Vindiciae contra Tyrannos: A Defence of Liberty against Tyrants.  
OR, Of the lawful power of the Prince over the people, and of the people over the Prince.  
BEING A Treatise written in Latin and French by Junius Brutus, and translated out of both into ENGLISH.  

Questions discussed in this Treatise.  
I. Whether Subjects are bound, and aught to obey Princes, if they command that which is against the Law of God.  
II. Whether it be lawful to resist a Prince which doth infringe the Law of God, or ruin the Church, by whom, how, and how fare it is lawful.  
III. Whether it be lawful to resist a Prince which doth oppress or ruin a public State, and how fare such resistance may be extended, by whom, how, and by what right, or law it is permitted.  
iv Whether neighbour Princes or States may be, or are bound by Law, to give succours to the Subjects of other Princes, afflicted for the cause of true Religion, or oppressed by manifest tyranny.   
LONDON, Printed by Matthew Simmons, and Robert Ibbitson, in Smithfield, near the Queens-head Tavern. 1648.   

THE Emperors, Theodosia's and Valentinian TO VOLUSIANUS, Great Provost of the Empire.  
IT is a thing well-becoming the Majesty of an Emperor, to acknowledge himself bound to obey the Laws. Our authority depending on the authority of the Laws, and in very deed to submit the principality to Law, is a greater thing then to bear rule. We therefore make it known unto all men, by the Declaration of this our Edict, that We do not allow Ourselves, or repute it lawful to do any thing contrary to this.  
Justine in the second Book, speaks thus of Lycargns, Lawgiver to the Lacedæmonians, He gave Laws to the Spartans' which had not any: and was as much renowned for his diligent observing of them himself, as for his discreet Inventing of them: For he made no Laws for others, to the obedience whereof he did not first submit himself. Fashioning the people to obey willingly, and the Prince to Govern uprightly.   


The first Question. Whether Subjects are bound and aught to obey Prints, if they command that which is against the Law of God.  
THIS question happily may seem at the first view to be altogether superfluous and unprofitable, for that it seems to make a doubt, of an axiom always held infallible amongst Christians, confirmed by many testimonies in Holy Scripture, divers examples of the histories of all ages, and by the death of all the Holy Martyrs, for it may be well demanded wherefore Christians have endured so many afflictions, but that they were always persuaded, that God must be obeyed simply, and absolutely, and Kings with this exception that they command not that which is repugnant to the law of God. Otherways wherefore should the Apostles have answered, that God must rather be obeyed than men, and also 
Act. 4. 19  seeing that the only will of God is always just, and that of men may be, and is, oftentimes unjust, who can doubt but that we must always obey God's commandments without any exception, and men's ever with limitation. But for so much as there are many Princes in these days, calling themselves Christians, which arrogantly assumes an unlimited power, over which God himself hath no command, and that they have no want of flatterers, which adore them as Gods upon earth, many others also, which for fear, or by constraint, either seem, or else do believe, that Princes ought to be obeyed in all things, and by all men. And withal, seeing the unhappiness of these times is such, that there is nothing so firm, certain, or pure, which is not shaken, disgraced, or polluted; I fear me that whosoever shall nearly, and throughly consider these things, will confess this question to be not only most profitable, but also, the times considered, most necessary. For my own part when I consider the cause of the many calamities, wherewith Christendom hath been afflicted, for these late years, I cannot but remember that of the Prophet Hosea, The Princes of Judah were like them 
Hos. 5. 10. 11.  that remove the bounds: wherefore I will power out myself like water. Ephraim is oppressed, and broken in judgement, because he willingly walked after the Commandment. Here you see the sin of the Princes, and people dispersed in these two words. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Princes exceed their bounds, not contenting themselves with that authority which the Almighty, and all good God hath given them, but seek to usurp that sovereignty, which he hath reserved to himself over all men, being not content to command the bodies, and goods of their Subjects at their pleasure, but assume licence to themselves to enforce the Consciences, which appertains chief to Jesus Christ, holding the earth not great enough for their ambition, they will climb and conquor heaven itself. The people on the other side walks after the commandment, when they yield to the desire of Princes, who command them that which is against the law of God, and as it were burn incense to, and adore these earthy Gods; and instead of resisting them, if they have means and occasion; suffer them to usurp the place of God, making no conscience to give that to Caesar, which belongs properly and only to God. Now is there any man that sees not this, if a man disobey a Prince commanding that which is wicked and unlawful, he shall presently be esteemed a Rebel, a Traitor, and guilty of High Treason, our Saviour Christ, the Apostles and all the Christians of the Primitive Church were charged with these Calumnies. If any after the example of Ezra, and Nehemiah, dispose himself to the building of the Temple of the 
Ezra. 4. Nehe. 5 7.  Lord, It will be said he aspires to the Crown, hatches innovations, and seeks the ruin of the State, than you shall presently see a million of these Minnious, and flatterers of Princes tickling their ears with an opinion, that if they once suffer this Temple to be rebuilded, they may bid their Kingdom farewell, and never look to raise impost or taxes on these men. But what a madness is this? There are no estates which ought to be esteemed firm and stable, but those, in whom the Temple of God is built, and which are indeed the Temple itself, and these we may truly call Kings, which reign with God, seeing that it is by him only that King's reign: On the contrary what beastly foolishness is it to think, that the State and Kingdom cannot subsist if God Almighty be not excluded, and his Temple demolished. From hence proceeds so many Tyrannous enterprises, unhappy and tragic death of Kings, and ruins of people. If these Sycophants knew what difference there is between God and Caesar, between the King of Kings, and a simple King, between the Lord, and the Vassal, and what tributs this Lord requires of his Subjects, and what authority he gives to Kings over those his Subjects, certainly so many Princes would not strive to trouble the Kingdom of God, and we should not see some of them precipitated from their Throns' by the just instigation of the Almighty, revenging himself of them, in the midst of their greatest strength, and the people should not be so sacked and pillaged, and trodden down.  
It than belongs to Princes to know how fare they may extend their authority, and to subjects in what they may obey them, lest the one encroaching on that jurisdiction, which no way belongs to them, and the others obeying him which commandeth further than he ought, they be both chastised, when they shall give an account thereof before another Judge: Now the end and scope of the question propounded, whereof the Holy Scripture shall principally give the resolution, is that which followeth. The question is, if subjects be bound to obey Kings, in case they command that which is against the Law of God: that is to say, to which of the two (God or the King) must we rather obey, when the question shall be resolved concerning the King, to whom is attributed absolute power, that concerning other Magistrates shall be also determined.  
First, the Holy Scripture doth teach, that God reigns by his own proper authority, and Kings by derivation, God from himself, Kings from God, that God hath a jurisdiction proper, Kings 
Prov. 8. job 12. Wisd. 6. 3.  are his delegates: It follows then, that the jurisdiction of God hath no limits, that of Kings bounded, that the power of God is infinite, that of Kings confined, that the Kingdom of God extends itself to all places, that of Kings is restrained within the confines of certain countries: In like manner God hath created of nothing both heaven, and earth; wherefore by good right he is Lord, and true Proprietorie, both of the one, and the other: All the Inhabitants of the earth hold of him that which they have, and are but his tenants, and farmers; all the Princes and Governors of the world are his stipendaries, and vassals, and are bound to take and acknowledge their investitures from him. Briefly, God alone is the owner and Lord, and all men of what degree, or quality soever they be, are his servants, farmers, officers, and vassals, and own account, and acknowledgement to him, according to that which he hath committed to their dispensation, the higher their place is, the greater their account must be, and according to the ranks whereunto God hath raised them, must they make their reckoning before his divine Majesty, which the Holy Scripture teacheth in infinite places, and all the faithful, yea, and the wisest amongst the Heathen have ever acknowledged: The earth is the Lords, and the fullness thereof, (so saith King David) And to the end that 
Psal. 24.  men should not sacrifice to their own industry; the earth yields no increase without the dew of heaven: Wherefore God commanded that his people should offer unto him the first of their fruits, and the Heathens themselves have consecrated the same unto their gods; to the end, that God might be acknowledged Lord, and they his grangers and vine dressers; the heaven is the Throne 
isaiah 66. 1. 1 Kings 1. 8  of the Lord, and the earth his footstool. And therefore seeing all the Kings of the world are under his feet; it is no marvel, if God be called the King of kings, and Lord of lords; all Kings be termed his Ministers established to judge rightly, and govern justly 
Prov. 8. 15  the world in the quality of Lieutenant's. By me (so saith the divine Wisdom) Kings reign, and the Princes judge the earth: If 
Job 1●. 18.  they do it not he looseth the bonds of Kings, and girdeth their loins with a girdle. As if he should say, it is in my power to establish 
Dan. 2. 21.  Kings in their Thrones, or to thrust them out, and from that occasion the Throne of Kings is called the Throre of God. Blessed be the Lord thy God (saith the Queen of Sheba) to King Solomon) 
2 Chron. 9 8.  which delighted in thee to set thee on his Throne to be King for the Lord thy God, to do judgement and justice. In like manner we read in another place, that Solomon sat on the Throne of the 
2 Chron. 2●. ●3. 1 Sam. 9 1●. and 10. 1.  Lord, or on the Throne of the Lords Kingdom. By the same reason the people is always called the Lords people, and the Lords inheritance, and the King's Governor of this inheritance, and Conductor or Leader of his people of God, which is the title given to David, to Solomon, to Ezechias, and to other good Princes; 
2 Sam. 6. 21. 2 King's ●0. 5. 2 Chron. 1 9 2 King. 11. 2 Chron. 33. 16. 2 Chron. 20. 6.  when also the Covenant is passed betwixt God and the King, it is upon condition that the people be, and remain always the people of God, to show that God will not in any case despoil himself of his propriety, and possession, when he gives to Kings the government of the people, but establish them to take charge of, and well use them, no more nor less than he which makes choice of a Shepherd to look to his flocks, remains notwithstanding himself still Master and owner of them. This was always known to those good Kings, David, Solomon, Jehosaphat, and others which acknowledged God to be the Lord of their Kingdoms and nations, and yet lost no privilege that justly belongs to real power; yea, they reigned much more happily in that they employed themselves cheerfully in the service of God, and in obedience to his Commandments. Nebuchadnezer, although he were a Heathen, and a mighty Emperor, did yet at the end acknowledge 
Dan 2. 3●. and 4. 14.  this, for though Daniel called him the King of Kings, to whom thee King of Heaven had granted power and Royal Majesty above all others: Yet on the contrary, (said he) Thy God O Daniel is truly the God of Gods, and Lord of Lords giving Kingdoms to whom he pleaseth, yea, to the most wretched of the world. For which cause Zenephon said at the Coronation of Cyrus; let us sacrifice to God. And profane Writers in many places do magnify God the most mighty and Sovereign King. At this day at the Inaugurating of Kings, and Christian Princes, they are called the servants of God, destinated to govern his people. Seeing then that Kings are only the Leiutenants of God, established in the Throne of God, by the Lord God himself, and the people are the people of God, and that the honour which is done to these Leiutenants proceeds from the reverence which is borne to those, that sent them to this service: it follows of necessity that Kings must be obeyed for God's cause, and not against God, and then, when they serve and obey God, and not otherways. It may be 
Divisum imperium cum Jove Caesar habet.  that the flatterers of the Court will reply, that God hath resigned, his power unto Kings, reserving Heaven for himself, and allowing the Earth to them to reign, and govern there according to their own fancies; briefly that the great ones of the World hold a divided Empire with God himself. Behold a discourse proper enough for that impudent Villain Cleon the Sycophant of Alexander, or for the poet Marshal which was not ashamed to call the Edicts of Domitian, the Ordinances of the Lord God. This discourse I say is worthy of that execrable Domitian who (as Suetonius recites) would be called God and Lord: But altogether unworthy of the ●ares of a Christian-Prince, and of the mouth of good Subjects, that sentence of God almighty must always remain irrevocably true, I will not give my glory to any other, that is, no man shall have such absolute 
Isa. 48. 11.  authority, but I will always remain sovereign. God doth not at any time disvest himself of his power, he holds a Sceptre in one hand to repress and quell the audacious boldness of those Princes which mutiny against him, and in the other a balance to control those that administer not justice wi●h equity as they ought, than these, there cannot be expressed more 
psa. 2. 9 Wisd. 6, 4.  certain marks of sovereign command. And if the Emperor in creating a King, reserves always to himself the imperial sovereignty, or a King as he of France in granting the government or possession of a Province to a stranger, or if it be to his Brother or Son reserves always to himself appeals, and the knowledge of such things as are the marks of royalty and sovereignty, the which also are always understood of themselves to be excepted, although they were altogether omitted in the grant of investiture, and fealty promised, with much more reason should God have sovereign power and command over all Kings being his servants and Officers, seeing we read, in so many places of Scripture, that he will call them to an account, and punish them, if they do not faithfully discharge their duties. Then therefore all Kings are the Vassals of the King of Kings, invested into their Office by the sword, which is the cognisance of their royal authority, to the end, that with the sword they maintain the Law of God, defend the good, and punish the evil: Even as we commonly see, that he which is a sovereign Lord, puts his Vassals into possession of their fee, by girding them with a sword, delivering them a buckler, and a standard, with condition that they shall fight for them with those arms if occasion shall serve. Now if we consider what is the duty of Vassals, we shall find that what may be said of them, agrees properly to Kings. The Vassal receives his fee of his Lord with right of justice, and charge to serve him in 
1 Sam. 8. and 9 20.  his wars. The King is established by the Lord God, the King of Kings; to the end he should administer justice to his people and defend them against all their enemies. The Vassal receives law and conditions from his Sovereign: God commands the King to observe his laws and to have them always before his eyes, promising that he and his successors shall possess long the Kingdom, if they be obedient, and on the contrary, rebellious to their Sovereign King. The Vassal obligeth that their reign shall be of small continuance, if they prove himself by Oath unto his Lord, and swears that he will be faithful, and obedient: In like manner the King promiseth solemnly to command, according to the express Law of God. 
Deu. 17. 19  Briefly the Vassal looseth his fee, if he commit felony, and by law forfeiteth all his privileges: In the like case the King looseth his Right, and many times his Realm also, if he despise God, if he complot with his enemies, and if he commit felony against that Royal Majesty, this will appear more clearly by the consideration of the Covenant which is contracted between God and the King, for God does that honour to his servants to call them his confederates. Now we read of two sorts of Covenants at the Inaugurating of Kings, the first between God, the King, and the People, that the people might be the people of God: The second between the King and the people, that the people shall obey faithfully, and the King command justly, we will treat hereafter of the second, and now speak of the first:  
When King Joas was crowned we read that a Covenant was contracted between God, the King, and the People: or, as it is 
The Alliance between God and the Kings. 2 King. 11. 2 Chro. 23. 16. 2 king. 23.  said in another place between Jehojada the Highpriest, all the People, and the King, That God should be their Lord. In likemanner we read that Josias and all the people entered into Covenants with the Lord: we may gather from these testimonies, that in passing these Covenants the Highpriest did Covenant in the name of God in express terms, that the King and the people should take order that God might be served purely, and according to his will, throughout the whole Kingdom of Juda, that the King should so reign that the people were suffered to serve God, and held in obedience to his law: That the people should so obey the King, as their obedience should have principal relation to God. It appears by this that the King & the people are jointly bound by promise and did oblige themselves by solemn Oath to serve God before all things. And indeed presently after they had sworn the Covenant, Josias and Joas did ruin the Idolatry of Baal and reestablished the pure service of God. The principal points of the Covenants were chiefly these.  
That the King himself, and all the people should be careful to honour and serve God according to his will revealed in his word, which if they performed, God would assist and preserve their estates: as in doing the contrary, he would abandon, and exterminate them, which doth plainly appear 
Deut. 29. 30. 31. Deut. 31. 26.  by the conferring of divers passages of holy writ. Moses somewhat before his death propounds these conditions of Covenant to all the people, and at the same time commands that the Law, which be those precepts given by the Lord should be in deposito kept in the Ark of the Covenant. After the decease 
Josh. 1.  of Moses, Joshua was established Captain, and Conductor of the people of God, and according as the Lord himself admonished, if he would have happy success in his affairs, he should not in any sort estrange himself from the 
Deut. ●7. 2●. Jos. 5. & 24.  Law: Joshua also for his part, desiring to make the Israelites understand upon what condition God had given them the Country of Canaan, as soon as they were entered into it, after due sacrifices performed, he read the Law in the presence of all the people, promising unto them in the Lords name all good things if they persisted in obedience; and threatening of all evil if they wilfully connived in disobedience. Sommarily, he assures them all prosperity, if they observed the Law; as otherways, he expressly declared, that in doing the contrary they should be utterly ruined: Also at all such times as they left the service of God, they were delivered into the hands of the Canaanites, and reduced in to slavery, under their Tyranny. Now this Covenant between God and the people in the times of the Judges, had vigour also in the times of the Kings, and was treated with them. After that Saul had been anointed, chosen, and wholly established King, Samuel speaks unto the people in these terms; Behold the King whom you have demanded 
2 Sam. 12.  and chosen, God hath established him King over you, obey you therefore and serve the Lord, as well you, as your King which is established over you, otherwise you and your King shall perish. As if he should say, you would have a King and God hath given you this here, notwithstanding think not that God will suffer any encroachment upon his right, but know that the King is as well bound to observe the Law as you, and if he fail therein, his delinquency shall be punished as severely as yours: Briefly, according to your desires Saul is given you for your King, to lead you in the wars, but with this condition annexed, that he himself follow the Law of God. After that Saul was rejected, because he kept not 
2 king. 2. 4. & 6. 12.  his promise, David was established King on the same condition, so also was his Son Solomon, for the Lord said, If thou keep my Law, I will confirm with thee the Covenant which I contracted with David. Now concerning this Covenant, it is inserted into the second book of the Chronicles, as followeth. There shall not fail there a man in my sight, to sit upon the Throne of Israel: yet so that thy children take heed 
2 Chron. 6. 16. & 7. 17. 2 king. 33. 2. Deut 17. 18 1 Sam. 10. 25.  to their way to walk in my Law, as thou hast walked before me. But if they serve Idols, I will drive them from the Land whereof I have given them possession. And therefore it was that the book of the Law was called the book of the Covenant of the Lord, (who commanded the Priests to give it the King) according to which Samuel put it into the hands of Saul, and according to the tenure thereof Josias yields himself soedetarie and vassal of the Lord. Also the Law which is kept in the Ark, is called the Covenant of the Lord with the children of Israel. Finally, the people delivered from the captivity of Babylon, do renew the Covenant with God, and do acknowledge 
2 Chron. 6 11. Nehem. 9 38.  throughout that Chapter, that they worthily deserved all those punishments for their falsifying their promise to God. It appears then that the Kings swear as vassals to observe the Law of God, whom they confess to be Sovereign Lord over all, Now according to that which we have already touched, if they violate their Oath, and transgress the law, we say that they have lost their kingdom, as vassals lose their fee by committing felony. We have said that there was the same covenant between God and the Kings of Judah, as before, between God and the people in the times of 
Jud. 2. 24 & 4. 2. etc. & 9 33. 1 Sam. 13. 13. & 15. 26.  Joshua and the Judges. But we see in many places, that when the people hath despised the Law, or made covenants with Baal, God hath delivered them into the hands of Eglon, Jabin, and other Kings of the Canaanites: And as it is one and the same Covenant, so those which do break it, receive like punishment. Saul is so audacious to sacrifice, infringing thereby the Law of God, and presently after saves the life of Agag, King of the Amalekites, against the express Commandment of God, for this occasion he is called Rebel by Samuel, and finally is chastised for his Rebellion. Thou hast sacrificed, saith he, but thou hadst done better to obey God, for, obedience is more worthy than sacrifice. Thou hast neglected the Lord thy God, he also hath rejected thee, that thou Reign no more over Israel. This hath been so certainly observed by the Lord, that the very children of Saul were deprived of their paternal inheritance, for that he having committed high Treason, did thereby incur the punishment of Tyrants, which affect a Kingdom that no way appertains unto them. And not only the Kings, but also their children and successors have been deprived of the Kingdom by reason of such felony. Solomon revolted from God to worship Idols. Incontinently the Prophet Abijah foretells that the Kingdom shall be divided under his Son Rehoboam. Finally, the word of the Lord is accomplished, and ten Tribes which made the greatest portion of the Kingdom, do quit Rehoboam, and adhere to Jeroboam his servant. Wherefore is this? for so much (saith the Lord) that they have left me to go after Astoroche, the God of the Sidoniens and Chamos the God of the Moabites, etc. I will also break in pieces their Kingdom: as if he should say, they have violated the Covenant, and have not kept promise, I am no more then tied unto them, they will lessen my majesty, and I will lessen their Kingdom: Although they be my servants, yet notwithstanding they will expel me my Kingdom; but I will drive them out themselves by Jeroboham which is their servant. Furthermore, for so much as this servant, fearing that the ten tribes for the cause of Religion should return to Jerusalem, set up Calves in Bethel, and made Israel to sin, withdrawing by this means the people far from God, what was the punishment of so ingrateful a Vassal and wicked Traitor towards his Lord? First, his son died, and in the end all his race, even unto the last of the males was taken from the face of the earth by the sword of Baasa, according to the judgement which was pronounced against him by the Prophet, because he revolted from the obedience of the Lord God: this than is cause sufficient, & often times also propounded, for the which God doth take from the King his fee, when he opposeth the Law of God, & withdraws himself from him to follow his enemies, to wit Idols, and as like crimes deserve like punishments, we read in the holy Histories that Kings of Israel and of Juda which have so far forgotten themselves, have in the end miserably perished. Now although the form both of the Church, and the Jewish Kingdom be changed, for that that which was before enclosed within the narrow bounds of Judea, is now dilated throughout the whole World, notwithstanding the same things may be said of Christian Kings, the Gospel having succeeded the Law, and Christian Princes being in the place of those of Jury: There is the same Covenant, the same Conditions, the same Punishments, and if they fail in the accomplishing, the same God Almighty revenger of all perfidious disloyalty; and as the former were bound to keep the Law, so the other are obliged to adhere to the doctrine of the Gospel, for the advancement whereof these Kings at their anointing, and receiving, do promise to employ the utmost of their means.  
Herod fearing Christ, whose reign he should rather have desired, sought to put him to death, as if he had affected a Kingdom in this World, did himself miserably perish, and lost his Kingdom. Julian the Apostate did cast off Christ Jesus to cleave unto the Impiety and Idolatry of the Pagans: but within a small time after he fell to his confusion, the force of the arm of Christ, whom in mockery he called the galilean. Ancient histories are replete with such examples, neither is there any want in those of these times. Of late years divers Kings drunk with the liquor which the Whore of Babylon hath presented unto them, have taken arms, and for the love of the Wolf, and of Antichrist, have made War against the Lamb of God, which is Christ Jesus, and yet at this day some amongst them do continue in the same course, we have seen some of them ruined in the deed, and in the midst of their wickedness, others also carried from their triumphs to their graves, those which survive and follow them in their courses have little reason to expect a better issue of their wicked practices, this sentence remains always most certain, That though all the 
psa. 2. 2. psa. 1 10 2. Apoc. 19: 16.  Kings of the earth do conjure and conspire against Christ and endeavour to cut in pieces our Lamb, yet in the end they shall yield the place, and maugre their hearts, confess that this Lamb is the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords. But what shall we say of the Heathen Kings? Certainly although they be not anointed and sacred of God, yet be they his Vassals and have received their power from him, whether they be chosen by lot or any other means whatsoever. If they have been chosen by the voices of an Assembly, we say that God governs the heart of man, and addresses the minds and intentions of all persons whether he pleaseth: If it be by lot, the lot is cast in the lap, saith the wise man, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. It is God only that in all ages establisheth, and takes away, confirms, and overthrows Kings 
pro. 16, 33.  according to his good pleasure; In which regard isaiah calls Cyrus the anointed of the Lord, and Daniel saith that Nebuchadnezer 
Esa. 45. 1. Dan. 2. 21 & 4. 24. Rom. 13. 1●.  and others have had their Kingdoms committed unto them by God; as also Saint Paul maintains that all Magistrates have received their authority from him: For although that God hath not commanded Pagans in express terms to obey him as he hath done those that have knowledge of him: yet notwithstanding the Pagans must needs confess that it is by the sovereign God that they reign, wherefore if they will not yield the tribute that they own to God in regard of themselves, at the least let them not attempt nor hinder the Sovereign to gather that which is due from those people which are in subjection to them; nor that they do not anticipate, nor appropriate to themselves divine Jurisdiction over them, which is the crime of high treason and true tyranny, for which occasion the Lord hath grievously punished even the Pagan Kings themselves. It than becomes those Princes that will free themselves from so enormous a mischief, carefully to distinguish their jurisdiction from that of Gods, yea, so much the more circumspectly for that God and the Prince have their right of authority over one and the same Land, over one and the same man, over one and the same thing; man is composed of body and soul, God hath form the body and infused the soul into him, to him only then may be attributed, and appropriated the commands both over the body and soul of man. If out of his mere grace and favour he hath permitted Kings to employ both the bodies and goods of their subjects, yet still with this Proviso and charge, that they preserve and defend their subjects; certainly Kings ought to think that the use of this authority is in such manner permitted, that notwithstanding the abuse of it is absolutely forbidden: First, those which confess that they hold their souls and lives of God, as they ought to acknowledge, they have then no right to impose any tribute upon souls. The King takes tribute and custom of the body, and of such things as are acquired or gained by the industry and travail of the body, God doth principally exact his right from the soul, which also in part executes her functions by the body. In the tribute of the King are comprehended the fruits of the earth, the contributions of money and other charges, both real and personal; the tribute of God is in Prayers, Sacraments, Predications of the pure word of God; briefly, all that which is called divine service, as well private as public; these two tributes are in such manner divers and distinguished, that the one hurts nothing the other, the Exchequer of God takes nothing from that of Caesar, but each of them have their right manifestly apart. But to speak in a word, whosoever confounds these things, doth heaven and earth together, and endeavours to reduce them into their first chaos, or later confusion. David hath excellently well distinguished these affairs, 
1 Chron. 26. 29. 2 Chron. 19 11.  ordaining officers to look to the right of God, and others for that of the King. Josephat hath followed the same course, establishing certain persons to judge the causes that belonged to the Almighty, and others to look to the justice of the King; the one to maintain the pure service of God, the other to preserve the rights of the King. But if a Prince usurp the right of God, and put himself forward after the manner of the Giants to scale the Heavens, he is no less guilty of high treason to his Sovereign, and commits felony in the same manner, as if one of his vassals should seize on the rights of his Crown, and puts himself into evident danger to be despoiled of his estates, and that so much the more justly, there being no proportion between God and an earthly King, between the Almighty and a mortal man; whereas yet between the Lord and the vassal there is some relation of proportion. So often therefore as any Prince shall so much forget himself, as insolently to say in his heart I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God: I will sit also upon the mount of the congregation in the sides of the Nor●h; I will ascend above the heights of the clouds, I will be like the most high. But on the contrary, will the Almighty say I will rise up more high, I will set myself against 
Esay 14. 13. 14.  thee; I will raze out thy name and all thy posterity, thy counsels shall vanish into smoke, but that which I have once determined 
Exo. 5. & 8. etc.  shall remain firm, and never be annihilated. The Lord said unto Pharaoh, let my people go, that they may serve me, and offer sacrifice unto me, and for that this proud man answered, that he knew not the God of the Hebrews, presently after he was miserably destroyed. 
Dan. 3. 5. & 4. 25. etc.  Nebuchadnezar commanded that his statue should be adored, and would be honoured as God, but within a short time the true God did deservedly chastise his unruly boldness, and desiring to be accounted God, he became a bruit beast, wand'ring through desert places like a wild ass, until (saith the Prophet) that he acknowledged the God of Israel to be the Sovereign Lord over 
Dan. 5. 2.  all, his son Belshaser abused the holy vessels of the Temple in Jerusalem, and put them to serve his excess and drunkenness, for that therefore he gave not glory to him, that held in his hands both his soul and his counsels, he lost his Kingdom, and was slain in that very night of his feasting Alexander the great took pleasure in the lies of his Flatterers, who termed him the son of Jupiter, and not only approved, but procured his adoration, but a sudden death gave a sad period to those triumphs, being blinded through his excess of conquests, began with too much affection, to delight in Antiochus, under colour of pacifying and uniting his subjects, commanded all men to forsake the Laws of God, and to apply 
1 Macha. 1. 43.  themselves in obedience to his: he profaned the Temple of the Jews, and polluted their Altars, but after divers ruins, defeats, and loss of battles, despoiled, and disgraced, he dies with grief, confessing that he deservedly suffered those miseries, because he would 
Mac. 6. 12. 13.  have constrained the Jews to leave their Religion. If we take into our consideration the death of Nero, that inhuman Butcherer of Christians, whom he unjustly slandered with the firing of Rome, being the abhorred act of his detested self. The end of Caligula, which made himself to be adored, of Domitian which would be called Lord and God, of Commodus, and divers others which would appropriate to themselves the honours due to God alone, we shall find that they have all and always according to their deceits miserably perished; when on the contrary, Trajan, Adrian, Antonius the courteous and others, have finished their days in peace, for although they knew not the true God, yet have they permitted the Christians the exercise of their Religion. Briefly, even as those rebellious vassals which endeavour to possess themselves of the Kingdom, do commit felony by the testimony of all Laws, and deserve to be extirpated; in like manner those are as really guilty which will not observe the Divine Law, whereunto all men without exception own their obedience, or which persecute those that desire to conform themselves thereunto, without hearing them in their just defences; now for that we see that God invests Kings into their Kingdoms, almost in the same manner that vassals are invested into their fees by their Sovereign, we must needs conclude, that Kings are the vassals of God, and deserve to be deprived of the benefit they receive from their Lord if they commit felony, in the same fashion as rebellious vassals are of their estates. These promises being allowed, this question may be easily resolved; for if God hold the place of Sovereign Lord, and the King as vassal: who dare deny but that we must rather obey the Sovereign, than the vassal? If God commands one thing, and the King commands the contrary, what is that proud man that would term him a rebel which refuseth to obey the King, when else he must disobey God. But on the contrary he should rather be condemned, and held for truly rebellious, which omits to obey God, or which will obey the King when he forbids him to yield obedience to God. Briefly, if God call us on the one side to unroll us in his service, and the King on the other, is any man so void of reason as he will not say we must leave the King, and apply ourselves to God's service, so fare be it from us to believe, that we are bound to obey a King, commanding any thing contrary to the Law of God, that centrally in obeying him we become Rebels to God; no more, no● 〈◊〉 than we would esteem a country man a Rebel, which for the love he bears to some rich and ancient inferior Lord, would bear Arms against the Sovereign Prince, or which had rather obey the writs of an inferior Judge then of a superior, the commandments of a Lieutenant of a Province, then of the Prince; to be brief, the directions of an officer rather than the express Ordinances of the King himself. In doing this we justly incur the 
Mich. 6. 16.  malediction of the Prophet Micha, which doth detest and curse in the name of God all those which obey the wicked and perverse Ordinances of Kings. By the Law of God we understand the two Tables given to Moses, in the which, as in unremovable bounds the authority of all Princes ought to be fixed. The first comprehends that which we own to God, the second that which we must do to our Neighbours; briefly, they contain piety and justice conjoined with charity, from which the preaching of the Gospel doth not derogate, but rather authorize and confirm: The first Table is esteemed 
There is a certain Politician of our time so detestable, that he hath dared to condemn Papinian, and to write in his books full of errors in matter of state, that Papinian because he would not excuse the parricide of Caracalla did bring irreparable damages to the affairs of the Empire.  the principal, as well in order as in dignity. If the Prince commands to cut the throat of an innocent, to pillage and commit extortion, there is no man (provided he have some feeling of conscience) that would execute such a commandment. If the Prince have committed some crime, as Adultery, Parricide, or some other wickedness, behold amongst the Heathen the learned Lawyer Papinian which will reprove Caracalla to his face, and had rather die then obey, when his cruel Prince commands him to lie and palliate his offence; nay, although he threaten him with a terrible death, yet would he not bear false witness; what shall we then do, if the Prince commands us to be Idolaters, if he would have us again crucify Christ Jesus, if he enjoins to blaspheme and despite God, and to drive him (if it were possible) out of Heaven, is there not yet more reason to disobey him, then to yield obedience to such extravagants commands: Yet a little further, seeing it is not sufficient to abstain from evil, but that we must do good, instead of worshipping of Idols, we must adore and serve the true God, according as he hath commanded us, and instead of bending our knees before Baal, we must render to the Lord the honour and service which he requires of us; for we are bound to serve God for his own sake only: but we honour our Prince, and love our Neighbour, because and for the love of God. Now if it be ill done to offend our neighbour, and if it be a capital crime to rise against our Prince, how shall we entitle those that rise in rebellion against the Majesty of the Sovereign Lord of all Manking; briefly, as it is a thing much more grievous to offend the Creator, than the creature, man, than the Image he represents; and as in terms of Law, he that hath wounded the proper person of a King, is much more culpable, than another that hath only broken the statue erected in his memory: so there is no question, but a much more terrible punishment is prepared for them, which infringe the first Table of the Law, then for those which only sin against the second; although the one depend of the other; whereupon it follows (to speak by comparison) that we, must take more careful regard to the observation of the first, then of the second. Furthermore, our Progenitors examples may teach us the rule we must follow in this case. King Ahab at the instigation of his wife Jesabel, killed all the Prophets, and servants of God that could be taken, notwithstanding Abdias Steward of Ahabs' house did both hide and 
1 King. 18. 4.  feed in a Cave a hundred Prophets, the excuse for this is soon ready; in obligations, oblige they never so nearly, the divine Majesty must always be excepted. The same Ahab enjoined all men to sacrifice to Baal: Elias instead of couling or relenting did reprove more freely the King, and all the people, convinced the Priests of Baal of their impiety, and caused them to be executed. Then in despite of that wicked and furious Jesabel, and manger that uxorious King, he doth redress and reform with a divine and a powerful endeavour the service of the true God. When Ahab reproached 
1 King. 18. 17.  him (as the Princes of our times do) that he troubled Israel, that he was rebellious, seditious, titles wherewith they are ordinarily charged, which are no way culpable thereof; nay, but it is thou thyself, answered Elias, which by thy Apostasy hath troubled Israel, which hath left the Lord the true God, to acquaint thyself with strange gods his enemies, in the same manner and by the 
Dan. 3. 18 & 6. lo. 13  leading and direction of the same spirit did Sidrac, Misack, and Abednego refuse to obey Nebuchadnezar, Daniel Darius, Eleazar Antiochus, and infinite others. After the coming of Jesus Christ, 
Act. 4. 19  it being forbidden the Apostles to preach the Gospel. Judge ye, (said they) whether it be reasonable as in the sight of God to obey 
Phi●o I●●e●s in his discourse of his Embassage to Cyrus. S. Ambros. in the Ep●st. 33.  men, rather than God; according to this the Apostles, not regarding neither the intendments nor designs of the greatness of the world, addressed themselves readily to do that which their Master Jesus Christ had commanded them. The Jews themselves would not permit that there should be set up in the Temple at Jerusalem the Eagle of silver, nor the statue of Caligula: what did Ambrose when the Emperor Valentinian commanded him to give the Temple at Milan to the Arrians? Thy Counsellors and Captains are come unto me, said he, to make me speedily deliver the Temple, saying it was done by the Authority and command of the Emperor, and that all things are in his power. I answered to it, That if he demanded that which is mine, to wit, mine inheritance, my money, I would not in any sort refuse it him, although all my goods belong properly to the poor, but the things divine are not in subjection to the power of the Emperor. What do we think that this holy man would have answered, if he had been demanded whether the living Temple of the Lord should be enthrawled to the slavery of Idols. These Examples, and the constancy of a million of Martyrs, which were glorious in their deaths, for not yielding obedience in this kind, according as the Ecclesiastical Histories, which are full of them, do demonstrate, may sufficiently serve for an express Law in this case. But for all this we have no want of a Law formerly written: For as often, and ever as the Apostles admonish Christians to obey Kings and Magistrates, they do first exhort, and as it were by way of advice, admonish every one to subject himself in like manner to God, and to obey him before and against any whatsoever, and there is no where to be found, in any of their writings, the least passage for this unlimited obedience, which the flatterers of Princes do exact from men of small understandings. Let every soul, saith Saint Paul, be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God: he makes mention of every soul, to the 
Rom. 13. 1.  end it may not be thought, that he would exempt any from this subjection; we may easily gather by divers such speeches, that we must obey God rather than the King: For if we obey the King, because, and for the love of God certainly this obedience may not be a conspiracy against God, But the Apostle will stop the gap to all ambiguity in adding that the Prince is the servant of God for our good, to wit, to do justice; from this necessarily follows that which we come from touching, that we must rather obey God then him who is his servant: This doth not yet content Saint Paul for he adds in the end, Give tribute, honour, and fear to whom they appertain, as if he 
Math. 22. 21. 1 pet. 2. 17. 18.  should say, that which was alleged by Christ, Give to Caesar that which is Caesar's, and to God that which is Gods: To Caesar tribute, and honour; ●o God fear. Saint Peter saith the same, fear God, honour the King; Servants obey your Masters not only the good and kind, but also the rigorous, we must practise these precepts according to the order they are set down in: to wit, that as servants are not bound to obey their Masters if they command any thing which is against the laws and ordinances of Kings: Subjects in like manner own no obedience to Kings which will make them to violate the Law of God.  
Object. 1 Certain lewd companions object, that even in the things themselves that concern the Conscience we must obey Kings, and are so shameless as to produce for witness of so wicked an opinion the Apostle Saint Peter and Saint Paul, concluding from hence, that we must yield obedience to all that the King shall ordain, though it be to embrace, without reply, any Superstition he shall please to establish. But there is no man so grossly void of sense, that sees not the impiety of these men. We reply: that Saint Paul saith in express terms, we must be subject to Princes, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. In opposing conscience to wrath, it is as much as if the 
Rom 1. 35.  Apostle had said, that the obedience of which he speaks ought not to proceed for fear of punishment, but from the love of God, and from the reverence which we are bound to bear unto the word, in the same sense Saint Paul enjoineth servants in such manner to obey their Masters, that it be not with eye service for fear of stripes, but in singleness of heart, fearing 
Col. 3. 22.  God, not simply, to acquire the favour of men, whom they may delude, but to bear the burden laid on their shoulders, by him whom no man can deceive.  
In brief there is manifest difference between these two manners of speech, to obey for conscience sake, and to obey in those thing which concern the conscience: otherways those which had much rather lose their lives with infinite torments than obey Princes which command them things contrary to the will of God, would have taught us that which these seek to persuade us to. Neither do they express themselves Object. 2 less impudent in that which they are accustomed to object to those which are not so well able to answer them. That obedience is better than sacrifice, for there is no Text in holy writ that doth more evidently confound them then this, which is contained in samuel's reprehension of King Saul, for 
1 Sam. 15. 22.  his disobedience to the Commandment of God, in sacrificing unfittingly. If then Saul although he were a King ought to obey God, it follows in all good consequence that subjects are not bound to obey their King by offending of God. Briefly, those (which after the barbarous manner of the men of Calcut) seek to enthral the service of God with a necessary dependence on the will of a mutable man, and Religion of the good pleasure of the King, as if he were some God on earth, they doubles little value the testimony of holy Writ. But let them (at the least) yet learn of a Heathen Orator. That in every public state, 
Cicero in the first book of offic.  there is certain degrees of duty, for those that converse and live in it, by which may appear wherein the one are obliged to the other. Insomuch that the first part of this duty belongs to the immortal God, the second concerns the Country, which is their common Mother, the third, those which are of our blood, the other parts leading us step by step to our other Neighbours. Now although the crime of High Treason be very heinous, yet according 
l. 2. ad leg. Jul. majest. Digest.  to the Civilians, it always follows after sacrilege, an offence which properly pertains to the Lord God and his service, insomuch that they do confidently affirm, that the robbing of a Church, is by their rules esteemed, a greater crime, than to conspire against the life of a Prince. Thus much for this first Question, wherein we persuade ourselves, that any man may receive satisfaction, if he be not utterly void of the fear of God.   

