RULES Of Civil Government, Drawn from the best Examples of Foreign Nations, and Commonwealths- Briefly discovering the excellency and benefit of good Governors, and the dangerous consequence of corrupt Self-seekers. In a short Dialogue between a Country man and a Scholar. Written by Robert Sprye, Lawyer. Humbly presented to his Excellency the Lord General as a word in season. Exod. 18. 22. Morover thou shalt provide out of all the people, able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating covetousness, and place such over them, etc. LONDON Printed for John Hancock in Popes-head-Alley, 1653. State-Policy. C. SIR, I Have of late heard much of a Commonwealth, but know not what it meaneth: I presume your late coming from Oxford, can somewhat inform me what it i●, and it's my earnest desire to know? S. A Commonwealth is a multitude of Men, ruled by one government. C. Our Ancient acquaintance encouraged me to demand this question of you, and I now perceive by your short Answer, which is so knotty and difficult to my understanding, that you have a desire to renew our old familiarity, by more questions from me; I shall the ref●re desire, if your leisure will permmit, to unfold to me in our country Language, what this word Government is? a●d not answer me by Scholastical resolutions, which make me farther of from being informed, then when I first demanded the question. S. My friend and Country man, by your last question, I am sensible, you either go about to inquire of my proficiency at the University; or else do propound the question throughly to be informed; friend, inregard of your former love to me, I will make bold to borrow so much time, if your patience will give audience throughly to instruct you in this matter, by a more larger unfolding the particulars of this your Quere, that so I may not put you to unnecessary Questions. C. Sir I am greatly beholding to you that you have not forgotten your old friend, but are willing to have discourse with him, I pray proceed to the Answer, and I shall attentively give ear. S. Government is a settled order of Commanding and obeying; Order is maintained by three things, viz. Religion, Laws, and Magistrates: the definition of Religion, I presume you know, but because of my promise to you; and to avoin multitude of questions, I will describe it what it is. Religion is that worship of God publicly professed and practised, and is maintained by Laws and Magistrates. C. Do all Nations agree that there is a God? S. Yea; all Nations agree in those three Propositions. 1 That there is a God: 2 That God is the punisher of offences and rewarder of virtues. 3 That whatsoever is a God ought to be worshipped. C. Is there not a difference amongst Nations concerning God? S. The difference of Nations, consisteth in these two points. 1 In their opinion, what is God, Christians, Jews and Turks, do all hold there is but one God. The Heathens in times past, and now many of the Americans: as also the people far Northward do hold that there are many gods and worship them accordingly. 2 The second difference amongst Nations is, In the manner of worshipping of God, and so the Christian Jews, and Turks, do mainly differ. C. What is the Centre of a Commonwealth? S. The Centre of a Commonwealth, where the hearts of all men in the same State do meet, is Religion. The force of Laws is shown only upon occasions. The better sort of the people will be sure to observe them. Lex non est justo posita. The Law is made for the offendor: as for offenders, Law can lay hold no farther than proofs may be made of offences: Scelera ta●tum Probata lege puniuntur Religion holdeth a perpetual strength, and aweth the couscience, restraining facta, dicta, cogitata, by the power of the which, Nemo nocens, se judice, absolvitur. C. What is the chief disturbance in a Common wealth? S. Nothing sooner divideth a State, than distraction in Religion, as may appear in old stories, by the distraction, as the Egyptians who worshipped several Gods in their Countries, and of latter times, by the strange Tumults in Germany, the Civil Wars in France, and the sad condition of England Scotland, and Ireland, at this time. C. What then is the best way to maintain Amity in a State? S. The greatest band of unity in a State, is unity and conformaty in Religion, neither can any State safely suffer divers Religions to be publicly maintained, or men of different Religion, from that which is maintained, to have any power to work a change. C. Show me by what Divine power, Magistrates can enforce contentious men to conformity, in the public exercise of Religion? S. You now put me to it indeed; but I will not now take it upon me to resolve you in such a point; our only discourse now is, what the greatest Politicians hold for the supportation of a Weale-publick or State. C. I may not then pin my faith, on what you relate, but I am to take it as the writing of ancient Statesmen, who labour to uphold that Government, they have set up, or have lived under, I pray then go on, and show me what Nations have been most strict in enforcing men to outward conformity? S. The Spaniard is the most observant of this, of all Nations, maintaining an Inquisition, not only to censure dicta ●●facta, of any that s●em to differ from them, but to search the very thoughts of men, whom by any means they suspect different. C. Are the Turks so severe, to those that live with in their Territories? S. No, The Turks howsoever they inquire into no man, merely for Religion, if he do not scandalise theirs; yet they suffer neither Christians, nor jews, nor any opposite to their Religion, to have either Armour or Authority. C. Did the Ancient Romans make War for Religion? S. The old Romans in their manifold Conquests, never pretended occasion of quarrel, by difference of Religion: but either revenge of wrong offered to their Citizens, or to their State, or else the relieving of their Confederates oppressed, or maintaining of their weak Neighbours. C. Did the Romans regard the Religion of their Enemies? S. The Religion of their Enemies, they had of it reverend esteem; howsoever they strictly observed Patrios Ritus, yet they often brought home Peregrinos Deos, and in the besieging of Cities, they had many Ceremonies and expiations, ad evocandum TUTELARES LOCI DEOS, to show they fought not against their Gods, but desired they would not secure their people & so should be reverenced in the Roman Territory. After the Roman Empire was grown to the height and could not sustain their own greatness, & the civil weeds sprang, all those Rites were omitted or forgotten. Ambition openly professed that it fought pro imperio neither was there any cause pretended between the concurrences, but the getting of the Empire. On those terms the world passed until Mahomet devised a new and strange Religion in the East parts, which set the world in a mighty difference, laying two