PROBLEMS Necessary to be Determined By all That have, or have not taken part on either side In the late unnatural War.  
For the making of their Peace with God and disposing them to a hearty Peace one with another.  
By reflecting upon what they have done, before they engage in a new more dangerous and doubtful War: dedicated to the Lord Major, Aldermen and Common-Councel of the Honourable City of LONDON.  
By P. D.  A violent man enticeth his neighbour, and leadeth him into the way that is not good. Prov. 17.29. If I yet pleased men I should not be the servant of Christ. Gal. 1.10. 
Printed in the year 1648.   

TO THE Lord Major, ALDERMEN, and COMMON-COUNCEL that now are, and that have been since the beginning of the late, not yet ended unnatural War.  
My Lord, and Gentlemen,  
THe ensuing Problems are a part of those inquiries, which the Writer of them thought necessary for him to make, before he engaged in the above mentioned War: although he had observed that thousands made not bones, to declare themselves on the one side, and on the other, before either had given any account to the world, of the grounds of their having taken up Arms; and so before it was possible for any man to judge, whether side had the better of the Cause: And though after this he had yet further observed, by discoursing with sundry persons of all ranks, and qualities, engaged on both sides, that not one of an hundred of them, could tell what the quarrel between them was; nor one of a thousand state it aright. Whether you, my Lord, aldermans, and Common-Councel men, were more careful to inform your understandings of the truth of these, and other general Problems, and to make application of them to the particular case, or matter of fact, and right in question, before you inclined your wills, either singly, or in Body to make choice of the part you have taken, and given example to others to take in that great action, wherein your part hath been so great, and upon what motives you took it, God knows, and you can tell. If you were not, it doth the more import you to put these Questions home to your consciences now, before those everlasting Books be sealed up by death, as they will be opened when we must all come to judgement. And what I take the liberty to say to you, I here ask leave in all humility to wish that all other men, in City and Country, whom it may concern, would say, and say in earnest to themselves, The Kings most Excellent Majesty and the Lord and Commons now, and heretofore, assembled in this Parliament, not excepted; of whose pardon for this so high presumption, I shall not doubt when I have made this sincere profession: That it is not my intention in making this most humble Request, or in publishing these Problems to reflect any otherwise upon either of their Proceed, then as in reference to the means of advancing a Peace between them, and with Him, whose displeasure neither of them can more endure than I can theirs. I humbly beseech all others into whose hands this Paper may come, to read it to the same end, and with the same temper of spirit one towards another, that I bear in my breast towards all, and every one of them. And then perhaps it may not be impossible, that all parties interessed, and engaged in the late war in any fashion, may find it easier to observe an error in their neighbours reckonning, then to pass their own: nor that thereupon they may be desirous of the leisure of a cessation of Arms for the perfecting of their accounts, before they be called for at their day, or at His, who is coming, and at the door to keep the great Audit of the whole world: nor that in fine they may all conclude, it is much safer to seek out means to expiate the blood that hath been already spilt in so nice a quarrel, then to run the danger of drawing the guilt of any more upon themselves, and their posterity: nor that after every of us shall be inclined to forgive one another, pray for one another, and to bear one another's burdens, God may be inclined to forgive us all, to hear our prayers to remove all our burdens, and to give us the grace when we have first made our peace with him, at last to be at peace again one with another. Which through the help of his Spirit hath been, and shall be a part of his daily prayer who by his grace is unfeignedly desirous to live and die a good subject, a good Englishman, and a good Christian, and who is, as he here subscribeth himself,  
My Lord Your Lordships, and the Cities most humble servant P. D. 12. August. 1648.   

THe Lord shall smite thee with madness, and blindness, and astonishment of heart: And thou shalt grope at noon days, as the blind gropeth in darkness, and thou shalt not prosper in thy ways: and thou shalt be only oppressed and spoilt evermore, and no man shall save thee. Deut. 28.28, 29.  
Put up again thy sword into his place. For all they that take the sword shall perish by the sword. Matth. 26.52.  
And David the King stood up upon his feet and said. Hear me my brethren, and my people. As for me I had in my heart to build an house of rest, for the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord, and for the footstool of our God, and had made ready for the building, But God said unto me, Thou shalt not build an house for my name, because thou hast been a man of war, and hast shed blood. 1 Chron 28.23.  
Therefore if thou bring thy gift to the Altar, and there remember'st that thybrother hath aught against thee;  
Leave there thy gift before the Altar, and go thy way, first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift. Matth. 5.23, 24.   

OMnia sunt misera in bellis civilibus, sed miserius nihil quam ipsa victoria, quae etiamsi ad meliores venit, tamen eos ipsos feroeiores, impotentioresque reddit ut etiam si natura tales non sint, necessitate esse cogantur. Multa enim victori eorum arbitrio per quos vicit, etiam invito, facienda sunt. Cicero Marcello.  
