THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED PROVINCES, In the restitution of the KING Of ENGLAND: Declared upon occasion of the present war with the English REBELLS.  
Anno M.DC.LIII.   

The interest of the UNITED PROVINCES in the restitution of the KING of ENGLAND: Declared upon occasion of their present liquor with the English Rebells.  
I will not meddle with the question, how far Princes and States are bound to succour their oppressed Neighbours, or to prosecute with war the Enemies of Religion, Gouvernment, and human Society: which may receive a different solution according to the variety of circumstances, and the condition of their own affairs: But this may be laid for a ground; that the concurrence of any to the confirmation of the usurped power of such persons, must be very unlawful to Christians. Among civill Heathens, not only sacrilege against their Gods, but Injustice against their Neighbours were the sole occasion of divers great wars, as we find related by Historians; they holding themselves bound, without reason of State, to the vindication of profanation, and relief of the oppressed: And it were to be wished, that here in Christians were not behind them, having more apparent obligations by divine revelation, then those Heathens by light of nature: And it frequently falls out, that while men look only at home to their own Commodity, and neglect the Calamity of their Neighbours, and think, prudence directs them to their own good, and to oversee the considerations of Piety, and Charity, they derive the same evil upon themselves, which they securely permitted to be exercised on others. The greatest scourges of the world have arisen from such security, while Princes and States respected not the growth of some desperate lewd persons by the ruin of their Neighbours. The Saracens,( and since the turk) are in most mens knowledge. And the supine neglect of Princes, that introduced the sufferings of christendom; and their own ruin in those times, by the growth of such Destroyers, are better remembered then remedied. It's now evident to most Princes and States, that it hath been more agreeable to Religion, Iustice and Prudence, that they had vigorously acted in suppressing the English Rebellion, and the effects of it are worse upon themselves, then they foresaw: especially upon the States of the low countries, who now discern, that by this usurped aristocratical power of a few, the ancient national affection between the Dutch and English is quiter abolished, in as much as respects the governing Party In England; and the Interest of Trade so far prosecuted, that the now English Rulers take it for granted, that their new power in England cannot continue, unless the Dutch be their vassals, and that it is impossible they should have a Trade proportionable to their new modeled State, while the Dutch enjoy the former freedom of Trade, they had with the Monarchy: And none, that look into the Actions of the English Rebells, can conceive the war begun by them proceeded from private choler or animosity, without predesigne upon reason of State, if either the strength of each be considered, or the councells that their condition must suggest to them: First the English consider, that all Trade to the South and West must be more difficult to the Dutch then the English, the passage being through the narrow Seas, where the English have so great advantages by their natural situation, and will be able to Trade with less danger, and with less charge annoy the Trade of the Dutch, then they can secure it: for the English Harbours give them the opportunity of all advantages to fight, or forbear. The English can better suffer a diminution of Trade, in regard of the largeness of their Territory, and a greater store of all necessaries within the land: And the excessive charge which the Dutch must be at to secure their Trade will eat it up. Upon these grounds the English Rebells found themselves, that the issue of the war must be to their advantage. That it is necessary for them to have a war, not only to gain a power over the Dutch, but to secure themselves; for they must of necessity keep an Army, & a fleet on foot, ruling now by force, without right by any law Divine, or human, a people wholly disaffected to their power, and to be kept under only by a Rod of Iron. They discern their fleet cannot be maintained by themselves, but by the pillage of the Dutch, who they intend shall bear their charges, there being no Nation else, that they can with more opportunity serve themselves of in that kind, the Spanish Trade being not yet to be given over by the English, which is the chiefest that is left their Marchants, and the French being of far less importance to them, then the Dutch. These considerations overweigh with those Rebells, that apprehended their strength by Sea, and Land, and the Victories, and Military inclination of their Armies, all thoughts of the opportunities, that the Dutch can give to break their power. The war being begun, and upon these grounds, I dare not advice, but give you my conceptions, wherein I shall not dissent from the common opinion, that the most probable way, to preserve the low countries, and to make the war short, and prosperous, is to declare for the Interest of the King of England: And though this way may look like a motion proceeding from the affection of a loyal Englishman towards his Prince, yet it, will appear to be drawn from reasons of the Dutch condition. First take the business in general as it is a State of war, all means possible are to be used to disunite the enemy, and contract all Alliances possible for defence: And touching the first, there is no means so prevalent to disunite the English, and to divert their forces, as the Dutch to declare for the King: for as all those in His three kingdoms, that have Loyalty left, will contribute all they can to the King: and to such Princes and States as assist Him: so many neutral, and indifferent persons, in those kingdoms, will not then account the war a national quarrel, as yet they understand it, but the interest of the Rebells only, whence the rapture in England will be wider, and more to their ruin, for there by all the grievances for want of Trade in England, and oppressions to maintain their war will be cast on the true causers, and the people of England will lay hold on the advantage presented for their release, whereas at present many English have a great animosity against the Dutch for not declaring for the King, having so clear an occasion, and they interpret it as a disaffection to the King and the English Nation, now languishing under a sore oppression, and the Dutch only seek how to serve themselves without consideration, or sense of their sad sufferings. If the Kings cause were owned by them, many, as well Sea-men, as others in His three kingdoms, would employ themselves on the Seas to make prise of the trading English, which now they do not in regard of the doubt they have of the intention of these countries for the King, and there would there upon follow a great want of Sea-men in England, and such, as served, would be suspected by them, and not without cause: And the losses the English would sustain by such English Sea-men, and others, as would employ themselves in ships of war, would be greater then the Fleets set out of Holland doth them. The assistance from foreign Princes would be better procured, & more surely retained, for they are more sensible of the perfidious proceedings of the