THE Christians rescue FROM THE GRAND ERROR of the HEATHEN, (touching the fatal Necessity of all Events) AND The Dismal consequences thereof, which have slily crept into the CHURCH. In several Defences Of some Notes, writ to Vindicate the Primitive and Scriptural Doctrine of God's Decrees.  
By THOMAS PIERCE Rector of Brington in Northamptonshire.  
LONDON, Printed by J. G. for Richard Royston, at the Angel in Ivy-lane. 1658.   

The general Preface to the ensuing Tracts.  
1. I cannot but think it very expedient, and very agreeable to Reason, that Altercations and Controversies in every kind, those especially in Religion, should be made to acknowledge their mortality, as well as the Controverters themselves, by whom the dissensions are kept alive. This, concerning God's Decrees of Reward and Punishment, as it is much stricken in years, and even decrepitly aged, so (by the blessing of God) it is drawing the faster towards its end too. The Erroneous side of the controversy is grown so feeble and dispirited, what with its wounds and bruises, and putrifying sores (which in its desperate encounters it hath received) and is become so ghastly to lookers on, that even they who are ashamed to see it falling, are more ashamed to hold it up.  
2. There is not sure a more effectual or shorter course for the putting a period to a Dispute, then by proceeding from such principles, as are assented to, and granted, by men of all sides.  
3. There are not any two Principles more universally received throughout the world, then that God is the Author of every thing that is good, and that he cannot be the Author of any thing that is evil, (I mean the evil of sin, which is properly evil in itself; for the evil of punishment is in itself very good, and doth only seem evil to them that suffer it.)  
4. In these preceding Considerations, I began to reason on those two 
* Correct copy of Notes. p. 6.  grounds. And supposing myself to be of neither, or at least of both parties, I was resolved to state the Question between me and myself, as I should finally be conducted by those infallible guides; religiously intending to go as far, and withal resolving to go no farther, than those granted Maxims should either carry or allow me.  
5. I have had the happiness to observe, that none of those whom I displeased in the course I took, have either dared (in 
† Note, that though they often make God the Author of sin, and use that word, as we I as worse, yet they o●ten confess it to be blasphemy; which makes me say they have not dared to deny my principle, because when they have, they have not dared to stand to it, but have rather denied their own hand-writing.  plain terms) to deny the truth of my Principles, or adventured to discover wherein my deductions could seem illegal; but only talking at Rovers, they have largely expressed their dislikes, without exhibiting to the Reader a reason why, except the contract they had made with some vulgar Errors, with which my Principles & Deductions were very equally inconsistent.  
6. What deductions they have made from their fanciful notions of God's prescience and decrees, I have abundantly proved to be blasphemous. And my proofs have been taken, not from Scripture only and Reason, and the whole suffrage of Antiquity, and the most eminent of the Moderns for Life and Learning, but over and above from their own Confessions, which in their soberest intervals have happily fall'n down from their public Pens. So unadvised was 
* Grot. R lig. ●raef sect 5. p. 5.  M. Baxter, in charging Grotius and others with uncharitable censures, and odious inferences; for the odious inferences are made by his own dear Brethren and predecessors, who have avowedly deduced them from those grounds of Theology on which they go: whereas Grotius and others have but recited them to their Authors out of their public works.  
7. The head spring of their Doctrines is known by the 
* Jam. 3. 11.  streams which issue from them, as the 
† Mat. 12. 33.  tree is known by its fruit. 
* Mat. 7. 18.  It cannot be a good tree which bringeth forth evil fruit: much less is that a good doctrine, whose very Patrons and Abettors have often acknowledg●d it doth infer (what a thousand times they have themselves inferred from it) that God is the natural cause of sin.  
8. The head-spring of their Doctrines is that of irrespective predestination, or praedetermination of all events (antecedent to prescience.)  
9 If God's eternal Decrees concerning the final estate of man cannot possibly be absolute, or irrespective, of those respective qualifications by which alone he can be qualified for reward or punishment, it cannot choose but follow (by the confession of all) that those Decrees are respective, or (as some express it) conditional (that is) according to God's pr●science of such and such qualifications. There being clearly no medium of participation, or proportion, no nor so much as of abnegation, betwixt the respectiveness and irrespectiveness of the very same act, as they both relate to the very same object. For what implies a contradiction, is very happily exploded by men of all sorts; So as the ruin of the one is the establishing of the other. And they that are beaten from the hold of irrespective predestination, must fly to the tenet of the respective by way of refuge; there being nothing betwixt them but the pit of Atheism.  
10. It is confessed by Mr. Whitfield, Wollebius, and Dr. Twisse against Moulin (to name no more) that there is parity of reason in the decrees, both of Election and Reprobation. And the respectiveness of the later doth evince the former to be respective.  
11. That I have spoken on these subjects according to God's revealed will, and not proceeded a step farther than I was warranted to go by unavoidable deductions from clearest Scripture, (not enduring their boldness, who interpret God's revealed word by those Caprices of their brains, which they presumptuously call God's secret will, always implying this contradiction, that it is secret and not secret,) the following Tracts will make apparent.  
12. As for those mysterious Questions, 1. Why the word of God is preached rather to one sort of men, then to another, and sometimes to a more impious people, 
Ezek 3. 6.  than those to whom it is not preached; 2. Why the means of conversion & perseverance unto the end are not afforded alike to all to whom the Gospel is daily preached, 
Mat. 11. 21.  and many times in greater measure to an exceedingly evil people then to a people less evil; 3. Why some men's lives are prolonged to a happy opportunity of true repentance; whilst others are speedily cut off (like Corah and his complices) in a state of impenitence; I never yet have inquired, I never will. 
* Deut. 29. 29.  The secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children.  
13. I shall conclude with an Admonition to the unstable and unlearned among the people, that they beware of those Teachers who prefer the interest of their Faction before the honour of their God; and will rather take part with a Presbyterian, in making God to be the Author and cause of sin, then live in any kind of charity with an Episcopal Divine, who proves that Doctrine to be blasphemous. Some have made themselves examples of this prodigious partiality; whilst even in Print they have thought it fitter, that a Brother of the Presbytery should invent strange slanders against the innocent, then that a man of the Church of England should proceed to conviction against the guilty. It will appear to all Readers, from the first to the last of these following Tracts, that my principal intention hath been to vindicate my God, both in his Essence, and in his Attributes, from the public calumnies of evil doers. whilst one doth teach, that God willeth sin; and another, that he ordains it; and a third, that it is one of God's works; the desperate sinner is taught to say, [I have done the will of God, and what God appointed me to do.] 2. Whilst some affirm, that God's willing of sin doth make it cease to be a sin; and others say, he willeth all sins; a third sort conclude, that there are no sins at all. 3. Whilst they say with eagerness, that God must be such, or there is no God at all, they teach as many to be Atheists as cannot believe with the Libertines, that God doth will and work sin. 4. Whilst they say that the Regenerate cannot possibly fall away, nor become notoriously ungodly by their commission of Crimson and Scarlet sins, they teach the Ranters to live accordingly. I can name the persons who have taught such things; and experience hath taught us what they are, who have reduced their knowledge of the several Lessons into Practice. Towards the remedying of this, I have in singleness of heart considered what should be the cause, and (as God hath enabled me) used my endeavours to remove it. I have been most of all intent upon clearing the Holiness of God, that men may think of him with Reverence, and Love unfeigned. A wrong apprehension of the Deity is apt to breed a wrong worship; and so I have pitched upon the subject, wherein it primely concerns us to set men right. The holiness of God is his sovereign Attribute, and dearer to him then his power. The Cherubims and Seraphims do continuaily cry out in honour to him, (Not high, and mighty, and unresistible, but) Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Hosts. As if God esteemed more of this, then of all his Attributes besides. And Bishop Andrews of precious memory thought fit to make it his observation, that in God, Holy Holy, is before, Lord of Hosts. His Holiness first, his Power after.  
May all that hate me upon the earth, but follow the method of the Angels which are in Heaven, speaking so honourably of God to a peevish world, as not to miss of his favour in the word to come; I shall not fail of 
1.  their Love, and shall receive the best recompense for all my Labour.  Fiat. Fiat. 
THO. PIERCE.   

Directions for the placing of the ensuing Tracts.  

I. The Correct Copy of Notes.  
II. The Divine philanthropy defended.  
III. The Divine Purity defended, in answer to Dr. Reynolds.  
IV. The Self-Revenger exemplified in Mr. B.  
V. Self-Condemnation exemplified in Mr. W. and others.    

A brief Table to the five ensuing Tracts immediately to follow the General Preface.  

I. In the Correct copy.  

Two General Principles 

1. That no moral evil is from the evil of God, but of the Creature p. 6. & 11.  
2. That all good is from the free grace of God. p. 6. & 55.    
The distinction of God's secret and revealed will, as contrary to one another, blasphemous p. 12.  
God permits sin, only so as not to hinder it by source p. 15.  
Man is the sole efficient cause of his own destruction p. 17.  
Absolute Reprobation contrary to all the ancient Fathers p. 25. 45. 

Even to S. Aug. p. 28. 44.    
The judgement of the Church of England p. 29.  
God's Decree of Reprobation is not irrespective, but conditional p. 32.  
Knowledge and foreknowledge in God p. 48.  
God's Antecedent and Consequent will p. 51.  
All good is from God's free Grace. p. 56.  
God's free Grace doth not destroy man's freewill p. 57  
Irresistible Grace not reconcilable with choice p. 59  
Distinction between 

Infallible and Necessary p. 61.  
Sufficient, Effectual, and Irresistible Grace p. 61.  
Taking and choosing p. 62.  
Voluntary, and Spontaneous p. 64.    
God's Grace the Cause of Good, man will the Instrument of choice p. 63.  
God's Decree of Election Conditional and Respective p. 68    

II. In the Divine philanthropy defended.  

Postdestination p. 4.  
Eternal predestination Receptive p. 7.  
Pelagianism p. 8.  
Arminius, and Arminianism. p. 12. chap. iv. p. 35.  
The judgement of the Church of England p. 19  
Literal, and Figurative Interpretations of Scripture p. 21. ch. iv. p. 47.  
Absolute, and Conditional will of God p. 56.  
Faith not the Cause, but the Condition of Election p. 63.  
Negative, and positive Reprobation p. 65. ch. iv. p. 4.  
Hell prepared for Devils, not for Men p. 70.  
Special Grace, p. 83. and Redemption p. 84.  
Christ died not only for the Elect p. 85.  
Christ died for all, not only sufficienter, but intentionaliter p. 93.  
Grace of Perseverance, p. 101. (chap. iv. p. 17.) not irresistible p. 102.  
Universal Tradition p. 105.  
The cause of Punishment eternal p. 108. 117.  
The cause of sin not Deficient, but Efficient p. 113.  
God's permission of sin p. 129. 139.  
God's Decrees, Absolute, Conditional chap. iv. p. 1.  
Preterition p. 4.  
Fundamentals p. 10.  
Synod at Dort p. 13.  
God's sovereignty, and Justice. p. 20.  
Plea for Infants p. 25.  
Universal Redemption p. 28.  
Esficacious Permission p. 33.  
Act, and sinful Act p. 43.  
Twofold command of God p. 52.  
God hath not two contrary wills p. 57    

III. In the Divine Purity Defended.  

The judgement of King James p. 6.  
Making God the Cause of Sin, is blasphemy in the judgement of the ancients p. 22.  
and Modern learned men p. 26.  
even the Calvinists p. 30.  
God's hardening men's hearts p. 66.  
God's Allmightiness p. 81.  
God's way of working on the will p. 92.  
Free grace not unconditional p. 112.    

IV. In the self-revenger.  

Abuse of the Tongue p. 1.  
Self-deceiving p. 2.  
Adam's Sin p. 22.  
Original Sin p. 23.  
Born in Sin p. 24.  
Innocency p. 32.  
Christian Perfection p. 35.  
Excommunicating and murdering Kings p. 77.  
Dangerous effects of Presbyterian Discipline p. 80.  
Universal and special Grace p. 87.  
Grotius his temper, and design p. 92.  
Episcopacy and Liturgy approved by Calvin p. 95.  
Rigour of Presbytery advances Popery p. 98.    

In the Appendage.  

Universal Grace and universal Redemption p. 128.  
Extent and Intent of Christ's death p. 138, 142.  
Application of it p. 145.    

V. In self-condemnation.  

Irrespective Decrees founded in the mistake of God's Prescience Introd. p. 3.  
Conditional Decrees p. 15.  
Order of Time, and Order of Nature p. 20.  
God's Promise Conditional p. 28.  
God's glory not advanced by irrespective Reprobation, ch. 1. p. 3.  
Act, and obliquity of the Act p. 11.  
Efficacious permission p. 22.  
Hebraism p. 39  
Actions Natural, and unnatural p. 72. 77. 81.  
Sin, and the sinful Action inseparable p. 84.  
Sin makes not for God's glory p. 87.  
The Nature of Knowledge and Degree p. 122.  
Foreknowledge p. 123. doth 

not necessitate p. 126.  
nor presuppose a Praedetermination p. 128.    


Futurition  
Will  
Certain  
Counsel   p. 132. 133.  
Sin hath a true Efficient Cause p. 145.  
Positive Entity of sin p. 149.  
The Importance of the word Author p. 187.  
Christ died for all p. 195. 207.     

A PARAENESIS to the Reader, (showing the first occasion of this following Discourse, and the author's necessity to make it public.)  
SECT. 1. THat I am subject to errors, it is no humility to acknowledge; it being no more than to confess, that I carry about me the infirmities of a man; which whosoever doth not, let him cast the first stone at me. But whether or no I am an heretic, or a dangerous person, I desire my 
John 8. 7.  Censors may be my judges; and do therefore address this present apology and Appeal, not to the kindness and partiality of my dearest friends, but to the very jealousies and prejudices of my severest enemies. I bar the suffrage of none, but the accuser of the Brethren, 
Rev. 12. 10. 9 11. Joh. 8. 14, 44.  that Abaddon or Apollyon, so very skilful to destroy, who is the Father of Lies, and was a murderer from the beginning.  
2. I do profess in the presence of that punctual Register within me (to which I bear a greater reverence than to affront it with a premeditated and wilful Lie) that I do not unsheathe my Pen, to wound the reputation of any man living. But since mine own lies bleeding in the mouths of some, whose very Tongues have Teeth, which bite much harder than I will ever allow mine, (and if there happen to be any in all my papers, I shall not think it painful to have them drawn) it is but needful that I be clothed at least with armour of defence. I meant indeed at the first, only to have armed myself with silence, that my reservedness and obscurity might keep me safe: and even now that I am forced, and as it were dragged into the field, I contend not for victory, but for an honourable Retreat. And if after I have suffered, I may be competently safe, I will thank my Buckler, but not my Sword. Even now that I am writing, it is with a kind of willingness to blot it out; and I do only so do it, as preferring an inconvenience before a mischief.  
3. There had been a private conference betwixt a Gentleman and myself, which (for his further satisfaction) I threw hastily into paper; every whit as incohaerent, as it had been in our oral and extemporary Discourse. A Discourse which of necessity was forced to be without method, as without premeditation; because (in my answers to his objections) I was bound to follow, after the measure that I was led. I thought the thing so inconsiderable, as not to vouchsafe it a reading over; but just as 'twas written, delivered it instantly to my friend, to be returned (when he had used it) unto the usual place of my forgetfulness. And forgotten it was so long, that truly I know not how long it was; till discoursing with another Gentleman upon the very same subject, I found my memory awaked by that sleeping scribble. But (forgetting that secrets do cease to be so, when they are told, though but to one, and that with strict conjurations of greatest secrecy) I gave him leave to peruse it as his leisure served him. It seems this Gentleman had a Confident, as well as I; and so my original increased and multiplied into many false copies, of which not one was like the mother. Now that my paper went abroad by the help of more hands than one, was against my knowledge, against my will, against my precept, against my care, and lastly against my best endeavours to recall it. It having been absolutely impossible, that I should love the publication of my poor Abortive, who never esteemed my ripest and most legitimate productions to be any way worthy of public view. So far was I from an ambition of being known by a disfigured and misshapen child, that when I first heard of its travels, it was fallen out of my memory; and when it came to me in a disguise, it was quite out of my knowledge.  
4. I do acknowledge the great abstruseness of the whole subject on which I treated, and the disproportion of my faculties to undertake or manage it. For if the 
Episc. Winton. in Iud. de art. Lamb.  learned bishop Andrews did choose with Saint Austin, much more may I with Bishop Andrews, rather to hear than to speak of these Insearchables. I do not hope to fathom either the Bathos of the Apostle, or the 
Rom. 11. 33. Psal. 36. 6.  Psalmists abyss. But I expect to be pardoned, if when my way is slippery, I take heed to my footing; and so eschew the precipice, as not to run upon the wolf. It is not the business of this paper, either to state an old question in a new-found way, or to publish my judgement, as a considerable thing. Who am I, that I should moderate between the Remonstrants, and antiremonstrants? betwixt S. Austin, and other Fathers? betwixt him, and himself? betwixt the Synod of Dort, and that other at Augusta? betwixt the Dominicans, and the Jesuites? Arminius, and Mr. Perkins? Twisse, and Bellarmine? or betwixt Whitaker, and Baro? Much indeed may be excused, because much may be locked for, from such reverend Prelates, as were Overall, and Davenant. But I believe, amongst the Clergy, there is not one in a hundred fit to speak of these Mysteries; and amongst the Laity, not one in a thousand that's fit to hear them. Hence was that silence first, and afterwards that secrecy, wherein I fain would have buried mine own conjectures: and even now that I am forced to be more public than I meant, (by the many false copies of my discourse, whereof one of the falsest is now preparing for the press, by one, who it seems is at very great leisure) it is not at all from any ambition to be followed, but from an humble desire to be rightly understood; and I therefore only pretend to an apology, and an Appeal. First, an apology for my imprudence, that I could think such a secret might be communicated to one; and so betray those papers to the Light, which belonged only to the Fire. Secondly, an Appeal, whether I am a Pelagian, or whether so much as a Massilian: or whether indeed I am not rather a very Orthodox Protestant of the Church of England. I have managed my discourse, as I ground my Faith, not from the hidden Mysteries of God's secret will, but from the clearest expressions of his written Word. Where, of divers interpretations (as often as they are divers) I love to pitch upon that, which I find agreed upon by the wisest, and the best; and which, in my shallow judgement, (which yet is the deepest that I have) doth seem the safest, and the most suitable to the analogy of Faith. Even Babes and Idiots have this advantage of their betters, to be afraid of that fire where wiser men have been burnt. And sad experience hath taught me, (who am a Babe and an Idiot in respect of the Aged and the wise) to steer aloof in my Doctrines from those fatal shelves, whereon my own small vessel hath been soundly dashed, and many others (much greater) as it were shipwrackt before mine eyes. This entirely is the reason, why I have hovered a long time betwixt the absoluteness of a Decree, and the Liberty of a Will, like a trembling Needle betwixt two loadstones; or rather like a man newly walking upon a Rope, who so balanceth his body with his two hands, that his continual fear of falling down is the only Tenure by which he stands. I dare not, for my life, be so bold as the Pelagians, nor yet so bloody as the Manichees. I would not split my judgement on the Symplegades of two intolerable mischiefs, either by robbing God of his Efficiency, in any one Act which is naturally good; or by aspersing his holiness, in any one Act which is morally evil. I do endeavour to keep myself, (and others committed to my keeping) both from the rock of Presumption, and from the gulf of Despair. I steer as carefully as I can (in this so dangerous Archipelago) betwixt the nature of God's will, and the condition of mine own; that so my Confidence may well consist with my Humility. I dare not impute to God, what is unworthy for him to own; nor arrogate to my self, what is God's peculiar: and therefore settle my mind and my judgement upon these two Grounds.   

The two Principles or Grounds of my Belief in this business.  
I. THat all the Evil of sin which dwelleth in me or proceedeth from me, is not imputable to God's will, but entirely to mine own. The Serpent and the protoplast were promoters of my guilt, but my God was no promoter either of their guilt or mine. When the Serpent speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; He is the Father of lies, and the works of your father ye will do, John 8. 44.  
II. That all the good which I do, I do first receive, not from any thing in my self, but from the special Grace and favour of Almighty God, who freely worketh in me both to will and to do, of his good pleasure, Phil. 2. 13.   

