אנדת המשכיל Iggeret hammashkil.  
OR, An Admonitory EPISTLE UNTO Mr Rich. Baxter, and Mr Tho. Hotchkiss,  
About their Applications (or Misapplications rather) of several Texts of Scripture (tending chiefly) to prove that the Afflictions of the Godly are proper Punishments.  
Unto which are prefixed two Dissertations; the one against Mr. Baxter's dangerous Problems and Positions, about the Immanent Acts of GOD'S Knowledge and Will, as if any of those could be said (without Blasphemy) to begin in GOD, in Time, and not to be Eternal as Himself is: Or, as if GOD could be said (without derogation to His infinite Perfections) to begin to Know and Will in Time, any thing which He did not Know and Will before, yea from all Eternity: The other, both against Mr. Baxter and Mr. Hotchkiss, about their Definition of Pardon and Remission of Sins, in opposition to Great Doctor Twisse's Definition of Pardon, as it is in GOD from all Eternity towards his Elect in CHRIST.  
By WILLIAM ROBERTSON, Mr. of Arts from the University of Edinburgh.  
LONDON, Printed by J. M. and T. N. for George Sawbridge at the Bible on Ludgate-hill. 1655   

TO The right Worthy and Reverend Mr David Dickson, Professor of Theology in the University of Edinburgh: Mr Robert Douglas, Mr Mungo Law, Mr George Hutchison, Mr John Smith, Mr James Hamilton, Mr Hugh Mackel, Mr Robert Trail, Mr Thomas Garvy, Mr Robert Lawry, Mr John Stirling, etc. Ministers of the Gospel at Edinburgh, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
Right Reverend (as to me, so to many moe far more precious souls in Scotland) Fathers in CHRIST,  
ALthough it may be looked upon as somewhat superfluous, or at least a little impertinent or unusual, to prefix a Dedicatory Epistle to an Epistolary Discourse; yet there be many urgent reasons which I have, not only to tender the testimonies of those most cordial respects that I own to such (friendship and) friends, and to so many friendly (yea fatherly) obligations, as I have had (from some) of you, (which do most frequently use to be the rise and ground of lines entitled Dedications:) But also to evidence (in me) the remembrance of those relations in which I stand, in reference to those, under whose oversight I have had both my Book at Schools, and my education in Christianity; And those reasons do call aloud to me, to give an account to you (as of all my pains and studies, so chief) of those ten or twelve sheets following written in this controversal way: And that first, because those principles, and such like as are herein pointed at, I did first drink in from the word of Truth, explained by your Doctrine; and afterwards, although I was more and more confirmed in them, by my own search and study of them, for some three or four years after I had left the Schools, yet it was most by being under the dropping of your doctrine, and the eye of your (wellordered) Discipline. And lastly, about three or four years ago, Providence carrying me abroad in the world, I went from home with your countenancing recommendation, to prosecute the principles and studies which I had begun under your teaching; so that (as I should be) I am loath to make any thing public to the world, which I would not willingly present to your view, and which I did fear you would not willingly own, at least for any thing that should be materially considerable in any work of mine. These and such like were some of the reasons, Reverend Sirs, which were the main motives chief moving me, not to publish this following Tractat, without prefixing the (most deserved) mention of the worth of your names before it; desiring thereby to give an account and testimony of this, that I have not left the Principles and Studies which I was brought up in, and did begin under your Ministry: For which end I do lay it down at your feet, as cordially as I do direct it, freely, to the hands of those who are chief concerned in it. And if it be accepted by you, upon this account (as I am somewhat hopeful it shall, at least for the matter of it: The points disputed in the first two discourses about the Immanent Acts of God's Knowledge and Will, and about the Nature of Remission of Sins, being, I hope, agreeable to truth, and to your own principles; & that which is chief aimed at, & pressed afterwards to the end, to wit, the more diligent study of the original words of God by Ministers, being so agreeable to your own practice, which for several years bygone, hath been to be careful not to admit any to be a Teacher of the word of God to others, who doth not understand it (in its original) himself, and therefore not to ordain any, nor to set any apart as a Minister of the Gospel, without a special trial, as of all other his abilities and qualifications for that holy calling, so chief of his competency in the textual knowledge of the Hebrew Bible, and the Greek New Testament. If, I say upon on those grounds, these lines, and the matter of the missive which followeth them be not disowned by you:) Then I have full satisfaction, as to one of the chief of my desires, ●●ent the particular; and I shall endeavour hereafter, God willing, more and more to make out myself and my pains, for your approbation, in any of my hereafter to be published undertake: Only I do further entreat you, that ye would be pleased frequently to mind the Throne of Grace, in my behalf, that I may be assisted with grace and strength from thence, not only to grow up and to continue steadfast in your Orthodox Principles of Truth, but also (which I desire to groan and mourn under as that which is mainly wanting, viz.) to be a follower of you, as ye are of Christ, in Christian Mortification of spirit, and in the ways of piety and holiness. Thus, hoping that you will be mindful of this great request, I rest, beseeching also the same gracious throne, for, no less then, Al-sufficiency itself to be made out to all of you, and to all the faithful Ministers of Christ, suitably to all your, and their most weighty employments, and great difficulties, in these last, worst, and most dangerous days; that so his grace may be always sufficient for you, to bear you wrestling through, and prevailing over all the difficult and perplexed emergencies, which possibly you can rencontre with, in discharging all, or any part of your duties, and in taking heed to yourselves, and to the flock of God, over which your Lord and Master hath made you Overseers, until you run your whole race with patience, and finish all your course with joy, and afterwards receive the Crown of Righteousness laid up for you, and for all those who through Faith are kept (persevering to the end) by the power of God to salvation; According to the prayers of him, who counts it a special privilege, if he shall be owned subscribing himself, Worthy Sirs,  
Your Son and Servant in Christ, WILLIAM ROBERTSON.   

ERRATA.  
pag. 46. l. 5. for, to know him, r. to punish him; and l. 6. for, you shall be, r. you know, Sir. p. 76. l. 15. selv●s two. p. 86. l. 3. r. I speak. etc. p. 87. l. 4. read after creature those words, should be the glory of the creater. p. 89. l. 15. r. out of, etc. p. 96. l. 10. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 105. l. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 152. l. r. gnasah lanu. p. 154. l. 10. r. l●●k.   


UNTO The Learned and Reverend Mr. RICHARD BAXTER, Teacher of the Church at Kederminster in Worcester-shire.  
Reverend Sir,  
ABout five or six years ago, I did see a Book, bearing for its title, [Aphorisms of Justification;] and for its Author, the name of [Richard Baxter, Pastor of the Church at Kederminster, etc.] I had it but then lent me for so short a time, (being but from one evening to the next) that I could scarcely have the opportunity to run over the Heads of it: yet as much as I could, I did (cursorily) peruse it, to inform myself of the Principles thereof; because I was always desirous to take notice of all Tractates tending to the clearing up of that subject: And although I never had the opportunity to see the Book itself again to this very hour, (although I have often desired, and enquired for it) yet it hath many times since occasioned the reflection of my thoughts upon those notions which I did then (though but confusedly) apprehend, by that cursory reading of it; and it hath often caused those expressions from me to others, which I do now here freely (as I cannot but always with freedom open my very thoughts, whensoever I resolve to put them in words) bespeak to yourself; viz. That I did conceive, that if the Author of that book were in any high estimation amongst the Ministry in England, (as I judged by the rational Learning in that book, he could not but be;) and if he did live to prosecute the defence of the Principles therein propounded, that that Book with the Author of it in the defence of those Principles, would prove the leading guides to the greatest or most dangerous Sects of disciples and followers, that the Church of England hath been troubled with in all these times of confusion. For I do always apprehend, that Jesuitical, Arminian, and Socinian principles, rationally and scholastically disputed and defended by a (reputed) learned and pious Minister, are (in the concomitants and consequents at least) much more dangerous to the Church, than the worst of the blasphemous delusions of Familists, Ranters, Quakers, etc. Because the deluded and fantastical imaginations of those Wretches, are but as flashes of smoke from the bottomless pit, which though they may darken much and over-cloud the face of the Church for a season, (especially in the hour and power of darkness and confusion) yet the least glimpse of the Sun of Righteousness his shining truth breaking through those clouds, will presently dispel and scatter them, so that all their authors and abettors shall be ashamed of them: But those other Principles, being (seemingly) backed with much of Reason and Learning, are (chief) dangerous for the perverting from the truth the more knowing sort of Christians, who seldom use to be led aside to blaspheme with mad and deluded dreamers.  
These may seem hard thoughts, and tart reflections upon that Book and the Author thereof. But, Sir, I have already told you, that I cannot but freely bespeak my thoughts, if I speak any thing at all: And the great stir that that little Book hath made in the world, since it was published, (it being generally disliked with a disrelishing prejudice, by most of the learned Ministers in England and Scotland; and yet in my thoughts too too many others highly admiring it, or at least too highly esteeming you and your principles in its defence;) and the greater it is likely yet to make, if you continue to prosecute the defence of it, and the consequences from it, which you have since owned and published, doth make me now again freely, and publicly, (which I dared not to do before, because you had but in that Book darkly and ambiguously, me thought, expressed yourself in some points which you do now professedly own,) to impart unto you, that I do now conceive and apprehend, that my former thoughts and apprehensions of that Book and its Author, were not altogether (as I could gladly wish they were) misconceptions, misapprehensions, and misconstructions of your Tenets.  
But, Sir, 〈◊〉 you should reckon it as, scarcely, fair dealing, thus to bespeak in general terms prejudices against you and your writings, without so much as hinting, at least, at any of them in particular: For your further satisfaction, before I fall upon that which I do mainly intent by these to signify unto you, I shall declare unto you the very res gesta, which was the cause and occasion of my chief dislike of your opinions, and no less than detestation of some of your Principles. And it was thus, Sir.  
I had long ago seen (as I have already declared) your Aphorisms of Justification; and about a twelvemonth ago, I did see Mr. Crandon (at least in his endeavour) rationally refuting them: But I never had leisure to read over all his book, only at some spare hours to view some parcels of it; and I could not therefore satisfactorily to others, nor with satisfaction to myself, either judge of your Work, nor of his; because I had never seen some Principles in that your book of Aphorisms, a little more plainly explicated by yourself, and owned more professedly then you do there▪ Only thus much I must freely say, that I do verily think that there is much more in Mr. Crandon's Works than you have as yet let the World know that you have taken notice of: and that (setting aside that which may be termed bitter railing, and revi●ing, or reproachful speaking in him) there is much thereof as yet unanswered; and that though himself be passed from amongst us, yet if another of his parts should espousse his 〈…〉 might let others know that you have made him 〈◊〉 bespoken him to be at least, far more irrational than he was when he wrote that book▪ But my resolution●, minime jurare in alicujus me●… hominis ve●… his; and therefore (with the forme●●●●●●●ation) I pass the defence of his Work. Afterwards you coming here to the City yourself, about two or three months ago, I did hear a great applause given by your Auditories to you in your Sermon●; and indeed by what I did hear myself from you▪ I could go along (proportionably) with many of your Admirers in estimation of your way of Preaching: But I will not, nay I dare not, nay I cannot express my estimation of you to be such, and so high, as to some of your Principles; but, quite contrary, as I am now to show you. For about that time of your so frequent preaching in many of the chief Auditories in the City, I was one evening with two Scholars and Preachers, whom I did hear speak of your Apology for your Aphorisms; and upon the occasion of their discourse about some points in that Apology of yours, and because of my own former thoughts about your book of Aphorisms, I was very desirous to peruse it, having never had the opportunity of perusing it before. And therefore the next morning I made enquiry for it, and had the sight of it; which when I had got, I did immediately fall to a cursory perusal of it, being confident you would in it explicate your mind more clearly, in some things delivered very ambiguously, as I thought, in your Aphorisms; and indeed I found it so: ●●r although that in the first three or four hours reading that morning, of the first part of your Apology to Mr. Black, I was very much taken with so much of a profound, deep and rational judgement, with such a clear and solid understanding, and with so great a height of a piercing wit, as I did apprehend in some of your reasonings and explications of some points by you holden forth there: yet in the afternoon, I was forced to pitch my thoughts for some time upon that exclamation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mah hebel Enosh, How vain a thing is frail mortal man! and to consider how diligently we should give heed to that advertisement, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Chidlu lachem min haadam asher neshamah boappo, ki bemmeh nechshab hu: Cease from man whose breath is in his nostrils, because wherein is he to be esteemed? How mutable is he, as in his purposes, in his resolutions, and most affectionate estimations? So, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 becol asher bo, in all (and every excellency) that is in him. For that very day, How great a change did I apprehend both in you and myself! For turning over, for my afternoons work, to your Apology against Mr. Kendal; me thought you looked upon me there with quite another countenance, the very glances whereof did so much affright me, when either I looked upon it, or when it stared me in the face, that I do profess I could not behold it, nor so much as think upon it, without trembling aversation. A sudden change, you will say, and yet no more strange than true; at least I am sure that I did apprehend such a change in your countenance, and that I did feel such a change wrought thereby in my breast, that although I had set, beforenoon, your accurate rationality in some of your disputing discourses upon one of the highest seats of my affection and estimation; yet in the afternoon, I never did abhor with greater detestation & indignation the principles of any man, and the defence of them, than I did that one most blasphemous (I must crave permission from you so to style it, because that is the best title I can give it in my thoughts, and therefore I can give it no better in words; so that I must say again, I never read of any Principle, in any man's writing, and the defence thereof, with greater indignation and detestation, than I did that most horrid) Principle of yours, and your defence of it, about the Immanent acts of God, in his Knowledge and Will: as if they (or any thing immanent in God) were, or could be, de novo, arising or beginning to be in him in time, and not from all eternity; as if there could be any thing in God, which is not God himself, and eternal as himself is.  
This, this I say, Sir, is that Monster of your mind, which did, and doth so much amaze me, that I shall be loath hereafter so suddenly to think so much, or esteem so highly of any man, as knowing (experimentally from you) that he may be so far left to himself, and to his own understanding, as that he may like the goat, with his foot in the evening, cast down and spurn over all the good milk hath been given all the day; and by his selfwilled affection biassing his judgement, to defend his own principles, or to make good his own expressions, in opposition to others, he may strain his wit to the utmost, to maintain contradictory Tenets, not only to truth made known by divine revelation, but even to truths that are evident of themselves by the very light of rational nature, or natural reason.  
The truth is, Sir, when I do think upon all the Opinions that your Antagonists do challenge you with, and do endeavour to fasten upon you, setting aside this, and the consequents of it, and although you should professedly own and maintain them all, they would not all of them taken together, besides this, so much have stumbled and offended me, nor would they so much have caused the public recording of this my abhorring detestation of your defence of them, as this one doth; because I do think that all the Errors that are laid to your door, though taken in cumulo, and bound in a bundle or bulk together, are not so heinously derogatory from the glorious Majesty of God, nor do they all of them so much blaspheme his name in his infinite perfections, as this doth, in its self and in its consequences. That is, that although one should openly maintain, that Faith is not the instrumental cause of our Justification; and that we are justified by some works, as Repentance, Hope, and Love, etc. as well as by Faith; and that we were saved by some of our Works as well as by Faith; and that our works were meritorious of eternal life, by God's appointment and Christ's merit: and that the afflictions of the Godly were real (and properly so called) punishments; and that Christ hath redeemed all the World universally by the price of his blood, (though that were indeed a sad saying, and most irrational, to say, that our Lord did pay the price of no less than his blood and death for those, for whom he saith himself he did not so much as pray unto his Father; and although that one should deny the final perseverance of all the truly godly, as conceiving that some might be such, and yet not peremptorily elected to salvation: I say, although these be dangerous Tenets indeed, yet if one should maintain all of them, and many such like Popish and Arminian errors, yet I could not abhor the defence of any one or all of them, so much as I do abhor and detest this one of yours, Sir, (if it could be severed from them, and they from it) to wit, in that you do frame to yourself (and would endeavour to impose upon others the horrid fiction of) a God like (in imperfections) unto frail and miserable man, in the actings of his Knowledge and Will; by maintaining God to begin to know in time, that which he did not know from all eternity; and to begin to will in time, that which he did not will from all eternity; and that in time he doth begin to love in Christ, those whom he did not love in Christ from all eternity; yea, that he loves to day whom he did hate yesterday, and loves to day whom he may hate to morrow; nay further, that he may reprobate or hate to damnation, those whom he hath predestinated; and predestinate or love to salvation, those whom he hath reprobated: For so the famous, or rather most infamous patronizers of your Tenets do hold and maintain in those very words which you do cite and transcribe from them, to show that you are not singular in those monstrous opinions of yours and theirs; and which words and Tenets you do not in particular disown when you transcribe them. And whether those be Tenets beseeming an Orthodox Minister in the Reformed Protestant Church, or an eminent Divine in the Church of England, let any Orthodox Christian judge; and whether these be not your Tenets, either professedly by you maintained, or quoted and transcribed from the worst of Blasphemers, in their express words, and not disowned by you, for the defence of your own positive Tenets, let any rational Reader peruse your dispute against Mr. Kendal about the immanent acts of God, and judge. Lastly, let the mere rational light of natural reason itself be judge, whether those Scriptures be not evident truths, which are plainly contradictory to those  blasphemous and accursed errors: As when it is said, that, Known anto the Lord are all his works, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the same word that the Septuagint renders the Hebrew phrase, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 megnolam, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 min hagnolam, à seculo, sive ab aeternitate; and so the Syriack translation expressly rendereth it) from eternity, (or from the beginning of the world, as our Translation hath it) Act. 15. 18. And that a thousand years are with the Lord as one day, and one day as a thousand years, 2 Pet. 3. 18. Whether rational light doth not clearly and immediately assent to the truths deduced from hence, that if we acknowledge God to be God, that is, infinite in all perfections; we must acknowledge that there is no beginning nor ending, nor no succession, change, nor variation, no futurition, nor preterition in the acts of his Knowledge or Will, nor in any thing that is in himself; nothing more or less in the perfection of his Knowledge, or in any of his Attributes; else how could he be, as he is in himself, infinit● and eternal in all his perfections? Whereas you do not stick, Sir, positively and (expressis verbis) plainly to affirm, that when God doth know a thing in its present existence, he doth then begin to know more of it, than he did know before of it from eternity: And what is that but to put a more, and a less, in the knowledge of God, and so to deprive it of infinite, eternal, immutable, and unchangeable perfection; and to reduce the increated and infinitely perfect knowledge of God, unto the infirmities and imperfections of the created knowledge in humane understandings? As if that because such worms as we know things far more perfectly when we behold them before us with our eyes in their real existence, then when we contemplate them as future and afar off, as it were, to come; therefore the infinite and unchangeable knowledge of God must be subjected to the same imperfection, infirmity, and frailty of knowledge. Whereas the very light of nature evidently demonstrateth this, that the infinite knowledge of an infinite Deity, must necessarily know (as the Scripture Ps. 139. 2. speaks of our thoughts, so) all things knowable, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 merachok, afar off, even so far off as from all eternity; and that as fully and perfectly, because every way infinitely, as he doth know them when they do really exist, and are known so to be unto us: Else, as it is often said, and as is clearly evident to natural light, he were not unchangeably, eternally, and infinitely perfect in his knowledge of things, and so he were not God, if he were capable of the least imperfection. And what is a more, or a less (though) in (the perfection of) knowledge, but an imperfect knowledge, or an imperfection of knowledge? a more in (perfection of) knowledge, necessarily inferring a less in (the same perfection of) knowledge; and a less perfect knowledge, being a little imperfect knowledge. Which to affirm to have been only in God from all eternity, of things future and to come, until their present real existence in themselves, and that then he gins to know more of them then he did before; which you do expressly, Sir: How fearful an apprehension and expression is it, and how destructively repugnant to his infinite and most perfect way of knowledge of things! For it doth most grossly suppose, that there is somewhat in God like to our organical eyes, whereby he doth (as we imperfect worms do) look out at windows, as it were, without himself, to behold somewhat of things in themselves, and in their real existence, which he did not so perfectly behold before that real existence of theirs in themselves.  
Which is so gross and crassly absurd an imagination of the most pure and most simple Deity, that even the light of natnre abhorreth it; to which it is clearly evident, that God knoweth all things infinitely, by nothing else that our reason can reach rational thoughts of, but his own most pure and most simple essence, which doth as (perfectissima rerum omnium idea) the most perfect idea of all things, represent all things knowable unto himself, uno eodem perfectissimo & simplicissimo actu, by one and the same most perfect, most pure, and most simple act; and that uno & eodem simplicissimo & perfectissimo cognitionis modo, by one & the selfsame most pure, most simple, and most perfect manner or way of knowledge; and that from all, and unto all eternity, before, in, and after all worlds. (Else how could he be rationally conceived unchangeable and immutable in himself and in his infinite perfections, if he did know things by divers and different ways of knowledge; as one way from all eternity in himself, by his own essence, for then there was nothing else to know things by; and another way in time, by the things themselves and their real existence?) Which is clearly consonant also to the Scripture-expression before cited from Peter: For the proportion mentioned there of a thousand years with the Lord as one day, and of one day with him as a thousand years; doth hold of ten thousand millions of years with him as one hour, and one hour with him as ten thousand millions of years: yea, ten hundred thousand millions of years are with him and his knowledge, as one minute; and one minute or momentany instant, with him and his infinite knowledge, as ten hundred thousand millions of years; the same proportion holding in infinitum. So that all time imaginable, with him and his infinite knowledge, is nothing but his infinite eternity; comprehending all the differences of time, past, present, and to come, and all things falling out therein by one eternal way, and infinitely perfect act of his knowledge; which he had from all eternity, hath now, and into all eternity, not by any thing without himself, or by any organical eye looking as it were out at a window, to behold things without himself, and to see them as they are in themselves and in their real existence; for such an imperfect way of knowledge, he hath given to created and finite understandings. But as he did from all eternity, so doth he now at this very present, and unto all eternity, see, know, and understand all things, past, present, and to come, by one and the same most perfect and infinite way of knowledge, to wit, not from or by any thing without himself, or distinct from himself, as finite and created understandings do; but in himself, and by himself, and his most pure and most simple uncompounded essence; or in and by the infinite representation of all things knowable, in that his most simple and uncompounded essence, which is the most perfect idea or exemplary form of them all. Thus he did understand and know things done this day, a thousand years ago; for both those (to wit a thousand years, and one day, yea ten hundred thousand years, and one hour or the minute of an hour) are one to him and his infinite knowledge: yea, this day he understandeth, and did from all eternity understand and know all things future for all thousands of years to come, thus, and no other way, then by the infinite and most perfect representation of things in his essence. For if there were different ways of knowledge in God, he were not without all variation and shadow of turning, and so would not be the immutable and unchangeable God. Which also would necessarily be inferred, if there were or could be any new immanent acts or act of God's knowledge, which were arising and beginning de novo, and in time: For than he would nor, nor could not be the same knowing God he was before and from all eternity, because he did begin to know what he did not know before and from all eternity; as you boldly dare aver he doth, about the present and real existence of things.  
What are your tergiversations, your subtle evasions, and sophistical arguments against the Truth, and for the defence of your most dangerous Opinions in this point, I do profess I would gladly take freedom here to meet with, and to descant a little about them. But when I do look back to my papers, I do see I have blotted already above a sheet and a half in one afternoons writing, about that which I did intent but to be the subject of some few proemial lines, and but introductory to the chief intended matter of this Epistle. I shall therefore endeavour to be the more brief in that which followeth, and in the body of the Epistle itself, when I shall come at it. Only thus much briefly I would say unto you further, That the same and much more the like grounds might be insisted upon, to manifest the like irrationality of your Tenets, about the immanent acts of Gods will also, which you dare likewise denominate to begin in time, and so to arise de novo in God, which were not before; and that he beginneth to will the present existence of things, when they do exist, which he did not will before; and that he beginneth to have in his will new acts of approbation, love and acceptance of a man, when he doth well, and so doth begin to love whom he did hate before, changing the acts of hatred unto the acts of love and acceptance: As likewise you affirm that there do begin and arise de novo, or in time, new acts in his will, of dislike, disapprobation, and hatred, when he doth evil. And hence you frequently, but blasphemously speak of the acts of Gods will about things without himself, as presupposing their objects to be existent, before these acts of the will of God were elicit, or did begin to be terminated upon those objects.  
Alas, Sir, if a rational Turk or Heathen, who did but acknowledge an infinite, immutable, and eternal Deity, did hear such positions; how would he abhor the Religion of those who acknowledge such Principles? and how would he exclaim against such blasphemous conceptions, as do apprehend the immutable will of God, in his own acts, to change from one contrary affection to another; and as do conceive the eternal will of God to presuppose any objects (besides himself) or any real entities, in any consideration unto the acts thereof, as existent before them; since that, in the acts thereof, is the absolute and universal cause of the existence of all objects and real entities besides himself; and how can any of those acts than presuppose their objects? How would not, far rather, the clear light of rational nature assent to these truths, because evidently clear of themselves, and by their own light, to all who do acknowledge an infinite and immutatable Deity? As when that immutable Deity should speak thus of himself; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ani Jehovah lo Shaniti, I the Lord change not; how could rational light but immediately subscribe unto it, and curse all blasphemies contrary or repugnant to it? and so abhor all such principles as do make God, in time, another knowing God, and another willing God, than he was from eternity, by beginning, in the acts of his Knowledge and Will, arising in him de novo and in time, to know and will what he did not know and will before, and to begin to love those whom he did hate before. And how would not the light of nature subscribe to the truth, if God should speak of every one whom in time he loveth, thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ahabat gnolam ahabticha, I have loved thee with an eternal love; and that therefore with external dispensations of mercy, indeed, proceeding from that love, he doth draw them to himself in time, but never doth begin in time with any new act of his will to love in time whom he hated before; because than he were not an immutable God, but changing from hatred to love, and from love to hatred again, if the objects change from good to evil, as your horrid suppositions do infer: Contrary to what the Word of truth affirmeth, and that rational light cannot but assent to it; That as whomsoever he loves, he loves them from all eternity, so also doth he love them to the end, and unto all eternity: And that although when his chosen and beloved ones do sin against him, he will correct and chastise them with cross-dispensations, for their good, and to reclaim them home to live in his love again; yet that he will never take his mercy and his loving kindness from them, and so never will turn his love of them into hatred of them, Ps. 89. 33. Will not the light of nature, of itself, subscribe to those truths, and abhor the contrary errors?  
