A VIEW OF A PRINTED BOOK entitled OBSERVATIONS UPON HIS majesty's LATE Answers and Expresses.  
OXFORD, Printed by Leonard Lichfield, Printer to the University. 1642.   

The Printer to the Reader.  
YOu will wonder, it may be, that this comes forth no sooner, and yet comes forth now, so long after the publishing of those Observations. That it comes forth no sooner, is not that it was no sooner ready, but having passed the author's hand long since, it waited till now the conveniency of a press. That it comes forth now (wanting not a precedent) is to free and undeceive 
Decl: of the Lo: & Com: of the 2 of Novemb.  such who are either entangled, or misled by his dangerous Doctrines; and to vindicate the King's just Rights and privileges: All which you will find so clearly done in the ensuing Treatise, that I doubt not but it will satisfy every impartial Reader.   

A VIEW OF A PRINTED BOOK entitled OBSERVATIONS UPON HIS majesty's LATE Answers and Expresses.  
I Have read of the Citizens of Abdera, That one hearing a strange Tragedy 
Luci●●.  full of seditious designs, they were all strucken into such a fit of frenzy, That for many days after, they did nothing but act the same Tragedy, with furious gestures in their streets; I would it were not too late to wish that licentious Pulpits and seditious Pamphlets might not work a like effect upon our London Citizens.  
Among the many other libels I have not observed any that hath so much intoxicated the vulgar, or entangled the more understanding, as these Observations, wherein Treachery is more cunningly mixed with some show of reason: Those other Spiders spun their Web for ensnaring only weak and silly flies; But Prentices and Porters are below our Observator: A King and His Answers shall be His Subject, and His Discourse shall soar alost u●to the head and origin both of regal and parliamentary Power, wherein as in a labyrinth of implicatory and inextricable errors, some Reader may unhappily lose himself. I shall not follow him in his maze of incertainties; I hope some able pen will undertake to give him a sharp and just Answer; mean while to those Animad versions formerly made, I shall add some few Observations.  
And first, I would have you observe the boldness of his undertaking; A Privad●, interposing himself betwixt a King and His Parliament, being in earnest debate of the highest Rights that ever have come in question twixt King and Parliament: It hath been the modesty and wisdom of former times, with a veil of Reverence, to reserve from vulgar insolence the Rights of Supreme Majesty. And although at this time, by unhappy occasions, they are fallen into question betwixt a King and His Parliament, yet should not any private man presume to meddle. What? Are not the Parties a King and His Parliament, exempt from our Observators Jurisdiction? No? nor is the Matter above his Cognizance? No surely, both are subject to his tribunal; and therefore he observes, and boldly censures His majesty's late Answers and Expresses.  
His Pamphlet treating matter of so high concernment. I was somewhat scrupled whether I might lawfully deal with it: But I considered, and be pleased likewise to consider, That I make not the Messages and Answers, either of the King, or Houses, subject to my censure or Observation, I only encounter with the Observator: Nor do I deal with the Matter itself otherwise then I find it in his Observations, examining his Principles, and proposing some Arguments, as against him only; upon all which, I presume not to make any determinate Conclusion.  
But now although his undertaking were bold, yet perhaps his expressions are so full of humility, and dutiful regard towards his King and sovereign, as will make amends; for which purpose, be pleased to observe these Particulars [Pag. 37.] As for those absurd, unreasonable, incredible suppositions, etc, He speaks of the King's suppositions. [Pag. 39] He first sets down the King's Reasons against Parliamentary Election of the great Officers: 1. That it would be prejudicial to the people; 2. Dishonourable to Himself: upon which the Observator thus replies; Man is by nature of restless ambition; Antoninus Pius was greatly renowned for communicating weighty Affairs, and following public advice: What will Nero more d●spise, then to condescend as Antoninus did; yet it were more necessary that Nero were limited, than Antoninus. Pag. 7. He tells us the King may not think to justify His Acts by a precedent of Queen Eliz. For the gracious Acts of soft Princes may more easily invade the Subjects Liberty, than the furious proceedings of such as Caligula was. Pag. 10. 'Tis a wonderful thing that the King's Papers (so he is pleased everywhere to term His majesty's Answers) being fraughted scarce with any thing else but such Doctrines of Division, tending all to the subversion of our ancient fundamental Constitutions, should find such applause in the world. See Pag. 3. how he checks at the King for using the word (Grace.) Pag. 31. he charges the King to have left the Parliament out of good opinion to Papists and Incendiaries; and that His solemn oaths of cordial love to them, hath wanted integrity and faith. See Pag. 38. how he scornfully taunts the King: If he spare not the King, do you think he will spare the Court? Pag. 42. He regards not those fond things (Courtiers) which cannot see in human nature what is depraved in it, and what not; But what if he be bold with the secondary derived Majesty of the King, yet he will be more respectful of that he calls the underived Majesty of the people. Pag. 11. We have ever found enmity and antipathy betwixt the Court and country, but never any till now, betwixt the Representatives, and the Body of the Kingdom represented; and were we not now those dregs of human Race, &c. What? the Kingdom represented to whom you say so great a Majesty is due, in whom Majesty is underived, will you say they are the dregs of human Race? Will you charge them with deserting their Representatives, than which, you say (Pag. 16.) there is nothing, next to renouncing God, more perfidious. I fear our Observator is some one of the malignant party, in saying, There is now enmity and antipathy betwixt the Representatives, and the Body of the Kingdom represented; he would then have us believe they are only Apprentices, and some of the courser sort, who unjustly assuming the name of whole Counties, being hired with public moneys, brought up those Petitions, extolling and approving their Proceedings, when as the Body of the Kingdom represented, had (as he saith) forsaken their Representatives.  
Who sees not the Observator's modesty? I will give you but a taste of his sincerity in citing the King's words. (Pag. 7.) he citys these in a small Character, as if they were the King's formal words: When Parliaments are assembled, they have no Commission to counsel, but in such points as the King pleases to propose: And if they make any transition into other matters, they are laable to imprisonment, at the King's pleasure; witness Wentworth's Case. The King only citys the Writ (the Form whereof is ancient) whereby they are summoned to counsel the King de quibusdam arduis, not in all things, but in some things, saith the King; Is this to say, only in such points as the King shall please to propose? Did not His Majesty in express words at the beginning of this Parliament, leave them to their own method? Again, Doth the King say, If they make any transition, they are liable to imprisonment at His pleasure? Not His pleasure, but the Law is the Rule he ties Himself unto; these than are but false Calumnies. Pag. 8. 9 46. he charges the King with this Position, The Lords and Commons in Parliament, are merely to council the King, As if without their consent the King might make a Law. That they are limited by the Writ, ad consilium only, That if we make the Lords and Commons to be more than Counsellors, we make them commanders and controllers, and this is not suitable to royalty. From hence the Observator takes occasion to argue very sadly, That the Lords and Commons are summoned not only ad c●nsilium, but ad consensum also, in the making and altering Laws; And in this (though in nothing else) he brings authority to back his reasons withal, citing the close Roll, 7. Ed. 1. Quodomnes tangit ab omnibus approb●ri d●bet▪ or trat●ari. He did well to corrupt the Record, by putting approbari d●bet, for tractari: otherwise it would not have served his turn.  
But surely the Point needed not proof, for never did the King, nor anybody else deny it; the King nowhere says, They are called ad consilium only, merely, or that to allow them mere then to counsel, were to make them Commanders: He saith they are called to counsel (that's true) not to command, (that's true) but he doth not deny them power of consenting, which the Observator contradicting himself, doth afterwards acknowledge (Pag. 16.) It is l●s● unq●●s●imed (saith he) That the legislative power is partly in the King, partly in the kingdom; and that the King in ordinary cases cannot make a Law or Ordia●n●●, without the Parliament. Is it left unquestioned? why then would you abuse the people as if the King had claimed a legislative power to himself, whereto the consent of the Lords and Commons were not requisite, (Pag. 7.) The King (saith he) deni●s the Lords and Commons, if h● withdraw himsel●▪ to have any power of any Court. (Pag. 10.) He citys these, as the King's precise words, 'Tis improbable and impossible, that His Cabinet-Councellors, or His Bishops, or soldiers, who must have so great a share in the misery, should take such pains in the procuring thereof. (Pag. 25.) He tells you, That the King (saith he) cannot without renouncing His own conscience and reason, preforce the Parliaments counsel before the Courts; All which, and many more, are falsely imposed upon the King, to alienate and corrupt the affections of His majesty's Subjects. (Pag. 25.) He saith, The King charges the Parliament with these Doctrines, as so offensive: 1. That the Parliament hath an absolute indisputabl● power of d●●laring Law. 2. That Parliaments are bound to no precedents. And then the Observator justifies these Doctrines, as well as he may, for they are most true; And had the King denied them, as the Observator would have it thought, he had indeed destroyed the power of Parliaments. But the Doctrines the King chargeth them with, are, That the then major part of the two Houses, had indisputable power of declaring jaw, and were not bound to precedents: Had the Observator taken the Charge aright, he would not have answered, Statutes are not binding to them, why then should precedents? For I hope the now major part of the Houses are bound by Statutes and cannot repeal them, though the Parliament may. What though his Pamphlet be stuffed with such corruptions? yet let me speak one word for him, He is no more faulty in this kind than others.  
You see his i●genuity; I shall now consider the solidity of his Reasons, and the goodly Consequences he draws from them. Omitting then those loose extravagant Passages, which have no connexion with the Body of his Discourse; the sum of that part which seemeth rational, is as followeth; Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale: The efficient cause is ever superior unto, and more excellent than that which it causeth: But the people in whom Power is original, and majesty underived, are the efficient cause conveying regal Power and majesty unto Princes, not God, who is no more the author of regal, then aristocratical Power: The same people being the efficient cause, are also the final cause, for whose good and preservation only that Power is conveyed; and their conveyance is fiduciary, upon trust, and under such Conditions as they please. The people being the efficient cause of Kingly Power, he hence inf●rres, They are above the King, Rex etsi sing●lis major, universis minor est. And from thence (to bring it on to his purpose) it must needs follow (as he thinks) the people being above the King, The Houses (being by virtue of representation the same people) must likewise be above the King; The Houses then being by virtue of representation the efficient cause, conveying regal Power upon Trust, and to no other end, but to the good and preservation of the people, may, when they please to say, That it is not disposed of by the King to that end, and according to that Trust, reassume that Power, and make themselves the disposers thereof; from all which Grounds he infers their power of making Ordinances, obliging the People in general, The Ordinance of the Militia to be legal, and consequently the Commissions of Array illegal, The taking and retaining Hull to be justifiable, The taking the Magazine, and whatsoever else hath been taken from the King. That the King hath in nothing appertaining to His Crown, an unconditionable Property, That whatsoever Acts he hath passed, whatsoever he hath done, or can do for His subjects, is mere Duty, That He ought to acknowledge, that he can in nothing merit of the whole State; That he ought to assent to all Bills that they approve, and adjudge fit to pass; That His great Officers be such as they shall allow of; That without him, they may authoritivè, declare the Law, and consequently, make and repeal Laws and Statutes at their pleasure; That when they adjudge the Power entrusted with Him for the kingdom's safety to be turned against them, they and all are ipso facto, absolved of all Obedience, of all Oaths and ties of Allegiance whatsoever to His Majesty, and bound to seek their preservation by resistance and defence. Desperate Conclusions.  
I shall examine his Grounds ordine retrograd●, beginning with that immediately antecedent to all his Conclusions, Wheth●r the Parliament (so he would have you call the major part of the Lords and Commons remaining) are above the King, by reason of their representing the whole Kingdom. How true it is, That the Houses, without the King, represent the universal Realm, shall be considered anon, passing that by.  
I conceive that the Parliament (Truly so called) is above the King, taken solely, for that it doth involve the King, without whom they are not truly a Parliament. The Parliament then, thus considered, is a whole compared with some part, and the King but a part (though the most excellent part) of the whole; Now every whole is greater than any part; the Head (though more excellent than all the other Members, yet) not more excellent than the whole Man: whereof the Head is but a part.  
But the King solely compared with the Parliament (or rather the Houses of Parliament) excluding or not involving the King, is superior and above them, whether you consider them scorsim, or conjunctim; for taken conjunctim, they make but a Body, which though it be greater then, than the Head in Bulk, yet doth the Head excel in virtue, Excellence, and Authority; And although, by virtue of representation, they are the Body of the whole Kingdom, yet is the King the Head of that Body, and the Representative of God himself, who, I am sure, is above the Body they represent.  
It is a principal undeniable, Pax in parem non habet imperium, multo minus in superior●●●. If then the Houses be above, nay, if but equal with the King, He can have no Command over them; But it is evident He hath Command over them; He calls and commands them to assemble; being assembled, or united together, He may command them to prorogue, or adjourn for time or place; upon which Command, it is then their Duty to rise▪ and remove; and again at His pleasure He can dissolve them: Although for this time His Majesty hath been graciously pleased to restrain Himself from the exercise of that Power, yet the Power itself is still in Him, as an Inheritance inseparable from His Crown.  
The Representatives of the Kingdom either are Subjects, or not; That they are not Subjects, by reason that they are assembled, is absurd, and so would not the King's Protection due unto Subjects, belong unto them. If they are Subjects, then doth the King remain their sovereign and superior: And indeed, so far is their uniting and assembling in Parliament from diminishing the Kingly sovereignty to which they were before all and every one Subject, as that the regal Majesty is thereby much more increased and augmented. (Cromp. Juris●. 10.) We are informed by Our Judges (saith King H. 8. to His Parliament) That We at no time stand so highly in Our Estate royal, as in the time of Parliament; wherein We as Head, and you as Members, are con●oyned and knit together in one Body politic.  
If the Houses, as representing the universal Realm, are above the King, than they may judge Him, punish, or depose Him; But they cannot judge Him, 22 Edw. 3. 3. Le Roy per cux ne doit estre ajuge. 3 Edw. 3. 
S●●m●. 158.  19 Scrope. Those which are Judges of Parliament, are Judges of their peers; but the King hath no Peer within His Own Kingdom, and therefore ought not to be judgedly them. And for deposing a King, or depriving Him of His Right and Authority, or any necessary part thereof, no Act of Parliament can prevail, much less the Lords and Commons. An Attainder by Parliament, could not bar the title to the crown from descending on King H. 7. nor was an act of Parliament disabling King H. 6. to reassume the 
1. H. 74. 6. Plow. Com. 238. 244.  Government of his people of any force, but without any repeal in itself frustrate and void, 7. Rep. 14. Calvin's case, an act of Parliament cannot take away the King's protection, or the Subjects service which is due by the Law of nature. 11. Rep. Sur de la wares Case William de la ware although disabled by act of Parliament was nevertheless called by Q. Eliz. to sit as a peer in Parliament for that it seems the Queen could not be barred of the service and counsel of any of her Subjects 2. H. 7. 6. A statute that the King by no non obstante shall dispense with it, is void, because it would take a necessary part of government out of the King: If then no act of Parliament be of force to take away the government or any necessary part thereof from the King; then surely is not any Ordinance of the Lord and Commons of force to do it; And consequently the Lords and Commons as representing the universal realm cannot be above the King, but inferior to him.  