CHAP. I.  
5. IF these are Principles to be granted, my work is done; for these are the Grounds on which I build my judgement, and these are 
Sic prop●nam, sic asseram, ut veritati quae nec fallit, nec fallitur, semper inhaream, semper obediens consentiensque reperiar. Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1. sub in it.  the Touchstones by which I try it. Whatsoever I believe concerning Election or Reprobation, and those other Questions which are depending, I do infer from these Truths, which (as I suppose) cannot possibly deceive me. And whilst I stand to these Grounds, I am not able to quit my judgement, how little soever it shall be liked by such as are wittily unreasonable. So that my Principles be right, I care not whether they carry me, whilst Scripture and my best Care are both Guides in my conveyance. For where the premises are true, the Conclusion cannot be false. All that needeth to be cared for in the progress of my search, is the legality of the deduction: which, if it be wrong, I shall be glad to hear of it for my instruction; and if it be right, it cannot choose but be Truth, which leaps naturally forth from the womb of Truth.  
6. If by any inadvertency (either in me, or the Reader) my words seem to clash with my Belief, it is by no other misfortune than befell S. Austin, when he used such expressions 
Nec inest i●s quae de libero arbitrio Patre● quidem & Neoterici asseruerunt, ea quam olim nonnulli putant impietas, si haecrite modò accipiantur, & sicut ipsi scriptores ea accipi volu●runt. Apud Cassand. consult. p. 130. In prafat. ad Vind. Grat. p. 3.  against the Pelagians, as seemed to contradict what he had spoken against the Manichees; and yet he professeth it was not his judgement, but his style only that was changed. The saying of Bucer is remarkable (and the more, because it was Bucer's) That there was no such harm in what was said by the learned, both ancient and modern, concerning the freedom of the will, if things were taken as they were meant (that is to say) by the right handle: and that would oftener be done, if the persons of some men were not a prejudice to their Cause: for I find the same words may pass with favour from one, which would not be endured should they be spoken by another. One short example will not be burdensome to the Reader. Doctor Twisse himself, hath said expressly. That the justice of God doth not appear in the absolute or simple condemnation of his creature, but in the condemnation of it for sin. Thus he speaketh in his Preface, which is most of it spent against Arminius. I did but say the same words to some admirers of Dr. Twisse, and yet was counted an Arminian; which makes me heartily desire that I may meet with unbiased and impartial Readers; that whatsoever I shall say in these following papers, may be compared with the two Principles which I have just now laid: I disallowing all that disagreeth with those principles, as the unhappiness of my Pen, or the unsteadiness of my brain. I desire all may go for no more than it is worth. If I seem to any man to be overtaken in a fault, he shall do well to restore 
Gal. 6. 1.  me in the spirit of meekness, remembering himself, lest he also be tempted. If I am thought to be in the wrong, by those that think themselves only in the right, they can conclude no worse of me, than that I am not infallible: If in any thing I err, it is for want of apprehension, not my unwillingness to apprehend; nor am I severely to be censured, for being every whit as dull, as those thousands of thousands, who have thought as I do. I hope my Reasons will make it appear, that, if I err, I am not affectedly, but invincibly ignorant; and so for being most unpassionately, I am most pardonably erroneous. Or if I am thought not to be so, I desire one favour from them that so think, even that all my faults (whether real or supposed) may rather be laid upon my person, than imputed to my Cause.  
7. Before I come to prove any thing from the first of my Principles, I foresee a necessity to prove my Principles to be true: for though the foolishness of man perverteth his way, 
Prov. 19 3.  yet his heart fretteth against the Lord. There are men in the world of no small name, who have told the world both out of the Pulpit, and from the press, that all the evil of sin, which is in man, proceedeth from God only as the Author, and from Man only as the Instrument; whether or no I am deceived, let the Reader judge by this following Catalogue of Expressions. I forbear to name the Authors in mere civility to their persons: But I have them lying by me very particularly quoted, and will produce them, if I am challenged by any man's Doubt, or Curiosity. The Expressions are such as these: (to begin with the mildest.)  
That all things happen, not only by God's prescience, but 
L. 3. 〈◊〉. 23. Sect. 6. p. 324.  by his express Order and positive Decree. Whereby many from the womb are devoted to certain and inevitable Destruction, that by their misery God's Name may be glorified.  
That God directeth his voice to some men, but that they 
L. 3. c. 24. Sect. 13 p. 333.  may be so much the deafer; he gives light unto them, but that they may be so much the blinder; he offers them instruction, but that they may be the more ignorant; and he useth a remedy, but to the end they may not be healed.  
That a wicked man, by the just impulse of God, doth that 
☜ L. 1. c. 18. Sect. 4. p. 71. L. 1. c. 17. Sect. 11. p. 66. ☜  which is not lawful for him to do.  
That the Devil and wicked men are so restrained on every side with the hand of God, as with a bridle, that they cannot conceive, nor contrive, nor execute any mischief, nor so much as endeavour its execution, any farther than God himself doth (not permit only, but) command: nor are they only held in fetters, but compelled also as with a bridle, to perform obedience to such commands.  
That Thieves and Murderers are the instruments of the 
〈◊〉. 1. c. 17. Sect. 5. p. 64.  Divine Providence, which the Lord himself useth to execute his Judgements which he hath determined within himself, and that he works through them.  
That God's Decree, by which any man is destined to 
L. 1. part. 1. Digr. 10. c 1. Sect. 4. p. 125. ☜  condemnation for sin, is not an Act of his justice, nor doth it presuppose sin; or if Damnation doth presuppose sin, it doth not follow, that the prescience of sin doth precede the will or Decree of Damning; or if the Will of Damning any man is an act of vindicative justice, it doth not follow that it presupposeth sin.  
That God can will that man shall not fall, by his will 
Ibid. Sect. 12. p. 140.  which is called Voluntas signi, and in the mean while he can ordain that the same man shall infallibly and efficaciously fall, by his Will which is called Voluntas beneplaciti. The former Will of God is improperly called his Will, for it only signifieth 
☞  what man ought to do by right; but the latter will is properly called a will, because by that he decreed what should [inevitably] come to pass.  
That when God makes an Angel or a Man a Transgressor, he himself doth not transgress, because he doth not break a 
☞ In serm. de Pro. c. 5. &c. 6. & sic ci●atur l. 〈◊〉. part. 1. p. 36.  Law. The very same sin, viz. Adult●ry or Murder, in as much as it is the work of God, the Author, mover, and compeller, it is not a crime; but in as much as it is of man, it is a wickedness.  
That they are Cowards and seek for subterfuges, who say 
L. 1. c. 18. Sect. 1. p. 68 ☞  that this is done by God's Permission only, and not by his Will. If the excaecation and madness of Ahab is a Judgement of God, the fiction of bare permission doth presently vanish; because it is ridiculous, that the Judge should only permit, and not also decree what he will have done, and also command the execution of it to his Ministers.  
That God's decree is not less efficacious in the permission of evil, than in the production of Good. (Nay) that 
☞ L. 2. part. 〈◊〉. p. 142, 143, 147 148, &c. ☞  God's Will doth pass, not only into the Permission of the sin, but into the Sin itself which is permitted. (Nay) that the Dominicans do imperfectly and obscurely relate the Truth, whilst besides God's concurrence to the making way for sin, they require nothing but the negation of efficacious grace, when it's manifest, that there is a farther prostitution to sin required. (Nay afterwards) that God doth administer the occasions of sinning, and doth so move and urge them, that they smite the sinner's mind, and really affect his Imagination, according to all those degrees, whether of Profit or Pleasure, represented in them.  
If my hand were not weary, if my heart did not tremble, if both my ears did not tingle, I could reckon up many more such frightful sayings, from mine own knowledge and inspection, which I have quoted to the very page, and can do to the very line of their several Authors: besides a cloud of blasphemies which I could name from other compilers, if I either listed or had need to take up any upon Trust. Now by all this it appears (as well as by many too literal expositions of some Texts in Scripture, which make God (blessed for ever!) to be the Tempter, the Deceiver, and the Father of lies) there is a necessity lying upon me to prove my first Principle, before some Readers will dare to trust it, viz. 
That all the Evil of sin which dwelleth in me, is not imputable to God's Will, but entirely to mine own. Adam and 
The first Principle.  the Serpent may be allowed as shavers, but my God (blessed for ever!) is none at all.   
8. This is plain by Scripture, and by the Evidences of Reason 
Proved by Scripture.  (to which anon I shall add Antiquity.) And first for Scripture, though the force of a Negative Argument is not irrefragable, yet it is not unworthy to be observed, that God is 
a P●aedestinare Deum homines ad peccata, aut poenas, in S. Scripturis non di●itur, sed eos ad vitam ●ternam prad stinare dicitur, quos vocare decernit. Grot. in Riv. Ap. Disc. p. 52.  nowhere affirmed to Predestine sin: and therefore the word Predestination is used without any Epithet, to signify nothing but Election in the ordinary sense: and it is set by 
b Quatuor priores Articuli Lambethani sunt d●Praedestinatione & Reprobatione; quarum illa significatur Rom. 11. 33. hac Psal. 36. 6. Epis. Wint. de Artic. Iudic.  Divines (both ancient and modern) as an opposite member to Reprobation; which cannot be done from the bare nature of the word, but from the Use of it in Scripture: and why should that be the sole use of it (when the word itself is as fit to signify the contrary) but because God is the Author of all the good we do, and of all the good that we receive, whereas Man is his own Author of all the evil which he committeth, and of the evil which he suffereth for such commissions?  
9 And though this bare negative Proof might seem sufficient in such a case [that God doth nowhere profess he wills or decrees the sin of Man] yet (to make us inexcusable when we excuse ourselves, like Adam, by any the least accusation of him that made us) God doth everywhere profess, that he wills it not: as when he 
a Exod. 20. 1. Rom. 6. 12.  forbids it by his Laws, when he provides against it by his 
b 1 Tim. 1. 20  Discipline, when he 
c Deut. 11. 18, 26.  shows us how to avoid it, when he tells us he cannot 
d Psal. 5. 4, 5. & 45. 7. Isai 61. 8.  endure it, when he 
e Deut. 5. 29.  wins us from it by Promises, when he frights us from it by 
f Rom. 1. 18. Gen. 2. 17.  Threats, when he professeth that it is to him both a 
g Isa. 7. 13.  Trouble, and a Dishonour. How doth he 
h Psal. 8●. 13.  wish that his People had walked in his ways? How doth he 
i Isa 5. 3, 4.  expostulate and make his Appeal, whether he had omitted any thing, which might tend to the conversion of a sinful Israel? In the whole 18. 
k Ezek. 18.  ch. of Ezekiel, God is pleased to make his own apology and Appeal, even to them that had accused him in an 
l Vers. 2, 29.  unworthy Proverb: [the Fathers have eaten sour Grapes, and the children's Teeth are set on edge] Are not my ways equal? and are not your ways unequal? Sure their ways had been his, if he had absolutely contrived them. The soul that sinneth it shall die, vers. 4. And why will ye die, O house of Israel? vers. 31. Which was virtually to ask them, why they would sin too; which they ought to have done, if he had willed it: for the positive will of God must and aught to be done; and can any man be punished, for doing that which he must? must any man be punished for doing that which he ought? 'Tis but an ill {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} (which some men use) to say that God hath a double Will, of which the one is secret, and the other revealed; the revealed Will not only diverse, but even opposite to the secret one: God ordaining sin with the one, whilst he forbids it with the other; and not always willing in secret what he reveals himself to be willing to. For this is a Salvo (a {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}) a great deal worse than the wound which it fain would cure. God's will indeed is divided, 
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Chrysost●●n c. 1. ad Eph. Homil. 1. p. 1036.  amongst orthodox Divines, in respect of several Acts, and in relation to several objects, or to the very same object at several Times, and in several Qualifications, into his first will and his second will, his antecedent and his consequent, his secret and revealed will: but to affirm two wills in simplicity itself, the one contrariant to the other, about the very same act (the one decreeing that very act which is prohibited by the other) seemeth a greater blasphemy to me, than that which the gnostics, and the Marcionites, and the Manichees were guilty of, when they 
August. in Haec. 6. Tertull. adversus Marc. l. 1. c. 1. Duos De●s adfert tanquam duas Symplegadas naufragii sui.  affirmed two Gods, as the different Fountains of Good and Evil. For by what I find in Tertullian (who was best acquainted with Marcion's Heresies) those two Principles of Good and Evil were found out as a Refuge for those other opinions, against which it is that this my Scribble was first designed. And what Tertullian speaks against Martion, might very well be repeated against the Absolute Reprobatarians: it having been better and more reasonable (in that Father's judgement) that God should never have forbid what he determined should be 
Quis iste De●s tam ●onus, ut ab illo malus fiat? ibid. c. 23. Ibid. c. 26.  done, than that he should determine to be done what he forbid. And so 'tis the lesser blasphemy of the two, to ascribe holiness to one principle, and unholiness to another (in the Marcionites sense) than both to him who is the Spirit of holiness; who therefore cannot so irrespectively decree the punishment of his Creature, as to necessitate his sin, and so be the Author of his Impenitence.  
10. Let no man say then when he is tempted, I am tempted 
Jam. 1. 13, 14, 15.  of God (as our modern Ranters are wont to do:) for every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. So far is God from being the Author of any man's sin, that he 
1 Cor. 10. 13.  is Faithful (saith the Apostle) and will not suffer us to be tempted above what we are able, but will be sure to make a way, either for conquest, or for escape. I dare not say then (with him in the Comedian, who had been a great sinner) Quid si haec quispiam voluit Deus? What if some God hath so decreed it? 
Teren. in Eunuch.  for S. James makes me believe, that sin is both engendered and conceived within me: when my lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin: and if my Lust is the Mother of it, sure the Father is 
Jam. 1. 15.  my Will. It was Davia's saying of wicked Israel, that they provoked 
Ps. 106. 29.  God to anger (not with his will, but) with their own Inventions: there are Contrivers of mischief (Psal. 58. 2.) devisors of lies (Eccles. 7. 13.) such as weary themselves to commit iniquity (Jer. 9 5.) Which cannot possibly be imputed unto an absolute decree. How many Volumes have been written De arte Magica? De arte Meretricia? De arte Lenonum? with 
Vide Cornel. Agrip. de vanit. scient.  such others as would blush to be named in English; and dare we say they are decreed to be Mysteriously wicked? or that their destruction was irrespective, and unconditional? I am in such disorder and discomposedness of mind, whilst I only repeat these bold expressions, that were it not to good purpose (as I conjecture and intend) I durst not venture to repeat them. O Lord, righteousness belongeth unto thee, but unto us confusion 
Dan. 9 7. Eccles. 7. 29.  of face: For thou hast made man upright, but we have found out many inventions.  
11. After Scripture I come to Reason: by which I hope to make it appear, that God Almighty is so far from being accessary 
Proved secondly by Reason.  to sin, and does so many things to hinder it, that he doth not permit it but in an equitable sense: and amongst many reasons which may be given, I shall (in civility to my Reader, and for the love of brevity) content myself with that one, which to my seeming is the best; and I the rather think it the best, because I ground it upon a notion which I have formerly learned from most judicious Mr. Hooker. That which assigns to every thing the kind, that which moderates the 
Hook. Eccl. Polit. l. 1.  power, and appoints the form and measure of working, that we properly call a Law. Hence the being of God is a kind of Law to his working; because that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to that he doth. So that being nothing but what is good, he can work nothing that is otherwise. It is therefore an error (saith that Man of judgement) to think there is no Reason for the works of God, besides his absolute will, (although no reason is known to us) for the Apostle tells us, he worketh all things (not simply and merely according to his will, but) {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, according to the 
Eph. 1. 11.  Counsel of his will: And because he doth voluntarily set himself a Law whereby to work, it follows that that Law is no abatement to his freedom. If he is pleased to set himself a Law or Rule, not to reprobate any, but upon prescience of sin (because that is most conformable to the nature of his goodness) can this be any prejudice to the perfection of his being? Is his nature the less absolute, because it pleases him that his will be conditional in some things, as it is absolute in others? Does he lose any prerogative, by being unable to be the Author of sin? Or is not that rather a very great Argument of his Power? such an ability as that being mere Infirmity. We are God's Creatures, but sin is ours. God saw 
Gen. 1. 31.  every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good. We see the things that are made by the Fiat of our will, and behold they are very evil. This Creative power of ours we justly reckon as the sequel of human weakness, and shall we heedlessly affirm it to be a jewel in the glorious diadem of God's almightiness? The Apostle indeed hath told us, that God worketh all things, (Ephes. 1. 11.) but first he speaks it of God's Election which he predestined in his Son, and the means conducing to such an end, which are none but good; not at all of Reprobation, the means in order to which are none but evil. Secondly, even 
* Nec tamen idc. r●o sumus stipites, ea enim nobis ut velimus & possimus concedit. Bez. in Eph. 1. 11.  Beza himself doth so interpet that place, as not to annihilate, or stupefy, but rather to strengthen and to rectify our wills. God makes an ill will a good one, not no will at all; (as 
* Bene volumus, on quidem natura, sed quia Deus ex mala voluntate bonam fecit. Ad Philip. 2. 13.  Beza elsewhere speaks, and it were heartily to be wished that he had never spoke otherwise) according to that of Austin, Ex nolentibus facit volentes. He says facit; not adigit, cogit, compellit. He makes us willing who are unwilling, but does not force us to be willing whilst we are un willing; (that is to say, to be willing against our wills, or whether we will or no.)  
12. But I find that I have shot somewhat farther than I aimed; it being only my design, and the proper business of this place, to show, that the words of the Apostle, [he worketh all things] are infinitely far from being meant either of sin, or Reprobation. So far from that, that God Almighty does not permit sin, as permission signifies connivance or consent; but he permits it, as that signifies [not to hinder by main force.] If I see a man stealing, and say nothing to him, I so permit as to be guilty: but if I warn and exhort, if I promise and threaten, and do all that may avert him (besides killing him) I so permit as to be innocent. In like manner, all that is done by God Almighty by way of permission, is his suffering us to live, and have that nature of the will with which he made us. Whereas to destroy us for the prevention of sin, or to make us become stocks (as Beza phrases it) or like wooden Engines (which are moved only by wires at the mere pleasure & discretion of the Engineer,) were by inevitable consequence to 
* Liberum & sui arbitrii & suae potestatis invenio hominem à Deo institutum; nullam magis Imaginem & similitud●nem Dei in illo animadver●ens, quam ejusmodi status formam. Tertull. advers. Marc. lib. 2. c. 5. see also cap. 6, 7.  uncreate his creature, which to do were repugnant to his immutability, as Tertul. shows. This is all that I am able to apprehend, or pronounce [that God permits our sins in this sense only; and that he disposes and orders them to the best advantage.]  
13. Having proved my first Principle by Scripture and Reason, 
Proved by Antiquity c. 2. Sect. 18.  it will be as easy to confirm it by the common suffrage of Antiquity; and to avoid the repetition of so long a Catalogue, which I suppose will be as needless, as I am sure it will be nauseous to a considerable Reader, I REFER him to the CITATIONS which will FOLLOW my FIRST INFERENCE, SECT. 18. I will content myself at present to shut up all with 
a Tametsi Deus creat & conservat Naturem, tamen causa peccati est voluntas mal●rum, viz. Diaboli & impio●um hominum, quae avertit se à Deo ad alias re●, contra mandata Dei. August. Confess. Artic. 6.  that Article of the Augustan Confession (to which our 39 Articles have the greatest regard and conformity, and which for that very reason is to me the most venerable of any Protestant Confession except our own) That though God is the Creator and Preserver of Nature, yet the only cause of sin is the will of the wicked (that is to say, of the Devil and ungodly men) turning itself from God to other things, against the (will and) commandments of God. 
b Aliquos ad malum divinae potestate praeordinatos esse, non solum non credimus, sed etiam si sint qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione in illis Anathema di●imus. Synod. Aurasic. Can. 25.  And the Orange Synod doth pronounce an Anathema upon all that think otherwise.  
If any will not subscribe to this Confession, I will leave him to learn modesty both from Arrian the Heathen, and from Philo the Jew.  
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Arrian. in Epictet. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Philo {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. p. 325.   

