THE cordial OF Mr. David jenkin's: OR HIS REPLY To H. P. barrister of Lincolns-inn, ANSWERED.  
LONDON: Printed for Robert Bostock, dwelling in Paul's churchyard, at the sign of the Kings Head. 1647.   

Master JENKINS his REPLY Answered.  
IN all the Papers which M J. weekly almost publishes (to slander and condemn the Parliament of Rebellion, Perjury, Oppression, Cozenage, &c.) his main artifice, and that which most infects the people, is, his blending and confounding things together, which are in nature different, and by all means ought to be discriminated. In three things especially his want of ingenuity is most obvious, and his not distinguishing most advantageous to him. For, first, He puts no difference betwixt that latitude of power which is due to a just just in just things, and when he pursues the true interest of his people; and that power which consists in doing wrong. And yet nothing is more notorious than this, that the Kings of England have vast Prerogatives in doing good, but none at all to do any man, much less the whole State, harm. Secondly, He distinguishes not betwixt those actions of the Subject which are done in times of necessity, and upon extraordinary extremities; and those which are done in ordinary times, when there is no special emergent cause to enforce them. Thirdly, He compares not the smaller matters of the Law with the weightier, but attributes to both alike; nay, when both 〈◊〉 consist or take place at the same time, he makes the weightier Law give way to that which is of less consequence, and may be reckoned, inter apices juris. The Law will admit of a private mischief rather than a public inconvenience; as nature will suffer this particular quantity of water contrary to its own propenfity to be violented and rapt upwards, rather than that any vacuity should be in the universe. But M. J. sometimes will endure public mischief, rather than private inconveniences; he will rather allow that Salus Populi shall be opposed, than such or such a branch of Prerogative, or the propriety of the Subject should be strained. Law is not so dull a study as some men would have it, nor are its bounds restrained to the ordinary actions and pleas of J. a Nokes and J. a styles, about a carve of ground, &c. no; the profession is far more noble, and as its basis, is reason improved with logic, so its pyramid is policy crowned with History and Philosophy. That Lawyer therefore that will argue upon this high subject, which M. J. now undertakes, aught to root himself deeper, before he begins to build up his argument, and to take notice of these premises:  
1. That all men who are qualified, and exalted to bear rule in a sphere above other men, are so dignified and differenced by some Commission; which Commission must be granted by man immediately, or else by God extraordinarily, and immediately.  
2. That in this age (which knows of no Oracles, or miracles remaining) God does not immediately, and otherwise then by the same providence (as rules in other human affairs) either design the persons, or distinguish the Prerogative of any Kings or Potentate. God is not said more properly to promote to the crown of England Edward the fourth, than Henry the sixth; nor to make a King of France more unlimitable than a King of England: These things are left to men, the same providence of God attending them, as attends other matters. Yea, the Scripture is most clear in this, that when God by immediate and extraordinary orders from heaven did interpose in designing Saul to the Throne of Israel, yet he did it by lottery, and did it so, that Saul might be said elected, and constituted by the people, as well as designed by God. And indeed since all Princes, whether hereditary, or elective, whether more absolute, or more conditionate, whether enthroned by just Title, or by tortion, and mere force, have Commissions equally from Heaven: How can we think that Heaven acts immediately alike in all? since Cyrus is as well God's anointed in those Provinces which he wins by the sword, as in those which come to him by descent; and the French King is as truly God's Vicegerent now in France, as Charles (whom he has intruded upon) is in England; and since the King of Spain, by special Law of Heaven, can claim no larger supremacy in Castille, then in Burgundy, in Naples, then in Arragon; what an unreasonable thing is it, to ascribe all these devolutions of rule, and variations of power to the immediate hand of God, which changes not, rather than to the acts of men, which are seldom permanent?  
3. That if we will suppose that Prince's Commissions are all immediately drawn and signed by God, yet we cannot suppose that God's Commission ever enabled any man to do injury; his charge to all Kings is contrary, and does inhibit all insolence in comportment, nay even all elation of heart. And for man, (so far as Princes are inaugurated upon earth) we see by experience they all almost have their visible tautologies, and Boundaries set to them; and it were most unnatural if the intendment of all human laws should not refer to the safety of the people.  