grounds to encourage his followers, the first that whosocever died in War against the Christians or other Enemies to the Mahometan law, did instantly pass to all pleasure and delight in Paradise. The second that death was so necessarily ordained to men, that no violence would end a man before his time, nor weariness avoid it at the time. Of this Mahomet the Saracens first and after them the Turks, a mighty people, borrowed their Religion. Of him their Haman family learned to cover the fire of Ambition, with the Ashes of Religion, & under pretence to propagate it, to persuade their followers both to fight an d to die resolutly? C. I partly believe that the Pope and his Predecessors have hither to walked by the Mahometan rule you last discoursed of. S. The Papacy, in the general, have very much followed this course or Rule, as you call it; concealing all their private revenges and ambitious desires, under the pretence of the Catholic cause: And that with that confident persuasion and credulity of their fellows, that many of the Papistical Soldiers, if he hath a cross on his back, and the Papistical benediction over his head, think that either they are not of danger in earth, or if they die, they have a present passage to Heaven, at least shall pass through Purgatory, and so escape Hell. In this point there is great difference betwixt the present and ancient Romans, that the old Romans had a reverend opinion of the Religion of all Countries, though different from them, and would never suffer any despite or wrong to be showed to the Conquered under that name of Religion, which is not in particular men's power to take or leave as they list. The present Papists make their decrees, the Rules of all truth in Religion, and those that are different, they curse, and mischief by all means they can invent, accounting, them Atheists, Miser eants, and Heretics etc. which violent proceeding hath enforced the like vehemency in the opposites to judge of him and his, in like sort, which hath been the sole cause of the great distraction in Christendom, and laid it so open to the Mahometans. There is no mischief that works so dangerously as that which is carried with a Colour of Religion. Simulata sanctitas duplex iniquitas. For that nothing can carry a multitude so forcibly, as blind zeal and superstition in any cause undertaken. In times past, Sortorius a Roman, razsed Portugal, & the better part of Spain, defeated the Roman Armies, working credit with his followers by pretending conference with Diana, by means of a white ●art. Mahomet by his Dove and Bull of late times, the Seriffo in Africa under a pretended Holiness, gate first his strength, by which he turned the lawful Prince out of the State, and settled himself and his. John of Leyden at one time, and Muncerus at another time, raised those great Tumults in Germany. C. Sir, in your description of Government, I remember you told me that order was maintained or supported by those three things, Religion, Law, and Magistrates, you have given me ample satisfaction concerning Religion. I desire you would now discover to me what Law is? S. Laws are certain Rules written, or customs continued, by which the light of persons, actions, or things are determined. Ius triplex est. 1 Ius naturae, Is the light of nature, by which we know what is wrong, being offered unto us, and that the same ●s wrong, being committed by ourselves against others. 2 Ius Gentium, T●e Law observed by all Nations, how difference so ever, and is the rule d●iding right between men of sundry Commonwealths; and it specially concerns Leagues, Contracts, Captives etc. 3 Ius , Is that by which the Citizens of every state are ruled, and it is of two sorts. 1 Ius Commune, Or Ius justiciae, the Common Law which is contained in the letter of the Law, or in the Customs of the Country, and this in particular cases may sometimes be the cause of wrong, as is often spoken, Summa Ius, summa Injuria. 2 Ius Equitatis, The Law of Equity, when a particular case by reason of some circumstance, desireth help and ease against the rigour of the Law; such was Ius Pretorium amongst the Romans, and the Court of Chancery with us in England. In the Case where the stranger saved the City by mounting on the Walls, and encouraged the Citizens to keep the Town against the Enemy, contrary to the Law, Peregrinus in mures si ascenderit Capitale esto: the action in itself most honourable, it by the letter of the Law, Capital. Besides all these there is Ius Prerogative, which resteth wholly in them, be they one or more, in whom the Supreme power and Authority resteth. Such have Princes in absolute Monarchies, and such a Power had the people of Rome, wh●n the State was Popular, to receive appeals from any of their Judges, to call matters determined by Law to a new audience, to suspend the execution of any sentence, or to pardon the punishment: Such also hath been the accustomed power of the Parliaments of England. The Law is necessary for every State, for that Leges fiunt propter homines; homines non fiunt propter Leges. Men are not made to satisfy the Law in its rigour, but Laws are made for the safety and preservation of men. Salus Populi suprema Lex. C. Do all Nations agree in their Laws? S. Noe. C. How then are their Laws to be discerned or known? S. There are two Rules by which the Laws and Customs of Countries are to be discerned. 1. By the Law of Nature, spoken of before, by that light. by which we know what is right or wrong, either in doing or suffering. Altrine facias, quod tibi factum nolis; in this all good estates agree, in the substance, framing their positive Laws against Atheism, Murder, Adultery, Theft, etc. Things in the light of Nature Condemned. Nations also differ in the punishment and means of restraining which is not in Nature defined. If any Law in a State be made against this of Nature, it must needs be inconvenient as implicating a contradiction in the Government to other Laws. For that the whole Law of nature, is most agreeable, and conformable, in all the several parts unto itself. 