A POLITICAL CATECHISM, OR, Certain Questions concerning the Government of this Land, Answered in his majesty's own words, taken out of His Answer to the 19 Propositions, Pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. of the first Edition; with some brief Observations thereupon. Published for the more complete settling of Consciences; particularly of those that have made the late Protestation, to maintain the Power and privileges of Parliament, when they shall herein see the Kings own Interpretation what that Power and privileges are. We can do nothing against the Truth, but for the Truth. 2 Cor. 13. 8. It is this twentieth day of May, An. Dom. 1643. Ordered by the Committee of the House of commonsins Parliament concerning Printing, that this book entitled, A political Catechism, be printed. John WHITE. LONDON Printed for SAMUEL GELLIBRAND, at the Brazen Serpent in Paul's churchyard, 1643. A political Catechism, Serving to instruct those that have made the Protestation concerning the power and privileges of Parliament; taken out of his majesty's Answer to the 19 Propositions. Question. HOW many Simple kinds are there of civil Government of States, and commonwealths? Answer. There are three kinds of Government among men; Absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, page, 17. Qu. 2. Are there any of these Simple forms perfect? Ans. All these have their particular Conveniences and Inconveniences, page 17. Observ. 1 Experience hath taught men everywhere to acknowledge this, and accordingly there never was long (if at all) continued any of these Forms exactly Simple; though some have more seemed such then others. Also in all mixtures there is commonly some one of these Forms more conspicuous than the rest, from whence such a particular Government hath its denomination. Q. 3. Is the State of England governed by any one of these kinds simply? A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath. moulded this [Government] out of a mixture of these. page 18, Q. 4 What kind of government than is that of the state of England? A. Regulated Monarchy. page 18. Observ. 1. If this Government be a mixture of all these, and a Regulated Monarchy; then it is a fond thing with us to talk of an Absolute Monarchy, and what an Absolute Monarch is, or may do. And it is only the language of Flattery that holds such Discourses. 2 It need not be counted a solecism (as some would persuade us) to speak of Free Subjects in a Monarchy, such a Monarchy as ours is. 3 If this Government be a mixture of all three, than the House of Commons, the Representative Body of the People, must needs be allowed a share in Government (some at least) which yet is denied, page 19 4 If this Government be a mixture, than is not the Government according to these laws, Solely Trusted to the King, as seems to be affirmed page 18. 5 If the Government be Regulated, why do men tell us that the King is above all Law? for it is by laws that he is Regulated. 6 If the King be Regulated by the Law, then is the King Accountable to the Law, and not to God only, as men would make us believe. 7 If the Monarchy or regal Authority itself be Regulated, than whatsoever is done by the King, undeniably without and beyond the limits of that Regulation, is not regal Authority. And therefore. 8 To resist the Notorious Transgressions of that Regulation, is no Resisting of regal Authority. And 9 It is so far from being a Resisting of the Ordinance of God, that it is not so much as Resisting the Ordinance of man. Q 5. By whom was this government framed in this sort? or who is to be accounted the Immediate Efficient of the Constitution thereof? A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this, page 18. Observ. 1. If our Ancestors were the moulders of this Government, than the King hath not his power, Solely, or Immediately, by Divine Right. 2 Much less hath he his Power or Authority by Right of Conquest. 3 But the Immediate original of it was from the People. And if so, Then— 4 In questioned cases, the King is to Produce his Grant (for he hath no more than what was granted) and not the People to show a Reservation; For all is presumed to be Reserved, which cannot be proved to be granted away. Q. 6 Is this Regulated and mixed Monarchy, as good as an Absolute Monarchy, or better, or worse? A. This Excellent Constitution of this Kingdom, (the Ancient, equal, Happy, Well-poysed, and never enough Commended Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom. page 17.) hath made this Nation so many years both Famous and Happy, and to a great Degree of Envy. page 20. Q. 7 How comes it to pass that this Constitution is so Excellent. A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this, out of a mixture of these, as to give to this Kingdom (as far as human Prudence can provide) the Conveniences of all three, without the Inconvenience of any one p. 18 Observ. 