A Serious Aviso TO THE GOOD PEOPLE OF THIS NATION, Concerning that Sort of Men, called Levellers.  
By J. PHILOLAUS.  Juven. 
Evertere domos totas aptantibus ipsis dii facilis.  
LONDON: Printed for Peter coal, at the Sign of the Printing-Press in cornhill, near the Royal Exchange. 1649.   

A SERIOVS AVISO TO THE LEVELLERS.  
Dear fellow Citizens,  
WHen I consider the strange dispensations of providence upon us of this Nation, I cannot but be swallowed up in admiration and deepest acknowledgement, how it hath been pleased to scourge us but with light afflictions, and notwithstanding bless us with such transcendent mercies as we should hardly have dared to have wished, though had we been after his own heart, nay the apple of his eye. Germany hath been drowned in a sea of blood, or wasted by fury of the fire, yet still how far off asserting a true Liberty and Reformation? France notwithstanding she hath dared bravely, stil groans under her burdens( & which is her greatest burden) is forced to fawn upon a distrustful Tyrant. But we among whom for almost a decade of years there hath been a continual effusion of blood, know neither Rapes, nor Desolations, nay are ignorant almost of the common calamities of war, while we have pulled down those powers of the Earth that stood between us and our Felecity, and have rendered ourselves a people absolutely Free, with less bloodshed, and in less time than our Ancestors have often and more laboriously and miserable spent in obtaining some specious shadow of freedom as a gift and benevolence of some unworthy Usurper, or else in maintaining of some unjust Title in order to the lust and vile ambition of some insatiate Pretender.  
When( I say) I revolu these things with myself( as truly I do often with a great deal of religious astonishment) I instantly think that there is more in this than the hand of Man; nay that the hand of the Almighty Himself hath visibly appeared: And since when he Appears none may Resist; I cannot but account it an ungrateful stiff-neckedness in any who shall not calmly close with all these mercies, and willingly resign himself up into the power which hath miraculously snach't us from the snares of oppression, and vigorously protected us in the full restoration of our Liberties.  
Now since the Parliament, that now sits, hath been the great Instrument of all this: As I have never yet been wanting faithfully both to serve and honor them; so have I had too many occasions of pitty and sorrow in their behalf, especially since having from the beginning struggled both with such inward and outward Resistances, and patiently suffered under such furious Invectives, Rash Engagements, as might well nigh deter the most Resolute virtue from persisting its purposes: they should in the very End, when they were about to reap the Fruits of their Constancy and integrity be thus afresh assaulted, and that by a sort of people sprung out of their own Bowels, dissenting from their own Engagement, and Actuating their Resolutions with greater fury( and possibly worse Consequences) than could be expected from the Malice and rancour of these very enemies, whose Principals and Interests are diametrically opposite.  
'Tis of these people( beloved countrymen) that I would at this time( amid hast and distractions) bid you forbear, & conjure by all your late sufferings, present quiet, & future expectations, to dis-favor and dis-beleeve; for as Divines say, those Errors are the most pernicious that keep nearest distance from the Truth; so in politics, these Factions are the most dangerous that seem to comply the most with the truest and direct interest in a Common-weal. For walking in the disguise either of Justice or truth they are both more strong and unseen, and yet they can( in due time, setch out of their own principles, pretences enough for prevarication and wickedness.  
This sort of men who( like other factions, content in time to own those Names which the scorn of others first puts upon them) are called Levellers, were at first mingled with the best Patriats, and asserters of our Freedom, that if they themselves had not violently burst forth, there had never been known a separation, but they had equally with them shared the glory of our Settlement, and never been noted Common disturbers; But now since by such a disorderly avulsion they have made themselves another body and are either pleased to Fancy or Attempt great things; let us take the pains to examine the base whereon they now stand, and see whether al these gorgeous pretences and splended Representations will not quickly vanish into spectres and Chymaeras.  
