THE King's Supremacy ASSERTED. OR A REMONSTRANCE OF The Kings Right AGAINST The PRETENDED PARLIAMENT.  
By ROBERT SHERINGHAM M.A. and Fellow of Gunvill, and Caius-Colledge in Cambridge.  
C R HONI SOIT QVI MAL Y PENSE  
Printed formerly in Holland, and now Reprinted by W. Godbid and are to be sold by Richard Skelton, and Richard Head, at 〈…〉   

TO HIS MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY CHARLES II.  
By the Grace of God KING of England, Scotland, etc. Defender Of the Faith.  
Most Gracious, and Dreadful Sovereign,  
THE Pretended Parliament of England having their Agents lately in the Low Countries, treating with the United Provinces about conditions of an offensive and defensive war, my resolution was to have set out this Remonstrance in the Dutch tongue for the satisfaction of those Provinces: but the treaty ended almost as soon as I began to actuate my resolution; whereupon I altered my purpose, and have now set it out in English for the satisfaction of your own Subjects, hoping the truth being here clearly illustrated, may have some effect upon their Consciences, which cannot but have great sway over them in ordering and directing their Actions. Experience teacheth that most men act less boldly and resolutley, (especially where their lives must be engaged) when they act against their Conscience, then when they are persuaded of the lawfulness and justice of their cause. There hath been more blood spilt by civil war in your Majesty's dominions within the space of ten years, since those pernicious principles touching the Supremacy of the People and lawfulness of resistance have been instilled into men's minds by some who fetched their doctrine from Hell to furnish the world with tragedies, then formerly in an Hundred. I conceive the nearest and readiest way to reform such un-christian practices, is to reform the Conscience; although I deny not but more sharp and violent remedies must also be applied: for some have lost all sense of Conscience, whom your Majesty, I hope, assisted by the almighty providence of God, shall reform by the Sword. This is that which Religion calls for at your hands, now oppressed by such a multitude, and confused swarm of Sectaries, that I should think it impossible for so many men of several Religions to live together in unity, did not the Likeness of their Nature and Manners reconcile their affections, as much as their differences in Religion can alienate and estrange them. And this is that which all your faithful Subjects pray for, who desire nothing more in this world then to see your Majesty seated in your Royal Throne, and able to protect them from the insolences of the Rebels, who make their will their law, disposing as freely of men's lives and fortunes, as if they had created them and given them their Being.  
It is a rule in Optics, when a dark body is greater than a light to which it is directly opposed, it casteth a shadow in infinitum: Such a shadow (if the continent were capable of an infinite shadow) will the dark body of the Rebels cast upon the Kingdom of England, whilst it is interposed between your Majesty and your loyal Subjects, depriving them both of your favourable Aspect, and of your Light and Influence, without which they can look for nothing but a continuation of their present miseries: for should the Rebels prevail and prosper in their designs, what else can be expected, but that which is wrested from others by Force and Violence, should be maintained by Tyranny and Injustice? But whilst they wade in blood to places of preferment and command, the Lord shall overthrew them in the midst of their course, as he overthrew the Egyptians in the Red-sea; I usurp not the name of a Prophet, but I speak as one believing God to be a faithful observer of his promises: He will not always be deaf to the prayers and complaints of those that are oppressed, but send them diliverance in his due time, and supply your Majesty with all things necessary both to vindicate your own Rights, and free your People from their oppression.   

THE CONTENTS.  

AN INTRODUCTION.  
The beginning, raise and progress of the Rebellion raised by the pretended Parliament. The Principles whereby they endeavour to justify their proceed. The Questions that shall be discussed,   

THE FIRST QUESTION.  
Whether the people and their Deputies in Parliament be Supreme and above the King, or coordinate with him by the Laws of the Land.  
CHAP. I. 
The State of the Question explained.  CHAP. II. 
The King's Supremacy in general showed by the Statutes of the Land.  CHAP. III. 
The King's Supremacy in particular showed by the Statutes of the Land.  CHAP. IU. 
The King's Supremacy in general showed by the Common Law. That the English Monarchy is susceptible of no alteration. That fundamental Laws ought not to be changed.  CHAP. V. 
The King's Supremacy in particular showed by the Common Law.  CHAP. VI 
The King's Supremacy both in general and particular showed by Reasons depending upon the Laws and Customs of the Land.  CHAP. VII. 
Divers objections made by the pretended House, answered: The King's Supremacy shown to be in his Person not in his Courts.  CHAP. VIII. 
Divers general objections made by the Author of the treatise of Monarchy touching the limitation and mixture of the English Monarchy, and coordination of the two Houses, answered. The nature of absolute, limited and mixed Government explained.  CHAP. IX. 
Divers general objections taken from the testimony of his Majesty, Bracton and Fortescue, together with the Precedents of Edward the second, and Richard the second, answered.  CHAP. X. 
Objections made against the King's Supremacy in particular, by Mr. Bridge, the Reverend Divines, and Other, answered.     

AN INTRODUCTION.  
The Beginning, Raise, and Progress of the Rebellion raised by the pretended Parliament. The Principles whereby they endeavour to justify their proceed. The Questions that shall be discussed.  
I Look upon the government of England, if the Laws might be restored to their ancient dignity and authority, as inferior to none in the world. Parliaments, whilst the King and Parliament have acted in their several spheres, & not invaded the rights and privileges of one another, have always been the surest means under God to unite their affections together, and to prevent those dangers which by their mutual discord must of necessity have ruined both. Some are so rash as to affirm, that all Transactions, Negotiations, and accords between Kings and Subjects ought to be interdicted; not only depriving subjects of the light and favours which they should receive from their Prince, but Princes also of many commodities which they may receive by capitulating with their subjects in Parliaments, where the whole kingdom being present, either in person or by representation, may give the King, and receive from him again, such reciprocal testimonies of love, that he may be assured his people seek nothing more than the preservation of his life, honour, and Royal dignity; and they, that their King endeavoureth no less to increase and maintain the liberty, riches, and prosperity of his people And I am confident the last Parliament had been as great as blessing to the land as ever any was in former ages, had not the ambition, avarice, and malice of some interrupted the course of the laws. But for this assembly of Traitors which hath a long time called themselves a Parliament, (sitting without the house of Lords, and secluding from the house of Commons, all that would not be as cruel, barbarous, and wicked as themselves) it is a disturber of the Kingdom's peace, an enemy and destroyer of the people; and if we look upon their actions in their beginning, in their raise, and in their progress, they may seem to have had always a formal opposition to justice, and to have acted by some occult and specifical quality not common to other Christians. There was indeed at the first beginning of the Parliament, much murmuring and discontent amongst the people, partly caused by the monopolies, and unusual taxation of Shipmoney, and partly occasioned by the abuses of divers Courts. Here the enemies of the Commonwealth finding a spacious overture to enter into this Rebellion, began to act their parts, and being too provident to lose such an advantage, laboured to exasperate the minds of the people, and to stir up those evil humours which began already to appear. And although his Majesty offered all just satisfaction for what was past, and the best security themselves should in reason require that the like Disorders might for ever after be prevented, yet these turbulent and factious spirits, being for the most part men of broken fortune, and hoping to heal themselves by the ruin of others, opposed all such motions, and would needs themselves become Chirurgeons to the state; and as Chirurgeons are wont to smooth and stroke the parts which they resolve shall bleed, so they began to smooth and stroke the people, promising them a new light in matters of Religion, and that they would remove the grievances, and sweeten the evils which affected the Common wealth: although in stead of removing and sweetening them, they have almost made them incurable. By these persuasions mixed with many pretences of Religion they procured the people to meet together in great multitudes, and in a tumultuous manner to assault divers of the Lords as they were going to the Parliament, and to drive them back again, not permitting them to speak in the house when their speech was most necessary for the service of the Kingdom. Although it was easy for his Majesty to discover their intentions, yet the love he bore his people made him to dissemble it, and to give way to their proceed, hoping they might in time be brought by his favours to mitigate and correct their furious practices; but finding at last that his patience served for nothing else but to fortify and encourage them in their malice, he thought himself obliged to take such ways as he judged most convenient to stop the course of their proceed, the continuation whereof was like to bring so many mischiefs to the Commonwealth: and seeing it was like to be prejudicial to the safety of the people as well as to his own to stay longer in a place where there was neither security for his person, nor liberty for any other than those factious persons to vote according to the dictates of their own reason, he was forced to withdraw himself from the Parliament to avoid the pernicious effects of those men's counsels which were resolved the whole commonwealth should sink rather than themselves not obtain those places of command and profit which they aimed at. The King being gone it was not to be wondered if they which in his presence had the boldness to wove such pernicious designs against the state, should in his absence endeavour to corrupt the fidelity of his subjects, for having the city of London wholly at their command, they neither wanted means nor opportunity to draw the people to their faction, who by such artificial devices as they used were easy to be ensnared: They told them that by resisting the King, they should not be rebels, but an army authorised by those which were depositaries of the King's authority; that this resistance was an inspiration from heaven which promised the restauration of their ancient liberties which, they said, had been so often violated by the King: They made them believe that the authority of the King, and the whole commonwealth, would be brought into confusion if they did not vigorously oppose those disorders were growing upon them, and remove those evil counsellors from the King that did misled and seduce him; and withal they set out a Declaration promising to preserve and defend the King's Majesty's person and authority together with the liberties of the Kingdom, assuring them they had no thoughts or intentions to diminish his Majesty's just power and greatness, or any way to alter the constitution of the government, or of Parliaments consisting of a King, a house of Lords, and a house of Commons. But now we see the effects contrary to those words and promises which were so solemnly made to the whole Kingdom: for they have not only diminished his Majesty's just power and greatness, overthrown the nature and very being of Parliaments, but most traitorously deprived his Majesty of his life, and that after he had condescended so far as to  all their unreasonable demands: which fact of theirs although it hath been masked with many specious pretences, and coloured with the fairest shows of justice; yet was it the most execrable murder that ever was committed next that of our Saviour Christ: and his ambitious judge hath gained this, that next PILATE, BRADSHAW of all such judges shall by posterity be esteemed the chief. This murder of the King as it was most unjust, so was it also most unseasonable considering the present disposition of the Kingdom, whose strength being already too much weakened and attenuated, ought not to have been further wasted and consumed by renewing the war, which the death of the King did threaten. But such motions could work nothing upon those which had long before resolved to make all other considerations give place to profit and ambition: the people abused themselves whilst they thought this factious assembly would be more careful and tender of them then of the King: for they have not only brought a new war upon them which might have been avoided, dashing them all against one another, but have also themselves many ways barbarously afflicted and destroyed them: they have made the scaffold the Gibbet, the prison, and the grave, the common places of their rendezvous; and those which they have not devoured by their cruelty, they devour by their unsatiable avarice; whilst they declaim against Kings for oppressing the people by unjust taxations, they have themselves, as hath been computed by many, squeezed more in one year from the Commonwealth than all the Kings of England have done since the conquest. The lawful Magistrates are deprived of the liberty and honour of their functions; and such as are the greatest enemies to justice are set up in their places; some are bereft of their estates, others are driven out of the Kingdom and forced to seek a foreign air, where they may breathe more freely then in their own: The whole Nobility, Clergy, & Commonalty walk desolately & mournfully up and down, being no more like the men they were, than the skins of sacrificed beasts are like their living bodies. And after all these indignities offered to the King and people, they endeavour contrary to the laws to alter the government and to pull up the very foundation of the Kingdom, calling their new frame and structure a Free Estate, and themselves the keepers of the freedom of England: Thus having guilt over this Idol of their own fancy, they force all men to fall down and worship it; they whose virtue oblige them to refuse; are cast into a furnace hotter than that of Babylon.  
Seeing the body of the Kingdom devoured thus to the very entrails, I could not without horror behold such a miserable carcase so rend and torn in every part, nor could I satisfy mine own conscience if I should not endeavour according to my poor abilities to oppose the rage and sury of these men which are grown so fat with the blood and spoil of others: My intention therefore is reserving matters of fact to speak here of matters of right, and to show the injustice of their cause, and discover the falsehood of all those Principles whereby they endeavour to justify their proceed; not doubting but I shall so far convince the understanding of all those that shall read this ensuing discourse, that they shall not hereafter enter into any combination with the rebels, or continue with them in them in case they be already engaged, except their hearts be hardened so far, as they dare act in matters of such concernment contrary to their consciences.  
The Principles and grounds whereby they endeavour to justify this present war against the King are two; First they say that it is lawful for the people to resist their sovereign and supreme governor's by force of arms in case they be Tyrants, and bend to subvert the laws and religion established, or by illegal proceed invade the lives, estates, or liberties of their subjects. But there is some disagreement amongst them in the restriction and limitation of their Principle; for some give free scope and liberty to all private persons to resist, and with their swords in their hands to defend their lives and estates against the unjust invasion of all Kings and governor's whatsoever. Others do a little stint the people and limit the bounds of resistance, permitting none to have that power but subordinate Magistrates, or the people collectively taken and their subsistutes in Parliament. Yet these content themselves with the same particular instances brought by others, alleging little besides particular examples, as the example of David who (as they say) would have resisted Saul if occasion had been offered; The example of the Priests, who, (as they say) assaulted Uzziah, and such like examples of particular men, which were neither the people collectively taken, nor their substitutes in Parliament, nor yet the greater part subordinate Magistrates.  
But some have thought upon an other way how to make good their rebellion confessing the former assertion to tend directly to the ruin and subversion of government, and to be also contrary to the law of God: these proceed upon another Principle, namely that supreme jurisdiction belongs to the people, the King they say is major singulis but minor universis, greater and hath more authority than any one of his subjects taken by retail, but taken in the gross his subjects are greater and have more authority than he; and these agree altogether in this that they teach all authority to be originally in the people tanquam in primo subjecto creato as in the first subject immediately under God, and from them translated to Magistrates; Yet these are also divided amongst themselves about the extent & latitude of the power that may be translated; for some of them say that the rights of sovereignty belong to the people by the law of nature, and are so essential to them that they cannot be separated or divided from them; they cannot be taken away by conquest, they cannot part with them by consent, but under what form of government soever they live, by what means soever established and set up, they have still reserved in them a supreme jurisdiction over all Magistrates, by which they are authorised to give a legal judgement upon all their actions, and to resume again their whole authority when they shall see occasion, making a circle in government, and granting a power in Magistrates to judge and govern the people, and also in the people to judge and govern their Magistrates. Others on the contrary side say that the people may lose the rights of sovereignty by conquest, or part with them by consent, so that they shall not reserve to themselves supreme jurisdiction over their Magistrates to judge juridically whether their actions be legal or illegal; but the people of England (they say) have not the facto parted with their authority in such a full degree, but are supreme by the laws of the land, or at least coordinate with the King; for at the first coalition of the government by paction and agreement made with the King they reserved to themselves a part in the rights of sovereignty which they still hold by law. This is their other Principle as destructive to government as the former, and the authors and maintainers of them both agree well enough in their end, that is, to stir up the people to rebellion: only they of the first rank would persuade them they may lawfully do it by way of self preservation; and they of the second by way of jurisdiction.  
I intent now by God's assistance to examine these mischievous Principles, and to discover as well the falsity of them, as the dangerous consequences that flow from them, which I hope to perform with such clearness, and evidence, that the most harc-brained sectaries amongst them shall be convinced, if they will but read that which shall be alleged against them.  
Now that I may proceed in opening and clearing the truth with the better method, I will divide the matter I am to handle into two parts; In the first part I will speak of Supremacy, and here I will show that the King alone is the only supreme head and governor of the Kingdom of England and that all the people and their deputies in Parliament, as well collectively taken, as severally, are his subjects and not coordinate with him: In the second part I will speak of Resistance, and there I will show that the supreme Magistrates and governor's of any Kingdom or Commonwealth may not by their subjects be resisted by force of arms upon pretence of tyranny or misdemeanour, or upon any other cause or pretence whatsoever. I will begin with Supremacy, because they endeavour now chief to purge themselves from the murders, and injustice which they have committed by the authority of the people, whose supremacy they say is sufficient to warrant their proceed. At the first they denied not the supremacy of the King, but as the keepers and guardians of it they raised an army against him by virtue of his own authority, but having seized upon his person and imprisoned him, it was then more conducible to their ends to avouch the supremacy of the people: But whosoever have the title, they exercise the power themselves, and as before they rebelled against the King, so now they murder and oppress the people by pretence of their own authority, which as their Deputies in Parliament they intent to manage as long as they can find means to defend and uphold their tyranny. Now, although this pretended Parliament are no more deputies of the people of England, than the Bantiti are deputies of the people of Italy, who if they had as great a power would soon have as great a right as these to govern under that pretence, yet for the present we will suppose them such, and examine only their Principle by which they labour to support their cause, that is, the Supremacy of the People. And first I will show that the people and their deputies in Parliament are neither supreme nor coordinate with the King by the laws of the land, as some of them say; secondly, that they are not supreme by the laws of nature, as others; thirdly, that the people never had in them any authority or jurisdiction at all which they could give or resume again upon occasion, as they generally affirm. And these particulars I intent to handle in three questions.  
The first question shall be, Whether the people and their deputies in Parliament be supreme and above the King or coordinate with him by the laws of the land.  
The second, Whether the people and their deputies in Parliament be supreme by the laws of nature, and have always reserved a juridical power of judging their magistrates, whether their actions be just, and of resuming authority in case they be not.  
The third, Whether authority be originally in the people, and translated by them to Kings and other supreme magistrates; or in the Kings and other supreme magistrates themselves immediately from God tanquam in primo subjecto creato, as in the first created subject.   

The KING'S Supremacy asserted.  
The First QUESTION. Whether the People and their Deputies in Parliament be supreme and above the King or coordinate with him by the Laws of the Land.  

CHAP. I. The state of the Question explained.  
THE first Question that shall come into consideration is, Whether the people and their Deputies in Parliament be supreme and above the King or coordinate with him by the Laws of the Land. The pretended Parliamentarians affirm the two Houses to be coordinate with the King in the rights of Sovereignty; for the Monarchy of England, they say is a mixed Monarchy, and this mixture is in the power and rights of Majesty themselves, so that the King alone hath not full and plenary authority to perform all acts requisite to Government, but there is in the Monarchy a concurrence of several powers belonging to several estates, which being mixed together make up one whole and entire power, and those several estates one supreme head of the Commonwealth. And although some of them are so liberal as to allow the King a primity of share in this coordination; yet others say that the superiority belongs to the two Houses, the King being greater than any one of the Members of Parliament, but less than the two houses collectively taken, who in the legislative power, which is one of the principal rights of Sovereignty, have a greater Interest than He, in whose breasts alone remaineth the final determination of Law; for they deny the King to have a negative voice, as if his sitting in Parliament were a ceremony and mere formality, and not an act of Majesty and Jurisdiction. This foundation, as I think, was first laid by the fuller Answerer, but the Treatiser, the Reverend Divines, and divers others have added a superstructure to it of many fine and new inventions of their own, which are not needful to be here related, because they altar not the state of the Question; for they all affirm the two Houses to be coordinate with the King in the rights of Sovereignty, and the mixture of the English Monarchy to be in the power itself. I will set down their assertions in the fuller Answerers own words. Before we judge, saith he, of what a Parliament can do in England, it will be needful to know what kind of Government this of England is; we are therefore to know that England is not a simply subordinative and absolute, but a coordinative and mixed Monarchy; this mixture or coordination is in the very supremacy of power itself, otherwise the Monarchy were not mixed: all Monarchies have a mixture or composition of subordinate and under officers in them; but here the Monarchy or highest power itself is compounded of three coordinate estates, a King, and two Honses of Parliament. And again a little after, he saith, But you'll say, what? is not the Parliament subordinate to the King? Are they not all Subjects? I answer, the Parliament cannot be said properly to be a Subject, because the King is a part, and so he should be subject to himself: no, nor are the two Houses without him subjects, every Member seorsim, taken severally, is a Subject; but all collectim in their House are not. In his Answer to Doctor Ferns Reply he addeth further. Although every one and all the Members are Subjects, the Houses cannot properly be said to be subject and coordinate too; they are the two membra dividentia, which must at no hand admit coincidence: nay, tho' all the Members as parts, and put them together too, are Subjects, yet all the parts of a whole taken all together are not equal to the whole, the order, site, relation, union of the parts, whence the formality of the whole results, being still yet wanting. These are the fantasies of the pretended Parliamentarians, which are so gross and contrary to Law, that the fuller Answerer seems to me to have been in a dream, when his head was first impregnated with such conceptions; And although I cannot but acknowledge that both the liberty and safety of the Nation consists in Free-Parliaments, yet I cannot forbear to declare the Truth in such a time as this, wherein Parliaments are abolished, and yet their Authority and Supremacy pretended to maintain Tyranny and Rebellion.  
I say therefore in opposition to these fantasies, first, that the King alone is by the Laws of the Land the only Supreme head and Governor of England, and that the people and their Deputies in Parliament, taken both collectim and seorsim, as well collectively as severally, are his Subjects, and not coordinate with him: there is no mixture at all in the rights of Soveraingty; for in respect of the power itself, the Monarchy is absolute, simple, pure, independent, without profanation of outward mixture, the King alone without further influence from the two Houses having full power and authority to do or cause to be done all acts of Justice. The King alone makes Laws by the assent of the two Houses, and if the two Houses are said at any time to make Laws, it is by a delegate power and authority communicated to them from him, and not by any power and authority which they have radically in themselves.  
Secondly, I say that the King alone is not only invested with all the rights of Soveraingty, but hath them also so inseparably annexed to his Royal person by the Laws of the Land, that they cannot be separated from him by any Act of Parliament, by any civil constitution, or pragmattical Sanction, by any Law or Ordinance whatsoever; but in case the King himself should improvidently by Act of Parliament agree to any thing tending to the diminution of his Royal Dignity, it is then in the power of the Common-law to control such a Statute, to make void all such acts as tend to the degradation, much more such as tend to the annihilation of Majesty. Having thus opened the state of the Question, I will now proceed to demonstrate the truth by Statutes, by Common-Law, and by reasons depending upon the laws and customs of the land.   

