THE LOGICIANS Schoolmaster:  
OR, A COMMENT UPON RAMUS Logic.  
By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queen's College in CAMBRIDGE.  
Whereunto are added, His Prelections on Ramus his Grammar; Taleus his Rhetoric; Also his Notes on Physics, Ethics, Astronomy, Medicine, and Optics.  
Never before Published.  
LONDON: Printed by Gartrude Dawson, and are to be sold by Sam. Thomson at the White-Horse in Paul's Churchyard. 1657.   

The Bookseller to the Reader.  
Courteous Reader,  
THe Author hereof, Mr. Alexander Richardson, was a man of transcendent parts, and most sublimate intellectuals, whereby he attained unto such a perfection in all Arts and Sciences, that there is nothing almost of liberal and ingenuous literature, which he had not insight into; and that such as to be able to lay down a system of it in most exact and methodical Precepts: and had his Abilities been drawn forth to the full advantage, doubtless the Arts had received a considerable improvement beyond what the world hath yet been acquainted withal. But so it is, that what by his want of Health, and what by the singular modesty of his Disposition (known unto them that knew him) the Commonwealth of Learning hath been deprived of so great a felicity. Neither yet did he envy others the Fruits of his own Abilities, but was always most ready to impart and communicate what he knew; which those of his time (divers of whom are still surviving) knew very well how to make good use of: For though he was but Master of Arts, (and not Fellow) of Queen's College, yet did divers Graduates from several Colleges flock unto his Lectures, and what he freely discoursed unto them in several Sciences, they as eagerly took from his mouth in writing, and then communicated unto others; which found such general acceptance, that happy was he who could make himself Master of Richardson's Notes, which they refused not to purchase at any pains in transcribing. For indeed they could easily perceive in him a reach beyond ordinary men, and that his words carried further; he dived deep, even unto the bottom of Entity, while others did but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and lick the Glass. But among many other Notes of his those of his Commentary on Ramus Logic were most generally prized and made use of by young Students: whereof (though long since printed) there are many Copies in Manuscript still in being; and indeed it was his Logic whereby, as by a Key, he opened the secrets of all other Arts and Sciences, to the admiration of all that heard him. I have therefore adventured upon this Second Impression, and have added to it his Prelections on Ramus his Grammar, Taleus his Rhetoric; also his Notes on Physics, Ethics, Astronomy, Medicine, and Optics, which I doubt not but they will meet with thy Acceptance proportionable to their worth, whereby I may be Encouraged to offer to thy view such other of his Works, as I can meet withal, which do yet sleep (as these have done hitherto) in the hands of Private men.  
Sam. Thomson.   

ERRATA in the Logic.  
Page 2, line 18, for impossibile, read possibile: p. 10. l. 12, 22, 31. f. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 11. l. 1. r. concrescens: p, 27, l, 8, r, is it. 31, l, 10, & 25, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 37, l, 4, r, congruens. 58 l. 24, r, his proper. 80. l. antepenult, r, Ergo they are. 86. l, 8, No, r, Now. 106, l, 6 r. materiare. 111, l, 14, There, r, Therefore. l, 24, ret, r, res. 115, l, 8, r, of it. Ergo. 143, l, 9, honorum, r, bonorum. 167, l, 26, serum, r, servum. 179. l, 25, painted, r, pointed 187, l, 27, formalae, r formulae. 220, l, 16, motum, 1, mutum. 251, l, 16, r, from this effect. 256, l, 22, r, homo non est. 323, l, 4, obtigit, r, contigit. 326, l, 10, f, 20, r, two. 330, l, 24, r, before we can. 334, l, 21, r, things mediately. 338, l, 2, r, otherwise if. 34●, l, 7, ano, 1, ovo. l, 8, twenty, r, two.   

In Grammatical Notes, etc.  
Page 2. line 16. r. Courtier in Boots. p. 7 l, 25. yet, r, yea. 9, l, penult, r, to make is. 10, l, 21, aggredi. 11, l, 27, for another genus, r, another been. 13. l. 25, r, ratsa●s. 15, l, 15, quae, r, duae. 21, l, 1, which, r, with. 25, l. 13. f, ●, r, a. 27, l, 8, r, Grecians have. l, 12, r, owe, as owe. 30, l, 7, r jurisprudentia. 31. l, 1, deal under. 37, l, 23, r, Dictio. 41, l, 15, f, et, r, est. 44, l, 3, r, adjuncts inesse. 45, l, 5, deal that. 53, l, 11, f, lecher, r, lechery. 56, l, 13, r, them one, 61, l, 21 rueri, r, tuorum. 75, l, 26, r, misti autem ediss. 76, l, 22, of four, r, of fewer. 82, l, 1, Licinius, r, Lucilianus. l, 3, r, with worms. 85, l, 6, lest, r, last. 88, l, 11, f, no, r, too special. 93, l, 6, form spinning, r, fine spinning, 101, l, 1, r, mere potentia. 108. l. 3. is r. est. l. 29. f. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 111. l. 24. f.—, r, carbone. 113. l. antepenult, r, is most hot and dry. penult, r, is most moist and hot. 126. l. 20. martor, r, marcor. 128. l. 27. this act, r, this art. 129. l. 15, acts have, r, arts have. 131. l, 1. Now, r, No. 132, l, 7, r, Aristotle. 134, l, 22, r, there for the comely aspect, one. 139, l, 9, est qua; r, est quae. 143, l, 7, r, both these affections. 144, l, 2, r, Perscrutatio. 145, l, last, f, plurimum, r, plurium. 146, l, 4, r, Circumvecta. l, 11, r, plurium motuum. l, 16, r, Sphaera nona. 148, l, 17, r, motu nonae. 149, l, 16, for 9 r, 6. 150, l, 4, plurimum, r, plurium. 151, l, antepenult, r, per se, quia. 135, l, 10, radius, ●, radians unum. l. ult. r. propius.   

The PREFACE or Entrance into the BOOK.  
I Suppose I am to dispute with a man, and be about to lay down every thing to his reason: if he grant that he have reason, I need no further proof of Ens: for if a man have an eye to see things, there must be an Ens, which must be the subject of it; for else it should be in vain: and as our outward eye were in vain, if there were not some things to be seen thereby; so were our inward eye of reason to no purpose, if there were not an ens to be seen. Now I will stand more upon ens, because I will ground my Rules of Art upon it, but that Reason is the proper adjunct of ens, we shall see more plainly hereafter. Yet let us know in the mean time, that if there be reason, it must either see something or nothing; now it cannot see nothing but per accidens, because it properly seethe ens, as I see a man not to be in such a place, because I see him not. True it is, that Ens is the subject of all Arts, but more specially of Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, as they are general: for indeed Reason first seethe both itself, and the other Arts.  

Ens est quod est.  
Now having found that ens is, it is requisite that we should know what it is; and I say ens est quod est. If we shall look at the Grammatical notation of ens, it is a participle of the present tense, and therefore is as much as quod est, even as legens and qui, or quae legit are the same: or as in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verberans, or qui verberat are all one, and that the very particle doth show. For if it be of the present tense, it is the same with the verb of the present tense, so that ens and quod est are the same. Again, if there be ens, as we have already proved, then vel est quod est, vel non quod est, vel quod non est at neque, non quod est, nec quod non est, ergo quod est. For when I say non quod est, than I put ens fictum impossibile, ergo this can no way be ens, no not in our fantasy; when I say quod non est, than I put ens fictum impossibile, and to that I give a quod but non est, so that in the end I say, ens est, quod est, that is, neither ens fictum possibile, or ens fictum impossibile; and therefore if we will define ens fictum impossibile, it is non quod est, if we define ens fictum possibile, it is quod non est. Now if neither ens fictum possibile, nor ens fictum impossibile be entia, then ens est quod est. And again, when I deny non quod est, I deny est, and when I deny quod non est, I deny est, ergo, ens est quod est. Again, ens and bonum are all one, therefore non ens and malum are all gone, therefore scions non sit, than it is bonum and malum: ergoens est quod est.   

Ens est primum vel a primo.  
If ens be, it must be either first absolutely which is not from another, or it must be from a first; that is from another, which is not from another: again, contradiction showeth it, for it is as if I should say, ens is non aliunde or aliunde; that is, it is of itself, or not of itself; and this is contradiction.  
But objection may be made, that in the continual generation of things, one thing is before another, as my father begot me, and another begot my father, and so in infinitum, ergo it is not necessary that ens should be absolutely first or from a first.  
Answ. This is nothing, for am I from my father. This than he was before I was, and I am after him, ergo here is prius and posterius, therefore here cannot be eternity, ergo this ens is not eternal. Again, is not my father's case as well as mine to be from another, and so all men till they come to ens primum; Yes, ergo all men are from others, till we come to this first absolute being, which is not from any other: for than he should not be primum: ergo ens est primum, vel a primo.   

Ens absolute primum est quod est seipso.  
First, if there be ens primum or a primo, there must be ens primum of necessity, for if there be ens primum, ye grant it me, if there be ens a primo, ye must also grant ens primum, therefore ens primum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primum, and maxim intelligibile, therefore Atheists are here to be confuted, for they may sooner doubt whether they themselves be, then whether God be, for if they be entia a primo, they must first know him, that is primum, before they can know themselves, for the cause is before the effect, Quod est seipso, it must be being either seipso or aliunde, if aliunde, ne primum, for that from which it is, is prius unto it, ergo est seipso.  
Object. Bellarmine saith that God is not seipso, neither any creature whatsoever, for than he saith, the same thing would be the cause of itself, and the effect.  
Resp. It is a mere sophism, or rather an Amphibolia of the phrase. For when we say God is seipso, we do not mean that he hath causes, but we mean privatively that he is not aliunde, and est seipso, and est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the same, it is quod est, and so est seipso.   

Ens primum est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
If he be seipso, than he is without causes, that that is absolutely first must have no causes, for than it is not absolutely first, ergo there can be no scientia of him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for tunc scire dicimur cum causas scimus. Again, first if he have no causes, he hath no end, ergo he is not made for an end, ergo there can be no art of him to guide him to an end. So that we find in this respect that ens primum cannot be the subject of Art; Every Art is to guide the thing whereof it is an Art to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again, every Art doth lay forth the causes, effects, subjects and the proper adjuncts of a thing, for if it have no causes it can have no qualities, and God hath none of these, ergo he is not the subject of Art. Hence again, as this ens is beyond our reason, so he is beyond our speech, either Grammar or Rhetoric, so that concerning this ens primum, whatsoever we think or speak it is imperfect. Now bring it to our Logic after another sort, and we shall see this ens to be beyond Art. Our Logic bringeth us first to a first efficient, and in the resolution of any thing we go so far, as in the end we find a first efficient. Now this first efficient hath nothing before it, ergo that is beyond our reason, therefore what that is we cannot tell, and therefore if we shall make him an effect to look out his causes, we shall not make him first, ergo he is beyond all Art: Then again, there is no Art but is an eternal rule in the Idea of God, as a precept of that thing whereof it is an Art, to guide it to its Eupraxie, therefore if there should be an Art of him, there must be a former ens which must have the Idea of it, to show how this ens primum was made, and whereby it must be governed: so that he is not the subject of our reason; so that whereas I said before, that ens was the subject of our reason; here I recall it, and say, that primum ens is beyond out Logic: and therefore he being beyond all art, we will go them over more briefly, till we come to ens a primo. First then, he is without efficient, for he is without causes, ergo he is uncreated: for the first matter, though it were without matter and form, yet it had an efficient, and an end, ergo was created: then again, he is seipso, ergo he must be uncreated, hence also he cannot be annihilated, neither generated, nor corrupted: again, hence he is independe aliunde, and therefore supremum: again, hence he is without matter: Now if he be without matter, therefore he is without genus, ergo is not a species either subalterna, or specialissima. Again if he be without form as without genus, than he cannot be defined, ergo he must be without limitation of essence, ergo without limitation of quantity, ergo without limitation of place, and because he is without beginning from any other thing, therefore he is without any duration, and because he is without any matter, ergo he is truly spiritual, for so we account things spiritual, according to the subtleness of their matter, but he hath no matter at all: Again he being without matter and form, ergo can be no membrum, because every member containeth a portion of matter and form, neither can he be an integrum, because that consisteth of members, which contain part of matter and form. Now in that he is absolutely first, therefore he can be but unum, for else there should be more: again if there should be more than one, than the one would say as well as the other, I am as forward as thee, and so none could be absolutely first. Again he is no genus, for that is an universal, or Synopsis of many together, whereas he is but one: so that now he is not properly an ens, but an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and above our Logic: again, in that he is absolutely first he must needs be without accidents (to use their term) without adjuncts, for they are second things arising from their substances, and in absolute primo ente there must be nothing, but that which is absolute primum: so that here we see his most simple being, and that he is beyond our Logic. Now if he be without all potentia, both essentialis, and accidentalis, he is pure act; so that this act now of his must needs be his esse, because he is pure act, for if he be agere, than his esse and agere are the same: so that if any one doth any thing. as every ens a primo doth by potentia, it is not pure act: some say the Angels do agere per essentiam, but it is false, unless they mean that they act first by potentia: now indeed there is nothing, but it doth act per faoultatem essentiae. First the form, that is the beginner of act, and when it acts upon matter internal, that is habitual, or a faculty, when it acts by the matter upon some external object, that is an act; for first there is the essence, the matter and the form, than the faculty, the forms act upon the matter internally; lastly, the act, which is of the form, by the matter externally: now these are not in God, but are his very essence. Now we find then, that this primum ens must be actus, and purus actus, because there is no potentia in him at all, ergo it must needs be, that he is primus actus, ergo optimus actus. for primus actus, and optimus actus are all one: Again hence it must needs follow, that if there be any act of other things, it must needs be from him, and therefore if there be any thing actu it must be from him: so then thus we have found him absolute in every thing.   

Ens a primo.  
Now to return to the first Syllogism. If there be reason, there must be an adaequatum subjectum of it, ergo ens a primo, for we have heard, that ens primum is beyond our reason, so that there must be ens a primo, which is adequatum subjectum rationi, and that now is liable to all our Logic, for it hath causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, etc. and thus we will go on, and see all the subjects of the Arts in the concretion of ens a primo, which the Philosophers say, cannot be demonstrated.  
That we might dig deep, and lay our foundation of Arts sure, I have showed that there is a being, and that it is double, the one from whom Art is, the other in whom it shines, now we heard that ens est quod est, which is nothing but the true notation of ens resolved by Grammar quod est. Now for the continual succession of things which some dream of, this it is, if all things be effects, there must be so many causes, ergo in the end we shall come to a first cause, that is not effectum: Further we heard that ens primum, was quod est seipso, that is without any other: so that in propriety be is neither essentia nor ens, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hence he neither hath causes, neither is any argument that doth arise from causes, ergo is an individuum, but not a species: he is without end, ergo he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: hence he therefore was never made, ergo he made all things: he is without definition, distribution, and properties, because he is without causes, ergo there can be no art of him, but he must be the Author of art, as we shall hear hereafter. He is merus Actus, because he is without all potentia, both substantialis, and accidentalis; again, he is primus actus, ergo optimus actus, ergo whatsoever is well done of any thing is first from him: again, he is infinitus actus, ergo able to do any finite thing, yea, and infinite.   

E●s a primo est, quod ut est a primo, sie est ex nihilo proter primum.  
First we proved before, that there is ens a primo, for proprium, & adaequatum subjectum rationis est, at ens a primo est proprium & adaequatum objectum, rather than subjectum rationis, ergo, Est a primo, that we heard before, for it cannot be of itself, for than it should be absolutely first, ergo not the subject of our reason, ergo it is aliunde, ergo it is in the end for him that is not aliunde, Propter primum, every ens a primo is made, ergo for an end, ergo at last propter primum, as propter finem: Again, optimus actus must do nothing in vain. It is a rule of Nature in schools, that God and Nature nihil agunt frustra, which indeed is a general rule of Logic applied to two special Arts, natural Philosophy and Divinity. Now then at last we shall find every thing to be made, for that which was never made, ergo propter primus ens.  
Object. But some things might be made for things that are made.  
Answ. I suppose mediately, yet when all things are effects, ergo made for an end, at length we shall come to an end, that is not an effect, as all creatures are made for man, and man also being made, is therefore for an end, ergo for God: Hence therefore we see that ens a prima is propter primum, ergo every ens a primo hath his vigour, or impulsus from his first efficient, whereby it is set forth to his end, so that the Lord hath shot out every ens a primo, as it were an arrow out of his bow, to act his end: so that the vigour and impulsus of every ens a primo, which it receives from God, is that it may shoot at it end, ex nihilo, because there was only a first efficient before it, for if it were ex aliquo, then there should be more firsts.  
Object. But how can something be made of nothing?  
Answ. God is infinite, both a part ante, and a part post, ergo he can make things of nothing, which have an infinite distance a part ante, though not a part post, for so every creature is infinite.   

Ens a primo est concretuns.  
Ens a primo must be both like, and unlike primum: so the world is one, ergo like God, it is made of many simples, ergo unlike him: so every thing is one, ergo like God, but is concretum, ergo is unlike him: so that every creature must take a blow of God, as Jacob when he wrestled with the Angel took a blow on the hip, though he overcame, whereby he was made lame. Again, our Logic tells us first of simples, and then of the disposing of them, therefore ens a primo must be concretum of simples, because it must be liable to our reason; so that as before there was ens, because there was reason, so here this ens, which is the subject of our reason must be concretum, because I must see it with my eye of Logic. This concretum is of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the reason of it is this, this ens though it be for God, yet it is mediately for man, as we may see through all the creatures of God, ergo we thus conclude, that every thing was made for man, and man for God; for we know that every thing consists of matter and form, and the end of the matter and form of a thing is to make up the effect, and thus we say, every thing is it own end. Now then in every ente a primo, there must be an actus to carry it to man, and an actum, that is, that that is carried, that that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actus, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the actum, or that which is carried. So we know that Logic carries from the thing to man, and speech from man to man, that which he hath seen with his Logic. By actus I mean that which doth make the thing actually to be carried to mine eye: so that it cannot come to me, but actu, by act, and it must bring the actum: now this actus is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for as colour acts the external thing to my external eye, and is about the thing, so this actus doth to my reason, and is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, about every thing, and is an object of my eye of reason, though it ariseth from the thing, and flieth about it. Now this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth concrescere both with itself, and with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so that Logic is concrescus with Logic, and with Grammar, and Rhetoric, etc. And hence it is called common, because it is concrescens with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and with every concretion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, So that it is concrescens cum seipso, & cum omnibus aliis concrescentibus. Now that that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is the Logismos of the thing, or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it, and these are the actus of the thing: for I see every thing by my Logic, and that sees nothing but arguments, axioms, syllogisms and method; ergo, I can see nothing but that that it doth thus dictate to my reason; ergo, Logic doth act the actum, or that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to my reason. Now then there must be reason in every thing, because I am to see every thing by my Logic, which is the rule of reason, ergo all things must be liable to it, ergo it must apprehend the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in every thing. Again, there must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in every thing, because though all things at the beginning were made for one man, yet by reason of sin since his fall, one cannot see all things, therefore there must be a carrier from one man to another, that which one man sees with his eye of Logic, he may utter it to another: so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actus rei ad hominem, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actu rei ab homine ad hominem.  
Now this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either loquentia or eloquentia: the reason of this distribution is this, we heard before that speech was a carrier from man to man: and because things that are reported, are not so easily received, as those which are seen by our eye of Logic, ergo it was requisite that there should not only be an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whereby things might be uttered, but also a fine suggering of them with Rhetoric, for the more easy receiving of them.  
Eloquentia is either more fine or more grave, that is, soluta, or ligata: the reason is this, argumentum is artificiale, or inartificiale: now because speech is an artificial argument, and so not easily received, the refore Rhetoric serves to deliver the matter more soberly and gravely; and Poetry yet makes it more fine, where all things must be done by measure and sweet sounds.  
So that now we see how these general Arts are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and that they are not of so great necessity in respect of the thing, as in regard of us for our good: for, so as every thing is made for man, so he must see them for his good, by that rule that they are created.  
These now though they be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because they are circumstantial, yet they are ab ente primo, because there are causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, etc. and speech in ente a primo.  
Now the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either quantity or quality, the reason is this, every ens a primo is finite, ergo must needs have limits of quantity, if he have limits of essence.  
Quantity is either discreet, or continued, for if every thing be finite, than it must be discreet, or distinct from any other. Again, as it is discreet, so it is continued, so fare as the form extendeth the matter, whereby we may see how fare it reacheth, and where it reacheth not. Now as there is quantity, so also there must be quality in every thing, for there is no ens a primo that is pure act, ergo it hath a form acting upon a matter, and thence proceed all quantities. Again, it being made for an end, must there fore act unto its end.  
Qualitas est natura, & bonitas, every thing hath nature, because it hath a matter and a form, ergo there is nature in every thing. And therefore Ramus saith, Forma est praecipua rerum natura: and the Philosophers call forma principium actionis, and materia principium passionis.  
Now this ens being of this scantling for quantity, and of this nature for act, must be good for God's glory: so that every thing hath a goodness in it. Again, were all things made for man, and must he see them with his reason? Yes: ergo they are good for him: ergo he must have a will to embrace them as bona, as well as an eye of reason to see them as vera, and so man also is made for God, as his will acts goodness.  
Now for the order of these, actus is before actum, for the one is actio, the other is passio, and actio is before passio, and is more excellent than it. Again, actus doth concrescere with itself, and with the actum that is in the thing: ergo, actus is more general; ergo is before actum.  
Again, because we do not give names to things but with reason from some argument of Logic in the thing: and again, because there must be an actus from the thing to man, before there can be an actus from man to man, therefore the Logismos in the thing must be before the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it; ergo Logic is the most general, and first in order of all Arts.  
Of those things that are acta, quantity is first, because it ariseth nexly from the matter and form of a thing: for first of all the matter and form limit the thing, when they are put together, before they act any thing, and afterward they act one upon the other. Now quality, that is the act of the form upon the matter; ergo, it is after quantity, but before goodness, because that is the end of Nature's act. For seeing quantity ariseth immediately from the matter and form of a thing, and Nature from the act of the form upon the matter: therefore goodness must be the last, as being the end of all the former: and thus did the Lord make all things, first making the causes effects of things, then imposing speech on them, than number, then measuring them by Geometry, how fare their magnitude should reach, and where it should not reach, before it should act. Now this act of Nature was to go no further upon external objects, but only be acted by the form upon the matter; whereas the moral act of goodness was to go further, for that is for God. Again, Nature is the next in most thing to quantity, and Goodness is last. And thus have we seen all that is in ente a primo, which is the ground of all Arts.   

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est, qua omnes artes comprehenduntur pro subordinatione finium.  
Now we are come to Arts, and first we are to begin with Encuclopaidia, and the definition of it. First for the name, it is Orbis ille, & Circulus Artium. The reason of it indeed is as much as Arts quite through, as we use to say when there are many poor folk to be served, though they stand in a long row, Have you served them round? But there is a further reason of it, A circle we know is a round line, whose beginning and end meet together in a common point; therefore this learning in a Circle must be showed to have a common point, and that we shall easily find. The proper subject of Art is Ens a primo, because we heard, that was made for an end. Now then from whence Ens a primo had his beginning, from thence must Ars have his beginning: But from Ens primum it had his beginning, ergo. Again, as Ens a primo hath for his beginning Ens primum, so it must have Ens primum for his last end, because Ens primum is not made for any end, but is the last end of all things itself, ergo he must also be the last end of Art: Then here we find, as Ens primum is the beginning of Art, so also he is the end of Art; because he is the beginning and end of those things that are the subjects of Arts; therefore there is one common point wherein they begin and end: ergo having the same beginning and end, here is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now howsoever the phrase may seem otherwise, as we heard before, yet here we see the wisdom of God in this name, though the Grecians did not know the reason of it when they gave it. Now the Scripture seemeth to witness this truth. For the Lord saith, I am the beginning and the end: that is, of things, and again, I am Alpha and Omega: these belong to Grammar, ergo to Art, ergo he is both the beginning and end of things, and the Alpha and Omega of the Arts.  
That this wisdom is round, we may also see in regard of the subject; for the World is round, and that is the subject of Art: ergo Art is so, for Art is an adjunct to it, and every adjunct takes figure of his subject. Again, if we will take Art for Knowledge, Knowledge is in a man's head, and that is round, so Encuclopaidia is every way in circulo: and thus we see the reason, why this name should be given to a Chain, whose links are the Arts. Now if Ens primum be the cause of entia a primo, than he hath the Idea of them in him: for he made them by counsel, and not by necessity; for than he should have needed them, and they have a parelion of that wisdom that is in his Idea. Again, it must needs be that this wisdom is his, because he governs them by the rules of Art, for so every rule of Art is a Statute-law of God, by which he made the things, and whereby he governs the things, whose Art it is. Now seeing it is so, therefore this Law hath God for the Author, and look what Idea was in the making of the thing, the same Idea is in the governing of it: for if the Lord should make it by one rule, and govern it by another, it would not serve the turn to guide the thing to the eupraxie, whereunto it was made. So that hence it follows, that every rule of Art is eternal. Again, our rule of Logic tells us, that every rule of Art is most true, and therefore is from God. For so every rule is true, as it answers to that Idea that is in him: and is most just, most wise; ergo is from God, who is most true, most just, and most wise. Now it is in God as in the fountain, and it is in the creature too, but there it is by a refraction: for this wisdom coming to the creature, according as the creature is, such is the Arts order and course. So that if ens a primo be divided into parts, this wisdom also will be divided into parts: and as in a Looking-glass that is broken, look how many pieces it is broken into, so many images shall you see: So for the Arts, look into how many parts the thing is divided, into so many parts will the Art be distributed.  
Q. What is the next subject of Ars in the thing?  
Answ. The Frame, as the term shows: for so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greek signifieth fabrica of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it is seen in the frame of the thing: so that the frame of the thing is taught in the Art. So when I say, Dial●ctica est ars bene disserendi, I do not define Logic, but I define the frame of reason: so that the parelion is the frame of the thing, and thence are the Arts written, and by the Art we see the frame: so than Encuclopaidia is the wisdom of God in the thing, ergo the subject of Encuclopaidia is Ars, that is the Frame of things,   

Qua comprehenduntur, or, continentur.  
The Chain Encuclopaidia is not a genus to Ars, no more than a Chain is a genus to the Links, but an integrum: for as a Chain is an integrum, and the Links membra; so Encuclopaidia is an integrum, and the Arts are the members that make up the whole. Now as the links must be linked together, before there be a Chain: so the Arts must be holden together, before there be Encuclopaidia: so that every Art is a link, and they must be linked together to make up the whole. Therefore I say, qua continentur, as parts, continentur a toto.  
For Arts may be holden together; for there is that community among the Arts, for Ars in genere is genus to them all: Therefore as Tully saith, they have a certain commonkinred, as being species of one genus: but this holding together is after another manner than links in a Chain: namely, pro subordinatione finium: Therefore they are not holden together confusedly, and as they come to hand, but every one must have his rank according to the generality of the end thereof. So that if we link Grammar on the Chain before Logic, we do not right: and so in like sort for the other Arts.  
I say, qua omnes arts, because as a Chain that hath not all his links, is not perfect, because it wants some parts: so the Chain of Arts will not be perfect, if there be any wanting; the rule of Logic teacheth us so much: for Encuclopaidia is a totum, ergo if any member be wanting, there will not be a totum made up. And thus we have heard the definition of Encuclopaidia, Now the subject of it is Ars, as the notation of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 showeth: and this wisdom of God is one in him, but is made various in the thing.   

Ars est quae constat praecaeptis prime verissimique scientificis rei suae ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 continuatis.  
First for the word Ars. For the Latin term divers have diversely sought for the notation of it. Some say it cometh of arctus a Sinew: some of arx a Tower. Now those that say it comes of arctus a Sinew, give this reason, Because the sinew is the strongest part in a man: for though the bones be stronger in some respect, yet because they will break, whereas the sinew will bend, ergo the sinews are stronger, so the arts in a thing serve to strengthen it for its Eupraxie. If it come of arx a Tower, we know that it is impregnable for the matter and building, and for the form also it is excellent, and so the strongest thing in the world: so the Arts are for matter invincible, for form most goodly,  
Ars in Greek is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth Fabrica, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fabrico, because it is seen in the frame of the thing. But, as we heard, the frame of the thing is the subject of Art: and when I say, Logica est ars bene disserendi, I do not define Logic, but the frame of reason, as it hath framed man: so when I say Grammatica est ars bene loquendi, I describe speech as it is to be framed. And therefore when we call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it is a Metonymy of the Subject for the Adjunct. So that here we may see, that Art is the wisdom of God, but yet as it is energetic in the thing, so it is called Ars, So that mark this, that Art is the Law of God, whereunto he created things, whereby the governeth them, and whereunto they yield obedience: for by their obedience we come to see this frame; therefore this Art is God's wisdom, as it is resplendent in the things, which is but as a drop of water to the whole Ocean sea, in respect of the infinite wisdom that is in him. Mark this well, for the Schools run into many absurdities, whilst they have thought that Art is in a man's head, and not in the thing.   

Quae constat.  
I make no genus of it, for it is genus summum in its kind, as Ens also is.  
Ob. But the Schools say Art is an intellectual virtue, ergo hath virtus for his genus.  
Answ. It is no genus of Art, neither is Ars quatenus it is Art in the thing a virtue; but as it is scientia in man's head, so indeed it belongs to the Ethics: for if virtue were a genus to Ars, virtue belongs to Ethics: and so by this reason. Ethics should be the most general Art, and also by that reason Ethics should be under Ethics: for virtus intellectualis is but a little part of them, therefore this is fallacia accidentis, as they call it.  
Again, to call it an habit as Aristotle saith it is, and as the Schools make it, that conceit is very simple, for habitus or quantitas habitualis belongeth to Logic, and is nothing but a special kind of adjunct: therefore Aristotle doth define homo to be genus rationale, whereas we know genus is but an adjunct to animal, which is the genus of homo: so that it is not Art in the thing, but the knowledge he hath of it, which is adjoined to man. Now we have heard, that Art is the wisdom of God, in ente a primo, and the frame of the creature is in the antitype of this wisdom, and is a subject of Art. I say, Ars est quae constat, though it be the frame of the thing. Now constare is to stand together in parts.  
Quest. How come Arts to have parts, being but that one wisdom in God?  
Answ. Not in regard of God, but in respect of the frame of the thing where we see it. For even as God's Mercy and Justice are one, but various in respect of the object: It is Mercy to him that comes before him in Christ; It is Justice to him that appears before him without Christ: So Art is one in God, but is various in respect of the various work it hath wrought in the creation of things, and that it acteth in their government to their end. Again, those parts must constare, for in the frame of the thing the subjects of the Arts do constare, ergo this wisdom following them must constare in his parts: and as one thing hath his frame, and another his, differing from the other; hence the precepts of Arts must be various, and must constare one with another; hence it follows, that in Art we must have no rules but those that will constare, and are essential to it. So that if we bring a rule of Grammar into Logic, or econtra: or if we leave out of Logic some essential rule to it, it will not constare: again, if the rules of Art be disordered, they will not stand together: therefore when I say constare, I say two things, first that every Art must have all the rules that are essential to it, and no more: and secondly, that every precept must be placed in his due order, and rank. For as a Painter that makes the picture of a man would make it very deformed, if he should set the head where the feet should be, or contra: so were it as absurd for an Artist to disorder his Art.   

Constant praeceptis.  
Every thing hath his special acts before it can work that main act, for which it was made, as reason must have two parts, it must see the simple causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, etc. and Axioms, Syllogisms and Method, that it may been disserere, therefore there are many petty acts of reason to be performed, which though they all conspire in one main act, yet are they not one another: and here we see, that as Arts did arise from the frame of the thing; so the precepts of Art are from the Acts of things: so that thus Arts constant praeceptis or regulis, all is one, both are good, and regere is as large as regula, and praeceptum as praecipere. But my reason why I rather choose praeceptum is this, because regula is tropical, for it is often taken for a Square or Ruler, whereby we rule any thing, and this is a grand Synecdoche. And again, because the Lord hath created, and governeth his creatures by the precepts of Arts, as by so many Statutes, or Commandments of the things act for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as at the Creation, when the Lord said, Let there be light, by this rule, as by a Precept, did the Lord create light, and also governs it. It is a Law as God governs reason, speech, quantity, etc. by the rule of Logic, Grammar, Mathematics; and even as a King governeth his Dominions by his Laws: so the Lord governeth his Creatures by the rules of Arts: and because the Creation began with Commandments, therefore we will still hold it, and they may be called Laws, Statutes or Commandments, etc. even as the Lord calleth his Laws for man Commandments. Again, I rather call the rules of Arts praecepta than regulae, because they being shortly delivered are as so many short directions for the guiding of the thing to the end thereof.   

Prime verissimeque scientificis.  
Every Precept of Art must be scientificum, that is making knowledge: scientia (saith our Logic) is the judgement of a necessary Axiom, and therefore must be so true, so just and so wise, as nothing can be more true, more just, more wise. Why? so are the Precepts of Art both in God, and in the Creature, for as for deductions the Lord hath shut them up in a brief rule of Art; for look how many uses there may be of a rule of Art in the thing whose rule it is, so many deductions will there arise from that rule. Now man not being able to take this wisdom from God, which is most simple, therefore it hath pleased the Lord to place it in the things, and as flowers do send out a scent, or odor that doth affect our sense of smelling, so every precept of Art doth spirare a sweet science to our glass of Understanding, which is indeed that irradiation, which we heard of in Divinity in the Creation of things: but it is called scientia by a Trope, for as the scent of a flower is not properly odor, but that that doth affect the sense; and as when we see a strange thing, we say, look what a sight is yonder, whereas sight is properly of the eye: so we call Art a scientia, or sweet savour in respect of our knowledge of it, which is a metonimy of the adjunct for the Subject.  
Quest. Now how do they scientificare? how are they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Answ. We have heard how they are in the things, and from thence they do come by an irradiation, to the Glass of our understanding, and as the Sun beams coming through a red or blue glass, etc. will bring the colour of the glass with them to our sense: so doth the irradiation of Art from the thing bring the colour of the thing with it to our understanding, I mean that this irradiation doth bring the frame of the thing with it, according to which we see it. Now than first it is called the wisdom of God, as it is one in him, then is it called arse, as it is in the thing, and when it is brought by an irradiation to our understanding, the first Act of it is to see the simples in the things, and this is called our intelligentia, for it is that perspicacy whereby we look at the invention that is in the thing: so that it is the first Act of our intellectus. As it is received in an axiom, we call it scientia. It is our sapientia as we can discourse with it syllogistically: and as we apply it rightly in time and place, so it is prudentia. And it is Ars as we can execute, it, and practise it in Analysi or Genesi, as Ars is rightly an intellectual virtue, as we teach it to another it is doctrina, and his learning is disciplina; last, as we set it down in writing or printing, it is liber.  
And every rule of Art is true, as when I say, R●sa est flos, Socrates est homo, though there be never a Rose or Socrates in the world, because the rule is eternal, for it is in the eternal Idea of God, though the thing be not. Now some Metaphysitians, not distinguishing aright hereof, say the thing is eternal, that is (say they) the thing was in God's eternal Idea; nay the Idea of God is eternal, but not the thing. I but Kickerman saith, the thing is eternal quoad essentiam, not quoad existentiam, but that is false, for existere belongs to effectum in Logic, and every effect must have all the causes, ergo matter and form, and these are not eternal.   

Prime.  
For there is no rule of Art, but is a necessary Axiom in its own place, and so is firstly true. Now deductions are true but at the first, second, third or fourth hand, according as they are drawn from the first rule, at the second, third or fourth hand, and are so far forth true, as the first rule is true, therefore when we dispute with any Adversaries, we bring our controversy to a rule of Art, and if they deny that, we say contra negantem principia, non est disputandum, though there is no rule of Art but may be demonstrated, and is first because it delivereth the first causes of the things.   

Verissimeque.  
Every rule of Art as it is prima scientia, so it is verissima: but for deductions, as they are second, or tertiae scientiae, according as they arise from the first rule, so they are secundo, or tertio true, to wit, so fare forth as the first is true.   

Concinnatis rei.  
Here is the subject of Ars, and as praecepta were the matter, and primo verissimeque scientificis were the qualities before: I do not say fabricae, for that is but one thing, whereas the rules of Arts are many. Again, Art is the rule of the government of the thing, as well as of the frame of it, therefore here is ens, or res in general: I do not say concinnatis to any one thing, because as Ars in genere is to all the special Arts; so is ens in genere to all the special entia. Now if you ask me what res is, I told you before in the definition of ens, so that it was defined before, but here I take it as a subject of Art.   

Concinnatis.  
I had not a better word, and therefore was fain to take this, though it doth not fit my purpose, as I would, for the thing indeed is made to the rule, and not the rule to the thing, though we first see the thing, and by the Act thereof observe the rule, Concinnatis to fit together, or to sing in parts, so that every thing must be placed in order, and fitted each to other, for nothing can be wisely done, if the precepts of Art be broken.   

Ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
For every thing is made, and governed to an end, and Art is the rule of the making and governing of things to their end, therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of every Art, and is not to be taught in any particular Art.   

Artis est praxis & prattomenon.  
We have heard what encuclopaidia is, qua Artes comprehenduntur, pro subordinatione finiam, and what Ars is. Now we come to the common affections belonging to Art, and they are praxis, and prattomenon. That Art hath his praxis and prattomenon, I thus prove it: if the end of things be an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, then as there is that actio, or motus: so there must be a res motu facta the prattomenon. But the end of every thing is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: therefore I prove it is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because laus rei est actione, and if there should be any thing made, that had not an end, it were in vain. Again, every thing is God's work, and he is pure Act, therefore every thing must agree to him, and so agere. And if there be a praxis and a prattomenon of the thing, there must needs be a praxis and prattomenon of Art, because the thing is fitted to the rule of Art, and not Art to the thing. Now the reason why some have dreamt that every Art hath not his praxis and prattomenon is, that false distinction of Arts into theoretical and practic, they call them theoretical which they do only contemplate; practic when we can by art agere: But there is no Art but is both theoretical and practic, for as we heard before, that we might both scire sapere, and intelligere, etc. so we may contemplate, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ergo this distribution is fallacia accidentis, for they do not distinguish Art as it is in the thing, but from their own knowledge of it.  
Object. But we cannot guide Astronomy, neither can we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with natural Philosophy, but only contemplate them?  
Answ. It is Ars as it is in fabrica rei, not as it is in homine, but there is praxis and prattomenon in every thing, as in the Sun we may see, his motion is Praxis, his course that he makes is Prattomenon: again, man doth not contemplate only, but also work by the rule of Astronomy, and by Nature, as in the sowing of corn, and planting of trees, etc. Now for practic they say they are such as do only practive, and leave no work behind them: or they are also poietick, and leave a work behind them. Of the first sort they make Ethics, Economics, Politics, Music, Optics and others, Why? doth not the Ethician work a good moral action, or virtue, by his rule of Ethics? and hath not the good husbandman in working by the rule of Economics his Prattomenon as well, as his praxis? and so of the rest. Is not the Commonwealth the Prattomenon of a good Politician to be governed by him according to the rule of the Politics? so for Music, is there not a song sung as well as the singing of it? and when they set their song we see it plain, that there is an opus as well as a motus. Now they had these from Aristotle, but they are false, and it is not commendable in the Creator, that every thing should have his praxis and prattomenon. Again, it doth not resemble the Creator, who is purus actus, unless there be a motus in it, and a res motu facta, as the rule of Logic teacheth in the doctrine of effectum, and not only Logic, but also Grammar teacheth so much, for there is scriptio and scriptum; so in Arithmetic there is a numbering, and a thing numbered. So for Geometry there is a measuring, and a thing measured: and so for all other Arts. And it cannot be otherwise by the rule of Grammar, for every verb is a transitive, and that is either active or neuter, and both of them govern an accusative case, which is the subject into which they pass over, as amo patrem, Pater is the subject unto which amo passeth over: and sero a verb neuter hath his subject in himself, as when I say, I sow, it is as if I should say, I sow seed, therefore there is a prattomenon of every Art, as well as a praxis. For if a man smells, he smells something, and when he sees, he sees something, and drinking, he drinks drink.   

Praxis est artis in agendo motus.  
There is nothing that can act sine motu, but only God: and hence it is that motus is general to every effect, and therefore is an effect by our rule of Logic.   

Praxis is Genesis, and Analysis.  
These two belong to art in like sort, because they belong to the thing where Art is, for if you grant a motus of every thing, it must either be from principles to the making up of a thing, or to the resolving of it. Now if Art make up a thing, it can also undo it, for the way is the same, only there is a progress and regress: so if I by my rule of Grammar join a nominative case and a verb together, I can also by the same rule undo them again, and see whether it be true; and this we call construing of Latin, which indeed is distruing, for it is Analysis, for we pull that asunder, which Tully hath laid together, and indeed none can well undo a thing, but he that hath made it, or one that knows how to make it: and therefore we do not send for a Joiner to pull down a house, but for a Carpenter, ergo if every thing have his Genesis and Analysis, Art must also have them, which follow the thing.   

Genesis est progressus artis a simplicibus ad composita.  
This Art hath his Genesis, which is a progress, for Genesis gins at the simples, and so goes to the composites, therefore must needs be a progress, now every thing but God is composed of simples, therefore there must needs be a Genesis of every Art which still follows the thing. So Logic first looks at the invention of things, then at the axioms, syllogisms and method. So Grammar first gins with letters, then with syllables, then with words, then with sentences: and Arithmetic first considereth simple number, then comparative, etc. So Geometry first looks at lines, then at superficies, then at corpus: so natural Philosophy first gins with simple natures, then with composites, first with those that are without life, than those that live, first a simple life, secondly those that live a composite life.   

Analysis est regressus a compositis ad simplicia.  
Analysis is an unwinding of a bottom of thread, which we wound up before: so we analyse that which was genised before, so that it is a regressio, &c, for that way that you took in genesi, the same way you take in analysi, only you begin at divers ends. So in Logic we take an axiom, and resolve it into arguments, and so in Grammar we take a sentence, and resolve it into words, and so when I ask what a word signifies, he that telleth me the signification of it doth analyse it, and so for the other Arts as we heard before in the doctrine of Genesis. Now the Schools thought that genesis and analysis belong to Method in Logic, which happily they might have from Aristotle, who entitleth his books Analytics, and thence they make method to be double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but they belong to every Art, therefore must be taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and again, there is genesis and analysis of one and the same axiom, as when I seek for a cause, or any other argument to make an axiom, or when I resolve it into a cause, etc. so that when I ask, what is Latin for such a word, I genise it, and englishing it I analyse it, so that they belong not to method, which is a disposition, for they may be of one word; again, they may be as well of any other rule as of method. Now because they did observe the analysis and genesis in method more usually, than of art in general, therefore they thought them to belong only to it; now indeed if I take any rule of art from other rules of art, I practise method, therefore they may be special practices of method, for as [said before, they may be in any other rule of Art, as well as in it. And method is not double because of them, no more than any rule of Art is double, because of the double use of it, and these are the life of Art, therefore those that will be expert for practise of any Art, let them practise these. Now for the general Arts, I think none will doubt, but that they belong to them, but for the special Arts there may be some doubt. If you draw any deduction from any first rule of any special Art, it is genesis; or if you draw deduction unto a first rule from it, it is analysis, etc. So when you examine the Sun's course by the rule of Astronomy, it is genesis, analysis contra. This analysis if it be imitated (for so it pleaseth the Lord to let us resolve his creatures) that we may work alike, that is called imitatio: so that those that have writ so much of imitatio, are to bring it hither, and imitatio is general, as we imitate some analysis of some thing that is genised. And indeed all our practice is nothing but genesis imitative of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so a child when he writes a copy by his Master's example doth imitate him, for first he looks at the line then at the sentences, then at the words, and lastly at the letters. So an apprentice when he works according as his master reacheth him, doth imitate his example: and thus as we see God's wisdom making up the thing, so we see man's work in imitating God.   

Vbi genesis desinit, ibi incipit analysis.  
For if genesis be progressus a simplicibus ad composita and analysis regressus a compositis ad simplicia, then genesis definit ubi incipit analysis: at, ergo; again it follows that analysis conjuncta is vere hermineutica, or interpretativa, for when I have an example, and do resolve the prattomenon, giving to every Art his own, I tell you all that is to be seen in the thing, as in this example, homo est bulla, but this later consecution will come in better in the doctrine of prattomenon.   

Prattomenon est res motu artis facta.  
Prattomenon is that that the Art hath done by his praxis, for actio must go before passio, and praxis is before prattomenon, and there is nothing, but it is made for man, and therefore must have a Prattomenon, for else the motion of it would be little worth: now to prattomenon there belongs two things, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for when Art hath acted, and acted a work, it resteth not there, for it is for an use, therefore there must go with prattomenon, an use thereof. Now this use may be confused with the prattomena of other Arts; so that this rule is here to be taught, that the Arts for their precepts are distinct, but not for the use of their prattomena: for use holds the prattomena of Arts together, as in this example, all flesh is grass, if it be examined. For in this there is the prattomenon of Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric, natural Philosophy, and lastly the prattomenon of Divinity. Hence we say the use of Arts is general, but we mean the use of the prattomenon of Arts, for the precepts of Art are not only distinct, but the praxis to, and the prattomenon also till we come to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it: as we may see in a Shipwright, his rule of Art is distinct, his motus is distinct, and his prattomenon is distinct, till you come to look at the manifold use of his prattomenon. So first the Shepherd hath his prattomenon, than the Grazier he useth the prattomenon of the shepherd, the Butcher useth the prattomenon of the Grazier, and the Cook useth the prattomenon of the Butcher, and they that eat the meat the Cook hath dressed use his Prattomenon. So that if the Philosopher will dispute as we say, he disputes as a Logician making axioms, or syllogisms, and so takes the prattomenon of Logic, and useth it in natural Philosophy. So the Tailor takes cloth made to his hand, and he useth it to this, or that end, to make such, or such a garment with it. There is also that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for as the prattomenon of every Art may be joined with the prattomenon of other Arts: so it must be provided that they be not so confused together, but that they may be severed again. So I can take magnitude from a body by the rule of Geometry, for whilst I take the prattomenon of any thing, and carry it to the Art to which it belongeth, that is aphares●s, it hath been taught in Schools to be peculiar only to Geometry, but it doth not take magnitude from the thing, but seethe is there distinct, and pulls it from another, and gives that prattomenon its proper use, and so looks at it by that Art whose prattomenon it is, and so doth every Art whatsoever, ergo it is general to them all.   

Posterior ars prioris utitur opere.  
This is from the use, so we may see in manual Arts, the Shepherd hath his prattomenon, and the Grazier he takes and useth it, and then the Butcher useth the Graziers prattomenon, and the Cook he useth the Butchers, etc. and thus we have heard of Art in general.   

Ars est generalis, aut specialis.  
I shown you before, that in ente aprimo there were certain concrescentia, and they were either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: now these that are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are more general than the other, for they do concrescere with themselves, and with the rest. As Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric do concrescere between themselves, and cumomnibus aliis concrescentibus in the thing, ergo accordingly must the Arts of them, namely, Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric be general: and because the other do not concrescere with the rest, but only in part, ergo they are more special, for though number and magnitude may concrescere with nature, but not with all other Arts, as Logic, etc. therefore they are not so general. Now things are more general or special in use, ergo the Art which still runs on with the thing must be distributed accordingly, not that I here distribute Art into genus and species, for in that sense they are all alike, yea the most special Art is as general, as that which is most general, therefore take heed of that, for I do not mean so, but I mean that some Arts are more general in respect of the general use of their prattomenon, and some are more special in regard of the special use of it, as one Art may be without another, and by nature is before it, as one is before two, for so Logic needeth not any other Art, but all the rest have need of it.   

Ars generalis est, quae est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, circaens.  
This general Art hath for his subject every thing, ergo I thus define it; It is the splendour or light that brings the thing to man from man: now in that it is of general use, it must needs be ubique. But is ens in genere the subject of the general Art? yes, but at the second hand, it is firstly the subject of arse in genere. Now there are general to ens in genere these two adjuncts, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, therefore the Arts of them must be general, and in every thing: so that if you look at ens quatenus ens, it belongs to arse, quatenus ars, if you look at the reason or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the thing, it belongs to Logic, Grammar, or Rhetoric, so that look at ens, as the Metaphysitians teach it, and you shall find all their doctrine to be here, or in Logic, or in Divinity, about the efficiency of God. Now I say it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non ens by consequence, but non ens is more special, and belongs to contraria negantia in Logic, but ens fictum is more general. I say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or circa, not but that it is in the thing, for the Logicum artificium of God is in every thing: but it is in the outside of it, and flies out of it, and acts outwardly to me, and in that respect I call it circa, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: I say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 also, for there can be no Art of non ens; for non ens is no creature, and Art is the wisdom of God and therefore is of that that is something. Now the Poets fall into many figments, but they mean thereby things, and so they belong to some special Arts: and all Esop's Fables and other fables are but Allegories belonging to natural Philosophy, or to moral Philosophy, though there may be fables of any art, for fabula belongs to rhetoric which is a general art.   

Ars generalis est rati nis, or orationis.  
This general art running according to the general thing, that is, which is of general use, is either the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: now the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is more general, because the thing must first be carried to me, before I can deliver it to another. Again, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of absolute necessity in every thing, and therefore must needs be there, whereas the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is therefore general because it may be every where, but is not; For it is impossible for us to see any thing without there be reason in it, ergo Logic the art that made it is most general, and omnium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore by nature is first, for other arts cannot be without it, that may be without them: and thus now we are come to Logic.    

THE LOGICIANS SCHOOLMASTER.  
The first Book.  

CHAP. I.  

Dialectica est ars bene disserendi.  
WE have heard what Encuclopaidia is, and of Ars, and that the subject of it is Res, that hath an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: We have heard moreover the affections of Arts, and the Species of them, that they are general of the thing acting, or special of the thing acted. Now than the first thing in nature is reason, and here remember what we heard before, that we may see as God governed things in general by Arts: so in special reason by Logic; and it is most general, because it is of most general use, not in regard of his Precepts, for so it is as special as any, but for use, because there can be nothing without Logic, yet Logic may be without speech, quantity, etc. ergo, this is most general. Now true it is, that this, as also the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proceed from the thing in nature; yet Logic is more general than any of the rest in regard of his use, for it is in itself in speech, in quantity, etc. so that look where any art is, there Logic is: but it doth not follow, that where Logic is, there Arithmetic, Geometry, etc. should be. Again, it pleased the Lord to make man his Steward under him over all the Creatures, ergo in this respect it is necessary he should behold all the creatures, to the employment of the use of the principal Lord, therefore he must first see them, therefore must be prepared with such a faculty, that he may see all things by it. Now this is omnium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. That there is such an Art, I show it thus.  
If there be reason, than there is an art of it, because reason is ens a primo, and it is for an end, therefore there must be that art, that is of reason's act. For the proposition I proved it before, for reason was for an end; for the Assumption none will deny, but that there is reason, if they will acknowledge themselves to be but men. Our Author calls this art Dialectica, which comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifying secerno, separo, seligo; as for example, if there were many things together, I would sever them, and this name fitteth reason's act very well; for Logic is like a fire among the Chemists, for as fire will congregare homogenia, and segregare heterogenia: so Logic is the fire of all Arts, severing in the same act that fire doth, Logic from Grammar, and Rhetoric from both, etc. and then it congregates to Logic that which is congreans to it, to Grammar that which is homogeny to it, etc. so that when it invents, it picks out homogenies, it disposeth them, and lays them in several places, therefore this name Dialectica is very fitly given to this art, that works this wonderful effect. Wonderful I may call it, for the Chemists can do great effects, but the Logicians can do greater, for they can see God's Logic in the things, and had not man fallen, he might have come to have seen all the wisdom of God in the Creatures. Now if Logic doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, congregare homogenia, and segregare heterogenia by the same effect, it may fitly be so called: now this art is so called, saith Diog enes Laertius, first by Plato, if he were the Author, he was more ancient than Aristotle, and antiquity should have honour with good reason, if we have any reason: nay, Geometry is so called from its subject rather, not metiri from antiquity; but Zenophon in his fourth book of remembrances saith, that Socrates was Plato's Schoolmaster, and he never writ any thing, but Plato always: so that Socrates might read it, and Zenophon hear it, for he was his Scholar, for Zenophon & Plato fuere aequales, and Diogenes Laertius might read it in Plato, as he had noted it from Socrates: and the Oracle witnesseth that Socrates was the wisest man in his time, and he was more wise than Aristotle; for Plato that was Socrates Scholar, was his Master; so that for this name we see how fitly it agrees to this art, and also the confirmation of it from antiquity. Now Aristotle calls it Logic, I do not deny but the name is good, but it is later, as Laertius witnesseth that Aristotle gave it first, but it is from the subject ●eason, as the names of most arts are. Arithmetic of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, numerus; Geometry of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, terra, etc. but it doth not so lively name this art as Dialectica doth, which names the life, and delivers the quintessence of Logic: so that Logica, as it is conjugate of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, names it well, but doth not set it out with that vigour that Dialectica doth: So thus we see the reason of the name.   

Est Ars.  
What art is we have heard before, this it is, every thing hath an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is accomplished by many petty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which causes the precepts of art to be answerable thereunto; so that Logicks main end is been disserere: bene invenire, and bene judicare are the petty acts of it. Now if Logica, and Dialectica show the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and frame of man's reason, and direct it to the chief end, its happiness, where the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esteth, than it is arse: at, ergo.   

Est ars bene disserendi.  
First disserendi, for the explanation of the word, dissero comes of dis and sero, sero signifies first to sow and does a sunder, or dissero, that makes disserui▪ to sow asunder; whether it be so used I find not, I for my part ever read it in this Logical signification, and that which I told you of concerning dialectica, is true 〈◊〉 his, that as there was things to be sown, and a sati● secernendorum, and a sowing them asunder: so there are first semina, which are arguments in invention: Secondly, a satio of them, that is, a disposing of them Axiomatically, and syllogistically; and lastly, a disserio, that is, a disposing of them according to true method and order; so that in this disserere we have the nature of reason quite through, as we had in Dialectica. So that this name delivers also to us very fitly the very soul of Logic; for as in man's body there is a soul or a form per quam res est, id quod est, & a caeteris rebus distinguitur; so there is of this art, or rather of the subject of it, reason: and as in other things the Lord hath wrought so cunningly, that we cannot see their forms, but only the next acts to the forms: so here our Author desireth to give to us the form of reason; which because he cannot do, therefore he delivers it by the final cause, the next act to the form: so that when he saith dialectica est ars bene disserendi, he means it is such an art that hath such a form that doth been disserere, therefore I conclude thus: if this be the happiness, the act, and soul of reason, than it is defined fitly Ars bene disserendi, at. ergo.   

Bene.  
Here it is an adverb, for Grammar here doth declare some controversy, and an adverb is a part of speech joined to the verb to show his signification, therefore been is here added to make perfect the act of this disserere, ergo, bene disserere is not two things, but one thing, and this is a commendation in defining arts, to break the forms of them, as little as we can, because the form is but one argument; and if we put two or more words into the form, we break it into so many pieces. Now for the reason of been in a Art, this it is, Art is the rule of the frame of Ens a primo: so Logic is the rule of reason, as it is God's creature, ergo, as it is good, ergo, bene is here put in well to show the Act of the goodness of this reason. Now since the fall of man, his reason is weakened, & darkened, & so there is a bona ratio, and a mala ratio▪ though mala ratio is not ratio indeed, but the error of rario, and this act is to guide reason, as it doth been disserere, not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 disserere, ergo, it is well put in to sever them. For if Dialectica be ars rationis bene agentis, than it is ars bene disserendi only, and not male disserendi, at, ergo. So Grammar is the Art only been loquendi, though it descry male loqui: now here among the Logicians are many questions, and controversies against our Author. As some except against the name dialectica, and makes it more special than here Ramus takes it, and they distribute reason into three parts, Dialectica, Sophistica, and Apodictica, which was the distribution of the Aristotelians, not of Aristotle himself; but Simplicius that chief fellow, was the first man that brought it up, and afterward it was generally received in Schools from him. By Dialectica they understand all probable reason, and probality in Schools is taken in two significations, sometime it is taken for a contingent true axiom, ergo it belongs to one little particle of the doctrine of axioma. Sometimes it is taken for axioma dubium, or quaestio, and then it belongs to the doctrine of Syllogisms; so that we shall find probability in these two places; but to make Dialectica so special, is to make a Camel go through the eye of a needle; is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no more general than so? doth it not go through all judgement, yea and invention too?  
Again, for Apodictica, which is de necessariis, that belongs to a necessary axiom, for no syllogisms are necessary, but the axioms which they consist of; but the syllogistical judgement is the same both of necessary and contingent axioms, and a syllogism of contingent propositions is necessary as well as that, which is of necessary axioms. Now for Sophistica, that is shut out, for if I see the truth, what need I look farther: and whereas they allege that it is of the apparency of truth, what care I for that? yet it is counterfeit: so that they would have all Logic to consist in a necessary and a contingent axiom, for no syllogisms are so: and that is the reason, that Ramus denies that demonstration; for their necessary that they speak of, is in axiom, not in syllogism. Again, Sophistica is general to all arts, and not special to Logic, for all arts have their errors. Now the Schools distribute Logic into Dialectica, Grammatica, and Rhetorica, which savours of a notorious equivocation. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indeed signifies ratio, and oratio, but this is only a distributing of the name, not of the thing, as if they should say Logica signifies ratio, or speech: many also there are that find fault with Ramus, for the reason of this name, some say it comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, colloquor; but that is not because of their collocutio; but because of their reasoning in their speech together: but again, what hath Logic to do with words, and to name Logic from speech hath no reason at all, for it may be without it. There is also a great question, whether Dialectica be Ars, as Scaliger will have it; because saith he opus post se reliquit; or if it be facultas, as Craelius holds, or whether it be scientia, as others say. These are babbles, we have heard that the wisdom of God is Ars in the thing, it is called scientia by a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, which is properly the judgement of a rule of art: so that here is a double trope, first a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, the knowledge of the art for the art itself: then a Synecdoche of the part for the whole, the rule for the whole art, for facultas, that is the subject ratio: ergo, Craelius speaks by metonimy of the subject for the adjunct; for the faculty is reason itself; so that dialectica est ars: as for their distribution in Schools, that arse doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and scientia only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or contemplare, it is a babble, we see scientia is the knowledge of the Art, and arse is rei, as Arithmetic is of number, Geometry of magnitude, etc. and Logic of reason, so that the scientia or Theory of Art is fallacia accidentis, to take it for the art itself, and is as if we should say, a painted man is a true man, ergo, when we say a man is a good Logician, we mean a man hath that knowledge of reason, and so for other arts; so that our knowledge of an art is no more of the essence of it, than my knowledge of a man is of the essence of the man. Again, when I say the knowledge of an Art, I say two things, knowledge, and art, which are subject and adjunct, ergo, knowledge is but accidental to the art. For bene disserendi there are many adversaries, and one grand enemy, some say it is rather ars bene utendi ratione, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is an adjunct to art, and it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not artis, as for example, we cannot say, the Merchant, or Mariner useth the Shipwrights art, but his work, but this is the chief absurdity that it breaks the form into pieces.  
Kickerman cries out against Ramus for this definition, and says it is a trope, ergo, ought not to be in art, he forgets his rules, for Rhetoric is a general art, ergo, it may be every where, but saith he, is it not better to teach with proper words, then with tropical, they are fit for simple men, not for judicious? I will confess it, and Ramus too, for Grammar is before Rhetoric, ergo, should be preferred: yet Tropes may be as plain, and as significant as other words sometimes; but I make no doubt, but that disserere is ever used in other sense then this Logical signification: but if it be, let him give me a better word; but he cannot, because he doth not but says, logica est ars dirigendi mentem in cognition rerum▪ and so breaks all in pieces. Again, what doth dirigere here? It belongs to art in general, for dirigere is as large as regere, and regere as regula, and regula as praeceptum; so that here he cannot be content to horse me up to art in general, for the genus only, but for the form too. Again for men's, he cannot abide Tropes; but what means he by mens? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth properly the divine part of the soul of man, and sometimes it is taken for the faculties of the soul, but here he must take it for reason, ergo, here are two Tropes, first a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct, the faculties for the soul itself. Secondly, a Synecdoche of the part for the whole, reason for the soul. For cognitio it comes of con and notio, to see things laid together, and it is the judgement of an axiom, and belongs to it, which is but a little particle of Logic.  
Lastly, for res, that is as general as ens, which is as general as arse, ergo, thus he hoists me up, and down, first to arse in general; then down again to natural Philosophy, for men's belongs thither, then to one piece of Logic: then again up to arse; and thus much for the explanation of the rule: the practice of it stands in this: God hath made all things for man, therefore he must have an eye to see them, and all of them must be liable to it, ergo, this rule tells us, first, if we would look at any thing we must take it with us, for it is ars bene disserendi, and so we shall see it: so that if we would do any thing with reason this pulls us by the ear and says it is the art to reason well: so that here we may see the commendation of this art not only in respect of the general use of it, but in that it teacheth us how to work by it, as God hath done before us: so that it first teacheth us Gods will and pleasure in things; and than what he would have us to do in the managing and governing of them: and here we may see, that all things at the first were made for one man.   

Eodemque sensu Logica dicta est.  
We have heard what Dialectica is, and have seen the reason of every word therein. Now Ramus doth commorari upon this rule, and tells us that eodem sensu Logica dicta est: the reason of it is, because here he tells us of a controversy betwixt him and Aristotle, which I prevented before, when I spoke of their distribution of Logic into Dialectica, Apodictica, and Sophistica. Now Ramus only sets down the rule according to truth, for thus it stands, if Dialectica delivers the Art of reason, than Logic and it are all one, but this is the Art that appertains to reason, and that is but one, ergo, so than if Logica signify the same that Dialectica doth, therefore there is the same definition of them both, for they are one in individuo, as the Schools speak, ergo in form, ergo but two names signifying the same thing.   

Dicta est.  
Meaning that that name of Aristotle's is the same with that Socrates gave; and whilst Plato doth interpret Logica to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Aristotle saith it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: they grant it to be the same with Dialectica, and for the distinction of Logic into those three, they must needs hold that those parts contain as much as the whole, but they do not by their own confession; so that this distribution was made by Simplicius, which did not understand Aristole, or at leastwise Logic, otherwise let them tell me any thing in Logic, that is not in Dialectica, according to our Author's definition of it. For Ramus will not deny but Dialectica and Logica are taken specially in Aristotle, as ratio is sometimes used for argumentum, but that is by a Synecdoche, for he wanting special names calls things by general words: as an exhalation he calls a fume, whereas a vapour is also a fume, and often he useth it in his Politics, Eodemque sensu, etc. that is, Logic is so defined, ars bene disserendi, even as Dialectica is, and whatsoever other conceits men have had concerning Dialectica, they are out of the way, for if they will say there is a necessary, a probable, and a sophistical argument, as many do speak, that belongs to an axiom, not to an argument, and whereas they say syllogismus is necessarius, that is Apodicticus, contingens and sophisticus, if we look at a necessary syllogism in Barbara, why there may be a contingent syllogism, that is a syllogism consisting of contingent axioms, for so they mean, nay I will make a false syllogism in Barbara, that shall be true and good, as omnis homo est lapis, omnis afinus est homo, ergo omnis asinus est lapis: and a demonstrative syllogism, as omne animal rationale est visible, omnis homo est animal rationale, ergo omnis homo est visibilis: so that these lie not in the syllogism, for then a dialectical syllogism would not be an apodictical, or sophistical, aut contra, but these lie in the axiom: for why? whatsoever is necessary is true, and a contingent axiom doth pronunciare aliquid esse verum, though it may be false, ergo whither truth belongs, thither they belong; now truth and falsehood follow upon affirmation, and negation, and they arise from an axiom, neither doth a man say aliquid esse, aut non esse, when he means an argument alone, till there be a disposition, ergo those that make a distribution of syllogisms by their matter deceive us: so that here we see it is true that our Author tells us, that eodem sensu Logica dicta est.    

CHAP. II.  

Dialecticae partes duae sunt, inventio, & dispositio.  
NOw we come to the second rule, having heard that Dialectica est ars bene disserendi; this rule needs nothing to make it plain, but that which went before scilicet ars in general, to show this to be an Art, and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of every ens a primo, to show that this Art's end is been differere, both which we heard of in the doctrine of Art, therefore this rule showing what is pictured in this book needs no more explanation, therefore it is the first rule of all, for it gives light to all the rules following, and taketh light of none: therefore doth this second rule give light to the former? no, it rather obscures it, for I must first know what Dialectica is before I hear it divided, for how can I divide I know not what? therefore this rule will give no light to the first, therefore never a rule following, and the first rule is a comment to this. Dialectica, that is, that which was ars bene disserendi, hath two parts, bene invenire argumenta, and bene disponere argumenta: why? because they are portions of this Art tending ad bene disserendi parts. Can Dialectica, this Art be parted? If it be that wisdom of God that is one most simple being, how comes it to be divided into branches? I have showed howsoever it is one in God, yet he hath made reason twisted in the thing, so that before it can been disserere, it must been invenire, and bene judicare: so that now reason as it is the subject of Logic, namely as it doth act, and is for an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and reason according to his frame hath these two operations, invenire and judicare, therefore the Art being the Idea of this frame, that hath two parts, must have two parts, for Logic behold reason, not as it is a faculty belonging to natural Philosophy, but as it acts. Now thus I argue. If reasons frame run into two heads, or actions, that it may 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than the Art must do so, now that reason is framed to run into these two heads, thus I shown it, All things were made for man, therefore he must have an eye to see them: now all things that God hath made are considered in themselves, or with others, for the world is one consisting of many parts, and they are considered alone or with others, therefore man's reason must run accordingly. God only is entire in himself having no respect to any other thing, he is simple, and hath no parts, therefore he is not liable to Logic: all other things are composed, that it might appear, that he is simple, so that every thing else is composed, or disposed with others, yet first it must be in itself, in use: for if I say a brickwall, there must needs first be bricks, and what use have we of words alone in Grammar, but in Syntax, and first we must see the Etymology of them: nay in every Art except Rhetoric there is no use of the first part without the second, neither is invention ever without judgement, therefore when every thing hath his double consideration, there must be two parts of reason, for as things are, so must reasons act be, for every thing must be so administered as that it be liable to reason, and be considered alone before it be disposed: therefore invention is first, so that any man that hath reason will acknowledge the necessity of this distribution: now these two parts are called Invention and Disposition. First for the reason of the name Invention, man was to see all God's creatures, and so to see his order in them: now how should man see them? were they written in his understanding? no more than Paul's steeple is in my eye, for man came furnished into the world only with Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric and Divinity, neither with the knowledge of these Arts, but with the faculties of them, and therefore the Arts must needs be there, for we read the Arts in the things: so that for Arithmetic, Geometry and nature, man was to learn them by the creatures, as he was also to learn the knowledge of Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric and Divinity. The reason is this, the Genesis of every thing is Gods, and man must see the rules of Art, therefore man must see them from singulars, by analysis: now than if man must learn these, and know them by his senses observation, induction and experience, than he must seek, and find out these, for they are not written in him: again, whereas every thing is in disposition, it is requisite that man find them out, and see them severally, therefore in this respect is this Art of reason called Invention, namely as he is sent by God to find out these things in his creatures; now if man must find them out with this act of his eye of reason, then is it fitly called invention, at, ergo. And this teacheth man thus much, that he is to seek out, and find this wisdom of God in the world, and not to be idle; for the world, and the creatures therein are like a book wherein God's wisdom is written, and there must we seek it out. Why is not this first Art called Disposition, because that is more familiar, and easy to us, for all things are disposed; but we are by this Art to sever them, and to look at them simply, so that this name teacheth man what he is to do in this act of his reason, namely, invenire argumenta, as in mists to look at the elements, etc. Now Kickerman cannot away with this distribution, and yet says nothing to this purpose against it, for I suppose Invention to be an ambiguous name, and have equivocation with it, as I do not deny, but it is taken sometimes for judgement, but that is tropically, yet while my Author tells me what it is, that is sufficient to know his meaning how here it is taken.  
Object. But Invention is never without judgement saith he, no inventions use is ever without judgements use: so he may say Etymology is never without Syntax, I but, saith he, you cannot invent without judgement, therefore they are no parts of Logic? as for example, a chest is made of wood, by this rule materia est causae ex qua res est, therefore here is syllogistical judgement, which is concluded a definitione, and this is Aristotle's demonstration, as if you should make a syllogism thus, That whereof the thing is, that is materia, But wood is that ex quo the Chest is, ergo. But here is only Logicks practise, and not any rule of Art taught us. The question betwixt Ramus and him is, whether any rule of invention belongs to judgement. This it is, the rules of invention give precepts of nothing at all concerning judgement, aut contra: therefore these are the true parts of Logic: and whilst he argues from the precept to the rule, it is fallacia accidentis, as if he should reason: Socrates est animal, animal est genus, ergo Socrates est genus; whereas we know the thing animal is not that Logical notion, neither Socrates, for they belong to natural Philosophy, but genus is no adjunct attributed unto them, so this invention is only of simple arguments, and of the simple consideration of them, and therefore our Art runs along according to God's order, and though we cannot practise any rule of invention, but by judgement, yet it doth not therefore follow that they are the same, for it is as if he should say this, homo, quae pars orationis? Nomen, here is the practice of Syntax, ergo Etymology, and Syntax, are all one.   

Inventio est prima pars Dialecticae de inveniendis argumentis,  
We have heard of the reason of the name Invention, why it is given to the first part, and that with great reason, for we must find by much seeking before we can see things. Again, Logic being the first help to see God's wisdom in his creatures, and this use of invention being to be found in the thing, it is hard to find, therefore it is fitly called invention from the act of it: So again in dispute, a man is fain to seek a third argument to prove his question. Judgement the second part is properly the act of our understanding, when it looks at arguments disposed, therefore here it is a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, when it is put for dispositio: and again it is properly the disposing of arguments together, which is of Axioms and Syllogisms.  
Method doth not look at the disposing of arguments, but at the placing of axioms: so that if I would distribute Dilectica thus, Dalecticae partes duae sunt, inventio, & dispositio: dispositio is judicum, or Methodus, judicium est axiomatic●m, or syllogisticum: my reasons are these: the arts of reason are performed by the internal senses, the best fancy invents best, and that is performed by a hot brain: cogitation serves judgement axiomatical, and syllogistical, and that is dry, and the best memory is an airy moist brain: ergo, whilst I see from this reason in natural Philosophy, that axiomatical and syllogistical judgement are thus combined, and the other severed, I think this art should be thus divided according to their instruments, as nature hath severed them. Again, our Author distributeth the second part into axioma, and discursus, and under discursus he placeth syllogismus and Methodus: now these two cannot be joined together: for why? what hath method to do with syllogismus? Method doth not dispose syllogisms, but axioms. Again, the use of a syllogism is to make clear that that is obscure, and to manifest truth; and the rule of truth belongs to axiomatical judgement if it be clear; if not, then to syllogistical judgement: but we bring our question after again to an axiom to see the truth of it, ergo, these two work about one thing, namely about truth, therefore they should be combined together. So that syllogistical judgement is to make clear that, which axiomatical judgement could not, yet the doctrine of axioma is before, and syllogistical judgement hath for his subject axioma dubium. The exceptions against this rule are these: first, Kickerman saith, There is no invention, but there is judgement withal, that is confessed to be true in use, as in Grammar the use of Etymology is never without Syntax, but the use is one thing, and the rule another: there is no precept of invention, that belongs to judgement aut contra: then he saith, Who can invent, but he must also judge? for (saith he) must not a man judge a cause before he find it? this is also a fallace of use: we cannot find a rule, but we use both invention and judgement, but by his argument, there should be no judgement, but syllogistical: then again he saith, invention was used for a third argument, and not as Ramus taketh it.  
True it is, the Schools thought it only to belong to syllogisms, and that there was but the use of an argument, not the doctrine of it, but thus I argue: Is invention of a third argument, ergo, it is of an argument, ergo, than it belongs not to judgement: for the doctrine of a simple conceit, as he calls it, is distinct from the doctrine of judgement. Again, if it be a third Argument, there w●s two before, ergo, there are Arguments disposed. Again, when a third Argument is found out, do we not dispose pars consequen● quaestionis in propositione, and antecedens in assumptione. and so make the proposition an axiom, and likewise the assumption: ergo, an argument is placed in an axiom as well as in a syllogism by their own confession: therefore we see evidently here, that the use of an Argument is common both to syllogistical and axiomatical judgement. And I would ask, whether causa est cujus vi res est, when it is disposed with the effect, be the same, and have the same definition in an axiom, that it hath in a syllogism? If they say it is the same, ergo, common to both, ergo, the doctrine of causa, and effectum, etc. must go before the doctrine of an axiom, and a syllogism, and Method, and must be distinct from them all: for as method is distinct from axiomatical, and syllogistical judgement, and is before them, because an axiom may be without them, not contra: So is the doctrine of arguments before the doctrine of axioms for the same reason: and Kickerman confesses as much, whilst he distributes Logic into terminus simplex, complexus, and discursus: he saith Authors of Arts are called Inventors, as Hypocrates of Medicina, Aristotle of Logic, but did they not all judge them? yes, but doth it therefore follow, that invention and judgement are not divers things, so that this distribution stands firm and sure, and as for his conceit to have invention taught in a syllogism, we shall hear of it when we come there, for it is very silly. Now for his distribution into three parts, it comes to one with ours, for his first part terminus simplex, so much of it as is Logic belongs to invention, so terminus complexus belongs to axiomatical judgement, and discursus to syllogisms, and he would have it belong to method too. But first the absurdities are these, he does not follow reasons 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which Logic delivers, for conceptus simplex is properly the judgement of a thing, when we see the truth thereof: so that this is not so proper as invention. Now when I say inventio, I say that part that directs my reason to seek out things secretly wrapped up in nature; again whilst he makes a distribution of the precepts of Logic, by these precepts we must understand the systema of Logic by a Metonymy of the material cause, and when he says a systema of precepts, that is a far fetched trope: again we never have more parts than two in a distribution, but there is some thing left out, for to admit of his distribution: but is there not a community betwixt his terminus complexus, and discursus, namely dispositio? ergo, here he wants the rul● of dispositio, and so makes his Art imperfect. Now he Pleads for the antiquity of it, which we are not to admit of, but of truth: why? his Logic was not in ancient time, is it therefore nought now?  
The use of this rule is this, as we heard before, Logic took my reason, and told me the marks to shoot at, so here it tells me that I must first invent, and so I shall go orderly to work, and then dispose, for the Bricklayer must first have bricks before he can make a brickwall, and the Grammarian must have words before he can make a sentence, and (as before) arguments are more general than axioms, axioms than syllogisms, etc. for the one may be without the other, not contra, as one is more general than two, two than three, etc. because one may be without two, or three, etc. not contra: so first we must invenire and then judicare, that we may bene disserere, for there is nothing betwixt them, but when we have stones then we may build, and whilst we find in the creatures of God things considered, as they are in themselves, and then in respect of others, therefore so must reason be distributed into his two acts, and now we come to invention, which is prima pars Dialecticae de inveniendis argumentis, first we have heard the reason of the name inventio betokening actively: the reason inventing or finding out, and howsoever we may find it taken for the whole act of Logic, yet it is a Synecdoche, and though we cannot but use judgement in it, yet it is but inventio, ergo, est pars. He rather keeps this word than membrum, though it be more general, because it is more in use: and again, because in Schools membrum hath been usually taken for the members of a man, as head, arms, legs, or the like: so that not having told us what membrum or pars is, he chooseth the more usual Dialectica; we heard concerning Dialectica before, therefore to hear it again were superfluous, it is Dialecticae, ergo, it is the integrum to it, as inventio is the membrum. Now indeed the Rhetoricians have taken invention to be a part of Rhetoric, and so judgement, but when they come to explain them, they teach Logic: and their dissertus is not only Rhetorician, but the Grammarian, and Logician, their Orator is omnium horarum homo, a man for every turn, so that he is a man in whom there is a confusion of all Arts: neither is Orator belonging to Rhetoric, but he is a general man, that hath all the Arts, and chief he is a Logician: now the Rhetoricians did imagine, because they used invention, and judgement, therefore they belonged to Rhetoric: so they might say of Law, Arithmetic, Geometry, natural Philosophy, or any other Art: now than those are the two parts of Dialectica only; and whereas men say commonly Ramus Logic serves for Rhetoric, not for natural Philosophy, as some do, they speak simply, for what use of Logic hath a Rhetorician in any other Art, as in Politics, is it not to prove some Thesis? therefore if he dispute here as a Politican by the rule of Logic, so may a natural Philosopher do, so causa, effectum, subjectum, adjunctum, and all other arguments are the same in all Arts, ergo, to make a special invention to Rhetoric, and another to nature, or any other Art, is simple. Now it is pars Dialecticae, we do not mean to make pars a genus of invention here, for it is a Logical notion, and belongs to Logic: but the reason of this definition is to bring in Dialectica, so that when we will analyse this definition, we must not say pars is genus, but Dialectica est integrum.   

