justifiable, which I have taken, yet the Doctor dares pronounce my Arguments insufficient to clear what I have undertaken. 'tis easy to pronounce it; let us see how he makes good his sentence. I proceeded distinctly first to lay down my Arguments proving Limitation, p. 31. Then those which prove Mixture, p. 40. He mingles them together: And to my first, third, fourth and fift proving Limitation, Answers that They prove only limitation in the exercise of power, p. 28. Why so? Neither the Denomination of Liege, nor any prescription can make us believe, that the Limitations of power had any other beginning then voluntary condescent. As if a Government by voluntary condescent might not receive a radical Limitation. But it lies on him to prove, it was by such condescent; if he can bring no record for it, it must in justice be held original, and ab initio. Those two denominations of Liege Sovereign: And Liege people do prove the very Sovereignty and Subjection Legal; but that is not so which hath only a moral Limitation; the denominations argue the bond 'twixt them to be Legal: And when Subjects have such a Liberty by custom and Law, that they own no farther subjection, than (when, or how ever they came by it) yet the very power of the Monarch is limited, as we heard in the former Chapter, unless any will put a vain power in the Prince, to which no Subjection is due; but of this enough there. Then he passeth to my Reasons proving mixture, which are three, p. 40. of my Treatise. The first is, That it is confessedly mixed of a Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracie, therefore radically, and in the very Power. He answers, It is not necessary the mixture should be in the Power: but it is sufficient if there be a concurrence of Persons whose consent is required to the exercise of Power, p. 39 Thus he answers to the conclusion; but says nothing to the Antecedent. 1. And indeed if it be mixed of these three, his answer is against commonsense; that a mixture of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracie should be satisfied by annexion of persons to the Monarch, having mere consent: for these are names of Power of Government; for Aristocracy and Democracie are Powers not Persons, as well as Monarchy: therefore a composition of these three must be all of Powers. 2. And indeed this chimaera of a mixture in the exercise of Power, is plain nonsense. For a mixture in the Acts or Exercise supposeth a mixture in the principles of Action, that is in the very Powers: A mixed Act proceeding from a simple Power is such stuff that I never heard before. Now if a mixture in Acts argues a mixture in Powers: These Powers must be  and supreme: for subordinate's make no mixture; also Powers concurrent to supreme Acts, such as Legislation is confessed to be, cannot be but supreme Powers. Neither can any man living clear that passage which he speaks of p. 45. from pure nonsense, sc. This coordination is but to some Act or Exercise of the Supreme Power, not in the power itself: For Concourse to an Act, implies a Power of Concurrence: and Concourse to a supreme Act, argues a supreme Power; for an inferior Power cannot afford a coordinate concurrence to a supreme Act. So that his Overseers were not mistaken when they checked him for that passage, and said, He granted a coordination of Subjects with his Majesty in the supreme Power. But here he brings a ponderous Reason, so often before urged. If the mixture be in the Supremacy of Power, how can the King be the Only supreme and Head. He cannot salve it with his Apex potestatis, unless the King must be the Crown or Top of the Head only; for they also must be our Head and our Sovereigns, if they be mixed in the Supremacy of Power, p. 29. Here I answer once for all to this so frequent an injection. 1. That the Titles of Head and Supreme are fully satisfied by this, that he is the sole Principle and fountain from whence the execution of all Law and Justice flows to his people by inferior Officers and Courts, all whose Authority is derivatively from him as its head. 2. That these Titles in proper construction import only Utmost chiefty, nor do they agree to any kind of right in the fundamental and radical Powers of a Kingdom; but to the principal and transcendent Interest: Another may have a right in the supreme Power, yet not be supreme, nor Head: because not having a supremacy in that Power: So it is in the Colleges, the Fellows have a fundamental interest in the power of Government, yet that hinders not, but that the Title of Head and Chief is given to him who is Governor; will the Doctor jest at it, and say they be Heads and Supremes too, and the Warden or Master is but the crown or top of the head. Also in the natural body, from whence the Metaphor of Head is borrowed, are three Fundamental and radical powers situate in the three Principal parts: yet none will say, the Heart and Liver are Heads too, because they partake the supreme Powers of nature. Let not the Doctor therefore strain a Metaphor so fare as to make himself merry with it. Let him really answer my Arguments by which I prove a radical Limitation and mixture. Let him answer; is not the Legislative Power the supreme? Have not the Houses an Authoritative concurrence and Influx into that business? If he avoid a punctual answer hereto by carping at words, he will prove himself a ridiculous Argumentatour while he seeks to make others seem so.  
My second Argument for radical mixture, is from the Legislative Power being in all three. He answers, That Phrase is satisfied and explained by that concurrence and consent in the exercise of supreme Power. It seems that invention of his must serve all turns. Is a Legislative Power satisfied by a bare powerlesse consent? I demand: is that Consent causal and Authoritative; or merely Consiliarie and unauthoritative? And whereas I prove that they have an enacting Authority by that received and set clause in the beginning of Acts; Be it enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, and the Authority of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament. He tells us a Vote and Power of assenting is a great Authority, p. 29. I inquire not how great it is: I ask whether that be all; whether that clause, which as expressly as words can, ascribes an enacting Authority to them, be satisfied by such a Power of Assenting? He sees it doth not, and therefore tells us of a former phrase which ran thus: The King by the advice and assent of the Prelates, Earls and Barons, and at the instance and request of the Commonalty hath ordained, etc. Suppose anciently some statutes run under that form: that advice and instance, must be understood of an Authoritative and enacting advice and instance; as the latter forms explain it: for it is equal that the latter expound the former; and not the contrary, as the Doctor would perversely have it, especially considering the Doctor's Exposition cannot stand with the latter; but mine agrees very well with the former. But how bold is this man, when during so many years and Parliaments, both Kings and States by this received Form, have acknowledged and established a concurrent enacting Authority in all three, yet he dares argue and oppose so express and confessed a truth? But in this answer, he discovers a great deal of superficialnes, in granting the Houses a Power of consenting to the establishment of laws; and yet deny them a Legislative, enacting Power: for such a Power of consenting (if it be necessary) is indeed a Power of enacting; for though in transeunt Acts one may stand by and consent to the doing, and yet not be Efficient; yet in immanent Acts which are done, per immediatam volitionem, by a mere expression of the Will, A concurrence in consenting, and a concurrence in doing is one and the same thing: Now Legislation is an imminent Act, consisting in a mere expression of an Authoritative Will.  
My third Argument for Mixture, was from its end, which was Restraint from excess. 1. He grants such a Restraint, but moral and legal, not forceable, p. 30. I answer, He deceitfully confounds moral and legal, as I shown before. 2. The End of Mixture in a State, is that there may be a power of restraining more than sufficient (as his Majesty expresses it) but the Doctor's mere moral power, is very insufficient; It limits not the Power at all; nor the Exercise properly, no more than an Oath, or Promise without it, would do: that is, makes it sin to exceed. But of this before. But here, which is very rare, He doth not only deny, but give a reason of it. If the fundamental Constitution had intended them such a Power, it would not have left a power in the Monarch to call, or dissolve them, which would make this power of theirs altogether ineffectual, p. 30. This Reason seems to have some weight in it, I will therefore, the more seriously consider it. 1. Whatever strength it hath had in it; now it hath none, because that power of dissolving is now by Law suspended, for this Parliament; and after it, a necessity by Law imposed of reducing that Power of Calling Parliaments, into Act, every Three years. 2. Neither was it true before these Acts, that such a Power was left in the Monarch at pleasure to use or not; for it was by ancient Law determined how often they should be convocated. 3. But being granted that this Power is simply and fully in the Monarch, yet I deny, that hence it follows, that it would make that Power of the Houses altogether ineffectual; because that de facto, though it hath been in the Monarch so long, yet it never hath made it void; but they have exercised a limiting Power, as Histories relate, enough yea and sometimes too much, over the Monarch, notwithstanding his Power of calling and dissolving them. Thus in the Colleges, the Fellows have an effectual, and more than moral limiting Power, though the Governor hath the Power of calling and dissolving their meetings. And anciently the prime Patriarch had the power of Calling and dissolving general Counsels, yet they had a Power of limiting, yea of Censuring him for exorbitances for all that. The Reason is, because many things fall out oft in a Government, inducing such necessities on the Monarch, that he for their supply will choose to reduce such power into act of Calling, and suspend such power of dissolving, although he know those States will use their Limiting Power in reducing such exorbitances, and punishing those dearest instruments which have been used in them. This the Constitutors of this Frame preconsidering might put in the Monarch this Power, and yet intent to the other States a Legal and effectual power of restraining his exorbitancies, by using Force, not against him, but its procurers and Instruments. Thus we see, there is no need of entering on that dispute, Whether this Power of calling and dissolving the Houses be placed in the Monarch, as all his other are, not absolutely, but with limitation of necessary reducing it into act, on the last exigencies of the Kingdom.  