CHAP. II. The King's Supremacy in general showed by the Statutes of the land.  
I Can both from Saxon and divers other laws and antiquities show the Kings of England to have ruled more absolutely, and to have anciently exercised a larger Jurisdiction, then hath of later years been exercised or challenged by their Successors: but because many immunities and privileges have been granted to the Subjects since their times; I will therefore confine myself to such statutes as have been made since the giving of the great Charter. And, to avoid tediousness, I will omit many statutes wherein the King is by both Houses collectively taken acknowledged to be supreme: for they frequently in the statutes style him, Our gracious Sovereign Lord the King. Our dreadful Sovereign Lord the King. I will likewise omit many others wherein they acknowledge themselves to be his Subjects, and that when they were in their site, relation, order, and union, in which posture the fuller Answerer fancies them to be coordinate: for such expressions run through divers statutes, Most humbly beseech your most excellent Majesty your faithful and obedient subjects the Lords spiritual and temporal, and the Commons in this your present Parliament assembled. In their most humble wise shown unto your Royal Majesty your loving subjects the Lords spiritual and temporal, and the Commons of this present Parliament assembled. I will only allege such statutes as have been made on purpose to declare to whom Supremacy and all power and jurisdiction belong: for there hath been divers acts of Parliament made to that end upon several occasions, wherein the King's Supremacy hath been acknowledged and confirmed unto him.  
In the four and twenty year of Henry the eighth an Act was made that no Appeals should be used but within the Realm: the Reason alleged in the Statute is because the King alone is the only Supreme head of the Realm, and is furnished with plenary and entire power to do all acts of justice. Where by divers sundry old authentic Histories and Chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed that this Realm of England is an Empire, and hath so been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme head and King, having the dignity and Royal estate of the imperial Crown of the same: unto whom a body politic, compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in terms and by names of spiritualty and temporalty been bounden and owen to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience, he being also institute and furnished by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary, whole, and entire power, pre-eminence, authority, prerogative, and jurisdiction, to render and yield justice and final determination to all manner of folk resiants or subjects within this his Realm. This clear testimomy of the King's Supremacy, is thus eluded by the fuller Answerer. saith he, Answer. what is meant by governed by one supreme head, such a one as is able to do all acts of needful justice, which the King in his natural capacity cannot do (he cannot make a law) it must therefore be understood in his full and entire politic capacity, which takes in Law and Parliament; nor can it be said that by those words a body politic compact of all sorts and degrees the Parliament is properly meant, but the Kingdom at large.  
Reply. The sum of his Answer is this, that in this Statute by the King not the King alone, but the King and the two Houses of Parliament are to be understood, and so although he would have the King's power to be less, yet to make him amends he will have his name to signify more than it did before. But this is nothing else but the evaporation of his own brain; for if in any place the word King could signify the King and the two Houses of Parliament, yet in this it must of necessity signify the King alone: 
35. H. 8. cap. 1.  these words having the dignity and Royal estate of the Imperial Crown of the same, can have reference to no other. Besides, in this Answer he contradicts his own Principles: for if the two Houses be coordinate with the King, and have power radically in themselves, not derived from him, they cannot be comprehended under his politic capacity. Whereas he saith the King cannot make a Law, and infer from thence that the King alone without taking in the two Houses hath not entire and plenary jurisdiction, his inference is very infirm; for it doth not diminish Majesty, but redounds to the glory of it, 
Argum. l. 8. c. de legibus.  to give laws to the people by the counsel and assent of wisemen: It hath been, and is for the most part the practice in absolute Monarchies, to make Laws that shall bind posterity by general consent and agreement, which yet doth not deprive the Monarch of his power, or derogate any way from the plenitude and entireness thereof. But I shall speak more of this when I come to answer their objections. Whereas he saith that by a body politic compact of all sorts and degrees, not the Parliament, but the Kingdom at large is properly meant, I know no man will contradict him. yet I say the two Houses are comprehended under the Kingdom at large, and are representative thereof in Parliament, and representatives cannot be the head, when the Kingdom at large, whose Representatives they are, is but the body; And therefore here the fuller Answerer hath a little overshot himself; for if by the body politic, the Kingdom at large be understood, then is the King major universis greater than all the people collectively taken by his own confession.  
In the first year of Queen Elizabeth another Act was made, wherein she is declared supreme head of the Realm in all causes as well Ecclesiastical as Temporal, and an Oath enjoined to be taken by divers both Ecclesiastical and Lay persons, wherein they were to acknowledge her supremacy, and to promise faith and true Allegiance: the Oath was this, I A. B. do utterly testify and declare in my conscience, that the Queen's Highness is the only supreme Governor of this Realm, and of all other her Highness' dominions and countries, as well in all Spiritual or Ecclesiastical things or causes, as Temporal, and that no foreign Prince, Person, Prelate, State, or Potentate, hath or aught to have any Jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority Ecclesiastical or Spiritual within this Realm, and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities and authorities, and do promise that from henceforth I shall bear faith and true Allegiance to the Queen's Highness, her Heirs, and lawful successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jnrisdictions, privileges, preeminences, and authorities, granted or belonging to the Queen's Highness, her Heirs, and Successors, or united & annexed to the imperial Crown of this Realm; so help me God and the Contents of this Book.  
Answer. 1 They answer, first. That this Statute was made to exclude a foreign power, and therefore all that can be collected out of it is, that the Queen was above all foreigners, but not above the People and their Deputies in Parliament.  
Reply. It is no matter wherefore the Statute was made, the Queen is there positively declared to be the only supreme Governor of the Realm: the words of a Statute, whatsoever the end was, are always supposed to be true, and are pleadable in their usual and Grammatical sense to all purposes. But was the Oath framed only to exclude a foreign power, are they sure of that? When God shall make inquisition for blood, and call the Reverend Divines, the fuller Answerer, the Treatiser, and the rest of their Complices to account for all the murders, oppressions, and injustice, whereof they have been the Authors and Abettors by stirring up the people to Rebellion, and teaching them lies, they will be found to have broken the oath of Allegiance, now his Majesty's rights have been invaded by the pretended Parliament, as well as if they had been invaded by a foreigner. For the Statute was made as well to declare who was the Supreme Governor of the Realm, as to declare who was not; The Pope challenged no Superiority over the Queen in Temporal matters, and yet in the Oath the Queen is acknowledged the supreme Governor of the Realm as well in Temporal as in Ecclesiastical causes: This had been very superfluous, if it had been composed and given only to exclude the Pope; and was neither true nor a fit expression, if the two Houses had been coordinate with her: neither had they sufficiently excluded a foreign power by this Act, which, they say, was the only end was aimed at: for the Pope claimed supreme jurisdiction over all in Ecclesiastical causes, as well over the two houses as over the Queen; yet in this act provision is made for none but the Queen: by the title of the Statute all ancient jurisdictions are restored to the Crown; but there is no restantation of dignity or jurisdiction to the people or to their substitutes in Parliament.  
Answer. 2 Secondly, they answer, That the Queen is declared to be supreme in respect of particular persons, but not in respect of the people collectively taken, or their Substitutes in Parliament.  
Reply. The Queen is declared in the oath to be supreme Governor of the Realm, and the Realm includes the People collectively taken.  
Besides supremacy cannot admit of that distinction, for they that have any above them or coordinate with them are not supreme, although they be greater than any one in particular.  
Answer. 3 Thirdly they answer, That the Queen's supremacy was to be understood, in curia non in camera in her Courts and not in her private capacity.  
Reply. The Queen by communicating her authority to her courts did not part with it herself; Mr. Lambert in his Discourse upon the high Courts of Justice, almost at the end of his Book speaks punctually to this exception, Thus have I, saith he, run along our Courts of all kinds, and have said (as I was able) severally of these lay and mixed Courts of record deriving them from the Crown their Original, and drawing by one and one (as it were so many roses) from the garland of the Prince; leaving nevertheless the garland itself undespoiled of that her sovereign virtue in the administration of justice: or as Bracton saith well; Rex habet ordinariam jurisdictionem, & omnia jura in manu sua, quae nec ita delegari possunt quin ordinaria remaneant cum ipsc Rege: And therefore whatsoever power is by him committed over unto other men, the same nevertheless remaineth still in himself in so much as he may take knowledge of all causes unless they be felony, treason, or such other, wherein because he is a party, he cannot personally sit in judgement, but must perform it by his delegates. The King's authority than is as well in his person in regard of his private, as in his Courts in regard of his politic capacity, and according to the Acts of Sovereignty and Majesty only in his person; for a delegate power can not be Supreme: not but that it is the same authority whereby he acts himself in person, and his judges in his courts, but because it is not all the same authority, but restrained in his Judges by commission, written, or law.  
In the first year of Edward the sixth an Act was made wherein the King is acknowledged to be the Supreme head of the Church and Realm, and that all power and authority was derived from him. Whereas the Archbishops and Bishops and other Spiritual persons in this Realm do use to make and send out their summons, 
1 E. 6. cap. 2.  citations and other process in their own names in such form and manner as was used in the time of the usurped power of the Bishop of Rome, contrary to the form and order of the summons and process of the common law, used in this Realm. Seeing that all authority of jurisdiction Spiritual and Temporal is derived and deducted from the King's Majesty as Supreme head of these Churches and Realms of England and Ireland, and so justly acknowledged by the clergy of the said Realms, and that all courts Ecclesiastical within the said two Realms be kept by no other power or authority either foreign or within the Realm but by the authority of his most excellent Majesty. Be it therefore further enacted, etc. Is it not evident from hence that the two houses of Parliament are subordinate to the King and that they have their power by derivation from him, who is the fountain of all authority? These words seeing that all authority of jurisdiction Spiritual and Temporal is derived and deducted from the King's Majesty, as Supreme head of these Churches and Realms of England and Ireland, do clearly intimate the two houses to have no authority radically in themselves, and to be no way coordinate with the King's Majesty in the rights of sovereignty.  
For conclusion of this Chapter I will add one Act more made in the first year of King James, wherein the two houses of Parliament collectively taken made an humble recognition of their faith and obedience to him. We your most humble and loyal Subjects the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, do from the bottom of our hearts yield to the Divine Majesty all humble thanks and praises not only for the said inestimable benefit and blessings above mentioned, but also that he hath further enriched your Highness with a most Royal progeny of most rare & excellent gifts and forwardness, and in his goodness is like to increase the happy number of them, and in most humble and lowly manner do beseech your most excellent Majesty, that (as a memorial to all posterities amongst the records of your high court of Parliament for ever to endure of our loyalty obedience and hearty and humble affection) it may be published and declared in this high court of Parliament, and enacted by authority of the same, that we (being bounden thereunto both by the laws of God and man) do recognize and acknowledge (and thereby express our unspeakable joys) that immediately upon the dissolution and decease of Elizabeth late Queen of England, the imperial crown of the Realm of England and of the Kingdoms, Dominions, and Rights belonging to the same, did by inherent birthright, and lawful and undoubted possession, descend and come to your most excellent Majesty, as being lineally, justly and lawfully next and sole heir of the blood Royal of this Realm, as is aforesaid; and that by the goodness of Almighty God, and lawful right of descent under one imperial crown, your Majesty is of the Kingdoms of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, the most potent and mighty King, and by God's goodness more able to protect and govern us your loving subjects in all peace and plenty than any of your noble Progenitors. And thereunto we most humbly and faithfully do submit and oblige ourselves, our heirs, and posterities, for ever, until the last drop of our bloods be spent: And do beseech your Majesty to accept the same as the first fruits of this high court of Parliament, of our loyalty and faith to your Majesty and your Royal progeny and posterity for ever. This is a far different strain from that which the present pretended Parliament have used to his Majesty, who although bound both by oath and duty to have been as respectful and obedient towards him, yet have they themselves after many insolences committed against his person, most audaciously and unadvisedly taken away his life, and procured others by defamatory libels to blast his credit, who according to the trust reposed in them, cease not to traduce him, and by malicious aspersions to slain his chiefest virtues, creeping like Snails over the sweetest flowers, and leaving behind them their slime and filthiness.   

CHAP. III. The King's supremacy in particular showed by the Statutes of the Land.  
THe King's supremacy in general being thus confirmed by several Acts of Parliament, I will now descend into particulars, and show his Majesty to be legally invested with all the particular rights of sovereignty. I will begin with the Militia, which is a right so essential to Majesty, that it can not, nor ought not to be separated from it: For Majesty consists not in a bare and empty title, but in the rights of sovereignty, which he cannot be said to possess, who wants the Sword to protect the Sceptre. It was confessed by the pretended Parliament at the beginning of these dissensions, that the Militia by right pertained to his Majesty, and therefore at the first they laboured to have it assigned to them by his own assent; but he opposing their unjust desires, as knowing both his own and the ruin of his posterity would be the necessary consequences of such a grant, they resolved seeing they could not gain it by surrender, to take it by assault, and assisted by men of like natures and inclinations, they seized upon his Majesty's forts and Magazines, and have since exercised an arbitary and tyrannical power over the lives and estates of all that pleased them not, and none could ever please them, but such as are of the same humour and disposition with themselves. I must confess I am amazed when I consider how confidently and desperately they have carried on their designs in a case so contrary to law and justice; for they could not have begun a war or contested with his Majesty about a matter more clear than that of the Militia, which is a right so inherent in the crown, settled upon it by the fundamental Laws of the Land, and confirmed by so many several acts of Parliament, that although the pretended Parliamentarians have a great dextetity in coining distinctions to elude the laws, yet they will not easily coin such as shall serve their turn in this particular. In the seventh year of Edward the first a Statute was made to enjoin all men to go to Parliaments, Treatises, and general Assemblies without force and arms, wherein the King's power over the Militia is acknowledged. The King to the justices of his bench sendeth greeteng. Whereas of late before certain persons deputed to treat upon sundry debates had between us and certain great men of our Realm, amongst other things it was accorded that in our next Parliament after provision shall be made by us and the common assent of the Prelates, Earls, and Barons, that in all Parliaments, Treaties, and other Assemblies, which should be made in the Realm of England for ever, that every man shall come without all force and armour well and peaceably to the honour of us, and the peace of us and our Realm. And now in our next Parliament at Westminster after the said Treatise, the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and the Commonalty of our Realm there assembled to take advice of this business, have said that to us it belongeth, and our part is through our Royal signory, straight to defend force of armour, and all other force against our peace at all times when it shall please us, and to punish them which shall do contrary, according to our laws and usages of our Realm, and hereunto they are bound to aid us as their Sovereign Lord at all seasons when need shall be. We command ye that ye cause these things to be read afore you in the said bench, and there to be enrolled. Given at Westminster the thirtieth day of October. In another Statute made the eleventh year of Henry the seventh, it is declared that all subjects of the Realm but especially those that have by the King any dignities, gifts, offices, fees, or annuities; are bound to assist the King in his wars against all rebellions, insurrections and powers raised against him. And by the Parliament holden the fourth and fifth years of Queen Mary an Act was made, wherein it was acknowledged that the Queen and her progenitors had power and authority to oppoint commissioners to muster and array the people and subjects, and to levy such a number as they should think fit to serve them in their wars, and a remedy provided against the abuses, that had formerly been committed by divers who absented themselves from such musters, and brought not their best furniture and array with them. 
Coke lib. 7.7. B.  I will omit the statutes made in the 11. H. 7. cap. 1. and the 2. E. 6. cap. 2. by which it appeareth that the subjects of England are bound to go with the King in his wars as well within the Realm as without: I will also omit the act not printed made in the fifth year of Henry the fourth concerning the commission of array, as also divers other acts and statutes made to that effect and purpose, because so much hath been said about that subject already by his Majesty, in his answer to the declaration of both houses of Parliament concerning the commission of array.  
Secondly the legislative power is another right of sovereignty, whereby Kings and supreme Magistrates are enabled by just and necessary laws to provide for the peace and safety of their people, and this is wholly and entirely in the King, although he be limited in the exercise of his power so as he can not make laws without the assent of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament. And this is that  the pretended house have stood so much upon: because the Kings of England desiring to rule their people by lenity, have out of princely clemency condescended so far as not to impose upon them (which they anciently did as I shall show hereafter) any new law, or alter and repeal the old, without their own consent, they from the premises would make the people believe that their authority is equal to the Kings, and that themselves as their deputies are coordinate with him: and not content with the share which they unjustly challenged at first, they afterwards laid claim to all, wholly excluding the King, and denying him his negative voice, usurping and taking upon themselves the whole power of making laws, whereas they have no other interest or authority but what they derive from him: the Statutes declare this in express terms, 
5. R. 2. cap. 2.  for their ordinary style is, The King doth will and command, and it is assented in the Parliament by the Prelates, 
7. H. 4. cap. 15.  Lords, and Commons. Our Sovereign Lord the King by the assent of the Lords spiritual and temporal and the Commons in this present Parliament hath ordained. And that the meaning and true intention of these expressions is such as I have said, 
22. E. 3.  will appear by the resolution of the Judges, of which I shall speak hereafter.  
Now that the King hath a negative voice in making laws, and that nothing can or aught to be esteemed an Act of Parliament without him, is evident by divers Statutes. In the first year of King James a Statute was made wherein the two Houses petitioning the King, that the recognition of their duty and obedience, as also of his Majesty's right unto the Crown of England, might be published in High Court of Parliament, to remain as a memorial to all posterity, conclude after this manner, which if your Majesty shall be pleased (as an argument of your gracious acceptation) to adorn with your Majesty's Royal assent, without which it can neither be complete and perfect, nor remain to all posterity according to our humble desire as a memorial of your Princely and tender affection towards us, we shall add this also to the rest of your Majesty's unspeakable and inestimable benefits. But in the fifteenth year of Edward the third, a Statute was made on purpose to make void an Act whereunto the King had promised to set his Seal, and seemed to assent, (which by some for that reason was esteemed a Statute) because he had not actually assented and set to his seal. Edward by the grace of God, etc. to the Sheriff of Lincoln greeting, whereas at our Parliament summoned at Westminster in the 15. of Easter last passed, certain Articles expressly contrary to the laws and customs of our Realm of England, and to our Prerogatives and rights Royal were pretended to be granted by us by the manner of a Statute, we considering how that by the bond of our Oath we be tied to the observance and defence of such laws, customs, rights, and prerogatives, and providently willing to revoke such things to their own state which be so improvidently done; upon conference and treatise thereupon had with the Earls, Barons, and other wise men of our said Realm, and because we never consented to the making of the Statute, but as than it behoved us, we dissimuled in the premises, by protestations of revocation of the said statute if indeed it should proceed to eschew the dangers which by the denying of the same, we feared to come, forasmuch as the said Parliament otherwise had been without dispatching any thing in discord dissolved, and so our earnest business had likely been ruinated, which God prohibit. and the said pretenced statute we promised then to be sealed. It seemed to the said Earls, Barons and other wise men that since the statute did not of our free will proceed, the same be void and ought not to have the name nor strength of a statute; and therefore by their counsel and assent we have decreed the said statute to be void, and the same in as much as it proceeded of deed, we have agreed to be anulled; willing nevertheless that the articles contained in the said pretenced statute, which by other of our statutes or of our progenitors Kings of England have been approved, shall according to the form of the said statute in every point, as convenient is, be observed: and the same we do only to the conservation and reintegration of the rights of our crown, as we be bound, and not that we should in any wise grieve or oppress our subjects, whom we desire to rule by lenity and gentleness. And therefore we do command thee that all these things thou cause to be openly proclaimed in such places within thy Bailiwick where thou shalt see expedient, witness myself at Westminster the first day of October the fifteenth year of our reign.  
Thirdly, allegiance or ligeance is another right of sovereignty due only to Supreme Rulers and Governors; A coordinate Magistrate who hath but a parcel and share of authority, can not alone challenge all obedience from the people, for all that are coordinate and have their shares in the rights of Sovereignty jointly taken together make up one supreme head, to whom only allegiance or ligeance is due. Now that allegiance or ligiance is due to the King and only to the King will appear by several Acts of Parliament. In the first year of King James, the Lords and Commons declared, that both the ancient and famous Realms of England and Scotland were united in allegiance and loyal subjection in his royal person, 
1. Jac. cap. 2.  to his Majesty and his posterity for ever; In 34. H. 8. cap. 1. and 35. H. 8. cap. 3. etc. the King is called the liege Lord of his subjects: and in the Acts of Parliament of 13. R. 2. cap. 5. & 11. R. 2. cap. 1. 14. H. 8. cap. 2, etc. subjects are called the King's liege people. By other Acts of Parliament divers oaths have been framed and given to the people, the contents and effects whereof were, that they should bear all faith and allegiance to the King and his heirs: In the six and twenty year of Henry the eighth an oath was taken by all the King's subjects for the surety of the succession of the crown of England, 
26. H. 8. cap. 2.  the oath was this; Ye shall swear to bear faith, truth, and obedience all only to the King's Majesty and to the heirs of his body of his most dear and entirely beloved lawful wife Queen Anne begotten and to be begotten, and further to the heirs of our said Sovereign Lord according to the limitation in the statute made for surety of his succession in the crown of this Realm mentioned and contained, and not to any other within this Realm, nor foreign authority, or Potentate, and in case any oath be made, or hath been made by you to any person, or persons, that then ye repute the same as vain, and annihilate, and that to your cunning, wit, and utmost of your power, without guile, fraud, or other undue mean, ye shall observe, keep, maintain, and defend the said act of succession and all the whole effects and contents thereof and all other acts and statutes made in confirmation, or for execution of the same, or for any thing therein contained. And this ye shall do against all manner of persons, of what estate, dignity, degree, or condition soever they be. And in no wise do or attempt, nor to your power suffer to be done or attempted, directly, or indirectly, any thing or things, privately or apertly to the let, hindrance, damage or derogation thereof, or of any part of the same by any manner of means or of any manner of pretence; so help you God, and all Saints, and the holy Evangelists. There are two things observable in this oath, first, that they swear inclnsiuè to bear all faith, truth and obedience, to the King's Majesty and his heirs, and only to them; Secondly that they swear exclusiuè to bear faith, truth, and obedience, to no other either within the realm or without, not to other persons, nor to other authority, by both which clauses of the oath it appears, that the King, 
28. H. 8. cap. 7.  and none but the King, can challenge faith and allegiance from the people. Afterwards in the eight and twenty year of King Henry the eighth the like oath was enjoined to be taken by all his subjects touching his succession by Queen Jane, for the former Act touching his succession by Queen Anne was repealed, but the oath enjoined was otherwise the same; And in the five and thirty year of his reign an other oath was framed, wherein, besides the contents of the former touching allegiance due to the King and his heirs, some other additions were inserted touching his Supremacy in Ecclesiastical causes: because the former oaths were not thought full enough to that effect and purpose; And these oaths were extraordinary and imposed by special appointment: 
l. 35.  But besides these there is another ordinary oath of Allegiance which was first instituted by King Arthur, 
l. 59  and is mentioned amongst the laws of King Edward, and confirmed by the laws of William the Conqueror; this oath cominueth still in force and should by the law be given in every Leer. The order and form of it appeareth in Britton who wrote in the reign of Edward the first, and compiled a book of the Statutes and laws which were then in use; the effect of it is this: 
Coke lib. 7. in calvin's case.  You shall swear that, that from this day forward you shall be true and faithful to our sovereign Lord the King and his heirs, and truth and faith shall bear of life and member and terrene honour, and you shall neither know nor hear of any ill or damage intended unto him, that you shall not defend so help you almighty God. By this it is clear enough that allegiance is due to the King: the pretended house on the other side is so far from having authority to exact allegiance from the people, that they were all bound themselves by law to take the oath of Allegiance before they were admitted to sit in the house; and having every one taken the said oath how they should be absolved, none but themselves can understand, whose common practice hath been to play with oaths as children play with toys and trifles, seeming rather to make them their pastime, then to esteem them religious acts, or sacred obligations.  
Fourthly to pardon the transgression of the laws, to remit treason, murder, felony, manslaughter; to appoint subordinate Judges; to make leagues with foreign Princes and States, all these are rights of sovereignty; and all these are declared and determined by the Statutes of the land to belong to the King's Majesty. First the power of pardoning the transgressions of the law, and of remitting treason, murder, felony, manslaughter, and such like offences is declared and determined to be in the King's Majesty by a Statute made in the twenty seventh year of Henry the eighth. 
27. H. 8. c. 24.  Where divers of the most ancient prerogatives and authorities of Justice appertaining to the imperial crown of this realm, have been severed and taken from the same by sundry gifts of the Kings most noble progenitors, Kings of this realm, to the great diminution and detriment of the Royal estate of the same, and to the hindrance and great delay of justice; for reformation whereof be it enacted by authority of this present Parliament, that no person or persons of what estate or degree soever they be of from the first day of July which shall be in the year of our Lord God 1536. shall have any power or authority to pardon, or remit any treasons, murders, manslaughters, or felonies, or any utlaries for any such offences aforesaid, committed, perpetrated, done or divulged or hereafter be committed done or divulged by or against any person or persons in any part of this Realm, Wales or the marches of the same; but that the King's highness his heirs and successors Kings of this Realm shall have the whole and sole power and authority thereof united and knit to the imperial crown of this realm, as of good right and equity it appertaineth, any grants, usages, prescription, act, or acts of Parliament, or any other thing to the contrary hereof notwithstanding. Secondly the power of appointing subordinate judges is declared and determined to be in the King by the same Statute. And be it also enacted by authority aforesaid that no person or persons of what estate degree or condition soever they be, from the said first day of July shall have any power or authority to make any justices of Eire, justices of assize, Justices of peace or justices of Goal delivery: but that all such Officers and Ministers shall be made by Letters Patents under the King's great Seal, in the name and by authority of the King's highness and his Heirs Kings of this Realm, in all Shires, Counties, Counties Palatine, and other places of this Realm, Wales, and the marches of the same, or in any other his Dominions, at their pleasure and wills in such manner and form as justices of Eire, justices of Assize, and justices of peace and justices of Goal delivery be commonly made in every shire of this Realm, any grants, usages, prescription, allowance, act or acts of Parliament, or any other thing or things, to the contrary thereof notwithstanding. Thirdly the power of making leagues with foreign Princes and States is declared to be in the King, by a Statute made in the fourteenth year of Edward the fourth, which gins thus. 
14. E. 4. cap. 4.  Whereas divers and great offences and attempts have now of late been done and committed against the amities and leagues made betwixt our said sovereign Lord the King and strange Prince. By this beginning of the Statute it is manifest that the power of making leagues and contracting alliance with foreign estates is a right belonging only to the crown. I could yet add divers other acts of Parliament to confirm this and all the other particulars above named, but I suppose these which are already alleged are more than sufficient; there are also other rights of Sovereignty which I could show by the statutes to be in the King, but because there is no contestation about them, I will not fight with a shadow; those above mentioned are the chiefest and inseparable from Majesty.   