And first for the Persons: wherein we may consider 2. things. First, whether they are fit to do it. Or Secondly, whether they ought to do it. For fitness there needs not much be said concerning the Persons, who are all of them private men, utterly unverst in Government, and some of them of boisterous and turbulent Natures that would possibly recoil at their own Designations if they were once settled. Now how fit any man is to direct and design in any thing wherein through long and constant observation he cannot pretend to a piercing judgement and perfect insight, let any man judge: But how much of al affairs and observations, those which concern the republic are the Nicest and most entangled? Contingences, fraud of men, succession of time, besides the Narrow poor blindness of mans Reason will evince: and the frequent examples of of Common-wealths( whose laws still needed alteration or explanation) demonstrate, That though it be easy to frame an Idea, and to trick it up with Nice Capriccios and airy whimzies, yet this, if it come to be settled and imposed would drag along with it more inconveniences, than the other if which it discomposed; and therefore I am verily of opinion that fantastic Eutopian Common wealths( which some witty men, some Philosophers have drawn unto us) introduced among men, would prove far more loathsome & be more fruitful of bad consequences than any of those of the Basest alloy yet known, and of this opinion I am the rather, because they seem all to me rather suited to the private conceptions and humors of their Architects than to the Accommodation and Penefit of Men, and that besides they contain many times, things naturally Monstrous, there would also appear abundance of Absurdities which only conversation and time could make apparent. Nay, and we see that the divine Plato( a man never too much commended for his other writings) yet when he came to handle this subject, has had the Fate to manage it so, that he has incurred the censure and exception of a many learned pens.  
Omit al this: since we have not constituted these men our lawgivers; & therefore are not implicitly bound to accept what they propose, lets ask them from whence they have this draft, & for what reason they conceive it for to urge it so much to us? if they say they have it by inspiration or Revealation( as I think they will not) we shal begin to suspect black fumes of Hypocondriac melancholy or distemper of the Imagination, if they say from example: from whence is it? do the people that live under it live happily by it? or are they sure our climb and humour is fit to receive it? or how came they to offer the imposition, And if the people will not accept it, what then? if they say 'tis that which they conceive most rational and necessary, I ask again whether they have some superiority of reason above other men, if they have, it remains on their side to prove: for we positively deny it, if they have not, their conclusions are but the resultance of so many private votes, For every man that has reason may have free liberty to use it; and then the thing hanging in doubt and suspense, where's the necessity? If they say the thing be so just as that it will force itself unto all mens understandings, and violentate them to comply with it, I must demand whether they mean mankind in genral, or us in particular? if the former, alas the customs, and educations, and complexions of some nations are so different that the very reasons differ, and what reason is there they should all walk by one Rule? if the latter, they run but the circled unless they tell us why to us only, and then demonstrate them useful to us: which if they do, we must again look whether they be such as may be bettered, or no, if they grant they may, then affirm I that he that produces a better plat-form ought out of their own principles( or which is stronger, out of reason) to be received; and then why urge they this Sceptical design of theirs; if they say it Cannot: I must return and justify, that No human government is absolutely perfect, and that particularly there are many things weak and trivial in theirs, and again ask them whether they would have it changeable or unchangeable, if changeable, what need all this stir for a thing of a day, and what necessity is there so to disorder the present frame and make ourselves liable to the Designs and Dangers of Enemies for so small a thing: if unchangeable, Is it perfect? that I think they will not say, if imperfect, how will they offer to obtrude it upon a people when it may every day grow more and more hateful, and restrain them from a freedom of change, and whether were not these provisions of theirs, the Foundations of a most absolute and exact Tyranny.  