4. That if any obscurity or ambiguity be in other laws, yet in the laws of England there is none at all. All our Books proclaim our Nation to be a free Nation, and our Kings to be limited from doing any wrong. And because there may be dispute about the interpretation of these generals, therefore particulars are deduced out of them, and our laws do not only declare us free, but wherein our freedom consists; nor do they bind the King from wrong but specify withal, what is wrong to the Subject. If the King arbitrarily change our laws, raise Subsidies, impose Taxes, imprison our bodies, deny, delay, or sell justice to us; this is declared to be wrong, and inconsistent with our freedom. And if any question arise about our Charters, the King himself cannot interpret, or sit as Judge, he is in all cases taken to be a party, and so incompetent to sit as Judge. His sworn Judges are to do right betwixt him and the Subject out of Parliament, and the two Estates are to do right above the Judges, if need be, in Parliament. And in case of any perplexity or doubt, the liberty and safety of the people is to be preferred before the Prerogative of the King; and all interpretations must rather favour that interest which is general, then that which is particular. And for the Military power of England, as the King ought not to use any other than the natural Liege people of England in his wars; so neither can he press the people of England to serve in his wars at discretion. If the war be foreign, or against a foreign power, the Parliament ought to be consulted in it; but if force be to be used against subjects, that force is to be merely sub-servient to Law, and whether it be to execute ordinary Judgements, or to suppress Riots, or Insurrections (how dangerous or great soever) the sheriff, and other ordinary Officers of Justice ought to be employed in the business, and those which are so employed are to be directed solely by the Judges and Courts of the Land in speeding Law, and not at all by any extrajudicial command of the King in opposition to Law: If these things were not so, the King of England could not be restrained from doing wrong, our Kings would be above all Law, and the Law could have no power above them, and if our Kings were above laws, and not restraineable thereby from doing wrong, the people of England were not a free people, but as remediless Slaves, as the Grand Signiors vassels are. Our laws provide against servitude in us, but that were vain if they did not provide also for efficacy in themselves, in so much as laws, if the King were above them, and so might alter them at pleasure, or interpret them according to his own sense, or could execute, or not execute at discretion by being sole Master of the sword, would be no better than Cobwebs to us.  
By the light which reflects from these fundamentals premised, we shall now the better view and examine that which Mr. Jenkins' replies to the eight particulars of H. P.  
In the first particular the question is, Whether the House of Commons have power to examine a Delinquent or no, Mr jenkin's holds the negative upon this ground, that they have neither the King's Writ, Patent, nor Commission for it. It was answered, That they did both sit and act by the King's Writ, and something greater than the King's Writ. Mr jenkin's not being able to deny that the Parliament was summoned by the King's Writ, and that it is continued still by an Act passed fince, only quarrels at the Act of continuance, pretending that the Act by which this Parliament is continued agrees not with the Act passed lately for a triennial Parliament, nor with that for an annual Parliament, passed in Edw. the thirds time, as also that it is mischievous, otherwise by Protections, privileges, &c. Is not this to quarrel with the King and both Houses? Is not this to tell us that Mr. jenkin's is wiser than all the three Estates, though joined together? The King, the Lords, and Commons judged that this Act did agree with the other two, yet Mr. jenkin's judges contrary. The King, the Lords, and Commons judged the advantage of this Act to be greater than any inconveniences, Mr. jenkin's is of another mind. Our books have a Rule, That no man ought to be wiser than Law; Mr. jenkin's exempts himself out of this Rule; but in the next place, whatsoever the three Estates may do, yet Mr. jenkin's tells us, that the two Houses make no Court, nor Body Corporate, nor Parliament without the King, no more than a man remains a man without a head; Here is the mistake, Mr. jenkin's thinks the King is a head to the Parliament simpliciter, or phisicè, whereas he is so but secundum quid, or metaphorisè, for if he were such a head to the politic Body, as the true head is to the natural Body, the body could have no subsistence without him; but experience in our case teaches us the contrary, and we can easily calculate that if the whole royal Line should be spent, and the crown Escheat sitting a Parliament, the Lords and Commons would remain a living Parliament, and be the supreme power of the kingdom without a King: Also if this should happen out of Parliament, the Lords joining with the chosen representants of the whole kingdom would be equally as competent (if not more) for all Acts of Majesty, and supreme dominion as now they are in Parliament. Mr. jenkin's must needs also know, that there are some Acts of Parliament yet of force in this Land, which by the Lords and Commons were carried and consumnated, not only without but even against the King; but I forbear to draw Censure upon myself by citing them; and whereas it was objected, That the Parliament was in a meaner condition than other inferior Courts, if the King's mere discretion could so make their deliberations void and vain. Mr. jenkin's replies, That this is most true and just, for as much as in other Courts the King can neither judge nor control; but in the Court of Parliament (quoad Acts) the King is both Judge and Controller. And why cannot the King judge and control in the ordinary Courts? because there they have the King's power committed to them by Patent, and as they are sworn to do right, so the King is sworn not to interrupt or frustrate them. Thus:  
1 We see the King's Patent to a few men is more vigorous, than the most honourable Writ of the Law is when it is directed from the King to all the peers, and Commons of the Land abetted besides with formal Statutes.  
2 We see an Oath taken from the Judges is of more value than the faith and loyalty of the whole people.  
3 We see the King by his Coronation Oath is stronglier obliged not to obstruct Justice in private cases; depending before lower Courts, than the general safety and welfare of the people in that Treshault counsel, which is so honourable that none ought to think ignobly of it.  
4 We must grant, that Mr. jenkin's can better tell what the Law is in this point than both Houses.  
5 Whereas an Argument Ab inconvenienti was valid in Law before, now an Argument drawn from the safety and liberty of the whole State, and from the end of all Law is made ridiculous by Mr. jenkin's; for he which grants we are borne to liberty and safety as our right, yet grants no means to attain to that right, nor remedy to recover it, except the King's Grace, and even then the Grand seigniors Subjects have their Master's grace and discretion to depend upon as well as we.  