Prima pars.  
Est prima pars, because it is more general than judgement, for it may be where judgement is not, for simple arguments are before the composition of arguments both in nature and working. The Carpenter must have his timber in several pieces to square them before he can join them together. Quod precedit natura in Dialectica, id prima pars est Dialec. at inventio: ergo,   

De inveniendis argumentis.  
As if he should say, inventio, that act of reason doth invenire argumenta, de inveniendis, why? he means the precepts of this act, for in this part de inveniendis argumentis is the subject, but these precepts of invention are first concerning a seeking: but to find what? it teacheth me first to hunt, and then to find a Hare, as if he should say, take the rule of causa, that Hound, and hunt, and you shall find a cause: as if he should say, would you seek a cause? first seek the artificiality, than the primative, then how it is simplex and consent aneum etc. and so come to causa, so that invention is not taken for judgement here, but for the seeking, and finding out of arguments.   

Argumentis.  
De argumentis inveniendis: Arguments to be sought out: why? because the Lord hath so commanded man to seek out his reason in his creatures, so that we must seek an argument, which is a term in latin belonging to Law, as the Rhetoricians thought, but it is more general to Logic: but because they used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which in Greek is to plead like an Orator, and so arg●e●e in Latin, therefore they thought them proper to th●m, yet argumentum here signifies any thing of arguere, that can charge another thing, and so doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greek: so here we see what invention seeks out, argumentum, and by it the thing, but at the second hand, quatenus there is Logismos in it: so that invention takes not the thing immediately, but by argumentum, so that argumentum is here as the Schools speak, concretum, that is, it is argumentum, as it doth arguere: so that when we hear argumentum, we must consider two things, first ens the subject of Art, and then the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and so by that the thing: as I see a Post with my outward eye by the colour, so that invention sees the thing mediante argumento: then observe again that argumentum is the subject of invention: now the Schools make a simple conceit, and so make a great ado about vox, as Kickerman and Schaliger do to bring it into Logic, they say vox quatenus it consisteth of letters, belongs to Grammar, but quatenus it signifies a thing, it belongs to Logic: but as for example, homo, what arguments are homo, and the thing it signifies? subjectum, and adjunctum, why? but these are but examples thereof, shall these come into Logic, because Logicks use is here? So the wall is white, is subjectum, and adjunctum, doth that axiom therefore belong to Logic? but let them but go to the definition of vox, and they shall see it belongs to Grammar, quatenus it signifies a thing: but they may see it in the general rule of ars generalis: for as ens is the subject of Logic at the second hand, so also of Grammar. Now he prosecutes vox, and says it is to be looked at ad modum significationis, or jure significata, or the like: ad modum significationis is categorematica, or suncategorematica, as homo: because, saith he, it signifies that thing, which may be an argument: why homo doth not signify an argument, it belongs to natural Philosophy, and the argument is but an affection to the thing that homo signifies, but what reason is there that homo should come into Logic, because it names the thing that is categorematica? it is fallacia accidentis: that meat you bought on Saturday, you did eat on Sunday; but it was raw meat you bought on Saturday, ergo. But for vox therefore it comes not into Logic, only there are conjugata and notatio, which belong to Logic, not because they signify things, for there is not in them any respect of the thing, and the name, but in conjugates how one name is derived from another, and in notation the reason of the name from some argument. Then he says vox categorematica is primae, or secundae intentionis, which he knows not how to utter but by certain comparisons, as of a dyal, the stile is prima intentionis, and the shadow secundae: but this vox primae intentionis is the word that names the thing, vox secundae is the word of Art. Now true it is this distribution is an old said saw, but there is no such thing, it is the same fallace ab accident. Homo and genus do not signify the same thing, homo is primae intentionis at the first hand, genus of the second, but genus doth not signify the same that homo doth: again genus hath his signification, as well as homo, that appears thus, because it hath a distinct definition from homo, therefore they are distinct re: so that genus is primae intentionis, to the thing it names, as homo is primae to that thing it names. Again, are there not terms of Art as well in Grammar, etc. as in Logic? why then doth he bring it in here? as homo est nomen, here nomen is the name of the thing, not the thing itself, ergo, homo, and nomen, are not voces primae & secundae intentionis, for they are divers things: so argumentum is concretum, that is, it is evermore with the thing, not that it is the thing, as homo is argumentum, and it doth arguere, which is an adjunct to the thing, for so every Logical notion is an adjunct to the thing itself, but here it is, because we cannot sever the Logical notion from the thing, because it is never but in re, that is the reason why argumentum is always in the concrete, whereas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be severed from the thing, but this rule bids us only find, but tells us not what as yet: so that it runs most orderly.  
We have heard the first part of Logic to be called Invention, in respect we are set to seek out the simples in the work of God. De inveniendis argumentis, because there is never a rule here, but it is a bloodhound to find a Deer: Again, we heard it was an argument that was to be hunted, not the thing but the argument, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the thing, for the thing doth not belong to Logic, but to every Art, and Logic doth look at the thing, by the logismos, as the outward eye beholds bodies, by light and colour: and this is called argumentum, a concrete, because Logic is never severed from the thing, nor the thing from Logic, for we cannot see the thing but by reason, therefore because these are inseparably together, for that cause the subject of invention is argumentum: so that in argumentum we are to consider two things, first the thing as it is the subject of Art in genere, and of the general Arts: and then that same birdlime, that is, in the thing, whereby it may cleave to another thing, which birdlime is the Logical notion; as when I say a chest is made of wood: in Greek they have two names for it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the arguing, the abstract as it were, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the argument: but our Author rather keeps the concrete, because it is always with the thing, and cannot be severed from it: then the subject of invention is ens at the first hand, but argumentum at the second. The term argumentum (as we heard) is from Law, as the Greek names also be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is concione concionare, and thus we see how fare Logicks rule reacheth, & this same argumentum was used at the first, for that which we call praedicatum a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a barbarous word made first by Boetius, but it is more general, as we may see by the third argument in a syllogism, which may be an antecedent in the proposition, or assumption, as well as the consequent.  
Kickerman saith vox is the subject of this first part, and he hath many distinctions of it, as it is abstracta, or concreta; this is nothing but a distribution of nomen into substantivum, and adjectivum, quatenus voces, and therefore the old Grammarians did so teach it: if they look at the thing, they belong to conjugates in Logic, and there we shall see them to signify the same thing; one absolutely the other as it hath respect to another, and they are there, not quatenus they are words, nor quatenus they signify, if we go no farther, but quatenus they contain, symbolise the nature of first arguments. Again, he saith, vox is univoca, or aequivoca: alas there is vox univoca in the world, as homo his example is vox aequivoca: if we call a painted man a man, as we may call tropically, but this belongs to a distribution, and is but an example thereof, not a rule: as canus is sidus, or animal terrestre, or m●rinum, is a distribution, ex adjunctis: so that to make a precept of an example is great confusion: and the definition of a thing will take away the ambiguity of the word. More distinctions he hath, which all are nothing, but several sorts of aequivocation, as if he should say, there may be aequivocation of Grammar, and there may be aequivocation in Rhetoric, etc. he tells us further; that a word must be certa, absoluta, etc. what hath Logic to do with this? let Grammar look to that, for it breaks the definition of vox est nota qua, etc. if it name not the thing fitly; as if vox should say, vox est vota qua unumquodque vocatur; will you call a man a spade, than he brings in predicament, and predictables. The world of Logicians doth imagine, that Architas Tarentinus was the first inventor of them, and taught them to his Scholar Pythagoras, now the reason that brought them in was this, that they might be furnished with matter to work about Logic. So that they were storehouses for them to lay up things one way or other, either analogice or a latere.  
Kickerman approves that purpose of them, for saith he, things do not belong to Logic, now the Logic in a predicament is this, the order of things being placed one before another, and so he saith the predicaments are of great use, for the finding of simples: Secondly they conduce for terminus complexus, because we see what may be a subject, and a predicate in a proposition: then another use of them (he says) is for discursus, for when we know what is above, and below, we may quickly know what is in the midst; and they are also of use for method.  
For the first Invention of them, they are not storehouses, for there is nothing but hath an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, therefore belongs to some Art: so that the Arts are the true storehouses of things: so that his table of substantia is nothing but a draught of natural Philosophy, but I must tell you untowardly, and that of quantity nothing but a draught of the Mathematics, that of quality nothing but a draught of natural and moral Philosophy. Other things he brings in, which are not so as he makes, ubi to be a genus of intus and foras: ad aliquid comes under relates. Quando belongs to adjunctum, etc. but because Logicks use is there, they think they belong to Logic, by the same argument let them bring all Arts in Logic: but saith he, the things themselves belong to the special Arts, but for the series they belong to Logic, that is, as if he should say, for their Logical notion they belong thither, but when he says series, he is presently in method: for his series is nothing but methods work; and if he reason that Arithmetic, Geometry, Nature, etc. belong to Logic, because methods use is there, that is fallacia accidentis, now the doctrine is one, and the use is another, the doctrine is distinct, the use confused: then again, whereas he says here you have genus summum, and subalternum, why we heard of them in the distribution ex effectis: but because substantia is corporea, or incorporea, here is a distribution as a genus into his species: therefore, saith he, this belongs to Logic: so let him bring in the daubers Art too; for Logicks use is there. Thus do they make a confusion, not seeing things distinct. Again, whereas they help to find out a subject, and predicate, they have shut out some, namely incompleta, as a man's hand, which may be a subject or a predicate, and when I say the world is made of the first matter, is not the first matter here a predicate? so they shut out transcendentia, as ens: but is not homo ens, therefore a predicate? Again, is not a predicate an argument, ergo, artificiale, aut inartificiale? if artificiale, then fetched out of some Art, therefore let me carry my subject to the Art whereunto it belongs, and there will I find any predicate: again for the help of a medium, is every medium a genus subalternum? Suppose we shall fetch a medium, that is genus summum, or an individuum, but let me go to the Art of my subject, and if I will take that which is above it, or below it, there I shall have it done to my hand. Again, he says the doctrine of the predicaments serve for definitions, and differences, etc. Why let me go to the Art, and there I shall see every thing taught to my hand, so that the doctrine of predicaments quatenus they are adumbrations of the Arts, are to be seen in their Arts. But to reason, that because Logicks use is there, therefore they belong to Logic, is very absurd. Again, if there be this predicament, to show the summum and subalternum genus, and species subalterna, and infima, why is there not a predicament to know causa? for by the same reason, there should be a predicament to find out causas, and let them say what they can of the predicaments, we shall find all in the doctrine of distribution, and definition, as substantia is corporea, aut incorporea is a distribution, and belongs to natural Philosophy; and so the next distribution of substantia corporea, etc. so if we take quantity, we shall see we are in some special Arithmetic, or Geometry, etc. for the predicables, genus, species, differentiae, proprium, accidens, these we know are special arguments, the two first belong to distributio ex effectis: differentia belongs to forma, for it is called forma, in respect of the thing form; and differentia, as it distinguisheth the thing from all other things. If they shall say, I, but here is distributio per formam, that is accidental to forma, and belongs to distributio, so that forma is the better word taken from the nature of it, for proprium is nothing but propriam adjunctum, and there it is taught as it hath respect to his subject, not as it is an act, and accidens is also a special kind of adjunct.  
Now the laws of Art require, that every precept deliver the principia thereof, and therefore be either definitions, distributions, or properties, which they after a sort seeing, made these to be helps to the predicaments; now for substantia quoad res it belongs to natural Philosophy, quoad serim or ordinem to method: for quantity it belongs to Mathematics? quality to moral Philosophy, yea, and to natural too: for relates, they belong to Logic; but there can be no series or order of them, for they are but examples of relates, as causa and effectum be relates; but only examples, ergo, infimae species: for actio it is nothing but motus; quando is nothing but the adjunct of time, passio a subject, ubi a special kind of subject also of place, situs belongs to Geometry, otherwise it is an adjunct, and habitus is a special kind of adjunct, therefore there can be nothing beneath these, but examples: so that do but look at his table, and you shall see him presently go out, as he says qualitas is naturalis, and moralis: this is false, for naturalis, aut moralis are two examples of that adjunct qualitas, and justice is no more a quality because it is a virtue, than Socrates est genus, because animal is genus: so that argumentum is the true subject of Invention, and not the predicables, and predicaments, any further than they are arguments.   

Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est.  
Now we come to the definition of argumentum; we heard that Dialectica is a general Art, and is conversant about every thing, and about non ens gratia entis, now then argumentum must be in every thing, therefore it is quod, any thing whatsoever, and thus it is demonstrated, because Logic is a general Art; so thus here we see argumentum est quod, which is as large as aliquid, quod affectum est: we know this is a borrowed word, affection is a disposition natural, as the eye is affected to see: but that we may see it the better, we will dig deeper, there is an efficient working, than his working, which is eff●ctio, which as it is about it, so it is affectum, ad effectum: as if my hand be wounded with a sword, there is first an efficient, then there is wounding which is effectio, then there is a wound which is effectum, than my hand is the affectum to be wounded, so that affectus is nothing but a nature in that thing, by which nature can perform that action: so argumentum is affectum, as if he should say, that that is made, or factus ad, or effected to another thing, or which hath this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it to work with another thing.  
Why affectum? It is a property of an argument as homo est risibilis, when he doth not ridere: so that he defines argumentum in invention, from that power or faculty: for as a man may have an affection to that thing he never doth: so an argument may have an affection to argue, when it acteth not: so that he teacheth from that disposition of it to act, so that he delivereth it not from his act, for that is but the use of it, but from its true nature; as the common Logicians call it praedicabile, that which may predicate, and says it is not an argument, till it be disposed, but this is accidental to argumentum; then in an axiom they call it praedicatum actu, which also is accidental to an axiom, for it may be subjectum as well, and both are accidental ad arguendum. Why ad arguendum? because the end of an argument is to argue, to play the argument, as the eye to see: ad arguendum, because evermore when we fetch an argument to show any thing, that is the arguens, and doth agere, the aliquid is also an argument, but it doth pati: so that as quoth was general, that is arguens, or does argue, so it tells me that any thing may be argued: so h●mo est aliquid, here homo is the aliquid, and is argued by his genus, which chargeth homo, therefore there is nothing in the world, but is an argument, and may argue, or be argued: but remember that both quod, and the aliquid, that is both the arguens, and argutum do arguere, but the one firstly, the other secondly; the one doth agere, the other doth pati, and so reagere. The aliquid tells me it is the first, and then quod comes, and argues it: now would you argue, than evermore look first, and that carefully, whether your quod will argue your aliquid: as will you build an house with sand? that will not serve the turn, for it is not affectum to it, neither hath it that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it: so that by any means let us keep close to our rule, and we shall not do wrong. The fallacian of the common Logicians of Coxismus, or petitio principii, or Cuculi cantus, for they are all one. As the Cuckoo cries Cuckoo, the Cuckoo is Cuckoo, ergo the Cuckoo cries Cuckoo, for here is no third argument; and this is commonly the woman's reason, because it hath so little reason in it, as they will say it is so, because it is so. So that simplex conversio among Logicians is a breach of this rule: as omnis homo est animal, ergo aliquod animal est homo: other Logicians as Polanus, calls argumentum Thema, which is too special, for thema is taken among Schools for a question to be judged by way of oration: again, every argument is not taken as thema, than he says thema est simplex, which is argumentum, or compositum, which is quaestio; and thus we see how our Logic goes most orderly, and that it looks at ens as it is simmonted with another thing.   

Quales sunt singulae rationes solae, & per se consideratae.  
We have heard what argumentum is, and the first thing that we are to look at in simples is this, the glue to be affectioned: as if we should look for a cause, see whether it be affected to be so: we have heard the fallacians in part before; as first, where there is no argument, but petitio principii, and that either where there is no petitio principii, and that either where there is no petitio at all, or where the same thing is uttered in a synonymy, or to the same purpose. Again, it is a breach of this rule, when that is brought for an argument, which is no argument, as baculus stat in angulo; or when the third Argument is more obscure and doubtful, than the arguments of the question, these and all other petitiones principii are breaches of this rule in general, and not of any special ones. Again, it is a breach of the definition of an argument, when we mistake the aliquid, though the argument be good, and so that Heterozetesis is a fallace of argumentum in genere; as when I talk of Chalk, he talks of Cheese. Now we come to the commoration after argumentum, quales sunt fingula rationes solae, etc. He hath defined argumentum from that affection that is continually in it; for the act is accidental, and may be wanting, for potentia (as we hear in nature) ariseth from the act of the form upon the matter. Now he saith singulae, that is, argument by argument, the cause alone, the effect alone, and so all the arguments from the beginning to the end. He saith rationes rather than argumenta, first because there is an equivocation in that word, many have thought it to belong to a syllogism only; and so when we say, I deny your reason, there it is taken for an axiom. Now it is taken sometimes for the faculty of reason, sometimes for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in things. Here he shows that it is taken for the same with argumentum. Solae, that is as they are to be considered in invention without judgement, and that he explains further per se, that is, they are in their definitions not respected with some thing externally, these are tales, that is such as I have defined unto you: so that he doth here commorari, because of difference with Aristotle, or rather with the Aristotelians, even as he stayed before upon the definition of Dialectica, for they thought there was no argument but in judgement, and therefore have question with Ramus whether an argument be to be taught before we come to a syllogism. Ramus here propounds it, and determines it for his own part, that it may be without judgement, and look at others, and you shall see them define all arguments, from their use in a syllogism, as we may see in all topic places of Aristotle, so that it is not so straight as they take it, and Ramus would teach us here, that to argue is accidental to an argument and disposition to: so that their mistaking makes him here to demur and stay upon it: Now indeed there must of necessity be a simple consideration of argumentum, for though things in nature are disposed together, yet they were severed at the first; and again we are to consider them so still, though they be together▪ Consideratae, he useth this word, because thought, invention and judgement are joined together in nature, yet he would here tell us, that we are to sever them by our consideration, as thus, I can see heat without fire, cold without water, etc. So that singulae ratione● are solae, & per se consideratae non in usu, for so they cannot be: but they are solae, & per se consideratae, in consideration, for so they be, he saith quails, because argumentum was defined, from his quality, or property of affection, and properties are qualities.   

Argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale.  
This affection, or glue is artificiale, or inartificiale, as if he should say argum●ntum hath this affection ex sese, and it is in artificio rei, or it is not ex sese, but from some other thing: so that every argument is affected, but two ways, one as an artificial argument, the other as an inartificial: now the reason of this distribution is this:  
God hath made all things for man, and at the beginning for one man, and they are to conduce to one, but all things cannot come under one man's eye of reason: therefore that he may be better furnished herein, God hath provided these two: the one whereby he may see by himself, the other whereby he may see by another man's eye. Again, that which we are to see is either in artificio rei, or not in artificio rei: so that all things are seeable, but not to be seen with one man's eye, but by many. This word artificiale teacheth us these things: first there is no artificial argument, but you shall see it in fabrica rei, therefore belongs to some Art, because Art delivers the frame of the thing, therefore there is no axiom that consisteth of artificial arguments, but it belongs to some Art. Now though we hear no arguments in Arts, but the causes, and properties, yet notwithstanding we have all arguments indeed; for there is no quality, but is proton in some general thing, as heat in fire, cold in water: now this gives us great light, yet effects must be there if they be proper: and the effect belongs to that rule where the property is taught, and dissentanies belong to Art too; as nature is constans, or inconstans, argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale: so that there are no axioms affirmed, or denied, true, or false, but we shall find them in some Art, either as a first rule, or a deduct by consequence necessary: so that hence is the greatest light that can be to a Scholar, to analyse his example, and bring every thing to his Art, where he shall see it in causa: so that if one would make a common place book, let him make the Rules of Arts his heads, and let him take any example, and see whether argument is more special, and so carry the axiom to that Art, and to that rule of the Art whether it belongs. As homo est justus, homo belongs to nature, justitia to moral Philosophy, ergo this axiom belongs to the doctrine of justice: so that moral Philosophy borrows man from nature to deliver itself.  
The use of this is unspeakable, I cannot deliver it unto you, the use itself will better testify it; for thus may a man try every thing whatsoever, yea though it be a contingent axiom; as audentes fortuna juvat: audacia belongs to Ethics, fortuna to Logic; and in audacia we shall find this, for it is that which thrusteth a man desperately: and here we may see what a true predicament is, not the predicaments but the Arts are the storehouses; for whatsoever is in artificio rei, we may see there, not only genus, species, etc. but all other arguments, for they are too narrow, and false too; for that distribution, substantia est creata, or increata, will not fail in any Art, and the three first predicaments (as we heard before) are nothing but practices of method. Now if it be objected, we must not have those things before we see them: no, we must first see them, that we may lay them up in store. We have our eye first, and then things appointed for us to see.   

Artificiale est quod ex sese arguit.  
Now here is that affection, that is in this kind of arguments, that glue that was before, is here quod ex se: so that this makes that more special, which before was more general: so that we shall still see what our eye of reason sees: we heard before that we see the thing, as it is an argument; here we see it, as it is affectioned to argue ex se. Ex se, what is that? as if he should say, look into the artificium of the thing, there shall you see his artificial arguing, ex se, that is it argues natura, or it is causa natura of its arguing: so that these arguments concur for the being of the thing. So wood is affected to argue a chest ex se, that is, it is in the artificio of wood to argue a chest made of wood ex se: so than this artificial argument ariseth from nature, from a vis ingenita, that is, in artificio rei: so the efficient argues ex se, as if I should say, if there were not that cunning in the efficient of a chest to make it, it would not be one. So that it is thus defined, quodex sese arguit. Argumentum was the next genus, and he doth not express it, but understand it here, because we heard of it so lately before: then again he hath it here, but after another manner, because he could not deliver the form of it, without the genus: for arguit is not here taken for act, but for potentia: as we say animal vidit, though he doth not actually see, but have the faculty of it: so we say, Does he eat or drink: meaning, can he eat or drink. For if it were taken for the act of arguing, than it should not be no where but in judgement: so that quod arguit, is as much as argumentum, and ex se is the form: if he had said artificiale est argumentum ex seize, he had said the same that ex sese arguit: but it had not been so plain to a young Scholar, and he had also newly done with argumentum before: so that this is the second thing that our eye of reason is to look at, namely, an artificial argument, which can ex sese arguere. Now fallaces may be in every rule. In the first, as if any abuse it to deceive and abuse reason: for the second, if any go about to judge before he see the invention, it is a fallace, and a preposterous course. So argumentum is artificiale, or inartificiale; they break this rule that will give testimony of a thing, whose artificial arguments they have not seen: so do the Papists in their implicit faith, when they believe as the Church believes, not knowing what the Church beleiveth. So Scholars that take any thing that their Authors deliver them, without any examination at all of the things they read. Kiekerman saith, an inartificial argument may be received before an artificial. I do not deny it, but yet you must examine it afterward: Gods testimonies only are undeniable, because he cannot lie; but no man's.   

Artificiale est primum aut ortum.  
We are farther to look at this glue, whereby a thing is put to another thing in artificio rei, it is there firstly, or secondly: this affection or going to the act is there at the first hand, or at the second hand: now it is the same still, but is looked at, as it is originally, or as it is arising from the first: as to make up me, there goes a soul and a body, and of the forms of the four elements is the form of my body made, and of their matter the matter of my body made: now the elements are firstly there, as making my body, and secondly my body is in me, as a part in me: so a man is first consisting of body and soul, and then is animal: now this wisdom of God is wonderful to consider, how he makes things first of causes, effects, etc. and then ranketh them under a general head. And if we go to the Creation, we shall see them evidently: first he made a first matter, than the first forms, and then mists that had their compliments, and did differ one from another, than they might be compared together, than they had names, and were ranked under general heads, as a part to a whole, etc. and then they might be defined, and their limits shown how fare they reach; for here our Author leads us to see every thing there, and to see how it is there, the reason of this distribution we shall see in every thing whatsoever: as in an ink-horn, there must be the matter of it, than itself, and it must have his adjuncts, etc. and then will it hold your ink; then when it is this, it is not a tree, or a stone, though it may be compared, and be equal, or unequal, like, or unlike: so that first we see what is in it firstly, than we may call it round, deep, made of horn, then range it under a head, then lay it out in its limits, and then give testimony of it.   

Primum quod est suae originis.  
This definition doth somewhat stick in my teeth before it come out, for it is a far fetched trope, and only one is suae originis▪ namely God: but he means this clamminess or glue that is suae originis, is first there, the ortum is not: as the son hath the nature of his father, but is another thing than his father: but first argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum, then artificiale est affectum ex sese; so primum is argumentum artificiale primitus: so that we must look at the argument, as it doth argue, not as it is suae originis, but quod originaliter arguit: he means that is there first, as we shall see by the nature of the thing: as homo justus; hear justitia is firstly in homine, as an adjunct, for he must first have that virtue before he can be denominated justus; then secondly, it is in him as he is denoninated from it: so a chest is made of wood; here is the cause and effect, and this is firstly; then from hence I may say a wooden chest, and this is secondly, arising from the first.   

Quod est suae originis.  
As if he should have said, that hath this affection to argue ex se primitus: now than we may go wonderful deep, if we will go by these degrees, what may we not see? if we would make a brief: Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est: artificiale ex se, primum primitus. The fallacians are many, as they that think they are conjugates that are in name: as he hath virtue, ergo, he is studiosus: so homo dormit, quia somnit: here is nothing but causes, and effects, and so synonimies; for conjugata are nomina: so again when orta are taken for prima, or taught before, aut contra: so do the common Logicians in the predicables, when they teach genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens: First see the orta contain the prima, whence they arise symbolice, as it were in a cognizance. Here we learn this, we must first look at the affection of an argument, than we must be ex seize, then primitus: now ortum contains the same nature that primum doth; and some say the effect ariseth from the causes, and the subject and adjunct from the effect. But doth the effect argue with the affection of causa? it doth not: or doth the subject or adjunct argue with the affection of an effect? No.   

Estque simplex aut comparatum.  
We have heard what the end of Logic is, and all shoots at this mark, to reason well, that is, that we may handle our reason well; now that we may do thus, we must have invention first, afterward judgement. Invention teacheth us to find out simples, Judgement teacheth us how to lay them together, we may compare invention or arguments, to the hook and nails in a thing; judgement to the fastening of them together. Now invention beholds arguments. Argumentum in Logic is a concrete, as the Schools call it, signifying the thing, together with the affection that is in it to argue another thing: as a Tailor is a Tailor quatenus, he hath that affection in him to make a garment: so that invention intends immediately the affection, and mediately the thing: for ens quatenus ens, is general to ars quatenus ars, but ens quatenus it is affected ad arguendum, so it belongs to Logic alone, and thus we go by degrees; for the Lord doth not let us see any thing immediately: now the very name invention tells us what we must do, namely, seek out, it tells us the Lord hath hid things secret in nature, and we must labour for the simples, and so find them: now we seek argumentum, which we heard to be of two sorts, artificiale, or inartificiale: artificiale is that which is in artificio rei; whereas the inartificiale doth but carry to us what other men have seen by the artificials; and because none can testify of a thing before he have seen it himself, ergo, artificiale is before inartificiale: and also because he that seethe inartificialiter, can but testify so far forth as he sees the thing, which is not at all, ergo, they that give testimony of that thing, whose artificial arguments they have not seen, are sophisters, and break this rule: and this is a sophism of the Papists in their implicit faith, which do believe as the Church beleiveth, neither knowing the artificial arguments of the thing, nor the thing itself that they believe. Now the artificial arguments are in the artificio of the thing, ergo, we must of necessity know all the artificial arguments in things, if we will know the things themselves wholly. And here by the way artificiale tells me, that every thing must be in some predicament, that is, in some Art, quod ex sese arguit: this affection is in the thing, and it is ex se, drawn out of the thing as it were: so that this hook whereby it lays hold on another thing, is natural to it, for so he means. Artificiale est primo, or secundo in artificio rei, as if the thing had a second kind of making, nature, or being: so a thing is made of matter and form, primitus: but when we consider how first singular parts are made of that matter, then organically are made of the singulars, and the whole made of the organical: here is the second invention, and here the matter is considered immediately in the parts, mediately in the whole. This is something subtle, but yet evident and plain: as first, imagine that thing justice in a man; here is subjectum, and adjunctum: and this is the first invention: then from that quality in him, I can denominate him a just man, and this is the second invention: so I look at a thing whose matter is made of wood, and can conjugate a name to it wooden: as a wooden chest, etc. so when I say a man is made ab humo, here is the material cause, and effect: but at the second hand, when I consider how man is made ab humo, and from thence denominate him homo, there it is that second Logic. So that the first invention only looks at the thing, without consideration of the names; the second invention looks both at the thing, and at the names. So when I denominate homo from that thing justice in him, to be justus, I mean not the name; nor the thing, but the name and the thing together: for orta a primis perinde sunt ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur, ergo, there must be both the nature of the first arguments in them, and that affectio also. So in a distribution, if we shall speak of distributio ex effect is, as in navi, alii malos scandunt, alii per fores cursitant etc. here malos scandere, per fores cursitare, sentinam exhaurire, are causes and effects firstly; but as these nautae are distributed by their effects, here is the orta categoria, the arising, arguing. So in a distribution ex causis of integrum into membra, the first invention is matter, and form, the second invention is them two together in the members making up the integrum. So in a distribution of the genus into the species; as in animali, there is essentia corporea plena vitae, & sensus, which are the causes of homo, and brutum: then there is a symbolum of them when we jumble them together: so in a distribution ex adjunctis, homo is aeger, homo is sanus, here is both subjectum, and adjunctum: but when I make a distribution, and say, homo est aeger, aut sanus, this is the second Logic: and this is nothing but the consideration of the community of a cause, an effect, a subject, an adjunct, for that causeth these distributions: so in a definition there is firstly genus, which ariseth from matter and form; then the second invention of them is the heaping of them together: so as they make but one argument, namely, definitio: so in a distribution, though there may be more arguments, yet are they also heaped together to make one argument, namely, descriptio, quod est suae originis: this is true in respect of ortum, which made Ramus so define it: but I had rather respect the definition of argumentum, quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est, and to say artificiale ex se, primum primitus: and so we shall deliver it as it acteth, which is best.  
Primum est simplex, seu absolutum, aut comparatum: I rather say absolutum, because absolutum and simplex are more opposed, and so, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are opposed, now these simple arguments do look at those that are in artificio rei, as they are in their own nature; for that is his meaning: as when I say the wall is white, here I look at the wall as it is simple and absolute in its own nature: and in like sort at whiteness as it is simple and absolute in its own nature: so that the absolute argument looks evermore at the things as they are absolute in themselves: as when I say a chest is made of wood, I look at both of them, as they are simple in their own nature: now the comparate doth not consider the thing absolutely, but with another. So in a chest if I consider the quantity of it, here the chest and its quantity are simple arguments: but when I say it is greater than a less Chest, or contra, than they are comparates: so that the comparison lieth as it is respected with some other thing: so that the comparative quantity, or quality is another thing, the absolute greatness or littleness, likeness, or unlikeness, for that which is absolve greatness may be comparative littleness, aut contra.   

Absolutum est consentaneum, aut dissentaneum.  
Object. But how are disagreers in artificio rei.  
Answ. True it is, that the one part of disagreers is not, but the other is: so that the absolute consideration hath respect either to the thing wherewith it agreeth, aut contra, as ratio in respect of itself, so it is argumentum simplex, seu absolutum, in respect of homo it is consentaneum, and goes to his constitution, consider it with irrationale, and there it tells me, it will not be that: so that which makes fire not to be water is in the artificio of fire: so that which causeth dissension is in the artificio of that thing that is dissentaneum: so that the same thing is consentaneum, and dissentaneum; consentaneum if we look at the thing wherein it is, dissentaneum if we look at another thing, that it is not: so in black, and white, there is that in black which makes it to be black; and there is moreover that in black which makes it not to be white: so that the same thing in divers respects is consentanie, and dissentanie: so that white or black considered with the wall may be consentanie, consider it with that which dissents from it, so it is dissentaneum, and all these must we see if we will see any thing throughly: First we must see the affectio in artificio rei, then primitus, then absolute, than consentanie; then absolute, quod consentit cum re, therefore this is clearly in artificio rei, and so is dissentaneum too; that consentit, hence we see consideration to be general between things, and they are made so, for else they would never make up one whole, as all creatures make up the world, for it is concordia discors, and discordia concors, that makes all things. Now as there is consention in all things, so also there is dissension, for else all things should be one: thus the Lord made all things to show forth his wisdom, and mighty power, that all things should consent together, and yet be many.   

Consentaneum est absolute aut modo quodam.  
For some things agree absolutely, others but after a sort, absolutum is absolutely required for the being of the thing, the other is but complimental: so that here he tells us if we would see any thing, first look what is in artificio rei, then look what is primitus there, than what is absolute, than what is consentanie, than what is simply required to the being of the thing. Absolute, that is, so agreeing to the thing, that if the one be not there, the other will not be there & contra, as if any one cause be wanting, there will be no effect, if there be a concurring of all the causes, than an effect, if no cause no effect, & contra, if an effect then all the causes, if no effect no concurrence of causes: so that this absolute agreement doth put a necessity of each others being: now absolute, and modo quodam are definitions of themselves, for he wanted words, and therefore delivered the definitum, by the definitio: so that to ask a definition of absolute, or modo quodam, is as if one should ask a definition of animal ratione.   

Absolute ut causa & effectum.  
The causes give esse to the effect, therefore without these esses the thing cannot existere, ergo, there are absolutely required. In like sort in the existere of the effect you may see the concurrence of all the esses, of all the causes, therefore these are absolute consentanea: Hence we learn, that all the causes must go to the making up of the effect. And again, if any effect, than there must be all the causes; so than we see how the ones being depends necessarily upon the other, ut causa & effectum, therefore the cause must first be looked at, as if I would look at ens, or any thing whatsoever, therefore our Author taking this course takes the very way of God in his creatures. Can any man see any thing throughly, and not see the causes first? he cannot: and is there any thing to be seen in a thing before the causes? there is not: therefore that is always first in nature, and therefore first also in reason. Now here are fallacians, as to think an effect may be from some causes, and to think the causes may be removed from the effect, which is a common fallace.  
Aristotle's organon, Tully's offices, etc. here is Aristotle's and Tully's casuality still, though they be dead. Now we see how orderly we go to work, if we had not done so, we could not have come to causa, all the arguing of them before, as of artificiale, primum, absolutum, consentaneum, simplex, are here in causa and effectum So that there are many clasps as it were, as the cause is in artificio of the effect, it is also there primitus, and absolute, and consentanie, and simpliciter: so that this descent doth very much clear truth, we have our flesh, blood, bones from causa, then afterward we have our compliments from modo quodam consentanea, than we may see we are not this, or that. See an imperfect garment at the Tailors, and you may ask what it is, but let the Tailor make it up complete with all its cuts, and jags, than you may see it yourself, and need not ask what it is for further knowledge of it.    

De efficient, procreante, & conservante.  
CHAP. I.  

Causa est cujus vires est.  
REmember the purpose of Logic is to direct man to see the wisdom of God, which that reason may do well it acts doubly, first by taking at simples, then by laying them together: that which we take with the first eye is argumentum, that is any thing so fare as it hath the affection to argue, first as it is in artificio rei, which therefore is in an Art, now it is firstly there or secondly: first it is there absolute by way of consention, respecting the thing wherein it is, or dissenting from the thing wherein it is not, those that consent are absolutely consenting, or modo quodam, absolute as the causes, and effect, that proceeds from the causes; here we must begin, because the first thing that cometh to man's reason is the cause, so if we take the world, or any part thereof, let us resolve it, and in the end we shall come to the first causes, a first efficient, etc. So God is the first cause of all things, and himself without all causes, ergo, the cause is first of all things, than the first matter is first in his kind, the first form in his kind, and the first end in his kind.  
So Aristotle saith, God is primum intelligibile: so than if we will see the wisdom of God in the creatures, we shall see the cause, the beginner: then again Aristotle doth confess, that causa is primum motus. Again, what is the initium of every thing, but his being, and that is from the causes, therefore they are first; again, the next cause is the farthest thing we can go unto, as if we work any thing, now if we take causes, and look into them, than we make them effects not causes, as if I look at the causes of a garment, I find the Tailor to be the cause, but if I look at his cause, I make him an effect, yet I cannot make the first efficient an effect, etc.  
The Greeks call causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 peto, because it is that which is first granted or required, as the Geometricians require a petitum, or as our Author should say there can be no demonstration of the first cause. Est argumentum absolute consentaneum, etc. causa est: if a cause be absolutely required for the effect, than there is a cause: then again Logic serves us to behold the wisdom of God, and himself also through the creature: now all things but God are made, and are composed, ergo, they must have causes, est absolute consentaneum, because they are essential to the effect. No shipwright no ship, no wood no ship, no form no effect, no end, no effect; and all these together an effect, & contra.   

Cujus vires est.  
First here he tells us of a vis, than he says it is vis essendi, then vis essendi rei: so that as there are four words, so four things, causa is here a concrete signifying the thing causing, as argumentum was before signifying the thing arguing, for our Logic that brings us to the first cause, doth but show him as he argueth, not as he is in his being, causa is the thing arguing, cujus, that is, est res causans, cujus vi, this vis and virtue is of the thing, but Logic looks at it as it is in the thing, and then at the thing: for if the thing had not vim esseficandi an effect, it could not be a cause, as wood will not make a gown: so that it is here secondly required, that the thing causans have vim causandi: and against this word is that common fallacian of non causa pro causa, as he that will lay to the charge of a child that which a man can only do: so when we ascribe to Nature that it cannot do, as the making of a World, which is peculiar to God, est.   

Est.  
Esse is a general term, and may signify the essence of a thing, or the tying of some thing to some thing that is not of the essence, as first when I say vir est, secondly, vir est doctus, where I do not respect homo from his causes, but as he hath this adjunct doctrina, and the reason why est is so general, is because this esse is from the causes, which are most general, for nothing can be said to be this, or that, before it be, which is from the causes: by this vis we must understand, that power, and faculty in the thing, that causeth another thing, as if he should say, the cause is affected to argue the effect forcibly, for vis is here the same that affectio is in argumentum. Esse indeed is general to all the causes, and existere is from them all, which appears by this, we say mundus est a Deo, est ex nihilo, est formata, etc. so that est is nothing but the act of the cause, to make the effect: so we shall see in a knife, there are all the four causes, to be in it, and the three former for the end, and therefore if we will not be deceived, here see that whatsoever is de esse of a thing that is a cause, res not effectum: for we have heard what res est, that is the subject of Art, but if we had said effectum it had been a posteriore, for we have not the effect wrought: Again, we are but yet in causa in general: by res he means res efficienda, not yet effecta. Now another fallacy is of non causa pro causa, when we take that to be the cause, which hath the potentia efficiendi, but doth not efficere, but is causa, quatenus it hath an hand in that effect: so that if one bring a cause, that is not a cause, though it have vim efficiendi, yet is it not causa.   

Itaque primus hic locus fons est omnis scientiae.  
This is a deduction out of the first rule, following this, if the thing be causae vi, than this is primus locus inventionis, for it is first in the cause, before it be in the effect: then again it is primus locus in respect it is the first argument we must look at. Locus, here Ramus tells us closely, that the Aristotelians topic places are these arguments, the first whereof is causa.   

Fons.  
We know the fountain is the first place where waters spring, so all things spring from the causes, yea subjects, adjuncts, etc.   

Fons scientiae.  
For if we know the causes, than we know the effects because they arise from them, and subjects, etc. and again that is the principal part of knowledge.   

Scirique demum creditur, etc.  
For till we know the causes we know but the outside of a thing, and that which may be removed from the thing without destroying the thing, but knowing the causes of a thing, we know it as it is, the things being arising from the causes, and thus knowing the thing, we know it intus, and in cute. Here Ramus doth commorare telling us what Aristotle meant by these words: And again too tells us that Aristotle's demonstration is nothing but the scientia of an axiom consisting of causa, and effectum, and he teacheth it to every cause in general efficient, matter, form, and end.  
No Aristotle saith, that a demonstration concludes the property of a subject by the definition, because that lays forth the essence of a thing, but it doth not tell us all the esse, ergo, not all the scientia, for the esses of the efficient and end do not go into a definition.   

 merito dicatur a Poeta, etc.  
Here he prefers the Poet's authority before Aristotle, for Aristotle being more employed in this doctrine might speak of it as a private man, but the Poet as a public man, foelix meaning a contemplative happiness, not a practic.   

Causa est efficiens, & materia, aut forma, & finis.  
Every cause yields an esse, but all together make the effect, now it is of two sorts efficiens, & materia, aut forma, & finis, for he cannot give it to us in two words, but makes a distinct axiom, and couples the parts with a conjunction copulative, by reason whereof they have a community, but where lies it, this it is I may call the two first potential causes, the other two acting causes: this the Schools tells us, when they call materia potentia, and the form actus, and this is Ramus meaning, as we shall see in many examples, as when a Tailor sets buttons on a doublet with thread, they are not done till all the causes are there: so a house is not an house so soon as it hath an efficient, and matter, but when it hath also a form, and end. Now our Author would not use potentia, and actus; first because they are barbarous words, secondly, they are improper, because they cannot be called potentia, and actus, but potentiating, and acting: then again, the form and end are potentia, as well as efficiens and materia, & contra: therefore he makes two couple of causes, for so we see the efficient is the first mover, moving quite through with the matter singly, and the form and end move them inseparably together, therefore they are thus distinguished, efficiens est motus a quo in a line, the matter ex qua, and form per quem, finis ad quem: but because there is a scope at matter, therefore there is a distinction. For as the efficient, and end terminate the thing, so the form and matter mediate the thing running quite through the same. So God made a matter, and gave it a form, and so an end, ergo, reason must see them thus. The same order there is also in God's providence: so man also doth imitate God, when he doth any thing orderly; the first care is for a workman, than a matter, than a form, and then an end: though we may have cloth before a Tailor, yet it is not a matter till it begin with the Tailor to bring an effect to pass. So then the efficient is in nature before the matter, and the matter before the form, for the form is an adjunct to the matter, and the form before the end, the end being an adjunct to the form; and again a thing must be form before it can have an end. The first efficient had the first matter and forms effect to him, the second forms are adjuncts to the matter. Now the first efficient is absolutely first, for it hath nothing before it: the first matter is not res prima, nor causa prima, but first for matter, ergo, it is from the first efficient only, ergo, never hath any existency in the world, but is ens incompletum: so the first form is from the first efficient, not of the first matter, but only in it, ergo it is ens also completum: hence our souls are not our forms, for then our forms should be res incompl●tae. Now the end is last, and the first end is the last end; it is first because it is most general, last because it is not made for another end, ergo it followeth of necessity that the last end is not made: so that the end as it is last, as the thing is acted: so it is first as it is most general, for all the former causes work to effect the end. As we say in Schools, finis est primus in intention, posterius in executione: so God made all things for his glory; here his glory is first in intention of him that works by counsel, but is acted last of all by all things that he made. And here Aristotle's bonum quo communius eo melius, is true of the last end of all things, which is God: for he is as we may say, finis communissimus, ergo, optimus.   

Efficiens est causa a qua res est.  
We have heard of causa, and of his kinds, and that they are disjoined, by which means there is made two couple of causes, the two first working jointly, even as the other do. Efficiens, & materia, here is a second distribution, and here the efficient is first; for it is first eujus vi res est: again, by the rule of method it is first in nature, because it giveth light to that which followeth; and that the efficient moves first we see it in every thing; he lays hold on the matter, which in respect of the efficient is moved, and by a natural appetite moves, and runs to make an effect of itself; and doth effect the effect, as well as the efficient, and that from the natural appetite it hath to the effect: but the mover or efficient is before the thing moved, and before the effect also.   

Efficiens.  
Efficiens, quasi exfaciens, moving quite through: for besides his first moving, as being the first cause, he moveth also together with the matter, form and end; and his working with the rest is the cause of his name.   

Est.  
Every cause is required to the effect, efficiens est causa, ergo: again, first there must needs be a mover to move the matter, before there can be a table wrought: this appears plainly by the creation of the world: and because every thing is an effect, therefore the efficient is the first cause: for take any thing, and you shall see the vis of the efficient to run quite through the same; so look into the world, and every part thereof, and you shall see God's finger in every thing, without which they could not be: so that efficiens est causa, and because an effect cannot be without its esse, ergo it is of the esse of it, a qua, from whom it is: as if he should say, it is terminus a quo, etc. so as the world began with God: so in every thing in nature, the beginning of motion is first from the next cause: so that efficiens est causa a qua, telling us that this is the first being the effect hath.   

Res.  
Here res is general as before to all the Arts, and it is the subject of the general Arts. Ramus doth not here break the rule of method not defining what res is. Again, if he had said a qua est, we should have had reference to res: again, if he had named effectum, it had been a posteriore, not having learned what effectum est. Res est, this is general to every cause, ergo it is taught in the definition of causa in general: but that he may not be so obscure, he borroweth some thing that went before, for else the perfect definition had been efficiens est a qua. Now this teacheth us to look first at the efficient in every thing: for Logic tells us not only of an esse in general, but of four several esses from which existere doth arise; as efficiens est causa a qua, materia ex qua, forma per quam, finis cujus gratia: why doth he not say, causa est cujus vi res sit? because something may be a cause, and yet is not; but if it do causare then it is a cause. So if I say will do a thing, and yet do it not, yet am I an efficient; for est doth here commend to us the adsignification of time, but the essence that so soon as it beginneth to move, so soon it is an efficient, though the effect be not till the matter, form, and end be there.   

Cujus et si vera genera, etc.  
Here Ramus doth commorari, telling us that those many species which the Aristotelians make, are not species, but modi efficientis, because more of them may be in one and the same efficient: as one man may be causa precreans and conservans, sola, and cum aliis, per se, & per accidens, because they may be in the same efficient. Even as actio and passio do not distinguish the thing, but are divers modi of the same thing. Here Ramus will find no species of efficiens, neither are there any of the other three; for the matter that is lowest, ergo it hath nothing under it, but examples: and so is the efficient: ergo he needed not say, Cujus etsi vera genera, etc. for how could rhat appear to him, that is not? we know the effect is single, ergo as the single matter, form and end, make that, so the thing efficient makes it, neither hath it any species.   

Vbertas tamen per magna, etc.  
There is great and plentiful use of the efficient, and as it is first of all, so is it most general of all, for matter cannot be a matter, till the efficient move it, and so of all other arguments: now these make cause the efficient to be commended, or discommended, and according to these modi is the effect more or less argued: as if a child kill his father, it is parricide: so if it be a good thing that is wrought by one alone, he is more to be commended than if he had done it, cum aliis, aut contra. Again, if a thing be done well natura, it is better than if it had been done necessitate; and more commendable when a thing is done by counsel than fortuna: now because these modi do urge and press the effect more or less, ergo there is reason in them, and therefore they belong to Logic: modi, that is, adjuncts not making these effects species, but only distinguished by accidents: that fallacian, non causa pro causa, is general to causa: and it is also particular to efficiens, making that causa efficiens which is not: as the Heretics in Divinity were deceived, which said that the Angels did make the world.   

Primo quod procreate, qut tueatur.  
These are first because they are more general than the rest, and also they are more in use: for we shall have this first modus in use twenty times for one to the other modi: so we respect God as causa procreans, and tueans, before we respect him alone: then again this procreant cause brings the thing first to his esse, and the preserving cause is the Keeper of the thing in his esse. Now in reason he that is the procreating cause, should also be the preserving cause: as God is not only causa procreans of the World, but also causa conservans, and so should parents, as they procreant children, so should they in like sort preserve them. The procreant cause is first, because things must needs have a being, before they can be preserved: now they are distinguished, because when a thing is procreated, it is not preserved, aut contra: and the modi are joined with the cause, not with the effect, because they are first in the efficient, as essential, for actio is before passio: so that here mark that next after we see the efficient we are to look at these modi. As we are saved by faith alone; here is efficiens sola. Our Author brings in an example of Ovid's, the 4. remedii: and Kickerman hath a fling at Ramus for his examples, and would have him bring his examples out of Divinity. But first Logic being a general Art, it is therefore best to fetch his examples out of the most common and general Writers, as out of Poets, and Historians, which the Gentiles and Turks may receive, these being more generally known to the world, than are the Scriptures: and again, Divinity is the most special Art of all. And so Ramns findeth fault (but justly) with Aristotle, for fetching his examples out of Geometry, which is too obscure: for it is a fallace to fetch examples to prove any thing, if the examples be not as well or better known to them to whom we demonstrate any thing as to ourselves. As they say in Geometry, A is not B, etc. for so they say in Geometry, angulus A, and angulus B. etc. Now Logic is a general Art, ergo it is best to fetch examples out of Poetry, etc. which belongs to Rhetoric a general Art, the example is this; first proper, otia are proper and conserving causes of love: then tropical, causa est procreans, cibus the cherisher.   

Otia si tollas, etc.  
Thus ●e reasons, otia are the causes of love; for take them away, and love is gone: hence it appears they were of the essence of love; so that because causa is of the essence of the effect, ergo put idleness, and you must put love, aut contra: for the essence will be wanting, and we have a rule sublata causa, tollitur effectum, and it is general to all causes, for they are all necessary to the esseficating of the effect: all the rules of causa in common Logicians you shall have here, as posita causa ponitur effectum, yet not one cause but all the causes must concur: many other rules they have, all which are enwrapped in the definition of causa: now it holds contingently in every cause; for if we put one cause, we put all the causes, and so it holds in the special causes, that posita causa ponitur effectum, & contra: as take away otium from Aegisthus, and you take away love: so that sublata causa a tertio tollitur effectum: so in judgement it is also true; as give otium to Aegisthus, and you may give him love, which argues from the efficient.   

Sic pater & mater procreant, nutrix tuetur.  
Before he shown us an example out of an Author, he wils us to look for the use of them out of Authors. The matter of the first belongs to Ethics, the matter of the second to History. Logic is a general Art, ergo his examples are best out of Poetry, and Oratory, wherein the use of all Art is. Now the aliquid before is love, which we should have heard of, against which Ovid makes a medicine. In this example Dido is the aliquid, for here the aliquid is the causa. Dardanus had two sons, Assaracus and Anchises, and of him came Aeneas: now here she takes away the true causes, and says Caucasus begot thee: so there Caucasus in duris cantibus is causa procreans, and Hyrcanae tigers are preserving causes: but this is false, for here is non causa pro causa.  
Object. But doth he well to bring fallaces?  
Answ. Yes out of Poets, for here non ens, or ens fictum, hath the nature of ens in it: neither are all fables lies, but by continued allegories they teach us notable truths: now she challengeth Aeneas with this for his manners, because he forsook her.   

Sic Romulus conditor Romanae urbis, etc.  
He makes examples of his own, and there is genesis, teaching us that though genesis be before analysis, yet genesis imitativa is nothing but the imitating of a former analysis. Again, our Author makes choice of such examples as may be paradigmaes, and whereunto any other example may be brought, as in the first he makes an accident to be the cause of an accident, in the second he makes a substantial effect to be from substantial causes naturally, but feignedly: in the last he brings substantial causes working substantial effects ordinarily in artificial things: and here we may see who first shot the arrow, before we can see where it lights, or through what it flew, or whence.    

CHAP. IU.  

Secundo causa efficiens sola efficit, aut cum aliis.  
WE are still in the efficient: the first thing that we can see in the artificio of any thing, is the efficient, and the modi of it: the most general modi was procreans and conservans before, now we come to the second modi, sola, aut cum aliis, which are more general than per se, and per accidens in use, but not so general as the first. Secundo sola, etc. this is next, ergo next after the first: sola, that is where this modus efficiendi is considered, and the force and virtue of this argument from the efficient cause stands in this modus sola: for so we are to consider always when any efficient is brought to argue any thing: see which modus is brought with it, as in the example before; the effect is pressed with the modus of procreans, and with the modus of conservans: as you would take away love, take away idleness, for it is the procreant and conserving cause of love. Now as God is the procreant and conserving cause of all things, so he is causa sola first, ergo that is before causa ●um aliis, afterward he is causa cum aliis, working together with the creatures, and we finding this in the first efficient, we may also find it in the first, in the second, and in every one; because all things are simulacra of the first. Now these belong to Logic, for there is reason in them, and any thing deserveth more or less, praise, or dispraise, as he doth good or evil sola, aut cum aliis.   

Earumque omnium, saepe alia principalis, alia adjuvans, & ministra.  
That is, earum omnium, quae cum aliis efficiunt, saepe alia principalis, alia adjuvans, & ministra, for so saepe here is part of the axiom, and thus often it falls out, that one among the rest in doing of things is principal, and (as we say) ringleader to the rest, though sometimes likewise all be hail fellows. So that as the Lord did at the first, work all things alone, and then with others: so likewise do the creatures in nature, and here again as the Lord is principal when he worketh with others, so also when creatures work together, one for the most part is principal.   

Alia adjuvans, & ministra.  
That is, as it were a minister, and an instrument, Here we are to understand there is the principal cause, which is helped, and doth not help: causa adjuvans is principally of living things, ministra is commonly of instruments, which have not life, though both of them may be of either. Virgil 9 of his Aeneidos. Nisus avocat ab Euriolo, etc. Me me adsum qui feci, etc. Nisus alone did the deed, mea fraus omnis, there lies the argument, therefore he was sola causa, ergo, in me convertite ferrum, O Rutuli. Euriolus was taken, Nisus escaped, and he reasons not from the doing of it, for so both might have deserved punishment, but from the manner of doing it, mea fraus omnis; and for Euriolus thus he saith, nihil iste nec ausus nec potuit. The syllogism is this.  
He that hath done this murder, is to be punished.  
But I alone have done it.  
Ergo, I alone am to be punished.  
The Assumption is thus proved by denying audacia to Euriolus, whereby he might have done it, and potentia whereby he might have accomplished it. Slaughter is to punishment a subject.   

Solitaria causa cum plerisque, & principalibus & sociis pro Marcellio  adhibetur.  
In the former example we see sola causa delivered in a strange phrase, this is causa cum aliis, and here dux is causa principalis, militum virtus, locorum oportunitas, etc. are the helping causes: and fortune is another principal cause, quae mavimam partem sibi vindicat, he reasons thus, thou art a valiant fellow Caesar, but thou hast helping causes, of which fortune is the chief. At vero hujus gloriae Caesar, etc. here Caesar hath no companion: so that Caesar in pardoning Marcellus is solacausa. Nihil centurio, nihil praefectus, etc. here he removes the species of efficiens that should be cum aliis, and he removes also fortune, which is a chief help in war; this example belongs to Polemica.   

Instrumenta etiam in catsis adjuvantibus connumerantur.  
That is whether they be cattle that have life, which are instruments for husbandry, or whether they be things without life, they are counted among helping causes: so a man writing with his pen, is principal, and his pen instrumental: but here we are to know, that we must always analyse, as our Author lays that down, which is to be analysed, as when I say he did this alone, though he had an instrument: here he is causa sola in respect he had not another man to help him, he is causa cum aliis as he hath an instrument.   

Quo argumento impius Epicurus, etc.  
The Epicure reasons thus, if God had no instruments to help him in making the world, than he made it not, but he had no instruments, etc. therefore this we know to be false, by a rule of Divinity, for to make the world was an infinite work, ergo nothing being finite could help him. Now many times there are fallaces from all these, as when causae non procreans is put for causa procreans, non conservans pro conservans, non sola pro sola, non cum aliis pro cum aliis: all which we are to determine by this rule.    

CHAP. V.  

Tertio causa efficiens per se efficit, aut per accidens.  
THe modi are of most special use, and indeed Ramus was long in determining about the doctrine of them, but this was his last determination. Now the former are more general than these, because these are more special in use: and again the other belong to these, these may be where the other are, but the other include these: these modi per se, and per accidens are more particular than the other, for their reach. Now natura belongs to natural Philosophy, as it were, consilium to moral as it were. Tertio causa efficiens, etc. these we have heard before, efficit per se sua facultate, that is, not only having it own nature in itself, whereby it worketh, but the beginning of its motion from itself, causa per accidens hath it from another.   

Sua facultate.  
By facultas here we are to understand the same, that vis was generally in the definition of causa, but he means here, that which hath his principium of motus of itself: if one do a thing per accidens, he doth it vi, but not sua: so sua facultate, that is, whose motus whereby it worketh is determinated in itself, ut quae natura vel confilio faciunt: these two names should seem to belong to natural and moral Philosophy, but we are to understand by Nature that thing whose nature is to work such an effect: yea any thing be it natural, or artificial, which hath that principium of motus in itself to work any thing.   

 quae natura vel consilio faciunt.  
Counsel is that which doth a thing by deliberation willingly, and wittingly, as God, Angels, and men only work by counsel: causa natura is as a knife cutteth sua natura, so all things are subject to nature: and when I find that a thing worketh propria vi, and that beginning of motus is with the nature of it taught, not from it nature, that is causa natura, as when another man crowds me, and so I crowd another, and fling him down, I do it with my nature, not from it. So in a Clock the lead goes down by a rule in nature, because it is heavy, and that pulls the rope, and the rope pulls the wheels, etc. all these move with their natures, though not from them.   

Ventorum naturalis efficientia est.  
In this example:  
una Eurusque Notusque ruunt, creberque procellis  
Affricus: & vastos tollunt ad littora fluctus.  
Here these three Eurus, Notus, and Affricus, are natural causes of tempests on the Seas, they are also causae cum aliis, and each of them is as principal as the other.  
Consilii exemplum est illa Ciceronis de se confessio.  
Suscepto bello Caesar gesto etiam magna ex parte, etc. those things that fall under Logic, them doth he define, as causa per se he defines to be quae sua facultate efficit, but if he should define what nature & counsel are, he should run into natural & moral Philosophy, for counsel belongs to Policy, yet for the modus of it in working an effect, it belongs to Logic, for a man may take counsel of himself, without Counsellors, as Kings have. Suscepto bello Caesar, etc. judicio meo, as voluntate: in these words lies the modus, which he proves a disparatis nulla vi coactus, etc. Fallaces here are very common, as when we take that for causa per se, which is causa per accidens, & contra: Now the reason why he gives these modi to the efficient, and not to the effect is, because they are modi movendi, and do not belong to the thing moved.   

Per accidens efficit causa, quae externa facultate efficit: ut in his quae fiunt necessitate, vel fortuna.  
Causa per accidens is that which worketh an effect, but non sua facultate, but is moved by some other thing, and yet notwithstanding it works after a sort sua facultate, but not sua facultate if we respect the effect, as fire drieth a cloth by removing the moisture, and so leaves the cloth dry, which drought is in the cloth.   

 in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna.  
Necessitate cum efficiens vi cogitur ad effectum. Here we see a necessity in invention, which is all one with coaction.  
By fortuna we are to understand the special providence of God, or ignorance of the next cause, for ignorance of the providence of God in all things, and of the next cause, hath caused that men say what fortune had I, when they are crossed in play, or such like.  
Now necessity answereth to nature, cum efficiens cogitur: so that this necessity here is a coaction, and yet is it efficiens though vi cogitur, cogitur when as the work of it per se is rather of some other thing: now the same thing in one respect may be causa per se, and in another respect causa per accidens, for they are but modi, vi externa ad effectum, so that it doth it not natura, or consilio.  
Object. Why saith he effectum rather than res?  
Answ. All comes to one, for he means res, neither doth he define effectum here. Here he means violence, not that vis in causa; this vis doth not work the effect, but works upon the cause, and is that facultas whereof he spoke before.   

Qualis est Pompeianorum excusatio.  
At mihi quidem (ait Orator) si proprium & verum nomen etc. Before he said he was causa consilio of going with Pompey against Caesar, he saith he was compelled fatali necessitate, and hither belongs fatum in Schools,   

Fortuna est causa per accidens quando praeter, etc.  
Our Author before did tell us of fortuna in the ablative case, here he puts it in the nominative, because fortune is a principal cause of that effect that another doth per accidens: the arguing we ascribe it to fortune, and say fortune did it: so that our Author would have us consider, first that it was fortune did it, secondly, that it takes away the title of doing it from him that did it.   

Per accidens.  
That is working externa facultate, now whereas he saith he doth it per accidens, he means fortune as it is commonly taken, when we make her blind not seeing what she doth, for hence it doth arise, when we do not a thing by counsel, but ●ab nab as they say, that causeth us to make fortune blind.   

Quando aliquid accidit.  
That is, happeneth, for here it is principal, the improvidence as it were, he neither sees himself a cause, neither doth he see who is the cause, and therefore he saith accidit, not efficit, for he saith I did it not; so again, ask him who did it, and ●e will say, I know not: so that accidere is the special efficere of this modus.   

Praeter scopium efficientis.  
Fortune may seem to be opposed to counsel, which evermore hath a scope whereat it levels, now when any thing happeneth praeter scopum, it is fortuna we say. Now things in nature may have a scope, which is beyond their nature, and then it is fortuna: so that praeter scopum is as much as if he should have said, praeter scopum fortunae, if it be causa fortuna: or praeter scopum naturae, if it be causa natura.  
Sic Pheraeo Jasoni profuit hostis, etc. here his enemy going about to kill him, healed him.   

In hoc genere causarnm imprudentia connumerari solet.  
Imprudentia is one modus of fortune, as here.  
Cur aliquid vidi, cur noxia lumina feci?  
Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est, etc.  
I unawares have seen that, which hath done me harm. Then Ovid was causa per accidens of working that effect he should not. So Actaeon was causa inscius of seeing Diana washing herself: and here Ovid reasons a simile, as Actaeon was torn in pieces of his dogs for seeing Diana unawares, so am I banished for seeing that I would.  
Scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est, etc. He means Augustus.  
So if a man go forth, and a tile fall from an house, and break his head, this is causa fortuna, it is natura as it break his head, being harder than his head, and fortuna as it hit him, and consilio it breaks his head if it be fling, for it hath a scope: true it is nothing but counsel hath his end in its intendment, yet there is no cause but hath his end of the effect it worketh.   

Hinc sumitur deprecatio, etc.  
For our Author said before accidit, therefore we are causes, ergo, it ought to be pardoned, deprecatio is from this manner of working fortuna: so they will say he is a proper man, but hath no luck.   

Fortunae autem nomen ignorantia causarum confinxit, etc.  
Here Ramus doth commorari in the name, lest he should be mistaken, it is an unchristian word, it is ignorance not only as it is opposed to counsel, but as it is unknown to the thing that worketh by fortune. Many other modi there are among other Logicians, all which may be brought hither, as causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either causa necessitate, or efficiens in genere, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is causa per se, if he shall say, anger did it, than there is a trope in it, as when I say, he writes, I mean his pen writes: if I say he writes with his pen, than I make him causa cum aliis: if I say he writes, he is efficiens. Now for the order of causes, one efficient may be cause of another efficient, etc. and so causa causae be causa causati, but this will fail, as when I look at a child, and commend him from his grandfather, not respecting the mean causes, there is not causa causae, but causa causati So when I say he came of Scipio, etc. Hactenus de efficient, and this we must always look at first in artificio rei: moreover observe here in every thing the manner of working: for so God is said to do some thing necessitate, as when we say he doth that he would not, though he would it in another sense, and fortuna, as man's fall was praeter sc●pum Legis.    

CHAP. VI  

De Materia. Materia est causa ex qua res est.  
WE have heard of the efficient cause, and his manner of moving in that work of his: now these are essential to Logic, because in the very manner, there lieth the force of the argument, and whatsoever hath reason belongeth to Logic, many distinctions there are among the Logicians, all which may be brought to these, that of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they say is that efficient cause that worketh internally; the Physicians call it causa evidens, and meat, and drink, is causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a disease: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is that cause that worketh externally; the Physicians call it causa continens: but here is no distinction of cause, neither have these quatenus causae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any force to argue the effect, but only quatenus efficiens, whereas we hear in every special modus of Ramus that they did press the effect strongly: as didst thou kill thy father? or didst thou it alone? etc. so also in causa per se, and per accidens, there is great difference in arguing a conclusion; if he did it natura, there is no rebuking of that, for it was from his nature: if he sinned by counsel, the punishment is so much the greater: if he did it well consilio, he deserves the more praise. Fortuna indeed is such a cause, as it is not a cause by Ramus definition, for fortune is but God's providence unknown: now if there be any other respect of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it will fall to the same with causa cum aliis.  
Now we come to materia, that (as we have heard) had a community with the efficient, which community was to move with it a great while before the form and end come: so soon as the efficient moves, presently the matter moves, but the form and end move not a good while after. Now because this difference (which causeth the distribution of causa) appears in greater things, ergo it is also in less things: but our Logic tells us, that the efficient must go before the matter, and how agreeable doth our Logic go to God's work in the creatures? if we shall take a thing and resolve it into his causes, and make them effects, and look at their causes, (for so when we look at their causes, we make them effects: so that absurd is that definition of causa, to be either going before, or concomitans to the effect) at last we shall come to a first efficient that hath nihil prius to him, ergo he was not made, ergo he ever was, ergo all other things once were not, for they were made, ergo they now being were from the first, ergo the first matter was not eternal, as Aristotle dreamt; but indeed he would cross Plato in what he could; yet one may confute him by his own rules, for he grants there is a primus motor, ergo he is movens, but not moved, for than he should have some thing to move him, and so not be first, ergo it is easy to make Aristotle believe he is , because he is first, ergo he must move others only, for he is infinite, ergo without limits of place, ergo in every place, ergo nusquam inclusus, or exclusus, ergo unmoveable.  
Now the first matter is first in his kind, namely, the first matter, but not the first thing: and we may conclude from this, that the first efficient was before the first matter: for if both were first, neither were first: for if the one should say he were first, the other would say nay, I am as forward as thee, and so there would be none absolutely first: and again, one is before two, ergo he that is absolutely first, can be but one.   

Materia.  
For his name, as efficiens was extrafaciens, moving all the rest, and not moved of them, but as it were pater; so materia is quasi mater, out of which the thing springs, as out of a mother: so that we may see the name to be given a simili, but yet with very good reason; as the child is not a patre, but of the mother; so the effect is from the efficient, but springs out of the matter. Now that there is such a matter thus it may appear; there is nothing composed, but its essence, and itself a distinct; for to make essentia and ens to be the same, is peculiar to God. Again, whatsoever is finite, that may be limited in his essence; now God only is infinite, and every other thing finite, ergo may be defined, ergo itself and its essence are distinct, ergo it must have a matter. Again, if every thing have not essence, as they speak of Angels, why are not they finite? ergo they may be defined, ergo their essence and themselves are distinct: again, if they have not a matter, what have they? nothing but an efficient, and an end? then they should be imperfect, and be either the first matter, or the first form: again, if they have a form, and no matter, than this form must be another thing from them, and how is that possible? for if the form and they be all one, than the cause and effect will be the same. But Logic is a general Art, and because every thing hath a matter, ergo materia belongs hither, and the first matter had not a matter, for than it should not have been first, but was incomplete.   

Materia est.  
For it gives esse, and as the force of the efficient was requisite for the esseficating of the thing, so the matter much more, for not only its esse, but its nature and self couches in the effect, and makes a bulk: and if the vis of the efficient were essential, because there could be no essefication of the effect without it, much more must the matter be essential; for if we take away the matter, we take away both the force and the thing itself. Now we must understand that ens and non ens are the subject of Logic: and as argumentum was concretum, and also causa, so when I say materia, I mean a thing that was made of a matter.   

Ex qua.  
That is, out of which it is raised, it is the mother of every thing, as we often speak of the earth: because every thing indeed is made of the four elements, but more especially nourished of the earth. Now the matter doth not only by his virtue cause the effect, but is interessed in it, and the effect riseth out of it, as if it were a child springing out of the mother, only it goes further in that its essence goes to the making up of the effect: now though the essence be from ●atter and form, yet the ens itself is from all the causes.   

Res est.  
That effect as we shall hear hereafter; for in this doctrine of causa, effectum is the aliquid, which we must call res, till we come to it.   

Est.  
Every cause gives an esse to the effect, and this esse is the bulk of it, and from whence ariseth the greatness or littleness of the effect by the form; now it is a great question in Schools, whether the matter doth any thing? indeed in respect of the efficient it is patience, but in respect of the effect it doth causare, and so doth agere. For if it be an effect in respect of every cause, than every cause is after a sort the efficient of that effect: and if you ask me what his action is, I answer, it doth materia, or substantiare the effect, as the efficient did efficere the effect: It is also passive in regard of the form, but both together cowork to make the effect; though forma be principium motus in the thing by the matter. Now this is the next thing to be inquired, after we see who made it, then whereof it was made: both which we see in every thing, and see them as they are done.  
Now the common Logicians bring in distinctions of Materia: As Kickerman saith, it is proxima, or remota: but he may say so of every argument, as well as of materia: he saith man is made of the first matter, then of the elements, which are more remote, but ex semine, that is nearer: alas we do not here consider priority, or posteriority, neither do these any more press the effect; here is no Logic still, but materia est causa, ex qua, ergo this will not fall in Logic: and if you mark it, presently when he comes to materia prima, and to the elements, he is in natural Philosophy, ergo here is no distinction of materia in Logic, but of the particular thing, that belongs to a particular Art.   

Hoc argumento ficto apud Ovid. 2. Metam. Solis domus, auro, pyropo, ebore, argento componitur.  
Regia Solis erat sublimibus alta columnis,  
Clara micante auro; flammasque imitante pyropo, etc.  
Here Ramus brings an example out of Ovid, which is a common School book, and here a feigned cause argues a feigned effect: ens and non ens are the subject of Logic, but non ens gratia entis, for so Logic looks at them first, and giveth entity to ens fictum, and therefore Grammar and Rhetoric must follow it, for they are attendants on it. The Regia Solis is here distributed into his parts, and they are argued by their matter: it had his pillars of gold for their matter, and pyropus another matter of the columns, the covering or ceiling of Ivory: the leaves of the doors made of silver. Observe how these causae cum aliis in the matter do not force the effect any thing at all, ergo he doth not teach them here; for whether they be made of one matter, or of more matters, all is one, ergo there is no Logic in that, ergo it doth not belong to Logic.   

Caesar 1. belli civilis. Imperat militibus Caesar ut, etc.  
Here milites are the efficient causes of the ships; then he distributes the ship into his parts, keels, ribs. Carinae primum, and statumina ex levi materia, the rest was viminibus contextum, lined within with leather: so that here is distributio integri in membra, and every part is argued by the material cause.    

CHAP. VII.  

Causae primum genus est inefficiente & materia secundum sequitur.  
WE have heard of the efficient, and of the matter, and this is the conclusion of it: now we come to the second which is in forma, & fine: so that whilst he saith, Causae primum genus ejusmodi est, etc. he tells me it was a distribution before, where the genus is subsistent in speciebus efficientis, & materiae, for so genus is totum partibus essentiale, and is never but in speciebus: so that the genus of them is comprehended in the doctrine of them two parts.  
Secundum sequitur in forma, & fine: he doth not say, Secundus est forma & fine: now as the efficient and matter were combined together, as moving together a while without the form and end: so the form and end, though the form be before, yet the end comes presently after, and is as it were the pedissequa to the form: and indeed where we cannot find the form of a thing, we put the end, as being next to it, and best expressing it. So bene disserere, the end of Logic, is put for the form of Logic; now as this distinction of the motion of the causes is seen in greater matters, so is it also in less: for there is a co-operation of the efficient and end together first, then of the form, and end together also, though not without the efficient and matter. In forma & fine, for the form is before the final cause; for before the form be induced, or ingenerated in the matter, it cannot be good for his end, and the end is causa in respect of the effect, not of the efficient. So we say a coat hath a form before it have an end, for it may be a coat, and yet not fit to serve me: now then as the efficient began the motion, and the motion redounded out of the matter, so it runs per formam, & finem.   

Forma est causa.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same that forma is in Latin, there is but a transposition of the letters, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the face; and fas and facies in Latin comes of facio, because when it is made it hath the face of a thing: so a thing when it hath its form, it hath a face, it will seem something: so that the efficients esse is not facies rei, nor the matters esse, for they might be otherwhere, ergo the efficient and matter are common causes: this is a particular one, which is one reason why the efficient and matter go before, being more general: so that when once he hath the face of a man, then is he a man; this word forma both in Latin and Greek is taken abusive for the outward figure of a thing; it is a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct; for figuration is not forma; as we may see in water put in a round glass, or in a square glass, the same water having the same form will have a round figure, or square figure, according to the glass wherein it is: now because the figure is adjoined to the form, ergo they say it is forma, and in Schools they call it forma accidentalis: now the figure follows the form, but it is not so essential, but it may be changed, and yet the water is the same, because the water is variable into divers figures, as we heard before in water. The Schools say, that no artificial thing hath any other form, ergo ask them in what predicament any artificial thing is, and they will answer in quality: but thus they will make Geometry to give the forms of things. Figura is a quality, ergo to make quality a form is very absurd: again, as before one and the same thing had divers figures, and only one form that makes the thing one: again, is the figure of a table the form of it? then the table belongs to Geometry, not to the Joiner's Art: again, whether doth the matter of the table belong to substantia? ergo the form too, or else it is in divers predicaments: again, figura is an accident, but forma is a cause, and gives essence to the thing.   

Est causa.  
We heard before that causa was cujus vi res est, now forma therefore gives vim esseficandi, it agrees with the matter in that their two essences constitute the effect; then again by how much the form yields his esse in a more special manner, than the matter, so much more the form is causa, the matter yields a portion of itself, but all the form is there, for the matter is common to both species, ergo must give matter to them both, ergo forma is a more inward cause than the matter: again, forma is principium actus, and therefore it is called actus, ergo est causa.   

Per quam.  
Through which, or by which the efficient was from the which, and the matter of the which, the form by which: so here we may see what the form doth; and if res be per formam, it must needs follow that the forms force is there in general, as the efficients, there is no more per quam, but all the form is there, ergo forma tota est in toto, and it is in qualibet parte partly: not wholly, and this is plain; as for example, by another rule of Logic, the members we know are essential to the whole, that is, containing a portion of the matter, and of the form of the whole, ergo, every member contains a part of the esse of the thing, ergo, it cannot contain the whole, ergo those that make anima rationalis, sensitiva, and vegitativa, forms of men, beasts and plants, and make it tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte, break this rule directly; for than they must be divided: but the truth is this, they are not forms, for if they be, whereof are they forms? viventis: what is the matter of them? as in animali: is corpus the matter of them? that cannot be, for it is forma animalis, not corporis; why than what is he but composed of them, ergo they are not the matter, and form, if there rise a third thing from them, than the thing hath another thing then either of them, ergo they are not the form, but contain a portion of the matter and form. Again, the body hath a form itself, for it hath his particular members, ergo they contain a portion of the matter, and of the form of the body, ergo, it is composed of a form besides the form of the whole, so that this it is, per quam, meaning it is quite through that portion of matter that makes that effect: so that there is not only matter, but also forma in every thing, & contra.   

Res est, quod est.  
There it essefies the thing, as well as the efficient, and the matter, id quost est: so that this esse from the form doth not only make it to be, but makes it to be that which it is: so that hereby we shall know the form, and as for the efficient and matter, for them a chest might have been a stool, or a table, but the form only makes it that which it is, and no other thing; again a body is the genus to a man, ergo not the matter, because he is corpus.  
Now we hear what the form is, such a thing as is rei superstrata materiae, the matter is substrata, and the form is laid upon it. Now question might be made what a thing forma is. The efficient, and matter we see what they are, the chestity, or tability, or these do deliver the form as well as they can, but the end delivers it better, The way to know this is only by the other rules of Logic, every member (as we heard before) contains a portion of the matter, and the form of the whole; how can that be? it is true, because membrum is essential to the whole. Indeed the doctrine of forma hath troubled the Schools very much, and how to name it I cannot tell, only it is causa per quam res est, this it is. The first efficient in time made the first matter, than he did superstruere a form upon it, so that the matter is the foundation of the form, whereby it is retained. Now in the elements both the matter and form are uniform, and therefore their parts are singular not making a mixture, but taking hold one of another, for so the matter is principium passionis, and the form actionis, and then again they both conspire to make up the whole. The next things are mingled of the elements, where all the elements are in every part; by this means there is a matter made of the matter of the four elements, and a form made of the forms of the four elements, and this is the best way to see the forms of any thing: a man's arm contains a portion of the matter and form of the whole: and again, it is made of singular parts which still contain a portion both of the matter, and of the form of it: so that in the end the forms of things arise from the elements by mistion; and this is that which Galen and Hypocrates mean when they call forma crasis: so for artificial things their forms arise from the forms of their parts: so that to know the forms of things this is the right, forma est causa per quam, etc. Now if we take this course to see the forms of things we shall easily see the truth: look how many members there are in a body, so many portions of matter and form there are, ergo, vita vegitativa, and sensitiva, are not the forms, but that is it that ariseth from the union of the elements forms: now by this means neither do we teach that the forms of things perish, and are annihilated, as the Philosophers say, neither are their forms divers, but conspire together to make one; neither is life a form, so that a bone is a bone, and hath the form of a bone when life is gone.   

Id quod est.  
This is peculiar to the form, for let forma be done away from a thing, and presently it is another thing: id quod est, namely that whereby it comes to be ranged under a general head is from the form.   

Ideoque hinc a caeteris rebus distinguitur.  
Because forma est causa, etc. it is not distinguished by the efficient, or matter, because all the force of them is not in the thing, as the forms force is: ideoque, etc. then we see evidently, that so fare forth as the form runs with the matter, so fare forth the thing is, id quod est; and so far forth also is it distinguished from all other things, now this is a necessary consecution from the first rule.  
Object. How can it be a first rule arising from a first rule?  
Answ. It is not simply and absolutely first, but first in his kind. So Dialecticae partes duae sunt, is not the first rule of Logic, because the definition is before, yet notwithstanding it is first in his kind; now the reason of it is thi●, every consectary that makes a rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be a rule of Art, for it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and is a first property in his kind, though there be more of them together: now it is here proton, and agrees to the parts afterwards, as risus first agrees to homo, and to Richard, William and John. etc. It is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it agrees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; so that all real distinction is from the form: and here is the doctrine of differentia with other Logicians, it is nothing but a property: and is here ideoque hinc a caeteris rebus distinguitur: so that that which is differentia constitutiva in regard of the effect, is differentia divisiva as it makes it differ from other things.   