And as for your so frequently and insnaringly bringing about the question at every turn, to Gods knowing and willing the present existence of things when they do exist, which he did not know nor will before▪ doth not the same rational light of nature clearly dictate and assent to the contrary, to wit, that God from all eternity did both will and know all things future, as fully and perfectly as ever he doth afterwards into all eternity? For there are no greater or lesser imperfections in the Knowledge and Will of God; else there were imperfections in himself, and so he were an imperfect God: But from all eternity God did will the present existence of every thing (that was future) to be for such a time. And hence it follows, that every such thing is future, till that before-willed time come; present or presently and really existent, so long as that before and eternally willed time doth continue; and past for ever, after that that before and eternally willed time is past. This is but one most simple and most single uncompounded act of Gods will; inferring the thing necessarily to be future so long as it is future, present so long as it is present, and past when once it is past: But it is a most fearful imagination, and a most irrational and absurd conception, to conceive and imagine divers new successive acts of Gods will about such objects; as one act for them as future, so long as they are future; another new act (succeeding the former) about their real existence whilst they are present; and another new act about their preterition, when they are passed. Whereas common light doth dictate to us, that all those are but one single act of God, willing and determining that such a thing shall be existent for such a time, which maketh such a thing future for such a time, (or future from all eternity, till such a time of its real existence,) present for such a time; (during the continuance of its real existence,) and past for ever, after that determined time of its real existence is once ended.  
And these are also the clear dictates of rational light, about the acts of God's Knowledge: For it is most irrational to conceive, that God doth first know things to be future by one act of his knowledge; and then when when they begin to exist, that he should begin, by a new successive act to the former, to know that they do exist; and that afterwards, when the time of their existence is at an end, that he should begin by another new successive act of his knowledge, to know that they are passed: But by one most perfect, most pure, most simple, most single and uncompounded act of his infinite knowledge, from all eternity he knoweth (because he willeth) such a thing to be existent for such a time; which is, from all eternity, to know it future for such a time, present for such a time, and ever past afterwards; and that all with one equally perfect and infinite act of knowledge, having neither more nor less of perfection of knowledge in it, but altogether the same and alike, from all eternity, in time, and unto all ternity; and that not by any thing without, besides, or distinct from himself, but in and by his own infinite, most simple, and most pure essence, and by the most perfect representation of all things therein, as was before explained.  
Thus did God know all things from all eternity, and before all worlds: And thus we must of necessity acknowledge that then he did know things only so, that is, in himself, and by his own essence, and the representation of things therein. For, from eternity, there was nothing without, besides, and distinct from himself and his own essence, to know things by, so that then there could be no looking out without himself, to see and to know things in themselves; because they were not then in themselves to be seen and known▪ but only in the representation of them by his own essence. Yea, thus also must we (if we will not blaspheme, by attributing imperfection to an infinite Deity, if we fear to do so, I say, we must) acknowledge that now in time, and unto all eternity, God doth know things now existent, past, or to be existent, not by any thing without, besides, or distinct from himself, as the formalis ratio, the formal reason of his knowledge; for this were, and could not be, but an imperfect way and manner of knowledge, for God to look out, as it were, without himself, to know gross corporeal things existent in themselves, by any species, or by any representation of, from, or by themselves, but only by that same infinite, immutable, eternal, and most perfect representation of all things in his own essence, (that being the most absolutely perfect manner and way of knowledge, not needing or lacking any thing from without, no not the things themselves, to know them by) and that as perfectly, and infinitely more perfectly in every particular consideration of things, then possibly they could be known in themselves, and without himself, by looking out upon them as they are in themselves, and without his own essence, and the infinite most perfect representation of them therein.  
Thus he did from all eternity know things, (for there was then no other thing but himself to know things by;) and thus therefore must we acknowledge that now in time, and unto all eternity, he doth know all things. Else how could it be avoided, but that there would be an imperfect change in God, in his knowledge, or in his way or manner of knowing, if from all eternity he did know things only in himself, and if in time he did begin to look out and know things without himself, and in themselves. But our God is the Lord Jehovah, who changeth not, Mal. 34. And with him is no variableness nor shadow of turning, Jam. 1. 17.  
Thus, Sir, I have put down my dissenting thoughts from your Tenets about these points, in a number of confused lines, without any premeditated order or method observed or taken notice of in them, but as fast put upon the paper as they did come into my mind, or could fall from my pen in so many hours writing as are in two afternoons, which I did mostly spend in writing thus far. So that there is only to be looked for in them the substance of my present and extemporary conceptions, without any study of accuracy, form, or method. For, the first afternoon that I did begin to write in, I did intent nothing here about this question, but briefly to let you know (in a page, or two at most, as than I thought) my public dissent from those your published Opinions, (which I could not but do, if I wrote any thing publicly in reference to you, or any of your followers) and how much I did dislike them; referring to a larger intended Dissertation the more full and large opposing of these Opinions in a more methodical Dispute against them. But no sooner did I fall upon those Tenets which I so much abhor, than I did find that I could not draw my thoughts to so narrow a compass in paper, as I had both resolved and desired to do. Always, Sir, if you shall be pleased to take notice of the matter, in any ways as you think fit yourself, not regarding or looking too much to formalities, (which I never did, nor can endeavour much to do) you shall engage me to take notice of what you shall please to communicate and impart unto me, in any way that you shall approve of, or think most convenient: Providing, that a mutual freedom be not prohibited; and that silence be not imperiously expected or commanded, if satisfaction be not given, and dissatisfaction removed and taken away.  
Now, Sir, as for that particular which the inscription of this Missive doth mainly point at, and which I did mainly intent at this time in these Epistolary lines, I could willingly give you an account of it, of my thoughts about it, and the occasion of it. But first, because I fear that I have wearied you already with my tediousness in the Proem to it; and secondly, because another of your Friends and followers, together with yourself, is concerned into it: I shall therefore crave your permission to let me breathe a little, and refresh myself, in changing the person to whom, as well as the subject matter about which, I shall speak in the following part of the Missive. In the mean time, what shall be spoken hereafter to your friend, in so far as it belongeth to yourself, and concerneth your own interest as well as his; you may be pleased (if you will) to take as much notice of it, and make all the use of it, which your prudent discretion shall think fit and convenient; and that as freely as if it were spoken to yourself, by  
Your friend and follower, so far as you follow Truth, WILLIAM ROBERTSON▪   

Unto the Learned Mr. THOMAS HOTCHKIS, Preacher at Granton in the County of WILTS.  
SIR,  
SOme few days ago, a Friend of mine (and a high Esteemer of a Friend and Patron of yours) one morning told me, that he had seen a Book bearing your name, about Remission of Sin, and the Nature thereof; with Mr. Baxters' Patrociny prefixed to it. I cannot but much esteem of that learned man, and most judicious Divine, in so far as I have rational grounds so to do; even as far as he doth evidence himself to be indeed what you do style him, that is, one Eagle-eyed in Rational disputations. Thus far I do go hand in hand along with you in estimation of him, (but no further.) And therefore I could not choose but be desirous to know and be acquainted with one (I mean you Sir) whom so great a man doth send abroad into the world under his tuition and patronising recommendation; as conceiving, and expressing so myself unto my Friend that told me of it, that it could not be without some special reason and deserving consideration, (as indeed I did perceive afterwards my suspicion failed me not, when I did all along through your whole Tractate, in tracing of your steps, observe his large foot.)  
I did therefore presently, with my friend, go to the Booksellers shops, to see if I could find you out, and so have the opportunity of my so much desired acquaintance with you, for your Friend and Patron's sake, whom I do so much respect. There indeed I did find you, but could not leave you, till I did bring you home to my Chamber, to the end I might be the more familiarly intimate with you. I spent most of the hours following ten a clock of that day, first in hearing Mr. Baxter preface his recommendation of you, and his goodliking approbation of your Tenets and opinions; (and no marvel, thought I to myself, because I suspected, as I afterwards in the progress did find, all, or most of them to be his own.) And then in hearing you speakfully your own mind, from the beginning to the end of your discourse. Upon which consideration, I hope common equity will require at your hands, that I may be also taken notice of, and heard a little, in giving you now an account, what then were some of my thoughts and observations, in going along with you in your elaborate Exercitation; and which I could not have leisure to put in paper to acquaint you with, till now about eight or ten days after my first hearing of you.  
And first, I would preface thus much, That I do not intent at this time, and in this Missive, to give you my Judgement about all the points by you disputed in that Dissertation of yours; That, Sir, could not be done conveniently in an Epistle; But there are chief two things that I desire to acquaint you freely with my thoughts about them. The one I purpose to insist a little upon, as being at first my chief intended scope and purpose, to signify to you (and to your great Friend) by these, what were my thoughts about it; and therefore I shall leave it to the second place. The other I will but mention, and touch in as few lines as I can, and it is this: I would entreat you not to be offended, that I do verily suppose your whole Book, in the chief intent and scope of the whole Exercitation therein contained, to be notoriously peccant and halting, in that known Fallacy called Ignoratio Elenchi, taking quid pro quo, and quite mistaking or wilfully misconstruing your Antagonists meaning, in your disputing against him. I give this censure upon the whole bulk of the Book, because the mistake lieth in the very subject of it, as it is cleared and explained in reference to the chief scope and purport thereof. A sharp censure it may be, perhaps, looked upon and construed: But, Sir, let me make out my reason to others, which makes it out thus much, and nothing less to me; and then let indifferent and unprejudiced arbitrators judge of it. My reason of such a censure is this, Sir. The subject of your Book is the Explication of the Nature of Forgiveness or Remission of Sin, in an Exercitation thereabout; chief tending, as I conceive, to refute and disapprove (and so to beat down that so much startled at, and conceived to be the grand pillar of Antinomianism, to wit) Remission or forgiveness of all the sins of the Elect, ab aeterno, from all eternity. And hereupon you take upon you to deal with that (truly so reputed) great Malleus, and indeed the grand hewer down of all Jesuitical and Arminian principles, root and branch; comparatively with whom, I do not ever think to see any one, or all of such his Antagonists, worthy to be named in one and the same year; He being absolutely to be set aside by himself, at least in opposition to all his Adversaries. as the (truly so reputed and styled) Flos illibatus Ingeniorum Scholasticorum.  
I say, Sir, upon the forementioned account, you take that noble and victorious Champion of the Grace of God (against all the blasphemous opposers thereof) the great Doctor William Twiss, whose very name in the mouth of any that understands his principles, is enough to hammer down all Jesuitized and Arminianized Theologasters, and to beat them from all they dare oppose him in: Him, I say, you do take to oppose you (indeed methinks a most impar congressus Achilli) and to be your Antagonist and Adversary in your Notions about remission of sin: Whereas either he is nothing at all such, that is, your adversary, in so far as there is truth in your conceptions about that point; or else if he be your Antagonist at all, it is but only in so far as you yourself are an Antagonist to Truth itself in that point; and to that which nill ye, or will ye, you must acknowledge to be truth, if you have either sense, reason, or any fundamental principles of the orthodox reform faith and religion left in you. I say again, that the learned Doctor is either not your Adversary at all, as you do fallaciously and sophistically bespeak him to be; or else only in so far as you are adversary to the truth, about the nature of remission and forgiveness of sin.  
For first, if the Doctor be a real Antagonist to you and your Patron, in your notions about the nature of forgiveness and remission of sin; then he must either deny, that remission of sin is the dissolving of the obligation to punishment by the law of Grace, which is the so much decantated and Eagle-eyed Baxterian definition of remission of sin; or else he must deny that remission of sin is the suspending or the effectual taking away the punishment itself in the real execution thereof, which is the so much cried up Hothckissian definition of remission of sin, (Hotchkis in this being sharper in sight, and more accurate, it seems, than the Eagle himself.) But if ever Doctor Twiss did deny either of those notions so far as there is any truth in them, or if any of his words inferring a denial of these truths, so far as they are truths, can be produced by any of his Antagonists, (although I have not looked upon any of his Works this four or five years bygone, but one half day only, when I had an occasion to turn over his Volumes about another question, not so much as minding, because having never so much as heard, of this to be disputed against him by you; yet if any such thing can be found in him, as that he averreth that the taking away of the punishment of sin, together with the dissolving the obligation to the punishment thereof, cannot be called remission or forgiveness of sin) than I shall be content to be whipped as a School boy by Mr. Hotchkis my master, when ever he shall teach and show me so much out of the Doctors own words and writings. Nay, upon the contrary, his very words which you cite and quote here out of him, do clearly infer the concession of both the forementioned definitions, so far as there is any truth in them. For what is Negatio punitionis, the denial, or the negation and denying of punishment, which in the very words you transcribe out of him, as against you, he doth acknowledge to belong to the nature and formal reason or quiddity of remission of sin: What is it, I say, but either the delaying, suspending, or taking away in whole or in part, the punishment due unto sin? And is not this the very nature and remission of sin, even in your so accurate (and more than eagle-eyed) definition itself thereof? And if so how doth then Doctor Twiss contradict you, or you contradict him, when both of you agree in the very quiddity itself, or in the very nature of remission and forgiveness of sin? Have you not had an eager and sharpened spirit of contradicting Twiss, when you make a contradiction, where there is none between you?  
Again, shall ever any rational man imagine, (that ever hath looked upon and understood but a page of the Doctors most accurate writings) and think that the most Rational Doctor was ignorant of this, That the dissolving of the obligation to punishment, by the ●aw of Grace, when the condition thereof is fulfilled, may be called a legal remission and forgiveness of sin, or remission and forgiveness of sin in a Law-sense, or by the Law?  
As I must acknowledge, I could not but with much indignation read so often from the pen of your Eagle-eyed Patron, the learned Doctor to be so much upbraided and reproached with ignorance of this point; so I do verily profess, I rather believe, that as he saith of himself, that he hath had most of his Scholastical learning, so he hath had the explication of this Notion also from the famous Doctor's writings: I say, I rather believe this, say what he will to the contrary, then that I will believe either him or you, though both of you should scandalise the Doctor, by affirming a thousand times, and upbraiding him (now when he is dead and gone, and so cannot answer for himself by word of mouth) to be ignorant of this point, so clearly revealed in Scripture?  
What? did ever the most Orthodox Doctor deny, that being justified by faith, we have peace with God through Jesus Christ our Lord? and that there is no condemnation (of the Law, of the Devil, of Sin. or of any other thing) to those that are in Christ Jesus? and that the Law of grace and faith in Christ hath freed us from the law of sin, death, and damnation? Did ever, I say, the most Rational and Scriptural Doctor deny those, and many such other like Scriptural Doctor deny those, and many such other like Scriptural truths? or rather did he not strenuously, by great strength and light given him from above, maintain them against all biasphemous opposers of these truths, and such like? And what are those truths, but this in substance, that by faith in Christ we have remission of sins; that is, by the new law of Grace, (the condition thereof, to wit Faith in Christ, being wrought in us by the Spirit) we are legally, and in a Law-sense, dissolved from the obligation to the punishment of death, threatened, and due unto us by the law of Works? And nothing of all this, I think, not any that ever was taught or catechised understandingly in the Christian Church, will deny: And I am sure the Doctor defended them, to the smart of all Jesuits and Arminians, to his very dying day; and his writings, after his death, will do the same so long (I am confident) as there is either Jesuit or Arminian upon earth; till all the monsters of their luxuriant brains be so dashed and crushed into pieces, as that there shall not so much as a remnant of them be heard of in the Church?  
How then is the learned Dr. feigned by you and your imperiously dictating Patron, to be ignorant of those truths, and of that your so much extolled explication of them? As if that the Doctor had been so much taken up with the doctrine about the Decrees of God, (as indeed he was so taken up with those mysterious truths, as that I hope his labours, next unto the Scripture, shall be mainly instrumental to effectuate all and more than is said in the foregoing lines, about the extirpating and utter eradicating all Jesuitical and Arminian principles, which have for so long a time infested the peace of the Church: Yet I say, it is a greater reproach to those who upbraid him with it, then to himself, because it is a notoriously known slander, to say that the Doctor was so much taken up about the Decrees of God,) as that he was ignorant of this truth, That by the law of faith, of grace, and Christ, we are freed in time from the law of sin, death, and damnation, and so dissolved from the obligation-to punishment, threatened and due unto us thereby. And what is that, but that lagally, or in sense of Law, our sins are forgiven us, when that obligation to punishment is so dissolved by the law of Grace, and through faith?  
How could then the sharpwitted Doctor be ignorant, that the dissolution, or freedom from the obligation to punishment, might be legally, or in sense of law called remission and forgiveness of sin? Or where did ever the Doctor wilfully (for I am sure he never did it ignorantly or mistakingly, as being ignorant of it; it being a point so clear of itself, for so far as is truth in it, as that not only the Doctor, but who is there any else that is rational, and can) deny it? Nay, he never did deny it at all. The Eagle is therefore too sharp and piercing, not only seeing that most brightly which others do see but dimly, but seeing that which is impossible to be seen, because it is not at all; as Doctor Twisse's ignorance, denial, or contradiction of this truth, (so far as it is a truth) is a mere nonentity, that cannot be seen by all the Eagle-eyed ones in the world. But I rather think that Eagle-eyes do sometimes sleep as well as others, and then I suppose they see no more than others; yet then perhaps the fancy or imagination even of Eagle-eyed ones may dream of nonentity, and feign to themselves and their own imaginations mere Chimeras.  
But say you, Sir, that the Doctor doth not only say, that negatio punitionis, the negation of punishment, may be called remission of sin; but also that negatio volitionis puniendi, the negation of the will, or the denial in the act of the will to punish, (that is, the purpose and resolution of the will, or a willing not to punish) may also be called remission of sin, and that the nature of forgiveness may be said therein to consist.  
And I answer, Sir, 1. Yet that doth not infer that either he doth contradict you, or that he doth deny what ye affirm about the point: For, say you, the nature of remission of sin consisteth in the taking away of the punishment itself; so saith the Doctor, that the very quiddity of remission of sin is punitionis negatio, the denying of the punishment, or the denying to punish; and what is that but to take it away? How doth he then contradict you, when he affirmeth the very thing that you affirm? But 2. whereas he saith also, that remission of sin is negatio volitionis puniendi, the denial of the will to punish, or a will not to punish; yet this doth not infer that he contradicteth you, or denieth what you say, but rather that he affirmeth the same thing with you, and doth only add somewhat thereunto: which is not, I hope, to contradict or deny what you say. You affirm, that remission of sin is the taking away of the punishment itself; the Doctor saith that remission of sin is indeed, or may be said to be the negation or the taking away of the punishment itself: (This is not to deny or contradict what you say, I am sure, but to say the same with you.) But the Doctor saith also, (and I hope with more reason than you can oppugn it) that remission of sin is or may be said (not only to be the negation of the punishment itself, but also) to be the negation of the will to punish, or the act of the will determining not to punish: But he doth not say that remission of sin is only this act of the will not to punish. Therefore this is to say somewhat more than you say indeed, but it is not to contradict or deny what you say, since he also affirmeth and granteth it. Else when Mr. Baxter saith that remission of sin consisteth in the dissolving of the obligation to punishment, and you acknowledging that same, yet you do add to it somewhat more, and say that the negation or taking away of the punishment itself, is also to be called remission of sin. Doth this contradict what Mr. Baxter saith? No, yourself do affirm that you do not contradict him in so saying. And whether doth the Doctor contradict what either of you saith, because he saith somewhat more (rationally) then both of you say?  
3. But further, Neither doth the Doctor say (in these words transcribed by you) positively, that the determination of the will not to punish, is formally remission of sin: But he saith only disjunctively, thus; The remission of sin, in the nature of it, is nothing else but either the negation of the punishment, or the negation of the will to punish. Leaving it fully free to you, which part of the disjunction to choose, and which you please you may like best without any contradiction of him to you, or of you to him, if you choose either of those disjunctive parts. And where is then the Doctor's contradiction of you, or his denying what you affirm?  
But lastly, Sir, what if the Doctor should contradict you by affirming indeed what you so much labour to disprove in him? I say, that he than doth no more contradict you, than you do contradict the truth; and your contradiction of him, (even under all the great patrociny and protection with which you conceive yourself securely sheltered) is nothing less than the contradiction of the truth itself in this point which we do now insist upon: Which that it may rationally be made out, let,  
1. The question be stated, Whether the will of God not to punish, be in itself, and can be (so) properly called pardon, remission, or forgiveness of sin. And  
2. Let it be supposed and granted, that the Great Twiss doth affirm, that Volitio non puniendi, or negatio volitionis puniendi in Deo; the will of God not to punish, may be properly called pardon, remission, and forgiveness of sin. And  
3. Do you but come out into the field, and deny this truth which the Doctor affirmeth; as you do indeed in your Exercitation, and Mr. Baxter also doth labour much to disprove it, by many seeming reasons, or sophistications rather, and by manifold absurdities which you and he doth allege it inferreth, etc. Then  
4 Notwithstanding all those terrors, yet under the shelter (of Truth, and) even of the famous Doctors umbra, though himself be gone from amongst us; against you, and all the shelter you have or can expect from all his living Antagonists, if Scriptural reason may be Judge, I dare stand up and affirm, That the determinate purpose of the will of God from all eternity, not to punish the sins of his elect in Christ with eternal death, is properly mental pardon, remission and forgiveness of sin, in the breast of God; and may, yea ought, properly, and most properly to be so called. Yea, I do aver this to be such a truth, and so clearly evident to Scriptural reason, that I do profess, that though all the Devils in hell, and all their erroneous instruments on earth, were each and all of them turned into Angels of light, employing all their delusions to oppose it, I would not fear the shaking of it: And I am eagerly desirous to come into a formal, rational, and methodical dispute with you about it, and the consequents of it, to shame and canvas all your sophistications against it, and to retort all your absurd consequences, by manifesting the absurdity of all such irrational illations. For I have looked over all your reasonings against it again and again, either where Mr. Baxter or you purposely do dispute against it, or where you touch and hint at it but the the by. And I do profefs I can give no better censure of them, but that each and all of them are either false and fallacious, or quite irrational, as being quite besides and out of the way, and nothing at all against the present truth in question.  
And although I would be glad to particularise this censure, and make it good in each of them, yet I cannot have the opportunity to do it at this time, and it would be too much for an Epistle: Therefore I shall only here, as briefly as I can, propose such an Explication of the present Truth, as that, in my apprehension, may make it evident of itself to every rational consideration of it:  
First therefore, I dare appeal to the most common vulgar sense and reason, about the truth of the point in general: Whether the purpose and resolution of the will not to punish delinquencies and faults, be not the real pardon, remission, and forgiveness of these faults and delinquencies? Let any rational man retire himself, and look back with reflecting thoughts upon the actings of his own soul and the faculties thereof within himself; and let him consider, if that whensoever he had taken distaste, or hatred and displeasure against any person, by reason of any fault of commission or omission, or upon any consideration whatsoever; and if it were in his hand to punish him, any manner of way which he pleased; let him consider, I say, whether or not that all along the time that he did retain a purpose and resolution in his will to punish the delinquent, some way or another, the fault itself and the person for the fault, was not unpardoned and unforgiven? But so soon as ever that either by an act of his free favour, or by some satisfaction offered or given, or upon any consideration whatsoever, he hath laid aside the purpose to punish the delinquent and the delinquency, and is so well pleased with him, that he doth take up a determinate resolution and purpose not to punish him; yea, he doth determine moreover, that at that time he shall think fit and most convenient, he will bestow many special favours upon him, and keep him continually in favour with him; yea, never resolve to cast him quite out of his favour again: I say, let any ratinal consideration reflect upon such actings of the will in such resolutions and purposes as these, and let it be seriously thought upon, whether at the very passing of these  acts of the will towards the delinquent, (though the delinquent know it not yet himself) both he himself and his faults be not pardoned; and whether the very passing of these acts of the will, that is, whether those same  purposes and resolutions of the will not to punish, but to bestow so many favours, be not really the mental pardon, remission, and forgiveness of the delinquent and his faults; and whether it may not, ought not, and must not properly, yea most properly be so called and styled, if we will call it any thing at all, to distinguish it from other acts of the will towards the same object? The truth is, I think it so clear, that I count him senseless, or wilfully irrational, that dareth to deny it.  
Take another illustration of the point, thus: A King hath a number of his Subjects broken out in rebellion against him; let it be supposed that they are but mad in doing of it, and that he can take order with them and punish them when he will; yet he is pleased out of his free, absolute, and royal favour, to decree, purpose, and resolve within himself not to punish those Rebels, but in due time, at the intercession (and perhaps the satisfaction some way or other) of his Son or Favourite in their behalf, to bring them home to himself, and to prefer all and each of them to places of honour about himself, and never to degrade nor reject them out of his favour, nor from their places of honour again; Is not this very decree not to punish, and to restore into favour, real and mental pardon, remission and forgiveness of these Rebels and their rebellions, in the council of the Kings own breast, heart, mind and will? and is it not properly to be called so? Will any, after this  decree of the Kings will, not to punish the Rebels, is passed, be so irrational as to say, that the Rebels are not mentally pardoned in the Kings own breast, and in the cabinet-councel within his own heart? And what though none know of it but the King's self, yet is it a real pardon, though a secret one: And what though the Rebels themselves come not to know those  acts of their Sovereign's will and pleasure towards them for a long time after, as being perhaps a thousand miles distant, or by some other impediment, or upon some political consideration kept from hearing of it? yet is it notwithstanding a real remission, and really passed in the King's breast, though not knowingly to them. Yea last, what though the full fruition of the King's favour be suspended to the Rebels for a time, and till such or such a condition be performed by them; and that it be with such a caution, that if after their reception into favour they fall into lesser faults, they shall be chastised with lesser stripes; yet all this doth not obstruct the reality of their pardon and remission, as to the main point of their lives: For he is fully determined not to punish them in that highest degree of punishment, so that they are fully pardoned as to that; and as for the condition of their enjoyment of his favour, if the King himself hath fully and absolutely determined also to bring them effectually to the performance of it, what can be a more absolute pardon, and a more complete remission than this? and who can deny it to be such?  
Now, Sir, the application I leave to yourself, for it is obvious: For hath not the Lord from all eternity determined and decreed not to punish his elect in Christ, for their sins, with eternal death? What is this decree and determination of the will of God, but the real pardon, remission, and forgiveness of their sins, secretly in the breast of God, although it be not known unto them? And what though the sensible enjoyment of God's favour be suspended for a season, until the performance of a condition, which is Believing; yet hath not God purposed also to work and effectuate that faith in them, which is the condition? and doth not that make their pardon, in his breast, altogether absolute? And lastly, what though he hath appointed also to correct them with the rods of men for their sins; yet the pardon of their souls, for the main, that is, from eternal death, is sure unto them, and altogether absolutely determined of God from all eternity: And therefore as to that, they are from eternity pardoned, from all the sins that they shall commit in time; because from eternity he hath purposed in Christ not to punish their souls with eternal death.  