Thus is our state like a goodly Ship, exquisitely decord, strongly manned, and abundantly rigged with all kind of Tackling; and so built for agility in fair weather, that nothing in that respect can be added to her perfection; yet still she is so moulded by these kind of Royalists, that the least foul weather over-sets her. We have excellent laws to secure our proprieties against the crown; we have excellent privileges in Parliaments to secure our laws against the Judges, and other Ministers of the crown; and yet nevertheless the Parliament itself is so discontinuable, dissolvable, and controllable by the Crown, that our all which depends upon it, has nothing in the last place, to make itself good to us, but the favour of the crown.  
Thus may our laws and privileges, in which there is acknowledged to be a directive, but no coactive force over the King, be compared to an imaginary mathematical Line in the heavens, but not to any fence or circumvallation upon the earth: Well may they inform the King what we ought to enjoy, as the laws of God and nature without them do to all other Nations; But they can never assure us what we shall enjoy. And therefore I wonder why the Royalists should so much extol the rare Constitution of this Kingdom, when besides some other flowers of the crown, they ascribe to the King such a negative voice in Parliament, as is sufficient alone to destroy all that is granted us in all things else. But to return to our Reply.  
'Tis maintained next, that whatsoever power is in both Houses, yet there is no power in the House of Commons to examine at all, because the House of Commons cannot administer an Oath; and examination without Oath is a mere communication, and rejected as unprofitable in Law.  
One reason why the House of Commons cannot examine upon Oath, is because it is no Court; and it appears to be no Court, because it has no power of trial, nor ever practised any such power, by Bill, Indictment, Information, Plaints, or original. And for the Lord cook's Relation, that the House of Commons have imposed Fines, and imprisoned men in Queen Elizabeth's time, and since; He says these are but late, and a few matters of fact, and à facto ad jus is no good argument. Here we see though the greatest plea against the House of Commons is the non-user of any such power, yet when the non-user is proved, then 'tis objected, That it is but of late times, and illustrated but by a few precedents.  
A second reason against the House of Commons being a Court, is because it has neither the King's Patent, nor any Statute nor common usage to make it so. The House of Lords is acknowledged to be a Court of Record to many purposes, partly because the King sits there, and partly because there is clear Law for their privileges; but the House of Commons is excepted against (as not within these reasons.) The truth is, both Houses are but one Court, and one council, and the time has been when they have both sat in one place together; and there may be good reason given why they may sit several and have their privileges kept distinct; and why the Lords should be more active in some matters of judgement, where the whole Commonalties interest is not touched: But this is no proof, That what the Lord's act by themselves, receives no influence from the House of Commons; Or that the House of peers is of more value in the eye of the Law, or has any greater jurisdiction by the Law, than the Representative Body of the whole State. As for the Kings sitting in the House of Lords, there is but little moment in that, in regard that he sits not there to judge, or to debate, but only to propose and consent. And there is no Law to debar him from the like in the Commons House; and so it was when both Houses sat together, and still is when they meet together. And secondly, whereas some Patent, Statute, or Usage, is demanded from the House of Commons, in maintenance of their judicial power, This we say is unreasonable: Nay, if any Patent, Statute, or Usage, could be produced for preference of the Peerage before all the Knights, Gentlemen, and Commons of England in this point; that were rather to be rejected, as most unjust and unnatural. A third reason is brought against the House of Commons out of the Writ of Summons, forasmuch as in that Writ, the King resolves, consults, and treats with his peers, super ardua regni, but the Commons are called ad faciendum & consentiendum in iis quae ibidem de communi concilio ordinari contigerint. These words of the Writ, though they are general, and in some things ambigious, yet they are no more disadvantageous to the Commons, then to the Lords or King. But if words are to be interpreted by the practice of Parliaments, and by the tenor of all our other laws, we shall find that the King's part is to propose and consent, but not to debate; that the Lord's part is to propose, debate, and consent in some things, but not in all: that the Commons part is to propose debate, and consent in all. And this appears by the raising of Treasure, the grand concernment of the Kingdom, called justly, Ornamentum pacis & firmamentum belli and in this, though the King and Lords may propose & consent, yet none but the Commons may propose, debate, and consent. From reasoning Mr Jenkins now betakes himself to railing, and tells both Lords and Commons, that whatsoever their Writ meant, they act now quite contrary; for by their Writ they were required to treat and consult with the King, concerning the King, the defence of the kingdom, and the Church; whereas they first imprison the King, next arm the kingdom for themselves against the King, and lastly demolish the Church by abolishing Bishops, Deans, &c.  
For the first, the King left them unconstrained, and deserted Westminster, whether they were summoned to attend him, and after took arms to dissolve them; but those arms being now broken, the Parliament keeps him from raising new broils, but so far are they from refusing to treat with him, that they prepare Propositions for him, and reject no messages or Letters that come from him; neither is the King's restraint properly to be called imprisonment being much different therefrom, both for the manner and for the end of it; the manner of it is ingenuous, and accompanied with many accommodations, which thousands of other freemen, nay Gentlemen of England cannot attain too; and for his Attendants, they are truly his Servants, and as observant in all Offices compatible with the peace of the kingdom as ever he had any. The end of his restraint also is not to incommodate him in any degree, there is nothing aimed at in it but to preserve the kingdom from new disturbance, till he appears fully reconciled, and to preserve him from drawing prejudice upon himself. For the second, since 'tis not for the kingdom's damage, nor the Kings, that future Commotions be suppressed; the Lords and Commons could no way better satisfy the intent of their Summons, than by suppressing Commotions by the same posture of defence as they now are in. I could wish also, that Mr. jenkin's would understand, that as the kingdom is called the Kings, so the King is called the Kingdoms; and that propriety which the kingdom has in the King, is more tenderly to be expounded then that which the King has in the kingdom. For the third, that the word Church should only be applied to churchmen, or the word churchmen to Bishops, Deans, &c. is more than the Law teaches: and if the business be studied well 'twill not be found a thing impossible, as Master jenkin's supposes for the Parliament to abolish Bishops, Deans, &c. and yet to advance churchmen, or to take away some of the excessive grandeur of churchmen without any destruction to the Church.  
