A DISSECTION OF ALL GOVERNMENTS: OR, An Answer to a Pamphlet, entitled, THE privileges OF THE PEOPLE, OR, Principles of Common Right and freedom, briefly laid open and asserted in two Chapters, &c.  
By W. J.  
London, Printed in the year. 1649.   

A Dissection of all Governments.  
I Shall not undertake in so short a time as is necessary for the confutation of a Pamphlet, to tyre myself and my Reader too with a punctual Answer line by line to his Paper entitled, The privileges of the People, or Principles of common Right and freedom briefly laid open and asserted in two Chapters, since I know that such an Answer must exceed the measure of a Pamphlet; and therefore I shall only anatomize all Governments as briefly and plainly as I can, that all people may have both the leisure and capacity of being my Judges, without the trouble of searching other books for the truth of my Citations.  

CHAP. I.  
THat Kings out of vanity and self-interest have frequently misapplied that power entrusted to them by God and man, I shall not at all deny( though that is not to be applied to our late renowned King neither) but if this be a rule for the abolishing of Monarchy, it will be as infallible for the dissolution of all Government, since that ambition, avarice, revenge, and all other imperfections in our natures, which may be assigned to Kings, as causes of misgovernment, are upon the same account to be expected from the natural or accidental corruption of every particular person in a number of Rulers, when they once come to the power of throwing off their disguises, and securely prosecuting their own interests. And if every private man be subject to the same corrupt will that a King is, what will this amount to in a multitude of Governours, when every one hath a distinct self-interest( as much as a King) to provide for, not only of his own Family, but of all others his friends and allies, whose fortunes must be made up out of the public stock, besides the prejudice( if not ruin) of those particular families that shall happen to have any controversies with them or any of their dependants, from the highest to the lowest. And what a transcendent tyranny this must necessary be, when every Member hath the power of a King, to delay the justice of the poor people( if not totally to obstruct it) I need go no further for an example then this present Parliament, which was a free election of as many supposed Patriots( as least enemies to Prerogative) as ever met together, and yet how soon, and to what an excess of corruption, faction, and arbitrary power they grew( even in those things they had formerly complained of) is too evident to need any proof. There are too many woeful examples of people imprisoned without hearing for Delinquents, upon the least malicious suggestion or misinformation of their factious neighbours( from whom no quiet people can be free) that have not so much as in their language appeared for the King or his Party; Besides the tiring of the poorer sort with a chargeable attendance, to the loss of their rights, for want of money or friends, or else because they must not be heard against the well-effected, that is, those of their faction and kindred. And the frequent bespeaking of Parliament-men for friends in businesses, be they right or wrong, who were quickly persuaded not only to do courtesies in that kind for their dependants, but for one another, and the active malice of one enemy to a poor plaintiff that can propose any thing to cause debates, and by consequence delay( which is the inseparable infirmity of all great Councells) shall( with the help of his faction) at any time hinder the course of Justice, if by an unjust sentence they do not rob men of their rights. To these natural( and notorious known corruptions) both in this, and all other great Councells, bribery may very well be added, since I think it will not be denied but the mayor part of mankind( if they be not positively dishonest) are to be obliquely lead unto it by hope, fear or some error of judgement, and if so, what a fine game have the dishonester( who must necessary be the craftier sort) to play, amongst a company of more plainde-aling, honest, foolish and cowardly people; we have found to our cost how well they can enrich themselves, and upon what really specious pretences, at least such as appear so to the humours of those they have to deal withall. But it will be alleged that( though a body once corrupt is not to be restored) as appears by the foulness of our present Parliament after so many purges; yet most of the foregoing inconveniences are to be prevented by due Elections and often changing of the Representatives. To this I shall give a more satisfactory Answer in it's proper place in the following Chapter. But for the present I shall only say, that I am confident that there will never be a more free and impartial Election of any Representative then was originally of this Parliament, at least whilst there is any Army in the kingdom; And yet we see how they have proved. And to say truth there is no Government in the world that is not subject to much depravation; but since the worst of Governments is a shelter from the storm of confusion,( that many headed tyranny, that bears down all property before it,) we ought undoubtedly to choose that least of evils which is freest from a general oppression, and is the best established bay or protection from that universal inundation of ruin, called the liberty( though not the property) of the people, to do what they list, and be Judges not only of their own established Judges, upon the sudden motion of any springing faction amongst them, but of all controversies amongst themselves, according to the strength of their several factions necessary growing from the inconstancy, and variety of their particular opinions and interests.  
