THE PREROGATIVE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT. A Political Discourse in two Books. 

The former Containing the first Praeliminary of Oceana, enlarged, interpreted, and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alleged against it under the Notion of Objections.  
The Second Concerning Ordination, against Dr. H. Hamond, Dr. L. Seaman, And the Authors they follow.    
In which two Books is contained the whole Commonwealth of the Hebrews, or of Israel, Senate, People, and Magistracy, both as it stood in the Institution by Moses, and as it came to be form after the Captivity.  
As also the different Policies introduced into the Church of Christ, during the time of the Apostles.  
By JAMES HARRINGTON.  Without counsel purposes are disappointed, but in the multitude of Counsellors they are established. Solomon. La multitudine è piu Savia è piu costante ch'vn Principe. Machiavil. 
LONDON, Printed for Tho. Brewster at the three Bibles at the West end of Paul's Churchyard, 1658.   

The Epistle Dedicatory.  
I Dedicate my Book to the Mirth and Discourse of the University Wits or good Companies, upon condition that they laugh not always in the wrong place; for if a Man who can tell what he would have be ridiculous, what are such as would have they know not what?  
Policy is an Art, Art is the Observation or Imitation of Nature, Nature is the Providence of God in the Government of the world, whence he that proceeds according unto Principles acknowledgeth Government unto God, and he that proceeds in defiance of Principles, attributes Government unto Chance, which denying the true God, or introducing a false One, is the highest point of Atheism or Superstition.  

Nullum numen abest, si sit Prudentia; sed te  
Nos facimus, Fortuna, Deam, Coeloque locamus.   
I neither do nor ever did refuse Obedience unto any Government, I never was nor am of any party, I go not about as some that would impose their own impertinence or absurdities upon me, endeavour to insinuate to settle a Commonwealth an't please you, which belongs not to me, but I undertake, as any man may do, to vindicate the reason of Popular government. In which Controversy let him that will buckle with me, I will give him a fall or he shall give me one, nor care I whether, because who ever get the fall, the good Companies and the good people too of this Nation will get arise in that knowledge, which if we be not like them that dwell upon the Cataracts of Nilus, among all this noise we have bad and are like to have of Axes and Hammers, is the most seasonable and necessary. But the University Wits or good Companies, are good at two Things, at diminishing a Commonwealth and at Multiplying a Louse.   

An Answer to three Objections against Popular government, that were given me after these two Books were Printed.  

Object. 1.  
MOnarchical government is more Natural, because we see even in Commonwealths that they have recourse unto this, as Lacedaemon in her Kings; Rome both in her Consuls and Dictator's, and Venice in her Dukes.  
Answer. Government whether Popular or Monarchical is equally artificial; wherefore to know which is the more natural, we must consider what piece of Art cometh nearest unto Nature; as for example, whether a Ship or an House be the more natural, and then it will be easy to resolve that a Ship is the more natural at Sea, and an House at Land. In like manner where one man or a few men are the Landlords, Monarchy must doubtlessly be the more natural, and where the whole people are the Landlords, a Commonwealth; for how can we understand that it should be natural unto a people that can live of themselves, to give away the means of their livelihood to one or a few men that they may serve or obey? Each government is equally artificial in effect or in itself, and equally natural in the cause, or the matter upon which it is founded.  
A Commonwealth consists of the Senate proposing, the People resolving, and the Magistracy executing; so the power of the Magistrates (whether, Kings as in Lacedaemon, Consuls as in Rome, or Dukes as in Venice) is but barely executive, but to a Monarch belongs both the Result and Execution too; wherefore that there have been Dukes, Consuls, or Kings in Common wealths, which were quite of another nature, is no Argument that Monarchical government is for this cause the more natural.  
And if a man shall instance in a mixed government, as King and Parliament, to say, that the King in this was more natural than the Parliament, must be a strange Affirmation.  
To argue from the Roman Dictator, an imperfection which ruin'd that Commonwealth and was not to be found in any other, that all Commonwealths have had the like recourse in exigences unto the like remedy, is quite contrary to the universal testimony of Prudence or Story.  
A man who considers that the Commonwealth of Venice hath stood one thousand years, which never any Monarchy did, and yet shall affirm that Monarchical government is more natural than Popular, must affirm that a thing which is less natural may be more durable and permanent than a thing that is more natural.  
Whether is a government of Laws less natural than a government of Men? or is it more natural unto a Prince to govern by Laws or by Will? Compare the violences and bloody rapes perpetually made upon the Crown, or Royal dignity in the Monarchies of the Hebrews and the Romans, with the State of the government under either Commonwealth, and tell me which was less violent or whether that which is more violent must therefore be more natural.   

Object. 2.  
The government of Heaven is a Monarchy, so is the government of Hell.  
Answer. In this (saith Machiavelli) Princes lose themselvesand their Empire that they neither know how to be perfectly good nor entirely wicked. He might as well have said, that a Prince is always subject to error and misgovernment, because he is a Man, and not a God nor a Devil. A shepherd unto his flock, a ploughman to his team is a better Nature, and so not only an absolute Prince but as it were a God. The government of a better or of a superior Nature, is to a worse or inferior as the government of God. The Creator is another and a better nature than the creature, the government in Heaven is of the Creator over his creatures that have their whole dependence upon him and subsistence in him. Where the Prince or the Few have the whole Lands, there is some what of dependence resembling this; so the government there, must of necessity be Monarchical or Aristocratical; But where the people have no such dependence, the causes of that Government which is in Heaven are not in Earth; for neither is the Prince a distinct or better Nature than the people, nor have they their subsistence by him; and therefore there can be no such effect. If a man were good as God, there is no question but he would be not only a Prince but a God, would govern by love and be not only obeyed but worshipped: or if he were ill as the Devil, and had as much power to do mischief, he would be dreaded as much and so govern by fear. To which later the nature of man hath so much nearer approaches, that albeit we never saw upon Earth a Monarchy like that of Heaven, yet it is certain the perfection of the Turkish Policy lies in this, that it cometh nearest to that of Hell.   

Object. 3.  
God instituted a Monarchy, namely in Melchizedec, before he instituted a Commonwealth.  
Answer. If Melchizedec were a King so was Abraham too, though one that paid him tithes, or was his subject; for Abraham made War or had the power of the Sword, as the rest of the Fathers of Families he fought against; So if Canaan were a Monarchy in those days, it was such an one as Germany is in these, where the Princes also have as much the right of the Sword as the Emperor, which comes rather (as hath been shown already) to a Commonwealth; but whether it were a Monarchy or a Commonwealth we may see by the present state of Germany, that it was of no great good Example, nor was Melchizedec otherwise made a King by God then the Emperor; that is as an Ordinance of Man.   
FINIS.   

Epistle to the Reader.  
WHo so sheddeth Man's blood, by Man shall his blood be shed; for in the Image of God made He Man. If this Rule hold as well in shedding the blood of a Turk as of a Christian, then that wherein Man is the Image of God is Reason. Of all Controversies, those of the Pen are the most Honourable; for in those of Force, there is more of the Image of the Beast; but in those of the Pen, there is more of the Image of God. In the Controversies of the Sword, there is but too often no other reason then Force; but the Controversy of the Pen hath never any Force but Reason. Of all Controversies of the Pen next those of Religion, those of Government are the most honourable, and the most useful, the true end of each, though in a different way, being that the will of God may be done in Earth as it is in Heaven. Of all Controversies of Government, those in the vindication of Popular Government are the most Noble, as that from whence all we have that is good is descended to us, and which if it had not been, Mankind at this day had been but a Herd of Beasts. The Prerogative of Popular government must be in an ill hand, or is a Game against which there is not a Card in the whole Pack, for we have the Books of Moses, those of the Greeks and of the Romans, not to omit Machiavelli, all for it: what have they; what can they have against us? A Sword; but that rusts, or must have a Scabbard, and the Scabbard of this kind of Sword is a good frame of Government.  
A Man may be possessed of a Piece of ground by force, but to make use or profit of it, he must Build upon it, and Till it, by reason; whatever is not founded upon Reason cannot be permanent. In reason there be two parts. Invention and Judgement. As to the later; in a Multitude of Counsellors (say both Solomon and Machiavelli) there is strength. For Judgement there is not that Order in Art or Nature that can compare with a Popular Assembly. The voice of the People is the voice of God. Hence it is, that in all well Ordered Policies the people have the ultimate result: but unless there be some other to invent, a Popular Assembly can be of no effect at all, but confusion. Invention is a solitary thing. All the Physicians in the world put together invented not the circulation of the blood, nor can invent any such thing, though in their own Art; yet this was invented by One alone, and being invented is unanimously voted and embraced by the generality of Physicians. The Plough and Wheels were at first (you must think) the invention of some rare Artists, but who or what shall ever be able to tear the use of them from the people? Hence, where Government is at a loss, a sole Legislater is of absolute Necessity; nay where it is not at a loss, if it be well modelled, as in Venice, the Proposers though frequently changeable, as in that case is Necessary, are very few, as the Counsellors, the Savi the Provosts. Where ever a Commonwealth is thus proposed to▪ the balance or Popular Assembly will do her duty to admiration, but till then never. Yet so it hath been with us of late years, that albeit in Royal Authority there was no more than the right of proposing, and the King himself was to stand (legibus & consuetudinibus quas vulgus elegerit) to the result of the People, the popular Council hath been put upon Invention, and they that have been the prevailing party have used means to keep the Result unto themselves, quite contrary unto the nature of popular Administration. Let one speak and the rest judge. Of what ever any one Man can say or do, Mankind is the Natural and competent Judge, in which is contained the very reason of Parliaments: through the want of this Understanding came in Confusion. Man that is in Honour and hath no understanding is like the Beasts that perish. Nor can we possibly return unto Order but by mending the hedge where it was broken. A prudent entire and fit proposition made unto a free Parliament recovers all. To them who are of the greatest Eminency or Authority in a Commonwealth belongs Naturally that part of Reason which is invention, and using this, they are to propose: but what did our Grandees ever invent or propose, that might show so much as that themselves knew what they would be at? and yet how confidently do they lay the fault upon the people and their unfitness (forsooth) for Government: in which they are wondrous wise. For this I will boldly say where there was an Aristocracy that performed their duty, there never was nor ever can be a people unfit for Government; but to the contrary, where the Aristocracy have failed, the people (being once under Orders) have held very often. But while they are not under Orders if they fail it is not their fault, but the fault of the Aristocracy; for who else should model a government but Men of Experience? There is not in England (I speak it to their shame) one GRANDEE that hath any perfect knowledge of the Orders of any one Commonwealth that ever was in the World. A way with this same grave complexion, this huff of wisdom maintained by making faces. The people cannot do their duty consisting in judgement but by virtue of such Orders as may bring them together and direct them; but the duty of the Aristocracy consisting in invention may be done by any one man and in his study; and where is there that one man among all the Grandees that studies? They are so far from knowing their own duty, that a Man for proposing that in which no man can find a flaw hath done enough to be ridiculous unto them, who are ridiculous unto the whole world in that they could never yet propose any thing that would hold.  
But if this amount unto a demonstration it amounts unto a clear detection of your profound Grandees, and a full proof that they are Fanatical persons, State-Jesuits, such as have reduced the Politics to Mental reservation, and implicit faith in their nods or nightcaps.  
God to propose his Commandments to the people of Israel, wrote them in two Tables; the Decemviri to propose their Commandments unto the people of Rome, wrote them in twelve Tables. The Athenians proposed in writing signed with the name of the particular Inventor, After this pattern do the Venetians (as was said) the same at this day. But no Goose-quill, no scribbling, your Grandees are above this.  
Moses who was the first Writer in this kind shall be pardoned, but Machiavelli the first in later times that hath revived his principles, or trodden in his steps, is deservedly pelted for it by Sermons. They are not for the Scripture but the Cabala.  
I will tell you a Story out of Bocalini. Apollo having spied the Philosopher and great Master of silence Harpocrates in the Court of Parnassus, used such importunity with him, that for once he was persuaded to speak, upon which such apparent discovery was made of the Hypocrite, and the plump ignorance which he had so long harbered under a deceitful silence, that he was forth with banished the Court. Were there cause I could be modest, but this virtue to the diminution of sound and wholesome principles would be none: wherefore let a Grandee write and I will show you Harpocrates.  
Thus having sufficiently defied Sir Guy, I may with the less impeachment of reputation descend unto Tom Thumb. Not that I hold myself a fit person to be exercised with Boys-play, but that some, who should have more wit, have so little as to think this something. A good Rat-catcher is not so great a blessing unto any City, as a good Jugglercatcher would be unto this Nation. Now because I want an Office, I shall show my Parts unto my Country, and how fit I am for the white Staff or long Poll of so worshipful a Preferment.  Ridiculus ne sis, esto.  

THE FIRST BOOK, CONTAINING The first Praeliminary of Oceana, enlarged, interpreted, and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alleged against it under the notion of Objections:  

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A full Answer to all such Objections as have hitherto been made against OCEANA.  
NEither the Author or Authors of the Considerations upon Oceana, nor any other have yet so much as once pretended one Contradiction or one Inequality to be in the whole Commonwealth. Now this is certain, That Frame of Government which is void of any contradiction or any inequality is void of all internal causes of dissolution, and must for so much as it embraceth have attained unto full perfection: This by wholesayl is a full Answer unto the Considerations, with all other objections hitherto and will be (with any Man that Comprehends the nature of Government) unto Thousands of such Books or Meriads of such tittle tattle. Nevertheless because every man is not provided with a sum▪ in the following discourse I shall comply with them that must have things by retail, or somewhat for their Farthing.   

Preface.  
IT is commonly said (and not without encouragement by some who think they have Parnassus by the horns) that the University hath lashed me: so it seems I have to do with the University, and lashing is lawful; with both which I am contented. In moorfield's while the People are busy at their sports, they often and ridiculously lose their Buttons, their Ribbons, and their Purses; where, if they light, as sometimes they do, upon the Masters of that Art, they fall on kicking them awhile, (which one may call a rude Charge) and then to their work again. I know not whether I invite you to moorfield's, but (difficile est Satyram non scribere) all the favour I desire at your hands is but this, that you would not so condemn one Man for kicking, as in the same Act to pardon another for cutting of purses. A Gentleman that commits a fallacious argument to writing, or goes about to satisfy others with such reasons as he is not satisfied with all himself, is no more a Gentleman but a pick pocket; with this in my mind, I betake myself unto my work, or rather to draw open the Curtain, and begin the Play.  
One that hath written Considerations upon Oceana, speaks the Prologue in this manner, I beseech you Gentlemen, are not we the Writers of Politics somewhat a ridiculous sort of People? Is it not a 
Epist.  fine piece of folly for private men sitting in their Cabinets to Rack their brains about Models of Government? Certainly our Labours make a very pleasant recreation for those great Personages who sitting at the Helm of Affairs have by their large experience not only acquired the perfect Art of Ruling, but have attained also unto the comprehension of the Nature and Foundation of Government. In which egregious Compliment the Considerer hath doffed his considering Cap.  
It was in the time of Alexander the greatest Prince and Commander of his age, that Aristotle with scarce inferior Applause and equal fame, being a private Man, wrote that excellent piece of Prudence in his Cabinet, which is called his Politics, going upon far other Principles than those of Alexander's government, which it hath long outlived: the like did Titus Livius in the time of Augustus, Sir Thomas Moor in the time of Henry the Eighth, and Machiavil when Italy was under Princes that afforded him not the ear. These works nevertheless are all of the most esteemed and applauded in this kind; nor have I found any Man, whose like endeavours have been persecuted since Plato by Dionysius. I study not without great examples, nor out of my calling; either Arms or this Art being the proper Trade of a Gentleman. A man may be entrusted with a Ship and a good Pilot too, yet not understand how to make Sea-cards. To say that a Man may not write of Government, except he be a Magistrate, is as absurd as to say that a man may not make a Sea-card unless he be a Pilot. It is known that Christopher Columbus made a Card in his Cabinet that found out the Indies. The Magistrate that was good at his Steerage never took it ill of him, that brought him a Card, seeing whether he would use it or no was at his own choice; And if flatterers (being the worst sort of Crows) did not pick out the eyes of the living, the ship of Government at this day throughout Christendom had not struck so often as she hath done. To treat of affairs 
Arte della Guer. Proem.  (saith Machiavil) which as to the conduct of them appertain to others, may be thought a great boldness; but if I commit errors in writing, these may be known without danger, whereas if they commit errors in acting, such come not otherwise to be known, then in the ruin of the Commonwealth. For which cause I presume to open the Scene of my Discourse, which is to change according unto the variety of these following Questions.  

Whether Prudence be well distinguished into Ancient 
I.  and Modern?  
Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defined 
II.  to be a Government of Laws, and not of Men: and Monarchy to be a Government of some Man, or few Men, and not of Laws?  
Whether the balance of Dominion in Land be 
III.  the Natural cause of Empire?  
Whether the balance of Empire be well divided 
FOUR  into National and Provincial; and whether these two, or Nations that are of distinct balance, coming to depend upon one and the same head, such a mixture create a new balance?  
Whether there be any common Right or Interest 
V.  of Mankind, distinct from the parts taken severally; and how by the Orders of a Commonwealth this may best be distinguished from private Interest?  
Whether the Senatusconsulta or decrees of the 
VI  Roman Senate had the power of Laws?  
Whether the Ten Commandments proposed 
VII.  by God or Moses, were voted by the people of Israel?  
Whether a Commonwealth coming up to the 
VIII.  perfection of the kind, come not up to the perfection of Government, and have no flaw in it?  
Whether Monarchy coming up to the perfection 
IX.  of the kind, come not short of the perfection of Government and have some flaw in it? in which is also treated of the balance of France, of the Original of a landed Clergy, of Arms and their kinds.  
Whether a Commonwealth that was not first 
X.  broken by herself, were ever conquered by any Monarch?  
Whether there be not an Agrarian, or some Law 
XI.  or Laws of that Nature to supply the defect of it in every commonwealth; and whether the Agrarian as it is stated in Oceana be not equal and satisfactory to all Interests or Parties?  
Whether courses or Rotation be necessary unto 
XII.  a well Ordered Commonwealth? In which is contained the Parembole or courses of Israel before the captivity, together with an Epitome of the whole commonwealth of Athens, as also another of the commonwealth of Venice.    


Ancient and Modern Prudence. CHAP. I. Whether Prudence be well distinguished into Ancient and Modern.  
THe Considerer, where by Ancient Prudence I understand the Policy of a Commonwealth, and by Modern Prudence that of King, Lords and Commons, which introduced by the Goths & Vandals upon the ruin of the Roman Empire, hath since reigned in these Western Countries, till by the predominating of some one of the three parts, it be now almost universally extinguished; thinks it enough for the confutation of this distinction, to show out of Thucydides that of Monarchy to be a more Ancient policy than that of a Commonwealth. Upon which occasion, I must begin here to discover that which the farther I go will be the more manifest; Namely that there is difference between quoting Authors, and saying some part of them without book: this may be done by their words, but the former no otherwise then by keeping unto their sense. Now the sense of Thucydides as he is translated by Mr. Hobbs, in the place alleged is thus: The manner (saith he) of living in the most Ancient times of Greece was Thieving, the stronger going abroad under the 
Thu. B. 1. P. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9  conduct of their most puissant Men, both to enrich themselves, and fetch home maintenance for the weak; for there was neither traffic, propriety of Lands, nor constant Abode, till Minos built a Navy, and expelling the Malefactors out of the Islands, planted Colonies of his own, by which means they who inhabited the Sea coasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings; of whom some grown now rich, compassed their Towns about with walls. For out of desire of gain the meaner sort underwent servitude with the Mighty; and the Mighty (thus overballancing at home) with their wealth, brought the lesser Cities (abroad) into subjection. Thus Pelops, though he were a stranger, obtained such power in Peloponesus that the Country was called after his Name; Thus Atreus obtained the Kingdom of Mycenae, and thus Kingdoms with honours limited came to be hereditary; and rising to power proceeded afterwards to the war against Troy. After the war with Troy, though with much ado, and in a long time Greece had constant rest (and land without doubt came to propriety) for shifting their seats no longer, at length they sent Colonies abroad; The Athenians into jonia with the Islands, the Peloponesians into Italy, Sicily, and other parts. The power of Greece thus improved, and the desire of money with all, their Revenues (in what? not in money, if yet there were no usury: therefore except a Man can show that there was usury in Land) being enlarged, in most of the Cities there more erected Tyrannies. Let us lay this place unto the former, when out of desire of gain the meaner sort underwent servitude with the Mighty, it caused hereditary Kingdoms with honours limited, as happened also with us since the time of the Goths and Vandals. But when the people came to Propriety in Land, and their Revenues were enlarged, such as assumed power over them, not according unto the Nature of their Propriety or Balance, were Tyrants; well, and what remedy? why, then it was (says the Considerer) that the Grecians out of an extreme aversion to that which was the cause of their present sufferings slipped into Popular Government, not that upon calm 
Consid. p. 4.  and mature debates they found it best, but that they might put themselves at the greatest distance (which spirit usually accompanies all Reformations) from that with which they were grown into dislike. Whereby he agrees exactly with his Author in making out the true force and Nature of the balance, working even without deliberation, and whether Men will or no. For the Government that is Natural and easy being in no other direction than that of the respective balance, is not of choice but of necessity. The Policy of King, Lords and Commons was not so much from the prudence of our Ancestors, as from their Necessity. If Three hundred Men held at this day the like overbalance unto the whole People, it were not in the power of Prudence to institute any other than the same kind of Government, through the same Necessity. Thus the meaner sort with Thucydides submitting unto the Mighty, it came to Kingdoms with hereditary honours; but the People coming to be wealthy, called their Kings though they knew not why, Tyrants, nay and using them accordingly found out means with as little deliberation it may be as a Bull takes to toss a Dog, or a Hern to split an Hawk; that is, rather (as at the long run they will ever do in the like case) by instinct than prudence or debate, to throw down that, which by the mere information of sense they could no longer bear, and which being thrown down they found themselves eased. But the question yet remains, and that is (forsooth) whether of these is to be called Ancient Prudence. To this end, never Man made a more unlucky choice than the Considerer hath done for himself of this Author, who in the very beginning of his book speaking of the Pelopenesian war, or that between the Commonwealths of Athens and Lacedaemon, says, that the Actions which preceded this, and those again that were more ancient, though the truth of them through length of time cannot by any means be clearly discovered, yet for any argument that (looking into times far passed) he had yet light on to persuade him, he does not think they have been very great either for matter of war, or otherwise; that is for matter of Peace or Government; And lest this should not be plain enough, he calls the Prudence of the 
Mr. Hobbs in the Magire.  three Periods (observed by Mr. Hobbs) that from the beginning of the Grecian memory to the Trojan war, That of the Trojan war itself, and that from thence to the present 
Thu. B. 1. p. 3.  Commonwealths and Wars, whereof he treateth, The Imbecility of ancient times. Wherefore certainly this Prevaricator (to give him his own fees) hath less discretion than a Common Attorney, who will be sure to examine only those 
Cousid. p. 34.  witnesses that seem to make for the cause in which he is entertained. Seeing that which he affirmeth to be Ancient Prudence is deposed by his own witness to have been the imbecility of ancient times, for which I could have so many more than I have leisure to examine, that (to take only of the most Authentic) as you have heard one Greek, I shall add no more than one Roman, and that is Florus in his Prologue where computing the ages of the Romans, (in the same manner Thucydides did those of the Greeks) he affirmeth the time while they lived under their Kings, to have been their infancy, that from the Consuls until they conquered Italy, their youth; that from hence unto their Emperors, their Manly age, and the rest (with a Compliment or Salvo unto Trajan his present Lord) their dotage.  
These things, though originally all Government among the Greeks and the Romans were Regal; are no more than they who have not yet passed their Novitiate in story might have known. Yet says the Considerer, It seems to be a defect 
Consid. p. 2. 3.  of experience to think that the Greek and the Roman actions are only considerable in antiquity. But is it such a defect of experience to think them only considerable, as not to think them chiefly considerable in antiquity, or that the name of ancient Prudence doth not belong unto that prudence which was chief in Antiquity? True saith he, it is very frequent with such as have been conversant with Greek and Roman Authors to be led by them into a belief that the rest of the world was a rude inconsiderable people, and which is a term they very much delight in, altogether Barbarous. This should be some fine Gentleman that would have Universities pulled down; for the Office of an University is no more than to preserve so much of Antiquity as may keep a Nation from stinking or being barbarous, which fault grew not in Monarchies but in Commonwealths; or whence hath the Christian world that Religion and those Laws which are now common, but from the Hebrews and Romans, or from whence have we Arts but from these or the Greeks? That we have a Doctor of Divinity or a Master of Art we may thank Popular government, or with what languages with what things are Scholars conversant that are otherwise descended? will they so plead their own cause as to tell us it is possible there should be a Nation at this day in the world without Universities, or Universities without Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and not be barbarous, that is to say, rude, unlearned, and inconsiderable? Yes, this humour even among the Greeks and Romans themselves was a servile addiction unto narrow Principles, and a piece of very pedantical pride. What man! the Greeks and the Romans that of all other would not serve, servile! their Principles, their Learning, with whose scraps we set up for Bachelors, Masters and Doctors of fine things, narrow! their inimitable eloquence a piece of very Pedantical pride! The world can never make sense of this any otherwise then that since Heads and Fellows of Colleges became the only Greeks and Romans; the Greeks and Romans are become servily addicted, of narrow Principles, very Pedants, and prouder of those things they do not understand, than the other were of those they did; For say they, in this question, the examples of the Babylonians, Persians, and Egyptians (not to omit the ancient and like modern discoveries of the Queen of the Amazons, and of the King of China) cannot without gross partiality be neglected. This is pretty; they who say nothing at all to the policy of these governments, accuse me, who have fully opened it, of negligence. The Babylonian, Persian, and (for aught appears to the contrary) the chinese Policy, is summed up, and far excelled by that at this day of Turkey; and in opening this, I have opened them all, so far from neglect, that I everywhere give the Turk his due, whose policy I assert to be the best of this kind, though not of the best kind. But they will bear me down and but with one Argument (which I beseech you mark) that it is absolutely of the best kind; for say they, it is of a more absolute form (hath more of the Man and less of the Law in it) then is to be met with in any Kingdom of Europe.  
I am amazed! This is that kind of government which to hold Barbarous, was in the Greeks and Romans Pedantical pride, but would be in us who have not the same temptation of Interest, downright folly. The Interest of a people is not their guide but their temptation! we that hold our land divided among us, have not the same temptation of interest that had the servile Hebrews, Greeks and Romans, but the same that had the free people of Babylon, Persia and Egypt, where not the people but the Prince was sole Landlord! O the Arts in which these men are Masters! To follow the Pedantical pride of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, Romulus, were with us downright folly; but to follow humble and learned Mahomet or Ottonian, in whose only Model the perfection of the Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian policy is consummated, is ancient Prudence! Exquisite Politicians! egregious Divines for the leading of a people into Egypt or Babylon! These things considered, whether ancient prudence as I have stated it be downright folly, or as they have stated it, be not downright knavery, I appeal unto any Court of Claims in the world, where the Judges (I mean) have not more in their Caps then in their heads, and in their Sleeves then the scarlet. And whereas men love compendious works, if I gain my cause, the Reader, for an answer unto the Oxford book need look no farther than this Chapter. For if Riches and Freedom be the end of Government; and these men propose nothing but slavery, beggary and Turkism, what need more words?   

CHAP. II. Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Laws and not of Men, and a Monarchy to be the Government of some Man or few Men, and not of Laws.  
THat part of the Preliminaries, which the Praevaricator (as is usual with him) recites in this place falsely and fraudulently, is thus. Relation had unto these two times (that of Ancient, and that of Modern Prudence) the One as is computed by Janotti ending with the Liberty of Rome, the other beginning with the Arms of Caesar (which extinguishing liberty became the translation of Ancient into Modern Prudence, introduced in the ruin of the Roman Empire by the Goths and Vandals) Government to define it (de jure) or according unto Ancient prudence, is an Art whereby a civil Society of Men, is instituted and preserved upon the foundation of Common right or interest, or (to follow Aristotle and Livy) it is an Empire of Laws, and not of Men.  
And Government to define it (de facto) or according unto Modern prudence, is an Art whereby some Man, or some few Men subject a City or a Nation, and rule it according unto his or their private interest, which because the Laws in such cases are made according to the interest of a Man, or some few Families, may be said to be an Empire of Men, and not of Laws.  
Hereby it is plain, whether in an Empire of Laws, and not of Men, as a Commonwealth; or in an Empire of Men, and not of Laws, as Monarchy;  
First, That Law must equally proceed from will, that is either from the Will of the whole People, as in a Commonwealth; from the will of one Man, as in Absolute, or from the will of a few Men, as in regulated Monarchy.  
Secondly, That will whether of one, or more, or all, is not presumed to be, much less to Act without a Mover.  
Thirdly, That the Mover of Will is Interest.  
Fourthly, That Interests also being of one, of more, or of all; those of one Man, or of a few Men, where Laws are made accordingly, being more private, then comes duly up unto Law (the Nature whereof lieth not in partiality but in Justice) may be called the Empire of Men, and not of Laws: And that of the whole People coming up to the Public Interest (which is none▪ other than Common right and Justice, excluding all partiality or private Interest) may be truly called the Empire of Laws, and not of Men. By all which put together, whereas it is demonstrable, that in this division of Government, I do not stay at the Will, which must have some Motive or Mover, but go unto the first and remotest Notion of Government in the Foundation and Origination of it, In which lies the credit of this Division, and the Definition of the several members; that is to say, of interest whether private or public: The Praevaricator telleth me, That this Division of Government 
Consid. p. 6▪  having (he knows not how) lost her Credit, the definitions of the several Members of it need not be considered farther then that they come not at all up to the first and remotest notion of Government in the Foundation and Origination of it, in which lies all the difficulty, and being here neglected, there is little hope the subsequent discourse can have in it the light of probable satisfaction, much less of force of infallible demonstration.  
Very good, Interest it should seem then is not the first and remotest Notion of Government, but that which he will out-throw, and at this cast, by saying that the Declaration of the will of the Sovereign power is called Law, which if 
Consid. p. 8.  it outlive the person whose will it was, it is only because the persons who succeed in power are presumed to have the same will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is the abrogation of the Law; so that still the Government is not in the Law, but in the person whose will gave a being unto that Law. I might as well say, The Declaration unto all men by these presents that a man oweth money is called a Bond, which if it outlive the person that entered into that bond, it is only because the persons that succeed him in his estate, are presumed to have the same will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is the abrogation or cancelling of the bond; so that still the debt is not in the bond, but in his will who gave a being unto that Bond. If it be alleged against this example that it is a private one, the Case may be put between several Princes, States, or Governments, or between several States of the same Principality or Government, whether it be a regulated Monarchy or a Commonwealth; for in like Obligation of the States, (as of the King, the Lords and Commons) or parties agreeing, Authoritate Patrum & jussu Populi, till the Parties that so agreed to the Obligation, shall agree to repeal or cancel it, lieth all law, that is not merely in the will of one Man, or of one State, or Party as the Oligarchy. But not to dispute these things farther in this place, let the Government be what it will, for the Prevaricator to fetch the Origination of Law no farther than the will, while he knows very well that I fetched it from interest, the Antecedent of will; and yet to boast that he hath out-thrown me, I say he is neither an honest man, nor a good Bowler. No matter, he will be a better Gunner; For where I said that the Magistrate upon the Bench is that unto the Law, which a Gunner upon his Platform is to his Cannon; he goes about to take better Aim, and says, if the proportion of things be accurately considered, it will appear that the Laden Cannon answers not to the Laws, but to the power of the person whose will created those Laws: which if some of them, that the power of the person whose will created them, intended should be of as good stuff or Carriage as the rest, do nevertheless according unto the Nature of their matter or of their charge, come short or over, and others break or recoil: sure this Report of the Prevaricator is not according unto the bore of my gun, but according unto the bore of such a Gunner. Yet again, if he be not so good a Gunner, he will be a better Anatomist; For whereas I affirm, that to say, Aristotle and Cicero wrote not the rights or rules of their Politics, from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, is as if a man should say of famous▪ Hervey, that he transcribed his Circulation of the blood, not out of the principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that body: he answers, that the whole force of this objection amounts but to this, that because Hervey in his Circulation, hath followed the Principles of Nature; therefore Aristotle and Cicero have done so in their Discourses of Government.  
Pretty! It is said in Scripture, thy Word is sweet as honey; Amounts that but to this, because honey is sweet, therefore the Word of God is sweet? To say that my Lord Protector hath not conquered many Nations, were as if one should say that Caesar had not conquered many Nations; Amounts that but to this, that because Caesar conquered many Nations; therefore my Lord Protector hath conquered many Nations; what I produce as a similitude, he calls an objection, where I say as he says because; what ingenuous man doth not detest such a cheat! A similitude is brought to show how a thing is or may be; not to prove that it is so; it is used for illustration, not as an argument; the Candle I held did not set up the post, but show where the post was set, and yet this blind Bayard hath run his head against it. Nor hath he yet enough; if he be not the better Naturalist, he will be the better Divine, though he make the worse Sermon. My Doctrine and Use upon that of Solomon, I have seen servants upon horses, and Princes walking as servants upon the Earth, discovers the true means whereby the Principles of Power and of Authority, the goods of the mind and of the fortune may so meet and twine in the wreath or Crown of Empire, that the Government standing upon Earth, like an Holy Altar, and breathing perpetual Incense unto Heaven, in Justice and Piety, may be something as it were between Heaven and Earth, while that only which is proposed by the best, and resolved by the most becomes Law; and so the whole Government an Empire of Laws, and not of Men. This he says, is a goodly Sermon; it is honest and sense. But let any man make sense, or honesty of this Doctrine, which is his own; To say that Laws do or can govern is to amuse 
Consid. p. 7.  ourselves with a form of speech, as when we say Time, or Age, or Death does such a thing, to which indeed the fancy of Poets or superstition of Women may adapt a person, and give a power of Action; but wise Men know they are only expressions of such Actions or qualifications as belong to things and persons.  
Speak out, is it the word of God, or the knavery and nonsense of such Preachers that ought to Govern? Are we to hearken unto that of the Talmud, There is more in the word of a Scribe then in the words of the Law, or that which Christ thereupon saith unto the Pharisees; You have made 
Mat. 15. 6.  the word of God of none effect by your traditions? Say, is a Commonwealth to be governed in the word of a Priest or a Pharisee, or by the Vote of the People, and the Interest of Mankind?   

CHAP. III. Whether the Balance of Dominion in Land be the Natural Cause of Empire.  
THe Doctrine of the Balance is that, though he strain at it, which chokes the Prevaricator: for this of all other is that Principle, which makes the Politics (not so before the Invention of the same) to be undeniable throughout; and (not to meddle with the Mathematics an Art I understand as little as Mathematicians do this) the most demonstrable of any whatsoever.  
For this cause I shall rather take pleasure then pains to look back or tread the same path with other and perhaps plainer steps; As thus; If a man having one hundred pounds a year, may keep one servant, or have one man at his Command, then having one hundred times so much, he may keep one hundred servants; and this multiplied by a thousand, he may have one hundred thousand men at his Command. Now that the single person, or Nobility in any Country of Europe, that had but half so many men at Command, would be King or Prince, is that which I think no Man will doubt. But (Point d'argent Point de Suisse) if the Money be flown, so are the Men also. Though riches in general have wings, and be apt to bate; yet those in Land are the most hooded and tied unto the Perch, whereas those in money have the least hold, and are the swiftest of flight. A Bank where the money takes not wing, but to come home seized, or like a Coy Duck, may well be great; but the Treasure of the Indies going out, and not upon returns makes no Bank; Whence a Bank never paid an Army, or paying an Army, soon became no Bank. But where a Prince or a Nobility hath an estate in Land, the Revenue whereof will defray this Charge; there their men are planted, have toes that are roots, and Arms that bring forth what fruit you please.  
Thus a single person is made, or a Nobility makes a King not with difficulty or any great prudence, but with ease, the rest coming home, as the Ox that not only knows his master's Crib, but must starve or repair to it. Nor for the same reason is government acquired with more ease than it is preserved; that is, if the Foundation of Propriety be in Land; but if in money, lightly come, lightly go. The reason why a single person or the Nobility that hath One hundred Thousand men, or half so many at Command, will have the Government, is that the Estate in Land whereby they are able to maintain so many, in any European Territory, must overbalance the rest that remains unto the People, at least, three parts in four, by which means they are no more able to dispute the Government with him or them, than your servant is with you. Now for the same reason, if the People hold three parts in four of the Territory, it is plain there can neither be any single person nor Nobility able to dispute the Government with them; in this case therefore (except force be interposed) they govern themselves. So by this computation of the balance of propriety or dominion in Land, you have according unto the Threefold Foundation of Propriety, the root or generation of the Threefold kind of Government or Empire.  
If one man be sole Landlord of a Territory, or overbalance 
Oceana, p. 4.  the whole People, three parts in four, or thereabouts, he is grand Signior; for so the Turk not from his Empire, but his Propriety is called, and the Empire in this case is absolute Monarchy.  
If the few, or a Nobility, or a Nobility with a Clergy be Landlords unto such a proportion as over ballanceth the People in like manner; they may make whom they please King, or if they be not pleased with their King, down with him, and set up whom they like better, a Henry the fourth, or the seventh, a Guise, a Montforth, a Nevil, or a Porter, should they find that best for their own ends and purposes: For as not the balance of the King, but that of the Nobility in this case is the cause of the Government, so not the Estate or riches of the Prince or Captain, but his virtue or ability, or fitness for the ends of the Nobility, acquires that Command or Office. This for Aristocracy, or mixed Monarchy. But if the whole People be Landlords, or hold the Land so divided among them, that no one Man, or Number of Men within the Compass of the Few or Aristocracy overbalance them, it is a Commonwealth. Such is the branch in the Root, or the balance of Propriety naturally producing Empire, which not confuted, no Man shall be able to batter my superstructures, and which confuted, I lay down my Arms. Till then, if the Cause necessarily precede the effect, Propriety must have a being before Empire, or beginning with it, must be still first in order.  
Propriety comes to have a being before Empire or Government two ways, either by Natural or violent revolution. Natural revolution happeneth from within, or by Commerce, as when a Government erected upon one ●●●lance, that for example of a Nobility or a Clergy, through the decay of their Estates comes to alter unto another balance; which alteration in the Root of Propriety leaves all unto Confusion, or produceth a New branch or Government according to the kind or nature of the root. Violent revolution happeneth from without, or by Arms, as when upon Conquest there follows confiscation. Confiscation again is of three kinds, when the Captain taking all unto himself, plants his Army by way of Military Colonies, Benefices, or Timars, which was the policy of Mahomet; or when the Captain hath some sharers, or a Nobility that divides with him, which was the policy introduced by the Goths and Vandals; or when the Captain divides the Inheritance by lots, or otherwise, unto the whole People; which Policy was instituted by God or Moses in the Commonwealth of Israel. This triple distribution whether from natural or violent revolution, returns as to the generation of Empire, unto the same thing that is unto the nature of the balance already stated and demonstrated; Now let us see what the Praevaricator will say, which first is this.  
The Assertion that Propriety producing Empire consisteth only in Land, appears too positive. A Pig of my own Sow; 
Consid. p. 14.  this is no more than I told him, only there is more employed in what I told him, than he will see; which therefore I shall now farther explain. The balance in money may be as good or better then that of Land in three cases. First, where there is no propriety of Land yet introduced, as in Greece during the time of her Ancient imbecility, whence (as is noted by Thucydides) the meaner sort through desire of gain, underwent the servitude of the Mighty. Secondly, in Cities of small Territory and great Trade, as Holland and Genoa, the Land not being able to feed the People, who must live upon Traffic, is overbalanced by the means of that Traffic; which is money. Thirdly, in a narrow Country, where the lots are at a low scantling, as among the Israelites, if Care be not had of money in the regulation of the same, it will eat out the balance of Land. For which cause though an Israelite might both have money, and put it forth unto usury; (Faenerabis multis gentibus, Thou shalt lend (upon usury) unto many nations) yet might he not lend it upon usury unto a Citizen 
Deut. 15. 6. 23. 19  or brother (Non Faenerabis fratri tuo) whence two things are manifest. First, that Usury in itself is not unlawful. And next that Usury in Israel was no otherwise forbidden, then as it might come to overthrow the balance or foundation of the Government, for where a Lot as to the General amounted not perhaps to four acres: a Man that should have had a Thousand pounds in his Purse, would not have regarded such a lot in comparirison of his money, & he that should have been half so much in debt, would have been quite eaten out. Usury is of such a Nature as not forbidden in like cases, must devour the Government. The Roman People while their Territory was no bigger, and their lots (which exceeded not two Acres a Man) were yet scanter, were flayed alive with it; and if they had not helped themselves by their tumults and the institution of their Tribunes, it had totally ruined both them and their Government. In a Commonwealth whose Territory is very small, the balance of the Government being laid upon the Land, as in Lacedaemon, it will not be sufficient to forbid usury; but money itself must be forbidden; Whence Lycurgns allowed of none, or of such only as being of Old, or otherwise useless Iron, was little better, or (if you will) little worse than none. The Prudence of which Law appeared in the neglect of it, as when Lysander General for the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponesian war, having taken Athens, and brought home the spoil of it, occasioned the ruin of that Commonwealth in her Victory. The Land of Canaan compared with Spain or England, was at the most but a Yorkshire, and Laconia was less than Canaan. Now if we imagine Yorkshire divided as was Canaan, into six hundred thousand lots, or as was Laconia into thirty Thousand; a Yorkshire Man having one Thousand pounds in his purse, would, I believe, have a better estate in Money then in Land; wherefore in this Case to make the Land hold the balance, there is no way but either that of Israel, by forbidding usury, or that of Lacedaemon, by forbidding money. Where a small sum may come to overbalance a Man's estate in Land, there I say Usury or money for the preservation of the balance in Land, must of Necessity be forbidden, or the Government will rather rest upon the balance of money, then upon that of Land, as in Holland and Genoa. But in a Territory of such extent as Spain, or England, the Land being not to be overbalanced by money, there needeth no forbidding of money or usury. In Lacedaemon Merchandise was forbidden, in Israel and Rome it was not exercised; wherefore unto these Usury must have been the more destructive; but in a Country where Merchandise is exercised, it is so far from being destructive, that it is necessary; else that which might be of profit to the Commonwealth would rust unprofitably in private purses, there being no Man that will venture his money but through hope of some gain; which if it be so regulated that the Borrower may gain more by it then the Lender (as at four in the Hundred, or thereabouts) Usury becomes a Mighty profit unto the Public, and Charity unto private Men; in which sense we may not be persuaded by them that do not observe the different causes that it is against Scripture. Had usury to a brother been permitted in Israel that government had been overthrown: but that such a Territory as England or Spain cannot be overbalanced by money, whether it be a scarce or a plentiful Commodity, whether it be accumulated by Parsimony, as in the purse of Henry the 7th, or presented by Fortune, as in the Revenue of the Indies, is sufficiently demonstrated, or shall be.  
First, by an Argument (ad hominem one) good enough 
Consid. p. 12.  for the Praevaricator, who argues thus; The wisdom or the riches of another Man can never give him a Title to my Obedience, nor oblige Mr. Harrington to give his clothes or Money to the next Man he meets, wiser or richer than himself.  
If he had said stronger, he had spoiled all; for the parting with a man's clothes or Money in that case cannot be helped; now the richer as to the case in debate, is the stronger; that is, the advantage of strength remains unto the balance. But well; he presumes me to have clothes and Money of mine own, Let him put the same case in the People or the similitude doth not hold: But if the people have clothes and Money of their own, these must either rise (for the bulk) out of Propriety in Land, or at the least out of cultivation of the Land, or the revenue of Industry, which if it be dependent, they must give such part of their clothes and Money to preserve that dependence out of which the rest ariseth, to him or them upon whom they depend, as he or they shall think fit, or parting with nothing unto this end must lose all; that is, if they be Tenants, they must pay their Rent or be turned out. So if they have Clothes and Money dependently, the balance of Land is in the Landlord or Landlords of the People: but if they have clothes and money independently, than the balance of Land must of Necessity be in the People themselves, in which case they neither would if there were any such, nor can because there be none such, give their money or clothes to such as are wiser, or richer, or stronger than themselves. So it is not a man's clothes and money, or riches, that obligeth him to acknowledge the title of his obedience unto him that is wiser or richer, but a man's no clothes, nor money, or his poverty, with which if the Praevaricator should come to want, he could not so finely prevaricate but he must serve somebody, so he were rich, no matter if less wise than himself; Wherefore seeing the People cannot be said to have clothes and money of their own without the balance in Land, and having the balance in Land, will never give their clothes, or money, or obedience unto a single person or a Nobility, though these should be the richer in money, the Praevaricator by his own Argument hath evinced that in such a Territory as England or Spain, Money can never come to overbalance Land.  
For a second Demonstration of this Truth, Henry the Seventh (albeit he missed of the Indies, in which for my part I think he hit) was the richest in money of English Princes. Nevertheless this accession of Revenue did not at all praeponderate on the King's part, nor change the balance. But while making Farms of a Standard, he increased the Yeomanry; and cutting off Retainers, he abased the Nobility, began that breach in the balance of Land, which proceeding hath ruined the Nobility, and in them that Government.  
For a Third, the Monarchy of Spain, since the silver of Potosi sailed up the Guadalquivir, which in English is, since that King had the Indies, stands upon the same balance in the Lands of the Nobility on which it always stood.  
And so the Learned Conclusion of the Praevaricator, 
Consid. p. 16.  That it is not to be doubted but a Revenue sufficient to maintain a force, able (to cry aware horns) or beat down all opposition, does equally conduce to Empire, whether it arise from Rents, Lands, Profits of ready Money, Duties, Customs. etc. asks you no more than where you saw her premises: For unless they ascended his Monti, and his Banks, it is not to be imagined which way they went, and with these because he is a professed Zealot for Monarchy; I would wish him by no means to be Montebanking or meddling; for the Purse of a Prince never yet made a Bank; nor till Spending and Trading money be all one, ever shall. The Genoese (which the King of Spain could never do with the Indies) can make you a Bank out of Letters of Exchange, and the Hollander with Herrings. Let him come no more here; Where there is a bank, ten to one, there is a Commonwealth. A King is a Soldier, or a Lover; neither of which makes a good Merchant; and without Merchandise, you will have a lean bank. It is true, the Family of the Medice's were both Merchants, and made a Bank into a Throne: but it was in a Commonwealth of Merchants, in a small Territory, by great purchases in Land, and rather in a mere confusion then under any settled government; which causes if he can give them all such another meeting, may do as much for another Man; otherwise let it be agreed and resolved, that in a Territory of any extent, the balance of Empire consists in Land and not in money, always provided that in case a Prince have Occasion to run away (as Henry the third of France out of Poland) his balance in ready money is absolutely the most proper for the carrying on of so great, and sudden an Enterprise.  
It is an excellent way of disputing, when a man hath alleged no experience, no example, no reason to conclude with no doubt. Certainly upon such occasions it is not unlawful nor unreasonable to be merry. Reasons (says one Commedian) are not so common as Blackberrys. For all that (saith another Commedian) no doubt but a revenue in taxes is as good as a revenue in fee-simple, for this, in brief, is the sense of his former particular, or that part of it, which the Monti and the Banks being already discharged, remains to be answered. Yet that the Rents and Profits of a man's land in Fee-simple or Propriety, come in naturally and easily, by common consent or concernment; that is, by virtue of the Law founded upon the public interest, and therefore voluntarily established by the whole people, is an apparent thing. So a man that will receive the Rents and Profits of other men's Lands, must either take them by mere force, or bring the people to make a Law divesting themselves of so much of their Propriety; which upon the matter is all one, because a people possessed of the balance, can no otherwise be brought to make such a Law farther than they see necessary for their common defence, but by force, nor to keep it any longer than that force continues. It is true, there is not only such a thing in nature as health, but as sickness: nor do I deny that there is such a thing as a government against the balance. But look about, seek, find where it stood, how it was yclept, how liked, or how long it lasted. Otherwise the comical Proposition comes to this, It is not to be doubted but that violence may be permanent or durable, and the Blackberry for it is because nature is permanent or durable! What other construction can be made of these words? It is not to be doubted but a revenue sufficient to maintain a force able to beat down all opposition (that is a force able to raise such a revenue) doth equally (on which word grows the Blackberry) conduce to Empire: that is as much as could any natural balance of the same! He may slain mouths, as he hath done some, but he shall never make a Politician. The Earth yieldeth her natural increase without losing her heart; but if you come once to force her, look your force continue, or she yields you nothing: and the balance of Empire consisting of Earth, is of the nature of her Element.  
Divines are given to speak much of things which the Considerer baulks in this place that would check them, to 
Consid. p. 23.  the end he may fly out with them in others, whereunto they do not belong, as where he saith, that Government is founded either upon Paternity, and the natural advantage the first Father had over all the rest of Mankind, who were his sons, or else from the increase of strength and power in some Man or Men, to whose will the rest submit, that by their submission they may avoid such mischief, as otherwise would be brought upon them. Which two Vagaries are to be fetched home unto this place.  
For the former; if Adam had lived till now, he could have seen no other than his own Children, and so that he must have been King by the right of Nature, was his peculiar Prerogative. But whether the eldest son of his house, if the Praevaricator can find him, at this time of the day. have the same right, is somewhat disputable; because it was early when Abraham and Lot dividing Territories, became several Kings: and not long after when the sons of Jacob being all Patriarches, by the appointment of God (whose right sure was not inferior unto that of Adam though he had lived) came under Popular Government. Wherefore the advantage of the first Father is for grave Men a pleasant fancy, nevertheless if he had lived till now, I hope they understand that the whole Earth would have been his demeans, and so the balance of his propriety must have answered unto his Empire: as did that also of Abraham and Lot unto theirs. Wherefore this way of deduction comes directly home again unto the balance. (Pater familias Latifundia possidens, & neminem aliâ lege in suas terras recipiens quam ut ditioni suae, qui recipiuntur, 
G. De jure belli, l. 1. c. 3.  se subjiciant est Rex) Fathers of families are of three sorts, either a sole Landlord, as Adam, and then he is an absolute Monarch; or a few Landlords as Lot and Abraham with the Patriarches of those days, who if they joined not together, were so many Princes, or if they joined, made a mixed Monarchy, or as Grotius believes a kind of Commonwealth administered in the Land of Canaan by Melchisedec, unto whom as King and Priest Abraham paid tithes of all that he had. Such a Magistracy was that also of Jethro King and Priest in the Commonwealth of Midian. Fathers of families for the Third sort, as when the Multitude are Landlords (which happened in the division of the Land of Canaan) make a Commonwealth; and thus much how ever it was out of the Praevaricators head in the place now reduced, he excepting no farther against the balance, then that it might consist as well in money, as in land, had confessed before.  
His second Vagary is in his deduction of Empire from increase of strength, for which we must once more round about our Coal fire. The strength whereof this effect can be expected, consists not in a pair of fists, but in an Army, and an Army is a beast with a great belly, which subsisteth not without very large pastures; so if one man have sufficient pasture, he may feed such a beast, if a few have the pasture they must feed the beast, and the Beast is theirs that feed it. But if the People be the sheep of their own pastures, they are not only a flock of sheep, but an Army of Lions, though by some accidents, as I confessed before, they be for a season confinable unto their Dens. So the advantage or increase of strength depends also upon the balance. There is nothing in the world to swear this Principle out of countenance, but the fame of Phalaris, Gelon, Dionysius, Agathocles, Nabis, etc. with which much good do them that like it. It is proper unto a Government upon the balance to take root at home and spread outwards; and to a Government against the balance to seek a root abroad, and to spread inwards; The former is sure, but the later never successful. Agathocles for having conquered Africa, took not the better root in Syracuse. (Parvi sunt arma for as nisi sit consilium domi.)  
To conclude this Chapter, the Praevaricator gives me this thank for finding out the balance of dominion (being as ancient in Nature as herself, and yet as new in Art as my writings) that I have given the world cause to complain of a great disappointment, who while at my hand that satisfaction in the Principles of Government was expected, which several great wits had in vain studied, have in diversifying riches in words only as Propriety, Dominion, Agrarian, Ballance, made up no more than a new Lexicon expressing the same thing that was known before, seeing the opinion that riches are power is (as ancient as the first book of Thucydides or the Politics of Aristotle, and) not omitted by M. Hobbs, or any other Politician. Which is as if he had told Dr. Harvey, that whereas the blood is the life, was an Opinion as ancient as Moses, and no girl ever pricked her finger, but knew it must have a course; he had given the world cause to complain of a great disappointment in not showing a man to be made of Gingerbread, and his Veins to run Malmsey.   