CHAP. II.  
14. MY first Demand being fully granted (as in the mathematics 'tis usual to build upon certain Postulata) it doth immediately follow, that 
The first Inference. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Ammonius in Joh. 8. Ourselves we condemn as the only causes of our own misery Hook. lib. 5. Sect. 72. Proved by Scripture in the negative.   
[Man himself is the sole efficient cause of his eternal punishment.]  
(I say the sole Cause, as excluding God, but not the Devil; whom yet I also exclude from the efficiency of the Cause; because he can only incite, and propose objects, and add persuasions to sin, but cannot force or cause it in me without my will and consent: so that the Devil being only a Tempter and persuader, cannot for that be justly styled an efficient. Or if he were, sure for that very Reason God himself cannot be so: but only Man and the Devil must be the Concauses of man's destruction.) Which is the second thing I am to prove both by Scripture, and Reason, and the whole suffrage of Antiquity.  
15. And here I shall not be so solicitous as to rifle my Concordance, but make use of such Scriptures as lie uppermost in my memory, and so are readiest to meet my pen. These I find are of two sorts, negative on God's part, and affirmative on man's. God gives the first under his oath, (Ezek. 33. 11.) As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your wicked ways, for why will you die, O house of Israel? In the 18. ch. of the same prophecy, the Latin translation is more emphatical than the English: for there it is not [non cupio] but [nolo mortem morientis;] no● that he doth not will the death of a sinner, but that he wils it 
C. 18. v. 32.  not: he doth not only not desire it, but (which makes the proof more forcible) he desires the contrary, even that he should turn from his wickedness and live, (chapter 33. vers. 14.) not willing (saith S. Peter) that any should perish, but (on the contrary) that all should come to Repentance. And so (1 Tim. 
2 Pet. 3. 9  2. 4.) He will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth. Where it appears by the Context, that the Apostle does not only speak of all kinds of particulars, but of all particulars of the kinds too: For he first of all exhorts them, that prayers, and supplications, and giving of thanks be made for all men, (verse 1.) secondly, he does instance in one sort of men, for Kings and all that are in Authority, (verse 2.) thirdly, he adds the Cause of his exhortation, for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, (verse 3, 4.) And if the Spanish Friar said true, that few Kings go to Hell, (giving this reason) because all Kings are but few, the Apostles way of arguing will be so much the stronger; for when he speaks of all men in general, he makes his instance in Kings: in all Kings without exception, thereby intimating Nero the worst of Kings, under whom at that time the Apostle lived. And he uses another argument (verse 6.) because Christ gave himself a ransom for all. This is yet more plain from Rom. 2. 4, 5. Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? but after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath? Observe who they are whom God would have to repent; even the hard-hearted and the impenitent. But I have stronger proofs out of Scripture, and less liable to cavil than any of these, which yet I thought fit to use, because I find they are the chief of those that Vossius relies 
Veteris haec Ecclesiae sententia fuit, velle Deum conversionem ad salutem omnium, non tantum genera singulo●um, sed singulos generum intelligens. Gerard. Voss. in Pelag. Hist. l. 7. Thes. 2.  upon, and expounds to my purpose from the Authority of the Ancients. I will add to these but three or four Texts more, of which the one will so establish and explain the other, as to leave no place of evasion to the gainsayer. First, our blessed Saviour is called by the Apostle, the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe, (1 Tim. 4. 10.) As if the Apostle had foreseen an objection, that the word [all] might be restrained unto the household of Faith, he prevents it by a distinction of general and special: For if he is a special Saviour of believers, he is a general Saviour of those that are unbelievers: not that unbelievers can be saved, whilst they are obstinate unbelievers, but upon condition they will repent and believe; else why should the Apostle affirm the Saviour to be of all, and then come off with an [especially] to them that believe? Certainly if it is every man's duty to believe in Christ, Christ died for every man. And this very argument is not easily answered in the very confession of Dr. Twisse; who yet by and by says, 'tis easily answered, and yet he leaves it without an answer; he only scorns it, and lets it pass. Twiss. in Respon. ad Armin. Praefat. p. 16. col. 2. This is secondly confirmed from the Apostle's way of arguing (2 Cor. 5. 14.) If one died for all, then were all dead. This is the major Proposition of an hypothetical syllogism: in which the thing to be proved is, that all were dead; and the Medium to prove it is, that one died for all. Now every man knows (that understands how to reason) that the argument of proof must be rather more, than less, known, than the thing in question to be proved: so that if it be clear, that all men were dead by the fall of the first Adam, it must be clearer (as St. Paul argues) that life was offered unto all by the death of the second Adam; and if none were died for but the Elect, than the Elect only were dead: for the word. [all] must signify as amply in the Assumption, as it does in the Sequel; or else the Reasoning will be fallacious and imperfect. The Apostle thus argues:  

If one died for all, then were all dead;  
But one died for all; (that must be the Assumption)  
Therefore all were dead.   
Whosoever here denies the Minor, does (before he is aware) condemn the Sequel of the Major, and so gives the Lie to the very words of the Text; which I can look for from none but some impure Helvidius, who would conclude the greatest falsehoods from the word of Truth. This is thirdly confirmed from the saying of the Apostle, (Rom. 11. 32.) that God concluded all in unbelief, (the Gentiles first, verse 30. and afterwards the Jews, verse 31.) that he might have mercy upon all. From whence I infer, that if this last [all] belong to none but the Elect, than none but the Elect were concluded in unbelief. But it is plain that all without exception were (first or last) concluded in unbelief: therefore the mercy was meant to all without exception. Lastly it is confirmed from those false Prophets and false Teachers, (2 Pet. 2. 1.) who though privily bringing in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bringing upon themselves swift destruction, yet it seems they were such whom the Lord had bought. So far is God from being the Cause of man's destruction, by an absolute, irrespective, unconditional Decree, that he gave himself a ransom even for them that perish. They were not left out of the bargain which was made with his justice, but the Apostle tells us they were actually bought. He whose blood was sufficient for a thousand worlds, would not grudge its extent to the major part of but one. He was merciful to all men, but the greatest part of men are unmerciful to themselves. He is the Saviour of all, but yet all are not saved: because he only offers, does not obtrude himself upon us. He 
* Gratiam salutarem non existimo conferri omnibus, sed ●amen omnibus 〈…〉 ferri; & ●r●sto esse De●m ut confera●ur. Epise. Wint. de Ar●ic. Lamb. Omnibus offer●ur Dei miseri●ordia. Nemo ●llius expers ●st, ●isi qui re●uit. Bernard. serm. 1. in Purif. Mar. In the affir●ative.  offers himself to all, but most refuse to receive him. He will have no man to perish, but repent, by his Antecedent will; but by his Consequent will he will have every man perish that is impenitent. Which is sufficient to have been said for the negative part of my undertaking, [That the cause of Damnation is not on God's part:] in which, if any one Text be found of power to convince, let no man cavil at those others which seem less convincing. If any one hath an objection, let him stay for an answer till his objection is urged. It might seem too easy, to solve objections of my own choice, or confute an argument of my own making; and therefore I pass (without notice of common shifts and subterfuges, till I am called to that Drudgery) to the second part of my enterprise, which is the affirmative.  
16. [That man himself is the cause of his eternal punishment.] Which though supposed in the negative, must yet be proved to some persons, who are prevailed upon by fashions and modes of speech; and will deny that very thing when they see it in one colour, which they will presently assent to when they behold it in another. He who is very loath to say, that God is the Author of sin and damnation, will many times say it in other terms; and therefore in other terms it must be proved that he is not. O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself, but in me is thine help, (Hosea 13. 6.) They that privily bring in Damnable Heresies 
Hos. 13. 6. 2 Pet. 2. 1. Prov. 19 3.  shall bring upon themselves swift destruction. The foolishness of man perverteth his way. And, as when lust conceiveth it bringeth forth sin, so when sin is finished it bringeth forth death, (Iam. 1. 15.) If death is that monster, of which sin is the Dam that brings it forth, how foul a thing must be the Sire? and can there be any greater blasphemy, than to bring God's Providence into the pedigree of Death? Death (saith the Apostle) is the wages of sin, Rom. 6. 23. and wages is not an absolute, but a relative word. It is but reason he should be paid it, who hath dearly earned it by his work. It is the will of man that is the servant of sin; Disobedience is the work, 
Vers. 20.  Death eternal is the wages, and the Devil is the paymaster; who as he sets men to work to the dishonour of their Creator, so he pays them their wages to the advancement of his glory. From whence I conclude (with the Book of wisdom) God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction 
Wisd. 1. 13, 14, 15, 16.  of the living: for he created all things that they might have their being, and the generations of the world were healthful, and there is no poison of Destruction in them, nor the kingdom of death upon the earth. But ungodly men with their words and works called it to them, and made a covenant with it; because they are worthy to take [{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}] part with it.  
17. I will confirm this truth by no more than one Reason; 
Proved secondly by Reason.  which, if it is not the best, doth seem to me to be the fittest; as being aptest to evince both the connexion and necessity of my first inference from my first Principle. It is taken from the nature and use of punishment; which as soon as it is named, doth presuppose a Guilt: for as every sin is the 
* {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}.  transgression of some Law, so every punishment is the revenge of some sin: upon which it follows, that if a man's sin is from himself, 'tis from himself that he is punished. And as the Law is not the Cause, but the 
* Rom. 7. 8.  Occasion only of sin; so God is not the Cause, but the inflicter only of punishment: for so says the Apostle, Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of Concupiscence: for without the Law sin was dead. That which is good not being made death, but sin working death by that which is good. 
vers. 13.  God and his Law are, each of them, the Causa sine qua non, the Condition without which sin and punishment could not have been, (for without Law no sin, & without God no Reprobation;) but not the Energetical efficient Cause, of which sin & punishment were the necessary effects. For if God had made a Hell by an absolute purpose, merely because he would that some should suffer it, and not in a previous intuition of their sins; Damnation had been a Misery, but not a Punishment: as if a Potter makes a vessel on purpose that he may break it, (which yet none but a mad man can be thought to do) or if a man merely for recreation cuts up Animals alive, (which yet none ever did that I can hear of, except a young Spanish Prince) it is an Infelicity and a torment, but no more a punishment than it is any thing else. Indeed the Common people, who do not understand the just propriety of words, make no distinction many times betwixt Pain and Punishment: not considering that Punishment is a relative word, of which the correlative is breach of Law; and therefore is fitly expressed in Scripture by the mutual relation betwixt a Parent and a Child: when lu● hath 
* {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, apud Lucianum dr.  conceived it bringeth forth sin; sin being perfected bringeth forth death, (Iam. 1. 15.) which is as much as to say (according to the propriety of the Apostles words) sin is the parent, and death is the child. Now there cannot be a child without a parent; (for they are relata secundum esse) much less can the child be before the parent; (for sunt simul natura, & dicuntur ad convertentiam.) Upon which it follows that punishment could not be ordained by God, either without sin or before it, or without respect and intuition of it, (which yet the great 
* Ideo praesciverit, qu●a d●creto s●osi● ordinavit. And for no other reason, Nisi quia D●o ita visum est. Calvin. Instit. l. 3. cap. 23. Sect. 7. p. 325.  Mr. Calvin does plainly say;) I say, it could not, because it implies a contradiction. For though God could easily make Adam out of the earth, and the earth out of nothing, yet he could not make a sinful Cain to be the son of sinful Adam, before there was an Adam, much less before there was a sinful one: because it were to be and not to be at the same time; Adam would be a Cause, before an entity; which God Almighty cannot do, because he is Almighty. So that when the Romanists assert their Transubstantiation, or the posterity of Martion their Absolute decree of all the evil in the world, (both pretending a Reverence to God's omnipotence) they do as good as say, 
† Non percipit se dicere, ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quod vera sint, falsa sunt. August. contra Faustum.  those things which are true may therefore be false, because they are true; or that God is so 
* {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Origen. contra Celsum▪ l. 4.  Almighty, as to be able not to be God: that being the Result of an Ability to make two parts of a contradiction true: (so said S. Austin against Faustus, and Origen against Celsus.) Whensoever it is said, 
Isidorus Pelusiota quarenti, {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, respondit, {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}.  [God can do all things] 'tis meant of all things that become him. So Isidore the Pelusiote. But (to return to that argument in the pursuit of which I have stepped somewhat too forward) if God's preordination of man's eternal misery were in order of nature before his prescience of man's sin, as Mr. Calvin evidently affirms in his [Ideo 
* Loco super●us paulo citato.  praesciverit, quia decreto suo praeordinavit,] setting Praeordination as the Cause, or Reason, or praevious Requisite to his prescience) either man's Reprobation must come to pass without sin, or else he must sin to bring it orderly to pass; which is to make God the author either of misery by itself without relation to sin, or else of sin in order to misery. The first cannot be, because God hath 
* Id●irco jurat, ut si non credimus promittenti Deo, credamus saltem pro salute juranti. Hieron. Epist. 46. O beatos nos, quorum causa Deus jurat! O miserrimos, si nec juranti credimus Tertul. l. de poenit. cap. 4. Eccles. 15. 12.  sworn, he hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner, (Ezek. 33. 14.) much less in his death that never sinned. And because, if it were so, the Scripture would not use the word Wages, and the word Punishment, and the word Retribution, and the word Reward. Hell indeed had been a torment, but not a recompense; a fatal Misery, but not a Mulct; an act of power, but not of vengeance; which yet in many places is the stile that God speaks in, Vengeance is mine, and I will repay, Rom. 12▪ 19 Nor can the second be less impossible, it having formerly been proved, that God is not the Author of sin;* he hath no need of the sinful man, whereby to bring man's ruin the more conveniently about; and most of them that dare say it, are fain to say it in a Disguise. Some indeed are for [ligonem, ligonem;] but the more modest blasphemers are glad to dress it in cleaner phrase. A strange {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} in Divinity, to put the (1) child before the parent, the (2) wages before the work, the (3) end before the means, the Reprobation 


1 Jam. 1. 15.  
2 Rom. 6. 23.  
3 Rom. 6. 21.    before the sin! yet so they do who make the Decree of Reprobation most irrespective and unconditional; and after that say, that whom God determines to the end, he determines to the means. To put the horse upon the Bridle, is a more rational Hypallage: For by this Divinity eternal punishment is imputed to God's Antecedent will, (which is called the first) and sin to his consequent will, (which is the second.) The first {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, and the other only {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, punishment chiefly, and sin by way of consecution. Men are bid not to sin ex voluntate signi, or revelata; but are determined 
Poterit Deus velle voluntate signi & appro●ante, ut homo non labatur; interea voluntate beneplaciti statuere potest gratiam efficacem negare, ex quo infallibiliter & efficaciter sequetur ut labatur. Twiss. in v●●. Grat. l. 1 de praed. Sect. 12. p. 140.  to it ex voluntate occulta, or beneplaciti. Distinctions very good, when at first they were invented for better uses: the former by S. Chrysostom, from whom it was borrowed by Damascene, and from him by the Schoolmen. But I say they all were used to very contrary purposes, by them, and by these, who endeavoured to repel those Fathers with their own weapons, (as the elaborate 
† ●os. Pela. hist. l. 6. Thes. 2.  Gerard Vossius does very largely make it appear.) I am sorry I must say, (what yet I must (saith 
* Quod dicere p●riculosum, ad ●disicationem proferendum est. Tertul. de poen. cap. 5.  Tertullian) when it may tend to edification) That the Lord God merciful, and gracious, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, who is all Bowels, and no gall, who hateth nothing that he hath made, who in the midst of judgement▪ remembreth mercy, ever forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin, is exhibited to the world by the Authors and Abetters of unconditional Reprobation, as a kind of Platonic Lover of so excellent a Creature's everlasting misery. Which if Mr. Calvin himself confessed to be a 
* Decretum horribile quidem fat●or, inficiari tamen nemo poterit. Calv. 〈◊〉. stit. l. 3: c. 23. Sect. 7. Lib. 1. part. 1. Sect. 13. p. 140.  Horrible Decree (who yet believed it) how frightful must that opinion appear to me, who did therefore leave it, because it frighted me into my wits? For to say that God is {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, a slayer of men from all eternity, (who is the Lamb slain, that is, a Saviour from the foundation of the world, Rev. 13. 8.) is to affirm that of him, which he affirmed of the Devil, who is called by our Saviour, A Murderer from the beginning, Ioh. 8. 44. Which the Devil could not be, if God had absolutely willed the Death of any, without respect or relation to the snares of the Devil: it being impossible to murder the Dead, or to slay those that were killed long before they were born. I know by whom it is answered, [That God doth will sin, not as it is sin, but as it is a Medium for the setting forth of his Glory; and so Damnation.] But whilst men find out Distinctions to excuse God Almighty, they do imply him to have offended. Which I am so weary even to think on, that I hasten, for some refreshment, to my third proof of this Inference, from the suffrage of Antiquity.  
18. Before I name any particular, I will take the confidence to say in general, That all the Greek and Latin Fathers before 
Proved thirdly by Antiquity.  St. Austin, and even Austin himself before his contention against Pelagius, (and even during that contention in some places of his works) besides those many Fathers who lived after him, were unanimously of this Judgement, That God did not absolutely decree the reprobation of any Creature, but upon prescience and supposition of wilful rebellion and impenitence. I have not lived long enough to read them all, but I have dipped into the most: and by the help of such Collectors as I have gotten into my Study, (whereof Vossius hath good reason to be the chief upon this occasion; and I the rather use him, because I find him so very punctual in every one of the quotations, which I have had means and opportunity to make trial of) I say, by the help of such credible Compilers, I shall give in a cloud of witnesses (I hope) sufficiently authentic. I do as little love to be Voluminous as Callimachus would have me, (cui {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}) and therefore shall set down only the substance of what the Fathers have said, referring the Reader, by my Citations, to the larger fields of their Discourses.  
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} 
Ignatius in Ep. ad Magnes. p. 53. edit. Vsser.   
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} 
Justin Martyr. in Apolog. prima pro Christianis pag. 35. edit. Sy●burg. 1593. .  

Tertull. contra Martion. l. 3. c. 24. edit. Iun. A. D. 1597. Lib. 2. cap. 5, 6.  Pluribus pereuntibus, quomodo defenditur perfecta bonitas, ex majore parte cessatrix, paucis aliqua, pluribus nulla, cedens perditioni, partiaria exit●●? Quod si plures salvi non erunt, erit jam non bonitas, sed malitia perfectior.— magis autem non faciens salvos, dum paucosfacit, perfectior erit in non juvando.— Suae potestatis invenio hominem à Deo constitutum,— lapsumque hominis non Deo, sed libero ejus Arbitrio deputandum. (I wonder Vossius did not remember Tertullian, than whom there is not any one more directly for this purpose. Justin Martyr also was ill omitted; and so was St. Ignatius.)  
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} 
Clemens Alex. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. p. 24. edit. Commel. vide & Clem. Rom. l. 1. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} cap. 45. .  
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} 
Theophil. ad Autol. l. 3. p. 33●. edit. Basil. 1555. .  

Origen. tract. 34. in Matth. p. 194.  Ignem autem aeternum non illis, quibus dicitur [discedite a me maledicti,] paratum ostendit, sicut regnum justis, sed Diabolo, & Angelis ejus: quia quantum ad se, homines non ad perditionem creavi●, sed ad vitam aeternam & gaudium. (Note that Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Euthymius, interpret these words of Christ, as Origen doth.)  

Athanas. Orat. de incarn. verbi Dei. T. 1. p 45.  {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}.  

Macar●us Homil. 26. p. 230. Homil. 30. p. 53  {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Et alibi, {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}.  

Basil. Homil. in Psal. 29. p. 80.  {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}.  

Ambros. l. 2. de secunda Interpellat. David. c. 11.  Ideo venit Dominus Jesus, ut salvum faceret quod perierat. Venit ergo ut peccatum mundi tolleret, ut vulnera nostra curaret. Sed quia non omnes medicinam expetunt, sed plerique refugiunt,— ideo volentes curat, non adstring it invitos.  

Hilarius Diacon. in epist. Pauli in Rom. c. 3. & 9 Idem ad 1 Tim. 11.  Non injust judicat, quia omnes vult salvos fieri, manente justitia— Deus utique vult omnes salvos fieri. Cur non impletur ejus voluntas? Said in omni locutione sensus est, conditio latet. Vult omnes salvos fieri, sed si accedant ad eum: Non enim sic vult, ut nolentes salventur, sed vult illos salvari, si & ipsi velint; nam legem omnibus dedit, nullum excepit a salute.  
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} 
Chrysost. in 1 Tim. c. 2. p. 1556. Idem ad Eph. c. 1. Hom. 1. p. 1036. .  

Hieronymus advers. Pelagianos l 2. sub finem, & ad Eph. c. 1.  Miseratur humano generi Deus, & non vult perire quod fecit.  
Vult Deus quaecunque sunt plena rationis & consilii. Vult salvari omnes & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Sed quia nullus absque propria voluntate servatur, (liberi enim arbitrii sumus vult nos bonum velle, ut cum voluerimus, velit in nobis & i●se suum implere consilium.  

Primasius in 1 Tim. 2.  Constat Deum omnia bona velle, sed homines suo vitio praecipitantur in malum.  
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} 
Damascenus l. 2. orth. fid. c. 29. — {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} 
Idem contra manichaeos' p. 375. edit. Basil. 1578. .  
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} 
Oecumenius ad 1 Tim. 2. .  

Anselmus in Matth. c. 6.  Duae sunt voluntates in Deo. Una misericordiae, quae non est cogens, nec aliquid libero arbitrio aufert, qua omnes homines vult salvos fieri, quod tamen in libera voluntate illorum positum est. Est alia, quae est de effectibus rerum, de qua dicitur, [omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit:] huic nemo potest resistere; de qua dicitur, Voluntati ejus quis resistit? (atque haec est duplex: permittens, respectu mali; approbans, respectu boni.) Itaque homines resistunt voluntati misericordiae, & non resistunt voluntati justitiae. (Postea in hunc sensum.) Orate ergo; Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in coelo (ubi non resistitur) sic & in terris, (ubi resistitur.)  

Bernardus serm. 5. in Natal. Dom. Idem serm. 1. in purif.. Mar.  Deus ex se sumit seminarium miserendi. Quod judicat & condemnat nos, eum quodammodo cogimus, ut longe aliter de corde ipsius miseratio, quam animadversio procedere videatur.— Omnibus offertur, & in communi posita est Dei misericordia; nemo illius expers est, nisi qui renuit.  
If after all these testimonies, I have S. Austin & Prosper to side with me in my assertion, I know not why I may not seem, to those who think me in an error, at least to have rationally and discreetly erred: and though Grotius gives a reason why 
Grotius in Rivet. Apolog. Discus. p. 97, 98.  S. Austin is the unfittest to be a judge in these matters, yet if Prosper (who best knew him) may be allowed for his Interpreter, I am very well content that he be one of my jury; for of four Expositions which that Father made (in several parts of his writings) upon 1 Tim. 2. 4. [God will have all men to be saved,] I find one very directly just such as I would have it; and it is even in those writings which he penned after the heresy of Pelagius was on foot; which is therefore with me of very great moment and authority.  
To this Question,  
De bona voluntate unde sit, si natura, cur non omnibus, 
August. in lib. de spiritu & litera ad Marcellinum c. 33.  cum sit idem Deus omnium Creator? si dono Dei, etiam hoc quare non omnibus, cum omnes homines velit salvos fieri?  
He thus answers;  
Vult Deus omnes homines salvos fieri, non sic tamen ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes just: ssime judicentur. Quod cum sit, Infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum ejus Evangelio non credunt: nec ideo tamen eam vincunt, verum seipsos fraudant magno & summo bono, malisque poenalibus implicant, experturi in suppliciis potestatem ejus, cujus in donis misericordiam contempserunt.  