CHAP. IU. The King's Supremacy in general showed by the Common Law.  
HAving showed the King's Supremacy from the Statutes, I come now to the Common law, which is the ground and foundation of it; for Statutes are but declarations of the royal power, the power itself with the several modifications and qualifications of it is more ancient than any statute, and cannot be limited or restrained by an Act of Parliament in any thing that tends to the derogation or diminution of Majesty: for the English Monarchy by the common law is an absolute Monarchy susceptible of no alteration in the rights and preeminences of Majesty.  
First I say the English Monarchy is an absolute Monarchy by the Common Law admitting no mixture in the rights of Sovereignty, the King alone being the only supreme head and governor having none superior to him or coordinate with him either singly, or collectively taken, this is expressly determined in Sir Edward Coke reports. If that Act of the first year of the late Queen had never been made, it was resolved by all the judges that the King or Queen of England for the time being may make such an Ecclesiastical Commission as is before mentioned by the ancient prerogative and Law of England. 
Coke lib. 5. in Caudreys' case.  And therefore by the ancient Laws of the realm this Kingdom of England is an absolute Empire and Monarchy consisting of one head which is the King and of a body politic compact and compounded of many and almost infinite several and yet agreeing members; all which the law divideth into two general parts, that is to say the Clergy, and the laity, both of them next and immediately under God subject and obedient to the head; also the King head of this Politic body is instituted and furnished with plenary and iutire power, prerogative, and jurisdiction to render justice and right to every part and member of this body of what estate degree or calling soever, in all causes Ecclesiastical or Temporal otherwise he should not be head of the whole body. This is further proved by Sir Edward Coke by divers Precedents and Acts of Parliament, who concludeth his report after this manner. 
Fol. 40.6.  Thus hath it appeared as well by the ancient common laws of this Realm, by the resolutions and judgements of the judges, and sages of the Laws of England in all succession of ages, as by authority of many acts of Parliament ancient and of later times, that the Kingdom of England is an absolute Monarchy, and that the King is the only supreme governor as well over Ecclesiastical persons and in Ecclesiastical causes as temporal within this Realm; to the due observation of which Laws both the King and Subject are sworn.  
In the second year of King James in Hillary Term letters being directed to the judges to have their resolution concerning the validity of a grant made by Queen Elizabeth under the great seal, of the benefit of a penal Statute in which grant power was given to the Lord Chancellor or Keeper of the great Seal, to make dispensations when and to whom he pleased, after great deliberation it was resolved, that when a Statute is made by Act of Parliament for the public good, the King could not give the power of dispensation to any Subject, or grant the forfeitures upon penal laws to any before the same be recovered and vested in his Majesty by due and lawful proceeding: and the reason there alleged is, because the King as head of the Commonwealth, and the fountain of justice and mercy, aught to have these rights of Sovereignty annexed only to his Royal person. 
Coke lib. 7. tit. penal. Statutes.  Car quant un statute est fait pro bono publico & le Rey (come le teste deal bien public & le fountaine de justice & mercy) est par tout le realm trust ove ceo cest confidence & trust est cy inseparablement adjoin & annex all Royal person del Roy in cy haut point de sovereignty, que il ne poit transfer ceo all disposition on poiar d'ascune private person ou al ascune private use, that is, For when a Statute is made for the public good and the King (as head of the Commonwealth and the fountain of justice and mercy) is by all the Realm trusted with it, that confidence and trust is so inseparably annexed to the Royal person of the King in so high a point of Sovereignty that he cannot transfer it to the disposition or power of a private person or to any private use. I shall not need to explain and amplify the matter by arguments and inferences drawn from these reports for the words are clear of themselves, and do expressly declare and resolve the Monarchy of England to be an absolute Monarchy, the King alone to be the only supreme head and Governor of the whole body, that is, of all the people, as well collectively as severally taken.  
And hence it is, (namely in regard of the King's Supremacy he being the only head of the Kingdom, having no equal or Superior but God alone, whose Vicegerent he is upon earth) that the Common law doth by way of fiction and similitude attribute unto him the Divine perfections. 
1. H. 7.10.  Finch lib, 2. deal ley. bap. 1. Roy est le test del bien public, immediate desoubs Dieu, desuis touts persons & en touts causes: Et pur ceo entant que il resemble le person del Dien, & port son image enter homes le Ley attribute a lui en un similitudinary manner, 
7. E. 4.17. 21. H. 7.2. Coke 7. f. 7. B. 43. El. Coke 5. fol. 114. B. 4. E. 6.31. 5. E. 4.7. 2. H. 4.7. 1. H. 7.19.  bombre deal excelleneys que sont en Dien, cest ascavoir SOVEREIGNTY, tout terre est tenu de de luy: nul action gist verse luy car quis commandra le Roy? POYAR, il poit commaunder ses subjects daler horse de Realm en guerr: poet fair ascune foreign coin currant icy per ses Proclamations. MAJESTY, ne poet prend ne departer ove oscune choose forsque per matter de record si non soit chattell ou tiel quia de minimis non curat lex. infiniteness en un manner, 
35. H. 6.26.  esteant present en touts ses courts, si come home poet dire en chescun lieu. PERPETVITY ayant perpetual succession, & ne unque mor. 
10. El. 331. 35. H. 6.61. 4. El. 246.  PERFECTION, car nul laches folly, infancy, ou corruption del sank est judge en lui. VERITY, ne serra unque estoppe. JUSTICE, ne poet esse disseisor ne fair ascun tort, id est, The King is head of the Commonwealth immediately under God, over all persons, and in all causes; and therefore because he represents the person of God, and bears his image, the law attributeth unto him in a similitudinary manner a shadow of Divine excellencies; namely SOVEREIGNTY, all lands are holden of him, no action lieth against him, for who shall command the King? POWER, he may command his Subjects to go out of the Realm to War. He may make any foreign coin currant here by his Proclamations: MAJESTY, he can neither take nor part with any thing without matter of Record, except it be chattel or such like, because the law regards not such small matters. INFINITENESS after a Manner, being present in all his courts, and as it were in all places. PERPETUITY, having perpetual succession, and being not subject to die; PERFECTION, for no laches, folly, infancy, or corruption of blood can be judged in him; TRUTH, he cannot be estopped. JUSTICE, he cannot be a disseisor or do any wrong.  
There are also divers prerogatives and privileges by the Common law belonging to the King, and divers Acts which the King may do, or not do, by reason of his Supremacy: The King shall not in his writ give any man the style or title of Dominus because it is unbeseeming his Majesty to use that term to any, he being himself omnium subditorum supremus Dominus, the supreme and sovereign Lord of all his subjects: and in this case although there be variance between the Writ and Obligation, 
8. E. 6.23. B. 11. E 4.2. 8. E. 4.2.  or other specialty, yet the Writ shall not abate, which it shall in other cases, as if they vary in the name, or surname, or if they vary in the surn.  
The King can hold land of no man, 
As. p. 1.18. Elizab. 498.  because he can have no superior, but on the other side all lands either immediately or mediately eaten holden of him as Sovereign Lord: for although a man hath a perpetual right in his estate, yet he hath it in the nature of a fee; and whether it cometh to him by descent, or purchase, he oweth a rent or duty for it: and therefore when in pleading a man would signify himself to have the greatest right in his estate, 
Littleton f. 3.  he saith, Que il est ou fuit seize de ceo en son demesne come de fee, that he is or was seized thereof in his demeasne as of fee; and if a man holds his estate immediately of the King, as of his Crown or person, this tenure is called a tenure in capite, because he holds it of the supreme head of the Commonwealth.  
If a man holdeth land both of the King and other inferior Lords whereby his heir becometh a Ward, the King alone shall have the custody both of the heir and land, the reason which is rendered in law is because the King can have none coordinate with him, or superior to him. Glanvil. lib. 7. cap. 10. Si quis in Capite de Domino Rege tenere debet, tunc ejus custodia ad Dominum Regem plene pertinet: sive alios Dominos habere debeat ipse haeres, sive non, quia Dominus Rex nullum habere potest parem, multo minus superiorem. i e. If any man holdeth land of our Lord the King in capite, than his wardship shall wholly belong to our Lord the King, whether he hath other Lords or not, because the King can have no equal, much less a superior. Bracton. lib. 2. cap. 37. Si aliquis haeres terram aliquam tenuerit de Domino Rege in Capite, sive alios Dominos habuerit, sive non, Dominus Rex aliis praefertur in custodia haeredis, & sive ipse haeres ab aliis prius fuerit feofatus, sive posterius, cùm Rex parem non habeat nec superiorem in regno suo; i. e. If an Heir holdeth land of our Lord the King whether he hath other Lords or not, our Lord the King shall have the wardship of the heir, whether the heir were first or last enfeoffed by others, because the King hath no equal or superior in his Kingdom. The law is the same as well for whole Societies, Incorporated, and collective bodies, as for Particular men; if a man should make the two houses his heir leaving them lands holden of them by Knight's service, if the same persons held also of the King in capite by Knight's service, the King alone should have the wardship and custody of the heir and land, though first enfeoffed by the others; and the reason in law of this prelation is, saith Bracton and Glanvil, because the King hath neither equal nor Superior.  
By the common law there lieth no action or writ against the King, but in case he seizeth his subjects lands, 
21. H. 7.2.  or taketh away their goods, having no title or order of law, petition is all the remedy the subject hath, 
Stanford in his exposition of the King's Prerogative c. 22.  and this petition is called a petition of right: The reason which is given in law for this is because the King is supreme and accountable to none but God. Bracton lib. 1. cap. 1. Non debet esse major eo. (I. e. Rege) in regno suo in exibitione juris, minimus autem esse debet vel quasi in judicio suscipiendo si petat; Si autem ab eo petatur (cum breve non currat contra ipsum) locus erit supplicationi quod factum suum corrigat & emendet, quod quidem si non fecerit, satis sufficit ei ad poenam quod Dominum expectet ultorem. Nemo quidem de factis suis praesumat disputare multo fortius contra factum suum venire. i e. There ought not to be in his Kingdom a greater than he (that is, than the King) in the exhibition of law, but he ought to be the least, or as it were the least in receiving judgement if he desire it. But if it be desired of him (because no writ lieth against him) there shall be place for petition that he would correct and amend his deed, which if he refuse to do, it is sufficient for his punishment that he may expect God a revenger, for no man must presume to dispute of his fact, much less oppose and resist it. And again lib. 4. cap. 10. Item inter caetera videndum est quis sit ille qui deijcit, Princeps s. ex potentia, vel aliquis pro eo, vel judex qui male judicaverit, vel privata persona. Si autem Princeps, vel Rex, vel alius qui superiorem non habuerit nisi Dominum, contra ipsum non habebitur remedium per assisam, immo tantum locus erit supplicationi, ut factum suum corrigat & emendet, quod si non fecerit, sufficient ei propoena quod Dominum expectet ultorem, i. e. It is also to be considered who it is that disseiseth, whether the King by his power, or some other in his name, or a Judge who judgeth unjustly, or a private person. If it be the King, or any other, who hath no superior but God, there shall be no remedy had against him by assize, only there shall be place for petition, that he would correct and amend his deed, which if he refuseth to do, it is sufficient for his punishment, that he may expect God a revenger. This is all the help which a subject hath against the King, because he is supreme, and bound to give an account of his actions to none but God, and this is the course which the two houses of Parliament are to take by law in case the King infringeth or is supposed to infringe the rights and liberties of the people, as will appear by divers petitions of right exhibited in former Parliaments.  
Secondly I say, the English Monarchy by the common law is susceptible of no alteration in the rights and preeminences of Majesty, I mean by any Act of Parliament, or by any agreement of King and people: what a conqueror in a just war, or what the people may do in case the blood Royal, which God prohibit, should be extinct, is not now disputable: but so long as there remains a King, or heir apparent to the crown, the rights and preeminences of Majesty can by no act, agreement, stipulation, or covenant made between King and people be severed and taken from the crown; should the King unwarily by Act of Parliament consent to any thing prejudicial and derogatory to his Royal prerogative, such Acts are void by the common law, and the Judges (being bound by oath to assent to nothing that may turn to the King's hindrance or damage) are bound to declare them so, 
23. H. 6. cap. 8.  and have done it de facto upon several occasions. By a Statute made in the twenty third year of Henry the sixth it is ordained that no man shall continue Sheriff of a Shire above one year, and that all patents from the King of that office, for term of years, of life, in fee simple, or in fee tail should be void any clause or word of non obstante in any wise put or to be put into such patents to be made notwithstanding; 
2. H. 7. Coke lib. 7. fol. 14.  now this Statute so far as it strikes at the King's prerogative is by the Judges of the land declared to be void, contrary to the express purview of that Act, and all Kings since might with a clause of non obstante against the manifest sense and words of that Statute have granted that office for life in tail, or in fee. 
11. H. 7.11. B.  Finch. lib. 2 fol. 22. Roy poet licencer choses prohibit per statute, come a coiner argent que est fait felony per un statute, & devant ceo fuit loyal a fair, car ceo est forsque malum prohibitum: mes malum in se, come a levier un nusance en le haut chemine, Roy ne poet licence home a fair; mes apres que est fait il poet ceo pardoner. Mes si lestatute dit, que son licence sera void, la le licence aver' un clause de non obstante, cest assavoir, dire non obstante ascune statute all contrary, ou auterment nest bone: come le Statute 33. H. 6. cap. 18. est, que grant del Roy deste viscount del ascun county pluis longement quam per un an serra void; nient obstant que son patent aver un clause de non obstante: uncore ove un cause de non obstante, tiel patent serra bone. i e. The King may licence things prohibited by Statute, as to coin silver, which is made felony by Statute, but was lawful before, for that is evil only because it is forbidden, but that which is evil in itself, as to levy a nusans in the high way, the King cannot licence a man to do that, but he may pardon it after it be done. But if the Statute say his licence shall be void, there the licence shall have a clause of non obstante, viz. it shall say any Statute to the contrary notwithstanding, or otherwise it is not good: As the Statute 23. H. 6. c. 18. is that the grant of the King to be Sheriff of a Shire longer than a year, shall be void, notwithstanding his patent shall have a clause of non obstante, and yet with a clause of non obstante such a patent shall be good. So likewise the King hath a power to dispense with penal Statutes, and if such dispensations should be prohibited or made void by Act of Parliament, 
Coke lib 7.37.  yet with a clause of non obstante, they shall be good, although it should be provided in express terms that such dispensations notwithstanding the said clause should be of none effect. By divers Statutes it hath been enacted, 
2. E. 3. cap. 2. 4. E. 3. cap. 13. 14. E. 3. c. 14.  that no charter of pardon of the death of a man nor of other felony should be granted; yet all these Statutes are by the common law made void, 
Stanford lib. 2.101.  because they cut off part of the King's prerogative. So likewise to grant letters patents of Denization is esteemed by the common law inter jura Majestatis & insignia summae potestatis, 
Coke in calvin's case.  and is so inseparably and individually annexed to the Royal person of the King as it cannot be divided from it. That which I have hitherto said of the rights and preeminences of Majesty, is to be understood of those rights and preeminences that are so essential to it, as they cannot be separted without the diminution or destruction of Majesty. As the power of the Militia, the power of making laws, the power of appointing Judges, and such like Acts of jurisdiction, as also the power of dispensing with penal Statutes, the power of pardoning the transgressions of the Law, the power of prosecuting the law, and such like supreme acts of justice and mercy: some of which rights and preeminences cannot be taken away without giving a wound, others not without bringing death, and dissolution to Majesty: yet there are other rights and preeminences that are called privileges which are not so essential to Majesty, but that they may by, special grace of the King be separated. Bracton. lib. 2. cap. 24. Ea vero quae jurisdictionis sunt & pacis & ea quae sunt justitiae & paci annexa ad nullum pertinent nisi ad Coronam & dignitatem Regiam, nec à Corona separari poterunt cum faciant ipsam Coronam. Ea vero quae dicuntur Privilegia, licet pertineant ad Coronam, tamen à Corona separari possunt & ad privatas personas transferri, sed de gratia ipsius Regis speciali. id est. Those things which belong to jurisdiction and peace: and those which are annexed to justice and peace pertain to none but the Crown; neither can they be separated from it because they make the Crown: But those which are called Privileges, although they pertain to the Crown, yet they may be separated from it and transferred to private persons, but not without the special favour of the King.  
It may seem strange that the King and the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the House of Commons, which are virtually the whole kingdom, should not have power to make what Laws they please, and to bind themselves and the whole kingdom by them in things not repugnant to the law of God; yet if we consider the ground of this restraint, we shall find it reasonable: for they which lay the first foundation of a Commonwealth, have authority to make laws that cannot be altered by posterity in matters that concern the rights both of King and people: for foundations cannot be removed without the ruin and subversion of the whole building: As for example, the division of things which is made at the first foundation of a Commonwealth (whether the people took the country they divide from the Inhabitants by conquest in a just war, or whether they did first actually possess it themselves as being before empty and vacant) cannot be altered by posterity, and a new division made without manifest injustice. The Laws which they then make for the preservation of their right and propriety in the said division, can not be disannulled by succeeding Parliaments, nor can any particular man be deprived of his inheritance, which descends unto him by virtue of that division, or of any part or parcel, or appurtenances thereof, by any contrary law which shall be made by them; I speak not what Parliaments may do by force, but what they may justly do; for they have not such an arbitrary power, but that they are always in a moral subjection to the rules of justice and natural equity. And in this case the King's condition ought not to be worse than the peoples, but his share and rights in the said division are as firmly and unchangeably to be preserved, as the share and rights of particular men: And both the King and people are obliged to this, not only by the rules of Justice, and natural equity, but by oath, and by the municipal Laws of the Land, 
l. 17.  to which they are both sworn. That the King is bound to this, appears by the Laws of King Edward. Debet vero de jure Rex omnes terras, & honores, omnes dignitates, & jura, & libertates coronae regni hujus in integrum cum omni integritate & sine diminutione observare & defendere; dispersa & dilapidata & amissa regni jura in pristinum statum & debitum viribus omnibus omnibus revocare. i e. The King ought by right to maintain and defend all the Lands, honours, dignities, rights and liberties of the Crown, entirely without diminution; and by all means to recall again those rights which are lost and separted from the Crown. That the people are bound to this, 
l. 35. l. 56.  appears likewise by the Laws of King Edward, and of William the Conqueror, who did a little enlarge the Laws of King Edward in this particular. Statuimus etiam & firmiter praecipimus ut omnes liberi homines totius regni nostri praedicti sint fratres conjurati, ad Monarchiam & ad Regnum nostrum pro viribus suis & facultatibus contra inimicos pro posse suo defendendum, & viriliter servandum, & pacem & dignitatem coronae nostrae integram observandam, & ad judicium rectum & justitiam constanter omnibus modis pro posse suo sine dilatione faciendam. Hoc decretum sancitum est in civitate London, i. e. we will and command that all free men of our Kingdom be sworn Brothers to defend and keep our Monarchy and Kingdom according to their power against the Enemies of the same, and to maintain the peace and dignity of our Crown entire, and to exercise right judgement, and justice according to their power without deceit and delay. This Decree was enacted in the City of London. By the civil law also the rights of Sovereignty cannot be separated from the Prince, and the reason alleged is, because they are essential to Majesty. Suprema jurisdictio & potestas regia, etsi Princeps velit, se separari non possunt, sunt enim ipsa forma & substantialis essentia Majestatis, ergo manente ipso Rege ab eo abdicari non possunt. Cabedo practic. observ. par. 2. decis. 40. n. 8. Io. Andr. in addit. ad specul. tit. de jurisdict. c. Cum Marthae. de celebrat. Missar. i e. Supreme jurisdiction and Kingly power cannot be separated from the Prince although he would himself, for they are essential to Majesty, and cannot be abdicated whilst he remaineth King.   

CHAP. V The King's Supremacy in particular showed by the Common Law.  
I Come now to the particular rights of Sovereignty, which are all by the Common law wholly in the power of the King. First, 
19 E. 4.6. Coke 7.25. B.  the Militia is his by the Common Law, and to him it only pertaineth, to make War with foreign Princes and Estates; as also to maintain the peace, to suppress Rebellions, and to see justice executed at home within his own Kingdom: Fleta lib. 1 cap. 17. Habet Rex in manu sua omnia jura quae ad Coronam & Laitalem pertinent potestatem, & materialem gladium qui pertinet ad Regni gubernaculum. i e. The King hath all the rights in his hand which belong to the Crown, and to Temporal jurisdiction, and the power of the sword, which belong to the Government of the Kingdom. So likewise saith Bracton, lib. 1. cap. 8. Sunt & alii potentes sub Rege qui dicuntur Barones, hoc est robut belli, sunt & alii qui dicuntur Vavasores, viri magnae dignitatis, vavasor enim nihil melius dici poterit quam vas fortium ad valetudinem. sunt & sub Rege milites, s. ad militiam exercendam electi. i e. There are other great men under the King which are called Barons, and other which are called Vavasours, men of great dignity. There are also soldiers under the King chosen to exercise the Militia. And in the beginning of his Book he saith that it is necessary this power should be in the King. In rege quirecte regit, necessaria sunt duo haec, arma videlicet & Leges, quibus utrumque tempus bellorum & pacis recte possit gubernari: utrumque enim istorum alter, us indiget auxilio, quo tam res militaris possit esse tuta, quam ipsae Leges usu armorum & praesidio possint esse servatae. Si autem arma defecerint contra hosts, rebelle, & indomitos sic erit regnum indefensum: Si autem Leges, sic exterminabitur justitia. i e. In a King that governeth well, two things are necessary, arms and laws, by which he may be enabled to rule both in times of peace and war; and both these help the need of one another, whereby both arms and laws may be preserved. If arms be wanting against enemies, and rebels, the Kingdom shall be without defence; if Laws be wanting, without justice. This is also evident from the Tenors, whereby most of the chief men in the Kingdom hold their estates: for all that hold in capite by Knight's service, are bound for their fee to assist the King in his wars, whensoever they shall be summoned by him; whether it be to suppress rebellion, or to resist a foreign invasion. And this hath been the known Law of the Land ever since the time of William the Conqueror, in the fourth year of whose reign this right was confirmed unto him by Act of Parliament: The words of the Statute are these, Statuinus & firmiter pracipimus, ut omnes Comites, & Barones, & Milites, & Servientes, & universi liberi homines totitu regni nostri praedicti habeant & teneant se semper bene in armis, & in equis ut decet & oportet, & quod sint semper prompti & parati ad servitium suum integrum nobis explendum & peragendum, cum semper opus adfuerit, secundum quod nobis debent de feodis & tenementis suis de jure facere, & sicut illis statuimus per commune consilium totius Regni nostri praedicti, & illis dedimus, & concessimus in feodis jure hereditario. i e. We will and command that all Earls, Barons, Knights, Villeins, and all Freemen of out whole kingdom, be always well provided with horse and arms, as it behoveth them, and that they be always in a readiness to serve us as often as need shall require according as they are bound by their Lands and Tenements, and as we have appointed them to do by the Common-council of our whole Kingdom, and for that consideration have given and granted them lands in Fee for ever.  
Secondly, The Legislative power belongs to the King alone by the Common Law, the two Houses have authority granted them by the King to assent or descent, but the power that makes it a law, the authority that animates it and makes it differ from a dead Letter, is in the King, who is the life and soul of the law, by whose authority alone the laws command, and forbidden, and vindicate, and punish offenders. So saith Bracton lib. 1. cap. 2. Hujusmodi verò Leges Anglicanae, & consuetudines, Regum authoritate jubent quandoque, quandoque vetant, & quandoque vindicant & puniunt transgressores. i e. These Laws and customs of England by the King's authority do sometimes command, sometimes forbid, and sometimes chastise and punish transgressors. This was also resolved by divers Earls and Barons, and by all the justices in the time of Edward the third: For one Haedlow and his wife having a controversy with the King, and desiring to have it decided in Parliament, a reference being made to divers Earls, and Barons, and to all the justices, to consider of the business, it was resolved that the two houses were not coordinate with the King in the Legislative power, but that the King alone made laws by the assent of the two Houses, that he had none equal or coordinate with him in his Realm, and that he could not be judged by the Parliament. 
22. E. 3.6.  Fuit dit que le Roy fist les leis per assent des peers & de la Commune, & non pas les peers, & le Commune: Et que il ne avera nul pere en sa terre demesne, & que le Roy per eux ne doit estr. ajuge. i e. It was resolved that the King makes laws by the assent of the Lords and Commons: and not the Lords and Commons, and that he could have no Peer in his own land, and that he could not be judged by them.  
The Common practice of the law confirms this as well as the resolution of the Judges; for the breach of any Statute whether it be by treason murder, felony perjury, or by any other way, is an offence against the King's authority alone, and pleas made against such offences are called the pleas of the crown, because they are done encounter la corone & dignity le Roy, 
Stanford les pleas del corone. lib. 1. cap. 1.  against the crown and dignity of the King. So that it is not the dignity and authority of the Lords and Commons which is violated by contempt of the law, but the dignity and authority of the King.  
He may dispense also with such laws as forbid a thing which is not malum in se, and pardon the transgression of others, as Treason, Felony, and the like; which in reason he ought no more to do, then to dispense with the laws of Germany, Spain, or France, or pardon the transgressors thereof, if they were not made by his own authority.  
Again it is an  Maxim of Law, Ejusdem est leges interpretari cujus est condere: None can interpret the laws, but the same power that makes them: Now that the King calling the Judges to him hath this power, is evident by his exposition upon the Statute of Gloucester made in the sixth year of Edward the first, extant amongst the printed Statutes, and following immediately after the said Statute, in these words. After by the King and his Justice's certain expositions were made upon some of the articles above mentioned, that is to wit, to the first article, for entries by disseisin, damages shall run from the time of the Statute published. In the same wise, in writs of entre upon disseisin in all writs of Mortdauncester. Cozenage, Aiel or Befaiel, of intrusion by one act by any manner of writ, damages shall run after the writ purchased against them that held by Statute, albeit their ancestors died seized thereof, etc. Here we see to whom the interpretation of the law belongeth, the Judges by themselves have a power to interpret it judicialiter, they could not otherwise proceed to judgement; but being called by the King, with him, and under him, they have a power to interpret it authoritative as hath been the practice, and is the known law of the Land. But for the two houses (besides that they can do nothing jointly together, unless the King doth actually concur with them) their structure is such that they are altogether uncapable and unfit to interpret law: For the power that interprets law must be always existent to act as new occasions shall arise, which requires the exercise of that power, which the two houses are not. And yet were they always existent, both houses having a negative voice, upon any disagreement between them, the interpretation of the law must be retarded, and all controversies depending thereupon undecided: and this disagreement might perhaps endure for ever, and so a final determination in such suits would be impossible. Now these are inconveniences which ought not to be admitted in any commonwealth: for it derogates both from the honour and wisdom of a Nation to be so moulded and framed, that justice cannot have a free passage in all contingencies.  
I will yet add for the further clearing of this point, that not only the legislative power itself, but the very exercise of the power also, so far as it is essential to government is in the King alone; for he can by edicts and proclamations provide for all necessary occasions, and special emergencies, not provided for by fixed and certain laws; which is one of the most excellent and eminent acts of the legislative power, and a sufficient remedy against all mischiefs, in case the two houses should refuse to concur with him in those things which concern the benefit of the Kingdom. He may also grant immunities, liberties, and privileges, to any college, town, city, or incorporation, and authorize the said communities to make such local Statutes as shall oblige every member thereof so far as they contradict not the general Statutes of the Land, which are all acts of the legislative power that he can exercise without the concurrence of the two houses.  
Now concerning the King's negative voice, 
12. H. 7.10. 4. H. 7.18. 7. H. 14. Judge Jenkins fol. 18.  it is the known law that the King hath a power of dissenting, and that no act of Parliament can have any authority except either in person or under his seal he signifies his assent.  
Thirdly allegiance or ligeancy is due to the King, and none but the King by the Common law, as Sir Edward Coke showeth at large in calvin's case from the resolution of the Judges. By that which hath been said appeareth, saith he, that this ligeance is due only to the King so as therein the question is not now cui sed quomodo debetur. It is true that the King hath two capacities in him, one a natural body being descended of the blood Royal of the realm, and this body is of the creation of almighty God, and is subject to death, infirmity, and such like; The other is a politic body or capacity, so called because it is framed by the policy of man (and in the 21. E. 4.39. B. is called a mystical body) and in this capacity the King is esteemed to be immortal, invisible, not subject to death, infirmity, infancy, nonage, etc. Vide Pl. Com. in le Case de Seigmor Barclay 238. Et in the case deal duchy 213. vide 6. E. 3.291. & 26. ass. pl. 54. Now seeing the King hath but one person and several capacities, and one politic capacity for the realm of England, and another for the realm of Scotland, it is necessary to be considered to which capacity ligeance is due, and it was resolved that it was due to the natural person of the King, which is ever accompanied with the politic capacity, and the politic capacity as it were appropriated to the natural capacity, and is not due to the politic capacity only; that is to the crown or Kingdom distinct from his natural capacity. In the same case a little after it followeth. And where divers books and Acts of Parliament speak of the ligeance of England as the 31. E. 3. tit. Cozenage 5.42. E. 3.2.13. E. 3. tit. Bre. 677.25. E. 3. Statut. 2. De natisultra mare. All these and divers other spenking briefly in a vulgar manner (for loquendum ut vulgus) and not pleading (for sentiendum ut docti) are to be understood of the ligeance due by the people to the King. For no man will affirm that England itself taking it for the continent thereof, doth owe any ligeance or faith, or that any ligeance of faith should be due to it; but it manifestly appeareth, that the ligeance or faith of the subject is proprium quarto modo to the King, omni, soli, & semper.  
Fourthly, the power of making Judges, and all such State officers as exercise any jurisdiction, is in the King alone by the Common law, and can not, nor ought not to be separated from him: for it is not reasonable that delegate Judges should be substituted by any but those whose delegates they are; nor can a King execute justice according to his oath (which next the Glory of God is the chief end of Government) by a naked title only; His subjects may be vexed by the rapine and exactions of unjust Judges, they may be wearied by delays, exhausted by insupportable fees, oppressed many several ways, and the King in the mean time must stand still and look on, if his hands be bound, and he disabled from punishing their delinquencies & deputing others into their places. And therefore this power cannot be disunited from the crown but aught to be de jure, as it hath always been de facto, a part of the King's prerogative. Bracton lib. 3. tit. de actionibus, cap. 10. Et si ipse Dominus Rex ad singulas causas terminandas non sufficiat, ut levior sit illi labor in plures personas partito onere, eligere debet de regno suo viros sapientes & timentes Deum, in quibus sit veritas eloquiorum, qui & ederunt avaritiam (quae inducit cupiditatem) & ex illis constituere Justiciarios, Vicecomites, & alios Ballivos, & Ministros suos, quibus referantur tam quaestiones super dubiis, quam querimoniae super injuriis. i e. And if our Lord the King be not sufficient to determine all controversies himself, he ought to select wise men, fearing God, and hating covetousness, and out of them constitute Justices, Sheriffs, Bailies, and other officers, to whom controversies and complaints may be referred. The practice of the law hath always been the same since Bracton's time, and all Judges and chief officers appointed by writ, patent, or commission from the King. Hence it is that all patents and commission of Judges, and other such officers, are determined by the common law at the King's death. Coke tit. discontinue de process, etc. part. 7.30. All common ley per demise le Roy le plea fuit discontinue, & le proces que fuit agard, & nient return devant le mort, le Roy fuit perde: Car per le breve del predecessor rien poit estre execute in le temps del novel Roy, si non que il soit in especial cases; car le mort le Roy, non solement les justices de lun Bank & de launt, & Barons deal exchequer, mes les viconts auxi, & eschetors, & touts commissions de Oyer & Terminer, Goal delivery, & justices de peace, sont determine per le mort le predecessor qui eux fist. i e. By the Common law all pleas were discontinued by the death of the King, and process awarded and not returned before his death, was lost: for by the writ of the predecessor nothing can be executed in the time of the new King, except it be in some special causes; for by the death of the King not only the justices of both the benches, and the Barons of the exchequer, but Sheriffs also, and Escheatours, and all commissions of Oyer and Terminer, Goal delivery, and Justices of peace, are determined by the death of the predecessor that made them.  
Fifthly, the power of making leagues and contracting alliance, as also of making war with foreign States is in the King alone. Coke lib. 7.25. Leagues between our Sovereign and others are the means to make aliens friends, & foedera percutere to make leagues, only and wholly pertaineth to the King: wars do make aliens enemies, and bellum indicere belongeth only and wholly to the King, and not to the subject, as appearath in 19 E. 4. fol. 6.6. It hath been resolved by the Judges, 
19 E. 4.46.22. E. 4. Fitz. jurisdiction last placite. Judge Jenkins fol. 17.  that if all the people of England collectively taken should break the league made with a foreign Prince, without the King's consent, the league holds, and is not broken. There are yet other rights of Majesty as the power of Coinage, the power of granting letters patents of Denization, the power of dispensing with such laws, as are dispensable, and the power of pardoning the transgression of them, with divers others, all which belong to the King by the Common law; but because they are not called in question, I will pass them over.   

