An Answer to a Letter Written by the R. R. The Ld B p of Rochester. Concerning The Chapter of Original Sin, In the Vnum Necessarium.  
By JER. TAYLOR D. D.  
London, Printed by E. Cotes for R. Royston at the Angel in Ivy-lane, 1656.   

An Answer to a Letter Written by the R. R. The L. B p. of Rochester.  
R. R. Father and my good Lord,  
YOur Lordship's Letter Dated July 28. I received not till Septemb. 11. It seems R. Royston detained it in his hands, supposing it could not come safely to me while I remain a prisoner. But I now have that liberty, that I can receive any Letters, and send any; for the Gentlemen under whose custody I am, as they are careful of their charges, so they are civil to my person. It was necessary I should tell this to your Lordship, that I may not be under a suspicion of neglecting to give accounts in those particulars, which with somuch prudence and charity you were pleased to represent in your Letter concerning my discourse of Original Sin. My Lord, in all your Exceptions, I cannot but observe your candour and your paternal care concerning me. For when there was nothing in the Doctrine, but your greater reason did easily see the justice and the truth of it, and I am persuaded could have taught me to have said many more material things in confirmation of what I have taught; yet so careful is your charity of me, that you would not omit to represent to my consideration what might be said by captious and weaker persons; or by the more wise and pious who are of a different judgement.  
But my Lord, first you are pleased to note that this discourse runs not the ordinary channel. True; for if it did, it must nurse the popular error: but when the disease is epidemical, as it is so much the worse, so the extraordinary remedy must be acknowledged to be the better. And if there be in it some things hard to be understood, as it was the fate of S. Paul's Epistles (as your Lordship notes out of S. Peter) yet this difficulty of understanding proceeds not from the thing itself, nor from the manner of handling it, but from the indisposition and prepossession of men's minds to the contrary, who are angry when they are told that they have been deceived: for it is usual with men to be more displeased, when they are told they were in error, then to be pleased with them who offer to lead them out of it.  
But your Lordship doth with great advantages represent an objection of some captious persons, which relates not to the material part of the Question, but to the rules of art. If there be no such thing as Original Sin transmitted from Adam to his posterity, than all that sixth chapter is a strife about a shadow, a Non ens. A. It is true my Lord, the Question as it is usually handled, is so. For when the Franciscan and Dominican do eternally dispute about the conception of the Blessed Virgin, whether it was with, or without Original Sin, meaning by way of grace and special exemption, this is de non ente; for there was no need of any such exemption: and they supposing that commonly it was otherwise, troubled themselves about the exception of a Rule, which in that sense which the supposed it, was not true at all: she was born as innocent from any impurity or formal guilt as Adam was created, and so was her Mother, and so was all her family. * When the Lutheran and the Roman dispute, whether justice and original righteousness in Adam was Natural or by Grace, it is de non ente: for it was positively neither, but negatively only; he had original righteousness till he sinned, that is, he was righteous. till he became unrighteous. * When the Calvinist troubles himself and his Parishioners with fierce declamations against natural inclinations or concupiscence, and disputes whether it remains in baptised persons, or whether it be taken off by Election, or by the Sacrament, whether to all Christians or to some few; this is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for it is no sin at all in persons baptised or unbaptised, till it be consented to.  
My Lord, when I was a young man in Cambridge, I knew a learned professor of Divinity, whose ordinary Lectures in the Lady Margaret's Chair for many years together, nine as I suppose, or thereabouts, were concerning Original Sin, and the appendent questions: This indeed could not choose but be Andabatarum conflictus. But then my discourse representing that these disputes are useless, and as they discourse usually to be de non ente, is not to be reproved. For I profess to evince that many of those things, of the sense of which they dispute, are not true at all in any sense, I declare them to be de non ente, that is, I untie their intricate knots by cutting them in pieces. For when a false proposition is the ground of disputes, the process must needs be infinite, unless you discover the first error. He that tells them they both fight about a shadow, and with many arguments proves the vanity of their whole process, they (if he says true) not he is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. * When S. Austin was horribly puzzled about the traduction of Original Sin, and thought himself forced to say that either the Father begat the soul, or that he could not transmit sin which is subjected in the soul, or at least he could not tell how it was transmitted: he had no way to be relieved but by being told that Original Sin was not subjected in the soul, because properly and formally it was no real sin of ours at all; but that it was only by imputation, and to certain purposes, not any inherent quality, or corruption: and so in effect all his trouble was the non ente. * But now some wits have lately risen in the Church of Rome, and they tell us another story. The soul follows the temperature of the body, and so Original Sin comes to be transmitted by contact: because the constitution of the body is the foams or nest of the sin, and the souls concupiscence is derived from the body's lust. But besides that this fancy disappears at the first handling, and there would be so many Original Sins as there are several constitutions, and the guilt would not be equal, and they who are born Eunuches should be less infected by Adam's pollution, by having less of concupiscence in the great instance of desires, [and after all, concupiscence itself could not be a sin in the soul, till the body was grown up to strength enough to infect it] Besides all this, (I say) while one does not know how Original Sin can be derived, and another who thinks he can, names a wrong way, and both the ways infer it to be another kind of thing then all the Schools of learning teach [and in the whole process it must be an impossible thing, because the instrument which hath all its operations by the force of the principal agent, cannot of itself produce a great change and violent effect upon the principal agent] does it not too clearly demonstrate, that all that infinite variety of fancies agreeing in nothing but in an endless uncertainty, is nothing else but a being busy about the quiddities of a dream, and the constituent parts of a shadow? But then, My Lord, my discourse representing all this to be vanity and uncertainty, ought not to be called or supposed to be a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: as he that ends the question between two Schoolmen disputing about the place of Purgatory, by saying they need not trouble themselves about the place; for that which is not, hath no place at all; ought not to be told he contends about a shadow, when he proves that to be true, which he suggested to the two trifling litigants.  
But as to the thing itself: I do not say there is no such thing as Original Sin, but it is not that which it is supposed to be: it is not our sin formally, but by imputation only; and it is imputed so, as to be an inlet to sickness, death and disorder: but it does not introduce a necessity of sinning, nor damn any one to the flames of Hell. So that Original Sin is not a Non ens, unless that be nothing which infers so many real mischiefs.  
The next thing your Lordship is pleased to note to me, is that in your wisdom you foresee, some will argue against my explication of the word Damnation, in the ninth Article of our Church, which affirms that Original Sin deserves damnation. Concerning which, My Lord, I do thus (and I hope fairly) acquit myself.  
1. That it having been affirmed by S. Austin that Infant's dying unbaptised are damned, he is deservedly called Durus pater Infantum, and generally forsaken by all sober men of the later ages: and it will be an intolerable thing to think the Church of England guilty of that which all her wiser sons, and all the Christian Churches generally abhor. I remember that I have heard that King James reproving a Scottish Minister, who refused to give private Baptism to a dying Infant, being asked by the Minister, if he thought the child should be damned for want of Baptism? answered, No, but I think you may be damned for refusing it: and he said well. But then my Lord, If Original Sin deserves damnation, then may Infants be damned if they die without Baptism. But if it be a horrible affirmative, to say that the poor babes shall be made Devils, or enter into their portion, if they want that ceremony, which is the only gate, the only way of salvation that stands open; then the word [Damnation] in the 9 Article must mean something less, than what we usually understand by it: or else the Article must be salved by expounding some other word to an allay and lessening of the horrible sentence; and particularly the word [Deserves] of which I shall afterwards give account. Both these ways I follow. The first is the way of the Schoolmen.  
For they suppose the state of unbaptized Infants to be a poena damni; and they are confident enough to say that this may be well supposed without inferring their suffering the pains of hell. But this sentence of theirs I admit and explicate with some little difference of expression. For so far I admit this pain of loss, or rather a deficiency from going to Heaven, to be the consequence of Adam's sin, that by it we being left in meris Naturalibus, could never by these strengths alone have gone to Heaven. Now whereas your Lordship in behalf of those whom you suppose may be captious, is pleased to argue. That as loss of sight or eyes infers a state of darkness or blindness: so the loss of Heaven infers Hell; and if Infants go not to heaven in that state, whither can they go but to hell? and that's Damnation in the greatest sense. I grant it, that if in the event of things they do not go to Heaven (as things are now ordered) it is but too likely that they go to Hell: but I add, that as all darkness does not infer horror and distraction of mind, or fearful apparitions and phantasms: so neither does all Hell, or states in Hell infer all those torments which the Schoolmen signify by a poena sensus (for I speak now in pursuance of their way). So that there is no necessity of a third place; but it concludes only that in the state of separation from God's presence there is a great variety of degrees and kinds of evil, and every one is not the extreme: and yet by the way, let me observe, that Gregory Nazianzen and Nicetas taught that there is a third place for Infants and Heathens: and Irenaeus affirmed that the evils of Hell were not eternal to all, but to the Devils only and the greater criminals. But neither they nor we, nor any man else can tell whether Hell be a place or no. It is a state of evil; but whether all the damned be in one or in twenty places, we cannot tell.  