Before the King commanded them to assemble, each particular and all of them were his Subjects and inferior to him: If by assembling into one body, and the virtue of representation they cease to be his Subjects and inferiors, why do they then in all their petitions, and declarations or Answers (proceeding from them not as particular men, but as houses of Parliament united) style him, Their gracious sovereign and themselves, His majesty's most humble Subjects, the Lords and Commons in Parliament. Let our Observator judge whether these representatives have not ill discharged their duty to the kingdom by debasing thus the underived majesty (so he calls it) of the people; by petitioning in so low and humble a form, him that is but their creature, and in whom there is no majesty, but what is from them derived down unto him (for so the Obseruator conceives it.)  
But now to answer the Observators Argument, which is thus, There is nothing, saith he, more known or assented to then this, that although the King be singulis major, yet universis minor, being below the people then in universali, he must likewise be below the representatives of that universality. I will not stand to question what necessary connexion these propositions have, The people are above the King: therefore their representatives are so: The King of England is above the King of Spain, doth the English ambassador, therefore take place of the King of Spain? But admitting a necessary Connexion. The people are above the King, ergo, the houses representing them. Why then è converso, The houses representing are not above the King, ergo, the people represented are not, and so having proved the houses below the King I have already proved the King above the people: yet a word more.  
'Tis true (as the Observator saith) nothing is more known, or assented to then this, that the King solely is Minor universis, the universality including the King; For no part, be it the head, can exceed or be greater than the whole; But again if the King and universality be contradistinguished, nothing is more known or assented to then this, That the King (I speak of the King of England, a sovereign King, not a Duke of Venice) is not only singulis major, but major universis. Nay most properly is the King above the people, considered as an entire Congregation; For chiefly as he is King, he is above all others; Now King relates to kingdom, Rex to Regnum: and kingdom or Regnum denotes an universality or body collected. As he is head, so is he in place, power and dignity above the body politic or universality, and not otherwise the head of any particular, but as he is a part of that universality. As out of the embryo (saith Fortescue) ariseth a body natural ruled by one head, even so of a multitude of people ariseth a kingdom which is a body mystical governed by one man, as by its head: As then in the natural body the head is improperly said to be the head of the arm, or of the leg, but the head of the body, so in truth must the King be made the head of the mystical body, not of the particular members. The King is but one head, and therefore but of one body, not then of the particulars which are many bodies but of the universal one body.  
There is a politic body which is the Vniversalitas Angli●: hath this body politic no head? or is the head inferior to its body, and yet no Monster? The Observator will object that the political head must be s●bservient to its body, for that it received its first being and subsistence from the body, we shall hereafter prove that the Regal power hath always its being from God though it be sometimes with the people's approbation: And as the political head hath its subsistence with the body, and must be destroyed by its dissolution, so if you destroy the head or kingly power, you destroy the kingdom, and dissolve it into a Chaos and confused multitude: Nec populus Acephatus (saith Fortescue) corpus vocari meretur, quiaut in naturalibus capite detru●cato residuum non corpus sed truncum appellamus; Sic in politicis sine capite communit as nullatenus corporatur. But admitting that in the body politic the head hath its power & authority derived merely and solely out of the politic provision, that radically and habitually was in the people to provide for its own safety and weal; yet I cannot see how it will follow that therefore the regal power must be subservient and subject unto the people: for as in the natural body, the heart being primum vivens, distributeth blood and spirit unto all the members, and giveth life and virtue unto the head itself, yet must that and the whole body be subject unto the head, which as supreme, governeth and directeth the whole man.  
A second kingly Attribute is this that he is Spons●s regni and at his Coronation wedded with a Ring unto the kingdom: The Observator saith this must be applied to subjects taken devisim not conjunctim: Otherwise as the wife is inferior to the husband, so would the people be in politics to the King: But in sadness is the King wedded to the particular men and women within this kingdom with beards, and without, I pray how many wives will he so have?  
The Observator foresaw the Arguments which might be drawn from these and other attributes, whereby Princes are 〈◊〉 Gods, Lords, Fathers, &c. and that therefore subjects must stand by the same relation; as Creatures, Servants, Children, &c. all Which he would shift off by his misapplied distinction of Kings are such singulis, but not universis. But indeed a King is said to be a Father, or Pater patriae, that is of the universality, not of particular persons; And elsewhere the King is termed an Oeconomus, or Pa●e●familuis, which with no congruity can be said in respect of particulars; Nor can the Observator satisfy any man considering that domestical government is the very Image and model of sovereignty in a commonweal; why children and servants might not as well use this distinction against their Parents, and Masters, as subjects against their sovereign, for may it not be objected though the Father in relation to his Children, or a Master of a Family in relation to his servants, be singulis major, yet Vniversis minor, and therefore if all the sons or servants hold together, they may command their Father or Master, or turn him out of doors; which was wisely foreseen by Agesilaus, when he returned this answer to a Citizen of Sparta that desired an alteration of the Government: That kind of Rule which a man would disdain in his own house, were very unfit to govern great Regions by. But the Observator will object that the relation holds not alike betwixt King and Subjects, as between Master and servants; For that the Master (saith he) is more worthy than his servants, and above them all: but this holds not in relation betwixt a King and his Subjects. Why that's the question, For proof whereof although he neither doth, or can allege any one authority; yet to prove the contrary that the people neither conjunctim nor divisim, and much less than representatives, are more worthy or above the King? amongst many peruse these few.  
Bracton l. 1. cap. 8. Omnis quidem sub eo (rege) & ipse sub nullo nisi tantum sub 
Camb. Britan. 163. The King hath sovereign power, he acknowledgeth no superior but God alone.  Deo, parem non habet in regno suo; quia sic amitteret praeceptum, nam par in parem non habet imperium, item nec multò fortiùs superiorem nec potentiorem habere debet, quia sic esset inferior sibi subditis. If he be tantum sub deo, then not under the people or their representatives.  
19 E. 4. 6. If all the people in England would make a war, yet if the King will not assent, it cannot be said a war; but the King alone may make 
See Sir Tho. Smith de Rep. Ang. li 2. cap. 4. 5. Rep. so. 86. de Iure regis Eccl. siastico.  a war or league; Is not the King in this above all the people in England?  
24. H. 8. cap. 12. Where by divers sundry old authentic histories and Chronicles, it is manifestly declared and expressed that this realm of England is an Empire, and so hath been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme head and King, having the Dignity and royal estate of the imperial crown of the same unto whom a body politic compact of all sorts and degrees of people been bounden and owen to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience &c. Note the King the supreme head (true saith the Observator singulis, not universis) unto whom a body politic compact of all sorts been bounden and owen next to God. (Than no mediate underived majesty twixt God and him) a natural obedience, that is due by the law of nature, or the Divine Law, not only by the pactions and agreement of politic Nations. 25. ●●, 8.  
25. H. 8. This your grace's realm recognising no superior under God, but only your Grace. By realm is meant either Subjects divisim or conjuncti●. If divisim then no particular is subject to Judges and Justice, nor to the Lords and Commons in Parliament, but only to the King, which is absurd: If conjunctim then is the King in the act recognized Major universis.  
Camb. Eliz. pag. 39 The Queen explains the Oath of supremacy, that she claims nothing thereby, Quam quod ad coronam Angliae jam olim jure spectavit, scilicet se sub Deo summam & supremam gubernationem & potestatem in o●nes regni ordines habere; Here is no distinction of being superior singulis, but not universis.  
16. R. 2. cap. 5. The crown of England immediately subject to God, and to none other. If immediately subject to God, then will not that distinction salve that the people in universali are above it.  
The judgement then of Bodin may be well applied unto this observator: 
Rodin de Rep. cap 8.  They which have written of the duty of magistrates, and other such like books have deceived themselves in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the Prince; A thing which ofttimes causeth the true subjects to revolt from the obedience which they owe unto their sovereign Prince: And ministereth matter of great troubles in Common wealths; of which their opinion, there is neither reason, nor ground▪ except the King be Captive, furious, or in his infancy, and so needeth to have a protector or Lieutenant appointed him by the suffrages of the people: For otherwise if the King should be subject unto the assemblies and decrees of the people, he should neither be King nor sovereign and the Common wealth neither realm nor monarchy, but a mere Aristocracy of many Lords in power equal, where the greater commandeth the less in general and every one in particular, and wherein the Edicts and laws are not to be published in the name of him that ruleth, but in the name and authority of the States, as in an aristocratical signiory, where he that is chief hath no power▪ but oweth obeisance unto the commandments of the signiory unto whom yet they all and every one of them feign themselves to owe their faith and obedience; which are all things so absurd, as hard it is to say, which is farthest from reason. Thus, he, which he doth a little after apply unto the state of England. Consider I pray whither it be not true, which this author saith, that the maintainers of this doctrine, do but feign themselves to owe faith and obedience unto their sovereign. They will take the Oath of Allegiance to be every one true and faithful; But than they will tell you that they were particulars only that took the Oath, and each in his particular is thereby bound, but the people in general is a certain universal body, in power and nature divided from every man in particular, and as an universal body they neither did nor could swear, and consequently are not bound. Each particular member to be admitted into the house of Parliament may swear that the King is the only Supreme governor in all things or causes; but being admitted they may altogether deny the King to be supreme governor in any cause or thing. Is the King only supreme governor in disposing of the Militia? The making of Laws is a cause or thing, and by and under them are all causes & things governed, yet so far is the King in this thing from being supreme governor, that he must be governed, and aught to follow the major vote: And it were well if he might as a burgess intervote, or at least as an honest Tradesman, might be admitted to vote in election of some burgess, for so at least by his proxy he should have some share in the supreme Government, though not the only supreme governor: But how inconvenient soever this position may be, that the people in universali, are above the King yet the Observator will prove it true, for that the people are the efficient cause, and author of regal power: But we shall first deny that ground, And secondly, we shall prove, that admitting they were the author of the regal power, yet it doth not follow that therefore they are above it.  
For the first▪ Let us examine, whether the people are the author, and efficient cause of conveying regal power. For better understanding whereof it will be requisite, first to search out the original cause and ground of political Government, or power to govern in general, and surely we shall find that to be no other, than the very Law of nature itself;  
The natural condition of mankind is such as necessarily requires society: Naked and impotent weaklings are we, when we enter the World, and unable without mutual help and assistance to preserve ourselves, whence society is absolutely requisite for the preservation of mankind in his infant being, as likewise for his future protection, from the violence of beasts and brutish men; again, would we preserve our 
7 Rep. 12 13. C●lv. Case.  being without civil society yet should we be more like beasts than men, dumb and void of all discourse: Man therefore naturally needeth civil society, and that society necessarily requires some form of civil Government, without which it were a confused assembly (not a society) and such as would ere long become destructive to itself; ubi non est Gubernator, corruet populus. So then from the Law of nature and 
Prov. 11.  necessity is government in general derived, which Law of nature is no other than the Divine moral Law itself, whence I conclude that God is the fountain, & efficient cause of all Government or power to govern in the general, So S. Paul Rom. 13. Non est potestas nisi à Deo, and again, Qui potestati resistit▪ Dei ordinationi resistit; True it is, although God be the author of all political power, yet doth he not always determine it to this or that particular form, but with the people's mediate election▪ So that it is lawful (yet not altogether indifferent) for a multitude among whom no form of Government is already established, to choose to themselves either a democratical, aristocratical, monarchical or mixed Government, and to design the particular person or persons that shall be therewith invested, But the power so determined by their vote, unto a particular form, and person, is from God still, not only as he is the author and universal cause of all things, but as from the immediate efficient cause, As when anciently Bishops and Presbyters were elected by the people, their order or power was not from the people, but immediately from God, The people only nominated or designed the person, but neither did, nor could confer the power or order of Priesthood▪ Surely the Observator doth not believe that a Horse was the author of Darius his power, and yet was the neighing of his horse the means by which the kingdom was determined unto him; before all the other Persian Lords. Nevertheless, he cannot imagine but that this people's election is the very efficient cause of that regal power that is elected and settled in some particular person, whereas in truth it is but a medium used in the conveyance of it from God, the only author, which instrumentally operates in the conveyance, but hath no causal influx at all into the regal power conveyed; whence it is that God challengeth to be acknowledged the author of regal power▪ Dan. 2. he (GOD) removeth Kings, and setteth up Kings, The God of Heaven hath given thee a kingdom, power, &c. Dan. 4. Cuicunque voluerit det illud. Prov. 8. By me Kings reign, by me Princes rule: By these places it is manifest (I think) that although the people's election may sometimes operate in the specifying of power, and designing the person, yet never is it a cause of that power; God only is the author and efficient cause thereof. See kitchen fol. 10. Le Roy est ordaine de Dieu. And therefore was that ever renowned Elizabeth acknowledged by her Parliament, to be the lawful Queen of England, Iure Divino, so saith Cambden, pag. 25. And the Parliament thought it just that King H. 8. Having his Kingly and regal power given by God (saith the Act) should in case of necessity, that would not abide the calling of a Parliament, by his Proclamation, or Edicts, provide for the safety of the realm.  
Regal power in specie, if it were conveyed or given by the people, then must it first have been in the people, for Nihil dat quod non habet, Now that regal power could be in the people is impossible, for 'tis against the nature of Regality, to be in more than one. Rex unicus esto. If the people had regal power, I would know over whom. Multitudo Deorum, nullitas est Deorum. Were supreme power radically and originally in the people, and by them delegated to some particular person, that should govern as a King, the King as their instrument would but propound Laws, but the people must enact them; As in Rome while it was a popular State, and that Magistracy was but beneficium populi. 
Livy.  Leges (saith Livy) à Magistratu proponuntur tantum sed â populo jubentur. But now in the government of this realm▪ 'tis clear contrary, Leges tantum proponuntur à populo, jubentur à Rege, By which it is manifest, that regal power with us cannot be beneficium populi. But again, the Observator must not take it for granted, that the determination of power to regal rather then aristocratical, &c. or the placing of it in such particular person, was always with the people's election, for surely regal power and the persons that should govern, without any choice of the people, hath been determined by God himself. I shall not insist on the particular institution of monarchical Government amongst the Angels, good and bad; nor on that which Bees and other sensitive Creatures do observe by that instinct of nature that the Divine goodness hath implanted. Nor on that monarchical Government amongst the Jews, which was often particularly determined by special ordinance sent from Heaven, by the ministry of Angels, or Prophets, though this were sufficient to disprove what the Observator affirmeth, That God is no more the author of regal then aristocratical power.  