CHAP. VI The King's Supremacy both in general and particular showed by reasons depending upon the laws and customs of the Land.  
ALthough I esteem positive Laws and customs more demonstrative than deductions and inferences, yet these have also their weight and importance; I will therefore in the last place add such reasons as shall sufficiently confirm the King's Supremacy, although the laws had positively declared, or the Judges resolved nothing concerning it.  
First, that power which is so under control that it can be annihilated at the will of another, must needs be inferior to that power which doth so overrule and master it; Now such is the condition of Parliaments, that the King by law can annihilate them at his pleasure; for they depend upon him quoad existentiam for their existence and continuance: If it should be granted that Parliaments are in actu signato by original constitution, yet the precise time of their existence, and continuance, hath always been at the King's appointment, it being in his power to call them and dissolve them when he please, so that they must needs be subordinate to him and depend upon him for their operation, when they depend upon him for their existence.  
Answer. To this the reverend Divines, answer, for the convention of Parliaments, the State hath authority in some eases to meet together in Parliament without a legal warrant from the King, as if the King be a prisoner in the enemy's hands, or distracted; and have done it de facto in the infancy and minority of some Kings: and for the dissolution of Parliaments, they say that they have heard wise men affirm, that by law a Parliament can not be dissolved whilst there are any petitions of grievances, or such matters of importance depending and unfinished.  
Reply. What needed the reverend Divines to have cited these wise men? Can they not as easily have said themselves, that Parliaments could not be dissolved by the King's command, as they said they might be called without it? Perhaps they thought that such notorious falsities would never pass currently amongst the people, if they were not confirmed by the authority of wise men as well as by their own: yet I believe the wise men they speak of were not so wise as Thales Milesius, but whatsoever they were, their magisterial dictates must not pass for law; for both that which these wise men affirm, and that which they affirm themselves, is manifestly opposite to law and truth. There was never yet since the first foundation of the Monarchy a Parliament called without a legal warrant from the King, nor can a Parliament be called without it; for the cases put by them are altogether impertinent, and can not be supposed: the King according to his politic capacity can not be a prisoner, or an infant, or distracted, but in case his condition be such as make him uncapable to guide and manage his charge in person, as in case of infancy, or distraction, the law hath made sufficient provision who shall exercise the regal power in such occurrencies; if he be prisoner in the enemy's hands he may substitute others, or if he be so closely kept as that can not be permitted, in such events also the law is not deficient: but in all these cases nothing can be acted by authority inherent in the people, but by the King's authority, which can never be in prison, nor is it subject to infancy or distraction; and Parliaments called at such time, by those that have authority by law to exercise the Royal power, are called by a legal warrant from the King; and without such a legal warrant they never were nor can be called: It there have been any general Conventions without it, as the reverend Divines (who should have done well to have quoted their authors, and their words) assure us, their acts were never esteemed laws, nor such Conventions, Parliaments. And that the King hath a power by law of dissolving Parliaments when he shall think it fit, hath been always without controversy: The two houses in the last Parliament, though thrifty managers of their privileges, 
Modus tenendi Parliamentum 4. pars instit. fol 3.4.  never claimed an arbitrary power of sitting without the King's assent: It is a known Maxim of the law, Rex est Principium, Caput, & Finis Parliamenti. The King is the Beginning, the Head, and the End of Parliament.  
Secondly, he that last fashioned and reform the English Monarchy obtained the crown by conquest; he had it not by election as a gift and gratuity of the people, but made his passage by the Sword: and Conquerors are not wont to allow of such coordinations, or admit so many sharers in the rights of Sovereignty as it is phantasied.  
Answer. 1 Some answer that conquest is no good title.  
Reply. I shall speak of this at large in the second question, where I shall show that conquest in a just war undertaken by those that have authority, is a lawful and just title.  
Answer. 2 Others answer that the conquest was not full and entire, but a partial conquest, occasioning a composition and agreement, and so the government is specificated according to that final composition and agreement, which was made.  
Reply. I deny not a composition and agreement, but I say there was none such as is pretended: for the composition and agreement was made after a victory; and it is not probable that the conqueror having been at such expense of blood in gaining the crown and rights of Sovereignty, should after his victory give them away again, and agree to such a mixture as is pleaded for. And although it may be justly exacted from them to prove that there was such a composition and agreement, as they speak of, made between them; yet I will take the burden of proving upon myself, and show there was not: for all the composition and agreement which was made or reported to be made by any author, was a grant from the conqueror that the Kingdom should enjoy the ancient laws and customs, whereby it had been formerly governed, which were called the laws of King Edward: this he performed, being moved by the petitions and instances of the people, in the fourth year of his reign, wherein he confirmed unto them the said laws and customs. Now amongst the laws of King Edward there is nothing to be found that can give the least colour or pretence for such a coordination as is conceited, but on the other side the King's supremacy is chief established by the ancient laws of the land, for the common law was the same it is now, before the conquest, and is the base and pillar of Royal power, as hath already been showed sufficiently: To which I could add many other things out of the laws of King Edward wherein the King is declared to be a Monarch and to be God's vicegerent constituted and ordained to govern the Kingdom (which includes the people collectively taken) and his Church, and to protect and defend them (which is an act belonging only to supreme authority, and which can not be performed without it) from injuries and oppression. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. fol. 142.  Rex autem quia Vicarius summi Regis est ad hoc est constitutus ut regnum terrenum, & super omnia sanctam veneretur Ecclesiam ejus, et regat, & ab injuriosis defendat, etc. Vniversa vero terra et tota et insulae omnes, usque Norwegiam, et usque Daciam, pertinent ad coronam regni ejus, et sunt de appendicijs et dignitatibus regis, et una est Monarchia, et unum est Regnum, et vocabatur quondam Regnum Britanniae, modo autem vocatur Regnum Anglorum. i e. The King because he is the vicar of God is ordained that he may govern the Church and his Kingdom, and the people of God, and defend them from all injuries, etc. But the whole continent and all the Islands are far as Norway and Denmark, belong to his crown, and are the appurtenances and dignities of the King, and are one Monarchy, and one Kingdom, and it was anciently called the Kingdom of Britain, now the Kingdom of England. By an other law of King Edward all men within the Realm are obliged to take an oath of Allegiance, and to promise fidelity to the King, 
a Besold. de jurib. Majestat. cap. 2. num. 36. Bornit. de Majest. c. 17.  which is a duty to be paid only to supreme authority. 
b L. 35.  Ita debent facere omnes Principes, & Comites, & simul jurare coram Episcopis Regni in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & similiter omnes proceres regni, & milites, & liberi homines universi totius regni Britanniae facere debent in pleno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fidelitatem Domino Regi ut praedictum est coram Episcopis Regni. i e. So ought all Princes to do, (that is, to take the Oath of Allegiance) and Earls, and swear together before the Bishops of the Kingdom in a public assembly, in like manner all the great men of the Kingdom, and Knights, and all the free men, aught to do fealty to our Lord the King, in a full assembly before the Bishops of the kingdom. To conclude this point; by the Laws of King Edward the Crown hath legibus solutam potestatem, 
c johan. Corvin. Breviar. cap. 11. Bisol. cap. 2. de jur. Mayest. Special. num. 41. Morla in Empocio juris tit. 1. quaest. 2. Petra cap. 25.  which is a prerogative compatible to none but supreme powers: by them the King may dispense with the Statutes, pardon the transgression of them, and lose whom he please from imprisonment wheresoever he goeth by his bare word alone. 
d L. 19  Habet etiam Rex alterius modi potestatem misericordiae super captivos; ubieunque enim venerit in civitatem, vel burgum, vel castellum, vel villam, vel etiam in via, si captivus fuerit, potest eum solo verbo solvere à captione: Solutus tamen satisfaciat cui foris secit. Murdrator vero, vel traditor hujusmodi criminosus, quamvis Rex iis condonaverit vitum & membra, secundum legem nullatenus in patria remanebunt. i.e. The King hath also another kind of power of pardoning such as are in prison, for wheresoever he goeth into any City, Borrough, Castell, or Village, or also in the high way, if any prisoner be there, he may by his word alone release him from imprisonment; yet he that is so released, must satisfy those to whom he hath made the forfeiture, but a Murderer, Traitor, or any such notorious Delinquent, although, the King hath given him his pardon of life and Member, may not by Law remain in his Country. The laws then granted by William the Conqueror did not deprive him of the rights of Sovereignty, but did rather strengthen his Title, joining law to conquest; for lest he might inconsiderately suffer his wings to be clipped, before he made the said grant he caused all the Laws and Customs that were in force in the time of King Edward to be written out, and then after good deliberation, finding nothing in them prejudicial to his Crown and Royal authority, he ratified and confirmed them, For whereas some of them say the Fundamental Laws are not written (that so they might cover their fraud and deceit, who pretending fundamental Laws are able to allege nothing out of them) this is contrary to all the Histories, and Records of those times, which testify that Willam the Conqueror commanded twelve of the wisest men to be chosen in every County, who did upon oath declare all the Laws and Customs which they knew, not adding or omitting any thing; Aldered Archbishop of York who had crowned him, and Hugo Bishop of London, as Chronicon Lichfieldense relateth, writ them out with their own hands. Yet he granted not these Laws without some emendations, 
Leges H. 1. c. 2.  as appears by the Laws of Henry the first, Lagam Regis EDWARD I vobis reddo cum illis emendationibus quibus eam Pater meus emendavit, Consilio Baronum suorum. i e. I restore unto you the Laws of King Edward with those emendations, which my father by the advice of his Barons added unto them. For although he let the old foundation stand, yet he enlarged it, and added divers new dignities and preeminencies to the Crown; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. fol. 151.  not wholly relinquishing the rights he had gained by conquest, as some without ground or reason affirm, but joining the rights of law and conquest together: And this was all done by consent and agreement of the people, and confirmed by Act of Parliament.  
Thirdly, the two Houses of Parliament are but the King's Counsel, according to their usual style, both in our Statutes and Law Books; at first the Members of the Pretended Parliament gave themselves not other name, and in propability would have been longer content with it, upon condition, his Majesty would have observed their counsels as Laws, and have acknowledged himself bound to obey them: for they were willing than he should have had the title of a King, so themselves might have had all the power and authority belonging to the Crown. But the truth is, there is a great distance between Counsels and Commands: Counselors are but subordinate officers, and may not impose their Counsels for Laws upon those which they serve in that employment.  
Answer. 1 To this it is answered, first, That the two Houses are called the Counsel of the Realm as well as the King's Counsel, and are trusted by the People as well as by the King.  
Reply. Although in some respects they be trusted by the people, yet as touching the office of Counsellors, they are trusted by the King; and when they are called the Council of the Realm, it is all one as if they were called the Council of the King, for under divers phrases the same thing is signified, it being an usual custom in law in expressions of this kind to take the Realm or kingdom for the King himself. Coke lib. 7.12. And oftentimes in the reports of our Book cases, and in acts of Parliament also the Crown or Kingdom is taken for the King himself, as in FITZ. NATUR. BRE. FOLLY. 5. tenure IN CAPITE is a tenure of the Crown, and is Signory in gross, that is of the person of the King, and so is the 30. H. 8. Dyer fol. 44, 45. a tenure in chief as of the Crown, is merely a tenure of the person of the King and therewith agreeth 28. H 8. tit. tenure Br. 65. The Statute of the 4. Hen. 5. cap. ultimo gave Priors aliens which were conventual to the King and his heirs, by which gift saith 34. H. 6.34. the same were annexed to the Crown. And in the said Act of 25. E. 3. whereas it is said in the beginning, within the ligeance of England, it is twice afterward said in the ligeance of the King, and yet all one ligeance due to the King. So in the 42. E. 3. fol. 2. where it is first said the ligeance of England, it is afterward in the same case called, the ligeance of the King; wherein though they used several manner and phrases of speech, yet they intended one and the same ligeance. So in our usual Commission of Assize, of Goal delivery, of Oyer and Terminer, of the Peace, etc. power is given to execute justice secundum legem & consuetudinem regni nostri Angliae: and yet Little. lib. 2. in his Chapter of Villeinage, fol. 43. in disabling of a man that is attainted in a praemunire, saith, that the same is the King's Law; and so doth the Register in the writ of ad jura Regia style the same.  
Answer. 2 Secondly, it is answered although the two Houses be the King's Counsel, yet they are not chosen by himself, the Lords are consiliari nati born Counselors, and the Commons are consiliari dati Counselors given him by Election of the people.  
Reply. Although the Lords be born Counselors, and the Commons chosen by the people, yet they cannot sit in Counsel, but at such times as the King is pleased to make use of them, and when he is pleased to summon them and command them to sit, the Lords cannot refuse to come, or the people to send their Deputies: nor doth it alter their condition, whether they be born his Counselors, given him by the people, or chosen by himself; they which are born to places of dignity and jurisdiction, or they which are chosen to them by the people, cease not for all that to be subordinate to the King; they are all his Subjects and Ministers, and are so far from having authority to challenge obedience to their Counsels, that if their Counsels be not such as they ought, they are themselves obnoxious to a censure of Law. A King is obliged in time of Parliament to follow the advice and direction of the two Houses, and out of Parliament of his Privy Counsel, when their advice and direction tendeth to the preservation of his person, and of his Royal authority, and to the preservation of his people, and of their rights and privileges; not that Counselors have authority over Kings, but because the matter of their Counsels do morally oblige their consciences: but if their advice and direction tend to the ruin of either, he may and aught to recede from their Counsels; and such a King is not a tyrant, but such Counselors traitors by the law. This is mysteriously represented to the Lords when they are first preferred to that degree and dignity, by the usual solemnities then performed; for if in stead of giving counsel for the King, they give counsel against him, they are not only by the Statutes of the Land declared to be traitors, but if the Statutes were silent, by a  condition of law annexed to their dignities, and veiled under certain ceremonies used at their first creation, they are to be condemned for such, and to forfeit their estates. Coke in Nevil's case lib. 7. fol. 34. Ceux que sont counties ount office de grand trust & confidence, & sont create pur 2. purposes: 1. ad consulendum regi tempore pacis: 2. ad defendendum regem & patriam tempore belli. Et pur c. antiquity add done eux 2. ensigns a resembler ceux deux duties: car primeremt. lour teste est adorn ove un capoe de honour, & coronet, & lour corpse ove unrobe in resemblance de counsel: secundmt. ilz sout succinct ove un espee in resemblans q. ilz serr. Foiall & loyal a defender lour Prince & pays: Donques quant tiel person encout. le duty & fine de son dignity, priest non solemt. counsel, mes arms auxi eneout. le Roy a luy de destroyer et de c. est attaint per due course del ley, per ceo il ad forfeit son dignity per un condition  annex all estate de dignity. i e. They which are Earls have an office of great trust and confidence, and are created for two purposes, first, to counsel the King in time of peace; secondly, to defend the King and their Country in time of war; and for this cause Antiquity hath given them two ensigns to represent these two duties, for, first, their head is adorned with a cap of honour and a coronet, and their body with a robe in resemblance of counsel; secondly, they are girt with a sword in, resemblance that they shall be faithful and loyal to defend their prince and country; when such a person then against his outy and end of his dignity take not only counsel but arms against the King to destroy him, and be attainted thereof by due course of law; He hath thereby forfeited his dignity by a  condition annexed unto it.  
Fourthly the Parliament is one of the King's courts, as is apparent both by our Statutes and law books; 
1. jac. cap 1. Bracton lib. 2. cap. 16. Fieta lib 2. cap. 2.  the two Houses therefore must derive all their authority from him: for the King is a full sea of authority, from whom all power and jurisdiction, by commissions, writs, letters patents, etc. as through so many channels, run into all his courts; if the two houses have authority radically in themselves by fundamental constitution, or if they derive their authority from any other than the King, the court is none of his.  
Answer. The Treatiser having made divers suppositions, which he telleth the Reader are the laws of the land, or to use his own words, the model and platform of the English Monarchy; out of the said suppositions frameth this answer. It is his Parliament, because an assembly of his subjects, convocated by his writ, to be his counsel to assist him in making laws for him to govern by: yet not his as his other courts are altogether deriving their whole authority from the fullness which is in him. Reply. Whereas he calls the Parliament an assembly of his subjects, whereas he faith they make laws for him to govern by, and that there is a fullness of power in him, he doth but compliment with his Majesty; his suppositions and principles agrees not with such expressions; for if the two Houses derive not their authority from his Majesty, but have it radically in themselves, how is there a fullness of power in him? if the jura Majestatis be divided amongst them, he hath not a fullness, but his share only of power: or how do they assist him to make laws to govern by? they assist not him alone, but all the three estates are mutually assistant to one another in making laws to govern jointly, where their joint concurrence is necessary; or to govern in their several charges, where they may act severally. Or lastly, how can they be called his subjects? subjection is due to the three estates acting together, or to either of them in their several places and jurisdictions, as well as to him: for it is due to him in the administration of that power which belong to him alone, so is it likewise to them by his principles, in things within the verge and compose of their authority. And yet all that he saith, if it were consistent with reason, is not sufficient to make the Parliament his Majesty's court, except it deriveth all authority and jurisdiction from him; it is not enough that they are an assembly of his subjects; for in divers foreign Nations, Ecclesiastical persons are subjects to the princes they live under, yet Ecclesiastical courts belong not to those Princes, but to the Sea of Rome; nor is it enough which he addeth, that they are summoned by his writ; for the Judges of divers courts, but chief of courts Christian, have sent out citations and summons, in their own name, as the King doth by writ, and yet they are not the proprietaries of those courts; nor yet is it sufficient that they are his Council; for his Counselors make it not his Court but his Authority; It is authority that constitutes a court, and inables it to proceed judicially; he which owns that, is owner and Master of the Court.  
Fiftly, Parliaments as they are now established, consisting of three estates, the King, the Lords, and the Commons, are but of late existence; and therefore such a composition and mixture of the said estates, as is pretended, can not be by original constitution. It is granted that Parliaments otherwise are of a long continuance, and may plead the prescription of many hundred years; for although the word Parliament hath been introduced (as is probable) since the Norman conquest, yet a convention of that nature was in use in the time of the Saxon Kings, who did seldom make laws without the counsel and assent of their wise men; and this assembly was called in the Saxon language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Council, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Synod. It is granted also that the Commons were sometimes called to such consultations, but that was a thing not necessary, or frequent, but rare, aibitrary, and contingent. There were no certain persons designed by law, whose concurrence was required to constitute a Parliament, but the King used the advice of those only which he pleased to call unto himself, which were always such as he thought most able to counsel and direct him, in the matters that were to be consulted of, and whose assent was likely to add most credit and estimation to the laws that were to be divulged. Sometimes he made laws without the assent of others; for offa King of the Mercians, 
In vita Offae 2.  as Matthew Paris relateth, being at Rome, ordained that every Houshoulder in all his dominions, (which were three and twenty Provinces, or Shires) that had above thirty pennyworth of goods in the field, should every year pay a Penny to the maintenance of the English School that then flourished at Rome, which in those times was a great taxation. His igitur auditis Rex, quid dig ne tant a benig nitati compenset, secum studiose pertractat. I andem Divina inspirante Gratia, consilium inivit salubre, et in die crastina scolam Anglorum que tunc Romae floruit ingressus. Dedit ibi ex Regali munificentia ad sustentationem Gentis Regni sui illuc venientis, singulos argenteos, de familiis singulis, omnibus in posterum diebus, singulis annis. Quibus, videlicet sors tantum contulit, extra domos in pascius, ut trig inta argenteorum pretium excederet. Hoc autem per totam suam ditionem teneri in perpetuum constituit, excepta tota terra Sancti Albani, suo Monasterio bonferenda, prout postea coliata privilegia protestantur. i e. The King hearing this considered with himself how he might recompense so great a courtesy; at last by Divine Inspiration very Sound counsel was suggested unto him, and going the next day into the English School that then flourished at Rome, he gave to the sustentation of such as should come thither out of his own Kingdom a penny to be paid yearly for ever out of every family by all whose goods in the field exceeded the value of thirty pence. And this he made a perpetual constitution throughout all his dominions, excepting only the lands, that were to be conferred upon the Monastery of Saint Alban, as the privileges afterwards granted do witness. This law continued a long time in force, yet I find it not confirmed by act of Parliament either in his own, or in the reigns of his successors: I find only in the laws of some Kings, as of King Edgar, and King Edward, a strict provision made for the payment thereof, 
L. 4.  because it was the King's Alms, which reason doth imply that it was not given by the whole Kingdom in Parliament, 
L. 10.  but by the King alone. But yet in those times laws were made commonly by the approbation and consent of the Nobles, Archbishops and Bishops, in a public Synod or Parliament: Sometimes the Queen was present, sometimes the inferior Clergy, and sometimes also the Commons, but that happened very seldom. I have seen divers Charters both in the Saxon and Latin tongue granted to Churches, and Monasteries, confirmed by act of Parliament, and attested by the Members of the same, yet amongst them all I have not seen so much as one, whereunto the assent or name of any of the Commons is subscribed. I will here insert one, for example sake, granted to the Monastery of Saint Alban by Ecgfride Son of Offa, because it is but short, 
Auctar. add tament. & fol. 239, 240.  and extant in the last Edition of Matthew Paris, where any one that please may see both that and divers others of like nature. Ego Ecgfridus gratia Dei Rex Merciorum, anno Dominicae incarnation is septingentesimo nonagasimo sexto, Indictione quarta, primo vero anno Regni nostri: terram X. manentium nomino Thyrefeld cum terminis suis. Domino meo Jesus Christo & ejus pretioso Marteri Albano, liberaliter & eternaliter cum consensu & testimonio optimatum meorum, in jus Monasteriale, pro anima m●a & parentum meorum devotissimetribuo & libenter concedi, Sitque praedicta terra ab omui terrenae servitutis jugo, semper aliena; atque eadem libertate sit libera, qua caeterae terrae Monesterii beati Albani conscriptae atque concessae sunt à glorioso Offa genitore meo.  