The second Question, Whether it be lawful to resist a Prince which doth infringe the Law of God, or ruin his Church, by whom, how, and how far it is lawful.  
THis Question seems at the first view to be of a high and difficult nature, for so much as there being small occasion to speak to Princes that fear God: On the contrary, there will be much danger to trouble the ears of those which acknowledge no other Sovereign but themselves, for which reason few or none have meddled with it, and if any have at all touched it, it hath been but as it were in passing by. The Question is, If it be lawful to resist a Prince violating the Law of God, or ruinating the Church, or hindering the restoring of it? If we hold ourselves to the tenure of the holy Scripture, it will resolve us. For, if in this case it have been lawful to the Jewish people (the which may be easily gathered from the books of the Old Testament) yea, if it have been enjoined them, I believe it will not be denied, that the same must be allowed to the whole people of any Christian Kingdom or Country whatsoever. In the first place it must be considered, that God having chosen Israel from amongst all the Nations of the Earth, to be a peculiar people to him, and covenanted with them, that they should be the people of God. This is written in divers places of Douteronomy: the substance and tenor of 
Deut. 7. 6. & 14. 2.  this alliance was, That all should be careful in their several lines, tribes, and families in the land of Canaan, to serve God purely, who would have a Church established amongst them for ever, which may be drawn from the testimony of divers places, namely that which is contained in the 27 Chap. of Deuteronomy, there Moses and the Levites covenanting as in the name of God, assembled all the people, and said unto them: This day Oh Israel art thou become the people of God, obey you therefore his voice, etc. And Moses said, when thou hast passed the River of Jordan, thou shalt set six Tribes on the mountain of Gerizzim on the one side, and the six other on the Mountain of ebal, and then the Levites shall read the Law of God, promising the observers all felicity, and threatening woe and destruction to the breakers thereof, and all the people shall answer, Amen. The which was afterwards performed by Joshua, at his entering into the Land of Canaan, and some few days before his death. We see by this that all the people is bound to maintain the law of 
Jos. 5. 24. & 24. 20. etc.  God to perfect his Church: and on the contrary to exterminate the Idols of the land of Canaan, a Covenant which can no ways appertain to particulars, but only to the whole body of the people. To which also it seems the encamping of all the Tribes round about the Ark of the Lord, to have reference, to the end that all should look to preservation of that which was committed to the custody of all. Now for the use and practise of this Covenant we may produce examples, the Inhabitants of Gabaa of the Tribe of Benjamin ravished the wife of a Levite, which died through their violence. 
Judg. 19, 20.  The Levite divided his wife into twelve pieces and sent them to the twelve Tribes, to the end that all the people together might wipe away this so horrible a crime committed in Israel. All the people met together at Mizpah and required the Benjamites to deliver to be punished those that were culpable of this enormous crime, which they refused to perform, wherefore with the allowance of God himself, the states of the people with an universal consent renounce and make war against the Benjamites, and by this means the authority of the second Table of the Law was maintained by the detriment and ruin of one entire Tribe which had broken it in one of the precepts. For the first we have an example sufficiently manifest in Joshua. After that the Rubenites, Gadites, & Manassites were returned into their dwellings beyond Jordan, they incontinently built a goodly Altar near unto the river, this seems 
Jos. 22  to contrary the commandment of the Lord, who expressly forbids to sacrifice any where but in the land of Canaan only, wherefore it was to be feared lest these men intended to serve Idols. This business being communicated to the people, inhabiting on this side Jordan: the place assigned for the meetings of the States was at Silo where the Ark of the Lord was. They all accordingly met, and Phineas the Highpriest the son of Eleazar was sent to the other to treat with them concerning this offence committed against the Law: And to the end they might know all the people had a hand in this business, they sent also the principal men of every Tribe to complain that the service of God is corrupted, by this devise, that God would be provoked by this rebellion, and become an enemy, not only to the guilty, but also to all Israel, as heretofore in Beelphegor. Briefly that they should denounce open war against them if they desisted not from this their manner of doing: There must of necessity have followed much mischief, if those Tribes beyond Jordan had not protested, that they erected that Altar only for a memorial that the Israelites both on the one and the other side of Jordan, both did and do profess one and the same Religion: and at all times whensoever, they have showed themselves negligent in the maintenance of the service of God, we have seen that they have ever been punished: This is the true cause wherefore they lost two battles against the Benjamites according as it appears in the end of the book of Judges, for in so carefully undertaking to punish the rape and outrage done to a particular person, they clearly convinced themselves of much negligent profaneness in the maintenance of God's right, by their continually negligence, omission to punish both corporal and spiritual whoredoms, there was then in these first times such a Covenant between God and the People.  
Now after that Kings were given unto the people, there was 
A covenant between God the king & the people. 2 king. 11. 17. & 23. 3.  so little purpose of disannulling or disbanding the former contract, that it was renewed and confirmed for ever. We have formerly said at the Inaugurating of Kings, there was a double Covenant treated of, to wit, between God, and the King; and between God, and the People. The agreement was first passed between God, the King, and the People: Or between the Highpriest the People, (which is named in the first place in the 23 Chapter in the 2 book of the Chronicles) and the King. The intention 
2 chron. 23 16.  of this was, that the people should be the people of God, (which is as much as to say) that the people should be the church of God, we have showed before to what end God contracted Covenants with the King: Let us now consider wherefore also he allies himself with the people. It is a thing most certain, that God hath not done this in vain, and if the people had not authority to promise, and to keep promise, it were vainly lost time to contract or Covenant with them. It may seem then that God hath done like those creditors, which having to deal with not very sufficient borrowers, take divers jointly bound for one and the same sum, insomuch as two or more being bound one for another and each of them apart, for the entire payment of the total sum, he may demand his whole debt of which of them he pleaseth. There was much danger to commit the custody of the Church to one man alone, and therefore God did recommend, and put it in trust to all the people: The King being raised to so slippery a place might easily be corrupted, for fear lest the Church should stumble with him, God would have the people also to be respondents for it. In the Covenant of which we speak, God, or (in his place) the Highpriest, are stipulators, the King and all the people, to wit, Israel, do jointly and voluntarily assume, promise, and oblige themselves for one and the same thing. The Highpriest demands if they promise that the people shall be the people of God, that God shall always have his Temple, his Church amongst them, where he shallbe purely served, The King is respondent, so also are the people (the whole body of the people representing as it were the office and place of one man) not severally, but jointly, as the words themselves make clear, being incontinent, and not by intermission or distance of time the one after the other. 
L. Mortuo 22. D. de fidei come. L. si non singuli C. si cert. Pet. I. penult. D. de duo reis 2 & 3. sect. 1. D. eodem.  We see here then two undertakers, the King and Israel, which by consequent are bound one for another and each for the whole. For as when Cajus and Titius have promised jointly to pay to their Creditor Seius a certain sum, each of them are bound for himself and his companion, and the Creditor may demand the sum of which of them he pleaseth. In the like manner the King for himself, and Israel for itself are bound with all circumspection to see that the Church be not damnified, if either of them be negligent of their Covenant, God may justly demand the whole of which of the two he pleaseth, and the more probably of the people then of the King, and for that many cannot so easily slip away as one, and have better means to discharge the debts then one alone. In 
L. cum pos. D. de censib. & ibi doct●res.  like manner, as when two men that are indebted, especially to the public Exchequer, the one is in such manner bound for the other, that he can take no benefit of the division granted; by the new Constitutions of Justinian: So likewise the King and Israel promising to pay tribute to God, which is the King of Kings, for accomplishment whereof, the one is obliged for the other. And as two Covenanters by promise, especially in contracts, the obligation whereof exposeth the Obligees to forfeitures and hazards, such as 
L. cum apparebit, D. locati. L. si divisa. C. eodem.  this is here, the failings of the one endamageth the other: so that if Israel forsake their God, and the King makes no account of it, he is justly guilty of Israel's delinquency. In like manner, if the King follow after strange gods, and not content to be seduced himself, seeks also to attract his Subjects, endeavouring by all means to ruin the Church, if Israel seek not to withdraw him from his rebellion, and contain him within the limits of obedience, they make the fault of their King, their own transgression. Briefly, as when there is danger that one of the debtors by consuming his goods may be disabled to give satisfaction, the other must satisfy the creditors who ought not to be endamaged, though one of his debtors have ill husbanded his estate, this ought not to be doubted in regard of Israel toward their King, and of the King towards Israel in case one of them apply himself to the service of Idols, or break their Covenant in any other sort, the one of them must pay the forfeiture and be punished for the other. Now that the Covenants of which we at this time treat, is of this nature, it appears also by other testimonies of Holy Scripture. Saul being established King of Israel, Samuel Priest 
1 Sam. 12. 14. 25.  and Prophet of the Lord, speaks in this manner to the people. Both you and your King which is over you serve the Lord your God, but if you persevere in malice (he taxeth them of malice for that they preferred the government of a man before that of God) you and your King shall perish, He adds after the reason, For it hath pleased God to choose you for his people. You see here both the parties evidently conjoined in the condition and the punishment: In like manner Asa King of Judah, by the counsel of the Prophet Azarie, assembleth all the people at Jerusalem, to wit, Juda and Benjamin, to enter into Covenant with God. Thither came also divers of the Tribe of Ephraim, Manasses, and Simeon, which were come thither to serve the Lord according to his own ordinance After the sacrifices were performed according to the Law, the Covenant was contracted in these terms, Whosoever shall not call upon the Lord God of Israel, be he the least or the greatest, let him die the death. In making mention of the greatest, you see that the King himself is not excepted from the designed punishment.  
But who may punish the King (for here is question of corporal 
2 king. 23. 2.  and temporal punishment?) If it be not the whole body of the people to whom the King sweareth and obligeth himself, no more nor less, than the people do to the King, we read also that King Josias being of the age of twenty and 
2 Chron. 4. 29.  five years, together with the whole people, doth make a Covenant with the Lord, the King and the People promising to keep the Laws, and Ordinances of God, and even then for the better accomplishing of the tenor of this agreement, the Idolatry of Baal was presently destroyed. If any will more exactly turn over the holy Bible, he may well find other testimonies to this purpose.  
But to what purpose should the consent of the people be required, wherefore should Israel or Juda be expressly bound to observe the Law of God? for what reason should they promise so solemnly to be for ever the people of God? If it be denied, by the same reason that they had any authority from God, or power to free themselves from perjury, or to hinder the ruin of the Church. For to what end should it serve to cause the people to promise to be the people of God, if they must, and are bound to endure and suffer the King to draw them after strange Gods. If the people be absolutely in bondage wherefore is it commanded then, to take order that God be purely served? if it be so that they cannot properly oblige themselves to God, and if it be not lawful for them by all to endeavour the accomplishment of their promise, shall we say that God hath made an agreement with them, which had 
I. quod att●net. 32. 1. D. de reg. jur.  no right neither to promise, nor to keep promise? But on the contrary, in this business of making a Covenant with the people, God would openly and plainly show, that the people hath right to make, hold, and accomplish their promises and contracts. For, if he be not worthy to be heard in public Court that will bargain or contract with a slave, or one that is under tutelage, shall it not be much more shameful to lay this imputation upon the Almighty, that he should contract with those which had no power to perform the conditions covenanted? But for this occasion it was, that when the Kings had broken their Covenants, the Prophets always addressed themselves to the house of Juda and Jacob, and to Samaria, to advertise them of their duties. Furthermore, they required the people that they not only withdraw themselves from sacrificing to Baal, but also that they cast down his Idol, and destroy his Priests and service; yea, even maugre the King himself. For example, Ahab having killed the Prophets of God, the Prophet Elias assembleth the people, and as it were convented the Estates, and doth there tax, reprehend, and reprove every one of them; the people at his exhortation do take and put to death the Priests of Baal. And for so much as the King neglected his duty, it behoved Israel more carefully to discharge theirs without tumult, not rashly, but by public authority, the Estates being assembled, and the equity of the cause orderly debated, and sufficiently cleared before they came to the execution of justice. On the contrary, so often, and always when Israel hath failed to oppose their King, which would overthrow the service of God, that which hath been formerly said of the two Debtors, the inability and ill husbandry of the one doth ever prejudice the other, the same happened to them; for as the King hath been punished for his Idolatry and Disloyalty, the people have also been chastised for their negligence, connivency, and stupidity, and it hath commonly happened, that the Kings have been much more often swarved, and drawn others with them then the people, for so much as ordinarily the great ones mould themselves into the fashion of the King, and the people conform themselves in humours to those that govern them: to be brief, all more usually offend after the example of one, then that one will reform himself as he seethe all the rest. This which we say will perhaps appear more plainly by examples; what do we suppose to have been the cause of the defeat and overthrow of the Army of Israel with their King Saul. Doth God correct the people for the sins of the Prince? Is the child 
1 Sam. 31.  beaten instead of the Father? It is a discourse not easily to be digested, say the Civilians, to maintain that the children should bear the punishments due for the offences of their Fathers; the Laws do not permit that any one shall suffer for the wickedness of another. Now God forbidden that the Judge of all the world (saith 
Gen. 18. 25. Deut. 24. 16. 2 King. 14 6. Ezech. 18. 20.  Abraham) should destroy the innocent with the guilty: On the contrary (saith the Lord) as the life of the Father, so the life of the son is in my hands; the fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin, That overthrow then, did it not proceed for that the people opposed not Saul, when he violated the Law of God; but applauded that miserable Prince when he wickedly persecuted the best men, as David and the Priests of the Lord. Amongst many other examples let us only produce some few. The same Saul to enlarge the possessions of the tribe of juda broke the public faith granted to the Gibeonites, at the first entry of the people into the land of Canaan, 
Sam. 21. 1.  and put to death as many of the Gibeonites as he could come by. By this execution Saul did break the third Commandment, for God had been called to witness this agreement, and the sixth also, in so much as he murdered the innocent, he ought to have maintained the authority of the two Tables of the Law; and thereupon it is said, that Saul and his house have committed this wickedness. In the mean time, after the death of Saul, and David being established King, the Lord being demanded, made answer, that it was already the third year that the whole country of Israel was afflicted with famine, because of this cruelty, and the hand of the Lord ceased not to strike, until that seven men of the house of Saul were given to the Gibeonites, who put them to death; seeing 
L. crimen. 26. D. de pae●is  that every one ought to bear his own burden, and that no man is esteemed the inheritor of another's crime; wherefore they say, that all the whole people of Israel deserves to be punished for Saul, who was already dead, and had (as it might seem) that controversy buried in the same grave with him, but only in regard that the people neglected to oppose a mischief so public and apparent, although they ought and might have done it: Think you it reason, 
L. Sancimus c. de paenis.  not any be punished unless they deserve it? And in what hath the people here failed, but in suffering the offence of their King. In like manner when David commanded joab, and the Governors of 
1 Sam. 24. 2. 2 Chron. 21. 2.  Israel to number the people, he is taxed to have committed a great fault; for even as Israel provoked the anger of God in demanding a King, one in whose wisdom they seemed to repose their safety: even so David did much forget himself, in hoping for victory through the multitude of his subjects; for so much as that is properly 
Abacuc. 1. 16.  (according to the saying of the Prophet) to sacrifice unto their net, and burn incense unto their drag, a kind of abominable Idolatry; for the Governors, they seeing that it would draw evil on the people, a little drew back at the first; afterwards, as it were, to be rid of the importunity they made the enrolment: in the mean season all the people are punished, and not David alone, but also the ancients of Israel, which represented the whole body of the people, put on sackcloth and ashes, the which notwithstanding was not done nor practised when David committed those horrible sins of murder and adultery. Who sees not in this last act, that all had sinned, and that all should repent; and finally that all were chastised, to wit David that had provoked God by so wicked a commandment, the Governors (as Peers and Assessors of the Kingdom, aught in the name of all Israel to have opposed the King) by their connivency, and over weak resistance; and all the people also which made their appearance to be enroled. God in this respect did like a chief Commander, or General of an army, he chastised the offence of the whole camp, by a sudden alarm given to all, and by the exemplary punishments of some particulars to keep all the rest in better awe and order. But tell me wherefore 
2 King 24. 4. 2 Chron. 33. 10. jer. 15. 4.  after that the King Manasses had polluted the Temple at jerusalem, do we read that God not only taxed Manasses, but all the people also? was it not to advertise Israel one of the sureties, that if they keep not the King within the limits of his duty, they should all smart for it; for what meant the Prophet jeremy to say, the house of juda is in subjection to the Assyrians, because of the impiety and cruelty of Manasses? but that they were guilty of all his offences, because they made no resistance: wherefore S. Austin 
S. August. upon Psal. 82. Ambro. in office.  and S. Ambrose said, Herod and Pilate condemned Jesus Christ, the Priests delivered him to be crucified, the people seem to have some compassion, notwithstanding all are punished; and wherefore so? for so much as they are all guilty of his death, in that they did not deliver him out of the hands of those wicked Judges, and Governors, there must also be added to this, many other proofs drawn from divers Authors for the further explication of this point, were it not that the testimonies of holy Scripture ought to suffice Christians. Furthermore, in so much as it is the duty of a good Magistrate, rather to endeavour to hinder and prevent a mischief, then to chastise the delinquents after the offence is committed, as good Physicians that prescribe a diet to allay and prevent diseases, as well as medicines to cure them: In like manner a people truly affected to true religion, will not simply consent themselves to reprove and repress a Prince that would abolish the Law of God, but also will have special regard, that through malice and wickedness he innovate nothing that may hurt the same, or that in tract of time may corrupt the pure service of God; and instead of supporting public offences committed against the divine Majesty, they will take away all occasions wherewith the offenders might cover their faults; we read that to have been practised by all Israel by a decree of Parliament in the assembly of the whole people, to remonstrate to those beyond jordan, touching the Altar they had builded, and by the King Ezechias, which caused the brazen Serpent to be broken. It is then lawful for Israel to resist the King, which would overthrow the Law of God, and abolish his Church, and not only so, but also they ought to know that in neglecting to perform this duty, they make themselves culpable of the same crime, and shall bear the like punishment with their King.  
If their assaults be verbal, their defence must be likewise verbal, if the sword be drawn against them, they may also take arms, and fight either with tongue or hand, as occasion is: yea, if they be 
August. in Josh. 23. q. 2.  assailed by surprisals, they may make use both of ambuscadces, and countermines, there being no rule in lawful war, that directs them for the manner, whether it be by open assailing their enemy, or by close surprising, provided always, that they carefully distinguish between advantageous stratagems, and perfidious Treason, which is always unlawful.  
But I see well, here will be an objection made, what will you say? That a whole people, that beast of many heads, must they run 
Dominus l. 1. D. de dolo malo  in a mutinous disorder, to order the businesses of the Commonwealth? What address or direction is there in an unruly and unbridled multitude? what counsel or wisdom, to manage the affairs of State?  
When we speak of all the people, we understand by that, only 
What is to be understood by this word people.  those which hold their authority from the people, to wit, the Magistrates, which are inferior to the King, and whom the people hath substituted, or established, as it were Consorts in the Empire, and with a kind of tribunitial authority, to restrain the encroachments of Sovereignty, and to represent the whole body of the people. We understand also, the Assembly of the Estates, which is nothing else but an Epitome, or brief collection of the Kingdom, to whom all public affairs have special and absolute reference, such were the Seventy Ancients in the Kingdom of Israel, amongst whom the High Priest was as it were precedent, and they judged all matters of greatest importance, those seventy being first chosen by six out of each Tribe, which came out of the land of Egypt, than the Heads or Governors of Provinces; In like manner the Judges and Provosts of Towns, the Captains of thousands, the Centurions and others which commanded over Families, the most valiant noble and otherways notable personages, of whom was composed the body of the States, assembled divers times as it plainly appears by the words of the holy Scripture. At the election of the first King which was Saul, all the Ancients of Israel assembled together at 
1 Sam. 1. 4.  Rama. In like manner and all Israel was assembled, or all Judah and Benjamin, etc. Now it is no way probable that all the people one by one met together there. Of this rank there are in every well governed Kingdom, the Princes, the Officers of the Crown, the Peers, the greatest and most notable Lords, the Deputies of Provinces, of whom the ordinary body of the Estate is composed, or the Parliament, or the Diet, or other Assembly according to the different names used in divers Countries of the world, in which Assemblies the principal care is had both for the preventing and reforming either of disorder or detriment in Church or Commonwealth. For as the Counsels of Basil and Constance have decreed (and well decreed) that the universal Council is in Authority above the Bishop of Rome. As in like manner the whole Chapter may overrule the Bishop, the University, the Rector, the Court, the Precedent: Briefly he whosoever he is that hath received authority from a Company, is inferior ro that whole company, although he be superior to any of the particular Members of it. Also is it without any scruple or doubt, that Israel which demanded and established a King as Governor of the Public must needs be above Saul established at their request, and for Israel's sake as it shall be more fully proved hereafter. And for so much as an orderly proceeding is necessarily required in all affairs discreetly addressed, and that it is not so probably hopeful that order shall be observed amongst so great a number of people; yea, and that there oftentimes occurs occasions which may not be communicated to a multitude, without manifest danger of the Commonwealth. We say, that all that which hath been spoken of privileges granted, and right committed to the people, aught to be referred to the Officers and Deputies of the Kingdom: and all that which hath been said of Israel, is to be understood of the Princes and Elders of Israel, to whom these things were granted and committed as the practice also hath verified.  
The Queen Athalia after the death of her son Ahazia King of 
● Chron. 23.  Judah, put to death all those of the royal blood, except little Joas, which being yet in the cradle was preserved by the piety and wisdom of his Aunt jehoshabeah. Athalia possesseth herself of the government, and reigned six year over Judah. It may well be the people murmured between their teeth, and durst not by reason of danger express what they thought in their minds. Finally, Jehoida the Highpriest the husband of Jehoshabeah, having secretly made a league and combination with the chief men of the Kingdom, did anoint and Crown King his Nephew Joas, being but seven year old, And he did not content himself to drive the Queen-Mother from the royal Throne, but he also put her to death, and presently overthrew the Idolatry of Baal. This deed of Jehoiada is approved, and by good reason, for he took on him the defence of a good Cause, for he assailed the Tyranny, and not the Kingdom. The Tyranny 
Barto● de Tirann●d. Deut. 17. 15.  (I say) which had no Title, as our modern Civilians speak. For by no Law were women admitted to the government of the Kingdom of Judah. Furthermore, that Tyranny was in vigour and practice: For Athalia had with unbounded mischief and cruelty invaded the Realm of her Nephews, and in the administration of that Government committed, infinite wickedness, and which was the worst of all, had cast off the service of the the living God to adore and compel others with her the Idol of Baal. Therefore then was she justly punished, and by him which had a lawful calling and authority to do it. For Jehoida was not a private and particular person, but the Highpriest, to whom the knowledge of civil causes did then belong: And besides he had for his Associates the principal men of the Kingdom the Levites, and being himself the King's kinsman and ally. Now for so much as he assembled not the estates at Mizpah according to the accustomed manner, he is not reproved for it, neither for that he consulted and contrived the matter secretly, for that if he had held any other manner of proceeding, the business must probably have sailed in the execution and success. 
Bartol. in tract. de Guelph. & Gibel.   
A combination or conjuration is good or ill according as the end whereunto it is addressed is good or ill; and perhaps also according as they are affected which are the managers of it. We say then that the Princes of Judah have done well, and that in following any other course they had failed of the right way. For even as the guardian ought to take charge and care that the goods of his pupil fall not into loss and detriment, and if he omit his duty therein, he may be compelled to give an account thereof: In like manner, those to whose custody and tuition the people have committed themselves, and whom they have constituted their Tutors and defenders ought to maintain them safe & entire in all their rights and privileges. To be short as it is lawful for a whole people to resist and oppose Tyranny; 
Vlp. l. 260. D. de reg. ●●ui.  so likewise the principal persons of the Kingdom, may as heads and for the good of the whole body confederate and associate themselves together, and as in a public State, that which is done by the greatest part is esteemed and taken as the act of all, so in like manner must it be said to be done which the better part of the most principal have acted, briefly that all the people had their hand in it.  
But here presents itself another question the which deserves to 
Whether part of a Kingdom may make resistance.  be considered, and amply debated in regard of the circumstance of time. Let us put the case that a King seeking to abolish the Law of God, or ruin the Church, that all the people or the greatest part yield their consents, that all the Princes or the greatest number of them make no reckoniug; and notwithstanding, a small handful of people, to wit, some of the Princes and Magistrates desire to preserve the Law of God entirely and inviolably, and to serve the Lord purely: what may it be lawful for them to do? if the King seek to compel those men to be Idolaters, ot will take from them the exercise of true religion? We speak not here of private and particular persons considered one by one, and which in that manner are not held as parts of the entire body; As the planks, the nails, the pegs, are no part of the Ship, neither the stones, the rafters, nor the rubbish are any part of the house: but we speak of some Town or Province, which makes a portion of a Kingdom, as the prow, the poop, the keel and other parts make a Ship: the foundation, the roof, and the walls make a house. We speak also of the Magistrate which governs such a City or Province. If we must make our defence with producing of examples, although we have not many ready by reason of the backwardness and carelessness of men when there is question to maintain the service of God: notwithstanding, we have some few to be examined and received according as they deserve. Libna, a Town of the Priests withdrew it 
john 21 13. 1 Chron. 6. 17. 2 Chron. 21. 10.  self from the obedience of Joram King of Judah, and left that Prince, because he had abandoned the God of his Fathers whom those of that Town would serve, and it may be they feared also lest in the end they should be compelled to sacrifice to Baal. In like manner when that the King Antiochus commanded that all the Jews should embrace his religion, and should forsake that which the God Almighty had taught them, Mattathias answered, we will not 
1 Mac 1. 43. & 2. 22. & 3. 43.  obey, nor will we do any thing contrary to our religion, neither did he only speak, but also being transported with the zeal of Phineas, he killed with his own hands a Jew, which constrained his fellow Citizens to sacrifice to Idols; then he took arms and retired into the mountain, gathered troops, and made war against Antiochu, for Religion, and for his Country with such success, that he regained jerusalem, broke and brought to nothing the power of the Pagans which they had gathered to ruin the Church, and then reestablished the pure service of God. If we will know who this Mathias was, he was the Father of the Maccabees of the Tribe of Levi; insomuch as it was not lawful for him according to the received custom and right of his race to restore the Kingdom by arms from the Tyranny of Antiochus. His followers were such as fled to the mountains together, with the inhabitants of Modin, to whom had adjoined themselves divers neighbouring Jews, and other fugitives from sundry quarters of judeah; all which solicitously desired the re-establishment of the Church. Almost all the rest, yea, the principals obeyed Antiochus, and that after the rout of his army, and his own miserable death: Although there were then a fair 
1 Mac. 6. 21. etc.  occasion to shake off his yoke, yet the Jews sought to the son of Antiochus, and entreated him to take on him the Kingdom, promising him fidelity and obedience. I might here produce the example of Deborah. The Lord God had subjected Israel to jabin King of Canaan, and they had remained in this servitude the space of twenty years, which might seem in some sort to have gained a right by prescription over the Kingdom; and together also that almost all Israel followed after strange gods. The principal and most powerful Tribes, to wit, Reuben, Ephraim, Benjamin, Dan, Asher, and some others adhered wholly to jabin. Yet notwithstanding the Prophetess Deborah which judged Israel, caused the Tribes of Zebulon, Nephthalie, and Issachar, or at the lest some of all those Tribes, to take arms under the conduct of Barac, and they overthrew Sisera the Lieutenant of jabin, and delivered Israel, which had no thought of liberty, and was content to remain in bondage; and having shaken off the yoke of Canaaniets they reestablished the pure service of the living God. But for so much as Deborah seems to have an extraordinary vocation, and that the Scripture doth not approve in express terms the do of them of Libna, although that in not disallowing of their proceed, it may seem in some sort to allow them, and for that the History of the Maccabees hath had no great authority in the ancient Church and for that it is commonly held that an assertion must be proved by laws and testimonies, not by examples, let us examine by the effect what we ought to judge according to the right of the matter now in question. We have formerly said that the King did swear to keep the Law of God, and promise to the uttermost of his power to maintain the Church: that the people of Israel considered in one body covenanting by the Highpriest, made the same promise to God. Now at this present we say, that all the Towns, and all the Magistrates of these Towns which be parts and portions of the Kingdom, promise each of them in his own behalf, and in express terms the which all Towns and Christian Commonalties have also done, although it have been but with a tacit consent. joshua being 
josuah ●4.  very old and near to his death, assembled all Israel at Sichem in the presence of God, to wit, before the Ark of the Covenant which was there. It is said that the Ancients of the people, the Heads of the Tribe, the Judges and Governors, and all which had any public command in the Towns of Israel met together there, where they swore to observe and keep the Law of the Lord. and did willingly put on the yoke of the Almighty God: whereby it appears that these Magistrates did oblige themselves in the names of their Towns and Commonalties which did send them to take order that God should be served throughout the whole Country, according as he had revealed in his Law. And Joshuah for his part having passed this contract of agreement between God and the people and enregistered the whole according as it was done, for a perpetual memorial of the matter he incontinently set up a stone.  
If there were occasion to remove the Ark of the Lord, The 
1 Chron. 1●. 2 Chron. 3. 1 Kings 7. 1 Chron. 2●. 2 Kings ●●. 2 Kings 23. 2 Chron. 23.  principals of the Country and Towns, the Captains the Centurions, the Provosts, and others were summoned by the Decree and Commandment of David, and of the Synagogue of Israel, if there be a purpose of building the Lords Temple, the same course is observed. And to the end it be not supposed, that some alteration hath been inserted after the creation of Kings: In the times of Joas and Josias, when there was question of renewing the Covenant between God and the People, all the Estates met together, and all were bound and obliged particularly. Also not only the King, but the Kingdom, and not only all the Kingdom, but also all the Pastors of the Kingdom promise each of them for their selves, fidelity and obedience to God. I say again, that not only the King and the People, but also all the Towns of Israel, and their Magistrates, oblige themselves to God, and as homagers to their liege lord tie themselves to be his for ever, with and against all men, for further proof of the aforesaid, I would entreat the Reader to diligently turn over the holy Bible, especially in the books of the Kings and the Chronicles. But for a yet more ample explication of this matter, let us produce for example what is in practice at this day. In the Empire of Germany, when the Emperor is to be crowned, the Electors and Princes of the Empire, as well Secular as Ecclesiastical, meet together personally, or else send their Ambassadors. The Prelates, Earls, and Barons, and all the Deputies of the Imperial Towns, come thither also, or else send special Proxies; then do they their homage to the Emperor; either for themselves, or for them whom they represent, with and under certain conditions: Now let us presuppose that one of these which hath done homage voluntarily, do afterwards endeavour to depose the Emperor, and advance himself into his place, and that the Princes and Barons deny their Sovereign the succours and tribute which they own him, and that they have intelligence with that other which conspired and sought to possess himself of the Imperial Throne: Think you that they of Straesborgh or of Nurembergh, which have bound themselves by faith unto the lawful Emperor, have not lawful right to repress and exclude this traitorous Intruder? Yea, on the contrary, if they do it not, if they give not succours to the Emperor in this his necessity, think you that they have satisfied or performed their fealty and promise, 
L. 3. l. Omned elict. Sect. ult. D. de re●mil.  seeing that he which hath not preserved his Governor when he had means to do it, aught to be held as culpable and guilty, as he which offered the violence and injury unto him. If it be so (as every one may sufficiently see it is) is it not then lawful for the men of Libna and of Modin? and doth not their duty enjoin them to do as much as if the other Estates of the Kingdom have left God to whose service and pleasure they know and acknowledge themselves to be bound to render obedience. Let us imagine then some joram or Antiochus which abolisheth true Religion, and lifts up himself above God, that Israel connives and is content, What should that Town do which desires to serve God purely? First, they should say with joshua, for their parts, look whom you desire rather to 
Iosh. 14. 15.  obey, the living God, or the Gods of the Amorites, for our parts we and our Families will serve the Lord. Choose you then I say, if you will obey in this point him, which without any right usurps that power and authority which no way appertains unto him, for my part, hap what may, I will keep my faith to him to whom I promised it. I make no question but that joshua would have done the uttermost of his endeavour to maintain the pure service of the living God in Thamnathe Serathe, a Town of Ephraim, where his house and estate lay; if the Israelites besides had so much forgot themselves as to have worshipped the god of the Amorites in the land of Canaan. But if the King should pass yet further, and send his Lieutenants to compel us to become Idolaters, and if he commands us to drive God and his service from amongst us; Shall we not rather shut our gates against the King and his Officers, then drive out of our Town the Lord which is the King of kings? Let the Burgesses and Citizens of Towns, Let the Magistrates and Governors of the People of God dwelling in Towns, consider with themselves that they have contracted two Covenants, and taken two Oaths: The first and most ancient with God, to whom the People have sworn to be his people: the second and next following, with the King, to whom the people hath promised obedience, as unto him which is the Governor and Conductor of the people of God. So then, as if a Viceroy conspiring against his Sovereign, although he had received from him an unlimited authority, if he should summon us to deliver the King whom he held besieged within the enclosure of our walls, we ought not to obey him, but resist with the uttermost of our power and means according to the tenor of our oath of Allegiance: In like manner think we that it is not a wickedness of all most detestable, if at the pleasure of a Prince which is the vassal and servant of God, we should drive God from dwelling amongst us, or deliver him (as far as in us 
10 Collatine de forma Fidei, etc. 1. de ● nova fidel. form.  lieth) into the hands of his enemies. You will say, it may be that the Towns appertain to the Prince. And I answer, that the Towns consist not of a heap of stones, but of that which we call people, that the people is the people of God, to whom they are first bound by oath: and secondly, to the King. For the Towns, although that the Kings have power over them, notwithstanding the right of inheritance of the Soil belongs to the Citizens and Owners, for all that which is in a Kingdom, is indeed under the Dominion of the King, but not of his proper Patrimony: God in truth is the only Lord propriator of all things, and it is of him that the King holds 
Senec. l. 7. the Benef. c. 6, 7. etc.  his royalties, and the people their Patrimony. This is as much as to say, you will reply, that for the cause of Religion it shall be lawful for the subjects to revolt from the obedience of their King, if this be once granted, it will presently open a gap to rebellion? But harken I pray you patiently, and consider this matter more throughly: I might answer in a word, that of two things, if the one must needs be done, it were much better to forsake the King, than God; or with S. Augustine in his fourth book of the City of God, chap. 4. and in the nineteenth book, and chapter the 21. That where there is no Justice, there is no Commonwealth. That there is no Justice, when he that is a mortal man would pull an other man out of the hands of the immortal God, to make him a slave of the devil, seeing that Justice is a virtue that gives to every one that which is his own, and that those which draw their necks out of the yoke of such Rulers, deliver themselves from the Tyranny of wicked spirits, and abandon a multitude of robbers, and not the Commonwealth. But to reassume this discourse a little higher, those which shall carry themselves as hath been formerly said, seem no ways accusable of the crime of revolt. Those are said properly to quit the King or the Commonwealth, which with the heart and purpose of an Enemy withdraw themselves from the obedience of the King or the Commonwealth, by means whereof they are justly accounted adversaries, and are oftentimes much more to be feared then any other enemies. But those of whom we now speak, do nothing resemble them. First they do in no sort refuse to obey, provided that they be commanded that which they may lawfully 
L 5. D. de cap. minute.  do, and that it be not against the honour of God. They pay willingly the Taxes, Customs, Imposts, and ordinary payments, provided that with these they seek not to abolish the tribute which they owe unto God. They obey Caesar while he commands in the quality of Caesar: but when Caesar passeth his bounds, when he usurps that Dominion which is none of his own, when he endeavours to assail the Throne of God, when he wars against the sovereign Lord both of himself and the people; they then esteem it reasonable not to obey Caesar: and yet after this to speak properly, they do no acts of hostility. He is properly an enemy which stirs up, which provokes another, which out of military insolency prepareth and seateth forth parties to war. They have been urged and assailed by open war, and close and treacherous surprisals: when death and destruction environs them round about, than they take arms, and wade their enemy's assaults: you cannot have Place with your enemies when you will; for if you lay down your weapons, if you give over making War they will not for all that disarm themselves, and lose their advantage. But for these men, desire but place and you have it, give over but assailing them, and they will lay down their Arms, cease to fight against God, and they will presently leave the lists, will you take their Swords out of their hands? abstain you only then from striking, seeing they are not the assailants, but the defendants, sheathe your Sword, and they will presently cast their Buckler on the ground, which hath been the reason that they have been often surprised by perfidious atribuscadoes, whereof these our times have afforded over frequent examples. Now as we cannot call that servant stubborn or a fugitive, which puts by the blow, which his Lord strikes at him with his Sword, or which withdraws or hides himself from his Master's fury, or shuts his Chamber door upon him, until his cole● land heat be passedover, much less ought we to esteem those seditions, which (holding the name and place of Servants and subjects) shut the gates of a City against their Prince, transported with anger, being ready to do all his just Commanddements, after he hath recovered his judgement, and related his former indignation; we must place in this rank, David Commander of the Army of 
1 Sam. 21. 22. 2 Sam. 25. 28.  Israel, under Saul, a furious King. David oppressed with Calumnies and false Taxations, watched and way-layed from all parts, he retired unto, and defended himself in unaccessible Mountains, and provided for his defence to oppose the walls of Ceila against the fury of the King, yea, he drew unto his party all those that he could, not to take away saul's life from him, as it plainly appeared afterwards; but to defend his own Cause: see wherefore jonathan the Son of Saul, made no difficulty, to make alliance with David, and to renew it from time to time; the which is called the Alliance of the Almighty. And Abbigall saith in expresso words, that David was wrongfully assailed, and that he made the War of God. We must also place in this rank the Maccabees; which having 
Macha. 6. 60. etc.  good means to maintain Wars, were content to receive peace from King Demetrius, and others, which Antiochus had offered them before, because by it, they should be secured in the free profession and exercise of their Religion. We may remember that those which in our times have fought for true Religion against Antichrist, both in Germany and France, have laid down Arms as soon as it was permitted them to serve God truly according to his Ordinance, and oftentimes having fair means and occasion to advance and continue the War to their much advantage: as had David and the Maccabees, where the Philistines constrained Saul to leave David to look to his own defence, and those Clouds of neighbouring enemies in Antiochus, saw ready to dissclue upon his head, hindered him also from further pursuing the Maccabees. See then the marks which distinguish and separate sufficiently, those of whom we speak from Rebels or seditions.  
But let us yet see other evident Testimonies of the equity of their cause; for their defection is of that nature, that take but away the occasion, if some extreme necessity compel not the contrary, they presently return to their former condition, and then you cannot properly say, they separated themselves from the King, or the Communality; but that they left joram, and Antiochus, or if you will, the Tyranny and unlawful power of one alone, or if divers particulars, which had no authority nor right to exact obedience in the same manner, as they commanded. The Sorbonists Doctors have taught us the like sundry times: whereof we will allege some examples.  
About the year 1300. Pope Boniface the 8 seeking to appropriate to his 
annal Franciae. Archiva Camerae Ratiocimorum. Lutetiae.  Sea, the copalties that belonged to the Crown of France: Philip the fair, the then King, doth taunt him somewhat sharply: the tenor of whose care letters are these.  
Philip by the Grace of God, King of the French, to Boniface, calling himself Sovereign Bishop, little or no health at all.  
Be it known to the great foolishness and unbounded rashness, that in temporal matters we have only God for our superior, and that the vacancy of certain Churches, and pretends belongs to us by copal prerogative, and that it appertains to us only to gather the fruits, and we will defend the possession thereof against all opposers, with the edge of our Swords, accounting them fools, and without brains that hold a contrary opinion. In those times all men acknowledged the Pope for God's Vicar on earth, and head of the universal Church: Insomuch, that (as it is said) common error went instead of a Law, notwithstanding the Sorbonists being assembled, and demanded, made answer, that the 
L. Parber, Philip D. de Senat.  King and the Kingdom might falsely without blame or danger of schism, exempt themselves from his obedience, and flatly refuse that, which the Pope demanded; for so much as it is not the separation: but the cause which makes the schism, and if there were schism, it should be only in separating from Boniface, and not from the Church, nor from the Pope, and that there was no danger nor offence in so remaining until some honest man were chosen Pope. Every one knows into what perplexities, the consciences of a whole Kingdom would fall, which held themselves separated from the Church, if this distinction be not true. I would demand now, if it be not yet more lawful to make use of this distinction, when a King invades and incroacheth on the jurisdiction of God, and oppresseth with hand servitude, the scales dearly bought with the precious blood of Jesus Christ. Let us add another example.  
In the year of our Lord 2408. when Pope Benedict the 13. did oppose the French Church by tributes, and exactions, the Clergy assembled; by the Command of King Charles the 6. decreed: that the King and Inhabitants 
Annals of France monstrelet.  of the Kingdom, ought not to obey Benedict, which was an Heritick, a schismatic, and altogether unworthy of that dignity: the which the Estates of the Kingdom approved, and the Parliament of Paris confirmed by a decree. The same Clergy also ordained that those which had been excommunicated by that Pope: as forsakers and enemies of the Church, should be presently absolved, nullifying all such excommunications, and this hath been practised not in France only, but in other places also: as Histories do credibly report. The which gives us just occasio●●ost perspicuously to see and know, that if he which holds the place of a Prince do govern ill, there may be a separation from him without incurring justly the blame of revolt; for that they are things in themselves directly contrary, to leave a bad Pope, and forsake the Church, a wicked King, and the Kingdom. To return to those of Lobna, they seem to have followed 
2 Kings 19 8.  this before remembered expedient; for after the reestablishment of the service of God, they presently became again the subjects of King Ezekias. And if ti is distinction be allowed place, when a Pope incroacheth on the rights of any Prince, which notwithstanding in some cases acknowledgeth him for his Sovereign: Is it not much more allowable, if a Prince which is a Vassal in that respect, endeavours to assure and appropriate to himself the rights of God. Let us conclude then to end this discourse, that all the people by the authority of those, into whose hands they have committed their Power, or divers of them may, and aught to 
Extrau. de majo. & obed.  reprove and repress a Prince, which Commands things against God. In like manner, that all, or at the least, the principals of Provinces or Towns, under the authority of the chief Magistrates, established first by God, and secondly by the Prince, may according to Law and reason, hinder the entrance of Idolatry, within the enclosure of their walls, and maintain their true Religion: yea further, they may extend the Confines of the Church, which is but one, and in failing hereof, if they have means to do it: they justly incur the penalty of High-Treason against the Divine Majesty.  