1. Then those that would place in the King, an Absolute and Abitrary Power to do what he List, are Destructive to the Nations happiness, and Enemies to the Kingdom. 2. If this Mixture cause this happiness, than it is not the greatness of the King's Power over his People, but the Restraint of that Power that hath made this Kingdom famous and Happy; for other Kings have Power as large, but not so much restrained; which largeness of their Power hath Raised those Kings indeed, (but not their Kingdoms) to a great degree of Envy. 3. Hence we discern, that it is Possible for Kings to envy their people's happiness, because the largeness of the people's happiness depends much upon the Restraint of the King's Exorbitant Power. 4. If this Mixture and well-Poised Constitution have raised this Kingdom to so Great a Degree of Envy, no marvel if jesuitical counsels be Active to overthrow this Happy Constitution. Q. 8 What is the Conveniency or Good of Monarchy? A. The uniting of a Nation under one Head, to Resist Invasion from abroad, and Insurrection at home. page 18. Obs. 1. What Pernicious counsellors are they then to a Monarch that advise him to bring in from abroad German Horse, or an Irish Army, or a Fleet of Danes to invade this Kingdom; or to employ Dunkeirk Ships to seize upon his Merchants, which is so formally contrary to the proper Good or End of Monarchy itself? 2. Or are they better or worse that Advise him to Authorize, or even permit any in his Name to Plunder, Rob, Spoil▪ Imprison any of his Subjects, whom they have found peaceably in their houses, or at work in the Fields, and have not disobeyed any legal Command of his? Q. 9 What is the Ill of Absolute Monarchy? or the Inconvenience to which it is liable? A. The Ill of Absolute Monarchy, is Tyranny. page 18. Obs. 1. Therefore the more Absolute a Monarch is, the more prone to be a Tyrant. 2. Therefore also it is safer to Restrain the King of some Power to do us good then to grant him too much opportunity to do us hurt; and the Danger is greater to the People in Englarging the King's Power, then in restraining it somewhat. Q. 10 What is the Good or Conveniency of Aristocracy? A. The good of Aristocracy is the conjunction of counsels in the Ablest Persons of a State for public Benefit. page 18 Obs. ●. Then surely it is for the public Benefit of the State, that this Conjunction of counsels in Parliament should be made use of more than once in thirteen or fourteen years; and the Law for a triennial Parliament (if there were not others before for the holding of a Parliament yearly) was a most necessary Law, as also that it should not be dissolved for fifty days. 2. It was not then Intended in the Constitution of this Government, that the King in the Greatest Matters of Importance for public Benefit, should only hear what they say, and then follow it or reject it merely at his own Pleasure; for this may be as well done in an Absolute Monarchy. 3. Neither is it agreeable to the Constitution of this Kingdom, to withdraw the King from affording his Presence to his Great council of State, that so the private Counsels of Private men may be preferred before those whom the Law and the Constitution of the Kingdom▪ counts the Ablest to judge of public Benefit. Q. 11 What is the Ill of Aristocracy, or the Inconvenience to which it is liable? A. The Ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Division. page. 18. Obs. What shall we say then to those Private councillors that have abused the King, by persuading him first to withdraw himself from his Parliament, and then to call away the Members of both Houses, when yet without the Consent of both Houses this Parliament cannot be Adjourned to another Place, much less Dissolved? Yet if all would have come away at call, had it not been Dissolved for want of legal Numbers Remaining? And what Greater Faction or Division can there be, than such as Divide between King and Parliament, and between the House and their Members? Are not they most Pernicious Instruments, that make monarchy itself, (whose end is to unite as was said before) thus far guilty of Faction and Division? Q. 12 What is the Good, or Convenience of Democracy? A. The good of Democracy is Liberty, and the courage and Industry which Liberty begets page 18. Obs. 1. Then the more Liberties are Encroached upon, the more the People will be rendered Cowardly and Poor, as may be plain enough seen by comparing