But to conclude my Answer to this first Chapter, I think I need no farther enlarge myself; if it be granted that the avarice of one Family with its Councellors, allies and dependants of all kinds, may better be satisfied at the public charge of a kingdom, then of four hundred interests with the same appurtenances; and if it be as certain that ten men may resolve as wisely of any business as any number whatsoever,( especially in the administration of Justice according to known rules,) no doubt, for the ease of the Subject in their dispatch, the convenience is so great as almost to balance all other discommodities; besides if they must be bribed, less money will serve, as we have shewed, and they will in time be glutted, and if it be no less clear in politic affairs that( for the secret and sudden dispatch of them) the number must be reduced to a few, as appears by the State Committee at Darby-house, who have a greater trust reposed in them, and do daily act things of greater consequence to the kingdom( without giving any account of them) then all the great council besides: and if the rule be the same for the Government of an Army by a general, who is an absolute Monarch, with such of his council as he pleaseth only to call, and that the maintenance of all laws and Rights must depend upon this or some such like arbitrary power, as too sadly now appears; then I say we may clearly and safely conclude, that it holds throughout for a certain truth, that a perpetual Monarchy though with the worst of Kings, is a more easy & commodious Government, then a perpetual Parliament, or Representative, and by consequence elective and alterable, Kings are by the same measure to be preferred before a changeable Representative or Parliament. Now whether an hereditary or elective Monarchy be to be preferred, or a mixed Government, will properly be the subject of my Answer to the following Chapter, being the last, and entitled,   

Of the Peoples right in the choice, change or regulation of Government; together with the original of Kingly power, and other forms of Government.  
TO overthrow the specious structure of this Title and following Chapter, appearing so beautiful and strong, but tending indeed to the ruin of all Order and Government, and by consequence of mankind, I must begin with the rottenness of its foundation, and show how pernicious and false that maxim, which hath so fair an outside, is, that all Government are fundamentally seated in the people, which I take to be the ground of all the following assertions, and, next to self-interest, the sad cause of all the late proceedings in this kingdom, and therefore to clear it to all impartial people, I shall begin first with the Will of God shewed in his first foundation for the good of man, directly oppotsie to this principle, though he hath permitted a kind of forms of Government since, as he hath allowed other miseries and confusions to fall upon us for our chastisement, the better to convince our extravagant fancies and inclinations, and reduce us to what he first thought fit for us; and next I shall make it appear in reason impossible to be a wholesome or a true maxim. And to begin with the Creation of the world, I think no man will deny, but that it was as consistent with Gods infinite goodness, and as easy for him, to have created a world of people at once, as one single Adam, had he not foreseen the turbulent factiousnesse and inconstancy of mans nature, tending to the alteration of all good things, and the destruction of one another; and therefore to prerent this confusion till their sins should more justly draw it upon them, be made one single man the possessor of the whole world, that( besides that Princely right) he might be the better confirmed in the monarchical Government of the people that were to spring from him, by being a Father to them both in nature and experience. Behold here( all ye seekers of rapine and confusion under the shadow of liberty) this great and primitive work of your Creator for man before he had offended him. Wherein you so evidently perceive( not by his words in Parables) but the most universal of his actions, that this God of order intended man for his Image as well in monarchical Government a● in his personal resemblance. And( if we believe that what he in his providence hath most generally thought fit in all Ages, ought conscientiously to be so received by us) it is as notorious that the Fathers of the people after Adam, from whom so many Nations sprung, were absolute Monarchs; and that the generality of Governments even to this day have continued the same, except when he was pleased to scourge the world with the conquests and oppressions of the romans, or would show his people the effects of their levity, presumption, and crimes. Certainly any man that believes that the fall of a leaf is not without his particular providence, must necessary be convinced by these evidences, especially when he hath in the Scripture given even to heathen Kings, as Cyrus and others, the attribute of his anointed, which is a mark of his favour that will hardly be found for any other Government: But since all this will be nothing to those of our present Rulers, that believe the Bible to be but a good Romance, as most of them have shewed by their actions, and some by their expressions, it will be necessary to offer at a little reasoning with them, the nature and difference between the elective and changeable Government they aim at, with the power of the people therein, and a hereditary Monarchy.  