But I have no need to make use of any of this. For when I affirm that Infants being by Adam reduced and left to their mere natural state, fall short of Heaven; I do not say they cannot go to Heaven at all, but they cannot go thither by their natural powers, they cannot without a new grace and favour go to heaven. But than it cannot presently be inferred, that therefore they go to hell; but this aught to be inferred, which indeed was the real consequent of it; therefore it is necessary that God's Grace should supply this defect, if God intends Heaven to them at all; and because Nature cannot, God sent a Saviour by whom it was effected. But if it be asked, what if this grace had not come? and that it be said, that without God's grace they must have gone to Hell, because without it they could not go to Heaven? I answer, That we know how it is, now that God in his goodness hath made provisions for them: but if he had not made such provisions, what would have been we know not, any more than we know what would have followed, if Adam had not sinned; where he should have lived, and how long, and in what circumstances the posterity should have been provided for in all their possible contingencies. But yet, this I know, that it follows not, that if without this Grace we could not have gone to Heaven, that therefore we must have gone to Hel. For although the first was ordinarily impossible, yet the second was absolutely unjust, and against God's goodness, and therefore more impossible. But because the first could not be done by nature, God was pleased to promise and to give his grace, that he might bring us to that state whither he had designed. us, that is, to a supernatural felicity. If Adam had not fallen, yet Heaven had not been a natural consequent of his obedience, but a Gracious, it had been a gift still: and of Adam though he had persisted in innocence, it is true to say, that without God's Grace, that is, by the mere force of Nature, he could never have arrived to a Supernatural state, that is, to the joys of Heaven; and yet it does not follow, that if he had remained in Innocence, he must have gone to Hell. Just so it is in Infants, Hell was not made for man, but for Devils; and therefore it must be something besides mere Nature that can bear any man thither: mere Nature goes neither to Heaven nor Hell. So that when I say Infants naturally cannot go to Heaven, and that this is a punishment of Adam's sin, he being for it punished with a loss of his gracious condition, and devolved to the state of Nature, and we by him left so; my meaning is, that this Damnation which is of our Nature, is but negative, that is, as a consequent of our Patriarches sin, our Nature is left imperfect and deficient in order to a supernatural end, which the Schoolmen call a poena damni, but improperly: they indeed think it may be a real event, and final condition of persons as well as things: but I affirm it was an evil effect of Adam's sin: but in the event of things it became to the persons the way to a new grace, and hath no other event as to Heaven and Hell directly and immediately. In the same sense and to the same purpose I understand the word Damnation in the 9 Article.  
But the word [Damnation] may very well, truly, and sufficiently signify all the purposes of the Article, if it be taken only for the effect of that sentence which was inflicted upon Adam, and descended on his posterity, that is, for condemnation to Death, and the evils of mortality. So the word is used by S. Paul 1 Cor. 11.29. He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh Damnation to himself. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the word, but that it did particularly signify temporal death and evils, appears by the instances of probation in the next words, For, for this cause some are weak amongst you, some are sick, and some are fallen asleep. This also in the Article. Original Sin deserves damnation, that is, it justly brought in the angry sentence of God upon Man, it brought him to death, and deserved it: it brought it upon us, and deserved it too. I do not say that we by that sin deserved that death, neither can death be properly a punishment of us till we superadded some evil of our own; yet Adam's sin deserved it so, that it was justly left to fall upon us, we as a consequent and punishment of his sin being reduced to our natural portion. In odiosis quod minimum est sequimur. The lesser sense of the word is certainly agreeable to truth and reason: and it were good we used the word in that sense which may best warrant her doctrine, especially for that use of the word, having the precedent of Scripture.  
I am confirmed in this interpretation by the 2. §. of the Article: viz. of the remanency of concupiscence or Original Sin in the Regenerate. All the sinfulness of Original Sin is the lust or concupiscence, that is, the proneness to sin. Now than I demand, whether Concupiscence before actual consent be a sin or no? and if it be a sin, whether it deserves damnation? That all sin deserves damnation, I am sure our Church denies not. If therefore concupiscence before consent be a sin, than this also deserves damnation where ever it is: and if so, than a man may be damned for Original Sin even after Baptism. For even after Baptism, concupiscence (or the sinfulness of Original Sin) remains in the regenerate: and that which is the same thing, the same viciousness, the same enmity to God after Baptism, is as damnable, it deserves damnation as much as that did that went before. If it be replied, that Baptism takes off the guilt or formal part of it, but leaves the material part behind, that is, though concupiscence remains, yet it shall not bring damnation to the regenerate or Baptised. I answer, that though baptismal regeneration puts a man into a state of grace and favour, so that what went before shall not be imputed to him afterwards, that is, Adam's sin shall not bring damnation (in any sense) yet it hinders not, but that what is sinful afterwards shall be then imputed to him, that is, he may be damned for his own concupiscence. He is quitted from it as it came from Adam; but by Baptism he is not quitted from it, as it is subjected in himself, if (I say) concupiscence before consent be a sin. If it be no sin, then for it, Infants unbaptised cannot with justice be damned; it does not deserve damnation: but if it be a sin, than so long as it is there, so long it deserves damnation; and Baptism did only quit the relation of it to Adam (for that was all that went before it) but not the danger of the man. * But because the Article supposes that it does not damn the regenerate or baptised, and yet that it hath the nature of sin, it follows evidently and undeniably, that both the phrases are to be diminished and understood in a favourable sense. As the phrase [the Nature of sin] signifies; so does [Damnation] but [the Nature of sin] signifies something that brings no guilt, because it is affirmed to be in the Regenerate, therefore [Damnation] signifies something that brings no Hell: but [to deserve Damnation] must mean something less than ordinary, that is, that concupiscence is a thing not morally good, not to be allowed of, not to be nursed, but mortified, fought against, disapproved, condemned and disallowed of men as it is of God.  
And truly My Lord, to say that for Adam's sin it is just in God to condemn Infants to the eternal flames of Hell: and to say, that concupiscence or natural inclinations before they pass into any act, could bring eternal condemnation from God's presence into the eternal portion of Devils, are two such horrid propositions, that if any Church in the world would expressly affirm them, I for my part should think it unlawful to communicate with her in the defence or profession of either, and do think it would be the greatest temptation in the world to make men not to love God, of whom men so easily speak such horrid things. I would suppose the Article to mean any thing rather then either of these. But yet one thing more I have to say.  
The Article is certainly to be expounded according to the analogy of faith, and the express words of Scripture, if there be any that speak expressly in this matter. Now whereas the Article explicating Original Sin affirms it to be that fault or corruption of man's nature (vitium Naturae, not peccatum) by which he is far gone from original righteousness, and is inclined to evil: because this is not full enough, the Article adds by way of explanation [So that the flesh lusteth against the spirit] that is, it really produces a state of evil temptations: it lusteth, that is, actually and habitually; [it lusteth against the spirit, and therefore deserves God's wrath and damnation] So the Article: Therefore; for no other reason but because the flesh lusteth against the spirit; not because it can lust, or is apta nata to lust, but because it lusteth actually, therefore it deserves damnation: and this is Original Sin: or as the Article expresses it, it hath the nature of sin; it is the foams, or matter of sin, and is in the original of mankind, and derived from Adam as our body is, but it deserves not damnation in the highest sense of the word, till the concupiscence be actual. Till then, the words of [Wrath and Damnation] must be meant in the less and more easy signification, according to the former explication: and must only relate to the personal sin of Adam. To this sense of the Article I hearty subscribe. For besides the reasonableness of the thing, and the very manner of speaking used in the Article; it is the very same way of speaking, and exactly the same doctrine which we find in S. James, (Jam. 1.14.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Concupiscence, when it is impregnated, when it hath conceived, than it brings forth sin: and sin when it is in production, and birth, brings forth death. But in Infants, concupiscence is innocent and a virgin, it conceives not, and therefore is without sin, and therefore without death or damnation. * Against these expositions I cannot imagine what can be really and materially objected.  