the Valour and Riches of this Nation in Q. Elizabeth's days, with what hath been of Late days. 2. The King himself, when once his Subjects by having lost their Liberties shall lose withal their Courages, will prove the greatest loser; for then his Kingdom will be an easy Prey to any foreign Invader, or even to a homebred Usurper, that could gather any sudden Strength, and would Promise more liberty. Q. 13 What is the Ill of Democracy, or the Inoonvenience to which it is liable? A. The Ills of Democracy are Tumults, Violence, and licentiousness. page 18. Obs. If these be the Evils for which the people's Liberty ought to be Restrained by the Mixture in this Government, than the Restraint of the Liberty should be measured according to the Exigency of these Evils, and so much Liberty need only be Restrained as is sufficient for the Prevention of these Evils. Q. 14 What is the mixture of this Kingdom, which gives it the Conveniences of all the three forementioned kinds of Government, without the Inconveniences of any one. A. In this Kingdom the laws are jointly made by a King, by a house of peers, and by a house of Commons chosen by the people: All having free Votes, and particular privileges. page 18. Obs. 1. Whereas there hath been great Question made by many what is meant by the Power and privileges of Parliament, mentioned in the Protestation, which hath been so generally made throughout the Kingdom? There is no Reason to doubt but those things which the King grants afterward, to be the particular privilege of each House, and of both, are their certain privileges according to Law, and the Constitution of the Kingdom; and to the maintaining of them every one that hath made the Protestation is most strictly bound, without peradventure or shift. 2. That the privileges which the King challenges to Himself, are to be yielded to, only so far forth as they are consistent with the Acknowledged privileges of the two Houses; because the Monarchy being Acknowledged to be a Regulated Monarchy, and the Government mixed of Aristocracy and Democracy, as well a Monarchy; it is the privileges of the two Houses of Parliament that makes the mixture, and so they must Regulate and Interpret the privileges of the King, and not the privileges of the King Regulate or Interpret theirs, save only to the maintaining still the regal dignity, and the Succession according to Laws. Q. 15 What privileges doth the King challenge to himself? A. The Government according to these laws is trusted to the king: power of treaties of war and peace, of making peers, of choosing Officers, and councillors for State judges for Law, Commanders for Forts and Castles; giving Commissions for raising men to make war abroad, or to prevent or provide against invasions and Insurr●ctions at home▪ Benefit of Confiscations, power of pardoving, and some other of like kind are placed in the King. page 18. Obs. 1. That all these are ordinarily in the King, Experience and Custom Teaches, even those that Know not the Law by reading; but by what hath been noted before, and follows after, it is to be understood only so, as not to prejudice the privileges of the Houses of Parliament, specially in cases of necessity, (of which hereafter.) Also— 2. It is acknowledged here, that the Government, Trusted, is to be according to the laws, and so all these Things are not Absolutely in the King; as for instance, Pardons, the Law denies Power of Pardoning wilful murder; And Benefit of some Confiscations belongs to some Private Lords of manors. 3. If Government only according to Law be trusted to the King then to Resist Notorious illegal Violences is not to Resist the King's Authority. Q. 16 For what end is this Authority trusted to the King, and Placed in him? A. For our subject's sake these rights are vested in us p 17 The Prince may not make use of this high and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it. page. 19 Obs. 1. Then the Good of the Subjects is ever to be preferred before the monarchial greatness of the King (the End is ever more considerable than the Means) Salus Populi is suprema Lex. 2. Whosoever counsels the King to any Thing against the good of his Subjects, is the King's Enemy as well as the commonwealths, by Attempting to turn him from that which is the end of his authority. Q. 17 To what purpose especially are the privileges of the house of Commons and the house of peers? A. That the Prince may not make use of this High and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it: and make use of the name of public Necessity for the gain of his private favourites and Followers &c. page 19 Obs. 1. The Law then supposes, that