2. The second Rule by which the Law of Nations are discerned; is, by the Supposition of the State, that is; by comparing the Law or Custom, with the main government in Practice, for if a Law be made which holds not on scope with the present Government established, it must needs breed variance and discord, and in the end some occasion for one party to assail the other. As it must needs happen to a Monarchy, if the people get any power to deal in the State; but most commonly in a popular State, if either they continue their great Offices for too long a time, or yield too great authority, by Decree, to any one man. Sy●●a first, and afterwards Caesar gate the whole state into their hands, by the name of perpetual Dictator's. Augustus, by a more popular name, Tribune of the people. C. By this I understand, that its a dangerous thing, suddenly to alter a standing Law, or custom of a Nation or State; for you say that divers distractions and broils do ensue thereupon? S. Ancient Laws and customs, are not to be suddenly changed, though they be but of small importance. Plato thinks that the change of Music ought not to be suffered, lest that should also change men's conditions. Amongst the Thurans whosoever attempted a new Law, must persuade it with a Halter about his neck, with which he was to be hanged, if he failed in showing the necessity of it. New Laws are seldom received with entire consent, and hardly observed at the first, if there be not great necessity; which necessity seldom appeareth, but with hazard, which may breed much danger before the Law be established. Few Laws make show of much virtue and obedience, yet it is more security when all Laws necessary have been together framed, and by continuance gotten strength. It is better to prevent a mischief, then to seek for a remedy, after it is happened; for though it be true, that (in corruptissima Rep. plures sunt leges) yet it's true ratione signi, not ratione Causae, for that Laws do not make any corruption, but show it, which would be greater if it were not hindered by Law, and men, must be supposed as they are, not as they should be; that as occasions of all natures do arise, so in time vices of all s●●ts will sooner show themselves then virtues. C. What you have already spoken concerning Law sufficeth. I shall now entreat you, for my more clear and distinct apprehension, to resolve Magistraty into the several heads and branches thereof? S. Magistracy, is a power in men which holdeth all in obedience to Religion and Law. C. You are again harping on your old string, the power of Magistrates in matters of Religion, but I believe you will not now resolve me, in regard you ●ave denied me formerly? S. I told you before, and I tell you again, I cannot now resolve you, because it is a matter of great consequence, and the greatest Scholars are (if I may so say) to their Ne plus ultra, concerning this thing, but I shall ●re long take some opportunity to give you my thoughts herein, I will let it pass now and proceed to the matter in hand, relating to Magistrates. Magistrates are of two sorts. 1. Supreme, who have the first place in Honour, and the chiefest in power to enforce obedience, that Religion and Laws may be observed. 2. Subordinate, be all Magistrates that have del●gate power, from the Supreme authority, to hold men in obedience in their several places. In the supreme Magistrate is especially considered, capacity of the State. which is two ways. 1. By his own understanding and experience, knowing and intending what to advise in all occurrences, which is almost impossible in the variety of accidents which befall in State business; yet such we read Augustus to have been; who kept written with his own hand large remembrances, of all his Legions, Officers, Rents, Customs, Allies, Leagues etc. 2. By Election of advice, propounded by others, which appeareth in the choice of the best Councillors, and in the choice of best Council in hard matters, neither blind by weakness of judgement, nor inclined by partial affection: for the Prince's choice is the life of any advice be it never so wise. If we look into any of their falls, they must have fallen not for want of fit Counsel propounded, but for want of Judgement, or partial affection in the choice of that Counsel which they followed. Quinec sibi potest recte consulares, nec aliis bene consulentibus auscultare velit, extremi est ingenij. C. What are the general Suppositions holden by the wisest Magistrates? S. 1. To prevent all inconveniences, in the beginning, and not to think those things which severally to the vulgar sort seem little, to be little., being joined together. Insensible vapours, do breed horrible Tempests, and small grains great heaps. 2. In avoiding inconveniences, to have special regard to the manner of avoiding them. In making their people obedient and quiet, not to suffer them so to forget Arms that they may be a prey, to their foreign Enemies, in making themselves strong against the Enemies, carefully to provide against disobedience and mutining, which often happeneth amongst Military people. 3. Not to suffer any one part, how good so ever in show to attain an overswaying power, or dependence, which cannot be brought and holden in order, and obedience, if opposition should happen, occasio facit ambitiosis. And men's powers are more certainly ruled, than their wills. 4. To distinguish warily offences and good deserts, rewards and punishments, that neither great deserts may breed Insolency, or hope of impunity for future offences, nor offences take away all hope of reward for future virtues. 5. Especially to have men, from their beginnings, to be brought up to the Commonwealth in which they live. Legum optimarum nulla est utilitas nisi sint, qui ad Rempub. informentur. 6. It is impossible, in civil cases, subject to such variety of times and other circumstances, always to find out optimam ex bonis: It is often times enough to take that which is mimimum ex malis etc. In those passages there is not respect always to be had to the greater part, nor yet to the better part, but to the whole State entirely considered: Pars quicquid est totius est. C. I conceive those six foregoing suppositions or Rules are peculiarly incident to the supreme Magistrate, but how ought a subordinate Magistrate to be qualified? S. Three things are to be considered chief in a subordinate Magistrate: 1. That they do affectionately love the State established. 2. That they have sufficient power to execute that which is required by their Office. 3. That their parts be answerable to that charge which they undertake, in the Commonwealth. Viz. Valour and Bounty fit for a Soldier, Wisdom and Justice for a Judge, Frugality and honesty, for an Officer of account. C. What are the accidental differences of States? S. They are two. 1. Good, Bad. 2. We●k Strong. C. How or in what respects are Commonwealths said to be Good or bad? S. Three ways. 1. In respect of their good or bad Laws, so the Lacedaemonian Respublick, was thought wanting, which by Laws permitted Theft, and Adultery. 2. In respect of Good or Bad Magistrates, so the Lacedaemonian Respublike was holden the best, in that the Magistrates most strictly observed the Laws and Customs of their Country, and the supposition of their State, which was Aristocratical, and Military. 3. In respect of both, as all good Commonwealths, whose Laws agree with the Law of Nature, and the Magistrates acting according to the Laws C. Is the Law, always to be executed according to the letter of I? S. No foe it is neither safe that Law alone should rule which can not distinguish of times, occasions, nor actions. Neither is it safe that Magistrates should rule alone without Law, for men are so subject to hatred love, fear, passion reward etc. It is best where both have their place, for that Law directeth best actions; but discretien and true judgement best distinguisheth circumstances. C. How shall a man discern the strength of a State? S. By observing these three things. 