But my Lord, I perceive the main outcry is like to be upon the authority of the Harmony of Confessions. Concerning which I shall say this, that in this Article the Harmony makes as good music as bells ringing backward; and they agree, especially when they come to be explicated and untwisted into their minute and explicit meanings, as much as Lutheran and Calvinist, as Papist and Protestant, as Thomas and Scotus, as Remonstrant and Dordrechtan, that is, as much as pro and con, or but a very little more. I have not the book with me here in prison, and this neighbourhood cannot supply me, and I dare not trust my memory to give a scheme of it: but your Lordship knows that in nothing more do the reformed Churches disagree, then in this and its appendages; and you are pleased to hint something of it, by saying that some speak more of this then the Church of England: and Andrew Rivet, though unwillingly, yet confesses, de Confessionibus nostris & earum syntagmate vel Harmonia, etiamsi in non nullis capitibus non planè conveniant, dicam tamen, melius in concordiam redigi posse quàm in Ecclesia Romana concordantiam discordantium Canonum, quo titulo decretum Gratiani, quod Canonistis regulas praefigit, solet infigniri. And what he affirms of the whole collection, is most notorious in the Article of Original Sin. For my own part I am ready to subscribe the first Helvetian confession, but not the second. So much difference there is in the confessions of the same Church.  
Now whereas your Lordship adds, that though they are fallible, yet when they bring evidence of holy Writ, their assertions are infallible, and not to be contradicted: I am bound to reply, that when they do so, whether they be infallible or no, I will believe them, because then though they might, yet they are not deceived. But as evidence of holy Writ had been sufficient without their authority: so without such evidence their authority is nothing. But then, My Lord, their citing and urging the words of S. Paul, Rom. 5.12. is so far from being an evident probation of their Article, that nothing is to me a surer argument of their fallibility, than the urging of that which evidently makes nothing for them, but much against them: As 1. Affirming expressly that death was the event of Adam's sin; the whole event, for it names no other; temporal death; according to that saying of S. Paul, 1 Cor. 15. In Adam we all die. And 2. Affirming this process of death to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is and aught to be taken to be the allay or condition of the condemnation. It became a punishment to them only who did sin; but upon them also inflicted for Adam 's sake.  
A like expression to which is in the Psalms, Psal. 106.32, 33. They angered him also at the waters of strife, so that he punished Moses for their sakes. Here was plainly a traduction of evil from the Nation to Moses their relative: For their sakes he was punished, but yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for as much as Moses had sinned: for so it follows, because they provoked his spirit, so that he spoke unadvisedly with his lips. So it is between Adam and us. He sinned and God was highly displeased. This displeasure went further than upon Adam's sin: for though that only was threatened with death, yet the sins of his children which were not so threatened, became so punished, and they were by nature heirs of wrath and damnation; that is, for his sake our sins inherited his curse. The curse that was specially and only threatened to him, we when we sinned did inherit for his sake. So that it is not so properly to be called, Original Sin, as an original curse upon our sin.  
To this purpose we have also another example of God transmitting the curse from one to another: Both were sinners, but one was the original of the curse or punishment. So said the Prophet to the wife of Jeroboam, 1 King. 14.16. [He shall give Israel up because of the sins of Jeroboam, who did sin, and who made Israel to sin] Jeroboam was the root of the sin and of the curse. Here it was also (that I may use the words of the Apostle) that by the sin of one man [Jeroboam] sin went out into all [Israel] and the curse, captivity, or death by sin, and so death went upon all men [of Israel] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in as much as all men [of Israel] have sinned. If these men had not sinned, they had not been punished: I cannot say they had not been afflicted; for David's child was smitten for his father's fault: but though they did sin, yet unless their root and principal had sinned, possibly they should not have so been punished: For his sake the punishment came. Upon the same account it may be, that we may inherit the damnation or curse for Adam's sake, though we deserve it; yet it being transmitted from Adam and not particularly threatened to the first posterity, we were his heirs, the heirs of death, deriving from him an original curse, but due also (if God so pleased) to our sins. And this is the full sense of the 12. verse, and the effect of the phrase 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
But your Lordship is pleased to object that though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does once signify [For as much as] yet three times it signifies in or by. To this I would be content to submit, if the observation could be verified, and be material when it were true. But besides that it is so used in 2 Cor. 5.4. your Lordship may please to see it used (as not only myself, but indeed most men, and particularly the Church of England does read it and expound it) in Mat. 26.50. And yet if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were written 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is the same with in or by, if it be rendered word for word, yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 twice in the Scripture signifies [for as much as] as you may read Rom. 8.3. & Heb. 2.18. So that here are two places besides this in question, and two more ex abundanti to show, that if it were not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but said in words expressly as you would have it in the meaning, yet even so neither the thing, nor any part of the thing could be evicted against me: and lastly, if it were not only said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but that that sense of it were admitted which is desired, and that it did mean in or by in this very place: yet the Question were not at all the nearer to be concluded against me. For I grant that it is true [in him we are all sinners] as it is true that [in him we all die] that is, for his sake we are used as sinners; being miserable really, but sinners in account and effect: as I have largely discoursed in my book. But then for the place here in question, it is so certain that it signifies the same thing (as our Church reads it) that it is not sense without it, but a violent breach of the period without precedent or reason. And after all; I have looked upon those places where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is said to signify in or by, and in one of them I find it so, Mar. 2.4. but in Act. 3.16. & Phil. 1.3. I find it not at all in any sense: but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indeed is used for in or by, in that of the Acts; and in the other it signifies, at or upon; but if all were granted that is pretended to, it no way prejudices my cause, as I have already proved.  
Next to these your Lordship seems a little more zealous and decretory in the Question upon the confidence of the 17, 18, & 19 verses of the 5. chapter to the Romans. The sum of which as your Lordship most ingeniously sums it up, is this. As by one many were made sinners: so by one many were made righteous, that by Adam, this by Christ. But by Christ we are made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 just, not by imputation only, but effectively and to real purposes; therefore by Adam we are really made sinners. And this your Lordship confirms by the observation of the sense of two words here used by the Apostle, The first is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies a sentence of guilt, or punishment for sin, and this sin to be theirs upon whom the condemnation comes, because God punishes none but for their own sin, Ezek. 18.2. From the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 clear from sin, so your Lordship renders it: and in opposition to this, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to be rendered, that is, guilty, criminal persons, really and properly. This is all which the wit of man can say from this place of S. Paul, and if I make it appear that this is invalid, I hope I am secure.  
To this then, I answer: That the Antithesis in these words here urged, (for there is another in the chapter) and this whole argument of S. Paul is full and entire without descending to minutes. Death came in by one man, much more shall life come by one man; if that by Adam, then much more this by Christ: by him to condemnation, by this man to justification. This is enough to verify the argument of S. Paul, though life and death did not come in the same manner to the several relatives; as indeed they did not: of which afterwards. But for the present: It runs thus. By Adam we were made sinners; by Christ we are made righteous: As certainly one as the other, though not in the same manner of dispensation. By Adam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 death reigned; by this man the reign of death shall be destroyed, and life set up in stead of it; by him we were used as sinners, for in him we died: but by Christ we are justified, that is, used as just persons, for by him we live. This is sufficient for the Apostles argument, and yet no necessity to affirm that we are sinners in Adam any more than by imputation: for we are by Christ made just no otherwise then by imputation.  
In the proof or persuasion I will use no indirect arguments, as to say, that to deny us to be just by imputation is the Doctrine of the Church of Rome and of the Socinian Conventicles, but expressly disliked by all the Lutheran, Calvinist, and Zuinglian Churches, and particularly by the Church of England, and indeed by the whole Harmony of Confessions: this I say, I will not make use of; not only because I myself do not love to be pressed by such prejudices rather then arguments; but because the question of the imputation of righteousness is very much mistaken and misunderstood on all hands. They that say that Christ's righteousness is imputed to us for justification, do it upon this account, because they know all that we do is imperfect, therefore they think themselves constrained to fly to Christ's righteousness, and think it must be imputed to us, or we perish. The other side, considering that this way would destroy the necessity of holy living; and that in order to our justification, there were conditions required on our parts, think it necessary to say that we are justified by inherent righteousness. Between these the truth is plain enough to be read. Thus:  
Christ's righteousness is not imputed to us for justification directly and immediately; neither can we be justified by our own righteousness: but our Faith and sincere endeavours are through Christ accepted in stead of legal righteousness: that is; we are justified through Christ, by imputation, not of Christ's, nor our own righteousness: but of our faith and endeavours of righteousness as if they were perfect: and we are justified by a Non-imputation, viz. of our past sins, and present unavoidable imperfections: that is, we are handled as if we were just persons and no sinners. So faith was imputed to Abraham for righteousness; not that it made him so, legally, but Evangelically, that is, by grace and imputation.  