Whether private men may resist by Arms.  
It remains now that we speak of particulars which are private persons. First, particulars or private persons, are not bound to take up arms 'gainst the Prince which would compel them to become Idolaters. The 
L. sicut 7, 5. 1. D. qu●d cujusque ●nivens.  Cove-nant between God & all the people who promise to be the people of God, doth not in any sort bind them to that; for as that which belongs to the whole universal body, is in no sort proper to particulars: so in like manner that which the body owes and is bound to perform, cannot by any sensible reason be required of particular persons: neither doth their duty any thing oblige them to it; for every one is bound to serve God in that proper vocation, to which this called. Now private persons they have no power, they have no public command, nor any calling to unsheathe the sword of authority; And therefore as God hath not put the sword into the hands of private men: so doth he not require in any sort that they should strike with it. It is said to them, put up thy sword into thy scabbard. On the contrary the Apostle says of Magistrates, 
Mat. 26 52. Rom. 13. 4.  they carry not the sword in vain; If particular men draw it forth, they make themselves Delinquents; If Magistrates be slow and negligent to use it when just occasion is offered, they are likewise justly unblamable of negligence in performing their duties, and equally guilty with the former. But you will say unto me, hath not God made a Covenant, as well with particular persons as with the generality, with the least as well as the higest? To what purpose was Circumcision, and Baptism ordained? What meaneth that frequent repetition of the Covenant in so many passages of holy writ? All this is true, but the consideration hereof is divers in their several kinds; For as all the subjects of a good and faithful Prince, of what degree soever they be are bound to obey him; but some of them notwithstanding have their particular duty, as Magistrates must hold others in obedience, in like manner all men are bound to serve God; but some as they are placed in a higher rank, have received greater authority in so much as they are accountable for the offences of others, if they attend not the charges of the Communality carefully.  
The Kings, the Commonalties of people, the Magistrates into whose hands the whole body of the Commonwealth hath committed the sword of authority, must and ought to take care that the Church be maintained and preserved, particulars ought only to look that they render themselves members of this Church. Kings and popular Estates are bound to hinder the pollution or ruin of the Temple of God, & aught to free and defend it from all corruption within, and all injury from without. Private men must take order that their bodies the Temples of of God, be pure, that they may be fit recptacles for the Holyghoast to dwell in them. If any man defile the Temple of God, saith the Apostle, him 
1 Cor. 3. 17. & 6. 19  shall God destroy; for the Temple of God is holy, which Temple ye are, to the former he gives the sword, which they bear with authority: to the other he recommends the sword of the spirit only, to wit, the word of God, wherewith St. Paul arms all Christians, against the assaults of the 
Ephes. 6. 17.  Devil, what shall then private men do? if the King will constrain them to serve Idols? If the Magistrates into whose hands the people hath consigned their authority, or if the Magistrates of the place, where these particulars dwell, do oppose these proceed of the King: let them in God's name obey their leaders, and employ all their means (as in the service of God) to aid the holy and commendable enterprises of those, which oppose themselves lawfully, against his wicked intention. Amongst others, they have the examples of the Centurions, and men at arms, which readily and cheerfully obeyed the Princes of juda, who stirred up by jehoydas, purged the Church from all profanation, & delivered the Kingdom from the tyranny of Athiliah. But if the Princes, and Magistrates, approve the courses of an outrageous and irreligious Prince, or if they do not resist him, we must lend our ears to the Council of Jesus Christ, to wit, to retire 
Mat. 10. 23.  ourselves into some other place; we have the example of the faithful mixed amongst the 10. Tribes of Israel, who seeing the true service of God abolished by jeroboam, and that none made any account of it, they retired 
2 Chron. 11. 13. & 15. 9 Heb. 6. 6. Mat. 10. 28. Exod. 12. etc. jud. 3. 16. 2 Kings 9  themselves into the territories of juda, where Religion remained in her purity: let us rather forsake our livelihoods and lives, than God, let us rather be crucified ourselves, then crucify the Lord of life: fear not them (saith the Lord) which can only kill the body. He himself, his Apostles, and an infinite number of Christian martyrs, have taught us this by their examples; shall it not then be permitted to any private person to resist by Arms? what shall we say of Moses, which lead Israel away in despite of King Pharaoh? And of Ehua, which after 10. years' servitude, when Israel might seem to belong by right of prescription, to him which held the possession thereof, he killed Eglon, the King of Moab, and delivered Israel from the yoke of the Moabites, and of johu, which put to death his Lord the King joram, exterpated the race of Ahab, and destroyed the Priests of Baal, were not these particulars? I answer, that if they be considered in themselves, they may well be accounted particular persons, insomuch as they had not any ordinary vocation; But, seeing that we know that they were called extraordinarily, and that God himself hath (if we may so speak) put his sword into their hands, be it far from us to account them particular or private persons, but rather let us esteem them by many degrees, excelling any ordinary Magistrates whatsoever. The calling of Moses is approved by the express word of God, and by most evident miracles, it is said of Ehud, that God stirred him up to kill the Tyrant, and deliver Israel; for jehu, he was anointed by the Commandment of the Prophet Elizeus, for to root out the race of Ahab, besides, that the principal men saluted him King, before he executed any thing. There may as much be said of all the rest, whose examples are propounded in holy writ. But where God Almighty doth not speak with his own mouth, nor extraordinarily by his Prophets, it is there that we ought to be exceeding cautious, and to stand upon our guards; for if any supposing he is inspired by the Holy-Ghost, do attribute to himself the before mentioned authority, I would entreat him to look that he be not puffed up with vain glory, and lest he make not a God to himself of his own fancy, and sacrifice to his own inventions, let him not then be conceived with vanity, lest instead of fruit he bring forth deluding lies. Let the people also be advised on their parts, lest in desiring to fight under the Banner of Jesus Christ, they run not to their own confusion to follow the Army of some galilean Thendas, or of Barcezha: as it happened to the Peasants and Anabaptists of Munster, in Germany, in the year 1323. I will not say, notwithstanding that the same God which to punish our offences, hath sent us in these our days, both Pharaoh's and Ahabs, may not sometimes raise up extraordinary deliverances to his people: certainly his justice and his mercy continue to all ages, firm and immutable. Now if these visible miracles appear not as in former times; we may yet at the least full by the effects that God works miraculously in our hearts, which is when we have our minds free from all ambition, a true and earnest ●eale, a right knowledge, and conscience; lest being guided by the spirit of error or ambition, we rather make Idols of our own imaginations, then serve and worship the true and living God.   

Whether it be lawful to take Arms for Religion.  
Furthermore to take away all scruple, we must necessarily answer, those which esteem, or else would, that others should think they hold that opinion, that the Church ought not to be defended by Arms. They say with all that, it was not without a great Mystery, that God did forbid in 
Exod. 20. 25. Deut. 27. 3. 1 Kings 6. 7  the Law, that the Altar should be made or adorned with the help of any tool of Iron; in like manner, that at the building of the Temple of Solamon: there was not heard any noise of Axe or Hammer, or other tools of Iron; from whence they collect that the Church which is the lively Temple of the Lord, ought not to be reform by Arms; yea, as if the stones of the Altar, and of the Temple, were ●ewed and taken out of the quarries without any instrument of Iron, which the text of the holy Scripture doth sufficiently clear. But if we oppose to this goodly Allegory, that which is written in the fourth Chapter of the book of Nehemiah, that one part of the people, carried mortar, and another part stood ready with their weapons, that some held in one hand their swords, and with the other carried the materials to the workmen, for the rebuilding of the Temple: to the end, by this means to prevent their enemies from ruining their work, we say also that the Church, is neither advanced, nor edified by these material weapons; but by these arms it is warranted, and preserved from the violence of the enemies, which will not by any means endure the increase of i●. Briefly, there hath been an infinite number of good Kings and Princes, (as Histories do testify, which by Arms: have maintained and defended the service of God against Pagans. They reply readily to this, that Wars in this manner were allowable under the Law▪ but since the time that grace hath been offered by Jesus Christ, who would not enter into jerusalem mounted on a brave horse; but meekly sitting on an ass: this manner of proceeding hath had an end, I answer first, that all agree with me in this, that our Saviour Christ during all the time that he conversed in this world, took not on him the Office of a Judge, or King; but rather of a private person, and a Delinquent by imputation of our transgressions: so that it is an allegation besides the purpose, to say that he hath not managed Arms. But I would willingly demand of such exceptionists: whether they think that by the coming of Jesus Christ in the flesh, that Magistrates have lost their right in the sword of Authority? If they say so, Saint Paul contradicts them, who says that the Magistrates carries not the sword in vain, and did not refuse their assistance 
Rom. 13 4. Acts 23. 17.  and power, against the violence of those which had conspired his death. And if they consent to the saying of the Apostle to what purpose should the Magistrates beat the sword, if it be not to serve God, who hath committed it to them, to defend the good and punish the bad? Can they do better service then to preserve the Church from the violence of the wicked, & to deliver the flock of Christ, from the swords of murderers? I would demand of them yet, whether they think that all use of Arms is forbidden to Christians? If this be their opinion, then would I know of them, wherefore Christ did grant to the Centurion his request? Wherefore did he give 
Matt. 8. 9 13. Luc. 3. 14. Act. 10. 47.  so excellent a testimony of him? wherefore doth St. john Baptist command the men at Arms to content themselves with their pay, and not to use any extortion and doth not rather persuade them to leave their ●●●ing? Wherefore did Saint Peter Baptise Cornellus the Centurion who was the first fruits of the Gentiles? From whence comes it that he did not in any sort whatsoever council him to leave his charge? Now if to bear arms & to make war be a thing lawful, can there possibly be found any war more just, then that which is taken in hand by the command of the superior, for the defence of the Church, and the preservation of the faithful? Is there any greater tyranny, then that which is exercised over the soul? Can there be imagined a war more commendable than that which suppresseth such a tyranny? For the last point, I would willingly know of these men, whether it be absolutely prohibited Christians, to make war upon any occasion whatsoever? If they say that it is forbidden them: from whence comes it then that the men at Arms, Captains, and Centurions, which had no other employment; but the managing of Arms were always received into the Church? wherefore do the ancient Fathers, and Christian Historians make so horrible mention, of certain legions composed wholly of Christian Soldiers, and amongst others of that of Malta, so renowned; for the victory which they obtained, and of that of Thebes, of the which St. Mauricious was General, who suffered martyrdom together with all his Troops, for the confessing of the name of Jesus Christ? And if it be permitted to make war (as it may be they will confess) to keep the limits and Towns of a Country, and to repulse an invading enemy: Is it not yet a thing much more reasonable, to take Arms to preserve and defend honest men, to suppress the wicked, and to keep and defend the limits and bounds of the Church, which is the Kingdom of Jesus Christ? if it were otherways, to what purpose? should St. john have foretold, that the whore of Babylon, shall be finally ruined by 
Apoc. 27. 26.  the 10. Kings, whom she hath bewitched? furthermore, if we h●ld a contrary opinion, what shall we say of the wares of Constantine, against Maxentius, and Licinius, celebrated by so many public orations, and approved by the Testimony of an infinite number of learned men, what opinion should we hold of the many voyages, made by Christian Princes, against the Turks and Saracens to conquer the holy Land, who had not, or at the least, ought not to have had, any other end in their designs; but to hinder the enemy from ruining the Temple of the Land, and to restore the integrity of his service into those Countries. Although then that the Church be not increased by Arms, notwithstanding it may be justly preserved by the means of Arms; I say further, that those that die in so holy a war, are no less● the Martyrs of Jesus Christ, than their brethren which were put to death for Religion; nay, they which die in that war seem to have this inadvantage, that with a free will & knowing sufficiently hazard, into which they cast themselves, notwithstanding, do courageously expose their lives to death and danger, whereas other do only not refuse death, when it behoveth them to suffer. The Turks strive to advance their opinion by the means of Arms, and if they do subdue a Country, they presently bringin by force the impieties of Mahomet; who in his Alcoran, hath so recommended Arms: as they are not ashamed to say it is the ready way to Heaven, yet do the Turks constrain no man in matter of conscierce. But he which is a much greater adversary to Christ, and true Religion, with all those Kings whom he hath enchanted, opposeth fire and faggots, to the light of the Gospel, tortures the word of God, compelling by wracking, and torments, as much as in him lieth: all men to become Idolaters, and finally is not ashamed, to advance and maintain their faith and law by perfidious disloyalty, and their traditions by continual traysons. Now on the contrary, those good Princes and Magistrates, are said properly to defend themselves, which invirone and fortify by all their means and industry the vine of Christ, already planted, ●o be planted in places where it hath not yet been, lest the wild boor of the Forest should sp●yl● or devour it: They do this (I say) in covering with their Buckler, and defending with their sword, those which by the preaching of the Gospel have been converted to true Religion, and in fortifying with their best ability, by ●avelin●, ditches, and rampers the Temple of God built with lively stones, until it Have attained the full height, in despite of all the furious assaults of the enemies thereof, we have lengthened out this discourse thus far, to the end, we might take away all scruple concerning this question. Set then the Estates, and all the Officers of a Kingdom, or the greatest part of them, every one established in authority by the people: know, that if they contain not within his bounds (or at the least, employ not the utmost of their endeavours thereto) a King that seeks to corrupt the Law of God, or hinders the reestablishment thereof, that they offend grievously against the Lord, with whom they have contracted Covenants upon those conditions: Those of a Town, or of a Province, making a portion of a Kingdom, let them know also, that they draw upon themselves the judgement of God, if they drive not impiety out of their walls and confines, if the King seek to bring it in, or if they be wanting to preserve by all means, the pure Doctrine of the Gospel, although for the defence thereof, they suffer for a time banishment, or any other misery. Finally, more private men must be all advertised, that nothing can excuse them, if they obey any in that which offends God, and that yet they have no right nor warrant, neither may in any sort by their private authority take arms, if it appear not most evidently, that they have extraordinary vocation thereunto, all which our discourse will suppose we have confirmed by pregnant Testimonies drawn from holy writ.    

THE THIRD QUESTION. Whether it be lawful to resist a Prince which doth oppress or ruin a public State, and how far such resistance may be extended, by whom, how, and by what right, or law it is permitted.  
FOr so much as we must here dispute of the lawful authority of a lawful Prince, I am confident that this question will be the less acceptable to Tyrants, and wicked Princes; for it is no marvel if those which receive no law, but what their own will, and fancy dictates unto them, be deaf unto the voice of that law which is grounded upon reason. Bu● I persuade myself that good Princes will willingly entertain this discourse, insomuch as they sufficiently know that all Magistrates, be they of never so high a rank, are but an inanimated and speaking law, neither though any thing be pressed home against the bad, can it fall within any inference against the good. Tyrants and Kings, as also good and bad Princes are in a direct diametre opposite and contrary; therefore that which shall be urged against Tyrants, is so fare from detracting any thing from Kings, as one the contrary, the more Tyrants are laid open in their proper colours, the more glorious doth the true worth, & dignity of Kings appear: neither can the vicious imperfections the one be laid open but it gives addition of perfections, and respect to the honour of the other. But for tyrants let them say and think what they please, that shall be the least of my care; for it is not to them, but again them that I writ; for Kings I believe that they will readily consent to that which is propounded, for by true proportion of reason they ought as much to hate Tyrants and wicked governor's. as Shepeards' hate wolves, Physicians, empoisoners, true Prophets, false Doctors for it must necessarily occur that reason infuseth into good Kings as much hatred against Tyrants, as nature imprinteth in dogs against wolves, for as the one lives by rapine and spoil, so the other is borne or bred to redress and prevent all such outrages. It may be the flatterers of tyrants will cast a supercilious aspect on these lines; but if they were not passed all grace they would rather blush for shame I very well know that the friends and faithful servants of Kings will not only approve and lovingly entertain this discourse but also with their best abilities defend the contents thereof accordingly then as the render shall find himself moved either with content or dislike in the reading hereof, let him know that by that he shall plainly discover either the affection, or hatred that he bears to Tyrants, let us now enter into the matter.  

King's are made by the People.  
We have showed before that it is God, that doth appoint Kings, which chooseth them, which gives the Kingdom to them: now we say that the people establish Kings, putteth the Sceptre into their hands, and which with their suffrages, approveth the election. God would have it done in this manner, to the end, that the Kings should acknowledge, that after God they held their power and Sovereignty from the people, and that it might the rather induce them, to apply & address the utmost of their care and thoughts for the profit of the people, without being puffed with any vain imagination: that they were form of any matter more excellent than other men; for which they were raised so high above others: as if they were to command over slocks of sheep, or herds of cattle; but let them remember and know, that they are of the same mould and condition as others, raised from the earth by the voice and acclamations: now as it were upon the shoulders of the people unto their thrones, that they might afterwards bear on their own shoulders the greatest burdens of the Commonwealth. Divers ages before that, the people of Israel demanded a King. God gave and appointed the Law of royal government contained in the 17. Chapter. ver. 14. of Deut. when says Moses, thou art come u●to ●he Land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein, and shalt say, I will set a King over me like as all the Nations that are about me, thou shalt in any wise set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose from amongst thy brethren, etc. You see here, that the election of the King is attributed to God, the establishment to the people: now when the practice of this law came in use, see in what manner they proceeded. The Elders of Israel which presented 
1 Sam. 8. 5.  the whole body of the people, (under this name of Elders, are comprehended the Captains, the Centurions, Commanders over fifties and tenns, Judges, provosts; but principally the chiefest of tribes) came to meet Samuel in Ramah, and not being willing longer to endure the government of the sons of Samuel, whose ill carriage had justly drawn on them: the people's dislike, and withal persuading themselves that they had found the means to make their wars hereafter with more advantage they demanded 
1 Sam. 9 16.  a King of Samuel, who ask Council of the Lord, he made known that he had chosen Saul for the Governor of his people. Then Samuel anointed Saul, and performed all those rights which belong to the election of a King required by the people. Now this might perhaps have seemed sufficient, if Samuel had presented to the people the King that was chosen by God, and had admonished them all to become good and obedient subjects. Notwithstanding to the end, that the King might know that he was established 
1 Sam. 20. 18. etc.  by the people, Samuel appointed the Estates to meet at Mispah, where being assembled as if the business were but then to begin, and nothing had already been done, to be brief as if the election of Saul were then only to be treated of, the lot is cast and falls on the Tribe of Benjamin, after on the family of Matri, and lastly on Saul, born of that family who was the same that God had chosen; Then by the consent of all the people Saul was declared King. Finally, to the that Saul nor any other might attribute the aforesaid 
1 Sam. 11. 14.  business to chance of lot, after that Saul had made some proof of his valour in raising the siege of the Ammonites in jabesh Gilead: some of the people pressing the business he was again confirmed King in a full assembly at Gilgal; ye see that he whom God had chosen, and the lo● had separated from all the rest, is established King by the suffrages of the people.  
And for David, by the Commandment of God, and in a manner more evident 
● Sam. ●6.  than the former, after the rejection of Saul, Samuel anointed for King over Israel David chosen by the Lord, which being done the spirit of the Lord presently left saul, and wrought in a special manner in David; But David notwithstanding reigns not, but was compeled to save himself in deserts and rocks, oftentimes falling upon the very brim of destruction, and never reigned as King till after the death of Saul: for then by the suffrages of all the people of judah he was first chosen King of judah, and seven years after by the consent of all Israel, he was inaugurated King of Israel in Hebron. So then he is anointed first by the Prophet at the commandment of God, as a token he was chosen, secondly by the commandment of the people when he was established King. And that to the end that Kings may always remember that it is from God; but by the people, and for the people's sake that they 
2 Sam. 2.  do raignt, and that in there glory they say not (as is there custom) that they hold their Kingdom only of God and there sword, but withal add that it was the people which first girt them with that sword. The same order offered in Solomon, although he was the King's son God hath chosen Solomon, to sit upon the Throne of his Kingdom, and by express words 
2 Sam. 7. 13. 1 Kings 3. Chron. 28. 5 1 Kings 2. 32. 1 Chron. 28. 1. & 20. 22. 24.  had promised David to be with him and assist him as a Father his soon. David had with his one mouth designed Solomon to be successor to his Crown in the presence of some of the principal of his Court. But this was not enough and therefore David assembled at jerusalem the Princes of Israel, the heads of the Tribes the Captains of the Soldiers and ordinance officers of the Kings, the centurions & other Magistrates of Towns together with his sons, the noble men and worthiest personages of the Kingdom, to consult and resolve upon the election. In this Assembly after they had called upon the name of God, Solomon by the consent of the whole congregation proclaimed and anointed for King, and sat (so saith the text) upon the Throne of Israel then and not before the Princes the Noblemen his brothers themselves do him homage, and take the Oath of Allegiance. And to the end, that it may not be said, that that was only done to avoid occasion of difference, which might arise amongst the brothers the sons of David about the succession, we read 
2 Kings 20. 2 Chron. 20. 36. & 22. 1. & 36, 1.  that the other following Kings have in the same manner been established in their places it is said, that after the death of Solomon, the people assembled to create his son Rehoboam King. After that Amaziah was killed, Ozias his only son was chosen King by all the people, Och●sias after joram, joachim, the son of josias, after the disease of his Father, whose piety might well seem to require that without any other solemnity, notwithstanding both he and the other were chosen and invested into the royal Throne by the suffrages of the people. To which also belongs, that which Hushai said to Absolam, nay; but 
2 Sam. 16. 18.  whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide, which is as much as to say, I will follow the King lawfully established, and according to the accustomed order; wherefore although that God had promised to his people a perpetual Lamp, to wit, a King, and a continual successor of the Line of David, and that the successor 
Psal. 132. 11. 12.  of the Kings of this people were approved by the word of God himself. Notwithstanding, since that we see that the Kings have not reigned, before the people had ordained and installed them, with requisite Ceremonies: it may be collected from this, that the Kingdom of Israel, was hereditary, if we consider David and the promise made to him, and that it was wholly elective, if we regard the particular persons. But to what purpose is this, but to make it apparent, that the election is only mentioned, that the Kings might have always in their remembrance, that they were raised to their dignities by the people, and therefore they should never forget during life, in what a strict bond of observance they are tied to those from whom they have received all their greatness. We read that the Kings of the Heathen have been established also by the people; for as when they had either troubles at home, or wars abroad, some one in whose ready valour, and discreet integrity, the people did principally rely and repose their greatest 
Herodi. lib. 1. Cicero. 1. de offici. Tit. Livi. lib. 1.  confidence, him they presently with a universal consent constituted King. Cicero saith, that amongst the Medes, Deioces from a Judge of private controvercies was for his uprightness, by the whole people elected King, and in the same manner were the first Kings chosen amongst the Romans. Insomuch, that after the death of Romulus, the interrayde and Government of the hundred senators, being little acceptable to the Quiutes it was agreed that from thence forward, the Kings should be chosen by the suffrages of the people, and the approbation of the senate. Forquius Superbus was therefore esteemed a tyrant, because being chosen neither by the people nor the senate, he intruded himself into the Kingdom only by force and usurpation; Wherefore julius Caesar long after though he gained the Empire by the sword, yet to the end he might add some shadow or pretence of right to his former intrusion, he caused himself to be declared both by the people and senate perpetually dictator. Augustus' his adopted son would never take on him as inheriter of the Empire, although he were declared so by the testaments of Cesar; but always held it as of the people and senate. The same also did Tiberius, Caligula and Claudius, and the first that assumed the Empire to himself without any colour of right, was Nero who also by the senate was condemned. Briefly for so much as none were ever born with Crowns one their heads, and sceptes in their hands, and that no man can be a King by himself nor reign without people; whereas on the contrary the people may subsist of themselves, and were long before they had any Kings, it must of necessity follow that Kings were at the first constituted by the people, And although the sons and dependants of such Kings inheriting their father's virtues, may in a sort seem to have rendered their Kingdom hereditary to their offsprings and that in some Kingdoms and Countries the right of free election seems in a sort buried; yet notwithstanding in all well ordered Kingdoms this custom is yet remaining, the sons do not succeed the fathers, before the people first have as it were a new established them by their new approbation; neither were they acknowledged in quality as inheriting it from the dead; but approved and accounted Kings then only when they were invested with the Kingdom, by receiving the Sceptre and Diadem from the hands of those who represent the Majesty of the people. One may see most evident marks of this in Christian Kingdoms, which are at this day esteemed hereditary; for the French King, he of Spain and England and others are commonly sacred, and as it were put into possession of their authority by the Peers, Lords of the Kingdom, and Officers of the Crown which represent the body of the people; no more nor less than the Emperors of Germany are chosen by the Electors, and the Kings of Polonia, by the yawodes and Pallatines' of the Kingdom, where the right of Election is yet in force. In like manner also, the Cities give no royal reception, nor entries unto the King but also their inauguration, and anciently they used not to count the times of their reign but from the day of their coronation, the which was strictly observed in France. But least the continued course of some successions should deceive us, we must take notice that the estates of the Kingdoms have often preferred the cousin before the son, the younger brother before the Elder as in France Lewis was preferred before his brother Robert Earl of Eureux: [Annalos Gill●j] in like manner Henry before Robert nephew to Cap●t. Nay which is more by authority of the people in the same Kingdom, the Crown hath been transported (the lawful inheritors living) from one lineage to another as from that of Merove to that of the Charlemaint, and from that of the Charlemains to tha● of the Capets, the which hath also been done in other Kingdoms as the best Historians testify; But not to wander from France the long continuance and power of which Kingdom may in some sort plead for a ruling authority, and where succession seems to have obtained most ●●putation. We read that Pharamont was chosen in the year 419 Pepin in the year 751. Charles the Great and Carleman the son of Pepin in the year 768 without having any respect to their Father's former estate. Carleman dying in the year 772. his portion fell not presently into the possession of his brother Charles the great, as it ordinarily happens in the succession of inheritances, but by the Ordinance of the people and the estates of the Kingdom he is invested with it. the same author witnesseth that in the year 812 Lewis the Courteous although he were the son of Charles the great was also elected: and in the Testament of Charlimane inserted into the history written by Nanclere, Charlemane doth entreat the people to choose by a general assembly of the Estates of the Kingdom which of his grandchildren or Nephews the people pleased, and commanding the Uncles to observe and obey the Ordinance of the people, by means whereof Charles the bald nephew to Lewis the courteous and judith, doth declare himself to be chosen King, as Aimonius the French historian recites.  
To conclude in a word, all Kings at the first were altogether elected, and those which at this day seem to have their Crown and Royal authority by inheritance, have or should have first and principally their confirmation from the people. Briefly although the people of some Countries have been accustomed to choose their Kings of such a lineage which for some notable merits have worthily deserved i●; yet we must believe that they choose the stock itself and not every branch that proceeds from it neither are they so tied to that election, as if the successor degenerate they may not choose another more worthy, neither those which come and are the next of that stock are borne Kings but created such, nor called Kings but Princes of the blood royal.   