Quid viro bono, et quieto, et bono civi magis expedit, quam abesse à civilibus controversiis? Caefar Imp: Ciceroni.  
Ostendisti sapientem et bonum civem initia belli civilis invitum suscipere, extrema non libenter perse qui. Cicero Marcello.  
Sepe inter nos impendentes easus de slevimus, cum belli civilis causas in privatorum cupiditatibus inclusas, pacis spem a publico consilio exclusam videremus. Cicero in Bruto.  
Dominus Maris Dominus Vniversi.   

Problems Necessary to be determined by all that have or have not taken part on either side In the late unnatural War.  
1. WHether uncertain fears, and jealousies of wrong intended to be done, contrary to a mutual Covenant interchangeably sworn, be not an insufficient plea for the justification of doing the least wrong in violation of that Covenant, by way of prevention; and much more for one of the Covenanters hazarding the life of the other, because he was jealous, or afraid that the other would have killed him.  
2. Whether it be lawful for a private Christian to go to law with his neighbour, upon the occasion of any wrong actually done to him, if he may recover his right, or be offered, just and full reparation of the wrong done, without Law: And whether the plaintiff may refuse the offer of an equal Arbitrement in a doubtful case.  
3. Whether it be not more unlawful for a Christian Prince, and his people to go to war one against the other, either for the maintenance of their respectively claimed rights, or for the reparation of pretended wrongs, or for any cause whatsoever, that might have been determined by the law of the Land without war. And whether the party that refuseth the offer of reparation, or arbitration, or any other indifferent means to avoid war, be not so much more to blame, as a war is more hard to be managed without the sin of the parties, and the damage of many other innocent persons, than a suit in law.  
4. Whether it be not more common for Superiors to oppress their inferiors, but more monstrous, as well as more rare, for Inferiors to oppress their Superiors, and so adjudged in our Law. And whether the later be not the more abominable before God, though the former be the more generally hateful among men; because he that hath the most power, is commonly presumed to have done, even when he hath suffered wrong.  
5. Whether it be not at least as lawful for a Sovereign Prince to defend the just rights of his Crown against his people by those Arms wherewith he is entrusted by the positive Law of the Land, as for a free People to defend their just Liberties against their Prince, by having recourse to the unwritten equity of that Law, or to the Law of nature. And whether if several sorts of the people have several laws, Customs and Franchises, which their Prince hath confirmed to them by his Oath, he be not thereby obliged to protect every sort of them in their respective rights, against the other, though greater in number and power, till the Rights of the weaker party may be found incompatible, with the good of the whole State, by the free judgement of the major part of them in whom under him, or with him the legislative power is, after a full hearing of all interessed parties. And whether the Prince having the whole Sovereignty in him, may disassent, if after this, he yet be of a contrary judgement.  
6. Whether a Sovereign Prince, may not be as well deposed by the States of his Country, taking the power belonging to him, to themselves, as by setting up another Prince in his place: And whether a free people under a Monarch may not be aswell enslaved by their own lawful Prince usurping an arbitrary power over them, as by the Conquest of a foreign Prince or State; And whether it be equally lawful for Prince, or people to resist in either case.  
7. Whether a Sovereign Prince whose Crown is not forfeitable can forfeit any of the known, and acknowledged rights of his Crown, by any unwarrantable act he may have been drawn into, through the misinformation, and seducement of evil Councillors; And whether he be not bound in conscience to discover, and deliver up such evil Counsellors to a due Trial by Law, in charity to himself, and to his people. And whether the people be not under the same obligation, and may not be aswel seduced by their Leaders, or Demagogues; and whether their rights ought not to be as unforfeitable in the same case.  
8. Whether any man ought to be punished for having given evil counsel either to Prince, or people, unless it can be made appear, that he gave it against the light of his own conscience; or with an evil mind either to hurt the one, or the other of them; or to advantage himself, or others; or unless his Counsel were wicked aswel as damagable, and such as is punishable either by some law of the land already made, or deserveth that a new law should be made upon that occasion to punish his offence, and all of like nature in time to come.  
9 Whether it be probable that in a well established government of long continuance, the manner of legal proceeding in any common, great, criminal cause should be doubtful, or unknown: And admitting it to be so in some case fallen forth, whether all and every of the respective States in whom the Legislative power is, being assembled together at the time, be not bound in Conscience to agree the difference by such an indifferent Law, or Ordinance, as may be enacted by their joint consent, rather than to go to war one against another, and to draw the whole State into partialities upon such an occasion.  
10. Whether he who giveth the first stop to the proceeding of justice according to law in that Cause, which thereupon becomes a pretence to begin a just Civil war, and will not agree to remove that stop, be not the offender. And whether the other, though he happen to be the aggressor in the action at war, as he was to have been Plaintiff in the action at Law, if the cause had been tried by law, yet be not on the defensive part in the war.  