After this he returns to my other Arguments for limitation; One of which, drawn from radical Mixture, he fully omits; but now having showed the invalidity of his exceptions against my arguments for it, I have given force to this argument for Limitation, drawn therefrom. That which he sets on last is my first for Limitation in the very Power: sc. the Kings own express confession: That the Law is the measure of his power: That the Powers which he hath are vested in him by Law, p. 31. of my Tract. And, as if this were not more than he could answer, the Doctor adds a third for us, in which he ascribes to the Houses a power more than sufficient to restrain his Excesses, p. 30. Here are Authorities as punctual and express as can be imagined. Yet the Doctor resolving not to be reasoned into a belief of these things, out faces all this evidence; and to that end frames three Answers such as they are. 1. He says, His Majesty had few of his learned Counsel about him. 2. His gracious expressions ought not to be drawn out to his disadvantage. 3. All that can be gathered from them doth not come up to these Conclusions, p. 31. In the two first he openly enough taxeth his Majesty of unadvised expressions, excusing it from absence of his learned Counselors (you may soon imagine whom he means) Thus disparaging the King's judgement and all then about him; and tells us we must not be unjust to set those say on the rack; that is, we must not take them in their plain meaning; but on this man's wrested and senseless interpretation: What do not these men dare do and say? Before we heard him correcting the expressions of all Modern Parliaments, teaching us to reform them by the old. Here the King and his Counsel setting out in such a time Declarations to all his Subjects to inform them about the nature and extent of his Royal Power: He compares those serious expresses to Trajan's sudden and excessive speech: He will correct Kings, Counsels, Parliaments and all, but he will have his way: To him they must come to learn how to speak, and what powers they have. But let us hear his Doctoral Exposition of his Majesties expresses. He says, The Law is the measure of his Power: We must understand his meaning to be that his power is bounded by Law: but it doth not follow, that his power wherein it is not limited by Law is not absolute and full, p. 31. Here is profound interpreting: If his Power be limited by Law? is there any part of it not limited by Law? If the Law be the measure of it, sure it is even with it; for the measure is equal in extent with the thing measured: Thus he papally interprets against the direct meaning of the Text: But he doth not show us how that can be understood, when he saith, His powers are vested in him by Law, if the Law be a limitation only of exercise: Nor how their Restraining power is more than sufficient, if it be only moral; which, how unsufficient a restraint for exorbitance it is, every one's experience can enough testify. I admire a man who pretends to conscience and judgement should take such liberty of interpreting. Certain if those Reasons and Testimonies do not clearly prove a radically limited and mixed Constitution of this Monarchy I shall despair of ever proving any thing by way of Argument any more.  
I had an intent to have subnexed other Arguments to make good Sect. 3 those Assertions: but I see it is to no purpose, 
7 Queries concerning this Government.  for he is resolved not to be reasoned into them: He can deny all as failing either in the Antecedent or Consequent, p. 32. The Power of this Kingdom he must have unlimited: He will give no Reason for it; nor hear no Reason against it. Yet, sigh he professeth himself a Resolver of Conscience, Let me therefore be so bold as to propose certain Cases to him. 1. Why in the late Oath proposed to be taken by all his Majesty's Subjects the Power of enacting Statutes is sworn to be jointly in the King's Majesty, Lords and Commons in Parliament. Certes the Doctor writ this Reply before that Oath was printed in Oxford, or else he did not consider of it. He cannot say, I hope there were but few of his counsel about him when that was framed: if the Doctor hath taken it, He hath forsworn this passage of his Reply; and sworn them a joint enacting power. 2. Why we are enjoined to swear that we do believe that the Subjects of England are not obliged by any Act made either by the King's Majesty solely, or the Houses solely, etc. Sure the Doctor hath abjured his other Assertion of the unlimited Power of the King, if he hath taken this Oath; for if Power be solely his, than an Act made by him solely is obliging: If they be not obligatory, they are not Authoritative; and so the mixture and limitation is in the Authority itself. Here is no place left for his distinction of Active and Passion subjection. For, 1. Will any think that the intent is to swear men to be bound not to do, but to suffer? 2. The Belief of a non-Obligation proceeds indifferently and as fully concerning the sole Acts of the King, us the Houses but I believe the Doctor will not say we are obliged to passive subjection to the sole Acts of the Houses. 3. I would know if the States do limit only morally, what they do, which is not done without them? A Promise and Oath do limit morally without them. He will say they may admonish him; and deny their consent, and so judge his Acts invalid: He means still morally invalid; and so would they be without them. 4. Suppose the Monarch minded to establish a Law, which he judges needful; and the States being averse, he enacts it without them; Is it not a Law? It hath all the Legislative authority in it. He will say it is not duly made. 1. I grant it: but yet it is a Law, for it hath all the Power of a Law. 2. But is it not duly made? Why, the power of last decision is in the King alone: Suppose he define that the Intent of his Predecessors in granting this consenting power to the Houses had no intent to hinder, but further themselves in establishing good laws; and therefore now they not concurring by assent to this needful Act, He ought not to be hindered, but may lawfully do it without them. He is the last Judge in this case; and it must be held ever lawfully enacted. So that in the result here is left to these States by the Doctor's grounds neither Civil nor Moral Limitation, but at pleasure. 5. If Limitation in our Government exempt Subjects from a necessity of active Subjection; but not from passive; How is it that our Laws do not only determine what the Monarch shall command, but also what he shall inflict: what shall be accounted Rebellion, what Felony, etc. and what not; also what he shall inflict for this crime, and that crime, and what not? Sith the Laws limiting what he shall command, do limit our necessity of active Subjection; it will follow, that the Laws limiting what he shall inflict, do limit our necessity of passive Subjection. Here's no evasion by saying the Laws do limit him morally what he shall inflict, and if he inflict beyond Law, he sins in it; but we must suffer: for the Doctor acknowledges, that the Laws defining what he shall command do so limit our active subjection, that we have a simple exemption from any necessity of Doing; and therefore also the Laws defining what he shall inflict, do so limit our passive subjection, that we have a simple exemption from any necessity of suffering, beyond those Limitations; for also, if they did not free us from passive subjection, it were unlawful not only to resist, but also to avoid suffering even by flight. 6. When the liberties of magna Charta, and other grants have been gotten and preserved, and recovered at the rate of so much trouble, suit, expense and blood, whither by all that ado was intended only a moral liberty, definement in the Monarch, and not also of the power itself; only that he might not lawfully exorbitate from established Laws, and not also that he might have no Authority or Power to exorbitate at all? Sure this was their aim, for the former he could not do before. 7. The Law granting a writ of Rebellion against him who refuseth to obey the sentence of the Judge, though he have an express Act of the King's will to warrant him: doth it not suppose those exceeding and extrajudicial Acts of the King's will to be unauthoritative, and unable to privilege a man from Resistance?  
If the Doctor by his faculty can resolve these Cases, He will do much in way of satisfaction of my conscience; but if he cannot they will prove so many convincing arguments that the Power of the Monarch in this Frame is not unlimited.  
Now having made good my Assertions, I expected another work; sc. an Examination of his Reasons for unlimitedness, and simplicity of Monarchical Power, but he is not guilty of my fault, he doth not go so much as to reason us into a belief of it. He doth in vain express a desire he hath that some skilful Lawyers or Divines would help him at this dead lift; yet he is like to go alone in this wild untrodden path of defending an unresistiblenesse on such supposals: shall we think any Divine will second him, in justifying his unwritten fancy about God's Ordinance necessarily investing all the acts of his will, who is supreme? Or any sound Lawyer will overthrow the grounds of his Profession, that the Royal Right, Authority and Government of this Realm is both founded on, and measured by the Laws thereof. Yea it is very remarkable, that his Majesty in all the Declarations and Expresses which I have seen, doth not once touch upon this way, sc. a challenge of such a latitude of Authority as can preserve destructive instruments from force; but condemns the now Resistance, by solemn protestations of innocency, and intention of governing by the known Laws.   

CHAP. VI An Answer to his 5. Sect. of Resistance in Relation to several kinds of Monarchy.  