Et forma simul cum reipsa ingeneratur.  
Again, here is another property, he saith, forma simul▪ etc. here are two things adjoined to forma, as properties, the first is that forma ingeneratur, the second is that simul cum reipsa ingeneratur. For the first there is much question how the forms come to things, the Philosophers say it is an heavenly nature, and comes by influence of the Sun, Moon and Stars, as if it were a quinta essentia from the elements, and must be extrinsice. Now these influences they know not what they are, if they be qualities of the Sun, Moon and Stars, than they cannot be forms, for the forms give essence, ergo, is no quality: if they be not qualities, than they are substances, what substance are they? If they be of their substance, than they are corruptible, shall it be from their matter? then it should be celestial, for they are not made of the elements, neither can matter make a form: and again, it cannot be of their matter, for than they should be diminished, neither can it be of their forms alone, for one thing cannot make a third distinct from it, ergo, it is not from them, but the Sun, Moon and Stars send down fire, which makes a mistion with the other elements, and so from their forms ariseth the forms of mists, for so mistio is alteratorum unio, ergo, it is made one, and it is evident that the forms of the four elements are all operative, that is, their qualities are in every thing. But they hold as it were a meeting of many Stars together at the conception of things, but as for their work, it is not so to be respected, for we see Esau and Jacob born at the same time, and yet of divers manners.   

Ingeneratur.  
Some are of opinion, that the form is in the thing before the thing be, but now it is educted, and brought out; true it is, it was before in the parts, but they were not membra: so that after that sort it was before, cum reipsa; how can this be whereas the end comes between the form, and the effect?  
Answ. This is a propriety, and every propriety is an adjunct to the thing, and the adjunct is after the subject, so that this comes after the form.   

Cum re.  
As if he should tell us the form lies in the matter after an hidden manner, but this property is before the end; ingenerari is another thing, than the form, ergo, forma is before it, but it is together with the thing.  
We have made an entrance into the formal cause, and have heard how that it is after the efficient, and the matter: again whereas every cause gave an esse, the form did that, and more too, the efficient gave a bare being, the matter gave a being and part of his essence, and the form gives his whole essence, and make it that which it is, and that reason of that makes it differ from all other things, and this the common Logicians did consider, when they made differentia to be divisiva, or constitutiva. Now here was their mistaking, that they called it differentia, which doth not arise from the essence of it, but from this property, that forma simul cum reipso ingeneratur.  
The Theory of the form is hardest of all humane learning, for it cannot be seen with our senses, but only by the effects of it we come to grope at it, because it is principium agens of every thing strengthened by the matter; but the contemplation of that belongs to natural Philosophy; and thus we may seek the forms of things. When I know that membrum is essentiale toti, and that the matter and form constitute the effect, it must needs be, that so many portions of matter, so many portions there are of forma, ergo, the Schools are deceived, which think the form may not be divided, for it may, because it is portionated from the members.  
The organical parts of a thing are made of simular parts, and the simular parts are made of the elements, both for matter and form, the elements of the first forms; now if you ask me further what they are, I can only say they are the works of the first efficient incomplete in themselves; so that if you will penitus introspicere, this is the way, and look what element is most predominant in the mist, so much more the nearer you shall come to see the form ingenerated: if we speak of the forms of the elements, they were extrinsice, and were ingenerated in the matter, again, if we shall speak of the soul of man, this is extrinsice infused, but the forms of other things are within, and are educed out of the matter, but there is nothing new in this, for the matter is so too.  
Ingeneratur. True thus fare as the form is not made but by composition of the elements, when the forms are not made, but in nature there is that misture, or in Art that composition, that there is a new form: as in a stone by the misture is made one form arising from the forms of the four elements, by their action and passion. So in artificial things, the form is a compound form made of the forms of the parts, and because that thing is now that which it was not, ergo this form must needs be that now, which it was not, ergo, ingeneratum: and the whole work of the efficient whilst he doth dollar, or hue a thing, is nothing but his preparing of it together with the rest of the matter to make a new thing. Forma is diversely ingenerated, if it be by composition, than it is composed, if it be of simples, than it is made by shaving or cutting it.  
Now whilst he saith simul at once, it may seem by this that the form and effect are together; he means not together in nature, for the form must be before the effect, because it constitutes the effect, and the constituter is before the thing constituted, therefore how are they simul? he means forma simul ingenerat: thus, I suppose two go together, and yet one of them goeth before the other, here is a priority, and simul too, he that is before goeth first, the other followeth, yet both move together: and as two hands laid together do move together, and yet one before the other, so is it with the formal cause and effect, the formal cause moves, and the effect also, but the effect follows it in every step, and the final cause follows the form, as the shadow follows the body, and the effect comes last: again, this is a property, ergo, an adjunct, ergo, is after the subject, for the form is an effect before it be a subject: so that the efficient doth as it were make the form, and the effect still follows as we may see in artificial things, so that so far forth as the form is ingenerated, so fare forth the effect is accomplished.   

Anima rationalis est forma hominis, etc.  
Here our Author doth commorari, and stay upon the doctrine of forma, for it is so deep, and subtle, as that it can hardly be perceived. This example is not true, because anima rationalis may subsist from the body; now as there can be no matter without a form, so there can be no form without a matter, therefore this example will not serve his turn, yet he brings that he could get; many in Schools have stumbled at this, and have gone about to mend it, but indeed they have marred it.  
Some say ratio belongs to Angels, ergo, it is not the proper form of homo, and therefore they have added mortale, and say homo is animal rationale mortale. Now if they join mortale to ratio, it is not mortalis. Again, animal ratione mortale doth detract from man, unless we speak of his body.   

Et distinguitur a caeteris omnibus naturis.  
That is not so, for the Angels though they be animae, and so have not animam rationalem, yet they have rationem; again, doth not the body of man distinguish him from other thing? so I suppose we admit of the Pythagorians metam, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. A man's soul in a bird will not make it a man.   

Geometricarum figurarum in triangulis, quadrangulis sua forma est.  
He brings such examples as he could find, and those whereof greatest question might be made; it hath been a question among Logicians, that this forma is peculiar to substances, not accidents; and hence have made a distinction of forma to be substantialis, or accidentalis: but they are deceived, for Logic is a general Art, and every thing that is made hath causes, ergo, may be defined, ergo, hath matter and form; for otherwise we could not have a perfect definition in Grammar, Rhetoric and Arithmetic, or in any other Arts that have accidents for their subjects: ergo, accidents behold a form as well as an efficient, ergo, he saith in Geometry, take a triangle, it consists of three lines with three angles, which by their unition in their angles, make up one form, as well as one matter.   

Phisicarum rerum, coeli, terrae, arborum, piscium sua forma est.  
He doth commorari here long for two causes: first, in respect the form is deep, and needs illustration. Secondly to confute other Logicians, that say accidents have no forms, unde praecipua rerum ut natura est, etc. if it be causa per quam res est id quod est, than it is praecipua rerum natura. Nature proper is res nata, that is, that springeth principiis, that is matter and form: so that the whole nature consisteth of them, and this is the proper signification of it, afterward it comes to signify the principia themselves; hence is materia and forma called natu●ae: so that in natural Philosophy, when you read of nature, they tell you commonly some tale of materia or forma: then again by a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, it signifieth the qualities natural in things: all this shows forma to be praecipua rei natura. Praecipua, first because it makes the thing to be id quod est, so doth not the matter: again, forma, why it is principium actus, from whence the qualities principally arise: for as the Philosophers teach, though not truly in every point, materia is principium passionis: forma actionis, and actio is better than passio, ergo the form more excellent than the matter, but both matter and form do agere, for they are causa; yet the forms begin, and the matter is but the sustentation of it, and the forms act is the stronger by the matter, not only as it acts internally, but when it acts upon external things by resistance by the way. Now as it hath chief interest in esseficating the effect, so it is praecipua rei natura, so also there is of it praecipua rei explicatio, si possit inveniri.   

Si possist inveniri.  
He saith it neither can be found out, nor that it cannot be found out. Si possit inveniri: sure it is findable; I prove it thus, it is liable to Logic, if it be objected to the eye, than the eye may see it; it may but hardly be found, because it doth not descry itself to the outward senses by qualities, as bodies do: again, the form in nature is so subtle that we can hardly find it, but see as it were the shadow of it, ergo divers have thought the forms of things to be divine. Some have gone so fare as to think them to be influences: but subtle it is indeed, and harder to find out, then either the efficient, or matter, ergo we commonly call that the matter, which contains the form too, because it is rather seen as it hath a material cause, than as it hath a formal.   

 in artificiofis rebus facilius occurrit.  
That is the reason why he that makes natures is more cunning than any man can trace his wisdom: as we may see in the elements, ergo no man can make a thing in nature; man may further nature, but he cannot make any thing: again, the parts are so fine in the mixture of things, as it is beyond the acies of man's eye to see them.   

In artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit.  
Why? because artificial things are the works of men, and one man may trace another, though every man cannot.   

Caesar. 7. Muri autem omnes Gallici, etc.  
As for example, in artificial things this very description will declare how hard a thing it is to find out the form, but we use to point at it by the matter, and by the position of it. There stood great beams all along, two foot asunder, put into the earth, & the distances between them were stuffed with great stones: when these were so fastened, then there was a new order begun, where they laid the beams against those stones that were laid before, and filled likewise the distances with stones which were against the first lay of beams: but what hath he told us now? why saith he, I am a Frenchman, and I will tell you the form of a French wall, where if you do but look at the forms of every part, and of them, you shall see a composed form: so that the Logician doth not look at the outward face of a thing, but at the inward essence: here he is fain to deliver the form by many other arguments, and indeed it is a description of forma.   

Est in secessu longo locus: ensula portum, etc.  
Here he hath by the position of the parts of the haven, told us the form of it.    

CHAP. VIII.  

De fine.  
Finis est causa cujus gratia res est.  
WE have gone through the esse of a thing, we have but heard of three, when the fourth comes, that makes up the perfection of the thing, namely finis.  
Finis, for the name, it is borrowed from Geometry; for that that is terminus there, is here called finis, and it is brought hither to signify that final cause that serveth to make up the effect: so that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if we keep the proportion of the esses, but it is not the last part and member thereof, as they make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last member of some whole, as Method is the last member of Logic. Finis is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the esse of a thing, not of the members of it. Now it is called finis, because it limits the thing for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and for his essence, and it is the last thing that limits it, ergo it is called finis.   

Est causa.  
Because with force thereof the thing is, and the end though it do not enter into the essence of the effect, by it own essence yet by it virtue it doth efficere, as doth the efficient.   

Cujus gratia.  
Therefore the final cause is that that graceth the effect, and thence hath the thing his commendation, cujus gratia, for whose grace; for gratia here signifieth not only for whose sake, but for whose grace, as if the final cause were that which doth grace the effect, and so indeed it doth. For as bonum quo communius, eo melius, so communior finis hath more grace than finis specialio●: for that cause, that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and excellent, then that which is more remote. Hence man is more excellent than any other creature, because he is made immediately for God. So then the end graceth it evermore: and the more excellent the end is, the more excellent is that effect. This then is the esse that the final cause doth give to the effect, namely, that which is good for that effect: so that the goodness of a thing is that vis in the effect, that it hath from the end: As in a knife, the efficient may be a slave, the matter likewise naught, the form though that be something, yet were it not for the end, neither the efficient, matter or form would move, ergo the final cause is said to be the happiness of the thing: so that a thing is not to be accounted happy till it be serviceable to that end for which it was made. A garment well made as touching the skill of the efficient, and of good stuff for the matter, and fit for a garment, and so of a good form, yet not fitting him for whom it was made, it wanteth his end, or happiness, and so is not perfect: Again, this shows the difference between the formal cause and the end, for the form may be as we see, and not the end. Again, we know there are many things that have not their perfection but by growth, and yet have all the causes, yet notwithstanding the end presently follows after the form: so man was made by God; here God is the efficient, earth the matter, reason the form; yet here is not his end, namely, fitness to serve God. And thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes, which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded.   

Physicis rebus finis homo propositas est; homini Deus.  
Of natural things man is the end: the grace of man is God, and God makes him good, not as an efficient, but as an end.   

Omnium artium est aliquod summom bonum & finis extremus.  
That is that end which they reach unto, but that is not the summum bonum of all things: for Logicks end is been disserere, Grammars bene loqui, etc. these are the furthest ends of Logic and Grammar, but not the furthest end of all: they are indeed the proper end of them, but not the summum bonum: so that he means by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them, and the end of Logic lies in the precepts of it, as they act bene disserere. This is the difference between the end and the effect. A house is made to dwell in, though it never be dwelled in: so for a garment, to be worn is one thing, and to be fit to wear another. So if I go forth to speak with one, and he be gone, yet I obtain my end: they commonly say he was frustrate of his end, but not frustrate of finis, quatenus finis, but quatenus effectum.   

Juno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit, cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur, solatii scilicet prolisque gratia.  
Sunt mihi his septem praestanti corpore Nymphae, etc.  
Here Juno persuades Aeolus to let his wind out, and she would give him one of her Nymphs, which she presseth upon him by final causes: first, that she may spend all her years with him: and secondly, that she may make him the father of a fair offspring.   

In defension Ligarii Cicero Tuberonem accusatorem urget, etc.  
Et certe (ait) contra ipsum Caesarem est congressus armatus, etc. As if he should say, Tubero thou hadst thy sword drawn at the battle of Pharsalio, thou didst strike his side: mark the variety of the phrases, and so of the ends. What meant thy sword? what was thy mind? here was the propositum. What meantst thou to have done? even to have killed Caesar. So that the final cause is not accidental to the thing, but even substantial; and therefore we have it so often in the definition of Arts used for the form, and that for this reason: because it is the next argument to it, and presupposeth the form: so that this is the use of the final cause in the definition of Arts.  
As Dialectica est ars bene disserendi, here bene disserere is the end, and it is as if he should say, Dialectica hath such a soul, as that it is able to perform and execute this or that thing, for which it was made. So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of all Arts: I but what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in general, why, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the effect of all Arts?  
Answ. But as every thing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of it ergo, if a man will do any Logicum opus, he must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes.    

CHAP. IX.  

De effectis. Effectum est, quod e causis existit, siveigitur gignatur, sive, etc.  
NOw we come to see a thing made up: it is worth the consideration, to see how we begin at the farthest thing, and at the first. There are four esses distinct, which we must look at distinctly and orderly, if we ●ill see things a●ight. First the efficients, than the matters, etc. now then let us see effectum. Effectum: for the name it seems to be nominated only from the efficient; for it comes of efficior, which comes o● efficio, whence efficiens comes: and howbeit it might be denominated materiatum, formatum, or finitum, yet he rather names it of the efficient; but we are to understand, that it hath reference to all the causes, even materiatum, formatum, finitum.  
Object. Why should there not be as many several kinds of effects, as there are of causes?  
Answ. Because no one cause alone can make an effect, for it is existent from them all: the causes are distinct in nature, and their forces are their own, ergo their doctrine must be distinct: but because essectum must be made of the composition of the four esses, ergo it can be but one: so that I cannot say, effectum efficientis, effectum materiae, effectum formae, or effectum finis, ergo we must see effectum alone in one lump, as it is in nature. Now because it hath all the esses of the causes, ergo good reason that the efficient that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and worketh generally quite through with every other cause, matter, form and end, should have the effect denominated from it, so that this child brought forth by the four causes is denominated from the efficient.   

Est.  
All things are effects, but God alone, ergo, effectum est: therefore whereas all things are made liable to our eye of reason, it is requisite that as we see the causes that make up the thing, so the effect, which is a quinta essentia arising from them.   

Quod.  
He means argumentum absolute consentancum: now we see plainly how the causes are absolutely agreeing to the effect, but how is the effect absolutely a-agreeing to them? yes, for if the effect be from them, it will vouchsafe to acknowledge itself to be from them: and we see in nature, that if an effect be, than all the causes are, & contra: again, that we may see it plainly, if we take away the efficient, the effect will be imperfect: so put the effect, and we put the matter and form substantially, and the esses of the other: so take away the effect, and you take away them. Now if the efficient be rotten, yet it is an effect, as this Logic is Ramus his effect, though he be dead and rotten: for here we respect not time, but the esse. Again, he puts efficiens generally a qua, materia ex qua, forma per quam, finis cujus gratia, and here effectum quod: the reason why he used quod so often, is, because he would tell us that Logic is general to every thing.   

Existit.  
Esse is of any one cause; existere is a compound of them all, not that existere hath respect of time and place, as some teach: true it is, time and place attend every thing, when it doth existere, but they are not of the esse of the thing, but are only complimental; est is a causa qualibet, existere ex omnibus, subsistere ex modo quodam consentaneis. Existere comes of ex and sto, now it doth stand upon its feet, and doth estare out from all the causes, being a fift thing from them.   

Ecausis.  
Here e is as much as a, ex per, and gratia: ecausis, that is, ab efficient, ex materi, per formam, gratia finis. Causis not causa, and therefore it is that all four causes must absolutely concur, or else the thing cannot existere, as the first matter did not: ergo, if Angels do existere, they must have all the causes: so the souls of men after they be out of the body, they cannot per se existere without they have all the causes, for if any one cause be wanting, they will be incomplete.   

Sive igitur gignatur, sive corrumpatur.  
Ramus doth here commorari upon this doctrine of effectum, because the common Aristotelians refer the doctrine of motus not to Logic but to natural Philosophy: but Ramus teacheth it here in Logic in the doctrine of effectum, sive igitur gignatur, sive corrumpatur, &c, whether it be made or corrupted, sive modo quodam moveatur, quidlibet, that is, whether it be augmented, or diminished, etc. generatio, and corruptio are substantial motus, augmentatio, and diminutio quantitatis, alteratio, and loci mutatio qualitatis: and all these are effects: then again, whereas the Aristotelians teach, that distruens causa, is not causa, Ramus teacheth that it is, for whether a man doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the same rule he doth both, ergo, both of them are motus of his act to the opus, ergo, causa distruens is a motus, and a cause, as well as opus destructum is an effect, and privations though they be privations in respect of their habits, yet they are effects in respect of their causes, ergo, they are causes both alike: they teach as if a man had done nothing when he did sin, whereas he spoils the Image of God in him: ergo, whilst they are more nice than wise they become foolish. If the Lord should bring to nothing that which he hath done, it would be his effect, at least the corruption of nothing. Now the effect is double, motus, and res motu facta, every thing is made motu, God only is sine motu, and doth not move when he works, for else he should not be primus movens, but motus: but if we resolve all things, it must needs bring us in the end to that which is : for so Aristotle found out most things by motus: now again, there are those that sever motus, and res motu facta, as the Aristotelians, which makes Ramus to commorari; they say, somethings rest motu only without a res motu facta, but that is not so, for there is nothing that God hath made, which doth movere, but there is a res motu facta of that motus: they conceit that some Art's motion hath no opus post se relictum, as when one plays on the Virginals, they say there is nothing left behind.  
Answ. What care I for that, Logic looks not to that, but as there is playing, so there is something played, which is res motu facta: and as there is writing, so there is something written. These, namely motus, and res motu facta, are never distinct asunder one without another, but only in that the one is not the other.   

Hujus loci sunt laudes, & vituperationes.  
As if Ramus should say, if you would commend a thing indeed, let it be from the effect, we may commend one from his fair building, but that is beggarly, as Tully saith, or a woman for her beauty, but this is childish, for the true commendation is from the effect: so man is here to be dispraised from his sin: so the Lord is to be praised from his effects.   

Quarum pleni sunt libri sacri, & prophani.  
Why in Scripture? because Divinity stands in action, not in Theory, and therefore we have them so often commended that have done well, & contra.   

Aenei. 6. facta variorum populorum, etc. Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera, etc.  
The Romans are commended from their effects; first, regere imperio populos: again parcere subjectis, etc. these are compared with the acts of other people, and they are made minora to the effects of the Romans. Excudent alii spirantia, etc. As the Corinthians will carve you any thing. Orabant causas melius, as the Orators among the Athenians, Coelique meatus, etc. as the Chaldeans and Egyptians will do.   

Huc dicta scriptaque referenda sunt.  
That is, dicta and scripta in respect of Authors, but if we look at the things written, or spoken, so they are testimonies. So Pericles and Hortensius are famous for speaking well. Demosthenes and Tully for both.   

Ad hunc locum referuntur consilia, & deliberationes, etc.  
Counsels and deliberations are effects of them that consult, and deliberate, etiam si omnio ad exitum perductae non fuerint. And this appears evidently in that Parmenio and Philotas were put to death, being suspected of conspiracy against Alexander. So also were Lentulus, and Cethegus, and other companions of Catiline.   

Sunt etiam effecta virtutum & vitiorum. Quid non ebrietas designat? operta recludit, etc.  
Now it is a common conceit that nothing is an effect, but that which is substantial, but accidental causes as I may call them, may have accidental effects. As drunkenness first operta recludit, secondly, in praelia trudit inermem, it makes a man go to war leaving his weapons behind him, it will make a man think himself as good as my Lord Mayor. Faecundae calices, here are cups for drink, and drink for drunkenness, quem non fecere desertum, that is a dizzard, he means a Logician, contracta quem non, etc. it makes a man in poverty a brave minded fellow.    

CHAP. X.  

De subjecto. Argumentum modo quodam consentaneum succedit ut subjectum & adjunctum, etc.  
WE have heard of the essential parts of a thing, and so have seen the thing in his essence, and we see how Logic doth direct the eye of our reason, to see the most inmost thing in it. Now we come to see the complimental things, that belong to a thing, not belonging or concurring to the existere of it: so that the causes were as it were the simular parts, these are as it were the blood in the sinews, etc. to make them full, and complimental: Modo quodam consentaneum, as if he should say, the causes were required ad esse rei, these are but required ad bene esse rei: so that the causes looked at the inside of the thing, and now we come to look at the outside of it.   

Argumentum modo quodam, etc.  
This is an imperfect transition containing only the proposition of that which follows, modo quodam: as if he should say, if they be there it is well, notwithstanding if they be wanting it is no prejudice to the essence of the thing, for they are but circumstances, whereas argumenta absolute consentanea are penetralia; again, argumenta modo quodam consentanea come after the being of the thing, for accidens inseparabilis, as homini risus aequo hinnitus, are but acts of the soul working in the bodies of their subjects,   

Succedit.  
Why? because they are after those that agree absolutely: we have heard that the effect ariseth from all the causes, and cannot existere without them, ergo, it must be a thing of necessity before it be subject, or adjunct, or before it can have a subject, or adjunct, for that which hath adjuncts is a subject, & contra.   

 subjectum, & adjunctum.  
A subject is by nature before an adjunct, and a thing is first a subject before it be an adjunct, and there must be a thing subjected to an adjunct before a thing can be adjoined to a subject: again the subject is more general than the adjunct, not that there are more subjects to one adjunct, for it is quite contrary, for there may be twenty adjuncts to one subject, but I mean it is more in use, and argues more strongly than the adjunct doth, As when I say the King is there, ergo, the Guard is there, is stronger than to say the Guard is there, therefore the King, and here we see as before, priority and posteriority. Now our reason is to behold things according to the course of God, for whatsoever we see it was first in God, and when he hath made a thing than it is a subject, and it is capable of adjuncts before it have them, ergo, subjectum is before adjunctum in the practice of God, and also of man. Now subjectum as it is first, so must it be taught first. The name subjectum tells me it is a thing laid undermost in regard of the adjunct, and it doth support it, and yet it is not of the essence of it, but only laid under it, and adjunctum is to ride on it as a packhorse: now as the efficient was most inmost, than the other three, or the effect, so is subjectum here, ergo it is by nature before adjunctum.   

Subjectum est cui aliquid adjungitur.  
He omits the genus, and the reason why he doth not teach the genus namely argumentum modo quodam consentaneum is because it is a definition itself, as absolute consentaneum was, for there is no definition of a definition, but if he had defined it, he had brought a definition to a definition, he wanted a word to name the thing, and therefore gives me a description instead thereof, cui aliquid, this aliquid is that ens we heard of in Art; so that this aliquid is any thing, not simply, but quatenus it hath an affection to be joined. A thing being an effect, is fit to receive outward things; and subjectum is defined by his relate adjunctum, for it is cui aliquid adjungitur, and whatsoever is subjected to another thing is his adjunct, as whiteness is an adjunct to a wall that is white.   

Adjungitur.  
Adjungitur, so that subjectum is the argument, and adjunctum the aliquid, adjungitur, so that here he tells us that the adjunct is adjoined to the subject, th' at which is must needs be after the thing to which it is tied, ergo, subjectum is before adjunctum, he saith it is but adjunctio, not entering into the essence of it, but that it may be taken away: so that as subjectum doth intimate a thing laid underneath, so the adjunct doth intimate a thing laid upon it: so that the adjunct doth depend, and hang upon the subject as upon a hook; or as one thing tied to another: thus have we heard the subjects argument to be so, as if his adjunct be removed from him, or he from his adjunct, yet he stands firm in his causes. Now for the manners.   

Anima est subjectum scientiae, ignore antiae, virtutis, vitii, quia haec praeter essentiam accedunt.  
Anima is a spiritual thing, so are these adjuncts, scientia, ignorantia, etc. of the same kind too, now these take hold one of another quodam modo, ergo, if they be removed, yet the soul remains entire, ergo, it is but subjectum of them, scientia, etc. Now are but adjoined to it, the anima his esse is not of their esse, aut contra. Some are of opinion (as Scaliger) that the Angels and men's souls esse, and agere, are the same, but then their actus should be perpetual: again than they have no adjuncts, than no causes, than God, ergo, they have their qualities. Again, it is a most sound, and sure argument that they are creatures, not God, because they are finite, ergo, have causes, ergo, are effects, ergo, have adjuncts.  
Object. But how are these joined to the soul? it hath two faculties; reason and will, now the faculties of the understanding are the intellectual virtues, when it can promptly, and readily perform its act, as when it is prompt and ready in inventing, than it is inteligentia, when it is prompt in seeking out truths, than it is sci●ntia, when it is ready in discoursing, than it is sapientia, etc. so that these intellectual virtues are habits of the faculty of reason, and lie in the promptness of its act: so by virtues he means moral virtue, not intellectual, and that is of the will. For when the will can promptly perform the act of bountifulness, or justice, than it is in like sort liberality, or justice, and so for the rest, and the contrary makes 〈◊〉 ergo, these are but adjuncts, quia praeter essentiam accident, that is, these come over, and above the essence. The soul is tanquam tabula abrasa, and these virtues come afterward.   

Corpus sanitatis, morbi, roboris, infirmitatis; pulchritudinis, deformitatis.  
The soul had his spiritual adjuncts, the body hath his proper adjuncts also, and this definition of his teacheth us to look at the proper adjuncts of things. So sanitas is a proper adjunct to the body, for there ariseth an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thence comes sanitas, and morbus: robur ariseth principally from the bones and sinews, beauty ariseth from the freshness of blood, and the analogy, and proportion of the parts, for if there be comely visage, and not blood, it is not beauty, we call it good favour, but not fair, but here it is opposed to deformity, and contains not only well favour, which stands in the symmetry of the parts one to another, which belongs to Physic, but colour which belongs to blood.   

Homo, subjectum est divitiarum, paupertatis, honoris, infamiae, vestitus, comitatus.  
Here homo hath his adjuncts general both to soul, and body; now here we see that subjects and adjuncts are not as the common Schools take them namely, only substances to be subjects, and accidents adjuncts: for accidents may be subjects, & contra, ergo, that distribution of ens into substantia, and accidens, will not follow in any Art, but here, and they a●e special kinds of subjects and adjuncts.   

Locus est subjectum rei locatae.  
Locus is a modus of subjectum, the Schools both ancient and of latter time have maintained locus to belong to natural Philosophy, because (say they) it ariseth from every thing in nature. Now first true it is, that there is nothing, but it is res naturalis, even reason, speech, quantity, etc. are res naturales, and it doth not therefore follow because it is res naturalis, ergo it belongs to nature, for it is a mere affection, and it is taken away, if we take away the locatum: and as causa may be no causa, effectum no effectum; so may locus be not locus. Again, cannot things in Art be in place, as well as things in nature? are not Angels finite and terminated? and locus, if we take it properly, is nothing but subjectum rei locatae: as in causa there was the thing causa, as it causeth: so there is locus as there is the thing receiving: as when I say such a one is in my chamber: here I consider my chamber not as it is in his building, but as it is receiving him. Again, if it should not be in Logic, it should rather be in Geometry than in Nature, for limitation of place is next and immediately from the limitation of quantity, and there we hear of locus, as there is repletio loci: locus here is put for the space of that place, by a metonimy of subject for the adjunct.   

Est subjectum.  
Here that which we heard of in adjuncts is res locata: because it doth apply that special kind of adjunct that answers to this subject locus. Now it is not essential to the thing, ergo is but complimental: again, that which is now in one place may remove to another place, ergo is not absolutely consenting to the thing: and thus we see it must needs belong to Logic, as being but in respect: they say only corpus is in loco descriptive, and not spirits, they are but in ubi, or in loco designatione: but what is this but a rule of Geometry? where we hear of completio loci by corpus: and therefore Aristotle brings locus to quantity. Then again they question whether the space that contains a thing be locus or no.  
Answ. Space belongs to nature, and is nothing but the measure that doth fill the place, and is nothing but that quadrangula sex complent locum, or a pint will receive a pint: and therefore to receive is to measure the space. I confess you may name it in Nature, but not define it.   

Sic Philosophi divinis entibus, licet parte, & magnitudine carentibus attribuunt locum.  
So the Philosophers give place to the intelligences, whereas he making them to move the heavens, saith they are on the superficies of them.   

Licet parte, & magnitudine carentibus.  
Here he speaks according to the common conceits in Schools, but I marvel how he or any other can say so. Scaliger saith, they are in divine predicament of quantity, but not in this gross predicament of quantity, and they have a figure. In what figure were Angels first created? An. In what figure was water first made? they can take any figure as water can; but I think they were first made in the figure of roundness. So Aristotle saith they were made as puncta. So is fire round, for that is figura capacissima, ergo, perfectissima. I have thought also that the Ark was made for all the world like a man, and there was the proportion of length proportionable to a man's breadth, and the height proportionable to a man's thickness. Now for the wanting of parts it is not so; for Angels may be divided, though their parts be simular: so are the elements parts; and as some writ, the wicked spirits may be struck, and so the Sun light; but it will too quickly return into itself: and as the light may be divided, so may they. And whereas they say, anima is tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte, they wrong God, and the creature, for what is the reason? God can have no parts, ergo no causes; other things whatsoever must needs have causes, ergo must have membra, ergo we cannot say they are all in every part. Yes, the reasonable soul is in my little finger? Content, but is that very portion of it that is in my head also in my little finger? There is a discontinuance, and the same thing should be here, and not there, which is flat contradiction: but God is not in this or that finger, but also between them. The Papists absurdity appears notably in this, in that they will have Christ's body to be really in the Sacrament in the bread, and in heaven also, and yet not in the air, but make a discontinuance: ergo it is in the bread, and not in the bread; in heaven, and not in heaven; for if it is in heaven, there it is shut up, and so in the bread.   

Sic Geometrae locum, locique differentias in rebus geometricis.  
That is, above, and below, angle, and base, etc.  
At prius ignotum ferro quum scindimus aequor, etc.  
Here he appoints several places to several things, and here locus is but subjectum, and they adjuncta.   

Sensilia sensuum, & res virtutibus, ac vitiis propositae, subjecta vitiorum, & virtutum hoc modo nominantur.  
Here are objecta, as the common Schools teach, because the sense is cast upon them: so virtues and vices; though they have their subjects themselves in one kind, yet here they are adjuncts, rebus virtutibus ac vitiis propositae. Now it is a fallace of non subjectum, when we give that to subjectum which is not subjectum. As Tully jested with Piso his little son, and said, who hath hanged my son to yonder sword?   

Ejusmodi subjecto Cicero 2. Agrar. disputat, inter Campanos nullam contentionem esse, qui nullus sit honour.  
Non gloriae cupiditate (ait) afferebantur, etc.  
Honour is the subject of ambition; the Campani had no honour among them, ergo no ambition: where there is no honour there is no ambition, but inter Campanos there is no honour, ergo no ambition. Here the proposition contains the subject, and adjunct, and by removing the subject, he removes the adjunct.   

Eodem argumento a Propertio dictum est.  
Navita de ventis, de tauris narrat Arator, etc.  
The Mariner he tells of the winds whereabout he is occupied, and vulnera are adjuncts to Soldiers; yet here as he talks of them he is adjunctum: and thus have we heard of the first compliment of a thing, namely, to be a subject, or to have a subject.    

CHAP. XI.  

De adjuncto.  
Adjunctum est, cui aliquid subjicitur: quod argumentum etsi subjecto est levius, attamen est copiosius & frequentius.  
NOw we come to adjuncts, which are after subjectum, and because subjectum and adjunctum have divers natures, ergo they must be taught distinctly, and in distinct Chapters; now therefore we come to adjunctum, which is the outmost thing, and it is called adjunctum, because it is adjoined to the thing, and it is put to another thing after it hath its being. Now there is nothing in the world, but may be a cause, an effect, a subject or adjunct; and therefore Logic is general of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: but in that he tells us, that it is but adjoined, he tells us that it doth agree but quodam modo, that is, conditionally; but many adjuncts be removed from their subjects, sigh their causes are in them.  
Answ. Sure there may be an alteration of them by the hindrance of the act of the form upon the matter, or the act externally. So the Adamant stone if we put but the juice of garlic upon it, it will not draw iron unto it. Again, the causes may be altered in the subject, ergo the adjunct may be removed, ergo it is but argumentum modo quodam consentaneum, and not absolute requisitum.   

Cui.  
Because any thing whatsoever may have the respect of an adjunct, as any thing may be a cause.   

Aliquid.  
That is, that that is propounded, or that which we are to argue, or that that is argued, so that that which the adjunct is adjoined to, is subjectum.   

subjicitur.  
Adjunctum doth presently tell me, that there is some thing cui aliquid adjungitur: he rather says subjicitur than adjungitur, because adjunctum hath reference to subjectum, and it is better to define them from the relation between them, than a comparatis; because relats are mutual causes one of another. Now here he shows that the adjunct is that that is builded upon the subject: and as the subject did presuppose a thing already made, but must support another thing; so adjunctum tells me it is a thing already made, but must lie upon the subject: subjectum signifies a supporter, or a suppository as it were: adjunctum, that is more common than subjectum, and subjectum lies always under; but adjunctum it may either lie over, or under, or be tacked to either side, yet it will fall off, unless it be nailed, or adjoined to the subject. Now that which tacks it to the subject is that affection which it hath to subjectum, every thing will not be an adjunct to every thing, nor every thing a subject to every thing. Solomon saith, if we bray a fool in a mortar, as wheat is brayed, he will not be wise: the reason is, for that his spirits are so dry, dull and earthy. Now wisdom hath so fine a hand, as that she cannot take hold of such hard things, but they will hurt it, so that it cannot be subjectum or adjunctum to any thing: and this shows that Logic is in the things in nature, and not in man's brain only. So this rule wils us to look how subjectum is able to support the adjunct, and when he sees how God hath done them for him, to use them to his turn. Again, this rule is of great use to see how things are tacked together in nature, so as the one being taken away the other will remain entire: then again, though the adjunct in nature cannot be severed from the subject, yet by my eye of Logic I can sever them.   

Quod argumento etsi sub: est levius, attamen est copiosius, & frequentius.  
Our Author doth commorari, and tells us with very good reason, that the adjunct is more light to press the subject than contra.  
Object. But this might have been before, if it be copiosius and frequentius; now he teacheth arguments according to their more strong manner of arguing; and subjectus is fortius, for because the causes of the adjuncts are in the subject, you may not therefore easily remove the subject, but you will destroy the adjunct, nor contra: yet some adjuncts may be taken away; and yet take away any adjunct, and there will be some imperfection in the thing: so that adjunctum will be levius, if we weigh them in a pair of balance: which appears many ways: as if Mr. Fanshaw be at London, his servants are there: this is more strong arguing than to say contra. Subjectum est fortius, because it is by nature before, and the adjunct is eatenus adjunctum, as it lies on the subject.   

Attamen est copiosius, & frequentius.  
For one adjunct can have but possibly one subject, but one subject may have an hundred adjuncts: now such a kind of copiousness or frequentity, doth not make the adjunct more general than the subject, in respect the subject is of more strength for the sustentation of the adjunct, than contra: and as it is more copius, so frequentius, that is, more often in common use, because it is of all arguments most familiar to men, even men unlearned: for the inmost thing is the efficient, than the matter, than the form, than the end, than the effect, than the subject, and lastly the adjunct, ergo because it is so plain as that a plain man may see, ergo it is frequentius.   

Itaque de ejusmodi signis ait Ovid 2. de remedio.  
He illustrates this by Ovid's testimony, which said as much, Forsitan haec aliquis, etc. meaning of signs: Sunt parva, because these are common qualities, which may be in divers things: so that one will not argue so strongly: multa juvant, that is where there is a concourse of many together, there is as it were a description, which argues strongly.   

Animi corporis que & totius hominis bona, & mala, quae dicuntur adjuncta sunt animi; corporis, hominis.  
As he hath showed before, anima, etc. to be subjects, so here he shows virtus, vitium, etc. to be adjuncts: now he takes them bona & mala, because there are tria genera honorum, namely, of the soul, of the body, and of man, so contra, tria genera malorum.   

Denique quic quam ulli subjecto extrinsecus accidit adjunctum ejus est.  
Again, here is another modus of adjunctum quicquid extrinsecus accidit, that is, comes unto it not as causes, effects, or subjects, but as it were adjoined to it accidentally, ergo he saith extrinsecus: for it was not our Author's mind that qualities were from within, though of necessity they must be.   

 ●utem locus est in subjectis, sic tempus est in adjunctis.  
That locus we heard of before was subjectum, and because it was a general affection, ergo it belongeth to Logic, and it was nothing but the application of a continet, to a contained: so time is nothing but the application of one thing to another thing; as when I say he came on monday, or at three of the clock, that is not time, but the adjunct of time: and here is the application of the course of primum mobile, or of the Clock to his act: it is duratio, the meeting of a thing. Time may well be compared to a line; and as fluxus punctum is linea, so fluxus nunc is tempus: he went in the turning of a hand, that is, whilst one might have turned his hand: so that I measure it by the durance, not by his length, or Geometry.   

Rei.  
For Logic is rei: and as causa is res, so tempus est res, or duratiorei, that is of the subject praesens, praeterita, & futura: here he doth distribute this time, to show that this distribution of time belongeth to Logic, and not to any other Art. Much descanting there is about time among other Logicians, which teach that it hath a double respect, one to the thing measured, and so it is properly time, another to the thing measuring, and that is not time, but as one is measuring it: now for the logical notion of time it is all one whether it be active or passive, and it is one and the same thing diversely respected, and because active and passive go always together, ergo, the time must needs be general to both; praeterita, praesens and futura. So for things that are subject to our Logic are divided into past, present and to come, for only God is not subject to time, because he is eternal, ergo is omne non esse ante post, neither can we say be is now if we respect time, for what should measure him, should primum mobile, or day and night? no, so that though he be at all times according to our Logic, yet he is with out respect of time at all times, for time is not eternal, ergo not omne non esse ante post. And Grammar, which is the garment of Logic, doth speak by the verb of time past, present, and to come; now we give it in Grammar to verbs, not but that it may be given to every thing, as well as to actions, and passions, but that we deliver it actively or passively.  
Again, primum mobile which God hath made a common globe to all the world, and is measured according to praeterita, praesens, and futura, ergo, time is in every thing, and Angels, and men's souls are without respect of primum mobile, and day and night: because they are beyond them, but they are not without duration passive, because they were made creatures by God: so that though their tempus be called avum, yet is it this tempus.  
Object. May praeteritum being past be said to be? no, if we respect pr●sens, for they are as we see here distinct things, but if we respect the thing, it is, yet not in time, but in its essence: how in it essence? not as it doth existere in rerum natura, but as it is in a rule, that is external: so that though Socrates now be not, yet this axiom Socrates est homo is now, and will be to the world's end: so praeteritum, praesens, and futurum all of them are, for we do not respect the adsignification of time, but look at the argument as it is a being: so that time future is a true thing, though the time be not yet come: and that duratio past, present, and to come are, because the thing still is: so that time is an adjunct. But here as locus must be a thing with that affection of receiving, so time must be a thing with this affection of measuring,   

Omninoque qualitates subjectis praeter causas adiunctae, etc.  
Again, another modus of adiunctum is called qualitates, which is adjoined to this, or that, not being causes, here comes in their predicament of qualitas, and qualitas is no genus of any thing, ergo, that distinction of qualitas to be naturalis, or moralis is not at all, but a special use of a thing that is taught in a general Art, for qualitas is but a logical term, and as adiunctum is genus to them, so is qualitas. Every example is infima species in Logic: so that calor is an adjunct to fire, and when I have said so, I have considered the logical respect, and no more.   

Praeter causas.  
We have heard that there can be nothing but must have causes: and so the existere of a thing is from the esses that the causes give, and then the adjuncts come over, and above the thing. Now qualities are of two sorts, proper and common, these are but special modi of these qualities: they may be proper, because they argue at proper, common because they argue at common, or at random, as we say. Now whatsoever hath affection to argue, that belongs to Logic, ergo, these, because they have affection to argue, rather as modi, that as adjuncts; as modi efficientis before. So therefore they are distinguished thus So risus doth argue homo, not so much in regard of his adiunctity as of its property. Now qualitates propriae have these properties with them, conveniunt they come together with the subject, and are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the whole, and afterward with the parts, ergo, he says well conveniunt.   

Omni.  
This is somewhat hard, for omni non dicitur de uno, aut de duobus, but tria simul omnia, that is, three will make an omne; and our Author teacheth in judgement, that a special axiom is quando consequens non omni, and there it may be of one or two: but here it must be taken more general for one or two, etc. but because the Schools thought properties convenire omni speciei only, and thought that individua had no properties, as they also thought that forma was only speciebus, and individua were distinguished accidentibus. But our Logic teacheth that every thing hath a form, and therefore hath properties, for commonly properties arise from the form, ergo, he saith, conveniunt omni, whether it be omni speciei, omni individuo.   

Soli.  
Soli shuts out all others, else it is not a property.   

Semper.  
So that if they agree omni, and non soli, or soli and non omni, or omni and soli, sed non semper, semper sed non omni & soli, they are no properties, ergo, a property doth argue with this virtue, that it argues omni, soli, and semper; and so it is meet, because they will come into Art, and will make a rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for this it is, every Art ought to deliver the causes, qualities, and act of a thing; for so there is in nature first the thing, than the qualities, or faculties, than the act which points out the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so that if one would make an Art of homo that part of natural Philosophy, he must speak of risus, because he doth some thing in nature by virtue of that quality: so heat, and cold, first agree to elementum calidum and frigidum, and afterwards to the species, not by the immediate acts of their forms upon their matter, but by the common acts of fire, and agree to produce heat, and water and earth to produce cold.   

 homini risus aequo hinnitus, cani latratus, etc.  
He means the faculty, not the act: so neighing to a Horse: every beast hath his peculiar voice though we cannot discern it so well. Common adjuncts are such as agree to that which is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but is first in the parts, and then in the general, as learning first agrees to Socrates, Plato, etc. and then to man, and this is the difference between proper and common adjuncts, the proper adjuncts agree first to the generals, and then to the singulars. The common agree first to the singulars, and then to the generals.   

Hoc genere argumenti Faunium Chaeriam, Cicero pro Roscio Comaedo cavillatur. Nun ipsum caput, & supercilia illa penitus abrasa, etc.  
He had not an hair, for he shaved them off, ergo, he reasons from thence, that he was a knave, and it may be true, because they are hot headed that are bald, this is a new modus, and he reasons from signs, which are common qualities, they do not agree omni, soli, and semper, and yet a knave doth omni soli, and semper commonly.   

Sic Martialis 2. lib. Zoilum ludit. Crine ruber, niger over, brevis pede, lumine luscus, etc.  
The cause of these not making a good man is this, the cause of a red head is colour, ergo, there is much heat, and where there is much heat there will be much fancy, and where there is much fancy, there will be much juggling. Niger over that comes from melancholy, that lies in the muscles about the mouth; brevis pede, that may have some reason with it, for such a one will go apace; lumine luseus, for when a man thinks he looks on him than he looks asquint, and when one would think he looks asquint, than he looks on him.   

Siv vestitus, & comitatus res adiunctae sunt, quo circumstantiae genere Dido, etc.  
Oecan●m intera surgens aurorarelinquit etc.  
So that not only accidents, but substances may be adjuncts; a man may be an adjunct as he is a servant. So Dido going a hunting is argued first from the time a●rora, than the attendance of young men, than their hunting instruments, etc.   

Est vero adi●nctorum ad subiecta quibus occupantur usus item magnus.  
There is another kind of adjunct, which are occupantia, as we heard before of subicta occupata. So Plato proves that those Cities are miserable, which want Physicians, and Judges, quia multa quoque & int●mperantiam, & iniustitiam in ea civitate versari necesse est.   

Sed consentaneorum categoria sic est, unde quidvis alteri consentane●m vel id●m, vel un●m di●i possit.  
We have now seen both what goes to the esse, and bene esse of a thing; now he calls it categoria the arguing, categeria signifies to plead against, and they that gave it that name first to argue, did discern truth by the contrary, which is borrowed from the Lawyers: and we know when we would see a thing, that if we take the contrary, it will make it magis illucescere: afterward it came to signify not that gainsaying one of another, but one man's pleading alone for his client, than it came to signify the arguments that he used in his speech for his client: and lastly, it came to signify any argument, and thence comes argumentum, the predicaments are called so, namely categoria, and so Ramus would have us consider every argument to be a predicament.   

Id●m vel unum.  
Moreover he doth commorari a while telling us that id m and unum, as the Aristotelians teach are nothing but these consentanie arguments: so id m genere doth arise from idem causa: so gemelli are idem tempore, that is adiuncto: so all modi of theirs arise from hence tanqu●m a primis, & simplicibus fontibus. We shall hear of idem genere, and idem specie, and idem i●divid●o, as if he should say, but all of them, huc sunt tanquam ad primos, & simplices fontes referendi.    

CHAP. XII.  

De diversis. Argumentum primum consentaneum expositum est, etc.  
WE have heard of consentaneum, and why he should put in primum rather than simplex I see not, for if he meant to have repeated them, he should have put in all, ergo primum would be put out, now the use of a transition is to hang things together, when the one part is newly gone before, as it were half forgotten, than we must have an imperfect transition, otherwise a perfect one: this method observed for memories sake: now it remains that we consider what the thing is not, and thus we go orderly to work. Before, we saw what went to a thing, for the making of it up: now we cannot well see what a thing is not, till we see what it is, for nonens is seen gratiaentis: now this respect ariseth not by way of argument: but by seeing what it was.   

Dissentaneum sequitur.  
This is opposite to consentaneum: sentio is general to them both, seutire is taken for intelligere, consentire is said of things that have the same judgement, mind and reason; dissentanies are of them that have not the same judgement, ergo, seem to have no reason in them in respect of consentanies, ergo, Aristotle denied diss●ntanie arguments and made them follow. Sequitur, ergo, it is by nature after, secondly, it is next to consentanies because they are simple arguments.   

Quod a re dissentis.  
That differs from the thing it argues, are still general: so that because the creatures of God are discreet, and many, ergo, there is dissension, and because reason was made to behold the creatures of God, ergo, it was necessary that they should be handled in Logic.   

Sunt autem dissentanea.  
Here he calls them dissentanea in the plural number, for that which was res before, is become dissentaneum, as it hath a dissentany to argue it, secondly, because here dissension agrees to them both as they are compared together.   

Aeque manifesta  
Hear dissentanies are made paria, arguing equally for manifestation, qua aequa manifesta, ergo, this property contains thus much, that one dissentanie is not before another, for the manifesting of it, as causa was before effectum, etc. Is not invention before judgement, and they are opposite? Ans. True for doctrine, but invention doth not clear judgement more, nor contra.   

Alterumque ab altero aequaliter arguitur.  
As there was not a priority, and posteriority, so they have equal force to argue, contrary to consentanies; so that manifestation is for the clearing of them, and arguing because they have the same doctrine, but than what use of them.   

Tame● si sua dissensione, clarius elucescant.  
Here it is, why they come principally into Logic, as black is not so black till it be set by white, etc. magis carendo quam fruendo, we see things, for when we have a thing, and see not the privation of it, we make not much reckoning of it, sua dissentione, this is a discretion from the other properties: so than we see why a contrary makes a contrary most clear, namely this, ergo, when we would show a thing that is obscure, we show it by a contrary, quia sua dissentione clarius elucescant.  
Hitherto of the properties, which would not be in consentanies, for one was more manifest, ergo, before another, and more strongly arguing. Dissentanea in the plural number, because one argument serves for them both, ergo, one name, and because they a●e equally manifest: again, to set one before another is to say it is stronger than the other. Again, they would not be aeque manifesta.   

Sunt diversa, vel opp●sita.  
We are to look at the dissension of things, now there is a more weak and a more strong dissension, the one turn but a little aside, others turn clean back, and are foes, ergo, accordingly doth he divide these: now remember it is ens, as ens that Logic considers, and many times it falls out, that one thing might be taken for another, but for diversity, and commonly our distinctions are diversa. Diversa is a more light dissension, and opposites contain them: so that diversa will give great light to opposita, but not contra, ergo, diversa are before. Diversa a divertendo, of turning a side, because they agree one with another commonly in dissension, only they divert a little the one from the other, and this is it that the name commends unto us: they may agree in nature, but are made to divert ratione, ratio we know belongs to Logic, and it is the same with argumentum: so that he means they differ but only in some logical respect: they are the subtlest of all arguments, because of their little dissension. Sola ratione, ergo, they do not of necessity make a denied axiom:   

Quo de genere sunt illa frequentissima. Non hoc sed illud: quanquam, tamen.  
This is not a rule of Art but a commoration, as if he should say, these arguments have not been in Schools before, but I have observed them by my experience, and then again they are subtle, ergo, I will help you, when you find, ergo, these notes commonly commend unto you diversa: so forma, and facundia are made to disagree in their adjunctive nature in respect of Ulysses: so that they differ not in their nature, but only in logical respect, as if he should say they may both be adjuncts to one subject, but yet differ in Ulysses.  
Priamus was ready to perish, and yet withheld not his hands, a man perishing should hold his hands, but Priamus did not: so that causa, and effectum which might consent are here diversa, not in respect of Priamus, but of themselves.   

Paula secus in Eunucho.  
He means there is a difference of modus. Suppose I be worthy of this reproach, yet thou shouldest not tell me of it, here is subjectum and adjunctum, the diversity is in respect of the cause, they are diversa in respect of him that offered it.   

Item alia aliusmodi.  
Scelus tu illud vocas Tubero. Here is a little difference too, this fact was called scelus by Tubero, Tully tells him, others gave it other names, alii enim errorem appellant, alii timorem, etc. but no man besides thee call it scelus. Here these names are made divers in respect of him that called it scelus: as if he should say, call it any of the rest, but call it not scelus, and thus we have heard diversa. If I say though he be rich or poor, yet he is honest here is a diversity, for so a discreet axiom may be affirmed: they are divers, because riches commonly make unhonest, and also poverty: so we may make diversity between the cause and effect, or in giving many causes to one effect, aut contra, or one subject to an adjunct, aut contra, or many subjects to one adjunct, aut contra, and according to these ways also, there may be several modi thereof.    

CHAP. XIII.  

De disperatis. Opposita sunt dissentanea, que ratione, & re dissentiunt.  
IN looking at things we first see the causes that give esse, than the compliments, that give been esse to the thing, than we see what it is not, and easily do by seeing them arguments that give esse: and first we are to see the diversity, which though they be conformable, yet they do divert somewhat one from another, and they are first, because they give light to all the rest that follow. Now we come to see their opposition, that is, those things which have their causes, effects, subjects and adjuncts, are not only dissenting in a logical respect, but are distinct reals. Opposita, gain sets, it cometh of ob and pono, as it were set against: ob is as it were a bolt to bar one thing from another: so that their nature is to be barred, not only ratione, but it is principally in their realty, and herein do diversa differ from opposites. Diversa are made to disagree in that wherein they might agree, whereas opposites descent in their nature.   

Sunt dissentanea.  
We heard they were called dissentanea by reason of their disagreeing, they do not sentire idem, but quot capita, tot sensus sunt among them, whereas consentanies are of the same judgement, and these names do well fit arguments, because they are as it were the senses of things. Dissentanea that is, such as think asunder, are severed, and distract our thoughts.   

Que ratione, & re dissentiunt.  
Ratione, that is, as diversa did, because they do not only disagree quatenus argumenta, that is, as they have logical respect in them, but quatenus they are res, as black is not white, they are opposites, and there is a bar that black cannot be white, & contra, which opposition is in their dissension, being clean of another judgement: so that there is dissension betwixt them in sensu nostro in beholding of them.   

Re.  
As if we say black is not white, we say not only, that black is not the cause, not the effect, subject, or adjunct of white, but that they are divers things in nature, ergo, this must be observed, that the bar is not only the bar of rational respect, but of reality.   

Itaque eidem attribui secundum idem, & ad idem, etc.  
Surely if they be barred from coming one at another, and that in nature, then non possunt eidem attribui. As first when I say blackness is not whiteness: and again when as I say blackness and whiteness cannot be given to the same subject: here the one dissension is in essence, the other is in accident, ergo this idem must be understood of the essence itself, and likewise the subject. Non possunt takes away all possibility of joining in one, ergo, whatsoever make● them consent, breaks this rule, for whereas this rule saith, sunt dissentanea, they make them consentanea, and again, whereas this rule saith, non possunt eidem attribui, they say, they may.   

Attribui.  
The attribute is always the consequent part of the axiom: so that if we give them to subjects, they cannot be given to one and the same subject: they may be the consequent, but not the antecedent part: so that contraries must be attributed, for when I say homo est animal, aut brutum, I give them both to animal, but not eidem. Now antecedent contraries will have contrary consequents, est enim par ratio, now they do dissentire ratione, & re, ergo, cannot any ways be consentanies, ergo, cannot be made by any means to agree.   

Secundum idem.  
According to the same, divers think this is put in in respect of relates, because of the example that follows, pater & filius ejusdem: but it hath a more general respect of opposites in their whole nature: else it should have been taught more specially in the doctrine of relates. Now two contraries may be given eidem, but not secundum idem, & adidem, & eodem tempore: eidem, that is, eidem genere, not eidem specie, as a man may be well, and a man may be sick, but not the same man: so that secundum idem hath respect to the same individuality as it were, or species: so homo may be aeger and sanus, but not secundum idem, for that identity cannot be: now ratio is given homini secundum idem, for herein omnis homo est idem, & ad idem, still there is idem, for if we consider them not about idem, they are not opposites: then again there must be the same respect: and also ad idem, that is the very same point, for whiteness in the wall, and whiteness in my hand, are neither attributed eidem, nor secundum idem; eodem tempore; for if they be diversis temporibus, than they may both agree eidem, as homo nunc sedens potest deinceps ambulare: so all these respects came from being dissentanea ratione, & re: so that all these must be respected: so that black and white in general are not opposites, but as they are considered in their dissenting and opposite nature: so that this is the true nature of opposites. If ex indocto fit doctus, here is a difference of time, and by this rule we may answer almost all the fallations that are made: that fallation a divisione is from hence, therefore this is a consecution from the definition going before, and principally from the word re. Sic Socrates albus & after eadem parte esse non potest.   

Itaque ex altero affirmato alterum negatur, & e contra.  
Et e contra follows from hence, for Ramus left it in his edition, and if econtra be not put in, the rule is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for if we have an example where ex altero negato alterum affirmatur, that hath otherwise no rule here, ergo we must say & e contra, for they that leave it out, as most have done since Ramus, here is their mistaking, because they think it is not a necessary consecution, but contingent. Now Ramus doth not teach us consecution that belongs to syllogisms, but arguments use, & if it be but contingently true, yet it may belong to Logic, as well, as if it were necessary: and it is very common in speech to say, it is not this, or that, but another thing: again the meaning of these two is this, ex altero affirmato alterum negatur, that is, they both cannot be affirmed, for he teacheth invention here, and not judgement, & e contra, that is, they cannot be both denied. They may be both denied, as a stone is not virtuous or vicious, are these opposites? yes by our rule, if & e contra be left out, but here they are neither of them attributed: so that I do not mean negation in an axiom, but the not giving of them to a thing, if both arguments be denied, they may be paria, as when I say, if it be not Thomas, it is not William, as if I should say, it is as much reason it should not be Thomas, as not William: so also if both be affirmed they may be paria, as when I say it may be Thomas as well as William, for all is one for that, and thus we must look at all these consectaries, because most fallaces are from hence, and they are very subtle.   

Opposita sunt disparata, aut contraia.  
They are of two sorts, that are barred disparates, that is unmatchable, or contraries such as are directly set one against the other, now the disparates are when the sides are not matching one another, for there is more against one, ne Hercules quidem contra duos, ergo, here the fight is not so violent, but the duellio is more strong, so that according to this opposition of things in nature must our Logic proceed.   

Disparata sunt opposita.  
Disparata are first because they will give light to the stronger dissension, as being contained in it: these destroy one another, but not with that violence and force that contraries do, they are called disparata, because here is impar congressus, and they are unmatchable: but contraries are well matched striking down right blows, whereas disparates steal one behind another. Sunt opposita, that is, dissenting re & ratione.   

Quorum unum mult is pariter opponitur.  
Here first unum opponitur multis, and then par opponitur to every one of them, and not unum uni: now that we may see it more throughly, this it is, whereas a thing is said not to be another thing, with the same reason that it may be said not to be a third, or a fourth, etc. that is, unum multis, and again opposed together, and that we may see this more particularly, here is the reason disparates are always under some more remote genus, whereas contraries will come under one next head, be it genus or what it will be, and that is the reason why they are unum multis, and pariter.  
Object. Why doth he say unum mult is rather than multa multis? for sometimes there are multa multis.  
Answ. First, because when there are multa multis, there is one more especially opposed to all the rest, than any of the other, ergo, he saith unum multis: secondly, because where there are multa multis, there is unum multis: thirdly, because in use we find unum opposed multis more frequent than multa multis. Homo is opposed to brutum as unum uni, but to Leo, and equus, as unum multis; again, he is opposed to brutum as Leo, and equus, as unum multis, but not pariter, Pariter alike, that is, there is not another kind of argument, when homo is opposed to Leo, then when he is opposed to equus, and here we may see that if opposites be only of two branches, then are they not disparates: then again, if they be of two sides only then are they contraries, ergo, if there be any distribution in Art where the parts are not opposed one to one, there will be a genus lost.   

Vnum multis.  
He doth not mean always in use, as if one disparate might not argue another, but he means as they are in nature, ut viridum, cinereum, rubrum, etc. are disparates.  
Quae singula extremis, & inter se disparata sunt.  
For colour is simplex, aut mistus, simplex is white and black, mistus the other colours, so that these come not under the next genus, sic liberalitas, & avaritia inter se disparantur: because prodigality may be where these are not, habit is virtue, or vice, virtue is this, or that, or liberality: vice is avaritia, or prodigalitas, so that these are unum multis, that is, not having one next genus, but a more remote genus of opposites, and avaritia, and prodigalitas are opposite in vice to liberality, and here is many to one, and a like.   

Virgilius 1. Aeneidos. O quam te memorem virgo: namque haud tibi vultus, etc.  
She is a Goddess, or a Virgin, she might have been a third, but he looks not at that. Not a woman, for she had not the countenance of a woman: again not a woman, for nec vox hominem sonat: ergo, Dea, and thus we see how one thing is not another.    

CHAP. XIV.  

De relatis. Contraria sunt opposita, quorum unum uni tantum opponitur.  
WE have heard of a thing in his essence, and in his compliments, and so also we have seen it is not, for that if it be declining but in a respect, it is a divers; if it decline re, than it is an opposite: a divers when it is considered with another thing in agreement, yet still severed in respect: and again when one thing is not another, by common opposition, that it makes with another, that is a disparate: then again it is a contrary by some peculiar nature in him directly against some other thing: so in a man we consider his causes, flesh, nerves, sinews, bones, etc. then his compliments, than we respect him as one diverting, or turning a side from another thing: then we look at his common nature whereby he is opposed to many things at once in the same nature, and so he is a disparate: a divers he is, as when I say, though a man was there, yet his horse was there also: again there is that whereunto he is opposed directly, as he is not brutum: and so he is a contrary. Now though there was not in one thing any thing to make it more plain, yet set them together, and the one will make the other more manifest, therefore this opposition is either where one fighteth against many; and these are disparates, or where the fight is more strong, and those are called contraries.  
Contraria, by reason here is but one to one, ergo these stand contra, that is face to face, when one did fight with many, some stood aside, some behind, but these face one another, so that if the one turn away, the other will turn to him again. Sunt opposita, that is, they have bars in their nature, namely ratio and res.   

Quorum unum uni tantum opponitur.  
So that this battle is a duellio, a battle of one against one, and so they fight, that the one things force is benr only against the force of the other thing. Vnum uni tantum, for disparates may be unum uni, but not tantum, unum uni because they come to communicate in one next nature, as homo and brutum in animal; or else the one so denies the other, that it takes away the entity of the thing affirmed. Vni; but we shall hear afterward that contraria negantia are nothing in themselves.  
Answ. They are something gratia entis, and our reason gives something to it, and apprehends it as some thing in respect of the contrary, and here we may see the force of our reason that can make of nothing something. Now something is made of nothing divers ways, first by our reason, secondly, by our fancy, or by the hallusination of the eye. Logic makes only two kinds of nothings, the contradicent, and the privant. Homo is a contrary to brutum, but to Leo and equus he is a disparate, because 〈◊〉 is opposed to equus in the same nature that he is opposed to Leo.   

Contraria sunt affirmantia, vel negantia.  
This distribution of contraries runs on, as the former did, for as the least dissension began first: so we still proceed to the greater: now by affirmantia and negantia, he means things positive, or privative, for there is either a thing opposed to a thing, or a thing opposed to nothing, and the fight between something and nothing is stronger than the former: for when one thing fights with another thing, then let them fight as long as they will, or can, yet they leave something behind them, but the other leaves nothing at all: so that contraries are where both are things in nature, or where the one is nothing, and are called negantia of the later part: as the other are called of both parts affirmantio.  
Affirmantia, as if he should say, they are things in nature, or things positive, as a Father, a child, etc.   

Affirmantia quorum utrumque affirmat, etc.  
He doth not say affirmatur, but affirmat, because he would willingly describe them from their act, for he would deliver the nature of the arguments, ut relata & adversa. There is likewise among these a difference of contrariety, for there are some affirmantia that may be reconciled, and ●●●e to agree, there be some also that will 〈…〉 ●gree, but perpetuo adversantur. The 〈◊〉 if you set them face to face will be 〈…〉 ●riends, but set them back to back, and 〈…〉 be foes: but set them adversa how you 〈◊〉, and they will be foes: so than relates have not so strong a fight betwixt them as adversa. Now they are called relates by reason of a certain reference they have one to another continually, yea indeed they are by reason of their reference, for the causes of the one relate are in his correlate, for the cause of the father's relation is not in him, but he receives his whole relative being from the correlate: so that in Divinity we know there is nothing added to the Godhead by giving to it the persons mutually. Sunt contra, here is one to one, for though a father have many children, yet the relation is but one, namely, betwixt fatherhood, and son-hood; and though many stand on the one side, yet there is but one relation: so in the high mystery of the Trinity, there is a double relation, first between the Father, and the Son; secondly between the Father and the Son on the one side, and the holy Ghost on the other side. So when I say Aristotle est discipulus Platonis, these are relates, yet when I say Aristotle est discipulus, this is subjectum and adjunctum: so cousin and cousin are relates, if we respect the relative quality, and not the men. Now that term of relates is used confusedly, as we say he is his father, meaning his procreant cause, quorum alterum constat.   

Quorum alterum constat e mutua, etc.  
Constare is to stand together of causes, e mutua alterius affectione, so that these relates have not their causes from the thing in whom they are, but from their correlates: as when I define a husband to be him that hath a wife, or a wife to be her that hath a husband; these are definitions e relatis, and so e causis. But what causes do relates contain? all the causes, both efficient, matter, form and end. E mutua, e is a sign of the effect, quod e causis existit: so that this is their nature.   

Atque inde nominande sunt relata.  
They are called relates in regard of the reference they have one to another: so that we may here see what relates are, and how they belong hither: they that think all arguments are relates, why they are so, as the cause, and effect, etc. but so I cannot call them species of argumentum consentaneum, for here they are examples, ergo, lowest of all. Again, if I say argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale, and so go on, thinking that all these are genera to causa and effectum, I deceive myself as they are relates; but if all arguments should be relates, as the arguments are taught in Logic, than all the examples of all arguments should be relates, as God, and the world: but when I make them relates, I analyse Logic even as I make the definition of Dialectica an example of definitio, so that (as I say) if relation were a common affection to all arguments, all examples also should be relates, which they are not; again, if causa and effectum were relates, than they must be together, for relates must be simul natura, ergo, this is fallacia accidentis, they thought the words of Art (as they call them) were relates, ergo, the doctrine of relates must go generally with all arguments. We know again that the causes, efficient, matter, form, and end, and the effect are distinct things, and do not constare e mutua alterius affectione, ergo, are not relates: again, causa est cujus vi res est, and the effect quod e causis existit. Now each relate contains the efficient, matter, form and end of his fellow, ergo, if they should be taught generally, then in the efficient alone, in the matter alone, in the form alone, and in the end alone there should be all the causes. Some would have relates taught as consentanie arguments, because they do agree; it is true, but they do disagree also, and if they should be taught in consentanies, their dissentio also should be taught there, or else they should make a double doctrine of one thing, and this kind of teaching had been a posteriore; again, where should they have been taught? they are mutual causes, ergo, not causa and effectum, but both causes and effects: again, the doctrine of causa efficiens, materia, forma, and finis are distinct: here they are confounded together in one. Now the Aristotelians have a predicament of relates, and have also their series, but their gradus of them will not stand, for relates have no species, but are lowest save only examples: and they go clean out, and say relates are of this nature, or that nature, as if they should say relates whose species are in this Art, or in that Art. As in Oeconomie in a family they are free, or bound, free husband, and wife, bound children, and servants, etc. but now the husband and wife are not relates, because the bound, and free are relates: all these are special examples of relates containing nothing under them, so that relates cannot possibly be a predicament according to their own doctrine, no more than causa and effectum, and by that course that they take, I can prove that Socrates est genus in going backward, and saying he is substantia, he is genus, etc. Now because the whole relation stands in their mutual causation, for that cause they are called relates.   

 pater qui filium habet, etc.  
So we say, is he such a man's son? here is a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, son put for man; when I say Paul is a servant of Christ, here I mean Paul's calling: servant hath a double respect in it, one as it is in Oeconomy, another as it hath logical relation, which we may see thus, for if he be Christ's servant, than Christ is his master.   

Relata dicuntur simul esse natura.  
The reason stands in this, the whole being of the one relate is contained in the other, ergo, they are simul, for if they be mutual causes, they must be mutual effects, ergo, as one is the cause, so the other is the effect, & contra, ergo, they must be simul.   

Natura.  
Because their nature springs from them mutually, for nature is arising from causes, here we may see in the Trinity, that one person is not before another, there is no respect of priority, or posteriority in the rest of contraries, because there is no force of arguing from thence, we heard before that all of them were aeque manifesta, that is, aeque intelligibi●ia, and not as consentanies, where the cause cleareth the effect more, then contra, because the causes are more simple and single: so likewise the subject is not beholding to the adjunct, but contra; again, the ●ause and subject did more argue the effect, and adjunct, than contra Again, from hence it is, that qui alterum perfecte norit, norit & reliquum, for they are mutual causes, and our scientia est e causis.   

Pro Marcello.  
Ex quo profecto intelligis, quanta in dato beneficio sit laus, cum in accepto tanta sit gloria. Dare and accipere be relates, as if he should say, if it be glorious to receive, than it is much more glorious to give; now his principal dri●t of arguing is a minore, but yet the arguments are relates: so that a thing is not given till it be received; and again he that knows the one knows the other.  
Tum serum sis t● genitum, blandeque fateris,  
Cum dicis dominum, Sosibiane, patrem.  
Sosibian is a servant to his father, because he is his master.   

Sic portorum Rhodiis locare honestum est, & Her macreonti conducere.  
If it be honest to let out, than it is honest to hire, for they are mutual causes, and in usury I think both taking on usury, and letting out to usury are unlawful, by reason of this relation, as Jeremy speaks. So discere and docere be relates,  
Jamilla (inquit) matura uxor generi, noverca, filii, filiae, pellex.  
Here he playeth with the names: and indeed all names of kindreds are relates.  
Ovid 1. Metamorphosios.  
— Non hospes ab hospite tutus.  
Non socer a gener●, fratrum quoque gratia rara est, etc.   

Atque argumentum talis relationis contrarium nihil habet, etc.  
Indeed here is no contrariety in these examples, neither consention in that respect, but they are paria: happily he could find no example of them in their disagreeing nature, and so would here commend unto us their use to be more often in the consentany affection, then in their dissentany nature, as when we say, how could that be, why he was his son.    

CHAP. XV.  

De adversis.  
Adversa sunt contraria affirmantia, quae inter se vel●ti e regione perpetuo adversantur.  
WE have heard what a thing is, that is, what goes to the being, and what to the well-being of it: and how thereby it dissenteth from other things by a diversity, or opposition: diverse might consent between themselves, but they are made to divert one from another. Again, for opposition it is re & ratione dissenting either by a disparate nature, or by a contrary nature.  
Contraries are either of one thing to another thing, or of one thing to nothing, the former kind also is of things that might agree, or of them that will never be at peace: now therefore we come to adversa, and these have their name of turning not aside as diversa, or as one to many as disparates, neither as relates, which have a double aspect, a conjunct aspect being set face to face, and an opposite aspect being set back to back. But adversa are in an oppsite aspect; hence a line drawn from the point of the one aspect through the centre, to the point of the other aspect will be a right line: so that here is no peace, they are overthwart neighbours continually. Sunt contraria, contraries were opposed one to one, so that a thing is not an adverse, but as it is opposed to some other thing.   

Sunt affirmantia.  
That is, they are things positive, whereof the one thing is not nothing, but both are something.  
Contraria quorum utrumque affirmat sunt affirmantia, id est vere entia:  
At haec contraria hujusmodi sunt,  
Ergo, adversa sunt contraria affirmantia.   

Adversantur.  
That is, according to their nature set one against another, by a right line.   

Perpetuo.  
2. Relates might be friends, though they would be foes, but adversa can never be reconciled: this dissension of adversa doth arise from a particular form; for homo is adverse to brutum, as brutum is animale irrationale, and as man is animale rationale, and these can never be reconciled, and every thing hath his contrary, though we cannot see by reason of the forms subtlety; for contrarieties arise from the forms.   

Inter se.  
This showeth that contraries are not opposite but when they are set one against another, as blackness in a shoe is not opposite to whiteness in a band.   

Veluti e regione.  
As if he should say, if one stand here or there, the other will face him, and if the one remove, the other also will remove: so that they are two overthwart neighbours directly opposed one to another continually. Disparates were behind one another, or on the one side one of another, never before one another. Relates also might be friends, but these will always be foes. In that he saith veluti e regione, he showeth that they differ from disparates, and perpetuo showeth that they differ from relates.   

Virgilius Aeneidos 11.  
Nulla salus bello: pacem te poscimus omnes.  
Salus and bellum are adversa.  
Sic albor & niger, calidum & frigidum, virtus & vitium opponuntur. Indeed we make them things, though their original be defects, for vice is sin, and we consider it as it acteth, and so it is ens.   

Paradox 2. contra Epicureos.  
Illud tamen arcte tenent, accurate que defendunt, voluptatem esse summum bonum, etc.  
Here he reasons that pleasure cannot be the goodness of a man, because it is the goodness of a beast; and man and beast are contraries.   

Sic libertas & servetus, apud Tibullum 2. lib. Sic mihi servitium video: dominamque paratam:  
Tu mihi libertas illa.  
Now I see bondage shall befall me, ergo, far well liberty.   

Pro Marcello.  
Nunquam enim temeritas cum sapientia commiscetur, nec ad consilium casus addmittitur.  
He makes temeritas and sapientia, adversa; consilium and casus contraries, but indeed they are disperates, for temeritas is a special kind of modus efficiendi, namely necessitate, aut fortuna, and consilium belongs to causa natura, aut consilio, so that they are not under one next genus.    

CHAP. VI  

De contradicentibus.  
Contraria negantia sunt, quorum alterum ait, alterum negat idem, eaque sunt contradicentia, aut privantia: contradicentia sunt contraria negantia, quorum alterum negat ubique, etc.  
WE have heard what a thing is, we have also heard that a thing is not this or that, as a divers, or as an opposite: as an opposite either by a general nature, which are disparates, or by a more particular nature, which are contraries: we have heard that one thing is opposed to one thing, or one thing is opposed to nothing; one thing is opposed to one thing, either as a relate, or in adversa: now we come to show how a thing being from his causes, is not a nothing.   

Contraria.  
Where there was a fight of one to one.   

Negantia.  
Here one of them is nothing, ergo, it cannot properly be said that here is one to one; yet our Logic here makes nothing something, per oppositum ens, and in very deed it is requisite that ens being from his causes, that it should not be another thing, so it should not be nothing. Negantia, not that he speaks here of the negation, that we shall hear of afterward in an axiom, but he means a not being. Ramus had not a better word, ergo, he keeps this delivering it in the active voice, desiring to commend to us the act, or arguing, or the faculty whereby arguments do act. Now nothing gives name to contradicentia, of contra, and dicens, because the affirmer: that that is a thing we have heard of before, it is common to affirmantia, ergo, because that is it which is only special: here he means them by the negative part.   

Sunt.  
For as there is a something so there must be a nothing; because every thing that is, (except ens primum) as it was not once, so may it not be again.   

Quorum alterum ait, alterum negat idem.  
That is, the one is a thing in rerum natura: alterum negat, that is, the other is not a thing in rerum natura. He hath not better words to utter them to the act of our understanding, ergo, borrows these words, ait, negat, which are a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject; but remove the Rhetoric, and you shall see what he means.   

Idem.  
For it is by oppositum ens, that non ens is ens: and it is by reason of nothings contradicent, that nothing is an argument. Here we see the force of reason, that maketh non ens to be ens, but it is by oppositum ens only: so that if there were not an idem, they were not contraries, no not opposites.  
Object. But might it not have been left out, being taught generally before?  
Answ. No: there must be a denial of the same thing, for the whole entity that we give to a negant, is per oppositum ens, ergo, it must have reference to idem.   

Sunt contradicentia, aut privantia.  
As the consentanies proceeded from causes to effects, and so to subjects and adjuncts: so do dissentanies disagree less or more. The less dissenting arguments must go before, because they are common to the other, and are contained in them: now opposites are not this or that, by a lesser or a more earnest opposition; contraries are of one thing to another, or of one thing to nothing; and here is a sharper contention: and again, among these the contradicent, though it take away the same thing ubique, yet it leaves something in room of it. Sunt contraria negantia, which we heard before.   

Quorum alterum negat ubique.  
Quorum alterum, namely the denied; negat ubique, that is in every subject, and puts another thing in room thereof, as visus, non visus, non visus denies visus in my eye, hand and foot, and in every part of my body, yet it doth not take away every thing, but there may be some thing that should be there.   

Negat Vbique.  
Good reason, for when it pursues the contrary in every part, it cannot be so strong a fight, as where the contrary fights with the other in the same subject; ut justus non justus, for the use of them, we seldom find them directly opposed, but in an axiom we chief find them: as when I say, it is so, it is not so: or we shall find them often by way of mocking, as when we cry at a thing, and say, If it be not, it is not: here is the antecedent negative, and the antecedent affirmative.   

Sic in defensicne Murenae, &c,  
Nihil ignoveris, saith the Stoic, imo aliquid, non omnia. Here be contradicent axioms, making one axiom to consist of contradicent arguments. So that by this example we may see where they are used. They are called contradientia, because the contrariety is in the denial of the word affirmed, quasi contrarietas in dictione, but it is in re indeed: so that this is contradiction, when two talk together, and the one denies that which the other said, as Dives, non Dives, bella, non bella, puella, non puella.  
So Cicero counts Atticus an Epicure by profession, that mortui non sunt miseri, because non sunt: now when we find contradiction in a speech, we show it by the rule; we find many arguments among the Papists to be of this kind, and also among our own men, The fallaces are general to opposites, and there are non-contradicents, for contradicents when men contend about nothing.    

CHAP. 17.  

De privantibus. Privantia sunt contraria negantia, quorum alterum negat●in eo tantum subjecto, in quo affirmatum suapte natura inest.  
NOw we come to see a thing in his being and with his compliments, may not be that absence of a thing where it should be for privans is nothing else; privans will neither let the habit of the thing it denieth be there, nor any other thing but itself, ergo, there is the greatest contention that can be, and between something and nothing in the same place, there is the greatest distance: and nothing pulls out something, as it were by the roots, and makes that something to be an absolute nothing.   

Privantia.  
They are so called, because of the privant that pulls the habit out of his house, as it were.   