Now this is all that Dr Twiss and all other Orthodox Divines do mention about this point, when they do affirm that the sins of the Elect are pardoned from eternity; viz. That God hath from eternity purposed and determined in his immutable will, not to punish his Elect with eternal death for their sins, but to free them from it. And what is pardon from eternal death, if it be not firstly, chief, and most properly, the determinate purpose of the will of God, not to punish with eternal death? I profess, Sir, I am almost ashamed to use so many words in so clear a case. Who but yourself, and some few others from whom you have drunk in those principles, will, or can deny that Pardon may be properly called the will, or the purpose of the will not to punish? And who else can deny, that the will not to punish, is really, and may be called properly pardon? Truly, methinks, the very first thoughts about the formal conceptions of those words, Remission, Pardon, and Forgiveness, should at the first inform any rational understanding, that they are most properly rational acts of rational and knowing faculties; I mean, that they are rational or reasonable acts, proceeding from rational and reasonable agents; and that they are immanent acts, elicited out of the rational faculties of those agents, I mean in their first, chief and most proper signification: For what is it to pardon, to remit, to forgive, but to resolve not to exact the rigour of punishment, or to lay aside the resolution of exacting strict punishment? As if you be offended at my rude informal way of writing, as you may think; and if it were in your hand to punish me as you pleased; if I should come and require pardon of you, and that ye would forgive me my offence, etc. I profess I know nothing that I should require or desire of you in such a suit, but that ye would freely and willingly be pleased to resolve or determine not to punish me: I say, this is the first thing that I would require and desire of you, that you would purpose not to punish me; and than if you were a man indeed, that is, constant in your resolutions, I would really hope that the punishment effectually should not be inflicted upon me?  
So I say, that which I do conceive is the first and formal conception to be apprehended about these words, pardon, remission, and forgiveness, etc. is the will not to punish. For, what is it that formally I mean, when I do say, I pardon, I remit, I forgive you, etc. What is it, I say, that I mean by these words, but only this; I will not punish you, or I will not deal with you in the strictness of punishment, according as I could, and as ye deserve? I say, this is the first formal apprehension and conception of those words, which is firstly, primarily, and most properly meant by them; although afterwards, an instrument or a grant of pardon, and the act thereof, may be called pardon in a legal or in a law-sense; as also the negation of, or cessation from punishment itself, may be called executive pardon: Yet both those presupposing the first, chief and most proper pardon, which is mental in the breast, or in the purpose and resolution of the will not to punish; from which flow all the other, as secondary, less proper, and more remote pardons, to him who pardoneth, at least; and more improper pardons both to the pardoner, and to the pardoned.  
The truth is, Sir, I think this truth explained upon these grounds, is so clearly evident to the understanding of any rational consideration, (even of a rustic or clownish apprehension) that, as I said at the beginning, if you have any reasonable sense or understanding, you cannot deny it. And yet since the great scope of your whole Exercitation is to disprove it; and seeing that your great Moecenae, at every turn whensoever it comes in his way, doth labour as much also as in him lieth to disprove it; I shall add yet one proof more (and then I shall draw to an end) of the point, to clear the explication of it, both against you and him; and I think, will ye, or nill ye (both) it shall strain an acknowledgement of the Truth in general, from you both.  
1. You say, Sir, that the will not to punish, is not pardon properly: why? because you allege that the taking away of the punishment itself is properly and formally the nature of pardon.  
2. Mr. Baxter saith, that the will not to punish, is not pardon; why? Because (saith he) the dissolving of the obligation to punishment by the law, is properly Pardon, and the nature of it.  
But 3. I say against you both, that in neither of those, the remission and forgiveness of sin, in its form and nature, doth so much and so properly consist, as in the resolute and determinate purpose of the will not to punish. And I prove it thus by one general Reason against you both.  
That which may separated and really severed from the remission, pardon and forgiveness of delinquencies, is not the nature of pardon and remission, etc. (For I hope you'll acknowledge that the nature of a thing cannot be really severed nor separated from itself.)  
But both the real or effectual taking away of the punishment itself, and the dissolving of the obligation to punishment by the law, may be really separated and severed from pardon, etc.  
Therefore in neither of them doth the nature of pardon consist.  
I prove the Minor first, against you Sir, (and your definition of Pardon, viz. That it is the effectual taking away of the punishment itself:) And that by supposing this case, which hath several times actually fallen out; to wit, Suppose a delinquent (or one reputed so) were ordained, appointed, and sent to the place of execution, both by the law, and the will of the King; suppose in the mean time much intercession were made for his life, and that he offered to give reasonable satisfaction for his offence, or that perhaps some witness or evidence did come in which was not known of before, declaring and evincing him to be innocent of the offence laid to his charge; immediately both the King by his will, and the Law, or the Judges by the Law acquit and pardon him; and all haste with diligence is used, and a message is sent to prevent the execution: But (alas for the poor man's case!) the messenger hath a great way to go perhaps, and the time may be short he hath to go it in, so that though he make all the diligent haste he can, before he is able to come at the place of execution, the hour appointed for it is come, and the execution is done. How doth this case, Sir, look upon your pardon? or how do you look upon it? Whether was this man pardoned, or not? take notice how ye answer this question; for you have more therein to contradict, then me, if you deny the pardon; for it is not only I, that will affirm this man really pardoned, by the mental pardon in the King's breast, or by the purpose of his will: But your Eagle-eyed Patron will affirm it with me, That the man was really pardoned, because the Law did dissolve the Obligation to know him, as much as was in it to do; and you shall be (your eyes will hardly see beyond the Eagles, so that) you must not, you will not contradict him, (whatever you would do me;) nay you say your , you will not contradict him in his definition of pardon, to be the dissolving of the obligation to punishment, in sense of Law; only you add somewhat more to his definition, to wit, the effectual taking away of the punishment. But, Sir, say I, if you add that, you must not add it as the nature of pardon, and as the definition of pardon. For here the poor man had pardon, real pardon, yea, full pardon, (not only in my estimation, but in his estimation, whose opinion to you, is of more force than a hundred of my Reasons;) and the punishment was not taken away, but the poor man is executed.  
I profess, Sir, I know not here, what rationally ye can answer; and I have put a stop for half an hour, to my writing, to think what shift you can possibly make for yourself; to evade, and have somewhat at least to say, that you be not utterly silenced; and as yet nothing can come in my mind, which probably you can (be so irrational, as to) allege, but this, That thus it is with man's pardon, or with pardon amongst men; but it is not so with God's pardon.  
But first, Sir, when we speak of the nature, quiddity or essence of a thing, in the definition of it, I think we should take notice, that all definitions of any thing, should be Universal, or universally agreeing to the thing defined, wherever it is existent, in every consideration, and in every subject, where it is found; and that nothing should be put as the nature or essence of a thing, but that which may (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) universally be affirmed of that thing, wherever it hath a Being. Now it is universally true, That where ever there is any real pardon, there is a will not to punish; whether we speak of man's pardon, or of Gods.  
Secondly, I say, That if it be universally so in pardon, and remission, or forgiveness with man, that his will, or purpose not to punish offenders, is really and properly to be called pardon; then any rational understanding will immediately infer, That if there be such a will, or purpose, not to punish sinners in God, then that will not to punish, is really, yea most really, and properly, yea most properly, is to be called pardon in God: For if a will not to punish in man, be pardon, (as I do appeal to any man that hath either sense or reason, and his wits about him, if it be not;) is not such a will, not to punish if it be in God, pardon also? but such a will is in God, from, and unto all eternity, not to punish the sins of his Elect in Christ, with eternal death. Dare you deny this? Therefore there is in God, from all eternity, a proper pardon of his Elect for all there sins, as to eternal death, because he hath eternally purposed not to punish them with that; and therefore as to that punishment of eternal death, they are eternally pardoned in the Breast of God, (although they cannot know it themselves, till they believe;) because God hath eternally purposed in his Breast, or in the Counsel of his Will, not to inflict it upon them, notwithstanding their desert, or merit of it in time:  
But thirdly, Sir, the case may be so put home to you; as to beat you quite out of that subterfuge, and make you ashamed of it; (not only from Reason, which I conceive is done already, but) even from your own, and your Patron's Principles, the Argument holds good against your opinion, That the effectual taking away of the punishment, is not the proper nature and essence of pardon; because they can, and may, nay really they are often severed, and separated the one from the other, and that even in the pardon (not only of man, but) of God, according to the Baxterian, and Hotchkissian principles; which I do make out thus. Let us but alter the former case a little, and see what it doth bespeak unto us: Suppose a King sent a Rebel, or a Traitor to the Gallows, and afterwards, either by a free act of Grace, or upon some consideration, or another; sent a pardon after him, which did arrive and come in time enough, before the execution, and was offered to the Traitor; but he stubbornly doth reject and refuse it, and so is hanged; in this case, the man is really pardoned, and forgiven his Rebellion, both by King, State, and Law as the supposition may be made; and yet the punishment is not effectually taken away; therefore the nature of pardon doth not consist in the effectual taking away of the punishment, for those two may be severed.  
Now what will you deny here, Sir? I say in this case, first, the man was pardoned; will you deny that? yes perhaps, as it comes from me, you will: But what if it come from the mouth of him, that hath the eagle's eye in his head, to see and consider well what he speaks, that it be not amiss? I hope you will not deny it then. Well then, if Mr. Baxter be such a one, as I am sure he is in your account, these are his very words, If such a pardon were brought to a Traitor at the Gallows, and he refuse it, and be hanged, men would say, That the King or State did pardon such a man, but he wilfully refused it. Now Sir, I hope you will not, you cannot in reason contradict the common saying of all men, especially, when he with the eagle's eyes in his forehead is amongst them; and whom in this point you yourself affirm, you will not contradict. So then the man was pardoned by the consent of all; you cannot deny that.  
But 2: I say, that notwithstanding he was pardoned, yet his punishment was not taken away. Will you deny this? sure not; for he was punished, and deservedly too; for else it had been unjust murder, if they had killed him without a cause, although he desired it. And therefore in this case, punishment and pardon seem rather to be all one, (for they go here both together, the man was pardoned and punished both,) than pardon and the effectual taking away of the punishment: for these two are severed here; the man was pardoned, yet his punishment was not taken away, therefore both these cannot be one and the same thing; for, quae realiter separari possunt, realiter inter se distinguuntur & differunt: Whatever things may or can be really separated, those things are really different the one from the other, and therefore the one of them cannot belong to the essence or definition of the other.  
What will be your evasion in the case thus stated, Sir? Perhaps it will be thought the same may be said as before, That thus it may be in pardon amongst men. No, the man with the eagle's eye hath prevented that: For it is to the pardon of God that he bringeth in and applieth the former case, in the words before quoted. And the ground of it is, Because, according to his and your (Arminian) principles, as Christ by the price of his blood hath universally redeemed all men, so God by his law of grace and by his offer of salvation in Christ hath universally pardoned all men: And yet notwithstanding that universal pardon, all the Reprobate (because of their obstinate final rejecting and refusing the grace and salvation offered therein by Christ) are eternally punished. To illustrate which, he bringeth the case mentioned last in the words transcribed out of him:  
Now I will not make it my business here to dispute against that feigned universal redemption and pardon: I do only thereby argue with you for the present ad hominem, That according to your own principles you do most irrationally make the nature of pardon to consist in the effectual taking away of the punishment; whereas many thousands you do acknowledge to be pardoned▪ who yet nevertheless are eternally punished. Therefore pardon, and the taking away of the punishment, cannot be all one, since they are separated the one from the other in many thousands of reprobates, and therefore of necessity must be really different and distinguished the one from the other.  
And thus much, Sir, for the Hotchkissian Definition of Pardon, (to wit, that it is the effectual taking away of the punishment) as it is brought in opposition to the Twissian, viz. That it is a will not to punish.  
Now, Sir, as to the Baxterian definition of Pardon, to wit, That it is the dissolving of the obligation to punishment by the law, or in a law-sense, as he and you do phrasifie it; I say the same against it, that I said against yours, That it is not worthy to be named in the same day with the Doctor's definition, to express the nature of pardon and forgiveness in general: And that because the Doctor's definition doth express universally the nature of (the first, chief, and most properly called) Pardon, wherever or in whomsoever it is found. For, wherever there is any proper pardon, the first, chief, and most proper part and step of it, is a purpose of the will not to punish: Where this is not, there is no proper pardon; and where this is, there is proper pardon.  there hath been any offence given, if the will of the party offended do once freely pass from the resolution to punish less or more the offence in the party offending, then is the offence and the offender pardoned, or then is that party offending fully pardoned and forgiven his offence: And in so far as the will passeth a purpose or resolution not to punish, in so far is the offence pardoned; and in so far as the will doth not resolve to desist from punishment, in so far the delinquent is not pardoned, not the delinquency forgiven. If the will not to punish be conditional, it is a conditional pardon; and if the will not to punish be absolute, it is an absolute pardon; and in a word, such as the will is not to punish, such is the pardon. And this showeth that this Definition expresseth the very nature of proper Pardon.  
The truth is, Sir, this is so clear and so evident in itself, and from its own light, that it is an admiration to me, that an Eagle-eyed one doth not see it. But compare we his Definition in opposition to this, and see if it be so fully quadrant to the nature of Pardon in general, and we shall find it nothing such. Pardon, saith he, is the dissolving of the obligation to punishment by the Law. But say I, the same argument which overthrew your definition, will lay this low also; for this may be many times without pardon, and pardon may be many times without this. Therefore this is not a true definition of Pardon in general, neither doth this express the nature of Pardon in general.  
First, I say, that there may be a dissolving of the obligation to punishment, where there is no real nor cordial pardon; and I prove it by this case: Suppose a King and State hath a number of Subjects broken out in rebellion; hereupon they issue out Laws and Ordinances against them as Traitors, and ordaining death to all that shall join with them. Here is the obligation to punishment passed against them all. But afterwards, when they have done much mischief, their number increaseth, and they become terrible to the King and State themselves; whereupon they capitulate with them, and are forced to cancel all public laws against them. Thus is their obligation to punishment dissolved by the law; but yet the case may be, that notwithstanding of all this dissolution of their obligation to punishment in law, yet the King and State doth never pardon them really, but upon the contrary they keep in their hearts a full purpose to punish them, and chief the greatest of them, who were chief authors of the rebellion, as they can catch them one by one, and one after another at an advantage. Their obligation to punishment by the Law here is dissolved, but yet they are not really nor cordially pardoned; therefore these two are not all one.  
Upon the other hand, real pardon may be, when there is no dissolving of any obligation to punishment by a law; and that in all pardoning and forgiveness of private offences betwixt friend and friend, where there is no statute-law made upon such offences. If I offend you by writing thus freely unto you, (little regarding your authority, as you may perhaps persuade yourself, when you are in terms of opposition to the truth by your tenets,) and hereupon you resolve to punish me by writing as tartly back again to me; and if I, being afraid of such a correction did come and sue to you for pardon; and if you were pleased freely to pardon me, or to pardon me upon condition I would recant what I had written, (which will not, I suppose, be, until I see good reason for it; but if I should, and thereupon) if you did purpose not to punish me, here I would acknowledge myself pardoned my ofsence of you, but I know no obligation to punishment by law between you and me, which would be dissolved in this case; for there was only your purpose to punish me. But, says Mr. Baxter, a purpose to punish, is no obligation to punishment, nor makes it due. These are his very words, and they seem to carry reason with them, (though I must insert this, that he draweth not an Eagle-eyed consequence from them in my apprehension: But thus far is clear from them, if they be true, that) therefore no obligation to punishment in this case can be dissolved, because there was none by law to be dissolved, but only a purpose in you to punish; which if you were pleased to pass from, I would acknowledge it to be a pardon, and thank you too, if ever I should reckon the thing itself a punishment.  
So that in such cases as this, and the former, it is clear, that there may be a dissolving of the obligation to punishment, where there is no real and cordial pardon; as also there may be real and cordial pardon, where there is no dissolving of obligation to punishment. Therefore these two are really different, and may be separated the one from the other; and so they are not one and the same thing, neither can the one be the definition of the other.  
Now what think you fittest to say in defence of the eagle's eyes? for me thinks they are a little dim here. Perhaps you will say, as you do elsewhere, He is of age, let him answer for himself: And truly I am contented to hear you both; and I profess I know not what either of you can say, until I hear you; only it may be that you will say for him, as I suspected you would say for yourself, that these cases are only between man and man, and that it is far otherwise when we speak of the pardon, remission and forgiveness of God. But I suspect that as this shift was but a staff of reeds in your own hand, so neither will it hold water for him.  
For first, I say, that the Doctor's definition doth agree universally to Pardon, both as it is in God, and as it is in man; or as it is an act of God, and as it is an act of man: In both, it is a purpose or resolution of the will not to punish; and therefore it is a more proper definition them either his or yours, which is not universal of all Pardon in general.  
And secondly, I doubt if Mr. Baxter will own you in this difference; for he several times brings arguments and reasons (as he thinks) together with similitudes and comparisons from pardon amongst men, in confirmation and illustration of his sense of the pardon of God.  
But thirdly, I shall but take the case first mentioned against his Definition, and alter it a little, and I am confident to clear it to be so fully applicable to God's pardon and forgiveness also, against his definition, that both of you shall be put to your wits end to seek what to answer to it, or what to say in defence and behalf of those definitions, the brats of your own brains. And thus I put you both to it. The Definition of Pardon which both of you do approve, (for you say you will not contradict Mr. Baxter in his Definition, which) is this: Pardon is the dissolving of the obligation to punishment by the law, or in a law-sense. Now do you think that this is a perfect definition, and that as it is distinct from, and taken in opposition to the Doctor's definition of pardon? Yes, you maintain it, or endeavour to do so at least, totis & junctis viribus, tooth and nail, as the word is. But answer me then this one Argument, (as it comprehends all what followeth, and taketh in also all that is spoke before against the Definition;) and I profess I shall publicly maintain it with you.  
That Definition which neither doth agree universally to Pardon as it is in man, nor to Pardon as it is in God, is a most imperfect Definition:  
But the Baxterian Definition (taken as distinct from, and as it opposeth Twisse's Definition of Pardon) is such:  
Therefore it is a shame to talk of it.  
I prove the Minor, (for I suppose it only needs proof, because of those Maxims of perfect Definitions, Cuicunque convenit definitio, ei convenit definitum, & contra; & cui non convenit definitio, nec ei convenit definitum, & contra; & definitio & definitum reciprocantur, etc. I say, those Topical Maxims make the Major unquestionable; and for the Minor, I prove it) thus by parts. First, it doth not agree universally to Pardon amongst men. To prove which, I first take the cases before instanced, and do suppose them as brought in again in this place, against the Definition, in the very words by which they are before expressed to disprove it; and then further, I add this case unto them. Suppose once again, that a King and a State had a number of Rebels and Traitors; the Law hath put an obligation universally upon them all, and upon all that shall ever be found in arms with them, to the punishment of death; yet perhaps amongst them there may be some of the chief Favourites both of King and State: These the King or State resolveth, whatever come of the rest, to spare, and not to punish, though they should continue in rebellion to the end; or at the end, some others get favour by some means or other, so that the King or the State doth purpose not to punish them; or suppose that some of them did cast lots for their life, and the King did purpose not to punish them whom the lots favoured: I say, those who were thus saved by any of those ways, they were really pardoned, and yet their obligation to punishment was not dissolved by the law, nay by the law they were still liable unto, and lying under the obligation to punishment; (for it is supposed that the law was not, nor could not be repealed, for many inconveniences:) They were obliged to punishment, and that obligation was not dissolved by the law; and yet they were pardoned. Therefore pardon, and dissolving the obligation to punishment by the law, is not all one thing, for they can be really separate and severed, and therefore they are really different the one from the other. The law condemns them, and obligeth them to punishment; only they are pardoned, because it is the King's purpose or will and pleasure not to punish them; and that is their pardon, (according to the Doctor's definition) although there be no promulgation or publishing of it by the law, but that it is only kept in the Kings own secret council, and the Rebels are not put to punishment, but the execution thereof is suspended by that will and pleasure of the King.  
So that the Doctor's Definition is in every case the most proper: For whether we say here in this case, that the Law stands in force condemning, but the Kings will purposing not to punish saves and pardons; (or although Mr. Baxter denieth that a purpose not to punish doth dissolve the Laws obligation, yet) if it should be said, that the Kings will dissolves the obligation of the Law; then say I, it is the Kings will not to punish, that is, most perfectly, properly, and primarily pardon; because the dissolving of the Laws obligation to punishment, is but a consequent following upon the Kings will not to punish: And whether there be any thought of the Law or not, yea whether there never had been an express Law made at all, (as the case may be supposed, that the offence done to the King or State was such, that there was no Law made at all against such an offence, although the delinquents did heinously offend the King or State thereby; and if no law was made against it, than the obligation of no law could be dissolved for the pardon of the offence:) yet the Kings will not to punish, is properly & perfectly pardon. And therefore the Baxterian definition of Pardon is either quite false, imperfect, and impertinent here in this case; or else, if it have any truth at all in it, applicable to the thing itself, it is but in so far as it is all one with the Twissian definition of Pardon; and therefore it is falsely and impertinently asserted for a perfect Definition, and true, as it is distinct from, and taken in opposition to the Doctor's definition of Pardon, since it is only true as it is all one with it.  
But 2. for the second part of the Minor, and which is most against you both, the case will be clearer, and subject to less exception; to wit, when it is spoken of God's pardon and forgiveness: For I say that your definition of pardon doth either not agree at all to that pardon that is in God; or if it do agree to truth and to that pardon which is in God, it is only in so far as it is quite coincident and all one with the Doctor's definition of Pardon; and therefore falsely asserted as true, as it is distinct from and taken in opposition to it. For you say, that Pardon is the dissolving of the Laws obligation to punishment: But I say, that this definition of Pardon doth not agree at all to that which is the most proper pardon in God, to wit, his pardoning of the Elect from eternity, as to the punishment of eternal death. For first, God hath from eternity decreed not to punish the sins of the elect in Christ with eternal death: This, I say, is the real and cordial pardon in the breast of God of all the elect, as to that punishment; and yet they themselves are not dissolved by the law of Grace from the obligation to that punishment, till they believe. So that here the Elect are really pardoned in the breast of God before they believe, (though they know not of it themselves) as to eternal death; and yet their obligation by the law to that death, is not dissolved by the law of grace, till they believe. Therefore these two are not one and the same, nay they are really different, because they may be really severed and separated the one from the other, even when we speak of Gods pardoning and forgiveness of sin.  
I do not think, Sir, that you can justly call this Argument petitio principii, a begging of that which is in the question: For I do suppose I have already done no less than wrested it out of your hands by strength and force of reason, though I do verily believe that any rational unprejudiced understanding would have granted the truth in the point willingly, it is so clear of itself: And whether it be not so, I do again but propose it, and leave it to be judged by any rational consideration; to wit, That seeing amongst all rational men, a willing purpose, or a free resolution of the will not to punish offenders and offences, is really and perfectly pardon of these offences and offenders, and is properly to be so called. So that whosoever hath such a will, freely, not to punish, but to accept into favour, is properly said to pardon and forgive those offenders and offences, which he doth so willingly purpose not to punish.  
Since it is so, I say, amongst all men universally, as when a King purposeth and resolveth not to punish, he pardons; and when any other private man purposeth not to punish other men's offences to him, when it is in his power to do it, he pardons them, whether it be towards equals, superiors, or inferiors: Then also when God purposeth freely not to punish the sins of his elect in Christ with eternal death, doth he not really, perfectly, and properly pardon them, as to that punishment? and is he not properly said to do so? Nay, doth he not then far more perfectly pardon, when he purposeth not to punish, than any man doth? Because a man may resolve now not to punish, and afterwards change in his resolution: but our God is the Lord Jehovah, who changeth not in his resolutions, but is immutable in all the purposes of his will. And if so, then doth he perfectly pardon all the sins of all his elect in Christ, even from eternity; because, first, he hath purposed not to punish them with eternal death; and secondly, all his purposes are immutable and eternal. You yourself not daring to deny either of these; or if you dare deny either of them, let it be but made known by your next, and I dare undertake (God willing) you shall be made ashamed of it.  
But (Sir) again, although this last Argument against your Definition of Pardon, hath mainly related to God's eternal pardon, or purpose not to punish; yet it may be made also good to oppugn your Definition of Pardon, because neither doth it agree to that pardon of God, which is, as you must acknowledge from your own principles, even in time; for when God doth work faith in the heart of a sinner, and doth make him a sincere Convert and a sound Believer in Christ, doth not God purpose, or is there not then a full resolution in the will of God not to punish that believing sinner with eternal death? Yes, Sir, you dare not deny it, unless you apostatise from the fundamentals of Christianity, this being one of the chief thereof, That whosoever believeth in him, and so cometh to him by true faith, him he will in no ways cast out, and that he shall not perish, but have eternal life: And that this is done according to the purpose of the will of God; for this is the will of the Father, that of all those who are given unto the Son, and who come unto him by saving faith, not any one should perish. This is certain then, that God hath purposed not to punish with eternal death the sins of any true believer: I say, that this purpose and intention is in God, (at least when any one doth actually believe, even according to your own principles) to wit, not to punish the sins of any true believer with eternal death, is past question: But Sir, say I, than your Definition is undone, as to the perfection of it in opposition to Twisse's Definition of Pardon. For this you will grant me, which I will lay down for a ground; That what once God hath purposed, he hath immutably purposed it, and cannot change it. If you deny it, let the world once know the atheism of such a principle, and I hope it shall be soon hissed out. But a Believer whom God hath thus once immutably purposed not to punish with eternal death, (and so whom he hath immutably pardoned as to that punishment, and therefore who never can be unpardoned again in the breast of God, because that purpose not to punish with eternal death, can never be recalled again; yet I say, even such a one) may fall grievously (though not totally nor finally, because God will perfect the good work of grace begun in him, in the time and by the means he thinks meetest,) from his first love, not only by heinous sinning against God actually, but by continuing in an habitually sinful condition for so long a time, too too much sad experience doth dolefully testify this to be too true, alas for it! yet the foundation of the Lord standeth sure, and he knoweth who are his own chosen ones, whom he hath immutably purposed not to punish with eternal death; so that he will never change that purpose, and therefore they are fully and perfectly pardoned in his breast for ever as to that punishment. And yet notwithstanding all the time of that their foresaid sinful estate and condition, the Law threatens them, and obligeth them to punishment for their sins, even to no less than eternal punishment; for such it threatens to all universally living in such sins, as even a Believer may fall and continue in for a season.  