1. Whether it be strong in the frame itself of present Government, so if Monarchy is held more strong, and in less hazard of distraction and division than a popular state. 2. Whether it be strong by continuance of time, having long holden on form, so New Principalities are weak, as wanting time to confirm them; Ancient Principalities are strong, where the peopl have been enured to reverence and obedince, Monarchy could not have been taken from the Assyrians, if Sardanapalus had not been a beast, nor from the blood of the Caesar's, if Nero had not been rather a Monster then a Man. 3. Whether it be strong only by virtue, Wisdom, and Valour● of them, which are in present Authority. So only New Principalities have strength by them which raise them, Such was the Gresian Monarchy, which appeared in the world, and vanished again like lightning; the strength whereof wholly consisted in Alexander, and with his death perished. C. What are the real differences of Commonwealths, and from whence have States their Denomination? S. The real difference of Commonwealths are taken from the different order in commanding and obeying; the Name of every State is given according to the Supreme and highest Authority. C. Wherein is the Supreme Authority manifested? S. In these four things. 1. Potestas belli et pacis. 2. Potestas vitae & Necis. 3. P●. faciendar. legum. 4. Po. Creandor. magistrate. By these four powers, States are determined in themselves, and distinguished one from another. In whom those four powers, or most of them do rest, whetherin on●, ●ome few, or in many, in them is the supreme Authority, and they give the Name to the State. If they be absolute in any, the state of them is called an absolute Monarchy, or Aristocraty etc. If they be partly in some, and partly in others, than the State is said to be a mixed Commonwealth. According as these powers are diversely settled, so States are r●ally distinguished. If those powers be in one person, well used, to the good of the people under him, the State is called A Monarchy. If in the person of one, abused, to the profit only of that one, and of his who hath the Authority in his hands, it's called A Tyranny. If in some few, well used to the common safety it is called, An Aristocraty. If in some few abused, to the profit and pleasure of some few. An Oligarchy. If the fore said powers, be in the multitude, well used, to the safety of all, Law having power above the people, i●s then called, A good Democraty. If in the multitude, abused to faction, and the setting up the basest of the people, the multitude overruling Law, A bad Democraty. C. Which of these Governments do you esteem the best? S. Heretofore most Hist●rians were of the judgement that regulated Monarchy, was the best, but the State of England, as now it stands, admits not such weak judgements as mine to distinguish. C. SIR, I see you are silent in your thoughts, I pray tell me what you account the worst. S. The worst State is a Tyranny, as being opposite to the best, Bonum & malum in suo g●n●re maxim distant. C. I have heard of an Anarchy, I pray what government is that? S. Anarchy is no State, but a confusion of all order, much wo●se than the worst Tyranny, which well appeared at Rome, after the death of Nero, when all men did what they list, which caused an honourable Senator to say, that if that misorder should continue, they should have occasion to wish for Nero again. It is better living where nothing, then where all things are lawful. C. I remember you told me, th●t if the forementioned powers were in one person, it was an absolute Monarchy; by which I conceive there are sev●rall kinds of Monarchies? S. A Monarchy is the government of one to the preservation of all, But Monarchies are of two sorts. 1. Absolute where the chief doth rul● all causes by his absolute Authority, not any way determined by Law, and the●e are good, so sa●re as the Authority is well used, and the chief doth hold it, Salus populi suprema L●x. For government was before positive Laws, and in Nature, there is absolute priority and power of the Father over his Children. 2. Limited, and that three manner of ways. 1. By Laws a lore, where the Subject may have lawful audience, and he●p in Law, for holding, or recovering his right against the Prince. 2. By Overseers alone, where there be Officers of State, which may demand ●e●son, wh●n the chief stretcheth his power to the the detriment of the Subject, such have been the Electors in Germany. 3. By Laws and Overseers, as in times passed in France, when the twelve pe●res held their places, and their Parliaments had their full power for the process of Laws. Just Principalities are generally maintained by holding the favour and love ●f the Subject. Imperium est in voluntate obsequentium. C. What means is a Governor to use to gain the love and affection of his people; and being gained; how isit to be kept, and preserved? S. The people's love is holden by these means. 1. By being Religious, to wards God, for that men will never seek, nor desire the overthrow of them, whom they are persuaded to be g●●●ded with device pro●ection. 2. By showing ●a●e of the puli●● safety not of private gain, me● do most willingly contribute, when they are persuaded that money is either employed or reserved for public benefit. 3. By building public works, and relieving public misfortunes. 4. By bestowing honours and rewards upon men of great worth by deserts. 5. By referring all matters of Justice and punishment to their offences, never showing contentment in the shame or misery of any. 6. Generally, by bounty, magnanimity, and all honourable and virtuous actions. C. Tyranny you say is the worst of governments, I shall earnestly desire, you would branch it forth, into its several parts, by which I may perceive the iniquity of it. S. Tyranny is the government of one man according to his own will, and respecting only his own profit, Tyrants have used two ways to support and uphold their Tyranny. 1. By taking away all desire and knowledge of altering their government, which is thus done. First by working pusillanimity. Ignorance, and distrust in the people; which is acted five manner of ways. 1. By taking away all Schools, and discipline; by which men might understand what is right or wrong; A thing practised by the Turks etc. 2. By taking away all societies and fraternities, by which they might be acquainted one with another. 3. By placing Guards in the strongest places, by which they might suppress any sudden attempt. 4. By placing privy spies to entrap such as talk of State matters, and so make all jealous of one another. 