And the better to make good my assertions by a chain of undeniable consequences; I must begin with the original necessity of order and superiority; since it must be granted that the very word Government( in the best sense) must be an insupportable found to the freedom of mans nature, if we could live without it. But since men were made with minds as different as their faces, and that self-love and interest is the most natural and predominant of all mans thoughts & inclinations, and inseparable from any, which no other affection in us is, it must certainly follow without a Government, that the good and ill natures, more or less, must one with another be subject to murder, rob, deceive, and prejudice one another in all kinds that they can; for the ill dispositions would do it for their recreations, as well as interest; and the good in their own defence, as finding so many oppressors, and by consequence having reason to suspect all, would be apt to strike first, to prevent the blow of another; and must, being robbed of all, do it for their sustenance, and so, through suspicion and hatred springing from necessity and perpetual provocations, and the habit and fashion of doing ill, the best and worst would grow alike, were they not limited by Religion and Government; And so every mans neighbour would be as great a tyrant and enemy to his property as can be imagined. For this reason, as my adversary hath very well observed, were Kings found necessary by our Ancestors to protect them from these violences; As Tully( whom he cites) hath very well expressed, though Tully, being a Heathen, rather supposed them to have been elected, then as I have expressed, according to holy Writ, hereditary. But because, in the very next line, our opposite gives us so proper an example of the corruption of an elective King, I shall give it you in his own words.( We have an instance out of Herodian Clio, where the Medes revolting from the Assyrians choose one Detoces for their King, a man of supposed strictness and equity in preventing disorders and abuses amongst them. But this remedy in time proved as bad as the disease; so that the people were forced to seek protection under several Rulers which they missed under one.) These are his words. But he tells us not whether they found it under several Rulers, nor how long they enjoyed it. But, for Deioces whom they choose, I suppose they thought him a man of as much integrity as cronwell in the Armies opinion; and yet power corrupted him; and that a number of four hundred must have more corruption amongst them then can be in one, though the worst of men, I think I have already sufficiently proved. But to proceed to the nature of elections in general, though we have found a great deal of calmness in them here, by reason that a Parliament-man was not a considerable preferment whilst they were Representors only, and not Judges of the peoples grievances, yet they are notoriously known to be fountains of as great corruption, faction, confusion and bloodshed as can be in the world; especially in the choice of Kings, without there be a perpetual standing Army to make an arbitrary decision of such controversies; and whether that remedy be as bad as the disease I need not at all dispute. But otherwise, the chargeable preparation of their factions to come glorious and strong to the place of Election, with the maintenance of them there, proves an expense and prejudice to their private fortunes, that must be made good out of the public stock when they are chosen; and what clashing there is of the pretenders to a Government with their friends and followers at such a time, hath been so evident in Poland and other places, that we may well conclude, that every one of them threatens the greatest misery that can happen to a Nation, I mean a civill War: and how few of these Rulers prove the men of merit they at first pretended to be, we have too many examples, besides the forementioned Deioces: and indeed it is not to be expected from them, because besides the charges of getting to their places, they are to provide, whilst they may, for the perpetual support of their families in that height of luxury that their greatness hath raised them unto; and if we consider our Elections of Parliament-men in England, we shall find, that one is chosen for placing some few gifts well, another because he keeps a good house, a third, because he is a good hypocrite, and preaches well; a fourth, because he is rich, a fift, because he can be drunk with all his neighbours, a sixth, merely because he is a fool, and therefore thought an honest man; but the greater part because they are of the kindred or faction of those that have then the chief power in the Nation, whilst the more learned and modest sort that despise the vanity of popularrity and turbulent factiousnesse, and apply themselves to the philosophical consideration of virtues out of fashion, are neither understood, nor so much as thought of; and that this ever hath been, and ever will be so, is as certain, as that the greatest part of the world, especially of the common people, are fools. And a changeable Representative chosen by, and framed out of the common people, as they are for the most part like to be, will be the same, if not a worse burden then I have already proved a perpetual Parliament: But to begin with what is to be said in their behalf, all that I know of it is, that they will not have time to grow into factions, and shuffle the Knaves together, nor dare they be so dishonest, because their reign is but short, and they may be called to an account for their misdemeanours. But I answer, that suppose they sit but six moneths, one of these six will be long enough for the worse sort by many circumstances, and the manner of proceedings, to understand each other, if they were not before acquainted with their