Here the person is pardoned in the breast of God as to eternal punishment; for he hath immutably purposed never to inflict that upon him, because a Believer, though in a backsliding condition; and yet the obligation of the Law unto that same punishment, is not dissolved actually as to him living in such an impenitent and sinful condition; (at least this must be most certain, according to the Baxterian principles, which do acknowledge no sin to be pardoned, and so the obligation of the Law to punishment for it not to be dissolved before it be committed, and till the sinner actuate faith and repentance about it.) Nay, it threatens him with it, and binds him over to it, as justly deserving it, because of his living and walking in such sins: Therefore Pardon is not the dissolving of the Laws obligation to punishment; because here there is Pardon, or a purpose not to punish with eternal death in the breast of God, which perfectly pardoneth, absolveth, and freeth him from the real danger of that death, which is a real and a perfect pardon from the punishment thereof; and yet the Law is not dissolved from its obligation of him to that punishment, but is of force against him, binding him over to it, as his due desert in himself, because of his sins, and so sinful a condition. Therefore these two are not all one, to wit, Pardon from eternal punishment, and the dissolving of the Laws obligation unto that punishment. For here in this case they are severed and really separated one from the other; therefore they are really distinct one from the other; and hence the one cannot be the nature, and express the definition of the other.  
I do profess I do here again, and more than ever, stand a little and amuse myself what can be answered by you, especially upon the Baxterian (Semi-Arminian) principles, which go so nigh to affirm that such a man in such a case should be looked upon as quite and totally fallen away from grace; and that the law of grace doth dissolve the obligation to punishment for no actual known sin, far less to a habitual living in sin for a time, till actual faith and repentancc be newly performed. But here the sinner is supposed to lie not only in a sinful, but in an impenitent condition; so that the law of grace cannot dissolve him in such a condition from the obligation of the law of death, to the punishment thereof. And yet he that should say, that in the supposed case, (wherein the person is supposed intentionally in the breast of God to be freed and absolved from that punishment of eternal death, and so to be perfectly pardoned as to that punishment, because God is supposed immutably to have purposed not to inflict it upon him, because one supposed also to be elected in Christ, and once a real and true believer: I say, that whosoever dare fay that) such a one, though in such a condition, is not really and perfectly pardoned, as to the punishment of eternal death; he dareth to belie the Truth of God to the face, which showeth us, That God is immutable in all the purposes of his will, (and so one once freed from eternal death by a purpose thereof, can never be in real danger of it again, although he know not so much and therefore aught to fear it in himself;) and that though he chastise his children and people, once in Covenant with him, by Faith in Christ, and correct them for their sins, when they turn away from him; (So that a believing sinner, in such a back-sliding condition, may indeed be, and is in danger of falling under many sad strokes of providential, fatherly, and castigatory corrections of several sorts: For I never do say, that God hath purposed not to inflict upon him any of those temporary chastisements, by which he useth as means to bring home to himself, his sheep that has gone astray from him, and bewildered themselves by wand'ring in the vanity and wickedness of their own inventions for a season; and therefore I shall not much make a quarrel with the Baxterian princip es, for saying, That Believers are not perfectly freed in this life, from those temporal and correcting strokes of fatherly and loving chastiments; because, as is said, God hath not purposed not to inflict such temporary corrections upon them for their sins, in their estrangements from him in this life; yet I say notwithstanding of all those, his truth, That although he correct them with those rods of tender and fatherly-hearted men,) yet his mercy and his loving kindness, he will never remove from them; nor break his Covenant with them, by quite again turning them out of it, whom he hath once taken within it, in Christ.  
Now Sir, if you will grant those Truths, and say, That that purpose of Gods will not to punish such an Elect Believer with eternal death, doth dissolve the Laws Obligation, as to that punishment, he being the supreme Lawmaker himself: Then, I say, first, That if Mr. Baxter say so, he will contradict himself in the defence of his own definition; for he saith and affirmeth expressly, That a purpose to punish, is no obligation to punishment, and that a purpose not to punish, is no remission of any such duness' to obligation, and so no dissolving of any obl gation: And if you, Sir, say so for him, as, if there be any truth in that which he and you say both, in the point of difference about the definition; you must say so, and can say nothing else, for aught that I know, to the supposed case; then I say, That the Baxterian definition, so much contended for, falls to the ground, because all the truth that is in it, is co-incident with the Doctor's definition of pardon, to wit, That it is a purpose or determination of the will not to punish, which is perfect pardon in itself, Whether the Law be dissolved, or whether there be any Law to be dissolved, or not at all: And therefore it is most irrationally maintained and disputed for so much, as true, being taken as distinct from, and in opposition to the Doctor's definition of pardon; from which, his hath all the truths in it, if it hath any in it all, in the cases propounded. I have one case yet more, Sir, briefly to propound against your so much fought for definition of pardon, and then to concluded, by trampling it under Twisse his definition, so that it shall never again rise to oppose it. The case is this, Sir, Suppose, when Adam had fallen, that God had not proclaimed unto him the Law of Grace in Christ, the Seed of the Woman, immediately after his fall; I think you will acknowledge the case supposed, and the supposition possible, for it was in the free choice of God, how, and at what time to reveal the way of Salvation to lost man man by the Messiah. Well, you will say, let the case be supposed, What will ye make it; only, Sir, I would desire you but to answer me this one question. In that supposition, and before there was any Saviour revealed to Adam, could not God have pardoned Adam? Or could not he, freely have forgiven his sin of disobedience to his commands? And that, without making known unto him a way to forgiveness by Faith in the Son, and Saviour of the World. It may be now, Sir, you may guests, and give a hint at that which I aim at; and I can also, by remembering what I read in your Book, conjecture how you would answer the question, if you be steadfast to your Tenets. But the truth in my thoughts is, Sir, that I do esteem that opinion from which I do conceive (by what I do remember I did hear you speak, a little to, once or twice in your discourse, when I sell first in conference with you) That you would draw your answer to the question here proposed, I say I do account that opinion (from which you would answer the question proposed) to be no less than Blasphemy; for so it sounds in my ears, every syllable of it, and so my thoughts cannot ruminate upon it otherways; and therefore in words I can afford no better expression about it, who ever be the authors and abettors of it; and if you please by your next, to call for an account of so harsh a censure, I hope you shall as readily have the grounds of the censure, as here you have the censure itself: In the mean time, Sir, I do propose the question above named, to any retional understanding, and I am confident, the very rational light of natural Reason will dictate unto me this answer, That God might, and could (if he would) have pardoned Adam freely without infinite satisfaction; nay, I say, that there is no impossibility, nor repugnant implication of contradiction in this supposition: But that when God called to Adam in Paradise, as he fled (foolishly) for fear, and shame, to hid himself; and after he had convinced him of his sin, and drawn him to an humble acknowledgement of it, as Nathan did to David; and of his guilt, and desert of death, that immediately, upon that acknowledgement, it was possible; and no implication of contradiction in it, That God might not only have pardoned him, as Nathan declared David to be pardoned: But he might also have immediately (if he had pleased) translated him to glory, by taking him up presently to himself, so that he should have lived no longer upon earth, as he did to Enoch; I say, the light of nature demonstrateth, that God might, and could have done so, if he had pleased, without any wrong, or contradiction to his Righteousness and Justice for the rational light of nature dictateth this principle, That the will and pleasure of the absolutely supreme Lawgiver, Maker, and Governor of the World▪ is the absolute rule of all Righteousness and Justice: If you think otherways, Sir, tell us by your next, and perhaps you shall be told again, That you think irrationally. Well then, I will suppose, until I hear from you, that God might have so pardoned Adam before he had revealed unto him, that his Messiah, Christ, the Seed of the Woman, was appointed to destroy the works of the Devil▪ And in that supposed case of pardon, Sir, What say you to the Baxterian definition of pardon? Where would then have been the dissolving of the obligation to punishment by the Law of Grace? When in the case supposed, the Law of Grace would not have been at all proclaimed, to dissolve any obligation to punishment by the Law of Death: What would have been more in such a pardon, in that or the like case, than the mere free and gracious will of God, freely passing from his right of the strictness of rigorous punishment: and so resolving not to punish Adam by death, for the disobedience of his command? I think it is here clear as the Sun (not over clouded) at Noon in a bright day, That there would have been nothing here in such a pardon, but the will, and the purpose of it, not to punish, and so freeing from deserved punishment; and yet this would have been as perfect a pardon, I think, as Adam would have desired, and it would have been as proper a pardon as any that could be so called. The truth is, Sir, I wonder not a little, that eagle's eyes did not see through so far, as to reach the consideration of those, or some such cases, when they did look about them every where to catch hold on all the stones they possibly could, to cast at Dr. Twisse's definition of pardon, which they look so much a squint upon.  
But perhaps, Sir, you will yet inquire what the case above mentioned will make against the Baxterian definition of pardon? and I will yet again tell you, it will throw a stone at it which will do more to it, than all that both of you can throw at Dr. Twisse's; and that is, it will lay it flat on its back, and measure it with the earth because it is but a most imperfect one, and no definition at all of pardon, since in any possible supposition it can be really severed and separated from it; for I hope, you will acknowledge the nature and essence of a thing in its true definition, cannot in any possible or imaginable consideration be really separated from it, as is said before; for else a thing could be really separated from itself, which is a contradiction: Homo, I think, & animal rationale, cannot possibly, be separated and really severed the one from the other: And, Sir, if ye can possibly mention me but one case of pardon, that hath not the Doctor's definition of pardon included into it, I shall quite you the cause, and never more dispute against you, nor your definition either, nor against any other Baxterian principle; for I am sure, that pardon, remission, or forgiveness of offences, is a rational and voluntary act, showing mercy upon some deserving or supposed to deserve punishment in whomsoever it existeth; and that cannot be done without the consent or purpose of the will, not to punish.  
I have almost done now, Sir, with this dispute (its time ere now, perhaps you may think, and truly so do I myself, if I could have left it sooner, after I did put hand to the Pen about it: But now, I say, I have near done with it) were it not to tell you, (now when I think on it) and to accuse myself for it, that I might have saved myself a great deal of this labour, if I had minded it well: You, and others perhaps, may think so to; but I believe the ground of our thoughts are not the same, whatever yours be, Sir. I will tell you my ground, why I think I might have spared most of my pains; in thus disputing against your definitions: I had thought always hitherto, Sir, that Mr. Baxter and you had been utter enemies to Doctor Twisse's definition of pardon. I am sure, I think any other would have thought so to, for I am confident, that by you both, there have been above a hundred weapons spent against it; that is, that Mr. Baxter and you have used a hundred and odd Arguments, and (at least, seeming) Reasons against Dr. Twisses definition of pardon, and the consequents of it: For in one place of one of his Books, Mr. Baxter formeth (or feigneth) no less than forty Arguments; and I am sure, in the rest of that Book, and his other Books, he hath above other forty form against it, in itself, and its consequences: And I am persuaded in your little Book, there are above twenty (seeming) Reasons and (feigned) Arguments against it, in itself, and in its consequences. Now, I say, that all this quarter that you keep, and all this stir that you make against that poor definition of the Doctors, would have made another as well as I, think, that you had been indeed enemies to it; and when all comes to all, and now I consider better upon it, I think there are none greater friends to it, than ye, and none does more maintain it, than ye; so that if Doctor Twisse had been desirous of two sure and solid Pillars to underprop his definition, when himself was dead and gone, Mr. Baxter and Mr. Hotchkis, might have been the two men for his purpose; and that in those very definitions which they would seem to the world to bring, and which all the world would really think they did indeed bring in opposition to his. I verily believe, Sir, that you do think I jest with you now, but really you are mistaken with me, in thinking I speak in jest, when I speak in good earnest unto you, as well as I was mistaken with you, in thinking you did, in earnest dispute against Doctor Twisse his definition of pardon; when, it seems to me now, you were but in jest against it, and only disputandi gratia, to show the acumen and sharpness of your wits, even in disputing pro utraque parte contradictionis; when you are really for it, and do bring one strong Argument (I dare say as strong and stronger than any, yea, than all of the hundred that you have brought seemingly against it) to maintain and defend it. In plain terms, Sir, I see, its dangerous disputing with Eagle-eyed ones, for they will see much that others cannot see; yea, they may persuade others that the Moon is made of Green-cheese, and that they are disputing against a definition, when they are really disputing for it; and that by such an argument as in my judgement is no less than unanswerable, even by themselves, if it were formed against them both, thus. The dissolving of the Laws obligation to punishment, according to Mr. Baxters' definition, and the effectual taking away of the punishment itself, according to Mr. Hotchkis his definition of pardon; is properly pardon, or the nature of forgiveness of sin; but, the will of God not to punish (which is Dr. Twisse his definition of pardon) is the dissolving of the Laws obligation to punishment, and the effectual taking away of the punishment itself: therefore the will of God not to punish, which is Dr. Twisse's definition of pardon (so much seemingly, at least, oppugned by Mr Baxter and Mr. Hotchkis, yet) is true and really, or properly pardon, and the nature of forgiveness of sin. and that even according to Mr. Baxter and Mr. Hotchkis themselves, and their own principles and definitions, notwithstanding all their seeming disputes against it.  
I do not speak truth, Sir, if I think not really, That although there had never another Argument been brought to defend Dr. Twisse's definition of pardon, to be true, and to express fully the nature of remission of sins, but this one: It had unanswerably done, and doth now (against yourselves) irrefragably and unquestionably the business to the full, against all that would not irrationally oppose it: For, I know not a thought that can enter in any of your heads against the Argument, but to make a demur a little, and with scrupling thoughts to be touched to the quick by the Minor: And when you have vexed yourselves in an irksome consideration about it, I am confident, That the light of your own Reason shall necessitate and force from you, a plain (though, because in contradiction to yourselves, a forced and unwilling) subscription to the truth of it; at least, I am sure, and fully persuaded, that every unprejudiced rational consideation (besides yourselves, and that is all I care for, if you should deny it) will willingly subscribe to the truth of the Minor Proposition; for there is nothing in it but this, That the will of the most supreme, and most absolute Lawgiver, to pass from the strict rigour of the punishment (that he might have justly inflicted by virtue) of a formerly published Law, and not to punish according to that Law, as that will doth eo ipso and de facto, immediately and fully pardon the Delinquents against that Law, so it doth eo ipso and de facto, immediately destroy and dissolve the obligation to punishment by that Law, and doth effectually take away (since his will is omnipotent and irresistible; and therefore always effectual, as well as immutable) the punishment due to delinquents, according to that formerly published Law: And whether that such a will not to punish be signified, either by another Law, or by a simple Declaration of it, or by the effects of it, that is nothing material; for still the will itself of the absolutely supreme Lawmaker, and in itself (however it be published) doth dissolve the obligation to punishment, and effectually take away the punishment itself, as to the thing itself, and really, although it may be not for some season to the knowledge of the pardoned by such a will, yet I say really, reipsa, and in effect such a will (of an absolutely supreme, omnipotent, and immutable Lawmaker) not to punish by the Law, doth take away effectually, both the obligation to punishment by that Law, and the punishment itself, according to that Law; from those that are the objects of such a will not to punish, and so who are really and effectually (although they did not know so much themselves, yet in the Lawgivers Breast) pardoned by it; and so are for ever out of real danger of falling into that punishment threatened by the other Law, (because an immutable and omnipotent Lawgiver hath purposed not to inflict it upon them,) although they may in their own apprehension, and so far as they know, or for aught that they have for assurance to the contrary, be under an apprehensive danger (as I may call it, for it is not real, but really and immutably taken away) of that punishment due to them, according to the former Law, until the time that the Lawgiver himself think fit to make known his will not to punish by that Law unto them, either by publishing another Law, or by a simple Declaration of his will, or by the real effects of it, or some way or other, as he thinks fittest himself.  
If these be not the dictates of Natural light, I know not what are such, (and these are nothing but the Minor of the former Argument explained;) and I leave it to the rational consideration of others, without prejudice, to judge and determine about them: Only this much I add, Sir, to you, and Mr. Baxter, that I think you will not deny, That the Covenant or Law of Grace, is nothing but the will of God, not to punish by or according to the former Law of Death, so (and in such terms as it runs upon, to wit, of appointing Salvation by Faith in Christ) published, dissolving the obligation, and effectually taking away the punishment of the Law of Death, which is all I require; for it is the Minor of the former Argument, which I leave you to ruminate upon, and to question quietly between yourselves too. Whether it be your Argument or mine; until next time, you be pleased to let me hear from you both, how you have determineed the question between you, and I shall, I hope, God willing, give my thoughts upon what shall be the result of your determination.  

I Have done now, Sir, (at this time at least) with the defence of great Dr. Twisse's Definition of Pardon and Remission of sin: And if you would know how I do after such a dispute; Truly, Sir, I'll tell you freely, I was once or twice weary at the length of my writing, since it was to be enclosed within the precinct of Epistolary lines; but I am not yet weary of (nor will be, I hope, when I am more put to) the defence of the controversy itself, and the disputes about it, or the controversal consequences and consequents depending upon it, and having connexion with it: As likewise, Sir, I'll tell you now, what I told you not before, That although now when I look over my papers, reckoning them and the time taken up in writing of them, I do perceive I have spent most of the hours in three days, in putting my extemporary conceptions upon four full sheets of paper anent this question; although, I say, I have spent so much time and pains about it, yet not only when I did first hear your discourse in your Dissertation, which was precisely this day fortnight ago, I had no such intention, but till Tuesday morning last passed about six a clock, and now it is Friday in the morning a little after the same hour, I had not so much as a thought to touch the Doctor's Definition, or the defence of it against you; but I had passed it over lightly in your book, as I had several times done before in Mr. Baxter's, (though not without a little indignation, I must confess, at the boldness of you both for it, in contradicting so regardlessly the Doctor in so clear a truth) without taking any resolution at all to make a question about it, and the points depending upon it, with either of you; but only to touch a little the point that is first put down in this Epistle, in the lines directed to your Patron himself, and immediately to go on to the work that is now to follow in some lines moe, to be directed to you indeed, but having reference to him also, both of you being to be equally concerned into them: (as I think in all or most other differences you must either stand or fall together.)  
But, Sir, (as is said) upon Tuesday morning, as I was about presently to fall upon the task now to be in hand, it did come into my mind, that if it were but in a parenthesis, or in some few lines, I might only tell you, that you and your Patron wronged the Doctor that is dead very much, and that in disputing against him (in my apprehension) merely sophistically, (and hence was the occasion of the fallacy I mentioned, and conceived your discourse sophisticating in, all alongst when you touch the point in question, or the questions depending upon it;) because that in all your disproving of his Definition of Pardon, you do not (or would not, at least, let the world know that you did) take notice, that the only intent of the Doctor by that Definition was to describe unto us, (not those notions of God's pardon, and remission of sins, as it consisteth in dissolving the laws obligation to punishment, by the law of grace, and in the effectual taking away of the punishment itself, those notions, so far as there is any truth in them, you cannot produce a word out of him, I am confident of it, that ever he did deny: But, I say, his intention by that Definition of his, was not to define or explain those Nations in your heads; but to give us his disciples, and you also his antagonists a description, and that as all descriptions of his were, an accurate one of) that pardon of God which is really in God, to wit, that mental and eternal pardon in his breast, by which, from and unto all eternity he doth free and absolve his elect ones in Christ, from the real danger of eternal punishment for their sins in time; this pardon being nothing else, (as the Doctor accurately describes it to our understandings;) but that immutable purpose of his will from all eternity, and (continuing steadfast) unto all eternity, not to punish them with that eternal death, which they otherwise, were it not for that pardon, deservedly must, and would have suffered, for their sins in time.  
This, Sir, was only the the Doctor's mind by that Definition; and yet you will aver, (I tell you of it again, that you may be ashamed of such a calumny, like unto the barking & jarring— at a dead Lion) that so great a man was ignorant of that which every Christian not only doth, but must know, to wit, That by the law of Grace, the obligation to punishment by the law of Works threatened, is dissolved; and that punishment is effectually taken away from believing and pardoned sinners, in the pardon and remission of their sins: And that that great Doctor, whose doctrine (drawn from the Word of truth in the Scriptures, and from those sparkles of pure rational light that in some measure is left in every reasonable breast) about the mysterious, and ever to be adored immutable Decrees of God, and the distinction of them from the execution of them in time, hath amazed the world wherever it hath come to be seen in his Works, for the profoundness and depth of knowledge thereof; that yet, Sir, notwithstanding all his superexcellent labours and works this way, you should dare more nor once or twice in your little Libel, as your Patron dareth often in his Works, to reproach the Doctor as ignorant to distinguish between the Decree of God, and the Execution thereof: I profess I can do nothing but laugh at it, first, for a while; and then afterwards, Sir, tell you, that in my thoughts he knew more of those Mysteries, than a hundred of you both, though all of that hundred had a hundred such Eagle-eyes in their heads, as the other of you two is feigned and imagined by you to have. I do but say feigned and imagined here, but I shall prove it by and by in some things below, and that the more eagerly in great Doctor Twisse's behalf.  
Thus much, Sir, or some such like business, I was only resolved thus to have hinted at in the beginning of the last Dispute, and so to have gone forward: But when once I did begin to write, I could not put a stop to the current of my thoughts, till they had run all the length they did, before I could give over; and they had run further yet, for there was immediately moe to come forth, if I had not violently stopped them; at that last, in my apprehension, so pertinent an Argument to the purpose, and so apposite ad hominem, that I cannot tell yet well whether I should call it yours or mine, without this distinction; That it is yours (Sir) for the matter and medium of it, and mine only for reducing it to a form to your hand; though I did think then, and I do think yet, an eagle's eye might have seen that it might have been so reduced as an objection to himself, if he had so minded the matter.  
Thus Sir, I must be suffered to breathe a little, before I begin a new subject. Yet having some end in such a breathing also, to wit, That if ever you let me or the world hear your thoughts upon what is written unto you before, you would be pleased rationally to take notice of what is material in it, and not to stand too much upon all (conceived perhaps by you) extravagancies, and punctilios of formalities; as knowing that it may be replied unto you, That it was told you before, that you had no elaborate or premeditate Discourse presented to your view, but only the excursions of undigested thoughts, rudely and coursely as they did presently result in the mind, put upon paper, in haste, to kiss your hands, Sir.  
But for all the haste, I have not done with you yet; for I have somewhat more of my mind to impart unto you, about some other particulars of no little concernment, in which I do conceive both your Patron and you are not a little mistaken, or else I am very much mistaken. And to show that one of us is much mistaken indeed, I for my part am so confident that the mistake in that which followeth lieth upon your side, as that I must premise thus much; That although I do imagine that some may think that I do take a dangerous task in hand, thus ever and anon, in one point after another, to be carping and meddling with no others than men of eagle's eyes; yet in the business that followeth to be called in question, I am so far from dreading any danger from such sharpness of sight, that I dare affirm, that both you and your Patron, Sir, are so far from either of you having the eyes of an Eagle in the points you are now to be called in question about, that if I do not prove you both to have no eyes at all to see with of your own, and that therefore you see nothing at all in those points with your own eyes, but that all the dim sight you have (or at least that you have manifested yourselves to have in your writings) about those things, you have it but only by seeing with other men's eyes, and merely relying upon other men's words, without any discerning faculty of your own, to take notice how much, or how far they speak right or wrong: If I do not, I say, make good what here is challenged, (for as harshly and tartly as it may here seem to be worded) against all the four eyes of you both; I do promise to shut and turn away both mine own eyes from ever looking upon a Book again, (after your next to free yourself, when it comes to my hand) whilst I breathe; which I am so far unwilling to do, that if I know my own heart, I would disdain no less than a Kingdom, if it were offered unto me merely upon the condition that I should never look again upon one Book only; and that is such a one, which I believe (Sir) neither of you did ever look upon in your days understandingly, nor minded much to do, if by these prefents you be not somewhat put to it, (so far are we different, it seems, in our estimation and judgement about more things than one, as not only in so many of our different Opinions, but in our pricing and prising but one Book, that you would not care much though you never did see it, and I would not utterly quit the sight of it for all my life, no not for what possibly could be given me from man on this side of heaven, or in the world here below,) And the name of this Book, Sir, so little by you and your Patron, and so much prized by me, is in our language called, The Hebrew Bible.  
And now at length, Sir, is ushered in that which at the beginning of this Epistolary discourse I did chief, yea at this time only intent; (the first discourse to Mr. Baxter being intended at first to have been but as an introduction to this in a very few lines; and this last dispute with you coming in merely by the by, and not being intended when I did begin to write this Missive, at all: But now I say, Sir, at last I am come to that which I chief intent by those papers,) to wit, to inform you of the notice I had taken in perusing your book, of the little notice which you had taken of that Book of books above mentioned, viz. the Hebrew Bible. And here, Sir, I must first, ere I go any further, put both you and myself in mind of this, That there is a far greater business now in hand, than was in controversy between us before, and a great deal more weighty, and more deeply to be taken in consideration, as being of far more concernment in itself and its consequences.  
Before, Sir, in our last dispute, the question was but about the words of a man, though a great one indeed) but here the question will be about the words of one that is infinitey greater and higher than the greatest and highest of men, even about the words of the most High God himself. Before, the Dispute was but about the sensing aright, or the right understanding of an Orthodox Doctor's Definition; but here the dispute will be about the right or wrong interpretation of the holy Spirits definitions in Scriptures, which must be the canon and rule for orthodox Doctors to judge of orthodox Tenets, and for Christians to try the spirits of men in their opinions of religion by. It was not a little wrong done to the dead by you, when you did calumniate and falsely accuse a dead man, even the most knowing and orthodox School-Divine, (for the most profound and deepest controversies in School-Divinity,) of ignorance and error; and that in those very points about which he knew more, (because more was revealed to him from above, what in his naturals and supernaturals together) than I verily believe most of the world did know besides himself; at least I am sure he hath left more behind him to testify of his knowledge in those points, than any of the world hath done besides himself: And therefore, Sir, I say it was a great injury done to his remembrance by you, several times in fifteen or sixteen sheets of paper of your Lucubratiunculoe, and often by your imperious Patron, to accuse and calumniate such a one of ignorance and error, in points for which all his Antagonists will never be able to compare with him.  
But, Sir, it will be found a greater injury done by you to the Living GOD, if you calumniate his words, adding unto them what is not found written in them at all, to make them countenance you and your Patron in your singular opinions. To put more into any man's words, then is indeed in them, to make them either for us or against us in our opinions, is not fair dealing between man and man, nay it is a clear breach of the command that inhibits and forbids bearing false witness against our neighbour: But to put more into the words of God then indeed is to be found in them, is to bear false witness against God; which is as much more a sin greater than the other, as God is above man in greatness, and as his words are above man's words in truth, which is no less than an infinite distance and disproportion in both. I wish, Sir, the matter of those words, or such like, and those or such like grounds, were more seriously laid to heart and more solidly considered, then is the fashion now adays to do; and then the Scriptures in themselves and in their own words would be more diligently searched into and studied; and I hope they shall be much more hereafter studied, then now they are, or hitherto have been.  