In eo tantum subjecto.  
He doth not mean that privantia are always adjuncts to some subject, for they may be of the same thing: as when I say, sight is not blindness: but this he means, that the habit is denied, and the denier takes away the very same thing without leaving any deputy thereof: as cecity denies the very entity of visus, where it should be, and plucks up as it were the first causes of it.   

Suapte natura inest.  
He doth not understand by nature, as if it were a thing considered in natural Philosophy, but in that thing where unto it might be consentany, ergo, by nature is to be considered that, that any way, or by any Rule of Art should agree to the thing. so that simplex natura is as much as consentaneum, or that which is confentanie, as a cause, effect, etc. to the thing.  
At que hic affirmatum, dicitur habitus negatum autem privatio.  
He keeps the common terms, it is called habitus, because it should be habitual to the thing whereunto it is given,  
Negatum autem privatio, because it pulls out the habit by the roots.   

Sic motus & quies, sic ebrius & et sobrius.  
Our Author brings such examples as are received in Schools, otherwise ebrietas is a vice: and indeed all vices are privantia. So sin is a habit, as it causeth the subject to act imperfectly; so non es ebrius quia sobrius: he takes away the privant by putting the habit.   

Sic cecum esse, et videre.  
Existat igitur ex hac familia aliquis, ac potissimum caecus ille.  
Let blind Appius come, because whilst he cannot see, he will take the less grief at her.  
So pauper, and dives, mors, and vita, and indeed this shows what sin is, that brought death, a privant cause, a privant effect,  
Item tacere, et loqui: so mortalitas is the privation of immortality, though it seem to make it a privant.   

Sed dissentaneorum categoria sic est, etc.  
Our Author told us before, that there was a category of consentanies, showing us where Aristotle's ten categories are: and here are categoremata of dissentanie also, and a categoria of them. Now because we cannot see categoria, or arguing without we first see the arguments, ergo we are here first taught the categoremata for the categorias sake.   

Vnde quidvis ab altero differre quolibet modo potest.  
Vnde quidvis, that is, any thing, as if he should say there is nothing, that is, not another thing, or nothing, but it is some of these ways.    

CHAP. 18.  

De paribus.  
Argumenta simplicia ita fuerunt in consentaneis et disentaneis: comparata sunt, quae inter se comparantur etc.  
WE have heard of a thing as it is in itself complete, and as it is first in the causes, and afterward with his compliments: and seeing it thus, we see how it is not another thing. Notwithstanding we come now to see that there may be a comparison betwixt it and another thing, happily to match it, or to be unequal, like or unlike: now whilst we see things thus we see the inside & outside of them. The arguments are called comparates, for this afection in them resteth as it were to argue so soon as they are sundered; as for example, lay one thing to another, it may be greater, though less to another, etc. so that these do not look at things as they are absolute, but as they are laid together. The reason of these arguments in nature is this, there are more things in nature than there are degrees of quantity or resemblance of similitude, ergo, some of them must be matches, some greater some less, and as the reason of that question one being asked, whether there were any two men in the world that had a like number of hairs upon their head? He said yes, because there were more men in the world than any man had hairs on his head: so it is here, there are more things in nature, than there are degrees of quantity, and they are finite, ergo some have the same quantity, and some have not: and again, because some things are like others, and some unlike, ergo, there must be a looking at that.   

Argumenta simplicia, etc.  
Here is a transition containing the doctrine of that which went before, and this is the conclusion.   

Comparata sunt, etc.  
Therefore it is imperfect wanting the proposition, the name comes of con and paro, to bring together, or lay together: so that howbeit the denomination of Comparates may seem to rise principally from parity, yet we must take them more generally, because imparia, similia, and dissimilia, are also compared, but are unmatches, for as our English word Matches may be taken for equal matches, or unequal, so may the Latin word comparata be taken for paria, or imparia, etc.   

Quae compar antur.  
So that this word delivereth the reference that one thing not being another, hath to it by way of reference.   

Inter se.  
That is, the one being compared with the other, and the other with that, and both comparates, the cause was of the effect, the subject of the adjunct, et contra: dissentanies had one denomination too, but comparates though they have the same denomination, yet we do not consider them absolute ely as dissentanies are, but as they are laid one to another, and the other to it.   

Quae tamet si ipsa comparationis natura aeque nota sunt, attamen alterum altero, etc.  
Here he tells us that comparats are like unto dissentanies in this, that they are aeque nota natura, as dissentanies are aeque manifestae, but though they be so, yet herein they descent from dissentanies, that the one in respect of one man may be more known and more notable than the other: so that though they be aeque nota natura, yet quoad nos, the one may be better known to a man than the other, ergo, here we must always take heed, that when we make comparisons (which do not conclude, but illustrate as they say) that we take our comparison from a thing, as well or better known to him to whom it is made, than the thing we go about to prove, otherwise we teach sophistically, and break this Rule.   

Saepeque notis brevius judicantur, aliquande partibus plenius distinguntur,  
Again, this is general to all comparats, judicantur, that is declared, showed, painted, ergo, he saith rather judicantur, than demonstrantur.   

Notis.  
He means this, comparats use is double, they are either shorter either with notes, or made full with parts.   

Quae propositio, redditioque nominantur.  
The parts of a full comparison are these, where the proposition is the argument arguing, and the redditio the aliquid.   

Atque omnino comparata etiam ficta arguunt, fidemque faciunt.  
Whereas a feigned cause cannot argue a true effect, aut contra, a feigned subject a true adjunct, and so in dissentanies, why in comparats we may feign one, and will argue another true one, and here is the ground of all Fables, which are full comparisons, similia, hence we say comparates do magis illustrare, than concludere: so that these are the three properties belonging to comparates in general.   

Comparatio est in quantitate, vel qualitate.  
He doth not sa● comparata, are quanta, or qualia, but comparatio est in quantitate, vel qualitate, looking at the categoria, or arguing; now it is not quantitas or qualitas, but in quantitate or qualitate, as if he should say, things that are compared, are laid together in their quantity, or quality, for we are not to understand any Arithmetical or Geometrical quantity or quality here, which is always the same, but it is Logical quantity and quality, that is, that quantity and quality which we consider in one thing with another: so that if you would know what this Loigicall quantity is, it is nothing but equality or inequality,   

In quantitate  
That is, when things are compared in their equality or inequality, for parity and imparity, similitude or dissimilitude belong to Logic; now comparatio in quantitate is first because quantity is by nature before quality, for this parity and imparity must needs be considered in the thing arising from the nature thereof, before we consider the quality in nature arising from the quantity; as for example, I must first consider the greatness of a wall, than I shall see that quality whiteness to be extended according to the greatness of the wall.   

Qua res comparatae, quantae dicuntur.  
Qua, that is, it is that affection of things that are laid together, for that he means when he saith qua,   

Res comparatae, etc.  
Quantity is an affection Logical to res: now in that he thus defines them, he doth not mean quantae in respect of the word, but in respect of the nature of the thing: for this it is, we know every thing hath this logismos, or Logical affection, whereby it may be called quanta; so qualities may be compared together, and be made greater or less, by reason of the finite nature of them.   

Est que parium vel imparium.  
Now because there are more things than degrees of quantity, for that cause it comes to pass, that some things are equally matched, and some unequally: so then, when we compare things together, and they be matches, those be paria: this parity is of those things which chance to be equal.   

Pari sunt quorum est una quantitas.  
First he calls them paria, as if he should say matches or fellows, or as we call them pairs, as a pair of gloves or garters, etc. else it may be they are imparia or dissimilia, for so sometimes that word imparia is used for dissimilia, quorum quantitas est una. He doth not mean that the things are one, but their quantity is parity, ergo, he saith, quorum quantitas est una: here he doth not mean that their quantity is one, but it is called parity.   

Argumentum igitur paris est, cum par explicatur a pari.  
This follows from the definition: by explicatur he means arguitur, but he saith explicatur, because it is the nature of those to unfold one another.   

E●●sque notae sunt par, aequaie, aequore, etc.  
Because others have not taught these kinds of arguments before, ergo, he pleaseth to stay a while upon them, and would teach us to judge of them by the phrase, as it were, but we must look at the matter.   

Par levibus ventis.  
Here Crusa, Aeneas first wife, is compared to the winds   

Et nunc aequali, etc.  
Here the age of one is compared with the age of another.  
Again, the Empire of Rome shall be equal to the whole earth, and their courage to the height of heaven.   

Cujus res gestae at que virtutes es, &c,  
Now follows full comparisons, his gallant deeds are compared with the whole course of the Sun, the proposition is here with what limits the earth is confined, with them is the earth limited.   

Littora quot conchas, quot amaena rosaria flores, etc.  
Here are many propositions to one reddition, as many shells as are on the sea shore, &c, so many are mine adversities: quae si comprendere coner, etc. again his repeating of them would be as if he should tell the drops of the Icarian sea.   

Hujus vero loci sunt consectaria illa è contrariis quidem orta, etc.  
These kinds of arguments though they seem to have in them contraries, yet by laying them together, and seeing their contrary consequence they come to be comparates. As Sosibian is a servant to his father because his fat●er is his master.   

Ex adversis sunt frequentiora.  
For the fo●mer examples were only true in relates, and privants, but ex adversis sunt frequentiora.  
If one accuse him whom I defend, than I may accuse him, whom he defends.  
Quod cum fateantur satis magnam, &c, If vice make miserable: shall not virtue make happy.   

Contraria enim c●ntrariorum sunt consequentia, etc.  
This rule holds not when it is genus, but when it follows from it, than it will be true, as I cannot say the father is good, ergo, the son is evil, because goodness and evilness do not follow from fatherhood, and sonhood, for consequentia is here as arising from contrary causes, or from causes in the thing, or as adjuncts.   

Dic quibus in terris (& eris mihi magnus Apollo) etc.  
This is a common argument among the common sort. One propounds a riddle, and the other not being able to answer, propounds another, and this also is common when one says give me this, and I will give you that.   

Paria vero ficta sunt illa, etc.  
Now we come to ficta paria. As Zenophons' wife would not rather have her neighbour's husband than her own: so she should not rather desire his garment, or gold, etc. and as Zenophon would not rather have his neighbour's wife than his own, so he should not rather desire his neighbour's horse, or ground, rather than his own: and here we see the use of the third property.    

CHAP. XIX.  

De majoribus. Imparia sunt, quorum quantitas non est una. Impar est majus aut minus. Majus est, cujus quantitas excedit.  
WE have heard how things may be compared with things, and this comparison was either in quantity or quality, which quantity was a logical quantity, not a geometrical quantity, for it was of things where Geometry cannot be considered. Again, this is general to every thing, not special to Geometry: and the reason hereof we heard to be, because there are more things in nature, than there are degrees in quantity; it was parium, or imparium. Paria were pairs, matches and equals, and imparia are such as agree not in any one of these three: but the aliquid here as it is greater to one, so is it less to another. Imparia therefore are such as are not pairs, but the one is greater than the other.   

Quorum quantitas non est una.  
We have heard concerning quantity, that paria were quorum una est quantitas, imparia sunt quorum non est una quantitas, that is, as parity was the quantity of paria, so imparity is the quantity of imparia.   

Non est una.  
Because the one's quantity is called majus, and the others minus: so that as paria had but one quantity, so imparia have two, one majus and another minus.   

Impar est majus, aut minus.  
Having showed what imparia are, here he distributeth them into majus and minus, as if he should say, imparity is either in majority or minority, and here is all logical quantity, and they that will make a predicament of quantity should indeed bring in this quantity, and not the table of Arithmetic and Geometry: the reason why this quantity is general, is because all things whatsoever are finite in essence, ergo, in quantity. Majus goes before minus, because it containeth in it the quantity of the minus, and exceedeth: so that the majus gives light to the minus, not contra. Majus is so called, because it is evermore considered in comparison of one thing to another: and therefore is not called magnum aut parvum, maximum aut minimum.   

Majus est, cujus quantitas excedit.  
Here majority is the quantity of majus, and this majority exceedeth, because that the majus is active in comparison of the minus, for the stronger acts upon the weaker, rather than contra.   

Propriae notae sunt, etc.  
Our Author doth commorari upon this doctrine, because others have taught them confusedly, therefore to keep us in order, that we may not be mistaken, he pleaseth to set down these notes, for our further help.   

Tostitur emedio, etc.  
Verbosa simulatio prudentiae, which is the third argument is argued a majori, domina illa sapientiae.  
There is not only contempt of the babbling Orator, (which is the aliquid) but of the good Orator.   

Hinc sumitur Logica quaedam gradatio, etc.  
That is, as a modus belonging nither is that logical gradation, etc. as the people and the Senate are compared, the Senate and the public garrisons, and they and the Generals, &c so that here is a climbing up the majus, in one respect, being made the minus in another respect.  
It is better to be the son of Thirsites, and an Achilles, then contra: the majus is before, the reason is this, that that is of his progenitors is not his own, but that which he hath of himself,  
Aeneas persuades his fellows to stay and bear these, because they have born greater.  
Thou openest thy fountain to thy enemies, give us leave to open our little springs to our friends.  
She gave thee great thanks, yea as big as great mountains. Now the majus is, quam abs te esse datum.   

Ficta vero majora etiam plurimum valent.  
As we heard before generally, that ficta comparata, might argue vera: so here ficta majora may argue ficta minora.  
If a Duke should love her, he could not keep her much less canst thou.  
If Jupiter should do it, I could not hope to do it, much less if Aeneas should bid me.    

CHAP. XX.  

De minoribus Minus est, cujus quantitas exceditur.  
MInus is a logical quantity that may be in every thing, as I have said before of majus: and minority is the quantity of minus, ergo, it is exceeded by the majus, because the majus contains the minus, and much more, double, triple, etc.   

Minus autem sepa indicatur, etc.  
As majority hath been abused by Authors, so hath minority, ergo, he would help us by notes, lest we should be deceived. Saepe, not always, as we shall hear afterward.   

Nemo non modo Romae, etc.  
Rome is compared with every corner of Italy, and the argument is drawn a minore. Catiline had sought out all the rascals in Rome, and all in every corner of Italy, which is the minus.  
Catalin would fain have been Consul to trouble the State, here Consul is the majus, and exul the minus.   

Ovid. 1. Reme. amoris.  
Here the body and soul are compared, the body is minus, the soul majus. If thou wilt labour for the good of the body, much more for the good of the soul.   

At que hujus ejusdem speciei sunt hae formalae, quae fiunt negatione parium.  
Hither we refer those manner of speeches, which are made by denials of equals.   

Omnes ex omni aetate, etc.  
If all the Lawyers of the Commonwealth were here, they are not comparable to Servitius Sulpitius: who is the majus.   

Aliquando not a nulla est.  
He was so far from finishing his work, which is the majus, that he had not laid so much as the foundation; which is the minus.  
We ought to be moved with the voice of Poets: why? stones, woods and wild beasts will be ordered by music, the minus.   

Gradatio illa est a minoribus.  
As in majoribus there was a climbing up from the lesser to the greater: so here there is a falling down from the lesser to the greater.  
Facinus est, vincere civem Romanum, is less than verberare, and verberare less than necare, and necare less in crucem tollere.   

Finguntur etiam minora.  
As we heard before of majora that were feigned: so here we hear of feigned minora.   

Ante leves ergo pascentur in aethere cervi, etc.  
The remembrance of kindness is compared with these feigned comparisons.  
O horrible thing, etc. that is the majus: to spew in thy own house at supper is a beastly thing, that is the minus: in caetu vero populi Romani, etc. that is the majus.    

CHAP. XXI.  

De similibus.  
Adhuc compaeratio in quantitate fuit, sequitur comparatio in qualitate, qua res comparatae quales dicuntur: nempe similes aut dissimiles.  
THis is not that quality in an adjunct which was absolutely considered: sequitur comparatio in qualitate, before he told us of comparata in quantitate, here he saith comparatio in qualitate, because all is one: but the categoria is that that Logic looks at rather, than the categorema, ergo, he saith here comparatio. By comparata in qualitate, we are to consider the things compared; by comparatio in qualitate we are to understand the arguing or categoria of them, and categorema is more in use than categoria, because Logic is evermore concreat with the thing, ergo comparatio in qualitate is all one as if he had said comparata in qualitate.   

Sequitur comparatio in qualitate.  
Or as I may say, comparativa qualitas, qua res comparatae quales dicuntur, as if he should say, by which res comparatae are comparata: so that whilst he saith res, he tells us we consider Logic together with the thing.   

Quales dicuntur.  
Because he doth define by conjugates, ergo he saith dicuntur, for conjugata are nomina, and so dictiones are nomina: quales, that is, similes or dissimiles: so that by quails we do not consider any absolute quality in any thing, but that which hath reference to some other thing.   

Nempe similes, aut dissimiles.  
As before we heard the ratio of comparata quantitate, so here we shall see the reason of similes, aut dissimiles in qualitate, which is because there are more things than qualities; and hence it comes to pass that some things are like to others, because they have the like quality: and some again are unlike, because they have not the like quality. Again, similia must go before dissimilia, as quantity went before quality, because it did arise immediately from the limits of the essence: now qualities are the acts of the form upon the matter, and there is no act till the essence be limited, ergo, till the thing hath quantity, ergo, quantity is first. Now similia are first, as the names show; for when we see unlikes, we know them to be dissimilia, by seeing them not to be similia: again, the dissimile is as it were the denial of simile.   

Similia sunt, quorum est eadem qualitas.  
Here we may see whither similitude belongs, namely, to Logic, and they are fitly called similia, because they stand in comparison with a thing.   

Quorum est eadem qualitas.  
From quality he doth define these qualia, and he saith eadem, not una as in quantity, which was quorum quantitas est una, yet the quantity of these is one, and the same: but he saith here eadem, because as we know una belongs to quantity, and eadem to quality.   

Similitudo proportio dicitur, etc.  
Here he doth commorari, because the Schools have abused this property, teaching that it doth belong to quantity: so we also abuse it in our common speech, as when we say he is a well proportioned man, when we mean that his members are correspondent, or like one to another.  similia proportionalia: this also follows, which also shows that proportio belongs hither.   

Notae similitudinis, etc.  
There are no Topick places of Logic wherein the Schools have been so mistaken as in these, therefore he sets down the notes to help us the better.  
Servius Sulpitius and his son are compared as similia.  
Augustus' cure of Ovid is compared with Achilles' cure of them only whom he wounded.  
The day of Tully's return to Rome from banishment was like immortality.  
He was made Verres, my Lord boar-pig (this shows that their orignial was from a base beginning, in that they gave themselves such names) as it were by drinking of Circe's cup, which turned Ulysses company into swine,  
They behold Pompey as a man come from heaven: non ex hac urbe, etc. there is also a dissimilitude, the commandment and doing are similia.   

Similitudinis partes deinceps explicantur.  
Hitherto we have heard short and contract comparisons; now we shall hear them at the full, either where the parts are disjoined, or where they are linked one in another.   

Di juncta quando termini quatuor, etc.  
He calls them termini, because they make as it were two axioms, in both which there is a consequent, and an antecedent part: two termini go to the Protasis, and two to the Antapadosis.  
Here the sick man, and his meat, and the wicked man, and his tasting of praise are made similia.  
Nocte pluit tota rediunt spectacula mane  
Divisum imperium cum Jove Caesar habet.  
These are the first verses that Virgil shown himself by, and set them on the gates where Augustus was to come out to be made Emperor, and verses than were rare, only one Ennius (as Tully witnesseth) had made some, which were no good ones, yet they were read for their matter: Virgil was at this time poor, and had not been thereabout long, being as it were a groom in Caesar's stable, and Augustus seeing them, demanded who made them, and none would challenge them, but one Batillus a simple fellow, praemium que magnumerat adeptus. On the next morning Virgil seeing that, sets on the gates again. Hos ego versiculos feci, etc. and Sic vos non vobis, four times, then Augustus called Batillus to perfect them, and he could not, than Augustus promised a great reward to him that could: so Virgil perfected them, and hereby mocked Battillus: the quatuor termini are these, first Virgil's labour, and the reward that was given Batillus, the other two the ox's ploughing, and others reaping the corn, etc.   

Aliquando nulla prorsus est nota.  
As we have heard before in minoribus, so here sometimes there are no notes at all, but they are understood: as when we use allegories. As white Daisies are not esteemed, and black Violets gathered: so a white boy sometimes may not be esteemed of, and a black boy regarded. Remember that always in those full comparisons that the proposition is the third argument, and the reddition is the aliquid.   

Continua est quando, est primus terminus, etc.  
This only it hath special, first it hath only three terms, then only one of them, namely, the middlemost is used twice, ergo, this is more composite the disjuncta similitudo, for there was but one reference of two terms to two, but here is a reference of three terms, where the middlemost hath a double reference.   

Ficta similitudo.  
As we heard before in general, that ficta comparata might argue true ones, so it is true especially, for indeed all fables for their matter are nothing but belong to Logic, and are full comparisons.  
If Horace be asked why he used to play on the fiddle in galleries, and why he came not into the City, he will answer by a feigned similitude of the Lion being sick, and the Foxes excuse of not coming to him.    

CHAP. XXII.  

De Dissimilibus.  
Dissimilia sunt comparata, quorum qualitas est diversa.  
THese have their names of does, and similia, because there is a dissimilitude with them, but a little difference, dissent, or rather a diversity; and as dissentanea of does, and sentio, contain diversa which might be consentanies, but for their little difference in logical respect: so dissimilia contain similia, but with a diversity.   

Sunt Comparata.  
He should say comparatae in qualitate, for otherwise comparata is not their next genus, ergo, that should be put in.   

Quorum qualitas est diversa.  
Therefore it cannot be said to be the same, now he saith it is but diversa, not opposite: show wing that similia are very diversa, but by way of comparison: so that we shall find dissimilia to differ only ratione, but handled comparatione.   

Dissimilitudinis propriae notae sunt.  
He still telleth us how to distinguish them.   

Heu domus antiqua, etc.  
The house and the master might be subjectum and adjunctum, but here they are dissimilia: dispar here is not impar, but dissimile, but they that gave it to dissimilia at first mistook the matter: and use hath changed it.  
The three Countries of France were unlike in speech, in order and in laws.  
It was all his labour to look with one countenance, to sound with another voice, to go with another pace, etc. these are effects handled with a diversity, and made comparates.  
Neoptolinus, and Achilles, father and son, causa and effectum are made divers, and are handled with a comparison.  
Wit and age adjuncts are handled by a dissimilitude.  
A day for sacrifice and a day for counsel are Dissimilia.  
I thought, O Meliebus, that Rome had been like Mantua: here is an example of similia, if we look at both: but Virgil meant not so.   

Nota plerumque nulla est.  
And yet there is a full comparison. Brutus the first Consul of Rome put his son to death for betraying Tarqvinius. Manilius put his son to death for killing one who challenged him to fight.    

CHAP. XXIII.  

De conjugatis. Hactenus prima argumenta sunt exposita, sequuntur orta de primis, quae perinde sunt ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur.  
HItherto we have heard of that that goeth to the being of a thing, and to the well being of the same, and how many ways it may not be another thing, and yet it may be compared with it, to see whether it be a greater, or less, like, or unlike, etc. and having seen things thus, now we come to consider how they may be named, and likewise how they may be ranged under some general head, and then be limited in their essence, and accordingly as we see good, may we give testimony thereof. And hitherto we have heard of those arguments that are firstly in the thing: now we come to consider how these first may argue, secondly by reason of the first.   

Hactenus prima argumenta sunt exposita, etc.  
This is an imperfect transition containing the conclusion of that which went before, and the proposition of that which followeth, this course that our Author keeps is most natural, for when we see a thing in all the arguments before, than it is requisite that we give it a name.   

Sequantur orta de primis.  
They are called orta because we shall see in the particulars every one to have a being from the first.   

Quae perinde sunt ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur.  
And for their arguing they carry themselves ad id quod arguunt, that is, to the aliquid, sicut prima unde oriuntur: so that this is their definition, so that look with what affection the first argue, with the same affection also do these argue: so that the difference of the first, and orta argumenta is not so much in the force of the arguments: as in that these argue after a new manner. These orta are of two sorts, either such as arise more simply, or such as arise more compositely: more simply as conjugata and notatio, for they arise but from one argument alone: more compositely as distributio, and definitio, for they arise from more arguments at once, therefore conjugata and notatio go before distribution and definition, for a distribution doth arise from consentanies, and dissentanies: a definition may arise from orta which are after consentanea and dissentanea. The first kind of orta are conjugata and notatio.   

Conjugata, sunt nomina, etc.  
So that these lie principally in the name for their arguing, ergo, they have this in particular: as to spring simply from the first, so to denominate things. Conjugata are before notatio, because they arise only from consentanies, notatio from both consentanies, and dissentanies: now for conjugata, they are yoked words, sunt nomina, so that these lie in the name.   

Vary deducta.  
Vary, not so much in respect of their ending, as in respect of their use.   

Ab eodem principio.  
That is, proceeding from one and the same beginning, principium is the thing signified, as the thing justice, etc. as if he should say, conjugates are nomina varie deducta, that is pulled in sunder, but have the same signification: signifying the same abstract as justitia, the concrete as justus, the act as just: so that he doth not mean  d●ducta, as if they were derivatives, but in respect of the thing: so that here we may see how nomina belong to Logic, namely, as they are things.   

In conjugatis symbolum est consentaneorum argumentorum.  
By conjugates he means a casting together: as if he should say you have consentanies only in conjugatis: so that in them is the symbolum, badge and token of consentanies only, and good reason, because these are denominations from one and the same thing continually, ergo, cannot be possibly from dissentanies, for than they should be from divers principia.   

Libertas quoniam nulli jam rest at amanti, etc.  
Liberty is not to him that is in love, ergo, a lover cannot be free, here the thing libertas is not the cause of liber, but curtu sis liber, looking at the effect together with liber. Now conjugates arise only from agreeing arguments, ergo, there is nothing that goes to the casuality, effectity, subjunctity, or adjunctity of a thing (as we may say) but we may denominate from it. As I may call a chest made of wood, a wooden chest: for indeed the reason of the name conjugata is from yoking the thing unto the man, or unto the act.   

C●cero 3. de natura Deorum cum Dionysio tyranno loquitur. Jam mensas argenteas de omnibus delubris jussit auferri, etc.  
Dionysius coming into Greece, rob their Temples, they used to have fine things in their Temples dedicated to their Gods, which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thence came 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 accursed, because they dedicated them to their Idols: now he took these things, and there was engraven in them, bona Deorum, ergo, he said, he would be so bold as uti eorum bonitate.  
I will not use him as a Consul, because he used me not as a consular, that is, as one that hath been a Consul.  
The cause was consularis, and senatoria, ergo he needed the help of the Consul, and the Senate, res consularis, and senatoria are the adjuncts to consul, and to senatus.    

CHAP. XXIV.  

De Notatione. Notatio est nominis interpretatio: nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum, etc.  
NOw we come to notatio, conjugata did nominate the thing from some thing that was in it, but did not name it properly, but so as it might agree to another thing that had the same consentany argument in it, from which that name was fetched, but notatio is the name of a thing, that is proper to it, he called the first conjugata; for as we were taught by them to give the thing a name which may be common to some other thing: so here notatio teacheth us to give the thing a name arising from some property in it: so that it be not common to other things; neither is the name and the thing the same, as we heard in conjugates, justitia, justus, and just, were the same, only they were delivered diversely.   

Est nominis interpretatio.  
That is, not the laying out of the name, but the reason of the name: so that the arguments arguing are nomen, and notatio nominis. Notatio is after conjugata, because it ariseth from dissentanies also, and comparats, whereas conjugates arise only from consentanies.   

Nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum.  
So saith our Grammar, vox est nota, qua unumquodque vocatur. Now as there are nomina, so ratio reddi potest, si vera notatione fiant. The denomination comes from something, as homo ab humo, for as humus signifieth the earth, so homo names not man earthy, but it is a new name drawn from humus.  
So terra is called vesta a vi stando.  
And fire is called focus a fovendo.   

Cicero 4. in Verrem. O Verrea plaeclara! Quo enim accessisti, quo non attuleris tecum istum diem! Etenim quam tu domum, quam urbem adiisti, quod favum denique, quod non eversum, atqu● extersum reliquiriss? etc.  
They made a holy day in Sicily for the honour of my Lord Boar-pig: now he was a sweepstake, ergo, his holy day was named of his manners, Verres a verendo, because he swept all where he came.   

Ovid 1. Fastorum.  
Prima dies tibi Carna datur, dea cardinis hac est, etc. Carna was so called, quasi dea cardinis, because she was conversant about doors and hinges.  
Tu conjugis, bonae foeminae, locupletis quidem cert● Bambalio quidem pater, etc. As Bambalio was so called, because he used to stammer and stutter in his speech.  
Ex dissentaneis autem est notatio.  
 Lucus, quia umbra opacus, parum luceat, & ludus,  
qui est longissime à lusu, & Dis, quia minime dives.  
Et comparatio autem est notatio▪  
 Pyropus quod flammam ignis imittitur.  
Est vero ut notationi ad suum nomen, sic nomini ad notationem sua affectio.  
Ramus doth commorari here, and shows how the name may argue the notation, as well as the notation may the name, though that be not so common as animi plenus, ergo animosus, et contra. And thus we have heard how nomina belong to Logic.    

CHAP. XXV.  

De Distributione. Reliquum est ex ortis aliunde argumentis, argumentum distributionis & definitionis.  
NOw we come to second orta, which arise manifoldly from more arguments: and this he desired to deliver unto us, when he said distributio and definitio. Now distributio must come after conjugata, & notatio, in respect of his double arising: then again it is requisite, that after we have seen the first arguments in things, that we next name them from some thing in them, and then that we see a thing as it is common with another: and again, when we see the distribution of it into his parts, we may soon see the limits of it, and how far it reacheth, and so give testimony thereof. Now a distribution doth arise from any consentany arguments, or common, because that a cause may be common to more effects, & contra: and a subject to more adjuncts, & contra: Hence it comes to pass, that a thing may be distributed, a common cause into special effects, aut contra, a common subject into special adjuncts, & contra. And this we see to be very true in nature by many examples: so that distributio is nothing but taking a common cause, or subject, & dividing it into special effects, or adjuncts, aut contra.   

Reliquum est, &c,  
This is an imperfect transition, and indeed containeth a distribution: as if he should say, ortum is reliquum or primum A distribution is from common causes, and a special cause, and that is perfect: or from some conflux of other Arguments, which the Schools call properties, and that is descriptio.   

In qua utraque pars affectio reciprocationis est.  
That is, this is a property to them. Now he saith affectio, because argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum. As if he should say, these arguments are affected to argue with a mutual receiving of themselves, as the whole contains just as much as the parts, et contra, the definition, as the definite, et contra. So that this reciprocation for all the world is like unto two Juggler's pots, where the one will hold just as much water as the other, and neither more nor less: so than the whole is not the parts, nor the definitum the d●finitio, only there is this mutual affection of reciprocation betwixt them; that is, they have that affection as that the parts simul sumptae will reach no further than the totum, aut contra; the definition than the definite, aut contra: as when I say, a man is sick, or well, here the parts may agree to other things than to man, Answer. True, but we must understand it as if it were said, homo is either homo aeger, or homo sanus: now this reciprocation in a distribution, is of all the parts together with the whole.   

Distributio est cum totum in parts distribuitur.  
Having showed the general affection, he now comes to tell what distribution is: it is called distribution in the active signification in respect of the parts; now distribution is the categoria, and the parts and the whole are the categoremata.   

Cum totum in parts distribuitur.  
Here is first a totum, which shows that it is always some common thing, and the parts are special things contained in the whole: so that that which is new here, common, as a common cause, a common effect, subject, or adjunct, etc. and here this common is called a totum, as it contains the parts, than again, this distribution is as it were a pulling the parts in pieces, and not a joining or gathering of them together, though iuductio be an inversa distributio: but he rather useth this word distributio, because it is more general, and more in use, and the arguing from the whole to the parts is more in use, than contra.   

Totum est quod continet parts.  
It is that which holdeth together the parts: continet, because all the parts are in the whole, as in one, as being the common head wherein they are.   

Pars est quae continetur à toto.  
For the container is the totum, and the parts the contained: so that the doctrine of distributio is but to teach us how to range and carry every thing to his home: It is a great question among the Physicians, whether a wen be a part of a man's body, or no. Answer. It is morbus, ergo, no part: it is in toto, but not contained à toto, for the whole contains the members by reason of its form, if we speak of integrum, but the form reacheth not to this.   

Atque ut distinctio totius in parts, distributio: sic collectio partium, etc.  
Many Logicians have made this to belong to argumentatio, but they are deceived, for they belong hither, and it is the same to do and undo, to divide the whole into parts, and to colligere the parts to make up the whole.   

Distributio sumitur ex argumentis toti quidem consentaneis, inter se autem dissentaneis,  
Here he showeth from whence distribution ariseth, namely from consentanies, in respect of the parts with the whole, and also from dissentanies, either disparates or contraries, in respect of the parts between themselves.   

Itaque tanto accuratior erit, quanto partium, etc.  
This is a deduction from that that went before; for if the former be true, than this also: now the greatest dissension is of contraries, and the greatest of all is between something and nothing, ergo, to distribute into tricotomies, and quadricotomies, etc. is to skip over something that should be taught. And thus much for distribution in general.    

CHAP. XVI.  

De distributione ex causis. Distributio prima est ex absolute consentaneis, causis nempe, & effectis.  
COncerning this doctrine of distributio, we have heard the generality: the ground from whence a distribution doth arise, is, for that the first arguments are common: as a common cause may be distributed by the effects, in like sort a common effect may be distributed into special causes: and so for the subject and adjunct: so that beside that community, there is nothing new in this second invention. In a distribution we observed a whole and a part: the whole contains the parts, and the parts are contained of the whole, ergo, if either the whole contain not all the parts, or all the parts be not contained of the whole, there will be no distribution. Now these arguments did arise from consentanies, in respect of the whole, but from dissentanies inter se. Itaque tanto accuratior erit, etc. ergo, a distribution into a dicotomy, which is of contraries is the best; yet if it cannot be had, we must be fain to make a tricotomy. Now we come to the species of Distribution.   

Distributio prima est ex absolute consentaneis, causis nempe, effectis.  
A distribution is a derivative argument from cause, or from modo quodam consentaneorum ut subjectorum, et adjunctorum. Now the use of distribution is this, that we may range every thing in his own order and place, for when we have seen a thing in his esse, and bene esse, and then that it is not this or that; and have also compared it with other things, to see whether it be equal or unequal, like or unlike, and likewise have given it a name; in the next place it is requisite, that we set it in his rank, for so the Lord hath ranged every thing in the world, as man under his genus animal, for the Lord hath made all things liable to our Logic, ergo, they must be ranged under some head, that we may see how they agree, and how they disagree.   

Distributio prima est, etc.  
Distributio is double (as I said before) ex absolute consentaneis, et modo quodam consentaneis: so that he calls that distribution which ariseth from a general cause, and a general effect. Distributio prima: It is prima in a double respect; first, because causa and effectum are prima: secondly, as they are before subjectum and adjunctum. He takes distributio here in the active signification, and according thereunto must the species be prosecuted, for he doth define them from the parts dividing. For the notation of the word (which gives great light) it comes of tribuo and dis, as if it signified that distribution that justice gives: it is a term belonging to Law, as many of our Logical terms do: and here it signifieth a severing of the parts, and a giving to every part his due, as when a common cause is distributed, and then to every special effect his own cause is given: so that here is nothing in this new invention, but this distribution, the rest is the first invention: as when I say, a man is sick, and a man is well, here are two subjects, and two adjuncts: but when I say of men, some are sick and some are well, here is a distribution. Now the reason why he joineth both causa and effectum together, saying, ex absolute consentaneis, causis nempe, & effectis, is because that in a distribution as there are parts, so there is a whole; distributio being both active and passive, though it be principally denominated from the parts: so that where the cause is the whole, there the effects must be parts.   

Distributio ex causis est, quando partes sunt causae totius.  
So that here the effect is the whole, and the causes are the parts: now he prosecutes the doctrine of distribution by the parts, because he goes according to the act of things, and the parts here constitute the whole: again, a whole, the very name doth deny a distribution; for if it be whole it is not distributed: but the parts show a whole, ergo, we must apply distribution to the parts; hence distributio ex causis is not when the cause is a whole, but when the causes are parts. Hence a Distributio ex integro is before a Distributio ex genere, because there the parts are effects.  
Distributio ex causis is here the first invention, in that he saith ex causis, the second invention in that he saith Distributio. Again, there is the first invention, when he saith, quando partes sunt causae; the second invention, when he saith, quando partes sunt causae totius; so that take the common effect, and make it a whole; the causes, and make them parts, and this is the second invention.   

Hic distributio integri in sua membra praecipuè laudatur.  
This now is a special modus of distributio ex causis, there may be a distribution of the effect, by the efficients, by the materials, by the formals, and from the end: but he doth not stay upon them, but presently comes to the distributio integri in membrae, because it is of greater use, and of more practice.   

Hic.  
That is, in the distributio ex causis: so that membra are parts, but all parts are not membra: and integrum is totum, but every totum is not integrum.   

Praecipuè laudatur.  
Why? because it is of so great use: secondly, because it is more secret, the other more familiar.   

Integrum est totum, cuipartes sunt essentiales.  
The integrum, the entire as we call it, is totum, that is, quod continet parts, ergo, the membra must be contained of the integrum, giving thereunto both portion of matter, and portion of form: Hence nails and hairs are not membra of a man's body, because they give not a portion of matter and form to it.   

Cui partes sunt essentiales  
So then if the members be essential to the whole, they give essence to it, that is, they afford causa: now essentia stands principally in the matter and form, ergo, he means these parts give matter and form to the whole.   

Membrum est pars integri.  
Therefore it is contained of the whole, ergo, gives essence, but how gives it essence? thus, which few Logicians show, as for example, in a man's body, every member hath his own matter and form, and all the members together make up a common matter, and a common form of the whole, so that a man is made of a soul and a body, than the soul is made of matter & form: the body also is made of Organical parts, and they give matter & form to it: then the simular parts contain the matter and form of the organical, and the simular parts are made of a portion of the matter and of the forms of the elements: so that we may see the form of man's body ariseth from a manifold comparison, now the integrum is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hoc aliquid, yet is it totum, though it be always singular.  
Why is integrum before membrum, seeing it gives essence to it?  
Answ. Integrum is made of the parts, and is a totum, ergo, must go before. Again, it is here before in this new invention, because it doth here continere parts, ergo, is the agent: again, when we consider distributio, because the whole doth distribute, and the parts are distributed, ergo, it is requisite, that we first see the whole; hence it is rather called distributio, then inductio, because it is more frequent to dispute from the whole to the parts, than from the parts to the whole. Now if integrum be cui partis sunt essentiales, and membrum be pars integri, than whatsoever is true of a part, is true of the whole, not contra, because membrum is essentiale toto, non contra. And by this rule it stands that Christ's sufferings are to be given to him as he is whole Christ, both God and Man: then again, by this Rule we see, that that which he hath felt being head, the whole hath felt: which if we consider well, we may see how Christ's righteousness is made ours, because he is the head, and that which the head suffers the whole suffers, ergo, that is the wholes that the head hath done.   

Sic Grammatica in etymologiam & syntaxin. &c,  
For why? Grammatica is the whole Art, Etymology and Syntax are the parts there of. Dialectica in inventionem, & judicium dividitur.  
Kickerman cannot away with this example, for (saith he) Dialectica is the habit, invention and judgement are Arts: now the parts must be of the same nature with the whole, because they constitute the whole. Alas poor man, this it is, the rule of Logic is the rule of man's reason, ergo, the rule must run along, not according to the nature of reason, for that belongs to natural Philosophy, but according to the act of it. Now by invention and judgement I do not mean the act, but the rule of the act that teacheth me invenire: invenire is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of this part of invention: now Dialectica is the whole, ergo, invention and judgement must consist of precepts containing the matter and form of the whole. Bene disserere is the end of Logic, ergo, these two parts must shoot at this mark; then again the form of Dialectica bene disserere ariseth from the parts, so that as our Author teacheth them they contain a portion of the matter, and a portion of the form of Logic. This it is, Logic looks at the motus of reason, and invention and judgement contain the motus, ergo, they are the parts.   

Haec distributio principalis est, cum rei longioris explicatio suscipuur.  
You have heard what is required in a perfect definition of the integrum into the members: and here are many, yea, most fallaces of any arguments, as if we leave out any part in a distribution; again, in distributione ex integro, if the parts do not contain a portion of the matter, and form of the whole: again, when we distribute in Grammar, vox est literaaut syllaba, it is not a perfect distribution, because these parts are not dissentany inter se, for a letter contains portion of the matter, and form of a syllable, and so is essential to it. Had distributio principalis est, si rei longioris, etc. if you mean to make any long discourse of any thing, divide it, for it gives great light, and help to your own memory, and to the people, hence distributions are the chief things in Art; hence many call their books partitions. Kickerman calls his systema, which belongs to distributio: and the respect of a distribution is but from a part of the Art, ergo, his name is to straight: ergo, remember this rule by any means, for it is of great use, both for the good of the teacher, and of the learner.   

Virgilius 1. Georg.  
Quid faciat laetas segetes: quo fidere terram Vertere (Maecenas) ulnusque adjungere vites, etc.  
Here Virgil distributes his whole work; this is a distribution of the integrum into the members, not of the subject into his adjuncts (as some will have it) for it is a distribution of his book. First he will teach how to blow, then how to set vines, then how to order cattle, then how to order Bees.   

Cicero pro Mureno.  
Intelligio (judices) ires accusationis partes fuisse: & earum unam in reprehensione vitae, etc.  
His oration was divided into three parts, first the reproving of Murenus for his life; Secondly, his seeking of honour; Lastly, the accusing of him of ambition: so Preachers divide their speech, not their text.  
Quin etiam aliter tractatur hoc argumenti genus, vel a partibus ad totum, vel a toto ad parts. Catullus.  
Quintia formosa est multis: mihi candida, longa, Recta est: haec ego sic singula confiteor, etc.  
Again, he shows another modus, when we bring in an induction of the parts to make up the whole, or when we argue from the whole to prove all the parts. As Quintia was fair to many, here is the totum, to me she is candida, long & recta, but there other things wanting in her to make her beautiful, namely, venustas, & mica salis: wit to make merry jests without offence, and good carriage: so here we see how he by withdrawing a part, denies the whole.  
Lesbian formosa est: quae cum pulcherrima tota est, Tum omnibus una om●es surripuit Veneres.  
Here now contrary to the other example, he gathers all the parts of beauty in one, and so concludes the whole.    

CHAP. XXVII.  

De distributione ex effectis, ubi de genere & specie. Distributio ex effectis, est quando partes sunt effecta.  
THe original of a distribution is from firsts arguments coming to have a generality, because they are common to many, distributio ex effectis est, etc. that is, when special causes may be given to one common effect, for as integrum though it be singular, yet is it totum, because it is made of the portions of the matter and form of the members: so here the effects are made of their genus.  
Now he says distributio ex effectis, because it ariseth ex effectis, for there are the causes distributing, and the parts distributed: so that here we may see why these arguments are rightly called orta: quando partes sunt effecta: so as the whole doth symbolice contain the causes, so the parts do symbolice contain the effect: as if he should say, effecta we heard of in the first invention, but effecta here sunt parts, this is the second invention. God as he made all things, so hath he ranged and ordered them one under another: so that in this definition, this is all, the parts are the effects, and the cause is the whole. Mariners are general causes, but they have special effects, for some climb the shroud, some run up and down, some pump, etc. here are the effects of the efficient cause: so we may distribute from the matter, as of wood is made a wooden chest, or table, or stool, etc. so from the form as we may from the genus, but this always consider in general, that the parts be part of the whole, and that they be homogeny parts, for if we shall divide a whole into parts, and particles, there will be no distribution, as if a man's body be anatomised; because the particles will agree with the parts.   

Distributio generis in species hic excellit.  
He doth here hasten to genus, as being the principal thing in this place: and it is as if he should say, that distribution which we usually hear of, and which we have so often in Schools of genus and species, they are but modi of a distribution ex effectis: and it is true, and whilst the common Logicians see not this, they know not the truth of them, nor their original▪ and this makes them to begin with genus and species in their Logic: so they know them not in their cause, but only in their second nature.   

Hic excellit.  
As if he should say, this is the chiefest modus in this distribution.   

Genus.  
Genus signifieth firstly a stock or kindred, now because all the species come from one root, as a family cometh from one stock, ergo, it is called genus, or as the parents are causes of their children, so is genus cause of the species: so the Hiraclides are they that come of Hiracles   

Species.  
This signifieth in the original the countenance of a thing, n●w we come to see nothing but singulars, ergo, individua, and species infimae are properly species, it comes of an old verb specio, or spicio; species it is that which is looked on: excellit that is of principal use, and this is the reason thereof, the Lord hath ranged all things under his own general, but this kind of ranging is more general than the rest, and the genus giving essence to the species, it draweth the species with it wheresoever it goeth; hence it is that wheresoever the genus of any thing is taught, there a so must the species be taught, and this was the father of predicaments, so that there is nothing, but is under a genus, but genus generalissimum   

Genus est, totum partibus essentiale.  
Totum est quod continet parts, for the parts we heard were holden together in the whole, for before whilst the members did contribute every one a portion of matter and form, they made up the whole, now genus is totum, but contrary to integrum, for there the integrum had his whole matter and form, from the members: but the genus comprehends the species in a common matter, and in a common form.   

Totum essentiale.  
By this we are to understand that which gives essence, that is, matter and form: so that integrum did contain all that the members had, but the genus doth not contain all that the species have: so that though all the essence of the genus be in the species, yet the whole essence of the species is not in the genus: when I say totum essentiale, I say two things, first, that genus is a totum: secondly, that there is nothing in the genus, but is also in the species.  
Object. But how can it be said that genus gives essence to the species, whereas they have more in them than the genus.  
Answ. To contain is to hold together, now because the species agree in one common matter, and a common form, as in uno puncto, ergo genus doth contain them: so that reciprocation here is to be understood so far forth, as by their hypostatical union the specius are made one in their genus; hence it is that whatsoever is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with the genus must agree with the species: therefore if any in distributing shall make any part as large as the genus, as Logicians distribute genus into perfectum, and imperfectum, they make species totum and not genus: so ens is substantia, or accidens will not come into any Art, for the parts are consentanies inter se being subjectum and adjunctum.   

Partibus.  
Pars est quae continetur non in toto, sed a toto, t●t●m est quod continet, as being the common punctum wherein the parts meet together, he saith also partibus non parti.   

Species est pars generis.  
Pars we heard before: generis: so that as membrum was pars integri, not generis, so species est pars generis, not integri: so that they which divide parts into integral, or simular, understand not Logic, for a part simular is nothing but species, which is pars generis, as a pan of water, & a drop of water is genus & species: a bone and a part of a bone is also genus and species; now they call it simular because they have the same denomination. Why so? genus doth predicare re et nomine, as they say pars generis: here observe, that species hath reference only to genus, and so genus to species; even as causa is effecti causa, and subjectum adjuncti subjectum, for they are relates, ergo, can repeat no other thing, but one another. So again, genus is totum, not speciei, but specierum, ergo, when we give a double face to him, we make him like Janus with a double forehead, for they make the same species to be species to two things: species therefore is generis species, as one son is but son of one father.  
Now this is their trouble, that they cannot distribute a species into individua, because (say they) individua do but differre numero: what is that? Differre numero is properly to reckon up, or make an induction of the individua to make up the species: again, when we distribute that species into all his individua, there is a distribution, for there is a totum, and parts distributed.  
Objection. But in a distribution we should have but two species.  
Answer. Why, is it not requisite that there should always be a decotomie, for indeed if we could find it out, every thing is decotomised, but the Lord hath not revealed it unto men, but hath kept it secret to himself.  
Objection. Singulars have no differences, but are distinct only by a conflux of common accidents.  
Answer. Then singulars should not differ in essence, ergo, I should be the same with you, and you with me; the first matter indeed was imperfect, but every thing else is an effect, ergo, hath all the causes, ergo, the form, If they ask me what it is, I answer them, that my soul is my form as they hold: or else thus, as my members are not another man's members; so my form arising from the parts of my body, is not another man's form, but is really distinct from it.  
Objection. But (say they) the reasonable soul is general to all men.  
Answer. There indeed may be some scruple, but when we consider that the forms of the body and the soul make up the form of a man, we shall see every man to have a distinct form, by which we shall know them each from other.   

Sic animal genus hominis & bestiae dicimus.  
He means that genus is a general totum, and comprehendeth the species under it: for as a Hen covereth her chickens with her wings, so genus covereth the species with his essence: then again, make an axiom, as homo est animal, and you shall see the species to be the subject more often than the genus, ergo, he saith subjecta.   

Genus est generalissimum, aut subalternum.  
Here he distributes genus unto us, showing us that there are two kinds thereof: the one is generalissimum, for so indeed every genus is general, and hath his subsistency only in singularibus: and because all genera do subsist in singularibus, ergo, all but singularia are genera: hence it is that they say in Schools, ens and unum confunduntur.   

Species sub alterna, aut specialissima.  
Genus generalissimum, cujus nullum est genus.  
Generalissimum is so called, because it is most genus, because that can be nothing but genus. Subalternum genus is genus, but not only genus, nor always genus.   

Cujus nullum est genus.  
There must needs be an end: for as there is a lowest whereat we must begin, so there must be an highest above which we cannot go, for there cannot be an infinitus motus in creatures: so the Lord hath in great wisdom ranged things in their order. So the common Logicians have made ten predicaments, or genera generalissima: but the first four have Logicks use in them, the rest are arguments, but if we would know the genera generalissima, every Art will tell us them best: now we may ascend to ens too: so that ens is the definitum indeed.  
God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so in Logic argumentum is genus generalissimum; vox in Grammar, etc. and all these are species of ens.   

Nullum genus.  
Here he denies any genus to stay our reason, that so we may not go too far: for since genus ariseth from the matter, we shall at last come to that which is no genus, but a matter only, ergo, we must distribute this into his matter, and form.   

Subalternum genus, ut subalternaitem species, quoth species hujus, illius autem genus est.  
Subalternum genus, may also be subalterna species: so that these being one and the same, only differing in respect, therefore one definition may serve for them both.   

Species specialissima, quae est individua in species alias, ut materia & forma singulares.  
Species (as before) signifies firstly a singular thing, and other species are called species at the second hand, but individua are properly called species quae speciuntur. Now he saith specialissima, that is indeed, and properly, as generalissimum had not genus above it, so species specialissima hath no species under it: individua is here an adjunct to species specialissima: now he saith individua, because he speaks of division, ergo, here he tells us, that we can go no further, to find any inferior species, we may only divide it into members, if we will.   

Genus vero, & species notae sunt causarum & effectorum.  
He doth commorari here, because the Schools have not commonly received, that genus contains the matter and common form of the species: but we know a perfect definition lays out the quiddity of a thing, that is, the matter and the form: now the form is there, but where is the matter? why, the genus contains the quiddity, the essence, the causes, ergo it is an argument unswerable that the genus contains the matter.   

Hinc universale est insigne, ac praestabile, quia causam declarat.  
The common Logicians never looked after any distribution, but of the integrum into the members, and of the genus into the species: now integrum is commonly a singular, ergo, in opposition to it they called genus an universal: then again the integrum is made of the matter and form of the members, now they are singulars, ergo, there can arise nothing from them, but that which is singular. Now the genus is common to the species, therefore by reason thereof it comes to be universal, and we must apprehend it in our minds.  
Object. It is a great question whether universalia be realia, or only intentionalia.  
Answ. True it is, that every universal is subsistent in singularibus, so that there is truly animal: but we must look for him in individuis, for genus is totum partibus essentiale: but if we make an abstraction of it from the singulars, than it is not real: but here is a fallace, for the universal still remains a thing, though I thus consider it in my mind: for I would dispute with them thus, If it be but a phantasm, then can it give no essence. Again, when we define, do we not lay out the thing? ergo, if genus were only mental, it could not give essence: so causa, effectum, and all other arguments are things real in nature, howsoever my Logic takes hold of them.   

Insigne.  
True it is, that every whole is general, because it is totum, but genus is universale insigne, ac praestabile, and so it appears: for because it gives esse not only in a distribution, but also in a definition, ergo, it is of great use even set in the forefront of the Aristotelians, quia causam declarat, and our knowledge is e causis.   

Distributio generis in species valde quidem excellit, sed difficilis est & rara inventu.  
Valde excellit, that is in use, sed difficilis est, & rara inventu, the reason is this, the genus is totum universale, and gives matter and form to the species: now the form is hard to be found: so that in common Authors we find this definition seldom, but in Arts it is more often: yet if we should examine it strictly, we might cavil; as when I say animal is homo, or brutum, here animal and homo have the same form, only homo and brutum do differ in form.   

Ovid 1. Metamor.  
Neu regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba,  
Astra tenent coeleste solum formae que deorum, etc.  
Here animal is the genus; astra, pisces, bestiae, & volucres, are the species, being argued by their several subject of places, and man is argued a comparatis, and from his adjunct authority.   

Cic. 1. Officiorum, virtutem dividit in species quatuor.  
So Tully distributes virtue into four parts, and gives the definitions of the species for the species themselves.   

Distributio generis in formas specierum eadem est, etc.  
The reason follows: ut animalium aliud loque●●● aliud motum: We may see our Author could not tell what to make the form of homo, for one while he saith animal is rationale aut irrationale, here he saith loquens, aut mutum.  
Object. But how can this distribution of generis in formas be true, when as the forms of the species are not in genere?  
Answ. Because the genus contains the matter and form of the species, and the special form is a membrum of the species, ergo, the genus being in individuis, and giving esse to them, may be said to contain their special form, even as I may be truly said to hold a stool in my hand, when as I have but a part of it in my hand.   

Genus & species non solum tractantur hac simplici divisionis formula, sedetiam separatim alterum ex altero.  
You have not genus and species always used after this simple manner, but one to argue another: for when I say homo est animal, there is a distribution, though there be but one species.   

Pro Archia.  
Ac ne quis a nobis hoc ita dici forte miretur, etc.  
Because he was a Rhetorician, therefore he should speak for Poetry, for they are both Arts: here he reason's a genere ad species; for arse is the genus, and eloquentia and Poetica are species.  
Contra genus tractatur per species.   

Ovid. 4. Tristium.  
Materiamque tuis tristem virtutibus imple:  
Ardua per praeceps gloria vadit iter, etc.  
Glory goes through an headlong journey: why? if Troy had not been the cause of Hector's glory, he had not been glorious: so that the art of War, of a Pilot at Sea, of Physic, etc. had not been known but by adversity.   

Exempla igitur specialia suo generi accomodata, sunt hujus loci.  
That is, when examples are applied to their genera sunt hujus loci, that is, they are species: now the very name commends a similitude to us, neither is there an example, but there is a similitude: as when one sets a child a copy to write by, it is a simile for him to make a simile by; and when one example is brought to argue an example, it is a simile, but when it is brought to argue a genus, than it is a species.   

Ad Atticum 7. Vrbem tu relinquas? etc.  
The question is, whether the City is to be left: it is lawful, Themistocles did so: it is not lawful, for out people did not forsake Rome, neither did Pericles forsake the City.    

CHAP. XXVIII.  

De distributione e subjectis. Reliqua distributio est quodam modo consentaneorum, ut subjectorum & adjunctorum. Distributio e subjectis est, cum partes sunt subjecta.  
DIstributio hath his denomination from the parts, because it is active in respect of them, and passive in regard of the whole: then again, because of the consention of the whole with the parts, ergo it is ex consentaneis: now there may be a common subject to more adjuncts, & contra, ergo, he saith, Reliqua distributio est quodam modo consentaneorum: and to use any more particular description of them is to no purpose, seeing we have heard what subjectum and adjunctum are.   

Distributio e subjectis est, cum partes sunt subjectae.  
So that if we shall but sever them, we shall see nothing but subjectum and adjunctum: if we keep them together, we shall see the arising affection.   

 apud Catullum. Virginitas non tota tua est, ex parte parentum est, etc.  
The maid's virginity is divided into three subjects; not as integrum into members, but three were owners of it, as three men may be owners of one ship.   

Sic Cicero 5. Tusculanorum. Sunt enim tria genera a bonorum, ut jam a laqueis Stoicorum, etc.  
So bonum: the totum is showed by his subjects: it is corporis the subject, or of external things belonging to the whole man, or animi.  
Some, as Kickerman and Doctor Downham, would have this distribution ex subjectis, and the next, to be imperfect, even as definitio is perfecta, aut imperfecta: but they are much deceived, for when a perfect definition may be had, we use no description, ergo, it serves only where a perfect definition cannot be had: it is not so here; for if we have a perfect definition, either integri in membra, or generis in species, we must not therefore leave out these, if they be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, aut contra; as we see axioma is affirmatum, and negatum must come into Logic, though it have his species afterward. Again, these distributions cannot be reduced to the perfect ones, either of integrum or genus.    

CHAP. XXIX.  

De distributione ex adjunctis. DIstributio ex adjunctis est, quando partes sunt adjuncta: ergo, the whole is subjectum.  
 hominum alii sani alii aegri, etc. This distribution will not be distributed (as I said before) into genus and species.   

Sic Virgilius 1. Georg. Quinque tenent coelum zonae, quarum una corusco, etc.  
The heaven is distributed by his adjuncts: it is temperate or intemperate, to dicotomize it, intemperate is hot, or cold: hot is the middle zone, cold are them between the Tropics: temperate are the other two.   

Caesar. 1. belli Gallic.  
Gallia est omnis divisa in parts tres, etc.  
Caesar divides the Country of France into three parts, according to the inhabitants thereof.    

CHAP. XXX.  

De definitione.  
Definitio est, cum explicatur quid res sit, eaque vicissim definitio argui potest.  
HItherto we have heard of a distribution; now we come to a definition: for having heard what a thing is, and how it differs from others, notwithstanding it may be compared with them, and be equal or unequal, like or unlike, and then be named: lastly, be ranged under some head: having I say seen all these things clapped close together in the thing, now it remains that we should lay out the limitation of it, and circumscribe it. This is the last of all, because it may arise from any of the arguments going before, and also from orta which follow.   

Definitio est cum explicatur quidres sit.  
We heard that the arguments arising manifoldly were distribution and definition: now definition ariseth as it shall fall out, either from agreers, or disagreers, comparates, or orta, ergo, it arising from more arguments than any of the rest, it is requisite that it should be after all the rest: though in laying down an Art it will have the first place, because if it be a perfect definition it lays out the essence of a thing immediately: if it be a description it lays down the quantity, etc. A definition is as it were a box, that lays up all the rules following in the Art, even as the body doth the members.   

Definitio.  
For the name, we know finis is terminus, and belongs to Geometry: we heard it borrowed from thence into Logic to signify a cause, here it signifies the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that definire is to set down the extreme, or utmost points of a thing, ergo, it must be reciprocal with the thing defined, else can it not define it: for if the definitum be larger than the definitio, than it out-reacheth the limits of the thing: if it be less, than it layeth not out the essence fully.   

Cum explicatur.  
So that definitio doth lay abroad: explicatio is a laying abroad the quiddity of a thing. In that he saith definitio doth explicare, he means all the arguments before were clapped together in the thing confusedly, but the definition doth lay them abroad: as in this word Dialectica there is a Synopsis of all Logic, but when I say, it is ars bene disserendi, here the definition lays out all more at large: the definite is like a Pedlar's pack, wherein his points, pins, knives, etc. are shut up altogether, and the definitio is like the laying of them out, or showing of them, to the end that he may sell them. The one may likewise be compared to a garment folded up, the other to a garment spread abroad at large.   

Quid.  
That is, the essence: for as in a perfect definition we may gather the other arguments of a thing, from the causes: so in a description we may gather the causes from other arguments: this entity therefore or essence, the definition always looks at: another difference of the definitum and the definitio is, that the definitum is ens, and the definitio is essentia.   

Res.  
That is the ens the subject of the general Arts, that is aliquid in the definition of argumentum.   

Eaque vicissim definitio argui potest.  
As the definite called before res may be argued a definitione, so contra: though the definitio be more often brought to argue the definite, than contra: ergo, it hath the name definition, not from definitum, but from the definitio.  
Object. Kickerman saith, Ramus will have definitio both an argument and an axiom.  
Answ. No, we make it an argument when we speak properly, we make it an axiom when we speak Synecdochichos.   

Definitio est perfecta, aut imperfecta.  
This distribution is now to good purpose, for the Schools have not agreed at any time of any perfect definition, as they say homo est animal rationale, this is not a perfect definition, ergo, some do add mortale, some capax disciplinae, some both; so that indeed we cannot give a perfect definition of any thing, ergo, because it is so hard to find the special form, it is requisite to have an imperfect one to grope out the form thereby, else we should be undone, if we could no way look at the essence of things, and here by the way we see the quiddity laid out perfectly by a perfect definition, and imperfectly by an imperfect definition.   

Illa, proprie definitio; haec, descriptio dicitur.  
Where we may see that perfecta definitio is properly the species of this definition, and that the definition before was synecdochichal; now that explio catio of the thing is perfect or imperfect: the one called definitio, the other descriptio; the one containing the limitation of the essence, the other the limitation of the quantity: so that whatsoever hath an essence distinct from itself must be limited, ergo, may be defined: ergo, have their perfect definition, though we cannot see what their form is.   

Definitio perfecta est definitio constance solis causis essentiam constituentibus.  
The reason is, because it stands of more parts, namely the genus, and form, laying out the composition of the thing.   

Ecausis.  
As if he should say, they do give existere to the definite.   

Solis.  
Because no other arguments come in a perfect definition.   

Essentiam constituentibus.  
That is, materia and forma, but materia is included in genere: so that definitio is ortum doubly, now there are four causes which give esse, but two of them only give essence, so that the effect hath his substance from the matter and form, not from the other causes.   

Quales causa genere, & forma comprehenduntur.  
Ramus doth commorari upon this doctrine, showing that a perfect definition doth lay out the substantial quiddity of a thing: now the reason why he saith genere, and not materia simply, but materia as it is in genere, is this, because the genus containeth not only the matter, but also a portion of the form, the general form: ergo, it must be the next genus that we must bring in a perfect definition, for if the genus be more remote, than the form of the next genus must be left out: but if we take the next genus, than we bring in all above it.   

Et forma comprehenduntur.  
That is the special form: the reason in nature is this, we find that the totum is not subsistent but in singularibus: now we find moreover that singulars have that whereby they are singulars beside, for else one singular could not be destinct from another, ergo, every singular must have his peculiar form, and also his matter, not as it is a first argument, but as it is symbolice in genere.   

 in aenimali, & pars formae.  
He means of the general form, for anima vegetativa, and sensitiva are the forms of vivens, and so of animal.   

Totam formam hominis.  
As if the form of man did consist of these as of parts: but it is not so, the truth is this, there is in some things a simple life, in some things more lives, as anima vegetativa is firstly in planta: now animal hath that, and somewhat more, namely, sensitiva; and man hath both them and also reason, so that one of the species hath nothing but that which the genus hath, namely, vivens and planta, for planta is vivens, quae vivit vitam tantum vegetativam, and so is vivens, only tantum makes the difference from others. Now from this discourse he gathers, that a definition is universale symbolum, not that singulars cannot be perfectly defined, as well as universals, but he means it is a symbolum containing universally the causes constituting the essence: so that the individuum hath the matter and form of every genus above him, ergo, it is universale in this respect, having his peculiar form added to them.   

Naturam.  
Here we may see what nature is in things properly: some make the form only to be nature, some the matter only, and some both form and matter: here we see the essence and nature are all one: in the first signification natura signifies res nata: secondly, it signifies res underes nata est, that is, the causes: so that here know that the causes being put, all things attending them follow, for so natura is taken for the properties of a thing. E qui dat formam, dat formam consequentiam: so that a perfect definition doth deliver whatsoever comes within the mame of nature.   

Tales definitiones sunt artium.  
No not tales if we should exactly try them by this rule, but they are the best examples. Now arse is not the next genus to Grammar, neither is been loqui the form, but the end of Grammar, but he tells us hereby, that there is a soul of Grammar, which is in every rule, which is as it were the simular parts of the Art, tending to this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, bene loqui.    

CHAP. XXXI.  

De Descriptiono.  
Descriptio est definitio ex alliis etiam argumentis rem definiens.  
THis we heard to be generally called definitio: so that it doth quodam modo definire: but as definitio in general before was a trope, so descriptio is not a definition, but as it doth explicate quid res sit, not definiendo from the essence, but describendo from the quantity: so that the definitio lays out the flesh, bones etc. and descriptio lays out the compliments. The definition was internal, the description is but external, limiting the thing as it were with chalk. The description may be compared to the Carpenters chalking, the definition to the thing chalked; and by how much the thing itself lays out the quiddity of it better than the chalking doth, by so much is a perfect definition more excellent than a description: so that here remember that howbeit a description cannot see the arguments laying out the essence of the thing, yet the intendment of it is to do it.   

Est definitio.  
That is, rem definiens, that is, quidditatem rei explicans.   

Ex aliis etiam argumentis.  
That is, others beside the causis: so that a description must have a genus with it, if it be not a genus generalissimum, that hath no genus: again he saith, ex aliis, not telling us which, because any of the arguments a foregoing may go into it, even a distribution, yea a testimonony also, as we may see in the descrption of fama: so that it may arise from in artificials, yet must it not be taught after them, because artificials must have nothing to do with inartificials.   

Atque haec succincta brevitas non est in hac specie perpetua, sed saepe illustriorem, & magnificentiorem explicationem desiderat.  
Our Author doth commorari upon the use of a description, showing that it is not always so brief as before▪ but sometime we shall lay it out in all the simples in the thing.   

Sed saepè illustriorem, & magnificentiorem, etc.  
That is, when we deliver things that are magis illustriora, et magnificentiora, it is requisite we should lay them out more at large than those that are of less moment.   

Sic gloria describitur in Miloniaena.  
Sed tamen ex omnibus praemiis virtutis si esset habenda ratio praemiorum, amplissimum esse praemium, gloriam, etc.  
Glory is argued from his genus praemium: praemium from his subject virtus, then à comparatis amplissimum; last, ab effectis.   

Sic 4. Aeneid. fama discribitur.  
Extemplo Libyae magnas ut fama per urbes,  
Fama malum, quod non aliud velocius ullum, etc.  
Fama is the aliquid argued by her effect of going, than the subject of place, urbes, and magnas an adjunct to urbes, urbes Libya the integrum, extemplo an adjunct of time: malum a genus, and malum is argued by an adjunct, swiftness, à minore. Monstrum another genus, horrendum an adjunct, mirabile dictu a testimony, nec dulci declinat somno a disparate.   

Tales sunt descriptiones plantarum, animalium in Physicis; item fluminum, etc.  
That is, when we lay out their whole quiddity at large: and thus have we seen all the artificial arguments that are in any thing: and so have seen the thing both within and without. Lastly, we shall hear that, having seen all in a thing that we have heard before, then may we safely give testimony of it as we see occasion, and not before.    

CHAP. XXXII,  

De testimonio Divino.  
Exposito artificiali argumento, sequitur inartificiale. Argumentum inartificiale est, quod non suae natura, sed assumpta artificialis alicujus argumenti vi arguit.  
WE have heard of artificial arguments, and there can be nothing that shall be in the artificio of any thing, but we have heard it: so that if we look at any of the creatures of God to see the root, the causes of it, and then the whole circumference and limitation thereof, we may by these arguments taught before, see it throughly. Now whereas one man cannot see all things, though at the first all things were made for one man, the Lord hath in wisdom ordained that we should receive somethings by reports from others; for as the world was to increase both in men and other creatures, it was impossible that one man should see all things intus & incute: so that whereas at the beginning all things being made for one man, and he afterwards could not see them, yet still it is so far forth true whilst all men see all things. It is called inartificiale for the contrary reason that artificiale was so called, namely of being in the thing, whereas this is not in the nature of the thing, but externè altogether: so that we may see his force by this, having no farther to do with the thing, then only by witnessing of it.   

Exposito artificiali argumento, etc.  
This transition contains the conclusion of all that went before, and the proposition of that which follows: and here again we may see how artificial arguments go before inartificials, because inartificial arguments have no ground but as they are backed with artificials. And this doctrine we may see to be true by the practice of common people; for if a man give testimony of that he knows not, others will say he doth he knows not what: For as no man can give testimony of that he knows not; so no man ought to receive a testimony, but as it is backed with artificials, otherwise he knows not the thing sufficiently as he should; and if he first hear a testimony of a thing, and afterward come to see the thing, he will then say he knows it, not because one testified so much, but because himself saw it to be so. It is called Argumentum inartificiale, because it never comes into Art to make up a Rule, though it may come in as a commoration to prove a rule syllogistically; but method is the disposition of axioms, not of syllogisms: now a testimony of a thing belongs to that Art to which the thing witnessed doth belong: as Aristotle's authority against the creation of the world belongs to Divinity, there to be confuted in the doctrine of the creation.   

Argumentum inartificiale sequitur.  
It is an Argument, for it is effected ad arguendum, but after a new manner, for it is externè: but as it is grounded upon the Artificials, so it is effected to argue.   

Argumentum inartificiale est, quod non sua natura, sed assumpta alicujus artificialis, argumenti vi arguit.  
It is of power to argue, as we heard before, but not vi sua: For when a man beareth witness of a thing, we receive it, presuming that he is familiarly acquainted with the thing that he witnesseth: so that arguit, but not sua natura: for alas, what harmony is there between the witnesser considered in his own nature, and the thing witnessed, considered in its own nature? None at all: so that we must look at either of these for their natures.   

Sed assumpta, etc.  
So that by the force of some artificial Argument taken unto it, it doth argue, ergo, this teacheth us not easily to receive every testimony hand over head, but first to look whether the testis be well acquainted with the thing witnessed, otherwise as it may be an error in him to give testimony of a thing he knows not, so may it be no less error in us that receive such a testimony. This we see reproved in common matters among men, and it teacheth us to receive the testimony of a man, not so much because ipse dixit; but because we are sure he knows the thing throughly.   

Vi assumpta.  
Nor that it is ortum argumentum, for orta did argue with the same force that the first did, from whence they did arise, but a testimony doth not argue with the force of an artificial, be it primum or ortum, though it be backed with artificial. The cause, effect should be in the witnesser, but they are not in the witness: if the testis have seen any one argument, we are so far to receive his testimony, and no farther: if he have seen more arguments, or all of them, then are we much more to receive his witness.   

Itaque cum exquisita rerum veritas subtilius exquiritur, per exiguam vim probationis habet.  
This being the nature of an inartificial, it hath little force to argue of itself: for all his strength is aliunde.   

Veritas.  
Truth belongs to an axiom, here he means, if we would see it to be ens, or the entity of it, surely this argument can stand us in no great stead: the testimony only swims in our brain, but we do not see the thing in its subtle parts: as if he should say, the artificial arguments do argue subtly, the inartificial more grossly.   

In civilibus autem et humanis rebus plerumque hoc argumentum praecipuam fidem è moribus arguentis efficit, si prudentia virtus, et benevolentia adfuerint.  
He stays upon the use of an inartificial argument. In the matters of the Commonwealth, or in matters concerning private men, this argument hath his special credit; because in this kind they are most received, we know all the matters in our Courts pass by writings or testimonies of men; and in these civil matters we look more after the men, then after the thing: there are Artificials here in these matters, but we look not at them; still we are to understand that the witnesses know the artificials: the reason is, because they are things done in time long before, which therefore cannot be decided but by writings or men's testimonies.   

Praecipuam fidem habet.  
That is, it doth urge most in respect of the subject, whereto it is used.   

E moribus arguentis, efficit, si prudentia virtus, et benevolentia adfuerint.  
This inartificial Argument hath not praecipuam fidem from itself, but as it proceedeth from him that is prudent, virtuous and benevolent. Prudentia is that skill a man hath to bring his Rule, or any deduct from his Rule to practice, that is, if he be not simple, and silly, to tattle and prattle he knows not what, then praecipuam fidem habet: so that prudentia doth require discretion, and judgement to know and deliver a truth. That commandment, Thou shalt not bear false witness, is here taught.  
Again, if he have not virtue joined with his prudentia, that is, if he make not conscience of witnessing the truth when he knoweth it, we ought not to receive it: so that as he must be able to judge of the truth, so must he have conscience to utter it.  
Lastly, because notwithstanding though he may be judicious and virtuous, yet it may be that even the best man may be carried with an affection either of love or anger, ergo, he must have good will to speak the truth howsoever, ergo, it is left to a malefactor, that if any of the jury seem not to have these things, he may except against him.   

Id uno nomine testimonium dicitur.  
Of the second part: for testis and testimonium are the arguments arguing; it is so called in respect of the thing witnessed, because that is nearest. Now some Logicians, as Kickerman, place testimonium in judgement, not in invention, for (saith he) it is an axiom, but he is decived, for the testis and the testimony are arguments, and make but one axiom: why, one argument may be an axiom, as a wise man is worthy respect: here a wise man is an axiom; but when it is a testimony it is not an axiom: True it is, that the testis speaks rem testatam axiomatically most commonly, and that is the reason our Author speaks so often of veritas here in this chapter; but as it is a testimony, it is no axiom.   

Est divinum vel humanum.  
Here is a distinction of testimonies, I dare not call it a distribution, for these parts belong not to a testimony, but as divers modi, we know that divinum testimonium is given from him from whom nothing is hid, but that he sees all things, the humane is not so: so that testimonium comes to be respected these two ways. Now if question be made, that divinum testimonium is beyond all controversy; surely if God say it we are to receive it: for God is good, and knows all, and no evil dwells with him, neither doth he wish evil to his. Man may say with the Academics, hoc tantum s●io, me nihil scire, ergo, if a divine and humane testimony be compared together, the humane is to give place to the divine: neither is there any divine testimony, but if we look after it, we shall see it in the thing: so that a divine testimony is most absolute, not quatenus testimonium, but in respect of of testis: hence do we plead so for the truth of the Scriptures, We say that we believe that which the Church delivereth, because God says it to our hearts by his holy Spirit, this is divinum: The Church of Rome says we are to believe it because the Church saith it, but that is but humanum, ergo, not so excellent. Again, they are not content to make the Church a witness of the Scriptures, but most absurdly the cause of them. But God, as he is the Author of them, so he is the witnesser by his Spirit: and it is one thing to consider God as the cause of them, and another to consider him as the testis thereof.   

In divinis testimoniis numerantur non solum deorum oraculi, sed etiam responsa vatum & fatidiorum.  
Our Author brings devilish examples, not divine: and he might have done much better if he had brought testimony out of Scripture; but the reason why he doth not is this, we know Logic is a general Art of all things whatsoever, ergo, the Scriptures not being received among all people, and he regarding that which was more common in use, as the Poet's Fables, and such like, and that which was more generally received, ergo, he omits the Scripture. Now here in the examples following we shall see that these oracula were oracula diabolorum, and responsa vatum were of liars. So that we must understand by divinum testimonium, that which is divinum in truth, and not only in name: for as there are many called Gods, and yet but one true God; so there are many divine testimonies, and yet but one true divine testimony.   

Cicero 3. Catiline, Nam ut illa omittam (ait Orator) visas nocturno tempore ab occidente faces, ardoremque coeli, ut fluminum jactus, etc.  
Strange signs were seen about the time of Catilins' conspiracy, burning heat, flashings appearing in the heaven, so that the gods did by them witness these things. So when God doth at any time show forth his justice, as he did in Jerusalem by the sword hanging over it, and by the strange bringing forth of the lamb by an heifer standing at the Altar to be sacrificed, or by comets, & such like, they are testimonies of some judgement to come.   

Deinde paulo post.  
Quo quidem tempore cum Aruspices ex tota Hetruria convenissent, etc.  
Here Tully makes many divine testimonies of Catilins' conspiracy, and of the state of Rome.  
Tandem cum dixisset, ut ex Aruspicum responsis ludi facti, & Jovis signum majus factum conversumque ad orientem, tum ait:  
Nun illud vero ita praesens erat, ut nutu Jovis optimi maximi factum esse videatur?  
Tully makes this among the rest a sign of Catalins conspiracy: they had made Jupiter's image a very little one, and therefore they took it down, and made it bigger, and it was set upon the stool looking toward the Senate, even at that time when these fellows of Catalin went through the Town, and thereby it did as it were command the Senators to look after these wretched fellows.   

Brevis est illud Tibulli.  
Quod si vera canunt sacris oracula templis,  
Haec illi nostro nomine dicta refer:  
Hoc tibi conjugium pr●mittit Delius ipse  
Faelix, ac alium desine velle virum.  
He would persuade her to marry, because Apollo had foretold that it should be fortunate with them.    

CHAP. XXXIII.  

De testimonio humano legis & sententiae.  
Testimonium humanum est common, aut proprium.  
KNowing that a humane testimony doth rest upon the artificial arguments, it cannot be so strong as divinum is: yet it may be true. Est common, aut proprium, because the more witnesses it hath, the stronger it is: that which is testified by one man alone is weaker, because one man may sooner be deceived than many: he may see only one artificial argument, they may see more, yea all: so that as a divine testimony is to be preferred before an humane, so a humane that is common, is to be preferred and received before an humane that is proper.   

Commune ut lex, & illustris sententia.  
Lex a law, a rule which is received either by the whole world, as the law of Nations; or of some peculiar Countries, as the laws of a private state: and this hath less force in it than the former, ergo, if the witnesses stand of more together, and of one alone still holding all of them prudent, virtuous and benevolent, we are to receive that which is witnessed by more men, sooner than the other. Now then where the Church of Rome reasons with us, it is not better to go to the Church, than to a private man? yes, but they must be prudent, virtuous and benevolent: again, they must see the artificial arguments of that witness, for else if one man shall bring testimony from the word of God, we are rather to receive his: else we prefer an humane testimony before a divine. Again, if it be an humane testimony, and a humane testimony that we compare together, let not a private man stand up to stir with his mere testimony against a whole assembly.  
The reason of the Creed being generally received in all Churches, is this, because it hath a divine testimony, ergo, next to the testimony of the Church, we are to prefer the common testimony, and then the private, as it doth not jar with the common one.   

