THE PEOPLES RIGHT BRIEFLY ASSERTED.  
LONDON, Printed for the Information of the Commonalty of England, France, and all other neighbour Nations, that groan under the oppression of Tyrannical Government. 164●.   

The Peoples Right briefly asserted.  
IT is the judgement of Ancient, and the best of Modern Writers. That the Body of a People, represented in a Convention of elected Estates, have a true and lawful power to dispose of things at pleasure, for their own Safety and Security; and in order to that, to dispose of the King o● Prince, if he neglect his Duty, or act contrary to that end for which he was at first ordained; for that Kings are constituted for the Peoples good, not the People made for a Kings pleasure, is a thing granted by all rational men.  
That therfore Kings have been, and justly may be laid aside, or otherwise censured, when they ●ail of that Duty, Historians will give Examples in all Kingdoms; and Political Writers sufficient Reasons for such Examples: Of which multitude it is not needful to grasp all; but such as have happened in those Kingdoms which are nearest to England, both in Seituation and Constitution of Government. Nor is it probable that such Examples had been so frequent, had it not been generally thought a thing consonant to the Laws of Nature and Reason.  
The Kingdom of France hath heretofore, not only in the boast of her own Writers, but consent of others, been esteemed a Government of the best Constitution,( though of late years it hath lost, in a high degree, the ●ust Liberty of the Nation,) and hath abounded with Examples of this kind. It is not therefore incident only to those kingdoms, where the King is apparently Elective, but Hereditary also, as France is accounted. For the People never lost, nor gave away their supreme Power of making Election, when need required, even in such Kingdoms. For though i●heritance in the Crown were tolerated, to avoid ●m●itious Cont●n●ions, Divisions, Interregnums, and other inconveniences of Elections; yet when greater mischi●fs happe●ed, as Tyr●nny in Government, the People did still, retain to themselves a power of curing th●● Malady; namely, of expelling those Tyrants, and choosing good Kings in their room.  
The Parliaments of France( saith Almonius) had so supreme an Authority, that not only all Laws were by them made and established, Peace and War decreed, Tributes imposed, and Offices conferred; but Kings also were by the same Authority, for Riot, Sloth, or Tyranny, laid aside, thrust into Monasteries, or otherwise punished; and sometimes, by that Power, whole Royal Families were deprived of Succession to the Crown ▪ even as they were at first advanced by the People. So that( saith he) By whose approbation they were at first preferred, by their dislike they were again rejected. But before we come to particular I●stances, let us consider the Reasons.  
Whosoever considereth that Kings and all Governors were instituted for the peoples happiness, and made by their consent, must needs acknowledge that end, to be first and especially looked into: And because Kings, as men, may stray from their right way, and fail of their Duty; therefore Laws were made for a Bridle to them: which were indeed no Bridle, if therewere no power to apply them, and see the Execution done: Which hath made divers of the learned political Writers( for it is not the voice of one) to wonder, that in Legitimate kingdoms( for we speak not of barbarous Tyrannies) any man should be so sottish, as to think or say, that private men should be enabled by the Law to sue the Prince for a small quantity of Land or Goods: and yet that the Representative Body of the whole People have not power to lay the Law against him for ●arricide, massacring of the People, and Treason( for that is their word) against his whole Country, and the Being of the Laws themselves: that the Law should use any severity in small things: and give impunity, with absolute licence, in the greatest and most hemous offences. And upon that point of a Kings offe●ding against his People and Country, it is that Bartolus speaks, when he proveth the whole People to be superior to the King, and Prop●ietary Lord of the kingdom: whereas the King is but as Steward and Administrator of it.  
Therefore( saith he) A King may commit Treason against the People, and be a traitor and R●bel to his Country: and may justly be deposed, and further punished, by that Lord against whom he hath offended, which is the People, and those who represent them. And if the King( saith he) go so far as to Arms and Force, those Representers are to call the People to Arms, and proceed against him, in all points, as against a public enemy.  
Hence came that old saying of wise men, That in the Nature of Man there are two Monsters, Anger and Lust: and that it is the Office of the Law to bridle these two, and subject them to the rule of Reason. He therefore that would( saith Buchanan) let loose a King, or any other Man, from the kerb of the Law, doth not let loose one Man, but two Monsters, to affront Reason. To the same purpose Aristotle concludeth, that he, which obeyeth the Law, obeyeth God and the Law: but he that absolutely obeyeth a Kings will, obeyeth a Man, and a Beast.  
The Law is more powerful then the King, as being the Covernor and Moderator of his lusts and actions: But the whole Body of the people are more powerful then the Law, as being the parent of it. For the People make the Law, and have power when they see cause, to abrogate or establish it. Therefore seeing that the Law is above the King, and the People above the Law: it is concluded as a thing out of question, by Buchanan, Iunius, and many others, that the People of right have power to call in question, and punish a King for transgressing the Law.  
If you look after examples, you may find many in almost all the legitimate kingdom that are known. Certain it is that the French, by authority of their public Convention or Parliament, deposed Childerike the first, Sigibert, Theodorik●, and Childerike the third for their Tyra●ny and unworthiness, and set up some of another Family in their ●oms ▪ some of them for being too much governed by wan●on and wicked Favourites, esteeming it all one, whether himself were extreme vicious, o● ruled by them that were so. By the same Representative authority, in conventions of the whole people( which were not much unlike the French or English Parliaments) were two Emperors of Germany deposed, Adolp●us and Wencesla●s, though not so much b●d Princes, as not good enough: The like hath been done i● Denmark, and in Sw●thland, with divers other King ▪ doms in Europe, as Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Bohemia, testified by good and authentic Historians.  