I shall only observe that even in Adam, and after among the Patriarchs, Noah, Abraham, Jacob, and others, the common Fathers of Mankind. Regal Government was instituted by GOD himself, without any Election of the people; GOD created mankind ex uno, ut esset inter homines non Democratia, sed Regnum: after which the Elders, or Fathers of Families successively, had by their Eldership, 
Gen. 14. ●●od. 32.  not only paternal, but regal power, as appears by their making war, and execoting sentence of death upon offenders: And from these original stock-fathers', Kingdoms and Monarchies, I suppose for the most part, have had their beginning, without popular Election, in their first commencement, and therefore I would have our King's style continued, Carolus Dei gratia, rather than, Carolus electione populi. This is excellently declared by Sir Thomas Smith, in his Commonwealth, lib. 1. cap. 12 to have been the natural source, or beginning of that Government, which is termed legitimum regnum, to difference it from Tyranny and absolute Dominion, Such as Nimrod and others first gained by usurpation, and after held by violence, over the people, And which is not otherwise from God▪ then as the Divine providence pleaseth to direct it, to the punishment of a sinful people, or to such other purpose as to his divine wisdom seems best: But with such absolute Dominion England hath nought to d●e, 'tis legitimum regnum that takes place with us; where the royal power (saith Fortescue) is restrained by power politic, that the King can neither change the law, without the consent of the subjects, nor charge them with any strange impositions against their will; And he there citys Aquinas to prove, that by this Rule, and kind of Regiment should all Mankind have been governed, if in Paradise they had not transgressed: By which i● appears, that God in the Law of nature, instituted this form of Government: And whether we call it paternal, or regal, it refers to that institution, and is from thence derived; True it is that violence of war, and vulgar Commotions may in most places have interrupted, and altered the course of succession according to this Divine institution; upon which occasion popular Elections may have interposed, But the King once Elected and seated in his Throne, is thenceforth d●●m●d to reign by that Paramount right▪ unto which the people's election is but a restitution, or as that learned Historian, Kings are made by God, and Laws divine; and by human Laws only declared to be Kings; and thereupon he observes, that 
Sir W. Raleigh. l. 2. Hist. Mund.  David thought himself accountable only to God: Tibi soli peccavi, Psal. 51.  
But again, if it were admitted, that the people originally were the authors of that regal power by which they are governed: I cannot see how it doth necessarily follow, that therefore there remains in them a power above the King: I acknowledge, that maxim with its just limitations, holds truly in natural causes, Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale: but surely it is mightily misapplied by the Observator, who would have us imagine, if the people made a King, they are themselves more King than he; I should rather think if regal power were originally conveyed from the people, they by conveying it over, have devested themselves of it; If it were conveyed with conditions, then under those conditions may it be held against them: if absolutely, then may it be held absolutely over them; It was necessary by the Law of nature, that they should convey over a power unto some, for will they, nill they, a people cannot be without a Government: Or were their conveyance voluntary, have they therefore a power over it, at pleasure to revoke it, although it were often ratified by Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy? Doth not this doctrine destroy not one y Monarchy, but all Government whatsoever? The people you say are the Authors, and efficient cause of that power, that the Parliament Members have by Conveyance from them; may the people therefore conclude themselves to be above the Parliament, and at pleasure revoke and control their power? May Newcastle, or any other particular Borough, or County disauthorize those they have empowered? Or if a particular Borough or County cannot remove their proxies, yet the major part of the Electors throughout the whole kingdom may according to this doctrine revoke the trust and authority, that all the Members have; If so, how can my obedience be required to their Votes when as it is doubtful whether the major part of the freeholders do not disavow their proceedings.  
Most certain it is (whether the people were the authors of regal power, or not) there neither is, nor can be any power remaining in the people, above that which is in a Monarch or King: for if the supreme power remain in the people, it must be a popular State, such as Rome sometimes was; The lacedaemonians had a King in name but their Estate was truly a popular Estate the supreme power being in those 5 worthy Members called the Ephori, who figuring & patronising the people had power to control the doings of their King; and their custom was (as Plutarch relates) every ninth year upon some clear night to gaze upon the Firmament, and if they observed the Moon to twincle, or any Star to sparkle or shoot, they thereupon would commit their King to prison, who might not thence be delivered, until the Oracle of Apollo, had so declared. A happy Government (I assure you) both for King, and people. But if you will allow of a true King in power, as well as in name, the sovereign power next under God, must be in him, not controllable with the breath of the fickle multitude.  
Princeps— Nec ponit aut sumit secures  
Arbitrio popularis aurae.  
The Roman Emperor was anciently chosen by the soldiers, but did there remain in them a power over the Emperor so elected? 'tis recorded 
Sozomen. li. 6.  that the soldiers having chosen Valentinian the elder, would have added ao lleague unto him in the imperial government: but the Emperor answered them, me ad imperium eligere penes vos erat, sed cum jam à vobis electus sim, consortem imperii quem postulastis non amplius in vectra, sed in mea potestate eligere situm est: and with this answer were the soldiers well contented, whereby it appears, there remained no superour power in them.  
Did there remain a superintendent power in the people over the King, it would then be lawful to appeal from the K●ng to the people as to the more supreme power: but such appeals were never heard of, at least not till of late, nor are they consistant with Monarchy, or any government, but necessarily tend to Anarchy, and destruction; Omnis honestae rei malus judex est vulgus: there is no commonwealth wherein there are not more evil than good, more simple than wise; if then the majority of the people shall determine upon the last appeal, what judgement shall we be ruled by.  
You see whereunto the Observators principles do lead, and if you desire to know the fountain from whence he drew these goodly doctrines, that little Treatise entitled, Puritano-Iesuitismus will point it out unto you.  
I shall forbear to consider any further, by what authority Kings do reign▪ And I heartily wish, that this Anti-monarchist had spent his time in praising God, for giving us that form of government, which experience teacheth, and all the learned in the world do acknowledge to be the best, and most convenient, rather than by presumptuous enquiry after the cause and origin thereof, to have endeavoured to shake and unsettle the same.  
As concerning the final cause of regal Authority, it must be acknowledged, the general end thereof is no other, than the conservation and good of the people; and true it is, that the King is bound not only by his Oath, but also by the very end of his regal Office, to protect us, and to endeavour our promotion to all kind of political happiness, even as much as he intends his own honour and right: But I cannot swallow that ingrateful inference the Observator makes from thence, daring to tell his King, That he cannot merit of the State, that whatsoever he doth for them, is me●re duty: May not the same act be of duty, and yet meritorious, or deserving? Is it not the duty of a Father to take care for his children? and yet yourself acknowledge the Father doth all his offices meritoriously.  
You suppose (though falsely) Kingly authority commenceth by pact and agreement with the people, is not honour and obedience, even by that very pact, to be paid him as a due reward? and doth not reward presuppose desert? although after such pact made, his care and protection be of duty, yet being free, to oblige himself by that pact to preserve, nourish, and defend his people, was an act meritorious. Omnium domos illius vigilia defendit, omnium 
Seneca.  otium illius labour, omnium delitias illius industria, omnium vacationem illius 
Stamford Preface.  occupatio. For which the Law doth attribute unto him, all Honour Dignity, and P cheminence: and yet you say he deserveth, nay he can deserve, nothing. The word (Grace) you tell him sounds not well in his mouth; yet surely former Kings have used the word without being checked for it. 28. ●. 1. cap. 1. The King ●f his special grace for redress of the grievances of his people, sustained by his wars, and for the amendment of their estate, and to the intent that they may be the more ready to do him service, the more willing to assist and ●yde him in time of need, grants, &c. You see that King terms it of special Grace, though for amendment of their estate; and for those Articles he granted them, he expected in retribution, that his subjects should be the more willing to assist and aid him in time of need: And so I hope will all good subjects be at this time the more willing to aid his Majesty for those many Acts of greater grace he hath pleased to pass unto us. You may see sundry other Acts, wherein the King himself speaking▪ pronounceth them to be of his special grace: W. 2. cap. 10 cap. 29. 18. E. 1. Stat. de quo warranto etc: Statutum de gratia regia di●itur 
Coke Insti●. 2 part pag. 379.  quando Rex dignatur cedere de jure suo regio pro quiet & comodo populi sui.  
Pr●m regal, the Observator passeth on to consider Parliamentary power, (pag. 5.) Parliaments have the same efficient cause as Monarchies, if not higher, for in truth the whole kingdom is not so properly the author as the essence itself of Parliaments, and Parliaments have also the same shall cause as Monarchies. Well, 'tis agreed, that the good of the kingdom is the end whereto Parliamentary power should direct itself; but then as concerning the power of Parliaments, and the efficient cause of that power, it will be requisite to consider the parts distinctly, and then the power of all together.  
The Parliament is a Body consisting of three distinct Estates, the King, the Lords, and the Commons: Unto the Commons considered alone, it most properly appertains to present the grievances of the people, and in humble manner to pray such redress, as the King with their consent, and advice of the Lords, shall deem to be just and fit. And this power (or rather trust) they derive from the people their Electors, yet not without dependence on the King: The Knights are sent by the County, but the County had power and command by the King's Writ to send them: And as for the Burgesses, their trust or power (call it what you will) doth more especially refer unto the King, as the author thereof; for whence had the elected Burgesses their power, but from the Borough that sent them; whence had the Borough power to send, but from the King, who by his Letters Patents incorporated them into a Borough, and gave them power to send Burgesses to the Parliament; which otherwise they had no more right to do, than any other vile whatsoever. And this is the ground of that power which the house of Commons have, as concerning the generalty of the kingdom: And besides this the house of Commons, although a great and honourable Assembly, yet of themselves (as I think) they are no Court either of Record, or of ordi●ary justice, unless it be with respect to their own Members, which is rather a necessary privilege then any power: They can neither administer an Oath, nor give any judgement twixt party and party; nor have they power to control or reverse a judgement given in the meanest pipowder Court. I speak not this with a mind to derogate from the due honour of that Assembly, but to occasion some friendly brother (if I am in error) to instr●ct me how the imposing of the Protestation by order of the Commons only, upon all the subjects in general, under a penalty of being branded with malignancy, and adjudged unfit to bear any public office, may be defended: How that order for levelling Chancels, and making other alterations in the Church, which issued from the Commons without the King, and in opposition to the Lords, may be justified either by reason or precedent: How that Remonstrance (a chief means of all our succeeding dissensions) that was voted, with so much opposition, in their own house, and was after published (I will not say to disaffect the people from his majesty's government) may be defended and justified. In brief, may I be instructed with some grounds, by which these and many other their actions and Votes may be warranted; I shall thenceforth acknowledge them (whom now perhaps by mistake I think to be no Court at all) to be the most supreme judicatory both for Law and State: In the mean while I am ignorant of any trust they have, other than a trust from the people, to consult and assent to the King and Lords in the making of laws, which without the consent of the Lords, and his majesty's concurrence, is altogether useless, and of no virtue; And in them apart I know no jurisdiction, but with respect to their own Members: and surely that (such as it is) they have from the crown the fountain of all justice, and the spring head of all jurisdiction.  
The house of peers considered simply have power by assent, or disassent, to enable or disable the making or repealing of any laws and general Ordinances; but without the concurrence of King and Commons, this of itself is of no use: They are likewise an high Court of judicatory in respect of particular causes orderly brought before them, having jurisdiction in many, though not in all, Cases. In criminal causes concerning life, and member, I think they have not jurisdiction without the King's special Commission; and therefore they cannot attaint any man for treason, murder, or felony: They are not only a Court of justice, but of Record, they may take a recognizance, 
● H. 7. 20.  and by the King's Writ or Commission may reverse for error the judgements given in any of the ordinary Courts: But all these powers, as likewise their Baronies, by reason of which they have place and vote in Parliament, are immediately and merely derived from the crown, the fountain of all honour and jurisdiction; and they do so necessarily depend upon the King, in matters of judicatory, as that in judgement of law they speak 
Stamf. 72.  ove bouch le Roy mesme.  
Thus much concerning the Lords and Commons apart from the King: The King alone he is Capitalis Angliae justiciarius, the fountain of all jurisdiction, and above all other jurisdictions. Britton speaking in the person 
12 H. 7. 17. Mirror of justice.  of King E. 1. nous volousque nostre jurisdiction soit sur touts jurisdictions in nostre royalme. By the law of Nations, and by the very end of regal power, the King is to judge the people, 1 Sam. cap. 8. Give us a King to judge us, (vers. 20.) We will have a King over us, that we also may be as the Nations, 
Bracton lib. 3. fol. 107.  and that our King may judge us. Bracton tells us, That the King alone, if he could suffice, aught to judge the people, and that by his Oath he is bound thereunto. And as the ordinary iuridicall power is supreme, and originally in the King; so likewise is the legislative, it being a principal end of regal authority, dare jus populo; which power was in Kings by the law of nature, while they governed the people by natural Equity, long before either municipal laws, or Parliaments had a being. Before Moses there were no 
Fortescue cap. ●●. 13. ● Rep. Cal●ins ●ase 13.  standing municipal laws, or at least not before Pharoneus; long before which there were Kings of S●it●●●, Assyria, Egypt &c. who according to natural Equity gave law unto their people. 
Rhemo cum fratre Quirinu●— jura dabat.  
Hoc Priami g●stamen erat ●um jura vocati● 
Virg▪   
M●r● d●ret popul●●—  But their laws they so gave, aught to be agreeable to natural Equity, aiming no less at the good of the people, then of themselves: Such conditions and limitations as are agreeable to natural Equity, Kings by the divine institution, were bound to observe; and some by their voluntary Oaths, for themselves and their successors, many times bound themselves to more strict limits, then were absolutely requisite; yet being agreeable to Equity, and consistent with Royalty, aught to be observed. And then●e it is, according to the several degrees that the latitude of natural Equity doth admit, in giving laws, that some Kings are more strictly limi●ed than others; and according to the oaths and promises made by the King of this realm, they can neither give, nor repeal any law, but ●ith the assent of the peers and people.  
The Observa●or doth not deny the Legislative power to be in the King, but (saith he) partly in the King, partly in the Kingdom; which I shall admit to be true in this sense, viz. that the Legislative power is not so in the King only, as that he being sole can either in ordinary or extraordinary cases, make or alter any Law; for thereunto is necessarily required the assent both of Lords and Commons: But yet to speak properly the Legislative power is solely in the King, although not in the King being sole, Rex solus legislator, non si solus; the assent of peers and Commons gives weight and testimony unto the Law, but the King only gives it force and authority: And it will be thus proved, the Legislative is the most sovereign power, jus dare, is somewhat more than jus dicere; If then this most supreme power were formalitèr & subjectivè, as well in the Lords and Commons, 
Davis rep. Rex Angliae est monarcha & Imperator in regno suo. Cassaneus in catol. glor.. mundi. Rex Angliae est absolutus Monarcha in regno suo.  as in the King, the Government of this kingdom during Parliament; would be democratical or aristocratical, not Monarchichall or regal; Nor would it be a kingdom or realm, but a republic; For what else is Aristocracy, but the supreme power seated in divers of the nobility? or what Democracy, but a like power in the people? The Legislative power is then solely in the King, ut in subjecto, and the consent of Lords and Commons is no parting or sharing in that power, but only a condition requisite to the use of that power in the King. And this (I conceive) is evidently proved by the Oath of Supremacy, whereby the King is acknowledged the only supreme governor, and likewise by the form of all our ancient Statutos, in which the King only speaks as the lawmaker; some Statutes are in form of a Writ in the King's name only, directed to the several Sheriffs: some in form of a Charter made by the King, sometimes it runs, the King wills, the King ordained, or the King in Parliament, or the King with the assent of the Lords and Commons, &c. And never did any Act run thus, The Lords and Commons with the assent of the King; or the Lords and Commons in Parliament ordain or order, &c. And in the passing Bills to this day, the imperative is only by the King, Soit fait come est desire, or Le Roy voet, 22. E. 3. 3. Pl. 25. Le roy fist les leys per ass●nt des peers▪ & de la comune, & non pas l●s peers & le comune. In a learned argument made in Parliament against impositions, and printed by command of a Committee this Parliament, that Champion for liberty, examining where the sovereign power is in this kingdom, The sovereign power (saith he,) Is agreed to be in the King, but in the King is a twofold power, the one in Parliament, the other cut of Parliament, the correcting of the errors of the ordinary Courts is by him, Acts of Parliament be they laws grounds, or whatsoever, the Act and power is the Kings, but with the assent of the Lords and Commons, which maketh it the most supreme power, not controlable by any, but controling the regal power out of Parliament, so he. Now by all that hath been said, 'tis apparent, That in the Lords and Commons severed from the King, there is only power in particular cases, as is before expressed; but that power that may oblige the subject in general by laws, Ordinances, or such like Acts, or Orders, is solely in the King: In the name of goodness then, what is that which the people speak of, when they talk of the power of the Parliament in such general cases, without and in opposition to the King? How can they without the King (the power being only in the King) make laws, and Ordinances, and with binding authority declare the Law? Is the Legislative power solely in the King, and yet hath he not a free assent, but must of necessity follow the major Vote? The royal assent was that which only did give power and force unto the Law, and it is now turned to an empty piece of formality▪ a matter of course, that without any Election must follow which way the Vote shall lead it? Or if the royal assent be not added, yet if the major part at any time shall deem it necessary that their Votes stand for laws, without it, they are as completely and firmly binding as if they were added.  