THE residue of his Book is spent about the Question of Resistance; Sect. 1 I might well spare the labour of any farther Answer; for now having so apparently made good these two Assertions. 1. That sovereignty may be limited in the very power. 2. That de facto, it is so in this Government, every one may discern the necessary truth of these inferences, 1. That in this Government, the exceeding Acts of the Princes will, being out of the compass of his Authority, can not authorise their Instruments. 2. That hereon Resistance of them is no other than of private men, not of Authority, or God's Ordinance. But because the Doctor's chief confidence is in this part of his discourse, and he is large in it, I will therefore go on in my work, and will briefly make appear that his Reasons are infirm, and his Authorities impertinent, and his Answers very insufficient: for having been so large in making good my supposals, and overthrowing his, I may the more contract myself in this remaining business. In this Section he proposeth two things. 1. To consider how I state the point of Resistance in the kinds of Governments. 2. To prove that Limitation and Mixture in government do not imply a forceable constraining Power in subjects, p. 39 I will follow him in both.  

My stating the Question vindicated.  He gins with a charitable censure of my stating the Question, and says he finds it to be in a way that lies very open to Rebellion, p. 33. Let the Reader judge: I am sure, his Resolves and Determinations are not in a way to destroy all liberty, and make all Governments Arbitrary, but directly do it. Then for my maintaining the Person of the Monarch in all Forms to be above the reach of Force, he approves it; yet says I allow subjects to raise Armies, to give battle to those that are about him as his guard. He wrongs me, I say not his guard but subversive seducers and instruments: Those which he called cutthroats in his first book; now he reputes he gave that hard name to his clients, whom he pleads so hard to save harmless, and makes them amends with the stile of a Guard. A guard which bring him into greater danger than all his enemies; who bring him into battle to save themselves, where Ordnance and Musket can put no difference: No; They use him as their guard. If harm befall him, which God avert, the guilt and punishment will fall on them who are so prodigal of hazarding his sacred Person, not on those who could desire nothing more than his security, by absence from a multitude, who by undertaking the subversion of Religion and Laws (for that is the Doctor's supposition) bring themselves in danger of condign destruction.  
Then he proceeds to Resistance in an Absolute State. Where I affirm, If such a Monarch should seek the destruction of the whole Community, his instruments of such inhumanity may be resisted. He dares not deny it; but would know what I do mean by the whole community. I mean the whole simely, or the whole interpretatively; that is, the greater part; and therefore his exception of the Jews in the Kingdom of Ahasuerus, or the Templars in the Western Kingdoms, is not to the purpose: but the instance which I bring of the Law-Countries, comes home: for they were the whole community; but the Replier corrupts it, when he saith the Spanish King intended the extirpation of the Protestants only, p. 34. For he intended not only theirs, but of all, Papists and else, which would not admit the introduction of an Arbitrary Government, and the subversion of their liberties, as the histories thereof make plain. Here in this 34. page, the Doctor shows a bad mind: Taking occasion to excuse the Rebels in Ireland, as if they might justify themselves on these grounds; and intimating a falsehood, as if the Parliament did intent their extirpation, hereby declaring how ill he likes any effectual course for the rooting out of Popery out of the Kingdoms. Indeed, he says, he pleads not for them, but yet he doth it. He finds out arguments for them; and shows them a way, both how to excuse themselves, and accuse the Parliament; and to call a resolution of cleansing that Island from Popery, an extirpation of their Nation. He says, the example of David proves not this, being but a particular Man. I say, it proves it the more strongly, as shall appear. Then if a particular man's life be invaded without any plea of reason, I suppose it hard to deny him the liberty of positive resistance of agents; and prove it by the instance of the people's rescue of Jonathan; and david's of himself; where the people's Oath; and David's Army, with his enquiry at Keilah do prove a serious and real purpose of Resistance, let the Doctor say what he please to the contrary; so that these examples come home to justify resistance in such case, even in an Absolute Monarchy; for here are particular men, in an absolute Monarchy, assaulted without plea of reason; for that Jonathan, who had wrought such a deliverance, should die, for tasting in his ignorance a little honey, there was no colour of reason; the King's rash oath was none. And that David should be put to death, whom Saul himself oft with his own mouth professed innocent, and absolved, was as much without plea of reason: so that here I need not fly to the Doctor's shift of an extraordinary case, as he tells me I must, p. 35. I acknowledge no extraordinary case in these examples: Take them in their due extent, and they justify no more than I have asserted; and so much they do. In my 5. Assertion, p. 11. Of submitting States, Liberties and Persons to the will of an Absolute Monarch carrying any plea of reason; He fault's my Order, and tells me, it should have been first. It seems this man's eye can spy small faults; but why first, he doth not say. I think in stating of the question of resistance I may as well begin with the Affirmative, and show first when it may be used, and then when it ought not; as on the contrary; but he will make a fault, where he finds none. But what says he to the Assertion? He grants it; but dislikes the limitation, so it carry plea or show of reason: and says here the way is open enough to rebellion, p. 36. No opener than himself makes it, p. 10. This is usual with him, when he dislikes a thing: He can speak no less words than Rebellion. But why says he so? Every man will be ready to think there is no reason nor equity in the will of the Monarch when he is oppressed by him. He may well enough, if he be oppressed: but yet there may be a plea and colour of equity even for an Act of Oppression; and in an Absolute Monarchy it will little avail a man though he think there is no reason for it: for he must not be his own judge; nor hath he any outward judge to appeal to; but the Reasonable will of the Monarch himself; if he submit to its determination, there is no fear of Rebellion; if not, I have done with him, in such a Government. Of Saules censure of Jonathan and David I have spoken already and made it appear it had no plea of reason, was not the act of a reasonable will; and therefore I may hold their examples ordinary, without impeachment of this Assertion.  
Then he proceeds to Resistance in limited and mixed Rules, p. 36. Concerning which I said, p. 17. If the exorbitances be of less moment they ought to be borne, and p. 18. If mortal and destructive neither can be otherwise redressed, than prevention by Resistance may be used. Here first he challengeth my ingenuity, for words spoken in my 49. page. He said Sect. 1. of his first book, We may and aught to deny obedience to such commands of the Prince as are unlawful by the Law of God; yea by the established laws of the Land. I censured this speech, that it is more than should be said, sure, a heinous fault in me: I say more; he hath said more than should be said, by all these three books, in which he says that which dissolves all frames of Government into arbitrary, overthrows all effectual limitation of Power; and sure that is more than should be said. And for that particular clause; Is it not more? He speaks without restriction: Doth join things unlawful by the law of God, and things unlawful by the laws of the Land: And puts the same may and aught to both; if the affirmation must be understood universally of one, how can it be understood otherwise of the other: It cannot be excused from the censure of a confused and unwary speech. He passeth, p. 37. to the Question, Who shall be the ultime judge of subversive exorbitancies. He would know who? I have told him my opinion hereof at large in that Tract: Here I would feign know his; but he would rather carp at mine, then give his own. When I say there can be no Authoritative judge to determine it. He commends my ingenuity, p. 37. but I do not only say it, but at large do prove it, there p. 67. as well against him, as against those others; why doth he not undertake that Question against me, if he hath any mind to it. He much dislikes when I say, p. 18. The fundament all Laws must judge in every man's conscience. This is, says he, a ready way to anarchy and confusion, p. 37. I refer not this case to the consciences of men as to an Authoritative Judge, but a moral principle of discerning Right: And who can deny unto man such a liberty to conceive of right according to the light he hath from the fundamentals of a State? Let the judicious read what I have said hereabout, p. 67. of that Tract; and let him then tell how that Question can be otherwise determined, unless he overthrow. Monarchy, by giving a final judgement to the States; or all Liberty, if he give it to the Monarch; and supposing the Aim at subversion be evident to men's consciences, can we deny them a natural power of judging according to that evidence; or liberty of assisting the wronged? So when I say the wronged side must make it evident to every man's conscience: also the appeal must be to the Community, as if there were no Government; and as every man is convinced in conscience he is bound to give assistance, p. 29. of my Tract: He calls this good stuff, p. 37. Why? because I say, the people are at liberty as if there were no Government; and this appeal is disadvantageous to the Monarch; for they will be more ready to believe their representative: This would in the consequence be dangerous, the high way to confusion, p. 38. Answ. 1. I say, not simply, that people are at liberty, as if there were no Government; but in this particular Question; bound still, as before, in all besides. 