CHAP. FOUR Whether the Balance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial; and whether these two, or Nations that are of distinct balance, coming to depend upon one and the same head, such a mixture create a new balance?  
THe Balance of Empire that is National as it is stated in the former Chapter, stands in regulated or mixed Monarchy upon the Propriety or Native interest of the Nobility, in a Commonwealth, upon the Propriety or Native interest of the People; so these are very natural. But the balance of absolute Monarchy partaking of force, as well as Nature, is a mixed thing and not much different from the balance of Provincial Empire, or the manner of holding a Province or conquered Country. In a Province, if the Native that is rich be admitted unto power, the power grows up Native, and overtops the Foreign; therefore you must either▪ not plant your Citizens in your Provinces, where in time they will become native, or so planting them neither trust them with Power nor with Arms. Thus the Provincial balance comes to be contrary to the National. And as where Empire is Native or national the administration of it can be no otherwise then according to the National balance; so where Empire is foreign or provincial the administration of it can be no otherwise then contrary unto the national balance. That this may be admitted without Opposition, 
Consid. p. 16. 17.  the Considerer is inclining to allow, Always provided that he be satisfied in this demand, whether distinct balances under the same Head or Governor, as those of Castille and Arragon, the power of the King (I presume he means by the balance of a Nobility) being greater in the One, and that of the People in the other, may not so poise one the other, as to produce a new balance. To which I answer, that no One government whatsoever hath any more than one of two balances; that (except in the Cases excepted) of Land which is National, or that of Arms which is Provincial. Wherefore if the King of Spain by his war against the Commons altered the Balance of Arragon, it must have been one of two ways, either by strengthening the balance of the Nobility, and governing the Aragonian People by them, in which case their balance though altered, remained yet National; or by holding both Nobility and People by a Provincial Governor and an Army, in which Case his Empire in that Kingdom is Provincial. There is no Third way, nor putting the Case that the balance of Castille be National, and that of Arragon Provincial; doth this any more create in the Monarchy of Spain a Third balance of Empire, than did the Multiplication of Associations and Provinces divers for their balances in the Commonwealth of Rome. England and Scotland being united in one Prince, made (if it had been rightly used) an increase of strength, but not a Third balance; nor do the Kingdoms in Spain. Whether a Sovereignty have many Territories and Provinces in subjection, or in League, it is all one as to this point; the stronger Union or League will give the stronger balance, and the Case of the present Sovereignty's in Europe being no other; the more nice than wise Speculation of the Considerer, who hath not been able to discern the balance of a League from that of Empire, is a Mare's nest.   

CHAP. V. Whether there be any Common right or interest of Mankind distinct from the parts taken severally; and how by the Orders of a Commonwealth it may best be distinguished from private interest.  
IN the next place the Prevaricator does not go about to play the man, but the unlucky boy. Where I say that 
Consid. p. 19 20  the soul of man is Mistress of two potent rivals, Reason and Passion; he doth not stand to weigh the truth of the thing, or the fitness of the comparison, either of which had been fair; but tumbles Dick upon Sis, the Logic upon the Rhetoric, the sense upon the figure, and scuds away in this manner. If I could be persuaded Mr. Harrington were so far in earnest, as to expect any man should be convinced by the metaphorical use of two or three words some farther consideration might be proposed. This is to use his Readers, as the Fox doth the Dogs, when having pissed upon his tail, and flapped it in their eyes, he gets away. Doth not his Book deserve to be guilded and carried in statesmen's pockets? Alas, mine are nothing (Quis leget haec? vel duo vel nemo) they break the Stationer. And yet let me comfort myself, Whose are better? the prevaricator seems to set every whit as light by those of Hooker and Grotius, at least where they favour me. The opinions of Grotius (says he) cannot oblige us beyond the reasons whereon they are founded; and what are those? he will dispute against that which he dares not repeat: that his Comment may take you by the Nose he hath left out the Text. The words of Grotius are of this sense. Though it 
In preleg. De jure B. ac. P.  be truly said that the creatures are naturally carried forth, unto their proper utility: this ought not to be taken in too general a sense, seeing divers of them abstain from their own profit, either in regard of those of the same kind, or at least of their young. Which words, saith the Prevaricator, carry a great restriction in them, and the way of producing actions in beasts is so different from the emanation of humane reason (mark the Impostor! the Author is speaking of natural affection, and he wipes out that, and puts in humane reason) that the inferences from (the natural affection of) the one, to the (degree of reason which is in the) other, must needs be very weak. Excellent! doth it therefore follow that the eminent degree of reason, wherewith all God hath endued man, must in him deface that natural affection, and desertion in some cases of private for common good, which is apparent even in beasts? What do reverend Divines mean to cry up this Infidel? Nay, is not he worse than an infidel that provideth not for his own family? A Commonwealth is but a great family; and a family is a little Commonwealth. Even Beasts in sparing out of their own mouths, and exposing themselves unto danger for their young, provide for their families; and in providing for their families, provide for their whole Commonwealth; that is, forsake in some things their private good and safety, for the good of the public or of the kind. In this case it is that even stones or heavy things (says Hooker) forsake 
Book 1.  their ordinary wont or centre and fly upwards, to relieve the distress of nature in common. Wretch that he is, shall a stone upon this occasion fly upwards, and will he have a man to go downwards! Yes, Mr. Hooker ' s expression (saith he) is altogether figurative, and it is easier to prove from thence that things wanting sense make discourses, and act by election, then that there is such a thing as a common interest of mankind. This is like the rest, Hooker speaketh of the necessity that is in nature, and this Gentleman translateth that sense into the word election. So because a stone is necessitated to comply with the common interest of nature, without Discourse or Election; therefore it rather follows from hence that things wanting sense make discourses and act by election then that there is such a thing as a common interest of mankind. His old trick. I do not say that because it is so with the creatures, therefore it must be so with man: but as we see it is with the creatures in this part, so we find it to be with man. And that so, and more than so, we find it to be with man (who though he le evil gives good things unto his children, will work hard, lay up, deny himself, venture his life for his little Commonwealth) is thus farther demonstrated. All civil Laws acknowledge that there is a common interest of mankind, and all civil laws proceed from the nature of man; therefore it is in the nature of man to acknowledge that there is a common interest of mankind. Upon this acknowledgement of mankind, a man that steals is put to death, which certainly is none of his private interest; nor is a man put to death for any other man's private interest; therefore there is a common interest of mankind distinct from the parts taken severally. But this though acknowledged in part by all Governments, yet through their natural frailty is nothing so well provided for in some as in others: for if the power be in one or a few men; one or a few men (we know) may be thiefs, and the rather because applying money that is public, without a consideration that is public, unto uses that are private, is thieving. But such thiefs will not be hanged; in this case therefore the Government goeth not upon public but private interest. In the frame of such a Government as can go upon no other than the public interest, consisteth that whole Philosophy of the Soul which concerneth Policy: and this whole Philosophy of the Soul being throughout the Commonwealth of Oceana demonstrated; For the Prevaricator to insinuate that I have omitted it, is to show what it is that he loveth more than truth. The main of this Philosophy consisteth in deposing passion and advancing reason unto the Throne of Empire. I expected news in this place, that this were to promise more for the Magistrate or the people, then hath been performed by Stoics, but two Girls (meaning no body any harm) have provoked his wrath (forsooth) to such extravagancy by the way, that though in all modesty it were forbidden (as he confesseth) by their cheeks, which discovering the green sickness, showed that they were past the rod, he hath taken them up! (Tantaene animis coelestibus ire!) what he may have in school Divinity for so rude a charge, I do not know; but he shall never be able to show any Maxim for this kind of Discipline or Philosophy of the soul either in Chivalry or the Politics. The offence of the Girls was no more, then that having a Cake (by gift of an Uucle or an Aunt, or by purchase, or such an one perhaps as was of their own making) in common, or between them, the one had most accurately divided, and the other was about to choose; when in comes me this rude fellow. How now Gentlewomen, says he, what dividing and choosing! 
Consid. p. 22. 23.  will no less serve your turn then the whole mystery of a well ordered Commonwealth? who has taught you to cast away passion (an't please you) like the Bran, and work up Reason as pure as the Flower of your Cake? Are you acquainted with the Author of Oceana, that hath seen foreign Countries, conversed with the Speculativi, learned of the most serene Lady Venetia to work with bobbins, makes you a Magistracy like a Pippin pie, and sells Butterprints with S. P. Q. R.? Have done as you dread Ballads, fusty Pamphlets, or the Ostracism of Billingsgate. Have done I say; will you vy that green in your cheeks with the purple of the State? must your mother, who was never there herself, seek you in the Oven? Come, when I live to see Machiavil in puff-paste, a Commonwealth come out of a Bakehouse, where smocks were the boulters, let me be a Millhorse.— But now you must know comes the best jest of all, and I need not say that it comes from Oxford; he tells them that their Cake is dough, (let it not be lost I beseech you) and so snatching it away, eats it▪ for all the world as Jack pudding eats the Custard. Did you ever see such a Bestia?  
But whereas either Office, that of dividing or choosing, was Communicable unto either of the Girls, it is not indifferent in the distribution of a Commonwealth, because dividing is separating one thing, one reason, one interest, or consideration from another, which they that can so discern in private affairs are called discreet, but they that can do it in Public are prudent, and the way of this kind of dividing in the language of a Commonwealth, is debating. But they that are capable of this kind of dividing or debating are few among many, that when things are thus divided and debated, are able enough to choose, which in the language of a Commonwealth is to resolve. Hence it is that the debate of the few because there be but few that can debate, is the wisest debate, and the result of the many (because every man hath an interest what to choose, and that choice which suiteth with every man's interest, excludeth the distinct or private interest or passion of any man, and so cometh up unto the Common and Public interest or reason) is the wisest result. Unto this end, God who doth nothing in vain, hath so divided Mankind into the Few, or the Natural Aristrocacy, and the Many, or the Natural Democracy, that there can hardly be upon any Occasion, a meeting of Twenty men, wherein it will not be apparent; or in which you may not see all those lines which are requisite unto the face of a beautiful Commonwealth. For example among any Twenty men, occasionally met, there will be some few (perhaps six) excelling the fourteen in greatness of parts. These six falling into discourse of business, or giving their judgement upon persons, or things, though but by way of mere conversation, will discover their abilities; whereupon they shall be listened unto and regarded by the Fourteen; that is, the six will acquire an Authority with, and imprint a Reverence upon the Fourteen, which Action and Passion in the Roman Commonwealth were called Authoritas Patrum, & verecundia Plebis; Nevertheless if the six endeavour to extend the authority which they find thus acquired to Power, that is, to bring the Fourteen to Terms or Conditions of obedience, or such as would be advantageous unto the few, but prejudicial to the many; The Fourteen will soon find that consenting they hurt not only themselves by endamaging their own interests, but hurt the Six also who by this means come to lose their virtue, and so spoil their debate, which while such advantages are procurable unto themselves, will go no farther upon the Common good, but their private benefit. Wherefore in this Case they will not consent, and not consenting they preserve not only their own liberty but the integrity of the Six also, who perceiving that they cannot impair the Common interest have no other interest left but to improve it; And neither any conversation nor any people, how dull soever and subject by fits to be deluded, but will soon see thus much, which is enough, because what is thus proposed by the Authority of the Six or of the Senate, and resolved by the Fourteen or by the People, is enacted by the whole, and becomes that Law, than which (though mankind be not infallible) there can be nothing less fallible in Mankind. Art is the imitation of Nature, by observation of such lines as these in the face of Nature, a Politician limbs his Commonwealth. But saith the Praevaricator, the Parologisme lies in this, that the Twenty men are first supposed to be a 
Consid. p. 26.  Commonwealth, and then it is considered how they would dispose of the Government: What is this? Art is the imitation of nature; therefore Art presumes Nature to be Art. A Picture is the representation of a face; therefore the Picture-drawer presumed the face to be a picture; and in this same, there is lying, being or squatting, a thing called a Parologisme. Did you ever hear such a Parakeetisme; for to speak a word without understanding, the sense of it is like a Parrot. And yet I wrong the Parrot in this comparison; for she though she do not understand herself, is understood by others, whereas neither can this Prevaricator tell what he means, nor any man else; Or riddle me, riddle me what is this? The sense of want among men that are in equality of power may beget a desire of Exchange, as 
Consid. p. 27.  Let me have your Horse, and you shall have my Cow, which is the fountain of private Contracts; but it is not to be with reason imagined, that this should be enough to make a man part with a natural freedom, and put himself into the hands of a Power from which he can afterward have no shield, though it should be used to his own destruction.  
Most Victorious nonsense! for he that says nothing, cannot be answered. It should seem if the Twenty men were indeed a Commonwealth, or in equality of power, (for so he puts the case) they might truck Horses and Cows, but not by any means consider or once let it enter into their heads, how by Art to make good their Natural freedom: That (unless they set up a Prince, as you shall see anon) were to part with their Natural freedom, and put themselves into the hands of a Power from which (there being no other Power but themselves) they can afterwards have no shield. To read it throughly for the understanding, as is intimated in his Epistle, will be more (I doubt) than his Book will obtain of any reader. Yet is he, in his own conceit, as sure footed as any Mule, & knows the road. But Mr. Harrington hath not lost his way without company, (his brother) Grotius complains, that they who treat of Jus Gentium do commonly mistake some part of the Roman Jus civil for it▪ & even so he laments (an't please you) that while Men profess to consider the Principles of Government they fall upon notions which are the mere effects of Government. But as an Ape is the more ugly for being like a Man; so this Praevaricator for making faces like Grotius. ay, who am complained of, deriving Government from the true principle of the same, in the balance or foundation, set the Superstructures accordingly, and he who complains (forsooth) never so much as proposeth any thing like a Principle or Superstructure, but runs altogether upon mere Notions; As where he asks me, what security will you give, that the Six in their Consultations shall not rather aim at their own advantage then that of the Fourteen, and so make 
Consid. p. 28.  use of the eminence of their parts to circumvent the rest? In another place he can answer himself and say, that the Fourteen or the People in this Constitution have the Vote and the Sword too. How then should the Six circumvent them? what security hath a Prince that his people will not pull him out of his Throne? why a Nobility or an Army; and are not the people in a Commonwealth their own Army? Is this to mind principles! On the other side, How (says he) shall we be satisfied that the Fourteen will not soon begin to think themselves wise enough to consult too, and making use of their excess in power pull the Six off their Cushions? as if there were any experience public or private, any sense, or reason, that men having the whole power in their own hands, would deprive themselves of Counselors, or that ever a Commonwealth deposed the Senate, or can depose the Senate, and remain a Commonwealth. The People of Capua being enraged to the full height, resolved and assembled together, (the Senate, if the People will, being always in their power,) on purpose to cut the Throats of the Senators, when Pacuvius Calavius exhorted them that ere they went upon the design, they would first make election among themselves of a new Senate, which (the Throats of the Old being cut) might for the safety of the Commonwealth immediately take their places; for said he, (Senatum omnino non habere non vultis. Quip aut Rex, quod abominandum, aut quod unum liberae civitatis Concilium est, Senatus habendus est) You 
Livy.  must either have a King, which I do not find by you that you intent, or what ever become of this, you must have some other Senate; for the Senate is a Council of such nature▪ as without it, no free City can subsist. By which speech of Pacuvius, the People (who thought themselves as the Considerer hath it, wise enough to consult,) being convinced, fell to work for the Election of a succeeding Senate out of themselves (the Praevaricator should not tell me of Notions, but learn that in a Commonwealth, there must be a Senate is a Principle) While the People of Cupua were intent upon choosing this new Senate, the parties proposed seemed unto them to be so ridiculously unfit for such an Office, that by this means coming to a nearer sight of themselves, they were secretly so filled with the shame of their Enterprise, that slinking away they would never after be known so much as to have thought upon such a Thing. Nor ever went any other people so far, not the Florentines themselves though addicted to Innovation or changing of the Senate beyond all other examples. Sons of the University, Brothers of the College: Heads and Points; you love fine words; whether tendeth to bring all things into servitude, my Hypothesis, or his 
* arochet.  Hypothytes? For saith he, I am willing to gratify Mr Harrington with his partition of the Twenty men into Six and Fourteen; but if I had been in an humour of contradiction, it had been as free for me to have said that some one of the twenty would have excelled all the rest in judgement, experience, courage, and height of Genius, and then told him, that this had been a natural Monarchy established by God himself over Mankind. As if the Twenty would give their clothes or money to the next man they meet wiser or richer than themselves, which before he denied (Oportet esse memorem) God established Kings no otherwise then by election of the people; and the Twenty will neither give their clothes nor money, How then? why in comes a Gallant with a file of Musqueteers, what says he, are you dividing and choosing here? Go to, I will have no dividing, give me all. Down go the pots, and up go their heels: what is this? why a King! what more? by divine Right! As he took the Cake from the Girls!   

CHAP. VI Whether the Senatusconsulta or Decrees of the Roman Senate had the power of Laws?  
AMong divers and weighty reasons why I would have that Prince look well to his file of Musqueteers, this is no small one, that he being upon no balance will never be able to give Law without them. For to think that he succeeds unto the Senate, or that the power of the Senate may serve his Turn, is a presumption will fail him. The Senate, as such, hath no power at all, but mere Authority of proposing unto the people, who are the Makers of their own Laws, whence the Decrees of the Senate of Rome are never Laws nor so called, but Senatusconsulta. It is true that a King coming in, the Senate as there it did, to his aid and advantage may remain, so they propose not as formerly unto the People, but now unto him who comes not in upon the right of the Senate, but upon that of the People (whence saith Justinian. Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem, quum lege Regia quae de ejus imperio lata est, Populus ei, & in eum omnes imperium 
Consid. p. 30. 31.  suum & potestatem concedat) Thus the Senatusconsultum, Macedonicum, with the rest that had place allowed by Justinian in the compilement of the Roman laws, were not Laws in that they were Senatusconsulta, or proposed by the Senate, but in that they were allowed by Justiman or the Prince, in whom was now the right of the People. Wherefore the Zealot for Monarchy hath made a (pas de clerc or) foul step in his procession where he argues thus out of Cujacius. It was soon agreed that the distinct decrees of the Senate and People should be extended to the nature of laws; therefore the distinct decrees of the Senate are laws whether it be so a greed by the people, or by the Prince, or no. For thus he hath no sooner made his Prince, than he kicks him heels over head; Seeing where the Decrees of the Senate are Laws without the King, that same is as much a King, as the Praevaricator a Politician. A law is that which was passed by the power of the people, or of the King. But out of the Light; In this place he takes a Welsh bait, and looking back makes a Muster of his Victories like the bustling 
Consid. p. 32.  Guascon, who to show what he had thrown out of the Windows in his debauchery, made a formal repetition of the whole Inventary of the House.   

CHAP. VII. Whether the Ten Commandments were proposed by God or Moses, and voted by the People of Israel.  
ONe would think the Guascon had done well, Is he satisfied? No, he will now throw the House out of the Windows. The principal stones being already taken 
Consid. p. 33. 35.  from the Foundation, He hath a bag of certain winds wherewithal to reverse the supper structures. The first wind he lets go is but a Puff, where he tells me that I bring Switz and Holland into the enumeration of the Heathen Commonwealths, which if I had done, their Liberties in many parts and places being more Ancient than the Christian Religion in those Countries (as is plain by Tacitus where he speaks of Civilis and of the Customs of the Germans) I had neither wronged them nor myself: but I do no such matter, for having enumerated the Heathen Commonwealths, I add that the proceedings of Holland and Switz (though after a more obscure manner) are of the like 
Oceana p. 19  nature. The next is a Storm, while reproaching me of rudeness, he brings in Doctor Ferne and the Clergy by the head and the shoulders, who till they undertake the quarrel of Monarchy, to the confusion of the Commonwealth of Israel, at least so far forth that there be no weight or obligation in such an Example, are posted. As if 
Consid. p. 35. 40.  for a Christian Commonwealth to make so much use of Israel, as the Roman did of Athens, whose Laws she transcribed, were against the Interest of the Clergy, which it seems, is so hostile unto Popular power, that to say the Laws of Nature though they be the fountains of all Civil Law, are not the Civil Law, till they be the Civil Law; Or thus, that thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal; though they be in natural Equity, yet were not the Laws of Israel or of England, till voted by the People of Israel, or the Parliament of England, is to assert the People into the Mighty liberty of being free from the whole Moral Law; and inasmuch as to be the adviser or persuader of a thing is less than to be the Author or Commander of it; to put an indignity upon God himself. In which fopperies, the Praevaricator, boasting of principles, but minding none; first confounds Authority, and Command, or Power: and nextforgets that the dignity of the Legislator, or (which is all one,) of the Senate succeeding unto his Office, as the Sanhedrim unto Moses, is the greatest dignity in a Commonwealth; and yet that the Laws or Orders of a Commonwealth derive no otherwise, whether from the Legislator (as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, etc.) or the Senate (as those of Israel, Lacedaemon, or Athens) then from their Authority received and confirmed by the Vote or Command of the People. It is true, that with Almighty God it is otherwise then with a Mortal Legislator, but through another Nature which unto him is peculiar, from whom as he is the cause of being, or the Creator of Mankind, Omnipotent power is inseparable; yet so equal is the goodness of this Nature unto the greatness thereof, that as he is the Cause of wellbeing by way of Election for Example in his chosen people Israel, or of Redemption, as in the Christian Church, Himself hath preferred before his Empire, his Authority or Proposition. What else is the meaning of these words, or of this proceeding of his? Now therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, 
Exod 19 5.  ye shall be unto me a Kingdom, or I will be your King; which Proposition being Voted by the People in the Affirmative, God proceeds to propose unto them the Ten Commandments in so dreadful a manner, that the People being exceedingly affrighted, say unto Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear thee; that is, be thou henceforth our 
Exod. 20. 19  Legislator or Proposer, and we will resolve accordingly; but let not God speak with us, lest we die. From whenceforth God proposeth unto the People no otherwise then by Moses, whom he instructeth in this manner, These are the judgements which thou shalt propose or set before them. 
Deut. 29. 1.  Wherefore it is said of the book of Deuteronomy containing the Covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel in the Land of Moab, beside the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb (Haec est lex quam Moses proposuit) this is the law which Moses set before 
Deut. 4. 44.  the children of Israel. Neither did God in this case make use of his Omnipotent power, nor Christ in the like, who also is King after the same manner in his Church, and would have been in Israel, where when to this end he might have mustered up Legions of Angels, & been victorious with such Armies, or Argyraspides, as never Prince could show the like, says no more than O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thee and thy Children, as an Hen gathereth 
Math. 23. 37.  her Chickens under her wings, and ye would not? where it is plain that the Jews rejecting Christ that he should not reign over them, the Law of the Gospel came not to be the Law of the Jews; and so if the Ten Commandments came to be the Law of Israel, it was not only because God proposed them, seeing Christ also proposed his Law, which neverthelese came not to be the Law of the Jews, but because the people received the One, and rejected the Other. It is not in the Nature of Religion, that it should be thought a profane saying, that if the Bible be in England, or in any other Government, the Law or Religion of the Land, it is not only because God hath proposed it, but also because the People or Magistrate hath received it, or resolved upon it; Otherwise we must set lighter by a Nation or Government, then by a private person who can have no part nor portion in this Law, unless he Vote it unto himself, in his own Conscience, without which, he remains in the Condition he was before, and as the Heathen who are a Law unto themselves. Thus whereas in a Covenant there must be two parties, the Old and New Testament being in sum the Old and New Covenant, These are that Authority and Proposition of God and Christ, to which they that refuse their Vote or result may be under the Empire of a Clergy, but are none of his Commonwealth. Nor seeing I am gone so far, doth this at all imply freewill, but (as is admirably observed by Mr. Hobbs) the freedom of that which naturally precedes will, namely, Deliberation or Debate, in which as the Scale by the weight of Reason or Passion comes to be turned one way or other, the Will is caused, and being caused, necessitated. When God cometh thus in upon the Soul of Man, he gives both the Will and the Deed; from which like Office of the Senate in a Commonwealth that is from the Excellency of their Deliberation and Debate which prudently and faithfully unfolded unto the People, doth also frequently cause and necessitate both the Will and the Deed, God himself hath said of the Senate, that they are Gods: an expression though divine yet not unknown to the Heathens (Homo homini Deus) one Man for the Excellency of his aid, may be a God unto another; but let the praevaricator look to it; for he that leadeth the blind out of his way, is his Devil.  
For the things I have of this kind, as also for what I have said upon the words Chirotonia and Ecclesia, the Praevaricator is delighted to make me beholding underhand unto Mr. Hobbs, Notwithstanding the open enmity which he saith I profess to his Politics. As if Josephus upon that of Samuel 
1 Sam. 8. 7 ●.  they have not rejected Thee, but they have rejected me that I should not reign over them, had not said of the People 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that they unchirotonized or unvoted God of the Kingdom. Now if they unchirotonized or unvoted God of the Kingdom, than they had chirotonized or voted him to the Kingdom, and so not only the Doctrine that God was King in Israel by Compact or Covenant, but the use of the word Chirotonia also in the sense I understand it, is more Ancient than Mr. Hobbs. I might add that of Capellus (Deus Populi Judaici Rex erat veluti 
In Diatriba de▪ vota jephts▪  Politicus, & Civilis Legislator) God was as Political King and Civil Legislator of the Jews. And for the use I have made of the word Ecclesia, as no Man can read such as have written of the Grecian Commonwealths, and miss it, so I do not remember that Mr. Hobbs hath spoken of it: To these things fuller satisfaction will be given in the second Book which nevertheless I do not speak to the end I might wave Obligation to so excellent an Author in his way. It is true, I have opposed the Politics of Mr. Hobbs to show him what he taught me, with as much disdain as he opposed those of the greatest Authors, in whose wholesome Fame and Doctrine the good of Mankind being concerned; my Conscience bears me witness, that I have done my duty: Nevertheless in most other things I firmly believe that Mr. Hobbs is, and will in future Ages be accounted the best Writer, at this day, in the World: And for his Treatises of Humane Nature, and of Liberty and Necessity, they are the greatest of New Lights, and those which I have followed and shall follow.   

CHAP. VIII. Whether a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the kind, come not up unto the perfection of Government, and have no flaw in it.  
WHat a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the kind is, I have shown both by the definition of an equal Commonwealth, and the Exemplification in all the parts.  
The Definition is contained in the first of my Preliminaries, which because it is short I shall repeat.  
An equal Commonwealth is a Government established upon an equal Agrarian arising into the supper structures or three Orders, The Senate debating and proposing, the People resolving, and the Magistracy executing, by an equal Rotation, or interchangeable election, through the suffrage of the People given by the Ballot The Exemplification is the whole Commonwealth of Oceana. Each of which by him, who, if his doctrine of pure and absolute Monarchy be observed can be no English man, is called an Irish bog; as in some sense it is, seeing the Praevaricator hath set never a foot in it, that will stand, nor hath more to say, then that 
Consid. p. 43.  where there is one ambitious poor man, or one vicious rich man, it is impossible there should be any such Government as can be secure from sedition.  
Which first is rather to make all Governments alike, then to object against any, seeing that there should not be one ambitious Poor man, or one vicious Rich man, is equally if not more improbable in a Monarchy then in a Commonwealth.  
Secondly, That one Man alone, whether he be rich or poor should without a party be able to disturb a Commonwealth with sedition, is an absurdity; nor is such a party as may be able in some sort to disturb the Peace by robbing upon the Highway, or some such disorder always able to disturb a Government with sedition: Wherefore this feat goes not so much upon the ability of any one man Rich or Poor, as the puissance of the Party he is able to make, and this puissance of the party goes upon the Nature of the Government and the content or discontents thence deriving to the Few, or the Many. The discontents whether of the Few or the Many derive from that which is, or by them is thought to be some bar unto their Interest, and those Interests which are the causes of sedition are three; the desire of Liberty, the desire of Power, and the desire of Riches, nor be there any more▪ for where the People through the want of bread, through violence offered unto their Women, or Oppression, rise up against their Governors, it relates unto the desire of Liberty, those also under the name of Religion make not a fourth but come unto One of the Three.  
Now to speak in the first place of the Many, and anon of the Few, the people in an equal Commonwealth, have none of these three Interests. Not the desire of Liberty, because the whole Frame of an equal Commonwealth is nothing else but such a Method whereby the liberty of the People is secured unto them. Not of power, because the power which otherwise they could not exercise, is thus estated in them. Nor of riches, because where the rich are so bounded by an Agrarian that they cannot overballence; and therefore neither Oppress the People nor Exclude their industry or merit from attaining to the like estate, power, or honour, the whole People have the whole riches of the Nation already equally divided among them, for that the riches of a Commonwealth should not go according unto the difference of men's industry, but be distributed by the Pole were unequal; Wherefore the people in an equal Commonwealth having none of those interests which are the causes of sedition, can be subject unto no such effect.  
To affirm then with the Considerer, that the whole of this Libration, is reduced to the want of power to disturb the Commonwealth, must needs be mistaken, seeing in the Commonwealth proposed the people have the power, but can have no such interest, and the people having no such interest, no party can have any such power, it being impossible that a party should come to overbalance the People, having their Arms in their own hands. The whole matter being thus reduced unto the want of power to disturb the Government; this according to his own Argument will appear to be the Libration in which the power whereof the Governor is possessed so vastly exceeds the power remaining with those, who are to obey (which in case of contest must be so small a party) that it would be desperately unreasonable for them to hope to maintain their Cause. If the true Method then of attaining to perfection in Government be to make the Governor absolute, and the people in an equal Commonwealth be absolute, then there can be none in this Government, that upon probable terms can dispute the power with the Governor, and so this State by his own Argument must be free from Sedition. Thus far upon occasion of the ambitious poor Man Objected. I have spoken of the Many, and in speaking of the Many, implicitly of the Few; for as in an unequal Commonwealth, for Example, England during the Peerage or Aristocracy, the Many depended upon or were included in the Few; So in an Equal Commonwealth the Few depend upon or are included in the Many, as the Senate of Venice depends upon, or is included in Great Council, by which it is annually elected in the whole or in some part. So what was said in an equal Commonwealth of the Many or the Poorer sort, is also said of the Few or of the Richer; who through the virtue of the Agrarian, as in Oceana, or of other Orders supplying the defect of an Agrarian, as in Venice, not able to overbalance the people can never have any power to disturb the Commonwealth in case they had such an interest, nor can have any such interest in case they had such power. For Example in Oceana putting the case, that the Few were as powerful as it is possible they should be; that is, that the whole Land were fallen into five thousand hands. The Five Thousand excluding, the People could get no more Riches by it, because they have the whole Land already, no more Liberty by it, because they were in perfect Liberty before; nor any more power by it, because through the equality of the balance or of their Estates, they can be no more by themselves, than an equal Commonwealth, and that they were with the people; but would be much less, the power or Commonwealth, in which there be Five thousand Equals, being not greater but much less than the power or Commonwealth wherein the whole people are Equal: because the power or effect of a greater People is proportionably greater than the power or effect of a lesser people, and the Few by this means would get no more then to be the lesser people. So the people being no bar unto the riches, Liberty, nor power of the Five Thousand and the desire of Liberty, Riches, and Power being the only causes of Sedition, There could arise no Sedition in this Commonwealth by reason of the Nobility, who have no such interest, if they had the power, nor have any such power if they had the interest, the people being equally possessed of the Government, of the Arms, and far superior in Number. In sum, an equal Commonwealth consisteth but of one hereditary Order, as the people, which is by election divided into two Orders as the Senate and the Congregation in Lacedaemon, or the Senate and the Great Council in Venice; for the Gentlemen of Venice, as hath been often said, are the people of Venice, the rest are Subjects. And an unequal Commonwealth consisteth of two Hereditary Orders, as the Patritians and Plebeians in Rome, whereof the former only had an hereditary capacity of the Senate; whence it comes to pass that the Senate and the people in an equal Commonmealth having but one and the same interest, never were, nor can be at variance; and that the Senate and the people in an unequal Commonwealth having two distinct interests, never did nor can agree. So an equal Commonwealth cannot be seditious, and an unequal Commonwealth can be no other than Seditious.  
If a Man be resolved as the Considerer is, to huddle these things together, there is no making any thing of this kind of Policy; of which therefore it will be a folly to talk. For example, Lacedaemon is either to be considered as not taking in the Helotes, and then in herself she was an equal Commonwealth void of any sedition, or cause of it, how much soever she were troubled with the Helotes. So the Objection made by him, of her troubles by the Helotes is impertinently urged, to show that she was a Seditious Commonwealth. Or if he will needs have it, that she took in the Helots', it is undeniable that she took them in unequally, and so was unequal, whence the troubles by the Helots' must needs be impertinently urged against an equal Commonwealth.  
Again, when I allege Venice from Piero Gradenigo, that is for the space of about four hundred years from the present date, at which time the Reformation yet in force began, as an Example of an equal Commonwealth, for him to instance in the times before, when though the Commonwealth according to the intention, were as Equal as now, yet being not bound by sufficient Orders to give herself security of her Native Liberty, her Dukes on the one side, did what they pleased, and the enraged People on the other side banished, condemned to death, or murdered them, who sees not the Imposture? Indeed he blushes at it himself. Wherefore my Assertion being not yet knocked on the head, he promiseth to kill it better, first by the Example of Lacedaemon leaving out the Helots', and next by that of Venice since the time of Piero Gradenigo.  
For the first you must know that once upon a time 
Consid. p. 60. Pausan. Lacon.  there was a quarrel between Cleomenes and Demaratus Kings of Lacedaemon about succession which was determined by the Ephori, that is, by a Court of Justice and not by the Sword; the like happened in Leotychides the known bastard of Alcibiades or so confessed to be by his Mother 
Plut. Alc.  unto divers of her Maids. Now this is a Maxim in the Politics where the differences of Kings can go no farther, than a Court of Justice, there the Government is seditious. Most ridiculous! Is there a stronger Argument that such a Government is not Seditious? No matter give him room, Much more fatal was the contest between Cleonymus and his brother Areus the son of Acrotatus by whose war Zarax was ruined and Pyrrhus came into the game, who besieged the Capital City: the reign of Agis and Cleomenes was so full of turbulence as would put a man out of breath to relate. Fair, and softly was not all this after Lysander, and the Spoils of Athens and so ruined Lacedaemon? I affirm there can be no sedition in an Equal Cmmonwealth, and he to oppose me, shows that there was Sedition in an unequal One; whether doth this Affirm his Assertion or mine?  
But for better luck in Venice. This City by Mr. Harrington' s own confession, is possessed of several advantages. Yes, I say that the Commonwealth of Venice, thus Seated is like a Man in a Citadel who thereby may be the safer from his Enemies, but ne'er a whit the safer from diseases. What conclusion would you expect he should infer from hence? why among these therefore there is good cause to reckon her Immunity from seditions; Doth not our Logician repeat faithfully and dispute honestly? Again, Sir, she is like a Ship ready to be boarded by Pirates, hath the Turk on this Frontier, the Pope on that, the King of Spain on another. As if this were an Argument every Government must not be void of Sedition, seeing there is none except they be Islands, whose frontiers are not bounded by the Territories of other Princes. Well, but since the last Reiglement (in English Reformation) in the time of Gradenigo; you have had three seditions in Venice, that of Marino Boccone, that of Baiamonte Tiepolo, and that of Marino Falerio.  
Bodin hath been long since beaten for this like Stockfish, and yet our Author will be serving it up for a Courtly dish. Bocconi would have killed the Duke, but was hanged before he could do it. Felton killed a Duke, that had greater power here then the other in Venice, and was hanged afterwards, therefore England was a seditions Government; for this must either be undeniable for Felton's sake, or why must the other be so for Bocconi's? Again, Falerio and his Complices would have destroyed the great Council, but were hanged before they could do it. Vaux and his Accomplices would have blown up the Parliament, but were hanged before they could do it; therefore England was in this relation a seditious Government, else why was Venice? There passeth not a Month but there die Rogues at Tyburn, is the Government therefore seditious? or is this one regard in which it is not? where all that so invade the Government are by virtue of the same brought unto that end, there the Commonwealth, or the Orders of it are not the Cause but the Cure of Sedition, and so these are undeniable Arguments that Venice is not seditious, where since the Reformation there hath not been a cut Finger upon this score, save only through the conspiracy of Baiamonte, which indeed came to blows. Nor for this yet, can Venice be called a seditious Commonwealth. You find no man accusing Rome of sedition in that she had a Manlius or a Melius that dangerously affected Monarchy, because unto these her Orders, by which they suffered death assoon applied the remedy. But Rome was a seditious Commonwealth because the perpetual feud that was between the Senate & the People sprung out of her Orders, and was that to which there was no Remedy to apply. England was not a seditious Government because it had a Vaux or a Felton, but because the power anciently of the Nobility, and late of the People was such by the Orders of the same as might at any time occasion Civil war. Put the case a slave or some desperate fellow have killed a Great Turk, the Government for that cannot be said seditious, but in this that through the very nature of the Policy, the Janissaries at any time may do as much, it is undeniable seditious. Baiamonte's conspiracy he will not say was of this nature. It was not a disease in the bones of the Commonwealth, but a thing that no sooner appeared, or broke out (though it be true, there happened a little scratching first) than it fell off like a scab; such an accident may befall the best constitution, and Venice never had the like but once: if he could say as much of a Monarchy, he gains no advantage; yet let him say it, and prove it, I give him all. I omit many falsehoods and absurdities in the proceeding of the Prevaricator, as where he intimateth the power of the Dukes to have been that whereby Venice gained I know not what, and yet to have been that also by which Falerio had like to have spoiled all: Each of which (the Duke of Venice having no power at all) is known to be false. Why should▪ I stay to put you in mind that having affirmed Venice to derive her Immunity from intestine discord no otherwise then a Ship, that is ready to be boarded by Pirates, he instanceth in such examples to the contrary, as took Occasion by the hair of a Foreign scalp, while in those of Boccone and Tiepolo the Commonwealth by her Wars with the Genoeses and Ferrara, was put to her plunges, and in that of Falerio reduced unto the last extremity. I shall only Note that if such sudden Flashes as these may come under the name of Sedition, he hath done a fine Office for Monarchy, seeing no Senate is so much exposed to like blows, as any Prince.  
Well; but for all this it is confessed that there may be such a thing as a seditious Commonwealth, in that the feud between the Senate and the People of Rome could not be cured; what security saith he will you give us, that 
Consid. p. 48.  the like may not happen in Oceana, or that the whole body of the People being entrusted with giving a Vote and keeping a Sword, may not by way of Counsel or Arms, fall to such work as Levelling the Five Thousand, or bringing the Agrarian from two to one Thousand pounds a year, or less, as they fancy.  
To which I answer by a like question, What security will he give me that the People of any Commonwealth shall not cast themselves into the Sea? A Prince may be mad and do so, but the people is naturally incapable of such madness: If men will boast of their knowledge in principles and yet talk of nothing but effects; why may not a Man fly as well as a Bird? but if causes may be regarded, let him once show how the Will seeing it is not free, nor moved without some Object, should move the people in such a manner; or for what, they having all the Liberty and all the Power that can be had, should strive? Well, that is soon done, for the Land may come into the hands of Five thousand, and so the Booty may be great and the resistance small. Good. The Romans being the wisest of all people went no farther towards the Remedy of their grievances then to strive for the introduction of an Agrarian, in which they fainted too, even to the Destruction of that Government. Except these, none have been so wise, and if there be any such thing familiar with the Nature of the people, why appeared it but once, and then vanished without effect? why did not the people for Example under the late Monarchy (when the Dominion or Freehold of the Nation, by greater shares, was in a smaller party, and they had not only Riches, but Liverty, and Power too, to whet them on) ever so much as think of levelling Three hundred Men for the Nobility and Clergy in whom was the balance, were no more. If it be replied that the people were not armed; by whom did the Barons make War with the Kings? If that they were not trusted with a Vote; what was that of the House of Commons? Let Dominion or Freehold stand upon what balance you will, unequal or equal, from the beginning of the world you shall never find a people turning Levellers: And as Reason is Experience in the root, so Experience is Reason in the branch, which might therefore be sufficient in the Case. Nevertheless for clearer satisfaction in a point of such Concernment, I shall endeaver to dig up and discover the Root of this branch, or the reason of this Experience. That which in Beasts is instinct, whereof they can give no Account, is in itself that wisdom of God whereby he provideth for them; so is it with the People, they are not Levellers, nor know they why, and yet it is, because to be levellers, were to destroy themselves. For seeing I must repeat, to repeat briefly. There is no Territory of any Extent and populousness where the Revenue of Industry is not twice as much as the dry Rent. (This hath been demonstrated in Oceana.) The revenue of industry is in those that work, that is, the People: Wherefore the Revenne of the People, where their industry is not obstructed, is twofold unto that of the Nobility, holding the whole Territory in Freehold. But where their Industry is obstructed, their Revenue is nothing. Civil war being of all other the greatest obstruction of Industry, the People in taking Arms must venture all they have, for that, which if they obtain, they lose two for one; and if they obtain not, all for nothing. Wherefore a People never will, nor ever can; never did, or ever shall take Arms for Levelling. But they are instructed with a Vote; and therefore taking away the Lands of the five Thousand, or diminishing the Agrarian by way of Counsel, they need not obstruct their industry, but preserving the Revenue of that, may bring themselves into the possession of the Land too. This will they, this can they less do, because being in Counsel they must propose something for the advantage of the Commonwealth, or of themselves, as their End in such an Action. But the Land coming to be in the possession of five Thousand, falleth not into a Number that is within the compass of the few, or such an One as can be Princes, either in regard of their number, or of their estates, but unto such an One as cannot consent to abolish the Agrarian, because that were to consent to rob one another, nor can have any Party among them, or against their Common interest, strong enough to force them, or to break it, which remaining, the five thousand neither be nor can be any more than a Popular State, and the balance remaineth every whit as equal, as if the Land were in never so many more hands. Wherefore the Commonwealth being not to be bettered by this means, the People by Counsel can never go about to levelly nor diminish the Agrarian for the good of the Commonwealth. Nor can they undertake it for the enrichment of themselves, because the Land of Oceana, as hath been demonstrated, being levelled or divided equally among the Fathers of Families only, cometh not to above Ten pounds a year unto each of them, whereas every Footman costeth his Master Twenty pounds a year; and there is not a Cottager having a Cow upon the Common, but with his own labour, at one shilling a day, gets Twenty pounds a years; which the Land being levelled, were impossible, because there would be no body able to set a Labourer on work, or to keep a Servant; wherefore neither would, nor could the People by Counsel go about any such business. So there being no possible cause of disagreement between the Few and the Many, the Senate and the People, there can be no such effect; whence this is the government, which being perfectly equal, hath such a Libration in the frame of it, that no man in or under it, can contract such Interest or Power, as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with Sedition. Yet after all this, the Praevaricator will only tell Mr. Harrington (for to deny the Conclusion, is a fair way of disputing) that this Libration 
Consid. p. 67.  is of the same Nature with a perpetual motion in the Mechanics. But let me tell him, that in the Politics there is nothing Mechanic, or like it. This is but an Ideotism of some Mathematician resembling his who imagined the Stream of a River to be like that of his Spigot,  

(Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille  
labitur & labetur in omne volubilia aevum.)  
The silly Swain upon a river stood,  
In hope the Rolling bottom of the flood  
Would once unwind itself, whose liquid clue  
The silver thread for ever shall renew.   
The Mathematician must not take God to be such an One as he is. Is that of the Sun, of the Stars, of a River, a perpetual Motion? even so One generation goeth, and 
Galen de usu partium. l. 4.  another cometh. Nature (saith Galen) hath a tendency to make her Creature immortal, if it were in the Capacity of the Matter on which she hath to work, but the People never dieth; This Motion of theirs is from the hand of a perpetual Mover, even God himself, in whom we live and move, and have our being; and to this Current the Politician addeth nothing but the banks, to which end, or none, the same God hath halso created humane Prudence. Wherefore there is not any thing that raiseth itself against God or right reason, if I say that it is in humane prudence so to apply these banks, that they may stand as long as the River runneth; or let this Considerer consider again, and tell me out of Scripture or Reason, why not. Mathematicians, it is true, pretend to be the Monopolists of demonstration; but speak ingenuously, have they, as to the Politics, hitherto given any other demonstration, then that there is difference between seeing, and making of Spectacles? Much more is that comparison of the Politics, going upon certain and demonstrable Principles, unto Astrologers and Fortune-tellers, who have none at all vain and Injurious: For as in relation to what David hath said, and Experience confirmed, of the Age of Man, that it is Threescore years and Ten; I may say, that if a Man lie bedrid, or die before Threescore years and Ten, of any Natural infirmity, or disease, it was not through any imperfection of Mankind, but of his particular Constitution. So in relation unto the Principles and definition of an Equal Commonwealth yet unshaken, nay untouched by this Praevaricator, I may safely affirm, that a Commonwealth is a Government, which if it have been seditious, it hath not been from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular Constitution, which where the like hath happened must have been unequal. My retreat unto these Principles is called running into a bog; as if such as have no Principles were not bogs, Informis limus, Stygiaeque Paludes.   