5. By often making show of foreign forces, which may be feared to be ready if any need require. 2. By taking a way all power from the people, which is thus wrought: 1. By banishing or putting to death, or shutting up in Prison the men of account and their offspring, that no male contents may know where to find a leader that the people would follow; the house of Bela took this course in the Moscovite State, It was Periander's Counsel to Thrasibulus; the house of Ottiman is so jealous, that the Grandsenior never thinks his Estate sure, before he hath cut of his Brethren. 2. By utterly impoverishing their Subjects by exactions. Dionysius in 5 years ga●t all the treasury of Sicily into his hands. 3. By maintaining disscention between the great men and the Commons, or of the greater men between themselves, taking part with neither, that they may know and use the griefs and wants of all. 4. By not suffering the great men to live at home, but attend there, where the higher power do obscure them, or if they be employed to keep their Children as Hostages, so useth the Magnus Mogor in Asia. 5. To commit no trust to the Natives, or men of great blood or kindred, but to Eunaches or strangers, such as can not be popular, nor hold place, but by their Tyranny, such are the Turkish Bassas. 6. To suffer no man to bear Arms, but their sworn Soldiers, to give Lands only to such, the inheritance depending still at their proper disposition, the Moscoveticall and Turkish practice, the one to his Gentlemen; the other to his Timariot; All other are slaves to them, as they are to their chief Lord. C. By what properties shall I know ● King from a Tyrant? S. These four differenses will distinguish them. 1. Kings were first chosen out of the best, and by the best, to guard them, and to rule the rash multitude. Tyrants had their beginning ex Demagogis; such as flattered the people, and stirred them up against the worthiest persons, and so under show of protecting of them, made away, all such as might with stand them, Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse. 2. The second scope of a King is virtue and honour. The scope of a Tyrant, profit and pleasure. 3. A King is the protector of all, Rich, and poor, that on neither doth, nor suffereth wrong of the other. A Tyrant only regardeth the profit and security of himself, and his leaving others open to all wrongs. 4. The trust of a King is in his Subjects, and of them he maketh his Guard. The trust of a Tyrant is only in strangers, and to them he commits his safety. C. How are Principalities overthrown? S. Two ways. 1. By foreign power, when one state assaileth and overthroweth another, the conquered receiveth such government as the Conqueror thinketh meet, so the Romans overthrew many Kingdoms, and turned them into principalities; to be governed by their Lif●tennants. 2. By Domestical seditions, which are commonly raised by these occasions, in number Six. 1. By the justice of the Rulers. 1. In Injuries towards th●ir persons, which is acted two manner of ways. 1. In murdering, and ravishing their Kinsfolks. As the Tarquin's at Rome. 2 In beating like slaves men of account. 2 In oppressing with exactions, so far that by extreme poverty, subjects grow desperate, having nothing to lose, but their ●fe, whereof want hath made them weary. 2 By contempt of them. 1 For their folly, and incapacity of state. 2 For effeminate manners, as Sard●●●palus. 3 For Drunkenness, as C●mbises and Dionysius Junior. 3 By fear of death or disgrace in the subject. 1 Either through knowledge or suspicion of anger conceived in the Chief himself. 2 Or fear of slander from them which are about him in Authority. 4 By hope of profit and wealth, which moveth specially base Rebels, which pretend a community of all. 5 By Ambition or desire of Honour, the most dangerous motive, for that it possesseth only great spirits, which are of resolution, to their utmost power, As S●av●la which attempted upon King Po s●nna, and the Confederates that slew Caesar in the Senat. 6 By desire of change in Religion, which hath only moved men in these latter times, being never made a pretence or motiv. for either foreign Conquests, or Domestical seditions, before Mah●met. Patet supra. C. You formerly told me, that Aristocraty was the power of Ruling in some few, well used, to the Common sefety: I pray acquaint me of what sort of the people they are or aught to be? S. Aristocraty, is a government of the best, for the safety of all, but there are three kinds. 1 The first, where respect is had, to both wealth, and virtue, in the chief of all Officers. 2 The second where respect is only had of wealth, this inclineth to an Oligarchy. 3 The third, where respect is only had of virtue, leaving it free to all, to make way to the chief places, this inclineth to a Democraty. C. What means have been used to maintain and uphold States Aristocratical. S. These Nine Maxims have been h●ld ●nd practiseed. 1 Compelling the Nobility to bring up their Children in feats of Arms, and politic Discipline, suffering the r●st to do as they list. So the Lacedæmonians brought up all their Children in public places, together, where they learned exercise of Arms and knowldege of government. 2 Constraining the Nobility upon great pe●al●y, to be present at their public Assemblies, suffering the rest to attend their profit and business. 3 Receiving the Citizens into their special patro●ages, that in Popul●● quarrels, every man severally might pacify his Clients, or followers, this was often practised by the Senators of Rome, to uphold their State. 4 Suffering none to continue in the greatest Offices for long time, that he might procure too many dependants, or weaken his opposites. 5 Giving no man that honour which others might not hope to obtain. 6 Employing them which were too great, in foreign business, that absence's might make them forgotten. 7 Keeping Offices of Honour, wholly amongst the Nobility, leaving them of petty matters and gain to the people. 8 Suppressing the first occasions of quarrels amongst the greatest men, To that end to hold friendly meetings in places indifferent, where pacifications may be made. 9 Holding the people in fehre of public dangers, to make an enemy if there were none, by that means, to draw from home such as were mutinous: A thing much practised by the Roman Senate, while their power held. C. You have declared nine Maxims or Sophims, that are the props of an Aristocratical State, but by what means is that government overthrown and changed? S. Three things alter and change an A●istocraty. 1. The Sedition of the great men, when their numbers do so increase, that the Honours to be divided, are not enough to satisfy their Number, the Lacedaemonian, for remedy of this, sent the Parthenians into Italy which built Tarentum. 