ANIMADVERSION Upon General Monck's LETTER To the GENTRY of DEVON: Wherein his Arguments for Anarchy are considered, and the weakness of his Harringtonian Principle detected.  
By M. W.  
Orbis, ut orbita, volvitur, incita, turbine miro.  
Printed in the year 1659.   

ANIMADVERSIONS Upon General MONCK's LETTER To the Gentry of DEVON.  
AMBITION is of a greedy nature, not content with the bodies and estates of men, but strives to attaque their souls also, and to takein that by policy or the force of Argument, which will hold out against all the force of Arms.  
The rise and progress of Mahomet, and the Ottoman Family, are solemn testimonials of this sad truth; but we have nearer instances of it: A few Members of the House of Commons of late, stealing into the Seat of Government, by the help of Samson and his Locks, are not content to seize our Bodies and Estates at pleasure; but, with the strength of his Jawbone only, would force our Understandings also, and persuade us to be mad with reason.  
We thought General Monck might have been our Pilot, and were so fond as to believe, He would steer us towards harbour, not by faction and private interest, but by Reason, and Christian prudence; that, seeing we could not avoid the horror of a fearful storm, we might evade the error of a final Shipwreck: but, instead thereof, being dispossessed of our Estates by Violence, he would argue us into a belief, that 'tis best to entail our welfare on them that wrong us; and prove it more rational, that we suffer our Vessel to remain in a continual storm, than to return again to that harbour, from whence we first took sail.  
And thus he displays his strength, Before these unhappy Wars, the Government of these Nations, was Monarchical in Church and State: These Wars have given birth and growth, to several interests, both in Church and State, heretofore not known: though now upon many accounts very considerable, as the Presbyterian, Independent, Anabaptist, and other Sectaries of all sorts, as to ecclesiastics; And the purchasers of the King's, Queen's, Prince's, Bishops, Deans, and Chapters, and all other forfeited Estates; and all these engaged in these Wars against the King, as to Civils. These Interests again are so interwoven by purchases, and intermarriages, and thereby forfeited, as, I think, upon rational grounds, it may be taken for granted, that no Government can be either Good, Peaceful, or Lasting to these Nations, that doth not rationally include, and comprehend the security, and preservation of all the aforesaid Interests, both civil, and spiritual. I mean so far as by the Word of God, they are warranted to be protected and preserved. But,  
1. If the Sects he mentions, had their Birth in the Wars, 'tis without dispute, that all of them are gross Errors, (truth being of an elder offspring) and so not fit to be secured, unless he means, in the Soldier's Dialect, to be restrained; nor are they then to be preserved, unless it were lawful to do evil, that good may come thereof.  
2. If the parties he mentions, were engaged in Wars against the King, they were perjured, and faithless Persons, and so no security to be had for their illgotten Estates; they swearing with hands lifted up to the most High, to maintain his Person in Honour and Safety; and, during all the Wars, declaring their intents to remove his evil Counsellors only from him; and to say, There was a condition in their Oath to preserve him, till they had him in their power, is a strain beyond the invention of Machiavelli, and a mental reservation, first found out in Hell. But to destroy his Person, take his Estate, and then to provide for the security of the purchaser, will make us worse than Heathens, and their practices to upbraid our provisions; for, Majores nostri religiosissimi, (saith Sallust) nihil victis cripiebant, praeter injuriae licenciam. And Seneca commends the practice, nihil ex Rege victo praeter gloriam sumere.  
3. Suppose the interests aforesaid are to be preserved and secured: Why cannot Monarchy preserve them as well as any other species of Government? in regard, it partakes with all the advantages of the other forms, without sharing in their disadvantages. Sure if they ought to be preserved, Monarchy is no more exclusive of them in England, than of Huguenots and Sects in France; or the like interests upon the admission of Charles the fourth, into that Kingdom: Yet let the People have their free Elections in Parliament, and there choose their own Government, (sure they know what is best for them) and what ever they shall there establish, no doubt the Nation will acquiesce in, and yield conformity and obedience unto it; but 'tis unreasonable to put them upon that election of a Junior in the mess in Cambridge, either to take the Rump or Nothing.  
But, because the General supports his Arguments in part upon Mr. Harrington's principle, that the support of Monarchy being taken away, that Government cannot be admitted; I must first remember him, that the King's Lands are not all the support of Monarchy: and then tell him, Mr. harrington's principle, that all Government is founded upon overbalance in propriety, is a weak and an uncertain proposition. For,  
1. He might with as much truth have told us, that the Government of a ship is founded upon overbalance of propriety in that ship; or the Government of a Town, in the overbalance of Estate in that Town. But his thin fallacy is transparent to him that can distinguish that which is constitutive of a thing, from that which is consecutive of it.  
2. I think he is no Peripatetique; 
Arist. 2. Analyt. lib. 1. cap. 2.  for, his principle hath nothing of Aristotle's requisites in principles, that is, that they be vera necessaria, immed ata, priora, notiora, & causae conclusionis; I mean, principia complexa sen praemissa Demonstrationis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— His Overbalance is not a new coined word, but 'tis analogum proportionis, purely Tropical, and so unfit to be used in a principle of Demonstration.  