2. He takes me as if by Community I meant only the Commons; when I express it by genus humanum, especially of that Kingdom. 3. He censures the Reason of Mankind of partiality towards their Representatives. Not so; for in so great a Question Wise men cannot be blinded: Honest men will go according to their conscience, and Reasonoble men according to evidence, and will see it concerns them as well to avoid Anarchy by aiding a wronged Monarch; as Tyranny by aiding an oppressed State. But sigh this Replicant is so bitter an enveigher against an Appeal ad conscientiom generis humani, in this last case so uncapable of an Authoritative decision: 1. Let him consider on what foundation God hath built Monarchy and all other powers, but on the consciences of men, Rom. 13. 2. Let him weigh whether, when he hath said all he can say, such an appeal be avoidable. For, 1. If a controversy arise between the King and a particular person or place; the King shall Judge it in his Courts by his Judges, and the sentence shall be executed by the force and arms of his other subjects. 2. If it be between Him and the Representatives of his whole Kingdom, and supreme Court of Judicature in which the Acts and Persons of all other Courts and Judges are to be judged. The King cannot judge this in his other Courts and by his Judges; nor yet by himself; for a King out of his Courts cannot judge in a Legal Government, especially the acts of his supreme Court. But be it so: suppose the Doctor and I should agree in this, that the King by himself is the ultime Judge of Controversies: Yet it is very like those States with whom the Contention is, will not yield him so, to judge against them, in his own cause. But suppose they do not submit to his determination: He will say, than they sin, and rebel against him. Well, let it be granted; yet submit they do not: I demand in this case, what course the King hath to make effectual his sentence? It must be by force of arms, by the sword: but of whom? Either the peoples whose representatives they are; or other men's: but what shall bind them to afford their Force to make good his sentence? It must be their conscience of his right: Thus when all is done and said, To the consciences of Men must his appeal be; and to them must he make evident his right, in this extreme contention. Yea this man in a controversy of the like nature, is compelled to acknowledge as much: For the Pleaders put the case; If a King be distracted, I may add, if his Title be dubious, etc. The Doctor's answer is, if it be clear that a King is so, etc. p. 8. but who shall determine this If? must not self-evidence in the consciences of Men? This is all the judicial power the Doctor can refer us to in these cases. Lastly, He would know what power there is in a Community to make resistance; and answers himself, A Parliamentary and Legal; not Military and Forcible, p. 38. Thus he speaks of these as contradistinct, when they are subordinate, Forcible being subservient to Legal to make it valid and effectual, which else were merely moral and ineffectual; but this is one of his supposals whose vanity I have before discovered: And p. 51. of my Treatise, in a full dispute have I proved the Parliaments power in resisting destructive instruments; which I doubt not, will appear clear, notwithstanding any thing said in this Reply. But that is very strange which he affirms, p. 39 That if they use a Legal restraining power, the Monarch cannot alter the established frame. Sure, by cannot, he understands fallaciously, as he useth to do, a moral cannot, that is, not without sin; which is a poor small cannot now adays: if he mean indeed cannot, that is, is not able, it is against reason, by his grounds; for what is not he able to do, whose lowest, most desperate instrument of pleasure is unresistible? Let him remember where he said, p. 19 A forcible consent cannot be wanting to a Conqueror, and a Conquerors power is no more than unresistible. Nay; I am senseless on the Doctor's grounds, if he cannot lawfully; for suppose he be pleased to make it a Question, whether he were not better govern by the civil-law, as more conducent to God's glory, and the end of Government. He is by Law the last judge of this Question, if he determine it best: then he may lawfully do it.  
Now we are come to the second part of this Section: in which he Sect. 2 undertakes the proof of this Assertion, 
His Arguments against power of resistance reserved. answered.  that Limitations and Mixtures in Monarchy do not imply a forcible constraining power in subjects for the preventing of dissolution, but only a Legal, p. 39 Answ. He fails in the very proposal of his Assertion in three points. 1. He proposeth it of Limitation in general; whereas I grant it of that which is only in exercise; affirming it only of that which is of the power itself. 2. He says, Forcible constraining power in subjects, when he should have specified against subversive instruments, for I grant it of the Monarch himself. 3. He opposeth forcible to Legal, when it should be opposed only to mere Moral, not to Legal, as before. Now let us weigh his Arguments. First, Such a power must be in them by reservation, and then it must be express in the constitution of the Government and Covenant, or else by implication. I will answer distinctly concerning this Reservation of power of forcible Resistance. 1. There is a Reservation of liberty, or power of not being subject neither actively nor passively to the exceeding Acts of the Monarches will: This is by implication, for what they did not resign up, they did reserve. 2. A power of Authoritative judging and resisting the Monarch thus exceeding. This neither expressly nor implicitly is reserved; not because it is unlawful, as the Doctor imagines, but contradictory to the very institution of a Monarchy, and so, under that intention, impossible. 3. A power of forcible resistance of subversive instruments. This by the Authority of the Law, is, not reserved, but expressly committed, not only to the Houses of Parliament, but all inferior Courts; for the Law, whose execution the King committeth unto them, commands them not only to resist, but punish its violaters, much more its subverters, without exceptions of Persons, or respect of their number, or ground and reason why they do it, whether with or against the King's private and absolute will or Warrant: supposing such men to be without warrant. And this power of judging all violators and subverters of Laws being committed to them, includes a power of employing the force or Arms of the County, or whole Kingdom, if need be, to make good the sentence of the Law against them: This power being a necessary attendant to the former. And they who have the power of judging by Commission, have the power of force by implication. To his five Arguments therefore by which he proves this power not reserved by implication; I briefly Answer. 1. Limitation cannot infer it, etc. Answer, Limitation in exercise only doth not: but in the power itself doth infer it, as I have often showed. 2. The inconveniencies of exorbitancy cannot infer it. Answer, They do not infer it of themselves, for they are the same in absolute Rule: but supposing a people mind in their Frame effectually to prevent those inconveniencies, that doth infer it. 3. The consent and intention of the people, choosing a Monarch cannot infer it, because it is not the measure of the power itself. Answer, I have before proved the contrary, and made the Doctor's supposal appear a groundless falsehood concerning unlimited power by God's ordinance. 4. The intention of the people in procuring Limitations of power cannot infer it. Answer, If the people's intention in it, be a greater security from oppression then in an absolute Government they can have, or a mere moral limitation can give them; than it doth infer it. 5. If the Architects did intent such a forceable power to these States, they would not have best it in his power to dissolve them, p. 42. This hath had its full satisfaction before. These are poor infirm arguments, as the reader cannot but see, yet he ends in a triumph. Therefore I conclude here as I promised in the second Section, where the Prince stands supreme, etc. there Subjects may not by force of arms resist, though he be exorbitant, etc. p. 43. 'Tis true he concludes as he promised, but he hath not proved, as he promised; nor as we expected; for here is nothing, but that which falls to the ground with his supposals on which they are built; and which I have demolished in the 4th Chapter.   

CHAP. VII. An Answer to the 7th Section of his Reply, of places of Scripture out of the old Testament.  
HIs sixth Section doth wholly concern the Author of the fuller Sect. 1 Answer, which I pass over, because I am chargeable for no more than is my own. And come to his seventh which contains an Examination of places alleged in this Question out of the old Testament. Where he gins confidently that there is no warrant for Resistance, p. 56. and he yields two Reasons why. 1. Because the Institution of that Kingdom was such as doth plainly exclude Resistance. 2. Because the Prophets never call for it. Ans. I grant it doth exclude it, as fare as in an absolute Monarchy it may be excluded; and therefore there is no need of answering his Arguments. But yet let us consider them sigh he is so large in them.  
To show us the Institution of that Kingdom he brings, 1 Sam. 8.11. Where he says we have it. For Samuel is commanded, v. 9 To tell the people (Jus Regis:) Now this jus Regis he makes a great matter of, and tells us it implies not a Right of doing such unjust Acts, but a security from Resistance and force, if he does them. p. 56.  
Ans. 1. It is no prejudice to the cause I defend, if I should grant all he would work out of this Text; for it proves no farther than of that particular Kingdom, inducing no necessity that all others must have the same Institution. Also that which he concludes is but a security for the Person of the Prince from force if he do such unjust Acts: which we grant him not only in that, but all Monarchies, even the most limited.  
2. If he have any further reach, and would conclude out of it a general binding Ordinance of security from Resistance intending even to subversive Instruments of Will. The world will wonder at him for such an audacious conclusion from such premises. And we will look a little nearer to what he says. All is grounded on his Interpretation of Jus Regis. Which he seeks to confirm by calvin's Authority.  