CHAP. IX. Whether Monarchy coming up to the perfection of the kind, come not short of the perfection of Government, and have some flaw in it? In which is also treated of the balance of France, of the Original of a landed Clergy; of Arms and their kinds.  
OF Monarchy I have said, that whereas it is of two kinds, the One by Arms, the Other by a Nobility; for that by Arms, as (to take the most perfect model) in Turkey, it is not in Art, or Nature to cure it of this dangerous flaw, that the Janissaries have frequent interest, and perpetual power to raise Sedition, or tear the Magistrate in Pieces. For that by a Nobility, as (to take the most perfect Model) of late in Oceana, it was not in Art or Nature to cure it of that dangerous flaw that the Nobility had frequent interest and perpetual power by their Retainers and Tenants to Raise sedition and Levy war; whence I conclude that Monarchy reaching the perfection of the kind, reacheth not the perfection of Government, but must still have some dangerous flaw in it.  
This place (though I did not intend by it to make work for a Tinker) could not be of less concernment than it proves to the Prevaricator, who as if he were obliged to Mend all; falls first to patching with a Monarchy by Arms, then with Monarchy by a Nobility; at length despairing, throws away each, and betakes himself with egregious confidence, to make out of both a New Monarchy, which is neither. By observation of these three Flourishes, the present Chapter may be brought into some Method: The first blow of his Hammer, or that whereby he intends the flaw or hole in Monarchy by Arms, shall henceforth be mended and Tite, is this. That the Guards of the King's person be 
Consid. p. 16.  not increased beyond Necessity of security, that they be not suffered to stagnate at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon service, and chiefly that they consist not of one entire body, united under the same head, but be divided into distinct parties and Commands; as we may see in France, where though (in proportion to the: extent of their Dominions) the King's guards be more Numerous than those of the Roman or Turkish Emperors, yet being divided into distinct bodies of French, Scots and Switz under their several Colonels and Captains, they have never been the Authors of any the least sedition: And in Turkey of late years they begin to learn the Art of poizing the Janissaries by the Spahy's, and so have frequently evaded the danger of their mutinies. Which fine work at the first view goes upon this false ground, that the Foundation of Monarchy by Arms is laid upon the Prince's Guards or the Court Militia, whereas Monarchy by Arms consisteth in no other balance, than the Princes being sole Landlord, which where imperfect as it was in that of the Roman Emperors, the Empire is the most troubled, and where perfect as in Turkey, the Empire is less seditions: For that which he saith of France, it relates to Monarchy by a Nobility; and therefore is not to be confounded (according to his method) with this, but referred unto the next branch.  
As to Monarchy by Arms, though it be true that the balance of Dominion in any of the three kinds may be said to be Natural, in regard of the Effect; yet seeing God hath given the Earth unto the Sons of Men, that of a sole Landlord, as Turkey, is not so Natural in the cause or foundation, as the Timars, and therefore requireth the Application of some kind of force, as the Janissaries, who are not the root of the Government, that being planted in the Earth of the Timars or military Farms and Colonies (for that the Janissaries are not the Foundation of this Empire, which was founded long before, is plain in that this Order was not introduced, till by Amurath the second) but the Dragon that lieth at that root, and without which the fruit would fall into the Mouths of the Timariot by way of propriety (as when the Knights fees granted first for life, became afterwards hereditary in Oceana) which would cause such a fall from Monarchy that it would become (as we have seen) the rise of Popular power (the Lots in case this should happen, of the Timariot, little differing from those divided by Joshua unto the Children of Israel) wherefore when this happens in the Turkish Monarchy, it is at an end: And that this doth not happen, though there be divers other concurrent Policies, I would have any Man show me, how it could be but for the Janissaries: Otherwise it is plain that the Janissaries being a flying Army, on wing at all games, and upon all occasions, are not so much the guard of the Prince, as of the Empire; which ruined, the Prey falls unto the Timariot, as those that are in possession, except these be ruined too, who being all Horse, and far greater in Number then the Janissaries, that are Foot, would in case the awe of the Prince, and the policy of the Government which holds them divided, were broken, be invincible by the Janissaries, who nevertheless by these aids can easily contain them. Whence the sedition of the Janissaries, like that of a Nobility, may be dangerous to the Prince, but never threatens the Throne; whereas the sedition of the Timariot like that of a people would be more against the Throne than the Prince. These things considered, and in them the Nature, Constitution, or Disease of Monarchy by Arms, we may consult the more rationally with the Considerer upon the Applications or remedies by him offered, which are three.  
First, that the Guards of the King's person be not increased beyond the necessity of security. But of what security, that of his Person, or of his Empire, or of both? for speaking of a Monarchy by Arms, in this later sense only it is true; and if so, than this singular Maxim of State (Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora) might have been spared (Celais'en va sans le dire come les heures de nostre curè.)  
Secondly, that they be not suffered to stagnate at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation, drawn out upon service; for if there be not perpetual service (it should seem) Men might be apt to think that Government was instituted for peace as well as War. I add no more than is employed in his words, which as to this of Turkey have chanced well; where not the Stagnation of the Janissaries only but of the Court itself (which by the institution should always be in exercise of Arms) is the cause of that present decay, so perceivable in this Empire. But the Prince sitting still or stagnating, to what the Circulation of the Janissaries (whose alienation from the Government, or intelligence with the Timariot, must needs be of dangerous consequence) could tend, should have been thought on; otherwise to expose the Empire to danger, for the safety of the Prince, is no cure of the Government.  
But his chief remedy remains, this Court Militia must not consist of one entire body united under the same head, but be divided under several Colonels, Captains, Parties, Brigades, and distributed unto several Quarters. As if this were a Cure, there were any Army that could be mutinous; but where he says not united under the same head, he intimates perhaps divers Generals, and divers Armies; Now such are the Turkish Beglerbegs and the Provinces under their Governments. That these therefore be kept divided, so that not any two of them can lay their heads together, without having them cut off; nor any Son succeed the Father in Government, requires that there be always a sufficient force (distinct from the interest of the Timariot and Beglerbegs) united, and still ready upon occasion of this service, and the Janissaries with the spahis or Court horse, being united, are no more then sufficient for this service: wherefore if these also were so divided as thereby to be weakened, they could not be sufficient for this service; and their division except such as might weaken them would be of no security to the Prince. That the Provinces, under this awe, are less apt to Rebel, than the Court guards to Mutiny, is no wonder; but the Court-guards being cured by the prescription of this Physician, of possibility of Mutiny (which without weakening them is impossible) the Provinces (if Liberty, or Riches, or Power, be desirable) would never endure the yoke of this Government. Wherefore it being inavoidable in the Turkish Empire, that either the Janissaries, or the Timariot may do what they list (in regard that whether of them be able to give law unto the other, must at the same time be able to give law unto the Prince, and to bring them unto an equal balance, were to make a Civil war, or at least to sow the seed of it) the Native wound of Monarchy by Arms remains uncured and uncurable. What more may be done for Monarchy, founded upon a Nobility, comes next to be tried. In this the Considerer gives his word, that there never riseth any danger unto the Crown, but when either a great part of the Sovereign power is put into the hands of the Nobility, as in Germany and Poland, (where it should 
Consid. p. 47.  seem by him, that the Electors, and the Gentry, do not put power into the hands of the Emperor, or King, but the Emperor, or King, putteth power into the hands of the Electors, or Gentry) or when some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and Dependence, as the Princes of the blood, and Lorraine, not long since, in France; and of old the Montforts and Nevi●s in England. The first of these he declareth to be a vicious government, and a Monarchy only in Name; the second he undertakes shall easily admit of this remedy. That the great ones be reduced (decimo sexto) to a lesser volume, and leveled into an Equality with the rest of their Order.  
His putpin is pretty, the Emperor puts power into the hand of the Electors; and the King of Poland puts power into the hands of the Gentlemen; which Governments therefore (and all such like, as when the King of England put power into the hands of the Barons, at such time as he was no longer able to keep it out of their fingers, by which means the Ancient and late Government of King, Lords, and Commons was restored) are vicious Constitutions, and Monarchies only in Name; such as he will not meddle with, and therefore let them go. Well; but where is the Patient then? if these be not Monarchies by Nobility, what do we mean by that thing? or what Government is it that we are to Cure? why such an One, where some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and Dependence, as the Princes of the blood, and Lorraine, not long since, in France; and of old the Montfords' and the Nevils in England. So then the same again (for these are no other) upon recollection, are those that admit of this Easy cure. Let the great Ones be reduced to a lesser volume, and levelled with the rest of their Order. But how? if they be the weaker party, they are not the great ones, and if they be the stronger party, how will he reduce them? Put the case a Man have the Gout, his Physician does not bid him reduce his overtopping toes unto the volume of the other foot, nor to level them unto Equality with the rest of their Order, but prescribes his remedies, and institutes the Method that should do this feat. What is the Method of our Aesculapius? (Point de Novelle,) or where are we to find it? even where you please. The Princes of the blood, and of Lorraine in France; the Montforts, and the Nevils in England, overtopped not their Order, by their own riches or power, but by that of the party, which for their fidelity, courage, or conduct, entrusted them with the managing of their Arms, or affairs. So the Prince that would have leveled them, must have leveled their party; which in case the controversy be upon the right, or pretended right of the Nobility in the Government (which commonly makes them hang together) may come to the whole Order: what then? Why then, 
Consid. p. 49.  says he, the Prince must preserve his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under, and yet not tall enough in any particular person to measure with himself: which abating, the figure is the same again; and so I have nothing to answer but the figure. Now for this, the Prince himself is no otherwise tall, then by being set upon the shoulders of the Nobility; and so if they set another upon the same shoulders, (as in Henry the 4th. or the 7th. who had no Titles unto the Crown, nor could otherwise have measured with the Prince) be he never so low, he comes to be tall enough in his particular person to measure with the Prince, and to be taller too, not only by those Old Examples, but others that are younger than ourselves, though such (the Nobility having not of late, been weighty enough to keep the People under) as derive from another Principle, that of Popular balance. A Prince therefore preserving his Nobility weighty enough to keep under the people, must preserve in them the balance of that kind of Empire; and the balance containing the riches, which are the power, and so the Arms of the Nation; this being in the Nobility, the Nobility, when willing, must be able to dispose of the King, or of the Government. Nor under a less weight is a Nobility qualified to keep down the people, as by an Argument from the contrary; Henry the 7th. having found the strength of his Nobility, that set him in a Throne to which he had no right, and fearing that the tide of their favour turning, they might do as much for another, abated the dependence of their Tenants, and cut off their Train of Retainers, which diminution of their weight, releasing by degrees the People, hath caused that Plain, or Levelly, into which we live to see the Mountain of that Monarchy now sunk and swallowed; wherefore the balance of the Nobility being such as failing that kind of Monarchy comes to ruin, and not failing, the Nobility, if they join may give Law unto the King, the inherent disease of Monarchy by a Nobility, remains also uncured, and uncurable.  
These are points to which I had spoken before; but 
The balance of France.  something concerning France, and Foreign Guards, was mumbled by the Praevaricator in a wrong place, while he was speaking of Turkey, where there is no such thing. This lest I be thought to have courted Opposition for nothing, shall open a New Scene; while I take the occasion in this place to speak first of the Balance of the French Monarchy, and next of the Nature and use of Foreign Guards.  
The whole Territory of France, except the Crown Lands, which on this account are not considerable, consisteth of three shares, or parts, whereof the Church holdeth one, the Nobility another, and the Precedents, Advocates, other Officers of the Parliaments, Courts of Justice, the Citizens, Merchants, Tradesmen, the Treasurers, receivers of the Customs, aids, taxes, impositions, Gabells, all which together make a vast body, hold a Third; by how equal portions I am sorry that I do not know, nor where to learn, but this is the balance of the French Monarchy, unto which the Peasant holding nothing, but living (though in one of the best Countries of the world) in the meanest and most miserable Condition of a Labourer, or Hiend, is of no account at all.  
The parties that hold the balance in a Territory are those of whom the Government doth naturally consist, wherefore these are called Estates; so the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons, are the three Estates of France. Though the Third because the Peasant partaking not of the balance can (in relation to Government) be of no account, is not called the Commons, but only the Third Estate: whereas the Yeomanry and Gentry in England, having weighed as well in the balance, as the Church, and the Nobility, the three Estates of England, while the Monarchy was in vigour, were the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons. The Consent of Nations evinceth that the Function of the Clergy, or Priest, except where otherwise 
Grotius de Imp. Sum. Pot. circa sacra. C. 2. S. 4.  determined of by Law, appertaineth unto the Magistrate. By this right Noah, Abraham, Job, with the rest of the Patriarches, instructed their Families or sacrisiced, There seemeth to have been a kind of Commonwealth in Canaan, while Melchisedec was both King and Priest; Such also was Moses till he consecrated Aaron, and conferred the Priesthood upon the Levites, who are expressly said to succeed unto the first born, that is unto the Patriarches, who till then exercised that Function. Nor was it otherwise with the Gentiles, where they who had the Sovereign power or were in eminent Magistracy, did also the Priestly Office (omnino apud veteres qui rerum potiebantur, iidem Auguria tenebant: ut enim sapere, sic divinare, regale ducebant, saith Cicero and Virgil Rex Anius, Rex idem hominum, Phoebique Sacerdos) You find the Heroes, that is, Princes in Poets sacrificing; The Ethiopian, Egyptian, Lacedaemonian Kings did the like; in Athens constantly and in Rome, when they had no Kings, occasionally they elected a Rex sacrorum, or King-Priest. 
Original of a Sauded Cleryg.  So that a free People had thus far power of electing their Priests, is not denied by any Man. This came it should seem, to be otherwise Established by the Law in Egypt, where the Priests (whose Lands Joseph when he bought those of the People did not buy) being great Landlords 
Gen. 47. 22.  (it may be unto the Third of the whole Territory) were one of the three Estates of the Realm. And it is clear in Scripture that the People, till they Sold their Lands, became not Servants unto Pharaoh. While Agesilaus was in 
Xenop. in Oatr. de Agel.  Egypt they deposed their King, which implies the recovery of their balance; but so seeing they set up another, as withal shows the balance of the Nobility to have been predominant. These particulars seem to come near unto the account of Diodorus Siculus, by whom the balance of Egypt should have stood thus. The whole Revenue was divided into three parts, whereof the Priests had the first, the King 
L. 1.  had the second, and the Nobility had the Third. It seems to me that the Priests had theirs by their Ancient right and title, untouched by Joseph, that the Kings had all the rest by the Purchase of Joseph, and that in time (as is usual in like cases) a Nobility came through the bounty of succeeding Kings to share with them in one half. But however it came about, Egypt by this means is the first Example of a Monarchy upon a Nobility, at least distributed into three Estates, by means of a Landed Clergy, which by consequence came to be the greatest Counsellors of State, and fitting Religion unto their uses, to bring the people to be the most superstitious in the whole World.  
Where it not for this Example, I should have said, that the Endowment of a Clergy or Religious Order with Lands▪ and the erecting of them into an Estate of the Realm or Government, were no Ancienter than the Goths and Vandals, who introducing a like Policy, which unto this day taketh place throughout the Christian world, have been the cause;  
First, why the Clergy have been generally great Counsellors unto Kings, while the People are led into superstition.  
Secondly, by planting a Religious Order in the Earth, why Religion hath been brought to serve worldly ends;  
And thirdly, by rendering the Mitre able to make War; why of later Ages we have had such a thing as War for Religion, which till the Clergy came to be a Third State or Landlords, was never known in the World: For that some Cities of Greece, taking Arms upon the usurpation or violation of some Temple, have called it the Holy war; 
Thucyd. l. 1,  such disputes having been but upon matter of fact, and not of faith▪ (in which every Man was free) came not to this Account. Moses was learned in all the learning of the Egyptians, but a landed Clergy introduced he not in Israel: nor went the Apostles about to lay any such foundation of a Church. Abating this one Example of Egypt, till the Goths and Vandals who brought in the Third Estate, a Government, if it were unequal, consisted but of two Estates, as that of Rome, whether under the Kings or the Commonwealth consisted of the Patritians and Plebeians, or of the Nobility and the people. And an equal Commonwealth consisteth but of One, which is the people; for Example of this, you have Lacedaemon and Venice, where the people being few, and having many Subjects or Servants, might also be called Nobility, as in regard of their Subjects, they are in Venice, and in regard of their Helots' or Servants, they might have been in Lacedaemon. That I say which introducing two Estates, causeth division, or makes a Commonwealth unequal, is not that she hath a Nobility (without which she is deprived of her most especial Ornament, and weakened in her conduct) but when only the Nobility is capable of Magistracy or of the Senate, and where this is so ordered, she is unequal as Rome: But where the Nobility is no otherwise capable of Magistracy nor of the Senate, then by Election of the People, the Commonwealth consisteth but of one Order, and is Equal as Lacedaemon or Venice.  
But for a Politician commend me to the Considerer, He will have Rome to have been an equal Commonwealth, and Venice to be an unequal one, which must be evinced by Wyre-drawing. For having elsewhere as hath been shown, admitted without-opposition that the balance of Empire is 
Consid. p. 16. 69. 70.  well divided into national and provincial, the humour now takes him to spin that wedge into such a thread as by entangling of these two, may make them both easy to be broken. Hereunto he betaketh himself in this manner. As Mr. Harrington hath well observed (p. 5.) where there are two parties in a Republic with equal power, (as in that of Rome the people had one half and the Nobility had the other half) confusion and misery are there entailed. For remedy whereof, or to avoid this, there can be no way but to make the Commonwealth very unequal.  
In answer to this, there will need no more then to repeat the same things honestly. Mr. Harrington speaketh of the National balance of Empire (p. 5.) unto this sense, where the Nobility holdeth half the propriety or about that proportion, and the people the other half, (the shares of the Land may be equal; but in regard that the Nobility have much among Few, and the People little among Many; the Few will not be contented to have authority, which is all their proper share in a Commonwealth; but will be bringing the People under power, which is not their proper share in a Commonwealth; wherefore this Commonwealth must needs be unequal; and except by altering the balance, as the Athenians did by the Sisacthia, or recision of debts; or as the Romans went about to do by an Agrarian, it be brought to such equality that the whole power be in the People, and there remain no more than Authority unto the Nobility) where is no remedy but the one (with perpetual feud) will eat out the other, as the People did the Nobility in Athens, and the Nobility the People in Rome. Where the Carcase is, there will be the Eagles also; where the Riches are, there will be the Power: So if a few be as rich as all the rest, a few will have as much power as all the rest; in which case the Commonwealth is unequal, and there can be no end of staving and tayling, till it be brought unto equality. This for the National balance; for the provincial, there power doth not follow propriety, but to the contrary. This the Praevaricator having acknowledged, le's slip, to the end that he may take a grip of Venice; which because the three or four thousand of which originally consisted, and now consisteth that whole government, having acquired Provinces, and increase of their City by later comers, do not admit these unto participation of power, he saith is an unequal Commonwealth. He will be a Mill-Horse, whether the Cake be dough or not; for this is to draw in a circle; and Rome, which by his former arguments should have been equal, by this again must be unequal, seeing Rome as little admitted her Provinces into the body of the Commonwealth as doth Venice. This clash is but by way of Parenthesis, to return therefore unto the business in present Agitation.  
The estates, be they one, or two, or three, are such (as was said) by virtue of the balance, upon which the Government must naturally depend. Wherefore constitutively the Government of France (and all other Monarchies of like balance) was administered by an Assembly of the three Estates, and thus continued, until that Nation being vanquished by the English, Charles the 7th. was put to such shifts, as for the recovery of himself in the greatest distress, he could make, unto which recovery while the Estates could not be legally called, he happening to attain without them, so ordered his affairs, that his Successors by adding unto his Inventions, came to rule without this Assembly; a way not suiting with the nature of their balance, which therefore required some Assistance by force, and other concurring Policies of like nature, whereof the foreign Guards of that Monarchy are one; The great baits alluring the Nobility another; and the Emergent interest of the Church a Third.  
To begin with the last of those, the Church, except it be in a War for Religion, as when they joined with the Princes of Lorraine; and what party of the French Nobility were made, or they could make, against the King of Navarre, are not of themselves so hot at hand, or prompt unto Arms, but the King being (to use their word) no Heretic, through their great apprehension of the third Estate, as that which is most addicted unto the Protestant Religion, may be confident, they will never side with the People: So by this Emergent interest, or accident, he hath the Church sure enough.  
For the Nobility, which is exceeding gallant, this Change hath the greatest baits; for whereas the Church being not spared, the Third Estate is laden, and the Peasant overladen with taxes, the Nobility is not only at better ease in this regard, but for the greater, or more considerable part, receiveth advantage by it; the King having always, whether in peace, or war, a great Cavalry, than which there is no better in the world for the Exercise, Entertainment, and profit of the Nobility; Governments of Cities, Castles, Provinces in abundance, which he rarely distributes unto any other. The greater Nobility are Mareschals, Generals; the less Officers in the Armies, especially of the Horse, the Emoluments whereof they receive also in time of peace; and many of this Order being Pensioners, taste of the King's liberality, without taking pains, or having any Employment at all. By which both that France is a Monarchy by a Nobility, and how she holdeth her Nobility is apparent.  
Now the Church and the Nobility standing thus engaged unto the King, by which means he hath two parts of the balance to one, it is demonstrable that the Government must be quiet. Nor seeing the Church for the reason shown is sure enough, comes the Government (since the Protestant Cities and Holds were demolished) to be otherwise disquieted then by the flying out of the Nobility, which whenever it happens in any party considerable, either for the Number, or the Interest, causeth the Crown to shake; for it seldom cometh to pass upon this occasion, but the Third Estate, or some part of it taketh Arms immediately. In which place it is worthy to be observed, that Wealth, according unto the distribution of the balance, hath contrary motions. The Third Estate in France having riches, and those laden with Taxes, come to have something to lose, and something to save, which keepeth them in continual fear or hope. The Nobility holding unto the King, the Third Estate hath something to lose, which withholdeth them from Arms, through fear; but the Nobility flying out, the Third Estate hath something to save, which precipitateth them into Arms through hope; whereas the Peasant having nothing to save, or to lose, to hope, or to fear, never stirs. The Case standing thus, the sufficiency of the French Politician (since the Masterpiece of Cardinal Richelieu, in demolishing those walls of the Protestants, which had otherwise by this time been a refuge for the Third Estate, and perhaps overturned the Monarchy) lieth altogether in finding for the Nobility work abroad, or balancing them in such sort at home, that if a party fly out, there may be a stronger within to reduce it, or at least to be opposed unto it. In this case, lest the Native interest of the Nobility, since the Assemblies of the three Estates were abolished, might cool the remaining party, or make them slower in the redress of such disorders, or discontents, than were requisite, the King is wisely provided of Foreign Guards; which being always in readiness, and not obnoxious unto the Native interest, may upon like occasions be of more Expedition and trust. Being come thus unto Foreign Arms, which is the point I more especially proposed unto myself in the present discourse, One objection in relation to what hath been already said seemeth to interpose itself. Seeing France, while it is not governed by the Assembly of States, is yet of the same balance it was, when governed by the Assembly of States; it may be said that a government of the same balance may admit of divers Administrations.  
To which I need make no other answer, then to put you in mind that while this Government was Natural, or administered by the Assembly of States, it is celebrated by Machiavelli, to have been the best ordered of any Monarchy in the world; and that what it is, or hath been of later times, you may believe your own eyes or ears.  
There be yet, before I can come unto Foreign Guards, 
Of Arms, and their kind.  some praevious considerations; All government as is implied by what hath been already shown, is of these three kinds. A government of Servants. A government of Subjects; Or a government of Citizens. The first is absolute Monarchy, as that of Turkey: The second Aristocratical Monarchy, as that of France: The third a Commonwealth, as those of Israel, of Rome, of Holland. Now (to follow Machiavelli in part) of these, The Government of Servants is the harder to be conquered, and the Easier to be held. The Government of Subjects is the easier to be conquered, and the harder to be held. To which I shall presume to add, That the Government of Citizens is both the hardest to be conquered, and the hardest to be held.  
My Author's reasons why a Government of Servants is the hardest to be conquered, come to this, that they are under perpetual discipline and command, void of such interests and factions, as have hands or power to lay hold upon advantages or innovation, whence he that invades the Turk must trust unto his own strength, and not rely upon disorders in the Government, or forces which he shall be sure enough to find united.  
His reason why this Government, being once broken, is easily held, are, That the Armies once past hope of rallying, there being no such thing as Families hanging together, or Nobility to stir up their Dependants, unto farther reluctancy for the present, or to preserve themselves by complacence with the Conquerors, for future discontents or advantages, he that hath won the Garland, hath no more to do but to extinguish the Royal line, and were it ever after in security. For the People having been always slaves, are such whose Condition he may better, in which case they are gainers by their Conqueror, but can never make worse, and therefore they lose nothing by him. Hence Alexander having conquered the Persian Empire, he and his Captains after him could hold it without the least dispute, except it arose among themselves. Hence Mahomet the second having taken Constantinople, and put Paleologus the Greek Emperor (whose Government was of like Nature with the Persian) together with his whole Family unto the Sword, the Turk hath held that Empire without reluctancy.  
On the other side, reasons why a Government of Subjects is easilier conquered, are these. That it is supported by a Nobility so Ancient, so powerful, and of such hold and influence upon the People, that the King without danger, if not ruin to himself or the Throne (an Example whereof was given in Hen. 7th of England) can neither invade their Privileges, nor levelly their Estates, which remaining, they have power upon every discontent to call in an Enemy, as Robert Count of Artois did the English, and the Duke of Guise the Spaniard into France.  
The Reasons why a Government of Subjects being so easily conquered, is nevertheless the harder to be held, are these. That the Nobility being soon out of countenance in such a case, and repenting themselves of such a bargain, have the same means in their hands whereby they brought in the Enemy, to drive him out, as those of France did both the English and the Spaniard.  
For the Government of Citizens, as it is of two kinds, an Equal or an unequal Commonwealth, the Reasons why it is the hardest to be conquered, are also of two kinds; As first the Reasons why a Government of Citizens where the Commonwealth is equal, is hardest to be conquered, are, that the Invader of such a Society must not only trust unto his own strength, in as much as the Commonwealth being equal, he must needs find them united, but in regard that such Citizens, being all Soldiers or trained up unto their Arms, which they use not for the defence of Slavery but of Liberty (a Condition not in this world to be bettered) they have more especially upon this occasion the highest Soul of Courage, and (if their Territory be of any Extent,) the vastest Body of a well disciplined Militia, that is possible in Nature; wherefore an Example of such an One overcome by the Arms of a Monarch, is not to be found in the World: And if some small City of this Frame have happened to be vanquished by a potent Commonwealth, this is her Prerogative, her Towers are her Funeral Pile, and she expireth in her own Flame, leaving nothing unto Conquest but her Ashes, as Sag●ntum overwhelmed by Carthage, and Numantia by Rome.  
The Reasons why a Government of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is unequal, is next the former, the hardest to be conquered are the same, with this difference, that albeit her Peace be not perfect within, her Condition is not to be bettered by any thing that is without; Wherefore Rome in all her strife never called in an Enemy; and if an Enemy upon occasion of her strife, and hopes of advantage by it, came without calling, he presented her with her most Sovereign Cure, who had no leisure to destroy herself, till having no Enemy to find her work, she became her own.  

— Nondum tibi defuit hostis  
In te verte manus—   
Nor is there any Example that a Government of this kind was ever subdued by the Arms of a Monarch; though some indeed may be found that have called or suffered Foreign Princes or Force to come in, as Holland by Marriages of their Princes, and Genoa through her Factions, as those of the Fiesci and Adorni.  
To conclude this part for the Reasons why a Government 
Cuic. l. 11.  of Citizens so acquired or possessed as through Marriage, or faction is the hardest to be held, there needs no more than that Men accustomed unto their Arms and their Liberties will never endure the yoke; Wherefore the Spaniard, though a mighty King, no sooner began in Holland, a small Commonwealth, to innovate or break her Orders, than she threw him off with such Courage and Disdain, as is Admirable unto the World. And somewhat of the like kind did Genoa by the help of her Doria in the vindication of her liberty from France.  
To come by this farthest way about as I think the nearest way home. Arms are of two sorts, Proper or Improper; 
Proper and improper Arms.  that is, Native or Foreign.  
Proper and Native Arms, are according unto the triple nature of Government, of three kinds; Servants in Arms, as the Helots' in Lacedaemon, the Timariot and Janissaries in Turkey: Subjects in Arms, as the Horse in France, and the Seaguards or Forces in Venice: or Citizens in Arms, as those upon the Lexiarcha in Athens, of the Morae in Lacedaemon, and the Legions in Rome.  Improper or Foreign Arms are of two Sorts. Auxiliaries or Mercenaries. 
Auxiliaries are such as are supplied by virtue of some League, as were those of the Latins and Italians unto the Romans; and those of the Cantons of Suisse (except Zurick) unto the King of France; or they may be such as are occasionally lent freely, or let forth for money by one State unto another, the later whereof differ not much from Mercenaries.  
Mercenaries are Soldiers of Fortune that have no other Trade then their Arms, and let out themselves for money; of such consisted the greatest part of the Carthaginian strength, such is the land Force of Venice, and notwithstanding the Ancient League of France with those Nations, such at this day are the Suisse and Scottish Guards (and sometimes a good part of the Foot) in France.  
Machiavil discourseth upon these particulars in his Art of War, unto Admiration: by whom I shall therefore steer.  
Where the Arms in bulk are proper, and consisting of Citizens, they have other Trades; and therefore are no Soldiers of Fortune; and yet because the Commonwealth hath Arms for her▪ Trade (in regard she is a Magistrate given for the good of Mankind, and beareth not her Sword in vain) they are all educated as well in Military as Civil discipline, taking their turns in service of either Nature according unto the Occasion, and the Orders of the Commonwealth, as in Israel, Athens, Lacedaemon and Rome, which had if their Territories permitted, and sometimes (as I may say) whether their Territories permitted or no, as in Israel, the vastest the highest tempered & the best disciplined Militia, that is to be found in the whole compass of Story. Some Armies of Israel have consisted of three or four hundred thousand Men: Rome upon the rumour of a gallic tumult, armed in Italy only, without Foreign aid, 
Pliny L. Aemilio Papo. C. A. tilio Regulo Cos.  seventy thousand Horse and seven hundred thousand Foot; things in our days (when the Turk can hardly Arm half so many) not to be credited.  
Hence that a Commonwealth, which had not first broken herself, or been broken by some other Commonwealth, should not be found to have been conquered by the Arms of any Monarch, is not miraculous but a natural effect of an apparent Cause. In this place, or upon this text, Divines whom I would desire not to be Enemies of Popular power, but to give Machiavil his due, shall, if they please, hear him make a goodly Sermon, in these words. If Ancient Commonwealths and Governments used diligence 
Arte della guerra Proem.  in any other Order to make their people Lovers of peace, faithfully unto their Country, and having the fear of God before their eyes, they doubled it in this of their Militia: for of whom should your Country expect greater faith, then of such as have offered themselves to die for her? whom should she endeavour to make greater Lovers of peace, then them who only can enslave her by force? In whom should there be greater Fear of God, then in such as carry their lives in their hands? This when Lawgivers and Captains rightly considered, was the Cause why Soldiers were esteemed honoured, followed and imitated above all men in the world, whereas since such Orders are broken, and Custom is altogether deviated from the course of Ancient prudence; men are come to detest the iniquity of the Camp, and fly the conversation of such as are in Arms, as the Pestilence. Where the Arms in bulk are proper, but consist of Subjects, they are the best next; and but the best next as appears by all Examples, Ancient, or Modern. The Arms with which Pyrrhus Prince of Epyrus invaded the Romans were of Subjects, yet that Prince though he were not vanquished by the Romans, confessed their advantage, and gave them over. The Spaniard, being a far more potent King than was Pyrrhus, hath acknowledged as much unto the Hollanders, though a far less Commonwealth than Rome: So have the Princes of Austria, and of Burgundy, unto the Switz. That the Arms of Subjects are nevertheless as much superior to the Arms of Servants, as inferior to the Arms of Citizens, is as plain; Seeing as Alexander, with Thirty thousand Subjects, vanquished Darius having innumerable slaves; so Thirty thousand Christians are at this day a Match for any Army of Turks; and we see Venice, whose force by Sea consists of Subjects, to have made him quit that Element near as fully unto her Dominion or Empire, as did the Persian to Athens.  
To Arms, that are proper, but consist of Servants, all the pre-eminence that can be given, is that they are better than foreign Arms; a proof whereof we have in those of Selimus, whereby he conquered the Mamalucks; who being but a foreign Force that held Egypt in subjection, the Country was irrecoverably lost, and (for the reasons already shown) as easily kept.  
Improper Arms, whether Auxiliary or Mercenary, where the Force of a Prince or of a Commonwealth consisteth, for the bulk or greater part, of no other, are the least effectual, and the most dangerous of all. For Auxiliaries, or what effect hath been found of them by Princes or Commonwealths, it was seen in France, during the League by the Spaniard; and in Holland during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, by the English; but especially in the Goths and Vandals, who having been Auxiliaries or Mercenaries relied upon by the later Emperors, came thereby to ruin the Roman Empire.  
Mercenaries, who make their Arms their Trade, must of all other be the most pernicious; for what can we expect less of such whose Art is not otherwise so profitable, then that they should (as Machiavil shows) be breakers of their faith, given up unto rapine, Enemies of peace and Government?  
To instance in some Commonwealths, that of Carthage after her first war with the Romans, fell through the Rebellion of Spendius, and Matho, Ringleaders of her Mercenaries, into another that was far more dangerous. Of such a Dilemma were the Arms of this State, that if Hannibal had conquered Rome, he must have been King of Carthage; and not conquering Rome, Carthage was ruined. The Commonwealth of Milan, trusting herself unto F. Sforza, and his mercenaries, became the Subject of her Servant, and he her Duke. Nor is Venice, whose Land forces are of the same kind, otherwise in safety, as to these, then by her situation. To give some instances of the same nature in Princes. The father of F. Sforza, being Captain of a like Mercenary Army, forced Joan Queen of Naples, whom he left disarmed in the midst of her enemies, to lay herself at the feet of the King of Arragon; and Braccio by such another treachery had plainly possessed himself of the Kingdom of Naples, had he not been broken at Aquila, where death intercepted his design. From what hath been said, first of Government and then of Arms; if a Government of servants be harder to be conquered, and easier to be held, then in this Foreign Arms must needs be least necessary, and most dangerous.  
If a Government of Subjects be easier to be conquered, and harder to be held, then in this Foreign Arms may be more necessary, but must be less dangerous.  
But though a Government of Citizens be both hardest to be conquered, and hardest to be held, yet as it is, again in this regard, of two kinds, this cannot be said of each kind alike, wherefore I must distinguish.  
In a Government of Citizens, if the Commonwealth be not for increase, but preservation only, as Lacedaemon, Carthage, Venice, Foreign Arms are both necessary and dangerous; but in a Government of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is both for increase and preservation, as Rome, Foreign Arms are neither necessary, nor dangerous.  
To Repeat the parts of this Conclusion, which being brief, is obscure, more fully and particularly.  
The Empire of Turkey is of the harder kind to be conquered, wherefore the Turk needeth not foreign guards, to defend him, but it is of the easier to be held, wherefore let him take heed of intrusting his person with Foreign Guards, who having a foreign interest, may have a foreign Nation to assist them; and so the person of the Prince being in their hands, they have no more to do then to Extinguish the Royal Line, and the Empire, being easily held, is their own thenceforth with security. Thus the Mamalucks which were at first Foreign Guards, extinguishing the Royal line of the Kings of Egypt, came to possess, and hold that Realm without opposition. Who well considers this point, will never enough admire the policy of the Turk, in the creation (as it were) of his Janissaries, free from any National interest that might make them dream of, or desire liberty, and yet soevoid of all foreign interest, or knowledge, that they know not what, or who were their Country or Parents. Hence though they have interest to murder the Turk, and sometimes do accordingly, they have no farther interest in the world, but what depends upon the Government; and so the Empire is safe, though the Prince be in danger; whereas if they were Foreign Guards, or had any Native interest, not only the Prince, but the Empire too would be in danger, the rest being servants, and such whose condition might be bettered by a Change, but could be no worse. Wherefore a Government of Servants must by no means admit of Foreign Guards, or Mamalucks.  
But the Empire of France, where the Nobility are not only subject to fly out, but to call in strangers, may have use of Foreign Guards, which not obnoxious to Native interest, and factions, as those of the Nobility, are the readiest and best help at this lift, yet not dangerous, though having the Prince in their power, because by him they are safe from the Nobility, who, were it not for the Prince, would be so far from bearing or brooking Foreign Guards, that in case a Foreigner came in upon their call, having the same means to help themselves, whereby they brought him in, they would shake the yoke, and the Ends why they called him in being satisfied or repent of, drive him out again, as they did the Spaniard, and the English; but if this Government being invaded or conquered, be so hard to be kept, how much harder being surprised? Wherefore in a Government by Subjects Foreign Arms may be more necessary, but must be less dangerous.  
In a Commonwealth for preservation, as Lacedaemon, Carthage, Venice, Foreign Arms are necessary: So Lacemon, though able to defend herself by her proper forces against any one City; yet the wars in Greece going much upon leagues and Confederates, was forced also to make use of her Confederates, and sometimes of her Helots'.  
But as anciently to Carthage, so now to Venice, Forreign or Mercenary Forces are essential, because for Land-service such a Constitution can have no other: Yet is this course extremely dangerous, as appeared by Lacedaemon, who (being ever in fear of her Helots') when she had acquired upon the matter the whole Empire of Greece, came by the rebellion of her Confederates, not only to lose all, but to ruin. For Carthage upon the Mutiny of Spendius & Matho, she escaped as at other times upon like occasions, very narrowly. That such an accident neither hath befallen Venice nor can befall her, is to be attributed unto her situation, by which, in this regard, she is secure: Nevertheless, her progress, or increase, which by this means either cannot be great, or being great, must render her but the more infirm, is full bard.  
To a Commonwealth for increase, which always taketh in the whole body of the People, Foreign Arms (seeing she aboundeth above all other kinds of policy, with such as are proper) must needs be the least necessary; and they are the most safe, because never admitting them, but for her mere convenience, and frugality in expense of Native blood, she receiveth no such charge of them as can recoil, but must carry point blank, and as vigorously at her proper interest, very near as her proper Arms. Thus did the Latin and Italian Auxiliaries, of which joined with the Roman Legions, consisted a Consular Army.  
By thus much it seemeth that an inference from the success of Arms unto the perfection of Government, and from the perfection of Government, to the success of Arms, should be no fallacious way of disputing.  
But this hath been sweaty work with▪ the Considerer; (who loves his ease) it is enough to argue thus. The Switz, Scottish, and French guards, have never been the Authors of any sedition, therefore the seditiousnesse of a Nobility may be mended by Foreign Guards; which is, as if one should say, such a Physician hath never been the cause of the Gout; therefore the Gout may be cured by such a Physician. That Foreign Arms may be well enough applied in the case of a seditious Nobility, and have some good effects, is not denied, but is France therefore cured of her sedition, or remains she notwithstanding her Foreign Guards, the most sedious example in the world? If thus she have not been, nor be, what hath he read of the Princes of the blood in former times, or heard of late from them? But if thus she have been, and be, is it not a fine way of cure to give us an example of the disease for the remedy? Nor are her Guards so void of sedition neither; but the Switz, if he want his pay, dares threaten Paris; the Scot (at least of late years) hath not been so bold; but if a Prince fly out, the Ensigns of the French Guards will one way or other be Captains, while Soldier and Officer too follows his affections or interests, which way soever they frame. I should be glad to know when a Dragon fell from that Court, that did not bear down stars with his train. But the Prevaricator is set upon it, whereas of late years, the Janissaries are known to have been far more imbrued in the blood of their Princes then ever: he gives us his honest word, that of late years in Turkey, they begin to learn the art of poising the Janissaries (who are the foot of the Prince's Guard) by the Spahyes, (who are the horse of the same) and so have frequently evaded the danger of their mutinies. At which rate, seeing every Army consisteth of Horse and Foot, no Army could be mutinous. If these had not been mere slights, and so intended, he might have done well to have shown us One Mutiny of the Janissaries appeased by the Spahyes. But all the parts of his Politics (as was said of those in Rhetoric) consist of Pronunciation.  
Thus the wounds of Monarchy, notwithstanding the former, or this last remedy of Foreign Guards, are still bleeding, or festering.  
But his courage is undaunted, (aut viam inveniat aut faciat) he will either mend a Government, or make one, by asserting without any example, but with egregious 
Consid. p. 48. 49.  confidence, That the perfection of Monarchy is free from those flaws, which are charged upon it, and that it consists in governing by a Nobility, weighty enough to keep the People under, yet not tall enough in any particular person to measure with the Prince; and by a Moderate Army kept under the Notion of Guards, and Garrisons, which may be sufficient to strangle all sedition in the Cradle, from which mixture, or Counterpoise of a Nobility and an Army, ariseth the most excellent form of Monarchical Government.  
There's for your learning now, A Model which is a short horse, and a Legislator that hath soon curried him. To the parts of it, consisting of a Nobility, and in force, I have already spoken severally. I shall now speak unto the whole together; that is, unto the imagined mixture or Counterpoise of a Nobility and an Army; and because there is nothing in Nature, that hath not had a natural effect by some example.  
The scale of Arms, or of Iron, continued in the Line of William the Conqueror, and the scale of Propiety, or gold, continued in the Barons of England, and their Successors. But in this, before the Baron's wars consisted not the perfection of the Monarchy, because it preponderated too much on the side of Arms; nor after the Baron's wars, because the King, putting power (which he could not keep out of their fingers) into the hands of the Nobility, it became a vicious constitution, and a Monarchy only in Name, (so saith the Considerer) therefore the balance being then only even, when neither the King could overbalance, or get the better of the Barons, nor the Baron's overbalance, or get the better of the King; the perfection of Monarchy consisted in the Baron's wars! Lycurgus' the Second!  
Mark; the King by all means must have a Nobility weighty enough to keep down the people; and then he must have an Army to hold gold weight with his Nobility; as if the Nobility in that case would keep down the People, and not fetch them up (as did the Barons) into their scale, that so together they might weigh down the Army; which sooner or later is the infallible consequence of this fantasy; or let it be shown where it was ever otherwise; to instance in France is quite contrary, where all the considerable offices, and commands being in the Nobility, or the richer sort of that Nation, the balance of Arms, and of propriety are not two, but one and the same. There is no way for Monarchy, but to have no Army, or no other than the Nobility, which maketh the regulated Monarchy, as in France, Spain, etc. or to have an Army that may weigh down Nobility and People too; that is, destroy them both, which maketh the absolute way of Monarchy, as in Turkey; the wit of man never found, nor shall find a third, there being no such thing in Nature.  
This Chapter is already with the longest, and yet I must give you a (corollary pouce de roy, or) Piece above measure; upon a question which the greenest Politician that ever brought his Verjuice to the Press, hath spurred me.  
Where he desires to know my opinion of the way of governing by Councils, which he confesseth he hath always thought admirable; he doth not mean such as are coordinate with the Prince (which have been seen in the world) but such 
Consid. p. 49. 50.  as those of Spain, purely of advice and dispatch, with power only to inform and persuade, not limit the Princes will. For almost all the weaknesses which have been thought incident to Monarchy, are by this course prevented, and if there be any steadiness and maturity in the Senate of a Commonwealth, this takes it all in.  
To give my Counsel without a fee, and deal sincerely with a Prevaricator: Let the Prince (that is, such an one as his) hold himself contented with his Divan, or Cabinet. If this be that he means, we are agreed; but if he would have more, I can make no less of his words, than an hankering after such Councils as I have proposed, and that these are such as he always thought admirable, such as prevent almost all the weaknesses incident to Monarchy, and take in the steadiness and maturity of a Commonwealth.  
How may we make this agree with that other place? where he saith that there is no frame of laws, or constitution of government, which will not decay and come to ruin, unless repaired by the prudence and dexterity of them that govern. Now that this may not be expected from a Monarch, as well as 
Consid. p. 68  from a Senate, or assembly of men, he hath not yet met with any conviction, but rather finds it reasonable to think that where debates are clearest, the result of them most secret, and the execution sudden, (which are the advantages of Monarchy) there the disorders of a State will soon be discovered, and the necessary remedies best applied. In that former place he bethought himself, that the debates of Rome were as clear as those of Antiochus, that her results were as secret as those of Philip, or Perseus, and of more sudden execution then either of theirs. He doubted it might be true, which is affirmed by good Authors, and commonly enough known, that for the clearness of debate, and secrecy of result, the world never saw any thing like the Senate of Venice, and that in all appearance they are for execution, as quick with the Divan, as the Divan can be with them. Now when all this is done, to banish so generous thoughts without showing us for what cause, and knock under the table, is sad news. But he shall find me, in any thing that is reasonable, most ready to serve him. To the question then, how such Councils as I have proposed would do with a Prince? I answer, truly the best of them, I doubt, but untowardly. One, that is the Popular Assembly, hath no mean, but is either the wisest in Nature, or hath no brains at all. When affairs go upon no other than the Public interest, this having no other interest to follow, nor eyes to see withal, is the wisest Council: but such ways are destructive to a Prince, and they will have no nay: The Congregation of Israel, when Rehoboam would not hearken to their advice, deposed him: and we know what Popular Councils, so soon as they came to sufficient power, did in England. If a Prince put a Popular Council from this ward, He does a great matter, and to little purpose, for they understand nothing else but themselves. Wherefore the Kings of France and of Spain, have dissolved all such Assemblies. It is true, where a Prince is not strong enough to get money out of them, but by their cocsent, they are necessary, but then they are not purely of advice and dispatch, but share in the Government, and he cannot be meddling with their Purses, but they will be meddling with his Laws. The Senate is of fitter use for a Prince, and yet except he have the way of Tiberius, but a ticklish piece, as appears by Maximinus, who was destroyed by Pupienus and Balbinus, Captains set up against him by this Order. To go unto the Root. These things are not otherwise in prudence or choice then by direction of the balance; where this is Popular no remedy, the Prince must be advised by the People, which if the late King would have endured, the Monarchy might have subsisted somewhat longer, but while the balance was Aristocratical, as during the great Estates of the Nobility and the Clergy, we find not the People to have been great or wise Counsellors. In sum, if a King govern by a Popular Council, or an house of Commons, the Throne will not stand long. If he governs by a Senate, or an house of Lords, let him never fear the Throne, but have a care of himself: there is no third as I have said often enough but the Divan.   

CHAP. X. Whether a Commonwealth that was not first broken by herself, were ever conquered by the Arms of any Monarch?  
I Come in this Chapter to resume the discourse, where I broke off in the former, making good my assertion that a Commonwealth is the Government, which from the beginning of the world unto this day was never conquered by any Monarch; For if the Commonwealths of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Macedon, they were first broken by themselves.  
When I speak of a Commonwealth, in relation to this point, I am no more to be argued against out of the Little Cities in Asia, or those of Ragusa, and San Marino, which cannot be shown to have had the Command of any considerable Army, than I argue against the Praevaricator, where he asserts Monarchy to consist of a mixture of Arms and of a Nobility, from the King of Yuetot who had neither.  
This assertion in the judgement of any rational Man ought not to be encountered, but where there was a Natural possbility of defence, in regard that a City which hath no Army at all, as Geneva (which yet being invaded by the Duke of Savoy found means to defend herself) or such an one as is not considerable, should be subdued by some potent Monarch (if we could find the Example) concerns the Government no more, then if it had been overwhelmed by some inundation, or swallowed up by some Earthquake. And yet all that is Opposed by the Considerer, amounts not unto thus much. The testimony he brings out of Pausanias comes far short; for it is recorded (saith the Author speaking of the Lucedemonians) that being corrupted by the bounty of Croesus, they were the first that 
Consid p. 53. Paus. Messen.  contracted Amity with the Barbarians at the time when that King added the Territories inhabited by the Dorians upon the border of Caria, with other Commonwealths in Asia unto his Empire. So that Croesus corrupted the Lacedæmonians with gifts, Pausanias is express, but whether he obtained the Asiatic Cities (likely in this case to have been easilier corrupted than the Lacedæmonians) by Arms or by Purchase, he is not express; and the presumption of the later, as in other regards, so in this is the stronger; that Croesus by the testimony of Solon, was more potent in Gold then in Iron. Now if it were so, (and if otherwise let the Considerer show) that these Commonwealths, inveagled by the Treasure of Croesus, came first under the Lydian, and fell with that under the Persian Empire, when Croesus was subdued by Cyrus; All I can learn by this example is no more than that Croesus, for aught that is perceivable, might have bought those Commonwealths as Cosimo of Medici's did Florence; of whom it is affirmed by Machiavelli that there was not a considerable Man in the whole City that had not received some considerable sum. So this Example presumes; but in the next (which is of Sicily) there is not so much as a Presumption in favour of the Assertor, The State of Sicily before that which the Romans call the first Carthaginian war being clear in Story against his design. For that Africa for the generation of Monsters is not more famous 
Fazello Hist. de Sicil Polyb. l. 1.  than Sicily for that of Tyrants, they who have passed their Novitiat in Story are not ignorant; nor how when Timoleon had freed her of this Vermin, and with Liberty she had recovered some strength and virtue, she relapsed under Agathocles and his horrid violation of faith, while he was trusted with the Arms of her Citizens: how after him Pyrrhus was called in from Epirus, after Pyrrhus Hiero usurped; all, by the same Arts, getting first into Trust or Charge, and then recoiling upon them that would take no warning: by which it is apparent that the Commonwealths of Sicily, like those of Greece, were ruined by themselves, and their own disorders; and no more subdued upon these changes by foreign Arms, than was Israel by the Canaanites, or Rome by the Gauls or Decemvirs.  
Israel (having broken her orders) was indeed sometimes oppressed by the Canaanites; Rome was sacked by the Gauls, and usurped by the Decemvirs, but as the Man that having gotten a fall in a Duel throws off his Adversary, recovers himself, and his sword, is not conquered, so neither the Commonwealth; wherefore neither Holland nor Genoa, though 
Decree of the States of Holland apud Grot. Hist. 4.  they have been under, being yet standing, can be said to be conquered by the Arms of Spain or of France, but rather to the contrary, seeing the Liberty of Holland (in many Cities more Ancient than any Records or other Monuments there can witness, and in itself then that of Tacitus, whereby Civilis born of Princely blood, is affirmed to have vindicated the Batavian freedom) is still the same; And Genoa though happy in her Doria, remaineth as she was before he was born. Nor did the Family of the Medici's banished out of Florence where by virtue of their prodigious wealth, and the inevitable consequence of the balance their Ancestors had been Princes many years before Charles the fifth was a Soldier, any more by the help of his Arms, those of the Pope (at that time of the same family) and their party at home, then get into their known saddle. To insist a little more at large upon the Stories of Genoa & Florence (because upon these the Prevanicator sets up his rest that Mr, Harrington must needs be afflicted) Genoa was and is an Oligarchy consisting of Twenty eight Families making the Great Council or Aggregation as they call it, none but these being capable of the Senate or of Magistracy and if ever it could be said of a Commonwealth that she had broken herself, it might be said at the time related to, of Genoa where not only the faction of the Guelphs and Gybelins, which had destroyed many Cities in Italy then reigned, but the fewed between the People included, and the Subject excluded, was as great as ever had been between the Nobility and the People in Rome, besides that of the Fieschi and the Adorni two families, like Caesar and Pompey, which having many years together, as it were engrossed the Magistracy of Duke, were nevertheless perpetually striving each with other, which should have it, and if one of these (as it did) brought in the King of France, there is nothing plainer than that this Commonwealth, was subdued by her own sedition, nor is there a man knowing any thing of her affairs, that maketh any doubt of it. That of Florence in deed if the Praevaricator could show it had been ever up, I should grant were down, but to relate the Story of this City, I must relate that of the House of Medici's. From Cosimo, a 
Comines. P. Jovius. Machiavelli.  Citizen famous throughout Europe both for his wisdom and his riches, this family for the space of sixty years, exercised, under the pretext of some Magistracy, very great power in Florence. To Cosimo succeeded Peter, to Peter Laurence a Man in Prudence and Liberality resembling his Grandfather, save that he used more absolute power in menaging the Commonwealth, yet with gentleness, and not altogether unto the suppression of Liberty. Nevertheless he obtained of the Siginory (which did for the most part as he would have them) some small guard for his person, he was a Man renowned through Italy, and looked upon by foreign Princes with much respect. To him succeeded his Son another Peter who through youth and rashness conceiving the power exercised by his Predecessors to be no more than his due, took upon him the Government as absolute Lord of All, and standing most formidably upon his Guard grew sottishly profuse of the Public money, committed many absurdities and violences; By which means having incurred the hatred of the Citizens, he was banished by the Signiory, with Cardinal John and Julian his brothers. This John coming after to be Pope Leo the Tenth, required the revocation of his brother's banishment, and the restitution of the House of Medici's, to which finding the prevailing party of the Florentines to be refractory, He stirred up the Arms of the Emperor Charles the fifth against them, by whose Joint Aid the City, after a long siege, was reduced unto her Old Ward, and Alexander of Medici's, Nephew unto the Pope and son in Law unto the Emperor, set in the known Saddle of his Ancestors. This is the Action for which the Praevaricator will have a Commonwealth to have been conquered by the Arms of a Monarch, though who reads the story may very safely affirm, First that Florence never attained unto any such Orders as could deserve the Name of a Commonwealth; and next that the purse of Cosimo had done that long before, which is here attributed unto the Arms of the Pope and the Emperor. Reason and Experience (as I said) are like the roots and the branches of Plants and trees: as of branches fruits and flowers being open and obvious unto the eye, the smell, the touch, and taste every girl can skill; so examples unto vulgar capacity are the best Arguments. Let him that saith a Commonwealth hath been at any time conquered by a Monarch, to it gain, and show us the Example. But though fruits and flowers be easily known each from other; their Roots are latent, and not only so, but of such resemblance that to distinguish of these a man must be a Gardener or an Herbalist. In this manner, the reason why a Commonwealth, hath not been overcome by a Monarch, hath been shown in the distribution of Arms, those of a Prince consisting of Subjects or servants, & those of a Commonwealth rightly Ordered, of Citizens, which difference relates plainly unto the perfection or imperfection of the Government.  
But, says the Prevaricator this seems intended for a Trial 
Consid. p, 51.  of our Noses whether they will serve us to discover the fallacy of an inference from the prosperous success of Arms to the perfection of Government. If she who should have some care of the Vineyard of Truth, shall lie pigging of wide bores, to grunt in this manner and fear with the tush, and I happen to ring some of them (as I have done this Marcassin for rooring) there is nothing in my faith, why such trial of their Noses should be sin; but for fallations inferrences such I leave unto them whose Caps are squarer then their play.  
For all that, Great and well policyd Empires (saith he) have been subverted by People so eloigned from the perfection of government, that we scarce know of any thing to tie them together, but the desire of booty. Where, or how came he to know this? what reason or experience doth he allege for the proof of it? May we not say of this, it is for the trial of our Noses, whether they will serve us to discover that a Conclusion should have some Premises? He gives us leave to go look, and all the premises that I can find are quite contrary.  
The Arms of Israel were always victorious, till the 
Judges ch. 1. & 2.  death of Josua, whereupon, the orders of that Commonwealth being neglected, they came afterwards to be seldom prosperous. Isocrates in his Oration to the Areopagites, speaks thus of Athens, The Lacedæmonians, who when we were under Oligarchy, every day commanded us something; now while we are under popular Administration, are our Petitioners that we would not see them utterly ruined by the Thebans. Nor did Lacedaemon ruin till her Agrarian, the foundation of her Government was first broken. The Arms of Rome (ever noted by Historians, and clearly evinced 
Arte della guerra▪  by Machiavil to have been the result of her policy) during the popular government were at such a pitch, as if Victory had known no other wings then those of her Eagles: nor seeing the Goths and Vandals are the Legislators from whom we derive the government of King, Lords, and Commons, were these when they overcame the Roman Empire, a people so eloigned from the perfection of Government, but their Policy was then far better than that of the Emperors, which having been at first founded upon a broken Senate, and a few Military Colonies, was now come unto a Cabinet, and a Mercenary Army. The Judgement of all ages and writers upon the Policy of the Roman Emperors, is in this place worthy, and through the pains already taken by Erasmus and Sleiden, easy to be inserted. O miserable and deplorable State (saith Erasmus) the 
In his Preface▪ to Suelonius.  Authority of the Senate, the power of the Law, the Liberty of the People being trodden underfoot; to a Prince, that got up in this manner, the whole World was a servant, while he himself was a servant unto such, as no honest man would have endured the like servants in his house! the Senate dreaded the Senate dreaded the Emperor, the Emperor dreaded his execrable Militia: the Emperor gave Laws unto Kings, and received them from his Mercenaries. To this is added by Sleiden, That the condition 
De qual. Imp.  of these Princes was so desperate, it was a wonderful thing, Ambition herself could have the courage to run such a hazard; seeing from Cajus Caesar slain in the Senate to Charles the Great, there had been above thirty of them murdered, and four that had laid violent hands upon themselves; For there was always something in them that offended the Soldiery which whether they were good or bad was equally subject to pick quarrels, upon the least occasion raised tumults, and dispatched even such of them as they had forced to accept of that dignity, for example▪ Aelius Pertinax. But, if this be true, that of the Goths and Vandals, when they subdued this Empire, must have been the better Government; for so ill as this never was there any, except that only of the Kings of Israel, which certainly was much worse. Those of the Britain's and the Gauls, were but the dregs of this of Rome, when they were overcome by the Saxons and Franks, who brought in the Policy of the Goths and Vandals.  
When Tamerlan overcame Bajazet, the Turkish Policy had not attained unto that extent of Territory, which is plainly necessary unto the nature of it, nor was the Order of the Janissaries yet instituted. The Hollander, who under a potent Prince, was but a Fisherman, with the restitution of the popular government, is become the better Soldier; nor hath been matched but by a rising Commonwealth, whose Policy you will say was yet worse: but then her balance (being that especially which produceth men) was far better. For vastness, for fruitfulness of territory, for bodies of men, for number, for courage, nature never made a Country more potent than Germany: yet this Nation anciently the Seminary of Nations, hath of late years, merely through the defect of her policy (which in tending one Common wealth hath made an hundred Monarchies in her bowels, whose cross interests twist her guts) been the theatre of the saddest Tragedies under the Sun; nor is she curable unless some Prince alling to work with the Hammer of War, be able totally to destroy the old, and forge her a Government entirely new. But, if this come to be, neither shall it be said, that a well polycyed Empire was subverted, nor by a people so eloigned from perfection of government, but theirs must be much better than the other. Let me be as ridiculous as you will, the World is (in faece Romuli) ripe for great changes which must come. And look to it, whether it be Germany, Spain, France, Italy, or England, that comes first to fix herself upon a firm foundation of policy, she shall give law unto, and be obeyed by the rest There was never so much fight as of late days to so little purpose; Arms, except they have a root in policy, are altogether fruitless. In the War between the King and the Parliament, not the Nation only, but the policy of it was divided, and which part of it was upon the better foundation?  
But saith he, Ragusa and San Marino are commended for 
Consid. p. 51.  their upright and equal frame of Government, and yet have hardly extended their Dominion, beyond the size of an handsome Manor.  
Have Ragusa, or San Marino been conquered by the Arms of any Monarch? For this (I take it) is the Question; though, if they had, these being Common wealths unarmed, it were nothing to the purpose. The question of increase is another point. Lacedaemon could not increase (because her frame was of another nature) without ruin; yet was she not conquered by any Monarch.  
Come, come says he for all this. It is not the perfection of 
Consid. p. 52.  Government, but the populousness of a Nation, the natural valour of the Inhabitants, the abundance of Horses, Arms, and other things necessary for equipping of an Army, assisted with a good Military Discipline, that qualify a People for Conquest; and where these concur, Victory is entailed upon them, Very fine▪  
As if these could concur any otherwise then by virtue of the policy. For example, there is no Nation under Heaven more populous than France. Yet saith Sir Francis Bacon, If the Gentlemen be too many, the Commons will be base, 
Essay 29.  and not the hundredth Pole fit for an Helmet, as may be seen by comparison of England with France, whereof the former, though far less in Territory and Populousness; hath been nevertheless the over-match; in regard the middle People in England make good Soldiers which the Paisants in France do not. This therefore was from the Policy, by which the one hath been the freest, and the other the most enslaved Subject in the World, and not from populousness, in which case, France must have been the Over match.  
The like is observable in the natural valour of the people, there being no greater courage of an Infantry, then that of the middle people in England, whereas the Peasant having none at all, is never used in Arms. Again, France hath one of the best Cavalries in the World, which the English never had, yet it availed her not. Victory is more especially entailed upon courage, and courage upon liberty, which groweth not without a root planted in the policy or foundation of the Government.  
Alexander with an handful of freermen, overcame the greatest abundance of Horses, Arms, and other things necessary for the equipping of an Army, the hugest Armies, the most vast and populous Empire in the World; and when he had done, could not by all these subdue that handful of freer men (though he killed Clitus with his own hand in the quarrel) unto the servile customs of that Empire. And that the best Military Discipline derived from the policy of the Romans, I intimated before, and have shown at large in other places.  
But the Praevaricator neither minds what is said, nor cares what he says; to affirm that a Common wealth was never conquered by any Monarch, and that a Commonwealth hath conquered many Monarches, or frequently led mighty Kings in triumph, is to run upon the foil, the second proposition being, with him, no more then, only the conversion of the first. As if that, Rome was not conquered 
Consid. p. 55.  by the World; and that the World was conquered by Rome, were but a simple conversion. So the World having not conquered Venice, it must follow, that Venice hath conquered the World. Do we take, or are we taken? Nor is he thus satisfied to burn his fingers, but he will blister his tongue.  
Where I said that the COMMONWEALTH OF VENICE, consisting of all them that first fled from the main Land, unto those▪ Islands where the City is now planted, at the institution took in the WHOLE PEOPLE, he would make you believe I had said that the SENATE OF VENICE at the first institution, TOOK IN THE WHOLE PEOPLE. It is matter of fact, and that in 
Consid. p. 70. Oceana p. 9  which his integrity will be apparent unto every man's judgement. I pray you see the places. And yet when he hath put this— upon me, he tells me, perhaps it is not true, and this only I grant him, passed peradventure is false, whether that I said it, or that the thing is possible. For how is it possible, that the Senate, which is no otherwise such▪ than as it consisteth of the Aristocracy, or select part of the People should take in the whole People? It is true, that good Authors, both ancient and modern, when they speak of the Senate of Rome, or of Venice historically, imply the People. Machiavil, speaketh of the Magistracy of Publilius Philo as prolonged by the Senate of Rome, without making any mention of the people, by whom nevertheless it was granted: the like is usual with other Authors. Thuanus seldom mentioneth the Common wealth of Venice, but by the name of the Senate; which not understood by the learned Considerer, where Contarini speaks in the same manner, of the courses taken by the Commonwealth of Venice, for withholding the Subject in the City from sedition, he takes him to be speaking of the means, whereby the Senate (an't please you) keeps the People under: and so having put one trick upon me, and another upon Contarini, these two are his premises, whence he draws this conclusion, That Venice is as much as any in the World, an unequal Common wealth. Now the conclusion, you know no body can deny.   