For point of duty, since yourselves are the most eager for equality of persons, 'tis but just we suppose ye equal to the rest, & if you be equal, I beseech you how came you by the super-intendency, if it be in respect of personal endowments( as I perceive few among ye stars of the first magnitude) this might enable you to advice but not to command, Besides you being willing to melt all this Nation into one body, ye must needs be but such a part of it, and such a number, and can ye show me why a greater number of private men( and ye are no more) not being Representatives or Magistrates may not lay the same claim to their model, and by consequence bring the Dagon of Monarchy once more amongst us, & then have we not laboured ourselves into a double Tyranny, if they say they do it in Right of the people, I demand how they can show their Authority from the people: If they say from the law of Nature, the dissenting parties must be considered, & heard; and who would you have Judges? If they deny the Representative at Westminster a Parliament, I must inquire, why they deny it to be one: They will say, it was called by the King's Writ, and the King's power determining with his death they ought to dissolve. But then I will ask whether the joint Consent of the 3. Estates( as they stood) were not more binding than any single Act of the Kings; this I think they deny not: Well, the King and they agree( and it was then adjudged an excellent Act) That they should not dissolve without the consent of all the 3. Estates: Now there being no King to dissolve them, may not we as well affirm that they are indissolvable, nay better; then that they are de jure disolv'd already upon the King's death, For when Two powers are put together, the strongest needs must prevail: and that power by which they sit being greater than that power by which they should not sit, it follows they ought to sit, and if they sit they are a Parliament, and if a Parliament, why ought a company of private men to stir against them without the penalty of disobeying Parliamentary power: And since the Actions of private men not derived from their Authority are unvalid and illegal, I wonder who can justify theirs.  
To prove my Assumption, That the Parliament is a Parliament, I must destroy that common objection which comes from al cider, That 'tis Imperfect, under Restrant, & mangled of a many Members. For their imperfection, since they exceed forty you need not care, and I believe not many months since you could have been content they had been a less number; and though in the Agreement( as you call it) you multiply the diminishing of the Parliament to two hundred at least, yet I am confident that if it serve any design of yours, you could easily be content to abate the Rigor of this Rule and shrink into a lesser number: however what Laws they find till they be repealed they must stand by, and you that traffic so much in Cooks. Institutes may there find some text to adjudge it, for my part I value the argument of as little force, as the House themselves conceive the restraint to be, which you say lies upon them, for they have declared themselves free from all such kind of fear; if they were guarded any otherwise than for their own necessary defence, 'tis a wonder why their guards remove so oft up and down upon their commands, or why they assert their liberty in not satisfying the soldiery point-blank at every humour, although in respect of their signal and faithful services they are desirous to use all indulgence to them, as to that means which under God hath preserved them in that safety and flourishing prosperity wherein they now sit: and for the secluding of the Members, if there were any injury at all, it was to the Gentlemen themselves, and yet what injury it was to put restraint upon them who manifestly violated their trusts and endeavoured to comply with the enemy, ye may judge, it seems ye once had the charity to forgive it, for till ye had divore'd yourselves from us ye were not known to complain of it, but rather( supposing it injust) were content to connive at it so long as it conduced to your own ends, and indeed were there nothing in the world to excuse it, The sovereign necessity & high danger to excuse it were enough, the good party being at that time almost overborne into an unworthy conclusion of an injust Treaty, and we ready to receive again the Basilisk into our arms, But how you can urge or demonstrate any such danger seems impossible to me especially concurring with so benign a Parliament who hasten with that slowness which is but requisite to justice to make a full accomplish for all your desires so far as they conduce to the happiness of the people whom they represent and do not go beyond the Altar, withal the army were in a public capacity, cemented and engaged by a many declarations, owned by several endearments of the Parliament: and crwoned by a many of noble victories, whereas you being a disjointed sort only of private men lye not under any such capacity nor cannot otherwise, then by wishes or propositions intermeddle( as I  told you) with any thing of public concernment and therefore I hope I may from the resultance of what hath been said, affirm, That this Parliament are at this time the sole Trustees of the republic that the same penalties ought to fall upon them who actually disobey them, as upon those who violate the majesty of a people.  