I wish some man would first sadly consider, and then give me satisfaction, if by these very Votes, the Government be not already altered, and Monarchy regulated by Law, turned into an arbitrary boundless Cligarchy; altered I say, as far forth as mere Votes are ab●e to prevail, which yet I hope will never be actually effected: This, and many other Observations that may be made out of the premises, I shall remit unto the ingenious reader: I shall only make application of what hath been said against the Observator, pag. 9 It is alleged (saith he) in derogation of Parliament, that whatsoever the right of Parliaments is to assemble, and treat in all cases of a public nature, yet without the King's concurrence or consent, they are liveless conventions without all virtue and power; the very name of Parliament, not due to them, This Allegation (saith he) at one blow confounds all Parliaments, and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the King's mere will, as any Nation under heaven, ever suffered under. Patience good Observavator! The very name surely is not due but to the very thing, In conjunction with the King, I can say the King and Parliament, n●ming the King specially propter excellentiam, but I cannot rightly say the King or Parliament, or the King against the Parliament; can you show me where the Lords and Commons opposed to the King, are termed a Parliament? Did ever any man describe a Parliament to be a body consisting of Lords and Commons only? with some difficulty I could find where it is said to be a body consisting of King, Lords, and Commons. I would not strive about words, but that I see the very name of Parliament misapplied to the two Houses doth somewhat abuse the people: As for Parliamentary power itself I have proved it to be formally and immoveably in the King only, ut in subjecto, and that the consent of Lords and Commons is but a requisite condition to complete that power, as to the doing of some Acts to which it cannot other wise extend: If then there be no concurrence of the King in whom only the power is, what are they but a liveless Convention without all value and power? What's a confirmation of the Dean and Chapter, without a grant of the Bishop to be confirmed? An assent o● Lords and Commons without an Act to be assented to, is somewhat like two cyphers without any figure, which yet if added to a figure make it centuple. If this Allegation against which the Observator doth exclaim with so much vehemency, be any new doctrine, I am content to be discarded; but if it shall appear to be a most known truth, and such as doth not more support the royal Prerogative, than the liberty of the subject, than I trust men will be satisfied, upon what grounds that odious scandal is raised against his Majesty, of intention to bring in an Arbitrary Government such as the French are subject to: A calumny not a little practised to beat off the subjects from their due Allegiance. The truth then of this position, that the Houses without the King (as to the making of any public Acts, Orders, or Ordinances) are liveless Conventions, will appear by these ensuing proofs, Com. 79. Although the Lords and Commons agree to a thing, it is but as an embryo, or issue in the belly, and yet unborn: It were to be wished these Embrio's ●id not at present too much trouble this part of the world. Lambert's Archeion, 271. The necessity of the assent of all the three Estates in Parliament is such, as without any one of them, the rest do but lose their labour. 11. H. 7. 27. per Davers. Le Roy est assentus, ceo fait un Act de Parliament. Polidore 185. Nihil ratum habetur nisi quod major pars utriusque concessus senserit, idque rex comprobarit. cowel ●nter▪ verbo prorog.. The King may quash any Law. 8. Rep. 20. b. crompton's Iurisd. 8. 6. Institut. 1▪ part. 90. b. Institut. 2. part. 158. accord'. Sir Tho. Smyth at Republica Anglicana lib. 2. cap. 3. No Bill is an Act of Parliament, Ordi●ina●ce, or Edict of Law, until both the Houses severally have agreed unto it, No nor then neither, but the last day of that Parliament or Session, the Prince cometh in person, and declares his pleasure concerning their proceedings, whereby the same may have perfect life and accomplishment by princely authority, and so have the whole consent of the Realm: those that the Prince doth ●●ow, be taken as perfect laws and Ordinances of the Realm of England, and none other: to those which the Prince liketh not, he answereth, Le Roy advisera, and th●se be accounted utterly dashed▪ and of none effect. Bodin de Republica. lib. 1. cap. 8. Albeit that in the Parliaments of England, which have commonly been holden every third year, there the Estates seem to have every great liberty (as the Northern people almost all breath thereafter) yet so it is that in effect they proceed not but by way of supplications, and requests unto the King: As in the Parliament of England holden in October, 1566. When the Estates by a common consent had resolved (as they gave the Queen, to understand) not to entreat of any thing until they had first appointed who should succeed her in the Crow●: she gave them no other answer, but that they were not to make her grave before she were dead. All those resolutions were to no purpose without her good liking; neither did she in that any thing that they required. Now also the Estaies of England are never otherwise assembled (no more than they are in this Realm of France or Spain) then by Parliament Writs, and express commandments proceeding from the King, which showeth very well that the Estates have no power of themselves to determine, command, or decre● any thing, seeing that they cannot so much as assemble themselves, neither being assembled, depart without express commandment from the King: Yet this may seem one special thing that the laws made by the King of England at the request of the States cannot be again repealed, but by calling again of the States, which is much used and ordinarily done, as I understood by Master Dale, the English ambassador, an honourable Gentleman, and a man of good understanding; who yet assured me that the King received or rejected the Law as seemed best unto himself, and stuck not to dispose thereof at his pleasure, and contrary to the will of the estates. I might add many more, but that by understanding men I should be laughed at, as holding a Candle to the Sun. Let the Observator tell me, which of all these doth not say fully as much as that which he saith, at one blow confounds all Parliaments, and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the King's mere will, as ever any Nation under Heaven suffered under: Let him against all these, and such others as I might add, allege but one single opinion from the beginning of the world till 1640. that in public Cases the Lords and Commons have any virtue and power, without, nay, maugre the King, to oblige the subject in general by any Law or Ordinance they shall make, and I promise him upon that to turn Reformado; mean while (I must think) not the King, but the Observator, with one blow confounds all Parliaments; for it doth not only cut off the head, with which the virtue, life, and soul of that body expires; but by the same reason it cuts off likewise the Lords from being any necessary part of the Parliament: For if the Commons shall adjudge that the Militia for repelling danger, aught to be put into such a way as dislikes the King and major part of the Lords (that's in truth now the Case) yet ought the House of Commons being virtually the whole kingdom, to be obeyed by the people against the will and command of King and Lords, and against the desire of the minor part (perhaps by two Votes) in the House of Commons; If the major part of the Lords shall be b●uited to be Popishly affected or Malignant, and thereupon their names shall be required that so the Rabble-rout may take a course with them, by means whereof they are necessitated to absent themselves; and by like seditious courses, a considerable part (if not the maior) of the Commons shall be driven from Parliament: if after this by the cunning practice of some few, the Major part of Lords and Commons, that shall be remaining shall adjudge such Assemblies, not to have been riotus and seditious and that therefore themselves have power, as a free Parliament to provide for the safety of the realm: and shall thereupon by or dinante require a Levy of Subsidies, to be presently made throughout the kingdom: you will say the Subjects are bound in such case, to lay along their necks▪ and pay; and is not this to subject us, to as unbounded a regiment of mere will, as any Nation under heaven, ever suffered under.  
This is more than ever the King pretended to he never claimed a power ●o make laws and lay taxes without the consent of Parliament; he only lays claim to a negative voice, that they without him may not make any laws, or charge his Subjects, but that all be done by the joint consent of him and his people; and otherwise their proceedings without him to be vertulesse and of no force. Against which so well known right let us see what worthy argument the Observator brings forth: By the same reason (saith he) that Parliaments are thus vertulesse, and void Courts, upon the King's desertion of them, other Courts must needs be the like; and than what remains, but that all our Laws, rights and liberties be either nowhere at all determinable, or else only in the King's breast. He is very wary not to fall under the King's determinations, though (as appears before) the ●nd why a King was set over Nations, was to judge them: and Bracton tells us, That the King by his oath is obliged (if he were able) in person to judge his people. And 'tis a known principle in the laws of England, Rex presumitur habere omnia jura in scrinio pectto●s sui: And yet as the government of this kingdom is now settled, the King cannot 
Vide Crompt. Ju●i●d. 108.  make void or vertulesse the settled Courts of Justice, and thereby draw all things to a determination within his own breast. And if any cause shall come before him as a Judge, to determine, yet he hath a rule to follow, and that's the Law, not his will: which Law in respect of the King, hath somewhat more than a directive force, restraining him and disabling him to go against it, so that he can do no wrong. The laws are made by the King's power, with the peoples or Parliaments assent, which is a superior power (or rather the same power in a higher degree or extent) to the regal power alone, and with●●●● their assent: And therefore the regal power out of Parliament cannot change nor al●●● the laws and Ordinances made in Parliament, but is bound by them, as being made by a superior power: whence it is that Bracton everywhere affirms the Law to be above the King solely. And by this superior power (that is by the King with the assent of his people or Parliament) were the ordinary Courts of Justice founded and established and their jurisdiction ascertained, and therefore may not be altered by the regal power alone; and by the same reason, the King cannot alter the Constitution of the Court of Parliament, but is the Constitution of all Courts alike? the ordinary Courts are so constituted as that the King's special Concurrence is not necessary. Arts and Judgements by the ordinary Judges alone, are complete, and binding: their assembling and departing is settled and doth not depend on the special pleasure of the Prince. But the Court of Parliament hath another kind of Constitution, the King's special concurrence is in that a necessary and essential part, Rex est cap●t principium, et finis Parliamenti. Their assembling 
Modi● tenendi Parliament.  expects his special call▪ their continuance depends on his will, the Judgemements, Arts and Ordinances, made in Parliiament, and concerning the kingdom in general, are the Kings only, and without him frustrate and null.  
Consider this good observator, and then tell me, if you did not endeavour grossly to abuse your reader, by telling us, that by the same reason the Parliament, is not a Court comple● without the King, the Common-pleas, and all other Courts are not: I confess I have wondered to see it of late so often a●●i●med, That as the King cannot, nor aught to declare by pr●claimation, or otherwise his disalowance of the acts & judgements of the ordinary Courts so not of the Votes & Ordinances of the Lords & Commons in Parliament, being the highest Court▪ Should the ordinary Courts take upon them to dispose of the Militia, by virtue of an Ordinance by them made, might not the King by his Proclamation declare the Militia of that Ordinance, and forewarn his Subjects, not to be abused by it? if the Observator can prove that the laws and Ordinances made by the now major part of the Lords and Commons, are (without and against the King's pleasure) of any more validity: that they are in themselves laws and Ordinances, and not only so called: then I shall admit that the King either by Prociamation, or otherwise, ought not to declare against them: mean while let every man judge, how well the observator hath maintained the power of the Lords and Commons (Maugre their King) to make laws and Ordinances that shall bind the people in general: By which Ordinances the Militia, the taking of Hull, the Navy, the Magazine,▪ the intercepting all money and other provision, that is but suspected to be passing towards the King the imprisoning all such as appear dutiful towards his majesty's commands and such like Acts must be justified or acknowledged unjust.  