Illustris sententia.  
For though it be not a law, yet is it generally received, as notable for truth: now he calls it illustris, opposing it to obscura, which though it may have truth in it, yet is it not so famous to be received. We say vox populi is vox Dei, because all truth comes from him.   

Legis autem & non scriptae, & scriptae, testimonium est. Pro Milone.  
Est enim (judices) non scripta, sed nata lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus; verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, etc.  
For there are some laws that are customs, and they are not written: indeed in civil affairs, it so comes to pass that we cannot see all, but are fain to leave some things to custom: yet there may be some laws written in our hearts, which we call natural.  
This is witnessed, that it is lawful for a man to defend himself by the law of Nature.   

Et ibidem.  
Quod si duodecem tabulae nocturnem furem quoquo modo, diurnum autem si se telo defender it interfici impune voluerunt, &c▪  
Why a man may slay his adversary by the Law of the twelve tables, which in the night time allows it.   

Sententiae illustres sunt proverbia.  
That is, old says, as they call them, because they are generally received, are called proverbs: ut pares cum paribus facillime congregantur: birds of a feather will fly together.  
Sparctam nactus es, you have an office look to it. This was occasioned thus, when they had chosen their King at Sparta, they used this proverb to him, Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna. Illustres sententiae are genus to proverbia, and dicta sapientum.   

Sunt item dicta sapientum.  
These were private testimonies at their original, came to be general afterwards because of the common receipt of them. Nosce teipsum. Socrates was counted the wisest man that lived in his time: and whereas the Mathematics and natural Philosophy then flourished, he was the first that taught civility: and the subject thereof is the knowledge of a man's self, ergo, he taught his Scholars this lesson. Nosce teipsum. He means to know Moral Philosophy, Ethics, Economics, Politics, etc. Ne quid nimis: too much of any thing is good for nothing.   

Proprium testimonium est, ut Platonis illud, 1. ad Quintum fratrem.  
Atque ille quidem princeps ingenii, & doctrinae, Plato, etc.  
That State is happy where Philosophers are Princes, or where Princes are Philosophers: Plato saith it, that is testimonium proprium.   

Talia sunt in Poetis. 6. Aeneid.  
Discite justitiam moniti, & ne temnite divos.  
Sic Homerico illo versu.  
Ajax autem ex Salamine duxit duodecim naves.  
The Athenians and the Megarenses had fought so long, that there was a law made at Athens, that none should speak of Salamis. Now Solon put a rope about his neck, and ran through the City, saying this verse, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. by this means the Athenians rising together got Salamis from the Megarenses, and it was belonging to Athens, because of the King thereof.   

Vivorum testimonia non sunt non tantum cum quaeritur de fundo, aut caede, etc.  
He doth not make a distinction of testimonies to be dead or alive, but he means by mortuorum those when they were alive, that are now dead: he makes many kinds of private testimonies, as obligations, confessiones, insiurandi, etc.   

Obligationis exemplum est, 5. Philip. Audebo etiam oblige are fidem meam (P. C.) vebis populoque Romano, etc.  
Augustus Caesar was yet a young youth, who went to school when his father Caesar was slain, and Antony made great stirs, thinking he should be in Caesar's place. Now the Romans offer the Soldiers this Augustus to be their Captain, that they might set him up against Antony, telling them that he would both overcome their enemies, and also that he would be a good Governor.   

Pignus autem obligatio quaedam est, ut apud Virg. Elog. 1.  
Vis ergo inter nos quid possit uterque vicissim  
Experiamur? ego hanc vitulam, ne forte recuses, etc.  
So a pledge or a pawn is a special kind of obligation: they that put out money to usury can tell that a pawn is an obligation.   

Confessio est libera, vel expressa tormentis, quae proprie quaestio dicitur. Tale fuit argumentum contra Milonem quod a Cicerone deridetur.  
Age vero, quae erat aut qualis quaestio?  
Confessio is when a man is a witness against himself, and it is either voluntary, or expressa tormentis, quae proprie quaestio dicitur, that is a Commission. How did the Commission go out? where is Ruscio and Casca? did Clodius lay wait for Milo? he did. Then when it was answered that they should be hanged for saying so, they answered again, that Clodius did not lie in wait for Milo, hoping for liberty.   

Hunc etiam referri potest argumentum, quo utimur, cum affirmationis nostrae approbationem, & experientiam proponimus.  
That is, this may be added to confession, when by experience we tell a thing. Would any body lend Volcatius twenty shillings, let him try, tecto recipiet nemo, no man will so much as receive him to house. If you were in my case, you would find it.   

Jusiur andum etiam testimonium est, 6. Aeneid. Per superos, & si qua fides tellure sub ima est, Invitus, regina, tuo de littere cessi.  
This is the last, and is humanum, because it is his witness that swears it.  
Ob. But is not that Divinum, when God swears by himself.  
An. No, because it is in respect of our weakness. 2ly, because we here consider God as if he were man. If there be any faith under the earth: now there is none.   

Reciprocatio hic obscurior est, ut quia testatum verum sit, testis sic etiam verax.  
Here is a reciprocation in a testimony, but it is more obscure, than that which we heard of before in the doctrine of a distribution, & definition, ut quia testatum, etc. the reason is here because that whatsoever the witnesser shall be, such shall the witness be: if he be prudent, virtuous and benevolent, his witness will be prudent, virtuous & benevolent, that is as if he should say, if the testis be true, then will the witness be true.   

Obscurior est.  
Because a man may bear false witness when he speaks the truth, and likewise because the simple man may sometimes speak the truth as well as the prudent man.     

THE LOGICIANS SCHOOLMASTER.  
The Second Book. De Judicio.  

CHAP. I.  

Quid Judicium. Adhuc prima Dialecticae artis pars fuit, in Inventione; pars altera sequitur in Judicio.  
WE have hitherto heard of simples, which simples may be composites, but yet we respect them as one joined to another, as man is made of many arguments, but may be considered as a simple: now we come to consider how one thing is joined with another thing. The glue which we heard of before, was that affection of one argument to another, which the common Logicians call categoria: but when they are put together in disposition, they belong to judgement: so that here we shall hear of nothing but laying of simples together, that is, of arguments with arguments; and that is either of two sides, of one argument to one, as in a simple axiom: or of three sides together, as in a syllogism: or lastly of axioms one after another for the help of memory, which is method: so that when we have seen this, we may see the reach of our reason, and the rule of it.   

Adhuc prima Dialecticae artis pars fuit, etc.  
This is a perfect transition, for it is long since we heard this distribution: our Author saith in inventione, and then sequitur Judicium: so that he teacheth us that the first part of Logic is conversant about the invention of arguments, and shows us that the first part of Logic came to be called invention by a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct: so judicium came to name the second part of Logic by a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct: or if you will, Invention and Judgement came to be the parts of Logic by a metonymy of the effect for the cause, for so invenire and judicare are acts performed by the first and second part of Logic, which if Kickerman had well considered he would not have reproved Ramus for this distribution.   

Sequitur judicium.  
Judicium is properly the act of our understanding, as it doth discern and determine truth and falsehood: for it comes of judex a judge: and when an axiom is made, our judgement comes to judge it: so that the name will in the end hardly be found large enough for this part of Logic. I would rather distribute it thus, Dialecticae partes duae sunt, Inventio, & Dispositio, and then Dispositio est judicium, aut methodus: and judicium est axiomaticum, aut syllogisticum. My reasons are these, first because in method I see no more judgement than in invention, but it is properly of the order of axioms. Again, judgement is for truth, and falsehood, and that is the drift of axiomatical and syllogistical judgement, ergo, they two are to be coupled together. Again, I observe this in nature, that there are three internal senses, fancy, cogitation and memory, for the common sense is all one with fancy. Now these serve reason, as the two affections love and hatred serve will; for as there is the affection of love to embrace that which will willeth, and the affection of hatred to hate that which will nilleth: so there is to serve reason, first a fancy that serves invention; cogitation and memory that serve disposition. Now these three are distinct in nature, because their organs and instruments by which they work are distinct, for the organ or instrument of fancy is heat, the instrument of cogitation is drith, and moisture of memory. Now the opposite to heat is cold, therefore cogitation and memory communicate in cold: then cold is a dry or moist cold, the dry cold is the instrument of cogitation, the moist cold is the organ of memory, but this cold must be but in a degree, for if it be too cold all is marred. Now then cogitation and memory communicating together in cold, there must be a genus, wherein judgement and method must also communicate, and that is dispositio: so that as these organs are by nature severed in man, so nature must sever our reason into invention and disposition, and disposition into judicium and methodus: and that these are distinct in nature many reasons do show, for when a man is first born, then is his invention best, his judgement is best when he is passed juvenis, he remembers best when he is a child, and then best for invention, because his head is then hottest; afterward best for judgement, because than his brain is driest: first of all best for memory, because his head then is moistest: again, man in the morning remembers best, because than his brain is moist by reason of the fumes that ascend to the brain, when he sleepeth; at noon he is fittest for cogitation, because his brain is then driest; at night he invents best, because than his brain is cold: and as in the Su●● course, her heat is moistest in the morning, driest at noon, and coldest at night: so is it with man's reason: so that the internal senses are thus divided: yet here do we rather admit of a dicotomie, because else we should leave out a genus, namely dispositio. Again, because the ends of invention and judgement are various: now it may seem strange, that Logic teacheth these parts thus divided: for if it be true, that a child hath his memory first best, than his cogitation, and then his fancy, why should not method be taught first, than judgement, and lastly invention? The reason is this indeed, if a child should have use of his disposition first, it would hinder his growth, for a child hath least use of his reasonable soul for a long time, because it is an hindrance of the acts of the vegetative and sensitive soul, by reason hereof if he should be moistest, he could not grow to that stature which is fitting: or if he should be dry, it would not extend his moisture again afterward; that his fancy is moistest, it is for the bene esse of the body, for moisture is most predominant in him, till he come to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his age, and then his moisture cannot extend itself by reason of his heat, and then he becomes most judicious: so that these are contrary to the order of method, for the good of man. Again, a child hath his faculty of memory principal, that then he may gather things into a store-house, and afterward he must come to judge them: ergo, it is necessary that he should have the best memory first, not so much for the act of his reason, as for the growth of his body (he is for anima vegetativa a plant: for sensitiva an animal) and yet there is no one act of any of these faculties above, but a●l act together: yet so as one is predominant: ergo, we say old age brings wisdom. Now wisdom is sapientia, that is syllogistical judgement; or prudentia, that is, the application thereof upon every occasion. Again, syllogistical judgement is for axiomatical judgement, for when an axiom is doubtful, we use the light of a third argument, and so going back to the rule of true and false axioms, we judge it to be true, or false: again, axiomatical and syllogistical judgement communicate in the disposition of arguments, whereas method disposeth axioms immediately, arguments mediately; again, method hath nothing to do with syllogistical judgement no more than with axiomatical judgement, ergo, we hear how these should be distributed from the organs of them in natural Philosophy, and from the very act of reason. Now for Kickerman who makes a tricotomy, he desiring to make a perfect Art leaves out a genus.   

Dispositio, est secunda pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis ad bene judicandum.  
This term dispositio commendeth to us the whole drift of the second part of Logic, that is, a disposing, severing, or putting arguments asunder, it is pars Logicae, taking it for the doctrine of Logic, it contains a portion thereof, which hath nothing to do with invention, I mean for precept, but only for use, for invention and judgement are as opposite as white and black.   

Pars Logicae.  
For indeed it belongs to no other Art, no not to Rhetoric for doctrine, but only for use, for as for their order of exordium, narratio, etc. it is nothing but method: ergo, it doth not follow, that because the Rhetorician useth disposition, ergo, it belongs to Rhetoric. The Orator, the Grammarian, etc. are general men, yet their Arts are distinct.   

Logicae.  
Because Logic is the rule of reason's act, and there is also this second act of reason to let us see how God hath disposed all things in nature: for so all things but God are composite, yet there are simples too; yes, but not in use subsistent in themselves, but ever with others: ergo, God's simplicity is a property that cannot be communicated to any other thing.   

Secunda.  
For there cannot be a disposition, till there be things to be put together, as a Bricklayer cannot lay bricks together, except he have bricks. Again, we know Grammar hath two parts, first Etymology of a word alone, and Syntax of more words together: so here there must be of things, first a simple consideration of arguments asunder, and then a disposing of them together.   

De disponendis.  
Our Author saith de disponendis: so that this it is, the whole of these rules following is to dispose things with things: or seeing God practise first in this rule, we imitate him: for if man be God's steward over his creatures, it is requisite he should know them, that he may take them to his comfort.   

argumentis.  
Surely it doth dispose arguments but mediately, not immediately, first it disposeth axioms, than arguments under axioms, for else I do not see how method will come under this definition, ergo, we are to understand it thus, de disponendis argumentis, that is, of disposing axioms immediately, arguments mediately, as they make up the axioms.   

Ad bene judicandum.  
This should be left out, for it belongs not to method, for it is ad memoriam recolendum rather, ergo, we may leave this out, yet he stays upon it, and gives the reason thereof, certa enim dispositionis regula unumquodque judicatur, this is true, but I deny that every rule of disposition tendeth ad bene judicandum, therefore Aristotle in his Problems saith, that a man of great judgement hath no great good memory, and the reason is this, because their instruments are contrary; so that certa, but not omni dispositionis regula unum quodque judicatur. Now from this Judicium, & dispositio pro eodem dicitur: yea but not rightly, and as I take it, here Ramus was mistaken: they that made this distribution of Logic first, as Tully, Aristotle, Plato, they knew not method, but shut it out of Logic, otherwise they would not have called this part judgement, And that they knew not method it is plain, because they never spoke of method.    

CHAP. II.  

De axiomatis affirmatione, & negatione. Judicium, est axiomaticum vel dianoeticum.  
DIsposition hath two parts, judicium and methodus, this is the true disposition: these do communicate in a disposition: for why? here in judgement we dispose arguments with arguments, in method we dispose axioms with axioms, ergo, both of them dispose. Again, their instruments are consenting in cold, ergo, both of them are contrary to hear, for that will sever things. Drith and moisture cleaving together, ergo, these are the parts judicium of disposing arguments to judge them, method of placing axioms to remember them. Judicium is first, because method disposeth only that which judgement frames, even as invention is before disposition: and this is wonderful to consider, for there can nothing be well and sound remembered, but that which is first judged, and nothing sound remembered, but that which is throughly invented And it is true with me, if I understand a thing rightly, I never forget it, else I never remember it: so that if a man forget any thing, he hath not judged it well, because he hath not invented it well: to see a thing in the cause, that is, the argument, for there causa is general, that is, our intelligentia, to make axioms is our scientia, to discourse is our sapientia, to apply every thing in time and place is our prudentia, to work the like our Art, these are the things that make a man a scholar, and a wise man, ergo, a man that shall take this course in his studies shall be an exquisite man every way, ergo, in the study of any Art this must be the way for him that desireth to be a scholar, first to see the rule of his Art, than the arguments, than the sapientia, than the prudentia, and so he shall remember it for ever.  
What Disposition is we have heard, and how there are two kinds of it; now judicium est dispositio ad bene judicandum; so that the use of this second part is of great use for the perfecting of judgement, for if we read things without judging them, we shall many times swallow that for truth, which we shall in the end find to be sophistry.   

Axioma est dispositio argumenti cum argumento, qua esse aliquid, aut non esse judicatur.  
Axioma, The word in his proper signification is, worthiness, or dignity, and by a metonymy of the adjunct for the subject, it signifieth such a truth as is worthy the receiving, or believing: now axioma dubium is not worthy this worthy name Axioma, because it is not per se manifestum, but we are fain to demur upon it, so that some axioms are not so plain as others: others also there are which are so plain, as he that cannot see them, or doubteth of them, deserveth the whip, Now because this first part of disposition is of a clear truth, ergo, he calls it axioma, as if he should say an honourable truth: putting us in mind thereby, that though this name be common to all axioms, yet it is principally to them which are per se manifesta. Again, he rather takes this name, because others will not so well fit his purpose. Again, the other names enunciatum, enunciatio, etc. belong rather to a syllogism.   

Axioma est dispositio.  
That is acknowledged, that there is such an axiom, as is plain, palpable and manifest: yet are there others also laid together with such a subtle hand, as we cannot easily see them, the thread is so fine as that we cannot see it without a candle or torch. To see the cause in nature why Iron goeth to a Loadstone, is hard: and axioma dubium, and subtillitas, in their tropical signification are all one: such are those argutiae arguing in a fine manner.  
Objection. If man had stood, should he not have needed syllogistical judgement, had there been no use of that?  
Answ. Yes, for he should have first invented before he had judged, and though his reason should have been so clear, as that he should have seen many things in nature, yet not all: For these Rules are eternal.  
Again, some things lie upward, which are plain, some also lie downward, which are not easily perceived: Again, if we will acknowledge that in Art many deductions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be drawn from a first Rule, and that we may apply a first Rule a thousand ways, why then we must acknowledge syllogistical judgement. Before he told us that dispositio was pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis: here he saith Judicium is dispositio argumenti cum argumento, here there is dispositio argumenti cum argumento, because Judicium is dispositio, but to dispose one argument with another is peculiar to an axiom.  
Here question may be made, whether it may not be dispositio argumentorum cum argumentis, or argumenti cum argumentis, or argumentorum cum argumento? Yes, but if it be argumentorum it is argumenti, ergo, this is more general: so that he saith argumenti cum argumento, as in a simple axiom: or argumentorum cum argumentis, aut contra, as in a composite axiom: so here is the playing at two-hand ruff, for here are but to sides in an axiom, ergo, in this respect he saith, argumenti cum argumento, argumenti in general, because all the kinds of arguments may be disposed in an axiom.   

Qua esse aliquid aut non esse judicatur.  
So that the drift of judicium is to look at an aliquid, so doth invention; but yet it goes further, and judges it esse aut non esse. Now aliquid, a thing, that is ens in genere, being an aliquid, is judged to be this or that: so that here we may see that what the common Logicians teach, that in an axiom there is a subject and a predicate; and the predicate is so called because it is foretold in the subject, & contra: as when I say, homo est animal, animal tells me somewhat of homo, and homo tells me somewhat of animal: and the aliquid, which is the subject, is she ed esse, aut non esse: hence it is, that an axiom shows aliquid esse, aut non esse, because every thing that is, is composite, and the simples are imperfect: he doth not say, aliquid esse verum, aut falsum; for if I say, homo est lapis, I say a thing to be, though it be false; and when I say, homo est animal, I say a thing to be, and it is true.  
Now divers bring in here quaestio, and they say it is simplex, which is the same with an Argument; or Composite, which is the same with an Axiom: as if there were no use of an Axiom, but by way of question: but we know that a question belongs to a Syllogism, and to make it as general as Axioma, will not be either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

Latinè enunciatum Enunciatio, Pronunciatum, Pronunciatio, effatum dicitur.  
Our Author s●ays upon the naming of Axioma, because few Logicians besides himself have received this name, therefore lest his Scholars should think it strange whereabout he goes, and whether he had forgotten himself, he tells them, that he means by axioma that which others call Enunciatum, etc. Propositio properly belongs to a Syllogism, and is the thesis, and the assumptio is the apotheosis. Why saith he Latinè, because axioma is graecè: as if he should say, I use this word as best sitting my turn, for no Latin term utters this thing so well. Again, the reason is (as if he should say) I had rather use this term, because the Latins fetching the tongue from the Greeks, have not names so fitting the things as they, because enunciatum, enunciatio, etc. have an adherency of words, and they do name Logic by Grammar, whereas we know an Axiom may be when it is not uttered.   

Enunciatum, enunciatio, &c,  
Enunciatum signifies the thing concrete, and enunciatio signifies the axiomation (as we may say) of it, the disposition of it, and so of the rest.   

Axioma est affirmatum, aut negatum: affirmatum, quando vinculum ejus affirmatur: negatum quando negatur.  
We have heard that there are but two sides of an axiom, and to this end qua judicatur aliquid esse, aut non esse. Now this axiom is distributed first into his adjuncts, therefore affirmatum and negatum attend upon the esse and non esse, which the axiom doth deliver. Homo est animal, here aliquid esse dicitur, and it is affirmatum: homo non est animal, here aliquid non esse dicitur, and it is negatum: so homo est lapis, here aliquid dicitur esse, & affirmatur: homo est lapis, here aliquid dicitur non esse, & negatur: so that the affirmation and negation of an axiom is not of the esse and non esse of it. If he said affirmatum, qua esse aliquid, here he doth not mean esse, but esse, that is affirmatum: as when I say, homo est lapis, Esse, and non esse are other things than affirmatum and negatum: but when a thing is so, it ought to be affirmed, and when it is not so, it ought to be denied. Here I say, he distributes an axiom into his proper adjuncts, ergo, this distribution is not imperfect, as we said before; because then the species which follow should be left out, for some there are which say a distribution is perfect or imperfect, even as a definition is perfect, or descriptio; but that is false: for we use not a description, when we can have a perfect definition, but we use a distribution ex adjunctis, when we also have a distribution generis in species. Again, it is not imperfect, because it cannot be a distribution of genus into the species, or of integrum into the members imperfectly; for than affirmatum would signify a simple axiom, and negatum a composite axiom. Again, if this distribution were left out, there would want a rule of Art, which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Now before we heard of Arguments that were affirmantia and negantia, here he saith, axioma est affirmatum aut negatum, for the band is it that denies or affirms the arguments one of another, ergo, the axiom is denied, aut contra: yea when there are Arguments affirmantia and negantia disposed in an axiom, it is affirmatum aut negatum: as when I say, darness is not light, the band denies light of darkness.   

Affirmatum quando vinculum ejus affirmatur.  
Why have we not yet heard of vinculum? If here be his first place, why doth he not describe it?  
Answer. Because we heard that Dispositio was pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis, and that judicium was dispositio argumenti cum argumento qua esse aliquid aut non esse judicatur: and in disposition we have this band, for though there be a positio of arguments, does that is a sunder: yet there is a composition too: so that we have it both in the general definition of disposition, and in the special description of Judicium.   

Vinculum.  
Now indeed vinculum is vox aequivoca, for it is the band of an axiom, of a syllogism, and of method: the band of method is called transitio, which ties two several doctrines together, as two banks that have water running between them are tied together by a bridge, ergo, in this case it cannot be defined.   

Vinculum affirmatur.  
Then we see that the affirmation of the axiom is from the band, and not from the arguments: and when we say homo est lapis, and homo non est lapis, we have a vinculum in both: though indeed where the arguments agree, there should be an est, and where they disagree, there should be a non est.   

Negatum quando negatur.  
For if it be ●ffi●matum, quando vinculum ejus affirmatur, so negatum contra: so that here evermore look to the vinculum: now this distribution doth not require that we should always affirm and deny too the same axiom and so look at it, neither shall we always find it so, though it may be so; because these are but adjuncts to an axiom, and where the same axiom is affirmed or denied.   

Hinc nascitur axiomaticum contradictio, quando idem axi●ma affirmatur, & negatur.  
So that in contradiction there is this peculiar, that the same axiom must be affirmed and denied: so that the true place of contradiction is here: he saith, Hinc nascitur: whence? from the affirmation and negation of the same axiom. Now the reason why the same axiom may be affirmed and denied, is because these are not essential to an axiom, and the axiom is the same whether it be affirmed or denied: the same it is also for esse, and non esse, but not for affirmation and negation: it is the same man that was in the morning cold, and warm at noon. Now here in disputation we are carefully to observe, that there be a contradiction, where we make one.   

Idem axioma.  
That is, the same arguments must be both affirmed and denied, one of another: and this we must carefully look unto, else may we contend de lana caprina. Again, he said idem.  
Object Homo est doctus, and homo non est doctus, are these the same arguments? yes, and the same axiom, but differing only in quality; they are subjectum and adjunctum: but when I say homo est doctus, and understand it of homo, which is not doctus, ●s Thirsites, it is still the same argument, but the arguments are disparates.    

CHAP. III.  

De vero, & falso.  
Axioma deinde est verum, aut falsum: verum quando pronunci●t utires est; falsum contra.  
IVdicium was either axiomaticum or syllogisticum: the axiomaticum was that which shown a thing to be, or not to be, and it was first distributed into affirmatum and negatum: now again, an axiom is distributed secondly into verum and falsum, which is by nature after the other, because an axiom is not true, or false, till it be affirmed or denied: as when I say homo and animal, I do not say that any thing is true or false, till I affirm that homo est animal, or deny him to be animal: so that truth and falsehood do arise from affirmation and negation: therefore verum and falsum are but adjuncts to an axiom, because they arise from adjuncts, and therefore secondly they are after affirmatum and negatum, because they arise from them. Now we are in our rule of judgement, which must guide our reason: to what end? to see the truth and falsehood of things, ergo, axioma is verum or falsum: and after our reason sees a thing to be verum, then may our will as bonum embrace it; for ens verum and bonum are all one, and here we may see whither verum belongs properly: sometimes indeed it is taken tropically for a like, as when I say this i● a true picture; but I mean that this picture is like such an one; here a similia: but the axiom is this, that this is the picture of such a one, it is true, so that in the end it will come to be proper: another signification we find of verum, as when it is opposed to fictum, but this is not proper, and the meaning is, that ens est is a true axiom: so that every signification at the last will fall out to be the same with this that is here taught. Aut falsum. If there be verum, it must have his contrary, which is falsum. Now though there is not falsum in nature, yet because God so created the things so vera, as they might be otherwise, ergo, there is falsum. The same axiom might be true and false, as we shall see in contingents, ergo, there is both verum and falsum.  
Object. Why may there not be the doctrine of a false syllogism, as well as of a false axiom?  
Answ. The axiom is not a false axiom, quatenus an axiom in Logic, but quatenus we look at the matter of it, for its truth or falsehood in natural Philosophy: so for a syllogism, if it break the rule of a syllogism for form, than it breaks the rule of Logic: but if it do peccare for his matter, than it breaks some rule of some other Art: so that Kickerman is much deceived, for a false syllogism is a false syllogism as it breaks the rule of a syllogism, but the doctrine of a false axiom doth not break the rule of an axiom, ergo, this is fallacia accidentis, and there is an equivocation in the word axiom, and in the word syllogism.   

Verum quando pronunciat utires est.  
Because verum and falsum are but adjuncts, why we handle them together with their subjects, and we define them also by their subjects: so that truth indeed belongs hither ergo, it is not the end of Logic, as some would have it, for then all the parts o● Logic should conspire in this: neither is it the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Logic, for that is method. Now in a true axiom there is required first a pronunciatio, that is, an axiomatical disposition: secondly, it must be utires est. Pronunciatio properly signifies an uttering or showing forth in words, but here he takes it for the same that axi ma is, as he told us before: ergo, he means by pronunciat, quando axiomatur, or axiomat: so that we must not dream that he meaneth, as if an axiom could not be if it be uttered.   

Vtires est.  
Here mark that the truth ariseth from res radically: now he tells us, verum axioma est quando dispositio fit uti res est: so that this refers us to the reality or essence of the thing. What difference is there between ●he res and the axiom? Much, for axiom is an adjunct to the thing; truth is first in God, than secondly, all things are so far forth true, as they answer to the idea in God, for so God created all things, and so they were very good, that is, they answered to his idea of them in himself: so that res is true at the second hand; and because Logic is concrete evermore with the thing, therefore he refers us to the res: so that here we may see what truth is properly, when the axioms do pronounce as the things are; so that first look at the truth in things, which hath it from God, then at the truth of the axiom which hath it from the thing: he saith quando pronunciat, because the same axiom may pronounce one way, and another way, but when it pronounceth utires est, then is it verum. Scaliger thinks he hath found out a great subtlety, who saith there is verit as in oratione, and that is when it answers not to the Idea in God, but to the apprehension in man: now truth lies not in the speech, but in the thing: he makes this comparison, there is Cardan, and his picture made in wax by a signet: he saith the picture is so far forth true, as it answers to the signet, so speech is so far forth true, as it answers man's apprehension. Now the picture is not true, for we must look at truth, as it is in Logic, which doth pronunciat uti res est. But whereas he says speech is true as it answers the thought, that is to say, they are similia: but the axiom here is, whether this picture be like Cardan, neither are we to look at man's thought, but at the thing indeed, speech is the very image of the thing, & so when I say the thing is as a man speaks it, I mean they are fimilia.   

Falsa contra.  
Why did he not say falsum quando pronunciat non uti res est. He shall not need, for it had been a vain repetition of the words going before, because falsum is contrary to verum, and contraria contrariorum sunt consequentia: so that falsum being contrary, whatsoever we hear of afterward affirmed of verum, we must understand the contrary of falsum, therefore whilst some ask why Ramus did distribute verum into contingens, and necessarium, whereas falsum is also so: it is sufficient that he saith falsum contra. Again, he prosecutes it no farther: because when we find an axiom false, we are not to look at it any farther, but there let our reason rest, ergo, he goes according to the act of our reason: but for verum our reason goes further, to see wh●ther it be contingens, or necessarium, so far as our reason is to look after it   

Axioma verum est contingens aut necessarium.  
These follow upon truth, not upon the thing immediately: and good reason, for as verum and falsum hanged upon affirmation and negation, so do these hang upon verum, so that it is contingens verum, and necessarium verum, and not contingens or necessarium axioma next and immediately, and such axioms there are in nature, for the Lord hath so joined some things together in nature, as they may be severed, others he hath so coupled, as that they cannot be disjoined.   

Contingens.  
It is therefore called contingens, because the truth thereof is but tactu, the arguments do but attingere one another, not fasten one in another, as subjectum, and adjunctum are but touching one another.   

Contingens quando sic verum est, ut aliquando falsum esse possit.  
This shows that truth and falsehood are but adjuncts to an axiom, because they do but contingere to it; so that a contingent axiom is of such a thing as may be true at one time, that is, pronunciare uti res est, and at another time falsum, that is, pronunciare utires non est. We find in common Logicians the term probabile, which they often use for axioma contingens, but it hath equivocation with it, for sometimes it is taken for a doubtful axiom, which may be general both to contingens and necessarium, and there it is properly, ergo, when they use it for a contingent axiom, it is a hard metaphor, for who would go about to prove that I sit here, which is contingens, so that probabile belongs to a syllogism: therefore how simply do some define Logic, Ars probabiliter disserendi: by probabiliter disserendi, they mean thema probabile, that is, axioma dubium, and so they join probabile with a syllogism, which properly belongs to the question.   

Quando sic verum est, etc.  
Here mark how contingens is defined by time: we heard of time before in the doctrine of adjunctum, ergo, it hath nothing to do here, ergo, aliquando hath not so much to do with time, as it looks after contingens, which may be verum and falsum at several times: for when a thing is once true, it cannot also be false, but diversis temporibus. Again, when we hear of contingens falsum, there let us leave it; and now falsum is contra, but because every thing is first true before it be false, ergo contingens must be defined quando sic, first verum est, and falsum afterward.   

 aliquando.  
He saith falsum esse possit, non est: for when it is true, it must not of necessity afterward be false, yet he gives the potentia, and says falsum esse possit, though it never be false. As audentes fortuna juvat: the arguments are causa per accidens and the effect.   

Fac enim id hodie esse verum; eras falsum esse poterit.  
He stays upon the doctrine of a contingent axiom, because it is a question in Aristotle, whether futurum contingens be true or false? this we shall answer by and by: only take this, that he doth not tie us to the present time, but it may be future, or to come: it will rain to morrow, this is a contingent axiom.   

Itaque veritatis hujus contingentis judicium, opinio dicitur.  
Truth was an adjunct to the thing, and judgement was the subject to truth: contingency is an adjunct to the truth: and the judgement of the truth of a contingent axiom is but opinio: so that opinio is the judgement of that axiom that is contingent: that I sit here is but opinio, for I may not sit here, so that if one tell it to another, he may be deceived of it. So that if a man teach contingent true axioms in any Art, he shall be deceived: such are many of Aristotle's rules, and of the Aristotelians, as when they say genus is praedicabile, why it may be subjicibile too.   

Que praeteritorum, & praesentium homini certa esse potest, futurorum per naturam non admodum potest.  
See here that the opinio, and judgement of this axiom praeteritorum, & praesentium may be certa: here we learn what our opinio may be of things past, present and to come; so that opinio is here distributed into certa and incerta: certa is duplex, praesentium and praeteritorum. Incerta only futurorum   

Quamvis Deo tempora omnia praesentia sunt.  
It is altogether certa to him: so that in a word we may see all Aristotle's dispute, that all truth is certa, but not to all; and here we see, that notwithstanding the certainty of a thing, yet it may be contingent, and not necessary, so God's decree of man's fall was certa, but not necessary, either by the necessity in an axiom, or by coaction in invention. Quamvis Deo tempora omnia praesentia sunt, here this would be put in, & cui ipse revelavit: for the opinio of truth belongs hither, and not to Divinity.  
Itaque Martialis Priscum merito cavillatur.  
Saepe rogare soles, qualis sim, Prisce, futurus,  
Si fiam locuples, simque repente potens:  
Quenquam posse putas mores narrare futuros?  
Dic mihi, si fias tu Leo, qualis eris.  
Priscus would often ask of Martial, what he would do if he were made rich and mighty suddenly. And Martial would ask him, what a one he would be, if he were a Lion: he cannot tell.   

Necessarium, quando semper verum est, nec falsum esse potest: & illud affirmatum appellatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de omni.  
We have done with verum contingens, verum as it should happen: now we come to necessarium; necessarium in Logic hath many significations: we heard of it before in Invention, where it signified violence, force, coation: but here it is more proper, and it is not opposed to nature as that before, but is that which concurs with nature, and commonly is true by nature.   

Necessarium quando semper verum est, nec falsum potest esse.  
Here we observe first the axioma necessarium is verum: secondly, it is semper verum: thirdly, it is without all possibility of being falsum: now contingens and necessarium arise firstly from the arguments, which when they are but modo quodam necessarium, are so joined together as they may be severed, they make but a contingent axiom: but when they are absolutely agreeing, and so as they cannot be severed in nature, than they make a necessary axiom.   

Quando semper est, erit, aut fuit.  
For by est we are to consider not so much the adsignification, but the connexion of the arguments: again, here is a perpetuity of truth required, so that it must be without all possibility of falsehood, a contingent axiom, though it never be false, yet it may be, but a necessary cannot be; so that by potentia we are to understand the habit, not the act. Now this potentia is in the arguments, as it cannot be that homo should not be animal, it is not in potentia naturae, that this should be false: so that a necessary axiom requiring a potentia, and that potentia is in the things, we must be careful to discern it.  
It is a common opinion, that whatsoever God decreed is necessary.  
Answ. Though it be true that God's decree shall most surely come to pass, yet doth it not put a necessity, for then this necessity must lie in the things, not in the Author of the things: so when we say his decree must come to pass, we mean it must be of necessity, that is, by coaction, and this also is false, for the Lord doth all things by counsel: so that here we are to look at the potentia in the arguments, and not to any external potentia. The not discerning of this necessity ex hypothesi, as they call it, and certainty, makes them take many things for necessary, which are not. So that to imagine such a thing, is to say, that God doth not things consilio: again, to say so, is to make the Stoics faetum, for their fatum was this, because Jupiter said so: so that if they say it cannot be otherwise, it is the Stoics fatum directly.   

Et illud affirmatum appellatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de omni.  
Aristotle doth in his demonstration labour much to show that the rules of Art must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, first, saith he, they must be concluded from the prima and proxima causa, so that he did dream of a demonstration in a syllogism, as when we conclude a property of a subject by the definition: his meaning was that the rules of Art should be most true, and arising from their immediate causes, but there is no syllogistical Art for demonstrations, but as we may dispose many arguments, cause and effect, subject and adjunct, &c, in a simple axiom, having one and the same doctrine: so we may dispose a syllogism, either of contingent axioms, or of necessary axioms in Barbara, as he would have, and yet the doctrine of an explicate is the same: ergo, the doctrine of demonstration is vain. Again, he saith, we conclude from the cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whereas indeed all our concluding is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Object. But it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in respect of the third argument.  
Answ. True, so also I will conclude 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from any other arguments as well as the cause: so that all the doctrine of Aristotle's demonstrations is here in a necessary axiom, and in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now an axiom is necessary here, not that there is any necessity in respect of the rule of Logic, but in respect of the matter of it.  
Object. A contingent axiom may deceive, ergo, his doctrine should not be in Art; as also an inartificial argument is not in Art.  
Answ. The doctrine of them is belonging to Art, as well as any other rules, for they are eternal: so that an axiom is contingent, or necessary in respect of the matter of it, ergo, we shall not need to speak of them in a syllogism; ergo, to distribute a syllogism according to the matter, or form of it (as Kickerman doth) is very absurd. Syllogismus dialecticus is nothing but a syllogism of contingent axioms: syllogismus apodicticus is nothing but a syllogism consisting of necessary axioms: and syllogismus sophisticus is so called from the form of it; and here observe evermore, that if the sophistry lie in any of the arguments alone that are disposed syllogistically, than it is a fallace of the arguments in invention, as non causa pro causa, non effectum pro effecto, etc. If the so phistry lie in form of the syllogism disposed, than it breaks some rule in the doctrine of syllogisms: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a necessary axiom affirmed: so that this is the difference in general of a necessary axiom, and an axiom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the axiom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is always affirmed: so that an axiom necessary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath three things in it, first, it must be semper verum, secondly, it must be without all potentiae of being false, which are general both to contingens, and necessarium: Lastly, it must be affirmatum which is peculiar to itself. He calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it is omnino verum: and the, which includes not only a necessary truth, but also affirmation: for if we predicate an adjunct upon his subject negatively, it will not be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies omnino, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies affirmed: so that it doth not require that an axiom should be general, for a proper axiom may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as if he would define the Sun, Moon, and Stars, so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 requires that it be verum, that is verum necessarium, and that it be de, that is, affirmatum.   

Impossibile contra, quod de nullo unquam verum esse potest.  
This axiom is opposed to necessarium, and also to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and it is contrary to that quoth de nullo, etc. so that because he saith the, therefore it is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, neither is it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are contrary.   

Impossibile.  
Impossibile is a false axiom, and here we may see how falsum still runs along with verum Possibile and impossibile be not species of falsum axioma, for both contingens and necessarium are possibilia, and it is general to them both: so that this is quod verum esse potest unquam, & de nullo: not that this axiom is always denied as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is affirmed, but it is contrary to an axiom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because that is always affirmed; and contrary to it, mark the contrariety, it is nunquam verum, opposed to semper verum: again, nunquam verum esse potest, is opposed to nec falsum esse potest, here it is contrary to a necessary one: lastly, it is the nullo opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de omni, here it is contrary to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now affirmatum, and negatum, verum, falsum, contingens, necessarium, possibile, and impossibile, etc. are (as they call them) words of Art, for indeed they belong to Logic: but these when any thing is brought as an example to them, it is nothing but an application of the species to the genus: now they call these modals, because the modus is the genus, and the axiom is the axiom. When I say homo est animal, est necessarium: why here are two axioms, which they are not ware of; and in this syllogism, Qui dicit te esse animal, dicit verum, qui dicit te esse asinum dicit te esse animal: ergo, etc. both the proposition and assumption may be denied, for in the proposition he disputes from a species to the genus: in the assumption he will prove hic homo est asinus, because that homo est animal, verum est: here again the assumption is false, for he disputes â specie ad genus.   

Axioma artium sic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse debent, sed praeterea homogenia, & catholica.  
Here he makes a special application of homogenic and catholic axioms, unto the axioms of Art, as if they did belong only to them: and it is true, for though the doctrine of axioms be general to every thing, as Logic is, yet these laws are peculiar to the axioms of Art: and they are general, because they belong to all axioms of Art: and there is no rule of Art, but it must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & contra: if it be all of these, then is it a very rule of Art; if it be only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than it is in a rule of Art, & is but a piece of axiomata artium, therefore every rule of Art must first be true, because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the rule of truth, ergo, a contingent axiom cannot be a rule of Art, for it may deceive us, as often as teach truth: and it must be affirmed, because it must teach, for a negative axiom tells us only what a thing is not: for though this axiom, lapis non est animal, will never fail, yet not teaching me what lapis is, I may take it for a stick, or any other thing.   

Axioma homogenium est, quando partes sunt essentiales inter se; ut forma formato, subjectum proprio adjuncto, genus speciei.  
Axioma a rule of Art, which must be worthy credit above all other rules: homogenium, that is, belonging to that Art, yea, and to that particular part of that Art, and to that particular point of that Art; as invention is not homogeny to judgement, ergo, homogeny here must be considered, not as it is in the same Art, but as it is in the same rule.   

Quando partes sunt essentiales inter se.  
That is, when the arguments are essential inter se: so that here is required an essentiality, as the causes are essential to the effect: what all of them? no, only the material and the formal; so that integrum and membra, genus and species, the subject and proper adjunct, because the causes of it are to be found in the causes of the subject: why these? because they arise from matter and form, are essential, both as it is active, namely, as the causes give essence to the effect, and also as it is passive, namely, as the effect is essentiated of the causes.   

 forma formato, subjectum proprio adjuncto, genus speciei.  
He saith, forma formato, not materia materiato, because though the matter give his essence, yet the form is but one, which makes the thing one, whereas there may be many matters, Genus speciei: mark how that the genus and form make a definition, ergo, the definitio and definitum are essential inter se ergo, that makes a rule of Art; here he leaves out integrum and membra, which I much marvel at, for had he put in them, than we had had all the arguments that could makes these rules of Art.   

Id appellatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, per se.  
The rule of justice that we give to every thing, that which is per se true, and homogeny, as longitude is in the superficies, but not per se, but per aliud, for so per se here is not opposed to per accidens, but to per aliud.   

Axioma catholicum est, quando consequens semper verum est de antecedente, non solum omni & per se, sed etiam reciproce: ut homo est animal rationale.  
A catholic axiom: this name is somewhat improper, for it doth not contain all that is in a catholic axiom, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is primum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de toto: so that this is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 first true of the whole, and afterward of the parts. Kickerman saith, that Aristotle takes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the same: but he neither saith so, nor means so.   

Quando consequens semper verum est, etc.  
By consequens he means an argument; now can an argument be true? here he takes verum in a more large sense than before: he means when the parts do so truly predicate one of another, as that they make a true axiom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

Non solum omni & pierce sed etiam reciproce.  
That is, when one part contains the other: so that one would think reciprocation might be an affection of subjectum, and proprium adjunctum in invention: it is true, that one contains as much as the other, but the subject and proper adjunct are not the same thing, as the definitio and definitum are. For homo and risus are not all one, but here reciprocation is between subjectum and adjunctum, because notwithstanding they be divers things, yet the one contain as much as the other: so that this reciprocation is more general than that before: so that the rules of Art are these three, namely, definitions, distributions and properties: and every rule of Art must be most true, most just and most wise, because the axiom must stay up the thing to guide it to his end.   

Tres hae sunt leges documentorum artis propriorum: prima 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lex veritas; secunda 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lex justitiae; tertia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lex ●apientiae dicatur.  
So that these three properties are required in every rule of Art.   

Atque ejusmodi axiomatum ita catholicorum judicium verissima & prima scientia est.  
So that the judgement of such catholic axioms, is prima verissimaque scientia, and all others are but second or third truths, as they are deducted from the first, second or third, and are per se so far forth true, as their first rule is true: hence whatsoever we read, we shall find it, if we mark it, to be either a rule of Art, or some deduct: so that the heads of Arts should be the heads of common place books, and so might we bring all that we read unto them, and try them.  
Now some say, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contains 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ergo, they might be left out.  
Answ. It doth not follow, for these three are distinct things, for as it is reciprocum, it is not in the same respect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Again, an axiom may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and yet not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. so also an axiom may break the rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and yet not break the rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. so that if they were left out, we should have no rule to show such axioms to be false.    

CHAP. IU.  

De axiomate simplici.  
Atque haec de communibus axiomatis affectionibus, species sequuntur.  
WE have hitherto heard of whatsoever is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to an axiom in general: for though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belong only to the rules of Art, yet because they may be simple or composite axioms, ergo, they are generally to be taught to them both: the judgement moreover of such axioms was prima verissimaque scientia. Prima, because that was first, and per se true, and most true, because all other deducts do so far forth approve themselves true, as they agree to the first, and these first rules are few, therefore they come nearest to God who is but one, and are next to his wisdom: others, which are deducts, may be many, and they come next to the first rules: we have among us a distinction of doctrine and use, doctrina is properly the first rule of Art, and use is the application thereof, or the special deducts gathered from the first. Others I find take doctrina for the first part of Divinity, and Use for the special practice of a rule of Art, but they are deceived, and speak improperly: and all the rules that Kickerman saith are wanting in Ramus, are nothing but the practice of a rule, that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and they are infinite. As posita causa ponitur effectum, this ariseth from the definition of causa, and it is only true, where the cause is brought as a third argument in a syllogism, and otherwise we have no use of it, and having handled all that is general to an axiom, now we come to the species, Atque haec de communibus, etc. This is a transition not from one part of an axiom to another, for those things that we heard of before touching an axiom, are but adjuncts to an axiom, therefore must not be severed from their subject: but because these have taken up two Chapters, and so continued the doctrine of axioma long, why we may have forgotten ourselves, thinking we have heard of the species already? no, saith Ramus, we come but now to the species.   

Axioma est simplex, aut compositum.  
Disposition we heard did dispose arguments either firstly, or at the second hand, in an axiom they are disposed either one with one, or one with more, or more with more; if one be disposed with one, so that there be but two sides, as it were playing at two hand ruff, than it is a simple axiom: and from this simple disposition of the arguments, it is called simplex, compositum contra: so that this double disposition of arguments makes this distribution, whereas affirmatum, negatum, and the other adjuncts before, rather looked at the band, then at the disposition of the arguments: so that axiomatica dispositio is simplex in respect of the simple disposition of the arguments that are disposed therein.   

Simplex quod verbi vinculo continetur.  
Simplex is first, because there cannot be a composite axiom, but there will be a simple axiom, and the composite is as it were a manifold simple.   

Verbi vinculo.  
He defines it from the band, not that it ariseth from thence, but because a verb falls out to tie an axiom to one.   

Continetur.  
For Invention did handle arguments severally, but in axioms they are laid together with a cement or verb.  
Object. Why doth he call it a verb? we have not heard of Grammar yet, doth he mean that verb which is taught there?  
Answ. No: but his meaning is, that the parts of this axiom are tied together by that which if it be uttered is a verb: so that verbum here is a metonimy of the adjunct from the subject, verb being put for that whose name will be a verb. If a man would lay bricks with bricks, to have them hold together, he must have mortar; and if he would fasten two pieces of wood together, he must have a nail, or a pin of wood: for as the mortar is to the bricks, and the nail or pin to the wood, such is this vinculum here spoken of to the arguments.   

Vinculo.  
He calls it vinculum, because the vinculum holdeth the arguments together in a kind of composition: imitating God therein, who hath tied things in nature with an affection: and indeed to speak the truth, it springs from the affection that is between the two arguments disposed.   

Itaque affirmato vel negato verbo, affirmatur, vel negatur.  
Before we heard in an axiom, that affirmatum was Quando vinculum ejus affirmatur, negatum contra: why then a simple axiom having the band affirmed must be affirmed & contra: so that this is nothing but a special application to this kind of axiom, of that which was before taught generally to all axioms: and that which is special here is, that it is the verbum that is denied or affirmed, which was vinculum before: and this commendation indeed is chief for contradiction: for if there be contradiction here, the verb must be affirmed, and denied: ut ignis urit: ignis est anteced●ns, urit consequens: here he calls the argument going before the verb antecedens, and the argument following the verb, consequens: others call them subjectum, and praedicatum, but he is not pleased with their names, because subjectum is properly an argument in invention, therefore if it should be used here, it would breed confusion: and not only subjects and predicates are disposed here, but all other arguments, therefore he rather keepeth the general terms showing so much: again, they are fit, because here we are in disposition, ergo, there must be an argument to go before the vinculum, and another to so low. Now we use these terms also in a composite axiom, but they are more proper here. The Aristotelians used their terms subjectum and praedicatum only in a simple axiom, for they had no composite axioms, but a connex, as we shall hear afterward.   

Atque hic prima est inventarum rerum dispositio causae cum effecto, ut in primo exemplo, etc.  
Prima by nature, not otherwise, because we cannot make a composite axiom of more arguments with more, but there will be more lines: here in a simple axiom there is but one line, and in a syllogism there will be a triangle, the demonstration may be this.  

A simple axiom.  
A composite of one to more  
A composite of more to more.  
A Syllogism.    

Quomodo argumentum quodlibet enunciari potest (exceptis plenis comparationibus & distributionibus) consentanea quidem affirmando, dissentanea negando.  
Ramus doth commorari in telling us the use of a simple axiom, and he tells us all arguments may be disposed therein, but plenae comparationes, and Plenae distributiones, for so he means, else homo est animal is a distribution, and yet a simple axiom: but otherwise these will evermore be a composite axiom.   

Consentanea quidem affirmando, dissentanea negando.  
Not but that consentanea may be denied, and dissentanea affirmed, for we heard before that the same axiom might be affirmed and denied, but thus they ought to be disposed, consentanea affirmando, dissentanea negando: now here by consentanea he doth not mean only causa, effectum, subjectum and adjunctum, but also those that do arise from them, even all that may any way agree: as in like sort by dissentanea he means also all them that do arise from them, or that do any way disagree: but here we are to know, that this is not any rule of Art, but only a commoration, applying that here in special, which he taught before. Now this disposition is easy: but here sometime the band, and the consequent part grammatically uttered will be the same, as ignis urit: now we come to the affections of a simple axiom, which belong not to a composite.   

Axioma simplex est generale, aut speciale.  
This is a distribution of the subject into the adjuncts, and though a composite axiom may be general, or special, yet there we do not look after it: so that composite axioms in a syllogism may make a simple syllogism, being considered not as composite, but as the arguments are simply disposed.   

Generale.  
This term comes of genus, not that this axiom consists always of those arguments genus and species; but he means that common which we hear of in Grammar, and yet notwithstanding the antecedent part may be common, and the axiom may be proper, ergo, he rather keeps that term generale, then common, though it be a hard trope. Now in a general axiom we are to observe these three things, first an antecedent that is common, secondly, a common consequent, thirdly, a general attribution of them, for else it might be a special axiom: so that generality and speciality belong to an axiom, and are not to be sought for in the doctrine of arguments.   

Atque hic contradictio non semper dividit verum & falsum, sed contingentium utraque pars falsa potest esse.  
He is careful to teach us contradiction, because there is a mean matter, because there is no dispute where there is no contradiction, ergo, he teacheth us the contradiction of a simple axiom, and now of a general axiom which will not always divide truth and falsehood, sed contingentium utraque pars, etc. that is, when we contradict a general by a general.   

Item non contingentium.  
Why saith he non contingentium? because these non contingentia are such as fall out, peradventure impossibilia, as in this example. Omne animal est rationale, nullum animal est rationalia, he could not well call them necessaria, nor possibilia, because they may be denied, whereas an impossible axiom should be affirmed.   

Axioma speciale est, quando consequens non omni antecedenti attribuitur: & high contradictio semper dividit verum a falso.  
It is called axioma speciale, not in respect it hath a species always disposed in it with a genus, but in respect it is more special than the general quando consequens, etc. Consequens indeed is the chiefest part in an axiom, and is commonly the argument that is brought to argue: not the antecedent, he doth not say consequens common: because it may be either common, or proper, it is no matter whether of them it be.   

Non omni antecedenti.  
Omni and non omni are contradictory, now omnis dicitur de tribus ad minimum, saith the Schools, ergo, if omnis be given generally to all in a general axiom, then non omnis may be given to one, as it is a special axiom: omnis indeed is the sign of a general axiom, but where it cannot be had, there the axiom is special: non omni, that is to the antecedent that cannot have omnis put before it.   

Attribuitur.  
Attribuitur, in an affirmed axiom, it may seem that there is attributio: but in a denied axiom rather abnegation: but attribuitur both here and in a general axiom must be taken more generally for the same that disponitur is, whether it be by way of affirmation or negation.   

Et hic contradictio semper dividit verum a falso.  
So that if our contradiction with any body be a special axiom, than we may be assured, that the one part is false, and that there is contradiction in it.   

Speciale est particular, aut proprium.  
Particular doth intimate a common, for nothing can be parted but a common, and it is so called, because though the antecedent be common, yet it takes but part of it.   

Particular quando consequens communi antecedenti particulariter attribuitur.  
Here is a fault in the print, for if it should be communi, because the consequent (as we heard before) may be common or proper: but the antecedent must be common; but here is a particularis attributio. Now a general axiom is before a special, because it is more large. Homo est doctus is a particular axiom, for antecedens is common, now it differs from a general, first in that a general must have a common consequens, this may have a common or proper; secondly, a general must have a general attribution, this is a particular one.   

Huic autem axiomati generaliter contradicitur.  
Therefore in like sort generali axiomati specialiter contradicitur, and then dividit verum a falso, for contradict a general by a particular, and it will divide truth and falsehood; so that a general axiom hath a double contradiction, one when we contradict a general by a general, and another when we contradict a general by a particular.   

Axioma proprium est, quando consequens antecedenti proprio attribuitur.  
This axiom doth require first a consequent be it proper or common: secondly a proper antecedent: thirdly an attributio. Now he means by proprium, not that the antecedent should always be a proper name, for an axiom of genus and species may make a proper axiom.    

CHAP. V.  

De axiomate copulato. Axioma compositum est, quod vinculo conjunctionis continetur.  
AXiomatical disposition was where there were two sides arguing, and they were either one argument to one, or more to one, & contra: but we have already heard of a simple axiom: now we come to a disposition, where there is one to more, aut contra, and it is called a composite axiom of this composite disposition. Axioma compositum est, quod vinculo conjunctionis continetur. This axiom contains more simples in it, though we consider but one side with one.   

Quod vinculo, etc.  
That is, whose parts are tied together with a conjunction, so that the trial of the axiom lies in the conjunction, not that it ties the arguments firstly, yet it doth tie them too, as when I say a man is just, and true, for the principal tying lies not in Is, but in And: so that though there be a verb, yet that is not here considered as the band. Now if a simple syllogism stand of composite axioms, then Is is the band.   

Vinculo conjuctionis continetur.  
So that the parts are held together by this vinculum, yet here he doth not mean a grammatical conjunction, but the thing that is signified by the conjunction: vox est nota in Grammar: so that metonimically he means that thing whereof the conjunction is a note, for he hath not a fit word, and therefore though Grammar be after Logic, yet because it is commonly taught in Schools first, therefore Ramus borroweth from that. Now then by vinculum conjunctionis we are to understand, that which the conjunction signifies, and that is nothing but the glue, or affection that knits things together.   

Itaque e conjunctione affirmata vel negata, affirmatur vel negatur.  
Here he doth deduct this consecution helped from a former rule: affirmation and negation were, where the band was affirmed or denied, ergo, if a conjunction be the copula of a composite axiom, then that being affirmed makes the axiom affirmed, & contra: this he stayed upon to teach us to discern of contradiction, which is of use especially in common talk, for if there be no contradiction in controversies, there will be no dispute.   

Contradictionisque pars vera, pars falsa.  
Here evermore contradiction divides truth from falsehood: so that if one part be true, the other will always be false, & contra.   

Enunciatum compositum est pro sua conjunctione congregativum, aut segregativum.  
The axiom stands upon the band, for we have heard of the arguments before, and that which is here new is the disposing or banding them together. Now according to the nature of a conjunction that ties two sides together, are axioms to be divided, for there are some conjunctions that belong to a syllogism tying three sides together.  
Congregativum, that is, where the parts are gathered together to argue one side: segregativum, that is, where the parts that make one side are severed, to argue the other side. Now the reason of this is plain, for some things there are that may agree in nature, and some things that must be severed, ergo, as God hath ordered his creatures, so must our Logic behold them.   

Congregativum enunciat omnia consentanea affirmando, omnia etiam dissentanea negando.  
Enunciat, that is, it doth dispose omnia consentanea affirmando, he means by consentanea, not only causa and effectum, subjectum and adjunctum, but paria, or comparata, or orta, otherwise it should enunciare none but consentanea and dissentanea, dissentanea negando, by dissentanea he means all argument wherein there may seem to be any dissension.   

Est vero copulatum aut connexum.  
Things disposed together, where there is two sides, are either disposed, that is, yoked together, as Oxen go together one by another, or as Horses are tied tail to tail one following another in a team. So that if the arguments be disposed, that is, yoked together as Oxen, than it is a copulate axiom, and if one argument go before another, and the later follow upon the former, than it is a connex: so that as one thing in nature is disposed together with another, or as one thing followeth upon another, so must our reason see them. A copulate is first, because there is not such a precedency and consequency of the arguments as in a connex, but both go together, ergo, a copulate is next to a simple, and thence it is that a copulate axiom is so often in a simple syllogism.   

Copulatum, cujus conjunctio est copulativa.  
The axiom is delivered altogether passively, the arguments were active, because the vinculum is affirmed or denied, and doth not affirm or deny, cujus conjunctio est copulativa, whose vinculum is a conjunction if it be uttered: copulativa, that is, coupling the arguments together, as,  
una Eurusque Notusque ruunt, creberque procellis Affricus—   

Hic igitur negatio erit & contradictio.  
Non una Eurusque Notusque ruunt, creberque procellis Affricus. Non doth not here deny that Eurns did blow, or that Notus did not blow, or that Affricus did not blow; but that all of them did not blow; for if one or two of them had blown, and not the third also, it had been false.   

Verum enunciati copulati judicium pendet ex omnium partium veritate: falsum, saltem ex una parte falsa.  
That we may therefore judge aright whether a copulate axiom be true or false, why, that it may be true, it must have all the parts true together: falsum may be of one part false: hence in bonds and obligations, where there are many conditions, if we break one we break all.   

Huic generi affine est enunciatum relatae qualitatis, cujus conjunctio est ipsa relatio.  
Here Ramus doth commorari, for he could not well tell what to say, for whereas he told us before that a conjunction was the band, here he saith, what shall we do with those axioms where there is no conjunction, but relata qualitas. Why, saith he, you must understand here that there is a conjunction: so that a species of a copulate is that axiom where there is a relation of quality, for though there be not a conjunction, yet here is the same in effect with a conjunction: as if it were thus; sopor est fessis gratus: sic tuum carmen est nobis gratum.  
Relatae qualitatis: he means also relatae quantitatis for so there are examples: as, how many fishes are in the sea? so many, saith Ovid, are my miseries: Now I have marvelled that he left out quantitatis, I had rather have said enunciatum relationis: not relatae comparationis, for dissentanea come not in here. Relatae qualitatis, where there are similia: he doth not mean that relation in arguments, but a pronoun.    

CHAP. VI  

De Axiomate connexo.  
Axioma connexum, est congregativum, cujus conjunctio est connexiva.  
AXioma connexum, is where the parts are knit one to the tail of another, as in a trace of Horses: and that there is such an axiom, it appears because of the tacking of one thing to follow another in nature.  
Est congregativum: As gathering things one upon the tail of another.   

Cu●us conjunctio est connexiva.  
Not that it is always so, but relation of time may be here also: as misery draws a lie, and vanity and falsehood follow after, cujus negatio non si, saying the consequent doth not follow upon the antecedent.   

Conjunctio etiam haec interdum negatur apertius negando consequentiam.  
Our Author doth commorari in these composite axioms, because other Logicians have either taught nothing at all of them, or very little: this conjunction is sometime denied more openly, negando consequentiam, that is, not by denying the consequent part, but by denying the consequent part to follow upon the antecedent, as si est homo, non est brutum, this is not a connex: so that we must look always that the consequent follow upon the antecedent, as si est miser, non est ideo vanus, this is a con.   

Pro Amer.  
Non continuo si me in sicariorum greg●m contuli sicarius sum.  
I am not presently a cutter, if I betake myself into the company of cutters: here the connex must be, non ideo sicarius sum, for he must have some time to learn to be a cutter.   

De Fato.  
Nec si omne enunciatum verum est aut falsum, sequitur illico causas esse immutabiles.  
So that the denial is non sequitur illico causas esse immutabiles: the reason follows:  
Affirmatio enim significat si sit antecedens non ideo consequens esse.  
That is, it followeth from the antecedent, as if he be a man he hath reason, for the consequent is affirmed, because the band is affirmed.   

Negatio itaque & contradictio statuit, si sit antecedens non ideo consequens esse. Quare cum, etc.  
It may be a true axiom, though never a part be true. As, si homo est Leo, est etiam quadrupes, that is a necessary true connex: but it is neither true that homo est Leo, nor that he is quadrupes, and so neither part is true: so that the truth of the consequent part of a connex axiom hangeth on the antecedent conditionaliter.   

At si connexio sit contingens, & pro sua tantum probabilitate ponatur, judicium ejus tantum opinio fuerit.  
So that he doth declare unto us how to judge of necessity and contingency, which lie in the necessary or contingent following of the consequent upon the antecedent.  Pamphile, si id facis, hodie postremum me vides.   

C●nnexo axiomati affinis est ista consequentiae relatio.  
A cousin connex, or a cousin to connex axiom, is that axiom which is uttered by cum, etiam, or tum, etc. so that these have the reference of the former: as appeareth in the example ut,  
Cum Tullius sit Orator, est etiam p●ritus bene dicendi.    

CHAP. VII.  

De axiomate discreto.  
Axioma s●gregativum, est cujus conjunctio est segregativa: id●oque argumenta dissentanea enunciat.  
A Composite axiom was so called because it had a joiner to his b●nd, that is, a conjunction: now the band may join the words, not the matter, ergo, a conjunction in a copulate axiom may couple the words, though it sever the matter, and if the band be not uttered, than that thing that the word doth notify is the logical b●nd. Now as axioma was congregativum, which gathered the parts, either yoking them like Oxen, as in a copulate, or tying them as Horses one after another, as in a connex: so segregativum doth sever and sunder the parts of the axiom, and therefore his conjunction is segregativa: so that where things are severed in nature, there must our Logic see them distinct.   

Ideoque argumenta dissentanea enunciat.  
Axioma segregativum cannot enunciare consentanea, but dissentanea: here he means all arguments where there is consention and dissension; for dissimilia may be disposed in a discrete axiom, though they be not dissentanies: so again, though it doth enunciare dissentanea, yet it doth not follow, but that it may enunciare consentanea, as animal est homo, aut brutum: so that they are dissentanea quatenus, the parts disjoined do dissentire inter se, and they are consentanea quatenus, the parts together argue the whole: so that the parts are not disjoined from the whole, but inter se.   

Enunciatum segregativum, est discretum aut disjunctum.  
This segregation of things is either a more easy discerning of them, whereas they might otherwise agree, which may appear to our eye, though it be not so palpable in the things: or it is disjunct where the parts are severed re & ratione, so that these axioms do serve for the deliverance of diversa and opposita.   

Discretum, cujus conjunctio est discretiva.  
Discretum of discerno: so that when things are so severed in nature, as we may see them disjunct with our eye, though not so plainly in the things themselves, they make a discreet axiom.   

Itaque è dissentaneis praecipuè diversa enunciat.  
This axiom doth enunciare dissimilia too, therefore if he had said dissimilia, he had included diversa: as though there be matters which might be judged by the outward senses, yet are they to be referred to the mind too.   

Cujus negatio, & contradictio est.  
So that the denial doth take away that discretion which was laid down before.   

Discretum enunciatum judicatur esse verum & legitimum, si partes non solum verae, sed etiam discretae sint; falsum vel ridiculum contra.  
Now for the judgement of this axiom, it is verum & legitimum: so that two things are required in judging a discreet axiom: first that the parts be true, else it will be a false axiom; secondly, that they be lawful, else they will be ridiculous, because the parts will not be divers. As to say, though he be a man, yet he is a living creature: here both parts are true, but here is no discretion & therefore it is ridiculous.    

CHAP. VIII.  

De axiomate disjuncto.  
Axioma disjunctum, est axioma segregativum, cujus conjunctio est disjuncta.  
THe discreet and disjunct sever things, but the former doth it only ratione: now the disjunct looks at an opposition between the things disjoined: it is called a disjunct axiom, as disjoining or pulling the parts out of joint: so than the former may be compared to the laying of two things that are distinct, but not pulled out of joint.   

Est segregativum.  
Therefore severing the matter, for the parts are so divided, that they cannot agree, or be united, because they are opposite sine ullo medio.   

Cujus conjunctio est disjunctiva.  
disjoining or pulling in pieces the things disposed, as there is either day or night, these are privantia, ergo, contraries, ergo, opposites.   

De Fato.  
Omnis enunciatio est vera, aut falsa.  
This is a disjunct in like sort, where veritas and falsitas are disjoined: now for the judgement of this axiom, here one part only is true, and not both, which ariseth from the nature of opposites. Itaque eidem attribui, etc. but if we consider the affection between the whole and the parts, there both will be true: as argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale, but because the whole with the form make up the species, therefore we say in effect, argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale: and if there composite axioms be disposed in a simple syllogism, than the verb will be the band: for we have nothing to do with the dissension of the parts, but to see how the parts of the question are disposed with the third argument.   

H●c significatur è disjunctis uni um verum esse.  
In a distinct axiom one part only is true, because they are dissentanea: as homo est bonus aut non bonus, these pa●ts are but contingent separated, bu● the disjunction is necessary.   

Cujus negatio  
Non omnis enunciatio est vera, a●t falsa.  
So that the denial taketh away the contradiction.   

Et contradictione significatur, non necess●rio alterum verum esse.  
So that though the parts may be contingently true, yet the axiom may be necssary.   

Veruntamen quamvis absolute vera disjunctio  a quoque sit: tamen nihil necesse est partes separatim necessarias esse.  
Therefore est is not the band, for it doth tie but contingent truth, but the conjunction is it, because it ties necessary truth.   

Itaque si disjunctio sit contingens non est absolute vera, & tantum opiniabilis est: qualis est frequenter in hominum usu.  
So that this disjunct contingent is not usual in common speech, ut si quaeratur, etc. whereas both, or neither of them might come.   

Tantum opinabilis.  
Because opinio is the judgement of a contingent axiom: and thus we have heard all the kinds of disposition on two sides.    

CHAP. IX.  

De Syllogismo, & ejus partibus.  
Atque ejusmod● judicium est axiomaticum, axiomatis perse manifesti sequitur dianoeticum.  
NOw we come to a disposition, where there are three sides, so that they play as it were at three hand ruff: Now mark the reason of this distribution of dispositio into axioma and syllogismus: some things there are that are laid together in nature without a mean, ergo, we may see them at the first hand uno intuiti: some things also have a mean, which we must use before we can see them, ergo, according to the things in nature, and according to the act of our reason in beholding these things, so must our Logic proceed, and as the medium shall either combine or sever them, so we may conclude them affirmatively or negatively, and herein stands the force of those rules, though they be not always true, quae conveniunt in aliquo tertio conveniunt inter se, & contra, because that medium is the holder of them two together, aut contra: for there the medium will be a bar to sever them; as otiosus est amator, Aegisthus est otiosus, ergo, est amatur, because otium is as glue to pull on amor, for it argues love as causa, and it pulls on Egstus as an adjunct. So this rule sublata ●●usa tollitur effectum, & contra: and all these rules of consecution are because the effect brings the cause with it: and any other argument as well as causa may be a mean whereby two things may be glued together: for this third argument is not so much a medium in regard of the other two disposed with it, but in respect of our seeing them, and we may see as well by any other arguments as by causa.   

Atque ejusmodi judicium est axiomaticum, etc.  
An axiom is such a thing as appears to be true at the first sight, or at the second hand: now our reason is to be so glued, as that it may be able to see any truth, ergo, if the truth appear at the first sight, an axiom will serve us, else we must have a candle to make it clear: so that here we may see, the purpose of syllogistical judgement is not to make things more true, or more false in themselves, but to make the truth, or falsehood more manifest unto us: so that clear per se belongs to an axiom; but perspicuity in regard of us belongs to a syllogism: and here we may also see, that axioma probabile, as they call it, and axioma subtle belong hither: so that all third arguments are not used to make the things more true in themselves, but to make the truth more manifest to us, ergo, Cardan, whilst he argued against Scaliger, that he that disputed of subtlety, might dispute of all things, was in the right, but when he would go about to prove, that all things were to be taught in subtlety, there he was out, for after we have discoursed a point syllogistically, we are fain to go back again to the rule of an axiom to judge the truth, or falsehood thereof, ergo, here we may see that axioms and syllogisms are confederate, and not syllogism and method. Now the same axiom may be manifest to one man, but dark to another, ergo, syllogistical judgement waits upon man, and if the truth or falsehood be nice or fine, that it cannot be seen with one act of our eye, than we must use a third argument: and subtle, if we define it aright, is axioma non adeo manifestum.   

Sequitur dianoeticum.  
Dianoia signifies reason's discourse, the laying about by our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for when at first she doth not see a truth, than she commands cogitation to coagitare, that is, to look after it: so that dianoia is nothing, but the running about of our reason for the finding out of truth. Some Logicians have compared axiomatical judgement to a calm sea, for there our reason is quiet, being satisfied with the truth, and syllogistical judgement to a troubled sea, that is, full of storms, winds and tempests, for there our reason beats every corner to conclude that which is doubtful, and from this act it is called dianoia; and the judgement of reason in such an Art is called dianoeticum, it running after this, or that: but our Author divides it afterward into syllogismus and methodus, which how it should be true I see not, namely, how method should be dianoia: for the three internal senses in nature are distinct, ergo, these parts ought to be distinct according to them, as we heard before. Now method makes all things one, and so we remember all things as one, and the things be judged before I come here, here I only lay things together to remember them.   

Dianoia est, cum aliud axioma ex alio deducitur estque syllogismus, aut methodus.  
This very definition tells me, that dianoia is nothing but syllogismus, and they are both one: so that here are deductions of axioms out of axioms, which surely belong to syllogistical judgement only, for I do not mean that it is ordering of one axiom before another, but a drawing of deductions from their first rules: true it is, that a former axiom gives light to that which follows, but that light is by virtue of syllogistical judgement, so that method placing axioms, doth indeed need axiomatical judgement, as that also needs invention before it can place them, but it doth not therefore follow, that the doctrine of axioms should be in method.   

Syllogismus est dianoia; qua questio cum argumento ita disponitur, ut posito antecedente, necessario concludatur.  
Syllogismus signifies properly the sum of an account in the species of numeration, especially in Addition: and summa and syllogismus are the same; and the Logicians have borrowed it of the Arithmeticians, because though Logic be the first Art in order, and nature, yet Arithmetic was observed by men before Logic, ergo, Plato set over his Academy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for it was taught among them as Grammar is now taught among us: for as for Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, they had them by nature, ergo, they studied the Mathematics first, ergo, they called them Mathematics, for the word is general to all Arts, and indeed that was the reason that Aristotle in his Logic brings demonstrations out of the Mathematics: so that this metaphor syllogismus was a priore to them. This syllogismus est dianoia, qua questio cum argumento, etc. it is indeed a contract of larger discourse, and here in this rule observe first a question, secondly, an argument, thirdly, a disposing of them together, fourthly, a set or constant position of the arguments and the question: Lastly, a necessary conclusion from them, first if it be a clear truth that ought not to be a question, else it should.   

Qu● quaestio.  
What question? shall he go ask any body? yes, a third argument if he will; but quaestio here is a law term signifying a commission: so that if he doubted he might see at the Law for the truth: so that this judgement is a Courtly kind of seeking out truth with two arguments before the judgement seat of a third argument and it is not quaestio which is made with an interrogation, which whilst some Logicians did not consider they fell so in love with quaestio, as that they made it the subject of Logic, and divided it into simplex which is the same with argumentum, and compositum which is the same with axioma. Then there must be an argument, he doth not call it tertium argumentum here, as he doth afteward, but only argumentum: though there are always three arguments, because here he considers it in respect of the whole question, not looking at the parts of the question as they are in Invention: and argumentum must be brought indeed as an evidence, or witness, rather than as a Judge, for I myself am the Judge thereof.   

Cum argumento.  
Therefore here, saith Kickerman, must argumentum come in: yea, here indeed it must come in, but it must, ergo, be taught before, for it must be before it can come in, ergo, to say it must be here taught, because it comes in here, is fallacia accidentis, so that an argument belongs to judgement, as it may be disposed, not as it may be in itself. But saith Kickerman further here is a question before an argument, ergo, the doctrine of a question must go before the doctrine of an argument, indeed it so falls out here, but yet the parts of a question are not before an argument without he will make Pigs fly with their tails forward.   

Disponitur.  
He would have further rules of consecution from the third argument, that he might know how to use them; but indeed the rule of syllogismus is the rule of consecution, ergo, those maxims, as they call them, are consecutions from the rules of invention, and are prosyllogisms. Now here is a disposition whereof Kickerman was not ware, whilst he would distribute Logic into a simple conceit, a double conceit, and into discursus: for if disposition be general both to his double conceit, and to his discursus, than he leaves out two rules, the definition and distribution of disposition, ergo, let us hold the right. Ita disponitur, because in a simple syllogism there is the disposition of the part of the question with the third argument, consequens in propositione, antecedens in assumptione, and in a composite syllogism there is the whole question placed with the third argument alone in the proposition, ergo, the question as the better man must have the third argument for his companion, for he is the Gentleman, ergo, he saith, quaestio cum argumento, and ●●t argumentum cum quaestione. Again, the third argument is for the questions sake, ergo, it is he that is the more lofty, but this is not quaevis quaestio, but that quaestio quae ita disponitur, ut posito antecedente necessario concludatur. He calls it an antecedent, ergo, a syllogism consisteth of two parts, an antecedent and a consequent. An antecedent is so called, because it goes before, and a consequent because it comes after: again, an antecedent and a consequent are not yoked together as two Oxen, as in a copulate axiom, but one before another as Horses trace, as in a connex hanging upon the former by a necessity of consequence. Now this question is so posita cum argumento, as that the question doth follow on them two, for the third argument never comes into the consequent part. Here positum is as it were put case, as put case there be an antecedent, tum necessarium concludatur.  
Object. Doth every syllogism conclude necessary truth? Yes, not but that it may be contingent, but he means necessario, that is, that this consequent will follow necessarily upon the antecedent, for the Art or rule of a syllogism: as otiosus est amator is contingent, Aegisthus est otiosus, is contingent, ergo, est amator, this consequent doth necessarily follow upon the antecedent: so that necessario goes not with the conclusion, but with the inference of the conclusion.   

Nam cum axioma dubium sit, quaestio efficitur, & ad ejus fidem tertio argumento opus est cum questione collocato.  
That is, when a matter is to be demurred, and stayed upon, quaestio efficitur, as before, & ad ejus fidem, etc. what is that? that is, ad ejus fiat dictum, that is, that you may build upon this truth tertio argumento opus est: so that fides properly belongs to the will, and to the resolution of the will, which is the extremity of reason, so that fides is in the will, ergo, belongs to Divinity; for when the Lord assures man by his Spirit, that he is reconciled unto him, his will saith presently fiat dictum; so that the third argument must give testimony of the honesty of the parts of the question, which two parts entering into the band, the controversy is ended. Collocato: here he tells us in general of the placing of the argument, but when it is to be placed, and where, we shall hear hereafter.   

Syllogismi antecedens partes duas habet propositionem, & assumptionem.  
He doth not define antecedence and consequence, for there is antecedence and consequence in an argument, as the cause is before the effect, etc. and in an axiom, and also here, ergo, they are voces ambiguae, ergo, are not to be defined here.   

Propositio, & assumptio.  
Propositio is oftentimes used generally for axioma, but it names an axiom only as it is used in a syllogism: and to use it more generally, is to abuse it, or at least to use a catathristical synecdoche: assumptio belongs hither only.   

Propositio est prima pars antecedentis qua questionis faltem consequens cum argumento disponitur.  
We have heard of a question, and an argument, which is a third in respect of the two in the question; but he calls it not a third before, because in a composite it is disposed with the whole question, not with the parts, than the dispositio of the argument cum quaestione is not at random, but so as there will be an antecedent and a consequent, which antecedent being put, the consequent will follow of necessity; that is, the inference of the conclusion will follow of necessity, so that necessity here follows upon the inference of the conclusion, not upon the conclusion. Now the parts of the antecedent are the proposition and assumption, for so it is requisite, that every syllogism stand of three parts, because they play at three hands: and there must be two parts of the antecedent, because the argument being but one can play but twice, namely, with the two parts of the question, and therefore if it should play the third time, it must play with itself, and thence it is, that it never comes into the conclusion: now in a composite syllogism there is silently contained the antecedent part of the question in the assumption, though it be not expressed. Now the common Logicians call the proposition the major propositio, and the assumption the minor propositio, and the reason of it is this, because the majus extremum, namely, the consequent part of the question was put in proposition, and the minus extremum in the assumption: for as touching a composite syllogism, Aristotle did not teach one word of it. Now Ramus keeps these terms propositio, and assumptio, and he had reason, for use hath taken up these words in good Authors for these things, as in Tully, Cornelius Agricola, and other Logicians that follow the more pure latin, and there is reason for it, for that which they call propositio there, is a thing propounded to him with whom we dispute, and then the former being granted, I do assume as it were out of the bowels of the proposition, the assumption: so the Greeks call propositio, Prothesis, and assumptio, Hypothesis: though I find some of them that call the proposition thesis, whereas the question is the thesis. Now propositio is that which is propounded, and carrieth a show of truth with it, ergo, we seldom deny the proposition, but rather the assumption, or else distinguish of it, ergo, our chiefest care must be of the assumption, to discern truth and falsehood in that.   