Chap. XI. whether there be not an Agrarian, or some Law, or Laws of that Nature, to supply the defect of it in every Common wealth: and whether the Agrarian, as it is stated in Oceana, be not equal and satisfactory unto all Interests.  
IN this Chapter the Praevaricator's devices, are the most well favoured; for whereas the Agrarian of Oceana, doth no more than pin the Basket, which is already filled, he gets up into the Tree, where the Birds have long since, eaten all the Cherries, and with what Clouts he can rake up, makes a most ridiculous scarecrow. This pains he needed not to have taken, if he had not slighted over much, the Lexicon of which, he allows me to be the Author, yet will have it, that he understood the words before; some of which nevertheless, his ill understanding requireth, should be farther interpreted in this place, as Propriety, Balance, Agrarian, and Levelling.  
Propriety is that which is every Mans own by the Law of the Land, and of this there is nothing stirred, but all entirely left as it was found by the Agrarian of Oceana.  
Propriety in money (except as hath been shown in Cities that have little or no Territory) cometh not unto the present Account: But Propriety in Land, according to the distribution that happeneth to be of the same, causeth the Political balance producing Empire of the like Nature: that is, if the Propriety in Lands be so diffused through the whole People, that neither one Landlord, nor a few Landlord's overbalance them, the Empire is popular. If the propriety in Lands be so engrossed by the Few, that they overbalance the whole people, the Empire is Aristocratical, or mixed Monarchy; But if Propriety in Lands be in one Landlord▪ to such a proportion as over-ballanceth the whole People, the Empire is absolute Monarchy. So the political balance is threefold, Democratical, Aristocratical, and Monarchical.  
Each of these Balances may be introduced either by the Legislator, at the institution of the Government; or by civil Vicissitude, alienation, or alteration of propriety under Government.  
Examples of the balance introduced at the institution, and by the Legislator▪ are first those in Israel and Lacedaemon, introduced by God or Moses; and Lycurgus, which were Democratical or Popular. Secondly, Those in England, France and Spain▪ introduced by the Goths, Vandals, Saxons, and Franks, which were Aristocratical, or such as produced the Government of King, Lords and Commons. Thirdly, those in the East and Turkey, introduced by Nimrod and Mahomet, or Ottoman, which were purely Monarchial.  
Examples of the Balance introduced by civil Vicissitude, alienation▪ or alteration of Propriety under Government are in Florence, where the Medici's attaining to excessive wealth, the balance altered from Popular, to Monarchial: In Greece, where the Argives being Lovers of equality 
Pausan: Corith.  and liberty▪ reduced the power of their Kings to so small a matter, that there remained unto the Children and Successors of Cisus, little more than the Title, where the balance altered from Monarchical to Popular. In Rome, about the time of Crassus, the Nobility having eaten the People out of their Lands, the balance altered from Popular, first unto Aristocratical, as in the Triumvirs, Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus; and then to Monarchical, as when Crassus being dead, and Pompey conquered, the whole came to Caesar. In 
Arist. Pol. L. 5. C. 3.  Tarentum, not long after the War with the Medes, the Nobility being wasted, and overcome by Iapy●es, the balance▪ and with that the Common wealth changed from Aristocratical, to Popular: the like of late hath discovered itself in Oceana. When a balance cometh so through civil Vicissitude to be changed, that the change cannot be attributed unto humane Providence, it is more peculiarly to be ascribed unto the hand of God; and so when there happeneth to be an irresistible change of the balance, not the old Government which God hath repealed, but the new Government, which he dictateth as present Legislator, is of Divine right.  
This volubility of the balance being apparent, it belongs unto Legislators to have eyes, and to occur with some prudential or legal remedy or prevention; and the Laws that are made in this Case are called Agrarian. So an Agrarian is a Law fixing the balance of a Government, in such manner that it cannot alter.  
This may be done divers ways, as by entailing the Lands upon certain Families, without power of Alienation in any case, as in Israel and Lacedaemon, or except with leave of the Magistrate, as in Spain; but this by making some Families too secure, as those in possession, and others too despairing, as those not in possession, may make the whole People less industrious.  
Wherefore the other way, which by the regulation of purchases, ordains only, that a Man's Land shall not exceed some certain proportion; for example, two thousand pounds a year, or exceeding such a proportion, shall divide in descending unto the Children, so soon as being more than one, they shall be capable of such division, or sub-division, till the greater share exceed not two thousand pounds a year in Land, lying and being within the Native Territory, is that which is received and established by the Common wealth of Oceana.  
By Levelling, they who use the word, seem to understand, when a People rising invades the Lands and Estates of the richer sort, and divides them equally among themselves; as for example,— No where in the World; this being that both in the way, and in the end, which I have already demonstrated to be impossible. Now the words of this Lexicon being thus interpreted; Let us hearken what the Praevaricator will say, and out it comes in this manner.  
To him that makes propriety, and that in Lands the foundation 
Consid. p. 73.  of Empire, the establishing of an Agrarian is of absolute necessity, that by it the power may be fixed in those hands to whom it was at first committed.  
What need we then proceed any farther, while he having no where disproved the balance in these words, gives the whole cause? For as to that which he faith of money seeing neither the vast treasure of Henry the 7th, altered the balance of England, nor the Revenue of the Indies altars that of Spain, this retreat (except in the cases excepted) is long since barricadoed. But he is on and off, and, any thing to the contrary notwithstanding, gives you this for certain.  
The Examples of an Agrarian are so infrequent; that Mr. Harrington is constrained to wave all, but two Commonwealths, and can find in the whole extent of History only Israel, and Lacedaemon to fasten upon.  
A man that hath read my Writings, or is skilled in History, cannot choose but see, how he slurs his Dice, nevertheless, to make this a little more apparent, It hath seemed to some, (says Aristotle) the main point of institution in Government, 
Pol. L. 2. C. 5.  to order riches right: whence otherwise derives all Civil discord? Upon this ground, Phaleas the Calcedonian Legislator made it his first work to introduce equality of goods, and Plato in his Laws, allows not increase unto a possession beyond certain bounds. The Argives, and the Messenians had each their Agrarian, after the manner of Lacedaemon, If a 
Plut. Lycur.  man shall translate the words (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, virtus & facultas civilis) Political virtue or faculty, where he finds them in Aristotle's Politics, (as I make bold, and appeal unto the Reader, whether too bold to do) by the words Political balance, understood as I have stated the thing, it will give such a light unto the Author, as will go nearer than any thing alleged (as before by this Praevaricator) to deprive me of the honour of that 
Pol. L. 3. C. 9  invention. For Example, where Aristotle saith, If one man, or such a number of men, as to the capacity of Government come within the compass of the Few, excel, all the rest (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) in balance, or in such manner, that the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Political faculties or Estates of all the rest, be not able to hold weight with him or them; they will never condescend to share equally with the rest in power; whom they excel in balance; nor is it to any purpose to give them Laws, who will be as the Gods, their own Laws: and answer the People as the Lions are said, by Antisthenes, to have answered the hares, when they had concluded, that every one ought to have an equal portion. For this cause (he adds) Cities that live under popular power, have instituted the Ostracism, for the▪ preservation of equality; by which, if a man increase in riches, retinue, or popularity above what is safe, they can remove him (without loss of honour or estate) for a time.  
If the Considerer think that I have strained courtesy with Aristotle (who indeed is not always of one mind) further than is warrantable, in relation to the balance, be it, as he pleaseth, I who must either have the more of Authority, or the less of Competition in the point, shall lose neither way. However, it is in this place enough, that the Ostracism being of like nature, was that which supplied the defect in the Grecian Cities of an Agrarian. To proceed then unto Rome, that the People there, by striving for an Agrarian, strove to save their Liberty, is apparent, in that through the want of such a Law, or the nonobservance of it, the Common wealth came plainly unto ruin. If a Venetian should keep a Table, or have his House furnished with retainers, he would be obnoxious unto the Council of Ten: and if the best of them appear with other state or equipage, then is allowed unto the meanest, he is obnoxious unto the Officers of the Pomp, which two Orders in a Commonwealth, where the Gentry have but small Estates in Land, are as much as need be in lieu of an Agrarian. But the Germane Republics have no more to supply the place of this Law, than that Estates descending, are divided among the Children, which sure no man but will say, must needs be both just and pious, And we ask you no more in Oceana; where grant this, and you grant the whole Agrarian. Thus had I set him all the Common wealths in the World before; and so it is no fault of mine, that he will throw but at three of them, These are Israel, Lacedaemon, & Oceana.  
First at Israel. Mr. Harrington (says he) thinks not upon the promise of God unto Abraham (whence the Israelites 
Consid. p. 77.  derived their right unto the Land of Canaan) but considers the division of the Lands as a Politic Constitution upon which the Government was founded, though in the whole History of the Bible, there be not the least foot-step of such a design.  
What means the man! The right of an Israelite unto his Land, derived from the promise of God unto Abraham▪ therefore the right of an Oceaner unto his Land, must derive from the promise of God unto Abraham? Or, why else should I in speaking of Oceana (where Propriety is taken as it was found, and not stirred an hair) think on the promise to Abraham? Nor matters it for the manner of division, seeing that was made, and this was found made, each according unto the Law of the Government. But in the whole Bible (says he) there is not the least foot-step that the end of the Israelitish Agrarian was Political, or that it was intended to be the foundation of the Government.  
The footsteps of God by the Testimony of David, may be seen in the deep waters, much more by the consent of the whole Bible, in Land, or in the foundation of Empire, unless we make the footsteps of God to be one thing, and his ways another, which as to Government are these.  
God by the Ballot of Israel (more fully described in 
Grot. ad Numb. 26. 53.  the next Book) divided the Land (some respect had unto the Princes and Patriarches, for the rest) to every one his inheritance, according unto the number of names, which were drawn out of the one Urn first, and the Lots of Land, (the measure with the goodness of the same considered) drawn afterwards out of the other Urn unto those Names. Wherefore God ordaining the Cause, and the Cause of Necessity producing the effect, God, in ordaining this Balance, intended popular Government. But when the People admitting of no Nay, would have a King. God thereupon commanding Samuel to show them the manner of the King, Samuel declared unto the People, concerning the manner or 
1 Sam. 8.  policy of the King, saying, He will take your Fields and your Vineyards, and your Olive-yards, even the best of them, and give unto his servants (which kind of proceeding must needs create the balance of a Nobility). Over and above this, he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your Vineyards, and of your sheep (by way of tax, for the maintenance of his Armies) and thus your Daughters shall come to be his Cooks and Confectioners, and your Sons to run before his Chariot. There is not from the balance to the superstructures, a more perfect description of a Monarchy, by a Nobility. For the third branch, the People of Egypt in time of the Famine, 
Gen. 47. 19 20.  which was very sore, come unto Joseph, saying, Buy us and our Land for bread, and we and our Land will be servants unto Pharaoh. And Joseph bought all the Land of Egypt (except that of the Priests) for Pharaoh. So the Land became Pharaohs: who lest the remembrance of their former Propriety by lively marks, and continual remembrancers 
Grot. ad Gen. 47.  should stir them up (as the Vandals in Africa, exuted in like manner of their Propriety, and yet remaining in their ancient dwellings, were stirred up by their Women) unto sedition, removed the People thus sold, or drove them like Cattle even from one End of the borders of Egypt unto the other end thereof. In which you have the balance of a sole Landlord or absolute Prince, with the miserable, and yet necessary consequence of an enslaved people. Now the balance of Governments throughout the Scriptures, being of these kinds, and no other, the Balance of Oceana is exactly calculated unto the most approved way, and the clearest footsteps of God in the whole History of the Bible: and whereas the Jubilee was a Law instituted for preservation of the Popular balance from alteration; so is the Agrarian, in Oceana.  
But says the Praevaricator, Hocus Pocus, or in the name of wonder, how can this Agrarian be the foundation of that Government, which had subsisted more than forty five years without it? For they were so long after the giving of this Law for the division of the Land, before they had the Land to divide.  
Which is as if one should say upon that other law of the like date. Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates; Hocus Pocus, or in the name of wonder, how should the Children of Israel make them Judges and Officers in in their gates, before they had any gates to make them in? fine sport to be played by an Attorney for the Clergy with Scripture, where it is plain enough that the Laws of a Commonwealth were given by Moses unto an Army to be put in Execution, when that Army should become a Commonwealth, as happened under Joshua.  
But no saying will serve his turn. If this Agrarian were meant as fundamental to the Government, the Provision (he will have it) was weak and not proper for attaining the end proposed, there being nothing in the Nature of the Agrarian to hinder, but that the whole Country might for the space of near fifty years, that is, the time between the two Jubilees, have come into the hands of One Man, and so have destroyed Balance, Agrarian, Government, and all.  
This they that boast of their Mathematics might have taken the pains (before they had been so confident) to have demonstrated possible; as how or by what means one Lot could come in fifty years to be multiplied six hundred thousand times, and that without usury, which bar (the Israelites being no Merchants) was thought sufficient to be given; or thus to call the prudence of God by their impracticable Phansyes, in question, is abominable.  
I would have Divines (as this Praevaricator persuades) and, it should seem, hath persuaded some of them, to overthrow the Commonwealth of Israel; for otherwise I will give them my word they shall never be able to touch that of Oceana, which expect in the hereditary succession and dignity of the Princes of the Tribes, and the Patriarches, and that the Senate was for life, differs not from the former: for as to the divers working up of the superstructures in divers Commonwealths according unto the diversity of occasions, it comes unto no Accountable difference; and much (I conceive) of this carving or finishing in Israel, (which had it been extant would perhaps have shown a greater resemblance) is lost. For the Senates, as to their Numbers, that of the 300 in Oceana, considering the Bulk of the People, exceedeth not that of the Seaventy in Israel; the succession and dignity of the Princes of the Tribes and of the Patriarches, was Ordained for the preservation of the Pedigrees, which (Christ being born) are not any more to be of like consequence; And that the Senators were for life, derived from a former Custom of such a Number of Elders exercising some Authority in Egypt (though not that of the Senate till it was instituted by God) from the descent of the Patriarches into that Land, who being at their descent se●venty persons, and governing their families by the right of Paternity; as the people increased, and they came to die had their Successors appointed in such manner that the number of Seaventy in remembrance of those Patriarches was diligently preserved. And forasmuch as the Patriarches governing their own Familied (which at first were all) in their own right were consequently for life, this also pleased in the substitution of others. These things rightly considered, I have not varied from the Authority of Israel in a tittle, there being neither any such necessaty use of Pedigrees, nor uninterrupted succession of Elders for life in Oceana; and unless a Man will say, That we ought to have the like Effect, where there is not the like Cause (which were absurd) the Authority of a Common wealth, holdeth no otherwise then from the cause to the effect.  
Oceana, I say, cannot be wounded but by piercing the Authority of Israel, with which she is armed Cap, a pie. 
Consid. p. 36.  It is true (as the Praevaricator saith in another place) that Law can oblige only those to whom it was given, and that the Laws of Israel were given as to the power or Obligation of them only to the Children of Israel. But the power (as hath been shown) of a Commonwealth and her Authority are different things, her power extends no farther than her own people, but her Authority may govern others, as that of Athens did Rome; when the later writ her twelve Tables by the Copy of the former. In this manner, though a Man or a Commonwealth, writing out of Ancient governments have liberty to choose that which suits best with the occasion, out of any; yet, whether we consider the wisdom and Justice of the Legislator supremely good, or the excellency of the Laws; the Prerogative of Authority, where the nature of the thing admits, must needs belong unto Israel. That this opinion should go sore with Divines, is strange; and yet if there be any feeling of their pulse by this their Advocate or Attorney, as true.  
For while he finds me writing out of Venice, he tells 
In his Epist.  me I have wisely put myself under her Protection or Authority, against whom he dares not make war, lest he should take part with the Turk.  
But when he finds me writing out of Israel, he tells me 
Consid. p. 39  that he is not aware of any Prerogative of Authority belonging to the Israelitish more than any other Republic: which is to take part with the Devil.  
So much for Israel: Now for Lacedaemon, but you will permit me to shake a friend or two by the hand, as I go.  

The first is Aristotle, in these words.  
Inequality is the source of all Sedition, as when the riches of 
Pol. L. 5. C. 3.  one or the few come to cause such an overbalance as draws the Commonwealth into Monarchy or Oligarchy; for prevention whereof the Ostracism hath been of use in divers places, as at Argos and Athens. But it were better to provide in the beginning, that there be no such Disease in the Common wealth, then to come afterwards unto her Cure.   

The second is Plutarch, in these words.  
Lycurgus' judging that there ought to be no other inequality 
Plut. Lycur.  among Citizens of the same Common wealth than what derives from their virtues, divided the Land so equally among the Lacedæmonians, that on a day beholding the Harvest of their lots lying by Cocks or Ricks in the field, he laughing said, that it seemed unto him they were all Brothers.   

The third should have been the Considerer, but he is at feud with us all.  
The design of Lycurgus (he professes) was not so much to 
Consid. p. 78.  attain an equality in the frame of his Government, as to drive into Exile riches, and the effects of them, Luxury and Debauchery.    

Gentlemen, What do you say? you have the Judgement of three great Philosophers, and may make your own choice; Only except he that hath but one hundred pounds a year, can have Wine and Women at as full Command, and Retainers in as great plenty, as he that hath ten thousand, I should think these advantages accrued from inequality, and that Lycurgus had skill enough in a Commonwealth to see as much. No, says the Praevaricator, it appears far otherwise, in that he admitted of no money, but old Iron, a Cartload of which was worth little. Well, but in Israel, where Silver and Gold was worth enough, my Gentleman would have it, that One man in the Compass of fifty years might purchase the whole Land, though that Country was much larger than this: and yet where, if the People had used money, they would have used Trade, and using both, such a thing, through the straightness of the Territory, might have happened, he will not conceive the like to have been possible. No, though he have an example of it in Lysander, who by the spoil of Athens ruined the Agrarian, first by the overbalance that a man's money came to hold unto his lot, then by eating out the lots themselves, and in those the equality of the Common wealth. But these things he interpreteth pleasantly, as if the vow of voluntary poverty (so he calls it) being broken, the Commonwealth, like a forsworn wretch, had gone and hanged herself: a Fancy too rank (I doubt) of the Cloister, to be good at this woyk.  
But whereas Plutarch, upon the narrowness of these lots (which had they been larger, must have made the Citizens fewer than thirty thousand, and so unable to defend the Common wealth,) and upon the use of this same old and rusty Iron instead of money, observes it came by this means to pass, that there was neither fine Orator, Fortune-teller, Bawd▪ nor Goldsmith to be found in Lacedaemon; Our 
Plur. Lycur.  Considerer professeth,  
That it is to him as strange as any thing in History, that Lycurgus should find credit enough to settle a Government, which carried along with it so much want and hardship unto particular men, that the total absence of Government could scarce have put them into a worse Condition, the Laws that he made, prohibiting the use of those things, which to enjoy with security, is that only to other men, that makes the yoke of Laws supportable.  
Here he is no Monk again; I would ask him no more, than that he would hold to some thing, be it any thing. It is true, we, who have been used to our Plum-pottage, are like enough to make faces (as did the King of Pontus) at the Lacedaemonian black broth: But who hath opened his mouth against Plum-pottage, gilded Coaches, Pages, Lacques, fair Manor, Houses, good Tables, rich furniture, full purses, Universities, good Benefices, Scarlet Robes, s●u re Caps, rich Jewels, or said any thing that would not multip'y all this? Why (says he) you are so far right, that the voice of Lycurgusses Agrarian, was, Every man shall be thus poor, and that of yours is, that No man shall be more than thus rich. This is an Argument (an't please you) by which he thinks he hath proved, that there is no difference between the Agrarian that was in Lacedaemon, and that which is in Oceana: for, Sir, whatsoever is thus and thus, is like. But the Agrarian of Lacedaemon was thus, A man could have no money, or none that deserved that Name; and the Agrarian of Oceana is thus, A man's money is not cozened: therefore the Agrarian of the one, and of the other are like. Was it not a great grievance in Lacedaemon, tro, that they had no such Logic nor Logician? Be this as it will, It had been impossible (says he) for Lyeurgus to have settled his Government, had he not wisely obtained response from the Oracle at Delphos, magnifying and recommending it; After which, all resistance would have been downright impiety and disobedience, which concerns Mr. Harrington very little. The Bible than is not so good an Oracle, as was that at Delphos. But this reflection hath a tang with it, that makes me think it relates to that where he says, I know not how; 
Consid. p. 18.  but Mr. Harrington hath taken up a very great unkindness for the Clergy: He will know nothing, neither that the Oracle of the Scripture is, of all other, the clearest for a Common wealth; nor that the Clergy being genera'ly against a Common wealth, is, in this, below the Priests of Delphos; who were more for Lycurgus, than these are for Moses. But hav' at the Agrarian of Oceana, with the whole bail of dice, and at five throws.  The first throw is, That it is unjust; for, 
If it be truly assorted (in the fourth page of Oceana) that Government is founded on Propriety, than Propriety consists in 
Consid. p. 81.  Nature before Government, and Government is to be fitted to Propriety, not Propriety to Government. How great a sin than would it be against the first and purest notion of Justice, to bring in a Government▪ not only different from, but directly destructive unto the settled Propriety of Oceana, where (in the the Hundred Page) there are confessed to be three hundred persons, whose Estates in Land exceed the Standard of two thousand pounds a year. Let me not be choked with the Example of Lacedaemon, till Mr. Harrington hath shown us the power of his persuasion with the Nobility of Oceana, as Lyeurgus with them of Lacedaemon, to throw up their Lands to be parcell'd by his Agrarian (as Page the hundredth and Thirteenth) and when that is done, I shall cease to complain of the Injustice of it. Nor need any one of these three hundred be put to own a shame, for preferring his own interest before that of an whole Nation; for though when Government is once fixed, it may be fit to submit private to Public Utility, when the question is of choosing a Government, every particular man is left unto his own native right, which cannot be prescribed against, by the Interest of all the rest of Mankind.  
How many false Dice there are in this throw, (because you see I have little to do) will be worth Counting.  
Whereas I nowhere deny Propriety to derive her being from Law; He insinuates that I presume, propriety to be in nature. One.  
Whereas in natural and domestic vicissitude, I assert, That Empire is to follow the Legal State of Propriety; he imposeth, as if I had asserted, that Empire must follow the Natural state of propriety. Two.  
Whereas in violent or foreign vicissitude (as when the Israelites possessed themselves of the Land of Canaan the Goths and Vandals of Italy, the Frankes of France, the Saxons of England) Propriety, in order unto the Government to be introduced, is alterable; he insinuateth as if I had said, that, Empire must always follow the state of Propriety, not as it may be altered in that relation, but as it is found. Three.  
Whereas the government of Oceana is exactly fitted unto propriety, as it was settled before; he insinuates it to be destructive unto the settled propriety. Four.  
Whereas I say, that to put it with the most, they that are Proprietors of Land in Oceana, exceeding two thousand pounds a year, do not exceed▪ three hundred persons: he saith, that I have confessed they be three hundred. Five.  
Whereas I show that the Nobility of Lacedaemon, upon persuasion of Lycurgus, threw up their Estates to be parcell'd by his Agrarian; but that, in Oceana, it is not needful or required that any man should part with a farthing, or throw up one shovelfull of his Earth: he imposeth, as if I went about to persuade the Nobility to throw up their Lands. Six.  
Whereas I have shown that no One of those within the three hundred, can have any interest against the Agrarian; He, without showing what such an interest can be, insinuates that they have an interest against it. Seven.  
Whereas the Government of Oceana goes altogether upon consent, and happeneth not only to fit private unto public, but even public unto private Utility, by which means it is void of all objection; he insinuates, that it is against private utility. Eight.  
Where he saith, that in choosing a Government, every Man is left, to his own Native right. He insinuates that the Agrarian, (which doth no more than fix propriety, as she found it) is against Native Right. Nine.  
Whereas God hath given the Earth unto the Sons of Men, which Native right (as in case a Man for hunger take so much as will feed him, and no more of any other Man's meat or Herd) prescribeth against legal Propriety, and is the cause why the Law esteemeth not such an Action to be theft; He insinuates that there is a Native right in Legal Propriety, which cannot be prescribed against by the interest of all the rest of Mankind. T●n.  
While he pleaded the case of Monarchy, Levelling was concluded lawful; In the case of a Commonwealth, (which asks no such favour) Levelling is concluded unlawful. Eleven.  
In the Reformation, or Level as to Monarchy, though Propriety subsisted before that Level, yet Propiety was to be fitted unto the Government, and not the Government unto propriety; but in the case of a Commonwealth the Government is to be fitted unto Propriety, and not Propriety unto the Government. Twelve.  
In that, any man was bound to relinquish his Native right, else how could a Prince level his Nobility; In this, no man is bound to relinquish his Native right. Thirteen.  
In that, this same Native right might be prescribed against by the Prince; In this, it cannot be prescribed against by the interest of mankind. Fourteen.  
In that, no Noble man but aught to own a shame if he preferred his interest before that of the Prince; In this, no Noble man ought to own a shame for preferring his own Interest before that of an whole Nation. Fifteen.  
Would you have any more? these fifteen Majors and Minors, or false dice, are sopped up again, and put all into this Conclusion, or Box, like themselves.  
Thus the Interest of the Three hundred is not Balanced with that of a whole Nation, but that of some few extravagant spirits: who by making dams in the Current of other men's Estates, hope to derive some water to their own parched fortunes.  
Calumniare fortiter, nihil adhaerebit. If a river have but one natural bed or channel, what dam is made in it by this Agrarian? but if a river have had many natural beds or channels, to which she hath forgotten to reach her breast, and whose mouths are dried up or obstructed; these are Dams which the Agrarian doth not make, but remove: and what parched fortunes can hereby hope to be watered but theirs only whose veins having drunk of the same blood, have a right in nature to drink of the same milk? The Law of Moses allowed▪ the firstborn but a double portion: was his an extravagant spirit?  
His second Throw, is, that The nature of the Agrarian is such as cannot be fixed, in regard that the People being entrusted with a Vote and a Sword, may alter it for the less, or come to drown-right Levelling. But as to this, in the Eighth Chapter I have barred his dice that being the place in which I thought most proper to give a full Answer to this Objection.  
At the third Throw, he is extrerm awkward. For whereas the Israelites (notwithstanding the voyages of Solomon, and what is said of the Ships of Tharsis) during their Agrarian, or while they had Land, were a Commonwealth of Husbandmen, and not of Merchants, nor came to the Excercise of this Trade, till they had no Land; or after their dispersion by the Emperor Adrian: he screws it in, after this manner▪ As the Jews who have no Lands are every where great Traders; so the possession of Lands being 
Confid. p. 85.  limited by this Agrarian, men who are either covetous or ambitious (as if Estates were not gotten by industry, but by covetousness and ambition) will employ themselves and their Estates in foreign Traffic, which being in a manner wholly engrossed by the Capital City of Oceana, that City, already too great, will immediately grow into an excess of power and riches very dangerous to the Common wealth; Amsterdam being come by such means to exercise of late a Tyranny in disposal of some public affairs, much to the prejudice both of the Liberty and Interest of the rest of the Union. An equal, if not greater incommodity to Oceana, would be created by the Agrarian, which making Emporium a City of Princes; would render the Country a Common wealth of Cottagers, able to dispute precedence with the Beggars-Bush.  
News, not from Tripoli, nor any other corner of the whole World but one. Bate me this, and show me in what other City increase of Houses, or new foundations was ever held a Nuysance. This sure is a Fancy that regards not the old Folks or ancient Prudence.  
One of the blessings that God promised unto Abraham, was, that his seed should be multiplied as the Stars of Heaven: And the Common wealth of Rome, by multiplying her seed, came to bond her Territory with the Ocean and her fame with the Stars of Heaven. That such populousness is that without which there can be no great Commonwealth, both Reason and good Authors are clear; but whether it ought to begin in the Country, or in the City, is a scruple I have not known them make. That of Israel, began in the Country; That of Rome, in the City. Except there be obstruction or impediment by the Law, as in Turkey where the Country; and in England▪ where the City is forbidden to increase. wherever there be a populous Country, for Example, France: it makes a populous City as Paris; And wherever there be a populous City as Rome, after the ruin of Alba, and Amsterdam after the ruin (as to Trade) of Antwerp; it makes a populous Territory, as was that of the Rustic Tribes, and is that of Holland.  
But the ways how a populous City comes to make a populous Country, and how apopulous Country comes to make a populous City are contrary; the one fiapning through sucking, as that of the City, and the other through weining, as that of the Country.  
For proof of the former, the more mouths there be in a City, the more meat of necessity must be vented by the Country, and so there will be more Corn, more cattle, and better Markets, which breeding more Labourers, more Husbandmen, and richer Farmers, bring the Country so far from a Common wealth of Cottagers, that where the blessings of God through the fruitfulness of late years with us, rendered the Husbandman unable to dispute precedence with the Beggars-bush, his Trade thus uninterrupted, in that his Markets are certain, goes on with increase of Children, of Servants, of Corn, and of cattle; for there is no reason why the fields adjoining unto Emporium, being but of an hard soil, should annually produce two Crops, but the populousness of the City.  
The Country then growing more populous, and better stocked with cattle, which also increaseth manure for the Land, must proportionably increase in fruitfulness. Hence it is, that (as the Romans also were good at such works) in Holland, there is scarce a puddle undrained, nor a bank of Sand cast up by the Sea, that is not covered with Earth, and made fruitful by the People; these being so strangely, with the growth of Amsterdam, increased, as comes perhaps to two parts in three: nor, the Agrarian taking place in Oceana, would it be longer disputed, whether she might not destroy Fishes to plant Men. Thus a populous City makes a Country milch, or populous by sucking; and whereas some may say, that such a City may suck from foreign parts, it is true enough, and no where more apparent than in Amsterdam. But a City that hath recourse unto a foreign dug, ere she had first sucked that of her proper Nurse or Territory dry, you shall hardly find; or finding, (as in some Plantation not yet weyned) will hardly be able to make that Objection hold, seeing it will not lie so much against the populousness of the place, as the contrary.  
But a populous Country, makes a populous City by weining; for when the People increase so much, that the dug of Earth can no more, the overplus must seek some other way of Livelihood: which is either Arms, such were those of the Goths and Vandals; or Merchandise and Manufacture, for which ends it being necessary, that they lay their heads and their Stock together, this makes populous Cities. Thus Holland being a small Territory, and sucked dry, hath upon the matter weaned the whole People, and is thereby become, as it were one City that sucks all the World.  
But by this means (says the Considerer) Emporium being already too great (while indeed Amsterdam considering the narrowness of her Territory, or the smallness of Holland, is much more populous) would immediately grow into an excess of power and riches, very dangerous unto Liberty, an Example whereof was seen in the late Tyranny of that City; As if it were not sufficiently known that Amsterdam contributes, and hath contributed more unto the defence of the Common wealth, or united Provinces, than all the rest of the League, and had in those late Actions which have been scandalised, resisted not the interest of Liberty, but of a Lord. That the increase of Rome, which was always studied by her best Citizens, should make her head too great for her body, or her power dangerous unto the Tribes, was never so much as imagined; and though she were a City of Princes, her Rustic Tribes were ever had in greatest esteem and honour; insomuch, that a Patrician would be of no other.  
But the Authority of ancient Common wealths is needless, the Praevaricator by his own Argumentation or might, lays himself neck and heels.  
For, saith he, Were this Agrarian once settled, Emporium would be a City of Princes, and the Nobility so throughly plumed, 
Consid. p. 93.  that they would be just as strong of wing, as wild Foul, in moulting time. There would be a City of Princes, and yet no Nobility. He is so fast that I have pity on him, if I knew but which way to let him lose. He means perhaps, that the Merchants growing rich, would be the Nobility; and the Nobility growing poor, would be Graziers.  
But so for aught I know, it was always, or worse, that is, men attained unto riches & honours by such or worse arts, & in poverty made not always so honest retreats. Unto all which infirmities of the State, I am deceived, if this Agrarian do not apply the proper remedies. For such an Agrarian maketh a Common wealth for increase: the Trade of a Common wealth for increase, is Arms, Arms are not born by Merchants, but by Noblemen, and Gentlemen. The Nobility therefore having these Arms in their hands, by which Provinces are to be acquired, new Provinces yield new estates; so whereas the Merchant hath his returns in Silk or Canvas, the Soldier will have his return in Land. He that representeth me as an Enemy to the Nobility, is the man he speaketh of; For if ever the Commonwealth attain unto five new Provinces, (and such a Common wealth will have Provinces enough) it is certain, that (besides honours, Magistracies, and the Revenues annexed) there will be more estates in the Nobility of Oceana, of fourteen thousand pound Land a year, than ever were, or can otherwise be of four; and that without any the least danger unto the Common wealth: for if Rome had but looked so far to it, as to have made good her Agrarian in Italy, though she had neglected the rest, the wealth of her Nobility might have sucked her Provinces, but must have enriched the People, & so rather have watered her Roots, then starved and destroyed them as it did. In this Case therefore the Nobility of Oceana, would not moulter like wild Foul, but be strong of wing as the Eagle.  
One Argument more I have heard urged against the populousness of the Capital City which is, that the rich in time of sickness forsaking the place, by which means the Markets come to fail, the poor lest they should starve, will run abroad, and infect the whole Country. But should a man tell them at Paris, or Grand Cairo (in the latter whereof, the Plague is more frequent and furious, then happens with us) that they are not to build Houses, nor increase so much, lest they should have the Plague, or that Children are not to be born so fast, lest they die, they would think it strange news. A Common wealth is furnished with Laws, and power to add such as she shall find needful. In case a City be in that manner visited it is the duty of the Country, and of the Government, to provide for them by contribution.  
The difficulty in making the Agrarian equal and steady 
Consid. p. 87.  through the rise or fall that may happen in money, which is the fourth throw of the Praevaricator; is that which it might have been for his ease to have taken notice, was long since sufficiently barred, where it is said, that if a new survey at the present Rent were taken, an Agrarian ordaining that no Man should thenceforth hold above so much Land as is there valued at the rate, however money might alter would be equal and steady enough.  
His last cast is, that the Agrarian would make war against 
Consid. p. 89▪  universal and immemorial Custom, which being without doubt more praevalent than that of Reason, there is nothing of such difficulty as to persuade men at once, and crudely, that they and their forefather's have been in an error.  
Wise men, I see, may differ in Judgement or Counsel, for, saith Sir Francis Bacon. Surely every Medicine is an Innovation, 
Essay 24.  and he that will not apply new remedies, must expect new evils: For Time is the greatest Innovator: And if Time of course alter things to the worse, and Wisdom and Counsel may not alter them to the better, what must be the end?  
But the Case of the Agrarian receiveth equal strength from each of these Counsellors or opinions; from the latter, in that it goes upon grounds which Time hath not innovated for the worse, but for the better, and so according to the former comes not to have been at once, and crudely persuaded, but introduced by custom, now grown universal and immemorial. For who remembers the Gentry of this Nation to have worn the blue coats of the Nobility, or the lower sort of people to have lived upon the smoke of their Kitchens? To the contrary, Is it not now the Universal custom for men to rely upon their own fortunes or industry, and not to put their Trust in Princes, seeking in their liberality or dependence the means of living? The Praevaricator might as well jump into his great Grandfather's old breeches, and persuade us that he is (a la mode) or in the new cut, as that the ways of our forefathers would agree with our Customs. Doth not every man now see, that if the Kings in those days had settled the Estates of the Nobility by a Law, restraining them from selling their Land, such a law had been an Agrarian, and yet not warring against their ancient Customs, but preserving them? Wherefore neither doth the Agrarian proposed, taking the balance of Estates as she now finceth them, make war against, but confirm the present Customs. The only Objection that can seem in this place to lie, is, that whereas it hath been the custom of Oceana that the Bulk of the Estate, should descend unto the Eldest Son, by the Agrarian, he cannot in case he have more brothers inherit above two thousand pounds a year in Land, or an equal share▪ But neither doth this, whether you regard the Parents or the Children, make war with custom. For putting the case the Father have twenty thousand pounds a year in Land, he goes not the less in his custom or way of life for the Agrarian, because for this he hath no less: and if he have more or fewer Sons to whom this Estate descends by equal or unequal portions, neither do they go less in their ways or customs of life for the Agrarian, because they never had more. But, says Aristotle, (speaking of the Ostracism as it supplies the defect of an Agrarian) this course is as necessary unto Kings, as unto Common wealths: By this means the Monarchies of Turkey 
Pol. l. 3. c. ●9.  and of Spain preserve their balance; through the neglect of this hath that of the Nobility of Oceana been broken; and this is it which the Praevaricator in advising that the Nobility be no farther Levelled than will serve to keep the people under, requires of his Prince. So, that an Agrarian is necessary to Government, be it what it will, is on all hands concluded.   