The whole body of the people is above the King.  
Now seeing that the people choose and establish their Kings, it followeth that the whole body of the people is above the King; for it is a thing most evident that he which is established by another is accounted under him that hath established him, & he which receives his authority from an other is less than he from whom he denies his power. Potiphar the Egyptian setteth joseph over all his House, Nebuchadoezzar Danniel over the Province of Babylon, Darius the sixscore governors over the kingdom. It is commonly said that Mrs. establish their servants, Kings their officers: In like manner also the people establish the King as administrator of the Common-wealth. G●od kings have not disdained this title; yea, he had one's themselves have affected it: insomuch, as for the space of divers Ages not Roman Emperor (if it were not some absolute tyrant, as Nero, Domitian, Caligula) would suffer himself to be called Lord; Furthermore, it must necessarily be that Kings were instituted for the people's sake, neither can it be, that for the pleasure of some hundred of men, and without doubt more foolish and worse than many of the other, all the rest were made, but much rather that th●se hundred were made for the us● and service of all the other, And reason requires that he be preferred above the other, who was made only to and for his occasion: so it is, that for the ships sa●e, the owner appoints a pilot over her, who sits at the he●m, and looks that she keeps her course, nor run nor upon any dangerous sheilf: the pilot doing his duty is obeyed by the Mariners; yea, & of him himself that is owner of the vessel, notwithstanding, the p●lot is a servant as well as the least in the ship from whom he only differs in this that he servs in better place than they do. In a Commonwealth common●y compared to a ship the King holds the p●nce of pilot, the people in general are owners of the vessel, obeying the pilot whilst he is ●a●e●ull of the public good although this pilot neither is nor aught to be esteemed other then servant to the public, as a Judge or General in war differs little from other officers, but that he is bound to bear greater burdens, & expose himself to more dangers. By the same reason also which t●e King gains by acquist of arms, be 〈…〉 possesseth himself of Frontier places in warring on the enemy, or that which he gets b● esch●ats or consistations, he gets it to the Kingdom & not to himself; to wit, to the people, of whom the Kingdom is composed; no more, nor less, than the servane doth for his master, neither may one contract or oblige themselves to him, but by & with reference to the authority derived from the people. Furthermore, there is an infinite sort of people which ●ive with out a King; but we cannot imagine a King without people, And those which have been raised to the Royal dignity, were not advanced because they excelled other men in beauty & comeliness, nor in some excellency of nature to govern them as shepherds do their flocks, but rather being made out of the same mass with the rest of the people, they should acknowledge that for them, they as it were borrow their power & authority, The ancient custom of the French represents that exceeding wel●, for they used to lift up on a buckler, & salute him King whom they had chosen. And wherefore is it said, I pray you that kings h●ve an infinite number of eyes, a million of ears, with extreme long hands, and feet exceeding swift? is it because they are like to Argos, Geryon, Midas, & divers others ●o celebrated by the Poets? No truly, but it is said in regard of all the people, whom the business principally concerns, who lend to the king for the good of the Commonwealth, their eye●, their ears, their means their faculties. Let the people forsake the king, he presently falls to the ground, although before his hearing & sight seemed most excellent, & that he was strong & in the best disposition that might be, yea that he seemed to triumph in all magnificence, yet in an instant he will become mo●t vi●e & contemptible, to be brief, instead of those divine honours wherewith all men adored him, he shallbe competed 
Dionysius for his Tyranny driven o●t of C●cil●e was fo●s●d to ta●e that course of lif● up●n h●m.  to become a Pedant, & whip children in the schoo● at Corinth. Take away but the basis, to this Giant, & l●●e the Rhodian Colosse he presently tumbles on the ground, & falls into pieces. Seeing th●n that the King is established in this degree by the people & for their sake, & that he cannot subsist without them, who can think it strange then for us to conclude, that the people are above the King. Now that which we speak of al● the people universally, ought also to be understood as hath been delivered in the 2. question, of those which in every Kingdom or town do showfully represent the body of the people, & which ordinarily (or at lest should be) ca●ed the officers of the Kingdom, or of the crown, & not of the King; For the officers of the ●ing it is he which placeth & displaceth them at his pleasure, yea, after his death they have no more power, & are accounted as dead. On the contrary, the officers of the Kingdom receive their authority from the people in the general Assembly of the states (or at the least wer● accustomed so anciently to have done) & cannot be disauthorised but by them, so then the one depends of the King, the other of the Kingdom, those of t●e sovereign officer of the kingdom which is the King himself, these of the sovereignty itself, that is of the people, of which sovereignty both the King, all his officers, and all his officers of the kingdom, aught to depend, the charge of the one hath proper relation to the care of the ●ings person: that of the other to look that the commonwealth receive no damage, the first ought to serve and assist the King, as all domestic servants are bound to do to their masters the other to preserve the rights & privileges of the people, & to carefully hinder the Prince that he neither omit the things that may advantage the state, nor commit any thing that may endamage the public.  
Briefly, the one are Servants and domestics of the Kings, and received into their places to obey his person: the other, on the contrary, are as Associates to the King in the administration of justice, participating of the Royal power and authority, being bound to the utmost of their power, to be assisting in the managing of the affairs of State, as well as the King who is as it were Precedent amongst them, and principal only in order and degree.  
Therefore, as all the whole People is above the King, and likewise taken in one entire body are in authority before him; yet being considered one by one they are all of them under the King. It is easy to know how far the power of the first Kings extended, in that Ephron King of the Hittites could not grant Abraham the Sepulchre, but in the presence and with the consent of the People: neither could Hemor the Hevite 
Gen. 34.  King of Sichem contract an alliance with jacob, without the People's assent, and confirmation thereof; because it was then the custom to refer the most important affairs to be dispensed and resolved in the general Assemblies of the People. This might easily be practised in those kingdoms, which were then almost confined within the circuit of one town.  
But since that Kings began to extend their limits, and that it was impossible for the People to assemble together all into one place because of their great numbers, which would have occasioned confusion the Officers of the kingdom were established, which should ordinarily preserve the rights of the People, in such sort notwithstanding, as when extraordinary occasion required the People might be assembled, or at the least such an abridgement as might by the principallest Members be a Representation of the whole Body. We see this order established in the kingdom of Israel, which (in the judgement of the wisest Politicians) was excellently ordered. The King had his Cupbearers his Carvers, his Chamberlains and Stewards. The kingdom had her Officers, to wit, the 71. Elders, and the heads and chief chosen out of all the Tribes, which had the care of the Public Faith in Peace and War.  
Furthermore, the kingdom had in every town Magistrates, which had the particular government of them, as the former were for the whole kingdom. At such times as affairs of consequence were to be treated of, they assembled together, but nothing that concerned the public state could receive any solid determination. David assembled the Officers of 
1. Chron. 29. 1 1. Chron. 13. 1.  his kingdom when he desired to invest his Son Solomon with the Royal Dignity; when he would have examined and approved that manner of policy, and managing of affairs, that he had revived and restored, and when there was question of removing the Ark of the Covenant.  
And because they represented the whole people, it is said in the History, that all the people assembled. These were the same Officers that delivered jonathan from death, condemned by the sentence of the King, by which it appears, that there might be an appeal from the King to the People.  
After that the kingdom was divided through the pride of Reoboam, 
● Sam. ●●. 45.  the Council at jerusalem composed of 71. Ancients, seems to have such authority, that they might judge the King, as well as the King might judge every one of them in particular.  
In this Council was Precedent the Duke of the house of juda, to wit, 
● Chron. 1●. Neh. 11. 9  some principal man chosen out of that Tribe; as also, in the City of jerusalem there was a Governor chosen out of the Tribe of Benjamin residing there. This will appear more manifest by examples, jeremy sent by God to denounce to the Jews the destruction of jerusalem, was therefore condemned first by the Priests and Prophets, in whose hands was 
●or. 16. 9 〈◊〉.  the Ecclesiastical jurisdiction afterwards by all the people of the City; that is, by the ordinary judges of jerusalem, to wit, the Milleniers, and the Centurions: Finally, the matter being brought before the Princes of juda, who were the 71. Elders assembled, and set near to the new Gate of the Temple, he was by them acquitted.  
In this very Assembly, they did discreetly condemn, in express terms, the wicked and cruel act of the King Ichoiakin, who a little before had caused the Prophet Vriah to be slain, who also foretell the destruction of jerusalem.  
We read in another place that Ledechias held in such reverence the authority of this Council, that he was so far from delivering of jeremy 
〈◊〉 37. 38.  from the dungeon, wherein to the 71. had cast him that he durst scant remove him into a less rigorous prison. They persuading him to give his consent to the putting to death the Prophet jeremy, he answered, that he was in their hands, and that he might not oppose them in my thing. The same King fearing lest they might make information against him, to bring him to an account for certain Speeches he had used to the Prophet jeremy, was glad to feign an untrue excuse It appears by this, that in the kingdom of juda this Council was above the King, in this kingdom, I say not fashioned or established by Plato or Arictotle, but by the Lord God, himself being Author of all their order, and supreme Moderator in that Monarchy. Such were the seven Magis or Sages in the Persian Empire, who had almost a paralleled dignity with the King, and were termed the ears and eyes of the King, who also never dissented from 
Arist. in Pol. lib. ●. c. 11. l. 3. c. 7.  the judgement of those Sages.  
In the kingdom of Sparta there was the Ephori, to whom an appeal lay from the judgement of the King, and who, as Aristotle says, had authority also to judge the Kings themselves.  
In Egypt the people were accustomed to choose and give officers to the King, to the end they might hinder and prevent any encroachment, or usurped authority, contrary to the Laws. Now as Aristotle doth ordinarily term those lawful Kings, which have for their Assistants, such officers 
Arist. in pol. l. 5. c. 11.  or Councillors: so also maketh he no difficulty to say, that where they be wanting, there can be no true Monarchy, but rather a tyranny, absolutely barbarous, or at the least such a Dominion, as doth most nearly approach tyranny.  
In the Roman Commonwealth, such were the Senators, and the Magistrates created by the people the tribune of those which were called Celerees, the Preter or Provost of the City, and others, insomuch as there lay an appeal from the King to the People, as Seneca declares by divers testimonies drawn from Cicero's books of the Commonwealth, and the History of Oratius sufficiently shows, who being condemned by the judges for killing his sister, was acquitted by the people.  
In the times of the Emperors, there was the Senate the Consults, the Praetors, the great Provosts of the Empire, the Governors of Provinces, attributed to the Senate and the People, all which were called the Magistrates and Officers of the people of Rome. And therefore, when that by the decree of the Senate, the Emperor Maximinus was declared enemy 
Herodi. ● 8.  of the Commonwealth, and that Maximus and Albinus were created Emperors by the Senate, the men of war were sworn to be faithful, and obedient to the people of Rome the Senate, and the Emperors. Now for the Empires and public States of these times (except those of Turquie, Muscovie, and such like, which are rather a rhapsody of Robbers, and barbarous intruders, than any lawful Empires) there is not one, which is not, or hath not heretofore been governed in the manner we have described. And if through the connivency and sloth of the principal Officers, the successors have found the business in a worse condition, those which have for the present the public Authority in their hands, are notwithstanding bound as much as in them lieth to reduce things into their primary estate and condition.  
In the Empire of Germany which is conferred by election, there is the Electors and the Princes both secular and Ecclesiastical, the Countess, Barons, and Deputies of the Imperial Cities, and as all these in their proper places are Solicitors for the public good likewise in the Diets do they represent the Majesty of the Empire, being obliged to advise, and carefully foresee, that neither by the Emperors, partiality, hate nor affection, the public State do suffer, or be interressed. And for this reason, the Empire hath its Chancellor, as well as the Emperor his, both the one and the other have their peculiar Officers and Treasurers apart. And it is a thing so notorious, that the Empire is preferred before the Emperor, that it is a common saying, That the Emperor does homage to the Empire.  
In like manner, in the Kingdom of Polonia, there is for Officers of the Crown, the Bishops, the Palatins, the Castellains, the Nobility, the Deputies 
Speculum saxonicum.  of Towns and Provinces assembled extraordinarily, before whom; and with whose consent, and no where else, they make new Laws, and determinations concerning wars. For the ordinary Government there, is the Counsellors of the kingdom, the Chancellor of the State, etc. although notwithstanding, the king have his Stewards, Chamberlains, Servants and Domestiques. Now if any man should demand in Polonia who were the greater, the King or all the people of the kingdom represented by the Lords and Magistrates; he should do as much, as if he asked at Veni●e, if the Duke were above the signory. But what shall we say of Kingdoms, which are said to go by hereditary succession? We may indeed conclude the very same. The kingdom of France heretofore preferred before all other, both in regard of the excellency of their Laws, and 
Ai●oni. lib. 5. c. 26. in Carolo ●●lv●.  majesty of their Estate may pass with most as a ruling case. Now although that those which have the public commands in their hands, do not discharge their duties as were to be desired, it follows not though, that they are not bound to do it. The King hath his high steward of his Household his Chamberlains, his Masters of his games, Cupbearers, and others, whose offices were wont so to depend on the person of the King, that after the death of their Master, the ro●●ces were void. And indeed at the Funeral of the King, the Lord high Steward in the presence of all the officers and servants of the household, breaks his staff of office, and says, Our Master is dead, let every one provide for himself. On the other side, the kingdom hath her officers, to wit, the Mayor of the Palace, which since hath been called the Constable, the Marshals, the Admiral, the Chancellor or great Referendary, the Secretaries, the Treasurers and others, which heretofore were created in the Assembly of the three Estates the Clergy, the Nobility, and the People.  
Since that, the Parliament of Paris was made Sedentary, they are not thought to be established in their places, before they have been first received and approved by that course of Parliament, and may not be dismissed nor deposed, but by the authority and consent of the same. Now all these officers take their oath to the Kingdom, which is as much as to say, to the people in the first place, then to the King which is protector of he Kingdom, the which appears by the tenor of the oath. Above all, the Constable, who receiving the Sword from the King, hath it girded unto him with this charge, That he maintain and defend the Commonwealth, as appears by the words that the King than pronounceth.  
Besides, the kingdom of France hath the Peers (so called either for 
S. Filius fam. instit. quib. mod. jus patriae pot. solvitur.  that they are the King's companions, or because they are the Fathers of the Commonwealth) taking their denominations from the several Provinces of the kingdom, in whose hands the King at his inauguration takes his oath, as if all the people of the kingdom were in them present, which shows that these twelve Peers are above the King. They on the other side swear, That they will preserve not the King, but the Crown, that they will assist the Commonwealth with their council, and therefore will be present with their best abilities to council the Prince both in peace and war, as appears plainly in the Paitentee of their Peership.  
And they therefore have the same right as the Peers of the Court, 
Renatus ch●pinus' lib. 3.  which according to the Law of the Lumbards', were not only associates to the Lord of the Fee in the judgement of cau●es, but also did take an accounted, and judge the differences that happenod between the Lord and his vassal.  
We may also know, that those Peers of France did often discuss suits and differences between the King and his Subjects: Insomuch, that when Charles the 6. would have given sentence against the Duke of Britain they opposed it, alleging that the discussing of that business belonged properly to the Peers, and not to the king, who might not in any 〈◊〉 derogate from their authority.  
Therefore it is, that yet at this day the Parliament of Paris is called the Court of Peers, being in some sort constituted Judge between the king and the people; yea, between the king and every private person, and is bound and aught to maintain the meanest in the kingdom against the king's Attorney, if he undertake any thing contrary to law.  
Furthermore, if the king ordain any thing in his Council, if he treat any agreement with the Princes his neighbours, if he begin a War, or make peace, as lately with Charles the 5. the Emperor, the Parliament ought to interpose their authority, and all that which concerns the public State must be there enregistered; neither is there any thing firm and stable which the Parliament doth not first approve. And to the end, that the Counsellors of that Parliament should not fear the king, formerly they attained not to that place, but by the nomination of the whole body of the Court; neither could they be dismissed for any lawful cause, but by the authority of the said Body.  
Furthermore, if the Letters of the King be not subsigned by a Secretary of the Kingdom, at this day called a Secretary of State, and if the Letters Patents be not sealed by the Chancellor, who hath power also to cancel them, they are of no force or value. There is also Dukes, Marquesses, Earls. Viscount's, Barons, Seneschabs, and in the cities and good towns Mayors, Baylistes, Lieutenants, Capitols, Consuls, Sindiques, Sheriffs, and others which have special authority through the Circuit of some countries or towns to preserve the people of their jurisdiction. Time it is, that at this day some of these dignities ere become hereditary. Thus much concerning the ordinary Magistrates.   

The Assembly of the three Estates.  
Besides all this, anciently every year, and since less often, to wit, when some urgent necessity required it, the general or three Estates were assembled, where all the Provinces and Towns of any worth, to w●t, the Burgesses Nobles, and Ecclesiastical persons, did all of them send their Deputies, and there they did publicly deliberate and conclude of that which concerned the public state. Always the authority of this Assembly was such, that what was there determined, whether it were to treat peace, or make war, or create a Regent in the Kingdom, or impose some new tribute, it was ever held firm and inviolable; nay, which is more by the authority of this Assembly, the Kings convinced of lose intemporancy, or of insufficiency, for so great a charge or tyranny, were disthronized; yes, their whole Races were for ever excluded from their succession to the Kingdom, no more, nor less, as their Progenitors were by the same authority formerly called to the administration of the same Kingdom. Those whom the consent and approbation of the Estates had formerly raised, were by the dissent and disallowing of the same afterwards cast down. Those which tracing in the virtuous steps of their Ancestors were called to that dignity, as if it had been their inheritance, were driven out and disinherited for their degenerating ingratitude, & for that being tainted with insupportable vices, they made themselves uncapable and unworthy of such honour.  
This shows, that succession was tolerated to avoid practices, close and underhand canvasing, discontents of persons refused; contentions, interraines, and other discommodities of elections. But on the other part, when successiou brought other mischiefs more pernicious, when tyranny trampled on the Kingdom, and when a Tyrant possessed himself of the Royal Throne, the Medicine proving much worse than the Disease: then the Estates of the Kingdom lawfully assembled in the name of all the people, have ever maintained their authority, whether it were to drive out a Tyrant, or other unworthy King, or to establish a good one in his place. The ancient French had learned that of the Gauses, as Caesar shows in his Commentaries. For Ambiorix King of the Eburons, or Leigeons confesseth, That such were the condition of the Gaulish Empire, that the people lawfully assembled, had no less power over the King, than the 
Caes. l. 5. & 7. de bello Gal. lico.  King had over the people. The which appears also in Vircingentorix, who gives an account of his actions before the Assembly of the people.  
In the kingdoms of Spain, especially Arragon, Valentia, and Catalonia, there is the very same For that which is called the justitia Major in Arragon hath the Sovereign authority in itself. And therefore, the Lords which represent the people proceed so far, that both at the inaugaration of the King, as also at the Assembly of the Estates, which is observed every t●ird year, to say to the King in express words that which follows, We which are as much worth as you, and have more power than you, choose you King upon these and these conditions, and there is one between you and us which commands over you, to wit, the justitia Major of Arragon, which oftentimes refuseth that which the King demands, and forbids that which the King ●njoynes.  
In the kingdoms of England and Scotland the Sovereignty seems to be in the Parliament, which heretofore was held almost every year. They call Parliaments the Assembly of the Estates the kingdom, in the which the Bishop's Earls, Barons, Deputies of Towns and Provinces deliver their opinions, and resolve with a joint consent of the affairs of State, the authority of this Assembly hath been so sacred and inviolable, that the King durst not abrogate or alter that which had been there once decreed.  
It was that which heretofore called and installed in their charges all the chief officers of the kingdom; yea, and sometimes the ordinary councillors of that which they call the King's privy Counsels. In sum, the other christian Kingdoms, as Hungary, Bohemia, Denmark, Swedea, and the rest, they have their officers apart from the Kings; and Histories, together with the examples that we have in these our times, sufficiently demonstrate that these Officers and Estates have known how to make use of their authority, even to the deposing and driving out of the tyrannors and unworthy Kings.  
We must nor therefore esteem that this cuts too short the wings of Royal authority, and that it is as much as to take the King's head from his shoulders.  
We believe that God is Almighty, neither think we it any thing diminisheth his power, because he cannot sin: neither say we, that his Empire is less to be esteemed, because it cannot be neither shaken, nor cast down: neither also must we judge a King to be too much abused, if he be withheld by others from falling into an error, to which he is overmuch inclined, or for that by the wisdom and discretion of some of his Councillors, his kingdom is preserved and kept entire and safe, which otherwise, happily by his weakness or wickedness might have been ruined. Will you say that a man is less healthful, because he is environed with discreet Physicians, which council him to avoid all intemperance, and forbidden him to eat such meats as are obnoxious to the stomach, yea, and which purge him many times against his will and when he resists? which will prove his better friends, whether these Physicians which are studiously careful of his health, or those Sycophants which are ready at every turn to give him that which must of necessity hasten his end? We must then always observe this distinction. The first are the friends of the King: The other are the friends of Francis which is King. The friends of Francis are those which serve him: The friends of the King are the officers & servants of the kingdom. For seeing the King hath this name, because of the kingdom, and that it is the people which give being and consistence to the kingdom, the which being lost, or ruined, be must needs cea●e to be a King, or at the least not so truly a King, or else we must take a shadow for a substance.  
Without question, those are most truly the King's friends, which are most industriously careful of the welfare of his kingdom, and those his worst enemies which neglect the good of the Common, wealth, and seek to draw the King into the same lapse of error.  
And as it is impossible to separate the kingdom from the people, nor the King from the Kingdom, in like manner, neither can the friends of the King be disjoined from the friends of the people, and the Kingdom.  
I say further, that those which with a true affection love Francis, had rather see him a King than a Subject. Now seeing they cannot see him a King, it necessarily follows, that in loving Francis, they must also love the Kingdom.  
But those which would be esteemed more the friends of Francis, then of the kingdom and the people, are truly flatterers, and the most pernicious enemies of the King and public State.  
Now if they were true friends indeed, they would desire and endeavour that the King might become more powerful, and more assured in his estate according to that notable saying of Theopompus King of Sparta, after the Ephores or Controllers of the Kings were instituted, Tkemore (said he) are appointed by the People to watch over, and look to the affairs of the Kingdom, the more those that govern shall have credit, and the more safe and happy shall be the State.   

Whether prescription of time can take away the right of the people.  
But peradventure, some one will reply, you speak to us here of Peers, of Lords and Officers of the Crown. But I for my part see not any, but only some shows and shadows of antiquity as if they were to be represented on a stage I see not for the present searce any tract of that ancient liberty, and authority, nay which is worse a great part, if not all, of those officers take care of nothing but their particular affairs, and almost, if not altogether, serve as flatterers about those Kings who jointly toss the poor people like ●ennice, balls: hardly is there one to be found that hath compussion on, or will lend a helping hand to the miserable subjects, flayed and scorched to the very bones, by their insolent and insupportable oppression: If any be but houth to have such a desire, they are presently condemned as Rebels and seditious, and are constrained either to fly wi●h much discommodity, or else must run hazard both of life and liberty. What can be answered to this? the business goes thus. The outrageousness of Kings, the ignorance of the party, together with the wicked connivance of the great ones of the kingdom, hath been for the most part such throughout the World, that the licentious and unbridled power wherewith most kings are transported and which hath made them insupportable, hath in a manner by the length of continuance gained right of prescription, and the people for want of using it hath incitely quit, if not altogether lost their just & ancient authority. So that it ordinarily happens, that what all men's care ought to attend on, is for the most part neglected by every man; for what is committed to the generalty, no man thinks is commended to his custody. Notwithstanding, no such prescription nor prevarication can justly prejudice the right of the people: It is commonly said that the Exchequers do admit no ●ale of prescription against it, much less against the whole body of the people, whose power transcends the Kings, and in whose right the King assumes to himself that privilege; for otherwise, wherefore is the Prince only administrator, and the people true proprietor of the public Exchequer, as we will prove here presently after. Furthermore, it is not a thing resolved on by all, that no tyrannous intrusion or usurpation, and continuance in the same course, can by any length of time prescribe against lawful liberty. If it be objected, that Kings were enthronised, and received their authority from the people that lived five hundred years ago, and not by those now living. I answer, that the Commonwealth never dies, although Kings be taken out of this life one after another; for as the continual running of the water gives the River a perpetual being; so the alternative revolution of birth and death renders the people (quoad hunc mundum) immortal.  
And further, as we have at this day the same Seine and Tiber as was 1000 years ago: in like manner also is there the same people of Germany, France, and Italy (excepting intermixing of Colonies, or such like) neither can the lapse of time, nor changing of individuals, altar in any sort the right of those people. Furthermore, if they say the King receives his kingdom from his Father, and not from the people, and he from his Grandsa her, and to one from another upward.  
I ask, could the Grandfather or Ancestor, transfer a greater right to his Successor, than he had himself? If he could not (as without doubt 
Ulpian de reg. juris l. 54.  it must need be so) is it not plainly perspicuous that what the Successor further arrogates to himself, he may usurp with as sare a conscience, as what a Thief g●●s by the highway side. The people on the contrary have their right of eviction entire and whole; although then that the officers of the Crown have for a time lost or left their ranks, this cannot in any true right prejudice the people, but rather clear otherwise as one would not grant audience, or show favour to a slave which had long time held his master prisoner, and did not only vaunt himself to be free, but also presumptuously assumed power over the life and death of his master: neither would any man allow the excuses of a those, because he had continued in that grave 30. years, or for that he had been bred in that course, of life by his Father, if he presumed by his long continuance in that function to prescribe for the lawfulness, but rather the longer he had continued in his wickedness, the more grievous should be his punishment: in like manner, the Prince is altogether unsupportable, which because he succeeds a Tyrant, or hath kept the people (by whose suffrages he holds the Crown) in a long slavery, or hath suppressed the Officers of the kingdom (who should be protectors of the public liberty) that therefore presumes, that what he affects is lawful for him to effect, and that his will is not to be restrained or corrected by any positive Law whatsoever. For prescription in tyranny detracts nothing from the right of the people; nay it rather much aggravates the Princes on rages. But what if the Peers and principal officers of the Kingdom makes themselves parts with the King? Wha● if betraying the Public, cause the yoke of tyranny upon the people's neck? shall it follow, that by this prevatication and treason the authority is devolved into the King? Does this detract any thing from the aight of the people's liberty, or does it add any licentious power to the King? Let the people thank themselves, say you, who relied on the distoyall loyalty of such men.  
But I answer, that these officers are indeed those Protectors whose principal care and study should be that the people be maintained in the free and absolute fruition of their goods and liberty. And therefore, in the same manner as if a treacherous Advocate for a sum of money should agree to betray the cause of his Client into the hands of his Adversary, which he ought to have defended, hath not power for all that to alter the course of justice, nor of a bad cause, to make a good one, although perhaps for a time he give some colour of it.  
In like manner this conspiracy of the great ones, combined to ruin the inferiors cannot disannul the right of the people; in the mean season, those great ones incur the punishment that the same asors against Prevaricators: and for the people, the same Law allows them to choose another Advocate, and afresh to pursue their cause, as if it were then only to begin.  
For if the people of Rome condemned their Captains and Generals of their Armies, because they capitulated with their Enemies to their disadvantage (although they were drawn to it by necessity, being on the point to be all overthrown) and would not be bound to perform the Soldier's capitulation: much less shall a free People be tied to bear the yoke of thraldom, which is cast on them by those who should and might have prevented it; but being neither forced nor compelled did for their own particular gain willingly betray those that had committed their liberty to their custody.   

Wherefore Kings were created.  
Now seeing that Kings have been ever established by the people, and that they have had Associates joined with them to contain them within the limits of their duties, the which Associates considered in particular one by one, are under the King and altogether in one entire Body are above him. We must consequently see wherefore first Kings were established, and what is principally their duty. We usually esteem a thing just and good when it attains to the proper end for which it is ordained.  
In the first place every one consents, That men by nature loving liberty, and having servitude, born rather to command, then obey, have not willingly admitted to be governed by another, and renounced as it were the privilege of nature, by submitting themselves to the commands of others; but for some special and great profit that they expected from it. For as Esope says, That the horse being before accustomed to wander as his pleasure, would never have received the bit into his mouth, nor the Rider on his back, but that he hoped by that means to overmatch the Bull: neither let us imagine, that Kings were chosen to apply to their own proper use, the goods that are gotten by the sweat of their Subjects; for every man loves and cherisheth his own, They have not received the power and authority of the People to make it serve as a Pander to their pleasures. for ordinarily, the inferiors hate, or at lest envietheir superiors.  
Let us then conclude, that they are established in this place to maintain by justice, and to defend by force of Arms, both the public State and particular persons from all damages and outrages, wherefore Saint Augustine saith, Those are properly called Lords and Masters 
A●ig lib. 16 de civet. dei, c. 15.  which provide for the good and profit of others, as the husband for the wife, Fathers for their children. They must therefore obey them that provide for them; although indeed to speak truly, those which govern in this manner, may in a so●t be said to serve those, whom they command over.  
For, as says the same Doctor, they command not for the desire of dominion, but for the duty they own to provide for the good of those that are subjected to them: nor affecting any Lord like domineering, but with charity and singular affection, desiring the welfare of those that are committed to them.  
Seneca in 81 Epistle says, That in the Golden Age, wise men only governed Kingdoms, they kept themselves within the bounds of moderation, and preserved the meanest from the oppression of the greatest. They preserved and dissuaded, according as it advantaged or disadvantaged, the public profit; by their wisdom, they furnished the Public with plenty of all necessaries, and by their diser●ion preventes scarcity, by their valour and courage they expelled dangers by their many benefits they increased and enriched their Subjects, they pleaded not their duty, in making pompous shows, but in well-governing their People. No man made trial what he was able to do against them, because every one received what he was capable of from them, etc.  
Therefore, then to govern is nothing else but to provide for. These proper ends of commanding, being far the People's commodity; the only duty of Kings and Emperors is to provide for the people's good, The Kingly dignity to speak properly is not a Title of Honour, but a weighty and burden some offices It is not a discharge or vacation from affairs, to run a licentions course of liberty, but a charge and vocation to all endustrious employments, for the service of the Commonwealth, the which hath some glimpse of honour withit, because in those first and Golden Ages, no man would have tasted of such continual troubles, if they had not been sweetened with some relish of honour: insomuch, as there was nothing more true, then that which was commonly said in those times. If every man knew with what turmoils and troubles the Royal wreath was wrapped withal, no man would vouchsafe to take it up, although it lay at his feet.  
When therefore that these words of mine and thine entered into the 
Meum & tuum.  world, and that differences fell amongst fellow Citizens, touching the propriety of goods and wars amongst neighbouring people about the right of their Confines, the people bethought themselves to have recourse to some one, who both could and should take order that the poor were not oppressed by the rich, nor the Patriots wronged by strangers.  
Now as wars and suits increased, they chose some one, in whose wisdom and valour they reposed most confidence. See then wherefore Kings were created in the first Ages to wit, to administer justice at home, and to be Leaders in the Wars abroad, and not only to repulse the incursions of the Enemy but also to reprosse and hinder the devastation and spoiling of the Subjects and their goods at home; but above all, to expel and drive away all devices and debanchments fare from their Dominions.  
This may be proved by all Histories, both divine and profane For the people of God they had at first no other King but God himself, who dwelled in the midst of them, and gave answer from between the Cherubins, appointed extraordinarily Judges and Captains for the wars, by means whereof, the people thought they had no need of Lieutenants, being honoured by the continual presence of their Sovereign King.  
Now when the people of God began to be a weary of the injustice of the Sons of Samuel, on whose old age they durst no longer rely, they demanded a King after the manner of other people, saying to 
1 Sam. 8 5. ● &. 20.  Samuel Give us a King as other people have that he may judge us. The●e is touched the first and principal point of the duty of a King, a little after they are both mentioned We will have (said they) a King over us like other Nations. Our King shall judge us, and go in and out before us, & lead our Armies. To do justice is alwaps set in the first place, for so much as it is an ordinary & perpetual thing: but wars are extraordinary, and happen as it were casually.  
Wherefore, Aristotle says that in the time of the Herold, all Kings 
Arist. de pol. l. 3. c. 11.  were Judges and Captains. For the Lavedemonian Kings, they in his time also had Sovereign authority only in the Army, and that confined also to the commandments of the Ephores.  
In like manner, the M●des who were ever in perpetual quarrels amongst themselves, at the length chose Deo●ces for their Judge, who 
Herod. l. 1.  had carried himself well in the deciding of some particular differences; presently after they made him King, and gave him Officers and Guards, that he might more easily suppress the powerful and insolent.  
Cicero saith, that anciently all Kings were established to administer justice, and that their institution and that of the Laws, had one and the same end, which was, that Equity and Right might be d●ly rendered to all men the which may be verified by the propriety of the words almost in all languages. King's are called by the Latins, Reges a regen●●, for that they must rule and govern the limits and bounds, both of the public and particulars. The names of Emperors, Princes, and Dukes have relation to their conduct 
The English word KING is derived from the Ronigen, which signifies either fortitude or wisdom.  in the wars, and principal places in Combats, and other places of Command. Likewise the Greeks' call them in their Language, Basiles, Archa, Hegemones, which is to say, props of the people, Princes, Conductors. The Germans and other Nations use all significant names, and which express, that the duty of a King consists not in making glorious Paradoes: but that it is an office of a weighty charge and continual care. But in brief, the Poet Homer calls Kings the Judges of Cities, and in describing of 
Hom. lib. 1. Head. Ovid. l. 6 meta.  Agamemno●, he calls him wise, strong, and valiant. As also, Ovid speaking of Erichtheus, says, that 
justia elubi●●●●alid●sne p●●enti●s armis.  it was hard to know, whether Justice or Valour were more transparent in him: in which these two Poets seems exactly to have described the duties of Kings and Princes. You see what was the Custom of the Kings of the Heathen Nations; after whose examples, the Jews demanded and established their Kings.  
The Queen of Sheba said also to S●lomon, that God had made him 
2 chron. 9 8. Wisdom, 9 7.  King over them to do judgement and Justice.  
And Solomon himself speaking to God, saith. Thou hast chosen me to be a King over thy People, and a Judge of thy Sons and Daughters.  
For this cause also the good Kings, as David, josephar, and others, being not able in their own persons to determine all the suits and differences of their Subjects (although in the causes of greatest importance they received an appeal always to themselves, as appears in Samuel) 
2 Sam. 15. 2. 1 chrou. 23. 4. & 26, 29 2 Chron. 19 It Rom. 13.  had ever above all things a special care, to establish in all places just and discreet Judges, and principally still to have an eye to the right administration of justice, knowing themselves to carry the sword, as well to chastise wicked and unjust Subjects, as to repulse foreign Enemies.  
Briefly, as the Apostles says, The Prince is ordained by God for the good a●d profit of the people, being armed with the sword to defend the good from the violence of the wicked, and when he dischargeth his duty therein all men own him honour and obedience.  
Seeing then that Kings are ordained by God and established by no people, to procure and provide for the good of those which are committed unto them, and that this good or profit be principally expressed in two things, to wit, in the administration of justice to their subjects, and in the managing of arms for the repulsing their enemies: certainly, we must infer and conclude from this that the Prince which applies himself to nothing but his peculiar profits, and pleasures, or to those ends which most readily conduce thereunto, which contemns and perverts all laws, which useth his subjects more cruelly than the barbarest enemy would do, he may truly and easily be called a Tyrant, and that those which in this manner govern their Kingdoms, be they of never so large an extent, are more properly unjust pillagers and boose-haiers then lawful governor's.   

Whether the Kings be above the law.  
We must here yet proceed a little further: for it is demanded whether the King which presides in the administration of justice have power to resolve and determine business according to his own will and pleasure? most the Kings be subject to the law, or doth the law depend 
August. 1. 4. c. 4. & 6. to ●ivita Dei.  upon the King; the law (saith an ancient) is respected by those which otherways contemn virtue for it enforceth obedience and ministereth conduct in warfaring and gives viger and lustre to justice and equity. Pausanias' the Spartan will answer in a word, that it becomes laws to direct, and men to yield obedience to their authority, Agositaus King of Sparta says that all commanders must obey the commandments of the laws, But it shall not be amiss to cla●●ume this matter a little higher, when people began for justice to seek to determine their differences, if they met with any private man that did justly appoint them they were satisfied with it, now for so much as such men were rarely and with much difficulty met withal, and for that the judgements of kings received as laws were oftentimes found contrary and difficult, than the Magistrates and others of great wisdom invented laws, which might speak to all men in one and the same voice. This being done it was expressly enjoined to kings that they should be the gardiens and administrators, And sometimes also for so much as the laws could not fore, see the perticularities of actions to resolve exactly it was permitted, the king to supply this defect, by the same natural equity by which the laws were drawn, and for fear lest they should go against law the people appointed them from time to time associates, counsellors, of whom we have formerly made mention, wherefore there is nothing which exemples the King from obedience which he owes to the law, which he ought to acknowledge as his Lady and Mistress esteeming nothing can become him worse than that feminine of which jurinall speaks; Sic volo, Sic jubeo, sic pro ratione voluntas. I will, I command, my will shall serve instead of reason, neither should they think their authority the less because they are confined to laws, for seeing the law is a divine gift coming from above, which human societies are happily governed and adddressed to their best and blesseddest end; those Kings are as ridiculous and worthy of contempts, which repute it a dishonour to conform themselves to law, as those surveyors which think themselves disgraced, by using of a rule, a compass, a chain, or other instruments, which men understanding the art of surveying are accustomed to do, or a Pilot which had rather sail, according to his fantasy and imagination, then steer his course by his needle and Sea lard, who can double, but that it is a thing more profitable & convenient to obey the law, than the King who is but one man? the law is the soul of a good king it give him motion sense and life. The King is the Organ and as it were the body by which the Law displays her forces exercises her function, and expresses her conceptions; now it is a thing much more reasonable to obey the soul, than the body, the law is the wisdom of divers sages; recollected in few words, but many see more clear and further than one alone, It is much better to follow the Law then any one man's opinion be he never so acute, the law is reason and wisdom itself, ●ee from all perturbation, not subject to be moved with choler, ambition, hate, or acceptances of person●; Entreaties nor threats cannot make it bow nor, bend on the contrary a man though induced with reason suffers himself to be lead and transported with anger, desire of revenge, and other passions which perplex him in such sort, that he looseth his understanding because being composed of reason and disordered affections he cannot so contain himself but some times his passions becomes his Master Accordingly we see that Valentinian a good Emperor, permits those of the Empire to have low wines at once, because he was misled by that impure affection. Because Cambyses the son of Gyms became enamoured of his own sister he would therefore have marriages between brother and sister, be approved and held lawful Cabades King of the Persians prohibits the punishment of adulteries we must look for such laws every day if we will have the law subjects to the King. To come to our purpose the law is an, understanding mind or rather an obstacle of many understandings the mind being the seal of all the intelligence faculties is (if I may so term it) a parcel of divinity: in so much as he who obeys the law seems to obey God, and receive him for Arbitrator of the mammets in controversy.  
But on the contrary, insomuch as man is composed of this divine: understanding, and of a number of unruly passions; so losing himself in that brutishness, as he becomes void of reason: and being in that condition, he is no longer a man, but a beast; he then which desires rather 
Aristo. lib. de mundo & lib 3 poli. ca●.  to obey the King, than the Law, seems to preser the commandment of a hest before that of God.  
And furthermore, though Aristotle were the Tutor of Alexander, yet he confesseth, that the divinity cannot so properly be compared to to any thing of this life, as to the ancient Laws: of well-governed States: he that prefers the Commonwealth applies himself to God's Ordinance: but he that leans to the King's fancies, instead of Law, prefers brutish sensuality before wellordered discretion. To which also the prophets seems to have respect, who in some places describe these great Empires, under the representation of ravening Beasts. But to go on, is not he a very Beast. who had rather have for his guide a blind and mad man than he which sees both with the eyes of the body, and mind, a beast rather th●n god. Whence it comes, that though kings as saith Aristotle, for a while, at the first, commanded without restraint of Laws, yet presently after civilised people reduced i●●●em to a lawful condition, by bi●ding them to keep and observe the Laws: and for this unruly absolute authority i● remained only amongst, those which commanded over barbarous Nations.  
He says afterwards, that this absolute power was the next degree to plain tyranny, and he had absolutely called it tyranny, had not these beasts like Barbarians, willingly subjected themselves unto it. But it will be replied, that it is unworthy the majesty of Kings, to have their wills bridled by Laws: but I will say that nothing is more royal then to have our unruly desires ruled by good laws.  
It is much pity to be restrained from that which we would do, it is much more worse to will that which we should not do, but it is the worst of all to do that which the Laws forbidden.  
I hear me thinks a certain Furionius tribune of the people which opposed the passing of a Law that was made against the excess which then reigned in Rome, saying. My Masters you are bridled, you are idle and settered with the rude bonds of servitude, your liberty is lost, a Law is laid on you, that commands you to be moderate: to what purpose is it to say, you are free, since you may not live in what excess of pleasure you like. This is the very complaint of many Kings at this day, and of their Mignior and Flatterers.  
The Royal Majesty is abolished, if they may not turn the kingdom topsie turvie at their pleasure Kings may go shake their ea●es, if Laws must be observed.  
P●radventure, it is a miserable thing to live, if a mad man may not be suffered to kill himself when he will.  
For what else do those things which violate and abolish Laws, without which, neither Empires, no nor the very Societies of freebooters 
Cicero I. ●. ossicii.  can at all subsist?  
Let us then reject these detestable falsinesse and impious vanities of the Court-Marmonsists, which make kings gods, and receive their say as Oracles, and which is worse are so shameless, as to persuade Kings, that nothing is just or equitable of itself, but takes its true form of justice or injustice, according as it pleaseth the King to ordain, as if he were some god, which could neither err nor sin at all. Certainly, all that which Gods will is just, and therefore, suppose it is Gods will, but that must be just with the Kings will, before it is his will. For it is not just because the King hath appointed it, but that King is just which appoints that to be held for just, which is so of itself.  
We will not then say as Anaxarchus did to Alexander, much perplexed for the death of his friend Clitus, whom he had killed with his own hands, to wit, that Themis the Goddess of Justice, fits by King's sides, as she does by Jupiter's, to approve and confirm whatsoever to them 〈◊〉 seem good: but rather, she sits as Precedent over kingdoms, to severely chastise those Kings which wrong or violate the majesty of the Laws, we can no ways approve that saying of Thrasimacus the Chaldoncan, That the profit and pleasure of Princes, is the rule by which all Laws are defined: but rather, that right must limit the profit of Princes, and the Laws restrain their pleasures. And instead of approving that which that villainous woman said to Caracalla, that whatsoever he desired was allowed him: We will maintain that nothing is lawful but what the law permits.  
And absolutely rejecting that detestable opinion of the same Caracalla, that Princes gives Laws too hers, but receive none from any; we will say that in all kingdoms well established, the King receives the Laws from the people, the wh●ch he ought carefully to consider and maintain, and whatsoever, e●ther by force or fr●ud he does, in prejudice of them must always be reputed unjust.   