† Ego Cynedrid Regina consensi.  
† Ego Vnwona Episcopus.  
† Ego Weohthunus Episcopus.  
† Ego Beona Abbas.  
† Ego Elfhun Episcopus.  
† Ego Brorda Dux.  
† Ego Wigbertus Dux.  
† Ego Wicga Dux.  
† Ego Cutbertus Dux.  
† Ego Ethelheardus Archiepiscopus cons.  
† Ego Eobing Dux.  
† Ego Forthred Abbas.  
† Ego Sighere filius Siger.  
† Ego Esne Dux.  
† Ego Cydda Dux.  
† Ego Winbertus Dux.  
† Ego Heardbertus Dux.  
† Ego Brorda Dux.   
Conscriptus est autem hic liber, in loco qui dicitur Chelcyd, in Synodo publico. That is,  
I Ecgfride by the grace of God King of the Mercians in the year of our Lord seven hundred ninety six in the fourth Indiction, and first year of our reign, do give grant, for my own soul, and the souls of my Ancestors with the assent and testimony of my Nobles, ten Hides of Land called Tyrefeld with the Bounds thereof, unto the Monastery of Saint Alban: and I exempt the said Lands from all Services, and make them free with the same freedom which was granted to the rest of the Lands of the same Monastery by Offa our father of glorious memory.  
This Charter was written at Chelehyd in a public Synod.  
By this Charter it is evident, that Parliaments were holden in those times without the Commons; for whereas it is specified by the King, that the abovesaid lands were given cum consensu & testimonio optimatum, his meaning is, that his grant was confirmed by the assent and testimony of Parliament; and yet the word Optimates cannot be extended to the Commons, neither was his grant confirmed by their testimony. In the prefaces likewise of divers Saxon Laws set out by Mr. Lambart the persons are expressed by whose counsel and assent the said Laws were enacted; yet, except only in the preface of King Inas Laws, there is no mention at all made of the Commons, but several Kings made most of those Laws by the advice and consent of their Bishops, and wise men, which were no other than their Privy Counsel; Mr. Lambart in his Archaion affirmeth them to be the Nobility, and Commons, and to support his opinion he allegeth a passage out of the Preface of the Laws of King Elfred which is neither material, nor faithfully cited; for there is no such passage to be found in that Preface. But to make his error apparent I shall need no other testimonies, than two precedents mentioned by himself, the first is of a Parliament holden by Edwin K. of Northumberland the second of a Parliament holden by Segebert K. of the East Saxons, whereunto they called their friends and their wise men: for Edwine being instigated by Paulinus to embrace the Christian religion, 
Beda Hist. Eccles. lib. 2. cap. 13.  answered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 habban, that he would speak with his friends and with his wise men in Parliament; which he did accordingly, and by their assent, himself, his whole Nobility, and a great parr of the Commons, were baptised. In like manner Sigebert held a Parliament whereunto he called his friends and his wise men upon the like occasion, 
Beda Eccles. Hist. lib. 3. cap. 22.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Then he held a Parliament with his wise men and friends, and by their advice, did, and consent, received the Christian faith. From this I gather that their wise men could not be their Nobility and Commons, as Mr. Lambart supposeth, if Parliaments had been then so moulded as they are at this this time: for all their friends must needs be contained under one of those degrees, and in case his supposition were true, should not have been distinguished from their wise men, which in all good construction they must; for the words do evidently imply, that besides their wise men, they called such other of their friends, as they thought, by reason of their prudence, or power and prevalency with the people, were most like to assist them, and further their designs. But whosoever their wise men were, although they were frequently called, yet they were not all of them called always to make laws, for in the time of Ethelstane divers Laws were made by the Counsel and assent of the Clergy alone, which we find amongst his other laws. Ic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 minum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 binnon mine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mina 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mina 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. i. e. I Ethelstane K. signify to all my Governors within my Kingdom, that by the advice of Wulfhelmus my Archbishop, and all my other Bishops, and servants of God, for the forgiveness of my sins, I have ordained, etc. And although laws were frequently made, 
Polydor. Virgil. lib. 11. Hist.  and Parliaments holden, in the Reigns of the Saxon Kings, yet the people had been so seldom called to such conventions in the time of Henry the first, that Polydore Virgil saith that institution may seem to have sprung from him. At illud appositè habeo dicere, Reges ante haec tempora non consuevisse populi conventum consultandi cansa (nisi perraro) facere, adeo ut ab Henrico id institutum jure manasse dici possit. i e. But this I can speak appositively, that Kings before these times were not accustomed (except very seldom) to call the people to their consultations, so that this institution may be said to have had its first beginning from King Henry. This is certain the House of Commons hath been accustomed now a long time to give their consent in making Laws, but how long is not certain; their opinion is most likely which think this custom began to take place about the time of Edward the first. For there are probable reasons which confirm, that Laws were made without the Concurrence of the Commons long after the time of the abovesaid Henry the first, who, although he did call them more frequently than any of his predecessors had done, yet he did not bind himself to make laws always by their assent. But because it would requite anintire treatise to speak sufficiently of this subject, and because it can no way prejudice the cause in hand, if we grant Parliaments as they are now moulded to be by fundamental agreement, seeing the K. by the laws of the land, and the said sundamental agreement, is invested, as hath been showed, with all the rights of Sovereignty, I will lay by many advantages, and omit many reasons and passages which I could allege touching this matter.  
Sixthly, if the Nobility and people be then, and only then coordinate with the King, when they are in their site, relation, order, and union, in Parliament, as the fuller Answerer affirmeth; in time of Parliament the Kingdom should be a Head without a Body: For if the King be part of the Head, and the whole Nobility part of the Head, and all the people part of the Head too, where is the Body? And on the other side in the vacancy of Parliaments, the Kingdom should be a body without a Head: For if the Nobility and people be only coordinate when they are in their site, relation, order? and union in Parliament, after a Parliament be broken up, where is the Head? For as the preservation of the whole consist in the order and union of its parts, so the dissolution of it followeth their separation and divorce. If this opinion than were true, the Commonwealth should be a strange deformed Monster, for in time of Parliament, when all the Body were a Head, it should be monstrous by too much perfection; and our of Parliament, when two parts of the Head were fallen into the Body, it should be monstrous by too little: In both cases it should want that beauty and comeliness which consists in the harmony and proportion of several parts.  
Seventhly, if we descend into particulars, we shall find Parliaments to be so moulded, that their frame and composition rendereth the two houses an unmeet subject for supreamacy; for the Militia, the power of making war or peace with foreign princes, and most of the other rights of Sovereignty, require a subject perpetually existent; many occasional accidents may arise that may call for present and sudden use of the supreme power, for which there can be no provision made by bodies not existent.  
Lastly if the people collectively taken be Supreme and above their King, there should be in every Kingdom of the world many Millions of Kings, namely, All the Subjects, and these many Millions of Kings should have but one Subject amongst them all, namely, Their King.  
I could add much more, both from the statutes, Common law, and reason, as well concerning the King's Supremacy in general, as concerning the particular rights of Sovereignty: But I presume that which hath been said is more than sufficient, not only to satisfy all that are indifferent and neutral, but to convince those that are most interessed, who shall not easily find shifts and distinctions plausible enough to illude such clear testimonies of law. But God only is able to change their hearts, and to make such impressions there as can cause them to repent and turn from their evil ways; I shall pray continually he would do it as well in regard of the peace and happiness of the Kingdom, as of their own salvation, which I cannot otherwise hope they should obtain; For whatsoever deceives them, and bears up their spirits for a time, repentance at last, (if God give them grace) will prove their best fortune.   

CHAP. VII. Divers Objections made by the pretended House answered: The King's Supremacy shown to be in His Person, not in His Courts.  
THE King's Supremacy being made apparent I shall now proceed to answer their objections, which yet are of that nature that they deserve more to be contemned then answered: for in stead of Law they allege Bedas axioms, their own fancies, and such other impertinencies, as one would think should sooner move a man to laughter, then to be of their opinion. But because they shall not complain that their objections are concealed, and because in answering them I shall further confirm the King's Supremacy, I will bring them all in order, not suppressing or omitting any thing that hath but the face of an objection, how slight and impertinent soever. I will begin with that which is alleged by them in several declarations, the sum and substance whereof, is that which followeth.  
Object. 1 The King's Supremacy is meant in curia non in Camera, in his Courts not in his private capacity. and to speak properly, only in his high Court of Parliament, wherein he is absolutely supreme Head and Governor, from which there is no appeal.  
Object. 2 And if the Parliament may take account what is done by by his Majesty in his inferior Courts, much more what is done by him without authority in any Court.  
Object. 3 And it is preached to the people in the King's Declarations, that by the Supremacy is meant a power inherent in the King's person, without, above, against all his Courts the Parliament not excepted, whereby the excellent Laws are turned into an arbitrary Government.  
Reply. Argus' Eyes will scarce be able to discover a word of Law or truth in all this, every sentence seemeth rather to be a Sarcasme then to contain matter of serious importance, wherein they deal with his Majesty, as the Jews did with our Saviour Christ, who having stripped him of his apparel, and used all the spiteful and opprobrious terms they could devise against him, added at last a mock to their other incivilities bowing unto him, and saying, HARLE KING OF THE JEWS. The pretended House having likewise seized upon all his Majesty's Revenues, and rights of the Crown, and offered him all the indignities they could invent, do yet style him their King, and supreme Head and Governor, but in such a manner, as they may seem, like the Jews, rather to do it by way of derision then in earnest.  
The King's Supremacy, they say, is meant in Curia non in Camera, in his Courts, not in his private capacity. As they fancy the people to have conveyed all authority to the King, so they fancy the King to have poured it out again into his Courts, as if he had no power, authority, or jurisdiction, adherent in his person, but had committed all to his delegate Judges, or rather (which they say is to speak properly) unto themselves: 
Manwood of sorrest laws part. 1.  whereas he hath by law a royal and supiremenent jurisdiction above all his courts, and may call causes out of them before himself, or hear appeals, and reform their abuses when occasion require. Lambart. Archaion fol. 95. I shall not need to repeat that which I have before this time opened, touching the beginning of the Kingly power and authority, for the delivery of justice to all the sorts, and in all the suits of his subjects, but I will confirm by proofs drawn out of our country laws and lawyers that the self same general jurisdiction is appropriated to all the Kings of this realm of England. Master Henry Bracton that lived in the time of King Henry the third hath in the ninth and tenth chapter of his book these words following: Rex (& non alius) debet judicare, si solus ad id sufficere possit, cum ad hoc per veritatem Sacramenti teneatur astrictus, exercere igitur debet Rex potestatem juris, sicut Dei Vicarius & minister in terra. Sin Dominus Rex ad singulas causas determinandas non sufficiat, ut levior sit illi labor in plures personaspartito onere, eligere debet viros sapientes, & timentes Deum, & ex illis constituere justiciarios. The words do prove two things serviceable to this purpose: first, that the K. only is to be the judge of his people, if he alone were able to perform that office as well because he is within his own Kingdom the viceroy of God, (the supreme judge of the world) as also for that he is thereunto bound by oath, taken at the Coronation. The second that albeit he do (for the multitude of causes) substitute others underneath him, yet is he not thereby discharged himself; for it is done ut levior sit illi labour that his labour be the lighter, not that he should sit unoccupied; and lest you should doubt that so much is not comprised in that oath of his, one question therein amongst others is this: Fancies fieri in omnibus judiciis tuis aequam, & rectam justitiam, & discretionem in misericordia, & veritate secundum vires tuas: To which he answereth, faciam: wherein the words judiciis tuis, & vires tuas, do more properly denote his own doing, than the doing of his subaltern justices; albeit their judgement be after a certain manner, the judgement of the King himself also, from whence their authority is derived. Much like the words of Bracton speaketh King Edward the first in the beginning of his book of law commonly called Britton: where after he had showed that he is the Vicar of God. and that he hath distributed his charge into sundry portions, because he alone is not sufficient to hear and determine all complaints of his people: then he addeth these words Nous volons que nostre jurisdiction so it sur touts jurisdictions en nostre realm: issent que in touts manners de felonies, trespass, contracts, & en touts maners de autres actions personals, on real, ayons poer a rendre & fair rendre les jugements tiels come ills, afferont, sans a uter process, par la ou nous scavons la droit verity come judges. We Will, saith the King, that our own jurisdiction be above all the jurisdiction of our realm: so as in all manner of felonies, trespasses, contracts, and in all other actions personals, or reals, we have power to yield (or cause to yield) such judgements as do appertain (without other process) wheresoever we know the right truth, as judges. Neither may this be taken to be meant of the King's bench, where there is only an imaginary presence of his person; but it must necessarily be understood of a jurisdiction remaining and left in the King's Royal body and breast distinct from that of his Bench, Marshalsey, Common pleas, Exchequer. and the other ordinary courts: because he doth immediately after, in the same place severally set forth by themselves, as well the authority of the King's Bench, as of the rest of those his ordinary Courts of justice. And that this was no new made law, or first brought in by the Normin conquest, I must put you in mind of that which I touched before, out of though Saxon laws of King Edgar, where you did read it thus: Nemo in lite Regem appellato, nisi quando domi jus consequi non poterit, sin juris summi onere domi prematur, ad regem ut is id oneris allevet, provocato: Let no man in suit appeal to the King unless he may not get right at home; but if that right be to heavy for him, go to she King to have it eased. By which it may evidently appear, that even so many years ago there might appellation be made to the King's Person, whensoever the cause should enforce it. Hitherto Mr. Lambart; who doth afterwards further prove this supreme and supereminent jurisdiction of the King by divers precedents and acts of Parliament. And although the Commons in some other Parliaments have seemed to impugn this prerogative, yet here, as he saith, 
Fol. 125.  the Kings always most gravely and considerately repelled that sort of attempt. The King's supremacy than is inherent in his Person not in his Courts, as the pretended House affirm; for his politic capacity can not be separated from his natural, but what power soever he maketh over unto his Courts, the same and greater remaineth in Himself; His authority is not separated from him by such a concession privitiuè but Cumulatiuè, only as Civilians distinguish in Concessions of like nature made by the Emperor, that is, He loseth no authority by Communicating it to others, but others, hold that which is communicated together with himself. As God loseth no authority by communicating it to Kings, so Kings loseth it not by communicating of it to their Courts. The Civilians give these reasons for the ground of their law, not much different from those alleged by Lambart out of Bracton and others. Credendum non est Imperatorem ita fontes suos derivasse foras ut nihil penes se remanserit; sed in quavis concessione semper authoritas & persona ejus excepta censetur: quis enim tam stolidus ut alii benefaciendo seipsum consumere velit, cum etiam Principis sit, & ad offitium ejus proprie pertineat jus dicere Knichen. d. superiorit. territ. cap. 1. num. 518. Wurms. evercit. 3. num. 15. Rosental. d. feud. cap. 5. conclus. 13. Pruckman. d. Regal. cap. 1. num. 17. Leipold. d. Concurrent. jurisdict. quaest. 1. i. e. It is not to be imagined that the Emperor should so empty his fountains as to leave nothing in himself; but it is to be conceived that in every concession his own person and authority is excepted, for who is such a fool to consume himself by doing good to others it is also the essential property, and office of a prince, to do justice.  
The pretended House proceed; And to speak properly only his high court of Parliament wherein he is absolutely supreme head and governor from which there is no appeal.  
Reply. They speak not more properly, as they say, but much more improperly than they did before; it is the same authority that is in all his courts & in his person too, though not all the same authority; for it is limited & restrained in his courts by commission, writ, or law; and according as as those limitations and restrictions are more or less, so may courts be said to have a greater or less jurisdiction, but not the King to be more or less supreme: nor is their expression improper only, but also full of falsehood and deceit; for whereas they say there can be no appeal from the high court of Parliament, they desire the people should so construe their words, as to think the two Houses could jointly by reason of the King's virtual presence take cognizance of a plea, and give judgement upon it, from which there could be no appeal; which had they spoke out their falsehood had been transparent, for only the Lords House is a court of judicature, and from thence appeals may be made to the King, who may and have reform the undue proceed of that Court, 
Lambarts Archeion sol. 133.  for anno 18. Edward. 1. Bogo de Clare being discharged of an accusation put against him in Parliament for some imperfections of form that were discovered in the complaint, the King commanded him nevertheless to appear before himself ad faciendum & recipiendum quod per Regem & ejus confilium fuerit faciendum, and so proceeded to are-examination of the whole cause. Neither is the former part of their words truer than the latter; the King's supreamacy they say to speak properly is only in his high court of Parliament. This in their sense is false; the supreamacy of the King is no more in his high Court of Parliament by reason of his virtual presence or politic capacity, then in his other Courts, when he is personally there his supreamacy then together with his Person is in the Court, not otherwise. For I have showed already in divers places that the rights of Sovereignty are not only individually inherent in his Person, but so inseparably also annexed unto it that they can not be communicated to others by any grant or concession made by himself in private, or by an act of Parliament. I shall now add, 
Lib. 7. in Calvinet case.  that their conceit is called in Cooks reports a damnable and damned opinion, and hath been at large confuted, and condemned, by all the judges, as is there related; it was first invented by the Spencers, who to cover their treason, said that homage and the oath of ligeance was more by reason of the King's Crown, that is, by reason of his politic capacity, then by reason of the Person of the King: from which opinion they inferred these detestable consequences. 1. If the King do not demean himself by reason, his Liege's are bound by oath to remove him. 2. Seeing the King could not be reform by suit of law, that aught to be done per aspertee. 3. That his Liege's are bound to govern in aid of him; all which were condemned by two parliaments, one in the Reign of Edward the second, called exilium Hugon●s le Spencer. And the other anno 1. E. 3. cap. 1. And indeed their conceit is so irrational, that it might easily be prognosticated they would never make good Statesmen: For when the King is not personally present in his Courts, he can be there by reason of his politic capacity no other ways but by virtual emanation; there can be in them no more authority than is delegated and committed to his judges: now, it is a common conception as evident as the first principles, that a delegate power can not be supreme; The exercise of supreme authority in some Commonwealths may, but the power itself can not be delegated. King's may also abdicate and resign up supreme authority but they can not delegate it. In how general terms soever, say Civilians, authority be granted by the Concessour to the concessary, supreme authority can not be comprised under those terms. Quocuuque modo Regalium concessio fiat, nihilominus superius illud & Majestaticum imperium, ea largitione nunquam censeatur comprehensum, sed potius major semper, quam est concessa, reservata & retenta putetur potestas. cap. Dudum. ¶ Hoc igitur de praebend. in 6. l. inquisitio. Et ibi De c. de solut. Periginus de jure sisci, lib. 1. tit. ult. num. 33. Kniken. de jure territorii cap. 1. num. 315. i. e. Which way soever Regalities are granted, it may not be supposed that supreme authority is comprehended under such a grant, but rather that a greater power than is granted is reserved to the Prince.  
Object. 2 Their second objection is, If the Parliament may take an account what is done by his Majesty in his inferior courts, much more what is done by him without authority in any court.  
Reply. This if is well put in; they say not categorically they may take an account what is done by his Majesty in his inseriour courts, yet they would have the people think them to have such a power; and therefore they lay it down as a supposition, which they seem to take for granted, although they know it to be false: If they were a full and legal Parliament, they might indeed take an account what is done in his Courts by subordinate Officers, but not what is done by his Majesty, who as King can do no wrong; His authority is from God, and if injustice be committed in his Courts, his Kingly authority is not the cause thereof, but the corruption of his judges who abuse it; and his Majesty may take an account of them either privately, or in his Parliament, but is not himself accountable for their abuses. For although the judgement of his courts may, and is termed in law the judgement of the King, yet that is to be understood of the act itself, which cannot be effected without his influence and concurrence; 
K. H. 7.4.  not of the obliquity and deviation from justice which is in it. Nor is he yet accountable to any but God for his perfonal actions; by the laws of the land he cannot be obnoxious to any guilt, had he committed treason or any other crime before he was King, by taking the Crown upon him all attainder of his person is purged ipso facto. Enough hath been said already to prove both the Houses and the Members thereof, as well collectively as severally taken, to be his inferior delegate, and subordinate ministers, that derive their authority from him, and in case of grievance are to sue unto him by petition, which is all the help the law giveth in such exigencies; for they are so far from having any jurisdiction over him in matters of misdemeanour, that they cannot take knowledge of those cases wherein Majesty without disparagement may submit itself to a legal trial, as in controversies of right, or of title to land, etc. except he be pleased to have the business decided in that Court. In Haedlows case before mentioned, it is resolved by all the Justices, that controversies which concetn the King cannot be determined in Parliament; 
22. E. 3.6.  and it is there added above what hath been cited, that Kings may not be judged by others than themselves and their justices, unques Roys ne serra adjuge si non per eux mesmes & lour justice. And this is true, as it was resolved by Scrope in the Bishop of Winchester's case, not only in respect of others, but in respect of the Members of Parliament themselves: for although they are to be tried by their own respective houses in things which concern the Parliament, if the fact touch not the King; yet if it touch the King, and the case be prosecuted by him, they cannot then take cognisance of it, except he thinks it expedient, who hath power if he please to try it in any of his other Courts. Fitz. tit. coron. p. 3. E. 3. p. 161. Ceux queux sount judges in Parliament sount judges de lour Peers, mes le Roy naver Pier in sa terre demesne, per que il ne doit per eux estre judge ne ailours fair son suit verse cestui qui luy trespassa quam la ou luy pleist. i e. They which are judged in Parliament are judged of their Peers, (that is the Lords by the House of Lords, and the Commons by the House of Commons) burr the King can have no Peer in in his own Land, and therefore he ought not to be judged by them, nor to make his process against him that offends, but where he please himself.  
Object. 3 Last of all they charge the King for atttibuting too much power and authority to himself. And it is preached to the People in the King's Declarations, that by the Supremacy is meant a power inherent in the King's person without above against all his Courts; the Parliament not exceped, whereby the excellent Laws are turned into an Arbitrary Government.  
It is no wonder if the Members of the Pretended House were more inclined to hear what their own seditious Divines preached in Saint Margaret's, than what the King preached in his Declarations; yet I believe it had been better for them if they had entertained his Majesty's Person and Declarations with more respect and duty. However for the present may seem to have ruined him and his people too, yet they which have mounted to places of dignity and profit upon the dead bodies of the King and People, may find in the end, that Rebellion and Murder sit not so high, but that vengeance and divine Justice sit above them. As for the charge which they bring against his Majesty, it is partly false; his Majesty never used such expressions as they pin upon him: where doth he say that he hath a personal power above and against the Parliament? let any man produce the words out of which he can force such a sense. Their Charge is also partly vain and frivolous; for whereas they accuse him for saying his Supremacy was inherent in his Person, they might as well accuse him for saying he was King: Supremacy is an essential attribute of Majesty, and cannot be separated without the corruption of its Subject; to say the King's Supremacy is in his Courts and not in his person, is not only to contradict the Laws, but the Common principles of reason. This hath been demonstrated in divers places, yet because occasion is offered again, I will hear add the resolution of all the Judges made in the first year of Henry the seventh concerning this matter; for a Parliament being then called, and both the King himself, and divers of the Members, being attainted of high Treason, it was resolved by the Judges that the Attainder of the Members ought to be anulled before they could sit in the house: but touching the King it was resolved, that his attainder was anulled upon his admittance to the crown, because the King is personable, that is, because his Kingly authority was inherent in his Person, by reason whereof he was discharged of all guilt against the Laws. 
1. H. 7.4.  Et donques fuit move un question que serra dit pur le Roy mesme pur ceo que il fuit attaint, & puis communication ewe entor eux, touts accordront, que le Roy fuit Personable, & discharge de ascune atteind eo facto qil. priest sur luy le Reign & ee. Roy. i e. And then a Question was moved what shall be said of the King himself, for he was also attainted, and after communication had amongst them, all agreed that the King was Personable, and discharged from all attainder in the very act that he took the Kingdom upon him and became King. Nor is the other part of their charge less frivolous and vain, wherein they accuse his Majesty as if he had committed a great crime in saying his Supremacy was a power inherent in his person without and above his Courts, for as hath been showed, the King hath not only an extraordinary jurisdiction where cases can have remedy no where else, but ordinary also above all his courts wherein he is but virtually present: Bracton. Sicut Dominus Papa in spiritualibus super omnibus habeat, 
Lib. 5. cap 15.  ordinariam jurisdictionem, ita haber Rex in Regno suo ordinariam in temporalibus & pares non habet neque superiores. That in Fleta is also to be understood of the King's ordinary jurisdiction. 
Lib. 1. cap. 17.  Potentia Rex omnes in Regno suo praecellere debet, quia parem habere non debet, nec multo fortius superiorem in justitia exhibenda. The King ought to have a superimenent power above all the rest in his Kingdom, because he ought to have no equal, much less a superiout in exhibiting justice.   