Chap. XII. Whether Courses or Rotation be necessary unto a well-ordered Commonwealth? In which is contained the courses or Pare●bole of Israel before the Captivivity, together, with the Epitome of Athens and Venice.  
ONe bout more, and we have done; this (as 
Ocean. p. 22.  reason good) will be upon wheels or Rotation, for,  
As the Agrarian answereth unto the Equality of the Foundation or Root, so doth Rotation unto the Equality of the Superstructures or branches of a Commonwealth.  
Equal Rotation is equal Vicissitude in, or Succession unto, Magistracy conferred for equal terms, enjoining such equal vacations, as cause the Government to take in the body of the People, by parts succeeding others, through free Election, or suffrage of the whole.  
The contrary whereunto is prolongation of Magistracy, which trashing the wheel of Rotation, destroys the life, or natural motion, of a Common wealth.  
The Praevaricator, what ever he hath done for himself, hath done this for me, that it will be out of doubt, whether my Principles be capable of greater Obligation, or confirmation, than by having Objections made against them. Nor have I been altogether ingrateful, or nice of my labour but gone far (much farther than I needed) about, that I might return with the more valuable Present, unto him that sent me on the Errand; I shall not be short of like proceeding upon the present Subject, but rather over.  
Rotation in a Common wealth, is of the Magistracy; of the Senate; of the People; of the Magistracy and the People; of the Magistracy and the Senate; or of the Magistracy of the Senate, and of the People; which in all, come unto Six kinds.  
For example of Rotation in the Magistracy, you have the Judge of Israel, called in Hebrew, Shophet, the like Magistracy 
Grot.  after the King's Ithobal and Baal came in use with the Tyrians, from these with their Posterity the Carthaginians, who also called their Supreme Magistrates, being in Number two, and for their Term Annual, Shophetim, which the Latins by a softer pronunciation render Suffetes.  
The Shophet or Judge of Israel, was a Magistrate, not that I can find, obliged unto any certain Term, throughout the Book of Judges; Nevertheless, it is plain, that his Election was occasional, and but for a time, after the manner of a Dictator.  
True it is, that Eli and Samuel, ruled all their lives, but upon this, such impatience in the People followed through the corruption of their Sons, as was the main cause of the succeeding Monarchy.  
The Magistrates in Athens (except the Areopagites being a Judicatory) were all upon rotation. The like for Lacedaemon and Rome, except the Kings in the former, who were indeed hereditary, but had no more power than the Duke in Venice, where all the rest of the Magistrates (except the Procuratori; whose Magistracy is but mere Ornament) are also upon Rotation.  
For Rotation of the Senate you have Athens, the Achaeans, Aetolians, Lyceans, the Amphictionium, and the Senate 
Pol. l. 2. c. 7.  of Lacedaemon reproved, in that it was for life, by Aristotle: Modern Examples of like kind, are the Diet of Switz, but especially the Senate of Venice.  
For the Rotation of the People, you have first Israel, where the Congregation, which the Greeks call Ecclesia, the Latins Comitia, or Concio, having a twofold capacity; first, that of an Army, in which they were the constant Guard of the Country; and secondly, that of a Representative, in which they gave the Vote of the People, at the Creation of their Laws, or election of their Magistrates, was monthly. Now the Children of Israel after their Number, to wit, the chief Fathers, and Captains of thousands 
1 Chron. 27.  and hundreds, and their Officers that served the King in any matter of the courses which came in and went out month by month, throughout all the months of the year, every course, were twenty and four thousand.  
Such a multitude there was of military age, that without 
Grot. ad locum.  inconvenience, four and twenty thousand were every month in Arms, whose Term expiring others succeeded, and so others, by which means the Rotation of the whole People came about in the space of one year. The Tribunes, or Commanders of the Tribes in Arms, or of the Prerogative for the month, are named in the following part of the Chapter, to the sixteenth Verse; where begins the Enumeration of the Princes, (though God and Ashur, for what reason I know not, be omitted) of the Tribes, remaining in their Provinces, where they judged the People, and as they received Orders, were to bring or send such farther enforcement or recruits, as occasion required unto the Army; after these, some other Officers are mentioned. There is no question to be made, but this Rotation of the People, together with their Prerogative, or Congregation, was preserved by the monthly Election of two thousand Deputies in each of the twelve Tribes, which in all, came to four and twenty thousand; or let any man show how otherwise it was likely to be done, the Nature of their Office being to give the Vote of the People, who therefore sure must have chosen them. By these, the Vote of the People was given to their Laws, and at Elections of their Magistrates.  
Unto their Laws, as where David proposeth the reduction of the Ark. And David consulted with the Captains 
1 Chron. 13.  of thousands and hundreds, and with every Leader. And David said unto all the Congregation of Israel, If it seem good unto you, and it be of the Lord God, let us send abroad to our Brethren every where (the Princes of the Tribes in their Provinces) that are left in the Land of Israel, and with them also to the Priests and Levites, which are in their Cities and Suburbs, that they may gather themselves unto us; And let us bring again the Ark of our God to us; for we enquired not at 
Gror. è. Tertul.  it in the days of Saul. And all the Congregation (gave their suffrage in the Affirmative) said that they would do so; for the thing was right in the Eyes of the People. (Nulla lex sibi soli conscientiam Justitiae sua debet, sed et à quibus obsequium expectat) Now that the same Congregation or representative gave the vote of the People also in the Election of Priests Officers and Magistrates, Moreover David and the Captains of the Host separated to the service of the Sons of 
1 Chron. 25.  A●aph, and of Heman, and of Jeduthun, who should Prophecy with Harps with Psalteryes & with Cymbals. But upon the occasion untowhich we are more especially beholding for the 
1 Chron. 28. 2.  preservation and discovery of this admirable order (David having proposed the business in a long and pious speech,) the Congregation made Solomon the Son of David King the second time and anointed him unto the Lord to be Chief, Governor, and Zadok to be Priest. For as to the first time 
1 Chron. 29. 22.  that Solomon was made King, it happened, through the sedition of Adoniae to have been done in haste and tumultuously by those only of Jerusalem; and the reason why 
Kings 1. 23.  Zadoc is here made Priest is that Abiathar was put out for being of the Conspiracy with Adonia.  
I may expect (by such Objections as they afford me) it should be alleged, that to prove an order in a Commonwealth, I instance in a Monarchy; as if there were any thing in this Order monarchial, or that could, if it had not been so received from the Commonwealth, have been introduced by the Kings, to whom in the Judgement of any sober man (the Praevaricator only excepted, who hath been huckling about some such Council for his Prince) no less could have followed, upon the first frown of the people, than did in Rehoboam, who, having 
1 Kings 12.  used them roughly, was deposed by the Congregation or the Major part. It is true, that while Israel was an Army, the Congregation, as it needed not to assemble by way of Election or representative, so I believe it did not, but that by all Israel assembled to this end, should be meant the whole people after they were planted upon their lots, and not their Representative, which in a political sense is 
1 Chr. 9 29.  as properly so called, were absurd and impossible, Nor need I go upon presumption only, be the same never so strong, seeing it is said in Scripture of the Korathites, that they were keepers of the gates of the Tabernacle, and their father's being over the Host of the Lord, were keepers of the Entry. That is (according to the interpretation of Grotius) the Korathites were now keepers of the gates, as it appears in the Book of Numbers, their Ancestors the Kohathites 
Num. 4.  had been in Camp, or while Israel was yet an Army. But our Translation is lame of the right foot as to the true discovery of the Ancient manner of this service, which according to the Septuagint and the Vulgar Latin was thus, they were keepers of the gates of the Tabernacle (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & familiae eorum per vices) and their fathers by turns or Rotation. So that offices and services by courses turns or Rotation are plainly more ancient than Kings in the Commonwealth of Israel; though it be true that when the courses or Rotation of the Congregation or Representative of the people were first introduced, be as hard to show, as it would be how, after the People were once planted upon their lots, they could be otherwise assembled. If writers argue well and lawfully from what the Sanhedrim was in the institution by Jehoshaphat unto what it had more auntiently been, to argue from what the Congregation was in the institution by David, unto what it had more auntiently been, is sufficiently warranted.  
These things rightly considered, there remains little doubt, but we have the courses of Israel for the first Example of Rotation in a Popular Assembly. Now to come from the Hebrew unto the Grecian prudence, the same is approved by Aristotle, which he exemplifies in the Commonwealth of Thales Milesius, where the people, he 
Poll. L. 4. C. 14.  saith assembled (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) by turns or rotation. Nor is the Roman prudence without some shadow of the like proceeding, where the Prerogative (pro tempore) with the jure-vocatae being made by Lot, gave frequently the Suffrage of the whole people. But the Gothick prudence in the policy of the Third State, runs altogether upon the collection of a Representative by the suffrage of the People, and though not so diligently regulated, by terms and vacations as to a standing assembly were necessary, by Turns, Rotation, Parembole, or courses; As in the Election of the late House of Commons, and the constitutive vicissitude of the Knights and Burgeses is known by sufficient experience.  
When the Rotation of a Commonwealth is both in the Magistracy and the People, I reckon it to be of a fourth kind, as in Israel, where both the Judge and the Congregation were so elected.  
The fifth kind is when the Rotation of a Commonwealth is in the Magistracy and the Senate, as in those of Athens, of the Achaeans, of the Aetohians, of the Lycians, and of Venice; upon which examples, rather for the influence each of them, at least Athens, may have upon the following Book, than any great Necessity from the present occasion, I shall enlarge myself in this place.  
The Common wealth of Athens was thus administered.  
The Senate of the Bean being the proposing-Assembly 
Epitome of the Athenian Common wealth.  (for that of the Areopagites, called also a Senate, was a Judicatory) consisted of four hundred Citizens chosen by Lot, which was performed with beans, these were annually removed all at once. By which means Athens became frustrated of the natural and necessary use of an Aristocracy, while neither her Senators were chosen for their parts, nor remained long enough in this function, to acquire the right understanding of their proper Office. These thus elected, were subdivided by Lot into four equal parts, called Prytanys, each of which for one quarter of the year was in Office. The Prytany or Prytans in Office elected ten Precedents, called Proedri, out of which Proedri or Presidents, they weekly chose one Provost of the Council, who was called the Epistata. The Epistata and the Proedris were the more peculiar Proposers to the Prytans, and to the Prytans it belonged especially to prepare business (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) for the Senate: they 
Petit. de Leg. Att.  gave also audience unto any that would propose any thing concerning the Common wealth, which if, reported by the Prytans, it were approved by the Senate, the party that proposed might promulgate the business, and promulgation being made, the Congregation assembled, and determined of it. (Sic data concio Laelio est, processit ille & Graecus apud 
Cic. pro Flac.  Graecos, non de culpa sua dixit, sed de paena quaestus est, porrexerunt manus, Psephisma natum est).  
The Prytans and their Magistrates, had right to assemble the Senate; and propose unto them; and what the Senate determined upon such a Proposition, if forthwith to be offered unto the People, as in private cases, was called Proboulema; but if not to be proposed, till the People had a year's trial of it, as was the ordinary way in order unto Laws to be enacted, it was called Psephisma; each of which words with that difference, signifies a Decree. A Decree of the Senate in the latter sense had for one year, the power of a Law, after which trial, it belonged to the Thesmothetae (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to hang it in writing upon the 
Ulpian ad Phil. 1.  Statues of the Heroes, and assemble the Congregation. These Magistrates were of the number of the Archons, which in all were nine, the chief more peculiarly so called▪ was Archon 
Pollux. L. 8. C. 8.  Eponymus, he by whose name the year was reckoned or denominated (his Magistracy being of a Civil concernment) the next was the King, a Magistrate of a Spiritual concernment) the third the Polemarch (whose Magistracy was of a Military concernment): the other six were the Thesmothetae, who had several functions common with the Nine, Others peculiar or proper to themselves, as (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to give the People (by ply-carts) notice when the Judicatories were to assemble, that is, when the People were to assemble in that Capacity, and to judge according to the Law made; or when the Senate, or the People were to assemble upon an (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) a crime that was not provided against by the Law, as that of Alcibiades, (the wits about that time in Athens, being most of them Atheists) for laughing at Ceres discovering her secrets, and shaving of the Mercury's. If an Archon or Demagogue were guilty of such a Crime, it belonged unto the cognizance of the Senate, otherwise unto that of the People, whom the Thesmothetae were also in like manner to warn, 
L. 8. C. 16.  when they were to come unto the suffrage.  
These six like the Electors in Venice, presided at all Elections of Magistrates, whether made by the lot as the judges, or by suffrage, as the new Archons, the Strategus or General, and most of the rest. They also had the hearing and introducing of all causes into the Judicatories.  
But the right of assembling the Ecclesia or Congregation belonged to the Prytans, by whom the Senate proposed unto the People.  
The Congregation consisted of all them that were upon the role of the Lexiarcha, that is to say, of the whole People having right unto the City▪ The Prytans seated upon a Tribunal were Precedents of this Assembly; The Assembly having sacrificed & made Oath of fidelity unto the Commonwealth; the Proedris or Precedents of the Prytans, proposed by Authority of the Senate unto the People in this manner. July the 16th Pol●cles being Archon, and the Tribe of Pandion in the Prytaneate, Demosthenes, Peaneus, thought thus, or was of this Opinion. The same Custom whereby the first Proposer subscribes his Opinion or Parte with his name, is at this day in Venice. Proposition being made, such of the People as would speak, were called to the Pulpit; they, that were fifty years of age, or upwards, were to come first, and the younger afterwards; which Custom of prating in this manner, made excellent Orators or Demagogs', but a bad Common wealth.  
From this that the People had not only the result of the Common wealth, but the debate also; Athens is called a Democracie, and this kind of Government is opposed unto that of Lacedaemon, which because the People there had not the power of debate, but of result only, was called Aristocracy, sometimes Oligarchy: thus the Greeks commonly are to be understood to distinguish of these two; while according to my Principles, (if you like them) debate in the People maketh Anarchy, and where they have the result, and no more, the rest being managed by a good Aristocracy, it maketh that which is properly and truly to be called Democracy, or Popular Government. Neither is this Opinion of mine new, but according to the Judgement of some of the Athenians themselves; for saith Isocrates in his Oration unto the Areopagites for reformation of the Athenian Government; I know the main reason, why the Lacedæmonians flourish, to be, that their Common wealth is popular. But to return. As many of the People, as would, having showed their Eloquence, and with these the Demagogues, who were frequently bribed, concealed their knavery; the Epistata, or Provost of the Proedris, put the Decree or Question unto the Vote, and the People gave the result of the Common wealth by their Chirotonia, that is, by holding up their hands; the result thus given, was the Law, or Psephisma of the People.  
Now for the functions of the Congregation, they 
Dem. Phil. 1.  were divers; as first, Election of Magistrates, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉); Namely, the Archons, the Strategus, or General, the Field-Officers, the Admirals, with divers others, all, or the chief of them Annual, and commonly upon Terms and Vacations, though it be true, (as Plutarch hath it) that Photion was Strategus four years together, having that honour still put upon him by the Congregation, without his seeking. The next Office of this Assembly, was to elect Judges into five Courts or Judicatories, for the People being in the Bulk too unwieldy a body for the performance of this duty, they exercised the supreme Judicature, by way of Representative, into which Election was made by Lottery, in such manner, that five hundred one thousand, or 1500. of them (according to the importance of the occasion) being above thirty years of age, and within the rest of the qualifications in that case provided by the Law, became the Sovereign Judicatory, called the Heliaea. In all Elections, whether by lot or suffrage, the Thesonothetae were Precedents, and ordered the Congregation. Farthermore, if they would amend, alter, repeal, or make a Law, this also was done by a Representative, of which no man was capable, that had not been of the Heliaea, for the rest elected out of the whole People: this amounting unto one thousand, was called the Nomothetae or Legislators. No Law received by the People, could be abrogated but by the Nomothetae; by these any Athenian (having obtained leave of the Senate) might abrogate a Law, provided, that withal, he put another in the place of it. These Laws the Proedris of the Prytans, were to put unto the Suffrage.  
First, the old, whether it agreed with the Athenian people, or not? then the new; and whether of these happened to be chirotonized or voted by the Nomothetae, was ratified; according to that piece of the Athenian Law cited by Demosthenes against Timocrates (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) what hath been said of the Commonwealth of Athens, in relation unto the present purpose, amounts unto thus much, that not only the Senate and the Magistracy in this Policy was upon rotation, but even the People also, at least, as to the Nomothetae, or their Legislative power, and the Supreme Judicatory of the Heliaea, each of these being a Representative, constituted of one Thousand or fifteen hundred Citizens.  
But for what follows in the second book it is necessary that I observe in this place the proceeding of certain Divines, who endeavour to make use of this Commonwealth for ends of their own▪ as particularly Doctor Seaman; who in his book called Four propositions, argues after this manner.  
Chirotonia (as Suidas hath it) signifies both Plebiscitum a Law made by the People, and Psephisma. Now (saith he) Psephisma is the ordinary word used in the Attic laws and in Demosthenes, for (Senatesconsultum) a Law made by the Senate; whence he draws this conclusion. As, when the People make a Law, they are said to Chirotonize; so may the Rulers in like manner, in those Laws that are made by themselves alone.  
These ways with divines are too bad. The words of Suidas are these (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Chirotonia is Election or ratification by the Many: which expressly excludeth the Few or the Senate from being otherwise contained by the word Chirotonia, than a part is by the whole. Nor hath the Author the word Psephisma, or Plebiscitum in the place. I would fain know what other word there is in Greek for Plebiscitum but Psephisma; and yet the Doctor puts it upon Suidas that he distinguishteh between these two, and, taking that for granted where he finds Psephisma in Demosthenes and the Attic Laws, will have it to signify no more than a decree of the Senate. It is true that some decrees of the Senate were so called, but those of the people had no other name, and when ever you find Psephisma in Demosthenes or the Attic Laws, for a Law, there is nothing more certain than that it is to be understood of the people, for to say that a Law in a Popular Commonwealth can be made without the people, is a contradiction.  
The second passage, is a what think you of these words 
Pollux, l. 8. c▪ 9  of Pollux (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) which the Doctor having englished in this manner; The Thesmothetae do privately prescribe when Judgement is to be given, and promulge public accusations, and suffrages unto the people, asks you whose Suffrages were these, if not the Ruler's? By which strange construction, where Pollux having first related in what part the function of the Thesmothetae, was common with that of the Nine Archons, comes (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to show you what was peculiar to themselves, namely to give notice when the Heliaea or other Indicatoryes were to assemble; the Dr. renders it, they do privately prescribe: as if the Session of a Court of Justice, and such an one as contained a thousand Judges, being the representative of the whole people, were to be privately prescribed, then to this private prescribing of Justice, he adds that they do publicly promulge (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) citations upon crimes not within the written Law; as if private prescription and public promulgation could stand together. Next whereas promulgation in the very Nature of the word signifies an Act before a Law made, he presumes the Law to be first made by the Rulers, and then promulgated by the Thesmothetae to the people, kim kam to the experience of all Commonwealths, the Nature of promulgation, and the sense of his Author, whose words as I showed before, declare it to have been the proper or peculiar office of the Thesmothetae to give the people notice when they were to assemble for Judicature, or when for giving their Chirotonia or suffrage, by promulgation of the cause (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) upon which they were to determine.  
For the fourth passage the Dr. quoting a wrong place for these words, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) that the Nomothetae (being a Representative, as I showed▪ of the whole people, chosen by lot, and in number one thousand) chirotonized or gave the Legislative suffrage; thence infers▪ that the Rulers chirotonized, voted or made Laws by themselves without the People: which is, as if one should say that the Prerogative Tribe in Rome, or the House of Commons in England, gave their Vote to such or such a Law, therefore it was made by the Rulers alone, and not by the People of Rome or of England.  
For the fourth passage, Stevens quotes Demosthenes at large in these words, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉). This the Doctor interprets of an Officer; to which I shall say more, when he shows me where the sentence is, or what went before: for as yet I do not know of an officer in any Common wealth, whose Election was indifferently made, either by the Senate, or by the People; nor do I think the Doctor hath looked farther for this, than Stephens, who hath not interpreted it.  
The fifth passage is, That a Decree of the Senate in Athens, had the force of a Law for one year, without the People. So had the Edicts of the Praetores in Rome; But I would fain know, whence the Senate in Athens, or the Praetors in Rome, originally derived this right (which was no more than that such Laws might be probationers, and so better understood, when they came to the Vote) but from the Chirotonia, or suffrage of the People.  
The sixth passage, stops the mouths of such as having nothing to say unto the matter of my writing, pick quarrels with the manner or freedom of it, the liberty I take in the defence of truth, seeing the Doctor takes a greater liberty upon other terms, while he bids his Antagonist (one that descended the cause now in my hand) go and consult his Authors, namely, Stephens and Budaeus again; for, saith he, you wrong those learned men, while you would have us believe that they were as ignorant of the Greek Story as yourself, or that things are to be found in them, which are not. To which confidence, I have better leave to say, that the Doctor should do well to take no worse counsel than he gives.  
But what is become of my Praevaricator, I have quite lost him, else I should have entreated him to compare his Notes out of my Sermon, with these out of the Doctors: or retract that same affectation, in saying, I know not, but Mr. Harrington has conceived a great unkindness for the Clergy. As if these their Stratagems, with which they make perpetual War against the unwary people, did not concern a man that hath undertaken the cause of popular Government.  
The Policy of the Achaeans consisted of divers Commonwealths under one, which was thus administered, the Cities sent their Deputies twice every year of course, and oftener if they were summoned by their Strategus, or their Demiurges, to the place appointed. The Strategus was the Supreme Magistrate, both Military and Civil, and the Demiurges being ten, were his Council, all Annual Magistrates elected by the People. This Council thus constituted, was called the Synarchy, and performed like duties, in relation unto the Senate, consisting of the Deputies sent by their peculiar Sovereignty's or Cities, as the Prytans unto that in Athens. The Policies of the Aetolians and Lycians, are so near the same again, that in one you have all; So both the Senates and the Magistracy of these Common wealths, were upon rotation. To conclude, with Venice.  
The Common wealth of Venice, consisteth of four parts, The 
Epitome of the Commonwealth of Venice. The great Council.  great Council, the Senate, the Collegio, and the Signiory.  
The Great Council is the aggregate body of the whole People, or Citizens of Venice, which for the paucity of their Number, and the Antiquity of their Extraction are called Gentlemen, or Noble Venetians; every one of which, at five and twenty years of Age hath right of Session and Suffrage in this Council; which right of Suffrage, because throughout this Commonwealth, in all Debates and Elections, it is given by the ballot, is called, The right of ballotting, whereby this Council being the Sovereign power, createth all the rest of the Orders, Councils, or Magistracies; hath constitutely the Ultimate result, both in cases of Judicature, and constitution of Laws.  
The Senate called also the Pregati, consisteth of Sixty Senators, 
The Senate.  properly so styled, whereof the great Council electeth six on a day, beginning so long before the Month of October, that these being all chosen by that time, then receive their Magistracy; it consisteth also of sixty more, called the Juncta, which are elected by the Scrutiny of the Old Senate, that is, by the Senate proposing, and the great Council resolving; the rest of their Creation, is after the same manner with the former. In the Sixty of the Senate, there cannot be above three of any one kindred, or Family, nor in the Junta so many, unless there be fewer in the former. These Magistracies are all Annual, but without interval, so that it is at the pleasure of the great Council, whether a Senator having finished his year, they will elect him again.  
The Collegio is a Council, consisting more especially of 
The College.  three Orders of Magistrates, called in their Language Savi as the Savi grandi, to whose cognizance or care belong the whole affairs of Sea and Land; the Savi di Terra ferma, to whose care and Cognizance belong the affairs of the Land, and the Savi di Mare, to whose Cognizance appertain the affairs of the Sea, and of the Islands. These are elected by the Senate, not all at once; but for the Savi Grandi, who are six, by three at a time, with the interposition of three months; and for the Savi di terra ferma, and the Savi di mare, who are each five, after the same manner▪ save only that the first Election consisteth of three, and the second of two; Each Order of the Savi elects weekly one Provost, each of which Provosts hath right in any affair belonging unto the Cognizance of his Order, to propose unto the Collegio. Audience of Ambassadors, and matters of foreign Negotiation, belong properly unto this Council.  
The Signiory consisteth of the Duke, and of his Counsellors. 
The Signiory.  The Duke is a Magistrate created by the great Council for life, to whom the Common wealth acknowledgeth the Reverence due unto a Prince, and all her Acts run in his Name, though without the Counsellors he have no power at all while they can perform any function of the Signiory without him. The Counsellors, whose Magistracy is Annual, are elected by the scrutiny of the Senate▪ naming one out of each Tribe, (for the City is locally divided into six Tribes) and the Great Council approving; so the Counsellors are six, whose function in part is of the Nature of Masters of Requests, having withal, power to grant certain privileges: but their greatest pre-eminence is, that all, or any one of them, may propose unto any Council in the Common wealth.  
The Signiory hath session and suffrage in the Collegio, the 
Certain Rights of the Councils.  Collegio hath Session and suffrage in the Senate, and the Senate hath Session and suffrage in the Great Council. The Signiory, or the Provosts of the Savi, have power to assemble the College, the College hath power to assemble the Senate, and the Senate hath power to assemble the Great Council; the Signiori, but more peculiarly the Provosts of the Savi, (in their own Offices and functions) have power to propose unto the College, the College hath power to propose unto the Senate, and the Senate hath power to propose unto the Great Council: what ever is thus proposed and resolved, either by the Senate (for sometimes, through the security of this Order, a Proposition goes no farther) or by the Great Council, is ratified, or becomes the Law of the Commonwealth. Over and above these Orders▪ they have three Judicatories, two Civil, and one Criminal, in each of which, forty Gentlemen elected by the great Council, are Judges for the Term of eight months; to these Judicatories, belong the Avogadori and the Auditori, who are Magistrates, having power to hear causes apart, and, as they judge fitting, to introduce them into the Courts.  
If a man tell me, that I omit many things, he may perceive I write an Epitome, in which no more should be comprehended, then that which understood may make a man understand the rest. But of these principal parts, consisteth the whole body of admirable Venice.  
The Consiglio de Dieci, or Council of Ten, being that which partaketh of Dictatorian power▪ is not a limb of her, but as it were a Sword in her hand. This Council (in which the Signiory hath also Session and suffrage) consisteth more peculiarly of ten Annual Magistrates, created by the Great Council, who afterwards elect three of their own number by Lott, which so elected are called Capi de Dieci, their Magistracy being monthly; again, out of the three Capi, one is taken by Lot, whose Magistracy is weekly, this is he, who over against the Tribunal in the Great Council, fits like another Duke, and is called, the Provost of the Dieci. It belongs to these three Magistrates, to assemble the Council of deal Ten which they are obliged to do weekly of course, and oftener as they see occasion. The Council being assembled, any one of the Signiory, or two of the Capi may propose to it, the power which they now exercise, (& wherein for their assistance they create three Magistrates called the grand Inquisitors) consists in the punishment of certain heinous crimes▪ especially that of Treason; in relation whereunto they are as it were Sentinels, standing upon the guard of the Commonwealth: But constitutively with the Addition of a Junta, consisting of other fifteen together with some of the chief Magistrates, having right in cases of important speed or secrecy unto this Council; they had the full and absolute power of the whole Commonwealth, as Dictator.  
That Venice either transcribed the whole and every part of her Constitution out of Athens and Lacedaemon; or happeneth to be framed, as if she had so done, is most apparent. The Result of this Commonwealth is in the Great Council, and the debate in the Senate▪ so was it in Lacedaemon. A decree made by the Senate of Athens had the power of a Law for one year without the people, at the end whereof the people might revoke it: A decree of the Senate of Venice stands good without the great Council, unless these see reason to revoke it. The Prytans, were a Council preparing business for the Senate; So is the Collegio in Venice; the Precedents of the Prytans were the Ten Proedris; those of the Collegio are the three Provosts of the Savi. The Archons or Princes of Athens being Nine, had a kind of Sovereign inspection upon all the Orders of the Commonwealth, so hath the Signiory of Venice consisting of Nine besides the Duke. The Quarancies in Venice are Judicatoryes of the nature of the Heliaea in Athens; and as the Thesmothetae heard and introduced the causes into that Judicatory, so do the Avogadori and the Auditori into these. The Consiglio de dieci in Venice is not of the body but an Appendix of the Commonwealth; so was the Court of the Ephori in Lacedaemon, and as these had power to put a King a Magistrate or any Delinquent of what degree soever unto death, so hath the Consiglio de dieci. This again is wrought up with the Capi di dieci, and the weekly Provost, as were the Prytans with the Proedris, and the weekly Epistata, and the Ballot is lineally descended from the Bean; yet is Venice in the whole, and in every part, a far more exquisite policy than either Athens or Lacedaemon.  
A Political is like a natural body. Commonwealths resemble and differ, as men resemble and differ; among whom you shall not see two faces, or two dispositions, that are alike. Peter and Thomas in all their parts are equally men, and yet Peter and Thomas of all men may be the most unlike; one may have his greater strength in his arms, the other in his legs; one his greater beauty in his soul, the other in his body; one may be a fool, the other wise▪ one valiant, the other cowardly. These two which at a distance you will nor know, one from the other; when you look nearer, or come to be better acquainted with you will never mistake. Our Considerer (who in his Epistle, would make you believe, that Oceana is but a mere Transcription out of Venice,) hath Companions like himself, and how near they look in matters of this nature, is plain, while one knoweth not Jethro from Moses, and the other takes a state of Civil War, to be the best model of a Civil Government.  
Let a man look near, and the shall not find any one Orders in Oceana (the Ballot only excepted) that hath not as much difference from, or resemblance unto any one order in Rome or Venice, as any one Orders in Rome or Venice hath from, or to, any one Orders in Athens or Lacedaemon: Which different temper of the parts, must of necessity in the whole, yield a result, a soul or Genius, altogether new in the World, as embracing the Arms of Rome, and the Counsels of Venice; and yet neither obnoxious unto the Turbulence of the one, nor the Narrowness of the other.  
But the sum of what hath been said of Venice, as to the business in hand, comes to no more, then that the Senate and the Magistracy of this Common wealth are upon Rotation. No more: nay I am well, if it come to so much. For the Praevaricator catching me up, where I say, that, for all this, the greater Magistracies in Venice are continually wheeled through a few hands, tells me, that I have confessed it to be otherwise. I have indeed confessed, that albeit, the 
Consid. p. 93.  Magistracies are all confessed for certain terms; yet those terms do not necessitate vacations, that is, the term of a Magistracy being expired, the party that bore it, is capable upon a new Election of bearing it again without interval or vacation; which doth not altogether trash the Rotation of the Common wealth, though it render the same very imperfect. This infirmity of Venice, deriveth from a complication of causes, none of which is incident unto a Common wealth, consisting of the Many: wherefore there lies no Obligation upon me, to discover the reason in this place. But on the contrary, seeing, let me show things never so new, they are slighted as old; I have an Obligation in this place, to try whether I may get esteem▪ by concealing some thing. What is said, every body knew before; this is not said▪ who knows it?  
A Riddle. Riddle me, Riddle me, what is this? The Magistracies in Venice (except such as are rather of Ornament then of power) are all Annual, or at most Biennial. No man whose term is expired, can hold his Magistracy longer, but by a new Election. The Elections are most of them made in the Great Council, and all by the Ballot, which is the most equal and impartial way of Suffrage. And yet the greater Magistracies are perpetually wheeled, through a few hands.  
If I be worthy to give advice unto a man that would study the politics; let him understand Venice, he that▪ understands Venice right, shall go nearest to judge (notwithstanding the difference that is in every Policy) right of any Government in the world. Now the assault of the Considerer deriving but from some (Pique, or) Emulation, which of us should be the abler Politician; It the Council of State had the curiosity to know either that, or who understands Venice, this riddle would make the discovery; For he that cannot easily unfold this Kiddle, doth not understand her.  
The sixth kind of Rotation is when a Commonwealth goes upon it in all her Orders, Senate, People, and Magistracy. Such an one taking in the Many, and being fixed upon the foot of a steady Agrarian▪ hath attained un●o perfect Equality. But of this, Example there is none, or you must accept of Oceana.  
The Rotation of Oceana is of two parts, the one of the 
Rotation, of Oceana.  Electors which is Annual, and the other of the Elected which is Triennial.  
Speaking of Electors in this sense, I mean as the great Council in Venice are Electors of all other Orders, Councils, or Magistrates. But the Commonwealth of Oceana taking in the whole People cannot, as doth the great Council of Venice (wherein they that have right are but a few) attain unto this capacity at one step: for which cause she taketh three steps; One at the Parishes, where every fifth Elder is annually elected by the whole people▪ (there is no doubt but there was some such Order in Israel whereby the Monthly Rotation of her Congregation or Prerogative, by election of two thousand in each Tribe, was preserved). The next step she takes is at the Hundred, whereby Election of Officers and Magistrates, the Troops, chosen at the Parishes, are well near form. Her third step, is at the Tribe, where the whole body of her deputies are in exact form, discipline, and function, Headed by proper Officers and Magistrates, these altogether consisting of One fifth part of the whole people. This Rotation, being in itself Annual, comes in regaurd of the body of the People to be Quinquennial or such as in the space of five years gives every Man his turn in the power of Election.  
But though every Man be so capable of being an Electpr▪ that he must have his Turn, yet every man is not so capable of being elected into those Magistracies, that are Sovereign or have the Leading of the whole Commonwealth, that it can be safe to lay a Necessity, that every Man must take his turn in these also; but it is enough that every Man, who in the Judgement and Conscience of his Country is fit, may take his turn. Wherefore upon the Conscience of the Electors, (so constituted as hath been shown) it goes to determine, who shall partake of Sovereign Magistracy, or be, at the Assembly of a Tribe, elected into the Senate or Prerogative; which assemblies are so Triennial, That one Third part of each falling every year, and another being elected, the Parliament is thereby perpetuated.  
Such was the constitution of those Councils which the Praevaricator hath confessed he always thought admirable: but now the toy takes him to be quite of another mind; for, saith he, That, Ancient Republics have through a malicious 
Consid. p. 90.  jealously (let them take it among them) made it unlawful even for persons of the clearest merit to continue long in Command, but have by perpetual vicissitude substituted new men in the Government is manifested enough; but with what success they did this, will best appear by Veturius, Varro, and Mancinus. He is still admirable: One would wonder what he means, if it be that there were but three weak or unfortunate Generals in the whole course of Rome; how strange is it to urge this as an argument against Rotation, which is as strong an one as can be urged, for Rotation? If the Romans by this way of Election, having experience of an able General, knew ever after, where to have him; or lighting upon one they found not so fit for their purpose, could in the Compass of one year, be rid of him of course, without dishonour or reproach to him, taking thereby a warning to come no more there; was this a proceeding to favour malice; or such an one as removing the cause of malice, left no root for such a branch or possibility of like effect? Certainly by this Assertion the Praevaricator hath Joled his presumptuous head; not only against the prudence of Ancient Commonwealths, but of God himself in that of Israel. Veturius, Varro, and Mancinus (though some of them cannot be at all points excused) by this mark upon them, may be thought hardlier of, than is needful; for which cause there being that also in their Stories, which is neither unpleasant nor unprofitable, I shall endeavour to make the Reader somewhat better acquainted with them. One of the greatest blows Rome ever received was by Pontius, Captain General of the Samnites, who having drawn her Consuls, Posthumius and Veturius, by Stratagem into the fastenses of Caudium, a Valley of narrow Entrance, and shut up the mouth of it 
Liv. l. 9  by possessing himself of the only Passage, the rest being environed with insuperable Rocks, the Samnite came to have both the Armies, and so upon the matter, the whole strength (in those days) of Rome inevitably at his discretion. Hereupon, having leisure and being desirous (in a matter of such moment) of good advice he dispatched a messenger unto his father Herennius the ablest Counsellor in Samnium, to know what might be his best course with the Romans now inavoydably at his mercy, who answered that he should open the Pass, and let them return untouched. The young General amazed at this Counsel, desired farther direction; whereupon Herennius for the second time made answer that he should cut them off to a man. But the General upon the strange disagreement of such opinions, having his father's age (for he was very old) in suspicion took a third course, which neither (according to the first advice of wise Herennius) making friends; nor (according unto the second) destroying enemies, became as he prophesied the utter ruin of the Commonwealth of Samnium. For the Romans being dismissed safe, but ignominiously, the Senate upon their Return, fell into the greatest strength and consternation, that had been known among them. On the one side to live and not revenge such an Affront was intolerable; on the other to revenge it, was against the faith of the Consuls, whose Necessity (the loss of two Armies lying upon it) had in truth forced them to accept of a dishonourable League with the Samnites. Now not the Armies, but the Senate itself was in Caudium, not a man of them could find the way out of this Vale environed with Rocks, but he only that could not find it out of the other, Posthumius, who having first showed, that neither War nor Peace could be so made, as to engage the Common wealth (injussu Populi) without the Command of the People, declared that the Senate returning the Consuls, with such other as had consented unto so wicked and dishonourable a peace, naked, and bound unto the Samnites, were free, nor ceased till the Senate (thereunto pressed by the Necessity of the Common wealth) resolving accordingly, He, Veturius, and some of the Tribunes, were delivered unto the Samnites; who nevertheless, to hold the Romans unto their League, dismissed them with safety. The disputes on either side that arose hereupon, and coming to Arms, ended with the destruction of Samnium, I omit: that which as to the present Occasion, is material, is, the reputation of the Consuls, and Veturius, though he were not the leading man, being for the rest, as deep in the Action as Posthumius; the People were so far from thinking themselves deceived in this choice, that the Consuls were more honoured in Rome, for having lost, than Pontius in Samnium for having won the day at Caudium.  
I do not rob Graves, nor steal Winding-sheets; my Controversies are not but with the Living, with none of these that have not showed themselves best able for their own defence; nor yet with such, but in the prosecution of truths opposed by them unto the damage of mankind; yet the Praevaricator accuseth me of rude charges, what are his then in defence of falsehood, and against such as cannot bite? or whether of these is the more noble?  
For Varro, who being Consul of Rome, lost the battle of Cannae unto Hannibal Captain General for the Carthag nians, though without Cowardice, yet by rashness, he is not so excusable.  
But for Mancinus, brought (as was Posthumous, by the 
Florus. l. 2. c. 18.  Samnites) unto dishonourable condition▪ by Megaera▪ Captain General of the Numantines, there be excuses: As first the Numantines, for their number not exceeding four thousand fight men, were the gallantest of so many, on which the Sun ever shone.  
Fourteen years had their Commonwealth held tack with the Romans, in courage, conduct, and virtue, having worsted Pompey the Great, and made a League with him, when she might have made an end of him, ere ever Mancinus (of whom Cicero gives a fair Character) came in Play: So his misfortunes having great Examples, cannot want some excuse, but suppose ner' One of them deserved any Excuse, what is it at which these Examples drive, against a Commonwealth? Sure the Samnites, the Carthaginians, the Numantines were as well Commonwealths as the Romans; and so wherever the advantage go, it must stay upon a Commonwealth; Or if it be Rotation that he would be at (for we must guess) granting Pontius the Samnite, and Megaera the Numantine, to have been no more upon Rotation, than Hannibal the Carthaginian; yet is it plain that Rome upon her Rotation overcame not only, Pontius, Hannibal and Megaera; but Samnium Carthage, and Numantia. So much for Rome, but, says 
Consid. p. 91.  he, No less appears by the rabble of Generals often made use of by the Athenians, while men of Valour and Conduct have lain by the walls.  
A Rabble of Generals did I never hear of before; but not to meddle with his Rhetoric, whereas each of his Objections hath at least some one Contradiction in it, this hath two (one à Priore, another à Posteriore) One in the Snoute, another in the tail of it. For had there been formerly no Rotation in Athens, how should there have been Men of valour and conduct to lie by the walls? and if Rotation thenceforth should have ceased, how could those men of valour and conduct have done other than lie by the walls? so this inavoydably confesseth, that Rotation was the means whereby Athens came to be stored with persons of valour and Conduct, they to be capable of Employment, and the Commonwealth to employ the whole virtue of her Citizens; And it being (in his own words) an Argument of much imperfection in a Government not to dare to employ the whole virtue of the Citizens; This wholly Routs a standing General, for the Government that dares employ but the virtue of One, dares not employ the virtue of all. Yet he jogs on.  
Those Orders must needs be against Nature, which excluding 
Consid. p. 91.  persons of the best qualifications give admission unto others, who have nothing to commend them but their Art in Canvasing for the suffrage of the People. He never takes notice that the Ballot bars Canvasing beyond all possibility of any such thing; but we will let that go; Canvasing, it is confessed, was more frequent in Rome and Athens then is laudable, where nevertheless it is the stronger Argument for the integrity of Popular Suffrage, which being free from any aid of art, produced▪ in those Commonwealths more illustrious Examples, (if a Man go no farther than Plutarch's lives) then are to be found in all the rest of Story.  
Yet (saith he) this Law hath been as often broken as a Commonwealth 
Consid. p. 91.  hath been brought into any exigence, for the hazard of trusting affairs in weak hands then appearing, no scruple hath been made to trample upon this Order, for giving the power to some able man at that time rendered uncapable by the Vacation, this Law requires. The continuation of the Consulship of Marius is sufficient to be alleged for the proof of this, though if occasion were it might be backed by plenty of Examples. His choice confutes his pretended variety, who jests with edged tools, this Example above all will cut his fingers, for by this prolongation of Magistracy, or to speak more properly of Empire (for the Magistracy of the Consul was civil and conferred by the people Centuriatis comitiis, but his Empire was Military and conferred Curiatis) Rome began to drive those wheels of her rotation heavily in Marius, which were quite taken off in Caesar.  
I have heretofore in vain, persuaded them upon this occasion, to take notice of a Chapter in Machiavelli, so worthy of regard, that I have now inserted it at length▪ as followeth.  
The proceedings of the Roman Commonwealth, being well 
Match. Discor. B. 3. Ch. 24.  considered, two things will be found to have been the causes of her dissolution. The Contention that happened through the endeavour of the people, (always opposed or eluded by the Nobility) to introduce an Agrarian; and the damage that accrued from the prolongation of Empire: Mischiefs which had they leen foreseen in due time, the Government by application of fit remedies might have been of longer life and better health. The diseases which this Commonwealth, from contention about the Agrarian, contracted, were acute, and tumultuous, but those being slower, and without tumult, which she got by prolongation of Empire were chronical, and went home with her, giving a warning by her Example, how dangerous it is unto States that would enjoy their liberty, to suffer Magistracy, how deservedly soever conferred, to remain long in the possession of the same man. Certainly if the rest of the Romans, whose Empire happened to be prolonged, had been as virtuous and provident as L. Quinctius, they had never run into this inconvenience. Of such wholesome Example was the goodness of this man, that the Senate and the people, after one of their ordinary disputes, being come to some accord, whereas the people had prolonged the Magistracy of their present Tribunes, in regard they were persons more fitly opposed unto the Ambition of the Nobility, then by a New Election they could readily have found, and hereupon the Senate (to show they needed not be worse at this game) would have prolouged the Consulate unto Quinctius, he refused his consent, saying that ill Examples were to be corrected by good ones, and not encouraged by others like themselves; nor could they stir his resolution, by which means they were necessitated to make new Consuls. Had this wisdom and virtue (I say) been duly regarded, or rightly understood, it might have saved Rome, which through this neglect came to ruin. The first whose Empire happened to be prolonged was Publilius Philo, his consulate expiring at the Camp before Palepolis, while it seemed unto the Senate that he had the Victory in his hand (Actum cum Tribunis Plebis est ad Populum, ferrent 
Liv. b. 9  ut cum Philo Consulatu abijsset, Proconsule rem gereret) they sent him no successor, but prolonged his Empire, by which means he came to be the first Proconsul. An Expedient (though introduced for the Public good) that came in time to be the public bane: For by how much the Roman Armies marched farther off, by so much the like course seeming to be the more necessary, became the more customary; whence ensued two pernicious consequences, the one that there being fewer Generals, and Men of known ability for conduct, the Art with the reputation of the same, came to be more engrossed, and obnoxious unto ambition: the other, that a General standing long, got such hold upon his Army; as could take them off from the Senate, and hang them on himself. Thus Marius and Sylla could be followed by the Soldiery to the detriment of the Commonwealth, and Caesar to her perdition. Whereas had Rome never prolonged Empire she might perhaps not so soon have arrived at Greatness, or acquisition, but would have made less haste to destruction.  
All the Dilemma that Machiavil observes in these words is, that if a Commonwealth wilt not be so slow in her acquisition as is required by Rotation, she will be less sure than is requisite unto her preservation: But the Praevaricator (not deigning to show us, upon what reasons or experience, he grounds his Maxim) is positive.  
That the Dilemma into which a Commonwealth is in this case brought is very dangerous, for either she must give herself 
Consid. p. 92.  a mortal blow by gaining the habit of infringing such orders as are necessary for her preservation, or receive one from without.  
This same is an other Parakeetisme: these words are spoken by me after Machiavelli in relation unto Dictatorian power, in which they are so far from concluding against Rotation, that this in case of a Dictator is more especially necessary (Maxima libertatis custodia est, ut magna imperia 
Mamercus apud. Liv. l. 4.  diuturna non sint, & temporis modus imponatur, quibus juris imponi dele non potest) which could not be more confirmed then by him, who in the example of Marius shows that the contrary course spoilt all.  
The Romans if they had sent a successor unto Publilius Philo at Palepolis, it may be might have let the Victory slip out of his hands, it may be not; However this had been no greater wound unto the Commonwealth, then that her Acquisition would have been slower, which ought not to come in Competition with the safety of a Government, and therefore amounts not unto a Dilemma, this being a kind of argument that should not be stubbed of one horn, but have each of equal length and danger. Nor is it so certain that increase is slower for Rotation, seeing neither was this interrupted by that, nor that by this, as the greatest Actions of Rome, the Conquest of Carthage by Scipio Africanus, of Macedon by Flaminius, and of Antiochus by Asiaticus, are irrefragable Testimonies.  
I would be loath to spoil the Considerers preferment, but he is not a safe Counsellor for a Prince; whose providence not supplying the defect of Rotation whether in civil or military affairs, with some thing of like nature, exposeth himself if not his Empire as much unto danger as a Commonwealth. Thus the Sons of Zeruiah, Joab Captain 
2 Sam. 3. 39  of the Host and Abishai his brother, were too strong for David; thus the Kings of Israel and of Juda fell most of them by their Captains or Favourites, as I have elsewhere observed more particularly. Thus Brutus being standing Captain of the Guards could cast out Tarquin: Thus Sejanus had means to attempt against Tiberius, Otho 
Arnisi.  to be the Rival of Galba, Casperius Aelianus, of Nerva; Cassius, of Antoninus; Perennis, of Commodus; Maximinus, of Alexander; Philippus, of Gordian; Aemilianus of Gallus, Ingebus, Lollianus, Aureolus, of Gallienus; Magnesius of Constantius; Maximus, of Gratian; Arbogastes of Valentinian; Ruffinus of Arcadius; Stilico of Honorius. Go from the West into the East, upon the death of Marcianus, Asparis alone, having the command of the Arms, could prefer Leo to the Empire: Phocas deprive Mauritius of the same, Heraclius depose Phocas, Leo Isaurius do as much to Theodosius Adramyttenus; Necephorus, to Irenes; Leo Armenius, to Michael Curopalates; Romanus Lagapenus, to Constantine, Nicephorus Phocas to Romanus Puer; Johannes Zismisces to Nicephorus Phocas; Isaac Comnenus, to Michael Stratioticus; Botoniates to Michael the Son of Ducas, Alexius Comnenus to Botoniates; which work continued in such manner till the destruction of that Empire. Go from the East unto the North. Gustavus attained unto the Kingdom of Sweden, by his power and command of an Army, and thus Secechus came near to supplant Bolessaus' the third of Poland. If Wallesteine had lived, what had become of his Master? In France, the race of Pharamont was extinguished by Pippin, and that of Pippin in like manner, each by the Major of the Palace, a standing Magistracy of Exorbitant trust. Go to the Indies: You shall find a King of Pegu to have been thrust out of the Realm of Tangue by his Captain General. Nay go where you will, though this be pretty well, you shall add more than one Example. But as to the Praevaricator, if he were not given to make such mouths as eat up nothing else, but his own words, I needed not have brought any other Testimony to absolve a Commonwealth of malice in this order than his own, where he saith, that when some 
Consid. p. 47. 48.  person over-tops the rest in commands, it is a disease of Monarchy which easily admits of this cure, that he be reduced unto a less volume, and leveled unto an equality with the rest of his Order. Now a Prince can no otherwise Level a Noble Man, that excels the rest through Command, unto equality with his order, then by causing those of the same Order to take their turns in like command. Good wits have ill Memories. But, saith he, I know not what advantage Mr. Harrington may foresee from the orders of this Rotation, for 
Consid. p. 93.  my part I can discover no other effect of it then this, that in a Commonwealth like that of Oceana, taking in the Many (for in Venice he confesseth it to be otherwise) where every man will press forward toward Magistracy, this Law by taking off at the end of one year some Officers, and all at the end of 
Oceana, p. 213.  three will keep the Republic in a perpetual Minority. No man having time allowed him to gain that Experience; which 
B. 2. 9  may serve to lead the Commonwealth to the understanding of her true interest either at home or abroad.  
What I have confessed to be otherwise in Venice, I have shown already at least so far as concerneth the present Occasion, the causes of that defect being incompatible with a Commonwealth consisting of the many; otherwise why was not the like found in Athens or Rome, where though every man pressed forward towards Magistracy, yet the Magistrates were, for illustrious Examples, more in weight and Number, than are to be found in all the rest of the world.  
If where Elections were the most exposed to the ambition of the Competitor, and the humours of the People they yet failed not to excel all others that were not Popular, what greater vindication can there be of the Natural integrity of Popular suffrage even at the worst? But this, where it is given by the Ballot, is at the best, and free from all that pressing for Magistracy in the Competitor, or faction of the People that can any ways be laid unto the former; or let the Considerer consider again, and tell me by what means either of these in such a State can be dangerous or troublesome, or if at worst the orders for Election in Oceana must not perform that part, better than a Crowd and a Sheriff. Well but putting the case the Elections which were not quarrelled much withal be rightly Stated; yet this Law for Terms and Vacations by taking off at the End of One year some Officers, and all at the end of Three, will keep the Republic in perpetual Minority, no man having time allowed him to gain that Experience, which may serve to lead the Commonwealth to the understanding of her true interest at home or abroad. Because every Man will press forward for Magistracy, therefore there ought not to be Terms and vacations, lest these should keep the Commonwealth in perpetual Minority. I would once see an Argument that might be reduced to Mood and Figure. The next Objection is, that these Orders take off at the end of One year some Officers, which is true, and that at the end of Three years, they take off all, which is false; for whereas the Leaders of the Commonwealth are all Triennial, the Orders every year take off no more than such only as have finished their three years' term, which is not all but a Third part. Wherefore let him speak out; three years is too short a Term for acquiring that knowledge, which is necessary unto the leading of a Commonwealth. To let the courses of Israel which were Monthly, the Annual Magistracyes of Athens and Rome go. If three years be too short a Term for this purpose, what was three months? A Parliament in the late Government was rarely longer lived then three months, nor more frequent than once in a year, so that a Man having been twelve years a Parliament man in England, could not have born his Magistracy above three years, though he were not necessarily subject unto any Vacation. Whereas a Parliament-man in Oceana may in twelve years have born his Magistracy. fix, Notwwithstanding the Necessity of his Vacations, which of these two are most straightened in the time necessary unto the gaining of due experience or knowledge for the leading of a Commonwealth? Nevertheless the Parliament of England was seldom or never without Men of Sufficient skill and ability; though the Orders there were more in Number, less in Method, not written and of greater difficulty than they be in Oceana: There, if not the Parliament man, the Parliament itself was upon Terms and Vacations, which unto a Council of such Nature is the most dangerous thing in the world, seeing dissolution, whether unto a body Natural or Political is death. For if Parliaments happened to rise again & again, this was not so much coming unto themselves, (seeing a Council of so different Genius hath not been known) as a New birth and a Council that is every year Newborn indeed must keep a commonwealth in perpetnall Minority or rather Infancy; always in danger of being overlaid by her Nurse, or strangled by her Guardian: whereas an Assembly continued by Succession or due Rotation regulated by Terms giving sufficient time for digestion, grows up, and is like a Man, who though he change his flesh neither changeth his body, nor his soul. Thus the Senate of Venice changing flesh, though not so often as in a Commonwealth consisting of the Many were requisite, yet oftenest of any other in the world, is, both in Body and Soul or Genius, the most unchangeable Council under Heaven. Flesh must be changed or it will stink of itself; there is a Term necessary to make a man able to lead the Commonwealth unto her interest, and there is a Term that may enable a Man to lead the Commonwealth unto his interest. In this regaurd it is, that (according to Mamerous) the Vacations are (mazima libertatis custodia) the Keepers of the Libertyes of Oceana.  
The three Regions into which each of the leading Councils, is divided, are three forms (as I may say) in the School of State, for them of the Third (though there be care in the choice) it is no such great matter what be their skill: The Ballot which they practised in the Tribe being that in the performance whereof no Man can be out, and this is all that is Necessary unto their Novitiate or first year, during which time they may be Auditors: by the Second, they will have seen all the Scenes, or the whole rotation of the Orders, so facile, and so intelligible, that at one reading a Man understands them as a Book, but at once Acting as a Play, and so Methodical, that he will remember them better. Tell me then what it is that can hinder him for the second year from being a Speaker; or why for the third, should he not be a very able Leader.  
The Senate and the Prerogative, or representative of the people, being each of like constitution, drop annually four hundred, which in a matter of ten years, amount to four thousand experienced Leaders, ready upon new elections to resume their leading.  
Another thing which I would have considered, is, whether our most Eminent Men found their parts in Parliament, or brought them thither. For if they brought them, think you not the Military Orders of the youth, the Discipline of the Tribes, the eight years' Orb of the Ambassadors, the Provincial Armies of Oceana, likely to breed Men of as good parts, as no such matter? Nor have Astronomers that familiarity with the Stars, which Men without these Orbs will have with such as are in them. He is very heavy, who cannot perceive that in a Government of this frame, the Education must be Universal, or diffused throughout the whole Body. Another thing which is as certain, as comfortable, is that the pretended depth and difficulty in matter of State, is a mere cheat. From the beginning of the World unto this day, you never found a Common wealth, where the Leaders having honesty enough, wanted skill enough to lead her unto her true interest at home or abroad: that which is necessary unto this end, is not so much skill as honesty, and let the Leaders of Oceana be dishonest if they can. In the leading of a Commonwealth aright; this is certain, wisdom and honesty are all one, and though you shall find defects in their virtue, those that have had the fewest, have ever been, and for ever shall be the wisest.  
Rome never ruin'd, till her balance being broken, the Nobility forsaking their ancient virtue, abandoned themselves unto their lusts; and the Senators, who as in the Case of Jugurtha, were all bribed, turned knaves; at which turn, all their skill in Government, (and in this never men had been better skilled) could not keep the Common wealth from over-rurning. Cicero (an honest man) laboured might and main. Pomponius Atticus another, despaired: Cato tore out his own bowels, the Poigniards of Brutus and Cassius, neither considered Prince nor Father. But the Common wealth had sprung her Planks, and spilt her ballast, the World could not save her.  
For the Close, the Praevaricator, who had judged before, that There was much reason to expect, some of the Clergy (against all of whom, Mr. Harrington hath declared War) 
Consid. p. 36. p. 94.  will undertake the quarrel: tells me in the last line, that There be unto whom he hath recommended the disquisition of the Jewish Common wealth.  
It is a miserable thing, to be condemned unto the perpetual Budget; once turn an honest man to me. In the mean time, that it may be farther seen, how much I am delighted in fair play, it being, so belike, that some Divines are already at work with me, and I have not so fully explained myself upon that point, which with them is of the greatest concernment, that they can yet say, they have peeped into my Hand, or seen my Game; as I have won this trick, gentlemans, or speak, so I play them out the last card in the next Book for up.   
FINIS.   

Advertisement to the Reader, or direction contained in certain Queries, how the Commonwealth of Oceana may be examined or answered, by divers sorts of men, without spoiling their high Dance, or cutting off any part of their Elegance, or freeness of Expression.  

To the Scholar that hath passed his Novitiate in Story.  
I. WHether the balance of Propriety in Land coming through Civil vicissitude by slow and undiscerned degrees, to alter as it did, and to stand as it doth in Oceana, any other Government could have been introduced (otherwise then by the interposition of foreign Arms) that could have subsisted naturally without violence or reluctancy, or steadily without frequent changes, alterations, and plunges, save that only of the Common wealth proposed?  
II. Whether the Balance in Land so standing as hath been shown, the Common wealth proposed, being once established, were without the immediate hand of God, as by Pestilence, Famine, Inundation, to be altered or broken, and which way.   

To the godly man.  
1. WHether Humane Prudence be not a Creature of God, and to what end God made this Creature?  
2. Whether the Common wealth of Israel in her main Orders, that is to say, the Senate, the People, and the Magistracy, were not erected by the same rules of humane Prudence, with other Common wealths?  
3. Whether Jethro were not an Heathen?  
4. Whether God did not approve of the Advice of Jethro, in the Fabric of the Common wealth of Israel?  
5. Whether the natural body of a Godly man, can any otherwise be said to support and nourish itself in the Air, or between Heaven and Earth, then by a figurative Speech? or whether it be any more possible for the Political body of a People so to do, then for the Natural body of a Godly man?   

To the Grandee, or Learned Commonwealths-man.  
1. WHether a Noble Housekeeper have an Horsekeeper, that is as well to live as himself, and whether the Housekeeper, should he lose his Estate, would not be an Horse keeper, rather than want bread?  
2. Whether Riches and Poverty (more or less) do not introduce Command or Obedience (more or less) as well in a Public, as in a Private Estate?  
3. Whether the Introduction of Commandor obedience, more or less, either in a public or private Estate, do not form or change the Genius of a man, or of a People accordingly? Or what is the reason why the Peasant in France is base, and the lower People in England of an high courage?  
4. Whether the Genius of the People of Oceana, have been of late years, or be devoted, or addicted unto the Nobility and the Clergy, as in former times?  
5. Whether the Genius of the People of Oceana, not being addicted unto the Nobility and Clergy, as formerly can be said to be for Monarchy, or against it?  
6. Whether the People be not frequently mistaken in Names, while as to things they mean otherwise; or whether the People of Oceana desiring Monarchy in Name, do not in truth desire a Government of Laws, and not of Men?  
7. Whether for these Reasons, not to know how to hold the Balance or foundation of a Government steady, nor yet to reform, or vary the Orders of the same; as the foundation comes to vary, be not to deliver a Nation unto certain ruin, and destruction?   

To the Rational Man.  
1. WHether there be any thing in this Fabric or Model, that is contradictory unto itself, unto Reason, or unto Truth?  
2. Whether a Common wealth can be framed entire or complete in all her necessary Orders, without any manner of contradiction to herself, to reason, or to truth, and yet be false, or insufficient?    

The Errors of the Press in the first Book.  
For fault, page 4. l. 38. read salt. for of, p. 8. l. 1. r. the. For instructed, p. 45. l. 12. r. entrusted. For will say, must, p. 86. l. 25. r. will say but must. For expect, p. 89. l. 14. r. except. For famylyed p. 89. l. 39 r. families. For Ply-earts, p. 109. l. 22. r. Placarts. Sans Comparison, if taken as English, is right enough, but if you take it for French, is to be read sans comparaison.   

THE SECOND BOOK.  
OR A Political Discourse CONCERNING ORDINATION.  
Against Dr. H. Hammond.  
Against Dr. L. Seaman.  
And the Authors they follow.  Optat Aprum aut fulvum descendere monte Leonem. 
E. W.  
LONDON: Printed by G. Dawson, for Tho. Brewster, and are to be sold at the three Bibles in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1657.   