But, Sir, to come to the business in particular which hath occasioned this Preface, which I suspect you may perhaps look upon as tartly reflecting upon your own interest and your Patrons; the truth is, Sir, I'll never lessen your conjecture in this point, but by and by I'll add somewhat unto it rather, to the end that the more seriously you may lay to heart what hath been spoken. Only first, Sir, because when that we are to give a true account and estimate of a man or of his works, it is very unjust and unequal to speak any thing of him that tends to his prejudice and discommendation, and not withal to take notice of what is praiseworthy in him, and tends to his profit and commendation: Therefore, Sir, before ● speak any thing further in the things that displeased me in your book, when I first read it, (and which I think should also displease you, when you are put to the consideration of them; I say, before I speak of those offensive places) I will first take notice of one or two passages for which I highly commend you; and that is, because in both of them (I scarce know in how many more you do the like) you have taken diligent pains (forsooth) in searching into the Original of the Word of God.  
The first place, and the chief, which I take notice of as worthy of commendation in this way, is in pag. 322. & 323. of your Book; where you do descant prettily upon the Apostles word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in 2 Cor 4. 18. to draw the emphasis of it to your own ends; neither will I quarrel with you about the force of the word which you do observe there, nor will stand to dispute either with you or against you, in what you chief aim at there, (though I cannot but tell you that I think it a hard saying, to aver as you do in the page before, that there is no command in the Scripture to make God's glory the end of our salvation. I had thought, that in that place Prov. 16. 4. which is the place now comes readiest in my mind, there had been a virtual command to make the glory of God the end of our salvation; for if God made himself and his own glory the end of all his works, since he hath made all for for himself, then methinks that thereby he commands us to aim at the same end with him, in all that concerns us, and chief in our Salvation; yea it seems to me a command of the Law, and light of nature itself, that the main end of the Creature, in all things, even in its own happiness; for as all happiness, and good cometh from the Creator, so all happiness and good should tend to him chief as the end, and terminate in him, and his glory principally; but I will make me no more dispute about that,) only I do take notice of, and commend there, (in that your application of that word of the Apostles, to the scope you aim at) your satirical irony of those below you in knowledge, whom you do with much gravity and majesty instruct thus: But I would that such wise ones, say you, would seriously peruse that place of Scripture, 2 Cor. 4. 18, etc. And that withal they would peruse the original, or at least, suffer themselves to be informed, touching the word in the original, which is translated, etc.  
I say, I do commend, or at least, I do not much disapprove in you, that you do thus keep up the authority of the original, and of yourself, who knows so well the original, to inform those that are ignorant of it with such majestic gravity, and not without a satiric irony, calling them, wise ones forsooth, who in your account there, are but mere dunces, doltheads, or blockheads, even Antimonian Asses. I say again, I do not altogether disapprove that satyr-ironico-peremptory way of dictating your knowledge in the original, to the simpletons that are ignorant of it, upon this ground and reason, if it were for no other, that I know you are not ignorant of the rule, nor are not unaccustomed to the practice of it; to wit that you do to others, and deal with others, as you would have others do to you, and deal with you; and that you do contentedly receive yourself, such a measure from others, as you do make out unto others yourself; (I profess really I am so, freely, in such cases as those, well enough pleased to be told of my mistakes, as I do tell others pleased to be told of my mistakes, as I do tell others of theirs:) So that now, I do hope, you will not take it in evil part, if you be informed yourself, by others; as you yourself do inform others, of ignorance or mistakes in the original and that with a satiric irony (sometimes) when it is dely deserving, (as you do here, because you think so much is deserved:) Although such a wise one as yourself, be joined with another such a wise one, as hath an Eagles-eye in his force-head, if both you, and he be in the same mistake about the original: Methinks I hear you say, yes, you are contented, at least, I say, that you must say so, if you speak any thing equitably, according to the rules above mentioned, and to the Law called, Lex talionis; like for like, is equitable. And so much for a short observation, upon your grave and sharp information of others in their mistakes of the original; the Use, perhaps, will follow by and by.  
But, Sir, I have one question to pose you with, before I leave it: I pray, Sir, why do you not inform others, as well, and as sharply also, about the force and emphasis of the original words of the Hebrew in the Old Testament, as you do of the Greek in the new? is not the one as well the Word of God, as the other? nay, is it not more originally (as to the Language and words) the Word of God than the other? for the New Testament is taken out of the Old, for the whole ●●bstance of it; to wit, the Messiah, Jesus Christ, ●orn of a Virgin, bruised for our iniquities, destroying the works of the Devil, by bruising the head of the Serpent; ascending on high, and leading captivity captive, in whom all Believers of all Nations of the World are blessed and saved, etc. Are not those, and all other saving and fundamental Truths of the Gospel, all taken out of the Old Testament? Why should not then, Ministers be able to inform first themselves, and then teach their people out the Hebrew original in the Old Testament, as well as out of the Greek in the New? especially seeing, that, for the inexpressible emphasis, and ineffable force of the words, and their copiousness in significations, and for so much of Divine Majesty imprinted upon the whole body of the Language, as it lieth in the Books of the Old Testament, it doth go a thousand times beyond all the Languages of the World besides: (Although the Greek, so much of it as is in the New Testament, being the Word of God, is of equal authority to the Old.)  
Should you, Sir, being a Minister of the Word of God; should you, I say, half that Word of your Master in your pains and study about it; should you not account and challenge yourself, as but half a Minister, if you have negligently or carelessly done so? Is he any thing to be accounted of, but as half a Messenger or Ambassador, that knows and understands but half of his Lord or Sovereign's Ambassage or Commission? Or is he a fit Ambassador, that can neither read with his own eyes, nor understand his Sovereign's Commission and Instructions entrusted unto him; or but the half of them? unless by the eyes, understanding, and words of a Translator, or an Interterpreter? What knows he, but his Interpreter may either ignorantly, or wilfully err in delivery of his Sovereign's will and pleasure?  
I wish, Sir, from the bottom of my heart, that these considerations were more seriously (by far) laid to heart, than they are; for are not Ministers Ambassadors of God in Christ? And again, I say, should not an Ambassador know and understand his Sovereign's will and pleasure, in his Lords own words, and not by an Interpreter or Translator only? Yes, Sir, they should; and it is their great sin and fault, if they use not all the means that providence affords them for that end; as he would be a most unreasonable man, to be an Ambassador for a King or State, who would not use the means the King or State would appoint him, of purpose to teach him the Language, which their Instructions must be given and delivered in: What if such an unreasonable man did take so unreasonable an Ambassage, and went therewith to trade with Foreigners, and Enemies perhaps to his Master and Kingdom. And suppose again, that one of the Adversaries (if it were but suspecting his ignorance) did step out, and allege, it was not his Master's Commission he delivered, and that the Articles were otherwise stated and sensed in the original copy, than he did understand by the translation of them; and if he did put him indeed to the trial of the original, how would not such an Ambassador be ashamed and nonplussed? It fears me Sir, that this shall be both your own case and your Eagle-eyed Patrons, ere it be long; and if it happen to be so, I hope you do remember (Sir) that such wise ones must suffer themselves to be informed about the Original, where they do either mistake it, or are ignorant of it.  
But, Sir, (now I think on't) I told you there were two places in your little Book, which I liked better than many others in your Book besides. One of them I have already given you, with my observation on't to be made use of as need requires. The other followeth, and that is pag: 148. & 149. A passage you have there, liking me no less than the former; and in this it liketh me better, that it is out of the Old Testament, and that you do take notice of a very remarkable observation, (I wish you had always so remembered, and bethought yourself so seriously as to have remembered it, wherever there were occasion:) which is this, Sir; That one and the same word in the Hebrew is many times differently rendered by our Translators. By the face of God, is sometimes (say ye) meant his favour; and so it is taken Ps. 51. 11. it being the selfsame word in the Original, (excellently well and emphatically observed!) as is used ver. 9 although it be differently rendered by our Translators, (better yet remarked!) e. g. in v. 9 face, in v. 11. presence. So then I see (Sir) and I do hearty commend you for it, that you do think it deserves to be taken notice of, where the Translators do diversely render the Original, or do differ in one place from their translation of the same word in another place: And so ye do think. I suppose likewise, that it should be observed, when they give divers words in the Hebrew one and the same translation. And all those (Sir) and many others, and such like varieties in the translation, (as when in one and the selfsame place they do give different or divers readings of the Hebrew words or phrases, etc.) I think are necessarily to be diligently searched into, and compared with the Original, before a man can be rightly termed an Interpreter of the Word, for the satisfaction either of himself or his hearers.  
And therefore, Sir, if you fail to be so accurate in your observations between the Translation and the Original hereafter, especially if there be more necessity of accuracy in observation then is here; for the truth is, I see little either of necessity or pertinency of such accuracy here, it being a business that a hundred have in their mouths and put in books, that never knew a word in the Original, that the same word in the Hebrew is translated sometimes face, and sometimes presence; or some such common and tristing expressions, which they have somewhere catcht to make use of, thereby to bear the world, and their hearers or readers in hand, that they are expert (forsooth) in the Hebrew criticisms. But, I say, all is well, if you be always as accurate in your explications of the Original, and comparing it with the Translation, when places occur of some more material consequence to be opened: But I fear me, Sir, it prove far otherwise with you, and that you have been more accurate (I know not upon what account) in this punctilio, when no need required it, (except to show that you had something really of that which you would be ashamed the world should know that you were altogether ignorant of; I say, I fear you have been more exact here, and that unnecessarily) then ever I shall find you all your book over again, even there where you bring Texts of Scripture to prove your opinions in matters controverted, and in dispute with your adversaries. If this prove not true, Sir, than I have lost my conjecturing faculty in such like cases; and if it do prove true, than I hope you will remember, that such wise ones must suffer themselves to be informed about the Original, etc.  
Thus (Sir) I have done with the first part of that equitable estimate I put upon your writings, having declared what I think praiseworthy in some passages of them, and how far. The other part of my estimate followeth, which I hope you will not take in ill part, since I have put that which so highly commends you before, and have showed quam strenue, how manly you have behaved yourself in those praiseworthy passages; and withal I have had observations upon them, so clearly arising from them, that they must several times be made use of particularly as we go on.  
Now therefore I come to declare unto you some passages which did not a little offend, and dislike me; some of which being altogether falsehoods, and those in this matter are not small ones, averring such things to be in the Word of God, which are not in them; others are mere needless impertinences, or gross mistake; all of them bewraying, and be-speaking aloud, Sir, that such a wise one must suffer himself to be informed about the words in the original, etc. Some of those mistake are singly and only your own; others are common to yourself, and your sharp-sighted Patron, under the same culpable mistaking or ignorance with you, and therefore he also must himself be informed about those his errors in the original.  
The first place then, that be-speaks to me here, a necessity in you of information about the original, I did find by casting my eye upon the Margin of the very Page going before your so exact Explication of the original, in reference to the translation, which we touched last; to wit, Page 128. where the truth is, Sir, (I must tell you in the entrance again, and put you in mind of it, that I must speak my thoughts freely to you, what ever they be, as I have a reasonable occasion; and therefore I say, that in the forecited place) you have one, not only of the grossest mistakes, that I think was ever put in a Print Book, but also one of the most impertinent falsehoods; putting that upon, and in the words of God, by one of his Prophets, that there is not the least show, nor appearance of, nay, that there is the quite contrary evidently bespoken in the words themselves, and, which is worst of all, in the translation also; so that I profess, Sir, I wonder not a little how such a mistake should have arisen in a rational head; you are for your own ends, in the Page instanced before, explaining what is meant in Scripture by the face of God, which sometimes is put, say you, for the favour of God, and sometimes for the wrath, and displeasure of God; and here we are directed with a reference to the Margin, where you do place, as a special observation, these words, In this sense the face of God, say you, is sometimes styled the back of God, Jer. 18. 17.  
When I did cast my eye upon your words, I thought somewhat strange of them, for I had never remembered, that ever I had observed any such expression, as that should import the face of God to be styled the back of God: And I thought I did owe you thanks for showing me such a phrase, if there were indeed any such; I did presently, therefore, turn to the place, and there, I profess, I was amazed at the mistake; for I did not only see nothing such there. but the quite contrary, for the words in themselves are these, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnoreph velo panim Erem bejom Edam; and verbatim, or word or for word, as they lie in the Text, translated, they are thus, The neck and not the face, will I cause or make them to see in the day of their destruction; or I will cause them to see the neck, and not the face, in the day of their calamity. Here, I say, I did find nothing such, as the face of God styled the back of God, but the quite contrary, if any thing at all such: For first, the word back is not in that Text at all, but the word neck, for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnoreph doth only signify the neck; the Verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnaraph in the Radical signification of it, importing to cut off the neck, as it were, that is, to behead: but it never signifieth the back; the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gev▪ or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gab, being only used for that.  
Secondly, Neither the face of God, nor the neck of God, is expressly in the Text; but the words may carry this sense; In the day of my people's calamity, when I do scatter them as with an east-wind before their enemies, (which are the words immediately before in the same verse,) then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 erem, I will cause them (to wit the enemies) to see 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnoreph the neck (of my people) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velo panim, and not the face (of my people) when I shall make my people flee before their enemies. The latter part of the verse being taken as another explication of the former part of the verse; this being also a most usual expression to express the running away from pursuing enemies▪ by turning their hinder parts, and not their breast or face to their adversaries.  
But, 3. though both we should take the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnoreph to be translated (in sense at least) the back; and that we should take the words as spoken of the face of God, and back of God, as I think it is most probable they should be so taken; yet I say here is no styling the face of God to be the back or neck of God; but as I said, the quite contrary; the face is opposite to the neck or back of God; as is obvious to the consideration of any at the very first rational view of the words, or but hearing them read, thus: I will make them to see (what? not my face styled my back, but) my back, (or the back of my displeasure and sad afflicting dispensations) and not my face (or the face of my favour and  mercies.)  
The truth is, Sir, I did run every where in my thoughts, and I looked round about me to seek a shift for you here, and I could find none. For first, as to the Translation, although I knew you before to be so excellent a Textuary-Divine as to the Original, that you can accurately teach us, that the same word in the Hebrew is sometimes rendered face, and sometimes presence; and that therefore you could notsatisfie yourself with the translation, if it did vary from the original: And yet although you yourself, I did see, in this place, did differ so much from yourself, in that place about face and presence, in the very next page, as that I was persuaded the Translation could not favour you in such nonsense; yet I did take it, and I did see it (as it could not rationally otherwise be but) quite against you; these being the words of the Translators, I will show them the back, and not the face, in the day of their calamity: where the opposition is clearly kept, as in the original, so in the translation, between the face or favour of God, and his back or displeasure; but not the face of God styled the back of God.  
Then secondly, because I did suppose that so accurate a piece as your Exercitation, could not be supposed to be sent abroad in the world, without the Authors review to take notice of escapes after the Press, therefore I did haft to turn over to the Errata at the end of the Book; but there I did see a number of literal faults corrected, most of which any that can understand English would have easily passed over without scarce taking notice of them; but of this material error and gross mistake of the Original, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quidem, not so much as a syllable of that there.  
Thirdly, I did suppose, that possibly it might be, (though truly I believe ye would not, or at least I think you ought not to have been so careless, if it possibly could have been helped, yet I did feign to myself that it might be) you had not seen your sheets after the Press, and that therefore yet it had been a fault of Correctors at the work itself there where it was a doing, and that they might have passed over some material fault in the work; yet afterwards when I considered the words, I could not possibly imagine how the mistake of the Printers could have been, unless they had purposely done it, and in stead of saying, that the face of God is opposed to the back of God, they had knowingly put in such nonsense, that the face of God is styled the back of God; which I suppose no Printer dared to do, or would have done.  
Yet fourthly, imagining again that a word might have been changed either knowingly or ignorantly, willingly or unwillingly, possibly or impossibly, by some one or another, without the Author's knowledge; yet when I look back to the Original again, I did see it evidently contradict that imagination of mine, and manifestly to clear unto me that the fault could lie no where but upon the Author's own score, in the supine negligence of study and search into, and the gross ignorance of the Original text of the Old Testament.  
For, Sir, you do bring this place of Scripture to prove, that the face of God is sometimes taken in Scripture for the wrath and displeasure of God: Whereas any in the world that hath any spark of sensible reason in them, at the first hearing of the words, even in the translation of them, will clearly perceive that by the face of God here is meant his  countenance, or merciful dispensations; and by his back is meant his displeasure and just judgements; because the Prophet threatneth them thus, I will show them the back, and not the face. So that this is not blind ignorance of the Original only, but intolerable mistaking of the meaning and words even of the Translation itself. I do profess I know not what to call it; only this I am sure of, that you are entrapped and caught without any evasion or way to escape, in one of the greatest, grossest, and most ignorant mistake, that ever a Minister or Ambassador of God (quoad nomen) was taken in or catched, in interpreting a Text of any of his Scriptures. And I hope, Sir, you are a wise one, that will willingly suffer yourself to be informed about the words in the Original, when they are mistaken: You know, Sir, how you use to inform others yourself, and you know yourself well enough, when you know you can inform them.  
But yet, now that (that which you may call) my passion is over, (for indeed I was offended with you in your mistake) methinks there is yet an evasion left for you, by which you may escape the challenge laid against you; and that therefore there hath been too great rigour used unto you. And the evasion may perhaps help you at a dead lift; for it is such a one indeed, that I know a man that hath no less than Eagles eyes in his head, Sir, as you think, who does see it so fit for his purpose, as that he frequently makes very much use of it, if he be challenged with errors and mistakes in his Tenets; and it may be that he may make use of it to shelter you from the storms that seem here to be blown against you, as I am sure it is a shield to himself to keep off many blows that would fall heavily upon him if he lacked it.  
And the way to escape is this, Sir, or at least it may be thought to be so; to wit, That it may be said and conceived you did not speak so much your own opinion concerning the words of the Text above rendered, as that you had what you spoke about the words from another hand, and so they were as much the words of another as your own which you spoke.  
But first, Sir, as to that I say, That that is the most sophistical and juggling way of speaking, that ever any free, rational, or ingenious man did speak in, (nay which doth not become such a one to speak so at all) if he doth not expressly manifest whether he do own or not, and how far he owns, or how far he disowns the words which he relateth: For unless he do so, no man can take hold upon what he saith; for always he will have a backdoor to get out at, whensoever he fears to be nonplussed and silenced; then will he say, he spoke that but as the mind of others, whatever he meant of that, or of any other thing besides that before.  
But again Sir, if either you yourself, or he for you, will use this shift, to free you in the particular, between you and me at this time, than I have two things to say, to stop either or both your mouths, with either of them; and the first is this, That if ever you produce an intelligent Author, understanding the Hebrew Text, that doth sense or nonsense the words in controversy, in your way, I shall be the first that shall challenge myself, as having with a too virulent Pen carped at your mistaken Criticism; and I shall humbly and hearty crave your pardon for it; and that you may oblige me by my promise, and acknowledged duty, to do so, Sir, if you can, I entreat you produce one unto me, by your next: In the mean time secondly, I will tell you and your friend, That if you do produce any such nonsensical babbler, that doth say that in those words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Erem gnoreph velo panim, I will cause them to see, or I will show them the (neck or) back, and not the face; the face of God is styled the back of God, than I will answer, Sir, if you think to evade and escape that way, that your remedy is as bad, and worse than the disease, because the remedy than would be the cause of the disease. For this is your sin, and this is your shame, That you have nothing of understanding, and knowing your Masters own words, but only an implicit faith, to take upon trust your translators words; so that if any one whom you take to be your Interpreter, speak nonsense before you, than you yourself do know nothing, but to follow him, and to dictate nonsense with him.  
And so I will conclude this first place, Sir, by telling you lastly, and minding you seriously of it; that into danger of such inextricable difficulties and perplexities, doth that man put himself to, who runneth as a Messenger and Ambassador about his acknowledged Lord and Master's business, and yet knoweth not (understandingly) to read his Master's Commission, and his Instructions, in the proper Language in which his Lord did deliver them to him:  
I have done now, Sir, with the first Text of Scripture in your Exercitation, much misapplied in prosecution of your Tenets: and I have a little more fully descanted about it, first, because it was a (grossly) material mistake; secondly, because I would in one place put several of my thoughts, that in several such cases afterwards, they may be reflected and looked upon here, as if they were just repeated over again in the same, or such like words, when the like need or occasion requires: And thirdly, this I did here so largely, that hence I might be more brief in prosecuting the rest of those misapplications and misconstructions of other Texts of Scripture, which I have marked in your Book; yea, I do resolve to be now as brief as I can, in all the rest of the places that I shall take notice, (because I am not well contented, that Epistolary lines are drawn by my hand to such a length, as I see they are;) only, Sir, remember that by an equitable rule you must suffer yourself to be informed, etc.   

ABout the beginning of your Book, when I first perused it, there were several places which I did mark, as impertinent and inconsiderate Applications of some Texts, with such mistake as did bewray indeed, little knowledge or study in the original; but yet not so gross and absurd ignorance as the first, which is already passed over. Now as I am looking out those marks which I had laid in your Book, the first day I did see it, I cast my eye upon a passage of yours, which I had marked, indeed, but had quite forgot when I did present to your view those two passages which I did so much commend, and count praiseworthy in your Exercitation: For if I had minded it, it would have been as highly commended and approved by me, as the other two, or at least, I am sure, it had been joined to them as a fellow for a third. The passage is this, Sir, Page 11. wherein your Observations upon the Negative phrases, used in Scripture about forgiveness of sins, this you put down as one of the chief, and most insisted on of any other I do take notice of there, to wit, only let it be noted, say you, concerning the two last places, viz. 2 Tim. 4. 16. and Acts 7. 60. That albeit the phrase in the translation be all one, (both being rendered a not laying sin to the charge of the sinner;) nevertheless the phrases in the original are divers, etc. Where you go on to paraphrase the two places in the original, and to collation them together; Probe factum, say I, accuratissime functus es officio, Reverendissime domine: Excellently well observed and commented, Sir, in tantum, and so far, at least. But hark you, I did once pose you with a question, which hath not well been answered as yet unto me, as I think, I know not if it will be. Why do you not as pathetically comment and paraphrase upon the Hebrew, the original in the Old Testament; distinguishing it, as it is in itself, and as it is phrasified in the translation? Is it because there is not so much matter to work upon that way, in the Hebrew, as there is in the Greek? No, Sir, you cannot say so, for there is a thousand times more in the Hebrew, as it is a Language, by the acknowledgement of all, that ever understood any thing solidly in it. Why then are you not as accurate in study and diligence about the Hebrew, and more than about the Greek? Well, perhaps it may be so complete a Divine is. Let us go to it, and try then.  
The first specimen or proof that I do look upon, to see whether it be so, or not, Sir, (that you do comment and paraphrase, explain and distinguish, comparing together, etc. the original and the translation in the Hebrew, as accurately as you do in the Greek;) is in the sixth Page of your Book; where amongst other Affirmative phrases, as you do call them in Scripture, in which remission of sins is holden forth unto us. This you put as one, His taking away our sins, and for it you quote, 2 Sam. 24. 10. I shall do you the service, as to put down the words for you, which are these, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vegnattah Jehovah hagnaber na et quavon gnabdecha; word for word rendered, they are thus, And now, O Lord, cause to pass over, or cause to pass by, or cause to pass away, the iniquity of thy servant; for the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hagnaber, may indeed be rendered, all those words, cause to pass over, or make to pass by. etc. But that signification of passing by, passing over, or passing away is the only proper signification of the word, it being the Imperative Hiphil from the Root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnabar, He passed over, passed by, or passed away; and in Hiphil, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hegnebir. He caused to pass away, or, he caused to pass by, or Pass over; which is the only proper signification of the word.  
Somewhat I would mark here, Sir, but I will let it alone as yet, till I hear you go on a little further; for in the next words, you say, in which form of words the Church is taught to pray for pardon, Hos. 14. 2. Is it so, Sir? let us see the words then, they are thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 col rissgnavon; Lift thou up, or, carry thou all iniquity: Is this the same phrase, Sir, or the same form of words with the former phrase or form of words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hagnaber et gnavon; no, it is not: The phrases and forms of speech in these two Texts, are as far different from other, as the root (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nasa) is different in the body of the Hebrew Language, or in an Hebrew Dictionary, from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnabar; that is all the three Radical Letters in both these roots being different; which how material a difference it is in the Hebrew, any that knoweth any thing of the Hebrew at all, knoweth, at least, as to the phrase and form of words, which you only take notice of here; saying, They are one and the same, when the words do differ in all their three Radicals, as is said in their form, as they are words; and in their significations also, so far as that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnabar, properly and only, signifieth, he passed over, etc. as is said before; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nasa, doth properly signify, he did lift up, or, he did carry; and hence he pardoned sin, by lifting it up, or carrying it away, as it were, and so in the fut. Kal. 2. pers. sing. m. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tissa, thou wilt take, carry, or lift up, or do thou carry, take, or lift up, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 col gnavon, all iniquity. Now, Sir, your intention is in that second Chapter of your Book, to take notice of the same, or different expressions which the Spirit of God useth in Scripture about remission of sins. And amongst those, first, out of one Text, you give us one form of expression of the Spirit of God, which you say is, take away all iniquity; when that is not the form of expression used in that place of Scripture, to wit, 2 Sam. 24. 10. but this, cause thou iniquity to pass by, or make thou iniquity to pass over. And secondly, with this Text, and the form of phrase and expression used in it, you give us another Text, which you say hath the same form of phrase and expression with the other, when it is not the same, but different from it, to wit, Hos. 14. 2. where the form of expression used. is not, cause thou iniquity to pass over, which was the former, but this, lift thou up, or carry sin away, as was said before in the Explication of those two Roots. Is this, Sir, to show as great diligence and care in searching and studying the Hebrew original of the Old Testament, and to comment and paraphrase upon it, distinguishing it in its difference, and variety, or agreement in its several phrases and forms of expression with the translation, etc. I say, Sir, do you thus show yourself as knowing and diligent to do in the Hebrew, as you use to do, and we have observed you to do in the Greek original of the New Testament? if you do it only thus, I shall not expect to hear any accurate Explication of the Hebrew from you at all, after this. If there be said in your behalf, any thing from the translation, than I will reply, that your observation about the Greek did run thus, I wish such wiseones would peruse the original, or at least suffer themselves to be informed, that the word is so and so in the original, though it be rendered so and so, etc. in the translation; and that it is to be noted, That although in several places the translation be divers, yet the word or phrase in the original is one and the same; and so though the translation in divers places be the same, yet the words and phrases in the original are different, etc. Such and such like are your accurate & critical observations upon the original, and translation of the New Testament: But none such are here upon the original and translation of the Old Testament, only I remember once you were pleased to dictate to us, that in two places of the Psal. 51. the same word in the original was translated in the ninth Verse, presence, and in the eleventh Verse, face; a pretty (or petty) observation indeed: But I doubt, I shall not in haste find the like from you again; but on the quite contrary, I doubt not, but I shall always (hereafter) find from you but just such pitiful stuff as I find here, that is nothing, when ever ye touch the Hebrew, but either ignorant, wilful, negligent, or careless mistake of the original. And I fear, nay, I know, the event will prove in our progress, the thing to be true, that here I conjecture; so that there will nothing remain, but that you must suffer yourself to be informed, when you are in mistakes about the original; as about the end of that third Chapter of your Exeration, Pag. 14. you fall just into such another mistake as we had last in hand; bewraying your far less knowledge, diligence, and study, in the Hebrew, then in the Greek. For in these two last pages of your third Chapter, your scope is to enumerate so many divers Negative phrases in Scripture, about Gods not forgiving and pardoning sin; and amongst those divers phrases, differing one from another in form of words, you make your second phrase to be Gods, not holding guiltless, in the Third Commandment, Exod. 20. 7. to which you add, 1 Kings 2. 9 In both which places indeed, the Root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nakah, is used in the Future tense of Piel, as in Exod. 20. 7. in 3. Pers. sing. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah lo Jenakkeh: The Lord will not absolve, or declare innocent, or hold guiltless; for such is the force of the word in the conjugation Piel, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nikkah, He absolved, he acquitted, he declared innocent, or he did hold guiltless, etc. The Root in kal being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nakah, He was pure, or innocent; and in Piel, He declared to be pure, or innocent, he absolved, etc. And so in the other place of the Kings, it is the same word in the 2. Pers. sing. piel. m. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all tenakkehu; Thou shalt not absolve him, acquit him, or hold him guiltless, or do thou not absolve him, or hold him guiltless, etc. Thus far you go right, and according to your scope, but I suppose, little further; for in the very next words, you bring your third divers phrase, or your third different form of expression in Scripture, about Gods not forgiving of sin; and that is, say ye, Gods not clearing or acquitting the sinner; and for this different phrase or form of speech from the former, you do bring two places, to wit, first, Exod. 34. 7. and secondly, Nah. 1. 3.  