11. Whether any war of any Prince upon his own people, or of any people against their Prince can be lawful, but a pure defensive; and whether it be possible, or can be conceived, how a war between them, should be purely defensive on doth parts, without supposing a failing on both sides, in giving way to the course of Justice, or a great misunderstanding between them.  
12. Whether it be not as possible, that a Civil war between Prince and people may be unjust on both sides, as a foreign war between Prince and Prince, State and State, or a Suit in law between man and man, and all these upon many and all the same grounds: as if the matter in question be not worthy to be striven about by law or arms, or if some third person be wronged by their strife, or have better right to that they strive for, then either of the parties, etc.  
13. Whether obedience to the forcible commands of Prince, or people, will be a sufficient-plea for having shed, or any way communicated in the shedding of blood in such a war, at his tribunal, who will not admit of obedience to any Law made by their joint Authority, for a defence of the least breach of any law of his.  
14. Whether Neutrality, or Partiality be more agreeable to the duty of good subjects, in such a War as aforesaid; and whether willing contributers to both sides in such a War, be not guilty of the sins of both, and greater sinners than the partakers on either side caeteris paribus, if they contribute to both sides for mere private respects; and whether such be properly called Neuters, being indeed Vterques.  
15. Whether the personal, or the Authoritative command of the Prince issued out of his supreme Court sitting in the time of such a War, will more excuse (though neither of them can absolve) them on either side, that have sinned of ignorance in such a War as aforesaid: And whether the person, or the Court of the Prince will be liable to a more heavy judgement for having drawn others into sin, at that day when there will be a review of all things done in this world, before him who is no respecter of persons.  
16. Whether a Sovereign Prince, or State, being a Politic head, can, or cannot do any wrong? And whether the major part of the true body of the State can, or cannot be in rebellion? And whether the major part of the representative body of the State, or of the supreme Court of Judicature, taking the major part as it standeth for the whole, can, or cannot err in judgement, or be, or be not liable to any guilt: And in what sense, or senses, all these are, or are not true.  
17. Whether the sins of a Community, as a Community, can be done away by the Confessions of the particular guilty persons of the Community; Or whether they by confessing their sin, and the innocent particular persons by not consenting thereunto, shall thereby only save their own souls; and such a public acknowledgement of the sin by the Community, or at least by their heads, and Representants, as was enjoined under the Law, be not still required in the time of the Gospel?  
18. Whether there be not, or ought not to be such a supreme Judicatory erected in every Christian State, as was among the Jews for the final determining of all controversies whether Ecclesiastical, or Civil, that may happen between man, and man; or between Community and Community; or between private man and Community, for the preventing of civil War: And whether in mixed governments, where the whole sovereign power, or the use of any part, or parts thereof, is either equally, or unequally divided between several Estates, there ought not to be such a Judicatory erected, for the preventing of their encroaching upon one another's power, and of discord and war between the said respective States upon that occasion, if there be any Christian State which is yet defective in this point?  
19 Whether the plotting, and attempting to impeach the freedom, and to corrupt the sentence of such a supreme Judicatory by open violence, be not a much greater crime, than the doing any thing presumptuously contrary to the judgement of such a Court as was instituted Deuteron. ch. 17. ver. 8, 9, 10, & 11. which was death by the Law of Moses, v. 12; or then the slaying of the Chancellor, Treasurer, or the King's Justices of the one Bench, or of the other, or of any other justices assigned to hear, and determine, being in their places doing their offices, which is high treason by the law of the Realm.  
20. Whether the like practising, and endeavouring to overawe that Sovereign Majesty in which a State hath placed the whole arbitrary legislative power, whether they have placed it in one, or in the major part of many persons consenting in one, be not the highest treason that can be committed in any State. And whether this may not be done by seditious tumults of the common people, as well as by men of higher rank. And likewise whether the contriving and endeavouring to do the same things by cunning and malicious practices, be not a heinous crime also, though of an inferior nature?  
21. Whether the refusing to deliver up notorious Delinquents to justice, be not a just cause of making War with rigour against a whole City, or Country so protecting them, though no otherwise partaking in the sin, in the judgement of God himself in the Cases of Gibeah of Benjamin, and of the City of Abel protecting Sheba: And whether protectors of such Delinquents have good ground to promise themselves a good issue of such a War, by their prosperous success in a battle, or two, if they do well consider the former of those stories?  
22. Whether the keeping of persons duly accused from being brought to a due legal trial, either upon presumption of their innocence in respect of their former good life, and fame, or for their good deserts, or for fear and jealousy of undue proceed against them, or upon pretence of some questionable privilege, or all these laid together, can amount to any more than a probable ground of a just defensive War? And whether it be safe to run into a demonstrable great sin in the general upon a probable ground that in this, or that special Case it is no sin?  