The Observator finding it more than difficult in a plain field to maintain his cause, endeavours to shelter it under famed pretences of extraordinary danger and necessity▪ in this extremity the King neglecting the helm, nay purposely steering towards rocks and shelves; It is the duty of his Parliament in this case, to oppose, and preserve him and his kingdom from utter wreck and ruin. He will then acknowledge that in ordinary cases, without the King, they cannot make a binding Law or Ordinance, but in danger (that is, when they please:) In the miast of our calamities (we are sensible of none, thanks be to God, but what their Ordinances have occasioned) the Parliament seeing they must make use of their legislative power, and make Ordinances to secure s●me Forts, and settle the Militia, or else two kingdoms probably will be lost; they do accordingly, the King proclaims to the contrary; in this contrariety consider if the Parliament 〈◊〉 virtually the whole kingdom, if it be not the supreme Judicatory, as well in ma●●●●● of State as Law, if their grounds of jealousy be vain. To what purpose shall we consider of their jealousies, if we think them to be but pretended by the cunning and practice of some few for accomplishing their designs and plots, invented by some of their own party▪ to be again by them discovered; yet must King and people submit to their judgement. Are not the now major part the supreme Judges of danger, to whom King and people are bound to submit? If they are, is it less than a mockery to bid us consider, when as after consideration, will we, nill we, we must subjugate our understandings and opinions to whatsoever they already have or hereafter shall declare? But yet at your bidding, I'll consider, in this contrariety whether the Parliament (pray call them the Lords and Commons now assembled) may not make use of their legislai●e power; yes, if they have any such: but I would not have them make use of the King legislative power, without him, and against him: had they been partners in that power, some colour you might have had to have called it theirs; but it seems the power is solely the Kings, they are only to give an assent to the use of it. Then you will, I consider whether they be not the supreme Judicatory. I think not: the Parliamenti● supreme and above them both in matters of State and Law: but again I must consisider you say, if the Lords and Cammons be not virtually the whole kingdom, why do you put in the Lords, whom at other times you can be content to spare? The Lord's Vote in respect of their baronies derived from the crown, the Commons Vote in right of their electors whom they represent, at least nine parts of the kingdom, neither do nor may Vote in their election, the clergy in respect of their spiritual livingt, may not, nor the most substantial copyholders, Farmours nor Lessees for years, not inheritrixes, Jointresses, nor reversioners, Heirs apparrent, and men that live upon Interest are excluded; and all that have not 40. s. per annum free▪ hold Land, which I imagine, cannot be above a tenth part of the kingdom. Tell me good Sir you that list 
Page 1.  to unsettle principles, power being (you say) nothing else but that might and vigour which a society of men contains in itself, why should the might and vigour of these being far the major part, be over Mastered, and concluded by the Votes of those that are deputed by a miner number of the people? or why should half the kingdom in which there are but few Burroughes, be equalled and overborne in Voting by two Counties, out of which many Burgesses are chosen? Old Sarum shall have as many Votes in Parliament, as the city of London, or County of Wiltes: By which it seems the Commons are not sent with equality from all parts, nor sent by all: how do they then represent all? what reason is there that all the kingdom should sit down with their Votes? the truth is, the King, Lords and Commons in conjunction are virtually the whole kingdom, for that all the people did at first submit themselves to their determination. 25 H. 8. 21. your royal majesty and your Lords and Commons representing the whole realm, in this your most high Court of Parliament, have power, &c. So that in the King principally, but yet in conjunction with the Lords and Commons, is the virtue and power of the whole kingdom contained: But if we shall admit that the virtue and power of the whole realm is by representation in the Commons alone, or at least in the Lords and Commons, what will thence follow? the kingdom (you will say) are the efficient cause of Kingly power, and consequently above it, they being above it have power over it, may reassume it, or dispose of it to such persons as they can confide in, and this power the Kingdom may confer upon such as they shall choose for that purpose. The Observator hath met with a free gamester: though his principles have been particularly disproved, and are destructive, not only to Monarchy, but unto all government, yet at present let him take all for granted. First, that the people have such power; and secondly, that they may transmit it unto such as they shall choose for that purpose; But the question is, whether they have done it? whether they have chosen the new members for that purpose, or for some other? The King did not create the Lords (I believe) for that end, nor create Borroughes with power to send Burgesses for that end, nor command the Counties to elect Knights for that purpose: nor did the Borroughes and Counties when they did elect, give any such power, upon the receipt of the Kings Writ by the sheriff, and warning or notice given to the Freeholders, they meet, and cry up some man's name; this in itself imports nothing but with reference to the Writ so that the people intrust them to do only what the Writ requires, and thereupon the sheriff returns Elegi feci duos milites, who have power from the County, ad faciendum (what I pray) quod breve in se exegit: in that they have no authority without the King, to judge of dangers and oblige the King and people to go their way for repelling the ●ame, and yet doth the Writ continue as large as ever it hath been; seeing neither the Kings writ, nor the people's election made thereupon do give it; I demand whence have the Lords and Commons, excluding the King, this sovereign power to judge of danger●● and thereupon if they so cause, to take from the King the power of the kingdom, and according to their pleasures, to dispose thereof unto certain confiding persons, unto which disposition the King and people are all required to conform, and give consent. We have been often told that it is by the fundamental Law of the Land; a foundation so deep, that like the River Nilus, it hides its head from all that seek it; never yet could any the most learned instruct us where to find out this fundamental Law; which hath lain buried so long that no lawbook, Record or Chronicle, makes any the least mention thereof. But yet at length a certain Pamphleter, defending the observator, hath happed upon it, but not amongst the laws of this Land, (he was nessitated to dig a little deep for it) but amongst nature's principles; It is radically couched in nature itself, and irrepealably enacted in her Magna Charta (to which all positive laws must in equity veil) that the State may lawfully of its self provide for its preservation, espectally if the King either see not the danger, or seeing it, will not provide for it in such m●nner as may give best security to himself and the commonwealth. certain it is there is no state but is endued with ability and means to preserve itself: instinct of nature will force all men preserve themselves from present destructior, and providence teacheth all to provide against future emergent dangers; and this surely the State of England hath done in submitting itself to the care and protection of a King, on whose good foresight and wisdom, next under God, the welfare of the whole realm dependeth: he sits as on a watch Tower, surveying his own dominions, and by the vigilancy of his council at home, and ambassadors abroad, hath timely intelligence of any approaching evil; against which if he shall need any extraordinary advice or aid of his Subjects he hath power by his writ to assemble them in Parliament, and with their assent to raise money and other necessary provision for their defence and safeguard: And this I say, is that means of safety wherewith the State of England hath provided itself, by putting themselves for better for worse, under the protection of a King against all dangers: And certainly he that ought to protect them against dangers, to him it appertains to judge of danger, and so much was admitted by those who argued for the Subject, in case of shipmoney, that the King was sole Judge of the dangers, but that he could not thereupon tax the Subject, but by assent in Parliament. But what (you will object) if the King will not see the danger, or seeing it will nevertheless suffer the kingdom to f●eat at all hazards? or what if being carried away with Malignant counsel, he himself shall steer it towards rocks and shelves? May not the kingdom in such case save themselves from ruin, and oppose the King? There can be no Generalissime so uncircumscribed, but that if he shall turn his Cannons upon his own soldiers, they are ipso facto absolved of all 
Page 4.  obedience, of all oaths, and ties of Allegiance whatsoever, for the time, and bound by higher duty, to seek their own preservation, by resistance and defence. For my part, I cannot but think that a state after much sufferance, seeing utter destruction to be at hand ready to swallow them up, may use any good and lawful means, as flight, and avoidance to preserve themselves from ruin by the hand of a tyrannising Lord: yet I dare not approve of active resistance, by taking up arms against a lawful sovereign Prince▪ though ●yranizing over his Subjects. If the Prince (saith Bodin) be an absolute sovereign, 
Bodin de Reput. l. 2. cap. 5.  as are the true monarchs of Spain, England, &c. where the Kings themselves have the sovereignty without all doubt, or question, not divided with their Subjects; in this case it is not lawful for any one of the Subjects in particular, nor all of them in general, to attempt anything either by way of fact, or of justice, against the honour, life, or dignity of the sovereign: albeit that he had committed all the wickedness, ●mpiety, and cruelty that could be spoken: for as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subject hath no such jurisdiction over his sovereign Prince, of whom dependeth 
Vide Cambd. Eliz. pa. 118. accord.  all power and authority to command. Now if it be not lawful for the Subject, by way of justice to proceed against his Prince, how should it then be lawful to proceed against him by way of fact or force? for question is not here, what men are able to do by strength and force, but what they ought of right to do? the subject is not only guilty of Treason in the highest degree, who hath slain his sovereign Prince, but he also which hath appempted the same, who hath given counsel, or consent thereto. And then he goes on to prove the same by sundry examples taken out of Scripture, and then saith he, to answer vain objecti●ns were but idly to abuse both time and learning: But as he which doubteth whether there be a God or Noah, is not with arguments to be refuted, but with severe punishments, so are they which call into question a thing so clear, and that by books publicly imprinted, that the Subjects may take up arms against their Prince being a Terant; Howbeit the most learned Divines are clear of opinion, that it is not lawful, without especial command from God; And as for that which Calvin faith, if there were at this time Magistrates appointed for the defence of thee people, and to restrain the insolency of Kings, as were the Ephori in Lacedemonia, the Tribunes in Rome, and the Demarches in Athens; that they ought to resist and impeach their licentiousness and cruelty: He showeth sufficiently that it was never lawful in a right Monarchy, for he speaketh but of the popular and Ar●stocratique States of commonweals. We read also that the Protestant Princes of Germany, before they entered into arms against Charles the Emperor, demanded of Martin Luther, if it were lawful? who frankly told them that it was not lawful, whatsoever tyranny, or impiety were pretended, yet was he not therein of them believed: So thereof ensued a most deadly and lamentable war, the ●●d whereof was most miserable, drawing with it the rheum and destruction of many great and noble houses of Germany, with exceeding slaughter of the Subje●ts. The Prince we may justly call the Father of the country, and aught to be more dear unto every one than any Father, Et nulla tanta impretas nullum tantum scelus est, quod sit parricidio vindicandum. I say therefore that the Subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against his sovereign Prince, how naughty and cruel soever he be. Lawful it is not to obey him in all things contrary unto the laws of God and nature, to fly and hide ourselves from him, but yet to suffer stripes, yea and death also, rather than to attempt any thing against his life or honour. This is the substance of that learned Protestants discourse, which is worth your reading at large. But alas, all this discourse is besides the present business, nothing is attempted against the life or honour of the Prince; the taking up of arms, and shooting bullets at him, is in defence of his majesty's person; there are no expressions in this observator, nor yet in him that hath made observations upon a speech of King James▪ with eight and twenty Queres, nor in any other Pamphlets that licentiously sly about, that do at all touch the honour of the King's Subjects may not resist (saith Bodin, and our best Divines) without special command; but ou● Brethren now have special instruction from the Spirit to do what they do, or if they have not the Spirit assuring them that they may take arms against their Prince, yet Master Cal. hath well distinguished, that it is one thing to sight against a King, another thing to fight against the lusts of a King: Against the lusts of a King, my beloved Brethren, we may fight, nay we ought to fight against them.  
And our observator stands in defence of that distinction, That levying Forces against 
Page 45.  the personal commands of the King (though accompanied with his presence) is not levying war against the King, but war against his authory, though not person, is war against the King. But in truth, are not all these shifting distinctions, like a shipman's hose, that will fit an Irish rebel as well as an English: I dare not speak my mind of that distinction the Observator maintains, but you shall hear what an honourable chancellor of England hath long since said of it; This is a dangerous 
Elsmere postnati 99  distinction between the King and the crown, and between the King and the kingdom; it reacheth too far, I wish every good Subject to beware of it. It was never taught but either by traitors, as in Spencer's Bill, in Edward the seconds time, or by treasonable Papists, as Harding in his confutation of the apology maintaineth, that Kings have their authority by the positive Law of Nations, and have no more power than the people have, of whom they take their temporal jurisdiction, and so Ficlerus, Simanca and others of that crew: by seditious sectaries and puritans as Buchanan de Jure Regni apud Scotus, Penry, Knox, and such like, in Calvin's case it is reported that in the reign of Ed. 2. the Spencers to cover the treason hatched in their hear●s, invented this damnable and damned opinion, that homage and oath of legiance was more by reason of the King's crown, (that is of his politic capacity) then by reason of the person of the King: upon which opinion they inferred execrable and detestable consequence. 1. If the King do not demean himself by reason in the right of his Crown, his liege's are bound by oath to remove the King. 2. Seeing the King could not be removed by suit of Law, that ought to be done per aspertee. 3. That his liege's be bound to govern in aid of him, and in default of him: All which were condemned by two Parliaments.  
I will not say that this concerns the Observator, or anybody else, let others judge; I only say, I am unsatisfied how we may lawfully use active resistance with our swords in our hands, against a lawful sovereign Prince, though tyrannising: or if it might be done yet certainly not till after much sufferance, and that destruction shall open its jaws ready to swallow us up; and not upon imagenary fears and jealousies, such as we have had now at least twelve months past; from Papists training under ground, and conspiracies against the State discovered by a traitor lying in a diteh, and which have been wrought in us by weekly relations of horrible, terrible strange news from Denmark, France, Spain, and from all places in Christendom, excepting Amsterdam, from thence no danger at all to be feared. But what if a kingdom may not resist, shall they not therefore have means to save themselves, if a seduced King shall endeavour to lead them back to popery, or to bring them under an arbitrary rule; may they not in good time foreseeing the danger, arm themselves for defence, and not suffer themselves to be led on to the ruin of their lives, fortunes and religion? For Religion, surely no Subjects ought to depart from it at the pleasure or command of any Prince or Potentate, how great or absolute soever his power be; and for their lives and fortunes no commonwealth may want a means of preservation, Salus populi supremalex. But I think the best way to preserve a kingdom or people, is not to allow them a power upon such suppositions, to rise against the pleasure and command of their King or governor; Caligula in a sudden fit of cruelty might wish that all his Subjects heads grew upon one man's shoulders, that so at one blow he might cut them off: But is it possible that after deliberation, such an unnatural wish should settle in the mind of any tyrant? certainly 'tis near bordering on impossibility, that a King should seriously desire to destroy the lives and fortunes of all his Subjects, with which his own sovereignty will necessarily be destroyed: or if he should endeavour to make them slaves and vassals to his arbitrary power, what doth he else but change the good title of a King, to that of a tyrant? which before a lawful Prince will ever do he must be extremely blinded with ambition, and cruelty: And if a King of England should affect it, yet hath the Law disabled him to effect it; his commands must all run in the right Channels of Justice, and equity, or by no particular officer ought to be obeyed, Nihil aliud potest Rex in terris, cum sit Minister Dei, et ejus Vicarius, quam quod de jure potest, it is then a very remote danger, and almost impossible, that can this way befall the Subject: and yet seeing it is not altogether impossible, a mischief I must acknowledge it is, to be under such a possibility. But on the other side, if you g●ve way to the inconstant multitude, upon pretence of saving themselves and the kingdom▪ to rise against authority, we shall every day have the government hazarded, if not destroyed; and in such case, doth not even natural prudence instruct us to live under a possible mischief, then under a daily inconvenience? this Doctrine (of the people's power to judge of danger against the commands of their sovereign, and upon that to take up defensive arms) if it should be admitted, will be more pernicious to Kingly government out of Parliament, than it will be to Parliaments themselves; for as the people may preserve themselves against a wilful seduced Prince that would destroy them, so may they against an Ordinance of the Lords and Commons, if they shall judge it to tend to the destruction of the kingdom, or subversion of Government, the Charter of nature by its supreme Law, entitles all to seek their salety, and against this it will be of little purpose for you to tell the people, that next to renouncing God, nothing is more pernicious then to forsake their representatives: when they shall judge their representatives, forsake their trust, and would lead them on to Anabaptism or any other way to destruction.  
The King is Judge of danger, at least out of Parliament, but if he will not see dangers, or if he himself shall become a danger to the kingdom, the kingdom may save itself: In Parliament we will suppose the Lords and Commons are Judges of danger, but if some driven away by force, and the rest seduced by a Malignant party, will not see dangers from Anabaptists, Brownists, &c. or shall themselves become a danger to the State and settled government, the people may save themselves from ruin; 'tis so written in Natures Magna Charta, cap. 1. Will not this cloak sit exceeding well upon the back of. Irish Rebels? they judge their Religion restrained, and ready to be destroyed by a Prince seduced by the advice of English Protestants, and defence and maintenance of their Religion they take up arms; let's first lay this ground in England, and then let a Doctor in Divinity or some seditious IMP, walk up and down under hand, like the pestilence in the dark to infect the minds of silly men, and make up a faction, whether against King or Parliament; thereupon what think you will become of regal and Parliamentary power, will not they both be made subject to the designs of such seditious, Protestants as at any time shall be able with the glorious names of Liberty, and self preservation to abuse and intoxicate the minds of the wavering multitude? If the King being led away with an old error of Protestancy, shall endeavour to extirpate the believing Brownist, or orthodox Anabaptist; may not the Brownists, or Anabaptiss (judging their Religion to be true) save themselves, nay ought they not to catch at all advantages, whereby they may deliver their blinded King, and kingdom, from following after their own destruction, in an Antichrist way of Protestancy? It was long siince suspected by the King, and by many of his good Subjects, that the ordinance of the Militia, would be used to the overthrow of Government and destruction of the realm, and since that hath raised unto the Authors of it a sufficient strength to over master all opposition we see they have already adventured to root out Episcopacy, together with Deans and Chapters, Archdeacons, chancellors, and the ancient and honourable profession of ecclesiastical and imperial Law, besides a good part of the common Law overturned, and in likelihood the rest will not stay long by us: And how far this wilful rejection (I say wilful rejection, not barely the want) of Episcopacy is destructive to the very essence of a Church, is much to be doubted. After so good e●rnest given of their intentions, I suppose a major part of the Realm, are well satisfied that their Militia, and the ordinances send to the destruction of the Realm, if so, then by this ground they may lawfully save themselves and oppose their destruction: Admit this, or forsake your principle. And yet if it will do you any service I am content at present you take advantage of it: I will admit the Kingdom, if they see the King would destroy them, may preserve themselves; you will say ●f the people have power to preserve themselves against the danger a seduced K. would bring upon them, then must they have power to judge of that danger, when it is, and when not: and if the people have power to judge of danger, and defend themselves, without and against their King; then may they intrust that power unto some others, for that all should assemble ●● next to impossible, and could not be without confusion; a few th●refore may be entrusted to judge for all, and to direct the manner of their defence: well, It is admitted they may intrust this power with some few, but that they have entrusted it with the Lords and Commons, I must deny. There is no colour to say it is entrusted with the Lords, they judge only for themselves, and if the King intended to alter the Government, or Religion, it is likely he would create such as should assist his intentions; and therefore it will be of little purpose to give the kingdom a power to judge of dangers, and save itself, unless they may do it by the major part of their proxies alone, both against King and Lords. You put in the Lords only to gloss your actions, for the present, but by your principles the power must be in the Commons only, if anywhere; Now clearly there is no such trust imparted to the Commons their trust is limited by the writ to advise with the King, not to make Acts and Ordinances in any case, against him: Nor can I possibly see why the Coroners elected by the body of each county according to the King's writ, might not as reasonably claim this trust, as the major part of the Commons alone, unless we must therefore think it to be the Commons right, because they now pretend unto it.  