2 The Transgression of that supposition in not making vertuea mean between the wealth of the great men, and liberty of the people; yielding too much to the people's liberty, makes the State democratical, but wholly to wealth oligarchical. 3 Negligence in small matters, suffering inferior Officers to be perpetual, which after giveth example and occasion that the greatest likewise should be so. C. By this it is evident to me that Aristocraty may be turned into a State democratical or Oligarchycall: my request is, that you would more fully show me what Oligarchy is, and wherein it differeth from the State last mentioned? S. Oligarchy is a Government of some few to their own profit; and it may be branched forth into 4. kinds. 1 Where all chief Officers, are chosen only by valution of wealth and possessions. 2 Where men of middle wealth, are admitted to Offices, but the precedent Magistrate c●huseth his successor. 3 Where, the Magistrates succeed, as in Inheritances, The Son in his Father's place. 4 Where all power is in some few, which rule above Law as they list, and this is like the worst kind of Democraty. C. How is this Rule▪ of Government kept from fall or ruin? S. The Fabric of this government is preserved from fall or ruin, by those Axioms or Sophisms, as Sir Walter Raleigh calls them, in his Book, called the Prince of State, which are these. 1 By suffering no Elections, to pass either by Lot or by Common suffrages, but by a set number. 2 By suffering no choice to be made, but out of certain, which likewise had such a valuation of goods. 3 By making their Officers perpetual or of long continuance. 4 By maintaining great Troops of Horse, imposed on them in Authority, which make a Terrible show, and can not be maintained but with great wealth so did the Eretrians and Chalcedonians. But Aristrocratyes and De●ocratyes have rather maintained footmen for their Soldiers. As the Lacedæmonians, the Romans, and at this day the Swissers. 5 By keeping the people poor and without Arms, that they might neither know how to arm themselves, or give, pay to them which should take Arms in their behalf. 6 By raising many Wars, or rumours of Wars; Common people are easily awed in public dangers. 7 By making Marriages only with themselves, where Marriages are Communicated, the greater sort is less esteemed. 8 By providing means of employment in Wars, or Colonies, when their Issue groweth too great, and all can not be in honour. C. I conceive those political Fabrics are destroyed, and brought to nought, by fewer means and ways: they are upheld like a house built by many hands, yet one man or two can pluck it down. My request now is, that you would show and unfold unto me the occasions of Oligarchyes fall? 1 By them that are not in Authority. As at Heraclea and Massilia, where the younger Brethren risen against the Elder, for that they were excluded from the Commonwealth. 2 By them in Authority, these five ways. 1 Either by reason of the small number, the Father and Son, or two Brethren can not be in Office together. 2 When the few in place would yet have fewer. 3 When the few having Luxuriously spent their goods and Estates, seek to spoil the Common Treasury. 4 When of those few which Rule, all can not come to the Chiefest place. 5 When they in Authority by any occasion fall at dissension and assail onn another, the weaker fetching in the people for his Guard, maketh either a Tyranny or a Democraty. 3 By Accident two ways. 1 In time of War through distrust in the people, those few enforced to hire sovereign Soldiers, which committed to one that is popular, with them makes himself Lord of all. 2 In time of peace, when the people and those few being at variance, commit themselves to a third, which oppresseth them both. C. I remember in your description of States, you mention a two fold Democraty; I request your patience to unfold to me the particulars thereof, and what difference hath been used in their Election of chief Officers. S. A Democraty, is a Government of all, to the good of all, or else A government of a multitude which are the greater part of the State, to that end they propound to themselves, and this is called a bad Democraty, and of near kin to Tyranny. As concerning their choice of State Officers, they had divers fashions of Liberties. 1 In some; all might be capable of the highest Offices, and all had voices in the Choice. 2 In others; all had suffrages, but yet they made their choice by certain estimation of wealth. 3 In some all might be Rulers, Ita ut Lex dominetur. In others all might rule. Ita ut Populus dominetur. C. In my Judgement, those popular States, that are not governed by the Rule or Square of Law, can have no strength, neither can their basis be well fixed. S. A popular State, hath neither strength nor goodness in the frame itself; besides it is subject to such daily factions and dissension and making way for every impudent flatterer to grow mighty, by fawning on people, and slandering them whose good virtues and fortunes for their greatness might be occasion of envy. C. How then is it supported, if it want strength and goodness? S. The strength of it only consisteth in the goodness, moral virtues and civil parts of their Citizens, and according to the divers sorts of people popular States do differ. 1 The most ancient is of Husbandmen supposed the best, because their life being laborious and full of business, they have least leisure to mutiny from their private cares. So the Medians are reported to have lived before Deiocius altered their government. 2 The second of Shepherd's much like the former for their kind of life. 3 The third of Artisans and Merchants etc. which must needs be full of innovations through their continual whispering and private devices at their meetings. 4 The other is a mixture of all those kinds together. Aristotle condemneth utterly the last; and yet we read not of any of the first, any thing memorable: The Athenians admitted of all sorts to the choice of Magistrates, the making Laws, and to their great censure, when they banished any by Ostracism. So did the Romans in the latter times howsoever the ancient did hold it a sufficient commendation to be commended. As Bonus Colonus & strenuus miles. C. What banishment was that Ostracism, and for what time, and what the Transgression that made men liable there: unto? S. It was a kind of banishment used amongst the Athenians, and the party exiled was to remain ten years in Exile, which was thus executed; by delivering Shells, with the names of the persons condemned written therein; It was used not so much to punish other Offences, as to ab●te the immoderate power of the Noblemen. C. What are the pretexts of a popular State, and what means do they use to maintain the same? S. The supposition of a popular State pretendeth two things, which in themselves are plaufible. 1 Equality. 2 Liberty. The means of maintaining their supposition have been these seven. 1 By choosing all Magistrates by the voices of all, and out of all. Ne quis sit exclusus á Republica. 