‛ ΑΥΤΟΚΑΤΑΚΡΙΣΙΣ, OR, Self-Condemnation, EXEMPLIFIED In Mr. Whitfield, Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Hickman. WITH OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS On Mr Calvin, Mr Beza, Mr Zuinglius, Mr Piscator, Mr Rivet, and Mr Rollock: BUT MORE ESPECIALLY On DOCTOR Twisse, and MASTER Hobbs; AGAINST WHOM, God's Purity and his Prescience, and his Eternal Decrees according to Prescience, (commonly called Respective or Conditional Decrees) with the sincere intention and the general extent of the Death of Christ, are finally cleared and made good; And the Adversaries Absurdities (confessed by themselves to be unexcusable) are proved against them undeniably, out of their own hand-writings.  
WITH An ADDITIONAL ADVERTISEMENT Of Mr Baxter's late Book Entitled The Grotian Religion discovered, etc.  
By THOMAS PIERCE Rector of Brington in Northamptonshire.  
London, Printed by J.G. for R. Royston at the Angel in Ivy-lane, 1658.   

TO THE READER.  
Christian Reader,  
THAT I presume to entertain thee with this Additional Importunity in vindication of those things so largely insisted upon already in several Tracts, to wit the Truth and Goodness of God's Decrees, and the things that are consequent thereunto, there is this (amongst other reasons) to be alleged for an excuse, that 'tis intended to be the last. Or if I live to grow worthier of bringing my thoughts into the light, as it is not likely to be in haste, so I hope it will be in some other kind.  
I wish that some had remembered whilst they were men of ripe years, what we all have been taught in our several childhoods, that there are four sorts of things which should not be drawn into dispute; but either be granted, or rejected, as soon as named. And I had once a very pleasing, but (it seems) a vain hope, that it could never become a Question, 
* See the right Reverend Bishop Bramhal his catching of the Leviathan, particularly from p. 467. to p. 473.  Whether or no there is a God? or, Whether God is a Spirit? or, Whether the holy Spirit of God can be the sovereign Author of all uncleanness. To be barely sceptical in such things as these, is sure a crime of greater moment then to be cherished with impunity, or to be suffered to pass abroad without being put unto a stand.  
But it seems we are fallen into that Age of the World, wherein the worst of Questions have not only been rudely started, but blasphemously stated in the very worst sense too. The most unwholesome Doctrines that can be named, have not only been brewed in the private fantasies and brains of unlearned men, but have publicly been broached by men of parts; and running out at their Pens, have been given for Drink to the giddy People.  
Reader, thou wilt find, in the ensuing Treatise, strange contradictions of divers men, both against the Scriptures and themselves too. Thou wilt find them saying that sins are the works of God, that God is pleased with them, that God doth will them with a perfect willingness, and that they make for God's glory. All directly against themselves, who having said such things in many places of their works, have also said sometimes they never said them. And all directly against the Scriptures, which say that sins are the works of the Devil, that they are grievous to God Almighty, that he wills them not, but abhors them, and that he is extremely dishonoured by them. Thou shalt find it acknowledged and avowed to have been publicly taught by famous men, whom thou wilt find to be justified in their very worst sayings, and not only so, but even owned for orthodox and classical Authors; I say, by such men as these thou shalt find it confessed to have been taught, 
If in a multitude of examples the Reader desires to be directed to one or two, he may satisfy himself, ch. 3. sect. 13 & sect. 27. n. 2, 3, 4, 5.  that God in plain terms is the Author of sin, that he not only wills it, but impells men to it, and makes them sin by coaction. And yet with a turn of the tongue, thou wilt find a bold Artist trying to lick them all clean. For though such things (saith 
† Look forward on c. 3. sect. 27.  he) have fallen from the pens of the Orthodox, yet they have not understood them in any flagitious or unconscionable sense, nor have they used to do it often, and the Jesuits have done it as well as they, and they have said the contrary at other times: and so without any more ado, salvares est, saltat senex. Thou wilt find men obtruding new Creeds upon the Church. One inserting this Article, that God is no Spirit; Another this, that God is the maker of all things real, and so (by a consequence unavoidable) of all the wickedness in the world. In a word, thou wilt find, that we 
* Isa. 6.5.  dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips, who 
† Ezek. 22.26.  put no difference between the holy and profane. It is impossible (saith 
* Job 14.4.  Job) to bring a clean thing out of an unclean; much more impossible (say I) to bring any thing unclean from the Spirit of purity. It is a lesser wickedness of the two, to ascribe unto the Devil some good works of God, then to charge God foolishly with the evil works of the Devil. It is a very great sin, for men to bear false witness against their neighbours: 'tis yet a greater, to be false witnesses 
* 1 Cor. 15.15.  for God. It is a greater sin yet to be false witnesses against him: but sure 'tis the greatest sin of all (by 
† 2 Pet. 3.16.  wresting and corrupting his sacred word) to make him bear false witness against himself.  
Had such impieties as these been only practised in private corners (as the Feasts of Bacchus heretofore) I had contented myself to have mourned over them in secret, like one of the 
* Lam. 2.10.  Elders of the daughters of Zion, I had sat upon the ground and kept silence: having the words of the Prophet Amos as it were sounding in mine ears, The 
† Amos 5.13.  prudent shall keep silence in that time, for it is an evil time. I should then have reasoned within myself, 
** Mat. 7.6.  that no man living can be obliged to cast what is holy unto * Dog's, or to give the * Pearl of reproof to Swine, (if yet my charity could have suffered me to think mine Adversaries such.) For why should I draw upon myself the implacable hatred of evil doers, in case I had reason to expect a very great prejudice to myself, without any the least hope of being profitable to others?  
But when I saw such things proclaimed in Gath, and as it were written with a Sunbeam in the streets of Askelon; when I found it taught by 
* Damus Deum esse causam particularem uniuscu jusque actus. Vin. Gr. l. 2. p. 40. col. 2.  Doctor Twisse and his followers (Mr. W. and Mr. B.) that God is the cause in particular of every act, nay the natural Cause, and the 
† Mr. B. c. 3. p. 11.  sovereign Author of the act of sin; nay that he wills and works, not in the act of sin only, but in the 
* Mr. W. Ext. of D. Prov. p. 12.  sin of the Act too, whose very pravity and deformity doth make way for God's glory; and when I found it acknowledged by Doctor Twisse, 
† Ex quibus quàm facile quae●o fuit viris istis indoctis, quales erant Libertini colligere D●um Aucrorem faisse omnium scelerum quae ab hominibus perpetrantur. Vin. Gr. l. 2. sect. 1. p. 52.  that such illiterate men as the Libertines than were (and as the Ranters now are) might very easily collect even from this one Doctrine, [The Act of sin is from God] that God himself is the Author of all the wickedness in the World; when I found it granted by 
* Of lib. and Nec. p. 26. & Q. p. 11.  Mr. Hobbs himself, that evil use may be made of such bold assertions, and that though he thought them to be true, and so to be inwardly believed, yet he thought them too dangerous to be spoken aloud, much less fit to be preached and printed too, (forgetting that himself had even preached them in print, and that in the very same books wherein he confesseth the danger of them;) when I considered how great an odium had been derived from these doctrines upon the Protestant name, through the dexterities of the Jesuits, and other Emissaries of Rome, who have charged the whole body of the Reformed Church with the particular misbehaviours of some very unsound and unruly members; when I considered that those Doctrines had stopped the way to reconcilement betwixt the Lutheran Churches, and those that follow the way of Calvin, they 
† See Doctor jackson's Exact Collect. l. 10 sect. 6. p. 3188.  not agreeing (say the Lutherans) in the worship of one God, because the God of the Lutherans is only the Author of what is good, whereas the God of the Calvinists is owned by them to be the Author of what is morally evil; last of all, when I considered the tremendous dignity of my calling, which is not only to be a shepherd, and a * Watchman in Israel, 
** Ezek. 33.7, 8. & ch. 34. v. 2, 10.  (and as such to be accountable as well for 
† Ibid.  other men's lapses as for mine own) but also a 
* 1 Cor. 4.1.  steward of the mysteries of the living God, (however unworthy and 
† 2 Cor. 2.16.  insufficient for so insuperable a work;) I say when I seriously considered these several things, and compared them all with one another, I had not the courage to be afraid of my fellow-creatures, the fear of whom did seem to me to be a desperate boldness: for what greater boldness can there be, then to stand in so great a fear of them who can at the 
* Mat. 10.28.  most but destroy the body, as not to stand in fear of him who can cast both body and soul into Hell? It is not a true love of God, which is not able to 
† Joh. 4.18.  cast out the fear of men. I know what 
* Ecclus. 2.12, 13.  woe is to them who have fearful hearts and faint hands, and what will be said at the judgment-seat, unto the sinner that goeth two ways? I know the 
† Rev. 21.8.  fearful and unbelieving shall have their portion in the lake of fire and brimstone. I know it was one of those sins which the Prophet did not think he could sufficiently bewail, (unless his 
* Jer. 9.1.  head were all water, and his eyes a fountain of tears, that he might weep day and night, 
† Vers. 3. Isa. 58.1.  NOT TO BE VALIANT for the TRUTH. Isaiah was bid to cry aloud without sparing, and to lift up his voice like a Trumpet in showing the people their transgressions. Should I presume to be afraid of the wrath of men, and in an awe of their persons forbear to tell them of their sins, (for some men's Doctrines become their sins, if 'tis a sin to blnspheme and dishonour God) I might well cry out, as the same Prophet did, 
* Isa. 6.5. Vae mihi quia lacui, id est, quia peccata non liberè reprehendi. Grot. in locum.  WOE IS ME FOR I●AM UNDONE. And that for the very s●●e reason which the Prophet gives of his outcry in the following words, because I am a man of unclean lips. That is, (as the learnedst Annotators have explained the place) I have been guiltily afraid to tell the great ones of their iniquities. Many are tickled with an opinion of their Policy and Prudence, when 'tis but cowardice and coldness in the cause of God. Woe be to such, for they are undone.  
But neither indeed can I pretend to have been valiant in my encounters, whom even mine Adversaries themselves have made unable to be afraid. For I have spoken no harder things of what I have found in their writings, than their Masters have spoken of the same, when they have found them in the writings or mouths of others. And this I doubt not but they will grant me, that Henbane is not the wholesomer for being found to grow in a specious Garden, no more than a Tulip is the uglier for having grown out of a Dunghill. Nor is El●sphemy the better for being found in he Works of a Christian Writer, any more than Pontius Pilate for having been mentioned in the Creed. When I find men 
* Jam. 2.7.  blaspheming that worthy name, which (I hope) shall ever be dearer to me then my life; and when I find them 
† Psal. 73.8.  corrupting others (as the Psalmist speaks) even by 
* vers. 9  stretching forth their mouth unto the heaven's, and that their 
† vers. 8.  talking is against the most H●gh; and when many of the 
* vers. 10.  people do fall unto them, whereout th●y suck no small advantage; I cannot but be offended at what is spoken, without partiality to them that speak. Whether I find it in the Jesuits (as sometimes I do,) or in the rigid Pre●byterians, (as I have many times done.) or in the d wnright Libertines, (as who does not?) I desire to give it its proper name. When Mr. Calvin writ against Quintin and Pocquet, and other persons of quality who were domestic servants to the Queen of Navarre, 
See calvin's Epist. 62. compared with what follows.  he made no scruple to call them Libertines, 
† Qui ●gnorab●nt quid sibi vel●et Lib rt●norum nomen, id Quintini nomi●e cogn●turi sunt. Exp●dit Be●luas tam p●●niciosas no â aliq â ●nsigni●i. Blash● m ●s x cra●il●s s●a●gunt.— Non solùm Ch●●s; t nam Relig onem, s d e●●am omnem human●tat●m quae hactenus inter Tu●cas, &c Calv. adversus Libers. c. 4.  and (what is more) pernicious b●asts, charged them with execrable blasphemy, than which no villainy was greater, no poison worse, as tending (saith the) to the subversion, not of the Christian Religion only, but even of that ingenuity and civil nature, which hath hitherto prevailed amongst Turks and Infidels. The making of God to be an Author and Cause of sin, Voetius confesseth to be [
* Voetius in Method. Resp. Calum. p. 1136.  absurd, and sottish, and implying a contradiction, horrid, blasphemous, scandalous, against all Theology and the consent of Christendom, against the light of nature, and the dictates of reason.] If Voetius say thus, much more may I. Again, to say that God hath imposed a necessity of sinning upon his creatures, is concluded by 
† Hist. Gottesch. c. 11. p. 173. R g. 5.  Remigius, to be a charging God foolishly as the Author of sin, which Doctor Whitaker affirms to be a very 
* Dr. Whitaker contra D●raeum. l. 8. sect, 1. p. 524.  great blasphemy. Nay whether it is not the greatest to be imagined, let the Reader conjecture by that which follows.  
1. The greatest blasphemy is that, which ascribes to God (as the Principal Cause and Contriver) the very worst of the worst that can be possibly imagined. 2. That is the worst of the worst which is the very worst thing in the Devil himself. 3. The Devil hath nothing worse in him then a necessity of sinning, or an impossibility to abstain from sin. 4. Therefore to say that God Almighty did eternally cause, or contrive, decree, or praedestin a necessity of sinning, in a great part of the Angels, and in the greatest part of mankind, is the greatest blasphemy to be imagined.  
That this is frequently to be met with in a great variety of Writers, the intelligent Reader needs not be told. And such a variety he will meet with in the following Treatise. For though that rigid Ternary of Presbyterians, Mr. W. Mr. B. and Mr. H. may seem to be the chief in my consideration, yet my Reader will much misunderstand me, if he thinks that Writers of their Pitch could have drawn so many sheets from me, upon the sole account of their own achievements. Had I spent so great a share of my precious time upon but two or three Aggressors of no greater fame and consideration, I had done much more than I could have answered, if not to my conscience, yet at least to my discretion. Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Barlee, in their several songs to the same Tune, (which they both entitle their vindications,) were of themselves sufficient to be the principal occasions of this my enterprise, but the impulsive causes were much more worthy: For I look upon these two, as on a couple of Chemists, whose very Quintessence and Elixir of strength and subtlety, I clearly discover to have been fetched from the public Elaboratories of the greatest Artists, both of the upper, and lower way; and in a more especial manner of Mr. Calvin and Doctor Twisse, whose good Latin they have turned into no good English; and what for many years together they had been gathering, they have at once produced in the great, and in the profuseness of their humour have shed it abroad amongst the people. It hath been therefore my chiefest aim, to enfeeble those Armouries and Magazines, from whence these Combatants have borrowed their choicest weapons, whether engaged in their offensive, or defensive quarrels.  
I have allowed Mr. W. the first and chief place in my consideration, (I mean in respect of Mr. B. and Mr. H.) first because he is a person of the greatest gravity and the 
† So saith Mr. B. in his Neces. V.n.c. ●. p. 32. l penult.  greyest hair, and one who was versed in these Controversies (as Mr. Barlee saith often) 
* Introduct. p. 3 & ch. 3. p. 18.  before I was born or brought forth into the l●ght; before I had a head or an eye; one who subscribed the 39 Articles 
* Ibid. p. 40.  before there was any such thing in the world as Mr. T. P. Lastly 
† ch. 2. p. 34.  Old enough and wise enough to be my father. When I observed Mr. B. upbraiding to me my want of years, 
† Ibid. p. 49.  more than any other thing, not one y in these pages which I have cited, but in many more which I conceal, (calling me one while, a 
* c. 2. p. 41.  Demure Junior, and another while, a 
† c. 2. p. 53.  Juvenal Divine) sometimes objecting his 
* Ch. 2. p. 27.  own antiquity, and Mr. W's extremely often, as if he thought that old age were the strongest 
* The weakness of it is visible in the S●nner Impleaded, p. 300, 301.  argument in the world against what ever had been alleged by one who followed them into the world at some years' distance; I comforted myself with the remembrance, that I did not choose my nativity, nor was I the Lord of my own Horoscope, and in regard I was as old as I was able to be by any means, it would not be reckoned as my fault, that I could not plead my longevity for the advantaging of my cause. It a ●pears by the words of 
* 1 Tim. 4.12.  S. Paul to Timothy, that a Priest is too apt to be despised for his youth. And to remove that stumbling-block out of the old man's way, he shall know that our Lord and Saviour did not quite attain to my years in his Peregrination upon the earth. S. John and S. Timothy were both but young men, when yet the first was an Apostle, and the second a Bishop. If Argumentation and Orthodoxy were to be reckoned by a man's age, I am sure the old Serpent would go beyond them. And though I myself am far from it, yet the truth which I assert hath Age enough to become an Argument. 
* Quod primum verum est. Tertul.  So that from this day forwards, I hope the difference of years betwixt my adversaries and me, (which they have hitherto more insisted on in all the●r public and private chat, then upon any one thing which they have conceived to be of use) shall be no longer an ingredient in our dispute. yet this is one reason, why 
* Job. 32.4, 6.7.  Mr. W. comes first into my consideration. Another reason is, because he publicly made me a second challenge from the Press, when I had in modesty and in mercy refused his first, as having been backward and unwilling to expose his age to inconvenience, (for which reason also I have been sparing to Mr. Cawdrey, notwithstanding his public and grand abuses) but finding he thought himself unanswerable in that he saw he was not answered, I strait concluded it a charity, to undeceive him. A third reason's, because he professeth in his Preface to his first book (which he hath boldly repeated in his second) that he 
* Ext. of Diu. Prov. is Praef. p.  goes higher, than other Divines of his party, in making God have an active hand in the actions of sinful men. How much higher than the most, the Reader shortly will see and wonder. Add to this, my having heard, that upon some weak Readers his book hath made some strong impressions. So that men of no skill, who are of narrow capacity, and very slow of apprehension, are not long to be trusted with that temptation. Again, I find that Mr. B. doth rely on Mr. W. as upon one of his 
* Corr. Corr. Ep. Ded. p. 8.  Majorites, to whose Protection and Patronage he chose to dedicate his former Book, (to wit his firstborn, the excellency of his strength) and whose gracious 
† Ibid.  assistance he then implored. Mr. W. answers to the call, owns himself for a Majorite, comes in to the rescue of Mr. B. (as Milo ran to set his shoulders as an equal prop to the falling house, which crushed him into Quiddini for his presumption) and 'tis but fit he should first be heeded, whom common Fame hath set uppermost in the thoughts of men.  
Next I proceed to Mr. B. his second part (as he calls it) because I was bound to it by promise, which I was loath not to perform. Then I antidote Mr. Hickman because he envenomed Mr. Barlee, and intermeddled in his affairs to such a desperate degree, that if he preacheth as he hath printed, his Disciples (of all others) have the greatest need of a preservative. I have often to do with Dr. Twisse, because they often translate his words, and once most solemnly they bring him to me with a defiance. Not to mention all particulars (with whom I have to do as occasion serves) I have many reflections on Mr. Hobbs, because he jumps so often with my Assailants, as if he had borrowed from their writings, or they from his. What I have more to premise I will dispatch in few words.  
If I seem too much enlarged in explaining some things, It is partly because I have to deal with such disputants, as cannot be confuted but by being first taught; and partly because it often happens, that their Master's confutatian doth stand in theirs.  
I do many times refer to what I have published already, as well to avoid prolixity, and vain repetitions, as to exempt my Reader from paying often for the very same matter in several volumes.  
I have reckoned with my Aggressers both separately and jointly. My two first Chapters and Introduction are chief addressed to Mr. W. My third to Mr. B. and Mr. H. My fourth to Dr. Twisse, Mr. W. and Mr. B.  
I have so disposed of the whole, as that all their concernments may be seen distinctly and apart. But yet so many were my occasions to show their differences and agreements, and their mutual collisions more especially, (the running of their heads against each other to the great endangering of their brains, which I verily believe will hardly ever leave aching, until they accept my way of cure, ch. 3. sect. 9) that Mr. B. is eminently concerned in all I say to Mr. W. and Mr. W. equally concerned in all I say to Mr. B. and Mr. Hickman commonly concerned in what I say to both the former, and their greatest Masters are concerned in what I say to all three.  
If I seem to have been pungent in laying open some sorer parts, I desire my Reader to look well upon the Case, to consider the duty of a Chirurgeon, and then to imagine (if he is able) how such Phagedaenous and eating sores can be taken away without being touched, and that with either the Lance, or Caustick. When an inveterate Ulcer hath been long skinned over, there is no way to cure it without searching it to the bottom: which though painful to the Patient, yet being in order to his ease, and (which is more) his safety too, he ought to be thankful to that diligent and impartial hand, which for some short time doth seem to hurt him. The ratio curandi cannot always be such, as I can always desire, and w●sh it might be; It must be such, as the malady requires, and calls for. But when my present Methods shall be found to have taken a good effect, so as the obstinate Tumour shall relent and suppurate, and finally cast forth its Core, together with the dregs of the peccant huzior, I shall gladly prepare another kind of composition, whose every line shall be a lentive.  
May the persons the most concerned consider well what is said in the following sheets, and The Lord give them understanding in all things. 
2 Tim. 2.7.    

The general Contents of the Introduction, showing the manifold Absurdities and Contradictions, which issue out from the Denial of God's eternal, respective or conditional Decrees.  
Sect. 1, 2. THe nearest way to end a Controversy, is to strike altogether at the Root of error. Sect. 3. The grand error touching Gods Decrees, and its numerous offspring, is rooted in the mistake of two things, The false conceits of Prescience and Praedetermination. Sect. 4, & 5. The speedy way to Conviction, made plain and open by a manifestation of three things. Sect. 6. The three things undertaken solemnly to be proved. Sect. 7. The same men affirm it to be both blasphemy, and truth, to say that God is the Author or Cause of sin, that he wills and works sin, etc. Sect. 8. Nothing but their Principles of God's Decrees can lead them to blasphemies of such a Nature. Instances briefly set down from Calvin, Zuinglius, Zanchy, Piscator, P. Martyr, Beza, Borrhaus, Triglandius, Dr. Twisse, Mr. Hobbs, Mr. Whitfield, and Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Hick. Sect. 9 How the violent streams of blasphemy may be quickly dried up in their several channels. Sect. 10. Mr. Whitfields' whole Fabric plucked up by the Foundation. His explication of what he means by conditional Decrees. His provision for a Flight from his whole undertaking. He is equally unfortunate whether he intended sense or nonsense. He is equally unhappy, whatever he means by the word Condition. Sect. 11. His first Argument compared with his Exposition of Conditional Decrees as he professeth to understand them. He is as unhappy in his best as in his worst meaning. His way of arguing in his best sense against Conditional Decrees, is as much against the Trinity of persons in the Godhead. He argues against his own Masters and Brethren, Beza, Wollebius, Dr. Reynolds. Directly against Saint Paul, and against the Eternity of God's foreknowledge. And in a flat contradiction to himself; also against Dr. Twisse, and even against the Tenet for which he argues. He is fain to make God's decrees to be Actus D●i ad iutra, against his own party who teach them to be ad extra. He makes God's Actions to be God himself (and so infers many Gods) even against his own Masters, Gomarus and Wollebius. Five blasphemous Absurdities which that absurdity doth infer. He makes God himself to be Reprobation itself. Sect. 12. An easy way to Mr. W's Reformation concisely opened and pointed at. To his pretended Arguments against Conditional Decrees are confronted two Arguments for conditional Decrees. The first is grounded on the Confession of all the contrary party, and according to the tenor of the seventeenth Article of the Church of England exhibited to us in the last clause of the Article. The second is grounded on another Confession of the contrary party in their definition of God's Decrees. Sect. 13. Mr. W's mistake of the thing in question represented in clearer and fairer colours.  

The general Contents of the several Chapters.  

Chap. I.  
Sect. 1. MAster W's fanciful Creation of three general Objections. The distrust he puts in his cause. His studied aiming beside the mark. He overthrows his own rampire. His second overthrow of himself and of his Absolute Decrees.  
Sect. 2. His third overthrow of himself by a most crimson contradiction. He enters on that which Mr. Calvin judged the worst part of Libertinism. His new contradiction about the manner of Gods working. His down right Libertinism. Libertines no Christian's. A Dilemma as a touch stone to try his meaning. The determination of man's will to wicked actions is not God's work. He inferreth God to be worse than the Author of sin. His meaning ferreted out of his words. His abuse of Scripture to serve his turn. He speaks worse of God then can be truly said of Satan. His ugly Doctrine of God spoken out by Mr. Barlee.  
Sect. 3. His third general Answer a mere majestic mistake.  
Sect. 4. He descends from Generals to Particulars, beginning with the charge of making God the Author of sin, and with a Tergiversation, and Imposition on the Scripture. He asperseth God with the decreeing of sin in the first attempt of his excuse. His memorable Answer to his own Objection. His meaning caught in a Dilemma. His foul use of the word Permission, and its odious impropriety represented in other colours. The common Poultice for a sore Doctrine.  
Sect. 5. He moulds a new Objection against himself, and grants what his Doctrine is charged with. His Answer consists in shifting the duty of a Respondent, and speaking quite another thing. He confounds the Permission of sin with sin, and tries to blot his Doctrine fair. His abuse of Saint Austin. He argues that God doth will sin perfectly, because he wills the permission of it. And fain would have Scripture to speak against God by speaking his activity in the production of sin. 1. From the selling of Joseph. 2. Pharaoh's obduration. 3. The Candanites hardening. 4. Absaloms' defiling his Father's Concubines. 5. Shimei's cursing David. 6, 7, 8. Three other Texts. 9 The Egyptians hatred of Israel. 10. God's being said to deceive the Prophet. 11. Giving up to vile affections. 12. Giving eyes not to see. 13. Sending delusion. 14. The Nations making league with the Romans. All which Scriptures are explained and vindicated from the frightful misapprehensions of this Mistaker.  
Sect. 6. Mr. W. most groundlessly infers God to sit still, and to be an idle Beholder, if he is not busy in the efficiency of sin.   

Chap. II.  
Sect. 1. OF the common Hebraisme by which such verbs are active in sound are only permissive in signification: by the admission of which Rule the foul Absurdities aforesaid would be avoided, and Scripture expounded 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Mr. W's. manifold unhappiness in rejecting that Rule. He makes contradictions in Scripture, and overthrows his own interest in other cases. He is convinced by that which he cannot but confess. His woeful shifts in expounding Scripture, and the mischiefs ensuing on it. His Masters contradict themselves by not observing the Hebraisme. Mr. W. makes light to be a sin, and incest to be no sin, by making a parity of Gods working in either case. He is beaten with his own weapons by any Atheist Dialogue-wise, condemned out of his own mouth. Scripture interprets Scripture against Mr. W.  
Sect. 2. His return to his first method of forging Objections to himself. He is at odds with Doctor Twisse. To make men sin is a a sin of the worst size, yet ascribed unto God by that sort of men.  
Sect. 3. The ease and ordinary perversion of the Scriptures. Mr. W. mistakes the errors for the persons of some Protestants, and confounds them with the Papists. His party clamour against themselves, and affront God with an Epitrope. Mr. W's. clamours against Protestant Divines. He jumps in so doing with the Jesuited Papists.  
Sect. 4. His foulest imputation cast upon the Scriptures. Saint Peter's caveat touching Paul's Epistles. The literal plalnness of some Scriptures doth make them difficult to some. A short direction to the means of remedy, or prevention, removing a stumbling-block out of the people's way.  
Sect. 5. Mr. W. either means, that God hath a hand in evil, because in good; or that the act of sin is not the sin; or that God is the proper cause and efficient of sin; and that he means the last is proved by a Dilemma. Humane learning a good foundation for a Divine.  
Sect. 6. Mr. W's. rare essays to separate the wickedness from the act of the wicked act.  
Sect. 7. His first essay is a bare Dictate, including eight gross absurdities: Of actions Natural and Unnatural. Of nature Corrupted and Uncorrupted. Mr. W. denies God's Omnipotence, and makes him the proper cause of sin.  
Sect. 8. His second essay is an Impertinence beyond example; or what is so much worse, as that it ought not to be named. He is forced to be pertinent, and his answer challenged.  
Sect. 9 His third essay is a continuance of his Tergiversation, and inferreth God the efficient of sin. Mr. W. vindicated from his abuses put upon himself. The probable causes of his chiefest aberrations. Five Expedients proposed to undeceive him.  
Sect. 10. His fourth essay makes the wickedest actions to be good, and from God.  
Sect. 11. His fifth essay doth betray him to a confession, that he maketh God the Author of sin. He mistakes a moral for a natural action, and is hampered in some Dilemmas. The method by which he is led into all his blasphemies.  
Sect. 12. Sin is inseparable from the sinful action, which Mr. W. seems to see by his Tergiversation. He makes an Accident the subject of Inhesion to an Accident. Confounds the act of differing with the passive power of being parted. Makes david's lying with Bathshebah no sin. And the sin of Adultery separable from itself.  
Sect. 13. He showeth his cause is desperate, by speaking purposely beside the purpose. He attempts the washing of wet from water, roundness from a Globe.  
Sect. 14. Mr. W. affirms that God doth will and work sin, and hath a hand in effecting it, and that sin makes for God's glory. Concludes sin to be good, or Gods working it as evil. Feigns God to work evil to a good end. Q. Whether he infers not God to be a sinner. His inconsistence with Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. and with himself. He frames not his propositions to the nature of God, but the nature of God to his propositions.  
Sect. 15, & 16. Mr. W's. great forgery in that little which he citys. His foul sense of God's determination that sin shall be done. His impious expression or Gods having a hand in sin, and the Importance of that phrase.  
Sect. 17. His gross error in the notion of God's permission. His tremendous notion of Alworking providence without exception of wickedness.  
Sect. 18. He puts himself afresh into his old straits betwixt gross blasphemy, and extraordinary impertinence. He affirms that God hath an active hand in the sins of Oppression, Rebellion, Murders, Treachery, Violence, and Wrong How the Great Turk proceeds on those maxims. He justifies the Ranters, by ascribing all our English changes to the hand of God. God is cleared from carelessness or weakness, with which he is charged by Mr. W.  
Sect. 19 God is cleared from willing and effecting what he hateth. A case put to show the danger of Mr. W's. Doctrine in order to practice.  
Sect. 20. Mr. W's. dangerous misapprehension of that figurative sentence, that God doth punish sin with sin. His making God the proper cause of the greatest sins: which he also extends to the very sin of the act, the pravity itself. He treads a step beyond Calvin worst.  
Sect. 21. The desperate nature of Mr. W's. Salvoes. And the hardness of his Emollients. His open profession that God's secret will is quite contrary to his revealed will in respect of the very same objects.   

Chap. III.  
Sect. 1. MAster B's. Confession of the Fact of which he pleads not guilty. His making God the Author of sin, and worse than so, in his endeavours to speak as warily as his principles will suffer him.  
Sect. 2. He contradicts his own and his Readers eyes without the possibility of gaining by it. His inconsistency with himself, with Mr. W. and Mr. Hick. He betrays himself many ways in his provision for an escape, making God (verbatim) the sovereign Author of sins both of omission and commission. Grants the whole charge, or understands not a moral act. His mixture of blasphemies with contradictions on the right and left hand.  
Sect. 3. He is ashamed to cite his own words truly. Proves himself conscious to himself of being left without excuse, in charging God with being a Tempter unto sin. Pretends a want of leisure to excuse or extenuate his blasphemy, yet baulks it at his greatest leisure. He accuseth God of that which is the worst quality of Satan. Flatly contradicts the Scripture. Commits the worst of contradictions as well as blasphemies.  
Sect. 4. He is enraged that his meaning should be measured by his words. Slanders ancient and modern, both Papists and Protestants. Saint Austin in particular. And implies it a sin for corn to grow.  
Sect. 5. His uncharitable reflection on his own Dr. Twisse. The Doctor's words cited.  
Sect. 6. Mr. B's. severity to himself, proving his falsehoods by self-contradictions. He unavoidably chargeth God with sin in himself; irrefragably proved from Heb. 6.18. He implies his blasphemies common to him with his party. He is convicted by Dr. Twisse of making God the Author of sin.  
Sect. 7. He makes no difference betwixt the act of Adultery, and Marriage, but equally makes God the Author of both: worse than the Encratitae.  
Sect. 8. The undeniable blasphemies which ensue upon the Doctrine of unconditional Praedestination. The great Disease of making God the Author of sin. The original Cause of the Disease. The Patient proved extremely sick of the Disease by his own acknowledgement of the Cause. Four short Arguments to confirm it.  
Sect. 9 The easy and infallible means of cure to all that are not resolved to continue sick. The nature of Knowledge opened, and distinguished from Decree. God's absolute Decree doth cause a necessity of event, but his foreknowledge doth not, nor possibly can it. The Absurdities which would follow if it were so. An Argument taken from the knowledge of what is past. The wide difference showed between a necessity of consequence, and a necessity of the consequent. 'Tis vain for the Adversaries to quit the first error, unless they quit the second also. D. Reynolds his concurrence with T. P. in this point, God's prescience doth not praesuppose a praedetermination. But rather praedetermination doth connotate prescience, if not praesuppose it. The cause of the error shown and removed. The Application to the present case, and a way opened to reconcilement.  
Sect. 10. Mr. B's. unavoidable consequential blasphemies, that God determined all wickedness before be could foreknow it. His ignorant use of the words, Futurition, Will, certain, Counsel. A threefold blasphemy, besides a self-contradiction.  
Sect. 11. His positive Doctrine of Gods ordaining sin both original and actual. Nonsense added to Blasphemy.  
Sect. 12. His self-contradiction in denying and also affirming that he maketh God the Author of sin. He is convicted by his own words, and the Assemblies, and Mr. W's. and Dr. Twisse, and Mr. Hobbs, which last is justified by Mr. W.  
Sect. 13. Mr. B's. 10000 curses upon himself and his Masters, with his confession of the blasphemy of which he was accused. The like confession of his owned Masters, together with their Commissions of the crime confessed.  
Sect. 14. His confession of faith touching God's commerce with sin. He professeth openly to believe, that God is the cause of sinfulness itself.  
Sect. 15. Concerning the efficient cause of sin. The state of the case from the beginning. Sin proved to have a true efficient cause, and by Mr. B's. confession, who also denies it. How his rail in lieu of answers do strike at S. James, but hit himself and his party, of Jam. 1.15.  
Sect. 16. Of the positive entity of sin, clearly proved.  
Sect. 17. Mr. B's. first Argument to prove the goodn'ss of sin, in which Mr. Hick. is equally concerned. The noisomeness of the Disease. The purging out of the peccant humour. Of metaphysical and moral bonity. The dangerous effects in Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. of being but Smatterers in Metaphysics. Dr. Twisse his foundation of irrespective decrees a thin Sophism. How a lie is verum, as much as si● bonum. Albertus Magnus his words explained, and Austin's vindicated from the impertinence of the Citation.  
Sect. 18. The most remarkable impiety of one Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. called by the name of a second Argument. Inferring the Godhead of sin on one hand, or its being God's creature on the other. Mr. H. miserably tossed by the two horns of his own Dilemma. A way opened to his rescue from his ineffable dangers. He is showed a medium betwixt God, and Gods Creatures, where he could see none. How Mr. H. and Mr. B. do infer Atheism itself to be the Creature of God, or God himself. Sins positive things, because inward habits. Man the Author of some positive things, and God of some privatives. Mr. H. confounds Negative and privative, as well as privative and privation. To harden our own hearts, and consent unto temptations are positive things. Our destruction from our selves a positive thing. Sin spoken of in Scripture as a positive thing. Mr. Hick. convinced by his own party. He will confess he hath blasphemed in case that sin is something positive, which is further proved many ways. The sad effects of forging God to be the maker of all things real without exception.  
Sect. 19 Mr. B's. first chip hewn out of Mr. H's. block. He foists into the Creed the word Real, and makes it supply the place of good. Provides a Creed for the Libertines, viz. that God is the maker of all sins, if sins are things real, (and things not real, implies a contradiction.) The different methods of our reasonings, and what comes of it. They ascribe the filthiest of positive Entities unto God. A●c convinced by the Assemblies confession of Faith. Are farther uncovered by being supposed to be catechised.  
Sect. 20. His second chip of the same block. Inconsistency with himself, and making all sinful actions to be wrought by God. His unsuccesful Reliance on the Jesuits.  
Sect. 21. His third chip more pitiful than the former.  
Sect. 22. His fourth chip the most lamentable of all. His arguing concludes him Pelagian, or Libertine. He is impertinent on purpose to make God the Author of sin.  
Sect. 23. By his fifth chip he denies God's Prescience of all wickedness, unless he also praedetermined it.  
Sect. 24. His impositions upon the Scripture. The Schoolmen. Aust●n. His new degree of Arminianism.  
Sect. 25. Mr. Hick's. Heathenish expression of sins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Sect. 26. Of Calvin's Doctrine, that God commands, yea compels the Devil and all that are wicked to Conceive & execure their evil dving.  
Sect. 27. Mr. B's. affected Tergiversation in his chiefest concernments. Of Zuinglius his Doctrine, that God is (in plain terms) the Author of sin. How Mr. B. holds the same, even in that which he confesseth to be the proper notion of the word Author. He accuseth Calvin in excusing him for saying that God doth will sin. And Piscator as well as Calvin, for saying that God doth thrust men into wickedness. He confesseth his Masters do some times teach a coaction from God to sin. He forgeth new Texts upon the Scripture.  
Sect. 28. He turns his back to the prime charge, and tacitly yields the whole cause.  
Sect. 29. Of Adam's inclination to sin before he sinned. The birth and growth of the very first sin, with the very wide difference betwixt the inclinations of the sensitive appetite, and the will.  
Sect. 30. The whole importance of the word Author. How the Adversaries say worse, then if they had only said verbatim, God is the Author of sin. Mr. Roll●cks strange Salvo.   

Chap. IU.  
Sect. 1. OF the signal fallacy swallowed first by Dr. Twisse, then by his followers. Mr, W's essay to cover it. The Fallacy shown in its deformity. The first cause of the whole mistake about the order of intentions and execution. That cause removed, and the fallacy left naked. Mr. W's. indirect course to excuse Dr. Twisse in contradiction to him. Dr. Twisse his error of Coordination in things subordinate.  
Sect. 2. Mr. W's. forgery of objections in other men's names.  
Sect. 3. Mr. W's. second part displayed, and Universal Redemption vindicated, as to the true intent and extent of Christ's death, from the feeble utmost of his attempts, in a subdivision of eight Paragraphs.  
Sect. 4. How the Presbyterians do nourish Socinianism in contracting Christ's death, and perverting Scripture. Daille, Camero, Am●rald, why they forsook their party abridging the benefit of Christ's death, Received rules for the interpreting of words, and ending controversies. The extreme absurdity of dutiful misbelief exploded by the Lord Primate. Mr. W's. reproach cast upon Christendom, and the Gospel of Christ. Europe, Asia, Africa, and America inferred by Mr. W. to be the least part of the world.  
Sect. 5. Universal Redemption proved from 2 Cor. 5.14. by S. Austin and Prosper, to the stopping of Mr. W's. and Mr. B's. mouths.  
Sect. 6. The conclusion, giving reasons why no more time is to be lost in this employment.     

AN INTRODUCTION To the three first Chapters Concerning the impious, and unexcusable, because blasphemous, and unavoidable, both Contradictions, and other Absurdities, which issue out from the Denial of God's eternal respective or conditional Decrees.  

SECT. 1.  

The nearest way to end a controversy is to strike altogether at the root of error.  When once an Error is grown fruitful, and hath run itself out into several Branches, it is commonly found (by sad experience) to grow the thicker for being lopped. There is not an Error in all Theology, which doth seem to have taken so deep a Root, or to have spread so sturdy Branches, or to have born so lewd a fruit, as that manyheaded Error, whose extirpation out of the Church ought so much the rather to be desired, because it hath shed such a fatal and deadly influence upon a multitude of Professors who have lately sat under its shade. Of those that have exercised themselves in so good a work, I may call it my Lot, and my Necessity, to have been one of the meanest. Faithfulness and Affection have been my chiefest qualifications; and I esteem it a privilege, as well as duty, to have done God service in any measure. But in every good Labourer, there is a skill and prudence, as well as industry and faithfulness, to be required. It is not enough to be doing and working, in a mere opposition to sloth and idleness; but by contrivance and forecast, to do a great deal of work in a little time.   

Sect. 2.  
I am not quite so sensible of that unquestionable Aphorism set down by Solomon, 
* Eccles. 12.12.  much study is a weariness to the flesh, as of the words going before it, in making many books there is no end. This I knew a long time since, but it is now that I consider it and lay it seriously to heart. And therefore now I determine to make an end of the Task imposed on me, not contenting myself with a bare Resistance, but proceeding to a Dispatch, of that Hydra-like Error of which I spoke. I will no longer amuse myself with striking off now and then a Head, which (besides that they are many) are very apt to be succeeded by many others growing up out of the very same Trunk; but rather compendiously endeavour to strike the Monster into the heart, which (besides that it is but one) is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first part that lives, and the last that dies in every creature.   

Sect. 3.  

The grand Error about God's Decrees and its numerous offspring is rooted in the mistake of two things.  The false conceit of God's prescience, and predetermination, makes up the error of irrespective and unconditional Decrees (I do not say of the most natural, but) of the most voluntary actions and effects; neither reward nor punishment, nor sin itself being excepted. This I take to be the heart, imparting life and activity to every member and limb of that body of error, whose most affectionate friends and abettors have conspired to find me my late employment. With this grand error, all the rest which grow from it must live and die. In this Mr. Whitfield hath put his chief trust. Upon this he hath been poreing (as his admirers have ●oasted) these thirty years. In his Apology for ●his, he hath publicly chosen to display his whole strength; as if by this he were desirous that every part of the controversy should be decided. I accept his challenge, and hearty thank him for the contrivance; He having given me an occasion of taking much a nearer way to my journey's end than I first intended.   

Sect. 4.  

The speedy way to conviction.  For if I prove out of his mouth, and out of the mouths of his predecessors, that what they publicly acknowledge to be blasphemously false, doth unavoidably follow from their espoused notion of God's Decrees; then can he not choose but acknowledge, that such a notion of God's Decrees must needs be dangerously false. He must confess that his book is an insufferable Libel against his Maker; and such, as against which he must publicly enter his protestation. Now that it is false and blasphemous, to say that God is the Author or cause of sin, both in those very terms, and in others as bad, and in many others much worse, is ever acknowledged by themselves in some parts of their Writings, (wherein forgetful of their Doctrines they consider nothing but duty) who yet in other parts of their own writings, (wherein forgetful of duty they reason only from their Doctrines) do most dogmatically deliver it for very great truth.   

Sect. 5.  

Made plain and open by a manifestation of three things.  In great affection to the most vulgar and less intelligent Readers (whose deliverance and liberty from the worst kind of thraldom I do especially aim at in what I publish) I will use the greatest plainness and perspicuity of speech, which by study and meditation I am able to contrive. Our whole Dispute will be concluded by a most cogent demonstration of these three things.  
First, that it is granted by the Adversaries themselves to be both false and blasphemous, to say that God is the Author or Cause of Sin.  
Secondly, 'tis affirmed by the very same Party to be neither false nor blasphemous, but a most necessary truth, to say that God is the Author or Cause of Sin.  
Thirdly, it cannot be denied by the aforesaid Party, that what they sometimes confess to be both false and blasphemous, they would not at other times affirm to be neither false nor blasphemous, but that they find it to be the natural and unavoidable issue flowing out from their Principles of God's Decrees.   

Sect. 6.  

The three things  I do solemnly take upon me, after mature deliberation, 
undertaken solemnly to be proved.  (and in a full comprehension of the several evidences and proofs) to make a cogent demonstration of those three things. A demonstration so cogent, that the most stomachful adversaries shall not be able to gainsay it, unless they will say, that they never say what they say, and that they have not printed what they have printed, or that the world lieth in darkness, so as we cannot read either their Latin, or their English, but only dream that we read what indeed we do not. Either they will, or they will not, proceed to those later degrees of madness. If they will, they will prove the liberty of their wills to speak against their own light, and against their own speakings, and against their testimonies of conscience, and against the witness of other men's eyes as well as of their own; and what is this, but to sin as with a Cart-rope, to turn Grace backward, to bid righteousness stand afar off, and to say, we will be stubborn in spite of evidence and conviction? Thus it is if they will proceed to the degrees of madness above specified. And if they will not (as sure they will not,) then in spite of themselves, and their own perverseness, they must fly by way of Refuge to these following confessions. First, That they have published self-contradictions beyond compare, affirming what they deny, and denying what they affirm, calling that by the name of blasphemy which they profess to think Orthodox, and asserting that for true Divinity (with one stroke of their pen) which (with another dash of the same pen) they call the Doctrine of Devils. Their Second Confession must be this, that being proved to have printed such contradictions in several parts of their Writings (as their occasions did require, or their necessities enforce them) they are obliged indispensably to declare their last thoughts, and to name that part of their contradiction to which they will finally adhere, and in adherence to which they will quit the contrary from this day forward; whether the affirmative, or the negative part of the contradiction; whether that which is for God, or that which is against him. If the later, they are declaredly Libertines and Ranters, and I shall wish for nothing more than the publick'st trial in the World to prove them such; there being nothing now wanting but a sufficient publication and notification of the thing, to effect its solemn 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or total Banishment out of the World. Thus it is if they adhere to the later part of their contradiction. And if they adhere unto the former, (which God of his mercy, and by his grace, may be pleased to work in them both to will, and to do,) I know not how they can escape an entire conversion unto the truth: or how obstinacy itself can slip its neck out of the collar, which the Sovereignty of Light hath sitted for it, and in a willing submission unto which the ghostly freedom of the obstinate doth chief stand.   


The same men affirm it to be both blasphemy and truth, to say that God is the Author or cause of sin.  Sect. 7.  
To prove the three things of which I spoke (in my last Paragraph but one) and to prove them so largely as I desire, is not the business of this place, but of my following Chapters, (of the second and third more especially) to which I now am but writing my Introduction. I will therefore say no more here, then what may serve to stay the appetite of any possible impatient and longing Reader.  
First, That the Adversaries do grant it to be both false and blasphemous, to say that God is the Author or cause of sin, 
Note the double concession of Mr. B. First, that his Masters do call it an excerable blasphemy, p. 129, etc. and yet they teach in other places, 1. That God is the Author of sin, 2. Wills Sin, 3. Impells to it, 4. Forceth men to it, p. 132, 133. where he labours to make it good.  I have abundantly proved in my Defence of God's purity chap. 4. Sect. 6. p. 30, 31. and shall farther do it in this following work, in particular chap. 3. sect. 13. & 27. Nor can they possibly eat their words, but at the peril of renouncing the whole stream of Church-Writers, both ancient and modern, of whom I have given a large specimen in my Divine Purity Def. ch. 4. sect. 5. p. 22, etc. to p. 29. And yet  
Secondly, That the same party do affirm it to be neither false nor blasphemous, but a most necessary truth, to say that God is the Author or cause of sin, I have more abundantly made apparent in Three distinct Tracts, viz. Correct Copy p. 9, 10, 50. especially Diu. Philanthropy defended ch. 3. sect. 34. p. 132. etc. to p. 139. & sect. 35. p. 141. and again Diu. Purity def. ch. 4. sect. 3. p. 19, 20. And I shall do it yet more effectually in the second and third Chapters of this following Work, in particular ch. 3. sect. 13. & 27. And therefore  
Thirdly, That they would not so frequently and affectionately contend for that very Doctrine, which sometimes (though very rarely) they confess to be false & blasphemous, but that they find it must follow from their espoused Principles of God's Decrees (so as they see they must relinquish either both, or neither, I have abundantly evinced in the Diu. Pur. def. ch. 4. sect. 7. p. 33, etc. to p. 39 especially from the citations out of Doctor Twisse, Du Moulin, Remigius, and the other friends of Gotteschalc, Bishop Cuthert Tunstal, and above all, out of Prosper, whom they many times dream to have been their Patron, and therefore cannot gainsay him without Discomfort. And again I shall evince it in several parts of the following work; and in particular ch. 3. sect. 8. & 10. Besides that the thing is so conspicuous of itself, that I may venture to make the Adversary the sole judge of the Business. For   


Nothing but their Principles of God's Decrees can lead them to blasphemies of such a nature.  Sect. 8.  
I demand of any man living, what should move such learned men as Huldericus Zuinglius, Doctor Twisse, Piscator, Zanchy, Triglandius, Beza, Calvin, Martyr, Borrhaus, and many others, to teach posterity in their printed works, [That God doth make men transgressors, 
For the several pages of their works, see the Diu. Philan. def. ch. 3. sect. 34. especially the Diu. Purity def. ch. 4. sect. 3. p. 19, 20. & sect. 6. p. 31, 32.  and is the Author of adultery, and that murder is the work of God, and that sinners do sin by the force of God's will; that God predestines men to sin, and to sin quatenus sin; that he is the Author of evil, not only of punishment, but of sin too; that he is the cause not only of humane actions, but of the very defects and privations; that he effecteth sins, that he exciteth, and tempteth, and 
* All the excuse Mr. B. makes for the saying that God doth compel men to sin, is that they use it but seldom. See what shall be said ch. 3. sect. 27. num. 5.  compelleth men to sin, and a world the like stuff; I say, what moved them to print such loathsome Doctrines? Was it that they esteemed them as flowers of Rhetoric, or witty sentences, or pretty conceits, or well-sounding periods, or soulsaving preachments, or Hosannas to the most High? This cannot be, no not so much as to be imagined.  
What invited Mr. Hobbs to say [That 
Mr. Hobbs of Liberty and Necessity, p. 23, 24.  sin may be necessarily caused in man by God's ordering all the world; that God doth will it and necessitate it, and 
* Id. in Animadvers. p. 11. & 107. & 106.  cause men to err, and is the principal Agent in the causing of all actions? (which he who saith doth also say, that he finds no difference betwixt the action and the sin of that action, from which great truth he should have inferred, that God cannot be the cause of sinful actions, not that he is the cause of sins.) What made the 
* p. 36, 37:  Comforter of believers to say, that God is the Author of sinfulness itself, and hath more hand in men's sinfulness than they themselves? Were these Writers afraid lest men should think too reverently of God, too hardly of the Devil, and too profanely of themselves? or were they moved with an itch to revive the Doctrine of Carneades, and to make men believe that sin is nothing but a name invented by ecclesiastics, and that the thing (called sin) is just as good as the thing called virtue, as being equally the work of God? 'tis very hard to think this. Or if this was one of their reasons, yet it was not certainly the first. But I have yet a harder Question.  
What should move Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Barlee, in the very books which they have printed on purpose to vindicate their Doctrine from all the horrible absurdities wherewith they stood charged, and wherein they knew it concerned them to speak as warily as they were able, as knowing that they were liable to be publicly called to an account, what (I say) should move them, at such a time▪ and in such a manner, to affirm that [God 
* For Mr. W's several pages where these things are taught, see the first and second chapters of the following work, especially the second; and in that for instance Sect. 14.  doth will and work sin; that he hath an efficiency in sin; that in all the wickedness in the world God hath a hand, a working hand, yea the chief hand; that sin doth make for God's glory; and that it hath a respect of good; and that God hath a hand in effecting it; yea that God doth act in it as a natural cause; that God decreed the sin of Adam, and so ordered the whole business that he should certainly fall; that it was necessary the first man should sin; that the Gospel doth stir up evil affections in the hearts of wicked men, and hardens men's hearts, and God intends it should do so, and sends it for this very purpose; that of sinful actions God is the Author and proper Cause; yea that he doth both will and work in the Sin of the Act, because not only the action simply considered, but the very Pravity and Deformity of it makes way for God's glory?] What moved Mr. Barlee to add his suffrage to Mr. Whitfield, and to say in plain terms, [That 
* For Mr. B's several pages where these things are taught, see the third whole chapter of the following work, and the Index of the Divine Philanthropy Def. which will direct to the rest.  God is the Sovereign Author of the material part of sin, which is the doing or leaving undone not only a natural, but moral act; such as David's lying with Bathshebah, or Cain's killing Abel, (as Doctor Twisse himself interprets the material part of sin) nay farther, that God is the cause of the very Obliquity of the Act of Sin; that God exciteth men to the act of adultery; that he stirreth them up to unjust acts, as a man puts spurs to a dull Jade; that he tempts men to sin; and a world the like blasphemies? Nay what made him and Mr. Hick. to tell the World, 
† See what shall be said ch. 3. Sect. 18.  that if sin is a positive Entity, either God is the Creator of sin, or else sin itself is God?] Did this prodigious pair of Writers think that these were acquaint Apophthegms which they were loath should die with them? or was it their purpose to strengthen the hands of evil-doers, and to tickle the ears of our English Libertines, who wear the new name of Ranters? or was their project the same with that of Mr. Hobbs? or did they mean by these things to administer comfort to believers, whether Fiduciaries, or Solifidians? were they fearful that Satan should be slandered, as the very first Fountain and source of sin? or that sinners should think too meanly of their sins, as if they had not a brave extraction? or are they inwardly haters of that very party which they are outwardly of? and have they taken this course to make them hateful to all besides? or do they really believe that these are the profitable and pithy truths, in which the Godly of the land ought to be throughly grounded? or are these the instances of their care and circumspection, in such a defence of their Doctrines, as might not give any distaste to pious minds? or do they think that these speeches concerning God are the most supple, and the most popular, that their Principles will bear, and so exhibited as Abstersions and Vindications of their Divinity? or do they count it a fine thing to contradict themselves solemnly and in Print, by saying that God is This and That, and then by saying they never say it? O me propè lassum juvate posteri! If none of these were their inducements, (as my charity forbids me to think they were) what other account can be rendered (even by such as would plead in favour of them) but that they teach such things through the necessity of their affairs? they are so naturally flowing from their conceit of God's prescience, and of his praedetermination (before his prescience) of all events without exception, and so of his absolute Decrees of reward and 
* Note, that absolute Reprobation must needs be confessed to be a very sore punishment, in whatsoever sense they please to take it.  punishment, without the consideration of their being in Christ by Faith, or out of Christ by infidelity, of their abiding in Christ by perseverance, or out of Christ by impenitence unto the end; That whilst they hold these Premises, they cannot possibly escape the black and terrible conclusion so lately mentioned. They must either part with their first Principles, or else they find (by many experiments) that the ugly inferences will follow, do what they can to the contrary. Having swallowed it for a Maxim, that God's prescience of all things doth presuppose his praedetermination (as Mr. B. tells us) and that he foreknew nothing but because he first had decreed it, (as Mr. Calvin) they find it necessary to infer, that God absolutely decreed and praedetermined all the wickedness in the World. Thus their Principles, rather than they, (or they by serving their Principles) have brought those monsters into the light. And if they sincerely do hate the sequels, they must bid farewell to the antecedent. For when it is affirmed, that two and two make five, it must be inferred, that five and but four, four being the product of two and two: which Downright Maccovius was so sensible of (who was as learned and as Zealous as any one of that Party) that he honestly confessed in the Synod at Dort, that if they did not maintain God's willing of sin, and his ordaining men to sin as sin, they must come over to the Remonstrants.   


How the violent streams of blasphemy may be quickly dried up in their several channels.  Sect. 9  
Now that all those black and noisome streams may no longer gush out of their pens, I find the most effectual and speedy course will be to dam up the Fountain, or Headspring of the effluxions. This is done on set purpose in the eighth and ninth Sections of the third Chapter of this Book. And there my Reader is to begin, if he will take my counsel; because he will there be entertained, not with the nature only, and cause, and malignity of the disease, but (if I am not much mistaken) with the proper method and means of cure too. For thus I reckon within myself, if God's foreknowledge of all events, and so (by consequence) of all the wickednesses in the world, be proved not to praesuppose his praedetermination of them, than it is proved in the same instant, that he did not absolutely decree the being of sin; but (on the contrary) that he conditionally decreed the permission of its being, which he foresaw would have a being by the sinner's determination of his own will to it, if he did not forcibly hinder the sinner's , which he eternally decreed he would not do. And in this is wrapped up another proof as undeniable, to wit, that all God's Decrees are not absolute or irrespective or unconditional, (as my adversaries presume to limit the power of the Almighty) but some of his deceees, namely those which respect the acts of voluntary agents, with the rewards or punishments which do ensue, must needs be respective and conditional, that is, secundùm praescientiam, according to his foreknowledge and eternal consideration, For whatsoever is found to be, in time, either the cause of man's punishment, or the condition required to his reward, that did God from eternity both foreknow and fore-consider; and according to that eternal foreknowledge and consideration of the temporal cause of the one, or condition requisite to the other, he did eternally decree both to punish and to reward.   


Mr. W's whole Fabric plucked up by the foundation.  Sect. 10.  
Whether Mr. Whitfield did understand this, or not, or whether he found it so clear a thing as not to be able to make a show of any colourable resistance, but by dissembling his understanding, and putting all his confidence in his affectation of a mistake, let his dearest friends judge by that which follows. For he lays the foundation of all his structure in these most signal and extraordinary lines:  

Arguments against Conditional Decrees.  
By Conditional Decrees we understand such as wherein the condition doth not only go before the execution, 
Mr. W's explication of what he understands by conditional Decrees.  or effecting of the things decreed, but before the Decree itself, before the eternal act of God's will, and that purpose within himself, whereby he hath determined that such or such things shall be, p. 2. lin. 21, 22, etc.   

His provision for a flight from h●s whole undertaking.  Num. 1. Observe (Good Reader) how sublimely his building is designed to rise, by him whose very basis is purposely laid within the clouds. He professeth to frame Arguments against conditional Decrees, not as I understand them, or any man living of my way; but as He and his Peers are Poetically pleased to understand them. And what is this but to make provision, that all his book may be no better than a vainglorious Tergiversation? boasting his strength, in running away from the general Title of his book? bravely threatening to dispute, yet poorly declining the thing in question? Durst he have writ against my Doctrine of Conditional Decrees (as it seems he dares against his own) he durst have cited my words, wherein my meaning might have appeared. Which why dared he not do, but because he found that my words were not liable to exception? He knew he was destitute of Arguments against Conditional Decrees, as I have always understood them; but as he understands them, he can order them at his pleasure. A goodly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and much good do't him with all his conquests, in that war which he wageth against himself.  

He is equally unfortunate whether he intended sense or nonsense.  2. But what are Mr. W's conditional Decrees, against which Mr. W. prepares to argue? he tells us [They are such, as wherein the condition doth go before the Decree itself.] Did he intent this for nonsense, or did he not? If he did, how mean and abject an opinion must he have had of his enterprise, who thought it not safe to speak sense for fear the people should understand him? if he did not, it seems he thought it good sense, to say, that the condition in the Decree was before the Decree itself wherein it was. Had he not embarked himself in a most desperate Adventure (as very shortly he will find) he would have told us that a Decree is therefore said to be conditional, because it is made with a condition annexed to it, or concomitant with it, or in a foresight of something, in respect of which it is decreed. For thence it is that the word conditional is commonly explained by the word respective, as absolute is (on the contrary) by irrespective. For example, God foreseeing or foreknowing that Adam and Cain would determine their wills to sin, (the one in eating, as the other in killing, what was forbidden) decreed to permit, and to punish both. In which case his Decree is called respective or conditional, because it was made in a prescience and praeconsideration, that they would both determine their wills to sin: which prescience was concomitant because coaeternal with his decree. Whereas according to Mr. W. God did absolutely decree that Adam should eat against precept, and that Cain should kill his brother. Which if he shall venture to deny, and say he holds (as I do) that God did only decree to permit them to sin, in a foreknowledge that they would freely and voluntarily do it, if not forcibly hindered from using the freedom of their wills; he will then be exactly of my opinion, and overthrow his whole fabric by subverting and even nulling his whole foundation. For to decree one thing in intuition of another, (and both from eternity, respecting their objects which shall be in time,) is to make a respective or conditional decree. Now because when God is said to decree and foreknow, he is implied eo ipso to decree something, and foreknow something, 'tis plain, the things now in time which were decreed and foreknown from all eternity, were some way present to the Almighty when he foreknew and decreed them, because the act implies the object about which it is conversant. And how can that which is merely temporal have been eternally present with the Almighty, but by its Idea or Exemplar in ment Dei? as the work of every rational and advised Agent is conceived by the Agent, before effected; the intelligible platform or conception is present with the workman, whilst the work itself or thing executed is yet but future. And here it is duly to be considered, that as the temporal thing which God eternally decreed was every whit as future when God decreed it, as any temporal thing which God foreknew when he eternally foreknew it; so his eternal foreknowledge was as eternal, as his eternal decree. Again it is duly to be considered, that as now in time, the sin doth go before the punishment, so from all eternity God foreknew this priority of the sin, and posteriority of the punishment. Nor could he possibly decree the second, until he had foreknown the first. Nay he must needs have decreed to punish sinners, according to his foreknowledge that they would sin; because whatsoever he did decree, he did knowingly, and wisely, and righteously decree, neither cruelly, nor by chance, or at a venture. So that God's foreknowledge was simultaneous with his decree, as having been coaeternal; neither was before the other in order of time (for that would imply a contradiction) although in order of nature his foreknowledge of sin did precede his Decree to punish sinners, and his foreknowledge that man would determine his will to sin, did precede his decree to permit that man's determination. Now I proceed to show more of Mr. W's unhappiness, into which he hath freely cast himself, either by not comprehending, or by dissembling his comprehension of these so plain and obvious things.  