King's receive Laws from the people.  
These may be sufficiently verified by examples. Before there was a King in Israel, God by Moses prescribed to him both sacred and evil 
Deut. 17  Ordinances, which he should have perpetually before his eyes. but after that Saul was elected and established by the people, Samuel delivered it to him written, to the end, he might carefully observe it neither were the succeeding Kings received before they had sworn to keep those Ordinances.  
The Ceremony was this, that together with the setting of the crown on the King's head, they delivered into his hands the Book of the Testimony, which some understand, to be the right of the people of the Land, others the Law of God, according to which he ought to govern the people. Cirus acknowledging himself conservator of his Country's Laws, obligeth himself to opposE any man that would offer to infringe them: and at his mauguration ties himself to observe them, although some flatterers tickled the ears of his Son Cambyses, that all things were lawful for him.  
The Kings of Sparta whom Aristotle calls lawful Princes, did every month renew their oaths, promising in the hands of the Ephori, 
Zeneph. de Reb. Laced.  procures for the kingdom, to rule according to those Laws which they had from Lieurgus.  
Hereupon it being asked Archidamus, the Son of Zeuxidamus, who were the Governors of Sparta, he answered the Laws, and the lawful Magistrates. and lest the laws might grow into contempt, these people bragged. that they received them from heaven, and that they were inspired from above, to the end that men might believe that their determinations were from God and not from man, the Kings of Egypt did in nothing vary from the tenor of the laws, and confessed that their principal felicity consisted in the obedience th●y yielded to them. Romulus at the institution of the Roman kingdom made this agreement with senators, the people should make laws and he would take both for himself and others to see them observed and kept Antiochus the third of that name King of Asia writ unto all the Cities of his 
〈◊〉 of lib 5. ca 6.  kingdom, T●at if the letters sent unto them in his name there were any thing found repugnant to the laws, they should believe they were no act of the Kings, and therefore yield no obedience unto them. Now although some Citizens say, that by decree of Senate the Emperor Augustus was declared to be exempt from obedience to Laws: yet notwithstanding Theodosius, and all the other good and reasonable Emperors, have professed that they were bound to the Laws, lest what had been extorted by violence, might be acknowledged and received instead of Law. And for Augustus Caesar in so much as the Roman Common wealth was en thralled by his power and violence she could ●ay nothing freely but that she had lost her freedom. And because they durst not call Augustus a tyrant the senate said he was exempt from ●ll obedience to the laws, which was in effect as much as if they plainly should have said, ●he Emperor was an outlaw. The same right ●●●h ever been of force in all well governed states and Kingdoms of Chr●st●ndome.  
For neither the Emperor the King of France, nor the Kings of Spain, England Polander, Hungary, and all other lawful Princes, as the Areh Dukes of Austriae Dukes of Brabante, Earls of Flanders, and Holland, nor other Princes are not recreated to the government of their estates before they have promised to the Electours, Peers, Pala●ins, Lords, Barons, and Governors, that they will render to every one right according to the laws of the Country, yea so strictly that they cannot alter or innovate any thing contrary to the privileges of the countries without the consent of the ●ownes and provinces, If they do it, they are no less guilty of rebellion against the laws than ●he people is in their kind if they refuse obedience, when they command according to law; briefly lawful princes receive the laws from the people as well as the crown in lieu of honour, and the sceptre in live of power, which they are bound to keep and maintain and therein repose their chiefest glory.   

If the Prince may make new laws.  
What then? shall it not be lawful for a Prince to make new laws and abrogate the old? seeing it belongs to the King not only to advise that nothing be done neither against nor to defraud the laws: but also that nothing be wan●ing to them or any thing to much in them; briefly that neither age nor lapse of time do abolish or entomb them: i● there be any thing to abridge, added, or taken away from them, ●t is his duty to assemble the estates, and to demand their advice and resolution, without presuming to publish any things be●ore the whole have been, first du●y examined and approved by them, after the l●w is once ennacted and published, there is no more dispute to be made above it, all men own obedience to it, and the prince in the first place to teach other men their duty, and for that all men are cavalier led by example then by precepts, the prince must necessarily express his willingness to observe the laws or else by what equity can he require obedience in his subjects to that which he himself con●●mnes.  
For the disterence which is betwixt Kings and subjects ought not to consist in impurity, but in equity and justice. And therefore although Augustus was esteemed to be exempt by the decree of the S●nate, notwithstanding reproving of a young man that had broken the julian law concerning adultery, he boldly replied to Augustus that he himself had transgressed the same laws which condemns adulteries, the Emperor acknowledged his fault and for grief forbore to late. So convenient a ●hing it is in nature to practise by example 
Demoth in oratio con. Timocrat.  that which we would teach by precipt.  
The Lawgicer Solon was wont to compare laws to money, for they m●●n●ain human societies as many preserves traffic, neither improperly then if they Kings may not lawfully or at the least heretofore could not mannace or embase good money without the consent of the Common wealth: much more ●ei●e can he have power to make and 
Innocen. 3. ad regem. Fam. in ca quado d●●ure juando.  unmake laws, without the which, no● Kings, nor subjects, can coha by't in security bu● must befor●● to live brutishly in caves and deserts like wild beast, wherefore also the Emperor of Germany esteem it needful to make some law for the good of the empire, first he demands the advice of the estates if it be there approved the Prince's Barons & Deputies of the towns signei● and then the law is ratified for he solemnly swears to keep the laws already made, and to introduce no new ones without a general consent. There is a Law in Poloniae, which hath been renewed in the year, 1454. and also in the year 1538. and by those it is decreed, that no new Laws shall be made, but by a common consent, nor no where else, but in the General Assembly of the Estates.  
For the Kingdom of France, where the Kings are thought to have greater authority, then in o●her places, anciently all Laws were only made in the Assembly of the Estates, or in the ambulatory Parliament. But since this Parliament hath been Sedentary, the King's edicts are not received as authentically, before the Parliament hath approved them.  
Whereas on the contrary, the decrees of this Parliament, where the Law is defective, have commonly the power and effect of Law. In the Kingdoms of England, Spain, Hungary, and others, they yet enjoy in some sort their ancient privileges.  
For, if the welfare of the Kingdom depends of the observation of the Laws, and the Laws are enthralled to the pleasore of one man? is it not most certain, that there can be no permanent stability in that government? Must it not then necessarily come to pass, that if the King (as some have been) be infected with Lunacy, either continually or by intervales, that the whole State fall inevitably to ruin? But if th● Laws be superior to the King, as we have already proved, and that the King be tied in the same respect of obedience to the Laws, as the Servant is to his Master who will be so senseless, that will not rather obey the Law, than the King? or will not readily yield his best assistance against those that seek to violate or infringe them? Now seeing that the King is not Lord over the Laws, let us examine how far his power may be justly extended in other things.   

Whether the Prince have power of life and death over his Subjects?  
The Minions of the Court hold it for an undeniable Maxim, That Princes have the same power of life and death over their Subjects, as anciently, Masters had over their slaves, and with these false imaginations have so bewitched Princes, that many, although they put not in ure with much rigour this imaginary right, yet they imagine, that they may lawfully do it, and in how much they defist from the practice thereof, insomuch, that they quit and relinquisite of their right and due.  
But we affirm on the contrary, that the Prince is but as the Minister and Executor of the Law, and may only unsheathe the Sword against those whom the Law hath condemned; and if he do otherwise, he is no more a King, but a Tyrant; no longer a Judge, but a Malefactor, and instead of that honourable Title of Conservatour, he shall be justly branded with that foul term of Violator of the Law and Equity.  
We must here first of all take into our consideration the foundation on which this our disputation is built, which we have resolved into this head, That Kings are ordained for the benefit and profit of the public State; this being granted, the question is soon discussed: For who will believe that men sought and desired a King, who upon any sudden motion might at his pleasure cut their throats: or which in colour or revenge might when he would take their heads from their shoulders.  
Briefly, who (as the wise man says) carries death at his tongues end we must not think so idly.  
There is no man so vain, which would willingly that his welfare should depend of another's pleasure; Nay, with much difficulty will any man trust his life in the hands of a friend ●r a brother, much less of a stranger be he never so worthy. Seeing that Envy, Hare, and Rage did so far transport Athanas and Ajax beyond the bounds of reason, that the one killed his children, the other failing to effect his desire in the same kind against his friends and companions, turned his fury and murderous intent, and acted the same revenge upon himself. Now it being natural to every man to love himself, and to seek the preservation of his own life.  
In what assurance I pray you would any man rest to have a Sword continually hanging over his head by a small thread, with the point towards him? Would any mirth or jollity relish in such a continual affright? Can you possible make choice of a more slender thread then to expose your life and welfare into the hands and power of a man so mutable that changes with every puffed of wind. Briefly, which almost a thousand times a day, shakes off the restraint of reason and discretion, and yields himself slave to his own unruly and disordered passions.  
Can there be hoped or imagined any profit or advantage so great or so worthy, which might equalise or counterpose this fear or this danger? Let us conclude then, that it is against Delinquents only, whom the mouth of the Law hath condemned, that Kings may draw forth the Sword of Authority.  
If the King may pardon those whom the Law condemns?  
But because life is a thing precious, and to be favoured peradventure it will be demanded, whether the King may not pardon and absolve those whom the Law hath condemned.  
I answer, no Otherwise this cruel pity would maintain Thiefs, Robbers Murderers Ravisters, Poisoners Sorcerers, & other plagues of Mankind, as we may read Tyrants have done here afore in many places, and to our woeful experience, we may yet see at this present time; And therefore, the Beast of Law in this kind, will by impurity much encreise the number of offenders.  
So that he which received the Sword of Authority from the Law to promise offence; will arm offenders therewith against the Laws, and put himself the Wolf into the Fold, which he ought to have warranted from their ravenous outrages.  
But for so much that it may chance in some occasions, that the Law being mute, may have need of a speaking Law and that the King being in some cases the aptest Expositor, a king for the Rule of his actions Equity and Reason, which as the soul of the Soul may so clear the intention thereof, as where the offence is rather committed against the words, than the intendment of the Law, he may free the innocent Offender from the guilt thereof, because a just and equitable Exposition of the Law may in all good reason be taken for Law itself, as nearest concurring with the intention of the Law makers.  
Notwithstanding least passion should preposse the place of reason 
I. Nomims & res S. verbum ex l●ge. D. the verb signif.  Kings should in this fashion themselves to the ordinary practice of the Emperor, severns not to determine absolutely any thing before it were maturely discussed by upright and discreet men in that faculty.  
And so the King may rigorously punish the Murderer; and yet notwithstanding pardon him, which casually, and without any such purpose killeth one. He may put to death the Thief, and yet pardon that man which in ●is own defence killeth him that would have rob him. Briesly in all other occurrences he may distinguish, as being established Aroitrator and Neuter, Chance medley from malice, forethought a good purpose from the Rigour of the Law, without favouring at any time Malice or Treason, Neither can the omission of this duty gain to him any true esteem of merciful: for certainly that Shepherd is much more pitiful which kills the Wolf, than he which lets him escape: the clemency of that King is more commendable which commits the malefactor to the hangman, than he which delivers him; By pu●●ing to death the murderer, many Innocents' are delivered from danger: whereas by suffering him escape, both he and others through hope of the like impunity, are made more audacious to perpetrate farther mischief, so that the immediate act of saving one Delinquent, arms many hands to murder divers Innocents'; there is therefore both truly mildness in putting to death some, and as certainly cruelty in pardoning of others. Therefore as it is permitted the King, being as it were Custos of the Law, in some cases to interpret the words thereof: so in all well ordered Kingdoms, it is enjoined the Counsel of State, and their duty obligeth them to examine the King's interpretation, and to moderate both his celereity and facilitle. If through the corruption and weakness of men this have not been so really and throughly observed as it ought: yet notwithstanding the right always remains entire, and there wants only integrity and courage in the parties to make it effectual.  
But not to heap up too many examples in a matter so manifestly clear, it hath been in this manner practised in the Realm of France. For we have there oftentimes seen those put to death, to whom the King had granted his Charter of pardon: and those pardoned, whom He commanded should be put to death. And sometimes offences committed in the King's presence remitted, because there was no other witness but himself. The which happened in the time of Hen: 2. to a certain stranger, who was accused by the King himself of a grievous offence. If an offendor by the intercession of friends have his pardon granted by the king, the Chancellor upon sufficient cause may cancel it: if the Chancellor connive, yet m●●t the crimined present it before the Judges, who ought not only carefully to consider, whether the Pardon were gotten by surreptitious or indirect means, but also if it be legal, and in due form: neither can the De inquent that hath obtained his Cha●ter of Pardon make use of it, until first he appeal in public Court-bare headed, and on his knees plead it, submitting himself prisoner until the Judges have maturely weighed and considered the reasons that induced the King to grant him his pardon: If they be found insufficient, the offendor must suffer the punishment of the Law, as if the King had not granted him any pardon: but if his pardon be allowed, he ought not so much to thank the King, as the equity of the Law which saved his life. The manner of these proceed was excellently ordained, both to contain the King within the limits of equity, lest being armed with public Authority, he should seek to revenge his own particular spleen, or out of fancy or partiality remit the wrongs and outrages committed against the public safety: as partly also to restrain an opinion in the Subject, that any thing could be obtained of the King which might prejudice the Laws. If these things have been ill observed in our times, notwithstanding that which we have formerly said, remains always certain, that it is the Laws which have power over the lives and deaths of the Inhabitants of a Kingdom, and not the King which is but Administrator and Conservator of the Laws.   

Subjects are the King's Brethren, and not his slaves.  
For truly neither are the Subjects, as it is commonly said, the King's slaves, or bond men: being neither prisoners taken in the wars, nor bought for money: but as considered in one entire body they are Lords, as we have formerly proved; so each of them in particular aught to be held as the King's Brothers and kinsmen. And to the end that we think not this strange, let us hear what God himself saith when he prescribes a law to Kings; That they lift 
Deuc. 17. 15. 20. Barto. in tract. de regi●n. civet.  not their heart above their brethren from amongst whom they were chosen. Whereupon Bartolus a famous Lawyer, who lived in an age that bred many Tyrants, did yet draw this conclusion from that Law, that Subjects were to be held and used in the quality and condition of the King's brethren, and not of his slaves. Also King David was not ashamed to call his Subjects his brethren. 
1 Chron 28. 2  The ancient Kings were called Abimelech, an Hebrew word which signifies, My father the King. The Almighty and all good God, of whose great gentleness and mercy we are daily partakers, and very seldom feel his severity, although we justly deserve it, yet is it always mercifully mixed with compassion; whereby he teacheth Princes, his Lieutenants, that Subjects ought rather to be held in obedience by love, than by fear.  
But lest they should except against me, as if I sought to trench too much upon the Royal Authority, I verily believe it is so much the greater, by how much it is likely to be of longer continuance. For saith one, servile fear is a bad guardian, for that Authority 
Cicer. l, 2. offic.  we desire should continue; for those in subjection hate them they fear, and whom we hate, we naturally wish their destruction: on the contrary, there is nothing more proper to maintain their Authority then the affection of their subjects, on whose love they may safeliest and with most security lay the foundation of their greatness. And therefore that Prince which governs his Subjects as brethren, may confidently assure himself to live securely in the midst of dangers: whereas he that useth them like slaves, must needs live in much anxiety and fear, and may well be resembled to the condition of that Master which remains alone in some desert in the midst of a great troop of slaves; for look how many slaves any hath, he must make account of so many Enemies, which almost all Tyrants that have been killed by their Subjects have experimented: whereas on the contrary, the Subjects of good Kings are ever as solicitously careful of their safety, as of their own welfare.  
To this may have reference that which is read in divers places 
Plato lib. 8. de repub. Seneca. Aliud est servire, aliud obedire: aliud libertas, aliud licentia. L. 5. D. de parricid. L. 2. ad leg. Corneliam de sicar. ubi ulp. L. 1. c. de parricid.  of Aristotle, and was said by Agasicles King of Sparta, That Kings command as fathers over their children, and Tyrants as masters over their slaves, which we must take in the same sense, that the civilian Martianus doth, to wit, that paternal authority consists in piety, and not in rigour, for that which was practised amongst the men of the accorne age, that fathers might sell, and put to death their children at their pleasure, hath no authority amongst Christians, yea the very Pagans which had any humanity, would not permit it to be practised on their slaves. Therefore than the father hath no power over the son's life, before first the Law have determined; it, otherwaise he offends the Law, Cornelius against privy murderers, and by the Law Pompeius against Parricides, the father is no less guilty which kills the son, than the son which murders the father: for the same occasion the Emperor Adrian banished into an Island which was the usual punishment for notorious offenders, a father which had slain his son, a hurting of whom he had entertained a jealous opinion for his mother in Law, concerning servants or slaves, we are admonished in holy writ to use them like brethren, and by humane constitutions as hirelings, or mercinaries.  
By the Civil Law of the Egyptians, and Romans, and by the 
Ecclesiast. 33. Cicer. lib. 3. offici. Diod. Sic. lib. 2. C. 2. L. 1 D. de his qui sunt sui, vel. al. juris.  constitutions of the Antonims, the Master is aswell liable to punishment which hath killed his own slave, as he which killed another man's. In like manner the Law delivers from the power of the Master the slave whom in his sickness he hath altogether neglected, or hath not afforded convenient food, and the infranchilde slave whose condition was somewhat better, might for any aparent injury bring his action against his Patron. Now seeing there is so great difference between slaves, and lawful children, betwixt Lords and fathers, and notwithstanding heretofore it was not permitted amongst the heathen, to use their slaves cruelly: What shall we say, pray you, of that father of the people, which cries out tragically with Aireus, I will devour my Children? In what esteem shall we hold that Prince which takes such pleasure in the massacring his Subjects, (condemned without being ever heard) that he dispatched many thousand of them, in one day, & yet is not glutted with blood: Briefly who after the example of Caligula (surnamed the Phaeton of the world) wisheth that all his people had but one head that he might cut it off at one blow? Shall it not be lawful to implore the assistance of the Law against such furious madness, and to pull from such a Tyrant the sword which he received to maintain the Law, and defend the good, when it is drawn by him only for rapine and ruin?   

Whether the goods of the people belong to the King,  
But to proceed, let us now see whether the King whom we have already proved, hath not power over the lives of his Subjects; is not at the least Lord over their Goods. In these days there is no language more common in the Courts of Princes, then of those who say all is the Kings. Whereby it follows, that in exacting any thing from his Subjects he takes but his own, and in that which he leaves them, he expresseth the care he hath that they should not be altogether destitute of means to maintain themselves; and this opinion hath gained so much power in the minds of some Princes, that they are not ashamed to say that the pains, sweat and industry of their Subjects is their proper revenue, as if their miserable Subjects only kept beasts to till the earth for their insolent master's profit, and luxury. And indeed, the practice at this day is just in this manner, although in all right & equity it ought to be contrary, now we must always remember that Kings were created for the good and profit of the people, and that those (as Aristotle says) which endeavour and seek the commodity of the people, are trusty Kings: whereas those that make their own private ends and pleasures, the only butt and aim of their desirers are truly Tyrants.  
It being then so that every one loves that which is his own, yea that many covet that which belongs to other men, is it any thing probable that men should seek a master to give him frankly all that they had long laboured for, and gained with the sweat of their brows? may we not rather imagine, that they chose such a man on whose integrity they relied for the administering of justice equally both to the poor and rich, and which would not assume all to himself, but rather maintain every one in the fruition of his own goods? or who like an unprofitable Drone should suck the fruit of other men's labours, but rather preserve the house, for those whose industry justly deserved it? briefly, who instead of extorting from the true owners their goods, would see them defended from all ravening oppressors? What I pray you skills it says the poor Country man, whether the King, or the enemy make havok of my goods, since through the spoil thereof I and my poor family die for hunger? what imports it whether a stranger or homebred caterpillar ruin my estate, and bring my poor fortune to extreme beggary? Whether a foreign Soldier, or a Sycophant Courtier by force or fraud, make me alike miserable? Why shall he be accounted a barbarous enemy, if thou be a friendly Patriot? Why he a Tyrant if thou be a King? Yea certainly by how much parricide is greater than manslaughter, by so much the wickedness of a King, exceeds in mischief the violence of an enemy.  
If then therefore in the creation of Kings, men gave not their own proper goods unto them, but only recommended them to their protection; by what other right then, but that of free booters, can they challenge the property of other men's goods to themselves? Wherefore the Kings of Egypt were not (according to Law) at the first the Lords of particular men's estates, but were only then when they were sold unto them for corn, and yet may there well be question made of the validity of that contract. Ahab King of Israel could not compel Naboth to sell him his 
Gen 45. 1 Kings. 21. 1. etc.  vineyard; but rather if he had been willing, the Law of God would not permit it. The Roman Emperors which had an unreasonable power, could neither by right have done it. At this day there is with much difficulty any Kingdom to be found, where the meanest Subject may not sue the King, & where many times the 
L. venditor. 13. D. de come. praed. divid.  King is not cast in the suit, which succeeding he must as well as others satisfy the judgement. And to this is not contrary, although at the first view it seem so, that which some of their most familiars have written of the Emperors. That by the civil Law all things were the Kings, and that Caesar was absolute Lord of all 
Seneca lib. de benef. 7. C. 4. 5. 6.  things, they themselves expound this their opinion in this manner, that the dominion of all things belongs to the King, and the propriety to the particular persons, insomuch as the one possesseth all by the right of commanding, the other by the Law of inheritance: We know, that it is a common saying amongst the Civilians, that if any make claim to a house, or a Ship, it follows not therefore that he can extend his right to all the furniture 
L. nave. 36. D. de evictionibus.  or lading. And therefore a King may challenge and gain right to the Kingdom of Germany, France and England▪ and yet notwithstanding he may not lawfully take any honest man's estate from him, but by manifest injustice, seeing that they are things divers, and by Law distinguished, to be possessors of the whole, and of all the particular parts.   

Whether the King be the proper owner of the Kingdom.  
But the King, is he not Lord proprietor of the public Revenue? We must handle this point somewhat more exactly than we did the former. In the first place, we must consider that the revenue of the public Excheaquer is one thing, & the proper patrimony of the Prince an other, of different nature are the goods of the Emperor, King, or Prince; to those of A●tonius, Henry, or Philip, those are properly the Kings, which he enjoys as King, those are Antonious his which he possesseth, as in the right of Antonius, the former he received from the people, the latter from those of his blood, as inheritor to them.  
This distinction is frequent in the books of the civil Law, where there is a difference ever made, between the patrimony of the Empire, and that of the Emperor, the treasury of Caesar is one 
L. bene à Zenone. C. de quod. praesc. C. unde quaest. Madge ib. 12. C. l. fiscus. D. de jurefisci.  thing, and the Exchequer of the Commonwealth another, and both the one and the other have their several procurers, there being divers dispensers of the sacred and public distributions, and of the particular & private expenses, insomuch as he which as Emperor is preferred before a private man, in a grant by deed or chartel, may also sometime as Antonius give place to an inferior person.  
In like manner in the Empire of Germany, the revenue of Ferdinand of Austria is one thing, and the revenue of the Emperor Ferdinand is another: the Empire, and the Emperor have their several treasurers: as also there is difference in the inheritances which the Princes derive from the houses of their ancestors, and those which are annexed to the Electoral dignities. Yea amongst the Turks themselves, Selimus his gardens and patrimonial lands are distinstuished from those of the public, the one serving for the provision of the Sultan's table, the other employed only about the Turquish affairs of State. There be notwithstanding Kingdoms as the French and English, and others in which the King hath no particular patrimony, but only the public which he received from the people, there this former distinction hath no place. For the goods which belongs to the Prince as a 
quaere. of what nature the ancient demeane is in England.  private person there is no question, he is absolute owner of them as other particular persons are, and may by the civil Law sell, engage, or dispose of them at his pleasure. But for the goods of the Kingdom, which in some places are commonly called the demeanes, the Kings may not be esteemed nor called in any sort whatsoever, absolute Lords Proprietors of them. For what if a man for the flocks sake have made thee Shepherd, doth it follow 
L. cum servus 39 Sec vlt. D. de leg. 1. l. universi. 9 & ●. seq. C de fundo patrim.  that thou hast liberty, to flay, pill, sell, and transport the Sheep at thy pleasure? Although the people have established thee Judge, or Governor of a City, or of some Province, hast thou therefore power to alienate, sell, or play away that City or Province? And seeing that in alienating or passing away a Province, the people also are sold, have they raised thee to that authority to the end thou shouldest separate them from the rest, or that thou shouldest prostitute and make them slaves to whom thou pleasest? Furthermore I demand if the Royal dignity be a patrimony, or an Office? If it be an Office, what Community hath it with any propriety? If it be a Patrimony, is it not such a one that at least the paramount propriety remains still in the people which were the doners? Briefly if the revenue of the Exchequer, or the demeanes of the Kingdom, be called the dowry of the Commonwealth, and by good right, and such a dowry whose dismembering or wasting, brings with it the ruin of the public State, the Kingdom and the King, by what Law shall it be lawful to alienate this dowry? Let the Emperor Wencislaus be infatuated, the French King Charles the sixth lunatic, and give or sell the Kingdom, or part of it to the English, let Malcolme King of the Scots, lavishly dissipate the demeanes and consume the public treasure, what follows for all this? Those which choose the King to withstand the invasions of foreign enemies, shall they through his madness & negligence be made the slaves of strangers, and those means & wealth, which would have secured them in the fruition of their own estates and fortunes? Shall they by the election of such a King be exposed to the prey & rapine of all comers, and that which particular persons have saved from their own necessities, and from those under their tutorship and government, (as it happened in Scotland) to indew the Commonwealth with it, shall it be devoured by some Pander or Broker, for unclean pleasures.  
But if as we have often said, that Kings were constituted for the people's use, what shall that use be, if it be perverted into abuse? What good can so much mischief, and inconvenience bring, what profit can come of such eminent and irreparable damages and dangers? If (I say) in seeking to purchase my own liberty & welfare, I engage myself into an absolute thraldom, and willingly subject myself to another's Yoke, and become a fettered slave to another man's unruly desires, therefore as it is imprinted in all of us by nature, so also hath it by a long custom been approved by all Nations, that it is not lawful for the King by the counsel of his own fancy and pleasure, to diminish or waste the public revenue; and those which have run a contrary course, have even lost that happy name of a King, and stood b●●●●ded with the infamous title of a Tyrant.  
I confess that when Kings were inst●uted, there was of necessity means to be assigned for them, as well to maintain their Royal dignity, as to furnish the expense of their teaine and Officers. Civility, and the welfare of the public State, seem to require it, for it was the duty of a King to establish Judges in all places, who should receive no presents, nor sell Justice: and also to have power ready to assist the execution of their Ordinances, and to secure the ways from dangers, that commerce might be open, and free, etc. If there were likelihood of wars to fortify and put Garrisons into the frontier places, and to hold an Army in the field, and to keep his Magazines well stored with munition. It is commonly said that peace cannot be well maintained without provision for wars, nor wars managed without men, nor men kept in discipline without pay, nor money gotten without Subsidies, and Tributes.  
To discharge therefore the burden of the State in time of Peace, was the demeane appointed, and in time of wars the tributes and imposts, yet so as if any extraordinary necessity required it, money might be raised by Subsidies or other fitting means. The final intendment of all, was ever the public utility, in so much as he which converts any of these public Revenues to his own private purposes, much more he which mispends them in anyunworthy or lose occasions, no way merits the name of a King, for the Prince (saith the Apostle) is the minister of God for the good of the people: and for that cause is Tribute paid unto them. 
Rom. 13.   
This is the true original cause of the customs, and imposts of the Romans, that those rich merchandises which were brought 
The same reason is recorded for all our imposts in England, with which a Navy was wont to be maintained at Sea.  from the Indies, Arabia, Ethiopia, might be secured in their passage by land from thiefs and robbers, & in their transportation by Sea from Pirates, insomuch as for their security, the Commonwealth maintained a Navy at Sea. In this rank we must put the Custom which was paid in the red Sea, and other Imposts of gates, bridges, and passages, for the securing of the great road ways, (therefore called the Praetorian consular, and the King's highways,) from the spoil of thiefs and freebooters. The care also of the reparation of bridges was referred to Commissaries deputed by the King, as appears 
Archi in Ca●. fi qois Romi p●●●s & pereg. 24. q 3. B●lam c●●. Sect. conventicula, de pace iure iurfir l. 2. D. ne quid in loto publ. viarum.  by the Ordinance of Lewis the Courteous, concerning the 12. bridges over the River of Seyne, commanding also boats to be in a readiness, to ferry over passengers, etc.  
For the tax laid upon Salt there was none in use in those times, the most of the Salt pits being enjoyed by private persons, because it seemed that that which nature out of her own bounty presented unto men, ought no more to be enhanced by sale then either the light, the air, or the water, as a certain King called 
L. magis puto D. de ●ebus corum.  Lycurgus in the lesser Asia, began to lay some impositions upon the Salt pits there, nature as it were impatiently bearing such a restraint of her liberality, the springs are said to dry up suddenly. 
Inu. Sat 4. Si quid palphurio, si credimus Armillato, Quicquid conspicuum palchrum q●ex aequo●e to●o est, Res fisci est ubicunque natat.  Now although certain Marm●usets of the Court would persuade us at this day, (as Juveral complained in his time) that the Sea affords nothing of worth, or good, which falls not within the compass of the King's Prerogative.  
He that first brought this taxation into Rome, was the Censor Livius, who therefore gained the surname of Salter, neither was it done but in the Commonwealth's extreme necessity. And in France King Philip the long, for the same reason obtained of the Estates the imposition upon Salt for five years only, what turmoils and troubles the continuance thereof hath bred every man knows. To be brief, all Tributes were imposed, and continued for the provision of means and stipends for the men of war, so as to make a Province stipendary or tributary, was esteemed the same with military.  
Behold wherefore Solomon exacted Tributes, to wit, to fortify 
1 King. 9 15.  the Towns, and to erect and furnish a public magazine, which being accomplished, the people required of Reholoam to be freed 
Post●l li. 3 de rep Turc.  from that burden. The Turks call the Tribute of the Provinces, the Sacred blood of the people and account it a most wicked crime to employ it in any thing but the defence of the people. Wherefore by the same reason all that which the King conquers in war belongs to the people, and nor to the King, because the people bore the charges of the war, as that which is gained by a factor accures to the account of his master. Yea and what advantage he gains by marriage, if it belongs simply and absolutely to his wife, that is acquired also to the Kingdom, for so much as it is to be presumed that he gained not that preferment in marriage in quality of Philip or Charles, but as he was King. On the contrary, in like manner the Queens have interest of endowment in the estates which their husbands gained and enjoyed before they attained the Crown, and have no title to that which is gotten after they are created Kings, because that is judged as the acquist of the Common purse, and hath no proper reference to the King's private estate, which was so determined in France, betwixt Philip of Valois, and his wife Jedne of Burgundy. But to the end that there be no money drawn from the people to be employed in private designs, and for particular ends and purposes; the Emperor swears, not to impose any Taxes or Tributes whatsoever, but by the authority of the Estates of the Empire. As much do the Kings of Polonia, Hungary, and Denmark promise: the English in like manner enjoy the same unto this day, by the Laws of Henry the third, and Edward the first.  
The French Kings in former times, imposed no Taxes but in the Assemblies, and with the consent of the three Estates; from thence sprung the Law of Philip of Valois, that the people should not have any Tribute laid on them but in urgent necessity, and with the consent of the Estates. Yea and anciently after these moneys were collected they were locked in coffers through every Diocese and recommended to the special care of selected men (who are the same which at this day are called Esleus) to the end that they should pay the soldiers enroled, within the Towns of their Dioceses: the which was in use in other Countries, as namely in Flanders and other neighbouring Provinces. At this day, though many corruptions be crept in, yet without the consent and confirmation of the Parliament, no exactions may be collected, notwithstanding there be some Provinces which are not bound to any thing, without the approbation of the Estates of the Country, as Languedoke, Brittannie Province, Daulphinie, and some others. All the Provinces of the Low Countries have the same privileges: finally lest the Exchequer devour all, like the spleen which exhales the spirits from the other members of the body. In all places they have confined the Exchequer within its proper bounds and limits. Seeing then it is most certain that what hath been ordinarily and extraordinarily assigned to Kings, to wit, Tributes, Taxes, and all the demeanes which comprehend all customs both for importations, and exportations, forfeitures, amercements, royal escheates, confiscations, and other dews of the same nature, were configned into their hands for the maintenance and defence of the people, and the State of the Kingdom, insomuch as if these sinews be cut, the people must needs fall to decay, and in demolishing these foundations the Kingdom will come to utter ruin. It necessarily follows, that he which lays impositions on the people only to oppress them, and by the public detriment seeks private profit, and with their own swords kills his subject he truly is unworthy the name of a King: Whereas concrarily, a true King as he is a careful mannager of the public affairs, so is he a ready protector of the Common welfare, and not a Lord in propriety of the Commonwealth, having as little authority to alienate or dissipate the demeans or public Revenue, as the Kingdom itself. And if he mis-govern the State, seeing it imports the Commonwealth that every one make use of his own talon, it is much more requisite for the public good, that he which hath the managing of it, carry himself as he ought.  
And therefore if a prodigal Lord by the authority of justice, be committed to the tuition of his kinsmen and friends, and compelled to suffer his revenues and means to be ordered, and disposed of by others; by much more reason may those which have interest in the affairs of State, & whose duty obligeth them thereto, take all the Administration and government of the State out of the hands of him which either negligently executes his place, ruins the Commonwealth, if after admonition he endeavours not to perform his duty. And for so much as it is easily to be proved, that in all lawful Dominions the King cannot be held Lord in propriety of the demeane; without searching into those elder times, whereof we have an apt representation in the 
Gen. 23.  person of Ephron King of the Hittites, who durst not sell the Field to Abraham without the consent of the people. This right is at this day practised in public States: the Emp: of Germany before his 
Sleyd. l. 1. & bulla aurea.  Coronation doth solemnly swear that he will neither alienate, dismember, nor engage any of the rights or members of the Empire. And if he recover, or conquer any thing with the Arms & means of the public, it shall be gained to the Empire, and not to himself. Wherefore when Charles the 4th. promised each of the Electors an hundred thousand Crowns to choose his Son Wencislaus Emperor, and having not ready money to deliver them, he mortgaged Customs, Taxes, Tributes, and certain Towns unto them, 
L. 1. & passim c. de con. re. alien. naucler. in Chron.  which were the proper appurtenances of the Empire: whereon followed much and vehement contestation, most men holding this engagement void. And questionless it had been so declared, but for the profit that those reaped thereby, which ought principally to have maintained and held entire the rights and dignities of the Empire. And it followed also, that Wencislaus was justly held uncapable of the government of the Empire, chief because he suffered the rights of the Empire over the Duchy of Millen to bewrested from him.  
There is a Law very ancient in the Kingdom of Polonia, which prohibits the alienating of any of the Kingdoms Lands; the which also 
C intellecto de jure jurando in Decretal. Polidor. Virgil. In cod. His. part 5. 1. 5. constis. 9  was renewed by King Lewis in the year 1375. In Hungary in anno 1221. there was a complaint made to Pope Honorius, that King Andrew had engaged the Crown Lands contrary to his oath. In England was the same by the Law of King Edw: in the year 1298. Likewise in Spain by the Ordinance made under Alphonsus, and renewed in the year 1560. in the Assembly of the Estates at Toledo. These Laws were then ratified, although long time before Custom had obtained the vigour and effect of Law. Now for the Kingdom of France whereto I longer confine myself, because she may in a sort pass as a pattern to the rest, this right hath ever remained there inviolable. It is one of the most ancient Laws of the Kingdom, and a right born with the Kingdom itself, that the Demain may not be alienated: the which Law in anno 1566. (although but ill observed) was renewed. There is only 2. cases excepted, the portions or Apennages of the children and brothers of the King, yet with this reservation, that the right of Vassalage remains 
Papon Arestor. l. 5. ●●. 10. Act. 4.  always to the Crown: in like manner if the condition of War require necessarily an alienation, yet it must be ever with power of redemption. Anciently neither the one nor the other were of validity, but by the commandment of the States: at this day since the Parliament hath been made sedentary, the Parliament of Paris which is the 
Sect 5. 11. & 16. legis regiae 1566.  Court of the Peers, and the Chamber of Accounts, and of the Treasury, must first approve it: as the Edicts of Charles the sixth and ninth do testify. This is a thing so certain, that if the ancient Kings themselves would endow a Church (although that was a work much favoured in those days) they were notwithstanding bound to have an allowance of the Estates: witness King Childebert, who might not endow the Abbey of St. Vincent at Paris before he had the French and Newstrafians consent. Clovis the 2d. and other Kings have observed the same. They 
Aimonius l. 4. cha. 41 etc.  might neither remit the regalities by granting infranchisements, nor the nomination of Prelates to any Church. And if any of them have done it, as Lewis 11. Philip 4. and Philip surnamed Augustus, did in favour of the Churches of Senis Auxera, and Nevers, the Parliament hath 
L. peto. 69 Sect praedium. D. de leg. 2. An. 1329. 1360. 1374. 1401. 1583.  declared it void. When the King is anointed at Reims, he swears to observe this Law: and if he infringe it, that Act hath as much validity with it as if he contracted to sell the Empires of the great Turk, or Sophy of Pe●sia. From this spring the Constitutions or Ordinances of Philip 6. of John 2d. of Charles 5th. 6th. and 8th. by which they revoke all alienations made by their Predecessors.  
In the Assembly of the Estates at Tours, where King Charles the 8th. 
Anno 1483. 1522. 1531. 1549 1560. by divers Decrees of the Court of Parliament.  was in person, divers alienations made by Lewis 11. were repealed, and annihilated, and there was taken away from the Heirs of Tancred of Chastel his great Minion, divers places which he had given him by his proper Authority. This was finally ratified in the last Assembly of the Estates held at Orleans. Thus much concerning the Kingdoms Demean. But to the end that we may yet more clearly perceive that the Kingdom is preferred before the King, and that he cannot by his own proper Authority diminish the Majesty he hath received from the people, nor infranchise or release from his Dominion any one of his Subjects; nor quit or relinquish the Sovereignty of ●he lest part of his Kingdom. charlemain in former times endeavoured to subject the Kingdom 
Paulus Aemilius, lib 3.  of France to the Germane Empire: the which the French did courageously oppose by the mouth of a Prince of Glasconnie; and it charlemain had proceeded in that business, it had come to the trial of the Sword. In like manner when any portion of the Kingdom was granted 
Anno 1195. 1●60. 1269. 2297. 1303. 1325. 1330. Anno 1360.  to the English, the sovereignty was almost always reserved. And if sometimes they obtained it by force, as at the Treaty of Bretignie, by the which king John quitted the Sovereignty of Glasconnie and Poyton that agreement was not kept, neither was he more bound to do it, than a Tutor or Guardian is being prisoner (as he was then) which for his own deliverance should engage the estate of his Pupils. By the power 
Anno 1465.  of the same Law the Parliament of Paris made void the Treaty of Confl●us by the which Duke Charles of Burgundy had drawn from the king A●niens, and other Towns of Picardy. In our days the same Parliament declared void the Agreement made at Madrid, between 
Anno 1525.  Francis the 1. then prisoner, and Charles the 5. concerning the Duchy 
A●●● 1420. M ●u●●●let. chap. 225.  of Bu●gundie. But the donation made by Charles the 6. unto H●n: king of England of the kingdom of France after his decease is a sufficient testimony for this matter, and of his madness, if there had been no other proof. But to leave off producing any further testimonies, examples, or reasons, by what right can the King give or sell away the kingdom or any part of it: seeing it consisteth of people, and not of earth or 
L. liber homo 10● D. de ver. oble. liem●t●. 34 ●●ct. ●. D. de co●te. ●mp l●●e●●●lt C de op●r. libert.  walls; and of Free men there can be made no sale, nor traffic: yea, and the Patrons themselves cannot compel the infranchisde servants to make their habitations in other places than themselves like. The which is the rather to be allowed, in that Subjects are neither slaves, nor intra●ch●●de servants, but brothers: and not only the King's brothers taken one by one, but also considered in one body, they ought to be e●●e●n●ed absolute Lords, and owners of the Kingdom.   