Est prima pars antecedentis.  
As if he should say, that the disposition of the question with the argument, must have a proposition, and that must be placed first: so that that which we shall hear of more particularly hereafter, here we hear it more generally, namely, that it must be prima pars.   

Qua questionis saltem consequens, etc.  
In this proposition there is a disposition of the question with the argument, saltem consequens, he speaks this, because whether our syllogism be simple or composite, the consequent part of the question is in the proposition. He saith saltem, because the whole question is in the proposition of a composite syllogism: ergo, the consequent part, therefore observe this generally in every proposition, there is the consequens quaestionis disposed with the antecedent; therefore whereas we heard before that a syllogism was qua quaestio cum argumento, etc. here we hear that propositio est qua quaestionis saltem consequens cum argumento disponitur.   

Assumptio est secunda pars antecedentis, quae assumitur e propositione.  
Assumptio, the second part of the antecedent part is called assumptio, because adsumitur, it is taken to the proposition, for the proposition being settled, we take the assumption out of it being more general: I was wont to compare the proposition to a Cow, and the assumption to her Calf, that is taken out of of her, and goeth by her side.   

Est secunda pars antecedentis.  
Propositio is before, for in the question the consequent part is more general, or at least equal to the antecedent, quatenus it is an axiom, by reason whereof the proposition that contains the consequent part of the question with the third argument, is more general than the assumption: and it is the principal, namely, the third argument: as, si Socrates est animal, est substantia: at si Socrates est homo est animal, ergo: again, here lies another reason, qua assumitur è propositione, ergo, the proposition must be more capacious, or at least equal, as where the proposition and assumption shall be reciprocal, for we cannot take two out of one.   

Assumitur.  
Because when the proposition shall be granted, than I will take my assumption out of it: so that this is generally to be observed, that the assumption is taken out of the proposition; this is the dianoia of it, qua aliud axioma ex alio deducitur: it is as a case of boxes where one is taken out of another: now if the assumption be not taken out of the proposition, than it is not ad idem, ergo, baculus stat in angulo.   

Syllogismi autem pars consequens est, quae complectitur partes quaestionis, eamqueconcludit: unde complexio & conclusio dicitur.  
So that we must take heed that we have not more in the conclusion than the parts of the question: for as it was a fallace if the assumption were not taken out of the proposition: so is it also here, if any thing come into the conclusion beside the question. If there should be any other thing, it would be either an heterozetesis, when the question is not concluded, as the Schools say, it is not adrem; or else apoluzetesis, i. concluding many questions in one, ergo, an heterozetesis, and apoluzetesis err against this rule.   

Eamque concludit.  
The third argument can never come into the conclusion: in a simple sillogism the third argument is brought as a candle, to see how it plays with the consequent part of the question in the proposition, and with the antecedent in the assumption, and then the question is concluded: in a composite syllogism we repeat the third argument in the assumption, as if he should say, mark this, this is it that shows the truth of the question. Concludit: that is, shuts them together in the axiom: but if they descent it severs things.   

Vnde complexio, & conclusio dicitur.  
These are logical terms, which he brings to show us how the same thing may have divers names: and hitherto we have heard generally de Syllogismus & ejus partibus. Now there are certain properties that belong to a syllogism, which are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hidings, for many times in our dispute we hid some parts; now the reason of that is indeed the distraction of our understanding, for many times we hasten to be at the conclusion without any reason; sometimes we touch the reason without the conclusion: and again, many times we touch all the parts, but disorderly, therefore this being in use we must have a doctrine thereof.   

Si qua pars syllogismi defuerit, enthymema dicitur.  
This by the common Logicians is made a special kind of argumentation, but they mistake it, for it is nothing but a syllogism wanting a leg, as if a man wanting a leg were not a man, so is this a syllogism, though it be lame. Again, in Grammar we say, quod subintelligitur non d●est: ergo, here though a part be not expressed, yet is it, not wanting: & the very name tells me as much. It comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in ment, because I keep a part of it in my mind: and even as in Arithmetic syllogismus is the totum; so enthumema is the reservation, or keeping of one in my mind, and setting down a cipher: so that that retention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, doth not make a distinct species of argumentatio.   

Si quid praeter illas tres partes accesserit prosyllogismus.  
Many times we shall see the proposition backed, the assumption backed, and the conclusion backed with a third argument, than it is prosyllogismus: so that sometimes as we are too straight, so here we are too large: divers Ramists have also thought there should be proaxioma; as Tully that famous Orator of Rome declaimed against Verres: here they say, that famous Orator of Rome is a proaxioma, and it is so; for if any thing be added in an axiom beside the antecedent and consequent part, it is but for illustration of that part whereunto it is joined: but in a prosyllogism there is a third argument that proves something backing either the assumption or the conclusion: as Paul an Apostle writes to the Romans: for here Apostle is part of the axiom, and from that name he is enjoined to write: that they call Sorites is nothing but many prosyllogisms one backing another, and one backing the principal.   

Partium etiam ordo saepe confunditur.  
Whereas the parts should be in order, the proposition first, than the assumption, and lastly the conclusion; sometimes we shall have the assumption first, than the proposition, than the conclusion, & contra, & alternè, & inverse: as Socrates est homo quia animal, etc. As for dilemma it is nothing but syllogismus disjunctus, and inductio is nothing but a collectio, or a reasoning from the parts to the whole.   

Attamen, si qua dubitatio propterea fuerit, explenda, quae desunt: amputanda, quae supersunt: & pars quae libet in locum redigenda est.  
If any parts be wanting, so that some scruple may arise thereof, set it down; if there be more than needs, take them away for the time; if any parts be disordered, set them at rights, first the proposition, than the assumption, and lastly the conclusion.    

CHAP. X.  

De syllogismo simplici contracto. Syllogismus est simplex aut compositus.  
WE have heard of a syllogism, and what it serves for, namely, to manifest a doubtful axiom: now we come to the species of a syllogism, est simplex, aut compositus. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: we have heard the reason of the name, that it is a brief of that which is more largely delivered: now for this cause the Stoics called it a fist, for it is not generally of Logic, but belongs to a syllogism. These names simplex and compositum we have heard of more often in Logic; we have heard of argumentum simplex, aut comparatum: and we have heard that axioma est simplex, aut compositum, and now that syllogismus est simplex, aut compositus: but it is the community of name, not the community of the thing: and for want of fit names, we may borrow the same often, if so be the definitions show the difference of them: in a simple axiom there is one argument simply disposed with one; in a simple syllogism there is also a simple disposition, but of the consequent part of the question in the proposition, of the antecedent in the assumption, ergo, from the breaking of this question thus, as there is a simple disposition, it is called simple, but in a composite syllogism the whole question, and the third argument are disposed together, ergo, according to these two kinds of disposition there are these parts of a syllogism; now the reason why there is this disposition in nature is this, the third argument which is well called so here, because here the parts of the question are broken, the truth must either be such, as is so doubtful, as we must be fain to pull the parts of the question in sunder to see it, and then we make a simple syllogism: or if the question be not so doubtful but that we may soon perceive it, than we make but a composite syllogism: hence it is, that the common Logicians never dreamt of a composite syllogism, but only of a simple, desiring to make all things more clear, but there are often more fallaces lie lurking under a composite syllogism, then under a simple one: hence in Schools we say, dispute catagorice, for in a composite the third argument being disposed with the whole question, doth not so clear it, as in a simple it doth; yet none is to except against it, the composite syllogism clears the whole question, the simple clears both the parts of the question.   

Simplex, ubi pars consequens quaestionis disponitur in propositione: pars antecedens in assumptione.  
This then is particular first in a simple syllogism, that the consequent part of the question is disposed with the third argument in the proposition, now whether before or after, we shall hear hereafter, for that is more particular; before in the definition of a syllogism it was quaestio cum argumento, then quaestion is saltem consequens, here it is pars consequens in propositione, pars antecedens in assumptione: and whether this be before or after, we shall hear hereafter: so that is general to every simple syllogism. Consequens in propositione, because that evermore is the more general part of the question, as we heard before, and the continent should hold more than the contentum, and the assumption assumitur è propositione, ergo, the consequent must be there, and the antecedent, therefore in the assumption he doth not say, consequens disponitur cum argumento, for that is general before in the definition of a syllogism.   

Estque affirmatus è partibus omnibus ●ffi●matis.  
Ramus now teacheth us the common properties of a simple syllogism, which agree not to a composite, but quatenus the proposition thereof may be a simple: affirmation and negation we heard of in an axiom, but here the syllogism is not so nominated from the band as before, but from the propositions affirmed, or denied, general, special, or proper; so that affirmation is here when every part, proposition, assumption and conclusion are affirmed.   

Negatus, e negata antecedentium partium altera cum complexione.  
Now we are here to observe, that in these general properties come in all those modi, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, etc. for they are nothing but generalis affirmatus, negatus, etc. so that if we observe but these rules, we shall swallow up many rules, and such words or modi, as would make a man afraid to read them, lest there should be some charming in them.  
Negatus e negata, etc. for ex omnibus negativis nihil concluditur: for if the third argument disagree from both parts, it will never glue them together; but here in general this is a certain truth, that the conclusion will follow the worse part, particularity cannot indeed hold in a contract, but for negation it will: now followeth another property.   

Generalis, e propositione & assumptione generalibus.  
This is not as the generality of an axiom, quando commune consequens attribuitur generaliter communi antecedenti: but here it is when the proposition and assumption are general.   

Specialis, ex altera tantum generali.  
Because the other part may be either particular or proper; if he had said, ex altera tantum speciale, it had not been so convenient: again, whilst he saith, ex altera tantum generali, he tells us there cannot be a concluding ex meris particularibus, because the conclusion would not follow, for in the particular axiom there may be a separation, as aliquis homo est doctus, aliquis homo non est doctus: here would be four termini.   

Proprius, ex utraque propria.  
Here mark, that as in the special syllogism, so in the proper, he makes no mention of the conclusion, because howsoever the parts be general, etc. the conclusion will be particular: now by the rules following I will presently know in what mood any syllo, gism will be concluded.   

Simplex syllogismus, est contractus partibus vel explicatus.  
Our Author brings in a distribution here, that hath not any warrantry from any other but himself, he hought long how he might make a dicotomy, which he might have done thus: a simple syllogism is more single, or more composite, this he thought of, but if he should have brought it in, then there would have been confusion, for than he bade severed the explicates: because there the third argument follows twice: whereas there are certain properties agreeing to them both, which have nothing to do with a contract. Again, I have seen in some of his additions a tricotomy into contractus, explicatus, primus and secundus: but this also would breed confusion; for by this means those properties that are general to both the explicates would be left out: but in the end he settled in this, though Machelmeneus a French man, who saith he was his Master, reports that Ramus desired him to mend this distribution: and I am sure, though he were his Master, the Scholar was better than the Master. Ramus saith it is contractus, or explicatus: which we are to justify thus: he follows use, and use contracts this kind of Syllogism more often than it explicates it: not that it is always contracted, but sometime it is explicated, as Ramus tells us: yet this is always true, that when it is explicated it may be contracted. Paul contracts it, hath God forsaken all Israel? God forbidden, I am an Israelite: this is it: Paul is not forsaken, Paul is an Israelite, ergo, all Israel is not forsaken: so that contractus is a species of syllogismus, because use doth most commonly contract this kind of syllogism: therefore because it is true more often, than it is false, therefore let the truth be taught generally, and the exception come more afterward, because that is more special in use, the explicate is never contracted, ergo, this opposition of them may seem to make them opposite species.   

Contractus, quando argumentum pro exemplo ita subjicitur particulari quaestioni, etc.  
Here these things are to be considered: for the argument is brought as an example always, than secondly, the question is particular, thirdly, it is subjected to the particular question as an example thereof, and here lies the contradiction, here the third argument is brought as an instance as we call it.   

Subjicitur.  
That is subjected as inferior to both the parts of the question: it must be subjectum of the consequent part of the question in the proposition, and subjectum of the antecedent part of the question in the assumption, if we explicate it: so that remember that before in the definition of spllogismus symplex, and apply it unto this: so that that which is here required is first a particular question then a third argument as a question is subjected, and this is when it is contracted.   

 utramque partem antecedens, & assumptione affirmatum intelligatur.  
For that is understood, intelligatur, that is, even when it is contracted: so that here is the reason why this syllogism is first. Aristotle and all his sect that follow him make this figure last: but a syllogism is a disposition, and according to the disposition of the third argument, such is the syllogism, if therefore it go before in both the parts of the antecedent, why to go before is before to go behind, ergo, this must be the first. Kickerman saith Aristotle's order is best, because the last figure is most general for use, he hath reason for it, for it is more large for his reach, but not so simple for disposition, and how can we conclude, till we know where to place the third argument.   

Hic enim argumentum quaestionis, etc. Ramus doth here commorari.  
Nec aliter explicatur.  
Ramus was here deceived, for sometime it is explicated, yet for one that is explicated, we shall have it contracted.    

CHAP. XI.  

De prima specie syllogismi simplicis explicati.  
In syllogismo explicati propofitio est generalis, aut propria, & conclusio similis antecedenti, aut partidebiliori.  
WE have heard that a simple syllogism did break the question, and the third argument was laid to each part, that is, to the consequent part in the proposition, and looked into that by the light of the third argument, and to the antecedent in the assumptions. Now simplex was by use contracted, or laid out more at large. Use is artium magister, saith the Schools, and because it was more often in use contracted than explicated, ergo, it was requisite that he should teach us the use of contracting it. This is in nature first, if we shall look at placing the third argument, for to come before is before to come behind, and to come behind is before to come before and behind. Now in a contract the question is always particular, and the antecedent part of the question in like sort doth always agree with the third argument, because the assumption must always be affirmed, so that do but consider those two things, and you shall presently know any contract syllogism, and thus much of a contract, now we come to an explicate.   

In syllogismo explicato propositio est generalis, aut propria, & conclusio similis antecedenti, aut parti debiliori.  
The things here to be considered are first in the proposition, then in the conclusion: the proposition must be general, or proper, not particular, for than it is a breach of this rule, and this fallace is very common even in common talk, as for example.  
I hat that ties us unto Christ is the act of our faith.  
The imputation of Christ's righteousness is not our act of faith saith one.  
Therefore it doth not tie us unto Christ.  
Here the proposition is not general, for we are made righteous, not for our saith alone, but for that we are in Christ by faith: faith ties us as an instrument, but we must take heed that we give not that to the instrument which is due to the principal cause, for even as my arm is tied not to my sinews, or nerves, but is tied to the whole body, and is a member of the whole, being tied unto them by the whole: so we are as members of Christ's body tied to his Church, and are part of the matter and form of the whole, the matter is quatenus, we are spiritually made of the semen of the word: the form is the union of the Spirit holding all the members in semine, in that word unto Christ, now there is no fallace more common than this, for if we have a reason we bring it, never looking after the conclusion how it will follow, ergo, let us now well consider it, that we be no more deceived, for thus one saith.  
We are adopted to be the Sons of God by the act of faith without Christ.  
But the imputation of Christ's righteousness doth not make us to be adopted Sons of God.  
Therefore this is as if I should say, that where by I am nourished or live is my hands, ergo, this is true, but yet I do not live only by my hands, for than I should feed on them; and so if we look at the invention we make that causa sola, which is causa cum aliis.   

Et conclusio similis antece denti aut parti debiliori.  
That is, if that be strong, that is general, it will be like it, ant parti debiliori, that is particular, negative or proper. Now for negation we heard of that generally before, that is, ex meris negativis nihil concluditur: so that it is generally true, that if the syllogism be negative, the conclusion thereof must be negative: but particularity and property are here to be understood: so that whether in a contract, or explicate, negation is general, and by pars debilior we are to understand both negation, particularity and property, but more especially particularity and property; particularity is debilior, then generality, because there we cannot so fully determine of a thing. Now negation is more weak than affirmation, because it is more general, as when I say a man is not a stone, for here I go far from the point of telling you what a man is, for yet he may be any thing but a stone.   

Species duae sunt: prima ubi argumentum semper sequitur, negatum in altera parte.  
For whilst a syllogism stands in the disposition of the question with a third argument; and a simple syllogism is from breaking the parts of the question, disposing the consequent in the proposition, the antecedent in the assumption, ergo, the species must be by reason of the disposition of the third argument going before only, or going behind only, or going both before and behind, ergo, they are very species of disposition. Now there are species duae, for there are no more places for the third argument: it cannot go after, and come before, as it may come before, and go after, the reason is this, the consequent part of the question is the majus extremum, ergo, if that should be in the assumption, then how could the assumption be taken out of the proposition, whereas the minus extremum was there, for so the assumption would be bigger than the proposition; and by this means the third argument in the proposition should be greater if it came after, than the majus extremum that should there go before it, whereas we heard before that the consequent part of the question is either more general, or at least equal to the third argument: and again, it should go before in the assumption, though it be greater than the minus extremum: so that there are no more places, it must either go before both, and so be less than both the parts of the question: or follow both, and so be greater than both: or else it must be a mean betwixt both.   

Prima ubi argumentum semper sequitur, &c,  
For here is a more simple disposition than in the second explicate, secondly, it is denied in altera parte, meaning in the one part of the antecedent part, either proposition or assumption: they must never both be denied, nor both affirmed. The rule of negatus told us that one of the antecedent, and the conclusion must be denied but not all.   

Semper sequitur.  
That is, the consequent in the proposition, and the antecedent in the assumption: so that if the question be negative we may conclude it here, or in all the rest: but particulars where the third argument agrees with the antecedent may be only concluded in a contract, as,   

Turbatus non bene utitur rati●ne.  
Turbatus is a man addicted to his affections, and the Stoics held that sapiens and turbatus were disparates, and the reason is, because sapientia is not turbatio. Sapientia is properly the readiness or promptness in syllogistical judgement: now where will rules without reason, that is not good; for the affections that attend upon will do trouble the reason, as love heats fancy, and hatred cools, both which are enemies to reason. Vsus rationis, the third argument is a genus of sapientia, for it is general of all Logic: and the intellectual virtues are the habtual promptnesses of reasons act: and this syllogism may also be concluded in the second kind of an explicate.  
Qui bene utitur ratione non est turbatus.  
Sapiens bene utitur ratione.  
Sapiens igitur non est turbatus.   

Hoc judicium ita fit a Cic. 3. Tus.  
Quemadmodum (ait) oculus conturbatus non est probe affectus ad suum munus fungendum, etc.  
The proposition is here adorned with a prosyllogisme a simili: & sapientis animus it a semper affectus est, ut ratione optime utatur: there is the assumption: nunquam igitur est perturbatus, there is the conclusion: and this is called a general of the first kind, because here are only negative syllogims, and therefore the conclusion is always negative, ergo, that is the first kind of generals, when the conclusion is like to the proposition, for here general is an affection of simplex syllogismus explicatus: but when I say generalis est primus, aut secundus, here is a distribution of the genus into the species: now it is general, because the third argument is given to the parts of the question generally.   

Res mortalis est composita.  
This is a general of the second sort, because here the assumption is denied: here composita agrees to res mortalis as a cause, ergo, the proposition is affirmmed: and because it will not agree with the antecedent anima, ergo, the assumption is denied.   

Cicero 1. Tusc. In animi autem cognition (inquit.)  
Here the assumption is first, being backed with a prosyllogism, a testimonio nisi enim in Physicis plumbei sumus, and here Tully's eloquence is showed in the variety of words signifying the same thing, and this belongs to natural Philosophy, where we hear that el●mentum is composed ex elementis Quod cum ita sit, etc. here is the conclusion. Est enim interius, etc. that is, res mortalis here is the proposition, and these are both general, for here compositio is general to the consequent part, and the conclusion is so too. Now we come to the species of specialis prima, aut secunda.   

Lividus non est magnanimus.  
This is special, because the proposition only is general; it is primus because it is negative in the proposition like unto the conclusion, the question is, whether maximus be a snake or a slow worm, for a snake is very slow: and lividus is properly that which is black, and blue, and metaphorically it signifies poison: it signifies also one that will not do good himself, and yet envieth at others that do well: magnanimus, that is, courageous: these are disparates. Maximus Ovid's friend is magnanimus: so that lividus non est magnanimus belongs to natural Philosophy.   

Ovid. 3. the pont. Eleg. 3.  
Livors iners vitium, mores non exit in altos, etc.  
Here is the proposition utque latens ima, etc. there is a prosyllogism to it, a simili. Mens tua sublimis, here is the assumption, and here are prosyllogisms to that; Maximi were so called first of Fabius Maximus who was more than Alexander Magnus, supra genus eminet ipsum a comparatis: ingenium for magnanimity, a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, than a minore. Ergo alii noceant miseris, here is a dissimilitude. Ac tua supplicibus, etc. here are prosyllogisms for the conclusion which is wanting.  
Specialis secundus.  
Saltator est luxuriosus.  
Specialis because one only part is general, secundus, because the assumption is denied, as the conclusion is. The question is, whether Muraena be a dancer.   

Cicero pro Muraena.  
Nemo enim fere salta sobrius, nisi forte insanit, etc.  
Here the proposition is first with a prosyllogism, neque insolitudine, etc. here is a distinction into the specials: intempestivi convivii, &c to mihi, etc. here is the assumption, and there is a distribution of the integrum into the members: lastly, the conclusion, & cum ea non reperiantur, here is again a repetition of the assumption with the conclusion.   

Ovid 1. Trist. Eleg. 2.  
Carmina proveniunt animo deducta sereno.  
Ovid excuses his verses tripliciter, my verses cannot be good: why? from the cause, carmina proveniunt, etc. nubila sunt su●●●is, here is a prosyllogism of the proposition ab adversis: secondly, carmina s●cessum etc. the proposition, the assumption is me mare, etc. Again, all fear should be removed from good verses: the assumption followeth enwrapped with a contrary, ego perditus ensem, etc. haec quoque quae facio, etc. here is a deprecatio instead of the conclusion, which is general to all the three syllogisms.   

Proprius primus.  
Agesilaus non est pictus ab Appelle, etc.  
Here the third argument disagrees with the consequent part, for Apelles lived not in Agesilaus time.   

Proprius secundus,  
Caesar oppressit patriam.  
Here we see our Author doth not bring examples of proper syllogisms out of Authors, because Authors commonly slide away in generals; but yet he might have brought some out of History, for there commonly we have proper syllogisms.    

CHAP. XII.  

De secunda specie syllogismi simplicis explicati.  
Secunda species, explicati syllogis est quando argumentum antecedit propositione, sequitur affirmatum in assumptione.  
WE have heard the reason of the disposition of a simple syllogism, and the reason why the contract must go first, because it placeth the third argument and that before, whereas the first explicate is the second, because it placeth the third argument both before and after, ergo, here is a more composite disposition than before, ergo, Ramus placeth this last, whereas Kickerman would have it first, because it is more general for use, but quatenus it is a syllogism it is more special: but he meant it was more general, because it concludeth more questions, but that is no reason, for so adjunctum in Invention should be taught before subjectum, for adjunctum est frequentius, & copiosus: but we cannot know what to place before and after, till first we know what it is to place before, and what it is to place after.   

Secunda species syllogismi explicati est, etc.  
There are two things to be considered in this definition: first, that the argument doth antecedere in propositione: secondly, that it be affirmed in the assumption: for the placing of the third argument, we must know, that the place of it is double: first, it must be the antecedent in the proposition; secondly, it must be the consequent in the assumption, and it had his name medium from this syllogism principally, for in a contract it was placed before the parts of the question, in the first explicate after them: here it comes between them both, and because this kind was most common, and a figure best known in Schools, ergo, hence came the third argument to be called medium: Secondly, the assumption must be affirmed, and herein it agreeth with a contract; and here we see what syllogism may be concluded in an explicate: first, an affirmed of all sorts, whether generalis, particularis, or proprius: secondly, a denied of all sorts but not every denied; for if the antecedent part disagree with the third argument, than it will be concluded in the first kind of an explicate, and therefore argumentum antecedit the consequent part of the question, sequitur affirmatum, the antecedent in the assumption, as we heard generally in a simple syllogism; as for example, the question is, whether profit attend honesty, the third argument is justum: for the proposition, if it be not well gotten it will not thrive: for the assumption, the truth of that appears, because justitia generalis, or virtus and honesta● are all one.   

Affirmatum generale Omne justum est utile.  
Cicero 2. officiorum, it a concludit.  
Summa quidem authoritas Philosophy, etc.  
Here the proposition is first, being backed with a prosyllogism a testimonio; then the assumption, and then the conclusion: and this is generalis, quia est ex propositione, & assumptione generalibus quia ex omnibus partibu▪ affirmatis, and the rest following are so for the reason out of their definitions.   

Neg. gene.  
Timidus non est liber.  
Hoc ita concluditur, & judicatur ab Horatio 1. Epist.  
Quo melior servo, quo liberior sit avarus, etc.  
The question is, whether a covetous man be free: no, for he will make himself a slave for a farthing: the proposition is argued in the example with a prosyllogism, and that is argued by another prosyllogism from his effects, nam qui cupit, etc. there is the assumption● porro qui metuens vivit, &c: there is the conclusion backed with a prosyllogism.   

Consslii expers, consilio reginon potest.  
Terentius in Eunucho.  
Here, quares in se neque consilium neque modum  
Habet ullum—  
Love cannot be governed by counsel: why? because it is expers consilii: any affection whatsoever if it be in excess it will hear no reason, love especially, for it is hot, and that intoxicate the head, and sets fancy on work, and will hear no judgement: the proposition is first, here quae res. In amore haec omnia insunt vitia, here instead of the assumption the causes of love are reckoned up. Incerta hac situ, etc. there is the conclusion backed with a prosyllogism a contrario.   

Affir. spec.  
consuls virtute facti, studiose rempub. tueri debent  
The question is, whether Cicero was to be causa quae ●ueatur Rempublicam: yes, because he is made Consul for his virtue.   

Sic Orator diligentiam suam, etc.  
The proposition is first, being argued with a prosyllogism a minore, qui non in incunabilis, that is, not by being born of them who have been Consuls; said in campo, that is when they go to the fields, not to their progenitors, and that he shows by a contrary to himself; then the assumption, nulli populo, and with a prosyllogism the conclusion, me ipsum, etc. he doth commorari upon the assumption by a digression: and upon the occasion of the prosyllogism he repeats again the conclusion.   

Quod optatum redierit, gratum est.  
The question is, whether Lesbian be welcome to Catullus: yes, because she is the subject of his desire, it is a connex axiom; but we are to look at it as it is a simple axiom, as the verb is the band that ties it.   

Ca●ullus sic concludit.  
Si quicquam cupidoque optanti obtigit unquam.  
The proposition is first, than the assumptio argued a minore carius auro: lastly, he doth commorari upon the conclusion, Lesbi animi cupido: where there is also a comparison added a minore.   

Neg. spec.  
Deceptor amantis puellae non est laudandus.  
Phillis apud Ovidium.  
Fallere credentem non est operosa puellam.  
Now followeth a negative special, Demophoon non est laudandus, from his effects the proposition is first, fallere with a prosyllogism, simplicitas, etc. then the assumption, sum decepta, than the conclusion with an execration by a testimony of the gods: and now in these kinds of simple syllogisms, the question is made much more clear and evident then in composite syllogisms, because here we sever the question into his parts, and lay the third argument with each part, to see the truth thereof: whereas in a composite syllogism we dispose the third argument with the whole question, and do not sever it at all. Now then, that we may know readily where any question may be concluded, it is but this, look at the question, whether it be affirmed, or denied, general, special, or proper: if it be a general affirmed, it can be concluded only in the second kind of an explicate, not in the first explicate, not in a contract: if it be a general denied it may only be concluded in the first explicate, and also in the second explicate, if the third argument agree with the antecedent part of the question: if it be a particular affirmed it may be concluded in a contract, not in the first explicate, but in the second explicate, if the third argument agree with the antecedent: if it be a particular denied it may be concluded in a contract, and in the first explicate, if the third argument disagree with the antecedent part of the question, and in the second explicate: so that this is the most general: if it be a proper affirmed, it can only be concluded in the second explicate, not in the first explicate, nor in a contract: if it be a proper denied, than it can be concluded only in the first explicate, or in the second explicate, if the third argument doth agree with the antedent part of the question, not in a contract.    

CHAP. XIII.  

De Syllogismo connexo primo. Adhuc syllogismus simplex fuit: syllogismus compositus, est syllogismus ubi tota quaestio est pars al●era propositionis affirmatae, & compositae: argumentum est pars reliqua.  
WE have heard of a simple syllogism, and how it came to be simple: now it is called a composite, by reason the whole question is placed in the proposition with the third argument, now which goes first, and which goes last, we shall hear in the specials. Again, this proposition must be affirmed, meaning the parts affirmed, and also composite, the assumption and conclusion are always, or at least may always be simple, and it is called composite, not so much in respect of the proposition, but of the disposing of the whole question with the third argument. Here we must not bring any part of the question into the assumption, for if we bring in one part, we wrong the other part: and if we bring in the whole question, we commit a tautology, making the proposition and assumption the same; but the third argument must come into the assumption, because it is the light to clear the question, ergo, it is first placed in the proposition with the whole question, then alone in the assumption: as if I should say, this is it that is two foot long, do you mark it: or as if I should show you corn, and a bushel together in the proposition, and then afterward show you a bushel alone, and tell you that it is a lawful one.   

Tollere autem in composito syllogismo, est specialem contradictionem ponere.  
That is, wheresoever we sh●ll hear of this term of art, tollere, we mean to put a special contradiction: why doth he say, specialem contradictionem? because that if the third argument be a general in the proposition, we must put the special contradiction to it in the assumption.   

Syllo: compositus, est connexus, aut disjunctus.  
That is a composite either where the proposition is a connex axiom, or where the third argument and the question are disjunct. Our copulate axiom will come into a simple syllogism, but not into a composite, our discreet axiom making but a discretion between the arguments, comes seldom into a syllogism, so that these only conclude, because in a connex axiom the arguments hang one upon another, following one the other: so that there we look at the two arguments simply agreeing: so in a disjunct the parts there argue as contraries, and one contrary will conclude another, because there the band severs the arguments contrary to a copulate axiom: now connexus is first, because a connex axiom comes before a disjunct,   

Syllogismus connexus, est syllogismus compositus propositionis connexae,  
So that here is nothing to be considered, but only the proposition, that it be a connex.   

Est que duorum modorum  
Because here are 20. places, the third argument may go before the question, or it may go after the question.   

Primus modus syllogismi connexi est, qui assumit antecedens, & consequens concludit.  
Here we may conclude affirmed questions in the first modus as in a contract the third argument was placed before, ergo, it was set first: so here in a connex that must be first where the argument goes before. As,   

Si dii sunt, divinatio est.  
Cicero 3. Officiorum.  
Atque si etiam hoc natu a praescribit, ut homo homini, etc.  
If a man must wish well to a man quia homo, he must seek the profit of a man, but prius, ergo, the proposition is obscured with a prosyllogism.   

Sic Aencidos 4. Dido judicat Aeneae remanendum esse.  
Mene fugis? per ego has lacrymas dextramque tuam te.  
If I have well deserved of thee, go not from me: first the proposition is backed with a prosyllogism: te propter, etc. the assumption: cui me, etc. the conclusion.   

Frequenter hic non assumitur idem, sed majus ut 1. Catil.  
Si te parents timerent, at que odissent tui, etc.  
You shall often have in this kind of syllogism the assumption omitted, and a prosyllogism in room of it. If Catilius parents could not away with him, he should go from them: at nunc te patria, etc. a majore.  
Concludendi modus hic idem est, quando propositio est lata temporis: quo genere nympha, etc.  
Cum Paris Oenone poterit spirare relicta.  
We heard before that such axioms, where there is cum, and tum, that is his meaning by relation of time, that it is a connex axiom: and so here a connex syllogism.  
When Paris hath left Oenone, then let Zantlous run back to his spring, at, ergo. Here the proposition is first, than the assumption, than the conclusion.    

CHAP. XIV.  

De syllogismo connexo secundo.  
Secundus modus connexitollit consequens, ut tollat antecedens.  
HEre is a connex, and here the third argument must come after, and the question must go before, ergo, it is secundus, and here we see there is a double taking away, tollit antecedens, ut tollat consequens.   

Si ulli rei sapiens assentietur usquam; aliquandi etians opinabitur, etc.  
Nunquam autem opinabitur;  
Nulli igitur rei assentietur:  
The Academics thought that a man should not have an opinion of any thing, and therefore should not assent to any thing, and from them came the Sceptics. Nunquam epinabitur, is a general negative, and aliquando opinibatur, is a special affirmed.   

Ovid 2. Trist.  
Si saperem, doctas odissem jure sorores, etc.  
There is the proposition with a prosyllogism from their effects. At nunc (tanta meo comes est insania morbo, etc.) there is the assumption, the conclusion is wanting. As the first kind of a connex did conclude affirmative questions; so this second kind concludes denied questions.   

Hae duae syllogismi species sunt omnium usitatissimae.  
That is, these two kinds of syllogisms are so plain, that every fool, as we say, may make them.    

CHAP. XV.  

De syllogismo disjuncto primo.  
Syllogismus disjunctus est syllogismus compositus propositionis disjunctae.  
Modi duo sunt; primus tollit unum, & reliquum concludit.  
WE have heard that a simple syllogism is better for the clearing of a doubtful axiom than a composite, because there the question is broken in pieces, and the third argument, which is the candle or light, is laid to each part. In a composite the third argument is laid to the whole question: so that there the question cannot be so clear: and there in the proposition we say in effect, this is the third argument, and then repeat it again in the assumption, and say this is it, mark it well Now it is connexus aut disjunctus; and connexus we heard of before, and now it remaineth that we speak of syllogismus disjunctus.   

Syllogismus disjunctus, etc.  
We have heard the reason of the name syllogismus, it is an Arithmetical term signifying the sum in Addition, because we gather in it as in a sum, that which hath been more fully delivered, it is called disjunctus, even as a disjunct axiom was so called, because the matter was severed, though the words of Grammar were not: so a disjunct syllogism is where the third argument is a thing disjoined from the question. It is composite because the proposition is composite, yet not every composite proposition maketh a disjunct syllogism, but where there is disjunction between the question, and the third argument, ergo, in these kinds of syllogisms we evermore conclude from opposites, as in a connex we conclude commonly from consentanies.   

Modi duo sunt; primus tollit unum, & reliquum concludit.  
In a disjunct syllogism it skilleth not where we place our question, whether before or after the third argument, secondly, observe in this first modus of a disjunct syllogism, that we take away the third argument in the assumption, and conclude the rest, thirdly, that in this first kind we conclude affirmatively, and lastly, that here we conclude simple questions, ut, Aut dies est, aut nox est, etc.  
Ciceronis pro Cluentio judicium tale est;  
Sed cum esset haec illi proposit a conditio, etc.  
Sic idem 2. Philip ratiocinatur.   

Nunquam ne intelliges tibi sta●u●ndum esse utrum illi, qui istam rem g●sserunt, homicidae sint, an vindives libertatis? etc.  
The question is this, either Brutus and Caius were freers of the Country, or traitors to the Country, the proposition is first with a prosyllogism. Attendite enim paulisper, etc. first be thine own judge, for Antony would be drunk; again, there is another prosyllogism to the proposition, plusquam homicidae, etc. and that he proves with another prosyllogism, they killed Caesar a father of the Country. Tu homo sapiens & considerate, quid dicis? this is the assumption, being backed with a prosyllogism, non homi●idae, which he proves from a testimony, from the effects of Antony The conclusion is last. Sequitur ut liberatores tuo judicio sint quandoquidem tertium nibil esse potest. So that all the parts are here laid down orderly, only they are obscured with prosyllogisms.   

Si parts d●●junctae propositionis sint duabus plures, judicandi, concludendique ars erit eadem.  
That is, it may so fall out that there may be more third arguments brought to conclude the question: as in disparates before can conclude truth, we must bring all the disparates together, and we must take away all but our question.  
Sic Cicero judicat, Rabirium cum consulibus esse oportere.  
Atque vidimus (ait) hac in rerum natura triasuisse, etc.  
The question is, whether Rabirive was to be with the Consuls, the proposition is first: the assumption follows with a prosyllogism. Latere with a prosyllogism a simili cum Saturnio esse, etc. with a prosyllogism also: then the conclusion backed with a prosyllogism, virtus, & honestus, etc.    

CHAP. XVI.  

De syllogismo disjuncto secundo.  
Disjunctus secundus e proposi●ione partibus omnibus affirmata assumit unum, & reliquum tollit.  
THe second disjunct is called secundus in respect that it concludes negatively, as the first concluded affirmatively, and as before the third argument was first taken away, and the rest concluded: so here contra we assume the third argument, and take away the rest: and further we are to consider, that the proposition must be affirmed partibus omnibus, yet we may say it is, or it is not arguing from a contradicent.   

Sic Juno cum Jove de Turno concludit 10. Aenei. Quid si qu●d voce gravaris,  
Mente dares, at que d●c Turno rata vita maneret;  
O husband that you would grant but in mind that Turnus might not be slain: either he must die, or I am deceived. The proposition is in those words, quod ut O potius, etc. the assumption taking away the Irony. Et in melius tua, quod potes, orsa reflectas, there is the conclusion.   

Ejus modi syllogismus efficiture propositione copulata negata, quae negata complexio dicitur: quaeque disjunctionis affirmatae vim obtinet.  
A syllogism whose proposition shall be a copulate axiom denied, because it is the same with a disjunct affirmed in value, ergo, it may make a disjunct syllogism, this is seldom found in use, but because other Logicians teach it, ergo, our Author would not leave out any thing, that belongs to the Art of reason, as,  
Non & dies est, & nox est;  
At dies est:  
Nonigitur nox est.  
Here non denies the one, and puts the other, for in a copulate axiom we heard, that none denied the coupling of the parts, and this is called negata complexio, because here the proposition may be denied, whereas before he said generally e propositione partibus omnibus affirmata.   

Complexio dicitur.  
By complexio he means the whole Syllogism, by a Senecdoche of the part for the whole, and now we have heard of the kinds of disposing arguments immediately: so far as the act of reason reacheth: now we come to method which is but one rule, yet indeed it is the golden rule of all Arts,    

CHAP. XVII.  

De Methodo secundum Aristotelem.  
Methodus est dianoia variorum axiomatum homogeniorum pro naturae suae claritate praepositorum.  
MEthodus, for the name it signifies with the way, or order, when any thing is done the right way, order, or manner, than it is with the way: so that it doth by name commend unto us the nearest and right way of performing any thing, ergo, it is fitly so called, for a right line is but one, and it is most short, inter eosdem terminos.   

Est dianoia.  
That is, a discourse of the mind, for axiomatical judgement is said to be of the mind quiet, and calm, and dianoia is said to be of the mind troubled, for there is an agitation of the brain to and fro●, that we may come to see the truth more plainly. Now I do not see in method how aliud axioma ex alio deducitur, if he mean that one axiom is here more general, and another more special; there may be a fallace in that, for the more general doth not contain in it the more special. In a man's body of all the members the head is first, yet none will say that it contains the rest of the members in it: notwithstanding there is something in this I must confess, for the former rule in an Art gives some light to the rule following, as Dialectica est ars bene disserendi, gives light to the second rule of Logic, for I must first know the whole, before I can distribute it into its parts, but how this is any discourse I do not see: Again, I have showed that among ancient Logicians dianoia is only given to syllogisms, and not to method, and in truth I hold dianoia and syllogismus to be all one. Again, method is for memory, not for the judging of things: and that argument before concerning the distinct organs of the parts of Logic, is instar omnium to prove it. It may be said fitly, that it is dispositio axiomatum, for in axiomatical and syllogistical judgement there were arguments disposed, by which indeed axioms did arise, but method doth not dispose any arguments, but axioms, ergo, this in like sort is a mean argument to show that axiomatical and syllogistical, judgement should go together, disposing arguments immediately, and method should be above, for it meddles not with arguments, but with axioms immediately.   

Axiomatum.  
Axioma signifies properly such a truth as is worthy credit without any discourse, ergo, it agrees to that which is per se manifestum, and therefore axioma dubium is not worthy that name axioma: but method is dispositio axiomatum: first of them that are clear without any light of a third argument: and doubtful axioms are not disposed by method, but as they are cleared before the tribunal seat of a third argument: and indeed method is principally a disposition of the axioms of Arts. Axiomatum not of things:  
Object. Is there not order in things?  
Answ. True it is, that method as the rest of Logic is an adjunct of the things, yet it disposeth them gratia axiomatum, for as invention is immediately of arguments, and they are of things: and as judgement is of axioms, and syllogisms, and they likewise are of things: so method is of axioms immediately, and of things immediately: so that we must lay up nothing by the rule of method but axioms, and this must be our care in reading any thing to take the axioms, and to carry them to their places in Arts.  
Object. Are not syllogisms to be remembered, ergo, is there not method of them?  
Answ. Yes, but we take the parts asunder, and make them axioms first, for the proposition, assumption, and conclusion are axioms, and belong to some Art, therefore look whither the more special argument in the axiom belongeth, and thither the axiom belongeth: and if we would remember the reason why such a thing is so, or not so, see where your rule is, and look at the former axioms, and you shall find arguments for the proof of any thing, and may so keep them: as for example: otiosus est amator, Aegisthus est otiosus, ergo Egistus est amator. The proposition belongs to moral Philosophy, for vitium is a vice, love is concupiscence the sin, and it is the affection of love disordered, ergo, this breaks the seventh Commandment, ergo, this axiom belongs hither, for love is the more special. Aegisthus est otiosus: this indeed belongs to the history of Aegisthus: but because we have it not, therefore we may carry it to otium: so the conclusion belongs to moral Philosophy, to concupiscence. Again, syllogisms serve but for the clearing of the truth of axioms, and then afterward we return again to the rule of an axiom to judge whether it be true or false, and this is all that is required for disposing arguments, ergo, method is dispositio axiomatum only. Again, we never remember any thing, but we make an axiom of it.  
Object. But we remember words.  
Answ. Though it be true that some remember words very strangely, yet they remember them as axioms, for the word, and the thing signified by the word make an axiom.  
Object. But I suppose they know not the meaning of the words.  
Answ. Yet the sound oreecho of the word in his head, which is an adjunct unto the word, and the word itself makes an axiom still: so that method is only of axioms: and commonly they that so remember words have little judgement, and if all the axioms of all things were laid down methodically, we should remember all things methodically.   

Variorum.  
For method is not in one axiom, therefore here take heed that we be not deceived, taking that to break the rule of method, which is a breach of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: as if this term invention be made a part of Rhetoric, it is against 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: but if the doctrine of this rule Inventio est prima paus Dialecticae, etc. be taught in Rhetoric, that is a breach of method: contra, the definition of Logic placed in Grammar or Rhetoric, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but a breach of method Again, he saith they are various, not such as shall be contrary one to another, for the difference of the axoms of Art is but in a diversity, as it were, not in opposition, because in respect of the object they all tend to one thing.   

Homogeniorum.  
That is of the same kindred: this homogenia is not that in an axiom, for that is between the arguments in an axiom, this is between the axioms themselves: so that let us beware that we put not heterogeny axioms in an Art: for they that have done so may be compared to ignorant Painters, that paint a horses head upon a man's body. Again, when we are to make a speech of any thing, we must be careful to speak within our compass, and not to bring in things that are heterogeny to the subject we speak of,   

Pro naturae suae claritate praepositorum.  
For method is the rule of order, ergo, there must be a praepositio & a postpositio of axioms here: ergo, if we will draw any Art out according to his true feature, we must set every thing in his own place, nature observes this course in every thing, as we see whilst the earth would rather ascend then there should be vacuum: and whilst the spirit of God his mighty power that governs all things, doth place every thing in order, we see he doth it by the rule of method continually: as he placeth the fire in the highest place above the other elements, than the air, etc. dulcenatale solum, etc. to every man, and to every thing, because by the rule of method that is his place: and if things be displaced, they will sooner perish. The reason in nature why the load stone desires to stand North and South, is because of the rule of method, it being most agreeable to the nature thereof so to stand: so that every thing desires by this rule, not only its proper place, but its proper situs also in that place.  
Pro naturae suae claritate: this proposition must be guided by this rule, namely, the clearness of their nature and good reason for the former axiom doth disery some light to the following. Again he saith, pro naturae suae, so that clarius natura must go first, not that which is simply clarius, because that that is by nature clarius, is clarius, and notius than any other: and whereas we have a distinction of notius natura, and notias nobis, they are the same Notius natura is in Genest, notius nobis is in Analysi: for howbeit in analysi we begin at the lowest, which is notius nobis, yet in the end we come to notius natura, and then that which is notius natura, is notius nobis: and we know in genere before we know in specie, as we know homo before we know Thomas, or William, etc. Hence it is that many of our great Doctors know the rules of Art, but know not how to practise them: so that indeed they know them not. Again, because prius natura commonly containeth something in it that we must know before we can understand the next rule; so Arts teach us: as Logic first teacheth Invention, than Judgement. In Invention it first teacheth an argument in general, then in specie: now if we would know which is natura prius in every thing, that we may do thus, if one rule give light to another or if one rule may be without the other to clear the truth of it, then that is first: otherwise it needs the help of another, it must come after that other: as one is before two, for I cannot know two before I know one: secondly, too cannot be but there must be one, whereas one may be without two.   

Vnde omnium inter se convenientia judicantur, memoriaque comprehendentur.  
Here he tells us a double fruit or end that ariseth thereof: for the first end, unde omnium inter se convenientia judic antur, true it is thus far, if an Art be set in order, we do there judge of the parts, but this is by axiomatical judgement, not by methodical, for I make but one axiom of two, as if I judge the definition of Logic to be before the distribution, here the distribution is an adjunct to the definition, and here I make of these two one axiom of a subject, and an adjunct, and judge them by the rule of axiomaaical judgement. The second end memoria comprehenditur, is true: so than the judgement of all the parts of an Art for their conveniency, is nothing but the seeing of their consention: for one axiom laid to another is subjectum and adjunctum, and so we make but one axiom of them: now method makes all things one, and we remember all things as one: and therefore it is that the world is one, namely, by method; and the reason why we forget any thing, is because we make one thing more things, for every sense is of one thing indeed. The reason why we remember a man whom we have seen before, is because we remember the disposition of the parts of his body, nose, mouth, eyes, etc. and so turning the glass of our understanding unto him again, we know him; and if we would remember any thing for our own present use, let us carry them home to their places, and we shall not forget them: and here we may see that we do not remember by taking the species of things into our brain, and there lay them up as in a chest, or let them hang as birds in a lime twig, and are received by fancy first, as if it did fashion them, than cogitation considers of them, and memory keeps them.  
Answ. There is no reason to show that these should be true, for these outward species that come to my external eye, vanish away quickly, for the species of the understanding they being made of the animal spirit must also soon vanish: but by the rule of method we place the things in their order, as God hath done, and when our eye hath seen them once in their place, she knows where to go to find them again: so that as my outward eye being once turned from the thing it beheld before, doth not receive any species from it: so my eye of reason hath not any species of any thing any longer than it looks at it, so that I may fitly compare our inward eye of reason, to our outward eye, or to a glass.   

Atque ut spectatur in axiomate veritas, & falsitas, in syllogismo consequentia, & inconsequentia: sic in methodo consideratur, ut per se clarius praecidat, obscurius sequatur; omninoque ordo & confusio judicatur.  
Ramus doth commorari upon this rule, and shows it by comparing it with other rules, for as the drift of an axiom is truth and falsehood, and of a syllogism consequence and inconsequence: so that syllogistical judgement is but to clear things to us, and we must go to axiomatical judgement, to see the truth and falsehood: so that rules of consecution are here, and maxims as they call them, rules of consequents, as sublata causa tollitur effectum, etc. these are but uses of the arguments of invention, and they follow by syllogistical judgement, we making the first rule to be the third argument: as here, if causa be cujus vires est, then sublata causa tollitur effectum. At. Ergo. Sic in methodo, etc.   

Omninoque ordo & confusio judicatur.  
By judgement here we are to understand axiomatical judgement, as I said before: but order is here, which we judge by the application of the rule of method to any thing, and so we syllogise.   

Sic disponitur ex homogeniis axiomatis primo loco absoluta notione primum, secundo secundum, tertio tertium, & ita deinceps.  
According to this rule of method shall be disposed homogeny axioms, first that which is absolute, that is, that which takes not light from any other: then of them that take light from others, secundo, secundum, tertio tertium: so that the definitions of things in Arts are absolute prima: but in truth there is not any definition of any Art absolutely first, but that of Encyclopadia: there are also magis and minus nota compared with others, which are in the second and third places.   

Ideoque methodus ab universalibus ad singularia perpetuo progreditur.  
So that here we must know that that which was before natura prius, is here universalius, not genus, species, or any such thing, but he means that method proceeds a natura notioribus ad natura ignotiora, and this is the genesis of method. Now Kickerman not seeing this well, and seeing Aristotle say in his Ethics that he must proceed a generalioribus ad specialiora, did imagine that every Art must have his praecognita: but Aristotle means, that having spoken de summo bono, which was the most general end, he was to speak of things more special tending to that end; and alas what is absolute primum in an Art, but the first rule? ergo, can there be any thing to be praecognitum? Again his praecognita are either the Art itself confusedly taught, or the exposition of some special rules thereof, and for postcognita, why the examples are infimae species, ergo, lowest, ergo, we cannot go further than examples for postcognita.   

Hac ●nim sola, & unica via proceditur ab antecedentibus omnino, & absolute notioribus ad consequentia ignota declarandum, eamque solam methodum Aristoteles docuit.  
So that things are to go before or after by their nature: and this Aristotle and every one doth consider, for when a man clotheth himself, first he is to cover his head, then to put on his doublet, hose, etc. and it is preposterous if a man should first put on his shoes, than his stockings, or breeches; and in making himself unready he must analyse, that is, first put off his shoes, than his stockings, etc.    

CHAP. XVIII.  

De prima methodi illustratione per exempla artium.  
Sed methodi unitatem exempla doctrinarum, & artium praecipue demonstant, praecipueque vindicant.  
OUr Author stays long upon method, his reasons are, because all Logicians are very silent in the doctrine of method: and they that have spoken of it are mistaken therein, for they make method to be nothing but genesis and analysis, whereas they are the practice of a rule, or of as many rules as are in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a thing, ergo, they are not method, though there may be a genesis and an analysis of the rules of method, as well as of any other rules of Logic, or other Arts. Now whilst other Logicians knew not this, they have run into many questions about the multiplicity of method, whereas it is but one: as may easily be showed by reason. For if all things are made one by the rule of method, though there are many things in the world, than there cannot be more methods, for then there should be more worlds.   

Exempla doctrinarum, & artium praecipue demonstrant, praecipueque vindicant.  
Ramus saith, that method (as it is true) is not better seen to be one, then in the rules of A●ts, for as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are only belonging to rules of Art: so method is almost, and principally of the rules of Arts, though their order m●y be in many other things.   

Quibus quamvis omnes regulae generales sint & universales, etc.  
In the rules of Art all are universals, not that there may not be proper axioms in an Art, but he means such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: otherwise if he should not mean thus, this generality would be only true of the rules of the general Arts, not of the special Arts: but though all be general, carum tamen gradus distinguntur, as they are compared one with another, as the definition of Logic is before the distribution, being more general than it. and so the distribution is more general than the next, and so for the rest.  
Again, the most general rule in disposition is more special than the last rule of invention, because inventions use is more general than judgements, though the rule of disposition may contain more in it, than the rule of invention containeth in it.   

Quantoque unaqu●que genelarior erit, tanto magis praecedet.  
That is, as it is pro naturae suae claritate praeponendum, so must it be placed.   

Generalissima loco, & ordine prima erit, quia lumine & notitia prima est.  
This being the course of nature to proceed from the highest to the lowest, for so we must place things: the reason followeth: now indeed Ramus himself took no great pain about Art in general, and therefore imagined that every definition in Art was absolutely first, whereas in very truth none of them are absolutely first, but only that rule of Encyclopaedia.   

Subalternae consequentiae sequentur, quia claritate sunt proximae: atque ex his natura notiores preponentur, minus notae substituentur,▪ tandemque specialissimae constituentur.  
Among subalterns some are more general, and some are more special, Ramus here speaks Allegorically, alluding to genus and species subalternae, and specialissimae in Invention: and here special rules are all one with others in themselves, though not in comparison with them:   

Definitio itaque generalissima prima erit.  
Ramus means the definitio, and the definitum, not d●finitio the argument: now this must be first, why? one would think it should rather be last; because a perfect definition intendeth to lay down the whole essence of a thing: and before a man can know a piece of a thing, he must know it in the whole as it is comprised in a brief, from the nearest causes thereof.   

Distributio sequitur: quae si multiplex fuerit, etc.  
For so we heard that a definition was manifold integri in membra, generis in species, etc. because as the definition laid out the whole in one lump at once from the causes, which are the utmost things: so in a distribution there is the whole, but laid out distributively in his parts: so that this is the difference of them: and the following rules do prosecute every part according to their place.   

Praecedit in parts integras partitio, etc.  
The reason of this is, because the membra make up the whole, and are causes thereof, as the definition was of the thing defined. Again, the distributio of generis in species is from the effects, and they are after the causes, ergo, distributio ex causis must go before them; again, a distribution of the integrum into the members in an Art is common to a distribution of the genus into the species: as for example, in Grammar vox is divided as integrum into litera, and syllaba, and both letters and syllables are general to vox numeri, and sine numero, which are the species of vox.   

Sequitur divisio in species, etc.  
But if there be a distribution of the subject into the adjuncts, they must go before distributio generis in species, as affirmatum, and negatum axioma, must go before simplex and compositum, because the adjuncts are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with an axiom in general. Again, if we set a distribution of the genus into the species before a distribution ex adjunctis, we must handle the species distinctly, ergo, there would be no room for distributio ex adjunctis to come in: but we must know that we seldom have these distributions of the same Art, for where there is distributio integri in membra, there is seldom distributio generis in species, though there may be either of these, and likewise a distribution ex adjunctis.   

Et transitionum vinculis, si longior inter eas intersit explicatio, colligandae sunt, etc.  
He gives us here a note by the way, that if the distribution went long before, that then we should use a transition from one part to another: so that here we see the use of a transition, and that it belongs to method, and it is as it were a bridge to go from one thing to another: and it serveth auditorem reficere, ac recreare.   

Omnes definitiones, distributiones, regulae Grammaticae repertae sint, atque unaquaeque sigillatim judicata, etc.  
Ramus supposeth every rule of Art already invented, and judged, how shall we dispose them? not by any rules before, but only by method which is behind, for we speak of order: as first the definition of Grammar, than the distribution, because parts simul sumpta are equivolent to the whole: and let an Art be laid down thus, and we shall see every thing plainly and evidently.    

CHAP. XIX.  

De secunda methodi illustratione per exempla Poetarum, Oratorum, Historicorum.  
Atqui methodus, non solum in materia artium & doctrinarum adhibetur; sed in omnibus rebus, quas facile & perspicue doc ere volumus, etc.  
AS Aristotle saith in the first of his Ethick 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. so every thing may orderly be laid down, quas facile, etc. therefore Poets, Orators, etc. observe this rule, howbeit they do not usque quaque ingredi, and insistere as Art requireth.  
Virgilius in Georgicus, etc.  
Hactenus avorum cultus & sidera coeli,  
Nunc te, Bacche canam:  
Poetry is a general Art, ergo, a Poet is a general Author, therefore Ramus brings examples out of Poetry to show this general Art of Logic, Virgil for example handles Georgics, that is, husbandry, and divides it into four parts, in his first book he handles that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with husbandry: but his distribution is not so good as it should be if it were an Art; for Virgil doth as Kickerman useth to do, namely, divides it into its common properties, and into its special properties: common as Astrologia, Meteorologia, than he comes by a transition to trees: then by a more imperfect transition in the beginning of his third book de bobus, etc. for a transition is perfect or imperfect; a perfect one consists of a conclusion of that which went before, and of a proposition of that that followeth: an imperfect transition consisteth of either of these severally and alone.   

Sic igitur Poeta generalissimum primo loco, etc.  
That is, this must be our care when we do any thing especially if it be of importance, that we miss not this method: but that we place every thing in his due order and method according to nature.   

Sic Ovidius in Fastis, etc.  
So Ovid in his Calendar first sets down the general definition of his works, and then he distributes it into twelve parts, according to the twelve months of the year: reprehending Romulus for making but ten months, but it should seem that the Romans had their time divided, as well in the time of Romulus, as afterward, ergo, he did invent all the twelve months, ergo, Ovid was deceived, in thinking that Numa Pompilius did make January and June: now he calls June Janus, because that month was dedicated to Janus, whom some think was javan, some No: and the first day of this month was his holy day.   

Oratores in prooemio, etc.  
So that here we may see this one method that as it is used in Arts, so is it used in Poets, and Orators: now the exordium is nothing but a commoration: the narration a description of that thing whereof he is to speak, the confirmation a distribution, etc.   

Sic Livius summam, etc.  
This example is for History.    

CHAP. XX.  

De Crypticis methodi.  
Haec igitur in variis axiomatis homogeneis, etc.  
RAmus hath showed us what method is, and that it is but one: now this exact order thereof is then, when we desire to teach any thing plainly.   

At cum delectatione motuve aliquo, etc.  
If a man be to deliver an Art, he must exactly observe this method in every point: but many times it falls out in discourses that disorder must be used, not for the doctrines sake, but because of the perversity of the hearers, for they often go out of their way by reason of their weakness; now this way is especially when we reject homogenies, as Orators use much to do, and draw in heterogenies, knowing that variety doth delight.   

Sed praecipue rerum ordo initio invertitur, etc.  
So as we shall see a rule come in like a morris-dancer, as Aristotle placeth many out of order.   

Itaque ad illam perfectae methodi, etc.  
So then, as we heard in a syllogism, that there was an inversion of the parts, a superfluity, and a defect: so here in method, haec imperfectior forma non solum detractis rebus mutila est vel superaditis rebus redundat, sed ordinis sui quibusdam gradibus inversis praepostera est.   

Quod Poeta facit, etc.  
This crypsis is more often in Poets than in Orators, or History, though it be used much in History: now populum docendum sibi proponit, i. belluam multorun capitum, but indeed he deceives them, yet it is only for delight. This order is very usual in Poetry, and very pleasant in a tale, or fables, because when we read them we cannot rest quiet till we come to an end of them.  
Sic (ut Homerus ait) Homerus Iliada disposuit.  
Nec gemino bellum Trojanum orditur ab ano, etc.  
He doth not begin the Trojan war from twenty Eggs, in one of which Eggs Helena was, and Castor and Pollux in another: Semper ad eventum festinat, etc. for in the first book of his Iliads one would think that he brought in the history of the ten years, but indeed thereby he takes occasion to bring in the history of the years before So Virgil fetcheth Aeneas from Sicily, which is a little from Carthage, etc.   

Sic commici Poeta, etc.  
For there every thing must seem to come by chance, not of purpose. Oratores vero, etc. they refer all to victory: they are like Lawyers, and therefore think they may lie at pleasure: therefore they will place their strongest arguments first, that their Auditors may chew the cud upon them: and then they put out their mean arguments in the middle, whilst their Auditors are meditating on the first; and then at last by that time the Auditors have well thought of the first, they bring out one or two strong ones more, to make their Auditors believe that they in the middle were like to the first and last.    
FINIS.   

GRAMMATICAL NOTES.  
THis we are to know, That God made all things for man, and at the beginning for one man, for there was but one: but since the Fall, because all things cannot come under one man's eye, immediately, therefore God hath providded Speech, to be an Hobson, or Carrier, between man and man; that thereby he might see all things, and that so God's Ordinance, of making all things for one man, might still continue. Logic doth act and bring the thing to my understanding & afterwards Speech is the carrier of it, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a constant rule of speech, that one man might understand another; but whereas these things, being uttered by Speech, are therefore hard to be received, because they are inartificial Arguments: therefore God hath provided Two arts of Speech, one of propriety of Speech, and another of the decking and sweetening of it. So that the Lord doth here, even as Physicians use to do with their Patients, to wit, when they have a bitter Potion to give, they use to sugar the top of the Pot wherein it is. So that Grammar may be compared to a plain Garment wtithout welt or guard, or it is like a grave Citizen. Rhetoric may be compared to the lace, or jags on the garment, and is like a fine Courtier: Poetry may be compared to some fine cut, and is a Courtier— going on his feet: so that according to the double use of Speech it is divided into two parts: the first whereof is Grammar.  
The name Grammatica is a Greek word, which therefore we see was first named of the Grecians, and is derived of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a letter, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a line of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifieth, (1) to engrave seu insculpo, and hence cometh our English word, engrave: (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth to write, because, the first writing was by Hieroglyphics, for at the first they used Hieroglyphics, making the images of Birds or Beasts, as an Horse for swiftness, a Bear or Lion for strength: a Lion's head and a Ring in it they use still over men's doors, signifying thereby watchfulness. For in Philosophy, we find that a Lion sleepeth with open eyes, and this was the first kind of writing: The second was in wax Tables, or Tables laid over with wax, where they have a stile made of steel, (and our English word steel cometh of stilus) and hence also stilus signifieth a pen; Now they wrote in these, by lifting up the wax, and so was the letter made: hence came exarare to signify to write, i e. to blow up, as they did the wax, and so shut up the Tables; and these, as Tully speaketh, had every one his letter-carrier to his Friend, and hence came letter-carriers, or tabellarii, and the Friend had keys to open the ●ables, and so read the letters: The next kind of writing was in the rind of the bark of a Beech, and there thy wrote with ink, and rolled them up. Now this rind was like unto parchment, and thence came liber, (which is properly that rind) to signify a Book; and our English word Book cometh of that word Beech, Buck, and to this day most of that which we call Beech, is called Buckmast. Now concerning the invention of ink, which was here first used, we read not of it; only this, that some call it atramentum sutorium, and therefore it seems they learned to make it by Cobblers and Dyers. The next kind of writing was in Parchment made of Sheep skins and Goat skins, which was invented in Phrygia, at Pergamus in Troy, and thence came Pergamena, to signify Parchment. The last kind of writing was in Papyr, which was first invented in Egypt which was made of a rush, called Papyros, hence came it to be named Papyrus, and Papyr in English: hence is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of bibloes that rush.  
Printing was invented a great while after any of these, not past some 300 years ago; it was invented at Gaud in Picardy, where there was a Knight that had his Seal fell into his ink as he was writing a letter, and he taking it up something nimbly for foiling his fingers let it fall in again, and afterwards lying on the papyr, there it left the print of the letters, and he seeing that, did by that means invent Printing: and thus much for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. From that cometh 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a line, and before Moses we know there was no writing but only by Hierogliphics, so that lines are not so ancient as hieroglyphics, except we mean such lines as we writ from one side of the papyr to the other: Now for writing by letters, Moses was the first, or rather God, as we may well think, seeing he hath brought all sounds to so few letters; though Josephus makes mention of two pillars that were before Moses, wherein were written the principles of the Mathematics, and that he saw one of them, yet I think he was either deceived, or they were after Moses, and hactenus of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Now followeth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 litera, for every letter hath lines except one, which hath only one, and that is (jod) which signifieth a space because it leaves out a space: And hence is Grammatica a Greek word, understand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and it will be a literal art, or the art of letters, because their language which they were to learn being natural unto them, they needed not to go any further than to learn their letters and to spell them, so they called it Grammatica literaria: as if the whole art of Grammar consisted only in the knowledge of letters. So that this name is as much too straight for the thing, as a Child's  is for Hercules' foot; but yet we knowing the meaning of the name, may still keep it, knowing that was the error of them which gave it, not of those who shall afterwards hold it. Grammatica is too straight, for the letters are the least part of Etymology; and truly, if we look at the names of all Arts, we shall find that they were named before they were perfected, as Dialectiea, coloquor: an adjunct. Rhetorica, a fluent Speech,  
Now this Art of Grammar is but one in nature, for at the beginning there was but one Speech, (as but one man) till an hundred years after the flood. Again, Speech is but one, in regard of the faculty, and also in regard of man; so that all the languages in the world are but as so many idioms of the same Grammar, and not divers Grammars; for one definition of Grammar, and one distribution; one definition of vox, and one distribution of vox, numeri & sive numero serveth to them all: And as in Greek those several Dialects do not make several Grammars, but only divers idioms; so do all languages whatsoever make several idioms, not several Grammars. Now this variety of languages came by the building of Babel, for whereas they built a Tower, both that might be famous for memory, and understanding that God would destroy the World either by Fire, or Water, therefore thus in their foolish conceits, they went about to prevent the power of God; first laying brick, and using slime for mortar to prevent fire, and a— of Reed and Palmtree leaves, which are very broad and like a target, which are there to be seen until this day, that they might swim upon the— made of this Reed: And Herodotus writeth that there were eight Ascents in it, and the two lowermost were furlongs high, so that if the rest were so, it was a mile high; and on the top (he saith) there was a Temple built, which was dedicated to Jupiter Belus, Son of Nimrod: This Tower they built, being loath to disperse themselves abroad over the face of the earth, as they were commanded Genesis the first, to replenish the earth: therefore it pleased God to work that Confusion of Tongues among them to sever them, and so make diversity of Countries; for according to their Tongues commonly Countries are severed. Of these Tongues were first the Mother Tongue, than the deducts from it; the mother Tongue is Hebrew, first, in respect of its self, for it is most natural, for there is not any natural notion, but it hath its natural word. Again, in Hebrew are the fewest words and yet signify the most things. Again, it is plain by the Scriptures, for the History, in Genesis showeth, that the words are Hebrew words, as Adam HEvah: But objection, Why might not God have given them from the Du●ch's? No, for there is no Dutch name so effectual as the Hebrew names be; so the Lord called the Heaven's Shammajim, and there is no name in the world that signifieth so; and the Sea Jam, there is no tongue that doth term it so from the same reason, and until the building of Babylon, their names were Hebrew names, and the Towns which they built before Babylon, had also Hebrew names; therefore, that Speech was the first.  
We have heard the reason of this name Grammatica, which is the definitum, now followeth the definition of it: i. e. Ars generalis in sermone, and so Grammar is Ars benè loquendi. First, he calleth it Ars, for that which is, and is for an end, must have a constant rule to guide man to that end. From this genus many questions may arise; as, How can Speech be eternal, seeing it is proper to man? Here we are to know that Speech is a Creature of God, and therefore 'twas in his eternal decree, as all other things: and though it be true that there was but one Tongue from the beginning of the World till the destruction of Babel, yet in God's decree all the rest are eternal, and so is the rule of Speech, and they were in the eternal notion of God. Again, their words do vary continually, therefore they were not eternal; for if one that died 500 years ago were now alive, and should speak, we could not understand him. Answ. Though it be true that words by reason of many sounds do daily change, yet the rule is eternal; though they be not spoken from eternal, yet the variety of Speech doth not change the rule of Grammar. as in reason, this axiom homo est animal was true before homo was, and will be for ever: So in Grammar is the rule eternal, as likewise is the rule of generation and corruption eternal, and ever true and the same, though men daily be generated and corrupted; so is Grammars rule external, though, etc. and 'tis because God would show his mighty power and wisdom, that there are as many several Grammars, as there are several ages, and more too; and there is nothing more wonderful under heaven then to consider the great variety o●●●ands and colours, and complexions of things, which all are from their contrary forms.  

Ars.  
In Latin some think the word comes from artus a s●new, others of arx a tower, ab arcendo; and both w●ll well agree to our purpose, for artus a sinew, we know the strength of those things that have sinews li●th in them, yet they are stronger than the bones, for the bones by reason of their hardness will break, whereas sinews will rather give back, and bend, and are more tough: So the rules of art are most strong an● sinewy. If we derive the word from arx a tower, it my be very well so, for as there is both great strength and much beauty, both in the matter and form, so the rules of Grammar are most strong, and make a most sweet harmony.   

Generalis.  
Because though it be not everywhere, as Logic is, yet it may be; now Logic is everywhere, because every thing was made for man; therefore he must have an eye to see every thing, for otherwise he could not use them aright. But Grammar, because when I see a thing by Logic, I may keep it to myself, therefore it is general only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 secundùm quid, therefore it is taught after Logic. Again, wheresoever there is Grammar, there is also Logic; where there is Logic, there is not always Grammar, for Logic may be only in ment, therefore it is more general.   

Orationis.  
This general art of Speech is twofold, both Grammar and Rhetoric; but the difference is this, that Grammar carrieth the matter in a budget neither too big nor too little, like one of these Irishmen with Breeches without pockets. Rhetorica carrieth it in a fine bag full of laces, yet not altogether full, for there are more words than matter; therefore both Grammar, Rhetoric, and Poetry are all equally general for subject, but not for use. For Grammars use is before the use of them, and may be without them even as a garment may be without a lace or jag. But here by the way, because these are general Arts, therefore they have no proper subject, but their use may be everywhere, and therefore Keckerman, whilst he maketh Rhetoric a special art, telleth me he never knew the right distribution of the arts, for it is the art of Speech, and that may be , therefore Rhetoric is general and may be used in any thing; therefore Tropes upon due consideration may be used in any art. Now if it be demanded, whether it be better to use Grammar, or Rhetoric in teaching of Children? I Answ. Grammar is better, 1. Because it is more general than Rhetoric: 2. Because it keeps us more close to the matter, which is a very good thing in teaching; yet not withstanding sometime Rhetoric is better, because it delivers the proper word together with some sweetness, for Tropes do arise from some arguments in Logic; so that we cannot condemn Rhetoric, neither is it possible we should always use Grammar, seeing there be many more things then proper names; for God making all things, and Man being to name them, and had not names sufficient for them: therefore for want of words, gave the same name to divers things by Tropes; and therefore Talaeus saith necessitas tropum genuit: Yet at the beginning one thing had but one name, but afterwards the same word came to signify many things, as we see in Hebrew, where one word signifieth twenty things, and but one properly and Grammatically, and all the rest Tropically. And I find that words are used improperly these ways: First, in respect of the Trope: Secondly, when we deliver the same things, in divers languages, there they use divers phrases, which must be compared together, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is good in Greek, in Latin it is to make Children, which is not usual. Now if you will know whether is better, bring them to Logic, and there see which phrase is more special, that is to be preferred: to make it general to the efficient cause in general, to beget or procreate Children is proper to the first modus of the efficient, therefore it is the better phrase. So vaccas agere in English is to drive Kine, though they say in some parts, do the Kine into the field: And there is another kind of Trope, which is caused by reason of the phrase; therefore one that teacheth young Scholars must have a special care, That first his Scholar knwo the nature of the thing, and then the name of it, which stands by this rule, v●x est nota quâ unumquodque vocatur, and by this means we shall teach them, first what every word signifieth in propriety, and then the thing as it is named in other tongues, and then the phrase, and then compare one phrase with another, and thus by the way we shall estimate which phrase in every language standeth with best reason. As that of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and in English to beget Children, where to beget is peculiar to nature, and belongeth to those things which have only a vegetative life, and therefore our English phrase is better: So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to put to the hand, and in Latin is agreed, to put to the foot, or to go to, which is more general, therefore the Greek phrase is better: So in English we say to go to, and to go in hand with, which phrase neither the Greeks nor the Latins have. It is a Metaphor fetched from the motion of the hand, which is the chief organ of motion, & is as much as I should say, put our hands to, & this is more special; so that bring them to Logic and ●here you shall be able to judge which phrase in every language is best; and so consequently which Tongue is best. And this way I can prove our English best, except the Hebrew: For those that invented the Greek Tongue, were great Scholars, and were very good Rhetoricians, and so made their Speech more eloquent, whereas our inventors of English were not so.   

Bene  
Is here an adverb joined to the verb to show his signification, and is not another word from loqui, and the reason of it is this, a man may loqui, but not bene loqui, as bonus vinum was as good as their Wine, but not good Grammar; as a man may dispute sophistically or ignorantly, and so break the rule of Logic: so likewise he may malè loqui and break the rule of Grammar. Again, since the Fall of man as there is a bona and a mala ratio, so there is a been and malè loqui, and Grammar gives not precepts of that malè loqui which was attracted by sin, but only of that bene loqui which is a Creature of God. Object. But many have thought that this been is nothing but that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the definition of art in general, and therefore should not be repeated in every special art. Answ. But they are to know, since the Fall, as we said before, there is a been and malè loqui, and art gives precept only to the bene loqui, and therefore been must be added for distinction sake: Again, they confess themselves, That been in the definition of arse, is the same that expeditè and that is an habit in man, whereas this been is essential unto Grammar as it is an art: Again, here been is joined with the form not with the genus, and therefore is another genus which is more special, over and above that which was before; for so we are to understand that the species contain more in them than the genus doth: Now for those who to avoid been will put more words into the definition, let them know that into how many words they divide the form, into so many parts they cut it; which ought not to be, because the form is but one Argument. Now it is a great question among many Scholars which language was the first (and that was indeed the Hebrew) Goropius would have the Dutch to be the first, and he argueth for it subtly, and hath many notations of words, as fast backwards is staff, because when we have a staff, we stand fast: so litera is of let and oer which signifieth to wander, because when we writ we let our Pen wander about.   

Benè loquendi.  
Here because the form is not easily found out, and when it is found out, we have not one word to express it in, therefore we are to imagine the form to be included in this Gerund in di: for because we have not a word to deliver the form in, hence we are fain to take the next argument to forma, which is finis and include it in that: and we are to know that in very deed every precept is a member of that Art whereof it is a precept, so that every precept hath a certain vigour, or life, or soul as it were, which soul taken up from all the precept, is the form of the Art. And again, howsoever it may be objected that Grammar is not in every thing (for many things have no names) and so is not a general Art, yet the work of Grammar is in every thing: So also though man only can speak, yet Grammars work is general, and so we are to understand it, to answer in proportion to Logic, for as I see every thing with my eye of reason, so it is requisite that after I have received it, I should carry every thing to another, and that I must do by Grammar: and Grammar hath a double reference, one in regard of him that speaks, and another in regard of the thing he speaks of, or the matter in hand. i e. We that here are to look out at the thing he speaks, and his meaning: and in very deed ens à primo is God's creature, and hath every Art in it: so that though Grammar, that is speech, is proper to man, yet Grammars work is in every thing: the reason is this, Every thing in nature is distinct, and I apprehend them so with my Logic; and they being so, must needs have distinct names, otherwise I cannot carry them to others distinctly and as they are. So that Grammar is general, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for so Adam by seeing into the nature of every Creature, could see their names, though we cannot do it: so he named the fire Esh, because of the noise it makes in green wood: so water maiim which signifieth quid, that is the essence, for so Thales thought that every thing was made of water: and in the second verse of the first Chapter of Genesis, it is said, The Spirit of God moved upon the waters, where water is put for the first matter: so we call it in Latin aqua quasi à quâ the efficient cause: so he called darkness lajil which signifieth rest, because it is the time of rest: So God called the day jam because of the jumbling noise that is made in it: so the earth erets from rashat tero to ware: and there is no name but it hath a reason of it, and that Logic tells me when it handled notatio, for ens à primo hath that in it which is in every general Art.   

Loquendi  
Loqui and dicere signify the same thing, but come to be distinguished thus, because that Rhetoric to which dicere doth belong, was seen most especially in pleading before Judges, hence they gave it that name dicere; which cometh of dico, and dico cometh of the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth the decision of a Controversy; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bifariam, or as some say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 divido, which may well be, because in pleading of controversies, they divide their speeches. Loquendi, not Ars Scribendi, for if they take it for the Orthography of a word it is accidental; neither are the letters the same in every tongue, therefore not the same writing of them: Again, the letters may be changed, though not well, for the Hebrew letters are given with great reason, and the other are taken from them: if they take writing as general as speaking, it is the same with Grammar: now the cause of it was this, Man receiveth into his understanding the notions of things, these notions are expressed and made known from him to another man by words, now because man was not to live always, neither by reason of the distance of place could speak unto every one, hence was the necessity of writing.   

Bene.  
For a man may loqui and yet not been loqui, i. e. according to bona locutio, whereof Grammar gives precepts: but he that speaks according to the rule of Grammar, whether he know he doth so or no, it is no matter, he doth been loqui, i. e. he speaketh such a speech as is pure according to the custom of the place where the speech is spoken: for in nature there is great variety of speech by reason of the heat and cold in men, which is according to the place wherein they are: hence many consonants in Dutch and our English tongue; so that variety of sounds is not always from the party named, but the party naming: and he that hath more heat, intentionally is more apt to pronounce, hence Englishmen are almost to learn any tongue.   

Id autem Latinis Latin.  
Here is a Commoration where he cometh into the Latin Grammar, as if he should say, in Latin after the Latin manner: for there are not so many Grammars as there are kinds of Speech, but it is as if he should say, Grammar is either the Latin, Greek, or Hebrew Grammar; which is a distribution of the adjunct into the subjects: for as there is but one Greek Grammar, yet many dialects: so the several Grammars are but so many several dialects or idioms of the general Grammar.   

Parts Grammaticae qua sunt Etymologia & Syntaxis.  
Here is a copulative axiom, and the Arguments are Grammatica the integrum, and Etymologia and Syntaxis the membra, which are yoked together. There are two parts of Grammar, first, because two of Logic: for if Grammar be the carrier of Logic betwixtmen, than it must be answerable to Logic to carry the simples and composit; for otherwise we shall not carry well. Again secondly, Speech is a garment to  our reason, and as we would think a Tailor a fool that should make a garment with one sleeve for him that hath two arms: so for Grammar, if we should make it with one sleeve to cover Logic that hath two arms. Et contra as we count that Tailor an idiot, that makes many sleeves for him that hath but two arms; so for him that makes many parts of Grammar to  Logic that hath but two parts; though now a days I know not how many sleeves and hangbys they make. For Orthography and Prosody they are not part of Grammar, but common adjuncts, and run through whole Grammar as blood through the whole body.   