3. He is equally unhappy whatever he means by the word Condition.  3. Forsooth he means such Decrees, by Conditional Decrees, whose condition goes before the Decree itself, as well as before the execution of the Decree.] Very well. But what does he mean by the condition? As being in act a temporal thing, or only in Idea, as being eternally in God's foreknowledge? If the first, than his meaning is wonderful, and never enough to be celebrated with admiration. For his project is but to prove, that temporal is not before eternal; and that that which comes after God's Decree at an infinite distance, could not possibly go before it. A very visible truth, but a most inexcusable Ignoratio Elenchi. If he shall say he means the second, he must also tell us his meaning of the word [before.] Does he mean a condition before in time, or before only in order? If the former, he implies a contradiction, by implying in eternity a priority of time: and when he saith that the condition is (understood by him to be) before the Decree itself, he implies another contradiction, by implying an eternal conditional Decree to have been a Decree, before conditional; for such it was, if the condition was in time before the Decree. But if he shall say he means the later, than he first of all infers that God is the Author of all the wickedness in the World, by his denying the possibility of such Decrees, (as in part hath been showed, and shall be showed in great plenty;) and secondly he ruins the utmost force of his first Argument, which therefore now shall be compared. For his next words are these;   

Sect. 11.  

Mr. W's first Argument to be compared with his exposition of conditional Decrees, is he understands them.  That such a Decree as this cannot agree with the excellent nature of God, if we consider him in regard either of his eternity, immutability, omnipotency, simplicity, or other perfections belonging to his nature, may thus appear;  
That which is absolutely eternal had nothing going before it, for it is absolutè primum: but all God's Decrees (being acts within himself, and therefore not really differing from himself) are absolutely eternal: therefore they can have no condition or consideration of any thing without himself going before them, p. 2. and 3.]  
Num. 1. Now his absurdities grow numerous, 
1. He is as unfortunate in his best, as in his worst meaning.  as well as gross: for either he here bewrayeth his former meaning to have been, of a priority of time in eternity it self, and so he is enwrapped in all the miseries so lately mentioned; or else he must say in his defence, that he only here means a priority of order, as I and others are wont to do. I am content to allow him the utmost favour that he can wish; I will suppose he means sense, and the very best that can be meant: yet as things go with him, I cannot choose but make him appear to be as unhappy in his best as in his worst meaning. And when I have done, he shall take his choice. For let him stick to what he will, and say he means what he can, or can be prompted by his Abettors to say he means, yet he hath so ordered the matter, that the measure of his calamities will be on every side equal. For admitting he here means a priority of order, from the impossibility of which in that which is absolutely eternal, he argues the impossibility of Conditional Decrees, we find him fallen without redress into these following absurdities.  

2. His way of arguing in his best sense against Conditional Decrees is as much against the Trinity of persons in the Godhead.  2. First his arguing is against the Trinity of the Godhead: for the Father is the first Person, the Son the second, the Holy Ghost the third and by a priority of order (though not of time) the first is before the second, as the second before the third. So that according to Mr. Whitfield, the second and third persons cannot be absolutely eternal; for whatsoever is so, is absolutè primum (saith Mr. W.) but the second and third persons are not both the first person; therefore (according to Mr. W.) they are not absolutely eternal. But by his favour the three persons are coaeternal, yet they differ in order, as the first from the second, and the second from the third; nay they differ also in their proprieties, and in their manner of working. The Father existing and working from himself, the Son from the Father, the Holy Ghost from both, as the Adversaries agree. But that which is of itself only, is before that which is of another, in some respect; therefore that which is eternal may have something going before it by a priority of order. Again, God's Essence is in order of nature before his attributes, and his attributes before his actions, yet God did act, and had attributes from all eternity. There must be Ens before Tale, and a subject before a predicate, especially in Conjugates, where the predicate is by way of adjunct; as when we say God is just, we imply his Being in the first word, and his attribute in the third. And as there must be men, before they can be happy, so God's decree that there shall be men, is (by one kind of priority) before his decree that they shall be happy. We intent the end before the means, God both at once; yet so, as that the one is in order of nature before the other. And this is confessed by Mr. W. p. 42. Arg. 3. viz. [That Divines do usually place an order in God's decrees wherein one thing goes before another.]  

3. He argues against his own M●st rs and Brethren.  3. Next his way of arguing is against his own Masters as well as brethren: 
* Calv. Lost. l. 3 c. 23. sect. 7. fol. 325.  for Mr. Calvin placeth God's Decree before his prescience, and so doth 
† Beza ad Rom. 11 4.  Beza; and Mr. Barlee saith, God's prescience praesupposeth his praedestination, c. 3. p. 13. Doctor Reynolds more truly thus, 
* D. Reyn. of the Passions, c. 42. p. 545.  The actions of our will were foreknown because our will would certainly execute them, though not without freedom and election. 
† Wolleb. in Theol. compen. l. 1. c. 3. p. 29.  Wollebius (more plainly than any other) affirms God's will to be considered as the efficient cause, and his Decree as the effect: and again he saith, 
* Id. ib. c. 4. p. 35.  that God's praedestination doth praesuppose his decree. So that according to Mr. W. all these are enemies to the absolute eternity of God's prescience, or of his praedestination; some placing his praedestination before his prescience, and some his decree before his praedestination, and some his will before his decree, even as the cause before the effect.  

4. He argues directly against S. Paul, as well as against the eternity of God's foreknowledge.  4. Again, his way of arguing is not only directly bend against the eternity of God's foreknowledge, as always supposed by himself to be after his decree, but more unhappily against the words of S. Paul, who in the very same period doth imply God's purpose and counsel, (and so his knowledge) to be in order of nature before his praedestination, Eph. 1.11. In whom (that is in Christ) we also have obtained an inheritance, being praedestinated [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] according to the purpose of him who worketh all things [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] according to the counsel of his will. Where his counsel is as the Rule by which he acts, which is in order of nature before his action, his action being according to the Rule of his counsel: from whence it is evident, that God did not first Decree, and then consult or consider, but both together, because both from eternity, yet so, as that his counsel or consultation was in order of nature before his Decree; he having wisely decreed, for this reason only, because he decreed according to his counsel; not by hap hazard, but according to his knowledge and consideration, that it would tend to his glory, without which it is evident he would never have decreed it. And therefore saith the same Apostle (2 Thess. 2.13.) God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation (he doth not say absolutely, but) through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the Truth: which God foreknew when he chose them. And according to foreknowledge they were chosen or elected, as S. Peter saith expressly 1 Pet. 1.2. as 'twere defining or explaining a conditional election. And S. Paul doth put foreknowledge before Praedestination, Rom. 8.29. which may fitly be compared with Rom. 11.2. and Act. 2.23.  

5. He argues in a fl●t contradiction to himself, and against Doctor Twisse.  5. His way of arguing is contradictory to himself, and to Doctor Twisse, with whom he joins in a confession, [That there is in God's Decrees prioritas Rationis (p. 6. Arg. 4.) and because (saith he) in order of nature the end goes before the means, and we can apprehend no other way, therefore that order is usually attributed unto God in his Decrees, that first he decrees the end, and then the means, p. 7. Doth M. W. here mean by Prioritas Rationis, one of the quinque modi priorum commonly known to all the World, or doth he not? If he doth, he should have told us which, and have confessed that his Argument p. 3. is against his own Doctrine p. 6. But if he doth not, then either he asserteth a sixth way of priority, which no man living can imagine, or else he speaks of a verbal priority, as opposed to real; and then his fetch is no deeper than this, that there is no priority in God's Decrees, except no priority: and because it is ugly to say there is none, except none, he therefore expresseth his meaning of none, by prioritas Ration is. Just as Wollebius and others do first affirm that God's 
* Decretum reverâ est ipsissima Dei voluntas: docendi tamen causâ, voluntas ut causa efficiens, Decretum verò ut effectum consideratur. Loco superiùs paulò cit. p. 29.  Decree is really his will, ipsissima voluntas, his very very very will; and then docendi gratiâ, considers his will as the efficient cause of his Decree, and his Decree as the effect of his will. This is still Mr. W's practice. To bring about his little ends, and to effect impossibilities, he considers God's Decrees as such in some places (as p. 6, 7, 42) which he professeth in other places to be impossible that they should be, (as p. 3, & 44.) And what is this but to acknowledge that they cannot procure for their Doctrines any colour of truth, but by grounding their Discourse upon the most declared falsehoods?  

6. He argues against the Tenent for which he argues.  6. His Argument is subversive of his own dear Tenent for which he argues: Because if God 
* Note, that Mr. W. proceeds to say (p. 3.) God could not foresee Faith, or any other grace in man, before man had any being in the World, as if he either denied all foresight in God, or understood not what foresight means. Again he saith, p. 42. that the foresight of sin cannot go before God's Decree.  foreknew nothing but because the first had foreordained it, (which is the saying of the whole party) his prescience then would be conditional of his Decree, and so there would be place for a cendition in eternity, which Mr. W. whilst he inserrs, endeavours to prove to be impossible. This is rare: impossible one way, and yet another way unavoidable. Again, when he saith, that God decreed to permit sin, he either means, that God decreed the permission only, in prescience of the sin; or that he decreed as well the sin, as the permission. If the later, he either means that the Decree was of the permission before the sin, or of the sin before the permission, Let him avow which he will, he must either avow a conditional Decree, or that his Doctrine is blasphemous, and that it is but his Parties salve, when they say that God decreed to permit men to sin, and mean his decreeing that men should sin.  

7. He is fain to make God's Decrees to be actus Dei ad intra, against his own party, who teach them to be ad extra.  7. His memorable Parenthesis [that God's Decrees are acts within himself, and therefore not really different from himself, p. 3. hath quite undone him many ways. For first, he means that God's Decrees are not only immanent, but also actus ad intra, as he saith in terminis p. 37. But this is lamentably false, his own Teachers being witness: for those are actus Dei ad intra, which relate to nothing without God; as his contemplation of himself, the generation of his Son, the procession of the Holy Ghost. But those are actus Dei ad extra, which are referred to any thing without the Godhead; such are God's Praedestination and Creation, which respect his creatures, whereof the former is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the later 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but both ad extra, for immanent and transient are the divisive members of actus or opera Dei ad Extra; as every Novitius in these controversies can well inform him. If he did not know the difference betwixt immanent and ad intra, or is a self-contradicter betwixt his p. 3. and p. 37. he alone is to answer for it. But this is the least of his absurdities; For  

8. He makes God's actions to be God himself against his own Masters and common sense.  8. The very thing which he affirms to be actus Dei ad intra, p. 37. and here an act within himself, he affirms to be no other than God himself. But that God himself should be an act of God, within God, is a strange conception. Let him consult his Master Wollebius, and he will say that God's Decree is an internal 
* Decretum Dei est interna voluniatis Divinae Actio p. 28.  action of the Divine will. Again let him ask his Master 
† Gomar. T. 3. Disp. 9 Thes. 29  Gomarus, and he will say that God's Decree is an action, and therefore not God, and therefore different from God: so inconsistent he is with such as gave him his Laws. But he is also inconsistent with common sense; For  

9 Five blasphemons absurdities which that absurdity doth infer.  9 If God's Decree is not really different from himself, and so really is himself, than 1. He depends upon himself as upon a free Agent, which was at liberty once to have decreed, or not decreed the redemption of the world, and by consequence at liberty to have been, or not to have been. 2. It would also follow, that God was the efficient cause of himself, because of his Decree, and so in order of nature before himself. 3. It would follow, that God could not choose but Decree, because he could not choose but be himself; and so that his Decree is falsely defined by all Divines of all Parties, except Mr. Hobbs and Mr. Whitfield. 4. It would follow, that the generation of God the Son would be God himself, as being actus Dei ad intra, whereas Decretum is but ad extra. 5. It would follow, that the Son might be said to have begot the Father, and the Father to have proceeded from the Son and the Holy Ghost, because the essence of God is equally common to each person in the Trinity. But these are things which are blasphemously absurd; therefore God's actions are not his essence, and therefore different from his essence, and by consequence from himself.  

10. He makes God himself to be Reprobation.  10. Mr. W. forgetting what he here saith, by that time he comes to p. 44. will have it there to be [Improper to say that God doth decree to reprobate, as if he should decree to decree; where as reprobation itself is the Decree, p. 44.] Were I not striving to put an end to my Introduction, I would examine whether he knew what is the English of decernere, and whether he pleads not for my notion of God's Decrees against his will. But I will only observe, how he first affirms God to be the same Being with his Decree, (p. 3.) and now his Decree to be Reprobation itself (p. 44.) so that according to Mr. W. God is Reprobation, and Reprobation is God.   

Sect. 12.  

An easy way to his Reformation concisely opened and pointed at.  That I may not seem to dwell in the very door, I will speak as concisely as I am able. 1. Mr. W. seems to have a prejudice against the coaeternity of God's consideration, according to which he did decree, because its object is temporal and without himself. As if the object of his Decree were not the same. 2. 
* Certè omnis voluntas est respectiva, sicut & scientia.  Doctor Twisse confesseth, (l. 2. p. 24. col. 2.) that the will of God, as well as knowledge, must needs be respective. And if of one object, why not of another? if in one kind, why not in another? 3. If he could, and did, nay could not but consider the sins of Angels, or of Men, whilst he decreed their Reprobation, what should move men to say, that he decreed their Reprobation without any consideration of their sins, which yet he could not but consider, as being wise and omniscient? If he did not foresee the fall of Adam, before he decreed to give his Son, yet this they will grant, that he did not decree to give his Son before he foresaw the fall of Adam; which is as much as I desire, if they will also grant that he had a respect to the fall of Adam, when he decreed to give his Son. 4. Again, let them grant, that causa exemplaris is before the efficient by any kind of priority, (such as is granted by themselves at other times) and even that will suffice to undeceive them. Of twenty Arguments which I could urge, and as it were build upon the ruins of Mr. W's whole Fabric, I shall lay down but two from the general confessions of the adverse Party.  
1. They do unanimously confess, that God's promise is conditional; and that his promise, though made in time, was decreed to be made from all Eternity; 
The first Argument for conditional Decrees grounded on the confession of all the contrary party, and according to the Tenor of the seventeenth Article of the Church of England, exhibited to us in the last clause of it.  and that it was decreed to be such as it is, a conditional promise. For, say they, (Mr. W. p. 37. and Mr. B. Correp. Corr. p. 86, 87.) God doth not only determine the thing itself that shall be done, but the manner how it shall be done.] Now if God's promise is conditional (as all acknowledge) God eternally decreed that he would make it (what it is) a conditional promise: which yet he could not do, but by considering the condition, as well as the promise to which it cleaves; for else he had not considered it as a conditional promise, nor could he be inconsiderate, in any thing, or circumstance, which he decreed: and a Decree of any thing in consideration of a condition, is exactly the thing I mean by a Conditional Decree. And what is thus argued from the promises of God which are conditional, may equally be argued from his conditional threats for his conditional Decree of Reprobation. Nor is there place for cavil in this plain Argument; for as the promise was decreed, so also was the condition; and as the condition was foreknown, so also was the promise. Again, as the promise was eternally in Idea or conception, so also was the condition. And as the condition is temporally in act or existence, so also is the promise. And hence plain Readers may see the mind of the seventeenth Article of the thirty nine.  

The second Argument for conditional Decrees from another confession of the contrary party in their definition of God's Decrees.  2. It is unanimously confessed by the adverse Party, (as a prime ingredient in its definition) that God 's Decree is an action of his Divine will depending on God as a free Agent. And by a consequence unavoidable, that God was free (from all eternity) to decree, or not to decree, to elect, or not to elect. For if he was not once free, how can he be said to have elected? And how unlikely are those men to thank God for their election, whose Principles do infer that he could not possibly have done otherwise? But to elect of necessity, or to choose without a freedom, implies a gross contradiction in adjecto. It will and must be therefore granted, that if God did decree any thing, he was free to decree it before he actually decreed; and if he chose or elected any one, he was free to elect before he actually elected. I say [Before] for this reason; because when he actually elected, he was not free to elect, and what he actually decreed, he was no longer free to decree. And the reason of my reason is most irrefragable, it being this, that what is done already cannot remain not yet done. That which is past, or present, cannot be future: and he who hath chosen, cannot still be to choose the numerical thing which he hath chosen. This implying another Contradiction. It will be granted then on all sides, that when God had determined his will ad hoc, it did not ad hoc remain undetermined. And because it was once completely free, or undetermined, 'tis plain that his Being and his Liberty were before his actual Decree: which being granted, there is nothing to hinder (by the very confession of the Adversary) but that his Decrees might be conditional.   

Sect. 13.  

Mr. W's mistake of the thing in Question represented in clearer and fairer colours.  But if Mr. W. and his Partisans will mean what they please by conditional Decrees, and then confute their capricious meanings, and entitle others to those overthrows, which (with pains and charges) they give themselves, I will leave them in their afflictions from this time forward. For what is to be done with such a Disputant, who undertaking to demonstrate that a man cannot possibly be an animal, shall begin his enterprise with this explication of his meaning?  
[By the word Animal, we understand such as wherein the animality doth bear the chief sway. And because of animals there are two sorts, (& vox 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be distinguished into its different significata) I mean that sort which is commonly called by Logicians Animal irrationale.  
That such an Animal as this cannot agree with the excellent nature of man, if we consider him in regard either of his risibility, or rationality, or other perfections belonging to his nature, may thus appear.]  
This is just the case of Mr. W. represented only in more visible, but fairer colours. It is a more important truth, that God's Decrees of election and reprobation are conditional, then that a man is an animal. And Mr. W. preparing to write against them, hath opened his meaning of the word conditional, as I have largely showed. How irresitible is the truth of conditional Decrees, which the Adversaries themselves cannot tell how to gainsay, until they have created themselves a subject, and called it ours? How deplorable are the endeavours of such opponents, whose chiefest refuge and strength is to mistake the very ground on which the Defendant is known to stand? Upon fairer terms than such as these, I will at any time undertake to make it appear to Mr. W. that two and two amount to ten, or that five and five put together do make but four. I am secure of the success whensoever it shall please him to show his strength, because I find the task is easier to prove that two and two are ten, then to prove that God's Decrees are all irrespective or unconditional: which though the chiefest of that Party have asserted as well as they have been able, yet have they done it in such a manner, as if they were afraid to have it believed. And this I hasten to make apparent in the following Chapters.    

CHAP. I. Concerning his Fanciful Creation of Three General Objections; and his Propounding in General in way of Answer, p. 19, 20.  

SECT. I.  
AS Mr. Whitfield found it his safest way, to s●end no less than eighteen ●ages, 
1. M. W 's distrust which he puts in his cause.  be●●des his Epistle to the Reader) upon a Subject of his own choice, before his courage would serve him to split himself u●on the Rocks, which he pretended to attempt in his valiant Title; so when he is brought to his proper Task (t●nquam Bos ad Ce●●ma) of answering such Objections as had been made against his Doctrines in the Divine philanthropy defended, he is fain to shrug three times together, before he is able to fall on.  
First he tells us, It is agreeable to right reason, that God being a most free, absolute, and omnipotent Agent, he might design the creatures that were of his own making to what ends himself pleased, without giving account to any, etc. (p. 19 Num. 1.) And this he calls his first General Answer, or thing propounded by way of Answer.  

2. His studied aiming beside the mark.  Secondly, But to whom, or to what, or upon what occasion, no man living can imagine, much less can he. Where dwells the man who ever dreamt of such an Objection against the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Sovereignty of God? not in any of their houses, who ascribe thus much to the Sapreme Civil Magistrate, that he is [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] unaccomptable upon earth, much more to the Omnipotent, that he is such even in Heaven. This general Objection was framed at Bugbruck, by that creator of Chimaeras who loves to fancy an Enemy, and then to fight him; when he cannot answer what is objected, he objects such things as he can answer. It is the cream of his strength, that he feels his own weakness, and therefore deals with a proportionable Objection. That which comes out of his Forge, he thinks is fit enough to pass between his Hammer and his Anvil. But then he ought to consider, that he should feign no more Objections than he can dissipate with his practice as well as with his Pen.  

3. Yet overthrows his own Rampire.  For Thirdly, If God was pleased that his Mercy should be over 
(a) Ps. 145.9. Ps. 103.8. Ps 145.8. Ps. 86.15.  all his works, and might do what he pleased, (as Mr. W. confesseth) why does he daringly exclude the greatest part of mankind from any imaginable share of that rich mercy? The least degree of God's mercy hath some of comfort: But is it a comfort to the Reprobates, that by a peremptory Decree they are rendered incapable of Heaven, and sure of Hell, without respect unto their sins, and yet inevitably sinful without repentance, that so they may not be damned for nothing? Why then do men, who are as worms, advance themselves against God, denying his 
(b) M. whitf. p. 2. l. antepen. penult. ult. & pag. seq.  1. Eternity. 2. Immutability, 3. Omnipotency, 4. Simplicity, and all his other perfections, because he was pleased to decree the end of his rational creatures, in an eternal consideration of the respective means? If God determined from eternity that Cain and Judas should be 
(c) Gen. 4.14, 16. Mat. 25.30. Act. 1.25.  cast out of his presence, in regard of their Murder and Impenitence, (and no otherwise) what is that to Mr. Whitfield? 
(d) Job 33.13.  Why dost thou strive against him, for he doth not give account of his matters? as Elihu pleaded for God in another case. The 
(a) Prov. 16. 4●  Lord hath made all things for himself, them that are good, for the day of good things, them that are (a) wicked, for the day of evil; yea in an eternal foreknowledge and consideration of their wickedness. If God was pleased to give his Son to be a ransom for all the World (upon their several performances of no impossible conditions) why should a Calvinist be offended, that all others are savable as well as he, whose bodies are 
(b) Job 33.6.  form of as good a clay, and whose 
(c) Eccl. 12.7.  souls can pretend to as high a pitch of extraction? why should the 
(d) Mat. 20.15.  Creatures eye be evil, because his God is exceeding good, and it seems much more, than Envy and Avarice can well endure? Let Mr. Wh. therefore cease from contriving Objections against himself; or if his Invention must needs be busy, let him conjure up no more than he is able to exorcise; nor 
(e) Wisd. 1.12.  pull disgraces upon his Doctrine, with the work of his hands. But withal let him be told, that as God was not bound to give account of his ways to any creature, (and as little to those of the Kirk, as to those of the Synagogue,) so when it pleased him (of his mercy and free love to Mankind) to reveal as much of them, as lies open to our eyes in his written Word, who dares call him to account for giving account of his Dispensations? if God is pleased in some Cases (and that as an instance of his freedom) to become 
(f) Isa. 5.3, 4, etc. Ezek. 18.  accountable to his creatures, and to become like 
(f) Heb. 4.15. Mat. 8.17.  one of us (sin alone being excepted) he is not to give an account to any.  

4. His second overthrow of himself, and of his absolute decrees.  Fourthly, What is added by Mr. W. That God might appoint his creatures to such ends as should make most for his glory, is very true, and very impertiment, and very much to the downfall of his Poetical Reprobation. For to decree men to punishment without respect unto their sins, makes not so much for God's glory, as to decree them to punishment in consideration of their sins: Unless Mr. Wh. is of opinion, that 'tis a more glorious thing to torment a creature as a creature, then to punish a sinner as being sinful; of that eternal Decrees are not every way answered by their Temporal executions. God created Mankind as he was mighty, but decreed to reprobate and elect as he was infinitely just. For Reprobation in all senses (negative, or positive) imports a very sore punishment, as every punishment imports a sin, for which the punishment is inflicted. That is most for God's glory, which is most for his justice and Mercy too: but to decree a man's misery, for the mere showing of a Sovereignty over the work of his hands, (and therefore to decree it without respect unto sin) hath nothing in it of Justice, much less of Mercy; and so is incompetible to ●im, who could not choose but be always (from all eternity) at once a Just and a Merciful Sovereign: it being destructive of his glory (and by consequence of his Being) that any one of his Attributes should (for an Article of time) exclude the other. From whence it follows that Mr. Wh. hath confuted all his own Doctrine in less than two lines. Nor can he be otherwise disintangled from his own dear 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Lime-twiggs, unless he can prove that God's dishonour doth make most for his glory: or unless he will add to his other miseries, that to be sinful by a Decree, or to be punished without sin (which by the way is a contradiction) tends nothing at all to God's dishonour. But for such things as these Ishall reckon with him hereafter: I hasten now to his Second General.   


His third overthrow of himself by a most crimson contradiction.  Sect. 2.  
His second Propounding (as he words it) in way of General Answer to no-body-knowes-what (nor doth he venture to tell us what) General Objection, doth very happily run thus; That which the Scripture plainly, clearly, and positively asserteth that God doth, we ought not to deny that he doth it, though we cannot discern the manner how he doth it: and p. 19 bear witness Reader, against anon; for when he comes to those Scriptures, which do plainly, clearly, and positively assert, that Christ hath died for all men, and tasted death for every man, and is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, and the like, than the Case is altered with him; and in a flat opposition to what he here tells us, It is (saith he) a very weak way of arguing, to argue from the signification of words; especially such words as have various significations; as all men, every man, the world, the whole world, and the rest, which are ofttimes used, not to signify every particular man and woman, but a part of them only, (p. 71, 72.) Well far the Disputant indeed, who will never lay down the Cudgels, so long as he is able to break his own shins with them; let his cause be never so bad, he will not fall from his principles, so long as self-contradiction can hold him up: rather than others of his kind shall be as saveable as He, the whole world must signify the smallest part of it; and we must not argue from the signification of words, we are not bound to adhere unto the letter, (p. 72.) So abominable and impious is Universal Redemption, that it cannot stand with God's wisdom (saith Mr. Whitfield) not be consistent with other Scriptures, nor can it agree with the Analogy of Faith, (p. 73.) Any way of exposition must be invented and embraced, rather than Christ must be admitted to have died for mankind. But here on the contrary side, when Mr. W. desires to prove, that God hath a hand in all sin, an efficiency in sin, that sin is God's work, and that God is actively the cause of sin, (and more such stuff, as shall be shown and cited in its proper place) this is such comfortable Doctrine to a man of his life and conversation, that all Texts of Scripture must be taken according to the Letter, whose outside and Letter doth sound this way: any thing must be swallowed against the Analogy of Faith, and against the plain tenor of all other Scriptures, rather than God must be exempted from the causality of sin. Mr. W. then must needs argue from the signification of words, which to do in other cases he calls a very great weakness, (p. 71.) This is the man of mettle, who cannot possibly be conquered, he is under the protection of so much frailty: or grant him conquered, he must not possibly be caught; for if he cannot out at the door, he will escape at the window. Yet I will follow him so far, as to lay some hold on him; and will not willingly let him go, until he shall promise a Recantation. For if in any one case, it may be pertinent in this to use the 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Greek proverb, That for a wicked man to prosper in making God the fountain and source of wickedness, will be apt to turn to God's discredit. The name of God will be 
† Rom. 2.24.  blasphemed among the Gentiles, if such Theology as this shall pass abroad amongst Christians without control. Observe how he goes on, p. 19  
2. It rather becomes us humbly to acknowledge our Ignorance 0688 0136 V 2 in the manner of Gods working, 
2. Mr. W. enters upon the worst part of Libertinism, as Mr. Calvin himself judged it. Contra Libert. c. 3.  then to deny any of his works, then to deny that he worketh all things, etc.— then to deny that he worketh most determinately, certainly, and infallibly, in the various and mutable motions of man's will. And to show his meaning to be no better than that of Beza, Piscator, and the rest of his Teachers, viz. that sinful works are some of 
* Zuingl. in Serm. de Prov. c. 5 & 6.  God's works, and that he 
† Beza advers. Castell. Aphor. 1. & 6. See The Divine Purity descended. p. 21. 30.  worketh all things, whether good or evil, without any the least exception, and that God doth determine the will of man to the most sinful Act which he committeth, he adds many things to make it evident that this indeed is the scope at which he here drives. For he tells us a little after, that when God is said in Scripture to harden men's hearts, to send them strong delusions, to bid Shimei curse David, to bid the evil spirit go and deceive Ahab, to turn the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people, to have given up the Gentiles to vile lusts, to put into the hearts of the ten Kings to give their power unto the beast, and the like, (p. 22.) we must not expound such Texts by the common Hebraism, but take them as literally as we do those other wherein God is said to make the earth, to form the light, to create man, and the like, (p. 23.) He also saith that God's permission of sin is not without action and operation, (p. 21.) that he must needs have some efficiency in it, (p. 24.) that he doth both will and work it, (p. 26.) that he hath a hand in effecting of it, (p. ●6.) And gaping so wide as he does, (nay wider than all this, as shall be showed in due time,) how can we fail to know his meaning by his gaping? Let us then contemplate the large Dimensions of his swallow, that at last we may demand what it is will stick with him.  

3. His now contradiction, about the manner of Gods working.  3. First, an huge Contradiction goes down very glibly; for as soon as his ignorance is acknowledged as to the manner of Gods working, (p. 19) he describes the manner of it, and sets it down as dogmatically, as if he had been an eye-witness, and of counsel to that secret and hidden will of God, which the men of his way are wont to oppose to his revealed one. He saith consentingly out of 
* Negari non potest, illum aliquo modo procurare negotium, cujus consilio & decreto genotium geritur. Piscat. ad Am. Collat. Vorst. sect. 17.  Piscator, (but blushed to put it into English) that God doth procure the business of sin] by whose counsel and decree the business is managed or carried on, (p. 21.) my more distinctly as to the manner, in another shred of Latin, which he calls a true Rule, but puts it not into English. The true English of it is this, That 
* Deus agit in peccato, non tanquam causa moralis, sed tanquam causa naturalis.  God doth act in sin, not as a moral, but as a natural cause, (p. 25.) that is to say, He doth not so act as to persuade only (which yet is bad enough of itself, and the worst that the Devil can arrive unto) but in such a natural way, as to necessitate the sinner; (which is infinitely worse than to persuade him.) Nor will it advantage him to say, that God decreeth, and procureth, and is the natural cause of the positive act of every sin, but the accidental cause only of the sin itself, (as He and Mr. Barlee shall be showed to say in plain terms.) For David's lying with Bathsheba was the positive act of Adultery, and sin itself, (but David's lying without Bathsheba was no sin at all, either in whole or in part) which if Mr. Wh. cannot deny, as I am sure he cannot, (and do challenge him to do if he thinks he may, or dares to do it) then must be confess it to be his Doctrine, that God was the natural cause of David's lying with Bathsheba, and that that positive act of Adultery was God's work, and his Creature; because of positive acts (he saith) that God is the proper efficient cause, (p. 24.) This lies on him unavoidably, unless he can separate the positive act of David's lying with Bathsheba, from David's sin of Adultery, which was his lying with Bathsheba, and nothing else: which I shall show he cannot do (if so gross a visible needs showing) when I discover how Mr. Hicks betrayed Mr. Barlee into a Blas● hemy (no less than sins being God, if a positive act) and how Mr. B. was even with him, by sending his Treachery to the Press. So much for Mr. W's. new self-contradiction.  

4. His downright Libertinism.  4. Next Mr. W. must be observed to speak the language of the Libertines 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to a syllable, as I lately intimated, but now shall openly express. Saint Paul having said, God worketh all things, (Eph. 1.10.) meaning all the Graces of the Holy Ghost, of which alone he there speaks (as Calvin himself confesseth,) the Libertines concluded (as 
* Efficit omnia, id est, omnia sine exceptions. Beza in locum. 

1. Facinus, puta Adulterium aut homicidium, est Dei Auto. is, Motoris. Impulsoris opus. Zuing. de Prov. c. 6.  
2. Deus videri potest causa, non modò humanarum actionum, verùm etiam D●fectuum atque Privationum quae ipsis inhaerent. Pet. Mart. in 1 Sam. c. 2.  
3. Deus efficit ea quae peccata sunt. Sturm. de Praedest. Thes. 16.  
4. Idem facit Deus, scilicet, procurat adulterium, maledicta, mendacia. Piscat. resp. ad Apolog. Birtii, p. 143.  
5. Omnes peccatores & flagitiosi, vi voluntatis Dei faciunt quicquid faciunt. Id. Resp. ad Tauffr. p. 65.  
6. Deus efficaciter agit seu efficit, & suâ efficacitate perag●t omnia, sine ullâ prorsus quantulâcunque exceptione. Beza contra castle. Aphorism. 1, 6, 7.    Beza did, and as Mr. W. now doth) that all their sins were Gods works. For that was their rule, which is now Mr. Whitfields', that what the Scripture both plainly and positively asserteth that God doth, we ought not to deny that he doth it, (p. 19) not admitting any Hebraisms, or other figures of speech, or restrictions and limitations of universal terms, but taking all by the Letter to serve their turn, as Mr. Wh. doth to serve his, (p. 23.) Hence are those ordinary Doctrines amongst the men of that batch: 1. That adultery or murder is the work of God the Author. 2. That God may seem to be the cause, not of humane actions only, but of the very defects and privations which cleave unto them. 3. That God effects those things which are sins. 4. That God procures adultery, curse, lyings, etc. 5. That all wicked men do all that they do by the force of Gods will. 6. That God efficaciously acteth or effecteth, and by his efficacity performeth all things without any the least exception. From which very saying, being pronounced by the Libertines, Mr. Calvin discovers two horrible, but unavoidable sequels. 1. That there is not any difference betwixt God and the Devil. 2. That God, by this Doctrine, is transmuted into the Devil. Calv. ad e●s. Libert. cap. 13. & 14.) Now when the Calvinists and the Libertines do teach the very same thing, why shall not I hate it in the Calvinists, as Calvin hated it in the Libertines? nay, why not more? since a Blasphemy is the worse (not one whit the better) for proceeding out of a learned and a leading man's mouth.  
— Tanto conspectius in se  
Crimen habet, quanto melior qui peccat habetur.  
Nor doth it move me that some Calvinists will take it ill at my hands (whilst others not rigid will take it well) for no doubt but the Libertines took it as ill of Mr. Calvin. The Treasure that I covet is not their Favour, but their Amendment. Let this precede, and that will follow unavoidably. I therefore ask Mr. Whitfield, 
* A Dilemma as a touchstone to try his meaning.  Is his meaning the same with Beza's and Peter Martyr's, and the rest in my margin, when he saith, we must not deny that God worketh all things, or is is not? If he say, Yes, he is a Libertine, and Mr. Calvin shall be my witness; and then let him renounce the Christian name and Religion, that the 
* Rom. 2.24.  Name of Christ be not blasphemed among the Gentiles. For we who are Christians do assert, that God worketh not all things without exception, good or bad, but all things only which are good, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, all things which become him. All the rest are the 
† 1 Joh. 3.8.  works of the Devil, and of his genuine Children, who are resolved to do their 
* Job. 8.41, 44.  Father's works. This was Christ's Doctrine, this was Saint john's, and Saint John (believe me) was a Christian. All Gods works are done in 
(a) Psal. 33.4.  Truth, therefore lies are none of his: and so 
* Piscat. loco paulo superius citato.  Piscator was out. The Lord is 
(b) Psal. 145.17.  holy in all his works, Adultery and Murder are therefore none of God's works: 
* Zuing. loc. jam citat.  Zuinglius therefore was deceived by his Doctrine of Decrees, and Mr. W. by Zuinglius. The Lord shall 
(c) Psal. 104.31.  rejoice in his works, but hath 
(d) Psal. 5.4.  no pleasure in wickedness: therefore Martin Borrhaus spoke very madly, when he dared to say that 
* Borrhaus in Exod. cap. 4. p. 448.  sins do please God; and Mr. Wh. more madly, when he saith that God doth will sin with a perfect will. p. 22. We see what must follow if Mr. W. shall answer, yes, to my Dilemma. But if his answer shall be, No, than he must burn his own Books, and all those Books from whence he made up his Cento, and publicly subscribe to the truth of mine. If he shall say his meaning is (p. 22.) that Gods will, of which he speaks, is only objected on the wise permission or patiented suffering of all sins, and not upon the sins themselves, why then did he entitle his book against me, and not against Mr. Barlee, or against his unconverted self? He and I will shake hands, if he will say he meant thus, and not as Doctor Twisse, who 
* See the place cited Correct Copy, p. 10.  saith, that the will of God doth pass, not only into the permission of the sin, but into the sin itself which is permitted. Utrum horum mavelit, accipiat: Let him now take his choice, and speaking distinctly to my Dilemma, let the world know what he is for, without any Tricks or Tergiversations. But I will tell him for his security, that he were better be tried by the waters of jealousy, if his meaning shall be found in the former part of the Dilemma; by how much a lesser evil it is, for 
* Num. 5.21.  the thigh to rot and the belly to swell, then for a man but to mean (or say in his 
† Psal. 14.1.  heart) that adultery and murder are the works of God. And therefore timely let me advise him to use the 
* Num. 19.13.  waters of separation, that the uncleanness of such Doctrines may not be on him.  

5. The Determination of man's will to wicked actions is not God's work.  5. In the next place let us consider what he means by those words, God worketh most determinately, certainly, and infallibly in the various and mutable motions of man's will. I do but passingly take notice of his unscholar-like use of the word Infallible, as if he knew not its meaning, or did not consider its Derivation (the fault is too small to be observed in a Writer of his breadth and thickness) I will rather try him by another Dilemma. Doth he mean that God doth so work on the wills of men, as to determine them of necessity to all their objects and actions, both good and evil? or doth he not mean this, but rather grant that man's will doth determine itself? If the later, all is well; he hath no more to do next, but to abandon his 
* Especially Mr. Barlee, and his brother Hickman, who say, that whatsoever positive thing is not from God is God. c. 3. p. 112. The apex of Blasphemy, as shall be showed hereafter.  party, and burn his books: whereas if the former is his meaning, (as hitherto it hath been) I know not what to do for him, to lighten the weight of his calamities, which will press him down deeply, do what I can: For first he implies a contradiction, as I demonstrated to a person of greater worth. And therefore here I repeat it not, but refer him to the 
* See The Divine Purity defended. ch. 8. sect. 2. p. 80, 81, 82. & sect. 5. p. 86, 87.  place where he cannot fail of it. Next it inferreth avoidable, that God is the natural cause of all the wickedness in the world. For example, suppose a wicked man hath conceived Adultery in his mind, or committed it in his Heart (as our 
† Mat. 5.28.  Saviour speaks.) If God did predetermin that wicked man to that physical Act of Concupiscence, and the will of that man to a consent, as well as the appetite to a complacency, he was not only the cause, but the sole cause of the Adultery. Nay farther yet, if the inward intention of the end is the determination of the will to the first act of sin (as the subtlest of them do say,) and if that Inten●ion, or whatever else is the Determination of the will, and the Determination itself, is a positive act (which none can deny,) and if God is the Creator or Maker, or proper cause, of whatsoever thing is positive (as these precious ones do affirm;) He is not only concluded the sole cause of the Adultery in his Creature, [Verum etiam id ipsum quod dicere nolo] but also that which is worse, and ineffably blasphemous. And here I ask Mr. Wh. was that adulterous thought or intention so determined to its object, in that respect evil, or was it not? If in that respect evil, he accuseth God; if not evil in that respect, he acquitteth the wicked man; and unavoidably inferreth, that there was never any Adulterer, Murderer, or the like, but was carried to the doing of all his wickedness with a good intention, a good desire, a very good determination of his will. And reason good too; For the Determination of man's will (they say) is God's work, or God's share in the procurement and accomplishment of sins. And God's part in the business they say is good. But then they leave man no share at all in his impieties: if they do, let them name it, which they never yet did. Indeed they talk in the general, [that God is the 
* Note this distinction which Mr. Barlee makes ch. 3. p. 55.  natural cause of the mere Act of sin, and a mere Accidental Cause of the obliquity of the act of sin.] But bid them instance in some particular, than they see that they are blind, and quickly speak themselves speechless. When a man hates God, or 
† Levi●. 24.15.  curseth God, or any otherwise blasphemes against him, let Mr. Wh. or Mr. B. or Mr. Hick. be asked, which is the act of that sin? and which is the obliquity of the act of that sin? you shall have them as mute as three dead Fishes. If the cursing of God is a whole sin, it is an act of sin, or an obliquity of an Act, or both together, and that either separably or inseparably: If only an act, where is the obliquity? if only an obliquity of an act, where is the act itself? (for all the whole sin is the cursing of God, nor more, nor less) if both together, and separably, let them make that separation in words, or dumb signs, that we may hear, and conceive it. But if both are inseparably together, let them confess the thousand blasphemies, and the six hundred contradictions, which have and may be detected in all their Doctrines and Distinctions; and after confession, let them amend too; I ask no more.  

6. His meaning ferreted out of his words.  6. It may from hence be collected, what is meant by Mr. W. when he immediately addeth, [that God worketh most holily in those very Actions wherein man works unrighteously, p. 19] Even the same with 
† See Correct Copy, p. 10.  Zuinglius (abetted also by 
* Twiss. Vind. Gra. l. 2. part. 1. p. 36, 37.  Dr. Twisse) that the very same sin, viz. Adultery or Murder, as it is the work of God the Author, Mover, and Impeller, it is not a crime, but as it is of man, it is a great one; which is only to say, that sin is God's work, but God is no sinner. He is the Author of sin in others, but sins not himself. He co-operates with the sinner to the effecting of his sin, but being God he is not guilty. That this must be the meaning of Mr. W. I can demonstrate by many Arguments. 1. By his denying Scientia media (though I am not sure he understands it) and holding with Mr. Calvin, that God foresaw nothing, but because he fore-ordained it. 2. By his 
* Note that in his Epistle to the Reader he argues the later from the former with a [must.]  concession, that there is the same reason of the fore sight of sin and the Decree of Reprobation, with the foresight of Faith, and the Decree of Election. But 'tis the Doctrine of him, and all his party, that Faith is the proper effect of Election, and not foreseen until decreed. Upon the very same ground (to use his own words in my violentum) he doth and must hold, that God did not foresee sin, until he had decreed it too. Nor will it lessen the absurdity, to say that God decreed to permit sin only, unless by permission he means a sufferance, or a wise not hindering: if so, he is right, but then he must burn Doctor Twisse his books, and retract his own: it being their constant doctrine, That God's permission of sin is efficacious. Nay no 
* Twiss. Vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1 p. 142, 143, etc.  less efficacious is God's decree in the permission of evil, than in the production of good: so very sore are their very salvoes. Thirdly, His meaning may be evinced, (as by all other passages of his book, which I have, and shall cite, so) by comparing his present words with the nature of sin itself, which is found to consist in such an indivisible point, that to say, God works in it, is to say as much as that he works it. As for example, To hate God is a sin, or a sinful action (two expressions for one thing). The very sinfulness of the sin doth entirely consist in the hating of God; not in God without hating, (for he is purity itself) not in hating without God as the object of it (for hatred in itself is a thing indifferent, and as apt to be good as evil, and even communicable to God, who hateth sin with a perfect hatred) but in the union and application of that act to that object. As the nature of man consists not in a body one●y, nor only in a soul, but in the union of the one with the other; so that the sinfulness of that sin of hating God, is nothing else but the union of that act with that object. And that is punctum indivisibile: for sin itself is a Physical abstract at the 
* Note that there is no such thing as pecceit● in any Profane, or Sacred Writer.  grossest, of which sinfulness at least is an abstract Metaphysical; which admitting not any Composition, cannot farther be abstracted so much as in imagination. How then can God work in the hating of God, and that no less than as a natural cause, (for so he doth, saith Mr. W. p. 25.) without being the cause of the sin itself, when in the hating of God there is nothing but sin? Here I exact of Mr. W. to tell the World what he means, or to satisfy for his words, of which he dares not tell the meaning. But again 4. He gives us notice of his true meaning (if not of the meaning which he will own) by three Texts of Scripture, which he applies to the purpose of which I spoke: for thus run his words;  

7. His abuse of Scripture to serve his turn.  7. How else can it be said when joseph's brethren sold him into Egypt out of envy, that God sent a man before? etc. And when David numbered the people, it is said not only that Satan stood up against Israel, and provoked David to number the people, 1 Chron. 21.1. but that the Lord moved David against them, in that he said, go number Israel, 2 Sam. 24.1. By these he seeks to make it credible, that God doth work in the wickedest actions as a natural cause, although these Texts do prove the contrary. To the first and most impertinent of the two allegations, I have f●oken so 
* In the Divine purity defended, ch. 7. Sect. 6. p. 63, 64, 65.  largely to Doctor Reynolds, that Mr. W. must fetch his answer thence. To the second, consisting of two contradictory Texts (as to the letter) I make an ease return, by showing the literal inconsistence of the one with the other, unless the first may be allowed to explain the second. For when the very same thing is said to be done by God, and by Satan, either one of the two must needs be figuratively spoken, or else there will be [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] irreconcileables in Scripture, not only [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] the bare appearances of Discord: else farewell to Torniellus, and all other Writers in that kind, who reconcile the Scriptures which seem to differ and contradict. First I take it for granted, that the word of God is not chargeable with any self-contradictions; That the very same action cannot at once be good and evil, Divine and Devilish; That God and Satan cannot do the same works. From whence it followeth of necessity, that when God is said to 
* Activum pro Passivo, ut saepè, inquit Grotius in locum.  move David to number the people (2 Sam. 24.1.) the meaning must be, He * permitted Satan to move David. For so the Scripture explains itself afterwards (1 Chron. 21.1.) by saying that Satan provoked David to that deed. Another example will make it plainer. It is said of the Devil (the God of this world) that he hath blinded the minds of unbelievers, lest the light of the Gospel should shine unto them (2 Cor. 4.4.) Again it is said of our God who cannot endure the least sin, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their hearts, that they should not see with their eyes, etc. (Joh. 12.40.) where because the two senses of those two Texts cannot possibly be the same, the former must needs be active, and the later only permissive. It is to be seriously considered, whether any such men can be fit for the Ministry, to be entrusted with the Key of Knowledge, to be Stewards of the Mysteries of the living God, who are not able to distinguish betwixt those Scriptures which differ most; but help the people to confound the works of God, and of the Devil. I confess my indignation is very great at this instant, whilst I observe M. W. (in a book 
* So he professeth in his Epistle to the Reader, p. 2, & 3.  intended for the unlearned) to present the letter of such Texts without the least explication, nay opposite Texts without the least offer of reconcilement, nay teaching that God hath an 
† P. 24.  efficiency in sin, and 
* P. 19  worketh in the worst actions as a natural cause, and 
* 25. He speaks worse of God then can be truly said of Satan.  determines the wills of men to every event; whereas the Devil himself cannot contribute so much to sin, by the utmost force of his Temptations: He can but persuade, and incline, as a moral agent, which cannot necessitate to wickedness, as the natural doth. And if his parishioners, or others as void of learning, shall ask him the manner of God's working and efficiency in sin (that they may know how it differs from the Devil's manner of working in the very same sin, and from the manner of working in which the sinner himself worketh) behold his answer is only this, [It beseems us humbly to acknowledge our ignorance in apprehending the manner of his working (p. 19) and again, we be not able to apprehend his secret and wonderful manner of working in evil actions, p. 23. lin. ult.] How then, Good Sir, saith the amazed Catechumenist? what shall we do in this Case, when our light is darkness? where shall we seek knowledge, when our Priests lips cannot preserve it? Mr. W's answer is at hand, 
* P. 24. lin. 3, 4.  Though he doth it miro & ineffabili modo, as Austin speaks, yet we are not to deny the doing of it. But first the people are abused with Augustine's name, who never said any such thing; His 
† P. 20. lin. 1. Enchirid. ad Laurent. c. 100  words are quite contrary: id non fit, that is not done beside the will of God, which is done against it. Mark Reader, He doth not say, what God doth, but what is done against God's will by God's permission, which is not beside his will to permit it. Next suppose Austin had said any such thing, had not that been one of his many Errors? But thirdly, 'Tis well Mr. W. will yield any authority to Augustine's Enchiridion, which is perfectly 
* August. Enchir. c. 98.  destructive to Mr. W's Doctrine. Well, Mr. W. declares his ignorance to the unlearned Quaerist, touching the manner of God's working and efficiency in sin, as a natural cause (which being precisely his own expressions, do put us in mind of his contradiction, whilst he confidently defines in some places, what he professeth not to know in others, as being wonderful and ineffable.) Make but room for Mr. Barlee, and he will help his Fellow-labourer to make it out with a wet finger. [
* Mr. B's Neces. vin. ch. 3. p. 12.  He that cannot or will not tell how God may be said to excite men to the Act of Adultery, which to the Adulterer so excited is sin, ☞ though not to God, neither will he tell how God without sin doth stir up men to the act of lying with their lawful Wives; 
† ad utrumque ejusdem generis excitatio & concursus. Idabid.  for the excitation and concurrence to both is of the same kind.] Observe the growth of this Student since his Correp. Correction. He there expressed his Divinity of God stirring up men to sin, by his putting spurs to a dull Jade. Now he tells us [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] in downright terms, that God hath the same concurrence to the most unlawful, and the most lawful actions. S. Paul no sooner said, Marriage is honourable, but immediately added, and the bed undefiled, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, immaculate, pure, and spotless: but Adultery is Rebellion against the Monarch of all the world. And yet he stirs up the wicked to the unclean Act of Rebellion against Himself by the same incitation (saith Mr. B.) whereby he excites his loyallest subject to the most blameless thing that can be named; not only not forbidden, but commanded by God for propagation; whereas Adultery is an Act which God forbids by his law, and from which he restrains by his Grace, dissuades by his Spirit, and which his children cannot commit, but by resisting his Grace, and by grieving his holy Spirit, by whom alone we are sealed unto the day of Redemption. But M. B. may say, that I now torment him before his time. I therefore return to his majorite, whose third general Answer doth now ensue.   

Sect. 3.  
Mr. Whitfield saith, 
Mr. W's third General Answer a m●er Majestic mistake.  [that the sum of what Mr. P. or any of his Predecessors in this controversy about God's absolute Decree hath objected against it, is included in that which the Apostle objects against himself, speaking of his subject, Rom. 9.14. Is God unjust? and, who hath resisted his will? which he answers with an Absit, & quis tu es?— And if we should give no other answer but this, it might suffice, p. 20.] What will not some be bold to say, rather than want wherewith to gainsay? First he forgeth a certain Tale, and gives it the Name of a Third general Answer. If he had called it a Whirligig, his impropriety had been less; for the Question there is the contrary to what it is here. There it was of God free mercy, which well might be without man's merit: Here it is of his wrath, which cannot be without our demerit. No less are the wander of Mr. W. But Secondly, Where was he told, that this is the sum of whatsoever hath been objected against his mythical Decree? He neither names his Author, nor gives his Reason, nay speaks precisely against his knowledge, and crudely dictates (stilo satis praetoriano) This is the sum. I answer with more Truth, but much less Majesty, that this indeed is the sum of all their subterfuges and salvoes, Quis tu es? Who art thou, O man, who objectest against God, that he hath not an efficiency and hand in sin? This was the very last plank which Mr. Hobbs was fain to betake himself unto, when he found himself shipwreckt by the most learned Bishop Bramhall, in his book of Liberty and Necessity, p. 20. The shift is common to the Libertines and Ranters, with Mr. Hobbs, and Mr. W. and Mr. B. etc. This is the ablest of their Answers, when nothing else will do the work, to say that God would have it so because he would, and however contrary to his word, yet 'tis a part of his secret will, (revealed only to that Tribe) at which the rest of mankind must content themselves with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and must hold themselves confuted with the [Quis tu es] of the Presbyterians. Thirdly, It is his other absolute leisure, to say that Saint Paul did speak of this subject, Rom. 9.14. It is enough to say No, and that 'tis senseless to imagine it. But I will tell him farther, that 
* Non fuit levis offensio, quòd tam pauci Judaei credierunt.— Nomen populi Dei objiciebatur Apostolo.— Haec est (meo judicio) occasio harum disputationum. Melanchth. in Praef. ad cap 9 ad Rom.  Saint Paul is there disputing against the male-contented Jew's, who were very much offended that the Gentiles should be received, and the Jews rejected (the greatest part of them) who hitherto were well known to be Gods peculiar and chosen people. This (saith Melanchthon) was the occasion of that which follows. And 
* Non aliud vult Paulus, Rom. 9 ●0, 11. quàm docere, Gratiam universalem esse; contra Judaeos, qui culpâ suâ exciderunt Grat●â, etc. H●mming. Praef. in Exposit. Epist. ad R●m. See Doctor Ham. Annot. upon that Chapter.  Hemmingius thus, That S. Paul intented nothing else (v. 10, 11.) but to teach that Grace was universal, and extended also to the Gentiles: This was contrary to the Doctrine which was then espoused by the Jews, as now it is by the Consistorians. Were this a place and a time to argue from the genuine and demonstrable sense of that Chapter (which of itself would make a Volume) there could nothing prove more destructive to Mr. W's Doctrines, than that one Chapter; and that not only according to S. Paul's sense, but even according to the senselesness which the 
* 2 Pet. 3.16.  unlearned and the unstable are want to wrest from that Scripture. Fourthly, The Quis tu es may fit my mouth a great deal better than Mr. W's. If God was pleased to punish none in his eternal Decree without respect unto their sins, and to 
† Tit. 2.14.  give himself a ransom for all mankind, Quis tu es, Who art thou O man that repliest against God? shall the thing form say to him that form it, why hast thou made me thus? Why was I not decreed and necessitated to bliss from all eternity? why have I not grace irresistible? why shouldst thou leave it in my power to be unhappy? why should any kind of wickedness be able to put me into a state of damnation? or why should all men be capable of escaping Hell, as well as I and my party? what have moral honest men to do with heaven? why were they not rejected before they were? The Puritanical Jews were apt to mutter to this effect, but let not Christians be so irrational. This were answer sufficient to all the ill-natured murmur of carnal men. But for the good of the vulgar (for some of whom Mr. Wh. may be too hard) I will apply my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the particular dangers now spread before them.   

Sect. 4.  
Mr. W. saith truly, 
He descends from Generals to Particulars, and gins with the charge of making God the Author of sin.  [that the first and principal objection against the Doctrine of absolute Decrees, is, that it makes God to be the Author of sin, p. 20.] But doth he say how we prove it? No, he durst not do that; How then should he have answered? He therefore proves it his own way, taking on him the person of T. P. or the like; but does not so much as pretend to have read the objection which he proposeth to be answered. And to one who speaks less than nothing it is not fit to speak much, although it is hard to abstain from speaking. The last part of his objection is somewhat honestly framed, [if God decrees the Being of sin, than he is the Author of it] Let us observe how he answers it, for in that we shall shortly find a very great jest.  
First he saith what was never denied I think by any, 
I. He gins with a Tergiversation, and imposition on the Scripture.  that God doth permit sin, and hath decreed to permit it. But then he adds (what is most false, unless it be carefully explained) [The Scripture is plain, that God decrees those actions, which when men do, they do very sinfully, (p. 20.)] 1. He here adds to the word of God: there's no such Scripture. 2. He slides from what he said of God decreeing to permit, and (without any transition, or pretence for the change,) pronounceth quite another thing, that God decrees the sinful actions, or sins themselves; for that these are synonymous I shown before. But let his own words shame him y these degrees. David's lying with Bathshebah was an Action, which when he did, he did very sinfully. Such Actions so done Mr. W. saith that God decrees. The Action specified was Adultery, and that was sin: and so according to M. W. God decreed that sin, that Adultery, that actual lying with another man's wife, that action which, when David did, he did sinfully. The instance which he gives Act. 2.23. & ch. 4.27, 28. is cross to his purpose; for 'ttwas in a foresight and consideration that Christ would be crucified by the Jews, if not violently hindered, upon which God determined he would not hinder, and so (by a consequence unavoidable) that the thing should be done by his permission. And therefore the first Text Act. 2.23. affords an excellent exposition to the second, Act. 4.27, 28. for 'tis said there expressly, he was delivered by the Counsel and foreknowledge of God. The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to determine doth no way exclude, but suppose 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to foreknow. And this was the answer of Justin Martyr to Tryphon, as I have elsewhere noted, and spoke so much by way of answer to this very objection of Mr. W. that I must send him thither for a fuller account, though what I have now said is somewhat more than I ovved him. [See Sinner Impl. part 2. ch. 2. p. 258. to p. 264.] And because the words of that Father were not there given at large, I have here thought fit to set them down in the Margin 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Just. Mart. contra Tryph. p. 370. porrò illam objectionem, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ita solvit Justinus. . I am very well pleased, that the same is objected against my Doctrine, which was objected by wicked Tryphon against that learned Apostolical and holy Father. What is added by Mr. W. of God permitting sin to be, is only for me, and against himself, unless he will declare that he is just as I am, and fairly publish his Retractations.  

2. His memorable answer to his own objection.  2. But where's his Answer to this Objection, [That if God decrees the Being of sin, than he is the Author of it?] Now comes the jest. His Answer to it is fully and wholly thus:  

8 Pag. 21.  But though God hath decreed that sin shall be, and therefore hath decreed to permit it, without ☜ which it could not be, yet it doth not follow that he is the Author of it.  
Doth he mean by God's decreeing that sin shall be, 
His meaning caught in a Dilemma.  that he decreed it absolutely, and antecedently to his prescience that it would be, if the sinners will were not hindered be some violent means? or that he decreed not to hinder it upon his eternal foreknowledge that the sinner would determine his will to sin, if not miraculously impeded? Which soever he shall say, it will be equally pleasant (and he must say one, for there is not a third.) If the former, he makes God to be the first and principal cause of every sin, but denies the sequel of his being the Author: which is as if he should say, Paul was a rational creature, but it doth not follow he was a man. Sophroniscus did beget Socrates, but yet was not his Father. The Jewish high Priests were the first and principal contrivers and procurers of the murdering of Christ (to which Judas and the Romans were instrumental) but it doth not follow they were the Authors of that murder. Thus Mr. W. with the same breath, denies what he affirms, whilst he affirms it, if he owns the former meaning of his words. And if the later, he yields the whole cause, by overthrowing the foundation of all his Doctrines; which is the placing God's Decree before his Knowledge, his preordination before his prescience; which although the most against Reason and Philosophy of any thing that can be named, hath been swallowed by the Calvinists from Mr. Calvin's own 
* Ideo praesciverit quia sic ordinavit. Calv. Inst. l. 3. c. 23. sect. 7. fol. 325. See Diu. Pur. c. 7. p. 74.  mouth. Thus it fares with Mr. W. if he means either of those two senses. If he can think upon a Third, I will speak to it when he shall name it. But be his sense what it can be, it was faulteringly done, to balk the words in the Objection, and to substitute others in the Answer; and unskilfully resolved, to obtrude a bare Denial, without pretending a dram of Reason to give it at least a little weight: nay, he hath not so much as an evasion to supply the room of an Answer; never an Orthodox putoff. The total of his answer (to bate the other flaws in it) is the syllable [No. It doth not follow, For it doth not.]  
3. And because he mingles the word [permit] in this and many other places, 
3. His soul use of the word permission. Of which see Diu. Philan. Def. ch. 3. p. 129, 130, to p. 139. & ch. 4. p. 53, 54.  as a necessary Emollient to assuage the hardness of his say, the Reader must once more be put in mind what is meant by [permission] in the writings of this and such like Authors. Their common account of their meaning is by the word efficacious: and if we ask how far forth God's permission of sin is efficacious, Doctor Twisse is Prolocutor, and tells the sense of the Party. God's Decree (saith he) is no less efficacious in the permission of evil, ☞ then in the production of good. But in the production of good, they all affirm with one mouth that God's Decree is absolute, irrespective, and irresistible; nor is it less (saith that Doctor) in the permission of sin. That Mr. W. thinks the Doctor Orthodox, his Book forbids us to disbelieve; for he saith that God hath a hand in sin, and a hand in the effecting of it, (p. 26.) that he hath some efficiency in it, (p. 24.) that he acteth or worketh in sin (not as a moral Agent by dissuading from it, but) as a natural cause promoting the Being and Act of sin, (p. 25.) that God's permission of sin is accompanied with Action and Operation, (p. 21.) and all this in the ugly sense, as I shall show more and more in the following Sections. And therefore his using the word permission doth but aggravate his guilt, until he shall declare, that he takes it in a passive and negative sense, so as to signify the suffering, and not hindering of sin. But then he must add a Recantation of those unsober expressions, with which the word Permission is inconsistent. 
* The odious impropriety represented in other less odious colours.  For suppose a man shall command or excite his Son to steal a Horse, and that so effectually, that the Horse is stolen by that Son upon his Father's excitation; can the Father be thought to speak truth or sense, if he shall plead that he did only permit his Son to steal by an efficacious permission, which could not be resisted because of its efficacy and force? Or will it avail him to plead not guilty, by saying he had but a hand in that stealth, or an efficiency in it, or that he only commanded and stirred up his Son to that vile Action, but was not the Author of that sin which cleaved to the Action, nor was it he, but his son who stole the Horse? Reader, this is the Case, but represented in fairer colours than Mr. W's Doctrine doth deserve. For he and his 
* Note that those Authors are defended by Mr. W. and Mr. B. as well as imitated and followed.  Teachers have said of God, that he decreeth, willeth, commandeth, determineth, seduceth, exciteth, stirreth up, impelleth, tempteth, effecteth, and maketh men to sin, and that not only as a moral cause (as some) but as a natural cause also (as others) as the Author of sin (say some) to sin quatenus sin (say others.) All which, and much more, I have formerly showed in three distinct Tracts, to which I must ever refer the Reader, though I am ever adding to my Supellex. And let this serve for their Emollient, made up of contrary ingredients (as Emplastra and Cataplasms may sometimes be) for the discussing the peccant Humour (at least for the concealing the ugly face of the Disease.) The first Ingredient is Active, and they allay it with a Passive, which is the second. The first they think hath too much of Positive in its Nature, and so they qualify it with that which hath somewhat of Negation in it. They add permission to efficacious, to save their credit; and efficacious to permission, for the salving of their cause. Their Dictionaries can tell them (and they who never read Tully, may easily look into Nizolius) that 
* Note that to permit is not the English of permitto; any more than to occide is the English of occido. But permit is purely Latin, made use of in English; as occide is Latin, not made use of in English. And as to occide is in English to kill; so to permit is in English to suffer.  permitto and sino are words of one signification. Sino signifies to suffer, or permit; Permitto signifies to permit or suffer. Judge how sore that part of their Doctrine is, to which an efficacious permission (that is an active sufferance, or an operative not-hindering) hath been only applied by way of Poultice. But some Patients are so unhappy, that either they tear off the Poultice from the Oedematous Tumour, or else they add to the composition as much as robs it of its anodynous and healing virtue. This will appear in the next Objection which Mr. W. hath raised against himself, as fittest (he thought) to fall before him.   