Whether the King be the usufruictuor of the Kingdom.  
But if the King be not Lord in propriety, yet at the least we may esteem him usufruictuor of the Kingdom, and of the Demean: nay truly we can allow him to have the usufruit, for being usufruictuor though the propriety remain in the people, yet may he absolutely dispose of the profits, and engage them at his pleasure. Now we have already proved, that Kings of their own Authority cannot engage the Revenues of the Exchequer, or the Demain of the Kingdom. The usufroictuor may dispose of the profits to whom, how, and when he pleaseth. Contrarily the excessive gifts of Princes are ever judged void, his unnecessary expenses are not allowed, his superfluous to be cut off, and that which is expended by him in any other occasion, but for the public utility, is justly esteemed to be unjustly extorted. And is no less liable to the Law Cincea, than the meanest Roman Citizen formerly was: In France the King's gifts are never of force, until the Chamber of Accounts have confirmed them. From hence proceed the postils of the ordinary Chamber in the giving up of the Accounts in the Reigns of prodig all kings, Trop donne: soyt repele, which is, excessive gifts must be recalled. The Judges of this Chamber solemnly swear to pass nothing which may prejudice the Kingdom, or the public State, notwithstanding any letters the King shall write unto them: but they are not always so mindful of this oath as were to be desired.  
Furthermore, the Law takes no care how a usufruictuor possesseth, and governs his revenues, but contrariwise she prescribes unto the King, how and to what use he shall employ his. For the ancient Kings of France, were bound to divide their royal revenues into four parts. The first was employed in the maintaining of the Ministers of the Church, and providing for the poor: The second for the King's table: The third for the wages of his Officers and household servants: The last in the repairing of bridges, castles, and the royal Palaces. And what was remaining was laid up in the treasury, to be bestowed 
Monstrel in Car. 6.  on the necessities of the Commonwealth. And Histories do at large relate the troubles and tumults, which happened about the year 1412 in the Assembly of the Estates at Paris, because Charles the sixth had wasted all the money that was raised of the revenues and demean, in his own and his minions lose pleasures, and that the expenses of the King's household which before exceeded not the sum of 94000. francs, did amount in that miserable estate of the Common wealth to five hundred and forty thousand francs. Now as the demeane was employed, in the before mentioned affairs: so the aids were only for the war and the taxes assigned for the payment of the men at arms, and for no other occasion. In other Kingdoms the King hath no greater authority, and in divers less, especially in the Empire of Germany, and in Poland. But we have made choice of the Kingdom of France, to the end it be not thought this hath any special prerogative above others, because there perhaps the commonwealth receiveth the most detriment. Briefly as I have before said, the name of a King signifie● not an inheritance, nor a Propriety, nor a usufruict, but 
Ex council. Valem. in c. 1. ●e his quae fiunt a praelat. abque consenlucapit.  a charge, office, and procuration. As a Bishop is chosen to look to the welfare of the soul, so is the King established to take care of the body so far forth as it concerns the public good: the one is dispenser of the heavenly treasure, the other of the secular, and what right the one hath in the Episcopal revenues, the same hath the other, and no greater in the Kingdoms demean. If the Bishop alien the goods of the Bishopric, without the consent of the Chapter, this alienation is of no value, If the King alien the demeane without the approbation of the Estates, that is also void; one portion of the eclesiastical goods ought to be employed in the reparation of the Churches, the second in relieving of the poor, the third for the maintenance of the Churchmen, and the fourth for the Bishop himself: We have seen before, that the King ought to divide into four parts the Revenues of the Kingdoms demean. The abuse of these times cannot infringe, or annihilate the right, for although the most part of the Bishops steal from the poor that which they profusely cast away on their panders, and ruin and destroy their lands and woods, the calling of the Bishop is not for all that altered. Although that some Emperors have assumed to themselves an absolute power, that cannot invest them with any further right, because no man can be judge in his own cause. What if some Caracalla vaunt, he will not want money whilst the sword remains in his custody: The Emperor Adrian will promise on the contrary, so to discharge his office of Principality, that he will always remember that the Commonwealth is not his, but the people's: which one thing almost distinguisheth a King from a Tyrant. Neither can that act of A●talus King of Pergomus designing the Roman people for heirs to his Kingdom, nor that of Alexander for Egypt, nor P●olom: for the Cyrenians, bequeathing their Kingdoms to the same people nor Praesutagus King of the Icenians, which left his to Caesar, draw any good consequence of right to those which usurp that which by no ●ust title belongs to them, nay by how much the intrusion is more violent; by so much the equity, & justice of the cause is more perspicuous: for what the Romans assumed under the colour of right, they would have made no difficulty if that pretext had been wanting to have taken by force: we have seen almost in our days how the Venetians possessed themselves of the Kingdom of Cyprus, under pretence of an imaginary adoption which would have proved ridiculous if it had not been seconded by power and arms. To which also may be not unfitly resembled the pretended donation of Constantine to Pope Silvester, for that straw of the decretist Gratian, was long since consumed and turned to ashes, neither is of more validity, the grant which Lewis the courteous made to Pope Paschal of the City of Rome, and part of Italy, because he gave that which he possessed not, no man opposed it. But when his Father 
Volater. l. Geogr. 3.  Charlemagne would have united & subjected the Kingdom of France to the German Empire, the French did lawfully oppose it: and if he had persisted in his purpose, they were resolved to have hindered him, and defended themselves by arms. There can be to as little advantage alleged that act of solomon's, whom we read to have delivered 
1 Kings 9 11.  twenty Towns to Hiram King of Tire: for he did not give them to him but for the securing of the Talents of gold which Hiram 
2 Chron. 8. 2.  had lent him, and they were redeemed at the end of the term, as it appears by the Text. Further, the soil was barren, and husbanded by the remaining Canaanites: But Solomon having redeemed it out of the hands of Hiram, delivered it to the Israelites to be inhabited and tilled. Neither serves it to much more purpose to allege that in some Kingdoms, there is no express agreement between the King and the people: for suppose there be no mention made, yet the law of nature teacheth us that Kings were not ordained to ruin, but to govern the Commonwealths, and that they 
L. 2. §. jus reipub. D. de administral. rer. ad Civit. pert. l. 〈◊〉. 27. D. de admut. tut.  may not by their proper authority alter or change the rights of the public State, and although they be Lords, yet can they challenge it in no other quality, then as Guardians do in the tuition of their pupils; neither can we account him a lawful Lord, which deprives the Commonwealth of her liberty, and sells her as a slave. Briefly, neither can we also allege, that some Kingdoms are the 
L. si fundum sect. si tut. D. depositi et expr●ssuis. Extravag. de rejudicata, c. intellecto.  proper acquists of the King himself, insomuch as they were not conquered by their proper means and swords, but by the hands, and with the wealth of the public; and there is nothing more agreeable to reason, then that which was gained with the joint faculties, and common danger of the public, should not be aliened disposed of, without the consent of the States which represent the Commonwealth: and the necessity of this law is such, that it is of force amongst robbers and freebooters themselves. He which follows a contrary course, must needs ruin humane society. And although the French conquered by force of arms, the Countries of Germany and Gaul, yet this before mentioned right remains still 
L. 2. et passi●. C. de interred. Com. rer. alie●●t.  entire.  
To conclude we must needs resolve, that Kings are neither proprietors, nor usu-fructuaries of the royal patrimony: but only administrators: and being so, they can by no just right attribute to themselves the propriety, use or profit of private men's estates, nor with as little reason the public revenues, which are in truth only the Commonwealths.  
But before we pass any further, we must here resolve a doubt. The people of Israel having demanded a King, the Lords said to Samuel: harken unto the voice of the people: notwithstanding, 
1 Sam. 8. 7. etc.  give them to understand what shall be the manner of the King which shall reign over them: he will take your fields, your vineyards, your olive-trees, to furnish his own occasions, and to enrich his servants: briefly, he will make the people slaves. One would hardly believe in what estimation the Courtiers of our times hold this Text, when of all the rest of the holy Scripture they make but a jest. In this place the Almighty and all good God, would manifest to the Israelites their Levite, when that they had God himself even present with them, who upon all occasions appointed them holy Judges, and worthy Commanders for the Wars, would notwithstanding rather subject themselves to the disordered commandments of a vain mutable man, than to the secure protection of the omnipotent and immutable God. He declares then unto them in what a slippery estate the King was placed, and how easily unruly authority fell into disordered violence, and Kingly power was turned into tyrannous wilfulness. Seeing the King that he gave them, would by preposterous violence draw the sword of authority against them, and subject the equity of the laws to his own unjust desires: and this mischief which they wilfully drew on themselves; they would happily repent of, when it would not be so easily remedied. Briefly, this Text doth not describe the right of Kings, but what right they are accustomed to attribute to themselves: not what by the privilege of their places they may justly do: but what power for the satisfying of their own lusts, they unjustly usurp. This will manifestly appear from the 17. Chapter of Deuteronomy, where God appoints a law for Kings. Here says Samuel the King will use his Subjects like slaves: there God forbids the King to lift his heart above his brethren: to wit, over his Subjects, whom he ought not to insult over, but to cherish as his kinsmen. He will make Chariots, levy horsemen, and take the goods of private men, says Samuel: on the contrary in Deutronomy, he is exhorted not to multiply horsemen, nor to heap up 
Deut. 17.  gold and silver, nor cause the people to return into Egypt, to wit, into bondage. In Samuel we see pictured to the life wicked Ahab, which 
1 Kings 21.  by pernicious means gets Naboths Vineyard: there David, who held it not lawful to drink that water which was purchased with 
2 Sam. 23. 16.  the danger of his Subjects lives. Samuel fortels that the King demanded by the Israelites, in stead of keeping the laws, would govern all according to his own fancy: on the contrary, God commands that his Law should by the Priests be delivered into the hands of the King, to copy it out, and to have it continually before his eyes. Therefore Samuel being high Priest, gave to Saul the royal law contained in the 17. of Deutronomy, written into a book, which certainly had been a frivolous act if the King were permitted to break it at his pleasure. Briefly, it is as much as if Samuel had said. You have asked a King after the manner of other Nations, the most of whom have Tyrants for their Governors: You desire a King to distribute justice equally amongst you: but many of them think all things lawful which their own appetites suggests unto them; in the mean season you willingly shake off the Lord, whose only will is equity and justice in the abstract.  
In Heroditus there is a history which plainly expresses, bow apt the royal government is to degenerate into tyranny, whereof Samuel so 
Herod. l. 2.  exactly forewarns the people. Deioces much renowned for his justice, was first chosen Judge amongst the Medes: presently after, to the end he might the better repress those which would oppose justice, he was chosen King, and invested with convenient authority, than he desired a guard, after a Citadel to be built in Eebatana the principal City of the Kingdom, with colour to secure him from conspiracies and machinations of Rebels; which being effected, he presently applies himself to revenge the least displeasures which were offered him with the greatest punishments.  
Finally, no man might presume to look this King in the face, and to laugh or cough in his presence, was punished with grievous torments. So dangerous a thing it is, to put into the hands of a weak mind (as all men's are by nature) unlimited power. Samuel therefore teacheth not in that place, that the authority of a King is absolute: on the contrary he discreetly admonisheth the people not to enthrall their liberty under the unnecessary yoke of a weak and unruly Master: he doth not absolutely exclude the royal authority, but would have it restrained within its own limits: he doth not amplify the King's right with an unbridled and licentious liberty: but rather tacitly persuades to put a bit into his mouth. It seems that this advice of samuel's was very beneficial to the Israelites, for that they circumspectly moderated the power of their Kings, the which most Nations grown wise, either by the experience of their own, or their neighbour's harms, have carefully looked unto, as will plainly appear by that which follows.  
We have showed already, that in the establishing of the King, 
An alliance or covenant between the K. & the people. Deut. 17. 1 Sam. 10. 27. 2 Sam. 5. 3.  there were two alliances or convenants contracted: the first between God, the King, and the people, of which we have formerly treated: the second between the King and the people, of which we must now say somewhat. After that Saul was established King, the royal Law was giune him, according to which he ought to govern. David made a Covenant in Hebron before the Lord, that is to say, taking God for witness, with all the ancients of Israel, which represented the whole body of the people, & even then he was made King. Joas 
1 Chron. 11. 3.  also by the mouth of Jehoiada the High Priest, entered into Covenant with the whole people of the land in the house of the Lord: And 
2 King. 11. 17. & 12. 2 Chron. 23. 3.  when the Crown was set on his head, together with it was the law of the Testimony put into his hand, which most expounds to be the law of God: likewise Josias promiseth to observe and keep the Commandments, Testimonies and Statutes comprised in the book of 
2 King. 23. 3.  the Covenant: under which words are contained all which belongs to the duties both of the first and second Table of the law of God. In all the before remembered places of the holy story, it is ever said that a Covenant was made with all the people, with all the multitude, with all the Elders, with all the men of Juda: to the end that we might know, as it is also fully expressed, that not only the principals of the Tribes, but also all the Milleniers, Centurions, and subaltern Magistrates should meet together, each of them in the name, and for their Towns and Commonalties, to covenant and contract with the King. In this assembly was the creating of the King determined of: for it was the people that made the King, and not the King the people.  
It is certain then, that the people by way of stipulation, require a performance of covenants, the King promises it. Now the condition of a Stipulator is in terms of law more worthy than of a promiser. The people asketh the King, whether he will govern justly and according to the laws? He promiseth he will. Then the people answereth, and not before, that whilst he governs uprightly, they will obey faithfully. The King therefore promiseth simply and absolutely, the people upon condition: the which failing to be accomplished, the people rest according to equity and reason, quit from their promise.  
In the first covenant, or contract, there is only an obligation to piety: in the second, to justice. In that the King promiseth to serve God religiously: in this, to rule the people justly. By the one he is obliged with the utmost of his endeavours to procure the glory of God: by the other, the profit of the people. In the first there is a condition expressed, If thou keep my commandments: in the second, If thou distribute justice equally to every man. God is the proper revenger of deficiency in the former, and the whole people the lawful punisher of delinquency in the latter, or the Estates, the representative body thereof, who have assumed to themselves the protection of the people. This hath been always practised in all well-governed Estates. Amongst the Persians, after the due performance of holy Rites, they contracted with Cyrus in manner following.  
Thou, O Cyrus, in the first place, shalt promise, That if any make war 
Zenophon lib. 8. Paed.  against the Persians, or seek to infringe the liberty of the Laws, thou wilt with the utmost of thy power defend and protect this country. Which having promised, they presently add, And we Persians promise to be aiding to keep all men in obedience, whilst thou defendest the country. Zenophon calls this agreement, A Confederation; as also Isocrates calls that which he writ of the duties of subjects towards their Princes, A Discourse of Confederation. The alliance 
Zenoph. in tract. de repub. Lacede.  or confederation was renewed every month between the Kings, and Ephores of Sparta, although those Kings were descended from the line of Hercules. And as these Kings did solemnly swear, to govern according to the Laws, so did the Ephores also to maintain them in their authority, whilst they performed their promise. Likewise in the Roman Kingdom there was an agreement between Romulus the Senate, and the people, in this manner: That the people should make Laws, and the King look they were kept: The people should decree war, and the King should manage it. Now although many Emperors rather by force and ambition, than by any lawful right, were seized of the Roman Empire, and by that which they call a Royal Law, attributed to themselves an absolute authority; notwithstanding by the fragments which remain both in books, and in Roman Inscriptions, of that Law, it plainly appears, that power and authority was granted them to preserve and govern the Commonwealth, not to ruin and oppress it by tyranny. Nay, all good Emperors have ever professed, that they held themselves tied to the Laws, & received the Empire from the Senate, to whose determination they always referred the most important affairs, and esteemed it a great error without their advice to resolve on the occasions of the public State.  
If we take into our consideration the condition of the Empires, Kingdoms and States of times, there is not any of them worthy of those names, where there is not some such covenant or confederacy between the people and the Prince. It is not long since that in the Empire of Germany, the King of the Romans being ready to be crowned Emperor; was bound to do homage, and make oath of Fealty to the Empire, no more nor less than as the vassal is bound to do to his Lord when he is invested with his fec. Although the form of the words which he is to swear, have been somewhat altered by the Popes, yet notwithstanding the substance still remains the same. According to which we know that Charles the fifth of the house of Austria, was under 
Specul. Saxon. lib. 3. Vrtic. 54.  certain conditions chosen Emperor, as in the same manner his successors were, the sum of which was, that he should keep the Laws already made, and make no new ones without the consent of the Electors, that he should govern the public affairs by the advice of the general Estates, nor engage any thing that belongs to the Empire, and other matters which are particularly recited by the Historians. When the Emperor is crowned at Aquisgrave, the Archbishop of Cullen requires of him in the first place, 
Sleyd. lib. 2. & 2.  If he will maintain the Church, if he will distribute justice, if he will defend the Empire, and protect Widows, Orphans, and all other worthy of compassion: The which after he hath solemnly sworn before the Altar, the Princes also which represent the Empire, are asked, if they will not promise the same; neither is the Emperor anointed, nor receives the other Ornaments of the Empire, before he have first taken that solemn oath. Whereupon it follows, that the Emperor is tied absoutely, and the princes of the Empire, under condition. That the same is observed in the Kingdom of Polonia, no man will make question, who had but seen or heard of the ceremonies and rites wherewith Henry of Anjoy was lately chosen and crowned King of that Country, & especially then when the condition of maintaining of the two Religions, the Reformed and the Roman, was demanded, the which the Lords of the kingdom in express terms required of him three several times, and he as often made promise to perform. The same is observed in the Kingdoms of Bohemia, Hungary, and others; the which we omit to relate particularly, to avoid prolixity.  
Now this manner of stipulation is not only received in those Kingdoms where the right of election is yet entirely observed; but even in those also which are esteemed to be simply hereditary, When the King of France is crowned, the Bishops of Laon and Beauvois, Ecclesiastical Peers, ask all the people there present, whether they desi●e and command, that he which is there before them, shall be their King? Whereupon he is said even then in the stile of the inauguration, to be chosen by the people: and when they have given the sign of consenting, than the King swears that he will maintain all the rights, privileges, and laws of France universally, that he will not alien the Demean, and the other Articles, which have been yet so changed and accommodated to bad intentions, as they differ greatly from that copy which remains in the Library of the Chapter of Beauvois, according to which it is recorded, that King Philip, the first of that name, took his Oath at his Coronation; yet notwithstanding they are not unfitly expressed: Neither is he girded with the sword, nor anointed, nor crowned by the Peers (who at that time wear Coronets on their heads) nor receives the Sceptre and rod of Justice, nor is proclaimed King, before first the people have commanded it: neither do the Peers take their oaths of allegiance before he have first solemnly sworn to keep the Laws carefully.  
And those be, that he shall not waste the public revenue, that he shall not of his own proper authority, impose any taxes, customs, or tributes: that he shall not make peace or war, nor determine of State-affairs, without the advice of the Council of State. Briefly, that he should leave to the Parliament, to the States, and to the Officers of the Kingdom, their authority entire, and all things else which have been usually observed in the Kingdom of France. And when he first enters any City or Province, he is bound to confirm their privileges, and swears to maintain their Laws and Customs. This is straight observed in the Cities of Tholouse, and Rochel, and in the Countries of Daulphinie, Province, and Britain: The which Towns and Provinces have their particular and express Covenants and agreements with the Kings, which must needs be void, if the condition expressed in the Contract be not of force, nor the Kings tied to the performance.  
There is the form of the Oath of the ancient Kings of Burgundy 
In Annal. Burgund.  yet extant in these words: I will protect all men in their rights, according to Law and justice.  
In England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark, there is almost the same custom as in France: but in no place there is used a more discreet care in their manner of proceeding, than in Spain. For in the Kingdom of Arragon, after the finishing of many Ceremonies, which are used between him, which represents the Justitia major of Arragon, which comprehends the majesty of the Commonwealth, seated in a higher seat, and the King, which is to be crowned, who swears fealty, and does his homage: and having read the Laws and conditions, to the accomplishment whereof he is sworn.  
Finally, the Lords of the Kingdom use to the King these words in the vulgar Language, as is before expressed, page 60. 
Nos qui valemos tanto como vos, y podemos mas que vos, vos elegimos kei con estas è y estate conditiones, entra vos y nos un que manda mas que vos.  We which are as much worth as you, and have more power than you, choose you King upon these and these conditions, and there is one between you and us, which commands over you. But least the King should think he swore only for fashion sake, and to observe an old custom, every third year in full assembly of the Estates, the very same words, and in the same manner are repeated unto him.  
And if under pretext of his royal dignity he become insolent, violating the Laws, and neglect his public faith and promise given, then by the privilege of the Kingdom, he is judged, excommunicated, as execrable as Julian the Apostata was by the primitive Church: which excommunication is esteemed of that validity, that instead of praying for the King in their public orisons, they pray against him, and the subjects are by the same right acquit from their oath of Allegiance: as the vassal is exempted from obedience and obligation by oath to his Lord which stands excommunicated; the which hath been determined and confirmed 
In Concil. Tolet. 4. c. 74. & in Tolet. 6. lib. 2. feud. tit. 28. sect. 1.  both by act of Council and Decree of State in the Kingdom of Arragon.  
In like manner, in the Kingdom of Castille in full assembly of the Estates, the King being ready to be crowned, is first in the presence of all advertised of his duty: and even then are read the Articles discreetly composed for the good of the Commonwealth, the King swears he will observe and keep them carefully and faithfully; which being done, than the Constable takes his oath of allegiance, after the Princes and Deputies for the Towns swear each of them in their order; and the same is observed in the Kingdoms of Portugal, Leon, and the rest of Spain. The lesser principalities have their institution grounded on the same right. The contracts which the Brabancers and the rest of the Netherlanders, together with those of Austria, Carinthia, and others, had with 
La Joyeuse entreè.  their Princes, were always conditional. But especially the Brabancers, to take away all occasion of dispute, have this express condition: which is that in the receiving of their Duke, there is read in his presence the ancient Articles, wherein is comprised that which is requisite for the public good; and thereunto is also added, that if he do not exactly and precisely observe them, they may choose what other Lord it shall seem good unto them; the which they do in express words protest unto him. He having allowed and accepted of these Articles, doth in that public assembly promise and solemnly swear to keep them. The which was observed in the reception of Philip the second King of Spain. 
Ludovicus Guicciard. in Discript. Belgiae.  Briefly, there is not any man can deny, but that there is a contract mutually obligatory between the King and the Subjects, which requires the people to obey faithfully, and the King to govern lawfully, for the performance whereof the King swears first, and after the people.  
I would ask here wherefore a man doth swear, if it be not to declare, that what he delivers he sincerely intends from his heart? Can any thing be judged more near to the law of nature, than to observe that which we approve? Furthermore, what is the reason 
L. 1. D. Acpact. l. non minorum 20. D. de transact  the King swears first, and at the instance, and required by the people, but to accept a condition either tacit or expressed? Wherefore is there a condition opposed to the Contract, if it be not that in failing to perform the condition, the contract according to law remains void? And if for want of satisfying the condition by right, the contract is of no force: who shall dare to call that people perjured, which refuseth to obey a King which makes no account of his promise, which he might and ought to have kept, and wilfully breaks those laws which he did swear to observe? On the contrary, may we not rather esteem such a King perfidious, perjured, and unworthy of his place? For if the Law free the vassal 
Lib. 2. feudor. tit. 26. §. 24. & tit. 47. Dionys. Halic. lib. 2.  from his Lord, who dealt feloniously with him, although that to speak properly the Lord sweareth not fealty to his vassal, but he to him: if the Law of the twelve Tables doth detest and hold in execration the protector that defraudeth him that is under his tuition: if the civil Law permit an enfranchised servant to bring his action against his patron, for any grievous usage: if in such cases the same Law delivers the slave from the power of his Master, although the obligation be natural only and not civil: is it not much more reasonable that the people be loosed from that oath of allegiance which they have taken, if the King (who may be not unfitly resembled by an Attorney sworn to look to his Client's cause) first break his oath solemnly taken? And what if all these ceremonies, solemn oaths, nay sacramental promises had never been taken? Doth not nature herself sufficiently teach that Kings were on this condition ordained by the people, that they should govern well? Judges that they should distribute justice uprightly? Captains in the war, that they should lead their Arms against their enemies: If on the contrary, they themselves forage and spoil their subjects, and instead of governors become enemies, as they leave indeed the true and essential qualities of a King, so neither aught the people to acknowledge them for lawful Princes. But what if a people (you will reply) subdued by force, be compelled 
Cicer. 1. Offic.  by the King to take an oath of servitude? And what if a robber, pirate, or tyrant, (I will answer) with whom no bond of humane society can be effectual, holding his dagger to your throat, constrain you presently to become bound in a great sum of money? Is it not an unquestionable Maxim in Law, that a promise exacted by violence cannot bind? especially if any thing be promised against common reason, or the law of nature? Is there any thing more repugnant to nature and reason, than that a people should manicle and fetter themselves; and to be obliged by promise to the Prince, with their own hands and weapons to be their own executioners? There is therefore a mutual obligation between the King and the people, which whether it be civil or natural only, whether tacit, or expressed in words, it cannot by any means be annihilated, nor by any Law be abrogated, much less by force made void. And this obligation is of such power, that the Prince which wilfully violates it, is a tyrant: and the people which purposely breaks it, may be justly termed seditious.  
Hitherto we have treated of a King, it now rests we do somewhat more fully describe a Tyrant. We have showed that he is a 
Who may truly be called tyrants?  King, which lawfully governs a Kingdom, either derived to him by succession, or committed to him by Election. It follows therefore that he is reputed a tyrant, which as opposite to a King, either 
Aristo. lib. 5. polit. c. 10.  gains a kingdom by violence, or indirect means, or being invested therewith by lawful election or succession, governs it not according to law and equity, or neglects those contracts and agreements, 
Bartol. in tract. de tyrannide.  to the observation whereof he was strictly obliged at his reception. All which may very well occur in one and the same person. The first is commonly called a tyrant without title: the second a tyrant by practice. Now it may well so come to pass, that he which possesseth himself of a kingdom by force, to govern justly, and he on whom it descends by a lawful title, to rule unjustly. But for so much as a kingdom is rather a right than an inheritance, and an office than a possession: he seems rather worthy the name of a tyrant, which unworthily acquits himself of his charge, than he which entered into his place by a wrong door. In the same sense is the Pope called an intruder which entered by indirect means into the papacy: and he an abuser which governs i'll in it.  
Pythagoras says, That a worthy stranger is to be preferred before an unworthy Citizen, yea though he be a Kinsman. Let it be lawful also for us to say, that a Prince which gained his Principality by indirect courses, provided he govern according to law, and administer justice equally, is much to be preferred before him, which carrieth himself tyrannously, although he were legally invested into his government with all the Ceremonies and Rites thereunto appertaining.  
For seeing that Kings were instituted to feed, to judge, to cure the disease's of the people: Certainly I had rather that a Thief should feed me, than a Shepherd devour me: I had rather receive justice from a R●bber, than outrage from a Judge: I had better be healed by an Empirick, than poisoned by a Doctor in Physic. It were much more profitable for me to have my estate carefully managed by an intruding Guardian, than to have it wasted and dissipated by one legally appointed.  
And although it may be that ambition was his first solicitor, to enter violently into the government, yet may it perhaps appear he affected it the rather to give testimony of his equity and moderation 
Zenophon. Pluta●chus in Alexand. in Aemi●co, Caesare. Livia us, lib. 1. Su●conius in Caesare, c. 75.  in governing, witness Circus, Alexander, and the Romans, which ordinarily accorded to those people they subdued, permission to govern themselves according to their own laws, customs, and privileges, yea sometimes incorporated them into the body of their own state: on the contrary, the Tyrant by practice seems to extend the privilege of his legal succession, the better to execute violence and extortion, as may be seen in these days, not only by the examples of the Turks and Moscovites, but also in diver● Christian Princes: therefore the act of one which at the first was ill, is in some reasonable time rectified by justice: whereas the other like an inveterate disease, the elder it grows, the worse it affects the Patient.  
Now if according to the saying of Saint Augustine, those kingdoms 
August. in lib. 4. c. 4. de c. vi. ●es.  where justice hath no place, are but a rhapsody of freebooters; they are in that, both the Tyrant without title, and he by practice alike, for that they are both thiefs, both robbers, and both unjust possessors, as he certainly is no less an unjust detainer which takes another man's goods against the owner's will, than he which employs it ill when it was taken before.  
But the fault is without comparison, much more greater of him which possesseth an estate for to ruin it, than of the other which made himself Master of it to preserve it.  
Briefly, the Tyrant by practice vainly colouring his unjust extortions with the justice of his title, is much more unblamable than the Tyrant without title, who recompenseth the violence of his first intrusion in a continued course of a legal and upright government.  
But to proceed, there may be observed some difference amongst 
Tyrants without title.  Tyrants without title: For there are some which ambitiously invade their neighbour's Countries, to enlarge their own, as Nimrod, Minus, and the Canaanites have done. Although such are termed Kings by their own people, yet to those on whose confines they have encroached without any just right, or occasion, they will be accounted Tyrants.  
There be others which having attained to the government of an elective Kingdom, that endeavour by deceitful means, by corruption, by present, and other bad practices, to make it become hereditary. For witness whereof, we need not make search into elder times; these are worse than the former, for so much as secret fraud, as Cicero saith, is ever more odious than open force.  
There be also others which are so horribly wicked, that they seek to enthrall their own native Country like the viperous brood which goaw through the entrails of their mother: as be those Generals of Armies created by the people, who afterwards by the means of those forces make themselves masters of the State, as Caesar at Rome under pretence of the Dictatorship, and divers Princes of Italy.  
There be women also which intrude themselves into the government of those kingdoms which the laws only permit to the males, and make themselves Queens and Regent's, as Athalia did in Judab, Semiramis in Assyria, Agrippina in the Roman Empire in the Reign of her son Nero, Mammea in Alexander Severus his time, Semiamira in Heliogabalusses; and certain Brunichildes in the kingdom of France, who so educated their son's [as the Queens of the house Medicis in these latter times] during their minority, that attaining to more maturity, their only care was to glut themselves in pleasures and delights: so that the whole management of affairs remained in the hands of their Mothers, or of their Minions, servants, and Officers. Those also are Tyrants without title, who taking advantage of the floath, weakness, and dissolute courses of those Princes which are otherwise lawfully instituted, and seeking to enwrap them in a sleepy dream of voluptuous idleness (as under the French Kings, especially those of the Merovingian line, some of the Mayres of the Palace have been advanced to that dignity for such egregious services) transferring into their own command all the royal authority, and leaving the King only the bare name. All which Tyrants are certainly of this condition, that if for the manner of their government they are not unblamable: Yet for so much as they entered into that jurisdiction by tyrannous intrusion, they may justly be termed Tyrants without title.  
Concerning Tyrants by practice, it is not so easy to describe 
Tyrants by practice.  them as true Kings. For reason rules the one, and self-will the other: the first prescribes bounds to his affections, the second confines his desires within no limits, what is the proper rights of Kings may be easily declared, but the outrageous insolences of Tyrants cannot without much difficulty be expressed. And as a right angle is uniform, and like to itself one and the fame. so an obliqne diversifies itself into various and sundry species: In like manner is justice and equity simple, and may be deciphered in few words: but injustice and injury are divers, and for their sundry accidents not to be so easily defined; but that more will be omitted then expressed. Now although there be certain rules by which these Tyrants may be represented (though not absolutely to the life:) yet notwithstanding there is not any more certain than by conferring and comparing a Tyrant's fraudulant sleights with a King's virtuous actions.  
A Tyrant lops off those ears which grow higher than the rest of the corn, especially where virtue make them most conspicuously eminent, oppresseth by calumnies, and fraudulent practices, the principal officers of the State, giveth out reports of intended conspiracies against himself, that he might have some colourable pretext to cut them off, witness Tiberius, Maximinius, & others, which spared not their own kinsmen, cousins, and brothers.  
The King on the contrary doth not only acknowledge, his brothers to be as it were consorts unto him in the Empire: But also holds in the place of brothers all the principal Officers of the Kingdom, & is not ashamed to confess that of them (inquality as deputed from the general Estates) he holds the Crown.  
The tyrant advanceth above and in opposition to the ancient and worthy Nobility, mean and unworthy persons; to the end that these base sellowes being absolutely his creatures, might applaud and apply themselves to the fulfilling of all his lose and unruly desires. The King maintains every man in his Rank, honours and respects the Grandees as the Kingdom's friends, desiring their good as well as his own.  
The tyrant hates and suspects discreet and wise men, and fears no opposition more than virtue, as being conscious of his own vicious courses, and esteeming his own security to consist principally in a general corruption of all estates, introduceth multiplicity of Taverns, Gaming-houses, Masks, Stageplays, Brothel-houses, and all other licentious superfluities, that might effeminate and bastardise noble spirits, as Cyrus did, to weaken and subdue the Sardiens: The King on the contrary allureth from all places honest and able men, and encourageth them by pensions and honours; and for seminaries of virtue, erects Schools and Universities in all convenient places.  
A tyrant as much as in him lies, prohibites or avoids all public 
Machiavil in principe.  Assemblies, fears Parliaments, Diets and meetings of the general Estates, flies the light, affecting (like the B●t) to converse only in darkness; yea, he is jealous of the very gesture, countenance, and discourse of his subjects. The King because he converses always as in the presence of Men and Angels, glories in 
Arist. lib. 5. c. 11. polit.  the multitude, and sufficiency of his Councillors, esteeming nothing well done which is ordered without their advice, and is so fare from doubting or distasting the public meeting of the general Estates, as he honours and respects those Assemblies with much favour and affection.  
A tyrant nourisheth and feedeth factions and dissensions amongst his subjects, ruins one by the help of another, that he may the easier vanquish the remainder, advantaging himself by this division, like those dishonest Surgeons which lengthen out their cures. Briefly after the manner of that abominable Vitellius, he is not ashamed to say, that the carcase of a dead enemy, especially a subjects, yields a good savour. On the contrary, a good King endeavours always to keep peace amongst his subjects, as a father amongst his children, chokes the seeds of troubles, and quickly heals the scar; the execution even of justice upon rebels, drawing tears from his compassionate eyes; yea, those whom a good King maintains and defends against a foreign enemy, a tyrant (the enemy of nature) compels them to turn the points of their swords into their own proper entrails. A tyrant fills his Garrisons with strange Soldiers, builds Citadels against his subjects, disarms the people, throws down their forts, makes himself formidable with guards of strangers, or men only fit for p●llage and spoil, gives pensions out of the public Treasury to spies and calumniating informers, dispersed through all Cities and Provinces. Contrariwise, a King reposeth more his safety 
1. vi. lib. 2 c. 1. Dionys. ●●ai●●. l. 5. de Arunte filio Porsennae.  in the love of his subjects, than in the strength of his Fortresses against his enemies, taking no care to enrol Soldiers, but accounts every subject as a man at arms to guard him, & builds forts to restrain the eruptions of foreign enemies, and not to constrain his subjects to obedience, in whose fidelity he putteth his greatest confidence. Therefore it is that tyrants, although they have such numberless guards about them to drive off throngs of 
Prov. 14. 28.  people from approaching them, yet cannot all those numbers secure them from doubts, jealousies and distrusts, which continually afflict and terrify their timorous consciencese yea in the midst of their greatest strength, the tyrannizer of tyrants, fear, mamaketh prize of their souls, and there triumphs in their affliction. A good King in the greatest concourse of people, is freest from 
Bartol. in tract de tyrannide.  doubts or fears, nor troubled with solicitous distrusts in his solitary retirements, all places are equally secure unto him, his own conscience being his best guard. If a tyrant want civil broils to exercise his cruel disposition in, he makes wars abroad; erects idle and needless trophies to continually employ his tributaries, that they might want leisure to think on other things, as Pharaoh did the Jews, and Polierates the Samiens; therefore he always 
Algid. Rom. de reg. prin.  prepares for, or threatens war, or at least seems so to do, and so still rather draws mischief on, than puts it further off. A King never makes war, but compelled unto it, and for the preservation of 
Cicero de offic. lib. 1.  the public; he never desires to purchase advantage by treason, he never entereth into any war that exposeth the Commonwealth to more danger than it affordeth probable hope of commodity.  
A Tyrant leaves no design unattempted by which he may fleece his Subjects of their substance, and turn it to his proper benefit, that being continually troubled in gaining means to live, they may have no leisure nor hope how to regain their liberty: On the contrary, the King knows that every good Subjects purse will be ready to supply the Commonwealth's occasion, and therefore believes he is possessed of no small treasure, whilst through his good government his Subjects flow in all abundance.  
A Tyrant extorts unjustly from many to cast prodigally upon two or three Minions, and those unworthy; he imposeth on all: and exacteth from all, to furnish their superfluous and riotous expenses: he builds his own, and followers fortunes on the ruins of the public: he draws out the people's blood, by the veins of their means, and gives it presently to carouse to his Court-leeches. But a King cuts off from his ordinary expenses, to ease the people's necessities, neglecteth his private state, and furnisheth with all magnificence the public occasions; briefly is prodigal of his own blood, to defend and maintain the people committed to his care.  
If a Tyrant as heretofore Tiberius, Nero, Commodus and others, did suffer his Subjects to have some breathing time from unreasonable exactions, and like sponges to gather some moisture, it is but to squeeze them out afterwards to his own use: on the contrary, if a King do sometimes open a vain, and draw some blood, it is for the people's good, and not to be expended at his own pleasure in any dissolute courses. And therefore as the holy Scripture compares the one to a Shepherd, so doth it also resemble the other to a roaring 
Prov. 8. 15.  Lion, to whom notwithstanding the Fox is oftentimes coupled. For a Tyrant as says Cice, is culpable in effect of the greatest injustice that 
Cicer. de offic. lib. 1.  may be imagined, and yet he carrieth it so cunningly, that when he most deceives, it is then that he maketh greatest appearance to deal sincerely. And therefore doth he artificially sergeant Religion and devotion, wherein saith Aristotle, he expresseth one of the most absolute 
Arist. lib. 5. polit. c. 11.  subtleties that Tyrants can possibly practise: he doth so compose his countenance to piety, by that means to terrify the people from conspiring against him; who they may well imagine to be especially favoured of God, expressing in all appearance so reverently to serve him. He feigns also to be exceedingly affected to the public good; not so much for the love of it, as for fear of his own safety.  
Furthermore he desires much to be esteemed just, and loyal in some affairs, purposely to deceive and betray more easily in matters of greater consequence: much like those thiefs which maintain themselves by thefts and robberies, cannot yet long subsist in their trade, without exercising some parcel of justice in their proceed. He also counterfeits the merciful, but it is in pardoning of such malefactors, in punishing whereof he might more truly gain the reputation of a pitiful Prince.  
To speak in a word, that which the true King is, the Tyrant would seem to be, and knowing that men are wonderfully attracted with, and enamoured of virtue, he endeavours with much subtlety to make his vices appear yet masked with some shadow of virtue: but let him counterfeit never so cunningly, still the Fox will be known by his tail: and although he fawn and flatter like a Spaniel, yet his snarling and grinning will ever bewray his currish kind.  
Furthermore, as a wellordered Monarchy partakes of the principal 
Tho. Aquin. in secund. secund. q. 12. a●t. 11.  commodities of all other governements: So on the contrary, where tyranny prevails, there all the discommodities of confusion are frequent.  
A Monarchy hath in this, conformity with an Aristocraty, that the most able and discreet are called to consultations: Tyranny and Oligarchy accord in this, that their counsels are composed of the worst and most corrupted. And as in the Council Royal, there may in a fort seem many Kings to have interests in the government, so in the other on the contrary, a multitude of Tyrants always domineers.  
The Monarchy borrows of the popular government the assemblies of the Estates, whither are sent for Deputies the most sufficient of Cities and Provinces, to deliberate of, and determine matters of State: the tyranny takes this of the Ochlocracie, that if she be not able to hinder the convocation of the Estates, yet will she endeavour by factious subtleties and pernicious practices, that the greatest enemies of Order and Reformation of the State be sent to those Assemblies, the which we have known practised in our times. In this manner assumes the Tyrant the countenance of a King, and tyranny the semblance of a Kingdom, and the continuance succeeds commonly according to the dexterity wherewith it is managed: yet, as Aristotle says, we shall hardly read of any tyranny that hath out-lasted a hundred yearee: briefly the King principally regards the public utility, and a Tyrant's chiefest care is for his private commodity.  
But seeing the condition of men is such, that a King is with much difficulty to be found, that in all his actions only agreeth at the public good, and yet cannot long subsist without expression of some special care thereof, we will conclude that where the Commonwealth's advantage is most preferred, there is both a lawful King and Kingdom; and where particular designs and private ends prevail against the public profit, there questionless is a Tyrant and tyranny.  
Thus much concerning Tyrants by practice, in the examining whereof we have not altogether fixed our discourse on the lose disorders of their wicked and licentious lives, 
a Bartol. in. tract. de tiranct de regim. Ciut.  which some say is the character of a bad man: but not always of a bad Prince. If therefore the Reader be not satisfied with this description, besides the more exact representations of Tyrants which he shall find in histories: he may in these our days behold an absolute model of many living and breathing Tyrants: whereof Aristotle in his time did much complain. Now at the last we are come as it were by degrees to the chief and principal point of the question. We have seen how that Kings 
b To whom it belongs to resist & suppress Tyrants without title.  have been chosen by God, either with relation to their Families or their persons only, and after installed by the people: In like manner what is the duty of the King, and of the Officers of the Kingdom, how fare the authority, power, and duty both of the one & the other extends, and what and how sacred are the Covenants and contracts which are made at the inauguration of Kings, and what conditions are intermixed, both tacit and expressed; finally who is a Tyrant without title, and who by practice, seeing it is a thing unquestionable that we are bound to obey a lawful King, which both to God and people carrieth himself according to those Covenants whereunto he stands obliged, as it were to God himself, seeing in a fort he represents his divine Majesty: It now follows that we treat, how, and by whom a Tyrant may be lawfully resisted, and who are the persons that ought to be chiefly actors therein, and what course is to be held, that the action may be managed according to right and reason: we must first speak of him which is commonly called a Tyrant without title. Let us suppose then that some Ninus having neither received outrage nor offence, invades a people over whom he hath no colour of pretention: that Caesar seeks to oppress his Country, 
c Otto Frising. Chron. l. 3. c. 7.  and the Roman Commonwealth: that Popiclus endeavours by murders and treasons to make the elective Kingdom of Polonia to become hereditary to him and his posterity: or some Brunichilde draws 
〈◊〉 lib. ●. c. 1. 〈◊〉 T●u●on. lib. 4. c. 51. lib. 5. c. 1●. lib. 8. c. 29.  to herself and her Protadius the absolute government of France: or Ebroinus taking advantage of Theodericks weakness and idleness, gaineth the entire administration of the State, and oppresseth the people, what shall be our lawful refuge herein?  
First, The law of nature teacheth, and commandeth us to maintain and defend our lives and liberties, without which life is scant worth the enjoying, against all injury and violence. Nature hath imprinted this by instinct in Dogs against Wolves, in Bulls against Lions, betwixt Pigeons and Spar hawks, betwixt Pullen and Kites, and yet much more in man against man himself, if man become a beast: and therefore he which questions the lawfulness of defending one's self, doth as much as in him lies question the law of nature. To this must be added the law of Nations, which distinguisheth possessions, and Dominions, fixes limits, and makes our confi●●s, which every man is bound to defend against all invaders. And therefore it is no less lawful to resist, Alexander the great, it without any right or being justly provoked, he invades a Country with a mighty Navy; as well as Diomedes the Pirate which scours the Seas in a small vessel. For in this case Alexander's right is no more than Di●medes his, but only he hath more power to do wrong, and not so easily to be compelled to reason as the other. Briefly, one may as well oppose Alexander in pillaging a Country, as a Thief in purloining a cloak, as well him when he seeks to batter down the walls of a City, as a robber that offers to break into a private house. There is besides this, the civil law, or municipial laws of several Countries which governs the societies of men, by certain rules, some in one manner, some in another; some submit themselves to the government of one man, some to more; others are ruled by a whole Communality, some absolutely exclude women from the Royal Throne, others admit them, these here choose their King descended of such a family, those there make election of whom they please, besides other customs practised amongst several Nations. If therefore any offer either by fraud or force to violate this law, we are all bound to resist him, because he wrongs that society to which we own all that we have, and would run our Country, to the preservation whereof, all men by nature; by law and by solemn oath are strictly obliged: insomuch that fear or negligence, or bad purposes, make us omit this duty, we may justly be accounted breakers of the Laws, betrayers of our Country, and contemners of Religion. Now as the Law of Nature, of Nations, and the civil commands us to take Arms against such Tyrants: so is there not any manner of reason that should persuade us to the contrary; neither is there any oath, covenant, or obligation, public or private, of power justly to restrain us: therefore the meanest private man may resist and lawfully 