Well, Sir, I have followed your quotations, and in both these places, I do find this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lo jenakkeh, He will not hold him guiltless, etc. But this phrase, and form of expression I found before in two places, to wit, Exod. 20. 7. and 1 King. 2. 9 How then is it another, and divers or different phrase from these.  
Alas, Sir, thus it is to declare your Lord and Master's Commission and Instructions to you, only by a translating Interpreter; not understanding the words of your own commission yourself: Your Interpreters may make you believe any thing they please, they may cause you believe that to be the same, which is not the same, that to be divers, which is not divers, that to differ, which doth not differ, and that to agree, which doth not agree, and that to be an article of your commission, by an instruction to you, which is not an article of your commission, nor an instruction to you at all. And if they can make you believe contradictions, they may make you believe that the Moon is made of Green Cheese, for aught I know; and that every Star in the Firmament is another World, if they would but say so much; for neither of those doth imply so much as a flat contradiction.  
These escapes, Sir, in the beginning of your Book, with the notice taken thus of them, I was the more willing, with all the hast I possibly could, that they should come into your hands; it being but a fortnight bygone, yesterday, since I did first, either see, or hear of your Book: And after I had once run over it; the day I saw it, I did not for nine days following, look upon it more; nor all that time had I leisure to begin to write a word of this missive, directed to your great friend and yourself: Yet when I did begin, I say, for to write unto you, I willingly would not leave off, till I had put a period to the course of my thoughts at this time, especially about advertising you, as I have said, about your escapes in the beginning of your Book; because in the end of it, I do see, that you notify unto us a design of a second part to this Treatise, in which you do propose to yourself, to communicate unto us those several phrases both of the Old and New Testament, which you take to be synonimous, and equivalent to forgiveness of sin, etc.  
But, Sir, how is it possible that you can take upon you to do so much, so daringly? What, Sir, to find out and set down those several phrases in the Old Testament, which you take to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. or equivalent to forgiveness of sin, as you do phrasifie your thoughts about your design, Will you do this, (I say) Sir, out of the Old Testament, when, for aught that I can see in this book, you know not yourself, and by your own eyes, a B. by a Bull-foot in it (as the word goes) in itself, unless that others put glasses of theirs before your own eyes, to look into it by? But, Sir, how can you satisfy yourself with those glasses that others do make and fit for your eyes? how do you know but that they are either multiplying, or magnifying glasses; making things, and words, representing things, either greater or less, more or fewer, and many manner of ways otherways then they are in themselves, unto your view? May not you thereby think things and words to be divers, which are one and the same? to differ, which do agree? and in a word, any thing to be what it is not? and therefore those things which you may take to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, synonimous and equivalent to forgiveness of sins, may be really such to non-forgiveness of sins, for aught that you know with your own eyes. And how shall others take that from your knowledge, Sir, which you know not yourself? Have we not had experience of some of your mistakes, and gross ones too already? why may not you be mistaken in many more likewise? as I am confident you will, if you meddle with many more.  
These advertisements I desire you timously and seriously to think upon, before that second Tractate of yours, that so you do not any more expose yourself to obloquys and reproaches for your mistake, and others to pains in correcting of them.  
And thus, Sir, I have almost done with those escapes about the Original in that little Book of yours, which are only your own, and in which none can claim an interest to but yourself. I am now about to put hand to my last work in this Epistle to you, wherein I must resolve to deal with more than yourself, because another (and that a great one) will be equally concerned in it, so that he must also have a share with you in the following quarrel, be it good or bad.  
In a word, Sir, I'll metaphorize no longer with jesting similitudes; but I'll tell you now in plain terms, that my business behind is to acquaint both you and Mr. Baxter, of some other very material and gross mistakes in the Original Text of the Old Testament, misapplying several Texts thereof to maintain your own opinions, and that in a business of most material consequence, as I shall illustrate it, not by any jesting Metaphor, but by a Comparison in good earnest, justly to a hair representing the case in question, yea being almost the very state of the question itself. The similitude, Sir, perhaps you guess at, for it was named I believe more than once, and more than you did desire before; yet I must touch it again, to show the state of the question, and how material a question it is, more clearly.  
Suppose (Sir) a great King had an embassage to send into a forriegn State, or rather into some of his own Dominions, that he were in some different terms with: Suppose the Commission were drawn up, and the Articles were sealed, and there were nothing remaining but to search for a fit man to carry this embassage: And suppose that one were obtruded as most accomplished for this employment, as having, 1. more sharpness of wit than is in an eagle's eye, to pierce and to pry into the principles and affections of people, to wed them to his Master's interest; and 2. as having a deep understanding and a profound judgement, with most solid reason to discuss all principles of state-policy; and 3. as being excellently well acquainted with the language of the State and people the embassage is to be directed unto, so that he can discourse with admirable eloquence and understanding therein. These three qualifications in so eminent a degree, would perhaps draw the eyes of all to look upon this man, as indeed the (only) man for such an employment; until that one thing come to be objected as an obstacle to this man's preferment, which makes perhaps a little demur about the business. And the obstacle (in my thoughts a main one) is this; That such a man, though never so well accomplished every other way, yet he is altogether ignorant of the language in which the Embassage, and Instructions of the King's Commission is sealed up, and originally written in.  
If I were apud Regem à consiliis ejus, and in this case sitting at or standing by besides the King's Council-table, this one obstacle were enough to draw from me a public and free dissenting voice, or a secret dissuading suggestion from the choice of this so great a man, notwithstanding of all his other abilities, as the absolutely fittest for such a function. Yet notwithstanding of my judgement, though it would be backed perhaps by divers others that were there, suppose that the plurality of voices went upon his side, and he were actually chosen, in consideration of his great endowments, and upon this ground, That notwithstanding he was ignorant himself of that language which his Master's embassage was writ in, yet there was a Translation of his Commission and Instructions sent abroad in the Country for the satisfaction of the body of the people, about the grounds he was sent to treat upon; and that that Translation, for the main bulk and body of it in general, was competently satisfactory in rendering the original Copy of the Commission, for the substance of it, obvious to the understanding of the common and unlettered people; and that therefore it would be sufficient enough for a man so well qualified in all other abilities, to explicate his Commission, and to dispute about his Articles by, against all that could oppose him, in the vulgar language of the people he was sent unto.  
Well, upon this account he accepts of the Embassage and Commission, takes the Translation of it and the Articles thereof along with him, and gets him gone about the employment. When he is arrived at the place he was sent to, he is accepted with all the applause that confluences of people could create unto him, he is so expert in his way to insinuate himself into people's affections: He delivers there to the State he was sent to, the substance of his Commission, and that in their own language, in such exquisite terms of rational and oratory eloquence, that he is admired by some, high esteemed by many, and very well accounted of for his accomplished qualifications by all. In the mean time, he comes afterwards to dispute about the State-controversies anent the Articles of his Embassage; and here also he supposes himself, and is cried up by others, as going beyond by far the most part of all his Antagonists, outreaching them all in sharpness of sight, as much and as far as the eagle's eye doth outreach the Night-owls: Till at length there falls in a controversy to be disputed between him and his adversaries, which nothing could so well determine as the sight and knowledge of his original papers for the articles of his Commission; and the question itself was no less material than this, Who were they that were threatened by his Master's articles and laws in them contained, to be punished as Traitors and Rebels? He did confidently aver, and did undertake to prove it from his Master's Writs, that all the whole Kingdom, both State and People, great and small, good and bad, better and worse, were threatened to be punished, as no less than Traitors, for all their offences.  
This was thought strange by the better sort of that State and People, who not only really were, but did know themselves to be great in his and their Sovereign's favour; and that according to those very Patents of the King which he did bring with him, for instructions to treat about the articles of his embassy: Therefore they did advise him not to be too confident in his sharpness of his sight, about that point; for they would hardly believe it, though he would swear it, that their Lord and Master was either so changeable in himself, in the acts of his own Knowledge and Will, as he would aver, or that he did in his Laws so threaten them who were before reconciled to him, and their ransom or price of redemption paid unto him, as far as was fully satisfactory to justice, to the utmost farthing. They did acknowledge indeed, that they knew their Sovereign's pleasure was such, even as to them his reconciled and ransomed ones, that if any of them did willingly transgress any statutes of his, he would as a Father out of love reprove and chastise them, to reclaim them to walk in his ways again; but that ever he intended or threatened in his laws, properly to punish them as a Judge out of justice, that they did deny, and desired him to consider his articles better, before he did any more assert it. But he d●d constantly continue peremptorily to aver, that all of the best of them were threatened in his Master's articles properly to be punished, even for their escapes and failings, out of infirmity of strength to walk so warily as they would, conform to their Lords laws; (for he dared not freely and openly to affirm, (though he was shrewdly suspected for holding the opinion of it) that any of such reconciled ones could ever become Traitors indeed, and obstinate Rebels to their Lord and his commandments.)  
Well, they did see they behoved to put him to it, and so they do. He saith, he will bring— I do not know how many Reasons and Arguments to prove what he affirms. Nay, but say they, Sir, subtle Wits may frame very many subtle Arguments to prove any thing; and all of us have not Eagles eyes in our foreheads to pry into such subtleties: You must show unto us our Lord and Masters own Writs and Words for it, or else we will not give a straw for your Ratiocinations, if they differ and disagree from those. Whereupon he produceth a number of places out of his translated Commission and Articles. Yea but, say they, those will not satisfy us either, Sir; for those are not our Lord and gracious Sovereigns own words nor writings; those are but your copied out translations, they are not his first and original words and writings.  
Hereupon my Lord Ambassador is put to a stand with himself; and to wish, though too late, that another had now undertaken his business. To say that he knows not whether it be so in the Original or not, that he will not, because he cannot for shame; for the highest of his admirers must cry out upon him then: What? one accounted to be so accomplished an Ambassador, and yet knows not himself, and by his own eyes (though never so sharp-sighted in other things, what then? since he cannot but with another man's eyes and knowledge) read understandingly his own Commission and his Masters own words in the articles of his ambassage? Did any ever hear or read of such an Ambassador? If he be befooled by, his Interpreters, he may befool us in all that concerns us.  
These and such like thoughts will make my Lord Ambassador, nill he, or will he, to produce his Patents; and when they are produced, if there be nothing found in them to prove what's in question, and what he did so confidently assert to be; nay upon the contrary, if in those very words which he doth allege to prove, that his Lords laws do threaten the better sort of his Subjects and most obedient, for their offences, with punishment properly so called, as of justice, and as a Judge, and not only with loving chastisements as a Father; if in those very words, I say, which he brings to prove this, it be expressly threatened only to chastise them, how would such an Ambassador look, and what thoughts would he himself and all others have of his rash undertaking?  
I leave it to yourself, Sir, and Mr. Baxter to think and consider seriously upon it; for you are the two Ambassadors by name, whom I do point at, in all this long storied supposition, of a case you may think perhaps in an Utopian State, or in the world of the Moon: No, good Sir, you are both mistaken; for I have insisted a little the longer upon it, because I think the substance thereof is of great concernment, and may be of much more consequence then either you or I are ware of at present, if seriously laid to heart and considered; as likewise because, as to greatness of distance from your particular concernment, it reacheth and goeth no farther, Sir, than Kederminster in Worcestershire, and Stanton in Wilts, and the Preachers at those places: Those are the two, Sir, who take upon them as Ambassadors of Christ to prove, that he and his law doth threaten Believers to punish their failings with that which is properly punishment, proceeding from no less than the wrath and justice of God, as he is a wrathful Judge, and not only as a Father out of fatherly love to chaftise them with the rods of his mercy, to reclaim them; but even with vengeance, proceeding from his vindictive and revenging justice to punish them. Now (Sir) Mr. Baxter hath been more than once put to it to prove it, and both of you have done all that ye can to make good your opinion from your Master's holy Writs, and from his Articles of instruction delivered unto you, to give out to his people: I will only peruse them, and see if you have need to be informed about the Original of them: Yea, Sir, I have perused them already, and I do see that you needs must suffer yourselves to be informed about the Original of them, insomuch that you have misapplied and grossly abused all and each of those Texts of the Old Testament which you have brought to prove, that punishment properly so called is threatened to the offences of the Godly; when in not any one of them, punishment either proper or improper, is mentioned at all. This (Sir) I tell you I have tried, and found to be true already; and now I have nothing to do but to inform yourselves of it, and to give to any others that desire to take notice of the question, a true account and information about it.  
And (Sir) because Mr. Baxter doth bring those Scriptures which you also insist upon, most succinctly and most briefly, laying them all together in e●mulo in his first Book of Aphorisms, (a book of strifes I think it may be called, it hath made so great a doing and stir in the world since it was published, both to himself and and others, either in defending or opposing it;) as I do now take notice of them in Mr. Crandon's book, I shall take them from him in the method and order that they are placed in there.  
This then, Sir, is one of Mr. Baxters' Arguments, whereby he proves, that the afflictions or the sufferings of the godly, are properly punishments: They are called punishments in Scripture, saith he, and therefore we may call them so; and the same is your Argument also, Sir.  
But here, I might first deny the consequence, both to you and him; for the strength of it lieth in this Proposition, Whatsoever is attributed to any thing in Scripture, we may properly attribute the same unto it; or we may properly call any thing as it is called, and said to be in Scripture: But this is not universally true: for hands and feet, etc. are attributed to God in Scripture; and yet we cannot properly attribute hands and feet, etc. to God, by averring, that such corporeal members are properly in God: It were borrid blasphemy to speak so. Yet the strength of your Argument would fall to the ground, if it were for no more but this, as it might be prosecuted.  
But Sir, my main business is to deny the Antecedent, or the first Proposition, and to put you both to prove it, by averring and asserting in terms of contradiction to your Proposition, That the Scripture doth not call the sufferings or afflictions of believing and godly persons, punishments: I say the Scripture calls them not punishments at all, either properly or improperly. Well, Mr. Baxter being put to it, as suspecting it would be denied him, he proves it with a catalogue of several Scriptures. I shall view them as he layeth them down, Sir, and I shall present both to your view and his what I do find in them.  
The first place which he brings to prove that the afflictions of the Godly are called Punishments in Scripture, is Levit. 26. 41, & 43. I have turned to these two verses, and I find no such thing in the words of God by his servant Moses in those Texts; nay, there is not so much as any mention made at all there of the word punishment: how can it then prove that the afflictions of the godly are not only chastisements, but proper punishments? For these, Sir, are the words of God themselves in that Text: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 veaz jirtzu et gnavonam.  
Now (Sir) there is no mention expressly here of their punishment at all, but only of their sin; as any that know any thing of Hebrew at all, in the very first look upon the words, will presently perceive: For there is only thus much expressed in them; And then, or, and if they will, or shall accept of their sin. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jirtzu being the third person plural fut. kal, they shall accept, or be well pleased with, etc. from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratzah, He was well pleased with, or he accepted, etc. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavonam is only in the verbal translation of it, their iniquity; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 am being the affix, their; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon signifying properly, only iniquity or perversity; for the root is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavah, which doth properly signify, He did perversely, or he did wickedly, or he perverted his way. So (Sir) the word punishment is not here at all; how then is it applied to the sins of the godly here?  
But you will say, the sense must be supplied some way: And I grant, there must be some good sense made, as far as we can, of all words of Scripture. But how? Must only the Baxterian or Hotchkissian sense be taken as good and orthodox, especially of those places of Scripture which they think may serve for their turns, when they have sensed them as they please? No Sir, we will not do so, except you could bring us to that straight, that we could probably sense them no other way than you do. But here the case is clear, that a sense quite and clear contradicting yours, as to the present question, may be put upon the words, as well and as probably, if not more probably than yours; to wit, by supplying the word correction or chastisement: And then the words will run thus; And if they accept of the chastisement of their iniquity. And then where is your proof from this Text, that the afflictions of the Godly are not only chastisements, but proper punishments? Nay, from this Text, thus translated, it is inferred against you, that they are chastisements, and not punishments, because the Scripture calls them not so. And yet you do say it does, Sir, and in this Text: but are you not ashamed in saying so?  
And that this supplement of the Text by the word chastisement, is as probable as by punishment, and a great deal more probable, is to me past question, if it were but upon this account; That no where else can you produce any place or Text of Scripture, where the express word punishment is attributed to the afflictions of the godly; but in very many places the word chastisement or correction is attributed to their afflictions.  
Now which is most probable, the Baxterian sense, by putting in a word to the Text that hath no parallel to it in all the Hebrew text, or by supplying the Text by a word that is often used elsewhere, when the Scripture speaks expressly to the point in question. I profess, Sir, upon this one consideration, I would count your sense rather nonsense, then to put it before this sense, which upon this ground, I say, is most probable; because your sense is supplied by a word no where in Scripture, and the other sense is by a word frequently used in Scripture. If you do but so much as name the Translation to me, Sir, or any thing from it, than  
1. I'll name to you again what in the story before is related in the case supposed, That all the people cry out upon my Lord Ambassador there, that his Lordship was but an Ambassador by name only, and no ways fit for the thing itself, since he could only judge of his Sovereign's Instructions and Commission unto him but by Translations.  
2. Sir, I'll freely tell you, that though I do as much esteem of our latest Translation as you or any can rationally do, accounting it better and much more accurate than I believe any vulgar Translation that is in the Christian world; yet I must not take the Translation that now is, nor no Translation that can be made in the world by humane industry, to be my Original; that is, I must not go with the Translation, to go against Reason with the Original, or to go against a more reasonable and probable translation of the Original; as always I shall esteem that to be, which is made up, where the sense is doubtful, by adding to such words as are conform to other parallel places of Scripture; rather than that which is framed of a word or words, which is not where extant in a parallel place to the Text in question, although it should have Mr. Baxter's approbation and Mr. Hotchkiss' both annexed unto it: But such is the Translation before approven; and therefore it is more rational and probable than the other, notwithstanding both your authorities in backing it.  
Thus (Sir) though you have not been advertised of a long while now, yet I hope you remember, That such wise ones must suffer themselves to be informed about the Original, when they are ignorant of it, or in any great mistaking about it. And so much for the information of Mr. Baxter and you, about the misapplication of this first Text of Scripture, as to you.  
But before I leave this Text, I would briefly propose to the Learned, whether there might not another more probable interpretation be put upon the words, then either of those; and that is, by taking the words precisely as they are in the Text, without addition of any word to them at all; but only by taking the Root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratzah, in another signification which it hath in the Scripture, then that of the translation here, which is indeed the most ordinary, and most usual signification that it is most frequently taken in; yet so, that the other I intent to mention, is used in Scripture also, and that is thus: the Root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratzah, though it most frequently doth signify, willingly to acquiesce in, or to be well pleased with, or to accept of any thing; yet it hath also sometimes this signification to perfect, or absolve and accomplish. And thus it is taken in this signification, Job 14. 6. The words are, Turn or look away from him, desist, and let him alone, look but a little aside from him as it were; for so much the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shegnah megnalaiv, doth import, etc. and then followeth in the Verse, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnad jirtzeh ke sachir ●omo, Until that he perfect, absolve, or accomplish, as an hireling his day. Here is the very word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jirtzeh, importing he shall absolve, accomplish, or perfect. In the 3: Fut. sing: in kal, which in the words before was in the 3. Plur. fut. kal, and translated there, they shall accept willingly of, or acquiesce in, etc. Now, I say, I would propose it to the Judiciously Learned in the Language, if the word might not be taken so in that same signification, Leu. 26. 41, 43. in which it is taken in, Job 14. 6. to wit, in that other signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratzah, to wit, to absolve; perfect, accomplish, and finish. And the truth is, the consideration of that excellent similitude in that place of Job, did lead my thoughts to that sense in this place, Leu. 26. For there, as all man's life is compared to the weary toil, turmoil, and travel of a weary laboring-hireling all the day, who is glad at his heart when the night comes to rest him in, after he hath accomplished and finished his task: So here, sin, or a sinful course, and way of walking, might be accounted (as indeed it is) the weary labour and toil of the Soul, which when the sinner hath broken off, by humble and cordial repentance, than he may be said to have accomplished the wearying labour of the Soul; and so, as a hireling, after sore work all day, the Soul fits down at case, and is at rest, when it is eased of the burden of sin; and so the words, Leu. 26. 41. may carry this sense, If their uncircumcised hearts shall then be humbled; and that so, if once 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jirtzu gnavonam, they shall accomplish, or finish, and absolve their sin; that is, if they shall put an end to their obduration and hardheartedness, by repentance, and cordial humiliation; then shall their souls have rest, and I will remember my covenant, etc. And so in the Verse 43. which is a threatening, the meaning might be this: But if they will not humble their hearts, and finish, or accomplish their sinful ways, and so break off their sins by repentance, yet by judgements they shall be made, will they nill they, to finish and accomplish their course of sinning.  
This I say, I do not absolutely aver to be the literal meaning of the place; but I do only propose it to the Judiciously Learned in the Language, to consider upon it; for as my thoughts are about the place now, I think it very probable; and moreover, I do remember a place in Isaiah, which hath the same Root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratzah, in niphal, which I wish were thought upon also, whether it may not bear the signification last insisted on, to wit, of finishing and accomplishing; and so in niphal, it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nirtzah, he was accomplished, perfected, absolved, or finished; and hence that place of Isaiah, which I point at, to wit, Isai. 40. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nirtzah gnavonah, might be translated, her iniquity is finished, or accomplished; the time of her sinning, or sinful, and perverse walking is now accomplished or finished; and so the former word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 maleah, would be better rendered, fulfilled; her appointed time, or her warfare is fulfilled: These considerations of this Root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratzah, in those Texts, I do but propose to be more seriously taken notice of afterwards.  
And now, Sir, I am ready to attend you, and your friend, as he goeth on further, and you do follow him.  
The next place or text of Scripture which Mr. Baxter brings to prove that the afflictions of the Godly are properly punishments, is Lam. 3. 39 The words are these, Why, or what should a living man complain, or bemoan himself? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 geber gnal chataav. But here, Sir, Mr. Baxter and you are no better in your proof than ye was before; nay you are in the very same ignorance and error, or in the same ignorant error and mistaking of the original that you was in before; for neither in this Text is the word Punishment mentioned at all; and how then will it prove, that punishment is properly attributed to the afflictions of the Godly. The truth is, Sir, you may this way go through the Text, and reckon above a hundred places to prove your opinion; that is, by taking and collecting all the Texts that doth but either name sin, or iniquity, and there in each of them to conclude, that the Scripture calls the afflictions of the Godly punishments for their sins; and that whether the Texts speak any thing at all of the godly more than of the wicked, or of the afflictions of the godly more than of the wicked; yea whether the Texts speak any thing at all of afflictions or punishments either of the godly or of the wicked: Yea I wonder that you give us not some such general Baxterian or Hotchisfian rule for the interpretation of all such scriptures, that they may or must be taken to prove that the afflictions of the godly are proper punishments, and so called in Scripture. I say, this Mr. Baxter or you might do, as rationally as you do bring this Text for the proof of that particular: For here 1. as is said, the word signifying punishment is not at all in this Text; for it is only thus, Why, or what should a man bemoan himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 geber●gnal chataav: a man for his sins. The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chataaiv, or without, the note of the plural number thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chataav, doth only properly and radically signify, his sins; for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chat is the root, which properly signifieth, he miss the mark, or went away, or erred, or went aside from the mark or scope he aimed at; see Jud. 20. 16. From which place we have the first and proper signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velo jachati, and would not miss the mark, etc. And hence by a metaphor, he sinned, by missing and going astray from the mark, or scope which he should always eye and aim at, to wit, the Glory of God and his Law: And hence is this Noun in the singular number 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chataah, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chete, sin, or a going astray from the Law of God; so that the word doth not signify properly, and in itself, any thing at all, of the punishment of sin. It is true indeed that Lexicographers and Translators (because of some places and texts of Scripture which must be supplied either by the addition of some words that are not in the Text, or by the explication of some words in the text some other way then their radical, proper, and used significations doth bespeak, therefore) they do generally say, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chet or chete, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chataah, sometimes (to put some probable interpretation upon some texts of Scripture) may be explained, as not only to import sin, but also to import and denote the punishment of sin. But then again, Sir, it is but where they are necessitated to it, for to explain the Scripture, when there can be no other probable interpretation of a text; wh●ch whether it be so or not here, we shall see ere we leave this Text; and further when they ●oe thus explain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chataah, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chete, or, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon to import the punishment of sin, they do take the word pena peccati, or punishment of sin, generally, or in a general sense, as importing all sufferings or afflictions about sin, as the cause or occasion of them, either loving and fatherly chastisements, or proper vindicative and revenging punishments, proceeding from a Judge of justice punishing offenders.  