ADVERTISEMENT To the READER.  
BOOks, especially whose Authors have gotten themselves Names, are leaders, wherefore in case any of these err in leading, it is not only lawful, but matter of conscience unto a man that perceives it, as far as he is able, to warn others. This were apology enough for my writing against Dr. Hammond, and Dr. Seaman; and yet I have happened to be brought under a farther obligation unto this enterprise, their books having been sent me by way of objection against what I have formerly said of Ordination, and am daily more and more confirmed I shall make good. However, there can be no great hurt in this Essay, Truth being like Venison, not only the best Quarry, but the best Game.   

Order of the Discourse.  
TO menage the present Controversy with the more clearness, I have divided my discourse into five Parts, or Chapters.  

The First explaining the words Chirotonia and Chirothesia, paraphrastically relates the story of the perambulation made by the Apostles Paul and Barnabas through the Cities of Lycaonia Pisyaia, etc. by way of Introduction.  
The second shows those Cities, or most of them at the time of this perambulation to have been under popular Government. In which is contained the whole administration of a Roman Province.  
The third shows the deduction of the Chirotonia from popular Government, and of the Original right of Ordination from the Chirotonia. In which is contained the institution of the Sanhedrin, or Senate of Israel by Moses, and of that at Rome by Romulus.  
The fourth shows the deduction of the Chirothesia from Monarchical, or Aristocratical Government, and the second way of Ordination from the Chirothesia. In which is contained the Commonwealth of the jews, as it stood after the captivity.  
The fifth debateth whether the Chirotonia used in the Cities mentioned were (as is pretended by Doctor Hamond, Dr. Seaman, and the Authors they follow) the same with the Chirothesia, or a far different thing. In which are contained the divers kinds of Church-government introduced and exercised in the age of the Apostles.   
I am entering into a discourse to run much for the words, upon a language not vulgar, (which therefore I shall use no otherwise than by way of parenthesis, not obstructing the sense) and for the things upon Customs that are foreign which therefore I shall interpret as well as I can. Now so to make my way into the parts of this discourse, that whereas they who have heretofore managed it in English, might in regard of their Readers have near as well written it in Greek, I may not be above the vulgar capacity; I shall open both the Names whereof, and the things whereupon we are about to Dispute by way of Introduction.   

A POLITICAL DISCOURSE CONCERNING Ordination.  

THE INTRODUCTION, OR First Chapter.  
THe Names or words whereof we are about to Dispute are Greek, the one Chirotonia, the other Chirothesia; the first signification of the word Chirotonia in Sindas, imports a certain lewd action of the hand, which seemeth also by the Greek that renders it by the same word, to have been intimated by Isai. 5. 9 In the second signification with Suidas, it is (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Election, (that is to say of Magistrates) or ratification, (that is to say of Laws) by the Many: which amounts both by his testimony, and that generally of ancient Authors unto this, that the most usual and natural signification of the word Chirotonia is popular Suffrage, whether given as when they speak of Athens by the holding up of hands, or as when they speak (as doth Suidas in the place mentioned) of Rome, and other Commonwealths, (whose suffrage was not given with this Ceremony,) without holding up of hands.  
Chirethesià (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) is a word that in the strict signification imports laying on of hands, and no more: but the Jews using to confer their Ordination most commonly by laying on of hands; and yet sometimes by word of mouth, or by letter, the word both as it relates to the custom of the Jewish Commonwealth, and Ordination thence transplanted into the Church of Christ, signifies Ordination conferred by one Man, or a few Men, that is to say, by some distinct Order from the people, whether with Imposition of hands, or without it.  
These words thus interpreted, I shall throughout my discourse (which else must have run altogether upon the Greek) presume as already I have done, to take for good English, and so proceed unto the things whereof we are to dispute; first, by opening the Scene of this perambulation, which will be done best by the help of Erasmus a man as for his learning not inferior to any, so for his freedom not addicted unto interests, or parties. For the Remainder then of this Introduction, I shall begin with the nineteenth Verse of the eleventh, and continue my discourse unto the end of the fourteenth Chapter of the Acts, interweaving the Text where it is darker with the Paraphrase of that excellent Author for light, and his Paraprase with the Text, where it is clearer for brevity in manner following.  
They whom the heat of persecution from the death of Stephen had dispersed, traveled through the Cities and 
Act. 11. 19  Villages as far as Phenice, and the adjacent Island of Cyprus; as also through Antiochia, which lieth between Phenice and Cilicia, preaching the Gospel received from the Apostles, which nevertheless they dared not to communicate, but to such only as were of the jewish Nation, not out of envy, but a kind of Superstition, they believing that to do otherwise were to give the children's bread unto dogs, which Christ hath forbidden.  
But some of them that believed being of Cyprus and Cyrene, when they came unto Antioch, had the boldness to speak of Christ unto the Greeks, preaching the Lord jesus, in which they made such progress, through the blessing of God upon them and their labours, that a great number of these also believing the Gospel, were turned unto the Lord. The tidings of these things coming unto the Ears of the Church, which was at jerusalem, a man of Apostolical sincerity, Barnabas the Levite, a Cyprian born, was sent by the Apostles to take a view of what was done upon the places, and if he found it to be according unto the will of God to approve of it, by authority of the Apostles. So great caution in receiving the Gentiles unto the Gospel was not, but the thing was greatly desired by the Apostles: but lest it should afterwards be repeated or made void by the jews, as done rashly, or that the Gentiles should rely less upon what was done, as conceiving it needed ratification by the Law. Wherefore Barnabas so soon as he came to Antioch, and found the Greeks by Faith, and without profession of the Law, to have received the same grace of God with the jews, was very much joyed that the number of Believers increased, and exhorted them to remain constant in their Enterprise of adhering unto the Lord. For he was a good Man, and full of the Holy Spirit, and of Faith. Wherefore through his Ministry it came to pass, that a Multitude of other Believers were added unto the former. Now Antioch being not far from Cilicia, the Neighbourhood of the place invited him to seck Paul the fittest helper in this work, as chosen by Christ to preach his Name unto the Gentiles, and Kings of the Earth. For when Paul fled from jerusalem, the Disciples had conducted him to Caesarea of Phenice, whence he went to Tarsus, whom therefore when Barnabas had found there, he brought to Antioch, hoping in a City both famous and populous, (but with a confused mixture of jews and Greeks) to receive the better fruit through the aid of an Apostle more peculiarly designed unto this work. These two being conversant an whole year in the Church of Antioch, which by the confluence both of jews and Greeks, became very numerous, so many were added by their preaching, that whereas hitherto not▪ exposing the Name of Christ unto Envy, they had been called Disciples, they now began first at Antioch from the Name of their founder to be called Christians. In these times certain Prophets came from the City of jerusalem unto Antioch, whereof one named Agabus, standing up in the Congregation, signified by inspiration, that there should be a great dearth through the whole world; which came to pass under Claudius Caesar the Successor of Caligula. At this time they at jerusalem, partly because they were poor at their conversion unto the Gospel, partly because they had deposited their goods in Common, and partly because they had been spoiled by the Priests for their profession of Christ, Ordained that by the contribution of such as had wherewithal, especially among the Believing Gentiles, money should be sent unto the relief of the Christians dwelling in judea: but so, that this Contribution was not to he forced but free; and according unto every man's ability. This money thus gathered was sent by Paul and Barnabas unto the Elders at jerusalem to be distributed at their discretion unto such as were in need. While Paul and Barnabas were thus employed, King Herod, the same that had beheaded john, and returned Christ clothed through derision in white unto Pilate, being grieved to see this kind of People increase, and the Name of jesus King of the jews to grow famous in divers Nations, became concerned to root out such a Faction, and so spreading; wherefore he stretched forth his hand to vex certain of the Church, killed james the Brother of john with the sword, and because he saw it pleased the jews, proceeded farther to take Peter also, who being imprisoned, was afterward miraculously delivered. But Paul and Barnabas having performed the Trust committed unto them by the brethren, and delivered the Contribution for relief of the Poor unto the Apostles, returned from jerusalem unto Antioch, taking with them john whose Surname was Mark.  
Now the Church of Antioch flourished in such manner, that she had some filled with the gift of Prophecy, & others withthat of teaching, among whom was Barnabas and Simeon alias Niger together with Lucias a Cirenian, and Manaen who had been brought up with Herod the Tetrarch, whom he left to come unto Christ; but the chief of them was Saul endowed with all the gifts and graces apostolical. While▪ all these were intent upon the Ministry of the Church, employing their several gifts unto the glory of God, and in his most acceptable service, the salvation of Souls with Fasting and Prayer, The Holy Ghost being stirred up by their zeal, signified his will by the Prophets, saying, Separate me Barnabas and Paul for the work whereunto I have called them, namely, to be Doctors of the Gentiles, that by them I may propagate the Gospel. The command of the Spirit was obeyed, and Barnabas with Paul, to the end that every one might see who were chosen, were separated from the rest; and when the Congregation had unanimously imoplored the favour of God by Prayer and Fasting, the most eminent in authority among them, laid their hands upon the persons so separated, and sent them wherever the Spirit of God should direct them. By this impulse therefore Barnabas and Paul went unto Selencia, being a Promontory of Antiochia, and thence sailed into the Island of Cyprus, where landed at Salamis a famous City upon the Eastern part of the Island, they preached not humane inventions, but the Word of God, nor that by stealth, but in the Synagogues of the Jews, whereof through the Neighbourhood of Syria there was store. This honour by the Commandment of Christ was always deferred unto the Jews, that the Gospel should be first offered unto them, lest they being a querulous and repining Nation should complain that they were despised; thus traveled these Apostles through the whole Island, till they came unto Paphos, a City consecrated unto Venus upon the Western Coast of Cyprus. Here they found a certain Magician called Bar-Jesus, that is the Son of Jesus a Jew, both by Nation and Religion, under which colour he falsely pretended unto the gift of Prophecy. This Man followed the Court of Sergius Paulus Proconsul or Governor of the Island for the Romans, otherwise a prudent Man; but this sort of Vermine insinuateth itself into the Best to choose that so their corruption may do the greater and more compendious mischief unto Mankind. The Proconsul nevertheless having understood the Gospel to be planting throughout Cyprus, not only forbore to stop the Ears of others, but by sending for Baruabas and Paul seemed desirous to open his own. Wherefore Bar-Jesus endeavouring to resist the growth of the Word, as an enemy to Christ, and resisting the Truth with falsehood, a strife arose between the true Prophets, and a false One, (for such is the interpretation of the Syriack word Elymas,) whom Paul at the length confuted of spiritual blindness, by taking away the Eyes of his body miraculously strucken in the presence of the Proconsul, who at the same time receiving the Light of the Gospel, embraced the Christian Faith This being done at Paphos, Paul embarked there with his Associates for the lesser Asia, and came unto Perga, being a City of Pamphylia; here John whose Surname was Mark left them, and returned unto Jerusalem, while they when they had visited Pamphylia traveled unto Antiochia, a City of Pisidia, where having entered a Synagogue, they sat after the usual manner with the rest attentive unto the Law and the Prophets; whereof when the parts appointed were read, and no Man stood up, the Rulers of the Synagogue perceiving that the strangers by their habit were Jews, and such as by their aspect promised more than ordinary, sent unto them, desiring that if they had any word of Exhortation for the people, they would speak. Whereupon Paul standing up preached unto them Christ; whence came the word of Lord to be divulged throughout that Region, albeit the Jews out of Envy to the Gentiles stirring up the devoutest of the Matrons (an Art not unknown in these times) and by them the chief of the City raised such sedition in it, and tumult against the Apostles; that Paul and Barnabas being cast out, shook off the dust from their feet against them, and went thence unto Iconium a City of Lycaonia. When they were come unto Iconium, 
Ch. 14.  entering with the Jews after the custom into the Synagogue, they preached as they had done at Antioch, the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and with such efficacy, that Multitudes both of the Jews▪ and Greeks believed; here again the Envy of the Jews became the Author of Sedition, by which means the City was divided into two parts or factions, whereof One stood for the unbelieving Jews, and the other for the Apostles. At length when such of the Gentiles as were joined with the Jews, and the Rulers of the City made an assault upon the Apostles, to offer violence, and stone them; they being aware of it, fled to Lystra (a City of Lycaonia, which is a part of Pamphylia) and Derbe. At Lystra there was a Man lame of his feet from the Womb, who having listened unto Paul, with great attention and Zeal, was miraculously cured by the Apostle; when the People seeing what Paul had done, cried out, the Gods were descended in the likeness of Men: a persuasion that might gain the more easily upon the minds of the Lycaonians for the fable of Jupiter and Mercury, said to have descended in humane shape, and been entertained by Lycaon, from whom the Lycaonians received their Name. Wherefore they called Barnabas for the gravity of his aspect, Jupiter, Paul for his Eloquence, Mercury, and the Priest of Jupiter, who dwelled in the Suburbs, brought Bulls and Garlands unto the Gates of the House, where the Apostles were, to have offered Sacrifice with the people, which the Apostles abhorring, vigorously dissuaded. In the mean time certain Jews by Nation that were unbelievers coming from Antioch of Pisidia, and Iconium, drew the people unto the other extreme, who from sacrificing unto the Apostles fell on stoning them; a work which was brought so near unto an end, that Paul being drawn by them out of the City was left for dead, though he soon after recovered; and went thence with Barnabas unto Derbe; when they had propagated the Gospel there also, they returned unto Lystra, Iconium and Antiochia, confirming the Disciples whom they had converted. Now because the propagation of the Gospel required that the Apostles should be moving through divers Nations, They chirotonizing them Elders in every Congregation, or Church, that is, ordaining them Elders by the votes of the people in every City, left them to perform the duties of the absent Apostles, and when they had fasted and prayed, commended them unto the Lord. These things being brought to a conclusion, or finished at Antioch in Pisidia, when they had perambulated this Country, they also visited Pamphylia, sowing the Gospel where it was not yet sown, and confirming those who already believed till they came to Perga: where having ordered their affairs, they proceeded to Attalia, being a Maritimate City of Pamphylia, and from thence they sailed back unto Antioch of Syria, whence first they set out with Commission from the Elders to preach the Gospel unto the Gentiles, and where by the Chirothesia or Imposition of Hands, Prayer, and Fasting, they had been recommended to the grace of God, and designed unto the work now finished.  
In this Narrative you have mention both of the Chirotonia and of the Chirothesia, or Imposition of Hands, but of the former as of Ordination; For by that such were made Presbyters or Church Officers as were not so before, of the latter not, I think as of Ordination, at least in the sense we now take it, but as of designation of Persons, unto an occasional and temporary Employment, that had been ordained before, for so sure had Paul at least; howsoever, that which is offered by 
Acts 6. 12.  this Narrative unto present consideration, is no more than the bare story.   

CHAP. II. That the Cities, or most of them named in the Perambulation of the Apostles, Paul and Barnabas were at that time under popular Government. In which is contained the administration of a Roman Province.  
THe Romans of all Nations under Heaven were endowed, as with the highest virtues, so with the greatest humane glory; which proceeded from this especially that they were in love with such as were in love with their Liberty, as to begin with their dawn. The Privernates, (a free People, inhabiting the City and parts adjoining, which at this day is called Piperno, some fifty miles from Rome, and five from S●sse) being the second time conquered by the Romans; It was consulted in the Senate what 
Livy. lib. 8. Ch. 21.  course should be taken with them; where while some, according unto the different temper of Men, showed themselves hotter, and others cooler, One of the Privernates more mindful of the condition wherein he was born, than of that wherein he was fallen, happened to render all more doubtful; for being asked by a Senator of the severer Judgement, what punishment he thought the Privernates might deserve, Such (says he) as they deserve, that believe themselves worthy of Liberty. At the courage of which answer the Consul perceiving in them that had been vehement enough before against the Privernates, but the greater animosity, to the end that by a gentler interrogatory he might draw forth, some softer answer, replied, And what if we inflict no punishment at all, but pardon you; what peace may we expect of you? why if you give us a goodone (said the other) a steady and perpetual peace, but if an ill One, not a long One. At which a certain Senator falling openly upon ruffling and threatening the Privernate, as if those words of his tended unto some practice or intention to stir▪ up the Cities in peace to sedition, the better part of the Father's being quite of another mind, declared, That they had heard the voice of a Man, and of a Freeman. For why (said they) should it be thought that any Man or people will remain longer under such a burden as they are not able to bear, then till they can throw it down? There a peace is faithful, where it is voluntary, if you will have slaves you are not to trust them, but their fetters. To this opinion the Consul especially inclining, inclined others, while he openly professed, That they who had no thought but upon their liberty, could not but be thought worthy to be Romans: whereupon the Decree passed by Authority of the Fathers, which was afterwards proposed unto the Congregation, and ratified by the Command of the people, whereby the Privernates were made Citizens of Rome. Such was the Genius of the To man Commonwealth, where by the way you may also observe the manner of her debate and result, (Authoritate Patrum & Jussu populi) by the advice of the Senate, and the Chirotonia of the people.  
But that which in this place is more particularly offered unto consideration is her usual way of proceeding in case of Conquest with other Nations; for albeit bearing an haughty brow towards such, as not contented to enjoy their liberty at home, would be her Rivals abroad, she dealt far otherwise, as with Carthage; This case excepted, and the pilling and polling of her Provinces, which happened through the Avarice and Luxury of her Nobility, when the balance of popular Power being broken, her Empire began towards the latter end to languish and decline; the way which she took with the Privernates was that which she usually observed with others throughout the course of her Victories, and was after the change of Government made good at least in some part, by the Roman Emperors, under whom were now those Cities mentioned in the present perambulation of the Apostles Paul and Barnabas. Strabo for his Credit, among Humane Autors is equal unto any; he lived about the time of this perambulation, and being a Greek, is less likely to be partial: Of that therefore which I have affirmed to have been the course of the Romans in their Victories, I shall make choice of this Author for a Witness; first where he Epitomiseth the Story of Athens after this manner, When the Carians by Sea, and the Baeotians by Land wasted Attica, C●crops the Prince, to bring the people under shelter, planted them in twelve Cities, (Cecropia, 
Strabo 1. 9  Tetrapolis, Epacrea, Decelea, Eleusis, Aphydna, Thoricus, Brauron, Cytherus, Sphettus, C●phissia, Phalerus,) which Theseus is said to have contracted into one called Athens. The Government of this City had many changes, at the first, it was Monarchical, then popular; This again was usurped by the Tyrants Pisistratus and his Sons, whence recovered, it fell afterwards into the hands of the Few, as when the four hundred once, and again the thirty Tyrants were imposed by the Lacedæmonians, in the war of Peloponesus; which yoke the Athenians (by means of their faithful Army) shaking off, restored their popular government, and held it until the Romans attained unto the Dominion of Greece. Now though it be true that they were not a little disturbed by the Kings of Macedon unto whom they were forced to yield some kind of Obedience; they nevertheless preserved the form of their Commonwealth so entire, that there be who affirm it never to have been better administered, than at such time as Macedon was governed by Cassander; for this Prince though in other thing more inclining towards the Tyrant, having taken Athens by surrender, used not the People ill, but made Demetrius Phalerius the Disciple of Theophrastus the Philosopher, chief Magistrate among them; a Man so far from ruining their Popular State (as in the Commentaries he writ upon this kind of Government is attested) that he repaired it. Nevertheless whether suspected or envied for his greatness with, or support by the Macedonian, after the death of Cassander he fled into Egypt, while his Enemies breaking down his Statues▪ (as some say) made homely Vessels of them. But the Romans having received the Athenians under their popular form left them their Laws and Liberties untouched, till in the war with Mithridates they were forced to receive such Tyrants as that King was pleased to give them; whereof Aristion the greatest, when the Romans had retaken the City from him, being found trampling upon the people, was put to death by Sylla, and the City pardoned, which to this day (he writ about the Reign of Tiberius) not only enjoys her liberties, but is high in honour with the Romans. This is the testimony of Strabo, agreeing with that of Cicero, where disputing of divine providence, he saith, that to affirm the world to be governed by chance, or without God, is as if One should say that Athens were not governed by oh Areopagites. Nor did the Romans by the deposition of the same Author (or indeed of any other) behave themselves worse in Asia, (the scene of our present discourse, where the same Paul of whom we are speaking being born at Tarsus a City of Cilicia, that had acquired like or greater privilege by the same bounty, was also a Citizen of Rome,) then in Greece. Asia is understood in three significations: First, 
Sigon. de antony's jure Provin.  for the third part of the world answering to Europe and Africa: Secondly, for that part of Asia, which is now called Anatolia. Thirdly, for that part of it which Attalus King of Pergamum dying without Heirs, bequeathed and left unto the People of Rome: this contained Mysia, Phrygia, Aeolis, Jonia, Caria, Doris, Lydia, Lycaonia, Pisidia, and by consequence the Cities whereof we are speaking: to all these Countries the Romans gave their liberty, till in favour of Aristonicus the Bastard of Eumenes, many of them taking Arms, they were recovered, brought into subjection, and framed into a Province.  
When a Consul had conquered a Country, and the Romans intended to form it into a Province, it was the custom of the Senate to send (Decem Legatos) ten of their Members, who with the Consul had power to introduce and establish their provincial way of Government. In this manner Asia was form by M. aquilius Consul, afterwards so excellently reform by Scaevola, that the Senate in their Edicts used to propose his Example unto succeeding Magistrates; and the Inhabitants to celebrate a Feast unto his Name. Nevertheless Mithridates King of Pontus (all the Romans in this Province being massacred in one day) came to possess himself of it, till it was recovered at several times by Sylla, Murena, Lucullus, and Pompey. The Romans in framing a Country into a Province, were not accustomed to deal with all the Inhabitants of the same in a like manner, but differently according to their different merit. Thus divers Cities in this were left free by Sylla, as those of the Ilienses, the Chians, Rhodians, Lycians, and Magnesians, with the Cizicens, though the last of these afterwards for their practices against the Romans forfeited their liberty unto Tiberius in whose Reign, they were for this reason deprived of the same.  
Taking Asia in the first sense, that is for one third part of the world, the next Province of the Romans in this Country was Cilicia, containing Pamphilia, Issauria, and Cilicia more peculiarly so called; here Cicero was sometimes Proconsul, in honour unto whom part of Phrygia with Pisidia, and Lycaonia were taken from the former, and added unto this Jurisdiction, by which means the Cities whereof we are speaking, came to be of this Province: adjoining hereunto, was the Commonwealth of the Lycians, which the Romans left free; Into this also the City of Attalia by some is computed, but Iconium both by Scrabo and Cicero, the latter whereof being Proconsul in his journey from Laodicea, was received 
Epist.  by the Magistrates and Deputies of this City: Lystra and Derbe being Cities of Lycaonia, must also have been of the same Province. Next unto the Province of Cilicia was that of Syria, containing Comagene, Seliucia, Phoenicia, Caelosyria, and Judea or Palestine. In Seleucis were the four famous Cities Seleucia, Antiochia, Apamea, the last entire in her liberty, and Laodicea; Comagene and Judea were under Kings, and not framed into Provinces, till in the time of the Emperors.  
The fourth Province of the Romans in Asia was that of Bithymia with Pontus, these were all acquired or confirmed by the Victories of Pompey the Great. Strabo who was a Cappadocian born at Amasia, relates a story worthy to be remembered in this place. From the time saith he, that the Romans having conquered Antiochus, became Moderators of Asia; they contracted leagues of amity with divers Nations; where there were Kings, the honour of address was deferred unto them, with whom the Treaties that concerned their Countries were concluded. But as concerning the Capad cians, they treated with the whole Nation, for which cause the royal Line of this Realm coming afterwards to fail, the Romans gave the people their freedom or leave to live under their own Laws: and when the people hereupon sending Ambassadors unto Rome, renounced their Liberty, being that to them which they said was intolerable, and demanded a King; The Romans amazed there should be Men that could so far despair, permitted them to choose of their own Nation, whom they pleased; so Ari●barzanes was chosen, whose Line again in the Third Generation coming to fail; Archelaus was made King by Anthony, (where you may observe in passing that, the Romans imposed not Monarchical Government, but for that matter used to leave a people as they found them) thus at the same time they left Pontus under King Mithridates, who not containing himself within his bounds, but extending them afterwards as far as Colchis and Arm nia the less, was reduced unto his Terms by Pompey, who divesting him of those Countries which he had usurped, distrihuted some part of them unto such Princes as had assisted the Romans in that War, and divided the rest into twelve Commonwealths, of which added to Bythynia, he made one Province, When the Roman Emperors became Monarches, they also upon like occasions made other distributions, constituting Kings, Princes, and Cities, some more some less, some wholly free, and others in subjection unto themselves.. Thus came a good, if not the greater part of the Cities in the Lesser Asia, and the other adjoining Provinces to be some more, some less free, but the most of them to remain Commonwealths, or to be erected into Popular Governments, as appears yet clearer by the intercourse of Pliny, while he was Praetor, or Governor of Bythinia, with his Master the Emperor Trajan, a plece of which I have inserted in the Letters following.  
Pliny to Trajane.  
SIR,  
IT is Provided by Pompey's Laws for the Bythinians that 
Plin. Epist. lib. 10.  no Man under Thirty years of Age be capable of Magistracy, or of the Senate: by the same it is also established, that they who have born Magistracy, may be Senators. Now because by a latter Edict of Augustus, the lesser Magistracies may be born by such as are above One and twenty; there remains with me these doubts, whether he that being under Thirty, hath born Magistracy, may be elected by the Censors into the Senate; and if he may, whether of those also that have not born Magistracy, a Man being above one and twenty, seeing at that age he may bear Magistracy,- may not by the same interpretation be Elected into the Senate, though he have not born it: which is here practised and pretended to be necessary, because it is somewhat better they say, that the Senate be filled with the children of good Families, than with the lower sort. My opinion being asked, upon these points, by the new Censors, I thought such as being under Thirty have born Magistracy, both by Pompey's Laws, and the Edict of Augustus to be capable of the Senate; seeing the Edict allows a man under Thirty to bear Magistracy, and the Law, a Man that hath born Magistracy, to be a Senator; But as to those that have not born Magistracy, though at the age in which they may bear it; I demur till I may understand your Majesty's pleasure, unto whom I have sent the Heads both of the Law, and of the Edict.  
Trajane to Pliny.  
YOu and I dearest Pliny are of one mind, Pompey's Laws are so far qualified by the Edict of Augustus, that they who are not under One and twenty may bear Magistracy, and they who have born Magistracy may be Senators in their respective Cities: but for such as have not born Magistracy, though they might have born it, I conceive them not Eligigible into the Senate, till they be thirty years of age.  
Pliny to Trajane.  
SIR,  
Pour is granted unto the Bythinian Cities by Powpey's Law, to adopt unto themselves what Citizens they please, so they be not foreigners but of the same Province, By the same Law it is shown in what cases the Censors may remove a man from the Senate; Among which nevertheless it is not provided what is to be done in case a foreign Citizen be a Senator. Wherefore certain of the Censors have thought fit to consult me, whether they ought to remove a man that is of a foreign City for that cause our of the Senate. Now because the Law, though it forbid the adoption of a foreigner, commandeth not that a Foreigner for that cause should be removed out of the Senate, and I am informed there be foreign Citizens almost in every Senate: so that many, not only Men, but Cities might suffer concussion by the restitution of the Law in that part, which through a kind of consent seemeth to be now grown obsolete; I conceive it necessary to have your Majesty's resolution in the case, to which end I have sent a Breviate of the Law annexed.  
Trajane to Pliny.  
With good cause (dearest Pliny) have you doubted what answer to return unto the Censors, enquiring whether they ought to Elect a man into the Senate that is of another City, though of the same Province; seeing on the one side the authority of the Law, and of custom on the other to the contrary might well disorder you. To innovate nothing for the time past, I think well of this expedient: they who are already elected Senators, though not according unto the Law, of what City soever they be, may remain for the present, but for the future Pompey's Law's should return to their full virtue, which if we should cause to look back, might create trouble.  
This might serve, but there will be no hurt in being a little fuller in the discovery of Provincial Government.  
The Provinces so framed as hath been shown, were subdivided into certain Circuits called Dioceses, That of Asia had six Alabandae, Sardes (anciently the seat of Croesus') Smyrna, Ephesus, Adramytis, Pergamum. That of Cilicia had also six, the Pamphilian, Issaurian, and Cilician, the Metropolis whereof was Tarsus a free City; To these were taken out of the Province of Asia, Cibyra, Sinnadae, Apamea; what were the Dioceses of the other two, Sigonius whom I follow doth not show. At these in the Winter, (for the Summer was spent commonly with the Army,) the people of the Province assembled at set times, as at our Assizes, where the Roman Governors did them Justice.  
The Governors or Magistrates unto whose care a Province was committed, were of two kinds: the first and chief was Consul or Praetor, which appellations differed not in power, but in dignity, that of Consul being more honourable, who had twelve Lictors, whereas the Praetor had but six, if the annual Magistracy of either of these came to be prorogued, he was called Proconsul, or Propraetor.  
The second kind of Magistrate in a Province, was the Quaester, Receiver or Treasurer, who being also annual, was attended by Lictors of his own, if he died within his year, the the Consul, Proconsul, or Praetor, might appoint one for that time in his place, who was called Proquestor. The power of the Consul, Proconsul, or Praetor was of two kinds, the one Civil, the other Military, the former called Magistracy, the latter Empire.  
The pomp of these assuming and exercising their Magistracy was reverend, the Consul, or Proconsul had Legates, sometimes more, but never under three, appointed him by the Senate; these were in the nature of Counsellors to assist him in all affairs of his Province, he had Tribunes, Colonels, or Field Officers for the Military part of his administration; he had also Secretaries, Sergeants, Heralds, or Criers, Lictors, or Ensign-bearers, Interpreters, Messengers, Divines, Chamberlains, Physicians, and besides these his Companions, which for the most part were of the younger sort of Gentlemen, or Gallants that accompanied him for his Ornament, and their own Education. Into this the somewhat-like Train of the Quaestor (who by the Law was in place of a Son unto the Proconsul, and to whom the Pro Consul was to give the regard of a Father) being cast, it made the Praetorian Cohort, or Guard always about the person of the Proconsul, who in this Equipage having done his devotions at the Capitol, departed the City Paludatus, that is in his Royal Mantle of gold and purple, followed for some part of the way with the whole train of his Friends, wishing him much joy, and good speed,  
In his Province he executed his twofold Office, the one of Captain General, the other of the supieme Magistrate; in the former relation he had an Army either received from his predecessor, or new levied in the City; this consisted in the one half of the Legions, (as I have elsewhere shown) and in the other of Associates; for the greatness of the same, it was proportioned unto the Province, or the occasion. To an ordinary Province in times of peace, I believe an army amounted not to above One Legion, with as many Auxiliaries that is to a matter of Twelve thousand Foot, and Twelve hundred Horse. The Magistracy or Jurisdiction of the Proconsul, or Praetor was executed at the Metropolitan City of each Dioecis, which upon this occasion was to furnish the Praetorian Cohort with lodging, salt, wood, hay, and stable-room at the charge of the Country. These (though Cicero, would hardly receive any of them) were towards the latter time of the Commonwealth, extended by the provincial Magistrates unto so great a burden to the people, that it caused divers Laws to be passed in Rome (de repetundis) for restitution to be made unto the Provinces, by such as had injured them. Upon such Laws was the prosecution of Verres by Cicero, When and where this kind of Court was to be held, the Consul, Proconsul, or Praetor by Proclamation gave timely notice, being assembled at the time, and the City appointed, in the Town Hall stood a Tribunal, upon this the Sella Curulis, or Chair of State, in which sat the Consul, Proconsul, or Praetor with his Praetorian Cohort or Band about him, furnished with all manner of pomp, and Officers requisite unto the ornament, or administration of so high a Magistracy. The jurisdiction of this Court was according unto the Laws made for the administration of the Province, but because they could not foresee all things, (as appeared by the questions which Pliny put upon the Laws of Pompey, unto Trajane) it came to pass, that much was permitted unto the Edicts of the provincial Praetors, as was also in use at Rome with the Praetors of the City: and if any man had judged otherwise in his Province, than he ought to have done in the City, made an Edict contrary unto the Law of his Province, or judged any thing otherwise than accordieg to his own Edict, he was held guilty of, and questionable for an heinous crime. But what the Law of this or that Province (which differed in each) was, would be hard particularly to say, only in general it was for the main very much resembling that of Sicily called Rupilia.  
Lege Rupilia, or by the Law of Rupilius, a cause between One Citizen and another being of the same City, was to be tried at home by their own Laws. A Cause between one Provincial and another being of divers Cities, was to be tried by Judges whom the Praetor should appoint by lot; what a private man claimed of a people, or a people of a private man, was to be referred unto the Senate of some third City. Upon what a Roman claimed of a Provincial, a Provincial was to be appointed Judge. Upon what a Provincial claimed of a Roman, a Roman was to be appointed Judge. For decision of other controversies select Judges from among the Romans (not out of the Praetorian Cohort, but out of such Romans, or other Citizens free of Rome as were present in the same Court) were to be given. In criminal causes as violence peculate or Treason, the Law, and the manner of proceeding was the same in the Provinces, as in Rome.  
For the Iributes, Customs, Taxes, levies of Men, Money, Shipping, ordinary, or extraordinary for the common defence of the Roman Republic, and her Provinces, the Consuls, Proconsuls, or Praetors, proceeded according unto such Decrees of the Senate as were in that case standing or renewed upon Emergent occasions; in gathering these say the Magistracy or office of the Quaestor: if the Proconsul were indisposed, or had more business than he could well turn his hand to, Courts of this nature might be held by one or more of his Legates. With matter of Religion they meddled not, Every Nation being so far left unto the Liberty of Conscience, that no violence for this cause was offered unto any man, by which means both Jews and Christians, at least, till the time of the persecuting Emperors had the free exercise of their Religion throughout the Roman Provinces. This the Jews liked well for themselves, nor were they troubled at the Heathens, but to the Christians they always grudged the like privilege. Thus when they could no otherwise induce Pilate to put Christ to death; they accused Christ of affecting Monarchy, and so affrighted Pilate being a mean conditioned fellow, while they threatened to let Tiberius know he was not Caesar's Friend; that he complied with their ends. But when at Corinth where Gallio (a man of another temper) was Proconsul of Achaia, they would have been at this Ward again, and with a great deal of Tumult had brought Paul before the Tribunal, Gallio took it not well, that they should think he had nothing else to do than to judge of words, and names, and questions of their Law, for he cared no more for the Disputes between the Christians and the Jews, than for those between the Epicureans and the S●●ick●. Wherefore his Lictors drove them from the Tribunal, and the officious Corinthians to show their love to the Proconsul fell on knocking them out of the way of other business.  
Now though the Commonwealth of the Achaeans, being at this time a Roman Province under the Proconsul Gallio, enjoyed no longer her common Senate, Strategus and Demiurges, according unto the model shown in the former Book, yet remained each particular City under her ancient form of Popular Government so that in these, especially at Corinth; many of the Greeks being of the same judgement, the Jews could not dispute with the Christians without Tumult. Of this kind was that which happened at Ephesus, where Christianity 
Acts 19  growing so fast, that the silversmiths of Diana's Temple began to fear they should lose their Trade: the jews liking better of Heathenism than Christianity, set Alexander one of their pack against Paul.  
This place (in times when men will understand no otherwise of humane story, then makes for their ends) is fallen happily unto my hand, seeing that which I have said of a Roman Province, will be thus no less than proved out of Scripture. For the Chancellor of Ephesus perceiving the Ecclesia, (so it is in the Original) or Assembly (as in our Translation) uncalled by the Senate, or the Magistracy to be tumultuously gathered in the Theatre: their usual place (as in Syracuse and other Cities) of meeting, betakes himself to appease the people with divers arguments: among which he hath these. First, as to matter of Religion, Ye have brought hither (saith he) these men which are neither robbers of Temples (Churches, our Bible hath it, before there was any Church to be robbed) Nor yet blasphemers of the Goddess: In which words (seeing that they offering no scandal, but only propagating that which was according to their own judgement were not obnoxious unto punishment) he shows that every man had Liberty of Conscience. Secondly asto Law. If Demetrius and the Craftsmen which are with him have a matter against any man, the Law (saith he) is open. Thirdly, as to the matter of Government which appears to be of two parts, the one provincial, the other Domestic, for the former (saith he) there are (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Proconsuls, (he speaks in the plural number with relation unto the Legates, by whom the Proconsul sometimes held his Courts. Otherwise this Magistrate was but one in a Province, as at this time for Asia P. Suilius) and to the latter (saith he) if you desire any thing concerning other matters, that is such as appertain unto the Government of the City, (in▪ which the care of the Temple was included) it shall be determined in a lawful Ecclesia, or Assembly of the people. By which you may see that notwithstanding the Provincial government, Ephesus, though she were no free City, (for with a free City the Proconsul had nothing of this kind to do) had (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) the government of herself, (as those other Cities mentioned in Plynies Epistles) by the Senate, and the people, for wherever one of these is named, as the Senate by Pliny, or the people by Luke, the other is understood. When the Chancellor had thus spoken, he dismissed the Ecclesia. It is Luke's own word, and so often as I have now repeated it, so often hath he used it upon the same occasion. Wherefore I might henceforth expect two things of Divines; first, that it might be acknowledged that I have good Authors, St. Luke and the Chancellor of Ephesus, for the word Ecclesia in this sense; and secondly that they would not persuade us, the word Ecclesia hath lost this signification, lest they condemn this place of Scripture to be no more understood. The manner of Provincial Government being thus proved, not only out of profane Authors, but out of Scripture itself; and the Cities that were least free having had such power over themselves, and their Territories; why if the Romans took no more of them for this protection, than was paid unto their former Lords, did they not rather undertake the patronage of the World than the Empire, seeing Venice, and Dantzig, while the one was Tributary to the Turk, the other to the King of Poland, were nevertheless so free Estates, that of a King, or a Commonwealth that should have put the rest of the world into the like condition, no less in our day could have been said? And yet that the Romans, when the nature of the Eastern Monarchies shall be rightly considered, took far less of these Cities, than their old Masters, will admit of little doubt. Cicero would not lie, He when he was Proconsul of Cilicia, wrote in this manner concerning his Circuit, to his friend Servilius. Two days I stand at La●dicea, at Ap●mea five, at Sinnadae three, at Pilomelis five, at Iconium ten, than which Jurisdiction or Government there is nothing more just or equal. Why then had not those Cities their Senates, and their Ecclesiae, or Congregations of the people as well as that of Ephesus, and those whereof Pliny gives account to Trajane?  
Corinth was in Achaia, Perga of Pamphilia, Antioch of Pisidia, Iconium, Lystra, Derbe of Lycaonia, were in Cilicia and with these as some reckon, Attalia. Ephesus, and the other Antioch were in Syria. Achaia, Cilicia, and Syria were Roman Provinces at the time of this perambulation of the Apostles. The Cities under Provincial administration, whether free are not free were under popular Government; whence it followeth, that Corinth, Ephesus, Antioch of Syria, Antioch of Pisidia, Perga, Iconium, Lystra, ` Derbe, Attalia, being at this time under Provincial administration, were at this time under popular Government. There hath been no hurt in going about, though indeed to show that these Cities (had quandam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) were under popular government, we needed to have gone no farther than the Text, as where the Chancellor of Ephesus to get rid of a tumultuous Ecclesia, or Assembly of the people, promiseth them a lawful one. In Iconium Lystra, Derbe and the rest, you hear not of any King, (as where Herod stretched out his hand to please the Jews, and vex the Church) but of the people, of their Rulers, of their Assemblies, and of their tumults. The people at Lystra are now agreed to give the Apostles divine honours, and anon both at Iconium and Lystra to stone them: Now to determine of divine honour, or of life and death, are acts of Sovereign power. It is true, these nevertheless may happen to be usurped by a mere Tumult, but that cannot be said of these Congregations, which consisted as well of the Magistrates and Rulers, as of the people, and where the Magistrates show that they had no distinct power whereby to restrain the people, nor other means to prevail against them, than by making of parties, which passages as they prove these Commonwealths on the one side to have been ill constituted, evince it on the other, that these Cities were under popular Government.   