2 By giving no power to any Magistrate, to put any to death, though condemned by Law, if they appealed to the people. libera si● provocatio ad Populum, absoluta Potestas in Populo. 3 By causing all to know the use of Arms, that they neither should fear Foreign forces or powers, nor one pa●tie to stand in awe of another. 4 By suffering no man to continue long in Office, and to be called to an account, his Office being ended and expired. 5 By diminishing the power of them which were grown to great by what means soever. As the Athenians used their Ostracismus, The Syrac●sans their Petalismus, the parties name written in Olive leaves, upon which he was to be exiled. 6 The more simple, otherwise. If he can but understand their Laws, and customs to see execution on Offenders, the fit and saf●r for a popular Estate. In some Democraties the chief Officer hath been tied to such kinds as are mechanical. 7 By compelling all to be at Assemblies, especially the meaner sort, who in some popularities have been invited by rewards. C. Sir, I have exercised your pa●ience long, and I fear I am to bold with you; but your freeness of discourse hitherto, encourageth me to demand, or request some other few resolutions before your departure. S. The time I have spent with you, I account it not l●st, for I have made a two fold gain thereof, by renewing our old acquaintance, and thereby our loves. 2 By bringing to my remembrance what I have read out of divers ancient Authors concerning state-policy. I shall willingly resolve you, if your demands come within the reach of my weak Learning. I pray proceed to your Question. C. How are democratical States altered? S. Democraties are changed into Oligarchyes, by the banding of them, in great favour with the people; if they can agreed between themselves: if they disagree, the one assailing the other, the conqueror raise a Monarchy. The Popular State of Rome, by the confederacy of Crassus, Pompey, and Caesar, proved in effect oligarchical, All things being acted as they would have them. Af●ir Crassus' death, Pompey and Caesar falling at variance, one assailing the other, the Conqueror drew the whole State to himself. After Caesar's death it became again Popular. The new Triumverate made it oligarchical, their dissentien, Monarchical again. C. What things are those, without which, neither of those forementioned States, can be supported, or continue without ruin. S. Aristotle sayeth, Sex sunt quae dicuntur necessaria Alimenta, Artificia, Arma, Pecunia, Sacra, Judicia. Moreover else where he sayeth. Quinque sunt arcana quae in potestate superioris Magistratus reservare solent Resp. Therefore it behoveth the Supreme power of any State, to have a special care, that those six things be duly had in regard, and according to the respective qualities and number of their Subjects. ALIMENTA. Nourishment which is to be considered. 1 By what kind the people desire to be maintained. By Tillage. By Pasture. 2 Where they have that which they fancy or most desire, from home; or from other Countries. 3 With what ease or difficulty the Victualia, desired may be gotten, ●t what rates, and what quantity is requisite. ARTIFICIA. Crafts to keep the people from Idleness. 1 Where regard is to be had, of what matter they work upon, whether Metals, Stones, or Wool, and where those things are to be had for their use. 2 To what value their works can raise the matter where on they work. 3 Regard is to be had, whether their kind of work maintain health of body, and strength of mind. ARMA. Arms whether made in their own Country. 1 Of what matter, of what fashion, of what use, and of what advantage. 2 Whether brought from Foreigners, with what ease, and at what rates or price. 3 Consideration is to be had of what advantage to the Nation, either in the excellency of the use, or in the private or proper usage to men alone. As the Roman Pilum, and the bow in times past Anglis. 4 Whether Arms be permitted to all so in democratical states, or to some few, as in Oligarchyes. 1 Pecuniae, Money, of what matter it is made, and the value of the same, 2 Whether the Mines thereof be in their own Country. 3 What things abound, by which it may be fetched from others. 4 Who hath the power of valuing. 5 What necessity of levying for public uses. 6 What necessity of disbursing for the same uses. SACRA. 1 The public manner of serving God. 2 The Orders and Degrees by which the Priests and Levites are distinguished from the Laiety, and one of them from another. 3 The maintenance, Liberty, and privileges that they have to maintain them of that place. 4 The power and honour that the Chief of them have either over them of the Clergy, or over others. 5 The means to hold the reverence of the people. 6 The Scriptures of life, to which they are bound by Oath, Vow, or Customs 7 Their apparel, in matter, Colour, or fashion, how it is different from the Laity. The Romans kept the whole ordering of matters of Religion, especially, amongst their greatest Personages. The Lords of the Senate, were the Pontifices, and Flamines. The Salii who carried their Ancilia in a strange manner about the City, were of the young Gentlemen, and most of their fraternities. were of men of the best stocks. C. What were these Salii? S. They were the Priests os Mars the gods of Battle, who bearing Ancilia or Targets and Shields dancing about the City in token of Triumph. C. What is to be observed concerning Magistrates? S. Four things. 1 Who hath the power of choosing them. 2 Who are capable, who are not? 3 What causes are in their power? what not. 4 By what their powers are ●nlarged or restrained. So long as the power of the Senate of ROME availd, though the people did choose, yet they did choose their great Officers, only ex Patritiis, out of those that came from the loins of Senators, who though they determined all matters, yet there was still liberty to appeal to the people. Afterwards all were made capable and any of the Tribunes might hinder any act of the Consul, or decree of the Senate. JUDJCJA. 1 Either criminal; as in cases of life and death. 2 Or Civil; as of personal or real actions, which concern matters of Trespass and Title The manner of proceeding whether the Trials be. 1 De facto only 2 De jure only. 3 De jure & de facto, together. C. There are five Maxims, or secrets as you call them, peculiar to the supreme power or chief Magistrate in regulating A State or weal public. I pray discover the particulars thereof, and how they become so necessary? S. Those five. Conciones, Magistratus, Juditia, Arma, & Exercitia. Require a more abler Statist than myself, to discover their power or use; and will take up longer time than now can be spared, or our patience quietly attend. In regard of the prolixity, I will only give you the branches thereof, but leave the demonstration of each particular, until another opportunity shall present itself. CONCIONES. Assemblies or Counsels. 