Now when the word is taken in this general sense by the Translators and Expositors, and so put in to any Text of Scripture, may not your adversaries expound and translate it, and the Text where it is put in, by chastisements and improper punishments, proceeding from fatherly love, especially if the Text speak of the godly, as well as you may do proper punishments proceeding from the justice of a Judge: Do you think, Sir, that your adversaries will take the dictates of your will to be the Rules and Laws by which to interpret the original Scriptures, which your own understanding (for aught can be seen by your writings) is altogether without knowledge, and ignorant of; this were indeed a blind following of a blind guide, to take a man's will for a rule in things that he knows not.  
I hope Sir, that Master Baxter will not take to himself, nor will any of his greatest admirers ascribe unto him so much authority; nor to you both, being joined together: as that staret pro ratione voluntas vestra, a●a●que haec (etiam in rebus quibus est) caeca. And if they will not ascribe to you so much, than you may easily conceive, that they will use their own authority in interpreting this place of improper punishments, that is of fatherly chastisements out of love only, and ascribe as much to it, as you do use your authority, in sensing it of proper punishments, proceeding out of justice from God as a Judge: yea they will think somewhat more of their own authority, if they know any thing more of the Original itself than you do: for than they can back their authority with this reason, that in all the Original Text of the Hebrew, the express word punishment, is not attributed to the sufferings of the Godly in no other place: but the word chastisement, or correction out of love, is many times attributed to them: and therefore that that word that is attributed to them in other places of Scripture, ought far rather to be made choice of, to put in, where the meaning and sense of the place is any thing doubtful, about these sufferings: then that word that is no where attributed to them at all in the text. This reason Sir, I esteem more of, then of a hundred of your bare assertions, running only thus, our will and pleasure is, etc. if you offer any thing to back your authority from the translation: you must be told again, that in the case supposed, the Ambassador is put to prove his Tenets from the original words and writs of his Lord and Master, as if there were not a translation of them to be looked upon, (we would see an excellent probation of them then) or else you prove nothing. And again, I say, t●●translation makes no more for you nor again▪ you; for they take the word punishment in so general a sense, as it comprehends chastisements, only out of love, as well as proper punishments out of justice as from a Judge; and so either of them may be chosen to be the proper meaning of the place, as there is most reason for it: and for that let the reason going before be considered, viz that the express word punishment (at all, either proper or improper) is never in the Hebrew Text attributed to the Saints sufferings, but chastisement and correction very often: therefore chastisement ought far rather to be put in to supply a defective sense: because it is a Scriptural word applied to the sufferings of the people of God; then punishment, for it is not. All this is said, Sir, in defence of the Text, supposing it granted unto you, that you do bring it in pertinently, as to the subject in question at least, to wit, the afflictions of the Godly. But,  
2. Secondly, what if an adversary to you should deny, that here there were any thing spoken, with any reference to the sufferings of Godly men at all, more nor of wicked men; how should you then prove by this Text, that the sufferings of the Godly are called punishments in Scripture? truly Sir, I would favour your adversaries this far, if that were alleged; that there is not word in this verse that hath any particular reference to Godly men; but only to men in general: for first, there is in the first part of the verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ mahjitonen Adam chai: Why should a living man complain?  
Now Sir, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adam chai, doth import only ● living man, or a man in natural and earthly lif●; and I think there be more such, a hundred to one, than there are Godly men; and so in the end of the verse the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 geber, is a general name for man; and if it have any particular limit●●on it is this, a strong man; not godly man; for the root is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gabar, he prevailed, he was strong, etc. and hence man is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 geber, from strength; which appellation (for signification the Latins use; calling man, Virro, a viribus; Now Sir, I could wish from my heart that all strong men were godly men, yea that all men living were godly men, (for then I would be sure that I were one myself) but I suspect it in many others, (as I many times fear it in myself) that it is not so, as I would gladly wish to have it; and if the Text speak 1. nothing of punishments, here at all, for there is not a word signifying punishment in the original of this Text. Nor 2. nothing of Godly men here at all; then how can this Text call the afflictions of godly men proper punishments? The only thing you can say here is, that the whole lamentations, and so this place, is in the name of the whole Church; but be it so, yet your Antagonists can tell you, that in the whole Church there are bad as well good, yea many more bad than good; there are wicked as well as godly, yea too too many more wicked than Godly; especially when any Universal affliction is laid upon the whole Church, as here it was, when all of them were led captive, & their land laid desolate. Now Sir, they would tell you, that therefore although the Text did mention proper punishments, as it doth mention no punishment at all; yet they would say, they were infflicted upon the Church for an Universal Deluge of wickedness which did overspread the land and the outward face of the Church, but that yet notwithstanding, these punishing strokes of justice upon the whole land, and the wicked in it; were but chastizing corrections out of fatherly love, upon the persons of the godly in it; even amidst all their common sufferings with the wicked, in common calamities: and that therefore those sufferings of the Church and Land, were but to be called punishments, in reference to wicked, because they were inflicted by God as a Judge out of justice upon them; but in reference to the persons of the Godly, (in which relation the question was stated) they were to be called but chastisements of love; because they did proceed from God as a Father in mercy to them.  
Doth not Master Baxter and you prove your points, excellently well Sir, when you bring a Text to prove that the afflictions of godly men are called properly punishments in Scripture, in which 1. there is not a word in that Text signifying punishment. 2. There is not a word in that Text signifying a godly man. And 3. when that we have supposed▪ all that you would have, to wit, that both these were in the Text, yet you do not prove your point; and if when we have gratified you with the supposition of all that you require, and yet you do not prove your points, I pray Sir tell me by your next, when will you prove them? in the mean time, till then, such wise ones must be contented to suffer themselves to be informed about the original when they are so grossly mistaken into it.  
I have done, Sir, with speaking my thoughts to Mr. Baxter and you; upon the second place brought to prove that the afflictions of the Godly are called proper punishments in Scripture; and I think, if I mistake not, I have told you, that you have not proved it by that text, although we should take it after the meaning that it is usually translated in; but in this Text also I have my thoughts about another construction, and interpretation of the place, without supplying the defective sense of it, either with the word punishment or chastisement; (for the truth is, if probably, I can make construction, and congruous interpretation of the very words of the original in any Text, or the context thereof, I do not willingly bring a word from elsewhere to supply the defective sense of that Text) and this sense I shall propose to your consideration, if you please, and to the judgement of the learned in the language. In the verses going before, the dispensations and providences, are all of them vindicated to be good and just; and therefore the Prophet infers in this verse, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mah jitonem Adam chai geber gnal chataav: Now, I say, at the very looking of the words over again, there is one sense, I think, may, rationally, be given of them, which likes me very well, and which I shall presently subjoin, when I have touched the emphasis of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jitonen, which is the future hithpael, third person singular of the Conjugation hithpael, from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 anon, he mourned, or lamented; and in hithpael 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hitonen, properly, he bemoaned himself, he lamented over himself, as it were; and hence, he murmured, repined, or fretted in, and over himself; because of his doleful condition some one way or another: He was grieved In himself because of some one evil or another upon him: The signification of this word being thus noted, I think the words might not unfitly be understood thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mah jitonen adam chai, why doth a living man repine, murmur, or fret in himself (as it were against God, in the evil (of affliction) which his providence hath justly brought upon him:) Rather, as it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 geber gnal chataav, let a man murmur, repine, and grieve at his sins. Or, why should living man bemoan himself, and complain, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jithonen grievously in himself at the evils which the good hand of God hath brought to fall on him: rather let him bewail and bemoan his sins which are the cause of all: Let a man complain and bemoan over his sins; for these are worse than all other evils that he can endure besides them. So that we need not name or mention punishment at all in the words, but only this, Why should a living man (fret, or murmur, and repine, or) bemoan and complain in himself (to wit against God and his dispensations, or at the evil spoken of, and intimated in the verse, and verses going before:) Let a man complain and bemoan himself, or be grieved in himself over his sins, and so repent of them, as the exhortation is at large laid out in the verse following; and then shall be an end of all our evil and misery: Or in a word, the words might be thus explained and taken, as if they were in the first part of the verse a question, and in the last part of it an answer to it thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mah jithonen adam chai, What should a living man (most or chief, as it were) complain of? (or be most grieved and vexed at, as the word jithonen importeth:) and the answer to the question is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 geher gnal chataav, a man should (chief) be grieved in himself over his sins, more than over, or for any thing else, as it were. There is another Text that much inclineth me thus to explain the words, taking the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jithonen to express, a man's murmuring, repining, fretting, grieving, and complaining in himself against God and his dispensations, because in that text I mean to wit, Numb. 11. 1. the same word is put expressing the people's repining, murmuring, and complaining against God in his providences towards them, thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vaihi ●agnam kemithonenim, and the people was, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 kemitonenim, as they who murmured, repined, and complained against God, etc. it being the participle hithpael of this same word, with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the note of sim●ltude put before it. And thus if we translate the Verse, Why should a living man complain, or murmur in himself, (to wit, against God) let him be bemoan himself (repeating again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jitonen) over his sins. Or if we translate it as a question and answer, thus; What should a man complain of? Answ. A man (should complain) for his sins, more than for any thing else, as it were. I think there will be no proof then in the words for you, Sir, that the afflictions of the people of God are called proper punishments. But the truth is, when I look on the text at last again, I caunot leave it, but express once again this much, that when there is nothing importing punishment, but these words in it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 g●al chataav, for, or over his sins; to say there is proper punishment attributed to the Godly for their sins, is so gross in itself, and betrays so gross ignorance of the Hebrew, that (if it had not been to have made your mistake the more clear to yourself and others) I am almost ashamed that I have insisted so long in refutation of it, and therefore now I come to the other places laid down in Master baxter's argument; where I susupect, we shall have no better stuff, nor stronger evidence for proving the point, than we have had in the first two. I am sure in the next two, we have not, for we have nothing in them but the very same thing we have before refuted; as we shall see when they are produced. The third and fourth places therefore which Master Baxter bringeth for to prove that the sufferings of the Godly, are called punishments in Scripture, are out of the fourth Chapter of this same book of Lamentations; to wit, Lam. 4. 6. 22. Well let us see the words, vers. 6. is thus; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vajigdal gnavon bat gnammi mechattat sedom. That is the first, the second place is vers. 21. and is thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tamburlaine gnav●nech bat tzion, I have perused them both over Sir, and I do here also lay them both before you to be perused over again; & if either you or Mr Baxter, can see in either of those two places, any thing at all to prove your point, that the afflictions or sufferings of the Godly, are called in Scripture proper punishments; then I shall acknowledge you to have the clearest Lynx eyes, and him to have the sharpest Eagle-eys, that ever looked upon an Hebrew Book, since there was ever any one in Britain.  
The truth is, there is nothing in either of them, but the very same glass of the Translators, put upon and before the Ambassador's eyes; and making him mistake again in the selfsame two words, of these two Verses, in which he was so grossly mistaken in the two places before examined; so that though when I did see, I had insisted so long about the refutation of them, I was not well pleased, especially it being almost needless, the very reading of the places being a refutation of them, as to his illation from them, yet now I am a little more satisfied, because it will save me some labour in insisting upon those two; for every passage of the refutation of the other two places, may be read to refute the application of these two; for there is not a word in these two places, that signifieth punishment at all, either proper or improper; but only the former explained words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chataah; the first of which signifieth perverseness or iniquity, the second sin, but none of them punishment, as was before explained. Yet because Mr. Baxter's mistake and escape is grosser here than before upon one consideration, and seems to be a willing mistake in himself, that he may make others mistake also with him; and because also something would be said here as to the translation itself; therefore we will speak a little to inform you of those two places also; the words of the first are, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Vajigdal gnavon bat gnammi mechattat sedom, rendered they are thus; and the iniquity of the daughter of my people, is greater than the sin of Sodom, this is the very verbal translation and signification of the words; and if Mr. Baxter should not blush to draw from hence, therefore the afflictions of the Godly are called proper punishments in Scripture; I profess I know not what can make a man blush, as to a mistake in words. But for the explaining and clearing of the ignorance in the mistake, I leave it to be taken notice of in the two former places; for as it is said, all that is spoken there may be reiterated or repeated here again; for the whole mistake lies in two words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon, perverseness or iniquity, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chattaah, sin, which were explained before not to signify punishment; and proved that they could not be with so much reason (when the afflictions of the Godly are spoken of) translated punishment, as chastisement; all which doth hold here also in those places. Only Mr. Baxter is, 1. To be told, that his mistake is a great deal more culpable here, then in the other places before examined, and that upon this account; because his mistake seemeth either here to be more willing and wilful, or else more negligent and careless then before; because here, although Mr. Baxter had never looked upon an Hebrew Bible in his days, yet he might have scrupled a little about the putting down this place in his argument, and that from the translation itself; for although the Translators in the body of the Translation, have indeed turned the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon, punishment of iniquity; yet in the margin, they have put this note at that word, or iniquity; now what shall we say here for Mr. Baxter? did not he so much as ever look upon the Hebrew Bible, to search if his proofs of his Tenets were clearly agreeing therewith? if he never did, this is his great fault; yea his great shame, and his great sin, that should have been so many years so eminent a Minister and Ambassador of God to his people, and hath in those years taken so much pains upon other studies of all Sciences, in all Authors; and yet never did so much as apply himself with diligence to understand his Lord and Master's Commission, and Articles committed to him, in their own proper language; but suppose he did not, but only use the Translators eyes, yet since there are Bibles of several sorts, had he never so much as a care to purchase to himself a Bible with the Marginal notes? if he never did, this was his further fault, and further tends to his blame; if he did acquire such a Bible with these Marginal notes, did he not make use of it when he made use of expounding and interpreting Scriptures? if he did not so much as make use of that little help that was besides him, (though small in itself, yet somewhat it is, and may be made good use of by▪ understanding Viewers of it many times?) than I say his faulty negligence was greatest of all in that, since he would not so much as look upon that little help which he had besides him, understood, and might so easily have used it; if he did look upon the Text, and see this reading upon the Margin; could he but know that that note imported, that that word might as well have been translated iniquity, as the punishment of iniquity; if he conceived this much, than he could not but know, that then it was not a sure place for him to make use of against his adversaries, because he could not but know, that if the word could be translated either ways, they would choose that way which was not against them, as well as he did that way which was for him; if he did know all this much, and yet would put down this place amongst others, than I say his mistake was willing and wilful and so the most heinous of all; for he both willingly did himself mistake, and did wilfully do what in him lay, to put his mistake upon others; and that apparently with such confidence, in his leading way; that he believed his approbations would be taken for Oracles; and without any proof, (though there was as much reason against them as for them; as those Marginal notes do import, that there is as much reason to translate the one way as the other.) But I shall never after this account his words Oracles in the interpretation of his Masters original Articles; and if they be not so there, they can not be so in consequences deduced from them.  
Thus Sir, I entreat you to show Master Baxter that he must suffer himself to be informed about the Original when he mistakes it, either unknowingly or wilfully: now as to our translation of this place; I would speak a word but of it here, and that is this; that although they have indeed here the proper signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon, to wit iniquity, set in the marginal notes; yet I could have wished it had been put in the translation itself, and the marginal notes left void, as to this word, in this place; for first, as is said before, the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon, never signifieth, radically nor properly punishments; only sometimes, if the sense can no other ways be made out, then, if the Text so necessarily require it; punishment of iniquity in a general sense, comprehending all sufferings inflicted for sin (as well chastisements out of fatherly love, as proper punishments, as from a Judge out of justice; as was before explained) may be put in for to supply the otherwise inevitable defective sense of the Text: yet I do not remember of any such place observed, where there is such necessity: But of this Text in hand, Lam. 4. 6. the truth is, I cannot conceive why they have put for the translation of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon, punishment of iniquity at all, either in text or margin; and my reason is, because I cannot so clearly see how the punishment of the sin of Judah and Jerusalem, was greater than the punishment of Sodom; for though it was great indeed, yet fire and brimstone was not reigned down upon them, nor they utterly destroyed without a remembrance or remnant left of them, any more upon earth, as the Sodomites were, whose overturning and destruction was in a moment, as is said in the verse here: But upon the other hand, if we translate the words as they do of themselves properly and radically offer themselves to our consideration, in their own proper, and radical signification thus, for the iniquity of the daughter of my people is greater than the sin of Sodom: Then the meaning may be such, as when Christ saith, if the great works had been done in Sodom and Gomorrah which have been done in thee, they had repent long ago, etc. That is, the sins of the people of God, by reason of the great aggravations of them, against so great light and knowledge of God and his ways revealed to them; against so many wondrous works done for them, amongst them, and against their enemies, etc. may well be compared with the sins of the worst of men, and may far go beyond them in the comparison. There is, I do see, indeed one consideration in the context, that it seemeth the Prophet takes much notice of and that is, that the prolonging of a less violent affliction, is more grievous than a violent stroke of present destruction. But I do not see that that comparison is aimed at in this verse: I do rather think that in it the Prophet gives an humble acknowledgement of the reason of all the miseries which was upon them, and of all the sad strokes which he mentions both before this verse and after it; as if the meaning were thus; Surely (in consideration of all those calamities upon us) the iniquity of the daughter of my people hath been greater (for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vajigdal importeth the preter tense, although it be the future, because of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vau conversive put before the future) then the sin of Sodom, which God overthrew in a moment, as it were, etc. However, this is sure, that though we should grant that punishment, and proper punishment were here meant, yet you may remember, Sir, that it was told you, though all that which you require were granted to you, it will not prove your point, because those heavy judgements were upon the whole land, and upon the body of the people for the universal spreading of wickedness and wicked men over the land; unto which wicked men, indeed, they were proper punishments, inflicted out of justice upon them, yea, and upon the whole land for their so heinous sins; yet still will your adversaries answer you, that those common calamities were not proper and personal punishments, but only chastisements of love as from a Father, upon the persons of the Godly.  
Thus, I say, you will not prove your point, though it were granted to you, that such Texts speak of proper punishments. But to say, that there are proper punishments mentioned in a text where there is nothing mentioned but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chataah, iniquity and sin; betrays such gross unskilfulness and ignorance in the Hebrew roots, that I can scarce speak any thing to it, but smile at it first; and then ●el such wise ones as do affirm it, that they must suffer themselves to be informed about the original, where they are so grossly mistaken into it. As to that other Text out of this Chapter, to wit, ver. 22. there can be no other thing said to it, then to this, and the former; for it is the same mistake of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon, iniquity, which Mr. Baxter will have properly to signify punishment, or to signify proper punishment; although the Translators in that verse also, and at that word in that verse, do put a marginal note, thus, or iniquity, and therefore Mr. Baxter can no more translate the word there by punishment, than his adversaries will translate it by iniquity, and with more reason will they translate it so, because it is the proper and radical signification of the word, and there is no forcible reason to alter the proper signification of the word in that verse: On the contrary, there seems more reason to keep it in the Text then either to take it away or to set it in the margin: Which that it may appear, we shall only look upon the text and leave it: The words than are these, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tam gnavonech bat tzion: Thy iniquity is accomplished, or absolved, O daughter of Zion: that is, thou hast now begunn to break off thy sins, and so to finish your sinful ways by repentance; therefore the Lord will also accomplish or finish his corrections upon you, and put an end to them, seeing you have put a period to your sins; he will not any more carry you captive, etc. as followeth in the rest of the verse.  
Now since this may be the meaning of the words, in their proper signification, how will Mr. Baxter force us to take his improper signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon, iniquity, to take it for punishment, and all to prove his opinion, that the afflictions of the godly are properly called punishments? When that, although we should gr●●● that in some such places those two words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gnavon, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chataah, might be translated in a general sense, punishment, yet that would be but by a figurative and metonymical way of speech, taking the words, which properly and radically do signify iniquity (or perverseness) and sin, to import, also iniquity and sin in the effects▪ or the effects of sin and iniquity, to wit, all sorts of afflictions and sufferings for sin; and then punishments (or sufferings for sin) in that general sense, will comprehend as well fatherly chastisements out of love (which your adversaries will affirm are always meant when these words are taken to bespeak the sufferings of the godly for sin, and that upon this good reason, because words properly signifying chastisements or corrections from love, are often attributed to the afflictions of the godly in Scripture; but never is there a word properly signifying punishment attributed unto them:) as well as proper punishments proceeding from the wrath, justice, and revenge of God as a Judge; which they will grant unto you to be meant, when those words are taken to import the sufferings of the wicked for their sins. But upon those grounds, Sir, they will tell you, that the eagle's eyes do see very much, and very far indeed, if they can see so far in those two words as to prove by them that the afflictions or sufferings of the godly are called proper punishments in Scripture, proceeding from the justice of God as a Judge, and not only chastisements and corrections proceeding from him as a Father, out of love, when the two words you prove it by, do not signify properly punishments of sin at all, but only sin and iniquity itself; or if by a metonymy, they may be taken for the effects of sin and iniquity, yet than they import, and may be translated chastisements out of love (in reference to the sins of the godly) as well as proper punishments out of wrath and justice, which are the portion of the wicked for their sins.  
And then they will conclude, Sir, that such Wiseeagle-eyed-ones must suffer themselves to be somewhat better informed about the original, then to conclude that from those two words it is proven, that the afflictions of the godly are called proper punishments in Scripture; and that therefore, other texts are to be brought to prove the point, than any where these two words have all the force to prove it; the which indeed is done by you both, if to any better purpose than hitherto, it will be seen by that which followeth.  
The fifth place, or Text of Scripture which Mr. B. and you do misapply, to prove that the Sufferings of the Godly are called in the Scripture, proper punishments, is Ezra 9 13. In which (as in each of all the Texts following cited by you both) when I have turned to the place, I do see you both so palpably culpable, not only of such palpable ignorance of the original patents and articles of your commission; but also of such negligent, or wilful inconsideration of the very translation itself; that I do profess (whither you will be ashamed of it or not, I know not; but I am sure you should, for) I am both ashamed and sorry in your behalf, to let the world know (although I cannot other ways do, but am necessitated to it. 1. Because such deceive of the world are already published, and therefore the publishers of them ought to be made publicly, and pungently to resent it: And 2. that such ignorant, or inconsiderate mistake▪ and such false deceive of others, by those mistakes, or mistaking misapplications may be headed, taken notice of, prevented, and shunned hereafter, before they be published to the public injury of the Christian world, through such misguidings of their Guides:) That such eminent Ministers in the Church of England, in those (blessed be God) so knowing days, are so grossly delinquent and deficient, and so notoriously faulty in that which ought to be their chief employment; because it is their first and chiefest part of the work and function they are called to, viz. The study of their Lord and Masters words, in which he hath delivered his Embassage to his people. And for the ground of such an accusation, how weighty soever it may seem to be, I shall need no more to underprop it, than the bare proposal of the former Text, and the rest following cited by you both, adding only this explication, that such wise ones must suffer themselves to be informed about the Original, when they are ignorant of, or mistaken in it themselves, or when they would misled others into the same mistake with them.  