And indeed My Lord, that I may speak freely in this great question: when one man hath sinned, his descendants and relatives, cannot possibly by him, or for him, or in him be made sinners properly and really. For in sin there are but two things imaginable: the irregular action; and the guilt, or obligation to punishment. Now we cannot in any sense be said to have done the action which another did, and not we: the action is as individual as the person; and Titius may as well be Cajus, and the Son be his own Father, as he can be said to have done the Father's action; and therefore we cannot possibly be guilty of it: for guilt is an obligation to punishment for having done it: the action and the guilt are relatives; one cannot be without the other: something must be done inwardly or outwardly, or there can be no guilt. * But then for the evil of punishment, that may pass further than the action. If it passes upon the innocent, it is not a punishment to them; but an evil inflicted by right of Dominion; but yet by reason of the relation of the afflicted to him that sinned, to him it is a punishment. But if it passes upon others that are not innocent, than it is a punishment to both; to the first principally; to the Descendants or Relatives, for the others sake; his sin being imputed so far.  
How far that is in the present case, and what it is, the Apostle expresses thus: It was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; vers. 18. or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vers. 16. a curse unto condemnation, or a judgement unto condemnation, that is, a curse inherited from the principal; deserved by him, and yet also actually descending upon us after we had sinned, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that is the judgement passed upon Adam; the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was on him; but it proved to be a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or a through condemnation when from him it passed upon all men that sinned. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sometimes differ in degrees: so the words are used by S. Paul otherwhere (1 Cor. 11.32.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; a judgement to prevent a punishment, or a less to forestall a greater in the same kind: so here the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 passed further; the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was fulfilled in his posterity passing on further, viz. that all who sinned should pass under the power of death as well as he: but this became formally and actually a punishment to them only who did sin personally: to them it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vers. 17. the reign of death; this is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vers. 21. the reign of sin in death: that is, the effect which Adam's sin had, was only to bring in the reign of death, which is already broken by Jesus Christ, and at last shall be quite destroyed. But to say that sin here is properly transmitted to us from Adam, formally, and so as to be inherent in us, is to say that we were made to do his action, which is a perfect contradiction.  
Now than your Lordship sees that what you note of the meaning of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I admit, and is indeed true enough, and agreeable to the discourse of the Apostle, and very much in justification of what I taught. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a punishment for sin, and this sin to be theirs upon whom the condemnation comes. I easily subscribe to it: but then take in the words of S. Paul, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by one sin, or by the sin of one the curse passed upon all men unto condemnation; that is, the curse descended from Adam; for his sake it was propagated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to a real condemnation, viz. when they should sin. For though this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the curse of death was threatened only to Adam, yet upon Gods being angry with him, God resolved it should descend: and if men did sin as Adam, or if they did sin at all, though less than Adam, yet the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the curse threatened to him should pass 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto the same actual condemnation which fell upon him, that is, it should actually bring them under the reign of death.  
But then my Lord, I beseech you let it be considered, if this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must suppose a punishment for sin, for the sin of him, his own sin that is so condemned, as your Lordship proves perfectly out of Ezek. 18. how can it be just that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 condemnation should pass upon us for Adam's sin, that is, not for his own sin who is so condemned, but for the sin of another? S. Paul easily resolves the doubt, if there had been any. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the reign of death passed upon all men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in as much as all men have sinned. And now why shall we suppose that we must be guilty of what we did not, when without any such 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 there is so much guilt of what we did really and personally? why shall it be that we die only for Adam's sin, and not rather as S. Paul expressly affirms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in as much as all men have sinned, since by your own argument it cannot be in as much as all men have not sinned; this you say cannot be, and yet you will not confess this which can be, and which S. Paul affirms to have been indeed: as if it were not more just and reasonable to say, that from Adam the curse descended unto the condemnation of the sins of the world, then to say the curse descended without consideration of their sins; but a sin must be imagined to make it seem reasonable and just to condemn us. [Now I submit it to the judgement of all the world, which way of arguing is most reasonable and concluding: You my Lord in behalf of others argue thus. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or condemnation cannot pass upon a man for any sin but his own: Therefore every man is truly guilty of Adam's sin, and that becomes his own. Against this I oppose mine. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or condemnation cannot pass upon a man for any sin but his own: therefore it did not pass upon man for Adam's fin; because Adam's sin, was Adam's, not our own: But we all have sinned, we have sins of our own, therefore for these the curse passed from Adam to us. To back mine, besides that common notices of sense and reason defend it, I have the plain words of S. Paul; Death passed upon all men, for as much as all men have sinned; all men, that is, the generality of mankind, all that lived till they could sin, the others that died before, died in their nature, not in their sin, neither Adam's nor their own, save only that Adam brought it in upon them, or rather left it to them, himself being disrobed of all that which could hinder it.  
Now for the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which your Lordship renders [clear from sin] I am sure no man is so justified in this world, as to be clear from sin; and if we all be sinners, and yet healed as just persons, it is certain we are just by imputation only, that is, Christ imputing our faith, and sincere, though not unerring obedience to us for righteousness: And then the Antithesis must hold thus; By Christ comes justification to life, as by Adam came the curse or the sin to the condemnation of death: But our justification which comes by Christ is by imputation and acceptilation, by grace and favour: not that we are made really, that is, legally and perfectly righteous, but by imputation of faith and obedience to us, as if it were perfect: And therefore Adam's sin was but by imputation only to certain purposes; not real, or proper, not formal or inherent. For the grace by Christ is more than the sin by Adam: if therefore that was not legal and proper, but Evangelical and gracious, favourable and imputative, much more is the sin of Adam in us improperly, and by imputation. * And truly my Lord, I think that no sound Divine of any of our Churches will say that we are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in any other sense: not that Christ's righteousness is imputed to us without any inherent graces in us, but that our imperfect services, our true faith and sincere endeavours of obedience are imputed to us for righteousness through Jesus Christ: and since it is certainly so, I am sure the Antithesis between Christ and Adam can never be salved by making us sinners really by Adam, and yet just or righteous by Christ only in acceptation and imputation. For than sin should abound more than grace; expressly against the honour of our blessed Saviour, the glory of our redemption, and the words of S. Paul. But rather on the contrary is it true, That though by Christ we were really and legally made perfectly righteous, it follows not that we were made sinners by Adam in the same manner and measure: for this similitude of S. Paul ought not to extend to an equality in all things; but still the advantage and prerogative, the abundance and the excess must be on the part of Grace: for if sin does abound, grace does much more abound; and we do more partake of righteousness by Christ, then of sin by Adam. Christ and Adam are the several fountains of emanation, and are compared aequè, but not aequaliter. Therefore this argument holds redundantly, since by Christ we are not made legally righteous, but by imputation only; much less are we made sinners by Adam. This in my sense is so infinitely far from being an objection, that it perfectly demonstrates the main question; and for my part I mean to rely upon it.  
As for that which your Lordship adds out of Rom. 5.19. That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies sinners, not by imitation, as the Pelagians dream, but sinners really and effectively; I shall not need to make any other reply; but that 1. I do not approve of that gloss of the Pelagians, that in Adam we are made sinners by imitation; and much less of that which affirms, we are made so properly and formally. But [made sinners] signifies, used like sinners; so as [justified] signifies healed like just persons: In which interpretation I follow S. Paul, not the Pelagians; they who are on the other side of the question, follow neither. And unless men take in their opinion before they read; and resolve not to understand S. Paul in this Epistle, I wonder why they should fancy that all that he says sounds that way which they commonly dream of: But as men fancy, so the Bells will ring. But I know your Lordship's grave and wiser judgement, sees not only this that I have now opened, but much beyond it, and that you will be a zealous advocate for the truth of God, and for the honour of his justice, wisdom and mercy.  
That which follows, makes me believe your Lordship resolved to try me, by speaking your own sense in the line, and your temptation in the interline. For when your Lordship had said that [My arguments for the vindication of God's goodness and justice are sound and holy] your hand run it over again and added [as abstracted from the case of Original Sin.] But why should this be abstracted from all the whole Oeconomy of God, from all his other dispensations? Is it in all cases of the world unjust for God, to impute our father's fins to us unto eternal condemnation; and is it otherwise in this only? Certainly a man would think this were the more favourable case; as being a single act, done but once, repent of after it was done, not consented to by the parties interested, not stipulated by God that it should be so, and being against all laws and all the reason of the world: therefore it were but reason that if any where, here much rather Gods justice and goodness should be relied upon as the measure of the event. * And if in other cases laws be never given to Idiots and Infants and persons uncapable, why should they be given here? but if they were not capable of a Law, then neither could they be of Sin; for where there is no law, there is no transgression. And is it unjust to condemn one man to hell for all the sin of a thousand of his Ancestors actually done by them? and shall it be accounted just to damn all the world for one sin of one man? But if it be said, that it is unjust to damn the innocent for the sin of another; but the world is not innocent, but really guilty in Adam. Besides that this is a begging of the question, it is also against common sense, to say that a man is not innocent of that which was done before he had a being; for if that be not sufficient, than it is impossible for a man to be innocent. And if this way of answer be admitted, any man may be damned for the sin of any Father; because it may be said here as well as there, that although the innocent must not perish for another's fault, yet the son is not innocent as being in his father's loins when the fault was committed, and the law calls him and makes him guilty. And if it were so indeed, this were so far from being an excuse, to say that the Law makes him guilty, that this were absolute tyranny, and the thing that were to be complained of.  