Sect. 5.  
Object. [But if he hath willed and decreed it, 
1. Mr. W. moulds, a new objection against himself, wherein he grants what his Doctrine is charged with.  his Decree is an energetical, and operative Decree, therefore he hath some hand in working and effecting of it, as Calvin, Piscator, and others teach, who are for the absolute Decree. Negari non potest illum aliquo modo procurare negotium, cujus consilio & decreto negotium geritur, saith Piscator: and if his Decree be operative, so as he hath any hand at all in the working of it, than he must needs be the Author of it. p. 21.] Bear witness, Reader, that this is also an Objection of his own making up against his own Doctrine; which no doubt but he did with as much tenderness as he could, in special regard unto the weakness both of the Answerer and the cause. Yet even thus it is such, as we shall find by and by he is not able to elude. But first observe his acknowledgement, that Calvin and Piscator, and the rest of his way, do in good earnest maintain the ugly premises in the Objection, viz. that God hath willed and decreed sin, and hath some hand in working and effecting of it; & negari non potest, it cannot be denied (saith Piscator) but that God procures the business, and that it is transacted by his Counsel and Decree. These things, I say, he doth not offer to deny in any part of his Answer, but doth his utmost to make all good (as shall immediately be seen;) he only denies (and 'tis a naked denial without the least reason) that they do hence infer God to be the Author of sin. Mark well his Answer, or rather his shifting himself of it in lieu of an Answer.  

2. His Answer consists in shifting the duty of a Respondent, and speaking quite another thing.  Answ. For Answer of this, two things are to be cleared. 1. That God's permission is not such a bare permission as is without all action and operation. 2. That though his permission is accompanied with some kind of operation, yet he is no Author of sin. p. 21.]  
This is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an achievement never to be forgotten. For in the Objection, there was not a syllable of God's Permission, which yet in his Answer is All in All. The Objection was of God's willing, decreeing, working, effecting, procuring sin, and the like. The Answer standeth in the clearing of God's permission, and showing it is not unac ompanied. Here than I must ask him (as before I did) doth he mean that God's permission is efficacious, and accompanied companied with those things which are ingredients in the Objection, viz. decreeing sin by an operative energetical Decree, willing and working, procuring and effecting it, (which is all the language of his Predecessors?) or doth he not mean any such things? If the first, I take hold of his confession, and will demonstrate that he doth worse than if he merely called God the Author of sin. If the second, he doth not answer, but sneak from giving any answer. He lays down a Cushion, and sits beside it. And if when one thing is objected, he shall answer to quite another, he is no sitter for a Disputant then a man that's deaf, who if he is asked what's a clock? will answer, a Windmill, or a Pump. But let him be granted to have a pertinent meaning (however his words are nothing less) yet the state of his affairs will be but so much the worse: For by that he discovers, how many dismal mysteries are closely couched in the word Permission; enough to show the great usefulness of what I spoke on that subject a few minutes since. Now then let us observe how he clears his two things, which he calls in his margin by the name of two Arguments.  

3. His first part of his escape, clearing his first thing with a very great blot.  3. [That Gods permission of sin is accompanied with some kind of operation, appears, because when he permits sin he doth volens permittere, he doth willingly permit it: then there is some act of his will about it. p. 21.]  
Mark his notable passage à genere ad genus. The permission he speaks of, is in relation to sin; but the will of God he here speaks of, is in relation to the permission. Did he take permission to be a sin, or not? If he did, he chargeth God with that sin, which (were it such) would denominate him a sinner. And this would be blasphemy in its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For the avoiding of which, if he shall say he did not, than he must say he is a shifter, not a Disputant or Respondent in any sense; for the thing he is to clear (and 'tis a task he imposed upon himself, without being bid,) is God's permission of SIN attended with operation (not his permission of his PERMISSION, which is perfect nonsense, and yet employed by Mr. W. unless he professeth to be impertinent) which in stead of clearing, he gives the slip, by saying that God doth willingly permit it. Where the willingness relates to the permission of sin, (which permission is no sin) not at all unto the sin which is permitted. Which if he did not discern, O the depth of his Apprehension! if he did, and yet passed it, O the depth of his Dissimulation! whether he did, or did not, he hath done a strange thing; for thus he argues, [God doth willingly permit sin, therefore there is some act of his will about it.] About what, good Sir, is the Act of Gods will? about the permission spoken of, which is Gods? or about the sin permitted, which sin is the Devils and his Instruments? The first is as impertinent, as the second is blasphemous. And though 'tis plain that Mr. W. doth mean the second, yet he offends against Logic, as much as against Theology: for thus he argues; God doth will to permit sin, which to do is no sin; therefore he willeth sin, which cannot be divided or distinguished from sin: which is to say in effect, Gods will is conversant about what is good (such is permission) therefore it is conversant about what is evil (such is sin permitted.) Because he doth not will sin (but only to suffer or to permit it, or not to hinder the sinners will) therefore he doth will it. One part of a contradiction is his proof of the other. But though he miscarries (to a prodigy) in his way of probation, yet he discovers his affection to his opinion, that God doth velle peccatum, immediately will sin, and that with a perfect will, as he goes on p. 22.  

4. His abuse of St. Austin.  4. Thus than he advanceth (if that can be in a Circle wherein he only runs round.) He 
* Deus permittit aut volens, aut nolens & invi●●s; non certè invitus, quia id esset cum Tristitiâ, & potentiâ se majorem haberet: Si volens permittit, est genus quoddam voluntatis. Enchir. aed Laur. p. 100  citys a passage out of Austin, in which he confesseth that that Father doth grant but this, [that God hath some kind of will in the permission of sin, p. 22.] So grants Arminius, and Pelagius, and all mankind. But what then (Mr. W?) A will in the permission is not a will in sin; for God's permission is of a contrary nature. If Austin had said, that God hath a will in the effecting of sin (which is contrary to his holy will) he had then said something to bear you out, or rather he had fallen into the same ditch with you. But Austin doth not, nay durst not say, that sin (permitted) is according to Gods will; for he saith that sin is 
† Fit contra voluntatem. Id. Ibid.  against his will; and that at the very same time, when he saith he hath a will in the PERMISSION of sin. Now be it remembered by the Reader, that Mr. W. doth mean an efficacious permission when he speaks of Gods permitting sin. And how much he means by efficacious, I lately showed. Together with that, compare his process.  

5. His arguing that God doth will sin perfectly, because be perfectly wills the permission of it.  5. If any kind of will, this must needs be a perfect will; for no imperfect will agrees to God, who is perfection itself: and how can he be said to will any thing without any Act of his will? p. 22.] Now the Doctrine comes more into the light. God's efficacious permissive will (as Mr. Barlee and others are wont to word it) is the same to sin, as to sinlessness, saith Mr. Whitfield: for more than perfect it cannot be when objected upon the best things; nor is it less than perfect (saith Mr. W.) when objected upon the worst: (for from Gods will to permit sin, he argues God's willing sin.) Which reasoning of his is so excellently absurd, that it demonstrates the contrary to what he seeks to prove by it. For because nothing in God is imperfect, and whatsoever he willeth he willeth in perfection, therefore he willeth not sin at all; it being of his perfection, that he cannot will sin; and the greatest imperfection in the worst of all Creatures, that they are able to will sin with a perfect willingness. And what a Divine must he be, who shall say the same of God, which is the very worst thing that can be said of the Devil, that he willeth sin with a perfect will? If to evade this whirlpool, Mr. W. shall say, he meant the permission only, nor the sin permitted, then 'tis the least of his misfortunes, that he hath only made Answers to the Man in the Moon, and then he will be split on the less dangerous Rock. But to make good his meaning, he must abjure his whole Book: for to say that God's decree is energetical only (not permissive) and to say that he decreeth the being of sin (which is his and his Teacher's Doctrine) is in consistent with mere permission; which is not an exertion, but a suspension of the will, from interposing any Impediment which might forcibly hinder the Creatures choice. Nay one thing I must add for the vindication of God's holiness, & for the instruction of Mr. W. (whose mere want of instruction I have the charity to hope is his greatest stumbling-block) That though God doth not hinder a man from sinning by any such physical impediment, whereby the man is rendered not able to sin wilfully, yet even then he doth hinder by such moral impediments, whereby the man is rendered able not to sin wilfully.  

6. He strives to prove God's Activity in the production of sin from Gods own word.  Now let us see how he clears the second thing he proposed in stead of Answer to the Objection. [Scripture-Expressions do constantly hold forth God's manner of working in sin, by way of action. It doth not say, God suffered Joseph's Brethren to sell him into Egypt, but that God sent him, Gen. 45.8. It doth not say, God suffered Pharaoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardened it, Exod. 9.12, etc. p. 22.] Here he tells us that the Scriptures hold forth, what before (p. 19) and after (p. 23.) he professeth to be ineffable and incomprehensible, viz. the manner of Gods working in sin. This is his first degree of misery. Again, he takes those Texts merely according to the Letter, which Mr. Barlee himself confesseth to be figuratively spoken, giving 
* Neces. Vind. ch. 3. p. 55.  this reason for it, [that God according to the Letter of many of those Texts, seems to be made a moral cause of sin as sin.] So that now Mr. W. hath played such a prank, as his own fellow-laborer must needs condemn in him. This is his second. Again he saith, that this is constantly held forth in Scripture by way of action, Constantly, good Sir? how can that be? Did not God tell Israel, that because he had purged them, and they were not purged, they should 
* Ezek. 24.13.  not be purged from their filthiness any more? that is to say, he would leave them to themselves, he would permit or suffer them to be filthy, he would not cleanse them against their wills? Which one Text is sufficient to have taught Mr. W. the true importance of all those at which he stumbles. And from thence it is evident what is meant by the Schoolmen, when they say that God punisheth sin with sin: which must thus be negatively expounded by Gods forsaking such sinners, withdrawing his grace so long resisted and abused, not cleansing them any more from their beloved filthiness. Let M. W. answer to this Question; Doth the Scripture express or hold forth the real command of the holy Ghost, in using that imperative, 
* Rev. 22.11.  Let him that will be filthy, be filthy still? Or was our Saviour accessary to the Jewish murder, in saying, 
† Joh. 2.19. which compare with Mar. 14.58.  destroy this temple, meaning the Temple of his body? To have commanded it in the sense (as he did in the letter) had been a kind of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, laying hands upon himself; yet the Jews (like Mr. W.) were so intent upon the letter, that they took an occasion from those words to bear false witness against our Saviour. [We heard him say, I will destroy this Temple made with hands, etc. Mar. 14.58.] But enough of Mr. W 's degrees of misery in his position, come we now to his examples.  

1. From the selling of Joseph.  His first (Gen. 45.8.) is most remarkably impertinent to that for which it was produced: for in stead of saying God sold Joseph into Egypt (in which sale of Joseph his brethren sinned) he confesseth that Joseph did only say unto his brethren, that God had sent him: nay he spoke it with an Antithesis to his brethren's action, and to a contrary scope to what Mr. W. directs the words. Reader, consider, and stand amazed at his matchless inconsiderateness in this particular. joseph's speech runs thus, 
* See the Divine Purity Def. c. 7. p. 63, 64, 65.  [God hath sent me before you, to preserve you a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance: so now, it was not you that sent me hither, but God, and he hath made me a Father to Pharaoh, and Lord of all his house, etc. v. 7, 8] He speaks of nothing but the good which God had done for him, upon occasion of that evil which they that sold him had done against him. Yet this is urged by Mr. W. for God's Activity and work in sin.  

2. From Pharaohs obduration.  His second Instance is not quite so ridiculous. [Exod. 9.12.] but 'tis ridiculous enough. For though God is said to harden Pharaohs heart by doing somewhat, yet was it not by working in sin, but by removing punishments, and all other means of his recovery, which had so long been afforded him, and all in vain. It was said before, Pharaohs heart was hardened, Ex. 7.22. which implies the permission, not efficiency of God. Nay farther it was said, That Pharaoh hardened his own heart, Ex. 8.15. Again after that, it was said that Pharaoh sinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants, Ex. 9.34. (whom God is said to have endured with much longsufferance, Rom. 9.22.) as 'twere on purpose to deliver us from the very possibility of erring grossly, when we afterwards read, God hardened his heart. And how did God do it? sure not as Pharaoh, nor as Satan, by any activity or efficiency of obduration, (for Satan hardened Pharaohs heart, as well as Pharaoh himself) but by a total and final withdrawing of his Grace, 
* Indurabo cor Pharaonis, id est, sinam indurari, non flectam genuinam impii cordis duriciem, Melan. in Praef. ad Comment. in c. 9 ad Rom.  leaving him in a state of irremediable wickedness, by such a kind of dereliction by which the damned are left in Hell. Nay even this very dereliction and leaving Pharaoh to himself, (the certain consequence of which was his final obduration) was awarded to him as a punishment for his having hardened his heart so often, when God by his Messengers and their Miracles had often called him to repentance. Compare God's words to Israel, Ps. 95.8.  

3. From the Canaanites hardening.  His third Instance is taken from Josh. 11.20. but more irrationally than the former. For it is said there expressly, the Canaanites hardened their hearts; which because they could not have done if God had not suffered them, it is therefore said it was of the Lord: for had he given them a cogent and irresistible Grace, or destroyed their human nature, their hardening their heart could not have been. And for God 
* Indurare quem si liberet, emollire potuistes, est non emollire— & paulò supetiùs, roli it Deus in perditis salvificam vim explic●re. Dallaeus Apol. part. 2. p. 117. In eundem sensum Augustin. in Epist. 105. ad Sirtum. Idque fatente Calvino Instil. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3. sol. 95.  not to hinder, or not to soften their hearts, which the Text saith expressly they had hardened against Israel, was no more than to permit what they committed by their option; and this for ends of his providence, that his people Israel might destroy those wicked Canaanites for their sins, the measure whereof they had filled up. But besides it must be noted (to show the impertinence was the greater) that for the Canaanites thus to harden their hearts against Israel, that is, to oppose and resist them coming to take away their land, could not be censured as a sin in them, unless they had a revelation that God had given their land to his People Israel; which as it appears not in Story (for aught I can learn) so if it doth, than Gods revealing it to them was far from having any hand in the hardening of their hearts: all he did was not softening what he found obdurate; and not to soften, is not to have any hand; the negative to that which is affirmed by Mr. Whitfield.  

4. From Absalom's defiling his Father's Concubines.  His fourth Instance is taken from 2 Sam. 12.12. in which he seems to be unhappier than in all the rest which went before: for observe how he applies it. [It is not said, God suffered Absalon to defile his Father's Concubines, but he tells David, what thou hast done secret, I will do in the sight of this sun, p. 22.] Now if it is literally meant (as Mr. W. contends) that God did do the same in public which David had done in private, the blasphemy is such as cannot modestly be named: for what was that which David did in secret, but his adultery with Bathshebah? And can it be possibly imagined, that God could do the same thing openly? yet so run the words, [what thou hast done I will do.] which undeniably proves, that the words are spoken by an Hebraism (which M. W. very shortly will be found in the Act of denying) and are permissive only in sense, though active in sound. For God could not do actively in the sight of the Sun, what David had done in secret. (That is such a gross and impious thought as some Heathens conceived of their carnal Jupiter.) And if Mr. W. had but read unto the end of the Story (which was at the most but the completion of God's Prophecy) 2 Sam. 16.22. He would there have found, that it was Absalon who did what Mr. W. applies to God. A Tent was spread upon the top of the house, and Absalon went in unto his Father's Concubines in the sight of all Israel. This (Reader) is the sin, which Mr. W. urgeth as an instance, [wherein the manner of Gods working is held forth to us by way of action, p. 22.] But not to speak more of the impiety, behold the unskilfulness of the Respondent. I will do this thing (saith God to David v. 12.) And what was this thing? It is expressed (v. 11.) I will raise up evil against thee, that is, the evil of punishment. I will take thy wives and give them, that is, permit Absalon to enjoy them. There was not the least need of any more from God, because Absalon of himself was ready enough to do it, his own 
* Jam. 1.14.  flesh was sufficient to draw him on. And besides his own flesh, he had Ahithophel at his ear to set him forward (ch. 16. v. 21.) nay both he and Ahithophel had the Devil at their elbows to urge and tempt them. 
† Frustra fit per plures quod fieri potest per pauciores.  Was not all this enough to bring the wickedness to pass, but God himself must be affirmed to have a hand in it, an efficiency in it, to work, to act, to operate in it, and that as a natural (which is a necessitating) cause? yet by all these expressions Mr. Wh. doth teach us his thoughts of God. I commend one thing to his consideration. It is acknowledged by him, and by all his party, that if God withhold or withdraw his Grace from any one of his creatures endued with reason, the creature is prone of himself to do abundantly evil. Let them content themselves with that then, and go no farther, until they can imagine some reason why.  

5. From Shimei's cursing David.  His fifth Instance is taken from Gods being said by David to have bid Shimei curse David, 2 Sam. 16.10, 11. of which I have spoken twice already in print, and both times largely. First, to Mr. B. in my Defence of the Divine Philan. ch. 4. §. 35. p. 47, 48, 49. And afterwards afresh to Dr. Reynolds in my Defence of the Divine purity, ch. 7. §. 8. p. 71, 72. To those two places I refer Mr. W. and to that which I shall say ch. 2. Sect. 1. Answ. 5. that I may not do like him, in printing the same book under two Titles, and letting it pass for two books, when 'tis indeed but one repeated.  

6, 7, 8. From three Texts already answered in equivalence.  So his sixth, seventh, and eighth Instances, from 1 King. 22.22. & Job 1. & Isa. 63.13. are answered out of the Answers which I have given to the five instances now immediately preceding, as also out of my Answers to D. Reyn. chap. 7. Sect. 8. particularly pag. 69, 70.  

9 From the Egyptians hatred of Israel.  His ninth Instance may be referred to the foresaid places, and so indeed may the rest: but because in the ninth, at least a blind man may stumble, I will therefore add, That Gods turning the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people (Psal. 105.25.) was his doing that which provoked them to jealousy and fear: that was first, and from that they 
* Oderint quem metuunt.  naturally turned to hatred. But what was that which God did, which did provoke them to that jealousy, fear, and hatred? even what was very good (v. 24.) for he increased his people exceedingly, and made them stronger than their enemies. He blessed and multiplied his people Israel, for which the envious Egyptians did fear, and hate, and conspire against them, Exod. 1.9, 10.  

10. From God's being said to deceive the Prophet.  His tenth Instance from (Ezek. 14.9.) doth ruin the drift for which he brings it: for as he who loves, teaches, reads, or hears, (in the literal sense without a figure) must needs be a lover, teacher, reader or hearer; so he who doth deceive without a figure, must without a figure be a deceiver. But because it is blasphemy to say, that God is really a deceiver, it must needs be figuratively spoken, and understood by the Hebraism so often mentioned by the most learned and unquestionable Writers, when it is said in that Text [I the Lord have deceived him:] what will be thought of Mr. W. who disclaims the Hebraism in that and in all the like cases? A word to the wise is here sufficient; but let him know, that in the judgement of all the Fathers, and by the granted meaning of other Scriptures, it is apparent that the meaning must needs be one of these two. Either deceiving is nothing else but Gods permitting the false Prophet, for his wickedness, to be deceived by the Deceiver, that is, the Devil; or delivering him up to his own corrupt heart, which is willing of itself to be deceived, and accordingly it follows in the very next words, [I will stretch out my hand upon him, and will destroy him.] Or else that of Grotius may fitly take place. It should be rendered (saith he) not, I have deceived, but, I will deceive him, (viz.) by giving him such an end as he expects not.  

11. From giving up to vile affections.  His eleventh Instance Rom. 1.26. is of the same importance with the former Instances above. By giving up is meant forsaking, 
* Tradere in desideria significat desertionem. Malanchth. in cap. 9 ad Rom. pag. 132, 133.  no longer calling them from vile affections. See The Sinner impleaded part 1. ch. 1. p. 9 where Augustine's Exposition in the Margin is the same with mine.  

12. From giving eyes not to see.  His twelfth Instance from Rom. 11.8, 9 doth only serve him to let us know that he reads the English Translation only, and mistakes the meaning of the Translators: for there is no such thing in S. Paul's own words as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, though our English Bibles read, [he gave them eyes that they should not see.] It is in the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, eyes of not seeing, or not to see, or eyes which see not. The sense is evidently this, that the major part of the people who made not use of that grace which God had offered, and resisted Christ when he was preached in their streets, did grow so obstinately blind (God withdrawing the means so long resisted, and so much abused,) as to fulfil the prediction of the Prophet Esay, ch. 29. v. 10. or at least to parallel the case of which the Prophet there speaks. And this doth farther appear from S. Paul's 
* Psal. 69.23.  citation of the Psalmist v. 10. Let their eyes be darkened that they may not see: words spoken by David, not as a Curse, but a Prophecy, that the things intended for their 
† Vers. 22.  welfare would become their trap. Their very Table (whose proper end was to refresh and feed them) would by their wickedness be made their 
* Ibid.  snare: And even the preaching of the Gospel (resisted by them) would accidentally advance their induration. If Mr. W. read the note of 
* Non accidit haec induratio, nisi interveniente Dei Decreto. Beza in Rom. 11.8.  Beza, and also took it by the worst handle, he alone must answer for it.  

13. From sending delusion.  His thirteenth Instance from 2 Thess. 2.10, 11. makes me think that his Concordance is his chief Commentator: for had he compared that Text with the whole Context (which your Concordance-Preachers seldom do) he had found the sense to have been this, That because they received not the love of the truth 
* Mark the Chasm or Ellipsis which must of necessity be thus filled up [Which truth was offered to the end that they might be saved.]  that they might be saved, (p. 10.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for this cause (or to punish this wickedness) God will suffer the man of sin (v. 3.) whose coming is after the working of Satan with all power and signs and lying wonders (v. 9) to come upon them with such advantages of strength and subtlety, as would gain credit with them, being not wonderfully restrained. God is said to send, what he (can, but) doth not hinder from being sent. We are taught to pray, Led us not into temptation, when yet our meaning is, suffer us not to be led, or leave us not helpless in our temptations, permit us not to be tempted above our strength, let thy Grace be sufficient for us: and thence it follows, but deliver us from evil. Thus our Saviour may be said to have sent the Devils into the herd of swine, because when they besought him, he gave way to their prayer; when they said, Suffer us to go, he answered, Go. Of which the meaning must needs be this, I suffer you to go; for he granted what they asked, and they asked for sufferance.  

14. From the Nations making league with the Romans.  His fourteenth and last Instance from Rev. 17.17. doth only proclaim him to be unqualified for such mysterious parts of Scripture. And I am hearty glad upon this occasion, that Doctor Hammonds Annotations are writ in English, that the lowest Reader may discern, how quite beside his own purpose Mr. W. hath seized on that Text also, which is only a prophecy of S. John, foretelling an eminent and remarkable Act of God's providence, in that all the nations should first confederate with the Romans, and yet afterwards breaking off should execute vengeance upon those Romans, and that Alaricus the King of the Goths and Vandals should so suddenly retire after his conquest and captivity of Rome, as if he had purposely been sent by the special Providence of God, to destroy the Idolaters, and preserve the Christians.   

Sect. 6.  
From all which it is evident, 
How Mr. W. most groundlessly inferreth God to fit still, p. 23. and to be an idle Beholder, p. 26.  that none of those active expressions alleged by Mr. W. (in his 22. page) can be pretended to denote Gods working in sin; more than his punishing of it doth (which yet is active) when he casts the sinner into hell. The consequent to which is the sinner's continuance to all eternity in his sins. Nor doth it follow (what he saith p. 23.) that if God hath no manner of working in sin, 
See more of this subject Sect. 17, 18, 19  he sits still as a spectator. For he is working in divers respects; as by the motions of his Spirit dissuading from sin, and also by his word, both writ and preached. Again he is working in overruling, ordering, and disposing sins committed to many excellent advantages, to which he is able by his wisdom to make them serve. But all this is nothing to his active working in sin, or his having a hand in it, (as Mr. W. phraseth it) but on the contrary, it shows that he hath no hand in it: for overruling sins to good, suppo●eth them committed, and when it is said (as it is commonly) that God draweth good out of evil, the meaning is, (not that he maketh it to be good in one respect, which is evil in another, as such men dream, but) that upon man's doing evil he takes an occasion of doing good: such was the saving of the world upon occasion of that murder which▪ the wicked ones committed in killing-Christ. And as good things are made an occasion of evil, yet are not evil, (as I lately showed) so are evil things made an occasion of good, yet are not good: which some men not descerning, are betrayed into the worst and uncleannest speeches; as, that adultery, or murder, as it is the work of God, its Author, mover, and impeller, is no sin at all, but only as it is of man: which though the saying of Zuinglius, a great Master of those men, yet 'tis abetted and approved by Doctor Twisse in particular; and in particular by Mr. Barlee, and aequivalently by Mr. Whitfield also. If any others of their way shall renounce the Doctrine, let them do it in print, and then the World will forgive them. Having showed that God is no idle spectator, (as the brethren do both speak) because he restrains from sin, and (when he suffers it) doth overrule it (as hath been showed) and doth also note it in his book (as the Prophets speak) and doth satisfy his justice in the punishment of sin, as well as exercise his mercy in forgiving it to the contrite and penitent sinner, and giveth the continuance of a Being unto his creature, by whose freewill the sin is made; I will add this little, that it were much a lesser evil in Mr. W. and his partners, to say that God sitteth still as a spectator only; then to asperse him with a working and activity in sin: for as to the commission of the sin itself, God is truly a mere spectator. The Sinners sole will determines itself unto the Sin.    

CHAP. II. Of Mr. W's Attempts to help Mr. B. by replying a few things to the Divine philanthropy defended, which now at last he doth particularly consider, and not till now.  

Sect. 1.  
TO such Texts of Scripture as are literally taken by that sort of men, 
Mr. W. gins with the end of that book, to which his Title-page pretended a Reply.  who do not only take the boldness to bear false witness against God, by charging his Majesty with having a high hand in sin, but most lewdly also do endeavour to make him bear false witness against himself, I did amongst many other things (which Mr. Whitfield studiously omitteth, that he may speak to that only which he thinks is least above his strength,) afford my Correptory Corrector this short note of Instruction,  

(a) Divine Philanth. defended, c. 4. p. 48.  That by a common Hebraism, such verbs as are active in sound, are only permissive in signification: by the admission of which Rule, those horrible absurdities would be avoided, and Scripture expounded 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
To which part of my Answer, 
M. W 's wonderful reply in behalf of M. B.  Mr. Wh. adventures this sad Reply. This he dictates, but doth not demonstrate, nor bring the least patch of an Argument to prove it, neither will all his skill in the Hebrew enable him to do it. And may he not by this shift evade the clearest and strongest Scriptures that are brought against him, by telling us that they signify quite another thing then the nature of the words doth import, if we will believe him? 2. Why may he not then interpret other Scriptures in the like manner, where the like expressions are used; as when the Lord saith, I form the light, and create darkness, I make peace, and create evil, Isa. 45.7. I have made the earth, and created man upon it, my hands spread out the heavens, Psal. 12? Why may we not by Mr. P. his Hebraisms, interpret these verbs that are active in sound to be permissive only in signification, and say that God hath permitted light and darkness to be created, and suffered the earth to be made, and the heavens to be spread out? p. 23.]  
How many ways Mr. Wh. hath uncovered himself in these words before the face of all people, I could never have showed, if himself had not made it thus needful for me; which I beseech his best friends to carry always in their minds, that they may not accuse me of severity in any one of the particulars which now ensue.  

His great unskilfulness in the things of a Divine.  First he uncovers his no-acquaintance, not only with the Hebrew, but with the plain 
* Quod autem in Scriptures legitur, Indurabo cor; item Tradidit eos in capiditates, & similia; haec figura sermonis facilè potest explicari, si quis observet naturam Hebraici sermonis: certum est enim has figuras habere significationem permittendi. Melanchth. in Comment. in c. 9 ad Rom. fol. 132. edit. Argentorati A. D. 1536. spanhemius & Dallaeus huc accedunt.  Latin Writers by whom the Idiotismes of Hebrew have been observed. How else could he complain that I did not demonstrate the Sun at Noon? I expected that Laymen should believe me as a Divine, in setting down that as a granted Rule; and that Divines should receive it upon their knowledge that it was true. But 'twas my fault not to remember that of the Clergy, as well as Laity, there are several sorts; and that many of the former are very ignorant, whereas many of the later have perfect knowledge. Be it so, that Mr. P. hath but a little skill in Hebrew, (who yet hath more than Mr. Wh. if he hath none) yet if any man living, sure Hugo Grotius had a great deal. And Grotius his 
* Decepisti, i. e. sivisti decipi. Saepe enim apud Hebraeos, verba sono activa, significatu passiva sunt. Grot. in Jer. c. 4. v. 10.  Annotations are guided much by that Rule. 
† Nec figurae illae verborum in sermone Hebraico pugnant cum sententia quam dixi, Indurabo cor Pharaonis, & sim●les: certum est enim, Hebraicâ phrasi significare eas permissionem, non voluntatem efficacem: Mel. in loc. de causâ pecc. p. 49.  Melanchthon (I am sure) was a great that Rule. It shall suffice me to say that in my Answer to Doctor Reynolds (ch. 7. p. 67, 68, etc.) I have proved the use of this Rule in the interpretation of such Texts, by the verdict of all the Fathers, by that of S. Austin in particular, by the exact Bishop Andrews, nay by the public acknowledgements of the most skilful Hebreicians of Mr. Wh's own party, even philip's de Morney, and Peter the Calvinist of Florence. I farther proved it by Scriptures agreed upon by all the World to be only capable of that construction. All which if Mr. W. did never see, nor what I said to 
* Diu. Philan. c. 1. p. 23.24. ch. 4. à p. 37. ad finem usque.  Mr. Barlee, I am not guilty of his omissions. And if he really did see, but made as if he did not, it is a commission he must repent of. Here lies the wonderful 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of this shrewd undertaker. Once I mentioned and only mentioned the abovesaid Hebraism, but in divers places I fully proved it; Mr. Wh. finding the naked mention, cries out I dictate, but do not prove; but 
(b) Note that my proof was in the first chapter (p. 23, 24.) my naked mention in the fourth, (p. 48.) so as he passed by the first, before he fell upon the second.  finding also my ample proof, of that he wisely makes no mention. From whence we may rationally infer, that all the fault was in his Will, and not (this bout) in his Understanding.  
Secondly, He uncovers his month's mind to the literal sense of those Texts, 
His frightful adherence unto the letter:  which say (according to the letter) that God did 
(c) 2 Sam. 16.10.  bid Shimei curse David, which was to do wickedly, and 
(d) Ezek. 20.26.  polluted the people in their own gifts, and 
(e) 2 Sam. 13.11, 12.  raised up evil, and 
(f) Ezek. 14.9.  deceived, and 
(g) Jer. 35.1, 2, 3, 4.  tempted, and 
(h) Isa 63.6.  made men drunk; which (according to the letter) do seem to charge God with the efficiency of sin. And yet (saith Mr. Wh.) such verbs as those must be actively, not permissively, understood; for this (he tells us) is a shift, by which a man may evade the clearest Scriptures, by telling us that they signify quite another thing then the nature of the words doth import. So unwilling is the old 
(i) Eph. 4.22.  man (as the Apostle speaks) that God should be cleared from all impurity, and the word of God rescued from blasphemous contradictions, that he will rather reproach the ancient Fathers of the Church, as well as the modern upholders of it, with ridiculous shifts and evasions, then submit to the judgement of common sense. For saith not the Scripture in other places, that God is of 
(k) Habak. 1.13.  purer eyes then to behold evil, and cannot look on iniquity; and will have 
(l) Ps. 94.20.  nothing to do with the stool of wickedness; and who is not a God that hath 
(m) Psal. 5.4.  pleasure in wickedness; and that all his wo●ks are 
(n) Gen. 1.31.  very good; and that sin by one 
(o) Rom. 5.12.  man entered into the world; and that all the wickedness in the world, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life, 
(p) 1 Joh. 2.16  is not of the Father, but of the world; and that 
(q) Jam. 1.13.14.  God tempteth no man: that he 
(r) Isa. 1.14.  cannot endure sin, and hates it, and is 
(s) ibid. & M●l. 2.17.  weary to bear it; and all things which may express, not only his perfect unwillingness to be dishonoured by sin, but his utmost 
* Zechar. 8.17.  hatred and detestation? Now when two sorts of Scripture do contradict each other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in respect of the surface and letter of them, there must be a way to reconcile them, or they will not be thought to be every where true, nor by consequence the 
† 1 Tim. 3.15.  word of God. They cannot be otherwise reconciled, then by taking one of the two in a 
* Note, M. W. himself confesses, ●. 48. that some Texts would contradict each other if literally taken.  figurative sense, and so the reconcilement is very easy. Now whether the figurative speaking is in the first sort of Texts, which do seemingly and literally asperse the goodness of our God, or in the second fort of Texts, which do really and plainly clear the goodness of God from all aspersions, let the Reader judge betwixt me and Mr. Whitfield. Nay Mr. Barlee himself, although he sometimes judgeth on Mr. W's side (as in his 
* See Divine Philanthr. ch. 1. p. 24, 25.  Correptory Correction, p. 69.) yet at last he is forced to judge against it: for he saith in plain terms (as I lately observed) in this his last print, [that God according to the letter of many Texts seems to be made a moral cause of sin as sin, ch. 3. p. 55.] so that Mr. W. and Mr. B. are as much at odds in their very conspiracy and conjunction against a third person, as Mr. B. is at odds with his dearest self.  

His overthrowing his own interest in other cases.  Thirdly, If M. W. admits of Hebraisms in any parts of Scripture, much more must he do it in those we now speak of; where if they are not admitted, the inconvenience will be greater than any where else. But no doubt in some parts he will not dare not to admit them, for fear of being censured a direct enemy to Christ, and to take part with the Socinians, nay (which is worse) with such as Julian, and the profane Helvidius. For how many prophecies of Christ are read by us in the Preterperfect Tense, the Hebrew Idiotism being retained in the English by our Translators? Isa. 9.6. there are two Hebraisms at once, which no creature can deny who doth acknowledge that Text to have a prospect upon Christ: [unto us a child is born] for [unto us a child shall be born.] And when the Jews object (as they do often) that Christ's name was Jesus, not wonderful, counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace; which yet (according to the letter) is affirmed to be the name by which he should be called who is there spoken of (Isa. 9.6.) what can Mr. W. allege for himself, unless he mind them of the most vulgar Hebraism, by which the Name is put to signify the Being? A man is said by the Hebrews to be called thus and thus, to whom such titles and epithets do well agree. So 
* Cited from Isa. 7.14.  Mat. 1.23. [They shall call his name Emmanuel] would be literally truer of the 
* Isa. 8.3. compared with vers. 8.  child of the Prophetess given to Ahaz for a sign, then of Jesus Christ the son of Mary, which yet according to the Hebraism is truer of Christ then of that child. Again, if our Greek copies of S. Mark did read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Mar. 3.29. (as well they may, because the ancient Manuscripts were found to do so, and out of them the vulgar Latin) what other reason could be rendered for our translating the words thus [in danger of eternal damnation] rather then [in danger of eternal sin] but that sin, by an Hebraism, is set to signify the punishment of sin? Nay, it is much more probable (in the judgement of Grotius) that S. Mark himself writ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [of sin] and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [of judgement or condemnation] was nothing else but Interpretamentum Hebraismi, the Exposition of that Hebraism which was used by S. Mark, who is known by all to have been an Hellenistick Writer; I say, by all, excepting such as Mr. W. who complains of hard words in a most plain English Writer. Again, if Helvidius his three objections (from Mat. 1. vers. 18. & vers. 25.) against the Virgin Mary's being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as the Greek Fathers are wont to call her,) a perpetual Virgin, should be urged by some Helvidian against Mr. W. he would be thankful to that man who should help him to answer unto the third, that there were three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the Hebrews, the Principality, the Priesthood, and the right of Inheritance, which were all the privileges of the firstborn, and in respect of which our blessed Saviour was so called. How much gladder should he be, to understand such Texts by the common Hebraism, whose literal acception is of so dangerous importance as hath been showed, if he did not [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] live in vassalage to an opinion, which cannot otherwise be defended, then by making God to have a hand in sin?  

He is convinced by that which he cannot but confess.  Fourthly, M. W. cannot but confess, that the verb sino is an active, that is to say, of the active voice, and yet its signification is only passive, for it only signifies to suffer. And when the Devils besought our Saviour, [
* Mat. 8.31.  suffer us to enter] they did not command him, but begged his leave, although they spoke in the Imperative or commanding mood. Our Saviour said to the Haemorrhois (Mat. 9.22.) Thy faith hath made thee whole: which was not literally, but figuratively true. S. Peter's words to Aeneas were not figuratively, but literally true, [
* Act. 9.34.  Jesus Christ maketh thee whole:] and if Christ healed the later, much more evidently the former. Thus when we are said to be justified by 
† Gal. 3.24.  Faith (in S. Paul's phrase) and by 
* Jam. 21. & 24.  works (in S. James) neither is literally true, without the help of a distinction or explication; for in exact propriety of speech, we are justified by 
† Rom. 8.33.  God, and by God alone. And Mr. W. might have known, that there is nothing more common in the opening of Texts, then to distinguish the literal from the rational importance.  

The mischiefs which ensue upon his way of exposition.  Fifthly, Whereas Mr. W. allegeth, [that the clearest Scriptures may be evaded by this shift, etc.] I will show him by some instances what kind of mischiefs have ensued by his way of apprehending those Texts of Scripture, whose Hebraism he slanders with the name of shift. One of his own examples is (p. 22.) David's saying of wicked Shimei, that the Lord had 
* 2 Sam. 16.10, 11.  bid him to curse his Sovereign, quite contrary to that which the Lord had commanded, [
† Exod. 22.28. compared with Jer. 19.5.  Thou shalt not revile the Gods, nor curse the Ruler of thy people.] nay Shimei being penitent 
* 2 Sam. 19.20. Quomodo dixit Dominus Semei maledicere David▪ non jubendo, etc. Austin. degra & lib. arbit. c ●0.  confessed his sin a little after. In this case, say I, either David was mistaken, (as well he might be who could commit such scarlet sins) and thought that Shimei might really be sent by God in that message (as Nathan before ch. 12.) to pronounce that curse which David confessedly had deserved; and in particular cases, it is manifest that God can dispense with his precepts to the sons of men, who yet must never pretend to any such dispensation, unless they can prove it to us by miracles, and show that the counter-precept was revealed to them from Heaven, which till then must be concluded to have been sent up from Hell: else any man may say, that God hath commanded him to kill, as well as to curse the Rule of his people, or whatever else is forbidden. But Shimei had nothing to show for it, nay he had afterwards something to show against it. And therefore if David was not mistaken, he must needs have spoken by an Hebraism; it being impossible that David should be an absolute Reprobatarian, and so imagine that God could bid a man sin. God could have sent a curse to David for his sins, by what Messenger he had pleased, as well by Shimei as by Nathan; but then that curse had been Gods, and not his Messengers. Shimei could not have sinned in the delivering of his message, whilst he did as God bid him: yet 'tis apparent by the Text, that Shimei sinned against God's Precept, Exod. 22.28. From whence it follows unvoidably, that the words of David are only permissive in signification, though active in sound. Nay this (saith irrefragable Melanchthou) is the true 
(*) Haec est ve●a Grammatica interpretatio, & nihil habet absurdi: Tradere in desideria significat desertionem: Deus deserit impins, & sinit●eo● furere, & non cohibet eorum furorem. Indurabo, id est, sinam indurari, non flectam impii cordis duritiem. Melanchth. in cap. 9 ad Rom. sol. 133.  Grammatical interpretation of such Scriptures, and hath nothing in it of absurd; because the most active expressions imaginable do by an ordinary figure only signify desertion, and sufferance, a not restraining of men's fury, and a not turning of their hearts. But alas! Melanchthon was a poor shifter to Mr. Whitfield. He was only admired for his learning and holiness, by the most learned and the most holy of the Christian world; he was courted and consulted by no greater persons than Kings and Princes: whereas Mr. W. is obliging the greatest Emperor of the East, and in a zealous contention for the Mahometan Decree, confutes Melanchthon and his Hebraisme, and all the Pillars of the Church, (both ancient and modern) with the least puff of his breath. [By this shift the clearest Scriptures may be evaded.] Mr. W. and the Scotish brethren, and James Naylors worshippers, and Andrew Smith, with Coppinger, Artington, and the rest, are for a literal understanding of Gods bidding Shimei to curse King David. God did not only permit, but was active and operative and efficacious in the villainy, say these Expounders: nay, decreed it absolutely (say they) from all etermity, antecedently to his prescience of Shimei's will. And in conformity to these dreams, Coppinger said he was commanded by the Spirit of God to murder the Privy Counsellors of Queen Elizabeth: a second had a call to slay the Ministers: and a third, who could not write or read, was to be the executioner of the Lords most holy will. (Dang. Posit. l. 4. c. 10. p. 164.) The same command was alleged by them who adored James Naylor: and when Andrew Smith, at prayer time, had stabbed the Quartermaster Farley in Farfar Church, he very seriously protested, that Christ commanded him to do it. Mr. Egerton was a Minister of no small note in the Presbytery, to whom when Coppinger had revealed his extraordinary call to execute vengeance upon the Magistrates, Mr. Egerton would not discourage him in his intentions: To use his own words, 
* Dang. Posit. l. 4. ch. 14. p. 174.  [he would not hinder the zeal of Coppinger, and should be loath to quench the Spirit of God in him.] Again, the Ministers of the Kirk, when they had caused the people to take up arms against the 
† Exod. 22.28.  Ruler of the People, said they were 
* Spots. Hist. Scot l. 2. p. 330, 331.  moved thereunto by the Spirit of God, (without the shift of an Hebraism, you may be sure.) I know not whether Eldavid was brought up in the Doctrine of irrespective Decrees; but of this I am sure, that when he gave himself out to be the forerunner of the Messiah, he said he did it (without an Hebraism) by the 
† See The self-Revenger Exempl. ch. 1. p. 3, 4.  commandment of God. The time would fail me, if I should speak of all the Impostors whom I have met with, from Numa Pompilius to Mahomed, and so downwards, who did all pretend (without an Hebraism) to a secret revelation of God's command. I will conclude with one instance, which (in several pertinent respects) will be as good as a thousand; and which having touched upon elsewhere for another purpose, I shall exhibit more fully, and with a new application. 
* This Story is to be had either in Knox his Hist. of the Church of Scotl. p. 143, 144, 145 or in Bish. B acrests: Dang. Pos. l. 4. ch. 15. p. 177, 178.  Norman Lesly (who was son to the Earl of Rothsey) had fallen out with the Cardinal who was withal the Archbishop of S. Andrews, upon a private cause (faith Buchanan) between them two. He, together with James Melvin, and Peter Carmichael (zealous Reformers of Religion in the Kingdom of Scotland) forcibly broke into the Castle, and into the chamber of the said Cardinal; where they found him sitting in his chair, and crying out in these words, [I am a Priest, ye will not slay me?] Lesly struck him once or twice, and so did Peter. But Melvin (sweet man!) perceiving them both to be in choler, (and being himself in cold blood) withdrew them from their temerity, which he reproved in these words: [This work and judgement of God, although it be secret, aught to be done with great gravity.] and then presenting to the Archbishop the point of his sword, he preached thus; [Repent thee of thy former wickedness, etc.— 
* Note that the Historian is Mr. Knox, who calls this Murder, the work of God; and writes in his margin, The Godly Fact and words of James Melvin.  we from God are sent to revenge it: for here before God I protest, that neither the hatred of thy person, nor love of thy riches, moveth me to strike thee, but only thy being an enemy against Jesus Christ and his holy Gospel.] Having so preached, he fell to practice; first running him through several times with a Stog-sword (to show it was not any hatred of hi● person) and then seizing on all his Goods, Plate, and Jewels, (to show it was not any love to his Riches.)  
Let it now be but remembered, how the men of Mr. Knox and Mr. Melvin's way do distinguish of God's secret and revealed Will, what they acknowledge themselves to mean by that distinction, and in what manner they do apply it, and how without any Hebraism they understand such Texts of which I am speaking; let this, I say, be remembered by the considering Reader, and then he hath met with the Application.  
Sixthly, 
6. Mr. W's. Master's commit contradictions by not observing the Hebraism.  For want of using the said Hebraism in giving the sense of such Texts whose letter seems to make God to be the Author of sin (as Mr. Barlee saith, c. 3. p. 55.) it is wonderful to behold, into how many absurdities, and civil wars, the Commanders in Chief of that party have unawares betrayed themselves. 
* Piscator in Resp. ad duplic. Vorst. par. i p. 325. & in praefat. enuntiato 6.  Piscator flatly denies, that God doth will whatsoever he commands; and yet he flatly confesseth, we ought to grant and believe, that God will have to be done by us whatsoever he commands, and to be omitted by us what he forbids. Again, Doctor Twisse, although he saith in 
† Twiss. Vin. Gr. l. 1. part. 1. Digr. 10. c. 1. sect. 12. p. 140.  some places, that God's secret will may be contrary to his precept or revealed will, which is improperly called his will; yet he saith in other places, that God must need; will whatsoever he commands: for thus he argues, [
* Idem l. 2. advers. Arm. C●im. 3. sect. 5. p. 150. Col. 2.  God cannot be denied to have willed that Shimei should cu●se David, because the Scripture professeth that God commanded Shimei to curse him.] But now Spanhemius, of the same party (and as eminent as either) doth wholly deny what is granted (and also denied) by those two; saying positively, that 
* Spanhemius in Exercitat. de Grat. univers. p. 147.  God doth sometimes command what yet he wills not that it should be done: adding this for an instance, that they who neve● shall repent, are yet commanded by God to do what God intends they never shall do. Lastly, Dallaeus, at least as learned as either of them, and a professed Anti-Arminian, confutes all Three in a most excellent manner; and 
† Non possum non admirati duos illos summos viros propositionem hanc, Deus ea vult quae jubet, quâ eae quae ipsis probantur argumentationes totae nituntur, alibi fortiter negare. Dal. Apol. pro duab. synod. part. 2.104.  admires at the two former, that men of their learning should abjure in some places, what at other times and places they make the Basis of their reasonings, viz. That God doth will what he commands. What should be the reason of such enormities? They could not think it a fine thing for Brethren to be at odds, nor did they purposely study for self-contradictions. Why then did they run such deadly Risks? It was sure because they could not help it. When they had swallowed the great Camel, they could not strain at such Gnats. When a man gins in irrespective unconditional Decrees, he cannot possibly foresee at what absurdity he shall end. Dato hoc uno sequuntur mille. And 
* Dallaeus his ingenuity in leaving his brethren when they leave reason.  therefore Dallaeus was so ingenuous as to acknowledge, what a man of his judgement could not but know, that all those Actives above mentioned must be explained by 
† Deus voluit indurare, id est, non-●mollire Pharaonem. Ibid. p. 118. In eundem senfum Polanus Partit. Theolog. l. 1. p 75, 76.  permission. He farther adds this observation, That the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is the word expressing the Induration of Pharaoh's heart, (Deut. 29.4.) is of that conjugation which is commonly called Hiphil; and verbs of that conjugation, by the 
* Sunt interdum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 potiùs quàm 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, verba hujus generis. Sp●n. Exerc. p. 214.  confession of Spanhemius (a prime Author with Mr. W.) are many times rather privative then positive. So that when it is said, God hardened the heart of Pharaoh, the meaning is, he did not soften it, but permitted it to itself. I hope Mr. W. will not say, that the Orthodox Preacher at Charenton is a shifter, much less his admired Professor at Leyden, whom the Preacher at Charenton hath well confuted.  
☞ Seventhly, 
Mr. W. makes Light to be sin, or Absalon 's filthiness to be none, by making a parity of Gods working in either case.  Mr. W's greatest unhappiness i● in the second part of his Answer before recited. Mark his words, good Reader: [Why may we not then interpret other Scriptures in the like manner, where the like expressions are used? as when the Lord saith, I form the light, I create darkness, Isa. 45.7. I have made the earth, and created man upon it, my hands spread out the heavens, Psal. 12. Why may we not by Mr. P. his Hebraisms, interpret these verbs which are active in sound, to be permissive only in signification, and say that God permitted light and darkness to be created, and suffered the earth to be made, & c? p. 23] I have thus recorded his words in the seventh part of my Answer, though I had set them down in the beginning of the Section, because they are the most memorable I ever met with, and are alone sufficient to make a penitent Author of Mr. W. For, first, I demand of his dearest Friends and Partisans (who will certainly condemn him for this adventure, in whatever else they may excuse him) Is the case the same in those other Texts and these? Is Light a sin? Or is it no sin to be hardhearted, to defile the Concubines of a Father, to curse the Ruler of the people, and the like? The Texts expounded by an Hebraism, were such as I spoke to in the fifth Section of the former Chapter, which to take according to the Letter, is adjudged by Mr. Balee to be an impious Fact, if it is an impious Fact to asperse God with the causality of sin as sin. But when it is said, God form the light, and created darkness, it cannot be pretended that the literal acception of the words doth so much as seem to make God the Author of sin. I therefore challenge Mr. Whitfield to publish his reasons for his pretended parity of Reason, by which he hath publicly affirmed, we may interpret Gods creating of light and darkness, of his permission to create them, as well as his hardening Pharaoh's heart, and his deceiving the false Prophets, of his permission and not hindering, that the former should be hardened, and the later deceived.] If he hath no reason to give (and sure if he had we should here have heard of it) I then require him, in the name of God, to take off the scandal which he hath given to many credulous souls for whom Christ died. Let him either declare it to be his Doctrine, that God had as really an hand in Shimei's cursing his King, in Absalom's polluting his Father's Concubines, in the Egyptians hatred of his Israel, in sending strong delusion, in putting it into the hearts of the ten Kings to do wickedly, (as he interprets the Text Rev. 17.17) and as really an hand in Pharaoh's obduration, as in creating the light and the darkness, in making the earth, and in spreading out the heavens; or if he dares not declare this, then let him print his confession (to adequate the Plaster unto the wound) that he only spoke out of his stomach, and not out of his reason, because he was resolved to contradict my Answer to Mr. Barlee, and knew not how to do it better. He could not be otherwise revenged on me, then by venting himself against the Scripture: wherein he conjectured very truly, if he took that course to make me smart; because there is nothing so grievous to me, as to find a professor of Christianity to turn God's word against the holiness of his will. But whilst I pray for his amendment, I will necessitate his confession, or confusion of Face, and that by this following violentum, by which in the person of a Jew, or rather of an Atheist, I will turn his weapon upon himself. Secondly, therefore let us imagine, that Mr. Whitfield is to defend the two Natures of Christ, Divine and Humane, against the personated Atheist, who shall thus object against them both.  
Ath. That which is really a Tree cannot be really a Man, 
Mr. W. beaten with his own weapons by any Atheist who shall oppose him.  much less really a God: But Christ is really a Tree. And thus I prove it. That which is a true Vine (not a fictitious one) is very really a Tree▪ But the Scripture saith plainly, that Christ is a Vine (Joh. 5.5.) nay a True Vine (v. 1.) Therefore Christ is really a Tree.  
Mr. Wh. Those words of Scripture are only spoken by a figure, and parabolically, which amongst the Hebrews was an usual way of expression. Christ did only represent his relation to his members by that which is seen betwixt the Vine and its Branches.  
Ath. This indeed you dictate, 
The Atheist replies in Mr. W's. own words, p. 23.  but not demonstrate; nor do you bring the least patch of an Argument to prove it. And may you not by this shift evade the clearest and strongest Scriptures when brought against you, by telling us they signify quite another thing then the nature of the words do import, if we will believe you?  
Mr. W. I tell you Christ was a Jew, amongst whom it was common to deliver themselves in Parables, as you may see throughout the Old Testament as well as New. And indeed all Nations have used Apologues and Tropes, not only to signify, but to imprint their minds upon the hearers.  
Ath. Why may we not then interpret other Scriptures in the like manner, 
The Atheist replies in Mr. W's own words, p. 23.  where the like expressions are used? as when the Lord saith, I and my Father are one, Joh. 10.30. Or when the Scripture saith that Christ said, I am the true Vine, why may we not say that the Scripture speaketh by a Parable, and brings in Christ speaking by a Prosopopoeia, as divers Authors of Mythology do make Dialogues and Discourses betwixt Trees and Rivers? For how can a True Vine speak indeed, and say, I am a True Vine?  
Mr. W. But 'tis granted by all story, as well secular as sacred, and by men of all Religions, as well false as true, that Christ did truly speak and teach in the Synagogues of the Jews, and in many other both public and private places.  
Ath. That doth only infer, that Christ was a speaking and didactical Tree, not that he was not a Tree at all; for if he really spoke, this was one of his real speeches, That he said he was a True Vine. Had he said only a Vine, you might have said he only meant he was a Figurative Vine: But to anticipate that evasion, he said, I am the True Vine. And as when it is said, [God hardened Pharaohs heart, 
The Atheist replies in Mr. W's own words, p. 22.  deceived the false Prophet, and the like, the Scripture doth hold forth the manner of Gods working in sin by way of Action;] so when it is said, that Christ said, I am the true Vine, the Scripture doth hold it forth by a verb substantive, which denoteth existence, and not Phraseology. As 
* Again Mr. W's. own words, p. 22.  it is not said, God suffered Pharaoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardened it, Exod. 9.12. so it is not said, I am a metaphorical Vine, or I am called, or accounted, or compared to a Vine, but I am the true Vine, Joh. 15.1.  
Mr. Wh. But how can those words be literally meant, which infer such an absurd and unintelligible thing, as that a Tree should be rational, and yet a Tree still? This implies a contradiction, for Christ to go about doing good, by preaching, healing, and exemplary life, and yet to be a True Vine in the literal notion of the word.  
Ath. But that which the Scripture plainly, clearly, 
The Atheist replies in Mr. W's own words, p. 19  and positively asserteth, you ought not to deny, though you cannot discern the manner how it can be; It rather beseems you humbly to acknowledge your ignorance in apprehending the manner, then to deny the thing.  
Let the Reader now judge, whether the Atheist in this Dialogue hath not replied to Mr. W. as much like a Disputant, as Mr. W. hath done to me. Nay, whether there is not this difference betwixt the two cases, that it is much a lesser evil, to say that Christ is a Vine without a Figure, then to say that God without a Figure did harden Pharaoh's heart, and will that Absalon should do filthily against his Father, and 
* Maledicere Davidi actus est malus, à pietate, & charitate, adeoque & à Dei voluntate alienus. Dallaeus Apol. part. 2. p. 103.  bid Shimei curse David, and deceive the Prophet, and the like. Again, it was said by our Saviour, I am the true Vine; but it was never said in Scripture, that God was a true hardener of Pharaoh's heart, or that he did truly deceive the Prophet.  
Eighthly, Since Mr. W. asks, 
8. Mr. W. condemned out of his own mouth.  [why may we not interpret ●ther Scriptures in the like manner, etc.] to which I have given at least a satisfactory Answer, and shown him the wofulness of his Question by an Argument ad hominem, and since he jeers me with my Hebraisms (which yet are his Masters as well as mine;) I will now proceed to justify my self, and to condemn him out of his mouth. For when he comes to deny Universal Redemption, and to resist the Scriptures which are point-blank against him, he is then so gracious as to use these words; Scripture must be interpreted by Scripture: and though we are not to recede from the literal sense when it will agree with other Scriptures, and with the Analogy of Faith; yet when it is defective both these ways, we are not bound to adhere to the Letter, p. 72. Very good: I thank Mr. W. for this justice, in the dispensing of which he doth not spare his own self. For if the words of Saint 
* He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world. 1 Joh. 2.2.  John were two ways defective as to the Letter, as neither agreeable with other Scriptures, nor with the Analogy of Faith, (as Mr. W. liberally dictates) how can all those Texts whose Letter seems to make God the cause of sin as sin (saith Mr. Barlee) be either agreeable to other Texts, or to the Analogy of Faith? Are any Scriptures inconsistent with the words of Saint John in the Letter? not one in any appearance; but all on the contrary do sound the same way. Or with what Analogy of Faith are Saint John's words unagreeable? even the Faith of Mr. W. and them of his Creed. But I have 
* See the second thing replied in this Section.  proved by examples, that the Letter of those Scriptures which are cited by Mr. W. to prove that God hath a hand in sin, are inconsistent with those others by which God is affirmed to have no hand in sin; nor can it agree with the Analogy of any Faith but Mr. Whitfields'. If the Letter of the Scripture may be two ways defective, (as Mr. W. tells us it may) where is it likely so to be, if not in the places of which we speak, since nothing is dearer to God Almighty, than the inviolable honour of his Purity and his Truth? And if we are not bound always to adhere unto the Letter (as Mr. W. also granteth, to serve his ends) why doth he hold himself to it where it is most to be forsaken? because 'tis more for his turn, that God should be operative and active in all the wickedness in the world, then that Christ should die for all mankind? If that is not his reason, let him tell me what is. And if that is his reason, we know the length of his foot. Judge (good Reader) of this man's Doctrines.  
9 Again, 
9 How Scripture interprets Scripture against Mr. W.  if Scripture must interpret Scripture (as Mr. W. also doth acknowledge) I desire no more to prove my Hebraism. For all those Scriptures of Gods hardening Pharaoh, bidding Shimei curse David, delivering up to vile affections, sending delusion, and the like, receive the same interpretation (which I have given) from the words of S. Paul (which are also Scripture) who told the People of Lycaonia, that [God in times past 
* Act. 14.16. which compare with Act. 17.30. Rom. 2.4. 1 Cor. 10.13. 1 Pet. 3.22. Exod. 34.6. Act. 13.18.  suffered all Nations to walk in their own ways.] Their wicked ways were wholly their own, and they alone did walk in them without God's help: he gave them their being, life, and motion, which were very good things, but he had not the least hand in the determination of their wills to wickedness, or their consenting to their temptations; he only suffered them with patience to walk in the ways which they had 
† Isa. 66.3.  chosen, to wit, their own ways, which were called their own, because they chose them. And here 'tis fit that I meet again with Mr. W. For as he said (p. 22.) that it was not said, God suffered Pharaoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardened it; so here I say on the other side, it was not said by S. Paul, God excited, or commanded, or decreed all nations to walk in their own ways, but that he suffered them to do it. Come we then to a trial of Scripture by Scripture, which to do for the benefit of common people (whom I am sure in my writings I most consider) I will compare 2. Scriptures, by placing one on the right hand, another on the left; that men may see so much the better, which of the two must be the Rule, by which the other is to be guided; which the Touchstone, by which the other is to be tried; which the Standard, with which the other is to comply.  
Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves, Rom. 1.24. For this cause, God gave them up to vile affections, v. 26. God in times past suffered all Nations to walk in their own ways, Act. 14.16. He endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, Rom. 9.2. (that is, fitted by themselves, by those their sins, which God endured or suffered.)  
They are both the say of S. Paul, as well the Active on the left hand, as the Passive on the right. By which of the two, which of the two must be expounded? when God is said to have given up to uncleanness, is it not only meant that he suffered them to be unclean? or when he is said to have suffered them to walk in their own ways, is it also meant that he had a 
* Note that p. 26. Mr. W. saith of sin, that God doth both will and work it, and hath a hand in effecting it.  hand and efficiency (to use the phrases of Mr. W.) in such their do? Res ipsa loquitur, The Case itself speaks itself. For, first, the uncleanness, and vile affections, were the uncleannest and vilest that can be thought on: and how could God have a * working or * active hand in such villainies, more vile than which the Devil himself cannot invent? Secondly, They were before habituated in the practice of their uncleanness, and that is rendered for the reason why God gave them up: 
** These are also M. W's expressions.  as appears by the wherefore v. 24. and for this cause v. 26. But what sense is it to say, that God did actively and operatively give them up to filthy habits, to which they had given up themselves too long before? or admit they had not, yet what madness is it to say, that because their tempter and their own hearts had made them admirably wicked, God should therefore be active to make them worse? Thirdly, There is 
* Note, I mean the conf ssion of M. W's Teachers, who know any thing of those matters; not of himself, who hath printed either his ignorance that there is any such thing, or at least the dissimulation of his knowledge.  confessedly an Hebraism, by which actives in sound are permissives in signification; but no such Hebraism, or other figure, by which passives in sound are actives in sense. Fourthly, For God to suffer or endure the sins of men is exactly agreeable to the Analogy of Faith; but to will and work sin, or to have an hand in the effecting of it (as M. W's words are) is according to the Analogy of what is worse than infidelity. From all which it is apparent, that the Scripture in the left Column must be interpreted by that in the right. And now I will add some more Examples.  
1. If the Prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have 
* That is, I have permitted him to be deceived: or (as Grotius) I will deceive him by giving him such an end as he expects not.  deceived that Prophet, Ezek. 14.9. 1. Speak ye every man the truth to his neighbour, and love no false oath; for all these are things that I hate, saith the Lord, Zech. 8.16, 17. 2. Behold I will 
* That is, I will expose it to the lusts of the Gentiles, and not restrain them from profaning it.  profane my Sanctuary, Ezek. 24.21. 2. He shall not profane the Sanctuary of his God. He shall not come nigh unto the Altar, that he profane not my Sanctuaries, for I the Lord do sanctify them, Leu. 21.12, 23. 3. I 
* That is, I suffered them to commit sacrileges, or to make sacrilegious sacrifices.  polluted them in their own gifts, Ezek. 20.26. 3. Thou art of purer eyes then to behold evil; neither canst thou look on iniquity, Hab. 1.13. 4. I 
† That is, I with drew my Grace from them, so that contemning my laws they made laws unto themselves.  gave them statutes which were not good, Ezek. 20.25. 4. The Commandment of the Lord is pure, and enlightening the eyes, Psal. 19.8. The Law is holy, and the Commandment holy, just, and good, Rom. 7.12. 5. God shall 
* That is, I will suffer Magicians to deceive them: or will not hinder delusion from being sent.  send them strong delusion that they should believe a lie, that they all might he damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness, 2 Thes▪ 2.11, 12. 5. Thou art not a God ha● hath pleasure in wickedness, neither shall any evil dwell with thee, Psal. 5.4. Thou desirest truth in the inward parts, Psal. 51.6. The fruit of the Spirit is in all truth, Eph. 5.9. As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, why will ye die? Ezek. 33.14. 6. O Lord, why hast thou 
† That is, why wouldst thou suffer us, by our being oppressed with a long tyranny, to faint in our duties, and to forsake thy law?  made us to err from thy ways, and hardened our heart from thy fear? Isa. 63.17. 6. Ye have wearied the Lord with your words, Mal. 2.17. Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and come and stand before me in this house, which is called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these abominations? Jer. 7.9, 10.  
Now what opinion they were of concerning Gods Decrees, who wearied him with their words, and said they were delivered to commit all those abominations, (and that in an active sense, without an Hebraism,) is very obvious to be imagined. Again, whether it implies not a most blasphemous contradiction, for God to will what he hateth, and to decree what he forbiddeth, & to set forward what he hindereth, (as far as promises, and threats, and persuasions come to) and to have a willingness of the same thing of which he is perfectly unwilling, every A B C darian may well inform us. And then (by a consequence unavoidable) whether the Scriptures on the right hand are not the 
* Note, that what is spoken by an Hebraism, Is. 6.10. Shut their eyes, and so repeated by S. John, he hath blinded their eyes, Joh. 12.40. is cited thus by our Saviour, Their eyes they have closed, Mat. 13.15. and so 'tis explained by S. Paul, Act. 28.27.  Touchstone, and the Rule whereby to try and to interpret the other Scriptures on the left; And whether those on the left hand are not spoken by the Hebraism of which I spoke, and to be meant of God's permission, not of his working or efficiency (as Mr. W. tell us;) And whether my way of understanding the Scriptures on the left hand is not perfectly agreeable to those Scriptures on the right, to the Analogy of Faith, to the judgement of right reason, to the constant assertion of 
* Note, that I exclude from the universalily of the Fathers all sorts of Libertines, by whatsoever Titles they are distinguished.  all the Fathers, nay to the dictate of common sense, I leave it to be determined by the indifferent Reader.  
Well therefore said S. Paul to the Heathens of Lycaonia, that God had suffered all Nations to walk in their own ways: for had he said (with Mr. W. p. 26.) that God did will and work sin, and had an hand in effecting of it, the Lycaonians might rather have stoned him, then have been ready to do 
* Act. 14.18.  sacrifice. S. Paul therefore added, (that they might not think ill of God for suffering the wickedness of the Nations) that although God had suffered them to walk in their own ways, yet he left not himself without a witness, in that he did good (v. 17.) which had not easily been believed, had he said to those heathens (as Mr. W. to us) that 
* Note, that M. W, makes this his medium whereby to prove God's hand in effecting sin, p. 26. lin. 5, 6, 7.  sin does make for God's glory, who in that respect doth both will and work it, and hath an hand in effecting of it. It being hard to believe, that sin, which is God's dishonour can make for his glory, or that God, who is all purity, can will and work sin. Hard (I say) for a Heathen to believe such stuff, but impossible for a Christian, who believes his Saviour affirming plainly, 
† Mat. 7.18.  that a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. There is an infinite difference betwixt sins making for God's glory, and Gods taking occasion from sin (which dishonours him one way) to glorify himself some other way. The Jews murdering of Christ did not make for God's glory, (for 'twas the greatest dishonour could have been done him, that they should commit such a wickedness whom God had owned for his people) but God did glorify his Mercy, his Wisdom, and his Justice, in accepting the death of Christ for the propitiation of all our sins. I say, in accepting the death, not the murdering of Christ. As Ch●ist did willingly lay down his life, and suffer himself to be put to death, he was the sacrifice of the world, and that did make for God's glory: But as the Jews did violently take away his life, they were murderers in the highest, and that did make for God's dishonour. No sober man did ever say, that God can make evil good; but some have said, that God can draw good out of evil, which is quite another thing. Nor do they mean by so saying, that God draws good out of evil, as we draw water out of a ditch, but that from men's doing evil he takes an occasion of doing good.   