CHAP. III. The deduction of the Chirotonia from Popular Government, and of the Original Right of Ordination from the Chirotonia. In which is contained the institution of the Sanhedrin, or Senate of Israel by Moses, and of that of Rome by Romulus.  
DIvines generally in their way of Disputing have a bias that runs more upon words, than upon things; so that in this place it will be necessary to give the interpretation of some other words, whereof they pretend to take a strong hold in their Controversies; the chief of these hath been spoken to already, Chirotonia being a word that properly signifies the suffrage of the people, wherever it is properly used, implies power; wherefore though the Senate decree by suffrage as well as the people, yet there being no more in a Decree of the Senate than Authority, the Senate is never said to Chirotonize, or very seldom and improperly, this word being peculiar unto the people: and thus much is employed in what went before.  
The next word in controversy is Psephisma, which signifies a Decree or Law, and this always implying power, always implies the suffrage of the people, that is, where it is spoken of popular Government; for though a Psephisma or decree of the Athenian Senate was a Law for a year before it came to the suffrage or Chirotonia of the people, yet the Law, or constitution of Solon whereby the Senate had this power, originally derived from the Chir●tonia of the people.  
The third word (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) signifies to constitute, or ordain, this in the political sense of the same implieth not power, but authority; for a man that writeth or proposeth a Decree or form of Government, may be said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to propose or constitute it, whether it be confirmed by the Chirotonia of the people or not; nay with Hal●carn●ssaeus the word signifies no more than barely to call or assemble the Senate; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Now if these words be sometimes otherwise taken, what words be there in any language that are not often used improperly? but that understood politically, they must of necessity be understood as I have shown; or will so entangle and disorder Government, that no man shall either make head or foot of it; is that which I make little question to evince in the surest way, that is by opening the nature of the things whence they derive, and whereof they are spoken by the best Authors.  
And because the words (though the things they signify were much more ancient) derive all from Athens, I shall begin by this constitution to show the proper use of them. Chirotonia in Athens as hath been shown out of Suidas, (who speaking of Rome relates to this) was Election of Magistrates, or Enacting of Laws by the suffrage of the people, which because they gave by holding up their hands, came thence to be called Chirotonia, which signifieth holding up of Hands. The Legislative Assembly, or Representative of the people called the Nomothetae, upon occasion of repealing an old Law, and Enacting a new one, gave the Chirotonia of the people, And yet saith the Athenian Law (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Let the Proedrigive or make 
Demost. contra Timocr.  the Chirotonia unto either Law. The Proedris as was shown in the former book were the ten Precedents of the Prytans, which Prytans upon this occasion were Precedents of the Nomothetae. Again, whereas it was the undoubted right and practice of the people to Elect their Magistrates by their Chirotonia, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) 
Phil. 1.  it is nevertheless shown by Pollux to have been the peculiar Office of the Thesmothetae (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to Chirotonize the Mágistrates. For as the Proedris were precedents of the people in their Legislative capacity, so were the 
L. 8. C. 8.  Thesmothetae upon occasion of Elections: thus the Chirotonia of the Proedris, or of the Thesmothetae signifies nothing else but the Chirotonia of the people, by which they Enacted all their Laws, and elected all their Civil or Ecclesiastical Magistrates, or Priests, as the Rex Sacrificus, and the Orgeones, except some by the lot, which ordination as is observed by Aristoile is equally popular. This whether ignorantly or wilfully unregarded, hath been as will be seen hereafter the cause of great absurdity, for who seeth not that to put the Chirotonia, or sovereign power of Athens upon the Proedris or the Thesmothetae, is to make such a thing of that Government, as can no wise be understood.  
What the people had passed by their Chirotonia, was called Psephisma, an Act or Law. And because in the Nomothetae there were always two Laws put together unto the Vote, that is to say, the Old one, and that which was offered in the room of it, they that were for the old Law were said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to pronounce in the Negative; and they that were for the new (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to pronounce for the Affirmative.  
These Laws, these Propositions, or this frame of Government having been proposed first by Solon, and then ratified or established by the Chirotonia of the Athenian people: Aristotle saith of him (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) that he instituted or constituted the popular Government with constitution, implieth not any power in Solon, who absolutely refused to be a King, and therefore the word (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) as to him implies no more than authority. I have showed you the words in controversy, and the things together in the Mint; Now whether they that as to Athens introduced them both, understood either; I leave my Reader by comparing them to judge.  
It is true that the things expressed by these words have been in some Commonwealths more, in others less ancient than the Greek Language, but this hindereth not the Greeks to apply the words unto the like constitutions or things, wherever they find them, as by following Halicarnassaeus I shall exemplify 
L. 2.  in Rome.  
(〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Romulus when he had distributed the people into Tribes, and into parishes proceeded to ordain the Senate; in this manner the Tribes were three, and the parishes Thirty; out of every Tribe he elected three Senators, and out of every parish three more, all by the suffrage of the people; These therefore came to ninety nine chosen by the Chirotonia, unto which he added one more, not chosen by the Chirotonia, but by himself only; Which Election we may therefore say was made by the Chirothesia, for as in this Chapter I am showing that the Chirotonia is Election by the Many, so in the next I shall show that the Chirothesia is Election by One, or by the Few. But to keep unto the matter in hand, the Magistrate thus chosen by Romulus was (praefectus urbi,) the Protector of the Commonwealth, or he who when the King was out of the Nation, or the City, as upon occasion of War, had the Exercise of Royal Power at home. In like manner with the Civil Magistracy were the Priests created, (though some of them not so anciently) for the Pontifex maximus, the Rex Sacrificus, and the Flamines were all ordained by the Suffrage of the people, (Pontifex Tributis, Rex centuri●●tis, Flamines Curiatis) the latter of which being no more than Parish Priests, had no other Ordination than by their Parishes. All the Laws, and all the Magistrates in Rome, even the Kings themselves were according unto the orders of this Commonwealth to be created by the Chirotonia of the people, which nevertheless is by Appian sometimes called (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) The Chirotonia of the Tribunes whether that these Magistrates were Precedents of the Assemblies of the people, or Elected by them. Sic Romani historici non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 untur 
Calv. Inst. L. 4. cap. 3. §. 15.  con●ulem qui comitia habuerit creasse ●●vos Magistratu, non aliam ob causam nisi quia suffragia receperit & populum moderatus est in eligendo.  
What passed the Chirotonia of the people, by the Greeks is called Psephisma, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Dion. Hal. L. 8.  when the Congregation of the people was to be dismissed, Marcus standing up, said, your Psephisma, that is, your Act is exceeding good, etc.  
This policy, for the greater part, is that, which Romulus (as was shown) is said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to have instituted, or ordained, though it be plain that he ordained it no otherwise than by the Chirotonia of the people.  
Thus you have another Example of the three words in controversy, (Chirotonia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Psephisma) still applied in the same sense, and to the same things. Have I not also discovered already, the Original right of Ordination, whether in Civil, or religious Orders? This will be scandalous. How! derive Ordination as it is in the Church of Christ, or asit was in the Church of the Jews from the Religion, or rather superstition of the Heathens! I meddle not with their Religion, nor yet with their superstition, but with their Ordination, which was neither but a part of their policy. And why is not Ordination in the Church or Commonwealth of Christ, as well a political thing as it was in the Churches, or Commonwealths of the Jews, or of the Heathens. Why is not Election of Officers in the Church as well a political thing, as election of Officers in the State? and why may not this be as lawfully performed by the Chirotonia in the one, as in the other?  
That Moses introduced the Chirotonia, is expressly said by 
Philo de inst. princ.  Philo; though he oppose it to the ballot, in which I believe he is mistaken, as not seeing that the ballot including the suffrage of the people, by that means came as properly under the denomination of the Chirotonia, as the suffrage of the Roman people, which though it were given by the Tablet, is so called by Greek Authors. All ordination of Magistrates, as of the Senators, or Elders of the Sanhedrin, of the Judges, or Elders of inferior Courts, of the Judge, or Suffes of Israel, of the King, of the Priests, of the Levites, whether with the ballot, or viva voce, was performed by the Chirotonia, or suffrage of the people; In this (especially if you admit the authority of the Jewish Lawyers, and Divines called the Talmudists) the Scripture will be clear, but their Names are hard; Wherefore not to make my Discourse more rough than I need, I shall here set them together; The Authors or writings I use by way of paraphrase upon the Scripture are the Gemara Babylonia, Midhar Rabath, Sepher Si●●ri, Sepher Tanchuma, Solomon Jarchius, Chiskuny, Abar●inel, Ajin Israel, Pesiktha Zoertha, these and many more being for the Election of the Sanhedrin by the ballot. I might have spoken them more briefly, for the truth is in all that is Talmudical, I am assisted by Selden Grotius, and their quotations out of the Rabbis, having in this learning so little skill, that if I miscalled none of them, I showed you a good part of my acquaintance with them.  
Nor am I wedded unto Grotius or Selden, whom sometimes I follow, and sometimes I leave, making use of their learning, but of my own reason. As to the things in this present controversy, they were no other in Athens and Rome than they had been in the Commonwealth of Israel.  
When Moses came to institute the Senate, he asked counsel 
Numb. 11. v. 16. 24.  of God. And the Lord said, Gather unto me seventy men of the Elders of Israel, and Moses went out and told the people the words of the Lord: that is, proposed the Dictate of the supreme Legislator unto the Chirotonia of the Congregation, what else can we make of these words of Moses to the people? 
Deut. 1. v. 13, 14, 15.  Take ye wise men, and understanding, and known among your Tribes (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) and I will constitute them Rulers over you. Now how the people could otherwise take or choose these Rulers or Magistrates thus proposed, than by their Chiro oxia, let Divines— show or notwithstanding the constitution of Moses, both the Senate of Israel, and the inferior Courts were decreed by the Chirotonia of the people. For the people upon this proposition resolved in the affirmative, or answered, and said, the thing which thou hast spoken is good for us to do. This than was the Psephisma, or decree of the people of Israel, whereupon saith Moses (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) I constituted or ordained them Governors. In which example you have the three words, or the three things again, nor as to the things, is it, or ever was it, otherwise in any Commonwealth, whence it is admirable in our Divines, who will have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 constituted, to be the word of power, that they do not see by this means they must make two powers in the same Government, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or constitution of the Legislator, & the Chirotonia, or suffrage of the people, or else say that the Commonwealth of Israel was instituted by the power of the Legislator, and the authority of the people, then which there is nothing more absurd. But the people stayed not upon their first Psephisma, or result that the thing was good for them to do, but did accordingly. The manner of their proceeding at different times was somewhat different; for it was sometimes viva voce, sometimes by the lot, without the suffrage, and sometimes by the ballot, which consisted not of the lot only, but of the suffrage. Also each of these are equally popular, (for neither of them giveth any advantage unto any person or party) but not equally prudent ways of proceeding; the lot committing too much unto For tune, except in some kinds of businesses, as first in the division of Lands, whence the suffrage was properly excluded, for the civisions being made by three Deputies out of each Tribe, if there happened to fall some advantage or disadvantage unto any man by the lot, it was equal or impartial; whereas if it had fallen by the suffrage, it must have been unequal, or partial: such was the cause why the lot in the division of the land of Canaan was used without the suffrage. In case of a crime committed by an unknown Author, but among many of whom some one or more must have been guilty, as in the cases of Achan and Jonathan; the lot was also used without the suffrage, somewhat after the manner of decimation in an Army, when many that are guilty throw the dice, and he on whom the lot falls is punished; yet with considerable difference, for whereas decimation is not used but for punishment where the persons are as well known as the guilt; this use of the lot in Israel was for the discovery of the unknown Author of some known crime, that some one of many being put to the question (who if either by his own confession, or other proof he were found guilty, was punished accordingly, otherwise not,) Men might have less encouragement that their crimes would be the more hidden, or less punishable for company, or the shadow of it.  
When the people were set upon the introduction of a new Magistracy, and cared not at all who should be the man, as in the Election of Saul, at which time the Philistines lay hard upon them, and they looked upon the Ease they hoped from a King, without coveting the trouble which he was like to have; it seemeth unto me; that there was a third use of the lot without the suffrage.  
But that the common use of the Lot in Israel employed also the suffrage, and was of the nature of the ballot at this day in Venice is little to be doubted, or you may satisfy yourself, when you have considered the manner how the Senate or Sanhedrin was first elected (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) or constituted by Moses.  
Upon the Psephisma, or decree of the Legislator and the people, the thing which thou hast spoken is good for us to do, they proceeded unto Election of Competitors in this manner. Each of the twelve Tribes (to be hereafter as well locally, as they were yet but geneologically divided) were to make the Election, not excluding the Thirteenth, nor yet nominally taking it in; for Levi though genealogically, as distinct a Tribe as any of them, yet was not designed locally so to be but to have the right of promiscuous inhabiting, cohabiting, or marriage with all or any of the rest, and with right of suffrage accordingly; For this cause, the Tribes being thirteen, are reckoned but twelve. So each of the twelve Tribes elected among themselves by their suffrages, six wise men, and understanding, and known among them, which being Elected, were written, and being written were delivered each in a several scroll unto Moses. Moses having received all the scrolls, had seventy two Competitors, which caused a fraction; for the Senate, as is plain by the Text, (gather me seventy men, that they may stand with thee,) was to consist but of seventy with Moses, that is, in all, of seventy one: So Moses having two Competitors more than he needed, caused two Urns to be brought, into one of which he cast the seventy two Competitors, or names written in the scrolls; and into the other seventy two scrolls of which two were blanks, and seventy were inscribed with the word Presbyter, this being done, the whole Congregation prayed, and when they had prayed, gave forth their lots.  
The Lots were given forth after this manner, first a Lot was drawn out of the Urn of the Magistracies, than another out of the Urn of the Competitors; The Competitor unto whose name a blank was drawn departed: but he unto whose name a prize was drawn, or given forth became a Magistrate.  
They who had thus gained Magistracy were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by this Psephisma decreed to be together of the number of the seventy Elders. But whereas in the Urn of Magistracies there were two blanks, two that had been written 
Numb. 11. 26.  Competitors must of necessity have failed of Magistracy. So Eldad and Medad being of them that were written Competitors 
Numb. 11.  by the Tribes, yet went not up unto the Tabernacle; that is, attained not to be (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) numbered among the seventy, who were to sit in the Court of the Tabernacle, as afterwards they did in the pavement, or stone-chamber in the Court of the Temple.  
In this place I shall mind you but once more of the three words in controversy. Moses the Legislator (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constituted, the people chirotonized; and that which they had chirotonized, was Psephisma, their Decree.  
There be in these times that are coifed with such opinions, that to show Scripture to be reason, is to make it loose weight with them, and to talk of the Talmudists is to profane it; of these I shall desire no more than to know how they understand that place of Eldad and Medad, for if they can no otherwise make sense of it, than as I have done, it is a sufficient proof, (letting the Talmudists go) of all that I have said. What therefore hath the Hierarchy, and the Presbytery for their opinion that the Sanhedrin was instituted by the Chirothesia, or Imposition of Hands?  
There is in the Old Testament no mention of laying on of Hands by way of Ordination, or election, but only by Moses in the designation of Joshua for his Successor; and in this Moses did first as Romulus afterwards in the Election of the Praefect or Protector of Rome; but upon a far greater exigence, for the Commonwealth of Rome, when Romulus did the like; was seated or planted, but the Commonwealth of Israel when Moses did this, was neither seated nor planted, nor indeed a Commonwealth, but an Army designed to be a Commonwealth. Now between the Government that is necessary unto an Army, and that which is necessary to a Commonwealth, there is a vast difference. The Government even of the Armies of Rome, when she was a Commonwealth, was nevertheless Monarchical: in this regard Moses himself exercised a kind of Dictatorian Power for his life, and the Commonwealth being not yet planted, nor having any balance whereupon to weigh herself, must either have been left at his death unto the care of some man, whom he knew best able to lay her foundation, or unto extreme hazard; wherefore this Ordination which was but accidental, regarding the present Military condition of the people, Moses most prudently distinguisheth from the other; in that he showed them how they should manage their Commonwealth, in this he bequeathes them the man whom he thinks the most likely to bring them to be a Commonwealth; of which judgement and undertaking of Moses, Joshua the next illustrious Example, most worthily acquitted himself.  
There is in these Elections another remarkable passage, but such a one as being so far from political, that it is supernatural, doth not properly appertain unto this discourse, and so I shall but point at it. When the Elders, thus chosen, were set round about the Tabernacle, the Lord came down in a cloud, 
Numb. 11. v. 24. 25.  and took of the spirit of Moses, and gave it unto the seventy Elders, and it came to pass, that when the Spirit rested upon them, they prophesied, and did not cease. So Joshua was full of the spirit of wisdom, for Moses had laid his hands upon him. And 
Deut. 33. v. 9  Paul mindeth Timothy, Stir up the gift of God which is in thee 
1 Tim. 1. v. 6.  by the laying on of my hands. But the Talmudists themselves do not pretend that their Ordination was farther accompanied with supernatural endowments than the first institution; and if Divines were as ingenuous, no less might be acknowledged of theirs: Moses was a Prophet, the like unto whom hath not been in Israel, and hath there been an Apostle like Paul in the Christian Church? Every body cannot do miracles, we see they cannot. Take heed how you deny sense, for then bread may be flesh. If we be not to make choice of a political institution without a miraculous test or recommendation; either Ordination was at first accompanied with supernatural gifts, and from thenceforth (as I conceive) neither. Divines me thinks as such should not be so much concerned in the Ordination of the Sanhedrin, or of Joshua, who were Magistrates, as the people or the Magistrate, yet if these should hence infer that their Election, Ordination, or designation of persons conferred supernatural gifts, Divines would hardly allow of it; & why are the people, or the Magistrate obliged to allow more unto that of a Clergy? To return.  
Such as I have shown was the Ordination of the Senate, or great Sanhedrin, that of the lesser Sanhedrin, or inferior Conrts, was of like nature, for it follows; I took the chief of your Tribes, wisemen and known (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) and made them Heads over you, Captains of thousands, and Captains of hundreds, 
Deut. 1. v. 15.  etc. which were other Magistrates than according unto our custom, we should readily expect to be intimated by such words, for they were the Judges of the inferior Courts, those that sat in the gates of each City, and others that appertained unto the Villages, as in the next Verse: and I charged your Judges at that time, saying, hear the Causes, and judge 
Ver. 16.  righteously.  
The next Magistrate whose Election comes to be considered is the Dictator, or Judge of Israel. Where it is said of this people, that the Lord raised them up Judges, which delivered 
Judg. 2. 16.  them out of the hands of those that spoilt them, it is to be understood (saith Sigonius) that God put it into the mind of the people to elect such Magistrates, or Captains over them. For 
De Rep. Heb.  example when the children of Ammon made war against Israrael, God raised up Jephtha, whose Election was after this manner: the Elders went to fetch Jephtha out of the Land of 
Judges 11.  Tob, and when they had brought him unto Mizpeh (which in those days was the place (where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) the Congregation of Israel usually assembled) the people made him Head and Captain over them. Now that the Election of the King was as much in the Chirotonia of the people, as that of the 
Deur. 17. 15.  Judge is passed all controversy, seeing the Law speaking of the people says thus. One from among thy brethren shalt thou set King over thee: and accordingly when the Government was changed to Monarchy, it was not Samuel, but the people that would have it so; thus Saul was chosen King by the Lot. Where the contradiction of Grotius is remarkable, who in this place to show that the Lot is of popular institution, quotes 
Arist. Poll. B. 6. C. 2.  Aristotle; and yet when he comes to speak of the Lots that were cast at the Election of Mathias, says it was that it might appear not whom the multitude, but whom God had ordained; as 
De Imp. S. P. C. 10.  if the Magistrate lawfully elected by the people, were not Elected by God; or that the lot which thus falleth into the lap were not at the disposing of the Lord. But if the League by which the people received David into the throne, or the Votes by which first the people of Jerusalem, and afterwards the Congregation of Israel (as was shown in the former Book) made Solomon King, were of the Lord, than Election by the people was of the Lord, and the Magistrate that was elected by the Chirotonia of the people, was elected by the Chirotonia of God, for as the Congregation of Israel is called 
Judges 20.  in Scripture (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) the Ecclesia or Congregation of God; so the Chirotonia of this Congregation is called by Josephus (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) the Chirotonia of God, who as I noted 
Jos. L. 4.  before out of Capellus, was in this Commonwealth Political King, or Civil Legislator (Sans comparison) as Solon in Athens, and Romulus in Rome; that is to propose unto the people, (Haec est lex quam Moses proposuit,) and whatever was proposed by God, or the lawful Magistrate under him, and chirotonized or voted by the people was Law in Israel, and no other. Nay and the people had not only power to reject any Law that was thus proposed, but to repeal any Law that was thus Enacted: for if God intending popular Government should have ordained it, otherwise he must have contradicted himself, wherefore he plainly acknowledgeth unto them this power, where (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) they rejected him (whom they had formerly chirotonized, 
Josephus. L. 6. C. 5.  or chosen King) that he should not reign over them: and elected Saul. This if God had withstood by his power, he must have introduced that kind of Monarchy which he had declared against, wherefore he chose rather to abandon this sottish and ingrateful people unto the most inextricable yoke of deserved slavery, telling them, when he had warned them, and they would not hear him, that they should cry unto him, and he would not hear them, one tittle of whose words passed not unfulfilled.  
By this time I have shown that all the Civil Magistrates in Israel were chosen by the Chirotonia of the People, or to follow Josephus by the Chirotonia of God, which is all one; for the Chirotonia of the Precedent of the Congregation, as I have instanced in that of the Proedris of the Thesmothetae of the Consuls, of the Tribunes, and the Chirotonia of the Congregation is the same thing; and of the Congregation of Israel God (except only at the voting of a King) was Precedent.  
To come then from the Civil Magistrates unto the Priests, and Levites, these were chosen in two ways, either by the lot, or by the Chirotonia.  
The office and dignity of the High Priest being the greatest in Israel, and by the institution to be hereditory, caused great Disputes in the Election: to this Moses by the command of God had designed Aaron his Brother, which designation, the command of God being at first either not so obvious, as that relation, or the ambition of others so blind that they could not, or would not see it, caused great combustion. First through the conspiracy of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram; and next by the murmuring of the Princes of the Tribes, all Emulous of this honour. Korah being not only a great man, but of the Tribe of Levi, could not see why he was not 
Numbers 16. Josephus L. 4.  as worthy of the Priesthood, consideration had of his Tribe as Aaron; and if any other Tribe might pretend to it, Dathan and Abiram being descended from Reuben were not only of the Elder House, but troubled to see a younger preferred before them Wherefore these having gained unto their party three hundred of the most powerful men of the Congregation, accused Moses of affecting Tyranny, and doing those things which threatened the liberty of the Commonwealth; as under pretence of Divination to blind the eyes of the people, preferring his Brother unto the Priesthood (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) without the suffrage of the Congregation: of which charge Moses acquitting himself in the Congregation, tells the people that Aaron was chosen both by God, and (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) by their suffrages, which (Korah being upon this occasion miraculously destroyed) were thereupon once more given by the people. Nevertheless the Princes of the Tribes continuing still discontented, and full of murmur, God decided the controversy by a second miracle, the budding of Aaron's rod: (and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) being thrice confirmed by the Chirotonia of God, he was confirmed in that honour. Now that the Chirotonia of God in this place of josephus signifies the Chirotonia of the people, is plain by that in Scripture, where they made Solomon King, 
1 Chro. 29. 22.  and Zadock to be Priest. After the captivity, as in other things, so in this power the Sanhedrin came (as I conceive) to overreach the people: Joshua the Son of Josedech being thus elected High Priest by the Sanhedrim, and this honour 
Grot. ad Hag. 1. 1. josephus de judg. l. 4. Maymon. Hal. Cele Hamikdasch. Chap. 4. & 5. 2 Chron. 24. 5. 25. 8. 26. 13.  thenceforth as appears by Maymonides being at the disposing of this Court. Nor could any inferior Priest serve at the Altar, except he had acquired that right by the lot, as is not only delivered by the same Author, and by Josephus but in Scripture. Now the lot as was shown giving no prerogative either unto any person or party is as popular an institution as the Chirotonia. So in election of Priests, the Orders of Israel differed not from humane prudence, nor those of other Commonwealths, the Priest of jupiter having been elected after the same manner in the Commonwealth of Syracuse, the Augustales, and the Vestals in that of Rome; and if the right of bearing holy Magistracy, being in Israel confined unto one Tribe or order, may seem to make any difference, it was for some time no otherwise in Athens, nor in Rome, where the Patritians or Nobility assumed these Offices, or the greatest of them to themselves, till the people in those Cities disputed that custom, as introduced without their consent, which the people of Israel could not fairly do, because it was introduced by their consent.  
To come unto the Levites in their Original Ordination, God commanded Moses saying, Thou shalt bring the Levites before the 
Numb: 8. v: 9, 10.  Tabernacle of the Congregation & thou shalt gather the whole assembly of the children of Israel, and they shall put their hands upon the Levites. This in the sound of the words may seem to imply the Chirothesia, or Imposition of Hands, but take heed of that, Divines will not allow the Chirothesia to be an Act of the people, but in this proceeding the whole people acted in the Ordination of the Levites, wherefore the Levites also were ordained by the Chirotonia, consent, vote, or suffrage of the whole people employed in this action. But for the Ordination of Priests and Levites, whatever it were, it is not unto the present purpose; Divines deriving not theirs from Priests and Levites, but from Dukes, Generals, and Magistrates, from that of Joshua and of the Sanhedrin, always provided, that this were of the same nature with the former, that is, by the Chirothesia, or Imposition of Hands, and not by the Chirotonia of the People. However the Ordination of the Magistracy was certainly Political; and so in this 
Exod. 29.  deduction they themselves confess that their Ordination also 
Numb. 8.  is a Political Constitution: yet whereas Moses is commanded by God to bring Aaron and his sons unto the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation, and having washed them there, to adorn them with the Priestly Robes, with the Mitre, and to anoint them: whereas he is commanded (the Children of Israel having first laid their Hands upon the Levites) to cleanse them, and offer them for an Offering; Divines of the Hierarchy and the Presbytery (though it be otherwise with Wallaeus, and such as acknowledge Popular Government) give the Congregation, or consent of the People for nothing, and put the whole Ordination of the Priests and Levites upon the washing and cleansing or other Ceremonies of their Consecration: as if to put the Ordination of Saul up on the Ceremony of anointing by Samuel, (though performed by the immediate command of God, were not absolutely contradictory to Scripture, and unto the known Law of Israel, which speaking of the people, expressly saith, One from among 
Philo de inst. principiis.  thy Brethren shalt thou set King over thee; upon which place saith Philo, Most wise Moses never intended that the royal dignity should be acquired by lot, but chose rather that the Kings should be elected by the Chirotonia, or suffrage of the whole people; the Congregations of the people assembled, upon this as upon other public affairs, required a sign or confirmation from God: for as much as by his will man is to the rest of nature, as the face unto the body. Whereunto agrees that of the Heathens, Os homini sublime dedit Coelumque tueri jussit, and their divinations upon the like occasions by entrails, none of which were ever understood as destructive of the liberty of the people, or of the freedom of their Chirotonia.  
Where Solomon is made King, and Zadock Priest by the people, albeit the ceremony of anointing was doubtlessly performed, and perhaps by the Prophet Nathan, it is wholly omitted in the place as not worth the speaking of. The opinion that the Ordination of the Priests and Levites lay in the Ceremonies of their consecration, is every whit as sober and agreeable unto reason, as if a man should hold the Kings of England to have been made by the unction of the Bishops, Israel from the institution of Moses to the Monarchy, was a Democracy, or popular Government; in popular Government the consent of the people is the power of the people, and both the Priests and Levites were ordained by the consent of the people of Israel.  
To bring these things unto the Cities in the perambulation of the Apostles, which by the former Chapter I have proved to have been popular Governments; it is acknowledged by Grotius unto the Cities of Asia, not only that they used the 
Di●m. C. 10.  Chirotonia, but in the strictest sense of the word, that is, to give their suffrage by the holding up of Hands, & that they had the liberty of their Religion, the choice of their Magistrates, both Civil and Ecclesiastical in their Ecclesiae, or Congregations, hath been also undeniably evidenced; whence it must needs follow that there were Cities in Asia (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Chirotonizing or ordaining them-Elders, that is, Magistrates and Priests in every Congregation (with Reverence be it spoken) long before Christ was in the flesh, or the Apostles any of them were born. Wherefore to sum up what in this Chapter I conceive to be sufficiently proved, I may boldly conclude, that the Chirotonia deriveth from popular constitution, and that there was a way of Ordination by the Chirotonia.   

CHAP. IU. The deduction of the Chirothesia from Monarchical or Aristocratical Government, and of the second way of Ordination from the Chirothesia. In which is contained the Commonwealth of the jews as it stood after the Captivity.  
WHat pleaseth the Prince (saith Justinian) hath the force of a Law, seeing the people in his Creation have devolved their whole power upon his person? which is which the most? But when Popular Government is changed into Monarchical, either the whole power of the people, or a great▪ part of it must of necessity accrue unto the King. Hence saith Samuel, he will appoint him Captains over Thousands, and Captains over Fifties: in which words perhaps is intimated the Judges of the inserior Courts, or Jethonian prefectures; so 
1 Sam. 8. 12.  that hereby Samuel tells the people they shall no more have the Election of their Rulers, but the King will have it: who it may be changed the nature of some of these Magistracies, or added others, for when David came to reign over all Israel, 
2 Sam. 8. 15.  Joab was over the host (his Strategus or General) Jehoshaphat was Recorder, Zadoc and Abi●elec were the Priests, Seraiah was the Scribe, and Benaiah was over the Pelethites, and the Cerethites; that is, was Captain of his Regiments of Guard, called perhaps by these names, as those of Romulus were called Celeres. But it should seem that few or none of these Officers were elected by the Chirotonia, that is by the people, but by the Prince, which kind of Election as will be shown anon may be called Chirothesia. For the deduction of this kind of Ordination, or Election, we shall do well to hearken first unto Doctor Hammond; who in his Quaere, or Discourse 
§ 10.  concerning Ordination, by the Imposition of Hands, puts it thus. To lift up the Hands was a Ceremony in Prayer, and 
Exod. 17. 11.  accordingly to lay hands on any, (differing no otherwise from lifting up, than by the determining that action to a peculiar object, (the person that was prayed for) was generally among the jews, a Ceremony of benediction used first by the Father to the Children; in bestowing the blessing upon them, (and with that the succession to some part of his Estate or Inheritance) as appears in Jacob's blessing the Children of joseph: he stretched out his 
Gen. 48. 14.  right hand and laid it upon Ephraim's head, and so his left hand on Manasses, and so he blessed, etc. From thence it was accommodated among them to the communicating of any part of power to others as assistants, or to the deriving of any successive Office from one to another. Thus when Moses had from Heaven received, and long used his Commission to be under God the Ruler of the People, the seventy Elders were by God's appointment 
Numb. 11. 17.  assumed to assist him: it being certain from the jewish writings, though the sacred Scripture have no occasion to mention it, that the succession of the seventy Elders under the name of San●edrim o Council was continued through all Ages by their creating others in the place of those that died, by this Ceremony of Imposition of Hands. To this purpose are the clear words of Maimonides, Moses our master created the seventy Elders 
'tis Sanhed. C 4.  by Imposition of Hands, and the Divine Majesty rested on them; and those Elders imposed Hands on others, and others on others, etc. So a little before the departure of Moses out of his life, when a Successor was to be provided for him, God commands him to take Joshua, and lay his hands upon him. And 
Numb. 27. 28, 23.  Moses laid his Hands upon him, and gave him a Charge as the Lord commanded by the hand of Moses: that is, derived unto him by this Ceremony the Authority which himself had, and constituted him his Successor in that Government. And so it is 
Deut. 34. 9  repeated Joshua was full of the spirit of wisdom, for Moses had laid his Hands upon him.  
This is the Doctor's deduction of the Chirothesia, or ordination by the Laying on of Hands from the Commonwealth of Israel: and (saith he) from the three Uses of this Ceremony there, that is first in praying for another, secondly, in paternal benediction; thirdly in creating successors in power, either in whole, or in part, derive three sorts of things in the New Testament, to which this Ceremony of Laying on of Hands is accommodated; that of prayer simply taken was of two sorts, either for the cure of Diseases, or pardoning of sins. For Diseases: They 
Mat. 16. 18.  shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover. For sins▪ they were done away also by this Ceremony in the absolution of Penitents, to which belongs that Exhortation of Paul to Timothy, Lay Hands suddenly on no man, (that is) not without due 
1 Tim. 5. 22.  examination and proof of his penitence, lest thou be partaker of other men's sins. From the second, that of Paternal benediction, was borrowed, first that of blessing Infants, with the Ceremony of Imposition of Hands, as it differed from Baptism. And secondly, that of confirming those of fuller age, that had been formerly 
Mat. 10. 16.  Baptised. Lastly to create Successors in any power, or communicating any part of power to others, as to Assistants, is answerable that Imposition of Hands in Ordination so often mentioned in the New Testament, sometimes in the lower degree, 
Acts 6. 6.  as in the ordaining of Deacons. Elsewhere in the highest degree, setting Governors over particular Churches, as generally when by that laying on of Hands, it is said they received the Holy Ghost, whereas the Holy Ghost contains all the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 required to the pastoral function, and so signifies power from on 
Luke 24. 49.  high; the Authority and function itself; so it being given by Imposition of Hands▪ makes the parallel exact between this of Christian Ordination, and that observed in the Creating Successors in the Jewish Sanhedrin. So far the Doctor.  
Now say I if the Scripture be silent as to the Ordination of 
Deut. 1. Numb. 11.  the Elders in Israel: what meaneth that place: Take the wise men, and understanding, and known among your Tribes, and I will make them Rulers over you; once in their lives let them give us the sense of it, or of that other, where Eldad and Medad are of those that were written, and yet went not up unto the Tabernacle: Otherwise that we hear no more of these, is from the silence of Divines, and not of the Scripture. But if the Scripture be not silent in this point, is there not a great deal of fancy in going on to cure the sick, to pardon sins, to bless Infants, confirm the Baptised, ordain Ministers, nay, give the Holy Ghost, and all the graces belonging unto the pastoral Function, from a place that hath no such thing in it? for if the Sanhedrim according to Scripture were not ordained by the Chirothesia, there is no such thing to be derived by the Chirothesia from the Sanhedrim. The first Chirotonia indeed of the Sanhedrim was accompanied with miraculous endowments, wherefore if they will derive these gifts and graces from the Sanhedrim, why are they sworn enemies to the Chirotonia? Again the Sanhedrim was a Civil Court or Senate, wherefore then by this title should not these gifts and graces be rather pretended unto by the Civil Magistrate, than by Divines? what becomes of the Priest Aaron and his Lots? is he left unto the Civil Magistrate, while Divines derive themselves from General joshua and his Chirothesia? But if the Sanhedrim and inferior Judicatories were otherwise ordained originally; then no Magistrate in Israel was originally ordained by the Chirothesia but only joshua. It is admirable that Divines should look upon God, as if in the institution of a Commonwealth he had no regard at all unto humane prudence; but were altogether fixed upon their vain advantages. Who made humane prudence? or to what end was it made? Any man that understands the politics, and considers that God was now proceeding according unto this art, as in his constitution of the Senate, and of the people, or Congregation is most obvious, must needs see that this power he indulged unto Moses of making his own choice of one man could not possibly be intended, as a permanent constitution, for whereas he intended Popular Government, nothing is plainer than that a people not electing their own Magistrates can have no popular Government. How absurd is it to conceive that God having already made an express Law that the people if at any time they came under Monarchy, should yet have the election of their King, should now make a Law that the people being under a Commonwealth, should no longer have the election of their Magistrates? for who seeth not that to introduce the Chirothesia as a standing Ordinance, had been to bar the people of this power? Israel at this time, though designed for a Commonwealth, had no Land, no foundation to balance herself upon, but was an Army in a Wilderness, encompassed about with enemies; to permit unto the people in this case, the choice of all their civil Magistrates was nevertheless safe enough, nay best of all, for at the election of wise men, and understanding, and known among their Tribes, so far as was needful unto civil administration, their skill must needs have been at any time sufficient, but the Commonwealth was yet in absolute necessity of a Protector, and of Dictarian power. Now to know who was fittest in this case to succeed Moses, required the wisdom of God, or of Moses, and therefore was not yet safe to be ventured upon a people so new in their Government. For these reasons I say Moses used the Chirothesia for once, and no more, or let them show me among all the Dictator's, judges, or Kings, that succeeded joshua, any one that was chosen by the Chirothesia, and be all Dictator's. It is now above three thousand years since the institution of the Sanhedrim, from which time the ambitious Elders first, than the Talmudists, and of latter ages Divines have been perpetually striving for, or possessing themselves of this same Oligarchycal invention of the Chirothesia pretended to be derived from Moses; though there be neither any such precept of God or Christ in the Old or New Testament, nor any unanimous result upon the point, either by the Talmudists or Divines themselves. And for the clear words quoted by the Doctor out of Maimonides, they are such unto which I shall in due time show Maimonides to be elsewhere of a clear contrary opinion. But in this Controversy, without some clearer deduction of the Chirothesia, we shall make no happy progress, in this therefore I shall follow Selden the ablest Talmudist of our age, or any.  
The Commonwealth of Lacedaemon (if I could stand to show it) hath strange resemblances to that of Israel, not only in the Agragrian, which is nothing to the present purpose, but in the Senate, which to prevent catching another time, I do not say was a judicatory only, but not only a Senate, but a judicatory also. For Lycurgus of all other Legislators was in this the likest unto God, or unto Moses, that his work was so tightly perfected at once, and his Laws so comprehensive, that if the Senate had had no other function than to make or propose new Laws, there being little or nothing of that wanting, they would have had little or nothing to do. Now it being thus, and much more than thus in Israel, the Sanhedrim was not only the Senate, but the supreme judicatory. And because one Court in a Territory of any Extent is no where sufficient unto this end; therefore the Sanhedrim had divers branches distended not only unto the Cities of judea, but even unto the Villages, these were called the Lesser Sanhedrim, or the jethronian Praefectures.  
The Great Sanhedrim consisting (as hath been shown) of 70. 
Selden de Syn.  Elders, sat first in the Tabernacle, and afterwards in the Court of the Temple.  
The jethronian Praefectures consisted some of three and twenty Elders, and others but of three. Of the former kind there were two in the gates of the Temple, and one sitting in the gates of every City, of the latter there was one almost in every Village.  
The power of the I●thronian Court consisting of twenty three Elders, was in matter of judicature, equal with that of the great Sanhedrin, only in cases of difficulty they observed this precept. If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgement 
Vide▪ Grot. ad Deut. 17. 8.  between blood and blood, between plea and plea, between stroke and stroke, being matter of controversy within thy gates; then shalt thou arise, and get thee up into the place which the Lord thy God shall choose (in the future, for the Commonwealth was yet but designed, not planted) and thou shalt come unto the Priests and the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire, and they shall show thee the sentence of judgement. That is, thou shalt consult the Sanhedrim, or if there be no Sanhedrim, the Suffes or judge of Israel. The reason why the Sanhedrim in this Text is mentioned under the name of the Priests and Levites is, that these about the beginning of this Commonwealth having (as were also the Egyptian Priests at the same time) been the learnedst Men, whether for Lawyers, or Physicians, there were scarce any other chosen into the Sanhedrim, though towards the latter end it happened to be far otherwise. For whereas sacrificing was feasting▪ the Priests enjoying a f●●idl●ness, became in latter times so heavy, that as to the Election of the Sanhedrim not only the Levites of inferior rank were upon the matter wholly laid by, but the High Priest himself sometimes omitted, the rest of the Tribes far excelling this in Learning.  
The power of the Triumvirates, or three judges in the Villages extended no farther than to inflict stripes to a certain number, and pecuniary mulcts to a certain sum. These possibly had the same recourse upon occasion of difficulty unto the judges in the gates, as the judges in the gates had to the Sanhedrim: but their power is not so much to the present purpose which regards only their manner of Election. This having been institutively exercised, as hath been shown by the Chirotonia, or Ballot of the People, came sooner or later, (I find no man that can resolve npon the certain time) to the Chirothesia. For though when a judge in the gate, was dead, that Court elected his Successor out of their Disciples, (each Court in the gates had 99 Disciples that were their constant auditors) or out of the Triumvirates; and when an Elder of the Sanhedrim died, the Sanhedrim elected his Successor out of the Courts in the gates, more particularly those in the gates of the Temple by suffrages; yet no man was capable of being elected into any of these Courts, that was not a Presbyter, nor was any man a Presbyter that had not received 
Mikotzl Misna Gemara  the Chirothesia: nor could any man confer the Chirothesia that had not first received it, or been so ordained a Presbyter himself: nor though he were so ordained, could he confer the like Ordination, but in the presence of two others, whether ordained or not ordained: and no Ordination could be conferred but either this way, or by some one of the judicatories. 
Abr. Zacuth. Maimonides.  The manner how this Ordination was conferred, if the party were present, was either by laying on of Hands, or by saying a Verse or Charm, or if he were absent, by a Letter, or Patent.  
An Elder thus Ordained was called Rabbi, might have Disciples, 
Rab. Jonah. Rab. Nathan.  teach, practice, or expound the Law, declare what was thereby free or forbidden (which with them was called binding and losing) ordain others with the assistance mentioned, or be capable of Election into some one, or any Court of Justice, according to the nature of his Ordination, the Conditions mentioned at the conferring of the same, or the gift that was in him by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery, which in some extended no farther than to show how meat should be killed and dressed, how uncleanness should be purified, what were vices of the body, what might be eaten or drunk, and what not? in others it extended to some one or more, or all the faculties expressed; but I am inclining to believe that a plenary Ordination, used not to be conferred but by the Great Sanhedrim, or at least some one of the jethronian Courts.  
They used also to confer this Ordination some time occasionally, and for a season in this manner. Receive the gift of 
Maimon. Tit. San. Cap. 4.  judiciary Ordination, or the right of binding and losing, till such time as you return unto us in the City. Where the Christian Jews still following their former Customs in higher matters, as the observation of the Sabbath, and of Circumcision, even unto such a degree, that Paul not to displease them took Timothy and circumcised him, seem unto me to have followed this custom, who when the Prophets at Antioch had informed them that Paul and Barnabas were to be separated unto an extraordinary work, laid their hands upon them, and sent them 
Acts 13. 3.  away: for otherwise as to Ordination Paul and Barnabas had that before; At least Paul by Ananias, and for any such 
Acts 9 17.  precept in the Christian Religion there was none.  
josephus, Philo, and other Authors, that tell us the Commonwealth of Israel was an Aristocracy, look no farther than the introduction of the Chirothesia by the Presbyterian party, which must have taken date some time after the Captivity, or the restitution of the Commonwealth by Ezra, there being not one syllable for it in Scripture, but enough to the contrary, seeing God introduced the Chirotonia. By which it is demonstrable that a Presbyterian party may bring a Popular Government unto Oligarchy; and deface even the work of God himself, so that it shall not be known to afer-ages; as also that Ecclesiastical Writers (for such are the Talmudists) may pretend that for many hundred years together, as Divines also have done, to be in Scripture, which neither is, nor ever was there. But have I yet said enough to show that Ordination especially as in this Example, not of a Clergy, but of a Magistracy, whether by the Chirotonia, or Chirothesia is a political institution? or must I rack my brains for Arguments to prove that an Order or a Law having such influence upon the Commonwealth, that being introduced or Repealed, it quite altars the whole frame of the Government, must needs be of a Political nature, and therefore not appertain unto Divines, or unto a Clergy, but unto the Magistrate, unless their traditions may be of force to alter the Government as they please? all is one, they can abate nothing of it, let what will come of the Government, the Chirothesia they must and will have. Then let them have Monarchy too, or Tyranny, for one of these according as the balance happeneth to stand with or against their Chirothesia is the certain consequence; either Tyranny as in Israel▪ or Monarchy as in the Papacy, and from that or the like principle, in all Gothick Empires, which examples to begin with Israel, well deserve the pains to be somewhat more diligently unfolded.  
All Elections in Israel, (save those of the Priests who were Eligible by the Lot) being thus usurped by the Presbyterian party, and the people by that means devested of their Chirotonia; some three hundred years before Christ, Hillel Senior High Priest, and Archon, or Prince of the Sanhedrim found means to draw this power of Ordination, in show somewhat otherwise, but in effect unto himself, and his Chirothesia, for by his influence upon the Sanhedrim it was 
Malmon. Tit. San. Cap. 4.  brought to pass, that whereas formerly any man Ordained, might (in the manner shown) have ordained his Disciples; it was now agreed that no man should be ordained without the Licence of the Prince, and that this power should not be in the Prince, but in the presence of the Father of the Sanhedrim, or Speaker of the House. Thus the Aristocracy of Israel becoming first Oligarchical took (according unto the nature of all such Governments) long steps towards Monarchy, which succeeding in the Asmonean Family, commonly called the Maccabees, was for their great merit (in vindicating the Jews from the Tyranny of Antiochus) confirmed unto them by the universal consent and Chirotonia of the people. Nevertheless unto him that understands the orders of a Commonwealth, or hath read the Athenian, Lacedaemonian, or Roman Story, it will be plain enough that but for their Aristocracy they needed not to have been so much beholding unto, or to have stood so much in need of one Family. It is true both the merit of these Princes, and the manner of their free Election by the people; seem to forbid the Name of Tyranny unto this institution. But so it is, that let there be never so much merit in the man, or inclination of the people to the Prince, or the Government that is not founded upon the due balance, the Prince in that case must either govern in the nature of a Commonwealth, as did those of this Family, reforming the policy after the Lacedaemonian Model, or turn Tyrant, as from their time, who lived in the Age of the Grecian Monarchy did all their Successors, till under the Romans this Nation became a Province. From which time such endeavours and insurrections they used for the recovery of their ancient policy, that under the Emperor Adrian, (who perceived at what their Ordination, being not of Priests, but of Magistrates, and of a Senate, pretending unto Sovereign Judicature and Authority seemed to aim) there came (saith the Talmud) against the Israelites an Edict out of the Kingdom of the wicked (meaning the Roman Empire) whereby whosoever should ordain, or be ordained, was to be put to death, and the school or City in which such an act should be done, to be destroyed; whereupon Rabbi Jehuda Ben Baba (lest Ordination should fail in Israel) went forth, and standing between two great mountains, and two great Cities, and between two Sabbath days journeys from Osa and Sephara, Ordained five Presbyters. For this feat the Rabbi is remembered by the Talmudists under the name of Ordinator; but the same (as it follows) being discovered by the Roman Guards, They shot his body through with so many Darts, as made it like a sieve, yet stayed not the business here, but so obstinate continued the Jew in the superstition unto which this kind of Ordination was now grown, that whereas by the same it was unlawful for them to Ordain in a foreign Land, and at home they could not be brought to abstain, the Emperor banished them all out of their own Country, whence happened their total dispersion. That of a thing, which at the first was a mere delusion, such Religion should come in time, and with education to be made that not only they who had received advantage could suffer Martyrdom, but they that had lost by it, would be utterly lost for it, were admirable in the case of this people, if it were not common in the case of most in the world at this day: custom may bring that to be received as an Ordinance of God, for which there is no colour in Scripture. For to consult Maimonides a little better upon this point. Whereas (saith he) they grant in 
Halac. San. C. 4. S. 11.  case it should happen that in all the Holy Land there remained but one Presbyter, that Presbyter assisted by two other Israelites, might ordain the seventy, or great Sanhedrim, and the Sanhedrim so constituted might constitute and ordain the lesser Courts, I am of opinion that were there no Presbyter in the Land, yet if all the wisemen of Israel should agree to constitute or ordain Judges, they might do it lawfully enough. But if so, then how comes it to pass that our Ancestors have been so solicitous, lest Judicature should fail in Israel? Surely for no other cause than that from the time of the Captivity the Israelites were so dispersed that they could not upon like occasions be brought together. Now I appeal whether the clear words of Maimonides, where he saith that out Master Moses ordained the Sanhedrim by the Chirothesia, be not more clearly and strongly contradicted in this place, than they are affirmed in the other, since acknowledging that if the people could assemble, they might Ordain the Sanhedrim; he gives it for granted, that when they did assemble, they had power to Ordain it, and that Moses did assemble them upon this occasion is plain in Scripture. Again if the power of Ordination fall ultimately unto the People, there is not a stronger argument in Nature, that it thence primarily derived. To conclude the Chirothesia of the Presbyterian party in Israel is thus confessed by the Author no otherwise necessaty, than through the defect of the Chirotonia of the People: which ingenuity of the Talmudist, for any thing that hath yet past, might be worthy the imitation of Divines.  
In tracking the Jews from the restitution of their Commonwealth after the Captivity to their dispersion, it seemeth that the later Monarchy in Israel was occasioned by the Oligarchy, the Oligarchy by the Aristocracy, and the Aristocracy by the Chirothesia. But that this Monarchy, though erected by Magnanimous and Popular Princes, could be no less than Tyranny derived from another principle, that is, the insufficiency of the balance. For albeit from the time of the Captivity, the Jubilee was no more in use, yet the Virgin Mary as an Heiress, is affirmed by some to have been Married unto joseph, by virtue of this Law, Every Daughter that possesseth an 
Numb. 27. 8.  inheritance in any Tribe of the Children of Israel, shall be Wife unto one of the Family of the Tribe of her Fathers, etc. By which the popular Agrarian may be more than suspected to have been of greater vigour than would admit of a well balanced Monarchy.  
The second Presbytery, which is now attained unto a well balanced Empire in the Papacy, hath infinitely excelled the pattern, the Lands of Italy being most of them in the Church. This if I had leisure might be tracked by the very same steps: at first it consisted of the seventy Parish Priests, or Presbyters of Rome; now seventy Cardinals creating unto themselves an High Priest, or Prince of their Sanhedrim, the Pope, but for the Superstition whereunto he hath brought Religion, and continues by his Chirothesia to hold it, a great and a Reverend Monarch, established upon a solid foundation, and governing by an Exquisite policy, not only well balanced at home, but deeply rooted in the greatest Monarchies of Christendom, where the Clergy by virtue of their Lands are one of the three States.  
The maxims of Rome are profound, for there is no making use of Princes without being necessary unto them; nor have they any regard unto that Religion which doth not regard Empire. All Monarchies of the Golthick model, that is to say, where the Clergy by virtue of their Lands are a third estate, subsist by the Pope, whose Religion creating a reverence in the people, and bearing an awe upon the Prince, preserveth the Clergy, that else being unarmed, become a certain prey unto the King or the people; and where this happeneth (as in Henry the Eighth) down goes the Throne, for so much as the Clergy looseth, falls out of the Monarchical into the Popular scale. Where a Clergy is a third estate, Popular Government wants earth and can never grow: but where they die at the root a Prince may sit a while, but is not safe; nor is it in nature (except he have a Nobility or Gentry able without a Clergy to give balance unto the people) that he should subsist long, or peaceably: For wherever a Government is founded upon an Army (as in the Kings of Israel, or the Emperors of Rome) there the saddest Tragedies under heaven are either one the stage, or in the Tiring-house. These things considered, the Chirothesia being originally nothing else but a way of Policy excluding the people, where it attaineth not unto a balance that is sufficient for this purpose, bringeth forth Oligarchy or Tyranny, as among the Jews: And where it attaineth unto a balance sufficient unto this end, produceth Monarchy as in the Papacy and in all Gothick Kingdoms.  
The Priests of Egypt, where (as it is described by Siculus) their revenue came unto the third part of the Realm, would, no question, have been exactly well fitted with the Chirothesia pretended unto by modern Divines. Suppose the Apostles had planted the Christian Religion in those parts. and the Priests had been all converted, I do not think that Divines will say that having altered their Religion they needed to have deserted their being a third estate; their overbalance to the people, their lands, their preheminece in the Government, or any part of their Policy for that: and I am as far from saying so as themselves.  
On the other side, as Paul was a Citizen of Rome, let us suppose him to have been a Citizen of Athens, and about (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to constitute the Christian Religion in this Gommon-wealth where any Citizen might speak unto the people. Imagine than he should have said thus. Men of Athens, that which you ignorantly seek, I bring unto you the true Religion, but to receive this, you must not alter your former belief only but your ancient Customs; your political Assemblies have been hitherto called, Ecclesiae, this word must lose the ancient sense, and be no more understood but of spiritual Consistories, and so whereas it hath been of a popular, it must henceforth be of an Aristocratical, or Presbyterian signification. For your Christonia that also must follow the same rule insomuch as on whomsoever, one or more of the Aristocracy or Presbytery shall lay their hands, the same is understood by virtue of that Action to be Chirotonized. How well would this have sounded in Egypt, and how ill in Athens? Cercainly the Policy of the Church of Christ admits of more prudence and temperament in these things, though the Apostles being Jews themselves, satisfied the converted Jews that were used to Aristocrrcy by retaining somewhat of their constitutions, as the Chirothesia yet when Paul and Barnabas come to constitute in Popular Commonwealths: they are (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Chirotonizing them Elders in every Congregation.   