Idem. serm. 38. de Sanctis.  Inevitabilis illa sententia [discedite à me maledicti] à piissimo Deo ideo multo ante praedicitur, ut à nobis totis viribus caveatur: si enim nos Deus noster vellet punire, non nos ante tot secula commoneret. Invitus quodammodo vindicat, qui quomodo evadere possimus, multo ante demonstrat: non enim te vult percutere, quitibi clamat, observa.  
'Tis very true that S. Austin did sometimes let fall such expressions (transported sometimes in the heat of his dispute) as raised some calumnies after his death, as if he had thought that God created the greatest part of mankind on purpose to do the will, not of God, but of the Devil. But Prosper made it appear, in his Answers to that and the like Objections, that they who censured Austin's judgement, were seduced to it by his style: and that (notwithstanding the misfortune of his expressions) Austin's judgement and his own was clearly this, (and so 
* Nihil aliud accipiendum in isto Augustini sermone existimo, quo ad interitum quosdam praedestinatos firmat, &c. Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1.  Fulgentius doth profess to understand it)  

Prosper (seu August.) ad object. Vincen. Artic. 2. & sequ. — Sincerissime credendum atque profitendum est, Deum velle ut omnes homines salvi fiant. Siquidem Apostolus, cujus ista sententia est, sollicitissime praecipit, ut Deo pro omnibus hominibus supplicetur: ex quibus quod multi pereunt, pereuntium est meritum; quod multi salvantur, salvantis est donum.— Nemo ab eo ideo creatus est, ut periret: quia alia est causa Nascendi, alia Pereundi. Ut enim nascantur homines, conditoris est beneficium; ut autem pereant, praevaricatoris est meritum.— Insanum omnino est dicere, Voluntatem Dei ex Dei voluntate non fieri; & Damnatorem Diaboli ejusque famulorum, velle ut Diabolo serviatur.— Nullo modo credendum homines— ex Dei voluntate cecidisse, cum potius allevet Dominus omnes qui corruunt, & erigat omnes elisos.— Dei ergo voluntas est, ut in bona voluntate maneatur. Qui & priusquam deseratur, neminem deserit: & multos desertores saepe convertit.— Deus nec quae illuminavit, obcaecat; nec quae aedificavit, destruit; nec quae plantavit, evellit. Quia praesciti sunt casuri, non sunt praedestinati. Essent autem praedestinati, si essent rever suri, & in sanctitate ac veritate mansuri: ac per hoc praedestinatio Dei multis est causa standi, nemini est causa labendi.— Hi cum á pietate deficiunt, non ex Dei opere, sed ex sua voluntate deficiunt, casuri tamen & recessuri ab eo, qui falli non potest, praesciuntur.— Deniquequi voluntatem spreverant invitantem, voluntatem Dei sentient vindicantem.  
{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Theodor. Heracl. in Joh. 8. 44.  
Anathema illi qui per Dei praescientiam in mortem hominem deprimi dixerit. Synod. Arelatensis.  
Suo prorsus decipiuntur Arbitrio, sua voluntate labuntur; & si in hac desidia perseverent, ipsi se his quae accepere despoliant. Scriptor. de vocat. Gent. l. 2. cap. 11.  
Quos praescivit Deus homines vitam in peccato terminaturos, praedestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos. Fulgentius ad Monimum l. 1.  

* Causam Reprobationis certum est hanc esse, viz. peceatum in hominibus. Melancht. in locis Theolog. de praedest. p. 316, 317. Idem ubique ait Petrus Molinaeus in sua Anatome Arminianismi.  Lastly, that this is precisely the judgement of the Church of England, I cannot better prove than by that sense & apprehension which Bishop Overall had of it; who does professedly interpret the mind of her Articles in this particular, and was as well able to do it as any man that ever lived. 
D. Over allus Theol. Cantab. professor de sententia Ecclesiae Anglic. &c. cap. 1.  — Sub generali promissione & praecepto tuto quisque potest indubia fide se includere, & cum certa spe ac fiducia ad thronum gratiae accedere, vereque cognoscere, si non confidat Deo promittenti, & mandanti obsequatur, suam culpam esse, non Dei; idque per negligentiam suam, non gratiae divinae defectum, accidere.— Ordo divinae praedestinationis nostrae in Articulo septimo iste videtur intentus; Deum praescium lapsus generis humani ad remedium ejusdem filium mittendum decrevisse, in coque salutis conditionem statuisse: tum ad eam in animis hominum producendam necessaria & sufficientia media & auxilia omnibus generatim secundum magis & minus ordinasse, quae magis speciatim his quos in Christo elegit ex reliquo hominum genere pro suo beneplacito cumularet, quibus hi ad fidem, perseverantiam & aeternam salutem certissime perducantur, & reliqui nihil habeant quod conquerantur, &c.  

Cap. 2. de morte Christi.  De morte Christi tam plena & ubique sibi constans Ecclesiae nostrae sententia, pro omnibus omnino hominibus, sive pro omnibus omnium hominum peccatis, Jesum Christum mortuum esse, ut mirandum sit ullos ex nostris id in controversiam vocare.  
Pro omnibus actualibus hominum peccatis, non tantum 
Artic. 2. Artic. 7. Artic. 31.  pro culpa Originis.  
Aeterna vita humano generi est proposita.  
Oblatio Christi semel facta perfecta est Redemptio, propitiatio & satisfactio pro omnibus peccatis totius mundi, tam originalibus quam actualibus.  
It is farther observed by that most moderate and learned man, that Mr. Calvin himself, however rigid he were in some 
Calvin. ad Heb. 9 28.  places, yet did so soberly contradict himself in others, that those very texts of Scripture, in which it is affirmed [Christ died for many] he so interprets as to say, the word [many] is put to signify [all] as Heb. 9 28. and that many are not saved is 
Idem ad Rom. 5.  (saith he) for this reason, [quia eos impedit sua incredulitas] because they are hindered by their own incredulity.  
19 I have not translated these Authorities, because they are 
The total sum of the Citations.  principally meant for such as are able to understand them. And if any plain Reader shall desire to have them in the gross, without being troubled to suffer them over in the retail, he may be pleased to receive it in these following words: That God did not absolutely, irrespectively, unconditionally decree the everlasting misery of any one, but in a foresight and intuition of their refusing his proffer. That he sent his Son to die for all the sins of the whole world, inviting and commanding all men everywhere to repent [and be forgiven] (Acts 17. 30.) but that most, like the slave in Exodus, are in love with their bondage, and will be bored through the ear. That everlasting fire was prepared especially (not for men, but) for the Devil and his Angels; nor for them by a peremptory irrespective Decree, but in prescience and respect of their pride and Apostasy. That Christ came to save that which was lost, and to call sinners to repentance, and to have gathered them as a Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, but they would not. That God gave his law, his rule, his promises to all, and excepted none in the publishing of either; but so as he expected they should be willing as well as he: for he would not save any whether they would or no. That God Almighty made no man on purpose to torment him, but that he might participate of his goodness. 
* The English Reader may be pleased to observe, that these last words are translated out of Prosper in his vindication of Augustine his dearest Friend, who is the only Father (I can hear of) whom our adversaries are willing to be tried by in this business. (See the Confession of Dr. Twiss. in Vin. dic. Grat. l. 1. Dign. 8. Sect. 4. p. 110.) The result of all. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Plotin. Enn. l. 2. p. 263. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Hierocl. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. p. 258.  That so many as perish may thank themselves; and that so many as live for ever are beholding to nothing but the grace of God. That God decreed the fall of none, but the raising up of those were down: and that those very men who are reprobated, had been predestined to salvation, if they would have returned and remained in truth and holiness; God's Decrees being to many the cause of their rise, but to none of their downfall. Lastly, that they who have despised the will of God, which did invite them to repentance, shall feel the terrors of his will, which is to execute vengeance upon the children of Disobedience.  
20. From all this together which hath been said from Scripture, from Reason, from the authority of the Ancients (who are the fittest of any to interpret Scripture) I thus conclude within myself. That God Almighty is the Author of men and Angels. That wicked Angels and wicked men are the Authors of sin; and that the sin of men and Angels is the Author of unexpressible and endless punishment. That sin is rebellion against the Majesty of God: that hell was made to punish Rebels; and that God never decreed any rebellion against himself. Upon which it follows, that as I look for the cause of my election in the sole merits of my Redeemer, so for the cause of my Reprobation in the obliquity of my will: because the Reason of my punishment is to be taken from my sin; and the Reason of my sin is to be taken from my self. From whence there follows (and follow it will, do what I can) a second Inference from my first, compared with my first Principle, viz.   