Sect. 2.  
Mr. W. proceeds to a new Objection, but of his own invention, 
His return to his first method of serging objections to himself.  not taken out of my writings, or out of any man's else; for if it had, he would have cited the place where it is legible. And yet he confidently saith, [He further objects p. 23.] so that here I must as confidently accuse him of Forgery, and charge him to make me satisfaction. But what superchery is this, to entitle his book against mine, and to omit a hundred things which I did really there object, and to forge a ridiculous objection, and (which is the top of the Commission) to call it mine? I have already been too tedious in speaking to his Chimaeras throughout my first Chapter, and will now be shorter to make amends.  

1. He is at odds with D. Twisse.  First, I observe 'tis his opinion, [that though God worketh not in the same manner in evil actions as he doth in good, or as evil men themselves do, yet me must not deny that he hath any work at all in evil actions, since himself doth so often and so expressly affirm it: p. 23, 24.] Dr. Twisse and Mr. W. are at odds, for the Doctor 
* See Correct Copy, p. 10.  saith undauntedly, that God's decree is no less efficacious in the permission of evil, then in the production of good.  

2. To make men sin is a sin of the worst size.  2. To say that God doth not work in sin as sinful men themselves do, is no more than to say, that God doth nor sin, or is not a sinner, but only makes men sinners, as 
* See Correct Copy, p. 10.  Zuinglius expressly speaks, whom Mr. W. defendeth p. 24. but to say that God did decree sin, and praedestine men to sin, and work sin in men as a physical cause, and compel men to sin, so as they cannot but commit it, is worse than truly can be said of any sinner; neither Man nor Devil can compel any one to sin. Tarquin could ravish Lucretia, but could not compel her to be lascivious. The Devil could torment and plunder Job, but not compel him to be impatient. Now that those men do teach, that men are compelled by God to sin, (besides my 
† Diu. Philanth. ch. 3. Sect. 34. p. 132, etc.  Catalogue of examples) I can prove by the 
* Quoties quenquam impelli à Deo aut cogi dicunt, rhetoricè potiùs loquuntur, etc. Twisse. Vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1. sect. 1. Crim. 3. c. 1. p. 29.  confession of Doctor Twisse, who doth acknowledge, and excuse that very expression in his own party. Besides, Jeroboam did not work in Israel's sins in the same manner that they did, (because he was not them) but 'twas the worst part of his Character, that he made Israel to sin, (2 King. 15.18, 24, 28.) yet he neither did, nor could compel them. It was the worst part of the unbelieving Jews, that they stirred up the Gentiles, and made their minds evil affected against the brethren (Act. 14.2.) yet they proceeded not to compulsion. Nay, it was reckoned by Nathan as the worst thing in David, that by the sins he had committed, he had given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme (2 Sam. 12.14.) which was far from coaction or compulsion, the very terms applied by those men to God. And therefore Deodate himself, though the chief Minister of Geneva, denies that God is so much as the 
* Deodat. in Prov. 16.4.  occasion of sin; much less could he judge him to be the cause, or the coactor.  

3. Yet ascribed unto God by that sort of men.  3. Though it is said by M. W. that the manner of Gods working in sin is secret, & not to be apprehended, (p. 23.) yet he and his predecessors have described the manner of it, in the most plentiful manner that any description can be made in. They say [he tempts, and prostitutes, and acts, and operates, and works, and wills, and seduceth, & draws, and commands, and compels, and moves, and drives, and stirs up to sin, as a natural cause (say some;) as a moral cause (sayothers;) as an efficient cause of the sinful act, as an accidental cause of the obliquity of the act, as a man puts spurs to a dull Jade, and as a man is excited to enjoy his own wife, etc.] All these expressions I have met with in Mr. W. partly, and partly in Mr. B. yet these are far from being All; they are but All which I can remember in the present haste that I am in. But whosoever shall examine my several Catalogues in other books, and compare them with what they find in this which now I am upon, will say that all this is truth, yet not the whole truth.   

Sect. 3.  

1. The easy and ordinary perversion of the Scriptures.  But Mr. W. proceedeth thus. [But all those Scriptures mentioned, it may appear what little reason Mr. P. had to make such a clamour against those our Protestant Divines,— as if they made God to be the Author of sin, when he knows that they positively professed, and some of them strongly proved the contrary, p. 24.] So he saith, and saith only. But 1. I have proved in my Sect. 1. of this Chapter, that the abuse of those Scriptures is a great portion of the impiety. Suppose that some Lucian should make a Cento out of the letter of the Scriptures, as Ausonius did out of Virgil; would the impiety of the thing be any whit the more excusable, because he could show that his expressions were all from Scripture? or would it not rather be so much the worse? 'Tis known that Proba Falconia composed a history of the Life of Christ, and a good part also of the Pentateuch of Moses, from out of the works of Virgil a Heathen Poet. And out of the very same Virgil (however so chaste in his expressions, that he hath won the Title of the Parthenian Poet) Ausonius very wittily, but yet most 
* Ingeniosum, sed adeo foedum, ut neque Scriptore nec Auditore dignum sir. Scaliger l. 6. p. 825  detestably, made up the filthiest Fescennine that hath been read. Again, the Empress Eudoxia writ the life of our Saviour in the words of Homer, (a blinder Heathen than Virgil was.) And were it not every whit as possible, to patch up the life of Achilles in a Rhapsody collected from the holy Penmen of our Gospel? If Mr. Wh. will know what may be done in this kind, let him consult the Capilupi, both Laelius, and Julius, set out by Henry Meibomius; and Otho Gryphius of Ratisbon; or Lilius Greg. Gyraldus; or whom else he pleaseth. Let me mind him also of this, that all the Heresies in Christendom have sucked out a nourishment to themselves from the sincere milk of the word, although immediately flowing from the breast of truth. So great a difference is to be found amongst the several digestions of the very same meat.  

2 Mr. W. mistakes the Errors for the Persons of some Protestants, and confounds them with the Papists.  2. I did not clamour against Protestant Divines, but against the heathenish asseverations which had been published in the writings of Presbyterians and Papists, not only Dominicans, but Jesuits also, for which I 
* S●e Diu. Phil●n. ch. 1. sect. 5. p. 27, 28.  produced the confessions of Doctor Twisse and Mr. Barlee. But being a Protestant myself, I had by so much the greater reason to declare against the blasphemies of any Protestant Divines, that I might not be accessary so much as by my silence; and that some Papists might cease to say (what they commonly have done) that those horrible Doctrines are indiscriminately the Protestants, and that quà tales. Nor can I but think it well worth my labour, if I have made it more known than it was before, that whatever dishonours have been done unto the Protestant Name, by those of the Kirk, or the Consistory, or their adherents here in England, yet the dutiful Sons of the Church of England have ever been free from any part of that guilt. Besides, the chief exclaimers against the Presbyterians (for Protestant Divines is an equivocal expression, and comprehends those Protestans whom I assert, as well as those whom I oppose) were the other sort of Presbyterians, I mean the Arminians & Remonstrants in the Low Countries, who still remained Presbyterian in point of Discipline (for aught I can learn) although they left their own party for the enormities of their Doctrine. Farther yet; My clamours were no greater against the Dogmatical sort of Calvinists, then were their own clamours against each other; nor indeed so great, as I conceive I have evinced upon 
* See The Diu. Purity defended, ch. 4. sect. 6. p. 31, etc.  another occasion. And how Doctor Twisse in particular hath made his clamours against his Brethren, I have 
† See the Diu. Philan. Def. c 1. p. 12. & ch. 3. p. 123, 124, 125.  acquainted Mr. Barlee when he wanted that knowledge.  

3. His party clamour against themselves, and affront God with an Epitrope.  3. What Mr. W. plead for them, doth make their case so much the worse: for if they say in some places, that God is much more than the Author of sin (as the word Author may be expounded;) and again in other places, that he is precisely the Author of it (both which I have showed again and again;) and yet do say in a third sort of places, that God is not the Author of sin; they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-condemners, and contradictors, and have justified me in all my say, as well when I accuse them of breathing hot and cold too, as when I accuse them of breathing all Fire. Besides, to say that God decreed sin by an Absolute Decree, that he wills and works it, that he is the cause of it, that he hath a hand and efficiency in it, tempts, excites, and compels men to it, but yet he is a good God, and therefore not the Author of it, what is this but to affront him with a dishonourable Epitrope? If my memory doth not deceive me, it was in a speech against Verres, where Cicero used such kind of Rhetoric: 
* Sat fur, sit sacrilegus, sit flagitiorum omnium vitiorumque Princeps; at est bonas Imperator & felix. Cic. in Verr.  Be it so that he is a Thief, a sacrilegious person, the Patron in chief of all villainies and vices, yet however he is a good and a happy General, etc. I clearly find that Mr. W. and many others of that way, do not hitherto understand the full importance of the word Author, its derivation, or use in classic Authors. I shall therefore make that a peculiar business, when I shall come to demonstrate, that I did use them with tenderness in saying no more of their Doctrines then plainly this, That they did make the God of purity to be the Author of sin. What can I think of that man, who shall tell me that I lie, and yet affirm when he hath done, I am a very true speaker? I cannot but think him a very bitter Rhetorician, and that he mocks me by an Epitrope. Doctor Twisse apologizeth (as I lately said) for the men of his way, by saying that their speeches are but Rhetorical, when God is said by any of them to 
* See the D●v. Philan. ch. 1. p. 26.  compel men to sin. And when that Doctor doth plainly say, [that there is on God's part a 
† Twiss. Vin. Gr. l. 2. p. 1. sect. 2. Cr. 3. Digr. 2. c. 15. p. 156.  prostitution to sin required, which prostitution cannot be perfected without temptations leading up to the act of sinning,] 'tis likely he would allege that he did yet deny God to be the Author of sin. But then I should think it a shrewd Epitrope, than which I cannot conceive a greater dishonour to the Almighty.  

4. Mr. W's. clamours against Protestant Divines.  4 Mr. W. must call to mind, what clamours he and his party have commonly made against Protestant Divines, by calling them Enemies to the Grace of God, and Introducers of Atheism, without a tolerable colour of reason for it, nay quite against it; since they are enemies to Grace, who sacrilegiously enclose it, and seek to rob it of its extent; and they are rather the Introducers of Atheism, who represent God to be such, as cannot modestly be owned: for when men have been taught such Notions of God, which as soon as they believe, they cannot conceive him to be good, they think it modesty to infer that there is 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  no God at all, and that the notions which they were taught were but the characters of a Chimaera.  

5. And jumps in so doing with the Jesuited Papists.  5. What Mr. W. saith in his parenthesis [that some of his Authors were instruments in advancing the work of Reformation, p. 24.] it most concerned him to have concealed: for in that he joins hands with the most Jesuited Papists, who did purposely infect some noted Protestants with their invention of irrespective Decrees, that they might have some little colour for which to defame our Reformation; betraying some Protestants into the mire, upon a design to accuse them of being dirty. But we know, as well as Aristotle (from whom we learned it) that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be faulty, and yet the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without all blame. Again, we insist upon Melanchthon, and the other brave persons of the Augustan Synod; upon the Orthodox Bishop Tunstal, who helped to begin our Reformation; upon the Confessors and Martyrs (such as Cranmer, Cooper, Latimer, and the like) who carried it on here in England. As we think not the worse of Christianity, for what is spoken by Zosimus of Constantine the Great; so neither do we conceive our Reformation to be concerned in the personal Aberrations of Mr. Calvin, or Zuinglius, any more than in the vices of King Henry the eighth. If there were any sound arguing from some particular Reformers, unto the general work of the Reformation, or from the same man's errors in one kind, to his being erroneous in all others, (than which sort of arguing there is nothing more silly) Geneva and Helvetia must look to that. But Luther in Saxony preceded both in that work; who though he fell into the errors of other men at the first, yet he exchanged them for the truth in his riper years, as well as Melanchthon and other Worthies.   

Sect. 4.  

1. His foulest Imputation cast upon the Scriptures.  Mr. W. saith further, [that what expressions they used in this subject, were but the same in effect with Scripture-expressions, yea not altogether so high, p. 24. 1. This is so admirably false, that I wonder how he durst say it. And because it is the Word of God upon which he hath cast this foul aspersion, In the name of God I do require him, either to make good his words by a collation of the particulars, or to take away this stumbling-block in as public a manner as here he sets it in the people's way. 2. If he shall make a Parodia of Holy Writ, which is a Rhapsody inversed, and so endeavour to palliate this ghastly speech, the fraud will be the more visible, by having on it so thick a cloak. And 3. If he is really of opinion, that the sense and mind of the Scriptures (though not the words) doth not only go as high, but higher too, than the expressions of his party, and of himself, whilst they say, [that God doth make men transgressors, and that adultery is his work, that he tempts men unto sin, nay compels them to it, that he wills and works it, nay that he preordained men to sin as sin, that not only the Action itself, but the very pravity and deformity of it makes way to God's glory, and a world the like stuff;] If he thinks that this was meant by the Apostle Saint Paul in his Epistles, God gave them up to uncleanness, Rom. 1.24. and God shall send them strong delusion, 2 Thess. 2.11. (which yet is infinitely different from those expressions I just now mentioned) I think it a duty incumbent on me, to admonish the followers of Mr. W. that they take great heed to that important Advertisement which is given them by Saint Peter; and that they accommodate it at least to this occasion. It being likely, 
* 2 Pet. 3.16. Saint Peter's Caveat touching Paul's Epistles.  That there are divers things in S. Paul's Epistles, which being hard to be understood, they that are unlearned and unstable are apt to wrest to their destruction. The matter we see is of no small moment. A man may wrest God's word (not to some little inconvenience only, but) to the greatest mischief to be imagined, the eternal destruction of Body and Soul. Scripture is easily mistaken; mistakes of Scripture are not easily rectified; and being not rectified, they do pervert the word of God, which is the River of Life, not only into a dead, but a kill Letter. Those two say of Saint Paul were both cited by Mr. W. (p. 22.) in the behalf of his own and his Teacher's Doctrines. The ugly Nature of those Doctrines I have many times showed: what he now saith of them, and of the Scriptures compared with them, the Reader hath seen in the beginning of this Section. And whether or no he is a wrester, good people judge.  
I know 'tis said by Mr. W. (p. 19) that in the places above mentioned the Scripture doth plainly, and clearly, and positively assert what God doth; and so by consequence he may ask, what can be easier than a short sentence wherein there is never a hard word? Every man who hath been cheated may know the meaning of delusion, and every child who can but go on an errand can tell us what it i● to send. Saint Peter speaks of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, difficult things to be understood in the Epistles of Saint Paul. But what need we have a Key when the Door is open?  

2. The literal plainness of some Scriptures doth make them difficult to some.  2. But here the unlearned and the unstable must be informed, that in the plainness of some Texts the greatest difficulty consists. And dangers are greatest, when least suspected: which no doubt is the reason why many stumble in plain ground, because they there take no heed unto their footing. Nothing seems to be plainer than those words of our Saviour, My Father is greater than I: And, This is my Body, This is my Blood; My Flesh is meat indeed, and my Blood is drink indeed. Yet from the plainness of the former, how many have stumbled into Arianism? and from the plainness of the later, how many have fallen into the error of Transubstantiation? And from the literal plainness of such words, God shall send them strong delusion that they should believe a lie, how many have stumbled and fallen headlong into that worst of errors, that God hath an hand and efficiency in sin? Even by those and the like expressions, Mr. W. hath made us see (such hath been his own blindness) that such plain Scriptures are hard, because they are plain: hard as to the sense because so plain, as to the Letter. But we know that Satan is the spirit of Delulusion; that the Magicians there alluded to were the Emissaries of Satan, and not of God; that God is the spirit both of holiness and Truth; that sin and Satan are none of God's Messengers; that Simon Magus (that man of sin, v. 3, 9) was Satan's Apostle, and sent by Satan, but not by God, who did only not hinder him from being sent; that Saint Paul's own words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (not strong delusion, but) the working of error, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to the believing of a lie, which signifies nothing but the event; it is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that they may believe a lie, which might seem to the illiterate to note the end of an intention. But suppose it had been [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That,] yet Mr. W. must have looked into the whole importance of the word; and I do earnestly beseech him (since he takes upon him to be a Shepherd, nay a 
* Note that He and Mr. B. did join in that prank of a mock-ordination of Ministers.  sender out of Shepherds into Christ his Fold) that he will vouchsafe to know the difference betwixt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the conjunction [That] as it is causal (and so in most places) or merely consequential, (and so in many:) this one distinction will preserve him from falling in many plain paths of Scripture (plain I mean as to the Letter) and in the path where he is fallen (2 Thes. 2.11.) it will contribute to help him up: whereas for want either of knowing, or at least of heeding this little thing, he hath frequently fallen, and very foully.  

3. A short direction to the means of remedy or prevention.  3. I will finally reinforce my Admonition upon the vulgar, that they take great heed in their perusal of many Scriptures; not that any Scriptures can be unsound or dangerous in themselves, but because they are capable of being wrested. Some are unlearned, and some. unstable, and the rather unstable, because unlearned. These must not be entrusted (by us or by themselves) with the less fordable passages of the waters of Life. I could give my instances in many Scriptures, but Saint Peter gives his in the Epistles of Saint Paul, that Learned Preacher of the Gentiles, whom none but such as are learned should dare to read without a Clavis. The Tremendous mistakes of the Texts above mentioned (Rom. 1.24, 26. 2 Thes. 2.11.) and of the greatest part of the ninth Chapter to the Romans, (to name no more) may serve for a warning to the ignorant and seduced people of the Nation, not to presume on such places without an Interpreter at their Elbow; I mean a qualified, authentic,  Interpreter, and such as may easily be had, and be as easily used by English Readers, that is in a word, Doctor Hammond's Annotations upon the whole New Testament.   

Sect. 5.  

1. Mr. W. either means that God hath a hand in evil, because in the contrary.  Mr. W. incurs another danger, which he also calls an other Argument. Some will laugh (I am sure) but others (I hope) will rather weep at it. His words are these, That God hath some hand in the Acts of sinful men, appears, because the substratum or subject of sin, namely, the natural motion or action whereunto the sin cleaveth, is that whereof he is the proper cause and efficient: therefore he must needs have some efficiency in it, p. 24.] If by the Substratum he means the man who is the subject of sin, 
Look forward on c. 3. sect. 14.  God indeed is the cause of man, but man is not a motion, much less a sin. If by Motion, Act, and Action, he means that which is natural, as the act of walking, eating, digesting, speaking, thinking, and the like; God again is the cause of these, but not of any thing that is sinful; it being no more sinful to walk, eat, speak, or think, then to be as God made us, not only moveables, but men. So that if Mr. W. doth mean no more, he speaks not a syllable to the purpose, but plainly deserts his undertaking. And to prove that God hath a hand in evil, because he hath a hand in that which is good, is to say a thing is, because it is not; or that it is thus, because it is quite otherwise. By such Logic as this, he may say, that the Devil hath a hand and efficiency in good, (giving this for his reason) because he is the efficient and proper cause of evil. And indeed it is much less impious, to ascribe something of Nature to that perverter of nature, than the least perversion of nature to the God of all grace.  

2. Or that the Act of sin is not the sin;  But 2. It appears by the scope and tenor of his Book, that when he saith, God hath a hand in the Acts of sinful men, he certainly means, the sinful Acts, which sinful Acts are the Acts of sin, or (to speak it in other words) the sins themselves; for that these are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, three expressions of the same thing, will be made undeniable by this example. The act of sinful David was the Act of lying with Bathshebah. The Act of lying with Bathshebah was the sinful Act, to wit, the Act of Adultery, and so the sin. For whether we say, that his lying with Bathshebah was his Adultery, or his Act of Adultery, we say the same thing, and we find them promiscuous in all men discourses of the thing. Now that his Adultery, or his Act of lying with Bathshebah, was the sin itself which he committed, (not the Substratum, or Subject of his sin, distinguishable from it tanquam accidens à subjecto, aut res à re,) I am confident Mr. W. will not dare to deny: It being granted by men of all sides, that to pollute another man's Wife is Adultery itself, and that Adultery is the sin itself which is called by that name, and by that distinguished from other sins.  

3. Or that God is the proper cause and efficient of sin; and this proved by a Dilemma.  3. From whence it follows avoidable, that Mr. W. affirms God to be the proper cause and efficient of sin itself. Nor can he escape it, let him go which way he will, to the negative, or the affirmative of what I said just now. For let him answer to my Dilemma. Was David's lying with Bathshebah (by which she was impregned) the mere substratum or subject of his sin of adultery, or the very sin of adultery itself? If Mr. W. shall say the first, than it is clearly his Doctrine, that God was the proper cause and efficient of David's lying with Bathshebah. (for 'tis his positive assertion, that of the motion or action to which the sin cleaves, God is the proper cause or efficient.) And if Mr. W. shall say the second, than he must run into the very same mischief, or yield me up the whole cause, and bid particular defiance to Mr. Barlee and Mr. Hick. which will soon appear by this other Dilemma. Was david's lying with Bathshebah (which is granted to be the very sin of Adultery in the second member of the first Dilemma) an Act, or an Action, or a Motion, or a positive thing? or was it none of these four? If he shall say, it was an act, an action, or a motion, than again he calls God the proper cause or efficient of the sin itself, david's lying with Bathshebah: (for if the Reader will look back, he shall find all three in the subject of this Section) and withal it implies a gross contradiction, to say that that is the sin itself, which was said before to be the subject only of sin to which the sin cleaves. If he shall say, that David's lying with Bathshebah was a positive thing (which he cannot but say, if he shall say it is the other three) then either he must acknowledge that Mr. Barlee and Mr. Hick. are blasphemers in grain, for having said expressly, that 
* Mr. Hick's words in a letter to Mr. B. printed by Mr. B. ch. 3. p. 112.  whatever positive thing is not from God is God, or else he must say it was the creature of God, or else he must say it was God himself. For so it follows in the two brethren, 
† Ibid Look forward on, ch. 3. Sect. 18.  there is no medium betwixt Deus & Creatura: making no distinction betwixt God's creatures and the Devils, but concluding that David's lying with Bathshebah, if a positive entity, was as much God's creature as David himself was. But if to avoid these rocks, Mr. W. shall throw himself on the later horn of the Dilemma, and say that David's lying with Bathshebah was no act, action, motion, or positive thing; that will toss him out of all reason; not only set him at enmity with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the common maxims of all mankind, and even the judgement of common sense, but also infer that sin is nothing, and so that sinners are either not damned at all, or damned for nothing, or damned for something besides their sins.  

4. Humane learning a good foundation for a Divine.  4. I will not here exagitate his wants of knowledge in physiology, (which would administer occasion of much discourse) because his errors in Divinity are too apt of themselves to make me tedious. I will only observe, how needful 'tis for a Divine to lay his foundations of knowledge in humane learning, or at least to preach only by way of exhortation to departed from evil, and to do the thing that is good, but not to meddle in matters beyond their ken. The sad effects of such meddling I have showed already, and am now to show further in the ensuing Paragraph. For what I spoke as a Physician to show Mr. B. the immediate cause of his disease, Mr. W. either could not, or would not comprehend, and doth his utmost to nourish the peccant Humours. Mark him well as he goes on.   

Sect. 6.  

Mr. W's rare essays to separate the wickedness from the Act of the wicked Act.  [Object. Against this Mr. P. objects, that it is as impossible to separate the wickedness of the Act from the Act which is wicked, as to separate roundness from the globe, and to separate sinfulness from the sin as from the sinful act, p. 24.] 1. This is now the second morsel of my Philanthropy, which he hath ventured to fasten his Teeth upon: that the Reader may see, how much oftener I have occasion to confute Mr. W's inventions, then to defend mine own Doctrine delivered in that Book, which his boasting Title-page pretends to combat. 2. He had not ●he courage to cite my words right, or to acknowledge in the Errata that his citation was wrong: For 1. he citys them all from ch. 4. p. 48. where I had said nothing like it: nor hath it cost me a little trouble to find the pages of my book where such words are to be found; which truly is matter of just complaint: and now at last I have found them in two distinct pages at great distance, whereas he hath cited them as from the same, and as spoken in the same period, p. 48. but the former part is p. 42. and the later p. 43. and each in the midst of the several pages. 2. He hath left out the word [wicked] which he found in my sentence before the first mention of the word [Act;] which is the less excusable, because he citys so few things from me. 3. He takes not any notice of what Lurged for the proof of those few words, but barely sets down the words themselves: which being a great Tergiversation in a pretender to confute me, deserves no other reply then to be sent for satisfaction to my three whole 
* See the Diu. Philan. defended, ch. 4. p. 42, 43, 44.  pages upon that subject. Yet that he may not be able to say I slight him, I will show him his unhappiness in every part of his Answer, though not so much of his unhappiness, as I could easily discover if I would lose so much time.   

Sect. 7.  

His first essay is a bare dictate including a manifold absurdity, no less than 8.  His 1. Answer is this [God is little beholding to him for so denying him to be the Author of the evil that cleaves to the actions of nature, as withal to deny him to be the Author of nature; for maintaining his purity, by denying his omnipotency, p. 24, 25.] First, 'Tis an ugly expression, to say that God is little beholding to me for any thing, as if for something he might be possibly beholding: when I have done my best for the honour of God, I have done but my duty; which being my duty but in part, and infinitely far from what I owe him, I must say (when all is done) I am an 
* Luk. 17.10.  unprofitable servant. 2. But yielding Mr. W. his naughty terms, how much less can it be said that God is beholding to Mr. W. who would so maintain him to be the Author of nature, as to make him also the Author of things against Nature? How much rather is Satan beholding to him, for so asserting God's omnipotence, as to asperse his purity, and so by consequence to plead for Satan? 3. It goes ill enough with Mr. W. that what he saith, he saith only, without an offer of any proof; to which it were sufficient to say the contrary with the same confidence, and to charge or challenge him to provide his proof against hereafter: yet even thus he is worsted, by the mere opposition of dictate to dictate; because 'tis less wicked to ascribe some work of God unto the Devil, then to ascribe the proper work of the Devil unto God. 
* Of actions natural and unnatural. Nature corrupted and uncorrupted.  4. But I will more than dictate: though he doth not; for I will mind him that the word Nature, which of itself is good when God is called the God of Nature, is often set in opposition to Grace, and is used to signify the corruption of Nature, at least by way of connotation: which Mr. W. not considering, (as something or other is still the cause of aberrations from the truth) confounds the Actions of Nature with unnatural actions. To speak, indeed, is the work of Nature, but sure it is not a sin to speak: To pray sincerely is the work of Grace, and sure it is not a sin to pray sincerely: But to blaspheme against God, is neither a work or an action of Grace or Nature; yet is it a work or action as really as the former; that is, a work of the Devil, ungracious, and unnatural, against the God of Grace and Nature. Now the difference is wide betwixt speaking in general, and speaking in particular to the glory of God, and particular speaking against God's glory. For the last of these, I demand of Mr. W. is that action of blaspheming or speaking against God, an action of Nature, or is it not? If he saith Yes, he doth bewray it to be his doctrine, that God is the Author of blaspheming against God; which blaspheming, as 'tis an action, so 'tis a sin too: If he saith No, than he confesseth there are actions which are not of Nature, unless he will say that to blaspheme is no action: if the former, he pulls down with both hands what he erected only with one; if the later, then according to his reasoning, either to speak is not an action, or to blaspheme is not to speak: and so the farther he proceeds, the wo●se it fares with him. 4. Where now was the ground of Mr. W's saying that I deny God's omnipotence? Even my dutiful denial that God is the Author of such actions, as blaspheming, cursing, fight against God, David 's lying with Bathshebah, Cain 's killing Abel, and the like. He may by the same Logic accuse the Apostle of denying God's omnipotence, and that in contradiction to the word of God: for our Saviour saith, with God nothing shall be impossible, Luke 1.37. but the Apostle saith, It is impossible for God to lie, Heb. 6.18. The reconcilement stands in this, that our Saviour spoke of good things only: for of evils it is true, that 'tis impossible for God to be either Principal or accessary. Now because I maintain, that God cannot will, or work sin in his creatures, Mr. W. proclaims that I deny God's omnipotence. And this is just the very calumny of Atheistical 
* Orig. contra Cells. l. 4.  Celsus against Origen. But I have 
† See Correct Copy, p. 22, 23.  elsewhere showed, that if God were- able to be the Author of such actions, he were able not to be God, which were only a power of being impotent. There are many things of which the Scripture saith, God cannot do them. As he cannot deny himself, 2 Tim. 2.13. He cannot lie, Tit. 1.2. What God hath promised absolutely he cannot but perform, Heb. 6.18. Goe 18. ●5. Gen. 19.22. Heb. 6.10. And therefore I am the asserter of God's omnipotence, because of his purity, and Mr. W. is the man who disputes against both. 6. He again is the man that denies God's omnipotence, who denies him to be able to decree the end in consideration of the means; or to make a rational creature with such a liberty of will, as to be able to determine his will ad hoc, to this or that forbidden object, without an efficiency from his creator. 7. What kind of Theist may he be thought, who doth not think that the creating and governing of a world, and the being the Author of all good things, are proofs enough of an omnipotence, unless the filthiest actions to be imagined may be admitted for Jewels in that rich Diadem?   

Sect. 8.  

1. His second essay is an impertinence beyond Example:  His second Answer runs thus: [Doth not the Scripture tell us expressly, that in him we live, move, and have our being? Act. 17.25. As he is the Author of our being, so also of those Natural motions that arise from our being, p. 25.] Thus the same Fallacy continues his error which made him err. And here I might repeat my former Section, if that were as seemly, as otherwise fit: but referring my Reader thither, I here will add 1. My amazement at the impertinence: for I had said, It is impossible to separate the wickedness of the wicked act (to wit, of Blasphemy, Adultery, or the like) from the act which is wicked. And Mr. W. (instead of instancing in any one wicked act, and showing how the wickedness may be separated from the act of wickedness, or (which is all one) the wicked act) doth only tell us of things which are no wicked acts, viz. our living, moving, and being in God, etc.  

2. Or what is so much worse, as that it ought not to be named.  2. If he pretends that he is not impertinent, he is infinitely worse, as the shallowest Reader can infer: for if the Apostle there spoke of wicked acts (which to think is most unpardonable) let him perform his enterprise, by showing which is the wickedness, and which the act, and by showing the separation, which he denies to be impossible.  

3. He is enforced to be pertinent, and his Answer challenged.  3. But let us enforce him to be pertinent, and challenge his Answer to this Question, Doth the Scripture any where say explicitly, or implicitly, that in God we blaspheme, and murder, and commit adultery? such as these are confessedly the wicked acts to which I alluded in my objection. Again, I ask Mr. W. Can the wickedness of an actual blaspheming be possibly separated from the act of blaspheming? Can the wickedness of David's congress with Bathshebah be possibly separated from the act of his congress with Bathshebah? Since his Answer of necessity must be Yes, or No, I am bound in duty both to God and my neighbours, to exact thus much of Mr. W. That he will either show how this may be done, or confess in print that he hath undertaken impossibilities, and that his first absurdity being swallowed, this is one of the thousand which follow after. Had he been able to show it, or had he but thought he had been able, he would sure have tried, and offered at it at least; he would have taken some one wicked act for his instance, displayed his tools, and begun his dissection, and made us perceive this separability, if not the separateness itself, at least with the eyes of our Metaphysical understandings. But because he hath merely proposed an objection, and forsaken it, speaking as far from his Theme as he could devise, I must needs believe, he understood his own weakness, and felt the strength of the objection; yet I am checked in my belief, by finding his answers grow worse and worse, as I think will appear by what now follows.   

Sect. 9  

His third Essay is a continuance of his Tergiversation, and inferreth God the efficient of sin.  His third Answer is this [Was not Natures work the same in Adam when he eaten the forbidden fruit, as when he did his necessary food? and in David, when he lay with Bathshebah, as when he lay with his lawful wife?— It is a true Rule, Deus agit in peccato, non tanquam causa moralis, sed tanquam causa naturalis, p. 25.] Now he makes us a discovery of his mind.  
1. He had said a little before (Answ. 1.) that God is the Author of the actions of nature: 
look forward on Sect. 12, 13.  and a little before that, that of natural motions and actions to which sin cleaves, God is the efficient and proper cause (p. 24.) now he adds, that nature's work is the same in the most unlawful and lawful actions; and exemplifies his meaning, not only after, but before the Fall also. From whence his Tenent must be concluded unavoidably this, That God was the efficient and proper cause of Adam's eating the forbidden fruit, as well as of his eating his necessary food; and as much the efficient and proper cause of David's lying with Bathshebah, as of his lying with lawful wife. He shall be greater than great Apollo, if he can show the least flaw in this deduction. Now to separate the act of Adam's eating forbidden fruit, from the wickedness of the act, which consisted in eating forbidden fruit, Mr. W. doth not so much as try. And if he cannot do it hereafter neither, (as I am sure he cannot, because it cannot be done) than it is clearly his opinion, (at least his Doctrine,) that God is the efficient and proper cause of all sin.  

2. Nature depraved and undepraved are opposite things.  2. It was the work of undepraved nature, for Adam to eat his necessary food, before he eat the unnecessary forbidden food. But to eat the forbidden was the ruin of nature, and not the work: I mean that nature wherewith God made him (not simply a man, but) an innocent man. And by Adam's eating that prohibitum, Mr. W. must not think to say, he meant the motion of Adam's jaws only, without his consent to the temptation, or his determination of his will to a forbidden object; for the eating the forbidden fruit was plainly the predicate in Mr. W's proposition, as Adam was the subject of it: not, eating, without forbidden fruit, nor eating fruit, without forbidden. And if twenty words are in the predicate (as possibly they may) they all can make but one term, and are equally coupled to the subject, by a neverfailing verb substantive, either expressed, or implied.  

3. Adam sioned before he eat in the determination of his will to eat.  3. Besides, Adam sinned before he eat, in the determination of his will to eat: and if that was also the work of Nature, as well as his volition to eat of any lawful fruit, (as Mr. W. must say, or eat up what he hath said) then according to Mr. W. God was the efficient and proper cause of that sin also, which lies in puncto indivisibili, perhaps more intelligibly than others may.  

4. Mr. W. vindicated from his abuses put upon himself.  4. Because Mr. W. hath been abused by himself, in the misapprehension of his own Rule, I think it my duty to disabuse him. And I shall do it by saying no more than this: 1. That as God doth give, and continue the being of his creature, with the natural endowments of such a being, (such as Life, Loco-motive, Reason, and Will, in his creature called Man) he doth not work as a moral, but as a natural cause. 2. But as he moves his creature by his grace to choose a right use of all his Faculties, in applying his actions to their proper objects, he only works as a moral cause. 3. And as he suffers or permits his creature to determine his will to forbidden objects, and in pursuance of that choice, to apply his faculties to execute what the will hath decreed, (be it to kill, to blaspheme, to hate God, or the like) in this third case, he neither worketh as a natural, or moral cause, but suffers his creature to pervert and abuse his Faculties of Nature into a contrary thing to that which God made them. As for example, Adam's Faculty to will was the work of God, and (under God) of Nature, a very excellent and noble Faculty: But Adam's applying that faculty to the forbidden fruit (which was his choice, or act of willing that numerical thing) was neither the work of God, nor of Nature, (God's handmaid) but the work of Adam against God, and against that Nature which God had given him; and which Adam, with Satan's help, did deprave, or pervert into another thing. Yet am I willing that Mr. W. should say that there was in it the work of Nature, if he will say that he means that work of that Nature, which could not be possibly the work of God, but of Adam only in one respect, and of the Devil in another.  

5. Five expedients proposed to undeceive M. W. by pointing at the causes of his mistakes.  5. The not distinguishing rightly betwixt Nature and Nature, God's Handmaid and his Rebel, Nature created by the good will of God, and Nature corrupted by the wicked will of the creature, doth seem to me a prime cause of Mr. W's errors in this affair. Another cause doth seem to be his want of a steady consideration, that Adam's sin did begin in the first aversion of his will (which was his rational appetite) from God and his Precept, unto the creature which was forbidden. His determining of his will (per actum imperatum) to the forbidden object, was the same sin in its growth. His actual eating in obedience to that Empire of his will, was the same sin in its perfection. In each of which three acts God had no hand at all: which because Mr. W. did not discern, the third cause of his errors doth seem to be, his not continuing to meditate, or to remember, that the Being of sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in the habitude and 
* This confessed by Dr. Twisse himself, in Vin. Gra. l. 2. par. 2. Crim. 3. Sect. 1. p. 155. Col. 2.  relation and indissoluble connexion of a voluntary act to a forbidden object: after a fancied separation of which two, we cannot so much as fancy the sin to be. For consider Adam's eating as unapplied to forbidden fruit, and so it cannot be conceived to be a sin, any more than the eating of a natural Agent, it being as natural to eat, as to grow by eating. Which makes me guess a fourth cause of Mr. W's error to be this, that either he did not exactly know, or not incessantly bear in mind, that the same man (as to several actions) is both a natural and a voluntary agent. We eat and drink as we are animals; but we fast and pray, and do our duties, or eat and drink against Precept, as we are men: the former as we are spiritual, and the later as carnal men. But Mr. W. in his instances of Adam and David, did confound the brutish with the rational property of the men. The fifth cause of his miscarriage doth seem to be, his not animadverting that sin is a concrete, in respect of sinfulness, and notes the same thing in one word, which sinful act doth note in two; which I will make him apprehend (do what he can to the contrary, beside; not reading what I am writing) by showing that a sin, and a sinful 
* Note that what is said of a sinful Act, is as true if applied to action or motion, which are also Mr. W's Terms.  act, have the same enunciation in all propositions to be imagined. Ex Gr. It is as true a praedication (and in sense the same) to say that David's lying with Bathshebah was his sin, as to say it was his sinful act. Again, as true a praedication, (and in sense the same) to say it was his adultery, as to say his adultery was his sin. Mr. W. shall find upon every turn of the tongue, that these terms are convertible, and that in Recto: and finding that, he will confess, that either he must separate the same thing from it self, or acknowledge his making God to be efficient of sin. Thus far am I brought beyond what I was bound to, or at first intended, by the mere strength of my desire to convert my Aggressor, whilst I confute him.  
And having done thus, I shall only put him in mind of his concurrence with Mr. B. as well as of his discord with Doctor Twisse. 1. He concurres with that of Mr. B. [That Gods concurrence and excitation to the Act of adultery, and to the husbands lying with his lawful wife, is the same, ch. 3. p. 12.] 2. He is at discord with Doctor Twisse, who saith that 
* See Correct● Copy, p. 10.  God doth so administer the occasions of sin, and doth so urge them, that they smite the sinner's mind, etc. which is to act in sin as a moral cause, whereas Mr. W. affirms his acting to be as a natural cause only. I will not exagitate the noisome instance by which he clears his meaning to us, nor will I show how he hath gratified his carnal Readers. I rather hasten to his ensuing words.   

Sect. 10.  

His fourth essay infers the wickedest Actions to be good, and from God.  His fourth Answer is, [That every new action and motion is a new Entity; now all entities and beings are from the first Being, and so far forth they are good, p. 25.] Apply his generals to particulars, and he is ever undone. The first Rebellion against God that ever was, was a new action or motion, and so a new entity; and therefore (saith Mr. W.) was from the first Being, and so far forth was good. Thus every new filthiness or elaborate sensuality which Petronius invented for Tiberius, hath Mr. W's commendation for the goodness of its being, and the Divinity of its extraction. It was descended (saith Mr. W.) from the first Being, which is God. 2. His sentence out of 
* Ipsum quantulumcunque esse bonum est, quia summum esse est summum bonum. De verâ. Relig. c. 4.  Austin is either quite beside the purpose (He speaking only of God's Creatures, and not of Satan's) or taken on purpose by the left handle, that Austin (as well as Scripture) may be pretended as a Factioner against Himself: For the sin against the Holy Ghost is a Being, as being really something, because the cause of damnation without hope of reprieve. But Saint Austin could not argue the least goodness in that sin, from the greatest goodness of that God against whom it is committed. 3. But it is added by Mr. W. [That if any natural act (quà actus) proceedeth not from the God of Nature, there must be a Creature without a Creator, Ibid.] But 1. Blasphemy, or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is not a natural act, but an act contra-natural, and yet it is a real act. 2. When God is called the God of Nature, it is to be meant of good Nature. 3. Blasphemy is an act of malicious Nature, against the Nature of God, and against the God of good Nature; but blasphemy as blasphemy (or that act as that act) proceedeth not from God: and yet it is not a Creature without a Creator; for men and Devils are the Creators of all sorts of blasphemy; which Mr. W. and the 
* Mr. Hickm. and Mr. B. spoken of before, & hereafter, c. 3 sect. 18.  two brethren will have to be created by God himself, or to be an Independent Creature. This is therefore a sixth cause of his and their aberrations, that they do not distinguish (with the Scriptures) betwixt the 
† Joh. 3.8.  works of the Devil and the 
* Psal. 103.22.  works of God.   

Sect. 11.  
His fifth Answer is the most to his disadvantage, unless the confession of his guilt may lead the way to his repentance: 
1. His fifth essay doth ensnare him with an implicit confession that he maketh God the Author of sin.  for believe me, Reader (though to believe it is very difficult) these words which follow are all his own. [Doth not Mr. P. by this Doctrine make God the Author of sin? for if God be the Author of all natural Actions, (as hath been proved,) and it be impossible (as he teacheth) to separate the sin from the action, than he that is the Author of the Action, must needs be the Author of the sin also which is unseparable from it, p. 25.] Thus he thinks he hath laid a Net for Mr. P. whilst Himself is caught in it, 
Look forwards on ch. 3. sect. 12. Num. 4. & sect. 18.  and cannot possibly get out. For 1. He confesseth most explicitly (though not in any humble Form) that if it is proved to be impossible to separate the sin from the sinful action (which I have often proved to be impossible) he cannot choose but take God to be the Author of sin. Here then again he must be summoned, to show us how David's sin, to wit, his Adultery, can be separated from his sinful action, to wit, his lying with Bathshebah: which until he shall perform, I must declare him (out of his Book, which is as much as from his own mouth) to be an Assertor of that Blasphemy, which yet he doth many times disown, though not so often as he owns it. 
2. He is fain to miscall things to countenance his mistakes, or else he knows not a moral action.  2. To make a show of having ensnared me, he is fain to call those things by the name of natural actions, which he knew at that instant I have ever called sins, or sinful actions, or acts of sin, unnatural actions, or acts against nature. But what he could not discern in the sins or sinful actions of Adam and David, I will compel him to see clearly by these following Queries, to which I shall earnestly expect his Answer. 
* Mr. W. hampered in s●me Dil●mm's.  Is a man's lying with a beast a sin, or not? If not a sin, how then was it 
* Exod. 22.19.  forbidden upon pain of death? If a sin, is it an Action, or not an Action? If not an action, what is an action? and how defined? But if it is an action, is it a natural action, or an action unnatural and against Nature? If a natural action, why saith Mr. W. that God is the efficient and proper cause, and now the Author of all natural actions? and so by consequence of a man's lying with a beast? If, to avoid that blasphemy, he saith it is not a natural, but an unnatural action; why then did he say (Ans. 3.) that Nature's work was the same, as well in wicked as lawful actions? If he flies from that too, (now he is scared with the danger) then let him say he is converted, and abjure his own Book, and join with me against Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. who say that sin is God, if a positive thing. To make sure work, I will appeal to Saint Paul, whether it hath not of old been found very possible, to 
* Rom. 1.26.  change the natural use into that which is against Nature, yet that change includes Action, but contra-natural. So again to worship 
† Jer. 2.27.  stones, and to serve the 
* Rom. 1.25.  Creature more than the Creator, Witchcraft and Incest, are all against Nature: But some of the Gentiles did by 
* Rom. 2.14.  Nature the things contained in the Law; whilst other men's actions were unnatural, because as 
† 2 Pet. 2.12.  natural brute Beasts, and not as men, they spoke evil of things they understood not.  

3. The method by which he is led into all his blasphemies.  3. It is most apparent at every turn, that the main thing to be discussed, is, whether the sin can be sequestered from the sinful Action. If it can, I must acknowledge my error, and make amends if I am able. But if it cannot, then Mr. W. and his party must do the like. My Method is, first to lay it as my Principle, That God cannot be possibly the Author of sin; and thence to infer, that he cannot be the Author of a man's lying with a Beast, which is a real act, and yet a sin: and my reason is, because I cannot conceive, much less describe, how that sin (called Bestiality) which consisteth in lying with a Beast, can be separated from that in which it perfectly consisteth. But Mr. W's. Method is, first to lay it as his Principle, that God is the Author of every real act, and so by consequence of a man's lying with a Beast; which because he knows to be a sin, of which he would not say plainly that God is the Author, he is fain to infer (as far as naked words come to) that the sin (which is the Devil's part) may be separated from the sinful act, which act is God's part, saith Mr. W. This (I say) he often dictates, but gives no reason, nor offers to try how it can be: nay clearly, though implicitly, doth make it appear that it cannot be, whilst he pretends to show it can be. For observe hi●next words, & hold from smiling if you are able.   

Sect. 12.  

1. The sin is inseparable from the sinful action; which Mr. W. seems to see by his Tergiversation. Compare this with c. 3. sect. 18.  [But I suppose he is not so dull-sighted, but if he pleased he could easily discern a difference between the action and the evil quality of it, p. 25.] This is his new Tergiversation, which is intended by its Author to do the office of a proof. In stead of trying to make me see what I affirm to be invisible, he contents himself to say, that I can see it if I please. By the same Logic I may prove, that he can stand in London, and hear the grass growing in this part of the Country; the medium to prove it being this, [Sure he is not so heavy-eared, but that he could hear it, if he pleased.] To discern any 
* Note, Reader, that I use the word Difference as an act of my bounty to Mr. W. against whom it lies upon me to prove no more than that there is no separability of david's sia called Adultery, from his lying with Bathshebah, which was his Action as well as Sin.  difference betwixt David's lying with Bathshebah and his Adultery, or betwixt his Adultery and his Sin, is at least as impossible as to hear the grass growing at 60 mile's distance. If Mr. W. can see a difference, where dull-sighted mortals can see nothing but Identity, he must lend them his eyes and his perspective, that they may see it as well as he; or supply them with Faith, by which at lest they may believe that he can see what they cannot. Had he thought he spoke rightly, why did he not descend to some one pertinent Instance, as that which I have given, or any other? It is a very ill sign when a man hides himself in 
† Dolus latet in generalibus.  generals, which are known to be nothing but second notions.  

2. He speaks as if be thought an Accident could be the subject of Inhesion unto an Accident.  2. He speaks of an action, and its quality, as if he considered not the predicaments they both are in; and thought that action is the subject in which quality is inherent, and from which it may be parted, as a separable accident from a substance. So that before I go further, it may be needful to mind him of these four things. 1. That action and quality are both accidents. 2. That an Accident is not the subject of Inhesion unto an Accident. 3. That some Accidents are separable from their subject of Inhesion, (as artificial colours upon a wall) and some inseparable, (as Risibility in a man.) 4. That every Action implies a Quality, according to which the Agent acts. Thus Calefactio must needs imply Calor: Nor is it possible to imagine the act of heating without Heat. Thus Hatred is a quality, and to hate God is an Action: Nor is it possible to separate the hating of God (which is the action) from the hatred of God (which is the quality, without which the action can have no Being.) Yet betwixt these two there is a difference, though no possible separation; which shows the gross Fallacy Mr. W. hath put upon himself, in making no difference between a Difference and a Separability. Many things are inseparable from many things, betwixt which notwithstanding there is a difference: which I would make to appear by uncontrollable examples, if I thought so meanly of Mr. W. as to think he needs them. But if he will tell me his wants, I promise speedily to supply them.  

3. He confounds the act of differing with the passive power of being parted.  3. This doth lead me to complain of a great injustice in Mr. W. who doth imply me to have said (what he knows I did not) that I cannot discern the difference between the quality and the action; whereas my words were these only, (and so cited by himself) That 'tis impossible to separate the wickedness of the wicked act from the act which is wicked. As if, when I say, it is impossible to separate the three persons in the Trinity (commonly called Individual) the one from the other; Mr. W. should answer, I am not so dull-sighted as not to discern there is a difference between the first Person and the second, the second and the third: whereas 'tis he is dull-sighted, who discerns not the difference between the act of differing in Individuals, and the passive power of being parted.  

4. He believes not (or dissembles) that David's action with Bathshtbah was his sin.  4. But though I am bound to say no more, then that the wickedness of the wicked action cannot be separated from the action which is wicked; and again, that the sin cannot be separated from the action which i● sinful (as Mr. W. 
* p. 25. Ans. 5. l. 30, 31, 32.  saith it can) yet I just now added, and still add, there is no difference. For David's lying with Bathshebah was his action, which action was his sin, which sin was his wickedness. The whole world lieth in wickedness, that is, in Sin. To prevent a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I give this notice to Mr. W. that if the word Wickedness is not always synonymous with sin, yet it is so often; and so I now use it.  

5. He makes the sin of adultery to be separable from itself.  5. Because the words of Mr. W. are very homonymous and uncertain (of several aspects, and to be taken or mistaken as many several ways) I will tell him what I discern, and where I cease to be discerning. I discern a gross difference between the sin and the sinner (though from some kinds of sinners some kinds of sin cannot be parted.) I discern another difference between the action, and the quality by which the action is good, or evil, or indifferent, (neither morally good, nor morally evil.) Again, I discern a clear difference between one evil action and another; as between David's Adultery, and his Murder. But I discern no difference between the same evil action, and itself; as between David's lying with Bathshebah, and his Adultery. Nor is it credible that such difference should be, much less be discernible, when even the acutest of Mr. W's own party (among whom 
* Libert. & Necess. p. 23. where note, that Mr. Hobbs seems to have borrowed his Argument, which proves his own doctrine blasphemous, from Doctor Jackson, l. 10. c. 6. fol. 3013. Mr. W. specks purposely beside the purpose, by which he tacitly confesseth his cause is desperate.  Mr. Hobbs hath no low place) have not only professed that they cannot discern any difference betwixt the sin and the sinful action, but they have clearly discerned there can be none. Nay Mr. W. doth here demonstrate that he cannot discern the least difference, whilst he tells me, that if I please, I can discern it. For mark how strangely he speaks to my similitude.   

Sect. 13.  
[The roundness may be separated from the Globe, and yet the matter of it remain still, when it is put into another Form, p. 25, 26.] Hence he discovers, that he knew his cause desperate, and did wilfully mistake his proper Task, because he saw it impossible to be performed. For first he leaves out the later end of my sentence, by which the sense is to be governed, and the scope of it to be taken: which had he not wilfully omitted, he could not certainly have said what here he saith. My words were far from being thus, [A Globe may be destroyed, and so its roundness be taken away; or, the roundness may be separated from the Globe by the Globes ceasing to be a Globe, and its matter cast into some other form] but on the contrary, thus, [
* See the Diu. Philanth. def. ch. 4. p. 42.  The roundness cannot be separated from the Globe which is round.] Which last words I did add on purpose, to note the continuance of the subject of the roundness spoken of, and to preserve my simplest Reader from the very possibility of that mistake, which Mr. W. out of subtlety hath here most resolutely committed. Having mentioned a Globe, I needed not have added round, had it not been for such Readers as do not know or con●ider, that nothing not round can be a Globe. Nor did I imagine that Mr. W. could have been of their number, who not considering a Globe is round, or else not a Globe, (which is a loathsome contradiction) can dream that roundness may be separated from the Globe, because the Globe with the roundness may be separated from the matter in which it was, to wit the brass or the wood, which may be cast or shaped into several figures. To separate roundness from the Globe, is neither more nor less impossible, then to separate roundness from roundness, which is so much more than to square the Circle, that many have ventured upon the one, (as well as M. Hobbs,) whereas none but M. Whitfield hath ever thought of doing the other. And yet his way of attempting it is at least as admirable as his attempt: For instead of proving against my words, that the roundness may be separated from the Globe which is round, (so as it still may remain a Globe) he saith the Globe may be cast, as to the matter of it, into another form; and what is this but to say, the Globe is not immutable, but may cease to be a Globe, by being turned into a conical, or a cubical Figure? But Mr. W. knew that this was contrary to the subject of which I spoke, and inconsistent with the case of which we are speaking: for it is not our Question, whether a sinner can be converted and become a Saint, or whether his sin can be done away and destroyed, and his actions which were wont to be very evil, be very much altered unto the better: But whether the sin can be separated from the sinful action, so as the action shall remain when the sin is gone from it. As whether David●s sin can be parted from his adultery, or his adultery from his lying with Bathshebah, it being supposed and granted, that he is lying with Bathshebah, and that the doing so is adultery, and that adultery is a sin. This being the Case, and Mr. W. speaking not of it, but of quite another thing, I therefore condemn him out of his own mouth, for having spoken against a truth, even whilst he saw it was unresistible. For he who sits beside the Cushion, no less the twenty yards wide, even after he took it into his hands as if he meant to sit on it, cannot be thought to sit beside it because it is not conspicuous, but because it is conspicuously so full of prickles, or any otherwise so frightful, as that he dares not adventure on it.  

2. His wonderful attempt to wash wet from water.  2. To show Mr. W. both his danger, and his dishonour in such his deal, let him name any one thing in any part of his doctrines wherein he will affirm an inseparability, and I will presently enforce him to confute himself out of himself. I will prove by an argument ad hominem (which he at least will not resist) that Mr. W. may be separated from Mr. W. nay, I will prove with more colour, that the difference is wide betwixt twenty and twice ten, because that is but one number, but this is two. I will prove the separability of his proper passion from his formal reason, and again of his formal reason from that essential whole to which it gives its specification. I will prove that a disease, however incurable, may be cured; because it is possible to kill the Patient. There is nothing so impossible, but may be proved to Mr. W. to be the contrary, if he will but take his own coin for current, which here he puts off to others without a blush. If his marvellous error hath been through ignorance, or inadvertency, (which yet I cannot conceive) he shall do well to study the nature of conjugates, and denominatives, of adjuncts and subjects, of common and proper accidents; and if he will try but to put his present sense into a Syllogism, he shall find four terms in the Premises, or Ignoratio Elenchi in the conclusion: he shall not escape one of the two, let him go which way he will.  
3. The three lines of his present Section, which shut it up, p. 26. are cabbage (not only twice, but) twenty times boiled, and from the first to the last is gratis dictum.   

Sect. 14.  

Mr. W. affirms God to will and work sin, and to have a hand in effecting of it, upon his supposal that sin makes for God's glory.  Mr. W's five Essays, instead of Answers to my Objection, being now at an end, he proceeds to a fourth Argument as he calls it in the Margin) whereby to prove his beloved Doctrine, of God's efficiency in sin. And thus it runs: So far as sin makes for the glory of God, so far he may both will and work it; for if he neither intends it, nor hath any hand at all in effecting it, how shall it make for his glory? p. 26.] First he lays for his foundation a most palpable falsehood, That sin doth make for God's glory. This is his postulatum he will needs have granted, and therefore gives no reason, or colour for it. Observe the manner of his speech: he saith not passively, sin is made an occasion upon which God is glorified; but actively, sin doth make for the glory of God. Nor doth he say, that sin makes for it per accidens, from whence he could not infer, God wills and works it; but by making this inference, he implies that sin doth make per se for God's glory. Is not he likely to infer strange things, whose very Principle implies a contradiction? To sin, is to rebel against the Maker of that Law, of which it is a transgression: to rebel against him, is to dishonour him: there is nothing but sin by which the God of all glory can be dishonoured: And to say that God's dishonour does make for his glory, is the same as to say, that that is for his glory which is against it. Thus the Ranters and Libertines are taught to plead for their sins, that they do not commit them as God thereby is dishonoured; but (in the contrary notion) as they make for God's glory: they rebel not against him, but take up arms; or if it must be called a rebellion, yet they rebel against him in his defence only, to the end they may make him a glorious God; they fight against him in loyalty, that his pardoning mercy may shine forth in its highest lustre. They in the times of the Apostles, who did evil that good might come of it, and sinned the more, that grace might abound, were led to sin by their opinion, that sin did make for God's glory. The Carpocratians thought it their duty as well as incerest, to fill up the measure of their sins, by which God was to be glorified. And many have attempted to pull the 
* Thou shalt not revile the Gods, nor curse the Ruler of thy people, Exod. 22.28.  Gods out of their Thrones, (that is, the Rulers of the people) professing to do it for their good, and for the glory of God Almighty.  

2. He concludes sin to be good, or God's willing and working it as evil. See what I, shall say Sect. 19 of this Chapter.  2. When Mr. W. saith, that sin doth make for God's glory, he doth certainly mean that sin is good, at least, so far as it makes for God's glory, because he presently adds, that God so far may will and work it. Which if he shall venture to deny, he will then bewray it to be his doctrine, that God may will and work sin as sin, and that sin as sin doth make for God's glory. For whatever is the object of God's will, or the effect of his working, or hath a tendency to his glory, must needs be taken in one notion of the two, as good, or as evil. If as good, then Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. are quite undone by Mr. W. who will either have God the Author of it, or else will conclude its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And again, Mr. W. is undone by himself, because he would separate the sin from the sinful act, for this very reason, that the act only is good, but not the sin. If he shall say, by way of refuge, that God doth will sin as evil, (not as good) how then doth he will it as it makes for his glory, unless Mr. W. will say, that it makes for his glory as it is evil? and if this last, than sin as evil must needs be good, because as such it does that in respect of which (saith Mr. W.) God wills and works it. And if God doth will, my work sin as it is evil, than it is not only good as w ll as evil, whilst it is evil, but good eatenus, so far forth as it is evil; good, because evil; that is, good, and not good: nay it therefore is good, because it is not. Into such kinds of mischief hath Mr. W. engulfed himself.  