CHAP. VIII. Divers general objections made by the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy touching the limitation and mixture of the English Monarchy, and coordination of the two Houses, answered. The Nature of Absolute, Limited, and Mixed Government, Explained.  
THE Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, the fuller Answerer, and other Pretended Parliamentarians, have invented a new form of Government to delude the People, which they tell them is the Government established in England; namely, a mixed Monarchy, consisting of three Estates, independent for their authority upon one another, all of them being coordinate, and having several shares in the rights of Sovereignty, by the fundamental laws of the land. A strange kind of Monarchy, not so much as heard of until these times, much less established in England: for a Monarchy is the Government of one alone, as the Etymology of the word importeth; now to say, the Government of three Estates, is the Government of one alone, doth not sound half handsomely. Other Authors have spoken of mixed Government, and mixed Commonwealths, but of mixed Monarchy in that sense which they do, none but themselves have treated. For according to the Verdict of other Authors, 
Besol. Synops. polit. doct. lib. 1. cap. 6.  when Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, are melted and allayed together, that which resulteth can take its name from none of the simple species or kinds of Government, although the chief authority, or primity of share belong to any one of the estates. Yet if they will needs have a mixed Government to be denominated from that kind that hath predominancy, they might with better reason have called their new frame a mixed Democraty; this denomination (besides that it is not so improper as the other, Democraty, implying the Government of the people, but not of the people only, as Monarchy doth of the Monarch alone) is more agreeable to the quality and nature of their platform; for the King's authority being so inconsiderable as they make it, the people in this mixture must needs be the predominant Element. The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy who seemeth to give most to the King, although in terms he grants him a primity of share in the supreme powet, yet in substance he would have it placed in the two Houses, attributing unto them such authority, as they may thereby make him deprivable at their pleasure. Now although the said Treatiser seemeth to be a Poet rather than a Lawyer, having many new fictions, but scarcely a word of law in all his treatise, yet because I cannot conveniently reduce his objections to any of the other Questions that are hereafter to be discussed, I will answer them in this place: But before I come to examine them, that all things may be clear, and better understood, I will, for perspicuity sake, speak a word or two of the division and several kinds of Absolute, Limited, and Mixed Government.  
I will begin with Absolute Government, of which there be three kinds; the first is Absolute both in respect of power, and also in respect of the use and exercise of it. In this kind of Government the Supreme Governors have perfect, Absolute, full and entire power; and in the exercise of it are subject to no limitation made by any humane law, paction or agreement, but are limited ab externo by the laws of God and nature only, being otherwise left to the free determination of their own wills. This is also called Arbitrary government, not because such governor's as have the free use of their power may do what they please; for their power is bounded by the laws of God and nature, and may not transgress and go beyond its limits: but because it is not bounded by any humane positive law made to restrain and regulate it. The ends of Government may be attained several ways in many particulars without breach of the Laws of God and nature; now when a Governor is not directed to his end in any of those particulars by humane constitution and appointment, but hath an open and free passage to act which way he please, his Government is Absolute and Arbitrary. Amongst all the several kinds of Government this only is jure Divino, as being more ancient than any humane law that could be made to direct it, by virtue and authority whereof, humane laws were at first enacted; all other sorts were introduced by the policy of men, yet lawful, humane Constitutions serving to conduct power to its end; making as it were a furrow, for it to pass in, and to contain it, which otherwise is apt to overflow its bounds, and to degenerate into tyranny. The second is Absolute in respect of the power alone; In this kind of Government the Supreme Governors have as perfect, Absolute, full, and entire power as the former, their authority have the same latitude, and all the same dimensions; but they are limited ab externo in the use and exercise of it, either by original and fundamental constitution, or else by laws made afterwards by special grace and condescension: so that although their power be perfect, Absolute, full and entire, in all respects, and able to produce all the effects of Government, yet they can not put it forth, and act by it according to their own free election, or according to the full activity of it, but must act according to those limitations made and granted by law. The third is Absolute in respect of the exercise only; In this kind of Government the exercise of the supreme authority is committed for a certain time, but the supreme authority itself not translated, to one or more, who by virtue of the said commission may exercise the power in an arbitrary manner during the time assigned them. Such were the Dictator's of the Roman Commonwealth, who ruled as arbitrarily all the time of their Dictatorship, as the most Absolute Monarches in the world, yet the supreme authority remained in the Senate: And such are they who exercise Royal power in the minority of Princes, whose Government is Absolute and Arbitrary.  
There are also three kinds of Limited Government answerable to Absolute; the first is Limited both in respect of Power, and also in respect of the use and exercise of it; In this kind of Government there are always more Governors than one, which are all Limited in the very essence and being of their power, having none of them perfect, absolute, full and entire authority, but only their several shares and proportion: neither can they act in an arbitrary manner according to the full extent of that power which they have, but have a certain rule set them by law. The second is Limited in respect of the power alone; In this kind of Government as in the former, there are always more Governors than own, which have all their Limited shares, yet may all act arbitrarily either jointly together, or every one within the pale and limits of his own authority. The third is Limited in respect of the exercise only; In this kind of Government, the Governors are absolute in regard of power, but circumscribed and Limited in the Acts of it.  
As of absolute and limited so there are likewise three kinds of Mixed Government suitable to the other; the first is Mixed both in respect of power, and also in respect of the use and exercise of it. In this kind of Government there is a mixture of several powers which compound and make up one perfect, absolute, full and entire power; and also of several persons and estates, to whom the said powers do radically and fundamentally pertain, which do jointly concur in the administration and exercise of them. The Second is Mixed in respect of the power alone; In this kind of Government several persons and estates are mixed together in the possession of power, but one alone do exercise all the acts of Sovereignty. In this manner was the Roman Commonwealth governed by Sylla; and by Dictator's in the time of exigence and necessity. The third is Mixed in respect of the exercise only; In this kind of Government several persons and estates are Mixed in the exercise of power, but one of the estates alone hath the dominion, and propriety of it.  
Now touching the Government of England, I have showed already that it is Monarchical, that the Monarchy is Absolute, in respect of the power; that the King alone hath perfect, Absolute, full and entire jurisdiction, able if put in action, to effectuate, and bring to pass, all the ends of Government: and that all other persons, of all estates and degrees whatsoever, both Nobles, and Commons, move in their several circuits and spheres of activity, by virtual emanation from him, and not by force of any power, authority, or jurisdiction inherent in themselves. And indeed all Monarchies are Absolute in this respect; that is, in respect of the power, for when the limitation is in the essence and being of power, Monarchy is destroyed, not limited.  
But yet the English Monarchy is Limited in respect of the use and exercise of power, the King being obliged to govern according to the laws of the land, which although they do not diminish Majesty in essentialibus, yet they do diversely qualify, and modificate it. It is also Mixed in the same respect, the King being obliged in some cases not to use his power without the assent and concurrence of the two other estates. The pretended Parliamentarians, on the other side, deny the English Monarchy to be Absolute in any respect; and affirm it to be Limited and Mixed, as well in respect of the power itself, as in respect of the use and exercise thereof, the two Houses of Parliament being coordinate with the King, not only in the administration of power, but in the possession of it. Yet they are not able to allege one syllable of law to make good these strange novelties, but strive by indirect inferences to deceive the people. Howsoever I will bring their objections, such as they are, and answer them in order: and first I will bring their objections whereby they endeavour to prove their pretended limitation, and then those whereby they endeavour to prove their pretended mixture.  
Object. touching limitation. 1 I conceive, and in my judgement persuaded, saith the Treatiser, that the Sovereignty of our Kings is radically and fundamentally limited, and not only in the use and exercise of it: and am persuaded so on these grounds, and reasons. First, because the King's Majesty himself, who best knows by his Council the nature of his own power, says, that that the Law is the measure of his power: 
Declar. from Newmarket Mart. 9 1641.  Which is as full a concession of the thing as words can express. If it be the measure of it, than his power is limited by it; for the measure is the limits and bounds of the thing limited. And in his answer to both the Houses concerning the Militia, Speaking of the men named to him, says, If more power shall be thought fit to be granted to them then by law is in the crown itself, his Majesty holds it reasonable, that the same be by some law first vested in him, with power to transfer it to those persons. In which passage it is granted, that the powers of the Crown are by law and that the King hath no more than are vested in him by law.  
Object. 2 Secondly, because it is in the very constitution of it mixed, as I shall afterwards make it appear, than it is radically limited; for as I shown before every mixed Monarchy is limited, though not on the contrary: For the necessary connexion of the other power to it, is one of the greatest limitations, a subordivation of causes, doth not ever prove the supreme cause of limited virtue, a coordination doth always.  
Object. 3 Thirdly, I prove it from the ancient ordinary and received Denominations; For the King's Majesty is called our Liege, that is, legal Sovereign; and we his liege, that is, legal Subjects. What do these names argue but that his Sovereignty and our Subjection is legal, that is, restrained by law?  
Object. 4 Fourthly, had we no other proof, yet that of prescription were sufficient: in all ages beyond record, the Laws and customs of the Kingdom, have been the rule of Government; liberties have been stood upon, and grants thereof, with limitations of Royal power, made and acknowledged by Magna Charta, and other public solemn acts; and no obedience acknowleded to be due but that which is according to law, nor claimed but under some pretext and title of law.  
Object. 5 Fifthly, the very being of our Common and Statute laws, and our Kings acknowledging themselves bound to govern by them, doth prove and prescribe them limited: For those Laws are not of their sole composure, nor were they established by their sole authority, but the concurrence of the other two estates: so that to be confined to that which is not merely their own, is to be in a limited condition.  
Reply. Before I come to answer his objections, out of his own mouth will I condemn him; for if he be persuaded, as he saith in his first objection, that the King by his Council knew the nature of his own power best, why hath he acted contrary to his Majesty's Declarations? why hath he, against his conscience, affirmed it to be lawful to take up arms against him? he knows his Majesty was never of that opinion. Now, to his objections I say that the second, and fifth, proceed upon his own principles, namely, that the Monarchy of England is mixed in the power itself, and that the Legislative power is not in the King alone, but jointly in the three estates: If these principles were true, his objections were material; but I have showed the contrary, and shall yet show it further hereafter. In his other three objections he doth not so much as touch the question propounded; he layeth down this conclusion to be proved, that the King's Sovereignty is radically and fundamentally Limited, and not only in the use and exercise of it, but endevoureth to prove no more than that it is limited in general, without specifying whether radically and in the essence and being of it, or in the exercise only. A Legal moderation and limitation of Royal power, as far as I know, is denied by none, although the Treatiser be pleased to lay a false imputation upon some Divines, because they hold it not limited in the same manner which he hath represented it: The King's Sovereignty to be radically and fundamentally limited, and not only in the use and exercise of it, is, in the sense by him explained, to be so limited, that his Majesty shall not only be restrained in the use and exercise of supreme power, but shall also be stinted in his share of it, and have no more than a single part, two other parts of the said power belonging to the other estates. Now, that he may deceive the people, he maketh a show as if he had gained his purpose by proving the King's power to be limited in general, whereas he knoweth well enough that there is a great difference between being limited, and being so limited by law. The King's power to be measured and limited by law, includes no more than that his power is of such a size and bigness as the law hath ordained; if the law giveth him perfect, absolute, full, and entire power, and limits him only in the exercise of it, this is a restraint and limitation according to law, yet not in the essence and being of power. And indeed this is the true and only limitation of Monarchy, whereby the Monarch's power is limited ab externo by humane laws and constitutions, and not by the free and arbitrary resolutions of his own will, and yet Monarchy preserved entire. But when the rights of Sovereignty are divided and placed in several Estates which limit one another, such a limitation is inconsistent with Monarchy. But the Treatiser objecteth further against this answer, that where the limitation of power is only in the exercise of it and not in the power itself all acts of Government are resolved at last into the arbitrary will of the Monarch: for although he be limited in the exercise of power by Law, or promise, yet if he will contrary to Law and Promise sinfully put it forth, his power is authoritative and may not be resisted: this is the full scope and sum of that which he replieth to Doctor Fern with no small ostentation. A Legal restraint, 
Pag. 11.  saith he, you seem to acknowledge; but such an one as resolve into the aobitrary Will of the Monarch, as I have made it appear in my former Treatise, which you will never be able to wipe off by this or any other reply. If this Reply were strictly examined, it would appear far unworthy such boasts and brags as are brought to set it out; but I shall only in brief show the insufficiency of it, and so let it pass. First, therefore I say that we do by this assertion no more resolve Monarchy than he resolves his mixed Commonwealth, into an arbitrary Government. For although in a mixed government every one of the estates hath but a limited share, yet taken together they have perfect, absolute, full, and entire power, which if they will contrary to law or promise sinfully put forth, it is as authoritative and unresistible as if it were in one man. He will grant, I suppose, the power of government to be equal in all Commonwealths, and that there can be no essential but only an accidental difference between them, for all Commonwealths have a sufficiency of power to attain to all the ends of government, and to make provision for all occurrencies, which cannot be otherwise limited then in the exercise: This he confesseth in another place; for disputing about the limitation of power in the essence and being thereof, and having made an objection against it, in answering the objection he saith, such a limitation cannot be where power is supreme, but for limitation to a rule and defined way of working, 
Pag. 23.  I cannot see how it withstands the end of Government, which is the same in other terms that he confutes in Doctor Fern, and doth expressly conclude that the power of Government taken in sua latitudine can not be limited in the essence and being of it, but in the use and exercise only; for, to be limited to a rule and defined way of working, is to be limited in the exercise, but not in the essence of power. If then allacts of government are resolved into the arbitrary will of the governor's where the limitation of power is only in the exercise of it, doth he not himself resolve his mixed commonwealth into an arbitrary Government? But secondly, I say, that to limit power in the exercise of it, is so far from resolving all cases into the arbitrary will of the Governor, that it is the only way and means to restrain arbitrariness; the limitation of power in the essence and being of it alone, is not sufficient to restrain it; for when power is limited in its essence and being, and terminated only within its own intrinsinque bounds, such a limitation is opposed to an Infinite, but not to an Arbitrary activity. When the three Estates have all their limited shares, yet they may all act arbitrarily according to the extent of that power which they have, not only when they act jointly together, but in the administration of their several charges, if their power be not regulated by law in the exercise of it; it is not the limitation of power therefore in the essence and being of it, but in the exercise, which denominates and constitutes a limited Government. Power which is limited in the essence and being of it only, although it cannot act arbitrarily in so great a latitude as when it is entire and absolute, yet it may act arbitrarily within its own bounds if it be determined only by the will of him that acteth by it, and not by a certain rule of law. Besides the former objections, the Treatiser in his reply to Doctor Fern hath added others which proceed upon one of their own principles, namely that all authority and power is originally in the people, from whence he inferreth that they may translate as much and as little, as they please to their governor's, and so limit their power in its being and essence. But because they speak not the facto but de possibili, and because I shall handle these things ex proposito in the third question, I will refer them them to their due place.  
Object. touching mixture. 1 I come now to the objections whereby they endeavour to prove the English Monarchy to be a mixed Monarchy. I conceive it saith the Treatiser, a clear and undoubted truth, that the authority of the land is of a compounded and mixed nature in the very root and constitution thereof, and my judgement is established on these grounds. First, it is acknowledged to be a Monarchy mixed with Aristocracy in the House of Peers, 
Answer to the 19 Propositions.  and Democracy in the House of Commons. Now (as before was made appear in the first part) it is no mixture which is not in the root and supremacy of power: For though it hath a subordination of inferior officers, and though the powers inferiur be seated in a mixed Subject, yet that makes it not a mixed Government: for it is compatible to the simplest in the world to have subordinate mixtures.  
Reply. His Majesty acknowledgeth Monarchy to be so mixed with Aristocracy and Democracy in the exercise of some part of his power, that the conveniencies of all those forms of Government, without the inconveniencies of any of them, are obtained by such a mixture; But he denyeth the mixture to be in the power itself, for the convenience which he saith it hath from Monarchy, is, that it is Governed by one Head: Where by one Head, he meaneth not one by mixture, but one single Person, one pure and unmixed subject, that hath all power and authority alone. The Treatiser, I conceive, hath purposely omitted his words, that his sense might not appear; but I shall cite them in the next chapter, and show the true intention and meaning of them. Now, whereas his Majesty hath acknowledged a mixture, to infer from thence that he granted the mixture to be in the power itself, because the other kind is not a true, but an improper kind of mixture, is a strange and unusual way of argumentation. If his Majesty was in an error, and apprehended that to be a true mixture, which is not, all that can be concluded thereupon, is, that he misunderstood the true nature of mixture, not that he granted the mixture to be such as they contend for, when it is evident that a man deny a thing in terminis, there is neither candour nor ingenuity in those, which will by consequences argue him to affirm it: Some accuse the Roman Catholics of Idolatry, because they affirm such things, as in their conceit seem by way of consequence to allow it, but no man was ever so void of ingenuity as to dispute the question whether Idolatry be lawful, and then cite them for Authors that maintain it to be lawful: In like manner some accuse Calvine of Turkism, because he affirm such things, as in their conceit seem by way of consequence to justify the practice and religion of the Turks; but no man was ever so unreasonable as to dispute the Question whether the Turkish religion be the true Religion, and then cite him for an Author that maintained it to be true; because it is evident that if those questions were propounded in terminis, the Roman Catholics would deny Idolatry to be lawful; and Calvine, if he were alive, the Turkish religion to be the true religion, what consequences soever other men draw from their words. Yet the Treatiser dealeth in this manner with his Majesty, for although it be evident, that his Majesty denied, in terminis, the mixture of the English Monarchy to be in the power itself, yet he argues him by consequences to affirm it: this to the Antecedent. But secondly, the consequent is also false; the mistake is in himself, not in his Majesty: why is it no mixture, which is not in the root and supremacy of power? he answereth, Though it hath a subordination of inferior officers, and though the powers inferior be seated in a mixed subject, yet that makes it not a mixed Government; for it is compatible to the simplest in the world to have subordinate mixtures: What if no government in the world be so perfectly simple as to exclude all subordinate mixtures? it doth not follow from thence, that a subordinate mixture is no mixture. I shall also deny the very ground and foundation of his argument; such subordinate mixtures, as are in the English Monarchy, are not compatible to the simplest government in the world; for where the government is arbitrary and absolute both in respect of power, and in respect also of the use and exercise of it, supreme governor's can put forth all the acts of power and jurisdiction alone; they can make laws, raise taxes, and exercise their whole power, according to the full activity of it, without the concurrence of the other estates: and although they do often make use of their direction and assistance; yet this mixture in the exercise of power proceeds not from the constitution of government, but from their own voluntary election, choosing this as the most conducible means to obtain the ends of government. For although they may act according to the full activity of their power, yet they cannot act in person at all times and in all places, nor is one man's wisdom sufficient to meet with all the Events and accidents of government, by reason whereof they are driven to seek a remedy against such inconveniencies as would arise frm these and the like causes; and if, when they find no better they substitute others and give them authority to act with them in the exercise of power, this voluntary mixture cannot have such an effect as to denominate a government mixed, because it depend upon the immediate will of the supreme governor, who may act without them, where and when he please: and whether he acts with them, or without them, the frame of government is still the same; for it is the constitution of a government that specificate it, and causeth it to be denominated mixed, or simple. There is a great difference then between such subordinate mixtures, and the subordinate dinate mixture that is in the English Monarchy, those are mutable, uncertain, depending upon the will of the Supreme Governor; this immutable, certain, depending upon the constitution of the Government: for whether it was effected by original contract with the people at the first foundation of the Monarchy, or whether it was established afterward by the voluntary grant and concession of some of our Kings, or whether it was introduced by custom, the Government is now so constituted, that the King can not make laws, raise subsidies, or exercise some other acts of his power, without the assent of the two other estates; So that the very constitution of the government is mixed in some respect, namely in respect of the exercise of some acts of power, which happeneth not in Commonwealths where the government is arbitrary.  
Object. 2 Besides that which is here alleged, the treatiser bringeth other objections in his reply to Doctor Fern, against mixture in the use and exercise of power. Aristocracy and Democracy, saith he, are powers, not Persons, as well as Monarchy: 
Pag. 38.  therefore a composition of these three must be all of powers, and indeed this Chimaera of a mixture in the exercise of power is plain non sense, for a mixture in the acts or exercise supposeth a mixture in the principles of action, that is in the very powers: a mixed act proceeding from a simple power, is such Stuff that I never heard before.  
Reply. First he saith that Aristocracy and Democracy are powers not persons, as well as Monarchy; and this he takes for granted, which is both an apparent falsity, and a Solecism; for Monarchy, aristocraty, and Democraty, are neither powers, nor persons, but forms of government equally relating to both, the words, according to their etymologies, noting persons as well as powers; and when these are mixed together, it is the mixture of persons, not of powers, that denominate a mixed form of Government, as I shall show immediately. Secondly he saith, that a mixture in the exercise of power is plain non fence, for a mixture in the acts or exercise supposeth a mixture in the principles of action, a mixed act proceeding from a simple power is such stuff that I never heard. Here in stead of law he bringeth an Axiom, either of his own coining, or taken out of some Author that writeth De causa & causato, to confirm his mixture; such axioms are no authentical proofs were they genrally true, which for the most part they are not, but admit of divers limitations: it is a very difficult matter to prove what kind of Government is established in any commonwealth, by Bedas Axioms, or the Axioms of any other Author; it had been more seasonable whilst he he was mixing the rights of Majesty, if, in making his assertion good, he had mixed a little Law with his Philosophy and Logic. But as his Axiom is not authentical, so without divers restrictions, it is not true; A mixed act may proceed from a simple cause, the Sun doth by the same power heat, resolve, and harden, at the same time; for the virtue of natural Agents is diversely modificated of the subject wherein it is received, and acteth variously according to the several dispositions thereof. And yet if his Axiom were authentical, or true, it is not pertinent; the question is, whether the mixture of several estates in the exercise of some acts of power be not a true mixture, sufficient to denominate a mixed Government; how doth it follow now that it is no true mixture, because a mixed act can not proceed from a simple power? If that were true, yet a mixed form of Government may proceed from the mixture of several persons, and estates; for forms of government are no acts. Besides, the Division of Government into simple and mixed, is made in respect of the Persons, and Estates, not of the power, which remains the same under all forms and changes of Government, and cannot properly & per se, but improperly & per accidens be said to be mixed; for it is mixed only ad mixtionem subjecti, when it is seated in a mixed subject, being otherwise the same that it is in a simple: and when a simple form of Government is changed into a mixed, or a mixed into a simple, the power suffereth not the least alteration, but is denominated simple or mixed, according as it is seated in a simple or mixed subject. This is the Common assertion of all Authors, who do generally teach the diversity of Commonwealths to arife from the diversity of Persons, their simplicity and mixture, from the simplicity and mixture of Persons, and estates; not from the diversity, or from the simplicity and mixture of powers. Quoad imperium haud discriminamus species rerum publicarum: Siquidem in qualibet Rep. deprehendere est summam legibusque solutam potestatem; verum quoad eos pene quos imperium est, differentia reipublicae formarum fieri debet, coque nomine aut Monarchicus aut Polyarchicus status est, Polyarchicus status aut simplex, aut vero mixtus existit. Besold. tit. de Reg. legit. Frederic. Tileman. Disp. Digest. 2. hes. 8. i. e. We distinguish not the forms of Commonwealths by power, for there is a supreme power above the laws in every Commonwealth; but the difference ariseth from the persons in whom the power is seated: and in that respect the state of a Commonwealth is either monarchial, or Polyarchicall; the Polyarchicall state is either simple or mixed. Now where the several forms of government are totally mixed, that is, where the mixture of the three Estates is both in the power and in the exercise of it, there the simple forms of government are corrupted, and that which results out of their mixture and corruption is another form distinct from them all; which by authors is generally called a mixed Commonwealth: this kind of government is always Polyarchicall, such a mixture being incompatible to Monarchy. But where they are but partially mixed, that is, where the mixture of the three Estates is in the exercise of power alone, there the simple forms of government are not destroyed by such a mixture, but suffer only an accidental change. This is a light mixture in comparison of the other, but as great as is consistent with any of the simple forms of government, and as true a mixture as the former; which although it doth not totally corrupt, yet it doth manifestly allay the simplicity of a government: for where several estates have interest by the constitution of a government in the exercise of power, the government is not so simple, as where one of the estates alone have all the interest.  
Object. 3 Thirdly that power where the legislative power is in all three is in the very root and essence of it compounded and mixed of those three; for that is the height of power, to which the other parts are subsequent and subservient: so that where this resideth in a mixed subject, that is in three distinct concurrent estates, the consent and concourse of all most free, and none depending on the will of the other, that Monarchy is in the most proper sense and in the very model of it of a mixed constitution: but such is the state of this Monarchy, as appears in the former question, and is self-apparent.  
Reply. This objection is soon answered by that which hath been said in the fifth chapter; but because it is their principal objection, I will more at large show the invalidity of it: first therefore I answer to the antecedent, that the concurrence of one or both the other estates with the monarch in the making and promulgation of laws is no good colour or pretence, much less a sufficient ground, for such a coordination and mixture as is pressed by them: Although their assents be free and not depending upon the will of the Monarch, yet that makes them not coordinate with him in the rights of Sovereignty. It is the common assertion of 
a Pannormit. cap. gravem de fententia excommun.  Canonists, 
b Bertol. in L. omnes populi ff. de justitia & jure q. 2. princip. quoestiunc. 5. num. 20.  Civilians, and 
c Suarez lib. 1. de legibus lib. 1. cap. 8. num. 9  Schoolmen, nor is it to my knowledge contradicted by any, that the Legislative power is delegable, 
d Besold. de jurib. Majest. cap. 2.  that such a concurrence is no argumeni of Supremacy, or of such a mixture as they would infer out of it: 
e Arnisae doct. polit. lib. 1. cap. 8.  Some call it therefore apparens mixtura, because it seemeth to destroy a simple form of government, and to make a mixture in the power itself, but doth not; though otherwise they acknowledge it to be such a mixture as doth remit the simplicity thereof. Grotius affirmeth to this purpose, Istam legislationem, quae alii quam summae potestati competit, nihil imminuere de jure summae potestatis; quod in Scholis dicunt, cumulatiuè datam censeri, non privatiuè. He speaketh this of laws made by general conventions, whose concurrence, he saith, doth not in the least manner diminish the rights of Majesty. Such a mixture of the three estates hath been in other monarchies, which all men acknowledge to have been absolute in respect of power: In the Persian monarchy, how absolute soever, the other Estates had interest with the monarch in the legislative power, as appeareth by that passage of Daniel, wherein the Princes, Governors, and other officers of Darius sought to betray him by a law. Then these Precedents and Princes assembled together to the King, 
Dan. cap. 6. vers. 7, 8, 9  and said thus unto him, King Darius live for ever, all the Precedents of the Kingdom, the Gevernours, and the Princes, the Counselors, and the captains, have consulted together to Establish a Royal Statute, and to make a firm decree, that whosoever shall ask a petition of any God or man for thirty days save of thee, O King, he shall be cast into the den of Lions. Now, O King, Establish the decree and sign the writing that it be not changed, according to the law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not, wherefore King Darius signed the writing and the decree. These Princes, Governors, and Officers of Darius, had the same authority in making laws that the Lords and Commons have in England; yet were not coordinate with the King: They had votum Consultivum and Decisivum; these words, have consulted to establish a Royal Statute, include both an act of Counsel, and an act of Authority and Jurisdiction. Grotius saith, they signed the Decree as well as the King, and that they had this authority by the constiution of the Government: And the sequel of the History doth imply as much; 
In Dan. cap. 6.  for had the act been his alone, had he set out his Decree by way of Edict or Proclamation, he might have altered it himself, as Ahasuerus did the Decree he set out touching the destruction of the Jews: 
Esther 3.12, 13. & 8.10, 13.  but being made by the assent of others who had a concurrent authority with him by Law, he could not alter it. I shall not need to instance in the Roman Empire, or in other Kingdoms, for it is generally known that such a mixture was in that, and hath been, and is, in most other Monarchies. And not only whole representative bodies, but divers particular free Cities have the same privilege; yet have not supreme authority. In our own Kingdom the common-council of every Incorporation have authority to make ordinances and constituions within their own Liberties, for the good order and government of their body. The Inhabitants of every Parish have authority to make Bylawes and Ordinances amongst themselves for their own profit, where they have custom for it; and for the public good, where they have no custom. Coke part. 5. in the Chamberlain of London's Case, tit. Cases de Bilawes & ordinances. Inhabitants dun ville, sans auscun custom poyent fair ordinances ou Bylawes pur reparation del Eglise, ou dun haut voy, ou dascun tiel chose, que est pur le bien public generalmennt, & in tiel case le greinder part liar. touts sauns ascun custom. Vide 44. E. 3.19. Mes si soit pur lour private profit dem. comme pur le bien ordering de lour Common de pasture ou semblables; lafoy Sans custom ils ne poient fair Bylawes. i e. The Inhabitants of a Parish without any custom may make Ordinances and Bylawes for the reparation of a Church or of the high way, or any other thing that is for the public good in general, and in such a case the greater part shall bind the less. But if it be for their own profit. as for the ordering of their Common, or the like, there without Custom they cannot make Bylawes. Why doth not the Treatiser and the Pretended Parliamentarians conclude from hence that every man is coordinate with the King in the rights of Sovereignty? for this is done by the Legislative power, and this authority they have by the constitution of the Government.  
But secondly I answer to the consequent, that the Legislative power is not radically in the three estates, but in the King alone; for although their assent be free and dependeth not upon his will, yet their authority is derived from him: he should have proved his consequent, which he saith appeareth in the former question, where indeed he doth confidently affirm the whole latitude of the Nomothetical power to be jointly in the three estates, yet offereth not to prove it. But there is scarcely any man in the Kingdom, so much a stranger to the Laws, but knows that the King alone hath power to dispense with the Statutes, and to abate their rigour where a mischief would otherwise ensue; that he alone hath power by edicts and Proclamations to order all affairs for which there is no order taken by certain and perpetual laws; that he with his Judges hath power to declare the meaning of the Law, and to give an authentic interpretation to statutes of ambiguous and doubtful sense. The King can exercise these and all other parts of the Nomothetical power which are of absolute necessity to government without the assent of the two houses, whose concurrence is only necessary in making laws which shall bind posterity, and may not be repealed without the consent of the people, as well as of the King. The whole latitude therefore of the Nomothetical power is not jointly in the three Estates, but the power only of making certain and perpetual Laws; and when such laws are made it is the King's authority that gives life unto them, they having otherwise no power to oblige the conscience then as they are his Commands. This hath been sufficiently confirmed already, yet I will here further illustrate the truth by the testimonies of 
a Lib. 3. cap. 9  Bracton and the Author of 
b Lib. 1. cap. 17.  Fleta, who applying that passage of the Civil Law, Quod Principi placet legis habet potestatem, to the King of England, say, That clause ought not to be understood of every thing that is rashly presumed to be his will, but of that which is justly determined upon good advice and deliberation by the Council of his Magistrates, Rege Authoritatem praestante, the King giving it Authority, and confirming it for a law: and from hence by an argument ab indecoro, they show that the King ought not to do unjustly, Cum ipse sit Author juris non debet inde Injuriarum nasci occasio, unde jura nascuntur, When he himself is the Author of the Law, injustice ought not to spring from the same fountain from whence the Law doth spring. The Legislative power is in the King therefore as in its spring and fountain, and in the other estates by derivation; they have right and interest in the use and exercise of some parts of the power, and may assent or descent what shall be made a Law, but the power itself is radically in him.  
Now the Legislative power is either Architectonical or preceptive: the Architectonical power is that which layeth the materials of a Law, and it consisteth in two things. First, in determining what is just, convenient, or necessary; they to whom this power is committed, have no jurisdiction granted them, but only and office and employment to deliberate and consult. Secondly, in declaring and promulgating that to be actually made a law and enacted, which upoo consultation is thought to be just, convenient, or necessary; they to whom this power is committed; have a jurisdiction granted them to define authoritatively what shall be a law. The preceptive power is that which maketh the law sacred and inviolable, and which giveth it force to oblige the conscience. It is evident by that which have been said that not the preceptive, but the exercise only of the Architectonical power is committed to the two houses, they have votum consultivum & decisivum both authority to consult what is just, convenient, or necessary; and also to decree what shall be made a law: but this authority is derived from the King. 
Pag. 39  The Treatiser in his reply to Dr. Fern seemeth to be unsatisfied with this answer & doth there dispute against it after this manner, my second argument saith he for radical mixture, is from the Legislative power being in all three: He answers, that phrase is satisfied and explained by that conncurrence and consent in the exercise of supreme power. It seems that invention of his must serve all turns is a legislative power satisfied by a bare powerlesse consent? I demand is that consent causal and authoritative? or merely consiliarie and unauthoritative? And whereas I prove that they have an enacting authority by that received and set clause in the beginning of acts; Be it enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, and the authority of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament. He tell us a vote and power of assenting is a great authority, I inquire not how great it is: I ask whether that be all; whether that clause, which as expressly as words can, asscribes an enacting authority to them, be satisfied by such a power of assenting. Here are many words heaped together, yet not so much as one that toucheth the present controversy: the question is not, whether the two Houses have authority, nor yet whether they have an enacting authority; it is evident they could not sit as Judges in the court without authority, nor enact without an enacting authority: but the question is, first, whether their enacting authority spoken of in the foresaid clause be only a power of assenting that such or such a law shall be established, or a power that Commandeth and giveth life and vigour to the laws: Secondly, whether this power be radically in themselves or derived from the King. To the first I say that it is only a power of assenting; 
7 H. 7.14. & 11. H. 7.25.  for it hath been resolved by the judges that this clause which he allegeth, Be it enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, and the authority of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, 
Lambarts Archeion f. 271.  is no more in substance and effect then that which was used anciently, The King, with the assent of the Lord and Commons, establisheth, the words assenteth & enacteth being equivalent in this case. And to the second I say that their authority is derived from the King, not radically in themselves; For although this Treatiser knows not, or will not seem to know how to put a difference between having an enacting authority, and having the Legislative authority radically in themselves, yet the Judges did, and others do: For they may enact by a delegate authority, that is, by having the use and exercise of the Legislative power committed to them so far as is necessary to that act, although it be not radically in them as their own. But now the Treatiser Speaketh not a word to either of these points, but showeth only that they have an enacting authority, which is a point not controverted. For their power of assenting and laying the materials of a law, is an enacting power, although their activity be not equal to the Kings; Subordinate Agents that are but Instruments of an other, and work by a derived power, when they concur with the principal and supreme agent have their causality in producing the effect. And therefore whereas he demandeth whether their consent be causal and authoritative, or merely consiliary and unauthoritative? I answer that it is as causal and authoritative as if the legislative power were radically in themselves, for he that worketh with an other man's tools is as much the cause of the work as if the tools he useth were his own; whether the authority by which they enact be the Kings, or radically in themselves, the effect will be the same.  
It may be further objected that these words, Be it enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, and the authority of the Lords & Commons assembled in Parliament, do imply distinct authorities, the authority of the K. and the authority of the Lords and commons; for theadition of these words, And the authority of the Lords & Commons, is improper, if laws be enacted by the King's authority alone. To this I answer; first, that there is nothing more frequent when the K. acteth jointly with his subordinate Ministers, then to ascribe a concurrent authority to those that act with him, although their authority be derived from him: for although his authority cannot be separated from him privatiuè as hath been said, yet cumulatiuè it may, that is, it may be inherent in his own Person, and yet be in others too, as the light of the Sun is inherent in its own body, and yet multiplied and diffused through the world; Now when it is separated from him after that manner, it is commonly called their authority to whom it is committed, because they are the seat and subject of it. That light which the Stairs derive from the Sun is usually called the light of the Stars, and the Stars are said by the means thereof to concur with the Sun, and to have a causality and operation upon inferior bodies; it is no impropriety to say, The light of the Sun and the light of the Stars inlightneth all the world, although the light of the Stars be derived from the Sun. But secondly, what if it be granted that the Lords and Commons have authority of their own distinct from the King's authority? To speak my own opinion freely, I think they have a distinct authority, I mean not Supreme authority, but an authority derived from the King, yet distinct from his. He that hath but a delegate power, if it be committed to him for term of years, term of life or perpetuity, he doth by such a grant acquire an estate in the said power, and an authority distinct from his that gave it him. As in an Estate of lands wherein a man hath a perpetual right in fee simple, or in fee tail, his right is distinguished from the King's right of whom he holds it, the King having the demeane of the Land, and the other the demeane of the Fee: so it is in an estate of power, and authority; if the King granteth an estate of power, authority, and jurisdiction, in fee simple, or in fee tail, for term of years, term of life, or perpetuity, their rights in the said authority are distinct; the King hath the demean of the Power, the other the demean of the use, the King hath Dominium directum the other Dominum utile. And this is the present case; the Legislative power is wholly and entirely the Kings, yet the Lords and Commons have a perpetual right in the use and exercise of some part thereof, so that the King cannot actually make a law, except they will also use the authority committed to them, it being in their power to assent or not assent, to use or not to use, the said authority. There is an authority then in the Lords and Commons distinct from the King's authority, which must necessarily be put forth in the making of laws, yet not supreme, but subordinate to the King, derived from him, and depending upon him. But this is more than can be forced out of the foresaid clause, and I think more than is intended in it.  
Object. 4 Fourthly, that Monarchy in which three estates are constituted, to the end that the power of the one should moderate and restrain from excess the power of the other, is mixed in the root and essence of it; but such is this as is confessed in the answer to the said propositions.  
Reply. The Antecedent and Consequent are both false: The erection of Courts, wherein the Judges have authority to proceed according to law, notwhitstanding the personal and arbitrary Commands of the King, hath always been esteemed a strong and effectual means to restrain and moderate the excesses of Monarchy: Yet the Judges cannot be inferred from hence to be coordinate with the King in the rights of Sovereignty, or to have a mixed power with him in the Government of the Kingdom. But the Consequent hath neither appearance nor shadow of truth; Parliaments were ordained, that the other estates might consult with the King about the weighty affairs of the Kingdom as often as he thought it needful, and agree to such laws as should be found profitable and expedient: not that they should quarrel and contest with him. It is true the two Houses do for the most part in time of Parliament gain an opportunity to have grievances redressed, because they may otherwise deny the King the assistance he desire; but they have no authority radically in themselves to redress them or to restrain and moderate his excesses by force of arms; nor were they constituted for that end: If it should be granted that Parliaments are by original constitution and agreement, and that the People have always given what laws they pleased to the Conqueror as often as the Crown hath been obtained by conquest; yet in probability they could have no such end as this Treatiser imagineth, or to abuse the people, seemeth to imagine: had they purposed the three estates, should moderate the excesses of one another in Parliaments, they would never have granted the King authority to dissolve them at his pleasure, whereby he might easily avoid and frustrate their intention. Besides Parliaments are so tempered as it is impossible to attain to that end by such a mixture; one of the estates, or any two of them, having no authority to make an act of Parliament without the third, which way can they moderate the excesses of one another by such acts further than the exorbitant estate shall be willing to be moderated? Nor doth his Majesty, as he imputeth to him, any any where confess that three estates are constituted in this Monarchy to the end that the power of one should moderate and restrain from excess the power of the other, he should therefore have cited his words, that the Reader might have judged of their sense.  
These are the objections, brought by the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, which are partly taken out of the fuller Answerer, and partly invented by himself. In answering them, to avoid needless Controversies, I have granted that a mixed form of government is possible, although I be not ignorant that a mixed government is but the invention of later times, and reputed impossible by authors of chiefest note. I have admitted also that the King, the Nobility, and Commons, are the three estates of Parliament, although I know this contrary to the Statutes, wherein the three Estates of Parliament are declared to be the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons. I have insisted the longer upon these Objections, because the Author of the foresaid Treatise is esteemed by some the chief Advocate of that side. I intent not to derogate from the Author, who I presume would have written more substantially had the case been capable of defence; yet if a man may guess at his humour by that Treatise, he seemeth to be much more inclined to assert new principles, then to show reasons how they should be maintained. That he might illude the Laws wherein the government of England is declared Monarchical, he layeth down divers positions to this effect, that where a transcendent interest, 
Part 1. cap. 4.  or primity of share, is in one man, it is sufficient to constitute a Monarchy, although the other estates have their shares also in the rights of Sovereignty, and supreme Authority; but he doth not so much as offer to prove this either by law or reason, although it be contrary to the Common received principles of other Authors, who teach that such a transcendent interest or primity of share cannot make a Monarch. For such a pre-eminence is in some persons in the most popular States, as in the Dukedoms of Venice and Genna, 
Besold. Synops. Polit. doct. lib. 1. cap. 6. num. 4.  where the Dukes have a transcendent interest, and primity of share, above the rest, and are Rectores & executores summique magistratus, having the gubernative, and executive power in their hands, and excelling all other in dignity and authority: Such preeminences therefore are reckoned amongst the Simulacra imperii Regii, 
Clapmar. Dearcan. Rerump. tit. de simulacris Imperii cap. 3. Vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy fal. 39  being but images and shadows of Kingly government where full and entire power is wanting. Again, that he might illude the Laws wherein the King is declared to be Supreme, he saith that a transcendent interest, or utmost Chiefty, is sufficient to make good that title; yet he endevoureth not to confirm this by one instance, although it be contrary to the received signification of the word when it hath reference to power and jurisdiction: for in Law when a governor or Ruler is called Supreme, the word Supreme is always opposed to subordinate and not to less: amongst Lawyers he shall often find power and jurisdiction divided into Supreme and subordinate, but never into Supreme, and less, if that which is less be also Supreme and independent. But yet if his new principles were granted to be true, he cannot by such shifts, in any plausible manner evade the Statutes, wherein the King is declared to have entire, whole, and plenary power, and to be so supreme that all authority is derived from him, and wherein it is declared that all obedience is due to him, and to him only: Will a transcendent interest make good all this? Is a Primity of Share entire, whole and plenary power? Can all authority be derived from him that hath but an utmost chief? Is all obedience due to one of the Estates, where the mixture is in the power itself, and supreme authority radically in the other? Surely if the other Estates have Power, Allegiance and Obedience is due unto it; they had as good challenge no power, as challenge no obedience.   