CHAP. III.  
21. That every Reprobate is praedetermined to eternal punishment, 
The second Inference.  not by God's irrespective, but conditional Decree.  
GOD doth punish no man under the notion of a Creature, 
explained.  but under the notion of a Malefactor: And because he does not create a malefactor, but a man, he hateth nothing that he hath created, but in as much as it hath wilfully (as it were) uncreated his image in it. So that no man is sinful, because ordained to condemnation; but ordained to condemnation, because he is sinful. Sin is foreseen, and punishment is foreappointed: but because that sin is the cause of punishment, and that the cause is not after, but before the effect (in priority of nature, though not of time) it follows that the effect is not foreappointed, until the cause is foreseen. So that God damns no man by an absolute decree, (that is to say) without respect or intuition of sin; but the prescience of the guilt is the motive and inducement to the determining of the judgement. And yet however my second Inference is depending upon my first by an essential tye, which gives it the force and intrinsic form of demonstration; yet (because some Readers will assent much sooner to a plain Reason less convincing, than to a more convincing Reason less plain; and that some are wrought upon, by an argument exactly proportioned to their capacities or tempers, rightly leveled and adopted more by luckiness than design, whilst another argument is displeasing, they know not why, but that there is an oddness in the look and mien, which betokens something of subtlety, and makes them suspect there is a serpent, though they see not the Ambush in which it lurks) I will gratify such a Reader by a proof of this too; first from Scripture, then from Reason (grounded upon Scripture,) and last of all by an addition to my former suffrages of Antiquity: in which S. Austin more especially shall speak as plainly, and as strongly in my behalf, as any man that can be bribed to be an Advocate, or a witness.  
22. That my proof from Scripture may be the more effectual, 
Proved by Scripture.  I shall first desire it may be considered, that since God is affirmed to have a secret and a revealed will, we must not preposterously interpret what we read of his revealed will, by what we conjecture of his secret one: (for that were to go into the dark to judge of those Colours which are seen only by the light) but we must either not conjecture at that which cannot be known, (as God's secret will cannot be, but by ceasing to be secret) or if we needs will be so busy, we must guess at his secret will by what we know of his revealed one, that so at least we may modestly and safely err. Upon which it follows, that we, who meekly confess we have not been of God's Counsel, must only judge of his eternal and impervestigable Decrees by what we find in his Word concerning his Promises and his Threats; which are fitly called the Transcripts or Copies of his Decrees. Such therefore as are his Threats, such must needs be his Decrees: (because the one cannot prevaricate or evacuate the other) but his Threats (as well as Promises) are all conditional; therefore his Decrees must be so too. Thus 
Gen. 2. 17.  in his Covenant with Adam (and indeed the word Covenant doth evince what I am speaking) he threatens Death, or decrees it, (not with that peremptory Reason, which is the redoubling of the will only, I will therefore because I will, but) on supposition of his eating the forbidden fruit. Which was not therefore forbidden, that Adam might sin in the eating; (man was not so ensnared by the guide of his youth) but Adam sinned in the eating, because it had been forbidden. Such immediately after was God's language to Cain, [If thou do well, thou shalt be accepted, and if thou dost 
Chap. 4. v. 7. Deut. 11. 26, 27.  not well, sin lieth at the door.] Again (saith God by the mouth of Moses) Behold, I set before you this Day a Blessing and a Curse. A blessing, if ye obey; and a Curse, if ye will not obey. That is the form of making Covenants betwixt God and man everywhere throughout the Scripture: and according to the fulfilling or not fulfilling of the Condition, the Righteous judge of all the world proceeds to sentence. Which that we may not so much as doubt of, He (by a merciful Anthropopathia) is pleased to speak like one of us. I will go 
Gen. 18. 21.  down now and see, whether they have done altogether according to the c●y of it; and if not, I will know. There is an expression of God to Eli (1 Sam. 2. 30.) which shows his will sometimes is either not absolute, or not immutable. I said indeed that the House of thy Father should walk before me for ever. But now the Lord saith, Be it far from me. Which words do not argue any fickleness in his Will, but demonstrate his Promise to have been conditional: there was an [If] employed, though not expressed, and so it appears by the very next words. This is also the style that is used in the New Testament. If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, 
Rom. 10. 9  and shalt believe in thine heart, &c. thou shalt be saved. From whence it follows, that if thou shalt not confess with thy mouth, nor believe in thine heart, &c. thou shalt be damned. If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father 
Mat. 6. 15. 2 T●m. 2. 12.  forgive your trespasses. If we suffer, we shall also reign; if we deny him, he also will deny us. I will cast her into a bed, and them that commit fornication with her into great tribulation, except they repent (Rev. 2. 22.) If ye believe not that I 
Rev. 2. 22. Ioh. 8. 24. 2 The. 1. 7, 8. Mar. 16. 16. Mat 1. 21. Tit. 2. 14.  am he, ye shall die in your sins, Joh. 8. 24. In a word, the very end of Christ's coming into the world, was to save us from our sins, (Mat. 1. 21.) to redeem us from all iniquity, (Tit. 2. 14.) He came to deliver us indeed out of the hand of our enemies, but to the end that we might serve him in holiness and righteousness 
Luk. 1. 74, 75.  all the days of our lives. (Luke 1. 74, 75.) Now the end (we know) s the prime condition, the greatest requisite of all; which to neglect without repentance, is the true cause of condemnation: for so runs the sentence of our Saviour (Mat. 25. 41.) Depart from me ye cursed into everlasting fire. Why? for what Reason? He gives the true reason in the next 
Mat. 25. 41, 42.  verse, (not because ye were Reprobated by an absolute Decree; not because ye were ordained to be vessels of wrath by a mere irrespective and inexorable will; but) because I was hungry and ye gave me no meat, because I was thirsty and ye gave me no drink. (Which yet they could not have given him, if it had not been given them from above to give.) From which, and a thousand such Texts besides, I do thus state the matter betwixt me and myself. That no man is infinitely punished by an unavoidable necessity, but for not doing his Duty; nor because he cannot, but will not do it. Impossibility is not a sin; and therefore no man is punished for not doing that which it is impossible for him to do. It was the cruelty of Adon●bezck 
Iu●g. 1. 7.  to cut off men's Thumbs, and then to make it their task to gather up meat under the Table. A greater cruelty in Pharaoh, to require a Tale of Brick, where he gave no straw. Whereas the Master we serve, will render to every man according 
Rom. 2. 6, 11. Gal. 6. 7.  to his works. With him there is no respect of persons. But whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap. And therefore let us not sin, under pretence that all we do is by an absolute Decree: (an opinion brought, amongst other Merchandise, out of Turkey into Christendom, and would be rooted out in the next Reformation) for every such sinner is his own worst Satan, he seeks out death in the error of his way, and pulls upon himself destruction with the works of his hands. 
Wisd. 1. 12.   
Other proofs out of Scripture, (and perhaps, to some, more convincing) will be found interweaved in my following proofs.  
23. I must next confirm this truth by Reason: and because 
Proved secondly by Reaso●.  this Reason will be manifold, I will make it my endeavour to be brief in each. Whereof the first shall be taken 
* Note, Reader, that the execution of God's Decree justly answering to his Decree, doth show the reason of the Reasons which now ensue; and is therefore noted in this third Edition, because Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Barlee comprehended it not in the two first; or at l●ast dissembled their comprehensions, because they found no other way of escape.  from the nature of punishment, which (as before I signified) does presuppose a sin; sin does imply a breach of Law; and this again does imply at once a rational and a voluntary agent. Which seems to me to be the Reason, why God is not offended with the Cruelty of the Bear, or with the Pride of the Peacock, or with the Thievery of the Fox. This is the reason, why the Earth does not sin by breeding Thorns and Thistles 
† Gen. 3. 17, 18  against its primitive institution. For the ground cannot be punished, and was not cursed for its own, but for Adam's sake. (Gen. 3. 17, 18.) And lastly, this is the Reason, why the Tower of Siloe was not damned for committing murder. Man is an Agent very capable of a Law, and so of sin, and so of punishment; and is therefore punished, not because he could not, but because he could help it, by that goodness of God which would have led 
Rom. 2. 4, 5.  him to Repentance, if he had not despised the riches of his goodness. Man is punished because he would sin, and not because he could not but sin.  
24. My second Reason is taken from the nature of a Covenant, which ever implies a Condition: now when the first Covenant was broken, God immediately made a second; not with a part, but with all mankind. And this is observable in the Title of our Gospel [{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman};] which though we render the [New Testament] we might better render the [New Covenant,] which cannot be without Conditions. Heaven and Hell are set before us: the performance of Faith and Obedience is that important condition, without which as the former will not be had, so cannot the latter be avoided.  
25. My third Reason is taken from the unlimited Generality whereby Promises and Threats, Rewards and Punishment, Exhortations and Dehortations, are exhibited to 
* Rev. 22. 17. Act. 17. 27. Mat. 28. 19 Luke 24. 47. John 20. 31.  all. The Gospel is commanded to be preached to all; and it is published in writing, that all may read and believe. baptism, Repentance, and Remission of sins are commanded to be offered to all in general, even to them that refuse both the Word and the Preachers; who when they are refused (and not before) are to shake the Dust off their feet for a Testimony against 
Luke 9 5.  them. Now preachings would be vain, and exhortations would be deceitful, if life and death did not depend upon submitting or refusing to be amended by them.  
26. My fourth Reason is taken from the Degrees of Damnation. Some shall be beaten with many stripes, and 
Luke 12. 47. Cap. 20. v. 47. Mat. 11. 20, 21, 23, 24. Mat. 10. 15.  some with fewer; some shall have a less, and some a greater Condemnation. It shall be worse for Chorazin than for Tyre, worse for Bethsaida than for Sidon, worse for Capernaum than for Sodona, worse for the Jews than for thy Ninevites: which is not because one had a greater Necessity of sinning than the other, but one was guilty of the greater Contempt; not because God had absolutely decreed a greater punishment to the one, but because the one had means of sinning less than the other. For our Saviour says expressly, that if the mighty works which were done in Chorazin and Bethsaida had been also done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented in sackcloth and ashes. Which was as much as to tell them, that it was not at all for want of means and mercy on God's part, but for want of will on theirs, that they did not do what was commanded to be done. And therefore our Saviour did upbraid them, because they repented not, (Matth. 11. 20.) which he could not have done, had it been impossible for them to have repented. Our blessed Saviour was too pitiful, and of too sweet a disposition, to jeer a poor Creature for being such as God made him, or for being such as he could not but be, whether by fatal, or by natural infirmity. We esteem it an ill nature to upbraid a stammerer for not speaking plain; nor is any man reproached for being naturally, but wilfully blind; nor for being born deaf, but for being like the Adder that stoppeth 
John 3. 19 Psalm 58. 4.  her ears. He that binds my feet, and then invites me to come to him, intends me nothing for entertainment, but a salted sarcasm, or bitter jest; for if he were serious, he would set my feet at liberty, that I might come in good earnest, and not say to me, as we say to a child that is fallen down, [Come hither to me, and I will lift thee up.] And yet this 
Calvin. in Institut. l. 3. cap. 23. Sect. 7.  Mr. Calvin is fain to say, (having been first of all engaged in that opinion) That so many nations of men, together with their infants, were involved, without remedy, in eternal punishment, by the fall of Adam, for no imaginable reason, but that so it seemed good in the sight of God: and being pinched with that Text (Ezek. 18. 23.) Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die, and not that he should return 
Mortem non vult Deus, in quantum vult poenitentiam; sed experientia docet, ita eam velle, ut cor peccatoris non tangat. Idem in Ezek. 18.  from his ways and live? he is fain to say, That God will not the Death of a sinner, so far forth as he will his Repentance; which experience teacheth us he doth so will, as not to touch his heart that he may repent. Which is all one as to say, He wils it so, as to command it; but he does not will it so, as to leave it possible: (that is) he wils it in show, but not in reality. Nor do I know any way possible for Mr. Calvin to escape those ugly sequels, but by saying [that the sinner may repent by the strength and force of Nature, without the touch of his heart by the grace of God:] which is to shelter himself under the heresy of Pelagius. Solomon gives us a more rational account, why wisdom one day will laugh at men's calamities, and mock when their fear cometh; even because they 
Prov. 1. 26. 29.  hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord.  
27. My fifth Reason is taken from the nature of Death, as that does signify Privation, and as Privation supposes a former Habit. A stone is said to be not alive, because it suffers the Negation of life, but a stone cannot properly be said to be dead, because it doth not suffer the Privation of life. So that when a man is said in Scripture to be spiritually dead in trespasses and sins, he is employed by that expression to have been spiritually alive. And no man is damned for the Negation, but the Privation of Grace; because the Negation of Grace would be God's work, whereas the Privation of it is his own. It having formerly been showed, That God doth not punish his own work in man, but man is punished for his own work; not for God's illiberality, but for his own being a prodigal; not because no talon was given him, but because he 
* Luke 19 13. 20.  squandered it away. Sin is properly the death of Grace; Death is a privation; a privation is of a habit. So that every sinner had grace, for this very Reason that he hath lost it; he was alive, for this very Reason that he is dead. He came alive out of God's hands, but he falls desperately by his own. A man may be dead born, but he cannot possibly be dead be gotten; deprived of life he cannot be in the very Act of his conception. A man can no more be created a sinner, than he can be generated a dead man: which insers the Condition of God's Decree.  
28. My sixth Reason is taken from Christ's having bought those very men (2 Pet. 2. 1.) whose damnation did not slumber (v. 3.) I have proved already, Christ died for all that were dead in Adam, from (2 Cor. 5. 14.) and from several other Texts. Which he could not be truly affirmed to do, if any one had been past by, by an absolute preterition. For that any man doth perish for whom Christ died, is from his own sin, and not from Adam's, if to free us from Adam's it was that Christ died. Which as it hath been already proved, so it may be confirmed from other Scriptures: as from 1 John 2. 2. where he is called the propitiation not for 
1 Ioh. 2. 2.  our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world. The Apostle foresees and confutes the heresy of Christ's dying only for the Elect, with a not only, but also. He died for Infidels & impenitents, as the whole stream of the Fathers conclude from those words, Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ 
Rom. 14. 15. 1 Cor. 8. 11.  died. And shall thy weak brother perish for whom Christ died? That this was the Judgement of the primitive Church, I can prove by an Induction; and though I now spare my Reader, yet I shall trouble him hereafter, if I am challenged to it. I shall at present refer him to the 31. Article of our Church of England. [The oblation of Christ once made is a perfect Redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, as well Original as Actual.] I had almost forgot a special Testimony of S. John, who calls the Messiah [the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.] So that if any man is in the dark, it is not for want of 
Ioh. 1. 9  Light, but because he will not see, (as S. Chrysostom infers;) which is the very interpretation that S. John himself gives it (chap. 3. ver. 19) This (says he) is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather 
Cap. 3. v. 19  than light, because their deeds were evil. Sure that which is the Reason of their Condemnation, was the Condition upon which they were determined to be damned: than which I know not what can be said either more plainly, or more convincingly of any subject whatsoever.  
29. My seventh Reason is taken from the conditional Decrees of temporal Death, and other temporal punishments; which are so evidently conditional, as I cannot believe any Creature will deny it. For the denunciations of destruction to Nineveh, and of certain death to Hezekiah, do put this quite out of all scruple: for the first was not destroyed, and the 
Jonah 3. 4, 10. 2 King. 20. 5.  second did not die, at that determinate time when God had threatened they should. Of which no reason can be given, but that God's Purposes, and Decrees. & Threats were conditional: on supposition of their Impenitence he threatened to destroy, and therefore on sight of their Repentance he promised to preserve. And from hence it is natural to argue thus. Is God so merciful to bodies? and is he less merciful to souls? Does he decree temporal judgements conditionally, because he is pitiful? and will he decree eternal ones absolutely, merely because he will? Is he so unwilling to inflict the first death, and will he show his power, his absolute power in the second? Did he spare the Ninevites in this life, because they were penitent? and will he damn them in the next, because they were Heathens, by his peremptory Decree? Is he mild in small things, & severe in the greatest? Is there no other way to understand those Texts in the 9 to the Romans, than by making those Texts which sound severely, to clash against those that sound compassionately? Is it not a more sober & a more reasonable Course, to interpret hard and doubtful Texts by a far greater number more clear and easy, than perversely to interpret a clear Text by a doubtful one, or an easy Text by one that's difficult? which is to show the light by the darkness. Or if some Texts have two senses, if some Texts are liable to many more, must we needs take them in the worst? and that in mere contradiction to the universal Church? If I had no other argument against an absolute Reprobation, this one were sufficient to prevail with me, That that Father of mercies, and God of all consolation, who spareth when we deserve punishment, did not determine us to punishment without any respect to our undeservings. He that had mercy upon wicked Ahab merely because of his Attrition, did not 
1 King. 21. 29.  absolutely damn him before he had done either good or evil, before the foundations of the world were laid. He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men, (Lam. 3. 33.) much less doth he damn them for his mere will and pleasure. When God doth execute a temporal punishment upon such as already have deserved it, he comes to it with reluctation, ({non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}) and therefore calls it his 
* Isa. 28. 21.  strange work; a work he loves not to be acquainted with: a work which he doth sometimes execute, because he is just; but still 
* Lam. 3. 33.  unwillingly, because he is compassionate. And he therefore so expresses it, as we are wont to do a thing we are not used to, and know not how to set about: [How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, 
Hos. 11. 8, 9  Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together. I will not execute the fierceness of mine 
Exod. 32. 14.  anger, for I am God, and not man.] Now that God doth profess to afflict unwillingly, and many times to repent him of the evil which he thought to do unto his people, is a demonstrative argument of his conditional decrees in things temporal, & by a greater force of Reason in things eternal.  
30. My eighth Reason is taken from the little flock which belongs to God, and the numerous herd which belongs to Belial; which would not have been, if they had both been measured out by a most absolute Decree. For when it pleased the Divine goodness to suffer death upon the cross for all the sins of the world, (the every drop of whose blood had been sufficiently precious to have purchased the Redemption of ten thousand Adam's, and ten thousand worlds of his posterity) he would not yield the major part unto his Rival Rebel, the black prince of darkness, reserving to himself the far lesser portion; and all this irrespectively, merely because he would. He would not absolutely determine such a general harvest of wheat and tares, as freely to yield the Devil the greater crop. He would not suffer his justice so to triumph over his Mercy, who loves that his Mercy should rejoice against judgement. It was not for want of a new 
Iam. 2. 13.  Instance to show his Power, or his justice; for they were both most eminent in the great Mystery of Redemption. Much greater instances and arguments than an absolute Decree; as I could evidently show, if I were but sure of my Readers patience.  
My ninth Reason is taken from the Reprobation of Angels, which was not irrespective, but in regard to their apostasy, as is and must be confessed by all who place the object of Reprobation in massa corrupta. For the overthrowing of which tenant (in all the Sublapsarians) Dr. Twisse himself does thus argue: Si Deus non potuit Angelos reprobare, nisi ut contumaces, ergo nec homines, nisi ut in contumacia perseverantes. De Praedest. Digres. 4. Sect. 4. c. 2.  
31. My tenth Reason is taken from the absurdities which have, and still must follow, if God's eternal decree of man's misery is not conditional, but absolute. And those absurdities are discernible by this following Dilemma.  
Let Dives be supposed to be the man that is damned. It is either because he sins, or merely because God will have it so. If for the first Reason, [because he sins] then sin is the cause of his damnation, and consequently before it. From whence it follows, that Dives is not damned merely because God will have it so; but that God will have it so, because he sins. (Which plainly shows the conditional Decree.) But if it be said that it is for the [second Reason, merely because God will have it so,] then that absolute Decree to have it so doth either necessitate him to sin damnably, or it does not. First, if it does, then how can Dives be guilty of that thing, of which God's absolute Decree is the peremptory Cause? Or how can that be guilt, which is necessity? (Dives could as little have cherished Lazarus, as the Tower of Siloe could have spared the Galileans, if his will had been no more free, than that Tower had a will.) And secondly, if it does not necessitate him to sin damnably, than Dives, who is damned, might possibly have not been damned. From whence it follows, that Dives is not damned absolutely, but in regard to his sins. (Which had they not been his choice, they had not been his, but his that did choose them. And it is a contradiction to say, a man chooses any thing without a free will, or by an absolute necessity, which is, whether he will or no.) Besides, if God did absolutely decree the end, which is damnation, and consequently the means, which is final impenitence; these Absurdities would follow. First, it would be a Reprobates duty to be damned. And to endeavour his salvation would be a sin: because it were striving against the stream of God's absolute Will. If all men are to choose, and withal to execute the will of God, and that it is God's will the greatest part shall be damned; it will then be a duty in the greatest part of men, to go industriously to Hell: and to do good will be a vice, because it tends Heaven-wards, and so to the crossing of an absolute irreversible decree. Which since I have considered, I have less wonderful than I was wont, at the conclusion of Carpocrates, that the very worst of Actions are out of duty to be performed: and that the soul shall be punished with its imprisonment in the body, until she hath filled up the number of her iniquities; according to that Text, Mat. 5. 29. Which we call Iniquities, but they Duties. And so indeed they would be, if every thing in the world (the means as well as the end) were absolutely ordained, and by consequence effected by God (blessed for ever) who can ordain nothing but good. And such sin and Hell must be [exceeding good] if they could possibly be ordained by as absolute a decree, as the Heavens and the earth, the water and the air, of which God said, they are very good. Secondly, God's revealed will being that all should repent, and his secret will being that very few shall, it follows thence, That it is his will that his will should not be done; and that God hath one will which is the same with the Devils; and that when a Reprobate says in the Pater noster [thy will be done] he vehemently prays for his own damnation. Which things, as they were falsely objected in France against S. Austin, so Prospers way to excuse him, was to make protestations against any such Tenent as conditional Reprobation. He says the very things in his Master's vindication, which 
Ineptissimae blasphemiae, Prod●giosa mendacia, Diabolicus mendaciorum indiculus. Leguntur apud Prosp. in Praefat. Respon. ad object. Vinc.  I have said in my own; and calls the sequels of that Opinion, which he disowns, most sottish blasphem●es, and not only prodigious, but Devilish lies. But he denies not that such ill consequences will follow upon the bold assertion of irrespective Reprobation, which he does therefore very distinctly and very earnestly disclaim. And he doth so much speak the very mind of S. Austin, that he seems sometimes to speak out of his mouth too: it being hard to say, whether the Answers to the Objections of Vincentius do truly belong to the Master or to the Scholar, they being inserted in both their Works; and that which is called Prospers by Vossius, is ascribed to S. Austin by Ludovicus Lucius. If I have made any unfriendly or injurious inference, I will instantly retract it upon the least conviction that it is so. But truly the Reasons which I have given, have served to confirm me in my adherence to my second inference: which I yet farther prove by the remaining votes of Antiquity. For though my former Citations are all to this purpose, yet I will not repeat them, but add some others (perhaps more fully and indisputably) to the number.  
32. 
* Proved thirdly by Antiquity.  And first I will set down the Confession of Mr. Calvin, That 
† Solent veteres &c. & Scholastici in ea acq●●sc●nt, &c. Non a●ia ratione quae futura sunt praev●deat, nisi quia ita ut fierent decre●it. Calv. instit. l. 3 23. Sect. 6.  the Schoolmen and Ancients are wont to say, [God's Reprobation of the wicked is in prescience of their wickedness;] but he professes to believe (with one more modern) that God foresaw all future things by no other means, than because he decreed they should be made, or done. Nor ought it (saith he) to seem absurd, that God did not only foresee, but by his will appoint the fall of Adam, and 
Nec abs●rdum videri d●b●●, D 'em non mo●o primi hominis casum, & in eo posteror●m ruinam praevidisse, sed arbit●io quoque suo dispensasse. Idem ibid. Sect. 7.  in him of his posterity. The Ancients, he confessed, were quite of another mind: but because he adds [dubitanter] and would have it thought that S. Austin was for his turn, I will set down some of their words, and begin with Austin's.  
33. No man is chosen unless as differing from him that is rejected. Nor know I how it is said [that God hath chosen us 
Nemo eligitur nisi ●am distans ab illo qui rejicitur: unde quod dictum est [quia elegit nos Deus ante mundi constitutionem] non video quomodo sit dictum, nisi de praescientia Fidei & operum p●etatis. & mox— Iacobus non ●l●ctus est ut fierct bonus, sed bonus sactus eligi potuit. Augustin. ad Simplicianum l. 1. quaest. 2.  before the foundation of the world] unless it be meant of his prescience of faith and good works— Jacob was not chosen that he might be made good, but having been seen to be made good, was capable of being chosen.  
If S. Austin was so distinctly for Conditional Election (and in those very works too, which he afterwards writ as very sufficient to confute Pelagius) he was infinitely rather for Conditional Reprobation; as any man knows that knows any thing of him, and may be seen in the same book to Simplician.  
Esau would not, and did not run; for if he had, he had attained 
Noluit ●rgo Esau, & non cu●urrit. Sed etsi voluisset, & cucurrisset, Dei adjutorio pervenisset, nisi vocatione contempta reprobus fieret. Id. in l. ad Sim.  by the help of God; unless he would be made a Reprobate by a contempt of his vocation.  
It seems unjust, that without the merits of good or evil works, 
Numquid iniquitas est apud Deum? absit. Iniquum e●im videtur, ut sine ullis bon●●um malorumve operum meritis, unum Deus eliga●, od atque alterum. Id. in Ene●irid. cap. 98.  God should love one, and hate another.  
Wicked men had no necessity of perishing from their not 
Non necessitatem pereundi habuerunt quia praedestinati non sunt; sed ideo praedestinati non sunt, quia tales ●u●uriex voluntaria praevaric atione praesciti sunt. Prosp. ad Gallorum cap. 3. edit. Basil. 1121.  being elected; but they were not therefore elected, because they were foreseen to be wicked through their own wilful prevarication.  
God foresaw that they would fall by their own proper will, 
Illos ruituros propria ipsorum voluntate praes●ivit, & ob hoc a filiis Perditionis nulla praedestinatione dis●revit. Id. ibid. a● cap. 7.  and for that very reason did not separate them by election from the sons of perdition.  
God is the Creator of all men, but no man was created to 
Omnium quidem hominum. Deus Creator est, sed nemo ab co ideo creatus est ut pereat. Idem ad object. Vinc. 3.  the end that he may perish.  
34. I have given the more Testimonies out of Prosper, because he is known to have been the Scholar and vindicator of S. Austin. And to produce their suffrages is to imply all the rest; they having been the only Ancients whom their contentions against Pelagianism made to speak sometimes to the great disadvantage of their own opinion, as they do not stick to confess themselves: and we ought in all reason to take that for their judgement, which we find delivered by themselves by way of Apology and vindication. But though I need not, I will add some others.  
He therefore brought the means of Recovery to all, that whosoever perished might impute it to himself, who would not 
Ideo omnibus opera sanitatis de●ulit, ut quicunque perierit, mortis suae causas sibi ascri●at, qui cura●i noluit, cum remedium haberet quo posset evadere. Ambros. lib. 2. de Cain & Abel cap. 13.  be cured, when he had a Remedy whereby he might.  
Even they that shall be wicked have power given them of Conversion and Repentance. 
Etiam his qui mali sint f●turi, datur potestas conv●rsionis & poenitentiae. Hieron. lib 3. adversus Pelagianos.   
God's love and hatred arises from his prescience of things 
Dilectio & odium D●i●vel ex praescientia nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus. Idem ad Malach. 1.  to come, or from the quality of men's works.  
If the day is equally born for all, how much rather is Jesus Christ?— When every man is called to a participation of the 
Si dies aequaliter nascitur omnibus, quan▪ to magis Christus?— Cum singuli ad donarium vocentur, quid est ut quod a Deo aequaliter distribuitur, humana interpretatione minuatur? Cyprian. Epist. 76.  gift, what is the reason, that what God hath equally distributed should by human interpretation be any way lessened?  

* Patet omnibus fons vita: neque ab jure potandi qu●squam prohibetur aut pellitur. Arnob. adversus Nat. lib. 2.  The fountain of life lies open to all: nor is any man forbid or hindered from the right of drinking.  
Let Dr. Twisse himself be heard to speak in this matter, and that against Piscator (both Antiarminians.) Damnatio est actus Judicis, & procedere debet secundum justitiam vindicativam: at ne vestigium quidem Justitiae apparet in damnatione Reproborum. (He speaks of absolute irrespective Reprobation, which Piscator set up.) Nam justitia neminem damnat nisi merentem. At esse reprobum, nequaquam significat mereri damnationem. Sola Damnatio peccatoris splendere f●cit dei Justitiam. Twissus in vind. Gr. de Praed. l. 1. Digr. 1. Sect. 4. p. 57  
35. Time and paper would fail me, and sufficient patience would fail my Reader, if I should make repetition of all I find to my purpose. For whatsoever hath been spoken by the Fathers of universal Redemption, doth diametrically oppose the irrespective Reprobation. And to reckon up their verdicts in that behalf, were to engage my self and my Reader in a new Ocean of employment. I hope the account that I have given of my belief in this matter is a sufficient apology for my belief, and may at least excuse, though not commend me. Rather than offend any man who takes me upon Trust to be unsound in my principles, I have made this excuse for being orthodox: and do humbly desire to be forgiven, if I shall still adhere to that doctrine, which by Scripture, and Reason, and the Authority of my Teachers, I am verily persuaded is the truest and the most safe: (to wit,)  

1. That man himself is the Cause of his sin.  
2. That sin is properly the Cause of its punishment. 
The sum of all that hath been said.    
And by consequence,  