23. Whether it be possible that a suit in Law, or a War may be just on both sides, in respect of the matter in question, to which it is impossible that both parties can have a good title, or cause of action: And whether their thinking they have so, which may in some measure justify both parties in an action at law (especially if both, or either of them be trusties, who may with good conscience stand for the questionable rights of those for whom they are trusted) can be a sufficient justification in an action at War, which in respect of the many unavoidable mischiefs that ever accompany all arms ought not to be commenced, or continued but upon clearly just, great, and necessary causes.  
24. Whether the justice of every action at war, as well as at Law, doth not depend entirely upon the trial of the point in issue between the parties: and whether all other, whether interessed persons, or bystanders, ought not to take that as it may be found in their respective Declarations, manifestoes, and other plead, leaving the judgement of secret motives to God who only can judge of their hearts, and who may judge otherwise of the justice of wars, than man may, because he seethe not as man seethe. And whether they be not bound in conscience to give equal credit, to the respective Declarations of both parties, in all matters of fact that have not fallen within their own private certain knowledge; and to use the same weights and measures in pondering the validity of their respective allegations, and to judge of them without passion, prejudice, or partiality.  
25. Whether all other things that may come into consideration in a war, besides the point in issue, how important soever they may be in themselves, yet in this trial by battle ought to be regarded either by the parties, or by any other person interessed in the war so far as to sway him in the giving of his assistance to the one side, or to the other, any more than the like things ought to sway a Juror in the giving of his verdict in a trial at Law. And particularly,  
26. Whether the extrajudicial qualifications of the persons either between whom a suit at Law, or a war is, or by whom the one or the other is managed, as whether they be Protestants, or Papists, religious, or profane, civil, or debauched, make any thing to the justice of the war, or suit, or aught to incline Jurors, or Partakers to the one side or to the other.  
27. Whether the good, or ill manner of managing a suit, or a war ought to be of any more weight with Jurors, or Partakers, seeing a good Cause may be ill managed, and an ill well: And whether a Suit, or a War undertaken, and commenced upon just grounds can turn to be unjust by any subsequent miscarriages in the one, or in the other, except the point in issue happen to be altered through the clear discovery of some concealed further design in one, or other of the parties, or some other intervening accident, as it frequently falleth out in long-breathed suits at Law, and came to pass in the Bohemian war by the death of the Emperor Mathias, which made a very considerable difference in the Case from that it was when the troubles began in his life time.  
28. Whether the accidental present interest, or the future advantages, or disadvantages, of what kind soever, which may accrue either to the parties themselves, or to the partakers, or to any third person, or to the public by the respective issue of a war, or suit; and whether the suspected or known designs, or intentions either of the parties, or of their partakers to make ill use of the victory, aught to be of any more force with Jurors, or Partakers, or whether they ought to be blind to them also, and to all other like circumstances, and respects.  
29. Whether the consideration of the accidental, and consequential interest of God himself in the issue of a matter in debate between two parties that are in war ought to engage soldiers, or contributers to take part with the one, or with the other, more than Jurors in a like case, the reason to the contrary being the same in both, to wit, because God hath no need of man's sin in either to maintain his Cause, or glory, and it being a manifest sin in a Juror to have any respect thereunto, how considerable soever such interest of God may be, as will be clear to the meanest capacity by putting the case between an Atheistical Church-Papist and a godly zealous Protestant, or Puritan touching the perpetual advowson of a great rectory, and no less clear in the case of a war between two Princes semblably qualified touching their title to a Kingdom divided in the profession of Religion.  
30. Whether a merely civil cause of clear justice in which true Religion is much interessed, though but by consequent, may not justly be called God's cause, and ought not to be undertaken more hearty, and maintained more vigorously by all good Christians in that respect, especially when the interest of religion is the only, or main motive to the opposition made by the adverse party, which was the case of the great Henry the fourth of France, who in that regard was commonly prayed for as fight the Lords battles, and is the case of the Prince Elector Palatine, and of Prince Rupert his brother, who in all appearance might ere this have recovered their ancient estates and dignities (to which by the laws of the Empire their title is unquestionable) by the same means that the said King did his Crown, if God by his grace had not made his example too fearful to them.  
31. Whether the entitling of God to any purely civil, and clearly unjust cause in respect of the interest of his true Religion involved by consequent only in the success thereof, be not a sin against the third Commandment, and of a high nature; and whether any damage which may happen to accrue to God's true Religion by occasion of the issue of such a War will not be put to his account that was in the wrong in the point of the justice of the War, though he were in the right in the point of the truth of his religion, and whether that will not be a heavy aggravation of his sin.  