CHAP. IX. Divers general objections taken from the testimony of his Majesty, Bracton, and Fortescue, together with the Precedents of Edward the Second, and Richard the Second, answered.  
BEsides the former objections, they urge the testimony of his Majesty, of Bracton, and Fortescue; to which I answer in general, that the decision of this controversy depends upon Law, and not upon the bare words and authority of any. The words of Lawyers are to be regarded no further than they are approved by law; for they are but men, & may be incited by passion or private interest to speak or write what they ought not. I have therefore purposely myself omitted all proofs of that nature, and although I could produce a catalogue of Lawyers longer than a Genealogy to confirm the King's right, yet I have cited none but such as prove what they say by the laws, except only those that are cited by themselves, which I had also omitted, but that I desire to make it evident how far those Authors are from favouring their seditious opinions. And if his Majesty out of a desire to avoid the effusion of blood used such gracious expressions as were most likely to prevail with the people, and consolidate their minds, they ought not in equity to prejudice the rights of the Crown, although he had abdicated therein, some part of his authority, and granted things destructive to his own prerogative. I have given this general answer, not because his Majesty, Bracton, or Fortescue have affirmed any thing in favour of their right, but to show the insufficiency of this objection in case they had; but the truth is they have notoriously perverted the meaning of his Majesty, as also the meaning of Bracton and Fortescue: And although I cannot imagine any man so senseless as to believe his Majesty ever subscribed to their judgement; or any that have perused the works of Bracton and Fortescue so void of understanding as to think they were ever abettors of such fantasies: yet that they may not exclaim for want of an answer I will more particularly examine what they say.  
Out of his Majesty's answer to the nineteen propositions they allege this passage. There being three kinds of Government amongst men, absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and all these having their particular conveniences and inconveniences, the experience and wisdom of your Ancestors, hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these, as to give to this Kingdom (as far as humane prudence can provide) the conveniences of all three, without the inconvenienees of any one, as long as the balance hangs even between the three estates, and they run jointly on in their proper channel (begetting verdure and fertility, in the meadows on both sides, and the overflowing of either on either side, raise no deludge or inundation) the ill of absolute Monarchy is Tyranny; the ill of Aristocracy is faction and division; the ills of Democracy are tumults, violence and licentiousness. The good of Monarchy is the uniting a nation under own head, to resist invasion from abroad, and insurrection at home; The good of Aristocracy is the conjunction of Counsel in the ablest persons of a State for the public benefit; The good of Democracy is liberty, and the courage and industry which liberty begets— the Lords being trusted with a judicatory power, are an excellent screen and bank between the prince and people— by just judgements to preserve the law, since— therefore the power legally placed in both houses is more than sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of tyranny— since to the power of punishing, which is already in your hands according to law. Thus far, and in this manner, his Majesty is cited by the fuller Answerer, who that he might the better wrest his Majesty's Speeches to his own purpose, hath made many transitions from one place to another, mutilating the sense, and leaving out that which should have made his Majesty's meaning apparent. And from these words he maketh divers deductions; his first deduction is, that his Majesty granteth the Government of England to be mixed in the power itself, 
1. Deduction. Answer to Doctor Fern. Pag. 1.  this he inferreth because his Majesty acknowledgeth a mixture, and it is no true mixture he saith, which is not in the very supremacy of power itself.  
Reply. This is answered in the former chapter: I shall here only desire the reader to take notice that his Majesty's true and real intention is such as I have there expounded; for these words, The good of Monarchy is the uniting a Nation under one Head, are a perfect commentary upon the former, and do clearly manifest, that his Majesty asserted not the Head and Seat of supreme power to be a mixed subject, but granted a mixture in the administration of power alone.  
His second deduction is that the King granteth the power of interpreting, 
2. Deduction. Reply to Doctor Fern. Pag. 34.  and giving final judgement of the sense of law, to be in the two houses; this he concludeth to be his Majesty's meaning, when he said, The Lords being trusted with a judicatory power, are an excellent screen and bank between the King and People by just judgements to preserve the law.  
Reply. The Lords may have a judicatory power, & be as a bank & Screen between the King and People, without the power of interpretation and giving final judgement of the sense of Law; It is sufficient that they have a power to interpret Law judicially in such cases as are cogniscible in the court, although they have no power to interpret it authoritively, which is a prerogative belonging to the King, calling his Judges unto him. But the best of all is, that he inferreth from the words above said, both the Houses to have a power of declaring law, for whereas his Majesty in the premises speaks only of the House of Lords, by a trick of more than Presbiterian Legerdemain he hath juggled the House of Commons into his inference.  
Deduction. 3 His third deduction is that his Majesty granteth the two Houses a power of forcible resistance in case they should judge his actions tyrannical and unjust; this he collecteth out of these words since— therefore the power legally placed in both Houses is more than sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of tyranny. This he says cannot be made good unless the Houses have a power of resistance; for tyranny cannot be otherwise restrained.  
It is evident that his Majesty speaks not in this place of a forcible, but of a legal way of restraint; Id possit quisquam quod jure possit, Every man is said to have a power to do that which he can do by law, although he may be hindered in the execution of it. His Majesty grants them not an absolute power of restraining tyranny, but let that be taken in which goeth immediately before, and his words will bear no other sense but that they have a power of restraining it, so far as humane prudence can by lawful and just ways provide. Neither is forcible resistance a more certain means of restraining tyranny then other legal ways less corrasive, if the Houses had a power of resistance, they are not sure always to prevail; it is better therefore to tolerate a mischief then to use a remedy which is worse than the disease, and uncertain too. But they have by law a double power as effectual as forcible resistance, they may inflict exemplary punishment upon evil instruments, whereby others may be afraid to take upon them such employments; and they may refuse to give the King subsidies and other necessary assistance, if he refuseth to moderate his excesses. If a tyrant and his evil instruments be strong and in no necessity, were it lawful to resist, and to levy war against them, the success would be doubtful, the damage certain; and if the best happen, they should but cure the Commonwealth of an Ague by giving it the Plague: But if he be necessitated either by insurrections, or otherwise, to crave the assistance of his Subjects, they shall then have liberty to execute their power upon his evil instruments, or to make use of any other means the law hath put into their hands. Where Tyranny reigns such opportunities will in a short time assuredly be offered; the best Princes cannot always suppress rebellions by the help of their loyal Subjects, how much less can Tyrants be able to do it without them. Such Exigencies being considered, I say the power legally placed in the Houses is more than sufficient to restrain Tyranny, without a power of resistance.  
Object. 2 Secondly, they allege the testimony of Bracton. Rex habet superiorem Deum. Item Legem per quam factus est Rex. Item Curiam suam, videlicet Comites & Barones. That is, 
Lib. 2. cap. 16.  The King hath God his Superior, and the Law by which he is made King, and his Court, namely, his Earls and Barons.  
Reply. Some think that Bracton speaketh not this himself, but supposeth only that some might make such an Objection; for these words, Sed dicere poterit quis, which go immediately before, seem to agree with that interpretation, and to be appliable to that which is here cited, and to all that followeth in the same Section. But because the words may also admit of another construction, and because I desire to satisfy the Reader in every regard, I will a little more strictly inquire into the sense and meaning of them, and show the insufficiency and weakness of this Objection, if they could be proved to be his own; for it is evident that these words cannot relate to any coercive power, or civil jurisdiction the Earls and Barons have over the Person of the King, but to a directive power alone, which their Counsels ought to have over him in governing of the people. For as both 
a Aquin. 2. Quest. 96. art. 5.  Divines and 
b Cabedo part. 2. decis. 78. Num. 1. Navar. in Rub. de judiciis num. 100  Lawyers usually distinguish, one may be said to be superior to another per potestatem Coërcivam, in respect of a coercive power, or civil jurisdiction he hath over him, by virtue whereof he may command what he please within the extent of his jurisdiction, and force him to obey it, this is a Legal power and superiority, which none but Magistrates have over their Subjects: or per potestatem directivam, in respect of a directive power he hath over him, by which he ought in Conscience to be ruled, although he cannot by legal process be forced to obedience; this is a moral power or superiority, which Subjects may have over their Magistrates: for in this regard Masters are superior to their Scholars, Counselors superior to those that are guided by their Counsels, and the Laws superior to the Lawmakers'. Bractons' scope in this place (if these words be spoken positively by himself, and not as a supposed Objection) can be nothing else but to assert the Earls and Barons in his Court to be Superior to the King per potestatem directivam, in respect of the directive power their Counsels ought to have over him, which although they be no legal commands, and cannot therefore civilly oblige him to obedience, yet they do morally oblige his Conscience, when he is convinced that they are just and necessary for the government of the Kingdom. These words cannot in any other sense be reconciled to that which he saith in other places, who when he speaketh of this Subject, doth every where resolve the contrary; if the Earls and Barons should be interpreted here to be his Superiors in respect of a coercive power, & civil jurisdiction, whereof the places above mentioned are sufficient instances; to which I could yet add more, if I thought it needful. But it would be superfluous to illustrate and interpret this place by other, when the words considered by themselves imply no more: for he maketh no distinction of Superiority, but calleth God, and the Law, and the Earls and Barons in his court, superior to the King after the same manner. Now it is evident that God in this place is said to be superior to him, in respect of the directive power his Law hath over him; for although God hath the jure a coercive power and jurisdiction over Kings, and shall de facto after their death dispose of them as their Judge, and in this life also doth often restrain them by his secret judgements, yet Bracton speaketh not in this place (as will appear immediately when the whole and entire period shall be cited) of either of those kinds of jurisdiction, but of giving present and open judgement upon the King's fact and upon his charter, which is a jurisdiction that he exerciseth not, but giveth his Law only for direction, by which all Princes ought to be regulated, both in granting their charters, and in the whole administration of their power. It is also clear that the Laws of the Land are said to be superior to him, in respect of the directive power of them, having otherwise no force or influence upon him: Bracton therefore meaneth that the Earls and Barons in his Court are superior to him in the same respect, and not in respect of any jurisdiction they ought to exercise over him. But if we look upon the coherence of these words, and their dependence upon the precedent and subsequent matter. Bracton's intention will more fully and easily be discerned; I will therefore set down as much as is necessary to the present purpose, and explain every clause of it, and show the relation and connexion one thing hath with another, and let the Reader judge whether this testimony of Bracton doth not strengthen the King's cause, and might not rather be alleged for him then against him. Nec factum Regis nec chartam potest quis judicare, ita quod factum Domini Regis irritetur. Sed dicere poterit quis quod Rex Justitiam fecerit, & been, & si hoc, eadem ratione quod male, & ita imponere ei quod injuriam emendet, ne incidat Rex & justiciari in judicium viventis Dei propter injuriam, Rex autem habet superiorem Deum. Item legem per quam factus est Rex, item curiam suam, videlicet Comites & Barones, quia Comites dicuntur quasi socii Regis, & qui habet socium habet Magistrum, & ideo si Rex fuerit sine frano. i e. sine lege, debent ei fraenum ponere. That is: No man may judge of the King's fact or his charter, so as to make void the fact of our Lord the King. But some may say the King hath done justice and well, and if so, by the same reason that he hath done ill, and impose upon him to amend the injury, lest he and his justices fall into the judgement of the living God for the injury. But the King hath God his superior, and the Law, by which he is made King, and his Court, namely his Earls and Barons, for they are called Comites, as being Companions to the King, and he that hath a Companion hath a Master, and therefore if the King be without a bridle, that is, without Law, they ought to put a bridle upon him. If this passage be well considered, it will be clear that Bracton in the words alleged, calleth not the Earls and Barons superior to the King in a civil and legal, but in a moral regard alone.  
First he saith: No man may judge of the King's fact, or his charter, so as to make void the fact of our Lord the King. How can the words alleged agree with this, if their exposition be admitted? How can the Earls and Barons in his Court be superior to the King, in respect of a coercive power or civil Jurisdiction; when they cannot judge his charter or his fact? No man can have a coercive power or civil jurisdiction over another, but he hath authority to judge him according to Law, and to force the execution of his Sentence.  
Secondly he saith: But some may say the King hath done Justice, and well, and if so, by the same reason that he hath done ill, and impose upon him to amend the injury, lest he and his Justices fall into the hands of the living God for the injury. But the King hath God his superior, and the Law by which he is made King, and his Court, namely his Earls and Barons. Having declared what power the Earls and Barons have not over the King, here he declareth what power they have. In case justice be not duly administered there are some, he saith, which may advertise him of it, and impose upon him to reform what is amiss; and those he declares to be the Earls and Barons in his Court, who, as well as God, and the Laws of the Realm are superior to him; that is, are superior to him in the same manner, namely, by a directive power. For he saith, not that they should by constraint, but by admonition impose upon him to amend the injury, using this reason, lest He and his Justices fall into the hands of the living God, according to that which he saith in the place before quoted, 
Cap. 4. p. 37.  Satis sufficit ei pro poena quod Dominum expectet ultorem.  
Thirdly, he saith: For they are called Comites, as being Companions of the King, and he that hath a Companion, hath a Master. Here he giveth a reason why the Earls and Barons may be called his Superiors, namely, because they are his Companions, and he that hath a Companion, hath a Master. This reason holds good if he indevoureth by it, to prove them his Superiors in respect of a directive power, and moral superiority, but is ridiculous if he should endeavour by it, to prove them his Superiors in respect of a coercive power or civil jurisdiction; for every one cannot be Superior to his Companions, in respect of jurisdiction, and be a liege Lord, or Legal Master, over all the rest: But every one may instruct Counsel and direct all his Companions, and be a moral Master over them; in that respect all Companions may be mutually one another's Masters.  
Fourthly, he saith: And therefore if the King be without a bridle, that is, without Law, they ought to put a bridle upon him. This inference which he maketh out of the former words doth also confirm that Bracton calleth them not his Superiors, in respect of a coercive power, or civil jurisdiction; for because they are his Companions, and so in a moral regard his Masters, they ought therefore, he saith, if he be without a bridle, to put a bridle of the Law upon him; This bridle than must be a bridle of Law, and not a bridle of their own ordinances; not a bridle of force, but a bridle of admonitions, counsel and advice; they have no other means but such by Law to bridle the King, if at any time he breaks out into violent and illegal courses. This is the Scope of Bracton as is evident by the whole coherence and connexion of the matter; who was so far from allowing such fond conceits and imaginations as they seem to suppose, that the contrary runs in one constant vein through all his book: if they regarded the authority of Bracton, they would soon lay down their arms, and sue to his Majesty for a Pardon.  
Thirdly, they allege the testimony of Fortescue, who speaking of the King of England, 
Fol. 25.  saith: Prinipatu ne dum Regali sed & Politico suo populo dominatur. That is, He governeth his People not only by Kingly, but also by Politic power.  
Reply. Fortescue implieth in these words that the King ought not to make his Will, but the Laws the rule of his power; not that others are coordinate with him in the rights of Soveraingty. 
Arist. Pol. l. 1. c. 1. & 3.  For power is either Despotical, or Politic. Despotical power is Kingly power not moderated nor restrained by humane Laws and constitutions; Politic power is Kingly power limited and restrained by humane and politic Laws. Now Fortescue saith: that the King's power is not merely Despotical and Regal, but Politic and tempered by law; and his intention is to show the difference between the Common Laws of England, and the Civil Laws: The Emperor after the power was translated to him from the Commonwealth by that Law which in the Digest is called lex regia, until the custom of making Laws by the assent of the people took place again, might command what he pleased. Quod Principi placet legis habet potestatem, is a part of that Law: but the King of England, he saith, cannot altogether govern his people by such a power, but is obliged to rule them according to the tenor of the Politic Laws and Constitutions of the Kingdom; so that Politic power is here opposed to Kingly power taken in its greatest latitude, and not to Kingly power moderated and restrained by Law. But how doth this concern the case in hand?  
Object. 4 Fourthly they allege Precedents: Parliaments, they say, have exercised a supreme power over the Crown of England itself, to transfer it from the right Heir, and settled it upon whom themselves thought meet to elect for their King. They cite two Kings which were deposed, Edward the second, and Richard the second, and then conclude, that those Parliaments which have exercised such jurisdiction over them must certainly be above them, and the highest Sovereign power.  
Reply. The deposition of those Kings hath been resolved Treason by all the Judges of England; and yet if it had been legal, 
Coke institut part. 2. tit. treason.  the Precedents are impertinent, for those acts were confirmed by the Kings themselves, and could never have been esteemed Acts of Parliament without their own assent.   