But in the Kingdom of Scotland their own Historian George Buchanan expresseth in plain terms, that he could name above a d●● n Kings of Scotland, who ▪ for their bad Reigns, were either condemned to perpetual imprisonment: or else by banishment, or voluntary death,( which some of them choose) escaped the just punishment of their offences.  
But least( saith he) any man should think I produce only old and obsolete examples of Kings long ago, such as were Culenus, Evenus, Ferchardus, and the like, I will instance one in the memory of our Fathers. James the third was by the General Consent of Parliament declared to be justly slain for his cruelty, and wicked reign; and it was ordered for the future, That none of those who had any hand, or gave assistance in his death, should ever be questioned, or tainted with any ignominy. That thing therefore( saith he) which being already done, was judged by the State to be well, and justly done, was doubtlessly proposed as exemplary for the future. This James the third was slain in Chase, after a battle, in which he was vanquished; where Buchanan expresseth. That the State made one War against him to destroy his wicked council; but the second War was to destroy the King himself, as being incorrigible.  
This Restraint of Regal licence the same Author confidently praiseth in his Nation, as a thing not only good and wholesome for the People, but profitable for the Kings themselves, and advantageous to their Posterities, alleging that for a main Reason, Why the Crown of Scotland hath continued the longest of any Crown in one Family, whereas other Crowns in Europe have been often changed from one race to another.  
England hath not wanted examples in this kind, though they have not been so frequent as in Scotland; two of the greatest note were Edward the second, and Richard the second, whose unfortunate reigns are so generally known, and have so often upon this s●d occasion in present been produced ●s instances, that it were needless to dwell upon the particulars of them; therefore I only name them, and forbear also particularly to relate how f●r some other dev●a●ing Princes, as King John, and Henry the third, have been restrained by Parliaments; and how much the best of Englands Princes, such as Edward the first, Edward the third, and Henry the fifth, have freely yielded to the control of that high Court, and thought it no dishon●r to them.  
Examples also of this kind have happened, and are averred by good Authors, concerning the Popes themselves; namely, that the Cardinals, upon some special occasions, may, without the con●ent of the Pope, call a council and judge him by it, if by any great and notor●ous sin he become a sc●ndal to the Universal Church, and be incorrigible, since Reformation is as necessar● in the Head, as in the Members; if contrary to his Oath he refuse to c●ll a Geneneral council, &c. But certain it is, that some of them have been deposed by authority of a council ▪ This is( saith Bald●●) in case the Pope ●●very abstinate: For first, Exhortations must be used; secondly, more severe remedie● ▪ and last of all, plainforce; and where no wisdom can prevail ●y council, force of arms must be th● remedy to cure him ▪ ●● therefore by confent of almost all the learned men, and many examples in ●act, it appear, that a council may justly depose a Pop●● who calleth himself King of Kings, and challengeth 〈◇〉 ● superiority above the Empero●, as the Sun is above the Mo●●, and more then that, an authority ●● depose Kings and Emperors when he sees cause: Who may not as well g●●n●, that the public council of a Kingdom may lawfully put down, and punish their King for extremily of mi●● government ▪  
Concerning this power of the people in restraining wicked Princes, Iunius, in his book Contra Tyrannos, 〈◇〉 a not able inference upon a place in the Prophet Ierem●ah, where the Prophet in the eleventh Chapter, and fourth verse, expressly declareth to the Kingdom of judah, that for the impiety and cruelty of King Manasses, the people were carried away captive by the Assiyrians; upon which pl●c●( saith he) very learned Expositors suppose( for we must not think that they were unjustly punished) the people w●r● guilty for not resisting the impiety and cruelty of their King.  
But where this power of resisting a King ▪ Within the Realm of Judah, lay, whether in the seventy Princes, or more General Assemblies of State,( being a Government far different from ours,) I make no judgement. For the Kings of judah reigned in a very absolute way, as far as we can perceive, and exercised a very Tyranny, being that Government which God gave them in his displeasure, for not being content to be honoured with Gods immediate Government, administered by his inspired Prophets; but desiring a King as the Heathen had. But the Limitation of Monarchy is better understood now by people in their own Countries, and by their own Laws, and therefore by English men in England, whose just Liberties cannot be altogether unknown to those that are wise in their neighbour Nations, who also have title to the same( or very like) Liberties. Neither can it be denied( in this l●te sad and bloody trial ▪ but that the Parliament of England, if they had a lawful power to proceed in this War, have also a just power to dispose of that Victory which God hath put into their hands, as they shall think best for the future security of the whole people, whom they represent: Nor is that security, by the Laws of Reason and Nature, to be made slightly, which hath cost the lives of ▪ so many thousands, and so vast an expense of Treasure for the purchase of it: And though they long suffered with patience the pressure of Tyranny heretofore, and moved more slowly to a Vindication then sharp necessity seemed to require,( as being not more afflicted with the sense of their wounds, then grieved to discover the hand that made them,) yet wise men will so censure of their past sufferings, and present actions, as neither to think the just Rights of English Freedom lessened by any length of patience, nor the King made more excusable by any continuance and increase of his offences.  
FINIS.