32. Whether the parties, and others interessed in a purely Civil Cause of dubious justice, wherein Religion is no otherwise concerned then as abovesaid, do well to engage themselves, and to endeavour to engage others therein under the title or colour of religion; or whether it be not a great sin to do this wittingly and wilfully, especially in them who being Ambassadors of a King that hath publicly declared his kingdom not to be of this world, and that accordingly refused to make himself a Judge of Civil inheritances between brethren, will hardly be able to show that they have any Commission from him to entangle themselves, and much less to interest his name in such affairs of this world, and it being well known that in the old Law it was death for a Prophet to presume to speak a word in his name that he had not commanded. Deut. 18.20.  
33. Whether it be lawful for Christian subjects to take up Arms against their Sovereign for reformation of the Religion by law established, or in defence of their Religion not established by law, or of their lives, or livelyhoods in danger by due execution of Law, our blessed Saviour having expressly forbidden them to save their lives by such means, with the addition of a most peremptory threatening if they do, and of most gracious promises, if they patiently lose their lives or livelyhoods, for his sake. And whether the truth or falsehood of their Religion or the power, or number of them that attempt any of the things aforesaid doth make any difference in the case, though they be the Major part of the true, or of the representative Body of a kingdom: Or whether all these be not Antichristian proceed directly contrary to the doctrine and practice of Christ, and of all his holy Apostles, and of the whole Church of God for many ages, and particularly of the Church of England since the Reformation.  
34. Whether the defence of the Religion by law established be not more properly a defence of the law then of the Religion: And whether it be not lawful for Subjects of one Religion, or profession to take up arms in defence of their lives, or livelihood against the violence and force of their fellow-subjects of a contrary Religion, or profession though established by Law, and though they pretend to have, or have authority from their Sovereign to massacre or plunder them for that Cause, unless their said fellow-subjects first bring, or endeavour to bring them to a due Legal trial: And whether the truth or falsehood of their Religion, or the number of the thus oppressed doth make any such difference in the case in point of justice, that one man of what Religion soever hath not as much right to defend himself against violence as another, or as a multitude: or that a multitude of what Religion, or number soever ought not to forbear such defence of their persons or estates as well as any one single man of the same Religion or profession if proceeded against one by one in a due Legal course: And whether in some occasions where summary proceed against many at once are used, and allowed in other matters the same ought not to be submitted unto in this also for conscience sake, provided that the proceed be such as may make it appear that they suffer as Martyrs, or confessors for Christ's sake: And whether there be any danger that the gates of hell should prevail against the Church of Christ, if all true Christians should suffer themselves thus to be killed like sheep, or whether it have not ever been most enlarged at those times when Christians were most willing to yield to be so rob or killed.  
35. Whether all they who by a mistake of the quarrel do any way engage themselves, or others in a just War upon unjustifyable grounds be not murderers before God, though not before men, as a man may commit adultery with his own wife if in the dark he chance to take her for another man's: And as a Juror may do unjustly in giving a just verdict if he do it upon unjust grounds through a mistake of the evidence, or through ignorance of the Law.  
36. Whether they who engage themselves in an unjust War upon just grounds be thereby wholly absolved from the guilt of blood any more than a Juror is that giveth an unjust verdict to the taking away of his neighbour's life upon just, but untrue grounds, or then he is free from adultery that lieth with his neighbour's wife taking her for his own, if the mistake happen through their own fault in either case.  
37. Whether all they, who though they understand the right of the quarrel in a just War, yet engage themselves or others therein upon unjustifiable motives, as for private revenge, or gain, or with minds any otherwise disposed then purely to procure a yielding to the justice thereof, be not also guilty of all the bloodshed therein: as a Juror may be a murderer in consenting to the taking away of his neighbour's life by a just verdict how clear soever the Law, or evidence be to him, if he be induced thereunto by his own private spleen, or by the bribery, or solicitation of some other revengeful third person, or by any other by-respect, and not merely by the merits of the cause.  
38. Whether they who at one time have allowed, or approved of the same proceed, or actions, in themselves or others of their own opinion or party, which at another time they have condemned with severity and punished with rigour in others of a contrary opinion or party, in the managery of one and the same true, or pretended cause of War, have not in so doing pronounced sentence of condemnation against themselves; or can have any well-grounded hope long to escape the heavy judgement of God, and his revenging hand, for this so wicked partiality, how holy, righteous, or sober soever they may be in other passages of their lives. And whether they who will by no means agree that others should have an act of Oblivion in this world, for those faults or crimes whereof themselves are no less guilty than their neighbours, can have any hope of pardon for their own transgressions of either sort in that world which is to come.  