First, for his Interpretation. I say the Original words in this place are not to be translated jus Regis, the Right of the King. Because 1. There is another more fit signification of them: the words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 now the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being applied to unjust Acts, as here it is ought not to be rendered jus, but mos, not Right, but manner, as appears by another place answerable to this, 1 Sam. 27.11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 speaking of David's roving, This will be his manner, 'twere ridiculous to render it, this will be his right or privilege. This out last Interpreters knowing, did willingly departed from the Vulgar Latin; whose Author either ignorantly or inconsiderately did render it jus Regis; which this Doctor for his advantage doth here make so much of. 2. That rendering of it, cannot be justified by any other Text of Scripture; for whersoever it is rendered Jus, it imports a moral Right; not a privilege or security in ill doing. I challenge any skilful in that tongue to bring one place where it is or can be so rendered.  
Then for calvin's Authority. I answer. 1. What if Calvin or any other deceived by the vulgar Latin, or ignorance of the extent of the Original word, have rendered it ill; must that be a prescription to others who know a better? 2. Neither doth Calvin, though he follow the Latin and render it jus, mean such a jus as the Doctor doth, sc. An absolute immunity, or security from Resistance: but only from private men. For after he hath in all those passages, which the Doctor citys, exempted Kings from violence, truly and piously urging patience in Subjects under the injuries of their Princes, at length Instit. l. 4. c. 10. (the same out of the which the Doctor brings his proofs) num. 31. He explains himself, De privatis hominibus semper loquor, that all is to be taken of private men; not of the States of a Kingdom, in their public meetings: never discerning of such a universal immunity, as the Doctor would put upon him to maintain. And here I challenge not the Ingenuity, but the Conscience of this Replier, who citys Calvin at large in the former place, as agreeing with him in this case of Resistance, when he cannot be ignorant of the contrary, and therefore conceals his following words in the 31. num. Where he expressly teaches the same Truth which I have asserted in my Treatise. Hear him speaking his judgement, De privatis hominibus semper loquor: Nam si qui nunc sunt populares magistratus ad moderandum Regum libidinem constituti (quales olim erant, qui Lacedemonijs regibus oppositi erant, Ephori, aut Romanis Consulibus, Tribuni plebis; aut Atheniensium Senatui, Demarchi; & qua etiam forte potestate (ut nunc res habent) funguntur in singulis regnis tres ordines, cum primarios conventus peragunt) adeo illos fenocienti Regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto, ut si Regibus impotenter grassantibus, & humili plebeculae insultantibus conniveant, eorum dissimulationem nefaria perfidia non carere affirmem, quia populi libertatem cui se, Dei ordinatione, Tutores positos norunt, fraudulenter produnt. He is clear, that the Estates in Parliament, not only may, but are God's ordinance for it, and are bound to resist, and not suffer the destruction of liberties, by exorbitating Princes; so that I may justly retort the Doctor's words, p. 57 There can be nothing spoken more plainly for the power of resistance in the Houses of Parliament than this.  
Then for his other reason from the 18. verse, Ye shall cry out in that day, and the Lord will not hear you. As in my Treatise I called it inconsequent; so also now: He is a good Logician which can draw his conclusion out of those premises. But he blames me, p. 58. for saying it was an absolute Monarchy, and cannot see how it can be so, according to my description of absoluteness. Why not? In Absolute Monarchy, there are no limits but the Monarches own will; but these had a fixed judicial Law, p. 59 I answer, That judicial Law was no limits of their power; but of the exercise only; for the non observance of it by the King did not amount to an untying of the bond of subjection in the people. The Judicial Laws being from God, not from any contract of the people, were in the same nature to that people, and for the time, with the Moral Laws; and in the same manner did limit their Kings, and no otherwise. But for the Absoluteness of that Monarchy, here Lyra (more faithfully cited, 
Lyra, in 1 Sam. 8.  than he did Calvin above) Constitutio Regis juxta potestatem sibi concessum est duplex.) 1. Plena & legibus absoluta, prout legiste de Imperatore dicere solent. 2. Cum potestate limitata. Now says he, the people sinned, not simply in ask a King; but in ask a King of the first sort, to judge them as the Nations, that is, absolutely. He is express. 1. That limitation of power makes a limited Monarch. 2. That Israel desiring such a Government as the adjacent Nations, desired an absolute Monarch. And indeed as the definement of the moral Law doth not disparage the Absoluteness of the Monarch, because it is from God, not the people; so did not their judicial, for the same reason.  
Sect 2 Next he comes to the people's rescue of Jonathan, p. 60. He may give their resolute Oath what names pleaseth him, a loving importunate violence, a soldierly boldness, or the like; it was a peremptory expression of no less than an intent of resistance, in case there had been need. Then for David's purpose in having armed men about him; He says it was only to secure his person against the cutthroats of Saul, that is, against his private Emissaries. But who sees not a large difference between securing a man's self from private Emissaries, and appearing in the field with Armies against the Armies of the Prince, p. 61. Answer, 1. It is against reason, that he should retain an Army of 600. valiant Soldiers, yea a great Army, like the Host of God, 1 Chron. 12.22. to secure himself merely against private Emissaries. 2. Let us grant him that there is a difference between securing against private Emissaries, and the open Army: yet if he grant it lawful to use force against one, he grants the cause by it, of all; for a warrant from an act of the Kings will is as valid to secure a few Emissaries, as a whole Army: and God's Ordinance in one man, is no more resistible, then in a multitude. Then for David's intent to keep Keylah against Saul, it is so evident, by the history, that I will say no more about it; but do refer him to that which the Pleaders for defensive Arms say about it. The Doctor seeks divers evasions, to get out of the reach of this example; but doth not satisfy himself, much less others, and therefore adds the fourth on which he must rest when all is said, That David's example was extraordinary: Hereon he brings some things in him which were extraordinary; We grant it in many things; but we deny it in this. If the Doctor will prove him to have a special privilege to resist God's ordinance in his Sovereign, more than other men; he must bring the grant and warrant for it: otherwise David must come under the common condition for this matter: He himself acknowledges he had none for violating the person of his Prince; and sure than he had none for violating the Authority of his Prince, conferred on private Emissaries, if they had any. But in his p. 65. He lays hard at me, and challengeth not only my Reason for calling this a shuffling Answer, but also my ingenuity, who confess the people in that Government might not resist; and yet do urge these examples for Resistance. Answer, 1. For my Reason: I have made it appear I have reason to call it so; is it not a mere evasion, to affirm in him an extraordinary privilege, and can bring no word, nor warrant for it? 2. For my ingenuity it is without cause challenged by him; for from the lawfulness of Resistance of unreasonable Acts of will, in an absolute Monarchy, where Reason is the Prince's law; I may a fortiori conclude the lawfulness of resisting of instruments of illegal Acts in a limited Monarchy, where the Law of the Land is the Prince's Law and bounds.   

CHAP. VIII. The 8. Section concerning Resistance forbidden, Rom. 13. answered.  