I hope, by this time your Lordship perceives, that I have no reason to fear that I prevaricate S. Paul's rule: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. I only endeavour to understand S. Paul's words, and I read them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in proportion to, and so as they may not entrench upon the reputation of God's goodness and justice: that's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be wise unto sobriety. But they that do so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to resolve it to be so whether God be honoured in it, or dishonoured, and to answer all arguments, whether they can or cannot be answered, and to efform all their Theology to the air of that one great proposition, and to find out ways for God to proceed in, which he hath never told of, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ways that are crooked and not to be insisted in, ways that are not right, if these men do not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than I hope I shall have less need to fear that I do, who do none of these things.  
And in proportion to my security here, I am confident that I am unconcerned in the consequent threatening. If any man shall Evangelize, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any other doctrine then what ye have received, something for Gospel which is not Gospel, something that ye have not received, let him be accursed. My Lord, if what I teach were not that which we have received, that God is just and righteous and true: that the soul that sins the same shall die: that we shall have no cause to say, The Fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge: that God is a gracious Father, pardoning iniquity, and therefore not exacting it where it is not: that Infants are from their Mother's wombs beloved of God their Father: that of such is the Kingdom of God: that he pities those souls who cannot discern the right hand from the left, as he declared in the case of the Ninevites: that to Infants there are special Angels appointed who always behold the face of God: that Christ took them in his arms and blessed them, and therefore they are not hated by God, and accursed heirs of Hell, and coheirs with Satan: that the Messiah was promised before any children were born; as certainly as that Adam sinned before they were born: that if sin abounds, grace does superabound; and therefore children are with greater effect involved in the grace than they could be in the sin: and the sin must be gone before it could do them mischief: if this were not the doctrine of both Testaments, and if the contrary were, than the threatening of S. Paul might well be held up against me: but else my Lord, to show such a Scorpion to him that speaks the truth of God in sincerity and humility, though it cannot make me to betray the truth and the honour of God, yet the very fear and affrightment which must needs seize upon every good man that does but behold it, or hear the words of that angry voice, shall and hath made me to pray not only that myself be preserved in truth, but that it would please God to bring into the way of truth all such as have erred and are deceived.  
My Lord, I humbly thank your Lordship for your grave and pious Council, and kiss the hand that reaches forth so paternal a rod. I see you are tender both of truth and me: and though I have not made this tedious reply to cause trouble to your Lordship, or to steal from you any part of your precious time, yet because I see your Lordship was persuaded endure personam, to give some little countenance to a popular error out of jealousy against a less usual truth, I thought it my duty to represent to your Lordship such things, by which as I can, so I ought to be defended against captious objectors. It is hard when men will not be patiented of truth, because another man offers it to them, and they did not first take it in, or if they did, were not pleased to own it.  
But from your Lordship I expect, and am sure to find the effects of your piety, wisdom and learning, and that an error for being popular shall not prevail against so necessary, though unobserved truth. A necessary truth I call it; because without this I do not understand how we can declare God's righteousness and justify him, with whom unrighteousness cannot dwell: But if men of a contrary opinion, can reconcile their usual doctrines of Original Sin with God's justice, and goodness and truth, I shall be well pleased with it, and think better of their doctrine then now I can.  
But until that be done, it were well (My Lord) if men would not trouble themselves or the Church with impertinent contradictions; but patiently give leave to have truth advanced, and God justified in his say and in his judgements, and the Church improved, and all errors confuted, that what did so prosperously begin the Reformation, may be admitted to bring it to perfection, that men may no longer go quâ itur, but quâ eundum est.   

The By of Rochester 's Letter to Dr. Taylor, with an account of the particulars there given in charge.  
WORTHY SIR,  
— Let me request you to weigh that of S. Paul, Ephes. 2.5. which are urged by some Ancients: and to remember, how often he calls Concupiscence Sin; whereby it is urged that although Baptism take away the guilt as concretively redounding to the person, yet the simple abstracted guilt, as to the Nature remains: for Sacraments are administered to Persons, not to Natures. I confess, I find not the Fathers so fully, and plainly speaking of Original Sin, till Pelagius had pudled the stream: but, after this, you may find S. Jerom in Hos. saying, In paradiso omnes praevaricati sunt in Adamo. And S. Ambrose in Rom. 1.5. Manifestum est omnes peccasse in Adam, quasi in massâ, ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores, quia ex eo sumus omnes; and as Greg. 39 Hom. in Ezek. Sine culpâ in mundo esse non potest, qui in mundum cum culpâ venit; But S. Austin is so frequent, so full and clear in his assertions, that his words & reasons will require your most judicious examinations, and more strict weighing of them; he saith epist. 107. Scimus secundùm Adam nos primâ nativitate contagium mortis contrahere; nec liberamur à supplicio mortis aeternae nisi per gratiam renascamur in Christo; Id. de verb. Apost. Ser. 4. peccatum à primo homine in omnes homines pertransiit, etenim illud peccatum non in fonte mansit, sed pertransiit, and Rom. 5. ubi te invenit? venundatum sub peccato, trahentem peccatum primi hominis, habentem peccatum antequam possis habere arbitrium. Id. de praedestin. & great. c. 2. Si infans unius diei non sit sine peccato, qui proprium habere non potuit, conficitur, ut illud traxerit alienum; de quo Apost. Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum; quod qui negat, negat profectò nos esse mortales; quoniam mors est poena peccati. Sequitur, necesse est, poena peccatum. Id. enchir. c. 9.29. Sola gratia redemptos discernit à perditis, quos in unam perditionis massam concreverat ab origine ducta communis contagio, Id. de peccator. mer. & remiss. l. 1. c. 3. Concupiscentia carnis peccatum est, quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis, Quid potest, aut potuit nasci ex servo, nisi servus? ideo sicut omnis homo ab Adamo est, ita & omnis homo per Adamum servus est peccati. Rom. 5. Falluntur ergo omnino, qui dicunt mortem solam, non & ●peccatum transiisse in genus humanum. Prosper. resp. ad articulum Augustino falsò impositum; Omnes homines praevaricationis reos, & damnationi obnoxios nasci periturosque nisi in Christo renascamur, asserimus. Tho. 12. q. 8. Secundum fidem Catholicam tenendum est, quod primum peccatum primi hominis, originaliter transit in posteros, propter quod etiam pueri mox nati deferuntur ad baptismum ab interiore culpâ abluendi. Contrarium est haeresis Pelag. unde peccatum quod sic à primo parente derivatur, dicitur Originale, sicut peccatum, quod ab animâ derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur actuale. Bonavent. in 2. sent. dist. 31. Sicut peccatum actuale tribuitur alicui ratione singularis personae: ita peccatum originale tribuitur ratione Naturae; corpus infectum traducitur, quia persona Adae infecit naturam, & natura infecit personam. Anima enim inficitur à carne per colligantiam, quum unita carni traxit ad se alterius proprietates. Lombar. 2. Sent. dist. 31. Peccatum originale per corruptionem carnis, in animâ fit: in vase enim dignoscitur vitium esse, quod vinum accescit.  
If you take into consideration the Covenant made between Almighty God and Adam as relating to his posterity, it may conduce to the satisfaction of those who urge it for a proof of Origial Sin. Now that the work may prosper under your hands to the manifestation of God's glory, the edification of the Church, and the satisfaction of all good Christians, is the hearty prayer of  
Your fellow Servant in our most Blessed Lord Christ Jesus. Jo. Roffens.  
My Lord,  
I Perceive that you have a great Charity to every one of the sons of the Church, that your Lordship refuses not to solicit their objections, and to take care that every man be answered that can make objections against my Doctrine; but as your charity makes you refuse no work or labour of love: so shall my duty and obedience make me ready to perform any commandment that can be relative to so excellent a principle.  
I am indeed sorry your Lordship is thus haunted with objections about the Question of Original Sin; but because you are pleased to hand them to me, I cannot think them so inconsiderable as in themselves they seem; for what your Lordship thinks worthy the reporting from others, I must think are fit to be answered and returned by me.  