And I am rather encouraged to say this; for suppose that in the late convulsion of government all the existant power whatever had been nulled or Suspended, yet surely that which first seized of the Rule, or first restored itself, was for that time the lawful and only Government; But the Parliaments power was so far from being vacated, that they continued still entire( unless that some putrifi'd limbs were lop't off) and therefore ought still to be obeied. But put the case( as ye say) that the sword prevailed only, yet the swords acknowledgement tacitly envested and enabled the Parliament, had it not been able before, especially if( as ye lately objected in a Letter to the Lord General) the Army were a distinct interest & combined only together with the intent of performing such and such resolutions; Moreover, granting either the Army could confirm the Parliament or were not subordinate, or stood merely upon their own engagement, yet so long as they persist, having as public, visible, and possibly good reasons as your propositions, I see not why they being in a public capacity should not rather be first heard.  
But since the Army are under the pay and service of the Parliament, let those men that have but been acquainted with the Name or Notions of bare moral honesty be Judges, whether you take a manly or gentle course in effectuating of your desires, in Endeavouring by your Spies and Emissaries to foment jealousies in the Army; debaush the minds of Souldiers, withdraw them from the obedience of their Commanders, and retard our service in Ireland, the preservation of which does in our politic interest almost as near concern as the preservation of our own Harths and Altars: Is this the way to consumate a many glorious pretences, by insinuating into the soldiers spirits arguments of contumacy? For my part I shall ever be jealous of that good which is effected by such bad means, and suppose that under the gilded pretences of such as make use of them; there ever lies something both poisonous and formedable.  
For your desires themselves, since the Parliament have prevented you in the modest and reasonable part of them, and are still going forward with pious provision for settlement, I think they may very well be excused to decline those parcels of yours which are rash and vile, and truly I think, both parties considered together, that they will be found the Abler to judge of them: For whereas there is on the one side a many Raw, Inconsiderate, unexperienced young men: There is on the other a many grave and sage persons, long verst in the Arts of Government and humors of the people, whose very Interest oblieges them to justice and a due quietation of the people: For as we are never like to have again a Representative so thoroughly purged and winnowed, so shall we never have any one again whose obligations will be so point blank opposite to the adverse party and their head.  
But lest ye object that I fraudulently insist only upon generals, I shal briefly touch at some of your propositions( for to do it particularly & fully may be a task by itself) and from hence demonstrate, that you only lay the foundations of a frantic Democracy and vile confusion, I shal not much insist upon that wherein you deny that any Member of Parliament shal be chosen for the next, Because I believe it proceeds rather out of malice and untoward prevention, than any serious reason or discretion; only I see no reason why those men whose fidelity we have so long and largely tasted( those whose misdemeanours have ejected them I pled not for) should be debarred from confirming us in our opinions, and assisting us with their Counsels the next time; But this seems strange to me, that if the Parliam, will not just when you dismiss them dissolve, that you will be ready with an Anti-Parliament for them, & so dispossess them, yet suppose they were upon such Noble Counsels as you yourselves could not really dislike( as no doubt they will be upon such as good men cannot dislike) would you break the thrid of their Debates, because it was your pleasure as that time? what a violation were it to Justice & Parliament! and what an hideous act and example of yours, and how far were the Conven●ion from being a Tumult? It were me thinks a very strange thing to sever a company of choice Gentlemen, & that in the very midst of their debats, which being of public relations must be oft Repeated, often discussed, and many to be satisfied, it is not to be supposed, they can have so sudden a determinotion as the Resolutions of a few private men conspiring in a Chamber; But pray let me ask you, suppose you could glean up a Mock-Synod, whether could you hold it lawful or unlawful? if the first, whether were it actually a Patliament before that other dissolved, or not till it were? if it were a true Parliament before the other broken up, then there were two Parliaments together, a thing never dreamed of but at Oxford, and then whether were they both true Parliaments, and whether might they not both vote contrarieties and contradictions: if not till the Parliament were dissolved, then all the Elections were voided, and such a suspension is both against Law, Reason and Example; if it be unlawful, it were but a Seditious sort of people tumultuously gathered together, and so to be remanded to their own homes: Yet I speak not this any way to maintain a perpetuity in this Parliament, but onely to assert their freedom of sitting and dissolving, free from all external force and power whatever; and if it be so entirely within them, I see not why they should not choose their own time, both in respect of Right( as I have proved) as in respect of Duty, lest they should leave things imperfect or unsettled, and consequently leave a way for greater Breaches: and that we have some Reason to think thus, is, That they have appointed a day to consider of the choosing of a New Representative; and for most of the Gentlemen themselves, they are so oppressed with the continuance and weight of the public burden, that they desire nothing more then to be eased of it.  