1 General. As that Des estates gene●aux in France, and the Parliaments in England. 1 of what Persons these state's General consist. 2 In what matters they may deal. 3 What Power they have, limited by Law, or above Law. 4 What Order they use in proceeding. 5 What Authority in concluding. 6 By what means. 1 Their power is drawn to Act in performing an● thing. 2 Their power is restrained from doing any thing. 2 Their Ordinary Counsels for ordinary Occurrences. Where in we are to consider. 1 Their Authority. 2 Their Inclinations to peace in War. 3 Their desires of honour or wealth. 4 The power of every particular. 1 In respect of the sufficiency and eminency of his parts. 2 In respect of his special favour and grace in the state. I told you before, that Oligarchyes constrained the rich men to be present at their great Assemblies, on pain of penalties. Democratyes, sometimes by rewards, invited the meaner sort at their general Assemblies, to make their presence the greater, and that they should not altogether lose their private profit ● which is most regarded by the multitude, by omitting their private affairs and following of public. EXERCITIA of body. Whether for health only. Whether for strength only. Whether for pleasure only. Whether and how fare they all be mixed. Use and custom, breeds delight in any exercise, The Romans so practised themselves with Arms; that they carried them with as much ease as their parts; hence came that saying. Arma militis membra sunt. 2 Exercise of mind. Whether te contemplation especially, as the Indian Gymnosophists, and the Athenians, which were great discoursers, whether to action especially, which is of most use in acivill life, which is active not contemplative: As the Lacedæmonians, who taught their Children, plurimum facere & minimum loqui. 3 What kind of Exercises. Are commanded by Law. Are permitted only. Are directly forbidden. As concerning Arms, I have already given you my thoughts of the same. But you may observe. 1 That Monarchical states have used to train, and discipline all, in the exercise of Arms. As in England all by an Edict to bear Arms that are up wards of seaventeen years of Age, and under threescore, except Scholars. 2 Aristocratical States, enforced only their Nobles to bring up their Children in feats of Arms, & military discipline. 3. oligarchical States, keep their Arms, and the use and practise of them only, amongst their greatest men and their followers, so doth the Muscovite & Turk at this day. 4 democratical or popular States, have accustomed to bring up all sorts of their people to Martial feats; and not only permitting, but enjoining all at a certain age to learn and practise themselves to warlike exercises. As the ancient Romans at seventeen years of Age, the Suiffers at this day sooner. An Act declaring and Constituting the People of England to be a Commonwealth and Free-State. Be it Declared and Enacted by this present PARLIAMENT, and by the authority of the same, That the People of ENGLAND, and of all the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging, are and shall be, and are hereby Constituted, Made, Established and Confirmed, to be a Commonwealth and Free-State: And shall from henceforth be Governed as a Commonwealth and Free-State, by the supreme Authority of this Nation, The Representatives of the People in Parliament, and by such as they shall appoint and constitute as Officers and Ministers under them for the good of the People, and that without any King or House of Lords. Die Sabbathi, 19 Maii, 1649. ORdered by the Commons assembled in Parliament, that this Act be forthwith Printed and Published. Hen: Scobell, Cleric. Parliamenti. POSTSCRIPT Gentle READER, HAving now given you a brief and clean discovery of the Government of several Nations, Kingdoms. and Commonwealths in the World which I have taken pains to Collect from Choice Authors, of divers Languages, that thou mayest the better judge of the Nature of our present New Established Commonwealth, as touching the Excellency thereof, and Encouragement to a willing Subjection thereunto, Take Mr. LILIES expressions in his conclusion of the Epistle to his Predictions for 1650. in these words, to every true English man, I heartily implore them, as one man to unite their hearts, their Prayers, their Forces, and Purses, unanimonsly, for defence of this Commonwealth now established; For without it as at present, our Condition stands, our lives and fortunes will be subject to all the inconveniences, a woeful Nation can expect from devouring Enemies: Conforming unto, and assisting this Authority; We shall have the better of all Nations, we shall by degrees arise to the most accomplished Government, that ever was visible since the Creation; and when the Commonalty of ENGLAND, viz. the Yeomanry, after some years are fitted for the work intended, it shall not displease them, that they have with patience acted so long a time without any visible Fruits of their Labours, Sith then the Sole Dominion and power shall rest in themselves, after which universal peace and never more any Wars shall follow in ENGLAND, until the day of the dissolution of this earthly Fabric. In the next place, I shall only put you in mind of the New Engagement, to be taken generally throughout the Nation, in regard it is of special concernment to all. The express words of it (are these) as it is Ordered by the Parliament, viz. I DO DECLARE AND PROMISE, THAT I WILL BE TRUE AND FAITHFUL TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND AS THE SAME NOW IS ESTABLISHED, WITHOUT A KING OR HOUSE OF LORDS. For such as make any doubt or scruple of taking this Engagement; I refer them to Mr. JOHN DURYES Book, lately published, called Considerations, concerning the present Engagement, whether it may lawfully be entered into, yea, or no, they are sold at the Star, under St. PETER'S Church in Cornhill, or in Popes-head Ally; Licenced by Master JOSEPH caryl. In my apprehension, he removeth all the stumbling blocks, and answereth all the Obejctions that can be made against the taking of it, which may satisfy all such as shut not their Eyes against the light. The three Chief Objections are these, viz. 1. OB. That the Oath of Allegiance, and the Nationall. Covenant are still binding and Contradictory to this present Engagement. 2. OB. That the present power by which the Engagement is tendered, is very doubtful as a power, unlawfully usurped, to which usurpation you think you will be accessary, if you take the engagement. 3. OB. That the Consequence of the Engagement seems to tend to an opposition against the Lawful H●ir of the Crown, and the right constitution of the Parliaments, whereunto you are preingaged, and from which you cannot recede. All which Objections, are learnedly and fully answered by Mr. DURY which hath saved me that Labour, and expense of time. VALE.