In your Lordships of November, 10. these things I am to reply to:  
Let me request you to weigh that of S. Paul Ephes. 2.5. The words are these [Even when we were dead in sins, (God) hath quickened us together with Christ] which words I do not at all suppose relate to the matter of Original Sin, but to the state of Heathen sins, habitual Idolatries and impurities; in which the world was dead before the great Reformation by Christ. And I do not know any Expositor of note that suspects any other sense of it; and the second verse of that chapter makes it so certain and plain, that it is too visible to insist upon it longer. But your Lordship adds further.  
And to remember how often he calls concupiscence Sin] I know S. Paul reckons Concupiscence to be one of the works of the flesh, and consequently such as excludes from heaven, Col. 3.5. Evil concupiscence] concupiscence with something superadded, but certainly that is nothing that is natural; for God made nothing that is evil, and whatsoever is natural and necessary cannot be mortified; but this may and must, and the Apostle calls upon us to do it; but that this is a superinducing, and an actual or habitual lusting appears by the following words, vers. 7. in which ye also walked sometimes when ye lived in them, such a concupiscence as that which is the effect of habitual sins or an estate of sins, of which the Apostle speaks, Rom. 7.8. Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence; that is, so great a state of evil, such strong inclinations and desires to sin, that I grew as captive under it; it introduced a necessity like those in S. Peter, who had eyes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 full of an Adulteress: the women had possessed their eyes, and therefore they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they could not cease from sin: because having 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all concupiscence, that is the very spirit of sinful desires, they could relish nothing but the productions of sin, they could fancy nothing but Coloquintida and Toad-stools of the earth. * Once more I find S. Paul speaking of Concupiscence, 1 Thess. 4.5. Let every man knew to possess his vessel in holiness and honour, not in the lust of concupiscence, as do the Gentiles which know not God. In the lust of Concupiscence, that is plainly in lustfulness and impurity: for it is a Hebraism, where a superlative is usually expressed by the synonymon: as Lutum coeni; pluvia imbris; so the Gall of bitterness and the iniquity of sins; Robur virium; the blackness of darkness, that is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the outer darkness, or the greatest darkness: so here the lust of Concupiscence, that is, the vilest and basest of it. I know not where else that the Apostle uses the word in any sense. But the like is to be said of the word lust, which the Apostle often uses, for the habits produced or the pregnant desires, but never for the natural principle and affection, when he speaks of sin.  
But your Lordship is pleased to add a subtlety in pursuance of your former advices and notices, which I confess I shall never understand.  
Although Baptism take away the guilt as concretively redoundding to the person, yet the simple abstracted guilt as to the Nature remains; for Sacraments are administered to persons, not to natures] Thus I suppose those persons from whom your Lordship reports it, intended as an answer to a secret objection. For if Concupiscence be a sin, and yet remains after baptism, then what good does Baptism effect? But if it be no sin after, than it is no sin before. To this it is answered as you see: there is a double guilt; a guilt of person, and of nature. That is taken away, this is not: for, Sacraments are given to Persons, not to Natures.  
But first, where is there such a distinction set down in Scripture, or in the prime antiquity, or in any moral Philosopher? There is no humane nature but what is in the persons of men; and though our understanding can make a separate consideration of these, or rather consider a person in a double capacity, in his personal and in his natural, that is (if I am to speak sense) a person may be considered in that which is proper to him, and in that which is common to him and others; yet these two considerations cannot make two distinct subjects capable of such different events. I will put it to the trial.  
This guilt that is in nature, what is it? Is it the same thing that was in the person? that is, is it an obligation to punishment? If it be not, I know not the meaning of the word, and therefore I have nothing to do with it. If it be, then if this guilt or obligation to punishment remains in the nature after it is taken from the person, then if this concupiscence deserve damnation, this nature shall be damned, though the person be saved. Let the Objectors, my Lord, choose which they will. If it does not deserve damnation, why do they say it does? If it does, than the guilty may suffer what they deserve, but the innocent or the absolved must not; the person then being acquitted, and the nature not acquitted, the nature shall be damned and the person be saved.  
But if it be said that the guilt remains in the nature to certain purposes, but not to all; then I reply, so it does in the person; for it is in the person after Baptism, so as to be a perpetual possibility and proneness to sin, and a principle of trouble; and if it be no otherwise in the nature, than this distinction is to no purpose; if it be otherwise in the nature, than it brings damnation to it, when it brings none to the Man, and then the former argument must return. But whether it prevail or no, yet I cannot but note, that what is here affirmed is expressly against the words commonly attributed to S. Cyprian (De ablutione pedum) Sic abluit quos parentalis labes infecerat, ut nec actualis nec Originalis macula post ablutionem illam ulla sui vestigia derelinquat: How this supposing it of Baptism can be reconciled with the guilt remaining in the nature, I confess I cannot give an account. It is expressly against S. Austin (Tom. 9 Tract. 41. in Johan. epist. ad Ocean.) saying, deleta est tota iniquitas! expressly against S. Hierom, Quomodo justificati sumus & sanctificati, si peccatum aliquid in nobis relinquitur?  
But again (My Lord) I did suppose that Concupiscence or Original Sin had been founded in nature, and had not been a personal but a natural evil. I am sure, so the Article of our Church affirms; it is the fault and corruption of our Nature. And so S. Bonaventure affirms in the words cited by your Lordship in your Letter: Sicut peccatum actuale tribuitur alicui ratione singularis personae: ita peccatum origivis tribuitur ratione naturae. Either then the Sacrament must have effect upon our Nature, to purify that which is vitiated by Concupiscence, or else it does no good at all. For if the guilt or sin be founded in the nature, (as the Article affirms) and Baptism does not take off the guilt from the nature, than it does nothing.  
Now since your Lordship is pleased in the behalf of the objectors so warily to avoid what they thought pressing, I will take leave to use the advantages it ministers: for so the Serpent teaches us where to strike him, by his so warily and guiltily defending his head. I therefore argue thus.  
Either Baptism does not take off the guilt of Original Sin, or else there may be punishment where there is no guilt, or else natural death was not it which God threatened as the punishment of Adam's fact. For it is certain, that all men die as well after baptism as before; and more after then before. That which would be properly the consequent of this Dilemma, is this, that when God threatened death to Adam, saying, On the day thou eatest of the tree thou shalt die the death, he inflicted and intended to inflict the evils of a troublesome mortal life. For Adam did not die that day, but Adam began to be miserable that day, to live upon hard labour, to eat fruits from an accursed field, till he should return to the earth whence he was taken. (Gen. 3.17, 18, 19) So that death in the common sense of the word was to be the end of his labour, not so much the punishment of the sin. For it is probable he should have gone off from the scene of this world to a better, though he had not sinned; but if he had not sinned, he should not be so afflicted, and he should not have died daily till he had died finally, that is, till he had returned to his dust whence he was taken, and whither he would naturally have gone: and it is no new thing in Scripture that miseries and infelicities should be called dying or death. (Exod. 10.17. 1 Cor. 15.31. 2 Cor. 1.10. & 4.10, 11, 12. & 11.23.) But I only note this as probable; as not being willing to admit what the Socinians answer in this argument; who affirm that God threatening death to the Sin of Adam, meant death eternal: which is certainly not true; as we learn from the words of the Apostle, saying, In Adam we all die; which is not true of death eternal, but it is true of the miseries and calamities of mankind, and it is true of temporal death in the sense now explicated, and in that which is commonly received.  
But I add also this problem. That which would have been, had there been no sin, and that which remains when the sin or guiltiness is gone, is not properly the punishment of the sin. But dissolution of the soul and body should have been, if Adam had not sinned, for the world would have been too little to have entertained those myriads of men which must in all reason have been born from that blessing of Increase and multiply, which was given at the first Creation; and to have confined mankind to the pleasures of this world, in case he had not fallen, would have been a punishment of his innocence; but however, it might have been, though God had not been angry, and shall still be, even when the sin is taken off. The proper consequent of this will be, that when the Apostle says, Death came in by sin, and that Death is the wages of sin, he primarily and literally means the solemnities, and causes, and infelicities, and untimeliness of temporal death, and not merely the dissolution, which is directly no evil, but an inlet to a better state. But I infist not on this, but offer it to the consideration of inquisitive and modest persons.  
And now that I may return thither from whence this objection brought me; I consider, that if any should urge this argument to me:  
Baptism delivers from Original Sin.  
Baptism does not deliver from Concupiscence; therefore Concupiscence is not Original Sin.  