2 Thus much of Mr. jenkin's Reply to the first particular, I come now to his second, where he takes it ill, that in cases of pardons the King should be thought to be virtually in the two Houses, for as much as that power he says remains solely in the King, and therefore cannot rest at all in the two Houses.  
That the power of pardoning Delinquents is so in the King solely, as that he cannot derive the same to the Parliament as he does his other power is not proved by Mr. jenkin's, nor can it be possibly proved, and that the King does not derive the same (as he does his other) is as far from being proved also; for doubtless in all Acts of Oblivion, the two Houses convey an additional vigour, and so make the Acts more virtuous than the Kings mere Act could do, and therefore this new vigour which is conveyed by the Houses, if it be not that which is derived from the King, as Mr. jenkin's Tenets deny, than it flows naturally and originally from the two Houses; and what can Mr. jenkin's cause gain by this? But says Mr. Jenkin, The King is a Prisoner, and so having no power but what is divested by his imprisonment, the power of the Houses is usurped by themselves, and not derived by the King. The block which Mr. Jenkens here stumbles at is this; He thinks an imprisoned King has no power at all, or remains indeed no King, but this is not absolutely true of all Kings imprisoned, for as our case is, either imprisonment is something more than that which our King suffers, or else imprisonment as to some Acts may stand with freedom as to other Acts. I have touched upon this subject already. But let Master jenkin's be as bitter as he pleases in his censures and reproaches, 'tis not intended by the two Houses that the King should be disabled from doing any acts of justice and piety, 'tis only from raising new Forces, and begetting new concussions, that this new guard desires to prevent him. Master jenkin's next says, that the King may revoke and discharge his Commissions at pleasure, but what of this? the question is, whether or no the King may frustrate and elude his Commissions; and this Master jenkin's speaks not directly to. We need not quarrel therefore further about this, we will grant to Master jenkin's that Parliaments may be justly determined and dissolved by our King, provided he will grant to us that the same may be justly frustrated or eluded. But Master jenkin's stomachs much at our calling the two Houses a Parliament, and censures it in us as a great delusion, although we know well that nothing is more common in speech, then to say that the King calls his Parliaments, writes to his Parliaments, dissolves his Parliaments, &c. The King must be taken abstracted from that which he calls, writes to, and dissolves, or else we must consider him calling himself, writing to himself, dissolving himself, which cannot be without absurdity. Besides, when we speak of the great council of the kingdom, we mean the Parliament abstracted from the King, forasmuch as the King in Parliament does not so properly give as receive counsel, and why we may not as well call the two Houses a Parliament, as the great council, treshault Court, or mickle-gemot of the King and kingdom, I cannot devise. The Law says the King cannot be absent from his parliament; this must be meant authoritatively, not personally, for divers of our Kings have been in France sitting Parliaments here, and yet even they were politically present, though physically absent, as Master jenkin's himself must needs grant. Now if the Parliament be the King's Court or council, and such a Court or council as he cannot virtually be absent from, though in person he be often distant, and at some time must not be otherwise, how can it be maintained by Master jenkin's that the two Houses are not the Parliament? Another objection of Master jenkin's against the two Houses is, that they were deserted by divers of their own Members, who in considerable numbers went to the King at Oxford; but this is no other objection than might be made against the Husband, when the wife elopes and withdraws from his bed, shall that party which remains constant, and attends duly at the place assigned in the summons for transacting of that business which was specified in the summons, suffer for that party's sake which proved inconstant, and neither observed the place nor business of the writ by which it was convened? sure this is most unreasonable; doubtless when the King called these uncertain members mongrels, who together with their whole faction would neither be cordially true to Religion and Liberty at London, nor totally consent to subvert them at Oxford, he had more reason on his side then Master jenkin's has, who disparages those that kept their stations because of the defection of their mongrel brethren. In the last place Master jenkin's though he confesses that the common Law did always restrain our Kings from all tallages & subsidies but by consent in Parliament, as doth appear by Magna Charta; yet he says this is no consequence, because the King cannot take the subjects good at pleasure, therefore the Commons have a concurrent power with the King in Parliament; indeed this consequence is ill-framed, but in its right form it appears thus; if the Commons in Parliament have that great power to raise treasure out of the whole kingdom, which the King has not our of Parliament, than they must deduce this power from themselves, or those whom they represent, and not from the King, who cannot give that which he has not in himself; but so it is that the Commons have this power, Ergo. If Mr. jenkin's will answer this he shall befriend my intellect. The last objection which Master jenkin's makes against this concurrent power of the Commons in granting subsidies is this, that Parliaments may be held, and be complete Parliaments without subsidies, and hereupon he tells us that former Parliaments rarely granted any unless in time of forrain-Warres; and Q. Eliz. refused a subsidy granted, & K. Ia. in his first year had none granted him. Is there any solidity in this objection? I appeal to all ingenuous men, Parliaments may be without subsidies, Ergo the granting of subsidies is no act of power in Parliaments; or thus, giving of subsidies is an Act of power in Parl. but since at sometime it may be diffused and intermitted, or a power that at sometimes is not reduced into acts, therefore it is no power, or not inherent in the people, but only derivative from the King. Let Master jenkin's apply his own words to himself here, for certainly he ought to make a conscience of blinding the people with such untrue colours to the ruin of King and kingdom.  