persons or Characters; and then have they the other five moneths to be corrupt in, with greater temptations of wickedness, then if they were to sit longer: First, because they have reason, according to their own interest, and the Proverb, to make hay whilst the Sun shines, especially those of the meaner sort, that have no other hopes, and nothing to lose: and there will be at once more real causes for the delay of justice, and far better pretences; As first, the newness of business, which requires some time to be understood: And next, the multiplicity, which will give them a very plausible pretence of receiving several complaints, together with a seeming zeal to dispatch all, though really to put off one business with another, by raising several debates, and concluding nothing till the end of their Sessions, and so they may thrive by under-hand bribes that can never be proved against them, and leave the same businesses to their Successors, who must be anew informed, and may play the same game over again: So that it is evident there will be more real causes of delay, and more temptations and excuses for corruption in a short, then a lasting Representative; and if so palpable an unjust sentence should be given, as would admit of no interpretation or excuse, which seldom or never happens, who should punish them for it? Certainly, the next Representative would never( for their own sakes) make the corruptness and insufficiency of their Jurisdiction so notorious, as to go beyond the ordinary method of a Repeal of the unjust act or sentence; or if they would proceed to punishment, they would scarce be able to execute it against a whole Representative without a civill war, especially when half the old Assembly shall be sitting in this new one, to interrupt both the sentence and execution of it; so that I think it sufficiently appears, that this changeable council is as uncontrouleable and otherwise more inconvenient then the perpetual one: I am sure they may go together with this note upon them, that every particular person in them hath a sufficient power to oppress, but they must all join together to do a good turn, and then are very slowly and chargably to be drawn to it too; and for elective Kings, they are by our Adversaries own instance, as well as by the reasons already alleged, a remedy as bad as the disease of a foreign Government was to the Medes; so that our next refuge must be to a mixed Government for the redress of our grievances, and if that failes us, we shall appeal to the people, and so come home again: But to explain the meaning of a mixed form, I must except against the subordination either of King to Parliament, or Parliament to King; for where that is, the absolute arbitrary power so complained of on both sides, will remain in the Supreme, and so it cannot be properly a mixed Government; but it is to be termed mixed, when these two powers have either an equal Jurisdiction together, or by turns to rule and call each other to an account, and either of these are very fine things in speculation; but absolutely certain to be as inconsistent with all Order and Government in the practise, as it is for two Kings to reign both together in one kingdom; for they will always either really differ in opinion, or pretend to do so when any good thing is proposed by either, through envy, jealousy, ambition or interest; and so either there shall be no administration of Justice at all, or more certainly, an opposition with fire and sword; & the like must certainly fall out where Rulers should take their turns, for those that have the advantage of possession, with the present power of obliging all ambitious, necessitated and covetous people, and the like advantage of ability to punish the rich and fearful, shall be able to make good that wrongful possession against the rightful Successors, to the horrible confusion if not the ruin and desolation of the Nation, as we very well know by woeful experience; so that it is clear that no country can be free, neither from inconveniences in a civill Government, nor from the arbitrary power of a Militia, either in a King, a High Constable, a General, or something of that nature equally dangerous; without they will lie open both to invasions from abroad, and insurrections at home. But now let me come to that which our pretended lovers of liberty would have to be the remedy to all these disorders, I mean appeals to the people; and I shall with confidence aver, that this remedy will at any time turn to all these diseases put together; and so the supposed cure of some few maladies, shall draw on the most endless and unexpressible miseries that can befall mankind in this world: and though I shall never deny that, the health of the people is the Supreme Law, yet, I must never allow them to be their own Physitians; and to make it the clearer we will suppose, though not grant, that the people choose the first Rulers: and the first question I shall ask is what the word Ruler or governor signifies? doth it not imply the commanding power of an absolute Judge, or at least a Judge of such rules as are given him; and can there be command without obedience, or is there obedience where there is contradiction, or any trust reposed without submitting to the reason and conscience of the Trustee? Can I command those that I have contracted with to command me, be Judge of my Judges? certainly no, all these are contrary to reason and conscience, and destructive to all commerce; and now behold the deluge that this popular power lets in. First it is evident that the people must assemble to judge together of the reasons that induce them to the necessity of their intended alteration of Governours; and if they are the Supreme Judges and have this liberty at one time, they have it likewise by the same reason at all times: and it is as certain, that