L. ult. D. ad leg. Jul. Majestatis.  oppose such an intruding tyrant. The Law Julia which condemns to death those that raise rebellion against their Country or Prince, hath here no place: for he is no Prince which without any lawful title invadeth the Commonwealth, or Confines of an other: nor he a rebel which by arms defends his Country: but rather to this had relation the Oath which all the youth of Athens were accustomed to take in the Temple of Aglaura: I will fight for Religion, for the Laws, for the Altars, and for our possessions, either alone or with others, and will do the utmost of my endeavour, to leave to posterity our Country, at the least in as good estate as I found it. To as little purpose can the 
Bartol. in trac. de Guelph. & Gibellin.  Laws made against seditious persons be alleged here; for he is seditious which undertakes to defend the people, in opposition of order and public Discipline; But he is no raiser, but a suppressor of sedition, which restraineth within the limits of reason, the subvertor of his Country's welfare, and public Discipline.  
On the contrary to this, hath proper relation the Law of Tyranacides, 
Plin. lib. 4. Alexand. ab Alex. lib. 6. cap. 4.  which honours the living with great and memorable recompenses, and the dead with worthy Epitaphs, and glorious Statues, that have been their Country's Liberators from Tyrants; as, Harmodius and Aristogiton at Athens, Brutus and Cassius in Greece, and Aratus of Sycione. To these by a public Decree were 
Ziphilm. in vita August.  erected Statues, because they delivered their Countries from the tyrannies of Pisistratus, of Caesar, and of Nicocles. The which was 
Plutarch. in Arato.  of such respect amongst the Ancients, that Zerxes having made himself Master of the City of Athens, caused to be transported into Persia the Statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton: afterwards 
Valer. Maxim. lib. 2, c. ultim.  Selcucus caused them to be returned into their former place: and as in their passage they came by Roades, those famous Citizens entertained them with public and stupendious solemnities, and during their abode there, they placed them in the choicest sacresties of their gods. But the Law made against forsakers, and traitors, takes absolutely hold on those which are negligent and careless to deliver their Country oppressed with tyranny, and condemns them to the same punishment, as those cowardly Soldiers, which when they should fight, either counterfeit sickness, or cast off their Arms and run away. Every one therefore both in general and particular, aught to yield their best assistance unto this: as in a public fire, to bring both hooks, and buckets, and 
L. 3. & l. Omne delictum. §. ult. D. de remilit.  water: we must not ceremoniously expect that the Captain of the Watch be first called, nor till the Governor of the Town be come into the streets; but let every man draw water and climb to the housetop; it is necessary for all men that the fire be quenched. For if whilst the Gauls with much silence and vigilancy seek to scale and surprise the Capitol, the Soldiers be drowsy with their former pains, the Watch buried in sleep, the dogs fail to bark: then must the geese play the Sentinels, and with their gagling noise give an alarm. And the Soldiers and Watch shall be degraded, yea, and put to death: the geese for perpetual remembrance of this deliverance, shall be always said in the Capitol, and much esteemed.  
This of which we have spoken, is to be understood of a tyranny not yet firmly rooted, to wit, whilst a tyrant conspires, machinates, and lays his plots and practices. But if he be once so possessed of the State, and that the people being subdued, promise and swear obedience: the Commonwealth being oppressed, resign their authority into his hands, and that the Kingdom in some formal manner, consent to the changing of their Laws: for so much certainly as then he hath gained a title which before he wanted, and seems to be as well a legal as actual possessor thereof, although this yoke were laid on the people's neck by compulsion, yet must they quietly and peaceably rest in the will of the Almighty, who at his pleasure transfers Kingdoms from one Nation to another. Otherways there should be no Kingdom whose juridiction might not be disputed: and it may well chance that he which before was a tyrant without title, having obtained the title of a King, may free himself from any tyrannous imputation by governing those under him with equity and moderation. Therefore then as the people of Jury under the authority 
2 Kings 24. and 25. jerem. 37.  of King Ezechias did lawfully resist the invasion of Senacherib the Assyrian: So on the contrary was Zadechias and all his subjects worthily punished, because that without any just occasion after they had done homage and sworn fealty to Nabuchadnezzar, they rise in rebellion against him. For after promise of performance it is too late to repent: and as in battles every one ought to give testimony of his valour, but being taken prisoner, must faithfully observe Covenants: so it is requisite that the people maintain their rights by all possible means: but if it chance that they be brought into the subjection of another's will, they must then patiently support the dominion of the Victor. So did Pompey Cato, and Cicero, and others, perform the parts of good Patriots then when they took arms against Caesar, seeking to alter the government of the State; neither can those be justly excused whose base fear hindered the happy success of Pompey and his partakers noble designer. Augustus himself is said to have reproved one who railed on Cato, affirming that he carried himself worthily and exceedingly affected to the greatness of his Country in courageously opposing the alteration which his contraries sought to introduce in the Government of the State, seeing all innovations of that nature are ever Authors of much trouble and confusion.  
Furthermore, no man can justly reprehend Brutus, Cassius, and the rest, who killed Caesar, before his tyrannical authority had taken any firm rooting. And so were there Statues of brass erected in honour of them by public decree at Athens, and placed by those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, then when after the dispatching of Caesar they retired from Rome, to avoid Mar: Antony and Augustus their revenge. But Cinna was certainly guilty of sedition, who after a legal transferring of the people's power into the hands of Augustus, is said to conspire against him. Likewise when the Pippins sought to take the Crown of France from the Merovingians; as also when those of the line of Capet endeavoured to supplant the Pippins, any might lawfully resist them without incurring the crime of sedition: but when by public counsel and the authority of the Estates, the kingdom was transferred from one family to another, it was then unlawful to oppose it. The same may be said if a Woman possess herself of the Kingdom, which the Salic Law absolutely prohibits, or if one seek to make a Kingdom merely elective, hereditary to his offspring, while those Laws stand in force, and are unr●pealed by the authority of the general Estates, which represent the body of the people. Neither is it necessary, in this respect, to have regard whether faction is the greater, more powerful or more illustrious. Always those are the greater number who are led by passion, than those that are ruled by reason, and therefore tyranny hath more servants than the Commonwealth. But Rome is there according to the saying of Pompey, where the Senate is, and the Senate is where there is obedience to the Laws, love of liberty, and studious carefulness for the Country's preservation. And therefore though Brennus may seem to be master of Rome: yet notwithstanding is Rome at veies with Camillus, who prepares to deliver Rome from bondage. It behoves therefore all true Romans to repair to Camillus, and assist his Enterprise with the utmost of their power and endeavours. Although Themistocles, and all his 
Plutarch. in vita Themist.  able and worthiest companions leave Athens, and put to Sea with a navy of two hundred Galleys, notwithstanding it cannot be said that any of these men are banished Athens. But rather as Themist●cles answered; These two hundred Galleys are more useful for us than the greatest City of all Greece: for that they are armed and prepared for the defence of those which endeavour to maintain and uphold the public State.  
But to come to other examples; it follows not that the Church of God must needs be always in that place where the Ark of the Covenant is: for the Philistines may carry the Ark into the Temples of their Idols. It is no good argument, that because we see the Roman Eagles waving in Ensigns, and hear their Legions named, that therefore presently we conclude that the Army of the Roman Commonwealth is there present: for there is only and properly the power of the State where they are assembled to maintain the liberty of the Country against the ravenous oppression of Tyrants, to infranchise the people from servitude, and to suppress the impudence of insulting flatterers, who abuse the Prince's weakness by oppressing his Subjects for the advantaging of their own fortunes, and contain ambitious minds from enlarging their desires beyond the limits of equity and moderation. Thus much concerning Tyrants without title. 
What may lawfully be done against Tyrants by practice.   
But for Tyrants by practice, whether they at first gained their authority by the sword, or were legally invested therewith by a general consent: It behoves us to examine this point with much wary circumspection. In the first place we must rememher, that all Princes are born men, and therefore reason and passion are as hardly to be separated in them, as the soul is from the body whilst the man liveth: We must not then expect Princes absolute in perfection, but rath●r repute ourselves happy if those that govern us be indifferently good. And therefore although the prince observe not exact mediocrity in State-affairs, if sometimes passion overrule his reason, if some careless omission make him neglect the public utility, or if he do not always carefully execute justice with equality, or repulse not with ready valour an invading enemy; he must not therefore be presently declared a tyrant. And certainly, seeing he rules not as a God over men, nor as men over beasts, but is a man composed of the same matter, and of the same nature with the rest: as we would questionless judge that prince unreasonably insolent, that should insult over and abuse his subjects, as if they were bruit beasts; so those people are doubtless as much void of reason, which imagine a prince should be complete in perfection, or expect divine abilities in a nature so frail and subject to imperfection. Put if a prince purposely ruin the Commonweal, if he presumptuously pervert and resist legal proceed, or lawful rights, if he make no reckoning of faith, covenants, justice nor piety, if he prosecute his subjects as enemies; briefly, if he express all or the chiefest of those wicked pr●ctsces we have so merly spoken of; then we may certainly declare him a tyrant, which is as much as an enemy both to God and men. We do not therefore speak of a prince less good, but of one absolute bad; not of one less wise, but of one malicious and treacherous; not of one less able judiciously to discuss legal differences, but as one perversely bend to pervert justice and equity; not of an unwarlick, but of one furiously disposed to ruin the people, and ransack the State. For the wisdom of a S●nate, the integrity of a Judge, the valour of a Captain, may peradventure enable a weak prince to govern well: But a tyrants could be content that all the Nobility, the Councillors of State, and Commanders for the wars, had but one head, that he might rake it off at one blow: those being the proper objects of his distrust and fear, and by consequence the principal subjects on whom he desires to execute his malice and cruelty. A foolish prince, although (to speak according to right and equity) he ought to be deposed, yet may he perhaps in some sort be born withal: But a tyrant the more he is tolerated, the more he becomes intolerable.  
Furthermore, as the Prince's pleasure is not always law, so many times it is not expedient that the people do all that which may lawfully be done: for it may often times chance, that the medicine proves more dangerous than the disease. Therefore it becomes wise men to try all ways before they come to blows, to use all other remedies before they suffer the sword to decide the controversy. If then those which represent the body of the people, foresee any iunovation or machination against the State, or that it be already embarked into a course of perdition, their duty is, first to admonish the Prince, and not to attend, that the disease by accession of time, and accidents, becomes unrecoverable. For tyranny may be properly resembled unto a Fever Hectic, the which at the first is easy to be cured, but with much difficulty to be known; but after it is sufficiently known, it becomes uncurable. Therefore small beginnings are to be carefully observed, and by those whom it concerns diligently prevented.  
If the Prince therefore persist in his violent courses, and contemn frequent admonitions, addressing his designs only to that end, that he may oppress at his pleasure, and effect his own desires without fear or restraint, he then doubtless makes himself liable to that detested crime of Tyranny: and whatsoever either the law, or lawful authority permits against a tyrant, may be lawfully practised against him. Tyranny is not only a will, but the chief and as it were the compliment and abstract of vices. A Tyrant subverts the State, pillages the people, lays stratagems to entrap their lives, breaks promise with all, scoffs at the sacred obligation of a solemn oath, and therefore is he so much more vile than the vilest of usual malefactors, by how much offences commited against a generality, are worthy of greater punishment than those which concern only particular and private persons. If Thiefs and those that commit sacrilege, be declared infamous; nay, if they justly suffer corporal punishment by death, can we invent any that may be worthily equivalent for so outrageous a crime?  
Furthermore, we have already proved, that all Kings receive their Royal authority from the people, that the whole people considered in one body, is above and greater than the King: and that the King and Emperor are only the prime and supreme governor's and ministers of the Kingdom and Empire; but the people the absolute Lord and owner thereof. It therefore necessarily follows, that a tyrant is in the same manner guilty of rebellion against the Majesty of the people, as the Lord of a see which feloniously transgress the conditions of his investitutes, & is liable to the same punishment, yea and certainly deserves much more greater than the equity of those laws inflict on the delinquents. Therefore as Barclus says, He may either be deposed by 
In tract. de tyrant. & in tract. de Regim. civet.  those which are, Lords in Sovereignty over him, or else justly punished according to the Law Julia, which codemnes those which offer violence to the public. The body of the people must needs be the Sovereign of those which represent it, which in some places are the Electors, Palatines, Peers; in other, the Assembly of the general Estates. And if the tyranny have gotten such sure footing, as there is no other means but force to remove him; then is it lawful for them to call the people to Arms, to enrol and raise forces, and to employ the utmost of their power, and use against him all advantages and stratagems of war, as against the enemy of the Commonwealth, and the disturber of the public peace. Briefly, the same sentence may be justly pronounced against him, as was against Manlius Capitolinus at Rome. 
Valerius lib. 6. c. 3.  Thou wast to me Manlius, when thou didst tumble down the Ganles that sealed the Capitole: But since thou art now become an enemy, like one of them, thou shalt be precipitated down from the same place from whence thou formerly tumbledst those enemies.  
The Officers of the Kingdom cannot for this be rightly taxed of sedition: for in a sedition there must necessarily concur but two parts, or sides, the which peremptorily contest together, so that it is necessary that the one be in the right, and the other in the wrong: That partundoubtedly hath the right on their side, which defends the Laws, and strives to advance the public profit 
Bart. in tract de Guclph. & Gibell. arg. l. 3. Sect. cum igitur D. de vi & vior.  of the Kingdom. And those on the contrary are questionless in the wrong, which break the Laws, and protect those that violate justice, and oppress the Commonwealth. Those are certainly in the right way, as saith Bartolus, which endeavour to suppress tyrannical government, and those in the wrong which oppose lawful authority. And that must ever be accounted just, which is intended only for the public benefit, and that unjust, which aims chief at private commodity. Wherefore Thomas Aquinas 
Tho. Aquin. s●c s●cand. q. 12 ●●t. 11. in s●re.  saith, That a tyrannical rule having no proper address for the public welfare, but only to satisfy a private will with increase of particular profit to the ruler, cannot in any reasonable construction be accounted lawful, and therefore the disturbance of such a government cannot be esteemed seditious, much less traitors; for that offence hath proper relation only to a lawful Prince, who indeed is an inanimated 
●●●● D. ad leg. 〈◊〉 j●st.  or speaking law; therefore seeing that he which employs the utmost of his means and power to annihilate the laws, and quell their virtue and vigour, can no ways be justly entitled therewith: 
●. ●c. p●●ad. 4.  So neither likewise can those which oppose and take arms against him, be branded with so notorious a crime. Also this offence is committed against the Common wealth: but for so much as the Commonwealth is there only where the laws are in force, and not where a Tyrant devours the State at his own pleasure and liking, he certainly is quit of that crime which ruins the Majesty of the public State, and those questionless are worthily protectors and preservers of the Commonwealth, who confident in the lawsulness of their authority, and summoned thereunto by their duty, do courageously resist the unjust proceed of the Tyrant.  
And in this their action we must not esteem them as private men and Subjects, but as the representative body of the people, yea and as the Sovereignty itself, which demands of his Minister an account of his administration. Neither can we in any good reason account the Officers of the Kingdom disloyal, who in this manner acquit themselves of their charge.  
There is ever, and in all places, a mutual and reciprocal obligation between the people and the Prince, the one promiseth to be a good and wise Prince, the other to obey faithfully, provided he govern justly. The people therefore is obliged to the Prince under condition: the Prince to the people simply and purely. Therefore if the Prince fail in his promise, the people is exempt from obedience, the contract is made void, the right of obligation of no force. Then the King if he govern unjustly is perjured, and the people likewise forsworn if they obey not his lawful commands: but that people is truly acquit from all perfidiousness, which publicly renounce the unjust dominion of a Tyrant, or he striving unjustly by strong hand to continue the possession, do constantly endeavour to expulse him by force of arms.  
It is therefore permitted the Officers of a Kingdom, either all, 
L. 106. D. de reg. jur.  or some good number of them to suppress a Tyrant; And it is not only lawful for them to do it, but their duty expressly requires it: and if they do it not, they can by no excuse colour their baseness. For the Electors Palatines Peers and other Officers of State must not think they were established only to make pompous paradoes and shows, when they are at the Coronation of the King, habited in their robes of State, as if there were some Masque or Interlude to be represented, or as if they were that day to act the parts of Roland Oliver, or Remaldo and such other personages on a Stage, or to counterfeit and revive the memory of the Knights of the round Table: and after the dismissing of that day's assembly, to suppos● they have sufficiently acquit themselves of their duty, until a recess of the like solemnity. Those solemn Rites and Ceremonies were not instituted for vain ostentation, nor to pass as in a dumb show to please the spectators, nor in children's sports as it is with Horace, to create a King in jest, but those Grandees must know, that as well for office and duty as for honour, they are called to the performance of those Rites, and that in them the Common wealth is committed and recommended to the King, as to her supreme and principal tutor, and protector, and to them as Coadjutors and assistants to him. And therefore as the Tutors or Guardlans (yea even those 
Vlp. l. 3. D. de adm. et peric. tut. et curate.  that are appointed by way of honour) are chosen to have care of, & observe the actions and importments of him which holds the principal rank in the tutor-ship, and to look how he carrieth himself in the administration of the goods of his pupil: so likewise 
L. 27. D. cod.  are the former ordained to have an eye to the courses of the King, for with an equivolent authority as the others for the pupil, so are they to hinder and prevent the damage and detriment of the people, the King being properly reputed as the prime Guardian, and they his Coadjutors.  
In like manner as the faults of the principal tutor who manages 
L. 14. D. de administ. ct peric. tut. l. 3. D. de suspec. tut. et cur.  the affairs, are justly imputed to the coadjoynt● in the tutorship, if when they ought and might, they did not discover his errors, and cause him to be deposed, especially failing in the main points of his charge, to wit, in not communicating unto them the affairs of his administration, in dealing unfaithfully in his place, in doing any thing to the dishonour or detriment of his pupil, in imbessilling of his goods or estate, or if he be an enemy to his pupil: briefly, if either in regard of the worthlessness of his person, or weakness of his judgement, he be unable well to discharge so weighty a charge. So also are the Peers and principal Officers of the Kingdom accountable for the government thereof, and must both prevent, and if occasion require, suppress the tyranny of the Prince, as also supply with their care and diligence his inability and weakness.  
Finally, If a Tutor omitting or neglecting to do all that for his pupil, which a discreet Father of a family would and might conveniently perform, cannot well be excused, and the better acquitting himself of his charge, hath others as concealers and associates, joined with him to oversee his actions: with much more reason may and aught the Officers of the Crown restrain the violent eruptions of that Prince, who instead of a father, becomes an enemy to his people; seeing to speak properly, they are as well accountable for his actions wherein the public hath interests, as for their own.  
Those officers must also remember, that the King holds truly 
l. 10. ct 33. D. de adm. et peric. tutor et Cur.  the first place in the administration of the State, but they the second, and so following according to their ranks; not that they should follow his courses, if he transgress the laws of equity and justice, not that if he oppress the Commonwealth, they should connive to his wickedness. For the Commonwealth was as well committed to their care as to his, so that it is not sufficient for them to discharge their own duty in particular, but it behoves them also to contain the Prince within the limits of reason. Briefly they have both jointly and severally promised with solemn oaths, to advance and procure the profit of the Commonwealth: although then that he forswear himself, yet may not they imagine that they are quit of their promise, no more than the Bishops, and Patriarches if they suffer an heretical Pope to ruin the Church: yea they should esteem themselves so much the more obliged to the observing of their oath: by how much they find him wilfully disposed to rush on in his perfidious courses. But if there be collufion betwixt him and them, they are prevaricators, if they dissemble they may justly be called forsakers, and traitors: If they deliver not the Commonwealth from tyranny, they may be truly ranked in the number of Tyrants: as on the contrary they are protectors, tutors, and in a sort Kings, if they keep and maintain the State safe and entire, which is also recommended to their care and custody.  
Although these things are sufficiently certain of themselves, yet may they be in some sort confirmed by examples. The Kings of Canaan which pressed the people of Israel with a hard, both corporal and spiritual servitude (prohibiting them all meetings and use of arms) were certainly Tyrants by practice, although they had some pretext of title. For, Eglon & Jabin had peaceable reigned almost the space of twenty years, God stirred up extraordinarily 
judg. 4. & 3.  Ehud, which by a politic stratagem killed Eglon, and Deborah which overthrew the Armle of Jabin, and by this service delivered the people from the servitude of Tyrants, not that it was unlawful for the ordinary Magistrates, the Princes of the Tribes, and such other Officers to have performed it, for Deborah doth reprove the sluggish idleness of some, and flatly detests the disloyalty of other● for that they failed to perforforme their duty herein. But it pleased God, taking commiseration of the distress of his people, in this manner to supply the defects of the ordinary Magistrates.  
Reboboam the son of Solomon refused to disburden the people 
1 King. 12. 6, etc.  of some unnecessary imposts and burdens: and being petitioned by the people in the general Assembly of the States, he grew insolent, and relying on the counsel of his Minions, arrogantly threatens to lay beavier burdens on them hereafter. No man can doubt, but that according to the tenor of the contract first passed between the King and the people, the prime and principal Officers of the Kingdom had authority to repress such insolence They were only unblamable in this, that they did that by faction and division, which should more properly have been done in the general Assembly of the States: in like manner in that they transferred the Sceptre from Juda (which was by God only confined to that Tribe) into another lineage: and also (as it chances in other affairs) for that they did ill and disorderly manage a just and lawful cause. Profane histories are full of such examples in other Kingdoms.  
Brutus' General of the Soldiers, and Lueretius Governor of the City of Rome, assemble the people against Tarqvinius Superbus, 
Titus Livi. lib. 1.  and by their authority thrust him from the royal Throne: Nay, which is more, his goods are confiscated: whereby it appears that if Tarqvinius had been apprehended, undoubtedly he should have been according to the public laws corporally punished.  
The true causes why Tarqvinius was deposed, were because he altered the custom whereby the King was obliged to advise with the Sena●e on all weighty affairs, that he made War and Peace according to his own fancy, that he treated confederacles without demanding counsel or consent from the people or Senate: that he violated the Laws whereof he was made Guardian: briefly that he made no reckoning to observe the contracts agreed between the former Kings, and the Nobility and people of Rome. For the Roman Emperors, I am sure you remember the sentence pronounced by the Senate against Nero, wherein he was judged enemy to the Commonwealth, and his body condemned to be ignominiously cast on the dunghill: and that other pronounced against Vitellius, which adjudge him to be shamefully dismembred, and in that miserable estate trailed through the City, and at last put to death: another against Maximinius who was despoiled of the Empire, and Maximus and Albinus established in his place by the Senace. There might also be added many others drawn from unquestionable Historians.  
The Emperor Trajan held not himself exempt from laws, neither desired he to be spared if he became a Tyrant: for in delivering the Sword unto the great Provost of the Empire, he says unto him; If I command as I should, use this sword for me: but if I do otherways, unsheathe it against me. In like manner the French by the authority of the States, and solicited thereunto by the Officers of the Kingdom, deposed Childerick the first, Sigisbert, Theodoricke, and Childericke the third, for their tyrannies, and choose others of another Family to sit on the Royal Throne. Yea they deposed some because of their idleness and want of judgement, who exposed the State in prey to Panders, Courtesans, Flatterers, and such other unworthy mushrooms of the Court, who governed all things at their pleasure: taking from such rash Phaetous the bridle of government, left the whole body of the State and people should be consumed through their unadvised folly.  
Amongst others, Theodoret was degraded because of Ebroinus Dagobert for Plectude and Thiband his Pander, with some others: the Estates esteeming the command of an effeminate Prince as insupportable as that of a woman, and as unwillingly supporting the yoke of tyrannous Ministers managing affairs in the name of a lose and unworthy Prince, as the burden of a tyrant alone. To be brief, no more suffering themselves to be governed by one possessed by a Devil, than they would by the Devil himself. It is not very long since the Estates compelled Lewis the eleventh (a Prince as subtle, and it may be as wilful as any) to receive thirty six Overseers, by whose advice he was bound to govern the affairs of State. The descendants from Charlemagne substituted in the place of the Merovingiens for the government of the kingdom, or those of Capet, supplanting the Charlemains by order of the Estates, and reigning at this day have no other nor better right to the Crown, than what we have formerly described; and it hath ever been according to Law permitted the whole body of the people represented by the counsel of the Kingdom, which are commonly called the Assembly of the States, to depose and establish Princes, according to the necessities of the Commonwealth. According to the same rule we read that Adolph was removed from the Empire of Germany Anno 1296. because for covetousness without 
Anno 1296.  any just occasion, he invaded the Kingdom of France, in favour of the English, and Wenceslaus was also deposed in the year of our Lord 1400. Yet were not these Princes exceeding bad ones, 
1400.  but of the number of those which are accounted less ill. Elizabeth the wife of Edward the second King of England, assembled the Parliament 
Froisard. li. 1. cap. 1.  against her husband, who was there deposed, both because he tyrannised in general over his Subjects, as also for that he cut 
Read the manner of the deposing of Richard the second.  off the heads of many noble men, without any just or legal proceeding. It is not long since Christian lost the Crown of Denmark, Henry that of Sweden, Mary Steward that of Scotland, for the same, or near resembling occasions: and the most worthy Histories relate divers alterations and changes which have happened in like manner, in the Kingdoms of Polonia, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Bohemia, and others.  
But what shall we say of the Pope himself? It is generally held 
Ant: de But. confil quod positum est inter consil. Paul. de Castro, vel antiq. nu. 412. incip viso puncto.  that the Cardinals because they do elect him, or if they fail in their duty, the Patriarkas which are next in rank to them, may upon certain occasions maugre the Pope, call a Council, yea, and in it judge him: As when by some notorious offence he scandalizeth the universal Church: if he be incorrigible, if reformation be as necessary in the head as the members, if contrary to his oath he refuse to call a general Council. And we read for certain that 
Mar. Laud●ns. in tract. de Card. 1. l. 2. q. 35. Ph●lip. Deci●s in quodan. co. ●i●o cujus verbs suerunt. Andr. B●●h. in d. con●● 1. lib. 1. 〈◊〉. 6. 〈…〉 de major. & obed.  divers Popes have been deposed by general Counsels. But if they obstinately abuse their authority, there must (saith Baldus) first be used verbal admonitions; secondly, herbal medicament● or remedies; thirdly, stones or compulsion; for where virtue and fair means, have not power to persuade, there force and terror must be put in ure to compel. Now if according to the opinions of most of the learned, by decrees of Counsels, and by custom in like occasions, it plainly appears that the Council may depose the P●pe, who notwithstanding vaunts himself to be the King of Kings, and as much in dignity above the Emperor, as the Sun is above the Moon, assuming to himself power to depose Kings and Emperors when he pleaseth. Who will make any doubt o● question, that the general Assembly of the Estates of any kingdom, who are the representative body thereof, may not only degrade and disthronize a tyrant: but also even disauthorize and depose a King, whose weakness or folly is hurtful or pernicious to the State.  
But let us suppose that in this our Ship of State, the Pilot is 
Simile.  drunk, the most of his associates are asleep, or after large and unreasonable tippling together, they regard their imminent danger in approaching a rock with idle and negligent jollity; the Ship in the mean season in stead of following her right course, that might serve for the best advantage of the owner's profit, is ready rather to split herself. What should then a Masters-mate or some other under-Officer do, who is vigilant and careful to perform his duty? Shall it be thought sufficient for him to pinch or paul them which are asleep? without daring in the mean time to put his helping hand to preserve the Vessel, which runs on a course to destruction, lest he should be thought to intermeddle with that which he hath no authority nor warrant to do? What mad discretion, nay rather notorious impiety were this? Seeing then that Tyranny, as Plato saith, is a drunken frenfie or frantic drunkenness, 
Plato lib. 8. & 9 de repub.  if the Prince endeavour to ruin the Commonwealth, and the principal Officers concur with him in his bad purposes, or at the least are lulled in a dull and drowsy dream of security, and the people (being indeed the true and absolute owner and Lord of the State) be through the pernicious negligence and fraudulent connivency of those Officers brought to the very brim of danger and destruction, and that there be notwithstanding amongst those unworthy Ministers of State, some one that doth studiously observe the deceitful and dangerous encroachments of tyranny, and from his soul detest it. What opposition do we suppose best befits such a one to make against it? Shall he consent himself to admonish his associates of their duty, who to their utmost ability endeavour the contrary? Besides, that such an advertisement is commonly accompanied with too much danger, and the condition of the times considered, the very soliciting of reformation will be held as a capital crime: so that in so doing he may be not unfitly 
Simile.  resembled to one that being in the midst of a desert, environed with thiefs, should neglect all means of defence, and after he had cast away his Arms, in an eloquent and learned discourse commend justice, and extol the worth and dignity of the Laws. This would be truly according to the Proverb, To run mad with reason. What then? Shall he be dull and deaf to the groans and cries of the people? Shall he stand still and be silent when he sees the thiefs enter? Shall he only hold his hands in his bosom, 
L. 3. & l. Omne delictum ●●ult. D. de re milit.  and with a demure countenance, idly bowaile the miserable condition of the times? If the Laws worthily condemn a Soldier, which for fear of the enemies counterfeits sickness, because in so doing he expresseth both disloyalty and treachery. What punishment can we invent sufficient for him, who either maliciously or basely betrays those whose protection and defence he hath absolutely undertaken and sworn? Nay rather than let such a one cheerfully call one, and command the Mariners to the performance of their duty: let him carefully and constantly take order that the Commonwealth be not endamaged, and if need so require, even in despite of the King, preserve the Kingdom, without which the kingly title were idle and frivolous, and if by no other means it can be effected, let him take the King and bind him hand and foot, that so he may be more conveniently cured of his frenzy and madness. For as we have already said, all the administration of the Kingdom, is not by the people absolutely resigned into the hands of the King; as neither the Bishopric, nor care of the universal 
C. Nullus in Carthagin. Council. Doctores pontificii.  Church, is totally committed to the Pope: but also to the care and custody of all the principal Officers of the Kingdom. Now for the preserving of peace and concord amongst those which govern, and for the preventing of jealous●●s, factions, and distrusts amongst men of equal rank and dignity, the King was created as prime and principal Superintendent in the government of the Commonwealth. The King swears that his most special care shall be for the welfare of the Kingdom; and the Officers of the Crown take all the same oath. If then the King, or divers of them falsifying their faith, ruin the Commonwealth, or abandon her in her greatest necessity, must the rest also fashion themselves to their base courses, and quit all care of the State's safety; as if the bad example of their companions, absolved them from their oath of fidelity? Nay, rather on the contrary, in seeing them neglect their promise, they shall best advantage the Commonwealth In carefully observing theirs: chief because for this reason they were instituted, as in the steads of Ephori, or public Controllers, and for that every thing gains the better estimation of just and right in that it is mainly and principally addressed to that end for which is was first ordained.  
Furthermore, if divers have jointly vowed one and the same thing, is the obligation of the one annihilated by the perjury of the other? If many become bound for one and the same sum, can the banquerouting of one of the obligees quit the rest of their engagement? If divers tutors administer ill the goods of their pupil, and that there be one amongst them that makes conscience of his actions, can the bad dealing of his companions acquit him? Nay rather on the contrary, he cannot free himself from the infamy of perjury, if to the utmost of his power he do not truly dilcharge his trust, and perform his promise: neither can the others defalliancy be excused, in the bad managing of the tutorship, if they likewise accuse not the rest that were joined with them in the administration, for it is not only the principal tutor that may call to an account those which are suspected to have unjustly 
L 3. D. de administ. & peric. tutor. & cur. lib. 3. D. de suspect. tus. & cura.  or indiscreetly ordered the affairs of their pupil, but even those which were formerly removed, may also upon just occasion discharge and remove the delinquents therein. Therefore those which are obliged to serve a whole Empire or Kingdom, as the Constable, Marshals, Peers, and others, or those which have particular obligations to some Provinces, or Cities, which make a part or portion of the Kingdom, as Dukes, Marquess', Earls, Sheriffs, Mayors, and the rest, are bound by the duty of their place, to secure the Commonwealth, and to free it from the burden of Tyrants, according to the rank and place which they hold of the people next after the King. The first ought to deliver the whole Kingdom from tyrannous oppression: the other as tutors, that part of the Kingdom whose protection they have undertaken: the duty of the former is to suppress the Tyrant: that of the latter, to drive him from their confines. Wherefore Mattathias being a principal man in the State, when some basely connived, others perniciously consorted with Antiochus the tyrannous oppressors of the Jewish Kingdom, he courageously opposing the manifest oppression, both of Church and State, encourageth 
1 Machab. 3. 43.  the people to the taking of Arms, with these words; Let us restore the decayed estate of our people, and let us fight for our people, and for the Sanctuary. Whereby it plainly appears, that not for Religion only; but even for our Country, and our possessions, we may fight, and take arms against a tyrant, as this Antiochus was. For the Machabites are not by any questioned, or reprehended for conquering the Kingdom, and expelling the tyrant, but in that they attributed to themselves the royal dignity, which only belonged by God's special appointment to the tribe of Juda.  
Humane Histories are frequently stored with examples of this 
Justin. lib. 1. Diodor. lib. 2. cap. 37.  kind. Arbactus Governor of the Medes killed effeminate Sardanapalus, spinning amongst women, and sportingly distributing all the treasures of the Kingdom amongst those his lose companions. Vindex and Galba quit the party of Nero, yea though the Senate connived, and in a sort supported his tyranny, and drew with them Gallia, and Spain, being the Provinces whereof they were Governors.  
But amongst all, the Decree of the Senate of Sparta is most notable, and aught to pass as an undeniable Maxim amongst all Nations. The Spartans' being Lords of the City Byzantium, sent Olearchus thither for Governor and Commander for the wars; who took Corn from the Citizens, and distributed it to his Soldiers. In the mean time the families of the Citizens died for hunger: Anaxilaus, a principal man of the City, disdaining that tyrannous usage, entered into treaty with Alcibiades to deliver up the Town, who shortly after was received into it. Anaxilaus being accused at Sparta for the delivery of Byzantium, pleaded his cause himself, and was there acquit by the Judges: for (said they) wars are to be made with enemies, and not with Nature. Nothing being more repugnant to Nature, than that those which are bound to defend a City, should be more cruel to the inhabitants, than their enemies that besiege them.  
This was the opinion of the Lacedæmonians, certainly just Rulers, Neither can he be accounted a just King, which approves not this sentence of absolution: for those which desire to govern according to the due proportion of equity and reason, take into consideration as well what the Law inflicts on tyrants, as also what are the proper rights and bounds both of the Patrician and Plebeian orders. But we must yet proceed a little further: There is not so mean a Mariner, but must be ready to prevent the shipwreck of the vessel, when either the negligence or wilsulnesse of the Pilot casts it into danger. Every Magistrate is bound to relieve, and as much as in him lies, to redress the miseries of the Commonwealth, if he shall see the Prince, or the principal Officers of State his associates, by their weakness or wickedness, to hazard the ruin thereof. Briefly, he must either free the whole kingdom, or at least that portion especially recommended to his care, from their imminent and encroaching tyranny. But hath this duty proper relation to every one: Shall it be permitted to Hendonius Sabinus, to Ennus Suranus, or to the Fencer Spartanus; or to be brief, to a mere private person, to present the bonnet to slaves, put Arms into the hand of subjects, or to join battle with the prince, although he oppress the people with tyranny? No certainly: The Common wealth was not given in charge to particular persons considered one by one; but on the contrary, particulars even as Papists, are recommended to the care of the principal Officers and Magistrates; and therefore they are not bound to defend the Commonwealth, which cannot defend themselves. God nor the people have not put the sword into the 
L. 2. de Sedi●●●sis.  hands of particular persons: Therefore if without commandment they draw the sword, they are seditions, although the cause seem never so just.  
Furthermore, the prince is not established by private and particular persons, but by all in general considered in one entire body; whereupon it follows, that they are bound to attend the commandment of all, to wit, of those which are the representative body of a kingdom, or of a Province, or of a City, or at the least of some one of them, before they undertake any thing against the prince. For as a pupil cannot bring an action, but being avowd 
L. 8. l. 9 D. de aucto. & constict. & cur.  in the name of his Tutor, although the pupil be indeed the true proprietor of the estate, and the tutor only owner with reference to the charge committed unto him: so likewise the people may not enterprise actions of such nature, but by the command of those, into whose hands they have refigned their power and authority, whether they be ordinary Magistrates, or extraordinary, created in the Assembly of the Estates; whom, if I may so say, for that purpose, they have girded with their sword, and invested with authority, both to govern and defend them, established in the same kind as the Praetor at Rome, who determined 
Sencea lib. 1. de Benefic.  all differences between masters and their servants, to the end that if any controversy happened between the King and the subjects, they should be Judges and preservers of the right, lest the subjects should assume power to themselves to be judges in their own causes. And therefore if they were oppressed with tributes, and unreasonable imposts, if any thing were attempted contrary to covenant and oath, and no Magistrate opposed those unjust proceed, they must rest quiet, and suppose that many times the best Physicians both to prevent and cure some grievous disease, do appoint both letting blood, evacuation of humours, & lancing of the flesh; and that the affairs of this world are of that nature, that with much difficulty one evil cannot be remedied without the adventuring if not the suffering of another, nor any good be achieved, without great pains. They have the example of the people of Israel, who during the reign of Solomon, refused not to pay those excessive taxes imposed on them, both for the building of the Temple, and fortifying of the Kingdom, because by a general consent they were granted for the promulgation of the glory of God, and for an ornament and defence of the public State.  
They have also the example of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who though he were King of Kings, notwithstanding because he conversed in this world in another quality, to wit, o a private and particular man, paid willingly tribute. If the Magistrates themselves manifestly favour the tyranny, or at the least do not formally oppose it; let private men remember the saying of Job, That for the sins of the people God permits bypocrites 
job. 34.  to reign, whom it is impossible either to convert or subvert, if men repent not of their ways, to walk in obedience to God's commandments; so that there is no other weapons to be used, but bended knees and humble hearts. Briefly, let them bear with bad princes, and pray for better, persuading themselves, that an outrageous tyranny is to be supported as patiently, as some exceeding damage done by the violence of tempests, or some excessive overflowing waters, or some such natural accidents unto the fruits of the earth, if they like not better to change their habitations, by retiring themselves into some other countries. So David fled into the mountains, and attempted nothing against the Tyrant Saul, because the people had not declared him any public Magistrate of the Kingdom.  
Jesus Christ, whose kingdom was not of this world, fled into Egypt, and so freed himself from the paws of the Tyrant. Saint Paul teaching of the duty of particular Christian men, and not 
Rom. 13.  of Magistrates, teacheth that Nero must be obeyed. But if all the principal Officers of State, or divers of them, or but one, endeavour to suppress a manifest tyranny, or if a Magistrate seek to free that province, or portion of the kingdom from oppression, which is committed to his care and custody, provided under colour of freedom he bring not in a new tyranny, then must all men with joint courage and alacrity, run to Arms, and take part with him or them, and assist with body and goods, as if God himself from heaven had proclaimed wars, and meant to join battle against tyrants, and by all ways and means endeavour to deliver their Country and Commonwealth from their tyrannous oppression. For as God doth oftentimes chastise a people by the cruelty of tyrants: so also doth he many times punish tyrants by the hands of the people. It being a most true saying, 
Ecclus 10.  verified in all ages: For the iniquities, violences, and wickednesses of Princes, Kingdoms are translated from one Nation to another: but tyranny was never of any durable continuance.  
The Centurians and men at arms did freely and courageously execute the commandments of the High Priest Jehoiada, in suppressing the tyranny of Athalia. In like manner all the faithful and generous Israelites took part and joined with the Machabites, as well to re-establish the true service of God, as also to free and deliver the State from the wicked and unjust oppression of Antiochus, and God blessed with happy success their just and commendable enterprise. What then? cannot God when he pleaseth stir up particular and private persons to ruin a mighty and powerful tyranny? He that gives power and ability to some even out of the dust without any title or colourable pretext of lawful authority to rise to the height of rule and dominion, and in it tyrannize and afflict the people for their transgressions? cannot he also even from the meanest multitude raise a liberator? He which enthralled and subjected the people of Israel to Jabin, and to Eglon, did he not deliver & enfranchise them by the hand of Ebud, Barac and Deborah, whilst the Magistrates & Officers were dead in a dull & negligent ecstasy of security? What then shall hinder, you may say the same God who in these days sends us Tyrants to correct us, that he may not also extraordinarily send correctors of tyrants to deliver us? What if Adab cut off good men, if Jezabel subborn false witnesses against Naboth, may not a Jehu be raised to exterminate the whole line of Arab, to revenge the death of Naboth, and to cast the body of Jezabel to be torn and devoured of dogs? Certainly as I have formerly answered, the Almighty is ever mindful of his justice, and maintains it as inviolably as his mercy.  
But for as much as in these latter times, those miraculous testimonies by which God was wont to confirm the extraordinary vocation of those famous Worthies, are now wanting for the most part: let the people be advised, that in seeking to cross the Sea dry foot, they take not some Impostor for their guide, that may lead them headlong to destruction (as we may read happened to the Jews:) and that in seeking freedom from tyranny, he that was the principal instrument to dis-inthrall them, became not himself a more insupportable Tyrant than the former: briefly, lest endeavouring to advantage the Commonwealth, they introduce not a common misery upon all the undertakers, participating therein with divers States of Italy, who seeking to suppress the present evil, added an accession of greater, and more intolerable servitude.  
Finally, that we may come to some period of this third question; Princes are chosen by God, and established by the people: As all particulars considered one by one are inferior to the Prince: so the whole body of the people and Officers of State which represent that body, are the Prince's superiors. In the receiving and inauguration of a Prince, there are Covenants and contracts passed between him and the people, which are tacit and expressed, natural or civil: to wit, to obey him faithfully whilst he commands justly, that he serving the Commonwealth, all men shall serve him, that whilst he governs according to law, all shall be submitted to his government, etc. The Officers of the Kingdom are the Guardians and Protectors of these Covenants and contracts. He that maliciously or wilfully violates these conditions, is questionless a Tyrant by practice. And therefore the Officers of State may judge him according to the laws: and if he support his tyranny by strong hands, their duty binds them, when by no other means it can be effected, by force of arms to suppress him.  
Of these Officers there be two kinds, those which have generally undertaken the protection of the Kingdom: as the Constable, Marshals, Peers, Palatines, and the rest, every one of which, although all the rest do either connive or consort with the tyranny, are bound to oppose and repress the Tyrant: and those which have undertaken the government of any Province, City, or part of the Kingdom, as Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Consuls, Mayors, Sheriffs, etc. they may according to right expel and drive tyranny and Tyrants from their Cities, Confines, and governments.  
But particular and private persons may not unsheathe the sword against Tyrants by practice, because they were not established by particulars, but by the whole body of the people. But for Tyrants which without title intrude themselves for so much as there is no contract or agreement between them and the people, it is indifferently permitted all to oppose and depose them; and in this rank of Tyrants may those be ranged, who, abusing the weakness and sloth of a lawful Prince, tyrannously insult over his Subjects. Thus much for this, to which for a more full resolution may be added that which hath been formerly discoursed in the second question.    