3. That man is the procurer of his own Misery.   
And by consequence,  

4. That Reprobation is a conditional thing.   
Not decreed by God Almighty to show his absolute power, but to show his power in the exercise of his justice: not determined before, but because of his prescience; nor without regard or respect, but in relation to sin, in foresight, and hatred, and requital of it, as of an injury, on which damnation is praeordained, by way of recompense and Revenge. And therefore the last day is called a day of judgement, as well as of perdition; and the judge himself is called, the Lord God of Recompense. 
2 Pet. 3. 7. Ier. 51. 56. 2 Thess. 1. 8.  And when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed in flaming fire, it shall be to take vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Now that which is the motive to the taking of vengeance, was also the motive to the making of the decree. He who therefore takes vengeance, because they obey not the Gospel of Christ, did for the very same Reason, decree to take it. Which to me is Demonstration that the Decree is conditional. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}.  
36. I have nothing now of duty that lies upon me to be 
An obvious expedient●o reconcile dissenters.  done, but that I descend to the second ground of my Belief. But for the love of Charity and Reconcilement, I will endeavour to take a course of making some composition with my Dissenters. If they will but come up to my most reasonable demands, we will not strive about words and phrases; so small a thing shall never part us. I will swallow the word [Necessity,] so I may take it down with a grain of salt. I will say with Dr. Whitaker 
Qui non sunt praedestinati ad salutem, necessario propter peccata condamnabuntur. Art. Lamb. 4. Atque id necessariò, (si sic loqui placeat) sed necessitate ex hypothesi, non absolutâ; Id est, ideo quia peccarunt, non autem ideo quia non sunt praedestinati. Epis. Wi●t. Iud. de art. Lamb.  (in his 4. Article at Lambeth,) That they who are not predestined to salvation, shall be necessarily damned, (but) for their sins (as he himself speaks.) I allow myself to be no wiser than Bishop Andrews, (the strings of whose Books I am not worthy to untie) who interprets necessario, not by an absolute Necessity, but by a Necessity which follows sin. They shall be damned for their sins; that is, for that very Reason because they have sinned, not for that only Reason, because they are not predestined. And because that Reverend (I know not whether more learned, or saintlike) Man, allowed himself to be no wiser than all the Fathers and Schoolmen that went before him, he thought 'twas fit to abstain from [such {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}] such new phrases and ways of holding forth and making out the ancient doctrines of the Church; and therefore instead of [necessity] to say [without doubt.] And for my own part, I desire to be no deeper, and to speak no better language, than all the Fathers of the Church (who have gone to Heaven with those opinions, for which I am censured by some to Hell:) I choose to say [a Conditional, not an absolute Necessity.]  
37. If I may guess (without censure) at the cause of other 
The probable cause of the dissension is a mistake of God's prescience.  men's mistakes, by that which once was mine own, I shall ascribe much of it to the vulgar misconception of God's prescience or foresight; which being constant and infallible, seems to give a necessity to all events, which are the objects of that prescience. And this must certainly be the reason, (I at least must so conjecture, who can think of no better, and did myself once stumble upon this very stone) why Mr. Calvin will have God's prescience to succeed his praeordination. The ground of which error does so border upon Truth, as to lessen the wonder, why men of good parts should so frequently mistake it for that truth itself on which it borders; (and does unluckily verify the Italian Proverb, Troppo confina la vertu col vitio.) God's prescience indeed doth imply a necessity, which it is mistaken to have effected. And again necessity is not by everybody distinguished, as by the admirable Boethius, (to whom I owe my greatest light in this particular:) for if it were, I believe many others might be converted, as I have been. But before I mention (much less insist on) the distinction, I shall choose to say something in preparation to it. It is briefly this:  
38. That the knowledge of the Eternal, far transcending 
The mist●ke is endeavoured to be rectified.  all motion and succession of time, does abide in the simplicity of its present being; beholding all past and future things in his simple knowledge, as just 
* Isa. 41. 22, 23. Acts 15. 18. Psal. 139. 2.  now done. And therefore Boethius will have it called not 
† Boe hius de c●nsol. Philosoph. lib. 5.  prescience, but Science; not Praevidence, but Providence: which doth not change the natures and proprieties of things future, but considers them as they are, in respect of himself; which is as they shall be, in respect of Time. For as the knowledge of things present doth import no necessity on that which is done; so the foreknowledge of things future lays no necessity on that which shall be: because whosoever either knows or sees things, he knows and sees them as they are, and not as they are not. God's knowledge doth not confound things, but reaches to all events, not only which come to pass, but as they come to pass; whether contingently, or necessarily. As (for illustration) when I see a man walk upon the earth, and at the very same instant the Sun shining in the Heavens, I see the first as voluntary, and the second as natural. And though at the instant that I see both done, there is a necessity that they be done (or else I could not see them when I do;) yet there was a necessity of one only, before they were done, (viz. the Suns shining in the Heavens) but none at all of the other, (viz. the man's walking upon the earth.) The Sun could not but shine, as being a natural agent; the man might not have walked, as being a voluntary one. Upon which it follows,  
39 There is a twofold necessity; whereof one is absolute, 
By the consideration of a twofold necessity in events.  and the other on Supposition. The absolute is that, by which a thing must be moved when something moves it. The Suppositive is that, by which a man shall be damned if he die Impenitent. The later necessity (though not 
Duae sunt necessitates. Simplex una, veluti quod necesse est omnes homines esse mortales: altera conditionis, ut si aliquem ambulare scias, eum ambulare, necesse est. both. de con. Phil. lib. 5.  the first) does extremely well consist both with the liberty of man's will, and God's conditional Decrees. E. G. I am now writing, and God foresaw that I am writing, yet it does not follow that I must needs write; for I can choose. What God foresees must necessarily come to pass, but it must come to pass in the same manner that he foresees it. He foresees I will write, not of necessity, but choice; so that his foresight does not make an absolute and peremptory Necessity, but infers a Necessity upon supposition. (We must mark, in a Parenthesis, how great a difference there is betwixt the making, and the inferring of a Necessity.) Whatsoever I do, there is an absolute Necessity that God should foresee; yet God foreseeing my voluntary Action, does not make it necessary, but on supposition that it is done. If all things are present to God (as indeed they are) his foresight must needs be all one with our sight. As therefore when I see a man dance as he pleases, it is necessary that he do what I see he does; but yet my looking on does not make it necessary: so God's foreseeing that man would sin, employed a certainty that so it would be, but did not make it an absolutely necessary or involuntary thing. For that a thing may be certain (in respect of its event) and yet not necessary (in respect of its cause,) is no news at all to a considering person, who will but duly distinguish God's Omniscience from his Omnipotence, and his Foresight from his Decree, and infallible from necessary, and spontaneous from voluntary, and that which follows as a Consequence only, from that which follows as a consequent. If I may judge by those errors, which I convince myself to have been in, when I was contrary-minded to what I am, I see as many mistakes in other men arising from the misfortune of confounding those things which I just now distinguished, as from any one unhappiness that I can think of. And from all that I have spoken upon this last subject, it seems inevitably to follow, that a suppositive Necessity, and none else, is very consistent with a free and contingent Action. whilst I see a man sitting, it is necessary that he sit, but upon supposition that I see him sitting, his posture is still a voluntary contingent thing. For he sat down when he would, and may arise when he pleaseth (but still with a proviso of God's permission.) I desire to be taught what is, if this is not, exact speaking, viz. That God by his prohibition under penalty 
Ecclus. 15. 14.  makes my disobedience become liable to punishment; and by his Decree to permit, or not hinder me, he leaves me in the hand of mine own counsel, & so in the state of peccability, that I may sin & perish if I will. So that by his prescience that I will sin, he hath no manner of influence or causality upon my sin; which infers my destruction to be entirely from myself. I am a little confident, that whosoever shall but read Boethius his fifth book, and reading shall understand it, and understanding shall have the modesty to retract an error, he will not reverence the 4. Section of the 23. chapter of the 3. book of Institutions, because it is Mr. Calvin's, but will suspect Mr. Calvin because of that Section. The question there is [Whether Reprobates were predestined to that corruption which is the cause of Damnation.] To which he answers with a [Fateor] I confess that all the sons of Adam, by the express will of God, fell down into the misery of that condition in which they are fettered and entangled. And a little after he professeth, that no account can be given, but by having recourse to the sole will of God, the cause of which lies hidden within itself. And that we may not think he speaketh only of the posterity of Adam, he telleth us plainly in the close of that Section, that no other cause can be given for the defection of Angels, than that God did reprobate & reject them. In this place I would ask, Was the angel's Defection or apostasy, their sin, or no? If not, why were they reprobated and cast into chains of darkness? and if it were, how then is God's Reprobation not only the chief, but the only Cause of such a sin? This is the sad effect of being enslaved to an opinion, and of being ashamed of that liberty which looks like being conquered. I believe the love of victory hath been the cause of as many mischiefs, as have been feigned to leap forth from Pandora's Box. Whereas, if every one that writes would but think it a noble and an honourable thing, to lead his own pride captive, to triumph over his own conceitedness and opiniastrete, and to pursue the glory of a well-natured submission; there is perhaps hardly an Author of any considerable length, but might think he had reason to write a book of retractations. And sure it will not be immodesty for a young man to say, That many old men might have done it, with as much reason as S. Austin.  
40. But as I have learned of Boethius (that most excellent Christian, as well as Senator, and profound Divine, 
And by a right Application of a twofold will in the Almighty.  as well as Philosopher, who lived a terror to heresy, and died a Martyr for the Truth) to distinguish of Necessity; so have I learned from other Ancients, to distinguish better of God's will, than I was wont to do before the time of my Retractation. First, I distinguish (with S. Chrysostom) of a first and second Will. God's first will is, that the sinner shall not die, but rather return from his wickedness and 
Chrysost. in Epist. ad Eph. c. 1. Homil. 1.  live: his second will is, that he who refuseth to return receive the wages of iniquity. Secondly, I distinguish (with Damascene) of an antecedent and a consequent will. The 
Damascen. l. 2. Orth. Fid. c. 29.  antecedent is that, by which he wils that every sinner should repent: his consequent is that, by which he preordaineth the damnation of the impenitent. Which distinction is not made in respect of God's will simply (in which there cannot be either prius or posterius) but in respect of the things which are the object of his will. For every thing is willed l●y God so far forth as it is good. Now a thing considered absolutely may be good or evil, which in a comparative consideration may be quite contrary. E. G. To save the life of a man, is good; and to destroy a man, is evil, in a first and absolute consideration: But if a man secondly be compared with his having been a murderer, then to save his life, is evil, and to destroy it, good. From whence it may be said of a just judge, that by his antecedent will he desires every man should live; but by a consequent will decrees the death of the Murderer: and even then, he doth so distinguish the murderer from the man, that he wisheth the man were not a murderer, whom he condemns as murderer, and not as man; for whilst he hath a will to hang the murderer, he hath a merciful woulding to save the man. He doth not hang the man, but only because he is a murderer; and (if it lay in his power) he would destroy the murderer, to save the man. Both the one and the other is not an absolute, but a conditional will: he would save the man (with an) [if] he were not a murderer; and doth destroy the murderer (with a) because he is a Malefactor. Just so, God's antecedent will is, that every man would repent, that they may not perish: it is his consequent 
Prosp. in Respon. ad Obj. Vincen. sub finem.  will, that every one may perish who will not repent. both the one and the other is respective and conditional. Thirdly, I distinguish (with Prosper) of an inviting and revenging will. The inviting will is that, by which all are bidden to the Wedding Feast: his revenging will is that, by which he punisheth those that will not come. Or fourthly, I distinguish 
Anselmus in Mat. cap. 6.  (with reverend Anselm) of the will of God's mercy, and of the will of his justice. It is the will of his Mercy, that Christ should die for the sins of all: but 'tis the will of his justice, that all should perish who come not in to him when they are called, or who only so come, as not to continue and persevere unto the end.  
41. All these distinctions come to one and the same purpose, and being rightly understood, as well as dexterously used, do seem to me a Gladius Delphicus, sufficient to cut asunder the chiefest knots in this Question. For the first will of God may be repealed, whereas the second is immutable: which is the ground of that Distinction betwixt the Threats and Promises under God's Oath, and those other under his Word only: of which saith the council of Toledo, Jurare Dei est, a seipso ordinata nullatenus convellere; poenitere 
Concil. Tolet. 8, cap. 1.  vero, eadem ordinata, cum voluerit, immutare. When he is resolved to execute his purpose, he is said to swear; and when it pleaseth him to alter it, he is said to repent: for there are some decrees of God which (being conditional) do never come to pass; as he thought to have done an Evil of punishment unto Israel, which yet he did not, Exod. 32. 14. And the reason of this is given us from that distinction before mentioned; which also serveth to reconcile many seeming repugnances in Scripture. For when it is said, that God repenteth (1 Sam. 16. 35.) it is meant of the first will; and when it is said, he cannot repent (1 Sam. 16. 29.) it is meant of the second. In respect of the first, we are said to grieve, to quench, to resist the Spirit of God, (1 Thess. 5. 19) but when it is said, who hath resisted his will? (Rom. 9 19) it is meant of the second. God's Mercy is above and before his justice; and therefore that is his first will, that all should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. 2. 4.) but yet so, as that his justice is not excluded by his Mercy; and therefore that is his second will, that so many should be damned as hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord. (Prov. 1. 29.) The will of his Mercy, that all should live, is from nothing but his goodness; whereas the will of his justice, that some should die, depends upon something in the Creature. (So that both parties may be gratified, they that are for the dependence, and the independency of his Will.) That the Reprobate is invited, is from the mercy of God's Will; but that he is punished for not accepting, is from the obliquity of his own. In respect of the first, it is the man that refuseth God (Ier. 8. 5.) but in respect of the second, it is God that doth reprobate man. (Rom. 1. 28.) The free love of the Creator is the only motive to his first will; but man's ingratitude and rebellion is his impellent to the second. The first shows him a tender and compassionate Father; the second speaks him a righteous and impartial judge: both proclaim him a powerful and a provident God. Now can any distinction be better chosen, can any word that is equivocal be more safely understood, can any Opinion (of God's will or man's) be more rationally, or more warily, or more religiously entertained, than that wherein God's Mercy doth greet his justice, and wherein his Love doth kiss his Power? I appeal to any man living, whether this be an Error; or if it is, whether it is not a very safe one; and if it is so, whether it is not a very small one: and if so safe, that nobody can suffer by it, if so small, that nobody can see it, whether the Author of this Appeal is not very excusable, both for not being able to see his own Eyes, nor to see his own error with other men's. As much as in me lies, I would live peaceably with all men; with those especially, 
Rom. 12. 18.  who when I speak unto them thereof, make them ready to battle. And in order to that Peace, I desire them to lay this one thing to heart; that as, if I were as they, I would quit my Opinion; so, if they were as I, they would not long keep their own.   