39 Whether it may be lawful for a People to depose that Prince to whom they, or their Representants have sworn Allegiance, in any imaginable case, considering and comparing what is written Exod: 20.7. Psal. 15.4. Joshua 9.1. to the end. 1 Sam. 8.10. to the 18. Deuteron. 17.14. and 15. Ezek. 17.11. to 21. Jerem. 52.3. to the 11. there being perhaps few stronger cases to be imagined for the dispensing with the obligation of an Oath then that was of Joshua, and of the Princes of the congregation having sworn to the Gibeonites, & Zedekiah to Nebuchadnezar: the first upon mere circumvention, both contrary to the express command of God, and yet the wrath of God having been revealed from heaven against the breakers of those Oaths. *********************************************  
40. Whether in the late great controversy between his Majesty and his two Houses of Parliam. it was not the duty of every good Christian and loyal subject of this Kingdom, desirous to approve his heart to God, and his actions to men, especially to those whom God hath set over him, to the end before he took any part in that War carefully to peruse, and with indifferency to weigh the respective Allegations, contained in those many several Declarations published by the King's Majesty on the one part, and by the Lords and Commons on the other part since the first breach between them, and particularly those whereby they have respectively given the people of this Kingdom, and the whole world an account of the Reasons of their having taken up Arms, whereof that of his Majesty beareth date 12 Aug. 1642. being also the date of the Proclamation whereby his Majesty gave notice of his resolution to set up his Royal Standard at Nottingham upon the 22th of the same month: And that of the Parliament was set forth in the beginning of the same month, I think before his Majesties.  
41. Whether upon the attentive reading of the said respective Declarations it will not be evident to every intelligent man capable to judge of affairs of this nature that the present unhappy War is not, or at least was not a War of Religion, otherwise then as Religion may be much concerned by consequent in the issue thereof. And whether this will not be yet more evident by comparing the conclusion of his Majesties said Declaration of the 12.th of Aug. from the paragraph beginning in these words [Our Case is truly stated, etc.] to the end thereof, with the Preface, of the Ordinance of the Lords and Commons for a weekly Assessment throughout the whole Kingdom for the maintenance of the Army raised by the Parliament 4. Martii. 1642. which beginneth in these words. [The Lords and Commons now Assembled in Parliament being fully satisfied and resolved in their consciences that they have lawfully taken up arms, and may, and aught to continue the same for the necessary defence of themselves, and the Parliament from violence and destruction, and of this Kingdom from foreign invasion, and for the bringing of notorious offenders to condign punishment, which are the only causes for which they have raised, and do continue an Army, and forces, which cannot possibly be maintained, nor the Kingdom subsist without the speedy raising of large and considerable sums of money proportionable to the great expenses which now this Kingdom is at for the supporting of the said Army, and for the saving of the whole Kingdom, our Religion, Laws, and Liberties from utter ruin, and destruction.] In which words the Lords and Commons (it may be) occasioned by many indiscreet defences of their proceed made by well-meaning, but unskilful men, have with great prudence distinguished the justifying causes of their having raised, and continuing an Army, and forces from the things which might by consequent have come into danger, if they had not raised an Army, and forces to defend them, among which Religion is one. And this the penner of his Majesties said Declaration had done as carefully from the beginning, in these words [Our quarrel is not against the Parliament, but against particular men etc.]  
42. Whether by the perusal of the said respective Declarations, and of the said Preface it be not also most evident, that his Majesty, and his two Houses of Parliament do both pretend to have taken up defensive Arms, and in defence of all and every the same things; And whether it be not also evident, that his Majesty in his said Declaration maketh the protecting of Delinquents, whom he nameth, from being brought to a Trial by their Peers, according to the Law of the Land, the only cause of the setting up of his standard, and raising defensive Arms against them, and as many of his subjests as should rise in Rebellion against his Majesty, and the Law, in behalf of the said pretended offenders, and in justification of their actions specified at large, and alleged to be High misdemeanours and Treason. And whether the three causes, upon which only the Lords, and Commons pretend to justify their having taken up defensive Arms, in their said Declaration of the fourth of March 1642, be not also reducible to one, to wit, that of bringing notorious offenders to condign punishment, whose practices are set forth at length in their declaration of the fourth of Aug. 1642, and of whom they then named none but the Lord Digby. For the pretended violence, and destruction of the said Lords and Commons, and of the Parliament, and the pretended foreign invasion of this Kingdom (which are the other two Causes) neither were then, nor by Law could have been charged on his Majesty, but on the said Lord Digby, and other unnamed Incendiaries; And whether it be not thereby manifest, that there were two Actions at War on foot at the same time, the one between the King, and his Parliament, the other between the Parliament, and his Majesty.  
43. Whether the penner of the said Declaration of the Lords, and Commons, of the fourth of August 1642, did not with great prudence carefully, and frequently disavow, and endeavour to disprove their having possessed themselves of Hull, or of the Militia, or Magazine, to be the grounds of the War: first in these express words to that purpose page. 496. of Husband's Collection, Then if they will not come to help the Parliament, and save themselves— especially now that the question is so clearly stated, and that it appeareth, that neither Hull, nor the Militia, nor the Magazine are the grounds of the War, which is so furiously driven on against us by a Malignant party, etc. And afterwards page 497— All this before we meddled with Hull, or Magazine, or Militia etc. to those words [But to destroy the Parliament. 