a part of them must meet before they can all assemble; and by consequence, any faction of innovators, theefs, murtherers, and the like, may legally make use of this pretence to assemble for the spoil or destruction of their country; and that they will do this is as certain as it is that there are a sufficient number of people in any Nation whatsoever, that would be glad of an opportunity of thriving wickedly; but admit this supposition to be false, and that they would never stir but upon a necessary occasion, and were all assembled, which is impossible, and should with one voice resolve on a reformation, when they once come to particulars all must infallibly turn to discord. For the first of these learned proposers shall be sure to be contradicted as plausibly, be it right or wrong, by some of the more cunningly ambitious and necessitated amongst them, that dare venture at any thing, and care not what follows, so as they can by a learned speech set all on slame, and make themselves heads of factions, the better to satisfy their ravenous desires on the best of the flock. And so this reformation becomes a good beginning to the total tearing out their own bowels by civill distension, and leaving the carcase of the Common-Wealth for a prey to a foreigner. Here we see the undeniable effect of that maxim of, all Government being fundamentally in the people; and indeed it had been strange, that all Government should have been in them that have no Government in them: And I confess, if they had been the Governours, I do not know who had been left to have been governed. And therefore since this can be no maxim at all, and that we must have a Government, and that all of them have their inconveniences, I shall conclude with that which I have said before, that the will of one man, though never so corrupt, is to be satisfied and glutted without any extraordinary prejudice to a whole Nation; and he is more likely to have care of a kingdom that is to leave it to his posterity, then he that hath onely his own being to provide for out of it, and can only forfeit his time by his misdemeanours, and run away with the public wealth when his reign is almost at an end. Besides, a hereditary King hath no need of an Army on foot to keep him in possession; and he hath much the advantage in an extraordinary care of his education, with the stock and example of all his heroic Ancestors, as motives of doing nobly. Besides, a notable store of his Fathers learned and experienced Councellors, that can sufficiently inform him of the hazard of governing ill, and would be able to steer his affairs, if the worst should happen, that he should be left a child or prove a fool; since there is no question, but the wiser sort would know better then the fools, how to humour him, and keep still in his favour. But howsoever, these inconveniences are mortal and uncertain; but those of any popular or elective Government certain and endless: and no doubt, if there were any Government in the world that were infallible, it would have been found out by this time, and all people would have both flown to it, and stuck to it. But it is evident, that when we have done all we can, we must trust God with something: his providence will govern that world which it hath created. And we see that both that divine will, and the wisdom of the greatest part of the world in all ages to this day have( by the practise of it) confirmed hereditary Monarchies to be the best.  
And now I shall wind up all with the confutation of our Libertines last assertion, that Antimonarchicalnesse is no crime at all, and that they that choose may change. I think I have already shewed the inconveniences of this allegation; but for the injustice of it I shall only ask, whether they that give any thing may take it away again when they please? and whether a thief deserves hanging for a robbery or no? And if that be the reward for a private robbery by the laws of our own and other Nations, what will then the public Murtherers and Theefs deserve, that not onely murder and rob their Prince of an inheritance, with the Revenue belonging to it, lineally devolved unto him from before the Norman Conquest, and since confirmed by his Subjects in Arms at the signing of Magna Charta, when they were in full power to vindicate their Liberties, and therefore can have no shadow of a pretence to claim a greater liberty then they then reserved to themselves at that voluntary agreement, ratified then, and since confirmed by so many Oaths of Allegiance, voluntary Protestations, and the like? but have robbed the universal people of a Prince so eminent in all the virtues appertaining to that public condition, under whom they had so ●ong securely flourished, notwithstanding some petty grievances ●prung from the corruption and mis-information of inferior Ministers, which were all redressed, and the Authors offered to a legal trial, before the two Houses begun that quarrel with him, for betraying his trust, for which he now died contrary to the will of those Houses, who were an excellent constitution whilst they were free, and within their bounds of representing grievances, and preparing laws, but are indeed as imministeriall dispensers of Justice, as those who contrary to their trust, undertake from their servants to become their Judges, and the whole kingdoms besides, to the present oppression, and future confusision and desolation of this flourishing kingdom, if they do not speedily seek( by the offer of an honourable and well-grounded peace) to make reparation to that excellent Son our natural Prince, who is so much the Image of all his Fathers virtues, as well as person, that we need not doubt his burying all his resentments for the peace and welfare of his three kingdoms, if they can resolve to trust him whom they have not so personally disobliged.  
FINIS.