CHAP: IV. Free and special Grace defended against the Pelagians and Massilians in the second Principle proposed.  
42. HAving proved hitherto that Sin is really the cause of Punishment, that Man is really the cause of sin, and therefore that Man is the grand cause of Punishment, (as being the cause of the cause of his Damnation) intending thereby to secure myself against the errors and blacker guilt of the Manichees, the Marcionites, the Stoics and the Turks, who do all affirm (some directly, some by necessary consequence) That God's absolute Will is the cause of sin, and man's only the instrument: the second part of my Task is, to be an Advocate for the pleading and asserting the Cause of God too; and that against the Opiners of the other extreme, to wit, the Pelagians and the Massilienses; who, to be liberal to Nature, do take away from Grace, and to strengthen the Handmaid, do lessen the forces of the Mistress. And though I think the later to be the milder heresy of the two, it being less dangerous to ascribe too much goodness to the Power of Nature, (which very power is undoubtedly the gift of God) than the very least evil to the God of all Grace, (and this according to the judgement of the Synod at Orange, which pronounced an Anathema upon the first heresy, whereas it did but civilly reject the second;) yet in a perfect dislike and rejection of this later extremity, as well as of the former, my second Principle is this.  
That all the good which I do, I do first receive; not from any thing in myself, but from the special Grace and Favour 
The second Principle or Ground of my Belief in this business.  of Almighty God, who freely worketh in me, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure, Phil. 2. 13.  
43. That I may not be suspected of any secret reservation within myself, in the laying down of this Principle; I will endeavour 
Explained.  to speak out, and make my Reader my Confessor, by revealing the very utmost of what I think in this business. I believe, that no man can come to Heaven any otherwise than by Christ; nor to Christ, unless it be given, (that is, unless the Father draw him.) First the Father loves the Son; 
Act. 4. 12. John 6. 44, 65.  next he loves us in the Son; then endows us with his Spirit; so endowed he elects us; so elected he predestines us; so predestined he will glorify us, by crowning his Gifts and Graces in us: I say his Graces, because they are not required by us, but infused by him; nor so properly given, as lent us; lent us as Talents, not to hide, but multiply. We owe it wholly to God, not that he gives us his Grace only, but that he gives us the grace to desire his Grace, as well as to use it to the advancement of his Glory: and we are to thank him, as for all other mercies, so for this also, even that we have the grace 〈◊〉 thank him. So far I am from that Pelagianism whereof I have wrongfully been accused, (I beseech God not to lay it to my accusers charge) that I have never lain under any the least Temptation to any degree of that heresy; no, no more than Fulgentius, or Prosper, or S. Austin himself. It not only is, but ever hath been my assertion, That as we cannot spiritually be nourished, unless the Father of Mercies doth reach out unto us the bread of Heaven; and as we cannot take it when it is offered, unless he give us the hand of Faith: so cannot we possibly desire to take it, unless he gives us our very appetite and hunger; we cannot pant after the waters of life, unless he give us our very thirst. He stirs us up, when we are sleeping, that we may seek him; and shows himself, when we are seeking, that we may find him; and gives us strength, when we have found him, that we may hold him fast unto the end. There is no good thought arising in us, unless suggested by his 
a Phil. 1. 6. and 2. 13. Heb 12. 2.  preventing Grace: no nor increasing, unless strengthened by 
b Luke 19 13, 26.  his subsequent Grace: no nor consummate, unless 
c 1 Cor. 15. 10.  perfected by his Grace of perseverance. If I am better than any man, it is God that 
d 1 Cor. 4. 7. Iam. 1. 17. 1 Cor. 1. 31. Psal. 115. 1. Reconciled with Choice, which is irreconcilable with irresistibility:  makes me differ: Every good gift is from above, and cometh down from the father of lights. And therefore he that will glory, let him glory in the Lord, saying with the Psalmist, Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy Name give the praise.  
44. Having thus secured myself from giving the will of man a sacrilegious liberty; I must withal provide, that I be able to answer the Objection of the Marcionites: which Tertullian could not do, but by asserting the liberty of the will; which Grace doth correct, but not destroy. Grace doth strengthen, but not compel Grace doth guide, but not necessitate. Grace makes able to choose good, but not unable to refuse it. 
a Object. 1. Si dens bon●s▪ & praesci●s mali, & p 〈…〉 tens depeller●, cur ho● nem labi passus est? Res●. Liberum, & sui arbitrii, & suae potestatis invenio ●ominem, & seq.  Martion objected thus; If God is good, and praescient of all the evil which is to come, and withal able to prevent it, why did he suffer mankind to fall? why did he not hold him fast by irresistible Grace? Tertullian answered, Tha● God made man in his own Image, and that in nothing more live●y, than in the liberty of a Will: And that it is to which his fall must be imputed. But (saith 
b Object. 2. Homo ita d●bu●t institui, ut non possit cadere. 〈…〉 esp. Ergo ●onum suum haberet ●mancipatum sibi à Deo: Et on●s aut malus necessita efuisset inventus, non volu●tate: Nec b●ni nec mali merces jure pensa▪ etur ●i. Tertul. advers. Marc. l. 2. c. 5, 6.  Martion) Man ought to have been made of such a frame, as not to be able to fall away. Marry then (saith Tertullian) Man had not been a voluntary, but a necessary Agent; (which is as much as to say, a Man should not have been a Man) nor could he have been a right object of Reward and Punishment.  
45. Before I venture on any rational or Scholastical way of arguing, I must first enlighten myself out of some clear places of 
† 1 Proved by Scripture. Phil. 2. 12, 13.  Scripture: amongst which there is none that seems more proper, than that of S. Paul to the Philippians; Work out your salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure. He bids them work, because God worketh; which they needed not have been bid to do, if God had worked after a physical irresistible manner. That they might not be betrayed into a yawning reliance upon their being supteracted to the working out of their salvation, he bids them work it out with fear and trembling (as our Saviour bids us, Strive to enter in at the strait gate, because many shall strive, and shall not enter:) which they needed not have done, had their salvation been (not only certain, but withal) a necessary unavoidable thing, and so inconsistent with choice and option. But the Apostle tells them (in the next verse) that it is God which worketh in them, not only to do, but to will and to do; by his preventing Grace he worketh in them to will, by assisting Grace he worketh in them to do: by neither so irresistibly, but that they must work it out themselves too; and that not only with expectation and hope, but with fear and trembling. God worketh in us to will (saith the Apostle) not without, or against, but according to the nature of that very will with which he made us. Grace doth not destroy, but establish, and strengthen, and perfect Nature. Shall we say that we do a thing without liberty and choice, because God worketh in us to will and to do? (that is) to do it by choice and option? is the liberty lost, because it is guided and enabled to do that which 
Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus. Nec ad virtutes, nec ad vitia necessitate tra●imur. Alioqui ubi necessitas, ibi nec damnatio, nec corona est. Hieron. contra Jovinian. c. 2. Valet liberum arbitrium ad bona, si divinitus adjuvetur; quod fit humiliter pet●ndo & faciendo. Augest. epist. 89. Psal. 119. 32. John 8. 32. Tertull. loco citato.  is good? If I can do all things through Christ that strengthens me, then can I (through him) both refuse the evil, and choose the good. Which would not be choice, if it were whether I would or no. And so it would be, were I unable to resist it (as I shall show by and by in the open confession of Dr. Twisse, whose Favourers cannot be angry with one that speaks his language.) I can do all things through him that strengthens me, (saith the Apostle.) Now to strengthen, is not to necessitate; for then to strengthen would be to weaken: because to necessitate or compel with an irresistibility, is to vanquish and overmaster; not to give strength, but rather to take it away. Again, our Saviour is said to tread down Satan under our feet. To what end doth he tread the Serpent down, but that we may have the freedom to trample on him? and though he doth it with his own feet, yet it is under ours. This liberty and freedom of the regenerate will is at once expressed and expounded in those words of the Psalmist, I will run the way of thy commandments, when thou shalt set my heart at liberty. To which is agreeable that of our Saviour, and the truth shall make you free. It being a great absurdity (in the opinion of Tertullian) that a man should have his happiness forced on him by God Almighty. So far is God from prostituting his Blessing, by such a controlling of the will, and such an obtruding of the object, as makes the object unavoidable, that he doth not only offer and propose it to his people's choice, but 
* 2 Cor. 5. 20. Deut. 30. 15, 19 Ios. 24. 15.  desires them also to choose it. I call heaven and earth to record this day against you (saith God by Moses) that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that thou and thy seed may live. But choose we cannot, if God works in us irresistibly; as I will farther prove by Reason.  
46. 
† 2 Proved by Reason. Illud proprie dicitur irresistibile, cui resistere nemo potest, quamvis vellet. Twiss. in praef. ad vin. Grat. Sect. 9 p. 3●.  That is properly called irresistible, which is of such an overruling and prevailing force, that a man cannot withstand it, although he would. (And thus Dr. Twisse hath well defined it.) Upon which it follows, that to choose irresistibly, is a contradiction in Adjecto: For it is to will a thing whether one will or no. He that saith, God worketh in us to choose irresistibly, doth say in effect, He so worketh in us, as that we cannot choose but choose; which is as much as to say, not only that we do what we cannot do, but that we therefore do it, because we cannot do it. He that cannot choose but choose, doth choose because he cannot choose; which is as bad as to say, that the thing is necessary, because it is impossible. To make this plain to my plainest Reader, I will show the legality of my deduction by these degrees. First, he that is wrought upon by God (to believe, obey, or persevere irresistibly,) cannot possibly do otherwise (than believe, obey, or persevere.) Secondly, he that cannot possibly do otherwise than he doth, cannot possibly choose but do what he doth. Thirdly, he that cannot choose but do what he doth, doth clearly do it whether he will or no. Fourthly, he that doth believe, obey, or persevere, whether he will or no, doth do it by as evident undeniable Necessity, as that by which a stone tends downward, (which tendency of the stone, though it is spontaneous, yet it is not voluntary; and as it it is not by violence, so it is not by choice neither.) Fifthly, he that willeth to believe, obey, or persevere, whether he will or no, doth do it by a Necessity, by which a stone tends upwards when it is thrown: (Which tendency of the stone is so far from voluntary, that it is not spontaneous; it is not only an irrational, but an unnatural thing; and besides implies a contradiction in a voluntary Agent, which cannot take place in an involuntary stone.) For to say a man willeth to obey or believe, whether he will or no, is to say, he willeth it either without his will, or against his will, or else not having a will at all; which is as bad as to say, that he must needs will it, because he cannot any way possible. I know not any trick imaginable to escape the odium of these Absurdities, unless by denying the definition of irresistible; which were not to escape, but to commute absurdities: and not only the authority of Doctor Twisse, but the very force of the word would cry it down. And so little is my deduction in a capacity to be blamed, that Doctor Twisse saith expressly of irresistibility, it hath no 
In actu volendi locum non habet. In loco citato.  place in the act of willing. And though he pleadeth for a Necessity which he will have to follow God's operation upon 
Ex hujusmodi autem oper●tione divina existit Necessitas effectus, cum ipsa libertate v●luntatis consent. en●. Ibid.  the Soul; yet he will have that Necessity to be no other, than what may very well agree with the liberty of the will. So that if that Doctor, in that his skirmish with Arminius, had not confounded a necessity with a certainty of event, and used that word in stead of this, his Antagonist and He (in that particular) must needs have wrangled into Friendship. For Arminius denieth the irresistible working of Grace upon the Will, and so doth Dr. Twisse. Again Dr. Twisse affirmeth, that the liberty of the Will doth agree with the working of Grace upon the Will, and so doth Arminius. And therefore I hope for no hard usage from such as are haters of Arminius, whilst I say the same things with them that hate him.  
47. Methinks the principal Ground of my mistakes heretofore 
The grounds of the opposite mistake removed,  in this business (if I may be allowed to pass a conjecture upon my self) is the misapprehension of certain Texts; the cause of whose misapprehension is the illogical confounding of two things, which, though they look like one another, yet are exceedingly different. E. G. from [Ezek. 29. 27. Cant. 1. 14. 1 Ioh. 3. 9 I will cause you to walk in my Statutes, &c. Draw me, we will run after thee. Whosoever is born of God cannot sin, because he is born of God, and the like] many conclude that God's working upon the wills of his Elect, is by such a physical immediate immutation of their wills, as doth not only produce a certain, but a necessary effect: and being forgetful (rather than ignorant) to distinguish necessity from certainty of events, they call that necessary which is but certain and infallible, and so (through haste or inadvertency) they swallow down the error of irresistible Grace; using the word irresistible in stead of efficacious. And this is a second inadvertency begotten of the first; as commonly one error loves to draw on another. Now because a fallacy undiscerned in the premises cannot possibly be discovered by gazing only on the Conclusion (just as an error in the first Concoction is hardly mended in the second;) I must mark out the difference betwixt infallible and necessary, before I can usefully distinguish betwixt effectual and irresistible. 
By rightly distinguishing betwixt infallible and necessary.   
48. Infallible properly is that that cannot err, or be deceived: That is properly necessary, which cannot but be. The first relates to the perfection of the Knowledge of God, but the second to the almightiness of his will. The first is properly applied unto the object of God's foresight, (and though 'tis otherwise used, yet 'tis by such a Catachresis, as I humbly conceive to be a stone of stumbling:) but the second more precisely unto the object of his Decree. The first is consistent with those contingent events, to which the second is diametrically opposed. E. G. That I am now writing is but contingent, because I do it upon choice: yet God's foreknowledge of this my writing from all Eternity did infer that this my writing would infallibly come to pass. This event is contingent, for I can choose; but yet infallible, for God cannot err. This contingent therefore doth infallibly come to pass, not by way of a consequent, but by way of consequence. My writing being not the effect, but the object only of God's Omniscience; which is, in order, before the Act. God foresees a contingent will contingently come to pass, and therefore we infer it will infallibly come to pass, because he foresees it who is infallible. So that his prescience is a consequent of the things coming to pass; and its infallibility of coming to pass is inferred from his prescience only by way of consequence. It is one thing, to follow as the effect of a Cause, in order of Nature; and quite another, to follow as the sequel of an Antecedent, in way of Argumentation. The short and plain upshot of all is this: The precious vessels of Election do very certainly and infallibly persevere unto the end, and that by reason of God's omniscience which cannot be deceived; but not of necessity and irresistibly, by reason of his omnipotence which cannot be frustrate nor defeated. What God foresees shall come to pass, shall infallibly come to pass, and that because he cannot err who is omniscient. (On the other side) what God decrees shall come to pass, must come to pass of necessity, because he cannot be resisted who is omnipotent.  
49. Hence it is easy to distinguish betwixt the other two things, which have been so often, & so unhappily confounded; 
Betwixt sufficient, effectual, and unresistible.  I mean sufficient, effectual, and irresistible, applied to Grace. 1. Sufficient Grace is that, which possibly may produce that effect for which it is given. 2. Effectual is that, which certainly will. 3. Irresistible is that, which necessarily must. That which is irresistible doth carry away its object to what it pleaseth, like a mighty Torrent, by indisputable force, maugre the greatest opposition that can be made; and therefore cannot take place in the elections of the will, which ceaseth to elect after the nature of a will, in case it be made to do any thing whether it will or no, (as hath already been showed from no less a concession than that of Doctor Twisse:) but that which is only effectual is quite another thing, and doth prevail upon the will not ineluctably, but infallibly. It doth so strongly and effectually incline the will, at such critical opportunities, and by such congruous means, as that the will doth very certainly and undoubtedly assent: but it doth not so irresistibly and compulsively necessitate, as to take away the freedom and possibility of assenting, by making it do what it doth, even whether it will or no.  
50. I discern the truth of this distinction with greater ease, 
Betwixt action in general, and volition in particular. Betwixt taking and choosing.  by having always in my prospect the very great difference betwixt the generical notion of acting or taking, and the specifical notion of willing or choosing. God indeed (if it please him) can by his absolute power over his Creature, make him act this thing, or take that thing, by ineluctable Necessity, and whether he will or no: but then that acting is not volition, and that taking is not choice: for the very word choice cannot be apprehended, but it must carry along with it a sound of freedom. Optio must be optimorum, and so duorum at least. It is of two things, or more, that we choose the best, whether in reality or in appearance. And this liberty of the will by which we choose, being acknowledged on all sides, (as well by Mr. Perkins and Dr. Twisse, as by Bellarmine and Arminius, as every man knows that hath but read and compared them) that famous {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of a twofold Necessity, the one of coaction, and the other of infallibility, (being built upon a manifest and gross mistake, both of the word Necessity, and the word Infallibility,) seems to me to be serviceable to no other end, than to cover a wound, which 'tis impossible to cure. But admit of that distinction of a twofold Necessity, or admit a Necessity be twenty fold, yet still it ceaseth not to have the nature of a Necessity. If it is absolutely necessary that I must go to London, it doth not cease to be Necessity, because I am drawn, rather than driven. Coaction and infallibility, if they do both imply an absolute and peremptory necessity (and so by consequence an irresistibility, and so by consequence are opposed to the elective faculty of the Will,) it is no matter how they differ in their syllables and their sounds. Shall I declare my judgement then, (although in weakness, yet in sincerity) how freewill is necessary to the choosing of good, to which, without Grace, it is altogether insufficient? My judgement is, that it is necessary, not as a Cause, but as a Condition: not as that, by virtue of which we can do any thing that is good; but as that, without which we cannot choose it. God's Grace alone is the cause of the good, but man's will is as really the instrument of the choice. We can do good, as God's Engines, without a will; and so did Balaam's ass without a Reason: but we cannot choose good, without a freewill; as that ass could not possibly understand what she spoke, without a Ratiocination. This seems to me to be as plain as the light. And now I speak of the light, (if my Reader please) by that light I will make it plain. We know the Sun is the fountain or cause of light; and light the only means by which we see. But yet the opening of the eyelid is a necessary condition; because if I wink, I am dark at noon. And if my eyelid is held open by such a power as I cannot resist, my Eye in that case cannot choose but see, and therefore cannot choose to see. My sight may be with delectation, but not properly with that which is called election. Thus if a man be never so much delighted in doing good, but (by reason of necessity) cannot possibly but do it, it is God that chooseth that good, and the man doth only act it. I say, God chooseth, by a catachrestical way of speaking, merely the better to show my thoughts. For though God did choose to make a world, and one world, because it was in his power to have made many worlds, or none at all; yet I conceive it absurd, to say that God did choose to be good, or that he chooseth to do good, (in opposition to evil) because he is good, and doth good by an absolute necessity; he cannot choose to be, or to do, any otherwise. And so he loves, but doth not choose it. For if that were true speaking, it would be as true speaking to say, That God doth will his being and doing good whether he will or no; or that he cannot choose but choose: which is sure very childish untoward speaking. only he chooseth to enable us to do it, because he can choose whether he will so enable us, or not. When he giveth us his Grace, he hath the power to withhold it; when he continueth his Grace, he hath the power to withdraw it: therefore doth he choose both to give and to continue it. The goodness of his essence is not arbitrary and elective, but spontaneous and natural: whereas the goodness of his effects in all his Creatures is not naturally necessary in respect of him, but arbitrary and elective, merely depending upon his choice and pleasure; for he gave us our goodness when he would, and may take it away when he plcaseth. To understand this the better, and to hold it the faster in my understanding,  
51. I must carefully distinguish betwixt spontaneum (that 
Betwixt voluntary and spontaneous.  which is of its own accord) and voluntarium, (that which is freely and upon choice.) The first is agreeable to inanimate creatures, the second only to rational. That is properly opposed to violence, but reconcilable with necessity, to which this is opposed. E. G. A stone tends downwards by a natural, and necessary, and spontaneous motion. It tends downwards of necessity, because it cannot but do so: and yet spontaneously, because it doth it without violence, and of its own accord. But yet that motion is not voluntary, nor doth the stone choose that kind of tendency, because it could not refuse it, as not being furnished with the liberty of a will. Thus when I made my entrance out of the womb into the world, I did not choose to go forwards, because I had not the power to stay behind; I did it as a spontaneous, not as a voluntary Agent. But now that I am capable either of virtue, or of vice, and do pursue the one, in refusal of the other, I do it not only in a spontaneous, but in a voluntary manner. We have the perfect character of a voluntary Agent in that admirable {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of the Son of sirach. The Lord left man in the hand of his counsel; if thou wilt, 
Ecclesiasticus 15. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.  to keep the commandments. He hath set fire and water before thee: stretch forth thy hand unto whether thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh shall be given him. I dare not (like Martion) be more inquisitive, why God made man with such a freedom of willing or nilling, than why he made the hand with those two Muscles, whereof the one doth move to thetaking of a thing, and the other, to the throwing of it away.  
52. Having spoken all this in order to the clearing of resistibility of the working of Grace in God's Elect, I think I 
A result of the whole in two Examples.  cannot do better than to apply my reasoning to two Examples (at least as much of it as shall be needful;) whereof one must be the Protoplast before his Fall, and the other must be one of his posterity, whom we are very well assured to have been one of God's Elect. Adam was made in a state of Innocence, and (God not requiring any impossibilities, as brick without straw) had grace enough to have performed a most adequate obedience to God's Command. Which if he had not resisted, how could he have sinned? And if that measure of Grace was lessened before he sinned, how was the taking away of Grace any punishment of his Fall? Or, how was he then in the state of Innocence? If he was not, then was he sinful before he sinned. God doth not take away his Grace, unless to punish the abuse of it. But Adam did not abuse it before he sinned. And by our saviour's Rule [To him that hath shall be given] God would rather have given him 
Mat. 25. 28.  more, than have taken away any. From whence it follows, that though the working of Grace in the heart of Adam was so strong and so perfect, as to enable him to stand, and that in no less than a state of Innocence; yet was it also so resistible, as to suffer him to fall, and that into no less than a state of perdition. And although he had the favour to be raised again in some measure, yet it was not to that Innocence from whence he fell. So that as to his first Covenant, and his first pitch of perfection, his Fall was not only total, but final too. And indeed I would know, why our Saviour hath told us, that from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath, if it is not for this reason, because he hath lavished out his talon, and hath resisted that power of doing well which was offered him. Sure there is no better arguing than ab actu ad potentiam. Man can resist, because he doth. And I may wonder, as well as Grotius, why such men are not confuted by their own experience, who say that Grace in the Elect is unresistible, unless they will deny themselves to be of the number of the Elect. David had Grace to have done better than he did in the double matter of Uriah, but he resisted it with a witness, and that for some months together. He was a vessel of election; how then did he resist the Grace of God, so as to fall into those damnable and killing sins, in which if he had been snatched away, he had perished irreversibly? It was not without grace, (for he was one of the Elect;) nor by its concurrence, (for God was not guilty:) it was therefore against the working and means of Grace. Indeed if God did his utmost, such as David could never sin: Or if they could, it would argue God to be conquered either by man, or Devil. unless we should say, that such omnipotent grace doth come, and go, and come again, after the measure that God is willing a man should sin, and repent, and sin again. And therefore it is evident, that God Almighty, in his Elect, doth show the congruous, efficacious power, but not the irresistibility and almightiness of his Grace. Sure David (and Solomon) did fall from Grace, by resisting it, in both acceptions of the word Grace, (as it is taken for gracious living, and as it is taken for the favour of God;) and this invincibly conclusible even from that very answer which is wont to be alleged for irresistibility. For they say that God had decreed the Repentance and return of David, and that therefore he could not die, until he had repented. Which is spoken by them for this reason, because if David had not repented, he must have perished: which yet he could not have done, if he had continued in the state of Grace.  
53. If against this it is excepted, That though a vessel of Election 
And that cleared from an exception.  may fall damnably from Grace, yet he cannot finally; this is unworthy for a Scholar to speak or hear: for whoever was so silly as to say or think, that the precious vessels of Election can fall away finally? this is not answering the argument, but forsaking the Question. The Question is, whether the Grace of God doth work irresistibly in the Elect? not, whether or no it brings them to a most certain and infallible degree of bliss? (For they that dispute against the first, affirm the second.) Grace is proved to be resistible in God's Elect by such examples as David. And to that it is answered, he could not so resist as to fall away finally. Which is first a skipping from the first Question to the second, and secondly, it is to say (what no man living doth gainsay) that such as persevere unto the end can never fall away finally. A gross identical proposition, which doth not only betray the weakness of that opinion which it asserteth, but doth establish the truth of this very Cause which I am pleading. For it confesseth, that Grace is resistible, and only denies that it is finally resisted. David was able to resist it, but he did not resist it unto the end. And every technical Grammarian can distinguish the Act which is employed in the Participle, from the Aptitude which is couched in the Adjective in bilis. But (to hasten towards the conclusion of my Readers sufferings) there is also a final as well as total resisting of such a Grace as is sufficient for the attainment of Glory. For (not to speak of those men who resisted and sinned against all the means that could be used, Isa. 5. 4. and who always resisted the Holy Ghost, Acts 7. 51. and who would not be gathered, after never so many essays, Mat. 23. 37.) how many Christian professors are now in Hell, who when they were Infants were fit and suitable for Heaven? Shall not I spare Nineveh, in which are above 120000. souls, which cannot distinguish betwixt the right hand and the left? Jonah 4. 11. God speaks there of Heathen Infants, towards whom his Bowels did yearn within him, and that upon the impendence of but a temporal destruction. But I speak here of Infants born and baptised into a membership of the Church. How many are there of such, who in their harmless nonage were babes of Grace, and yet have outlived their Innocence, so as at last to be transformed into vessels of wrath? I will shut up this Paragraph with the words of Tertullion. 
* Saulum tam Dei Spiritus vertit in Prophetan, quam & malus spiritus post●ain Apostat●m. Iud●m aliquandi● cum electis dep●●atum post●a diabolus intravit. Tert. de anima c 1.  Saul was turned into a P●ophet by the Spirit of holiness, as well as into an Apostate by the spirit of uncleanness: And the Devil entered into Judas, who for some time together had been deputed with the Elect. And with the saying of St. Augustine, That 
† Si regeneratus & just ficatus in malam vi●am sua vol●ntate r●lab●tur, certo is non potest d●cere, 〈…〉 on acc●pi, q●●a acc●ptam gratiam Dei suo in malum arbi●●io l●bero amisit. Aug. de Grat. & Corr. c. 6. &c. 9  if the regenerate and justified shall fall away into a wicked course of living by his own will and pleasure, he cannot say, I have not received, because he hath wilfully lost that Grace of God which he had received, by that will of his which was at liberty to sin. And how exactly that Father doth speak my sense of this business, I leave it for any one to judge who shall consult him De praed. Sanct. l. 1. c. 14. De bono Persev. l. 2. c. 1, & 6. & l. 2. c. 8, & 13. And I would very fain know, whether the lost Groat, the lost Sheep, and the prodigal Son, do not signify (in our saviour's Parables) that a true believer may be lost, and being lost may be found, and again become a true believer. Which is as much as I desire to prove the thing under consideration.   