* See the words at the end of page 24. ] And yet more fully and clearly ibidem:— Yet willingly would we give his Majesty satisfaction in these particulars, (and so have we offered it) could we be secured, that disarming ourselves, and delivering them up to his Majesty— we should not for our own destruction put the military sword into the hands of those evil Councillors, and illaffected persons, who are so prevalent with his Majesty. And whether the Penner of certain late Declarations of the Lords and Commons, particularly that 4ᵒ Martii 1647. concerning the Papers of the Scots Commissioners, wherein are these words, page 68 [As to the Militia, although that be the foundation of security to us, and our posterity, and was the principal immediate ground of our Quarrel, etc. And these in the same page— Have we fought all this while with the King for the Militia, to subject it to the arbitrement of the Scots Commissioners?] were well advised in those, and other like passages; there being, as I humbly conceive, nothing more clear, then that the Militia (by which word, brought into use, by this Parliament, I do not understand the power of araying, or charging the subjects of this Kingdom with such, and such arms, which regularly cannot be imposed without the joint authority of King, Lords, and Commons; but the power of assembling, and conducting the subjects so armed, for the suppression of all Rebellions, insurrections, and invasions:) undoubtedly ever was in the King alone, and was clearly acknowledged to be so, by this very Parliament, when they petitioned his Majesty to put the whole Militia into the hands of such persons as should be recommended to his Majesty by both Houses of Parliament 1ᵒ. Martii 1641: When they made their first Ordinance for the ordering of the Mllitia, whereby they give power to Colonels, and Captains to lead, conduct, and employ his Majesty's subjects according as they from time to time shall receive directions by his Majesty's authority signified by both Houses of Parliament, 2ᵒ Martii 1641: And when they resolved upon the Question, That in this case of extreme danger, and of his Majesty's refusal, the Ordinance agreed on by both Houses for the Militia doth oblige the People, and aught to be obeyed by the fundamental Laws of this Kingdom 15ᵒ. Martii 1641. And whether the true ground of the fracture of the Parliamentarian party into Presbyterian, and Independent, and of the sharp controversy arisen between them, upon other pretences, be not which of them should have the Lion's skin, before he be dead. And whether if the Independent could have gone shear away with it whole, it be not already manifest, that they would have been subdivided again upon the same ground. And whether there be any hope of seeing an end of these bitter disputes, till the sword be put again into the hand, where it hath been of old: And whether there be not means to place it there in such a way, as may be much safer for the people, and no less safe for the Houses of Parliament, then to have it in their hands, who being Two, may at length also come to strive about it.  
44. Whether the penner of his Majesty's Declaration of the twelfth of August, did not with like prudence also distinguish the Delinquents named therein, into two ranks, charging the former of them to have been the Contrivers, Fosterers, and Fomentors of mistakes, and jealousies betwixt body, and head, his Majesty, and his two Houses of Parliament, whom his Majesty thereby requireth to be delivered into the hands of Justice. All the charge against the later rank being, their having levied War against the King, contrary to the Statute of the 25. year of King Edward the third, as is pretended, but in obedience to several Ordinances of this present Parliament, as is confessed; which Ordinances they are therefore allowed to plead. And whether those noble Lords, and others, so impeached of treason, might not then without danger have submitted to their trial appointed by Law, supposing the formerly accused Members, had also then submitted to a Legal trial, and should have been tried first, and would have been acquitted by their Peers, so as there had been no pretence of a just War on his Majesty's part for their detainer.  
45. Whether the sixth Article preferred against the said accused Members, be not by his Majesty avowed to be the chief head of their Charge, aswell in his Majesty's said Declaration as in the Articles themselves, the said Article being comprised in these words, That for the completing of their traitorous designs, they have endeavoured, as fare as in them lay, by force, and terror to compel the Parliament to join with them in their traitorous designs, and to that end have actually raised, and countenanced tumults against the King, and Parliament. And whether the main Charge against the Lord Digby, and other Incendiaries in the Parliaments said Declaration of the fourth of August 1642. be not the very same, viz. their combining to bury the happiness of this kingdom in the ruin of this Parliament, and by forcing it to cut up the freedom of Parliament by the root, as it is expressed page 494. And whether the main charge of the Army against the eleven Members be not to the same effect: And whether in common discourse some do not charge Others to be as guilty of the same crime, as any of the accused by the Army, by the Houses, or by his Majesty.  