3. He feigns God to work evil to a good end.  3. Upon this foundation, that sin makes for God's glory, observe how he raiseth his superstructure. He saith that God may both will and work sin: not one, but both; not will or work, but will and work it. Here behold a barefaced speaker. The Sinner and his Satan can have no more said of them: God and they are said to differ in their aims, not at all in their actions. All do will and work sin: but God doth both (saith Mr. W.) as it makes for his glory; the Sinner and Satan do both, but not for God's glory; Let Satan pass; but how few sinners are there, who will and work sin, to the end that God may be dishonoured? I believe, and hope there are no such sinners. Nay, how many sinners have sworn (with hands lifted up to the most High God) that they have willed and worked those very things, which they have afterwards confessed to have been damnable sins, without respect unto self, and merely as making for the glory of God? we have our Saviour's words for it, and Paul's example. Our Lord foretold his own Disciples, that 
* Joh. 16.2.  whosoever should kill them would think they did God service. And 'twas in 
† Philip. 3.6.  zeal to religion that Paul persecuted the Church before his conversion of name and temper. He was cruel as he was godly, a rigid 
* Vers. 5.  Pharisee, and in his way 
† Vers. 6.  blameless. Of these it will not be denied then, that they did will and work sin (not as sin, but) as it made for God's glory, as they conceived. The sad consequences and uses which some have made of this Doctrine, I have showed partly 
* See the Diu. Philanth. Def. ch. 4. p. 42.  elsewhere, and so forbear.  

4. Q. Whether he infers not God to be a● sinner.  4. He doth not only make sin to be the object of God's will, (which is desperately bad) but the effect of his working, which sounds much worse. To work sin doth define and denominate a sinner, witness the words of our Saviour to the condemned Reprobates, Depart from me ye that 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Mat. 7.23.  work sin, or Transgression. The Devils chief sinning is his making others to become sinners, and thence he hath purchased the name of Satan, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Tempter. Nor doth it excuse Mr. W. to have said that God doth work sia as it makes for his glory. For besides the absurdities which I shown in that shift, he must remember that the end is but one circumstance of many, which are all required to make a good action: 
* Bonum est ex causâ integrâ, malum ex quolibet defectu:  the least defect is enough to deprave an action, and the greatest perfection is but enough to make it every way blameless. Besides, the end is  to the essence of an action, in respect of the matter and the form, which make it up. And if it is impossible for a good man to work sin to a good end, (interim ut sit bonus secundum quod vult) much less can God work it in order to his glory. Further yet it must be noted, that as some things are evil, because forbidden by God; so others have been forbidden by him, because they were in their nature antecedently evil. And how can God work sins which are so naturally such, (as the blaspheming, cursing, and hating of God himself) that the purity of his being is an eternal Law unto himself against such working? Let Mr. W. make reflection upon his words.  

5. He is inconsistent with M. H. and Mr. B.  5. If God doth work sin, in as much as it makes for his glory, than sin is his work in the same respect in which he works it. And if so, it is a positive thing, which Mr. H. and Mr. B. will by no means endure; for then (say they) it must be God, unless it be granted to be his Creature. Thus the Brethren betray each other, and each himself, both into most frightful and inextricable straits.  

6. Inconsistent with them and with himself too.  6. That we may not be able to wrong the meaning of Mr. W. he gives his reason for his blasphemy: [For if he neither intends it, nor hath any hand at all in effecting it, how shall it make for his glory? p. 26.] Elsewhere he saith, God hath an efficiency in sin, and a hand in sin; but now he tells us in plainer terms, God hath a hand in effecting sin. Then sin (it seems) is the effect, of which God is the efficient; and yet at other times they tell us, that sin hath no efficient, but only a deficient cause. So irreconcilable they are with one another, and with themselves. As the wicked men effect sin, Mr. W. grants it dishonours God. And therefore to the end that it may make for his glory, M. W. tell us, he himself must have a hand in effecting of it; for so he expostulates, if he doth not do so, how shall it make for his glory? A well-taught child would answer thus; If sin cannot make for God's glory, unless God hath a hand in effecting it, than the first cannot be, because the second is impossible. So common it is for those men to begin their reasonings at the wrong end; witness this last violentum.  

7. He frames not his Propositions to the nature of God, but the nature of God to his Propositions:  7. What at first he saith God may do, he now inferreth that he must do. And what is that, but to will and work sin, and to have a hand in effecting it? how else (saith he) shall it make for his glory? that is, how else shall Mr. W's principle be true? Mr. W's maxims must be true, though God must be blasphemed to help make them out. The original of his error I shown long since, in his not apprehending what is meant by Gods taking occasion to glorify himself, partly by punishing, partly by pardoning, partly by ordering the sins of men. In all which cases it is not sin, but God's justice in punishing, his mercy in pardoning, and his wisdom in ordering, which do make for his glory.   

Sect. 15.  
Mr. W's next thing, which I know not what to call, but is called by him a fifth Argument in his margin, is the same which was spoken by Mr. B. to whom I gave 
† See the Diu. Philanth. ch. 3. p. 129. to. p. 140.  a large Answer; and the same which was spoken by the Superintendent Mr. Hobbs in his egregious 
* Num. 12. p. 107. lin. 1.  Animadversions (or rather Tergiversations) on the learned Bishops Reply; nay the same which was spoken by Mr. W. himself, no longer ago then p. 23. to which I gave a whole Section in the close of my first Chapter. And it amounts to no more than an expression of his fear, that God will be found an Idle Spectator, and an Idle Beholder, (they are his own words) unless hebe granted to will and work sin. Against which he proceeds to frame, and answer an Objection; which that he may answer the less unhappily, he fashions it to himself in these following words.   

Sect. 16.  

1. His great forgery in that little which he citys.  Sect. 16. [Mr. P. thinks to shift himself from this argument by telling us, That God doth wisely order and dispose of sin after the committing of it, but doth not determine that it shall be done, or hath any hand in the doing, p. 26.] 1. These words he citys from my Diu. Philan. Def. c. 3. p. 129. where I cannot find them, nor in any other page of any thing which I have written: So that here I must demand more reparations for more injury. My words were these; [That God, besides his permitting of our sins, doth dispose and order them to the best Advantage.] What Mr. W. hath foisted in, and how he hath forged the whole period, I need not say; the Reader sees it.  

2. His foul sense of Gods determining that sin shall be done.  2. God, according to his prescience that sin would be voluntarily done, if not miraculously hindered, did determine not to hinder, & so consequentially or conditionally, that sin should be done by his permission, that is, God determined to permit it to be done. Where permission, not sin, is the object of God's determination. But Mr. B's Doctrine was, (and Mr. W's is) that God did absolutely and antecedently determine its being done, and determine the wills of men to do it, and that he could not foresee it but because he decreed it, and that his will of evil was as efficacious as his will of good. In a word, that he doth so determine its being done, as to have an efficiency and a hand in the doing of it. Nay in plain terms, that he doth work it. And working (we know) is acting, doing, causing, at least designing, or contriving sin.  

3. His impious expression of Gods having a hand in sin, and the importance of that phrase.  3. What he means by Gods determining sin, he explains in the next words, by his having a hand in it; which is a most formidable expression, and never enough to be detested. For he who only permits sin cannot be said to have an hand in it. Nor 2. he who suffers another to tempt for the exercise of the constancy, or patience, of a Job, or a Joseph. Nor 3. he who withdraws grace for sin committed, to punish former despites which had been done to grace given. Nor 4. he who delivers up to Satan by way of Discipline, to bring unto Repentance the Presumptuous, or the Secure. But to have a hand in sin, is to be a partner in it, or an Accessary, whether by commanding, or counselling, or contriving, or countenancing, or carrying on the business by secret impul●●ons and excitations; all which are but a few of our Adversaries phrases. And because Mr. W. is a frequent user of this expression, I will once for all desire my Reader to note the horrible importance of it. It is the observation of the most Learned who have commented upon Scripture, that God's great efficacy in working is expressed by Finger; his greater efficacy by Hand; his greatest by Arm. When Moses turned the dust of Egypt into Lice by the power of God, showing itself in his weakness, the Magicians told Pharaoh, It was the 
* Exod. 8.19. which compare with Luk. 11.20.  finger of God. When Job spoke of God's power by which he created the world, and by which he doth sustain it, he said, 
† Job 12.9. which compare with Act. 11.21.  The hand of the Lord had wrought it. And when the Mother of our Lord would express the very greatest, that is, the most to be admired of all God's works, his own conception and Incarnation in the Body of Mary, she said that God had showed strength with his 
* Luk. 1.51.  Arm. And so without more ado I leave my Reader to judge both of the phrase and meaning of Mr. W. when he saith that God hath a hand in sin; which because I denied and disproved also, Mr. W. tells me again, what he told me twice before, that God is inferred to be a mere Spectator. Observe his words.   

Sect. 17.  

1. Mr. W's gross error in the notion of God's permission.  [But then still it follows, that he stands as a mere spectator in regard of the greatest part of actions that are done in the world.— But how can this stand with the Alwise and All-working providence of God, (without which a sparrow falls not to the ground) that he should stand looking on, etc. and determine: nor do any thing while they be done and passed, only afterwards employ his wisdom in ordering of them? p. 26, 27.] Though 'twere sufficient to refer him to what I have said of God's permission in divers Tracts already published, which if he hath read, he is utterly inexcusable for what he here so crudely, and yet so frequently, venteth: yet I will tell him once more, what I told him so lately (Chap. 1. Sect. 6.) but only now I will do it in plainer terms, that I may leave him no pretence of misapprehending or overseeing my meaning in it. I do not mean that God permits sin with such a neglectfulness, and unconcernedness, as the Epicureans are wont to dream of, who feign a God sitting with his back towards the world; but I mean a most useful and a most wise Permission, becoming the wisdom as well as goodness of that only wise God, who will not hinder what he sees, and hateth perfectly while he sees it, because it is better that he should bring that good out of evil which he can and doth, then that he should not suffer any evil to be done. I never speak of a bare permission, as that excludes every thing else, but only as it excludes Gods working, or decreeing, or willing sin. God doth not only permit, but punish evil, and dispose of it to good, as the murdering of Christ to the salvation of the world: yet God had no more a hand in that the villish murder, (non impediendo efficaciter) than I have a hand in the falling down of any house which I do not underprop.  

2. His tremendous notion of all-working providence:  2. Mr. W. opposeth to a mere looking on, the all-working Providence of God, which is the language of the Libertines, without any distinction of good or evil, and shows us what he means by Gods having a hand in all the wickedness of the world. The instance he gives of a sparrow falling to the ground is most impertinent to the subject of his ciscourse, unless he can prove it to be a sin for a sparrow so to fall, which if he could do, he w●uld also prove that God doth neither will nor work it. His following words are most insipid, because he knows 'tis granted, that God did foresee sin before it was; and sustains the Being of his creature whilst 'tis committing; and being committed, overruleth it also to some advantage. But what is this to his 
* This hath been spoken of ch. 1. sect. 2.  determining the will of the sinner to the sin, which is the boldly-irreligious Tenet, of which its Patrons cannot give us any excusable account?   

Sect. 18.  

1. M. W. newly puts himself into his old straits, betwixt gross Blasphemies and extraordinary Impereinence.  Mr. W. professeth to give instances in some of his former examples, and so with a bare repetition fills up the [page 27. and part of p. 28.] That I may not repeat, as he hath done, I send back my Reader to the fifth Section of my first Chapter. Only here I observe, he saith that God had the chief hand in joseph's being sent into Egypt. If he means his brethren's sin in selling Joseph to strangers, (not knowing or caring to what place they would carry him) than the blasphemy is apparent: if he means not that, but another thing, Gods doing good unto Joseph in his affliction, than the impertinence is as signal. As if when the question is, whether the Physician hath any hand in the Patient's Disease, the Respondent should say, Yes, he hath the chief hand, because he is not only a spectator, or looker on, but administers such things as cure his malady, and perhaps restores him to better health then before he fell sick. I have reason to be as weary of disputing with such Respondents, as any workman could be at the Tower of Babel; where when he called for stone, he was supplied with mortar, and when for mortar, they brought him stone.  

2. Affirms God to have a hand in oppression;  2. Mr. W. goes on to Pharaohs oppression of the Israelites, which he affirmeth God to have had a 
* Note that in his Preface to his Extent of God's Providence, he professeth to understand it of God's active hand.  hand in, because he had determined it, and foretold it many years before. What [it] doth he mean that God determined? If Pharaohs will to his oppression, behold the blasphemy; if the permission of the oppression, mark well the impertinence. To foretell is far from having a hand in the event. The Physician foretells when his Patient shall have a paroxysm in a Chronical disease, even whilst he is prescribing the usual means of prevention. Mr. W. must study the difference betwixt the end of an intention, the event of a Prophecy, and the effect of a cause; and not imagine that Isaiah had any hand in the birth of Cyrus, because he foretold it an hundred years before Cyrus was born.  

3. And in rebellion.  3. Mr. W. saith, that God had a hand in that, which is called rebellion, 1 Kings 12.19. And to say that he saith this, is a word enough for the wise. Again, that God hand a hand in the destruction of Samaria, Is. 10.3. But what then? was it a sin for God to destroy such sinners, who were the people of his wrath, because hypocritical, v. 6? And might he not do it by what instrument he pleased, by giving a right, as he did to Israel over the Canaanites, or by permitting the violence, as he did to Assyria over Israel? But what hath Mr. W. got by this? was Assyria the happier for being the Rod of God's anger, v. 5? No; the Rod, when it is used, is commonly cast into the Fire; and to be burnt is worse than to be beaten.  

4. In murders, treacheries, violence and wrong.  4. Mr. W. saith farther p. 28. That when dominion hath been devolved from one hand to another, it hath seldom been done without much violence and wrong, yea, without murders, treacheries, and bloodshed. To which he presently adds, that God had a hand in such things. If he means in those unjust things, he speaks according to his Principles as well as Mr. Hobbs; if otherwise, he is but impertinent. I wish that that were the worst. But because it is said, that God doth give Kingdoms to whom he will (Dan. 4.14.) he must be brought to a remembrance, that God is sometimes said to give Kingdoms in the Letter, as when he gave Israel the land of Canaan: but sometimes only by an Hebraism, as when he permitted the Assyrians to hold his people in captivity for seventy years; though I do not remember that God was ever said in Scripture to have given the Kingdom of Israel unto Assyria. Besides, God giveth riches to whom he will, yet gives it not literally to them that steal, to them that seize on their neighbour's goods by fraud, or violence. For than whosoever hath the strongest arm, and hath added to that the longest sword, might live amongst his neighbours like a great Pike in a Pond, and say he doth but take what God hath given him. The King of Spain and the Great Turk would probably love to hear such Preachers, as would thus promote the universality of their Empire. And the later proceeds upon the very same Maxim with Mr. W.  

5. He justifies all our English Ranters by ascribing all our changes to the hand of God.  5. Wh●t is added touching the changes which have happened here at home, I need not speak unto at all. It being clear already, that as all actions are wicked which are against the will of God, revealed to us in his commandments, (affirmative and negative,) so God abhors all such, and is so far from having a hand in them, that he will certainly lift up his hand against them, if not remarkably in this world, yet infallibly in the next: for the longer he is in lifting up his hand, he lifts it up so much the higher, and by so much more heavily he lets it fall. How quickly do men's opinions run out of their heads into their hearts, and thence into their hands too, I mean, their actions? I am persuaded that Mr. W. had hardly taken a sequestration, if he had not believed that God had had a hand in it.  

6. God cleared from carelessness or weakness.  6. But mark how he goes on: To deny that God hath a hand (in the proper subject of our debate) were (saith he) to make God a very weak and impotent, or a very remiss and careless Governor of the world, etc. p. 28. Bona verba quaeso. Ne saevi, magne Sacerdos. Must it be weakness in God not to have a hand in wickedness? No, 'tis an argument of his power, as well as purity. See the prodigious groundlesness of speaking thus concerning God, exhibited at large in the sixth Section of my first Chapter, and in the seventeenth of this. God indeed gives man his power to will, and to do: but man being left [in manu consilii sui] in the hand of his own counsel, doth determine his will to such and such actions as God forbids, rather than to such as God commands, to wit, Adulteries, Murders, Extortions, and the like. As God forbids these actions which are sins, so he gives Grace to abstain from the doing of them, and all things else, except an irresistible impeding of us. He farther disposeth and ordereth the things done to good, and that in many respects, as I have 
* See the Sinner impleaded, part. 2. ch. 2. p. 262.  elsewhere showed. This in all, but more in some, of whom we have Pharaoh for an example, whom he did not only withdraw his Grace from, but condemned also to live, (when he might have sent him as quick into hell, as he did Corah and his company) being delivered up finally unto an utter obduration, I will shut up this Paragraph with that of Moses to Israel, 
* Deut. 9.4.  Speak not thou in thine heart, For my righteousness the Lord hath brought me in to possess this land— 
† Vers. 5.  Not for thy righteousness, or for the uprightness of thine heart, dost thou possess it, but for the wickedness of these Nations the Lord doth drive them out from before thee. 
* Ves. 6.  Not for thy righteousness, for thou art a stiffnecked people.   

Sect. 19  

God hath no hand in w lling or effecting what he hates.  M. W. now proceeds to undertake a new Objection which he doth not cite from any part of my writings, or any man's else; but it seems it is such as he thought he could answer, and 'tis briefly this: God hates all sin, and therefore can have no hand at all either in willing or effecting of i●; for no man will have any hand in doing what he hates, p. 28.] First, I observe he doth not deny what is objected, in so much as he owns it to be his Doctrine, that God hath a hand in willing and effecting what he hates. Secondly, I observe that he doth not answer the Objection, but only puts [Answ.] before his words, which are partly an Evasion or Tergiversation, and partly a Grant of the thing objected. The Evasion is thus, [Though he hates it, yet he permits it.] And why is he said to permit sin, which he hates, rather than to permit righteousness, which he loves, but because he hath not any hand in the former, as he hath in the later? And what an Argumentator must he be thought, who goes to prove that God doth will and work s●n, by saying, he permits it? that is in effect, because he neither wills, nor works it? His reason is worse, which is taken from Gods getting glory by sin, ibid. for God gets nothing by any man's righteousness (if we speak exactly) much less by his sins. Or if we may say by a Figure, that God gets glory by our thanksgivings, yet sure by our blasphemies he gets nothing but dishonour. Because God takes occasion of doing good, upon our doing evil, (which good conduceth to his glory) it seems Mr. W. is of opinion, that God gets glory by the evil: than which I cannot imagine a more intolerable mistake. 
* A case put to show the danger of Mr. W's Doctrine.  He who concludes he is a vessel of absolute election, and that he cannot fall totally or finally from Grace, may corrupt himself strangely by such a maxim, as that sin makes for. God's glory, or that God may get himself glory by it; and be apt to plead, upon his committing of adultery or incest, that he did not do it as 'twas forbidden by the word (which is 
* This is the Doctrine of Dr. Twisse & others, particularly owned by Mr. W. p. 47.  improperly called the will of God, say they,) but as God did secretly will it, as it made for God's glory, or to the end that God might get himself some glory by it. He did it not out of lust, or as a sin, but to procreate a Saint, and increase the number of the godly, and withal to glorify that discriminating mercy, which could not be exercised in the pardoning of such sins, if they were not committed by them in whom they are capable of being pardoned, that is to say, by the Elect. I put this Case, to fright men out of those premises, from which (if God restrain them not) they have been known by experience to draw such horrible conclusions. And had I not been able to give examples, I should not have thought this method needful. Mr. W. tells us plain enough, (both p. 26. and here too) that so far as sin makes for God's glory, God may both 
**** Note that all are his own expressions, ●. 26, & 28. which must be compared: to which purpose, look on what I h●ve said sect. 14. of this Chapter.  will, and * work it, and have a hand in 〈◊〉 effecting, or * working of it. And though sin be in itself evil, yet it may have some respect of * good. As for that which he calls a true Rule, and what he hath out of Austin against himself, I will not exagitate his unhappiness therein, (as I must also forbear to do it in many other particulars,) merely for fear I should be endless.   

Sect. 20.  
Mr. W. proceeds to a sixth Argument, whereby he proves his great willingness to prove that God hath efficiency and hand in sin; 
Mr. W's dangerous misapprehension of that figurative Sentence, That God doth punish sin with sia.  but more than his willingness to prove it, he proveth not. For his Argument is but this, [That God punisheth one sin with another; and punishment is more than a bare permission. It were ridiculous to say, that a Judge only permitteth a malefactor to be arraigned, condemned, and executed, p. 28. lin. ult. p. 29. lin. 1, 2, 3, 4.] First, it is not any where said in Scripture, that God doth punish one sin with another; but 'tis a sentence of the Schoolmen, as commonly known to be catachrestical as any beggar knows his own dish, and hath neither truth nor sense in it, unless it be figuratively meant. For God punisheth the sinner and not the sin. Nor doth he imprint sin on him as the Lictor doth stripes, but withdraws his grace, and leaves the sinner to himself, whereupon he sinneth without restraint. But I have spoken of this in 
* See the Sinner Impleaded, c. 1. p. 9  another place, where I have also recorded S. Augustine's suffrage for the truth.  

2. His making God the proper cause of the greatest sins.  2. But Mr. W. hath so prodigiously misunderstood that sentence, or else so guiltily dissembled his understanding, as to express Gods punishing of sin with sin by the positive actions of a Judge, in his arraigning, condemning, and execution of malefactors: which is to make God the Author and proper cause of the greatest sins in the world, such as are the later sins which are called the punishments of the former. It being frequently the Doctrine of Mr. W. that of all positive actions God is the Author and 
† Ext. of God's Prov. c. 4. p. 11.  proper cause. But Idolatries, and Adulteries, Blasphemies, and Murders, and the sins not to be named (Rom. 1.26.) are positive actions, and punishments, in the Schoolmens sense; and so according to Mr. W. God is blasphemously inferred to be their Author and proper cause.  

3. Which he also extends to the very sin of the act.  3. Now we see what moved him to say in print, [That God must 
* Ibid. p. 12. jin. 1, 2.  needs some way both will and work in the sin of the Act.] Mark well, good Reader: He doth not say (as at other times) the act of sin, or the sinful act, but the sin of the act, meaning the pravity, and deformity and obliquity itself, as he explains himself in the next two lines, wherein he saith that God gets glory to himself by that very pravity and deformity.  

4. He treads a step beyond Calvin's worst.  4. Mr. W. in this doth tread a step beyond Calvin, not only 
" †" Calv. Instit. l. 1. c. 18. sect. 1. fol. 68  follows him through thick and thin. For though Mr. Calvin speaks broadly, [that the wicked man, whilst he acteth, is 
* Id. ib. sect. 2. fol. 69. Apparet cer â destinatione Dei fuisse impulsos. Fateor quidem interpositâ Satanae operâ saepe Deum agere in Reprebis; sed ut e jus impulsu Satan ipse suas parts agate.— unde hoc, nisi quod à Deo manat efficacia erroris, ut mendacium credant? etc. Ibid. Summa haec sit, quum Dei voluntas dicitur rerum omnium esse cause,— ut non tantùm vim suam exerat in electis, sed etiam reprobos in obsequium cogat. Ibid. Et jam satis apertè ostendi, Deum vocari eorum omnium Authorem, quae isti censores volunt otioso tantum ejus permissu contingere. Id. ib. sect. 3. p. 7.  acted by God; and that the Assyrians were thrust on [to rob and plunder by the sure destination of God; and that God doth act in the reprobates by the interposition of Satan's help; that Satan by God's impulse may act his own part also; and that the efficacy of error proceeds from God; and that when he casts men into filthy desires, he is the chief Author of his just vengeance, (that is, of sin in Mr. W's sense) and Satan only the Minister; and that the will of God is the cause of all things; and that his providence doth not only exert its force in the elect who are ruled by his holy Spirit, but doth also compel the reprobates to be obsequious; and that God is called the Author of all those things which the censorious will have to happen by his idle permission only: though these are frightful expressions, and applied in such a manner as not to be capable of excuse, yet Mr. W. (as I shown) hath stepped beyond him.  
5. The 
† Veteres religiosiù interdum simplicem veritatis confessionem in hac parte reformidant.— Ne Augustinus quidem illâ superst●tione interdum solutus est, quemadmodum ubi dicit, indurationem & excaecationem non ad operationem Dei, sed ad praescientiam spectare. Calv. Inst. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3. fol. 95.  Ancient Fathers were afraid to ascribe that to God's working which they saw could only be the object of his prescience, and his permission; and this by the confession of Mr. Calvin himself, who as he calls it their superstition, so he confesseth that S. Austin was not always free from it. But Mr. Calvin in despite of the Father's piety, which he brands with the Title of Superstition, doth very dogmatically pronounce of those later sins of men which are called the punishments of the former, that as they are punishments, God is 
* Idem. l. 1. c. 18. Sect. 2.  Author praecipuus, the prime or chief Author, and that the Devil is only subservient to him, Satan verò tantù Minister. And though he saith that the Ancients were somewhat too religious in their fear of speaking the simple truth, (as he calls it) yet he confesseth their fear was very sober, because the thing which they feared was the 
* Idem ib. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3. fol. 95.  opening a passage unto impiety, of irreverently defaming the works of God. Now what it was which misled Mr. W. and Mr. B. from that holy fear of those Fathers, to speak of God in such a fearless and frightful manner, (as I have partly already showed, and am partly to show in my following Chapter) I believe most Readers do judge as I do.   

Sect. 21.  

1. The desperate nature of Mr. u's Salvoes, and the hardness of his very emollients.  Mr. W. having now done with the prime part of his enterprise, wherein he hath often made God to be the Author of sin, and often very much worse, goes on talking to himself, from p. 29. to p. 35. in an endeavoured excuse of what he hath hitherto delivered. And in the very entrance on that attempt, he makes himselef unexcusable, by dropping out such excuses as stand in need of an excuse, but cannot find one. 1. Though God's permission of sin is an operative permission (saith Mr. W.) yet he is not the Author of the evil permitted. His reason is, because what the wicked do wickedly, God doth holily, p. 29. Which is only to say, that God is not the Author of sin in Himself, not that he is not the Author of sin in others. The Question is not whether God is a Transgressor, but whether he makes men Transgressor's, as Zuinglius publicly affirmeth. Not whether David's lying with Bathshebah was a good Adultery, and so no sin, in as much as it was the work of God, and in as much as God did impel him to it (as Zuinglius also speaks.) This is not the Question, but the sordid begging of the Question, and a taking that for granted, which we deny and abominate with all our might, as most blasphemous and irrational. The Question is, whether God impelled David to that Adultery, or did work in the sin of that act, (as Mr. W. speaks) which whilst I deny as a most impious and a most senseless proposition, he must first of all prove and make apparent, before he comes to infer upon it, that the very same thing which man doth wickedly God doth holily and justly: For God doth it not at all, nor can he do it, because he is God.  
2. What he saith of the Physicians occasioning the sickness, yea the death of the Patient, 
2.  by giving Physic which meets widow ha' malignant Humour, who yet cannot be said to be the Author of those effects, p. 29, 30. is as impertinent a similitude as he could easily have chosen, and shows he considers not of what he speaks, or understands not any thing of the word Author, or seeks to amuse his illiterate Reader.  
3. He hopes to excuse himself by uttering these following Aphorisms, 
3.  which pass with him for fan and soft and suppling speeches. 1. God may be said to administer occasions of sinning, and so to have some kind of hand in it, 
The mollifying expressions of the harsh speaker.  by his word, and by his works, p. 30. 2. The Law hath an efficacy in stirring up sinful motions, p. 30. 3. The good word of God doth accidentally stir up the corruption that is in men's wicked hearts, p. 31. 4. Christ's preaching, and Stephens preaching had an EFFICIENCY in stirring up the wrath of their Hearers, p. 31. 5. The good word of God doth stir up evil affections in the hearts of wicked men, p. 31. Thus he puts upon himself that thick and palpable Fallacy, non causae pro causâ. Because when the word of God is preached, the evil affections of the wicked are stirred up, he concludes that God's word doth stir them up. As if my writing were the cause of those things which come to pass when I am writing. Again, he doth not distinguish betwixt the giving of occasions, and taking occasions when none are given. God hath spoken and done those exceeding good things, from which men have snatched an occasion of evil; but to administer or give occasions of doing wickedly, is so ill a phrase, that it is very unskilfully applied to God (to say no worse.) And I had hoped that these times had taught the unlearnedst to distinguish betwixt Scandalum datum, & acceptum; Acceptum, sed non datum. Though David was pardoned his sin of Adultery, yet because by that deed he had given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, his Infant Child did surely die, 2 Sam. 12.13, 14. If Mr. W. did not consider that there is such a thing as the sin of scandal, or did not know what scandal is, and wherein it stands, he may both know and consider it another time. He, who in doing what is lawful, intends to make another man sin, as well as he who doth it by doing what is unlawful, without out intending any such thing, is properly said to give occasion, to scandalise, to lay a snare in his Brother's way.  

4. His open profession that God's secret will is contrary to his revealed will, in respect of the very same objects.  4. I am urged to enlarge upon another passage in Mr. W. where he saith, that the wicked in their evil actions do that which is contrary to the revealed will of God, though the same things which he wills, viz. by his secret will which they know not, p. 34. But I count the number of my pages, and am exhorted to spend but little time against a man of no greater strength, and have already acquainted him with enough of his unhappiness; and whatsoever I shall omit of his other misadventures, I shall abundantly meet with in my Account of Mr. Barlee and Mr. Hick. whom I intent for the Subjects of the following Chapter.    

CHAP. III. Of Mr. Barlee's forging God to be the Author of Sin, and very much worse than so too, in his very endeavours to speak as warily as his Principles will suffer him.  

Sect. 1.  
BEing now to consider the Doctrinal part of Mr. Barlee's Book, which he Entitles, A Necessary Vindication, or full Abstersion, I must begin with his Third Chapter: where omitting his Buffonery, (as that which serves to no end, but to proclaim him to the world for the most lantentable Zany that ever pretended to stir up laughter) I will immediately address myself to the uncovering of his Doctrines; and of those in the first place, which have most endeared him to Mr. Whitfield, by forging God to have a hand in all the wickedness in the World without exception; and not only to be the Author, but (which is much more frightful) the Necessitator of sin.  
His first Abstersion in this kind (for so he was resolved to word it, 
His acknowledgement of the crime for which be Apologizeth.  and the Printer it seems did let him have his own will) is a plain acknowledgement of the Crime with which he stands charged. For of 
Diu. Philan. c. 3. from p. 1●3. to p. 139.  all those Authors and Assertions which I objected to Mr. B. as to a Follower and a Disciple, he professeth to disown no more than two. His words are these, [I will only except against monstrous Leviathan Hobbs, and the Book which he calls Comfort for Believers. These I disown from ever having been my Masters, c. 3. p. 7.] Away with these two then; they are excepted against. But for Zanchie, Borrhaus, Piscator, Beza, Zuinglius, and Martyr, and all the other ingredients in that long Catalogue, Mr. B. avows them to be his Masters. Ingenuum est agnoscere per quos profeceris. But it is taught by those Authors, (in the very 
† Ibid.  pages by him cited) That both the Reprobates and the Elect were preordained to sin as sin; That God is the Author of sin in general, of Murder and Adultery in particular; That he is the cause of sin; and in particular the cause of Incredulity; That God doth thrust men on unto wickedness, and the like. Therefore these and the rest (from p. 133. to p. 139.) are avowedly the Doctrines of Mr. Barlee. And why Mr. Hobbs is out of favour, who hath not spoken so noisomly as these have done (for aught I have hitherto observed) I cannot guests at the reason, unless he hath offended by his comparative reservedness.   

Sect. 2.  

1. He contradicts his own and his Readers eyes, without the least possibility of gaining by it.  His next Abstersion (c. 3. p. 11.) hath the unhappiness to begin with a very bold falsehood, in contradiction to his own and his Readers eyes. For he professeth [every where (in his Correp. Correction) to have carefully distinguished these three things; 
least possibility of gaining by it.  1. The material part of sin, 2. The formal part of sin, 3. The ruling and overruling the sin and sinner. This he professeth to have done in all the places which I directed unto, and fears not to say, that his heedful Readers may easily see it. Either he is confident of no such Readers, or else he hath a worse confidence to affirm point-blank he cares not what: For when he spoke of God's tempting men to sin, p. 79. he said, he was not at leisure to tell in what sense: nay, he did peremptorily pronounce, that God doth not only determine all things and actions (without exception) but their several modalities too: and that of all such modalities God is the supreme cause, p. 86, 87. So that according to Mr. B. God was not only the Determiner and sovereign Cause of David's lying with Bathshebah, which was a Thing or Action, but of every Circumstance or Modality, and so of the sinfulness itself, the application of David's will to the forbidden object, and of every point of Aggravation with which the Adultery was loaded. Now though the broad-est-mouthed. Libertine must study hard to speak worse, yet this was one of Mr. B's. most careful speeches.  
2. He professeth his care for the clearing of God from having any efficiency in sin, 
2. His inconsistency with himself, with Mr. W. and Mr. Hick.  as such (p. 11.) yet it was flatly his language, as well as Mr. W's. (p. 24.) that God must needs have some efficiency in sin. And his Masters say, in sin as sin, as hath been showed. If by the word [as such] he means another modality, than he either contradicts what was so lately cited from him, or else it is his Divinity, that God is the cause of sin as such. But this again is a contradiction to his clearing God from it. If he means (as Mr. W.) that God doth will and work sin, not as it is sin, but as it makes for God's glory; then he is liable to all those miseries into which Mr. W. hath plunged himself, and condemns himself out of his own mouth, as well as out of Mr. W's. and Mr. Hick. out of both. In a word, he is ruined seven several ways; for an Acquaintance with which I send him back to my second Chapter Sect. 14.  
But. 3. Let us come to the utmost of his Acumen and his Care. He saith, [that the material part of sin, 
3. He betrays himself many ways in his very provision for an escape. Look forward on Sect. 7. and 12. of this Chapter.  is the doing or leaving undone some positive natural or moral act, and of that he calls God the sovereign Author, p. 11.] So that if David's Adultery or lying with Bathshebah was a positive act either natural or moral (which he cannot deny) he is declaredly of opinion, that God was the sovereign Author of it. Again, he calls it a part of sin, whilst he calls it the material part of sin; and adds, that God is the Author of it: but every part of the whole must needs participate the nature of the whole, (especially in Accidents:) and even so he makes God to be the Author of sin, not only in equivalence, but even in those very terms. Nor will it help him to say, materiale▪ substratum; for by that he must mean either the substance or the action, either David himself, or his lying with Bathshebah. If the former, he is undone; for 'tis to say, that a substance is a part of an accident, and that David himself was a part of his Adultery. If he flies unto the later, he is worse undone then in the former; for 'tis to say, that the Action which is confessedly positive, is a part of that which (according to him and Mr. Hick.) is merely privative; and that David's lying with Bathshebah was but part of his Adultery, or at least that his Adultery was but part of his sin. If to avoid these Absurdities, he shall say the very truth, that the Action itself, to wit, david's lying with Bathshebah, was indeed his whole Adultery, and so his whole sin; then his miseries are as pressing as when he spoke the greatest falsehood, unless he cry peccavi, and yield the whole cause: For either he must deny that David's lying with Bathshebah was a positive thing, or say that God was the Author of it (as here he doth) or else he must say that Sin is God (which is his own Inference, c. 3. p. 112.) or he must spit in the face of his pious friend Mr. Hick. who betrayed him to that senseless blasphemous Inference. Now let him go which way he pleaseth, he will find in conclusion (perhaps before I have done with him) that the last of the four is much the safest.  
4. He saith that God is but a permissor of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, wherein he speaks as I would have him. 
4. He knows not how to descent from my Doctrine, but by charging God as the author of sin.  Again, he speaks my sense in the third particular, of Gods governing, ruling, and overruling both the sin and the sinner. So that our difference must lie in the first particular of the three, or there is no difference at all, but he is exactly of my opinion. If this later, why then was I the subject of his Correptory Correction? if the former, he is the subject of his own. For he knows I ever granted, that the Being of the Creature depends on God, and so the power to act, as well as liberty to choose. It must therefore be in somewhat else that Mr. B. thinks fit to differ from me. And what can that be but this, that God doth determine the will of the sinner to the sin, and is the Author either of doing, or omitting, those things which are not to be done, or left undone? the very blasphemy with which I charged him.  
5. He doth profess to make God the sovereign Author of doing, 
5. He grants the whole charge, or understands not a moral act.  or leaving undone, not only natural, but moral acts. So that in case he knows the difference betwixt a natural and moral act, he must acknowledge it for his Doctrine, that God is the sovereign Author of all sins, both of omission and commission.  
6. Yet no sooner hath this Abstersor divided sin into two parts, 
6. He ingulfs himself in contradictions on the right hand, and on the left.  (material and formal) but strait he adds, that the second alone is properly sin, (p. 11.) and so in one short breath he implies a couple of contradictions. For if he means, the second part is alone the whole sin, how then is it a part? if he means that that alone is part of the sin, how then is it a second? He must either prove, that two parts are but one part, or that one only is both together, or that one half is the whole, or that the whole is no more than the formal part; or else he must confess, that 'tis impossible to separate the act from the sin (as David's lying with Bathshebah from his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for breach of precept) and that Mr. Hick. hath abused him more than any man living, by making him lean upon a weapon which is often running through his elbow.   

Sect. 3.  

He is ashamed to cite his own words truly.  His third Abstersion defiles him all over, and proves him conscious to himself of such a guilt, as admitteth of nothing in its excuse. He pretendeth only to have said, [He was not at leisure in reference to Jam. 1.13, 14. fully to open in what sense God may seem, and yet not be the Author of sin, p. 11.] But his words were quite otherwise, how God may be said to 
* Correp. Corr. p. 79.  tempt men unto sin. Which here he durst not repeat, but puts the word seem to supply the place of that Blasphemy.  
And here six things are very observable. 1. That he thought it a blasphemy beyond his power even to palliate, 
1. He proves himself conscious to himself of being left without excuse.  to have charged God with being a Tempter, and a Tempter unto sin too. For why should he falsify his own words, if he thought them innocent? why had he not the courage to be honest in the citation, if he thought his words had been excusable. He could not think it a gallant thing to be caught condemning himself in print without a confession that he had erred: and therefore he anchored upon this, as his lesser misery of the two, hoping perhaps that I might probably overlook it; and of all other Readers he was secure, that they would not compare his second book with his first.  
2. It was strange that he had the leisure to write a book of thirty sheets, the leisure to rail, and to raise reports, 
2. He pretends a want of leisure to excuse or extenuate his blasphemy.  the leisure to charge God impiously with the tempting of men to sin, but not the leisure to show how, so as not to infer him the Author of sin: at leisure to lay a stumbling-blook before the people, but not at leisure to remove it out of the way. It was highly for his interest, to have endeavoured the clearing of those words from blasphemy; why then was he wanting in any the least of such endeavours? even because he found it a most unfaisible attempt. But instead of confessing it was impossible to be done, he thought it handsomer to say, he had not leisure to do it in.  
3. Be it so that he was not at leisure in his first book, 
3. Yet be baulks it in his second book, wherein he pretends a vindication, and cannot pretend a want of leisure.  yet how comes it to pass he was not at leisure in his second? Does he think it a vindication, to let us know that he is capable of no excuse? or will he say that nothing ails him, because he is desperately sick? Either let him repent, and make some public satisfaction for calumniating God as a Tempter unto sin, or let him try to reconcile it with the analogy of faith, or let him declare himself a Libertine without delay. And if he writes another book, I do early bespeak him to be at leisure, and to repeat his own words without further fraud, or Tergiversation.  
4. Had he only said that God doth tempt men, 
4. He forgeth God to be a Satan, and shows the bottom of his doctrine of God's decrees.  he might have opened in what sense, by saying not unto sin. But having specified the object, as well as the act, by saying he tempts men to sin, he hath left nothing to be opened; having opened his whole heart, and shown us the inside, the kernel, the very marrow of his Divinity, as to the subject of our debate. For to tempt men unto sin, is the definition of Satan, and the worst that we can say of the Devil himself. The word tentare of itself is very innocent, and signifies to prove, or to try, or to bring as 'twere unto the Touchstone. But when applied unto sin, it only signifies to seduce, or debauch the person that is tempted. Vincentius Lirinensis, out of the Latin Translation Deut. 13.3. doth read the Text thus, 
* Sed objici potest, cur à Deo non prohibetur doceri, quod à Deo prohibetur audiri? Quia (inquit) Tentat vos Deus. Vin. Lir. cap. 15.  quia tentat vos Deus, and that is all; he doth not add, ad peccandum: and our English Translators have fitly rendered the passage thus, The Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, Deut. 13.3. And in this sense it is that God is said to tempt Abraham, Gen. 22.1. that is, by way of proof and trial, as the Apostle himself explains it, Heb. 11.17. By Faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac.  
5. But to tempt men unto sin, 
5. He sets himself against the Scripture, and flatly contradicts S. James in particular.  is so far from being spoken of God in Scripture, that it saith the quite contrary in the very place by him cited, Let no man say when he is tempered, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man, Jam. 1.13. At such enmity Mr. B. doth stand with S. James, that what the Apostle saith we may not say of God Almighty, Mr. B. saith we may say of him. Let the Reader believe which of the two he thinks good. I for my part believe S. James.  
For 6. To say that God doth tempt men to sin, 
6. He implies the worst of contradictions, as well as blasphemies.  implies a dull contradiction, as well as Blasphemy. It ceasing eo ipso to be a sin, when God is said to tempt to it. Admit that God had bid Abraham to kill his Son (whereas he bade him only offer him, Gen. 22.2. and distinctly forbade the kill of him, v. 12.) it had then been a sacrifice, and not a sin. Or had it then been a sin, Abraham must not have done it; or if he must, he must have been sinful by God's command; it had been his duty to do wickedly, as some of our modern men teach. But as it is said to be impossible for God to lie, (Heb. 6.18.) because to lie is simply evil; and for God to do evil, implies the worst contradiction: so is it also as impossible for God to tempt us unto sin, because to tempt unto sin is as simply evil, as to lie; and for God so to do, implies the worst contradiction. Nay, the tempting men to sin, is one of the very worst sins which men or Devils can commit: which when Mr. B. ascribed to God, he was necessitated to say, he was not at leisure to tell in what sense. It being as much as to say, he was not at leisure to facilitate things impossible, to verify falsehood in its extremity, to reconcile both parts of a contradiction, and to make a blasphemy a very good business. To do these things, Mr. B. hath not been at leisure any time these three years, and yet as little at leisure to confess, and repent, and amend his life.   

Sect. 4.  
Since he is destitute of Excuses, 
1. He is enraged that his meaning should be measured by his words. Look forwards on Sect. 27. where he is showed confessing, what is properly the Author of sin.  I will take some notice of his complaints. His first is, [that I was uncharitable and irrational in insinuating, that he would have done it in a way which would have aspersed God with man's sin, p. 11.] First, he knows I did not expound his meaning, but allege his words only, his saying God may be said to tempt men unto sin; leaving every Reader to judge of his meaning by his words: for by his looks or dumb signs, I knew not how it was possible to guests his meaning. Was I irrational 〈◊〉 this, that I recited his words, and meddled not with his meaning, yet supposed his meaning to be according to his words? I know but one meaning or signification of his words; nor doth he yet so much as try to set down a second. Suppose a man shall affirm that four and four do make twelve, and I shall tell him he is mistaken, they make but eight; will he tell me I am irrational in insinuating his meaning to be as bad as his words? yet this is our case in other colours. Or when the Libertines said, God worketh all things without exception (which Mr. Beza said as well as they) was Mr. Calvin uncharitable, when he concluded their 
* Look back to chap. 1. Sect. 2. Num. 4.  meaning to be blasphemous in three respects? I direct this Question to Mr. Barlee.  

2. He slanders Ancient and Modern both Papists and Protestants.  2. He saith his words might be explained, as ancient and modern Interpreters, both Pontifician and Protestant, have done, p. 12. But yet he names not any one, either ancient or modern, in the writings of whom any such words are to be found, much less their Interpreting of any such words. And I require him to tell me of any one or more of them, who have said that God doth tempt men to sin, or who have showed that such words may have a tolerable meaning: or if he cannot do this, let him publicly satisfy for the slander which he hath cast upon ancient and modern writers. There is not a Libertine, or a Ranter, but may say the same thing for the greatest blasphemy to be thought on: calling all men irrational and uncharitable creatures, who shall think their meaning to be amiss; and referring in general to Ancients and Moderns, who being taken in their particulars did never dream of any such thing.  

3. He slanders S. Austin in particular: and implies it a sin for corn to grow.  3. Nay Mr. B. is more unhappy in his generality; for he proves irresistibly, he never read any such thing, because in his marginal citation there is not one word of it, though pretendedly brought even for that very purpose. What other reason can be imagined, why Mr. B. should refer to the words of Austin, and set them down in his margin, but because he either did not understand them himself, or hoped that such of his Readers as know no Latin might suppose that Saint Austin had been as blasphemous as himself? mark the dealing of the Disputant. Saint Austin saith, that Nature is good in as much as it is Nature, and that Nature is evil in as much as it is vicious; Ergo, God may be said in some way to tempt men unto sin, according to Austin. Is not this a rare Logician? But mark him farther; Austin instanceth in making stolen corn to grow (p. 12.) what then? why then according to Austin (saith Mr. W.) God may be said to tempt men unto sin. Auditum admissi Fletum teneatis amici? either he thinks it a sin for corn to grow when it is stolen, and that it grows upon being tempted, or else he speaks as impertinently as the art of man can devise; and hath nothing to excuse it but (what is very much worse) his opinion that the Thief was tempted by God to steal that corn, which being stolen, God makes to grow. As if the growing of such corn were the peculiar blessing of the Almighty upon the Thief, in reward of that stealth to which he yielded, when so divinely tempted as Mr. B. supposeth him to have been. This is not ridiculous, for 'tis deplorably sad, and should stir up the pity as well as indignation of all that read it.   

Sect. 5.  

1. His uncharitable reflection on his own Dr. Twisse.  His next complaint is, [that I was supercilious in overlooking that which he directed me to out of Doctor Twisse, p. 12.] First, in the page which he refers to, he citys not a syllable from Doctor Twisse, (as in other places he doth, and as no doubt he would have done, if he had thought it for his Interest) but magisterially 
* Correp. cor. p. 79.  saith, [Let him consult with Doctor Twisse against Mr. Hoard, from p. 17. to p. 28.] a Book I never yet saw, nor know where to bo●row, and why I should buy it at his pleasure, I know no reason. If Dr. Twisse in those pages accuseth God of tempting men to sin, and then excuseth him by saying, that 'tis not a sin to be a Tempter unto sin (which yet we know is a sin in grain, and so, as incompetible to God as any thing else that can be named) I shall be as sorry for the Doctor as now I am for his Timothy, and think the Blasphemy but so much the worse. But if the Doctor saith no such thing, Mr. B. is guilty of having persecuted the dead with his invention.  

2. Doctor Twisse his own words cited.  2. If Mr. B. will needs know what was delivered in good earnest by Doctor Twisse, concerning the sense and the manner of God's tempting men to sin (as Mr. B. words it) I will tell him out of my memory of the Doctors own words, not (as he) from my invention; that in case I shall by accident do the Author some hurt, it may be impossible for me to do him wrong. The Doctor taking upon him to show Gods concurrence to the commission of sin, doth affirm in plain terms, [That 
* Cùm tamen manifestum sit, ulteriorem aliquam, per occasiones agendi suppeditatas, ad peccata (ut it a dicam) prostitutionem requiri, quae sine tentationibus ad peccandum inducentibus absolvi non potest. Vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1. Crim. 3. sect. 2. Digr. 2. c. 15. p. 156.  besides his denial of efficacious Grace, there is, by occasions of acting offered, a farther prostitution to sins required, which prostitution cannot be perfected without temptations inducing to sin, ad peccandum (the word is) to the Action of sinning.] Would you have him explain his meaning? he doth it thus; 
† Licet Deo, & occasiones quidvis agendi subministrare, easque ita movere, & agere, ut animum hominis pulsent, & imaginationem afficiant verè, juxta quoscunque gradus aut utilitatis, aut etc. Id. Ibid. p. 156. Col. 2.  [God doth so move and put on the occasions which he subministers, that they smite the mind, and truly affect the imagination, according to all those degrees, either of profit, or pleasure, or opportunity of acting, represented to the sinner in those occasions.] I have showed my knowledge of Doctor Twisse his opinion, in the most accurate of his writings against Arminius. But his meddlings with Mr. Hoard I never read. Had Mr. B. produced his words as I have done, they had perhaps been as little to his advantage: yet still they come short of Mr. B's. in point of broadness at least, if not of sense.   

Sect. 6.  

6. Mr. W's. proof of his falsehoods by his self-contradictions.  It is another of his complaints, [That I did barely repeat his several say, without any the least show of confutation, when they were wary enough, and commonly enough received, p. 12.] Hear his falsities are loaded with his self-contradictions. 1. A little before he had accused me of irrational and uncharitable insinuations, and often told me of wresting his words; yet now he signally confesseth, that I did barely repeat his words. And could I possibly have used him with greater equity and compassion, then to show his Doctrines by their own light only, without those Gloss, Inferences, and Aggravations, with which I might easily have exposed them to greater shame? What doth he now but proclaim me the fairest Adversary, and the most tender, that he could possibly have provoked?  

2. He unavoidably chargeth God with sin in himself, as may irrefragably be proved from Heb. 6.18.  2. Admit it were true (what is most false) that I did barely set down his words, but never added a confutation; this had but tended unto his greater disadvantage. For how grossly blasphemous must those words be, which were sufficiently punished by being showed? And how apparently false must that have been, the very discovering of which I could think enough for a Confutation? If I accuse a man of saying, that God doth tempt men to sin, I need no other proof, than the page of the Book wherein the words lie printed; it being taken for granted, that the words are Blasphemy in the highest; it being no less then to say, that God is Satan, or a sinner. For to tempt men unto sin is a greater sin then to lie, and hath a blacker mark put upon it throughout the Scriptures: but 'tis a great blasphemy to say, that God doth lie; and a greater, by consequence, to say he tempts men to sin. Why saith the Scripture, It is impossible for God to lie, but because it is impossible for God to do evil? And for the very same reason, it is impossible for God to tempt men to sin. And though the making this appear in its native colours, must needs be pungent to Mr. B. yet how can I help it, when he complains of me to the world, that I repeatd his words, but did not confute them?  

3. He little needed a confutation.  3. How little reason he had to complain of that, the Reader may see in many places of my Diu. philanthropy defended. And the Index will help him to make quick work of his experiment. But some of his words were so conspicuously blasphemous, that I thought it sufficient to h●ng them out upon a Gibbet; they having a natural propension to scare the Reader with their appearance. If a Schoolboy should say, that God did tempt him to be a Truant, (citing the words of Mr. B. for his security) his Master would certainly think it fittest to confute him only with a Ferular.  

4. When he is most unwary he is wary enough, and implies his blasphemies common to him with his party.  4. In that he saith his words were wary enough to be uttered even in print, he leaves us to imagine how much more he may say in his private Pulpit, and how much more in his private Parlour, where he is less kept in awe, then when he appears upon the Theatre. And when he adds, that such words are commonly enough received, he needs must mean his own Party; for which the most rigid will hardly thank him, and the moderator sort will cast it off as a slander. When Mr. B. had said, that God doth stir up men to unjust acts, he opened his mind by this simile, even as a man puts spurs to a dull Jade. And though he confesseth that the expressions of Mr. Calvin, Zuinglius, and Dr. Twisse, may be possibly too high, (p. 8.) nay that they spoke with some 
* Corrept. Corr. p. 56.  fearfulness of what they spoke, nay though the Fathers of the Church were religiously afraid to speak the like (by the confession of Mr. 
† Calv. Instit. l. 2. c. 4. sect. 3. sol. 95.  Calvin) and though Mr. B. doth approve, yea defend their expressions, as well as add to their number as black as any, yet now he boasts that they were wary enough, and he hath nothing (happy Creature!) for which to crave mercy.  

5. He is convicted by Dr. Twisse of making God the Author of sin.  5. What he presently adds of his words and meaning at other times, when he denies that God is the Author of sin, doth but add to his impiety a self-contradiction. My proof of which shall be taken partly from himself, and partly from Dr. Twisse. It is said expressly by himself, (p. 11.) That God is the sovereign Author of the material part of sin; 
* Fornicatio notat peccatum, non tantùm secundum formale ejus, quà peccatum est; sed & secundum materiale ejus, quà actus est. Twiss. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 1. Digr. 2. c. 14. p. 155.  and as expressly by Doctor Twisse, that Fornication denoteth sin, not only according to its formal part, but also according to its material part. Or if he had not said it (as he hath) in those very words, yet he approved of those words in Borrhaus and Zuinglius, and said it often himself in words equivalent, yea divers times in very much worse; which however I have already made plain enough, yet in the Tract of my account I shall make it much plainer.   

Sect. 7.  

He makes no difference betwixt the act of adultery, and of marriage, but equally makes God the Author of both. Look forward on c. 3. sect. 12.  Now (Reader) observe how our intimate acquaintance gins to unbosom himself to us. His words and syllables are these; He that cannot or will not tell, how God may be said to excite men to the act of adultery, which to the adulterer so excited is sin, though not to God, neither will he tell how God without sin doth stir up men to the act of lying with their lawful wives (for it is ad utrumque but ejusdem generis excitatio & concursus) unless he makes himself guilty of something of sinful concupiscence, which always more or less since the fall cleaves to the act, p. 12.] Here is matter for a whole Volume, if I could think it fit to give the reins to my pen upon such a large subject; but many things do admonish me to study brevity and dispatch. I will therefore first send back my Reader to what I 
* Look back to ch. 1. sect. 2. num. 7. & ch. 2. sect. 9  spoke (upon occasion offered to me by Mr. W.) to these very words. Next I will set down the Branches of Mr. B's Doctrine herein contained. As 1. That God may be said to excite (that is in English, to stir up) men to the act of adultery. 2. That that to which the adulterer is so excited is a sin. 3. That (by a consequence immediate and unavoidable) God may be said to excite or stir up men to sin. 4. That God's concurrence and excitation is of the very same kind, both to the lawful and unlawful act; to the matrimonial, which he commanded, and to the adulterous, which he forbade. Now that he who exciteth any agent to any act, is properly said to be the Author of that to which he exciteth, is evident to as many as understand the word Author, and the uses of it in Classic Writers; of which that none may be ignorant, I do intent very shortly to make provision. And having said but thus much, I shall only ask of Mr. B. what sinful concupiscence is that he speaks of (as unavoidable and inseparable) in a man's lying with his wife, according to Gods most holy and mo●t wise Institution, for the procreation of children, that he may train them to the service and glory of God? Is it lawful, commanded, pronounced honourable in Scripture, and undefiled, and (after all this) is it sinful too? This was the horrible doctrine of the Encratitae, from whom the Fathers were wont to vindicate the Catholic Doctrine of Original sin. But Mr. B. is worse than the Encratitae, because he holds this Doctrine, and is yet the husband of two wives. He may perhaps have spoken truth in the noisome instance of his own secrets, (which yet I wonder he would thus publicly reveal,) but from his particular experience of himself, he was most shamefully advised to draw a gneral conclusion.   

Sect. 8.  
He treads not many steps farther, 
1. The undeniable blasphemies which ensue upon Mr. B's. doctrine of praedestination.  but he stumbles and falls down, and bruiseth himself, in a most deplorable and piteous manner. And I desire to make it the more illustrious, that Looker's on may take warning by his mishap; yea that himself (if it is possible) may not longer be able to endure his Doctrines. The Case stands thus: I had said in my 
* Correct Cop. p. 49.  Notes, [God foresees I will write, not of necessity, but choice; so that his foresight doth not make an absolute and peremptory necessity, but infers a necessity on supposition.] Mr. Barlee saith, that this is senseless; and as if he thought that necessity had been the English of Praedestination, he changeth my words in this manner: [It is senseless to say that Prescience doth infer a Praedestination, p. 13.] In opposition to which he sets down this as a maxim, [That 
* Note, that he affirmeth (in Its p. 61.) that the will in respect of God's decree is necessarily determined to will.  Prescience of a thing future must needs praesuppose a Praedestination, or a Praedetermination of it, pag. 13. lin. 26.] Here it is that I desire the seduced Reader will give attention. This is one of the first stones at which the men of that way are wont to stumble: if this is happily removed, both they that are staggering will stand upright, and they that are down (if they are not stomachful and childish) will surely rise. Since Mr. B. hath been my Patient, I have often told him what he ails, but he thought that the malady was somewhat too loathsome to be acknowledged. I will therefore now perform two things: First, I will manifest his disease, together with the great cause, and then I will plainly demonstrate the means of cure.  

2. The great disease of making God the Author of sin.  2. The Disease (as I have frequently observed) is this; That he and his Masters do most openly, clearly, and unexcusably make God to be the Fountain, Author, or Cause of sin, of all sin, of every sin, without exception; as much the Author of it as the sinner himself, and as much as Satan who tempts him to sin, and in some respects much more then both. Which before I come to demonstrate, I will name the Cause of this Disease; which being premised, must needs be followed by its effects.  

3. The original cause of the disease.  3. The Cause of it is this; That they believe God's prescience or foreknowledge of all things and events, to be neither praevious to, nor simultaneous with, but directly after his praedetermination of them. Mr. Calvin expressed it thus; 
* See the Divine purity defended, ch. 7. sect. 8. p. 74.  that God did therefore foreknow all things, because he fore-ordained all things: of which I have spoken on another occasion. And now Mr. Barlee expresseth it thus, [Gods prescience of a thing future must needs praesuppose a praedestination, or a praedetermination of it.]  

4. The Patient proved extrembly sick of the disease by his own acknowledgement of the cause. Look sorward on the tenth Section of this Chapter.  4. That Mr. B. is sick of the disease I mentioned, I now prove out of his words, which declare the Cause to be reigning in him. And to make the shorter work of it, I shall proceed to conviction by this Dilemma. Doth he believe God's prescience of sin, or not? If he doth not, than all his own party will send him packing to the Anticyrae, every mouth will be opened full wide against him: he will not therefore dare to say No to my Dilemma. And if he saith Yes, his calamity will be greater; for adhering to his Maxim, he must confess his Doctrine to be this, That God did praedetermine sin, antecedently to his prescience or foreknowledge of sin. To make it plain by Syllogism;  
1. He who holds that God's prescience of what is future must needs p esuppose his praedetermination of it, holds that the praedetermination precedes the prescience.  
2. But Mr. B. doth declaredly hold the former.  
3. Therefore he also doth hold the later.  
This being made thus evident to the most ignorant of his Favourers, and undeniable to the most obstinate, I will now go on to prove my Necessary Assertion, That Mr. B. is sick of the most loathsome and the most dangerous Disease, of making God to be the Author and Cause of sin.  

5. Four short arguments to confirm it, left for every Reader to enlarge upon in his thoughts.  1. If God foresaw nothing, but as being first fore-appointed or predetermined by himself, than he foresaw not any man's determination of his will to sin, until himself had predetermined that man's determination of his will to sin. Now if the Devil is the cause of another man's sinning, by merely inclining his will to sin, and if the sinner himself is another cause of his sin by merely determining his will to sin, (though not as sin, but under the notion and appearance at least of good;) how can God be thought less, if from all Eternity (before the Man or the Devil had any existence) he had predetermined doth the temptation of the one, (which is the sin of the Devil) and the sin of the other (who yields himself captive to that temptation) yea, the determination of both their wills to both their sins? Yet thus he did (saith Mr. B.) at least in signo rationis, before he could be able to foresee the one or the other.  
2. If he who shall command or advise a man to do a thing which he knows to be forbidden, and so a sin, cannot possibly be conceived to be less than a concause, and coadjutor; what then must he be concluded, who doth absolutely and irresistibly predetermine and tie up the will to sin?  
3. God in his Law doth forbid the whole moral act, (to wit, Adultery or Murder) and the liberty of the Agent to commit it; (Thou shalt not do this or that:) he doth not only forbid the obliquity of the Act abstracted from the Act, (as the repugnance of killing an innocent with the Law, which saith, Thou shalt not kill, abstracted from killing;) for this last is impossible to be so much as conceived, much less to be ex parte rei, and implies a gross contradiction. God forbids us to blaspheme, he doth not forbid us to blaspheme amiss, implying it possible to blaspheme aright. So that if he predetermines the will of man, (or man as a voluntary Agent) to the positive Act of blaspheming, he predetermines to that which he forbids, that is, to sin. And if the union of the pravity with the Act doth move God to forbid that the Act itself be freely done, how can he then predetermine that it shall be done freely? or admitting that he can, who is then the Author of sin? It is hard to say, whether the impossibility on one hand, or the absurdity on the other, is more observable in the Case.  