such Cases may fall out, though it then Charge the Blame upon those favourites and Followers, and not upon the King (as we shall see by and by.) 2. We need not wonder then why Private favourites and Followers are such Enemies to Parliaments and their privileges, which are on purpose to hinder their gains: Of which also more anon. 3. The two Houses are by the Law it seems, to be Trusted, when they Declare, that the Power is made use of for the Hurt of the People; and the Name of public necessity made use of for the Gain of Private favourites and Followers, and the like. Q 18 What are the special privileges of the House of Commons towards this? A. The House of Comm●ns, an Excellent conserver of Liberty— is solely entrusted with the first propositions concerning the levys of Moneys which is the sinews as well of peace as of war etc page 19 Obs. 1. It seems then the House of Commons is presumed to be more careful for the Subjects Liberties, then either the King, or the House of Peers. 2. Then it must needs be strange for any to conceive (as the King's Declarations would persuade) that the House of Commons would Fight against and Subvert the liberty and Propriety of the Subject, and the King's favourites and Followers Fight for them, and Protect them. 3. Then no Moneys may be levied, neither for Peace nor war, no not under Pretence of public Necessity, (as Ship-money and Monopolies were) without the House of Commons first propound and Grant it. 4. If the House of Commons be an Excellent Conserver of liberty, it must Needs have some Power in some Cases to levy money even without the King's consent; or else it will be utterly unpossible to conserve liberty at all. Of which likewise more anon. Q. 19 But if the King's Private favourites and Followers have ●ctually persuaded him to any Thing against the Laws and Liberties of the Subject with what further Power and privilege is the House of Commons entrusted toward the Conserving of Liberty? A. With the Impeaching of those▪ who for their own Ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten command of the King, have violated that Law, which he is bound (when he knows it) to protect; and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him, at least not to serve him in the contrary. page 19 Obs. 1. Then it is no Excuse to any that Violate the Laws, that they serve the King in it. 2. The Law counts all Commands from the King, which are any way contrary to the Law, Surreptitiously-Gotten. 3. Then the Parliament speaks according to the Law, when they constantly lay the Blame of all violations upon the King's favourites and Followers, and their getting Surreptitiously Commands from him, and not upon the King himself. 4. No Command of the King is to hinder the Commons from Impreaching such as have violated the Law. 5. The King is bound not to Protect any of his Followers and favourites against the Commons Impeachment of them; because he Knows and Affirms, that he is bound to Protect the Laws, and that this is the Law, that the Commons are to Impeach such. Qu. 20. What is the special privilege of the House of Peers in the former Case of such favourites and Followers of the Kings as are Impeached by the Commons? and so to decide all Matters in Questions between the King and the People. A. The Lords being trusted with a judicatory power are an Excellent Screen and Bank between the Prince and the people, to Ass●st●nch against any Encroachments of the other, and by just judgements to preserve that Law which ought to be the Rule of every one of the three, page 19 Qu. 21. But have the two Houses Power to put their judgements into Execution, as well as to Impeach and judge? A. The power of punishment is already in your hands according to Law, page 20. Obs. 1. Then again it is no wonder that the King's favourites and Followers hate Parliaments, (who not only Hinder their Gain, but have Power to punish them) when they have violated the Laws. 2. Then the Lords (and much more the two Houses together) are supreme Judges of all matters in Difference between the King and the People, and have Power to Prevent all the King's Encroachments upon the People, as well as the Peoples upon him. 3. Then the King is Bound not to Protect any whom the Lords upon the Impeachment of the Commons, have Judged Delinquents; For he hath granted that he is bound to Protect the Law, and that according to Law the Power of Punishing (even of his Favourites and Followers, 'fore spoken of) is in their hands, and they cannot punish them, so long as he Protects them. 4. Then the Law Allows them as the Supreme Judicatory (even th●t which must be a screen between the King and the People, and Assist the People against the King's Encroachments, and punish the King's favourites and Followers, though countenanced by Surreptitiously-Gotten Commands from the King) a Power to bring such as they have Judged, (or are to Judge) to Condign Punishment, which is granted to all inferior Judges in their Circuits and jurisdictions. 