Etymologia.  
Cometh of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sermo, i. e. veriloqutio, and in very deed according to the notation it belongeth rather to Logic than to Grammar, for it is nothing else but notatio, and so the Grammarians use to give examples, as lepus from the adjunct, quafis levipes, but the Grammarians, it being before used in Logic, brought it into Grammar and so use hath received it; even as some will have Dialectica to come of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 colloquor, and so belong to Grammar.  
The reason of this distribution is for that every speech consisteth of words, for that as Syntax answereth to judgement, so Etymology to invention: the occasion of it was this, In ancient time when Grammar was first invented in Greece, it was only observed in letters and syllables; the next observation among the Greeks, was to look at the notation and reason of words, and so came to call that part of Grammar Etymology, and afterwards the Grecians found out the whole Art of Grammar before any other Nations.   

Syntaxis.  
Cometh of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consuo or construo: because in the beginning they laid the words together according to the matter, so they did in Greek and Hebrew till the Orators took that liberty to them to change: and because as Logic lays things together; so doth Syntax utter them, if Grammar be right it must tie nothing together but that which Logic doth tie: Hence is Logic before Grammar in genesi, but Grammar before Logic in analysi, so is Grammar before Rhetoric in genesi, but Rhetoric before Grammar in analysi: hence do we remove the Rhetoric to see the Grammar and Logic in analysi.   

Etym logia est prima pars Grammaticae, quae vocum singularum proprietates interpretatur.  
This definition is not so good as if he had said est de voce, or praecipit de voce, though praecipere be too large, for it is in Art. And Etymology doth interpretari not only the properties of words, but also letters, and fyllables, which are the causes of words.   

Est prima pars.  
Here prima and pars are Logical terms, therefore not genus to etymologia. The word interpretari belongeth to analysis, and is all one with it. Etymologia ergo est prima pars Grammaticae, quae est de voce, here is a definition ab integro & subjecto.   

Etymologia est.  
If there be vox, then there is etymologia, but there is vox. Ergo.   

Prima pars.  
For there is a simple consideration of a thing therefore there must be a simple consideration of the name of a thing, whereof etymoligia must give precept. It is prima because I must consider a word, first simply in its own nature before I join him with another.   

De voce.  
So that the subject of Etymology is vox (oratio, and sermo, belong properly to Syntax) as argumentum of invention, and Grammar goes no farther than vox: so that all we shall hear of in this part of Grammar is of a word alone. Hence not the thing chest, but the name chest is a noun: for the three general Arts all take their notions from ens, and yet ens itself may belong to Physics. Logic takes notion of it as it hath causes, effects, subjects, and adjuncts: Grammar as it doth notify it by its name to another. Physic as it consists of principles. And for that distinction of vox to be primae or secundae intentionis, it is a toy: as animael say they, is primae intentionis genus secundae. But I would ask them is animal & genus the same thing? No, for they belong to divers Arts: And genus in his own Art is as well primae intentionis as animal is, and it is a mere fallacia accidentis.   

De voce.  
Simplici not the vocibus. And for one word to be laid to another word is but accidental to it, so that Syntax doth not handle vox. He saith vox, not dictio, though sometimes they be the same, yet it is dictio, as Rhetoric takes the notion of it; and here we may note two things, namely that first when we look at, or consider a thing Grammatically, we first give it a vox that is a name, for that is the most simple consideration of a thing. Secondly, It is not only vox which is spoken, but which is written also.   

Vox est nota quâ unumqu●dque vocatur.  
Some call it dictio, some vocabulum, but vox is best, because it names the thing from his special use, à vocando.   

Nota.  
Here nota is not general to vox, for nota is a Logical term, and belongeth to adjunct, so that this definition is from the subject and the conjugate, and he means (as if he should say) vox is that whereby notice of the thing is given us. It is nota; here he doth not consider vox as it is a quality in man proceeding from such causes, but as it doth notify the thing whereof it is vox: So our eye of reason, as it is a part of man, and faculty of the soul, belongeth to Physics, as vox doth: but as it doth act for that Eupraxie, for which it was made, so it belongeth to Logic. In that he calls it nota, we see it is another thing than the thing itself whereof it is a note, and vox is nota, i. e. a notifying and making known the apprehension of man's mind, even as wax having the picture of the seal is to the seal itself: and 〈◊〉 was man to name things. And here is a fallacy very useful, to say this or that is a true speech, when it is not the speech in property, but the Logic clothed in the speech, that is true or false.   

Vnumquodque.  
For Grammar is a general Art. Ergo, ens is his subject more remote, so that here he doth but specialize ens: so that vox is but the subject of Grammar more special, unumquodque more general: and as affectio is to argumentum, so is vocatio to the thing called: so also that which was the aliquid in argumentum, as Grammar takes his notion of it, is unumquodque: And that definition of nomen, of a thing that may be seen, felt, heard, or understood, is erroneous; for I can see, feel, or understand a thing, and yet name it not. But doth res belong to Grammar? No, but things attending ens, for otherwise arse in general is about ens, and words are terms given unto things, so their doctrine must be general. So that every thing hath its name, which notatio in Logic showeth.  
Again, Here we may see that verbs, adverbs, and conjunctions are voces; and hence we may see the definition of a Noun to be too general, and secondly, their error in calling nomen not vox.   

Vocatur.  
Here I am told how this nota is used, which is for the calling of a thing, and the naming of it; hence when we are asked what part of Speech such a thing is, we are to know that the thing is no part of speech, but the name of it: so it is fallacia divisionis, when they ask, what part of Speech a whole Speech is.  
It is a great question which Scaliger in his Book, De causts linguae Latinae, whether words be ex thesi, or ad placitum?  
But for Compound words they are ex thesi, as first words also in propriety of speech; for we know that speech is the creature of God, yea and that words signify this or that thing, it is also from the providence of God: so God taught Adam to name the Creatures: and so God wrought the Confusion of Tongues: Now man was to name them, and God by man; because that speech was to be the carrier betwixt man and man.  
Again, Man was to be the Lords Steward over his Creatures, and therefore he must know their names; and Adam did name things with reason, and according to his apprehension, which we may see by men now adays that name things so, as, according to their apprehension, they can give a reason thereof. So that words are given with respect to the thing named, and the reason of the things named is in the thing, so that words are not ad placitum; so we give to little things little names, so in English things that are glib have their names run much upon (l) or other semi-vowels: if greater things, than their names run upon grosser letters.  
Now the Art of Speech is arse bexe sermocinandi, for that is general both to Grammar and Rhetoric. And the wisdom of God concerning Speech is double, pure, and ornate, and these are in the things, which Rhetoric shows, in that there is reason in every Trope, and figura teacheth us to figurate the Speech as the thing is; and if it be great, we give it a great name: if little, we give it a little name.  
And hence do arise the three styles of Tully, That for a lofty thing we have a lofty stile, for a mean thing a mean stile, for a little thing a low stile, and that with good reason, for Speech is the garment of Reason, and therefore ought not to be too little, or too great for it.  
And for their Rules these Arts are eternal though changed by man, which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and distinguisheth things by their names, and Rhetoric is the same to all the world.  
And so for Grammar, the Rule for variation is eternal, though the variation of words be according to the variation of men, and this consists either in single words, or in construction of more words, where always note, that as the word governed doth depend upon the word that governeth it, so do the things.   

Vox constat syllabâ; syllaba constat literâ; litera est ex sono individuo.  
For sonus is the material cause of it, the form is from the figuration of it with the instruments of the mouth: For the word litera some think it cometh from litteratura, and therefore write it with a double it, whereas it should be with a single t; some think it comes of lineatura, and so of linea, from the matter: some think it comes of litura a blot, which Scaliger believeth not, because it is from the destruction of it: but this reason is more witty than sound, for man is called mortalis of his death, but I think it comes of litura a blot, because when we set black upon white, we do as it were blot the white paper: and so sometime bloting and writing are confounded.  
Linea comes of linum, linen, made of flax, (because thread was the first thing that was considered for a line) and not of lino, which signifieth to blot out, so as delinere is the same with delere.   

Litera est vocalis aut consona.  
The reason in nature is, because there are two principal sorts of the position of the mouth: the first is when we make a sound without any more ado: the second is, where there is a more special kind of the use of the Organs in the mouth; which letters either make a complete sound in themselves, or an incomplete; and even as in nature the first matter was incomplete, yet makes things which are complete: so the Consonants, which in themselves are incomplete, with vowels make syllables, which are complete.  
This word vocalis signifieth vocal, i. e. sounding of himself; for he needeth no other, though he be joined with another. Now for vocalis, they usually define it litera quae per se syllabam potest efficere: this is à priore but not generally true, for in our English tongue our w, oo, ee, never make a complete sound, neither in Hebrew, and yet there they make a complete sound, though they be not without a consonant.  
Now for my own part, I would define a vowel to be litera quae completum sonum edit, or quae plenè sonat, or rather quae constat sono completo; but in Hebrew I am content with Mr. Junius, quâ movetur syllaba, for a vowel is in a syllable, as the soul in a body, and as the soul moveth itself and the body also, so doth a vowel move itself and the consonants also: and the Hebrews may seem to have held the vowels to have been some spiritual thing, and therefore did not figure them with characters or bodies, but with pricks only: and hence at the first they wrote without pricks: and afterwards when they used pricks, they did not set them in the letters, neither do they always now, but above and under the letter, because they would show that the soul doth move all parts, as if they should say, anima est tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte: and as the Angels by the rule of Divinity, were made puncto temporis: so the Hebricians thinking the vowels to be spirits, figured them out punctis: also, because they thought spirits had not quantity. Vocalis is commonly defined litera quae per se syllabam potest efficere.   

Quae Syllabam.  
This word syllaba hath been oft enough repeated before, and therefore needeth no repetition here again. Vocalis is litera, and litera is before a syllable in nature, therefore this is à posteriori.   

Per se.  
This is not general, for in ab, ebb, ib, ob, ub, these do not per se syllabam efficere. Again, this potentia is not general at all times in use; for this vowel, a, in this syllable ab, cannot make a full sound. And again, for per se, in english our w, oo, ee, do never per se syllabam efficere; now from the definition it followeth that so many syllables so many vowels; now for consonants the very name showeth that they cannot make a complete and full sound, and therefore they require a more special position of the mouth, for their prolation: and hence is our order in writing a, b, c, d, not good; but first setting the vowels and then the consonants, yet some have thought that some liquids make a full sound, which is not true, for that they always have a vowel going before them, as mutes have ever a vowel coming after them: thus for all Grammars do agree, but here is a Question, Whether a letter or a syllable be brevis or longa? and in old time we know they used to write a longae with a double aa, so in Greek▪ and ω, ε and ο, only differ in time: but to Answer to the Question, We must needs confess that the vowel is the motor, but yet a short vowel by reason of the consonants joined with it may be made long & contra, and therefore I think it more proper of a syllable than of a letter. For thus I reason, One letter should have but one character, Ergo▪ yet we will speak of them here. The reason therefore of length and shortness in speech is this, The Lord hath appointed speech to be the carrier from man to man, therefore it must be such as will easily be received, therefore must be ordered by time and tune: for as every act is ordered with time, so must speech be: Again, little things are to have little names, therefore short names: great things great names, ergo, long names: now for a semi-short, or the like, they belong to Music and not to Grammar. Now in our short time we may be as long as we will, as men when they are angry will be as short in the long, as at other times they are in the short. Brevis is simplicis temporis, longa is duplicis; that is, look as your short is, your long must be twice as much.  
A Vowel is either deduct or contract, deduct is with the mouth drawn wide, and that is either with a greater rictus, as a, or with a lesser as e and i: a is first, for it is the first in nature, and it is the first letter that we speak, though it have a greater yawning than either e or i: Now the lesser yawning was common to both e and i, which shows the affinity betwixt them: hence did jed in the Hebrew stand for both e and i, and they call them cousin vowels: so also in Latin we writ indifferently turrem or turrim. Contract is of the drawing together of the mouth, for the form of the letter is from the form of the mouth in the pronunciation of it. C●ntracta is either a poach-mouth, or a hens-tayl: i e. either wide or round: now in a contract it is required first that the mouth be drawn round: secondly, that as in a deduct the tongue was lifted up to the palate: so here contrarily it should be pressed down; and it is o, or u, and y. The difference of these is in a more full or lesser orb in the pronouncing of them, and in Hebrew o and u, are usually set in letters, namely, in vau, and this showeth how they do coincidere, which is in use: so θ s in Greek is changed into us, in Latin, as papyros into papyrus: yet o is with a more full orb, u with a more contract: and the figuration of the Latin letters is from the Greek, and the Greek from the Hebrew: yet this is not always, but there are some exceptions: For e in the Hebrew seems to be from the Assyrians, so the single θ in the Greek seems to be from the Assyrians: yet they might have it from the frame of the mouth, but so it would be the same with u, and in the Greek υ is like half an o: now the o must have a full globe, and the tongue is drawn into the solum; and this letter, if we mark, soundeth more inwardly in the mouth, whereas u and y make as it were a whistling through the lips, and so sound through the lips: The Grecians o short, which is the same with camets hatuph: the Greek long ο is as two long ωω: so in English we have our short o, with o alone; and our long o sometimes with oa, as coal: sometimes with owe, or owe: or more seldom with ou, as aught: but it were better if we had the Greek ω, or some other character: now for u, this hath a more contract mouth for the prolation of it, and seems to whistle through the lips; u also hath the tongue brought back in the mouth, and it soundeth almost in the very opening of the mouth: in Hebrew gibbuts soundeth like u, or as we do in tu and the like: Surech soundeth as▪ in Greek, υ is their u short, ov is their long u, and is rather a vowel than a diphthong; for there is but one position of the mouth in it.   
Caetera desunt.   

RHETORICAL NOTES.  

CHAP. I.  

Rhetorica.  
THe name is of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fluo, as a stream doth, but tropically it signifieth to speak fluently: the reason of this Art is, that Speech being the Carrier from man to man, which is but a testimony, therefore not easily received, God hath therefore provided a kind of sugar, that thereby it might be the more easily received: and Rhetoric is as honey to a bitter Potion, or lace to a garment. It is   

Ars,  
Because it consisteth of Precepts fitted to an Eupraxy.   

Dicendi.  
It cometh of Dico, which cometh of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greek which signifieth a decision or determination of a Controversy, and belongeth to ju isprud, so that dicere is properly to plead in Courts or places of Justice; and because Rhetoric at the first was in such places of most use, therefore is this word given unto it. which in propriety is too straight for the Art to which it is given: but because Use hath received it, we are content with it, knowing that it was the error of them who first gave it, not of those who afterwards used it.   

Bene.  
This Bene is not the same with that in the definitiof ars, for that in arse is whereby a man doth a thing expeditè, or ex habitu, and is not in Art, but in Homine; but now this bene dicere, or bene loqui, or the like, is a bene dicere, or bene loqui beyond that in the definition of arse, for the species is beyond the genus, by a form, which Ramus teacheth in the definition of forma: but the reason why been is put in the definition of every Art, is because every Creature of God, by reason of our sin, is made evil unto us and obscured, so there is good or bad: so Speech is good or bad: and the Art takes hold only of that which is good. For it is the wisdom of God, and therefore for difference sake it is requisite that been should come under into the definition of every Art. And here it is an adverb joined to this verb, to show this thing that is the good function of this action bene dicere. So he doth been dicere which useth word in tempore, and he doth malè dicere, which useth them intempestiuè.   

Cujus virtus.  
Here he doth commorari, to show the effects of Rhetoric, and indeed so every art hath great effects being wisely used.   

Ideòque Plato.  
Now Plato being an honest man in Greece, and those that were called Sophistae, abusing this Art, and making the common people by it believe, That God was evil, and truth falsehood: he was angry with them, and so called it The Art of Cookery, of Flattery, of Painting, of Enchanting: though indeed it was by the fallacies of the Arguments in Logic: and thereupon that name Sophistae, which before was a name of honour, became afterwards a name of reproach. Now (as I said before) it was not Rhetoric, but false reason of Logic; only the Rhetoric set a gloss upon it, and these names are as it Plato should say, though this be a kind of Music which in itself is good, yet thus it ought not to be used, but is unneedful, and therefore he calleth it a kind of sauce, and painting out of a thing: or as if he should say, a cup of poison fweetned with honey. And Aristotle following his Master Plato, said it was in a good Commonwealth unneedful: but indeed Rhetoric is a kind of Music, which is good and needful. The Romans of long time would not admit of Rhetoric, and among the Turks I think that they will never receive it: and indeed rude people, yea, and all kind of people are easily deceived by Rhetoric; not in regard of judgement, but of the affection of love, which embraceth it, and voluptas is the object of affection. Now indeed here lieth the fallacy, in that a Speech being seasoned with Rhetoric, passeth by the understanding, and so the Will takes hold of it, and whilst the Will doth hastily embrace it, the reason cannot examine it: and so in Tropes, it is respected of Rhetoricians to bring sounding words to tickle the ear, but the understanding is not well pleased, because it doth not understand it: and Rhetoric is the art of affection as it sweeteneth the speech, for the affection of love is so greedy of it that it will not let the understanding take it, therefore Rhetoric is said to be the art of affection, Grammar of things to be understood; but this is nothing, for they are both of Speech and so are Arts to entertain bonum.  
Now for the Turks, I think they will never embrace it, for they are as God's rods to whip his Christians withal. We have already heard what Rhetoric is: now followeth the distribution; and that is into Elocution and Pronunciation: for according to the double act of this art must this art be distributed, for we have already heard that Speech is God's Creature given unto man to be a Carrier from man to man; and that because one man's eye cannot see all things, which being only a bare testimony, is not easily received, and therefore must be sugared or sauced, that it may be more sweet and pleasant, and also more evident. Now Speech is adorned by speech, or by gesture, for though Speech be considered in gesture, yet not the Speech properly, but the sound or tenor of it: For in that Oration, where both speech and gesture are answerable one to another, that is most plain, and takes the most effect in the hearts of the hearers: and gesture is a kind of dicere, and therefore when they use pleading in Courts, they use gesture, that there may be a more pleasant dicere consisting of these two parts: so that Speech is adorned either with speech or gesture. The First of these is called Elocutio of eloquor, which though for notation it be the same with pronunciatio, yet in definition and in use they are distinct. This is first because elocutio may be without pronunciatio, as are Tully's and Demosthenes' his Orations: and secondly, Pronunciatio may be improperly of that which is merely Grammatical; therefore elocutio must go before, so that according to the double sweetening of Speech must Rhetoric have these two parts.   

Elocutio est exornatio.  
Here exornatio is not a genus to elecutio, therefore I define elocutio to be prima pars Rhetorica, de exornatione orationis.   

Est exornatio.  
We know that the garment is one thing, and the cut another, so that Grammar and Rhetoric are distinct Arts; and we may easily discern between them: For I may compare Grammar to plain dealing, or to one that speaketh plainly: and Rhetoric is one that is eloquent, or as it were one that sets jewels or pearls in Grammar, for the making it the more evident, to be received more easily.   

Orationis.  
Oratio is properly the subject of Grammar, as ratio is of Logic. But because Rhetoric also is the Art of Speech as well as Grammar, therefore mediately, or at the second hand oratio comes to be the subject of Rhetoric: namely, as this oratio is adorned with tropes and figures. Hence it followeth that Rhetoric is a general Art, because his subject oratio is general: yea, as general as Grammar. For howbeit in precept it be taught after it, yet for use the one is not where the other may not be; neither is it after Grammar for subject or common use, but only in a kind of precedency of doctrine, even as Logic is before Grammar, only because if we use Grammar which is the latter, Logick's use must be the former; as oratio should not be before Ratio. Now because Rhetoric is a general Art, hence it followeth, that it may be used in any art, if so be we have not a word without a trope, that is so usually and familiarly known, as the tropical word is: or if it be not of so great use as the tropical word is: for tropes do arise from the arguments in Logic; so that they do not only set a lustre or resplendency upon the word used, but also show the argument from whence it is drawn. Which thing if Keckerman had well considered, he would not have found fault with Ramus for using a trope in that word disserere, both because Rhetoric is general, and secondly, because that word disserere is of a thousand times more use than any other word.  
Object. But Rhetoric saith he, is an Art only of the Affection, and not of the Understanding?  
Answ. So I can say of Grammar, for only Logic is that which my understanding takes hold of: and oratio is to the ear, yet also to the understanding, as it carrieth the reason with it. Now indeed Rhetoric slips down more speedily than Grammar doth to the affections, and is more volupe: and voluptas as it tendeth to bonum, is the object of affection. And so these Sophistae of Greece, when they would deceive their Auditors, did so adorn their speech, as that it would move so speedily to the affections, that the understanding could not examine it: and thence it is, that this Art hath been most abused, of any art, and of least request. For it is of the nature of Music, that it steals away the affections from that where about they ought to be occupied.   

Eáque perse plurimum potest.  
This is a rule of propriety, for it agreeth only to this part of this art, and not any other part whatsoever of any other art: so we know invention is not of any force without judgement, but is seen only in judgement. So for Etymology and Syntax in Grammar; but elocutio can do much by itself without pronunciatio. Now the true reason of this propriety is this, because there may be exornatio orationis which is written, as there is pronouncing: and scriptio orationis may be without the pronunciatio of it: for elocutio is orationis, but pronunciatio is oris, and there may be oratio where there is not os, but not contra.   

 in Curione, qui.  
Here he doth commorari upon the commendation of this propriety; which he illustrateth à specie of Curio, who was a Roman, that had very pleasant, and eloquent words, but his pronunciation was very mean, hence his elocutio was commendable, but not his pronunciatio, for there he was maximè nudus, though for eloqution he was orator optimis proximus numeratus.    

CHAP. II.  

Elocutio est Tropus aut figura.  
HEre Elocutio is not a genus to Tropus and Figura, but is used tropically by a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct. Therefore I had rather say, Ornamentum or exornatio orationis, est Tropus aut Figura: and by that means give them their genus. Here exornatio orationis is a definition itself, and therefore cannot be defined, for there cannot be a definition of a definition: therefore I do not define exornatio orationis, but only distribute it into Tropes and Figures.  
Now for the demonstration of this distribution. We have already seen that Rhetoric is an Ornament of Speech, therefore must run along answerably, with it, therefore distribute it according to it, therefore a Speech is either of one word alone, or more together: as if he should say, Rhetoric must adorn Etymology and Syntax: so that as Tropus is to Etymology, so is figura to Syntax.   

Tropus est Elocutio.  
I would define it thus, Tropus est ornamentum orationis, etc. Or, Tropus est, quo verbum, etc.  
Tropus of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because words that are tropical are turned from that which they naturally signify, to that which they do not naturally signify. It is Ornamentum, because besides its lustre, it carrieth an argument with it. Orationis, because it is only in oratione; and is in it as a jewel or gem is in a Ring; and here the art lieth in the word.   

Quà Verbum.  
He useth verbum rather than nomen, because nomen properly signifieth that part of Speech which is declined with gender and case, though for notation it cometh of novimen, of novimus, of novi, of nosco, because we know things by their names. But verbum properly is as general as vox, and so it is here taken, but by a synechdochy of the genus for the species is put for a verb. Again, Dicti hath more ambiguity with it than verbum, and vox is peculiar to Grammar. Again, not only nomina but verba are also tropical. Again, Verbum in a Sentence is the chief word, for it is vinculum, so that there can be no Sentence without it, therefore used with good reason.   

Verbum immutatur.  
Here is a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct, for the word is not changed, but only the use or signification of it.   

A native significatione.  
That is à Grammaticâ, or propriâ significatione: though it be not always so at the first hand: for sometimes words are changed from one tropical signification to another tropical signification: and there they are firstly from the other tropical signification, and à natia â significatione at the second hand.   

In aliam  
Not quamlibet, but such an one as shall be according to Logic; as that which properly signifieth a cause, may tropically signify the effect, aut contra: and so of the rest of the Argumen which argue one another. [In aliam,] i. e. into such an one as use hath brought up that it may be put for.   

Tropus verò Aristoteli.  
Here he doth commorari about the commendation of a Trope, his Argument is à contrario, as if he should say, If it be so pleasant when it is abused, much more when it is rightly used.   

Ideóque Platonis oratio.  
Plate had two Scholars, Aristotle and Zenocrates: Aristotle was of a quick wit, and therefore Plato said, He needed a bridle for him: Zenocrates was more dull, but of a greater judgement; therefore he said, He wanted a spur for him. Now Plato left his School to Zenocrates, which made Aristotle malign at him, and upbraid him with his faults: and among the rest he challengeth him with Tropes, which is a good fault; though truth 'tis that proper words are better even in an Oration, if they can be so conveniently had: though afterwards Aristotle commended Tropes, if they were pleasant and not far fetched from home.   

Et certè Tropum.  
Here he sets down the procreant and conservant cause of a Trope; and for necessity, though Grammar be as large as Logic, yea, as large as our thoughts; yet at the first it was not: yea, they used to say, The heart cannot comprehend her own thoughts: and again, because things at the first were so many, that they could not readily give the proper name of every thing, hence arose Tropes: afterwards these Tropes were sweet and pleasant, and therefore they would let them go no more.   

Nam ut vest is frigoris, etc.  
Man at first needed not , but now by reason of sin (the temper of his body, and external cold together cause cold) he needeth  which he useth not only for heat, but also for ornament. So for Tropes though necessity brought them in, yet decency doth hold them.   

Delectat autem ideo, etc.  
Because it is witty to let pass those things which are before our feet. Secondly, Because our cogitation is refreshed by them: for variety delighteth, as there is in Tropes, and even as if we see Speech in his holiday garment.   

Haec igitur prima sunt.  
These are the first sauses and remedies to make Speech look red and white.   

Sedtamen verecund. etc.  
Here is a propriety, a Trope must be bashful and shamefaced, not brought in by another, or come in rushing perforce, but gentle and led by the hand, or I pray you ceme in: Now to all kinf of Tropes there be certain general affections; and those are either in one word alone, or in the continuance of more words together: Those which are in one word alone, are either such as are too hard and harsh; or too bold and proud, such as are pulled in by the ears and are more sausy: now these are general affections of Tropes; and the reason of them is this, We have heard what a Trope is, namely, where a word is changed from his natural signification into another: now because that for want of words we cannot readily give a fit word that is tropical, therefore we are forced to bring them in more harshly sometimes and more proudly: now that which is more harsh, is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, abusio tropi, which comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 abutor; that is, a word which is abused more unkindly, or a word hardly entertained: 'tis called of the Grammarians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

Tunc ego, etc.  
If I might only hope for this grief: here is an harsh Trope; for Spes is expectatio boni; and metus or tim●r expectatio mali; so that here is either a synechdochy, or a catachrestical Irony. Now, for Hyperbole, that hath no affinity with catachrésis, for an hyperbole is very usual and commendable, neither is there any harshness in it, but it is a little too proud: but catachrésis is harsh, and not used but of Poets only; not of Orators, at least, very seldom.   

Gladium vagina, etc.  
This is also harsh; for we rather say, Vagina & gladio vacua, than gladius est vagina vacuus: Vacuum here is a metaphour, h. e. (exutum.)   

Hyperbole est audacia tropi.  
Of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be carried above: and this affection signifieth that for which it was fetched very kindly, but proudly, and so as it doth inhaunch and increase the matter to very good purpose: and this affection is very commenadble and usual especially in Scripture: Meiosis, diminutio, which is contrary to hyperbole is nothing else but a synechdochy of the species for the genus.  
The Second affection of Tropes in the continuance of more words is called Allegoria, which is continuatio troporum, yet those Tropes must be of the same kind of Tropes; as they must be all of them either metonymies, metaphors, ironyes, or synechdochyes: not one a metonymy, another an irony, and another a metaphor, and another a synecdochy: it hath his notation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

Sedin Allegoria tenendum.  
That is, In an Allegory look from what thing we first fetch our Allegory, with the same thing must we end. As, if I begin with a ship, I must end with a ship; for if I begin with a ship, and end with a plough, inconsequentia foedissima fuerit. So also we see in the Gospel, how the Allegory of Dives and Lazarus is continued; how they were there feasted, and afterward how they were to feast in another place, where Dives had such a dry feast, as he desired but the tip of his finger to cool him withal: but how Lazarus was taken into a joyful feast, yea, even into Abraham's bosom; where we may see even by this rule, what is meant in this place by Abraham's bosom; namely, that Lazarus sitteth in Heaven next unto Abraham: So is the Allegory continued from the thing he doth fetch it: And this rule is of great use in Scripture, for the understanding of the Spirit of God in many places, which otherwise might seem dark. Now for him that gave his fellow a box on the ear which felled him, and yet said nisi tetigi; what affection is this? it is a kind of hyperbole of his own commendation, as if he could do more with a touch, than others with a great stroke.    

CHAP. III.  

Troporum genera duo sunt. Primum est metonymia & ironia.  
THis distribution of the kinds of Tropes is in respect of the things whence they are borrowed, and those from the Arguments of invention. The second distribution is from simple arguments.   

Metonymia est tropus causae ad effect. subj. ad adjunct: vel contrà.  
Here is definitio ex distributione, as if he should say, is absolutè vel modo quodam consentaneorum, which is showed by the induction of the species. But because not every cause is put Tropically for every effect, nor è contrà; neither every subj. for every adj. nor è contrà, therefore he chooseth rather to keep himself closely by these species, then to speak generally.   

Metonymia.  
Of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a change of the name, which is true of every Trope, but because use hath received, we content ourselves with it, knowing what is meant by it: or if ye will make it a synecdochy of the genus for the species. And this trope is first, for that the arguments whence they are borrowed, are first; and the reason why the cause is put for the effect, is, because it gives esse to the effect: so the reason why the effect is put for the cause, is, because it hath its esse from the cause. So why the subj. is put for the adjunct, because the adjunct in esse is in the subj. et contrà; so that this Trope is of consentany Arguments.   

Metonymia causae est efficieintis aut materiae.  
Here also is a definition of the metonymy of the cause ex distributionne. There is not any Trope of the other causes, neither form nor end; not of the form, for that is the effect itself, where the form is, and therefore Ramus said, Distributio generis in species & formas eadem est. Neither of the final cause, for that cannot so determine, because one thing may have many ends.  
Object. So the effect may have many efficients?  
Answ. But then according to the several modi of the efficient, there will be several effects: but there are not modi of the final cause.   

Efficient. cùminvent. & author.  
Here Inventor and Author are the two modi of the efficient. The first examples be of the Inventor, as   

Tum Cererem, &c,  
Ceres is corrupted with water; here is Ceres the Inventor of Corn: put for Corn,   

Cerealiáque arma.  
Here Arma is a Metaphor.   

Quos amisimus Cives.  
Those Citizens which we have lost.   

Mars pro bello. Aut dulcis musti, etc.  
Or he that doth concoct the humour of sweet Muskedine with Vulcan, i. e. fire: and this is he that is called Tubalcain often in Scripture.   

Sinè Cerere & Libero, etc.  
Without Bread and Wine lusts wares cold. And here is an Allegory, for the same Trope is continued: yet 'tis better to use venus than Coitus, but Liber and Ceres are more than the severity of the judgement seat will bear.   

Est preterea hîc valdè usitat, etc.  
Here is Author, the second modus of the efficient; and this is valdè usitatum: yea, of much greater use, than is the Inventor: so Martial calleth the history of Livy, Livy.   

Metonymia materiae.  
This is a definition itself, neither needeth it more to be added to it, for there is not definitio definitionis, yet I may say it is quando nomen materiae traducitur admateriatum significandum.   

Non domus & fundus, etc.  
Aes & aurum, pro aeneis & nureiss nummis.  
Aes & ferrum duelli.  
Brass and Iron are signs of War, not of Peace. pro armis aeneis & ferreiss. So is silver put for silver householdstuff so plate for the dishes made of plate.    

CHAP. IU.  

Metonymia effecti, cùm ex effect, etc.  
HE here makes the effect to answer only to the efficient, and in Latin it doth so; but in Hebrew sometimes it doth not, as in Genesis, chap. 1. vers. 2. The earth was wtthout form, and void: and sometimes it is found so in English, also in Latin; as 'twas called Lavinium, because 'twas built either from the material cause, or the subject of place. Now this is a common metonymy; neither doth he lay down all the modi which belong unto it. So spes is obscura, obscura is a metaphor, afterwards a metonymy, i. e. incerta. So is caeca pro ignorant a metaphour. So pale Death knocks equally at poor men's shops, and Kings turrets: Death is said to be pale, because it makes things so.   

Pallentesque habitant, etc.  
Morbi efficiunt pallentes: senectus a metonymy of the adj. for the subject; for the man that is old: it is tristis because it causeth sorrow. Here sometimes the efficient is put for the effect without any more ado; as in these examples that went before: sometimes the adjective is given to the substantive, which noteth the vis of the efficient, and not the efficient itself, as in this example that followeth.   

Praecipitem iram.  
Many modi there are of this metonymy of the effect which he omitteth: as this, when a man carrieth a Sword in his hand, we say, this man carrieth Death in his hand▪ here is Death put for the instrumental cause: so mors in olla.    

CHAP. V.  

Metonym. subj. est, etc.  
WE have heard before the reason of the name of Metonymia, and that it is distributed according to the Arguments whence it is borrowed: namely, to be of Arguments consentanious absolutè, or modo quodam: absolutè, as the cause and the effect: of the cause was of the efficient or matter; yet of these two causes the matter is more usually put for the effect: as, this Chest is wood: i. e. made of wood. Now the reason why 'tis so usual that the matter is put commonly for the effect, is this, because the genus doth arise from the matter, and doth predicate in quid of it.   

Cùm nomen, etc.  
That is, when that Noun which properly signifieth a subj. is delivered to signify the thing adjoined. Here he saith nomen, not verbum, as he did in the definition of a Trope, to show that he liketh both of them indifferently, and therefore useth them promiscuously. Here we are to understand that this definition is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for every subject is not put to signify his adjunct; or contrà: as whiteness is not put for wall, yet this is the best definition that can be given, and is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with his modi that follow.   

 cùm ponitur Continens, etc.  
Neither is this generally true, for every continens non pro quáque re contenta ponitur, but is to be limited with his two modi that follow: The first whereof is, when the place is put for the inhabitants thereof: and this is the first special modus of that modus of continens pro re contenta.   

Invadunt urbem, etc.  
The City was not buried in sleep and Wine, but the People in the City: So urbs pulcherrima for cives pulcherrimi. So   

Quòd in me carcerem effudistis.  
They cast a Prison upon me; for the Prisoners.   

Testis est Italia.  
Here Tully calls Italy, France, Sicily, Spain, to witness, for the Italians, French, Sicilians, and Spaniards; and here is also allegoria. Now the second special modus of that modus of continens pro re contenta, is, when the place is put for the things done in the place: so the market is put for the Rhetorical actions done in it: so by Academia where Plato taught, Lycéum where Aristotle taught, and Tusculane where Tully taught, is meant the Learning made famous therein. There is yet another special modus of continens pro re contenta, which I marvel that he left, as this, Reach me the cup, for the drink in the cup: and, Give me thy purse, for the money in the purse: here is continens pro re contenta, and yet neither of the special modi aforegoing.   

Ex hoc genere est illud.  
This is not a third special modus of continens pro re contenta, but a second from it, and here the possessor is put for the thing possed, as our neighbour Vcalegon burneth, for his house: Vcalegon comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non curo, therefore he that dwelleth near such a careless neighbour, had need to be careful for fear of fire. This modus is very useful in prose, as, he is with me, that is at my house.   

Sic dicimus hominem devorari.  
We say, the man is undone, or eaten up, when his Goods are taken from him, and this is another modus: The next modus is, the Captain for his Army: The last is, the Advocate for his Client.    

CHAP. VI  
WE have heard the reason of this Art of Rhetoric, namely, that 'tis to sweeten speech with, otherwise being inartificial it is of little force in the hearer's ears. For whereas every thing coming to mind, doth first come to the outward senses, then to the inward senses, and hence to the understanding, & so to the affections, and last of all to the Will. Rhetoric comes to the understanding, yet presently, before it can examine it, the affections lay hold of it, and so, tickle the Will that it may approve it: and hence it came to be abused, 1. with sophistry to the understanding; 2. for tickling of the Will.  
We have heard also that it hath two parts, namely, for that Speech is so; either writing, or uttering of it: hence is the double consideration of speech; the first whereof is called elocutio, which may be in writing alone without pronunciation, but pronunciation cannot be without elocution; hence it followeth that these are several parts: And secondly, Elocutio is before Pronunciatio: now elocutio is either in one word alone, adorning etymology; or in more words together adorning Syntax: that which is in one word alone is called tropus; and the reason of the sweetness of a Trope is, because it doth not only give a splendour, but besides that it carrieth us to another Argument from whence it was drawn: for every Trope signifieth two things to the hearer:  
First, A kind of sweetness with the thing it delivereth: and secondly, the argument whence it was drawn. Therefore though at the first necessity found it out, yet afterwards variety did so delight that it would not cast them off. Now these Tropes are not of any words as we will, but of consentanies with consentanies, dissent. with dissent. etc. and therefore the distribution of the doctrine of Tropes must run along according as the arguments are distributed: yet we have not fit words to distribute them withal, for if we should have said that a Trope is either simple or comparate, than we should have left out those Tropes which do arise from orta argumenta, as, synecdoche integri, & membri, generis & speciei. Again, not every simple argument is put for every simple one; neither every comp. for every comp. so that in this distribution there would have been a double error, therefore he contents himself with the special words Metonym. and Ironia, commending unto us a totum which we are to imagine by these specials as they have a community one with another, which is in regard of the arguments from whence they arise.  
1. For a metonymy of the cause, that is either of the efficient or of the matter: The reason of these two Tropes is, because these two causes in constituting the effect, are precedent a good while before either form or end. Now here, first the efficient is put for the effect, for that often times giveth names to the effect: and this metonymy hath two modi, the first when the Inventour is put for the thing invented; the second when the Author is put for the thing effected: so, we call Ramus his Logic, Ramus: and the reason hereof is this, because at the first we had not readily a name for it; for the thing being new we could not hastily give it a name, but gave the Author's name, till we had a better for it: So, for the matter we call Money silver, because at the first we had not readily a better name. Now there are no Tropes, of the formal and final causes; and the reason is, because they were so confused with the effect, that at the first we cannot readily sever them, both because forma simul ingenita cum effecto: and secondly, because these two causes do work so near to the effect a good while after either efficient or matter.  
2. A metonymy of the effect is, when the efficient is signified by his effects: here he seemeth to make the effect only to answer to the efficient; but it doth answer also to the matter at least, though not in Latin, yet in Hebrew and English: Luz was called Bethel before it was Bethel. Now this metonymy of the effect hath two modi: The first, when the effect is given to the efficient adjectively: the second when given to the efficient not adjectively, but abstractively: as he said, Death was in the Pot, because Colliquintida was in it. Now as the cause is put for the effect, & contrà; so, the subj. for the adj. & contrà.  
3. In the metonymy of the subject the modi are either contin. pro re contenta, as locus pro incolis, & ad res locatas; or possessor pro re possessâ; or Dux pro exercitu; or Advocatus pro Cliente.  
4. Now followeth the metonymy of the Adjunct.  

Cùm ex adj. res subj. signify.  
That is, when the name of an adjunct is given to the subj. whereof 'tis an adjunct: So we use to say, Saving your Honour: If it please your Worship: Honour and Worship being put for the subjects thereof: for, because the term of the cause, effect, subject, and adj. did not at the first come readily to our hand, therefore we were fain to put cause for effect, subj. for adj. aut contrà. So, the names of Virtues and Vices are put for virtuous and vicious men: as Lecher for a lecherous man; Covetousness for a covetous man, etc. and this is the first modus of this metonymy.  
The second modus is, when the sign is put for the thing signed; as, pubes for inventus; for pubes is properly the budding of the beard; when he beginneth to be adolescens.  
The third modus is, when the adjunct of time is put for the subject; as time for the unmannerly Citizens in that time: so aspera saecula for the People that were then asperi; so is togae for Peace, and here [cedant arma togae, conced. etc.] are two Hyperboly's.    

CHAP. VII.  

Ironia est Tropus à contrar. ad contr.  
SO that this Trope is only from those Arguments of contraries, and not of disparates, because they are too many. This definition is too general, for Relates are not so put one for another, because they are of more use in their agreeing affection, than in their disagreeing, but only is special to adversa contradicentia and privantia.   

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Cavillator, a wrangler: simulator, making that to be, which is not: dissimulator, making th●t not be, which is: illusor, a mocker: irrisor, a derider: this is the proper name of this Trope, and the use of it chief is ad jocandum. Now here, because there is so little reason that one contrary should be put for another; therefore 'tis hardly perceived, yet is to be distinguished either by word, or gesture, or by both.   

Heus bone vir.  
So,  
Meaning malè adversa.   

Curasti probè.  
That is, Non curasti, contradicentia: So integritas tua, i. e. your uprightness, your shamefacedness, your good done deeds; and so for the adversa. The modi here are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which are contradicentia; as let me not speak of your calamity: So may there also be of privantia, as when we say of a rich man, This man indeed is very poor.    

CHAP. VIII.  
WE have already spoken of those Tropes which do arise from simple Arguments: now follow those that do arise from Comparates and Orta.  

Tropi primum genus.  
Here is a perfect transition; wherein by the species the genus is commended unto us. For because Rhetoric doth not trace Logic in every step, but only in some few, hence it cannot be so exactly distributed, according as the Arguments of Logic are: hence was he fain to couple these two species metonym. and irony together, whose community is in that they both arise from simple Arguments.   

Secund. seq. in metaph. & synecd.  
Here the one is from Comparates, the other from orta, which whilst Ramus doth couple them togegether with this conjunction, he commends unto us a genus, which he could not name for us. We have heard before, Logic was compared to the body, Grammar to the garment, and Rhetoric to the lace laid upon it, which because it is an ornament unto it, 'tis not all over the garment, but only in some parts, for it must be rare, for it would not be an ornament if it was all over; so that we cannot so fitly distribute it according to Logic. Metaphora of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to carry over, for this Trope doth carry us from one simile to another.   

Metaph, est quando ex sim. etc.  
Hence this Trope doth only arise from similia, because the quality wherein they are compared makes them, and if that a mistaking should be, it is not great. There is no Trope that doth arise from comparates in quantity, because there is no proportion, for it belongeth only to similia.   

Itaque metaph, est ad unum verbum contr. sim.  
This is a deduction fetched out of Logic from a contract similitude, which is in one word.   

Tropus nullus est florentior.  
Here he doth commorari in the commendation of this Trope fetched from that Argument in Logic whence it ariseth. For whereas other Arguments do prove that which they are brought to argue, similia do only illustrate: so that a Metaphor is more excellent than any other Trope in clearing, and making bright, and our speech more pleasant: and, indeed, a metaphor makes us see, as it were, superficie tenus, if it be taken wisely and brought to the senses, especially to the eye which is the most acute sense.   

Name & odor urbanitatis.  
The sweetness of your Civility.   

Mollitudo humanitatis.  
The softness of your Kindness: These metaphors are fetched from the senses, and are good (indeed,) but yet those that are to the eye, are more pleasant; for they put into the mind things which we cannot see: and indeed the Will receiveth things from the understanding, and that from the senses inward and outward, especially the eyes.   

Nihil est in rerum natura, etc.  
There's nothing in nature, but a simile may be drawn from it, for Logic is general of every thing.   

Cujus ego Patrem, etc.  
Whose Father I account a God, and a Parent of my Fortune, and my name, i. e. as a God, and as a Parent.   

Honos alit arts.  
That is quasi alit, for alo is properly to nourish, as meat doth.   

Omnesque incenduntur.  
Are set on fire, this Trope here is fetched from fire which burns up things which are combustible.   

Spem fronte serenat.  
He makes clear his hope by his countenance; serenare is to make clear as the day is when the Sun shineth forth bright.   

Magnóque irari fluctuat aestu.  
He chafeth with the great heat of his angers; from the Sea: and this is a fit metaphor for an angry man, both for his gesture and speech, and these are to the sense of the eyes.   

 sementem seceris, ita meats.  
As thou sowest, so shalt thou reap: as you begin (for so signifies sementis, the beginning of the Harvest) so shall you end.   

Latrant.  
So, some Orators bark, and do not speak: this is taken from Dogs, and this is laid to the ear.   

Ad illius hanc orationem adhinniit.  
He laughed or gigled; from an horse: This also is especially to the ear, though we may also see the gesture.   

Hyperbole verò & Allegoria, etc.  
Now in Metaphors, Hyperboles, and Allegories have most praise: and hence 'tis that other Rhetoricians have made them proper only to a metaphor: and an Hyperbolical metaphor makes a lofty stile; when we give life to things which have not life, this is a special modus, and the reason of it is this, because if the grace of a metaphor be for the making plain of a thing unto us, then much more these, for the acts of living things are more apparent unto us, and therefore more pleasant.   

Geminique minantur.  
So,  
Two Rocks threatened into Heaven: minari is properly from that affection of ira.   

Pontem indignatus Araxes.  
The River Araxes scorneth the Bridge: This is taken for a mighty Prince.   

Parietes medius fidius, etc.  
The Walls of this Court, O Caesar, by my faith, me thinks do give thee thanks: This is taken from men. There also are most excellent Allegories; as, Virtue is fastened with deep roots: this is taken from Plants, which cannot be weakened by force, nor be removed from their place. Here he continueth his Allegory from the same thing wherewith he began it.   

Memoriâ vestrâ, etc.  
Our assays shall be cherished by your memories, and shall grow by your talk, and shall wax old by the monuments of writing. So also that, he is set on fire with wickedness, his eyes did burn, and cruelty burst out of his countenance; this is from the nature of fire.   

O Navis, etc.  
This is spoken of the Commonwealth, taken from a ship.   

Quaere Coracem, etc.  
Let us suffer this Crow to bring out his young ones out of his Nest, i. e. Let us suffer this Orator Corax, (which was one of their Sophisters which abused Rhetoric) let us suffer him to bring out his Sophistical Scholars into the Court.   

Neque tam fui timidus, etc.  
I was not so fearful that in the Troubles of the Commonwealth I would not do so and so: here 'tis fetched from a ship at Sea. I fear the cloud of thy forehead, and thy stinking breath infected (as it were) with brimstone: This is taken from Coins and Metals.    

CHAP. IX.  

Metaphora igitur ejusm. fuit.  
WE have heard of a Metaphour, now follows Synecdoche, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to take up shortly, by the whole a part, or by the part a whole.   

Pars est membr. vel spec.  
Here follows Logic, desiring to trim Logic fitly.   

Synecdoche membri, etc.  
Not every part for every whole, nor contrà, but sometimes, as, the member being put for the whole, and yet not every member for every whole, but only some; and 'tis as if he should say, Parson is either that which is a member, or that which is a species: so that here is not every distribution, sc. of the subj. or adjunct, for they will be a metonymy of the subj. or adjunct. Synecdoche membri, when by one member the whole is signified.   

O tecta ipsa misera.  
O miserable covering! of how unmeet a Master (if I may call him a Master) are ye held? here the covering for the house, that it covered.   

Haud aliter, etc.  
No otherwise your Poop, Puppis is the further part of a ship.   

Pubesque tueri.  
Pubes here is a metonymy, as before.   

Prosâ mucronem pro glad, etc.  
So also prose will suffer that the point of the sword be put for the sword; but not the poop for the ship, nor the mast for the boards. Here also is a kind of Allegory.   

Nullo me modo posse.  
I tell thee I cannot be safe with thee in the same house, seeing I am in great jeopardy that I am in the same City: here is parietes pro domo, maenia pro urbe: So oculi & aures, pro oculatis & auritis hominibus.    

CHAP. X.  
A Synecdoche of the species, is, when by the species the genus is signified.  

Certè, etc. parricida.  
Which is properly when one killeth his Father, but is generally put for homicida: This is the first modus.  
The second modus is when infinitum numeri dicimus pro magno: as, a man may bring out 6 hundred such.   

Cujus ex Ludo, etc.  
Out of whose School came as many Princes, as out of Trojan's Horse.  
The third modus is the singular number for the plural: as, Romanus for Romani; and in both the examples following: for what is so necessary, as to hold the Weapons to defend Thee, for Us.   

Allegoria hîc freq.  
Here also is a kind of Allegory, as we may see in the examples following: as, Catones, Philippi, Laesis pro Civibus honoratis, & pauperibus. There were two Cato's that were wise, the third was weak: and thence the proverb was tertius è coelo cecidit Cato. So Venus and Mars; for Vulcan took them with an iron Net in bed together, and went and told the other Gods. So Tyhys for a Pirate, or the Sea: Argos was the ship that Jason sailed in to Colchis for the golden Fleece: so, great Achilles, for any noble man: so, Troy for any other place.   

Hunc Caepuae, etc.  
So  
When we saw this man at Capua with a stern spirit: Magii, Blossii, were Romans of stern spirits.    

CHAP. XI.  
Whereas before the part might briefly contain the whole, so now contrary; these do arise from the cause and effect in Rhetoric, and this is opposite to that which went before, and is integri or generis: integri, when of the whole is signified the member.  

Pabula gustâssent.  
They had tasted the pasture of Troy; for part of it. Bibit is a metaphor; Germania a metonymy of the subj. for the adjunct.   

Res vides quomodo, etc.  
You see how the case stands: Orbis pro globo, & pro parte orbis.    

CHAP. XII.  
SYnecd. generis is, when the word that signifies the genus is given to the species: as, virtus pro fortitudine; Homo for Catiline: so, for what hope do you keep such an animal, pro bestia: Yet we must take heed that we put not any genus for any species; as, quadrupes pro equo: and this is the first modus.  
The second modus, as Tydides' for Diomedes; and Pelides for Achilles.  
The third modus, Poëta pro Virgilio; Orator pro Tullio.  
The fourth modus, as, the plural number for the singular; as, we have deceived the people, and seemed Orators unto them. Here likewise is a kind of Allegory, as in the example that followeth.   

CHAP. XIII.  
THus much of the Tropes; at whose excellency if you look, the metaphor is chief, because it layeth out the thing more plainly and pleasantly than the rest: the next is an Irony, because dissentanea suâ dissentione Clar. elucescunt. The next a metonymy, for that ariseth from Consentanies: Last a synecdoche, for that ariseth from Orta: for the example, 'tis plain.   

CHAP. XIV.  
WE have heard that Elocutio was in one word, or in more words: in one, as a Trope, and that was the first part of Eloc. The second follows in more words, which therefore doth not adorn Etymology, but Syntax: and this is called figura, which is a borrowed word from Geometry, and signifieth the figuring of a Speech, or the making of it comely, so that it lies in the shape of a Speech to please especially the ear, or the eye: for so doth Rhetoric especially please these two senses: or a figured Speech you may fitly term a well-set Speech.  

Est clocutio.  
That is an ornament of speech.   

Quâ orationis habitus.  
That is, the habit of a Speech is changed from a Grammatical to a Rhetorical. There habitus is a word fetched out of Natural Philosophy, from a man that hath a good habit, i. e. a comely man of person, or one well set: so that the ornanent lies here in the well set of the Speech which causeth this figure.   

Arecta & simplici consuet.  
For whereas Grammar is the garment of Logic, and would cover every thing as Logic lays it down, the Nominative case before the Verb, and the Accusative after the Verb: Figura comes and sets this speech otherwise, and so changeth the habit of it; so that I may compare Grammar to a trubkin, and Rhetoric to a fine handsome fellow: and in Rhetoric I may compare a Trope to one cut or jag, and a Figure to all the jags, or the whole shape thereof: They called figuram 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because 'tis the habit, or attiring, or well set of the speech: this name seemeth first to have come from Players, by reason that in Comedies and Tragedies we know the same party being in divers habit, played divers parts: hence 'tis that some would have it a Player, or a poor man in princely attire, or a Frenchman: Tully did despair in his art in his Book called Orator, increasing the number of Figures, and in his Book De Oratore doth diminish it: and in his Tropics he saith, 'tis no error in a thing that is infinite, to pass some thing; but 'tis in art an error to omit any thing.   

At hujus infinitatis, etc.  
Here Taleus in effect doth confess that which Tully said before: or at the leastwise would commend unto us the difficulty of this doctrine of Figures. We have heard what Rhetoric is, and the parts of it; how that 'twas the sweetening of speech, and had his good use at the first; till afterwards Sophisters did anoint their Paradoxes with it, which made it evil, even as a bad Ditty under a good Song: It had two parts; for that speech may be either only written, or also spoken: now the first of these can do much of itself, & is called elocutio, which commends unto us ornaments either in one word which is tropus, or in more words which is figura.  
Object. But a Trope may be in more words?  
Answ. It cannot, only thus, sometimes in Latin more words may signify one thing, and yet in another language it may be delivered in one word; for otherwise tropus is but in one word, unless it be a continued Trope, and then there is a Trope in every word. Now figura is in the fashioning of the speech, and so is turned from his Grammatical vis and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and so as it would make the speech more pleasant: Now this fashion is either outwardly, or inwardly; for figura dictionis is in the outward word, but figura sententiae is in the inward matter principally, yet in the outward also, and therefore is mere compos. and therefore to be handled after figura dictionis: and hence is this distribution of figura, when the words only, or also the matter is adorned; and the reason is, that as tropus did sweeten the word and brought it to signify two things; so doth figura sweeten the sentence both within and without: this care the Lord had in framing this art, that thereby the truth might be more easily received.   

Fig. dictionis est figura.  
So that figura is his genus: where there is fugurated a Speech resounding sweetly in themselves: so that 'tis in the fit sounding and correspondency of words among themselves one upon another; so that there are these things to be considered, 1. A figuration, 2. a sound 3. between the words 4. fit, and lastly sweet, and as it were a certain harmony of well tuned strings, and every word is as 'twere a well tuned string, and all together consenting make a sweet harmony.   

Quo uno nihil, etc.  
Yes figura sententiae is cognatior animo, but yet none is cognatior nostris auribus quàm figura dictionis.   

Numero enim excitamur.  
This is true of Poetry and Music, for we know Music, how when Alexander the Great heard it, was thereby stirred up to Wars, and again when the found of it was more remiss, he ceased from it; so that this figure is to make speech more pleasant: and as 'twere makes us dance to hear it, and is as the Apothecary's Box. Now this figura dictionis is either in the measure of sounds, or in the repetition of them: now the measuring of sounds is, when we give every one his true dimension, and hence Music is therefore pleasant to the ear: and also Bells delight us much if there be good proportion in the sounds of them observed in the ringing of them: So, the Nightingale is very pleasant, both for the variety and proportion of her sounds: But now the Cuckoo is nothing delighting because she always fing one tune, and she is like the Ass in Aesop, that would play Music: Now here Poetry is nothing but this Rhetoric, which is in the measuring of sounds, and this is very pleasing to the ear. And here we may see in what harmony man at the first was made; I mean in what consent with other things, seeing that he is now so delighted with this dimension, for before the Fall this kind of figure was without doubt much more pleasing. Now since the Fall we know some men are not delighted at all with Poetry; which if it be from their nature that they despise it, it argueth a distemperature of it, otherwise 'tis wisdom in others. Dimension is before repetition, because it needs dimension, as we shall see in some figures hereafter.    

CHAP. XV.  
WE have heard of figura which is outward, or both outward and inward: The outward is always in the sounds, and is either in the dimension of sounds, or in the repetition of them. Dimension is as 'twere fine music in right number and quantity: Repetition as 'twere an echo, or sweet tinkling; so that these are like to music measured by time. Now this figura dictionis is distributed by his form, which is dimensio sonorum, or eorum repetitio; and hence 'tis that dimensio sonorum, etc. are not defined, for they are definitions themselves: neither doth he define dimensio, for it belongeth to Grammar for the time of it.  

Dimensio est Poëica vel orat.  
So that here comes in Poetry, so that 'tis not a distinct art by itself, and therefore not to be handled by itself, but is a branch of Rhetoric: Poetry is before, because Oratory is borrowed from it: again Poets were long before Orators: and the first Poets we read of were the Pythagorians; and after them was Homer which is one most ancient, and this Poetry was the first measure that was in speech, and this was invented for the rudeness of the people that it might every way answer the ear from the one end to the other. Poetica of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 facio, because th●y made things which were not as though they were; as Chimaeraes' monsters, and in ancient time all the truth was so delivered.   

Poëtica quae perpetuis, etc.  
Which is tied with perpetual Laws, i. e. even from the one end to the other, or which is managed from the one end to the other with laws of certain spaces; which is not so in Oratory: so that I may compare Poetry to neatness and lepidity, and Oratory to gravity: for to be so tied as Poetry, is too nice, and is such an one as he which would not let an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lie on the Cape of his Cloak, which is not manly but womanly. Or like to him which was fellow-Senator with Hortensius, who putting one of the cuts of his garment out of frame, caused him to be very angry: and Poetry may also be compared to a fine Frenchman of the French fashion, or to a Courtier: Oratory to a grave Alderman.   

Et ferè in fabul. argumentis, etc.  
For the most part 'tis used in fables; and fabula is the subject of Poetry which is ad hominum mores imitandum, & exprimendum. And now the first Poetry was those Sylvestres Musae which were called Pastoral Shepherds, and this is very ancient, as we may see in Abel which was a Keeper of Sheep, and also in Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Now this keeping of Sheep at the first was very usual, and being an Office of no great Work, but that the shepherds had great leisure, they fell to study and seek out the Nature of things, as of their Sheep, and plants, and the like: Others among them not so well minded fell to love, and to play hob and tib, and so made lovesongs, and Ballads: after these shepherds there were others which made songs and Ballads of the Acts of Noblemen, among the rest Homer being but poor and did beg, and when his Father died, his Mother married a Schoolmaster which taught him: He did make songs; and rapsodia signifieth songs tied together: Now afterwards Homer went to Travel, and as he went on the Sea by studying got the Rheum that he became blind, and came back again and made songs, and used to sing them at Cobbler's shops: and afterwards he that was Governor in Greece caused Homer's songs to be gathered together into one Book by Aristarchus, and those which Aristarchus said were Homer's verses were put in, and those which he said were not, were left out: hence 'tis that when we see any one which is a curious Judge in any thing, we call him Aristarchus.   

Hinc Tragaed. Comaed, etc.  
These are branches of Poetry, if we respect the verse, but if we look at the matter, they will belong to other arts. It is called Tragaedia, because a Goat was given to it for a reward: Comaedia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a cross-way, because it was used in compitis, for they used to play their Comedies in streets, making their stages upon Carts, that they might go about and be seen.   

In quibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
That is fall out: agnitio knowing of it suddenly: for Poetry worketh so craftily, making things that are not as though they were, and so makes our knowledge of it more sudden.   

Numerus Poet. est Rythm. aut metr.  
This distribution falls not out every way well; for in Rhythmus, if we mark it, we shall often find repetition of sounds: for 'tis   

Certâ clausulâ terminat.  
So that there is of an epistrophe in it: yet this distribution cannot be amended, but only the fault noted. Rhythmus of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as metrum of mensura. Rhythmus is a Poetical number containing a certain number of syllables ending with a certain clause.  
Object. But why are not the feet dactylus and spondaeus taught generally to them both?  
Answ. No Rhythmus only looks at the arithmetic of syllables, i. e. at the number of them; and not at the geometr. i e. the quantity of them. Rhythmus is before, because 'tis more ancient.    

CHAP. XVI.  
WE have heard of dimensio Poëtica in Rhythmus, which dimensio though it hath been used only in fabulosis argum●ntis, yet notwithstanding it being a branch of Rhetoric which is a general art, we are to know it may be used in any thing whatsoever. Now followeth Meeter which is very ancient, though Aristotle denieth it, and thinketh Homor to be the first in Greece, which may be true; for the Grecians had but little learning amongst them at the first, but what they got from others: but in Judaea it was common, and so ancient, that Wriers do ascribe it to Moses to be the first that wrote Heroical verse, and they were Psalms that he wrote so; and some also writ that he had a Daughter which was a very fine Poet: And David also and Solomon wrote verses in Meeter, which were long before the Grecians: And for Homer, his Father-in-law was a Schoolmaster which taught him, and afterwards his Father bound him Apprentice to a Merchant, and so he traveled the Seas, did see Ulysses his travels and wrote his History of Troy about that: and when Homer traveled, even as he was entertained where he came, so he did describe those people. Metrum and Rhythmus are the same, and only two names for one thing. Metrum of mensura, 'tis a metonymy of the adj. for the subject, the measure put for the matter measured which it handleth. Metrum is a dimension Poetical containing certain feet placed in certain places: so that there are these Three things to be considered in this definition; 1. A Poetical number: 2. Certain kinds of feet: 3. Those feet must be placed in certain places. 1. I say Poetical number, for that is the genus, as we heard before: 2. Certain kinds of feet, as in a Phaleucium, Spondaeus, Dactylus & Choraei tres: in a Sapphick, Choraeus, spondaeus, dactylus, & Chorei duo. 3. They must be placed in certain places.  
Now for the place, note only this, That in an Hexametre in quinto loco be dactylus tantùm, and in sexto spondaeus; and this is all for place. Now because pes is mentioned in the definition of metrum, hence it comes here in the next place, being an adjunct unto metrum, to be defined.  

Pes est dimensio.  
Pes is called dimensio, which is general both to Rhythmus and metrum, but this dimensio is finita, i. e. limited with certain times of syllables, not with certain syllables.   

Estque bissyl. aut trissyl.  
Et uterque simplex aut mistus.  
As Spondaeus which is bissyllabus, because it containeth but two syllables: and simplex, because they are both of one and the same time, to wit, either both short, or both long: Spondaeus comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a be stead, which is a metaphour. Pyrrhichius is of a short, which comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth swift, because of the speedy running of it. Now indeed this foot should have been set before spondaeus, because one long hath as much time as two short, therefore two long have as much time as four short; therefore the short ones are more simple dissyllables. Mistus is Jambus, and this foot had its name from the inventour thereof. Choreus signifies a measure used in dancing, and comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Trissyllabus simplex is molossus, of three long, which should have come after Trochaeus: 'tis called Molossus from that Country so called where 'twas found out, and where the people were much delighted with it: The same Country was also called Epyrus of him which was their first beginning, which was Pyrrhus. Trochaeus of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 curro to run like a Trope. Now for dissyllables simple there can be no more but those mentioned; but for the rest many more feet there are which may be observed; and yet not material, whether they be here brought in or no. Trissyllabus mistus because of so many syllables is more various: here 1. is dactylus, which signifies a finger, where there are three joints, the first is stronger, the other two be weaker. Anapaestus of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a repeated foot.   

Mistia è dissimil. continuis, etc.  
Creticus, so called of the Country Crete. Amphibrachus of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because 'tis short at both ends: Here the parts of Meeter being declared, now the common adjuncts or affections follow, and these are two, First, if a word end with a vowel, or m, or both, and the word following begin with a vowel, they are taken away, so that this property consisteth of two parts: the first is, if a vowel end a word without m, and the next word begin with a vowel, then eliditur, as, sera nimis vita est, The second part is where there is a vowel and also m ending a word, and the next word beginneth with a vowel, all are taken away, as, nullum ille, here i and m are taken away. Now the second property is this, that ultima syllaba of a verse, habetur pro indifferenti. Now for the kinds of Meeter, they are many, yea, and as many more as he hath set down, much like the tunes of music: and as in Speech there are many kinds of words, so are there many kinds of Meeter: yet those which are ordinary in Schools, and of most use, are simple or composite: Simple is of two feet, and is called Adonicum of Adonicus the Author; when Sapph being a fine Woman loved and made sapphick verses, which were so called of her, and after his death, at the end of every third verse, she in memorial of Adonicus made Carmen Adonicum: this consists of two feet, for if it should be of four, it would be a foot, and not a verse: now this Sapph was a very fine Musicioner, and she did excel Pindar in it. Carmen Compositum is of more feet than two, and is either tetrametr. or polymetr. here he is fain to make shift as he can with such words as he can get; for otherwise tetram. is polymetr. though the schools use to say three is the least number of multitude, and say tria sunt omnia. Tetram. is that which hath four feet, and this is the first; for there is no verse of note that is of three feet: Polymet. is pentam. or hexamet. Asclepiad. of Asclepiades is the name of a Poet that found out this kind of verses. Pentametra are Phaleucium, so called of the Author: Sapphicum of Sapph, as before: or Elegum, of Eligo to choose, for these were a choice kind of verses. Hexametrum epicum is of 6 feet.   

Verùne pentam. ab epico nunque separatur.  
Here by pentam he means elegum, by a synecdoche: Now here are not all the kinds of Meeter by many, yea, the common Grammars have ●ambicks, which here are not set down, though the matter be not great.    

CHAP. XVII.  
WE have already heard the doctrine of Poetical number: now follows Oratorical, which did not at the first observe measure: The first that used to write were Poets, which wrote in verse; yet Orators used to speak in prose, but not to write prose of a great while after the Poets.  

Numerus oratorius est numerus, etc.  
That is, 'tis not tied to such a strict number of syllables as Poetry is, neither to the same feet in many sentences together: dissimilis poëtico, for it doth not quite through observe the number of feet as Poetry doth; neither doth it use the same feet together: dissimilis sibi ipsi, because we should not always use it, lest the people should think it to be a set Speech; neither should the same feet be perpetuo used, but in divers clauses divers feet. Now this oratorical number at the first did arise from Poetry; for the Orators seeing the Poets much to delight the people by their Poetical number, they also did endeavour to find out a kind of oratorical number, whereby both their matter and speech might be of more grace, and comeliness unto the people: Now, indeed, this oratorical number hath a kind of deceit in it, but 'tis bonus dolus, and not malus dolus; even as the Physicians use a kind of deceit, whereas they giving to their Patient a bitter Potion do sugar it at the top, that the bitterness of the Potion may not so sensibly be felt. Now the deceit is this, namely, in that because this dolus doth sweeten the matter, therefore they think the matter is deceitful, which is fall●cia adjuncti, and therefore they did use number in prose, but at liberty, not Rhythme, or Number. The inventor of this oratorical number was Thrasymachus; but he tied himself too strictly, and came too near unto the Poets: next was Gorgias, but he was also too sweet, and therefore did make the people mark his speech, and not the matter, and therefore did wrong the matter: He was a notable Sophister in Arîstotle's and Plato's time, and was Isocrates his Master: but this Gorgias by this means did much wrong the matter; even as if we see a Gentleman in a very fine suit, we shall so much look at the suit, that we shall not look to the properness of his person: Now Isocrates which was Gorgias his Scholar did excel them both, and indeed he is the sweetest of all for figura dictionis, for he is very moderate: but Demosthenes and Aeschines were sweeter for figura sententiae; for Demosthenes was strong, and therefore his speech was more violent, as it were, casting out thunderbolts. Now for the grace of oratorical number. Hyperbaton transmutatio (of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) is permitted, that it may be lawful for the sugaring of speech to transpose their words in a sentence into such places as they will make the best sound; for otherwise (as Fabius saith) a speech will be rugged, hard, and dissolute, and yawning, if we shall place the words as they do arise; so that in Greek and Latin we may for sweeter sound use by porbaton, but yet notwithstanding in our English tongue we must not: for use hath placed them Grammatically, and therefore they may not be changed.   

Differenda igitur quaedam sunt & praesumenda.  
Some words therefore (saith he) are to be put back, and some to be put before: and even as in building of Stones, every stone must not be laid as they come next to hand, but as they will best lie together: so nothing will make a more sweet speech than a fit mutation of the order of words. This oratorical number hath no rythme in it, but only in a certain repetition that is in epizeuxis and epistrophe, as we shall hear hereafter, but is only in the observation of feet, which Tully esteemed of so much worth, as that he affirmed the speeches to exclaim, when the words fell fitly: and so our Sermons do much delight; yet in them we must take heed we be not too curious, lest we draw the people's minds from the matter to the words, and so rob God; for so the speech will so delight the ear and the affections, that the matter will not enter into the heart: and without question Demosthenes had never laid his thunderbolts so, had they not been cast from him with number: and therefore (saith Tully) as wrestlers and sword-players do shun every thing warily, and do not strike vehemently, that whatsoever is profitable unto fight, the same may be comely unto the sight: so an Oration doth not make any deep wound, unless the stroke be fit, neither doth it well enough fly the force, except it know what is comely in the flying of it: therefore as their motion is who are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unskilful at that play of Olympus; so is their Oration who do not shut up their sentences with numbers.    

CHAP. XVIII.  
THis is the commendation of Tully of oratorical number in feet, which ought to be much more acceptable to us than to the Author himself, who being enwraped with the Schools and Comments of Rhetoricians thought this act to be most hard which is in twenty orations observed by Ramus and shown to be most easy; so much more excellent was the Orators nature and use than his art. Now here was but one rule which was generally taught before, namely, That oratorical number be unlike both to Poetry and itself: here he doth commorari and tells us that therefore in prose we must not use verse; yet sometimes you may for authority or pleasure, as Tully of old did using the example of the Athenians: The next rule is, that we make not the beginning or end of a verse, the beginning or end of prose; neither that we begin or end our Oration with any sentence like to verse: though indeed in the beginning there is less care, because there it comes new, and therefore the people are ready to pass it away, and in the middle of an Oration there is no consideration at all, but in the end must be greatest care of all: hence Orators use to place some good Arguments in the beginning, the worst in the middle, and the best at the latter end: now the end is most to be regarded because it doth most appear, and is best understood by the people; so that though the beginning and middle, which peradventure they have forgot, were not good, yet the conclusion being good, they will judge all the rest to be good also: now in Oratory we are to observe the last six syllables of a clause quae bissyllabis tantùm pedibus definiri potest: neither must we be too curious in observing the syllables of every clause. Now he comes to the specials, and there he tells us that all syllables long, make a slow and a rare clause; yet if they be all long, 'tis not amiss in a grave matter: but all short are more rare than all long; for there 'tis too swift, and that speech doth not become the gravity of an Oratory, but long and short together are more usual. Here note, that, as in Poetry, so also in Oratory, nihil sit, extrema illa longa sit, an brevis.  
Now this Oratorical number is learned two ways, either by taking a well set sentence and displacing the words to see how they will sound, or to take some sentence which is dissolved, and to place it better. Now there must be such variety of feet in Oratory, as that of Licinius, that sweet words are framed as Carvers work by art, and pavement engraven with— or the like; and the oratorical number doth as well regard the sound of the letters, namely, that one word do not end with a vowel, and the next word begin with a vowel; neither that Rhetorical sentences run upon one letter, as, O tight, tute, tate, etc. but that the consonants sound well as it doth respect the measure of the syllables.  

Sume de Graccho apud Censores.  
Their Censors were two, which were to look to the manners of the people, and had authority to correct them, and from their Office they had their name.   

Causam judicii longè aliam statuo.  
For Tully judged all these sounds by his ear, but indeed it is by the affections also.   

Causam afferre Tullius nullam potest.  
Yes, the other were more familiar to the people, and he knew what pleased them best; now if there be consonants ending a clause, they must not be too stiff; neither is it requisite that a verb should be last in a sentence, if there be other words that will sound better: Tully's clause was esse videatur, Jambus & Chorei duo: And thus much of Poetical dimension.    

CHAP. XIX.  
WE have heard of figura dictionis in dimensione soni, both Poëticâ and Oratoriâ, where we are to note that Talaeus should have taught hyperbaton, and that same literarum bonitas as general affections to all dimension, for the hyperbaton is general to every tongue besides the French and our English tongue; and therefore indeed most part of the Syntax of our English tongue lieth in the placing of the word.  

Figura dictionis in repetit, est similis aut dissim.  
That is like, or somewhat unlike: for so we heard in Logic that dissim. sunt, quor. qual. & diversa; so that a dissimilitude hath a dissension but only in a diversity: so that it is somewhat unlike. Similis is either simil. soni, or dictionis, and both of them either continuè or disjunctè, i. e. either without any thing coming between, or that hath something interposed: Contin. is either in eadem dictione, or diversâ: in eadem dictione appellatur epizeuxis of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because they are so near that they are not severed but only by a parenthesis, which is no part of the sentence.   

Hic solùm numerus non vox iteratur.  
It should be sonus not numerus, for that we heard of before: and again, he saith quae est in soni repetitione, therefore it should be sonus.   

Interdum parenthesis interponitur.  
Here he doth admonish us of a Caution that might fall out, and that's of a parenthesis, which though it be in the same sentence, yet is not part of it; therefore doth no harm to this figure. Now figura dictionis in diversa sententia est anadiplosis, or climax.    

CHAP. XX.  
ANadiplosis is when the foregoing sentence endeth in the same word that the same sentence beginneth withal. It cometh of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reduplicatio. He saith  

Quando sonus idem.  
Because where is the same word, there the same sound also, not contrà: though there may be the same word, and the same sound in this figure as well as in the rest; therefore because he had not one word to comprehend sonus and dictio he took the more general.    

CHAP. XXI.  
CLimax signifieth a gradatio, or a climbing up the ladder of stairs, or the like: it is a manifold anadiplosis; so that it is not an opposite species of anadiplosis, but a property of it, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of Tropes: so that the difference of them is this, That anadiplosis is in one word twice repeated, and climax is in more words often iterated: and here in a climax note that always the word is not the least of the former sentence that gins the second; I mean 'tis not always in place, yet 'tis in sense, as torvaleaena lupum sequitur, not sequitur lupum.  
Caetera desiderantur plurimum.    

NOTES OF PHYSICS.  
PHysica est ars bene naturandi.] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is natura, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 understand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is ars naturalis, or the art pertaining to nature; 'tis arse as appears by the definition thereof and this affection.  
Bene naturandi.] i. e. to do the work of nature well, for Physica is the rule of natures acting, so do Angels whilst they do their act; and 'tis the rule whereby God made them. Neither is it only of contemplative things, but of the practice, as may appear by the branches of it; as hortulana, agricultura. Si natura Physica, at natura, ergo.  

Natura est, quae est orta à principiis.  
Natura est, quando aliquid naturâ fit. Nature is every thing, quatenus tis ortum à principiis, as all is but God himself. Some think that corpus is Physics object, but if we take corpus generally for that which hath the three dimensions, it is too large and belongeth to Geometry, if it be taken more specially as 'tis orta à principiis, 'tis no special: for natura est spiritualis aut corporea; but because every thing is res nata, ergo every thing is à natura. Neither is generation and corruption so large as natura or principia, for they are both of the form only, neither were the Angels generated, and so shall not corrupt, but created & so eternal per se. Neither is nature and propagation reciprocal, but propagation and inconstant nature; and so what is the reason that Parents love their Children— but because of the continuance of their progeny by their continual propagation? And this shows that man was made to be unchangeable.  
Some Philosophers say that Sciences have their subjects, but Arts have not: but let them look to the distribution of ars generalis; and there they shall see that Logic hath an object, namely ratio, and Grammar, namely oratio: and nature comes of nascor, quasi res nata or orta, for nature will comprise any thing in it but God. And so Aristotle doth entitle his Books De ortu & interitu, which do appertain to every thing but God; and hence comes ortus. Kickerman would have a special art of Spirits, scilicet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and let him, but yet 'twill be a branch of natural Philosophy. And for the Spirits, this is that deceiveth them, they think if we give them matter, we must make them bodies: but this is an inconsequence, for accidents have their matter, and yet are not bodies: and matter belongeth to Logic which is general, but corpus is special to Geometry. But for the Angels, are they not many? and have they not any community? Ergo then they have a genus. They say analogicè, if they mean symbolicè, 'tis true. And they must have forms, for they are distinct: if they have matter without form, than they do not exist; et contra; if they have neither matter nor form, than they are infinite. And natura beginneth where creation endeth: So that it looks not at materia as 'twas created of nothing, for so 'twas a miracle; but as 'tis now a nature and fit to essificare other natures.  
Principia sunt Materiale.  
Principia sunt Formale.  
These are first to be considered in Physics: and materia and forma belong to Logic, and are adjuncts to the thing that is materia and forma. Now because we know not what to call them, we are fain to borrow these words materiale and formale: and then I say two things, First, the thing which is materiale and formale: Secondly, That affection they have to be called materiale and formale. Hence it follows (though it belong to Divinity) that, because every nature doth arise ex principiis it is not eternal; neither are these principiae eternal, because they are from an ens primum. And from these principia do arise all qualities, as Aristotle is right, and yet wrong; for he saith, that they come from the form: but they are qualities of the thing, and as the thing was made of matter and form, so the qualities arise from the thing made of them both. And principium materiale, is the thing whereof materia in Logic is the notion; and so formale. And for materia to be prima and secunda in Logic, there is nothing such, but the thing materiale is primum aut secundum: and for materiale primum it cannot be defined, for it hath nothing but the efficient before it: only 'tis that which is primum substratum in naturâ, and formale is that which is primum superstratum in naturâ; so that one is as 'twere the subject, the other the adjunct. And so anima is in corpore tanquam adjunctum in subjecto, And, (by the way) anima est tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte, is false; for anima is finite, and if it should be tota in qualibet parte, than it should be so by the same reason that we say God is totus in qualibet parte, and so is God: so that 'tis but pars in parte: again it hath limits of quantity, ergo it hath some figure, ergo partem extra partem, ergo position of parts. And primum materiale is made of nothing, and so is next unto nothing, so that nature looks at it as it doth constitute things. And from these we may prove Divinity, for every thing is made of nothing, and so by the same power may be resolved into nothing: so that nature teacheth nothing contrary to Divinity. And from these are all qualities: and all qualities have their quantity according to their subject; so Learning, when I say, Such an one is great Scholar. But Objection, Some will say, What to be measured with a yard? No, but if a good Logician, than so far forth as his Logic reacheth.  
Pricipium est materiale, formale.] From these principia may we conclude any thing. And by how much more form and less matter any thing hath; so much more action there is. But  
Quest. How then is it continued, if there be so little matter to comfort the form?  
Answ. The continuance of motion is no hurt to any thing; for 'tis but to extend the matter, and bring it in frame: and hence 'tis that there is more action in some things than in other things. So the Angels do most act, for they have most form: yet we are to think that they have the three dimensions; and many of them cannot be together, for there should be penetratio dimensionum, ergo essentiarum. And there in the definition of Nature, we heard of ortus, because that is general to every nature to be orta à principiis. But interitus belongeth only to inconstans natura. So that 'tis no good consequence to say, such a thing had ortum, ergo it must have interitum: and the reason is, because Angels and the highest Heavens have their principla congenita, and ergo, nature cannot dissolve them. The Earth hath less form than Water; for if it had the form of Water upon it, it would occupy more room. So that 'tis not from the matter, but from the form. And every nature hath these two principia; the principium passionis is from the matter, actionis from the form. And from these come limits of essence & of quantity, which reaches so far as the form extends the matter: so the matter of earth reacheth so far as the form extends it, otherwise the matter of it might further be extended. And here is that question amongst Physicians, Whether Hairs and Nails be parts of man, or not? For if the form extends itself so far, (which it doth not) than they should be parts. Scaliger saith, the Angels have quantity, but not praedicamental, but spiritual quantity; which is nothing but their subtle quantity: and because they have quantity, hence they must be under some figure, and they have their place, and that is one.   