Rebells against their King and country, then of the losses of the Dutch, and they are doubtful to embark themselves in a war with the Dutch, when they profess no other end then Retorsion for their losses, which is no other, then Letters of reprisal, and will not believe, that the United Provinces have a thorough resolution to make war against the Rebells in England, until they shall see that the King of England be taken in by them, whose Interest is so very necessary to the good success of that war: and most Princes will sooner be invited before the Dutch have received a loss then after, and the Dutch danger is greater in a loss, then their advantage in a Victory; The one being a ruin to their Trade: The other not a full security: And most men conclude from the not declaring for the King, that the Dutch will be content to have peace, even on very hard conditions, while the King is not owned, nor such Alliances made as might remonstrate they intended to try the event of a war. The Rebells of England likewise make the same collections from the forbearance of the States of the Netherlands to take in the King into their quarrel, and take it to be a fear to provoke them too far, or a fear, that the King may prejudice their affairs. For the first, the Dutch, in all reason, ought to remove that conceit, for there cannot be a greater encouragement to an enemy, then to know, that his enemy fears him, whence their Souldiers take heart, and such as love them not, who are in power, for fear dare not now profess, or act against them. It cannot be expected, that any strangers should so Passionately enter into a war against those Rebells upon the Injuries they have done the Netherlands, as upon the horrid Regicide and many murders, barbarisms, and vaillaines that they have acted to gain their power, which hath made them odious to all good Christians and honest men: And it must needs prove a violent motive to any to act in a war, when the impieties of the enemy are more prevalent then private Interest. Many of those in the very Provinces themselves, that fight in the war, being not so sensible of the losses of others, that have been robbed by the Rebells, as of the wickedness they have committed at home. And if the States declare for the King, it may be reasonably presumed, that no Prince or State will assist such odious Rebells against them, so as they will be the declared Ennemyes of mankind. Such English, as have a desire to assist the Dutch against those Rebells are loathe to adventure themselves, when they apprehended they advance not the cause of the King, nor contribute to the ruin of the Rebells, but only to a pacifiation of the hostility begun between the two Nations, which will render the condition of the English more miserable. It is not unknown to the Rebells, how great a party is still in heart for the King in the three kingdoms, nor to others by what means these Rebells seek to destroy them. And the consideration of the royal party, being by far the most numerous in the three kingdoms, is a great cause why the Rebells must have a war, and thence it must follow, that their enemies must seek to make the best advantage of that party, which will be oppressed by the Rebells during the war, and be useless to those, that have wars with them, while they declare not for the Kings Right, which that party desires only to maintain. And though the readiness of the King, party to rise did not appear at his Maj. last coming into England out of Scotland, that was not for want of will, they being surprised by the Kings sudden, and unexpected coming, whereof they had not notice till the Rebells had formed their army, placed guards in all places, and imprisoned all the principal Persons they suspected to be well affencted to his MAJESTY. I shall not offer the motives of Religion, which as it inclined Queen ELIZABETH to the succour of the United Provinces, ought not to be neglected to the King against the most scandalous Sectaries, hypocritical traitors, and bloody murtherers, that any age hath produced Nor those of honour, that those Countries apprehended the opportunity of reinvesting the King, and destroying the Rebells, & were the first declared Enemies of them upon that ground. The profit is very evident by what hath been said with this addition, that if they take in the Kings cause, there is likely to be a speedy end of the war, and all Princes, that have an Interest in the preservation of the United Provinces, must hearty engage in their assistance, where at present there is scar hope of the end of a war, and a peace would be but a snare, when on the one side its like to hold no longer then the first opportunity offers advantage in the breach of it, and would prove as ruinous as a war could be expected. Those countries have the experience of the principles of falsehood, and infidelity that these Rebells steer by, that there is no dependence on any promises, or Leagues they make, they considering only their own advantages: And if they offer to treat for peace, it is only to ly in wait to surprise those they treat with, and to make them unprovided by omitting needful preparations, or seasonable enterprizes, or losing profitable Alliances for their support. And it were an indelible infamy, if these Provinces should cast themselves into the subjection of those execrable Rebells, who will never treat with them on better terms, nor think themselves secure in any peace with them without the possession of cautionary towns. It were not reasonable that the King should make known the ways of attaining his rights, or the use he can make of his loyal subjects if an occasion were offered, until his Interest be taken into the war, for that were to make all means fruiteles, and to betray his cause, and friends to the Enemy: But it may easily find credit, when so great a part of his kingdoms are affencted to him, that there cannot want many ways, & advantages to weaken the Rebells power, and give an entrance to his right, and the peace of these Countries by the help of his Allies; And there can be no apprehension of danger from taking in the King, neither to the public, nor private persons, who may be confident of Iustice, and gratitude from him: it being a rare Example, if any Prince or his posterity hath ever forgotten so great an obligation to those, that have restored him; And they cannot think, that he willbe a cause to undermine, or subject that State, that endeavour to advance his, neither can it consist with his honour, and Interest to disunite them, or set up parties against one another. It must be his endeavour to reconcile all differences among that people, that assist him, it being the work of his Enemies to create jealosies; and disaffections beetwene his friends. And such as prefer the preservation of domestic welfare in their States before kindnesses to friends, or detestation of bloody usurpers, must conceive the same consideration in the King to set his own Interest before any personal respects: And no jealosy can fear that from him, which will not certainly be acted by his Rebells, if he be not restored. Thus have I briefly delivered you what I apprehended of the present condition of this war: and I am the more confident, that I am not swayed by Interest, or partiality, finding most men of different nations, and uningaged concur in the Conclusion. That nothing can render the war so short, not the Netherlands so strong, and safe, as the speedy joining in the cause of the King of England.  
FINIS