Neither do I know whether or no in your Agreement, you give the people too great a swing, and render their power far more Unlimited and Arbitrary then is even consistent with Democracy itself: For truly, he that considers the giddiness, inconstancy, and sometimes perverseness of the Multitude, would be loathe that the whole ruins of Government should be turned into their hands immediately, and that their power should not be somewhat restrained and regulated. From this we red such ridiculous, contradictious and pitiful Changes in the Populacy of Athens; and from hence came all those various Disturbances, which for a long time afflicted Florence: whereas if it be modestly disposed, and sweetly tempered( as we have reason to hope will be the Resultance of the councils of the Parliament) it is the best assurance of the happiness of a people, whose Liberty is not to be valued according to the Extent, but Use and Safety.  
Nor do I think I any way pled the cause of those insatiable Cormorants the Lawyers, nor yet defend either the Intricacy or subtleties of the Law itself, if I affirm, That in endeavouring to take away some entangled Knots, and causes of unnecessary Delay, you pluck up the whole Roots of the Law, and render it nothing but a means of speedy Injustice: Not that I could wish any thing preserved in it, that might foment Debates, or hinder a just Cause: But that I know there will be such Contingencies and Perplexities happen in the course of life, that it will be impossible for a country Jury, or some Annual Magistrate, not verst or bread that way, ever to determine.  
Another thing is, That this Buskin of yours is fitted to all Interests, and ye endeavour to catch all Broken-Parties within the Drag Net of your Interest: yet you may consider, left in case you should prevail, Whether those men would not be Coloquintada or no in your Broth; the Countreymans Snake( in the Fable) lay as dead in the could, but once warm, began to hiss and sting: Believe it, if you nourish these Serpents, you may expect no better from them; for who knows not what danges there is in the Reconciliation of a Civil Enemy; and yourselves cannot be ignorant, what contrariety your Principles and Interest holds with all the other of the Nation.  
Others I could add to these, but that I purpose not to swell above my intended Brevity; and I suppose, whoever is really possessed about these, may have a shrewd guess at the rest. For my part, whatever Ends drive you on to these courses, whether you occultly act the designs of the Kingists, as some such not to say, or that ye are driven on by private Enmity and Animosity, or that you are discontented at the present State, and labour a Change, or that 'tis onely your Indiscretion hurries into all the Tumults, I should earnestly sue unto you, That you would peaceably apply yourselves to your several Callings, and not put your Sickle into that Harvest, in which, it seems, Providence hath not appointed you labourers: but sitting down, and expecting the out-going of the Divine Will, you may all in your several stations, enjoy the sweet Comforts of Peace and Blessing promised to peaceable men; and withal, avoid that punishment and ignominy which must necessary happen to the Firebrands of a country.  
And for you( my countrymen) who are not as yet touched with the Venom, I shall onely wish this Paper an Antidote to preserve you, that you may not shut your eyes at the mighty Appearances of Providence, nor turn renegadoes from his Instruments, but quietly awaiting the issue of these things, you may perceive and feel what a blessedness it is, Not to join in the Designs of wicked men, who though they may for a while storm and prosper, yet at the length they must be overthrown, and have their faces covered with shane and Confusion.  
21 11 Maii, 1649.  
FINIS.