5. Then if those Delinquents get the King to Protect them, or surreptiously get Commands of him, to Raise Arms to Shelter themselves against the judgement of the two Houses; the two Houses have Power by the Law to Raise not only the Posse Comitatus of those Counties where such Delinquents are▪ to apprehend them; but also the Posse Regni, the Power of the whole Kingdom if need be; or else the Power of Punishment is not in their hands according to Law, and it would be safer contemning and scorning and opposing the highest judicatory, the Parliament, than any inferior Court, a Judge of Assize, or the like: and they that could get Commands to Violate the Law before, would easily get Protection against the Parliament when they are Questioned, if the Parliament had no Power to Raise Arms to suppress them. Qu. 22. But if there be an Attempt or Danger, that the King's favourites and Followers go about to change this Regulated Monarchy into an Arbitrary Government, and so into a tyranny, is there authority in the Houses sufficient according to what was sore mentioned to remedy this? A. Power Legally Placed in Both Houses is more than sufficient to prevent and Restrain the power of tyranny P. 20. Obs. 1. Then at lest what ever Power is Necessary to Prevent or Restrain the Power of tyranny is confessed to be Legally placed in both Houses; for else there is not Power sufficient, much less, more than sufficient. 2. Then it is lawful for the two Houses to Raise Arms to defend themselves in case an Army be Raised against them, for else they have not Power sufficient to restrain the Power of tyranny: There is no Greater Attempt of tyranny then to Raise Arms against the Houses of Parliament, and there is no way to Restrain this tyranny, but by Raising Arms in their own Defence: less than this cannot be sufficient. 3. If a legal Power be placed in them, not only to Restrain, but prevent the power of tyranny, than they are the legal judges, when there is danger of tyranny; and they have legal Power to Command their judgement to be obeyed, for Preventions as well as Restraint of tyranny. 4. Then it is lawful for them to provide for their own and the kingdom's safety, and they have legal Power to command the People to this purpose; not only when Arms are Actually Raised against them, but when they Discern, and accordingly Declare a Preparation made towards it: for if they let alone altogether the Exercise of their Power, till Arms are Actually Raised against them; they may in all likelihood find it too late, not only to Prevent, but even to Restrain the Power of tyranny. 5. Then they have legal Power in such Times of Danger, to put into safe hands, such Forts, Ports, Magazines, Ships, and Power of the Militia, as are Intended, or likely to be Intended, to Introduce a Tyranny; for else they cannot have Power sufficient to Prevent or Restrain the Power of tyranny. 6. Then they have legal Power to levy Moneys, Arms, Horse, Ammunitions, upon the Subjects, in such cases of Danger, even without or against the King's Consent; for it cannot be imagined that in such cases when the King's Favourites and Followers have gotten Commands from him, to Protect them in their Delinquencies, and Attempts to Introduce tyranny, that ever he will consent to ●evies of Moneys against those Favourites and followers of his, or to the Raising Arms against them, specially he being still in their hands, and among them, and not with his Parliament; and without such Levies of Moneys, &c. it is not possible for the two Houses of Parliament to Prevent or restrain sufficiently the Power of tyranny. 7 They that have made the Protestation, to maintain and defend the Power and privileges of Parliament, may see in all these Things (Acknowledged by the King, and clearly Following from his Acknowledgements) what is that Power, and what are privileges of Parliament, which they have so solemnly in the Presence of Almighty God Vowed, Promised and Protested to maintain, &c. 8. And finally, since the two Houses of Parliament have so often and fully Declared their Intentions in settling the Militia, securing Hull and the Magazine there, and the navy at Sea, with the Ports and Forts, and afterward in Raising Arms under the Command of the Earl of Essex, and last of all, Levying Moneys by voluntary Contibutions and