CHAP. V. Whether the Chirotonia mentinoned in the fourteenth of the Acts be indeed as is pretended by Dr. Hamond, Dr. Seaman and the Authors they follow, the same with the Chirothesia or a far different thing; in which are contained the divers kinds of Churchgovernment, introduced and exercised in the age of the Apostles  
EIther I have impettinently intruded upon the Politics, or cannot be said so much to meddle in Church-matters, as Churchmen may be said to have meddled in States matters. For if the Chirotonia be election by the many, and the Chirothesia be election by one, or by the Few, the whole difference between Popular and Monarchical Government falls upon these two words; And so the question will be, whether the Scriptures were intended more for the advantage of a Prince, of an Hierarchy or Presbytery, than of the People. But that God in the Old Testamentiinstituted the Chirotonia, not only in the Commonwealth as by the election of the Sanhedrim, but in the Monarchy as in the Election of the Kings is plain; so if there remain any advantage in Scripture unto Kings unto the Hierarchy, or Presbytery, it must be in the New Testament. Israel was Gods chosen people, and God was Israel's chosen King; That God was pleased to bow the Heavens, and come down unto them, was his choice, not theirs; but in that upon his proposition, and those of his servant Moses, they resolved to Obey his voice, and keep his Covenant, they chose him their King. In like manner the Church is Christ's chosen people, and Christ is the Churches chosen King. That Christ taking flesh was pleased to bow the Heavens, and come down in a more familiar capacity of proposing himself unto Mankind, was his own choice, not theirs; but in that the Church upon his proposition, or those of his Apostles sent by him, as he was sent by the Father, resolved to obey his voice, and keep his Covenant, she hath chosen him her King. Whatever in nature or in grace, in Church, or in State, is chosen by Man according unto the will of God, is chosen by God, of whom is both the Will and the Deed. Which things considered; I wonder at Doctor Hamond, who says:  
Sure the Jewish and Heathen Cities, to whom the Gospel by 
§ 36.  Christ's command was to be preached were not to choose their Guides or Teachers. Christ was not chosen by them to whom he preached, for saith he, ye have not chosen me, he came from Heaven, sent by his Father on that Errand, and happy they whom he was thus pleased to choose, to call, and preach to. And when his Apostles after his example go and preach to all Nations, and actually gather Disciples, they chose their Auditors, and not their auditors them. To make short work, I shall answer by explaining his words as they fall.  
A Roman choosing whether he would speak unto the Senate or the People, chose his Auditors, & not they him: Nevertheless if it were the Consul they chose him, & not he them. It is onething to be a Speaker unto a People, that have theliberty, when that is done, to do as they think fit, and another thing to be a guide whom the People have consented, or obliged themselves to follow, which distinction not regarded, makes the rest of his Argumentation recoil upon himself, while he proceeds thus, and they that give up their Names to the obedience of the Gospel, (choose the Preachers as I should think of that Gospel their guides) One branch of this obedience obligeth them (by their own consent it seems, because before they gave up their Names) to observe those that (being thus placed over them by their consent) are placed over them by God, such not only are their Civil Magistrates (who succeed unto their places by, and govern according to the Laws which the people have chosen) but also their Pastors, whom the Holy Ghost either mediately (according to the Rules of Church-Discipline in Scripture) or immediately (upon some such miraculous call, as the people shall judge to be no imposture) hath set over them. From which words the Doctor not considering those qualifications, I have shown all along to be naturally inherent in them, concludes that a Bishop is made by the Holy Ghost, and not by the people.  
If he would stand to this yet it were something, for if the Holy Ghost make a Bishop, than I should think that the Holy Ghost ordained a Bishop, and so that the Election and Ordination of a Bishop were all one. But this hereafter will appear to be a more dangerous concession, than perhaps you may yet apprehend. Wherefore when all is done you will not find Divines, at least Doctor Hamond to grant that the Holy Ghost can ordain, he may elect indeed, and that is all, but there is no ordination without the Chirothesia of the Bishops, or of the Presbytery. Take the Doctor's word for it.  
When St. Paul saith of the Bishops of Asia, that the Holy 
§ 107 Acts 20. 28.  Ghost had set them Overseers, I suppose that it is to be understood of their Election or nomination unto those dignities, for so Clement speaks of St. john, who constituted Bishops of those that were signified by the Spirit, where the Spirits signification notes the Election or nomination of the persons, but the constituting them was the ordination of St. john.  
God may purpose as the Electors do to the great Council of Venice, but the power of the Council, that is to resolve or ordain is in the Bishop saith Doctor Hamond, and in the the Presbytery saith Doctor Seaman. Indeed that Election and Ordination be distinct things, is to Divines of so great importance, that losing this hold they lose all For as I said before whatever is chosen by man according unto the Will of God, that is according unto Divine Law, whether natural or positive, the same whether in state or Church, is chosen by God, or by the Holy Ghost, of whom is both the will and the deed. To evade this, and keep all in their own hands, or Chirothesia, Divines have invented this distinction, that Election is one thing, and Ordination another. God may Elect, but they must constitute, that is, God may propose, but they must resolve. And yet Grotius who in these things is a great Champion for the Clergy, hath little 
De Imp. sum. Pot. C. 10. § 31.  more to say upon this point than this. Whether we consider ancient or modern times, we shall find the manner of Election very different, not only in different Ages and Countries, but in different years of the same age, and places of the same Country; so uncertain a thing is it to determine of, that which the Scripture hath left uncertain. And while men dispute not of right, but of convenience, it is wonderful to see what probable Arguments are brought on all sides. Give me Cyprian and his times, there is no danger in popular Election. Give me the Nicene Fathers, and let the Bishops take it willingly. Give me Theodosius Valentinian, and Charles the Great, then Royal Election there is nothing safer. Upon the heels of these words treads Doctor 
§ 104  Hamond in this manner. That Election and Ordination are several things, is sufficiently known unto every man that measures the nature of words either by usuage or Dictionaries; only for the convincing of such as think not themselves obliged to the observation of so vulgar Laws, I shall propose these evidences; In the story of the Creation of the Deacons of Jerusalem. There are 
Acts 6.  two things distinctly set down, one proposed to the multitude of Disciples to be done by them: another reserved unto the Apostles, that which was proposed unto the Multitude, was to elect, etc. Election of the persons was by the Apostles permitted to them, but still the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constituting is reserved to the Apostles. Then comes Doctor Seaman: Be it granted, as it 
Of Ordinat. p. 13.  is by Protestants generally, that Paul and Barnabas made Elders with the consent of the people, their consent is one thing, and their power another.  
Where in the first place I for my particular (who have had the Books of Doctor Hamond, and Doctor Seaman, sent to me by way of Objection, need not go a step further. All that I have inserted in my Occana concerning Ordination, is in these three Votes acknowledged and confirmed. For the Probationer, to be there sent by an University unto a Cure that is vacant, may by a Doctor, or the Doctors of the same University already ordained, receive Imposition of Hands, if that be thought fit to be added, and then the Election of the same Probationer by the people does no hurt, nay saith 
De Imp. c. 10.  Grotius, is of the right of nature; for it is naturally permitted unto every Congregation to procure those things which are necessary unto their conservation, of which number is the Application of Function. So Merchants have the right of Electing of a Master of their Ship, Travellers of a Guide in their way, and a free people of their King. The Merchant it seems doth not make the Master of his Ship, the Traveller his Guide, nor the free people their King, but elect them. As if Van Tromp had been Admiral, a Robber upon the Highway had been a Scout, or the guide of an Army, or Saul a King before they were elected. The point is very nice, which instead of proving, he illustrates in the beginning of the same Chapter by these three similitudes.  
The first is this, the power of the Husband is from God, the Application of this power unto a certain person is from consent, by which nevertheless the right is not given, for if this were by consent, the Matrimony might be dissolved by consent, which cannot be. As if an apparent retraction of Matrimonial consent, as when a Wife consents unto another than her own Husband, or committeth Adultery, did not deliver a man from the bond of Marriage by the Judgements of Christ. There is an imperfection or cruelty in those Laws, which make Marriage to last longer than a man in humanity may be judged to be an Husband, or a Woman a Wife; to think that Religion destroys humanity, or to think that there is any defending of that by Religion which will not hold in Justice, or natural equity, is a vast error.  
The second similitude is this; Imperial power is not in the Princes that are Electors of the Empire, wherefore it is not given by them, but applied by them unto a certain person.  
This is answered by Peter, where he commandeth Obedience 
1 Pet. 2. 13.  unto every Ordinance of Man (or as some nearer the Original every power created by men) whether it be unto the Roman Emperor as Supreme, or unto the Proconsuls of Asia, and Phrygia, as sent by him (for this is the sense of the Greek, and thus it is interpreted by Grotius) now if the than Roman Emperor were a creature of man, why not the now Roman Emperor?  
The last similitude runs thus: The power of life and death is not in the multitude, before they be a Commonwealth, for no private man hath the right of revenge, yet it is applied by them unto some man or Political body of men. But if a man invade the life of another, that other whether under Laws, or not under Laws, hath the right to defend his own life, even by taking away that (if there be no other probable remedy) of the invader. So that men are so far from having been void of the power of life and death before they came under Laws, that Laws can never be so made as wholly to deprive them of it after they come under them; wherefore the power of life and death is derived by the Magistrate from, and conferred upon him by the consent or Chirotonia of the people, whereof he is but a mere creature, that is to say an Ordinance of man.  
Thus these candles being so far from lighting the house, that they die in the socket: Grotius hath been no less bountiful than to grant us that the people have as much right, (where there is no humane creature or Law to the contrary) to elect their Churchmen, as Merchants have to elect their Seamen, Travilers their guides, or a free▪ people their King; which is enough a conscience. Nor is Doctor Hamond straighter handed, Election (says he) was permitted by the Apostles unto the multitude, and therefore the same may be allowed, always provided that the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constituting be reserved unto the Pastors, or ordained Doctors and Preachers: and Doctor Seaman upon condition that the people will not say that it was done by their power, but think it fair that it was done by their consent is also very well contented; So all stands strait with what I have heretofore proposed. Let no man then say what ever follow, that I drive any ends or interest, these being already fully obtained and granted, nevertheless for truth sake I cannot leave this discourse imperfect. If a Politician should say that the Election and the Ordination of a Roman Council or Pontifex were not of like nature. That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contract of the Senate of Rome with the people in the Elelection of Numa (ut cum populus regem jussisset, id sic ratum 
Livy L.  esset, si patres authores fierent) included or employed the Sovereign power to be in the Fathers. That the consent of this people was one thing and their power another: If I say he should affirm these or the like in Athens, Lacedaemon, or any other Commonwealth, that is or hath been under the Sun, there would be nothing under the Sun more ridiculous than that Policitian. But should men pretending unto Government of any kind be not obliged unto some consideration of these rules in nature and universal experience; yet I wonder how the word (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to constitute with which they make such a flourish, did not lead them, otherwise than they follow, this as it was said of Solon by Aristotle being that which I have already shown to be used both in the Greek of the Scripture, for the constitution of the Sanhedrim by Moses, and in other Authors for that of the Senate by Romulus, each of which was then elected by the people; whence it may appear plainly that this is no word as they pretend to exclude popular suffrage, but rather to imply it. And indeed that it is of no such nature, as necessarily to include power, could not have been overseen in the New Testament, but voluntarily where (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) they are signified by it that conducted 
Acts 7. 15.  Paul. But they have Miracles; such indeed as have neither words nor reason for them had need of Miracles. And where are these same Miracles? why the Apostles by the Chirothesia or laying on of hands conferred the Holy Ghost. So they did not only when they used that Ceremony in reference to ordination, but when they used it not in that relation, as to those that were newly Baptised in Samaria, 
Acts 8.  men, and women: now it is not probable, that these, who should seem to have been numerous, were all ordained, at lest the women; And so the Miracle is to be attributed unto the hands of the Apostles, and not unto ordination in general. Joshua was full of the Spirit, (not because he had been ordained by the Chirothesia, for so had many of them that crucified Christ and persecuted the Apostles, but) because Moses had laid his hands upon him.  
Would Divines be contended that we should argue thus; the Chirotonia or suffrage of the people of Israel at the first institution was followed with Miraculous endowments, therefore who ever is elected by the people shall have the like? Or what have they to show why the Argument is more holding as to their Chirothesia, seeing for above one thousand years all the Hierarchy and Presbytery laid together have done no more Miracles than a Parish Clerk?  
A continued Miracle, as that the Sea ebbs and flows, the Sun always runs his admirable course, is nature. Intermitted nature as that the waters of the red Sea were mountains, that the Sun stood still in the dial of Ahaz, is a Miracle. To continue the latter kind of Miracle were to destroy the former, that is, to desolve nature. Wherefore this is a certain rule that no continued external Act can be in the later sense Miraculous. Now Government whether in Church or State is equally a continued external Act. An internal continued Act may indeed be natural or supernatural as Faith.  
A natural man being even in his own natural apprehension fearfully and wonderfully made, is by the continued Miracle of nature convinced that the world had a creator, and so comes to believe in that which is supernatural; whence it is that all Nations have had some Religion: and a Spiritual man being convinced by the purity of Christ's Doctrine, and the Miracles whereby it was first planted, is brought unto the Christian Faith. However Christ may require such continued Faith or Spiritual exercise of his Church as is supernatural, he requireth not any such continued Act or bodily exercise of his Church as is supernatural. But the Government of the Church is a continued Act or bodily exercise. It should be heeded that to delude the sense is not to do Miracles, but to use imposture. Now to persuade us, That Monarchical, Aristocratical, Popular, or mixed Government have not always been in nature, or that there hath ever been any other in the Church were to delude sense; Wherefore give me leave (in which I am confident I shall use no manner of irreverence unto the Scripture, but on the contrary make the right use of it) to discourse upon Church-Government, according unto the rules of prudence.  
The Gospel was intended by Christ to be preached unto all Nations, which (Princes and States being above all things exceeding tenacious of their power) is to me a certain Argument that the Policy of the Church must be so provided for, as not to give any of them just cause of Jealousy, there being nothing more likely to obstruct the growth of Religion, and truly the nearer I look unto the Scripture, the more I am confirmed in this opinion.  
Christ being taken up into Heaven the first Ordination 
First way of Ordination in the Church of Christ. Acts 1.  that we find was that of the Apostle Mathias after this manner.  
The Aristocracy of the Church, that is the Apostles assembled the whole Congregation of Disciples or Believers at Jerusalem, being in number one hundred and twenty, where Peter (it having as it should seem been so agreed by the Apostles) was Proposer, who standing up in the midst of the Disciples acquainted them, that whereas Judas was gone unto his place, the occasion of their present meeting was to elect another Apostle in his room: whereupon proceeding unto the Suffrage, they appointed two Competitors, joseph and Mathias, whose names being written each in a several Scroll, were put into one Urn, and at the same time two other lots whereof, one was a blank, and the other inscribed with the word Apostle were put into another Urn, which done they prayed and said, Thou Lord which knowest the hearts of all men, show whether of these two thou hast chosen: The Prayer being ended they gave forth their lots, and the lot fell upon Mathias (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) and by this Psephisma (the very Popular word, and not only so, hut being applied unto the ballot, in the very literal and Original signification) he was added unto the eleven Apostles. So you have the first way of Ordination in the Church after Christ was taken up into Heaven performed by the Election or Chirotomia of the whole Church.  
Now except any man can show that Mathias ever received the imposition of hands, these several things are already demonstrated. First, that the Chirotonia is not only the more ancient way of Ordination in the Commonwealth of Israel, but in the Church of Christ. Secondly, that the Chirothesia or Imposition of Hands is no way necessary unto Ordination in the Christian Church. Thirdly, that the discipline of the Christian Church was primitively Popular (For to say that in regard of the Apostles it was Aristocratical, is to forget that there is no such thing, without a mixture of Aristocracy, that is without the Senate, as a Popular Government in nature.) Fourthly, that Ordination in the Commonwealth of Oceana being exactly after this pattern, is exactly according unto the discipline of the Church of Christ. And five, that Ordination and Election in this example are not two, but one and the same thing.  
The last of these Propositions having been affirmed by Mr. Hobbs, Dr. Hamond tells him plainly, that his assertion is far from all truth: Let us therefore consider the Doctor's 
§ 115.  Reasons, which are these; seeing the Congregation (saith he) is affirmed by the Gentleman to have Ordained, and it is plain by the words of St. Luke, that God Elected, Election and Ordination by this Example, must be distinct things: which in another place going about to fortify with this Argument, that it was done by Lottery, and Solomon says, the Lot is at the disposing of the Lord, he utterly overthrows without and beyond help; for in this Solomon not denying, but rather affirming that he was chosen King by the People, plainly shows that Election by the People is Election by God. Where it is affirmed, that God raised up judges in Israel, it is not denied that the People elected them. The Doctor is at it in Maimonides more than once, that the Divine Majesties rested upon such as were Ordained by Imposition of Hands. But whereas it is affirmed by Maimonides more often, that when the People (Ecclesia Dei) or Congregation of Israel assembled then the Divine Majesty, or the Holy Ghost rested upon them: Of this he never takes any notice: The People whether in Israel, Athens, Lacedaemon, or Rome, never assembled for Enacting of Laws or Election of Magistrates without sacrifice and imploring the assistance of God, to whom when their work was performed they always attributed the whole result or election; and would the Doctor have Christians to allow him but a Piece? for whereas God Electing there had in the sense both of Jews and Heathens, his choice of all, God electing here had in the sense of Divines, but his choice of two, which were next this or none, but that indeed, where he hath not the whole he hath none at all: Is that then far from all truth, which the Gentleman, or that which the Divine hath said, either in this part, or where he addeth, that the hundred and twenty 
Dr. H. of Imposition. § 115.  in the text are never mentioned but once, and then it is in a Parenthesis? I will but transcribe the place.  
And in those days Peter stood up in the midst of the Disciples, 
Acts 1. 15.  and said, (the number of the Names together were about an hundred and twenty), etc. Are the Disciples in the Parenthesis, or out of it? Are they but once mentioned, and that is in a Parenthesis? Or are they but once numbered, and that is in a Parenthesis? If a Gentleman should do thus, what would they say? Or, what were ill enough to be said? But to mend the text, and bring the Disciple into the Parenthesis, they have more ways than one; whereas the Heathen People (while the Priests were willing) mixed these duties with devotions, Divines will not suffer a Christian People upon like occasions to pray, for where it is said, they prayed, it went before, they appointed two, and it follows, They gave out their lots: which antecedent and consequent if the People prayed, must be equally understood of them, and so they could be no Parenthesis. Therefore pray they must not, or Divines are lost; But how will they silence them? To show you this art I must transcribe the Heads of the Chapter.  
The Apostles being returned from Mount Olivet unto Jerusalem, 
Ver. 13.  went up into an upper room, where abode both Peter and James, and john, and Andrew, james the son of Alpheus, and Simon Zelotes, and judas the brother of james.  
And in these days Peter stood up in the mid est of the Disciples, 
15.  and said (the number of Names together were about one hundred and twenty)  
Men and brethren. 
16.   
Of those men which accompanied with us all the time, that 
21.  the Lord jesus went in and out among us.  
Must one be ordained to be Witness with us of his Resurrection. 
22.   
And they appointed two joseph and Mathias. 
23.   
And they prayed and said, Thou Lord which knowest the 
24.  hearts of all men, show whether of these two thou hast chosen.  
And they gave forth their lots, and the lot fell upon Mathias, 
26.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
They whom Peter acquainted that one must be Ordained, one would verily believe▪ were the hundred and twenty Disciples, in the midst of whom he stood up, and made the Proposition, and so much the rather, because this was no more than the Apostles knew before: and (in all right understanding of Government and sense) were already agreed upon, it being the Office of the Aristocracy or Senate in a Commonwealth (and such exactly were the Apostles in the Church) upon all new Orders or Elections to be made; first, to debate and determine by themselves, and then to propose unto the Chirotonia or ultimate result of the People. But Divines say absolutely no, which word to make good, They appointed two, and they prayed, and they gave forth their lots, being sentences that stand plainly together, or hunt in couples, must leap shear over nine verses, Peter's whole Oration, (which by this means is no more than a Parenthesis neither) and over the hundred and twenty Disciples; without touching an hair of their heads, to light plumb upon the thirteenth verse, and the eleven Apostles! Never man used his Grammar so since he threw it at a Pear tree! yet that Chrylostome (who understood Greek) allows of no such construction, is confessed by the 
Grotius.  learnedest of this opinion; and whereas they fly unto the Latin Fathers, that retreat is wholly cut off by David blundel in his very learned Treatise of the right of the People in Church Government,  
But what do we stand upon words? Are these such whereof the things unto which they relate may be interpreters? Or unto what things can they relate but the Institution of the Sanhedrim by Moses? That at the Institution of the Sanhedrim the Competitors were Elected by the suffrage of the People, and from thence that the Ballot of Israel consisted not only of a Lot but of a Suffrage too, hath been already demonstrated out of Scripture; and that the Election of Mathias was by the Ballot of Israel is not less apparent in itself, than fully confessed upon the place by Grotius.  They that under colour of Religion, in matter of Government 
Demonstration that God never ordained any policy Ecclesiastical or Civil, but upon the principles of humane Prudence. Josh. 9 11.  slight prudence, are mistaken or do not mean honestly. Neither God nor Christ ever instituted any Policy whatsoever, upon any other principles than those of Humane Prudence. The Ambassadors sent from the Gibeonites to joshua, deliver their message in this manner, The Elders and all the Inhabitants of our Country spoke unto us saying go meet them, and say unto them, We are your servants, Therefore now make you a League with us. They that had power to send Ambassadors, and to make a League with a foreign Nation, had sovereign power, this sovereign power was in the Elders, or Senate, and in the People of Gibeon; wherefore God constituting his Commonwealth for the main Orders (that is to say the Senate & the people) upon the same Principles, on which the Gibeonites had long before built theirs, laid his foundations upon no other than humane prudence; so for the inferior Courts they were transcribed by Moses on't of the Commonwealth of Midian, upon advice of Jethro his Father in Law. According unto such patterns was Israel framed, and by that of Israel this first Policy of the Church of Christ so exactly, as (sans comparison) any man shall show the Commonwealth of Occana to have been transcribed out of Rome or Venice. Let them that would have the Government be somewhat between earth and heaven consider this place. 
Nor is Ecclesiastical Policy only subject unto humane Prudence, but unto the same vicissitudes also whereunto humane prudence is subject, both in her own nature and as she is obnoxious to the State wherein she is planted, and that inavoidably; as I come now to demonstrate by the Alterations which happened even in the Age of the Apostles themselves; for this at the Election of Mathias being altered, the next form of Ecclesiastical Policy introduced in their times, is resembled by Grotius unto that of Athens, of which, for the better clearing of what follows, it is necessary that I first say something by way of introduction.  
The Thesmothetae, being in number six, were Magistrates of the highest dignity, power and rank in Athens. These 
Arist. 2. lib. 2. c. 10.  saith Aristotle, were elected by the Chirotonia or suffrage of the people, and saith, Pollux being Elected underwent the inquisition of the Senate, where they were to answer to these Interrogatories, Whether they worshipped the god of their Countries? Whether they had been dutiful unto their Parents? born Arms for the Commonwealth? paid duties or taxes? In 
Pol. lib. 8. c 9  which particulars the Senate being satisfied, They were sworn and Crowned with Mirile: which comes to this, that the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) or constitution being reserved unto the Senate, the Thesmothetae were Elected by the Chirotonia of the people. Now though the Government of Athens throughout the Cities of Asia (being most of them of the like Model) was most known, I will not say that the Apostles wrote their Orders out of Athens, but seeing all Political Institutions must needs be according to humane Prudence, and there is nothing to be written out of this but what will fall even with some other Government that is or hath been, I may say as 
Act. 6.  Grotius hath said before me) that the frame of Church-Government in the ensuing example was after the manner of Athens.  
When the number of the Disciples (or Believers) was multiplied, 
Second way of Ordination in the Church of Cstrist.  there arose a murmuring among such of the Jews as having beenbredin Alexandria or other parts, were for their Language (which was Greek) partly strangers, against the Hebrews or converted Jews, that spoke their own Language, as if these indeed used them like strangers, their widows being neglected, or not dealt so liberally withal as those of the Hebrews in the Contributions due for their constant maintenance.  
Hereupon the twelve Ayostles (after the manner of the Senate) having without all question debated the business among themselves, as appears by the speech upon which they were agreed, assembled the people (which is still Senatorian) or called the multitude of the Disciples unto them, and said, It is not reason that we should leave preaching, or the word of God, to be taken up with this, though charitable, nay, seeing we have introduced community of goods, most just and necessary employment of providing food and clothing for every one of our fellowship or community (the Christians in these times, much after the manner of the Lacedaemonian Convives used to eat in public and together) to do this as it ought to be done, were to become Caterers, and be taken up in serving Tables. Wherefore brethren (take the wise men and understanding, and known among you) look out servant Men of honest report full of the Holy Ghost, and of wisdom, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) whom we may appoint over this business.  
This saying, that is, this Proposition of the Senate or Apostles pleased the whole multitude (like that of Moses, the thing which thou hast said is good for us to do) So they chose Stephen, Philip, Prochorus, Nicanor, Timon, Permenas' and Nicholas, whom being Elected, they set before the Apostles, who when they had prayed, laid their hands upon them.  
What fuller demonstration can be given of any thing, than that in this example, Ordination and Election are one and the same, and that this was conferred by the Chirotonia of the People? If there be any possible way of making this clearer, it must be by Opposition. Wherefore let us see what Divines have to say to the contrary.  
Grotius gives all we ask from this place, which he gives for nothing, because it concerns not the Election of Pastors, but of Deacons. As if Stephen and Philip had not only been Preachers of the Gospel, but done Miracles. What Dr. Seaman denies or grants in relation unto the same, I have endeavoured to understand, but it will not do. Dr. Ham●nd is so plain, that his Objections may be of use. He to prove that the Ordination of these Deacons was not in the Chirotonia of their Disciples; but in the Chirothesia of the Apostles hath these Arguments.  
There be two things distinctly set down Election permitted unto the poople (and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constituting reserved unto the Apostles.  
To which I answer, That there were two things set down by the Athenian Law, Election of the Thesmothetae by the People, and the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constituting of them by the Senate, yet that the Ordination was in the power, and that the power was in the people of Athens; he that makes a doubt is not resolved whether the most popular Commonwealth that ever was▪ were a Democracy.  
But saith he, this looking out of men (or choosing) was permitted unto he multitude by the Apostles with these three bounds. First to take seven neither more nor fewer. Secondly, those men generally known and well reputed of. And thirdly, full of the Spirit and of discretion or parts fit for Government. To which I answer, that the Election of the Thesmothetae was permitted by the Law unto the people of Athens, with these three bounds, First to take six neither more nor fewer: Secondly, those generally known and reputed of. Thirdly in such estimation for their honesty and ability for Government as in their consciences (to which also they made Oath) they should judge fittest for the Commonwealth; yet is all this so far from any proof, that Athens was no Democracy, or that the Sovereign power, whether in Enacting of Laws, or election of Magistrates by the lot or the suffrage (institutions equally popular) was not in the people, that it amounts unto the strongest argument the people were Sovereign, and the Commonwealth was Democratical. Could truth desire greater advantage than redounds from such opposition? We have another example of the same model, in which, because it hath been paraphrased upon already in the Introduction, I shall be briefer here. In the Church of Antioch where the 
Acts 13.  Disciples were now become so numerous, that they began to be called Christians, there were among them Prophets, so being assembled upon occasion (as I conceive) of giving an extraordinary Commission after the manner of the people of Athens when they Elected Ambassadors, or (that I may avoid strife upon a point so indifferent) to choose two new Apostles; The Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work wbereunto I have appointed them; that is, (for so it is rendered by all Interpreters) the Holy Ghost spoke those words by the mouths of the Prophets. Now the Prophets being well known for such, this suffrage of theirs was no sooner given than (as one that can allow Prophets to be leading men may easily think) followed by all the rest of the Congregation: so the whole multitude having fasted and prayed, the most eminent among them, or the Senatorian order in that Church, laid their hands upon Paul and Barnabas, who being thus sent forth by the Holy Ghost, departed unto Seleucia.  
To evade this apparent Election, or Chirotonia of the whole Congregation, whereby these Apostles or Ambassadors unto the Churches of the Gentiles were ordained; Divines have nothing to say, but that they were elected by the Holy Ghost: as if the Chirotonia of the people were more exclusive unto Election by the Holy Ghost, than the Chirothesia of the Aristocracy, for which in the mean time they contend: but if neither of these were indeed exclusive of the Holy Ghost, how is it possible, in this frame (where though of natural necessity an Aristocracy must have been included, yet the Aristocracy is not in the Text, so much as distinguished from the people, or once named) that the power, and so the ordination should not have been in the people? The Council of the Apostles, of the Elders, and of the whole Church at Jerusalem, and other Councils, not of Apostles, nor of the whole Church in other times or places, used this form in their Acts, It seemeth good unto the Holy Ghost, and 
Acts 15. 22.  unto us: but doth this where a true, or where a pretended style exclude that act from being an Act of that whole Council? or how comes it to pals that because Paul and Barnabas were separated by the Holy Ghost, they were not ordained by the Chirotonia of the whole Christian people at Antioch?  
The Chirothesia can be no otherwise understood in nature, nor ever was in the Commonwealth of the Jews, than Election by the few: And so even under the mere Chirothesia, Ordination and Election were not two, but one and the same thing. If Moses ordained Joshua his Successor by the Chirothesia, he Elected joshua his Successor by the Chirothesia, and for what reason must it be otherwise with the Chirotonia? That a Pharisee could do more with one hand, or a pair of hands, than a Christian Church, or Congregation can do with all their hands, is a Doctrine very much for the honour of the true Religion, and a sovereign maxim of Ecclesiastical policy.  
The third constitution of Church Government in Scripture 
Third way of Ordination i the Church c Christ.  (whether consisting of Bishops or Presbyters, between which at this time a man shall hardly find a difference) runs wholly upon the Aristocracy without mention of the people, and is therefore compared by Grotius unto the Sanhedrim of 
Grot ad 2 Tim. 4. 14.  Israel, as that came to be in these days; from whence Divines also generally and truly confess that it was taken up, to which I shall need to add no more than that it is an order for which there is no precept, either in the Old Testament of God, or in the New of Christ: This therefore thus taken up by the Apostles from the Jews, is a clear demonstration that the Government of the Church in what purity soever of the times, nay though under the inspection of the Apostles themselves, hath been obnoxious unto that of the State wherein it was planted. The Sanhedrim from the institution of the Chirothesia for a constant Order, consisted of no other Senators than such only as had been ordained by the Imposition of Hands, which came now to be conferred by the Prince in the presence, or with the assistance of the Sanhedrim; the same order was observed by the Jewish Synagogues, of 
Grot. ad Mat. 19 13.  which each had her archon: nor would the Jews converted unto the Christian Faith relinquish the Law of Moses, whereunto this way of Ordination, among other things, though erroneously, was vulgarly attributed: whence in the Church, where it consisted of converted Jews, Ordination was conferred by the Archon, or first in order of the Presbytery with the assistance of the rest. Hence Paul, in one place, exhorts Timothy thus: Neglect not the gift that is in 
1 Tim. 4. 14.  thee, which was given thee by Prophecy, with the laying on of the 
2 Tim. 1. 6.  hands of the Presbytery. And in another thus: Wherefore I put thee in remembrance, that thou st●r up the gift of God which is in thee by the putting on of my hands.  
I grant Divines, that Ordination by this time was wholly in the Presbytery, what say they then unto the distinction of Ordination and Election? Are these still two distinct things, or may we hence, at least, compute them to be one and the same? If they say yes; Why then might they not have been so before? If they say no; Who in this place but the Presbytery elected? Why says Doctor Hamond, 
§ 106.  it is plain that the Spirit of Prophecy elected? But to give account of no more than is already performed, were the spirit of History rather than of Prophecy, to which it appertains to tell things before they be done, as did the Prophets now living in this Church, that Tim thy should come to be ordained, so the place is interpreted by Grotius, and how it should otherwise be understood I cannot see: But putting the case some Act preceded, as Saul and David were elected Kings by Prophecy: Yet did ever man say that for this Soul or David were any whit the less elected Kings by the People? To the contrary in every well ordered Commonwealth (a jove principium) the disposing of the Lot and of the Suffrage too, hath universally been attributed unto God.  
The Piety of Divines in persuading the People, that God 
§ 134.  elects for them, and therefore they need not trouble themselves to vote, is as if they should persuade them that God provides their daily bread, and therefore they need not trouble themselves to work. To conclude this point with Doctor hamond's own words upon the same occasion; this didinction of Ordination and Election is in Divines the procreative mistake, or ignorance producing all the 
§ 111.  rest.  
The reason why Paul ordained now after this manner among the Jews, is unto me an irrefragable Argument, that he ordained not after this manner among the Gentiles; for whereas the first ordination in the Christian Church, namely that of Mathias, was performed by the Chirotonia; which by degrees came now in complacence with the Jews unto the Chirothesia; it seems he was contented not to alter the worst of Political institutions or customs, where he found them confirmed by long and universal practice; and if so, why should any man think that he would go about to alter or weed out the best, where they had taken like Root? That this administration of the Jews was of the very worst, is clear in the nature of the politics, there being no example of a pure Aristocracy, or of a Senate, such as was now the Sanhedrim without a popular balance that ever governed with Justice, or was of any continuance. Nor was the Chiroth sia, by which means this work came to effect in Israel, introduced by the prudence of God, but by the corrupt arts of men. Now that the Governments at the same time of the Gentiles, all balanced by the Chirotonia of the people, were in their Nature more excellent, and indeed more accommodated unto ancient prudence, as it was introduced by God himself in the Commonwealth of Israel, hath been already sufficiently proved; Nevertheless to refresh your memory with one example more.  
Crete having been (as is affirmed by the consent of Authors) the most ancient, and the most excellent Commonwealth in humane Story, was founded by Rhadamanthus and Minos, an age before the Trojan War; These were held to have learned their arts by familiar discourse with Jupiter, and from point to point to have framed their model, according unto his direction. Nor though all acknowledge Minos to have been a King, did he found his Government upon any other than a popular balance, or a fundamental regard unto the Liberty of the people. For the whole Commonwealth 
Epitome of the Commonwealth of Crete  was made up of these three parts, The College, The Senate, and the People. The College consisted of the Annual Magistrates called the Cosmi, these had the whole extentive power, s●me in leading forth the Armies, and others in judging the people, which functions were accordingly assigned by the Orders unto each in particular; that which was common unto them all, was to propose such things as they had debated or prepared in their College or Council unto the Senate, The Senate being Elective for life, was the Council unto which appertained the Debate of what ever was to be proposed unto the Congregation. The Congregation or Assembly of the people of Crete had not the right of Debate, but in enacting of Laws, and election of Magistrates had the ultimate result of the Commonwealth, such was the copy after which Lycurgus wrote himself so famous a Legislator: And thus stood this frame unto the six hundred and eight year of Rome; when this people having been too favourable unto Pirates then infesting those Seas, turned the arms of the Romans upon themselves, and by these under the conduct of Quinctus Metellus, thence called Creticus, Crete was made a Province, though the chief Cities being first freed, it should seem (by Cicero's second Oration against Anthony) that the whole Island was at length restored unto her ancient Liberty. However by the manner observed by the Romans (as was shown) in Provincial Government, the Gities under their Magistrates (who while the Commonwealth was a Province, perhaps might have exercised the Office of the Cosmi) were not yet deprived of their popular Assemblies, at least in their distinct Cities, electing all Magistrates for their (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) peculiar or domestic Government; such was the state of Crete, when Paul having appealed from the jews unto Caesar; and being thereupon conducted by Sea towards Rome, touched in his way upon this Island, where he left Titus to constitute Elders in every City. The word (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Constitate our Divines will have to signify Ordain by Imposition of Hands, and Imposition of Hands foe signify an Act of power, excluding the people. But why Paul, who among the Jews had complied with their customs, should enjoin, or how Titus had it been so enjoined should accomplish this where the power was Popular, they have not shown nor considered. To introduce Religion, or Government there be but two ways, that is to say, either by persuasion, or by force. To persuade the people of Crete, in whom was the power unto this new way of Ordination; Titus must have spoken to this effect, Men of Crete.  
Minos' being a King could not choose but have a natural inclination unto popular power, wherefore his pretence that Jupiter told him, Power was to be in the people, may be suspected to have been imagined merely for his own ends; or this is a certain sign that Jupiter is no true, but a feigned god; seeing the true God will have it that the people should have no power at all; but that such upon whom his Ambassadors shall confer power, be without all dispute obeyed. How! are you starting at this! are you solicitous for your Commonwealth! it is true that upon carnal principles or humane prudence, without power in the people, there can be no Commonwealth: but Israel was a Commonwealth without power in the people▪ Where Moses made all the Laws by the power invested in him by God, and created all the Magistrates, not by popular suffrage but by his Chirotonsia. Wherefore Men of Crect know ye that on whomsoever I lay my hands, the same is in all spiritual affairs or matter of Church-government to be obeyed by you, after the same manner that you have hitherto obeyed such Magistrates or Priests as have been ordained by your own Election, or Chirotonia. Of what other nature the Arguments of Titus to the pretended purpose could have been; I am not able to imagine; nor how this should have done less than provoke the people unto a dangerous jealousy of such a Doctrine. But Divines to set all strait, think it enough to repeat the words of Paul to Titus in Greek. For this cause left I thee in Crete (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) 
Tit. 1. 5.  that thou shouldst ordain Elders in every City. It is true that Demosthenes speaketh somewhat 
Decorond.  like words concerning the expedition of Philip, of Macedon, in Peloponesus (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) when he had ordained Tyrants in every City: but then Philip had an Army; what Army did Paul leave with Titus? or if he ordained his Elders neither of these two ways, I see no other than that only by the known and legal Chirotonia or Suffrage of the people. But if this be clear the Clergy come from Crete, not upon the wings of Titus, but of Icarus, whose ambitious wax is dissolved by the Sun.  
So much I conceive is now discovered concerning Church-government, as may show, that it was not of one, but of three kinds, each obnoxious unto the nature of the civil Government under which it was planted, in as much as the Chirotonia, or ballot of Israel being first introduced pure, and without any mixture, as at the Ordination of Mathias, came aftewards to receive some mixture of the Chirothesia, as in the ordination of Stephen, and last of all by excluding the people to degenerate wholly into the Chirothesia of the Presbytery, as in the ordination of Timothy; all this by the testimony of Scripture, and in the purest times, even the age of the Apostles. Whence my undertaking to show that as Christ intended his Doctrine should be preached unto all Nations, so he intended his Discipline should be such as might suit with any Government, (as indeed if the choice of any of these three be lawful, it doth exactly) is I hope performed. For where the Government is popular, it is the same with the first, where it is Aristocratical or Monarchical, it agrees with the last, and where it is mixed, it is between both, and responsible unto the second. Of these three in the further exercise of their natural and intended compliance with humane prudence, it may be convenient to give some fuller Exemplification.  
That any other Ordination than that of the first kind for the original Authority or practice of it whether in the Commonwealth of Israel or in the Church of Christ, and indeed for the prerogative of the same in nature should have been introduced by the Apostles, where it might, much less where the nature of the civil Policy would admit of no other, is neither propable by Scripture nor Reason; whence it is that in the Cities of Lyeaonia and Pisidia, the Government of these being then Popular, we do not find any mention at all of the Chirothesia, the Apostles in these places (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Chirotonizing Elders in every Congregation.  
To evade this place, our Adversaries turn tails to the 
§ 3.  things, and make their whole flight at the words. In taking one of them into the disputation, I shall take in all, for they run all upon the same quotations, or with little addition.  
That the word Chirotonizing, (saith Doctor Hamond) in this place signifies no more than Ordaining by the Imposition of Hands, is not so generally acknowledged by late Writers, but that it may be useful to give some few Testimonies out of those Wtiters which were nearest the times of the Scripture. Thus Philo Judaeus of Joseph (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) he was ordained Governor of all Egypt under the King. So again of Moses (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) he was constituted their Ruler. So of Aaron's sons (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) God constituted them Priests. Alexander son of Antiochus Epiphanes writes to Jonathan 
Joseph. An. L. 13. C. 5.  (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) we (in the regal stile) constitute thee High Priest. Lucian says of Hephestion (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) that Alexander made him a God when he was dead. Appian (which is added out of Grotius whence most of the rest is taken) to signify Election of Magistrates made by the Roman Emperors uses no other word; and later Writers speak of some that were chirotonized Emperors by their Fathers. For the use of the word among Christian Writers take one place in the Author of the Constitutions 
L. 7. C. 45.  for many; Clement after the death of Linus (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) was ordained Bishop of Rome by Peter. But what need 
Acts 10. 41.  any more, Christ's Disciples are said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) designed or foreconstituted by God the witnesses of his Resurrection: by all which that of Paul & Barnabas (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) is but constituting or creating Elders in every Church. Wherefore they that have looked so far back to the Original, as to think it necessary to render the word to create by suffrages, are sure guilty of very impertinent nicety. I promise you had this been against one of our Doctors, it might have been a rude charge; but it is but against Erasmus, Beza, Diodati, and such as took upon them to translate the Switz, French, Italian, Belgic, and (till the Episcopal correction) the English Bibles. And what apparent cause is there of such confidence? What necessity is there even in the places alleged why the word Chirotonia should be understood in the sense imposed? The People of Egypt till having sold their Lands they came to lose their Popular balance, were not servants unto Pharaoh, wherefore when Joseph was made Governor over all Egypt they were sree, now that a King should make a Governor of a free People without their consent, or some advice as we say of his Parliament, is altogether impropable, the rather because a Protector in the absence or minority of the King hath been no otherwise made in England, nor pretendeth the present Protector unto any other title than the like Chirotonia. But that Moses is said by the same Author (who affirmed that he introduced the Chirotonia in Israel) to have been Chirotonized Ruler of the People, can in my judgement be no otherwise than originally and literally taken, seeing God himself was no otherwise made King in Israel than by the suffrage of the People. That the like must be understood of the Sons of Aaron hath been already shown. The Doctor is the first hath told me, that the plural number for the royal stile is so ancient as Epiphanes: Sure I am it was not derived from his Macedonian Predecessors, for in the Letters to the Athenians and the Thebans recited by Demosthenes, Philip of Macedon 
De Cor.  writes in the singular number. But the Letter of Epiphanes to Jonathan must it seems import that he at single hand (though the words carry double) had Chirotonized an High Priest of the Jews: Who can help it? Some Princes have not only given out that their Priests have been chirotonized when they were not, but that themselves have been Chirotonized when there was no such matter. When a Prince says that he was Chirotonized or Elected by the People, to talk of Rhetoric is to have none. Divines in this case commonly understand it to be proper, or literally meant, for to impose a new sense is to spoil the word, and spoil the word, spoil the Prince. Lucian is a droll and intends a jest, but not so good an one, as that he of all other should come nearest to help up with an Heirarchy. For the Chirotonia or Election of the Roman Magistrates by the suffrage of the People or of the Army, every man knows that it is literal; Suidas himself interpreting the word by this very example; where he affirms it to signify Election or Ratification by the many. The quotation out of the Constitutions, with those of Bishop Bilson, and others out of the Greek Fathers, and out of Councils, do not only imply the word Chirotonia, but the thing, while they all relate unto that kind of Ordination, which being in those Churches yet administered as at the Ordination of Stephen, was not conferred without the consent of the People. But it is above all, that labouring to prove the Chirotonia and the Chirothesia, to be the same thing, they should rely most upon the place where the Apostles are said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to have been fore-chirotonized by God; as if it were clear in this, that God ordained the Apostles by the laying on of Hands, for so it must be understood, or it makes no more for them, than for us. Or if they mean it only to show that the word Chirotonia or suffrage is used for some Ordination that cannot be taken in our sense; so the word Chirothesia (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) or laying on of Hands, where Ananias being neither Bishop nor Ptesbyter but only a Disciple, that is a Christian, lays his Hands upon Paul, is used for some Ordination that cannot be taken in their sense; or a man not Ordained may Ordain as well as they, for to say that the call was extraordinary where the like is, or is pretended, will avail little. But there is no need that we should go so near the wind; wherefore to give them all these places in their own sense, even till we come to the Cities in question. What word in any Language is not sometimes nay frequently used in some other than the proper sense? With what elegance, if this be forbidden, can any man write or speak? Is a word like a Woman that being taken with a Metaphor, it can never be restored unto the Original Virtue? If Chirotonia have (as Divines pretend) lost all other but their signification, how shall we understand it in Isaiah or where Paul speaks it of the Brother (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) 
2 Cor. 8. 19  Chirotonized, or chosen by the Churches? Certainly in this one place at least it is of our sense, and in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it is but once yet in all the New Testament of any other, so that if we gain the place in controversy, we have it twice of our sense in Scripture for once not in theirs, but in any other; and in humane Authors, they will not so much as pretend to have it once for them of an hundred times for us; which is pretty well for the vindication of the propriety of one word, and somewhat more perhaps than can be done for another. But in the sense of words that are sometimes properly and sometimes improperly taken, may we admit of the things whereof they are spoken for Interpreters? Or if Lilies and Roses have been almost as often said of Lady's Cheeks, must we understand them no otherwise when we are speaking of Gardens?  
Yes says Doctor Hamond, and therefore to say of the Apostles Paul and Barnabas, that they created elders by their own suffrages, is no w●re than to say that they jointly did create, and indeed being but two, there could be no place for suffrages, and to affirm they did it by the suffrages of others, is not agreeable to the pretended use of the word, for where it is used of choosing by suffrages, as when the people are said to Chirotonize, it is certain that their own, and not others suffrages are meant by it.  
It were hardly possible to have contrived a greater number of 
His own words to Mr. Hobbs. § 118.  Affirmations inso small a compass, nor to have gone farther in them from all truth. Phrases as words are to be understood according unto the Rule and Law of Speech, which is use, and thus that the Apostles created Elders by their own suffrage, is not said, that they did it by the suffrage of others, is necessarily employed; as also that the people are understood to chirotonize as well when it is said of the Precedents of their Assemblies, as of themselves.  Diruit, aedificat, mutat quadratarotundis. 
When a man is said to build an House, or marry a Daughter, he is not understood to be the Mason, of the Brides-groom; But the Apostles built Churches in these Cities, therefore the people were not the Masons. The Apostles married Christ unto these Nations, therefore the people gave not their consent or suffrage! what a construction were this, in-ordinary discourse or writing, and yet in the language (as I may say) of a Commonwealth the phrase is more usual. How often doth Demosthenes speak of his Laws, (see my Psephisma, peruse my Law) and those of other private men: after 
De Coron.  which Copy the Par●è, or Laws in the Commonwealth of Venice, are called by the names of the Proposers, as were those of Rome, Rupilia, Cornelia, Tr●bonia, in which manner we have Poynings Laws▪ and some Statutes bearing no other Style than Enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, which nevertheless are known to have been all Enacted by the Parliament. Thus the Laws of Moses Rhadamanthus, Minos, Lycurgus, S●lon, Romulus, King Edward, were (leges & consuetudines quas vulgus elegerit) such as the people had confirmed or chosen by their Chirotonia. But they may say granting you this use of speech in relation unto Laws, what have you of this kind for Elections? The exception is nice, but to leave none.  
The High Sheriffs in England proposing unto their Counries the Names of such as stand, are said to Elect Parliament men. They that thus propose Competitors unto the Great Council in Venice are called Electors, and said to elect the Magistrates. The Proedris certain Magistrates to whom it belonged to put the question in the Representative of the people of Athens consisting of one thousand, were said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) 
Demost. cont. Timocrat.  to give or make the suffrage. The Thesmothetae who were Precedents at the creation of Magistrates were said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to chirotonize the Generals. Josephus 
Pol. l. 8. c. 8.  renders those words of God unto Samuel, Harken unto the voice of the people (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) 
Ant. l. 6. c. 4.  I command thee to chirotonize them a King, which Authors vindicating Luke for his understanding, both of the Grecian customs, and propriety of speech, at each of which he was expert, come up unto the full and genuine interpretation of the place in controversy, where Paul and Barnabas (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Chirotonizing them Elders in every Congregation, can be no otherwise understood than that they here, as Moses at the institution of the Sanhedrim; Samuel at the Election of the King; the Proedris at the passing of Laws; the Thesmothetae at the creation of Magistrates; the Electors in the great Council of Venice; and the High Sheriffs in the Counties of England, were no more than Precedents of that Chirotonia, which was given or made by the suffrage of the people.  
Wherefore the Greek is thus rendered by these several Translations of the Bible. 
That of Zurich. 
When they had created them Elders by suffrages in every Congregation.  That of Beza. 
When they had created them Elders by suffrages in every Congregation.  The French. 
When by the advice of the Assemblies they had established Elders.  The Italian. 
When by the advice of the Congregation they had constituted them Elders.  That of Diodati. 
When they had ordained them in every Church by the common votes of the Elders.  That appointed by the Synod of Dort. 
When in each Church by the holding up of Hands they had Elected Presbyters.  That used in England from the time of the Reformation, until the Episcopal correction of the same. 
When they had ordained them Elders by Election in every Congregation.    
Indeed the circumstance of the place forbids any other construction of the words, for if the suffrage or Chirotonia, (which were scarce sense) related unto the Apostles only, what needed they have done that in every Congregation, or Church, which they might have done in any Chamber or closet? The circumstance of the action forbids any other construction, for the people were assembled upon occasion of Election or creation of Officers, which thing doth not use to be done in Assemblies gathered for Divine service; besides these Congregations were not always of one mind, but sometimes for sacrificing unto the Apostles, sometimes for stoning them, which are acts of power; wherefore they were political Assemblies. Now these consisting also of a people that had in their Cities (quandam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) the government, of themselves, hence ariseth the strongest circumstance of all, forbidding any interpretation of the Text, that might exclude them from election of their own Magistrates, Priests, or Ecclesiastical Elders, such as had been the Asiarches, though Heathen Prelates, yet remembered by the Scriptures as affectionate 
Acts 19 31.  Friends unto Paul, or such as were those, though to a better end, now ordained by the Apostles. Wherefore Grotius, notwithstanding all the art he useth in other places to avoid this sense, giving his note upon the Text yields; though chirotonizing may be said of any Election made by one, or by the Few: yet to the Election in this place it is probable that the consent of the people was given, no less being employed in the beginning of the Chapter, where the Multitude believed, where they were stirred up, where they were evil affected, and where part held with the jews, and part with the Apostles. Which shows that the people were active in the business. But says Doctor Seaman, There is difference between the consent of the people▪ and the power of the people, which is not to understand the case in controversy, nor to take notice that the people whereof we are speaking were under popular Government, for where ever the people are under popular Government, between that which is done by their consent, and that which is done (jussu populi) by their power, there is no difference. How should the people give their consent but by their suffrage? or what difference, where they have power, can there be between the suffrage, and the power of the people?  
Doctor Hamond upon this point is far more quainct, where the Scripture saith that the multitude were evil affected, and where part held with the jews, and part with the Apostles, he thinks it e'en like enough. But where it is said that a great multitude of the Jews, and also of the Greeks believed; he seemeth to have no opinion of it. For saith he, It is evident 
§ 134  that Believers were at first but few in every Town or City, they were not whole Corporations at once converted, nor consequently could they act in a common capacity: But as Clemens Romanus saith, they that were by the Apostles constituted Bishops and Deacons in several Cities and Regions, were constituted over those that should after believe, there were oft so few at the present. And then as fast as any did come into the Faith, they readily submitted themselves to those by and under whom they did come in, and were not at all troubled (honest men) with the consultation or deliberation about the way of electing their Teachers and Guides.  
Come away; to leave the Scripture a while, and follow Clemens, be it so for discourse sake that in those days there was no where any such thing as a great multitude believing, much less whole States or Commonwealths at once converted, whereby they might still act in a common capacity, but only some private or gathered Congregations or Churches, and that in such it was the Apostles Paul and Barnabas chirotonized: yet these as they were found, or as afterwards they came to be made, must of necessity have been Corporatioos, for what can a number of Men coming into a Society regulated by certain Laws, Constitutions, or form be but a Corporation? Some Ecclesiastical policy or discipline they must have had: and that probably seeing the greatest Legislators, even Moses himself) have written after Copies, according unto some pattern, what was this pattern? and whence came it?  
Why saith he, not from their Heathen customs, but from 
§ 125.  the Metropolis; for it must be remembered that wheresoever the Gospel was preached, it came originally from jerusalem, and then 
§ 135.  as Agrippa in Philo saith of that City, it was the Metropolis not only of judea, but many other Regions, because of the Colonies thence sent into Egypt, Phenice, and both the Syria's; nay to Pamphilia, Celicia, and a great part of Asia, as far as Bythinia and Pontus. So in reason the Churches in Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch, where Paul and Barnabas ordained Elders were to follow the pattern at jerusalem, and there We know it was not by the suffrage of the people, that an Elder was assumed into the Sanhedrim, but the Prince or head of the Sanhedrim received him in by Imposition of Hands; it will be much more reasonable to deduce the circumstances of ordaining Elders from the customs familiar unto them that preached the Faith unto them, than from the former usages of them, to whom it was preached, who were not to dispute, but to believe and receive the institutions as well as Doctrines which were brought them.  
These me thinks are strange arguments; the Gospel came to us from Rome, is Rome therefore the Metropolis of England? It is true Agrippa being a Jew, and writing unto Caligula in the behalf of the Jews▪ not of the Christians, tells him, That jerusalem is the Metropolis of the jews, and of all their Colonies; so is London of the English, and of all their 
Philo delegatitione ad Cajum.  Colonies; but doth it follow from hence that either Jerusalem, or London is the Metropolis of Christendom? But the Jews▪ had many Colonies in Asia, and therefore the Churches of Lystra, Iconinm, and Antioch were to follow the pattern at Jerusalem. The Jews indeed had Synagogues in Iconium and Lystra, as the French have Churches in England, but is this a good argument, the French have Churches in England, therefore the English are to follow the orders of the French Church? The Jews withstood the Gospel at Iconium, for saith the Text, The multitude of the City was divided, and part 
Acts 14. 4.  he●d with the jews, and part with the Apostles: therefore the believing Iconians must have acknowledged Jerusalem to be their Metropolis, and were to follow the pattern of that City. And what was that? why there we know it was not by the suffrages of the people that an Elder was assumed into the Sanhedrim, but the Prince or head of the Sanhedrim received him in by Imposition of Hands. The Government of the Iconians was popular, that of the Jews was Aristoeratical; therefore the Iconians receiving the Christian Faith, were bound to change their Democracy into Aristocracy. The Apostles to comply with an Oligarchy, had altered that ordination, which originally (as at the election of Mathias) was popular unto Aristocracy; therefore being now to plant the Gospel in a free State, they might not alter it from Aristocracy to Democracy: to please the Jews they might change for the worse, therefore to please the Iconians they might not change for the betrer, but must tell the people plainly that they were not to dispute, but to believe and receive the institutions as well as Doctrines that were brought them from the Metropolis. How would this found unto a people that understood themselves!  Sic volo sic juheo stat proratione voluntas. 
The right temper of a Metropolitan, to whom Popular power is an Heathen eustome, and with whom nothing will agree but Princing of it in the Senate. But with the Apostles it was otherwise, who making no words of the Chirothesia where it was needless, were glad of this occasion to Chirotonize, or elect them Elders in every Congregation by Popular fuffrage. But this (they will say) is not to come off from the haune, but to run still upon the People in a common or public capacity. Though the Scripture speak of great multitudes believing, believe it there was no such thing; Clemens saith they were very few, their Assemblies private, and very scanty things. As private as they were, by the judgement of Divines they were it seems to receive from their pattern (if that were the Sanhedrim) a form that was public enough, and why might not they have received this from that public from whereunto they were accustomed, rather than from a Foreign Policy, and one contrary to their customs? why should they suffer such power in new and private, as they would not endure in their old and public Magistrates? or if they received the Scriptures, why should they choose that Ordination which would fit them worst rather that which would fit them best? That of Timothy, rather than that of Mathias? Or let their Assemblies have been never so private or scanty, yet if the Apostles Chirotonized th●m Elders in every Congregation, Is it not demonstrable that they did receive that of Mathias, and not that of Timothy?  
Thus much for the Propagation of the pure or first kind of Ecclesiastical Policy unto the Cities of Lycaonia. The mixed or second kind into which (the Christian Presbytery delighting to follow the steps of the Jewish) the former might soon degenerate, continued in the primitive Church (to speak with the least, for Wall●us brings it down to Charles the Great) three hundred years after Christ; which Assertion in Mr. Hobbs proved out of Amianus Marcellinus, Doctor Hamond hath either willingly overseen, or includes in this Answer, it is most visibly void of all appearance of truth. Wherefore to the quotation mentioned, I 
§ 138.  shall add the words of Platina. Damasus the second by Nation a Bravarian surnamed Bagniarius, or as some will Popo; possessed himself of the Papacy by force, and without consent of the Clergy and of the People. Now what can be clearer than that by this place the Clergy and the People had hitherto right to elect the Pope? The Doctor comes near the word of defiance unto Mr. Hobbs, in a matter of fact so apparent unto any judgement that I need not add what goes before in the life of Clement the second, where the Emperor engageth the People of Rome not to meddle with the Election of the Pope without his express Command: nor what follows after in Leo the ninth, where the whole power of Election was now conferred by the Emperor upon ihe Clergy. Again Victor the second, (saith the same Author) obtained the Papacy rather by favour of the Emperor, than by free suffrages of ihe Clergy and the People of Rome, who apprehended the power of the Emperor whose displeasure they had sometime incurred by Creating Popes: So than the People, (it is clear) had hitherto created the Popes. The power of Election thus in the whole Clergy came afterwards, as at this day, to be restrained unto the Cardinals only; and so to devolve into the third kind of Ordination exactly correspondent unto the Sanhedrim and their Chirothesia, as it was exereised among the converted Jews, when Timothy was Ordained by the laying on of the Hands of the Presbytery.  
Now this is that with which of all others Divines are so enamoured, that they will not endure it should he said there is any other: It is also propitious above all the rest unto Monarchy, as that which according unto the inherent nature or impotence of Oligarchy, must have a Prince at home or abroad to rest upon or become the inevitable prey of the People. Herein lies the Arcanum or secret of that Antipathy, which is between a Clergy and a Popular Government, and of that sympathy which is between the Mitre and the Crown. A Prince receiving a Clergy with the Monopoly of their Chirothesia, hath no more to do than to make a Metrapolitan, by whom he governs them, and by them the People, especially if he endow them with good Revenues, for so they become an Estate of his Realm, and a more steady Pillar of his Throne than his Nobility themselves, who as their dependence is not so strong, are of a more stirring nature. This is the Gothick Model from whence we had our Pattern, and in which No Bishop, no King.  
Thus for the dignity of Ecclesiastical Policies, whether in Scripture or Humane Prudence, Popular Government you see is naturally inclined unto the very best, and the spiritual Aristocracy unto the very worst. It is also remarkable that the Political balance extends itself unto the decision of the question about Ordination. For as a People never offered to dispute with a well balanced Clergy, so a Clergy dis-mounted never gained any thing by disputing with the People. As to the question of Empire, or Government, (I Propheti disarmati Rovivano) The Apostles became all▪ things unto all.  
Thus beyond all measure improsperous are this Divines undertake 
His own words to Mr. Hobbs▪ § 122.  against Mr. Hobbs, and the undertake of Divines upon this Subject.   
FINIS.   

Advertisement to the Reader, or Direction to the Answerer.  
THe Answer of this Book must lie in proving that the Apostles at the several times and places mentioned, introduced but one way of Ordination, and that the same unto which Divines now pretend: or if the Apostles divided, that is to say introduced divers ways of Ordination, than the People or Magistrate may choose.  
I have taken the more leisure and pains to state (I think) all the cases of Controversy that can arise out of the Commonwealth of Oceana, as you have seen in these two Books, to the end that I may be no more obliged to write; and yet not omit Writing upon any occasion that shall be offered, for if my Principles be overthrown (which when I see I shall most ingenuously confess with thanks unto the Author) such an acknowledgement will lie in a little room; and this failing, I am deceived if I shall not now be able to show any Writer against me that his Answer is none, within the compass of three or four Sheets.  
This also will be the fittest way for Boys play, with which I am sure enough to he entertained by the quibbling University men, I mean a certain busy Ging of them, who having publicly vaunted that they would bring forty examples against the balance, and since laid their Caps together about it, have not produced one. These vaunts of theirs offering prejudice unto truth, and good Principles, were the cause why they were indeed pressed to show some of their skill; not that they were thought fit Judges of these things, but first that they had declared themselves so, and next that they may know they are not.   

The Errors of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
FOr Sanhedrin read Sanhedrim, this error 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place, for Sindas' p. 1. l. 4. r. Suidas, for stand p▪ 21●l●3●. ●▪ stayed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Zotertha p. 27. l. 29. r. Zotertha, for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 24. l. 39 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, page 28. l. 34. deal Also, for Golthick p. 49. r. Gothick, for Christonia p. 50. r. Chirotonia, for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 26. l. 45. ●. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 26. l. 32. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for Council p. 56▪ l. 26. r. Consul, for the p. 54. l. 26. r. ye.