The fourth question. Whether neighbour Princes may, or are bound by law to aid the Subjects of other Princes, peasecuted for true Religion, or oppressed by manifest tyranny.  
We have yet one other question to treat of, in the discussing whereof there is more use of an equitable judgement then of animble apprehension: and if charity were but in any reasonable proportion prevalent amongst the men of this age, the disputation thereof were altogether frivolous: but seeing nothing in these days is more rare nor less esteemed than charity; we will speak somewhat of this our question. We have already sufficiently proved that all Tyrants, whether those that seek to captivate the minds and souls of the people with an erroneous and superstitious opinion in matter of Religion, or those that would enthrall their bodies and estates with miserable servitude and excessive impositions, may justly by the people be both suppressed and expulsed. But for so much as Tyrants are for the most part so cunning, and Subjects seldom so caucelous, that the disease is hardly known, or at the least not carefully observed before the remedy prove almost desperate, nor think of their own defence before they are brought to those straits: that they are unable to defend themselves, but compelled to implore the assistance of others: Our demand therefore is, if Christian Princes lawfully may and aught to secure those Subjects which are afflicted for true Religion, or oppressed by unjust servitude, and whose sufferings are either for the kingdom of Christ, or for the liberty of their own state? There are many, which hoping to advance their own ends, and encroach on others rights, that will readily embrace the part of the afflicted, and proclaim the lawfulness of it: but the hope of gain is the certain and only aim of their purposes: And in this manner the Romans, Alexander the great, and divers others, pretending to suppress Tyrants, have oftentimes enlarged their own limits. It is not long sin●●, we saw King Henry the Second make Wars on the Emperor Charles the Fifth, under colour of defending and delivering the Protestant Princes. As also Henry the Eighth King of England was in like manner ready to assist the Germans, if the Emperor Charles should molest them. But if there be some appearance of danger, and little expectance of profit, than it is that most Princes do vehemently dispute the lawfulness of the action. And as the former cover their ambition and avarice with the veil of charity and piety: so on the contrary do the other call their fear and cowardly baseness integrity and justice, although that piety (which is ever careful of another's good) love no part in the counsels of the first: nor justice (which affectionately desires the easing of a neighbour's grief) in cooling the charitable intendments of the later. Therefore without learning either to the one side or the other, let us follow those rules which piety and justice trace us out in matter of Religion.  
First, All accord in this, That there is one only Church, whereof Jesus Christ is the head, the members whereof are so united and conjoined together, that if the least of them be offended or wronged, they all participate both in the harm and sorrow, as throughout holy Scripture plainly appears. Wherefore the Church is compared to a body: Now it oftentimes happens that the body is not only overthrown by a wound in the arm, or thigh, but even also much endangered, yea and sometimes killed by a small hurt in the little finger. Vainly therefore doth any man vaunt that this body is recommended to his care and custody, if he suffer that to be dismembered and pulled in pieces which he might have preserved whole and entire. The Church is compared to an edifice: on which side soever the building is undermined, it many times chances that the whole tumbles down, and on what rafter or piece of timber soever the flame takes hold, it endangers the whole house of burning, he must needs be therefore worthy of scum who should defer to quench the fire which had cautht his house top, because he dwells most in the Cellar: would not all hold him for a mad man which should neglect by countermining to frustrate a mine, because it was intended to overthrow that wall there, and not this here.  
Again, the Church is resembled to a ship, which as it sails together, so doth it sink together: insomuch that in a tempest, those which be in the forecast, or in the keel, are no more secure than those which remain at the st●●n or on the deck: so that the proverb commonly says, when men run the like hazard in matter of danger, that they venture both in, one bottom. This being granted, questionless whosoever hath not a fellow-feeling in commiserating the trouble, danger & distress of the Church, is no member of that body, nor domestic in the family of Jesus Christ, nor hath any place in the Ark of the covenant of grace. He which hath any sense of Religion in his heart ought no more to doubt whether he be obliged to aid the afflicted members of the Church, than he would be assisted to himself in the like distress: for the union of the Church unites us all into one body, and therefore every one in his calling must be ready to assist the needy, and so much the more willingly, by how much the Almighty hath bestowed a greater portion of his blessings on us: which were not conferred, that we should be made possessors of them, but that we should be dispensers thereof according to the necessity of his Saints.  
As this Church is one, so is she recommended, and given in charge to all Christian Princes in general, and to every one of them in particular: For so much as it was dangerous to leave the care to one alone, and the unity of it would not by any means permit, that she should be divided into pieces, and every portion assigned unto one particular: God hath committed it all entire to particulars, and all the parts of it to all in general, not only to preserve and defend it, but also to amplify and increase it as much as might be. Insomuch that if a Prince which hath undertaken the care of a portion of the Church, as that of Germany and England, and notwithstanding neglect and forsake another part that is oppressed, and which he might secure, he doubtless abandons the Church, Christ having but one only Spouse, which the Prince is so bound to preserve and defend that she be not violated or corrupted in any part if it be possible. And in the same manner as every private person is bound by his humble and ardent prayers to God to desire the restoring of the Church: So likewise are the Magistrates tied diligently to procure the same with the utmost of their power and means which God hath put into their hands. For the Church of Ephesus is no other than that of Colossus: but these two are portions of the universal Church, which is the kingdom of Christ, the increase and prosperity whereof ought to be the continual subject of all private men's prayers and desires; but it is the duty of all Kings, Princes, and Magistrates, not only to amplify and extend the limits and bounds of the Church in all places, but only to preserve and defend it against all men whatsoever. Wherefore there was but one Temple in Judea built by Solomon, which represented the unity of the Church. And therefore ridiculous and worthy of punishment were that Churchwarden which had care only of some small part of the Church, and suffered all the rest to be spoiled with rain and weather. In like manner, all Christian Kings when they receive the sword on the day of their Coronation, solemnly swear to maintain the Catholic or universal Church, and the ceremony then used doth fully express it, for holding the sword in their hands, they turn to the East, West, North, and South, and brandish it, to the end that it may be known that no part of the world is excepted. As by this ceremony they assume the protection of the Church, it must be questionless understood of the true Church, and not of the false: therefore ought they to employ the utmost of their ability to reform and wholly to restore that which they hold to be the pure and truly Christian Church, to wit, ordered and governed according to the direction of the Word of God. That this was the practice of godly Princes, we have their examples to instruct us. In the time of Ezechias King of Juda, the Kingdom of Israel had been a long time 
2 Chron 30.  before in subjection to the Assyrians, to wit, ever since the King Osea his time; And therefore if the Church of Juda only, and not the whole universal Church had been committed to the custody of Exechias: and if in the preservation of the Church the same course were to be held, as in the dividing of lands, and imposing of tributes, then questionless Ezechias would have contained himself within his own limits, especially then when the exorbitant power of the Assyrians lorded it every where. Now we read that he sent express Messengers throughout Israel, to wit, to the subjects of the King of Assyria, to invite them to come to Jerusalem to celebrate the paschal feast: yea and he aided the faithful Israelites of the tribes of Ephraim and Manasses, and others the subjects of the Assyrians, to ruin the high places which were in their quarters.  
We read also that the good King Josias expelled Idolatry, no● 
2 Kings 22. 2 Chron. 34. & 35.  only out of his own Kingdom, but also even out of the Kingdom of Israel, which was then wholly in subjection to the King of Assyria. And no marvel, for where the glory of God, and the kingdom of Christ are in question, there no bounds or limits can confine the zeal and fervent affection of pious and godly Princes. Though the opposition be great, and the power of the oppos●rs greater, yet the more they fear God, the less they will fear men. These generous examples of divers godly Princes have since been imitated by sundry Christian Kings, by whose means the Church (which was heretofore restrained within the narrow limits of Palestine) hath been since dilated throughout the universal world. Constantine and Licinius governed the Empire together, the one in the Orient, the other in the Occident, they were associates of equal power and authority. And amongst equals, as the Proverb is, there is no 
Par in parem non babet imperium.  command. Notwithstanding, because Licinius doth every where banish, torment, and put to death the Christians, and amongst them divers of the nobility, and that for and under pretence of Religion. Constantine makes war against him, and by force compels him to give free liberty of Religion to the Christians, and because he broke his faith and relapsed into his former cruelties, he caused him to be apprehended and put to death in the City of Thessalonica. This Emperor's piety was with so great an applause celebrated by the Divines of those times, that they suppose that saying in the Prophet Isaiah, to be meant by him; That Kings shall be Pastors and nursing Fathers of the Church. After his death the Roman Empire was divided equally between his sons, without advantaging the one more than the other. Constans favoured the orthodox Christians, Constantius being the elder, learned to the Arrians, and for that cause banished the learned Athanasius from Alexandria; the greatest professed adversary of the Arrians. Certianly, if any consideration in matter of confines be absolutely requisite, it must needs be amongst brethren. And notwithstanding Constant threatens to war on his brother, if he restore not Athanasius, and had without doubt performed it, if the other had long deferred the accomplishment of his desire. And if he proceeded so fare for the restitution of one Bishop: had it not been much more likely and reasonable, for him to have assisted a good part of the people, if they implored his aid against the tyranny of those that refused them the exercise of their Religion, under the authority of their Magistrates and Governors? So at the persuasion of Atticus the 
Sozo. lib. 7. cap. 18.  Bishop, Theodisius made war on Cosroes King of Persia to deliver the Christians of his Kingdom from persecution, although they were but particular and private persons. Which certainly those most just Princes, who instituted so many worthy Laws, and had so great and special care of justice, would not have done, if by that fact they had supposed any thing were usurped on another man's right, o●●he Law of Nations violated. But to what end were so many expeditions undertaken by Christian Princes into the holy Land against the Saracens? Wherefore were demanded and raised so many of those Saladine tenths? To what purpose were so many confederacies made, and croysadoes proclaimed against the Turks, if it were not lawful for Christian Princes, yea those furthest remote, to deliver the Church of God from the oppression of tyrants, and to free captive Christians from under the yoke of bondage? What were the motives that led them to those wars? What were the reasons that urged them to undergo those dangers? But only in regard of the Church's union, Christ summoned every man from all parts with a unanimous consent, to undertake the defence thereof? For all men are bound to repulse common dangers with a joint and common opposition: all which have a natural consent and relation with this we now treat of. If this were lawful for them against Mahomet, and not only lawful, but that the backward and negligent were ever made liable to all infamous contempt, and the forward and ready undertakers always recompensed with all honourable respect and reward, according to the merit of their virtues: wherefore not now against the enemy of Christ & his Saints? If it be a lawful war to fight against the Greeks' (that I may use that phrase) when they assail our Troy: wherefore is it unlawful to pursue and prevent that incendiary Sinon? Finally, if it have been esteemed an heriocall act to deliver Christians from corporal servitude, (for the Turks enforce none in point of Religion) is it not a thing yet much more noble to infranchise and set at liberty souls imprisoned in the mists of error?  
These examples of so many religious Princes, might well have the directive power of Law. But let us hear what God himself pronounces in many places of his Word by the mouth of his Prophets, against those which advance not the building up of his Church, or which make no reckoning of her afflictions. The Gadites, the Reubenites, and half tribe of Manasses, desire of Moses 
Numb. 32. Iosh. 4. 12. Deut. 3. 20.  that he would allot them their portion on the other side of Jordan. Moses grants their request, but with this proviso and condition: That they should not only assist their other brethren the Israelites to conquer the land of Canaan, but also that they should march the first, and serve as vanguard to the rest, because they had their portions first set them forth, and if they fail to perform this duty, he with an anathema, destinies them to destruction, and compares them to those which were adjudged rebels at Codisbarnea. And what? says he, your brethren shall fight, and you in the mean season rest quiet at home? Nay on the contrary, you also shall pass Jordan, and not return into their houses, before first the Lord have driven his enemies out from before his face, and granted place to your brethren as well as you, then shall you be innocent before the Lord and his people Israel. He shows by this that those which God first blesseth with so great a benefit, if they help not their brothers, if they make not themselves shares in their labours, companions in their travels, and leaders in their dangers, they must questionless expect a heavy punishment to fall upon them.  
Likewise when under the conduct of Deborah, the Nephtalites and 
judges 5.  Zabulonites took arms against the tyrant Jabin: and that in the mean season the Reubenites which should have been first in the field took their ease and played on their pipes, whilst their flocks and herds fed at liberty: the Gadites held themselves secured with the rampire of the river; the Danites gloried in their command at Sea; And Ashur, to be brief, was confident in the difficult access of their mountains: The Spirit of the Lord speaking by the Prophetess, doth in express terms condemn them all; Curse ye Meros' 
judges 5. 23.  (said the Angel of the Lord) curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof: because they came not to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty. But blessed above women shall Jael the wife of Heber the Kenite be, who though she might have alleged the alliance which her husband had with the Canaanites, did notwithstanding kill Sisera the General of the enemy's army. And therefore Vriah spoke religiously, and like a true Patriarch, when he said, The Ark of the Lord, and Israel, and Judah abide in tents, and my Lord 
2 Sam. 11. 11.  Joab, and the servants of my Lord are encamped in the open fields; Shall I then go into mine house, to eat and to drink, and to lie with my wife? a thou livest, and as thy soul liveth, I will not do this thing. But on the contrary, impious and wicked were the Princes of Israel, who supposing themselves secured by the craggy mountains of Samaria, and strong fortifications of Zion, took liberty to lose themselves in luxurious seasts, lose delights, drinking delicious wines, and sleeping in presumed beds of Ivory, despising in the mean season 
Amos 6.  poor Joseph, to wit, the Lords flock tormented and miserably vexed on all sides, nor have any compassion on their affliction. The Lord God hath sworn by himself, saith the Lord God of Hosts, I abhor the excellency of Jacob, and hate his palaces: therefore will I deliver up the City, with all that is therein, and those that wallow thus in pleasures, shall be the first shall go into captivity. Wickedly therefore did those Ephraimites, who in stead of congratulating and applauding the 
●udg. 8 & 12.  famous and notable victories of Gideon and Jephta, did envy and traduce them, whom notwithstanding they had forsaken in dangers.  
As much may be said of the Israelites, who seeing David overcome the difficulty of his affairs, and remain a peaceable King, say aloud, We are thy flesh and thy bones: and some years after, seeing 
2 Sam. 5. 2. 2 Sam. 20. 1.  him embroiled again in troubles, cried out, We have no part in David, neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse. Let us rank also with these all those Christians in name only, which will communicate at the holy table, and yet refuse to take the cup of affliction with their brethren, which look for salvation in the Church, and care not for the safety and preservation of the Church, & the members thereof. Briesly, which adore one and the same God the ●ather, acknowledge and avow themselves of the same household of faith, and profess to be one and the same body in Jesus Christ, and notwithstanding yield no succour nor assistance to their Saviour afflicted in his members. What vengeance do you think will God inflict on such impiety? Moses compares those which abandon 
Numb. 32.  their brethren to the rebels of Cadeshbarnea: Now none of those by the decree of the Almighty, entered into the land of Canaan. Let not those than pretend any interest in the heavenly Canaan, wh●ch will not secure Christ when he is crucified, and suffering a thousand times a day in his members, and as it were begging their alms from door to door. The Son of God with his own mouth condemns them to everlasting fire that when he was hungry gave him no meat; when he was thirsty gave him no drink; when he was a stranger, lodged him not; naked, and clothed him not; sick, and in prison, and visited him not. And therefore let those expect punishments without end, which lend a deaf ear to the complaints and groan of our Saviour Jesus Christ, suffering all these things daily in his members; although otherwise they appear both to others and themselves to be jolly Christians, yet shall their condition be much more miserable than that of many Infidels. For why; were they the Jews only, & Scribes and Pharises, to speak properly, that crucified Christ? or were they Ethnics, Turks, or some certain p●●nitious Sects of Christians, which crucify, torment, and persecute him in his members? No certainly, the Jew●● hold him an imposter, the Ethnic a malefactor, the Turks an Infidel, the others an heretic, insomuch as if we consider the intention of these men, as the censuring of all offences ought to have principal relation thereunto, we cannot conclude that it is properly Christ that they persecute with such hatred, but some criminal person, which in the●r opinion deserves this usage: But they do truly and properly persecute and crucify Christ Jesus, which profess to acknowledge him for the Messiah, God and Redeemer of the world, and which notwithstanding fail to free him from persecution and vexation in his members, when it is in their power to do it. Briefly, he which om●ts to deliver his neighbour from the hands of the murderer, when he sees him in evident danger of his life, is questionless guilty of the murder, as well as the murderer. For seeing he neglected when he had means to preserve his life, it must needs necessarily follow, 
Aug. in Psa. 32 Amb. lib. 1. de Offic. Gratian in Decret.  that he desireth his death. And in all crimes the will and intendment ought principally to be regarded. But questionless these Christian princes which do not relieve and assist the true professors, which suffer for true religion, are much more guilty of murder than any other, because they might deliver from danger an infinite number of people, which for want of timely succours, suffer death and torments under the cruel hands of their persecuters: and to this may be added, that to suffer one's brother to be murdered, is a greater offence than if he were a stranger. Nay, I widow say further, those forsakers of their brethren in their time of danger distress, are more vile, and more to be abhorred than the tyrants themselves that persecute them. For it is much more wicked, and worthy of greater punishment to kill an honest man that is innocent & fea●ing God (as those which consent with them in the faith must of necessity know the true professors to be) than a thief, an imposter, a magician or an heretic, as those which persecute the true Christians do commonly believe them to be, it is a greater offence by many degrees to strive with God than man. Briefly, in one and the same action it is a much more grievous crime perfidiously to betray, than ignorantly to offend. But may the same also be said of them which refuse to assist those that are oppressed by tyranny, or defend the liberty of the Commonwealth against the oppression of tyrants? For in this case the conjunction or confederacy seems not to be of so strict a condition between the one and the other, here we speak of the Commonwealth diversely governed according to the customs of the countries, and particularly recommended to these here, or those there, and not of the Church of God, which is composed of all, and recommended to all in general, and to every one in particular. The Jew saith, our Saviour Christ is not only neighbour to the Jew, but also to the Samaritan, and to every other man. But we ought to love our neighbour as ourselves; and therefore an Israelite is not only bound to deliver an Israelite from the hands of thiefs, if it be in his power, but every stranger also; yea, though unknown, i● he will righely discharge his duty: neither let him dispute whether it be lawful to defend another, which believe, he may justly defend himself. For it is much more just, if we truly consider the concomitants, to deliver from danger and outrage another than ones self; seeing that what is done for pure charity, is more right and allowable, than that which is executed for colour, or desire of revenge, or by any other transport of passion: in revenging our own wrongs we never keep a mean, whereas in other men's, though much greater, the most intemperate will easily observe moderation. Furthermore, the heathens themselves may teach us what humane society, and what the law of nature requires of us in this business; wherefore Cicero says, That Nature being the common mother of mankind, prescribes and ordains, 
〈…〉 3. Offic.  that every man endeavour and procure the good of another whatsoever be be, only because he is a man: otherwise all bonds of society, yea and mankind itself must needs go to ruin. And therefore as Justice built on these two Basis, or pillars, First, that none be wronged: secondly, that good be done to all if it be possible. So also is there two sorts of injustice; the first, in those which offer injury to their neighbours; the second, in them which when they have means to deliver the oppressed, do notwithstanding suffer them to sink under the burden of their wrongs: For whosoever doth wrong to another, either moved thereunto by anger, or any other passion, he may in a sort be truly said to lay violent hands on his companion; but he which hath means and defends not the afflicted, or to his power wards not the blows that are struck at him, is as much faulty, as if he forsook his parents, or his friends, or his country in their distress. That which was done by the first, may well be attributed to choler, which is a short madness; the fault committed by the other, discovers a bad mind, and a wicked purpose, which are the perpetual tormentors and tyrants of the conscience. The fury of the first may be in some sort excused, but the malice of the second admits no colour of defence. Peradventure you will say, I fear in aiding the one, I shall do wrong to the other. And I answer, You seek a Cloak of justice wherewith to cover your base remissness: and if you lay your hand on your heart, you will presently confess, that it is somewhat else, and not justice, that with holds you from performing your duty. For as the same Cicero says in another place, Either thou wilt not make the wrongdoer thine enemy, or not take pains, or not be at so much charge, or else negligence, sloth, or the hindering of thine own occasions, or the crossing of other purposes, takes thee off from the defence of those who otherwise thou art bound to relieve. Now in saying thou only attends thine own affairs, fearing to wrong another, thou fallest into another kind of injustice: for thou abandonest humane society, in that thou wile not afford any endeavour either of mind, body, or goods, for the necessary preservation thereof. Read the Directions of the heathen Philosophers and Politicians who have written more divinely herein, than many Christians in these days. From hence also proceeds, that the Roman law designs punishment to the neighbour which will not deliver the slave from the outrageous fury of his master.  
Amongst the Egyptians, if any man had seen another assailed 
Diodor. Siculus, l. 2. c. 2.  and distressed by thiefs and robbers, and did not according to his power presently aid him, he was adjudgd worthy of death, if at the least he discovered or delivered not the delinquents into the hand of the Magistrate. If he were negligent in performing this duty for the first mulct, he was to receive a certain number of blows on his body, and to fast for 3. days together. If the neighbour be so firmly obliged in this mutual duty of succour to his neighbour, yea to an unknown person in case he be assailed by thiefs: shall it not be lawful for a good Prince to assist, not slaves to an imperious Master, or children against a furious Father; but a Kingdom against a Tyrant, the Commonwealth against the private spleen of one, the people (who are indeed the true owners of the State) ●●ainst a ministering servant to the public. And if he carelessly or wilfully omit this duty, deserves he no● himself to be esteemed a Tyrant, and punished accordingly, as well as the other a sobber, which neglected to assist his neighbour in that danger? Theucidides 
Theucid. lib. 1.  upon this matter says, that those are not only Tyrants which make other men slaves, but much more those who having means to suppress and prevent such oppression, take no care to perform it. And amongst others, those which assumed the title of Protectors of Greece, and defenders of the Country: and yet stir not to deliver their Country from oppression of strangers, and truly indeed. For a Tyrant i● in some sort compelled to hold a strait and tyrannous hand over those, who by violence and tyranny, he hath constrained to obey him, because as Tiberius said, he holds the Wolf by the ears, whom he can neither hold without pain and force, nor let go without danger & death. To the end than that he may blot out one sin with another sin, he files up one wickedness to another, and is forced to do injuries to others, lest he should prove by remissness injurious to himself. But the Prince which with a negligent and idle regard looks on the outrageousness of a Tyrant, and the massacring of Innocent, that he might have preserved, like the barbarous spectacles of the Roman sword-playes is so much more guilty than the Tyrant himself, by how much the cruel and homicidious directors and appointers of these bloody sports, were more justly punishable by all good laws than the poor and constrained actors in those murdering tragedies: and as he questionless deserves greater punishment, which out of insolent jollity murders one, than he which unwillingly for fear of a further harm kills a man. If any object that it is against reason and good order to meddle in the affairs of another: I answer with the old man in Terrence, I am a man, and I believe that all duties of humanity are fit and convenient for me. If others seeking to cover their base negligence, and careless unwillingness, 
Pompon. de reg. ju●. l●g. 36.  allege that bounds and jurisdictions are distingnisht one from another, and that it is not lawful to thrust one's sickle into another's harvest. Neither am I also of that opinion, that upon any such colour or pretence, it is lawful for a Prince to encroach upon another's jurisdiction or right, or upon that occasion to usurp another's country, and so carry another man's corn into his b●rne, as divers have taken such shadows to maeke their bad intentions. I will not I say, that after the manner of those arbitrators which Cicero 
Ciccr. 2. offic.  speaks of, thou adjudge the things in controversy to thyself. But I require that you repress the Prince that invades the kingdom of Christ, that you contain the Tyrant within his own limits, that you stretch forth your hand of compassion to the people afflicted, that you raise up the Commonwealth lying grovelling on the ground, and that you so carry yourself in the ordering a●d managing of this, that all men may see your principal aim and end was the public benefit of humane society, and not any private profit or advantage of your own; For seeing that justice respects only the public, and that which is without, and injustice fixes a man wholly on himself: it doubtless becomes a man truly honest so to dispose his actions, that ever private interests give place, and yield to public commodity.  
Briefly to epitomise what hath been formerly said if a Prince outrageously over-pass the bounds of piety & justice. A neighbour Prince may justly and religiously leave his own Country, not to invade and usurp another's, but to contain the other within the limits of justice and equity: and if he neglect or omit his duty herein, he shows himself a wicked and unworthy Magistrace. If a Prince tyrannize over the people, a neighbour Prince ought to yield succours as freely and willingly to the people, as he would do to the Prince his Brother if the people mutined against him: yea he should so much the more readily secure the people, by how much there is more just cause of pity to see many afflicted, than one alone. If Porsenna brought Tarqvinius Superbus back to Rome, much more justly might Constantine, requested by the Senate, and Roman people, expel Marentius the Tyrant from Rome. Briefly, if man become a Wolf to man, who hinders that man (according to the proverb) may not be instead of God to the needy? And therefore the Ancients have ranked Hercules amongst the gods, because he punished and tamed Procrustes, Busiris, and other Tyrants, the plagues of man kind, and monsters of the earth. So whilst the Roman Empire retained her freedom, she was truly accounted the safe guard of all the world against the violence of Tyrants, because the Senate was the port and refuge of Kings, people, and Nations. In like manner Constantine, called by the Romans against Mixentius, had God Almighty for the leader of his Army: and the whole Church doth with exceeding commendations celebrate his enterprise, although that Maxentius had the same authority in the West, a● Constantine had in the East. Also Charlemagne undertook War against the Lombard's, being requested to assist the Nobility of Italy: although the Kingdom of the Lombard's had been of a long continuance, and he had no just pretence of right over them. In like manner when Charles the bald, King of France, had tyrannously put to cleath the Governor of the Country between the River of saint and Loire, with the Duke Lambert, and another Nobleman called Jametius, and that other great men of the Kingdom were retired unto Lewis King of Germany, brother, (but by another mo●her) unto Charles, to request aid against him, and his mother called Juclith, one of the most pernicious women of the world, Lewis gare them audience in a full Assembly of the Germane Princes, by whose joint advice it was decreed, that Wars should be made against Charles for the re-establishing in their goods, honours, and estates, those whom he had unjustly dispossessed.  
Finally, as there hath ever been Tyrants dispersed here and there, so also all histories testify that there hath been neighbouring Princes to oppose tyranny, and maintain the people in their right. The Princes of these times by imitating so worthy examples, should suppress the Tyrants both of bodies and souls, and restrain the oppressors both of the Commonwealth, and of the Church of Christ: otherwise they themselves may most deservedly be branded with that infamous title of Tyrant.  
And to conclude this discourse in a word, piety command● that the Law and Church of God be maintained: Justice requires that Tyrants and destroyers of the Commonwealth be compelled to reason: Charity challenges the right of relieving and restoring the oppressed. Those that make no account of these things, do as much as in them lies to drive piety, justice and charity out of this world, that they may never more be heard of.   
FINIS.