assessments; they have only used that legal Power which is in them for the Punishment of Delinquents, and for the Prevention and Restraint of the Power of tyranny, of all which they are the legal Judges; and all the Subjects of this Kingdom are bound by the Laws to obey them herein, and those doubly bound that have made the late Protestation. That the Reader may the better discern how the Answers here applied do agree with the words of his majesty's Answer to the 19 Propositions, I have here transcribed so much of it as concerns this particular. Page 17. We call God to witness, that as for our subject's sake these Rights are vested in us, so for their sakes as well as for our own) we are resolved not to quit them nor to subvert (though in a parliamentary way) the ancient, equal, happy well-poysed, and never-enough-commended Constitution of the government of this kingdom. There being three kinds of government amongst men Absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and all these having their particular conveniences and inconveniences. page 18. The experience and wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these, as to give to this Kingdom (as far as human prudence can provide) the conveniences of all three, without the inconveniences of any one, as long as the balance hangs even between the three Estates▪ and they run jointly on in their proper channel begetting Verdure and Fert●lity in the meadows on both sides) and the overflowing of either on either side, raise no Deluge or Inundation. The Ill of Absolute Monarc●y is Tyranny, The Ill of Aristocracy is Faction and division, The Ills of Democracy are Tumults, Violence, and licentiousness: The good of Monarchy is the uniting a Nation under one Head, to Resist invasion from abroad, and Insurrection at home: The good of Aristocracy is the conjunction of council in the Ablest persons of a State for the public benefit: The good of Democracy is Liberty, and the courage and industry which Liberty begets. In this kingdom the Laws are jointly made by a King, by a house of peers, and by a house of Commons chosen by the people, all having free Votes and particular privileges. The government according to these Laws is trusted to the King, power of Treaties of war & peace, of making peers, of choosing Officers & counsellors for State judges for Law, commanders for Forts & Castles giving Commissions for raising men to make war abroad, or to prevent & provide against Invasions or Insurrections at home, benefit of Consiscations, power of pardoning▪ & some more of the like kind are placed in the King.— Again, Page 19 that the Prince may not make use of this high and pertetuall power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it, and make use of the name of public Necessity for the gain of his private favourites and Followers to the detriment of his people; the house of Commons an excellent conserver of Liberty▪ but never intended for any share in government, or the choosing of them that should govern) is solely entrusted with the first Propositions concerning the levys of moneys (which is the sinews as well of peace as war, and the unpeaching of those who for their own ends, though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten command of the King, have violated that Law, which he is bound (when he knows it) to protect, & to the protection of which they were bound to advise him, at least not to serve him to the contrary: & the Lords being trusted with a judicatory power, are an excellent screen and bank between the Prince and people, to assist each against any encroachments of the other, and by just judgements to preserve that Law which ought to be the Rule of every one of the three.— Pag. 20. Since therefore the Power Legally placed in both Houses is more than sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of tyranny:— since this would be a total subversion of the fundamental Laws, and that excellent Constitution of this Kingdom, which hath made this Nation so many years both Famous & happy to a great degree of envy; since to the power of punishing (which is already in your hands according to Law) if— since the encroaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the other is unhappy in the effects both to them & all the rest— Pag. 2●. Our answer is▪ Nolumus Leges Angliae mutari. But this We promise, that We will be as careful of preserving the laws in what is supposed to concern wholly our subjects, as in what most concerns ourselves: For indeed We profess to believe that the preservation of every Law concerns us, those of Obed●ence being not secure, when those of protection are Violated. FINIS.