Impossibilium nulla est obligatio.  4. If God is not, by his predetermination of sin, the Author of sin, who is then the Author of it? Man cannot be, for in that case he cannot sin. For can he possibly hinder the for bidden Act from having a pravity or filth, on supposition that it be free, and known to be forbidden? Or can he so order the matter, that there shall not be an Entity of the Act, a wilfulness of the Agent, nor a testimony of conscience against the thing done? No, this is impossible, the predetermination being supposed: or else it is a being too strong for God; which is blasphemous, as well as impossible. How then can God be conceived to exact any thing of his Creature, who doth the thing that is forbid, being predetermined to the Act which is forbidden, and to every circumstance of the Act? What is said of man, may be repeated of the Devil; and if neither of them can be the Author of sin, according to Mr. B's. Maxims, the Reader knows what to think of Him and Them.   

Sect. 9  
To remove the cause of this Noisome and Inveterate Disease, and to keep it from being Desperate, 
1. The easy and infallible means of cure to all who are not resolved to continue sick.  at least from being Epidemical, I must clear the point of God's Prescience to my less instructed and common Readers, such as Mr. W. and Mr. B. appear to be. And because they are reckoned as chief men of their party, there must needs be great numbers who partake with them in their greatest wants. First, they seem not to consider that Prescience is nothing else but the Latin word for foreknowledge, or else not to know what knowledge naturally importeth; and so discern not precisely wherein Gods Knowledge doth differ from his Decree. How else could they imagine (with 
* Mr. W. discovers his opinion, that whatever God foreknows must necessarily come to pass (and so all sins) as well as whatever he decrees, doth the like.  Mr. W.) that God's foreknowledge doth necessitate as well as his decree? or how could they dream (with Mr. B.) that God's foreknowledge of what is future (and so of all sins) is after his praedetermination? two gross absurdities, not repugnant only to reason and common sense, but inconsistent with one another, yet both affirmed by the same sort of men. By Mr. Hobbs, amongst others, in his Animadversions on Bishop Bramhal. In his Answ. to an Object. p. 40. of his Extent of Diu. Prov. Mr. B. c. 3. p. 26. and Mr. Hobbs, p. 108.  
2. They will soon quit the first, if they have but the patience to consider, 
2. The nature of knowledge opened, and distinguished from decree.  that scientia est habitus conclusionis, as simplex intelligentia is principiorum. When the mind is in possession of any conclusion immediately flowing from the premises, and united to them by an essential tye, than the rational Agent is said properly to know. Scire est per causam scire. To know is not to make either the cause or the effect; but to find out the effect by the cause (as in Demonstration à priori,) or to tract the cause by the footsteps of the effect (as in Demonstration à posteriori.) This is great plainness to such as know but a little Latin; but I labour for them who understand none at all: to them I speak thus. To know is properly an Act of the Intellect; but to decree or determine is an Act of the Will. The Act of knowing presupposeth the object, which needs must be knowable by a priority of nature, before it is possible to be actually known. There may be scibile, or a thing knowable, where there is 
* Note that scibile and scientia are only Kelata secundum à ci, and are not capable of being both ways converted per conversionem simplicem, in respect of us who are not omniscient. In which respect only this thing is spoken.  not yet scientia or an actual knowledge of it, (such as a very great part of the habitable world, until Christopher Columbus and Americus Vespusius had begun their Discoveries.) But an actual knowledge cannot possibly be imagined before an object knowable, nay must imply its being actually known. And though the object is future (as in all foreknowledge) yet even than it must be actual in its Idea, and made present unto the mind by its intelligible species. In which respect it was rightly affirmed by the 
† Plotin. Enn. 5. l. 9 c. 13. & Enn. 6. l. 3. c. 1.  Platonics, that before the Creation of this visible world, there was in God's mind a World Intelligible, that is, an Exemplary Cause, an idea or Platform, according to which the world was made. But now to Decree is another thing, as being an act of the will, and being supposed to be absolute, is (for that very reason) effective also. For though God's Decree alone (abstractively considered) will not cause a necessity; yet his decreeing to do, being always followed with his doing what he decreeth, must needs (in sensu isto composito) necessitate the object which is decreed.  
3. God's foreknowledge doth not make things simply to be, and therefore makes them not to be of necessity. 
3. Though Gods absolute decree of doing any thing doth cause a necessity of the event, yet his foreknowledge doth not, nor possibly can it.  But his Decree (I speak of) must needs do both. This may be illustrated by a Physician's foreknowledge of alteration in the Patient upon a critical day, which yet hath nothing of efficiency in its coming to pass. But if the Physician doth decree to work a change in the Patient, by such or such means as he resolves on, he is then the Author of such a change; and if it be with a purpose to dispatch the Patient, it is not his prophecy, but his murder.  
4. If God's foreknowledge did imprint a real necessity on the things foreknown, 
4. The absurdity which would follow if it were so.  this portentous absurdity would unavoidably follow, that he must act in nothing freely, but in every thing as a necessitated and limited Agent. A blasphemy not to be escaped but by the denial of his omniscience from all Eternity, which is every whit as great a blasphemy. And to the same inconvenience the irrespective predestination must needs be subject.  
5. If God's foreknowledge did necessitate the things foreknown, it was either simply as foreknowledge, 
5. Other absurdities which would follow.  or as God's foreknowledge in particular. Not as the first, because then the foreknowledge of every man that can prophesy would be the cause of things future which he foretells. Cyrus then had been beholding to the Prophet Isaiah for his birth, because the Prophet foreknew it a hundred years beforehand. Not as the first therefore; nor yet as the 
* Note, that God foreknew what himself would choose to do; yet did not necessitate himself. He eternally foreknew that he would in time let Adam fall; and not only let him, but help him to rise unto repentance: yet who dares say he was necessitated to either?  second, because the act is not the cause of the object, but by a priority of order (as I shown before) the object of knowledge is before the act, how long soever it may be after by a posteriority of Time. It must first have been true, that there should be such a man as Cyrus, or else it had not been possible for the holy Prophet to have foreknown it. God foreknew all things that are good, as being certain that he would do them; and he also foreknew all things that are evil, as being certain that wicked Agents would freely do them, if they were not hindered; and as certain that he would not hinder, but permit, or suffer them to be done. Both were present to his omniscience from all eternity.  
6. There is no quicker way to make this point most plain and easy, 
6. An Argument taken from the knowledge of what is past.  then by bidding the obstinate to consider, that knowledge is as properly of things past, as future. But it implies a contradiction, for a present act of knowledge to necessitate or cause a thing quite past. The Almighty knows at this instant that Adam fell, as well as he knew from eternity that Adam would fall. Now all acts of true knowledge must needs imply infallibility; else it cannot be perfect knowledge, but some other thing; as confidence, belief, opinion, suspicion, or shrewd conjecture. From whence it follows, that all acts of true knowledge do infer a necessity, although they cannot make any, to wit, a necessity of consequence arising from the truth of a proposition. But such a necessity is inferred from every true knowledge of what is past as well as from a foreknowledge of what is coming: which my hasty Adversaries having not hitherto considered, they have incessantly confounded it with the antecedent and absolute necessity of the consequent, even such as is conferred by every cause on its effect. And therefore next I must enforce them (do what they can to the contrary) to discern a palpable difference betwixt these two; and to discern it so clearly, as not to be able to descent, however able to conceal it by a dissimulation.  
7. Before I show the Case in God, I will provide some light for the weaker-eyed Reader to see it by. 
7. A manifestation of the wide difference between a necessity of consequence from the antecedent to the sequel, and a necessity of the consequent imposed by the cause upon the effect.  This is conspicuous to All, that if I hear a man blaspheme against his Maker, it doth necessarily follow that he blasphemeth; for if he doth not, I do not hear him, it being impossible to hear what is not to be heard: but this being granted that I do really hear the man blaspheme, his blasphemy is inferred by a most necessary sequel. Yet this is only a Necessity of Consequence, arising from the Truth of a Proposition; wherein the reality of my hearing his blasphemy being supposed, the reality of the blasphemy doth unavoidably follow. But my hearing him blaspheme doth not necessitate his blaspheming; for it would be what it is, if I did not hear it. And though I hear him blaspheming whilst he blasphemes, yet in order of nature his blaspheming hath the priority; for he must be to be heard, before I can hear him. From whence it is manifest, that here is not any absolute or antecedent necessity, or a necessity of the thing, as of the consequent or effect. But his blasphemy is a voluntary and contingent Action. Now by this it will be easy for the thickest capacity to discern, that if God foreknew from eternity this blasphemy of the man, then by a necessary consequence the man doth really blaspheme: For if he doth not, God could not possibly foreknow he doth. But this is only a necessity arising from the truth of that Proposition, That God's foreknowledge is infallible, or not capable of erring, and that what he foreknows is very really foreknown. It is not a necessity of the existence of the thing, imprinted in the blasphemer by God's foreknowledge; but still the blasphemy is a voluntary and contingent action: which it could not be, if the man did commit it by an antecedent Necessitation. And if he did, such antecedent Necessitation must have flown from God's Omnipotence, and not at all from his foreknowledge. It being the nature of knowledge, not to produce its object, but to suppose it. God doth contemplate by his knowledge what he effecteth by his power. But it is not in his power to be effective of sin, much less in his foreknowledge to be necessitative of blasphemy, which whosoever shall affirm, will be a very unskilful and dull blasphemer. For  
8. As God's Decree is Actio ad extra, so is his foreknowledge also; 
8. Foreknowledge therefore doth not necessitate.  yet (by the 
* Mr. Wh. p. 37. Where note that M. W. doth call God's decree, Actus Dei ad Intra, which in another man had been a strange mistake. Note also, that God's knowledge of himself is actio ad intra, though his foreknowledge of us is actio ad extra.  confession of the Adversary) it doth not ponere quicquam in ob●ecto: being an action within himself (saith Mr. W.) it works not any thing upon the Creature, and therefore doth not necessitate; for whosoever necessitates, does make necessary, not infer it only. He makes a necessity in the thing which he necessitates, not only infers it in a proposition which another makes of things contingent. If the Adversaries expound the word Necessitative, not by effective, but illative, than first they speak nonsense before they expound it, and after the Exposition they give up their Cause. First they speak nonsense, in saying that God's foreknowledge doth antecedently necessitate the being of sin, when it infers only that it will be; and next they give up their Cause, in confessing that there is not an antecedent necessity of all events, but a suppositive necessity of some, or a necessity of consequence, arising only from the truth of a proposition, whose Antecedent doth of necessity infer the Sequel.  
9 Having snewed the difference betwixt an absolute causal and a conditional consequential Necessity, and freed the prescience of God from the vulgar and senseless imputation; 
9 It is vain for the Adversaries to quit the first error, unless they quit the second also.  how will the men of that way be ever able to free themselves? For admit they quit the first great error of making God's prescience to necessitate sin, yet still they live in the misery of the second, which is their absolute decree and praedetermination of all events. For this can never be freed from laying absolute necessity, having that influence on the effect which prescience cannot be thought to have. As if I decree that my servant shall rob my Neighbour, I do contribute more towards it, then if I only foresee that he will voluntarily do it: and supposing my decree to be irresistible (as 'tis supposed to be in God) it must produce a Causal Necessity. The common 
* Note here, that Mr. W. holding the doctrine of , which he try's to reconcile with his absolute decree of all things, was betrayed (poor man!) into this sad speech; [God having decreed the Fall of Adam, it was necessary that this should come to pass; but it was also necessary that it should come to pass freely] Ext. of Diu. Prov. c. 9 p. 42. and again he saith [It was necessary that the first man should sin, upon supposition of God's Decree, and that he should sin freely. Ibid. p. 40. See the Divine Purity Defended, c. 8. p. 80, 81, 82.  shift is too shameful to serve in stead of an excuse. For if God did absolutely decree that man should voluntarily sin, (which they are often 
* Treatise of the Passions, etc. ch. 42. p. 544, 545.  fain to say, though it implies a Contradiction) than he might possibly have forborn the commission of it (because he did voluntarily commit it) which yet was absolutely impossible, if God had absolutely decreed it.  
I think it fit in this place to insert a passage of Doctor Reynolds, 
Dr. Reyn. his concurrence with T. P. in this point.  both because he doth condemn and severely censure the very same error which I at this instant do write against, and also because he is a person whom Mr. W. and Mr. B. conclude to be of their party. 
* Note, that he means an Hypothetical Necessity, or of the consequence, as appears by his last words.  His words are these, Others there have been yet more impious, which seek to fasten all the corruptions of their wills on something above the Heavens, even the eternal foreknowledge and the providence of God. As if my foreknowledge that on the morrow the Sun will rise, or that such men as these shall one day be brought to a most severe doom, were the cause working a necessity of the next day, or the last Judgement. It is true indeed, God's prescience implies a necessity after that manner as he foreknows; but this is Necessitas onely Infallibilitatis, in regard of his undoceivable knowledge, which ever foresees things as they will certainly come to pass, by the free or natural working of the Agents whence they proceed. It is not necessitas coactionis, or DETERMINATIONIS, whereby the will of man is, without any other disposition or propension in itself, enforced or unspontaneously determined to the producing of such effects. The actions of our will are not therefore necessarily executed, ☜ because they were foreknown; but therefore they were foreknown, because our will would certainly execute them, though not without freedom and election.] Now how contrary this is to Beza, Wollebius, and Mr. W. in particular, all do know who have read these four: And how contrary in general to all the enemies of Arminius, all can tell who have any acquaintance with them all. It is evident by the last period, that Dr. Reynolds pleadeth for freewill as much as I have ever done.  
I shall conclude this Subject by putting the Adversary in mind, that the English of Infallible is undeceivable, whereas the men of that way do use it to signify irresistible: which is as gross a mistake, as if they should hearken with their eyes, or try to see with their ears. Were it not for the assistance of such obstinate mistakes, they would want wherewith to mutter against the Cogency of Truth. Two short propositions will subdue their error, if it lies not protected by an invincible perverseness.  

1. What God decreed to effect, will come to pass unavoidably, and by a necessitation, because his absolute will and his power cannot possibly be resisted.  
2. But what he only decreed to permit, will contingently come to pass; yet (in case he hath foreseen it will come to pass) with a certainty of event, because his foreknowledge is infallible, and cannot possibly be deceived.   
What he decreed to effect is every way good, but what is morally evil he decreed only to permit, and patiently, but wisely, to suffer Men and Devils to effect, (that is, not to hinder forcibly from being effected,) and being effected by the wilfulness of Men or Devils, to overrule and order to the best advantages and ends to which they are capable of being made to serve.  
10. Now I come to show the senselesness of the next great error, 
10. God's prescience doth not of necessity praesuppose a pradetermination.  which Mr. B. expresseth in these words, [That prescience of a thing future must needs praesuppose a praedestination, or a praedetermination of it, p. 13.] It seems the man did not know, & even his Masters did not consider, that causa exemplaris is in order of nature before the efficient, and thought that God could decree to do something, before he knew what he would decree to do. If God did praedetermine before he foreknew, he praedetermined at a venture he knew not what. For he knew it not, until he had praedetermined it, if it was needful for his prescience to praesuppose his praedetermination. But it is blasphemy to say what unavoidably doth infer, That God decreed he knew not what, until he had actually decreed it. God knew all things, which yet he cannot be conceived to have done, if any thing can be conceived before his knowledge. From the first moment of Eternity (with pardon to the word Moment, which I only use to reveal my meaning, as Unum in Metaphysics is said to be momento primo, verum, secundo, bonum, tertio,) God knew himself, his own essence, attributes and actions, his actions ad intra as well as ad extra; therefore he knew he would decree, as well as what he would decree, and how he would decree it. He knew he would decree a world; and in that, all voluntarily, as well as natural Agents. So that though this visible world was temporal, yet the platform of it (the intelligible world) was eternal: it being, before it was created, in ment Dei conceived. For he did not know nothing, when he knew he would create it, at an infinite distance from its creation. He knew it eternally, but created it in time; betwixt which two there is an infinite distance. As he knew what, so also how things would be, and how himself would decree them. Somethings absolutely, as the being of man; other things conditionally, as the punishment of man: which could not possibly be considered, much less decreed, without respect unto sin, which the very word Punishment must praesuppose. Besides, if God's prescience preceded not his Decrees of Election and Reprobation, there was not a● moment in Eternity in which he was free to elect or reprobate: For the freedom to choose must needs precede the act of choice; and to deny God his freedom in his elections, is as impious as irrational.  

11. But rather praedetermination doth connotate prescience, if not (in some sense) praesuppose it also.  11. Well then, It being blasphemously irrational, to say that God did praedetermine he knew not what, or before he knew what, (in any sense) 'tis plain his praedetermination preceded not his prescience, and by consequence his prescience praesupposed not his praedetermination; but rather his praedetermination (of what he did praedetermine) did connotate his prescience, if not praesuppose it. Let this one thing be well considered, that though we cannot say with truth or modesty, God decreed or praedetermined any one the least thing which he did not know; yet we may say with great truth, that he knew what he would 
† This is confessed by Mr. B. l. 3. p. 22.  not decree, as well as what he would. And again, Verum, the object of the Intellect, is in order of nature before Bonum, the object of the Will. So as his prescience in some sense preceded his decree (by a priority of order) but his decree in no sense preceded his prescience. Nay in a perfectly wise Agent, who doth nothing but according to the 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Eph. 1.11.  counsel of his will, according to knowledge and consultation, it is not conceivable by the most precise and metaphysical abstraction, how a praedetermination can be before prescience. As in order of Dignity, Wisdom goes before Power, so in order of Naeture, Advice does go before Action, and the act of the Understanding before that of the Will. A wise resolution doth praesuppose Knowledge. To determine before advice and consideration, is counted rashness and folly in mortal men, and so is impiously imputed to the Alwise God.  

12. The cause of the error shown, and removed.  12. The cause of the error in Mr. B. and his Masters, doth seem to me to be this, that even whilst they use the word Future, they do consider it as past. And though their speech is of a prescience or foreknowledge in God, yet their reasoning is clearly of a post science or after knowledge. Because they know the wisest Agent cannot tell what he hath done, until he hath done it; they therefore conclude of the wisest Agent, (even God himself) that he cannot tell what he will do, until he actually doth it. God worketh always from eternity hitherto, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, even till now, 
* Joh. 5.17.  saith our Saviour: and what he now worketh, he knew he would work from all eternity, even whilst he determined that he would work it. He did not first determine, and then know, but determined according to his knowledge. Thus far indeed the men of that way may safely speak; that God's Decree of Creation was before his knowledge of a world actually created: for before a thing can be known as actually done, (as the actual creation of the world, or the world created) God must needs have decreed that he would do it. But withal let them consider, that we are speaking of God's knowledge of what is future, not yet in act; and therefore call it his foreknowledge, which contemplates what will be, in the presence only of its Idea. And his Decree of Creation could not possibly be before that Idea of a world to be created. Man in some things hath a similitude with his maker. And as a man cannot decree to make a Watch (or any other piece of work) before the image of that Watch is in his mind; so God himself could not decree to create a world, before he knew it in its exemplar, and conceived how it should be: and that for the reason before specified, because he could not decree [vagum quid & indefinitum] he knew not what.  

13. The Application to the present case, and away opened to reconcilement.  13. I will apply my discourse to the case in hand. God must needs have decreed that he would permit sin, before he could know or consider it as actually permitted. But 'tis one thing to know it in Ideâ, or in exemplari, as a thing which may be, if God will, and so may not be, if he will not; and quite another thing, to behold it as actually being: for this is after his decreeing that it shall be, if it be such on which his decree can pass, as the creating of a world, and the permitting of sin; but upon sinning it self the decree of God could never pass: and therefore for that, I must resume what I lately said, that God eternally foreknew what he did not decree the being of, as well as all which he did decree. As he knew he would create one world, so he knew he would not create a hundred. As he knew he would suffer or permit us to sin, so he knew he would not tempt, not incite us, not necessitate us to sin. As he knew, whilst he decreed, that he would give us free-wills; so he knew, whilst he decreed, that he would not take that freedom from them; and he knew what he did not, yea what he could not decree, our many impious abuses which we voluntarily make of this our freedom.  
Now let my Adversaries recount, as well how far I go their way, as where I leave them, and for what Reasons. 1. Let them consider that I say (as well as themselves) that (in order of nature, though not of time) God did first decree to make or do things before he knew them as actually made or done. 2. Let them consider that I leave them by adding this, that God decreed nothing future before he foreknew it in Idea; and foreknew, but decreed not, the Acts of sin, such as Adultery, Murder, Blasphemy, and the like. 3. Let them consider my Reasons (to name no more) are these two: first, it is impiously irrational, to make God to have decreed he knew not what; and next, it is worse, to make him the Author or Cause of Sin. Let them admit of so much as may consist with the wisdom and goodness of God. And for any thing else, I will not strive with them. But till that shall be done, I must proceed to discover their grievous failings.   

Sect. 10.  
I can pass no further than the two and twentieth page of Mr. B. without observing him teaching, 
Mr. B's. unavoidable consequential blasphemy, that God determined all wickedness before he could foreknow it.  [That the things which God foreknows will have a certain futurition; he foreknows them all by virtue of his own will and counsel, whereby from all eternity he determines their futurition, and without which he could not know that they should certainly be, p. 22.] First he speaks of Futurition, 
1. His ignorant use of the word Futurition.  as if he thought it signified Existence; for he talks of Gods knowing what will be future; whereas that which will be, is future now, whilst yet it is not, but hereafter it will be present. Had he said waterish water, he had committed a less absurdity.  

2. Of the word Will.  2. He talks of Gods knowing by virtue of his Will, as if he knew not the difference betwixt the Understanding, whose proper object is truth or falsehood; and the Will, whose proper object is good or evil, (good only of Gods will, and evil also of ours.) He might as well have said, that God did will by virtue of his knowledge, and indeed much better; because 'tis natural for the Will to follow the judgement of the Intellect. The sight of the object is before the pursuit, or else the pursuit is in the dark. If Mr. B. had said, that he sees by virtue of his hands or feet, he had been less to be blamed, because he had but made himself a Monster; and with himself he may be bold, but not with God.  

3. Of the word Certain.  3. He talks of Certain, as if he thought it had been all one with Necessary; or if he knew what he spoke, (as probably he did) he hath blasphemed unexcusably. For God foreknew that all the wickedness in the world would very certainly be (it had not else been foreknowledge, but false conjecture, if what he seemed to foreknow had been uncertain:) and so 'tis the Doctrine of Mr. B. That God could not foreknow all the wickedness in the world, unless by his will he had first determined its futurition.  

4. Of the word Counsel.  4. He talks of God's Counsel, as if he knew nothing of the word; For he saith that God foreknew by virtue of his Counsel, as well as Will: whereas Counsel cannot be Counsel, but by virtue of Knowledge. In the absence of Knowledge there must be Error and Unadvisedness, but consultation or Counsel there cannot be. Thus his Doctrine of Decrees hath made plain English a stranger to him.  

5. His threefold Blasphemy, besides his self-contradiction.  5. But the most notorious thing in his present speech, is his making God to will sin, and his not allowing that God could otherwise foresee it, then by decreeing its coming to pass. Which first, is blasphemously contradicting to the word of God, who saith he wills not the wickedness of a sinner, (Psal. 5.4.) Next, 
Look back on the eighth and ninth sect: of this Chapter.  'tis blasphemously contradicting to the Oath of God, who swears he wills not the death of a sinner, (Ezek. 33.11.) Thirdly, 'tis no less than blasphemously to infer, that the narrow knowledge of man is more extensive than the knowledge of God: For man doth know many things which he doth not will or determine; whereas God (saith Mr. B. with his Condisciples, and Predecessors) never knew any thing in the world but what he willed and determined; nay (which is yet a greater madness) that he never knew, or could know any thing, but because he willed and determined its future being. Fourthly, 'tis repugnant to the common Rule by which his own dear party are wont to be guided at other times, to wit, that the Will doth necessarily follow (not go before) the practical Judgement of the Intellect or Understanding.   

Sect. 11.  
Not many lines farther, 
1. Mr. B's. positive Doctrine of Gods ordaining all sins, both original and actual.  he forgets himself thus, [As for future moral evil things, whether original or actual sins, God foreknew them all in the same moment of Eternity, because even then he did by his permissive and ordinative will determine that they should fall out, p. 22.] Here let him distinguish, that his just meaning may appear. Does he mean Gods ordering only of all sins, or his ordaining them also? If so, than it is blasphemy; if not so, it is contrary to the Assemblies Catechism, and Confession of Faith too, and as contrary to himself. For it is said by that Assembly, that God by the counsel of his own Will, did freely and unchangeably 
* Assem. Confess. of Faith, c. 3. Artic. 1.  ordain whatsoever comes to pass. And again, say they, He hath 
† Assem. short Catech. p. 158. Edit. Lond. 1656.  fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass. Thus the Assembly of Divines. And Mr. B. himself affirms God's Prescience to be subordinate to his Decree both in the moments of Time and Nature, p. 23. l. 5. Agreeable to which is the Pulpit-Doctrine of Mr. Case: [This is the 
⁂ M. Case his Sermon, Entitled, The vanity of glorying in the flesh. p. 58.  plot of Divine Providence, which he hath been * contriving from the days of Eternity; the miscarriage of the first Covenant was not of improvidence, but of * ordination.] But Doctor Twisse and Mr. Whitfield will have it thus; 
† Non tantùm voluiss● Deum ab aeterno dicimus, sed conformiter ita operatum esse in tempore, & totum negotium ita administrasse, ut revenrâ peccaret Adamus. Vin. l. 2. p. 27. cited by Mr. W. in Ext. of D. Prov. p. 10.  God did not only will [the sin of Adam] from Eternity, but conformably to it did so work in time, and so administer the whole business, as that Adam might [or should] really [or effectually] sin. Mr. W. approves of this extremely, and translates it so, as to leave out the word whole, (which is in the Latin of great Importance) and renders reverâ by certainly, by which he meant unavoidably, if he meant at that as at other times. Thus we see 'tis the Doctrine of Mr. B. his Brethren, and his Masters also, that God ordained all sins both original and actual, and that he foreknew them, because he foreordained them.  
2. By this the Reader may judge, 
2. Mr. B's. Nonsense added to Blasphemy.  what sense he puts on the word Permissive, when he adds Ordinative to it for explication. If the man should have said, that the world was created by God's permissive and ordinative will, he had only spoke nonsense, and had but moved his Readers laughter. Whereas in saying that original and actual sins were determined to fall out by God's permissive and ordinative will, he adds blasphemy to nonsense, and cannot but stir up his Readers wrath.   

Sect. 12.  
In his c. 3. p. 55. he hath done a stranger thing then when he denied his own hand, 
1. Mr. B's. self-contradiction in denying, and yet affirming that he maketh God to be the Author of sin.  because he denies what he hath printed, to wit, that he pleaded for a literal sense of those Texts, of which he now at last saith, [That God according to the letter of many of those Texts, seems to be made a moral cause of sin as sin, p. 55.] Yet in his Corrept. Corr. p. 69, 70. he did hearty plead against me (for my charging those men with too literal Expositions of such Texts) that the sense of Scripture was but one, 
Look back on Sect. 7. of this Chap. and on Sect. 2. Num. 3.  and that the Grammatical; and withal jeered me for teaching him to recede from the words, and to approach nearer unto the genuine sense; ending his jeer too, with credat Judaens apella, non ego: all which he now denies, to my great amazement. 'Tis true indeed, he added these words, Where the Letter is not plainly metaphorical, typical, or contrary to some other plain places, and the clear Analogy of Faith: all which condemns him so much the more, because he said this of other Scriptures (like Mr. W.) which say that Christ did taste death for every man, and the like; but not of those Texts whose Grammatical sense he there defended. For he referred to the Texts reckoned up by himself, p. 103. and what should they be, but Mat. 20.28. & 26.28. Heb. 9.28. Rom. 5.18. concerning Gods mercy and love to mankind? not those, whose naked Letter doth seem (to such as he is) to make God the Author or Cause of sin. So that now more than ever, I admire his Conscience, which would suffer him to speak so very plainly against his knowledge.  

2. He is convict-by his own words, by the Assemblies, and by Mr. W's.  2. I will convince him out of his mouth: for when he mentioned the Analogy of Faith, did he not mean that Faith which is owned by him and his party? And is it not one of the Articles of their public Confession of Faith (which I lately cited, sect. 11.) That God did foreord in whatsoever comes to pass? Doth not Mr. W. (his Majorite) contend most stiffly for a literal sense of those Texts which he would have to make God to will and work sin? (p. 19 20.) and doth not that Majorite 
* Mr. W's. Ext. of D. Prov. p. 12.  elsewhere teach the people in Print, [that God must needs some way both will and work in the 
* Ibid.  sin of the Act, because not only the action itself, but the very pravity and deformity of it makes way for God's glory? 
† Ibid. p. 11.  That as sin makes for his glory, he hath a hand in effecting it? and that 
* Ib. p. 44.  sin by accident makes much for his glory? That God did 
† Ib. p. 40, 42.  decree the sin of Adam, and that his sin was therefore necessary? * That God intends his Gospel should harden men's hearts, and close their eyes, and shut their ears, and that he sends it for this very purpose? Lastly, doth he not say, 
† Ib. 45.  that in all the sins which are committed by men, God hath a secret working hand? and in this his last Book, he chief hand too? (p. 27.) Thus I convince him out of his own mouth, and Mr. W's.  

3. He is convicted out of his own and Dr. Twiffe his words also.  3. I will next convince him out of his own and Dr. Twisse his mouth also. First, for his own part he professeth, that he maketh God the sovereign Author of the material part of sin, p. 11. Now because from Dr. Twisse he learned his distinction betwixt the material and formal part of sin, and because I well remember what the Doctor saith of it, let us next consider that Doctor's words. 
* Futtum omne duo netat, viz. actum contrect●ndi sive surripiendi ●es alienas, & actus hujus deformitatem, quatenus sc. lege divinâ nobis interdi●itur rebu● alienis sur ipiendis. Sic & Homicidium duo consignifica●, & actum interficiendi hominem, & illicitam ejus conditionem, sive cum lege Dei repugnantiam. Similiter Adulterium duo connotat, nimirum actum c ncumbendi cum alienâ, atque hujus actus turpitudinem. Twiss. Vin. Gra. l. 2. par. 1. D●gr. 2. cap. 14. p. 155.  [Theft doth note two things, the act of snatching away another man's goods (the material part of the sin,) and the deformity of this act, in as much as we are forbid by the law of God to snatch away another man's goods, (the formal part of the sin.) So also Murder doth signify two things at once, the act of killing a man, and the illegal condition of that act, which is its repugnance with the law of God. Likewise also Adultery doth connotate two things, to wit, the act of lying with another man's wife, and the flagitious turpitude of this act.] These three are the examples which the Doctor gives us of his distinction betwixt the material and formal part of sin. Compare these words with Mr. B's. above cited, (and with the Doctors in divers places of his Books.) and Mr. B. must confess his printed Profession to be this, That God is the sovereign Author of any man's robbing his Neighbour's goods, of any man's destroying his Neighbour's person, and of any man's lying with his Neighbour's wife. Or to instance in particulars, it is the public profession of Mr. B's. Faith (a special Article of his novel Creed) That God was the sovereign Author of Achan's stealing the golden wedge, of David's lying with Bathshebah, and of Cain's killing Abel. Now since 'tis granted by all the world, that the first was Theft, the second Adultery, the third Murder, God is affirmed by Mr. B. to be the sovereign Author of Theft, of Adultery, and of Murder. And because 'tis also granted by men of all sides, That Theft is a sin, Adultery a sin, and Murder a sin, God is affirmed by Mr. B. to be the sovereign Author of the first sin, of the second sin, of the third sin, and so (by a parity of reason) of all the sins in the world.  

4. He is convicted out of his own, and Mr. Hobbs his mouth; Mr. Hobbs his words being justified by Mr. W.  4. In the last place I will condemn him, not only out of his own mouth, but out of Mr. Hobbs his also. First Mr. B. (as I shown before) doth make his Confession of Faith in the first person singular, and speaks dogmatically thus; [I make God] and what is it that he makes him? he tells us in the next words, [I make God to be the sovereign Author.] But of what doth he make him the sovereign Author? He tells us that in these words, [of the material part of sin.]. And what doth he mean by the material part of sin? he tells us distinctly in the same breath, [either the doing, or the leaving undone some positive Natural or MORAL Act, p. 11.] What moral Act for example? he tells p. 12. the Act of Adultery. And how makes he God the Author of that Act? he tells us in the same breath, by exciting men to it. What kind of excitation (or stirring up) doth he mean? he told us that in his first appearance upon the stage, even as a man pu●s spurs to a dull Jade, Correp. Corr. p. 61. Now let us compare Mr. Hobbs his words, who is as able a Calvinist (as to these points) as their party hath lately had. He, after all his meditation [
* Mr. Hobbs of Liberty and Necessity, p. 23, 24.  cannot find any difference between an Action, and the sin of that Action; as for example, between the kill of Uriah, and the sin of David in kill Uriah; nor when one is the cause both of the Action and of the Law, how another can be the cause of the disagreement between them, no more than how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them.] Whether Mr. Hobbs doth argue thus from his heart, as being really seduced by Mr. Barlee's principles which he defends, or doth only talk it from his Teeth outward, as playing the Drole with Religion upon the grounds which are given him by rigid Presbyterians, I leave each Reader to pass his own judgement. But sure his deduction is duly made from the error of absolute praedestination, of praedetermination antecedent to prescience, and so the necessitation of all events. And I wonder if any of that patry who have granted and given him his premises, will adventure publicly to deny his conclusion. Well, we have the Confession of Mr. Hobbs, what that Doctrine doth unavoidably infer, which is common to him with Mr. W. and Mr. B. But because Mr. B. hath given him an Epithet, and a Praenomen, and expressed his detestation by calling him 
* c. 3. p. 7.  Monstrous Leviathan Hobbs, I will add to his the like confession of Mr. W. [That if 'tis impossible to separate the sin from the action, 
Look back onth. 2. sect. 10.  than he that is the Author of the Action must needs be the Author of the sin also which is inseparable from it, p. 25.]   

Sect. 13.  
Notwithstanding all which hath been proved, 
1. Mr. B's. 10000 curses upon himself and his masters. And his implicit confession, that that is blasphemy which I have called by that name. Look forwards on Sect. 27. Num. 2, 3, 4, 5. of this Chap. where Mr. B. confesseth & tries to justify what here he poureth his curses on.  and will be proved yet farther, from the printed words of Mr. B. that God is made by him to be the Fountain and Cause of sin, yet like a desperate Malefactor, he falls a cursing in these words, [I wish miriads of Anathematisms to light upon him who holds it, be he who he will be, if he repent not the sooner, p. 54, 55.] One Myriad had been enough (if he who writ Myriad and did not mend it in the Errata, understood what it meant) it being no less than 10000 yet more then so many curses, the man who said he never cursed, doth pour at once upon himself, and upon the chief men of his way, on supposition that they still do what I have proved them to have done. If their opinion is contrary to their words, (which is the only excuse he can pretend to) it doth but aggravate their guilt, and speak them wilful. He who shall deny his having aspersed his neighbour with the ignominy of Theft, because he did but charge him with having invaded another man's goods, will only make himself capable of so much a greater condemnation. I am sorry that Mr. B. hath put himself under a curse; but am hearty glad he dares not own what he hath written, because I hope he will find it needful, to hate those principles, which led him to write such Poenitenda.  

2. The like confession of his owned Masters, together with their Commissions of the crime confessed.  2. The like Confession hath been made by Mr. Calvin, and Dr. Whitaker, and many more; whose words do rise up in judgement against themselves and their party, as they do justify my charge in the severest part of it throughout my Books: which that the stomachfullest Adversary may not be able to deny, I will confront their own words to their own words, and to the words of their friends, in two parallel Columns; setting down on the left hand the Adversaries Confession, that it is indeed a horrid Blasphemy, to say that God is the Author, or Cause, or Necessitator of sin; and linking with it on the right hand the Adversaries Commission of the very same crime confessed by them.  

Mr. Calvin's Confession.  
De maleficiis Deo Authore perpetratis, locutus,  (inquit) ut quidvis contra tam prodigiosam Blasphemiam dicatur, libenter patiar, modò ne immerito immisceatur nomen meum. Calv. the occult. Dei Providentiâ p. 736.  
Idem Calvinus in Libertinos cap. 13. ait, ex hoc Articulo, Deum scilicet omnia operari, Tria admodum horrenda consequi; quorum primum hoc est, Nullum inter Deum & Diabolum discrimen fore. Et porrò cap. 14. in eosdem, Ipsum à se abnegari oportet, & in Diabolum transmut ari.— Et cap. 4. Execrabilis Blasphemia dicitur.  
Remigius, although a Patron of Gotteschalc's Cause, concludes against the whole party in these following words.  
— Nulli necessitatem imposuerit ut malus esset. Hoc enim si fecisset, ipse utique esset Auctor malorum, etc. Hist. Gottesch. cap. 11. p. 173.  

Mr. Calvin's Commission of the Crime confessed.  
Et jam satis apertè ostendi, Deum vocari eorum OMNIUM AUTHOREM, quae isti Censores volunt otioso tantùm ejus Permissu contingere. Calv. Inst. l. 1. c. 18. sect. 3. p. 70.  
De Assyriis praedatoribus iniquissimis locutus, apparet (inquit) certâ destinatione Dei fuisse impulsos: fateor Satanae operâ interpositâ saepe Deum agere in reprobis; sed ut ejus IMPULSU Satan suas parts agate.— A Deo ipso manat efficacia erroris ut mendaciis credant, etc. Vindictae suae (projectionis, scilicet, in foedas cupiditates) praecipuus est AUTHOR, Satan tantùm minister.— voluntas Dei rerum omnium causa.— Reprobos in obsequium cogit. Id. ib. sect. 2. fol. 69. Idem facinus Deo, Satanae, homini assignari, absurdum non est. Ibid. l. 2. c. 4. sect. 2. p. 95. Obstinatio cordis Divina fuit ad ruinam praeparatio. Ib. sect. 3. p. 96.  
Frustra de praescientiâ lis movetur, ubi constat ordinatione potius & nutu omnia evenire. Ib. l. 3. c. 23. sect. 6. fol. 324.  
Hic (scilicet peccator) justo illius (scilicet Dei) IMPULSU agit quod sibi non licet. Id. l. 1. c. 18. sect. 4. fol. 71. Idem consulatur contra Pighium, de aeter. Dei Praedest. p. 118. ubi Deum peccati Authorem facit.    

Doctor Whitaker 's confession in reference to the whole party, without exception.  
Si Calvinus, aut Martyr, aut Quisquam nostrûm affirmet, Deum esse Authorem & causam peccati, non repugno quin simus OMNES HORRENDAE BLASPHEMIAE scelerisque Rei. Whitak. l. 8. contra Duraeum, sect. 1. p. 524. Doctor Fulk confesseth the same in his Defence of the English Translation, p. 500  
Mr. Whitfield himself doth now confess it to be a Crime, and a great Crime, to make God the Author of sin, p. 2. l. 2. And Mr. Barlee multiplies his Curses on all that do it, (as hath been showed) and calls it a sottish unholy opinion, c. 3. p. 132. although they both are deeply guilty, not only by approving it, and defending it in others; but by doing it also themselves in the most open expressions, in which an Author of sin can be described.  

The Parties Commismission of the Crime confessed.  
Unum atque idem facinus, puta Adulterium, aut Homicidium, Dei AUTHORIS, motoris, Impulsoris opus est. Zu●ng. in Serm. de Prov. c. 6. Deus Angelum vel Hominem Transgressorem facit. Id. ib. cap. 5. Dictis hisce Zuinglianis D. Twissus patrocinium suum commodat. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 2. p. 37.  
Aliter Satan malorum quàm Deus, five de malo quod in culpâ, sive de eo quod in poena cernitur, loquamur, AUTHOR judicatur esse. Borrhaus ad Isa. cap. 28.  
Fatemur Deum non modo ipsius operis peccaminosi, sed & intentionis malae AUTHOREM esse, etc. D. Twiss. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 1. p. 36.  
Deus homines ad suas pravas actiones incitat, seducit, jubet, indurat, trahit, deceptiones immittit, & quae peccata gravia sunt efficit. Martyr in Jud. 3. vers. 9 p. 45.  
Ad peccatum quà peccatum praeordinati sunt tam electi, quàm reprobi. Trigland. Defence. fol. 87.  
Mr. W. and Mr. B. have equalled all the rest, if not outdone them; as my Reader hath partly seen, and will see yet farther in the several Sections of my second and third Chapters, where I have faithfully exhibited, and shall exhibit, their words and pages.    
It were a task too easy to write a just volume, in confronting the Confessions to the Commissions of that party. But of things so nauseous, I think it enough to let every Passenger have a taste. And I am called away by Mr. Barlee's next words, affirming God to be the cause of the very obliquity of the act of sin, in his very attempt of an Abstersion. That I may not possibly do him wrong, I will transcribe his own words, and make them the top of another Section.   

Sect. 14.  

His confession of Faith touching God's commerce with sin.  His Apology for himself, and for his Creed, is verbatim thus; I do every where make it evident, that I do only believe God to be a Natural Cause of the mere Act of sin (without which it is impossible that any sin can be committed,) but that he is only a mere accidental ●ause of the obliquity of the act of sin, wherein alone the formality of sin is consisting, and from whence alone sins Denomination ought to be taken, p. 55.] This is his wary way of speaking, and this (he tells us) is his Belief, 1. That God is the cause of sin; both of that which he calls the material 
* p. 11.  part of sin, or the positive act, & of that which he calls the formal 
* Ibid.  part of sin, or the obliquity of the act. God (saith Mr. B.) is the cause of both parts, and so of the whole sin, of which they both are components. But 2. he tells us, that God is not the natural cause of both, but the accidental cause of the one, and the natural cause of the other. A fair confession of his Faith. For Cain's killing Abel, and David's lying with Bathshebah were positive acts, and each of them (saith Doctor Twisse) materiale peccati; so that of them Mr. B. believeth God to be the natural cause. And supposing it possible to separate their obliquities, he believeth God to be the cause of them also. For although he calls it accidental, he cannot mean that it is none; for than he would have said, that God is no cause at all of the obliquity of the act: whereas he now saith the contrary, that God is a cause of the obliquity, because an accidental cause; nor will the known 
* Ponsito uno Conjugatorum ponitur alterum. Et si Conjugatorum unum uniconveniat, alterum etiam conveniet alterit  Rule of Conjugates allow him any the least evasion. The Question is not what kind of cause of the obliquity they affirm God to be, natural or moral, per se or per accidens, but whether or no he is a cause. And to this Mr. B. makes answer in the affirmative. Nor can he be imagined to argue thus, God is not a natural, but an accidental cause; therefore no cause at all. For that were to argue that a thing is not, because it is; and that a proposition is false, because it is true: We may argue by such Logic, that Mr. B. is not a man, because he is not a patiented, but an angry man. And to deny that God is the Author of that obliquity, of which he affirms him to be the cause, is the same thing as to say, he is indeed the Author of the obliquity, but the Author of the obliquity he is not; for whatsoever is the cause of any thing in any kind of causality, is so far forth the Author of it as it is the cause, according to the use of the word Author in all Classic Writers, as I shall show in due time.  

How Mr. B. makes God the natural cause of sin itself.  And if that which he calls the Act of sin, (as the act of cursing or hating God, of David's lying with Bathshebah, and the like,) is nothing else but the sin itself in its whole essence, (as indeed it is, and I have demonstrated before,) than his belief must needs be this, that God is the natural cause of sin; which is worse than to believe him the moral cause only, by how much it is worse to necessitate any man to wickedness, then only to tempt and persuade him to it. He who necessitates, being the sole cause of it; and he who persuades, the concause only. I will say no more here, because I have enlarged so much 
* Look back on ch. 2. sect. 5.  already on an occasion offered by Mr. W. I will only add a word to Mr. B's. citation in his Margin; If he is to be judged a moral cause of any sin, who moves any one to it, by help or counsel, favour or persuasion, (as † Dominicus à Soto doth truly speak, 
* In moralibus prorsus est judicaturque causa, qui lege, , consilio, favore vel persuasu movet quempiam sive ad bonum sive ad malum. Domin. à Soto de Nat. & Gra. l. 1. c. 12.  how falsely soever in some other things) than God is also accused of being the moral cause of sin, by Mr. B. and his party, who have publicly taught, that God doth tempt men to sin, and so far favour the regenerate in the very worst sins they can commit, as that they cannot fall totally, much less finally from grace. I have showed the former in the third Section of this Chapter; and the later long ago in the Diu. Purity defended ch. 14. sect. 2. p. 128, 129, etc.   

Sect. 15.  

Mr. B's. most signal and most desperate attempt, from p. 111. to p. 121  Now I proceed to that part of Mr. B. which will save me the labour of saying more, and make him wish (ere it be long) that he had said nothing at all, but that he had rather been born dumb. For 'tis that wherein he engageth, not his own credit only, (if he can possibly imagine that he hath any yet left him) but the credit of his friends too, amongst whom Mr. Hick. of Mag. Coll. is branded by him for a chief. Nor only so, but he engageth very deeply his soul and conscience, which ought (I am sure) to be dearest to him. Now that himself and his Abettors may not fail of comprehending the breadth and depth of the Calamity into which he hath ingulphed and plunged himself; and to the end that he may find it much the most for his Interest, to make a public Recantation, and to act 
* 2 Cor. 7.11.  revenge upon himself, I will (as briefly as I am able) premise the state of the affair betwixt him and me, that so the life of his unhappiness may at last appear in the greater lustre.  

2. The state of the case from its Original.  2. I had proved, in my 
† Ch. 3. p. 110. to p. 116.  Defence of the Divine philanthropy, that the sinner is the efficient cause of sin, in confutation of Mr. B. who denied that sin had any efficient cause at all, but only (forsooth) a deficient cause. I say, I had proved the efficient of sin by a great number of Arguments, whereof each was so cogent, that neither Mr. B. nor M. W. nor Mr. Hick. had the courage to venture on a solution. I do hearty wish that my Reader will here peruse those seven pages in my D. Philan. Defended, from p. 110. to p. 116. where he will find my Thesis proved by so many convincing Demonstrations, as have not left the Adversary the least colour for a Reply. And because some Readers may not have that Book in their possession, whilst others are unwilling to neglect the work they are upon, I will here recapitulate (but very briefly) what there is proved in ample manner.  

3. Proofs that sin hath an efficient cause.  3. 1. If man is the cause of sin, and not efficient, he is the material formal, or final cause; if the Deficient is none of these, (as none will say it is) it is no cause at all. If sin hath no cause, it hath no real being, much less can it be the cause of punishment: and so God is inferred to punish men without cause. 2. Where there is no efficient, there is no effect, that is, there is nothing: and so (according to Mr. B.) men are either not damned, or damned for nothing. 3. If the sinner is but deficient as to the being of sin, he is less the cause of it then God is inferred to be by them, who say that Gods will of sin is efficacious, and irresistible, as that which predetermines, decrees, and necessitates sin; and efficacious, ab efficiendo, is prevalent, forcible, etc. 4. Mr. B. confesseth (in a sober fit) that the sinning creature is the 
* Corrept. p. 79.  efficient cause of sin, although he saith (in a fit of passion) that sin hath 
† Ib d. p. 55.  no efficient cause. 5. He often mentions the 
* Ibid. p. 79.  Being of sin, as when he saith that God 
* p. 178.  ordained it. Whereby he infers it to be effected, and so to have an efficient. 6. If he saith (as at other times he doth) that sin consists wholly in a deficiency, he infers (what is worse) that no creature can effect sin, nor by consequence commit it. 7. Whilst he affirms God's absolute ordination of sin in one breath, and that sin hath only a deficient cause in another breath, he chargeth on God all the causality of sin, of which he allows it to be capable. 8. As when he breathes hot, he saith that God ordained and determined sin; so when he breathes cold, he saith that God can ordain nothing but good; which is to infer that sin is good: And to what is good he allows an efficient cause. 9 If sins of omission (as not praying, and not giving alms, etc.) had but a deficient cause, yet sins of commission (as cursing and sacrilege, etc.) have a cause efficient with a witness. 10. Admitting that sin were a privative Entity, it would not follow that it hath not any efficient cause. For he who deprives a man of life, or sight, is the efficient cause of death, or blindness. And darkness (the privative of light) was one of the works of God's Creation, Gen. 1.4, 5. of all which he was the efficient cause. 11. What is privative in one respect may be positive in another; as our sicknesses and sins do daily teach us. Murder is not only privative of virtue, but also constitutive of vice; and must have something in it of positive, to make it differ in specie from all other sins, and in degree from all other murders. Of some we say, they are not good; whilst others are not only positively, but superlatively evil. 12. Every privation presupposeth an habit to which it stands in opposition: but a man may be covetous who never was liberal. 13. An Agent morally deficient in the performance of a Duty doth effect that evil action which is so morally deficient. For 1. The Adulterer is the efficient of his filthy Act, which is his sin. 2. The Devil is the Father of lies, and a Father is an efficient. 3. A man (through grace) is the efficient cause of a good Action. And Mr. B. is worse than a Pelagian, if he will say that man is more efficient of good then of evil. 14. Mr. B. 
* Corrpt. 111.  confesseth (in a lucid interval) that there may be something positive in a privation. 15. Punishment is a positive Entity, and owned to have an efficient cause. But Mr. B. saith often that sin is a punishment. 16. Whilst he denies his making God the Author of sin, because sin (forsooth) hath no efficient, he unavoidably infers, 1. Either that God is not the Author of death; or 2. that he is the Author of sin, if of death; or 3. of both; or 4. of neither. 17. If when they say that God is the cause of sin, they do not infer he is the Author, because the cause is but deficient, they plead no more for God then for the Devil; for if nothing is an Author which is not efficient, and if sin hath no efficient, than neither Men nor Devils can be the Authors of sin.  
4. In stead of answering these things, 
4. Mr. B's impertinencies, and rail in lieu of Answers, do strick obliquely at S. James.  Mr. B. talks thus, p. 111. sect. 3. First, that my opinion of sins having a positive Entity, and an efficient cause is a dreadful opinion. Secondly, that there is no question between us about any thing else: (which if true, than my evincing this concludes the Controversy between us.) Thirdly, that he trembles more at the thought of commiting sin, than many of my party, if not myself, at the open acting of it. Fourthly, that God's judicial hand appears against me. Fifthly, that my conclusion (out of S. James, ch. 1. v. 15.) is 1000 times more for Gods being the Author of sin, than the words of his party which I have cited. Sixthly, that God's just hand is upon me. Seventhly, Quem perdere vult Deus hunc dementat, p. 112. These are his general Answers thrust up together into one Paragraph. Before I come to his particular Answers (which are infinitely worse) I will entreat my Reader to compare my seventeen particulars with Mr. B's. seven, and with what I shall now say from the express words of S. James, who saith, that 
* Jam. 1.15.  lust having conceived bringeth forth sin. The conception of lust is before expressed by a man's being drawn away, and enticed by his lust (v. 14.) The Spirit solicits the Will on one side, lust on the other. If lust prevails and carries away the wills consent, than lust conceives; or (which is all one in effect) the Will is 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  drawn away, and 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  deceived, or overreached by Lust: not only invited, but ensnared and wrought upon by the invitation, so as to give up its consent. Lust by this doth conceive, and then bringeth forth sin, as the Parent the Child. What is sin therefore, but the production of the will consenting to Lust, or drawn away by it? The production (I mean) of the evil will, which by thus consenting becomes evil. Now this being the upshot of what I mean by the efficient cause, and positive entity of sin; against whom hath Mr. B. spent the expressions of his Pet? against we only, who spoke from S. James, or against S. James also, from whom I spoke? 
* Note how the bitterest of his censures do hit himself and his party.  Nay, hath he not spent them upon himself, who hath confessed, even in Print, the very same things which here he rails at? He hath openly affirmed, both that the sinning Creature is the efficient cause of his sin, (Corrept. p. 79.) and that there ☞ may be something of positive in a privation, (Ibid. p. 111.) Nay are not all his rail against all his own party, who say that God doth 
† Look back on ch. 2. p. 90.  efficere peccata, and not only will, but 
** M.W's. own words p. 26. of which I have spoken ch. 2. sect. 14. and also sect. 20, 21.  work sin, and that he hath a hand in * effecting sin? Sure these are very frequently the expressions of his Masters, as well as Brethren: and therefore judge (good Reader) whether S. James and Mr. P. or Mr. B. and his party, are the pertinent objects of Mr. B's. Invectives, especially his last expressed in 
* Quem perdere vult Deus hunc dementat. Of the positive Entity of sin.  Latin, [1. Dementation sent from God; and 2. as a token of Reprobation.]   

Sect. 16.  
To the Preface which he makes to his more particular Discussion, wherein he only takes occasion to call it a horrible opinion, that sin as sin in respect of its obliquity, hath a positive entity and efficient cause, p. 112. lin. 9, 10. I have but three things to say. 1. That if it were so indeed, he would be utterly unexcusable for having embraced that opinion in that part of his Prints so lately cited; or for railing at an opinion which himself confessed to be true: or if he hath since seen his error, why was not his second volume a Recantation of his first? And what will he do to Mr. W. for saying that God had a hand in effecting sin, whereby he inferred, that sin had an effective or efficient cause? 2. He cannot say he speaks of the formal part of sin as sin, and not of the whole sin, because he speaks of sin in respect of its obliquity, which he is wont to call the formal part of sin. And 'tis nonsense to say, that sin as sin in respect of its sin, or that obliquity as obliquity in respect of its obliquity, hath not a positive entity, or efficient cause. So as he dares not deny, but that sin doth signify the integrum peccati, or whole filthy act (such as cain's killing Abel, or David's lying with Bathshebah) whose repugnance with God's Law is called obliquity. And because that sin is an obliqne, or crooked, or irregular action, Mr. B. concludes it no positive Entity. 3. But to rest on him to sobriety and common sense, I shall need only to ask him, whether Rectitude is not a positive Entity. If he saith yes (as I am sure he needs must) what show of reason can he pretend, why obliquity is not as much so as Rectitude? how much more that whole sin, of which obliquity is accounted the formal part? Is not a Circle, quà talis, as positively a figure, or a round figure, as a right line is a right line? Is not crookedness or gibbosity in any man's shape as positively such, as straightness or clean making? When a crooked parent begets a child which is also as crooked, is he less a positive and efficient cause, then if he and his child were both well shaped? When Adam begat Cain in a state of sin, (with Satan's image in stead of Gods, as some of the Fathers have expressed it) was not the cause and the effect too, as truly positive, as if they both had been sinless? An action flowing from an Agent hath as positive an Entity, as the Agent himself from whom it flows. The sin of Murder is an Action; as Cain's killing Abel: So is the sin of Adultery; as David's lying with Bathshebah. Nor any whit the less such, in respect of their being irregular actions; any more than a wicked man is the less a man for being wicked. David's lying with Bathshebah before she was his wife, was as positive an Entity, and had a cause as efficient, as David's lying with Bathshebah after she was his wife; which alone is sufficient to fill Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. with confusion of Face, and to compel them to Recantations, unless they will shelter themselves under Rantism and Libertinism, by saying that David's lying with Bathshebah was no adultery, or such an adultery as was no sin, or that it was a very good sin, because a positive Entity, and that which had an efficient cause. For Mr. B's. first Argument doth follow thus:   

Sect. 17.  
If sin as sin be a positive Entity, 
1. Mr. B's first Argument to prove the goodness of sin, in which Mr. Hick. is equally concerned.  than it is a thing in itself good. For every positive thing is good. It is to all Scholars well known, that unum, verum, bonum convertuntur, p. 112.] First, he cannot but confess, that if sin is a thing positive, he seeks to prove (by this Argument) that sin is good. But that it is a thing positive, I have abundantly proved in my two last Sections, and himself hath confessed in his Correptory 
* p. 79. & p. 111. both before cited and compared with one another.  Correction; therefore he cannot but confess, that all the force of this Argument is only to prove that sin is good.  
2. A thing that is privative in one respect, is also positive in another, 
2. The noisomeness of the Disease.  as every Sciolist knows and Mr. B. hath virtually confessed. Every Sciolist can tell, that the corruption of one thing is the generation of another; that what is privative of life or sight, must needs be positive of death or blindness. The Darkness which God created was not more privative of the Day, than it was positive of the Night. Nay, doth not Mr. B. confess as much? for in saying that the sinner is the 
* Correp. p. 79.  efficient cause of his sin, he doth grant it to be a thing. And in saying, there may be something of 
* Ib. p. 111.  positive in a privation, he doth more than grant it to be a positive thing. I therefore say, more, because a privation is but the abstract of privative. And the Transgression of the Law, which is sin, is not a mere privation of virtue, but a positive thing, which is privative of virtue, & positive of vice. Sin is so perfectly a concrete, that unless it is a concrete, it cannot be conceived to be a sin: No, no more than a concrete can be conceived to be a concrete when it ceaseth to be a concrete. The most Poetical brain cannot fancy the least ●●●ial difference betwixt David's lying with Bathshebah, and his adultery with Bathshebah, at the time of her being Uriah's wife. So that now Mr. B. must confess, that the least part of his blasphemy is no less than this, that sin is good as it is positive of evil, although it is evil as it is privative of good. This being the Printed Article of his unchristian Creed, [THAT EVERY POSITIVE THING IS GOOD.]  

3. The purging out of the peccant Humour.  3. Having showed him the noisomeness of his Disease, I will now remove the peccant Humour by which it appears to have been fed, to wit, his Ignorance, or Inadvercency, that bonum metaphysicum, which is converted with ens, hath quite another signification then bonum morale. And being Aristotle's phrase (who was neither a Prophet of the old Testament, nor an Evangelist of the new) should rather have been rejected as unsound and unsafe, then have been used by a Priest to prove the goodness of sin. For the Libertines and Ranters (who are as little versed in Metaphysics, and in Aristotle's meanings, as Mr. B. or Mr. Hick. or Mr. Hobbs) are not only very ignorant of the 
* Bonitas moralis, naturalis, transcendentalis, passim leguntur apud id genus Scriptores.  difference betwixt good and good, but they cannot easily be taught it. And a Carneadist will be glad to introduce an opinion that sin is good, by calling it Bonum Metaphysicum, or Transcendentale. Mr. B. must now be taught (that he may not debauch his Disciples) that the adequate subject of Metaphysical Science is ens quatenus ens, real illud; not omnimodo positivum quatenus positivum. And so, in one sense it comprehendeth 
* Vide Scot Quodl. 3. Art. 1  Res, and 
† Vide Monlorium de Univers. cap. 7.  Aliquid. And Mr. B's. very obliquity (he knows) is really some thing: but then again he must be taught, that Bonum in Metaphysics, which is converted with Ens, doth not signify Good in English, any more than Canis (the Star) doth signify the Dog which walks about with four feet in our English streets and apprehensions, though that (in Latin) is Canis too. The difference is not the less betwixt malum (an Apple) and malum (an Evil) and 
* In accusativo.  malum (an mast) because they are expressed in the very same letters. Bonum, in English, doth signify good, as opposed to evil. But in Metaphysics no more than ens in ordine ad appetitum. And that sin is such, Mr. B. knows by sad and minutely experience; and so before he is ware, he hath proved the thing which he endeavoured to disprove, by his very endeavours to disprove it, viz. that sin is a positive thing.  

4. Dr. Twisse his Foundation a thin Sophism.  4. Upon this lamentable Sophism, as lame and as naked as it appears, Dr. Twisse hath founded his Doctrine of irrespective Reprobation. Because, forsooth, there is aliqua bonitas (nimirum entis) in damnato, but none in annihilato, therefore God (saith the Doctor) who may annihilate for nothing, may damn his Creatures also for nothing; this being (saith he) the lesser evil. Choose now (good Reader) whether thy Saviour, or Doctor Twisse, doth best deserve to be believed. Doctor Twisse tells us that it is better to be tormented in Hell for ever, then to be turned again to nothing. Our Saviour tells us the contrary, Mat. 18.6. & Mat. 26.24. Mar. 14.21. where he saith in effect, that it is better to be annihilated, then to be damned. By the Logic of that Doctor, it should be better also to do wickedly, than not to do any thing at all, and sin would be good by being something.  

5. How a lie is verum as much as sin bonum.  5. If nonsense is to be spoken in the style of Metaphysics (as misunderstood by a Hobbist or a Presbyterian) then indeed we must say, that sin is bonum metaphysicum, and that a lie by consequence is metaphysicum verum. Then which if Mr. B. doth mean no more, the Reader sees what he hath gained. But if by Good he means bonum morale, let him prove that Parricide, Incest, Witchcraft, or Blasphemy, must either be naked privations, or moral good things; for according to his dream, they must either be nothing, or no sins, or moral virtues, or sins and moral virtues too. And so the Devil, who is not a bare privation, must be with Mr. B. a moral good.  
6. Now I must show him the sense of his Latin Citations in the Margin. 1. Albertus Magnus his speech hath thus far truth in it, 
6. Albertus Magnus his words explained. 
Perfectius est agere, quàm esse. Id quod non est à se nec potest à se manere in esse, multò minus potest agere à seipso. Et cùm actus malus secundum conversionem ad materiam sit simpliciter actus egrediens à potentiâ actiuâ perfectâ secundum naturam, ideo non egreditur ab eo, nisi secundum quod movetur à causâ primâ, alioqui sequeretur duo principia esse. Alb. Mag. in Pet. Lomb. Senten. 2. Disp. 37.   that actus malus is not so from the man, as if he could simply agere à seipso, if God did not give him the power of being and acting as a very free Agent. But this being supposed, it is meetly the work of man's own will (which God hath left thus free, that is, determinable by itself) to determine his Will to this or that which is evil. So again it is true, quod non egreditur abeo, nisi secundum quod movetur à causâ primâ, if he means by movetur, his having the power of being and acting as a man, both given and continued by God unto him: which is abundantly sufficient to avoid the duo principia, if he means coaeterna: otherwise 'tis certain, that God is the principle of good only, and Lucifer only of evil. Thus the Citation makes not for Mr. B. but in two respects it makes against him: for actus malus is actus, and egredient from that power which is enabled to act (as that is more perfect then barely to be) and so as to need a dependence from the first cause, which must infer the Agent to be more than deficient; for to a mere deficiency there needed not his moveri à causâ primâ. 2. Mr. B. doth here assert, that man had his power to sin from God, 
Mr. B. (taught by Mr. Rivet) doth most avowedly make God the Author of sin.  nor will he deny that that power hath a positive entity; but he had argued before (c. 2. p. 54.) That if the power to sin was from God, God must unavoidably be the Author of sin, which besides the great impiety, betrays a sottishness in the blasphemer: for the power to sin being (in order of time, as well as of nature) before the being of sin, it follows that such a power is not only no sin, but 'tis impossible that it should be; else Adam must have been sinful whilst he was innocent, and sinned before he sinned, because he had the power to sin, before it was possible for him to sin, or for that power to be reduced into act. Mark now the arguing of Mr. B. from his 
* See the Diu. Philan. ch. 4. sect. 24. p. 24.  friend Mr. Rivet. If that power or capability which neither was nor could be sin, was from God, than God was unavoidably the Author of s●n, that is, he was, because he was not; it was necessary, because impossible. This 'tis to be a rigid Consistorian. He and Rivet must either say, 
Look forward on sect. 29.  that Adam actually sinned before he had the power to sin, or that it is part of their belief, that God is unavoidably the Author of sin.  