3. The third particular now offers it sel●●●n order, and here Master jenkin's his reply ought to prove that if the two Houses had a Parliamentary power in themselves, they needed not send Propositions to the King, but instead of opposing this (which was the only thing made good by his answerer) he diverts his force to oppose the equity and justice of the Propositions sent to his Majesty. This is not to reply to his Answerer, but to satisfy his own peevish disposition; yet since he may abuse the people as well when he rails as when he argues something must be returned in answer to him. After he has magisterially condemned the Propositions in general as being contrary to law, he vouchsafes at last thus particularly to interrogate us: Have the two Houses a strict right to lay upon the people what taxes they judge meet, have they power to pardon all Treasons, &c. subintelligitur without the King's consent? We answer they have not any such ordinary power; but if the kingdom's safety lie upon it, and the King will not concur in saving the kingdom in an ordinary way, they may have recourse to extraordinary means for the saving of it ordinarily the people may not take up arms, but in case of extraordinary invasion by foreign or domestic force they may justify taking up of Arms, and when War itself is justifiable, all the necessary concomitants and expedients of a politic war are justifiable. Nature has confined water to a descending course, yet not by such a rigid Law, but that for the necessary subvention of the whole fabric, and for the avoiding of that vacuity which Nature more abhors then the dispensation, or temporary suspension of such, or such a particular inferior Law, this ponderous element may forsake its ordinary course, and mount upwards. In a Village where houses stand scattered and remote, 'tis not lawful for me to demolish this house, because that which stands next it is all of a flame, but in a city this is lawful where the houses are so conjoined, that the flame of one house may extend itself to the consuming or endangering of a whole street or more. It is not generally lawful for me to judge my neighbour unheard, or to execute my neighbour unjudged: Yet if I find my neighbour engaged in such a Treason as Faulx was, and ready with his Match to give fire to such a train of Powder as he had laid, and have no other means to prevent him, I may run upon him with my Sword, and make myself both his Judge and Executioner. Now if Master jenkin's will say, that such extraordinary acts as these are warranted by Law, I shall comply with him, yet I conceive 'tis not upon any particular Law, but upon the general law of public safety that these warrants are grounded upon; & if I am not mistaken, 'tis rather policy, than Law, that admits of such strange deviations from the common practice and rule of Law. But says Master jenkin's, these propositions cannot pass into Statutes but by the King's concurrence, and has not the King a free power to assent, or dissent in those things which must receive their being from his concurrence? Or is the seeking of the King's concurrence nothing but a mere compliment? We answer, The King has a power to assent and dissent: yet without any impeachment of his liberty, he may, nay he must, assent to such Bills as are for the public good, and to dissent from such as are tending to the public detriment; the reason is, because the free choice of the King is to receive its determination from without from the matter of the Bills, not from within, or from the propension of his own will: for the will enjoys a more perfect liberty when it is attracted, and as it were necessitated by that object which is good, then when it is left to its own equilibrious motions, and so wavers indifferently betwixt good and evil. If it be said, that in the choice of that which is good, the King cannot so well satisfy his own judgement by the advice or reason of other men, as by that which is dictated to him by his own breast: It must be answered, first, in the grand concernments of the kingdom, wherein the King has not so great a share as the people has, 'tis more just that the reason of two Estates be satisfied, than his. Secondly, in cases where the King is severally interessed, his particular interests ought to succumb and give a preference to the general. Thirdly, either the matter in debate is intricate, and admits of doubts, or not; If there be doubt in it, than the King ought not to oppose his single judgement, or rather opinion to the resolution of the Highest Court and council of the kingdom: If there be no doubt in it, (an accident sure very rare, that the Lords and Representants of a whole State should judge a thing to be advantageous, when the King knows it certainly to be disadvantageous) than the King is to consider whither the matter in question be necessary or expedient, if it be expedient only, than the King ought not to contest about it, forasmuch as that contestation may be more inexpedient for the State than his concession. But if it be necessary (as the cause of true Religion, &c.) where the King being Orthodox, knows his Subjects to be blinded with Idolatry or heresy, and cannot without sin give his royal assent to such irreligious Bills, as they present; then as it were impious in him to sign them, so it is outrageous in him to disturb the public peace about them. The reason of this is, because politicians guide themselves rather by the calculation of what is probable than what is possible only, and therefore though it be possible that a King with one eye should see more than a Parliament with many, yet since this is not probable, there is scarce any State but chooses rather to be swayed by the counsels of many then by the counsel of one, and where the counsel of one claims a prevalence above the counsels of many, 'tis not obeyed without great reluctance commonly, and public disturbance. Besides, if one man's eyes perchance see more than the eyes of many (as is very rare, though not impossible) yet 'tis very strange that that one man's discovery should not open the eyes of other standers by without force, in respect that light is a thing lovely to all, and ready to be embraced upon the least glimpse of it, and a very little thereof being let in through a narrow cranny, may make all that is contained in a very wide room visible. And if one man possibly in things indifferent should see more than many, yet 'tis very near to an impossibility, that one man should apprehend truth more than many, where that one man has more prejudice against the truth by self-interest, than the many. And who can doubt, but that Princes, as Princes, are more drawn by the by as of self-interest against that which is the good of the community, than that Court which is not only by the virtue of representation, but even naturally also in some degree the community itself? The root sends juice and nourishment to the branches, but expects none back from them; and the father's love has a strong ascent towards the fruit of his body, but weak and virtulesse is the descent