First then, for the words which you aim at in Ezra 9 13. They are thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ki attah Elohenu chasachta lemattah megnavonenu. Now, Sir, I say, that he who would prove from those words, that the sufferings of the godly are called in Scripture (not only chastisements out of fatherly love, but) proper punishments out of revenging justice, doth nothing else, but (instead of proving the point) both shame himself and abuse others; for there is nothing in them, being Verbatim translated, but this, for or seeing thou our God hast kept back, restrained, withdrawn, reserved, or withheld (for this is the radical signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chasachta, being the 2d. pers. sing. of preter. kal. from the root in the third person, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chasach, which only importeth these significations to withhold, to draw or keep back, to restrain, to take away, etc.) below or beneath (which is the only signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mattah, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lemattah, from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 netah, to decline, etc.) our iniquities. So that there is not a word of punishment here: And how then can it be proved from this place, that the word punishment properly taken for the vengeance of Vindictive Justice, is attributed to the sufferings of the Godly in Scriptures: if it be said that the sense of the place doth carry and import so much, your Antagonists will answer, 1. That the question is, whether the word itself punishment, be in the Scripture applied to the sufferings of the Godly; and that therefore, if you bring not a Text that hath expressly in it, a word properly signifying punishment, you are quite extra Rhombum, and do bring nothing to the point in controversy. 2. They will tell you, that even as to the sense of this place, there is nothing more in it, than there is in these words, Psalm. 103. verse. 10▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l● cachataenu gn sahlanu velo kegnavonotenu gamal gnalenu. He hath not done to us according to our sins, neither hath he rewarded us according to our iniquities; & truly I would not a little wonder why this place, in the Psal. 103. is not listed and numbered by you amongst the rest (in the Catalogue of (mis-applyed) Texts of Scripture, to prove that the afflictions of the Godly are proper punishments) were it not for this consideration that you do see nothing (your self with your own eyes) but (all, and only) with your Spectacles; for if the Translation-glasse had been put before your eyes here, thus, he hath not punished us according as our sins and iniquities have deserved, (as the Translators, in a general sense, might as rationally have rendered those words, Ps. 103. ver. 10. as they have done those, Ezr. 9 13.) then be sure it would have been set down by you with the first of them. But then, 3. Your Antagonists would have answered you, that in both those places, the sense may be taken (and that more rationally, because more agreeably to other Scriptures, which do often apply the word Chastisements to the Saints sufferings, but never the word punishment) quite contrary to your opinion in this controversy, thus; thou hast withheld from us below our iniquities, and hast not dealt with us according to our sins, nor rewarded us according to our iniquities; to wit, because in that thou hast not punished us with strokes of vengeance and vindictive justice, as thou hast done to the wicked and ungodly; who were never acknowledged by thee as thy peculiar people; but thou hast only afflicted us with chastisements of mercy and fatherly love, as thou dost to all thy own children, from thy fatherly care of their future well-being: And then Sir, they will ask you, where is your proof from these and such like places of Scripture, that the sufferings of the Godly are proper punishments? nay, they will further ask you, if that from those same places which you bring to prove that the afflictions of the Godly are called proper punishments, it may not rationally be deduced, that they are not proper punishments, from the justice of a judge, but only chastisements out of fatherly love; and if you say, that Mr. Baxter and you do sense the places other ways, they will instantly reply, that (for all that they can see in your writings) the sight and sense of you both as to the point in question, is but no sight, or nonsense, it being nothing at all in itself, but only by other men's Glasses; and this much, Sir, I think, may be rationally said, to back the former accusation, of mistaking the original in this place; and as to the other part of it, viz. your negligent or wilful inconsideration of the translation itself; or your so superficial looking through that Glass; I do conceive it most clearly thus to be by yourselves bewrayed; because that in all the English Bibles with the Marginal notes, at those words in Ezra 9 13. thou hast punished us less than our iniquities deserve, there is this note put in the Margin; Heb. thou hast with held below our iniquities, which importeth, that that is the formal, proper, and radical signification of the Hebrew words, and therefore the truest translation of them; this being so, your Adversaries will ask you, did never Mr. Baxter or you so much as look (not upon the original itself, but) upon one of those Bibles with the Marginal notes, which doth oftentimes most properly render the signification of the Hebrew words? if you have looked upon such Bibles, did you it so carelessly as you would not so much as trouble yourself with the casting of your eye aside to view those Marginal tranflations? if you did loog upon them, yet did you knowingly and wilfully pass them over, as regardless of the authority of your Masters Original Writs, and Words, when they make nothing for you, but are rather against your tenets? The truth is, if those and such like questions were proposed to me, for to answer in your behalf, I would, and I do, leave them wholly to be answered by yourselves, if you be able, and old enough for it, for I profess I am not; because I account what is aimed at in them, to be by you, no less, then inexcusably unanswerable; in that I do esteem your negligence, in studying to understand your Masters own words, no less than inexcusable; and that therefore the only answer I can give in your be half is, that such wise ones must suffer themselves to be informed of the original, when they are ignorant of it, or mistaken in it. There are two other Texts of Scripture following, by Mr. Baxter; and one other joined by you; (with the former of Ezra. 9 13.) but all three misapplied grossly by you both, to prove the point, that the sufferings of the godly are called proper punishments in Scripture; in examination of the which three places, I shall put them altogether, because the mistake of them all lieth in one Hebrew word, and that the most vulgarly known Hebrew root in the whole language; it being as much known to all that have ever heard any thing of the Hebrew Grammar, as Amorett is to all who have ever heard any thing of the Latin Grammar; because it is the pardigme or exemplary verb generally used by all Grammarians, according to which other Hebrew verbs are to be form and declined; to wit, the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pakad, so well known in itself, and in its signification: He visited; that any Schoolboy, upon two or three days study of the Hebrew Grammar, may be made able to inform such wise ones about their mistaking of this original root, at least; yea the truth is, (and the greater both your sin and shame, your ignorance and neglect of studying to understand your Lords Original Embassage and Instructions to you, in his commission by you to his people, receiving thereby the higher and greater aggravation) one month's study of the Hebrew Grammar and Dictionary, might have made both or either of you to know so much of the Languag, as that it would have prevented all these mistakes and misapplications of Texts of Scripture, which you are now (so tartly; as possibly you may think) taxed for; yea it would have made you ashamed of those mistakes in the behalf of others, if you had trapped and traced them in such mistakes; which doth, I say, greatly aggravate the guiltiness of such men (chief, if they be the Lords Ambassadors) who have spent so much time, yea so many years in the study of Philosophy and Philosophical and Metaphysical Authors; so much time yea so many years in the study of School-divinity, and all the controversies in Scholastical Theology, and last of all who have taken themselves to a study of so much time, and so many years more, as the vast study of Volving over the Voluminous works of the Greek and Latin Fathers is, (for thus Mr. Baxter gives an account of his studies unto us) and yet in all this time, nor in all these so many years, for such Bookish-men, not to set apart a few weeks, or one month at least, (for that study which is almost unum necessarium; and I am sure it is and aught to be esteemed, the chief necessary work prerequired to their function, and absolutely necessary to the rational discharging of their office, as Ambassadors of God to his people, to wit) for study of so sacred and excellent a language, wherein their Lords original Articles of his Embassage to his people are written and delivered; this I say, doth greatly aggravate such student's guiltiness in their other studies; even especially since the study of that language, for so little time, as is mentioned, but of a few weeks, might make Embassaduors at least thus far qualified in the knowledge of their Master's words, as that knowing the necessary grounds of the Hebrew Grammar, they may upon any occasion turn over an Hebrew Lexicon or Dictionary, to search out the radical and proper significations of the Hebrew roots; and not to be so grossly and paipably ignorant and mistaken in them, as to need so rude an information about the Original and Radical significations of them. This much of qualification for understanding the Original words of God, may be attained unto, and acquired in so short a time, and with some occasional practice and exercise in it this way, as need requires; and whosoever doth willingly or carelessly neglect the study of this sacred language this much at least; in so far, he is not worthy to be styled (no not nomine tenus) an Ambassador of God to his people. Thus I have been somewhat large in ushering in the three next Texts of Scripture misapplied by Mr. Baxter, and you to the present point in question: but I have been so the more willingly, because there are 3. of them to be together, & one word will be but necessary to clear the mistake in them all: but chief because I do think that what is chief intended by such like expressions can never be more then enough pressed to a serious consideration of it: to wit, that the Ambassadors of God in Christ to his people, may be stired upto a more diligent study, to know and understand their Lord and Master's commission in his own words delivered to them. Now the three next Texts misapplyed by Master Baxter and you, to prove that the sufferings of the Godly are called in Scripture proper punishments, are these following, viz. two which Master Baxter doth cite out of the prophecy by Hosea, Hos. 4. 9 and Hos. 12. 2. and one which you do cite out of the prophecy by Amos, Am. 3. 2. The words of all those three Texts which you do aim a●, as making for your business, are these: Hos. 4. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, upakadti gnalaiv derachaiv. & I will visit upon (him or) them, (his or) their ways: And Hos. 12. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, uliphkod gnal Jag: akob kidrachaiv, and to visit Jacob according to his ways. And so Ames 3. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, gnal ken Ephked gnalechem Et col gnavozotechem, Therefore will I visit upon you all your iniquities. Now there is not a word in any of those three Texts that signifieth punishment, or to punish: How then can any, or all of them prove that the sufferings of the Godly are called proper punishments in Scripture, there is only the Translators glass put upon one word, which deceives your cyes in all the three: (yet without any mistake in them, for in all the three paces, which doth not a little aggravate the faultiness of your so gross mistake, as was before explained: they put the radical and proper signification of that word in the margin: which you do wilfully overlook, as not making much for your business) for there is only in those three Texts, three Tenses of the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pakad which all the world, almost, or atleast all in the world that hath ever learned any thing of Hebrew, knoweth that it doth not signify, to punish: but that the radical signification of it, is, he visited: and hence in the 1. pers. of the preterite tense in kal, it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pakadti, I have visited, but with Vau conversive before it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upakadti, and I shall or will visit, as in thr first of these three texts, Hos. 4. 9 and in the infinite kal, with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 put before, it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 liphkod to visit, as in the second text, Hos. 12. 2. and in the first pers. sing. of future kal, it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ephkod, I shall or will visit (in the third Text, Amos 3. 2.) as any one that hath learned so far in the Hebrew Grammar, as Amorett is in the Latin Rudiments or Accidents, knoweth, and could have informed you about the resolving and proper signification of those three words, in those three Texts of Scripture; and then any rational Consideration could have informed you, that the word visitation or to visit, being spoken in reference to affliction or suffering for offences; is as well applicable to visitations out of Mercy, as to visitations out of Justice; and so may as well be taken for the Chastisements and Corrections of God, from his fatherly love to his Children, when it is spoken of their sufferings; as for the strokes of wrath, vengeance, and vindictive justice, or proper punishment; which your Adversaries will say is only meant, when the word is spoken of the strokes of God's wrath upon sinners that are not his people: And they'll tell you also, that they have more reason upon their side, for them to say so, than your bare (and in the present case, of interpretation of Masters original words, but blind) authority can possibly make against them; because it is more agreeable to the consent of other Scriptures; for as is often said no word signifying proper punishment, is attributed to the Saints sufferings in any place at all of the Scripture, but many times the word signifying chastisement and correction out of fatherly love, is attributed to them in Scripture; therefore where neither of them is expressed Verbatim in the Text, the one of them they'll say, even chastisement or fatherly correction out of love, is more rationally upon the  ground, to be understood then the other, when the sufferings of the Godly are spoken of; and when they have told you so much, than I have nothing more to tell you, but this, that thus such wise ones must suffer themselves to be informed of the original by others, when they do not peruse it themselves.  
Unto the former Texts of Ezra 9 13. Lam. 3. 39 and Amos 3. 2. already examined; you do add other two in which you do seem to place much emphasis and force for your opinions; because you bring them to answer a main objection which you conceive may be made against you, and to prove that even the remnant of the godly in the Church are said in Scripture to be punished, and that the sufferings of the Saints themselves are called by God, in his Word, punishments: But, I do suspect, you are as much mistaken in the emphasis and force of them as in any of the rest; and that it may be seen I do not conjecture amiss, I shall produce those two Texts (which in effect are but one and the same, for the very same words which you mistake are in both places:) and lay them before any rational consideration to determine upon my conjecture. The two Texts than are, Jerem. 46. v. last, and 30. v. 11. And the words (which Mr. Baxter also to prove the point in question, citeth for their emphasis) in both are these, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 venakk●h lo Anakkecha. Now for the consideration of them, we are first to repeat and remember the state of the question, which is, whether God be said in Scripture (properly, or in proper words signifying punishment) to punish the Saints (as a Judge from wrathful and vindictive justice and vengeance) for their sins: And Mr. Baxter, and Mr. Hotchkiss doth c●te these words to prove the affirmative part of the question, viz. That God is said in Scripture to punish the sins of the Saints with proper punishments. But then, say I, the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nakkeh here must signify properly to punish; and if that were granted, one would think that Mr. Baxter and Mr. Hotchkisse had gained their point, since they had at last brought one Text to prove that God is said in scripture properly to punish the Saints for their sins, in which Text the words having relation to the Saints sufferings, were acknowledged (or supposed at least) to signify properly to punish. But though this were granted to them, yet nothing less could be inferred from the words of this Text: Nay if it were indeed so, that the words here did properly signify to punish, the quite contrary must necessarily be inferred from them; to wit, that God will not at all punish the remnant of the Godly for their sins; for the words than would, clearly import, and properly signify thus much, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nakkeh lo anakkecha; puniendo non puniam te, in, or by punishing I will not punish thee; which would import (accordiug to that usual Hebraism, by doubling the Verb, to increase and augment the force of the signification, as Gen. 2. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mot tamut, in, or by dying thou shalt die; that is, thou shalt surely or certainly die; and so here these words upon the former snpposition, that they did signify properly to punish, would signify thus) surely, or certainly I will not punish thee; or I will not at all punish thee; or whatever else I do to thee (as for correction and chastisement, etc. which is indeed threatened, but by measure in the words immediately going before:) yet be sure of this, that I will never punish thee.  
And if this be not an excellent proof for an Ambassador to prove that his Lord and Sovereign doth denounce in his word proper punishments, or that his Lord doth threaten that he will (properly) punish the best, and most obedient of his subjects for their sins ' let the world judge, when (according to the Ambassadors own acception of the words which be so much breathes after to be acknowledged to him, and if it were granted) those very words which he citeth, would bring in his Lord and Sovereign speaking thus expressly, I will not punish you at all, who desire and endeavour to be my dutiful subjects: Although, indeed, I do resolve to correct you in measure, as a loving and merciful father doth his children for their offences. And if those words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nakkeh lo anakkecha (with the words going before) would not clearly bespeak so much, if the infinitive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nakkeh did signify to punish, I leave it to be determined at the very first view of the words, by any that knows but this mu●h of the Hebrew dialect, that the repeating of the verb doth add a special force and emphasis to the signification of it; and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lo, is the Hebrew negative particle, not. I do seriously profess, if there were no more said but this much for the clearing of your mistake in this text, I think I should shame and fright both Mr. Baxter and you from ever citing a text out of the Old Testament again, till you know more of the original of it, because I think you should always fear and remember this, that you cite, and you know not what you cite, and that when you have done so, you know not whom providence may stir up to tell you so much.  
And thus far, Sir, by way of concession (although, because I am sure it makes little to your purpose, I therefore know not whither, or how far pleasing or displeasing) to you, granting or supposing that some words in some of the Texts you bring, did properly signify to punish, even as they relate to the remnant of the godly and their sufferings: (which you will never evince while you breath.) But you are further to be informed, that no such signification can be forced from this root at all, as that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nakk●h should signify properly to punish, but rather the quite contrary; for the root in Kal, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nakah which radically only signifieth he was pure, clean, or innocent; and in piel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nikkah, it importeth he made pure and clean, or he made innocent; and hence he declared innocent, or he did absolve and acquit as not guilty. Whence our translation most frequently renders it, by holding guiltless, as in the third Commandment, Exod. 20. 7. etc. For the Lord, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lo jenakkah (the future piel 3. person singular) will not hold him guiltless, etc. absolving, or clearing and acquitting from guilt, as Exod. 34. 7. and Nah. 1. 3. etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nakkeh (the infinitive piel to absolve, clear, or acquit, by making innocent as it were) lo jenakk●h, abselvenda non absolvet, sive, declarando, innocentem, non declarahit: that is, surely, or certainly, he will not clear., acquit, nor absolve; or he will not at all, or altogether clear, acquit, or absolve, etc. by making or declaring innocent as it were. And so here in this Text, Jer. 46. v. last, and 30. v. 11. Those words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nakkeh (the infinitive piel, as before) lo anakkecha (the future piel. 1. sing. with the affix 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cha, thou.) verbatim, and word for word translated, they are rendered thus, absolvendo non absolvam te, sive dectarando non declarabo te innocentem; that is, in, or by acquitting, clearing, or absolving, I will not clear, absolve, nor acquit thee altogether, by declaring thee altogether innocent. The meaning of which phrase is, certainly I will not altogether acquit thee, by declaring thee altogether pure and innocent, when thou hast offended; because I have determined to chastise and correct thee (though out of love, and) in measure (when thou dost offend) as the words immediately preceding these, in the same verse do clearly import and express; and the sense of it is the same which the same word importeth, Exod. 20. 7. in the third Commandment; for as there the Lord determineth not to hold guiltless, by declaring altogether innocent, him, whosoever he be, whether godly or wicked, who shall dare to profane his holy name by taking it in vain, but one way or other he will make it manifest, that he doth not acquit nor clear any, as altogether innocent and without fault and gnilt in so doing. So here, J●r. 46. and 30 he doth indeed threaten the remnant of the godly, some way or another to make it manifest, that he doth not approve of their failings, and faults; and that he will not hold them altogether guiltless, by declaring (them altogether innocent, when they have offended against him but that rather he will by some dispensations of his providence, evidence to themselves their own guiltyness, and manifest to the world his taking notice of it, after they have offended him by their sins.  
And this is all which can be made out from the proper and known signification of those words: But when the question is more particularly proposed, what are those dispensations of divine providence by which he notifyeth this his taking notice of the offences of the godly viz. Whether they be proper punishments proceeding from God as a judge out of justice and vindictive wrath or vengeance; or whether they be only fatherly corrections from God as a loving father, out of love and mercy, to reclaim his own from their sinful ways? I do think this a very scriptural reason, and Christianlike answer, that if the Spirit of God in Scripture doth very frequently give out the sufferings of the godly by the name of chastisements and corrections, but never by the name of (proper) punishments, that then, the Saints sufferings are (more scripturally at least) to be called rather chastisements and corrections, than (proper) punishments; but the antecedent or first proposition is true, viz. That the Scripture doth often call the sufferings of the Saints corrections (as in those very words of Jer. 46. 28. & 30. 11. Yet I will not make a full end of thee, but I will correct thee in measure: And (so show that) I will not (altogether or) wholly hold thee guiltless (&c. as is before explained) when thou dost sin, and of fend me: but no where doth the Scripture call the Saints sufferings (proper) punishments; (for if it doth, I desire you would but inform me of it by your next, if you can, more fully and clearly then in this; and then I do promise you to challenge myself for challenging you as not being able to do it;) therefore the consequent or the last proposition is also true, viz that Christians ought rather to call the Saints sufferings, chastisements and corrections, than (proper) punishments.  
The last two Texts which Mr. Baxter citeth, in that sixth argument of his dispute in his Aphorisms, to prove that the sufferings of the Godly are called (proper) punishments in Scripture; are out of Leu. 28. ver. 18. and 24. But as they are the last of his citations out of Scripture in that place, so they are (especially one of them) the greatest and the grossest of his mistakes, about the Scriptures original (if any can be greater than some of yours, and his that have been examined before:) for the evident proof of which it will be only necessary in a word or two to ranscribe the Texts, and render them in their proper and radical signification.  
The words then mistaken of one of them, viz. Leu. 26. ver. 24 are these, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vehikkiti etchem gam ani, etc. and Verbatim they are rendered thus (and only thus properly, as any that ever hath read but two or three Psalms in the Hebrew Text understandingly, cannot but know at the very first sight of the Text, for the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hikkiti, is so frequently used in the Hebrew Text, and so frequently translated, in its proper and radical signification of smiting, that none who knows any thing in the Hebrew roots, can be ignorant that this is the true, genuine, proper and radical signification and translation of these words:) And I will smite you yet seven times more, etc. for the mistaken word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hickiti, is the first singular of the preterite tense in hiphil, I have smitten, but with Vau conversive before it, I will smite; from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nacah, not used in kal, but in hiphal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hickah he smote, he did smite or strike, etc. And it is constantly thus translated, as Esay 11. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (the same word) velickah eretz; and he shall smite the earth, etc. and 2 King. 13. 18. And he said, smite upon the ground, and he smote thrice, etc. where the same word is used in the imperative singular, and the third pers. sing. future, in hiphal; as every where else it hath this proper signification, and is translated accordingly: Now who knoweth not, that a father smiteth his Children, when he chastiseth and correcteth them out of love, to make them sensible of, and to reclaim from their faults, as well as the Judge doth (or causeth the Executioner to do) when he strikes the Malefactor, out of vindictive and revenging justice? And who likewise will not easily conjecture, that since the word to smite is as well applicable to the strokes of chastisement and correction out of fatherly love, as to the strokes of punishing vengeance, or vindictive and revenging justice; that Mr. Baxter's Antagonists will make choice of the one, when the word is spoken of the sufferings of the Godly, as well as he doth the other, and that they will disdain to weigh the weight of his authority to the contrary, upon this ground, that the word properly and radically signifying to correct or chastise, is frequently attributed in the Scripture to the dispensations of God to his people, when they offend him, as is often intimated before, and as we shall see, a little below the proof of it; but never is there a word properly and radically signifying to punish, attributed to them in the Scripture; and if he do join the authority of the translation to his own▪ they will value this reason equivalent to both; and then they'll further tell him; 1. That the Translators do take the word punishment in a general sense, as it is applicable to strokes of mercy, as well as of justice; and not only as it is taken for the strokes of wrathful and vindictive vengeance, which are proper punishments out of justice from a revenging judge, and to the satisfaction of justice, as Mr. Baxter and Mr. Hotchkis do take the word. And 2. they'll mind him again of the case of the question as it was at first stated, viz. that he is to prove his tenets out of his Lord and Masters original words, as if there were not a translation of them at hand to look on, or else he must lie under and bear the imputation of an unfit Ambassador of his Master to his people, in this far at least, (which is very far in my apprehension) that he cannot so much as read understandingly his Master's words, but by other men's eyes; and if so, how can he then possibly from his own knowledge, bespeak and declare his Master's mind to his people? And then they'll conclude, that therefore such wise ones must suffer themselves to be informed of the original, when they are so much mistaken about it.  
But now at length we come to the last, and yet the grossest of all Mr. Baxter's mistakes in this point; for I think it is one of the most intolerably impertinent misapplications, that ever a rational disputant was guilty of, in citing a testimony to gain authority to any of his opinions; so that the truth is, I cannot but be sorry, that I am necessitated to be so pungent to the reputation of a learned man, as the mere relation of the mistake must needs be; when it is known and taken notice of; yea I should resolve in silence to pass it over; were it not thereby to procure hereafter more serious thoughts about the application of Scriptural testimonies, to authorise men's opinions; and that more diligence may be used for the understanding of the original testimonies of Scripture, than hitherto hath been; lest otherways applications be found and proved to be nothing but most impertinent misapplications, and deceiving illusions both of others and of themselves, who bring such Testimonies for confirmation of their Tenets: for this end I cannot but declare, that Mr. Baxter's mistake and mis-application of that one Text of Scripture, Leu. 26. 18. May be enough to frighten a hundred from citing any unknown testimony out of Scripture, lest they both deceive themselves and others; and give occasion to some one or other to tell them, that if they worship not an unknown God, in being deceived of the mind and meaning of God, and not knowing it themselves by his own words; yet certainly by so doing, they read their Lectures from the unknown words of the true God; which how dangerous a thing it is, let the serious thoughts of serious Christians judge; for thereby they read to others what they know not (themselves) whether it be truth or error, because they know not themselves, and by their own knowledge, whether it be agreeable to the pure original words of truth in the Scripture which they cite, or whether it may not be quite contrary to them, for any thing that they know, or can see and discern with their own eyes.  
But that it may clearly appear that this advertisement is not given without ground from this mistake of Mr. Baxters, and his misapplication of that forementioned Text, Leu. 26. 18. The state of the question is once more to be remembered and mentioned: And it is this, Whether the sufferings of the godly or their afflictions be proper punishments, being inflicted upon them, and proceeding from God as a Judge, out of vindictive vengeance and revenging wrath, for satisfaction of his Justice, which Mr. Baxter affirmeth, or whether they be only chastisements and corrections proceeding from God our of fatherly love and mercy to reclaim his people from their sins, and to make them sensible of their offences, and that God will not altogether hold them guiltless, or count or declare them innocent, who do knowingly offend against him: This Mr. baxter's Antagonists do affirm, and upon this ground, that the Scripture doth never call the afflictions of the godly by the name of proper punishments, because such are inflicted for satisfaction to justice, but nothing but infinite or eternal sufferings can satisfy infinite justice; and therefore none but the sufferings of Christ, God as well as man can be equivalent to such a satisfaction, and he hath paid it fully for the godly, and and therefore it cannot be paid, nor justly required to be paid again by themselves.  
Well, but Mr. Baxter will undertake to prove the contrary, that the Saints sufferings are proper punishments, etc. and by this argument, the Scriin many places doth call them proper punishments, therefore they are so, and are to be called so by us: The antecedent is denied to him, and his Antagonists do affirm, that the Scriptures do not call them so.  
Now he being put to prove his assertion, that the Scripture doth call the sufferings of the Godly proper punishments, and not only Chastisements and Corrections; would it ever enter into any man's imagination, that so judiciously rational, and learned a man, and so sharp sighted in all his disputes, as Master Baxter is; would bring such a Text to prove his point, as Leu. 21. ver. 21. And I will chastise (or correct) you seven times for your sins; would this be a fit Text to prove that God doth not only correct and chastise his people for their sins, but also that he doth properly punish them; in which there is not a word of punishment threatened, but only of Chastisement and Correction for offences.  
I do verily think that there are many hundreds in England, that would aver me a very liar to my face, if I should only by word of mouth affirm unto them, that eagle-eyed Baxter were so far over-seen, and so short sighted in proving his points: And therefore I must first of all tell it now to himself, that it is no less than truth, that he is so far overseen, and that his sight is just so short, and nothing sharper in this particular; for out of that very chapter, Leu. 26. He brings a text, viz. v. 18. to prove that the sufferings of the godly are called proper punishments in Scripture, & not only chastisements & corrections; in which verse there is nothing more mentioned of punishments, then in v. 28 but only of chastisement & correction; for in both those verses the very self root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jasar, is used, which only doth signify to correct and chastise, or to instruct by chastisement and correction; as all that ever knew any thing of the body of the Hebrew roots, can easily and evidently testify; and if the self same root be not used in both these verses, let any man that knoweth but the Hebrew letter's look and see; for v. 28. the words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vejissarti etchem; and I will correct or chastise you, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jissarti being the first person sing. pret piel. I have corrected or chastised, but with the conversive va● before it, I will correct and chastise, and in 18. the word is thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vejasaphri lejasserah etchem; and I will add to chastise or correct you, that is, I will yet chastise or correct you more, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lejasserah, to correct or instruct, being the infinitive piel, with the infinitive letter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lamed, put before the radical letters, and the paragogique 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he put after them, from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jusar, he corrected or chastised; or he instructed by correction and chastisement. Now is not this an excellent proof of Mr. Baxters, to prove that the sufferings of the godly are called proper punishments in Scripture, and not only chastisements and corrections, by a text that mentioneth not a word of punishment, but only of correction and chastisement, thus, I will chastise or correct you yet seven times more, etc. Who would have imagined Mr. Baxter to have been so irrtional in his probations? By this means Mr. Baxter might reckon up near a hundred of places wherein God is spoken of as chastizing and correcting his people, and by all and each of which, he might go about to prove, that God doth properly punish them, and not only chastise them, as when David saith Ps●l. 118. v. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jassor jisserani Jah in chastising God hath chastised me (the same word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jasar, in the infinitive, and preter tense piel, to correct or chastise) Mr. Baxter might translate it, in punishing God hath punished me; that is, surely he hath punished me, and from hence infer, that the afflictions of the Godly are not only chastisements, but they are certainly properly punishments, because the Scripture doth certainly call them so: But alas this were but to make it evident how dangerous a thing it is, not only for the blind to be led by the blind, but even for those who know nothing themselves, with their own eyes, to follow blindfoldedly seeing Guides; for if they please they may lead them whither they will, even to their own destruction: For, by appearance, if the Translators should call the word signifying Light, Darkness, and the word signifying Darkness if they should translate it Light; if they should call Truth Error, and Error Truth; or if they should translate one and the same word Light and in one place, and darkness and error in another, all were one case to Mr. Baxter; for he would not be at the pains to undeceive himself & others from such illusions. The truth is, I must now at last for bear to speak any thing further of such mistakes, because if I should speak any more about them, it would be to this purpose, to show that he did not deserve the name of an Ambassador of Christ, who being entrapped and caught in such deceive of himself and others, through his own most faulty negligence, should not so cordialy evidence his resenting of it, as to lay aside all his other studies, whether, of the Fathers, Schoolmen, or Philosophers and to set himself seriously, at last, which he should have done first, to the study of his Lord and Masters own original words, in which he hath delivered his Embassage, and the instructions and articles thereof to his people. Having therefore thus informed such Wise ones about the Original, I rest theirs, as reason shall hereafter require:    
William Robertson.  
FINIS.