I did not know well what to answer; I could possibly say something to satisfy the boys & young men at a public disputation, but not to satisfy myself when I am upon my knees and giving an account to God of all my secret and hearty persuasions. But I consider, that by Concupiscence must be meant either the first inclinations to their object; or the proper acts of Election which are the second acts of Concupiscence. If the first inclinations be meant, then certainly that cannot be a sin which is natural, and which is necessary. For I consider that Concupiscence and natural desires are like hunger; which while it is natural and necessary, is not for the destruction but conservation of man; when it goes beyond the limits of nature, it is violent and a disease: and so is Concupiscence; But desires or lustings when they are taken for the natural propensity to their proper object, are so far from being a sin, that they are the instruments of felicity for this duration, and when they grow towards being irregular, they may, if we please, grow instruments of felicity in order to the other duration, because they may serve a virtue by being restrained; And to desire that to which all men tend naturally, is no more a sin then to desire to be happy is a sin: desire is no more a sin then joy or sorrow is: neither can it be fancied why one passion more than another can be in its whole nature Criminal; either all or none are so; when any of them grows irregular or inordinate, Joy is as bad as Desire, and Fear as bad as either.  
But if by Concupiscence we mean the second acts of it, that is, avoidable consentings, and deliberate elections, then let it be as much condemned as the Apostle and all the Church after him hath sentenced it; but than it is not Adam's sin, but our own by which we are condemned; for it is not his fault that we choose; If we choose, it is our own; if we choose not, it is no fault. For there is a natural act of the Will as well as of the Understanding, and in the choice of the supreme Good, and in the first apprehension of its proper object, the Will is as natural as any other faculty; and the other faculties have degrees of adherence as well as the Will: so have the potestative and intellective faculties; they are delighted in their best objects. But because these only are natural, and the will is natural sometimes, but not always, there it is that a difference can be.  
For I consider, if the first Concupiscence be a sin, Original Sin, (for actual it is not) and that this is properly, personally, and inherently our sin by traduction, that is, if our will be necessitated to sin by Adam's fall, as it must needs be if it can sin when it cannot deliberate, then there can be no reason told, why it is more a sin to will evil, then to understand it: and how does that which is moral differ from that which is natural? for the understanding is first and primely moved by its object, and in that motion by nothing else but by God, who moves all things: and if that which hath nothing else to move it but the object, yet is not free; it is strange that the will can in any sense be free, when it is necessitated by wisdom and by power, and by Adam, that is, from within and from without, besides what God and violence do and can do.  
But in this I have not only Scripture and all the reason of the world on my side, but the complying sentences of the most eminent writers of the Primitive Church; I need not trouble myself with citations of many of them, since Calvin (lib. 3. Instit. c. 3. § 10.) confesses that S. Austin hath collected their testimonies and is of their opinion, that Concupiscence is not a sin, but an infirmity only. But I will here set down the words of S. chrysostom (Homil. 13. in epist. Rom.) because they are very clear; Ipsae passiones in se peccatum non sunt Effraenata verò ipsarum immoderantia peccatum operata est. Concupiscentia quidem peccatum non est quando verò egressa modum foras eruperit, tunc demum adulterium sit, non à concupiscentia sed à nimio & illicito illius luxu.  
By the way I cannot but wonder why men are pleased, where ever they find the word Concupiscence in the New Testament, presently to dream of Original Sin, and make that to be the sum total of it; whereas Concupiscence if it were the product of Adam's fall, is but one small part of it; [Et ut exempli gratiae unam illarum tractem] said S. chrysostom in the forecited place; Concupiscence is but one of the passions, and in the utmost extension of the word, it can be taken but for one half of the passion; for not only all the passions of the Concupiscible faculty can be a principle of sin, but the Irascible does more hurt in the world; that is more sensual, this is more devilish. The reason why I note this, is because upon this account it will seem, that concupiscence is no more to be called a sin then anger is, and as S. Paul said, Be angry, but sin not; so he might have said, Desire, or lust, but sin not. For there are some lustings and desires without sin, as well as some Angers; and that which is indifferent to virtue and vice, cannot of itself be a vice; To which I add, that if Concupiscence taken for all desires be a sin, than so are all the passions of the Irascible faculty. Why one more than the other is not to be told, but that Anger in the first motions is not a sin, appears, because it is not always sinful in the second; a man may be actually angry, and yet really innocent: and so he may be lustful and full of desire, and yet he may be not only that which is good, or he may overcome his desires to that which is bad. I have now considered what your Lordship received from others, and gave me in charge yourself, concerning concupiscence.  
Your next charge is concerning Antiquity, intimating that although the first antiquity is not clearly against me, yet the second is. For thus your Lordship is pleased to write their objection [I confess I find not the Fathers so fully and plainly speaking of Original Sin, till Pelagius had pudled the stream; but after this you may find S. Jerom etc.]  
That the Fathers of the first 400 years did speak plainly and fully of it, is so evident as nothing more, and I appeal to their testimonies as they are set down in the papers annexed in their proper place; and therefore that must needs be one of the little arts by which some men use to escape from the pressure of that authority, by which because they would have other men concluded, sometimes upon strict inquiry they find themselves entangled. Original Sin as it is at this day commonly explicated, was not the Doctrine of the primitive Church; but when Pelagius had pudled the stream, S. Austin was so angry that he stamped and disturbed it more: and truly my Lord, I do not think that the Gentlemen that urged against me S. Austin's opinion, do well consider that I profess myself to follow those fathers who were before him; and whom S. Austin did forsake as I do him in the question. They may as well press me with his authority in the Article of the damnation of Infants dying unbaptised, or of absolute predestination. In which Article, S. Austin's words are equally urged by the Jansenists and Molinists, by the Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants, and they can serve both, and therefore cannot determine me. But then (My Lord) let it be remembered, that they are as much against S. chrysostom as I am against S. Austin, with this only difference; that S. chrysostom speaks constantly in the argument, which S. Austin did not, and particularly in that part of it which concerns Concupiscence. For in the inquiry, whether it be a sin or no; he speaks so variously, that though Calvin complains of him, that he calls it only an infirmity, yet he also brings testimonies from him to prove it to be a sin, and let any man try if he can tie these words together. (De peccator. mer. et remission. l. 1. c. 3.) Concupiscentia carnis peccatum est, quia inest illi in obedientia contra dominatum mentis. Which are the words your Lordship quotes: Concupiscence is a sin because it is a disobedience to the Empire of the spirit. But yet in another place; (lib. 1. de civet. Dei cap. 25.) Illa Concupiscentialis inobedientia quanto magis absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si absque culpa est in corpore dormientis? It is a sin and it is no sin, it is criminal, but is without fault; it is culpable because it is a disobedience, and yet this disobedience without actual consent is not culpable. If I do believe S. Austin, I must disbeleeve him; and which part soever I take, I shall be reproved by the same authority. But when the Fathers are divided from each other, or themselves, it is indifferent to follow either; but when any of them are divided from reason and Scripture, than it is not indifferent for us to follow them, and neglect these; and yet if these who object S. Austin's authority to my Doctrine, will be content to subject to all that he says, I am content they shall follow him in this too, provided that they will give me my liberty because I will not be tied to him that speaks contrary things to himself, and contrary to them that went before him; and though he was a rare person, yet he was as fallible as any of my brethren at this day. He was followed by many ignorant ages, and all the world knows by what accidental advantages he acquired a great reputation: but he who made no scruple of deserting all his predecessors, must give us leave upon the strength of his own reasons to quit his authority.  