of that juice which falls from the branches to the root, or of that love which the son refunds upon his progenitors; and even so it is in the relative Offices of Prince and Subject, the Prince looks less tenderly upon the people as being his root or parent, whilst yet the people looks more tenderly upon the Prince, as its own stem and issue. Hence it is, that all States are accounted more or less slavish, as their Princes are more or less arbitrary in their supreme counsels; and all men are accounted more or less miserable, as they are more or less slavish. What became of Rome, and of the whole world that was subject to Rome, after it was once yoked by the Caesars, who might arbitrarily wave the advice of the Senate, & consult with Slaves, Eunuchs, Women, Panders, &c. or what brought us to all our late bloody catastrophes, but the discountenance and detestation of Parliaments? Ask the Lord Digby himself, and even his Speeches made in Parliament since November 1640. will inform us, that there were many causes of our miseries, but the cause of all those causes was the abandoning and disgusting of Parliaments: Sure the Lord Digby may pass as an authentic testimony for our side, and yet even the Lord Digby, before he turned Courtier, had the ingenuity to resent this kingdom's servility, when a woman of a false religion, hostile nation, and adverse affection, together with her Jesuitical train, had more predominance in our public affairs than the two Estates assembled in Parliament. But Master jenkin's will still say, that the King is assisted with his Judges, and other counsel both spiritual and temporal, and that the House of Commons in some debates may be divided unto two or three odds voices; and therefore why may not the King so assisted be better advised than those two or three odds voices? This is an old objection, and seems plausible, but is easily answered: For 1. It is very unequal that a few counsellors whom the King chooses should be preferred before many whom the Kingdom chooses, in those matters which import the kingdom, more than the King. 2. If the King's council in the House of Peers were equally to be valued with the House of Commons, yet still so long as it is left arbitrary to the King to follow their advice, or not, the kingdom is in the condition as Turkey is, where the Grand Signior is left only to consult with himself or any of his Concubines or Eunuchs. And lastly, there can be no lower or baser degree of slavery imagined, then for a Nation to be subjected to a Lord that is so absolute in the highest results of State, as that he may use no counsel, or make choice of what counsel he pleases.  
4. I hast now to the fourth particular, where M. jenkin's affirms again, that the two Houses do separate the King's power from his Person as the Spencers did, and from thence frame the same three condemned conclusions as they did. The separation of his Person from his power is proved, partly by imprisonment of his Person, and partly by usurping all his power; for M. jenkin's tells us, that the two Houses counterfeit a seal of their own▪ and thereby seal Writs, make Judges, settle Courts, and this is done contrary to the King's consent, not declared only by Letters, Ministers, and word of mouth, but by his true great seal of England.  
It is here, 1. To be noted, that M. jenkin's himself does now distinguish betwixt that which the King declares by word of mouth personally; And by Letters and Ministers extrajudicially; and that which he declares legally by his Writs, and judicially by the great seal: and this is a plain concession, that the King's Person may urge one thing, and his Office another; that his personal command may be unjust and not to be obeyed, at the same time that his regal command may be just, and necessarily must exact obedience. It is to be noted 2. That the reason alleged, why the King's commands in this war are legal and just, not personal and unjust, is, because they were authorised and fortified with the true great seal: and what is this but to proclaim, 1. That the great seal of England is solely at the King's dispose, to be employed according to his mere discretion: 2. That the mere annexion of the great Seal makes any Act of the King's legal and authentical: 3. That M. jenkin's is better able to judge of the two great seals which is the true one, than the two Houses of Parliament? When M. jenkin's will be as learned in proving, as he is audacious in presuming, these new quaint points, we shall know what to answer; In the mean time we will expatiate no further than his discourse leads us. As for imprisoment of the King's Person, we have answered to that already, and forasmuch as the keeping chaplains from him is objected, we answer thereunto, that not chaplains, but such and such chaplains, viz. such as the State judges Incendiaries, are denied, and there is no more injustice in restraining such Incendiaries then in restraining Commanders and arms. Now to parallel the Houses with the Spencers, M. jenkin's says, that they having declared his majesty to have broken his trust touching the government of his people, they have raised arms to take him, they have taken and imprisoned him, they govern themselves, they make laws, impose Taxes, make Judges, Sheriffs, and take upon them Omnia insignia Majestatis; and is not this says, he to remove the King for misdemeanours, to reform per aspertee, to govern in aid of him, the three conclusions of the Spencers? M. jenkin's here, as if he had abjured all ingenuity, confounds diverse things which he knows to be exceeding different in nature. For 1. He takes no notice whether the force which has been used by the Parliament be offensive, or defensive; and yet none can be ignorant, how many things may be justified in a defendant which cannot by the offendant. 2. He distinguishes not betwixt that force of the defendant, which aims only at a temporary securance against the assailant, & that which proposes to itself vindication or reparation by the total removal, or destruction of the assailant. He knows well, that the Spencers aimed at a total dethronization of their Master, whilst the Parliament aims at nothing but beating down that Sword which was drawn against them. 2. That the Spencers intended to levy offensive Arms, for reforming that in their Master per aspertee, which was not so dangerous to their persons and lives, as that which has been contrived and enterprised against this Parliament, for not only a party of 300 Armed men to seize and tear five principal Members out of the House, (and by consequence to menace all that retained any freedom in them) but Armies were solicited to attempt against this Parliament before they thought of any force; and this is far above those provocations which were pretended by the two Spencers. 3. The Spencers, by pretext of governing in aid of the King, intended to oppress all the Nobility, Gentry, commonalty of the Land, but this is impossible to be suspected in a Parliament, which consists of the choice, and are a considerable part of all these.  