NOw we are come to his principal strength against Resistance out Sect. 1 of Rom. 13. From whence nothing can be collected against any Resistance, but that which is of the Powers, of the Ordinance: but that which I defend is of neither of them, therefore I have no cause to fear his inferences from that Text. Now supposing the truth which I have made good, that in a limited State the limitation is of the Power itself, and not only of the exercise; it follows evidently that in such a State resistance of destructive instruments, is neither of Power nor God's Ordinance. I might therefore well omit that which at large here he speaks of Resistance of the Powers. The first part of the Section is spent in replying to the Exceptions of the Reverend Divines. The first thing I find which concerns me is, p. 77. I will therefore begin with him there. Where he accuseth me that in my 59, 64, and 66. page of that Treatise, I grant they might not resist in that Monarchy; but affirm that subjects may in this; and he brings me in giving two Reasons for it. 1. Because Religion was then no part of the Laws, but here it is. 2. Because that was an Absolute Monarchy, this a Limited and mixed, p. 77. But may I not here challenge both the ingenuity and conscience of this Replyer. Did I ever grant that God's Ordinance of Power might be resisted here; or give any Reasons for so unreasonable an Assertion? It would be tedious to repeat here, what I have said there. Let the Reader see; if he please. I will recite the sum. 1. The Doctor affirmed, that in the Apostles time the Senate of Rome might challenge more than our Parliaments can now, I denied it, and gave my reason, sc. That State was then devolved into a Monarchy by Conquest, etc. of this the Doctor speaks not a word, perhaps he is now ashamed of that comparison. 2. He said, there was greater cause of Resistance then, than now. I answered. There was then no cause at all: Not for Religion, being then, no part of the Law: Not Liberties; because then that was past, the Government changed; and an Oath taken of absolute subjection. Have I by these things granted a liberty of Resistance of God's Ordinance to this people; and deny it to those? No; Neither They, nor We; not that enslaved Senate; nor our free Parliaments, no cause, no privilege can justify this. Yea I ascribe more to God's Ordinance of Power, than He: He says that in a limited state we own only passive subjection to exceeding commands of a Prince by promise limiting himself in the use of his power. I say; though he sin in exceeding such promise; yet we own him also Active obedience in such commands which Gods Law forbids us not to be Active in. Neither do I bring Doctor bilson's testimony to prove that Religion was then no part of the Law, as he affirms I do, p. 77. but sure he neither heeded what I had written, nor what himself wrote. I laid down an Assertion that God's Ordinance of which St Paul speaks, is the Power and the Person of him which is supremely invested with that Power; and for this did I bring Dr Bilson; who, explaining the Power there forbidden to be resisted, says it is the Princes will not against his Laws; but agreeing to his Laws. Here he serves Dr Bilson and other Divines, as before the King, and the Parliaments, teaches them a meaning contrary to their words: They mean such states as may by the known Laws use forceable restraint: No such meaning of his words: He makes no distinction of states; but expounds the Text in question, speaking of God's Ordinance in general, in all Rulers: He knows it well enough; and therefore adds, They were willing to excuse as much as might be those motions of the Protestants in France and the Low-Countries; but had they lived now, they would have spoken more cautelously. That is, They spoke rashly, wronged the truth, and reached their consciences to excuse the commotions and rebellions of those days. This is like a Doctor. But he likes the Homily better than them all, that speaks home, he says; but what, he speaks not, nor do I answer. But he will try the force of this exception, because I profess, with Mr Burrowes, against Resisting of Authority though abused: And with Dr Bilson, admit of resisting the Princes will against the Laws: This is fast and lose, says he. How so? In limited Monarchies, where the Prince hath no Authority beyond the Law: there an act beyond the Law is unauthoritative and merely private; so that it is no abusing of Authority; but an exceeding of Authority. Authority abused to undue acting of matters within its compass, Mr Burrowes speaks of, and that must not be resisted. But the Princes will acting against his Law, that is matters without the compass of Authority is not God's ordinance, says Dr Bilson, and so may be rested in its instruments. I still say, let him prove such acts to proceed from Authority, I will disclaim Resistance of their instruments, either the meanest Constable in the Land, or Soldier in the army. But how clouds he this truth which is clear as the day? 1. In that Government under which the Apostle lived, men might not resist, though the Powers commanded contrary to Law, as oft they did: Not under the Arrian Emperors, though religion was then a part of the law, p. 78. Answer, 1. Dr Abbot that learned Bishop of Sarum was of another judgement; Demonstrat. Antichrist, c. 7. In that Government he doth distinguish the Christians carriage according to the distinction of times. At first before Religion was established by Law, caedebantur, non caedebant, but after Constantine's time when it was established by Law. Caedebant, non caedebantur. 2. We may grant it in that Government, because it was absolute, and the Laws were to the Prince but moral limitations of exercise: And, as I have often acknowledged, Acts of the Princes will, exceeding such limitation, are potestative, and must not be resisted: but it will not follow that therefore they are so, in governments where the Laws are limitations of the power itself, and exceeding acts are not potestative. Sure in those times, as patiented as the Christians were, under their persecutors, if their Religion and persons had been assaulted without Authority, they would have made Resistance: And this is all we affirm. 2. He makes two inquiries, 1. Whether the first Parliament in Qu. Elizabeth's reign might have resisted her endeavours to change the established Religion? Answer, They had sinned in withstanding the introduction of truth, and the Abolition of Falsehood; yet civilly and legally they might have done it: and abrogate a Law without the States she could not. But, blessed be God there was no such opposition; but a joint consent of all three Legislative Powers. 2. How can the putting down of Episcopal Government, be now justified which stands by Law? Answer; It cannot, unless there be a confluence of the consent of all three; nor do I believe it is intended without the King's consent, Unless their constant doctrine and practice to overthrow the liberties and Government of this Kingdom into Arbitrarines do prove them in all their sort subversive, and inconsistent with its safe being: Let therefore the Doctor and the rest of them look how they continue to maintain such destructive Doctrines: for they will sooner remove themselves out of this Church, than the Subjects out of their ancient and just Liberties.  
Sect 2 At length let us see what he says against the absolute condition of the Roman Emperors. His other exception is, they were absolute Monarches, and therefore not to be resisted, p. 79. Ans. He doth me manifest injury: See my Treatise, I no where so argue; nor have I any need; for I equally affirm it of limited, as of absolute power, that they ought not to be resisted; for they are equally God's Ordinance, which extends to the powers that are: Neither have I any need of that distinction to satisfy the Apostles Text: I asserted not the absoluteness of the Imperial authority for any such reason: but against his false affirmation, That that Senate in St Paul's time, might challenge more than our great Council can now. Here is apparent i'll dealing. But what can he oppose to what I said about the absoluteness of those Roman Emperors? 1. It cannot be cleared that they were de jure absolute. An. Yes, it can; according to the Doctors own grounds; for, 1. There was a full Conquest made by Julius Caesar in that fatal battle against Pompey not only of him; 
Seneca. consol ad Marciam.  but in and with him, of the whole Senate, for in eo prima acies senatus fuit, says Seneca. And the struggling remainders of the free Senate were again vanquished in that battle of Octavius against Cassius and Brutus. From that time all being prostrate to his Will. 2. There was a submission to an Absolute yoke. Romae ruere in servitium consuls, 
Annal. l. 1. s ●.  Patres, Eques, says Tacitus: yea the Senate was so forward to it, that Tiberius was wont to say, as oft as he went out of the Court, 
Ib. l. 3 s 11  O homines ad servitutem natos! 3. There was also an establishment of this subjection by an Oath: for the Senate and Armies were brought under the same bond; and all this before St Paul's conversion. That which he brings out of latter Authors, p. 80. of the Lex regia, quâ populus principi omne suum imperium & potestatem contulit: and his conjectures of it's not being before Vespasians time, is not worth a looking into: It was a formal compliment of flattery to give that to him in words, which he had in power and Use so many years before. Also that of their forbearing the Diadem and Title of King, being contented only with that of Prince, was but the putting on a silken veil upon a rough government. Under that smooth Title the people and Senate were held as much under, as the grand seigneur or Persian now hold their Vassals. But they did perquam aiu magnam potestatis partem cum senatu communicare, p. 80. They did so; 'Twas their indulgence, or rather policy to impart it. It is affirmed, not by uncertain Collections of late Authors; but by Tacitus, who is instar omneum in this business; 
Annal. l. 1. s. 1. l. 3. s. 10.  of Augustus the first and best of them all, Posito Triumviri nomine, consulem se ferens, insurgere paulatim, munia Magistratuum, senatus, Legum inse trahere; and of Tiberius, that imaginem antiquitatis senatui praebebat. They conveyed their will through the old channel of the Senate, that it might relish the better with the people; yet at pleasure did what they listed, by them, and against them. 2. He says, The Apostle in his reason against Resistance hath no respect to the absolute or limited condition of those Roman Emperors. Nor do I say, he hath: the Reason he urgeth is the Ordinance of God, which is true without distinction of the whole latitude of Power. 3. A limited condition doth no more infer a lawfulness of resistance for exorbitances, than an Absolute, p. 82. I say not, that it doth; no condition can infer a lawfulness of Resistance of the Power, though abused; but here is the privilege of a people under a limited Monarch, his exceeding Acts are not abuses of Power; but simply non potestative; and therefore their Agents may be resisted, without resisting the power; which is not so in an absolute Rule; if there were no privilege, why did men trouble themselves in constituting Limitations, and Mixtures in a State: In a word, unless he can prove Power in all Limited States, to be illimited: and all the Acts of will in the supreme to flow from God's Ordinance: He labours in vain from that text, or any else to conclude against Resistance of subversive Instruments in a mixed Government.   

CHAP. IX. His ninth Section Answered: the Reasons against Resistance satisfied: and those for Resistance vindicated.  
WE are now come to his last Section: In examination of which Sect. 1 it will appear that he hath as little Reason as Scripture against that Resistance which I have asserted in my Treatise. Herein he doth two things. 1. Brings his Reasons against Resistance. 2. Endeavours to answer those which I brought for it. But for more evident proceeding about both, we must distinctly call to mind the Question, of what it is. 1. It is of Resistance in this state; that is, a state which I have proved to be limited and mixed in the very power itself. 2. It is only of Resistance of destructive Instruments: Therefore if his Reasons do not reach to such a Resistance, they are not to the purpose.  