CHAP. X. Objections made against the KING'S supremacy in Particular, by Mr. Bridge, the reverend Divines, and Others, answered.  
THey have yet other Objections whereby they endeavour to prove that the Particular Rights of Sovereignty are divided from the King and placed in the two Houses. And first touching the Militia. Mr. Bridge and the reverend Divines, have found a device how the Parliament. may make use of that, and levy war against the King by his own authority. They say, as Judges they may send out Messengers or Sergeants at Arms for his evil Counselors, and in case they refuse to appear before them, fetch them in as Delinquents by force of arms; this is the sum of their Objection, but I will set it down in their own terms. Suppose, saith Mr. Bridge, a man be complained of to the Parliament for some notorious crime, it is granted by all, that the Parliament hath a power to send a Sergeant at Arms for him, 
Mr. Bridges Objection.  and if he refuse to come, that Sergeant at arms hath a power to call more, and if the Delinquent shall raise twenty, or thirty, or an hundred men to rescue him, than the Parliament hath power to send down more messengers by force to bring up the Delinquent, and if they may raise an hundred, why may they not upon the like occasion raise a thousand and so ten thousand? And again in his answer to Doctor Ferns reply. If the Parliament may send one Sergeant at Arms, than twenty, than an hundred, than a thousand.  
Reply. This I confess is a subtle invention, for there can be by Law but thirty Sergeants at Arms at the same time within the Realm; now if Mr. Bridge can show a way how out of thirty Sergeants at Arms an Army of a thousand, 
13. R. 2. Cap. 6.  or ten thousand may be raised, he shall be worthy to have a Statue erected to his Memory.  
The reverend Divines have in substance the same objection, 
The reverend Divines objection.  saving only they are not so punctual for point of Law as to have their Army consist of Sergeants at Arms; and they allege a case in Law to justify that way of proceeding. Supposing, say they, the power of calling and dissolving Parliaments wholly in the King ordinarily; yet there may be such power in them so long at they do sit, to command arms to be raised for the suppressing of any Delinquents, maintaining themselves with Arms even under the colour of the King's authority, which I thus make good: If there be any such kind of power in the very judges in their Courts at Westminster, for the whole Kingdom, and in their several circuits for the shires they sit in, although themselves are made Judges at the Kings will merely, and put out ordinarily at his pleasure, and they can neither keep assizes at any time, nor keep any term any any where, but when and so long as the King pleases to give commission: If (I say) there be such a power in the Judges and even in one of them, then much more in the whole Parliament, which is unquestionably and undoubtedly the highest judicature in the Kingdom, and hath most power during their sit now that such a kind of power is in the Judges, I appeal to experience in the case following. A private man hath a suit with the King about land or house and the like, the King hath possession and some officer or tenant of his holds it for the King, the Judges having heard the cause give sentence for the subject, adjudge him to have the possession delivered him by the King's Tenant or Officer; he refuses and Arms himself to keep possession still, upon this, after due summons and process of Law, a writ of rebellion shall go out against the Officer of the Kings, even though he should pretend to keep possession still, by a command and warrant from the King, and the Sheriff shall be commanded to raise arms oven the whole posse Comitatus if need be to expel this Officer of the Kings, and bring him to condign punishment for resisting the King's authority in his Laws. Here now is raising of Arms by the King's legal authority, against the King's Title, and the King's Officer, notwithstanding any pretended authority from the King's personal command and that Officer hath a Writ of Rebellion sent against him, and shall be punished by Law, for offering to resist the Law upon any pretence (ask the Lawyers whether in sense this be not the Law, and ordinarily practised, save that the King do not command the contrary, but whether that would hinder Law or not?) the Parliament may then in case of necessity raise arms against the King's personal command for the general safety, and keeping possession (which is more necessary than the hope of regaining) of the Houses, Lands, Goods, Liberties, Lives, Religion and all, and this by the King's legal Authority, and resisters of this are the Rebels in the Law's account, and not the instruments so employed legally, though with Arms by the Parliament.  
Reply. For matter of fact, it was themselves that withheld Delinquents from a legal trial, the King detained none; but when divers Members of the Parliament were assaulted in the streets, driven from the house, defamed by Libels, and Justice not permitted to take place, it was the office of the King to protect them in their Rights and Liberties, and to force the due execution of the Laws: and if he refused to yield up those to their injustice which assisted him, this was not to keep Delinquents from their trial, but to protect his loyal subjects according to law; this for matter of fact. But for matter of Right, suppose the King had taken up arms unjustly, the Law doth not permit his Courts to oppose him, or to call any in question that are assistant to him: when the King taketh up arms they which attend upon his Person, or are employed in other places about the same service, may not be molested or troubled by process of Law, either in Parliament, or in any of his Courts, as is declared and enacted by a Statute made the eleventh year of Henry the seventh.  
The King our Sovereign Lord calling to his remembrance the duty of Allegiance of his Subjects of this his Realm, 
11. H. 7. cap. 1.  and that they by reason of the same are bound to serve their Prince and Sovereign Lord, for the time being, in his wars, for the defence of Him and the Land, against every rebellion, power, and might reared against him, and with him to enter and abide in service, in battle, if case so require, and that for the same service what fortune ever fall by chance in the same battle against the mind and will of the Prince (as in this Land, sometime passed hath been seen) that it is not reasonable but against all Laws, Reason and good Conscience, that the said Subjects going with their Sovereign Lord in Wars, attending upon him in his Person, or being in other places by his Commandment within this Land or without, any thing should lose or forfeit for doing their true duty and service of Allegiance. It be therefore ordained, enacted, and established by the King our Sovereign Lord, by the advice and assent of the Lords Spiritual, and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and authority of the same, that from henceforth no manner of person or persons whatsoever he or they be, that attend upon the King and Sovereign Lord of this Land for the time being, in his person, and do him true and faithful service of Allegiance in the same, or be in other places by his Commandment in his Wars, within this Land or without: that for the said deed and true duty of Allegiance he or they be in no wise convict or attaint of high treason, ne of other offences for that cause, by Act of Parliament, or otherwise by any process of Law, whereby he or any of them shall lose or forfeit Life, Lands, Tenements, Rents, Possessions, Hereditaments, Goods, Chattels, or any other things: but to be for that deed and service utterly discharged of any vexation, trouble, or loss.  
As for the case that is put by them, it is very impertinent, and the whole Objection made both by Mr. Bridge and themselves? full of erroneous passages and mistakes, first they assume the two Houses to be the whole Parliament; Secondly, they assume them to be a Court of judicature, Thirdly, they assume the Judges to have a power of suppressing any Delinquents, and maintaining themselves by arms: The two former assumptions are absolutely false, and the latter true only in some cases, so far as they have order of Law; and no man deny such a power to be in either of the Houses, they may force Delinquents to appear before them in such cases, and in such a manner as the Law hath provided; for what is so done, is done by the King's Command in Law, which is to be obeyed before his personal commands. But they must proceed no further, nor after any other manner then the King commands in Law: And first, although the King's bare Command be not sufficient to warrant his Tenant or others to resist the sentence of his Courts, yet if the King in Person taketh up arms and granteth Commissions to any to assist him, his Courts must then forbear all process of Law, and desist from all further opposition, as is provided in the foresaid statute. And secondly, although the King doth not authorise the fact in person, or by Commission, yet neither the two Houses in Parliament, nor the Judges can make what Ordinances they please to raise arms, or employ their own instruments to bring in Delinquents, but must proceed according to order of Law, and commit the whole carriage of the business to such of the King's Officers as are appointed for that purpose, which are chief the high Sheriffs of Counties, who are also confined by Law, and may not exceed their Commission. For both in the case put by the reverend Divines, and also in all cases whatsoever, if Delinquents grow so strong that they be able to resist the posse Commitatus, and cannot be suppressed but by a War, and by the Militia of the Kingdom, the Sheriff ought then to certify the Court thereof, and the prosecution of the matter must be left to the King, to whom only it is reserved to preserve the peace of the Kingdom in such cases.  
Object. 2 Secondly against the King's Negative voice they urge the Oath taken at his Coronation, whereby, they say, he is bound to give his assent to all Bills offered him by the Lords and Commons. They have found out a form in Latin, which they say, was anciently used, and aught now to be taken, the Form is this: Concedis just as leges & consuetudines esse tenendas, & promittis pro te eas esse protegendas, & ad hónorem Dei corroborandas, quas vulgus elegerit, secundum vires tuas.  
Resp. Concedo & Promitto.  
The word, Elegerit, they say, may and aught to be taken in the future tense, and doth oblige the King to agree to all acts that shall be thought convenient by the Houses. And to confirm this they allege a Herald's Book, wherein, they say, the Oath is found so Englished. They allege also an ancient French Form, wherein, they say, it is so taken. The Form is this: Sire grants vous a tener & garder les leis & customs naturelles, les quels la communaute de vostre Royaume aur' eslue, & les defenderer, & efforceeer a l' honeur de Dieu a vostre poiare.  
Resp. je le grante & promitte.  
Reply. In all the authentical Records of the Exchequer, the word Elegerit is Englished in the Preterperfect tense, and not in the future tense, proposing no more unto the King, but that he would uphold and maintain the Laws and Customs only which are actually then in use when he taketh the said Oath, not such as shall be offered him by the Houses. The words in the oath taken by his Majesty following the usual precedents were these.  
BISHOP. Sir, will you grant to hold and keep the Laws and rightful Customs which the Commonalty of this your Kingdom have, and will you uphold them to the honour of God so much as in you lieth?  
KING. I grant and promise so to do.  
The ancient Oath which is upon record, used in the time of Henry the eight, in whose reign, they say, the Herald, whose Book they speak of, lived, was this:  
That he shall keep and maintain the Liberties of the Holy Church, 
Book of Oath Fol. 1.  of old time granted by the righteous Kings of England: and that he shall keep all the Lands honours and dignities, righteous and free of the Crown of England in all manner holy, without any manner of minishments; and the rights of the Crown hurt, decay, or loss, to his power shall call again into the ancient estate; and that he shall keep the peace of the holy Church, and of the Clergy, and of the people with good accord; and that he shall do in his judgement equity and right justice with discretion and mercy: and that he shall grant to hold the Laws and Customs of the Realm, and to his power keep them, and affirm them, which the flock and people have chosen; and the evil Laws and Customs wholly to put out, and steadfast and stable peace to the people of his Realm keep, and cause to be kept to his power.  
As for the French Form I cannot but wonder they should allege it; for it doth manifestly contradict that which they say and endeavour to prove by it, word for word it is thus to be rendered in English: Sir, do you grant to hold and keep the rightful Laws and Customs which the Commonalty of your Reaelm shall have chosen, and to defend them and give them force to your power? Answ. I grant and promise it. Who is there that understands the French Tongue, which sees not that these words aur' eslue, shall have chosen which are put in the future tense can have reference to no other Laws and Customs, but those only which the Commonalty shall have chosen when the King taketh the Oath; for the Form should have run thus: quells la Communaute de vostre Royaume eslirà, that is, which the Commonalty of your Realm shall choose, if Laws which were afterwards to be made had been intended in the Oath.  
But let it be granted that Elegerit ought to be taken is the future tense, yet leges & consuetudines cannot relate to the Laws which shall be presented to the King by the two Houses in Parliament, for the word vulgus cannot be applied to the Lords.  
Yet let that also be given them, the Oath binds him to protect and corroborate only just Laws not all which they shall say are just; for it is evident whether Elegerit be taken in the preter perfect tense, or in the future tense, that by justas leges & consuetudines, it is implied, that he is not bound to protect and corroborate all Laws and Customs, but only those which are just; whereof he himself assisted by his Justices and Council at Law, who ought to inform him were he wanteth information, is to be the Judge.  
To conclude, let the word Elegerit and all the other words signify what they please, it is not much important to their cause, for the said Latin Form was never used to be taken. In the time of Henry the third, the King's Oath contained only these three things: 
Bracton l. 3. Cap. 9  1. Se esse praecepturum & pro viribus opem impensurum, ut Ecclesiae Dei & omni populo Christiano vera pax omni suo tempore observetur. 2. Ut rapacitates & omnes iniquitates omnibus gradibus interdicat. 3.  in omnibus judiciis aequitatem praecipiat & misericordiam: In later times the English Form above mentioned, without any alteration importing their sense, hath been used to be taken many ages together. Now if they could show (which I believe they cannot) that divers Kings have taken the Latin Form they speak of, yet that is not sufficient to prove a Custom, seeing the practice was formerly, and is at the present otherwise.  
Object. 3 Thirdly, some infer that the King hath not a power of dissenting from the usual answer which he giveth when he refuseth to pass a Bill. Le Roy s'adviserâ, wherein they say he doth not peremptorily deny his assent, but only craveth time to deliberate upon it.  
Reply. To what purpose should he crave time to deliberate about that which cannot be avoided, there is no consultation to be used de necessariis: Yet he may answer otherwise if he please, 
a Judge Jenkins Fol. 32.  Roy ne veult or 
b holinsh. vol. 1. Fol. 108.  il ne playst, are usual forms as well as that.  
Object. 4 Fourthly, they allege Precedents, The Militia and the chief Officers of the Kingdom, they say, have been disposed of in Parliament.  
Reply. If I should give a particular Answer to all their Precedents, I should weary the Reader with such impertinencies; sometimes they allege a seditious speech of some of the Members for an Act of Parliament; sometimes they say such or such a thing was done by Act of Parliament, and and cite an Author in the margin, whereas no such thing is to be found in the said Author; Sometimes they urge a Precedent wherein the Houses denied to give the King such subsidies and assistance, as he required to his wars, because the said wars were undertaken without their assent, and conclude from thence that the power of making war and treating with foreign states belong to the two Houses, when the reason of their denial was the miscarriages of the war, and the mis-imployment of former subsidies, not that they challenged the power of making war or treating with foreign states to pertain unto them. They thought it would have been more convenient for the better carrying on of the war at that time, if the King had undertaken and managed it, by their advice and assent, but claimed no right in the said power. But supposing all that they say true, and all their Precedents pertinent, I shall make these two general Answers; first, I say, that if the King, as in conscience he was bound, did at the request of the Houses discharge divers corrupt Officers, and substitute others into their places, or if upon just reasons and motives in the vacancy of an office he disposed of it by the assent and approbation of the two Houses, or ordered his war by their advice and direction, or if the two Houses had challenged such a power as is pretended, this doth not argue them to have a right in the Election of the said Officers, or that the carriage and conduct of the war depended upon their assent: it might be in the King, a free and voluntary Act of grace not an obligation of law: or he might do it out of politic respects to have their concurrence in some other matter; for although He cannot be forced by law to grant all their desires, yet in wisdom, policy, and conscience He ought to yield unto them when their desires are just, legal, and prudential; it hath ever been damageable to the King and for the most part to the Kingdom also, when differences between himself and his two Houses have not been fairly appeased.  
Secondly, I say that if they were able to allege an act of Parliament wherein such a Right were placed in them, such acts by the common Law of the Land were void, for the Rights of the Crown are settled upon it by the fundamental Laws, as hath been showed, and cannot be separated by Act of Parliament. These are all the Objections which could without violence be referred to this place; The rest which depend not upon Law shall be answered in the other Questions, if any thing be omitted that seemeth to justify their cause, let any man undertake to answer me, and give me notice of it, and I doubt not but I shall be able, through the assistance of God, to make a full and satisfactory reply unto him. And this I shall desire of my Adversary, that when he maketh use of any authority he would cite the words at large, as I myself have done in all material points, and not make references only in the margin, that the Reader may judge of the scope and intention thereof, and be able to discern which of us dealeth faithfully, and which of us engaged by faction strive to elude the Laws, and wrest them from their genuine and native sense.  
And thus by the Grace and Mercy of God, I have in part discharged my Conscience, being bound by all the bonds both of divine and humane laws to oppose and withstand, as far as I am able, the false doctrine, and principles, which Wolves in Sheep's Clothing endeavour daily to infuse into men's minds. I shall easily avoid, I presume, the usual calumny incident to those which writ upon this Subject, as namely, that under the pretext of promoting the Apostles doctrine of obedience, they intent by flattering Princes, to promote their own private interest. I would to God the condition of his Majesty and the Kingdom were such as they might have some colur to lay that imputation upon me. But I am not ignorant that I might soon have advanced my own interest by adoring the pretended Parliament, who dispose of all men's estates and fortunes at their pleasure, pretending as much right to all his Majesty's Kingdoms, and to all the power and glory thereof, as the Devil did to all the Kingdoms of the world. For that, 
Luk. 4.6.  say the Members, is delivered unto us, and to whomsoever we will, we give it, And I know they use to distribute their favours liberally to those that will fall down and worship them. But how poor soever my condition is, I have no inclination to buy my interest at so dear a rate; I had rather perish in the performance of my duty then be confederate to their Sacrilege, and other Impieties, or not render my country that service which I own it, for whose liberty I would willingly Sacrifice not only my own interest but my Life. I should be no good Englishman if I did not desire a better subject to discourse upon then the miseries of the Kingdom, and if by being silent and turning a way mine eyes, I could help to quench the Flame that audacious and factious Spirits have kindled in it, I should have abstained from writing at this time: But the Danger and miserable condition thereof calls for action to all those, which had not rather see all things managed according to the appetit of those Incendianies' and Firebrands of the Commonwealth, than hazard themselves and their own interest for the Rights and Liberties of the Kingdom. I could wish that all whom it concerns would seriously consider, that the Fat and Riches of the the Land was the Patrimony and Inheritance of their Ancestors, and may be of their Posterity, if their own fears and negligence gives it not their enemies. I could wish also that the pretended Parliamentarians would seriously consider their own condition, whom I esteem of all men most miserable: To speak my desires, I wish unfeignedly the Salvation of them all; but to speak my thoughts, I conceive more hopes of the honest Heathen, then of any man that shall die a Rebel, or not make Restitution of all that he hath gained by oppression and injustice.  
Soli DEO Gloria.  
FINIS.