46. Whether they who in their private judgements have absolved the Speakers of the two Houses, (in which they are but the shadows of his Majesty's sacred person) from all blame, in what they did the last summer, can with much equity, or justice condemn his Majesty, for having withdrawn himself from the tumults at Westminster, when time was, allowing all to be true which hath been alleged by his Majesty, and others in his behalf, for motives inducing him thereunto. And whether any thing, and what, and how much is wanting to make the retirement of a part of the Members of both Houses, to an old Army, which had refused to be disbanded at their appointment, a just parallel to the retirement of a much greater part of the Members of both Houses to York, or Oxford, and there contributing their assistance toward the raising and maintaining of an Army. And whether if this last mentioned Army had found no more opposition in their march to Westminster, and through London, than the forementioned Army did the last year, the said Members needed to have done any more, than was then acted by the General, and Officers of the said Army, for the compassing of their design.  **** Desunt nonnulla. **** 
47. Whether upon the whole matter, Whereas it was alleged on both sides, that they took up Arms in defence of his Majesty's person, of the true Protestant Religion, (which words ought to be understood of that which in this Kingdom is established for true) of the Laws, and Liberties of the Kingdom, and of the power, and Privilege of Parliament, The truth be not, That the last only, to wit, the Privilege of Parliament, was in Question; (if the question were about matter of right) none of the former having been, or having on either side been said to be, in any danger otherwise, then as the freedom of Parliament was by both sides pretended, to have been intended to be by the there impeached. And whether, freedom being the main Privilege of Parliament, and the providing for the freedom of the Parliament, and of all other Assemblies, having been said to belong to the King by the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and the Communality of this Realm assembled in Parliament at Westminster, of purpose to take advice of this business, in the seventh year of King Edward the first, And that by the Statute than made it was declared, that it is the King's part through his Royal signory straight to defend force of armour, and all other force against his peace, and to punish them which shall do contrary, according to the Laws, and usages of this Realm, and that all the Subjects thereof are thereunto bound to aid the King, as their Sovereign Lord, a all seasons when need shall be, Whether I say in the late action at War, taken as commenced on the part of the Parliament, the only point of fact in issue were not, whether his Majesty either did proceed, or would have proceeded according to the Laws, and Usages of this Realm, in the accusation of the Lord Kimbolton, (now Earl of Manchester,) and of the five Members of the House of Commons, charged with an endeavour by force, and terror to compel the Parliament to join with them in their Traitorous Designs, and with having to that end actually raised and countenanced Tumuls against the King, and Parliament. I say would have proceeded, Because his Majesty taking notice that some conceived it disputable, whether his proceed against the persons aforesaid by his Attorney were legal, and agreeable to the Privileges of Parliament, was pleased to wave those his proceed, and to Declare That when the minds of men were composed, he would proceed against them in an unquestionable way. And whether in the late action at War, taken as commenced on his Majesty's part, the only point of fact in issue were not, whether his Majesty did ever refuse to deliver the Lord Digby, or any other duly accused Incendiary to a Legal trial, before the beginning of the War.  
48. Whether his Majesty's Solicitor have not fully declared his being of opinion, that the justice of the great Cause yet depending between the King his Master, and his two Houses of Parliament, must come at last to be determined by matter of fact, in a speech by him made at Guildhall at a Common Hall there held, on Friday 6. October 1643. upon the occasion of desiring the assistance of our Brethren of Scotland in this War, in the words to be read, page 5. of the Copy of that Speech published according to Order, and printed by R. Cotes in 1646. And whether the truth of any matter of fact be not more surely determined by producing witnesses upon Oath, then by Trial by Battle.  The words last cited. 
In case they be called in, we are to consider then what alteration this is like to make; we are therefore to consider how it comes about that the Party comes to be so equal, that so many should engage themselves on the other Parry, as we see they do; certainly a great many of them do it, being uncertain in their judgements to which side to cleave. Another Party they do it, because that they out of fear desire to keep their estates, and stand Neuters:  
For the first of those, certainly both at home and abroad, those that are averse, they look upon us as a Protestant Kingdom, but divided among ourselves; they hear Protestations on both sides, that both Parties do protest to maintain the Protestant Religion, the Laws of the Kingdom, and the Liberty of the Subject; and they see and read the Declarations that go out on both sides, and the matter of fact being that that makes the cause, they know not what to believe of that;  The words cited page 18. 
All this before we meddled with Hull or Magazine, or Militia, show plainly that our Act in securing them, was not the cause of the Kings taking up Arms, and exercising hostility upon his loving, and loyal subjects, which was in the thought and endeavours of those about the King who then had and still have the greatest influence upon his Counsels; before we thought of Hull or Militia, or any thing else of that nature; And than that our resigning of them now, would not prevail with him to make him lay down his Arms, and return to his Parliament and gratify the earnest and longing desires of his people to enjoy his presence, favour and protection: But that if he could recover either by our resignation, or any other way pieces of so much advantage to him, and weakening to us, use would be made of them to our infinite prejudice, and ruin, the intention being still the same, not to rest satisfied with having Hull or taking away the Ordinance of the Militia; But to destroy the Parliament, etc.  
FINIS.