Now against Resistance the Doctor brings no fewer than nine Reasons; In his first book he had only five, here he hath made up in number, what they wanted in weight. I will in few words answer them distinctly, for many need not. 1. His first is from the wisdom of God putting his people under Kings, without power of Resistance; this should be to us instead of a most forceable Reason, p. 84. Answ. Well it may be instead of one; but it is not one. For 1. It was their desire to be under an Absolute Government, as their neighbour Countries were; and they offended God in it, as Lyra observes; therefore he giving them such a King as they desired; did not in his wisdom intent a binding form for all people: I think the Doctor will not affirm he did. 2. If he mean Resistance of their Prince his Authority and person, I grant they were so put under; and so are we, and all that are put under Monarches; but if he mean the Acts of the Princes will which were not Authoritative; I do deny it, and the former alleged instances prove they were not: and that is all I affirm in other Monarchies.  
2. The word of God gives no direction for it. The Prophets call not on the Elders for it: The new Testament commends patience in suffering for well-doing, Answ. 1. In Civil matters negative reasonings from Scripture are not proving. 2. The word gives proving and imitable examples for it, as before: and indeed the Scripture doth every way justify resistance of cutthroats and private destructive Assaulters of Laws and Liberties, who have no Authority derived to them; and I defend no other.  
3. The Apostle forbids Resistance of the Powers, not from any compact of the people, but from the Ordinance of God. 'Tis true: for no compact of people could establish an unresistible Power without the Ordinance of God. I acknowledge the Apostles ground for it: and therefore allow no resistance where there is God's Ordinance to secure them, not for any abuse.  
4. To be supreme and next to God implies a security from Resistance, p. 85. I grant all; His Person, his Power is hereby secured: I condemn all rising up against the King: but instruments of subversion, have nothing of the King in them: not his person nor Authority is risen up against in them. For his conceits about jus Regis I have said enough above. Neither do I give to the Houses the power of the Lacedaemonian Ephori. They had an Authority over the very person of the King: which the Houses claim not. I give them no more than Calvin doth to the three Estates in their general meetings. The Doctor well knows what I will answer him; which he seeks to evade, 1. By affirming that the Resisting of Instruments acting by his Power, which he hath committed to them, is a resisting of him, p. 86. 'Tis true, it is so; but we speak of instruments, which act not by his power, that is, his Authority; but by his will in a course exceeding the Limitation of his Authority. Can he prove that a limited Prince could commit Power to do acts without the bounds of his Power, the Question were answered, else he begs it, but answers it not. 2. He would desire me to look again upon the two Assertions of the Reverend Divines which I reject: He cannot conceive, how I can retain my own Assertion, and reject theirs. The Doctor hath a great mind to pick some contradiction in me; but still fails in his endeavour. In good earnest, doth he speak really, when he says, he cannot conceive, etc. Well, let us look again on the two Assertions which I reject in them. 1. Governors who under pretence of Authority from God's Ordinance disturb the quiet and godly life, are fare from being God's Ordinance in so doing. 2. This tyranny not being God's Ordinance, they which resist it even with arms, resist not the Ordinance of God. Do I defend any Assertions equivalent to these. Rather I assert in that Treatise, and here also the contrary. 1. Governors whither in absolute or limited States, keeping within the measure of their power, may disturb the quiet and godly life, and yet be God's Ordinance in that act, though crossing the end of God's Ordinance in it. 2. Powers though abused, yet being God's Ordinance, they which resist even in abusive acts of it, resist the Ordinance of God. Is here no difference? Cannot I retain this Assertion, that exceeding Acts in limited Monarchy are not God's Ordinance, and may in instruments be resisted: And yet reject theirs, who maintain resistance of Governors themselves, in all acts of abused power? He makes no difference between Acts exceeding bounds of power: and Acts of abused power: but of this more than enough before. 3. But he will answer more particularly, so he had need. What is it? He that bears the sword, that is, has the supreme Power, gives Commission to under-Ministers for Justice; and to other Officers for the Militia: If therefore the Resistance of those though abusing their Power, be a resistance of the Power; so it is also of these. Answ. I grant all: for it proceeds only of Ministers abusing Power committed to them: not of Excesses of Power. I will retort it. Like as if when the supreme gives Commission of Justice to a Judge; and he exceeding unto Acts without the compass of his Commission is but a private man in those Acts and may be resisted: so if Commission of Arms be given to a General, etc.  
5. Subjection is due to a Prince, and the contrary forbidden without distinction of a good and bad Prince. I grant it, and give the reason, because they are God's Ordinance: but the Question is of instruments of exceeding Acts, in which they are not God's Ordinance.  
6. Good reason that he which hath the supreme Trust, should have the greatest security, p. 87. Answ. It is so; and so we grant him: for he hath a full security from all violence for both Person and Authority, what ever exorbitance he breaks out unto. The people have not so: Every Subject being under the penalty of the Law for its transgressions. But the Doctor forgets his Clients, He is not arguing for security of Sovereigns; but Subjects, if they may be so called, which endeavour to subvert laws and governments. But may we not also say, as it is good reason the supreme should have the greatest security; so the people also should have some security; and not be exposed like bruit beasts to the savage lusts of every instrument of cruelty: having only this to comfort them, that they sin in so doing? and so they do, which with cruelty destroy even the bruit creatures.  
7. From the end and benefits of Government, for the enjoying of which, it is good reason we should bear with the exorbitances. Still he speaks good reason; but nothing to the purpose; for we dispute not of exorbitances of them who have the power; but of them who have no power for what they do. In exorbitances of lesser nature, their will may secure instruments; but it is against reason that the benefits we have by their Government should cause us to bear with them who would destroy their laws and government, for of such is the Question. I wonder here again he brings Calvin, when he cannot but know that he is expressly for power of Resistance in the Houses: and no doubt P. Martyr, and the rest follow Calvin in this.  
8. Power of Resistance in Subjects would be a remedy worse than the disease, and more subversive of a State, then if it wore left without it, p. 90. Why would it be so? It would be a continual Seminary of jealousies twixt Prince and people, and confusion through the continuance of the mischiefs of War. Concerning this Argument of his, see p. 60. of my Treatise, where it is fully satisfied. 1. Who will believe the power of Resisting destructive instruments, should be more destructive, then to let them alone without Resistance? 2. Suppose by abuse of this power those evils should happen (for it so falls out to the best physic, where the nocumentous humours are prevailing) yet this is but by accident: such Power per se and of its own nature tends to the preventing of subversion. On the contrary by woeful experience, this Doctrine of the unresistiblenesse of such men, hath nursed up a brood of audacious projectors, and where it is taught, a state will never be without them. Whereas, if the Truth were known it would refrain the spirits of wicked men from parricide and State subversion. Neither can any thing be more mischievous, then to teach an impunity for projectors, and Agents of mischief: and he hath not the reason of a man who argues otherwise. 3. Neither can this doctrine, as the Replier traduces it, extend to the deposing of Princes, or the diminishing of their Authority, for it concerns only their Instruments, not their Persons; their Absolute, extra-legall Will; not their Authority. And for jealousies, they will be more bred by that Doctrine which gives the Prince a Power to undo the State, then by that which terminates both; and gives neither a power to subvert the other; Danger is the nurse of jealousy: that which takes away power of hurting takes away Danger; and so removes jealousies: but indeed such which have a plot of breaking up the hedge of Government, and bringing lawless powers into a State, care not for having such a Power in those Houses whom it would cause them to fear, and look on with continual jealousies. The Homily of Rebellion is in vain cited against that which is no rebellion.  
9 The last and weakest of all is that of the hearts of Kings being in God's hands, Prov 21.1. and that of God's Covenant with David and his seed, 2 Chron. 6.16. & 7.17. How the Doctor can draw hence a conclusion against Resistance of subversive instruments, I cannot imagine. Sure if these Texts had any proving force in them, they had not been brought so late: Rather than place had been in the former Section, where in the close he says, He chose only to insist on those Texts which are fit to bear argument but here he hath broke his word, yet he is excusable, for he had no better.  
Sect. 2 At length he comes to my Arguments brought for Resistance. If they be not more concluding than his, would they had never seen the light, nor come to the eye of any judicious man. Let us see what he hath to say to them.  