5. The 5. particular now offers itself, wherein Mr. jenkin's maintains that every King of England, and only the King in England can grant pardons, and that in all cases, and for this he citys Stanfords pleas 99 It was not, nor is denied to M. jenkin's that the Kings of England have power to pardon delinquencies, so far as themselves are parties suffering. But the question is whether the Kings of England only can, and always can pardon delinquencies; and whatsoever Master jenkin's thinks, the authorities of Stanford and Dier are not full to prove the affirmative; and certainly if it were proprium quarto modo for the Kings of England to pardon in all cases, it were very unproper for general acts of indemnity to be passed by all three estates, frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora; if one of the estates be sufficient; to what purpose do the other 2 concur? Secondly, all remedy by appeal would be cut off from subjects. For either my appeal must make void the King's pardon, or if the King's pardon be not void in this case, and as to this murder committed, my appeal must be dismissed. It had been candid in Mr. jenkin's if he would have replied some thing to this objection about appeals, for now it may be supposed he replied nothing therein, because he could reply nothing to the purpose; besides, if the King's pardon cannot frustrate my appeal (as Mr. jenkin's knows well it cannot) why should the same destroy the remedy and justice that is due to a whole state? Treason may be committed against the State as well as against the King, even as murder may damnify me as well as the King, and shall it be held less contrary to justice that the State should be deprived of its remedy by the King's pardon, then that I should? Good Mr. jenkin's policy is not to be superseded by Law, but Law is to be improved by policy: and as in quiet times and private cases 'tis safer to follow Law then Policy, so in times of troubles, and in affairs of general and great concernment, 'tis safer to observe Policy then Law. The same may be said of not pardoning, for doubtless the King has as much latitude to refuse, as to grant pardon, yet when his power in either may be mischievous, his power in both must submit to reason of State, and Law is not violated, but better improved when true reason of State takes place above it.  
6. I am now to proceed to the sixth particular, where Mr. jenkin's will not endure that the King shall be said to retain the right or habit of governing, at the same time when he is said not to be actually in a condition to govern; he intimates that the Law makes no such distinction, & infers ubi lex non distinguit, non est distinguendum: by this it should seem it is not allowable that a Lawyer should make use of any distinctions, for which he has not some book authority, though the difference of things be never so pregnant. A miserable confinement to Lawyers, and sure 4 or 500 years past if Lawyers had been so confined, we had now left us no prints of any distinctions at all. All other scholars besides Lawyers, nay all Lawyers that are not mere Lawyers, (I mean by mere Lawyers, such as have made no improvement of their reason by logic, policy, and other human literature) are of a contrary opinion, and hold it more true, qui bene distinguit, bene docet. But what a ridiculous thing is this, because Hen. 6. lying in his cradle not able to speak, write, read, or do any act of power, has a right to govern, therefore I must grant he is in a condition to govern, for fear of distinguishing when the Law does not distinguish? so of Edw. 2. and Ri. 2. because they had a right to the Crown, in that moment of time when they abdicated the same, and pronounced themselves unfit to govern, therefore I am obliged to believe that they were not abdicated nor made unfit for government. Next Mr. jenkin's likes not this distinction that the King is not barred simply from returning to his Parliament though he be barred secundum quid, that is from returning unreconciled or armed against his Parliament, he professes that he and the whole City knows the contrary; how the City should know the Parliaments intentions so exquisitely, or M. jenkin's be assured of the city's knowledge so infallably I cannot imagine; but I wish M. jenkin's which takes upon him to be a Priest as well as a Lawyer by virtue of Justinians Commission, were such a Priest indeed, as that we might expect nothing but knowledge and truth from his lips.  