The Observator tells us, We may not imagine the Houses should be injurious, no age will furnish us with one story of any Parliament, freely elected and held, that ever did injure a whole kingdom, or exercise any Tyranny. I'll charge tyranny on none; only I say if the now major part of Lords and Commons against the King's pleasure, and authentic Proclamations, have power to command the subjects in general, and to imprison, kill, and slay such as withstand their commands, and obey his majesty's Proclamations, I would gladly be instructed how this power is derived unto them, either from King or people, or whether we must think they above all other men, were naturally borne unto it? Mean while, I like well the Observators note in honour of free Parliaments, that never any such injured a kingdom. But yet such as have called themselves free Parliaments have injured King and kingdom, this have the Lords and Commons done when they have left the head free in His royal assent, or disassent to such Bills, as they had a mind to pass; of which take one Example, 15. E. 3. The Lords and Commons pressed the King to pass a Law derogatory to his just prerogative, that Parliament being ended, and the kingdom representing itself again the same year, it was enacted, Whereas in the last Parliament certain Articles expressly contrary to the laws of England and the Prerogatives and royal rights, were pretended to be granted by manner of a Statute, the King considering how that by the bond of his Oath, he was bound to the defence of such laws and Prerogatives, because the King never freely consented to the said pretended Statute; It seemed good to the Earls Barons, and other wise men, that sithence the said statute did not of the King's freewill proceed, the same should be void.  
It seems at this time, the King was not bound to pass whatsoever the Lords and Commons Voted to be for the good of the kingdom: And his oath did tie him to seek a restitution of his prerogative against such forced laws, so far was it from tying him to pass all such laws as the Houses should judge fit.  
Questionless the King is bound by oath and office, to pass all good and just laws (yet that part of the oath that hath been urged doth not prove so much) But the question is whether he be not free to judge what is a good and just Law, and what not? But must submit his understanding, judgement, and Conscience to the votes of Lords and Commons, so that the six Articles for popery pass them he is bound to pass it. Queen Elizabeth was boun● to pass an Act abolishing popery, because the Lords and Commons had Voted a Bill again●● protestancy, Queen Mary was bound to pass that likewise.  
So again the King wishes all good subjects to put the case to themselves; If the Papist● in Ireland should make themselves the major part of both Houses, and pretending their Religion to be in danger of extirpation by a Malignant party of Protestants and puritans should pass a Bill for settling the Militia in such as they should confide in, is not the King bound to assent unto it? Not in that case, saith the Observator, For England and Ireland are one and the same Dominion, there is as true and intimate an union betwixt them and England, as betwixt England and Wales, though they meet not in one Parliament; yet to s●●● purposes their Parliaments are not to be held several Parliaments, and therefore if Papist● were stronger, and more in Parliament there, yet would they want authority to over rule any thing voted and established before in England, and they being the minor part of Ireland 〈◊〉 ENGLAND both aught to sit down, for that the major part will probability prevail against them; and in all suffrages, the minor part that blood may not be shed●, ought to 〈◊〉 down.  
Alack, alack, how doth the good man bestir himself to bedge up a seeming answer unto this objection? He supposeth England and Ireland to be one and the same dominion which is certainly false; Statutes that are limited to the realm and Dominion of England, do not extend to Ireland: That there is as true and intimate an union betwixt England and Ireland, as betwixt England and Wales, is con●radicted by himself, acknowledging England and Ireland to be governed by several Parliaments, several to most (if not to all) purposes▪ 'tis true Ireland is united to the imperial crown of England, and so is Scotland, yet all 
33. H. 8. ca. 1. 28. H. 8. c. 19 Davis Rep. 25.  three are distinct kingdoms: He saith they want authority there, to over rule any thing established before in England: But Ireland will say the English Parliament wants authority to establish a Religion in Ireland: Or admit the Irish Parliament hath not authority to over rule any thing established before in England, yet the point that the King instanteth in, that is the Militia of Ireland, is not established by Parliam●nt in England; why ought not the King then to ass●nt to the disposal of it according as the Irish parliament shall desire? or if he will not assent, why may not the Irish of themselves dispose of it, as now the English do? If we shall admit them to be one Dominion, why then if the papists in Ireland, the popish party in England, and their adherents the episcopal party, and the misnamed Malignant party shall join in one desire against our superfine Reformers, the Reformers being far the minor part, aught to sit down and acquiesce, otherwise blood will be shed, and the major part in probability prevail; you to lay a Calumny on the King, will say they speak all one language, and conspire in one end, which although no sober man will credit, yet this is certain, that they all concur in some things against new Confounders (I should say Reformers) In these things then by your own rule, the minor part ought to yield and acquiesce.  
If the major part present of Lords and Commons shall desire it, the King you will say, is bound to pass an Act that no marriage for any of his Children shall be concluded, not treated on without the Parliaments assent; By the same reason that he is bound to pass this Law to the English, he will be bound to pass the like to the Irish, and again the like to the kingdom of Scotland, because the Lords and Commons in the several Parliaments desire it, and the kingdoms have a like interest and right to warrant that desire; If these laws be passed what will become of the royal line; Besides a match may be mentioned or treated on, a Parliament for that 〈◊〉 purpose must be called in each kingdom, and being called, is it probable three Nations so different in their constitutions should agree in one? The Scots ●●y approves marriage desired with the French. The Irish will rather desire the alliancs of Spain, The English of Denmark.  
In this case to observe one Law, is to break two; yet such a Law being Voted, or any thing else, the King you say is bound to pass it, and you seem to prove it thus: 'tis acknowledged the King is bound by Oath and Office to pass all just laws that are either for preservation or good of the Subjects: to grant this say you, that he is bound to pass just ●awes, and yet to leave him to his own free judgement, what is a just and good Law, is to give us a dry right without a remedy: So again you object, If the King will not call the Parliament. For making laws when it is expedient, that must not conclude the people, for the● they would have a dry right to Parliaments without a remedy: And upon this ground, and for that the King hath his power given him (as you suppose) by the people, and that upon trust, you will have him accountable to the Lords and Commons the representatives of the people, how he hath discharged his trust: and if he shall be found neglectful or faulty, there must be you say, a means to enforce, otherwise we are subject to the boundless will of the Prince, and a gap is opened to, as past and arbitrary power, as ever the Grand signior had: If the King may so assume a share in the Legislative power, as that without his concurrence, the Lords and Commons may not Judge of dangers, and by temporary Ordinances put the kingdom into a posture of defence, God hath not then left human nature any means of sufficient preservation. Thus the Observator.  
Although he mention God, yet I doubt his Argument, is grounded in atheism, because forsooth, we have not the remedy in our own hands, therefore are we without remedy expos●● to the will of any tyrannous Prince that may be: either than he thinks there is no God, or with Epicurus, that he is ot●osum inexer●itum et neminem i●t humanis rebus ad ●●li cardines o●●●b lat, & nulla tangitur mortalium cura. For if there be a God with providence, why should we be afraid to trust our remedy with him? There is a bridle to restrain the licentious will of ambitious Princes, and that's the Law, but the reins must not be laid in the hands of subjects, The Heart of the King, must be in the hands of the Lord, he will direct it towards the subjects good; or if a Prince shall incline to Tyranny, he will in good time remove him, unless it be his pleasure by him to chastise the sins of that people, or to try and improve their patience, in which case there is a blessing for them, that can content themselves with a fiat voluntas Domini. God only (I have proved) is the Author, and efficient cause of Kingly power, Kings are his anointed his vicegerents, and therefore properly occomptable to him alone. Where the word of a King is, there is power, and who may say 
Eccles. 8. v● 8. Bracton l. 5 tract. 3. c. 3. & li. 1. cap. 8. W●sd. 6.  unto him what dost then? Non potest ei (Regi) necessitatem aliquis imponere quod injurian● s●●m corrigat et emendat nisi velit, cum superiorem non habeat nisi Deum, et satis erit ●i ad pae●●● quod dominum expectat ultorem. Punishment enough indeed, if you consider how much more severe God is, in taking an Account of Kings, then of other men subject to temporal punishments, which you may see set down by a King himself. hear therefore O ye Kings and understand, learn ye that be judges of the end of the Earth, Give ●are you that rule the people, and glory in the multitude of Nations, for power is given you of the Lord and sovereignty from the highest, who shall try your works, and search out your counsels, because being Ministers of his kingdom, you have not judged aright, nor kept the law, nor walked after the council of God; horribly and speedily shall he come upon you, for a sharp judgement, shall be to them that be in high places, for mercy will soon pardon the meanest, but mighty men shall be mightily tormented. Were there not a God to take this severe account from Kings, and to strain their ambitious desire from tyrannising over their subjects, yet by what hath been formerly said, it will appear to be more safe for a people, to live subject to the inconvenience then to give power to the people, upon pretence of saving themselves, to ri●e against sovereign authority.  
A supreme indisputable power must be somewhere, this the observator acknowledgeth, and all must acknowledge that are not in love with Anarchy: the question than is only this, whe● is its most safe resting? In the Parliament saith the observator▪ ● agree with him in the King 
pag. 45. Arist. Eth. 18. Cap. 10  in Parliament, is the most safe resting of the supreme indisputable power: But the mischief is, the observator by Parliament means only the Lords & Commons distinguished from the King: Now whether it be more safe resting in them, or in the King with them, th●● is the question? which in effect is all one with this whether Democracy be a better form of Government always follows the disposition of the sovereign power; If therefore the Sov●reigne power rest incontrollably in one alone, then is the Government simply monarchical, If it rest in the chief peers, than it is an Optimacy: If in the people Democracy: If it r●●t in one alone and yet to the use of it in the most weighty matters, a consent of Peers, and people is to be had▪ then it is not an absolute, but an admirably well tempered Monarchy. Now if you compare the 3 simple forms of Government, A●istotle will thus determine Har●●●● optima est Regnum, deterima Democratia: In so clear a truth, the spirit of opposition could not force him to dissent from his Master Plato, who having set down those 3 simple forms of Government, with three mixed and compounded, thus delivers his judgement. V●i●● dominatio bonis instructa leg●bus sex illarum omnium optima est, Gubernationem vero ●a●in qu● 
Plato in Bolitico▪  non multi imperant mediam cens●re d●b●mus, caeterum multorum administration●m ●●●ibus is rebus debilematque infirm●m. And surely if this judgement be not right, near all the world are in error; But n●w though simple Monarchy, do far exceed their Cons●●ar or popular Government, yet is it not without its inconveniencies, and therefore it may be so tempered and mixed, as that it may still remain Monarchy, and yet have its inconveniencies restrained & avoided as farforth as may be, then will it of all others, whether absolute, or mixed, become the most useful and convenient form of Government. Now such, and no other is the constitution of Government in England, so well poised and moulded by the wisdom of our ancestors as that it gives to this kingdom▪ the conveniencies of all, without the inconveniencies of any one; as far forth as by human prudence they may be prevented. The supreme power therefore of making Laws whereby to govern and judge the people in time of peace, as likewise 
His majesty's Answer to the 19 propositions  the power of armies for preventing of invasions and insurrections, rests in a King only, & immovably, whereby he is sufficiently enabled to protect his people: And again as the King himself acknowledgeth those laws by which he is to govern may not be made but by the Consent of the house of Peers and by the house of Commons chosen by the people, all h●ving free votes and particular privileges▪ And that the Prince, may not make use of his high and perpetual power, to the hurt ●f ●ho●e for whose good he hath it, the house of Commons (as an ●●cellent conserv●r of liberty) is solely entrusted with the first propositions concerning the levies of m●●y (the sinews of pe●c●, a●●●●) and for the impe●cki●g of tho●e who for their own ends (though countenanced by any surreptiti●usly gotten command of the King) have violated that law▪ which the King is bound (when h● knows it) to protect and to the protection of which, they were bound to advise him, at the least not to serve him in the contrary, And the Lords being trusted with a jud●●atory power are an exc●llent sk●●ene and bank between the prince & people, to assist each ●gainst the encroachment of the other. Now whether it be more safe for the supreme indisputable power after this manner to rest in the King, or else to be in the Lords and Commons, excluding the king, that's the question? The ●bser●ator urgeth these inconveniences that s●eme to rem●i● in this regulated Monarchy, so that it is at the King's pleasure when h● shall iudg● fit to call parliament● and being called, by dissent he my frustrate their proceedings, and at his pleasure dissolve ●heir being: If this be so, how have they a power more than sufficient to restrain tyranny? ●●●●ly if these principles hold, Parliaments will be made the very Engines and Scaffolds whereby to erect▪ a Government more tyrannical than ever was known in any other kingdom: What ●●mes do we live in, when the known principles of ancient Government shall be thus impudently railed at? That it is left at the King's just pleasure to call Parliaments, (upon which o●●er rights depend) is a truth so manifest, that I am ashamed to allege any proof of it; that the King hath indisputable power of dissolving of Parliaments, is equally manifest, and acknowledged by the Act for not dissolving this present Parliament; and that the King in his ●udgment dissenting may thereby quash their proceedings, for as much as it is at this time denied, I have formerly proved it. But if this be so, what is left to restrain tyranny? Marry as much as conveniently may be: For though it be at the King's pleasure to call and dissolve Parliaments; he is disabled to make any new laws, or repeal the old, how great need so●ver there be for it: Nor may he raise Subsidies for his wars, or other occasions, without 〈◊〉 in Parliament: If impositions be otherwise indirectly laid upon the subject, the ministers ought not to levy it, or if it be levied, experience teacheth that the King will be thereby the greater loser: These and many other motives there are enforcing a King to call Parliaments, and to comply with the just desires of his subjects': And yet of late I must confess, we have had occasion to bewail the too long intermission of Parliaments of which a reverend judge complaining, gives us the probable reason: At the last meeting in Parliament (saith 
Hutton's Argument against Ship money p. 33  he) either by ill choice of the members, of that House, or by the great increase of the number, or by the ambitious humours of some Members of that House, who aimed more at their own ●●ds, and designs, than the general good of the commonwealth; things were so carried, not ●● was used in ancient time, but so disastrously, that it hath wrought such a disease of this course of Parliaments, as we and all that love the commonwealth, have just cause to be sorry for it. But now the fruits that have sprung from this error in Government, are discovered, the remembrance whereof will ever hereafter put Princes in mind of calling Parliaments. And to secure this unto us, His majesty hath now passed an Act for Trieninall Parliaments, not d●●●olvable within the space of 50▪ days'; than which can there be a better assurance against tyranny, not destroying monarchy itself? Yet all this will not satisfy the Observator; If the King shall have the disposing of the Militia, or power of the kingdom, according to the established laws, and may so claim a share in the Legislative power, as that the Lords and Commons may not without him, make laws and ordinances whensoever themselves shall think fit and necessary so to do; or if at any time (without presupposing a necessity) he shall not according to his oath and office, assent to what laws and ordinances the Houses shall Vote, though they go against his own judgement and Conscience; there will be still a means left for the King to make himself a tyrant, or an absolute Lord, not limited by Law, but disposing all things according to his lawles●e will, and pleasure; A power you say, is left that he may these, but the Law trusts him presuming he will not abuse it, and that objection that is against the presumption of the Law, none should presume to make. Something must be left if it cannot be restrained, but that Monarchy will be destroyed, or disabled to perform its office▪ that restraint that you would put upon it by placing a superior power in the Lords & Commons, into whose command the King shall be but a mere Minister, changes the government to popular or consular, having less appearance of Monarchy in it, then that of Venice, wher● the Duke in the highest power of making laws, hath a concluding voice freely allowed him, and yet is that government acknowledged to be aristocratical, if not democratical. If then the King should so abuse his power, as to make himsel●● an absolute Monarch, yet we are better to live under that, then under an optimacy mixed with democracy.  