CHAP. V.  
54. HAving evinced to myself (and that is all that I pretend to) 
The Decr●e of Election conditional and respective.  first, that my will of itself is inclinable to evil; and that, secondly, of itself it is not inclinable to good; and that, thirdly, it is inclined by the singular and special operation of Grace, to the refusing of evil, and to the choosing of good; and 
Quâ gratiâ non nova voluntas creature, neque invita voluntas cogitur; sed infirma sanatur, depravata corrigitur, & ex mala in ●onam convertitur, ac interi●re quodam modo trabitur, ut ex nolente volens efficiatur, & Divinae vocationi libenter consentiat, &c. August. de great. & lib. a●b. ad Valent. cap. 13.  that therefore, in the fourth place, that singular Grace doth not work so irresistibly as to compel an unwilling will, but yet so strongly, as to heal a sick one; not so necessitating the will of God's Elect, as that inevitably it must, but yet so powerfully persuading, as that it certainly will, both believe and obey, and after repentance persevere unto the end: I should in civility to my Reader conclude this Trouble, if I were sure that some men would not call it Tergiversation; and if I were not obliged by those Papers, which have been so frequently, so falsely, (that I may not say maliciously) transcribed, and are threatened to be laid very publicly to my charge, (and which I plead in the defence of this mine own publication, which I should never have chosen upon such a subject, as I have least of all studied, and am least delighted in of any other) to remonstrate the utmost of what I think in these matters. For I do steadfastly believe (what I also asserted in that extemporary D●scourse, which was the innocent cause of this unacceptable effect.) That God's Decree of Election 
Sicut praescit, praedestina●, & propterea praedestinat, quia quale futurum sit praescit. Malatantum praescit, & non praedestinat. Aug. in Resp. ad calum. Pelag. sub initium l. 6. ●ypognosticon.  from all eternity, was not absolute and irrespective, but in respect unto, and in prescience of some qualification, without which no man is the proper object of such Decree. And this I prove to myself from these ways of Reasoning.  
55. First, I consider with myself, that there is no salvation but only to such as are found to be in Christ Jesus, in the 
Proved by reason from its being respective of our being in Christ, and of the conditions by which we are so.  day of Death and of judgement. Which no man living can be, unless he be qualified with such conditions, as without which it is impossible to be so found (such as are Faith, and Obedience, and Repentance, after sin, bringing forth such fruits as are worthy of Repentance, and perseverance in well-doing unto the end.) That God will save none but such, is all men's Confession. And that he saves none but such whom he decrees to save, is every whit as plain. Therefore none but such are the object of such Decree. For if he decreed to save any without regard or respect to their being such, he might actually save them without regard or respect to their being such. Because whatsoever is justly decreed, may be justly executed as it is decreed. But it is granted on all sides (●s I suppose) that God will save none except such as are found to be in Christ with the aforesaid qualifications: and therefore it should be agreed on all sides, that he decreed to save none but such as they. And what is that but a respective and conditional Decree, made in intuition of our being in Christ, and of our being so qualified to be in Christ? So that although our election is not of works, but of him that calleth; yet good works are required as a necessary condition, though utterly unworthy to be a cause of our election. Nor can it be without respect to the condition of the Covenant, that the Covenant is made, and the promise decreed to be fulfilled.  
56. Secondly, I consider, that the Decree of the Father to send the Son to be a second Adam, was in respect and regard to the back-sliding of the first Adam. Without which it was impossible that the Son of God should have been sent to be the Saviour of the world. And the decree of God Almighty to save 
Eph. 1. 4, 6. Rom. 8. 39 2 Cor. 5. 15.  the first Adam, was in regard of and respect to the meritoriousness of the second Adam. For God adopteth never a child, nor doth acknowledge him for his own, so as to give him eternal life, unless it be for the sake of his only-begotten Son. First, God pitied a woeful world, than he loved what he pitied, next he gave his own Son to save what he loved; and upon the condition of believing in his Son, he gave it a promise of eternal life. For so believing is interposed betwixt love and life, in the 3. of S. John verse 26. God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish but have everlasting life. From this Text it appeareth, that God loved the world before he gave his Son to it; for therefore gave he his Son, because he loved it. But it was not a love by which he loved it to life everlasting; for with such love he only loved it in his Son; and the world is not capable of such a love without the condition of believing. It was therefore in prescience of our believing in Christ, that God elected us to life eternal. For Christ is not only the means, (as some affirm) but the meritorious cause, and the Head of our Election. Christ was foreknown, 1 Pet. 1. 2. and we in him, Rom. 8. 29. Christ was predestined, and we by him, Ephes. 1. 5.  
57 Thirdly, I consider, that there must be a difference before 
And from the nature of Election. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Oecum. apud Episc. wint. de Artic. Lamb. ●●d.  there can be an election. Love indeed is an act of favour, but election is properly an act of judgement; a preferring of the better before the worse. They that say God elected such a number of men without the least intuition of their qualifications by which they are differenced from the reprobated crew, do speak illogically (to say no worse.) How much safer is it to say, that because such men as are in Christ by Faith, are better than such as are out of Christ by Infidelity, therefore those are taken, and these are left? Nor doth this derogate from God, or arrogate to man, to say, he chooseth his own gifts, any more than it doth to say, he crowns them. For God doth gave us the advantage of our being in Christ, as well as choose us for that advantage. First he giveth us his Son, next he giveth us his Grace whereby to enable us to believe in his Son, and so believing he doth elect us. So that here is no matter for man to boast on; he having nothing which he hath not received, no not so much as his {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. It is God that makes the difference, as well as God that chooseth. And it seems this very argument from the nature and use of the word Election, did prevail with S. Austin and Oecumen●us. St. Austin saith expressly, that justification precedeth Election; 
Non tamen Electio praecedit justificationem, sed Electionem justificatio. Nemo enim eligitur, nisi ●am d●stans ab illo qui rejicitur. unde quod dictum est, Quia eleg●t nos Deus ante mundi constitutionem, non video quomodo sit dicendum nisi praescientia. August. ad Simpl. 1. 2.  and his reason is, because no man is elected unless he differ from him that is rejected.  
58. Fourthly, I consider that the whole Tenor of the Scriptures, 
Proved by Scripture.  in the judgement of all the Fathers, who are best able to understand them, teacheth no other predestination, than in and through Christ, which is respective and conditional. First the Scripture gives us none but conditional promises; such as, If any man keep my saying, he 
Joh. 8. 51. Gal. 6. 7, 9  shall never taste Death. Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he reap. And, we shall reap if we faint not. If any man will hear my voice, and open the door, I 
Rev. 3. 20.  will come in to him, &c. Nay even the very Texts which are wont to be urged for irrespective Election do seem very precisely to evince the contrary. For when God is said to predestine according to his good pleasure which he 
Eph. 1. 9  had purposed in himself, the word {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, rendered good pleasure, doth not signify the absoluteness, but the respectiveness of his will: for it relateth to something in which God is well pleased, and that is Christ. It being impossible for God to please himself with mankind, or for men to be acceptable and well pleasing to God, any otherwise than in him, of whom it was said, This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased. Besides, all those Scriptures which do teach universal Grace, and Redemption, (which I suppose hath been proved in the prosecution of my first principle) do seem to me most clearly to infer a respective and conditional Election. For if it is true, that Christ did offer up himself, not only sufficiently, but intentionally, for all; if he did earnestly desire, that every one would come in upon the preaching of his Word, and receive the benefit of his Death and Passion; if his warnings were not in jest, and his invitations serious; if [depart from me ye cursed] was therefore foretold, that every one might beware and not obtrude himself upon that sentence; if he is unwilling that any one should be caught in the serpent's snare, who shows to all (without exception) a certain way to escape; if (as St. Austin speaks) he is desirous not to strike, who bids us look to 
Aug in S●rm. 28. de Sanct. Idem contra 2 epist. Pelag. l. 3. c. 2. Idem de sp. & lit. ad Marcell. c. 33.  our posture, and stand upon our guard; if (as St. Austin speaks again) he shows his power to punish none but only those that refuse his Mercy, and would not damn any one without respect to sin, who gave his own Son to die for all: then his refusing of the Goats in respect of that which makes them differ from Sheep, infers his Election of the Sheep in respect of that which makes them differ from Goats. And I have made the more haste to make this Inference, because as the respectiveness of Election needs not otherwise to be proved than by the respectiveness of Reprobation; so they are both taken for granted, upon the supposition of Christ's having died, not only sufficiently, but intentionally, for all. Towards which (having discoursed so largely of it already) I will only offer this one consideration, which meets my pen as I am writing, and even obtrudes itself upon me to be delivered. It is briefly this: That since our Saviour upon the cross did very heartily pray, even for those very homicides, and parricides, and Deicides that killed him, we have no reason but to believe, that he laid down his life even for them that took it away; and that he died for all for whom he prayed. And yet we reading of their Murders, but not of their Repentance, I should be loath to tell my people, that those crucifying wretches were precious vessels of Election, (in compliance with that opinion, that Christ died only for the Elect) lest they should comfort up themselves in the most crimson sins that can be named (like some in the world) as well consisting with their pretensions to the kingdom of Heaven. And yet, in my shallow judgement, (which because it is shallow, I do submit to those of deeper and profounder reach, how dogmatically soever I may seem to have spoken in many places of this Discourse) I say, in my shallow judgement, Christ died for all for whom he prayed; and he prayed for them that cursed themselves. His blood be upon us (said they;) and yet (said he) Father, forgive them. He made his murderer's Execration become his Prayer. He took the poison out of their Curse, and made it wholesome for them. He wished, as well as they, that his blood might be both upon them and upon their children; but in his own most merciful, not in their barbarous and cruel sense: for they meant the guilt, He the benefit of his blood; and would have it light on them, not to accuse, but cleanse them. And yet I dare not affirm, that they were all a portion of God's Elect.  
59 Lastly, I consider, that the main stream of the Fathers doth run this way. And not to trouble my Reader with 
And by Antiquity, from the concessions of Anti-remonstrants.  such a Catalogue of particulars, as I gave in before, for a Conditional reprobation, (which yet I think were very easy upon a very small warning) I will content myself at present to prove what I say from the confessions of Beza, and Doctor Twisse. First Beza in his Comment upon Rom. 11. 
Patres hic nullo modo audiend●, qui ad praevisionem hoc referunt. Beza in Rom. 11. 2. edit. 2. Twiss. in Vin. Gr l. 1. part. 1. Digr. 8. sect. 4. p. 110. August. de bono ●ersever. c. 19 & 20. Twiss. loco citat●.  2. rejects the judgement of the Fathers, because they are not (as he would have them) for the absolute, irrespective, unconditional way. And Dr. Twisse confesseth, that all the Ancients, before St. Austin, did place the object of God's Election in Fide praevisa. At which St. Austin was so far from being any way displeased, as that (with very great reverence to their Authority) he made it appear to be an innocent and harmless Tenent. He affirmed that all the Fathers, who lived before himself, agreed in this, That the Grace of God is not prevented by human merits. Which one profession he thought sufficient for the asserting of the free Grace of the Divine predestination. To which saying of St. Austin, because I find that Dr. Twisse doth very readily subscribe, I ought in reason to be secured from any very hard censure, because I am not an affirmer of human merits, much less do I place them in a precedency to Grace.  
60. I conclude with a desire of so much liberty of conscience, 
The Conclusion.  as to believe with St. Paul, That God is a respecter not of 
* Rom. 2. 11.  Persons, but of 
* verse 14.  Works. That my sins are perfectly and entirely mine own. And that if I do any thing that is good, it is not I that do it, but the 
a 1 Cor. 15. 10.  Grace of God that is in me. Yet so, as that I can 
b Philip. 4. 13.  do all things through him that strengthens me. And who doth so strengthen, as that I may do them, but not so force me as that I must. In this, and every other thing, I have been long since taught by Vincentius Lirinensis, (whom I shall ever observe to the utmost of my discretion) to opine with the most, and most judicious, rather than with the fewest, and least discerning. Opiniastrete is a fault, but Fallibility is none. If my Teachers are in the right, they have knowledge enough to make me moderately instructed: if they are anywhere in the wrong, they have authority enough to make me pardonably erroneous: if I have not perspicacity to comprehend them as they deserve, it seems they have Depths enough to prove, I am invincibly ignorant.  
The End.   

A postscript.  
HAving been many times desired, and at last prevailed with, to permit these Notes a second time unto the press, I somewhat more than intended (for I had made some preparations, as well by adding many things, as by omitting some 
* I mean the things that are personal only, by way of Remonstrance or apology, and not exactly material to the Questions under Debate.  few) to have improved and advanced them into the dignity of a Volume, to which in justice, as well as modesty, they have not hitherto pretended. But I was prompted by second thoughts, to which I commonly submit my first, only to add such running Titles over the heads of the Pages, with such notifications of the chapters and sections relating to them, as seemed to be of advantage to common Readers: neither enlarging nor diminishing the things themselves, but taking care to have them printed, not only page for page, but line for line as they were before. And to this course I was led by two reasons more especially. First, that no correptory Correptor might have any pretence for new Inventions; and not only no cause, but no occasion to accuse me of Tergiversation. Next, that the Reader might discern, with his greatest ease, in what an incomparable manner both my words and pages had been misquoted by my Correptor, in his Aspersions, and how truly cited by me, in my Defence.  
Whosoever shall have the patience to view the structure here laid, and those unquestionable Pillars on which it lies, or shall be at the pains to compare the Rivulets with those 
* p. 6.  two Fountains from whence they stream, He will think it more than strange, that any man should be transported with such exorbitancies of passion, as to load me with dirt, for no other reason, than that he hated to see me clean; that so much money, and sweat, and time, and conscience, should be so lavishly laid out in such impure and cheap stuff, as Pelagian, Socinian, Jesuitical, Atheistical, Dragon, Devil, Impudent, Diabolical, Satanical Blasphemer, and a world of merchandise besides, fetched from the same place of traffic; and all for no other cause or provocation, than my clearing God's Will, and laying blame upon mine own.  
This kind of usage puts me in mind of what was said by King James in that Preface which he made to his Basilicon Doron. 
* {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. in Praes. ad lect. p. 6, 7.  If the charitable Reader will advisedly consider, both the method and matter of my Treatise, he will easily judge what wrong I have sustained by the carping at both.— I would have thought my sincere plainness in the first part, should have d●tted the mouth of the most envious Momus, that eve● hell did hatch (they are the Kings own words,) from ●a●king at any other part of my Book upon that Ground; except they would allege me to be contrary to myself, which in so small a Volume would smell of too great weakness & s 〈…〉 pperiness of memory.— 
* Ibid. p. 16.  Some fraughted with causeless envy at the Author, did greedi●y search out the Book, thinking their stomach fit enough, for turning never so wholesome food into noisome and infective humours.— which hath enforced the untimous divulgating of this Book, far contrary to my intentions, as I have already said— 
* p. 20.  Well, leaving these new Baptizers and Blockers of others' men's Books, to their own Follies, I return to my purpose. This again puts me in mind of what was said by another King, to whom King James was but a Subject. 
† Mat. 10. 24, ●5.  If they have called the Master of the house Beelzebub, how much more shall they call them of his household? The Disciple is not above his Master, nor the servant above his Lord: it is enough for the Disciple that he be as his Master, and the servant as his Lord. So that I have no reason to afflict myself with any Calumnies already past, or to flatter myself with any hopes, that I shall be able to prevent them for the time to come; for when the children of Men are set upon it to be injurious, neither the Serpent nor the Dove, nor both together, can escape them. Had there been place of evasion either for innocence, or circumspection (innocence giving no cause, and circumspection cutting off occasions) sure John the Baptist had not been slandered, much less our Saviour: Yet were they (each of them) slandered, not only upon divers, but upon contrary pretences. John came unto the world neither eating nor drinking, and they said, He had a 
a Mat. 11. 18.  Devil. Our Saviour came both eating and drinking, and they said, Behold a man 
b verse 19  gluttonous and a wine-bibber. Now because it is evident, that let a man's conversation be what it can be, he must eat, or not eat, drink, or not drink, no man therefore hath an exemption from being smitten with the Tongue. For if he is seen either eating or drinking, he is liable to be called either a Glutton, or a Drunkard, because Gluttons and Drunkards do eat and drink. And if he is seen neither eating nor drinking, he is apt to be reported to have a Devil, because a Devil doth neither eat nor drink. From all which I gather, That the disease of evil and false-speaking (which a late Author in two words hath called Correptory Correption) is sooner cured by a man's carelessness, than prevented by his care. For some are able to create as well the matter, as the form of their Inventions; and if we will not be so liberal, as to 
* 1 Tim. 5. 14  give them occasion, they will then be so bold, as to take occasion without our leave.  
What I speak on this Theme, is not only in relation to those unparalleled Inventions already publicly discovered, but in relation to some which have happened since; which if they had not since happened, I had not made the least reflection upon that which was sufficiently made known before. There is (it seems by the effect) a generation of men, who when they cannot hurt publicly by force of Argument, or dint of Pen, they love to try a more secret and private way, saying within themselves, (as once they did of Jeremiah) 
c Jer. 18. 18.  Come let us devise devices against him; come and let us smite him with the tongue. There are certain Rumigeruli, whose Trade in English is expressed by Whisperers and Tale-bearers, who having 
d {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} 1 Tim. 5. 13  learned to be idle (as the Apostle speaks of some young widows) and being perfect in that kind of learning, go wandering about from house to house: nor is that the worst of them; for they are not 
e {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, &c. ibid.  only idle (as the Apostle goes on) but Tatlers also and busybodies, speaking things which they ought not. They advise the people, in effect, not to use their own eyes; or if they do, not to trust them; not to give up their assent to what they know; nor to confide in their experience: but to believe what they are told, or to tell it as freely as if they were able to believe it; and to do it the more demurely by how much there is the greater need, as being quite against the verdicts of sense and reason. This brings into my memory the words of Prosper, 
f Prosper contra C●llat. cap. 4●. p. 413. ex August. Epist. ad Sixtum 105. Isa. 59 4. Jer. 7. 8.  Quod in ap●rto clamare jam metuunt, in secreto seminare non quiescunt: and that other saying of Cicero, Sordidum genus hominum, qui parum proficiunt, nisi admodum mentiantur,  
Now because there are those who put their* Trust in their Inventions, and 
g Ier. 9 5.  teach their Tongues to speak lies, and make Forgeries 
h Isai. 28. 15.  their refuge; I think it a duty to my self, who have been 
i Rom. 3. 8.  slanderously reported of in several kinds, & a duty which I owe both to the Reader in general, and to the credulous receivers of such reports, at least to declare as S. Paul did, that such reports are slanderous. S. Paul complained that He was slanderously reported of, in being affirmed to have said, 
* Ibid.  Let us do evil that good may come: for which report notwithstanding there was not any just cause, yet at least there was some little colour; because the Apostle had said, That the 
k verse 5.  unrighteousness of men commendeth the righteousness of God, and that the truth of God through men's 
l verse 7.  lies might the more redound unto his glory. Upon occasion of which words, either not really understood, or else industriously mistaken, he was reported by his enemies to have said another thing, viz. That evil might be done in order to a good end: which was so far from having been said by the Apostle, that he declared it a slander, and farther pronounced of the reporters, that their 
m verse 8.  damnation was just. This was said of those men who had some colour for their Inventions. But there is not any the least colour for my being reported to be a Jesuite, or a denyer of original sin, or a Socinian, or a Pelagian, or the Author of Books which I never read, or a presumptuous affirmer that I am without sin, or any other of those things of which I am slanderously reported to have been guilty. I must therefore desire the equal Reader, that if he is not already, he will learn at least to be mistrustful, and not admit of any Traditions concerning me and my Betters, from such an uncreditable Historian as giddy RUMOR: but that he will judge of other men, as every man doth judge of Trees, by the nature of the 
a Mat. 7. 16, 20  fruits which are seen to grow from them; viz. the quality of their writings, and the constant tenor of their Lives. The words of King James to his Son Henry are very apposite and suitable on this occasion. [
b {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. l. 12. p. 99, & 100 1. 2. 3. 4.  Principally, exercise true wisdom in discerning wisely betwixt true and false Reports: First, considering the nature of the person Reporter; next, what interest he can have in the weal or evil of him of whom he maketh the report; thirdly, the likelihood of the purpose itself; and lastly, the nature and by-past life of the delated person: and where ye find a Tatler, away with him.— It is better to try reports, than to foster suspicion upon an honest man: for since suspicion is the tyrant's sickness, as the fruit of an evil conscience, potius in alteram partem peccato; I mean, in not mistrusting one, to whom no such unhonesty was known before.  
It may perhaps be of use to such as are forgers of Calumny, to be told how inhuman a sin it is, and how peculiarly Diabolical. I say peculiarly Diabolical, because it hath pleased the Holy Ghost to give the Devil the name of 


{non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}  
Diabolus.  
Diable.  
Diavolo.  
Devil.    Devil, even from that his chief property, of raising Calumnies and framing lies. Thence said our Saviour to the Jews, Ye are of your Father the 
c Joh. 8. 44.  Devil, who when he speaketh a Lie, he speaketh of his own: from whence there is nothing more evident, than that the Devil is the 
d Ibid.  Father as well of liars, as of lies. It may also be of use to such as are able to believe the most incredible Narrations, to consider the deceitfulness of that old Proverb (to which they trust and give credence) to wit, that a great deal of smoke doth argue at least some little fire: For the most impure dunghill may smoke and vapour, when yet there is not the least Fire that can be pretended to be the cause. And therefore if any man shall liken me to that (e) Dragon of 
e Correp. Corr. Epist. Ded. 2. p 16.  Hell, Rev. 12. 15. or 
† Id. ibid. p. 15 e That Dragon was the old Serpent, the Devil and Satan, Rev. 20. 2.  use to call this Copy of harmless Notes, Daemon Meridianum, that is, a masculineneuter-noonday Devil, his Reader must not think so hardly of my Person, or my Papers, as to give the least credit to such Reports, till we are able to show him some Cloven Feet.  
Now because I am ascertained by several Authors, that my Notes and I shall be assaulted by some new Machines of the old Engineer, as soon as a Stationer shall be found of a more daring complexion, than those that hitherto have refused to thrust the Things into the light; and because it is easier of the two, to prevent a Calumny, then to expel it; and because I would abstain (as much as in me lies) as well from every appearance, as from every kind of so great an evil, as that of raising a false Report (which I so groundedly hate, and so feelingly condemn, that if through ignorance or credulity I have wronged any man, I will, upon knowledge of any such wrong, make as ample satisfaction, as I am able to require from my Delators) I say, for these good reasons, I think it fit that I vindicate myself and others, from the least suspicion of having injured the late most learned and pious Primate of Armagh, whose utter di like and rejection of all the Doctrines of Geneva, touching the points in debate betwixt my Neighbours and my self, I did publicly affirm, not without just ground and mature deliberation. For which, however I am censured and threatened too, yet am I not able (being innocent) either tobe troubled at such unkindness, or to be scared with such Bugs. For first I spoke what I spoke (and I speak it still) to the immortal Honour of that Great Prelate, who preferred Truth before Error, although the Error was such as had first possessed him. The first point of honour is to repent us of our sins; and the next to that, is to retract our aberrations. If I had spoken without witness, I had but charitably erred, because in materia favorabili, non odiosa. I said no more of my Lord Primate, than of King James, and Bishop Andrews, & Melanchthon, who in the declining part of their Lives, did also change their judgements unto the better. I said no more in effect, than that the Reverend Primate did conform his judgement (and so professed not long before his death) to all the Fathers of the Church for the first four Centuries after Christ; as even the Adversary must grant, unless he will venture to accuse S. Austin's 
* Prosp. acquit. in Epist. ad August. p. 886.  Second. In saying, that the Primate did embrace the Doctrine of universal Redemption, (which I can prove by many most unquestionable Persons, who had it poured into their ears by the Primates own mouth) I do as good as say all, although not all I have to say. And yet in saying that, I say no more, than that his Lordship did concur with the Evangelist S. John, who hath delivered his Belief in these plain words, That Jesus Christ the righteous is the propitiation for our sins; and not for our sins only, but Also for the sins of the WHOLE WORLD, 1 Ioh. 2. 1, 2. In a word, whosoever shall appear to hold that Negative (which by being but a Negative will be impossible to be proved) That my Lord Primate of Armagh did not declare his Rejection of those Opinions which I resist, and which himself had embraced in former times, will wrong the memory of the Bishop, to whom in singleness of affection I have done this right. And of what I now say, or said before, I am ready and willing to give a satisfactory account, either privately, or publicly, to Friends or Enemies, as occasion shall serve, or need require. What I said will be proved by several learned and grave Divines, who had conference with the Bishop upon that subject, and will be glad, upon just occasion, to attest the same under their Hands. And to vindicate myself in this particular, as well as the Friends of the Bishop, who are the witnesses of his chan●, and of the Bishop himself especially, who●e is the happiness and the Glory to have professed it, was one of my principal Inducements to give the Reader this little postscript.  
The End.