7. The seventh particular comes now in order, where M. jenkin's puts us in mind of the oath of Supremacy, taken by all members of the House at their first sitting, and asks H. P. why he styles the King Supreme governor in all all causes and over all persons, &c. and leaves out only Supreme? surely not to detract any thing from the King's celsitude, but because the word seemed superfluous; for he that swears the King to be Supreme over all persons, swears him to be only Supreme over all persons, inasmuch as there cannot be more Supreme persons over all than one; but away with these frivolous logomachies. The argument runs thus, If the King be only Supreme governor in all causes, than in Parliament causes, if over all persons, then over both Houses, and if so, then how is he become a prisoner, and how do the Houses Act by virtue of their prisoners writ? It was answered before that the King is granted to be Supreme or only Supreme over all persons, but yet still {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, and not beyond the Law, nor beyond that community for which and by which the Laws themselves were made. The Duke of Venice (the like may be said also of all elective conditionate Kings and Potentates) has no person in any cause whatsoever superior, or equal to him: yet he has his bounds set him by the Law; and as the Law is above him whom it bounds, so that power which can make, and alter Law in Venice, is above the Law itself. M. jenkin's himself confesses that the King is not above the Law, nor above the safety of the people; but in regard that the King is Supreme in all causes, as well Parliamentary as other, and over all persons, as well the Lords and Commons in Parliament as others, M. jenkin's supposes there is no other Judge of the Law, & safety of the people but the K. but this is not to be admitted by us, because we know well that whosoever is the Supreme judge of the Law, if not directly, yet he is consequentially above all Laws, and whosoever is above all Law cannot be restrained by the safety of the people, though the most sublime of all Laws. Wherefore if this be admitted true of our King, that he is Supreme Judge of Law, than it must follow that the Subject of England has no more assurance of Law or safety then what is founded only in the King's breast, and discretion. For the Kings being a prisoner that has been already answered, and indeed it is is more truly said that his hands are held and disweapond, then that his feet are fettered, or his head undiademnd. Then for the Parliaments acting by the King's writ, there ought to be some mistakes cleared therein also; for we do grant that the writ is the Kings, the Great seal is the Kings, that Officer which has the custody thereof is the Kings, the People are the Kings; but we do not grant that any of these are so the Kings, as that they are not the kingdoms also in a more eminent degree: for as the Husband is the wife's truly, but not 〈◊〉 eminently as the Wife is the Husbands, so the kingdom is the Kings, and the King is the kingdoms, yet the kingdom's interest and relation far is more valuable and sublime.  
8. The last particular now offers itself in the close of all, and here M. jenkin's does not deny expressly that many things may be good in Law notwithstanding that some formalities, or those things which we term apices Iuris are wanting; for doubtless where 2 Laws are and both cannot be fulfilled, the less important Law though it be more particular must give way to the more important Law, though more general. ex. gr. when the King dies, by the common Law in force, Parl. cease, all judges, Sheriffs & Officers not absolutely necessary &c. return to a private condition, and so remain till new Commissions obtained: but if the new King happen to be beyond sea, as at the death of Hen. 3. so that new Commissions cannot be immediately granted, and thereupon the greater Law of public safety is brought into competition with the Law of an inferior nature, a new seal may be made, new Judges, new Officers may be created, and either a former Parl. may be continued, or a new one summoned, and all necessary points of complete administration may be expedited as in probality they were before the arrival of Ed. 1. God did not make any particular dispensation his showbread might be eaten by common persons if in distress, or the golden vessels of his Temple aliened when the City was to be redeemed from the insolence and rapines of a prevailing. Enemy, the general Law of necessity was sufficient to warrant both the one and the other, but I will press this no further since M. jenkin's alleges nothing to show why a Parl. which cannot deliver itself by an Act, may not use means to deliver itself by an Ordinance. I will not insist further hereupon. But instead of disputing, M. jenkin's seems to jeer 〈◊〉 for setting up Excise, raising arms, Taxing the people, imprisoning the King, abolishing the Common Prayer Book, selling Church-Lands, &c. and in an irony he concludes, that all these are in order to public justice and safety. M. jenkin's here leaves us upon uncertainties, whether he condemns our Cause because it required such props, or only these props because they assisted us in promoting so bad a cause. If he allow of the ends, but not of the means, if he allow we may defend the laws and safety of the State, but not by arms, or if he allow of arms but not of Taxes, &c. He must renounce▪ rule natural as well as logical, Qui dat finem, dat media con●● centia ad finem; If he allow of the means, but not as conducting to such an end, upon presumption that our laws, and the Sc●● were not endangered, or if he prove that they may not be defended, he takes upon him more than is due; for his part is to plead, not to judge, and answers might be given to his pleading, but nothing can be said to his judging.  
I conclude therefore with the L. cooks censure of Treason as M. jenkin's does, and am of the same opinion, that Treason ever produces fatal and final destruction to the offendor, and never attains to its desired ends; and wish that all men for this Cause would serve God, honour the King, and have no company with the Seditious. Yet let me add this, we have neighbours now in the Netherlands, that lately have revolted from their Master, and yet prosper and flourish beyond all in Europe; the justice of their revolt may be questioned by some▪ but I for divers reasons do not question it, & one amongst the rest is this of the L. cooks, because I think an act merely treasonable cannot prosper.  
FINIS.