How are Consular estates almost continually tossed up and down, with the bill●●●● 〈◊〉 surges of ambitious discontented factions? what republic could ever preserve itself fro● being torn in pieces with intestine disentions? or over run with forragne invasion? di● not Rome when it was a republic any other while degenate into seditions di●cord, and civil wars? with in the space of 500▪ years' (to which period it could not reach how many things and rechanges had they of their government: under all which it 〈◊〉 came to flourish, so as under the sole Gournement. of Julius and Augustus▪ And yet R●●● of all states have best thriven under such popular government the other three empires Assyrian, Grecian▪ and Persian grew to their greatness under Monarchy, and were of lon●●● continuance then the republic of Rome: but I will not enlarge myself upon soe co●●● a theme, where in all learned men agree and experience conformeth an Optima●●●● Rep●●lique unlimited. to be far worse than unlimited▪ sovereignty. The Obs●ruator▪ neu●rthe●●● stands vp●n defence of the contrary, the King objecting that the houses claim an arbir●●●● illimited power to unsettle the security of all men's estates, and that they are sed●●ible▪ 〈◊〉 may nay have abused this power: To this the observator answereth. That there is an Arbit●●ry 
page. 34.  power in every state somewh●re, 'tis true 'tis necessary every man hath absolute power ov●r himself; but because no man can hate himself this power is not d●ngerous: So every State ha● a● arbitrary power over itself, and there is no danger in it for the same reason; if the state 〈◊〉 his to one man, or fe●, th●r● may be danger in it, but the Parliament is neither on●, or fe● it is no good consequence the Parliament doth abuse power because it may; and again●▪ The King challenges a greater power than Parliaments.  
Is not this to prefer Democracy, if not Anarchy before Monarchy? Not only suprem● power regulated by Law, is safer in many then in one or few, but an arbitrary power is likewise in them without danger, because as one man cannot hate himself, so a state cannot h●●● itself: But yet a state may hate one another, some few may ambitiously seek to overto●● the rest; the rest may tumultuously rise against the few; divisions may b●eake th●● into pe●ces and make them a prey for foreign invasion: and there wants a sovereign King to sett●● differences, to suppress tumults, and invasions, and yet no danger, because no man can ●ate himself: But what though arbitrary power in the people, or their proxies the parliament▪ may be thus abused? 'tis no good consequence therefore they do or will abuse it; If it be not a good consequence against Parliaments, than not against Kings, that because they may abuse their power to make themselves absolute, therefore they do it, or will do it: Again you tell us the King challenges a greater power than Parliaments, you mean the Lords and C●●mons, and 'tis true he challenges a greater power than they have; but not ● greater than they challenge or you give them, for you say Every state hath an absolute arbitrary power▪ and ●● Parliament is indeed the state itself, and so have an absolute arbitrary power; a greater the● which I am sure, neither King, nor Tyrant can claim; and the King of England ne●ther lawfully can, nor doth claim so much; He claims a supreme power not absolute bu● political, regulated by law, not arbitrary, nor can he make Parliament ordinances or laws binding to the kingdom in general without them, upon any pretended necessities, but without him they make such.  
The observator ha●h another Argument to prove Domocracy, or the Soverai●ne power in a Committee to be better and more safe than in one. The King asketh, why not the King predominate rather than the Lords and Commons? The observator answers, We ●●● a maxim, and it was ground●d up●n nature, and never till this Parliament withstood▪ That a Committe● can have no private e●ds ●o misl●ad it▪ no Parliament ever injured a whole king●●●●, o● exercised any Tyranny, nor is there ●●y possibility how it should. True it is a Committee or Corporation metaphysically abstracted from those of whom it is compounded, can have no private end, as not being subject to any lust, appetite, or passion, 〈◊〉 yet to death; but the particulars compounding that body may have private or at least evil 〈◊〉.  
What doth the Observator think of the council of TRENT? Could it aim 〈◊〉 nothing but good? cannot a Committee exercise Tyrann●e? D●d the vas●alls unto ●●●thage never suffer under that Committee? would they not have chosen to groan under the oppressions of a Dionysius, rather than under the intolerable exactions and Ordinances ●f that Tyran●zing Dame? Did not Athens suffer under thirty Tyrants, who at first had the people's consent to govern? Did never any Parliament in Rich. 2d. time abuse the ●ingdome▪ Why then did one Parliament condemn another? Was there not a Parliament sometimes branded with the name of Parliamentum insanum? and hath there not been ● Parliament termed Parliamentum Doctorum in quo jugulum Ecclesiae atrocius petebatur? I speak not this to cast any the least blemish upon that thrice Honourable, and never enough commended counsel; but only to show that by the fury and practise of some Members, the whole body may possibly be led into error, and injure the commonwealth: Some members may possibly combined themselves for alteration of Government in Church and State, and if they can back their design which the force of an unruly multitude, they may with that force and hypocrisy mixed together, prevail with the major part of the Houses, and then having got an Act to be indissolvable, they may go on with their design, making ●se of such schismatical and seditious dispositions as the commonwealth shall then abound with, and abusing the rest of the people with imaginary fears and jealousies from foreign kingdoms, and pretending an alteration of Government to be endeavoured a prelatical popish malignant party at home, who have so far seduced their King, as that he will not ●earken to the advice of his great council▪ they may then upon pretence of prepelling such dangers, make themselves Monsters of the Militia, and strength of the realm; That ●one, it is possible they may proceed to destroy the hierarchy of Church, and monarchy in the State, and then what will let but that they may reign as arbitrary Lords? possible I say it is, that some Members in a Committee may thus make themselves Lordly Tyrants, and the● too late will the people wish to have kept under a King, though he should have proved ● Tyrant; for so there might have been some end of their miseries: Many Tyrants have again changed into worthy Kings, or if that hope should delude their expectations, yet his death would ere long make place for a successor, who probably may prove a milder Lord: but a tyrannising community will be an immortal slavery. I da●e not say this is now aimed at by any, yet I could wish men would wa●ily consider circumstances, and well weigh with themselves whether our Observators principles do not make way for some such end; which the wisdom of Parliament cannot but deter; and I hope, will ever present.  
He gives an absolute arbitrary power to such as shall by what means soever make themselves a major part in the Houses▪ neither Statutes nor precedents shall be binding unto them: all oaths and ties of Allegiance unto their King must cease, if they Vote their sovereign be their danger; and yet for●ooth they are obliged by justice and honour not to do wrong to King nor kingdom, that is all the security this observator will allow for our Religion lives ●●●●erties: and yet what applause and approbation hath his desp●rate principles received amongst many of us, as if they all tended to a glorious freedom. O that men would wisely consider what enemies they are unto themselves, who blindly hinting after the name of liberty, overtorne and destroy their ancient sec●●ities.  
'tis not prerogative that is now contending with the subject's liberty, but liber●ie struggles with ochlocracy, the established protestant Religion with schism and heresy; whether learning, Law, the flower of Nobility, the best and choice of the commonalty may live an● not be destroyed, is the question? An Act of oblivion wherein all unhappy difference● and contentions may lie forever buried, hath once and again been offered and refused▪ So●● men's debts and necessities must be satisfied out of the skins of those they call malignant●  
Are not all such as meddle with the Commission of Array, or assist and stand by his majesty in this opposition, declared by those whose well meaning integrity, his majesty supposeth to be abused by some few malignant spirits, to be wicked and traitorous enemies to the State? Is it not ag●ine required that all who are or shall be voted Delinquents be delivered up to the justice (as they call it) of Parliament? will they be content to be tried o● both sides, by the kingdom representing itself in a second Parliament? No saith the Observator, that were to exceed in infinitum. Will they then allow the King to be an essential part of this Parliament? or if not, will they remove this Parliament to any other plac● but London? that so all the members may freely resort unto it, and deliver their conscience● without being posted or prescribed or torn in pieces by a rabble of people that shall requir●● their names:: They see no reason for that. What remains then but that themselves be justified by themselves, and all that dissent from them be at their mercy or destruction? And do not three parts of four of the Nobility dissent from them? Are not near an equal part of the Commons house disinclined to these proceedings? If you intermingle the Lords, and Commons elected, are they not opposed with equal number? Besides the King and his royal Line to turn the State, survey the kingdom, are not the most and most learned of the Divines against them? Are not the most and most learned in the professions of Cano● and Common law, disapproving their proceedings? will they in that property falls within the cognizance of judges, as the legality or illegality of the Commission of Array, be directed by the judges and sergeants for such purposes attending in the house of Lords? On which side stands the visible major part of those Seminaries of learning the universities, and inns of Court? which way are the most of the gentry and such of the commonalty, whose education or nature gives them abilities to discern further into things than other men? Must these be all turned out of the King's protection, to be at pleasure destroyed? Must the Militia be delivered up, that so the King may be disabled to give them, and such as shall hereafter, finding themselves abused, return unto their sovereign, a due and just protection? because those that demand the disposal of it, have found a means to betray a multitude unto their cause, amongst whom, and on whose side, all the Anabaptists, Brownists, Familists, and Non-conformists, are to be found even to a man; and yet besides them, I verily believe there are very many able, honest, and well minded men, as likewise many right noble Lords and Members in the House of Commons, most heartily desiring the good of their country, whose innocence and noble disposition making them unapt to suspect a foul face of treachery to be masked under the pretence of liberty, subjects them to the deceits and hypocrisy of some few furious deformers, who as they want not art to abuse the integrity of many good subjects, so have they many other means and inducements to make their cause suitable with the common sort of men: They adorn it, with assuming (but unjustly) the glorious name of Parliament, with the very ty●le of Reformation they so tickle up the crazy minds of the multitude, (who ever are in dislike with what is present, and believe much virtue to be in that which they never tried) that to witness their affections and forwardness in such a cause, they will be content to charge, and overcharge themselves, and some of them to hazard their own lives, rather than (as they are persuaded) to live like vassals under a tyrannising Prince, or Popish superstition; and these slanders of an intention to bring in Popery, and superstition, and arbitrary rule, with such other falsities, are ever made the Triarian Legion, in which they put their last and chiefest strength; were in soundness of reason that did support their cause, it would not prevail chiefly where least ability of judgement, is? But as which the simpler sort (ever jealous over the intents and purposes of wiser men) imaginary fears and slanders are the aptest means to prevail; So in others, ambition and self conceit meeting with an unquiet and factious spirit, is that which (I am persuaded) hath given the greatest furtherance unto this unhappy cause.  
Let every man enter into his own heart, and ask himself, what it is that he particular wants? what point of liberty his Ancestors ever had, which he now hath not, or may not have granted by the King? Let him ask himself whether more be not granted then ever our Forefathers had? and whether it be not as well, Nay better secured unto us, than ever any liberty was unto them? Why then are we not happy and contented as they were? Surely we shall find no other cause of our present misery, but that unquiet spirit within ourselves; were we not possessed with this unquiet spirit, strong in its illusions, vain and ridiculous fears could not have so far prevailed with us? Who to affright the world hath invented day by day those many plots of Treason, which experience hath assured us to be all but vain, or wickedly invented? What is it that carries on with fury and madness those disturbers of Church and State the Brownist, the Anabaptist, and those of the Family? Is not this unquiet spirit that rages within their own breasts? This is that spirit with which some seditious preachers being themselves professed, labour to infuse the same into their ignorant auditory? with this seditious spirit some members finding themselves to have been hurried on to the hazard of their lives and fortunes, endeavour as much as they can to draw others into the same danger, hoping thereby to make the multitude of offenders, a refuge and safe guard for their own offences: It is the desperate fury of this bloodthirsty spirit that rejects all terms of Accommodation.  The way of peace it will not know. 
O most unhappy England! Thou that for happiness stoodst so lately in the envy of all Europe, shalt now through the raging fury of this infernal spirit, lie weltering in thine own blood: Dead carcases shall be strowen up and down thy streets, the Father divided against his own bowels, brother against brother, like the Children of Sadmus, each slaying and imbruing their hands in the others blood.  