1. That Resistance is lawful which is no Resistance of the Ordinance of God; but this of subversive instruments is not, being neither of the Person nor Authority of the Prince. He says, He hath proposed and answered this above under his third and fourth Reasons. And there I doubt not but the invalidity of his Answer doth plainly appear.  
2. Without this Power of Resistance all limitation of Government is vain; and all forms resolve into that which is arbitrary. He tells me, My Argument is inconsequent by my own description of Absolute Monarchy: so that the restraint of a limited Monarch is Legal and Moral, not forceable and Military, p. 93. I answer, I describe limited and Absolute Monarchy not by Force; but the having or not having a bounds of Will; but how absurd it is when the distinctive conceit in the definition of a limited Monarch, is a Law terminating his will to take it of a moral terminating, which is common to all, not only Monarches but men? Especially sigh I explain myself so fully afterwards, as I do, there p. 7. in the three degrees of absoluteness. But I have above enough discovered the fraud and falsehood of his confounding of Legal and moral Limitation; and have proved that to give a Limited Monarch only a moral Limitation, is to resolve all into Absolute and Arbitrary, for the most absolute under heaven hath moral limitation.  
3. Such Power is due to a public State for its preservation which is allowed to a particular person. He answers, this is not universally true. Why not? a State is more worthy, and comprehends a multitude of particular men: doth number detract from their privilege? He would seem to have reason for his denial: A private man hath by the law of nature power of selfe-preservation against the force of another private man; yet is this power yielded up in regard of Civil Power, and not to be used against persons endued with such power, p. 94. 1. He still speaks Truth; but not to the Question: which is not of persons endued with civil power; but such as we have proved to have no power; grant them endued with power, neither a particular man: or a whole Community must resist them: but having none, it is much more allowable in a public state, than a particular person. 2. He speaks of a power yielded up, as if in all governments the people do simply yield up all power of Resistance into a full subjection unto all Acts of the Princes will: Whereas we have proved, that in limited Governments it is not so: but to the Princes Will measured and regulated by a Law; and therefore they have that power still, in respect of all instruments of acts of Will not so regulated.  
But it is observable, that p 95. the Doctor is beaten off from his own grounds, and yields up in the Close of his book a full Victory to Truth. Which will appear if we look bacl to his first book, and Sect. 1. where he proposeth the Question in his own terms, whither if a King be bend or seduced to subvert Religion, Laws and Liberties, Subjects may take up arms and resist. He undertakes to maintain the Negative; and here was the beginning of the controversy. Now see in this Reply how he is sunk and stolen off from that which he undertook to defend; and upon the matter grants us the Cause. For, 1. By bent or seduced to subvert, he tells us, he means not a purpose of the mind, but doing many Acts arbitrarily tending to subversion; as if he would yield, that (supposing him bend, that is purposing and intending it in his mind and course) he might be resisted. 2. Nay, by [bend to subvert] he does not mean so much as Acts subversive; but only Acts tending to subversion of themselves; for the frame of government and Laws cannot be subverted without the consent of the two Houses. So that now the Question is rather, Whither subversion be possible by such instruments; then whether their Resistance be lawful: Sure it were pity to disturb them by Resistance in an impossible work: Let them run on rather till they see their own vanity and folly: but suppose they should bring it to pass; than it would be too late to come to this Doctor and tell him, he was deceived, and did deceive. Certainly those great Politicians who have had this design in managing so many years, are not of his mind. Yea, suppose it cannot be done without the consent of the Houses; yet the Doctor can tell us in another case, that where there is an unresistible power, Consent cannot long be wanting. What then; will he yield us a power of Resistance, if we can prove such a design possible?  
Here also because the Doctor says this liberty which I allow a State for its preservation, tends rather to its subversion, p. 94. and every where calumniates me as an inducer of confusion, and Anarchy, and my Assertions as opening a way to Rebellion. It concerns me effectually to vindicate myself, and the truth which I maintain from these aspersions; and make it appear that the power of Resistance I defend is not a remedy worse than the disease of subversion. Which I can do no better way, then by a positive setting down the naked truth which I aver in this and the former Treatise; and show how it shuts up every way to these evils which he lays uncharitably to my charge. 1. I assert no forceable Resistance in any case but subversive and extreme. 2. Subversive and extreme cases respect either particular men; or the whole state and Government. For particular men even in extreme cases of state or life, I allow no public Resistance: but appeal if it may be had; or if not, yet no public Resistance: for whether the wrong be done him by inferior or superior Magistrates, either it is, 1. Under form and course of Law, and power committed them; and then to resist, is to resist the power. 2. Or without all form and course of Law and power committed to them: and then a man values his state and life too high, to make public resistance, and bring on the state a general disturbance for his private good, and sins, though not against God's ordinance of Power, in this case, yet against the public peace and weal. For the whole state or government, and the last cases of its subversion, of which the Doctor puts the Question. 1. I condemn all force used against the Person of the supreme, or his Power and Authority in any inferior Ministers thereof. 2. I aver not public forceable resistance of Ministers of acts of will which are only actual invasions, or excesses of limitation; and not such as plainly argue a bent of subversion, and apparent danger thereof, if prevention be not used: so that the Doctor goes from the Question, and comes home to me, when he says here that he speaks only of the former sort. 3. I affirm not force in this utmost case to be assumed by private men against destructive instruments of the Princes will: as if any man were warranted on his own imagination of public danger to raise forces for prevention. But the Courts of Justice, and especially the supreme Court, to whom the conservation of Government and Law is committed, and a Power not only to resist, but also censure and punish its violaters, much more its subverters without regard of number or warrant, (The Law supposing no warrant can be in such case) This is the power of Resistance which I have asserted: and it this be inducing of civil war, or a way to subversion and Rebellion: It is a war raised by defenders of Law, against subverters of Law: A Rebellion raised by Magistrates having Authority, against instruments of arbitrariness having no authority: A resistance tending to subversion, but of none but subverters. 'Tis good reason then, it seems, if destroyers grow to the number and strength of an Army, for Magistrates to let them alone, and not raise arms to suppress them, lest they open a way to confusion and bring on the miseries of a civil War. This is the Doctor's preservative Doctrine, and my contrary is destructive. 4. I argued from the end of the institution of the Houses, and their interest in making Laws, and preserving the frame. He says this is grounded on my false supposal of their being joined with the King in the very sovereign power, p. 96. Answer, I have justified that supposal; and manifested his strange boldness in denying it against the Kings, and so many Parliaments direct affirmations; and desire the reader to take notice, that this is calvin's argument for Resistance, in the place above recited, how ever the Doctor doth make so light of it.  
5. From the power of inferior Courts to punish violaters of Law, though pretending a warrant of the Kings will for it. He says this Argument is inconsequent to prove power of raising Armies to oppose the Forces of their Sovereign. He hastens to a conclusion, and weighs not much what he answers. I say it concludes inevitably: for if the Kings warrant to violate Law, will not privilege one from force of justice, than not a hundred, not an Army of violaters. Their multitude makes the danger greater, and the Kingdom more unhappy; not Malefactors more privileged. The forces of the Sovereign in truth, are the Forces raised to defend his Government; not those which are raised to subvert it. They are his, which have his Authoritative will; not those which have only his arbitrary. If ever Reasons did demonstrate a truth, I am confident these five have made good, The power of the estates in Parliament to resist subversive instruments, be they more or fewer.  
Thus have I traced this Author through his Reply; and whether Sect. 3 I have not sufficiently vindicated my Treatise from it, I refer myself to the conscience of every one who hath the understanding of a judicious man; and the impartiality of a just man. In my cap. 8. is a moderate debate of the present contention; and divers Petitions tending to pacification if it had been possible: but he toucheth not on that chapped. His discourse shows him to have nothing to do with Moderation; nor doth desire Peace, but on the terms of a full dedition into the hands of subversive instruments. I have done with him: He resolved, I Answered. He hath replied. I have returned on it. I am even with him; and in truth above him, I am sure. Now I desire to spin out this contention no longer. Yet if he, or any else please to rejoin, I wish he would save himself, and me a labour: to let alone the book; and deal only with the 4th; and 5th Chapters concerning the Doctor's supposals; if he can make good them; and invalidate mine, as much as in me lieth, I will yield him the cause: but I judge it impossible, if I know what is impossible. The God of spirits allay the spirits of men from this extreme opposition: And give such a issue to these woeful wars, that the sceptre of Christ, the Gospel of Peace may be fully submitted to and maintained by a King enjoying inviolate his due sovereignty; and a People their due and lawful liberties, Amen.  PHIL. 4.5. 
Let your moderation be known unto all men: The Lord is at hand.   
FINIS.