7. S. Augustine's words most impertinently cited.  7. Saint Austin's speech of Natura vitiosa in sensu diviso, in which are separated those two things, natura and vitium, is nothing at all to the purpose of sin, whose very being is evil, and hath not the least moral bonity in it; of which alone we here speak. There is no doubt, but Nature is good when it is not evil, and evil when it is vicious: but what is this to the posiciveness or privativeness of sin? This is but one of Mr. Bis. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

Sect. 18.  
I now proceed to the second Argument, which is the most horrible of all: 
☞ The most remarkable blasphemy of one Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. called by the name of a second Argument.  it is hard to say, whether more impious, or more unscholarly. And as if one Presbyterian had not sufficed to make it sufficiently absurd, Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. have joined their forces. But Mr. Hick. is the Chieftain in this exploit, (if Mr. B. hath not done him wrong) because it came out of his Forge, and was sent from Oxford to Brockhole to be hammered on by Mr. Barlee. Observe (good Reader) the words and syllables of the men.  
If sin is a positive Entity, IT IS GOD; for as a very 
* Note that Mr. B. in his margin, explained whom he meant in these large Characters. Mr. H. HICK. of his own College, p. 112.  learned pious friend of mine wrote to me not long since very well, Whatever positive thing is not from God, is God; there being no medium betwixt Deus and Creatura. In truth every positive thing must be Creator, or Creature; and who now is the Manichee, maintaining an independent evil principle? p. 112.  
Before I show how many ways this brace of Presbyterians have been unhappy in this conjunction of their abilities expressed in five or six lines, I will take a short notice of the Authority and Repute which is acquired to Mr. Hick. by his being noted (in the margin) to be a man of mine own College. For aught I know, he may be also in possession of mine own Fellowship, and mine own Chamber, and mine own meat and drink, and those yearly Revenues which are mine own too: and for which I may the rather expect to have some satisfaction, because it seems the Visitors made him one of my Receivers and Usufructuaries (for my legitimate Heir or Successor they could not make him.) And I have reason to be glad that he is thought such a pious and learned man: because if he is pious, he will the sooner pay me my Arrears; and if he is learned, he will not object against my known and indisputable right. But of his Learning and Piety both at once, I am now to make some easy trials.  
1. First he concludes the Devil's Pride (not only to be good, but) to be God; 
1. How Mr. Hick, infers the Godhead of sin, which I durst not repete, but that I cannot confute it otherwise.  for the Devil's pride is a positive thing (as I have lately made apparent, Sect. 15, 16. and shall farther demonstrate by and by.) And being the very filthiness of the filthiest spirit, it cannot possibly be from God, or one of God's Creatures. And if not so, then (say the Brethren) it must needs be God. For so run their words, [whatever positive thing is not from God, is God, there being no medium betwixt Deus and Creatura, God and his Creature.] The Devil's pride is as positive a thing as his lies are, and as much from the Devil, and as really a sin, and so as infinitely far from being one of God's Creatures. But God's word tells us, that 
* Joh. 8.44.  lies are from the Devil, and not from God. The Devil alone is the 
* Ibid.  father of lies, whereas God on the contrary is the spirit of 
† Joh. 16.13.  truth. And as a lie in particular is the child of the Devil, (for relata dicuntur ad convertentiam) so sins in general are the 
* 1 Joh. 3.8.  works of the Devil: and so they are called in many places of Scripture by the name of 
† Mic. 6.16. Gal. 5.19. Eph. 5.11. Col. 1.21. Heb. 9.14. Rev. 9 20.  works; as 'twere on purpose to show us that they are positive things. The works of darkness, the works of the flesh, the works of men's hands, dead works, the works of the Devil. Nay farther yet, so far are those works from being God's Creatures, that the Son of God was manifested in the flesh, that he might destroy the works of the Devil, 1 Joh. 3.8. And yet those works must needs be positive things, even for this very reason, that they are capable of destruction: privatio est habitûs privatio, and vacuum vacui implicat locatum. Every privation is of something positive; and not to be so implies a palpable contradiction. He who shall prove there is a vacuum in nature, because there is vacuum vacui, will say no more in effect, then that there is a vacuum, because there is not a vacuum. And so a privation of a privation is nothing else but a position, that is, not a privation. So that unless Mr. Hick. will embrace the suds of a contradiction, he must confess that to be positive, which God came to destroy; and that he came to destroy, not his own works, but the Devils; and that the works of the Devil are nothing else but sins: upon which he must recant his most deplorable way of arguing, and make some kind of satisfaction for his so scandalous an attempt; or else he must own his proposition in one part of it, or in another; either by saying that the Devils works are Gods Creatures, (and so from God) or that he thinks they are God himself.  
2. I do so pity the Malefactor, 
2. It weigh opened to the undeceiving of M. Hick. by showing him a Medium where he could see none. Look back on ch. 2. sect. 7.  even at this very instant whilst I am persecuting his crime, that though in conscience and duty I am bound to show it in every part of its deformity, (that the weaker sort may be warned against the kill Doctrines of such Instructers) yet am I unwilling to go farther in showing the dangers (nay real mischiefs) into which he is fallen, and fallen headlong, by his own wilful precipitation of himself and others, (for I hear he is a person who hath many more followers then Mr. B.) until I have showed him a way whereby he may scrabble out of the misery wherein he lies. He must know there is a medium betwixt God and his creatures, (and I wonder what ailed him that he should say there is none) even the works of the Devil, which the Son of God himself came to 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  dissolve and dissipate, 1 Joh. 3.8. Men and Devils have their creatures, which are not God's: such are all their 
* Psal. 106.3.  inventions, with which they are said to go a * whoring, and with which they 
† Vers. 29.  provoke God to anger, and on which God is said to have taken 
* Psal. 99.8.  vengeance. God made men upright, but they have sought out many inventions (Eccles. 7.29.) Man and his natural faculties are the creatures of God, but the abuses and pollutions of those natural faculties are man's own creatures. Res in Metaphysics hath three acceptions; in the first of which it comprehendeth entia rationis, as opposed to Nihil: so that when a man hath chimaeras in his head, as golden Mountains, Eutopia's, Hirco-Cervi, Centaurs, Models of houses to be built hereafter, or perhaps never, false apprehensions of God, Atheistical conceits and imaginations, and all manner of lies; Man (in that case) is the creator of those entia rationis, whether merely groundless, or wicked notions. We know that to lie, is a positive thing; yet Saint Paul affirms it to be impossible to be the Creature of God, Tit. 1.2. Heb. 6.18. It was one instance of God's Almightiness, that he created Men and Angels with such a liberty of will in conjunction with Ratiocination, as to be able to have their Creatures too; although those Creatures must needs be vain, whose Creators are finite, and Creatures too. Nay so evident it is; that men are really Creators, that they seem to be such in the proper notion of the word, as Creation signifies the Production of something out of nothing; for there are entia rationis ratiocinantis, which have not so much as fundamentum in re. But why do I talk Metaphysically to such a Scholar as lies before me, who seems so great a stranger to it, that I may very well take up the proverbial verse, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉;  
My design is to convert, and not confound him, and therefore I will use a greater plainness. When a witty 
* Psal. 14.1. & Psal. 53.1.  Fool strives to prove there is no God, and when a sil●y Fool does believe it, (as wrought upon by the witty ones proof) Atheism than becomes his Creature. My will and my power to will this, or that, or another thing, is the Creature of God: but the determination of my will to that which God forbiddeth, and my aversion from God, and my dislike of God's will, and my loving or willing what God abhorreth, these are my Creatures, and I alone must answer for them, if I shall ever be so wretched as to abuse my liberty by such a looseness. Concerning the many most real and positive things which were the Creatures of Nero, Tiberius, Petronius, and Domitian, and which to derive from God's Will, or Creative Power, were a blasphemy great enough to make a man's hair stand upright at the very thought of it, I have spoken 
* The sinner Impl. part 2. ch. 2. sect. 12. p. 264, 265.  elsewhere, and therefore now do but give a hint of them. Concerning the 
† Bishop Andrews Sermon of the worshipping of Imaginations, p. 33, 37.  vain imaginations created and worshipped by Presbyterians, under the specious name of the Apostles Doctrine, Government, Sacraments, and Prayers, Bishop Andrews of blessed memory hath wisely treated. God indeed made Gold and Silver; but for the Idols which were made of Gold and Silver (the mere invention of the Heathens by the help of Satan,) the Scripture tells us they were the work of men's hands, Psal. 115.4. They that make them are like unto them, (v. 8.) It was God, who said in the second Commandment, Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven Image. He did not say, Thou shalt not worship the graven Images which I the Lord thy God have made. God created the Earth out of nothing, and made metals out of the Earth: But the Idolaters themselves did make their Idols out of those metals. God made them men, but (by the help of the Devil) they made themselves Idolisers of graven Images. God continued their being, life, motion, and every faculty or power to act as free Agents; but to apply their faculties to the making of Idols, to reduce their power into the act of worshipping what they had made, to urite their wills with the accursed thing, and to choose their own Gods, these were the instances of th●ir freedom, and humane creatures. When S. Paul saith plainly, there be Gods many, meaning false and fanciful Gods, (which were become the true God's Rivals in the greatest part of the world,) he cannot mean that the true God had made so many false God●, but that they were creatures of the creature. And if mechanical works, (as Watches, Windmills, Fire-shovells, and bellows) are properly called the works 
1 Cor. 8.5.  of men, as to the shape and fashion by which they are specified (although the materials of wood and iron, and the men themselves, are the works of God only,) how much more are those spiritual and cannal works, Pride, Envy, Malice, Idolatry, Murder, Drunkenness, and the like, the works and creatures of Men and Devils? It was the saying of S. Austin (as I have read him cited by a most eminent Prelate of our own) Peccator non est inter opera Dei, a sinner is no work of God: As a man, he is God's work; but as a sinful man, he is his own; or if not his own, I am sure the Devils, saith that great man. And when Austin saith (upon Luk. 15.7, 10.) that the joy of heaven extends no farther than the works of God, he doth imply that there are works which are not of God. Mr. Hick. therefore should have made his division thus, by a Trichotomy: All positive things are either 1. God, or 2. his creatures, or 3. things wrought by his creatures through the power which the Creator hath communicated unto them. And that the brethren's way of arguing the very Deity of sin (from its being something positive, yet none of God's creatures,) was the fantastic creature of the brethren, I farther proceed to make apparent and undeniable.  
3. The sin called Atheism is a positive thing, 
3. How Mr. H. and Mr. B. do infer atheism itself to be the creature of God, or God himself.  ns being a positive belief that there is no God, not a belief of nothing, nor a belief of any thing else, nor a privation of Godhead without belief, but (in sensu composito) a belief of no God; that is Atheism. Now I ask Mr. Hick. Is it from God as his creature, or is it not? If he saith that it is not, he must avow it to be God, or recant his argument: if he saith that it is, he must confess he holds God to be the Author of sin. He cannot deny it to be a positive thing, because every belief is a species of quality, to wit an habit, or disposition of mind, and every 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere, or act of believing, is in the predicament of action, and so a positive entity or thing. Nor can he say that all Atheism doth consist in not believing there is a God, as that is opposed to the being of belief; for stones and trees would then be Atheists, as not believing there is a God: whereas Atheism on the contrary (however the word is compounded with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) is the positive belief that there is no God, and is competent to nothing below a man. That I may not here be mistaken by such as are not only willing, but glad to fall into mistakes (when nothing else is left to help them) I will explain my true meaning in what I speak concerning Atheism, when I call it a belief that there is no God, and not a mere absence of belief that there is a God. I take it for granted that there are none but have heard at least there is a God, and that the being of a God is at least believed by other men; from whence it follows avoidable, that the supposed Atheists of whom I speak, (who have heard of a God, and of believers that 
† Heb. 11.6.  God is, and yet for their own parts do not believe any such thing) must needs have a positive belief that they have heard a false report, and that the Theists are erroneous, and that their fellow-Atheists are orthodox in that particular. Nevertheless I discern so wide a difference, betwixt irrational creatures which neither do, nor can, nor can be obliged to believe there is a God, and men who can, and aught also to believe it; that if it is possible for a man not to believe there is a God, without believing that there is no God, I pronounce him guilty of negative Atheism. But this I take to be impossible in any capable subject, which is able, and obliged to have an actual belief. And because an infant of two days old hath not the exercise of reason, and is not capable of any positive belief, it follows that that infant is not guilty of Atheism in any sense, (any more than the trees of which I spoke) although he doth not believe there is a God. But admit the possibility of merely negative Atheism in a subject capable of actual Faith, yet all will grant that positive Atheism is a sin, and a greater sin than the negative; which evinceth the thing that I am proving. Mr. Hobbs himself, though he 
* Mr. Hobbs his Leviath. p. 214.  denies that there are spirits, which is the heart of Atheism, (for God is a Spirit, Joh. 4.24.) yet he saith that 
† Id de Civ. c. 14. scot. 19  Atheism is an erroneous opinion, and so infers it to be a positive thing. Again, he saith that sins are 
* Lib. & Neces. p. 23.  actions; and that actions are things positive, his nearest Confederates will not deny.  
The like may be said of all other sins, especially sins of commission; which being riveted in a man by long custom and continuance, are commonly called 
* Sins are positive things, because inward habits.  HABITUAL SINS. So then, Mr. Hick. cannot but confess, that vices are habits as well as virtues, (there is a habit of Drunkenness, as well as of Sobriety;) and that Habits are Qualities he cannot be ignorant, if he is but able to tell his fingers; and that a habit is a thing positive, his postpraedicaments have taught him, where a habit and a privation are set as opposite terms, such as do mutually necessitate each others absence: which being granted by all the world, Mr. H's. Dilemma hath caught him in this inextricable snare, that he must either do a public penance, or confess his Belief to be one of these two things; [So many Sins, so many Gods; or so many Sins, so many Creatures derived from God.] He sees his sin in his punishment, and what a vain thing it is for 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Beetles to fly in the face of Eagles; for such a thing as Mr. Hick. to strike at God, and his Purity, by giving sin an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and laying his Child (when he hath done) at another man's door: For so I find by Mr. B. p. 114.  

4. Man the Author of some positive things, & God of some privatives. Rom. 22.11.  4. The positive Entity of sin may farther be evinced thus: There must be something positive to make a man positively foul; which foulness suffers a privation when the man is cleansed of his filth. Sin doth make a man filthy; God by his grace doth make him clean. The filth of sin is many times so ingrained, that after Gods own cleansings the habitual sinner remains unclean. I have 
† Ezek. 23.13.  purged thee (saith God) and thou wast not purged; therefore shalt thou not be purged from thy filthiness any more. Yet in a flat contradiction to Mr. Hick's Divinity, the filth which is positive is man's own Creature, whereas the cleansing which is privative is God's own work.  

5. Mr. Hick. confounds Negative and Privative, as well as Privative and Privation.  5. Whilst Mr. Hick. denies sin to be something positive, he seems to make no difference betwixt a simple negative, and a privative properly so called. And again, confounds a privation properly so called, with a thing called privative secundum quid. He makes no difference betwixt not blessing, and cursing God; betwixt ceasing to give alms, (which is one kind of sin) and grinding the faces of the poor, (by rapine, oppression, and extortion) which is another. He makes no difference betwixt not saving, and killing another man. And yet the men of his party do interpret God's sufferance or permission of sin, by efficacious and operative; from whence I thus argue: If to permit sin only (which is only not to hinder) can be any way positive, because efficacious; how much more is that positive which is called persuasion, or temptation unto sin? yet temptation unto sin is a horrible sin in the tempter, though none at all in the person tempted.  

6. To harden our own hearts and consent unto temptations are positive things.  6. Mr. H's. party are wont to say, that God doth harden a man's heart by way of action. So saith Mr. W. p. 22. How much more by way of action doth a man harden his own heart? and every action is a positive entity; Ipsum privare, as much as any. To consent to a temptation, he knows is sin; and he will not deny it to be a thing positive. But to consent to a temptation is none of God's offspring, much less is it a God; by which Mr. H. may discern, that in the Net which he had laid he is 
* Psal. 9.15. & 35.8.  caught himself. And his traitorous Child (I mean his Argument) hath done exactly unto him, as he 
† Deut. 19.19.  thought to have done unto his brother.  

7. Our destruction from ourselves a positive thing.  7. Though it is God that made us, and not we ourselves, (Psal. 95.) yet our spiritual destruction is from ourselves, and not from God, (Hos. 13.6. Wisd. 1.13, 14.) And believe me, to destroy is a positive thing, as the woeful effect can well inform us. And if the determination of the will to blaspheme, or curse God, (which will be granted by all Sects to be a positive thing) is not man's own work, but his Creators, who then is made by Mr. Hick. to be the Author of such impieties?  
8. Sin is so spoken of in Scripture, as to be every where concluded a very positive thing. 
8. Sin spoken of Scripture as a positive thing.  There are that sin as with a 
(a) Is. 5.18.  Cart-rope, and 
(b) Is. 30.1.  add sin unto sin. Christ 
(c) Is. 53.10, 12  bore our sins, and made his soul an offering for them. All sin shall be forgiven, 
(d) Mat. 12.31.  except that against the Holy Ghost. We read of 
(e) Gen. 20.9. Joh. 15.22. & 19.11. 1 Joh. 5.16.17  great and little sins in comparison. We also read (in proportion) of 
(f) Mat. 23.14. Luk. 12.48.  greater and lesser damnation. Sin is the 
(g) 1 Cor. 15.56.  sting of Death, and death the 
(h) Rom. 6.23.  wages of sin. And the cause cannot have a lesser Being than the effect. Sin 
(k) Rom. 7.8.  wrought in me (saith the Apostle) all manner of concupiscence. And perfectius est agere, quâm esse, saith Albertus Magnus. Sin hath its 
(l) Rom. 7.8, 9  life, and death, and resurrection. There is a 
(m) Heb. 3.13.  deceitfulness of sin. And sin is said to have its 
(n) Heb. 11.25.  pleasures. Sin is a thing to be 
(o) Heb. 12.1.  laid aside, either totally, or for a time. There are that are 
(p) Rom. 7.14.  sold under sin, and are servants to it, and cannot 
(q) 2 Pet. 2.14.  cease from it. Insomuch that sin doth rule and 
(r) Rom. 5.21. & 6.12.  reign over them. In a word, it is evident from the Scriptures, that from the time in which sin did make its 
(s) Rom. 5.12.  entrance into the world, it was able to change the course of Nature. And could a simple privation, which is but the absence of an Entity (supposed to have been present) have been the cause of all this?  

9 Mr. Hick. convinced by his own party.  9 Mr. Hick's own party acknowledge sin to be a compound, made up of a material and formal part. The material part of it Mr. W. calls a natural act (p. 25.) Mr. B. both a natural and moral act, (p. 11.) Doctor Twisse gives his instance in the act of lying with another man's wife; All positive things. Nay, the formal part of sin is a positive Entity, as themselves have defined it; it being the result of two positive things, to wit, the repugnance of any Action with the Law of God. Nay, Mr. W. saith broadly, that God must needs both will and work in the sin of the act, the very pravity itself, p. 12. implying it to have an efficient cause.  

10. He argues with the Libertines.  10. Mr. Hick. argues like the Libertines, and as it were out of their mouths, whilst he contends that all things positive are either God's Creatures, or God himself. And so he comes to be concerned in what I said to Mr. W. ch. 1. sect. 2. p. 8, 9, etc. I leave the Reader to collect how Mr. Hick. would frame his Answers to any man that should Catechise him in the very first Article of the Nicene Creed, he having discovered to all the world in what a latitude he understands it.  

11. Mr. Hick. will confess he hath blasphemed, in case that sin is something positive; which is many ways proved.  11. This Mr. Hick. will unavoidably confess, that if 'tis impossible to separate the sinful act from the sin, as David's lying with Bathshebah from his sin of Adultery; nay that we cannot imagine or conceive how they can possibly be distinguished; then sin must needs be something positive, and so is inferred by him, to be either God's Creature, or God himself. But that there is not the least difference betwixt the sinful act and the sin, (as betwixt the act of hating God, and the sin of hating God, which is that act of hating God) I have manifested 
* Look back on ch. 2. sect. 12, & 13. and also on sect. 9, & 11. of the same ch. 2.  before to Mr. W. In all which Mr. Hick. comes to be equally concerned; and I refer him to four Sections pointed out in the * margin. To all which I add these following proofs. 1. Sin being complexum quid (in the acknowledgement of all) cannot admit of an abstraction, and yet remain the complexum which it was before abstracted. God can separate the soul of man from the body, but not the man from the man, who is the upshot of their union. This would imply a contradiction; as, that the parts are united when they are separated or not united. To make it plain and naked for the thickest heads, I shall use this example; David's sin of Adultery was not possible to be merely his repugnance with the Law, abstracted from his lying with Uriah's wife; nor merely his lying with Uriah's wife, abstracted from its repugnance with the Law of God: But 'twas the product or result of both united. As a man is not his body only without his soul, nor only his soul without his body, but a compound consisting of soul and body. 2. The sinful act being a Relative, whose very being (as such) is in relation to the law which it transgresseth, it is as impossible to separate the one from the other, as to separate a Father from his very relation unto a Son. 3. Mr. Hobbs hath 
* Liberty and Necess. p. 23.  confessed (what his brethren of the Kirk will never be able to claw off, either by owning or disowning,) that if God is the Author of the action, which is a breach of the law, as well as of the law of which it is a breach, he must be the Author of the breach, that is, the sin, and of the very repugnance betwixt the law and the action by which it is broken; which shows the inseparability of which I speak. And because the Author of all things requisite to the being of any thing, must needs be the Author of the being; therefore, say I, God is so far from being, that 'tis impossible he should be, the Author of any one action which is a transgression of the law, that is, a sin, but only the Author of the man's freewill, and of his power to use his freedom, which power is innocent, as hath been 
* S●ct. 18. Num. 7.  showed. The sin gins not but with the abuse of that power in the determining of the will to the forbidden and wrong object: which wrong determining of the will is the sinners own action, and his alone, since he did freely choose it, whilst yet the contrary was in his power to choose. The power to act being before the act, is therefore separable from it, though the act being done against the law, is not separable from the obliquity, which is, its being done against the law. 4. If it is said that man hath a pravity in his nature, 
Who they are who make God the Author as well of original as actual sin. Look forwards on the 27. sect. num. 4. of this ch.  which accompanies the action of which God is the Author, and so distinguishable from it, and that God doth but make the lame horse go, which was lame before he made him go, and so is the cause of his going, but not of his lameness; that will be found to be a Reed, which will run into the elbow of such as shall dare to lean upon it: for when Adam was yet innocent, he was not as a lame horse, and yet he ceased to be innocent; or (if you please) he grew lame by eating that which was forbidden. So that if God was the cause of his eating that forbidden fruit, he was also the cause of the sin, which was nothing else but his eating the fruit forbidden, if he made him eat, he made him lame. Besides, if a horse which goes not, and hath only an aptitude to go lamely, will of necessity go lamely if he be made to go at all; he who shall cause that horse to go, will also cause him to go lamely: so will God be concluded the cause of sin, if having first given us the power to act against his law, he shall also reduce that power into that act, so as that positive act shall be his creature; yet so it must be, (saith Mr. Hick.) if a positive act. And Doctor Twisse doth say as bluntly, [
* Damus Deum esse causam uniuscujusque actûs. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 1. p. 40.  we grant that God is the particular cause of every act.] Wherein this differs from that of the Libertines, let him tell us who can. 5. God hath forbidden in his law the positive acts of Stealing, Adultery, Murder, and the like, for which positive acts he will also cast into Hell. It will be ill pleading for Cain that God alone was the Author of the positive act of his stabbing Abel, and of the law which forbade it, from which two the obliquity was an unavoidable resultance. And if the sin of blasphemy is distinguishable from the act of speaking against God, then did God forbid something besides the sin, (which implies a horrible contradiction) and there may be a good act of speaking against God, as well as an evil one; which again implies another contradiction. 6. When Mr. Hick.'s Masters are wont to say, that God praedestined men to sin, as the means of damnation, they do and must mean, to sin as sin, because sin is no otherwise the means of damnation; and divers of them do use that very reduplication. Now because they teach also that God decreed the means as well as the end, they infer sin as sin to be a positive act, and therefore not distinguishable from it.  
I have now done with Mr. Hick. as to this particular, which Mr. B. calls his second Argument, u●on which I have the more enlarged, because I perceive it to be the great block at which those men are wont to stumble, and at which the Libertines have fallen down headlong. Again, I find it to be the block, out of which Mr. B. hath hewed so many chips, and little splinters; which having flown into his eyes, have made him rageful as well as blind. This will very much appear by the following Sections, which for that very reason shall be so much the shorter.   

Sect. 19  

Mr. B's. first chip hewn out of Mr. Hick.'s Block.  Mr. B. thus debauched by his leading friend as hath been showed, sticks not to say in plain terms, He must either maintain God to be the Author of sin, or else he must speedily renounce the very first Article of his Christian Creed, and say that God did not make heaven and earth, and all real things visible and invisible therein. That in him we do not live, move, and have our being, Act. 17.28. That every good and perfect gift in its kind is not from God, Jam. 1.17. p. 113.] Though this is a chip of the old block, and might be sent for its reception to the former Section, yet in order to his cure, I will make him feel his infirmity.  

1. He foists the word real into the Creed, and makes it to stand in the place of good, and infers God the maker of all sins.  1. The word real is in neither Creed but foisted in by M. B. and if he intends it as exegetical of all things visible and invisible, in the Nicaene Creed, he makes a Creed for the Ranters, who finding by experience that blasphemies and adulteries are real things, and having been taught (by whom think you?) to believe that God is the maker of all things real without exception, conclude those things to be very good. Such domestic Libertines must be taught that when God is said to be the maker of all things, it is only meant of all things that are good, which alone are possible to be made by God; not of all things that are real, whereof many are evil, and only made by Men and Devils.  

2. The different methods of our reasonings, and what comes of it.  2. Mark (Good Reader) before thou goest any farther, the different methods of our reasoning, and the different effects. I lay it down as my Principle, that God is not the maker of sin, therefore not of David's adultery; therefore not of that action called his lying with Bathshebah; therefore not of every positive and real thing. But Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. and the Libertines do build backwards thus: They lay it down as their Principle, That God is the maker of all things that are real without exception, therefore of David's lying with Bathshebah, (acknowledged by all to be a real and positive thing) therefore of his Adultery, (unless his Adultery can be differenced from his lying with Bathshebah) therefore of his sin, (unless his sin can be differenced from his Adultery.) Again, the Libertines argue thus; God doth decree sin, therefore it is good. But I argue thus; Sin cannot be good, therefore God cannot decree it. Of so great concernment it is, that they be beaten out of their methods and ways of reasoning, and taught to begin at the right end.  

3. They ascribe all positive entities, however filthy, unto God.  3. I who prove sin to be a positive entity, do also prove it to be the work of men and Devils only; whereas 'tis he and Mr. Hick. who do impute it unto God, on supposition of its positive entity. What he saith from Act. 17.28. is wholly impertinent, unless he thinks it to be a sin to live, and to move, and to have a being. For that innocent liberty and power which we have from God, we alone do determine to the doing of evil. Much less pertinent is that from S. James (c. 1. v. 17.) unless he thinks that sin can be a good and a perfect gift, or that every positive entity is such.  

4. They are convinced by the Assemblies confession of faith, ch. 9 Artic. 1.  4. It is part of the Assemblies confession of faith, [God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to do good or evil. From whence it follows, that Adam's determination of his free will to the eating of forbidden fruit, (which was a positive entity) was merely from Adam, and not from God. Unless they will say, he had a necessity supernatural, though not from nature; which if they say, it will be at their peril. Again, 'tis granted by all, that man since the fall hath a liberty of will in things not moral, and in many things which are merely moral; which infers them to be the Authors of many positive Acts.  

5. They are farther uncovered, by being supposed to be catcchized.  5. If Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. were to be publicly Catechised, and first asked who made them men, 2. who made them sinners, 3. who made them Priests, 4. who made their Doublets either long or short-wasted, 5. who is wont to wash their , to cleanse their hands, and their feet, and to do some other much viler offices; they would not say (for shame) that God did make or do those things, which they know to be positive and real Entities; but to each of those Questions they would certainly return a severe Answer. Again, if they are asked, who made the short-wastedness of the Doublet aforesaid, they will say, the same Tailor who made it a short-wasted Doublet. Ask them then, who made the sinfulness of the sinful Action (to wit David's lying with Bathshebah) they will say, the same Agent who made the sinful Action, that positive Entity, David's lying with Bathshebah against the Law. Who made that positive Entity, or sinful action? Even God, say 
* Mr. W. saith that of every positive act God is the proper efficient cause, p. 24. Mr. B. and Mr. H. the same and worse, as hath been showed.  they; but (say I) the Adulterer, against the precept and will of God, and against that measure of his grace, which had been sufficient to prevent it, if David had not been a resolute and wilful sinner. I conclude this Section with the confession of Mr. W. [That he who is the Author of the Action, must needs be the Author of the sin also which is unseparable from it, p. 25.] But both himself and Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. do say, that God is the Author and maker of the action (as being a positive and real thing,) therefore according to their concessions they do all make God the Author of sin.   

Sect. 20.  

Mr. B's. second chip of the old block.  Mr. B. hews out his second chip thus, [He must hold, that there be myriads of myriads of actions in the world which are not wrought by God, etc. p. 113. This second chip is wonderful, if compared with the first; 
1. His inconsistency with himself, and his inferring all sinful actions to be wrought by God.  for there he would have me bound up by my Thesis, to maintain that God is the Author of sin, though here he makes me to hold, that there are 100000. of Actions not wrought by God: if the first were swallowed, there is no place for the second; and if the second, than no place for the first. For if I hold (as I do) that there are myriads of sins, or sinful actions, whereof not one can by any possibility be wrought by God, then by no possibility can I make God the Author of sin. But now Mr. B. declares his Tenet, that all the actions in the world (however filthy and noisome) are wrought by God. I say the contrary, that there is a world of wickedness which is none of Gods making, but of the Devils, and his party, whether in Hell or in Earth.  

2. His unsuccesful reliance on the Jesuits.  2. Whilst I deny that any sinful actions are wrought by God, I do not deny that he permits them; and I have often showed, how the sinner depends on God, both for his power to live and move. What he saith of the sesuites may well be true; for they are kinsmen in these affairs. The Jesuits, in waggery, did purposely propagate many blasphemies, arising from the Tenet of unconditional Reprobation, in many Protestant parts of the Christian world, that by making them odious, they might fright men from thence into the Church of Rome. I find the observation in the Renowned and Judicious 
* Exact. Coll. l. 10. ch. 39 sect. 6. p. 3189.  Dr. Jackson, whom Mr. B. put me upon reading, by his saying that I had read him, when indeed I had not. And since the Jesuit Suarez is of so much Authority with his Cousin of the Kirk, I will observe out of 
† Proprio & real influxu concurrit Deus ad actus liberi Arbitrii ut reales actus sunt, etiamsi saepissimè & intrinsecè mali sint: nam cùm hi actus sint verè res & effectus reales, necesse est ut saltem illam dopendentiam à Deo habeant, quae omnibus causarum secundarum effect bus generalis & omnino necessaria est. Suarez de concursu, motione, & auxiliis Dei, lib. 2.  Suarez, that the acts of  are real acts, though evil, and the real effects of second causes; which Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. are both entreated to chew upon. And again, I will observe, that Suarez gives those acts but a general dependence upon God; whereas Doctor Twisse (as I lately cited him) makes God to be causa particularis uniuscujusque actus: which is worse than the Jesuit, though the Jesuits and Dominicans are too too bad in their Assertions.   

Sect. 21.  

Mr. B's. 3d. chip more pitiful than the former.  Mr. B. saith farther [It will follow, that the more sinful acts any commits, the more he is a Creator, and a kind of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a God of himself, p. 13.] Still a chip of the same block. But 1. what pretence hath he for this, when I have said so often, that though the sinner in some sort may be called the Creator of his sins, yet the evil which he doth, he doth by that power and freedom of will which he had from God? How then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in any sense? 2. To be a God of evil, is a very sad privilege. And the word [God] is so far from signifying Him only who is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that 
* Exod. 22.28.  men and 
† 1 Cor. 8.5.  Idols are called Gods in Scripture; and Satan himself, the 
* 2 Cor. 4.4.  God of this world. And so the sum of Mr. B's. acumen is but this, That the more sins a man commits, of the more sins he is the Author. The more evil the Devil invents, the works of the Devil are so much the more. Very pretty. Look back on Sect. 18. & 19 Num. 5.   

Sect. 22.  

Mr. B's. fourth chip, the most lamentable of all.  Mr. B. gins to be more extravagant than himself, (not only more than other men) by arguing from the supposal of sins being a thing positive, [That God did never concur to any the best action that ever the holiest Saint did act, p. 113.] As wild a saying as this is, his reason for it is little less; it being no other than this, [That sinful infirmity doth cleave to their holiest performances. Ibid.]  

1. Mr. B's. arguing concludes him either Pelagian, or Libertine.  1. If this were reduced into a Syllogism, it would overthrow his whole Fabric, and that two ways: for either it would argue him a Pelagian, in denying that our best actions are from the grace of God; or else a flat Libertine, in affirming our evil and good actions to proceed from God in equal manner. The sum of his arguing is this, That if sin is not from God, the holiest action of man is not from God. But first he must be minded of his least unhappiness, which is his great impertinence: for this is not the thing which here it lay upon him to prove, That sin is from God, but that it is not a thing positive; whereas by striving to prove it is from God, he proves it also a thing positive, against himself and his friend Mr. H. Hick. For in that they both say, whatsoever positive thing is not from God is God, they unavoidably imply, that whatsoever is from God is a positive thing.  

2. His great impertinence is to no end, but to make God the Author of sin.  2. From hence it is evident and undeniable, that though Mr. B. in some places doth deny his derivation of sin from God, yet his heart is so full, so brim-ful of it, that here he goes out of his way to shed some of it upon his paper; or if unknowingly it falls from him, it is still a sign he overflows. If he thinks that the best actions of the holiest men are the very sins of infirmity which he saith do cleave to them, he knows his dangers above recited, and many more I need not name; but 
* Isa. 5.20.  woe to him that calleth good evil, and evil good. If he means that the sin is a distinct thing from it; why could he not distinguish betwixt the Sun and a Coal-pit? betwixt the pious action, which is from God, and the sin annexed, which is from man? God's concurrence is an equivocal word, and must be carefully distinguished. If it relates only to good, God concurs to the very act; if to evil, God concurs not any otherwise, then by continuing to us the liberty & power to act with which he endued us as we are men. But to abuse that liberty, and to reduce that power into any forbidden or evil act, is the unhappy and sole privilege of the depraved Creature.   

Sect. 23.  
Mr. B. saith farther, that if sin is something positive, 
Mr. B's. fifth chip denies God's prescience of all wickedness, unless he also praedetermined it.  and none of God's Creatures, [It will overturn all Divine prescience of sins; and how can that be foreknown by God, which is in no sense praedetermined by him; in which he hath at all no hand? p. 113.] This is the same sad beggary of the thing in Question, without the least offer of proof, which his cogent necessities have so often squeezed from him, and which I have 
* See the eighth, ninth & tenth Sections of this third chapter.  spoken to so largely in divers Sections. Though he hath several times confessed, that Deity itself is overturned if prescience, yet here he professedly overturns God's prescience of any thing in the world, but what he first doth praedetermine, and hath a hand in. If God did not praedetermine (nor had any hand at all in) all the villainies in the world, (which none can imagine but Mr. B. and his party) than he could not foreknow them, saith the unclean Dictator. And so he casts himself into his wont straight, of aspersing God's holiness on the one hand, and his prescience on the other. To what he asks, and asks only, I will fully (but briefly) answer, that God can foresee what we will do, as well as what he will do himself. He may determine to give us power, and foresee how we will use it. He gives us a power to act freely, and to determine our own wills; which would not be wills, much less our own wills, if determined by any thing except ourselves. So much am I for God's prescience, that I extend it to all things without exception; as well to the evil, which he did not praedetermine, as to the good, which he did. But 'tis a great derogation to God's infinite knowledge, to say it reacheth no farther than to his own decrees and executions: The very thing which the Socinians do so improve, as to deny God's prescience of future contingencies. And whether Mr. B. with his party are not Socinians in this point (according to that method which they do constantly use in judging others) let them be their own Judges in cooler blood. If they deny it, 'tis at their peril; it being much a lesser error, to think that God foresaw no wickedness, then that he foreordained any.   

Sect. 24.  
Mr. B. concludes with an affirmation, 
1. Mr. B's. Impositions upon the Scripture,  (which he hopes may pass with the easy multitude for a kind of sixth Argument) that my opinion is contrary 1. to Scripture, which speaks of sin as of a privative, when it speaks most properly; 2. to Austin, who pleads that sin hath no cause efficient, but only deficient; 3. to Schoolmen of all sides and parties; 4. to his honoured and beloved Father Arminius, p. 114. The first is contrary to truth in the very judgement of common sense, as I have largely made appear (and partly out of his own mouth) in the 15, 16, 17, and 18. Sections of this Chapter. But yet I will ask him this little thing, Doth the Scripture speak properly when it saith that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh? and doth it not speak properly when it saith that sin is a work of the Devil, that the Devil is the Father of it, that Lust conceiveth and bringeth forth sin? True indeed, it is called Vanity; but so is 
* Psal. 39 11.  Man too, who yet (I hope) is a positive entity nevertheless. Nay Man at his 
† Vers. 5.  best estate is altogether vanity: nay altogether 
* Psal. 62.9.  lighter than vanity itself. Sin indeed is called darkness, but by a figure, and so are 
† Eph. 5.8.  men too. A man is not where called emptiness, no more is sin. But sin hath negative attributes (as every thing in the world hath) in respect of its having no moral goodness. How many things are there, which God himself in Scripture is affirmed not to be? yet Mr. B. will not deny him to be a positive entity.  

2. The Schoolmer.  2. As for the Schoolmen, if either they talk erroneously (as Mr. B. will confess they often do) or are mistaken by Mr. Barlee, (who is as good at that faculty as any man of his paste) or were never read by him, (who doth not cite so much as one in this place,) who can help it?  
3. S. Austin might err as well in this as in many other things wherein Mr. B. will say he erred, 
3. S. Austin. August. lib. 12. De Civit. Dei cap. 7. ubi de causâ malae voluntatis agit, conferat●r 'em ejusdem lib. 21. de Civitate Dei, cap. 24. ubi pa●um (inquit) veraciter dicitur quod dicitur (Mat. 12.32.) nisi essent, quibus etsi non in isto, tamen rem●tteretur in futuro saeculo. His new degree of Arminianism  and in the very same book which here he citys. I say he might, not that he does. For Mr. B. understood not his own citation, which being seemingly for him, doth make against him in reality. For Austin's speech belongs only to the cause of the evil will, not of every evil act of which the will is the cause. Again, it only belongs to the causes that are without the man: and this is that which I would have, that God is far from being the efficient cause of an evil will; he is not so much as the deficient, because he is not wanting in those things that are necessary to make an evil will good: so far is Austin from pleading that sin hath no efficient cause. Notwithstanding all that he hath spoken, the impious man's own will is the efficient cause of his impiety.  
4. Whereas he saith that my opinion is most contrary to Arminius, he contradicts a good part of both his books, wherein he saith that my opinions are 
† c. 3. p. 25.  all derived from Arminius. I had formerly proved by many 
* Div Phi. def. c. 1. p. 12, 13, etc.  instances, how far himself was an Arminian, and how impossible it was that I should be so. Now he lends me another instance, wherein Himself and Mr. Hick, are at agreement with Arminius, and I am contrary to all three. But I am of opinion he wrongs Arminius, and makes him more Presbyterian than indeed he was; had he read any such thing: he would in all probability have set down the ●lace. His case is sad, whether he pretends to Truth or Falsehood. If to the first, he hurts himself and Mr. Hick. If to the second, he slanders Arminius, and stabs himself.   

Sect. 25.  
Having made this way for his own unhappiness, 
Mr. Hick's heathenish expression of sins, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, commended by Mr. B. for 1. learned, 2. witty, and 3. well written.  by that variety of attempts to which Mr. Hick. (it seems) betrayed him; he acts the well-natured man, and even blesseth the Author of his unhappiness. He declares that Mr. Hick. is his cordial friend, who wrote well to him, told him learnedly and wittily, that Mr. T. P. is the first who gave sin this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an extraordinary invention, p. 114.] Here is his tragical Exit for many reasons. 1. Mr. Hick.'s saying that my invention is extraordinary, is no proof that Arminius doth say the contrary, or that Mr. Hick. did write well, or that his saying was both learned and witty. Each of these I deny, and have sufficiently disproved in my eighteenth Section. 2. He knows that I had never mentioned any such Heathenish expression, as sins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; nor was it ever to be found in any Author but Mr. Hick. And he knows that it was clearly his own invention; either arising from his opinion that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pono, and signified the posicive entity of sin, (which though a sad miscarriage of the Scholar, is yet the very best that his friends can make of it) or from his sadder apprehension that sin must needs have a Godhead, if it is none of God's creatures, and yet a positive thing. To believe the former were a huge act of charity; but there is no place for it with Mr. Hick. who hath forced me to the severity of believing the later. 3. All Mr. Hick. hath displayed is his being overflown with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which (could its banks have contained it, would not thus have gushed over on no occasion, when 'tis plain that the effect could be nothing else but to drown his credit with a yellow, as well as his cause with a blacker Jaundice. But evenit malo male, and 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Erynnis (as they say) still proves a virgin: for poor Perillus is the first who is likely to be tortured with his invention; and believe me, the brazen Bull was a lesser misery, then to be found in the impiety of making the foulest actions to be the Rivulets issuing out by a necessity from God the Source. What Spirit but an unclean one, can be the cause of vacleannesse▪ that is, of sin? Who are they whom I have proved to have printed in plain terms, that God is the cause of that uncleanness? When the Pharisees heretofore, who were the Jewish Puritans, or Preci●ans, and reckoned themselves the godly party of the land, had slandered our Saviour with having an unclean Spirit, (who, although he was God, did appear to them as he was man too) our Saviour told them (on that occa●●on) the danger of blaspheming against the holy Ghost. Let them who love the Lord Jesus in sincerity, and tender the safety of their own as well as of other men's souls, not only read, but consider, and then apply what is spoken, Mar. 3.28, 29, 30.  
I now dismiss the signal Paragraph which Mr. Hick. suggested to Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Barlee hath vented to all the People; which yet I should not have dismissed so soon, but that my Reader may be referred to several Sections for an enlargement, as ch. 1. sect. 2. from p. 7. to p. 13. ch. 2. sect. 5. p. 69, 70. sect. 10. p. 79, 80, 81. sect. 14. p. 88, 90. All which being considered, Mr. B. doth fitly dislike the stile of Unfortunate Writer, for if it ever belonged to any, it doth to him and Mr. Hick.   

Sect. 26.  
Mr. B. having thus far miscarried (by the help of Mr. Hick.) proceeds to plead for himself, 
A short speci●●● of M. B's. rem●●nt of Abst rsions in order to the Readers and P●inrs ●ase.  and his guilty Master's, in such a treacherous manner both to them and himself, that to give my Readers an account of such numerous failings, were to draw out the man's unhappiness to an intolerable length. And because a Pigmy as well as Hercules may be judged of by a foot, I will leave the Reader, by that which follows, to guess at the body of his abstersions.  
1. What I had cited out of Calvin's Institutions, he affirmed to have been fetched from Calvin's Book De Providentiâ; and said I did as good as name it. I 
* Diu. Phila●. def. ch. 3. p. 127 etc.  showed him the grosseness of his mistake, and proved the wilfulness of it, which raised the error into a sin. Now by way of abstersion, he confesseth the fact, p. 126. and complains he was misled by his edition of Calvin, which he saith was different from mine. And (which shows the wilfulness of his last crime also) he is silent of the book De Providentiâ, and talks of nothing but Institutions: which had he really consulted, he must needs have met with the citation, as since he confesseth to have done. But this doth only introduce his more incomparable Commission. For  

Of Calvin's Doctrine, that God commands, yea compels the D vil, and all that are wicked to conceive and perpetrate their evil doing.  2. I had cited other words from Calvin's Institutions, and that from the page where now I see them, to wit p. 66. c. 17. l. 1. Edit. Genev. A. D. 1637. But it seems M. B. conceived the passage so unexcusable, that instead of labouring to salve the matter, he daringly broke out in this equally ridiculous and desperate manner; [I will give all my books for a halfpenny, which I should be loath to part with for 150 l. if the fourth testimony be to be found in Calvin's book of Institution in the place quoted by him, p. 126▪ To punish the Malefactor for such a ●old dishonesty, I will not challenge all his books, (which yet are due to me for one halfpenny) but record the words of Mr. Calvin, with the page and the lines wherein they lie. [Verùm ubi in memo iam revocant, Diabolum totamque improborum cohortem sic omnibus partibus manu Dei, ☜ tanquam fr no cohiberi, ut nec concipere ullum adversus nos maleficium, nec conceptum moliri, nec ad perpetrandum, si maxi●è moliantur, digitum movere queant, nisi quantum ille permiserit, imo nisi quantum mandârit; nec compedibus tantùm ejus teneri ligatos, sed ☞ etiam ad obsequia praestanda fraeno cogi; habent unde se prolixè consolentur. Calv. Inst. l. 1. c. 17. sect. 11. p. (seu potius fol.) 66. col. 2. lin. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Edit. Genev. 1637. And this was the fourth blasphemous Instance which I produced in English, Correct Copy, p. 9 Thus the Malefactor is proved most guilty; and not only so, but he stands condemned out of his mouth too. For when it is for his turn to skin over an ulcer, which he sees cannot be cured, he 
* p. 126. lin. 1, etc.  saith, It appears by the pages which I quote out of Calvin, that he follows one Edition of the Institutions, and I another; his having been printed 1585. and mine no longer ago then 1637. Is this a man to manage a controversy with any longer, who never regards what he utters, either to sully another, or to absterse himself, so that he may but say something, and become the Author of a book? 1. It seems my Edition is much later than his, and therefore probably more emendate. 2. Had it been true that my citation did not appear in his Edition, he should not yet have concluded that it appeared not in mine own. 3. Had he not been resolute in making a refuge of a mistake, he might have borrowed my Calvin, or at least have asked when it was printed. 4. Though the Printer erred in a punctilio, by putting sect. 12. for sect. 11. yet he made it no error by expressing the very page exactly right, which made the Section become needless; besides that sect. 11. and sect. 12. are the very next neighbours to one another, and being both extremely short, they cannot but both be seen at once, with one and the same cast of the Readers eye: so utterly destitute of excuses is the Merchant become in this adventure, which I have prosecuted thus at large for these three reasons. First in order to brevity, that other things may be compendiously and yet sufficiently replied to, by the Readers being entreated to guess at the Disputant by this one instance; and how unworthy he is of my farther consideration. 2. It appears by this instance, that whatsoever blasphemous Doctrines I have publicly cited from that Tribe of Writers, I am proved to have truly and justly cited, by that man of all the world, who is most concerned to have them thought false; for in case he had found one real flaw, how would the Victor have triumphed, who is so full of ovations in being beaten? 3. It appears by this one instance, how ashamed they are of those Doctrines in their modest intervals, which in their Fits of courage they use to boast of. Mr. B. was unwilling either to praise or dispraise what he found cited out of Calvin, viz. That the Devil and all other wicked ones, are not only permitted, but commanded also; nor only commanded, but compelled also [ad concipiendum, moliendum, perpetrandum maleficium] to conceive, to attempt, and to accomplish their evil doing. I will not dissect the words, much less read a Lecture on them, unless I shall possibly be invited by some worthier person then Mr. B.   

Sect. 27.  

Mr. B's. affected Tergiversations in his chiefest con● cernments.  That which next follows in Mr. B. from p. 127. to 137. is never enough to be admired. For pretending to answer that large Catalogue of Blasphemies which I had collected out of his Masters in my Defence of the Divine Philanth. c. 3. p. 132. to p. 140. he doth not so much as meddle with any one of the particulars of which the Catalogue is composed: but in stead of that, he performs these pranks. 1. He 
* p. 127.  sends the Reader to his first book, where there is not a syllable touching any one of them. 2. 
Ibid.  He asks what it would conduce to the main Question, though some out of divers owned classical Authors should not prove to be exactly defensible. 3. He saith, 
Ibid.  if I will hold what they do, I shall explicate such matters by as soft phrases as I please. 4. 
* p. 128.  He complains that my Design was hateful in the making of that Collection. 5. He tells us that the 
† p. 130, 131.  Jesuits, to wit, Bellarmin, Suarez, Pererius, Vega, have writ as boldly of God, as the Presbyterians so often cited; and that Arminius (who was also a Presbyterian) did something like it. 6. 
Ibid.  He complains that my Indictment doth serve for nothing, but to make his Classical Authors odious (for so he commonly describes the party) and to make room for such as Grotius and Castalio. 7. 
Ibid. Ibid.  He protests against Hobbs, and the Comforter of Believers, as no Protestants. 8. He calls the objection which is made against his Masters, their making God the Author of sin, an old musty stolen objection. 9 
* p. 132.  He pleads (against matter of Fact, demonstrated to the eyes and ears of all) that men so eminent for piety and learning were never like to be the Authors of so foul and sottish an opinion. (Mark that, Reader. It is as if one should prove that Peter did not deny Christ, because of the unlikelihood that so great and good an Apostle should do so wickedly. Or that Pelagius was no Heretic, nor writ against by Austin, because Austin commended him so very much, which 'twas not likely he would have done, if he had thought him a Heretic.) 10. 
Ibid.  He saith his Masters are not like to need an Apology, like that of the Poet, Lasciva est nostra pagina, vita proba est. 11. He granteth that his Masters have taught in Print, 1. 
* p. 132, 133. ☞  That God is the Author of sin, 2. God wills sin, 3. He impells to it, 4. He forceth men to it. These things Mr. B. takes upon him to excuse; and the manner of it is wonderful.  
2. To the first of the four he answers thus; 1 
* p. 133. Of Zuinglius his Doctrine, that God is the Author of sin.  That he doth at no hand like it, that God should be the Author of any culpable evil. Reader, observe his partiality, and self-contradiction. When the Libertines pronounce the words, than he calls it, with Mr. Calvin, an execrable blasphemy, (p. 129.) and curses them that are so blasphemous, (54, 55.) but now he finds the same blasphemy in his own Master's writings, the case is altered; and the worst he saith is, [He doth not like it for his own part.] Like indulgent old Eli reproving his Sons for their sacrilege and rapine, Nay, my Sons, it is no good report which I hear; why do ye such things? 1 Sam. 2.23, 24. There's his partiality. And here he professeth to dislike what he frequently approves (as hath been showed) commending the Authors for very Classical, and owning them for his Masters. There's his self-contradiction. But now he hath said he likes not the blasphemy for his own part (that's the word) he shows us how vehemently he likes it for those other men's parts who are his Classical Authors. First for 
* Ibid. Note, that of all who call God the Author of sin, he names only Zuinglius, omitting Borrhaus, who calls him the Author of the evil of sin, as well as of punishment.  Zuinglius he allegeth, that a little Candour would interpret him to have meant that God is the Author of the evil of punishment, rather than of sin. But Zuinglius his word is peccatum, which signifies sin only. And he doth instance in the sins called Adultery and Murder, naming them Gods works, and calling God their Author. (See Corr. Copy, p. 10. & Philan. c. 4. p. 59, 60.) So that the best of Mr. B's. excuse is this, that though Zuinglius calls God the Author of sin (not speaking a word of punishment in the place which I cited) and so must be confessed to have meant the evil of sin, yet charity should interpret, that he meant the evil of punishment also; and rather that then the other. Or 2. if Zuinglius did mean as he spoke, he did not mean that God was a moral Author of sin, 
Ibid. How Mr. B. makes God the Author of sin in that which he confesseth to be the proper notion of the word Author. Look back on sect. 3, & 4. of this Chap.  so as the Devil is, by way of persuasion, but (it seems then) a natural Author of sin, which is infinitely worse, as acting by way of necessitation. But when Mr. B. said that God doth tempt men to sin, he spoke of a persuasion; and now he saith, that to persuade unto sin doth infer the proper Author of it. So he is judged and condemned out of his own mouth again, to have properly made God the Author of sin. 3. He saith 
† Ibid.  it is not credible that Zuinglius should mean any other Author or Cause of sin, then non removens prohibens, or causa per accidens. But 1. I cited his words, and not his meanings (either beside or against his words.) 2. His words will not signify such a meaning as this: Else, when the world is called Gods work, Mr. B. may say, God was but causa per accidens, and that the world was not properly his work. 4. Causa per accidens, if causa, is extremely bad; and God is in no sense the cause of sin. 5. Removens prohibens he understands not, if I may guests by the Use he makes of it: For Zuinglius saith that God doth make men Transgressor's, as well as that sin is the work of God.  
Last of all, he produceth some Popish Writers, 
Ibid.  who writ as grossly as Zuinglius the Presbyterian. And who did ever doubt of it? Sure none that knows their consanguinity. Ocham and Gabriel do affirm, 
Ocham & Gabriel affirmant, quod Deus in rigore & proprietate Sermonis est causa peccati. Medin. in 1.2. q. 79. a.  that God in a rigour and propriety of speech is the cause of sin. What then? Therefore the rigider sort of Papists are like the rigider sort of Presbyterians.  
3. To the second thing which he confesseth as his Master's Doctrine, 
3. Mr. B. accuseth Calvin, in excusing him, for saying, God doth will sin.  viz. that God doth will sin, he saith these things, p. 134.1. That the meaning of the Orthodox hath been often explained. 2. That Calvin explains himself. And how should that be, but that though God doth will sin, yet he wills it not as sin? The horrid nature of which shift I have 
* Look back on ch. 2. sect. 19 And see Diu. Philanth. c. 4. p. 42.  elsewhere displayed. This is the fountain of those unclean say, That Adultery is good in as much as it is the work of God the Author; And that all sins are good in as much as they make for God's glory. That is from Zuinglius, and this from Mr. W. 3. He tells us that Mr. calvin's meaning is no worse than the Schoolmens, naming a Papist in the margin, 
Look back on ch. 2. sect. 3. p. 61.  according to his wont. To show a very great affinity betwixt the worst sort of Papists and Presbyterians, doth universally pass with Mr. B. for an Abstersion. Yet this is the man who rails so frequently at others for having any good thing common to them with the Papists.  
4. To the third thing granted to be the Doctrine of his Masters, 
4. Mr. B. accuseth Piscator and Calvin, in his way of excusing them for saying that God doth thrust men into wickedness.  viz. That God doth drive, or thrust men on into wickedness, and that men do sin by God's impulse, he hath returned four things, p. 134, 135.1. That neither Calvin nor Piscator do understand it in a flagitious or unconscionable manner. (And may it not be pleaded as well for the Pharisees, that although indeed they said of Christ, He hath an unclean spirit (Mark 3.30.) yet they did not understand it in a flagitious sense?) 2. That when himself had affirmed Gods stirring up the wicked to their wicked deeds, as a man puts spurs to a dull Jade, he brought the Simile to show, that the man is the Author of the going of the horse, but not of the halting. (The sad estate of which shift I shown very 
* Look back on sect. 18. num. 11. of this Chap.  lately, and therefore I forbear to repeat it here.) 3. That whatever Calvin and Piscator do say in some places, yet they say the contrary in other places. (This doth justify what I said in my 
† Look back on Introduct. sect. 4, 5, 6, 7.  Introduction: and the Logic here used is just the same, as if the Barbarians of Melita should plead for themselves, that though they called S. Paul a Murderer in one place, yet they did not wrong him, because in another place they called him a God, Act. 28.4, 6. And so though Judas at one time betrayed his Master, yet he did not mean it in a flagitious sense, because at another time he did not betray him; yea and kissed him too when he did betray him. If Mr. B. speaks Treason, such Abstersions as these will not avail him. 4. That whatever they say, they understand no more than Arminius. (What is this, but to acknowledge, that as Arminius was a Presbyterian, so the Presbyterians are for Arminius, wheresoever Arminius doth chance to err, or speak unhappily?)  
5. To the fourth thing granted to be the Doctrine of his Masters, viz. That men do sin by God's coaction, 
5. Mr. B. grants that his Masters do sometimes teach a coaction from God to sin. Look back on ch. 2. sect. 2. p. 59, 60. &. sect. 3. p. 62.  (which by the way he doth distinguish from forcing and thrusting into sin) he would seem to give a salvo by floundring again in this following manner, p. 135, 136. First he saith, That Orthodox Writers do use it very seldom. Hold, good Reader, and bear me witness, that the man pleads guilty to the very worst part of the Indictment. He confesseth that they do use to blaspheme in this manner, by saying that God doth compel men to sin, but only allegeth that they use it not often. And though I can prove they use it often, yet I am willing to pass it by, if they will but recant, and promise never to do the like. The Question was not, whether a few times, or many times they vent this blasphemy; but whether or no they do it not sometimes. Mr. B. saith, Yes, sometimes, but seldom; not often, though now and then. Judas did not often betray his Master; but it was too much that he did it once. By such a soft phrase he slandered the Scriptures in his former Volume, 
☜ He forgeth new things upon the Scripture.  [The Scriptures say not much, or often, that God doth pradestine men to sin, Corrept. Corr. p. 72. at the bottom.] which is a desperate forgery imposed on the word of God, for the Scriptures say not any such thing, no not once, no not any thing like it; no nor the Fathers of the Church, who are slandered together with the Scriptures. (ibid.) 'Twas but a bold invention to lessen the odium which lay upon his Divinity. Next he tells us, that whensoever Orthodox Wriers douse the word Coaction (in saying that God doth compel men to sin) they mostly at the same time acknowledge they speak improperly, p. 135. (Which by the way is very false, and if it were true, 'twere too too bad, as I have 
* See Diu. Philan. ch. 1. p. 26. Look back also on ch. 2. of this book.  elsewhere showed) But what impropriety is that he speaks of? even such as implies a contradiction, and a condemnation of his own Party: for his words are these (and he takes them out of Paraeus) They understand it not of a coaction which destroys the will of man, but of such an one which proceeds from the fierce impetus and inclination of the sinners will, p. 136. l. 1, 2. Here he miscarries several ways at once; for first he fights with Doctor Twisse and Doctor Reynolds, and with all the rest of his Party, and with all mankind (except Paraeus) who confers it incompetent to the will to suffer any coaction. 2. If they meant by coaction, the sinners own inclination and impetus of will, they must have said that the sinner compels himself; which had been much better nonsense, then to have said (as they are wont) that God compels him to sin. To say, the will doth suffer coaction by its own inclination, is innocent nonsense in comparison: but to say that God compels men to sin, is a horrid blasphemy. Besides, 3. He again confesseth the whole fact, by saying whensoever they use to do so! as before he said, [they use it seldom.] 4. He confesseth they do not always acknowledge any impropriety, because he saith, they do it mostly: so that in some of his Masters, and in some places of their works, he doth acknowledge as much guilt as I have ever charged their Doctrines with. 5. He doth not rightly translate Paraeus, nay he is not so much as consistent with him; for 
* Qui cogit invitos, is est causa p●ccati Qui verò cogit volentes, is pierce causa est boni, etc. Paraeus in C●stig. ad lib B●ll. de Am●ss. Grat. & stat. peccati. Note, th●t D●● Twiss doth confess it to be their custom, to say that men are compelled by God to sin. Vin. Gra. l. 2. p. 1. c. 1. p. 29.  Paraeus talks nonsense in this following sort: [He who compels men against their consents, is the cause of sin; but not he who compels men with their consents.] To exagitate this as it deserves would require a whole Volume. 6. As sad as these salvoes appear to be, they are the best that he could borrow from the ablest Abstersors who went before him. And he concludes with this excuse, that Bellarmine the Jesuit and other Papists, are near of kin in this case to the Presbyterians. As for the bold and groundless forgery concerning Bellarmine and my self, I pass it by, as being personal, of which I am sure there is enough in the Self-Revenger.   

Sect. 28.  