Passionis. Actionis.  
By virtue of the form there ariseth actio, by virtue of the matter passio: Yet they arise from them both, but more especially from the one, than the other: for every thing is effectum: ergo, it hath causes, ergo these causes do agere, ergo the effect doth pati: so that every nature doth pati. And again, every nature hath principia, from whence cometh actio. Hence are these most general, yet passio before; because it cometh more principally from the matter, as also because every thing doth pati in its very generation before it be perfect, And the materiale doth pati, and the formale agere, yet the materiale doth agere also, so Aristotle saith, materia doth appetere formam, ut foemina virum.   

Crassities, Tenuitas.  
Crassities comes from the contraction of the matter, as tenuitas from the extension of the form in the matter: and one and the same thing may be crassum and tenue: and as there is a certain limitatio of every thing by reason of its principia, so there is a certain limitation in regard of extension and contraction in them.   

Tenuitas vocatur & subtilitas.  
Subtilitas we call slenderness: subtilitas is the form spinning of the matter by the form; crassities contra. So take a Portion of the first matter, and put the form of fire upon it, and it will spin it finer than the form of air will do, and so the rest. So that the act of the form on the matter extending it, causeth subtlety; crassities is contrà. Again, every thing hath porosity in it, and so it rends: and 'tis requisite there should be porosity in every Element, for that there must be apposition of elements: and that there must be, as in the earth, that it may bring forth fruit. And that which Kickerman calls impurity in the elements, is nothing but this apposition of them. And for the doctrine of the three Regions of the Air, it comes in the Meteors, as not being so distinguished as 'tis an Element. but as the Meteors be in it.   

Gravitas. Levitas.  
Gravitas and Levitas do arise from the continual act of the form: for where there is a great deal of form, and little matter, there is most levity. So in the highest Heavens, because the principia were together, and there is much acting of the form, hence is it most light, and hath the highest place. And gravity is a privation as it were of levity, as opacity is of light. And so the same matter may be more light by the action of the form, not more grave. And so the first matter was most grave, because it was without form: and as it was every thing imperfectly so 'twas in loco, and was quantum imperfectly; though limits of place and quantity be so far as matter and form reach: and 'twas without form, ergo imperfect. And for so many legions of Spirits in a man's body, we are to imagine them to have distinct places; so when we pull a thing, we would have it in two places, ergo it rends. And acts are either internal, when the form extends the matter; and hence is subtilitas and crassities, and this is the true arising of subtilitas, some say it ariseth from heat, and rarity: but there may be subtlety where these are not, as in the highest Heavens: and this is plain in the Elements which have one common matter, and yet by their forms they are more or less extended: neither is heat the cause of extension, for the earth will be more extended, if the form of Water be in it. Again, when the form extends the matter beyond its reach, till it rend, this is rarity: Gravitas is from more matter, and less form, levitas contrà: The external act is of the matter and form. Raritas and Densitas. Rarity is the extension of the matter by the form, that it rents and becomes porose, and so is every thing, for if Angels can extend themselves, then 'tis from their rarity and density, and ergo from porosity: and so for Adam, and the patriarches, and the rest, they being in the highest Heavens, there must needs be cessio corporum, and there must be no vacuum, ergo there is a caelestis aura that doth cedere. Scaliger saith when the air is extended 'tis porosus, and yet he cannot tell what 'tis that is in the pores of it; for if it were air, than it should still be one continued body with it: but all the Elements are together by apposition; so that there are other elements in it. And raritas and densitas are not qualities, saith Aristotle, but the distance of the parts, and as it were a kind of ratio. And these may be of the same thing as the air may be more rare, and more dense. And these are internal acts. The external, act the power of action and passion: For where there is much potentia actionis, there must be much potentia passionis, and so antipathy: where if there be much action, than there must be patientis fuga, or else it perisheth. Now where there is much action and affection to his like as is cause, effect, subject or adjunct, this is Sympathy.  
Multiplex & discontinuum unum mundum efficit ordine, et hinc ascensus. descensus.  
Multiplex & discontinuum unum mundum efficit contiguitate, & hinc nullum datur vacuum.  
The world consisteth of many parts, which are not continua, but contigua: yet we may call the world one, as he that made it is one; scilicet in method or order, not in continued quantity. And by reason, that all things are one by method, hence there can be no vacuum: First, because there would be a crypsis of this method: again, vacuum is non ens; but only ens à primo is part of the world, ergo not non ens, for nothing cannot be a part of something. Nature is manifold, but 'tis made one by method: as every rule of Logic are divers in themselves, but make but one act by method, so nature being manifold in itself, is made one by method. And here are a great many Controversies answered; as, That the world is not one by continuity but method, we know is the wisdom of God, according to which God created and governs things; ergo the things do appetere their place, as God hath placed them: hence 'tis that things ascend and descend. Some say 'tis for their own preservation: which indeed is the final cause, but the efficient cause is method. And as a Painter, when he paints a thing, should make a deformity, if he should set things out of order: so nature, if things should not be rightly placed, so that there be no crypsis of method. And here comes in the world, which is multiplex and discontinua natura: here also by reason of this method there comes to be contiguity of every thing; so that there cannot be vacuum: for then the world should not be one, and so we should make two worlds, and make nothing something. And though God's wisdom, Power, and other Attributes, be, and in God, yet he would have them appear instar omnium, and to be sufficient for all things: and so he made them many, to show the variety of this wisdom. Now again, as they are many in themselves, yet they must be but one, to show that the variety of this wisdom is but one in him. And they are in one method, and so make one world. So we say in Logic, and 'tis sometimes true, That the cause and the effect be like: and so is God and the world. So the world is but one: and is round, as being the most capacious figure of all: now 'tis one, not in continuity, for than it should but have one quantity, and so one form, but as before in contiguity as it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. an heap, but an orderly heap, and so is but one in method. And hence every thing desireth its place and order by the rule of method; which commands that naturâ prior must praecedere: ergo the outmost things must first be made; and ergo they must have more form than matter, that they may ascend: and so by order, from the highest nature, goeth down to the lowest: And for those Philosophers which make Nature to be God, I doubt it, and methinks 'tis like their opinion which made the Godhead the form of every thing. But we must not wrong God, but acknowledge the principia to be causes of things, and give them their effects, for they say in that such qualities— such a thing, 'tis from God: But as a man doth write with pen, so God hath made a creature which worketh of itself, even as the Pen writeth, but is governed by God even as the pen by the writer. So that nature's work is when the two causes do work according to God's Logicum artificium: and Nature is the cause of natural effects; and is to be distinguished from God. So that here we see the disposition and order of every thing. So when I see a Tree bring forth fruit, I conclude there is Logic; and yet neither tree nor fruit hath reason: ergo there is one greater that hath reason: which methinks were sufficient to convert any Atheist. And from this order of things comes contiguity: for there must be no vacuum, as before, since that would be a breach of method. So we see Water and Earth will go up even into the element of Fire for the preservation of the unity of this world. And if there should be a vacuum it must needs be something or nothing, then in the world or out of the world; if out of the world, than it were not all things; if in the world, than a part of the world, then as before in ens it should be ens; if in the world and not ens, than the world must be two. And from method 'tis that the Loadstone desireth to stand North and South; and so doth every thing, yea naturally, not guided by counsel desire natale solum. And when we do transplant trees, 'tis a monster and against nature; and so that one woman should nurse an other woman's child: And one woman may have three children, though she have but two dugs, so that she have milk for them. And from sympathy it is, that the iron goeth to the loadstone, for 'tis his food; ergo his preserving cause; and the stone may act through a Table. For descensus. What is the reason that fire cometh down? Common Philosophers ascribe it to plate, which belongeth to subjectum; but 'tis place, which is order, and belongeth to method: and that is the next cause, though the final cause be as before, ne detur vacuum. So when I cast a stone, that it flies, 'tis propria forma; the reason why it flies from me is that it doth pati, and ergo doth fly his enemy. The common Philosophers ascribe it to the air, which in very deed doth hinder it as themselves shall confess; for cast a stone upward, and when it falleth down again, what is the reason it moveth faster when 'tis near the centre, than when 'tis farther off, but because when 'tis near the centre there is less resistance of the air than there was above? So what is the reason we take force to strike with an Axe, and that goes farther, than if we set it upon a thing and lay great weight on it? because the wood can resist the Axe well enough. Now we lift up our hands, because all the vital spirits in the legs and other parts of the body come to enable that part which acteth most; and the higher it goeth the more forciblly it cometh, for that it is more able to resist the air; as also there is a double motion, natural and violent: and it will come down more easily, because it is a natural motion; not upward so well because 'tis violent unto it. So a thing that hangs down, that part moveth most which is farthest from the centre, for that it suffereth violence. So what's the reason, that put salt Beef into the Sea and it will be fresh; but put fresh in, and it will be salt? because 'tis the nature of salt to constringe; and that's the reason salt Beef occupieth less place than fresh doth: now its pores being filled with salt, the salt water cannot get in, but only the fine water pierceth in, and so takes away the salt: but if it be fresh the pores be so open, that the salt water entereth in, and so it becometh salt.  
Materiale est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in naturâ primum substratum: and this is fons passionis. Formale est essentia in naturâ prîmum superstratum, as before: and this is fons actionis. And from these principia many things in nature may be made manifest. As from hence, things natural have finitness of essence, which belongeth to every nature: and thence limits of quantity, as the Angels have; and thence they are always under some figure; thence also have they limits of place; and so Zanchius saith, an Angel is in his own place. Again, if every natural thing have these principia, then 'tis principiatum; ergo tis in tempore, and had a beginning: hence nature must have an efficient; ergo not eternal: and this efficient only can turn the constant nature into nothing; but they are not resolvable per se, because they are proxima to nothing in their kind: otherwise if nature should resolve them, it could work a miracle, which is above nature, for nature found them created, and must so leave them, for creatio and annihilatio are not effects of nature, but above it: Hence the soul of man could not be created by nature; for then either of something or nothing; not of nothing. For creatio is above nature, if of something, then resolvable again. Again, if every thing in nature be of these principia, hence is generatio ex aliquo, and corruptio in aliquid; from these principia comes actus & potentia; actus est ex acto formae in materiam; potentia est ex actu formae per materiam: From these inward acts come (1) levity and gravity; and there are two causes of levity, the first is a form more active; the second is less proportion of matter: The causes of gravity are contra: again the causes of subtlety are more proportion of form, and more active, and less proportion of matter: again rarity and density are degrees of porosity; and every thing is porose; so Angels do contract themselves, by retracting (as I may say) themselves into their pores; neither need we to fear vacuum ergo, in the highest heavens; for there is a calestis aura to prevent it: so also the highest heavens are porose, neither is there any door to open and shut, but God doth that at his pleasure: so also fire can extend and tontract itself, and that because of rarity and so porosity; much more ergo the Angels. And extension and contraction comes from porosity: which will plainly appear in the Elements which are together by apposition; for one is in the pores of an other; and this is that which Kickerman calls a misture; and indeed besides this apposition there is a kind of imperfect misture in them, so that I may call the Earth or any of them a Mere. Potentia is ex actu formae per materiam. I call it rather potentia than Qualitas; because the other is always in act, but this sometimes doth not work. This potentia excitatur ad actionem by passio; and this passio is either amica or inimica: amica is that sympathy which is between consentanies; inimica that antipathy between dissentanies: and these are ex rei alicujus preservationis appetitu. Now from both these comes motus which is either naturalis, or violentus: naturalis ex amicâ passione; violentus ex inimicâ▪ Naturalis is flower at the beginning, and swifter at the end; because 'tis nearer to that which it doth appetere, and so moves faster: and this showeth that there is an appetitio of consentanies, and as I may call it a kind of raptus. Motus violentus is swift at the beginning, and flower at the end; for it makes haste, till it be out of the reach of its enemy, and then it thinks it may go more slowly: and according as agens acts, so doth patience pati: now this patience is ergo debilior, or fortior: if debilior, then resistentia, and as I may say, oppugnatio: if fortior, then also resistentia and patientis fuga.   

Natura est constans, aut inconstans.  
God made all things for his glory; ergo he made some things constant, to show his immutability and constancy: and some inconstant, to show the variety of his wisdom, scilicet that it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all sufficient and infinite. Things ergo constant, not in regard of the Creator, for he can resolve them: but per se in respect of their own nature, and so are not subject to interitus; neither doth it follow that if they had ortus, ergo interitus; for these constant natures never have any privation, ergo no contrariety. Ergo no interitus, so that their matter and form were simul ingenerated, and the one never without the other. Nature is manifold, but made one by method; and here comes in the world as a general affection of nature: and every nature is a member of the world, and so a part thereof: so that the world is not one, as before, by continuity but contiguity: and for the preservation of this world's unity it is that things ascend and descend, rather than from their gravity and levity; for as every thing doth appetere sui ipsius preservationem, so totius conservationem also; and hence they come down and go up, for else the world would be two, for there would be vacuity: so that gravity and levity are not properly causes of ascent and descent: for a heavy thing though it be out of its place and be high, yet 'tis not there heavy by method; and so alight thing though it be in place of an heavy thing, yet it desireth not to ascend to prevent vacuum. It is praeter naturam that a man swimeth on water, and sinketh not.   

Constans, cujus principia congenita in ipsâ primùm.  
The constant natures cannot be resolved; as the highest heavens: because they are to be a perpetual habitation of perpetuals: And these are most strong: hence the Devil is so strong against man if God did not restrain him. Hence they are in Aevum; for though they had a beginning, yet no end: and these have most form, and least matter, and most action in them.   

Constans vel Coelum, aut intelligentia.  
Coelum. It hath least matter of any thing, except Angels; hence is it so extended, and more pure than any of the elements. The Schools call it quinta essentia: and I am content that they should call the highest heavens so: for 'tis not miscible as the Elements are. The Elements are subjugated, for their essence is in every thing, but 'tis cut and so mingled in little parts: then there is a proportion of every one of them; then the forms take hold one of another, and so they are united, and this is the unio alteratorum; for they are but only altered, and a third thing made of them. And this proportion is according to arithmetic proportion. And the highest heaven is most firm, which may be because of its solidity. Coelum is constant because it must contain all the rest, yea the inconstant: Again, it must be constant, as before, because the inhabitants are so.  
Object. It hath no inhabitants?  
Answ. It hath: for there are two deformities in things, first, to be without form; secondly, void: Ergo this must not be void; ergo the Angels are in it. Now these highest heavens have their principia congenita in them: otherwise the matter should be before the form, and so there would be a privatio, and not an habit; and then nature might resolve them, and so they should not be constant. But here may arise Two doubts:  
Object. 1. If these principia be congenita, then how were they before the effect?  
Answ. That which Ramus saith of the form, that simul ingeneratur cum effecto, is true in them: now this is a property of the form; and a property we know is an adjunct to the thing, whereof 'tis a property: and the subject is before the adjunct, ergo, forma before this property, and this property before the effect, and ergo the form is in them before they be effected.  
Object. 2. If these principia be congenita, then why should the Material Cause in Logic be handled before the formal, since here they are both simul?  
Answ. As the form was before the effect, so was their matter before their form, and every effect is motu but in God. So in the Creation of an Angel both matter and form moves together, yet first the matter, and then the form: So first we apprehend the substratum, and then the superstatum: as imagine, in such a point the matter and form gins, and after as the matter runs on, so the form runs along with it: So we may see it more plainly in the generation and corruption of the Elements: for even as the one corrupteth, so presently follows that which is generated: So when I hold both my hands together and move them, they both move, and yet the one moves first: so for the creation of Angels. So that there is a priority, and posteriority, and yet a simul: and nature where it finds them, there it must leave them: and it finds their principia congenita, ergo it cannot resolve them; hence cannot they be divided. Again they must be most valid and strong, that they may prevail over the inconstant natures; as also that they may do the work of the Lord as it should be done. Yet there is resistentia and raptus betwixt them and the inconstant natures. Again, they are actuosissimae, for they must prevail with the inconstant natures: hence they have most form and least matter: hence they are most light, and so have the highest place: Again most subtle and rare, hence is their great extension and little contraction: most subtle; hence their matter most pure and finely spun. Our Divines say the matter of the highest heavens and of the elements is all one, but I would rather call the highest heavens a quintae essentia with Aristotle, for 'tis not commiscible as the Elements are.  
Object. But they have one genus namely nature, ergo the same matter?  
Answ. There is a community of them, but not in their next genus, ergo not in their matter: Coelum or Intelligentiae.] As of the inconstant natures, some have life, and some have not: so likewise of the constant, some live, and some do not. Coelum is first, for 'tis the others place, ergo their subject, which is before the adjunct. This Coelum first consisteth of parts which shine most brightly, for there is neither Sun, Moon, nor Stars, and there must not be darkness: but these parts are, as I may say, perfused with a most excellent light. Which is after a sort resembled unto us in gems and precious stones. These parts are foris, or intus: foris is tectum or solum: tectum est quod tegit omnia & est extimum. Neither is our Saviour Christ's body highest of any thing; for there is this tectum above it. And this must needs be the greatest and best figured, that is, most round; and 'tis in spatio tanquam in loco; yet differing from other things, because 'tis not externally limited by any other thing but only in spatio. Solum is that which is gone upon. Intus is aura coelestis which is most pure and most desaecated from other things.   

Intelligentiae.  
In Divinity they are called Angels of their office and place: and their matter is the fame with the highest heavens: as those creatures which live in the earth have most earth in them, and those that are in the water, air, or fire, have most water, air, and fire. And the Angels have least matter, and most form of any: hence are they most subtle: hence in their greatest condensation so fine, that we cannot see them. And these have reason whereby they see most accutely all other things; for they are made for God and man's use. They have Will also, for where there is Reason, there must be Will. And thirdly, they have local motion; which is by extension as the Sun beams. And in the good Angels there is no superiority and inferiority: but in the evil, Beelzebub is said to be the chief: which is but only the opposing of him to Christ of Bagnal Zebub. They are most active of any thing, having most form and least matter of any thing: and they are cum ratione & voluntate, active, because they have the greatest charge of any creature: cum ratione, that they may do wisely; cum voluntate, that they may do it cheerful: and so they are said to do the Will of God speedily, willingly, and wittingly. They have least matter: hence can they so extend it; and hence they are so subtle. Again they are most active per materiam: hence most swift in motion: which motion is by extension, and so by this celerity contracted again. Some Philosophers hold, That the Angels move the heavens; and their reason is, because their motion is so wonderful. But so they may say, the Angels move a Plant, because it brings forth an apple which is so wounderful. Now these Angels having so subtle matter; hence in their greatest condensation, they are far beyond the edge of our eye to see them: hence are they called spiritual from their subtlety. And as the highest heavens are Olympus, i. e. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, most shining, so are the Angels: Olympus was a very high hill, and there was thundering and lightning in the top of it: now they thought it was above the clouds, and so the Sun made it so bright. Again, the Angels are so strong: hence 'tis that the enemy can break down trees and houses, and cast down steeples: so the Soul of man is swift, and is not as some think in one part principally, but in every part of man: and according as the body increaseth, so doth it extend itself. Hence also an Angel being so strong, can carry a man, as he did Philip. The Angels do understand a thing as we do mediately; else they should do it by a miracle, for they cannot see God's idea but when he pleaseth: and God hath genised every thing, ergo they must analyse it, and that by the same Logic that we do: yea, and they do labour and observe by induction of singulars as we do. And they can see and hear; so they attend in the Church at Sermons: and so Paul meaneth in the Corinthians, when he saith, We should use decency for offending the good Angels: for so he meaneth it: neither can do be understood of the Ministers, for he did not need to speak it of himself. Again, did not the Serpent speak to man and woman in the garden? Yes: but that was with a Serpent's tongue. Yea but with that he would not speak.   

Inconstans natura is elementum elementatum.  
Elementum est ex prae existente or rather praesubsistente materiâ. Hence comes generatio & corruptio; for the constant natures have only an ortus, but not an interitus, because their principia were congenita: but these inconstant natures have both generation & corruption, and hence are they called inconstant. And here because the matter was before the form; hence it may be resolveable again: hence 'tis that the constant natures do prevail with the inconstant, when there is a fight betwixt them. Generatio est novae formae acquisitio. Corruptio est veteris formae amissio. In these inconstant natures the matter was before the form; hence was there in them a privatio: Yet the matter was capable of a form hence the form being once ingenerated must still continue in the matter. For alteratio qualitatum, we heard of it before; for 'tis also general to the Angels. Now because the matter was subsistent without the form; hence it may be separated from the matter: Yet because simul ingeneratur cum re ipsâ; hence it cannot be separated ex toto, but ex parte tantum. So that here the form doth as it were rise upon the back of the matter. And as there is never in nature a formale without a materiale, so by consequence there is never a materiale without a formale: and the matter is put without the form as it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Schools rightly teach.  
Elementum aut elementatum. I choose these terms rather than any other, because I would show the course & order that nature observes in her working. Elementum est natura inconstans, quod ex materiali principio immediate oritur: For elementarium, or that which is made of the elements is ex materiali principio, but mediately and at the second hand: even as method in Logic disposeth arguments at the second hand, as they make axioms. First for the names, Elementum, some say 'tis quasi alimentum, because our nourishment is from them: and true 'tis, that that whereof we are made, by the same we are nourished: but here it signifieth that which is lowest and most simple next to the materiale principium. Now 'tis natura because orta principiis: yet inconstans, because the matter was before the form. Immediatè. Because it was made immediately of the first matter: hence no other thing was immediately of the first matter: hence all the secundum materiale must needs be in the four Elements, otherwise it should not be perfect: again, this was not a good definition. Again, because 'tis immediatè: hence there is nothing mistus, but is mistus immediatè ex elementis: so our nourishment before it doth nourish us in the liver, is turned into the four humours, whereof every one hath some element predominating in it, and so is turned into the elements again. No other thing is immediatè ex principio materiali, so that the four elements must needs take it up all: hence again the elements are most simple of inconstant natures, ergo they must have one common matter, and every one his peculiar form. Now from this community of matter hence they are opposite one to another, because they may be in one subject (but natura constans and inconstans have not one common subject) and that rule of opposites doth evidently demonstrate that there is a primum materiale principium, because the elements are opposite by reason of that common matter: for the form is in the matter as the adjunct in the subject: hence 'tis that substances are as well contraries as accidents, for a quality can but alter a quality, not a substance. Again, because 'tis immediately ex materiali principio, hence there is no misture but only a putting together of the materialia and formalia principia: and here in the elements there is such a proportion of matter and form, that other qualities beside those before do arise: even from the portion of the matter and form there is greater action and less passion, or contra: hence also because we know not their forms, we are fain to distribute them from their qualities, hence these are the prima materialia. Neither could there be a misture without many formalia: now the elements are most simple: hence the elements have fewer qualities, than the elementaria have, because their composition are most simple, and so not having so many forms to act neither such a composite matter to pati and reagere: Hence having few qualities they are so soon corrupted: so fire will soon corrupt the air: hence is also the easy transmutation of the elements, which made Keckerman think the elements were imperfecta: but they are perfecta, though they be sooner corrupted than mista. Now in the elements themselves there is so much sooner corruption by how many fewer qualities there are betwixt them: so fire cannot turn water into itself, but by the means of the air, that is first expelling the cold which is contrary, and then driving out the moisture, which showeth that there is air in it.   

Elementum est calidum aut frigidum.  
This distribution into calor and frigus, takes the elements in order, and here in there is contrariety: and these qualities are firstly in the elements; for the constant natures are not hot nor cold; because they having such abundance of form and so little matter, hence the matter cannot resist and pati the forms act. Calor is when the form hath such a portion of matter that it can actupon it, and the matter pati and reagere, yet not so as it taketh away the forms act, but maketh it rather the greater: and hence est calor: for because the form of fire is more active than the form of air, hence 'tis most hot. Cold is contra. So that I may say, Elementum is when the form acteth upon the matter: Calidum is the strong act of the form upon the matter: Frigidum is the weak act of the form upon the matter: So fire is hot and dry: hot because of the strong act of the form upon the matter; dry, because this heat acted by the form driveth out the moisture: So we see when fire doth heat any thing it expels the moisture and so leaves it dry. So the fire causeth heat in itself, and outwardly also when it is condensated: so in— its parts are united and ergo it will burn which showeth it must needs be hot: and from this heat followeth the quality of brightness; which is chief in the fire for that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The lowest element is most opacum; the middle elements are indifferent, inclining to light because of the fire and to opacity by reason of the lowest element. Some say rarity is caused by heat, and so they say the fire doth rarify. But it doth as well condensate. Indeed the fire by reason of the forms act on the matter is more subtle than the other elements; and hence will more easily enter into the pores of them and so raraifie them. But put leather into the fire and it will condensate that and make it shrink by reason of the moisture in it; and so the earth is left dry. So it rarefies the air in getting into the pores of it, and drives away its form, and so makes it (by extending it) the more subtle, and carrieth it with it. So in a gun, the fire's form acting upon the matter cannot be kept in such a little room: ergo it bursts out of the gun and breaks the air. So air is very subtle in its parts and will enter into the very pores of the thing and by reason of its moisture and heat will make a thing swell, and so rarefies it and makes it occupy a greater place. Water we say being rare becomes air and air being dense becomes water: the form of the one getting uper hand, than the form of the other contracts itself and so become condensate; as the other form extends itself and so becomes rare, not that it becomes rare, but that by the act of the form 'tis made to occupy a greater place. Heat is common to both fire and air; but fire is first, because 'tis more formal and less material for the same portion of the matter takes a greater place hath a more active form and here ergo the matter doth less reagere and the body of the fire may be bigger than the body of the earth but not in proportion, so a pottle of fire is more than a pint of earth. Calidus is that in which there is more formale than materiale: ignis is that which hath most materiale & least formale in constant natures: hence 'tis the highest of all other elements and there keeps the highest place. Yet I cannot say 'tis merely light, for the highest heavens are above it ergo lighter than it, also 'tis of a most equal temper and light yet so as not burning but per accidens. Neither did Cardane need to think that the heavens should burn up, if there was that element of fire, for it doth urere and comburere only per accidens; as 'tis condensated for the higest heavens it cannot burn, for the parts cannot burn, for the parts cannot be separated, because they are congenita. Again the highest heavens are most subtle and solid ergo will not burn: but in carbone the fire is apparent, for 'tis condensated, and because of its subtlety 'tis not per se seeable, but only in materiae crassity. So we see in our fire that when our shins are burnt fire comes unto them, for t●s not air, as some think for why then should we not roast meat in the air? And yet the fire coming to our shins is not seeable though feelable, ergo much less seeable in its own element; yet it will appear in a glass being held at our shins; so in a glass window being gathered together and beams sent down by the sun and in hot countries where the beams come down perpendicularly they make a great heat. Some think these beams are not real but be sent down by the sun, and beget lumen in the air, but than what becomes of that lumen when the sun goes down: but gather the sun beams into a glass and they will burn, ergo they are fire; again air will not burn, ergo it is not it. The fire is that where the form doth most extend the matter of all inconstant natures and so is most moist hot & dry. The air is that which is most and hot; here the form is not altogether so active and ergo the matter is not so extended; again here the act being less, hence 'tis not so hot as the fire, neither is the matter, ergo so acted upon, and ergo is neither so dry as the fire: again 'tis most moist for the form cannot dry it because of the heat in it, and hence 'tis most diffuse, and ergo most moist and most moistening; hence 'tis that air will so replere any thing that there be no vacuum.  
Frigidum is water or earth: cold is in both these by reason their forms are not so active, and their matter is more abundant and more—, and this appears in divers extending of the same matter having divers forms. So if the same matter have the form of water it will be cold; if of air it will be moist; if of fire it will be hot: ergo these qualities are from the greater and lesser act of the form. These elements are cold because they have more matter or less form. So they say the Moon is cold, because she takes up vapours and yet not able to take them up to the fire leaves them and they become cold. so put lukewarm water to scalding water and it will be more cold; because it dulleth the forms act of the scalding water. Now in the elements there is one common matter to them all: now that one is more subtle and another more dense; 'tis from the forms act upon the matter; neither the forms act alone nor the mats alone: but both together cause these qualities; which indeed are rather acts than qualities So the fire doth act continually. Now as the form doth act inwardly upon the matter; so we say 'tis habitual: as it is acted by them both outwardly and so more sensibly, so we call it an act. So the vegetative foul doth continually vegetate. And in these I say there is more matter & less form: hence the form is clogged with the matter that it cannot act, and so 'tis dull; as a beetle against a wool sack. Frigidum where there is more matter than form; that is, the proportion of the matter is greater than the proportion of the form. Hence 'tis probable that the first matter was equally divided into four elements, and that one had at the first as much as an other, but afterwards according as the form did extend or contract them; so came one to be greater than the other, aut contra. But here it may be Objected, Is the water greater than the earth? or was it as great as the earth? Yes, the water was greater than the earth for quantity: so at Noe's flood we read how high it was above the highest hills: again we know it overflowed the whole earth, though God now for the preservation of his creatures, which were to live upon the earth, hath divided the waters, and hath placed some of them above in the firmament, and some of them below on the earth; and but for the waters in hollow places in the earth, the diameter of the earth would be a great deal less. And that the hills are so many cisterns to hold water 'tis plain, because water comes out of hills, and the earth is full of water, so the river Niger runneth under the earth; so the river Aesopus runneth under the mediterrane sea; so that though some object, that the sea is but in some parts some 2 miles deep, yet there are many waters under the earth. Frigidum est aqua et terra. Water first, where there is more matter & less form, but not in proportion with the earth. Hence because of the abundance of their matter these elements are seeable: the other elements being hot are not seeable, and that with great reason, namely that we might more perfectly and more clearly see the things that move in them which we could not have done so well had they been seeable: as in water we cannot so perfectly see fish. Water is most cold and moist by reason of the forms act being more active than the form of earth. But how then is it most cold? Because, though the form act more than the form of earth, yet the matter doth so strongly reagere, that 'tis more sensibly cold because of the greater action and passion; even as when a ball or a stone is cast forcibly unto me, if I meet it with my hand it doth more sensibly agere, than if I take it gent lie in my hand. 'Tis also moist, because it being exceedingly cold is also moist, and moisture causeth softness; so that softness is a quality arising from moisture and is properly of the air and secondly of the water. The earth is most dry: because the form of it is so little active, cannot extend it ergo to make it fluid, and so it makes it dry. Fire is more fluid than the earth but not so dry: air having heat which doth extend, moisture makes it most moist but not dry. Again 'tis cold but not actually as water, because the form doth not act so much upon it, as the form of water upon water. Again hence the earth is most solid and least porous of any of the elements. Again the earth is most dark and opake of all the elements; the air and water are capable of light and opacity: because the creatures that live in them, have a sensible life, and should have light and darkness night and day. Thus much of the elements simply considered as they are elements: now there is not only an apposition of them, but a kind of imperfect misture; for they cannot give sapor and such other qualities as they have, but as they are mista: Ergo we shall hear of them again in the meteors, as also of the regions of the air, and of mare, and of other rivers which are meteors.   

Elementarium.  
Elementare est quod ex elementis est. Ergo for its matter 'tis made immediately of the materiale principium: and for the form of it, 'tis made proximè ex formis elementorum.  
Obj. But then the forms of things should be composed?  
Answ. So they are: even as the body is composed of many parts, which are composed of many similar parts, which contain both matter and form. Again, Mistio est miscibilium alteratorum unio. Ergo 'tis mistio that makes a thing unum: then must the forms be mista, and so composite, for that makes the thing unum. Now for those that say the forms of things are from the influences, I would ask them, What it is that unites the matter and form together: for in Logic we know there is nothing betwixt the matter and the form? Some say that spirit is the vinculum of the soul and body: yea, but the soul is not the form: and again, what shall unite them in a stone where there is no such spirit? Object. 2. Some deny the forms of the elements to be in the mist: But if they be not; how do they return into the elements again: and again 'tis granted by all that the qualities are there, ergo their forms must be there: and the elements are actu in the mist; yea, and are agents there as we shall hear hereafter in mistione. Now the greatest objection I find against this, is this; say they, How can things without life cause things to live? There may be a vivens of them, because anima vegetiva, and sensitiva are nourished by nutriment: for spiritus vitalis is the vegetative soul, which is nourished by humidum radical, and hath air predominating in it; and spirit us animalis is that sensitive soul which is nourished by moisture and heat, and hath fire predominating in it: and the common people do use to say that these do vanescere in auras: and the spiritus animalis is made of the vital spirit, and the vital spirit is made of a natural spirit which ariseth from the meat which we eat: ergo if these can nourish and keep life, they can also cause life. If they shall say the vital spirit is not made of the natural, than it must be made of nothing, and so should be eternal in nature. Keckerman saith, the elements are corpora incompleta; which is most false, for they should not exist but in composites; but they do in themselves, for they are effects. I rather choose this word elementarium than mistum, because mistum is but an adjunct to it. Elementarium est quod est ex elementis; and so the first matter, but at the second hand: and hence it appears that the elements go into the mistum. But the greatest Objection that ever I met with concerning this, is that, How can things which have not life, cause life? Yes: For life is but an act, and a composite act: Again, life is preserved and maintained by the elements, ergo may be caused by them; so the animal spirits are made of the vital, and the vital of the elements, not only as they are acts, but also as they are membra, for there is no other soul in Plants and Beasts, for they are next to the reasonable soul. Now if they shall say these spirits vital and animal be not made of the elements, but of some other thing, I would ask them, Of what, of the spirits which are in the meat? Then the forms of Plants and Beasts must be made of the forms of Herbs, and of such things as they feed on. if they will say, they be made of the influences; they are then either accidents, which cannot be forms, or substances: if substances, than they should be portions of the matter and form of the Stars, and then the stars should not remain the same thing. Mistio, they say is alteratorum unio; so that in the framing of the forms of things there must be an alteration and another form distinct from any of these forms from whence it did arise: even as in a Chest made of boards, I cannot in propriety of speech call them boards, but a Chest made of these boards: So in the things that are missed I cannot say, the elements forms are their forms, but 'tis a mist form composed of the elements which are incomplete in the mist. So that true 'tis there is an alteration, but a generation also; though generation will not serve the turn, because there is not a corruption of the elements, which make the things: neither indeed do generation and corruption go always together, for when a chicken is made of an egg, there is not a corruption but a perfecting of the egg, neither is there acquisitio novae formae, but veteris perfectio. And the elements are members of the elementaries: but a part of fire is not a membrum of fire, but part of the matter and form of fire. Now here is the chief question, How these are in the mist. First of all, the elements by the mutual action and passion of their matter and form are holden together, and make one simple thing: and now these have one common matter, but distinct forms, and so are opposite, which will ergo fight together, and one fly the other, except there be something to hold them together: hence it appears there must be more things than one in a mist. Now contraries will soon destroy one another, except they have some stickler, as I suppose air comes to earth and makes it clammy; then the water comes to temperate earth's dryness, that it cannot overcome the airs moisture; then the fire comes to water to maintain airs heat: so that there is a discors concordia and a concors discordia; and then all the forms must so act as one doth not dominare over another, as 'tis in things imperfectly mixed, which do not ergo long continue: so that the forms act must here needs be abated. Again the matter is but one, ergo it is nature's care to keep every little particle of the matter with its form there temperately acting. And being so close and so divided, hence 'tis that they are far beyond the acies of our eyes to see them; which is plain in natural things; and so in artificial things, we see sometimes  made of wool of so many colours, which are so finely mingled in the cloth that we can hardly distinguish all the colours. And these parts in the mist are so diminute, that indeed they come next to penetratio corporum. Elementarium est proximè ex elementis. For we find that they are resolved into the elements; ergo made of them: again they are nourished by the elements, ergo made of them; both for matter and form. Which is thus proved, for they are both in mistress, and of the matter is not made form, nor of the form matter: again, those things which have life, their life is maintained by the elements; and if it be a good reasoning to say, the body is nourished by the elements, ergo made of them, 'tis as good to prove the form to be made of their forms also: again, natural, vital, and animal spirits are the souls of Plants and Beasts, and are made of the elements; the natural are made in the liver, the vital in the heart, and the animal in the head; and if animal be an univocum genus to homo and brutum, it must be all in them, and the same in them both, for univocum is idemre and ratione.  
Mistio is more than alteratio; and yet we cannot call it generatio, because there is not corruptio which is veteris formae amissio: but both matter and form are turned into the elements, and for the matter they have one common matter, and they have a camposite form arising from the forms of elements an it still remaineth in the same part of the matter that it was in the simple. Now in the mist the forms must subigere, which is by action and passion, so that there are contraries in every mist: and in mists there must not be a proportion of the elements in quantity but in act. Consider ergo in every mistion 1. that there be a proportion of the elements according to act, 2. that these parts are so imminute and almost indivisible that they cannot be seen; though all the parts in the mist are not equally minute: for the more formal elements as they are more subtle in themselves so also more minute in the mist. And good reason 'tis that these should be so because these must act and subdue one another: so to earth which is the— as it were, comes to air, and there exceeding drought and exceeding moisture fight together, and the air doth as it were rarify the earth; now these two being contraries will soon destroy one another if there be not a stickler to take up the controversy betwixt them, scilicet water, as before, and to it fire; and so these make a knot of good fellows. Now these parts thus fastened one upon another, according as they hold together such shall be the continuance of the mist. And these acts of the forms of these minute parts may be compared to so many pins or nails which hold things together: as in the mist we see that fire cannot get out because 'tis nailed in by water, nor air for 'tis pinned in by earth. Now for that question how the forms become one since it remains in the same matter, wherein it was before. 'tis made one by the mutual act and catching hold one part of another, and so in them makes one form. And according to the qualities of their acts shall the continuance of the mist be; as when we see two men of equal strength wrestle together, they will struggle together a great while before either of them fall: so in the elements. from this mistion comes temperature, as we may see in hot water being but indifferently warm is neither so cold as to cool, nor so hot as to burn. Temperamentum is the respect or reference of these qualities in the mist; for the forms of the elements remaining in the mist and acting there must needs have qualities to proceed from them. Yet these acts of the elements in the mist, are not in eodem gradu in the mist that they are in the elements: for they are restrained one by another neither all mista in that proportion that one should answer another exactly, for then there could be but one kind of misture. Temperametum est ad pondus vel adjustitiam. For that ad pondus there can be no such found in the world, for this would never corrupt temperamentum where there is excess of one quality or two; of one quality is simple, which is calidum, where the hot elements exceed the cold; or frigidum, where the cold elements exceed the hot; of two qualities is composite, but these 2 qualities must not be contraries, for they would destroy one another, but they must be more remiss and from the exceeding act not in extremity of these qualities, as in pepper, ginger, etc. have the things their denomination. Now there cannot be a temperature wherein three do exceed; for then the fourth would be destroyed. And here we see there are nine temperatures: first that ad pondus, of which sort indeed, as before, there is none to be found, yet we do imagine it for the better understanding of the rest; then that wherein one only quality exceeds, and that's of 4 sorts; or that wherein 2 qualities exceed which is of 4 sorts also: Now these temperaments have their degrees which though there be infinite of them yet four only observed. As in grammar from the letters arise varieties of sillabls and so words; so from the temperament in nature arise so many similars: for these temperaments are firstly of similars, ergo the similars being many have not the same temperature with the whole, sor first 'tis of the fimiliars, then of the organical, and lastly of the whole. Now there is also temperature of one thing in regard of another, as of a man with a Lion we say the one is hot or cold in respect of the other; for because mistum attends elementarium, according to the variety of the composition divers qualities arise. Now in things composed of similar parts only, as worms eels, they ergo having their life alike in every part, hence they live after they be cut, and they have the like temperament: but these things that have organical parts, when they are cut in pieces, their parts will not live; for the life hath one principal seat and is not in every part alike. Now in comparing the temperature of things together if one exceed the other above the common rate we call it a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 otherwise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 under 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is putrido rottenness, when the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is in heat and moisture where the heat is only able to set it up and make it rotten, and so nature is dissolved and this is general to the elementaries, and to the air and water so far forth as they be mingled with vapours; so we say in sickness-time the air is infected. Now temperature ad pondus proves another reason: because in nature it would be fit for no office, as not to cool because heat is equal to it, not to dry because moisture will hinder it or contra. There must be inequal proportions of the elements, and consequently more temperaments, because things are made to diverss ends, so that ergo they must have elements predominating in them whereby they may be fitted to such and such ends. secondly Temperament must be unequal, because they must be mutable, and there must be dissolution. Ergo the temperature must be unequal and one element too strong for an other. And these predominating elements do so much destroy themselves to our sense as they do by our act, though they do to our sense also, as I can taste ginger and find it hot. Where one only doth predominate 'tis either heat, cold, moisture, or drith: for as before according to that for which the thing was made such elements shall it have predominating in it for the attainig of that end: so we say the heart is naturally hot, for to turn the chylus into chymum, so the brain cold per se but accidentally hot, which heat is brought from the heart to it by the vital spirits: so that according to things ends so must they be made, as bones have drith in them predominating, because they are the foundation of the body, even as the earth is the foundation of the world. So again we say the four humours caused in the liver are fluid, and ergo have air predominating in them, because 'tis their office to run up and down to nourish every part: and for the humours first our meat and nutriment comes to our stomach and there is turned into chylus, and hence it comes into the liver and is turned into chymum, and the humours are made of the succus of this nutriment in the liver; and of these humours is made semen and that part of the semen which hath most drith in it makes a bone, which is a similar part, and so of the rest. Now in some things there are two qualities predominating in respect of a double use of the thing: and these predominting qualities must evermore be disparates, not contraries, for than they would destroy one another. Now man of all things comes nearest to the temperament ad pondus and ergo he is most sure to mark others temperature being compared with man's temperature. Crasis and temperamentum are all one. But now the degrees of temperature are not infinite, but they distinguish them into four only: and where any element is predominate above these degrees there is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in living creatues is called morbus, which Adam was not subject unto, and yet had the art of medicina, ergo morbus is not the object of medicina; hence is putredo, now putredo and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differ in that, one quantity must drive out another so as that there be a dissolution; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be without any dissolution: again the common philosophers make putredo only, where moister predominates: and thirdly putredo is where only external qualities uniting with internal do make a dissolution, as by external heat united with internal heat do make a dissolution, as by external heat united which internal heat water is expelled; and so in wood the heat and the moisture that hold it together being taken away by the fire falls into ashes. And by reason of this putredo things come to stink, which we call faetor: yet where this putredo is but in any degree (for there be degrees of it) there it doth not stink So moisture external will putrify as wood in water, which we call martor, for we have no proper word: so drith will cause putrefaction; so wood will rot, which we call caries: so will cold also putrify by quenching heat: so rust is a kind of putrefaction, which caused by external moisture united with internal and so makes things, as it were ' sweat and becomes rusty. And these are the effects of putredo, and these are general, etc. The rest is wanting.    

ETHICAL NOTES.  
DIvinity is the rule to make a man happy: And this man in his life hath a double respect: First, As he is a man alone: Secondly, As he is sociate; and sociate is either in a Family, or in a Commonwealth. Hence must the distinction of the proles of Theologie go accordingly; and all these must tend to happiness: now these are proles of Theologie arising from the second part thereof; namely, from the second table of the law, which by reason of man's Fall is almost dashed out of him: yet there is so much left in him as is able to show him that he was made able to please God, and secondly, to live well. So that this work of being a good Divine is wrought in man from several causes, for the sanctified man because be hath Faith, he keepeth the rules of Ethics, Economics, and Politics by the spirit of Sanctification: but the only civil man which wanteth Faith, doth therefore fail in a Divine, and so all is spoiled; yet he keepeth the rule of Ethics by the spirit of restraint, which spirit keepeth him from those enormous sins which otherwise he would have committed. For we are to imagine every one of us by nature committing all kind of sins, in that measure as he which is the most sinful committeth the greatest sins that he is given unto. So that no man is at liberty in this kind to do so much as one civil act without the spirit of restraint, and therefore much less an action of Faith.  

Ethica est ars bene gerendise.  
Ethica is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mos, custom or manner: it is more frequent in the plural number 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 manners; and hence were the Gentiles called Ethnici, because they were otherwise mannered than the Israelites, which were the Children of God: its arse because it consists of precepts most true, just, wise, etc. yea, and in very deed before the Fall this act of Ethics was the very rule of Divinity: Bene gerendi se: so that it is the rule of the good carriage of a man's self; and here by se I mean vir bonus. Gero properly is to carry himself, ergo not to ride, but to go on foot: i. e. so to carry himself as no man can justly except against him.   

Vir bonus est qui bonis instruitur.  
Because we cannot give a perfect definition of this art, ergo we are fain to bring the subject of the art into the definition thereof, and so need not to defineit any more: notwithstanding if we please we may thus define it from the notation; Vir bonus est qui bonis instruitur. So that this teacheth him how he may be an honest man, namely, if he hath this bonum, both internum and externum.   

Bonum est quod est appetendum, Or, appetibile ad bene se gerundum.  
This bonum here is that which Tully calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & honestum. Quod est appetendum, or appetibile: I give it no genus because as all other acts have their genera generalissima, so here bonum is the genus summum: I say appetibile because it is the nature of bonum to be desired, for it is the subject of the Will, and ergo the affection of Love it doth desire it. Now that this bonum must contain all both inward and outward bona, I prove it thus: Quicquid requiritur ad bene gerendum se is here meant, but both bona corporis & animî are required ad bene se gerendum, ergo both are necessary.  
Bonum produceth these two qualities, gràtia & authoritas.   

Gratia est quâ apud homines plurimum vales.  
And this is that which causeth good estimation among men.   

Authoritas est quâ apud homines plurimum potes.  
For he that will be a good Ethician must not only be an honest man, but such an one as hath those things which do attend bonum both corporis et animi: now as I said before this gratia maketh good estimimation among men; and from this ariseth authoritas, whereby he can do much with men.   

Bonum est viri totius aut partis.  
Because as there must be internal virtues for the beginning of any act, so there must be external bona for the performance thereof. So Adam at the beginning had not only all things made fit for him, but also Lordship over them. Which Lordship containeth both favour and authority: Thus did the Philosopher's account bona to be viritotius aut partis.  
Bonum totius hominis est quod externè advenit, seu confert ad bene se gerendum.  
And this is Libertas  
And this is Facultates.   

Libertas est quâ expeditè seu liberè te bene geras.  
But this a servant cannot do, and ergo Aristotle requireth in his Ethics that he that would be a good Artist in this kind should be a freeman and one that is suijuris. And so we see in common experience that those which are not free cannot do as they would.  
Object. But cannot a servant be a good Artist in this kind?  
Answ Now indeed not as he is a servant and ergo if Adam had stood we should not have had any servants for there had been no need of them but every man in his own place should have performed his own duties. Again one may be a servant to such a master as will permit him no opportunity for good exercises, but otherwise as this bondage came in by sin and is a slave thereof so he that is so tied cannot been se gerere.   

Facultates sunt quibus te geras.  
And of this sort are riches. Friends and the like; and these are also necessary to a good man: because many being free from servitude yet for want of these they cannot do their will, ergo we see Adam at the beginning had not only liberty but an help meet for him.  
Object But cannot a man bene se gerere without a wife?  
Answ. Not unless he have other friends instead of a wife. And thus we see also by experience, especially in Scholars, which notwithstanding being very desirious of company, yet for want of books or company to confer with all or some such like thing oftentimes come short of their desires. So that wesee these outward things are of a good use for the car rage of a man's self. But here Question may be made,  
Are riches good, seeing the Stoics thought them not so, and most now a-dayes say they are indifferent and good according as they are used?  
Answ. The common answer to this is that they are good according as they are used. But I am not of that mind, for that they are per se and simpliciter good, as the Scripture testifies. as also because they were made for a good end, whereas if they were indifferent they should have been made for an evil end: again they are the gift of God and therefore they are good per se and in their own nature, though Astriotle seemeth to make them indifferent, arguing that if they should be simply good, than they should make the man good. But this is a fallacy, for the default that they are not good is not in the riches but in the want of other things which should conduce ad bene se gerendum. And it is as if he should argue thus, He that hath invention only without judgement is not a good Logician ergo this invention is not good, which is an inconsequence.  
Facultates are Divitiae. Opens.   

Divitiae sunt quibus per se bene seu commodè te geras. Opens sunt quibus per alios bene te geras.  
For divitiae are a man's own proper substance; and they draw opes which are the use of an other man's good: and this is the difference of them. Hence the Poet saith, Aspicis, ut veniunt ad candida tecta columbae? But may not a poor man been se gerere?  
Answ. No he cannot perform this action of morality after such a sort as he which hath facultates. Yet that a man may bene se gerere I do not require abundance of riches, but only so much as is requisite for this end. Notwithstanding a poor man may be a good divine, because the Lord doth not exact at any man's hands more than that which he gave him. But Adam he had all things; and such a man Ethics look at. Now for Opens, for Adam was not absolute having all the creatures till he had a wife also, and ergo a man's parents brethren and friends do conduce ad bene se gerendum, parents for his bringing up and friends to help him in his place and calling.   

Bonum partis est quod inhaeret aut internè conducit ad bene te gerendmu.  
And as the other was extrinsecè agens, so this is intrinsecè agens. And this also we may see in Adam, who was endued with strength of body and comely aspect, The heathen Philosophers have stumbled at these things in making felicity to consist in riches honour and the like: yet Aristotle thought they did only conduce unto happiness, thouhg he was deceived with the same fallacy he was before.  
Partis is Corporis, aut Animi.  
Because bonum is externum aut internum.   

Bonum corporis est quod est innatum or connatum corpori.  
For it is not acquisitum as bona animi are.  
Object. But these bona corporis are natural, ergo how are they required ad bene te gerendum?  
Answ. We have them to some end and therefore to manage the carraige of ourselves, ergo the Poet saith, Gratior est virtus veniens a corpore pulchro.  
This stands in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
This stands in aspectu grato.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est quâ validè te geras.  
And validity lieth in the body: and he that will perform any virtue as justice wisdom or the like must have this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so that if a man be sick lame or deformed or have no constitution of body, that action, whatsoever it be, looseth his grace, and is ridiculous in respect of him that performeth it. I remember Socrates found fault with the games of Olympia, because there the body was only exercised and the virtues thereof and not the virtues of the mind; and so he said an Ox or Lion might be practised. But he was deceived; for the case is not equal, for the bona corporis in man are ad bene se gerendum whereas there is no such thing meant in the strength of an Ox or Lyon.   

Aspectus gratus est quo decenter te geras et 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
So that this addeth decus to the action: and we see by continual experience, that where men are not much known, therefore the comely aspect of one man is much preferred before another: and ergo though a man had all the bona that went before and wanted this he would but be a mocking stock. So that as a precious jewel should be placed in a precious matter and not in dust, so should virtue in a comely man. Euexia is more general than sanitas and tells us that all the members of a man's body do concur to th●s good action. Pulchritudo is properly that good colour that is of a good crasis and belongeth to a woman and ergo is more special than aspectus gratus.   

Bonum animi est bonum quod facultatem animi perfecit, eodemque sensu virtus diciter,  
I say quod facultatem animi perfecit. perfectio and bonum are all one; for than we say a thing is bonum when it is perfectum. God hath endued man's soul with faculties, which when they can act readily then they are called bona and habits. perfecit. because these faculties of understanding and will are not perfected till they can work readily, and then they have their perfection: so that look what faculties of the soul have such readiness of act they have their perfection, and they are called bona animi.   

Aemulatio est quâ alterius exemplo excitamer ad bonum.  
Virtus animi hath her stirrer up to that which is good, and in her course her spur, and limits, and carriers. For a man that is expert in the eupraxie of any quality is stirred up by some of these, so that this aemulatio is not a virtue of itself but is a provoker of bunus Ethicus unto virtue. Quâ excitamur or excitaris. Because every man at the beginning was made for an eupraxie for God; and in the fall though he were no way able to perform it; yet there remain such relics as to leave him without excuse, and so stir him up to good by others example, and amongst the rest this is one provoker and indeed the first of them. Alterius exemplo this is the cause that provoketh us to bonum; not envying the good examples of others, but grieving that we cannot excel them. Ergo, this ariseth from a kind of ambition: but it is good not desiring the evil, or the staying of him, but his going on.   

Calcar est quo currens excitatur ad bonum persequendum.  
Now as we have heard, that there is an impetus or first setting on to begin, so there is a spur in cursu to set him on to go lustily forward.  
Calcar est mediocre aut ingens.  
Mediocre est quod mediocritèr incitat.  
It is from the notation: and if calcar in genere be quod incitat, then calcar mediocre est quod mediocritèr incitat.  
Mediocre est Laus.  
Mediocre est Fama.   

Laus est mediocre calcar à paucioribus propter mediocrem viriutem additum & subditum.  
First, We do not give laus to any one till we see he do something of the act, and so it differeth from emulation. I say mediocre calcar; because this spur doth not gag so deep as ingens calcar doth. Propter mediocrem virtutem. For laus is of that virtue which is not yet come to perfection, but is a degree unto it. Apaucioribus; because it not yet being perfect, is not known so well as that of fama is.   

Fama est calcar mediocre quod plurium ore versatur.  
Now when virtue is but mean, and so not known to many, we give laus unto it: if it be known of many, than it hath fama given unto it. And this is the difference betwixt laus and Fama.  
Calcar ingens est quando virtus venerit ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Calcar ingens est Honor.  
Calcar ingens est Gloria.   

Honour est quo virtus perfecta honoratur.  
I say quo virtus perfecta honoratur: because here the act is come to its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or perfection. So we see in Arts and Trades, that we do not give honour to any Art till the man be his Trades or Arts-master. Now gloria is the highest spur, and differeth from honour, in that it is more general than honour, even as fama is more general than laus.  
Cancelli aut carceres sunt quibus virtue intra suos limites coercetur aut continetur.  
Cancelli sunt Pudor.  
Cancelli sunt Paenitentia.  
So that whilst these two are in man, they are as bridles to keep us from evil, and to do good.   

Pudor est quo à transiliendis limitibus coercetur.  
Now I say so because pudor is a shamefac'tness to commit evil, and to omit good, and that always before the act; whereas verecundia is that blushing after act, and that is natural, and is but in some men, not in all; and therefore it belongeth not to moral Philosophy: So that a man should be shameful lest he do evil: and ergo, Aristotle faith in his Politics, That he is not a man that will not be shameful: and yet in his Ethics he saith that pudor and poenitentia are not beseeming a good man, because he must do nothing that he must be ashamed of, or grieved for: But admit this were true, yet he granteth that a young man may be ashamed and often play the slip: but indeed there is no man, though he be a perfect good man, but he shall need these to keep him to good, and from committing of evil, and if he had them not, he were not vir bonus. Now Aristotle meaneth that a good man should not have them actually after that evil is committed, but only poenitentia: but take them as bridles before the act of evil to keep him from committing of evil; and so they are requisites to a good man.   

Poenitentia est quâ à virtute omittendà & vitio committendo deterremur.  
Some think that poenitentia doth not belong to Ethics: but it doth as it is thus taught, and thus may the more civil man have it.  
Object. But a good man ought to do nothing whereof he should be ashamad?  
Answ. True: but if virtus be sensim acquisita, then there are many degrees to the perfection of it, and so may there be many slips, which we must be ware of, and ergo, must have this to keep us from evil.  
Virtus est Intellectûs: Voluntatîs.  
If God hath endued man's soul with these two faculties of Understanding and Will, than also the bona of this soul must be distributed accordingly, and so be bona intellectûs, or voluntatis: at; Ergo. Now when these faculties do act readily, than we say they have their perfection.   

Virtus intellectûs est quâ facultatem intellectûs perficit.  
Even as virtus in general was before, so is this in special described unto us.  
Quâ rem agendam perspicit Intelligentia. Sapientia.  
Here now beginneth the doctrine of Intellectual Virtues, the first whereof are these:   

Intelligentia est quae principia rei agendae perspicit.  
It is named ab intellectu, as if it were the act of the whole intellectus, but it beholdeth only the principiae of things, and looks between the Arguments in them. Some Philosophers make intelligentia only of the principia of common rules of invention in Logic, as this: The whole is bigger than the part, etc. But if this were so, then there should be no intelligentia of other Arts, but it is the readiness of the act of invention both in making Arguments, and in using them; that is, both in analysi and genesi.   

Scientia est virtus intellectûs.  
Whereby we readily see the truth: we call it the judgement of a necessary axiom. But it's the act of the judgement for truth; and these are for the seeing of things. Now these follow that we are to use after that we have seen intelligentia and scientia.   

Sapientia est quae rem agendam ad usum contemplatur.  
For when we see the intelligentia and scientia, then by our sapientiâ we gather an hundred conclusions, and this is one in contemplation only, gathering these deductions, and yet practising them.   

Prudentia est quâ res agenda ad usum dirigitur.  
For as before there was the readiness of the other virtues, so arse is the doing and executing of those things that are to be applied in their right time, and fit place, and so they may be prudent, and not good artists. Now all these are necessary for the virtues of the Will; ergo are taught before them: for vir fortis, justus, etc. must be intelligens, sciens, sapiens, etc. Now for the cardinal virtues, only prudentia is here, and the rest come after; because they are virtutes voluntatis.   

Virtus voluntatis est quae facultatem voluntatatis perficit.  
That a man may behave himself well, he must be bonis instructus, and they are totius hominis, aut partis, i. e. Corporis or animi. And all these are necessary that a man may bene se gerere; and he must have the virtues of the mind as intelligentia etc. that he may be perfect in the practice of all arts: and whereas the common Philosophers require only prudentiam and justiam universalem indeed all these are requisite. Now follow the virtues of the will and these are the chiefest of all and are only in bono: but now bonus may have gratiam, authoritatem, bona corporis and intellectûs but he must be bonus that hath bona voluntatis, though in infimo gradu, and ergo these virtues do most conduce ad bene se gerendum. So that we see as in divinity summum bonum is the subject of the will, so also in Ethics will hath his object bonum. Now we are to know that Ethics look at such an one as Adam was before his fall, for he was endued with all bona both interna and externa, both intellectus and voluntatis so that he is our pattern. Now virtus voluntatis hath always adjoined unto it conscience, so had Adam a conscience to accuse and excuse. But what is conescince?  
Answ. It is so much of the Law as yet is in man; or it is the lecture of the understanding reading the Law that is in the will. Now for all the distinctions in Schools of conscience as it is good or bad etc. they are false; for conscience is neither good nor bad: but when we do a thing and afterward know it to be evil than we call it an evil conscience, or if there be no effect of virtue we call it no conscience: So that this it is, if a man do evil and his conscience be against it, they say it is a bad conscience and yet this conscience is good.  
Si adsit, excusantem & haec Voluptatem Praemii expectationem.  
That is if it be according to moral virtue it brings with it delight; (not that voluptatem which we shall hear of hereafter,) and expectation of the reward, for the very natural man will expect it.  
Si absit, accusantem et haec Dolorum Paenae metum.  
That is if virtue be absent there it will whip him; and hence is grief and fear of punishment; which is opposed to pleasure and expectation of reward. So Adam had his conscience when he hid him in the garden.   

Prosequitur affectu, amoris, auream mediocritatem; odii extrema.  
This virtus voluntatis doth prosecute with the affection of love auream mediocritatem; and with the affection of hate, the extremes. Now these extremes are to come into act, because they are the object of hatred, which is an affection.  
Est in gradu infimo vel— mediocri supremo  
This is a property of the virtues of the will; not that the virtues of the mind have not their degrees, but we look not at these but at them and these of virtue have both affection before.  
Virtus voluntatis esterga Deum: Hominem.  
Here still we must run on with Adam, and this act going on according to divinity.   

Sanctitas est virtus voluntatis Deum immediatè respiciens.  
For so all virtues do look at God, but this immediately. I say it is virtus volunatis, because it is an act of the will.   

Quae rectus de Deo sensus.  
That is sanctitas consisteth in the right understanding of God, or in the right worshipping of him, as God is the subject of of our worship, not as he is the object of our understanding.  
Atheismus est defectus sensûs dei.  
Rescrutatio gloriae est excessus seusûs dei.  
Rectus cultus Dei.  
This virtue is a definition itself it is that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

Prophanatio est defectus cultûs Dei,  
It is all carelessness of the worship of God.  
Superstitio est excessus cultûs Dei.  
Caetera desiderantur    

ASTRONOMIAE.  

Caput primum.  
AStronomia est ars caeli mobilis.  
Caelum mobile est quod perpetuo motu fertur in gyrum.  
Zodiacus norma est longitudinum et latitudinum.  
Aequator declinationum in coelo.  
Coelum hoc in plures sphaeras est distinctum.  
Hae verò sibi invicem ita contiguae sunt, ut superior semper interiorem se undequaque conclusam contineat, non secus ac in ovo gallinaceo, luteum albumen & putamen, alterum alterius complexu tenetur, nec tamen ulla alterius motum impedit.  
Sphaera est unius motûs vel plurimum.   

Caput secundum.  
SPhaera unius motûs est primum mobile.  
Primum mobile est sphaera vicenis quaternis horis ab ortu per occasum ad ortum circum verta super polos mundi.  
Itaque hic motus per aequinoctialem describitur, & quindecim gradus unâ horâ conficit, diemque naturalem describit.  
Hujus motus dicitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

Caput tertium.  
SPhaera plurimum motuum est, quae fertur, & motu primi mobilis, & simul nisu suo. Quo propior primo mobili, eo proprio motu fertur tardiùs. Estque duplicis, vel multiplicis.   

Caput quartum.  
SPhaera duplicismotus est, sphaera nova, quae praeter motum primi mobilis, suo fertur obliqùe ab occasu ad ortum, circa polos Zodiaci. Centum annis fit ejus progressio uno gradu.   

Caput quintum.  
MOtûs multiplicis sphaera est, quae praeter motus illos priores, suum porro habet & stellis insignitur.  
Stellarum declinatio est ab aequin octiali.  
Estque sphaera octava, vel planetaria.  
Sphaera octava est quae perpetuo motu fertur polis in peripheria duorum circulorum, quorum diameter est minutarum 24 circa puncta aequinoctialia mundi: fitque hic circulus juxta Copernici traditionem annis 3434. Hoc motu Ecliptica octavae sphaerae ab Eclipticâ mundi in Austrum et Boream mutat; hinc nonnunquam ad Aequatorem punctis solstitialibus accedit nonnunquam discedit: unde eorum maxima elongatio mutatur, nec semper eadem manet, nam quae tempore Ptolomaei fuit 23 gradus 35 minuta, nostro aevo à Wernero et Copernico deprehensa 23 gradus 28 minuta cum semisse; maxima itaque declinatio est 23 gradus 52 minuta, minima 23 gradus 24 minuta; est ergo maxima hujus mutationis differentia 24 minuta. Porro motu novae sphaerae fertur ab occidente ad orientem annis centum ferè gradum. Hinc initia hujus dodecadem oriorum & septo recesserunt ab initiis Zodiaci mundi eorundemque do decalem. Initia sunt poli sphaerae octavae est autem octavae sphaerae à terrâ undequaque distantia decies millium & quadrag●nta diametrorum terrae dodrantis perpetuò: numerantur verò pro diametro terrae 1720 milliaria Germanica. Sphaera octava est quae proprio motu super duos circulos, quorum diameter est minutorum 24 & poli sunt puncta aequinoctitialia quae discribuntur ab initiis Arietis & Librae octavae sphaerae. Hic motus, vocatur motus trepidationis, & motus accessûs & recessûs. Quidam volunt diametrum circulorum in quibus vertuntur poli octavae sphaerae esse quatuor gradus 18 min. 43 sec. Revolutionemque facere annis 7000.   

Caput sextum.  
In octauâ hac sphaerâ funt stellae fixae. Suntque immutabilibus semper spatiis disjunctae à se invicem, veluti in paralelis provehuntur, in suo orbe, dignoscuntur scintillatione. Stellae hae igitur proptur motum novae sphaerae progrediuntur singulis centum annis ferè gradum, aliàs tamen tardiùs, aliàs celeriùs, quòd aliás versùs Orientem, aliàs versùs Occidentem, aliás versùs Meridiam, aliàs versùs Arctum, ex motu novae & octavae sphaerae. Soli deo stellarum numerus notus est; Veteres autem annotavere visu & effectu insignes mille viginti duas.   

Caput septimum.  
Stellae ob immensam distantiam minutissimae quidem apparent, suâ tomen mole terram multis partibus excedunt, suntque magnitudine sextuplices.  
Primae magnitudinis sunt, quae caeteras omnes splendore vincunt, terrâque majores sunt centies septies cum undecim sexagessimis quartis; est enim diametri earum ad diametrum terrae proportio quadrupla super-parciens tres quartas, quae 19 ad quator. Cum ergo per 18 proprsitionem Element: 12 sphaerae sunt inter se in triplâ ratione suarum dimentientium, diametris cubicè multiplicatis majoreque cubo per minorem diviso colligitur differentia seu excessus. Harum sunt 15.  
Secundae magnitudinis sunt etc. (●) est enim proportio diametri earum ad diametrum terrae quadrupla super-parciens viginti quinque sexagessimis, quae est 205 ad 60. Harum numerus 45.  
Tertiae magnitudinis sunt, quae terram septuagies bis cum triente ferè superant; proportio enim diametrorum quadrupla est sesque sexta, quae est 25 ad 9 Sunt autem numero 205.  
Quartae sunt terrâ majores quinquagies quater & semisse, vel paulo plus; proportio enim diametrorum est tripla super-parciens quatuor quintas, quae 19 ad 5. Et sunt 477.  
Quintae, quae vincunt mole suâ terram tricies semel: proportio est tripla superparciens tres tricessimas octavas, quae 119 ad 38. Quarum numerus 217.  
Septae, sunt minimae superantque terram paulo plus decies octies: proportio dupla super parciens quinque octavas quae 21 ad ●. Numerus harum stellarum est 49.— His addiderunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 obscuras 9, & nebulosas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 7.   

Caput octavum.  
STellae partim in certos asterismos sunt digestae, partim sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Asterismus est stellarum plurimum vicinarum certâ ratione ab aliis distinctarum effigies, cujus similitudine & nomen sortitur ut agnosci faciliûs possint.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 autem constant certo stellarum numero vel incerto: qui certo stellarum numero vel incerto: qui certo stellarum numero constant sunt 48. Hipparchus & Prolomaeus appellant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Proclus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Plinius signa & sydera, Vulgus constellationes. Haec partitio ex Phaeniciâ in Graeciam. Phynices autem à patribus sanctis post diluvium.   

Caput nonum.  
PRimus ac situ utilissimus est Ursa minor, sive Plaustrum minus; est autem asterismus fiellis in modum ursulae formatus, quarum una in extremitate caudae est tertiae magnitudivis, fatis lucida, stella Polaris dicitur, quòd Polo proxima sit, nam tantum quatuor gradibus distat. Haec igitur à propinquitate ad Polum notu facilis est. Dicitur Tartaris, Seles micol, ferreus clavus. Hinc paulo alia in medietate caudae, deinde alia in initio caudae. & deinceps duae in sinistrâ ponètibiâ & duae denique in sinistro humero.  
Proximus est Vrsa major, qui est astrismus constans stellis 27; quarum septem lucidiores secundae magnitudinis versus polum. Plaustrum majus vulgò vocaur. etc. etc. etc.    

MEDICINAE LIBER PRIMUS.  

Caput primum.  
MEdicina est ars bene sanandi.  
Medicina est] quia sanitas est, ad finem dirigenda.  
Est ars] quia sanitas ob finem.  
Sanandi] qui est sanitatis.  
Bene] quia sanitas bona, & bene agier à sanitate oportet.   

Sanitas est affectus corporis per se ad actionem suam probè efficiendam.  
Sanitas est] Quia corporis sua constitutio ad proprium munus.  
Affectus] qui ex corporis constitutione fit id aptum vel ineptum ad munus suum.  
Corporis] quia corpus sedes est sanitatis, & non propriè dicitur anima sana per se, qui orta ex corporis constitutione.  
Ad actionem suam efficiendam] quia corpus propter functionem aliquam, ergo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ejus ad actionem efficiendam.  
Probè] quia corpus à naturâ, ideoque propter functionem optimam in suo genere. Natura enim tendit in optimum.   

Caput secundum.  
SAnitatis sunt sua signa, & suae causae.  
Sua signa, quia sanitas ipsa abstrusa plerum que latet, itaque sua signa habere debet, ex quibus eam possimus expiscari.  
Et suae causae, quia immutari possint ergo suae causae sunt, quibus immutari possint.   

Signum est quo proditur sanitas.  
Quo proditur, quia signo mens ad sanitatem rectâ ratione ducitur.   

Signum est sanitatis praesentis vel absentis, quia sanitas vel praesens vel absens esse possit.  
Signum presentis sanitatis est, quo praesens sanitas indicatur, & dicitur demonstrativum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quia signum est quo proditur sanitas.  
Signum absentis sanitatis est, quo absens sanitas indicatur, quia signum est quo proditur sanitas.   

Signum absentis sanitatis, est praeteriti vel futuri.  
Quia omnis sanitas absens est praeteriti vel futuri.  
Signum sanitatis praeteriti temporis, quo praeterita corporis sanitas memoriâ repetitur; et dicitur commemorativum.  
Signum sanitatis futuri temporis, quo futura saniras praevidetur; et dicitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Signa potro sunt vel comitantia, vel assidentia; quia signa sanitatis sunt, vel quae perpetuò adsint, vel non adsint.  
Comitantia sunt, quae sanitatem perpetuò comitantur.  
Perpetuò] quia comitantia sunt sanitatis comites perpetui.  
Assidentia, quae etiam adesse possint, quia assidentia modò adsunt, modò absunt.  
Hîc excellit symptoma.  
Symptoma est, signum ex sanitate profectum. &c. etc. etc.    

OPTICAE LIBER PRIMUS.  
OPtica est ars bene videndi.  
Res ad videndum proposita, est visibile.  
Visibile est per centrum oculi perceptibile.  
Visibile generale prius apparet quàm speciale.  
Visibile recipitur vel verè, vel hallucinanter.  
Verè, quando visibile rectè ad oculum se habet.  
Hallucinanter, quando aliter.  

Liber secundus.  
VIsibile est primarium, vel secundarium.  
Primarium, quod emittit radios.  
Radius est linea è quovis radiantis puncto speciem ejus unà perferens.  
E●rad●●s à radiante obverso in oppositum fit radiosa pyramis.  
Pyramis radiosa est cujus basis in radiante obverso, centrum verò punctum in opposito.   

Itaque  
Si radians suerit sphaericum, pyramis erit conus.   

Et  
Si radians fuerit angulosum erit recti termina pyramis.   

Et  
Pyramis fastigiatur in centro oculi, quando radianti opponitur etiam ferit oculos impressione quadam.   

Itaque  
Omne quod videtur, sub angulo videtur.   

Et  
Quia una basis utriusque pyramidis, utriusque oculi radius unum conspicitur.  
Radius perpendicularis caeteris est robustior.  
In radiosâ autem pyramide axis est radius principalis.  
Axis est radius a centro basis ad verticem perpendicularis.   

Itaque  
Fortiùs à re visâ imprimitur, valentiùs etiam accipitur.   

Itaque  
Certissima comprehensio visibilis sit per axem.  
Per alium radium tanto ce●tior, quanto axi propinquior fuerit.  
Quovis è puncto Radiantis, Radiantis axis provenit in adversum.   

Itaque  
Et pyramis è Radiante obverso quaqua versum in oppositum.  
Radii autem immittuntur sine intermissione.   

Itaque  
Et pyramides.  
Radiorum locus est intervallum ad quod permedium porriguntur radii.  
Quo hoc intervallum majus est, eo pyramidis angulus in opposito minor, quo minus eo major.   

Itaque  
Radians quo remotius, eo apparet minus, quo proprius eo majus.   

Et  
Si angulus illinc minor hinc major quam pro oculi acie, visu non percipitur.  
Medium est corpus perspicuum, illustratum, situm inter radians & oppositum.  
Radii medii tincturam capient.   

Liber tertius.  
RAdii sunt simplices vel geminati.  
Simplices quorum quilibet in pyramide unus.   

Itaque  
In eodem medio cum opposito constituti.   

Liber quartus.  
GEminati qui angulum rectilineum faciunt.  
Suntque catoptici vel mesoptici.  
Catoptici, ubi à densâ corporis superficie versùs partem unde veniunt reverberantur.  
Radii catoptici angulos faciunt in superficie densi corporis, quorum alter incidentiae, alter reflectionis appellatur.  
Angulus incidentiae quem faciunt advenientes, in superficie densi corporis.  
Angulus reflectionis, est, quem faciunt iidem radii inde reflexi.  
Angulus reflectionis aequalis est angulo incidentiae,  
Verùm oculus specularem tantùm reflectionem percipit.  
Speculum est densi corporis polita superficies.  
Radiùs perpendicularis à speculo in seipsum reflectitur.  
Reflectio radiantis speciem debilitat.   

Liber quintus.  
RAdii mesoptici, qui per aliud medium penetrantes franguntur.  
Refractio fit in superficie perspicuum terminante.  
Radius tamen rectus hîc è radiante corpore rectè transit, tanquam medium esset unicum; neque quicquam novae soliditatis occursu patitur.  
Obliqui igitur hîc tantùm refringuntur.  
Radius igitur obliquus hîc angulum facit, cujus alterum crus est super alterum intra communem mediorum superficiem.   

Itaque  
Quo obliquior est angulus, eo major est ejus infirmitas & debilitatio.  
Perpendiculum fractionis est quod à puncto incidentiae in alteram partem educitur.  
Perpendiculum est index loci, in quem radius deserens suam rectitudinem refringitur.  
Radius autem hic vel ad perpendiculum infra rectitudinem frangitur, vel à perpendiculo ultra eandem progreditur.  
Si radius obliquus inciderit in medium densius, versus perpendiculum frangetur; si in rarius à perpendiculo.   

Itaque  
Imago refracti visibilis, abaquâ in aerem videtur major visibili.  
In aquâ tamen pauca & valde clarâ sensus falli potest  
In obliquo conspectu mesoptico locus imaginis est perpendiculi à re visâ in communem mediorum superficiem concursus cum radio visionis recto.   

Itaque  
Res visa per radios refractos extra suum locum apparet.  
Extra suum locum apparere est, propiùs vel remotiùs, quàm absit videri; seu superiùs vel inferiùs, dexteriùs sinistriusve.   

Hinc  
Fieri potest ut per fractos radios videatur quid piam quod per rectos in conspectum venire non potest.   

Hinc  
Si res aliqua in vas iniiciatur, & ab oculo recedat vas quoad res in fundo posita cerni non possit; eavidebitur loco ab oculo remotiore, si aquae in vas infundantur.   

Et  
Stella super finitorem apparebit, quae adhuc est infra,   

Liber sextus.  
Visibile primarium est lux & color.  
Quorum alter alterius actus est ut conspiciatur. Lux quod lucendo radiat.   

Itaque  
Cr jus radius lucis speciem perfert.   

Et  
Quae per se medium suum collustrat.  
Si medium ab alterâ luce majore illustretur, minor eâ obscurabitur.  
Ab omni puncto concavi luminosi radii perpendiculares in centro confluunt.   

Itaque  
In concavo luminoso luminis vis maxima est circacentrum.   

Itaque  
Coelestis circa terram.  
Lux a sole universam mundi fabricam complet.   

Itaque  
Diametrali intervallo conspici potest.  
Stellarum lux magnitudinem distantiae eam assequi potest ut evanescat.   

Itaque  
A nobis plurimae non cernuntur, qui ab ipsis semidiametro hoc est 180 milliaribus absumus.   

Et  
Quae cernuntur tam parvae apparent, ut lucida coeli puncta esse videantur.   

Itaque  
Multo minus diametrali intervallo conspiciuntur.   

Liber septimus.  
RAdius perpendicularis in seipsum reflectitur.   

Itaque  
Reflectio unit plures radios; nempe à pluribus punctis in unum concurrunt.   

Itaque  
Multiplicant virtutem ejus.   

Itaeque  
Lux reflexa est fortior incidente.   
FINIS.