In this violent storm of intestine war, who can promise to himself security of his fortunes, family, or life in itself; Shall not we be all split upon the rocks of self division, or overwhelmed with the stormy wind of foreign invasion, unless with timely resistance, we either cast out or destroy this unquiet spirit? Let us not delud● ourselves with imaginations that to give way to its fury, will be the shortest way to end our misery: Consider those that are in opposition to it: Consider the justness of their cause, and you will not exact, that they while there runs but one drop of blood in their v●ines should yield themselves to be trampled on by the fury of their insulting adversaries, betraying their Religion and Liberty to the destroying Anabaptist; or when they shall be overborne and destroyed, do you that shall survive them, expect to enjoy a calm after so bloody a Tempest? will there not arise dissensions amongst yourselves? You do not all surely conspire the same end, who nevertheless infected by some few malignant spirits, are united in opposition to your sovereign: of many of you I cannot but say, O quam honesta voluntate miseri●stis? Yet are there not Anabaptists Brownists and other Sectaries abounding amongst you? and do not each aim at the establishing of his own Sect? Against all which you that are truly Protestants must oppose yourselves, and so must engage yourselves in a second war, as bloody as the former, unless you will comply and suff●r yourselves to be carried on beyond your proposed ends of reformation; which is an effect that often befalls well-minding reformers, when they attempt it by tumultuous force, by some fury▪ amongst them to be forced on beyond their aim and intended scope. These and many other miseries will assuredly encount●r with you, unless God shall please timely to unite the hearts of the King and His Parliament, to the confusion of those s●ismaticall and seditious spirits, who hope by abusing the good intentions of th●se ●onourable Houses, to establish their design●s in the destr●ction of the commonwealth. If any harsh expressions have fallen from me in this discourse, I desire they may be applied against the destroying pests, and only against them. If in the matter which the Observator hath given occasion to treat of, I have through error too strictly limited the royal power, or in aught derogated from the right and au●hority of the houses of Parliament. I shall be most sorry for such my mistake, and be ready to retract the same upon the first intimation. It was necessary if I would say any thing against the Observator, that I should insist upon the actions of the major part of the House; in which whatsoever hath been said, is by way of proposal of my doubts rather than dogmatizing any conclusions, and that the observator may not from h●nce have any occasion further to debate and bandy the principles of Government, which ought to remain sacred and untouched▪ I shall abstract from thence in way of recapitulation such doubts, as (without examining the cause and origin of regal and Parliamentary power) being well satisfied, will much settle my now scrupulous mind, and will I think, go far in satisfaction of many others: They arise from consideration of the means used in composing the House of Commons, of the proceedings and Acts of the Houses so composed, or from the consequences a and effects that from those acts and proceedings are likely to ensue.  
His majesty objects, that in the determination of elections, no other rule was observed then affection to the persons, with reverence to their opinions for the abolition and destruction of ecclesiastical government, &c. witness the excelling at one clap a great number of persons fairly elected, upon pretence of having had their hand in some Monopoly: against whom to this day they never have proceeded, whereby they might be restored if innocent, or if faulty others might be elected in their rooms to serve for the Coun●ry: And yet they continue among them, some that are notoriously known to be promoters of Monopolies, because their opinions are such as do well please them. This objection and many others in that Declaration concerning the determination of elections, doth and will somewhat stagger me until the observator shall furnish me, with a sufficient answer. Again I desire to be instructed▪ whether it be but a calumny raised against some worthy Members, that by their means and countenance terror and force should be used to amate the courage of some members, who would not otherwise comply with their opinions, whether nippie reprehensions and sometimes imprisonment and other punishments were not rigorously used towards such as did not run with the happy vote of the prime and worthy members? whereas others combined for alteration, did and might take a liberty to say and propose even what they pleased themselves? If there be a truth in these objections, it will be to little purpose to dispute what is the power of the Houses of Parliament fairly chosen and freely vo●ing.  
Concerning their arts and proceedings, I am unsatisfied by the Observator, whether the Commons alone may make binding Ordinances, even out of the case of necessity? If not, how shall I defend their imposing the Protestation upon all the kingdom, by a Declaration, that what person soever shall not take it, is unfit to bear office in Church and commonwealth, and yet before that the Lords had rejected a bill for imposing the same Protestation? How sha●l I defend their published orders, as that of the ninth of September in derogation of the book of Common prayer, and for suspension of some laws in force concerning Church-government: Or if not in ordinary ●ases, yet inform me, whether in case of ne●essitie, the Commons may make O●dinances, maugre the King and Lords, and dispose of the strengeh of the realm? And if so, whether they may not likewise levy Subsidies, and impose taxes in such manner as they shall think fi●.  
Whether is it pliamenta●y when a Bi●l hath been once and again rejected to obtrude it a third time in the same Session, taking advantage of the absence of such, as are known to oppose it? Thus it is said was done to pass the Ordinance for the Militia.  
How shall I satisfy such as saw heard, and felt the frequent tumults resorting to the Parliament house d●ores, o be no tumults but lawful assemblies, although they threatened and assaulted some Members, and af●righted very many? If I yield they were tumults, I contradict a Declaration in the name of the Lords and Commons, defining them to be lawful assemblies: If I say they were not tumults, I am threatened by a Decl●ration formerly made by a fuller house of Peers, and s●nt down to the house of Commons to have had their assistance for the suppressing of such tumul●s.  
If it be objected to me, that the new major part of the Houses do assume and challenge ordinary power to make new, and repeal old laws; shall I answer, that they have not as yet so far encroached upon the liberty of the Subject, my opponent will I doubt reply, that indirectly and implicite●y they have alr●ady done it, though pol●●ie will that they forbear a while to claim it in down right terms, for fear it should too much sta●tle the subject, whose liberty must be invaded by degrees; at first th●refore the v●te shall be only thus, Whensoever the Lords a●● Commons shall d●cla●e what the law of the land is, the same must be asse●ted to and obeyed: Let this be ●rst swall●wed, and it w●ll ●hence be early proved in good time, that those 
De●lar. Maii 27 concerning the Stat. of E. 1.  that may authorative declare the law, l●ying an obligation immediately upon all to obey such Declaration, may likewise whensoever they please, make new or repeal the old law: this will wil● be proved by a Declaration of the Lords and Commons. If it were admitted (say they) that the King by his Proclamation (●he ●ow major part of Lo●ds and Commons by their vote) may declare a law, thereby his Proclamation (their vote) will in effect become laws: which would turn ●o the subversion of the law of the land, and the rights and liberties of the Subject. This again the Observator proves, There is (saith he) in the interpretation of law upon the last appeal the same supremacy of power requisite, as is in making it, and therefore grant the King to be supreme interpreter, and 'tis all one as if we grant him to be supr●m● maker of law; grant him this, and we grant ●im to be above all limits, all conditions, all human bounds whatsoever, we resign all into his hands, Lives, laws, Liberties, Parliaments, all to be held at me●re discre●ion. But the King (will my opponent say) never c●aimed to himself alone any such power; but the now major part of the two Houses do claim to themselves (and such as shall at any time make themselves a major part) this supreme power of interpreting and declaring law; and accordingly they declare that the King may not send for sergeant Skippon, nor require any subject to come to him, which by some special service is not bound to come to him. That the K●ng could not by the law adjourn the term to York and many such other Declarations, and Interpretations of law they have made, to all which they require the kingdom should obey without appealing. And so they (not the King) will have our laws, Lives, Liberties, Parliaments, all to be held at mere discretion: Now what clear answer may be made to this reply, I desire to be instructed,  
Another doubt that perplexeth me, ariseth from their declaring the privilege of Parliament to extend to high treason; now I do not know that any privilege can have its ground or commencement, unless it be by statute, grant, or prescription; no statute, grant, or presciption can be alleged for this privilege against treason; nor indeed can a grant in such case hold fo●ce, if the King and Pope (when the Pope was conceived to have had plenitude of power) should have both joined in granting a sanctuary for treason, although it were not to exempt traitors from all manner of trial or punishment, yet was such a grant in itself merely void, 1 Hen. 7. Staff●rds case, &c. And by the statute 26 Hen. 8. cap. 13. it is enacted, that no offendor in any kind of high treason shall have the privilege of any manner of sanctuary: And as there is neither statute nor grant, so no prescription neither to exempt the members of Parliament wholly from punishment, nor yet to change the method and manner of their trial: for no prescription can be, but it must be both reasonable in itself, and also used and allowed; now there hath not been nor can be any one instance given to prove that this privilege was either allowed, or so much as claimed: nay the contrary practice hath been witnessed by Wentworth's case cited by his majesty, whereunto many others might be added: and as it wants allowance or claim, so is it in itself unreasonable; for if after the rising of the House, I shall overhear or discover a Parliament man plotting treason, and ye● may not attach him till I have acquainted the House, which cannot be till next day, or perhaps two days after that they again sit, the treason in the mean while will be executed, or the traitor perceiving himself discovered, will be fled. So if a Parliament man at York commit treason, murder, or robbery, if you may not arrest him till you have been at London, and got leave of the House, the offendor without doubt will not stir away, till you return to apprehend him. Can we imagine any should have greater privilege, than the law of Nations gives to ambassadors, and yet they have no privilege i● case of high treason; being an offence against the laws of Nations and Nature, Cambd. Eliz. fol. 201. May not every judge in Westminster Hall claim this privilege with better colour than a Member of Parliament, though the Parliament be a higher Court than any of them? For as the King may impeach one judge, so more, and then it will be in his pleasure, or of any other accuser, to make the ordinary Courts (though settled by prescription and Acts of Parliament, and less depending upon the will of the King, then doth the being of the two Houses) what they will, when they will: and then if the King hath any suit depending in the Common Pleas, and finds some of the judges inclining against him; they may be held under a feigned accusation of Treason, till the others have given judgement for the king: Surely though the Parliament be a superior Court, yet have the ordinary Courts as firm a foundation as that can have, and are more necessary for the people: and yet without question upon such pretence no judge▪ may claim a privilege from arrest in Case of Treason.  
If we consult with our Law books, they tell us that the privilege of Parliament doth not extend to Treason, nor yet breach of the peace, nor yet (as I think) against the King's debt; for the reason and ground of privilege is, because the king hath an Interest in the members, to have their advice, therefore no subject may arrest them for his debt; But that cannot give them privilege against the king himself. Vid●, Dyer, 59 60. Every Burgasse hath privilege quant larrest nest forsque all suit dun Subject 2: 8. 4. 8. b. per Danby Dyer. 275. Crompton. 8. b. 9 10. 11 Elsm●re Postnati. 20. 21.  
Now whereas the observator saith, that this privilege is claimed in case of suspicion only, and when leave may be had, and when competent accusers appear not; This overthrows the reasons given by the Houses, and is not in itself satisfactory: For th●e Attorney general in the most competent accuser, and the accusation was of down-right High Treason, not only of suspicion: and yet upon probable suspicion the accused aught to be imprisoned.  
I must therefore entreat the observator in this particular for that it hath been a cause of so great combustion, and taking up of arms within this kingdom, to give me a more full satisfaction.  
There remains one other scruple wherewith I am perplexed: and it ariseth for their voting the Commissions of Array to be illegal; whether they deny the power itself, or only dislike▪ the ●orme of this present commission, is uncertain? Now as concerning the first, it seems to me that posse regni, or the power over the Militia muster array &c. is by the fundamental Law inmovably settled in the crown, or rather the crown, settled on it: ● being such an individual right of the crown, as if a King without it, is in truth nothing Op●rtet (saith Glanvill) regiam potestatem armis esse decoratam. In rege (saith Bracto) qui recteregit, necessaria sunt hac duo, arma viz et leges: and the Statute ma●e El●●ven Henry the seventh. Cap 1. tells us that by duty of All glance, the Subjects are bound to serve their sovereign Lord for the time being, in his wars, for d●f●nce of him and the Land, against every Robellion▪ power and miget reared ag●inst ●im, And with him to enter and abide in service in battail● if the case so require &c. And another Statute. 4. & 5. Phil. & Mary: Cap 3: shows that the Ki●gs of his Realm have ever used to muster their Subjects, and to Levy a number of them for serv●ce in wa●res: And so those Reverend judges Hutton and Crook, arguing for the S●●ject in Case of Shipmoney, acknowledge the mustering and arraying of the Subjects by Commissions to be undoubted right of the crown. Hutton fol 39 That there have been Commissions of Array, and provision for arms, and for preparing Armour, according to the variety of times, for training and disciplining of soldiers to be prepared for defence &c. That this hath been in use, no man can or ever could deny: But the arms wherewith they were charged were still their own proper goods; And doth not the whole frame of Government of the realm depend (and ever hath done) upon Commissions granted by the King to Shereiffs and justices of peace? whi●h are in substance the same with this: 12. Hen 7. 17. tells us, that at first all administration of justice, was in the crown, till people multiplying, Shereiffs were deputed, under whom are all to be ready for defence of the realm, when enemies come; And the Sherif●e is to attend the King in time of war, and shall cause the people to go with the King for the defence of the realm against enemies and now by all this it appears, that it is the kings right to discipline, and array the souldier● and to dispose of the strength of the realm: And that this power is inseparable from him, even an act of Parliament. if it would disable the king t● defend the kingdom, is void, ding ag●inst Law and reason. Cooke's Argument 56. But you sa●, that the Parli●ment ●esires no ●em fall of that power which was in the King, but that which was in such or such a substitu●e: But whether they desire it or no, they have by th●i ordinance of Militia, taken away that power which was in the King; unless we shall think those to be his substitutes that take it against his wi●l, and hold it, and employ it against him.  
Again you tell us, it is but for a time disposed of by a t●mporary Ordinanc and not absol●tely and for ever tak●n from the King, and seeing th●y de●●red it not for the present occasion▪ why sh●uld the King d●ny it. Should a good fellow desire the observators wi●e for the present occasion, I doubt he would not be so kind hearted, as to grant it? And surely there be some kind of things that are not to be departed with though for a day; Semiramis desired of her husband king Ninus, that he would grant unto her the sovereign power for five days (as Diodorus Siculus or) as Plutarch reporteth, but for one day, which being granted her, she in that place caused her husband to be slain and ever after ruled as Queen; I hope nobody is so wicked as to imagine any such vile intention: and yet this story may well show how a king is no more himself, i● he but for a day; depart from his individual right: And such it appears by his right to the Militia of the realm, and therefore the Commission of Array, is in substance undeniably good.  
But then whether the form of the Commission, be legal, I can see as little reason to doubt, seeing it is for substance and form both by a very act of Parliament now in force, and by his majesty's Ceclararation, cleared from all colour of objection? So that in mine own understanding, it seems unquestionable both for matter and form: You will say nevertheless, that I ought to submit my understanding, and implicity believe it illegal, because so voted: But this sound somewhat harsh, that we should be bound to submit to such votes, against an Act of Parliament, upon record; unless you can assure me that they are proper ●udges against the king, and all such as descent from them, whether it be an Act of Parliament or not?  
And if they are, yet I pray satisfy me concerning the manner of their proceedings▪ why was it so hastily determined being a question of that weight, and which required a perusal of many ancient Statutes, and Records? Why were none of the judges nor sergeants advised within such a qu●stion of legality, or illegality? The Commission is in Latin, and old legal Latin, are all the members that voted against it, able to give the grammar Construction of it? But above all, why was it voted without so much as hearing the King or his counsel to speak in his cause, before it were condemned? You know what the Poet saith,  Qui statuit aliquid parte inaudita altera, aequum licet statuerit, haud aequus futi. 
I spare to load the Observator with any more doubts concerning their past votes, the good Consequences whereof and of other concomitant proceedings, I do much fear. If the observator shall give me but probable hope of the good event of things; and satisfy my doubt in these particulars I shall with cheerfulness, ever after pay an humble obedience unto all such votes and proceedings, and shall from thenceforth acknowledge myself for his industry in settling and satisfying my yet unsatisfied Conscience to be much indebted unto him; mean while I bid him heartily farewell.  
FINIS