Mr. B. turns his back to the chief part of the charge, and tacitly yields the whole cause.  I now expected with great longing, what he would say to my fourth Chapter of the Divine Philanthropy defended, where he and his Masters are most concerned, even from p. 36. to p. 65. But in stead of speaking one syllable to those twenty nine whole pages, he only tells us he needs not do it, sect. 3. p. 137. and pretends to render some reasons why. As, 1. for fear of needless repetitions: and 2. no body needs be solicitous what becomes of Doctor Twisse or Mr. B' s particular expressions: 3. And this task hath been performed by other men (against his own knowledge, as his partiallest friends will confess) 4. And what is omitted by himself, he hopes before long will be done by another, p. 138. And thus he thinks he hath done like a brave Abstersor, in refusing to plead to the indictment.   

Sect. 29.  

1. Of Adam's inclination to sin before he sinned.  Mr. B. being desirous to show his good will to Mr. Rivet, whom I had proved to be guilty of making God the Author of sin, by saying the very inclination which Adam had to sin, before he sinned, could not choose but be vicious, and yet of God's making; is fain to commit a world of faults for the making a salve to that one sore, from p. 139. to p. 144. The chief ingredients in his salve are those that follow: 1. Rivet was a strong Disputant before Mr. T.P. was brought forth into the world: the same which he had pleaded for Mr. W. (as if the oldest men must needs bemost orthodox, and of quicker sight than their juniors.) 2. Other eminent men have used that argument as well as he: (as if to err in company, were either to be orthodox, or very near it.) 3. He speaks of concupiscence, and lust, which are a couple of sins; whereas the question is only of Adam's inclination before his very first sin. 4. He speaks of lust after the fall, Rom. 7.7. and which was in the will too; whereas the subject of the dispute was before the fall, nor in the will, but in the appetite. And so he either understands not, or wilfully flies from the thing in question. 5. He calls an inclination to sin a weighty plummet inclining; at once an abstract and concrete in one and the same respect. 6. He saith that Adam, even before the fall, had the Devil's image upon him, as well as God's, if his inclination to sin was before his first sin; as if he thought that potentia could not be before actus. 7. He confounds temptation to sin with sin. 8. He asks why I should be  of granting, that Christ had any inclination to sin? (which why should he ask, if he did not think that impious thing which he imputes to Castellio, without the least citation from him?) 9 He confesseth he cannot tell how to salve those absurdities which I had showed his opinion must needs betray him into, as progressus in infinitum, and prius primo. 10. He saith (out of 
* Nulla peccati Adami in Adamo reddi eausa potest, quae non sit ipsa peccatum. Camero contra Epist. viri docti. p. 163.  Camero) that there could be no cause of Adam 's sin which was not also itself a sin. And so his party, by consequence, must needs be charged by him and Camero, with the crime of making God to be sin itself, as often as they call him the cause of sin.  

2. Concerning the birth & growth of the very first sin; with the very wide difference betwixt the inclinations of the sensitive appetite, and the will.  2. Though I need not say more than what remains unassaulted in my Defence of the Divine Philanthropy (ch. 4. p. 23, 24, 25.) or more than what I have added in the eighteenth Section of this Chapter (Num. 6.) yet because his understanding may be as dark in this Point, as his will crooked, I will endeavour to afford him sufficient light. The inclination of the will to evil, differs much from that of the sensitive appetite, to which the Apple even in Paradise was very grateful. The will (we know) is the middle faculty betwixt the sensitive appetite on one side, and the reasoning faculty on the other. The propension of the will to the sensitive appetite's proposal of what forbidden, was the very beginning of Adam's sin, it having been his first degree of aversion from God unto the creature: thus it was in Eve also, before it was in Adam, and was a sin in her will some insensible time before her eating; but her fullness of consent, and actual eating, and giving her husband to eat also, were all additions to that first sin: which I call the first for this reason, because nothing of sin can be so much as imagined, before the propending of the will to the forbidden object; and because it was in the will before it could be in the hand or mouth. The very next degree of sin to the propending of the will, was Delectation; next, Morosa Cogitatio; next, a plenitude of Consent; next, the actual eating what was forbidden. But now the gratefulness of the sweet to one sense, and of fair to another, is less than the least of those degrees; and the inclination of the sensitive appetite could be no sin at all, remaining only in the sense, and winning nothing from the will, which continued as yet in its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But when the will of Eve was debauched by her appetite into an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (that is, a bending of her will the wrong way,) so as her mind did hang or hanker after the apple, that was clearly the beginning of her transgression.   

Sect. 30.  

The importance of the word Author.  To conclude the whole Chapter, and so to quit the whole subject, I must satisfy a complaint which Mr. B. hath made (c. 3. p. 129.) That I charged him and his Masters with the crime of having said a great deal worse, and in much worse terms, then that God is (verbatim) the Author of sin. Now that he may not complain afresh of his having complained to no purpose, and to the end he may beware of rash complain for the future, I will prove my charge in such a manner, as not to leave his very abettors the possibility to descent. The most succinct way to do it, will be to lay down the whole importance of the aequivocal word Author, and then to compare it with those expressions which are confessed by Mr. B. to have been used by his Masters, as well as Brethren.  

1. Author quando que 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 significat, quandoque 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Priscian. lib. 5. Idem valet quod 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Coel. Sec. Cur. Author est ut sic dicam Factor, Laur. Val. l. 4. Hortator & Author, Cic. in partit, Orat. 52. Consiliario & Authore aliquid inire, legitur apud Cic. ad Alt. l. 14.305.4. Suasor & Author deditionis. Cic. 3. Offic. p. 147. Author est in quo est vis, potestas, & dignitas. Liv. l. 1. ab urbe cond. 72. Impero, Authorque sumut me cuivis castrandum loces, Plaut. Aul. 7.73. suspend, vinci, verbera, Author sum, sino, Idem Penal. 3.17. Author●est à quo quis jus comparavit. Cic. 7. Verr. Authores pupillorum vocantur, in quorum administratione infirma aetas, resque eorum sunt, Paulus Juriscon. Authores sunt qui Authoritatem suam & decretum interponunt, Liv. l. 1. ab urb. con. Viae Author qui viam monstrat, aut qui ire jubet. Ovid. 3. Metam. Etiam Duces militum Authores vocabantur, Valla. l. 4.  1. Author sometimes doth signify the first beginner of a work, sometimes him who doth help advance it; sometimes a factor, sometimes only a persuader; sometimes a sole cause, sometimes a concause; sometimes a person of power and dignity, by whose advice or command a thing is done; sometimes him who confers a right; sometimes the guardian of a child under age; sometimes him who doth abet or assert, or uphold another in any action: sometimes he that shows the way is said to be the Author of it: sometimes he who appointeth or decreeth any thing, is called the Author of the thing decreed.  

2. How the enemies of truth say what is worse than that God is (verbatim) the Author of sin.  2. Now from hence it is apparent, how many ways Mr. B. and his Praedecessors have not only made God the Author of sin, but something worse too. Had they only said in plain terms (as I have showed they have) God is the Author of sin, they might have sought for some excuse or mitigation of the crime from the softest importance of the word Author. They might have said they meant no more, then that God doth persuade or tempt men to sin, (as Mr. B's word was.) But notwithstanding even that had been sufficiently blasphemous, Mr. B. 
† His confession is to be seen from his p. 133. to his p. 136.  confesseth (as I have 
* Look back on Sect. 27. num. 5.  showed) that they affirm God's impelling and forcing men to sin, his making men sin by coaction, which Prosper professeth to be 
* Prosper ad object. Vincen. 11. p. 341, 342.  worse than can be truly spoken of the Devil himself. Now though he who compels a man to sin, is properly called the Author of it; yet because the word Author hath other softer significations, this must needs be much worse than only to say he is the Author.  

3. Mr. Rolloc's strange Salvo.  3. Nay in not many lines (p. 128.) before Mr. B. is so unhappy as to put me on this task, be citys a passage from Mr. Rolloc, thus excusing and mollifying that Parties Doctrine; [
† Non est Decretum malitiae quà malitia est, sed quà bonitatis rationem habet. R. Rolloc. in Rom. 8.29.  God's decree of sinfulness in the abstract, is not of sinfulness as such, but as it hath the nature of goodness in it.] His word is malitia, as the abstract of malum, and himself explains it by Anomia, in the two lines going before. To show how Mr. W. and Mr. B. have stretched the blasphemy to its extremity, by teaching that God doth work sin, as well as will it, and hath a hand in effecting. of it, that he makes it necessary, 
* Dr. Twisse affirmeth, that God's Incitation and Excitation to the act of sin doth not only influere in ipsum actum Creaturae, but also in ipsam voluntatem etc. Vin. Gra. l. 2. par. 1. c. 12. sect. 2. p. 142.  excites men to it, is the maker of all real things without exception, and the cause of the obliquity itself in abstracto; I say, to show this afresh on this occasion, were [actum agere] to make a needless repetition of what hath been the subject of many Sections.    

CHAP. IU. A notorious fallacy of Doctor Twisse and his Followers; with several failings discovered in Mr. Wh.  

Sect. 1.  

Of the signal Fallacy swallowed first by D. Twisse, then by his Followers.  MY chief enterprise being performed in so large a manner, and the whole Tree of Error plucked up by the root, it may seem a superfluity to spend more time upon little twiggs, whose whole subsistence is from the root, and must therefore perish together with it. Yet because Doctor Twisse is a leading man, and hath built the highest Castle, on the most Airy Foundation, of any artificer in the kind; and because Mr. W. was not contented, that the Doctor's unhappiness should go alone, but was desirous to join his own too; I will regard him so much as to take him in.  

1. Dr. Twisse his important fallacy which runs through his book.  I had showed the sad fallacy which Dr. Twisse had put upon himself and his followers, through his misusage or mistake of that Logic Maxim, [What is first intended is last executed.] For either not understanding, or wilfully dissembling his understanding (I cannot say which, though I am sure of one of the two) what is the scope of that Maxim, and within what limits its truth is bound; he most unreasonably concluded, that because punishment is executed after sin, therefore sin was intended after God decreed punishment. The cause of his fallacy I shall show anon, and how inconsistent he is with Mr. W. or with himself. I shown that if the Maxim had universal truth in it, a thousand such absurdities as this would follow; that if I first intent to take ship at Dover, and afterwards intent to sail into France, I must (according to that Maxim, as 'tis mistaken by Doctor Twisse) first sail into France, and after that take ship at Dover.  

2. Mr. W's essay to cover the fallacy in his p. 17, & 18.  2. To slubber over the business, Mr. Wh. thus talks to admiration; [Is not the journey into France the first thing here intended, and in order to that to take ship at Dover?] Reader, observe to what a prodigy some men are able to tread awry. I had plainly put my case thus, that my first intention is for Dover (not resolving yet to what Country I will sail, much less to what Port,) and my second intention for France, particularly for Calais; in answer to which Mr. W. asks, Is not France first intended, and Dover next? and what is this but to say, that my first intention is my last, and my second is my first? If he shall say, that France is the first thing intended by him, and Dover the second, he will confess the absurdity with which I charge him: for I had spoken of my intentions, in putting the case at that time; not at all of any man's else, much less of Mr. W's, a year or two after the time that my case was put.  

3. The Fallacy shown in its deformity.  3. That he may plead no more for Doctor Twisse his mishaps, nor escape a right apprehension of his own miscarriage, (and that the party may yield their Palladium lost) I will illustrate the Case with the greatest perspicuity I can imagine. Suppose a man here in England taking his life to be in danger, intends to go out of the Kingdom, he cares not whither, for preservation from present peril: the first thing that he intends, is to take ship at Dover; than it being free to him to go whither he will, as to Flanders, or Holland, or any place else, he at last decrees to go to France: this than is last in his intention, and must therefore (by the Doctrine of Dr. T.) be the first in execution; than which there is nothing more impossible, and so nothing more absurd. Again, a man intends to build a house, not to let it out to others, but to dwell in it himself, and after that intends to make it sumptuous; in doing that he turns Bankrupt, and therefore determines to let it out: this is the last in execution, the sumptuous furnishing of it was next before that, building before that; will it now follow (as Dr. T. his Logic would have it) that he lets it out before he furnisheth it? and that he does furnish it before he builds it? Once more, A man determines to take a servant; after he hath taken him, he finds him a knave, and so resolves to put him away: must he therefore put him away before he takes him, because his intention to take him was before his intention to put him away? yet such is the arguing of Doctor Twisse, who 
* Si peccati permissio prius intenderetur quàm damnatio, sequeretur in executione ut damnatio priùs sieret quàm peccati permisso. Twiss. in Praesat. ad Vin. Gr. p. 3.  saith, that if God did decree to permit sin, before he decreed to damn men for sin, it would follow they must be damned, before they can so much as be permitted to sin.  

4. T●e first cause of the whole mistake.  4. As the cause of this Error was his taking that Maxim by the left handle, Quod primum in intention, est ultimum in executione; so the cause of that also was his overhasty imagination, that 
* Neque enim ullus intentionis ordo est, nisi ratione mediorum & Finis. Id. ibid.  there is no order of intention, unless in respect of the end and the means; which he dictates tanquam ex Tripod, as an unquestionable truth, though there is nothing more visibly and even palpably false. For there being many means to one end, (to wit God's glory) one of these means may be subordinate to another, and so, in ment Dei, before the other. God did not decree to create man to the end that he should sin; nor did he decree that man should sin, to the end he might be damned: but he decreed to create man, and to permit him to sin, and to damn him for sinning, to the end his glory might be advanced. And this is 
Neque enim damnotio potest esse finis à Deo intentus, quandoquidem D●us fac●● omnia propter se. Necesse est ergo ut gloria Dei ejusque patefactio sit finis actionum Divinarum. Idem ibid.  acknowledged by the Doctor even in that very page.  

5. That first cause removed, and the fallacy les● naked.  5. To remove the Origin of the whole evil, I shall not need to say more than this: God foreseeing that man would voluntarily sin if he were not forcibly hindered, and decreeing not to use any forcible hindrance (which would not suit with the nature of a free and voluntary Agent) he also saw that Adam would make a wrong choice, and thereby fall from his state of Innocence. This state of Adam is to be looked on as a Disease, which stands in need of a Sovereign Remedy. The death of Christ is that Remedy which God decreed. And it cannot be imagined, that the Remedy should be first in intention, before the Disease was foreseen, or the very permission of it decreed; though still the Remedy is to be last in execution, as it was also in the intention. Therefore the Axiom must be so limited, as to be only appliable to those things, whereof the later is the absolute end, and the former decreed as a means to attain it by. But thus it is not in ment Dei; for the permission of sin is not designed by God as a means of bringing in any former decree of giving Christ; but as that which is suitable to Adam's nature, created with a free elective faculty, commonly known by the name of Will. Now God foreseeing that man will do what will be permitted to be done, doth also foresee an opportunity of magnifying his mercy in giving Christ, and accordingly decrees to give him. And that before Adam falls, though not before he decrees to permit his fall, and actually foresees that fall of Adam. From whence 'tis clear, that 
* Quod primum in intention, est ultimum in executione.  that Maxim is very absurdly applied unto the business of God's decrees; as by numberless instances might be evinced. For what man will say, that the Creation of the world, which was the first thing in execution, was therefore the last in God's intention? It was certainly praecedaneous, in ment Dei, to the fall of Adam. For how could Adam be considered as an actual sinner, without being considered as something capable of sin? Indeed Mr. Perkins was so unhappy as to teach it for Divinity, 
† Etiam ipso Decreto creandi prius esse judicavi decretum praedestinandi tum ad salutem tum ad damnationem. Id. Ib. p. 2. col. 1.  That God's decree of damning was before his decree of creating man. And Doctor Twisse 
* Ibid.  confesseth that he was once of that mind. But Arminius clearly confuted Perkins; and Doctor Twisse doth seem to confess as much, calling Perkins his opinion 
* Ibid.  rigidiorem sententiam. Let it now be remembered, that there is a priority of order amongst those things whereof neither can be said to be the end of the other, and the original cause of the error is quite removed.  

6. Mr. W's indirect course to excuse Doctor Twisse in contradiction to him.  6. But Mr. W. allegeth, that Doctor Twisse understands the old maxim de finibus ultimis, non intermediis, p. 18.] If he did not look into the Doctor's words, why would he speak thus without any knowledge of the Fact? And if he did, why would he speak against his knowledge? The Doctor applies the maxim only to sin and damnation, and things on this side damnation, but not to any thing beyond it. And that damnation is not finis ultimus, the Doctor stiffly maintains in the place before cited. If Mr. W. thinks it is, he contradicts the Doctor, whilst he asserts him. It is agreed on all sides, that the Glory of God is finis ultimus, to which the damnation of the impenitent is but a means. And therefore Mr. W. might have omitted his ill language which there he gives me, unless he had found some colour for it. If he did not fear his undertaking, why did he not cite the page or chapter, where I had spoken of the subject, that I and others might easily have found it out? I leave his best friends to judge of such deal.  

7. Doctor Twisse his error of co-ordination, etc.  7. But Doctor Twisse saith farther, that the decrees of permitting sin, and of giving Christ, are , Ibid. p. 3.] In saying that, he did well to oppose Mr. Perkins, although not well to miss the truth: It doth not follow that they are not subordinate, because not so as Mr. Perkins feigned them: they are one after another in order of nature (though not of time) as the Disease is before the Cure, as well in nature as time; and though both are means to God's glory, yet still the Remedy must suppose the Disease, and one is naturally conceivable before the other. And so for the punishment of sin, which is another means of God's glory, it praesupposeth sin by such a necessity of illation, that God cannot be imagined to decree a man's punishment, without regard to some offence, which the nature of punishment doth imply: which being the main thing that I objected to Mr. B. (speaking of 
* See D. Phil. ch 1. p. 5, 6.  Postdestination) to which he durst not re●●ly, nor Mr. W. in his behalf, I leave with the rest of this Section, as a full rejoinder to what he hath in his running Titles, concerning Postdestination, or Negative Reprobation, since the body of his Book is filled with Tergiversations.   

Sect. 2.  
There being nothing now left of any moment in Mr. W. 
Mr. M's. forgery of objections in other men's names.  I will discover his other failings in the fewest words that I am able. In his p. 43. he makes a syllogism after an ugly manner in the third figure, and tells his Reader it is mine, nay he pretends to cite it from Philan. c. 4. p. 5. and calls it pitiful Sophistry: yet his own heart and the world shall be my witnesses, that there is no such thing in any part of any book which I have published; much less there where he pretends it. All my redress of such wrongs, is to protest against them, and to require reparations from the person offending, and to direct my Readers to Philanth. c. 4. p. 5. where they will see what it was which made the enemy to sly into such lewd deal for his defence. He and Mr. B. must either prove that Reprobation is no punishment, or else confess their cause is ruined.   

Sect. 3.  
In Mr. W's. second part, which is all against conditional and universal Redemption, p. 53. 
Mr. W. of Christ's death, p. 53.  I observe these things with a running eye. 1. He denies that Christ died for all mankind. Not only in contradiction to Scripture, and the Church of England, but to Bishop 
* Sent. Daven. p. 10, 11.  Davenant in particular, and even to Dr. Twifs, as Mr. Baxter shows in his Praef. to his Disp. p. 11, 13, 14. Next, he saith, that there is no conditional Election of all. Who saith there is any election of all? an election of persevering believers is not of all. 3. Election and Redemption are not commensurate, as he affirms. Redemption is not the fruit of Election, witness the poverty of his proofs, p. 54. His first is nothing to Redemption, no nor the second. But on the contrary, Electing in Christ praesupposeth Redemption, in God's eternal foresight, and our being considered as believers in Christ. No nor the third, for Redemption according to rich grace, (Eph. 1.7.) is not of a few; to the more it is extended, the richer ' 'tis. His fourth from Joh. 3.16. is yet more grossly against himself. God so loved the world, as to give his Son for the world, not the smallest part of it. Had that been the meaning, Saint John had said, God so hated the world, that he denied his Son to the far greater part of it, that not believing in him they might perish, etc. Mr. W's. proofs p. 55. from the word [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so] are most ridiculous of all; for so is expressive of the degree of the love, not exclusive of it, or of any man from it, but inclusive of all, etc. It seems the Presbyterian love must be enclosed, or good for nothing; whereas sincere love, the more extensive it is, it is ever the greater, not the more restrained. What would he think if one should say, he is so loving a Neighbour, that he hardly loves one in twenty? a man so kind, that he hates more than he loves? Redeeming love tends to eternal life, even to them that never come thither: and this is sure the greatest love, as being extended also to enemies, whereas the other is only to supposed friends. But indeed betwixt infinites there is no comparison. The comparison made Joh. 15.13. is of finite men's loves; and yet even there the greatest is that of laying down a life. Does Mr. W. think there are two greatest?  
2. His Answers to that Objection, p. 55. [The world is here the object of this love, therefore it cannot be meant of an electing love] are strangely gross. For (1) special love, with him, is nothing else but electing love: nor is there need in that notion, to say that all are the objects of it. It is but his begging of the Question, to confound Electing with Redeeming love. God's hating Esau is comparatively meant, and is but loving him less than his brother Jacob: in which sense we are obliged to 
* Luk. 14.26.  hate our Parents, our Wives and Children. Even 
† Luth. in Gen. 33.  Luther and 
* Mollerus in Mal. cap. 1.  Mollerus did not doubt of Esau's et eternal bliss. Nor durst Oecolampadius to account him a Reprobate, because he knew those words (Rom. 9) were only spoken by a 
† Oecolam. Edit. Crisp. 1158. Gen.  figure. 2. He confessed the world doth either signify in Scripture the whole universe of men, or the greatest part, which is the worst, (p. 55, 56.) and this most usually he grants. But he ask, why may it not also signify the fewest and the best too? as if he knew not the Rule, Analogum per se positum stat pro famosiori. He saith a heap that hath more chaff than wheat in it, is usually called a heap of wheat, (p. 56.) By deceitful Jobbers no doubt it may be, who cheat the Buyer. But would Mr. W. buy his Corn so? or think the man honest who should so sell a bag of Corrans, where 29. parts of 30. are very trash? Joh. 6.33. there is bread spoken of, giving life to the world, that is to say, to all that eat it. And Rom. 11.15. the world is all except the Jews, therefore by far the greater part. Then 2 Cor. 5.19. Reconciling the world, is meant of the whole world, but conditionally. The other Texts 2 Pet. 2.5. & 1 Joh. 5.19. which speak of the world, and the whole world, are clearly meant of the greatest part, not of the least. So all flesh, Joel 2.28. is meant of all Nations, all the earth, as well the Gentiles as the Jews. Mundus Redemptionis, in Austin, is not mundus simply, but restrained to those that are finally saved; which is not the notion of Redemption of which we are speaking from Joh. 3.16. where God so loved the world (without restraint) that [quicunque vellet credere] whosoever would believe, might have life everlasting.  
3. His Answer to that Objection, p. 56. [The world is distributed into believers and unbelievers, etc.] is very woeful. For 1. Is not the word Believing a restraint of the World? If so, then there are some who are not believing, and then there is a distribution: which Mr. W. denies. 2. If those who are uncalled, our Saviour calls by the name of the world, than the world signifies not only the Elect: for Mr. W. cannot say that all the uncalled are the Elect.  
4. What he calls his second Argument, p. 57 is gratis dictum, he crudely affirming, without the least proof, that Christ died for none but whom he approved. Point-blank against Scripture, 2 Pet. 2.1. where Christ is said to have bought them that deny him, and broach damnable heresies, and bring upon themselves swift destruction. Did he approve of such men? or did he not die for them whom he bought? Alas Mr. W!  
5. His third Argument, p. 57 is thus easily retorted; That if it is as he would have it, Christ died for many who were already in Heaven. And his Answer to the Objection, p. 58. is somewhat worse: For as he holds that they in Hell were decreed absolutely to be damned; so he holds that they in Heaven were as absolutely decreed to be saved. In both he is but a beggar of the thing in question: for I affirm those decrees not to be absolute, but respective.  
6. As for his 
* His Argument is this, If Christ died to purchase Faith, and all other things needful, etc. then he did not die to purchase salvatton upon condition of believing, etc.  fourth (p. 58) I deny the sequel; but he takes leave to prove his Antecedent only, which no man denies. In his Answer to the Objection, p. 59 he misunderstands the word Condition; which is not resisting, but using and improving Gods gifts and graces: and so God will give them the grace of faith, if they will humbly beg, or thankfully receive it. None can come except the Father draws; but when he draws, all may that will. And though no condition is required to God's first grace, (p. 60.) yet the receiving of that is required to his giving of more.  
7. His fifth Argument, (p. 60, 61.) if granted, proves my conclusion, that Christ died not only sufficiently, but intentionally for all; for that he died for all, the Scripture saith. But (2.) Christ hath not actually taken away impenitency by his death, any farther than by purchasing sufficient grace to repent. 'Tis true, the blood of Jesus cleanseth us from all sin, 1 John 1.7. but how? actually? or only meritoriously? not so, but thus, 
* Locis in●rà citandis. Num. 8.  saith the late great Primate. He hath redeemed us from iniquity, Tit. 2.14. but by giving us grace to forsake iniquity. (Let Mr. W. mark that.) He saves his people from their sins, (Mat. 1.) but we must be his then by our faithfulness to him, as well as faith, before he will save us from the punishment which our sins will otherwise entail upon us. He hath so far delivered us, (Luke 1.74.) as to give us grace or power whereby to serve him. And though 'tis the property of the flesh to resist the spirit (as Mr. W. saith truly, p. 61.) yet 'tis the work of Christ's spirit to mortify the flesh: which when we have done, even to that very Spirit we im●ute our conquest. Whereas he saith, to the great reproach of his Doctrine, 
* A confession to be recorded, as dropping from the p●n of the guilty party.  [That Christ cannot be said seriously to desire the salvation of those, from whom he will not remove those things which he knows will hinder their salvation, p. 61.] I answer, that he could not seriously desire it, if he did not give them sufficient means: but this ☜ lights heavily upon them who deny such a sufficiency to the most of mankind, and so infer Gods offers to be serious only to a few. I always teach, that Christ is wanting to none in what is requisite to their safety, if they are not wanting to themselves. But though his desire is serious, it is not passionate, or unreasonable, so as to save men by force, either against, or without their wills. He doth not violently remove whatsoever hinders them from salvation by any acts of mere power, but deals with men as free Agents, who could not otherwise be fit for reward or punishment. He takes away the heart of stone where it is really taken away, and none but he can do that work: but he does it not irresistibly, and therefore in many the stone remains not taken away, where yet he mercifully attempts it by such kind of means, as are wise and congruous, and in themselves sufficient; only the wilfulness of men doth keep them from being effectual also.  
8. His sixth Argument from Tit. 2.14. (in his p. 62.) deserves not any Indignation, but very much Pity. For those Believers whom Christ receiveth, he doth purge and purify with 
* Jam. 4.6.  more grace. That all are not purged, is their 
† Ezek. 24.13. See the Primates judgement of Christ's death, p. 6. & 21.  own fault only. Christ satisfied for all upon the Cross, but did not actually save them; as his Grace of Armagh doth often say. Application is not a necessary effect of Redemption; and that Mr. W. may also learn from the same 
* Id. ibid. 22, & 16, & 38.  writing of the said Primate. Christ doth not leave it unto man only to make the Application, yet gives him grace whereby to make it. And for what is said p. 63. from 1 Joh. 2.1, 2. I answer thus, There is a twofold Advocation or Intercession of Christ, one on the Cross, and one in Heaven. Again, one for sinners, that they may repent; another for penitents, that they may finally persevere. He had this prayer for his Crucifiers, Father, forgive them. But another for his Disciples; Father, keep those whom thou hast given me, (Joh. 17.11.) That kind of prayer was was not for the world, but for those who came in from among the worldlings, (Joh. 17.9.) That former prayer was for Rebels who stood out; this later for obedient and loyal Subjects, who were already in his possession.  
9 His seventh Argument (p. 63.) from that promise of God, The seed of the woman shall break the Serpent's head, (Gen. 3.) is a very strong Argument of the Disputers weakness; and serves for nothing in the world, but to proclaim the grossness of his mistake. For the seed of the woman is Jesus Christ, the object of true belief; not true believers. So that all falls at once, which he hath built on this bottom. Yet I will note one rarity for being a rarity indeed. ☞ Mr. W. saith that the Serpent doth not properly exercise his enmity against all men, but against the Elect only, (p. 63.) And what moves him to say it, but his being resolved to conclude this from it, Ergo, Christ died not for all, but only for the Elect? But stay, good Sir, is not Satan their enemy, whom he tempts to sin, and possesseth, and makes to cut themselves with stones? or doth he not exercise his enmity against them whom he betrays to the pains of Hell? Besides, hath he a knowledge of the Elect (before the last audit) or hath he not? If he hath, from whence? or why will he tempt them at all, when he knows 'tis lost labour? If he hath not a knowledge of them, how can he single them out from all the Reprobates, to practise his enmity upon them?  
10. His eighth Argument, (p. 64, 65.) is the worst of all, as well as the last, it being nothing but a presumption, that all the infants of the Heathen are unavoidably damned. Yet ask him what he thinks of himself and his party (who are exceedingly more sinful than Heathen Infants) he will tell you they are Elect, and must be saved as unavoidably. Mr. B. is on this pin too, from his p. 144. to p. 147. But having cut them out work in 
* See Diu. Philanth. ch. 4. p. 25, 26. The self-Revenger, ch. 1. p. 22, etc. and p. 32, 33.  other places, I only pity them in this, beseeching God to endue them with grace and reason. I will but briefly forewarn others against the presumption of passing judgement upon other men's souls, and rudely pressing into God's secrets. God acquaints us indeed with his manner of proceeding in certain cases, as with those to whom his word is preached; but of his dealing with others we are not qualified to judge, un less as far as we are led by general rules out of Scripture. As for example, [He hath no pleasure in the death of the wicked. He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. He is a God ready to pardon, swift to show mercy, and slow to wrath. His mercy is over all his works. His Commandments are not grievous. The soul that sinneth it shall die. The son shall not die for the iniquity of the Parents. God requireth according to what men have, not according to what they have not.] He condemns not any man for not seeing, to whom he never gave eyes, or who never had light whereby to see. He condems not the deaf, for not hearing the Gospel; nor the tender Infant, for not comprehending it, whilst it is near. And how he will be pleased to deal with others, who are under the same Impossibility for want of preaching, he hath not otherwise told us then by parity of reason, that many are saved by Christ's name, who never heard it; and by his merits, who never heard of them. I say not these things, as if the interest of my cause were concerned in it; I am sure it is not: For if all the Heathen are damned for their unbelief, then am I still in the right; it is not because Christ is not offered, but because they will not accept. And if they that are redeemed, are so conditionally, then what can hinder us from believing (especially since God hath so often said it) that the Heathens also were redeemed, as well as Christians? And may it for ever be kept in mind (for many great and weighty reasons) that 'tis not knowledge, but practice, to which the promises are made.   

Sect. 4.  

How they strengthen Socinianism, who contract the benefit of Christ's death.  Mr. W. spends his remaining papes in a pretended Answer to Objections, in two of which I am concerned. The first (beginning p. 71.) I have already shown to be destructive to what he had positively delivered, p. 19 Or if his p. 19 is owned by him, it is just as destructive to his p. 71, 72. & so I refer him to what I have said, c. 1. sect. 2. p. 4, & 5. But because Mr. B. on the same 
* ch. 3. p 84, 85, 86.  subject doth also speak the same sense, (if it is sense to say, that all and every man doth signify very few in respect of all, and that the whole world notes the lesser part only,) I will add a few things, to deliver them both at once from the present thraldom they are in.  

1. Socinians and Presbyterians compared.  1. If the world, and the whole world, shall be permitted to signify the little flock only, and not the Universe of men, a way is opened to the Socinians, to persist in their course of robbing the Church of those Texts which we allege for the proof of Christ's Divinity. One of the clearest Texts we have is Joh. 1.10. The world was made by him: Here by the world, say the 
* Volkel. lib. 5. cap. 10. p. 446.  Socinians, is not meant this Fabric of Heaven and Earth, not yet the Universe of men throughout the world, but the state of Bliss in the life to come, which the Man Christ Jesus hath purchased for us. And they have more to say for it, than the Presbyterians for their Whimsy, because the Apostle doth call that future state, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the world to come, Heb. 2.5. but he never useth the word World to signify only the Elect. Nay, as the Learned Daille doth acknowledge, (who is fare from being an Arminian) whensoever the World in Holy Writ doth not signify Mankind, it clearly signifies the greater and 
† Non solet Scriptura mundi nomen in figurato sensu absolutè positum in bonam, sed in deteriorem partem usurpare. Dallaeus in Apol. pro Duab. sin. part. 1. p. 16.  worse part. Nay Mr. Daille 
* Id. ib. p. 17.  gives this for the first and chief reason why Camero and Amyrald, and other eminent Protestants, did departed from their brethren the Calvinists in this particular, and chose rather to submit to the plain Tenor of the Scripture as it was ever understood by the Primitive Church. Besides, he gives notice to Spanhemius, 
* Aperitur audacibus ingeniis licentia quoslibet sensus divinis verbis affingendi, quae omnia pro libitu invertent, & ad peregrinas significationes detorquebunt, si nobis hoc ipsi permiserimus, ut mundi nomen simpliciter positum pro solis electis sumamus, sensu, ut quivis videt, planè allegorico, & apud hominum, sive Judaeorum, sive Gentilium, Scriptores nove atque inaudito. Id. ib. p. 16. , that if we suffer our own selves to understand the world of the Elect only, (a trick never heard of, saith Daille, from any Writer in the World, whether Jew or Gentile) we shall encourage the bold and licentious people to make God's word a Nose of Wax, and forge up on it what sense they please.  

2. Received Rules for the interpreting of words, and ending controversies.  2. Mr. W. doth confess p. 72. and Mr. B. p. 84, 85. 1. That we must not recede from the literal sense of Scripture when it will agree with other Scriptures. And 2. That Scripture-Phrases must be interpreted according to the nature of the matter expressed by them.] The former of these two I shown 
* See D. Phil. ch. 4. sect. 26. p. 31.  so plainly, that neither of these brethren have offered any thing against it; and so they confess, in equivalence, that in the literal sense of those expressions [all, every, the whole, etc.] the Texts I cited are to be taken. Then for the later, it is evident that the matter of Christ's procuring a salvability for all without exception, is of a 
† See the Sinner Impl. part. 2. c. 2. p. 272. to p. 279.  favourable nature, both in respect of God and Man. Whereas the matter of God's leaving the far greatest part of mankind under a desperate impossibility of being saved, is of an 
* See the Sinner Impl. part 2. c. 2. p. 280. to p. 284  odious nature in all respects. Now we have general 
† 1. In non odiosis, sumenda verba secundum totam proprietatem usus popularis, etc. 2. In favorabilioribus, verba laxiùs sumenda. 3. In odiosis, sermo figuratus admittitur, quo onus vitatur, etc. Grot. de Jure Belli & Pacis, l. 1. cap. 16.  Rules for the interpreting of any matters in dispute, by reason of any ambiguity which may be pretended to lie in words; and such unquestionable Rules, as the law of all Nations (of what Religion whatsoever) is wont to go by in all Debates, that so Controversies and Jars may not certainly be endless; which yet they certainly will be, if there are not some standing Rules, by which the words of all compacts are to be measured and made certain, as to their sense and signification. Such Rules are these in the Civil law, (which is founded upon the Law of Nature.) 

1. In things not odious, words are to be taken according to the whole propriety of popular use, 
The first Rule.  so as the Masculine may include the Feminine, and the Indefinite the Universal.  
2. In matters more favourable, words are to be taken in the most lax and wide signification that they will bear. 
The second Rule.   
3. In things of an odious nature, a figurative sense must be admitted, 
The third Rule.  to avoid rigour or absurdity. And a greater restriction is to be used then for the rigid propriety of the wo●d.    
Hence it is that as when God is said in Scripture to harden the heart, to pollute his Temple, to profane his Sanctuary, and the like, I say 'tis figuratively spoken, and must be only understood by the common Hebraism; so when Christ is said to be the Saviour of the world, the Propitiation for the sins of the whole world, the Saviour of all men, and to have tasted death for every man, and the like, I say 'tis meant in the propriety of those universals; and if [whole] in one Text had not been added to [the world] as we know it is 1 Joh. 2.2. yet that Indefinite [the world] must have included the universal: my reasons of both are taken à diversâ ratione materiae odiosae, & favorabilis. But now my Adversaries (on the contrary) do take the words in their propriety where the matter is odious; and they contend for a Synecdoche (such as never was heard of before the broaching of their Heresy) where the matter is the most favourable to be imagined: unless they think it no odious thing for God to be concluded the Author of sin; and a thing very odious for the mercy of God to be over all his works, and for other men to be saveable as well as themselves.  

3. The extreme absurdity of dutiful misbelief.  3. Mr. B. confesseth (p. 87.) that in the general proposal of the Gospel to every creature Mar. 16.15. there cannot possibly lurk any mental reservation, or insincerity.] And that an untruth is to be believed by the commandment of him who is the God of truth, the Lord Primate calls the 
* The Primates Judgement of the true intent and extent of Christ's death, p. 24, 25.  extreme absurdity into which the Arminians did drive the Calvinists. Nor did he doubt but Mr. Culverwel was driven to the extremity on the right hand, by the 
† Ib. p. 25.  absurdities which he discerned in this extremity on the left. For (saith the Primate) what would not a man fly unto rather than yield that Christ died in no ways for the Reprobates, and that none but the Elect had any kind of title to him, 
p. 26. p. 27.  and yet many thousand Reprobates should be bound in conscience to believe that he died for them, and tied to accept him for their Redeemer and Saviour, yea, and should be condemned to everlasting torments for want of such a faith, (if we may call that Faith which is not grounded on the word of Truth) whereby they should have believed that, which in itself was most untrue, and laid hold of that in which they had no kind of interest? 
* Mr. W's Tenet, that only the least part of the world ought to believe the Gospel.  Yet Mr. W. saith plainly that all men are not commanded to believe, but only the least part of the world, p. 75. thereby inferring, 1. That the greatest part of the World do not sin in not believing, as being not commanded to it; 2. That none of that greatest part are damned for not believing; 3. Or if they are, they are damned for not doing that, which not to do is no sin; 4. Or that they actually do sin without offending against Precept; 5. And so, by a consequence unavoidable, that S. John hath falsely defined sin to be [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] the transgression of the law. He farther saith, 
* His reproach cast upon all Christendom & the Gospel of Christ. See Prosper de vocatione Gentium l. 2. c. 1, & 2, & 16. &c proving that God did never leave himself without a witness in any part of the world. Compare Act. 14.17. Psal. 76. & Psal. 118. Isa. 60.  that the Gospel is only preached to the least part of the world, ibid. as if he knew nothing either of Church-History, or Cosmography; nor did believe any truth to be in the Prophecies of the Old Testament, or in the oeconomy of the New. It seems the 1. Protestants, and 2. Papists, and 3. Greeks, and 4. Muscovites, 5. the asiatics under the Patriarch of Jerusalem, 6. the Melchites under that of Antioch, 7. the Armenians under 100 Bishops, 8. the Jacobites (who are mingled with the Mahometans through a great part of Asia under their Patriarch at Caramite) 9 the Christians under the Patriarch of Mozul about Assyria, Mesopotamia, Parthia, and Media, (accounted more than all the Papists) 10. the Georgians in Iberia, 11. the Circassians, 12. the Mengrellians, 13. the Christians of all Anatolia under the Patriarch of Constantinople, 14. those in the Kingdoms of Cazan and Astracan under the Patriarch of Moscow, 15. the Maronites, 16. the Indians of S. Thome, 17. those under the Patriarch of Alexandria, whose jurisdiction hath reached from the Gaditan straits to the River Nile, 18. The Abassin Christians in Aethiopia under their Abunna, 19 those in Congo and Angola, 20. besides all the Americans through New Spain, Castilia nova, Peru, and Brasile, 21. besides all the English, Dutch, and French Plantations in Mexicana, and the Islands on either side, (that is to say in fewer words) Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, do pass with Mr. W. for the least part of the World. It were easy to teach this bold affirmer (were there time, or necessity for such a work) how much the greatest part of the world was preached to by the Apostles, and Deacons, and other Disciples of Christ, both in the first and succeeding ages of the Church. I have heard of one who thought the Sun never shined out of Spain and Italy. And now I meet with his peer, who thinks the Sunshine of the Gospel doth reach no further than his stunted knowledge of what is done under the Sun. But grant him his dictate, he is still undone in his doctrine: for the Gospel is preached here in England and France, as well to the Reprobates as the Elect; which Reprobates are in duty to believe a lie, or else they are not commanded to believe, and so shall never be punished for want of faith, or shall be punished for that which cannot possibly be a sin. One or more of these things must be admitted by Mr. W. if Christ died only for the elect, as he positively affirms. Now considering the Tenent of that Tribe, that the Papists are Reprobates, and the Episcopal Protestants a kind of Papists (Cassandrian Papists their word is) and Independents of all sorts as bad as either, it may well become a Quaere, whether it is not his opinion, that Christ died only for Presbyterians, and that none besides are sincerely commanded to believe. But I am not at leisure to sift him so, as well I might.   

Sect. 5.  

Universal Redemption proved from 2 Cor. 5.14. by Saint Austin and Prosper.  The last thing I am concerned to consider in Mr. W. and Mr. B. is their nibbling at that Rock of demonstration, which I opposed against their error, in my Notes first p. 19 and next more largely in my Defence of God's Philanthropy, c. 4. p. 28, 29, 30. I mean that Rock of the Apostle, 2 Cor. 5.14. making it good against all opposers, that as sure as all were dead in sin, so sure it is that Christ died for all. This is nibbled at tenderly by Mr. W. p. 77. and yet more tenderly by Mr. B. p. 93. by both so tenderly, as if they discerned it to be a Rock, as firm and hard as the Marpesian, and were fearful to venture their teeth upon it; especially the man with the noisome teeth, as knowing that such would break the soon. To make short work, I allow Mr. B. his Tergiversation, and am content to be tried by the best Interpreters, 
1. Omnes itaque mortui sunt in peccatis, nemine prorsus excepto; five in originalibus, sive etiam voluntate additis, vel ignorando, vel sciendo, nec faciendo quod justum est; & pro omnibus mortuis vivus mortuus est unus, i.e. nullum habens omnino peccatum. Ex hoc probavit omnes mortuos esse, quia pro omnibus mortuus est unus.— In illo uno (sc. Adamo) mortui sunt omnes, ut moreretur alius unus pro omnibus. Et rursus— A morte justissimae damnationis per unum mediatorem liberatur Genus Humanum.— Unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt. Conclusio haec Apostoli invicta est; ac per hoc, quia & parvulis mortuus est, profecto etiam parvuli mortui sunt, etc.  (as he pretends to be desirous, p. 92.) even by those whom he and Mr. W. shall grant to be the best Interpreters, as to this particular, to wit, S. Austin and Prosper. 1. S. Austin argues from that Text in the very same manner that I did, [viz. That Christ died for all without exception, because all without exception were dead in sin] no less than six distinct times. Once, lib. 20. de Civ. Dei cap. 6. init. Tom. 5. p. 1340. again, lib. 6. contra Julian. cap. 4. Tom. 7. p. 432. and again, ibid. c. p. 434. and again, ibid. c. 5.9. p. 436. once more, ibid. c. 17. p. 442. col. 2. And in another book against Julian, although imperfect, l. 1. c. 62. Tom. 7. p. 24. and yet again, lib. de Corrept. & Gratiâ, cap. 16. Tom. 7. p. 541. And to this is consonant what he taught in his Retractations, c. 3. lib. 1. Judaeos & Gentiles, Christi contemptores, vocatos fuisse eâ vocatione quâ vocati sunt qui noluerunt venire ad Nuptias. And again in his very Retractations, Verum est omnino omnes hoc posse si velint, lib. 1. cap. 9 And to the same purpose in his Confessions there is a notable passage, lib. 8. c. 5. Tom. 1.  
2. Prosper also doth prove that Christ died for all that were dead in sin, 
2. Nulla ratiò dubitandi est, Christum pro impiis mortuum, à quorum numero si quis liber inventus est, non est pro omnibus mortuus Christus. Sed prorsus pro omnibus est Christus mortuus, &c Prosper de voc. Gen. l. 2. c. 16. p. 144, 145.  and so for every son of Adam, unless there is any one of the number free from all sin; for Christ (saith he) died not for such: but he proves there cannot be any such, and therefore none for whom Christ died not; and his chiefest proof is from 2 Cor. 5.14. which he expounds exactly, as I have done from the beginning; and he indeed was the first in whom I met with it, at least three years before I saw it in S. Austin.  
3. To save me the labour of saying more, Mr. B. hath dropped a confession, which he saith is the confession of all my adversaries, That an offer of Christ is made to all unto whom the Gospel is, and by commission ought to be, preached, p. 87. he also confesseth that the offer is sincerely made, ibid. This I lay hold on, though he saith the contrary shortly after, viz. That God in the means of Grace, doth not so much as make an offer of salvation to all, p. 90. Again, though he saith at one fit, that there was in Christ's death a sufficiency for all, even of a 
* Note, that he had railed at me in his first book, for saying this very thing; and after blotted out his railing, in the North-hampton Copies of that Print, as resolving to assert, in his second book, what he condemned in his first.  thousand worlds, if there were so many, p. 91. yet at another fit he tells us, that God had not an intention to save all, p. 90. and yet in a third fit, he saith, the proposal of the Gospel to every creature is without reservation or insincerity, p. 87. and further yet, that it is pessible, by virtue of Christ's merits, for all men to be saved, p. 87. and how so? he saith very truly, in case of true faith and repentance: there he is also for conditional redemption to all the world, as exactly as I am. As for his flat contradictions to the Lord Primate, with whom he professed to concur, and many other misfortunes upon this subject, I refer him to all his concernments in The Self-Revenger exemplified.   

Sect. 6.  

The Conclusion.  I now conclude with some reasons, why I lose no more time in exposing these Authors to more pity, and their Doctrines to more contempt. 1. I am told by men of knowledge, that their books are already become waste paper, bought by a few only of the many, and read contentedly by none at all. 2. I am importuned by divers not to consider them overmuch, who have not a dangerous plausibility amongst the vulgar, but to reserve my spare hours for the most popular man of that party, who (as I am credibly informed) is doing his utmost to find me work. 3. They have adventured to nibble, (and but to nibble) at so few things in my Answer, that they do tacitly grant the greatest part to have left no colour for a Reply. 4. A great part of their performances are visible shifts, rather than serious oppositions; even mean transitions à genere ad genus, easy sneakings ab Hypothesi ad Thesin, at every pinch Ignorationes Elenchi, purposed sit beside the Cushion, and many times betwixt two stools too, gratis dicta are their very least frailties, as studied forgeries are the greatest; and I confess it is painful, to spend much time (with Domitian) in killing Flies. 5. When they are brought to such straits, that they find not a crevice or a keyhole whereat to attempt a creeping out, they yield themselves up, and all for which they have contended, without so much as making any terms of mercy. As for example, 
Certissimum est nobis, Decrevisse, ut non nisi nolentes atque impii perderentur, Twiss. Vin. Gr. l. 1. p. 100  Mr. B. professeth He doth readily yield, that God did not absolutely decree the Reprobation positive of any creature, but upon prescience and supposition of wilful rebellion and impenitence, p. 70, 71. nay he professeth this to be the Doctrine of all Orthodox Writers, ancient and modern, p. 70. And why should He be much talked with, who confesseth all in one breath, which he denieth in another? See the Diu. Philanth. ch. 4. p. 4. especially p. 5. yet no sooner gets he lose, but he denies the very thing which the necessity of his affairs had made him confess, and pleads (for want of a better excuse) Lapsus linguae non est error mentis, p. 77. what cares he how he miscarries, who can so easily make amends? 6. When this evader is so stomachful that he will not yield, and yet so despairing of success that he will not resist a cogent Argument, he makes no scruple to profess a Tergiversation. As for example, when I had pressed him with a 
* See the Diu. Phi. ch. 3. p. 65.  Dilemma of huge importance, even evincing out of his mouth, that his Distinction of Positive and Negative Reprobation was but a shift, he contents himself with this return, [Mr. Barlee needs not answer that Dilemma, p. 81.] And so when he knows not what to say to the convincing points of my reasonings about the general extent and sincere intent of Christ's death, he gives me the slip in these words, [It would be superfluous labour to spend more time and paper in giving more particular answers to his luxuriant discourses, p. 93.] 7. Mr. W. and he and Mr. Hobbs are so frequently condemned out of their own mouths, that they would need no Confuters besides themselves, if all their Readers were but attentive. To give a few instances of many, Mr. W. saith p. 29. God is not the Author of evil, because not causa per se, but per accidens. Yet in his extent of Diu. Prov. p. 40. he saith that causa per accidens never works till causa per se sets it on work.] Now because it is not man who sets God on work, it is plainly his meaning, that God is causa per se of sin, and sets man on work who is causa per accidens; which others call a deficient cause. Again, he confesseth in his last Work, p. 25. that if it is impossible to separate the sin from the action, than he who is the Author of the one, is also of the other. Yet he also confesseth p. 37. that the modi rerum are not really distinguished from the things themselves, but so nearly conjoined as they cannot be separated. Nor can any reason be rendered why Doctor Twisse should say, 
Mr. Hobbs his prodigious self-contradictions.  that Fornication denoteth sin even secundùm materiale, except this one, that the sin is inseparable from the Act. In like manner Mr. Hobbs, though he saith in 
* Of Lib. and Necess. p. 23.  one place, that sins are actions, and in 
† Quaest. Num? 12. p. 105.  another place, that God is the cause of all actions, and in a 
* Ibid. p. 107.  third place, that he is a principal Agent in the causing of all actions, yet he 
† Ibid. p. 105, 106.  denies him to be the Author of the actions which he causeth. And his reason for it is more prodigious than all the rest; for God (saith he) cannot be said to be the Author of sin, because he doth but necessitate it, not command or warrant it, p. 105, 106. yet even this last he contradicts too, by saying that 
* Of Lib. and Necess. p. 22.  power irresistible doth justify all actions. Now that which necessitates is power irresistible, and that which justifies doth warrant, and he saith that that which warrants is the Author of sin. (Qu. p. 106.) and that sin must needs derive a necessity from God (p. 105.) and the greatest men of his Principle do say that God commands men to sin, which he confesseth is to call him the Author of sin. (p. 106.) Nay he 
* Q. p. 11. l. 7, 8, 9, 10. from the bottom▪  elsewhere professeth, that a man must not SAY, God hath caused him to err, and it is through the Lord that he fell away, but he may THINK so very well. And woe had been to Ecclesiasticus, had he denied it. Nor is there any thing more common with these men, then to say that sin is necessary as decreed by God, although contingent as freely willed by man. Now necessary being that, which cannot choose but be, and contingent that, which either may or may not be; what is this but to say, it is necessary as decreed, but not necessary as not decreed? It cannot but be, and yet it might possibly not have been: it is contingent, and not contingent: which is as if they should say, we cannot deny our Adversaries Premises, and therefore we must hold the one part of the contradiction; but we will not quit our own conclusion, and therefore we must hold the other part of the contradiction. Thus by their own way of arguing, they are men, and they are not: they are men, as being endued with Reason; and they are not, as being endued with none. Sure that sort of men is no longer to be disputed with, who have drank so deeply, and digested, and reduced also to practice, the 
* Quamcunque duarum viarum primò diversarum homines inicrint, recta tendunt ad superos. Escobar. Theol. Moral. Tom. 1. in prael. cap. 3. See the Mystery of Jesuitism, Letter 5. p. 59, 60. and Additionals second Edit. p. 70, etc. p. 90, etc.  Jesuits doctrine of Probability. 8. Last of all, for Mr. B. who hath spent so many whole sheets in calling me Papist, Arminian, Socinian, Massilian, Pelagian, and what else he listed, though I could make it undeniable, (even to him, and his Congerrones,) that he hath spoken of each, as if he knew nothing of any one, and could prove him irresistibly (by an Argument ad hominem) to be a Hobbist, a Mahometan, and of every other Sect of men, with whom he partakes in any kind; yet I shall imitate S. Austin, and take a shorter course with him: When that Father was accused by Secundinus for a Manichee, he purged himself in this manner; Secundinus saith I am a Manichee, and I say I am not. Let the Reader judge, which of us is herein to be believed. My case is the same, and I will take the same course. Mr. Barlee saith I am a Papist, Pelagian, Socinian, Sorcerer, etc. But I say No to all his say: I leave it now to the Reader, to believe whom he pleaseth, Mr. Barlee, or Mr. Pierce.    

Extend manum, & tange, etc.  (Job. 1.11.) 
Id est, permit ut extendam manum, & tangam cuncta quae possidet; ut saepius in sacris Scripturis tribuuntur Deo Actiones, cù solùm eas fieri permiserit.  August. ad Simplician. l. 2. q. 2. 
Either make the Tree good and his Fruit good, or else make the Tree corrupt and his Fruit corrupt,  Matt. 12.33. 
For the Tree is known by his Fruit. Ibid.   

An Additional Advertisement To the Reader, July 26.1658.  
MY present Tract being finished and wrought off at the Press, the Stationer sends me (at this instant) a little book of Mr. Baxter's which addresseth itself in the Title-page to no more than three men, to wit, Grotius, the new Tilenus, and Mr. Pierce; but in several passages of the thing his objections reach to many more; though, having only run it over with a transient eye, I can remember no more particulars than Bishop Bramhall, Doctor Sanderson, Doctor Heylin, and Doctor Taylor. Had it not come a little too late, and were it not more in my humour, than it seems to be in Mr. Baxter's, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to prefer a good speed before a great deal of haste, an hour or two had sufficed to have made a Winding-sheet for himself, at least as suitable as that which he made for Popery. But as it is, I must declare to all those persons concerned in it with myself, and to Tilenus the second more especially, (whom after all my inquiries I have not the happiness to know in the least degree) that till the end of this Summer I shall not bestow the least though upon any part of Mr. Baxter; and that for these ensuing reasons.  
First, because I am praeengaged in divers matters of greater moment, which will take me up wholly the next three months. And if I return to any Dispute in any kind whatsoever, as it will fall out cross to my inclinations, so I resolve to do it only at times of leisure and diversion. For whilst my time may be spent in some good employment, why should I lose it in my least necessary Defences?  
Next, I desire to understand what entertainment the thing will find with considering Readers: for if it seems to others what it doth to me, it will tend to nothing but the disparagement of its Author. Nor need I vindicate Mr. Baxter from his severities done unto himself. Besides, that I resolve, never to controvert a subject, until the most sober unbyass't persons shall think it publicly useful, as well as I.  
Thirdly, I think it will be best to expect the final resolutions of the other persons concerned, especially of the excellent Tilenus' junior, whom Mr. Baxter hath blurred with his blackest ink: and if he possibly is alive to undertake his own cause, the world will find 'twill be but impar● congressus.  
Again, I am told that Doctor Reynolds is at last resolved to find me work: and in case it proves true, I shall remember the speech of the King of Syria at Ramoth-Gilead, Fight ye not with small or great, save only with the King of Israel, 2 Chron. 18.30. He is so worthily reputed the Coryphaeus of that party (if yet he is not too worthy to be in earnest one of them) that Mr. Baxter will follow him very contentedly at a very great and humble distance.  
Fifthly I ought to think twice, before I meddle with Mr. Baxter, because I find him so very liable, (I had almost said in every line,) for as much as I can judge by my short and cursory perusal of him. And where advantages are too many, some consideration is to be had how much of all that abundance is to be taken and left: for 'tis a thankless office to acquaint a man with his unhappiness; and in the doing of that, I would not willingly be endless.  
Sixthly, I am to meditate, in what manner of terms I ought to deal with Mr. Baxter. The desires of my soul are to use him gently; but considering his guilt, I know not whether my indulgence may not be hurtful to his admirers, who may be apt to think well of his greatest crimes, if they find me (like Eli to his sons) too mild a Censor. Nor am I sure that my softness will not be mischievous to himself; who may mistake my longanimity for carnal fear, and so by sinning yet more, may make a worse thing happen unto him. I say not this without ground, because I find him abusing my former lenity, as if he imagined his being terrible had made me courteous. Christian Reader, observe my reason: He doth now acknowledge to all the world, and withal professeth [he 
Praef. sect. 4. p. 3.  must acknowledge, both my gentleness, and charity, and brotherly moderation in dealing with him.] But as if gentleness, and charity, and brotherly moderation were only fit for a moral man, and were the glittering sins of an Episcopal Divine, he behaves himself so unexpectedly in divers passages of his Book, as if he durst not imitate the best things in me, and (in the point of charity) had thought it his duty to come behind.  
I had done no worse, than the clearing of God from those slanders which the tongue of the wicked had raised against him, and the freeing myself from those other slanders which were raised against me for clearing God, (things confessed to be matchless and groundless slanders by the dearest friends of Mr. Barlee, & now at last not denied by himself;) when yet Mr. Baxter thinks fit to say in the depth of his passion and partiality, [
Mr. Baxter in his Praef. addressed to Mr. T.P. Sect. 20. towards the end of it.  That he had rather die in the state of David before Nathan spoke to him, or of Peter after he had denied his Lord, (that is, in the state of an Adulterer, Murderer, and one who projected the drunkenness of Uriah, and continued thus about a year in an impenitent state,) then of Mr. Pierce that hath committed no such sin.] Nor doth he give the least reason, besides my writing that Book, and the rest of my failings which are known to God only. He doth not pretend to know the least sin in me, excepting my public Writings against those sins of which I knew not that he was guilty, until (in this his late Book) he revealed it to me from the Press. And that I have failings known to God (I will add, to myself also) is no more than he might have said even of David and Peter after the times of their repentance. Yet goes he not 5. pages farther, before his eruption into these strange words. [I 
Ibid. sect. 24.  had rather my right hand were used as Cranmers than I should have written against Puritan what you have done:] Yet it is known that I writ against no other Puritans, than such as were defined at Hampton-Court to be Protestants frighted out of their wits: Such Puritans as are known to be painted sepulchers, having a form only of godliness without the power of it. Such as were thought by judicious Hooker to be fit inhabitants for a wilderness, not for a wellordered City: Such as have ever despised dominion, and spoken evil of dignities, have been commonly Boutefeus' and men of blood, the Proverbial Autors and Fautors of Sedition and violence in Church and State. If Mr. Baxter doth know enough of the ancient Gnostics and Catharists, the Pharisees of Judaea, and rigid Jesuits at Rome, (besides what I have not now time to name,) he knows the Puritans against whom I have written.  
Lastly, I find him so frequently unmasking himself to all his Readers, by pretending that the difference between me and my Antagonists is merely verbal, and so acknowledging himself to be really of my opinions, yet calling me as well as others by the very same names, (Arminian and Pelagian,) which with equal reason are often fastened upon himself, by not a few of his own Tribe; sometimes showing himself an Advocate for the crimson sins of other men, and not only an Advocate, but an Encomiast of his own; concluding Grotius to be a Papist, for the very same reasons for which himself (if he is just) must needs conclude him to be a Protestant, (unless he thinks as hardly of the Augustan Confession, as of the Articles of the Council of Trent) mistaking at once the whole drift of Grotius his excellent Discussio Apologetici Rivetiani, and parcelling his mistake into a great many Sections towards the making of a book; citing Grotius his Latin, and not translating it into English, or translating it so lamely (to say no worse) as to conceal his true meaning from English Readers; I say so frequently do I discern Mr. Baxters' uncovering of himself, in these and many more respects, that for aught I yet know, these very hints which I have given for the intelligent Reader to enlarge upon unto himself, may be a sufficient 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 against the Contagion of all his Volume. My perusal of his book hath been so hasty (it having been brought me by the same Carrier by whom I am hastily sending this short account unto the Press) that although I can say I have run it over, yet I cannot say I have read it all. And therefore my Reader will be satisfied with this one instance of my experience. In his Sect. 21. p. 34, 35. Grotius is brought by Mr. Baxter speaking thus in his Discussio: ⁂ Quare nunc planè ita sentit Grotius, & multi cum ipso, non posse Protestants inter se jungi, nisi simul jungantur cum iis qui Sedi Romanae coherent; sine quâ nullum sperari potest in Ecclesiâ Commune Regimen. Ideo optat (mark this good Reader) ut ea divulsio quae evenit, & causae divulsionis tollantur. Inter eas non est Primatus Episcopi Romani secundum Canon's, fatente Melancthone.—  
The later part of these words (which are the chief) Mr. Baxter takes no notice of in the English account which he renders of them, only contents himself to say Here you see that Grotius judged that the only way for union was for all Protestants to join with them that adhere to the See of Rome.] He is deeply silent as to the causes of the breach, which Grotius did wish might be taken away; and which he charged the Papists with. Vot. pro Pace p. 7, 8.  
I have not a minute wherein to say more, then that for all his meddlings and misdemeanours about my last reckoning with Mr. Barlee, (in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Self-revenger exemplified) I sincerely commiserate his passion, I truly pardon his partiality, and I hearty pray for his amendment.   

ERRATA.  
PAge 6. lin 9 in marg. r. libert. c. 13. p. 7. l. 5. from the bottom. r. Mr. Hickman. p. 31. l. 15. after done r. in. p. 40. l. 8. in marg. r. 2 Sam. 12.11, 12. p. 50. l. 1. r. Joh. 15.5. p. 95. l. 3. from the bottom. r. had. p. 102. l. 9 r. himself. p. 113. l. 8. for Mr. W. r. Mr. B. p. 114. l. 28. in marg. for Mr. W. r. Mr. B. p. 149. l. 16. for rest on, r. restore. 163. l. 1. in marg. after of r. in. p. 169. l. 10. for severe r. several. p. 171. l. 1. for. p. 13. r. p. 113. p. 176, l. 5. r. Erinays'. p. 187. l. 5. after what, r. was. p. 197. l. 7. in marg. r. in Gen. p 203. 39 in marg. r. vitetur. p. 208. l 13. in marg. r. p. 844, 845.  
THE END.