3. If by propriety he intends all the species of it, whereof Principality is one, Parturiunt montes, etc. And yet that is not always true, for he that hath the Legislative, Judiciary, and Military power, and not the Right also, hath the Government; that is, he hath jus possessionis, but he hath not jus proprietatis, the propriety of it. But if by Propriety, he intends only the largest Estate in Lands or Goods, his assertion is every way false: for one may have the largest Estate, and yet not the power aforesaid; and one may have the power aforesaid, and not the largest Estate; because they are genera coordinata, &, by consequence, eorum differentiae sunt specie diversae, I mean ultimatè constitutivae. The Law of the Land might have informed him this. Indeed, it calls them both Inheritances: yet he that incroacheth upon the power of the Sovereign, is said to disinherit him; but he that enters upon his Estate, is only termed an Intruder, and works no change at all upon the Estate: It is also manifest in the distinction of tenors in Capite, from th'other tenors which Littleton acquaints us with.  
4. 
Lib. 2. cap. 3. De jure Belli & Pacis.  Moreover all Government is relative to the people, and an Estate is so far from being the foundation of it, that Prince and People both, may consist without it. Let Grotius judge: Imperium (saith he) duas solet habere materias, sibi subjacentes: primariam, Personas (quae materia solùm inter dum sufficit, ut in exercitu virorum, mulierum, puerorum, quaerente novas sedes): Secundariam, Locum, (qui Territori●m dicitur, etc.) Quanquam autem plorumque uno actu quaeri solent, Imperium & Dominium; sunt tamen distincta.  
5. Examples of the rise of Governors make against him John de Medici's, the raiser of his Family in Florence, got the government of the City by his wisdom and great discretion, not by overbalance in propriety, as Guicciardine may inform us. And to instance in Sparta; What overbalance of propriety had Lycurgus in Lacedaemon, being only Protector of Carilaus? yet He, by his own power, could mould the Government as he list, make a Senate, and bestow the Supreme Power as he pleased. I could produce moreapt instances, were it not to serve the Commonwealth's men, in their own Country.  
6. It is unreasonable, that a rich man (in a reduplicative sense) shall govern me, because he hath contracted a larger estate than I; but it is natural for the strong to rule the weak, as, for a man to govern a child, or the wise to govern a fool.  
7. His Principle is destructive of his Equal Commonwealth: for, if all Government be founded upon Overbalance in Propriety, his Equal Commonwealth is no Government: But all Government is founded upon Overbalance in Propriety: Therefore, etc. The Connexion is plain: for where there is an Equality, there is no Overbalance; where no Overbalance, (upon his ground) no foundation for Government; and where there is no Foundation, there can be no Superstructure: the assumption is his own principle: therefore 'tis necessary, that his Commonwealth be no Government. Thus, while others in fight for Propriety in Government, have reduced us to no Government at all, Mr. H. by laying foundations for his imaginary Commonwealth, hath principled us for a no Commonwealth at all.  
But the General hath another Argument, we may well call Argumentum Hercul●um, That the Army will never endure Monarchy. I answer, 1. Who made Cromwell Protector? ab esse ad posse is a good Argument. 2. 'Tis in vain for him that will do good, to ask advice of him that never intends any. Nulla fides pietasque viris qui castra sequuntur, is the Motto of most Soldiers; and hath seldom been falsified, but in that noble Legion, which chose rather to die Martyrs, than live Traitors. 3. If the Soldier rule us, then 'tis their Government, not Republic; for 'tis not Republic to be under force. 4. It is Aristotle's Argument, 
Arist. polit. lib. 4. cap. 2.  That Monarchy is the best Government, because Tyranny, its opposite, is the worst: It shall be my Argument, ad hominem, by way of retortion, To have Monarches as the best Governors, because Soldiers, the worst of Tyrants, are the most against it. Opposita juxta se posita magis elucescunt.  
Lastly, The General hath one other Argument deserves more consideration, to wit, That Introduction of Monarchy will occasion a new war. But, 1. Will the seclusion of it procure us Peace? or rather entail a War upon us and our posterity? 2. Can we ever purchase peace with the price of iniquity? 3. Can there be any way imaginable to reconcile all interests, but by a full and a free Parliament, where the grievances of all parties may be heard, and the injuries of the greatest be redressed? for without this, let a bribed Orator prate what he will, or a seditious Burgess plot what he can, 'tis as impossible to obtain peace and safety, or for a man to be at ease while he is upon the Rack; as to empty a River, until the Springs thereof be stopped. And set up by force what tribunitial Power you please, you will find to be true the words of Livy; Tribuni militum, 
lib. 4.  consulari potestate, quatuor creati sunt (saith he), Quintius Paenus ex consulatu, C. Furius M. Posthumius, A. Cornelius Cossus. Ex its Cossus, praefuit urbi. Tres, delectu habito profecti sunt Veios, documentoque fuerunt quam plurium imperium bello inutile esset. I endendo ad sua quisque consilia, cum aliud ali● videretur, aperuerunt ad occasionem locum host: incertam namque aciem, signum altis dare receptui, al●is cani jubentibus, invatêre opportune Veientes: Castra propinqua turbantes, ac terga dantes accepere. Plus itaque ignominiae quam cladis est acceptum. Moesta civitas fuit, vinci insueta; odisse Tribunos, poscere Dictatorem, in eo verti spes civitatis. 
Iliad 2:  And you will be forced to say with Homer at last, (with which Aristotle concludes the twelfth of his Metaphysics)  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
Non multos regnare bonum est: Rex unicus esto  
Unius imperium; cum: Jupiter aurea magnus  
Sceptra dedit, juss●que suis dare jura tuendis.  
FINIS.