All that I shall observe is this, that the Doctrine of Original Sin as it is explicated by S. Austin, had two parents; one was the Doctrine of the Encratites, and some other Heretics, who forbade Marriage, and supposing it to be evil, thought they were warranted to say, it was the bed ofsin, and children the spawn of vipers and sinners. And S. Austin himself, and especially S. Hierom (whom your Lordship citys) speaks some things of marriage, which if they were true, than marriage were highly to be refused, as being the increaser of sin rather than of children, and a semination in the flesh, and contrary to the spirit, and such a thing which being mingled with sin, produces univocal issues, the mother and the daughter are so like that they are the worse again. For if a proper inherent sin be effected by chaste marriages, than they are in this particular equal to adulterous embraces, and rather to be pardoned then allowed; and if all Concupiscence be vicious, than no marriage can be pure. These things it may be have not been so much considered, but your Lordship I know remembers strange say in S. Hierom, in Athenagoras, and in S. Austin, which possibly have been countenanced and maintained at the charge of this opinion. But the other parent of this is the zeal against the Pelagian Heresy, which did serve itself by saying too little in this Article, and therefore was thought fit to be confuted by saying too much; and that I conjecture right in this affair, I appeal to the words which I cited out of S. Austin in the matter of Concupiscence; concerning which he speaks the same thing that I do, when he is disengaged; as in his books De civitate Dei: but in his Tractate de peccatorum meritis & remissione, which was written in his heat against the Pelagians he speaks quite contrary. And who ever shall with observation read his one book of Original Sin against Pelagius, his two books de Nuptiis & Concupiscentia to Valerius, his three books to Marcellinus, de peccatorum meritis & remis●ione, his four books to Boniface, contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, his six books to Claudius against Julianus, and shall think himself bound to believe all that this excellent man wrote, will not only find it impossible he should, but will have reason to say, that zeal against an error is not always the best instrument to find out truth. The same complaint hath been made of others; and S. Jerome hath suffered deeply in the infirmity. I shall not therefore trouble your Lordship with giving particular answers to the words of S. Jerom and S. Ambrose, because (besides what I have already said) I do not think that their words are an argument fit to conclude against so much evidence, nor against a much less than that which I have every where brought in this Article, though indeed their words are capable of a fair interpretation, and besides the words quoted out of S. Ambrose are none of his; and for Aquinas, Lombard, and Bonaventure, your Lordship might as well press me with the opinion of Mr. Calvin, Knox and Buchannan, with the Synod of Dort, or the Scots Presbyteries: I know they are against me, and therefore I reprove them for it, but it is no disparagement to the truth, that other men are in error. And yet of all the Schoolmen, Bonaventure should lest have been urged against me, for the proverbs sake: for, Adam non peccavit in Bonaventura; Alexander of Hales would often say, that Adam never sinned in Bonaventure. But it may be he was not in earnest: no more am I  
The last thing your Lordship gives to me in charge in the behalf of the objectors, is that I would take into consideration the Covenant made between Almighty God and Adam, as relating to his posterity.  
To this I answer, that I know of no such thing; God made a covenant with Adam indeed, and used the right of his dominion over his posterity, and yet did nothing but what was just; but I find in Scripture no mention made of any such Covenant as is dreamt of about the matter of original sin: only the Covenant of works God did make with all men till Christ came; but he did never exact it after Adam; but for a Covenant that God should make with Adam, that if he stood, all his posterity should be I know not what; and if he fell, they should be in a damnable condition, of this (I say) there is nec vola nec vestigium in holy Scripture, that ever I could meet with: if there had been any such covenant, it had been but equity that to all the persons interessed it should have been communicated, and caution given to all who were to suffer, and abilities given to them to prevent the evil: for else it is not a Covenant with them, but a decree concerning them; and it is impossible that there should be a covenant made between two, when one of the parties knows nothing of it.  
I will enter no further into this enquiry, but only observe, that though there was no such covenant, yet the event that happened might without any such covenant have justly entered in at many doors. It is one thing to say that God by Adam's sin was moved to a severer intercourse with his posterity, for that is certainly true; and it is another thing to say that Adam's sin of itself did deserve all the evil that came actually upon his children; Death is the wages of sin, one death for one sin; but not 10000 millions for one sin; but therefore the Apostle affirms it to have descended on all, in as much as all men have sinned; But if from a sinning Parent a good child descends; the child's innocence will more prevail with God for kindness, than the father's sin shall prevail for trouble. Non omnia parentum peccata dii in liberos convertunt, sed siquis de malo nascitur bonus, tanquam benè affectus, corpore natus de morboso, is generis poena liberatur, tanquam ex improbitatis domo, in aliam familiam datus: qui vero morbo in similitudinem generis refertur atque redigitur vitiosi, ei nimirum convenit tanquam haeredi debitas poenas vitii persolvere, said Plutarch (De iis qui sero à Numine puniuntur. ex interpr. Cluserii.) God does not always make the father's sins descend upon the children. But if a good child is born of a bad father, like a healthful body from an ill affected one, he is freed from the punishment of his stock, and passes from the house of wickedness into another family. But he who inherits the disease, he also must be heir of the punishment; Quorum natura amplexa est cognatam malitiam, hos Justitia similitudinem pravitatis persequens supplicio affecit, if they pursue their kindred's wickedness, they shall be pursued by a cognation of judgement.  
Other ways there are by which it may come to pass that the sins of others may descend upon us. He that is author or the persuader, the minister or the helper, the approver or the follower, may derive the sins of others to himself, but than it is not their sins only, but our own too, and it is like a dead taper put to a burning light and held there, this derives light and flames from the other, and yet then hath it of its own, but they dwell together and make one body. These are the ways by which punishment can enter, but there are evils which are no punishments, and they may come upon more accounts, by God's Dominion, by natural consequence, by infection, by destitution and dereliction, for the glory of God, by right of authority, for the institution or exercise of the sufferers, or for their more immediate good.  
But that directly and properly one should be punished for the sins of others was indeed practised by some Commonwealths; Utilitatis specie saepissimè in repub. peccari, said Cicero, they do it sometimes for terror, and because their ways of preventing evil is very imperfect: and when Pedianus secundus the Praetor was killed by a slave, all the family of them was killed in punishment; this was secundum veterem morem said Tacit. (Annal. 14.) for in the slaughter of Marcellus the slaves fled for fear of such usage; it was thus, I say, among the Romans, but habuit aliquid iniqui, and God forbidden we should say such things of the fountain of Justice and mercy. But I have done, and will move no more stones, but hereafter carry them as long as I can, rather than make a noise by throwing them down; I shall only add this one thing: I was troubled with an objection lately; for it being propounded to me, why it is to be believed that the sin of Adam could spoil the nature of man, and yet the nature of Devils could not be spoiled by their sin which was worse; I could not well tell what to say, and therefore I held my peace.  
THE END.   

An Advertisement to the Reader.  
PAg. 8, & 9 there are seven lines misplaced, which are to be read thus: pag. 8. lin. 16. read, till the body was grown up to strength enough to infect it] [and in the whole process it must be an impossible thing, because the instrument which hath all its operations by the force of the principal agent, cannot of itself produce a great change and violent effect upon the principal agent] Besides all this, (I say) while one does not know how Original Sin can be derived, and another who thinks he can, names a wrong way, and both the ways infer it to be another kind of thing then all the Schools of learning teach: does it not too clearly demonstrate,—   


The names of several Treatises and Sermons written by Jer. Taylor D.D.  
1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Course of Sermons for all the Sundays in the year, together with a Discourse of the Divine Institution, Necessity and Separation of the Office Ministerial, in fol.  
2. Episcopacy asserted, in 4.  
3. The History of the Life and Death of the Ever-blessed Jesus Christ, 2. Edit. in fol.  
4. The Liberty of Prophesying, in 4.  
5. An Apology for authorised and Set forms of Liturgy, in 4.  
6. The Rule and Exercises of holy living, in 12.  
7. The Rule and Exercises of holy dying, in 12.  
8. The Golden Grove, or, A Manual of daily Prayers fitted to the days of the week, together with a short Method of Peace and Holiness.  
9 The Doctrine an practice of repentance rescued from popular Errors, in a large 8. Newly published.   

Books written by H. Hammond. D. D.  
A Paraphrase and Annotations upon all the Books of the New Test. by H. Hammond D.D. in fol.  
2. The Practical Catechism, with all other English Treatises of H. Hammond, D. D. in two volumes in 4.  
3. Dissertiones quatuor, quibus Episcopatus Jura ex S. Scriptures & primaeva Antiquitate adstruuntur, contra sententiam D. Blondelli & aliorum. Authore Henrico Hammond, in 4.  
4. A Letter of Resolution of six Queries, in 12.  
5. Of Schism. A Defence of the Church of England, against the Exceptions of the Romanists, in 12.  
6. Of Fundamentals in a notion referring to practice, by H. Hammond D. D. in 12.  
7. Six books of late Controversy in defence of the Church of England, in two volumes in 4. newly published.   

Books newly published.  
DOctor Cousins Devotions, in 12. The persecuted Ministry, by William Langley late of St. Mary's in the City of Lichfield, Minister, in 4.  
A Discourse of Auxiliary Beauty, or Artificial Handsomeness. In point of Conscience between two Ladies, in 8.  
Lyford's Legacy; or, an help to young People. Preparing them for the worthy receiving of the Lords Supper, in 12.  
The Principles of Holy Christian Religion: or the Catechism of the Church of England paraphrazed. By R. Sherlock B. D. at Borwick Hall in Lancashire, in 8.  
A Discourse. 1. Of the Holy Spirit of God, His Impressions and workings on the Souls of Men. 2. Of Divine Revelation, Mediate and Immediate. 3. Of Error, Heresy, and Schism: the Nature, Kinds, Causes, Reasons, and Dangers thereof: with directions for avoiding the same. By R. Sherlock, B. D. in 4.   
THE END.